

IPS 5038 (Aug 19 46)

33

(99)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

REQUEST FORM

August 19th 1946

INCIDENT - ACCUSED

JUDGE ALBERT WILLIAMS

Revised

Original attached.

The undersigned requests the consideration of Document # 5038 B (Describe):

Affidavit of Lt. Col. G.E. Ramsay

Territory: Burma and Siam

~~Duplicate as supplied (5038 B) to be copied.~~

excepts as marked.

Translate and duplicate as per copy attached (5038 B), pages 6 & 7

~~Duplicate as supplied (5038 B) to be copied.~~

Duplicate total off't. in English

for introduction in evidence (specify purpose)

Class B and C Offences

*Excepts slightly altered.
Please check 192 November*

R.S. DAVIES

Staff Attorney

August 19th 1946

TO THE DOCUMENT OFFICER:

The above document has been approved for processing by you with changes as follows:

*31 Oct
SK*

Albert Williams

Judge Albert Williams
Document Control Attorney

By _____
Secretary

cut stencil

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

31 Oct, 1946

TO: TRANSLATION GENERAL

Attached is Document No. 5038 B for Harris

Arrange for translation as follows:

Check Trans of excerpts as
marked on attached Eng copy -
old trans (Jap processed copy) attached.
Excerpts altered. Make corrections
on this Jap copy.

Dupl Jap only - complete re-do
Jap necessary, in any event, as
there are not enough copies in
vault, - probably there will be many
corrections and additions. Destroy
existing Jap copies in vault.

bx

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

Eng st sent to Dupl today

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

31 Oct

, 1946

TO : DUPLICATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 5038 B for Davis

Arrange for reproduction 135 copies in English and

 copies in Japanese as follows:

Eng Stencils as attached.

Destroy existing Eng copies
in vault.

Jap will follow upon completion
of trans.

SK

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

DOCUMENT DIVISION

1 Nov 1946

MIMEOGRAPH SECTION is requested to Run DOC. NO. 5038 B
requested by Davies in Eng No. of pages 2
No. of copies 135.

COMPLETED: Date 11-4 Signature Mugaton

VAULT: Date 11-4 Signature [Signature]

This receipt with two copies of this document attached to go to
Room 374, Miss Allen.

Duchko - Destroy existing Eng
copies of 5038 B.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST.
NO. 1.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ORS.
- AGAINST -
ARAKI, SADAQ, AND ORS.

I, GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY of SYDNEY in the State of New South Wales, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was NX34999, Lt. Col. George Ernest Ramsay, 2/30 Australian Infantry Battalion, when I became a P.O.W. at Singapore in February 1942. In April, 1942, I was transferred to 2/18 Battalion.
2. On reaching MERGUI on 24 May, 1942, it was obvious that no preparations had been made for our reception. The Japs evidently had been moving around looking for a camp site and finally had decided on the Mergui School.
3. The area was capable of holding about 600 to 800 with reasonable comfort but on arrival at MERGUI there were 500 United Kingdom troops from SUMATRA and I was told that I had to take command of the whole force - that was, there was to be a total of 1500 men in this school camp. A great number of the British troops had dysentery. Conditions for the first 10 days or more were very overcrowded; there was no proper sanitary accommodation; the waterlogged ground prevented the digging of more latrines. There were no hospital facilities. We had 17 deaths at Mergui - 12 British and 5 Australians.
4. Three men were shot at Mergui - Australians named Davies, Bell and Schubert. They allegedly tried to escape. I am satisfied that the first 2 did try; but the third man, Schubert, was only out trying to get some food. I made representations in each case to the Japanese commander, pointing out that it was contrary to the Conventions; he pointed out in his turn that he would place my representations before Major ITSUI, commander of the garrison for the whole area. I was assured that my representations were placed before the commander and I was informed that he (ITSUI) was quite adamant, and that the men were to be shot. They were shot. We were not present. They were taken away on a truck early one morning and we did not actually see them at any time. We were subsequently officially informed, verbally, that they had been shot. In the case of Schubert, I was assured that nothing would happen to him before I was seen again - that once more they were forwarding my representations to ITSUI, and then they told me that Schubert would not be shot until I had been notified. In his case, when he was first captured, he aggravated the offence by jumping out of the Jap guardroom window; had he not done that I might have been able to save him. In fact, the padre spoke to me one morning

and said he had passed a truck and Schubert was in it with his hands tied, and Schubert as the truck sped past had called out "Does the Colonel know they're going to shoot me?". I went up to the Jap commander's quarters and on the way there I heard a shot or shots. I reminded the commander of his promise that the man would not be shot without first notifying me, but he said that it could not have done any good, since ITSUI had ordered that Schubert had to be shot.

5. We got to Tavoy in late August or September, 1942. The camp consisted of mixed forces including 200 Dutch from the Netherlands East Indies. I was in Tavoy for about 4 months. Some men were caught whom the Japs alleged were stealing from the Jap stores. Two men were beaten - Minton and Gaut. Also Sgt. Goggin. They were taken away to Tavoy gaol. They reported to me on their return. There was a Jap sergeant in charge of the camp and he said he had no jurisdiction over the KEMPEI TAI. According to the story of the three men, they were tortured, and a Burmese assisted the Japs at the gaol. Minton was made to kneel with a pole tight in behind his knees and he was forced backwards, while a KEMPEI TAI Jap stood at one end of the pole and the Burmese on the other. They worked up and down at the ends of the pole, forcing it to move backwards, and roll in between his knees. A Jap officer stood in front of him and hit him back with a golf club each time he tried to lean forward to ease the pain. Gaut was punished in similar style, but in addition he had big weals across his back from a knotted rope - his back was hurt and when I last saw him he was not fully recovered from his back injury. I saw him about 2 years afterwards, the last time I saw him. I saw him immediately after the torture. Minton had red bruises behind his knees. Gaut's back was strained.

6. Men at Tavoy did aerodrome work. They were enlarging the drome. It was a military drome.

Sworn before me at Sydney

on the tenth day of September, 1946. /s/ G. E. Ramsay.

/s/ R. L. Deasey J.P.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

11-8, 1946.

TO:

Attached is Document No. 5038 B together with translated material which will be reproduced for you as a result of your request of 10-31, 1946.

It is requested that you review this material and return ALL of it to this office at the earliest practicable date. No further processing can be accomplished until this is done.

Any questions should be addressed to Allen, Room 374.

DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT

1st Ind.

TO: DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT

, 1946

Approved for reproduction when the following corrections have been made. (Must be indicated by page numbers. If no corrections, state NONE.)

NONE



Attorney

OK

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

CORRECTION SLIP

TO : *Davies*
FROM : *Allen*

DATE: *7 Nov.*
DOC. NO.: *5038B*

Language	Page No.	Line No.	Doc. now reads:	Suggested correction
				<i>None</i>

PP

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

13-11, 1946.

TO: DUPLICATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 3038 B for Mastyn.

Arrange for reproduction of 135 copies in English and 120 copies
in Japanese as follows:

Substitute ~~(Attach)~~ completed work (for) ~~(to)~~ existing processed
Document No. 3038 B (Jap)

Return original document to _____

Mastyn

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

DOCUMENT DIVISION

11-15 1946

MIMEOGRAPH SECTION is requested to run Document No. 5038 B
requested by Mootlyn in Jap No. of copies 120
No. of pages 6

COMPLETED: Date 11-15 Signature Nagatori

VAULT: Date 11-15 Signature Jmc

This receipt with one copy of this document attached to go to Room 364, Lieutenant Ohberg.

NOTE TO MR. NAGATORI:

NOTE TO MR. BUCHKO: ✓ Destroy existing Jap
copies of 5038 B -
~~NOTE TO MR. KAWAHIMA:~~
This is re-do.

Doc 5038 B


證據書類第五〇三八號 B

AF 582A

一、私ハ一九四二年／昭和十七年／二月ニ、シン
カボ^{Widdowson}イルデ捕虜トナリマシタ時、^{2/30}オーストラ
リア／*Antistation* / 歩兵大隊、NX三四九
九九、陸軍中佐ジョージ アイネスト ラムゼ
イ／*Erge Ernest Ramsey* / デアリマシタ。一九四二
年／昭和十七年／四月ニ、私ハ^{2/18}大隊ニ移サレ
マシタ。

二、一九四二年／昭和十七年／五月二十四日ニ、マ
ーグイ／*McGee* / ニ着キマシタガ、我々
ヲ受入レルベキ何ノ準備モ無カツタコトハ明瞭
デシタ。日本人ハ明カニ歩キ廻ツテ收容所ノ場
所ヲ探シテ居マシタガ最後ニマーグイ學校／
Margui School / ニ定メマシタ。

三、其ノ場所ハ六百人カラ八百人位相當ユツクリト
入り得ル所デシタカ、マーグイ／*McGee* /
ニ着イタ時ハ、スマトラ／*SUMATRA* / カ
ラ五百人ノ英國軍隊／聯合王國軍隊／カ來テ居
リ私ハ此全部隊ノ指揮ヲ取ラネバナラヌト言渡



Doc 5038B

サレマシタ。即チ、此ノ學校キャンプニ合計千五百人居タコトニナリマス。英兵ノ多クハ赤痢患者デシタ。最初ノ十日又ハモウ少シノ間ハ非常ニ混雜シタ状態デシタ。適當ナ衛生設備ハ有リマセンデシタ。此濕地帯ハモット便所ヲ掘ルコトヲ妨ゲマシタ。何等病院ノ施設カ有リマセンデシタ。マーグイ / 比田ロロ / ニ於テハ十七人ノ死亡者 / 十二人ノ英國人ト五人ノオーストラリア人トカ居リマシタ。

四、マーグイ Mengui デ三人射殺サレマシタ

ーオーストラリア人デ名ハデーヴィス /

Davies / *Bell* / 及シユ

ウベルト / *Schubert* / ト言ハマス。彼等ハ逃亡

ヲ試ミタノダト言ハレテイマシタ。

始メノ二人カ逃ゲヤウトシタコトハ領カレマス

カ三人目ノシュューベルト / *Schubert* / ハ只食物

ヲ取リニ行ク爲ニ出テ居タノデアリマス。事件

ハ條約ニ反シテ居ルカトテ私ハ日本ノ指揮官ニ

一々ノ件ニ關シテ抗議ヲ致シマシタ。彼ハソレ

ナラ此ノ全地域ノ守備隊ノ指揮官イツキ / *Stavi*

ノ少佐ニ私ノ申入レヲ廻ハスト言セマシタ。

2 *

Doc 5038 B

3*

私ハ私ノ申入カ同指揮官ニ廻附サレタコトヲ確
言サレマシタ、私ハ彼（イツキ）/ *Itami* / カ
全ク頑固デ、是等ノ兵違ガ殺サレルコトニナツ
タト告ゲラレマシタ。彼等ハ射タレマシタ。私
共ハ其所ニ居合ハセマセンデシタ。彼等ハ或朝
早ク、トラツクテ連レテ行カレ私共ハ實際モハ
ヤ彼等ヲ見マセンデシタ。私共ハ後デ正式ニ口
頭デ彼等カ射タレタコトヲ告ゲラレマシタ。シ
ユールト / *Schubert* / ニ關シテハ私カ又會
フ迄ハ彼ニ何事モ起ラヌデアラウトイフ事、更
ラニ重ネテ彼等ハ私ノ申入レヲイツキ / *Itami* /
ニ廻附シテ居ル所ダトイフコト、次イデ、シユ
ールト / *Schubert* / ニ關シテハ私ニ通告スル
迄彼ヲ殺サヌトイフコトヲ私ハ保證サレマシタ。
彼ノ場合ハ最初彼カ捕ツタ時、彼ハ日本兵ノ監
視室ノ窓カラ飛降りヤウトシタ此事カ罪ヲ尙重
クシタノデシタ。彼カ若シノウシナカツタチ私
ハ彼ヲ救フコトカ出來タカモ知レマセン。事實
神父ガアル朝私ニ話シテ聽カセテ吳レマシタカ
彼カ、トラツクノ傍ヲ通ツタ時シユールト /
Schubert / ハ彼ノ手ヲ結バラレテ其ノ中ニ居
リ、シユールト / *Schubert* / ハ、トラツクカ
走り過キタ時「彼等カ私ヲ射殺シニ行クノヲ大

Doc 5038B

佐へ知ツテ居ルノカ？。レト叫ンデ居タト云ツ
テ居マシタ。私へ日本人指揮官ノ宿舍ニ
行キノ途中デ私ハ銃ノ音ヲ一度カ二度聞キマ
シタ。私ハ指揮官ニ豫メ私ニ告ゲナイデ彼ヲ射
ツコトハシナイト云フ約束ニツイテ注意ヲ致シ
マシタ、然シ彼ハイツキ / H H U R H / ガシユ
I ベルト / Schulerst / ヲ射ツヤウ命令シテ來
タノデ、ドウスル事モ出來ナカツタト云ヒマシ
タ。

五、

私達ハ一九四二年 / 昭和十七年 / 八月ノ終リカ

九月ニタヴオイ / Jany / ニ移リマシタ。

キヤンプハ蘭領東印度 *Netherlands East Indies* /

カラノ二百人ノオランダ人ヲ含ム混合部隊デ出

來テ居リマシタ。私ハタヴオイ *Jany* / ニ

約四ヶ月居リマシタ。日本軍倉庫カラ品物ヲ盜

ンダ者ダト日本兵ガ云フテイタ數人ノ人ガ捕ツ

テ居マシタ。二人打タレマシタ *I Min* /

Tom / トガウト / *Gant* / デス。又ゴギン

/ *Goggin* / 軍曹モ打タレマシタ。彼等ハ、

タヴオイ / *Jany* / ノ牢獄ニ送ラレマシタ。

彼等ハ歸ツテカラ私ニ報告ヲシテ呉レマシタ。

ソノキヤンプノ主任ハ日本人軍曹デアリマシタ

カ彼ハ憲兵隊 / *H H U R H* / ニ對シ權

4 ★

限ハ持ツテ居ナイト語ツタ。三人ノ者ノ話ニ依
 レバ彼等ハ拷問ニ掛ケラレ且牢獄デハ、ビルマ
 人ガ日本兵ノ手傳ヒヲシテ居タトノコトデス。
 ミントン / *Minton* / ハ彼ノ膝ノ後ニ棒ヲシ
 ツカリト嵌メ込ミ跪カサレソシテ無理ニ後ニ反
 ラサレタリシ、其ノ間日本人憲兵 / *ド曰ヒ曰*
H H H H / 一人カ其棒ノ一端ニビルマ人ガ立ツ
 テ居タ。彼等ハ棒ノ兩端デ上下ニ動カシ棒ヲ逆
 ニ動カスヤウニシ、彼ノ膝間デグルグル廻スヤ
 ウニシタトノ事デス一人ノ日本人將校カ彼ノ前
 ニ立チ彼カ痛ミヲ樂ニスルヤウ前ノ方ニ凭タレ
 ルヤウニスル度ニゴルフノ棒デ彼ヲ打返シタト
 ノコトデス。ガウト / *Gaut* / モ亦同様ノ方法
 デ罰セラレタトノコトデスカ尙彼ハ結び目ノア
 ル繩ノ爲ニ出來タ大キナ鞭痕カ脊中ニ在リー彼
 ハ脊中ハ害ハシテ私カ彼ヲ最後ニ見タ時モ彼ノ
 脊中ノ怪我ハ十分ニ回復シテマセンデシタ。ソ
 レカラ二年後ニ彼ニ會ヒマシタガ、之カ彼ニ會
 ツタ最後デシタ。拷問ノ直後ニ彼ニ會ヒマシタ。
 ミントン / *Minton* / ハ膝ノ後ニ赤イ傷痕カアリ
 マシタ。ガウト / *Gaut* / ノ脊中ハ引キツ

6 *

Doc 5038B

テ居マシタ。

六、タヴオイ / *Gandy* / ノ兵達ハ飛行場ノ仕事ヲ
シテ居リマシタ。彼等ハ飛行場ヲ擴ゲル作業ヲ
シテ居マシタ。陸軍飛行場デアリマシタ。

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

REQUEST FORM

1946

INCIDENT - ACCUSED

JUDGE ALBERT WILLIAMS

The undersigned requests the consideration of Document # 5038
(describe):

2 Excerpts from records of evidence of Lt. Col. George Ernest Ramsay - ~~Singapore~~ Burma-Thailand Ry. and BURMA (Originals of records also herewith)

for introduction in evidence (specify purpose) **As to treatment of POW - Class B offense**

*2 Documents 5038 A
5038 B*

R. J. Davis

Staff Attorney

7 MAY 1946

2 May

1946

TO THE DOCUMENT OFFICER:

The above document has been approved for processing by you with changes as follows:

**Stencil -
70 copies available**

Albert Williams

Judge Albert Williams
Document Control Attorney

By

Boy

Secretary

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

REQUEST FORM

August 19th

1946

INCIDENT - ACCUSED

JUDGE ALBERT WILLIAMS

Approved

The undersigned requests the consideration of Document # 5038 A (Describe):

Affidavit of Lt. Col. G.E. Ramsay
Territory: Burma and Siam

Duplicate total of original Affidavit *excepts as marked*
Translate and duplicate ~~as per copy attached (5038 A), pages 42 - 45~~

~~The undersigned requests the consideration of Document # 5038 A (Describe):~~

for introduction in evidence (specify purpose)

Class B and C Offences

Excerpt slightly altered. Please check 1st paragraph

R.S. DAVIES

Staff Attorney

August 19th 1946

TO THE DOCUMENT OFFICER:

The above document has been approved for processing by you with changes as follows:

*31 Oct
SK ✓*

Albert Williams
Judge Albert Williams *lw*
Document Control Attorney

By _____
Secretary

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

31 Oct, 1946

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 503PH for Hannes

Arrange for translation as follows:

Check Trans. of excerpts
as marked on attached Eng
copy of affidavit - attached
Jap processed copy for aid.
Excerpts are altered.

Dupl: Jap re-do, best we
re-do completely since this was
done long ago & we don't have enough
copies. Also since there will be
corrections & additions since the
excerpt is altered. Best copy existing
Jap copies in Vault. BK

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

Eng sent to Dupl today.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

31 Oct , 1946

TO : DUPLICATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 5038A for Davies

Arrange for reproduction 135 copies in English and

 copies in Japanese as follows:

Dupl E It as attached
destroy all existing copies
of Eng 5038A 's. in vault.

Jap will follow when trans
completed.

SK

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

11-8, 1946.

TO:

Attached is Document No. 5038 A together with translated material which will be reproduced for you as a result of your request of 10-31, 1946.

It is requested that you review this material and return ALL of it to this office at the earliest practicable date. No further processing can be accomplished until this is done.

Any questions should be addressed to Allen, Room 374.

DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT

1st Ind.

TO: DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT

, 1946

Approved for reproduction when the following corrections have been made. (Must be indicated by page numbers. If no corrections, state NONE.)

NONE

Robert J. Mayer
Attorney

OK.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

CORRECTION SLIP

TO :

DATE:

8 Nov

FROM :

DOC. NO.:

5038A

Language	Page No.	Line No.	Doc. now reads:	Suggested correction
				None

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

18-11, 1946.

TO: DUPLICATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 5038 A for Mustyn.

Arrange for reproduction of ~~155 copies in English and 120~~ copies
in Japanese as follows:

Substitute ~~(Attach)~~ completed work (for) ~~(to)~~ existing processed
Document No. 5038 A.

Return original document to _____

WBN

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

DOCUMENT DIVISION

1 Nov 1946

MIMOGRAPH SECTION is requested to Run DOC. NO. 5038 A
requested by Davies in Eng No. of pages 4
No. of copies 135.

COMPLETED: Date 11-4 Signature Nagatori

VAULT: Date 11-5 Signature JFB

This receipt with two copies of this document attached to go to
Room 374, Miss Allen.

Buchko - Destroy existing
Eng copies of 5038 A.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

NO. 1.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and ors.

- AGAINST -

ARAKI, SADA0, and ors.

I, GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY of Sydney in the State of New South Wales, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was NX34999, Lt. Colonel George Ernest Ramsay, 2/30 Australian Infantry Battalion when I was captured by the Japanese at Singapore in February, 1942.
2. I was transferred to the 2/18 Battalion on a day in April, 1942. I left there with A Force which was a force of 3000 under Brigadier Varley. We were to move overseas to an unknown destination. I was in command of 1 Bn. of A Force. It consisted of about 850 all ranks. We embarked on the CELEBES MARU with 1000 troops which included my own 1 Bn and a detachment from the 2/4 CCS. The remaining 2000 embarked on the TOYASHI MARU under Brigadier Varley. Before leaving we were told that the force would go to the same destination as the other one but in fact 1000 men were dropped at Victoria Point on the extreme tip of lower Burma, and the next 1000 with me were dropped at MERGUI.
3. The remaining 1000 under Brigadier Varley were disembarked at TAVOY.
4. We got to Tavoy in late August or September, 1942. Brigadier Varley was still there with portion of the original 1000 but he was in a separate camp and I was denied official access to him.
5. On leaving TAVOY we moved to THANBUYZYAT by rail and also on foot. This was in December, 1942. Colonel NAGATOMO had his headquarters at THANBUYZYAT and when I was at THANBUYZYAT Brig. Varley had established his own headquarters there. He stayed in THANBUYZYAT for a night or two and then moved to 26 Kilo Camp. Hitherto we had been with Jap front line troops; but on arrival at 26 Kilo camp we had our first experience with Koreans as guards. They were pretty bad.
6. A Jap sergeant named FANATO was there; a Jap engineer officer also was there and they were insistent on a certain number of our men going out to work each day. I wrote to them several times and made verbal protests against the numbers of men being required and setting out the reasons why their requests were impossible of fulfilment. He threatened on several occasions, and did on several occasions parade the whole camp and selected the men himself. This was the Jap officer. We were sometimes, however, able to substitute

For these men other men whom the M.O. regarded as fitter than the ones picked out by the Jap officer. Throughout, the question of work quotas was one of daily dispute and trouble.

7. From 26 Kilo camp we moved to 75 Kilo camp, called MEILOE. There we struck a worse crowd of Korean guards than at 26 camp. There was a lot of indiscriminate bashing there though no serious injuries were sustained. The health of the men was poor. Men would be required to leave the camp early in the morning and would not return until 2 or 3 the next morning; then they would be compelled to leave again the same morning shortly after dawn. Occasionally protests to the Japs resulted in some of the men being given an extra hour or two of rest. The rainy season there, men often worked in mud up to their knees and they had no change of clothing. Meals were only fair.

8. The Jap engineer soldiers ill-treated the men a lot by hitting them with bamboos, their fists and rifle butts, through no fault of the men but due to the impatience of the Japs who could not understand that the men did not understand what was being required of them all of the time.

9. Jap Commander there was Lieut. HOSHI. I had my own force - Ramsay force and Flack and Green forces.

10. Korean guards apparently under instructions from the camp commander often forced men out to work. HOSHI would often promise that they would not be sent out without the concurrence of our M.Os but he failed to pass those instructions on to his Korean administrative staff apparently, anyway. So, when the work party was formed in the morning, he would not be available, and the Koreans would deny that they had received instructions from their commander. On one occasion I went up and found him in the grounds just as a party of our men just selected were being sent out. I reminded him of his promise, pointed out the men to him, and he ordered them back to camp. However, he seemed to take great care subsequently that he was never about the place when other parties were going out. In this camp we had about 10 deaths.

11. We moved to 105 Kilo camp, called AUNGANAUNG, in April or May 1943, and remained there for seven months. It was there we struck tropical ulcers pretty badly, a lot of the men getting them. There was a hospital back at 55 Kilo called the Death Camp. Some men were sent back there for amputation. There were over 100 amputation cases and some died after the operation. The M.Os. at 105 Kilo camp were Captains Cumming, Higgin, Anderson and White; they were all A.A.M.C. Our camp in strength varied between the 2000 and 2500 mark. Of my original force of 1000 men I lost 128; I put my deaths down at 15%. There were 158 deaths at the 105 Kilo camp from the mixed force in the seven months. There were instances of men being knocked about by the Japs and the Koreans with bamboos and other things, necessitating medical treatment. Koreans were particularly brutal. If they wanted to punish a man they would

strike him anywhere at all, and on half healed ulcers. They have kicked men on the shins and the shins had ulcers on them. I saw Japs screw a stick into a man's navel. Lt. HOSHI was commander there.

12. Ulcers extended from knee to ankle, exposing the shinbone for 8 or 9 inches. They went black. I have seen ulcers cover a whole foot. The question of iodiform was a pressing one throughout and once one of my men said he had been offered a small jar of iodiform by a Jap in exchange for his watch. He had been pestered several times to exchange his watch but as it was a present from his mother he did not want to let it go. However, in order to relieve his friend's suffering from ulcers he finally let it go for the bottle of iodiform from the Jap. I told the Jap Commander that the bottle could only have been obtained by illegal means by his men. The exchange was made in the presence of the Jap Commander. The iodiform was in a bottle about 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches by 3 inches. Our M.O. said there was enough in it to last several weeks. There was no label on it.

13. At the 105 camp there was a lot of dysentery and some malaria. We had 3 to 4 cholera deaths there. There were no medical supplies; we tried to get emetine from as far back as MERGUI but never could.

14. In December, 1943, after completion of the railway, we moved to TAMARKAN.

15. There was a statement that the railway had to be put down at all costs - responsibility for that was with Col. NAGATOMO, who was i/c of No. 3 Branch, which took in our A Force, and Co. Williams' force which had come from Java.

16. Later Col. NAKAMURA, who took Col. NAGATOMO'S place, spoke in similar terms. He said we were only a rabble army and that we were dependent on the Jap Imperial Army for our safety. NAGATOMO had once read out some such statement in Japanese and then his interpreter read it out in English. There are copies of this; copies were left with us.

17. NAGATOMO came out to the camp on one or two occasions, but did not go right through. At no time did he interview me in the latter stages, or ask if I had any complaints generally. Neither of these two Jap Commanders ensured that their instructions, whatever they were after I had had early interviews with them, were carried out. Perhaps they all of the time had no intention of giving these instructions. There always seemed to be a general desire on the part of Japanese Commanders to evade responsibility. Hoshi would send his batman out, if we called, to say Hoshi was indisposed and could not be disturbed. Once we arrived too quickly for him; we got onto the verandah of his cottage and through the window saw him just getting into bed, clothed, with his boots on. He came out subsequently and saw us. But that was

HIS dodge.

18. On 1 January, 1944, we reached TAMARKAN. It was alleged to be a rest camp. Food for the first few months was a considerable improvement on anything we had had. There were not many troops there when we arrived, but troops came all of the time out of the jungle from the jungle camps and by May there must have been about 5000 troops there.

19. There were constant irritation tactics and minor bashings. These were daily occurrences. At one time the camp commander was MATSUSAKI. No indication was ever given to me by the Japs of any change in their command there.

20. In August, 1944, the Japs re-organised their groups. Colonel Anderson, who had taken Frig. Varley's place, took over command from me.

21. There were some deaths at Tamarkan. In the "black month" we lost about 2 a day; we took dead bodies straight from the trucks. Dysentery and fever and malnutrition caused most of the deaths. We had no quinine or atabrin. There was a Jap M.O. at NAGATOMO's headquarters who occasionally visited the camp, and once more in their usual style they agreed that the men were very sick; but I was told by the commander later that the men were fit to work because his M.O. had so reported. The name of the Jap M.O. was HIGUCHI. The M.O. at Tamarkan was NOBOSAWA. I believe neither of them had any medical background. HIGUCHI was a dentist and NOBOSAWA a vet. Our senior M.O. was Col. Hamilton. For most of the time, before Col. Hamilton, Major Hobbs was our M.O. at TAMARKAN.

22. We remained at TAMARKAN until February, 1945, when they separated officers from Ors.

23. We were moved to KANBULI; a party of 3,000, including Australian, British, American and Dutch. All officers. They moved the officers on a 6-day trip by river and on foot to a new camp, and parties went in batches of 500. Five parties already had left at intervals of 5 days each. I reached BANGKOK on the night we were notified that the war was over. The camp site was on the other side of BANGKOK.

24. Lieut NITO, Chief of Staff of NAGATOMO, once visited our camp. Normally he had been drinking before his arrival. He told Major Green, Col. Black and me that he could promise us an honourable death, and that if things went bad he would shoot us himself. /

/s/ G. E. Ramsay.

TAKEN AND SWORN AT SYDNEY ON THE TENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER,
1946. BEFORE ME /s/ R. L. Deasey, J.P.

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余 ジョージ アーネスト ラムゼー

GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY

住所 ミーサウスウエールスカ シドニー市
ハ宣誓ノ上左ノ証言ヲ為ス

一千九百四十二年(昭和十七年)二月 ミニガポールニ
於テ日本軍ニ依リ捕虜トナリシトキ余 ジョージ
アーネスト ラムゼーハ 中佐ニシテ 濠州歩兵
ニ言ハ大隊ニ所属シ 標識番號 NX三
四九九九チアツク。

ニ余ハ千九百四十二年(昭和十七年)四月某日
ヲハ大隊ニ転属サセラレタ。余ハヴァーレイ
VARLEY 準將指揮下ノ兵カニ
A部隊ト共ニ 其處ヲ去リタ。

以下二頁ニ續ク

doc 5038A

我々ハ海ヲ越エ 某目的地へ移ルノテアツタ。
余ハA部隊ノ大隊ヲ指揮シテ居タ。此ノ部隊
ハ各階級ノモノ約八百五十名ヨリ成リ立ツテ居タ。
我々ハ余ノ大隊及ビ2/4戦線豫備病隊(C、
C、S)ノ分遣隊ヲ含ム一千ノ兵ト共ニセレベス丸
ニ乗船シタ。残余ノ二千名ハ MARKET 準將指
揮ノ下ニ、トセ之丸 / TOYASHIMARU =
乗船シタ。

出発スル前、此ノ隊ハ、モウ一ツノ隊ト同一目的地
ニ赴クノダト云ヒ聞カサレテ居タ。然シ實際
ノトコロ一千名ハ南部ビルマノ最先端ビクトリヤポイント
VICTORIA POINTニ下船サセラレ、ソシテ
余ヲ含ム爾余ノ一千名ハ、マダグワイ / MERGUY
テ下船シタ。

三、ヴァーレイ準將麾下ノ残余ノ一千名ハ、タボイ /
AVOY / 上陸セシメラレタ。

四、我々ハ一九四三年 / 昭和十七年 / 八月下旬乃至九月ニ、タボ
イニ到着シタ。ヴァーレイ準將ハ元ノ一千名ノ一部ト共ニ
未ダ其處ニ居タ。然シ彼ハ別ノキャンプニ居タ。余ハ
彼ニ対スル公式ノ接近ヲ拒否サレタ。

五、タボイヲ出発シテ、鉄道及ビ徒歩ニテ、サンバイテ
ヤット / THANNBUZZYAT = 移ツタ。時ニ一九四三年
/ 昭和十七年 / 十二月デアツタ。ナガトモ大佐 / NAGATO
MO / ハサンバイヤットニ彼ノ司令部ヲ設ケテ居タ。

No 2

ソニテ余カサンバイヂヤットニ居タ時、ガアレイ準將ハ彼自身ノ司令部ヲ其處ニ設置シタ。彼ハサンバイヂヤットニ一ニ夜滞在シテ後ニ十六キロキヤンプニ移動シタ。此ノ迄吾マハ日本軍ノ第一線部隊ト一緒ニ居タゲアルガニ十六キロキヤンプニ到着シテ監視トシテノ朝鮮人ヲ初メテ體驗シタ。彼等可成リ悪カヲ。六、其處ニハフアナト/FANATOト云フ日本人軍曹ガ居タ。日本人兵將杖モ一人居タガ、彼等ハ我マノ中ヨリ或ル人数ヲ毎日勞務ニ出ス様トノ要求ヲ固執シタ。余ハ彼等ニ対シ、數回書面ヲ送り、又屢次口頭ヲ以テ彼等ノ要求スル人数ニ対シ抗議ヲ爲シ、彼等ノ要求ヲ充タス事ノ不可能ナル理由ヲ述ベタ。彼ハ度々恐喝ニ出タ。又彼ハ度々全キヤンプヲ査閲シ自分テ人質ノ選擇ヲシタ。之ハ右ノ日本人將杖デアツタ。然レシ、我々ハ時々其ノ日本人將杖ノ選ニテ兵隊ノ代リニ我ガ軍醫ガヨリ適当ト認メタ兵ヲ以テ之ニ替ヘルコトガ出来タ。始終勞働割問題ガ日々ノ論争及ビ悩ミノ一ツデアツタ。

七、我々ハニ十六キロキヤンプカラマイロ山/MERLOEト呼バレテ居ルヤニ五キロキヤンプニ移動シタ。此處ニテ、ニ十六キロキヤンプ上ニ惡イ朝鮮人監視ノ一團ニ出合ツタ。重傷者ハ出サナカッタガ、無差別的ニ随分毆ラシタ。兵ノ健康状態ハ悪カッタ。兵ハ朝早クキヤンプヲ出発スルコトヲ要求サレ、翌朝ノ二時カ三時ニ到ル迄帰ツテ来ナカッタ。而モ其朝、夜ガ明ナルト間モナク又出発スルコトヲ強制サシタ。時々日本人ニ抗議ヲ申込ダシ結果、部下ノ一部者ハ一ニ時間余カニ休憩時間ヲ與ヘラシタ。同地ハ

雨期ニナツタ。兵ハ泥地ニ膝ヲ没シテ労働シタコトモ度々アツタ。而モ着換ノ衣履ヲ持ツテ居テ多ク。食事ハ僅カニ足リル程度デアツタ。

六 部下ニ過失ガアツタ譯デハナイニ聞ラズ、常ニ何ヲ要求サレテ居ルノカ知ルコトノ出来ナカッタ部下ノ立場ヲ了解出来ズ、短氣ニ爲メニ日本人兵達ハ行、養骨又ハ銃ノ床尾デ殴打シテ部下ヲ随分虐待シタ

九 同地ノ日本人指揮官ハ「ホシ」/HOSHII/中尉デアツタ。余ハ自分部隊、即チラハゼー隊及ビブラック/BLACK/隊トグリーン/GREEN/隊ヲ持ツテ居タ。

十 朝鮮人監視ハ、明ラカニキャンプノ指揮官ノ指図ニ従ツテ、屢々部下ニ労働ヲ強制シタ。「ホシ」/HOSHII/ハ屢々、我オノ軍醫向同意ナクシテハ彼等ニ労働サセナイト約束シテラ、之ヲ彼ノ朝鮮人事務担当者ニ通達シナカッタ。兎ニ角外見ハサウ見受ケラレタ。斯クシテ朝、作業隊ガ編成サレ時分ハ彼ハ何ノ足シモナラナカッタ。ソシテ朝鮮人達ハ彼等ノ指揮官カラ指図ヲ受ケテ居ルコトヲ否定シタ。一度、一度指名サレタ部下ノ一隊ガ作業ヲ送り出サレル其ノ場ニ彼ヲ見附ケタ。余ハ彼ノ約束ヲ彼ニ注意シ部下ヲ彼ニ指摘シタ。彼ハ部下ニキャンプニ歸ル様命令シタ。然レ其後ト云フモノハ、彼ハ作業隊ガ送り出サレル時ニハ決シテ其ノ附近ニ居合セナイ様ニ随分氣ヲ附ケテ居タ様ニ見受ケラレタ。此ノキャンプ

ヲ八十名バカリ死セシタ。

其
一九五二年ノ昭和二十八年ノ四月カ五月デアッタ。我々ハ「オウングウング」
/ Aungmyethazan / ト呼バレテ居ル一〇五キロキャンプニ移ツテ、
其處ニセケ月程居タ。我々ハ其處デ大分酷ク熱帯潰瘍ニ
カッタ。多数ノ兵等ガ之ニカッタ。死ノキャンプト呼バレテ居
ル五十五キロニハ病院ガアッタ。部下ノ中ニハ切断手術ヲ行フ爲
メニ其處ヘ送ラレタモノモ居タ。切断手術ヲ要スル患者ガ百以上其處
ニ居タ。或者ハ手術後死セシタ。一〇五キロキャンプノ軍醫ハ、
カミング / CUMMING / ヒギン / HIGGIN / アンダーソン / ANDERSON /
及ビホワイト / WHITE / ノ各大尉デアッタ。彼等ハ皆豪洲軍軍
醫西部 / A.A.M.C. / ノ人達デアッタ。我ガキャンプノ兵員ハ
二〇〇名乃至二、五〇〇名ノ間ヲ往來シテ居タ。元、一千名ヲ有シ
タ余ノ部隊デハ一三八名ヲ喪失シタ。余ハ余ノ部隊ノ死亡率ヲ
十五パーセントニ喰ヒ止メタ。一〇五キロキャンプデハセケ月間ニ混成部隊
ヨリ一五八名ノ死亡者ヲ出シタ。

我ガ兵ハ日本人及ビ朝鮮人ニ竹ヤ其ノ他デ打擲サレテ醫面ニ療
手當ヲ必要トサレタ幾多ノ例ガアッタ。朝鮮人ハ特ニ残虐デアッタ。
彼等ハ罰シヤウトスル者ニ対シテハ其ノ者ヲ所キラハス、半バニ癒リカケ
タ潰瘍ノ上ヲモ殴打シタ。彼等ハ我ガ兵ノ向脛ヲ、然モ潰瘍ヲ
ル向脛ヲ、蹴飛シタリシタコトモアル。日本人等ガ我兵ノ一人ノ脛ニ
棒ヲネジ込ムノヲ見タコトガアル。其處ノ指揮官ハ「ホシ」 / HOSHIE /
中尉デアッタ。

十二、潰瘍ハ膝カラ踝マテ擴ツテ、向脛ノ骨ガ八、九吋モ露出シタ。

其レが黒クナツタ。潰瘍ガ足全体ニ擴ツテ居ルノヲ見タコトガアル。
 ヨードホルムノ問題ハ始終緊急ノ問題デアッタ。部下ノ一人ハ日本人
 ガヨードホルムノ小サナ一壘ニ對シ時計ヲ交換シヨウト云フ條件ヲ研
 チ出シテ來タ、ト命ニ云ツタ。彼ハ度々彼ノ時計ヲ交換スル様セカ
 マレタガ、實際其ノ時計ハ彼ノ母親ノ贈物デアツタノテ手離シ度ク
 ハナカツタノデアル。然シ彼ハ戦友ガ潰瘍ニ苦ニテ居ルノヲ救フ爲メ
 遂ニ其ノ時計ヲ手離シテヨードホルムト交換シタ。余ハ日本人指
 揮官ニ對シ、其ノ壘ハ彼ノ部下ガ正規デナイ方故ニヨリテ辛クジテ手ニ入レ
 ル事ガ出來タノヲ告ゲタ。此ノ交換ハ其ノ日本人指揮官面前テ行
 ハレタノデアツタ。此ノヨードホルムハ至一吋半、長サ三吋位ノ壘ニツテ居タ。
 吾々ノ軍醫將校ハ之ヲケテ數週間ハ充分ニ間ニ合フト云ツテ居タ。壘ニハ
 レツテルガ貼ラレテ居ナカツタ。

十三、一〇五キャンブデハ、多數ノ赤痢患者ト、マラリヤ患者ガ若干居タ。
 コレヲテ死ニタ者モ三、四名居タ。藥品ノ支給ハナカツタ。後方遠ク
 マーグイ/Merrygoon/カラエメチンヲ得ヨウトシテ見タガ駄目デアツタ。

十四、一九四三年/昭和十八年/十二月、鉄道ノ完成後、我々ハ「タマルカン」
 /Tamarcan/ニ移ツタ。

十五、鉄道ハ如何ナル犠牲ヲ拂ワテモ敷設セネバナラヌト云フ聲明
 ガアツタ。其ノ責任ハ、我がA部隊ト「ジヤバ」カラ來タ「ウィリアムス」
 /WILLIAMS/大佐ノ部隊ヲ收容シテ居タ第三支所ノ指揮
 ニ當ツテ居タ「ナガトモ」/NAGATOMO/大佐ニ課セラレテ居タ。

十六、其ノ後、「ナガトモ」NAGATOMO大佐三代ツテ就任シタ
 中村大佐モ同じ口振りデアツタ。彼ハ我々ハ軍ニ烏合ノ衆
 ニ過ギナイト云ヒ、又我々ノ身ノ安全ハ日本帝國ノ軍隊ニ依
 存シテイルノダト云ワタ。一度、「ナガトモ」NAGATOMO
 大佐ガサウ云フ聲明ヲ日本語テ讀ミ上ケテ、彼ノ通譯
 ガ其レヲ英語テ讀ミ上ケタコトガアル。其ノ寫シガ若干
 殘ツテ居ル。其ノ寫シハ我々ニ渡サレタノデアアル。

十七、「ナガトモ」NAGATOMOハ、二度キヤンプニヤツテ來
 タコトガアルガ、全体ヲ見廻ラナカッタ。終頃ニナワテカラハ
 彼ハ余ニ一度モ會ワタコトモナケレバ、一般的ニ何カ許ヘルコト
 ハナイカト聞イタコトモナカッタ。余ガ初メ頃此兩名ニ會
 ワタ其ノ以後ニ發セラシタ指令ハ如何ナルモノデアツタ
 カハ知ラナイガ、此ノ日本人指揮官兩名共何レモ彼等ノ
 發シタ指令ハ実行サレルモノトハ保證シテ呉レナカッタ。
 恐ラク彼等ハ始メカラ終迄指令ヲ發シヤウトスル意
 志ガナカッタノカラウ。日本人指揮官等ハ何時モ責任
 ヲ免シヨウトバカリ思ツテ居タ様ニ思ハレル。面會ニ行ク
 ト、「ホシ」HOSHIIハ從卒ヲヨコシテ、氣分ガ悪イカラ
 静カニシテ居ナケレバナラヌト傳ヘサセタ。一度彼ノ所へ出掛
 ケルガ早過キタ爲メ、宿舎ノ縁側カラ窓越シニ度寢
 床ニ入ラントスルトコロヲ見附ケタ。服ヲ着タ儘、長靴ヲ
 履イテ居タ。サレバ彼ハ出テ來テ我々ニ會ワタ。然レ此
 レハ彼ノゴマカシデアツタ。

十八、一九四四年、昭和十九年、二月一日、我々ハタマルカンニ到着
 TAMARKAN

之ヲ。此處ハ休憩所ト稱サレテ居タ。最初ノ數ヶ月間ノ
食事ハ今マテ與ヘラシテ居タモノヨリハ大分良カワタ。我
々カ着イタ頃兵隊モ左程多クハ居ナカワタガ、ジヤンゲ
ルヤジヤンケルノ中ニ在ルキヤンポカフ續々絶エズヤワテ
末テ五月マデニハ之ガ約五千名ニ達シタト思フ。

十九

ミシホラシルソトビンタハ始終絶エナカワタ。毎日ノフトテ
アワタ。一時、キヤンポノ指揮ハ松崎 音譯 MATSUZAKI
ノカトワテ居タ。指揮官ノ変更ニ就イテハ日本人側カ
ラハ一度モ自分ニ知ラセカナカワタ。

二十

一九四四年昭和十九年ノ八月ニ日本兵ハ自分達ノ隊ノ
再編成ヲ実施シタ。ウアーレイ VARLEY 準將ノ地
位ヲ引継イダ。アンダーソン ANDERSON 大佐ハ余ノ
指揮權ヲ引継イダ。

二十一

「タマルカン」 Tamarkan 内ハ若干死亡者カ出タ。
暗黒ノ月 BLACK MONTH 二ハ一日ニ二名位失ワタ。

我々ハ死体ヲ直接貨物自動車カラ引取ワタ。此死セテ大
部分ハ赤痢、熱病及ビ栄養失調ニ基因スルモノカ
ワタ。我々ハキニーネモマテアリンモ持タナカワタ。ナガ
トモ NAGATOMO ノ本部ニハ日本人軍醫ガ入居
テ時折キヤンポヲ訪シタ。相変ラズ例ノ調子デ部下ハ
大分病弱デアルトイフ事ヲ肯定シタガ、後ニツテ指揮官ハ
余ニ對シ、軍醫ノ報告ニ依ルト、仕事ヲスルニハ差支ヘナイト事
ヲアワタ。此ノ日本人軍醫ノ名前ハ樋口 音譯 HIGUCHI
ノデアワタ。タマルカン Tamarkan ノ軍医ハ「ホサワ

NOBOSAWA / テアワタ。ニ人何シモ醫學的素養ハナカウタ
ヤウニ思フ。樋口 / HIGHUCHI / ハ齒科醫テアワタシホサウ / N
OBOSAWA / ハ獸醫テアワタ。我方ノ先任軍醫ハハミルトン / HA
MILTON / 大佐テアワタ。タマルカン / TamarKan / テハハミルトン / HA
MILTON / 大佐ノ前ハズフト / HOBBS / 少佐カ軍醫ヲ務
メテ居ラシタ。

二五、 我々ハ一九四五年昭和二十年二月彼等カ長 / OST / 將校ヲ別々
ニ分ケルマデ「タマルカン」 / TamarKan / ニ居タ。

二六、 我々臺灣、英、米、蘭ヲ合ムニ、三〇〇〇名ノ一行ハ「カンブリ」 / Ka
mbury / ニ移サシタ。全部將校テアワタ。彼等ハ將校達ヲ、河
川及ヒ徒歩ニヨリ、六日間ノ旅程デ新シイキャンプニ移動サ
セタ。五〇〇名ヅク一組トシテ出テ居タ。五組ハ各五日ノ
間隔ヲ置イテ既ニ出テ居タ。余ハ「バンコック」 / B
ANGKOK / ニ夜到着シタ。我々ハ戦多カ終ツタト通
告サシタ。キャンプノ位置ハ「バンコック」 / BANGKOK /
向側テアワタ。

二七、 「ナガトモ」 / Nagatom / ノ主任參謀「ニトウ」 / N
ITO / 中尉カ一度我々ノキャンプヲ訪ツレ
タ。彼カ来ル時ハ決ツテ酒ヲ飲ンテ居タ。
彼ハ「グリーン」 / Green / 少佐、
「ブラック」 / Black / 及余ニ對シ、立派ナ死
ヲ約速出スルト言ワタ。ソシテ、事態ガ
悪化シタラ彼自ラ我々ヲ射殺スルト云ツ
タ。

余 ジョージ アーネスト ラムゼー

GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY

住所 ミサウス ウェイルス カ シドニー 市

八宣 誓 の上 庄 の 証言 を 為 す

一 千九百四十二年 (昭和十七年) 二月 シニガポール =

於 テ 日 本 軍 隊 ヲ 捕 虜 ト ナリシトキ余 ガ ジョー

ジ アー ネ ス ト ラム ゼー ハ 中佐ニシテ 濠 洲 歩 兵

ラ グ 大 隊 ニ 所 属 シ 標 識 番 號 ノ N X 三

四 九 九 九 テ ア ツ ク

ニ 余 ハ 千九百四十二年 (昭和十七年) 四月 某日

ラ グ 大 隊 ニ 転 属 サ セ ラ レ タ 余 ハ グ ア ー レイ

ノ V A R L E Y ノ 準 將 指 揮 下 ノ 兵 カ ニ テ

ノ A 部 隊 ト 共 ニ 其 處 ヲ 在 リ タ

一 ト フ リ ン ト

以下二頁ニ續ク

我々ハ海ヲ越エタ某目的地へ移ルノテアツタ。
余ハA部隊ノ大隊ヲ指揮シテ居タ。此ノ部隊
ハ各階級ノモノ約八百五十名ヨリ成リ立ツテ居タ。
我々ハ余ノ大隊及ビ2/4戦線豫備病隊(C、
C、S)ノ分遣隊ヲ含ム一千ノ兵ト共ニセレベス丸
ニ乗船シタ。残余ノ二千名ハヴァアレーノ
指揮ヲ下ニトセシ丸ノTOYASHIMARUニ
乗船シタ。

出発スル前、此ノ隊ハ、モウツノ隊ト同一目的地
ニ赴クノダト云ヒ聞カサレテ居タ。然シ實際
ノトコロ一千名ハ南部ビルマノ最先端ビクトリヤポイント
VICTORIA POINTニ下船セシレ、ソシテ
余ヲ含ム爾余ノ一千名ハ、マリーグワイノMERGUYI
テ下船シタ。

三、ヴァアレーノ準將麾下ノ残余ノ一千名ハ、タボイノ
AVOYノニ上陸セシメラレタ。

四、我々ハ一九四三年ノ昭和十七年ノ八月下旬乃至九月ニ、タボ
イニ到着シタ。ヴァアレーノ準將ハ、一千名ノ一部ト共ニ
未ダ其處ニ居タ。然シ彼ハ別ノキャンプニ居タ。余ハ
彼ニ対スル公式ノ接近ヲ拒否セタ。

五、タボイヲ出発シテ、鉄道及ビ徒歩ニテ、サンバイチ
ヤットノTHANBUZZYATニ移ツタ。時ニ一九四三年
ノ昭和十七年ノ十二月デアツタ。ナガトモ大佐ノNAGATO
MOハ、サンバイチヤットニ彼ノ司令部ヲ設ケテ居タ。

ソシテ余がサンバイヂヤットニ居タ時、ヴァイレイ準將ハ彼自身ノ司令部ヲ其處ニ設置シタ。彼ハサンバイヂヤットニ一ニ駐在シテ後ニ十六キロキヤンプニ移動シタ。此ノ迄吾々ハ日本軍ノ第一線部隊ト一諾ニ居タゲアルガニ十六キロキヤンプニ到着シテ監視トシテノ朝鮮人ヲ初メ體驗シタ。彼等可成リ悪カタ。六、其處ニハ「フアナト」/「FANATO」ト云フ日本人軍曹ガ居タ。日本人兵將校モ一人居タガ、彼等ハ我々ノ中ヨリ或ル人数ヲ毎日勞務ニ出ス振トノ要求ヲ固執シタ。余ハ彼等ニ対シ、數回書面ヲ送り、又屢次口頭ヲ以テ彼等ノ要求スル人数ニ対シ抗議ヲ爲シ、彼等ノ要求ヲ充タス事ノ不可能ナル理由ヲ述ベタ。彼ハ度々恐喝ニ出タ。又彼ハ度々全キヤンプヲ査閲シ自分テ人質ノ選擇ヲシタ。之ハ右ノ日本人將校デアツタ。然ラシ、我々ハ時々其ノ日本人將校ノ選ニテ兵隊ノ代リニ我ガ軍醫ガヨリ適當ト認メタ兵ヲ以テ之ニ替ヘルコトガ出来タ。始終勞働割向頭ガ日々ノ論争及ビ惱ミノ一ツデアツタ。

七、我々ハニ十六キロキヤンプカラ「メイロ山」/「MEILOE」ト呼バレテ居ルヤ五キロキヤンプニ移動シタ。此處テ、ニ十六キロキヤンプニ至リ悪イ朝鮮人監視ノ團ニ出合ツタ。重傷者ハ出サナカッタガ、無差別的ニ随分殴ラレタ。兵ノ健康状態ハ悪カッタ。兵ハ朝早くキヤンプヲ出発スルコトヲ要求サレ、翌朝ノ二時カ三時ニ到ル迄帰ツテ来ナカッタ。而モ其朝、夜ガ明ケルト間モナク又出発スルコトヲ強制サレタ。時々日本人ニ抗議ヲ申込ダシテ結果、部下ノ一部ノ者ハ一ニ時間余カニ休憩時間ヲ與ヘラレタ。同地ハ

雨期ニナツタ。兵ハ泥地ニ膝ヲ没シテ労働シタコトモ度々アツタ。而モ着換ノ衣類ヲ持ツテ居ナク多ク。食事ハ僅カニ足ルル程度デアリタ。

ハ 部下ニ過失カアツタ譯デハナイニ聞ラズ、常ニ何ヲ要求サレテ居ルノカ知ルコトノ出来ナカッタ部下ノ立場ヲ了解出来ズ、短氣ニ爲テニ日本人兵達ハ竹、斧、骨又ハ銃ノ床尾デ殴打シテ部下ヲ随分虐待シタ

九 同地ノ日本人指揮官ハ「ホシ」/HOSHII/中尉デアッタ。余ハ自分部隊、即チラムゼー隊及ビブラック/BLACK/隊トグリーン/GREEN/隊ヲ持ツテ居タ。

十 朝鮮人監視ハ、明ラカニキャンプノ指揮官ノ指図ニ従ツテ、屢々部下ニ労働ヲ強制シタ。「ホシ」/HOSHII/ハ屢々、我オノ軍醫向意ナクシテハ彼等ニ労働サセナイト約束シテラ、之ヲ彼ノ朝鮮人事務担当者ニ通達シテカッタ。兎ニ角外見ハサウ見受ケラレタ。斯クシテ朝、作業隊ガ編成サレ時分ニ彼ハ何シノ足シモノナラナカッタ。コレテ朝鮮人達ハ彼等ノ指揮官カラ指図ヲ受ケテ居ルコトヲ定シタ。一度、一度指名サレタ部下ノ隊ガ作業ニ送り出サレ其ノ場ニ彼ヲ見附ケタ。余ハ彼ノ約束ヲ彼ニ注意シ部下ヲ彼ニ指摘シタ。彼ハ部下ニキャンプニ歸ル様命合シタ。然レ其後ト本フモノハ、彼ハ作業隊ガ送り出サレ時ニハ決シテ其ノ附近ニ居合セナイ様ニ随分氣ヲ附ケテ居タ様ニ見受ケラレタ。此ノキャンプ

テ八十名バカリ死セシタ。

其

一、五年ノ昭和十一年ノ四月カ五月デアッタ。我々ハ「オウング」
/ Aungmyethazan / ト呼バレテ居ル一〇五キロキャンプニ移ツテ、
其處ニセツ月程居タ。我々ハ其處テ大分酷ク熱帯潰瘍ニ
カ、ツタ。多数ノ兵等カ之ニカ、ツタ。死ノキャンプト呼バレテ居
ル五十五キロニハ病院ガアッタ。部下ノ中ニハ切断手術ヲ行フ属
メニ其處へ送ラレタモノモ居タ。切断手術ヲ要スル患者カ百以上其處
ニ居タ。或者ハ手術後死セシタ。一〇五キロキャンプノ軍醫ハ、

カミング / CUMMING / ヒギン / HIGGIN / アンダーソン / ANDERSON /
及ビホワイト / WHITE / ノ各大尉デアツタ。彼等ハ皆濠洲軍軍
醫部 / A.A.M.C. / ノ人達デアツタ。我カキャンプノ兵員ハ
二、〇〇〇名乃至二、五〇〇名ノ間ヲ往來シテ居タ。元、一千名ヲ有シ
タ余ノ部隊ハ一三八名ヲ喪失シタ。余ハ余ノ部隊ノ死ニ率ヲ
十五パーセントニ喰ヒ止メタ。一〇五キロキャンプデアセツ月間ニ混成部隊
ヨリ一五八名ノ死セ者ヲ出シタ。

我カ兵ハ日本人及ビ朝鮮人ニ竹ヤ其ノ他デ打擲サレテ毀面瘡
手當ヲ必要トサレタ幾多ノ例ガアッタ。朝鮮人ハ特ニ残虐デアッタ。
彼等ハ罰シヤウトスル者ニ対シテハ其ノ者ヲ所キラハス、半バ癒リカケ
タ潰瘍ノ上ヲモ殴打シタ。彼等ハ我カ兵ノ向脛ヲ、然モ潰瘍ヲ
ル向脛ヲ、蹴飛シタリシタコトモアル。日本人等ガ我兵ノ一人ノ臍ニ
棒ヲネジ込ムノヲ見タコトガアル。其處ノ指揮官ハ「ホシ」 / HOSH /
中尉デアッタ。

十二、潰瘍ハ膝カラ踝マデ擴ツテ、向脛ノ骨ガ八、九吋モ露出シタ。

其レガ患クナツタ。潰瘍ガ足全体ニ擴ツテ居ルノヲ見タコトガアル。

ヨードホルムノ問題ハ始終取急ノ問題デアッタ。部下ノ一人ハ日本人

ガヨードホルムノ小サナ一壺ニ對シ時計ヲ交換シヨウト云フ條件ヲ持

チ出シテ來タ、ト命ニ云ツタ。彼ハ度々彼ノ時計ヲ交換スル様セカ

マレタガ、實際其ノ時計ハ彼ノ母親ノ贈物デアツタノテ手離シ度ク

ハナカツタノデアル。然レ彼ハ戦友ガ潰瘍ニ苦ニテ居ルヲ救フ爲メ

遂ヒニ其ノ時計ヲ手離シテヨードホルムト交換シタ。余ハ日本人指

揮官ニ對シ、其ノ壺ハ彼ノ部下ガ正規デナイ方故ニヨリテ辛クシテ手ニ入レ

ル事ガ出来タノヲ告ゲタ。此ノ交換ハ其ノ日本人指揮官面前テ行

ハレタノデアッタ。此ノヨードホルムハ全一吋半、長サ三吋位ノ壺ニツテ居タ。

吾々ノ軍醫西將校ハ之ヲ數週間ハ充分ニ合フト云ツテ居タ。壺ニハ

シツテルガ貼ラレテ居ナカッタ。

十三、一〇五キャンブデハ、多數ノ赤痢患者ト、マラリヤ患者ガ若干居タ。

コレラテ死シタ者モ三、四名居タ。樂呂ノ支給ハナカッタ。後方遠ク

マイカイ/Merrygouli/カラエメチンヲ得ヨウトシテ見タガ駄目デアッタ。

十四、一九四三年/昭和十八年/十二月、鉄道ノ完成後、我々ハ「タマルカン

/Tamarkam/ニ移ツタ。

十五、鉄道ハ如何ナル犠牲ヲ拂ワテモ敷設セネバナラヌト云フ聲明

ガアツタ。其ノ責任ハ、我がA部隊ト「ジヤバ」カラ來タ「ウィリアムス」

/WILLIAMS/大佐ノ部隊ヲ收容シテ居タ第三支所ノ指揮

ニ當ツテ居タ「ナガトモ」/NAGATOMO/大佐ニ課セラレテ居タ。

十六、其ノ後、コナトモ/NAGATOMO大佐氏ツテ就任シタ

中村大佐モ同じ口振りデアッタ。彼ハ我々ハ軍ニ烏合ノ衆ニ過ギナイト云ヒ、又我々身ノ安全ハ日本帝國ノ軍隊ニ依存シテイルノダト云ツタ。一度、コナトモ/NAGATOMO大佐ガサウ云フ聲明ヲ日本語テ讀ミ上ケテ、彼ノ通譯ガ其レヲ英語テ讀ミ上ケタコトガアル。其ノ寫シガ若干残ツテ居ル。其ノ寫シハ我々ニ渡サレタノデアアル。

十七、コナトモ/NAGATOMOハ、二度キヤンプニヤツテ來

タコトガアルガ、全体ヲ見廻ラサカツタ。終頃ニオツテカラハ、彼ハ余ニ一度モ會ワツコトモナケレバ、一般的ニ何カ許ヘルコトハナイカト聞イタコトモナカツタ。余ガ初メ頃此兩名ニ會ワタ其ノ以後ニ發セラレタ指令ハ如何ナルモデアッタ。カハ知ラナイガ、此ノ日本人指揮官兩名共何レモ彼等ノ發シタ指令ハ実行サレルモノトハ保證シテ呉レサカツタ。恐ラク彼等ハ始メカラ終迄指令ヲ發シヤウトスル意志ガナカワタノカラウ。日本人指揮官等ハ何時モ責任ヲ免シヨウトバカリ思ツテ居タ様ニ思ハレル。面會ニ行クト、ホシ/HOSHIハ從卒ヲヨコシテ、氣分ガ悪イカラ静カニシテ居ナケレバナラヌト傳ヘサセタ。一度彼ノ所ヘ出掛ケルガ早過キタ爲メ、宿舎ノ縁側カラ窓越ニテ度寢床ニ入ラントスルトコロヲ見附ケタ。服ヲ着タ儘、長靴ヲ履イテ居タ、サレバ彼ハ出て來テ我々ニ會ワツタ。然レ此レハ彼ノゴマカシテアツタ。

十六、一九四四年/昭和十九年一月一日、我々ハタマルカンニ到着

TAMARCAN

ニタ。此處ハ休憩所ト稱サレテ居タ。最初ノ數ヶ月間ノ
食事ハ今マテ與ヘラシテ居タモノヨリハ大分良カワタ。我
々カ着イタ頃兵隊モ左程多クハ居ナカワタガ、ジヤンガ
ルヤジヤンガルノ中ニ在ルキヤンブカラ續々絶エズマワテ
末テ五月マデニハ之カ約五千名ニ達シタト思フ。

十九、
ジホラレルノトビシタハ始終絶エナカワタ。毎日ノコトデ
アワタ。一時、キヤンブノ指揮ハ松崎ノ音譯 MATSUZAKI
ノカトワテ居タ。指揮官ノ変更ニ就キテハ日本人側カ
ラハ一度モ自分ニ知ラセカナカワタ。

二十、
一九四四年昭和十九年ノ八月ニ日本兵ハ自分達ノ隊ノ
再編成ヲ實施シタ。ウァーレイノVARLEYノ准將ノ地
位ヲ引継イダ。アンドンソンノANDERSONノ大佐ハ余ノ
指揮權ヲ引継イダ。

二十一、
タマルカンノTamarikanノテハ若干死セ者カ出タ。
暗黒ノ月ノBLACK MONTHノニハ一日ニニ名位失ワタ。
我々ハ死体ヲ直接貨物自動車カラ引取ツタ。此死セノ大
部分ハ赤痢、熱病及ヒ瘧疾良失調ニ基因スルモノカ
ワタ。我々ハキニーネモマテプリンモ持タナカワタ。ナガ
トモノNAGATOMOノ本部ニハ日本人軍醫ガ居
テ時折キヤンブヲ訪シタ。相変ラズ例ノ調子デ部下ハ
大分病弱デアルトイフ事ヲ肯定シタガ、後ニツテ指揮官ハ
余ニ對シ軍醫ノ報告ニ依ルト、仕事ヲスルニ差支ヘナイケ事
デアワタ。此ノ日本人軍醫ノ名前ハ樋口ノ音譯 HIGUCHI
ノデアワタ。タマルカンノTamarikanノ軍医ハノホサワ

NOBOSAWA テアワタ。ニ何モ醫學的素養ハナカッタ
 ヤウニ思フ。樋口 HIGUCHI ハ齒科醫テアワタ。ホサワ N
 OBOSAWA ハ獸醫テアワタ。我方ノ先任軍醫ハハミルトン HA
 MILTON 大佐テアワタ。タマルカン Tamar Kan テハハミルトン HA
 MILTON 大佐ノ前ハ、ズフト、ホブズ HOBBS 少佐カ軍醫ヲ務
 メテ居ラレタ。

二五、我々一九四五年昭和二十年二月彼等カ兵 ORS 少將校ヲ別々
 ニ分ケルマデタマルカン Tamar Kan ニ居タ。

二六、我々壕、菜、米、蘭ヲ食ムニ、〇〇〇名ノ一行ハ、カンカリ Ka
 m Dwin ニ移サレタ。全部將校テアワタ。彼等ハ將校達ヲ、河
 川及ヒ徒歩ニヨリ、六日間ノ旅程ヲ新シイキヤンポニ移動サ
 セタ。五〇〇名ヅ、ヲ一組トシテ出發シタ。五組ハ各五日ノ
 間隔ヲ置イテ、既ニ出發シテ居タ。余ハ、バンコック B
 ANG KOK ニ夜到着シタ。我々ハ戦争カ終ワタト通
 告サレタ。キヤンポノ位置ハ、バンコック BANG KOK ノ
 向側テアワタ。

二七、ナガトモ NAGATOMO ノ主任參謀ヲニトウ N
 ITO 中尉ガ一度我々ノキヤンポヲ訪ツレ
 タ。彼ガ来る時ハ決ツテ酒ヲ飲ンテ居タ。
 彼ハ、グリーン少佐 Green、コアラウ
 ク大佐 Black 及余ニ對シ、立派ナ一死
 ヲ約束出來ルト言ワタ。ソシテ、事能ハカ
 悪化シタラ彼自ラ我々ヲ射殺スルト云ツ
 タ。

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

NO. 1.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and ors.

- AGAINST -

ARAKI, SADA0, and ors.

I, GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY of Sydney in the State of New South Wales, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was NX34999, Lt. Colonel George Ernest Ramsay, 2/30 Australian Infantry Battalion when I was captured by the Japanese at Singapore in February, 1942.

2. I was transferred to the 2/18 Battalion on a day in April, 1942. I left there with A Force which was a force of 3000 under Brigadier Varley. We were to move overseas to an unknown destination. I was in command of 1 Bn. of A Force. It consisted of about 850 all ranks. We embarked on the CELEBES MARU with 1000 troops which included my own 1 Bn and a detachment from the 2/4 CCS. The remaining 2000 embarked on the TOYASHI MARU under Brigadier Varley. Before leaving we were told that the force would go to the same destination as the other one but in fact 1000 men were dropped at Victoria Point on the extreme tip of lower Burma, and the next 1000 with me were dropped at MERGUI.

3. The remaining 1000 under Brigadier Varley were disembarked at TAVOY.

4. We got to Tavoy in late August or September, 1942. Brigadier Varley was still there with portion of the original 1000 but he was in a separate camp and I was denied official access to him.

5. On leaving TAVOY we moved to THANBUYZYAT by rail and also on foot. This was in December, 1942. Colonel NAGATOMO had his headquarters at THANBUYZYAT and when I was at THANBUYZYAT Brig. Varley had established his own headquarters there. He stayed in THANBUYZYAT for a night or two and then moved to 26 Kilo Camp. Hitherto we had been with Jap front line troops; but on arrival at 26 Kilo camp we had our first experience with Koreans as guards. They were pretty bad.

6. A Jap sergeant named FANATO was there; a Jap engineer officer also was there and they were insistent on a certain number of our men going out to work each day. I wrote to them several times and made verbal protests against the numbers of men being required and setting out the reasons why their requests were impossible of fulfilment. He threatened on several occasions, and did on several occasions parade the whole camp and selected the men himself. This was the Jap officer. We were sometimes, however, able to substitute

for these men other men whom the M.O. regarded as fitter than the ones picked out by the Jap officer. Throughout, the question of work quotas was one of daily dispute and trouble.

7. From 26 Kilo camp we moved to 75 Kilo camp, called MEILOE. There we struck a worse crowd of Korean guards than at 26 camp. There was a lot of indiscriminate bashing there though no serious injuries were sustained. The health of the men was poor. Men would be required to leave the camp early in the morning and would not return until 2 or 3 the next morning; then they would be compelled to leave again the same morning shortly after dawn. Occasionally protests to the Japs resulted in some of the men being given an extra hour or two of rest. The rainy season there, men often worked in mud up to their knees and they had no change of clothing. Meals were only fair.
8. The Jap engineer soldiers ill-treated the men a lot by hitting them with bamboos, their fists and rifle butts, through no fault of the men but due to the impatience of the Japs who could not understand that the men did not understand what was being required of them all of the time.
9. Jap Commander there was Lieut. HOSHI. I had my own force - Ramsay force and Black and Green forces.
10. Korean guards apparently under instructions from the camp commander often forced men out to work. HOSHI would often promise that they would not be sent out without the concurrence of our M.Os but he failed to pass those instructions on to his Korean administrative staff apparently, anyway. So, when the work party was formed in the morning, he would not be available, and the Koreans would deny that they had received instructions from their commander. On one occasion I went up and found him in the grounds just as a party of our men just selected were being sent out. I reminded him of his promise, pointed out the men to him, and he ordered them back to camp. However, he seemed to take great care subsequently that he was never about the place when other parties were going out. In this camp we had about 10 deaths.
11. We moved to 105 Kilo camp, called AUNGANAUNG, in April or May 1943, and remained there for seven months. It was there we struck tropical ulcers pretty badly, a lot of the men getting them. There was a hospital back at 55 Kilo called the Death Camp. Some men were sent back there for amputation. There were over 100 amputation cases and some died after the operation. The M.Os. at 105 Kilo camp were Captains Cumming, Higgin, Anderson and White; they were all A.A.M.C. Our camp in strength varied between the 2000 and 2500 mark. Of my original force of 1000 men I lost 128; I put my deaths down at 15%. There were 158 deaths at the 105 Kilo camp from the mixed force in the seven months. There were instances of men being knocked about by the Japs and the Koreans with bamboos and other things, necessitating medical treatment. Koreans were particularly brutal. If they wanted to punish a man they would

strike him anywhere at all, and on half healed ulcers. They have kicked men on the shins and the shins had ulcers on them. I saw Japs screw a stick into a man's navel. Lt. MOSHI was commander there.

12. Ulcers extended from knee to ankle, exposing the shinbone for 8 or 9 inches. They went black. I have seen ulcers cover a whole foot. The question of iodiform was a pressing one throughout and once one of my men said he had been offered a small jar of iodiform by a Jap in exchange for his watch. He had been pestered several times to exchange his watch but as it was a present from his mother he did not want to let it go. However, in order to relieve his friend's suffering from ulcers he finally let it go for the bottle of iodiform from the Jap. I told the Jap Commander that the bottle could only have been obtained by illegal means by his men. The exchange was made in the presence of the Jap Commander. The iodiform was in a bottle about 1 1/2 inches by 3 inches. Our M.O. said there was enough in it to last several weeks. There was no label on it.

13. At the 105 camp there was a lot of dysentery and some malaria. We had 3 to 4 cholera deaths there. There were no medical supplies; we tried to get emetine from as far back as MERGUI but never could.

14. In December, 1943, after completion of the railway, we moved to TAMARKAN.

15. There was a statement that the railway had to be put down at all costs - responsibility for that was with Col. NAGATOMO, who was i/c of No. 3 Branch, which took in our A Force, and Co. Williams' force which had come from Java.

16. Later Col. NAKAMURA, who took Col. NAGATOMO'S place, spoke in similar terms. He said we were only a rabble army and that we were dependent on the Jap Imperial Army for our safety. NAGATOMO had once read out some such statement in Japanese and then his interpreter read it out in English. There are copies of this; copies were left with us.

17. NAGATOMO came out to the camp on one or two occasions, but did not go right through. At no time did he interview me in the latter stages, or ask if I had any complaints generally. Neither of these two Jap Commanders ensured that their instructions, whatever they were after I had had early interviews with them, were carried out. Perhaps they all of the time had no intention of giving these instructions. There always seemed to be a general desire on the part of Japanese Commanders to evade responsibility. Hoski would send his batman out, if we called, to say Hoski was indisposed and could not be disturbed. Once we arrived too quickly for him; we got onto the verandah of his cottage and through the window saw him just getting into bed, clothed, with his boots on. He came out subsequently and saw us. But that was

HIS dodge.

18. On 1 January, 1944, we reached TAMARKAN. It was alleged to be a rest camp. Food for the first few months was a considerable improvement on anything we had had. There were not many troops there when we arrived, but troops came all of the time out of the jungle from the jungle camps and by May there must have been about 5000 troops there.

19. There were constant irritation tactics and minor bashings. These were daily occurrences. At one time the camp commander was MATSUSAKI. No indication was ever given to me by the Japs of any change in their command there.

20. In August, 1944, the Japs re-organised their groups. Colonel Anderson, who had taken Brig. Varley's place, took over command from me.

21. There were some deaths at Tamarkan. In the "black month" we lost about 2 a day; we took dead bodies straight from the trucks. Dysentery and fever and malnutrition caused most of the deaths. We had no quinine or atabrin. There was a Jap M.O. at NAGATOMO's headquarters who occasionally visited the camp, and once more in their usual style they agreed that the men were very sick; but I was told by the commander later that the men were fit to work because his M.O. had so reported. The name of the Jap M.O. was HIGUCHI. The M.O. at Tamarkan was NOBOSAWA. I believe neither of them had any medical background. HIGUCHI was a dentist and NOBOSAWA a vet. Our senior M.O. was Col. Hamilton. For most of the time, before Col. Hamilton, Major Hobbs was our M.O. at TAMARKAN.

22. We remained at TAMARKAN until February, 1945, when they separated officers from Ors.

23. We were moved to KANBURI; a party of 3,000, including Australian, British, American and Dutch. All officers. They moved the officers on a 6-day trip by river and on foot to a new camp, and parties went in batches of 500. Five parties already had left at intervals of 5 days each. I reached BANGKOK on the night we were notified that the war was over. The camp site was on the other side of BANGKOK.

24. Lieut NITO, Chief of Staff of NAGATOMO, once visited our camp. Normally he had been drinking before his arrival. He told Major Green, Col. Black and me that he could promise us an honourable death, and that if things went bad he would shoot us himself.

/s/ G. E. Ramsay.

TAKEN AND SWORN AT SYDNEY ON THE TENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER,
1946. BEFORE ME /s/ R. L. Deasey, J.P.

~~書証第五〇三號A~~

~~極東軍事裁判所~~

~~第一號~~

~~亞米合衆國其他~~

~~封~~

~~荒木貞夫 其他~~

~~余、ゲョーシ、アーネスト、ラムゼー~~

~~GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY~~

~~住所 ニューサウスウェールズ州シドニー市~~

~~ハ宣誓ノ上ニ在リ証言ヲ爲ス~~

~~一九四十二年(昭和十七年)三月 シンガポール~~

1052A

海老原

Translated by Ebihara
checked by Atita.

52

日本軍ニ依リ

ニ於テ捕虜トナリシトキ余カヨリシアーネスト

ラムゼーハ中佐ニシテ濠州歩兵ニシテ大隊ニ

所屬シ軍隊番號^{標識}NX三四九九デアワタ。

ニ余ハ千九百四十二年(昭和十七年)四月某日

ニ新大隊ニ轉屬サセラレタ。余ハヴァーレイ

✓ARLEY 准將指揮ト下キ兵力三千人^部隊ト共ニ

其處ヲ去ツタ

以下プリント

ジョージ、アーネスト、ラムゼー
自軍中佐デヨージ、アーネスト、ラムゼーハ宣誓
ノ上左ノ証言ヲス

余ノ軍隊番號ハN.E.三四九九九、階級中佐、
氏名ハデヨージ、アーネスト、ラムゼー、
所屬ハ二ノ一八 濠州歩兵六隊、元所屬ハ二ノ三〇
六隊

昭和十七年四月2/18 六隊ニ轉屬

本國ノ住所ハニューヨークウエールズシドニー市
クレモールン、ブライトモリア街八番地

余ハ昭和十七年二月シンガポールニ於テ捕虜トナ
ツタ

余ハ昭和十七年四月ノ以日2/13 六隊へ轉属トナ
タ。余ハヴァーレイ準將指揮ノ下ニ兵力三千ノ一
隊ト共ニ其處ヲ去ツタ

我々ハ海ヲ遊ユキ不明^{某目的}ノ地へ移ルノデアツタ。

余ハA部隊ノ第一六^部ヲ指揮シテ居タ。此ノ^部隊
ハ各階級ヲ通シ約五百五十名ヨリ成リ立ツテ居タ。我々ハ

余ノ大隊及ビ^{2/4}戰線豫備病隊(O、O、S)ノ分
遣隊ヲ含ム一千ノ兵力ト共ニセレベス丸ニ乗船シ

タ。我々ノ二千名ハヴァーレイ^{MARK}準將指揮ノ下ニ、
トヤシ丸~~TOYASHIMARU~~ニ乗船シタ。

出發スル前、此ノ隊ハ、モウ一ツノ隊ト同一目的
地ニ赴クノダト云ヒ聞カサレテ居タ。然シ實際ノ
トコロ一千名ハ南部ビルマノ最先端ピクトリヤ
ポイント VICTORIA、POINTニ下船セラレ
、ソシテ余ヲ含ム一千名ハ、MERG
UIデ下船シタ。ヴァレレイ準將指揮下ノ殘余ノ
一千名キ、TAVOYニ上陸セシメラレタ。
我々ハ昭和十七年八月下旬カ九月ニ、タボヤイ
ニ到着シタ。ヴァレレイ準將ハ本ノ一千名ノ一部ト
共ニ未ダ其處ニ居タ、然シ彼ハ別ノキャンプニ居
タ。余ハ彼ニ對スル公式接迎ヲ拒否サレタ。

五、タボイヲ出發シテ、鐵道及ビ徒歩ニテ、サンバイヂ
ヤット THANBUZYATニ移ツタ。時ニ昭和
十七年十二月デアツタ。

其後クンニイトクウエイ KUNKWITKWAYト
稱セラレテ居ル二十六キロキャンプニ移ツタ。ナ
ガオモ大佐 NAGATOMO、サンバイヂヤットニ彼指揮
司令部ヲ設テ居タ。ソシテ余ガサンバイヂヤット
ニ居タ時、ヴァレレイ準將ハ彼自身ノ司令部ヲ其處
ニ設テ居タ。吾々ハサンバイヂヤットニ一、二夜
滞在シテ後二十六キロキャンプニ移動シタ。此レ
迄吾々ハ日本軍ノ第一線部隊ト一齣ニ居タノデア
ルガ二十六キロキャンプニ到着シテ初メ整朝鮮人
ヲ警戒兵ト初體驗シタ。彼等ハ可成リ悪カツタ。

六

其處ニハ「フアナト」^{FRANATO}ト云フ日本人軍
 官ガ居タ。日本人工兵將校モ一人居タガ、彼等ハ我
 タノ中ヨリ或ル人数ヲ毎日勞務ニ出ス様強ヒテ要求
 セタ^{ヲ國執シ}。余ハ彼等ニ對シ、數回書ヲ送リ、又口頭ヲ以
 テ彼等ノ要求スル人数ニ對シ抗議ヲ爲シ、彼等ノ要
 求ヲ果ス事ノ不可能ナル理由ヲ述ベタ。彼ハ度々怒
 罵ニ出タ。又彼ハ度々^至キヤンプ全体ヲ物々シイ態度
 ヲ歩キ廻ツテ^{査閱シ}、自分テ人員ノ選擇ヲシタ。之ガ其ノ
 日本人將校デアツタ。然シ、我々ハ時々其ノ日本人
 將校ノ選ンダ兵隊ノ代リニ我が軍醫ガヨリ適當ト認
 メタ兵ヲ以テ之ニ替ヘルコトガ出來タ。始終勞働割
 當問口ガ日々ノ論争及ビ信ミノ一ツデアツタ。

七

我々ハ
 二十六キロキヤンプカラ一、メロロ^{MEI LODE}ト
 呼バレテ居ル七十五キロキヤンプニ移動シタ。此處
 デ、二十六キロキヤンプ以上ニ惡イ朝鮮人^{監視}兵ノ
 一團ニ出合ツタ。重傷者ハ出サナカツタガ、無差別
 的ニ随分毆ラレタ。兵ノ健康狀態ハ惡カツタ。兵ハ
 朝早くキヤンプヲ出發スルコトヲ要求サレ、翌朝ノ
 二時カ三時ニ到ル迄歸ツテ來ナカツタ。而モ^其申朝夜
 ガ明ケルト聞モナク又出發スルコトヲ強制サレタ。
 時々日本人ニ抗議ヲ申込シタ結果、部下ノ一部ノ者
 ハ一、二時間余分ニ休息時間ヲ與ヘラレタ。同地ハ

雨期ニナツタ。兵ハ泥地ニ膝ヲ没シテ勞働シタコ
トモ度々アツタ。而モ着換ノ衣類ヲ持ツテ居ナカ
ツタ。給養ハ概ネ良カツタ。モシタハ僅カニ足ル程度デアツタ。

八 部下ニ過失ガアツタ譯デハナイニ聞ラズ、常ニ
何ヲ要求サレテ居ルノカ知ルコトノ出来ナカツタ
部下ノ立場ヲ了解出来ズ、短氣ノ爲メニ日本人工
兵ハ竹、拳骨又ハ銃ノ尻尾板デ打ッテ部下ヲ隨
分虐待シタ。

九 同地ノ日本人指揮官ハ「ホシ」~~ノ~~ HOSHII 中
尉デアツタ。余ハ自分 部隊ヲムゼー隊~~及ヒ~~ブラッ
ク~~ノ~~ BLACK 隊トグリーン~~ノ~~ GREEN 隊ト
十 隊ヲ持ツテ居タ。

十 朝鮮人~~監視~~ 衛隊兵ハ、明ラカニキヤンプノ指揮官ノ
指圖ニ從ツテギハアルガ、屢々部下ニ勞働ヲ強制
シタ。一「ホシ」~~ノ~~ HOSHII ハ屢々、~~我~~ 部下ノ同意ナ
クシテハ彼等ニ勞働サセナイト約束シ乍ラ、之ヲ彼
朝鮮人~~事務~~ 執行部~~担当者~~ノ幹部ニ通告シナカツタ。兎ニ角外
見ハサウ見受ケラレタ。~~斯~~ 朝、作業隊ガ編
成サレル時分ニオルト、彼ハ彼ニ立ツテ呉レナカ
ツタ。朝鮮人~~ソシ~~ 連ハ上官カラ指圖ヲ受ケテ居ルコト
ヲ否定シタ。一度、丁度部下ガ連ヲサレカ~~作業~~ 作業ニ

其日本工兵等ハ我カ兵ニ過矢カ無カワタニ関ラス。唯

我カ兵等ガ常ニ何故^儘割サレテ居ルカ解ラヌ事實ヲ

日本兵ガヨク解ラヌ為メノ齒ガエサカラ竹、拳骨

又ハ銃ノ床尾板ヲ毆打シテ戦兵等ヲ羞侍シタ

送り出サレル其ノ場ニ彼ヲ見附ケタ。余ハ^彼結東ノ事ヲ^{彼ニ注意し}忠ヒ出サセテ其ノ部下ヲ彼ニ指捕シタ。彼ハ部下ニキヤンプニ歸ル様命令シタ。然シ其ノ後ト云フモノハ、彼ハ作業隊ガ送り出サレル時ニハ決シテ其ノ附近ニ居合セナイ様ニ随分氣ヲ附ケテ居タ様ニ見受ケラレタ。此ノキヤンプデハ十名バカリ死亡シタ。

十一
昭和十八年ノ四月カ五月デアツタ。我々ハ一オ

ウガノウングレ ~~Aunbeilbung~~ ト呼バレテ^ルル一〇五キロキヤンプニ移ツテ、其處ニ七ケ月^居居タ。其處デ大分^多酷^多熱帯^多瘧^多ニカ、ツタ。部下^{其ノ}キ^{其ノ}隊^{其ノ}分^{其ノ}之^{其ノ}ニ^{其ノ}カ、ツタ。死ノキヤンプト呼バレテ居ル五十五キロニハ病院ガアツタ。部下ノ中ニハ切斷手術ヲ行フ爲メニ其處ヘ送ラレタモノモ居タ。百以上^{其ノ}者^{其ノ}ガ^{其ノ}百^{其ノ}以上^{其ノ}其^{其ノ}處^{其ノ}ニ^{其ノ}居^{其ノ}タ^{其ノ}ガ、^{其ノ}攻^{其ノ}者^{其ノ}ハ^{其ノ}手^{其ノ}首^{其ノ}以上^{其ノ}切^{其ノ}斷^{其ノ}手^{其ノ}術^{其ノ}患^{其ノ}者^{其ノ}ガ^{其ノ}其^{其ノ}處^{其ノ}ニ^{其ノ}居^{其ノ}タ^{其ノ}ガ、^{其ノ}攻^{其ノ}者^{其ノ}ハ^{其ノ}手^{其ノ}術^{其ノ}後^{其ノ}死^{其ノ}亡^{其ノ}シ^{其ノ}タ。一〇五キロキヤンプノキヤン^{其ノ}部^{其ノ}ノ^{其ノ}兵^{其ノ}隊^{其ノ}ハ^{其ノ}二、〇〇〇名^{其ノ}乃^{其ノ}至^{其ノ}二、五〇〇名^{其ノ}ノ^{其ノ}間^{其ノ}ヲ^{其ノ}往^{其ノ}來^{其ノ}シ^{其ノ}テ^{其ノ}居^{其ノ}タ。元、一^{其ノ}千^{其ノ}名^{其ノ}ヲ^{其ノ}有^{其ノ}シ^{其ノ}タ^{其ノ}余^{其ノ}ノ^{其ノ}部^{其ノ}隊^{其ノ}キ^{其ノ}一^{其ノ}二^{其ノ}八^{其ノ}名^{其ノ}喪^{其ノ}失^{其ノ}シ^{其ノ}タ。余ハ^{其ノ}余^{其ノ}ノ^{其ノ}部^{其ノ}隊^{其ノ}ノ^{其ノ}死^{其ノ}亡^{其ノ}率^{其ノ}ヲ^{其ノ}一^{其ノ}五^{其ノ}百^{其ノ}一^{其ノ}セ^{其ノ}ン^{其ノ}ト^{其ノ}ニ^{其ノ}陰^{其ノ}ヒ^{其ノ}止^{其ノ}メ

CUMMINZ
カミング
HIGGIN
ヒギン
ANDERSON
アンダーソン
WHITE
ワイト
A.A.M.C.

大尉^{グレイ}ガ居タ。彼等ハ皆^{グレイ}濠洲軍^{グレイ}軍部^{グレイ}ノ人^{グレイ}達^{グレイ}デアツタ。我ガキヤンプノ兵^{グレイ}隊^{グレイ}ハ二、〇〇〇

〇名乃至二、五〇〇名ノ間ヲ往來シテ居タ。元、一千名ヲ有シタ余ノ部^{グレイ}隊^{グレイ}キ一^{グレイ}二^{グレイ}八^{グレイ}名^{グレイ}喪^{グレイ}失^{グレイ}シ^{グレイ}タ。余ハ余ノ部^{グレイ}隊^{グレイ}ノ死亡率ヲ一五百一セントニ陰ヒ止メ

8
タ。一〇五キロキヤンプデハ七ヶ月間ニ混成隊ヨ
リ一五八名ノ死亡者ヲ出シタ。

部^カ下ニハ日本人及ビ朝鮮人ニ竹ヤ其ノ他ヲ打キ
廻サレテ醫療手當ヲ必要トサレタ^{例ガキ}。朝
鮮人ハ特ニ強虐デアツタ。彼等ハ罰シヤウトスル
者ニ對シテハ其ノ者^イ所キラハズ、半^バ懲^{リカケタ}キ^イ潰瘍
ノ上ヲモ毆打シタ。彼等ハ部^カ下ノ向^カ區ヲ、然モ潰
瘍ノアル向^カ區ヲ、蹴飛シタリシタコトモアル。日
本人^カ集^カガ一人^カノ男^カノ厨^カイ中ニ木^カノ棒ヲネジ込ムノ
ヲ見タコトガアル。其處ノ指揮官ハ「ホシ」^カ H
O S H I 中尉デアツタ。

十一

潰瘍ハ膝カラ踝マデ潰ツテ、向^カ區ノ骨ガ八、九
吋^カモ露出シタ。其レガ黒クナツタ。潰瘍ガ足全体
ニ潰ツテ居ルノヲ見タコトガアル。ヨードホルム
ノ問題ハ始終緊急ノ問題デアツタ。部^カ下ノ一人ハ
日本人ガヨードホルムノ小サナ一袋ニ對シ時計ヲ
交換シヨウト云フ條件ヲ持テ出シテ來タ、ト余ニ
云ツ^カ來^カタ。部^カ下^カハ^カ屢々^カ時^カ計^カト^カイ^カ交^カ換^カヲ^カセ^カガ^カマ^カレ
タガ、實際其ノ時計ハ彼ノ母親ノ贈物デアツタノ
デ手離シ度クハナカツタノデアアル。然シ彼ハ戰友
ガ潰瘍ニ苦ンデ居ルノヲ救フ爲メ^カ其^カノ^カ時^カ計^カヲ^カ手
離シテヨードホルムト交換シタ。余ハ日本人指揮

9

正規デナイ方法ニヨリテ
一、辛フルテ

官ニ對シ、其ノ壕ハ彼ノ部下ガ本注ナ手段ヲ手ニ
入レタニ決ツテ居ルト告ゲタ。此ノ交換ハ其ノ日
本人指揮官ノ面前デ行ハレタノデアツタ。此ノヨ
ードホルムハ壕一ト五時^長高サ三時^位ノ壕ニ入ツテ
居タ。

吾々ノ軍醫將校ハ之ダケデ數日間ハ充分ニ間ニ合
フト云ツテ居タ。壕ニハレツテアルモ何ニモ貼ラレ
テ居ナカツタ。

十三、一〇五キヤンプデハ、赤痢患者ガ多^多數キ、マラ
リヤ患者^ガ若干居タ。コレラデ死ンダ者モ三、四
名居タ。藥品ノ支給ハナカツタ。後方道ク^カブル
グイ^カ Mergerui^カ ナチエメチンヲ得ヨウト
シテ見タガ歐目デアツタ。

十四、^{一九四三年}昭和十八年十二月、鐵道ノ完成後、^{我々ハ}一タマルカ
ン^カ (T a m a r k a n)^カ ニ移ツタ。

十五、鐵道ハ如何ナル犧牲ヲ拂ツテモ敷設セネバナラ
ヌト云フ聲明ガアツタ。其ノ責任ハ、我ガ^部隊ト
「ジャバ」カラ來タ「ウイリアムス」^カ W I L L
I A M S^カ 六佐ノ^部隊ヲ收容シテ居タ第三支隊^カノ指
揮ニ當ツテ居タ「ナガモ」^カ (N A G A T A M O)^カ
六佐ニ課セラレテ居タ。

十六

其ノ後、一ナガタモレ ~~NAGATAMO~~ 六
 佐ニ代ツテ航行シタ中村六佐モ同ジ口張リヤ人デ
 ナツタ。彼ハ、我々ハ單ニ馬合イテニ過ギナイト
 云ヒ、又我々ノ身ノ安全ハ日本帝國ノ宜長キ事ト
 ア居ルト云ツタ。一度、一ナガタモレ ~~NAGATA~~
 TAMO ~~六佐ガサウ云フ~~ 明ナコトヲ日本語デ讀
 ミ上ゲテ、彼ノ通譯ガ其レヲ英語デ讀ミ上ゲタコ
 トガアル。其ノ寫シガ ~~第~~ ツテ居ル。其ノ寫シハ我
 タニ渡サレタノデアアル。

十七、一ナガタモレ ~~NAGATAMO~~ ハ一、二度
 キヤンプニヤツテ來タコトガアルガ、全体ヲ見廻
 ラナカツタ。後 ~~終~~ 頃ニナツテカラハ、彼ハ余ニ一度
 モ會ツタコトモナケレバ、一般的ニ何カ ~~新~~ 本 ~~ハ~~ ナ
 イカトキ聞イタコトモ ~~カ~~ イ。余ガ初メ頃此ノ兩名
 ニ會ツタ、其ノ以後ニ發セラレタ指令ハ如何ナル
 モノデアツタカハ知ラナイガ、此ノ日本人指揮官
 兩名共何レモ彼等ノ發シタ指令ハ ~~行~~ サレルモノ
 トハ保證シテ呉レナカツタ。指令ヲ發シヤウトス
 ル意志ガ ~~全~~ 然ナカツタノダラウ。日本人指揮官
 ハ何時モ責任ヲ免レヨウトバカリ思ツテ居タ様ニ
 思ハレル。面會ニ行クト一ホシ ~~HOSH~~ I
 ハ從卒ヲヨコシテ、氣分ガ悪イカラ歸カニシテ居

敏達島に到着

ナケルムオラタ

オイト信へサセタ。一返信ヒニ行ツタガ、後ニト

ツチハ早ヤ過ギタ爲メ、宿舎ノ後側カラ窓越シニ

丁度寝床ニ入ラントスルトコロヲ見附ケタ。服ヲ

着タ儘、長靴ヲ履イテ居タ。サレバ彼ハ出テ來テ

我々ニ會ツタ。然シ此レハ彼ノ十ツノ手デアツタ。

一九四四年

十八、昭和十九年二月一日、我々ハタマルカント

ニ到着シタ。此處ハ休憩所ト稱サレテ

居タ。最初ノ數ヶ月間ノ給養ハ今マデ與ヘラレテ

居タモノヨリハ大分良カツタ。我々が着イタ頃兵

除モ左程多クハ居ナカツタガ、ジヤングルヤジヤ

ングルノ中ニ在ルキヤンプカラ續々絶エズヤツテ

來テ五月マデニハ五千名モ居タ。

十九、ジボラレルノトビンタハ始終絶エナカツタ。毎

日ノコトデアツタ。一時、キヤンプノ指揮ハ松崎

MATSUZAKIガトツテ居タ。指揮官ノ

變更ニ就イテハ、日本人側カラハ一度モ指

シカツタ。

二十、昭和十九年八月ニ日本人ハ自分達ノ隊ノ再編

成ヲ實施シタ。一、ヴァーレイ、VARLEY、

將ノ地位ヲ代ツタ。二、アンダーソン、ANDERSON

SON、大佐ハ余ノ指令權ヲ引繼イダ。

一九四四年

昭和十九年八月ニ日本人ハ自分達ノ隊ノ再編

成ヲ實施シタ。一、ヴァーレイ、VARLEY、

將ノ地位ヲ代ツタ。二、アンダーソン、ANDERSON

SON、大佐ハ余ノ指令權ヲ引繼イダ。

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昭和十九年八月ニ日本人ハ自分達ノ隊ノ再編

成ヲ實施シタ。一、ヴァーレイ、VARLEY、

將ノ地位ヲ代ツタ。二、アンダーソン、ANDERSON

SON、大佐ハ余ノ指令權ヲ引繼イダ。

一九四四年

昭和十九年八月ニ日本人ハ自分達ノ隊ノ再編

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SON、大佐ハ余ノ指令權ヲ引繼イダ。

一九四四年

昭和十九年八月ニ日本人ハ自分達ノ隊ノ再編

成ヲ實施シタ。一、ヴァーレイ、VARLEY、

將ノ地位ヲ代ツタ。二、アンダーソン、ANDERSON

SON、大佐ハ余ノ指令權ヲ引繼イダ。

「タマルカン」(Tamarikal) デハ若干死亡者
 が出タ。暗黒ナル月(BLACKMONTH)ニハ一日
 ニ二名位失ツタ。我々ハ死体ヲ直接賞物自動車カ
 ラ引取ツタ。^{此死七ノ大部命ハ}赤痢、熱病及ビ榮養失調^{ニ基}ヲ死因^{トス}
 主スルモノダツタ。我々ハキニーネモアテブリ
 ンモ持タナカッタ。一ナガ及モ^ト「NAGATAMO」
 指令部ニハ日本人軍醫ガ一人居^テタ^リ時折キヤンブ
 ヲ訪レタ。相變ラズ例^キテ部下ハ大分病弱デ
 アル^{トイフ}事^ヲ決定シタガ、後ニナツテ指揮官ハ余ニ對
 シ、軍醫ノ報告ニ依ルト、仕事ヲスルニハ差支ヘ
 ナイ^ト事^ヲ告^テタ。此ノ日本人軍醫ノ名前ハ樋口^{音譯}
 IGUCHIデアツタ。「タマルカン」(Tamarikal)
 ノ軍醫ノ名前ハ「ノボサワ」(NOBOSAWA)ト
 シテ居^ルタ。二人何レモ醫學的素養ハナカツタヤウ
 ニ思フ。樋口(HIGUCHI)ハ^{音譯}軍醫デアツタシ、
 「ノボサワ」(NOBOSAWA)ハ^{音譯}軍醫デアツタ。
 我々ノ前任軍醫ハ「ハミルトン」(HAMILTON)
 大佐デアツタ。「タマルカン」(Tamarikal)デ
 ハ「ハミルトン」(HAMILTON)大佐ノ前ハ、
 「ズット」(HOBBS)少佐ガ軍醫ヲ務メテ
 居^ラレタ。

九四年
 二十二年、我々ハ昭和二十二年二月、彼等ガ豫備編成軍ト將^ス

枚ヲ別々ニ分ケルマデ「タマルカン」~~タ~~ Tamar
K^{AN}ニ居タ。

二十三、我々、英、米、^蘭和ヲ含ム三、〇〇〇名ノ一行ハ、「カンブリ」~~カ~~ Kamburiニ移サレタ。全部將校デアツタ。彼等ハ將校達ヲ、河上^川ヤ徒歩ニヨリ、六日間ノ旅程デ新シイキャンプニ移動サセタ。五〇〇名^ゾヲ一組トシテ出發シタ。五組^ハ各五日ノ間隔ヲ置イテ既ニ出發シテ居タ。余ハ「バンコック」~~バ~~ BANGKOKニ夜到着シタ。我々ハ戦争ガ終ツタト通告サレタ。キャンプノ位置ハ「バンコック」~~バ~~ BANGKOKノ向側デアツタ。

二十四

「ナガタモ」(NAGATAMO)ノ主任參謀「ニトウ」~~ニ~~ NITONAITOSノ中尉ガ一度我々ノキャンプヲ訪^レレタ。彼ガ來ル時ハ決ツテ酒ヲ飲ンデ居タ。彼ハ「グリーン」少佐~~グ~~ Greer、~~ブ~~ Black及余ニ對シ、立派ナ死ヲ與ヘテ呉レル事ガ出來ルト約束^{出来ルト云フ}シタ。ソシテ、事態ガ悪化シタラ彼自ラ我々ヲ射殺スルト云ツタ

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST.
NO. 1.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ORS.
- AGAINST -
ARAKI, SADAO, AND ORS.

I, GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY of SYDNEY in the State of New South Wales, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was NX34999, Lt. Col. George Ernest Ramsay, 2/30 Australian Infantry Battalion, when I became a P.O.W. at Singapore in February 1942. In April, 1942, I was transferred to 2/18 Battalion.

2. On reaching MERGUI on 24 May, 1942, it was obvious that no preparations had been made for our reception. The Japs evidently had been moving around looking for a camp site and finally had decided on the Mergui School.

3. The area was capable of holding about 600 to 800 with reasonable comfort but on arrival at MERGUI there were 500 United Kingdom troops from SUMATRA and I was told that I had to take command of the whole force - that was, there was to be a total of 1500 men in this school camp. A great number of the British troops had dysentery. Conditions for the first 10 days or more were very overcrowded; there was no proper sanitary accommodation; the waterlogged ground prevented the digging of more latrines. There were no hospital facilities. We had 17 deaths at Mergui - 12 British and 5 Australians.

4. Three men were shot at Mergui - Australians named Davies, Bell and Schubert. They allegedly tried to escape. I am satisfied that the first 2 did try; but the third man, Schubert, was only out trying to get some food. I made representations in each case to the Japanese commander, pointing out that it was contrary to the Conventions; he pointed out in his turn that he would place my representations before Major ITSUI, commander of the garrison for the whole area. I was assured that my representations were placed before the commander and I was informed that he (ITSUI) was quite adamant, and that the men were to be shot. They were shot. We were not present. They were taken away on a truck early one morning and we did not actually see them at any time. We were subsequently officially informed, verbally, that they had been shot. In the case of Schubert, I was assured that nothing would happen to him before I was seen again - that once more they were forwarding my representations to ITSUI, and then they told me that Schubert would not be shot until I had been notified. In his case, when he was first captured, he aggravated the offence by jumping out of the Jap guardroom window; had he not done that, I might have been able to save him. In fact, the padre spoke to me one morning

and said he had passed a truck and Schubert was in it with his hands tied, and Schubert as the truck sped past had called out "Does the Colonel know they're going to shoot me?". I went up to the Jap commander's quarters and on the way there I heard a shot or shots. I reminded the commander of his promise that the man would not be shot without first notifying me, but he said that it could not have done any good, since ITSUI had ordered that Schubert had to be shot.

5. We got to Tavoy in late August or September, 1942. The camp consisted of mixed forces including 200 Dutch from the Netherlands East Indies. I was in Tavoy for about 4 months. Some men were caught whom the Japs alleged were stealing from the Jap stores. Two men were beaten - Minton and Gaut. Also Sgt. Goggin. They were taken away to Tavoy gaol. They reported to me on their return. There was a Jap sergeant in charge of the camp and he said he had no jurisdiction over the KEMPEI TAI. According to the story of the three men, they were tortured, and a Burmese assisted the Japs at the gaol. Minton was made to kneel with a pole tight in behind his knees and he was forced backwards, while a KEMPEI TAI Jap stood at one end of the pole and the Burmese on the other. They worked up and down at the ends of the pole, forcing it to move backwards, and roll in between his knees. A Jap officer stood in front of him and hit him back with a golf club each time he tried to lean forward to ease the pain. Gaut was punished in similar style, but in addition he had big weals across his back from a knotted rope - his back was hurt and when I last saw him he was not fully recovered from his back injury. I saw him about 2 years afterwards, the last time I saw him. I saw him immediately after the torture. Minton had red bruises behind his knees. Gaut's back was strained.

6. Men at Tavoy did aerodrome work. They were enlarging the drome. It was a military drome.

Sworn before me at Sydney

on the tenth day of September, 1946. /s/ G. E. Ramsay.

/s/ R. L. Deasey J.P.

(Translated by AZUMA Torazo)

Evidentiary Document No. 5038 B.

證據書類 第五〇三八號 B.

第一頁

極東國際軍事裁判所

第一

ARAKI, SADAO.

アメリカ合衆國其他對 荒木貞夫 其他

State of New South Wales / SYDNEY

余、ニューサウスウェールズ州 シドニー、ジョージアーネストラムセイ

GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY

宣誓を行はんとし左如く陳述す。

Singapore

一、私ハ一九四二年／昭和十七年／二月ニシンガポールに捕虜ト

2/30 Australians

ナリニシタ時、オーストラリア 歩兵大隊、NX三四九九、陸軍中佐

George Ernest Ramsay

ジョージアーネストラムセイにテアリニシタ。一九四二年／昭和十七年／

四月ニ、私ハ 2/18 大隊ニ移シサレニシメ。

二、一九四二年／昭和十七年／五月ニ十四日ニマーグイ／MERGUYニ

checked by water

AZUMA

ニ着キマシタガ、我々ヲ受入レルヒキ何ノ準備モ無カフヲトハ

收容所 場所

明瞭デシタ。日本人ハ明カニ歩キ回ツテキャンプノ位置ヲ探

Mergui School

シテ居マシタガ最後ニマーグイ學校ニ定メシタ。

三、其ノ場所ハ六百ノカラ八百ノ位相者ユツリト、リ得ル所

MERGUI

SUMATRA

デシタガマーグイニ着イタ時ハスマトラカラ五百人ノ英國軍

英文 United Kingdom troops トナルモ添附日訳文ハ聯合國軍ト訳シテリ

聯合王國軍隊

誤リト思科スガ来テ居リ私ハ全軍ハ指揮ヲ取ラネハナラヌト

部隊

言後サレモシタ一即チ、此ノ各校キャンプニ合計千五百人

居ルコトニナリマス。英國軍ノ多クハ赤痢患者デシタ。最

初ノ十日又ハモウ少シノ間ハ非常ニ混雜シタ状態デシタ、通

此濕地帯

者ナ衛生設備ハ有リセシテシタ。水ノ多クイ地面ハモウト便所ヲ

何等

施設カ

振ルニトテ妨ゲシタ。

病院ノ便宜モ有リセシテシタ。

マーグイニ

Mergui

A2UM1A

ITSUI

是等、矢

ハ彼(イツ井)が全ク頑固デ、男達射殺サレルコトニツツト告

ケラレシメ。 彼等ハ射タレテ殺サレシメ。 私共ハ其所ニ居合ハセマ

セシメ。 彼等ハ或朝早クトスクテ連レテ行カレ 私共ハ實際モハ

彼等ヲ見マセシメ。 私共ハ後程正式ニ頭コキ依テ彼等ハ射タレ

タコトヲ告ケラレシメ。 不存ヘルトニ聞シテハ私共ハ解シヤイ中ハ彼ニ

何事エ起ラヌアウト傳説サレタマ。 即チ幸度彼等ハ私ノ抗議ヲ

ITSUI

Schubert

通言ニ追

イツ井ニ報告シタマヘ。 ソレカラ不存ヘルトニ聞シテハ私ニ前以テ此等

事ナシキハ 彼ヲ殺サヌト書キシメ。 彼ノ案件南シテ最初彼が

捕ツタ時、 彼ハ日本人見張リ室ノ窓ノ窓カテ能降リヤウトシテ其罪

ヲ尚重クシタマヘ。 彼が若シソウシナカフメラ 私ハ彼ヲ殺フコトガ出来タカ

又知ラセシ。 幸々、軍隊附神父ガアル朝私ニ話シテ聽カセテ呉レシ

Page 2

Schubert

シガ彼がトスク傍ヲ通ツタ時 不存ヘルトハ 彼ノキヲ結ビシテ 其中

(Schubert)

ニ居リ、^シスルヘルトハトスクカ走り過キタ時「彼等が私ヲ射殺

ニ行クヲ大佐ハ知ツテ居ルノカ？」ト叫ビ居タト云フテ居ルニシテ。

私ハ日本人指揮官ノ宿所^舎ニ行キノ途中テ、私ハ銃ノ音ヲ一層ノ二

ニ度聞キニシテ。私ハ指揮官ニ私ニ苦ケナイテ彼ヲ射ツコトハレナイト

(ITSUI)

云フ約束ニツイテ。注意ヲ致シシテ、知シ彼ハイツ井ガ

(Schubert)

(ドウスル事モ出来)

木五ヘルトヲ射ツヤウ命令シテ来タ共、告ケタテ何ノ彼ニモウ

キイホトナカフタト云ヒニシテ。

五、私達ハ一九四二年ノ昭和十七年ノ八月ノ終リカ九月ニタツキイ

(Netherlands East Indies)

ニ行キマストナリニシテ。キャンプハ蘭領東印度カラノ二百人ノオレン

(部隊)

(Tavoy)

タルヲ含キ混合軍ヲ出来テ居リニシテ。私ハタツキイニ約四ヶ月

(軍倉庫)

(日本兵カ云フテイタ)

居リニシテ。日本人ノ店カラ品物ヲ盗ンタ者ヲトネトキテ數人ノ人カ申

本人ヲ捕ツテ居ルニシテ。三人折タレニシタ。ミントン/Minton/トガツト

Grant / ズ。又ゴギン / Roggin / 軍曹モ打タレシム。 彼等

Taney / ハタウカイノ牢獄ニ送ラレシム。 彼等ハ帰ツテカラ私ニ次イ報告

フシテ呉レシム。 ンノキャンプノ責任ニ日本人 軍曹カモヲ居タカ

KEMPEI TAI / 彼ハ憲兵隊ニ対シ 権限ハ持ツ居ナイト 語ツタ。 三人ノ者ノ語ニ

依レバ 彼等ハ拷問ニ掛ケラレ 且牢獄デハ一ビルニ人カ 日本又ノ手 傳ニ

Minton / タラシテ居タトノトテス。 ミントンハ 彼ノ膝ノ後ニ棒ヲシツカリト

蹴メ込ミ 蹴カサレソシテ 無理ニ後ニ及ナレタリシ。 其ノ間日本

KEMPEI TAI / 人 憲兵隊ノ人カ 棒ノ片ヲ一 端ニ立ケ 他ノ端ニビルニ人カ 立ツテ居

タ。 彼等ハ棒ノ兩端デ 上下ニ動カシ 棒ヲ送ニ 動かカスヤウニシ。 彼

膝ノ間デ クルクル 廻スヤウニシタトノ事ヲテス。 一人ノ日本人 特

校カ 彼ノ前ニ立ケ 彼カ 痛ミヲ 樂ニスルヤウ 前ノ方ニ 促メシヤウニ

Grant / スル度ニ ブルフノ棒デ 彼ヲ 打返レタトノコトテス。 ガウトモ亦 同様

AZUMA

7

ノ方去テ田徴也ラサレタト、ミトテスガ尚彼ハ結ハ目アル繩ノ為ニ出来

タ大キテ、鞭痕ガ脊中ニ在リ | 彼ノ脊中ハ害ハレテ私ガ彼ヲ

ニ最後ニ見タ時モ、彼ノ脊中ノ怪我ハ十分ニ回復シテセシメテシメ。ソレカ

之ガ彼ニ會フタ最後デシタ。

ラニ年後ニ彼ニ會ヒシメカ、ヤ、後會ヒタセト。持向ノ直後ニ彼ニ

Minton

Gault

會ヒシメ。ミントノハ膝ノ後ニ赤イ傷痕ガアリシメ。カウトハ

脊中ハ引キツ疼痛ヲテ居マシメ。

Taney

失達

天、タウタイノ人由トハ飛行場ノ仕事ヲシテ居シメ。彼等ハ飛行場ヲ抗ケル作業ヲシテ居シメ。軍陸軍飛行場外ト思ヒタ。

Sydney

トトニニ於テ余ノ面前ニ宣宣言言ス

一九四六年 昭和二十一年 九月十日

G. E. Ramsay

署名 *J. O. Ramsey*

署名 *J. O. Ramsey*

R. L. Dancy p. P.

その場所は六百から八百人位相当ゆつくりと入り
得る所ではたが、マーグイに着いた時はスマトラ
から五百人の联合国軍が来て居り私は全軍の指揮
を取らねばならぬと言渡されました、即ちこの学校キャン
プに合計千五百人ゑる事になりました。英国軍の
多くは赤痢で病に罹りました。最初の十日又はもう少しの
間は非常に混雑した状態でした。適者を
衛生設備は有りませんでした。水の多い地面はもつと
便所を掘る事も出来ませんでした。病院の便宜は
ありませんでした。マーグイに於ては十二人の英国人五人の
オーストラリア人合計十七人の死人がありました。

マーグイに三人射撃殺された。オーストラリア人
名は、ダヴィス、ベル及びスチュベルトと言います。

彼等は逃

始めの二人が実際に逃げやうとした事は

三人目のスチュベルトは

事件は協約に反してゐるからとて私は日本、

指揮官にこの件に關して抗議を致しました。

指揮官はこれをききこの地の全守備隊の指揮

者では、イツ井小佐に私の抗議を移すかと

言ひました。私の抗議がイワイ指揮官に移送される迄

射たれと殺されました。イワイお佐は頑固な三人の男は

射たれと殺されました。私共はそこに居りませぬ

射たれと殺されました。私共は彼等が朝早くトラウクで連れで行かれ

射たれと殺されました。私共は彼等を實際に見合せんとすべし

射たれと殺されました。私共は彼等が朝早くトラウクで連れで行かれ

射たれと殺されました。私共は彼等が朝早くトラウクで連れで行かれ

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私は日本人指揮官の宿所に行き、その途中で私は銃の音を一夜か二夜か聞きました。私は指揮官に私に告げなさいと頼み、射撃はしなさいと云う約束は出来た。彼に注意を指揮官は、イツ平がスケユヘルトを射つやう命令をして来たのを、告げたと何の彼も主

(昭和十七年)

私は一九四三年八月の終りが九月にタヴオイに行かぬはなりました。キャンプは蘭領東印度オウリ、二百人のオランダ人を含めて混合軍が来るに居りました。私はタヴオイに約四ヶ月居りました。数人の人が日本に捕つておきました。

日本人の居る品物を盗んだ者は、水で、二人を打たれ、水を盗ました。

一人はミントンで他はガウトと云います。又ゴギン軍曹も、彼等はタヴオイの牢獄に送られ

ました。彼等は帰つてから私に次の報告をいへる水、ました。そのキャンプの責任は日本人軍曹がある。彼は憲兵隊の権限は持つて居る。

三人の者、古に依れば、半年獄にはヒルマ大も日本人の手助けをしなるとの、ミントンは彼の膝の

秋の五

後に棒をシッカリと舞ひ廻らせ、腕かせられ、無理に
 後に反らされたりし。この間日本人憲兵隊の
 一人が棒の片方に立ち他の端にピルマ人が立つておこし、
 彼等は棒の両端を上下に動かし棒を逆に動かす
 手にし、ミントンの膝の向むくひを廻すやうにし、このやうに
 一人の日本人特技が彼の前には立ち彼が痛みで前
 方に平に落ちるやうに任じたる。棒にする度にゴルフの棒で
 彼を地に反らせ、棒打つたやうに、カウトも并同棒
 打つたやうに、尚彼は結い目のある
 縄の端にお来た大い傷痕が春中にあつて、この傷は
 いとく、私が彼を最後に見た時、それは十分に回復
 してゐるやうで、二年後に彼に会い
 まし、その時、彼は、拷問の直後に彼に
 会いました。ミントンは膝の治に赤い傷痕が
 ありました。他の者は日本一行つと、思ひます。この
 かウートの春中は突張つておました。彼は今帰る
 事件は一九四二年九月八日から十月までした。
 昭和十七年

タボオイの人間は飛行場の任をさしておき、
 彼等は飛行場を広げる作業をしておき、
 早く飛行場だと思ひます。

Evidentiary Document
5038 B

GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY.

Lt. Col. George Ernest Ramsay being duly sworn gives the following evidence:

My Army number is NX 34999; rank, Lt. Col.; full name, George Ernest Ramsay; unit, 2/18 Aust. Inf. Bn.; formerly 2/30 Bn.; I was transferred to 2/18 Bn. in April 1942. Home address: 8 Brightmore Street, Cremorne, Sydney, New South Wales.

I became a POW at Singapore in February 1942.

.....

On reaching Mergui on 24 May 1942 it was obvious that no preparations had been made for our reception. The Japs evidently had been moving around looking for a camp site and finally had decided on the Mergui school.

The area was capable of holding about 600 to 800 with reasonable comfort but on arrival at Mergui there were 500 United Kingdom troops from Sumatra and I was told that I had to take command of the whole force - that was, there was to be a total of 1,500 men in this school camp. A great number of the British troops had dysentery. Conditions for the first ten days or more were very overcrowded; there was no proper sanitary accommodation; the waterlogged ground prevented the digging of more latrines. There were no hospital facilities. We had 17 deaths at Mergui - 12 British and 5 Australian.

.....

Three men were shot at Mergui - Australians named Davies, Bell and Schubert.

They allegedly tried to escape. I am satisfied that the first two did try; but the third man, Schubert, was only out trying to get some food. I made representations in each case to the Japanese commander, pointing out that it was contrary to the conventions; he pointed out in his turn that he would place my representations before Major Itsui, commander of the garrison for the whole area. I was assured that my representations were placed before the Commander, and was informed that he (Itsui) was quite adamant and that the men were to be shot. They were shot. We were not present. They were taken away on a truck early one morning and we did not actually see them at any time. We were subsequently officially informed, verbally, that they had been shot. In the case of Schubert, I was assured that nothing would happen to him before I was seen again --- that once more they were forwarding my representations to Itsui, and then they told me that Schubert would not be shot until I had been notified. In his case, when he was first captured, he aggravated the offence by jumping out of the Jap guardroom window; had he not done that, I might have been able to save him. In fact, the padre spoke to me one morning and said he had passed a truck and Schubert was in it with his hands tied, and Schubert as the truck sped past had called out "Does the Colonel know they're going to shoot me?" I went up to the Jap Commander's quarters and on the way there I heard a shot or shots. I reminded the commander of his promise that the man would not be shot without first notifying me, but he said that it could not have done any good, since Itsui had ordered that Schubert had to be shot.

.....

We got to Tavoy in late August or September 1942. . . . The camp consisted of mixed forces including 200 Dutch from the Netherlands East Indies. I was in Tavoy for about four months. Some men were caught whom the Japs

George Ernest Ramsay (cont.)

alleged were stealing from the Jap stores. Two men were beaten - Minton and Gaut. Also Sgt. Goggin. They were taken away to Tavoy gaol. They reported to me on their return. There was a Jap sergeant in charge of the camp and he said he had no jurisdiction over the Kempei Tai. According to the story of the three men, they were tortured, and a Burmese assisted the Japs at the gaol. Minton was made to kneel with a pole tight in behind his knees and he was forced backwards, while a Kempei Tai Jap stood on one end of the pole and the Burmese on the other. They worked up and down at the ends of the pole, forcing it to move backwards, and roll it between his knees. A Jap officer stood in front of him and hit him back with a golfclub each time he tried to lean forward to ease the pain. Gaut was punished in similar style but in addition he had big weals across his back from a knotted rope - his back was hurt and when I last saw him he was not fully recovered from the back injury. I saw him about two years afterwards, the last time I saw him. I saw him immediately after the torture. Minton had red bruises behind his knees. Gaut's back was strained; he has now returned; I believe the other men went to Japan. This was about 8 September or October 1942.

.....

Men at Tavoy did aerodrome work. They were enlarging the drome. It was, I presume, a military drome.

.....

GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY.

Evidentiary Document

5038 A

Lt.-Col. George Ernest Ramsay being duly sworn gives the following evidence:

My Army number is NX34999; rank, Lt. Col.; full name, George Ernest Ramsay; unit, 2/18 Aust. Inf. Bn., formerly 2/30 Bn; I was transferred to 2/18 Bn. in April 1942. Home address: 8 Brightmore Street, Cremorne, Sydney, New South Wales.

I became a POW at Singapore in February 1942.

.....

I was transferred to the 2/18 Bn. on a day in April 1942. I left there with A Force which was a force of 3,000 under Brigadier Varley. We were to move overseas to an unknown destination. I was in command of 1 Bn of A Force. It consisted of about 850 all ranks. We embarked on the Celebes Maru with 1,000 troops which included my own 1 Bn. and a detachment from the 2/4 CCS. The remaining 2,000 embarked on the Toyashi Maru under Brigadier Varley. Before leaving we were told that the force would go to the same destination as the other one but in fact 1,000 men were dropped at Victoria Point, on the extreme tip of lower Burma, and the next 1,000 with me were dropped at Mergui.

The remaining 1,000 under Brigadier Varley were disembarked at Tavoy.

.....

We got to Tavoy in late August or September 1942. Brigadier Varley was still there with portion of the original 1,000 but he was in a separate camp, and I was denied official access to him.

.....

On leaving Tavoy we moved to Thanbazyat by rail and also on foot. This was in December 1942. We moved then to the 26 Kilo camp, known as Kunknitkway. Colonel Nagatamo had his headquarters at Thanbazyat and when I was at Thanbazyat Brigadier Varley had established his own headquarters there. We stayed in Thanbazyat for a night or two and then moved to 26 Kilo camp. Hitherto we had been with Jap front line troops; but on arrival at 26 Kilo camp we had our first experience with Koreans as guards. They were pretty bad.

A Jap sergeant named Fanato was there; a Jap engineer officer also was there and they were insistent on a certain number of our men going out to work each day. I wrote to them several times and made verbal protests against the numbers of men being required and setting out the reasons why their requests were impossible of fulfilment. He threatened on several occasions, and did on several occasions parade the whole camp and selected the men himself. This was the Jap officer. We were sometimes, however, able to substitute for these men other men whom the M.Os regarded as fitter than the ones picked out by the Jap officer. Throughout, the question of work quotas was one of daily dispute and trouble.

From the 26 Kilo camp we moved to 75 Kilo camp, called Meiloe. There we struck a worse crowd of Korean guards than at the 26 camp. There was a lot of indiscriminate bashing there though no serious injuries were sustained. The health of the men was poor. Men would be required to leave the camp early in the morning and would not return until 2 or 3 the next morning; then they would be compelled to leave again the same morning shortly after dawn. Occasionally protests to the Japs resulted in some of the men being

given an extra hour or two of rest. The rainy season set in there; men often worked in mud up to their knees and they had no change of clothing. Meals were only fair.

The Jap engineer soldiers ill-treated the men a lot by hitting them with bamboos, their fists, and rifle butts, through no fault of the men but due to the impatience of the Japs who could not understand that the men did not understand what was being required of them all of the time.

Jap commander there was Lieut. Hoshi. I had my own force - Ramsay force; and Black and Green Forces.

Korean guards apparently under instructions from the camp commander often forced men out to work. Hoshi would often promise that they would not be sent out without the concurrence of our MOs but he failed to pass those instructions on to his Korean administrative staff - apparently, anyway. So, when the work party was formed in the morning, he would not be available, and the Koreans would deny that they had received any instructions from their commander. On one occasion I went up and found him in the ground just as a party of our men just selected were being sent out. I reminded him of his promise, pointed out the men to him, and he ordered them back to camp. However, he seemed to take great care subsequently that he was never about the place when other parties were going out. In this camp we had about 10 deaths.

We moved to the 105 Kilo camp, called Aunganaung, in April or May 1943, and remained there for seven months. It was there we struck tropical ulcers pretty badly, a lot of the men getting them. There was a hospital back at 55 kilo - called the Death Camp. Some men were sent back there for amputation. There were over 100 amputation cases, and some died after the operation. The MOs at 105 kilo camp were Captains Cumming, Higgins, Anderson and White; they were all AAMC. Our camp in strength varied between the 2,000 and 2,500 mark. Of my original force of 1,000, I lost 128; I put my deaths down at 15 per cent. There were 158 deaths at the 105 kilo camp from the mixed force, in the seven months. There were instances of men being knocked about by the Japs and the Koreans with bamboos and other things, necessitating medical treatment. Koreans were particularly brutal. If they wanted to punish a man they would strike him anywhere at all, and on half-healed ulcers. They have kicked men on the shins and the shins had ulcers on them. I saw Japs screw a stick into a man's navel. Lt. Hoshi was Commander there.

Ulcers extended from knee to ankle, exposing the shinbone for 8 or 9 inches. They went black. I have seen ulcers cover a whole foot. The question of iodoform was a pressing one throughout and once one of my men said he had been offered a small jar of iodoform by a Jap in exchange for his watch. He had been postured several times to exchange his watch but as it was a present from his mother he did not want to let it go. However, in order to relieve his friends' suffering from ulcers he finally let it go for the bottle of iodoform from the Jap. I told the Jap commander that the bottle could only have been obtained by illegal means by his men. The exchange was made in the presence of the Jap commander. The iodoform was in a bottle about 1½ inches by 3 inches. Our M.O. said there was enough in it to last several weeks. There was no label on it.

At the 105 camp there was a lot of dysentery and some malaria. We had three to four cholera deaths there. There were no medical supplies; we tried to get emetine from as far back as Mergui but never could.

In December 1943, after completion of the railway, we moved to Tamarkan.

There was a statement that the railway had to be put down at all costs - responsibility for that was with Colonel Nagatamo, who was i/c of No. 3 Branch which took in our A Force, and Col. William's force which had come from Java.

Later Col. Nakamura, who took Col. Nagatamo's place, spoke in similar terms. He said we were only a rabble Army and that we were dependent on the Jap Imperial Army for our safety. Nagatamo had once read out some such statement in Japanese and then his interpreter read it out in English. There are copies of this; copies were left with us.

Nagatamo came out to the camp on one or two occasions but did not go right through. At no time did he interview me in the latter stages or ask if I had any complaints generally. Neither of these two Jap commanders ensured that their instructions, whatever they were after I had had early interviews with them, were carried out. Perhaps they all of the time had no intention of giving the instructions. There always seemed to be a general desire on the part of Japanese commanders to evade responsibility. Hoshi would send his batman out, if we called, to say Hoshi was indisposed and could not be disturbed. Once we arrived too quickly for him; we got onto the verandah of his cottage and through the window saw him just getting into bed, clothed, with his boots on. He came out subsequently and saw us. But that was his dodge.

On 1 January 1944 we reached Tamarkan. It was alleged to be a rest camp. Food for the first few months was a considerable improvement on anything we had had. There were not many troops there when we arrived but troops came all of the time out of the jungle from the jungle camps and by May there must have been about 5,000 troops there.

There were constant irritation tactics and minor bashings. These were daily occurrences. At one time the camp commander was Matsusaki. No indication was ever given to me by the Japs of any change in their command there.

In August 1944 the Japs reorganised their groups. Colonel Anderson, who had taken Brigadier Varley's place, took over command from me.

There were some deaths at Tamarkan. In the "black month" we lost about two a day; we took dead bodies straight from the trucks. Dysentery and fever and malnutrition caused most of the deaths. We had no quinine or atebri. There was a Jap M.O. at Nagatamo's headquarters who occasionally visited the camp, and once more in their usual style they agreed that the men were very sick; but I was told by the commander later that the men were fit to work, because his M.O. had so reported. The name of the Jap M.O. was Higuchi. The M.O. at Tamarkan was named Nobosawa. I believe neither of them had any medical background; Higuchi was a dentist and Nobosawa a vet. Our senior M.O. was Col. Hamilton. For most of the time, before Col. Hamilton, Major Hobbs was our M.O. at Tamarkan.

We remained at Tamarkan until February 1945, when they separated officers from the ORs.

We were moved to Kamburi, a party of 3,000 including Australian, British, Americans and Dutch. All officers. They moved the officers on a 6-day trip

by river and on foot to a new camp and parties went in batches of 500. Five parties already had left at intervals of five days each. I reached Bangkok on the night we were notified that the war was over. The camp site was on the other side of Bangkok.

^{NATO?}
Lieut. Nito, chief of staff to Nagatamo, once visited our camp. Normally he had been drinking before his arrival. He told Major Green, Colonel Black and me that he could promise us an honourable death and that if things went bad he would shoot us himself.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

NO. 1.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and ors.

- AGAINST -

ARAKI, SADA0, and ors.

I, GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY of Sydney in the State of New South Wales, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was NX34999, Lt. Colonel George Ernest Ramsay, 2/30 Australian Infantry Battalion when I was captured by the Japanese at Singapore in February, 1942.

2. I was transferred to the 2/18 Battalion on a day in April, 1942 I left there with A Force which was a force of 3000 under Brigadier Varley. We were to move overseas to an unknown destination. I was in command of 1 Bn. of A Force. It consisted of about 850 all ranks. We embarked on the CELEBES MARU with 1000 troops which included my own 1 Bn and a detachment from the 2/4 CCS. The remaining 2000 embarked on the TOYASHI MARU under Brigadier Varley. Before leaving we were told that the force would go to the same destination as the other one but in fact 1000 men were dropped at Victoria Point on the extreme tip of lower Burma, and the next 1000 with me were dropped at MERGUI.

3. The remaining 1000 under Brigadier Varley were disembarked at TAVOY.

4. We got to Tavoy in late August or September, 1942. Brigadier Varley was still there with portion of the original 1000 but he was in a separate camp and I was denied official access to him.

5. On leaving TAVOY we moved to THANBUYZYAT by rail and also on foot. This was in December, 1942. Colonel NAGATOMO had his headquarters at THANBUYZYAT and when I was at THANBUYZYAT Brig. Varley had established his own headquarters there. He stayed in THANBUYZYAT for a night or two and then moved to 26 Kilo Camp. Hitherto we had been with Jap front line troops; but on arrival at 26 Kilo camp we had our first experience with Koreans as guards. They were pretty bad.

6. A Jap sergeant named FANATO was there; a Jap engineer officer also was there and they were insistent on a certain number of our men going out to work each day. I wrote to them several times and made verbal protests against the numbers of men being required and setting out the reasons why their requests were impossible of fulfilment. He threatened on several occasions, and did on several occasions parade the whole camp and selected the men himself. This was the Jap officer. We were sometimes, however, able to substitute

For these men other men whom the M.O. regarded as fitter than the ones picked out by the Jap officer. Throughout, the question of work quotas was one of daily dispute and trouble.

7. From 26 Kilo camp we moved to 75 Kilo camp, called MEILOE. There we struck a worse crowd of Korean guards than at 26 camp. There was a lot of indiscriminate bashing there though no serious injuries were sustained. The health of the men was poor. Men would be required to leave the camp early in the morning and would not return until 2 or 3 the next morning; then they would be compelled to leave again the same morning shortly after dawn. Occasionally protests to the Japs resulted in some of the men being given an extra hour or two of rest. The rainy season there, men often worked in mud up to their knees and they had no change of clothing. Meals were only fair.

8. The Jap engineer soldiers ill-treated the men a lot by hitting them with bamboos, their fists and rifle butts, through no fault of the men but due to the impatience of the Japs who could not understand that the men did not understand what was being required of them all of the time.

9. Jap Commander there was Lieut. HOSHI. I had my own force - Ramsay force and Black and Green forces.

10. Korean guards apparently under instructions from the camp commander often forced men out to work. HOSHI would often promise that they would not be sent out without the concurrence of our M.Os but he failed to pass those instructions on to his Korean administrative staff apparently, anyway. So, when the work party was formed in the morning, he would not be available, and the Koreans would deny that they had received instructions from their commander. On one occasion I went up and found him in the grounds just as a party of our men just selected were being sent out. I reminded him of his promise, pointed out the men to him, and he ordered them back to camp. However, he seemed to take great care subsequently that he was never about the place when other parties were going out. In this camp we had about 10 deaths.

11. We moved to 105 Kilo camp, called AUNGANAUNG, in April or May 1943, and remained there for seven months. It was there we struck tropical ulcers pretty badly, a lot of the men getting them. There was a hospital back at 55 Kilo called the Death Camp. Some men were sent back there for amputation. There were over 100 amputation cases and some died after the operation. The M.Os. at 105 Kilo camp were Captains Cumming, Higgin, Anderson and White; they were all A.A.M.C. Our camp in strength varied between the 2000 and 2500 mark. Of my original force of 1000 men I lost 128; I put my deaths down at 15%. There were 158 deaths at the 105 Kilo camp from the mixed force in the seven months. There were instances of men being knocked about by the Japs and the Koreans with bamboos and other things, necessitating medical treatment. Koreans were particularly brutal. If they wanted to punish a man they would

strike him anywhere at all, and on half healed ulcers. They have kicked men on the shins and the shins had ulcers on them. I saw Japs screw a stick into a man's navel. Lt. HOSHI was commander there.

12. Ulcers extended from knee to ankle, exposing the shinbone for 8 or 9 inches. They went black. I have seen ulcers cover a whole foot. The question of iodiform was a pressing one throughout and once one of my men said he had been offered a small jar of iodiform by a Jap in exchange for his watch. He had been pestered several times to exchange his watch but as it was a present from his mother he did not want to let it go. However, in order to relieve his friend's suffering from ulcers he finally let it go for the bottle of iodiform from the Jap. I told the Jap Commander that the bottle could only have been obtained by illegal means by his men. The exchange was made in the presence of the Jap Commander. The iodiform was in a bottle about 1 1/2 inches by 3 inches. Our M.O. said there was enough in it to last several weeks. There was no label on it.

13. At the 105 camp there was a lot of dysentery and some malaria. We had 3 to 4 cholera deaths there. There were no medical supplies; we tried to get emetine from as far back as MERGUI but never could.

14. In December, 1943, after completion of the railway, we moved to TAMARKAN.

15. There was a statement that the railway had to be put down at all costs - responsibility for that was with Col. NAGATOMO, who was i/c of No. 3 Branch, which took in our A Force, and Co. Williams' force which had come from Java.

16. Later Col. NAKAMURA, who took Col. NAGATOMO'S place, spoke in similar terms. He said we were only a rabble army and that we were dependent on the Jap Imperial Army for our safety. NAGATOMO had once read out some such statement in Japanese and then his interpreter read it out in English. There are copies of this; copies were left with us.

17. NAGATOMO came out to the camp on one or two occasions, but did not go right through. At no time did he interview me in the latter stages, or ask if I had any complaints generally. Neither of these two Jap Commanders ensured that their instructions, whatever they were after I had had early interviews with them, were carried out. Perhaps they all of the time had no intention of giving these instructions. There always seemed to be a general desire on the part of Japanese Commanders to evade responsibility. Hoshi would send his batman out, if we called, to say Hoshi was indisposed and could not be disturbed. Once we arrived too quickly for him; we got onto the verandah of his cottage and through the window saw him just getting into bed, clothed, with his boots on. He came out subsequently and saw us. But that was

HIS dodge.

18. On 1 January, 1944, we reached TAMARKAN. It was alleged to be a rest camp. Food for the first few months was a considerable improvement on anything we had had. There were not many troops there when we arrived, but troops came all of the time out of the jungle from the jungle camps and by May there must have been about 5000 troops there.

19. There were constant irritation tactics and minor bashings. These were daily occurrences. At one time the camp commander was MATSUSAKI. No indication was ever given to me by the Japs of any change in their command there.

20. In August, 1944, the Japs re-organised their groups. Colonel Anderson, who had taken Frig. Varley's place, took over command from me.

21. There were some deaths at Tamarkan. In the "black month" we lost about 2 a day; we took dead bodies straight from the trucks. Dysentery and fever and malnutrition caused most of the deaths. We had no quinine or atebirin. There was a Jap M.O. at NAGATOLO's headquarters who occasionally visited the camp, and once more in their usual style they agreed that the men were very sick; but I was told by the commander later that the men were fit to work because his M.O. had so reported. The name of the Jap M.O. was HIGUCHI. The M.O. at Tamarkan was NOBOSAWA. I believe neither of them had any medical background. HIGUCHI was a dentist and NOBOSAWA a vet. Our senior M.O. was Col. Hamilton. For most of the time, before Col. Hamilton, Major Hobbs was our M.O. at TAMARKAN.

22. We remained at TAMARKAN until February, 1945, when they separated officers from Ors.

23. We were moved to KANBULI; a party of 3,000, including Australian, British, American and Dutch. All officers. They moved the officers on a 6-day trip by river and on foot to a new camp, and parties went in batches of 500. Five parties already had left a intervals of 5 days each. I reached BANGKOK on the night we were notified that the war was over. The camp site was on the other side of BANGKOK.

24. Lieut NITO, Chief of Staff of NAGOTOMO, once visited our camp. Normally he had been drinking before his arrival. He told Major Green, Col. Black and me that he could promise us an honourable death, and that if things went bad he would shoot us himself. /

TAKEN AND SWORN AT SYDNEY ON THE TENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER,
1946. BEFORE ME /s/ R. L. Deasey, J.P.

/s/ G. E. Rarsay.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST.

NO. 1.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ORS.

- AGAINST -

ARAKI, SADAQ, AND ORS.

I, GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY of SYDNEY in the State of New South Wales, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was NX34999, Lt. Col. George Ernest Ramsay, 2/30 Australian Infantry Battalion, when I became a P.O.W. at Singapore in February 1942. In April, 1942, I was transferred to 2/18 Battalion.

2. On reaching MERGUI on 24 May, 1942, it was obvious that no preparations had been made for our reception. The Japs evidently had been moving around looking for a camp site and finally had decided on the Mergui School.

3. The area was capable of holding about 600 to 800 with reasonable comfort but on arrival at MERGUI there were 500 United Kingdom troops from SUMATRA and I was told that I had to take command of the whole force - that was, there was to be a total of 1500 men in this school camp. A great number of the British troops had dysentery. Conditions for the first 10 days or more were very overcrowded; there was no proper sanitary accommodation; the waterlogged ground prevented the digging of more latrines. There were no hospital facilities. We had 17 deaths at Mergui - 12 British and 5 Australians.

4. Three men were shot at Mergui - Australians named Davies, Bell and Schubert. They allegedly tried to escape. I am satisfied that the first 2 did try; but the third man, Schubert, was only out trying to get some food. I made representations in each case to the Japanese commander, pointing out that it was contrary to the Conventions; he pointed out in his turn that he would place my representations before Major ITSUI, commander of the garrison for the whole area. I was assured that my representations were placed before the commander and I was informed that he (ITSUI) was quite adamant, and that the men were to be shot. They were shot. We were not present. They were taken away on a truck early one morning and we did not actually see them at any time. We were subsequently officially informed, verbally, that they had been shot. In the case of Schubert, I was assured that nothing would happen to him before I was seen again - that once more they were forwarding my representations to ITSUI, and then they told me that Schubert would not be shot until I had been notified. In his case, when he was first captured, he aggravated the offence by jumping out of the Jap guardroom window; had he not done that I might have been able to save him. In fact, the padre spoke to me one morning

and said he had passed a truck and Schubert was in it with his hands tied, and Schubert as the truck sped past had called out "Does the Colonel know they're going to shoot me?". I went up to the Jap commander's quarters and on the way there I heard a shot or shots. I reminded the commander of his promise that the man would not be shot without first notifying me, but he said that it could not have done any good, since ITSUI had ordered that Schubert had to be shot.

5. We got to Tavoy in late August or September, 1942. The camp consisted of mixed forces including 200 Dutch from the Netherlands East Indies. I was in Tavoy for about 4 months. Some men were caught whom the Japs alleged were stealing from the Jap stores. Two men were beaten - Minton and Gaut. Also Sgt. Goggin. They were taken away to Tavoy gaol. They reported to me on their return. There was a Jap sergeant in charge of the camp and he said he had no jurisdiction over the KEMPEI TAI. According to the story of the three men, they were tortured, and a Burmese assisted the Japs at the gaol. Minton was made to kneel with a pole tight in behind his knees and he was forced backwards, while a KEMPEI TAI Jap stood at one end of the pole and the Burmese on the other. They worked up and down at the ends of the pole, forcing it to move backwards, and roll in between his knees. A Jap officer stood in front of him and hit him back with a golf club each time he tried to lean forward to ease the pain. Gaut was punished in similar style, but in addition he had big weals across his back from a knotted rope - his back was hurt and when I last saw him he was not fully recovered from his back injury. I saw him about 2 years afterwards, the last time I saw him. I saw him immediately after the torture. Minton had red bruises behind his knees. Gaut's back was strained.

6. Men at Tavoy did aerodrome work. They were enlarging the drome. It was a military drome.

Sworn before me at Sydney

on the tenth day of September, 1946. /s/ G. E. Ramsay.

/s/ R. L. Deasey J.P.