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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, April 2, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING MARCH 30, 1946

Summary. Within their capabilities, the various political parties and their candidates are making an effort to arouse the interest and enthusiasm of the electorate in their respective platforms. Despite limitations brought on by shortages of materials, difficulties of travel and communications, and regulations concerning posters, the tempo of the campaign is increasing in the cities, towns, and villages of Japan. A feeling of pessimism over the lack of public interest in the election nevertheless pervades various circles. Reasons for this apparent failure on the part of the people to respond to the freedoms of discussion, congregation, and voting power may be attributed to the hardships and inconveniences of daily life, lack of confidence in the parties, leadership, and candidates, fatalism of the Japanese masses, low levels of political education and experience of the people, and to some extent, the ineptness of the parties in arousing public enthusiasm. Taken in combination, these various factors suggest that abstention of voters in the coming election will be high, a result which would be unfortunate and might give rise to an implication that the initial test of democracy in Japan has failed. The Government is aware of this danger. If the new Diet is to represent the choice of the Japanese people as a whole, abstention from voting must be kept to a minimum. To combat this disinterestedness, it may perhaps be desirable for SCAP, through suitable channels and means, to emphasize the importance of the political responsibilities which the people have to assume under these new freedoms and which must be discharged in the election and in the new Diet. Somewhat in keeping with the practice of political parties in other countries, when dealing with such specific problems as inflation, Governmental finance, unemployment, and the food shortage, the programs of the major parties are made up of generalities. In some instances, however, Japanese parties have exceeded practices elsewhere in showing an inclination to juggle inconsistencies, to ignore objectivity, and to confuse or disguise fundamental issues with political "mumbo-jumbo". As of March 31, a total of 2,737 candidates were running in the campaign. End of Summary.

The Election Campaign

With the election campaign now entering into its final phase, the various political parties and their candidates are making an effort, within their capabilities, to arouse the

interest

interest and enthusiasm of the electorate in their respective platforms. The pattern of campaigning in Japan is tame by comparison with similar activities in the United States, because of the limitations under present conditions imposed on the parties in Japan by shortages of materials, difficulties and expense of travel and communications, and the detailed regulations concerning permissible sizes of posters and advertising matter. There are, nevertheless, an increasing number of posters bearing the names of candidates and campaign slogans making their appearance throughout the cities, towns, and villages of Japan--evidence that the candidates and their supporters are busily engaged in furthering their causes. Less obvious, but probably more efficacious in gathering adherents, are the speaking tours conducted in the provinces by candidates who thereby hope to popularize themselves with their constituents. Tours of this nature are usually arranged by a committee which fixes a rigid schedule of appearances throughout the prefecture, it being not unusual for a candidate to attend as many as fifty "meetings" over a period of five or six days. In addition, the candidate attends the customary private entertainments, such as lunches and dinners, which afford ample opportunity for back-stage discussion of campaign problems and strategy.

Despite the activities of the candidates and their supporters, however, a feeling of pessimism over the lack of public interest in the election campaign appears to pervade Government circles, politicians, and many thoughtful Japanese. Lack of enthusiasm for the election among the general populace, particularly in the large cities, is such that the Home and Education Ministries are making an effort to stimulate greater interest, but as yet with little or no success, and with undetermined effect on the total vote to be cast.

In searching for underlying reasons for the apparent failure of the Japanese to respond to their newly-found freedoms of discussion, congregation, and voting power, the hardships and inconveniences of daily life, including difficulties of travel and communications, are the chief factors which detract from political activity and interest. Contributory causes, powerful but less obvious, are (a) a general lack of confidence in the parties, leadership, and candidates; (b) the deep-seated fatalism inherently characteristic of the Japanese masses, accustomed to follow but not to lead; (c) the low levels of political education and experience of the people as a whole; and (3) to some extent, the ineptness of the parties in arousing public enthusiasm for their respective principles.

Candidates and the Diet

In evaluating the standing and character of the numerous candidates, even well-informed Japanese observers are all too apt to dismiss the subject with over-simplifications such as "all candidates are of low caliber", "all politicians are venal", or "all candidates are merely new faces masking for old." This attitude of resignation is difficult to combat, in view of the

suspicions

suspicions with which politicians in Japan have been viewed for many years. It is also apparent that many of the purged political leaders of Japan are generally known or believed to be the sponsors of substitute candidates now running under the auspices of a major party label.

Taken in combination, the various factors touched upon above are giving rise to predictions by competent Japanese observers that the abstention of voters in the election will be high, and that the forthcoming Diet may not be chosen by a real majority of the people. A growth of this belief, prior to Japan's first post-hostilities general election, would be unfortunate because of possible implications that the initial test of democracy in Japan has failed and that the same leaders of the political parties are still in power in the background. (It is to be noted that reference is not made here to the former leaders of Japan who have been discredited, who have retired, or who have otherwise disappeared from important political activity. Reference is made merely to important figures in political parties and in the Diet.)

Aside from the political importance of the forthcoming general election as a manifestation of political procedure under American democratization policies in Japan, it is apparent that the new Diet should, if possible, represent the choice of the Japanese people as a whole, a choice which will be incontestable only if the rate of abstention from voting is kept to a minimum. While it is true that education, time, and greater political experience are the ingredients from which a Japanese democracy must be shaped, popular interest might perhaps be increased by giving encouragement to the candidates as a class. The stigma of "low caliber" which has been attached to many candidates has simultaneously undermined the confidence of the people in the Diet. Not all candidates are bad, and it is to be hoped that new leaders of character and competence will arise.

It is believed highly important to take every appropriate step to combat disinterestedness of the Japanese people in political affairs and their innate suspicion and low opinion of party politicians and party politics as a whole. It might be especially effective to stress the necessity for every qualified voter to cast his or her vote. Woman suffrage will in all likelihood increase considerably the percentage of abstainers unless efforts to bring women to the polls are successful. In this connection it would appear helpful and desirable for SCAP to employ the prestige and influence of the occupation to emphasize, through suitable channels and means, the importance of the political responsibilities which the people must assume under their new freedom and which they must discharge in the election and in the new Diet. The candidates, also, might well receive encouragement from a statement that the new Diet will have sympathetic understanding and assistance of SCAP, provided that genuine efforts are made to develop truly democratic principles in Japan.

Current Problems and the Parties

Published statements, speeches, and radio talks sponsored by the political parties generally fail to deal specifically with the major problems with which the Japanese people are currently faced. For the most part, radio talks made by major party candidates are prepared more for listener appeal than for the advancement of possible solutions of these problems, while the talks of minor party and independent candidates are variously poor, ill-prepared, and heavily weighted on the side of vituperation against traditional politicians. In overall propaganda approach, the major parties continue to emphasize the shortcomings of Government policies to a point where the Cabinet's prestige and authority is threatened with being seriously undermined. However, no concrete alternatives are offered. There is also a pronounced tendency on the part of party speakers to denounce rival party principles, a healthy sign were it not for the sterility of the speakers' programs. Finally, in keeping with the known sentiments of the great majority of the electorate, the maintenance of the Emperor system is in most cases propounded as an original party principle, despite the fact that the Emperor's retention is favored by all and is no longer a live campaign issue, except for the Communist Party.

Somewhat in keeping with the practice of political parties in other countries, the parties' respective attitudes on specific practical problems generally amount to platitudinous statements of principles, lacking substance, and generally further confusing the issue by their contradiction of terms. Thus, on the important problem of combatting inflation, the Progressives advocate an adjustment of State revenue and expenditure, but desire generous funds for social and cultural programs. The Social Democrats, while advocating nationalization of leading industries as a check to inflation, fail to demonstrate that production will be thereby increased. The Communist plan for an anti-inflation policy is almost entirely based upon Communistic ideology and would have hope of success only if Japan as a whole were Communized. All parties advocate increased food production as one of the methods for halting inflationary trends yet their suggestions lack practicality or an objective examination of capabilities.

Governmental financial problems are treated by the parties in terms of "financial readjustment." Simultaneously, they propose social and rehabilitation programs completely at variance with financial capabilities. Outstanding Government bonds are recognized in principle by the Progressives and Liberals, while the Social Democrats and Communists favor cancellation of the holdings of large bondholders. Internal war indemnity payments are advocated by the Progressives and Liberals, as opposed to cancellation of all indemnification proposed by the Social Democrats and Communists. The latter two parties apparently also desire to change Japan's economic order irrespective of any confusion which might result therefrom.

Several

Several parties would solve the unemployment problem by such methods as the promotion of export industries and the construction of public works, plans which are somewhat inconsistent with their advocacy of "financial readjustment" and rely to some extent upon the principle of giving jobs to end unemployment. Whether Japan would be financially capable of supporting large-scale deficit financing is a question which the parties do not answer.

Various solutions of the serious problems of food production and distribution are suggested by the parties. The Progressives approve of governmental coercive measures but seek assistance from SCAP. The Liberal Party merely insists that coercive methods to force farmers to sell their rice are fruitless and adds vaguely that in any event, rice is scarce. The food problem is used by the Social Democrats as an argument for increasing the membership of the new Japan Farmers' Union, while the Communists sponsor voluntary offerings for sale of rice through the Communist-controlled Farmers' Committees. The Cooperatives advocate voluntary sales of rice by farmers, but suggest that no rice is available.

Candidates and the Parties

As of March 31, the net number of candidates continuing in the campaign showed a decrease of one. Six Liberals and nine Social Democratic candidates withdrew from the race, while the number of "independents" increased from 788 to 802. The respective numbers of candidates by parties, compared with those of a week ago, are as follows:

Party	March 24	March 31
Progressive	376	376
Liberal	486	480
Social Democratic	339	330
Communist	143	143
Cooperative	88	92
Minor Parties	568	564
Independents	788	802
Total	2,788	2,787

William J. Sebald

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, March 27, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING MARCH 23, 1946.

Summary. The titular leaders of the five major political parties have issued statements which purport to set forth the principles for which the party is striving. In general, these statements are vaguely worded, suggesting that the parties are "playing safe" in an endeavor not to antagonize certain sections of the electorate. Rather than rely upon specific problems and issues, it is believed that the parties will gather votes through the tested method of support from local politicians and organizations controlled by the party leaders and their supporters. The Progressives, Liberals, and Cooperatives place emphasis upon the retention of the Emperor, a relatively safe issue easily understood by the great majority of voters. The Social Democratic and Communist Parties failed to make a clear-cut statement concerning the Emperor, although the Communist statement contains oblique references to a "democratic republican Government", suggesting its continuing aim to abolish the Emperor system in its entirety. Greatest divergence of views is indicated in the economic programs of the parties. These vary from the Liberals' view that there should be extensive emphasis on industrialization, to an outright gift of land to working farmers as advocated by the Communists. Only the Progressives and Communists are unequivocal concerning the equality of women, the Liberals barely mention women, and the Social Democrats and Cooperatives ignore the problem. As of March 24 a total of 2,788 candidates had signified their intention to run in the general election. Political writers are already indulging in speculations concerning probable post-election coalitions centering about the Liberal Party. Reliable observers consider it unlikely that the Communist Party will gain more than token representation in the new Diet. The Communists, however, are concentrating upon strengthening their party organization and express confidence that the Party will show increased strength in the election after next. A considerable body of public opinion continues to decry the numerous minor parties and large numbers of independent candidates appearing on the political scene. In the opinion of Mr. OHATA Akira, secretary of the Young Men's Constitutional Party and treasurer of the Federation of New Parties, more than half of all minor parties will disappear from the political scene after the election. End of Summary.

Political Party Programs

During the past ten days, the titular head of each major political party issued a statement purporting to represent the

principles

principles for which his party is striving. Given a prominent position in consecutive issues of Asahi, these statements undoubtedly attracted wide attention among the reading public and may thus serve to awaken to some extent the public's interest in anticipated forthcoming party Government. A careful reading of these statements, however, suggests the usual vagueness as to purposes and aims on the part of all major parties, an effect which is in part produced by choice of language, and in part by the obvious omission of principles which might well have been included. This vagueness reflects the traditional political party's approach to an election campaign and represents a studied attitude by party leaders not to offend any important section of the electorate by taking an unequivocal stand upon major issues. It is obvious that the parties are "playing safe" with their statements of principles, and that in lieu of reliance upon principles are more apt to gather votes through the personal appeal of their recognized candidates and by assistance from local assembly members and organizations "controlled" by party leaders and their supporters. If the party statements are to be considered as enunciations of the respective party creeds, it is not yet apparent, despite the imminency of the election date, that specific major problems will be the issues upon which the election will be decided.

As might have been anticipated, the Progressive and Liberal Parties place greatest emphasis in their statements upon the maintenance of the Emperor, a relatively safe issue easily understood by the large conservative section of Japan and which might serve as a rallying point for the overwhelming majority who appear to be suspicious of the more radical doctrines hitherto announced by the Communists and left-wing Social Democrats. The Cooperative Party also stresses the necessity to "maintain the line of Emperors, unbroken for centuries." KATAYAMA Tetsu, Executive Secretary of the Social Democratic Party, failed to make a clear-cut statement of his party's attitude towards the Emperor. Instead, it was stated that the Social Democrats believe that too much power is still vested in the Emperor under the Government's draft Constitution. This cautious attitude probably represents a continuation of the efforts on the part of the Social Democrats to minimize the danger of a serious pre-election schism between right and left-wing elements of the Party's leadership. Likewise, the Communist Party in its statement failed to mention the Emperor but signified its program by referring to the necessity of establishing a "democratic republican Government"--an oblique reference to the Communist wish to abolish the Emperor system in its entirety.

Although expressed in general terms, the greatest divergence of views among the five major parties, as indicated by the party statements, is found in their respective economic programs. Briefly, these programs provide as follows:

Party

Party	Economic Program
Progressive	Moderate economic control by the Government, with foreign trade on a large scale as the principal goal.
Liberal	Industrialization to utilize Japan's excess population
Cooperative	Establishment of a cooperative community, with publicly elected managements for large enterprises.
Social Democratic	Nationalization of important industries, with adoption of socialistic planning.
Communist	To give land to all working farmers and to release medium and small industrialists from "monopolistic capitalism."

The subject of equality of women is clearly mentioned only in the programs of the Progressive and Communist parties, despite numerous statements previously made by leaders of all major parties that serious efforts are being made to interest women in their respective programs. The Progressive Party statement unequivocably records the Party's desire that "the inequality of the sexes must be abolished in all fields," an aim which is hardly exceeded by the Communist Party's "to give women liberty and equality." The Liberal Party merely states, in effect, that something must be done regarding the position of women in Japan, a platform principle which would hardly attract women's votes in a democracy. Neither the Social Democrats nor the Cooperatives even refer to the problem.

A section of the Tokyo Metropolitan press has recently advanced a plea for greater similarity in the platforms of all major political parties, on the ground that too great a divergence of party aims might make impossible a smooth-working Diet. It is stated that in view of the ease with which one of the three major parties could operate to embarrass the Government (assuming that the Progressives, Liberals, and Social Democrats should obtain approximately equal strength) the major parties should attempt to reconcile their principles along parallel lines. In view of past experience in Japan with political party leadership which eventually collapsed because of obstructionism and a short-sighted scramble to gain power at the expense of the majority party it appears likely that opportunistic bickering may characterize much of the coming Diet's activities. However, this will spring not necessarily from differences of view on principles but from the inferior degree of political morality and experience. Its remedy will be found in a clearer definition of principles and development of political morality and a sense of national responsibility.

(Summarized

(Summarized translations of the statements issued by the five major parties are enclosed as Appendices I, II, III, IV, and V.)

Candidates and the Parties

During the past week the number of candidates who have filed notices of candidacy has increased from 2,610 to 2,788, divided by political affiliations as follows:

Party	March 17	March 24
Progressive	356	376
Liberal	463	486
Social Democrats	332	339
Communist	138	143
Cooperative	78	88
Minor Parties	523	568
Independents	726	788
TOTALS	2,616	2,788

Perhaps because it has the largest number of officially supported candidates, the Liberal Party, with HATOYAMA Ichiro as its President, appears to be receiving more press publicity than formerly, although Mr. HATOYAMA is still under fire from the leftist press which is urging his withdrawal as a candidate. Political writers are already indulging in speculations concerning probable post-election coalitions between the Liberals and Progressives, or alternatively between the Liberals and Social Democrats, both of which possibilities were admitted by Mr. HATOYAMA in a recent interview. Little attention is given by the press to the Communist Party as an opposition factor, and the general consensus of opinion appears to consider it unlikely that the Communists will gain more than a token representation in the new Diet. Even the Communist leaders have stated that their party is now primarily engaged in strengthening its organization. The Communist leadership in Japan, it is believed, possesses sufficient political acumen to concentrate upon the well-seasoned party tactics of infiltration to enhance the party's long-range plans rather than attempt immediate gains in the current campaign. The relatively large number of Communist Party-sponsored candidates (143) may be taken as some evidence of a widespread party organization rather than as an index of immediate political strength. NOSAKA Sanzo, himself a candidate in the First District of Tokyo City, has stated that "increased Communist Party strength will become apparent in the next election but one."

Minor Parties and Independents

One of the anomalous features of the Japanese political scene is the continued appearance of numerous minor parties, many of which in fact comprise only one candidate and are

obviously

obviously the product of the personal vanity or political ambition of petty politicians. A number of newspaper editorials continue to decry the large numbers of independent and minor party candidates and stress the principle that by keeping away from the major parties, this class of politician assists in a continued disregard for the rule of the majority.

An interesting example of a typical minor party is the "Young Men's Constitutional Party" (Rikken Seinen-to), one of 11 minor parties comprising the "Federation of New Parties" (Shinto Rengo). Mr. OH.T. Akira, Secretary of the former and Treasurer of the federation, described his party as a group of approximately 100 young men between the ages of 20 and 30, lacking experience, but who at least are not tainted by old-line party standards. Both organizations were organized by one YAMAMOTO Monju, organizer and secretary of the defunct East Asia New Order Society, recently ordered dissolved. According to Mr. OH.T., the Young Men's Constitutional Society is not formally running a candidate at this time, but is supporting two "independents". Its chief aim is to familiarize its members with "political theories" which are discussed at lecture meetings called for this purpose.

The New Parties' Federation is a loose organization designed to enable the member parties mutually to assist and support each other. Six of the eleven parties involved are each running one candidate; the remaining five parties are running a total of fifteen candidates. In Mr. OH.T.'s opinion, most of the minor party candidates, would affiliate themselves with a major party, if elected, but the minor party candidates feel that it would be disadvantageous to their personal interests were they to declare allegiance to a major party prior to the election.

William J. Sebald

APPENDIX I

Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 1946 Summary Translation

Public Pledge to the People, by KATAYAMA Tetsu, Executive Secretary, Social Democratic Party

1. Rise with Socialism:

Our slogan for the coming election is: Rise with Socialism or fall with Capitalism. Japan must adopt socialism for its reconstruction. Capitalism will lead to its destruction. All the past economic policies have failed because of the pursuance of capitalistic policies.

2. Agrarian reform; democratization of rationing:

We will expose all hidden goods and distribute them through the regular ration channels. Rice purchasing will be done through the cooperation of the farmers' unions. Ration machinery will be democratized to insure minimum living standards.
All fertilizer industries will be nationalized if necessary; agrarian reform will be executed thoroughly so that all will become independent farmers for the development of the production spirit.
Subsidies and encouragement will be given toward the formation of consumer cooperatives and public markets to help relieve the burden of the housewives.

3. Production increase and national monetary control:

Socialistic economic planning will be put into effect for the realization of the "production first" principle. Coal will be nationalized to insure distribution of a minimum of ~ million tons per month (between 2-1/2 million and 3 million).
Reclamation of hidden materials for use in the production of civilian goods; promotion of the production of exchange goods for importation of daily necessities and foods by planned mobilization of labor power through the positive cooperation of labor unions; restriction of improper profits.
Our principle is, "Increased production of necessities through high efficiency and high wages."
Property tax exemption to be from 60,000 to 70,000 yen.

4. Non-workers will not eat:

Our policy for unemployment is: Those who do not work will not eat. Public works such as dam construction and rehabilitation of war devastated areas will absorb much of the unemployed. We proceed from the premise that the unemployed are the victims of national policy. Full efforts

will be

will be made to absorb them in useful industries and relief will also be granted. Unemployment insurance will be put into effect after the planned distribution of labor power. Up to that time an unemployment allowance system will be applied. For example: Rehabilitation Labor Corporations will be organized in war devastated areas which would register the unemployed and put them to work for a few hours a day, the allowance will take care of minimum standards. Labor unions to operate these organs and to undertake their training (unemployed).
Public housing projects will be begun for solution of the housing problem.

5. Establishment of a democratic constitution:

The new constitution is good in many ways but there are faults. Too much power is still vested in the Emperor, the duration of the Diet is not clear, and no provision is made for the permanent existence of the DIET, composition of the House of Councillors is not given, and the peerage is still to exist for some time. Democracy and the abolition of war must await the establishment of socialism.

APPENDIX II

Asahi Shimbun, March 14, 1946 Summary Translation

Public Pledge to the People, by HATOYAMA Ichiro, President of the Liberal Party

1. Upholding the national polity:

The primary requisite in political reconstruction and the opening of a new destiny lies in the maintenance of the national polity. By national polity is meant the progressive totality of the Japanese race. Its preservation is not only a feeling but also a nationalistic desire on the part of the people. Thus the maintenance of the Emperor system is the passionate will of the people combining both reason and faith. The establishment of democratic ideals and systems with the Emperor system at the center is the sole path open for Japan.

To realize this it is necessary to abolish the Emperor's divine power and make of him an ordinary character. In this sense a great reduction should be made in Imperial prerogatives, to be granted to the Diet and to the Cabinet, both representing the people's will. In this way the rights of the people will be respected and freedom and justice will reign.

2. Food problem:

The importation of foreign foods is absolutely necessary. The farmers must be responsible for selling rice to the Government.

3. Industrial policy for a new Japan:

It was a political mistake for Japan to have been troubled about her over-population problem. The basis for the future progress of Japan must be this rich population. That is to say, for Japan, which is lacking in foodstuffs and raw materials, it is necessary to pursue a policy of intense industrialization which would necessitate high labor power and to export this plentiful labor power in the form of goods. In this connection the existence of favorable manpower and ocean transportation conditions promises great hope for the future of Japan.

When the Allied Forces begin to demand reparations in kind, we believe that they will open a way to supply us with the necessary equipment and raw materials. If this occurs, it would provide a great opportunity for industrial development.

The Liberal Party is for industrial rehabilitation. This includes the control of vicious inflation. In regard to the property tax we favor the principle of national joint taxation by increasing the exemption level from the present figure

of ¥0,000

of 50,000 yen to 100,000 yen. We hope that the industrial-capitalists will not think of themselves alone but would consider arousing the national cooperative spirit.

4. Social and cultural policies:

Industrial rehabilitation is the key to the solution of the unemployment problem as well as the absorption of demobilized soldiers and repatriates. Rehabilitation of war devastated areas and overall national planning are also needed. Proper distribution of unemployed and the reemployment of the intelligentsia through joint efforts of the government and the people are required. The position of women and education must be solved. It is the policy of the Liberal Party to work toward the harmonious cooperation of the workers and the capitalists.

We believe that freedom is the natural desire of man and for the fulfillment of this desire, cultural development and education are necessary. This is our task.

APPENDIX XII

Asahi Shimbun, March 15, 1946 Summary Translation

Public Pledge to the People, by TOKUDA Kyuichi, Chief Secretary of the Communist Party

1. Our party is true to its promise. We shall never go back on the pledge that we made to the people in the election campaign. Therefore, we shall never give any promises which would be impossible to fulfill.

2. The basis of our promises is to devote ourselves to initiate every possible measure for the security and promotion of the people's way of life, and to carry them out with no anticipation of reward.

3. The basic aim of our party is to make Japan contented, peaceful, and wealthy.

4. It is an immediate necessity to procure employment, food and homes for workers, farmers, demobilized service men, repatriated nationals from overseas, war victims, medium and small businessmen, and all oppressed people. Basic and immediate plans for this are:

(a) To increase wages in accordance with the present trend in prices of commodities, rates, fares, and other daily expenses.

(b) To give all the working farmers land, and, at the same time, to multiply their present holding, enlarging it at least two-fold.

(c) To give women liberty and equality; that is, not to discriminate between men and women in professions, and to allow women to compete for important offices, abolishing all social and political discriminations.

(d) To release the medium and small businessmen and industrialists from the restrictions of the bureaucratic control system and monopolistic capitalism, and to guarantee freedom of business, thereby assisting in the increase of food products and the smoothness of distribution. Our party is ready to make many concrete measures to carry out these plans.

5. In order to solve the problems of food and daily necessities, the following measures are being prepared.

(a)To expose and deliver into the hands of the people the food and daily necessities concealed or hoarded by big capitalists and landowners, the military clique and bureaucrats.

(b) Agricultural products and daily necessities are to be delivered voluntarily and distributed under the supervision of the people.

(c) To abolish the forced administration of staple food, lest it cause a feeling of unrest among the farmers. At the

same

same time, to distribute such necessities as farm implements, clothing, fuel and salt, thereby giving impetus to the flow of agricultural products.

6. In order to prevent inflation and secure the life of the people:

(a) To have the Government withdraw the moratorium, which has favored monopolistic capitalists, Zaibatsu and large landowners.

(b) To immediately amalgamate the banks and other banking institutions and deliver them into the hands of the people, thereby freezing the funds of capitalists and landowners.

(c) To circulate plenty of funds, so far as they are really used for the increase of production, and so far as they are managed by a managing conference, including workers.

(d) To lend sufficient funds, if necessary, for farming, under the supervision of the farmers' unions, and thereby giving impetus to the increase of agricultural products.

(e) To permit funds for furnishing homes for laborers, farmers, workers, demobilized soldiers, war victims, repatriates, and others.

(f) To allow the funds of political parties, unions, cultural associations, and other corporations, insofar as they really work for democracy.

7. In order to put laborers, farmers, office workers, demobilized soldiers, war victims, and the unemployed, immediately and completely to work:

(a) To make use of all equipment by preventing the sabotage of production by capitalists and the reactionary government, and to absorb the unemployed therein. If necessary, in order to make room for the jobless, working hours are to be reduced.

(b) To encourage the reconstruction and expansion of communications, the marine transportation and postal businesses, and, at the same time, to improve the labor conditions of workers, reducing working hours and increasing the number of workers.

(c) To reconstruct all the institutes and houses destroyed by air raids. The Government and the public corporations must immediately begin to expand and promote rehabilitation work.

(d) To commence lumbering on forests owned by the Imperial Family, the State, capitalists, and landowners, and appropriate them for building purposes, fuel, etcetera.

(e) To commence operations for reclaiming waste lands in possession of the Imperial Family, the State, capitalists, and landowners.

(f) To commence big projects for preventing floods, digging canals, drying swampy grounds and developing hydroelectric plants. These projects must be started immediately under the direction of a people's republican government.

8. If we are to carry out these various plans, we must:

(a) Thoroughly punish the war criminals and those who are guilty of infringing upon human rights;

(b) Overthrow the reactionary SHIDEHARA cabinet at once;

(c) Enact a democratic constitution, thereby having the people take the helm of state affairs, through the national Diet, under a unicameral system.

9. If

9. If we are to carry out these plans, it is essential to form a popular front, which acts on behalf of the people, by combining the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, labor unions, farmers' unions, cultural organizations, organizations of medium and small businessmen and industrialists, young men's associations, etcetera. We must establish a democratic republican government, respected by the masses, by establishing this popular front.

10. In order to fix more concrete and minute policies for the execution of these basic plans, we must overthrow the present feudalistic Emperor system, under which the people have long been suppressed by the brutal army and police groups, the large landowners and capitalists and bureaucrats. It is a matter of course that a people's republican government must be established in their place.

APPENDIX IV

Asahi Shimbun, March 16, 1946 Summary Translation

The Program of the Progressive Party
by SAITO Takao

1. Emperor System.

We need hardly stress the fact that we love and respect the Emperor, as representing the family from which the Japanese race has sprung. We feel, furthermore, that during the growth of democracy there is the danger that power can concentrate in the hands of the Government rather than in those of Parliament; in order words, at times there is a risk that the head of the Government may turn dictator. Our party is looking to cultural, peaceful and moral heritage of our Emperor system for providing us with a safeguard against such perils. Accordingly, we desire the Emperor to have the right of veto in case the Parliament transfers its general prerogatives to the Government, or whenever emergency legislation is considered, tending to curtail individual liberties on a large scale.

2. Foreign Policy.

In this field we will make sincere efforts to carry out the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and to join a world-wide organization, able to contribute to world peace and culture.

3. Culture.

We want a new Japanese culture to contribute to world culture, and science must expand on an epoch-making scale. In other fields, we want to preserve Japan's peculiar culture, at the same time bringing about its amalgamation with world civilization.

4. Education.

We advocate a great reform in the object of education. We want to educate the personality and regard education within the family and in the schools as most important; to this end adequate educational facilities must be created.

5. Women.

The inequality of the sexes must be abolished in all fields, and we must raise the status of women. Their work in the households must be made easier by the use of electricity and other devices and they must have leisure for reading, study and recreation. Their interest in society as well as in the development of their own personality must be stimulated.

6. Planning and Trade.

In order to feed 80 millions in our poorly supplied country, we must be prepared to employ one half of the total population

in trade

in trade and industry. Because we must import raw materials, while exporting finished products, we are in need of scientific planning for production. Trade must likewise be planned, and the advice of the Allied Powers must be sought on the details.

7. Controlled Economy.

We favor moderate economic control which will not blunt creative abilities or interfere with justifiable gains. Great industrial associations must be formed to ensure distribution of materials and the production of essential goods. Yet on behalf of the democratization of industry, an agency must be created with even greater powers than those of the American Trust Controlling Agency, so that the arbitrariness of capitalists may be checked.

8. Industrial Reconstruction.

This is the key to overcome all economic difficulties and must, therefore, be the object of our greatest efforts. This implies that adequate policies must be evolved for all related fields, such as the handling of labor-capital disputes, balance of production-costs and prices, etc.

9. The Food Problem.

This problem must be approached through distributing fertilizer and through appropriate measures.

10. Labor Policy.

A healthy development of the trade union movement must be supported and working conditions improved. Assistance must also be extended to consumers unions. Labor disputes should be settled by a general arbitration system; minimum wages must be guaranteed, and social insurance should be expanded. Workers should take part in the management of plants and should have their share of the profits.

APPENDIX V

Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 1946 Summary Translation

Public Pledge to the People, by IGARA Tadao, Representative Manager of the Cooperative Party

1. It is a strong conviction of our party that the only way of reconstruction left for our fatherland is the principle of cooperation, in which all the people live in mutual reliance and assistance in all phases of our lives, such as the political, economic, educational and cultural.

2. We must firmly hold to the spirit of cooperation, in other words, co-prosperity and mutual reliance must accompany the cessation of struggles. The establishment of a cooperative community, with liberty, equality and peace joined with labor, autonomy and fraternity; only in this can we find a way of establishing a new Japan. From such a point of view, our party should propose the following platform:

3. Establishment of a Democratic Political Structure: In the first place we must maintain the line of Emperors, unbroken for centuries. The Japanese policy must be led by the Diet representing the people's will, in close cooperation with the Emperor and the people. From this point of view, we agree on the whole with the recent government draft of the Constitution. However, from the standpoint of cooperation, we should like to advocate that since the House of Representatives is representative of districts, the chamber of Councillors must be representative of occupations. The principle of cooperation rejects a despotism by either, the Legislature, the executive or the judiciary. Above all, to protect the independence of the judiciary, preventing despotism by the legislature, more consideration must be given to the appointment and removal of judicial officers.

Further, we should like to invest the Emperor with a veto power like that of the President of the United States, which would be used when the Diet does not accurately reflect public opinion on important matters. The Emperor should also be invested with the power of appeal to a national election. On the other hand, we emphasize the necessity of a thorough-going public management of election, opening of the party expenses to the public view, and the establishment of a membership-fee system, to prevent corruption of party politics and the revival of plutocracy.

4. Establishment of a Democratic Economic Structure: The principle of cooperation will naturally demand the democratization of the economic organization. We absolutely reject state ownership of important enterprises after the dissolution of the Zaibatsu, expecting to realize quickly their management by the cooperative society. We mean that enterprise should be managed for the public welfare by publicly elected operators and financed by capital invested by laborers, capitalists and consumers who have an interest in it.

We intend

We intend to solve the unemployment and repatriation problems by alloting agricultural, forestry and fishing rights. Stress will be laid upon the reclamation of waste lands, the draining of swampy land and plantation and agriculture and fisheries. At the same time, more efforts will be made in the production or engineering fields, and war reconstruction.

5. Enforcement of Food Policy. As the food problem is the basis of all other problems, we advocate that all efforts should be concentrated to implement the food policy for the coming two years.

We are preparing measures regarding autonomic rice delivery, that can really be approved by the farmers, that envisage the distribution of fertilizer, farm-implements and other necessities which they eagerly want, through the activities of the cooperatives. On the other hand, we will let the people know the real food situation so that they can bear the shortage.

In order to give impetus to the increase of cocoons, which are very important as sources of foreign exchange with which to pay for imports, their price should be more than 450 "Kake"; and two "Sho" of extra rice should be distributed for the delivery of 1 "Kan" of cocoons.

6. New Establishment of the Peace Ministry: The Government is the greatest consumer. In view of preventing inflation and establishing a cooperative society and nation, the national expenditure must be curtailed to fit the present economic power of this country. We intend to found the Peace Ministry as an agency for conducting the business of demobilization and repatriation, planning the reconstruction of war-damaged cities and towns, and establishing a permanent peace policy of cooperation, thereby raising Japan from a fourth-class to a first-class power with a high standard of culture.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, March 19, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING
WEEK ENDING MARCH 16, 1946

Summary. After many weeks of uncertainty following purges and new regulations, the political parties generally welcomed the official announcement fixing election day on April 10, 1946. The political campaign has appeared to be of secondary interest to the press to date, in part due to the occurrence in Japan and elsewhere of many events of major importance. Conditions in Japan tend to discourage political activity and understanding of issues involved on the part of the masses. Nor has stimulation been provided by the leadership of the political parties. While it is as yet too early to prognosticate with any degree of accuracy concerning probable results of the election, current forecasts by political leaders indicate usual optimism by the three major parties that they will each be the largest party in the new Diet. An interesting trend has developed as a result of rather large numbers of "independent" candidates affiliating themselves with the major parties, a development which may contribute to a stabilized Diet. More than 2,600 candidates have filed formal notices of candidacy. A new movement for the establishment of a popular front has been launched by a committee of sponsors headed by Mr. YAMAKAMA Hitoshi. The sponsors hope to attract a wide circle of representative individuals and whole sections of political parties, unions, and associations. In the opinion of informed observers, the development of the popular front movement is slow. It hardly seems likely that the optimistic anticipations of the popular front sponsors will be realized. In the provinces, such movements have been local affairs, generally non-political in character, and limited to the solution of specific problems. End of Summary.

Inauguration of Election Campaign

After many weeks of uncertainty, sudden changes brought on by the "purge", realignment of party leadership, and the completion of filing information reports concerning party organizations and finances, the political parties generally welcomed the official announcement fixing the election date as April 10, 1946. The announcement left a scant 30 days during which the numerous candidates and their supporters may appeal to the voters and prepare for the final decision of the electorate. The importance of the political campaign, however, has been somewhat obscured by numerous events of major importance in Japan and elsewhere. This has detracted somewhat from the attention given by the press to the election campaign.

It is

It is also understandable that a people, particularly those in large cities, burdened with the necessity of obtaining food, warmth, housing, transportation, and the bare essentials of living under the conditions in Japan today, find it difficult to become interested in political parties and their efforts to support party candidates. In general, these conditions would seem to contribute to passivity in the sense that the voters will probably rely upon instinct and personal appeal rather than upon an understanding, or attempted understanding, of the issues involved. The generally superficial leadership demonstrated to date by political parties in their endeavors to attract voters is paralleled by the apparent political lethargy of the masses. In the final analysis, the attraction to a party lies in the personalities of its candidates rather than in the party per se or in its avowed principles.

It is as yet too early to attempt prognostication of probable election results, but current forecasts by party leaders are each in the usual optimistic vein. INUKAI Ken of the Progressive Party is confident that "more than 300 seats" will be gained by his party, in view of the solidarity of the party's constituencies. The Liberal Party likewise hopes to obtain "more than 300 seats" in the new Diet, chiefly because in the opinion of party leaders, the people prefer free capitalism to state control. KATAYAMA Tetsu, Secretary General of the Social Democratic Party, expressed his party's belief that it will emerge as the major party in the Diet in view of the broad base of farmers and laborers upon which the party is formed. IKAWA Tadao, President of the Cooperative Party, is confident that the influence of the many cooperative societies throughout Japan will return a large number of the Party's candidates. TOKUDA Kyuichi, Secretary General of the Japan Communist Party, contented himself with once again stressing the Party's determination "to carry out this democratic revolution."

Candidates and the Parties

As of March 9 the Government had received 3,296 applications from prospective candidates for qualification certificates under its "purge" ordinance. Confirmation was issued to 3,045 candidates, 98 applicants were "purged", 14 applications were still under consideration, and 138 applications were withdrawn prior to decision by the Government. By sexes, the "approved" candidates are divided into 2,971 males and 74 females. (The numbers of candidates tentatively "approved" by the Government for each election district, together with the number of seats available, are tabulated in Appendix I.)

An interesting development since candidates have filed their formal notices of candidacy is noted in the large number of "independents" who have affiliated themselves with one of the major parties. A number of these affiliations are somewhat tenuous, in that they do not become effective until after the election, but they nevertheless indicate a trend which, if continued, would tend to stabilize the political character of the Diet. (Reliable statistics concerning the declarations of "independents" are as yet unavailable, but it is estimated that approximately 30% have already declared for a major party.)

According

According to an investigation made by Asahi, the total number of candidates who have filed formal notices of candidacy with the local authorities now exceeds 2,600, or approximately six times the number of seats available. (A tabulation of the number of candidates who have already filed, by parties and election districts, is enclosed as Appendix II. This is the final step necessary before an individual can become a candidate and should not be confused with the "approval" given by the Government.)

Popular Front Movement

As previously reported, the Communist Party has made repeated efforts to launch a popular front through the coalition of the Communist and Social Democratic Parties. NOSAKA Sanzo, Communist leader, has hitherto been the leading exponent of the popular front, a proposal which has given leftist elements a rallying point for opposition to the more moderate section of the Social Democratic leadership.

A formidable effort to form a popular front is now being made under the leadership of Mr. YAMAKAWA Hitoshi, popular leftist writer. As sponsors of the movement, Mr. YAMAKAWA has gathered a group of well-known persons whose announced purpose is to create a preparation committee to formulate a platform and other detailed arrangements for a popular front. The sponsors include the following:

YAMAKAWA Hitoshi	Leftist writer
NOSAKA Sanzo	Communist leader
TAKANO Iwasaburo	Leftist Social Democrat
YOKOTA Kisaburo	International law authority
OUCHI Hyoe	Professor, Tokyo Imperial University
KUROSAWA Kazoku	Communist commentator and writer
KAMEDAMA Joseimm	Commentator and writer
IWAJIMASHI Tomoan	Editor, "Oriental Economist"
HANI Goroku	Roman commentator
KAWASAKI Natsu	Woman commentator
TATSUNO Takashi	Professor, Tokyo Imperial University
FUJITA Taki	Professor, Tsuda Girls College
ABE Iso	Leftist Social Democrat - ?
ASANATA Kansan	Leftist Social Democrat
KIKUKAWA Katsumi	Journalist
SUZUKI Itsutaro	Professor, Tokyo Imperial University
SUZUKA Hiroshi	Professor, Kyoto Imperial University
MIURA Tetsutaro	Adviser, "Oriental Economist"

The political affiliations or tendencies of those who have not declared their political allegiance is unknown but obviously would not differ seriously from the general complexion of the leftist or communist views of their associates.

According to Mr. YAMAKAWA, the desire of the sponsors of the popular front is to include in the movement as wide a circle of representative individuals and organizations as possible and to

incorporate

incorporate whole sections of existing political parties, cooperatives, unions, and associations. Mr. YAMAKAWA denied that the popular front is based on ideological lines, but stated that it aims to be the enemy of "anti-democratic" elements of every kind. He feels that the Japanese people must themselves develop new leaders and influences, a need which is urgent in view of the dire situation in which Japan finds itself. He visualizes the possibility of civil disturbances, in part caused by lack of competent leadership. Consequently, the popular front movement, he says, is designed to furnish leaders who would be ready to cooperate with the Headquarters whenever needed to allay or control such trouble. In Mr. YAMAKAWA's opinion, it is unfortunate that insufficient time remains prior to the election for development of an effective, politically-minded popular front organization, but it is hoped that eventually the movement will be of sufficient strength to sponsor its own candidates, e.g., as "Democratic People's League (Minshu Jinmin Remmei)" nominees. It is interesting to note that this program is at variance with HUSAKA's contention that the popular front is merely a democratic movement which has no political aspirations.

Regarding the possibility of the Communist Party eventually gaining control of the popular front organization, Mr. YAMAKAWA readily admitted that if the Communists join as a party, such danger does exist. He insists, however, that his "group" is considering the matter carefully "in order not to have trouble." It is not clear just what he has in mind in using the word "trouble", but it is obvious that he envisages the possibility of the Communist Party using or eventually controlling the "popular front". In this connection, in view of the familiar tactics of the Communist Party, it would appear likely that although the Party as a whole will eventually identify itself with the popular front movement, the Communist Party will be careful to preserve publicly the cooperative character of the movement and to avoid any accusation that it is exclusively communist.

Despite the optimistic and somewhat naive predictions of the popular front sponsors, even Kamiyama admitted that the development of the front is slow and that the attitude of the majority leadership of the Social Democratic Party is unfriendly towards the plan. Mr. YAMAKAWA expressed disappointment over the failure of small merchants as a class to evince interest in his movement, but insists that his plan is the only method by which Japan can be saved. The National Federation of Labor, largely controlled by Social Democrats, also appears skeptical of the advisability of encouraging the popular front, largely because the sponsors appear to lack clear-cut objectives. Of the political parties, only the Communist Party has expressed wholehearted approval, although opportunity was taken in its statement strongly to criticize the right-wing Social Democrats as "betrayers of the people" because of their refusal to join the popular front.

Viewed

Viewed objectively, it does not appear at the moment and so long as there remains reasonable economic stability and opportunity for livelihood that the popular front will rapidly develop into the force anticipated by its sponsors, despite semblances of popular front movements in the provinces. In the latter cases, local conditions resulting in mal-distribution of food or similar problems have furnished an impetus for so-called political party coalitions to solve such problems, but in almost every case the "movement" has been short-lived or is continued as a non-political effort. The popular front remains a live political question, the development of which should continue to be carefully observed.

William J. Sebald

Appendix I

Election District	Number of "Approved" Candidates	Seats Available	
Hokkaido 1st	74	14	25
" 2nd	39	9	
Aomori	48	7	
Iwate	50	8	
Miyagi	44	9	
Akita	37	8	
Yamagata	49	9	
Fukushima	90	13	
Ibaragi	106	13	
Tochigi	63	10	
Gunma	64	10	
Saitama	60	12	
Chiba	91	13	
Tokyo 1st	130	10	22
" 2nd	150	12	
Kanagawa	82	12	
Niigata 1st	32	7	15
" 2nd	40	8	
Toyama	42	6	
Ishikawa	38	6	
Fukui	46	5	
Yamanashi	38	5	
Nagano	88	14	
Gifu	63	10	
Shizuoka	100	14	
Aichi 1st	77	11	18
" 2nd	34	7	
Mie	49	9	
Shiga	44	6	
Kyoto	75	10	
Osaka 1st	81	7	18
" 2nd	62	11	
Hyogo 1st	85	11	18
Hyogo 2nd	33	7	
Nara	28	5	
Wakayama	44	6	
Tottori	25	4	
Shimane	24	6	
Okayama	58	10	
Hiroshima	61	12	
Yamaguchi	55	9	
Tokushima	26	5	
Kagawa	27	6	
Ehime	38	9	
Kochi	30	5	
Fukuoka 1st	69	9	18
" 2nd	31	9	
Saga	41	5	
Nagasaki	60	8	
Kumamoto	72	10	
Oita	59	7	
Miyazaki	35	6	
Kagoshima	57	11	
Okinawa		3	
TOTALS	3,045	468	

Appendix II

Asahi Shimbun — March 17, 1946

Result of Candidates

	Progressive Party	Liberal Party	Social Democratic Party	Communist Party	Cooperative Party	Various Political Parties	Independents	TOTALS
KANTO DISTRICT								
Tokyo	26	33	21	7	5	81	67	240
Kanagawa	7	11	9	3	2	17	22	71
Saitama	8	13	7	3		12	8	51
Chiba	14	16	7	6	3	11	22	79
Ibaraki	16	13	10	4	5	18	17	83
Yamanashi	4	2	3	2	1	9	10	31
Gunma	8	9	6	4	1	9	14	53
Tochigi	10	13	8	5	2	8	8	54
TOHOKU DISTRICT								
Hokkaido	2	19	15	9	12	21	18	96
Aomori	6	9	3	2	2	4	7	33
Akita	8	8	4	3	3	5	8	39
Yamagata	4	6	7	2		5	10	34
Iwate	6	19	6	1	1	2	9	44
Miyagi	4	8	5	2		14	5	38
Fukushima	19	12	8	3	3	12	21	78
HOKURIKU-SHINETSU DISTRICT								
Nagano	4	11	6	7	7	16	19	70
Niigata	10	13	10	4		12	17	66
Toyama	8	5	8	2	1	3	7	34
Ishikawa	4	4	3	2	1	4	16	34
Fukui	5	9	4	2		4	14	38
TOKAI DISTRICT								
Shizuoka	14	16	8	3	1	16	24	82
Aichi	26	14	12	6	1	22	21	101
Mie	7	8	10	1		9	16	50
Gifu	7	14	9	3		4	18	55
KINKI DISTRICT								
Osaka	13	19	17	6	4	33	46	138
Kyoto	8	14	7	3	2	10	27	71
Shiga	4	8	7	1		5	11	36
Nara	3	4	5	2	1	5	8	28
Wakayama	3	10	5	2	1	9	17	47
Hyogo	19	20	18	5	2	27	24	113

CHUGOKU

	Progressive Party	Liberal Party	Social Democratic Party	Communist Party	Cooperative Party	Various Political Parties	Independents	TOTALS
OKUGOKU DISTRICT								
Okayama	5	9	7	3		6	16	46
Hiroshima		8	5	1		10	19	43
Yamaguchi	1	14	6	2	3	4	14	44
Tottori	3	4	2	2		5	6	22
Shimane	6	2	3	2	1	2	4	20
SHIKOKU DISTRICT								
Kagawa	2	7	5	1		2	7	24
Ehime	11	7	4	2		5	6	35
Tokushima	1	2	2	1	1	3	18	28
Kochi	4	3	3	2	1	6	5	24
KYUSHU DISTRICT								
Fukuoka	12	6	13	5	1	22	31	89
Kumamoto	7	8	5	2		5	22	49
Saga	6	7	4	2	3	7	5	34
Nagasaki	9	8	6	2	3	9	16	53
Oita	7	8	8	3		13	9	48
Miyazaki		4	6	2	1	9	5	27
Kagoshima	5	6	6	3	3	9	12	44
Okinawa								
TOTALS	255	463	332	138	78	523	726	2,616

800

Political

#26

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 19, 1946.

CONFIDENTIAL.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff.

SUBJECT: Political Parties in Japan: Developments During Week Ending January 19, 1946.

There is transmitted hereunder, pursuant to the Chief of Staff's memorandum of October 3, 1945, our latest weekly report on political parties in Japan, which covers developments during the week ending February 16, 1946.

Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer in Charge

Enclosure:

Political Parties Report
dated February 18, 1946.

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 18, 1946.

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 16, 1946.

SUMMARY. The major parties have been seriously affected by the Government's announcement of its clarification policy concerning the SCAP January 4 purge directive, with casualties among former Diet members now estimated to run as high as 90 percent. The Cabinet has indicated a surprising firmness not to deviate from its announced policy, thus shattering the hopes of many ex-Diet members who had hoped to let their records speak for themselves. It is obvious, however, that the order eliminates numbers of experienced parliamentarians whose presence in the new Diet will be sorely missed when the business of organizing committees and steering through important legislation begins. The Progressive, Liberal, and Cooperative Parties have been especially hard hit, but are implementing plans to supply alternates who, despite their probable second-rate caliber, have hopes of being elected. The Social Democratic Party's leadership has been seriously unbalanced and fear is expressed that the left-wingers of the party are now in a position to exercise much greater influence upon the party's policies. The leftist press continues its attacks on right-wing leaders whose position appears to be somewhat ambiguous, thereby hoping further to strengthen or accomplish left-wing control. The Social Democratic and Communist Parties are utilizing unions as political weapons, with the Communists continuing strong efforts to infiltrate Social Democratic strongholds. NOSAKA Sanzo's organizing tour of the Kansai is admittedly a tour of invasion into Social Democratic territory and supplements Communist infiltration tactics elsewhere from above and below. The "popular front" issue is being kept alive by the Communists and leftist press, and even Liberal Party President HATOYAMA Ichiro has issued a denial that his party is interested in forming a popular front with the Progressives. The Progressive Party's constitutional revision plan appears to be a liberal document which has borrowed a number of provisions from American and British constitutional doctrines. It is more explicit than any plan which has previously been announced. End of SUMMARY.

The Cabinet's Purge of Candidates

The Government's clarification of the SCAP January 4 purge directive has resulted in a growing confusion among the rank and file of the major political parties. With estimates of casualties among former Diet members ranging as high as 90 percent, only some 50 old-time politicians appear to be eligible as candidates in the coming election. The press has carried numerous detailed items concerning the latest purge measure, with comments varying from mild approval to calls in the leftist papers for further ruthless screening. In a series of individual conferences with

party

party leaders, the Cabinet has clarified its stand on the "recommended candidate" formula to the effect that no exceptions are to be allowed. This attitude comes as a heavy shock to those ex-Diet members who had hoped to stand on their past records as a whole.

The order has cut deeply across the four major parties (Progressive, Liberal, Cooperative and Social Democratic) and will undoubtedly exert considerable influence on party structures by its elimination of experienced personnel whose places must necessarily be taken by alternates in the case of the highly organized parties, and by persons of lesser experience in such parties as the Social Democratic and Cooperative Parties.

Aside from the desire of many candidates to become members of the Diet in a sincere endeavor to assist Japan in these difficult times, the fact nevertheless remains that the business of organizing a people's assembly with its traditionally complex rules of parliamentary procedure is a major task calling for consummate skill and procedural knowledge. Unless the Diet is to become a zoo, as it was once termed during the pseudo-Democratic days of the Seiyukai and Minseito, it is evident that a backbone of experienced leaders should be available to furnish guidance to the major party entrusted with organizing the Diet and steering through its committees and to the floor the critical legislation which lies ahead. That such experience will be almost entirely lacking is evident from an examination of the effects of the latest purge upon the several parties.

(a) Progressive Party

Worst affected by the purge was the old-line leadership of the Progressive Party. Among the party's leaders, comprising its President, MACHIDA Chuji, 16 Directors, and the heads of 10 sections, only SAITO Takao, veteran politician with a liberal reputation, remains unaffected. It is known, however, that the Progressives have been quietly preparing for a purge and are ready to bring forward substitute candidates who will have full support from the party's well-oiled national political machine, a left-over of the old Minseito and Seiyukai organizations. There are also a number of so-called independent candidates who, in fact, have the backing of the party machine but who for various reasons do not prefer to run under a party label. Finally, the Progressive Party has solid backing among many influential members of prefectural assemblies which remain relatively untouched by current directives, have not been subjected to an election since the beginning of the war, and remain the repository of local prejudices.

According to Mr. SAITO Takao, acting head of the Progressives, positions formerly monopolized in the party by ex-Diet members will now gradually be filled by less experienced politicians. From a long-range viewpoint, this is probably an advance, but Mr. SAITO predicts that the election of so many newcomers will result in placing a second-rate body of politicians in charge of the country's destinies when vision and ability are required. In any event, the Progressives, despite the bitter medicine they have been forced

to swallow

to swallow during the past six weeks, are confident that the party will emerge with a majority. To paraphrase Mr. SAITO, in Japanese politics, as elsewhere, a party must have a "machine". A party with a "machine" at its disposal need not worry too much about the caliber of its candidates.

(b) Liberal Party

The Liberal Party has also lost a number of its influential personalities. Luckily for the party, present indications are that Mr. HATOYAMA Ichiro will weather the storm, despite somewhat distorted charges in Yomiuri and other leftist papers that he must resign because of his "position" as adviser to the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society. Mr. HATOYAMA has emphatically denied having held the position as charged and reaffirmed his decision to be a candidate. Should Mr. HATOYAMA be disqualified, it is doubtful whether the Liberal Party could survive.

(c) Social Democratic Party

An unexpected result of the latest purge order may be a considerable strengthening of the left-wing faction of the Social Democratic Party, accused by certain sections of the right-wing of being subject to Communist influence and direction. Among influential right-wing members of the party made ineligible are KAWAKAMI Jotaro, SUGIYAMA Motojiro, and TAMAN Kiyomi, with the leftist press adding HIRANO Rikizo, MIYAKE Masaichi, KAWAKATA Kiyone, and KOMO Mitsu. To counter-balance this loss, MATSUMOTO Jiichiro of the left-wing appears to fall within the ban. Irrespective of factions, it is obvious that the Social Democratic Party, at best still in an organizational stage, will lose valuable and experienced leaders with many years of work among labor unions to their credit.

The Cabinet's order will further serve to intensify internal party manoeuverings and upset the precarious balance which has hitherto been maintained by several groupings in the party's leadership. In the order of left to right, the Social Democratic Party's leadership now appears to be divided into the following factions:

YAMAKAWA Hitoshi) ARAHATA Kanson)	Proponents of "popular fmt" with the Communists; appear to be under strong Communist influence; admittedly left-wing.
KATO Kanju) SUZUKI Mosaburo) KURODA Hisao)	Said by right-wing faction to be under Communist influence; admittedly left-wing.
MIZUTANI Chosaburo) *MATSUMOTO Jiichiro)	Proponents of a "popular front" with the Communists and possibly under their influence; admittedly left-wing.
*KAWAKAMI Jotaro) *SUGIYAMA Motojiro) *KOMO Mitsu) ASANUMA Inejiro) SUNAGA Ko) NOMIZO Masaru) TAHARA Haruji) NAKAMURA Takaichi) *MIYAKE Shoichi)	Self-styled rightwing of party; Anti-Communist and anti-left-wing.

KATAYAMA

KATAYAMA Tetsu) Right-wing; hold party together by
MATSUOKA Komakichi) assuming leadership and through force
*NISHIO Suehiro) of personalities.
HARA Hyo)
YONEKUBO Mitsutsuke)

*HIRANO Rikizo) Extreme right-wing of party;appears to play lone hand.

(*Disqualified or alleged to be disqualified)

Yoshiuri has been most diligent in searching out reasons for disqualifying such right-wingers as HIRANO Rikizo and NISHIO Suehiro, in obvious attempts to increase the influence of the left-wing. It is apparently hoped thereby to bring about Social Democratic acceptance of the Communist-sponsored "popular front", previously opposed by both NISHIO and HIRANO.

(d) Cooperative Party

The leadership of the Cooperatives has been practically wiped out as a result of the purge. The sole remaining member of the Executive Committee is IKAWA Tadao, well known in the United States as a financial expert and later adviser to Ambassador NOMURA, now acting as the head of the party. IKAWA stated, however, that suitable substitutes can be found for the disqualified candidates, although their caliber remains an unknown factor.

(e) Communist Party

The Communists are pressing the advantage derived from the latest purge order by attacking the reputations of the few remaining old-school political leaders, urging more extensive purges, and by softening their platform on major issues such as private property, the Emperor, and the advocacy of a peaceful bourgeois revolution. Rumors have already been spread that the election is to be postponed, while in the meantime an intensive campaign of invasion of existing unions, or organization of new ones under Communist auspices, is proceeding apace.

Control of Unions as a Political Factor

It is the policy of both Social Democrats and Communists to utilize the discipline and organization of unions as political weapons, a function which appears to be the primary consideration in the minds of the union leaders. This attitude explains the current trip to the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe area of NOSAKA Sanzo, Communist leader, who has frankly stated that the chief purpose of his trip is the organization of labor unions with a view to their utilization in the forthcoming election. Some 200 Japanese Communists presently en route to Japan from Yenan are to be employed in such organizational duties, and an additional 130 Japanese are reported by NOSAKA to be under training at Fenshihui, Manchuria, for the same purpose.

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be made to increase Communist influence in labor unions of the Kansai. This trip is, in fact, a direct invasion of territory generally regarded as solidly under the leadership of NISHIO Suehiro and other Social Democratic leaders. Press reports indicate that SHIGA Yoshio, editor of the Communist party organ "Red Flag", will visit the Osaka-Kobe area shortly after NOSAKA's return to Tokyo.

The struggle for the control of organized unions currently taking place between the two parties is well illustrated by four organizations controlled by the Social Democrats. These are

Japan Federation of Cooperative Unions (Nippon Kyodo Kumiai Dosei),
Japan Fisheries Union (Nippon Gyomin Kumiai),
Japan Farmers Union (Nippon Nomin Kumiai), and
Japan Federation of Trade Unions (Nippon Rodo Kumiai Sodomei).

Growing Communist influence, however, appears in the case of all except the Japan Fisheries Union, an influence which is obtained by infiltration both from above and below. With their discipline and centralized direction, the Communists generally have a much greater influence in union affairs than their numbers would warrant. This situation has also been particularly noticeable among the Miners' Unions, controlled by the Social Democrats, in Hokkaido.

The Communist-controlled Farmers Committees (Nomin Iinkai) are growing in importance through the wide base upon which they are organized. The same is true of the Trade Unions Councils (Rodo Kumiai Kyogi-kai). The former are organized, horizontally, in nine districts, with lower "cells" under the control of each District Council. In the case of the Farmers Committees, the unit of organization is the prefecture. These two organizations are said to be controlled directly by TOKUDA Kyuji and SHIGA Yoshio, militant Communist leaders.

Popular Front Issue

The so-called "popular front" issue continues to be mentioned in the press, with Yomiuri, Asahi, and Mainichi occasionally keeping the issue alive. NOSAKA Sanzo, upon every possible occasion, mentions the popular front as one of the immediate aims of his party. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, while somewhat embarrassed by the statements of their left-wing members to the effect that a popular front must be formed, officially continue to abide by the party's decision of January 16. Even HATOYAMA Ichiro, President of the Liberal Party, presently conducting a tour of Shikoku and Kyushu, has entered into discussion of the popular front by stating that the Liberals will not form such a front with the Progressives in opposition to the Communist proposal. His denial was occasioned by a reported suggestion made by KIMURA Takeo to the effect that a Progressive-Liberal front should oppose any left-wing front which might be formed.

Progressive Party's Constitutional Revision Plan

Under the leadership of SAITO Takao, the Constitutional Revision Committee of the Progressive Party finally completed its

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labors and published its revision plan on February 14. This draft plan in its entirety has not yet been studied by this Office; but on the basis of remarks by Mr. SAITO it appears to be a much more liberal document than previous indications suggested would be approved by the Progressive Party. If this impression proves correct after study of the draft, it is possibly indicative that the Progressive Party, formerly labeled as ultra-conservative, is also capable of adopting democratic principles. In general, the Progressive Party's plan seems to have eliminated much that is objectionable in the present Constitution. It attempts explicit definitions of the Emperor's prerogatives. It guarantees freedom of religion, speech, writing, publication, assembly, and association. A new departure is the establishment of the right of petitioning courts of justice for a hearing, a provision closely resembling the right of habeas corpus. The Privy Council and peerage are to be abolished, and a Chamber of Councilers established in lieu of the House of Peers. There are guarantees of the supremacy of the House of Representatives, and a Diet Standing Committee is to be established to act upon emergency matters subject, however, to eventual approval by the next regular Diet session. The presidents of both Houses must be consulted by the Emperor in selecting the Premier, and Cabinet responsibility to the Diet is stipulated. Constitutional amendment may be initiated by a two-thirds vote of both Houses.

The Progressive Party's plan, while subject to further examination and study, appears to be a well-rounded document which mirrors the views of Mr. SAITO whose avocation is constitutional law. An alumnus of Yale University (1901-1904), Mr. SAITO states that he has attempted to parallel the Constitution of the United States to the greatest possible extent, without forsaking certain principles fundamental to the Japanese tradition.

William J. Sebald

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 18, 1946.

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS
DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 16, 1946.

Summary. The major parties have been seriously affected by the Government's announcement of its clarification policy concerning the SCAP January 4 purge directive, with casualties among former Diet members now estimated to run as high as 90 percent. The Cabinet has indicated a surprising firmness not to deviate from its announced policy, thus shattering the hopes of many ex-Diet members who had hoped to let their records speak for themselves. It is obvious, however, that the order eliminates numbers of experienced parliamentarians whose presence in the new Diet will be sorely missed when the business of organizing committees and steering through important legislation begins. The Progressive, Liberal, and Cooperative Parties have been especially hard hit, but are implementing plans to supply alternates, who, despite their probable second-rate caliber, have hopes of being elected. The Social Democratic Party's leadership has been seriously unbalanced and fear is expressed that the left-wingers of the party are now in a position to exercise much greater influence upon the party's policies. The leftist press continues its attacks on right-wing leaders whose position appears to be somewhat ambiguous, thereby hoping further to strengthen or accomplish left-wing control. The Social Democratic and Communist Parties are utilizing unions as political weapons, with the Communists continuing strong efforts to infiltrate Social Democratic strongholds. NOSAKA Sanzo's organizing tour of the Kansai is admittedly a tour of invasion into Social Democratic territory and supplements Communist infiltration tactics elsewhere from above and below. The "popular front" issue is being kept alive by the Communists and leftist press, and even Liberal Party President HATOYAMA Ichiro has issued a denial that his party is interested in forming a popular front with the Progressives. The Progressive Party's constitutional revision plan appears to be a liberal document which has borrowed a number of provisions from American and British constitutional doctrines. It is more explicit than any plan which has previously been announced. End of Summary.

The Cabinet's Purge of Candidates

The Government's clarification of the SCAP January 4 purge directive has resulted in a growing confusion among the rank and file of the major political parties. With estimates of casualties among former Diet members ranging as high as 90 percent, only some 50 old-time politicians appear to be eligible as candidates in the coming election. The press has carried numerous detailed items concerning the latest purge measure, with comments varying from mild approval to calls in the leftist press for further ruthless screening. In a series of individual conferences with

party

party leaders, the Cabinet has clarified its stand on the "recommended candidate" formula to the effect that no exceptions are to be allowed. This attitude comes as a heavy shock to those ex-Diet members who had hoped to stand on their past records as a whole.

The order has cut deeply across the four major Parties (Progressive, Liberal, Cooperative and Social Democratic) and will undoubtedly exert considerable influence on party structures by its elimination of experienced personnel whose places must necessarily be taken by alternates in the case of the highly organized parties, and by persons of lesser experience in such parties as the Social Democratic and Cooperative Parties.

Aside from the desire of many candidates to become members of the Diet in a sincere endeavor to assist Japan in these difficult times, the fact nevertheless remains that the business of organizing a people's assembly with its traditionally complex rules of parliamentary procedure is a major task calling for consummate skill and procedural knowledge. Unless the Diet is to become a zoo, as it was once termed during the pseudo-Democratic days of the Seiyukai and Minseito, it is evident that a backbone of experienced leaders should be available to furnish guidance to the major party entrusted with organizing the Diet and steering through its committees and to the floor the critical legislation which lies ahead. That such experience will be almost entirely lacking is evident from an examination of the effects of the latest purge upon the several parties.

(a) Progressive Party

Worst affected by the purge was the old-line leadership of the Progressive Party. Among the party's leaders, comprising its President, MACHIDA Chuji, 16 Directors, and the heads of 10 sections, only SAITO Takao, veteran politician with a liberal reputation, remains unaffected. It is known, however, that the Progressives have been quietly preparing for a purge and are ready to bring forward substitute candidates who will have full support from the party's well-oiled national political machine, a left-over of the old Minseito and Seiyukai organizations. There are also a number of so-called independent candidates who, in fact, have the backing of the party machine but who for various reasons do not prefer to run under a party label. Finally, the Progressive Party has solid backing among many influential members of prefectural assemblies which remain relatively untouched by current directives, have not been subjected to an election since the beginning of the war, and remain the repository of local prejudices.

According to Mr. SAITO Takao, acting head of the Progressives, positions formerly monopolized in the party by ex-Diet members will now gradually be filled by less experienced politicians. From a long-range viewpoint, this is probably an advance, but Mr. SAITO predicts that the election of so many newcomers will result in placing a second-rate body of politicians in charge of the country's destinies when vision and ability are required. In any event, the Progressives, despite the bitter medicine they have been forced

to swallow

to swallow during the past six weeks, are confident that the party will emerge with a majority. To paraphrase Mr. SAITO, in Japanese politics, as elsewhere, a party must have a "machine". A party with a "machine" at its disposal need not worry too much about the caliber of its candidates.

(b) Liberal Party

The Liberal Party has also lost a number of its influential personalities. Luckily for the party, present indications are that Mr. HATOYAMA Ichiro will weather the storm, despite somewhat distorted charges in Yomiuri and other leftist papers that he must resign because of his "position" as adviser to the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society. Mr. HATOYAMA has emphatically denied having held the position as charged and reaffirmed his decision to be a candidate. Should Mr. HATOYAMA be disqualified, it is doubtful whether the Liberal Party could survive.

(c) Social Democratic Party

An unexpected result of the latest purge order may be a considerable strengthening of the left-wing faction of the Social Democratic Party, accused by certain sections of the right-wing of being subject to Communist influence and direction. Among influential right-wing members of the party made ineligible are KAWAKAMI Jotaro, SUGIYAMA Motojiro, and TAMAN Kiyomi, with the leftist press adding HIRANO Rikizo, MIYAKE Masaichi, KAWAMATA Kiyono, and KONO Mitsu. To counter-balance this loss, MATSUMOTO Jiichiro of the left-wing appears to fall within the ban. Irrespective of factions, it is obvious that the Social Democratic Party, at best still in an organizational stage, will lose valuable and experienced leaders with many years of work among labor unions to their credit.

The Cabinet's order will further serve to intensify internal party maneuverings and upset the precarious balance which has hitherto been maintained by several groupings in the party's leadership. In the order of left to right, the Social Democratic Party's leadership now appears to be divided into the following factions:

YAMAKAWA Hitoshi) ARAHATA Kanson)	Proponents of "popular front" with the Communists; appear to be under strong Communist influence; admittedly left-wing.
KATO Kanju) SUZUKI Mosaburo) KURODA Hiseo)	Said by right-wing faction to be under Communist influence; admittedly left-wing.
MIZUTANI Gosaburo) *MATSUMOTO Jiichiro)	Proponents of a "popular front" with the Communists and possibly under their influence; admittedly left-wing.
*KAWAKAMI Jotaro) *SUGIYAMA Motojiro) *KONO Mitsu) ASANUMA Inejiro) SUMAGA Eo) NOMIZO Masaru) TAHARA Ensuji) NAKAMURA Takaichi) *Miyake Shoichi)	Self-styled right-wing of party; anti-Communist and anti-left-wing.

KATAZAWA

KATAYAMA Tetsu HATTORI Kenkichi *NISHIO Suehiro HARA Hyo YONEKUBO Mitsutsuke	Right-wing; hold party together by assuming leadership and through force of personalities.
*HIRANO Rikizo	Extreme right-wing of party; appears to play lone hand.

(*Disqualified or alleged to be disqualified.)

Yoshida has been most diligent in searching out reasons for disqualifying such right-wingers as HIRANO Rikizo and NISHIO Suehiro, in obvious attempts to increase the influence of the left-wing. It is apparently hoped thereby to bring about Social Democratic acceptance of the Communist-sponsored "popular front", previously opposed by both NISHIO and HIRANO.

(d) Cooperative Party

The leadership of the Cooperatives has been practically wiped out as a result of the purge. The sole remaining member of the Executive Committee is IKAWA Tadao, well known in the United States as a financial expert and later adviser to Ambassador KONOIKE, now acting as the head of the party. IKAWA stated, however, that suitable substitutes can be found for the disqualified candidates, although their caliber remains an unknown factor.

(e) Communist Party

The Communists are pressing the advantage derived from the latest purge order by attacking the reputations of the few remaining old-school political leaders, urging more extensive purges, and by softening their platform on major issues such as private property, the Emperor, and the advocacy of a peaceful bourgeois revolution. Rumors have already been spread that the election is to be postponed, while in the meantime an intensive campaign of invasion of existing unions, or organization of new ones under Communist auspices, is proceeding apace.

Control of Unions as a Political Factor

It is the policy of both Social Democrats and Communists to utilize the discipline and organization of unions as political weapons, a function which appears to be the primary consideration in the minds of the union leaders. This attitude explains the current trip to the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe area of NOSAKA Sanzo, Communist leader, who has frankly stated that the chief purpose of his trip is the organization of labor unions with a view to their utilization in the forthcoming election. Some 200 Japanese Communists presently en route to Japan from Yenan are to be employed in such organizational duties, and an additional 130 Japanese are reported by NOSAKA to be under training at Fushiki, Manchuria, for the same purpose.

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William J. Sebald

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 12, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 9, 1946.

Summary. The fact that political parties in Japan have in the past been tainted with scandal, venality, and double-dealing makes it imperative that the parties undergo a thorough house-cleaning if persons of ability, character, and genuine love for their country are to be persuaded to enter the political scene. The problems which will face the new Diet are of vital importance. Announcement of the Government's clarification concerning the recent SCAP purge directive has increased the difficulties of party leaders, as some eighty percent of former Diet members have become ineligible under the Cabinet's decision. A number of Social Democrats feel that their past records should speak for themselves and exceptions made in their cases. The Japan Farmers' Union, largely controlled by the Social Democrats, was organized on February 9 and claims some 300,000 members. The Parties were quick to use as political capital the Four Ministers' Statement regarding the control of illegal seizures of plants by employees. A Social Democratic leader, KATAYAMA Totsu, considers most independent parties to be rightist in view, but of little political importance. SAKOMIZU Hisatsune, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the SUZUKI Cabinet, plans to issue a call for the formation of a young men's party based firmly upon support of the Emperor. The Social Democratic Constitutional Revision Committee plans to produce, according to KATAYAMA Tetsu, a truly democratic plan for revision of the Constitution. All parties, except possibly the Communists, are now agreed that the Emperor must be continued, but with some modification of his prerogatives. End of Summary.

General

In a pessimistic editorial on February 9, Mainichi complained of the generally low caliber of the more than 2,500 candidates who have already appeared to contest a total of 468 seats in the forthcoming general election. Political parties were taken to task for producing quantity--250 or 300 per party--rather than quality. The paper pointed its finger at what it termed a weakness of democracy, namely, that the majority speaks. The Social Democratic Party was particularly criticized for putting forth a large number of candidates, with the clear implication that few people of high standing have been attracted to its banner.

The political parties in Japan have in the past been tainted by unsavory odors of scandal, venality, and double-dealing, a reputation which was hardly improved by the supineness of politicians during the past five years. Consequently, it is only with difficulty that persons of ability, character, and genuine love for their country can be persuaded to subject themselves to the rough and tumble circus of the Japanese political arena. Political parties in Japan being what

they

they are, it is customary for the candidate to seek the party rather than the reverse. The problems which will face the new Diet are of vital importance to Japan. The problems and the manner in which they are handled are of importance also to the United States and the world. Unless and until the political parties themselves clean house and seek candidates of the highest reputation, however, it appears unlikely that the caliber of the House of Representatives can be raised to a level commensurate with the gift of democracy.

Difficulties facing the several major parties were increased by the publication on February 9 of the Government's policy regarding the forthcoming screening of candidates for the election. It was estimated by Chief Cabinet Secretary HARAHASHI Wataru that some 400 candidates are ineligible because they were "recommended candidates", i.e., sponsored by the TOJO Cabinet, in the last election. In this connection, it is interesting to note that prior to the Cabinet release, HARAHASHI had been besieged by numerous candidates seeking informal approval of their candidacy. Under the policy as announced, even the Social Democratic Party, previously thought to be practically immune under a literal reading of the SCAP purge directive, will be seriously affected. It is estimated in some quarters that such prominent leaders as MATSUMOTO Jiichiro, SUGIYAMA Motojiro, KAWAKAMI Jotaro, and TAHAN Kiyoomi are now ineligible. It is apparent that the right-wing element of the Party has been heavily hit and it may be anticipated that the difficulties hitherto experienced in keeping the leadership of the Party together will be increased. The gap between the right and left wings of the Party is gradually widening under pressure from the leftist press, with such left-wingers as KATO Kanju, MIZUTANI Chosaburo, SUZUKI Mosaburo, and KURODA Misao refusing to bow to the right-wing line of the Socialist Party.

Mainichi estimates the effect of the Government's policy upon the major parties as disqualifying some eighty percent of the former Diet members, as follows:

PARTY	"RECOMMENDED CANDIDATES"	ELIGIBLE
Progressive	238	27
Liberal	28	20
Social Democratic	7	10
Cooperative	22	5
Independents	35	10
Totals	330	72

It is at once obvious that any clear-cut definition of who should be purged immediately raises questions in the minds of affected persons and their friends. A number of candidates who for many years were associated with the labor movement, for example, feel that every dog is entitled to one bite. They argue that it is patently unfair to use the "recommended candidate" formula as a basis for disqualification in their cases. They go on to assert that an examination of the record will show that they have in the past, with one possible exception, been steadfast in their principles. Rationalization of this kind is fully in keeping with the Japanese propensity for eliding weak points and stressing the strong.

On balance, it would appear that a thorough purge may assist to some extent in cleansing Japanese political circles, but the real

problem

problem is one which will require much time, patience, and political understanding on the part of the Japanese people. Until Japanese public opinion can be mobilized upon an intelligent democratic plane, it is doubtful whether basic reform of the parties will be accomplished.

Japan Farmers' Union

In accordance with previously announced plans, the inaugural ceremony of the Japan Farmers' Union (Nippon Nomin Kumiai) took place on February 9. It is, in fact, a re-birth on a national scale of the former Japan Farmers' Union (Nippon Nomin Kumiai), Greater Japan Farmers' Union (Dai Nippon Nomin Kumiai), North Japan Farmers' Union (Kita Nippon Nomin Kumiai), and the Federation of Japan Farmers' Unions (Nippon Nomin Kumiai Sodomei), all of which were ordered dissolved by the Government on March 13, 1942, prior to the general election. The newly organized Union is reported to comprise some 300,000 members. Its president is SUNAGA Konomu of Gunma Prefecture, a former farmers' union leader; the secretary-general is NOMIZO Masaru of Nagano Prefecture, a veterinarian active in farmers' union circles. The Central Executive Committee is composed of eleven members of whom all but one are acknowledged members of the Social Democratic Party. The one exception is KURODA Hisao, suspected by leading Social Democrats to be a Communist, although not yet an acknowledged member of the Party. KURODA has been appointed to the key position in charge of education and the press.

According to an estimate made by a leading member of the Social Democratic Party to the writer, approximately seventy percent of the rank and file of the Union are Social Democrats, 10% have Communist leanings, and 20% have no party affiliations. It is the hope of the Social Democrats that this 20% can be attracted to the Social Democratic Party. At the time of writing, committees for the study of the Union's platform have not yet been appointed. Press reports, however, indicate that the principal problems to be attacked include:

(a) A thorough reform of the land system.
(b) The food problem.
(c) Democratization of farm villages.
(d) Cooperation with various democratic bodies (cooperative societies, fishermen's unions, labor unions, etc.) and the establishment of a movement for unification of the farmers' front.

Control of Production by Laborers

In an endeavor to stop further instances of the illegal seizure of plants by employees, the Cabinet on February 1 issued a statement over the names of four ministers. The statement in effect warned labor that such illegal seizures would in the future be severely dealt with, although the principle of freedom to strike was acknowledged. The political parties were quick to make capital out of this statement. The Progressives and Liberals generally agreed with the Government, although both parties expressed dissatisfaction with the slowness of the Cabinet to act more quickly. The Social Democrats, while not entirely condemning the statement, took exception to its tone of blaming labor alone. The Communists, however, violently

opposed

opposed the statement on every ground, and insisted that labor should have the right to seize plants. They argue that production is increased thereby and unless employees are allowed to seize plants, their fundamental rights under the Potsdam Declaration are violated.

Independent Parties

Mr. KATAYAMA Tetsu, Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party, in a personal interview recently expressed his views concerning the numerous independent candidates and independent parties, stating that the great majority of these parties are against the Communists, but leave the Social Democratic Party alone, or at least do not make direct attacks against the latter. On the other hand, he observed that if the Communists were driven underground, the independent parties would undoubtedly attack the Social Democrats. Consequently, he can only surmise that the majority of these parties are extreme nationalists and are probably receiving their funds from nationalistic quarters. So-called "independent candidates" are considered a nuisance to regularly organized parties in that they are constantly badgering party leaders for support and assistance. Furthermore, independent parties often amount to no more than two or three persons who adopt high-sounding names with a view to obtaining funds or feeling their way in the political world. Mr. KATAYAMA referred to this custom among small politicians as "Diet disease".

SAKOMIZU Hisatsune, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the SUZUKI Cabinet, has stated that he is readying plans for combining many of the younger elements of the independent parties and, if successful in the forthcoming election, will have himself appointed president of such new party. He will then issue a call for all younger elements of the recognized groups to enter his circle. The principal object of the new party is to bring forth young, vigorous leaders in Japan and to rehabilitate the country in every respect through the leadership of the Emperor. SAKOMIZU visualizes his new party, admittedly still in the planning stage, as an Emperor's party which is to play a role similar to that of the young leaders active at the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868).

Social Democratic Party Constitutional Reform

According to KATAYAMA Tetsu, the Constitutional Revision Committee appointed by the Social Democratic Party will render its report at about the end of February. KATAYAMA stated that the Social Democrats are convinced that the Japanese people desire to retain the Emperor and would not sanction an abrupt change, such as abdication. On the other hand, as the party's draft Constitution will indicate, the Emperor should have his prerogatives taken away, except for the following:

(a) The right to give recognition to learning, art, and culture.
(b) The right of amnesty.
(c) The power to represent Japan in foreign affairs, but only in a "decorative" capacity.
(d) The right to order the largest party to form a Cabinet.
(e) The right to sanction legislation duly passed by the Diet, but no veto right.

It is

It is interesting to note that all the major parties now agree that the Emperor should be kept in some form, and even the Communists appear to have softened their previously outright demand for abolition of the Emperor per se. Likewise, it is also becoming increasingly apparent that Japanese political leaders are becoming more sensitive to eventual treatment of the Emperor under a revised Constitution.

Further changes which will appear in the Social Democratic draft Constitution, according to KATAYAMA, include abolition of the Privy Council and the peerage, supremacy of the Lower House, reformation and change of the House of Peers into a body comprising occupational representation, increased independence of the judiciary, and clear-cut absolute guarantees of fundamental human rights.

William J. Sebald

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COPY FOR GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 11, 1946.

NO. 248

SUBJECT: Transmitting Memoranda Prepared by TSURUMI Yusuke.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit two memoranda prepared by Mr. TSURUMI Yusuke, member of the Japanese House of Representatives and Secretary General of the Progressive Party, on the subjects "Some Observations on the Effects of the Directive of January 4, 1946" and "A Brief Sketch of the Changes That Came Over the Three Political Organizations During the War." Mr. TSURUMI prepared these memoranda to summarize views which he expressed in a conversation with the Honorable Nelson T. Johnson and Dr. George H. Blakeslee of the Far Eastern Commission and Dr. Karl G. Leebrick of this Mission.

SUMMARY. The memorandum on the SCAP directive of January 4 presents the opinions: that the directive is not as favorably accepted as previous directives; that it is too sweeping in its disqualification of former officeholders; that the severity of the punishment, without a trial or hearings, is unfortunate; and that it is based on incorrect information about the political organizations active during World War II. The second memorandum gives a brief statement of the origin, organization, and policies of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Youths' Corps of the I.R.A.A., the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society in its first and second phases, and the Political Association of Great Japan. It is the thesis of the memorandum that this last named association was anti-militaristic and had as members many leaders who should continue their leadership of Japan today. All these groups are included in the directive without distinction. End of SUMMARY.

Mr. TSURUMI's views should be considered against the background of the fact that he was an officer of the Political Association of Great Japan (Dai Nippon Seijikai) and hence falls within the scope

of the

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of the directive, complained of in his memoranda, which disqualifies such persons from holding office. These expressions are believed to be representative of a considerable number of Japanese politicians of all groups, many of whom instinctively distrust new influences and younger leaders, and, ignoring the spirit behind the directive, are swayed by the way in which their own personal position may be affected. Further information concerning the attitude of Mr. TSURUMI and his present activities is contained in this Mission's despatch no. 215 of January 19, 1946.

Respectfully yours,

Max W. Bishop
Foreign Service Officer

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum, "Some Observations on the Effects of the Directive of January 4, 1946."
2. Memorandum, "A Brief Sketch of the Changes that came Over the Three Political Organizations During the War."

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Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 248 of February 11, 1946, from the Office United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, on the subject "Transmitting Memoranda Prepared by TSURUMI Yusuke."

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE EFFECTS OF THE DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY 4, 1946

By TSURUMI, Yusuke, Politician, Writer, Well known as a lecturer in the United States.

The directive that the American Headquarters addressed to the Japanese Government on January 4, 1946 has a significance which if not correctly explained has the danger of being missed by the Americans. It is different from other directives issued by the American Army of occupation during last year. These were appreciated by the Japanese and their intentions had never been questioned or doubted. The last one, however, is making an entirely different impression not on the masses but on the thinking elements in Japan. These thinking Japanese are not articulate, much less aggressive, but reticent and quiet. But these are the people who really run the country. So I will try to analyse their psychology and explain the causes of their apprehension.

In the first place, the point most alarming to them is the sweeping nature of the directive. If this is applied in a comprehensive manner, it will drive a great number of able and honest people from the positions of usefulness and disrupt the continuity of governance in Japan. These people will not be replaced by younger and more desirable people as the directive aims, but by people not only inefficient but even dubious in character.

Those who served as moderating influence during the war are hit by this directive, while those who worked hand in glove with militarists and yet were not important enough to hold any positions of consequence will be left untouched. And it is particularly these people that will supersede the former in the coming election.

Take for example the case of Mr. Katsu Kawasaki. He was a Parliamentary Councillor of War in 1924, and comes consequently within the scope of this directive. But was it not the able and unrelenting attack of Kawasaki on the I.H.A.A. on the floor of the Diet in February 1941 that stopped the arrogant march of Nazism in Japan?

Then take another case. Mr. Fusajiro Ichinomiya's name is well known among the Japanese intellectuals as one of the most conscientious liberals in the Diet. It was he who opposed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, the Japanese-German alliance in 1940 and gave a spirited support to Takao Saito at the critical moment of the latter's political career after his famous speech in 1940. Yet Ichinomiya is classified as an undesirable personnel simply because he held the position of the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Navy under Yonai in 1937.

I am citing only a few prominent cases. The most iniquitous part is that when these honest men are driven out of political life, their places will be filled by local politicians of unsavory character.

In the second place, the thing that is rather difficult of comprehension for the quiet and thoughtful people is the severity of the punishment meted out by the directive. It deprives the person in

question

question of most important civil rights for an indefinite period of time without allowing any means of defending himself. Even the ordinary right of self defense in legal procedure granted to a criminal suspect is denied him. When we think of the enormous number of persons involved, it raises a serious question in the minds of many.

In the third place, the directive is a pretty complicated document and in some cases leaves large margins in their interpretation and application. The aim of the directive is clearly stated at the start by the quotation from the text of the Potsdam Declaration. It is to eliminate those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest. In that case it is difficult to understand why the section c of item 2 puts the three different political organizations in the same category.

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and the Political Association of Great Japan were not of the same nature or had the same purpose to pursue. They were entirely different in character.

How these three different organizations came into existence and how they reacted on the political situations of Japan during the war needs a special study. This will help to understand the politics of Japan not only during the war but also at the present moment. I attach a brief survey of the political situation during the war with special reference to the formation of these three political organizations.

The reporting of the directive and its reactions by the vernacular papers was not all too reassuring to the thinking elements in Japan. Frankly these people are amazed at the sudden change of front by the press after the American Army of occupation moved into Japan. They give an impression to the thinking Japanese that they are anxious to please the Americans and not report truthfully. The reactions that are taking place in the minds of the thousands of honest people are not printed in the vernacular press. If the American authorities think that these are the public opinions of Japan, I am afraid, it entails some serious danger.

I have had occasions to talk with not only the people past middle age but those in their thirties and twenties. These people are frankly disturbed in their minds over the directive. They were sincere in appreciating the fair and just treatment of Japan by America. They are therefore all the more distressed because they began to apprehend if the real intention of America in issuing this directive was not to disrupt the political continuity of Japan and give her over to irresponsible elements of the country. In the changing psychology of a people passing through a national crisis, this kind of misunderstanding sometimes lodges a dangerous explosive in their minds and if left unattended to may bring about a damage in the long future all out of proportion to its original cause. The gravity of the situation being such, I made bold to state frankly the effects that the directive are bring/forth in Japan beyond the ken of the outside observers.

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 248 of February 11, 1946, from Office of the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, on the subject "Transmitting Memoranda Prepared by TSURUMI Yusuke."

A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE CHANGES THAT CAME OVER THE THREE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE WAR.

By TSURUMI Yusuke.

I. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

This was organized under the second Konoye Cabinet in September, 1940 by the rightist elements, instigated by young Army officers. Its aim was to destroy Parliamentalism and create in its place a strong political organization after the pattern of Kyo do Kai in Manchukuo.

At first it swept every political obstacles off its way and seemed to attain its goal of being the only political organization of the country.

The opposition came, however, in the Diet, when the budget for 3,000,000 was presented to its financial committee. Mr. Katsu Kawasaki interpellated the government about the nature of the organization. Premier Konoye could not answer this veteran debater and absented himself. Hiranuma spoke on his behalf and changed the nature of this organization from a sole political organization of the land into a subsidiary one attached to the executive branch of the government. Thus parliamentarianism was saved from extinction. Yet the original nature of totalitarianism remained ingrained in this organization and always threatened to destroy Parliamentarianism. The appropriation increased every year and reached to ¥40,000,000 later. The officers of the I.R.A.A. were, therefore, very well paid.

II. The Youth's Corps of I.R.A.A.

When the I.R.A.A. was stamped officially as a subsidiary organization of the administration, its sponsors tried to resurrect the original idea of taking politics out of the hands of M. P.'s and created the Youth's Corps of the I.R.A.A. This was in a way the combination of Hitler Jugend and Sturm Abtheilung. It did not confine its membership to the youth but invited any elements favoring totalitarianism.

Its aim was to undermine the strength of political parties by taking their adherents away from them. In those days political parties had to dissolve themselves under the government's pressure and were denied to have any branches in the country. Branches were only allowed to the I.R.A.A. and its Youth's Corps.

The general election of April, 1942 was conducted mainly through this Youth's Corps. The branches of this Youth's Corps selected the candidates for the Diet. They at first wanted to close the doors to former political party members and monopolize the candidacy to themselves. But a compromise was agreed upon and former party members were also included in the candidacies. They succeeded, however, in electing a great number of their own candidates with the help of the government intervention.

III. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society.---The First Period under General Abe.

This society was organized immediately after the general election and included almost all the M. P.'s---even those who were not recommended by the Youth's Corps. Except Yukio Ozaki and a few others

others joined this, even including men like Hatoyama, Saigo Nakano, and Dr. Ashida. The idea of one party for one state was achieved ostensibly.

The nature of this organization was made public by its president, General Abe, in his inaugural speech. He said in effect, "The government and our party are the head and tail of the same thing and move in unison." It was financed entirely by the government. Therefore, during General Abe's presidency, this party was a part of the government.

IV. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society---The Second Period, under Admiral Kobayashi.

After the fall of Saipan in June, 1944 opposition to Tojo grew stronger every day until it was strongly voiced by this party and brought about his downfall. From that moment the nature of the party underwent a drastic change and when Koiso Cabinet came into existence and Admiral Kobayashi succeeded to General Abe as its president, he expressed the sentiment of the party in his inaugural speech by saying, "From now on we will assume a strict neutrality toward the cabinet and each measure that the government presents will be judged on its own merit." He also severed the financial connection of the party with the government and financed it with contributions he raised from among private citizens.

The party, therefore, became an entirely independent organization under Kobayashi.

V. During Kobayashi's period there arose in the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society a new movement. It was to make it a still more independent political party by creating branches all over the country with members recruited from among the people as was the case in the old days of political parties. This was opposed by the army and did not materialize. But the agitation kept on going until late in 1944, a committee was organized within the party to find out the means of strengthening the party. Its aim was the abolition of the I.R.A.A. and the Youth's Corps of the I.R.A.A. On January 12, 1945, this committee passed a resolution to dissolve the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, as well as the I.R.A.A. and Youth's Corps of the I.R.A.A. This was a very important event. Its aim was to cut the shackles of the army dominion of a political party asunder and assert its political power. It was due to the weakening of the army in the fields of battle and its consequent decline of power at home. Premier Koiso consented to this in principle but delayed its execution for three months. It was after his cabinet fell and was succeeded by Suzuki that a new political party came into existence. It called itself the Political Association of Great Japan. The significance lies in its dropping the prefix of "Imperial Rule Assistance." Its nature was definitely anti-army and as its result quite a number of former members of the I.R.A. Political Society refused to join this new party and organized different groups.

One group was financed by the former Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojo Cabinet, Mr. Shinsuke Kishi and was headed by Mr. Sakiya Ino, Minister of Agriculture in Tojo Cabinet. It included 31 M.P.'s close to the army. They called themselves "Seisaku-Doshi-Kai"

or the defense

er the Defense of the State Political Association.

Another group was organized by M.P.'s close to the Youth's Corps of the I.R.A.A. It was headed by Mr. Kazue Miura and called itself "Yokuso-Giin-Domei" or "Youth's Corps M.P.'s League." It had 22 M.P.'s.

There were still others who did not join these above groups. Men like Kunitoshi Tsukuno, whose connection to Tojo was notorious joined the group of independents.

The Political Association of Great Japan was engaging vigorously in the creation of local branches all over the country and recruiting members from among the people. It met with opposition from prefectural governments and friction with bureaucrats was growing daily when the war came to an end in August, 1945.

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, February 4, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING FEBRUARY 2, 1946

Summary. The date of the general election having been set for March 31, the parties are now busily engaged in advancing their respective platforms with a view to attracting the voters. February should witness considerable behind-the-scenes maneuvering and attempts to realign party memberships. Party propaganda continues to be based upon opposition to the Government, but few concrete or practical proposals of a constructive nature have been offered as alternatives to Government measures. The popular front issue against was the outstanding press topic of the week, but the Social Democrats have reaffirmed their previously announced decision to postpone action thereon until after the election. The appointment of a Committee to prepare for a popular front was construed in many quarters as a compromise solution. Social Democratic opposition to the Communist-sponsored popular front proposal apparently is based upon the practical consideration of the farmer vote, traditionally frightened by Communist ideology. An analysis of Party proposals on methods of attacking the knotty problem of inflation reveals a considerable divergence of views, most of which are couched in general terms and generally oppose Government plans. The recent Ordinance providing for an examination into the background of candidates has given rise to doubts regarding the ability of the Cabinet to weed out undesirable candidates without thereby showing favoritism or advancing the interests of friends of the Cabinet. New candidates are reported to number more than 1,000, with the Progressives supporting some 400, Liberals 300, Social Democrats more than 300, and the Cooperatives some 120. Both Social Democrats and Communists are apparently encouraging a movement to expedite the repatriation of Japanese stranded in areas presently under Soviet control. Movements of this kind are examples of efforts on the part of parties to widen their influence among the masses. End of Summary.

General

The date of the general election having been set for March 31, the parties are now busily preparing for the campaign which, in accordance with the Election Law, will officially begin on March 1. This leaves a scant four weeks during which the parties will endeavor to increase their popular appeal by making announcements of their respective attitudes on current and future problems. It is probable that the month of February will witness a considerable amount of behind-the-scenes maneuvering on the part of the more powerful political personalities, in various endeavors to attract "opposition" candidates into their fold. It may be anticipated, as the platforms and issues raised by the several parties crystallize, that some realignments will take place. Although precise information is lacking, rumors are sufficiently prevalent in the political world to call attention to two such possibilities.

The writer has been informed on good authority that an undetermined number of the more liberal elements of the Progressive and Liberal Parties are seriously considering joining forces with the Social Democrats, on the plausible ground of this Party's enhanced chances for

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success, partly occasioned by the postponed election date. A second series of rumors revolves about HARAHASHI Wataru, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, who is pictured as one of the younger, ambitious politicians, anxious to form his own party. Whether these straws in the wind will become actualities remains to be seen, but Japanese politicians are not hesitant to switch from one party to another if by so doing their own interests can be advanced.

During the past week all parties have engaged in activity of minor importance only. In general, the parties continue their opposition to Government measures, but have little of a concrete nature to offer as alternatives. In the Japanese political world, it would be asking too much to expect the "outs" to agree with measures proposed by the "ins", and the present situation is therefore all the more confused by the non-political character of the Cabinet. In this opposition the Social Democrats and Communists are most vocal. The attitude of the former undoubtedly arises from a feeling of relative strength; that of the latter from weakness and because of the wide gap which exists between their principles along ideological lines and those proposed by an admittedly conservative Cabinet.

Popular Front

At a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party on January 29, the Party's previous decision concerning collaboration with the Communist Party in forming a joint front was reaffirmed, but as a compromise measure, a committee to prepare for a Democratic Front was appointed. As reported by Asahi in its January 31 issue, conditions prevailing within the Social Democratic Party are such that little likelihood exists that a popular front can be formed even after the elections, unless a radical change in the Party's leadership is made. The paper reported that MIZUTANI Chozaburo spoke in favor of collaboration, but was opposed by the "right" wing of the Party led by NISHIO Suehiro and HIRANO Rikizo. Proponents of collaboration were enumerated as MIZUTANI Chozaburo, MATSUMOTO Jiichiro, SUZUKI Mosaburo, KATO Kanju, KURODA Yoshio, and [illegible] Mitsumaka. Among the opponents and majority were KATAYAMA Tetsu, NISHIO Suehiro, KONO Mitsu, HIRANO Rikizo, ASANUMA Inejiro, NOMIZO Katsu, and SUMATA Ko.

On collaboration limited to a solution of the food question, NISHIO was reported by Asahi to have voiced strong opposition on the ground that the Social Democrats would lose the support of many farmers by joining with the Communists. If, on the other hand, the Liberal and Cooperative Parties were also to join, the presence of the Communists would not have an adverse effect in this regard. He therefore called for all parties to unify in a movement to increase the farmers' effort of rice. Asahi concluded by stating that the Social Democrats are opposed to the Communists only because of unfavorable influences upon their election results and by reason of their confidence that they will emerge as the major party.

In the above connection, HOSHINO Yasunosuke, one of the younger influential members of the Cooperative Party (Kyodo-to), informed the writer that it is absolutely unthinkable that his party would join with either the Progressives, Liberals, or Communists. On the other hand, he hopes that some way can be found to unify into one party the Social Democrats and Cooperatives. Another source felt that such a union could be accomplished through the elevation of KAGAWA Toyohiko to the presidency of the Social Democratic Party. It is known that

KAGAWA

HAGANA enjoys some confidence among the rank and file of both parties. There is good reason to believe, however, that this confidence springs from HAGANA's contacts and influence among Americans, both in Japan and the United States, rather than from his ability or experience as a politician or leader. It is also evident that the Progressives and Liberal parties are standing firm on their absolute opposition to collaboration with the Communists in any form. It therefore appears that the much trumpeted popular front issue has little chance for success as yet if its sponsors, the Communists, are to become a part thereof.

The press as a whole continues to favor a popular front, and Mainichi has suggested the formation of a coalition cabinet to replace the Shidehara cabinet prior to the election. How this would be done and under whose leadership such a cabinet would be formed, or what the prospects might be of such a cabinet operating with any degree of efficiency or unity are questions which remain unanswered. In any event, it is the belief of the writer that the formation of a coalition cabinet prior to the election would only cause confusion and encourage an uncontrolled struggle for power by all parties. Specific and practical advice with respect to the popular front is conspicuous by its absence in all the arguments advanced by the many proponents of such collaboration. Its appeal lies in the coinage of words rather than in a specific demonstration that such a front can be made to work in the bedlam of practical Japanese politics.

Inflation and the Parties

According to an analysis published by Asahi in its issue of January 30, considerable divergence of opinion exists among the political parties on practical methods of attacking the urgent problem of inflation. The high points of the views of the four major parties follow.

(a) Progressive Party: The plan recommended by the Political Affairs Investigation Society by a committee especially appointed to study the problem of inflation envisages reductions in national expenditures, compensation to munitions factories, pensions, and other expenditures. The imposition of the capital levy and wartime profits tax is acknowledged as inevitable, except that the Cabinet's plan should be rejected as it will cripple recovery efforts. Low-earning enterprises, such as railways, should be owned and operated by civilians, but high-earning undertakings, e.g., insurance, should be carried out by the State. A special deposit system should be set up whereby surplus purchasing power can be checked, but production must be increased. The Party, however, insists that inflation is not a problem which can be considered independently of other factors. The most important care is to find a way for the reconstruction of the national economy.

(b) Liberal Party: The Party has decided to oppose the capital levy and other taxes planned by the Government on the ground that national economic recovery will be hindered thereby. Alternative plans are presently in process of investigation.

(c) Social Democratic Party: (1) The suspension of compensation payments to munitions factories and the creation of an investigative body regarding their properties. (2) Suspension of interest on Government war bonds and the creation of an adjustment committee to adjust Government bonds. (3) Broadening of the principles of blocked accounts, except for small amounts. (4) Improvement of issuing methods of Government bonds.

(5) Kawier

(5) Heavier taxation of wartime profits. (6) Reduction of the budget and the establishment of a five-year financial plan. (7) Increased production.

(d) Communist Party: (1) Nationalization of all banks and their management by the people. (Presumably by selected persons operating in the name of the people.) (2) Labor management of all important industries and rejection of control of industry by the military (sic), bureaucrats, and monopoly interests. (3) Rejection of counter-measures against inflation which sacrifice the working class. (4) Settlement of the Government bond problem for which the Emperor, capitalists, and landowners are responsible. (5) Abolition of taxation of the masses. (6) Management by the people of all food and necessities. (7) A democratic settlement of the land problem.

The SCAP's Purge Directive

On January 30 the Government made public by an ordinance its rules whereby candidates in the forthcoming general election are required to answer a detailed questionnaire concerning their personal history, former affiliations, contributions to and from natural or juridical persons, and other information. Reaction to this order has been varied, but professional politicians, particularly those of the Left, read into the Government's order the threat of an unfair screening process whereby border-line cases may be divided into two categories, namely, (a) friends of the Government, and (b) others. Suggestions have been made that the establishment of an impartial board or other body to hear appeals of those weeded out by the Government is required, and that publication of the complete information submitted by candidates would at least inform the public of each candidate's background, thereby giving a fair basis of comparison. The theory has been advanced that Chief Cabinet Secretary HARAHASHI Katsuo, and not the Premier, will in fact control the screening under the Government's order.

Party Candidates

Both Mainichi and Asahi devoted considerable space during the week to discussions concerning the number of "new" candidates, reportedly aggregating more than 1,000, sponsored by the several parties. According to Asahi, the Progressive Party, hardest hit by the January 4 purge directive, nevertheless expects to emerge as the major party as a result of the elections, with some 400 recognized candidates in the field. The Liberal Party is placing approximately 300 candidates in the race and hopes to seek the support of the people by virtue of its stand on the food and inflation issues. The Liberals are also standing on the maintenance of the national polity, an expression which may easily connotate every degree of maintenance of the Emperor from that prevailing today to a status of semi-retirement. The Social Democratic Party, according to Mainichi, is now believed to be in a most favorable position, with a good chance of emerging as the majority party. Some 151 candidates have already decided to run on the Social Democratic platform, with an additional 150 still to be recognized by the Party. Refusal to join a common front with the Communists is understood to have strengthened the Social Democrats, the decision having indicated the Party's unwillingness to see eye to eye with the Communists on the Emperor issue. The Communists, according to a statement made by MOSAKA Sanzo to the writer, do not expect to make much headway in the coming election, but are confident that their strength in the future will show remarkable gains. Jiji Press reported the possibility that MOSAKA will run as a candidate and that influential

leaders in the Party are pressing his candidacy. Little fanfare has attended the efforts of the Cooperative Party, but the Party is sponsoring some 120 candidates, of whom it is confidently expected at least 40 will be elected, with a maximum of 60. It should be noted that some 24 former Diet members are included among the Cooperative Party candidates. The Cooperatives are strongest in Hokkaido, where it is anticipated a minimum of 7 candidates will be elected out of 23 seats available.

Repatriation of Japanese

According to Mainichi Sangyo Keizai on January 29, the Communist Party has decided to develop a national movement to expedite the repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria and Korea. This movement, according to the news item, is being developed in several prefectures, with the Communist Party acting as the linking element. A similar movement is being sponsored by the Social Democratic Party and may assume considerable proportions if the assertions made to the writer by TANABA Naruji, a member of the Central Executive Committee, may be believed. According to TANABA, more than 500,000 letters have been received at the Social Democratic Headquarters from relatives and friends of persons stranded in Manchuria, Korea, Saghalien, and the Kuriles. TANABA stated that many people are placing pressure on his party to organize mass meetings, parades, and direct action movements to bring this problem to the attention of the Russian Embassy as well as the Headquarters. He hoped, however, that the problem could be settled "privately".

The above information is considered important only because it illustrates the efforts of the Communists and Social Democrats to sponsor movements of any kind which will bring their respective parties in closer contact with a wider circle of people. It is a manifestation of a surface paternalism common to Japanese politics; the desire of political groups to sponsor or associate themselves with any movement having appeal to large numbers, or ostensibly for the common good.

William J. Sebald

Copy for Col. Kades

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 29, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING JANUARY 26, 1946.

Summary. The Communists have continued their offensive to bring about a popular front with the Social Democrats. The attendance at welcome meetings, held in honor of NOSAKA Sanzo, of prominent Social Democrats has made the maintenance of the previously announced decision that a popular front is premature, extremely difficult. NOSAKA Sanzo is rapidly emerging as a leader of Leftist elements among political parties. OZAKI Yukio has declared himself in favor of the popular front, while KAGAWA Toyohiko, prominent Christian, voiced his opposition on the ground that only the Communists would be strengthened thereby. The conservative parties have been passive and apparently rely upon such collateral activities as constitutional reform to attract popular appeal. The Liberal Party's plan for revision of the Constitution hedges on the Emperor's position and in effect leaves the institution practically unchanged, except for reducing some of his prerogatives. The plan envisages a strengthened Diet, but suggests maintenance of a Peerage system. Basic guarantees of freedom of speech, thought, and religion leave room for improvement, but the independence of the judiciary is strengthened. The Privy Council is abolished. The Progressive and Social Democratic Parties have both announced their intention to submit revision plans. No party has announced proposals as to how the amended Constitution will be adopted. Some attempts have been made in the press to increase popular interest in women candidates, but no indications have as yet appeared which might suggest that women will be a potent factor in the general election. According to an estimate made by HIRANO Rikizo, prominent Socialist, campaign expenses for each candidate will reach a minimum of 100,000 Yen, with wealthier candidates spending much larger amounts. The Election Law makes subterfuges possible, and a successful party does not examine too closely into the campaign expenditures of its members. There is no legal compulsion to record the source or amount of contributions to parties or members. End of Summary.

The Popular Front Issue

The popular front issue continued to dominate political activity during the week, with the Communist Party continuing its offensive in an endeavor to overcome the thinly veiled objections of the Social Democrats. The leaders of the Socialists have been somewhat hard put to maintain their position of waiting until after the elections, an attitude which becomes increasingly difficult in the face of overwhelming press sentiment in favor of the immediate formation of a "popular front", a "common front", "people's front", or "Democratic front".

Added impetus to the movement resulted from statements made upon

two occasions

two occasions centering around meetings called to welcome NOSAKA Sanzo, the Communist leader recently returned from Yenan, who is assuming increased stature as a leader of Leftist elements in the Japanese political world. The stand of the Social Democrats has been somewhat weakened by participation at such meetings of influential members, including YAMAKAWA Hitoshi, MATSUOKA Komakichi, NIZUTANI Chozaburo, NIRAKO Rikizo, KATO Kanjo, MATSUMOTO Jiichiro, SUZUKI Mosaburo, and many others.

In addition to expressions of general agreement by representative Socialists that a popular front must be formed to solve such urgent problems as food and housing shortages, Japan's veteran Liberal, OZAKI Yukio sent a message favoring the formation of a popular front to a welcome meeting held on January 25 under joint Left Wing Socialist-Communist auspices. As reported by Asahi, OZAKI not only welcomed the return to Japan of NOSAKA and supported the popular front proposal recently made by YAMAKAWA Hitoshi, but states:

> "...The old political parties and old politicians have no longer power for saving Japan. To rescue Japan from their hands and place her in the grasp of Democratic influences is the only way left to liberate the oppressed masses in general and lead Japan from a ruined country to a bright future. To turn out such a new influence is the purpose of the people's front proposal. With such an interpretation I gladly approve it...."

It is nevertheless apparent that the Socialist leadership, while paying lip-service to the general principles of a united front, still continues to abide by the decision announced after the January 16 meeting of the Party's Central Executive Committee. Reaffirmation of this position was announced on January 25 after a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Social Democratic Party, again on the ground that a joint front as proposed by the Communists is premature. For different reasons, KAGAWA Toyohiko was reported as being opposed to a popular front because (1) the Emperor system must be continued, and (2) the formation of a popular front "would, as in the case of France, only result in strengthening the Communists."

Compulsory Rice Requisitioning

In pressing their case for a united front, the Communists have been quick to take advantage of the Government's announced determination to carry out an almost universally unpopular measure, namely, the somewhat belated enforcement of compulsory rice requisition measures. By this means the Government hopes to force the farmers to sell their rice at fixed prices, with penal provisions for failure to comply. The Social Democrats and Communists say, in effect, that the two parties see eye to eye in their opposition and can therefore join forces to overthrow the Government. Mainichi on January 25 reported that the Communists propose, in contradistinction to the Government measure, to set up a People's Council comprising agricultural organizations, labor unions, and cooperative societies to administer production, distribution, and rice requisition according to areas and occupational groups. The paper called upon the Government to discuss the food question with the political parties, farmers' organizations, and cooperative societies.

Conservative

Conservative Parties

In the midst of this uproar concerning a joint Social Democrat-Communist front, the conservative Progressive, Liberal, and Cooperative Parties have been relatively quiet and passive in their respective bids for popular appeal. Press items concerning these parties have been limited to such collateral activities as the announcement of efforts to stimulate women candidates, and the approval by the Executive Committee of the Liberal Party of its plan for revision of the Constitution. Both topics are discussed more fully below.

Constitutional Reform by the Parties

(a) Liberal Party:

On January 21, the Liberal Party announced the completion and adoption by its Executive Committee of the Party's plan for revision of the Constitution. Under the chairmanship of ANDO Masazumi, the Special Investigation Committee for Constitutional Reform (comprising KANEMORI Tokujiro, former Chief of the Legislative Board, YOSHIDA Hisashi, professor at Keio University, HIRAI Senzo, former director of the Insurance Board, and GO Bunbei, Dean of Nippon University) has been devoting its efforts to a plan for revision of the constitution since November 1945. The plan, submitted in full as an Enclosure, provides for the maintenance of the Emperor system with rights of sovereignty remaining in the Emperor. Although it is expressly stated that "Sovereignty resides in the Japanese State", the Emperor "bears neither legal nor political responsibility". Whether these conflicting general principles can be reconciled in the definitive draft remains to be seen.

Certain specified prerogatives of the Emperor are to be carried out with the assistance of the Ministers of State. The Privy Councillor system is abolished. A number of currently objectionable prerogatives are abolished, e.g., emergency ordinances, enactment of independent ordinances, prerogatives over the organization of administrative organs, Supreme Command, organization of the army and navy, law of siege, and emergency powers.

The powers of the Diet are strengthened, and the House of Representatives is given power to override the House of Councillors (new name for House of Peers). The draft plan, by implication, suggests the maintenance of a system of peerage.

The guarantee of freedom of thought, speech, and religion is hedged by the statement that they are established by law "but cannot be arbitrarily restricted".

Independence of the judiciary is considerably strengthened, and the right of the Diet to initiate constitutional amendment is recognized.

In connection with the Liberal Party's proposal, Asahi quoted HATOYAMA Ichiro as follows:

"Our party's belief in the Emperor system is that the Imperial line is unbroken for ages eternal and the Emperor combines in himself the rights of sovereignty as the head of the state. This is our conception of national polity.... The people have deep faith in the Emperor's authority.

"Our party

"Our party has made the location of sovereignty clear, swept away the cloud of mysticism, added greatly to the powers of the Diet, established a system of cabinet responsibility, provided for the Emperor's non-responsibility both legally and politically, strengthened the independence of the judiciary, and provided for the increase and protection of the people's rights, thus establishing a constitutional monarchy."

A typical editorial concerning the Liberal Party's draft plan is appended as an Enclosure.

(b) Social Democratic Party:

The Social Democratic Party announced its decision to submit its own plan for revision of the Constitution after examining the draft under preparation by the Constitutional Research Society. According to Mainichi, the Party has already decided that the following points require revision:

1. Readjustment and reduction of the Emperor's prerogatives;
2. Expansion and maintenance of rights of national freedom;
3. Increase in powers of the Diet;
4. Revision of the Law of the House of Peers;
5. Responsibility of the Cabinet to the Diet;
6. Abolition of the Privy Council;
7. Abolition of emergency Imperial ordinances;
8. Abolition of carrying over the previous year's budget;
9. Amendment of constitutional revision procedure;
10. Amendment of Imperial Household Rules, and abolition of office of the Keeper of the Privy Seal.

(c) Progressive Party:

According to Asahi on January 20, the Progressive Party is continuing its study of the constitution revision problem. In view of the slow progress made by a committee headed by SAITO Tatsuo, a research organization has been appointed, headed by NAGANO Takaichi and TANUMA Hidekichi. Younger members of the Progressive Party were reported by Mainichi to have urged the Party to clarify its stand on the Emperor issue.

(d) Communist Party:

No announcement has been noted concerning definite Communist plans for a revision of the Constitution. Statements attributed to Communist leaders have been general, vague, and destructive. They propose change but fail to provide alternatives.

Yonan

Women Candidates

According to Mainichi, the recent "purge" directive has increased the number of women candidates who will stand for election in the forthcoming general election. On the other hand, Yomiuri has been advocating a house-cleaning of nationalist elements among the various women's organizations, past and present. Especially signalled out for condemnation are former leaders of the Women's Patriotic Association (Aikoku Fujin-kai), Women's National Defense Association (Kokubo Fujin-kai), Women's Aviation Association of Japan (Dai Nippon Koku Fujin-kai), and Women's Association of Japan (Dai Nippon Fujin-kai). Mainichi's round-up of women candidates as of January 20 is appended as an Enclosure.

Election Expenses

In a recent conversation with the writer, HIRANO Rikizo, prominent member of the Social Democratic Party and Diet member, expressed alarm at the anticipated costs which will be involved in the forthcoming election. Mr. HIRANO estimated that each candidate will be required to spend at least 100,000 Yen whether he is elected or not, and that some of the more wealthy candidates may be expected to spend as much as 1,000,000 Yen, despite the fact that the Election Law limits expenditures to 30 sen per voter. Formerly, this amounted to an authorized expenditure of approximately 10,000 Yen per candidate, but with the increase in registered voters, it will now reach some 25,000 Yen. Under the new Law, candidates are required to keep records of their expenditures, but the records are submitted to the Prefectural authorities only when called for. At no time has it been necessary to account for the source of funds.

As a practical matter, the records of expenditures are meaningless because many subterfuges are possible. Furthermore, the maximum penalty for violating the Law in this regard is loss of the seat. Obviously, the Party which has won the election does not push its investigations with much vigor and consequently excess expenditures on the part of such Party members are usually condoned. In HIRANO's opinion, some practical measures to reduce the cost of election should be devised.

The Social Democratic Party would not welcome publication of the sources of its Party funds, unless the contributions for election purposes were limited in amount and applied to all Parties without exception. To do otherwise would stop contributions.

The major items of expense in a political campaign are: printing, paper, travel expenses (taxis, etc.), entertainment of prospective voters, and rice and food for Party "workers".

William J. Sebald

1. Constitutional Revision Plan Adopted by Liberal Party.
2. Constitutional Revision Plan By Liberal Party.
3. Women Candidates.

Enclosure No. 1.

Asahi Shimbun January 22, 1946.

Constitutional Revision Plan Adopted by The Liberal Party

I. The Emperor.

A. Sovereignty resides in the Japanese State.
B. The Emperor combines in himself the rights of sovereignty.
C. The Imperial line is unbroken for ages eternal.
D. The Emperor bears neither legal nor political responsibility.

II. So-called Imperial Prerogatives.

The following items as well as all other national affairs conducted in the name of the Emperor are done with assistance of the Ministers of State.

A. Sanction and promulgation of laws.
B. Diet convocation, opening, closing, and proroguing and dissolution of the House of Representatives.
C. Appointment and dismissal of officers.
D. Diplomacy.
E. Conferring of marks of honor.
F. Amnesty.

Note: The following prerogatives are abolished; Emergency ordinances, Execution ordinances (ordinances necessary for the execution of laws, maintenance of public peace and order and promotion of public welfare), enactment of independent ordinances, prerogative over the organization of administrative organs, Supreme Command, Organization of the Army and Navy, Law of Siege, Emergency powers.

III. Rights of nationals.

A. The freedom of thought, speech, religion, learning and art (technique) are established by law but cannot be arbitrarily restricted.
B. The freedom of enterprise and labor cannot be restricted without law.
C. Private property and the stability of righteous living must be maintained.

IV. The Diet.

A. The Diet is a legislative organ exercising at the same time control over administration.
B. Generally the principle that laws are the product of the Diet is to be maintained.
C. The first house is to be the House of Representatives, and the second, Sangi-in (House of Councillors).
D. The House of Councillors is an organ which utilizes learning and experience. It is also a political-stabilizing organ.
E. The supremacy of the House of Representatives over the House of Councillors is recognized by the following:

1. The

1. The strengthening of the House of Representatives as having priority rights in budgetary discussion.
2. The House of Representatives may override by a 2/3 vote amendments to and rejections of bills which have been previously passed by it by the House of Councillors.
(In relation to this, the time of discussion by the House of Councillors of bills passed by the House of Representatives may be restricted).
3. The House of Councillors is prohibited from reporting to the Throne regarding cabinet non-confidence or taking a vote on it.

F. When the Diet is not in session, both Houses are to establish a permanent committee, which, when time does not allow the calling of a special session, may assume certain Diet functions provisionally such as legislative powers replacing emergency ordinances.
G. The Diet may carry on direct negotiations with various administrative bodies and with the people.

V. Ministers of State and Cabinet.

A. Basic matters regarding the State Ministers and the Cabinet, which are not mentioned in the Constitution, are decided by law.
B. The supremacy of the Prime Minister over the other state ministers is to be clarified.
C. Cabinet responsibility to the Diet is to be clarified. (Ministerial).
D. The provisions of the Cabinet system is to be mentioned in the Constitution. Cabinet prerogatives over ordinances of execution, independent ordinances and the enactment of other ordinances are to be recognized.

VI. Privy Councillors.

The Privy Councillor system is to be abolished.

VII. Courts and Board of Audit.

A. Independence of the judiciary is to be strengthened. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is to be directly under the Emperor.
B. Establishment of independent control over the lower courts by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
C. A separate Office of Public Procurator is to be set up under the Justice Minister.
D. Abolishment of the administrative court system. It is to be placed under the jurisdiction of the judiciary courts. The provisions of administrative litigation are to be enlarged.
E. The Director of the Board of Audit is to be directly under the Emperor.
F. The appointment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the director of the Board of Audit requires the approval of the Diet.

VIII. Revision of the Constitution.

A. The right of the Diet in initiating constitutional revision is recognized.

Enclosure No. 2.

Mainichi - Editorial. January 23, 1946.

Constitutional Revision by Liberal Party

The Constitutional revision prepared by the Liberal Party may be commented upon with one word: it is a draft suitable to the present situation. There are opinions unsuitable to the present situation, and a draft suitable for the present situation is not always correct in the future. The Constitution must have a durable basis, though it is not unchangeable. It is important to bear the future in mind in drafting a Constitution. Mr. Hatoyama said in his statement that "some advocate the abolition of the Emperor system, while others claim to place the Emperor in a decorative position. The people are either lamenting or worried over such a possibility. Does this agree with the tradition of the country or the people's conviction?"

The people are lamenting or worried at the present time. The peoples ideas have already undergone a great change since the termination of the war and will change more in future. How is this change to be accounted for? It is because the solution of the question of the Emperor system is not clear. The controversial point of this question should be recognized and clarified.

Concretely speaking, the Liberalists' Constitution provides that the Emperor shall possess the right of sovereignty. How does the subject body of sovereignty differ from the possessor of sovereignty? The Liberalists' Constitution appears to have adopted a theory of State corporation by placing sovereignty upon the people. Such a difficult point should be interpreted in simple language. The Constitution in question exempts the Emperor from legal and political responsibility. How does it differ from the inviolable character of the Emperor as provided in the present Constitution? The question lies in this: how far can the Emperor exercise his will as the possessor of sovereignty. If he does, and yet if he is not made responsible for his will, can government be carried out as a practical matter in the future? The Liberalists' Constitution copies the unwritten British Constitution that the King rules but does not govern the country. If the British model is taken, the Emperor's position must be clearly stated, as the Japanese Constitution is a written law. Japan is placed in a position to clarify the Emperor's position in the light of building up a democratic State, in view of the fact that the SCAP leaves the question to be solved by the free will of the people.

The Liberalists plan the abolition of the Emperor's prerogatives in regard to Emergency Ordinances, Enforcement Ordinances, Official Institutions, Supreme Command, Martial Law, etc., as provided in the present Constitution. This will reduce the Emperor's power to a great extent, but it will not change the nature of the Emperor. So long as the Emperor is made the possessor of sovereignty and is exempt from legal and political responsibility, therreformed Constitution does not differ from the present Constitution in nature, with the only exception that it advances one step toward free expression of the people's will. The reformed Constitution provides that freedom of thought, speech, religion, study, and art shall not be unduly restricted. How is "unduly" to be interpreted? The protection of

private

private property is clearly stated, but is this expression enough? In stipulating these principles in a concrete way, there are many points to be foreseen in preventing evils inherent to a free society.

It is a happy omen, however, that the Liberal Party has published a draft of a Constitutional revision in a relatively detailed way. It should have clarified the organ by which the Constitution is to be revised and its method and time, without which the Constitution has no meaning.

Enclosure No. 3.

Women Candidates

Socialist Party

YAMAZAKI Michiko (Shizuoka) - Her husband was a former MP from the Social Mass Party. He has not been heard of since going to Borneo with a military mission (civilian). She has been active with the farmer's union and nursery-school. She says: "I would like to have politics concerned directly with living in such matters as, improvement of the treatment of women teachers, bereaved families, assistance to fellow countrymen abroad, aid to war victims, particularly orphans, etc."

KATO Shizue (wife of KATO Kanju) - (Tokyo) - She was famous formerly as a birth-control advocate (Baroness Ishimoto). She attended the Peers School and graduated from the Pollard School in N.Y. Says she: "In addition to following the Party's women's policies, I hope to continue with the birth-control movement".

YUKAWA Haru (wife of a village head in Tochigi-ken) - "I would like to save the farming women from feudalistic slavery". She has been active in enlightening women and in production promotion.

Communist Party

KATSUMI Fusako (uncertified) - Founder of the first women's communist society, Sekirun-kai. Chairman of the women's division of the labor union council. Imprisoned in 1928 in Hokkaido as a result of a communist incident. Released with the termination of the war.

KATSUME Teru (uncertified) - Active as chairman of woman's division of the Tokyo Seiko Consumers Cooperative Union.

KOMIYAMA Tomie (32, Mistress of Sadaki Takahashi, a communist member who died in prison). - (From Hiroshima) - (Uncertified) - Famous as a leader of 8000 woman workers in a factory dispute.

Liberal Party

KUBUSHIRO Ochimi (Tokyo) - Executive of Fujin Kyofu-Kai and carried on movement for the abolition of licensed prostitution. Active in women suffrage movement as a Christian. Would like to work for the liberation of women.

TAKEUCHI Shigeyo (Physician) M.D. - Would like to work for women and child welfare from a physician's standpoint with special emphasis on the destruction of tuberculosis.

Progressive

Progressive Party

TAKAYOSHI Tomiko (Gunma Prefecture) - Graduate of English Department of Nippon University. Studied in U. S. Professor in Nippon Women's College. Director of Domestic Science Research Institute. For the sake of political education she would like to see at least one woman candidate from each prefecture.

KIUCHI Kyo - 39 years as a women teacher. Only lady principal of national school. Would like to improve treatment of women teachers.

New Japan Women's Party

MIYANIGASHI Katsuko (Wife of president of New Japan Party) - President of New Japan Women's Party. For the solution of problems of mothers and housewives.

MATSUDAIRA Toshiko - Vice-president of New Japan Women's Party.

Japan People's Party (Nippon Min-to)

FUKUCHI Fumino (Tokyo) - Employed in Social Bureau of Tokyo Prefectural Office. Would like to work for improvement of lot of housewives, teachers and bereaved families.

Independent

YONEYAMA Hisako (Ishikawa Prefecture) - Organized Women Suffrage League with ICHIKAWA Fusae and KIUCHI Kyo in Ishikawa Prefecture. Would like to work for child welfare and the solution of food problem.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 18, 1946

RESTRICTED

No. 209

Subject: Views of KAMEKAWA Tetsuya.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit copy of a memorandum of conversation between officers of the staff of this Mission and Mr. KAMEKAWA Tetsuya, a Japanese writer on economics and finance and a close friend of Mr. OZAKI Yukio, the famous liberal parliamentarian who recently retired.

SUMMARY. Mr. KAMEKAWA, who stated that he was expressing Mr. OZAKI's views, urged the abolition of the Privy Council and claimed that the newly appointed Home Minister, Mr. KIMURA Chuzo, should be considered a war criminal suspect because of his long membership in the Privy Council. He believed that important officials of the Imperial Household Department should retire and that an early abdication of the Emperor would be desirable. End of SUMMARY.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum of Conversation of January 16, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department.
Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 209 dated January 18, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Views of KANEKANA Totsuyo".

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

January 16, 1946.

Participants: Mr. KANEKANA Totsuyo
Mr. William J. Sebald
Mr. Russell L. Durgin

Subject: Certain aspects of the present political situation.

Mr. KANEKANA is a writer and scholar, and an authority on matters of economics and finance. For many years he was connected with the government statistical bureau. He is a close friend of Mr. OZAKI Yukio, the well known liberal.

Mr. KANEKANA called on Mr. Durgin on his own initiative. He stated that he had recently had a long conference with Mr. OZAKI Yukio at Atami and he wished to pass on to us some of Mr. OZAKI's views on the current political situation in Japan. The main points of Mr. KANEKANA's remarks to us were as follows:

1. In view of the powerful character of the Privy Council, both legally and politically, it is surprising that the recent purge of people responsible for the war did not include the members of this group. The appointment of Home Minister MITSUCHI Chuzo, who was continuously a member of the Privy Council since before the war, is open to serious question. He should be held accountable, even as a war criminal. His appointment as Home Minister cannot but make people raise questions as to the consistency of the policies of General Headquarters. The Privy Council is no longer needed and should be abolished immediately. All war-time members of the Privy Council should be ineligible for any important government position.

2. All important officials connected with the Imperial Household Department should be forced to resign. Those surrounding the throne are responsible for much of the present confusion.

3. An early voluntary abdication of the Emperor would help bring about the urgently needed changes. Prince TAKAMATSU would be the most logical choice for Regent.

4. In view of the present urgency of the situation, and in spite of his age and physical condition, Mr. OZAKI is reported by Mr. KANEKANA as willing to come to Tokyo if the government and General MacArthur's Headquarters should so desire.

The interviewers were impressed with Mr. KANEKANA's obvious sincerity and his earnest desire to express what he reports to be the carefully considered views of Mr. OZAKI.

WILLIAM J. SEBALD
RUSSELL L. DURGIN

Copy for General Headquarters, SCAP

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 19, 1946.

RESTRICTED

NO. 212

SUBJECT: Views of KIMURA Takeo, Member of Liberal Party, on Current Political Problems.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward copy of a memorandum of views expressed by Mr. KIMURA Takeo, an influential member of the Liberal Party, during an interrogation by a staff member of this Mission and officers of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on January 15, 1946.

SUMMARY. The Liberal Party welcomes delay in the elections and considers itself relatively little affected by the SCAP directives of January 4. The Progressive Party is attempting to make political use of the Farmers and Business Society. KAGAWA Toyohiko has enough following to ensure him election but he is not a politician and has no influence on political leaders. End of SUMMARY.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation.

Original and hecto to Department.

Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP.

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Enclosure to despatch no. 212, January 19, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Views of KIMURA Takeo, Member of Liberal Party, on Current Political Problems."

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

January 15, 1946.

Participants: KIMURA Takeo, an influential member of the Liberal Party who, in the last Diet, was Head of the Committee of Liberal Party Diet Members (Giin Kanri).

William J. Sebald
T/5 R. Yasui, Counter Intelligence Section, GHQ
H. Kawashima, interpreter brought by Mr. KIMURA

Subject: Views on Current Political Problems.

(This interview was arranged by the Counter Intelligence Section of GHQ for the purpose of obtaining information concerning suspected war criminals.)

The gist of Mr. KIMURA's views concerning various political questions, as developed during the interrogation, are set forth below:

Postponement of elections.

In so far as the Liberal Party is concerned, the recent SCAP directive for the postponement of the general election until March 15 is greatly welcomed. The Liberal Party is a relatively new party, and any delay in the election date will redound to its benefit by allowing more time to attract political personalities to its banner. Americans should understand the difference between elections in Japan and those held in the United States. In America, the party platform is a powerful influence in deciding an election and the issues are generally more clearly drawn. In Japan, on the other hand, a Party's strength is based almost solely upon the personalities of thecandidates.

Only some fifty members of the former Diet belong to the Liberal Party. These candidates have established themselves as personalities and have a following. New candidates, however, must henceforth establish themselves and the added time now granted will be of assistance in this regard. Before the delay was announced, 180 candidates (including the fifty ex-Diet members) were to run as Liberal Party members; it is now expected that some 250 candidates will be put forward.

The SCAP "purge" directive of January 4, 1946.

The SCAP directive of January 4 probably will not greatly affect the Liberal

the Liberal Party, and so far, it has been decided that only three candidates are affected, viz., MATSUNO Tsuruhei, USHIZUKA Toratare, and ANDO Seijun (Masazumi). Several others could probably be named, but in view of doubt which arises in their cases, it is preferred not to mention their names. The political parties generally complied with the terms of the directive with willingness, although some factions consider the directive unfair in that persons who were anti-war in spirit were nevertheless technically caught within its provisions. Many doubtful cases are bound to arise and a quasi-judicial board to decide such cases would be welcomed by all parties, irrespective of the numbers of candidates involved (except the Communist Party, the attitude of which is unknown). Mr. KIMURA himself was a Member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and an "adviser" to the Toa-Renmei (East Asia Federation), a union of the Toa Doshikai (Society for Common Thought in East Asia), an active group, and the Toa Kyokai (East Asia Society), a publishing group. KIMURA was a member of the latter, but does not consider himself personally involved by the directive.

Effect of former membership in the IRAPS.

The chief aim of the coming election is to eliminate all Diet members who supported the TOJO Cabinet. When asked why the Liberal Party still supports candidates who were members of the IRAPS, KIMURA discoursed at length concerning the difficulty, during the war, of not being a member. Only OZAKI Yukio and a very few others had the courage of their convictions not to join; not to belong to the IRAPS was tantamount to risking a charge of lese majesta.

Progressive Party and the Nogyokai.

The Progressive Party is making use of the structure and facilities of the Nogyokai (Farmers and Business Society), formed by the union of the Sangyo Kumiai (Manufacturers Guild) and the Nokai (Farmers Association). In fact, the Nogyokai has no political aspirations, but its members and following are being utilized and put to political uses for the coming election.

Views concerning KAGAWA Toyohiko.

Although KAGAWA Toyohiko is doubtlessly a sincere Socialist, he is also a firm believer in cooperative principles. This gives rise to some doubt as to his primary allegiance to the Socialist Party. He has a following and can be elected, but his influence upon political leaders is nil. He is definitely not a politician--he is more of a theoretician.

W. J. SEBALD

Copy for Colonel Kades

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 7, 1946.

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING JANUARY 5, 1946

The New Year holidays and uncertainty over the date of the general elections brought political activity practically to a standstill. However, the issuance by SCAP on January 4 of the two directives abolishing certain organizations and disqualifying individuals from public office threw the political parties into sudden confused activity.

The Progressive Party finds itself deprived of its president and most of its leading officials. Probably the only outstanding members unaffected by the directives are SAITO Takao, KAWASAKI Katsu and YOSHIOKA Yayo.

The consensus is that the Progressives cannot continue to exist as a party. Certain of the Liberal Party leaders will also have to retire from public life, including ANDO Masazumi, although the blow is far less severe than that suffered by the Progressives. The Cooperative Party finds one of its leaders, SENGOKU Kotaro, Minister of Agriculture in the HIGASHI-KUNI Cabinet, disqualified because of his position as director in the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association. The Social Democrats gain considerably in power and prestige, although a few of their members, such as KONO Mitsu and KAWAKAMI Jotaro, will be affected. The Communists are of course delighted with the directive and announce that they will seek to put additional candidates into the field.

The burning question at the moment is the future of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet. Although there is no certainty at this moment that the Cabinet will fall, the press and numbers of informed Japanese believed that the Cabinet cannot long survive the impact of this most recent blow, much more far-reaching in its effect than the directive of October 4 which caused the downfall of the HIGASHI-KUNI Cabinet. The Social Democrats and Cooperatives are anxious to establish a coalition party Cabinet and state they would be able to work together and with the Liberal Party in the interim period prior to elections. Among those proposed for Prime Minister are Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika (who may possibly be affected by the directive because of a position he held in Malaya during the war), KAGAWA Toyohiko, who it is said would attract support from Socialists and Cooperatives, and HATOYAMA Ichiro, president of the Liberal Party.

Observers point out that SHIDEHARA has lost the confidence of the people, that the recent directives will remove several members from his Cabinet, and that a patchwork job would achieve little more than temporary relief and might aggravate the increasingly serious economic situation. They believe that new leadership is needed in Japan, leadership which will rally the farmers of the nation to the effective execution of a plan to relieve the food shortage.

The opinion

The opinion seems to increase among intelligent Japanese that SCAP will inevitably be forced to take more direct part in the administration of Japan. The lack of experience in democratic practices and the limp, negative state of political leadership increases the dependence upon the occupying power. Tokyo Shimbun on January 5 editorialized on a theme which has appeared more and more frequently in the Japanese press, namely, that while the reconstruction of Japan must in the final analysis depend on the efforts of the Japanese themselves, they have so far failed signally to take any initiative action toward the establishment of democracy.

In the present situation, it would therefore seem to be the wisest course to direct power into the hands of those who will have some incentive to accomplish constructive results. The political parties are on trial; if there is hope in democratic government for Japan, then political parties under leadership untainted by war responsibility, should be given the opportunity to prove themselves.

John K. Emmerson
Foreign Service Officer

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, January 4, 1946.

NO. 156

SUBJECT: Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation with MATSUOKA Komakichi on "The Labor Movement in Japan."

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of conversation between Mr. MATSUOKA Komakichi, leader of the Japanese labor movement and prominent member of the Social Democratic Party, and a member of this Mission.

Mr. MATSUOKA has been associated with the Japanese labor movement for many years and is president of the Japan Labor Union Alliance.

Summary. Reactionary groups are still influential and are attempting to infiltrate into labor organizations. The Communists have no important strength at present but unless a sound labor movement develops in Japan along the lines of the British Labor Party, there is danger of unrest caused by extremist elements, both Right and Left. The Japan Labor Union Alliance, with a present membership of 100,000, hopes to increase its membership to 300,000 by spring of 1946. The new Labor Union Law is welcomed as a present from General MacArthur; unemployment insurance should be the next reform to be instituted. Most industrial workers will vote for the Social Democratic Party. Political education, especially for workers and for women, is essential. End of summary.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation.

Original and hectograph to Department.

Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 156, January 4, 1946,
from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan,
on the subject: "Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation
with MATSUOKA Komakichi on 'The Labor Movement in Japan.'"

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 17, 1945.

Participants: Mr. MATSUOKA Komakichi;
Mr. Emmerson.

Subject: Japanese Labor Movement.

There is a good chance in Japan for the development of a sound labor movement. Workers understand clearly that they were deceived by the Government and that the Industrial Patriotic Association (Sangyo Hokokukai), which supplanted all labor unions in Japan, was simply an adaptation of the Fascist labor front in Germany. Unfortunately, workers under 30 years of age have had no experience in a true labor movement.

Reactionary groups are still influential among demobilized officers and former students of military schools and may attempt to mobilize workers for their own ends. An example is the All Japan Federation of Workers (Zenkoku Kinrosha Domei), successor to the nationalistic Kokusui-to which functioned during the war.

Japan should imitate the British labor movement and should choose the middle way personified by the British Labor Party. If such a sound labor movement does not develop in Japan, there is danger of the growth of the extreme Right and the extreme Left, in which case Japan might conceivably become another Spain.

The Communists have no important strength at present. They have acquired wide sympathy and interest because of their long suppression and the martyrdom of their leaders. This interest, however, does not indicate any popular widespread understanding of communism. With legalization of their party and freedom of activity the Communists may lose some of their dramatic appeal.

The Japan Labor Union Alliance (Nihon Rodo Sodomei), of which Mr. MATSUOKA is president, now has a membership of 100,000, which is expected to reach 300,000 or more by the spring of 1946. Local labor unions are being rapidly organized in various parts of the country, but unfortunately there are few able labor leaders and it will be necessary to educate and train organizers for the future success of the movement.

The Labor Union Alliance has not yet been able to publish an organ and at the moment lacks a building in which to start a labor school.

The Government has so far opposed the affiliation of railway and postal workers with the Labor Alliance

but favors

but favors separate unions for these government employees. The Government should set an example to private industry and should encourage government workers to unionize with employees of private industry.

The new Labor Union Law is welcomed as a present from General MacArthur by Japanese labor leaders who have worked for many years to attain this objective. Unemployment insurance should be the next reform to be considered and it is hoped that such a bill will be introduced in the next Diet.

Employers who previously did not encourage the organization of labor have now changed their attitude and in general arecooperating and facilitating their employees to unionize.

The votes of most industrial workers will be controlled by the Social Democratic Party. The workers will not support the Liberals or the Progressives and they will cast very few votes for Communist candidates.

Unfortunately, the Socialists are at a disadvantage in the elections because of lack of funds. The new election law is unfavorable to the less opulent parties by permitting unrestricted campaigning by third parties.

The political education of women is as important as that of workers. Women can be expected to remain conservative until political education makes some progress. The Progressive Party will draw considerable strength from the farmers, who are conservative, although the Social Democrats are gaining a following among tenants.

J.K.E.

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

No. 151 Tokyo, Japan, January 2, 1946

Subject: Views of Mr. HIRANO Rikizo, Prominent Leader of The Social Democratic Party.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose two memoranda of conversation between Mr. HIRANO Rikizo, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, and a member of this Mission.

SUMMARY. (Of Mr. HIRANO's views) Communism may be aided by Russian participation in the Control Council for Japan. However, if the Social Democratic Party develops along the lines of the British Labor Party, the Communists will not attain substantial power in Japan. Some Japanese are of the opinion that the Russians may back the Japanese Communist Party and the Americans another political group. The Social Democratic Party hopes to follow the lead of the United States and the party policy will be pro-American. The SHIDEHARA Cabinet is in a weak position at present and will resign if a directive is issued by SCAP postponing the date of the elections. In case of a Cabinet resignation, the Social Democratic Party should be given a mandate to form a new Government. The present Cabinet members do not enjoy the confidence of the farmers and workers whose full cooperation is essential for the solution of emergency economic problems, such as the food shortage. A Cabinet under the leadership of MATSUOKA Komakichi, president of the Japan Federation Labor, and himself, as head of the Japan Farmers Union, would be able to accomplish concrete results in the interim before the elections. The prestige of the party would rise to the point that it would win at least 250 seats in the next House of Representatives. End of Summary.

It is suggested that, wholly apart from the merits of Mr. HIRANO's proposal of a Social Democratic Cabinet, the possibility of a resignation of the SHIDEHARA Government before the elections should be envisaged and the question of the personnel of a successor Government carefully studied.

A brief biographical sketch of HIRANO follows:

HIRANO Rikizo. Born Gifu Prefecture, November, 1889. Graduated Waseda University, politics and economics, 1922. Was

active

active in the agrarian movement which developed during the years 1922 to 1926. Chairman of the propaganda committee, Japan Farmers Union (Nihon Nomin Kumiai) 1922. General Secretary of the Japan Farmers Party (Nihon Nomin-to) 1926. General Secretary Japan Masses Party (Nihon Taishu-to) 1926. Member of the Central Committee, Social Masses Party (Shakai Minshuto) 1926. President of Japan Farmers Union (Nihon Nomin Kumiai) 1937. Elected to the House of Representatives in 1936, 1937, and 1941. Is at present a director of the Social Democratic Party and chairman of the Election Policy Committee. He is regarded, with NIZUSAWA Chozaburo and HATSUOKA Kumaichi, as one of the three most important leaders of the party.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of Conversation, December 27, 1945.
2. Memorandum of Conversation, December 30, 1945.

Original and hectograph to Department.
Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 151 dated January 2, 1946, from George Atcheson, Jr., United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Views of Mr. HIRANO Rikizo, Prominent Leader of the Social Democratic Party".

COPY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

December 27, 1945

Participants: Mr. HIRANO Rikizo,
Mr. Emmerson.

Subject : Political Parties and a Possible Change in Government.

Mr. HIRANO made the following comments in the course of an informal conversation:

Popular Front. The approaches by the Communist Party for a united front with the Social Democratic Party represent political strategy to create a rift within the Social Democratic ranks. Ninety percent of the Social Democrats oppose the formation of a united front with the Communists. Ten percent favor cooperation on specific issues.

Communist Party. The Communist Party claims a membership of 4,000 at the present time. If the party takes a realistic attitude toward liberal and agrarian problems it will grow in strength. It is likely, however, that the membership and influence of the party will rise to a certain degree and go no farther. The Communists will not be able to elect more than a handful of candidates to the Diet. They may take advantage of social unrest and may be responsible for certain disturbances. However, if the Social Democratic Party develops along the lines of the British Labor Party the Communists will not attain any substantial power in the country.

The strength of the Communist Party lies largely in the working classes and has not yet made itself widely felt among farmers, who are opposed to the communist policy of confiscating land without compensation. Feeling for the right of ownership is strong in Japanese farmers and the Russian system of nationalization of land and collectivism does not appeal to Japanese peasants.

Regardless of its statements to the contrary, the Japanese Communist Party is associated with Russia in the minds of the Japanese people. Antagonism toward Russia, which is profound, is based on two factors: first, a natural antipathy toward "Red" ideology; and, second, Russia's entry into the war against Japan. The people blame their own militarists for the war with the United States but feel hatred and contempt for the Russians, who came into the war only at the last moment when Japan was already in its last agonies of defeat. The close association with Russia and the Comintern by the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party in years past has created a deep impression on the Japanese people that the present Communist Party is influenced and directed by Russia. It is recalled that in former times Japanese Communists spoke of Russia in terms of "mother country".

Other

Other Political Parties. From public opinion polls recently taken in various parts of the country it can be concluded that the Social Democratic Party enjoys the support of from 60% to 70% of Japanese farmers and workers. If present political conditions prevail, the Progressives, because of the onus of war responsibility, cannot be expected to elect more than 100 persons to the next Diet. The Social Democrats will return at least 150 members, the Liberals and Independents approximately 100 each.

The New Japan Cooperative Party is a group of Diet members who found none of the existing parties to their liking and joined together to form a new political party. They have no definite ideology. The leaders are FUNATA Chu and KUROZAWA Zorise. Funata has had no great political experience but has been associated with a number of enterprises during his career, including several government positions.

Changes in Cabinet. The SHIDEHARA Cabinet is extremely shaky at present and if SCAP issues an order postponing the elections, will resign. Since the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal has been abolished the Emperor will now turn for advice to Admiral SUZUKI Kantaro, newly appointed President of the Privy Council. The successor to the SHIDEHARA Cabinet should be formed by persons without taint of war responsibility and with the ability to secure popular confidence and carry out pressing economic reforms. The only group capable of forming such a government is the Social Democratic Party. Admiral SUZUKI, who opposed the war and brought it to a conclusion as Prime Minister, would be favorable to recommending to the Emperor that the next government be formed by the Socialists.

A Social Democratic Cabinet would be led jointly by KATSUOKA Komakichi as representative of the Japanese laboring classes and by HIRANO Rikizo, representative of the farmers. An historical precedent for a joint cabinet is the OKUMA-ITAGAKI Cabinet. In such a Government, if KATSUOKA were to assume the post of Prime Minister, HIRANO would become Minister of Agriculture. NIZUTANI might become Minister for Foreign Affairs and NISHIO, Minister of Welfare.

A Social Democratic Cabinet enjoying wide popular confidence would be able to attack energetically present economic problems. For example, the farmers are reluctant to cooperate in solving the food distribution problem because they lack confidence in the Government and especially in the present Minister of Agriculture. They would follow a minister who represented their own interests. The present Land Reform Bill is unsatisfactory and should be promptly revised. The production of fertilizer could be increased by 1,000,000 tons through reorganization of the producers and elimination of sabotage. Only after taking these three steps should the Government appeal to the Allied Powers for imports of food.

There is no outstanding leader today outside of the Social Democratic Party who could rally the country to a successful economic reform program. A sampling of public opinion already shows that the Socialists enjoy wide popular support. If they were given an opportunity to form a government they would increase that confidence and by the time the postponed elections were held could be expected to win at least 250 seats in the new Diet.

J.K.H.

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch No. 151 dated January 2, 1946, from George Atcheson, Jr., United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Views of Mr. HIRANO Rikizo, Prominent Leader of the Social Democratic Party".

COPY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

December 30, 1945

Participants: Mr. HIRANO Rikizo,
Mr. Atcheson.

Subject : Present Political Situation.

Mr. HIRANO called at his own request to discuss certain points which had arisen during our conversation of December 27. He asked first whether I could inform him of the approximate date of the general elections. I replied that I had no information on this point. He said that the Social Democratic Party favored postponement of the elections but it was difficult to make plans for the campaign so long as the date remained in doubt.

Mr. HIRANO next referred to his comment regarding the possibility of the resignation of the SHIDEHARA Cabinet and asked for my views on his proposal that the Social Democratic Party be asked to form a Cabinet. I told him that I could not express an opinion on this point but was of course glad to transmit his views to SCAP. He emphasized that the SHIDEHARA Cabinet, with three of its members affiliated with the Progressive Party and without Socialist representation, was unfit to remain at the helm of Government during the period prior to the elections. He felt that SHIDEHARA would himself resign but that other members of his Cabinet wished to remain in office. In any case, it was HIRANO's opinion that the Cabinet should be forced to retire.

He then referred to the reports of the formation of a 4-Power Council to govern Japan and expressed apprehension over Soviet influence in the occupation policy. He stated that a great many people were worried that the USSR represented in the Council in Tokyo, direct Russian aid would be given to the Japanese Communist Party. He stated that the Social Democrats hoped to follow the lead of the United States and that their policy would be pro-American. He inquired whether it was the policy of the United States to encourage one political group over another. I replied that my understanding of the general objectives of the occupation was that the United States wished to adopt a fair, equitable attitude, and to encourage the Japanese themselves to evolve a democratic system which would represent the freely expressed will of the people. I said it was my personal opinion that the United States Government would not wish to aid one political group against another nor to put obstacles in the way of any political organization unless its activities were inimical to the general objectives of the occupation.

Mr. HIRANO said that some members of the Social Democratic Party were anxious for the return to Japan from the United States of OYAMA Ikuo and were prepared to offer him the presidency of the

Enclosure

Social Democratic Party. He asked my opinion regarding OYAMA's return and possible political activity. I repeated that the United States would probably not wish to support politically any individual or any group, that OYAMA had led a quiet, scholarly life in the United States and that his political stature was unknown. I said that if he came back to Japan, he would return as an individual without any backing or support from the United States Government.

HIRANO then remarked that if OYAMA returned from the United States, would it then be probable that Japanese Communists would return to Japan from Soviet Russia and from Communist China. I replied that it was my personal opinion that an equitable attitude would have to be taken. He said that many Japanese were worried about the influence which Communists returning from abroad would be able to exert in Japan. He said that the political situation in Japan would acquire considerable international significance if the Russians were actively supporting a Communist party here.

Regarding the revision of the Japanese Constitution, HIRANO stated that the Social Democratic Party supported in general the draft prepared by the civilian committee which included KOSHITO Tatsuo and TAKANO Iwasaburo, both Socialist party members.

Mr. HIRANO stated that he appreciated the opportunity of speaking with me, asking me to keep confidential his remarks regarding Russia. During the course of the conversation, he spoke of himself as the highest officer of his party and intimated that he had the right to speak for the party.

J.K.B.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 31, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 29, 1945.

Summary

Continued uncertainty over the date of the general election and the rumored possibility of a SCAP order restricting the candidacy of the Diet members has prevented the political parties from launching active campaigns. Time is on the side of the new parties whose membership is least tainted with the activities of the war years. Social Democrats, Cooperatives, and Communists strongly desire a delayed election which will give them additional opportunity to build up their party organizations. Progressives and Liberals continue to make optimistic statements to the press but both are deeply concerned over the rumored possible issuance of directives which would have far-reaching effect on the future of their parties.

While it is admitted that with a new electorate and numerous unknown factors influencing the result of the elections, no accurate predictions can now be made, opinion is increasing that a coalition Cabinet will be necessary because of the probability that no one party can win a landslide victory. In the meantime speculation is rife that the SHIDEHARA Cabinet may resign before the elections, in which case an interim Government must be chosen. The choice of a Prime Minister at this time is a difficult one. Japanese of varying shades of political opinion point out the necessity of leadership which will inspire the confidence of the farmers, whose cooperation is sorely needed to solve the food problem.

A leader of the Social Democratic Party has proposed that his party be given the mandate to form a Cabinet. He states that present indications are that the Social Democrats enjoy wide popular support. He is confident that the Socialists could accomplish concrete results in the face of the present economic crises before the coming elections, and that the party could provide competent leadership not available elsewhere.

The Progressive Party

In spite of the threat of disqualification of many of their members hanging over them, Progressive Party representatives spoke optimistically to the press regarding their chances in the coming elections. They will have between

four hundred

four hundred and five hundred candidates in the field and still expect to win two hundred seats. Of two hundred and seventy members of the past Diet, seventy will refrain from running for office, forty to fifty candidates will be former parliamentarians who have held seats in the recently dissolved House of Representatives. The remaining two hundred or more will be "new" persons without previous experience.

The party, in a list of "slogans" officially selected for campaign purposes, proposed "injection of new blood into the Diet through election of as many new candidates as possible as a necessary premise to the establishment of democracy and faithful execution of the Potsdam Declaration."

According to the Mainichi, the following additional directors have been designated for the party: SHIMADA Toshio, former president of the House of Representatives, UEDA Takakichi, KUBOI Yoshimitsu (all three former members of the Seiyukai), KATSUTA Nagakichi and YAMAMOTO Kozo, former Minseito members, and Mrs. YOSHIOKA Yayoi.

On December 26 the Progressive Party announced the formation of a Special Policy Committee with NAKASHIMA Yadanji as chairman and TANABE Tadao as vice-chairman. This committee, which will be composed of members of the party representing Tokyo prefecture in the previous Diet, will investigate the problems of food, coal, transportation, and inflation.

The Japan Cooperative Party

The Japan Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyodo-to) has announced its platform and policies and, according to its leaders, is prepared to sponsor from one hundred to one hundred and thirty candidates in the coming elections. The party upholds the Emperor system but advocates democratic revision of the Constitution and the "reorganization of industry, economy, and national culture on the cooperative principle." It opposes the nationalization of industries, with the exception of such utilities as telegraphs, telephones and railroads. The party is, however, willing to cooperate closely with the Social Democratic Party. It expects wide support from rural districts where the cooperative movement has flourished.

Leaders of the Party point out that they originally had no intention of forming a new political party and only did so in response to urgent requests from local groups organized in twelve prefectures. Their principal present objective, they say, is not political power but political education.

According the party leaders, the principles and policies of the Japan Cooperative Party have the full support and sympathy of both Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika and KAGAWA Toyohiko, long associated with the cooperative movement in Japan. The press erroneously announced that Marquis TOKUGAWA had resigned his membership in the Social

Democratic

Democratic Party to join the Progressives. He reportedly stated that if the Cooperative Party had been in existence earlier he would have joined it, but that he now felt obligated to remain for a time in the Social Democratic Party. KAGAWA was, as is well known, one of the founders of the Social Democratic Party.

Leaders of the Cooperative Party are SENGOKU Kotaro, Minister of Agriculture in the HIGASHI-KUNI Cabinet, KUROSAWA Torazo, Hokkaido "Butter King" and for many years active in the cooperative movement, FUNADA Naka, director of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and WIKAWA Tadao, formerly Financial Commissioner in New York, president of several cooperative organizations, and unofficial adviser to Ambassador NOMURA during the American-Japanese conversations in Washington in 1941.

Cooperative Party leaders state that there is considerable sentiment within the Social Democratic Party for a coalition with the Cooperatives following the next election. Some Socialists would like to amalgamate the two parties and at the same time eliminate the troublesome left wing now within the Social Democratic Party. The Cooperatives say that they are not at present thinking of amalgamation with any other party.

There is attached as an appendix a statement of policies furnished by Mr. FUNADA Naka of the party's Central Committee.

The Social Democratic Party

The Social Democrats are confident of success in the coming elections. One of the party leaders stated in an interview with the writer on December 27 that the Social Democrats would win one hundred and fifty seats. He stated that various polls of public opinion which had been taken recently showed that from sixty to seventy per cent of the farmers and workers support the Social Democratic Party.

On December 27 the Social Democrats rejected the third proposal for a united front made by the Japanese Communist Party. In a note handed to the Communists by ASANUMA Inajiro, the Socialists specified that they had already established their own policy for expediting the marketing of farm produce and the securing of essential foodstuffs in close cooperation with farmers unions, and they believed the Socialists and Communists should pursue separately their policies for solution of the food problem.

Commenting on the Communist proposals for a united front HIRANO Rikizo, one of the members of the party election committee, stated to the writer that ninety per cent of the members of the Social Democratic Party opposed the formation of a united front with the Communists. Only ten per cent of the party members favored cooperation with the Communist Party on specific issues; no one was ready to establish a full united front.

HIRANO, in his interview with the writer on December 27, expressed

27, expressed the opinion that the SHIDEHARA Cabinet was now in a shaky position and would resign if a SCAP order is issued to postpone the elections. In such a case, he stated, the Emperor would probably consult Admiral SUZUKI Kantaro, President of the Privy Council, since the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal no longer exists. HIRANO believed that Baron SUZUKI, whom he described as an upright official who had never favored war with the United States, would be favorably disposed toward giving the mandate to form a Cabinet to the Social Democratic Party. The Socialists, enjoying wide popular confidence, especially among workers and farmers, would be able to solve pressing economic problems where the SHIDEHARA Cabinet has failed. Such a Cabinet would possibly be a joint one, with either MATSUOKA Komakichi or HIRANO himself assuming the office of Prime Minister. He cited the example of the OKUMA-ITAGAKI Cabinet as a precedent for joint reponsibility. He said that since MATSUOKA enjoys the confidence of labor and himself that of the farmers, their approach to food, unemployment and agrarian problems would receive popular support and cooperation. HIRANO suggested that in a Social Democratic Cabinet, MIZUTANI Chosaburo might become Foreign Minister and NISHIO Suehiro, Welfare Minister. If MATSUOKA were Prime Minister, he thought that he (HIRANO) would take the Agriculture post.

HIRANO expressed the opinion that if a Social Democratic Cabinet were formed for the interim period preceding the elections, the party would win two hundred and fifty seats in the next Diet instead of his presently estimated one hundred and fifty, thus becoming the majority party.

The Communist Party

The Communists have announced that they will conduct a vigorous campaign, through the press and by enlisting support of the Social Democrats, to obtain postponement of the general elections for at least another month. They have stated that one hundred and sixty members will run for Diet seats and that they hope to win sixty seats in the next House of Representatives. A party spokesman has further indicated to the press that the Communists will support "genuine democrats" running on the Social Democratic ticket.

The most recent (the third) proposal to the Social Democrats of a united front was made on the basis of a solution for the food crisis. The Communists proposed close cooperation between the farmers unions sponsored by the Social Democrats and their own farmers' committees. The Socialists, however, replied that the Communist-organized committees would be incapable of launching a nation-wide campaign and that the farmers' unions would be able to solve the food question without Communist aid. The Social Democratic leaders also commented to the Communists that personal attacks on Socialist leaders had not helped toward an amicable atmosphere between the two parties.

The press continued to devote considerable space to Communist activities. The Asahi editorial of December 27 surprisingly supported a popular front and deplored the prejudice with which, it stated, the Communists had been looked upon in Japan.

Other Parties

Representatives of twenty-one minor parties were reported to have met on December 26 to discuss "urgent problems of the moment" and to investigate the possibility of establishing a common front among them.

Jiji Press reported that several rightist groups were attempting to organize Japanese youth along totalitarian lines. The Youth League (Seinen Renmei) is reported to have issued an appeal to youths to "find a way out of the present predicament of 'have-not' nations."

The following new political organizations were announced during the week:

Independent Socialist Party (Dokuritsu Shakai-to).

Principles: (1) Defense of the Emperor as center of the cooperative racial structure; (2) Public election of Prime Minister and Prefectural Governors; (3) Increase of national production through cooperative organization.

Seven candidates for the House of Representatives have been announced, including KAMEI Kanichiro, former Diet member, former officer of the Social Mass Party, and in 1939 and 1940, chief of the East Asia Department, Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

New Democracy Association (Shin Minshu Kyokai).

The objective of this group is said to be the political education of the people, for which purpose it is proposed to establish a political school and to sponsor a political cultural movement.

Japan League of Democracy (Nihon Minshu-sugi Renmei).

This organization, founded on December 26 under the direction of EGI Takehiko states as its purpose to investigate democratic methods in various occupations and professions and to sponsor university lecture courses.

John K. Emmerson
Foreign Service Officer

Appendix: Policies of the
Japan Cooperative Party.

APPENDIX

Policies of the Japan Cooperative Party
(Received from FUNABA Naka)

Major Principles

1. The party is resolved to preserve the Imperial lineage, and institute with it a democratic form of government of all the people.

2. The party is resolved to found a new-born democratic Japan by reorganizing our industries, economics and national culture on cooperative principles with service, autonomy and mutual love as keynotes.

Outline of National Policies Advocated

1. To revise our constitution along democratic principles so as to ensure realization of parliamentary government reflecting people's will.

2. To stablize people's life by mutual aid of town and country through cooperative socieities, and thereby establish national economic system with perfect harmony among agriculture, industry and commerce.

3. To realize a new sovial system based on service and cooperation by breaking down capitalistic domination and any other feudalistic elements.

4. To institute a new education policy with keynotes of research for truth and respect for individuality, and thereby build high national culture.

5. To contribute to international amity and progress of world culture by creating a peace-loving nation.

Emergency Policies to be Advocated in the Coming Campaign

(1) Food Problems.

1. Immediately provide 3 go per capita per day of rice and its equivalents.

2. Remove bureaucratic control on food production and replace it with cooperative production system in agrarian and fishing communities.

3. Reorganize government made street associations as well as neighborhood associations into autonomous consumers' cooperative societies, and let them have direct connection with the production cooperatives in agrarian and fishing communities.

4. Remove all kinds of bureaucratic control organizations for food distribution, such as Food Corporation, etc., and replace them with autonomous merchants' distribution cooperatives as far as towns and cities are concerned.

5. Promptly

5. Promptly realize radical reforms in our land system, including crown domains, military grounds, etc., and thereby contribute to rapid increase in staple food production.

6. Steadily increase production of chemical fertilizers with agricultural cooperatives' participation in the enterprise.

7. Immediately commence large scale cultivation of idle lands, nation-wide adjustment of rice fields and other land improvements.

8. Encourage the use of floured goods, and thereby improve the nation's food situation.

9. Attempt to increase production of silk, tea sundry goods, etc., as collateral to importing foodstuffs, and encourage offering of art treasures and production increase of industrial art objects.

(2) Inflation Problems.

1. Drastically cut various kinds of government subsidies, and put an end to state compensation for munition industries loss; provided, however, that special consideration be given to the conversion of such industries to peace industries.

2. Lighten the burden of national expenditures by postponing interest payments or redemptions of war loans, and also by thoroughgoing retrenchment through sweeping reform in the administrative system.

3. Absorb all kinds of war-profit tax and also by reforming existing taxation system.

4. Sweep away floating purchasing power by freezing part of deposits in connection with exchanging new paper currencies with existing ones.

(3) Unemployment Problem.

1. Speedily establish reconstruction program of war destroyed districts, and thereby utilize unemployed labor.

2. Promptly commence large scale productive engineering developments, reclamation, afforestation, etc.

3. Give employment to labor by extension or repairing of railroads or tracks.

4. Encourage all lines of industrial improvement to agricultural products.

5. Speedily promote peace industries by creating productive cooperatives of middle or small manufacturers.

6. Mobilize

6. Mobilize the enemployed in coal mining by improving miners' income.

(4) War Sufferers, Foreign Returned Problems.

1. Open large private homes and unoccupied buildings and houses to accommodate the war sufferers.

2. Give preferential employment to the war sufferers and repatriated.

3. Make thoroughgoing search and recovery of surplus commodities stored as war materials at the close of the war and distribute them among war sufferers and repatriated.

4. Create an office for the purpose of giving relief to Japanese still remaining abroad and for facilitating their return home.

(5) Political and Social Reforms.

1. Abolish the peerage system and also discrimination still existing between former Samurai class and commoners.

2. Close such feudalistic organs as Privy Council, Imperial Household Department, etc.

3. Completely reorganize the Upper House along vocational representative lines.

4. Promptly reorganize the present administrative system, and repeal Civil Service Act with the purpose of opening the way for capable men to enter government.

5. Democratize local government with governors elected by people's votes.

6. Protect people's right by reforming judicial as well as police system.

7. Guarantee the living of teachers as well as lower public servants and all kinds of salaried people and give them benefit of universal social insurance.

8. Take drastic method towards population problem by adopting scientific birth control, redistribution of inhabitants between the town and the country, etc.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 24, 1945.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff.

There is transmitted hereunder our eleventh weekly report on Japanese political parties submitted pursuant to the Chief of Staff's memorandum of October 3, 1945. Attached as an appendix to the report is a list of the members of each party in the recently dissolved House of Representatives.

A bombshell was thrown into political circles with the report published in all Japanese newspapers on December 21 that SCAP would take steps to disqualify from the candidacy to the House of Representatives former leaders of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and its successor organizations. It was also reported as an alternative that all members of the past Diet "recommended" by the TOJO Government would be disqualified.

In accordance with previous recommendations made by this office, it is believed that action by SCAP to ban from candidacy for the Diet persons in certain categories is necessary and would be welcomed by a large percentage of the Japanese people. As rumor of such contemplated action has now appeared in the Japanese press, we submit the recommendation that the directive should be issued with the minimum delay. Until such action is taken—or decision not to take it is announced—candidates cannot with certainty be selected by the various parties, campaign issues remain confused, and the constructive process of activating a democratic form of representative government cannot begin. In making this recommendation, we are also inclined to favor postponement of the elections for at least a month beyond the date contemplated in order to give the parties and prospective candidates time to adjust themselves to the new situation and to organize their campaigns.

George Atcheson, Jr.
Minister
U. S. Political Adviser

Enclosure:

Political Parties in Japan:
Developments During the Week
Ending December 22, 1945.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 24, 1945.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING

THE WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 22, 1945

With the dissolution of the Diet on December 18, most representatives who expect to be candidates for election scattered to their home province to begin their campaigns. The future of the political parties was suddenly clouded with uncertainty with the publication in the press of rumors that SCAP had insisted upon postponement of the election date, which had been reported as on or about January 24, and would issue a directive prohibiting persons in certain categories from becoming candidates for Diet seats in the coming elections. If, as rumored, members or officers of the IRAA, IRAPS, and Political Association of Great Japan, would be banned from running for office, the Progressive Party would receive an almost fatal blow. Therefore, it appeared that campaign activity on the part of members of the dissolved Diet would remain at a standstill until clarification of SCAP's intentions was obtained.

In the meantime the parties began to announce the lists of their candidates. The Progressives would enter 250 or 300, the Liberals 250, the Social Democrats a possible 300, and the Communists approximately 100. The Japan Cooperative Party, latest political party to enter the ring, announced that it would support 120 candidates. Numerous minor parties continued to appear and to announce candidates.

Observers believe that, unless the rumored directive from SCAP materializes, the Progressives will emerge with a strength of 200 or more seats. Liberals and Social Democrats may win from 100 to 150 seats each. In such case, the Liberals and Social Democrats would have a combined strength greater than the Progressives. If party strength should be considered in the selection of the next Prime Minister a coalition Cabinet might be formed, with HATOYAMA as Liberal leader, standing a good chance to head the government.

Progressive Party

The thorny question of a president for the Progressive Party was finally decided on December 18, the day of the Diet's dissolution, by the selection of MACHIDA Chuji, octogenarian Minseito politician. Certain party leaders such as, for example, SAITO Takao were said to be dissatisfied with the choice but realized that the party must maintain its unity through the coming elections in order to survive.

From 300 to 350 candidates are expected to rpprosent the Progressives in the coming election. Most observers are agreed that, unless a directive should be issued by SCAP qualifying eligibility for election, the Progressive Party will win the largest number of seats in the elections. In spite of widespread criticism in the press and in the Diet for war responsibility, the Progressives are favored by organization and financial support which are likely to prove decisive factors.

In a press statement, TSURUMI Yusuke, secretary general of the

party,

party, announced the slogans of the Progressives to be: 1) protection and maintenance of the national polity (Imperial institution); 2) guarantee of people's livelihood through thorough enforcement of a social welfare policy; and 3) recovery of international confidence. He attacked the Communist Party and said the Progressives would seek a social welfare policy more thorough than the American New Deal. According to Jiji Press, TSURUMI admitted that his party had no effective solution for the food supply problem "except to appeal to the Supreme Allied authorities to help us tide over this food supply crisis".

Liberal Party

One of the weaknesses of the Liberal Party is its reputation as a one-man party. People refer to it as "HATOYAMA's Party" as frequently as they call it by its rightful name. HATOYAMA's record during the war years is clean; he did not associate himself with TOJO's policies nor with the Political Association of Great Japan (Dai Nippon Seiji-Kai). Nevertheless his reputation as a liberal political leader has not improved since the formation of his party and since the Diet session. His speeches at political rallies and in the Diet have been uninspiring. He has been unable to explain away satisfactorily his action in 1933 in removing certain professors at Kyoto Imperial University when he was Minister of Education. However, he is generally conceded to be an able politician with generally liberal ideas. He is mentioned frequently as the next prime minister in a Government in which the Liberal Party might hold the balance of power in the Diet.

The Liberal Party expects to place approximately 250 candidates in the field. Since the distribution of Liberal strength parallels that of the Progressives, there will be direct competition between candidates of the two parties in most constituencies. Liberals hope to return at least 150 members to the House of Representatives, although this may be an optimistic prediction. Their greatest efforts are expected to be put forth in Tokyo, Kanagawa prefecture (Yokohama), and Hokkaido.

The Liberals, like the Progressives, are emphasizing maintenance of the national polity and the Imperial institution as the cornerstone of their policy. They are advocating a daily rice ration of 2.5 go, imports of foodstuffs and unemployment relief. They are proposing public works projects, such as construction of dams, ports, and harbors, as a solution to unemployment. They are making special appeals to the commercial classes by talking of free trade, international trade, and aid to small and medium scale industries.

Social Democratic Party

The Social Democratic Party announced on December 21 a list of 148 candidates for seats in the House of Representatives. The party has stated that additional lists will be issued and that the total number of candidates may reach 300. Among the candidates already announced is one woman, YAMAZAKI Michiko, wife of YAMAZAKI Kenji, present Diet member from Shizuoka Prefecture.

Social Democrats expect that approximately 100 of their candidates will be

will be successful in the coming elections. In a statement to the press, KATAYAMA Tetsu, secretary general of the party, said that his party alone was capable of shouldering responsibility in the present situation, that Japan's plight was the result of "capitalistic politics". He stated that the Social Democratic Party would not suffer a disadvantage because its candidates were relatively unknown men, that the Japanese voters now would attach more importance to parties than to individuals.

Although repercussions of the ONO incident (described in this office's report "Political Parties in Japan: Developments during the week ending December 15, 1945") have subsided, speculation is still rife as to the ability of the Social Democratic Party to prevent a secession of its left wing group. Many of these members are said to favor close cooperation with the Communist Party but still fear the "Red" label. Farthest to the left in the Social Democratic Party is said to be TAKATSU Seido, incidentally the author of a book published on November 25 entitled "Causes of Soviet Victory and German Defeat" (Soren no Shoin to Doitsu no haiin). Both TAKATSU and MATSUMOTO Jiichiro are said to advocate a united front with the Communists.

SHIGA Yoshio, Communist Party leader, in an interview with officers of GHQ and the writer on December 20, quoted a recent statement by NISHIO Suehiro that the Liberal and Progressive Parties but not the Communist Party are the enemies of the Social Democrats. NISHIO is said to belong to the "Center" faction within the Social Democratic Party and to have been preciously strongly anti-Communist in sentiment. SHIGA attributes NISHIO's present favorable attitude and that of other Social Democrats to a fear of being named war criminals by the Communist Party. He believes that increasing numbers of Social Democrats would like to affiliate with the Communists but their feeling of subservience to the Emperor is still too strong to permit them to change allegiance. SHIGA cited two examples of members of Social Democratic Party local branches having left their own party to join the Communists. He asserted that in Ibaraki prefecture the local branch of the Social Democrats had gone over completely to the Communists and that in Tochigi prefecture at a meeting of delegates of the Social Democratic Party, 70% of those in attendance had walked out of the meeting announcing their intention to join the Communist Party.

The Communist Party

The Communist Party by December 22 had presented a list of 66 candidates for seats in the House of Representatives in the coming elections and states that at least 103 persons will finally be named to represent the party. The 66 candidates are distributed through 30 prefectures; the party states that it expects to enter candidates in at least 38 prefectures. One of the Communist candidates is SUZUKI Tonin, former chief of the Foreign Department of Yomiuri-Hochi newspaper and leader of the recent strike against the paper's owner, SHORIKI Matsutaro.

In the interview of December 20 mentioned above, SHIGA Yoshio stated that the Communist Party was making steady progress in Japan. He said that evidences of the party's gaining strength could be found in the trade union movement, the peasant movement, and the increasing signs of pro-Communist sentiment within the ranks of the Social Democratic Party. He stated that the trade union movement was progressing

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toward the "One Big Union" idea in which the Communists were cooperating. Two agrarian organizations, the Peasants Committee (Nomin Iin-kai), sponsored by the Communists and the Peasants Union (Nomin Kumisi) sponsored by the Social Democrats, were beginning to cooperate and their eventual union is expected. Efforts are being made in local districts to unite the delegates from both groups and upon this basis, the calling of a National Peasants Representatives Congress (Zenkoku Nomin Daihyosha Kaigi) is contemplated.

SHIGA stated that the Communist Party was anxious to cooperate with the Social Democrats in both the trade union and agrarian movements and that it was hoped unity could be achieved. He specified that Communist support would be conditional upon maintenance of democratic principles by these groups. As an example of the desire of certain Social Democrats to cooperate with the Communists he remarked that three of the Socialist leaders, HIRANO Rikizo, KURODA Hiseo, and OKADA Sojo, had proposed a meeting with SHIGA to talk over these problems.

According to SHIGA, the Communist Party is likewise willing to cooperate with other political groups in achieving democratic reforms in Japan. He states that such cooperation might take the form of a "Democratic League" growing out of the present "People's Emancipation League" (Jinmin Kaiho Renmei) and that the party is ready to leave aside the controversial Emperor question in forming such an organization, believing that a process of political education will gradually win adherence to the Communist support of a people's republic in place of a monarchy.

The Communist Youth Movement, inaugurated at the time of the Party Congress in early December, appeals to Japanese youth under the age of 26. It is its principle deliberately to omit from discussion the Emperor system but to work toward the propagation of Communism among youth. A publication to be called Flag of Youth is scheduled to appear at the end of December and the establishment of a school is contemplated.

News of the arrival in Seoul, Korea of NOSAKA Sanji (alias NOSAKA Tetsu, OKANO Susumu) and his group of Japanese Communists from Yenan, North China, has been greeted with elation by the party headquarters in Tokyo. In a statement issued to the press on December 20, the party expressed a wish for the speedy arrival in Japan of NOSAKA and his group and again denied rumors of a disagreement in policy between the Yenan and Tokyo organizations.

Japan Cooperative Party

On December 18, day of the dissolution of the Diet, a new party was formed by Diet members who have remained independent up to the present time. It was called the Japan Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyodoto) and with 26 members in the dissolved House of Representatives became the third strongest party from the point of view of representation in the past Diet. Leaders are KUROSAWA Torazo, butter manufacturer of Hokkaido long active in the cooperative movement, FUNADA Naka (Chm), and SENGOKU Kotaro, member of the House of Peers and former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika served notice on December 19 that he was resigning his membership in

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