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# Capabilities of the Soviet Theater Forces

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.

Concurring:

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# CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET THEATER FORCES

## THE PROBLEM

To estimate the role and capabilities of the Soviet theater forces, especially against the NATO area in Europe, at present and over the next two years or so.

## FOREWORD

1. As considered in this estimate, the components of the Soviet theater forces include: the ground forces and their weapons; tactical aircraft and missiles; supporting and logistical elements such as transport aircraft; and major portions of the surface naval and submarine fleets. The roles and capabilities of those Soviet forces which would perform other primary military missions, notably long-range striking forces and air and missile defense forces, are the subject of other National Intelligence Estimates.

2. In recent years, Soviets have debated at greater depth than in the past the probable nature of a general nuclear conflict between the Bloc and the West, and the information available to us reflects this increased attention. In this estimate, particularly in Chapters I and IV, we consider mainly the employment of Soviet theater forces in general nuclear war, taking some account of the way in which Soviet plans might be affected if operations were begun on short notice, or after a period of preparation. In Chapter V, we consider at much shorter length the possible employment of these forces in limited nuclear or conventional warfare under the threat of escalation.

3. It should be emphasized that, in discussing Soviet theater forces and their capabilities, we do not take account of the actions of opposing Western forces. In particular, we do not assess the

effect on Soviet theater forces of an initial, strategic nuclear exchange. We believe, however, that the effect of such an exchange could be a principal factor governing the ability of Soviet theater forces to carry out their assigned missions in a general war.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS [1]

A. Soviet military doctrine for general nuclear war stresses the use of all types of forces, and not strategic forces alone, from the outset of hostilities. The requirements for general nuclear war, as the Soviets see them, include forces prepared for action during a relatively brief strategic exchange, and forces suitable for protracted theater warfare involving extensive campaigns. Although this position imposes heavy demands on Soviet resources, it is still being sustained after extensive debate within the political and military leadership. We believe that for at least the next few years the Soviets will continue to regard large theater forces as essential. (*Paras. 1–5*)

B. Soviet doctrine continues to assume the full-scale employment of theater forces from the outset of a general war, with the ultimate objective of annihilating enemy military capabilities and occupying territory. The prospect of nuclear warfare has led to many modifications but no radical revisions in operational doctrine for theater forces. Efforts are being made to adjust organization and training to the requirements of rapid advance and flexible maneuver, to coordinate the employment of tactical nuclear support for Soviet forces, and to ensure destruction of the comparable nuclear means of the enemy. The traditional Soviet concept of combined arms operations has provided a basis for gearing modernized tactical air and missile support to the motorized and armored ground forces. (*Paras. 6–11*)

C. The ground elements of Soviet theater forces, containing nearly two million men and representing the largest part of the total military establishment, are well-trained and equipped with excellent materiel. Present trends point to a continuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. We estimate that there are

[1] The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissents from major aspects of this estimate. For his views, see pages 7–10, immediately following the SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

about 145 line divisions, approximately 80 of them considered to be combat ready and the remainder at low and cadre strength. The strongest concentrations are in East Germany and in the western and southern border regions of the USSR. If the Soviets were able to mobilize for 30 days before the initiation of hostilities, they could expand their total forces to about 100 combat ready and 125 nonready divisions, although there would be deficiencies in training, equipment, and supporting units. (*Paras. 13–16, 46–49*)

D. Short-range rockets and road mobile missiles with ranges up to 350 nautical miles are now in the artillery support structure of major Soviet theater commands. Tactical Aviation has been sharply reduced in quantity, and a prime current deficiency is the small number of modern aircraft, particularly fighter bombers. However, there have been qualitative improvements in aircraft and their armament, and this trend will continue. In addition, tactical ballistic and antiaircraft missiles are now available, and theater support could also be afforded by MRBMs and IRBMs in western USSR. These developments provide a net increase in the firepower available to support theater forces in the event of general war, but at the expense of some flexibility. (*Paras. 17–21*)

E. Organic air transport is now sufficient to airlift simultaneously only one airborne division or the assault echelons of two such divisions; we believe that this capacity may be doubled in the next several years. Amphibious assault capabilities are extremely limited, and there are no indications of significant future improvements. (*Paras. 29–30, 33–34*)

F. Tactical nuclear support is still limited in quantity and quality, but it has improved markedly over the past few years. Soviet military planners are now in a position to think in terms of committing up to a few hundred nuclear weapons, virtually all with yields in the kiloton range, to a typical *front* operation.[2] Limitations on the quantity and variety of nuclear weapons available to theater forces will have eased by the mid-1960's. The Soviets are probably developing subkiloton weapons, but we have no present evidence of work on delivery systems designed spe-

[2] A *front* is roughly comparable to a Western army group.

cifically for such weapons. We believe that chemical warfare munitions are available in quantity and would be used extensively in conjunction with nuclear and conventional weapons in general war. (*Paras. 25–27, 45*)

G. Although tactical nuclear delivery systems are integral to Soviet theater forces, the nuclear weapons themselves do not appear to be in their custody. Such weapons are normally stored in depots operated by the Ministry of Defense and located within the USSR. Soviet procedures for controlling these weapons ensure the national leadership that they will not be used without authorization. Existing procedures, together with deficiencies in logistical support, appear to penalize the Soviets in terms of operational readiness and rapid response for tactical nuclear weapons employment. (*Paras. 22–24*)

H. The Soviets probably consider the East European Satellite forces to be a sizable but problematic asset, because of their varying levels of effectiveness and reliability. In the event of war, however, the USSR would probably employ some Satellite forces in combined combat operations, by integrating selected Satellite divisions, corps, or even field armies directly into major Soviet commands. Other Satellite units would be retained under national command for security, reserve, and other functions. (*Paras. 36–37, 41–42*)

I. The principal operations of Soviet theater forces in general war would be directed against NATO in Europe. The Soviets plan to move massive forces rapidly toward the Channel coast in the initial days of such a war. This campaign would probably be augmented by operations in Scandinavia, operations toward the Mediterranean, and operations toward the exits of the Baltic and Black Seas. The Soviet submarine fleet would contribute to the campaign against Western Europe by interdiction operations against the highly important Atlantic supply lines. Other peripheral areas, notably the Far East, apparently have lesser priority for theater force operations. Soviet capabilities to conduct theater force operations against North America are limited to minor airborne and amphibious attacks against Alaska and other Arctic bases. (*Paras. 44, 59*)

J. Although Soviet theater forces are formidable, especially in the area facing NATO in Europe, they continue to have certain limitations beyond those of tactical nuclear support. In the initial period of a general war, a significant portion of the tactical fighters would need to be assigned to interceptor as well as to ground attack missions. In offensive operations, the highly mechanized group forces are in constant danger of outrunning their logistic support. Finally, existing command and control systems do not permit the Soviets to exercise their traditional strict supervision over subordinates in the widely extended deployment required on the nuclear battlefield. (*Para. 45*)

K. The Soviets currently have 22 line divisions and 1,200 tactical aircraft stationed in East Germany and Poland. In a situation in which surprise or pre-emption were overriding considerations, they could launch an attack against Western Europe without prior buildup. If circumstances permitted, however, the USSR would seek to assemble a considerably larger striking force, primarily of Soviet but probably including some Satellite units. This force could comprise three *fronts* with a total of 50–60 divisions and 2,000 tactical aircraft. We estimate that under noncombat conditions, such a striking force could be built up in East Germany and western Czechoslovakia within 30 days, and a theater reserve could be provided for backup. The ability of these and other Soviet theater forces to carry out their assigned general war campaigns could be governed principally by the effects of the initial nuclear exchange. (*Paras. 53–58*)

L. The adjustments in Soviet theater forces in the past few years have not materially impaired their capabilities to conduct nonnuclear operations. The USSR's highly mechanized forces have favorable characteristics for the dispersed operations required because of the constant possibility of escalation to nuclear warfare. Over the past two years, the nonnuclear firepower of ground units has not been significantly altered, but the supporting nonnuclear firepower which can be delivered by tactical aircraft has decreased. There are indications that the Soviets have recently given recognition to the possibility of nonnuclear war with NATO forces in Europe. They probably intend to retain capabilities for conventional warfare against NATO, but they do not appear to have revised their expectation that any major

conflict with NATO would be nuclear from the start or would probably escalate. (*Paras. 63–66*)

M. The Soviets have evidently not elaborated any doctrine for limited nuclear warfare by theater forces, involving the use of tactical weapons only. We think they would be severely handicapped in any attempts to conduct such warfare at present. Moreover, thus far the Soviets appear to think that limited nuclear conflict in the NATO area would almost certainly escalate to general war. (*Para. 67*)

*Views of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF:*

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissents from major aspects of this estimate. First, he considers that a large body of recent Soviet doctrinal material has not been properly reflected in a number of fundamental judgments in this estimate. As a result, he considers that this estimate, to a considerable degree, depicts Soviet military concepts and doctrine of several years ago and give improper weight to the prospects for further changes in Soviet thinking on these subjects over the period of the estimate. Secondly, in his view, the current capabilities of operational weapon systems and the tactical options available for their employment have not been given due weight in this estimate.

2. More specifically, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF considers this estimate deficient in the following principal respects:

a. In its judgments of Soviet thinking on the importance of surprise in a general war and the decisiveness of the initial phase; the role of nuclear weapons in all phases of general war; the possibility of nonnuclear, large-scale limited war between the nuclear powers; and whether the debate over military concepts and doctrine has ended.

b. In its implications of the over-all capabilities of Soviet tactical aviation to support theater forces, both in general nuclear war and nonnuclear, large-scale limited war.

3. Consequently, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would recast the Summary and Conclusions in the following manner:

A. Current Soviet military doctrine, although in a state of flux on other issues, maintains that nuclear weapons will play the dominant role in all phases of a general war and that the initial phase of such a war may be decisive in determining its outcome. Hence, the Soviet emphasis in doctrinal statements on the advantages of surprise and preemption. This doctrine has not been questioned.

B. At the present time the combined arms doctrine continues to be accepted, and nuclear weapons and delivery systems have been assigned to tactical as well as strategic forces with priority given to the latter in nuclear weapons allocation. Although increasing attention has been given to the prospects of a short war, the continuing possibility of protracted military operations, in addition to the tactical requirements of the initial phase, have necessitated maintaining large, balanced forces. Large armies are still considered important to assist in carrying out and exploiting the results of Soviet nuclear attack and consolidating victory. More attention, however, is being given to the need for forces to carry out recuperative and control operations within the USSR following nuclear exchanges. The above doctrinal considerations have already had considerable impact on the size and structure of Soviet theater forces and on their operational doctrine, and may have even greater impact in the years ahead.

C. The possibility of limited war involving Soviet forces has been no more than mentioned in Soviet writing. No doctrine of limited war, whether nuclear or nonnuclear, has been discussed. On the contrary, Soviet doctrine explicitly assigns to the enemy the intention of using local war as a screen for surprise attack. The expressed view has been maintained that local wars between nuclear powers will most likely escalate into general war. Soviet leaders apparently believe that a limited nuclear war could not be fought in Europe. They also probably discount the possibility of conducting large-scale nonnuclear operations in Europe without escalation. The Soviets have shown an appreciation of the risks incurred in leaving the enemy the initiative for sudden resort to nuclear weapons, especially if hostilities should reach a considerable scale.

D. The extensive Soviet debate on military doctrine of the last few years, while it accorded primacy to nuclear weapons and missiles, has not resolved the central Soviet military problem—the confrontation with the U.S. Soviet leaders no longer make claims of strategic superiority. The Cuban episode may well have been an attempt to improve Soviet strategic posture by a short cut. If so, the dilemma of strategic inferiority has come to the fore again. Because of this, and the fact that satisfaction of high priority economic objectives is being jeopardized by defense requirements, difficult choices in resource allocation may be required.

E. The Soviets still assume in their operational doctrine the full-scale employment of theater forces from the outset of a general war, with the ultimate objective of annihilating enemy military capabilities and occupying territory. Efforts are being made to adjust organization and training to the requirements of rapid advance and flexible maneuver, to coordinate the employment of tactical nuclear support and to ensure destruction of the nuclear means of the enemy.

F. The over-all capabilities of the theater force have increased over the past few years. These capabilities continue to be improved through the development and deployment of new equipment and through the application of more modern training and operational techniques. Theater ground and air equipment for nuclear warfare have been continually modernized without impairment of the nonnuclear capabilities of theater forces.

G. The ground elements of Soviet theater forces, containing nearly two million men and representing the largest part of the total military establishment, are well trained and equipped with excellent materiel. Present trends point to a continuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. We can confirm 116 line divisions and believe that the total of such divisions lies within a range of 120 to 150; approximately 80 divisions are considered to be combat-ready and the remainder at low cadre strength. The strongest concentrations are in East Germany and in the western and southern border regions of the USSR. If the Soviets were able to mobilize for 30 days before the initiation of hostilities, they could expand their total forces to about 100 combat-ready and 125 non-ready divisions, although there would be deficiencies in training, equipment and supporting units.

H. Short range rockets and road-mobile, tactical ballistic missiles with ranges up to 350 nautical miles have been incorporated into the support structure of major Soviet theater commands. Concurrently, and with further improvements in the support environment, the number of aircraft assigned to Soviet tactical aviation has been reduced to a current level of about 3,000 and we expect further numerical reductions. At the same time, however, new higher performance, more versatile aircraft have been and continue to be introduced. Air transport is now sufficient to airlift simultaneously only one airborne division or the assault echelons of two such divisions; we believe that this capacity may be doubled in the next several years. Amphibious assault capabilities are extremely limited, and there are no indications of significant future improvements.

I. The Soviets are unlikely to jeopardize achieving strategic surprise in a Soviet-initiated war by undertaking extensive mobilization. The concept of mobilization after initiation of general war is currently under discussion in military literature. A new view questions the possibility of extensive mobilization and at best anticipates only replacement of losses.

J. The Soviet nuclear stockpile has increased markedly over the past few years. Because of the increasing availability of tactical nuclear weapons, Soviet military planners are now in a position to think in terms of committing up to a few hundred nuclear weapons, virtually all with yields in the kiloton range, to

a typical *front* operation.* Existing limitations on the quantity and variety of nuclear weapons available to theater forces will have eased by the mid-1960s. The Soviets are probably developing subkiloton weapons for use by a variety of tactical delivery systems. We believe that chemical warfare munitions are available and would be used in conjunction with nuclear and conventional weapons in support of *front* operations.

K. Although tactical nuclear delivery systems are integral to Soviet theater forces the nuclear weapons themselves do not appear to be in their custody. Such weapons are normally stored in depots operated by the Ministry of Defense and located within the USSR. Soviet procedures for controlling these weapons retain for the national leadership the decision for their use. Existing procedures, together with deficiencies in logistical support, appear to penalize the Soviets in terms of operational readiness from a low alert posture; however, we estimate that the Soviets would take the necessary steps to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to theater forces during periods of heightened tension.

L. The principal operations of Soviet theater forces in general war would be directed against NATO in Europe. The Soviets plan to move massive forces rapidly toward the Channel coast in the initial days of such a war. This campaign would probably be augmented by operations in Scandinavia, operations toward the Mediterranean, and operations toward the exits of the Baltic and Black Seas. The Soviet naval air forces and submarine fleet would contribute to the campaign against western Europe by attack of seaborne nuclear forces and interdiction operations against the highly important Atlantic supply lines. Naval air forces and the submarine fleet in the Soviet Far East would defend against the nuclear threat posed by U.S. sea and shore-based nuclear capable forces in that theater. Other peripheral areas have lesser priority for theater force operations. Soviet capabilities to conduct other than strategic operations against North America are limited to minor airborne or amphibious attacks against Alaska, Canada and Greenland.

M. Although theater forces are formidable, especially in the area facing NATO in Europe, they continue to have problems related to the conduct of offensive operations. The highly mechanized ground forces are in constant danger of outrunning their logistic support. Also, existing command and control systems do not permit the Soviets to exercise their traditional strict supervision over subordinates in the widely extended deployment required on the nuclear battlefield. Finally, some of the Soviet tactical fighter units are equipped and trained only for the interceptor mission. However, most of the tactical fighter units are trained and equipped to perform both ground attack and interceptor missions and could be used in either role depending on the operational requirements of the moment: defending against air attack; providing close support to the ground forces; or assisting ground offensive operations by striking ground targets in the enemy's rear. Thus, considering the substantial capabilities of tactical air support forces, we conclude that Soviet tactical aviation is capable of providing requisite air support to theater forces either in general war or nonnuclear, large-scale limited war.

N. The Soviets probably consider the East European Satellite forces to be a sizeable but problematic asset because of their varying levels of effectiveness and reliability. In the event of war, however, the USSR would probably employ some Satellite forces in combined combat operations, by integrating selected Satellite ground and air elements directly into major Soviet commands. Other Satellite units would be retained under national command for security, reserve and other functions.

* A *front* is roughly comparable to a Western army group.

O. The USSR could launch an attack against Western Europe without prior buildup, employing the 22 Soviet line divisions and 1,200 tactical aircraft in East Germany and Poland. Under certain circumstances, however, the Soviets might assemble larger forces. Logistically speaking, a force of up to 50–60 divisions and about 2,000 aircraft could be positioned in the forward area over a 30 day period and a theater reserve could be provided. We consider such a buildup highly unlikely in view of the importance the Soviets place on achieving surprise, as discussed above.

# DISCUSSION [a]

## I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THEATER FORCES

1. Along with the great attention given to the development of strategic capabilities in recent years, Soviet military doctrine continues to place great emphasis upon large-scale war in Europe. The revolution in modern weapons has significantly modified but not supplanted this longstanding emphasis. Although current doctrine recognizes the critical importance of the initial strategic exchange, it rejects the argument that the outcome of a general war fought with nuclear and missile weapons will be entirely dependent upon the exchange of strategic blows on the Soviet and American homelands, or that the struggle will necessarily be short. Instead, the Soviets assert that general nuclear war could be protracted and that, in any case, victory requires not only the destruction of US long-range power but the defeat of enemy theater forces and the occupation of enemy territory, especially in Western Europe.

### *Trends in Theater Warfare Concepts*

2. Based on this strategic concept, the Soviets hold that strong and balanced forces are essential to the USSR's military posture. Acknowledging the critical importance of the initial period of a general war, Soviet doctrine stresses the use of all types of forces, and not strategic attack forces alone, from its outset. From these considerations flow a requirement for large and modern theater forces in being. These forces also serve to provide a formidable capability for conventional or limited nuclear war and to strengthen the hand of the national leadership in pursuing foreign policy objectives. But in the Soviet view, requirements for general war are the principal factors determining the structure and size of theater forces.

3. Soviet military doctrine is subject to continuing review and reconsideration in the light of evolving strategic and military technological factors. Russian belief in the need for large standing forces for war in Europe is still being sustained through such review. A particularly intensive debate was precipitated in 1959 by Khrushchev, who apparently believed that existing doctrine and force structure had not been revised and streamlined in ways appropriate to nuclear and missile warfare. He was evidently concerned about the heavy costs of advanced weapons, and the prospective burden on an economy already fully com-

[a] The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissents from major aspects of this estimate. For his views, see pages 7–10, immediately following the SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

mitted to a variety of high-priority programs. Thus, in announcing a new military policy in January 1960, he stressed the deterrence provided by nuclear-armed missiles and disparaged the effectiveness of more conventional arms. His program originally called for a reduction of one-third in military manpower and alterations in the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, particularly at the expense of ground, tactical air, and surface naval forces.

4. During the period following Khrushchev's announcement, extended debate among senior Soviet officers resulted in a more penetrating reconsideration of the nature of modern war and the role and doctrine of theater warfare. This debate was sparked by the initiative of the political leadership, and gave encouragement to those military men who believed that more drastic changes in doctrine, strategy, and force structure were called for in the missile age. By the fall of 1961, this intensive review resulted in a compromise of the more radical "modern" school with the conservative or "traditional" one. Thus the "Khrushchev doctrine," with its stress on deterrence and its concern primarily for the political uses of military power, has been modified since 1960 to meet requirements seen by the military for waging general war should one occur. These requirements impose a heavy demand for forces to meet the general war contingencies, both of relatively brief and largely strategic nuclear action, and of protracted military action involving extensive theater campaigns.

5. As of 1962, both political and military leaders accept the fact that new and costly demands for advanced weapon systems are superimposed upon Soviet resources without easing the burden of maintaining large theater forces. The effort to modernize and strengthen all arms of the Soviet forces simultaneously squeezes hard on resources available for investment and consumption goals to which the leadership is strongly committed. Thus Khrushchev may once again seek a reduction in resources devoted to theater forces on the grounds that growing nuclear capabilities will permit this cutback without endangering Soviet security. Developments within the Soviet leadership, changes in the level of international tension, and other factors might also contribute to a reopening of this question. We believe, however, that for at least the next few years the Soviets will continue to regard large theater forces as essential.

### *Current Operational Doctrine*

6. Soviet military doctrine does not address itself in any depth to the variety of circumstances in which general nuclear war might begin. Most Soviet military writings assume that such a war would be initiated by Western strategic attacks on the USSR or by Soviet pre-emptive strategic blows against the West. In such circumstances, these writings call for large-scale theater force operations, primarily in Europe,

beginning simultaneously with or immediately after the outbreak of a general war. While Soviet strategic planning must take account of the possible effect on theater force operations of an escalating local conflict, the operational doctrine for theater forces, described in the following paragraphs, assumes full-scale employment from the outset of the war.

7. In developing new guidance for the employment of their theater forces under modern general war conditions, Soviet military planners have proceeded by modifying a longstanding and comprehensive body of doctrine. The essential elements of that doctrine have changed little: the enemy's military capabilities are to be annihilated and his territory occupied by means of decisive offensive operations. These operations are to be facilitated where possible by surprise and deception. In addition, Soviet military doctrine calls for concentration of decisive force at the critical place and time, rapid commitment of second echelons and reserves, and development of a breakthrough with powerful, sustained pursuit.

8. The prospect of nuclear warfare has led to many substantial changes in tactical implementation of this doctrine. The Soviets no longer expect to conduct breakthrough operations against the kind of massive enemy ground force concentrations which they faced in World War II. The enemy's potential for massive nuclear strikes imposes a need for maneuverability and flexibility in deployment and control of one's own nuclear weapon systems, and a need to seek out and destroy rapidly the comparable nuclear means of the opponent. Soviet doctrine now recognizes this, and efforts are under way to adjust Soviet organization and training accordingly.

9. The traditional Soviet concept of combined arms operations centered on infantry forces has provided a basis for gearing modernized tactical air and missile support to motorized and armored ground forces. Artillery armed with short-range rockets and missiles is assuming an increasingly important role for tactical fire support, although tactical aviation continues to have an important role in both tactical fire support and reconnaissance. Soviet planning for the coordination of tactical nuclear support by aircraft and missiles appears to be well advanced. However, the problem of coordinating the operations of medium and intermediate range missiles and medium bombers, held under centralized national command, with the operations of theater forces, appears not to have been resolved.

10. Current Soviet operational doctrine calls for a norm of advance, under conditions of nuclear warfare and against opposition, of up to 100 kilometers per 24-hour day. Traditional concern over open flanks and encircled and bypassed enemy forces has receded. The motorized infantry, with a fast-moving armored leading edge and heavy con-

ventional and low-yield nuclear rocket support, is the key element of maneuver, and missiles with ranges up to 350 nautical miles (n.m.), with low to medium-yield nuclear warheads, form the chief element of firepower.

11. The enormous firepower of multimegaton nuclear weapons has undoubtedly led the Soviets to consider concepts for theater operations, such as rendering very large areas radioactive, which go far beyond revisions within the current framework of doctrine. It is evident, however, that the mainstream of Soviet military thinking currently rejects such a radical approach. Moreover, Soviet political leaders, with their basic concern for the political objectives and political outcome of war, would be unlikely to base their planning on so drastically revised a strategy.

## II. GENERAL TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET THEATER FORCES

12. The program to reduce the Soviet Armed Forces by one-third, announced by Khrushchev in January 1960, marked the opening of a period of extensive reorganization and adjustment. In mid-1961, after approximately half of the projected reduction of 1.2 million men in the Soviet Armed Forces had been made, the program of reductions was suspended, allegedly in response to the US military buildup prompted by Soviet pressures on Berlin. Later in that year, selected reservists were recalled and men due for routine discharge were retained on duty. Many of these extended duty tours were permitted to lapse during 1962, but increases in military manpower for certain branches of service, particularly missile associated personnel, have probably left a net increase over the strength of early 1961 but below that of early 1960. We believe that the force level now stands at about 3.25 million men, of which nearly 2 million are in the theater ground forces. While there may be some fluctuations or moderate decline in this general level, we believe that roughly the present strength and composition of the Soviet Armed Forces will continue over the next few years.

### *Ground Forces*

13. The Soviet ground forces, which represent the largest part of the military establishment, are well-trained and equipped with excellent materiel. Combat troops are distributed among 15 military districts in the USSR and three groups of forces in the European Satellites. The strongest concentrations are in East Germany and the western and southern border regions of the USSR; a lesser concentration is in the maritime area of the Soviet Far East. Most Soviet ground forces are organized into field armies with combat and service support for the line motorized rifle and tank divisions. Combat and service support is generally stretched thin, and there is a low ratio of nondivisional support

to the present divisional force. However, there are large numbers of artillery, missile, and antiaircraft artillery brigades and regiments which are either allocated to field armies or retained under higher command headquarters. Combat air support is provided by units of Tactical Aviation, organized into tactical air armies under the operational control of the military district or group-of-forces commander.

14. Of the nearly two million men in the Soviet theater ground forces, a little over half are in line divisions and the remainder are in combat and service support elements. We estimate that, as of 1 October 1962, there were 145 line divisions.[4] Of these, approximately 80 are considered to be combat ready (at 70 percent of authorized personnel strength or greater), and the remaining 65 are at low and cadre strength (estimated to range between 60 and 20 percent of authorized strength and hence requiring substantial augmentation before commitment to combat). The reductions since the beginning of 1960 have cut the number of combat ready divisions by about 20 and of low strength divisions by 5, indicating a continuing Soviet preference for maintaining a very large and partly skeletal ground force capable of rapidly being fleshed out with mobilization. At present, there are an estimated 34 tank divisions, 7 airborne divisions, and 104 motorized rifle divisions.[5]

15. The program of modernization and reorganization has involved the introduction over the last several years of more advanced designs of pratically all types of equipment, including surface-to-surface ballistic missiles of 150 and 350 n.m. range, tanks, armored personnel carriers, nuclear-capable free rockets with ranges up to 26 n.m., antiaircraft guided missiles, artillery and antiaircraft guns, recoilless antitank weapons, and a wide variety of transport vehicles. In some instances, there have been two successive generations of equipment since World War II. The increasing number of tracked and wheeled amphibians and amphibious tanks has greatly improved Soviet river-crossing capabilities, and we expect extensive equipping with the new amphibious armored personnel carrier.

16. Present trends in the ground weapons development program point to a continuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. Specific areas of concentration probably will include light gun and missile weapons to defend against low-flying aircraft, a field antimissile system, air-trans-

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[4] The number of divisions confirmed since January 1961 is 116; most of the additional divisions included in our estimate are understrength units located in areas from which information is received only sporadically. Taking account of this and other factors, we conclude that the current total of divisions could lie within a range of 120 to 150, with the most probable figure being about 145. For a detailed estimate of ground divisions by location and type, see Annex, Table 1.

[5] All rifle and mechanized divisions have been converted into motorized rifle and tank units.

portable weapons and equipment, weight reduction of existing equipment, and improved reconnaissance and communications. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are replacing medium and heavy antiaircraft guns; guided antitank missiles are being introduced and will probably replace some antitank guns.

*Tactical Missile and Air Support*

17. Soviet development of guided missiles has greatly improved the fire support available to field forces. Road mobile surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with maximum ranges of 150 n.m. (SS–1 and SS–1A) and 350 n.m. (SS–2) have been available for several years.[6] Although nuclear warheads are probably the primary armament of these missiles, operational considerations might prescribe the use of chemical (CW) and high explosive (HE) warheads. The SS–1 and SS–2 missiles are intended primarily for a ground support role, and missile units are assigned to direct operational control of field commanders. Although there is little direct evidence on their deployment, we estimate that about 35 SS–1 brigades (with 6 launchers each) and 30 SS–2 battalions (with 2 launchers each) are now operational. These missile units are believed to be in the artillery support structure of major Soviet theater force commands, although none have been firmly identified. We believe that the numbers of SS–1 and SS–2 units will remain fairly stable. However, the Soviets probably will soon begin replacing the SS–2 with an improved follow-on system of similar range, as they have done with the SS–1.

18. The number of aircraft in Tactical Aviation was reduced by half in 1960 and 1961. Since that time, it has been generally stabilized in overall strength, with phasing in of new model aircraft and continuing reductions in older models. As a result of reductions and transfers, Soviet Tactical Aviation is now mainly located in the areas adjoining major potential land theaters of combat. About half its total strength is with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and most of the remainder is in western and southern USSR. Tactical Aviation will continue to receive new models and to decline in numbers of aircraft—probably from about 3,000 to less than 2,000 over the next two years.[7] The estimated current and future numbers of Soviet tactical aircraft appear low in relation to total ground forces.

19. A prime current deficiency of Soviet Tactical Aviation is the lack of modern aircraft, particularly fighter bombers. The mainstay of

[6] For the estimated performance of Soviet tactical missiles and rockets, see Annex, Table 4.

[7] For the estimated strength of Soviet Tactical Aviation by location and type, see Annex, Table 2.

Soviet offensive tactical air support is still the obsolescent BEAGLE subsonic light bomber. However, the FIREBAR, a supersonic tactical fighter bomber, is now entering service. Most current Soviet fighters were designed primarily as interceptors and have limited load-carrying and range capabilities. However, they can perform a variety of missions in support of ground forces, and can be equipped to deliver nuclear bombs.[8] Over 70 percent of the fighters in Tactical Aviation are obsolescent FAGOTs, FRESCOs, and FARMERs, but the introduction of modern supersonic fighters has been accelerated. Among the newer fighter types, the FISHBED, FITTER, and FIDDLER (the last of these not yet in units) appear to be suitable for carrying nuclear weapons and performing ground support missions. The Soviets have conducted some training in fighter delivery of nuclear weapons.

20. Tactical Aviation now has some 150 n.m. surface-to-surface cruise missiles (SHADDOCK, SSC–1). For the present at least, the Soviets have evidently decided not to assign medium-range (700 and 1,100 n.m.) missiles or medium bombers to the theater field forces. A small number of medium bombers were assigned to Tactical Aviation a few years ago, but have since been withdrawn. All medium-range missiles and bombers are now believed to be assigned to the Strategic Rocket Troops and to Long Range and Naval Aviation, respectively.

21. In sum, Tactical Aviation has been sharply reduced in quantity, and a prime current deficiency is the small number of modern aircraft, particularly fighter bombers. However, there have been qualitative improvements in aircraft and their armament, and this trend will continue. In addition, tactical ballistic and antiaircraft missiles are now available, and theater support could also be afforded by MRBMs and IRBMs in western USSR. These developments would provide a net increase in the firepower available to support theater forces in the event of general war, but at the expense of some flexibility.

### *Tactical Nuclear Weapons*

22. Although nuclear weapons do not appear to be physically located with field forces under peacetime conditions, delivery systems for such weapons are found at the field army and higher levels; divisional artillery apparently now includes nuclear-capable free rockets. There are no nuclear weapons delivery systems below divisional level. Command lines for use of nuclear weapons are restricted to *front* and in some cases field army commanders, with orders for their employment normally executed through the corresponding deputy commanders for artillery and, in the case of tactical air delivery, through the air army of the

[redacted]

[8] For the estimated performance of Soviet fighters in close support roles, see Annex, Table 3.

*front.*[9] Allocations to *fronts* would be made by the High Command, and within and among these tactical levels by the *front* commander, in accordance with established guidelines and weapons availability.

23. In peacetime, nuclear weapons are stored in depots operated by the Ministry of Defense. As far as we can determine, these depots are located within the USSR; none have been identified in East Germany. Release and delivery of nuclear weapons to firing units, by air or ground transport, would be made upon order from the Minister of Defense.

24. The existing procedures for controlling nuclear weapons employment within a theater insure the national leadership that employment of nuclear weapons will not be initiated without political authorization. In addition, weapons allocation procedures give the national leadership substantial control over the numbers and yields of weapons employed by major theater force commands. The direct channel of allocation and of operational orders from the Ministry of Defense to the *front* commanders limits the freedom of field commanders to select targets. It appears that, as part of the effort to insure central control, special units have been created throughout the chain of command to hold physical custody of nuclear weapons. Existing procedures appear to penalize the Soviets in terms of operational readiness and rapid response for use of tactical nuclear weapons. We have no evidence indicating at what stage of readiness for combat these weapons would be turned over to field forces.

25. The broad range of nuclear tests in 1961 and 1962 points to an effort to improve the nuclear capabilities of all arms of the Soviet military establishment. We believe that limitations on allocation of nuclear weapons to theater forces will have eased by the mid-1960's, and these forces will then have a greater variety of nuclear weapons at their disposal. We believe that a variety of tactical nuclear weapons is now available, virtually all of them with yields in the kiloton range, but possibly including some in the low megaton range. The Soviets are probably developing subkiloton range warheads, but there is no present evidence that they are developing delivery systems specifically for such weapons.

26. Soviet military planners are now in a position to think in terms of committing up to a few hundred nuclear weapons for a typical *front* operation. Initial preparatory nuclear strikes are considered crucial to an operation. A high volume of concentrated nuclear strikes is called for in the preparatory phase, prior to offensive thrusts by ground forces, with theater forces expending a large percentage of their nuclear

[9] The *front* is the largest wartime Soviet field command, roughly comparable to a Western army group but including tactical aviation. It has administrative as well as tactical responsibilities.

weapons allocations during that phase. The primary targets in all phases of theater operations remain enemy nuclear delivery systems. Target priorities also are assigned to major troop formations, command and control complexes, and logistical installations. We believe, however, that shortfalls in organization, equipment, and logistic support would hamper the actual execution of Soviet doctrine for use of tactical nuclear weapons.

### *Chemical Warfare*

27. The Soviets consider CW munitions as an integral part of the Soviet arsenal for extensive use in conjunction with conventional and nuclear weapons in the event of general nuclear war. They would probably be used, after initial authorization by Moscow, on decision of the *front* commander in accordance with his estimate of the tactical advantages. Chemical munitions might be used in meeting engagements, for ground combat on the line of contact, and against enemy troop concentrations, command posts, and missile launch sites, and other key targets within about 300 miles of the battle front. The Soviets contemplate CW delivery by aircraft, short-range missiles, and conventional artillery. [redacted] we estimate that the USSR possesses an inventory of at least 200,000 tons of toxic agents in bulk and in filled munitions. About half the Soviet stockpile could consist of nerve agents, with the remainder consisting of various older standard agents. For tactical missile employment, the primary CW munition would probably be nerve gas of the V-agent type. We do not believe that the Soviets plan to use BW agents for tactical field combat.

### *Military Air Transport*

28. Soviet military transports are under the administrative authority of Military Transport Aviation, which coordinates military air transport activity and furnishes airlift support to all Soviet military forces except the navy. Military Transport Aviation has about 1,500 light and medium transports and 275 helicopters, almost all of which are operationally assigned to the Ministry of Defense, Long Range Aviation, Air Defense Forces, Tactical Aviation, Rocket Troops, and Airborne Troops. Transports assigned to Airborne Troops and the Ministry of Defense also provide a general purpose pool for the support of all major cargo and personnel lifts.

29. Approximately 200 light transports of the CAB, COACH, and CRATE types, about 60 converted BULL piston medium bombers, and about 385 medium turboprop transports of the CAT, CAMP, and CUB types, are assigned by Military Transport Aviation to support of airborne troops. The assigned transports of the airborne troops are



[redacted]

sufficient to airlift simultaneously a single airborne division or the assault echelons of two airborne divisions. Each divisional assault echelon would be limited to about 6,000 troops, including headquarters elements, nine rifle battalions, and light regimental support elements. Divisional combat and service support as well as transport vehicles of the infantry would not be included. A second sortie of the entire fleet would be needed to deliver the balance of the two divisions.

30. The probable addition in the near future of more transports will enhance Soviet capabilities to lift large numbers of troops or cargo to peripheral areas. We believe that in several years, transports assigned to support of airborne troops may have twice the present lift capacity. Soviet airlift capabilities also could be augmented by about 375 jet and turboprop transports now in civil aviation; these include the CAMEL jet medium transport, the CAT and COOT turboprop medium transports, and limited numbers of the CLEAT, a turboprop heavy transport. These aircraft have an airlift capability of nearly two additional divisional assault echelons. We believe that the two new high performance light transports, the TU–124 jet and the AN–24 turboprop, may begin to replace the outmoded and uneconomical CAB, COACH, and CRATE transports.

*Naval Support*

31. The Soviet Navy was traditionally viewed primarily as a supporting element to the land field forces on their maritime flanks. In recent years, however, the role of the navy in support of theater operations has come to emphasize the interdiction of Western sea lines of communication and operations against Western naval forces, in addition to defending the littoral of the Soviet Bloc. Submarine-launched missile attacks against Western territory could also support Soviet theater operations.

32. During the last few years the surface and submarine fleets have been pared of obsolescent units. New guided missile destroyers, antisubmarine and mine warfare ships, and missile launching patrol boats have augmented the coastal defensive capabilities of the Soviet Navy. Naval Aviation has been drastically reduced by the elimination of its fighter and most light bomber elements as a result of transfers and deactivations. Medium bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), and others equipped for reconnaissance, have increased the effectiveness of Naval Aviation. In addition, there is evidence that a program to re-equip the Soviet Navy's coastal artillery and antiaircraft artillery units with missile armament is well under way. Guided missile armament on destroyers and patrol craft has greatly increased the range at which they can engage opposing naval forces, but their usefulness

against land targets is questionable. The Soviet Navy is capable of mining in the closed seas, and of some aerial or submarine mining of Western ports and their approaches.

33. The Soviet amphibious assault capability is limited to shore-to-shore operations over short distances. Using all available naval landing ships and craft, the maximum lift would be 1 battalion in the Northern Fleet area, 1 battalion in the Pacific Fleet area, 1 regiment in the Black Sea, and 2 regiments in the Baltic. The Soviets possess a total merchant ship lift in all seas which is theoretically sufficient to transport approximately 20 motorized rifle divisions; however, such a lift would require port or other extensive off-loading facilities in the landing area. Assuming all Soviet merchant ships were available for use in their respective areas of registry, their approximate lift capability would be:

| | |
|---|---|
| North | 2½ motorized rifle divisions |
| Baltic | 5 motorized rifle divisions |
| Black | 5 motorized rifle divisions |
| Pacific | 8 motorized rifle divisions |

34. The Soviets may seek to further develop their amphibious lift capability, but significant improvement will depend upon their acquisition of additional amphibious craft, extensive training, and development of a reliable logistic support system. There are no current indications of such an improvement.

## III. CONTRIBUTION OF THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES

35. Since May 1955, Soviet and East European Satellite forces have been part of a unified military command established under the Warsaw Pact. The headquarters of the command is in Moscow, and its Commander in Chief is a Marshal of the Soviet Union as well as a First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Satellite defense ministers are designated Deputy Commanders in Chief, but there is no evidence that they regularly participate in the functions of the unified command, which are evidently handled almost exclusively by Soviet staff officers.

36. In addition to its obvious role as a political counter to NATO and a symbol of Bloc solidarity, the Warsaw Pact military command has served as a convenient instrument for the further standardization of Satellite doctrine and procedures along Soviet lines. A relatively large amount of combined training of Soviet and Satellite units has been held under its auspices. [redacted] combat units have sometimes been involved on a fairly substantial scale. From the nature and extent of this training activity, we judge that the Soviets probably intend to employ some Satellite forces in combined combat operations in the event of war.

37. We believe that in wartime, East European Satellite military forces would be under the control of the Soviet High Command, and the Warsaw Pact command as such would have little or no operational role. Selected Satellite divisions, corps, or even field armies would be integrated directly into Soviet field armies or *fronts*. Others would be retained under national command for such missions as defense against NATO air attack and sabotage, theater reserve, and line of communications security. The manner and extent to which Satellite forces would be employed would be determined by the Soviet estimate of their reliability and effectiveness, and by the availability of supporting elements.

38. The total personnel strength of the Satellite ground forces was augmented by nearly 20 percent as a result of the Berlin crisis in 1961. The increased strength was primarily in the line divisions, which had previously been manned at between 45 and 75 percent of wartime strength. Unlike the Soviet increase, which was subsequently offset through normal releases from service, the Satellite increase has in part been retained. Strength remains at about 970,000.

39. About 36 of the 63 Satellite divisions are considered to be sufficiently manned and equipped for commitment to combat as part of an overall effort against NATO. Of these, some 24 are Polish, East German, and Czech and the remaining 12 are Bulgarian and Rumanian divisions. Hungarian divisions are not included because of equipment shortages and inadequacy of higher unit training.[10]

40. Satellite field forces have very little tactical air support, because the primary mission of Satellite air forces is air defense. These air forces are made up almost entirely of obsolescent aircraft. However, more advanced fighters are being furnished to the Satellites and we believe this trend will continue, thereby improving the capabilities of Satellite air units. Certain key cities of East Europe are now defended by SAMs of the SA–2 type, but the Satellites still depend heavily on their 2,600 fighters for air defense. At least in the initial stages of a general war, it is unlikely that Satellite fighter aircraft would be released from this role in large numbers to provide close support for ground forces or to perform other offensive missions.[11]

41. Thus the Soviets probably consider the Satellite forces to be a sizable but problematic asset to their theater force capabilities against NATO in Europe. Satellite ground divisions are of varying degrees of effectiveness; more than half of them could probably be committed to combat without mobilization, but they suffer from a general shortage

[10] For a detailed estimate of East European ground divisions by location and type, see Annex, Table 6.

[11] For a detailed estimate of the strength of East European Air Forces, see Annex, Table 7.

of nondivisional support. Satellite air forces consist primarily of older model Soviet fighters and are intended mainly for air defense. The role of Satellite naval forces is limited to coastal defense. The Satellites have dual capable weapons of various types, but the Soviets have not been willing to provide them with nuclear bombs and warheads.

42. Reliability is probably still a critical factor in Soviet planning for the employment of the East European Satellite forces. The degree of risk would vary widely among units and nationalities, and would further depend on the cause and nature of the hostilities, the nationality of the opposing forces, and the fortunes of war. Under certain circumstances, concern over political reliability might even cause the Soviets to consider some of the Satellite forces as a liability rather than an asset. By careful selection of courses of action and missions for the Satellite forces, the USSR could tap much of their potential, but it could not count upon them for the full range of operations against NATO.

## IV. CURRENT CAPABILITIES FOR GENERAL WAR CAMPAIGNS

43. As a matter of simple military necessity, the Soviets are preparing their theater field forces for the contingency of general nuclear war. Their primary concern is to insure that these forces will be able to survive the massive employment of nuclear weapons by the enemy and to fight effectively in conjunction with the USSR's own nuclear and missile strikes. During the initial nuclear exchange, the role of theater field forces would be secondary to that of strategic attack and air defense forces, but theater forces would be expected to contribute to Soviet offensive and defensive action by engaging the enemy on a broad front and by neutralizing nuclear weapons and bases where possible. The ultimate strategic objectives of Soviet theater operations in general war would be to defeat enemy ground forces and to occupy strategically important territory.

44. The statements of Soviet leaders, as well as the deployment and training of Soviet theater forces, make it clear that the principal operations of these forces in general war would be directed against NATO in Europe. The Soviets plan to move massive theater forces rapidly toward the Channel coast in the initial days of a general war. This campaign would probably be augmented by operations in the Scandinavian area, to secure the exit of the Baltic and acquire advance bases for the Northern Fleet. The Soviets evidently also contemplate operations toward the Mediterranean, and to secure the exit of the Black Sea. Other peripheral areas, such as the Middle and Far East, are apparently regarded as having lesser priority for theater force operations. Soviet capabilities to conduct theater operations against North America are

limited to minor airborne and amphibious attacks against Alaska and other Arctic bases.

*Principal Strengths and Limitations of Soviet Theater Forces*

45. The longstanding Soviet concern with concepts and forces for campaigns in adjoining theaters, especially in Europe, has resulted in a formidable theater force strong in armor, battlefield mobility, and units in being. The tactical nuclear delivery capabilities of these forces, although improving, are limited in both quantity and quality at present. Further, in the initial phase of a general war, a significant portion of the fighters of Tactical Aviation would need to be assigned to interceptor missions as well as to ground attack missions. In offensive operations, the highly mechanized ground forces are in constant danger of outrunning their logistical tail, which is heavily dependent on railroads. Finally, the Soviets have traditionally exercised very strict supervision over the actions of their subordinates, but existing command and control systems do not permit the strict supervision over the widely extended deployment required on the nuclear battlefield or under the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

*Soviet Forces Available for Employment Against NATO*

46. There are a great many factors which have decisive bearing on the size of the forces which the Soviets could and would employ in operations against NATO, and their effects cannot be estimated with assurance. Some of the most important of these are: (a) the question of the extent to which the Soviets would have the initiative, or be able to achieve surprise; (b) the number of units which would be retained as a mobilization and training base; (c) the extent of employment and the combat effectiveness of Satellite divisions; and (d) force requirements in other areas. In addition, we are not certain as to the quantities of weapons and equipment available for mobilization purposes. The Soviets have evidently satisfied their mobilization requirements in virtually all categories of conventional artillery and tanks, even for a mobilization which would double the current number of divisions. However, we believe that shortages of other combat and support equipment (such as communications and transport), as well as of trained specialists for support units, would impede the expansion of force levels.[12]

47. Soviet theater forces are disposed in such a manner that the bulk of their combat ready forces are available for use against NATO. We estimate that a total of 117 divisions, 72 of them combat ready, are located west of the Urals. The 26 combat ready divisions located in

[12] For a detailed estimate of Soviet stocks of ground force weapons, see Annex, Table 5.

East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, have been given the highest level of support of any major Soviet ground formations. These Soviet forces in East Europe have almost half the total strength of Tactical Aviation, and have a considerably higher ratio of combat and service support units than forces inside the USSR itself.[13]

48. Combat-ready Soviet divisions available for employment against NATO are currently stationed as follows:

| | COMBAT READY DIVISIONS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LOCATION | MTG. RIFLE | TANK | AIRBORNE | TOTAL |
| Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) | 10 | 10 | .. | 20 |
| Northern Group of Forces, Poland (NGF) | 1 | 1 | .. | 2 |
| Southern Group of Forces, Hungary (SGF) | 1 | 3 | .. | 4 |
| Western USSR | 12 | 8 | 3 | 23 |
| Northwest USSR | 3 | .. | 1 | 4 |
| Southwest USSR | 6 | 1 | .. | 7 |
| Southern USSR* | 8 | 2 | 2 | 12 |
| TOTAL | 41 | 25 | 6 | 72 |

* Includes four divisions opposite eastern Iran and Afghanistan.

If the Soviets were able to mobilize for 10 days before the initiation of hostilities, some of the 45 Soviet low-strength divisions west of the Urals could be brought up to strength and thereafter used to augment forces in the combat areas. However, these divisions would be incompletely trained and their commitment to combat would deplete the cadres necessary for mobilizing and training additional divisions. Hence their use would be problematical.

49. If the Soviets were able to mobilize for 30 days before the initiation of hostilities, they could expand their total forces to about 100 combat ready and 125 nonready divisions. Of these M+30 divisions, the following would be in areas from which they could be employed against NATO:

| LOCATION | COMBAT READY DIVISIONS | NONREADY DIVISIONS |
|---|---|---|
| GSFG | 20 | .. |
| NGF | 2 | .. |
| SGF | 4 | .. |
| Western USSR | 28 | 52 |
| Northwest USSR | 4 | 8 |
| Southwest USSR | 10 | 12 |
| Southern USSR* | 18 | 12 |
| TOTAL | 86 | 84 |

* Includes divisions opposite eastern Iran and Afghanistan.

[13] For the geographic distribution of Soviet ground divisions and tactical aircraft, see Annex, Map.

50. Soviet Tactical Aviation now has about 230 jet light bombers and 1,200 fighters in Eastern Europe. The Satellites together have about 180 light bombers and about 2,600 fighters, the latter intended primarily for air defense. In the entire European USSR, there are in Tactical Aviation an additional 330 light bombers and about 850 fighters; also available for employment against NATO are about 55 light bombers and 280 fighters in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan. Nearly 40 percent of the light bombers and a small percentage of the fighters have primarily reconnaissance roles.

51. The Soviet Navy has large numbers of modern, long-range submarines (including missile launching types) and major surface ships assigned to its three fleets in the European area, as shown in the following summary table:

| FLEETS | TORPEDO ATTACK SUBS | BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBS | CRUISE MISSILE SUBS | CRUISERS | DESTROYERS AND ESCORTS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern | 109 | 31 | 7 | 4 | 50 |
| Baltic | 40* | 0 | 2 | 5 | 30 |
| Black Sea | 31* | 0 | 1 | 5 | 26 |

* Does not include medium-range submarines designed for operations in closed seas; 26 such submarines are currently in the Baltic, and four are in the Black Sea.

Of the submarines in the Northern Fleet, with unrestricted access to the open seas, about 65 (including the missile subs) are capable of operating off the US coasts, while the remainder were apparently designed for operation in the eastern North Atlantic. The surface ships of the Northern Fleet are also capable of operations in the eastern North Atlantic, but their operations would probably be confined to the radius of land-based air cover. There are about 250 BADGER medium bombers, the bulk of them equipped with ASMs, and about 40 MADGE seaplanes assigned to the three European Fleets.

52. Although the 800 European-based medium bombers of Long Range Aviation would be committed to strategic attack missions in the initial stage of a general war, some of them could be employed for follow-up support of theater campaigns in the NATO area. We estimate that the USSR has a force of medium and intermediate range missiles which includes more than 500 operational launching pads deployed within range of NATO targets.

*Gross Capabilities for a Campaign Against Western Europe*

53. Because of our uncertainty regarding many critical factors, we can express the gross capabilities of Soviet theater forces only in terms of the maximum forces which could be built up and supported in each

area of operations, provided that in the aggregate these forces do not exceed the total strength which the USSR is likely to be able to marshal. Our estimate of these gross capabilities, moreover, does not take account of the actions of opposing military forces, nor does it allow for the effects of a strategic nuclear exchange. We believe that in a general war the initial nuclear exchange could be a principal factor governing the ability of Soviet theater forces to carry out the campaigns described in succeeding paragraphs.

54. The size of the ground and tactical air forces the Soviets could employ initially against Western Europe in general war would depend in part on whether operations were begun on short notice or after a period of preparation. The Soviets currently have 22 line divisions and 1,200 tactical aircraft stationed in East Germany and Poland. If surprise were the overriding factor or the Soviets concluded that they must quickly initiate pre-emptive operations, they could launch an attack against Western Europe without prior buildup. Such an action would not be consistent, however, with Soviet doctrine concerning the necessity for numerical superiority in the area of engagement.

55. Soviet doctrine and recent military exercises strongly suggest that if circumstances permitted, the USSR would seek to assemble a considerably larger striking force for a campaign into Western Europe. The major drive contemplated in this campaign would clearly be into West Germany. Considering current Soviet doctrine for combat organization and echelonment, as well as the geography of the area, we believe that the striking force for such a campaign could comprise three *fronts* with a total of 50–60 ground divisions, with air support totaling some 2,000 tactical aircraft. In addition, some theater reserve forces would probably be called for by Soviet doctrine.

56. In addition to Soviet forces in East Germany and Poland, the 23 combat ready Soviet divisions and 800 tactical aircraft in western USSR could be moved forward for a campaign against Western Europe. To assemble a full 60-division striking force, however, the Soviets would have to employ additional divisions, which they could draw from a number of sources. Of the 35 Satellite ground divisions of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, we believe that up to 24 could make reasonably early contributions. After some delay, the Soviets could also bring in a portion of the 21 divisions in western USSR which are normally at low strength, or could draw upon units in northwestern, southwestern, or southern USSR.

57. For assembly and support of forces in the forward area, the rail net of Eastern Europe could probably sustain a reinforcement rate of up to three division slices daily for movements extending from the Soviet border through Poland and Czechoslovakia, or about two division slices

daily for movements extending through East Germany. (A division slice includes a division of men and equipment plus its share of combat and service support units.) These maximum daily reinforcement rates could be achieved after about seven days of preparation. They would be reduced as soon as resupply shipments reached significant size, but large-scale resupply would not need to be initiated until after the outbreak of hostilities. Road and water transport could also be used for movement of men and material, but would probably not add significantly to the reinforcement rate.

58. Under noncombat conditions, the Bloc could build up a 50–60 division striking force in East Germany and western Czechoslovakia within 30 days. This force could be assembled in a manner designed to give NATO a minimum of warning and reaction time, for example, by about 15 days of covert preparation and reduced scale reinforcement followed by 15 days of open, maximum scale reinforcement. If the Bloc followed such a plan, it could probably also have a theater reserve of about 24 second-line Soviet and Satellite divisions in Poland and eastern Czechoslovakia about 30 days after the start of the buildup.

59. The Soviet submarine fleet could contribute to a campaign against Western Europe by operations against the highly important sea lines of communication from North America. The capability of Soviet submarines to interdict these supply lines would depend on a number of factors: endurance of the submarines, transit time to station, repair and overhaul requirements, logistic support, and the extent of opposition. Interdiction operations against North Atlantic supply routes would be accomplished largely by submarines of the Northern Fleet; this force includes about 85 submarines which have insufficient radius to operate in US coastal areas but which could operate in the Norwegian Sea and eastern Atlantic. Not considering combat attrition, about 24 Northern Fleet submarines could be maintained on stations continuously in the eastern Atlantic approaches to the UK and Europe. This force might be augmented by submarines deployed from the Baltic prior to hostilities. Marginal coverage of the approaches to the Mediterranean could also be achieved. In addition, the Soviets could maintain some 5–10 long-range, torpedo-attack submarines on more distant stations for operations against shipping in the western Atlantic.

*Gross Capabilities For Campaigns in Other Areas*

60. The major drive across central Europe would probably be accompanied by lesser thrusts in other military theaters, employing the ground divisions adjacent to them and the limited numbers of tactical aircraft not committed to the main westward thrust.

61. For an initial campaign against Scandinavia, the USSR could use the 4 combat ready and 4 understrength divisions facing Finland and

northern Norway. The 4 Soviet divisions in Hungary might form the initial echelon of a *front* moving toward Italy. For a campaign into Greece and Turkish Thrace, the USSR has available 7 combat ready divisions in the southwestern USSR and up to 12 Bulgarian and Rumanian divisions; some of the 7 Soviet ready divisions in the Carpathian Military District, if not sent westward, could also be used in this theater. The position of Yugoslavia as neutral, ally, or enemy would be a key factor influencing the strategy of Soviet campaigns against either Italy or Greece and Turkey.

62. In the initial stage of a general war, limited operations might be launched against Iran and eastern Turkey. Twelve combat ready divisions are stationed in southern USSR facing eastern Turkey and Iran; because of logistic limitations, somewhat less than half this number of divisions could be employed against eastern Turkey. Soviet forces in the Far East number 7 combat ready and 10 understrength divisions, including 1 airborne division without adequate airlift. We estimate the Far Eastern capability for amphibious assault at only 1 battalion. These theater forces have been substantially reduced in recent years, and it is doubtful that the Soviets would launch a theater campaign with their own forces in the Far Eastern area.

## V. LIMITED WARFARE

### *Large Scale Limited War*

63. The Soviets have been especially concerned in recent years with developing concepts and capabilities for waging nuclear theater campaigns. This appears to have been in response to a NATO policy which was frankly based on a resort to nuclear weapons from the beginning of such a campaign. More recent indications of US interest in building NATO's capability for an initial nonnuclear response do not appear thus far to have altered the Soviet expectations that any major conflict in Europe would either be nuclear from the start or would probably escalate.

64. There are indications in their recent writings, however, that the Soviets have given recognition to the possibility of nonnuclear warfare with NATO forces in Europe. They recognize the advantages to them if an engagement in the European theater could be kept nonnuclear, and a Soviet objective in such a conflict would be to prevent escalation. But they also recognize the great risk, should hostilities reach any considerable scale, of leaving to the opponent the initiative for a sudden resort to nuclear attack. They probably intend to retain the capability to conduct large-scale nonnuclear operations against NATO even though they do not count on being able to exercise this option.

65. The adjustments in Soviet theater forces in the past few years have not materially impaired their capabilities to conduct nonnuclear operations. Offensive and defensive weapons have continued to be modernized. Over the past two years, the nonnuclear firepower of ground units has not been significantly altered, but the supporting nonnuclear firepower which can be delivered by tactical aircraft has decreased.

66. In the event of military action in the NATO area without the employment of nuclear weapons, the possibility of escalation to nuclear warfare would be a constant influence on the battle. Under these conditions, Soviet forces have certain characteristics in their favor. Their highly mechanized, high-speed forces are well adapted to penetrating gaps in enemy formations and exploiting deep into the enemy rear. Their high degree of mechanization would permit them to concentrate forces briefly while on the move to achieve local superiority in combat power, and to disperse again before becoming a nuclear target. Moreover, the traditional Soviet doctrine of echelonment would permit Soviet forces to apply a great concentration of combat power throughout the depth of the enemy formations.

67. As far as we can determine, there has been almost no Soviet doctrinal discussion about limited nuclear warfare by theater forces, involving the use of tactical weapons only. Thus far, the Soviets appear to think that limited nuclear conflict in the NATO area would almost certainly escalate to general war. We think the USSR would be severely handicapped in any attempts to conduct such warfare at present. There are, at present, limitations in numbers of low-yield nuclear weapons, in accurate short-range delivery means, and in tactical nuclear air support. There are also strong indications that the Soviet command and control system does not have the speed and flexibility necessary for highly controlled, discriminating use of tactical nuclear weapons.

*Distant Limited Military Action*

68. Soviet theater forces are primarily designed for operations in areas contiguous to the Bloc. The USSR is increasing its concern with remote areas such as Cuba, Laos, and Africa, but in any present effort to deploy ground and tactical air forces rapidly to distant areas, and to maintain them once deployed, the USSR faces many disadvantages. It is severely limited in airlift, sealift, and naval support suitable for distant actions. Moreover, in many areas it lacks political arrangements to insure that it can provide adequate logistic support.

69. There is no evidence that the USSR has established any special military component trained and equipped specifically for independent small-scale operations, although of course it could employ portions of

its existing forces. It is possible that over the next few years the Soviets will seek to improve their capabilities for distant, limited military operations through the designation and training of appropriate forces, and the development of suitable equipment for their use and logistic support. They may attempt to overcome their geographic disadvantage for applying such forces by negotiating with neutralist countries to utilize available facilities for refueling and maintenance of Soviet military aircraft or naval ships.

Table 1

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET GROUND DIVISIONS, 1962

| Area | Motorized Rifle Divisions | | | Tank Divisions | | | Airborne Divisions [a] | | Totals |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Combat Ready | Low Strength | Total | Combat Ready | Low Strength | Total | Combat Ready | Total | |
| Eastern Europe | 12 | .. | 12 | 14 | .. | 14 | .. | .. | 26 |
| Northwestern USSR | 3 | 3 | 6 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| Western USSR | 12 | 16 | 28 | 8 | 5 | 13 | 3 | 3 | 44 |
| Southwestern USSR | 6 | 7 | 13 | 1 | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 14 |
| Southern USSR | 8 | 13 | 21 | 2 | .. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 25 |
| Central USSR | .. | 11 | 11 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11 |
| Far Eastern USSR | 5 | 8 | 13 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 17 |
| Totals | 46 | 58 | 104 | 26 | 8 | 34 | 7 | 7 | [b] 145 |

[a] All airborne divisions are estimated to be combat ready.

[b] The number of divisions confirmed since January 1961 is 116; most of the additional divisions included in our estimate are under-strength units located in areas from which information is received only sporadically. Taking account of this and other factors, we conclude that the current total of divisions could lie within a range of 120 to 150, with the most probable figure being about 145.

Table 2

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET TACTICAL AVIATION BY LOCATION AND TYPE, 1 OCTOBER 1962 AND MID-1964

| Aircraft | 24th AA East Germany | SAF Hungary | 37th AA Poland | 13th AA Leningrad MD | 15th AA Baltic MD | 1st AA Belorussia MD | 14th AA Carpathian MD | Kiev MD AF | 5th AA Odessa MD | Moscow MD AF | 11th AA Transcaucasus MD | 6th AA Turkestan MD | u/i AA Far East MD | 1 October 1962 Totals | Mid-1964 Totals |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAGOT | 25 | .. | .. | .. | 30 | .. | 10 | 20 | .. | .. | .. | 70 | .. | 155 | .. |
| FRESCO A, B, C | 310 | 45 | 80 | 90 | 20 | 130 | 100 | 70 | 60 | 20 | 80 | 60 | 90 | 1,155 | 425 |
| FRESCO D, E | 110 | 25 | 60 | .. | 25 | 30 | .. | .. | .. | 10 | .. | .. | 35 | 295 | 100 |
| FARMER | 70 | 35 | 30 | .. | 10 | 10 | .. | .. | 30 | 20 | 70 | 20 | .. | 295 | 200 |
| FLASHLIGHT A | 25 | .. | .. | .. | 20 | .. | .. | .. | 20 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 65 | .. |
| FISHBED | 110 | 85 | 60 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10 | .. | .. | .. | 265 | 400 |
| FITTER | 70 | .. | 25 | .. | 20 | 10 | 10 | .. | 10 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 145 | 325 |
| FLASHLIGHT D | .. | .. | 25 | .. | .. | .. | 10 | .. | 10 | 20 | .. | .. | .. | 65 | 325 |
| FIREBAR | 30 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10 | .. | .. | .. | 10 | .. | .. | 50 | |
| FIDDLER TYPE | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 25 |
| BEAGLE | 155 | 65 | 10 | 35 | 110 | 95 | 50 | .. | 30 | .. | 35 | 20 | 55 | 660 | 150 |
| Totals | 905 | 255 | 290 | 125 | 235 | 275 | 190 | 90 | 160 | 80 | 195 | 170 | 180 | 3,150 | 1,950 |

Table 3

SOVIET AIRCRAFT CLOSE SUPPORT PERFORMANCE [a] [b]

| AIRCRAFT | FUEL LOAD | COMBAT RADIUS (nm) | MAXIMUM SPEED AT SL (kts) | ARMAMENT [c] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAGOT<br>MIG-15 | 2,500 pounds (internal only) | 100 | 585 | 1 x 37 mm gun.<br>2 x 23 mm guns.<br>2 x 550 pound bombs. |
| FRESCO A, B, & C<br>MIG-17 | 2,480 pounds (internal only) | 60 | 570 | 1 x 37 mm gun.<br>2 x 23 mm guns.<br>2-550 pound bombs. |
| | 3,200 pounds (1 external tank) | 180 | 570 | 1 x 37 mm gun.<br>2 x 23 mm guns.<br>1-1,100 pound bomb. |
| FARMER A [d] | 3,950 pounds (internal only) | 170 | 645 | 1 x 37 mm gun.<br>2 x 23 mm guns.<br>2 x 550 pound bombs. |
| | 6,150 pounds (external fuel) | 415 | 645 | 1 x 37 mm gun.<br>2-210 mm rockets.[e] |
| FARMER C & D [d]<br>MIG-19 | 3,950 pounds (internal only) | 170 | 645 | 2 x 30 mm guns.<br>2-550 pound bombs. |
| | 6,150 pounds (external fuel) | 415 | 645 | 2 x 30 mm guns.<br>2-210 mm rockets. |
| FITTER [d] [f] | 7,000 pounds (internal only) | 210 | 715 | 2 x 30 mm guns.<br>2-210 mm rockets.<br>2 x 1,100 pound bombs. |
| | 10,000 pounds (2 external fuselage tanks). | 485 | 715 | 2 x 30 mm guns.<br>2-210 mm rockets. |
| | 10,000 pounds (2 external fuselage tanks). | 450 | 715 | 2 x 30 mm guns.<br>2-550 pound bombs. |
| FISHBED C [d] [g] | 3,750 pounds (internal only) | 200 | 660 | 2 x 30 mm guns.<br>1-1,100 pound bomb. |
| | 4,550 pounds (1 external fuselage tank). | 285 | 660 | 2 x 30 mm guns.<br>2-210 mm rockets. |
| | 4,550 pounds (1 external fuselage tank). | 250 | 660 | 2 x 30 mm guns.<br>2-550 pound bombs. |
| FIREBAR A [f] | 7,000 pounds (internal only) | 275 | 655 | 1 x 30 mm gun.<br>2,200 pound bomb load. |
| | 10,900 pounds (2 external tanks) | 460 | 655 | 1 x 30 mm gun.<br>2,200 pound bomb load. |
| FIDDLER | 33,800 pounds (internal only) | 900 | 650 | 2,200 pound bomb load. |

[a] Selected mission profile: (1) Take off (two minutes at normal rated power). Climb on course at military power. (2) Cruise to target at speed and altitude for maximum range. Drop external tanks. (3) Descend to target, five minutes at military power at sea level. (4) Climb at military power, return to base at speed and altitude for maximum range. (5) Reserve allowance of 10 minutes loiter in landing pattern at base. Actual combat performance will vary depending on load carried and mission profile flown. The radius will be considerably less if flown at low level.

[b] All aircraft considered to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

[c] All bomb and rocket loads are carried externally except for FIREBAR A which carries bombs internally.

[d] Two air-to-air rocket packs are carried and contain multiple 55 mm 7.5 pound rockets. The number of these air-to-air rockets per pack could be either 8 or 19.

[e] Each 210 mm air-to-ground rocket weighs about 132 pounds.

[f] Four pylons for carrying external stores are provided. Two are under the wings and two are under the fuselage.

[g] For a high level bombing mission the combat radius would be 390 n.m. with internal fuel, and 730 n.m. with external fuel.

Table 4

ESTIMATED SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR MISSILES AND ROCKETS

| | SS-1A | SS-1B [a] | SS-2 | SSC-1 | SSC-2 [b] FROG-1 | FROG-2 | FROG-3 | FROG-4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maximum range (nm) | 150 | 150 (CW or HE)<br>75 (nuclear) | 350 | 300 (may be guidance limited to 150) | 15 | 11 | 13 | 26 |
| Trajectory | Ballistic | Ballistic | Ballistic | Aerodynamic, low altitude, low supersonic | free flight | | | |
| Propulsion | LOX-alcohol | Storable liquid | Nonstorable liquid | Turbojet, JP fuel, atmospheric oxygen | solid fuel | | | |
| Guidance | Radio inertial, possibly all inertial | All inertial | Radio inertial about | Unknown, possible radio link | none | | | |
| Accuracy | ¾ nm CEP | ½ nm CEP | ¾ nm CEP | ½ nm against known fixed targets at 150 nm | 400–800 yards | 300–600 yards | 500–1,000 yards | 650–1,650 yards |
| Warhead (pounds) | 1,700 (CW, HE or nuclear) | 1,200 (CW or HE)<br>2,500 (nuclear) | 2,500 (CW, HE, nuclear) | 1,000–2,000 estimated nuclear, (HE, CW) | 3,000 | 1,300 | 1,300 | 700 |
| Reliability | On launcher—90 percent<br>In flight—80 percent | On launcher—90 percent<br>In flight—80 percent | On launcher—90 percent<br>In flight—80 percent | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown |
| Reaction time | 2–4 hours after arrival at presurveyed site. Can be held at X–1 hour for extended periods and at X–15 minutes for limited periods. | 2 hours after arrival at presurveyed site. Can be held at X–10 minutes for extended periods. | 2–4 hours after arrival at presurveyed site. Can be held at X–1 hour for extended periods, and X–15 minutes for limited periods. | 1 hour after arrival at presurveyed site | From arrival at presurveyed site—15–30 minutes | | | |
| Refire time | 4–6 hours | 3–4 hours | 4–6 hours | Unknown | 15–30 minutes | | | |
| Mobility | Has cross-country mobility in unfueled condition | Some cross-country mobility in fueled condition | Mobile on good roads limited cross-country mobility | Good on highways, limited on secondary roads | 25 miles per hour | | | |

[a] There is evidence of an improved model designated SS–1C, which has a range of 150 nm with a nuclear warhead. Other characteristics are unknown but they will probably be similar to, or improvements of those of the SS–1B.

[b] We estimate that the USSR has developed a vehicle-mounted, tactical cruise missile with a range of 15 to 25 nm for delivery of HE or nuclear payloads. Other characteristics are unknown.

Table 5

ESTIMATED STOCKS OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE WEAPONS, 1962

General Note:

The estimated totals of major armaments are based upon estimated cumulative production. The evidence on production ranges from poor to excellent, depending on the particular category of weapons and the sometimes spotty quality of direct evidence. The quantities of armament with troops are based on observation and known tables of organization and equipment of Soviet units extrapolated for those units where observation is not possible. The estimated quantity in depots is based entirely upon subtraction of equipment in the hands of troops, attrition of such equipment, and exports from the total estimated cumulative production. There is, therefore, considerable uncertainty about these estimates, particularly of armaments in depots.

| Item of Equipment | With Troops | In Depots |
|---|---|---|
| Mortars: | | |
| 82 mm | 6,600 | 50,500 |
| 120 mm | 2,300 | 37,600 |
| 160 mm | 1,800 | 18,000 |
| 240 mm | 150 | 2,650 |
| RCL Weapons: | | |
| 82 mm RCL gun | 3,500 | 16,400 |
| 107 mm RCL gun | 2,700 | 19,800 |
| Artillery-Field: | | |
| 100 mm gun | 3,500 | 18,100 |
| 122 mm gun | 1,100 | 7,300 |
| 122 mm How | 5,800 | 9,900 |
| 130 mm gun | 800 | 800 |
| 152 mm gun/How | 1,900 | 5,700 |
| 152 mm How | 200 | 5,400 |
| 203 mm gun/How | 150 | 850 |
| (*Antitank*) | | |
| 57 mm AT (towed) | 3,100 | 17,700 |
| 85 mm field/AT | 4,500 | 27,000 |
| Antitank missile [a] | unknown | unknown |
| (*Air Defense*) | | |
| 37 mm AA | none | 8,500 |
| 57 mm AA | 4,200 | 4,300 |
| 85 mm AA | none | 12,900 |
| 100 mm AA | 1,700 | 4,700 |
| 14.5 mm AA multibarrel [b] | unknown | unknown |
| (*Rocket Launchers*) | | |
| 140 mm RL | 1,800 | 5,200 |
| 200 mm RL | 500 | 700 |
| 240 mm RL | 1,300 | 5,700 |
| 250 mm RL | 400 | unknown |
| RL, trkd. amph. FROG | 700 | unknown |
| (*Surface-to-Surface Launchers*) | | |
| 150 nm SS-1 | 210 | unknown |
| 350 nm SS-2 [c] | 60 | unknown |
| Cruise-type | unknown | unknown |
| (*Surface-to-Air Launchers*) | | |
| SA-2 [d] | unknown | unknown |
| SA-3 [e] | unknown | unknown |

Table 5 (*Continued*)

| Item of Equipment | With Troops | In Depots |
|---|---|---|
| Armor: | | |
| Lt. amph. tk. PT-76 | 3,100 | 700 |
| Medium tk. T-34, T-54/55 [f] | 31,800 | 30,100 |
| Heavy tk. TS 2/3, T-10 | 3,300 | 8,500 |
| (*Assault Guns*) | | |
| ASU-57 | .. | 1,800 |
| SU-85/100 | .. | 10,400 |
| JSU 122, 152 | 2,800 | 9,700 |
| New SU-85 [g] | unknown | unknown |
| Personnel carriers (incl. new 8 whld. amph. APC) | 33,000 | unknown |
| Motor Transport: | | |
| Trucks and command cars | 400,000 | unknown |
| Tractors/tracked prime movers | 25,900 | unknown |
| Amphibian (trkd. and shld.) | 10,000 | 10,500 |

[a] New antitank missile will probably start to replace conventional antitank guns during period 1962–1964.

[b] New multibarreled 14.5 mm antiaircraft gun will probably start to replace conventional antiaircraft guns during period 1962–1964.

[c] Additional SS-2 (350 nm) missiles will be allocated to major commands during period 1962–1964.

[d] Some SA-2 units have been deployed in support of Soviet field forces in East Germany and possibly in the USSR. See NIE 11-3-62, paragraph 16.

[e] See NIE 11-3-62, paragraph 20.

[f] During period 1962–1964, 4,250 Soviet medium tanks expected to be modified at factories.

[g] New ASU-85 probably will be phased into Soviet ground forces during period 1962–1964.

Table 6

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE GROUND FIELD FORCES, 1962

| Country | Rifle Divisions | | | Motorized Rifle/ Mechanized Divisions | | | Tank Divisions | | | Airborne Divisions | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | TO/E | Actual | No. | TO/E | Actual | No. | TO/E | Actual | No. | TO/E | Actual | |
| Bulgaria | 5 | 11,500 | 7,500 | 2 | 13,000 | 7,500 | 3 | 10,500 | 6,500 | .. | .. | .. | 10 |
| Czechoslovakia | .. | .. | .. | 12 | 13,000 | 7,500 | 2 | 10,500 | 6,000 | .. | .. | .. | 14 |
| East Germany | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 13,000 | 10,000 | 2 | 10,000 | 8,000 | .. | .. | .. | 6 |
| Hungary | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 13,000 | 8,000 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 |
| Poland | 1 | 11,500 | unknown | 9 | 13,000 | 9,000 | 4 | 10,500 | 7,500 | 1 | 9,000 | 3,500 | 15 |
| Rumania | 9 | 11,500 | 9,500 | 3 | 13,000 | 8,000 | 1 | 10,500 | 7,000 | .. | .. | .. | 13 |
| Totals | 15 | .. | .. | 35 | .. | .. | 12 | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 63 |

Table 7

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIR FORCES, 1 OCTOBER 1962

| Aircraft | Albania | Bulgaria | Czechoslovakia | East Germany | Hungary | Poland | Polish Navy | Rumania | Totals |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FAGOT | 25 | 35 | 210 | .. | .. | 300 | 25 | 140 | 735 |
| FRESCO A, B, C | 25 | 220 | 115 | 220 | 85 | 225 | 20 | 75 | 985 |
| FRESCO D, E | 20 | 30 | 105 | 50 | 35 | 175 | 10 | 10 | 435 |
| FRESCO or FARMER | .. | .. | .. | 70 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 70 |
| FARMER | .. | 100 | 105 | 30 | 10 | 60 | .. | 30 | 335 |
| FISHBED | .. | .. | 25 | 30 | 35 | 10 | .. | .. | 100 |
| FIREBAR/FLASHLIGHT D | .. | .. | 10 | .. | .. | .. | 5 | .. | 15 |
| BEAGLE | .. | 20 | 50 | .. | .. | 85 | 10 | 15 | 180 |
| Totals | 70 | 405 | 620 | * 400 | 165 | 855 | 70 | 270 | 2,855 |

* The status of about half of these aircraft is not clear, since the East German Air Force is organized to handle only about 200 aircraft.

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# Deployment of Soviet Ground Divisions and Tactical Aircraft, 1 October 1962




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