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馬洛里作

門戶開放政策的再估價

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門戶開放政策的再估價

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譯自「外交季刊」

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外交政策頗受政府人員的影響，也可能受政府以外人們的影響，但是要說它是他們所「製造」，那就太淺薄了。它是地理，政治，種族，宗教與經濟等力量影響的結果，這中間有一些是變動的，有些是固定的，他們影響着人民對於世界其他人的態度。這態度可能是侵略的，柔順的或合作的。它也許是一對的「或是一錯的」。它可能導致成功或失敗。政治領袖只是刺激它或運用它，而不在創造它。使德國侵略的並非希特勒；使英國堅定的建築師也決非邱吉爾；使美國在經濟上強大機警而熱心的決非羅斯福；每一個成功的政治領袖都本能地明瞭他們的人民是什麼，他們需要什麼；而真正為好為壞，決定他們動向的還是他們大多數人民。

那末在今天我們外交政策方面，這種考慮與我們的對華政策一樣有關聯嗎？中國正發生着深刻的政治與經濟變化，不過變化非常曲折而遲緩；那末在中美關係方面自然特別應該有長期打算。有許多人說，我們美國對中國並無固定政策，他們永遠呼籲國務院「拿定主意」。但是他們把政策與日常事務的進行混為一談。有時報紙消息，甚至政府消息，都使情形弄得模糊。美國的確是有一個政策的，雖然暫時有變動，它可以追溯到一百五十年以前。我相信，開始美國對華政策是經過深思熟慮的，因為它與美國人民的希望符合；它是恰當的，因為目前中國的局勢是如此不穩而混亂，因此我們要強調它的價值，並以此作為衡量我們日常決定的尺度，正是恰當的時候。自然，那個政策的基礎是門戶開放政策。我們此刻值得探討的是這個熟悉的名稱究竟代表些什麼，而它在今天又有什麼意義。

這政策的根本是商業的。中美的交往開始在美國立國之初，即快船時代。早在產業革命以前，一對華通商一的可能就極受新英倫人的注意。最初是茶，絲與瓷器這些東西鼓勵了我們的一些船主，繞好望角，經印度洋到廣州；爲了交換，他們將布匹，棉花，鉛與人參帶到中國。貿易由小而大，但是它從未迅速發展得與中國龐大的人口與需要相適應。當此種貿易發展時，美國有三條路可走：我們可以要求獨有的安排，租界與雙邊的貿易；我們可以避免官方的行動，任我們的商人按他們的能力去發展貿易；我們也可要求我們商人獲得「最惠國待遇」；——這就是說，按平等互惠的原則進行貿易，任何一國獲得特權，其他國家也同等享受。這是對我們最有利的制度，也是我們一度到處擁護的制度。在中國對外貿易中，美國部分的比例逐漸增高，到一九三七年中日正式開始作戰時，美國在中國出口中佔百分之廿七·五九，在輸入方面佔百分之十九·七五，已躍居領導各國的首位。

早在一八四四年柯辛(Caleb Cushing)訂立黃翰條約(Treaty of Wanghia)時，美國已經獲得平等之權。但是我們的政策一直到同一世紀的末年才有了明確的規定。由於中國的積弱，由於歐洲國家的壓迫，力求取得勢力範圍，不僅美國而且其他國家都將得不到貿易自由。於是國務卿海約翰(John Hay)揭櫫了一般所謂「門戶開放政策」。

讓我們回顧一下當時的情景。中國已在甲午之戰中爲日本所擊敗，俄國已佔領大連，德國已在山東獲得立足點，英國佔有威海衛，並在長江流域佔有強固勢力，法國控制了華南的廣州灣，義大利正竭力設法在中國沿海獲取地位。所有這些區域都成爲「勢力範圍」或「利益」中心，從而可能成爲一國商人專有的範圍。

國務卿海約翰的目的在保衛最惠國的貿易權，這權利是當年各外國在華要求特權或勢力時獲得的。因爲他在一八九九年九月六日照會英德俄三國，以後又照會日義法三國。致英國的照會內有左列之文句：

奉告貴英國政府以美國希望，即發佈一正式宣言，並獲得其他要求中國劃出勢力範圍之國家，以類似宣告表示贊助，以便各該國在其所有利益或勢力範圍內履行下列三點，似爲特別適當之時機。

一、各國對於在中國所得之「利益範圍」或租借區域或別項既得權利，互不干涉。

二、各國「利益範圍」內之各港，除非爲「自由港」無論對於何國入港商品，皆遵中國現行海關稅率賦課，其賦課關稅由中國政府徵收。

三、各國「範圍」內之各港對於他國入港船舶，不課本國船舶以上之入港稅；各國「範圍」內之建築，控制或經營之鐵道，對於他國貨物過境不課本國貨物以上之運費。

當時歐洲列強都有意瓜分中國，盱衡一般情勢，海約翰勇敢的行動很可能不見成效。但是事實上協議的規定適用於所有國家，足令每一國家具有制止獨佔特權生長的利益。最後列強終於表示同意。此項保障美國商人的權利並增進機會的安排，成爲制止其他國家在中國領土施行侵佔的有力因素。

當時除了擴展對華貿易問題以外還有保護在華美人的生命財產的問題。這不是一個容易的問題。在十九世紀之初中國是個逝世者的國家。它與其他人民極少交往，而且閉關自守也不願來往。從事貿易的外人都被隔離在廣州，而且除商業之外，一無關係。外籍婦人不准在華居留，即外人居住區也在禁止之列。

對於打破中國人這種冷淡，英人較美人尤爲強項。（雖然一八四四年柯辛赴華，曾由海軍船艦四艘保護）在十八世紀末與十九世紀初，英國曾派遣使者駐留北京帝廷。他們被視爲納貢使者，而「天子」還拒絕承認英國或其他外國。一直到一八四二年鴉片戰爭之後，廣州，廈門，寧波，福州與上海五口才正式爲英國通商。美國雖未參戰，在一八四四年才要求並獲得本國人民與英國人民同等待遇，美人被准在五口成立家庭，設立領館，甚至設立教堂與醫院。而中美「黃翰條約」更較中英條約進了一步，它規定美國人在華犯法應聽由美國領事裁判，因此開始了中國的領事裁判權制度，當時中國對這制度並不反對，但以後所有其他國家一致分享，終於使它感到日漸慙困。領事裁判權至一九四三年終於取消。

門戶開放政策的施行形成美國協助中國成爲自由強大而統一國家有意識而且誠摯而堅定的努力。同時我們已協助了任何按禮儀與實效而如此作爲的局外者。門戶開放政策雖然保證美國人甚至在其他國家的勢力範圍獲得同等商業特權，但美人仍始終覺得如無外國的勢力，而中國政府能統治其至少有宗主權的全部土地，貿易的情況勢必更好。早在一八五三年，美國專

員亨佛萊馬歇爾已經說過：「美國最大的利益在於支持中國，而不在于坐視中國成爲一片混亂的舞台，從而成爲歐洲野心者的獵物。」但是國際一致接受門戶開放政策是一九二二年華府會議時的事情。比，中，法，英，義，日，荷，葡，美等國家所訂九國公約的第一條即稱：

「締約國，除中國外，同意一、尊重中國主權，獨立，土地與行政之完整。

二、給予中國完全無礙之機會，以發展並維持一有力而鞏固之政府。

三、施用各國之權勢，以期切實設立並維持各國和中國境內之商務實業機會均等之原則。

四、不得乘中國現在狀況，營謀特別權利，而減少友邦人民之權利，並不得獎許有妨友邦安全之舉動。

公約的另一條文保證簽字國尊重貿易機會平等之原則。

一九二二年以後若干年間，九國公約業已被破壞兩次——一次爲一九三一年日本進攻中國，另一次爲羅斯福總統與邱吉爾首相於雅爾達同意蘇聯恢復其在滿洲的勢力範圍，作爲蘇聯參加對日戰爭的代價。（大約五十年前，俄羅斯的先佔旅順港，也爲促使海約翰採取行動的一個強有力因素。）

美國與中國最接近戰爭時爲一九〇〇年拳匪之亂，其時美軍爲援救爲中國人所包圍之領事館，曾與列強部隊一同開到北京。由於西方國家若干人民也是攻擊的目標，門戶開放政策可能被擱置起來。海約翰竭力設法防止緊急事變成爲發動對華新戰爭的藉口。他用麥金萊總統的名義致各國列強以照會，內謂美國的目的限於恢復秩序與保護美國權益，一以便在遠東獲致永久和平與安全，保持中國土地與行政之完整，保障所有條約與國際法所保證的權利，並保障全世界與中國各地進行貿易公平與平等之原則。一

一九〇一年「辛丑條約」規定列強從此得在京津兩地駐兵，保持由京入海的鐵路開放。美國在京津駐兵一直等到二次世界大戰爆發爲止。有時爲警衛計美兵會開往上海，同時海軍也爲類似理由進入長江巡邏，因此美國人民的生命財產已有所保護，但是美國從未以混亂爲藉口而進行戰爭或施行威脅中國獨立與安寧的勒索。

如所週知，美國應得之庚子賠款已應私人方面要求，歸還中國，充其派遣留美學生之用。

一句話，美國政策的基調是友善。中美之間的友善是雙方的，雖然有時暫時有些不信任，如通過排除法等，但真誠是實在的。由於基本目標的相同，友善事屬可能。中國與美國都需和平，雙方也都並無侵略意圖，兩國都需要貿易。

門戶開放政策並非於真空中施行。它對於具體情勢，具有實際的反映。但是它後面具有兩國的利益，並附合美國人對中國一般態度。它使我們贏得中國人的友善，它在新中國的生長中也起有巨大作用。

三

沒有一個國家能解決另一國家的內部問題，而美國傳統的對華門戶開放政策由堅持貿易門戶開放，協助中國成爲自由強大而聯合之國家，也決不能消除中國內部的困難。也沒有人認爲它可能。但是我們長期間致力於謀求中國的自由，我們無疑是協助中國向這一目標發展。二次大戰以後的中國對外政治地位大見增高。由於治外法權的取消，中國又在百多年來第一次恢復了完整無缺的主權。所有中國的領土刻已全由中國人所控制與治理，僅外蒙與更重要的東北數省除外，前者係中國被迫而允予獨立，後者中國係被迫予蘇聯以特殊地位。（或許有人會辯稱東北的特殊地位事屬合法，並不干犯中國主權，但事實上顯然有所侵害。）中國列位爲五強之一，在安理會內獲得常任理事，（此事美國會熱烈支持。）這些都是政治勝利的大項目。

而且還有一點應予注意，一九三七年日本侵華以前若干年間，中國在內政方面曾有令人興奮的進步。雖然日本侵佔滿洲，並侵入華北與沿海，雖然國民政府無力結束其與持異議的共產黨間的鬥爭，中國政府所統治的地區之廣大，確爲革命以後任何時期所不及。政府的財政經濟地位漸趨鞏固，並顯示改進之景象，這自然是日本不遑遲延執行其征服政策的原因。

中國參與二次世界大戰，歷時八年之久，大戰之末中國確已支離破碎，如今追述往事已並不合時。也許由戰時對蔣介石戰志與耐力以及爲蔣所領導的中國人民所表讚揚與感佩的極端發生逆轉，事屬自然發展。八年征服與抵抗的爆炸性與摧毀性影響，不僅爲中國的經濟與政府規制所不能忍受，而且中國的民氣也大受損傷。在四十年代之末僅爲強弩之末的內戰，此刻又復熾燃。中共政權顯示着各處共黨政權的特色——對敵方無情的宣傳，在各處志在獲取的地區施行第五縱隊活動，南京政

府爲此而以恐怖手段施行報復。我們經常得到報告，說它無能而腐敗，說它無力進行爲恢復經濟與政治健康所必需的改革。事實如此，那天今天美國在中國的利益爲何，而我們怎樣的政策才能獲得它呢？

在經濟上說，我們在中國直接而顯明的利害關係並不大。中國人民的生活水準如此低落，以致它雖有廣多的人民，他的對外貿易數量相當小，它國內的情況又如此不安，因此它還不是美國投資的一塊好地方。

一九三三年，李默估計我們投資不過二萬四千萬美元，——其中商業投資一萬五千五百萬元，美人擁有的中國政府的債券四千一百萬元，教會與慈善機關產業四千三百萬元。大戰期間以及大戰後，美國資金投放中國，數量空前；幾達卅五萬萬元。戰勝日本以後美國的經濟協助可分述如左：

一九四六年十二月卅一日的租借	七四七、〇〇〇、〇〇〇
進出口銀行建設借款	四九、八〇〇、〇〇〇
進出口銀行棉花借款	三二、〇〇〇、〇〇〇
聯總	四八一、〇〇〇、〇〇〇
對外清算委員會剩餘物資借款	三五、〇〇〇、〇〇〇
航海委員會出售船隻借款	一六、五〇〇、〇〇〇
按原售價出售之剩餘物資	八二四、〇〇〇、〇〇〇
總計	二、一八六、〇〇〇、〇〇〇

不過，其中有一小部分是按歸還的原則的；如果我們想到利潤的可能，我們的財政利害，關係實在並沒有由於這種戰時的援助而大見增進。除上列總數以外，一九四六年進出口銀行有五萬萬信用借款已標明撥付中國。馬歇爾離華返國以後，據說，除非在一九四七年六月卅日以前能有可滿意的建設性計劃否則到期後即算撤消。結果一九四七年六月卅日預定貸款作廢。但是六月廿七日進出口銀行宣稱，預定數目雖已過期，但爲了中國政府各項特殊的計劃，它可以考慮將借款延期。

美人對於與中國四萬萬願主做買賣一向心嚮往之，四萬萬人等於國內市場三倍。也許一部分熱情已在事實顯示可能性並

不巨大的時候抑抵。譬如說，一八二〇年時，我們的對華貿易合我們全部對外貿易額的十分之一，中國人購取我們販售國外的全部貨品的百分之十一·八，同時我們向中國的購買也合全部進口的百分之二〇·九。但是這希望並未實現。譬如說，在這次大戰前的十年間，中國貨品進口只合我們全部進口的百分之二·四。自然，中國果能工業化，可以打開實現一百五十年來若干期望的前途。旨在發展貿易門戶開放政策是我們考慮中的原則之一，我們自然不宜放棄。但是要在中國所得利潤可觀，現在不可能，而是將來的事情。

在戰略上說，我們在一個人自由強大而統一的中國的利益是可觀的。二次世界大戰的經驗證明中國對我們安全關係之重大出於我們想像之外。自從本世紀初我們獲得菲律賓以後，它如果遭受侵略，我們必須加以保衛，如果我們失去了它，就得作巨大的化費才能收回來。我們雖已令菲島獨立，但我們對它的國防仍負有責任。我們知道亞洲東南沿海如爲一擴張而不友好的強國所有，自屬爲對菲律賓最後也是對美國的一種威脅。因此我們可以確信地說，一個堅強獨立而統一的中國掌握着整個亞洲東海岸。實在是世界該處和平與繁榮的最佳希望；因此對美國安全也極關重要。由於空戰的發展，菲島完全不能經受來自中國的進攻。當日本開始對我作戰時，它在大陸上的地位不僅便利它對菲島的征服，而且使我方收復菲島與擊敗日本的任務愈爲艱巨。

至於滿洲；局勢與大戰以前相似，所不同的就是蘇聯日本成爲該區的主宰國。我們在雅爾達的決定顯然係根據一種假定，而這事態會構成對美國的嚴重威脅，不然就是一種疏忽。滿洲會先後或同時成爲俄日兩國的特殊勢力範圍，爲時不少年，而俄日爭雄，因而發生戰爭，也都沒有影響我們的軍事利益。但是俄羅斯果像日本過去一樣，因有那裏的地位使它越長城而南下中國，那時，戰略情勢就顯然改變了。

至於俄羅斯是否像在十九世紀三十年代一樣企圖重佔在中國本部的利益，而結果大不如意，同時如果南下，是否能順利征服或控制中國（日本已失敗），從而動用中國的資源與人力，從事征服世界的冒險，——都只是猜測。不過有一點可以自信地說，就是一個強大，獨立而統一的中國完全控制亞洲的東部海岸，實爲世界這一部分和平與繁榮的最大希望，因此對於美國的安全也極關重要。也許在外交方面，國務院所欣然理會與支持的美國利權，也以這一點爲最了。

美國在中國政治前途方面，關係也非小可，雖然說明白實非易事。也許中國四萬萬人所取的發展途徑將在今後五十年中影響全世界的政治形式，而且由於美國的生活條件關係，其影響較諸歐洲發生的任何形勢爲大。我們要求中國向民主之途邁進，——使政府能代表全民利益，而非任何一個集團或階級獨裁。因爲雖然中國具有若干代表合理與容忍的最好民主理想的個人，雖然中國的農民在許多方面正是最民主的人民，它還必須發展一個真正民主的政權。中國是中國。我們自然只能觀望，等候他自己的人才產生新的制度，去適應它的秉賦與新的需要。

一九四三年，盟國慎重決定在東西兩戰場之間，應予西戰場以優先時，偉大而客觀的政治學者如麥金德爵士即撰文宣稱，「制服日本稍遲誠明智之舉。中國在適當時機，當獲得大批資金，作爲可償清之借款，用以協助全人類的四分之一，從事建立新文化的及古典的奇業，這種新文化當既非十分東方的，也非十分西方的。」這話也許就說明了所能作成的政治保證的範圍。我以爲，中國無疑是明瞭那一個保證的成立的，並相信保證如予履行，對我們與對他們都有利益。

但是現實的問題不在解釋我們久遠的利益，而自然在目前的情勢之下如何獲得它們。今天要怎樣去協助中國，使它成爲一個自由，堅強而統一的國家，並對美國以及美國的民主理想友誼。

四

本人以爲，我們既然必須有所抉擇，可以把抉擇列成三項：

要發展我們商務，戰略以及政治上的利益，第一而最明顯的途徑是在經濟上以及其他我們力能設法的方面充分支持目前中國友好的政府，其情形就同支持英國現政府以克服其困難一樣。

這是大多數美國人所希望美國政府在日本制服之後在中國採行的途徑，它按諸國際法的每一條文都是正確的，它與我們傳統的對華政策與義務都正相吻合。只由於在實際上並無效果，因此它沒有實行，而現在也沒有實行。上面已經指出過，中國經八年的戰爭業已虧耗。政府受着經濟崩潰與中共公開叛變兩面夾攻。巨額金錢與大量貨品都不能解決它的問題。

第二個途徑正是第一個的反面，即一反傳統的門戶開放政策，明白顯示，我們絲毫不予中國現政府以支持。雖然我不敢

想像有那位實際負責的人員胆敢冒險採取這一途徑，雖然我以為這途徑果真探行，那末美國人民一明瞭它的意義，一定要求改變新政策，但是這個變通辦法正為許多美國報紙與期刊的作家所倡導。它是與全世界共產黨的路線符合的；但是熱烈同情中國人民而對中國政府不能為他們減輕困苦，大為憤慨，固非共產黨人而已。中國慘象的嚴重似乎已提示中國的友人政策需有相當地戲劇性的推行。我們應該有所作為！而「作為」主要必須對付危機頂點——即戲劇性地表示我們對中國現狀的不滿如何深刻。自然，這種建議代表一種特殊的美國人的看法——如果不是我們成熟的判斷，也是我們表示感想的方法。無論如何，人們同情提倡這方針的人們的動機，實比聽從他們的理論容易。

贊成將美國對國民政府的支持轉移與中共的理論似乎是為順從國際局勢的現實，現已極少為人所表示。不過，有時仍出以真正浪漫主義的希望，即如果中共（它的領袖都是信誓旦旦的馬克斯主義者，其中不少曾在莫斯科留學。）一旦掌握了中國政府的權力，中國從此將於某種奇異的情態之下與蘇聯疏離，既然這種理論幸虧後有在中國試驗，我們要獲得它無效的證明，只須看看如匈牙利，羅馬尼亞或南斯拉夫各馬克斯主義者的領袖的作為就行了。

有一種有關的理論是說，因為我們支持一個名孚眾望的政府，我們現行的政策是在「製造共產黨」。它效果的問題將唯美國用來置南京政權於中國人民之上的力量的程度而定。美國駐華部隊為數極少，而且又如此分散，所負美國正常的事務又如此嚴謹，如果美國部隊被中國農民心目中與中國政府的缺點關聯，他們的理解也一定是精明的。

同樣有一種攻擊說，我們的「干涉」冒着蘇聯干涉中國的危險，因此增加了戰爭的危機。這說法的理由是如果我們「撤出中國」而俄羅斯進入，那末我們可抱清新的良心回來，並投身戰爭，蘇聯的權力流注於蘇聯邊境每一個真空的事實是如此理解的鎖鍊的一個堅固環節，（通常這是未經說明的了解。）我以為許多紛亂來自「干涉」一詞的使用不當。我們現在並非「干涉」中國。賣軍火結一個友邦或應它政府之請求派以軍事代表團都不是干涉。

目前美國駐華軍事人員可分三類：陸軍，海軍與海軍陸戰隊。第一類包括駐華軍事顧問團團員，抗日英靈保管處人員與為各處服務的供應人員，第二類為駐華海軍顧問團的團員，第三類是保衛在華若干剩留的美國設施的衛隊。總數一萬人不到。突然撤退在華這些部隊當為美國政策逆轉的象徵，（事實上我們是逐漸在撤退。）但是倡導這方針的人們沒有說，或者也

許沒有想到這事情的全部意義是什麼。它並不意味我們中止予中國事務的影響，而是意味我們已決定設法牽倒中國的現政府。

第三個途徑似乎是合乎邏輯的一個。它非常簡單，就是重新強調我們歷經試驗的對華政策，——並且觀望。總之，我們與中國有所往來；如果我們認爲以某種戲劇性的行動可令情勢改善，我們就是自欺。目前無疑是忍耐爲好的時期。我們以中國人民的朋友的身份，頗希望中國人民進行其業經進行的根本改革。我們要求中國完成其革命。日本採取西制，而不作根本變革，它給與我們的教訓是沉重而悲慘的。我們相信一個強大，自由，民主而統一的中國將爲亞洲以至於世界和平的重要因素。在目前它對於中國政府並無實際幫助。但是在給與援助而不予約束，以致無效與浪費，以及撤回任何可能援助之間不失爲一條穩健的中間途徑。除非我們認爲中共比蔣可取，而蔣政府應予推翻，那末捨棄我們的既定政策，實屬毫無合理根據。

大約二十年前，我正僑居中國，我會問過中國第一屆留美學生海軍上將蔣廷幹（譯音）中國要「澄清」需多少時候。他答道：「不久了」。我又追問他：「究竟多久？五年嗎？」他說，「也許要一百年。中國歷史告訴我們一個朝代崩潰以後，要建立一個穩固的新政府往往需時百年。」那末從中國一九一一年革命起，要整頓出一個新政權來，還需要六十五年以上的時間。我當時認爲蔡將軍也許太悲觀了。現在一九四七年了，我仍舊希望這工作能迅速完成，但是我仍以爲要有長遠的眼光爲妥。

長遠的眼光在一九四八年十二月十八日杜魯門關於對華政策的最近一次重要談話中說的很明白，談話中有謂：「中國是個主權國家。我們承認該事實，並承認中國國民政府……我們保證不干涉中國內政……我們將堅持協助中國人民獲致該國和平與經濟復興的政策，……一俟中國情勢改善，我們當即考慮推行與內戰無關的其他計劃的援助，以資鼓勵經濟建設與改革……」

自從一九四六年十二月以來中國的局勢並未改善，同時也沒有一種援助被認爲具有實際的可能。魏德邁將軍的代表團也許能覓致將來給予協助的方法。政府的派遣代表團出於長期的政策，這種政策是健全的。採行與這一政策符合的行動將獲致結果。叛離這一政策就可能後悔。

The Open Door in China:

A REAPPRAISAL

BY WALTER H. MALLORY

FOREIGN policy is influenced by persons in government, and may be influenced by persons outside government, but only in a superficial sense is it "made" by them. It is the product of geographical, political, racial, religious and economic forces, some of which may change but most of which are constant, and which play upon a people until they take an attitude toward the rest of the world. That attitude may be aggressive or submissive or cooperative. It may be "right" or "wrong." It may lead to success or failure. Political leaders do not create it so much as stimulate and direct it. Hitler did not make the Germans aggressive; Churchill was not the architect of British steadiness; nor did Roosevelt make the Americans economically powerful, mercurial, warm-hearted — I leave it to our friends or our enemies to supply the characterizing adjective. Each successful political leader knows instinctively what his people are, or what they want; and, for better or worse, leads them in the direction that the vast majority of them want to go.

Is there any area of foreign policy today in which such considerations are so relevant as in our policy toward China? China is in process of profound political and economic change, but change there comes tortuously and slowly. In Chinese-American relations, then, it is particularly necessary to provide for the long haul. Many persons say that we have no settled policy toward China, and they are forever calling on the State Depart-

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ment to "make up its mind." But they confuse policy with the day-to-day conduct of affairs. Press dispatches; even official communications, sometimes obscure the pattern. One does nevertheless exist, despite temporary variations, and it goes back 150 years. The American policy toward China was well conceived originally, I believe, because it accorded with the fundamental attitudes of the American people; and it is precisely because the present situation in China is so unsettled and perplexing that this is the very time for us to emphasize its validity and use it as the yardstick for measuring all our day-to-day decisions. The basis of that traditional policy is, of course, the Open Door. What have those familiar words stood for and what do they signify today?

II

The policy was essentially commercial in origin. Intercourse between China and the United States began in the early days of the Republic—the clipper ship era. The possibilities of the "China trade" caught the imagination of New Englanders long before the industrial revolution. At first it was the desire for tea and silk and chinaware that led our ship captains to undertake the arduous voyage around the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean to Canton. For exchange they took to China furs and cotton, lead and ginseng. From small beginnings the trade grew steadily, but never as fast as China's vast population and need for goods seemed to warrant. In the development of this trade there were three courses open to the United States. We could have sought exclusive arrangements, concessions and bilateral deals; we could have avoided official action and have left our traders to secure what business they could by their own efforts; or we could have demanded "most-favored-nation treatment" for our businessmen—

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i.e., trade on a basis of equality and reciprocity, whereby privileges extended to any nation are extended to all. This was the system which was the most favorable for us, and the one which we championed, here as elsewhere. Of China's total foreign trade, the proportion which went to the United States grew constantly, until in 1937, before hostilities between Japan and China began in earnest, the United States led all other nations, taking 27.59 percent of China's exports and furnishing her with 19.75 percent of her imports.

Thus, in the Treaty of Wanghia, concluded by Caleb Cushing in 1844, equal trading rights for the United States were secured. But our policy was not clearly defined until the latter years of the century. Due to the weakness of China and the encroachments of European countries which were carving out for themselves special spheres of influence, it seemed clear that freedom of trade over wide areas would be denied not only to the United States but to other countries as well. It was then that Secretary of State John Hay successfully elaborated and carried through what came to be known as the "policy of the Open Door."

Let us recall the state of affairs at that time. China had been defeated by Japan in the war of 1894-5, Russia had occupied Port Arthur in Manchuria, Germany had obtained a foothold in Shantung, England had secured Wei-hai-wei and was strong in the Yangtse Valley, France was in control of Kwang-chow-wan in South China, and Italy was endeavoring to gain a position on the Chinese coast. Each of these areas was the center of a "sphere of influence" or "interest" which seemed likely to be made the exclusive province of the traders of one nation.

Secretary Hay's purpose was to safeguard the most-favored-nation trading rights which the United States

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had secured by treaty with China in Chinese territory wherein foreign nations claimed special interest or influence. He, therefore, on September 6, 1899, sent notes to Great Britain, Germany and Russia, and subsequently to Japan, Italy and France. The note to Britain contained the following passages:

The present moment seems a particularly opportune one for informing Her Britannic Majesty's Government of the desire of the United States to see it make a formal declaration and to lend its support in obtaining similar declarations from the various Powers claiming "spheres of influence" in China, to the effect that each in its respective spheres of interest or influence—

First. Will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.

Considering the temper of the time, when many European Powers were intent on "slicing the Chinese melon," it seemed unlikely that Secretary Hay's bold move would be successful. But the fact that the provisions of the agreement applied to all nations gave each an interest in checking the growth of monopoly privileges. Consent from the other Powers finally came. The arrangement designed to guard the rights and increase the opportunity of American traders was a strong factor in checking further encroachments on the territory of China by other states.

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Along with the problem of expanding trade with China, there was the problem of protecting the lives, property and interests of Americans there. It was not an easy one. In the early part of the nineteenth century China was a hermit nation. She had scarcely any intercourse with other peoples and desired none. Foreigners who sought to trade were segregated in Canton and had no association with the Chinese except for business. Foreign women were not allowed in China, even in the area set aside for foreign residence.

The British were more forceful than the Americans in breaking down Chinese aloofness (though Caleb Cushing in 1844 was escorted to China by four naval vessels). In the late 1700's and the early 1800's the British sent emissaries to the Imperial Court in Peking. They were treated as tribute bearers, and the Son of Heaven refused to recognize Great Britain or any other foreign nation. It was not until 1842, following the "opium war" with Great Britain, that Canton, Amoy, Ningpo, Foochow and Shanghai were formally opened to British trade. Although the United States did not engage in the war, she demanded and gained in 1844 equal standing with the British in respect to the treatment to be accorded her citizens. Americans were permitted to establish homes in the five treaty ports, to open consulates there, and even to establish churches and hospitals. The American-Chinese Treaty of Wanghia went further than the Anglo-Chinese treaty by stipulating that Americans who committed any crime in China would be subject to trial only by the American consul—a provision made essential by the difference in legal concepts between China and the west. Thus was established the beginning of extraterritoriality in China—a system to which the Chinese did not object at the time but which, when shared later by almost all

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other countries, they found increasingly irksome. Extraterritoriality was finally abolished by treaty in 1943.

The application of the Open Door policy led to a conscious effort by the United States to help China become a free, strong and united nation. In that endeavor our effort has been sincere and persistent. We have helped whenever an outsider might do so with propriety and effectiveness. While the Open Door policy in China assured to Americans equal commercial privileges even in the areas where the other Great Powers had spheres of influence, it had long been felt by the United States that even better conditions for trade would result if foreign nations had no spheres of influence at all, and if the Chinese Government were to administer all the territory over which it had at least nominal suzerainty. As early as 1853, Humphrey Marshall, the American Commissioner, had said: "The highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining China . . . rather than to see China become the theatre of wide-spread anarchy and ultimately the prey of European ambition." This was the inception of the idea that the United States should not only respect Chinese sovereignty but should actively help China in setting her house in order. This basic concept has constantly guided our relations with China and with the other Powers which have had interests there. But it was not until the Washington Conference of 1922 that international acceptance of this elaboration of the Open Door doctrine was secured. Article I of the Nine-Power Treaty, signed by Belgium, China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United States, provided:

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree: 1, To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; 2, To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and main-

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tain for herself an effective and stable government; 3, To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; 4, To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

Other clauses in the Agreement pledged the signatory Powers to respect the principle of equal opportunity of trade.

In the years since 1922 the Nine-Power Treaty has twice been broken—by Japan when she attacked China in 1931, by the United States and Great Britain when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Yalta agreed that Russia should resume her special sphere in Manchuria as the price of her entry into the war against Japan. (Incidentally, Russia's earlier occupation of Port Arthur had been a strong factor in prompting John Hay to act nearly 50 years ago.)

The closest we ever came to war with China was during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, when American troops were sent to Peking along with those of other Powers for the relief of the Legations which were besieged by the Chinese. Since the citizens of several of the western Powers were also the object of the Chinese attack, there was danger that the policy of the Open Door might be set aside. Secretary Hay strove to prevent the emergency from being made the excuse for war or for new demands upon China. In a note sent in the name of President McKinley to the other Powers, he said that the purpose of the United States was to limit its intervention to the restoration of order and the protection of American rights, to "bring about permanent peace and safety to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed

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by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

The Boxer settlement in 1901 provided that the Powers should henceforth be permitted to maintain troops in Peking and Tientsin, and to keep the railway open from the capital to the sea; and the United States maintained garrisons there until the outbreak of World War II. American troops have also on occasion been sent to Shanghai for police purposes and the Navy has maintained a patrol of gunboats on the Yangtze River for similar reasons. Thus the lives and property of American citizens have been assiduously protected in China, but never have disorders there been used by the United States as a basis for war or for exactions which were a threat to China's independence or well-being.

As is well known, the balance of the United States' share of the Boxer indemnity, after private claims had been paid, was returned to China to finance scholarships for Chinese students in American universities.

In a word, then, the keynote of the American policy has been friendship. Friendship between China and the United States has been mutual and, despite periods of temporary distrust such as that occasioned by the passage of the exclusion act, genuine. It has been possible because of an identity of basic aims. Both China and the United States have wanted peace, neither has had aggressive designs against the other, both have wanted trade.

The Open Door policy has not been carried out in a vacuum. It has been a practical response to a concrete situation. But it has had behind it the weight of interest of both nations, and has been in keeping with the

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general attitude of Americans toward the Chinese people. It won for us the friendship of the Chinese and it played a major part in helping to bring to birth the new China.

III

No nation can solve the internal problems of another, and the traditional American policy in China, beginning with insistence upon the Open Door for trade and developing to include assistance for China's effort to become free, strong and united, by no means resolved Chinese domestic difficulties. No one supposed that it would. But by casting our weight on the side of China's freedom over a considerable period of time we unquestionably have helped China advance toward that goal. The Chinese Republic came out of the Second World War in a greatly strengthened external political position. With the abolition of extraterritoriality, China regained her unqualified sovereignty for the first time in more than a hundred years.

With the exception of Outer Mongolia, to which China was forced to grant independence, and the much more important provinces of Manchuria, where she has been compelled to give the U.S.S.R. a special status, all territory of China is now controlled and administered by the Chinese. (It may be argued that the special status of Manchuria legally does not violate Chinese sovereignty, but in effect it obviously does.) China's inclusion among the Big Five, with a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations (which the United States warmly supported), was the hallmark of this political triumph.

It is proper to note, moreover, that in the field of domestic affairs China seemed to be making heartening progress in the years before the Japanese attack in 1937. Despite Japan's conquest of Manchuria and her infiltra-

tion in north China and along the coast, and despite the inability of the National Government to conclude the struggle with the dissident Communist faction, the area administered by the established Government of China was larger than it had been at any time since the revolution. The financial and economic position of the Government was becoming stronger and showed prospects of further improvement. That, of course, is why Japan dared not postpone any longer the execution of her plans of conquest.

The Second World War lasted eight years for China, and at the end of it China was shattered. It is not fashionable at the moment to recount her miseries. Perhaps it is natural also that there should be a reaction from the extremes of admiration and gratitude which were expressed for Chiang Kai-shek in the war years, and for the Chinese people whose strength of will and powers of endurance he marshalled. In any event, not only were China's financial and political arrangements unable to withstand the explosive and destructive effects of eight years of conquest and resistance, but China's morale was also greatly impaired. The civil war which seemed to be only flickering towards the end of the thirties is now flaring. The Communist régime displays the attributes of Communist régimes everywhere—conscienceless propaganda against its opponents, fifth-column activities in areas which it aims to acquire. The Nanking Government has retaliated with terror on its own account. We are told constantly that it is inefficient and corrupt and it obviously does not have the strength to tackle the reform measures which must precede the establishment of economic and political health.

This being the case, what is the American interest in China today, and what policy seems most likely to secure it?

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Economically, our immediate and discernible stake in China is not great. The standard of living of the Chinese people has been so low that, despite her enormous population, China's foreign trade has been relatively small, and conditions in the country have been so unsettled that it has not offered a good field for American investment.

In 1933 Professor C. E. Remer listed our investments at less than \$240,000,000—business investments \$155,000,000; American holdings of Chinese securities and obligations of the Chinese Government \$41,000,000; and missionary and philanthropic properties \$43,000,000. During the war years, and since, American funds have been poured into China at an unprecedented rate and to a total of nearly three and a half billion dollars. The financial help since V-J Day breaks down as follows:¹

Lend-Lease as of December 31, 1946 ^a	\$747,000,000
Export-Import reconstruction credits authorized	49,800,000
Export-Import cotton credits	33,000,000
UNRRA	481,000,000
FLC surplus property credits	35,000,000
Maritime Commission ships sales credits	16,500,000
Surplus property at original procurement cost ^b	824,000,000
	<hr/> <hr/> \$2,186,300,000

^a Shipments subsequent to this date are of minor importance.

^b Sold for \$175,000,000.

¹We are here discussing China policy, not the wisdom or unwisdom of measures taken to win the Second World War. For example, the State Department has been criticized because Lend-Lease military help was given to Chiang Kai-shek and not to the Chinese Communists. Many of the critics were pleased when similar help was extended to Tito, in another theater of operations. Later events would indicate that the Lend-Lease

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Little of this large sum is on a returnable basis, however, and our financial stake—if we think in terms of a possibility of profit—has not been greatly increased by this wartime assistance. In addition to the sums above named, a credit of \$500,000,000 was earmarked by the Export-Import Bank in April 1946. After General Marshall returned from China some months later it was stated that this proffered credit would lapse on June 30, 1947, unless satisfactory constructive plans were developed before that time. The earmarking expired on June 30, 1947. However, on June 27 the Bank stated that it would consider the extension of credit to the Chinese National Government for specific projects, notwithstanding the expiration of the earmarking.

Americans have always been fascinated by the prospect of doing business with China's 400,000,000 customers—three times the number in our own domestic market.

Perhaps some of this enthusiasm has been handed down from early days when the possibilities did seem more bright. In the year 1820, for example, our trade with China represented more than a tenth of our total foreign trade, the Chinese buying 11.8 percent of all we sold abroad and we purchasing from them 10.9 percent of our imports. But this promise was not fulfilled. During the ten-year period before the recent war, for example, only 2.8 percent of our total imports came from China, and we sold her only 2.4 percent of our exports. Industrialization of China might pave the way, of course, for a realization of some of the promises of a century and

policy left no greater problems in China than it did, say, in the Balkans. But one's view of that will depend upon which side of the iron curtain one's sympathies lie. The important point to be noted is that Lend-Lease policy is quite distinct from China policy; and that its purpose was to defeat the Axis, not to strengthen either Chiang or Tito.

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a half ago. The Open Door for development of trade is one of our considered principles which we shall surely not relinquish.

But tangible financial profits in China in any sizable amount are a future, not a present possibility.

Strategically, our interest in a free, strong and united China is great. The experience of World War II proved that China was more important to our safety than we thought. Since our acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century, it has been clear that we would defend the Islands if they were invaded and that if we lost them we would at all costs endeavor to take them back. Although we have given the Philippines their independence, we are continuing to assume the obligation for their defense. As we learned to our sorrow, the possession of the southeast coast of Asia by an expanding and unfriendly Power constitutes a threat to the Philippines and consequently a threat to the United States.

With the growth of air warfare the Islands are completely vulnerable to attack from China. When Japan started the war against us her continental position in China both facilitated her conquest of the Islands and made our task of regaining them and of defeating Japan very much greater.

In Manchuria, the situation is similar to that which existed before the start of the war, with the exception that Russia has succeeded Japan as the dominant Power in that region. Our decision at Yalta apparently was based on the assumption that this would not constitute a serious threat to the United States—or else it was inadvertent. Manchuria has been a sphere of special interest for Russia or Japan, or both, for many years, and this has not affected our military interests, even though

Russia and Japan fought a war over their rivalry there. But if that special position were to lead Russia, as it did Japan, to expand into China south of the Great Wall, then the strategic situation would plainly be changed.

Whether Russia will be tempted to resume the interest in China proper which she showed in the 1920's, and which ended so unsatisfactorily for her, and whether if so she could succeed in conquering or controlling China, where Japan failed, and could harness China's resources and manpower for a venture in world conquest—all this is a matter of conjecture. It can be stated confidently, however, that a strong, independent and united China in complete control of the east coast of Asia offers the best hope for peace and prosperity in that part of the world; and thus it is of importance for American security. Perhaps no other American interest in the field of foreign affairs is more readily perceived and supported by the State Department than this one.

The American interest in the political future of China is no less great, though not quite so easily described. Perhaps the course of development taken by the 400,000,000 Chinese will influence the political shape of the world 50 years from now—and hence the conditions of life in the United States—more than anything that is likely to happen in Europe. We want China to move in the direction of democracy—to evolve a government representing the interests of all her people and not a dictatorship of any class or group. But it is wise not to scatter the word “democracy” too freely through discussions of affairs in China. For though China has produced individuals who represent the finest democratic ideals of reason and tolerance, and though her peasantry is in many ways among the most democratic of peoples, she has still to develop a truly democratic régime. China

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is—China. We shall have to wait and see what new institutions her own genius produces to suit her temperament and her new needs.

In 1943, when the Allies were deliberately giving the requirements of the western theater of war priority over those in the eastern theater, it came naturally to so great and objective a student of politics as Sir Halford J. Mackinder to write: "Wisely the conquering of Japan waits for a while. In due course China will receive capital on a generous scale as a debt of honor, to help in her romantic adventure of building for a quarter of humanity a new civilization, either quite Eastern nor quite Western."² That perhaps describes the terms of the political pledge as well as it can be put. There is no doubt, I think, that the Chinese understood that that pledge was made; and that they believe it is in our interest as well as theirs that it be redeemed.

But the hard question, of course, is not to define our long-range interests, but to determine how to secure them in the present circumstances. What to do today to help China become a free, strong and united nation, friendly to the United States and to our ideals of democracy?

IV

Since a choice must be made, we can, I think, reduce the alternatives to three.

The first and most obvious course of action to further our commercial, strategic and political interests would be to back the present friendly Government of China to the hilt, financially and in every way we could devise—just as, for example, we try to help the present

2. "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1943.

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Government of Great Britain to overcome its difficulties. That is the course which most Americans expected the United States Government to take in China after Japan was conquered; it would have been correct by every canon of international law, consistent with our traditional China policy, and in keeping with our obligations. It was not followed, and cannot now be followed, for the reason that it would in practice be ineffective. As noted above, China is exhausted from eight years of war. The Government is beset by a breakdown of the national economy on the one hand and open rebellion of the Communists on the other. Great sums of money and quantities of goods will not solve her problems.

The second course is the exact opposite of the first: to reverse our traditional policy of the Open Door and make plain that we will not support the Government of China in any way. Though I cannot imagine any man in a position of actual responsibility choosing to risk such a course, and though I think it is most probable that were it taken the American people would demand a reversal of the new policy as soon as they understood its implications, this alternative is now being championed by a number of writers in American newspapers and periodicals. It is in accordance with the world-wide Communist Party line; but an ardent sympathy for the people of China and a fierce indignation with the Government of China for not alleviating their plight are not found exclusively among Communists. The intensity of China's misery seems to suggest the need for a correspondingly dramatic stroke of policy on the part of China's friends. We should do something! And that "something" should be keyed to the pitch of the crisis—something showing dramatically how strongly we disapprove of present conditions in China. This suggestion represents, of course,

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a characteristic American approach—characteristic of our way of expressing our feelings, if not our mature judgment. However this may be, one finds it easier to sympathize with the motives of some who advocate this course than to follow their reasoning.

The argument in favor of transferring American support from the National Government to the Chinese Communists seems to have yielded to the realities of the international situation and is now seldom expressed. On occasion, however, it takes the form of a truly romantic hope that if the Chinese Communists (whose leaders are avowed Marxists, many of them schooled in Moscow) were to succeed to power in the Chinese Government, China would thereby in some strange manner be drawn away from the Soviet Union. Since, fortunately, this theory has not been tested in China, we have to look to the behavior of Marxist leaders in, say, Hungary, Rumania or Jugoslavia for evidence of its invalidity. Most Americans find the evidence conclusive.

A related argument is that our present policy is "making Communists," since we are supporting an unpopular government. The question of its validity would seem to turn upon the degree of force which the United States is using to impose the Nanking régime upon the Chinese people. The number of American troops in China is so small, the troops are so scattered, and their pre-occupation with the legitimate affairs of the United States is so strict, that the Chinese peasantry are subtle indeed in their reasoning if the presence of the American soldiery is linked in their minds to defects in the Chinese Government.

Similarly the charge is made that our "intervention" risks provoking the intervention of the U.S.S.R. in China,

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and thus increases the risk of war. It is reasoned that if we "clear out of China," and Russia comes in, *then* we can return with a clear conscience and fight the war. The fact that Soviet power flows into every vacuum on the Soviet border is the one firm link in such a chain of reasoning (for all that it is usually the unstated one). Much confusion stems, I think, from the misuse of the term "intervention." We are not now "intervening" in China. It is not intervention to sell military equipment to a friendly Power or to dispatch a military mission to it at the request of its government.

There are at present United States military personnel in China in three categories, Army, Navy and Marines. The first is composed of members of the Army Advisory Group to China, grave registration personnel, and supply personnel for these; the second of members of the Naval Advisory Group to China; the third of guards for protection of the remaining United States installations in China. The total is less than 10,000 men. To withdraw these troops suddenly (we are in fact withdrawing them gradually) would be taken in China as symbolizing a reversal of United States policy. But those who advocate such a course do not say, or perhaps do not perceive, what the full implications of it would be. It would be taken to mean not that we were ceasing to exert influence upon Chinese affairs, but that we had decided to try to bring down the present Chinese Government.

The third course seems the logical one. It is, quite simply, to reemphasize our tested China policy—and to wait. After all, we are dealing with China; and we delude ourselves if we believe that there is any dramatic stroke of action which will rapidly improve the situation there. This is indeed a time for patience. As

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friends of the Chinese people we want them to carry through the fundamental changes which they have undertaken. We want the Chinese revolution to be completed. Our experience with Japan, which adopted western institutions without making fundamental changes in her feudal system, was costly and tragic. We believe that a strong, free, democratic and united China will be a powerful factor for peace in Asia and in the world. It may not be expedient to give large practical help to the Chinese Government at this moment. But there is a sane middle course between giving aid without stint that would be wasteful and ineffective, and withdrawing the possibility of any assistance whatever. Unless we are of the opinion that the Communists are preferable to Chiang, and that Chiang's Government should be overthrown, there is no rational ground for abandoning our established policy.

Some twenty years ago when I was living in China, I recall asking Admiral Tsai Ting-kan, one of the first Chinese to have been educated in the United States, and a very wise old gentleman, how long he thought it would be before China "settled down." "Not long," he said. "How long?" I pressed him. "Five years?" "No," he replied, "perhaps a hundred years. Chinese history teaches us that it usually takes a hundred years after a dynasty falls before a new government is firmly established." That leaves China about 65 more years in which to hammer out a new régime, dating from the revolution of 1911. I thought then that Admiral Tsai was too pessimistic. Now, in 1947, I am still willing to hope that the job can be done sooner, but I also see the wisdom of taking the long view.

This long view is evident in the last important statement of our China policy, made by President Truman on

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December 18, 1946. In the course of it he said: "China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. . . . We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. . . . We will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country. . . . When conditions in China improve, we are prepared to consider aid in carrying out other projects, unrelated to civil strife, which would encourage economic reconstruction and reform.

Conditions have not improved since last December, and no aid has been considered a practical possibility. General Wedemeyer's mission may find ways to give assistance in the future. The long-term policy of the Government, which dictated the sending of the mission, is sound. Action taken in harmony with this policy is likely to prove fruitful. Departures from this policy are likely to be regretted.