

170. A. 17.

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HISTORY

of the Simla, 1850

OF

THE RISE AND PROGRESS

OF THE

BENGAL ARMY.

BY

CAPTAIN ARTHUR BROOME,

BENGAL ARTILLERY.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

1170

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
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THE OFFICERS OF THE BENGAL ARMY,

BY ONE

WHO IS PROUD TO SUBSCRIBE HIMSELF

A COMRADE.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN submitting this volume to the public, I consider it right to mention that in a less complete state it was published some years ago in the columns of the *Calcutta Star*.

In its present form it contains the only available detailed narrative of the Military events of an important period, and the only special record of the early deeds and condition of an Army, which, by the varied and brilliant nature of its services, during nearly a century of active and successful operations, has established a prominent position in public estimation.

Such a record necessarily possesses in itself an interest totally independent of its mode of treatment. As regards the latter, I have merely endeavoured to collect material with industry, to employ it with discrimination, and to narrate facts plainly and honestly. It is for my readers to decide how far I have been successful in my aim.

The unavoidable necessity of printing and publishing in India has also been disadvantageous, as productive of considerable delay and numerous typographical errors.

Should this attempt meet the approval of my Brother Officers, it is my earnest desire and full intention to carry on the work;—bringing it up, if possible, to the close of the late Punjaub campaign.

ARTHUR BROOME.

COSSIPORE, }
1st June, 1850. }

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HISTORY OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS
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BENGAL ARMY.

CHAPTER I.*

FROM THE EARLIEST ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH INFLUENCE IN INDIA, TO THE CAPTURE OF CALCUTTA BY SOORAJOO-DOWLAH, IN THE YEAR 1756.

IN a work like the present, bearing reference to a particular class in a limited portion of our Eastern Empire, it would be out of place to attempt to detail the gradual rise of the British power in India; suffice it to say that after the enterprising Vasco de Gama had doubled the Cape of Good Hope in the year 1497, and opened the road for his countrymen to the riches of the East, the Portuguese were not slow in availing themselves of the advantages placed at their command, of which, under Papal authority, they for some time obtained the exclusive monopoly; and a very few years saw this nation established in various places on the continent of India as well as in the Eastern Archipelago.

Such a career of triumph and commercial success was not viewed by other European nations without a natural desire to participate in the advantages;—the Dutch were the first to

* The works chiefly consulted in this Chapter are Bruce's Annals of the East India Company, 3 vols. 4to.

Orme's Military Transactions in Indistan, 3 vols. 4to.

Stuart's History of Bengal, 1 vol. 4to.

Hamilton's new Account of the East Indies, 2 vols. 8vo.

The Seir-Mutakherin. (Translated :) Calcutta Edition, 3 vols. 4to.

Grose's Voyage to the East Indies, 2 vols. 8vo.

Holwell's India Tracts, 3rd Edition, 1 vol. 8vo.

First Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1776, 1 vol. folio.

Auber's Rise and Progress of the British power in India, 2 vols. 8vo.

Wilson's Edition of Mill's British India, 6 vols. 8vo.

assert their claim to enter into the field of profitable adventure; the English whose love of enterprize had been excited and fostered by the exertions and discoveries of a host of illustrious navigators who appeared about this period, Sir Hugh Willoughby, Chancellor, Cabot, Frobisher, Davis and Hudson, soon prepared to follow the example,—and the successful voyages of Drake and Cavendish induced a body of English merchants to address a memorial to her Majesty Queen Elizabeth in October 1589, requesting licence to equip three ships for the purpose of trading to the East Indies: this request appears to have been favourably received, and in 1591 the first English commercial voyage was commenced, with three vessels under the direction and command of Captain Raymond;* this voyage was a disastrous one, but considerable experience was obtained and the ardour of the English merchants was little damped by the result.

[In 1599 an Association of Merchant Adventurers was formed in London, with a capital of £30,000 for the purpose of trading 'to the East Indies and other Islands and countries thereabouts,' and the Royal assent was applied for and obtained to this project 'intended for the honor of their native country, and the advancement of trade and merchandize within the realm of England.' The charter was dated 31st December 1600. This association which may be looked upon as the foundation of the present East India Company, led to a succession of voyages more or less fortunate, which before long resulted in the Company obtaining establishments at various places on the coast of the Peninsular, as well as amongst the Eastern Islands. The first factory established was at Surat, under a firmán obtained from the Emperor Jehánguire in December 1612,† which port continued to be the principal seat of the British commerce on the Western coast, or in fact in India, until the year 1687, when the Presidency of Western India was transferred to Bombay, which Island had been ceded to Charles 2nd by the Portuguese in 1662,

* Bruce's Annals of the East India Company, vol. 1, p. 109.

† Ibid, p. 136. ‡ Ibid, p. 163.

and was by him transferred to the East India Company in A.D. 1653-87. 1668. In 1614 the Agents of the Company applied to the Emperor Jehánguire for permission to fortify the factory at Surat,* and in that year Sir Thomas Roe arrived from England as an *'Ambassador to the Great Mogul or King of India'* from His Majesty King James the 1st; the Company agreeing to defray his expences on condition that under their exclusive privileges they were to acquire such advantages as might result from this mission.† Factories were about this time attempted to be formed on the Coromandel coast, at Pulicat and Masulipatam, but these were of a temporary nature, and in consequence of the opposition exhibited by the Dutch, did not prove very successful and were finally withdrawn. In 1623 the infamous massacre of the British agent, factors and residents at Amboyna was perpetrated by the Dutch authorities,‡ which led to the ruin of the English trade and the extinction of British influence in the Islands. In 1625 an establishment was formed at Armagon on the Coromandel Coast,§ and in September 1628 the factory at Masulipatam was removed thither;|| Armagon was the chief settlement on the Coromandel coast until 1640, when not having been found well situated for trade, the factory was removed by Mr. Day, the Company's Agent, to Madraspatam, where a piece of ground had been purchased from the Naig of the district, on which was erected a fortification that received the name of Fort St. George,¶ the foundation of the present town of Madras and Fort St. George which was raised to the rank of a Presidency in the year 1653.**

Having thus noticed the origin and progress of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, it now remains to relate somewhat more in detail, the formation and history of that of Bengal,—the latest established, but soon rendered by circumstances the most important of the three, and now the seat of the Supreme Government of India, and the principal scene of the following narrative.

* Bruce's Annals, vol. 1, p. 170.

† Ibid, p. 174.

‡ Ibid, p. 247.

§ Ibid, p. 269.

|| Ibid, p. 291.

¶ Ibid, pp. 377-8

** Ibid, p. 484.

A. D. 1644.

In the year 1644* a daughter of the Emperor Sháh Jêhán met with a serious accident, her clothes having caught fire and her body being severely burnt before the flame could be extinguished. The skill of the native doctors was essayed in vain to effect a cure, and fame having already spread the reputation of the English in the healing art, an express was despatched by the Emperor to the factory at Surat, requesting the assistance of an English Surgeon. Mr. Gabriel Boughton, Surgeon of the Company's ship *Hopewell*, was selected for the purpose; he immediately hastened to the Emperor's camp, then in the Deccan, and had the good fortune to effect a complete cure of the suffering Princess. This success rendered him a great favourite with the Emperor, and having been desired to name his own reward, he generously laid aside all private consideration and requested that his countrymen might have liberty to trade in Bengal free of all duties, and to establish factories in that province. The Portuguese and Dutch already possessed establishments there for some years, although the power of the former was nearly annihilated by the severe blow received in 1632, when their factory and possessions at Hooghly were captured and destroyed by Kossim Khán the Soobahdar of Bengal. An establishment in Bengal had for some years past been a great desideratum on the part of the Company, who had long had their eye upon the trade of that province. So far back as 1620 they had attempted to establish a factory at Patna, † with a view it may be supposed to the traffic in saltpetre, and in 1633 they obtained a mandate from the Emperor Sháh Jehán, authorising them to trade to Bengal, but limiting them to the port of Piply as the sole place of resort. The only available official intimation on this subject is to be found in the following extract of a letter from Wm. Methwald, &c. to the Company, dated the 21st of February 1633,

* Bruce, vol. 1, p. 406 and Stewart, pp. 251-2. The latter fixes Dr. Boughton's visit in the year 1636, but Bruce's access to the official documents renders him the better authority. Stewart evidently confounds the privileges granted through Mr. Boughton with those obtained, in 1633-4.

† Stewart, pp. 222-3, who quotes Messrs. Hughes' and Parker's letter, vol. 1. of Indian Records. A. D. 1620.

from Surat. *'The 2nd present we received from Agra the A. D. 1652.
' King's Firmand, which gives liberty of trade unto us in his
' whole country of Bengala; but restrains our shipping only
' unto the Port of Pibley; which Firmand was sent unto us by
' a servant of our own, which was dispeped unto Agra.'** In consequence of this grant, Mr. Norris, one of the factors at Masulipatam, was dispatched to Pibley to open the trade, of which he made a very favourable report. In 1642 the trade was in a measure established and the first regular despatches were sent direct to the Company by Mr. Day, who had come round from Madras to superintend the new establishment, and who strongly recommended the formation of a factory at Balasore. The commercial arrangements however appear to have been entirely dependant on Madras, and notwithstanding the promise held out, to have been somewhat unsatisfactory in their results, for in 1643-4 the question was submitted to the decision of the Court of Directors whether the factory formed in Bengal should be continued or dissolved.†

[Such was the low condition of the trade when Mr. Boughton obtained the Emperor's firmán; armed with which and furnished with an escort and the means of travelling, he proceeded to the Court of Sooltán Shoojah, the second son of the Emperor, who held the Government of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, and was at the time residing at Rajmahal. Here he was equally fortunate in curing one of the Ladies of the Royal Zenana, who was suffering from a complaint in her side, which circumstance rendered him a favourite also with the Prince, who being a person of grateful and liberal disposition, afforded full and ready assistance to Mr. Boughton in re-organizing or rather in establishing the trade in Bengal, and he further granted the English his favour and protection during the whole period of his Government which he retained until the year 1657, when he entered into a competition for the Imperial throne, that ended in his overthrow and death.]

In 1651-2, the Prince granted the British a nishán or firmán

* Stewart, Appendix, No. J.

† Bruce, vol. 1, p. 402.

A. D. 1652. and perwánahs giving them the privilege of free trade throughout the province on payment of the trifling sum of three thousand rupees annually.*

Factories were now established at Hooghly and an Agency at Patna for the purchase of saltpetre, an article for which the Civil War then raging in England, caused a large demand.]

Although so much liberty was granted as regarded the trade and so much favour and protection exhibited in all other respects, the jealousy of the Mogul Government was watchful in preventing the establishment of any military power in the country; the principal factory, which was at Hooghly, was constructed under the supervision of the Officers of Government and the utmost vigilance exercised to prevent the erection of any building that could possibly render the place convertible into a station of defence. The establishment of armed retainers was moreover strictly limited to '*an Ensign and thirty men to do honor to the principal Agents,*'† which little band may be looked upon as the nucleus of the present extensive Army maintained by the Company in the Bengal Presidency.]

This dependent position of the Bengal establishment induced the Court of Directors to render it subordinate to that of Madras, on which it was directed to rely for counsel and assistance in any cases of difficulty.

Such was the state of affairs for several years; the English enjoying protection and their trade gradually improving, until the defeat of Sooltán Shoojah by his brother's General, the famous Meer Joomlah; when the latter having occupied Rajmahal, seized upon all the Company's boats coming from Patna laden with saltpetre, and otherwise obstructed and injured the trade. These acts of oppression induced the Agent at Hooghly to resort to the rash measure of seizing a country junk as a security for the Company's property and debts; which unwise proceeding naturally excited the anger of Meer Joomlah, who threatened severe retaliation and issued orders

* Bruce, vol. 1, pp. 463-4.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 10.

to take possession of the factory at Hooghly. Alarmed at A. D. 1669. this danger, the Agent applied for instructions to the President and Council of Surat, by whom he was directed immediately to restore the junk and the property it contained and to make full concessions to the Mogul General; but should these not be accepted, he was ordered to call in the several Agencies, to hold all the Company's stores and property ready for embarkation and to be prepared to leave the place; the Agent was also advised to be upon his guard against the address and duplicity of the Mogul Officers, who it was observed *'usually offered civilities at the very moment when they intended to have recourse to violence and depredation.'** These concessions, accompanied by an ample apology, appear to have been accepted by Meer Joomlah, but the English Agents were thenceforward treated with much more rigour than before. In the beginning of 1662, Sir Edward Winter then President at Madras, sent round an Agent to Hooghly to endeavour to adjust all differences between the former factory and Meer Joomlah, and to establish branch factories at Kossimbazar and other places, in which arrangements he appears to have been tolerably successful.

In 1668 the subordination of Bengal to Madras having been found inconvenient in a mercantile point of view, all goods from the former being sent round to the latter for transmission to England, it was suggested that the Court should furnish an enlarged stock and shipping and that all future consignments should be sent direct from Bengal to Europe.

In 1669 orders were received from the Court of Directors, placing the Government of Bengal establishment on a similar footing, though still subordinate, to that of Madras.† Mr. Powell was appointed Chief Agent with a Council of six members under him, of which the Agents at Patna and Kossimbazar were to form a part, whenever they might be present at Hooghly.†

About this time the English ships which hitherto had been confined to the ports of Ballasore and Piply, began to

* Bruce, vol. 1, pp. 560-1.

+ Ibid, pp. 258-9.

A. D. 1678. move up the river, until they finally came regularly to Hooghly, and to ensure their safe passage up and down the stream, the Company obtained permission to organise a regular establishment of Pilots in the year 1669, from which date the present Bengal Pilot service has its origin.* Meer Joomlah died in 1663-4 and was succeeded in the Government of the provinces of Behar, Bengal and Orissa by Shaistah Khán, the Ameerool-Omrah, son of the Vuzier Azof Jah, and nephew of the celebrated Noor Jehán :† during his first Government, notwithstanding some occasional differences, the English interests appear to have gradually thriven and the trade to have increased. Soon after assuming the Soobahdaree, he was involved in hostilities with the King of Arrakan, and it is worthy of remark that on this occasion he demanded the assistance of a party of English gunners from the factory at Hooghly, and on the Agent declining compliance, he threatened to put a stop to the traffic in saltpetre,‡—which threat appears to have been effectual, as his compelling the English-soldiers to join him in the war in Arrakan, was subsequently enumerated by the British Agents as one of the causes of grievance against him :—this fact denotes that the Company were gradually increasing their military establishment, however small it might still have been.

In 1675, the establishment at Bengal was under the orders of the Court of Directors, placed on the same footing as those at Surat and Madras, and similar gradations of rank fixed for all the Company's servants. In 1677, Shaistah Khán was removed from the Soobahdaree of Bengal to the Government of Agra, and through his exertions, the Company obtained an Imperial nishán or perpetual firmán for free trade, on payment of the annual peishcush of 3,000 rupees, similar to and confirmatory of that they had previously received from Sool-tán Shoojah; this was granted by the Emperor Sháh Jehán on the 12th of September 1678,|| and was considered of such

* Bruce, vol. 2, pp. 228-9.

† Stewart, pp. 291-6.

‡ India Records, vol. 3. A. D. 1664. quoted by Stewart.

§ Bruce, vol. 2, p. 379.

|| Bruce, vol. 2, p. 431, and Stewart, p. 308-9.

importance, that its receipt at Hooghly was hailed by a salute A. D. 1687. of 300 guns. The trade this year is stated to have been greater than in any previous period of the Company's commerce.

Shaistah Khán was succeeded by a foster Brother of Aurungzebe, named Fidwai Khán, who died very shortly afterwards, and the Government was then conferred on Prince Mohommed Azeem, the third son of Aurungzebe, to whom in 1678 the English advanced the sum of 21,000 rupees, for which he confirmed all their privileges :* in 1679 he was recalled and Shaistah Khán was re-appointed Soobahdar of Bengal.

During the second administration of this Nobleman the affairs of the Company took a very different turn, and the English were for the first time in Bengal, to be seen acting in open hostility to the Native authorities.

In the year 1681 the Court having discovered that retaining the Bengal establishment as subordinate to that of Madras led to much inconvenience, irregularity and disputes, placed the former on an independent footing, and sent out Mr. Hedges, a Member of their own Committee, (equivalent to a Director of the present day,) "*with special powers to be their Agent and Governor in the Bay of Bengal and the factories subordinate ;*" these consisting at the time of Patna, Kossimbazar, Malda, Ballasore and Dacca. As affording some idea of the extent of the commerce at this period, it is to be observed that the annual stock allotted for the trade and expenses of Bengal this year amounted to £230,000. Mr. Hedges touched at Madras, from whence under the orders of the Court, a reinforcement of a "*Corporal of approved fidelity and courage, with twenty soldiers,*" † accompanied him to Bengal, as a guard to his person and to strengthen the power of the Agency in acting against interlopers or free traders, who were becoming very numerous about this period. Mr. Job Charnock, destined afterwards to play a conspicuous part in the history of the British rise and progress in Bengal, was appointed to the charge of the factory at Kossimbazar. In

* Stewart, p. 303 and Appendix.

† Bruce, vol. 2, pp. 467-8.

A. D. 1683. 1683. Mr. Hedges, whose arrangements do not appear to have been very successful or to have given satisfaction to the Court, was removed, and Mr. Gyfford who had been appointed President at Madras was ordered to Bengal, taking with him a Company of soldiers from Fort St. George and arms and accoutrements for another complete Company, which it was directed should be formed from the seamen of the several vessels then employed in Bengal: *—so that by this time the Company must have had a military force of about 250 European troops on this establishment. The dread the Company entertained of the obnoxious interlopers and their determination to suppress them by force, led to this great increase of their Military strength; and with the same view, an armed vessel, the *Charles the Second*, mounting 72 Guns, under Sir Thomas Grantham, was sent out *‘to cruise in the Bay of Bengal, to seize on the interlopers of every description and to second the efforts of the Court at home, for suppressing a class of freebooters acting equally against the exclusive privileges of the Company, and the interest of the nation.’* † Mr. Gyfford was directed not only to employ the Military force at his disposal against these obnoxious interlopers, but if possible to obtain possession of an island at the mouth of the Ganges, which was to be fortified and constituted the chief seat of the Company’s trade in that part of India:—he was further authorised to expend 30,000 rupees in obtaining a firmán sanctioning this arrangement; but at the same time a discretionary power on the subject was vested in himself and his Council, should the measure be found one likely to give umbrage to the Mogul Government. The Company of Infantry from Madras was ordered to be sent back whenever affairs should be settled, but the remaining troops were to continue embodied, and to be employed on board the smaller vessels and at the Factories, for protecting the trade and the Company’s property, and if necessary they were to assist a projected expedition from England to be placed under the command of Sir John Witwang for the recovery of the Company’s trade and factory at Bantám.

* Bruce, vol. 2., p. 503.

† Ibid, p. 506.

In the following year the Court reiterated their injunctions to the Agent and Council at Hooghly to endeavour to obtain some permanent place of defence, and directed that application should be made to the Nawaub Shaistah Khán or if necessary to the Emperor Aurungzebe, for some station within the province, which might be fortified and the circumjacent lands rented as at Bombay and Madras, any such station when obtained to be made the seat of trade in Bengal A. D. 1684.

Shaistah Khán was however much too experienced a statesman to permit a body of daring and encroaching foreigners to obtain any such footing in the province, and he peremptorily refused to listen to the application submitted; but there were other causes that rendered the Nawaub unwilling to grant any favour to the English, at whose growing power and influence he was gradually becoming alarmed, and towards whom he had recently manifested a very inimical feeling. A short time previous, a young adventurer giving himself out as a son of the late unfortunate Sooltán Shoojah, assumed the name of Akhbar and coined a specious tale, to the effect that he alone had escaped from the destruction that had overwhelmed the rest of that devoted family; there were not wanting many discontented parties to espouse his cause, and for some time he remained in considerable force near Patna. The English factory was at Singee about ten or twelve miles from Patna, amongst the saltpetre grounds; and as Mr. Peacock, the chief, with the other English gentlemen continued to reside there unmolested though surrounded by the rebels, the Nawaub suspected them of being in league or correspondence with the young impostor, and in consequence stopped the purchase of any more saltpetre and threw Mr. Peacock into prison, from which he was with much difficulty and intercession some time afterwards released.† In 1680 arrangements had been made between the Emperor Aurungzebe and the factory at Surat, by which it was agreed that all goods should pass free from any other charges, on payment of a duty of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; this could not in justice apply to Bengal, nor is there any reason to

✓ • Bruce, vol. 2, p. 532.

+ Stewart, pp. 310-1.

A. D. 1685. suppose that such was the intention of the Emperor, the English having already a guarantee for free trade in Bengal under several Royal firmáns, confirmed by their regular payment of the annual peishcush of 3,000 rupees. Shaistah Khán however determined to consider Bengal as included in the arrangement and insisted upon payment of the duty. These disputes aggravated by the oppressive conduct of the Nawaub's subordinates, particularly the Foujdar of Kossim-bazar, caused a complete breach between the English and Shaistah Khán, which very materially injured the trade of the former, most of whose ships left the river without obtaining a cargo. [The Court on hearing of these transactions, in the despatches for the year 1685, censured the Agent and Council for having been much too timid and submissive towards the Nawaub, and they issued instructions that application should be made to the Emperor through the Madras Presidency for permission to occupy some of the uninhabited Islands of the Ganges, directing also that Ingellee should be fortified at once, and further intimated that a plan had been formed *'for re-asserting the Company's rights of trade in Bengal and for preventing for the future, the oppressions of their Agents, either by the Nawaub or the Dutch, in the exercise of those rights which they had acquired by Phirmaunds.'*]

The plan thus alluded to, was more fully detailed in the instructions from the Secret Committee, and involved a decided appeal to arms and the declaration of open hostilities with the Nawaub of Dacca, [for so the Soobahdar of Bengal was termed,] and also with his master, the Emperor Aurungzebe. An expedition was fitted out in England for this purpose, with the sanction of the King, consisting of ten ships of from seventy to twelve guns each, and the command given to Captain Nicholson of the Company's service, with the rank of Vice Admiral, but on the arrival of the expedition in the Ganges, the Agent at Hooghly was to assume the command as Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the land forces. On board this fleet were embarked six complete Companies of Infantry, raised

in England for the purpose, with Subaltern Officers but without Captains, it being intended that the Members of Council in Bengal should each act in that capacity.—It was further ordered that this force should be joined by a complete Company from Priaman and by a detachment from Fort St. George, and also on arrival, by the seamen of the fleet, so as to form a complete Regiment of ten Companies of a thousand men.] The fleet was to be joined by the Company's other ships then in Bengal, which would make a total of 19 vessels. Royal commissions were granted by King James the 2nd, to Captain Nicholson and the other eighteen Commanders, which were however to be subordinate to those of any Officers commanding His Majesty's vessels which they might meet on the way.*

Chittagong was fixed upon as the place of debarkation, with orders to take possession of and defend it in the strongest possible manner, for which purpose 200 pieces of cannon were sent out to be mounted on the works. As soon as Chittagong should be captured and put in a state of proper defence, the troops and the smaller vessels were to proceed against Dacca, which it was contemplated would offer but little resistance; and when masters of his capital, terms were to be offered to the Nawaub on the following conditions: '*That he should cede the city and territory of Chittagong to the Company, and pay the debts due by him; that he should allow rupees coined at Chittagong to pass current in the Province, and restore all privileges according to the ancient Phirmaunds; each party to bear their respective losses and expenses in the war; on these conditions alone the Company would agree to resettle the factories in Bengal.*'† This treaty, if concluded, was further to be ratified by the Emperor and the President at Surat. One-sixth of the prizes taken in this expedition was to be divided amongst the several Commanders, and one-third of the money received from the Nawaub to be shared amongst the fleet and forces. In furtherance of these arrangements, a treaty of friendship and alliance was ordered to be contracted with the king of Arrakan, who was understood

† Bruce, vol. 2, p. 558.

† Ibid, p. 560.

A. D. 1686. to be hostile to the Emperor and his Viceroy, whilst the President at Surat was also directed to negotiate terms with Sambajee Rajah and others, to co-operate with the Bengal expedition in annoying and injuring the Mogul Government. When these measures were all carried into effect, Chittagong was to be made the chief station in Bengal, a mint was to be established there and five per cent. customs levied on the inhabitants. To avoid the charge of commencing hostilities without sufficient cause and due warning given, the Admiral was furnished with letters from the Court, addressed to the Nawaub Shaistah Khán and to the Emperor Aurungzebe, setting forth the grievances the English had sustained by the breach of the firmáns which had been formerly granted to them, the seizure of their property and the various extortions and injuries inflicted by the different Native Agents.

However wisely and carefully these plans may have been concerted and arranged, the object in view was completely defeated by a variety of unforeseen circumstances and disastrous incidents. Contrary winds and bad weather detained and dispersed the fleet, one vessel was lost, two of the largest ships having a very considerable portion of the troops on board were unable to make the passage, and Admiral Nicholson with the ~~remnant of the expedition did not reach~~ the mouth of the Hooghly until the month of October 1686. In the mean time the Madras Presidency had sent round all their disposable force, consisting of about 400 men, leaving Fort St. George with a garrison of only 15 or 20 Europeans and a few Topasses. Job Charnock who was at this time the Chief Agent at Hooghly, had in obedience to the Court's orders, raised a second Company of Portuguese Infantry or Topasses at that place, officered by the Company's servants at the factory.* On the arrival of the ships in the river, Mr. Charnock immediately ordered them up to the factory. The advent of these reinforcements, the expectation of others, and the hostile attitude assumed by the English at Hooghly, excited the alarm of the Nawaub Shaistah Khán, and he hastened to propose

* Stewart, p. 314.

terms, offering to compromise all differences and to submit A. D. 1686. the question of the claims of the English to arbitration.

Whether the Nawaub was really sincere in the expression of his desire to make terms or not, he was determined to be prepared for hostilities should negotiation fail, and accordingly summoning troops from all parts of the Soobahdaree, he assembled a very considerable force of both horse and foot in the immediate neighbourhood, which was placed under the command of the Foujdar of Hooghly. Whilst the proposed terms were under consideration, an unexpected event occurred which soon brought matters to a crisis. On the 28th of October 1686 an affray took place in the Bazar at Hooghly, between a few English soldiers and a more numerous party of the Nawaub's troops, in which three of the former were wounded; a company of the English troops was called out to defend their comrades, whilst those of the Nawaub came pouring in on the other side,—a second company followed, and finally the whole force of both parties was warmly engaged; a general and well contested action ensued and lasted for some hours, but at length the courage and discipline of the English proved more than a match for the great numerical superiority of the enemy, aided as the latter were by a large body of Cavalry; and in this the first action fought between the two nations in Bengal, the British gained a complete victory, leaving 60 of the enemy dead in the field besides a considerable number of wounded; they also stormed and took a Battery of eleven guns, the whole of which were either spiked or destroyed.* The total force of the English on this occasion amounted to less than 500 men. In the meantime Admiral Nicholson with the vessels under his command was not idle, the town of Hooghly was warmly cannonaded and upwards of 500 houses burned or destroyed, amongst which were the Company's ware-houses, in what was called the old factory. The destruction of property was very great, but no pillaging was permitted, an exhibition of moderation for which Mr. Charnock was subse-

* Bruce, vol. 2, p. 579. Stewart, pp. 314-5.

A. D. 1686. sequently reprimanded by the Court, who remarked that such a measure 'woula have convinced the natives of their power.*

After this defeat the Foujdar felt or affected extreme alarm, and requested a cessation of arms, which was granted on condition of his rendering assistance to convey the Company's remaining goods on board the ships, particularly the saltpetre, of which a very large quantity was in store. Negotiations were again set on foot, and it was agreed that the English should be restored to all their original privileges of trade until a new firmán could be obtained from the Emperor. The claims of the Company for indemnification and losses were also taken under consideration; these had now increased to the extent of 66 lakhs of rupees.

The reader may find some amusement in the details of these claims, which were as follows:—†

	Rupees.
For what Bulchund forced from Mr. Vincent at Cassumbuzar.	14,000
For what Sief Cawn plundered out of our Factory at Pattana, by 1000 Foot and 500 Horse, and putting Mr. Meverill in irons.....	80,000
For detaining y ^e Agent with y ^e silk at Cassumbuzar.....	400,000
For protecting Haggerston from justice.....	45,000
For what forced out of Dacca Factory, account-Picars.....	44,000
For what forced from our Merchants at Hughly.	12,000
For demolishing and plundering Malda Factory	150,000
For custom paid at the Mint at Hughly contrary to our Phirmaund	150,000
To demorage of shipping y ^e three last years.....	2,000,000
For what extorted from us in presents, &c.	200,000
For debts remaineing and owing us in the country	800,000
For besieging of Hughly Factory y ^e death of y ^e Agent and four men	300,000
For burning y ^e old factory and y ^e goods in it, in y ^e latter skirmish	300,000
For charge of 1,000 men and 20 ships for y ^e war	2,000,000
For y ^e charges of our Factorys and buildings, if we leave y ^e country.....	130,000
	6,625,000

* Bruce, vol. 2, p. 596.

† Ibid, f. 580.

The object of the enemy was evidently to gain time in order A. D. 1687. to prepare for further hostilities; during this suspension the Nawaub directed the English factories at Dacca, Malda, Patna, and Kossimbazar to be seized, the property to be confiscated and the agents to be imprisoned; whilst he used every exertion to collect a further body of troops, which in the month of December he was enabled to assemble close to Hooghly.

The Agent and Council upon this, determined that it would be no longer safe to remain at that place, and accordingly on the 20th December they moved down to the village of Chuttanuttee,* on the present site of Calcutta, with all the ships, troops and property, where they commenced to intrench themselves. Here negotiations were re-commenced; three of the Nawaub's Officers were deputed to Mr. Charnock and advantageous terms were agreed upon, to the effect that the trade should be restored to its ancient footing, that a tract of land should be given to erect a Fort, with liberty to establish a Mint, and that all debts due to the Company should be discharged; but when Mr. Charnock required that this treaty should be ratified by the Emperor as well as by the Nawaub, the demand was evaded and delays were created, until Shaishtah Khán was in a condition to assemble a sufficient force to re-commence hostilities on a more extended scale.

In the mean time the French and Dutch took advantage of the condition of the English, and succeeded not only in procuring cargoes for the time being, but in re-establishing their respective trades, which had suffered greatly under the previous superiority of the latter nation.

In the beginning of February 1687, information was received by Mr. Charnock that the Nawaub's General, Abdool Sumud Khán, had arrived at Hooghly with a very large force, chiefly Cavalry, and that preparations were making for surrounding and destroying the British at Chuttanuttee; under these circumstances it was deemed inexpedient to remain there longer, and the whole establishment accordingly moved down to Ingellee; on the way, however, they stormed and

* Bruce, vol. 2, p. 581. Stewart, p. 315.

A.D. 1687. took the Fort of Tannah on the right bank of the river, below Chuttanuttee, and plundered and destroyed everything between that and Ingellee, including several granaries and depôts of salt belonging to the Nawaub; they also seized and carried off a number of Mogul vessels which they met in the river, and sending off several of their own ships to Balasore, they burned and destroyed about forty more sail of native merchant vessels.*

Ingellee, where they had now taken up their final position, was probably one of the most unhealthy situations that could have been selected for the purpose; it was then as now, a low flat Island, the surface of which is either covered with sand or long rank grass, the habitation only of deer and tigers, and the whole Island did not produce a drop of good water; it was separated from the main land by a narrow channel, the passage of which was defended by the erection of batteries at the several accessible points, whilst the ships anchoring in the stream, completely commanded the passage of the river.

Abdool Sumud Khán had followed them with the greater portion of his force, and made several attempts to gain possession of the Island, in all of which he was gallantly repulsed; when finding force of no avail, he wisely left the work to be done by the pestilential climate and brackish water of the Island, which in the course of a few months carried off more than half of the force, and left the remainder in a condition of the most helpless weakness and misery. At this critical period, overtures were made to Mr. Charnock by the Nawaub, which the former gladly entertained; an armistice was concluded and on the 16th of August 1687 a treaty was signed, by which it was agreed that the English should be permitted to return to all their factories in the province, that the obnoxious duty of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. should be remitted, and that they should have a tract of land at Oolahbareeah, on the right bank of the Hooghly, with permission to erect magazines and construct docks for their shipping; the only condition on their part being the restoration of all the

* Bruce, vol. 2, p. 608. Stewart, p. 317.

Mogul vessels they had detained.* These favourable terms A. D. 1688. were the result of the proceedings on the Bombay Coast, where hostilities having been likewise declared, the English cruisers blocked up the ports and seized upon every Mogul vessel that put to sea, not only destroying their commerce, but what appears to have been of greater importance in the sight of the fanatical Aurungzebe, putting a stop to the annual pilgrimages to Mecca. These decided measures induced the Emperor to conclude terms with Sir John Child the *Governor of Bombay*, in consequence of which, orders were also sent to Shaistah Khán to compromise matters in Bengal, and to restore the English in that quarter to all their former privileges; this fortunate circumstance saved the small remnant of the British at Ingellee from utter destruction.

Mr. Charnock and his small party now hastened to Oolahbareeah, where they commenced making docks for careening the ships, which by this time were greatly in want of repair, but after residing here for three or four months and not finding the locality as convenient as was anticipated, he applied for and obtained permission to return to Chuttanuttee.†

Scarcely were they beginning to get settled at this place, when the Nawaub and his agents re-commenced their oppressions, consequent on the renewal of hostilities on the Malabar Coast; the English were all ordered to remove to Hooghly, and forbidden to build with either stone or brick at Chuttanuttee; their property was plundered by the Nawaub's troops under his alleged sanction, and a large sum was demanded from Mr. Charnock as indemnity for the damage the country had sustained during the late disturbances. The Agent, unable to obtain terms either by force of arms or by payment of the sum demanded, deputed two members of the Council to Dacca to try the effect of conciliation and to point out that the object of the English in desiring to settle at Chuttanuttee was to avoid collision with the native authorities at Hooghly, as also on account of the gradual filling up of the river, which rendered it daily more difficult and dangerous for large vessels to come up abreast of that town.‡

* Stewart, p. 317-8

† Ibid, p. 319.

‡ Ibid, p. 320.

A. D. 1688. Whilst these Deputies were absent, a circumstance occurred which completely changed the aspect of affairs. When the Court had received intelligence of the ill-success of the expedition under Admiral Nicholson and the irresolute proceedings of Mr. Charnock and his Council, they hastened to dispatch *the Defence*, a large armed ship of 64 guns, accompanied by a small frigate, having on board 160 soldiers, the whole under the command of Captain Heath, with orders to carry the original intentions of the Court into execution, or if that was not feasible, to retire with their servants and property to Madras.*

Heath was a man of hot and excitable temperament, and acted from the momentary impulse of his own feelings rather than in concert with the Agent or Council, or in obedience to the Court's commands: Orme describes him as "*a man of courage, but of variable disposition, not far removed from craziness.*" He arrived off Chuttanuttee in the month of October 1688,† and on ascertaining the state of affairs, he expressed his rage at the duplicity of the Nawaub and determined, in opposition to the advice and remonstrances of Mr. Charnock and the Council, to re-commence hostilities. In accordance with this resolution, he ordered all the Company's servants to embark on board the fleet with their wealth and moveables, and on the 8th of November he set sail for Balasore.

On arrival in the roads, the Governor of that town offered to enter into terms on the part of the Nawaub and to adjust all matters in dispute, as also to release two English factors, who were residing there, and who, on approach of the fleet, had been detained as hostages; to these overtures Heath paid no attention, and in spite of a remonstrance on the part of the Agent and Council, on the 29th of November‡ he landed the troops and seamen, attacked and took a redoubt mounting thirty pieces of cannon and plundered the town: the

* Bruce, vol. 2, p. 595. Stewart, p. 319.

† Bruce, vol. 2, p. 647. Orme, vol. 2, p. 116.

‡ Bruce, vol. 2, pp. 647-8. Stewart, p. 321.

Governor in revenge set fire to the English factory which A. D. 1689. was destroyed, and then retreated into the interior, carrying with him the two English factors. Unfortunately on that very day a purwánah had been received from the Nawaub, containing a copy of a treaty made with the two Deputies at Dacca, in which it was stipulated that the English should be restored to all their privileges on condition of their co-operating with the Mogul troops in an attack upon the dominions of the King of Arrakan.

The troops and seamen having glutted themselves with the pillage of Balasore, set sail again on the 13th of December, and on the 17th of January 1689 arrived at Chittagong with the intention of capturing that place, in accordance with the original instructions of the Court.* Finding the works and garrison of a much stronger description than they had been led to expect, a council of war was held, in which it was agreed to write once more to the Nawaub setting forth their grievances and claims and requesting redress, awaiting the reply before determining on their further proceedings: Heath's impatience however, would not allow him to remain for this reply, and without making any attempt on the Fort of Chittagong, he sailed off to the mouth of the river leading to the city of Arrakan, where he arrived on the 31st of January, and immediately sent proposals to the King, offering to co-operate with him against the Moguls, providing he would grant the English a settlement in his dominions.† These propositions were rejected, and as a last resource, he entered into a negotiation with a Chief of some consequence who had revolted against the King, proffering him his assistance upon similar terms. This offer would, in all probability, have been accepted and would have answered the object the Company had in view, but the same impatience marked his conduct in this as on previous occasions, and without waiting for an answer to his proposals, he sailed off with his whole fleet, now amounting to 15 vessels, and reached Madras on the 4th

* Bruce, vol. 2, p. 648. Stewart, p. 321.

† Bruce, vol. 2, p. 648. Stewart, p. 321.

A. D. 1689. of March 1689, bringing with him the Company's effects, troops and servants, with the exception of the Deputies at Dacca, the two factors at Balasore, and two others, who were in confinement at the up-country factories. Here he apologized to the Governor of Fort St. George for his conduct, asserting that nothing but lies had been told him on all sides.*

The Emperor Aurungzebe was now seriously incensed against the English, and he issued peremptory orders that they should be completely extirpated from his dominions. All their property in Bengal was confiscated, the agents left behind were placed in irons, the factories at Masulipatam and Vizagapatam were attacked and destroyed and all the English found there put to death.†

About this period the Nawaub Shaistah Khán, being far advanced in years, obtained permission to resign the Government of Bengal and retired to Agra, where he died not long afterwards.‡

Ibraheem Khán, son of the celebrated Ali Murdán Khán, was appointed to succeed him in the Soobahdaree of Bengal :§ he was a man of a kind and gentle disposition but greatly wanting in energy and activity ; his first act on assuming the Government was to release the English agents whom he found in confinement. Shortly afterwards, under instructions received from the Emperor, he wrote to Madras making overtures to Mr. Charnock to re-settle in Bengal. Aurungzebe, notwithstanding his indignation against the English whom he had ordered to be extirpated throughout the country, soon found by the diminution of his revenues the real value to the Empire of the wide extended commerce of the Company. His religious feelings were also touched by observing how completely the English cruisers could annoy his subjects and prevent all intercourse between India and Arabia, and being a man who always made his passions subservient to his interests and policy,

* Bruce, vol. 2, p. 640. Orme, vol. 2, p. 14. Stewart, p. 322.

† Stewart, p. 322.

‡ Stewart, p. 333.

§ Stewart, p. 324

he smothered his anger, and in January 1690, authorised A. D. 1690. his minister to conclude terms with Messrs. Weldon and Novarro, two English Commissioners who had been sent for the purpose from Bombay by Sir John Child the Governor and Director-General of the Company's settlements.* The result was satisfactory; and although the Emperor assumed a very high tone, as of a master pardoning his rebellious subjects, the terms generally were advantageous to the British, who were restored to all their long-contested privileges. As a specimen of the style adopted by the Mogul Government, the following firmán from the Emperor Aurungzebe to the Nawaub Ibraheem Khán, dated 23d April, 1690, may prove interesting:—

“ You must understand that it has been the good fortune of the English to repent them of their irregular past proceedings; and they not being in their former greatness, have by their Vakeels, petitioned for their lives and a pardon for their faults, which out of my extraordinary favour towards them, I have accordingly granted: therefore upon receipt hereof, my Phirmaund, you must not create them any further trouble, but let them trade freely in your Government as formerly: and this order I expect you see strictly observed.”†

The English although well inclined to give the Nawaub credit for sincerity in his invitation to them to return, as well as in his promise of restoring all their former privileges and putting them on a footing with the most favoured nation in all respects, could not forget the deceptions that had been practiced on them before, and declined acceding to the proposition unless the Emperor would grant them a specific firmán for Bengal, defining the precise terms upon which they were in future to carry on their trade and make their other arrangements. The Court in the preceding year had written out to say that such a firmán was indispensable before they should return, and also that they ought to obtain per-

* Stewart, p. 325. Bruce, vol. 2, p. 652. † Stewart, Appendix No. 6.

A. D. 1690. mission to make a settlement at Chuttanuttee with leave to fortify the place.

The Nawaub wrote a second time to say that he had made application for the required firmán, but as some delay must necessarily occur, he requested them to return on the assurance of his friendship and protection. Accordingly Mr. Charnock, with his council and factors, embarked at Madras and once more arrived at Chuttanuttee on the 24th of August, 1690,* accompanied by an Officer and thirty soldiers, the military establishment originally sanctioned. Early in the next year, the required Husb-ool-hookum or order was received from the Emperor, authorising the re-establishment of all their former factories, with liberty to trade through the province, free of all duties of any description, on payment of the annual peish-cush of 3,000 rupees. They were further permitted to form a settlement at Chuttanuttee, but were not allowed to erect any fortification, a privilege which the Court were most anxious to obtain, as they also were to get authority for the establishment of a Mint. By the close of this year, however, they had received reinforcements and increased the military establishment to a Company of 100 men.† The Court resolved that, during Mr. Charnock's life-time, Bengal should remain independent of Madras, he being President, but that on his death it should again become subordinate to Fort St. George.‡ They further recommended that until permission should be obtained to fortify Chuttanuttee, no other factories should be established, but agents sent to different parts of the country to make purchases. The settlement however, began to increase rapidly, and was permanently fixed as the Head-quarters of the Company's establishments in Bengal.

In the beginning of the following year, Mr. Charnock died, and was buried in the old cemetery of that City of which he

* Stewart, p. 326. Orme, vol. 2, p. 15, says that they arrived in the end of July.

† Bruce, vol. 3, p. 120.

‡ Bruce, vol. 3, pp. 143-4.

was the founder, where his tomb is yet to be seen in the old burying ground near St. John's Cathedral, being one of the very few allowed to remain when that building was erected.* A.D. 1692.

Charnock was a man whom circumstances rather than individual merit forced into a prominent position, he appears to have been possessed of more animal than moral courage, and to have been both indolent and indecisive. His policy, which was rash in the first instance, was timid afterwards, for which he received the severe censure of the Court. Although apparently honest himself, he wanted firmness to check the dishonesty of those under him. In his earlier career he had suffered great indignities, having been imprisoned by Shaistah Khán's orders; Orme says he was scourged,† but of this there exists no proof. As the founder of Calcutta, however, his name will probably be remembered as long as the British Empire in India shall exist. Captain Alexander Hamilton in his quaint and amusing "New account of the East Indies" published in 1744, gives a very unfavourable character of the Father of Calcutta, but being himself an "*Interloper*" and consequently obnoxious and inimical to all the Company's servants in authority, his opinions and report must be received

* The following is the inscription on the tomb.

"D. O. M.

Jobus Charnock, Armig^r.

Anglus, et nup. in hoc

Regno Bengalensi

Dignissim⁹. Anglorū.

Agens.

Mortalitatis suæ exuvias

Sub hoc marmore deposuit, ut

in spe beatæ resurrectionis ad

Christi Judicis adventum

obdormirent.

Qui postquam in solo non

suo perigrinatus essit diu,

reversus est domum sue æter-

-nitatis decimo die Januarii,

1692."

Two daughters, Mrs. White and Mrs. Tyre, are buried with him.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 12.

A. D. 1693. with caution, more especially as in that particular case, he was unable to speak from personal observation.*

Mr. Charnock was succeeded by Mr. Ellis, the next in seniority, a person apparently even less fitted for the situation than his predecessor.

This year a temporary stop was put to the saltpetre trade in Bengal, which for the time seriously embarrassed the Company. This arose from the circumstance of the Grand Seignor at Constantinople, having written to the Mogul Emperor to say that he understood the Europeans procured the greater portion of one of the ingredients used for making gunpowder in his dominions,—and as it was frequently employed against true believers, the Emperor would be accessory to the death of so many of the faithful if he any longer countenanced or permitted the traffic. This was appealing to the weak side of Aurungzebe's character, his bigotry, and the most stringent commands were accordingly issued to put an end to the trade;† these orders however did not long remain in force, and were only productive of temporary inconvenience and alarm.

In the year 1692, the Court had appointed Sir John Goldesborough to be the superior of all their establishments, with the rank of General,‡ to have his head-quarters at Fort St. George, with orders to visit the several factories and establishments, and to carry out such reforms as he might deem necessary or advisable. He arrived at Madras early in 1693, and shortly after inspected the establishments at Fort St. David and Vizagapatam; from thence he proceeded in the month of August to Bengal, where he found matters in a very unsatisfactory state,—mismanagement and extravagance existing in all departments. One of his first measures was to remove Mr. Ellis from the situation of President, to which he appointed Mr. Erye, the Chief of the factory at Dacca: he then proceeded to reduce the expenses of the establishment which had become most extravagant, particularly as regarded the military force, which was then commanded by Captain Hill; this

* Hamilton's New Account of the East Indies, vol. 2, pp. 6-7.

† Stewart, p. 327.

‡ Bruce, vol. 3, p. 138.

officer was of course opposed to such measures, and Sir John A. D. 1695. describes him in his report as "fractious and irregular in the extreme"—Sir John however carried his point, and sent Captain Hill with the greater part of his force to Madras, leaving only a guard of two Serjeants, two Corporals, and twenty Privates. ~~The pay of the soldiers were fixed at 4 Rupees per month, independent of their clothing and rations, which Sir John~~ "considered to be a more ample allowance, than the troops of any other establishment in India received."*

Sir John Goldesborough's last act was an application to the Foujdar of Hooghly to obstruct the intention of Captain Pitt, a determined leader amongst the Interlopers, who had arrived in the river with a large armed vessel and a valuable cargo, for the purpose of opening a trade at Hooghly. Sir John declared that if encouragement was given to that individual to trade, the English would leave Bengal altogether, and his spirited remonstrance had its due effect.—Whilst pursuing a course of prudent and determined reform, his career was suddenly cut short by death, which occurred in January, 1694, leaving the management of affairs to Mr. Eyre, who had not at the time arrived from Dacca.†

During the year 1695 another order was issued by the Emperor, directing a suspension of all trade with Europeans in his dominions, in consequence of the piracies committed by Captain Kyd and other interlopers and adventurers; but in Bengal the evil was experienced in a less degree than elsewhere, owing to the friendship of the Governor of Hooghly which was cheaply purchased by Mr. Eyre.

This year, advices were received from the Court, who were much alarmed for the safety of their several settlements, in consequence of the report of a large French expedition being under orders for India; they therefore enjoined defensive arrangements generally, and sent out a large reinforcement of English and Swiss soldiers to the Coast, and also directed the enlistment of Armenians and "Caffres or Blacks" assigning as a reason, "that every recruit sent from England cost the

* Bruce, vol. 3, pp. 151-2.

† Ibid, pp. 152-3

A. D. 1695. *Company £ 30;** this appears to have led to a gradual extension of the small military force fixed by Sir John Goldesborough, which we soon find considerably increased in numbers.

At this period an alarming rebellion broke out in Bengal, headed by a Hindoo Zemindar of Burdwan, named Soobah Sing, who having resisted and slain the Rajah of that district, called to his assistance Rehim Khán, the leader of the Patan tribe remaining in Orissa; the rebels emboldened by their success and encouraged by the apathy and indolence of the Nawaub and the misconduct of the Foujdar of Jessore, who fled before them, soon drew a large force to their standards, attacked and took possession of Hooghly, and threatened the entire subversion of the Government. On the commencement of these disturbances, the several European establishments entertained a number of native soldiers for the protection of their property, and professing themselves the friends of the local Government, solicited permission to put their factories in a state of defence against the insurgents; to this request the Nawaub replied in general terms, directing them to defend themselves; when they taking for granted what was not positively forbidden, hastened to erect walls of masonry with bastions or flanking towers at the angles, around their several factories, and thus originated the fortifications of Chinsurah, Chandernagore, and Calcutta.† Shortly afterwards, a party of the insurgents, made an attempt upon Chuttanuttee, but were repulsed with considerable loss, after having set fire to some of the neighbouring villages. Another detachment laid siege to the Fort of Tannah about 8 miles below Calcutta, on the opposite side of the river, but the English at the request of the Foujdar of Hooghly, dispatched an armed vessel to the assistance of the garrison, and the insurgents were compelled to retreat. In the mean time the English were indefatigable in their exertions to put their establishment in a defensible condition; the bastions were made capable of bearing artillery, but to avoid exciting

* Bruce, vol. 3, p. 162.

† Bruce, vol. 3, pp. 209, 220, 231-2. Orme, vol. 2, p. 16, Stewart, pp. 329, 333-4.

the suspicion of the Nawaub, the embrasures were built up on the exterior, with a facing of wall, one brick thick. The settlement had now become much more healthy than it was at first, and the consideration it obtained from the Nawaub and the Foujdar at Hooghly, as well as the security it afforded in the present troubled period, together with its thriving commerce, rendered it a place of importance and greatly increased the number of its inhabitants.

During all this time, the insurgents were gradually gaining head, they had taken possession of Rajmahal and Málda, at which latter place the English factory was plundered. The Emperor on hearing of these disturbances, was alike astonished and indignant at the conduct of Ibraheem Khán, and immediately appointed his own grandson Azeem-oo-shán to assume charge of the Soobahdaree, directing that in the interim the Nawaub's son, Zuberdust Khán, a tried and gallant soldier, should be placed in command of the military resources of the province, and sent against the rebels. This young nobleman immediately made his arrangements, marched against the enemy, defeated them at Rajmahal, followed them up to Muxadavad, and finally to Burdwán, when Azeem-oo-shán arriving in the province, ordered him to refrain from further hostilities, and so offended him by the coolness of his reception, that he left the Army, taking with him the flower of the troops.* The young Prince was of an indolent disposition and exceedingly avaricious, the accumulation of money being his leading object. The rebels took advantage of the first weakness, and the English of the second; the latter dispatched Mr. Stanley, one of the Council, to the Prince's camp, not only to counteract certain intrigues set on foot by the Dutch Company, but to procure a grant from his Highness of the villages of Chuttanuttee, Govindpoor, and Kalleeghatta† adjoining their settlement, as also an order to exclude all Interlopers;—for the former of these privileges they paid 16,000 Rupees; but the Interlopers making a pre-

* Stewart, pp. 334-40.

† From whence originated the modern name "Calcutta." Chuttanuttee occupied the site of the present native portion of the city, Govindpoor stood where the new Fort William is erected, and the European part of the city, including the site of the old Fort, is built within the precincts of Kalleeghatta.

A. D. 1699. sent of 14,000 Rupees obtained a licence for free trade.* The Zemindars of the villages at first refused to make over their rights, unless the order was countersigned by the Emperor's Dewan; confirmation was obtained by a further present of broad cloth valued at 800 Rupees more. A fresh firmán for free trade, confirming all former privileges, was also obtained in January 1700 from the Prince. In 1698, Bengal was again made independent of Madras; but as no Court of Judicature had been as yet established in the former, all offenders against the Company were to be sent to Fort St. George to take their trial. The defences were ordered to be gradually strengthened and made regular, but in such a manner as not to give offence to the Mogul authorities.† This year a new East India Company, called the "English Company," was established, and the disputes between the two bodies proved exceedingly prejudicial to the British interests for some time, though less so in Bengal than elsewhere.

Sir Edward Littleton, who was appointed President and Consul of the new or "English Company," arrived with his Council and establishment at Hooghly in July 1699, where he fixed his head-quarters. He also brought with him a company of soldiers as a Guard, under three officers, a Captain, a Lieutenant and an Ensign.‡ He and Mr. Beard, the President at Calcutta, who had succeeded Mr. Eyre on the return of the latter to England, continued to keep up the appearance of civility and occasionally even that of mutual assistance.

In the end of 1699, the Court re-appointed Mr. or rather as he had then become, Sir Charles Eyre, to the charge of their affairs in Bengal, which they now, for the first time, raised to the rank of a Presidency.§ In thus superceding Mr. Beard, the Court recorded that the measure in no manner arose from any disapprobation of the conduct of that "old and faithful servant," who still enjoyed their fullest confidence, and who was appointed second to the President, and

* Bruce, vol. 3, pp. 247, 278, 300.

† Ibid, p. 268.

‡ Ibid, p. 349.

§ Ibid, p. 301.

continued on his full allowances of Chief Agent, viz., £200 A. D. 1700. a year salary, with £100 personal gratuity. The Court particularly impressed on Sir Charles Eyre the necessity of strengthening the fortifications and rendering them regular, so as to afford a safe retreat for all their servants and property in the event of any disturbances or civil wars; as however, the President expressed some fear that the suspicion of the Nawaub or his officers might be awakened, he was permitted to exercise a discretionary power on the subject, but he was recommended to give the outline of the buildings, the form of a pentagon if possible, that being at the time considered the strongest figure for defence,—and to see to the strengthening of the timbers,—that the windows were so arranged as to be capable of being used as port holes in case of attack, and that the buildings flanked each other.† The Council of the new Presidency was to consist of five, Sir Charles Eyre President, Mr Beard second and Accomptant, Mr. Halsey third and Warehouse-keeper, Mr. White fourth and Purser of Marine, and Mr. Ralph Sheldon fifth and Receiver of the Revenues and Manager of all subordinate business.

The new fort was called "Fort William,"† in honour of His Majesty King William III., and taxes were ordered to be imposed and levied similar to those at Fort St. George.

Sir Charles Eyre however, never joined his appointment and Mr. Beard continued to hold the Presidency.

About this time the Foujdar of Hooghly threatened to appoint a Kázy or Mahomedan Judge to Calcutta, in consequence of the number of Mahomedan subjects now congregated there; but this measure, which would have been productive of serious inconvenience to the settlement, was averted by a bribe to the Prince.

During the year 1700, a reinforcement of troops was sent from England and barracks were ordered to be erected for their accommodation within the Fort; this arose from the anticipation of disturbances on the death of the Emperor, now yearly expected, and for the same reason orders were

* Bruce, vol. 3, p. 302.

† Ibid, p. 301.

A. D. 1701. reiterated regarding the strengthening and enlarging the fortifications.]

These orders were again issued in January and March, 1701-2, when it was directed that the Fort should be made a regular pentagon with bastions, and the works be made extensive enough to accommodate all the establishments of the out-factories, in case it should be found necessary to withdraw them on the death of the Emperor.† During this year the famous Embassy of Sir William Norris to the Court of Aurungzebe took place, on which he was deputed by King William and the “English Company;‡” the result however was unsatisfactory, and Aurungzebe renewed some dormant claims upon the old or “London Company,” for damage done to his subjects by the Pirates; the factories at Patna and Rajmahal were seized, the property found confiscated to make good these demands, and an embargo was laid upon all trade. The several European factories took the alarm and prepared to act on the defensive. Sir Edward Littleton fortified the factory at Hooghly to the best of his ability, and raised a Company of 100 Portuguese for its defence, enlisting also such other Europeans as he could obtain, the greater part of the Company he had brought out with him having died;—he also brought up the *De Grave* an armed vessel, and stationed her alongside the factory for better protection.§ The Agents of the old Company at Calcutta were equally active, they strengthened their defences and mounted additional guns upon the works. Their garrison at this time amounted to 120 European Soldiers, and they drafted several seamen from the vessels to assist in working the guns.|| President Beard however, took a still bolder step, he detained several Mogul vessels on the point of sailing to Surat and Persia; this measure had the desired effect, the embargo was taken off the trade by the Foujdar of Hooghly, and shortly afterwards a *Husb-ool-hookum* was received from the Emperor to the same purport. The rivalry

* Bruce, vol. 3, p. 364. † Bruce, vol. 3, pp. 433-4. ‡ Vide Appendix A.

§ Bruce, vol. 3, p. 524. || Bruce, vol. 3, pp. 481 and 506.

of two Companies having been found productive of serious A. D. 1705. injury to both parties, arrangements were made for an union of the two, and the agents of both were informed of the probability of such a measure. Notwithstanding all these obstacles and difficulties, the settlement continued to prosper, the shipping increased, and an addition was made to the number of Pilots on the river, two small vessels were ordered from Bombay or the Coast to be employed in that service, and a "Bankshall" was built at Kedgerree. Although Prince Azeem-oo-shán remained in Bengal, the government of the province was intrusted to Moorshed Koolee Khán, a man of ability and decision, who had recently been Dewán at Hyderabad. He appears to have been a friend to commerce, though not so to the peculiar privileges enjoyed by the English, and he was further jealous of their growing power and of the general extension of the European fortifications.

In 1703-4 the terms of the union between the rival Companies having been considerably advanced, and the Dewán occasioning the Agents of the "English Company" much trouble at Hooghly, on the plea of their not having the benefit of the claim to free trade, they all moved down under Sir Edward Littleton to Calcutta.* The force at that place, shortly after this, in 1705-6, received a reinforcement under Lieutenant Woodville of 16 men, and then amounted to 129 Infantry Soldiers, exclusive of "*the Gunner and his crew*," which at this period constituted the whole of the Company's Artillery in Bengal, and it was recommended that in consequence of the oppression of the Dewán, this force should never be allowed to fall below 100 men, which was the least number required for the defence of the place; that proper Officers should be attached, and from 15 to 20 recruits sent out annually to replace casualties.†

It may be mentioned here, that a reinforcement had been furnished from Bengal to Bencoolen a short time previously, where there was a great want of soldiers.‡ The Dewán Moor-

* Bruce, vol. 3, p. 515. † Ibid, p. 551. ‡ Ibid, p. 576.

A. D. 1707. shed Koolee Khán, continued to give considerable annoyance to the English trade, notwithstanding which, the settlement rapidly progressed; the final junction of the two Companies was nearly settled, and a Commission was appointed from Madras to enquire into the stock and debts and to arrange the details connected with the union as far as regarded Bengal. Mr. Beard and Sir Edward Littleton both died about this time, when Mr. Sheldon of the "London," and Mr. Hedges of the "English Company," succeeded to the management of the two concerns. In the incorporation of the servants of the two establishments, the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th places in the Council were to be filled from the old, and the 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 8th, from the new Company; the chair to be taken weekly by Mr. Sheldon and Mr. Hedges alternately,—and at last in the year 1707-8 the rival interests were finally merged into *the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies*.

On the 21st February 1707, the Emperor Aurungzebe died at the advanced age of 91 years. He was succeeded, but not without a struggle, by his eldest son Bahádoor Sháh, the father of Azeem-oo-Shán. In Bengal this convulsion passed off more quietly than was expected, but the United Council pointed out the necessity for strengthening the works of Fort William to protect the daily increasing number of inhabitants in Calcutta, and solicited a supply of 50 pieces of brass cannon from England for this purpose.* We learn from Captain Hamilton who ✓ visited Calcutta about this period that the garrison consisted of between 2 and 300 soldiers.†

Azeem-oo-Shán, who had been instrumental in placing his father on the throne, was re-appointed to the Soobahdaree of Bengal, and Moorshed Koolee Khán, with the rank of Nawaub of Orissa, was nominated Deputy-Governor as well as Dewán; the latter now renewed his arrogant bearing towards the English, and insisted on their paying the same duties as all other European merchants. A negotiation ensued, in which they agreed to pay him 30,000 rupees for a sunnud confirming their former privileges, but this appears never to have been

* Bruce, vol. 3, p. 662.

† Hamilton, vol. 2, p. 11.

acted on, the Civil war inducing the Court to hold over the A. D. 1713. measure pending the results of the struggle. In the mean time Bahádoor Sháh died in 1712, and his son Azeem-oo-Shán being killed shortly afterwards, the throne ultimately passed to Furrookhseer, the son of the latter prince, after defeating his uncle Jehándar Sháh in a severe engagement near Agra.

Moorshed Koolee Khán was confirmed in the Government of Bengal, and his exactions and oppressions now became so grievous, disregarding all former firmáns and privileges, that Mr. Hedges, who had succeeded to the sole charge of the Presidency, determined in 1713, upon sending an Embassy to the Court of the Emperor. The parties selected were Mr. John Surnam and Mr. Edward Stephenson, two old and able members of the service; they were accompanied by an Armenian named Khojah Surhaad, in the capacity of native agent and Persian interpreter, and by Mr. William Hamilton who was attached to the Embassy as Surgeon: they also took presents of Europe manufactures and curiosities to the amount of £30,000 sterling.*

The Nuwaub, who viewed this Embassy with a jealous eye, exerted all his interest at the Court to frustrate its object, and would doubtless have succeeded but for an unexpected and most fortunate circumstance. The Emperor Furrookhseer had for some months past been engaged to marry the daughter of Ajeet Singh, the Maharana or Rajpoot Prince of Oodypoor, but was at this time afflicted with a complaint that baffled the skill of all the Physicians of the Court and compelled him to postpone his marriage; at length by the recommendation of the Khán Dowrán, he was induced to send for Mr. Hamilton, the Surgeon of the Embassy, who shortly succeeded in perfectly restoring him to health. The Emperor, grateful for this benefit, bestowed several munificent presents on Mr. Hamilton, and further promised to grant whatever favour he should ask; this gentleman, in the same manner that Mr. Boughton had done before, generously waived his own claims and interests, and besought the Emperor to concede the ob-

* Stewart, pp. 395-6. Auber, vol. 1, p. 16.

A. D. 1717. jects of the English mission. Furrookhseer was astonished at such disinterestedness, and promised compliance as soon as the ceremonials of his marriage were concluded.*

After some delay and much intrigue, a firmán† was at last obtained in 1717, confirming all former privileges, authorizing the Company to issue *dustucks*, exempting any goods specified therein from search on duty, placing the use of the Mint at Moorshedabad at their disposal, and granting them permission to purchase 38 villages about and below Calcutta on both sides of the river, on payment of the annual ground rent of 8,121½ rupees in addition to the 1,195 rupees, which they already paid for the villages of Chuttanuttee, Govindpore and Calcutta. ~~Moorshed Kooler Khán~~ was much enraged at this measure, but he could not openly oppose the Emperor's orders; however, he privately threatened the Zemindars of the several villages with his vengeance if they parted with their land to the Company on any terms that might be offered, as he foresaw that such a measure would give the English the complete command of the river, where they would be enabled to erect batteries on either side: he also resisted every attempt to abuse the privilege of the *dustucks*, confining them solely to the Company's goods intended for export, and not permitting them to grant the privilege to others for purposes of inland trade. The Company wisely gave up these points, not a little influenced by the fear that such an addition of territory would demand an augmentation of the military force and also, as they stated, that "*our soldiers may not be harrassed by long marches to defend our bounds.*"‡ Matters were at length amicably arranged, and by conciliating the Nawaub and making him occasional presents, the English affairs enjoyed a long interval of repose and prosperity. Calcutta rapidly increased in importance, merchants of all descriptions, European and Native, thronged to the place, and in 1727 the shipping belonging to the Port had increased to 10,000 tons.§

* Vide Appendix B.

† Vide Appendix C.

‡ Anber, vol. 1, p. 24.

§ Orme, vol. 2, pp. 25-6.

Mr. Hamilton, to whom the Company was so deeply indebted, died soon after his arrival in Calcutta, on the 10th December 1717.* A. D. 1721.

Considerable improvements were made about this time or very soon after this, in the public buildings and in the arrangements about the town, with a view to facilitating the means of defence and communication, and also contributing to the salubrity of the place; these were noticed and approved by the Court in their letter dated 16th February 1721, of which the following is an extract:—

“ Para. 76. The reasons given for making the new roads on the S. S. W. side of your town, and the benefit expected and arising thereby, as well to see through your bounds into the country of the neighbouring Zemindars, who attacked you some time before, as to facilitate the march of your soldiers when necessary to support your utmost out-guards, and prevent private robberies in the night from rogues abroad, and that thereby the wind hath a free passage into the town, and likely to contribute to its healthiness, carry their own commendations with them; and we must add, we look on it as a piece of good management

* In clearing away the ground for the foundation of St. John's Cathedral, which stands partly on the site of the old cemetery, Mr. Hamilton's tombstone was discovered, and is now placed in the same building with that of Job Charnock. It contains two inscriptions, the one in English the other in Persian; in these a discrepancy as to the date of his demise will be observable.

The former is as follows:

“ Under this stone lies interred the body of W. Hamilton, Surgeon, who departed this life the 10th September 1717. His memory ought to be dear to this nation for the credit he gained the English in curing Ferruksere, the present king of Hindoostan, of a malignant distemper, by which he made his own name famous at the Court of that great monarch, and without doubt will perpetuate his memory, as well in Great Britain as in all other nations in Europe.”

The Persian inscription has been translated by Mr. Gladwin and is to the following effect:

“ William Hamilton, Physician, in the service of the English Company, who had accompanied the English Ambassador to the enlightened presence, and having made his own name famous in the four quarters of the earth by the cure of the Emperor, the Asylum of the world, Mohammed Ferruklseer, the Victorious; and, with a thousand difficulties, having obtained permission from the Court, which is the refuge of the universe, to return to his country; by the Divine decree, on the fourth of December, 1717, died in Calcutta, and is buried here.”

A. D. 1737. ' in you to lay hold of a fitting opportunity to persuade your
' inhabitants to agree to your making them, and they bear the
' charge."*

Moorshed Koolee Khán died in 1725 and was succeeded by his son-in-law, Shoojah-oo-deen Khán, who held the Government until his death in 1739.† During his reign there is but little to record with respect to the English settlement, which gradually increased and prospered.‡ In 1726 a Mayor's Court was established in Calcutta for the administration of justice, consisting of a Mayor and Aldermen, upon the same footing as that at Madras. In the instructions received from England, it was directed that the process of this Court should be simple and expeditious, "*so that justice ought not to be made sour by delay.*"§ Some annoyance and jealousy was excited by the establishment of a Company, called the "Ostend East India Company," who settled themselves at Banky-bazar, a little below Chandernagore, but were finally driven out of the province in 1733. In October 1737, a furious hurricane committed great devastation amongst the shipping and property at Calcutta, where 200 houses were completely destroyed, and the steeple of the Church sunk to the ground without breaking; of nine English ships in the river, eight were lost with all their crews. The only difference that occurred between the Company and Shoojah-oo-deen during his administration, arose from the circumstance of the Foujdar of Hooghly having seized a boat laden with silk belonging to the Company, upon which the Council im-

* Auber, vol. 1, pp. 25-6.

† Stewart, 413, 433.

‡ † The best estimate of the Military force at this period is to be found in the following official statement of "Military charges at Fort William and its subordinates for five years, from May 1729 to April 1734."

From 1729	„ 1730	„ 26,473
„ 1730	„ 1731	„ 21,966
„ 1731	„ 1732	„ 22,612
„ 1732	„ 1733	„ 11,626
„ 1733	„ 1734	„ 12,407

£ 95,081

§ Auber, vol. 1, p. 30.

prudently sent up a party of soldiers and released it by force ; A. D. 1734. this act of violence greatly incensed the Nawaub, and he issued an order stopping not only the trade, but supplies of every description, and the President was only able to appease him by payment of a large sum of money and making a most ample apology.* The flourishing condition of the settlement had introduced a very luxurious and extravagant style of living, which the Court in their dispatches severely condemned ; the salaries allowed to the Company's servants continued very small, the President only receiving £300 a year, but every one was more or less engaged in private trade, by which large fortunes were realized to the great detriment of the Company's interests, which were comparatively neglected. As far back as 1725 the Court remonstrated on the extravagance of the President Mr. Deane in having charged the Company eleven hundred rupees for a pair of horses for his carriage, and directed that the amount should be recovered from his estate, he having died a short time before, and expressed their disapproval of such "*superfluities.*" But in 1731 they comment in a letter dated 3rd December, on a much more luxurious and extravagant mode of living which had crept into the settlement, and they recommend their President Mr. John Stackhouse who had just been appointed,—“ to show a good example of frugality, by keeping a decent retinue, such as formerly was practised, for the dignity of his station ; and not fall into that foppery of having a set of music at his table, and a coach and six, with guards and running footmen, as we are informed is now practised, not only by the President, but by some of inferior rank, and that he recommend the same to all those that shall be in lower stations, in order to check this luxury.”†

These injunctions appear to have had their due effect, for in a letter dated 31st January, 1734, they make the following quaint remarks :—

“ We are highly pleased that the extravagant way of living which had obtained such deep rooting among you, is entirely

* Stewart, p. 426.

† Auber, vol. 1, p. 33.

A. D. 1741. ' laid aside. Whenever such a practice prevails in any of our
 ' servants, we shall always suspect that we are the paymasters
 ' in some shape or other, and it seldom fails of bringing
 ' them to penury and want; we must therefore, both for your
 ' sakes and our own, earnestly recommend frugality as a
 ' cardinal virtue, and by due regard to thê said advice, we do
 ' not doubt but the diet and other allowances from us will
 ' be amply sufficient to defray all necessary expenses, as
 ' Bengal is not only the cheapest part of India to live in,
 ' but perhaps the most plentiful country in the whole
 ' world.*

✓ The increase of the Military establishment, appears to have kept pace with that of all other branches of the service.

The French also were greatly extending their trade and influence, under the talented and energetic Dupleix, who was Governor at Chandernagore, from 1730 to 1742.

Sirfiráz Khán succeeded his father Shujah-oo-deen Khán in the Soobahdaree of Bengal, during whose Government the celebrated Nádir Sháh invaded India, and called upon the Nawaub for tribute which was duly and promptly paid, the English contributing their quota to the general amount furnished from the province. Sirfiráz Khán was slain at the battle of Gheriah in January 1741,† and his conqueror Ali Verdee Khán, assumed the Government, which he retained until his death in 1756. He was a soldier and an able politician, and seldom interfered with the European Factories except when hard pressed by his enemies; on one or two of such occasions he called upon them all to contribute to the defence of the province, and in one instance the English paid him three lakhs of rupees. His reign was a continued and arduous struggle, particularly with the Mahrattas, who having made themselves masters of the western portion of Orissa, poured down upon Bengal almost annually; Ali Verdee Khán resisted them gallantly and defeated them frequently, but their national untiring perseverance was too much for him at last, and he was finally compelled, worn out with age and

* Auber, vol. 1, p. 34.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol. 1, p. 361.

exertion, to conclude terms, by which he ceded to them the province of Orissa and bound himself to pay twelve lakhs annually as *chout*.* A. D. 1743.

During his Government, Calcutta continued to increase in size and commercial prosperity. In the year 1742 the Mahrattas devastated the whole province and sacked the town of Hooghly, on this occasion the English applied for and obtained permission to dig a ditch and throw up an intrenchment round their settlement, which if completed would have extended for more than seven miles; an absurd work, when the weakness of the garrison was considered; small redoubts were added at intervals, to protect the bridges and salient angles; but after the work had been carried on for six months, and little more than three miles of the ditch were completed, finding that the Mahrattas did not advance, the work was discontinued; it was however always known afterwards as the *Mahratta Ditch*,† some traces of which yet remain. At the same time permission was obtained to erect a wall of masonry, with bastions at the corners, around the factory at Kossimbazar. At this period the European, Armenian and Portuguese inhabitants were for the first time regularly embodied into a Militia, and a number of Lascars were also entertained to assist the *Gun-room crew* in working the guns and preparing and looking after the Ordnance stores; this is the first notice to be found regarding the employment of that most useful class of men. The arrangements made on this occasion met the approval of the Court as shown in the following extract from a letter dated the 21st March, 1743:—

“ We entirely approve of the necessary precaution taken
‘ on the Morattas invasion, to prevent a surprise by hiring
‘ a number of Lascars, forming the inhabitants into a militia,
‘ surveying the town, fortifications, guns, purchasing some
‘ small arms and the like; the expense upon such an urgent
‘ occasion we cheerfully acquiesce in, relying upon your care
‘ and frugality in disbursing our money on every article.”‡

With exception to a few instances of plunder at the out-factories, and the occasional stoppage of boats coming down the river with goods, the English suffered little by the

* Stewart, p. 486.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 15.

‡ Auber, vol. 1, p. 87.

D. A. 1748. invasions of the Mahrattas; on the contrary they were in reality gainers, for the security of the settlement induced numbers to come and reside in the town.

✓ The war between the French and English which raged with so much violence on the coast, had comparatively but little effect upon Bengal, where the fear of the Nawaub restrained both parties from attempting any hostilities against each other. In or before the year 1742, a detachment appears to have been sent round to Bombay, but the exact date, or the occasion for the measure, is not known. In the Bombay official returns of that year, the Bengal Detachment is represented as consisting of 1 Ensign, 2 Serjeants, 4 Corporals, 14 European Privates and 1 Topaz.*

✓ In 1748, the Court determined to place the Artillery at the three Presidencies in a much more efficient condition;—heretofore this branch of the force was rather on the footing of Marine Artillery, being chiefly recruited from the Company's ships, on board of which it was occasionally employed; the detail was commanded by a Warrant Officer, designated the *Master Gunner*, who also performed the duties of Military Store-keeper, and his subordinates were ranked as *Gunners*, *Quarter Gunners*, and *Gunners' Mates*, in imitation of the Naval nomenclature of the period.

✓ On the 17th June 1748, the Court addressed a circular letter of the three Presidencies on this subject, ordering a Company of Artillery, on the model of that in the Royal Service, to be formed at each, into which the well conducted and qualified members of the *Gun-room crews* were to be absorbed.

The following extracts notify the principal arrangements:—

“As it is intended to abolish the offices of Gunners, Gunners' Mates, Quarter Gunners and Gun-room crew, and to enlist in lieu of them a regular Company of Artillery for the better defence of our Settlements in time of danger, and for the training up a regular and disciplined Corps, for the Ordnance Service.—We do hereby order for the more

* E. I. U. S. Journal, January, 1838, p. 27. Article “Three year's Gleanings.” The article bearing the foregoing title and which it is much to be regretted was never completed, is an admirably written record of the early services of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers.

' easy attaining this end, that the following Regulations be A. D. 1718
' strictly followed and observed:—

" That the said Company of Artillery do consist of one
' Second Captain, one Captain Lieutenant and Director of the
' Laboratory, one First Lieutenant Fireworker, one Second
' Lieutenant Fireworker, one Ensign Fireworker, four Serjeant
' Bombardiers, four Corporal Bombardiers, two Drummers,
' and one hundred Gunners.

" So soon as the Company of Artillery consists of a sufficient
' number of Officers and Gunners to do the duty of the Gun-
' ners and Gun-room crew (which it is strongly recommended
' may be as soon as possible) the office of Gunner, and
' of all belonging to the Gun-room, are to be abolished."

A Military store-keeper was at the same time appointed to
take charge of the stores, hitherto under the charge of the
Gunner. Amongst the regulations for the guidance of the
Director of the Laboratory was the following, which will
perhaps amuse the reader:—

" No Foreigner whether in our service or not (except such
' as hath been admitted into it by the Court of Directors) nor
' no Indian, black or persons of a mixt breed, nor any Roman
' Catholic of what nation soever, shall on any pretence be
' admitted to set foot in the Laboratory, or any of the Military
' Magazines, either out of curiosity, or to be employed in
' them, or to come near them, so as to see what is doing or
' contained therein, nor shall any such persons have a copy or
' sight of any accounts or papers relating to any Military
stores whatsoever."

It was further strictly ordered that no Roman Catholic ✓
nor any Officer or Soldier married to a Roman Catholic
should be admitted or permitted to remain in the Company
of Artillery.

One first Captain and Chief Engineer was to be appointed
on a salary of. £200 a year, to command the three Companies
and reside at that Presidency where his services were most
required. This situation was offered to Major John Goodyere
who commanded a Company of Royal Artillery on board
Admiral Boscawen's fleet;—but it does not appear that he
ever assumed the command. ●

The pay of the Second Captain and Engineer was fixed at

"Major Goodyere was appointed as Chief Engineer of the Company of Artillery, and was offered the command of the three Companies of Artillery, but he never assumed the command."

A. D. 1749. £150, of the Captain Lieutenant at £100, of the 1st Lieutenant Fireworker at £75, of the 2d Lieutenant Fireworker at £60, and of the Ensign at £50 per annum.

The pay of the Serjeant Bombardiers was fixed at 2 shillings per diem, of the Corporal Bombardiers at 1 shilling and 6 pence, of the Gunners and Drummers at 1 shilling each.

In the following year the Court appointed the illustrious Benjamin Robins as *Engineer General* and *Commander-in-Chief of Artillery*, at all the settlements in India, with plenary authority over the whole Ordnance Department at the three Presidencies, and with the rank of third in Council at each.

His instructions were to visit each of the Settlements in turn, and to examine the fortifications, buildings, Artillery and Military stores. As particularly regarded Calcutta, the following formed a portion of the orders issued by the Court, as notified in their circular letter to the three Presidencies dated 8th December 1749.

“As we are resolved to throw up some works about the Town of Calcutta, for the better defence of its inhabitants, agreeably to our letter of the 17th June 1748, a copy of which is herewith delivered you, you are therefore on your arrival at Fort William to consider of a plan for that purpose; in forming this plan you are to endeavour, that it may be of such a nature, that without any material change in the general disposition and without demolishing the works that will first be raised, the whole may afterwards be wrought into a more complete fortress; when after maturely weighing all the circumstances necessary to be considered, you have formed your plan for the works about Calcutta, and have made an estimate of the time, expence, materials and workmen necessary to complete it, and have determined with what part to begin, and in what order to proceed; you are then to lay the whole before our Governor and Council, and to require them to prepare the money, materials and workmen, and to issue the proper orders for carrying on the work, which requisition of yours they would be directed to comply with.”

It does not appear however that Mr. Robins ever visited Calcutta, though his successor Lieutenant Colonel Scott did so in 1755.

In 1751, the Court reiterated their orders for training the Militia and ordered them to be formed into 2 Companies.* A. D. 1754. The regular military establishment at this time appears to have consisted of five Companies of Infantry and one of Artillery. Supplies of men and money were more than once called for from Madras about this period, and in 1752 one of the Companies of Infantry, completed to 100 men, was embarked for that Presidency, where they arrived in the beginning of February,† and a few days afterwards took the field under Captain Clive and bore a distinguished part in the action of Coveprauk ; they then proceeded to Trichinopoly, and were finally incorporated in the Madras Battalion.

In 1754 the first legislative enactment was passed for the regulation of the Company's Military force. This act which bore date in the twenty-seventh year of His Majesty King George II., was entitled "An act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion of Officers and Soldiers in the service of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies and for the punishment of offences committed in the East Indies or at the island of St. Helena." Under this act, Articles of war, applicable to the three Presidencies were framed, which with slight modification continued to guide the service for many years.‡

Ali Verdee Khán was always inclined to encourage the commerce of Europeans, of the value of which to the revenue of the Province he was fully sensible, but he appears to have had a presentiment that before long they would become masters of the Country.

Mustapha Khán, his principal General, more than once

* Holwell's Indian Tracts, 3d Ed. p. 302.

† Orme, vol. 1, p. 209.

‡ The Military charges at Fort William and the subordinates from May, 1750 to April 1755 was as follows:

From 1750	to 1751	£ 21,799
„ 1751	„ 1752	„ 21,378
„ 1752	„ 1753	„ 18,714
„ 1753	„ 1754	„ 16,904
„ 1754	„ 1755	„ 18,598
		<u>£ 97,393</u>

A. D. 1756. urged him to expel the English and seize their property and wealth, and others of his Court and family advocated the same view, but he would never consent to listen to them. "What have the English done to me," he said on one occasion, "that I should use them ill? It is now difficult to extinguish the fire on land; but should the sea be in flames who could then put them out?"* Alluding by this to the Naval power of the English. Some time before his death he had proclaimed his Nephew, Sooraj-oo-dowlah, on whom he lavished his whole affections, heir to his Soobahdaree; this youth naturally of a weak mind and cruel disposition, and educated in the worst of all schools, the vice and luxury of an Eastern Court, was completely spoiled by the indulgence and doting fondness of his Grandfather, and gave way to every description of vice and profligacy without any check. In the words of the Author of Seir Mutaqherin, "he made no distinction betwixt vice and virtue, and paying no regard to the nearest relations, he carried defilement wherever he went; and like a man alienated in his mind, he made the houses of men and women of distinction the scenes of his profligacy, without minding either rank or station. In a little time he became as detested as Pharoah, and people on meeting him by chance used to say God save us from him!"† Such was the character of the man who was destined by his future conduct to occasion one of the most extraordinary revolutions in history, a revolution which placed the Empire of the East at the disposal of the British nation.

On the 9th of April, 1756 Ali Verdee Khán departed this life and Sooraj-oo-dowlah succeeded to the Government of Bengal.

We now come to one of the most important events in the annals of the British connection with India, an event most distressing and unfortunate in itself, but most beneficial and prosperous in its subsequent results.

Sooraj-oo-dowlah, amongst others of his caprices, appears to have early entertained a marked dislike towards the English, a feeling which several about him found it to their

* Stewart, p. 491, Seir Mutaqherin, vol. 1, p. 691.

† Seir-Mutaqherin, vol. 1, pp. 645-6.

interest to encourage and which they materially fostered by A. D. 1756. pointing out the wealth that might be obtained by the capture of Calcutta, as well as the honour of defeating the English. To these motives another was added, which ultimately served as an excuse for commencing hostilities.

A short time previous to the death of Ali Verdee Khán, Nerwaish Mahommud his Nephew had sunk into the grave, and Sooraj-oo-dowlah immediately confined Rajah Raj Boollub a wealthy Hindoo, who had been Nerwaish's Deputy in the Government of Dacca, and who happened to be at Moorshe-dabad at the time; Sooraj-oo-dowlah also sent emissaries to Dacca to seize his family and property, but Kissen Boollub* his son, receiving timely intimation, embarked the property on boats and on pretence of making a pilgrimage to Gunga Saugor or Juggernáth, proceeded to Calcutta, where he arrived on the 17th of March and was permitted to take up his residence; Sooraj-oo-dowlah on hearing this, was greatly annoyed and sent an agent of his own to Mr. Drake, the Governor of Calcutta, to demand that Kissen Boollub should be given up, but as this man came without letter or credentials, and moreover entered the town in disguise, the Governor who was in doubt what course to adopt, took advantage of this circumstance and would not acknowledge him, but directed that he should be turned out of Calcutta, a measure which added to the irritation of Sooraj-oo-dowlah, who however was at the moment deeply occupied with the approaching dissolution of his Grandfather and preparations for insuring his own succession.† Just about this time, intelligence was received from the Court of the probability of a war between England and France, and as this was a different affair from the struggles of the rival Establishments on the Coast, and moreover as the check of Ali Verdee Khán's influence was now about to pass away, the President and Council considered it advisable to look to their fortifications.

* Generally mentioned as Kissen Dass by Europeans. Seid Goolam Hossein Khán a cotemporary writer and well acquainted with all parties in the Durbar, gives the names adopted in the text, here and elsewhere.

† Holwell, p. 275. Orme, vol. 2, p. 54

A. D. 1756. These during the recent protracted interval of peace had been most unwisely neglected and permitted to fall into a state of considerable decay. Some repairs were immediately commenced upon, particularly on the river side of the fort, and some useless outworks were thrown up in the environs of the town, consisting chiefly of a redoubt and draw-bridge at Bágh Bazar, commanding the passage of the Ditch, called Perring's Redoubt.*

The young Nawaub hearing an exaggerated account of these preparations, wrote to Mr. Drake on the subject, stating that he understood the English were digging a ditch and building a wall round the town, and he insisted not only upon their immediately suspending further operations but also upon all that had been erected, being instantly demolished.

To this Mr. Drake replied that the Nawaub had been misinformed on the subject, that there was no wall around the town, neither were they building one, and the only ditch was that round the settlement which had been dug in 1742, by permission of the late Nawaub, as a defence against the Mahrattas; he further added that war was expected with the French, and as that nation during the former war, had not hesitated to attack and take possession of Fort St. George, contrary to the neutrality that might have been expected in the Mogul's dominions, the English were apprehensive that they might act in the same way in Bengal, to guard against which the line of defences on the river side was being put in repair.†

This reply the Nawaub received on the 17th May at Rajmahal, whither he had advanced in progress to attack his Cousin Shokut Jung, the young Nawaub of Purneah, whom an influential party at the Court, disgusted with Sooraj-oodowlah's conduct, were anxious to see upon the throne,—a knowledge of which excited the jealousy of the latter and led to the expedition. He was just about to cross the Ganges with his army, when he received Mr. Drake's letter; his anger was greatly excited by the reply, he accused the Eng-

* Holwell, pp. 276-9 † Holwell, p. 277.

lish of harbouring State offenders and fortifying themselves contrary to his express orders, and declared his intention to annihilate them. He immediately commenced his return with his Army, sending Rajah Doolub Ram one of his principal officers, with 3000 men in advance to invest the factory at Kossimbazar. This detachment came before the factory on the 22nd May and surrounded it, but committed no farther hostilities; on the 1st of June, the Nawaub himself arrived with the main body of the Army.*

A. D. 1756.
June.

The defences at Kossimbazar were of an insignificant description, barely sufficient to render the use of cannon necessary to attack it; the building was a quadrangle having small bastions at the corners, the curtains were only three feet thick, built round ranges of ware-houses of which they formed the exterior wall; there was no ditch or outer defence, and the whole was surrounded by buildings which overlooked the factory at the distance of about 100 yards; the guns were of small calibre and most of them were honey-combed, the carriages more or less decayed, and the whole stock of ammunition not exceeding 600 rounds; but worst of all, the garrison consisted of only one Officer, Lieutenant Elliot, and forty-four regular soldiers, of whom twenty were Portuguese and several Dutchmen together with about 250 matchlock men.† Under such circumstances a protracted defence could not reasonably be expected: but the Council at Calcutta entertained a different opinion, and refused to send any reinforcement, they declared it to be their belief that the garrison was sufficiently strong to defend the place against the force opposed to them, and accordingly orders were issued to make the best defence practicable, and if the garrison ultimately found the factory to be untenable, they were to effect a retreat if in their power. This considerate order, however, never reached them.‡

The Nawaub on his arrival at Kossimbazar, sent to Mr. Watts the Chief of the factory, threatening to attack the place with his whole force unless that gentleman immediately

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 56.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 57. Grose, vol. 2, p. 240.

‡ Holwell, p. 280.

A. D. 1756. went to him ; the latter hesitated at first, but receiving a letter
June. with assurances of safety from Rajah Doolub Ram, he proceeded to the camp accompanied by the Surgeon, Mr. Forth, where he was received by the Nawaub with bitter invectives and reproaches, and was compelled by menaces to sign a moochulka or obligation with a penalty annexed, to the effect that within fifteen days the new works raised in Calcutta should be demolished, that all servants of the Government who had taken refuge, there should be given up, and a refund made to the Nawaub of all revenues of which the Soobahdaree had been defrauded by the abuse of the Company's dustucks. Messrs. Collet and Batson the next two seniors at the factory, were also sent for and likewise obliged to put their names to the document. They were then kept in confinement in breach of the promises made, and the factory being untenable, was surrendered on the 4th of June : the property found there was plundered, the soldiers confined and the whole party subjected to such indignities, that Lieutenant Elliot who commanded the troops, was driven to distraction and shot himself.*

On the 9th of June the Nawaub commenced his march for Calcutta. Surprise and consternation reigned at that place when tidings arrived that Kossimbazar was actually invested. On the 1st of June the Governor and Council wrote a most submissive letter to the Nawaub, and sent it to be delivered by Mr. Watts, expressive of their readiness to demolish all the out-works, the erection of which was understood to have given the chief cause of offence ; this letter though sent in triplicate, appears never to have reached its destination ; the interposition of Kojah Wuzeed, the chief merchant of the province who resided at Hooghly, was also requested, but his advocacy failed entirely. In the meanwhile, fearful of giving further cause of offence, no preparations were made for defending the place and much valuable time was lost, until at length on the 7th of June, intelligence was received of the surrender of Kossimbazar and of the intended advance of the Nawaub, when it became apparent that nothing

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 58.

remained but to endeavour to insure safety by a determined resistance. This decision was unfortunately arrived at somewhat late, and much confusion, timidity and vacillation existed in the Council and amongst the leaders. True it is, the means available were limited and inferior, and the danger was considerable; but had there been an energetic mind at the head of either the Civil or Military affairs, there is good reason to believe that a different result might have ensued; particularly as the rains were daily expected, which would have rendered it impossible for the Nawaub's army to have kept the field, could they have been held in check until the monsoon set in.* The Fort was an ill-arranged, patch-work building, in the form of an irregular tetragon; its longest sides to the east and west extended nearly parallel to the river 210 yards; the south face was about 130, and the north face 100 yards in length; at each corner was a small bastion capable of mounting 10 guns, the curtains were of masonry about four feet thick, and as at Kossimbazar, formed the outer wall of ranges of ware-houses and other buildings, the roofs of which served as a terreplein to the ramparts: these, which were at any time ill-adapted to bear artillery, had from neglect fallen into such a condition that except on the river side, guns could not be fired upon them, and in one instance when the attempt was made with a 3 or 4 pounder, the gun and terrace fell in together. Windows were also pierced from these chambers, through the curtains, affording ready points of entrance to a daring enemy. Another instance of the state of blind security into which the rulers of the Presidency had allowed themselves to fall, was exhibited in the fact of a range of godowns having been erected in the year 1747, on the outside of the southern face, completely occupying the space between the flanks of the adjacent bastions, and consequently depriving the whole southern side of the means of flanking defence. A battery of 3-pounders was, however, mounted en barbette on the the roof of this new building.

The main entrance to the Fort was on the eastern

A. D. 1756.
June.

* The rains did set in, the day after the capture of the Fort. Holwell, p. 282.

A. D. 1756. side, where there was a projecting gateway mounting five
 June. guns, three to the front and one on either flank. On
 the western side along the bank of the river, was a battery
 of heavy cannon, mounted in embrasures of solid masonry,
 and joined at either end to the western bastions by screen
 walls of masonry, in each of which was a small gateway with
 pallisades. There was no ditch, pallisade or other external
 defence around the works; and to crown all, the fort was
 surrounded by several buildings which completely commanded
 it, at the distance of from 50 to 100 yards: of these the
 principal were a house and out-offices belonging to Mr.
 Cruttenden, which entirely blocked up the space in front of
 the north-west bastion and northern curtain,—a house of
 Mr. Eyres opposite the north-east bastion, and two other
 buildings very near it,—the Church opposite the eastern
 curtain, and the Governor's house opposite the south-west
 bastion on the river side.*

The Fort occupied the ground from where the Import
 Warehouse now stands, north of old Fort Ghaut Street, to
 about opposite the centre of Tank Square which was then called
 the Park or Lall Bâgh, the southern face extending from the
 line of the present Export Warehouse to Coelah Ghat: in
 the direction of the Park and to the south-east, generally, the
 ground was tolerably open. The town extended about half a
 mile above and below the Fort and some 600 yards inland; the
 houses were for the most part detached in separate compounds
 or inclosures.

The decaying condition of the defences had been more
 than once brought to notice, particularly by Captain Jasper
 Leigh Jones, who commanded the Artillery in 1755, but no
 steps were taken to remedy the evil, until the danger was
 imminent.†

The supply of powder was small and of inferior quality,
 the fuzes for the shells had been driven many years before and
 were spoiled, the carriages were mostly in a state of decay, and
 fifty new pieces that had been sent out by the Court three

* This description of the Fort is chiefly taken from Orme and Holwell.

† Holwell, p. 298.

years previously, chiefly 18 and 24-pounders, were lying A. D. 1756.
dismounted and useless, under the walls of the Fort.* June.

✓ The regular force of the Presidency at this time consisted of four Companies of Infantry and one of Artillery, but a considerable portion was detached at the several out-factories; the total number present amounted only to 264 men, of whom a portion were Topasses †; there were also two Companies of Militia, composed of the Company's servants together with the European, Portuguese, and Armenian inhabitants, amounting to 250 more, making a total of 514 men, of which number, 174 only were Englishmen. The officers commanding the regular Companies were Captain Commandant Minchin, who commanded the whole, Captains Clayton, Buchanan and Grant, and Captain Witherington commanding the Artillery, Captain Lieutenant Smith appears to have been attached to Captain Minchin's Company, consequent on the general command exercised by the latter officer. The Subalterns of the Companies were Lieutenants Bishop, Hays, Blagg, Simpson and Bellamy, Ensigns Piccard, Scott, Hastings, C. Wedderburn, Walcott and two or three others whose names are not traceable;—Lieutenant Cudmore and Ensigns Carstairs and Muir were detached at the out-factories of Dacca, Balasore and Jugdeah at the time.‡

✓ The two Companies of Militia were officered from the members of the Civil Service: Mr. Holwell commanded the 1st, and Mr. William Mackett the 2nd Company, both of whom were members of Council; amongst the other gentlemen holding commissions in these Companies, were the Reverend Mr. Mapletoft the Chaplain of the Presidency, and Mr. Henry Wedderburn, who were the two Captains Lieutenant of the Companies, Lieutenants Le Beaume and Summers, and Ensigns Douglas and Dumbleton.§ The vessels then in the river, were the the *Saint George*, a Company's ship, with the *Dodaly*, the *Diligence* and five small private craft. As soon as hostilities were determined on, the troops and agents at the several out-factories of Dacca,

* Holwell, p. 304.

† Native Portuguese and Eurasians, armed and equipped like the Europeans,—so called from wearing hats.

‡ This list is made up from Holwell, Orme, Cooke and Williams. § Ibid.

A. D. 1750. Jugdeah and Balasore were called in, but none arrived in time to assist in the defence. The condition of the Fort being so bad, it was determined to throw up defences in the town and attempt to make the principal stand there; accordingly three batteries were erected across the three main avenues leading to the Fort, each mounting two eighteen-pounders and two field-pieces. That to the east, which was the principal one, was about 300 yards from the Fort, situated between the Court house and the corner of the Park, and must have occupied the ground in front of the present St. Andrew's Church. The north battery was about 250 yards from the Fort, on the banks of the river, where the road which passed the eastern face of the Fort, took a sudden bend to the river and passed out of the line of defence from the works, which point it was considered an object to defend: this battery must have occupied a position between the present sites of Bebee Ross's Ghaut and Moyla Ghaut. The third, or southern battery was between 3 or 400 yards from the Fort, at the corner of the cemetery, just between the present south-east gate of the old Cathedral and the corner of the Government House compound. There were several minor inlets to the town, which were defended by breast-works and pallisades, and trenches were dug across the more open spots, particularly in the Park; but this was done with so little skill or military knowledge, that the earth thrown out of them served the enemy for ready-made breast-works when they ultimately advanced. Along the eastern bound of the Park was a broad rope-walk, on the opposite side of which were three English houses, all within musket shot of the eastern battery; a lane led into the southern corner of this rope-walk, which was also defended, being a pass of importance,—as the enemy by entering in that direction, might pass along the side of the Park entirely under cover, until they got to the rear of the southern battery; on this account a fourth or reserve battery was erected about 250 yards in rear of the latter, across the same road, and about the centre of the western side of the Park.* Such was the state of the town, and the

* The position of the four Batteries is clearly laid down by Orme, pp. 30 and 31, vol. 1, p. 200. Nil. Plat. No. 1.

nature of the preparations for defence; to which, it must be added, that the Peons or Buxarries* as they were then generally called, were increased to 1500 in number;—but little dependence was to be placed on their courage or fidelity.†

A. D. 1756.
June.

Had the same time and labour that was expended upon the erection of these works, all of which were liable to be turned in various directions, and which when attacked, did not hold out for a day,—been devoted to repairing and improving the Fort itself, to digging a ditch and constructing a covered way with a pallisade, and to the demolition of all the neighbouring buildings, there is every reason to suppose that they might have set the enemy at defiance: as although supplied with a numerous artillery, the Nawaub's gunners were entirely unacquainted with the proper management of that arm.‡

Hostilities were commenced on the part of the British, by an attack upon the fort of Tannah, on the opposite side of the river, about 5 miles below Calcutta. Two vessels of about 300 tons, and two small Brigantines anchored before it on the 13th of June, and as soon as they opened their fire, the garrison consisting of about 50 of the Nawaub's troops, evacuated the place, on which a small detachment of Europeans and Lascars were landed and took possession, spiking a portion of the guns and throwing the remainder into the river; but the next day, 2000 men arrived from Hooghly, drove this detachment to their boats and opened a heavy fire on the vessels from their matchlocks and two field-pieces which they mounted on the walls; the ships attempted to return the fire, but their light guns made no impression on the walls of the fort, and though a reinforcement of 30 men was sent from Calcutta, the whole were obliged to return, having failed in their attempt.

In the mean time, the Nawaub advanced with such expedition, that many of his troops died from fatigue and exposure; his Army crossed the river at Hooghly on the 15th, the following afternoon his advanced guard appeared in sight, and

* Native foot soldiers armed with matchlocks.

† Orme, vol. 2, pp. 59.

‡ Holwell, p. 305. Orme, pp. 59-60.

A. D. 1756. not being aware that the Mahratta ditch had never been
 June. completed, they immediately attempted to force it at the Northern point near its junction with the river, opposite to their line of march.

It was here that Perring's redoubt was situated to defend this passage, and as the guard stationed there amounted only to 20 men, a reinforcement of 30 more and a large party of Buxarries was added, the whole under the command of Ensign Piccard, a young officer of much intelligence and some experience, who had served for a short time on the Coast. The *Saint George* was also anchored a little higher up, to flank the thickets that ran up to the north side of the rivulet. The enemy commenced the attack with the fire of 4000 matchlock-men and 4 field-pieces, which was answered by the guns on the redoubt, and a couple of field-pieces stationed at the bridge, as well as by the musketry and matchlocks of the defenders; the enemy unable to gain any advantage gave over the attempt at nightfall, and as usual with a Native Army, having taken their evening meal, were soon wrapped in sleep. Ensign Piccard hearing nothing stirring and guessing the state of affairs, assembled his party about midnight, crossed the bridge, seized and spiked the 4 guns, and beat up the quarters of the enemy in the thickets, retiring without the loss of a man.*

The following morning having received information of the incomplete condition of the ditch, the enemy desisted from their attack to the north and passed round to the east, where they broke into the Company's bounds in great numbers, set fire to a large bazar to the north-east of the town and took possession of the native quarter to the northward.

A detachment was sent to dislodge them, and succeeded in making some prisoners, who gave intelligence that a general attack on the out-posts was to take place the next day.

On learning this, the reinforcement that had been sent to Perring's redoubt was recalled, and the garrison passed the night under arms.

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 62.

As anticipated, the enemy made an attack upon the outposts on the morning of the 18th. About 8 o'clock a large division approached the southern Battery, which was commanded by Captain Buchanan; they took up a position in the neighbouring houses, from whence they galled the defenders considerably by a heavy fire of matchlocks and wall pieces. The guns were turned against these houses, but with little effect; the party notwithstanding, held bravely to their post, and Captain Buchanan, who was an intelligent and experienced Officer, detached several small parties into the houses to the left of the Battery, to prevent their flank being turned through any of the avenues in that direction.*

A. D. 1756.
June.

The Battery to the north on the river side, the detachment holding which was commanded by Captain Lieutenant Smith, was also attacked about 9 o'clock, but the enemy did not find the same advantages of shelter there as at the southern Battery; the street was narrow and the inclosures on the bank of the river were completely commanded by the guns, whilst the houses on the other side were close to the Battery and almost joined one to the other, and 4 or 5 Europeans had been thrown into each. As the enemy advanced up the narrow street to the Battery, one well directed discharge of the guns swept their column completely, upon which they immediately broke and took shelter in the cross streets and lanes adjoining, from whence they came out in small parties and kept up a desultory fire: to drive them from thence, a detachment with a field-piece moved to the front and perfectly succeeded, but being induced to go on too far, the enemy doubled again on their rear and attempted to intercept their return; the fire of the gun however, again dispersed them, and the detachment returned all safe.† Soon after this, the whole of the enemy moved off from that quarter and joined the division employed against the eastern Battery.

That Battery was commanded by Captain Clayton, an Officer of neither experience nor energy, resolution or judgment, who early in the morning had detached a platoon of Europeans

* Orme, vol. 2. pp. 65 and 67.

† Ibid, vol. 2, p. 6.

A. D. 1756. with two field-pieces under Lieutenant Le Beaume, to a barricade in advance of the Battery, at some distance up the main avenue, (the present Lall Bazar,) and also threw 40 Buxarries, under Ensign Carstairs, into the gaol compound, somewhat more to the right, the walls of which were high and in which apertures had been made to admit of the two-fields pieces being fired through them. The position of the gaol was about the site of the present Lall Bazar Auction Mart. About 9 o'clock, a large force of the enemy amounting to several thousands, moved up against the advanced barricade, but were so warmly received by the quick and effective fire of the two field-pieces, that they dispersed and took shelter in the adjoining thickets, under cover of which they opened an incessant though irregular discharge from their matchlocks upon the detachment; notwithstanding this, the latter held their position for a couple of hours, when having lost several of the party and more being wounded, they retreated in good order to the gaol, bringing with them their two field-pieces. In the meantime the enemy had penetrated by other inlets, and had taken possession of the three houses along the rope-walk, from the windows and terraces of which they kept up so hot a fire upon the back of the gaol, that the detachment having lost several more men was obliged to make a retreat to the Battery, leaving the guns behind.*

About noon the attack ceased, but at two o'clock was renewed with increased vigour,—an incessant fire being kept up from the houses on the rope-walk and also from other buildings to the left; so deadly were its effects that none could remain in the Battery save the few actually required to work the guns, the remainder took shelter in the Court house which was situated close at hand, about the eastern extremity of the present Writer's Buildings, from whence the place of those who were every now and then killed at the guns was supplied. Mr. Holwell and Captain Wedderburn who were stationed at this post with a portion of the 1st Militia Company, suggested to Captain Clayton to detach some of the party to the buildings right and

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 65.

left, to defend them and keep down the enemy's fire, but he refused to weaken his detail, although in their position they were perfectly useless ; about 4 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy forced the barricade at the south-east corner of the rope-walk, where a Serjeant and twenty men were posted, and rushed in with the intention of cutting off the eastern Battery, but one of the eighteen-pounders being turned upon them, loaded with grape, compelled them to retreat and seek for shelter.

A. D. 1756.
June.

The fire from the adjacent houses continued to increase, and Captain Clayton sent Mr. Holwell to the Governor, to represent the impossibility of maintaining the post unless reinforced. Mr. Holwell returned with orders for the party to retreat, bringing off the guns if practicable ; but on re-joining he found all in confusion,—the two 18-pounders and one of the field-pieces already spiked, and the whole party preparing to leave the post,—which they did immediately afterwards, bringing with them the remaining field-piece.*

The other two Batteries had remained unmolested since noon, but a party had been sent from the southern Battery to defend a barricade to the eastward of it ; they took possession of two houses, one on either side, a Serjeant and twelve men occupying one belonging to Mr. Goddart, and Lieutenant Blagg with ten Volunteers, eight of whom were members of the Civil service, holding the other, which was that of the Commandant, Captain Minchin. Their fire completely defended this pass until the eastern Battery was deserted, when the enemy gathered in numbers all round them. The Serjeant and his party seeing their danger, made a retreat in time, having the advantage of an acquaintance with the ground, but the other party not being aware of this, were cut off ; when finding themselves completely surrounded, they determined to fight their way out in a body, and succeeded—with the exception of two, Messrs Charles Smith and Wilkinson, who got separated from the rest ; the former killed five of the enemy with his own hand before he fell, when the latter surrendered himself and was immediately cut to pieces. The remainder reached the Battery in safety.†

* Holwell, p. 313. Orme, vol. 2, p. 67. † Orme, vol. 2, p. 68. Holwell, p. 315.

A. D. 1756.
June.

The other two detachments at the north and south Batteries under Captain Lieutenant Smith and Captain Buchanan were now called in, and even the reserve Battery close to the Fort was abandoned, the guns at these posts being spiked and left there; boats were also sent to bring off Ensign Piccard and his party from Perring's redoubt, where they had remained up to this time.*

The loss of these Batteries which had been looked upon as the chief means of defence, occurring on the very first day, caused a general feeling of consternation. The Buxarries deserted in a body, and of the Lascars employed to serve the guns, not above twenty remained; the Armenian and Portuguese Militia were stupified with fear, and all the Portuguese with their families, to the number of 1500, crowded into the Fort, adding to the clamour and confusion. The English however, still preserved their courage and made preparations for a stout defence of the Fort; small parties were detached to the neighbouring buildings that immediately overlooked the walls; these were the church, Mr. Eyre's, Mr. Cruttenden's and the Governor's houses.†

The enemy meanwhile had drilled the three guns that had been abandoned at the eastern Battery and turned them upon the Fort, whilst their infantry taking up a position behind the trenches that had been dug across the Park *for defence*, kept up an incessant fire of small arms upon the ramparts.‡

As night approached it was resolved to send all the European women on board the vessels lying off the Fort, which was accordingly done, and two Members of Council were deputed to superintend the arrangements; these two gentlemen, Messrs Manningham and Frankland, went on board the *Dodaly*, and not only refused to return when ordered by the President, but dropped down the following morning to Govindpore, an example subsequently followed by all the other vessels:—to this base desertion

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 68.

+ Ibid.

‡ Ibid.—Holwell, p. 309.

of their comrades much of the subsequent confusion and flight is to be attributed.*

A. D. 1756.
June.

At two in the morning a Council was held, at which all members of the service, and the respectable English residents were present, and after debating for two hours whether they should embark at once or defer the measure until the following evening, they broke up without any fixed determination;—but as the first proposition was not carried into execution, it was generally understood that the second was to be adopted. Previous to this however, the party stationed at the Governor's house had suffered so much from the enemy's fire that they were withdrawn, a measure which completely exposed the southern side of the Fort, the ware-houses built there precluding the possibility of any flanking defence from the bastions. At midnight the enemy made an attempt to escalate at this point, on which the Governor ordered the drums to beat the general alarm, when the assailants gave over the attempt, fancying the Garrison were on the alert;—this however, was far from being the case, for scarcely a man responded to the summons.†

Early the next morning the enemy renewed their attack,—they threw up a Battery of three guns in the south-west angle of the Park, from which and from the three pieces captured in the eastern Battery, they now cannonaded the Fort, whilst their matchlock-men kept up a hot fire upon the parties in the detached houses as also upon the parapets; they had not ventured to take possession of the Governor's house, and therefore another party under the command of Ensign Piccard was sent to re-occupy it. But the fire opposed to them was now found too hot, one by one the little party fell under it, until at last Ensign Piccard himself was wounded and compelled to return to the Fort, when the remainder of the detachment followed his example.‡—Upon this, the parties at the Church and other buildings were also called in, when the enemy immediately took possession of them, and flushed with this success, continued the attack with renewed vigour.

* Holwell, pp. 318 and 338.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 69.

‡ Ibid.

A. D. 1756. Terror and confusion now reigned within the walls and the
June. voice of order was completely drowned.

Most of the boats had deserted during the night, and when the embarkation of the Portuguese women and children was attempted, a fearful scene of confusion ensued ; the few boats available were so crowded by the numbers rushing into them, that several overset and many persons were drowned. A party of the Militia had been sent with the ladies the night before, none of whom returned,—and others fearing that all chance of safety would be lost, hastened to escape also : the enemy now commenced firing rockets at the vessels from the houses on the banks of the river, of which they had taken possession, and the crews, fearing that the ships would be set on fire, weighed anchor and following the example of the *Dodaly*, dropped down to Govindpore about three miles below the Fort.*

At this sight a regard for personal safety overcame the sense of honour and propriety in the breast of too many of those who should have been foremost in exhibiting an example of coolness and courage. Amongst these were Mr. Drake the Governor and Captain Minchin the Commandant of the troops, whose disgraceful example was followed by Captain Grant, Captains Lieutenant Smith and Wedderburn, Lieutenant Le Beaume and other Officers of the Militia, as also by the greater portion of that Corps, together with a few of the Subalterns and several men of the Regular Force.† Mr. Drake the Governor, had hitherto shown no want of personal courage, however much he may have been deficient in ability and experience. He had visited the works in the morning and had been active on the occasion of an alarm caused by an attack on the western side ; shortly after this, a report was brought

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 70. Mr. Cooke's narrative in first Report of the Select Committee, p. 10.

† Grose, vol. 2, p. 242, states that besides the Governor, 4 of the Council, 8 Gentlemen in the service, 4 Officers, 100 Soldiers, and Militia 52 Merchants, &c. 59 ladies and 33 children embarked and escaped to Fulta. Holwell in his narrative, pp. 315-6 mentions 4 Members of Council, a great number of Covenanted Servants, 3 Military Captains, and 8 or 9 Commissioned Officers, which last of course includes the Militia.

to him that the powder in store was all damp and unserviceable; although dismayed at this intelligence, he had the discretion to keep it secret, and exerted himself to restore some degree of order; but seeing that many of the Garrison had fled,—that only two boats remained, and that several of his friends and associates were embarking in one of them,—his dread of the consequences of Sooraj-oo-dowlah's anger overcame all other considerations,—he threw himself into the remaining boat and accompanied by several other gentlemen of the service, made his escape to the *Dodaly*.*

A. D. 1756.
June.

This had been done without any notice having been given to the Garrison, whose surprise and indignation at this dastardly desertion can easily be imagined: their total number was now reduced to 190, with no prospect of assistance and but one of escape before them; Mr. Peakes was the senior member of Council present, but he waived his rank and Mr. Holwell was unanimously elected to the charge of affairs: his first care was to lock the western gate leading to the river, with a view of preventing any further desertions. Attention was now turned to the means of defence and several vigorous attacks on the part of the enemy were gallantly repulsed: but the latter, having possessed themselves of the church and all the neighbouring buildings, kept up a hot and destructive fire upon the ramparts. To counteract this as much as possible, traverses were erected at intervals, composed of bales of broad cloth and cotton taken out of the ware-houses; these were also placed along the line of the thin parapet to strengthen it and serve as a protection against the enemy's artillery.

The only hope of safety that now remained, rested in the *Saint George* a Company's ship, commanded by Captain Thomas Hague, which on the approach of Sooraj-oo-dowlah, had been sent up to support the defence of Perring's redoubt.

A boat having been procured, Messrs Peakes and Lewis were sent up with instructions to the commander to bring

* Grose says, vol. 2, p. 242, that Mr. Drake declared himself a Quaker and embarked leaving the defence to Mr. Holwell.—This story however appears to be without foundation.

A. D. 1756. the vessel down to the Fort, so as to enable the garrison to
 June. make a general retreat; she arrived in sight about noon, and whilst all were watching the progress of this the last resource,—their only glimmering of hope was quenched by the ship striking hard and fast on a sand-bank, a little above the Fort, owing to the misconduct of the pilot, who lost his presence of mind.* Signals for assistance were now thrown out to the vessels that had dropped down the river but which were still in sight,—as it was hoped that their first panic being over, a consciousness of the cruelty and disgrace of abandoning their companions would have induced them to return and assist in covering their retreat,—the more so that their own safety was quite insured: but to their eternal infamy not an effort was made, although Captain Grant more than once urged the President to make the attempt,—a measure which Captain Young, the craven commander of the *Dodaly*, pronounced to be *dangerous*.† The ships consequently remained at anchor for two days until the Fort was taken, without making the slightest effort to release their unfortunate comrades,—which had they done/there can be no doubt that all might have been brought off. For the first panic and flight some extenuating circumstances might perhaps be found, but for this subsequent cowardly and inhuman conduct there can be no palliation.]

The enemy finding their direct attacks upon the Fort so determinedly foiled, gave over the attempt, but employed themselves in setting fire to all the adjacent buildings, including the Governor's and Mr. Cruttenden's houses, and the Marine Yard. The horrors of that evening, only to be exceeded by those of the following night, may be more easily imagined than described; the miserable survivors of the garrison, helpless and hopeless, were encompassed by the flames of the surrounding buildings, which lit up the whole scene and shone upon the camp of their ruthless enemies, the deserted and pillaged city and the stranded vessel in the river,—a sad emblem of their own hopes and prospects.

* Mr. Cooke's narrative, p. 10.

† Holwell, p. 324.

Early on the morning of the 20th, the Nawaub's force renewed the attack with increased numbers and vigour; an attempt was made to force an entrance by the windows left in the eastern curtain, and whilst the Garrison were occupied in repelling this onset, an alarm was spread that the enemy were scaling the north-western Bastion;—a portion of the force immediately hastened thither, and a severe struggle ensued for about an hour, during which period an exceedingly sharp fire was kept up on both sides; the besiegers at last gave over the attempt, and retired with heavy loss; but a brisk cannonade was continued from the Batteries, and an irregular but destructive fire maintained from the matchlocks. During this short period, twenty-five of the small Garrison had been killed or mortally wounded, and seventy more had received hurts of a less serious nature,*—whilst others having broken into the arrack stores had become completely intoxicated. Under these circumstances, it was deemed advisable to endeavour to pacify the Nawaub and obtain some terms. A letter was accordingly written by Omeen Chund, a wealthy and influential Hindoo, who had been retained as a prisoner in the Fort, directed to Monik Chund, the Governor of Hooghly, and one of the Nawaub's principal officers, soliciting his intercession in favour of the Garrison and offering to capitulate; this letter was conveyed by an Armenian, but no acknowledgment or reply was received.

A. D. 1756.
June.

About noon the fire of the enemy ceased altogether, and hopes were entertained as to a favourable result from the communication; at 2 P. M. it was languidly renewed, and about 4 o'clock an officer advanced from the enemy's ranks towards the Fort with a flag of truce, and made signs to the Garrison to desist from firing; on this Mr. Holwell hastened to the south-east Bastion and waiving another flag, ordered the firing to cease; he then threw over a letter he had ready, to the same effect, as that sent in the morning, but addressed to Rajah Doolub Ram, the Nawaub's Dewan. A parley ensued, during which the enemy gradually pressed up to the foot of the walls, when one party attempted to force the eastern gate and a second

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 72.

A. D. 1756. to cut down the pallisades near the south-west Bastion, June. whilst an escalade by the southern ware-houses was also attempted. Mr. Holwell, still hoping that matters might be accommodated, at first forbade all firing, and waived his flag of truce,—but in vain; the enemy re-commenced the attack, Mr Baillie was wounded by his side, and he again called the men to the ramparts,—but the call was ineffectual: many were dead, and more wounded; some drunk, and others worn out with fatigue, had retired to seek a little rest. In the mean time several of the Dutch soldiers had broken open the western gate of the Fort, intending to escape, of which the enemy immediately took advantage, and rushed in there, whilst others came pouring over the southern ware-houses and gained possession of the Fort. No further resistance was attempted, the remaining men laid down their arms, and the Nawaub's Troops fully occupied with the rich plunder of the place, refrained from bloodshed. A party of about twenty of the Garrison made an attempt to escape by the north-west Bastion, dropping from the embrasures; a few succeeded, but the greater number were overtaken and made prisoners.* About 5 o'clock the Nawaub entered the Fort, carried in an open litter, attended by Meer Jaffier Khan, his Bukhshee,† or General in chief, and most of his principal Officers; Mr. Holwell and the other gentlemen, who had been rifled and stripped of all their valuables, were brought before him with their hands bound; Sooraj-oo-dowlah ordered them to be unloosed, and promised Mr. Holwell *on the word of a soldier* that they should not be injured; he then asked for Mr. Drake, against whom he expressed himself much incensed: he seemed surprised to find so small a Garrison, and he gave permission to the Armenians and Portuguese to return to their houses at once. He then sent for Omeen Chund and Kissen Boolub, and received them civilly; he also sent to secure the Treasury and was loud in his disappointment at the smallness

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 73.

† Literally "Paymaster;"—in a native Army this officer generally exercises the chief command.

of the sum it was found to contain,—amounting only to 50,000 Rupees. He then appointed Monik Chund to the charge of the Fort and took his departure, repeating his assurances of safety to the prisoners.* As soon as it was dark, the whole party were collected in a body by their guards, whilst a fitting place was sought for their security. At first they were assembled in a low verandah running along the front of the Barracks, situated on the right hand of the eastern gateway; little suspecting the misery in store for them, they were laughing together at the oddity of their situation, when [about 8 o'clock they were ordered to move into a small room close at hand, which was the common dungeon of the Garrison, and generally known as the *Black Hole*. Horrified at this order they began to expostulate, when the Nawaub's Officer, who was superintending the arrangements, ordered his men to cut down any one who hesitated, and the whole party were accordingly forced into compliance. The tragedy of that night is too well known to render it necessary to go into its painful details; suffice it to say that the whole party, amounting to 146 souls, including one lady, a Mrs. Carey, wife of a Captain of one of the vessels, with several wounded officers and men, were thrust into a building about 18 feet square, having only two small barred windows on the western or leeward side, and those obstructed by a low verandah: this, too, at the hottest season of the year, immediately preceding the commencement of the rains, when the air is always close and sultry,—to which was to be added the effects of the conflagration on either side of them, loading the atmosphere with clouds of dense smoke.]

A. D. 1756.
June.

The consequences may be imagined;—a scene of unparalleled horror and suffering ensued. Moved by their misery, and a promised reward of a thousand rupees, the Jemadar who commanded the guard proceeded to endeavour to obtain permission to remove the whole or a portion into another room, but he shortly returned and reported that nothing could be

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 73. Holwell, p. 389.

A. D. 1756.
June.

done, as the Nawaub was asleep and no one dared to waken him. Phrenzy now spread amongst the devoted party, and "water! water!" was the general cry; some was brought, but this only increased their sufferings, for maddened by the sight, every one rushed and fought for a place near the window to obtain a share, and many were trampled to death in the attempt, whilst their inhuman guards stood laughing at the windows, and held up their torches to get a better view of the deadly struggles of their victims. Every moment their miseries were enhanced, fever seized upon all, and as the majority perished, a dreadful stench arose from their putrifying bodies;—by two o'clock in the morning not more than fifty remained alive. Soon after day-break the Nawaub hearing of what had occurred, sent to know if Mr. Holwell was yet living, and ordered the release of the survivors; but so numerous were the dead, and so weak and reduced were the few still in existence, that nearly half an hour was occupied in removing the bodies from around the door which opened inwards:—at last 23 ghastly figures, all that remained alive, emerged from this fearful prison.* Mr. Holwell, unable to stand and scarcely able to speak, was dragged before the Nawaub, who instead of commiserating his sufferings threatened him with further punishment if he persisted in refusing to reveal the spot where the Company's treasures were concealed; an idea of which the Nawaub could not divest himself. In vain Mr. Holwell assured him that no treasure existed,—he was only disbelieved, threatened, abused, and finally made over as a prisoner to the charge of Meer Moodeen, together with Messrs Court, Burdet, and Ensign Walcott, who were all placed in a hackery and carried to the Camp, when they were thrust together into a miserable little tent about four feet long and three wide, where they lay half in and half out, exposed to the sun, whilst their bodies, from the result of the preceding evening, broke out into one mass of boils and ulcers.

* A detailed account of this fearful catastrophe is to be found in Mr. Holwell's narrative, published in his *India Tracts*, and in Mr. Secretary Cooke's narrative in the First Report of the Select Committee. Vide Appendix D.

Amongst those who perished on that fatal night were nearly all the Military, including Captains Clayton, Buchanan, and Witherington, Lieutenants Bishop, Hays, Blagg, Simpson, and Bellamy, Ensigns Piccard, Scott, Hastings, and Wedderburn; with Ensigns Coales and Dumbleton of the Militia, and 74 non-commissioned officers and privates of the Regular and Militia force. The only commissioned officer who survived was Ensign Walcot; Mr. Patrick Moran, who subsequently received a commission and rose to be a Captain in the service, and 13 men of the Regulars and Militia also remained alive. Mrs. Carey,* her husband having died during the night, was reserved for the Zenana of Meer Jaffier Khán, but the few remaining prisoners were set at liberty and allowed to go where they chose; they all hastened to leave a scene of such horrors, and crawled down to Govindpore, *where the vessels were still at anchor*,—and after some difficulty they contrived to get on board. “*Here*,” says Mr. Orme, “*their appearance, and the dreadful tale they had to tell, were the severest reproaches to those on board, who intent only on their own preservation, had made no efforts to facilitate the escape of the rest of the garrison; never perhaps was such an opportunity of performing an heroic action so ignominiously neglected: for a single sloop, with fifteen brave men on board, might in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, have come up, and anchoring under the Fort, carried away all those who suffered in the dungeon.*”†

But even when escaped from the Fort, their fears were not at rest,—for in attempting to proceed down the river on the 20th, they were exposed to the fire of a few guns mounted by the enemy on the Fort of Tannah, by which a snow and a sloop were driven on shore, when the others all returned to their station at Govindpore,—where they remained until the 24th, on which date they were joined by three ships from Bombay, which passed the Fort without receiving any injury, viz.,

* The author of the *Sier Mutakherin* states that some other Ladies were made prisoners, but reserved and restored to their husbands by Meerza Emir Beg, Vide Appendix E.

† Orme, vol. 2, pp. 77-8.

A. D. 1756. the *Success*, the *Speedwell*, and the *Bombay frigate*.*— Encouraged by this reinforcement, they weighed anchor and passed Tannah with the loss of only two lascars; on the 25th they sailed by Budge Budge, where another vessel was stranded by bad management, and on the following day they reached Fultah, which was then a place of some importance, having a town with a large bazar, and was moreover the station of all the Dutch shipping. The monsoon being against them as regarded further progress, they determined, if not driven away by the Nawaub, to remain at Fultah until the season changed.

In the mean time Sooraj-oo-dowlah was occupied in collecting the plunder of Calcutta, the amount of which greatly disappointed him; he accordingly ordered Mr. Holwell and his companions to Moorshedabad, in the hope of finally obtaining the information as to where the supposed treasure was concealed; they were taken up in an open boat, still in irons, without clothing, and with no food but rice and water, and treated with great insult and cruelty during the passage. On arrival at Moorshedabad, they were lodged in a miserable cowhouse; but the gentlemen of the Dutch and French Factories did their utmost to alleviate their wants and misfortunes. Here they found Messieurs Hastings and Chambers who had been made prisoners after the capture of Kossimbazar, but had obtained their liberty at the intercession of the French and Dutch agents, who were security for their appearance; Messrs Watts and Collet were in like manner set at liberty at Chinsurah.

The Nawaub having ransacked Calcutta, changed its name to Alinuggur,† appointed Monik Chund Governor of the Fort, and flattering himself that he had for ever extirpated the English power, thought it unnecessary to follow up the small party of refugees assembled at Fultah.

He commenced his march to Moorshedabad on the 2nd July; but on the way he sent detachments to Chinsurah and Chandernagore, the head-quarters of the Dutch and French,

* Holwell, p. 283.

† Orme, Vol. 2, p. 80.

threatening to destroy their factories and extirpate them also, A. D. 1756. and compelling them to purchase their safety by the payment of 450,000 Rs., from the Dutch, and 350,000 Rs., from the French;—the difference in favour of the latter, being in consideration of a supply of 200 chests of gunpowder with which they had furnished him when on his way down to attack Calcutta.* On his arrival at Moorshedabad, he issued an order sequestrating all merchandise and effects belonging to the English or their tenants throughout his dominions; and finding that nothing was to be got from Mr. Holwell or his companions, he at length released them and permitted them to go where they pleased. They immediately hastened to the Dutch factory at Chinsurah, and from thence ultimately joined the fleet at Fultah.

[In the meantime, a very acceptable reinforcement from Madras had arrived at that station, in the beginning of August, consisting of 230 troops, chiefly Europeans, under the command of Major Kilpatrick of the Madras Service. This measure originated in orders from England, issued many months previously, when the Court anticipating that some troubles and disturbances might arise in Bengal on the death of Ali Verdee Khan, an event of which they were in daily expectation, had determined to be in a state of preparation, and had directed that the Bengal force should be increased by drafts from Madras, and that Major Kilpatrick should be sent round to Calcutta to command the whole force, with a seat in Council at that Presidency.† This order, however, was not carried into effect until the news was received at Madras of the surrender of Kossimbazar, which reached them on the 15th July. Major Kilpatrick and his detachment were then immediately embarked on board the *Delaware*, a Company's ship; they left Madras on the 20th July, and reached Fultah on the 2nd August.]

* Orme, p. 80.

† First Report of the Select Committee. Appendix, pp. 69-70.

‡ Orme, vol. 2, pp. 84 and 120. Williams, in his history of the Bengal Native Infantry, p. 135, states that this detachment was the foundation of the Grenadier Company of the Bengal European Regiment. This is apparently a mistake, as in

A. D. 1758.

Mr. Boddom, the Agent at Balasore, accompanied by two other gentlemen, and 25 European soldiers, under the command of Ensign Carstairs, also joined the Fleet at Fultah; as did Mr. Amyatt, the Agent at Jugdeah, with four other gentlemen of the Civil Service, viz., Messrs, Pleydell, Verelst. Smith, and Hay, and 20 soldiers under the command of Ensign Grainger Muir; Mr. Richard Beecher, the Agent, at Dacca, with Lieutenant Cudmore and six other gentlemen, four of whom were members of Council, three ladies and 24 soldiers, were made prisoners at that station, but were humanely treated and permitted to reside at the French factory there,—from the gentlemen belonging to which they experienced much kindness and attention, and finally through their intercession obtained their liberty;—when they also proceeded to Fultah.* Such of the Europeans as had escaped from Fort William, during the assault, of whom there must have been nearly 100, proceeded at once to, or subsequently joined at Fultah, as did also many of the Armenians and Portuguese; these for the most part belonged to the regular force or to the Militia, and of the latter, the greater portion having no other resource, entered the regular Companies, a course likewise adopted by several of the Militia officers; the more respectable portion of the inhabitants, however, including a number of the Civil Servants, formed themselves into a separate Volunteer Company, amongst these was Mr. Warren Hastings, afterwards Governor General; Mr. John Johnstone, a young Writer, attached himself to the Artillery in which he served as a Lieutenant for some time. Several vessels also had arrived from England, Bombay, and elsewhere, which tended to strengthen the fleet, and one or two additional officers had also joined, amongst whom the name of Captain Dugald Campbell is specially mentioned. Captains Minchin and Grant were sentenced to be dismissed the service for their desertion of their post; but Captain Grant put in a statement in his own vindication, in which he particularly and distinctly affirm-

the first place, scarcely a man of this detachment remained alive six months; and in the second, the Grenadier Company that come round with Lord Clive a few months after and was incorporated in the Bengal Battalion, would have formed the more natural and probable foundation.

* First Report of the select Committee, p. 12, Grose, vol. II, p. 251.

cd that he had urged Mr. Drake to return the same evening A. D. 1756. that they fled from the Fort, to succour those left behind;—and that there was truth in this assertion may be inferred from the fact of his being re-admitted into the service. It does not appear that either Captains Minchin or Grant were tried by a Court Martial, but on the contrary, that they received their sentence of dimissal from the Governor and Council,—most of whom must have blushed to record their decision. The total force collected at this time could not have been less than 400 or 450 men, to which were also attached 4 light field pieces, most probably brought round with Major Kilpatrick's detachment. Amongst the officers belonging to this force, the following names are traceable: Captains Dugald Campbell, Alexander Grant, Smith and H. Wedderburn; Lieutenants Le Beaume and Cudmore, Ensigns Carstairs, Muir, Walcott, Douglas, Sommers and Moran.* Dr. Nathaniel Wilson appears to have acted as Surgeon to the force. With exception to Lieut. Johnstone, no Artillery Officers are mentioned, though there is sufficient evidence that there must have been some present. It appears probable that Lieut. John Kinch was one of them, but whether he originally belonged to the garrison or not, is uncertain. Of the officers that came round with Major Kilpatrick, no names can now be traced,* except that of Mr. Archibald Keir, who was Surgeon on board the *Delaware*; his services as a Medical man were very acceptable, and he also acted as Secretary to the Council. When the *Delaware* was ordered home, he accepted a Lieutenant's commission, and was shortly after appointed Quarter Master of the force and finally obtained his company.

But though they were thus early enabled to muster so considerable a force at Fultah, they were wretchedly provided with arms, ammunition, stores, and even with clothing; nor were they much better off for provisions. Their numbers too, soon began to decrease at a fearful rate, especially in Major Kilpatrick's detachment, in which the mortality was very great. Partly from the absence of sufficient shelter on shore, and partly from fear of

* This list, small as it is, has been collected from various sources.

A. D. 1756. surprise, they all slept on board the vessels,—where from want of room, they were compelled to occupy the open decks. This exposure during the rainy season, coupled with bad food and other privations, brought on a malignant fever, which infected all the ships, and ultimately carried off a majority of the party, leaving the remainder in a wretchedly reduced and pitiable condition.

To make matters worse, the Council, instead of turning their attention to the adoption of measures calculated to improve the health, comfort, or safety of the troops, passed their whole time in disputes, intrigues and mutual recrimination : the only point on which they were all agreed, was the necessity of sending some one to Madras to represent the real state of affairs, as also the misery and danger of their present position, and to solicit a reinforcement and further assistance. This was one of the first measures they decided on, and accordingly Mr. Manningham and Lieut Le Beaume were selected for this duty ; they left Fultah in a small vessel about the middle of July, and reached Madras in the early part of August.

CHAPTER II.*

FROM THE CAPTURE OF CALCUTTA IN 1756, TO THE DEFEAT AND DEATH OF SOORAJ-OO-DOWLAH IN JUNE 1757.

ALTHOUGH intelligence of the danger impending over the Bengal Presidency had reached Madras in July 1756, and had led to the dispatch of the *Delaware* with the detachment under Major Kilpatrick, the news of the capture of Calcutta and the catastrophe attendant on it, was not received at Fort St. George until the 5th of August following.

The narrative of the murder of so many of their countrymen and of the sufferings of the remaining survivors, excited the liveliest horror and resentment in the minds of all at that Presidency, at the same time that, under the then existing state of affairs, it occasioned no little perplexity.

The Military force of the French and English on the Madras Coast, was at this time nearly equal,—each consisting of about 2,000 Europeans and 10,000 Native soldiers. The British European force was composed of Colonel Adlcreron's Regiment, (H. M.'s 39th Foot,) with a small detail of Royal Artillery attached to serve the Regimental field-pieces, the Madras European Regiment, and a strong Company of Artillery. The Sipahis were supplied with arms and ammunition from the public stores, but were clothed in the native fashion, commanded by native officers, and possessed but little discipline.

Intelligence had been received from England a short time previous, that a renewal of hostilities with France was

* The works chiefly consulted in this Chapter, are the following :—

Orme's Military Transactions in Indostan, vol. 2nd.

Ives' Voyage and Historical Narrative, 1 vol., 4to.

The Seir Mutakherin, Calcutta edition, vol. 1st.

Caraccioli's Life of Lord Clive, 4 vols., 8vo.

Malcolm's Life of Lord Clive, 3 vols., 8vo.

Grose's Voyage to the East Indies, vol. 2nd.

First Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1773.

Wilson's Edition of Mill's British India, vol. 3rd.

Annual Register. Various years.

Hansard's Parliamentary History. Various years.

General Military Register of the Bengal establishment, 1 vol. folio. Calcutta, 1795.

A. D. 1756. almost inevitable, and that the Government of that Nation was preparing an expedition at Brest, consisting of 19 ships of war and 3000 troops, avowedly destined for Pondicherry. Under these circumstances, a force could ill be spared from the Madras Presidency :—but on the other hand, the strong and natural desire to avenge the cause of their injured countrymen, to alleviate their distresses, and to retrieve the national honor, rendered some exertion imperative ; and that, to be of any avail, required to be on a liberal and effective footing. Added to this, the loss of the revenues derivable from the Bengal trade, would be sufficient to ruin the Company's interests in India ; and if measures were not taken to retrieve their misfortunes before the expected arrival of the French reinforcements, the union of that Nation with the Nawaub of Bengal would render all future efforts at recovering their position much more difficult and hopeless. There was also the chance that any expedition detached at once to Bengal, might effect its object and return to Madras before it would be absolutely required at the latter settlement. Fortunately the French had no Naval Force in India at the time, whilst Admiral Watson with the squadron under his command was then in the roads, having lately arrived from the Bombay side, where in conjunction with a force under Colonel Clive, he had destroyed the piratical power of the notorious Toolagee Angria, and taken the strong fort of Gherriah.

After much discussion and delay, it was accordingly determined to send a sufficient military force with the fleet, to recover Calcutta and restore the interests and position of the English in Bengal,—after affecting which, they were to return immediately to Madras. A further delay arose in deciding who should be nominated to command the expedition. Mr. Pigot, the Governor of Fort St. George, was anxious for the appointment, and his position as the representative and senior agent of the Company, would have been advantageous in arranging the civil and political details;—but his want of all military knowledge and experience was a decided bar. Colonel Adlerson then claimed the command, offering to take his whole Regiment with him if nominated to it ;—but his ignorance of the country and the people, and his total

want of experience in the irregular warfare that might A. D. 1756. be expected, was considered a sufficient objection, whilst there existed a still more potent one in the fact of his independence of the Company's powers and authority. The gallant Colonel Stringer Lawrence, who commanded the Company's force on the Coast, was severely afflicted with asthma, to which it was feared that the damp and fogs of Bengal would prove so adverse, as probably to incapacitate him from active duty. Under these circumstances, Colonel Robert Clive, the second in command of the Company's troops, was selected for the important charge ; and to enable him to adopt the most vigorous line of proceeding, and thus insure his earlier return to the Coast, he was vested with independent powers in all matters connected with the military arrangements, liberally supplied with money, and empowered to draw bills on the Madras Government.*

Mr. Drake the Governor, and the Council in Bengal, were still acknowledged as constituting a Presidency, and allowed to retain full powers in all commercial and civil affairs ; they were likewise furnished with considerable pecuniary aid.

Two months were lost in these debates, before the final resolutions were adopted and the embarkation commenced ; the *Kingfisher* sloop of war was however, despatched at once to inform the unfortunate party at Fultah that assistance would speedily arrive.

The expedition consisted of five of His Majesty's ships of war, the *Kent* of 64 guns, bearing the flag of Admiral Watson commanding ; the *Cumberland* of 70 guns, carrying Admiral Pococke's flag ; the *Tiger* of 60, the *Salisbury* of 50, and the *Bridgewater* of 20 guns : the *Blaze* was also intended to have formed a portion of the squadron, but being unable to make the passage was obliged to bear away to Bombay ; Captain King, who commanded her, served however as a volunteer in the *Kent*. To these were added the *Protector*, *Walpole*, *Marlborough*, and two other Company's vessels as transports, and also a Fire-ship.† The military force embarked consisted of

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 88.

† The strength and constitution of the Fleet is gathered from Orme and Ives.

A. D. 1756. about 900 Europeans, of whom 250, forming three Companies, belonged to H. M.'s 39th Regiment, who were shipped, not without considerable objections on the part of Colonel Adlercron, and on the understanding that they were only to be employed as Marines on board the fleet; * they were commanded by Captain Archibald Grant of that Corps, with whom were Captains Eyre Coote and Weller, Lieutenants Waggoner, Corneille, and Carnac, Ensigns Yorke, Donnellan, and Broadbridge. The 4 field-pieces and the detail of Royal Artillery attached to this Regiment, were also embarked, but subsequently relanded on Colonel Adlercron's refusal to sanction their going, unless he went himself. The remainder was composed of five Companies of the Madras European Battalion, each Company completed to 100 Privates, making a total with the non-commissioned officers, of about 570 men; together with a detachment of about 80 Artillery under Lieutenant William Jennings, who had been appointed Adjutant of the Train in 1755. To these were added 1200 Sipahis, a few field pieces, and a considerable supply of military stores. Two of the Companies of the Madras Battalion, never reached Bengal, which materially reduced the Force actually employed. The three Companies that were landed, of which one was composed of Grenadiers, appear to have been commanded by Captains F. Gaupp, Pye, and Fraser; and amongst the officers attached to them were Lieutenants R. Campbell, T. Rumbold and Adnet, Ensigns R. L. Knox, L. MacLean and H. Oswald;—Captain Briggs† of the same Corps was Aide-de-camp to Colonel Clive, and Mr. Walsh was Paymaster to the detachment.‡ All being completed, the fleet set sail on the 16th October 1756. This was unfortunately the worst season of the year for reaching Bengal, the monsoon blowing dead against them. The

* The 39th Regt. had served as a Marine Battalion for about 5 years, previous to its going to India;—vide services of that Corps in the Naval and Military Magazine for March 1827.

† Malcolm, vol. 1, pp. 137-40.

‡ These are all the names that can now be traced, it is possible that some of these even might have belonged to Major Kilpatrick's detachment. Lieutenant Rumbold did not accompany the fleet, but joined subsequently from Vizagapatam.

Admiral was consequently compelled to steer across to the Tenasserim Coast, and thence beat over to Balasore roads; the weather was very tempestuous, and the progress of the fleet but slow. At one time the *Salisbury* was in some danger, having sprung a leak; the Fire-ship, unable to stem the violence of the monsoon, bore away to Ceylon, and the *Marlborough*, the largest of the Company's ships, being a heavy sailer, was left behind; the rest of the fleet arrived in soundings off Point Palmyras on the 1st December. Here the *Cumberland* and *Salisbury* grounded, but were fortunately got off with the tide; the *Cumberland* was however, compelled to bear away to Vizagapatam; the remaining vessels were detained several days in Balasore roads, waiting for the spring tides; but at last they reached Fultah,—the *Kent* on the 11th, the *Tiger* on the 15th, and all the other vessels by the 20th of December. The absence of the *Cumberland* and the *Marlborough* greatly impaired the efficiency of the expedition, as on board the former were about 300 of the European troops, and on the latter the greater part of the field artillery and military stores.*

The miserable remnant of the Presidency assembled at Fultah, were overjoyed at the arrival of these reinforcements, and their delight and good spirits struck the new-comers as affording a remarkable contrast to their wretched condition. Sickness and death had been so fearfully busy amongst them, that out of the party of 230 men brought round by Major Kilpatrick, one-half had sunk into the grave, and only about thirty of those who survived were fit for active duty;† the remnant of the Bengal Military force, from being more accustomed to the climate, appears to have fared better, and was now able to join the force, strengthened by the Company of Volunteers formed from amongst the Civilians and respectable European inhabitants who had escaped from Calcutta and the out-factories, which Company now mustered upwards of 70 officers and men.

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 120, says, that 250 European Troops were on board the *Cumberland*, but he proves, pp. 142-3, that there must have been at least 300.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 120.—Ives, p. 99, states, that to the best of his remembrance not above 30 remained alive, and not above 10 fit for duty.

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Colonel Clive's first measure was to despatch the letters he had brought from the Madras Government, together with one from himself and one from Admiral Watson, to Monik Chund, the Governor of Calcutta, for transmission to the Nawaub. These were forwarded open, and Monik Chund having read them, declined to send them on, as being written in too menacing a style : immediate hostilities were accordingly determined on.

The Nawaub, who imagined that by the capture of Calcutta he had destroyed the English power completely, was perfectly astonished when he heard of the arrival of this armament ; but he immediately ordered an assemblage of his whole army at Moorshedabad, preparatory to marching towards Calcutta. Monik Chund, the Governor of the latter place, was however, better acquainted with the real state of affairs, and expecting a renewal of the war, had busied himself in strengthening the defences and improving his garrison :—he had repaired the fort of Tannah and commenced another on the opposite bank, which he named Alighur ; he had also a couple of ships ready prepared, laden with bricks, to be sunk in the stream between the two ; and the Fort of Budge Budge, lower down the river on the left bank, was strongly fortified and garrisoned.

The expedition left Fultah on the 27th December, and anchored off Moyapore the following day. As the Fort of Budge Budge was the first object of attack, it was arranged that the ships should move up abreast and cannonade it ; and with a view of intercepting the retreat of the garrison, that Colonel Clive should make a detour with the land force so as to get to the northward of the Fort, between it and Calcutta.

Leaving 130 men of Adlercron's Regiment, ~~all~~ that had arrived, to act as marines on board the ships, Clive started before sunset on the 28th, with the Company's European troops and the whole of the Sipahis, accompanied by a couple of light field-pieces and a tumbril, * all drawn by the troops,

* Of these field-pieces, Clive says in a letter to Mr. Pigot, dated 8th January 1757, that after all the trouble they occasioned they were of little use "having neither tubes nor portfires, and wrong carriages sent with them from Fort St. David."—Malcolm, vol. 1, p. 154.

as no draught cattle were procurable. The native guides to whom they were compelled to trust, led them by a circuitous route into the interior, through an uninhabited part of the district, full of swamps, and intersected with numerous water-courses; the labour of dragging the carriages through such a country was excessive; after great hardship and fatigue for 15 hours, the troops reached their destination about 8 o'clock the next morning. The spot selected was a large hollow, the bed of a lake in the rainy season, about 10 feet below the level of the country, and surrounded by jungle; it was situated nearly a mile and a half north-east of the Fort, and about a mile from the river, midway to which latter, led the main road from the Fort to Calcutta. The eastern and part of the southern bank of the hollow were skirted by an abandoned village and its enclosures. The European Grenadiers and 300 Sipahis were detached to a village on the banks of the river, under the impression that their appearance would induce the garrison to suppose the whole English force were stationed there, and thus lead them to retreat by the main road instead of by the river route; the Volunteer Company was posted amongst the thickets adjoining the main road, towards the river side, so that their fire might drive the enemy in the direction of the hollow where the main body was stationed. The two field-pieces were planted on the north side of the village, and the remaining troops stationed amongst the buildings and under the banks of the hollow. These arrangements being completed, the men, who were all exceedingly fatigued with their arduous night's march, were permitted to quit their arms and rest themselves, and in a short time all were fast asleep;—so tired and worn out was the whole party, that even the ordinary precaution of posting sentries appears to have been most unaccountably and unwarrantably neglected.*

Monik Chund, the Governor of Calcutta, had arrived to the support of Budge Budge the previous day, with a force of 1500 horse and 2000 foot, and having been made acquainted by his spies with the movements of the British and their

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 123.

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present state of fancied security, he immediately determined to attack them; but his arrangements were better planned than executed. The troops had scarcely been asleep an hour, when they were unexpectedly aroused by a rapid but irregular fire of small arms from the neighbouring thicket and enclosures, more especially from the eastern side of the village, towards which a large body of matchlock-men were observed hastening to obtain possession of it. All immediately ran to their arms, which were laying on the ground about 60 yards from the eastern bank, and there formed line as they came up; but unfortunately in the confusion, the Artillerymen instead of repairing to their own post at the guns, hastened to seek protection in the line, thus depriving the detachment of its chief means of defence. During this confusion the enemy gained possession of the whole eastern bank, from whence, themselves under cover, they kept up an irregular but galling fire on the detachment, by which an Ensign and several men were killed.*

Clive, whose coolness and intrepidity never deserted him under the most trying circumstances, took in the whole state of affairs at a single glance:—to have removed the troops out of reach of the enemy's fire, would, he feared, be likely to cause a panic; he therefore ordered them to stand fast, but directed a platoon from the right and another from the centre to advance and drive the enemy from the bank; these detachments moved forward under a heavy fire, and the platoon from the centre lost eight men before they reached the bank; they persevered however, gained their object, and after pouring in a volley, cleared the line with their bayonets, driving the enemy towards the village where they were met by the right platoon, who more fortunate, had only lost three men:—this intrepid conduct astonished the enemy, who immediately began to fall back, and sought shelter under cover of the jungle and enclosures, from which they kept up a continued but ineffectual fire, although some of their officers were observed gallantly exerting themselves to induce them once more to ad-

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 123.

vance. In the interim, the Company of Bengal Volunteers having heard the firing, hastened to the scene of action and arrived in time to recover the two guns, which the enemy had seized but were unable to use; on this the Artillerymen immediately joined them and opened a fire on the enemy, who fled for support towards a large body of Cavalry which was now seen advancing towards the hollow; on meeting these fugitives, the horsemen halted and drew up in order, at the distance of about half a mile, headed by Monik Chund himself. Clive then formed his detachment in line and hastened to engage them, supported by his field-pieces, which fired as the party advanced; the enemy stood firm for some time, until a shot from one of the guns passed close to the head of Monik Chund, who was mounted on an elephant, when he immediately gave the signal for retreat, and the whole body moved rapidly off towards Calcutta. / On this Clive marched his entire detachment towards the village on the bank of the river, where they met Major Kilpatrick with his party advancing to their assistance.*

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In the mean time, the Admiral's ship, the *Kent*, having out-sailed the rest of the fleet, anchored before the Fort, and opening a heavy fire, soon silenced that of the enemy and made a breach in the ramparts; but the troops having endured so much fatigue already, it was determined to defer the assault until the ensuing morning; they accordingly passed the remainder of the day in the village, without any recurrence of hostilities on either side, and in the evening were joined by a party of 250 sailors, destined to aid in the assault, under the command of Captain King; two 24-pounder guns were also landed for the purpose.

At night all was perfectly quiet,—not a sound was to be heard save the measured tread or occasional challenge of the sentries posted round the camp, a precaution not neglected a second time; when suddenly the whole force was aroused by shouts and firing in the direction of the Fort; which disturbance originated in the following circumstance. Several of the sailors excited by finding themselves once more on shore,

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 124.

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with the prospect of active employment and a liberal allowance of liquor that had been distributed that evening, strolled out to take a look at the Fort; one of these named Strahan, more adventurous than the rest, got up close to the walls unperceived, and finding that the guns had made a practicable breach in one of the Bastions, could not resist the inclination to ascend it; on reaching the top, he found a party of the garrison sitting together smoking; being armed, he immediately fired a pistol amongst them, and waving his cutlass, shouted out "the place is mine," giving three hearty cheers at the same time; the enemy recovering from their surprise, and perceiving that he was alone, immediately attacked him; he defended himself with great intrepidity and skill, until at last his sword broke off close to the hilt, when he would have been overpowered, had not some of his comrades, who heard his shouts, opportunely arrived to his assistance. A sharp conflict now ensued, the troops rushed to the Fort to join in the attack, and the garrison, of which a considerable portion had previously retreated, fled in all directions. The only casualty on this occasion was that of Captain Dugald Campbell of the Bengal service, who whilst leading on a Company of the Sipahis, was shot by some of the sailors, who mistook them for a party of the enemy.* Captain Eyre Coote, commanding the detachment of King's troops that had landed, took possession of the Fort that night, and a salute was fired the following morning. Eighteen pieces of cannon, from 24-pounders downwards, and forty barrels of powder were found in the place.

Strahan, the hero of the previous evening's adventure, was brought before Admiral Watson, who, however much he might admire the individual bravery exhibited, considered it necessary to show his displeasure at the breach of discipline that had been committed. On being called upon for explanation of his conduct, Strahan replied, scratching his head with one hand and holding his hat in the other—"Why, to be sure, Sir, "it was I that took the Fort, but I hope there was no harm "in it." The Admiral scarcely able to repress a smile at the

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 125.—Warren Hastings subsequently married the widow of this Officer.

simplicity of the answer, expatiated on the consequences that might have ensued from such irregular conduct, and finally dismissed him with a severe rebuke, and a threat of punishment; Strahan somewhat surprised at this turn of affairs, no sooner found himself clear of the cabin, than he exclaimed, "Well, if I am flogged for this 'ere action, I will never take another Fort by myself as long as I live, by G—d."

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It is needless to say that no punishment was awarded, and had his conduct been a little more steady, the Admiral would doubtless have promoted him on the first favorable opportunity.*

The operations of the morning attack at the hollow, had effected a change in the opinions of both parties; the courage and resolution displayed by the British, effectually removed the contemptuous opinion which Monik Chund and his followers had entertained of English troops, from what they had witnessed six months previously at Calcutta; whilst the skill with which the attack was planned, gave rise to an opinion on the part of the English, much more favourable to the enemy than circumstances warranted.

Clive has been greatly blamed by some writers for his conduct on this occasion, whilst by others, attempts equally injudicious have been made to exculpate him entirely.

That a want of prudence was exhibited in the choice of a position so easily assailable, is too obvious to admit of denial, and the neglect of the ordinary precaution of planting sentries was inexcusable; but on the other hand, it should be stated that Clive himself was suffering severely from sickness at the time, which the fatigues of the previous evening must have greatly aggravated,—that he was entirely opposed to the arrangement from the commencement,—that he had in vain applied to the Admiral for boats to take the troops to the point of debarkation, and thus save them the fatigue of the long night

* Mr. Ives, who was Surgeon to the *Kent* during the expedition, and an intimate friend of the Admiral, gives this anecdote in detail, and mentions in a note that he subsequently received a visit from Strahan in England, who having served throughout the war under Admiral Pococke, was then a pensioner, and was looking forward to an appointment of Cook on board a first class ship, as the height of his ambition.

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march, and that having had no time or opportunity of judging for himself, he was entirely at the mercy of the guides furnished to him, who appear to have played him false;—above all, if the first fault rested with him, it should not be forgotten that it was his coolness, decision, and judgment, that retrieved the error and saved the force,—turning what might have been a most serious disaster, into a brilliant success. Monik Chund was so impressed with the determined conduct he had witnessed, that he remained only a few hours at Calcutta, where he left a garrison of 500 men to defend the place, and hastened off to join the Nawaub at Moorsheda-bad, and report as his fears dictated, the serious character of this new invasion.

On the 30th, the European troops all re-embarked, and the following morning the fleet weighed anchor, the Sipahis marching upwards along the bank of the river.* On the 1st January 1757, the squadron anchored opposite the Forts of Tannah and Alighur, where the *Kingfisher* Sloop of War had arrived a few days previous, and had deterred the Governor of Hooghly from sinking in the channel, the vessels laden with bricks, which he had prepared for that purpose. The enemy abandoned these Forts, which together mounted 50 pieces of cannon, without firing a shot.

Early on the morning of the 2d, Colonel Clive landed with all the Company's European troops, and joined by the Sipahis, marched along the high road to Calcutta.

The fleet at the same time weighed anchor, with the exception of the *Salisbury*, which vessel remained behind to bring off the abandoned guns and to destroy the works. The *Tiger* arrived opposite to Calcutta the first of the squadron, quickly followed however by the *Kent*, but from want of wind, neither vessel could at first get their broadsides to bear, during which time the enemy opened a brisk fire, and killed 9 men on board the *Kent*, and 7 on board the *Tiger* ;

* Ives, p. 101, himself an eye-witness, is very explicit in his statement to this effect. Orme, however, vol. 2, p. 125, says that the Europeans and Sipahis were landed on the morning of the 2nd January, near the new Fort of Alighur.

but as the ships took up their positions and commenced to return the cannonade, the fire from the Fort slackened, and the enemy observing that Colonel Clive, with the troops, had nearly invested the place on the land side, abandoned the defence and hastened to seek safety in flight.*

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On this some of the old inhabitants of the town made signals for the vessels to cease firing, and hoisted an old British ensign on a tree, when the Admiral sent Captain Eyre Coote with a Company of the 39th Regiment in boats, to take possession of the Fort in His Majesty's name. Immediately afterwards Colonel Clive arrived, and Captain Coote exhibited a commission from the Admiral appointing him (Coote) Governor of the Fort; Clive was naturally surprised at such conduct, and refused to acknowledge Captain Coote's commission, demanding obedience to his own orders on the score of his own Royal commission as a Lieutenant-Colonel. A reference was made to the Admiral, who insisted upon Colonel Clive abandoning the Fort, threatening in case of refusal to fire upon him. Clive persisted in his resolution, saying, that he could not be answerable for the consequences of the Admiral's conduct. Captain Latham however, now came on shore, and being on intimate terms of friendship with both parties, succeeded in arranging this most unpleasant dispute; it was accordingly agreed that the Admiral himself should land, and as the senior Officer, assume the command, and that he should then make it over to Mr. Drake, the Company's representative and Governor of the Settlement;—this was done, and Colonel Clive made over the keys to Admiral Watson on the following day, who then immediately delivered them to Mr. Drake.†

Thus early commenced the jealousy and disputes between the two services, which have since, too frequently, reflected discredit on the parties concerned, and caused much inconvenience and detriment to the interests of the state.

* Orme, vol. 2. pp. 125-6.—Ives, p. 102.

† Ives, p. 102—Sir J. Malcolm in his Memoirs of Lord Clive, says, on the authority of a note from Captain Speke, that Clive only resigned the command for the time, on the understanding that it was to be subsequently restored to him.

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The first act of the authorities was to issue a proclamation of war against the Nawaub,—the Admiral on the part of the King, and the Governor on that of the Company.

The greater portion of the Company's merchandize, that had been left in the Fort in June last, was found untouched, having been reserved for the use of the Nawaub; but all private property of any value had been carried away, and most of the European dwelling-houses had either been demolished or greatly injured by fire, leaving a sad spectacle to the poverty-stricken possessors on their return. In the Fort itself, little or no change had been made in the plan of the works, beyond repairing them, but some of the buildings had been destroyed to furnish material for a mosque which had been erected in the centre of the place. Most of the Native inhabitants of the lower orders had returned to their houses, but the more wealthy had held aloof, fearful of the avarice and oppression of Monik Chund.

It was soon ascertained that the successes of the English had created a panic in the minds of all the native authorities in the neighbourhood, and that the greatest consternation existed at Hooghly, an immediate attack upon that town being expected. Intelligence was also received that the Nawaub would not be able to quit Moorshedabad with his Army for some days; under these circumstances, it was resolved to lose no time, but to send off a detachment to Hooghly at once.

Accordingly 200 Europeans, including nearly all the men of Adlercron's Regiment that had arrived, under Captain Coote, together with 250 Sipahis, were embarked on board the *Bridge-water*, Captain Smith; the *Kingfisher*, Captain Toby; and the *Thunder* Bomb-ketch, Captain Warwick; which latter vessel had recently joined the squadron in the river; to these were added several of the boats of the fleet, manned by 150 sailors, under the command of Captain King.* /

* Orme, pp. 126-7.—Ives, pp. 104-5.—Mill puts a most illiberal construction on this expedition to Hooghly, which without assigning any authority, he states "was undertaken solely with a view to plunder," forgetting that under the circumstances nothing could be more legitimate than a sudden and well-directed blow at the commercial emporium and principal granary of the Province.

The direction of this expedition was intrusted to Major Kilpatrick. The armament sailed from Calcutta on the 5th of January, but was much delayed on the passage, owing to the *Bridgewater* striking on a sand bank, from which she could not be got off for two days. On the evening of the 9th, they came up abreast of Hooghly, and on the following morning the ships commenced a cannonade upon the Fort, which lasted until near midnight. Captain Coote having proceeded to examine the breach, pronounced it practicable, and an assault was accordingly ordered for the following morning at day-break. A party of about 50 men, who had been landed for the purpose, marched up to the main gate and commenced firing, to attract the enemy's attention, whilst Captain Coote with the remainder of the troops, accompanied by the sailors, silently mounted the breach without opposition,—when the enemy discovering these assailants on the ramparts, fled in confusion by one of the other gates. The place was found to be much stronger than had been supposed; the garrison consisted of 2000 men, in addition to which, 3000 horse had been sent from Moorshedabad to protect the town, but they had retreated on the approach of the expedition, remaining, however, a few miles distant to watch the course of events.

The loss of the troops on this occasion, amounted to only 3 Europeans and 10 Sipahis killed, besides several wounded; that of the fleet was more considerable, several sailors were killed and twenty-five wounded; Mr. Hamilton, a midshipman of the *Kent*, was killed; Mr. Edward Roberts, also a midshipman in the same vessel, lost his hand and was promoted for his conduct on the occasion: Messrs. Owen and Samble, midshipmen of the *Tiger*, were wounded, and Lieutenant James Roddam, of the *Kent*, died from the effects of fatigue. 20 pieces of ordnance of different calibres, from 24-pounders downwards, were found in the Fort, and goods, chiefly metals, to the amount of 150,000 rupees, besides a large store of grain. This booty fell far short of what was expected; but it was subsequently ascertained, that all the more valuable stores had been taken into the Dutch factory at Chinsurah.*

* Ives, pp. 104-7.—Orme, vol. 2, p. 127.

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On the 12th, Captain Coote with 50 Europeans and 100 Sipahis, accompanied by the sailors under Captain Speke of the *Kent*, who had been sent by the Admiral to take the command of the Naval portion of the force, marched to Bandedell, about 3 miles further to the northward, where they destroyed several large granaries of rice established by the Nawaub at that place, and also at the village of Gongee:—but on returning, they were surrounded by the enemy to the number of nearly 5000. Captain Coote immediately ordered the village to be fired to protect his rear, and advanced boldly against the enemy, firing by alternate platoons,—one of the chief officers in command, together with several men, were killed at the first discharge, upon which their Cavalry turned and fled; the Infantry however, threw themselves into the neighbouring houses, and kept up a desultory fire, but with little effect, and the party succeeded in forcing their way back without losing a man. Major Kilpatrick hearing the firing, moved out to their assistance, but the affair was over before he joined.*

On the 16th, another party, chiefly sailors, proceeded in boats some miles to the northward and destroyed several more store houses on both sides of the river, without encountering any opposition, and on the 19th, the Europeans with the boats and smaller vessels returned to Calcutta.

During the period occupied by the expedition to Hooghly, the long expected intelligence was received from Europe, *viâ* Aleppo, that war had been declared between Great Britain and France in the month of May preceding. It was naturally anticipated that the French at Chandernagore would immedi-

* Ives, pp. 106, relates the following anecdote of three sailors who were missing, having straggled into the country and fallen asleep. "Early the next morning, a raft was observed floating down the river, and on it sat, with the greatest composure imaginable, our three missing sailors: who after they were taken off, and brought on board their ships, gave the following account of their adventure: 'that awaking in the beginning of the night, and perceiving their companions had left them, they judged it expedient to set fire to all the villages, in order to intimidate the enemy, and make them believe that the whole detachment still continued on shore, which had done them so much mischief the preceding day. That as soon as the day broke they repaired to the water's edge to search for a boat, in which they hoped to be conveyed on board their ships. No such thing however could be found; but luckily for them this raft at length presented itself, on which they resolved to trust themselves.' By good fortune, they arrived safe among their companions, before their enemies had so far recovered from their panic, as to think of cutting off their retreat."

ately side with the Nawaub, and as they had a body of 300 European troops with a good train of Field Artillery,—had they done so, the British force would have found it very difficult to cope with an enemy so superior in all respects,—possessing, as they would have done when united, a complete command of the resources of the country. It was accordingly determined to open a communication with the Nawaub once more, with a view to negotiate terms. Application to this effect was made to the *Juggut Seths*,* the great Bankers and most influential parties at Moorshedabad, but they declined to appear personally in the affair, although they authorised their principal agent, Runjeet Rae, to use his best endeavours to bring about an accommodation, and Omeen Chund, the Calcutta merchant, who had considerable property in that town and benefited largely by the trade, exerted all his influence and abilities to the same effect. But the news of the capture and plunder of Hooghly, which was received at this inopportune moment, so irritated the Nawaub, that he refused to listen to any overtures, and gave orders to march immediately with his whole force upon Calcutta.

In the mean time the English had not been wanting in preparation; Captain King was dispatched to England in a sloop of 60 tons, to convey the intelligence of the recovery of Calcutta and the present condition of affairs. An attack upon Dacca had been determined on, but the report of the Nawaub's immediate approach, caused this plan to be laid aside. Some attempts were made to put the Fort into a better condition of defence, and an intrenched camp was formed about a mile or more to the northward of the town, near Cossipore, beyond the Mahrattah ditch, and half a mile from the river,† with several strong outposts around it. / The selection of this

* The leading members of this wealthy and powerful firm, were Mahtub Roy and Rajah Suroop Chund, grandsons of the famous Juggut-Seth-Futteh-Chund, who established the concern.

† Ives, p. 110, gives the following illustration of the condition of the environs of Calcutta, at that period:—"While the Colonel was in search of a proper place for an encampment, a wild buffalo ran at his guard; and although the sepoy it attacked, discharged his musket ball into its body, and received it on his bayonet, yet the creature killed the man and made off. The wild buffaloes are here very large; they exceed the largest ox in England, and have legs remarkably thick and strong, &c."

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position was judicious, as the Salt-water lake, which covered a much greater extent of territory than at present, came up to within a mile of the Mahrattah ditch, and an enemy coming from the northward, could not pass round to invest Calcutta, except through that interval, and consequently within sight of the camp.*

Another point to which Clive turned his attention, with that wonderful discrimination and foresight which peculiarly marked his character, was the organization of an efficient Native regular force, and at this early period he had commenced the formation of a Battalion of Sipahis, and had already raised some three or four hundred men, selected with a due regard to their physical and other military qualifications. Hitherto, the native troops employed at Calcutta, when required, designated "*Buxarries*," were nothing more than Burkundáz, armed and equipped in the usual native manner, without any attempt at discipline or regularity; and even at Madras and Bombay, the Sipahis which were regularly maintained there,—and who were generally termed *Telingas*, from the circumstance that those originally employed came from the province of *Telingana*,—although supplied with European arms and accoutrements, still adhered to the native style of dress and equipment, were subject to very little discipline or drill, and were under the immediate command of their own countrymen: such was the condition of the Sipahis that had come round from Madras with the expedition, and though not wanting in courage and activity, they were never looked upon as capable of opposing, or as even fit to be taken into account when brought against an European enemy.

Clive wisely determined to make the experiment of assimilating them as far as practicable to the European Battalion, and accordingly not only furnished the new Corps with arms and accoutrements, but with clothing of the European fashion, drilled and disciplined them as regular troops, and appointed an European officer to command and non-commissioned officers to instruct and drill them. Such was the origin of the First Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, called from its equipment the "*Lall Pultun*" or "Red Regi-

* Orme, p. 128.

ment," a name which it long maintained.* This system which was soon found to answer admirably, was speedily imitated at the other Presidencies of Bombay and Madras. At the period now more immediately under consideration, the experiment was in its infancy, only a few hundred men having been yet raised, and their training, as may be supposed, not very far advanced. It must be borne in mind, that the class of men then available for service, and of whom the earliest Corps were composed, were a very different race from what could now be obtained in or about Calcutta. The Moosulmán conquest of the province, the condition of actual independence of the Court of Delhi maintained by the late Nawabs, the frequent changes in the Government, and the continued hostilities occurring, induced many adventurers from the northward to come down in search of service, and led to large drafts being made on the population of Behar, Oude, the Doab, Rohilcund, and even beyond the Indus, to meet demands for troops on particular emergencies, who were liable to be again thrown on their own resources, as soon as the occasion for their services had passed away. It was from such men and their immediate descendants, that the selection was made, and in the Corps then and subsequently raised in and about Calcutta, were to be found Patháns, Rohillas, a few Jaths, some Rajpoots and even Brahmins. The natives of the Province were never entertained as soldiers by any party. The majority, however, of the men in the ranks in early years were Moosulmáns, owing to the circumstances stated.

Although news had arrived of the declaration of hostilities in Europe, no official intimation on the subject had been received either by the French or English in Bengal. Fortunately the former had no man of ability at their head, and bearing in mind the reproaches with which Dupleix had been assailed by the French Government on a former occasion, for not acceding to a neutrality on the Coast, although the parent

* Williams, pp. 4 and 165-6. This Regiment was subsequently, and is still named the "Galliez or Gillis-ka-Pultun" from Captain Primrose Galliez who long commanded it.

"Pultun" is the native corruption of the English term "*Platoon*," which latter is itself derived from the French word "*Peloton*."

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countries were at war,—they unwisely for themselves, determined to adopt a line of policy consonant to the former views of their Government in the instance alluded to;—they accordingly declined to join the Nawaub, and commenced a negociation with the British authorities, for establishing a local abstinence from hostilities in the province;—a course of procedure, as acceptable to the latter as it was unexpected.*

About the end of the month, the *Marlborough*, which had been so long missing, arrived with the Field Artillery and stores on board. The British force now consisted of more than 700 European Infantry, 100 Artillery, and about 1500 Sipahis, with 14 field-pieces, nearly all 6-pounders. On the 30th of January, the Nawaub crossed the river a few miles above Hooghly, with an army consisting of 18,000 Horse, 15,000 Foot, 10,000 Bildars or Pioneers, with 40 pieces of heavy cannon and 50 Elephants, besides an enormous amount of koolies, camp followers and armed plunderers termed "Lootchees," who followed the camp for the sake of the pillage they could obtain. The approach of this force deterred the villagers from bringing in provisions either to the town or camp, and all the natives hired for the use of the troops, deserted in a body. No draught cattle were available, and there was only one horse with the force, which had been brought from Madras.† On the 2nd of February, the advance of the enemy's force appeared in sight; the Lootchees quickly spread themselves over the country beyond the Mahratta ditch, pillaging and destroying everything within their reach, and a considerable body even crossed over and commenced their devastations in the northern suburbs of the town. Upon this, a detachment which was posted at Perring's Redoubt, for the protection of that quarter, sallied out and speedily drove them back again over the ditch, killing and wounding several, and making about 50 prisoners;—which decided measure effectually checked their depredations, and made them more cautious for the future. Mass after mass of the enemy's troops now defil-

* Orme, vol. 2. pp. 128-9.

† Ditto.

ed upon the plain to the right of the Dum-Dum road, and supported by cannon, began to intrench themselves, about a mile and half to the south-east of the British camp. Upon this, Colonel Clive marched out with the greater part of his force, supported by 6 field-pieces, and advancing towards the enemy, drew up opposite to their line of march and commenced a cannonade; this was speedily returned from a battery of 10 heavy pieces from the intrenchment, when Clive perceiving that any further measures would be exceedingly hazardous, drew off the troops gradually and in good order to the camp. In this affair three Sipahis and two Artillerymen were killed, and several wounded; amongst the latter, were Captain Nicholas Weller, of H. M.'s 39th Foot, and Captain Fraser of the Madras Regiment.*

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For some days past, negociations had been carried on with the Nawaub in the hope of accommodating matters,—such under existing circumstances, being the earnest desire of the British authorities; but although these overtures were received and even replied to, with every appearance of cordiality, it was evident, as the Nawaub continued rapidly advancing, that his sole object was merely to throw the English off their guard and gain time for the completion of his arrangements. /On the 3rd of February the main body of the Army arrived, accompanied by the Nawaub in person, who took up his quarters in Omeen Chund's garden,—a piece of ground to the right of the Dum-Dum road, beyond the general line of the Mahrattah ditch, which here made a sweep so to enclose it on three sides. In the morning he had sent to request that Deputies might be dispatched to him to arrange terms, and accordingly Messrs. Watts and Scrafton were commissioned to attend him; they did not find his Head Quarters until late in the evening, and when they at length arrived, they were treated with great insolence and brutality by the attendants. After considerable delay, they were shown into the Durbar, where they boldly expostulated

* Ives, p. 111. As Captain Fraser is not mentioned again, and his place was soon after filled up, he most probably either died, or left Bengal on account of his wounds.

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with the Nawaub for entering the bounds of the Company's territory, whilst at the very time he was amusing Colonel Clive with professions of his earnest desire for peace; they also tendered a paper containing the written propositions of the British Authorities, which the Nawaub read and then dismissed them, desiring them to confer with his Dewan. As they went out, Omeen Chund gave them a hint to look to their personal safety, adding significantly, that the whole of the Nawaub's cannon had not yet arrived.* Upon this they quietly withdrew themselves from the camp, and hastened to convey tidings of the state of affairs to Colonel Clive, who, on receiving this intelligence, resolved upon attacking the Nawaub's camp early the following morning. He immediately sent off an express to the Admiral, apprising him of his design, and requesting the assistance of a reinforcement from the fleet. Orders were consequently issued to the several vessels to furnish their quota of officers and sailors for this service, and a body of five hundred and sixty-nine men, armed with muskets and all volunteers, were assembled and dispatched in boats to the camp, under the command of Captain Warwick of the *Thunder* Bomb-ketch. They joined the force, already under arms, about 2 A. M. on the 4th, when they shortly afterwards commenced their march.†

To understand the following details, the position of the hostile forces must be borne in mind:—the British camp had been established near Cossipore, and a communication was maintained with Calcutta, not only by water, but along the bank of the river, supported by the detachment at Perring's Redoubt, which commanded the bridge over the ditch at that point, and was situated near the site of the present Chitpore suspension bridge. The enemy had extended themselves outside the Mahrattah ditch, between it and the Lake, from the Dum-Dum road to Ballygunge and Alipore, having detachments also on the town side, especially near Omeen Chund's garden, where the Nawaub himself was encamped. Clive's plan of operations was as bold as it was skilful, his intention being to march at once upon the enemy's heavy bat-

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 131.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 131.—Ives, p. 111.

tery of cannon, and having spiked them, to push for the Head A. D. 1757.
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About 3 A. M. Clive commenced his march; the detachment consisted of 650 European Infantry, 100 Artillery, 800 Sipahis, and the Sailors, with a body of Lascars, accompanied by 6 six-pounder field-pieces and a cohorn. A small party of Europeans, and between two or three hundred of the newly raised Sipahis were left to guard the camp. A similar party garrisoned the Fort, and another detail occupied Perring's Redoubt. One half of the Sipahis were in advance, then followed the European Battalion, the Grenadiers of the King's and Company's detachments leading; after them came the Artillery, the guns drawn by the sailors, and the ammunition carried by the Lascars,—and to prevent the latter from throwing away their loads, they were guarded all round by the remainder of the sailors, who also formed a protection to the guns; the rear was brought up by the remaining half of the Sipahis.

Mr. Amyatt and a Native acted as guides; a little before daybreak the detachment came upon the enemy's advanced guards, who after a hurried discharge of matchlocks and rockets took to flight. Unfortunately, one of the rockets struck the pouch of a Sipahi and exploded his cartridges, the fire of which communicated to several others and created great confusion;* but none of the enemy being near to take advantage of this accident, order was quickly restored by Captain Coote. The detachment continued to advance;—but though the day had dawned, a dense fog peculiar to Bengal at that season of the year, began to overspread the ground, and prevented anything being visible at a yard distant;—they proceeded without interruption until they arrived opposite to Omeen Chund's garden, when they heard the sound of a body of horse coming upon them at full gallop; this was a select Corps of Persian and Mogul Horse, forming the Nawaub's guard, who were stationed near his quarters, but outside the ditch; they were allowed to come on to within 30 paces of the line, which then poured in a deliberate and deadly fire that emptied a number

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 131-2.

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of saddles and dispersed the remainder of the party in the greatest confusion. The detachment then resumed its march at a leisurely pace, platoons constantly firing on either hand, whilst the field-pieces fired round shot outwardly and forward, in an oblique direction, but without any definite object, the fog being so thick as to prevent any one seeing above two or three yards before them. Further on to their front, was a causeway leading from the end of the Lake across the Mahrattah ditch, raised several feet above the level of the country with a smaller ditch on either side. It was known that the passage across the main ditch at this point was barricaded, but it was Clive's intention, having gained the causeway, to proceed along its course, force the barricade, and then turning short to the right, to double back along the rampart inside the ditch, and thus arrive at the Nawaub's Head Quarters in Omeen Chund's garden; but as soon as the first divisions of Sipahis reached the causeway and changed their direction to the right, the field pieces in the rear continuing to fire obliquely forward, killed several of the leading files,—when the whole division rushed across the causeway in confusion, seeking safety under cover of the bank, an example followed by those immediately in the rear. As soon as Clive ascertained the state of the case, he ordered the whole to pass the causeway and halt a little beyond,—intending to form them into a column of attack and proceed against the barricade at the end of the causeway. This brought all the troops into one confused mass, and whilst the Colonel was waiting for the return of some officers whom he had sent to examine the defences of the barricade, the party were suddenly and unexpectedly assailed by a discharge from two heavy guns, mounted in a small bastion in the lines along the ditch, loaded with grape and langrage, which killed and disabled twenty-two Europeans; a second discharge occasioned further loss, though not to the same extent; this threw the detachment into great confusion,—the plan of storming the barricade was abandoned,—and the whole hastened forward, endeavouring to gain another road in advance, which also led from the Lake across the Mahrattah ditch, and was continued by the main road and avenue leading to the Fort, through the Lall Bagh,

which forms the present road from the Lall Bazaar by the Bow Bazaar and Boitaconnah to the Circular Road ; but their progress was greatly impeded by the difficulty of transporting the field-pieces. The ground between the causeway and the road in question, was laid out in rice fields, divided by embankments, and the guns could only be drawn along the ditches at the sides of the banks, and consequently were continually changing their direction ; the fog began to clear away after 9 o'clock, and parties of the enemy's horse were observed hovering about on all sides, which rendered it necessary to detach platoons to the right and left to keep them at a distance, and even occasionally to raise the field pieces over the banks and give them a salute ; the two guns which had already done so much mischief, continued their fire, and as the detachment advanced, two other pieces opened from another battery in the same line, near the road. At 10 A. M. the troops gained the road, having been compelled to abandon two of the field pieces, which had broken down ; here they formed column to force the passage of the ditch, which they found defended by a strong body of horse and foot drawn up across their route, whilst a larger body of Cavalry attacked their rear with considerable courage, and captured another field piece,—which however, was gallantly rescued by Ensign Yorke with a platoon of H. M.'s 39th Regt. The fire of the leading platoons speedily dispersed the party in front, and the whole detachment crossed over the ditch into the Company's territory. The original intention of attacking Omeen Chund's garden, where the Nawaub was encamped, surrounded by a large body of horse, might still have been adhered to ; but Clive considered that the troops had already suffered too much fatigue, having been under arms for eight hours, and marching and fighting the greater part of the time,—and accordingly he retired along the avenue to the Fort, which he reached about noon, having been harrassed by the enemy's Horse and Artillery for a considerable distance. The loss of the British in this affair was heavy, 27 Europeans, 18 Sipahis, and 12 Sailors were killed, and 70 Europeans, 35 Sipahis and 12 Sailors wounded. Captains Pye and Bridges, both of the Madras service, the former commanding

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the Grenadiers, and the latter Colonel Clive's Aide-de-camp,* were killed, as also Mr. Belcher, Colonel Clive's Secretary; Lieutenant Lutwidge of the *Salisbury* was mortally wounded, and died shortly afterwards, and Mr. Ellis of the Civil Service, who with several other gentlemen of that branch acted as a volunteer, lost his leg. The greatest part of the mischief was done by the 4 guns mounted on the ramparts inside the ditch.

The loss of the enemy was however very much more serious, consisting of about 1300 killed and wounded, including in the former, two of the principal officers and twenty-two of lesser note; 500 horses, 300 draught bullocks, and 4 Elephants were also killed or disabled in the affair.† In the evening the whole force returned to their camp, marching along the banks of the river, and crossing the ditch close to the enemy's outposts, who did not venture to oppose or molest them.

The loss sustained by the British in this attack considerably damped the spirits of the troops, who blamed the Commander, and looked upon the enterprise as rash, ill-concerted, and an unnecessary waste of life. But although the original plan was in a measure defeated, owing to the fog, it cannot be looked upon as otherwise than at once bold and judicious;—such as a display of energy and audacity being well calculated to strike terror into the mind of the Nawaub, and some such measure being rendered absolutely necessary by the growing scarcity of provisions,—the command of the whole country being in the hands of the enemy, of which, the composition of their force, chiefly Cavalry, enabled them to avail themselves to the full extent. Probably, as observed by Orme, the chances of success might have been greater had the detachment assembled at Perring's Redoubt, “which was not half a mile from Omichund's garden, to “which they might have marched on a spacious road capable

* Ives designates Captain Bridge as the Secretary, but this is an evident mistake. Sir Eyre Coote in his evidence before the Select Committee, says that both Lord Clive's Secretary and A. D. C. were killed, and Orme specially mentions Mr. Belcher as the Secretary.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 135. Ives, 112.

“ of admitting 12 or 15 men abreast, on the left exposed in-
 “ deed to the annoyance of matchlocks from some enclosures,
 “ where, however, Cavalry could not act, but their right
 “ would have been defended by the rampart of the Moh-
 “ rattoe Ditch, contiguous to which the road lies; and their
 “ only danger would have been in front, from the onsets of
 “ Cavalry, and the discharge of what pieces of cannon the
 “ enemy had got near the garden.”* A. D. 1757.
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Taken altogether, it may be considered a dashing affair, and the conception not unworthy of the “Heaven-born General” who formed it. The result was clearly shown in the altered bearing of the Nawaub, who never before having been so near a witness to an action, was astonished and terrified at the courage and intrepidity of the attempt, by which his own safety had been so nearly jeopardied. The following morning he sent a letter through Runjeet Rae, complaining of the hostilities that had been committed whilst terms were under consideration, but at the same time offering definite proposals for a peace. To this Colonel Clive replied that he had merely marched through the Nawaub’s camp to convince him personally of what the British Troops were capable, who had cautiously abstained from hurting any one excepting those actually opposed to them; and that he was now willing to renew the negotiation. The Nawaub, notwithstanding this taunt, continued the correspondence, and to prove his sincerity, or to be out of the reach of so daring an enemy, drew off his Army and encamped about three miles to the north-east of the Salt-water Lake, beyond Dum-Dum. At last, on the 9th of February, the terms were fully agreed to, and a treaty was concluded, to the effect that the English should be restored to all the privileges accorded to them by former firmans, including the grant of the neighbouring villages,—the purchase of which had been defeated by the different Soobahdars and their agents;—that all the Company’s factories and all money or property belonging to the Company, their servants or tenants that had been seized or taken by the Nawaub or his officers, should be restored or made good;—that the English should be permitted to fortify Calcutta in such manner as they might think proper, and to

* Orme, vol. 2, pp. 134-5.

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On the 11th, the Nawaub marched a few miles on his return homeward, and sent Khiluts or dresses of honour to the Admiral and Colonel Clive,—at the same time proposing a further treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, against all enemies; this was immediately acceded to, and the new treaty returned duly signed the same day, by the hands of Omeen Chund, who was instructed by Colonel Clive to ascertain whether the Nawaub would sanction an attack on the French settlement at Chandernagore.†

Clive, whose early career had been passed in an unceasing struggle with the French on the Coast, considered it a matter of primary importance entirely to destroy their power in Bengal, which measure coincided with the instructions he had received from Madras. During the apprehension entertained of their forming a junction with the Nawaub's forces, he had gladly responded to and encouraged the pacific line of policy they had so unwisely adopted, but now that he was relieved from the hostility of the Nawaub, he immediately turned his whole attention to this great object, and lost no time in ascertaining the sentiments of Sooraj-oo-dowlah, as already stated. The proposed measure was exceedingly repugnant to the latter, who was greatly incensed on first receiving the proposition; but dreading an immediate renewal of hostilities, he evaded the general question,—sent a temporising answer,—alluded to the report then current, that Monsieur Bussy meditated an incursion into Bengal from the Deccan, supported by a squadron from Pondicherry,—advised the English to be on their guard,—and authorised them to adopt any measures to prevent the French obtaining a further footing in the pro-

* Vide Appendix. F.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 136.

vince: he also requested that he might be furnished with 20 European Artillerymen to work his own guns and instruct his troops, and suggested that Mr. Watts, who was a good linguist, and whom he looked upon as an easy, unsuspecting man, might be deputed to his Court as the Company's representative. Both these requests were complied with, and the next day he continued his march to Moorshedabad. Clive who interpreted the Nawaub's reply as containing no positive injunction against an attack upon the French, made his arrangements without delay, and on the 18th of February crossed the river a few miles above Calcutta, with his whole disposable force, preparatory to a regular attack upon Chandernagore.*

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In the mean time the French had taken the alarm, and had written pressing letters to the Nawaub, urging him for his own safety to protect their settlement,—pointing out the danger to be feared from the ambition of the English, if left without any check or rival in the province, and at liberty to turn their sole attention to the Native powers. These representations, which reached the Nawaub at Agadeep, had their full effect; he flew into a violent rage with the English, and accused them of breach of faith; he halted and wrote a letter peremptorily forbidding them to commit any act of hostility, and he further forwarded a sum of one lakh of rupees to the Government at Chandernagore, to aid them in their preparations for defence, and also dispatched 1500 men from his camp, to reinforce the Governor of Hooghly, the subsequently notorious Nund Komar, ordering him to render the French every assistance in the event of their being attacked.

On receipt of this intelligence, the Admiral and Colonel Clive desisted from any further active proceeding in the matter, and wrote to the Nawaub notifying that in compliance with his request they had done so,—and that accordingly, they had withdrawn the troops from that side of the river. But notwithstanding the expression of indignation on the part of the Nawaub, and his acknowledged distaste to the contemplated measure, Clive did not despair of ultimately obtaining his

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 136.

A. D. 1757. consent,—to which Mr. Watts and Omeen Chund, who had
 March. now been appointed the English Agent, were directed to turn their attention and exertions.

In the mean time the French, whilst soliciting the protection and assistance of the Nawaub, strenuously exerted themselves to bring about some agreement with the English;—and the Council at Calcutta, hopeless of the Nawaub's consent to hostilities, and fearing to undertake any aggressive measure in opposition to his wishes, consented to entertain a treaty of neutrality in Bengal,—to be guaranteed by the Nawaub. But when all points seemed about to be adjusted, an unexpected difficulty arose from the circumstance of the Council at Chandernagore being subordinate to that of Pondicherry,—and consequently, any agreement made by the former was not obligatory on the latter,—whilst the act of the Council at Calcutta was definitive.*

This was a serious and startling objection, the more so when the conduct of Dupleix on a similar occasion was remembered, in which he had disavowed the authority of La Bourdonnais to ransom Madras, which had surrendered to him in September 1746.† Admiral Watson, under these circumstances, refused to ratify the treaty: Colonel Clive urged upon him the necessity of either doing that, or determining at once to attack the settlement, with or without the Nawaub's sanction;—the more so as official intelligence of the war between France and England was received at this time, now the first week of March. At this crisis a circumstance occurred which materially favoured the views of the English: Sooraj-oo-dowlah had just heard of the taking of Delhi by Ahmed Sháh Abdállie, and also that an incursion into Bengal was contemplated by that formidable Monarch; alarmed at this intelligence, he looked to the British assistance as the only chance of enabling him to oppose the threatened attack of the Dorránee Chief, and accordingly he immediately adopted a more conciliatory line of policy. Nund Komar, the Governor of Hooghly, had also been brought over by Omeen Chund

* Ives, p. 119.—Malcolm's Life of Clive, vol. 1, p. 125.

† Orme, vol. 1, pp. 68-77.

to the English interests, and his representations, coupled with the dread of the Afghán invasion, though they could not bring about a direct consent to the attack upon the French Settlement, rendered the Nawaub more indifferent to the evidently hostile preparations of the English.

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On the very day that Clive received a request from Soorajoo-Dowlah to aid him against Ahmed Sháh, intelligence reached Calcutta that Commodore James had arrived at the mouth of the river with three ships from Bombay, having on board a reinforcement from that Presidency of two Companies of European Infantry and a detachment of Artillery.*

This reinforcement was brought round in the Commodore's own frigate, the *Revenge*, with the *Orixa* and *Mahmuty* Company's ships; they had made a comparatively rapid passage considering the season of the year, having left Bombay on the 26th of the preceding October, immediately on receipt of intelligence at that Presidency of the capture of Calcutta in the previous June. The Commodore had been obliged to bear down to the south as far as 10° of that latitude, and then eastward to the meridian of Acheen Head, from whence, with the north-east monsoon, he made the entrance of the Hooghly. On the way he captured *L'Indien*, a French Indiaman, laden with military stores and provisions.

The two Companies of Bombay Infantry on board these ships, were very strong, amounting together to upwards of 300 men, of whom however about one-third were Malabar Topasses. The officers who came round with this Detachment were Captains Buchanan and Armstrong, commanding the two Companies of Infantry; Captain Lieutenant Eger-ton, Lieutenants Palmer, Molitore, Walsh, and Ensign Robertson. Captain Robert Barker appears to have commanded the detail of Artillery, which was most probably a por-

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 139, says "three Companies of Infantry and one of Artillery."—Ives, p. 118, gives a detachment of 500 men.—Grose, vol. 2, p. 256, fixes the number at 300;—but the author of the History of the Bombay European Regiment, entitled "Three years Gleanings," and who had access to the old records of the Corps at Bombay, says distinctly "two Companies of Infantry and a detachment of Artillery." The Topasses were probably reckoned by Orme as a third Company.

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 March. been sent from England to Bombay with Colonel Clive in
 1755.*

At the same time, a report was brought that the *Cumberland* of 74 guns, which had parted from the squadron after leaving Madras, had arrived at Balasore with the remaining portion of the Detachment of H. M.'s 39th Regiment on board. Colonel Clive now urged the Members forming the Select Committee of the Council, to adopt decisive measures,—and having won over Major Kilpatrick to his views, and voting Mr. Drake's opinion, of which no one could make anything, *as no opinion at all*,—whilst Mr. Beecher, the remaining Member, recorded his own neutrality,—he obtained the majority of votes and made his arrangements at once.†

He wrote to the Nawaub that he would join him as soon as the report of the advance of the Afgháns received confirmation, and that in the mean time he would move up as far as Chandernagore. Accordingly the troops broke up from the encampment which they had formed opposite to Calcutta, on the 7th of March, and proceeded very slowly towards Chandernagore,—the Infantry by land and the Artillery by water,—so as to give the Bombay Detachment time to join them before entering the French boundary. Admiral Watson, however, still persisted in his refusal to co-operate without the Nawaub's consent, but he wrote to that Prince in a very angry style,—pointing out that the French had employed his name as a guarantee to a treaty they had no power to conclude, and therefore deserved no favour,—complaining that the terms of the treaty made on the 9th of February had not been acted up to, particularly as regarded the promise of restitution and compensation,—accusing him of assisting the French with men and money,—and concluding by saying that if arrangements were not made within ten days for fulfilling all the terms of the treaty, he would send to the coast for more troops and ships, *and that he would kindle such a flame in the country, as all the waters of the Ganges should not*

* First Report from the Select Committee, Lord Clive's Evidence, p. 14.

† Ibid, p. 15.

be able to extinguish. This remarkable letter closed with the following significant warning, "*Remember that he promises you this, who never yet broke his word with you or with any man whatsoever.*" Alarmed at the tone thus adopted and the threats conveyed, the Nawaub replied in the most humble style,—denied having given any assistance to the French,—pledged himself to the early and full performance of all the terms of the treaty,—and with reference to the proposed attack on Chandernagore, observed, "*You have understanding and generosity, if your enemy with an upright heart claims your protection you will give him life, but then you must be well satisfied of the innocence of his intention ; if not, whatever you think right, that do.*"

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This letter, which was received on the 13th of March, was considered sufficient permission, and the Admiral now agreed to assist in the enterprise ; and although another letter was received the next day, forbidding the attack in the most positive terms, this contradiction was looked upon as an indignity, and no attention was paid to it.

The Settlement of Chandernagore, like that of Calcutta, consisted of a Fort and a town, one portion inhabited by the Europeans and the remainder by natives, with a small tract of territory around it ; this latter commenced at the southern boundary of the Dutch settlement of Chinsurah, and extended for two miles along the banks of the river, and about a mile and a half inland ! the Fort was situated half-way between the north and south extremities of the territory, and some 30 yards from the river. It was a square of about 120 yards, with a Bastion mounting 10 guns, at each corner ; several guns were also placed on the Curtains ; on the eastern side was a Ravelin covering the Water Gate and extending to the bank of the river ; on this work 8 more guns were mounted. All these guns were of heavy calibres, chiefly 24 and 32 pounders, and 6 smaller pieces were mounted on the terrace of the church which over-

* Ives, p. 125, distinctly states that " it was this paragraph that encouraged the Admiral and Colonel to proceed in their attack on Chandernagore."

A. D. 1757. looked the walls. On hearing of the declaration of hos-
 March. tilities, the French had commenced to dig a ditch and throw up a Glacis all round the works, but these had not been completed; they had however demolished all the buildings within a hundred yards of the Fort, and erected several Batteries beyond the foot of the Glacis, one of 3 guns on the northern side, leading to Chinsurah; one of 4 guns to the westward, on the high road leading from that quarter to the northern face; and to the south, which was considered the most accessible side, owing to the cover afforded by the town, they had thrown up four Batteries,—three of which were in the principal streets leading to the Fort, and the other close to the river, about 150 yards south of the Fort, commanding a narrow part of the channel, in which several vessels had been sunk to obstruct the passage of the English squadron. The garrison consisted of 600 Europeans and 700 Sipahis and Lascars, but only 300 of the former were regular soldiers, the remainder consisting of Militia formed from the French inhabitants; to these were also added the crews of the vessels then lying off the Fort, who must have amounted to between one and two hundred more, and who proved most active and efficient auxiliaries.* They likewise expected considerable assistance from the Governor of Hooghly, in accordance with the Nawaub's promises and directions, and a portion of his troops were actually in the settlement;—but Nund Komar, consequent on his understanding with Omeen Chund, withdrew them on the approach of the English;—excusing himself to the Nawaub, by stating, that he wished to save the standard of the province from the disgrace to which it must have been exposed, by assisting the French against such a superior force as that sent against them.

The Bombay detachment having joined him, Clive commenced operations on the 14th of March. On the previous evening, he summoned the Garrison to surrender, but received no reply. Having obtained intelligence of the erection of the four Batteries to the south of the Fort, commanding the approach

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 141.

either from the town or by the river side, he made a detour, and entered the territories from the westward, along the high road leading from that direction to the northern face of the Fort, in which road was situated the 4-Gun Battery already mentioned, and which was commanded by the north-west Bastion. The enemy had sent out strong detachments, which skirmished with the English advance, until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, availing themselves of their local knowledge and the cover afforded by numerous thickets and detached buildings; their fire however was not very destructive, and they were at last compelled to take refuge in rear of the Battery,—upon which the English took possession of several adjacent houses, and kept up so hot a fire of small-arms on this Field work, that when night fell, the enemy spiked the guns and retired into the Fort. In this affair, Captain Coote of H. M.'s 39th Regiment, particularly distinguished himself. The possession of this important Battery, rendered the four others, advanced to the south of the Fort, perfectly useless,—as they were now liable to be turned by the rear, and the details stationed in them, made prisoners;—to avoid which, the guns and men were withdrawn into the Fort by daybreak the following morning. On the 15th, the English established themselves in the town and buildings on the southern Esplanade, where they were tolerably well sheltered from the fire of the garrison. During the 16th, they were employed in bringing up the Artillery and stores, and on the 17th, they opened a heavy fire of small-arms from the tops of the houses, and threw a number of shells into the place from some cohorns and a brass 13-inch mortar. This was continued during the 18th, and a Battery for 5 Twenty-four pounder guns was commenced in rear of some ruins opposite the south face of the south-east Bastion: the deserted Battery on the side of the river was also occupied and prepared for the reception of 3 Twenty-four pounder guns, which, on the 19th, opened on the south flank and face of the north-east Bastion.* On this day the *Kent, Tiger,*

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* Orme, pp. 141-2.—Malcolm, vol. 1, p. 197, who quotes Colonel Clive's letter to Mr. Pigot, Governor of Madras. In his evidence, Colonel Clive says the guns used in these Batteries were all 32-Pounders.

A. D. 1757. and *Salisbury* came up and anchored off the Prussian Gardens, a little more than a mile below the Fort. The navigation of such large vessels so far up the river, had been attended with great difficulty and danger, but the skill and nerve of Captain Speke, who commanded the Admiral's flag ship, the *Kent*, surmounted all obstacles. Above the position taken up by the ships, was an extensive sand bank, which rendered the channel very narrow, and this passage, which was under the range of the Fort guns, was made more difficult and dangerous by the enemy having sunk three large vessels in the channel. Three other large vessels lay at anchor above the Fort, and these it was reported had been prepared as fire ships. Upon this the Admiral determined to anticipate their employment, and at night he dispatched a strong party in boats to cut their cables; this was effectually done, and all three vessels drifted on the sands;* the crews had however been previously taken out to reinforce the garrison.

Although the Admiral was most anxious to commence the attack with as little delay as possible, the tides unfortunately did not serve at this period,—the flood occurring either too early in the morning or too late in the afternoon; the interim was however employed in preparation and examination of the channel. [Lieutenant Hey, the third Lieutenant of the *Kent*, an intelligent officer, was sent with a flag of truce to the Governor of the Fort, demanding a surrender of the place, which was courteously but resolutely refused; in passing and re-passing the channel he carefully examined the situation of the sunken vessels, and the following day, the Master of the *Kent*, Mr. John Delamotte, proceeded in a small boat to sound all around them, which he gallantly effected under a heavy and incessant cannonade from the Fort, and ascertained that there was sufficient room for one vessel to pass at a time. This had been previously reported to be the case by a Monsieur Terranneau, an officer of considerable ability, in the French service, who, owing to some injury, real or imaginary, received from Monsieur Renault, the Governor of Chandernagore, had some

* Ives, p. 127.

time previously deserted to Colonel Clive, to whom he rendered considerable service during the siege.*

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In the mean time, the operations on the land side proceeded with great vigour: the fire from the small-arms and mortars was kept up with good effect, but the 3 guns on the river Battery were silenced on the 20th, by the superior fire of the enemy from the north and south-east Bastions. On the 21st, the fire from the Fort brought down a house close to the 5-Gun Battery, injuring several men and retarding the completion of that work; on the evening of the 22nd, however, it was finished, and the guns placed in position, whilst the river side Battery was repaired and ordnance again mounted in it.† All being now in readiness, it was determined to make a combined attack on the following morning, as there was no time to be lost,—the Nawaub having sent a succession of messengers and letters, couched in the most menacing terms, peremptorily forbidding the attack; he had also sent forward a large detachment of his force, under the command of Rajah Doolub Ram, to assist the French,—but on their arrival near Hooghly, Nund Komar persuaded the commander to halt, by representing that the French must have inevitably surrendered before he could possibly arrive to their assistance.

* [The author of the *Seir Mutakherin*, states that the English were incited to the expedition by the representations of this officer, whom he terms "*Moosher Terno*," and who he says rendered great assistance to the Admiral in pointing out the narrow passage that had been left between the sunken vessels. Monsieur Raymond, the quaint Translator of this work, appends the following note regarding this individual:—

"Terrano, a French officer, who, dissatisfied with Renaud, the Governor of the Fort, went over, not to the Admiral, but to the Colonel, to whom he became of some use.

"This man, who had some merit, having made money in the English service, sent a few years after a supply to his father in France, promising to take care of him henceforward. The old man returned the money, with a letter, in which he protested against holding any correspondence with a traitor to his country; and the son, in despair at the style of the letter, hanged himself at his own door, with his own handkerchief. He was a tall, stout man, who having lost his right arm by a ball of cannon, had found means to write legibly with the left, and what is more, to write a pamphlet on Artillery, in good English. The officers at first would not admit him in their Corps, but the Colonel remonstrated, and he observed, that his word was engaged to the man on that article, and that a failure on his part would preclude any further desertions."

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 142.

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In the interim, the *Cumberland*, with Admiral Pococke on board, arrived at Ingellee : and this gallant officer, hearing the state of affairs, and aware of the impossibility of bringing up the vessel in time to participate in the expected action, took his barge, strongly manned, and rowing night and day, reached the fleet a few hours before the attack commenced, when he immediately hoisted his flag on board the *Tiger*.*

On the morning of the 23rd, the three ships weighed anchor. It was previously arranged that the *Tiger* should take up a position opposite the north-east Bastion, the *Kent* abreast of the Curtain and Ravelin, and the *Salisbury* against the south-east Bastion. At sunrise on the 23rd of March, the two land Batteries opened their fire, which was immediately and gallantly answered by the more powerful Artillery of the Fort, with greater effect, whilst an incessant roll of musketry was maintained by the troops from the houses, and by the enemy from the ramparts.

In the mean time the three vessels moved slowly upwards with the tide, the *Tiger* leading ; this ship first came alongside the Ravelin, and by one well-directed broadside completely cleared that defence ; she then proceeded onwards, and about 7 A. M., got into her position abreast of the north-east Bastion. The *Kent*, which followed next, let go her anchor opposite to the Ravelin as previously arranged, but at this moment a sudden, heavy, and well-directed fire from the ramparts, killed several men and severely wounded Captain Speke ; this caused a momentary confusion, during which, the cable, not being stopped in time, ran out to its full length, and the ebb tide having made just before, the vessel dropped down from her allotted post, until her poop was beyond the south-east Bastion, and thus she became also exposed to the heavy guns from the east flank of the south-west Bastion, of which the enemy availed themselves to the full extent, pouring in a very destructive fire of cannon and musketry ; by this accident the *Salisbury* was unfortunately thrown out of the action altogether, and obliged to anchor

* Ives, p. 128.

about 150 yards below the Fort. During the whole time that the *Kent* and *Tiger* were getting into their positions, the enemy kept up a heavy and well-directed cannonade upon them, without a single shot being returned ; but as soon as the two vessels were fairly at anchor, they opened their broadsides with tremendous effect, whilst a hot discharge of musketry was kept up from the tops. In the interim, the two Batteries on shore maintained an incessant cross-fire on the eastern Bastions, whilst the two ships battered them in front, and the troops from the houses kept up a continued fusilade of small arms. To all this the enemy replied in the most gallant and skilful manner, whilst for three hours naught was to be heard but one incessant roll of artillery and musketry, the crashing of timbers or masonry, the shouts and cheers of the combatants on either side, mingled with the shrieks and groans of the wounded and the dying. The flank guns of the south-west Bastion galled the *Kent* very severely, and the Admiral ordered all the lower deck guns that could be brought to bear, to fire on this Battery,—which they at last succeeded in silencing : but about eight o'clock, several of the enemy's shot struck the *Kent* at the same moment, and ignited some cartridges, which by their explosion, set fire to the wad nets and other loose articles on board, and filled the lower deck with smoke ; an alarm of fire was given, and the idea spread that a shell had fallen into the gunner's store-rooms ; this notion struck a panic into the crew, and some 70 or 80 men jumped out of the port-holes into the boats that were alongside. The enemy soon became aware of this confusion, and redoubled their cannonade. The fire was however, quickly extinguished, by the exertions of Lieutenant William Brereton, commanding the lower deck, who then rushed to the ports and exhorted the men in the boats to return on board, upbraiding them for deserting their quarters ; at first this was of no avail, when he exclaimed, "*Are you Britons? You Englishmen, and fly from danger? for shame, for shame!*" This reproach had the desired effect, they returned on board to a man, and as if to atone for their temporary dereliction from duty, renewed their fire with increased spirit and alacrity.*

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* Ives, p. 129.

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Soon after this, the fire from the Fort began to slacken, as one by one, their guns were dismounted; and at 9 o'clock their Batteries having been all nearly silenced and their parapets destroyed, they hung out a flag of truce, on which the cannonade was immediately suspended, and Captain Coote, with Lieutenant Brereton, the only officer on board the *Kent* unwounded, were sent to receive their proposals for surrender: some hours were spent in arranging the terms, during which period, several officers with about 50 of the best troops and some 20 sipahis, quitted the Fort and marched to the northward, where they subsequently joined Monsieur Law, the Chief of the French factory at Kossimbazar. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when no hope of further effective resistance remained, the capitulation was finally concluded, and the Fort surrendered to Admiral Watson as the senior officer. The terms were simple; the Civilians were allowed to go where they pleased with their clothes and linen,—the European portion of the garrison surrendered as prisoners of war, the officers being admitted on parole,—the native portion were permitted to go to their homes.*

— The conduct of the French on this occasion was most creditable, and well worthy the acknowledged gallantry of that nation; Monsieur Renault, the Governor, displayed great courage and determination; but the chief merit of the defence was due to Monsieur Devignes, commander of the French Company's Ship *Saint Contest*: he took charge of the Bastions and directed their fire with great skill and judgment, and by his own example inspired energy and courage into all those around him.† Their loss was heavy considering the extent of the garrison, amounting to about 50 killed and double that number wounded. Amongst the prisoners was a deserter from the *Tiger*, a Corporal Lee of the Marines, whose exertions in the enemy's mortar Battery had been very effective; he had been wounded during the action, and was finally sent home a prisoner to England. Within the Fort were nearly 50 European

* Vide Appendix G.

† Orme, vol. 2, pp. 144-5.

ladies.* The loss of the assailants was very severe. On board the *Tiger*, Mr. Phillips, the Master, and 14 men were killed. Admiral Pococke was slightly wounded, Mr. Pater, the Mate, lost an arm, Messrs. Wilkinson, Thompson, and Cribble, Midshipmen, and 41 men were wounded. On board the *Kent*, Mr. Perreau the first Lieutenant was killed, and Mr. Rawlins Hey, the third Lieutenant, and Mr. William Speke, a Midshipman, were mortally wounded; the latter was the son of the Captain, and the same ball that caused the son's death wounded the father very severely.† Mr. Stanton, the Second Lieutenant, Mr. Barnes, the Purser, Mr. Lister, the Admiral's Secretary, and Messrs. Marriot and Wood, Midshipmen, were severely wounded; 37 men were killed and 74 wounded. Three of the

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* Mr. Ives mentions an incident regarding the relief of a French gentleman, who had suffered the loss of his property during the siege, which shows that even in those days, the horrors of war might be tempered by a humane and civilized enemy. His statement is as follows:—

“It happened unfortunately that Mons. *Nicolas*, a man of a most amiable character, and the father of a large family, had not been so provident as the rest of his countrymen, in securing his effects within the fort, but had left them in the town; consequently upon Colonel *Clive's* first taking possession of the place, they had all been plundered by our common soldiers; and the poor gentleman and his family hereby were to all appearance ruined. The generous and humane Captain *Speke* having heard of the hard fate of Mons. *Nicolas*, took care to represent it to the two admirals in all its affecting circumstances; who immediately advanced the sum of 1500 rupees each. Their example was followed by the five captains of the squadron, who subscribed 5000 between them. Mr. *Doidge* added 800 more; and the same sum was thrown in by another person, who was a sincere well-wisher to this unfortunate gentleman: so that a present of 9600 rupees, or 1200*l.* sterling, was in a few minutes collected towards the relief of this valuable *Frenchman*, and his distressed family.

One of the company was presently dispatched with this money, who had orders to acquaint Mons. *Nicolas*, “that a few of his *English* friends desired his acceptance of it, as a small testimony of the very high esteem they had for his moral character, and of their unfeigned sympathy with him in his misfortunes.” The poor gentleman, quite transported at such an instance of generosity in an enemy, cried out in a sort of extacy, “*Good God! they are friends indeed!*”—He accepted of the present with great thankfulness, and desired that “his most grateful acknowledgements might be made to his unknown benefactors; for whose happiness, and the happiness of their families, not only his, but the prayers of his children's children, he hoped, would frequently be presented to heaven.”—He could add no more:—“The tears which ran plentifully down his cheeks, bespoke the feelings of his heart; and indeed implied much more than even *Cicero* with all the powers of oratory could possibly have expressed.”

† Vide Appendix H.

A. D. 1757. lower deck guns were dismantled, and the vessel had 6 shots in her masts and 142 in her hull, besides great damage done to her rigging. The loss of the troops was comparatively trifling, amounting during the action to only one man killed and 10 wounded, their total loss during the siege, not exceeding 30 or 40 killed and wounded.*

The immediate capture of the Fort was doubtless to be attributed to the exertions and conduct of the two vessels, but there is every reason to believe that it would have ultimately fallen to the troops, even without that valuable aid, providing no active opposition had been experienced from the Nawaub; an opinion which Colonel Clive expressed before the attack, and subsequently recorded in his evidence before the Parliamentary Committee.† The troops engaged in this successful and, in its results, most important affair, were the details of the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Artillery, the detachment of H. M.'s 39th Regiment, the Bengal Battalion, (*now the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers*) the detachments of the Madras and Bombay European Battalions, the Bengal Sipahi Battalion, (*now the 1st Regiment of Native Infantry*) and the detachment of Madras Sipahis.

Immediately after possession was taken of the Fort, a detachment was sent in pursuit of the party who had escaped; but the latter being assisted by the Nawaub's officers, and having a long start, managed to reach Kossimbazar without interruption, and the detachment finding pursuit useless, returned to Camp.

The amount of property acquired by the capture of Chandernagore was valued at £130,000 sterling ‡

When the Nawaub heard of this event, he was exceedingly enraged, but at the same time he received very positive (though false,) intelligence from Patna, that a portion of Ahmed Sháh's force was in full march to invade the province of Behar, and that they had entered into an

* First Report of the Select Committee, p. 15.

† First Report of the Select Committee, Lord Clive's evidence, p. 16.

‡ Orme, vol. 2, p. 146.—Ives, p. 135.

agreement with Ballajee Rao, the Mahrattah General, who was A. D. 1757. to attack Bengal at the same time. Alarmed at this intelligence, Sooraj-oo-dowlah dissembled his anger against the English, and wrote to both the Admiral and Colonel Clive, congratulating them on their recent success,—expressing his earnest desire to continue on terms of friendship and alliance,—and offering the territory of Chandernagore to the English, on the same terms on which it had been held by the French: as a further proof of his sincerity he restored a portion of the English effects he had captured the previous year, and paid up 450,000 rupees in cash, in part compensation for what had been destroyed or made away with, in accordance with the treaty concluded in February.

Notwithstanding these professions, he still entertained strong suspicions of the English, and there is no doubt that he meditated their injury and destruction, whenever opportunity should offer. He directed Rajah Doolub Ram to encamp with the division of the Army under his command, at Plassey, on the island of Kossimbazar, 30 miles to the south of Moorshedabad. This measure was but little consonant with his protestations of amity and confidence, and it was accordingly determined to put them to the test by requesting him to give up all the other French factories and subjects remaining in his dominions. ~~Nothing could have been more repugnant to his wishes and intentions than such a proceeding,~~ and he accordingly evaded compliance, alleging in excuse, that as a feudatory of the Emperor he could not contribute to the destruction of Europeans, who had been established in the province so long, under the sanction of so many successive monarchs; forgetting how little he had been restrained by any such consideration during the previous year, when he attacked the English and captured and destroyed their factories at Kossimbazar and Calcutta.

Under these circumstances, Clive made up his mind to remain in Bengal, and to retain all the troops until the following September, as he foresaw that nothing but intimidation would induce the Nawaub to comply fully with the terms he had agreed to,—and further, that to reduce the British force

A. D. 1757. in the province at that time, would be to offer a temptation to his avarice and revenge, and seriously endanger the Company's possessions.* The ships all returned to Calcutta, where the *Kent*, which was an old vessel, and had suffered so much in the recent affair, was condemned; but Colonel Clive moved the troops to Hooghly, and encamped them on the plain to the north of that town, as affording the best position either to overawe or to act against the Nawaub.

The arrival of the *Cumberland* had added but little to the strength of the Force. 300 Infantry had originally been embarked on this vessel, when the expedition left Madras, of whom two Companies, amounting to upwards of 200 men, belonged to the Madras Battalion, and the remainder, under 100, to H. M.'s 39th Regiment. Having been greatly delayed on the passage, and striking on a sand bank off Point Palmyras, Admiral Pococke was forced to bear away for Vizagapatam, where he found that factory in great fear and anxiety, expecting to be attacked by Monsieur Bussy; he accordingly at the request of the local authorities, landed one Company of the Madras Battalion there, and the currents being still opposed to his progress, he returned to Madras;—where under the orders of that Presidency, he re-landed the remainder of the Madras Battalion, and took in their place a number of convalescent sailors belonging to the fleet. There now only remained on board the Company of H. M.'s 39th, amounting to about 90 men, and with these he arrived at the mouth of the Hooghly, in time to participate himself in the capture of Chandernagore, but not to admit of the troops being employed;—they were moreover in a very sickly condition, having suffered greatly during the protracted voyage.†

The force now assembled in camp and garrison amounted to upwards of 1100 Europeans, including Topasses and Artillery, with some 2000 Sipahis: many of the prisoners taken at Chandernagore, amongst whom were some Dutch and Germans, as well as French, took service in the Company's Battalion, as did also some of the sailors of the *Kent*, when that vessel was

* Malcolm, vol. 1, pp. 198-200.—Orme, vol. 2, p. 146. † Orme, vol. 2, pp. 142-3.

condemned ; of the latter, however, it would appear that the A. D. 1757. greater number entered into the Artillery.

The immediate dread of an Afghán invasion having passed away, the Nawaub's resentment towards the English increased, and Monsieur Law having informed him that a fleet of 40 French ships had actually arrived in India, and were at the time attacking Bombay, he assumed a more overbearing tone, and resumed his former evasions regarding the treaty,—the terms of which were yet incomplete. Colonel Clive now wrote to him to the effect that nothing could convince the English that he bore them the good will of an Ally, but permission to attack the French factory at Kossimbazar, and that his dignity would be preserved by adopting a line of non-interference. This request provoked the Nawaub to excess, and in the extravagance of his passion he threatened to put Mr. Watts to death ; but he as suddenly repented of this imprudence, and being equally anxious to keep the English from his Capital, and at the same time to preserve the French for future contingencies, he furnished Monsieur Law with money, arms, and ammunition, and ordered him to march slowly towards Behar, but to expect and be prepared for an early summons to return to Moorshedabad, as soon as circumstances should enable him to assume a more hostile attitude.

Monsieur Law, who was an officer of discernment and ability, had already detected the disaffection and ill-will borne towards the Nawaub by many of his principal officers, and he foresaw that opportunity only was wanting to organize a powerful conspiracy for his overthrow. He revealed his suspicions to Sooraj-oo-dowlah, and strongly urged upon him the necessity of retaining the French about his person ; but the very individuals to whom Monsieur Law referred, exerted their influence over the Nawaub, and pointing out the impolicy of quarrelling with the victorious and powerful English on account of the vanquished and fugitive French, induced him to consent to dismiss Monsieur Law and his party, which he did, telling him that he hoped soon to send for him again. “ *Send for me again,*” replied Monsieur Law. “ *Be assured my Lord Nawaub that this is the last time we shall see each*

A. D. 1757. "*other ; remember my words,—we shall never meet again ; it is nearly impossible.*"*

A short time sufficed to prove the truth of this prophecy. On learning the departure of this party, Colonel Clive prepared to send a detachment in pursuit of them. This intelligence further exasperated the Nawaub, who insisted that Mr. Watts should immediately return to Calcutta, or give an assurance under his hand that the English would make no further attempts to molest the French. Mr. Watts refused either alternative, but obtained permission to consult the Council, who ordered him to send all the treasure and more valuable effects to Calcutta, as opportunity might offer, without exciting suspicion. Colonel Clive also detached Captain Grant with a party of 40 Europeans and some Sipahis, to protect the British factory at Kossimbazar, and sent a supply of ammunition in boats concealed under rice.†

A system of mutual recrimination and intrigue now ensued, the details of which it is unnecessary to enter into ;—suffice it to say, that the Nawaub had evidently determined upon the destruction of the British, whenever the Squadron should leave the river, or Colonel Clive return with the troops to Madras ; and not only did he support and protect the French party under Monsieur Law, but he entered into correspondence with Monsieur Bussy, then at the head of a large force in the Northren Circars, whom he invited to enter Bengal, or at any rate to send him a body of regular troops to enable him to crush the obnoxious English. It is tolerably certain that he would have commenced hostilities at once, had he not been in fear of attack from other quarters ; the report of an Afghán invasion being continually revived, whilst Ballajee Rao, the Mahratta Chief in Berar, was known to be meditating an incursion into the province. Notwithstanding these accumulated dangers, real or imaginary, the unfortunate Prince, who appears to have been destitute of prudence as he was of every other virtue, was daily alienating the regard

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 1, p. 762.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 146.—Malcolm, vol. 1, p. 232.

and weakening the fidelity of all the principal men at his Court.* A. D. 1757.

The Buckshee, Meer Jaffier Khán, an officer who in his younger days had proved himself a man of character and spirit, which had raised him in the favor and esteem of the late Ali Verdee Khán, and who now commanded the Army of the state, as well as a considerable force of his own, was grievously offended at the insolent and capricious treatment he received at the hands of the young Nawaub, who viewed his influence at the Durbar and his relationship to the Royal family, he being a son-in-law of the late Ali Verdee Khán, as an additional offence. Monik Chund also, the late Governor of Calcutta, had been recently thrown into prison, from which he only purchased his escape, by payment of a fine of 10 lakhs of rupees. The Dewan or Minister, Rajah Doolub Ram, took offence at finding his measures controlled by a young parasitical favourite, named Mohun Lall, upon whom Sooraj-oo-dowlah lavished all his favour and affection. But the most dangerous of all these domestic enemies, were the Juggut Seths, the great Hindoo Bankers—whose wealth, connections, knowledge, and commercial influence, rendered them all powerful throughout the province. Accustomed to the just and politic rule of Ali Verdee Khán,—whose confidence they had largely shared, and whose countenance and protection they had always experienced,—they trembled for their wealth under the capricious and tyrannical government of Sooraj-oo-dowlah : an anxiety fully justified by the inordinate avarice and unscrupulous conduct of that Prince. Under these circumstances, they determined to turn to the best account, the spirit of discontent and rebellion then existing in the Durbar. The English power offered the most effectual agency for this purpose, and to secure this they bent their whole attention, fanning the flames of discord between that nation and the Nawaub. At length they ventured the experiment of ascertaining how far the former were inclined to enter into a league against the existing ruler. On the 23rd of April, Mr. Watts received a message from an officer named Yar Lootf Khán requesting a secret conference. This Chief, a Pathán by

* Orme, vol. 2, pp. 147-8.

A. D. 1757. birth, commanded 2000 horse in the Nawaub's service, but being a man of approved courage, and, after a fashion, of fidelity, he was entertained by the Juggut Seths, for their protection in the event of any danger threatening them. Mr. Watts deputed Omeen Chund as his agent in the conference. Yar Lootf Khán represented that the Nawaub was irrevocably bent on the destruction of the English,—that at present he was temporizing from political motives, but that as soon as all danger from the Patháns was over, he had determined on their extirpation, and had sworn that they should never again be allowed a footing in the country ;—that the Nawaub was about to march immediately to Patna, to watch the Patháns, when the English might easily obtain possession of Moorshedabad ;—that if they would make the attempt, he (Yar Lootf Khán) would join them ;—and if they would consent to proclaim him Nawaub, he was certain of the support of Rajah Doolub Ram and the Juggut Seths : in return for which assistance, he offered to enter into any engagements the English should propose. Mr. Watts, who had been warned by Colonel Clive to watch for any such manifestation of the evident feeling then existing at the Durbar, gave the project every encouragement, and immediately communicated the circumstance to the Colonel, who approved of his conduct, and at once countermanded a party he was about to send after Monsieur Law, writing a very civil letter to the Nawaub at the same time.* Scarcely had this affair been broached, when a similar, but far more important offer, was made by Meer Jaffier Khán, through the medium of Kojah Petroos, the Armenian Merchant, who had been formerly employed by the English to negotiate the treaty in the preceding February. The superior influence and position of Meer Jaffier Khán at once determined Clive and the Select Committee of the Council to decide in his favour. Mr. Watts was authorised to conclude the terms of the negociation, and received general instructions as to the nature and extent of the stipulations he was to demand on behalf of the English ; the chief of which were a full pecuniary compensation for all previous losses, public or private, and

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 148.

an ample reward to the Company and all concerned for present risks and contemplated services. These measures were decided upon at a meeting of the Committee, held on the 1st of May, after which, Clive returned to the camp, which, at the suggestion of Meer Jaffier Khán, he at once broke up,—sending one-half of the troops, including the Artillery, to Calcutta, under the command of Major Kilpatrick, and the remainder to Chandernagore:—he also wrote to the Nawaub, stating that he had done so,—and requesting that, as a corresponding proof of his pacific intentions, the force encamped at Plassey under Rajah Doolub Ram might also be withdrawn.*

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By this time Sooraj-oo-dowlah had received positive intelligence of the retreat of Ahmed Sháh Abdállie with the Afghán force from Delhi, and being thus relieved from his fears in that quarter, and buoyed up with the expectation of assistance from Monsieur Bussy, he considered it less necessary to temporise with the English: instead therefore, of removing the Division of his Army from Plassey, he ordered Meer Jaffier Khán with whom he had previously effected a formal reconciliation, to proceed with 15,000 men, to reinforce Rajah Doolub Ram. The detachment of Europeans and Sipahis under Captain Grant, which Colonel Clive had ordered up to reinforce the factory at Kossimbazar, had been stopped at Kutwah; but the Nawaub, having been falsely informed that the English were secretly introducing soldiers into that factory, sent a large body of troops and retainers to invest and search the place, when the garrison was found to consist of only 40 Europeans and 8 Topasses,—of the former 20 were the Artillerymen sent up with the Nawaub in February, and the remainder were chiefly French deserters.

At the same time he wrote to Monsieur Law to remain at Bhágulpore pending further instructions, and began to make his preparation for the approaching struggle. His great object of dread was the fire of the vessels of war, of the effect of whose broadsides at Budge-Budge, Calcutta and Chandernagore, he had received exaggerated accounts; and in the excess

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 149.

A. D. 1757. of his ignorance and timidity, he conceived it possible that they could proceed up the great branch of the Ganges, and then come down the Kossimbazar river to Moorshedabad; to guard against which, he caused large piles to be sunk across that stream, opposite to Sootey, about 20 miles above the City.

Meer Jaffier Khán having received the order to proceed with his troops to Plassey, where an intrenched Camp had been formed, thought that any signs of reluctance or hesitation might give rise to suspicion, and accordingly he marched from Moorshedabad on the 29th April, leaving his agent to carry on the correspondence with Mr. Watts; this gentleman, to remove suspicion, ordered Captain Grant's detachment, still remaining at Kutwah, to return to Calcutta; at the same time he dispatched Mr. Scrafton to the Select Committee, to receive their final instructions; these were issued on the 6th of May, and communicated to Meer Jaffier Khán's agent. The latter took them to Plassey for the approval of his principal, and returned to the city on the 14th. Meer Jaffier Khán consented to the whole of the terms; but at the same time he made a particular request that Omeen Chund might not be made acquainted with the confederacy, as he looked upon him as an intriguing Hindoo, without the slightest fortitude or honesty. Unfortunately, Omeen Chund already knew too much, and Mr. Watts found that, however desirable it might be to keep him in ignorance, it was now impossible. The wily Bengallee discovering from the reluctance with which he was intrusted with the secret, that but little benefit was intended for him individually, beyond his share, in common with the other Hindoo merchants, of the compensation for the losses sustained in Calcutta, in the previous June, now made use of his knowledge to enforce compliance with his demands; he put in a claim to one-sixth of the Nawaub's jewels, which were rated at four millions and a half sterling, though generally supposed to be much more valuable; he also demanded a commission of 5 per cent. on all the Nawaub's property,—at the same time giving it to be clearly understood, that refusal would be attended with a discovery of the whole plan. Mr. Watts, although astonished and alarmed at the audacity of these demands, and the villainy of the

threats accompanying them, evaded a positive reply, but soothed him by an appearance of general acquiescence and a promise of referring his demands to the Select Committee. / Accordingly, on the 14th of May, he transmitted the articles of the treaty as submitted by himself and accepted by Meer Jaffier Khán, at the same time announcing the treacherous conduct of Omeen Chund, and giving an account of several other instances of his intrigues and roguery,—in which, for the sake of personal benefit, he had not only injured and endangered the English interests, but had defrauded them to a considerable extent.—The Council were equally astonished and indignant at the conduct of Omeen Chund, and for some time were doubtful as to the course to be adopted with reference to his exorbitant propositions, until Colonel Clive suggested that the best plan would be to foil him with his own weapon of deceit.

It was accordingly determined to prepare two copies of the treaty,—one real, the other fictitious; in the real one,—which alone was to be considered binding,—to make no mention whatever of Omeen Chund; but in the fictitious one,—which was to be shewn to the intriguing Hindoo,—to include a stipulation in his favour for the sum of twenty lakhs of rupees;—both treaties to be signed by Meer Jaffier Khán and also by the Admiral, Colonel Clive, and the Members of the Select Committee. The two copies were accordingly prepared with great secrecy,—the real one on white, the fictitious one on red paper. When all was ready, a difficulty arose, owing to the Admiral, from a proper sense of honour, refusing to put his name to the false one; as however his signature was indispensable to lull the suspicion of Omeen Chund, it was counterfeited: a proceeding, which though Admiral Watson bore no part in, there is every reason to believe he was fully acquainted with.* The odium of this transaction, however, rests with Clive, and though he rendered the Government an essential service at the moment, he did so at the expense of a stain upon his own character, which no expediency can justify, nor casuistry can conceal.]

* First Report of the Select Committee; Lord Clive's and Mr. Cooke's evidence, pp. 19—22.

A. D. 1757. The terms regarding the amount of restitution stipulated for by Mr. Watts, were slightly modified by the Select Committee, and were as follows : to the Company one Kuror of Rupees ; to the English inhabitants 50 Lakhs ; to the Native inhabitants 20 Lakhs, and to the Armenian inhabitants 7 Lakhs. It was also determined to apply for a donation of 25 Lakhs for the Squadron, and 25 Lakhs for the Army ;—and finally it was proposed to ask for a donation to each of the members of the Committee, which unscrupulous suggestion was also generally acceded to.*

These points having been all arranged, it became necessary that some trustworthy person should be deputed to confer with Meer Jaffier Khán on the subject of these amended terms, with the additional donations, and to procure the final and formal ratification of the treaty : but that officer being still encamped at Plassey, this was a matter of some difficulty, as the Nawaub's suspicions were liable to be roused by such a measure. Fortunately, a circumstance had occurred a few days before, which afforded a favourable opportunity for making the attempt. On the 3rd of May, a stranger calling himself Govind Rae, had arrived at Calcutta, bearing a letter purporting to be from Ballajee Rao, the Mahrattah Chief of Berar, dated from Golkondah, in which he proposed to co-operate with the English against the Nawaub, and offered to march on Bengal with one hundred and twenty thousand men, immediately on receiving the summons of the English Governor.†

There were several circumstances that caused a suspicion as to the authenticity of this document, and it was the general impression of the Council, that it was a scheme of the Nawaub to ascertain the feelings and intentions of the English towards himself. In this dilemma, Colonel Clive, with his usual tact and foresight, proposed to communicate the letter to the Nawaub, assuming a belief of its authenticity,—so that should it be a scheme of Sooraj-oo-dow-

* Official Treaty.—First Report of the Select Committee,—Appendix, p. 105.—Lord Clive's evidence, p. 19. Mr. Beecher's evidence, pp. 12 13, and Second Report, p. 19.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 153.

lah, the artifice would thus be turned upon himself,—and if it was a veritable proposition from Ballajee Rao, nothing was more likely to remove all suspicion as to the designs of the English, than this apparent frankness and confidence, at the same time that it afforded the desired opportunity of sending up a person to communicate personally with Meer Jaffier Khán. Accordingly, Clive wrote to the Nawaub, to say that he had sent Mr. Scrafton to communicate a matter of great importance, and that gentleman was intrusted with the Mahrattah letter, and directed to endeavour to communicate with Meer Jaffier Khán by the way. Mr. Scrafton started on his mission, but was unable to hold any intercourse with Meer Jaffier Khán, as he was stopped at Plassey by the Nawaub's emissaries, and compelled to take the direct road to Moorshedabad, where he arrived on the 4th, and made over the Mahrattah letter to Sooraj-oodowlah, together with one from Colonel Clive, to the following effect :—

“ I have sent Mr. Scrafton to communicate a matter of the greatest importance. Notwithstanding all that the English have suffered from you, I give this last proof of my desire to live in peace with you. Why do you keep your army in the field? They distress all the merchants and prevent us from renewing our trade. The English cannot stay in Bengal without freedom of trade. Do not induce us to suspect that you intend to destroy us whensoever you have an opportunity.”*

The Nawaub appeared to be highly pleased at this proof of confidence, as he had heard of Govind Rae's arrival at Calcutta, and the object of his mission,—which proved to be genuine; the letter having been really written by Ballajee Rao. His suspicions of the English had just before been greatly enhanced by Omeen Chund, who for his own purposes, had persuaded the Nawaub, that they had entered into a communication with Monsieur Bussy, proposing a combined attack with the French upon Sooraj-oo-dowlah, which report, absurd as it was, the Nawaub credited,—and rewarded Omeen Chund with an order on the Rajah of Burdwan for Rupees 4,50,000, the

A. D. 1757. amount of an old loan, which was the sole object that wily intriguer had in view in coining and communicating the report. The Nawaub now expressed his conviction of the good faith of the English, and announced his intention of recalling Meer Jaffier Khán with the troops under his command from Plassey, but leaving Rajah Doolub Ram there, with his Division, in order that he might be in readiness to co-operate with the English against the Mahrattahs, in the event of the latter invading the province, which he professed to believe they would do. This arrangement would have entirely marred the scheme, as both Messrs. Watts and Scrafton were aware that Meer Jaffier Khán would be as unwilling to conclude any decisive measures whilst a portion of the Nawaub's troops were in the field, as if the whole were there. They therefore urged Sooraj-oo-dowlah to recall the whole,—pointing out the improbability of the Mahrattahs making any attempt, if unsupported by the English, and that the maintenance of the force at Plassey, could only be construed into a doubt of the good faith of the latter nation,—which, after their recent proof of confidence and good-will, was unjust and insulting. After some hesitation, the Nawaub yielded to these arguments, and recalled the whole force to Moorshedabad, where they arrived—Meer Jaffier Khán on the 30th of May, and Rajah Doolub Ram on the 3rd June.*

Meer Jaffier Khán on his arrival, immediately proceeded to pay his respects to the Nawaub;—but the latter being now relieved from all his fear of hostilities, either from the English or Patháns, considered that he had no longer any need of that officer's aid or services, and giving way to his personal feelings of dislike and jealousy, received him with extreme haughtiness and insult,—carried to such an extent, as to afford reason to apprehend immediate proceedings of a dangerous nature. Meer Jaffier Khán accordingly retired to his own palace, situated at the southern extremity of the city, which he commenced placing in a state of defence,—collected his own immediate troops around him,—and warned all his friends and partizans to hold themselves in readiness to come to his assistance if required.

* Orme, vol. 2, pp. 158-60.

He also sent a trusty messenger to Mr. Watts, to whom A. D. 1757. that gentleman gave the two treaties—real and fictitious,—together with the separate agreement relative to the donations to the Army, Squadron, and Members of the Committee. Meer Jaffier Khán, however, declined to sign them until he had consulted Rajah Doolub Ram, who had joined in the conspiracy. When the latter officer arrived and perused the stipulations, he objected to the enormous pecuniary demands, which he declared that the whole of the Nawaub's treasury would be unable to meet,—and proposed that instead of these, an equal division should be made between Meer Jaffier Khán and the English, of all money and effects that should be obtained. Mr. Watts declined to recede from the proposed terms ; but with a view of removing Rajah Doolub Ram's scruples, he offered him the management of the Treasury, with a commission of five per cent. on all sums realized. This had the desired effect ;—Rajah Doolub Ram relinquished his objections, and Meer Jaffier Khán signed the treaty on the 4th of June.* On the same date the Nawaub, not from any suspicion of what was on foot, but from his aversion to Meer Jaffier Khán, and his determination to weaken the authority and effect the destruction of that officer, ordered him to resign the command of the Army, in favour of a partizan of the Nawaub, named Kojah Haddee.

All preliminaries being now arranged, it only remained that Meer Jaffier Khán should solemnly swear to observe the terms he had entered into ; but owing to the surveillance under which Mr. Watts and himself were placed by the Nawaub, a personal meeting for this purpose,—which was indispensable,—became a matter of considerable difficulty. The former, however, relying on the fidelity of his servants, ventured on a dangerous expedient ; he caused himself to be conveyed in a covered palkee, such as was used for the conveyance of women of distinction, to Meer Jaffier Khán's Zenana, into which he was admitted without suspicion : here he was received by Meer Jaffier Khán, who, placing the Koran on his own head, and his right

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 160.

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June. hand on the head of his son Meerun, took the requisite oath. At this conference, Meer Jaffier Khán confessed that he could now only command 3,000 troops, on whose services any firm reliance could be placed ; but that he expected several other Chiefs, whom he knew to be discontented with the Nawaub, would join him when matters came to a crisis. He arranged and explained the course he would adopt, if an engagement occurred, and earnestly recommended that the English troops should take the field, and commence operations at once. It was also resolved that he should send a confidential officer, by name Omar Beg, to Calcutta, with the treaties duly signed, sealed, and sworn to,—whilst he employed himself in making preparations for effectual co-operation.

These arrangements being finally concluded, nothing more remained for Mr. Watts to do ; but as his departure would have excited the suspicion of the Nawaub, he resolved on remaining to the latest safe moment, making all necessary preparations for flight, when that measure should be rendered unavoidable.

The nearer affairs drew towards a crisis, the more did Mr. Watts feel apprehensive of the treachery of Omeen Chund, and apparently with good grounds. It was therefore determined to endeavour to remove him from the scene of action, and under pretext of solicitude for his safety, it was suggested that he should accompany Mr. Scrafton to Calcutta, as his age and physical condition rendered him unfit for any great exertion, which would probably be required to effect his escape, if he waited until Mr. Watts left. These arguments, in which there was much truth, had their full weight,—but his great avarice induced him to delay from day to day, in the hopes of obtaining certain sums still due to him from the Treasury. The Nawaub's permission was also requisite before he could depart, but this the old intriguer obtained by giving cause of offence, and receiving orders to leave Moorshedabad. At last Mr. Scrafton got him off, and after some further delays on the road, they arrived in Calcutta on the 8th of June ; where Omeen Chund was well received by the Council,—whose cordiality, however, could not remove certain suspicions that had recently arisen in

his mind; and scarcely had he arrived, ere he commenced intriguing in the city, and endeavouring by bribery to discover through the Native Amlah of the Council, if any deceit had been practised on him. On the 10th of June, Omar Beg arrived in Calcutta with the two treaties, and delivered them over to the Select Committee.* The valid treaty contained, in addition to the pecuniary terms already stated, a confirmation of all the advantages ceded by Sooraj-oo-dowlah in the preceding February, as also a grant to the Company of all the lands lying south of Calcutta, together with a slip of ground 600 yards wide, all round the outside of the Mahrattah Ditch,—the cession of all the French factories and establishments in the province,—a pledge that the Nawaub would erect no fortifications below Hooghly, and an agreement of mutual support.

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This treaty was signed by Admiral Watson, Colonel Clive, Mr. Drake, Mr. Watts, Major Kilpatrick, and Mr. Beecher.

The donations to the army, squadron, and committee, were written in a separate treaty.

These were as follows:—to the Squadron, Rs. 2,500,000; to the Army, Rs. 2,500,000; to Mr. Drake, the Governor, Rs. 280,000; to Colonel Clive, as second in the Select Committee, Rs. 280,000; to Mr. Watts, Major Kilpatrick, Mr. Manningham, and Mr. Beecher, as members of the Select Committee, Rs. 240,000 each. In addition to these sums, the following private donations were subsequently given, though they do not appear to have been inserted in the separate agreement; viz., to Colonel Clive Rs. 1,600,000; to Mr. Watts Rs. 800,000; to Major Kilpatrick Rs. 300,000; to the six Members of Council, Rs. 1,00,000 each; to Mr. Walsh, Secretary to Colonel Clive, and Pay Master to the Madras troops, Rs. 500,000; to Mr. Scrafton, Rs. 200,000; to Mr. Lushington, Rs. 50,000; to Major Archibald Grant, commanding the detachment of H. M.'s 39th Regiment, Rs. 100,000.

All the Military Officers mentioned above, also received their

* Vide Appendix I.

A. D. 1757. share of the donation to the Army, of which Colonel Clive's
June. portion amounted to Rs. 200,000.*

It now only remained to commence^e operations at once. During this period some changes and considerable promotion had taken place in the Force. In the Bengal Battalion, Lieutenants Le Beaume, Cudmore, and Muir, had been promoted to the rank of Captain; Lieutenant Carstairs to that of Captain Lieutenant; Lieutenant Walcot had died from the effects of his sufferings in the Black Hole. Several officers had also joined the Battalion, amongst whom was Captain Christian Fischer, a Danish Officer, who entered the service as a Captain on the 7th of February. Captains Grant and Coote of H. M.'s 39th Regiment had each been promoted to the local rank of Major, and most of the other officers had obtained a step in their respective grades. In the Madras Detachment, Lieutenants Rumbold and Campbell had been promoted to the two Companies, vacant by the death of Captain Pye, and the death or retirement of Captain Fraser. In the Bombay Detachment, Lieutenant Charles Palmer had succeeded to the Command of Captain Buchanan's Company, that officer having died on the 5th of June.† Lieutenant Jennings of the Artillery had been promoted to the rank of Captain, and obtained the command of the whole of that arm, Captain Barker having proceeded to Madras to assume the command of the Artillery at Fort St. George. Lieutenant R. L. Knox appears to have had the command of the newly raised Bengal Sipahi Battalion.

On the 12th of June, the Troops stationed at Calcutta proceeded to join the remainder of the force at Chandernagore, taking with them 150 Sailors of the Squadron, and leaving at Calcutta only a few sick Europeans, some Topasses and Sipahis to guard the French Prisoners, and a few Artillerymen to look after the guns on the ramparts. At Chandernagore, 100 of the Sailors under the command of Lieutenant John Clerke, first Lieutenant of the *Kent*, with a few Sipahis

* First Report of the Select Committee, pp. 13, 16, 19.—Second Report, p. 19. Wilson's Mill, vol. 3, pp. 185-7. Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 193-4.

† Three Years' Gleanings, p. 105.

and the sick of the detachment that had been stationed there, were left for the defence of that place ; so that all the effective Europeans might be brought into the field. On the 13th the whole force left Chandernagore,—the Europeans, with all the Artillery, ammunition and stores, proceeding by water in 200 boats, which were towed up by dandies against the stream, whilst the Sipahis marched up along the right bank of the river, on the high road made by the Mogul Government from Hooghly to Patna.

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The Nawaub having reason to suspect the fidelity of Nund Komar, had a short time previously appointed a new Governor to Hooghly, who threatened to oppose the passage of the boats ; but Colonel Clive sent him a menacing letter, which, supported by the *Bridgewater* anchoring opposite to the Fort, speedily induced him to alter his tone and resolution.

When leaving Chandernagore, Colonel Clive dismissed two emissaries of the Nawaub who were in camp, with a communication to the following purport :—

“ That the Nawaub had used every subterfuge to evade the
 “ accomplishment of the treaty of February : that he had in
 “ four months, restored only a fifth part of the effects he had
 “ plundered from the English ; that he had scarcely made
 “ peace before he invited Mr. Bussy to come from the Dek-
 “ kan, and assist him in extirpating them once more out of
 “ his dominions : that the party of French troops with Mr.
 “ Law, were at this very time maintained at his expence with-
 “ in 100 miles of his capital ; that he had, on groundless
 “ suspicions, insulted the English honor ; at one time send-
 “ ing troops to examine their factory at Kossimbazar ; at
 “ another, driving their Vakeel with disgrace out of his pre-
 “ sence ; that he had promised a sum of gold rupees, then de-
 “ nied that promise ; and then sent Omeen Chund from
 “ the city, under pretence that it was he who had de-
 “ ceived the English commanders in that business. On the
 “ other hand, the English had borne all these injuries patient-
 “ ly, and had even taken the field to assist him when alarmed
 “ by the approach of the Patháns ; but at length seeing no
 “ other remedy, their army was now marching to Moorshedabad,

A. D. 1757. " where they intended to refer their complaints to the decision
 June. " of the principal officers of his government, namely Meer
 " Jaffier Khán, Rajah Dooloob Ram, the Seths, Meer Moodeen,
 " and Mohun Loll ; to which arbitration it was hoped that he
 " would acquiesce, and spare the effusion of blood."*

In the mean time the movements of the British force were anxiously watched at Moorshedabad, where the strength of the confederate party was daily increasing. Monik Chund had proffered his alliance to Meer Jaffier Khán, and the Seths had won over Yar Lootf Khán and several other Chiefs of distinction and influence, all of whom however, outwardly maintained the appearance of duty and adhesion to the interests of the Nawaub.

Sooraj-oo-dowlah had received some indirect hints of an intrigue being on foot, in which Meer Jaffier Khán was a principal, but of the exact nature of the confederacy or of the fact of the English being connected with it at all, he was perfectly ignorant. What had come to his ears however, was sufficient to induce him to determine on the destruction of Meer Jaffier Khán at once ; but unwisely and unfortunately for himself, he gave utterance to his threats before he was prepared to put them into execution. From the 8th to the 13th of June was passed in preparation for attack and defence on either side, and the interchange of hostile messages and defiance. Meer Jaffier Khán, who now hourly expected to be attacked, urged Mr. Watts to seek safety in flight, and at last that gentleman, on the 13th of June, proceeded to the factory at Kossimbazar as if on an ordinary visit, when the other gentlemen there, Messieurs Collet, Sykes, and the Surgeon, joined him, and ordering supper to be ready on their return, rode out with their dogs, as if for the usual evening's exercise. After proceeding a few miles, they sent back the dog-keepers, and attended only by one servant, a Pathán who was mounted, they set spurs to their horses, and fairly commenced their flight ; about midnight they reached Agahdeep, where, although

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 164.—Ives, pp. 148-9.—Malcolm, vol. 1, pp. 255-6 : all of

there was a party of the Nawaub's troops stationed, who were all asleep, they succeeded in procuring a couple of boats, in which they rowed down the river, leaving their horses in charge of the Pathán. At the junction of the Kossimbazar and Jelinghee Rivers, they found a detachment with some boats who had been sent up to meet them, and aid their escape: on the following day they joined the Army at Kulnah.

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June.

Intelligence of Mr. Watts' flight reached the Nawaub on the 14th, just as he was about to commence an attack upon Meer Jaffier Khán's Palace. This information overwhelmed him with terror, as it proved the participation of the English in the confederacy, a fact to which he would previously give no credence, but which was now put beyond a doubt by the rumours received of their advance. His natural timidity magnified the danger of his position, and instead of resolutely crushing Meer Jaffier Khán and his party, before the English could arrive, he turned his whole attention to detaching that officer from the confederacy by promises and negociation.

Many of the influential Chiefs in the Durbar exerted themselves to bring about a reconciliation, to which the only apparent difficulty existed in the fears or pride of Meer Jaffier Khán, who refused to trust himself in the Nawaub's Palace. Upon this, Sooraj-oo-dowlah, as humble and obsequious in the hour of trouble as he was proud and arrogant in prosperity, waived his rank and position, and proceeded himself to the Palace of Meer Jaffier Khán, where a formal reconciliation took place, sanctified by solemn oaths on the Koran; Meer Jaffier Khán pledging himself not to join or assist the English, and the Nawaub agreeing to permit him to retire from the province with all his treasure and family, as soon as the present troubles were over.*

This reconciliation took place on the 15th, and hollow as it must have been apparent to all, it so elated the weak Nawaub, that he wrote to Colonel Clive in terms of defiance, and ordered all his Army, including the troops of Meer Jaffier Khán, to assemble at their former encampment at

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 167.

A. D. 1757. Plassey; he at the same time wrote to Monsieur Law, who
 June. with his party was waiting at Bhágulpore, to hasten to his assistance with all practicable expedition,

The English Army in the mean time continued to advance; on the 16th they reached Pultee, a town on the western bank of the Kossimbazar River, about six miles above its junction with the Jelinghee. About 12 miles further up, on the same side, was the Fort of Kutwah,—the Governor of which had promised to surrender after a certain show of resistance; accordingly Major Eyre Coote was sent forward on the 17th, with 200 Europeans, 500 Sipahis, a field gun and a small howitzer, to summon the place. This detachment arrived at midnight, and took possession of the town, which they found deserted,—but having left some of the appurtenances of their artillery behind, they were unable to make any use of them; they therefore remained quiet until the following morning, when Major Coote went to the bank of the Adjee, a small stream that separated the town from the fort, and waved a white flag: this was at first only answered by a smart fire from the garrison, but at length the Governor came down to the opposite bank, and a parley ensued, when, instead of adhering to his promise, the Governor positively refused to surrender, and defied the attack. Upon this Major Coote made his dispositions for the assault. The Sipahis crossed the stream at once, and taking up a position under shelter of a small ridge on the opposite bank, opened a hot fire of musketry on the ramparts; whilst the Europeans moving higher up where they crossed by a ford at some distance to the left. As soon as the garrison perceived that the latter had crossed the stream, they set fire to a range of mat-sheds, built alongside the walls, and made their escape to the northward. Within the fort, and in the neighbourhood, an immense supply of grain was discovered, sufficient to sustain an army of 10,000 men for a year, together with a considerable quantity of military stores and ammunition, and 14 pieces of cannon.* In the evening the

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 168.—Ives, p. 150.

main body of the Army arrived,—and the next day the periodical rains commenced with such violence, that the troops were obliged to strike their tents and seek shelter in huts and houses in the town and fort. A. D. 1757.
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In the mean time the troops of the Nawaub, who were ordered to march to Plassey, broke into a state of mutiny, and refused to quit the city until all their arrears of pay were discharged; this tumult lasted for three days, and was only appeased by a liberal distribution of money.

Since his departure from Chandernagore, Colonel Clive had written daily to Meer Jaffier Khán, apprising him of his movements; but up to his arrival at Kutwah he had received only one letter in reply;—this was dated the 16th, and mentioned the fact of his outward reconciliation with the Nawaub, and his oath not to assist the English,—but at the same time stated that “the purport of his covenant with them must be carried into execution.” This ambiguous communication, at such a moment, led Colonel Clive to suspect that Meer Jaffier Khán might after all betray the English, by leaguering with the Nawaub in the moment of trial, and he determined not to cross the river until this doubt should be removed, or affairs present a more satisfactory appearance. On the 20th, a messenger whom Mr. Watts had dispatched from Kulnah, arrived in camp, and reported that he had been introduced to Meer Jaffier Khán and his son Meerun, in a private court of their palace, but that whilst they were questioning him, some of the Nawaub’s emissaries came round,—when Meer Jaffier Khán and Meerun immediately changed their manner, threatened to have his head cut off as a spy, and to destroy all the English if they should presume to cross the river. Upon this Colonel Clive wrote to the Select Committee for further orders, and expressed his determination not to risk the safety of the troops without good cause; but rather, if he saw no chance of Meer Jaffier Khán joining him, to fortify himself at Kutwah,—as they had abundance of grain there,—until the rains were over, when some of the native powers might be induced to join.

The same evening, letters were received from Meer Jaffier

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tenor; they mentioned that he was to march with his troops from the city on that date; that he was to be posted on one flank of the Army, from whence he promised to send more explicit intelligence, alleging the fear of discovery as the cause of his previous silence and reserve:—no hint was given of his plans or intentions as to the line to be adopted in the field.*

These communications left Colonel Clive in a state of great doubt and perplexity: on the same day he wrote to the Rajah of Burdwan to join him,—if only with a thousand horse,—although he had little expectation of any native assistance until his exertions should have been crowned with some degree of success, sufficient to afford encouragement to those inclined to join his standard. He now pondered seriously on the danger and difficulties of his situation, and the extreme hazard of passing an unfordable river in the face of a powerful enemy, at a distance of 150 miles from all support or point of retreat,—when if defeat ensued, not one man could expect to return to tell it. Under these circumstances, he determined to call a Council of War of all the officers present, above the rank of Subaltern. These amounted to twenty, and Clive laid the following question before them. “Whether under existing circumstances, and without other assistance, it would be prudent to cross the river and come to action at once with the Nawaub, or whether they should fortify themselves at Kutwah and wait until the monsoon was over, when the Mahrattahs or some other Country power might be induced to join them.” Contrary to the usual practice, Colonel Clive gave his own vote first,—which was against coming to immediate action,—and the others then voted according to their seniority.

Majors Kilpatrick and Archibald Grant both sided with Colonel Clive, but Major Coote warmly espoused the opposite view. His arguments were, that hitherto they had met with nothing but success, which had greatly elated the spirits of the troops, whereas delay would only serve to damp their ardour. That delay would further enable Monsieur Law and

his party to arrive, which would not only strengthen the ene- A. D. 1757.
my, and add vigour to their councils, but would serve to June.
weaken the English force materially,—owing to the number of
Frenchmen in the ranks, who had taken service after the cap-
ture of Chandernagore, and who would undoubtedly desert
to their countrymen on the first opportunity. That consequent
on the numbers of the enemy, and the great distance from
Calcutta, all supplies would be cut off, which would reduce
the Europeans in particular to great distress. Finally, he
suggested, that if it was decided not to come to immediate
action, it would be more advisable to return to Calcutta at
once, although he fully admitted the disgrace this measure
would entail on their arms, and the injury that must accrue
to the Company's interest from such a proceeding.*—Notwith-
standing the justice and weight of these arguments, the ma-
jority of the Council decided against an immediate action.

The following were the names of those who voted on this
occasion, and the sides they espoused :—

Against coming to immediate action.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clive, in Chief Command.

Major James Kilpatrick, Commanding the Company's Troops.

Major Archibald Grant, Commanding the Detachment H.
M.'s 39th Regt.

Captain George Frederick Gaupp, Commanding the
Madras Detachment.

Captain Thomas Rumbold, Madras Service.

Captain Christian Fischer, Bengal Service.

Captain Charles Palmer, Bombay Service.

Captain Le Beaume, Bengal Service.

Captain R. Waggoner, H. M.'s 39th Regiment.

Captain John Corneille, H. M.'s 39th Regiment.

Captain William Jennings, Commanding the Artillery.

Captain Lieutenant Francis Parshaw (service doubtful).

Captain Lieutenant Molitore, Bombay Service.

* Orme, vol. 2, pp. 70-1.—Sir Eyre Coote's evidence given in First Report of
the Select Committee, p. 23.

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For coming to immediate action.

Major Eyre Coote, H. M.'s 39th Regiment.

Captain Alexander Grant, Bengal Service.

Captain John Cudmore, Bengal Service.

Captain Andrew Armstrong, Commanding the Bombay Detachment.

Haings Captain ~~George~~ Muir, Bengal Service.

Captain Robert Campbell, Madras Service.

Captain Lieutenant Peter Carstairs, Bengal Service.*

This was the only Council of War Colonel Clive ever held, and, as he stated in his evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, had he abided by their decision, it would have caused the ruin of the East India Company. After some hours of mature reflection, he resolved, notwithstanding the decision recorded, to adopt the bolder line of conduct, and accordingly he ordered the army to cross the river the following morning.† At sunrise on the 22nd, the troops began to pass over: the sick and superfluous stores were lodged in the Fort at Kutwah, where a Subaltern officer, with a party of Europeans and some Sipahis, was left to defend the place. By four in the afternoon the whole of the troops were across. Here another letter was received from Meer Jaffier Khán, also dated the 19th, to the effect that "the Nawaub had halted at Munkarrah, " a village about six miles from Kossimbazar, and intended to " intrench himself and wait the event at that place, where Meer " Jaffier proposed that the English should attack him by sur- " prise, marching round by the inland part of the Island." Colonel Clive immediately sent back the messenger with this answer, " that he should march to Plassey without delay, and would

* This list is taken from Sir Eyre Coote's evidence as given in the First Report of the Select Committee; the services of the officers only are added. Orme confirms this statement and gives the same numbers, but not the names. Sir J. Malcolm gives a different list, comprising only 16 officers, from a document found amongst Lord Clive's M.S.S. But Lord Clive in his examination before the Select Committee, confirmed Sir Eyre Coote's statement, and begged to correct his own previous evidence, which he said was a mistake, caused by a lapse of 15 years, and his not having consulted any records.

† Ives, p. 150, states that Clive changed his resolve, consequent on a more favourable communication from Meer Jaffier Khán. This is in some measure confirmed by Scrafton.

“ the next morning advance six miles further to the village of A. D. 1757.
 “ Daoodpoor ; but if Meer Jaffier Khán did not join him there, ^{June}
 “ he would make peace with the Nawaub.”*

The troops commenced their march before sunset, following the course of the river in line with the boats, which were towed up against the stream ; after eight hours of extreme fatigue, marching constantly with the water up to their waists,—owing to the inundation caused by the recent heavy rain, which continued to pour on them during the whole route,—they reached Plassey, a distance of fifteen miles, at one o'clock in the morning of the 23rd June. Here they took up their position in a large tope or grove of mangoe trees. From this they could distinctly hear the sound of drums and other music, which convinced them that the Nawaub's Army was in the immediate neighbourhood. Sooraj-oo-dowlah's intention to remain at Munkarrah had arisen from a supposition that the English would have immediately pushed on after the capture of Kutwah,—in which case they must have reached Plassey before he could have arrived there ;—but when he found that they still remained inactive, he continued his march, and arrived at his old intrenched encampment, where he took up a position, twelve hours before the English reached the grove. Colonel Clive having examined his own position, and made the necessary dispositions for security, planted sentries round the camp, and permitted the troops to betake themselves to rest. After their fatigues they were all soon locked in sleep, and silence reigned throughout the camp ; but not many of the officers, and certainly not their Commander, indulged in repose on that eventful morning.

[The mangoe tope or grove of Plassey in which Colonel Clive had taken up his position, was situated little more than a mile from the Nawaub's intrenched camp : it was about 800 yards in length and 300 in breadth, the trees being planted in regular rows, as is usual in the country ; all round it was a bank of earth, which afforded a good breast-work for the troops, and also a ditch beyond, but the latter was choked up with weeds and brambles :—the position of the tope was diagonal to the river, the north-west angle being little more

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than 50 yards from the bank, whilst at the south-west corner it was upwards of 200 yards distant. A little in advance, on the bank of the river, stood a hunting house belonging to the Nawaub, encompassed by a wall of masonry. On arrival during the night, Clive had stationed a party of 200 Europeans and 300 Sipahis, with two field pieces, in this building,—but in the morning he withdrew the greater part, leaving however, a sufficient guard for the defence of the place.

The actual force in the Field on this occasion amounted to 950 European Infantry and 150 Artillery; in the former were included nearly 100 Bombay and 100 Bengal Topasses; and amongst the latter were, 50 Sailors and seven Midshipmen, under the Command of Lieutenant Hayter, who acted as Artillery; to these were also added a detail of Lascars; the Native Infantry consisted of 2,100 men, partly the Madras Sipahis and partly the newly raised Bengal Battalion. The Artillery train was composed of 10 field pieces, viz. 8 six-pounders and 2 small howitzers.*

The Nawaub's Army consisted altogether of 50,000 Foot, 18,000 Horse, and 53 pieces of Artillery, mostly of heavy calibres, 32, 24, and 18 pounders. These were mounted on large platforms, furnished with wheels, and drawn by 40 or 50 yoke of powerful oxen, assisted by Elephants; one of the latter animals followed each carriage, pushing it forward with his head whenever it came to any difficulty; on these platforms were conveyed not only the guns and carriages, but the ammunition, stores, and gunners. The most efficient portion of the whole force was a small party of between forty and fifty Frenchmen, chiefly deserters, under the command of a Monsieur St. Frais, formerly one of the Council at Chandernagore; this detail acted as Artillery, and had 4 light field pieces attached.

Near the spot selected for the Nawaub's intrenched camp, the river made a remarkable bend, in shape like a horse-shoe, with the points much contracted,—thereby forming

* This detail of the force is taken from Orme,—Ives,—Clive's Report to the Court of Directors, dated 26th July 1757, given by Sir John Malcolm,—Clive's evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons—and Sir Eyre Coote's Narrative.

a peninsula of about three miles in circumference, the neck of which was less than a quarter of a mile in breadth. The intrenchment commenced a little below the southern point of this gorge, resting on the river, from whence it extended inland for about 200 yards, and then at an obtuse angle swept round to the north-east for about 3 miles; at this angle a redoubt was erected, on which several pieces of cannon were mounted.*

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About 300 yards to the eastward of this redoubt, was a hillock covered with jungle, and about 800 yards to the south nearer to the grove, was a tank,—and 100 yards further south was a second and larger one;—both of these were surrounded by bunds or large banks of earth, at some distance from their margins, and with the hillock, all formed important positions for either force to occupy. [The Nawaub's Army was encamped partly in the peninsula and partly in rear of the intrenchment.† The infantry were armed with matchlocks, swords, pikes, bows and arrows, and rockets, and possessed little or no discipline; the Cavalry in which the strength of the Army consisted, was of a superior description, both men and horses being of northern origin and large size.]

— At daybreak on the 23rd, the whole Army moved out of the intrenchment, by several openings purposely left, and advanced towards the British position,—the Infantry and Cavalry marching in separate and compact bodies and making a splendid appearance. St. Frais and his party took post in advance, with their 4 field pieces, at the larger tank nearest the grove; and in a line to their right, near the river, two heavy guns were posted under a Native officer; behind these two batteries were stationed a chosen body of 5,000 Horse and 7,000 Foot, partly under Meer Moodeen, the Nawaub's best and most faithful General, and partly under a son of the favourite Mohun Lall. The remainder of the Army extended in a curve, their right resting on the hillock near the camp, and sweeping round in dense columns of Horse and Foot to about 800 yards to the eastward of the south-east angle of the grove. Here were

* Orme, vol. 2, pp. 172-3.

† Vide plate No. II.

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stationed the troops of Meer Jaffier Khán, Rajah Doolub Ram, and Yar Lootf Khán. Instead of adopting the usual mode of posting all the guns in one heavy battery, they were interspersed between the several columns, two, three, and four pieces together. Thus the English were nearly surrounded—either by the river or the enemy's force; but the chief opposition they had in reality to overcome, was from the troops in their front.

Clive watched the enemy's dispositions from the top of the hunting house, and though astonished at their numbers and apparent confidence, he considered it advisable to move his troops from their sheltered position in the grove, as their remaining there might have been attributed to timidity, which would have only rendered the enemy bolder and more enterprising. He accordingly drew them up in line in front of the grove, their left resting on the hunting house. / In the centre he placed the Europeans, who were told off into four divisions; the 1st commanded by Major Kilpatrick, the 2nd by Major Archibald Grant, the 3rd by Major Eyre Coote, and the 4th by Captain G. F. Gaupp; on either flank of the Europeans were posted 3 six-pounders, and beyond them, to the right and left, were the Sipahis in two divisions.

This line extended about 600 yards beyond the right of the grove, but the enemy on that flank were at such a distance, that there was little to fear in that quarter, as they could easily have thrown back their right and formed in front of and parallel to the east side of the grove, had such been rendered necessary. About 200 yards in front of the hunting house and the left division of Sipahis, were a couple of brick kilns,—and here a small party was posted in advance with the remaining 2 six-pounders and the 2 howitzers. About eight A. M. the action commenced by the discharge of one of St. Frais' guns from the tank, which killed one and wounded another of the Grenadier Company that was posted on the right of the European Battalion: this was the signal for the whole force to open their fire, and a heavy cannonade was immediately commenced from the enemy's line, but fortunately most of their shot flew high, and did but little mischief. The

four pieces in advance at the brick kilns, replied promptly and effectively to the fire of St. Frais' guns from the tank, and the other batteries of the enemy were answered by the six-pounders from the line; these latter were however, too light to make any impression on the enemy's heavy Artillery, but every shot told well amongst the dense masses of their Cavalry and Infantry. Still, though many of the enemy were slain, the disparity of numbers was too great to render this of any advantage, and in half an hour,—the English having lost 10 Europeans and 20 Sipahis killed and wounded,—Clive ordered the troops to retire steadily under shelter of the grove,—leaving a detachment still at the brick kilns, and another in Plassey house. This movement greatly elated the enemy, who advanced their guns much nearer, and began to fire with greater vivacity; but their shot had little effect beyond shattering the trees, as the troops were well protected by the embankment, and were directed to sit down so as to be but little exposed; holes were made in the bank to serve as embrasures for the field pieces, from which they kept up a smart and effective fire, killing and wounding a number of the enemy's gunners, and causing several serious explosions amongst their ammunition. In this state, matters continued for two or three hours,—numbers of the enemy falling at every discharge of the English Artillery, which appears to have been most skilfully and gallantly served, whilst every now and then a casualty occurred amongst the party in the grove. [At about 11 A. M. Clive held a conference with his officers at the drum-head, when it was decided to maintain the cannonade during the day, and at midnight to make an attack upon the Nawaub's camp.—About noon a very heavy shower commenced, which lasted for nearly an hour, and completely deluged the plain, at the same time that it damaged nearly all the enemy's ammunition, which was much exposed; the consequence was that their fire materially slackened. A party of the enemy's horse, anticipating a similar result as regarded the English Artillery, advanced boldly towards the grove, to take advantage of it; but the English arrangements were so much better in this respect, that their ammunition had receiv-

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ed little or no injury,—and this body of Cavalry were received with so warm a fire as to induce them to retire with some precipitation. In this affair Meer Meodeen was mortally wounded by a shot from one of the six-poublers. When the intelligence of this misfortune was brought to the Nawaub, he was greatly disheartened, and immediately sent for Meer Jaffier Khán. Up to this period he had been sitting in his tent, fed by flattering assurances of victory, brought from time to time by those about him. On Meer Jaffier Khán's arrival, the Nawaub supplicated his assistance in the most humiliating manner, and called upon him by his relationship and fidelity to Ali Verdee Khan, to exert himself to save him now, throwing his turband on the ground before him and saying—'Jaffier, that turband you must defend.' Meer Jaffier bowed with his hands on his breast, and promised to exert himself to the utmost. He immediately returned to his troops and confederates, and sent off a letter to Colonel Clive, informing him of what had passed, and urging him to push on immediately, or at any rate to attack the camp at night. This letter, owing to the cowardice of the messenger, did not reach its destination until late in the evening. In the mean time the fears of the Nawaub continued to increase every moment, of which Rajah Doolub Ram took advantage, and urged him to return to the Capital.

This insidious advice was adopted, and after having issued the orders for the troops to retire within their intrenchment, Sooraj-oo-dowlah mounted a fleet sowaree camel, and accompanied by about 2000 Horsemen, fled at his utmost speed towards the Capital,—by which act he sealed his fate.

About 2 P. M. the enemy's cannonade completely ceased, and they were observed yoking their oxen and slowly retiring towards their camp, in obedience to the orders they had received. St. Frais and his little party, however, still maintained their post at the tank. This would have been an advantageous position from which to cannonade the retreating enemy, and Major Kilpatrick observing that the French party were now nearly isolated, could not resist so tempting an op-

portunity of securing the post;—taking two companies of the Battalion and two field pieces, he hastened forward from the grove towards the tank, sending word to Colonel Clive of what he had done, and the motives that induced him to the measure. A. D. 1757.
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The Colonel had just gone into Plassey house to change his clothes and rest himself after so many hours of fatigue and excitement, giving orders that he should be informed if any change or movement was observed in the enemy's position. It has been reported he had fallen asleep,—and if such was the case, it could not be wondered at, after what he had undergone, and it would only serve to prove the nerve and calmness of the man, who could snatch a few moments repose at such a time and under such circumstances. Be this as it may, the moment he received Major Kilpatrick's message, he hastened to the spot, and severely reprimanded that officer for acting without orders; but seeing matters advanced so far, he directed him to return to the grove and bring up the rest of the troops, whilst he himself remained in command of the detachment, being determined now rather to bring on the action again than make a retreat. St. Frais observing that the whole force was advancing, and that his own position was entirely unsupported, abandoned the tank,—carrying off his field pieces, and retreating with them to the redoubt at the angle of the intrenchment, where he planted them, all ready to act again.

Whilst the main body of the English were advancing towards the tank, that part of the Nawaub's Army which had been stationed on the left flank opposite to the south east angle of the grove, were observed to linger behind the rest of the force in the retreat, and when they had come up almost abreast of the northern line of the grove, they faced to their left and advanced in that direction; these were the troops of Meer Jaffier Khán, but not being recognised, it was supposed, that they intended to fall upon the baggage and boats whilst the main body was advancing. Accordingly, a party of Europeans and Sipahis was detached from the line to oppose them, under the command of Captains Alexander Grant and Rumbold, with a field piece under the charge of Mr. John Johnstone of the Civil Service, who served again

A. D. 1757. during this campaign as a Volunteer with the Artillery.
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Meanwhile the main body having reached the tank, Clive planted all the field pieces on the mound, and from thence began to cannonade the enemy's camp, upon which many of their troops again came out of the intrenchment, and their Artillery began to do the same.

Clive observing this, advanced nearer and posted half the troops and Artillery on the mound of the lesser tank, and the remainder on a rising ground about 200 yards to the left of it; he also detached the Grenadiers of H. M.'s 39th Regt., and the Grenadier Company of the Bengal Sipahi Battalion, to lodge themselves behind a tank close to the enemy's intrenchment, from whence they kept up a hot fire of musketry, whilst the cannonade from the other two stations was maintained with such vigour and efficiency as to cause a very heavy loss amongst the enemy's troops, and threw the cattle attached to their guns into great confusion. On the other hand, St. Frais plyed his guns from the redoubt with great spirit, and the enemy's matchlock men from the intrenchments, and from the hillock east of the redoubt, maintained an irregular but unintermitting fire. Their Cavalry also made several bold attempts to charge, but were as often repulsed by the rapid and deadly fire of the British field pieces. It was here that the contest was most obstinate, and on this occasion the chief loss of the English was sustained. At last, Clive observing that Meer Jaffier Khán's party were moving away from the field without joining the rest of the Nawaub's troops, became convinced who they were; and having now no danger to apprehend on his flank or rear, he determined on making a vigorous effort for victory, by attacking St. Frais' redoubt, and the hillock to the east of it,—in the jungle of which it was suspected there was an ambuscade. Two strong detachments were formed for this purpose, and advanced from either flank, whilst the main body moved forward more slowly to support either party, or to act as occasion should offer. The detachment on the right gained the hillock without firing a shot, and

when that to the left closed upon the redoubt, St. Frais finding himself again deserted by his allies, retired without offering any further resistance,—leaving the redoubt and field pieces in the hands of the attacking party. This position being carried, no further opposition was attempted, and by 5 o'clock the English were in possession of the whole intrenchment and camp, with no other obstacle to their advance than was presented by the enormous mass of baggage, stores, camp equipage and cattle, scattered all round them.

[The success was rendered more complete and positive by the arrival of messengers from Meer Jaffier Khán, to which Colonel Clive replied by requesting a meeting the following morning at Daoodpore.] The troops being informed that they were to receive a liberal donation in money, welcomed the order to push on to Daoodpore with hearty cheers, notwithstanding the fatigue they had already undergone during the last two days, and the temptation to plunder that lay spread around them. A short halt was made to enable the Commissariat to take possession of a sufficient number of the Nawaub's splendid oxen, to replace the inferior cattle in their own Artillery and store carriages; but a detachment under Major Coote was sent on at once, to pursue the enemy and prevent any attempt to rally, and by 8 o'clock the whole force reached Daoodpore, where they rested for the night. [The loss of the British in this action was remarkably small, amounting only to 7 Europeans and 16 Sipahis killed, and 13 Europeans and 36 Sipahis wounded; of the Europeans 6 of the killed and 10 of the wounded belonged to the Artillery, on whom the brunt of the action rested; two officers of that arm were also wounded, but their names are not recorded; these were the only officers who received any injury, with exception to Mr. Shoreditch, a Midshipman of the *Kent*, also attached to the Artillery, who was shot in the thigh. The loss of the enemy amounted to about 500 killed, and an equal proportion wounded, including several of their officers; 3 elephants and a number of horses were also left dead on the field, and 53 pieces of cannon, the whole of the baggage, camp equipage, stores and cattle, fell into the hands of the victors.]—Thus was

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A. D. 1757. fought and won the famous battle of Plassey, which may truly
June. be said to have decided the fate of India.*

The Corps engaged were the Bengal-European Battalion, detachments of H. M.'s 39th Regiment, of the Madras and of the Bombay Battalions; the whole of the Artillery, the 1st Sipahi Battalion, and the detachment of Madras Sipahis. Of these Corps, H. M.'s 39th Regiment, the Bengal Battalion, [*now the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers*;] the Madras Battalion, [*now the 1st Madras European Fusiliers*;] the Bombay Battalion [*now the 1st Bombay European Fusiliers*;] and the Bengal Sipahi Battalion, [*now the 1st Regiment Bengal Native Infantry,*] have all been permitted to emblazon the word "*Plassey*" on their colours and appointments; a distinction which has been unaccountably withheld from the Artillery, to whom in reality the victory was mainly to be attributed.

On the morning of the 24th, Colonel Clive deputed Mr. Sraffton and Omar Beg to meet Meer Jaffier Khán and conduct him to the English camp at Daoodpore. Meer Jaffier Khán was in a state of considerable doubt and anxiety as to the nature of the reception he was likely to meet with, as he felt conscious that Colonel Clive had good cause of complaint against him for the vacillating and ineffective line of conduct he had adopted. On reaching the camp, he found the troops drawn out to do him honor, and as he alighted from his elephant they presented arms; being unacquainted with the nature of this compliment, the noise and suddenness of the movement made him start back, apprehensive of treachery, but at this moment Colonel Clive advanced and saluted him as Nawaub of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, which dissipated his alarm, and revived his spirits. They conferred together for about an hour in the Colonel's tent, Meer Jaffier Khán making many apologies and excuses for his conduct, and the Colonel wisely refraining from any reproaches or reflections upon it. Clive however, urged the necessity of his hastening on to

* This account of the Battle of Plassey is chiefly compiled from Orme, Ives, Grose, Malcolm, Lord Clive's report and evidence, and Sir Eyre Coote's narrative.

Moorshedabad to prevent any further effort at opposition or attempt at escape on the part of Sooraj-oo-dowlah, and also to prevent the treasury being plundered. Meer Jaffier Khán accordingly returned to his camp, and commenced his march with his whole force to Moorshedabad, where he arrived that evening. Clive now despatched conciliatory letters to Rajah Doolub Ram, Yar Lootf Khán and Monik Chund, and in the afternoon made a short march of about six miles from Daoodpore, and encamped near the village of Boptah.*

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June.

The unfortunate Sooraj-oo-dowlah, after his flight from the field of battle, reached Moorshedabad before midnight on the 23rd. Early in the morning he held a consultation with all his principal officers who had escaped. Some suggested that he should surrender himself to the English and trust to their clemency and generosity; but this advice he imputed to treachery:—others proposed that he should make a stand in the City, and that with a view of encouraging the troops he should put himself at their head, and make a liberal distribution of money and promises. This plan appears to have met his approval, for he ordered the assemblage of the troops and the donation to each man of three month's pay:—but scarcely had he retired to his Zenana, where he was left to his own reflections and the fears of his women, than all his terrors returned. He now made preparations for sending off the females of his family and a portion of his treasures, and before noon fifty elephants laden with the women, jewels, and gold mohurs, took their departure towards Patna, he himself intending to follow. Meer Jaffier Khán's arrival in the evening expedited his movements, and suspicious of all around him, he entrusted his secret only to a favourite Eunuch by whose assistance he escaped at night unnoticed from the palace, accompanied only by Lootf-ool-Nissa his favorite wife, carrying with him a casket of his most valuable jewels. The Eunuch had a boat prepared at the ghaut, into which all three entered, and

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 179.

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June. urging the rowers to speed, they proceeded up the river at a rapid rate;—Sooraj-oo-dowlah's intention being to escape to Monsieur Law, and with him to proceed to Patna, where Rajah Ram Narain the Governor of that province would, he felt confident, support his cause.*

Soon after midnight, Meer Jaffier Khán heard of his flight, and immediately dispatched parties in all directions in pursuit of him. The following morning the City was in great confusion,—the Nawaub had fled, none knew whither,—no one had been proclaimed in his place,—the English were advancing, and few knew what to expect. Mohun Lall and several of the Nawaub's favorites and partizans, were apprehended in the act of escaping, and the following day the elephants, with the women and the treasure, were overtaken by some of Meer Jaffier Khán's troops at Baghwangolah, and brought back to the Capital.

Colonel Clive, with the troops, arrived at noon on the 25th, and halted at Maudipore, from whence he sent forward Messrs. Watts and Walsh, with an escort of 100 Sipahis, to wait upon Meer Jaffier Khán. This measure clearly pointed out to the inhabitants, whom they were to look upon as their future ruler. The next three days were passed in arranging matters relative to the payment of the promised donations to the Army, the Navy, and the Members of the Select Committee, together with that to the Company and the restitution to the Inhabitants of Calcutta. These sums altogether amounted to 22,000,000 Rupees, an amount which it was found that the whole of the Nawaub's treasury, jewels, and property was not nearly sufficient to meet. The English had doubtless, with their usual credulity on this subject, greatly over-estimated the wealth of Sooraj-oo-dowlah; but there is also reason to believe that in the confusion that ensued immediately subsequent to his defeat and flight, a very large portion of his treasure and jewels were made away with, by those about the

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 179. The author of the *Seir Mutakherin* says that he accompanied the women, &c. to Baghwangolah, and there embarked with several followers.

Durbar.* It was however finally agreed that half of the sums stipulated should be paid down at once; of which two-thirds were to be in coin and one-third in jewels and plate; and that the remaining half should be discharged in three years, by three equal annual payments. Colonel Clive's entrance into the City was not only delayed by the adjustment of these matters, but by a rumour of a conspiracy for his assassination, in which Meerun, Rajah Doolub Ram, and Kuddum Hoosein, a man of considerable influence, were stated to be engaged. This appears however to have been unfounded, as Clive's own apprehensions were easily removed, and Rajah Doolub Ram was not only allowed the promised commission of 5 per cent. on all the Nawaub's treasures, but subsequently met with very great support from the Colonel.

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June.

On the 29th, Clive entered the City, attended by 200 Europeans and 300 Sipahis, and took up his quarters at the palace of Moradbagh, which afforded sufficient accommodation for all his escort. Here he was waited upon by Meerun, with whom he proceeded to the Nawaub's palace, where, in the public hall of audience, Meer Jaffier Khán and all the principal officers were waiting to receive him. Clive now led Meer Jaffier Khán, who affected some reluctance, to the Musnud, and seating him thereon, saluted him as Nawaub, with the usual forms, and presented him with a nuzzur of 101 gold mohurs. He then, through an interpreter, addressed the assembled nobles, congratulated them on their good fortune which had given them an able and valiant ruler in the place of a weak tyrant like Sooraj-oo-dowlah, and exhorted them to be faithful to their new master.† They then all made their several obeisances and presented nuzzurs according to custom. The new Nawaub was now publicly proclaimed with the high sounding titles of Shoojah-ool-moolk, Hysam-oo-dowlah, Meer Jaffier Ali Khán Bahadoor, Mahábut Jung, and thus the revolution was completed.

* The translator of the Seir Mutakherin, states that eight kurors of rupees were concealed in a separate treasury in the Zenana, and gives sufficient reason to believe that this allegation is not altogether without foundation.—Vide Appendix. J.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 183.

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July.

The next day Meer Jaffier Khán visited Colonel Clive, and the arrangements for the payment of the several stipulated sums were definitively and officially agreed upon. On this occasion the two treaties were produced, and Oyneen Chund who was present, was undeceived as to his expectation of reward: the shock occasioned by the discovery of the fraud practised upon him, is said to have affected his reason, but this seems improbable, as we find him subsequently mixing in public affairs, though never occupying his former prominent position. Avarice being his ruling passion, this blow was doubtless a severe one, and he must have felt it deeply; it is certain that he shortly afterwards took a pilgrimage to a famous Hindoo shrine at MálDAH, and for a time alienated himself altogether from business.

On the 2nd of July, news was brought to the City that Sooraj-oo-dowlah had been captured; a report which excited some commotion amongst the Nawaub's troops. He had reached Rajmahal, where the rowers of his boat, fatigued with excessive toil, were obliged to rest for the night, and he took shelter in the buildings of a deserted garden: here he was discovered at daybreak by a fakier named Dana Shah, whose nose and ears he had ordered to be cut off thirteen months before, when on his march against the Nawaub of Purneah.* This man recognizing him, immediately made the circumstance known to a brother of Meer Jaffier, named Meer Daood, then governor of the town, who at once sent off a party of troops that had arrived in quest of him; they made him prisoner and hastened with him to Moorshedabad, which they reached about midnight on the 2nd of July, and immediately brought their prize to Meer Jaffier Khán, bound like a common felon, in the very palace where but a few days before he had reigned as a despotic monarch. Trembling and weeping, Sooraj-oo-dowlah prostrated himself before his kinsman, and in the most abject manner implored for life alone. Meer Jaffier Khán appears to have been moved, either by compassion for the fallen condition of his former master and rival, or touched

* Stuart, p. 530.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 1, p. 775.

with compunction at the recollection of the benefits he himself had received from Ali Verdee Khan, who died with the conviction that these favours would be repaid by fidelity to his grandson and heir. [But whilst these thoughts were passing in Meer Jaffier's mind, his son Meerun, a youth of a fierce and cruel disposition, who greatly resembled Sooraj-oo-dowlah in his character, though wanting in the same grace of manner and advantages of person, loudly and urgently insisted that the prisoner should be put to death.]

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The new Nawaub ordered him to be removed to a place of security, when he was taken to a distant part of the building and confined in a miserable chamber, awaiting further orders. Meer Jaffier Khán now consulted the several officers present as to his disposal. The better class, either from contempt of the weak and pusillanimous character of the deposed Prince, from whom they considered no apprehension need, be entertained, or else from regard to the memory of Ali Verdee Khán, and some probably from political and personal motives, recommended that his life should be spared, and that he should be kept in a state of mild but secure imprisonment. Others however, to obtain favour with Meerun, or to prove their zeal, dwelt on the danger of escape and revolution during his life, and urged the necessity of removing him and thus avoiding all such risks. [Meerun, observing his father's unwillingness to pronounce a decision, advised him to retire to rest, promising he would himself take care of the prisoner. Meer Jaffier Khán affecting to understand from this, that no violence was intended, retired to his private apartment; when Meerun immediately sent one of his own followers, named Mahmedhee Beg,* to the guard with the fatal order for Sooraj-oo-dowlah's death. The boisterous intrusion of these ruffians into his room, convinced the unfortunate prisoner that his fate was sealed; the fear of death overcame him, and he burst into an agony of remorse and lamentation. At length he recovered himself sufficiently to ask leave to make his ablutions and say

* This ruffian had been bred up in the house of Sooraj-oo-dowlah's father, and was under great obligations to the family.

A. D. 1757. his prayers; his executioners, impatient to complete their
July. work and obtain their reward, complied so far as to dash over his head, a pot of water that stood in the room;—the leader then stabbed him with a dagger, and the swords of his accomplices completed the ruthless work.* The following morning his mangled remains were placed on an elephant and exposed throughout the City, when they were finally conveyed to the tomb of Ali Verdee Khán, and there interred. The populace beheld the procession with awe and consternation, and the soldiery, having no longer a choice between two masters, submitted quietly to Meer Jaffier Khán. Thus perished Sooraj-oo-dowlah in the 20th year of his age, and the 15th month of his reign; a prince whose short career was connected in a most important manner with the British interests in India, both for good and evil.

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 184. Stuart, p. 531. Seir Mutakherin, vol. 1, pp. 778-9.

B.

CHAPTER III.*

FROM THE ACCESSION OF MEER JAFFIER KHAN IN JUNE 1757, TO
THE DEPARTURE OF COLONEL CLIVE FOR EUROPE IN FEB. 1760.

THE news of the victory at Plassey reached Calcutta on the 25th of June, in a letter from Colonel Clive to the Governor, and shortly afterward intelligence was received of the arrangements that had been made with the new Nawaub, Meer Jaffier Khán. Secrecy being no longer requisite, the nature and advantages of the terms concluded, were made known to the inhabitants and members of the service, which diffused universal joy and satisfaction amongst all ranks, and afforded a remarkable contrast to their condition at the same period of the preceding year. A. D. 1757.
July.

A vessel was immediately despatched to England with the welcome news, and Mr. Manningham, who had just arrived from Madras, was sent up to Moorshedabad, where he was appointed to act in conjunction with Colonel Clive and Mr. Watts, in the formation of a Special Committee for the management and adjustment of all affairs connected with the late revolution.

Continued difficulties were started by Rajah Doolub Ram relative to the condition of the Nawaub's treasury, but Colonel

* The works that have chiefly furnished materials for this Chapter, are:—
Orme's Military Transactions in Hindostan, vols. 2 and 3.
Cambridge's War in India, 1 vol. 8vo. 1762.
Ives' Voyage and Historical Narrative, 1 vol., 4to.
The Sier Mutakberin, Calcutta edition, vol. 2.
Carracioli's Life of Lord Clive, 4 vols. 8vo.
Malcolm's Life of Lord Clive, 3 vols., 8vo.
Grose's Voyage to the East Indies, vol. 2.
Wilson's Edition of Mill's British India, vol. 3.
First and Second Reports of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1773.
Reports of the Committee of Secresy appointed by the House of Commons, 1773.
Annual Register. Various years.
Hansard's Parliamentry History. Various years.
General Military Register of the Bengal Establishment, 1 vol. folio, Calcutta, 1795.

A. D. 1757. Clive continued firm in his demands, and at length on the 6th of July, the Committee received, in coined silver, the sum of Rs. 7,271,666 in part payment of the first instalment. This treasure was packed in 700 chests and laden on 100 boats, which proceeded under the charge of a large body of troops, to Nuddeah, where they were met by the boats of the Squadron, under which escort, the treasure was brought to Calcutta in triumph, with banners and music, the majority of the inhabitants joining the procession.* Never before had the nation obtained a prize of such value, and the arrival of this sum amongst the impoverished inhabitants was a source of general rejoicing. On the 9th of August following, Rajah Doolub Ram after many excuses and delays, paid up an additional sum of Rs. 1,655,358, in cash ; and on the 30th of the same month, he delivered a further amount of Rs. 1,599,737 in gold, jewels, and coin. These three payments made up the sum of Rs. 10,765,737. The amount of the first instalment agreed upon, was Rs. 11,350,000, being one-half of the total stipulations ; consequently the balance still remaining unpaid was Rs. 584,905.†

A Committee of the most respectable inhabitants was appointed to regulate the distribution of the compensation for the losses sustained during the capture of Calcutta, and this difficult and delicate duty appears to have been performed with such discretion and equity, as to afford general satisfaction. This influx of bullion spread affluence amongst all classes, and afforded an extraordinary stimulus to trade and commerce, but it was followed by its usual consequences, luxury and reckless speculation, and also by an unjust and domineering abuse of the privileges of trade obtained by the recent treaty. One of the earliest measures adopted consequent on the new arrangements, was the establishment of a mint, and the first rupees were coined in Calcutta on the 19th August, 1758.‡

The settlement of the other stipulated payments was not so easily arranged. Admiral Watson, who though he had

* Orme, vol. 2, pp. 187-8.

† Ibid, p. 188.

‡ Ibid.

signed the treaty with Meer Jaffier Khán, had taken no part or responsibility as a member of the Select Committee in bringing about the revolution, now put in his claim to share in the benefits accruing to that body, although no sum had been stipulated for on his account, beyond his share of the donation to the Squadron, which was a very considerable one. This claim was resisted; but when referred to Colonel Clive, he gave his opinion, that though the Admiral had no legal or specific right, his services and cooperation in the general arrangements entitled him to a share, which he proposed should be made equal to the Governor's by a deduction of 10 per cent. from the sums obtained by all the other participators, and he further remitted at once the amount of that deduction from his own quota. This example was followed by several of the other gentlemen, but the majority refused to accede to the proposition.*

A. D. 1782
July.

The Admiral's heirs subsequently brought their claim into a Court of Law in England, but without success.

Another cause of dissension related to the claims of that portion of the Squadron which served with the land force, they claiming a right to participate in the donation to the Army as well as in that to the Navy. This was resisted by the Military, who strengthened their objection by adducing the fact that the share of each grade in the Navy was already greater than that of the corresponding ranks in the Army. With a view of arranging this and other disputed points, Colonel Clive appointed a Committee, consisting of two officers from each branch of the service; and it was agreed that the votes of a majority should decide every question. This Committee decided against the claim of the Navy, and further resolved that the amount available should be divided at once. Colonel Clive considering this decision unfair towards the Navy, who had no representatives present, overruled their determination, and dissolved the Committee.

Upon this, the Military officers drew up and signed a protest, remonstrating against the Colonel's opinions and conduct, which was brought to him on the 5th of July, by a

* Malcolm, vol. 1, p. 282.

A. D. 1757. deputation of officers from the Committee ; Clive immediately placed the whole of the deputation under arrest, and July. sent Captain Armstrong of the Bombay detachment, whom he looked upon as the ringleader, down to Calcutta.

The protest of the officers is not upon record, but Clive's answer to it has been preserved. It is addressed "*To the Officers who sent the remonstrance and protest,*" and is as follows :—

" GENTLEMEN,

" I have received both your remonstrance and protest. Had you consulted the dictates of your own reason, those of justice, or the respect due to your commanding officer, I am persuaded such a paper, so highly injurious to your own honour as officers, could never have escaped you.

" You say you were assembled at a council to give your opinion about a matter of property. Pray, Gentlemen, how comes it that a promise of a sum of money from the Nabob, entirely negotiated by me, can be deemed a matter of right and property ? So very far from it, it is now in my power to return to the Nabob the money already advanced, and leave it to his option whether he will perform his promise or not. You have stormed no town, and found the money there ; neither did you find it in the plains of Plassey, after the defeat of the Nabob. In short, Gentlemen, it pains me to remind you, that what you are to receive is entirely owing to the care I took of your interest. Had I not interfered greatly in it, you had been left to the Company's generosity, who perhaps would have thought you sufficiently rewarded in receiving a present of six month's pay ; in return for which, I have been treated with the greatest disrespect and ingratitude, and what is still worse, you have flown in the face of my authority for over-ruling an opinion, which, if passed, would have been highly injurious to your own reputation, being attended with injustice to the Navy, and been of the worst consequences to the cause of the nation and the Company.

" I shall, therefore, send the money down to Calcutta, give directions to the agents of both parties to have it shroffed ; and when the Nabob signifies his pleasure (on whom it solely depends) that the money be paid you, you shall then receive it, and not before.

" Your behaviour has been such, that you cannot expect I should interest myself any further in your concerns. I therefore retract the promise I made the other day, of negotiating either the rest of the Nabob's promise, or the one-third, which was to be received in the same manner as the rest of the public money, at three yearly equal payments.

" I am, Gentlemen,

" Your most obedient, humble servant,

Upon this, the officers addressed a letter acknowledging themselves in error, which they forwarded through Major Kilpatrick, who was deputed to wait upon the Colonel, and request him to forget and forgive what had taken place. A. D. 1757.
August

To this Colonel Clive acceded, and replied to their acknowledgment in the following terms:—

“ GENTLEMEN,

“ I have ever been desirous of the love and good opinion of my officers, and have often pursued their interest in preference of my own. What passed the other day is now forgotten, and I shall always be glad of an opportunity of convincing you how much.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

ROBT. CLIVE.

Thus ended this disagreeable discussion; but much ill-will was created amongst the troops by finding their brethren of the Navy, who had generally, so little share in the dangers and fatigues of the campaign, so much more liberally remunerated than themselves, who had endured the chief risk, labour, and privation.

Admiral Watson only lived to see the complete success of the arrangements in which he had borne so important and distinguished a part; he had been ailing for some time past, and on the 12th of August, became seriously indisposed; his disease was the malignant fever, then so prevalent in Bengal, which carried him off on the 16th of the same month. On the following day, he was buried in the cemetery of Calcutta, where his tomb still remains;* his funeral was attended not only by Admiral Pococke and the officers and men of the

* The following is the inscription on the tomb.

‘ Here lies interred the body of Charles Watson, Esq., Vice Admiral of the White, Commander-in Chief of his Majesty’s Naval Forces in the East Indies, who departed this life on the 16th day of August 1757, in the 44th year of his age.

Gheriah taken, February 13th, 1756.

Calcutta freed, January 2nd, 1757.

Chandernagore taken, March 23rd, 1757.

EXEGIT MONUMENTUM CERE PERENNIUS.

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August.

Squadron, but by Colonel Clive, and all the Military officers in Calcutta, as also by all the European inhabitants, by most of the French gentlemen, then prisoners on parole in Calcutta, and by a vast concourse of Armenians and Natives. His frank and honest character and kindly disposition had endeared him to all classes, and few public men in India have been more generally beloved and respected. Previous to the news of his death reaching England, he had been appointed a Vice Admiral of the White, and a monument was subsequently erected to his memory in Westminster Abbey.

With reference to the enlarged territory and the higher military position now obtained by the British in India, one of the primary measures that appears to have occupied the attention of Colonel Clive was the increase of the military force of the Presidency; but as nothing could be done to effect this, as far as the European troops were concerned, beyond local enlistment on a small scale, he contented himself with writing home and urgently impressing upon the Court of Directors the necessity of speedily sending out a large body of recruits for this purpose, and in the mean time exerted himself to obtain such immediate addition to his military strength, as lay within the compass of his own means: accordingly, he commenced, without delay, enlisting men and organising a second Battalion or Regiment of regular Sipahis, which, formed on drafts from the old Corps, was in a state of comparative efficiency in a remarkably short period.*

But before entering further on the general military arrangements and proceedings of this period, it becomes necessary to revert to occurrences immediately subsequent to, and consequent on, the victory at Plassey.

Monsieur Law, with the party of Frenchmen and Sipahis under his command, had immediately advanced from Bâghlipore on receipt of Sooraj-oo-dowlah's summons, and had actually arrived within twenty miles of Râjmahal, when he received intelligence of the defeat and capture of that un-

* This Battalion must not be confounded with the existing 2nd or Grenadier Regiment of Native Infantry, as it was destroyed at Patna in 1763.

Captain Williams, p. 14, falls into the error of taking this Corps for the "Matthew's-ka Pultun," a distinguished Battalion, which was not however raised until

fortunate Prince ; upon the confirmation of which, he com- A. D. 1757.
menced a retrograde march towards Patna, with the intention
of offering his services to Rajah Ram Narain, the Governor
of that province.

Of all the Hindoo officers whom Ali Verdee Khán had raised to power and office, Ram Narain appears to have been the only one possessed of sufficient gratitude to his former master, to remain faithful to the cause of the grandson. It is, however, probable, that his continual absence from the Durbar, owing to which he was comparatively little subject to the caprices and insolence of Sooraj-oo-dowlah, may have in a great measure tended to this result, and a strong feeling of personal enmity towards Meer Jaffier Khán, kept constantly alive by his collision with Mahmood Ahmee Khán, a brother, and Meer Mahmood Kossim Khán, a brother-in-law of that chief, doubtless aided materially in binding him to the interests of his Sovereign. A knowledge of these circumstances had induced the Juggut Seths and Rajah Doolub Ram to avoid giving him any hint of the measures in contemplation, or attempting to enlist him in the confederacy. Foreseeing, however, the probability of some dissensions, he had all along regarded Monsieur Law and his party as an important resource in the event of any struggle, and from the time they had first entered the province under his charge, he had given them his countenance and support. Under these circumstances, Monsieur Law's determination of joining him was at once natural and judicious. It was equally natural that Meer Jaffier Khán and the members of the new ministry should feel distrust of Ram Narain, and be desirous of preventing, if possible, the junction of Monsieur Law, which would afford a material accession to his strength. It was therefore determined to send a detachment without delay, to overtake and destroy the French party, or at any rate to overawe Ram Narain, and deter him from taking them into his service should they reach Patna.

Meer Jaffier Khán notwithstanding the apparent acquiescence of the soldiery in the new state of affairs, felt so little confidence in their regard or fidelity towards himself, that he was afraid to trust any considerable body of them at a distance,

A. D. 1757. which Colonel Clive perceiving, and being also aware of the
July. dilatory nature of native proceedings, determined to undertake the expedition with British troops alone.

It was the 4th of July, when Clive came to this determination, and he immediately sent forward the two Grenadier Companies of the Sipahi Battalion, under a Native officer named Mooten Beg, as an advanced guard, directing a body of European troops and Madras Sipahis to hold themselves in readiness to follow, under the command of Major Archibald Grant of H. M.'s 39th Regiment. The next day, however, some changes were made in these arrangements, and the command of the detachment was given to Major Eyre Coote, who accordingly came in from camp to Moorshedabad to assume command. /

The details for this expedition, in addition to the two Grenadier companies of Sipahis forming the advance, consisted of two companies of European Infantry, under the command of Captain Alexander Grant of the Bengal service, with a detail of Artillery and 2 six pounder field-pieces, commanded by Lieutenant Kinch, aided by Mr. Johnstone, who also acted as Major Coote's Secretary, together with three companies of the Madras Sipahis, and 10 Bildars or Mahmootee-men; amounting altogether to 223 Europeans, including officers and Artillery, and 500 Sipahis, including the advanced guard.* The baggage, stores, carriages, ammunition, and provisions were laden upon 40 boats, all of which were very ill equipped with boatmen or tackle, and these were not ready until the 6th of July, by which time the French party had got half way to Patna.

On that date, Major Coote commenced his march from Moorshedabad, and the same evening reached Rumna, where he was greatly annoyed by the drunkenness and disorder prevailing amongst his detachment. The following morning he embarked the Europeans in the boats which had been prepared for the purpose, and continued his route,—the Sipahis marching parallel with the boats along the bank of the ri-

* Ives, p. 156.—Orme, vol. 2, p. 186.

ver ; that evening they arrived at Chupwah ; the following evening they reached Belghatta, where, meeting the Royal fleet of boats from Dacca, he procured three good boats and 87 dandies or boatmen from the Nazir in charge of the flotilla. Here Major Coote, leaving the Europeans in their boats under the command of Captain Grant, pushed on with the three companies of Sipahis, with a view of overtaking the two advanced companies, which had started two days previously : that night he reached Sooty, near the confluence of the Ganges and the Kossimbazar river. On the evening of the 9th, he got as far as Dogatchee, where he was met by Meer Jaffier Khán's brother, Daood Khán, who commanded at Rajmahal, from whom he learned that Monsieur Law had left Terriahgully but a few days before ; on the 10th, he pushed on to Rajmahal, where he overtook the two advance companies of Sipahis ; here he halted for the Europeans to join, who came up late on the following night, having experienced great difficulty in proceeding from want of dandies and proper tackle for the boats, and from the wretched condition of these vessels ; three boats were still left behind,—one containing the arrack for the troops, another the tumbrils of the guns, and a third the ammunition. The Major now applied to Daood Khán, who promised to procure a fresh supply of arrack, and to send out and collect more boats. He also engaged to furnish a considerable body of Cavalry, and to reinforce the detachments stationed at Terriahgully and Sikreegully,—the latter, however, he entirely neglected, and only furnished a party of 120 Horse, and even these refused to march without an advance of pay, which Major Coote had neither the means or authority to furnish. All the workmen procurable on the spot were employed in repairing the boats, and on the night of the 12th, the tumbril and ammunition boats came up. The Major now wrote to Colonel Clive, reporting the difficulties and obstructions he had encountered, and requesting orders relative to his future proceedings : he also reported that the advanced party of Sipahis had captured a Swiss in the French service, named *Alexander Saussure*, whom they discovered disguised as a native, respecting whose

A. D. 1757.
July.

A. D. 1757. disposal he also requested instructions.] On the 13th, he received a letter from Colonel Clive written some days previous, directing him to follow Monsieur Law as far as Patna, if he could not come up with him before reaching that place.*

July

On the same day the Serjeant of the Guard, by name Duvergne, reported that the prisoner *Saussure* had been tampering with him and persuading him to desert, and that he had divulged a plan which he had formed for escaping, through the connivance of one of the Sipahis, who was on guard over him; he had further communicated to him the contents of a letter he had written to Monsieur Law, giving that officer an account of the proceedings and intentions of the English detachment, and narrating his own plans of escape. On receiving this report, Major Coote sent Lieutenant Flacton, the officer on duty, to search the prisoner, on whose person was found not only the letter alluded to, addressed to Monsieur Law, but other documents of importance. From these and other evidences obtained, it appeared that *Saussure* was a deserter from the British service, having originally come out to India in a Swiss Company, raised for, and attached to, the Bombay European Regiment; he had deserted from thence and entered the Dutch service, in which he obtained a commission, but having, whilst stationed at Batavia, killed one officer in a duel and wounded two others, he had been compelled to make his escape, and had contrived to reach Pondicherry, where being speedily engaged in a similar affair, he had been obliged to leave that place also, which he did in a Danish ship bound to Bengal, where he arrived a short time before the battle of Plassey, when he immediately joined the party stationed at Kossimbazar under Monsieur St. Frais. In his letter to Monsieur Law he gave a full detail of that action, and represented that he had been promised the command of 4,000 men by Sooraj-oo-dowlah, which he had proposed to employ as an advanced guard in preventing the English from obtaining possession of Plassey grove; to the non-perform-

* Ives, p. 158.

ance of this promise by the Nawaub, and the want of support given to the French party stationed at the tank, he ascribed the loss of the action. He went on to say that, after the defeat, he had proposed to Monsieur St. Frais to endeavour to form a junction with Monsieur Law, but that officer considering such a measure impracticable, he had himself determined to make the attempt; that he had secreted himself until the departure of Major Coote, and then set out on his undertaking, disguised as a Moosulmán, but had unfortunately been detected by Mooten Beg commanding the advanced party of Sipahis, whilst lingering in their camp. He further mentioned his plan and intention of escaping, and requested that a trustworthy Hirkarrah might be sent to facilitate his designs and aid him in the attempt. But at the same time he urged Monsieur Law to aggressive measures; he wrote—“You, Sir, have it in your power with the Troops under your command, to get the better of the English detachment now in pursuit of you. In the twinkling of an eye you may entirely change the face of affairs here. Your name is in high repute amongst the Moors, and the military reputation of Monsieur Bussy is so great and dreaded, that this party must instantly fly at his very name.” He then concluded by recommending Monsieur Law to make a sudden countermarch, and to attack the Major’s party at a particular spot which he described, assuring him that such an unexpected attempt could not fail of success, and that he might easily kill or make prisoners all the officers, especially those of the Sipahis, who were, he stated, “more addicted to drunkenness than even the European soldiers themselves.*”

A. D. 1757.
July.

The prisoner being brought before a Court Martial consisting of Major Coote and the other officers, was unable to deny that he had written the letters found on his person, and having nothing to urge in his defence, was found guilty of desertion and of acting as a spy, and as such was condemned to be hung; which sentence Major Coote considered

* Ives, p. 159.

A. D. 1757. it advisable to act upon without delay, and it was accordingly
 July. put in execution that evening, in presence of the whole detachment. The Sipahi whom he had seduced into connivance at his intended escape, was tried on the following day by a Native Court Martial, composed of the Soobadars and Jemmadars of the detachment, by whom he was found guilty, and sentenced to receive 500 lashes, and to be dismissed from the service.* This is the first instance on record in the Bengal Army of a Native Court Martial, and it is worthy of observation that on that occasion the excellent principle of dismissal after corporal punishment, long subsequently introduced as a general rule into the service, was first brought into operation.

After various delays and fruitless promises on the part of Daood Khán, Major Coote was obliged to re-commence his march on the 15th, in very little better condition than he arrived ; a supply of dandies, tackle and fresh boats, in which he had intended to have embarked the Sipahis had been faithfully promised, but none were furnished ; the latter were consequently obliged to continue their route by land. That evening he reached Sikreegully and examined the pass there, which he found to be very difficult and well calculated for defence, the natural obstacles having been rendered more formidable by a strong line of fortifications ; on the 16th, he reached Goujapoor, and on the 17th, after passing the defile of Terriahgully, similar in character to, but even more formidable than that of Sikreegully, he reached Shahabad. Here a French Sipahi from the coast, joined the camp, who reported that, having had a quarrel with his Jemmadar, and having received no pay for some time, he had deserted from Monsieur Law's detachment about 10 days before, when they were at Monghyr ; that the party consisted of about 140 Europeans and 90 Sipahis, with 3 field-pieces, that they were all well armed and equipped, and had plenty of ammunition and military stores, but were in much distress for money. On the 18th the whole party

* Ives, p. 160.

reached Bághulpore, 65 miles from Rajmahal and 55 miles from Patna. Here the Major received a letter from Colonel Clive, dated the 13th, enclosing purwánahs from Meer Jaffier Khán, addressed to the several officers in his route, ordering that every assistance should be rendered to the detachment, either as regarded provisions, boats, or men, and also a commission, conferring on Major Eyre Coote the command of the whole of the Nawaub's troops. The Major immediately sent for the Foujdar, and showing his purwánah, demanded 60 Horsemen, which were readily furnished; he also sent a purwánah to the Rajah of Kurruckpore, requesting the assistance of 200 Horsemen, whom he directed to be sent to meet him at Mongheer. He then forwarded the Nawaub's order to the Jemmadar at Bhar, directing him to burn the boats of Monsieur Law's fleet if they should put in there, and to throw every other possible obstacle in their way: on the same evening, however, he received a letter from Mr. Peakes, the chief of the factory at Patna, dated the 16th, reporting, that Monsieur Law had passed that city, and was marching on towards the territories of Shoojah-oo-dowlah, the Nawaub of Oude; he further reported that the party consisted of 100 Europeans, 125 Coast and 40 Bengal Sipahis, with 8 field-pieces and 9 patteraroes.*

On the 19th the Major continued his route, the Europeans still in their boats, the 60 Horsemen and the Sipahis marching as heretofore: that evening he reached Jehangheerah, and on the 20th, proceeded to Goorghat-nullah, where he was joined by Meerza Kulbee Allee, the son of the Foujdar of Bághulpore, with a party of buxarries or matchlock-men, and pushing on, he reached Mongheer late that night. Here he was immediately waited upon by the Dewan, or Governor of the place, from whom he demanded a supply of dandies, as several of the boats were in the rear, and two reported to be aground; on the following day, 30 dandies having been furnished, the whole of the fleet was brought up. Major Coote was desirous of entering and examining the Fort of Mongheer, which

* Ives, p. 162.

A. D. 1757. then maintained considerable reputation as a place of strength :
 July. but on approaching the walls, although accompanied by the Dewan, he received a significant hint to give over the attempt,—the garrison lining the ramparts with their matches and port-fires lighted.* On the 22nd, he continued his route, the Sipahis marching round the Fort, and the boats with the Europeans crossing the river on account of the strong currents at this point. The former made a long march and reached Nawaubgunge, whilst the latter having had one boat upset, by which an European and several stand of arms were lost, re-crossed the river and anchored for the night at Hybutgunge. Here another communication was received from Mr. Peakes, announcing that Monsieur Law had reached Chuprah, and being now close on the Oude frontier, was certain of the means of escaping when he pleased.

On the evening of the 22nd, Major Coote, with the greater part of the fleet, stopped at Nawaubgunge, but some of the boats went on to Luckinpore. On the 23rd the Major's *budge-row* grounded at the mouth of the Raj Nullah, and he was compelled to leave her to be got off and repaired ; from thence he proceeded on foot to Luckinpore, where he joined the rest of the fleet and the Sipahis, when the whole pushed on to Burreah, which they reached that afternoon. Several accidents having happened to the fleet, and daily risks having been incurred, the Major determined upon disembarking the whole of the troops and marching on from Burreah : he accordingly landed the field-pieces and ammunition, which were drawn and carried by the troops, and putting himself at the head of the party, they marched that evening to Derriahpore, a distance of about six miles. On the 24th they made a long and fatiguing march to Perraruck, where they arrived about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. During the whole of this march the Europeans had expressed great discontent, and latterly began to evince a very mutinous spirit ; they complained of the fatigue and privations they had undergone, of the great inconvenience they suffered from the want of arrack and shoes,

* Ives, p. 163.

and at last, on reaching Perraruck, positively refused to march any farther.* Major Coote, finding them deaf to his orders and entreaties, embarked them once more in their boats, and leaving Capt. Grant in command, directed him to follow leisurely, whilst he himself continued his march with the Sipahis to Bhar. On the arrival of the fleet at this place, the Major made another attempt, through the medium of the Non-commissioned officers, to bring the Europeans to a proper sense of their duty, reminding them of his exertions on their behalf, pointing out the serious nature of their offence, and threatening them not only to report the whole circumstance to Colonel Clive, but to leave them behind at Patna, and continue the pursuit with the Sipahis alone. To this they replied that "they should look upon the latter part of the threatened disgrace as the most desirable event that could happen to them, as they were persuaded that their officers' intention was to kill them, in order to put their share of prize money into their own pockets." Finding all remonstrance useless whilst the men were in this temper, he gave over the attempt, and directing Captain Grant to bring them on to Patna, continued his march with the Sipahis alone. On the 25th, he made a forced march to Bykantpore near Futwah, about 8 miles from Patna. During this march he received letters from Rajah Ram Narain, the Governor of Behar, apologising for the escape of the French party under Monsieur Law, which he attributed partly to his not having received earlier instructions on the subject from Moorshedabad, and partly to his having himself been absent from Patna for some time, engaged in an expedition against the petty Rajahs of Moy and Sader, whose districts lay about 30 miles south-east of Patna. He further stated that, on his return, he had immediately proclaimed Meer Jaffier Khán, Nawaub of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, that he had dispatched 2,000 troops in pursuit of Monsieur Law, and disbanded the greater portion of his own Army. On the detachment reaching the camp, a deputation from Ram Narain arrived, under pretence of

A. D. 1757.
July.

* Ives, p. 164.

A. D. 1757. July. compliment, but in reality to observe the nature and strength of the force and ascertain the commander's intentions. They repeated the substance of the Rajah's letter, to which Major Coote replied by saying that he would be at Patna the next day, when he would himself wait on the Rajah and arrange further plans and operations.*

On the morning of the 26th, having landed the Artillery, they and the Sipahis marched into Patna, whilst the Major, joining the Europeans, proceeded by water. The whole reached the English factory, situated on the bank of the river, just without the western wall of the City, about noon. This was a spacious building, within which the whole of the Europeans and Sipahis were quartered. Major Coote prepared immediately to wait upon Rajah Ram Narain, but he received a message from the latter, requesting him to take some repose, which he must require, and to defer his visit until the following day. In the afternoon, 3 Europeans and some Sipahis, who, with the butcher of the detachment, were bringing some cattle from the bazar to the factory, were, without any provocation, attacked by a party of peons belonging to the Garrison, and several of them wounded. This was immediately reported to Rajah Ram Narain, who disavowed all knowledge of the outrage, expressed his regret for what had occurred, and promised, if he could convict the perpetrators, to send them to Major Coote; but no attempt was made to discover or punish them; at the same time he requested that the Major would not visit him the next day, as previously arranged, on the plea that some collision might occur between their respective followers. During the night, a number of the Europeans got drunk and behaved in a most disorderly manner,—upon which Major Coote selected 30 of the worst amongst them, who had also been foremost in the recent mutiny, and placed them in confinement.†

On the following day, the Major held a conference with Mahomud Ahmee, the brother, and Meer Kossim Khán, the brother-in-law of the Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán. They warned him to be on his guard against Ram Narain, who, they stated,

* Ives, p. 165.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 191.

meditated rendering himself independent of Meer Jaffier Khán, with which view he had already made application for assistance to Shoojah-oo-dowlah, the Nawaub of Oude ; that he also purposed the destruction of the English, and had held a council the previous evening, in which it was arranged to fall upon the detachment unexpectedly and cut off the whole party. This was in a measure confirmed by the report of one of the officers, who, whilst walking in the City, overheard two men of some rank discussing a plan for surprising the factory,—they supposing him to be ignorant of the language,—as was then generally the case with Europeans. The two Noblemen further stated that Rajah Ram Narain might easily have intercepted Monsieur Law had he thought proper to do so, instead of which he had rendered him every assistance, and was still in communication with him. This information determined Major Coote to take every precaution for the safety of the detachment, and to place no confidence in the advice or promises of the Rajah.* /

He now wrote to Colonel Clive, reporting the state of affairs, and also addressed the Nawaub of Oude, requesting him not to allow the French to enter or remain in his dominions. His own greatest cause of anxiety was owing to the mutinous disposition of the troops ; but having now a favourable opportunity, he determined to try the effects of severity. He accordingly ordered a Court Martial on the 30 men he had placed in confinement, when they were all found guilty of mutinous and insubordinate conduct, and sentenced to be flogged, which was immediately carried into effect in the presence of the whole detachment.† This timely severity was perfectly successful, and no further murmurs were heard from the Europeans ; but on the following day, the 29th, a very unexpected emeute occurred amongst the Sipahis. [Having determined to continue his pursuit of the French party, Major Coote had paraded the troops in the afternoon, preparatory to a march, when the Sipahis in a body laid down their arms, and refused to proceed farther. The Madras

A. D. 1757.
July.

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 192.—Ives, p. 166.

† Ibid.

A. D. 1757. Sipahis, in particular, complained of the hardships and fatigue they had undergone; and the immense distance that they were now removed from their families; that they had embarked only for service in Calcutta, whereas they had been gradually taken on to Chandernagore, Moorshedabad, and Patna, and that now they were again required to advance, and consequently saw no end to their labours. They also complained of being in arrears of pay, and not having received the just amount to which they were entitled. Major Coote endeavoured to persuade them to return to their duty; he pointed out the ill consequence that must accrue from their conduct;—that that party was a very small one, and surrounded by enemies, who were on the watch to take advantage of any opportunity such as the present;—that every thing depended upon their unanimity and discipline;—that by laying down their arms they were depriving themselves of their only means of defence,—and that they might be sure the least that could happen to them, in such a case, would be, to lose all the wealth they already accumulated, and also to forfeit all their claims to the large amount of prize-money now due.* This remonstrance had the desired effect, the men resumed their arms, and marched at once with the Artillery to Bankypore, where the Company had a garden about 5 miles from the City; the European Infantry proceeding thither by water. During the 30th, they were delayed at Bankypore making preparations; many of the dandies and followers had deserted, and although Rajah Ram Narain had promised a liberal supply of whatever was required, very little assistance was actually received. On this day, Major Coote held a council of war, consisting of the 4 Captains under his command; he produced the several letters he had received from Colonel Clive, ordering him to follow Monsieur Law as far as practicable, and also stated that he had received positive intelligence that the French party were a day's march out of the Behar territory, and were encamped in that of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah; he accordingly put the question, “whether they thought it possible that the detachment under his

* Ives, pp. 166-7.

“ command could go on with the same expedition they had
 “ hitherto done?” It was unanimously decided to be impossi-
 ble, for the following reasons:—“ 1st. Because the Sipahis
 ‘ had already laid down their arms on account of the great
 ‘ fatigues they had undergone in their long march to Patna, and
 ‘ had been prevailed on with much difficulty to take them
 ‘ up again. 2ndly. Because of the discontent that reigned
 ‘ amongst the Europeans, the desertion of the dandies and
 ‘ black servants, and the very great difficulty that was daily ex-
 ‘ perienced of getting others in their room.” The Council
 were, however, unanimously of opinion, “ that they should still
 ‘ proceed in the best manner they could, though by easier
 ‘ marches, in pursuit of Mr. Law.”*
 A. D. 1757.
 August.

On the 31st, they accordingly made a short march to Dina-
 pore, from whence Major Coote sent forward three Hirkarabs
 to procure intelligence of the position and movements of the
 French party. Here they were joined by a party of Rajah
 Ram Narain's troops, under the command of an officer named
 Hybut Jung.

On the 1st of August, the detachment marched to Moneah,
 at the confluence of the Soane and the Ganges. Here Hybut
 Jung refused to proceed any farther, and threatened the Sipa-
 his to put any of them to death who should venture to enter
 the Bazar. Lieutenant John Kinch, who commanded the Artil-
 lery which marched with the Sipahis, reported to Major Coote
 that he had observed hostile demonstrations in the several vil-
 lages they had passed through, the inhabitants of which were
 all armed. The Major therefore ordered the Sipahis to encamp
 on the bank of the river near the boats, doubled the picquets
 and pointed the guns against the town. On the 2nd, the Sipa-
 his were ferried over to the other side of the Ganges and
 marched along the northern bank to Chuprah, whilst the Euro-
 peans, with the Artillery and ammunition, proceeded in boats.
 The baggage, stores, and cattle, with the Lascars and a guard of
 a Jemmadar and 16 Sipahis, crossed the Soane, and march-
 ed along the southern bank, until they arrived opposite to

* Ives, p. 167.

A. D. 1757. Chuprah, when they also were ferried over; a tedious operation, as very few boats could be procured from the Rajah's Agent, and the river at this point was nearly three miles broad. The object of this separation appears difficult to understand, as the whole might have been ferried over in the European's boats from Moneah, and the baggage and cattle would not then have been left comparatively unprotected, to invite the enemy's attack. As it happened, however, no evil resulted from the measure beyond an additional delay.

August.

On the 4th of August, the whole detachment and followers were assembled at Chuprah, and the Hirkarahs, whom the Major had dispatched to obtain intelligence of Monsieur Law's party, returned with information that they were halted at Benares, a distance of 140 miles from Chuprah, where they were living under the protection of Rajah Bulwunt Singh, a feudatory of the Nawaub of Oude; that Bulwunt Singh had assembled 4,000 troops to oppose the English, and that Fuzl Allee Khan, the Nawaub of Ghazeepore, and Dunsee Ram, the petty Rajah of Petora, were collecting their followers for the same purpose, and also, that the roads to Benares were in a very bad state, being covered with water, and impassable for Artillery, and that there were three rivers to be crossed on the way. Further pursuit appeared under these circumstances unavailing, and as the river Dewah or Gogra, 18 miles from Chuprah, formed the boundary of the Nawaub of Oude's territory, an advance beyond that stream would be considered as a positive act of hostility against Shoojah-oo-Dowlah.*

Before coming to any decision on this subject, however, Major Coote once more called a council of war, consisting of the whole of his officers, and placing before them all the information he possessed on the subject, requested them to give their opinions, "whether, under existing circumstances, it was advisable to proceed any further in pursuit of Monsieur Law and his party." They were unanimously of opinion that it was not, and they recorded the following reasons for coming to this decision:—

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 193.

“ Because we apprehend the *French* would not have presumed to have remained so long at *Benares*, but have continued their route up the country, unless they had been very sure of being protected by *Shoojah Dowlah*, and the other neighbouring powers ; and with this protection, we have not the least reason to expect to succeed at this season of the year against them, since we are in want of boats to carry the *Sepoys* up the river ; and the depth of water on the roads, and the three rivers we have to pass, is such as to render it impossible for us to march there by land ; not to mention the distress we are sure to suffer in an enemy’s country, through want of provisions for the soldiers and of *dandies* ; or the many bad consequences that may ensue from engaging ourselves and the *Nawaub Meer Jaffier*, at this juncture, in disputes with the neighbouring princes.”*

A. D. 1757.
August.

The next question was, “ whether they had better remain at *Chuprah* or return to *Patna*,” on which point they were equally unanimous in their opinions, deciding that it was not only expedient, but absolutely necessary to return to *Patna* ; especially as the *Surgeon* represented that the men were rapidly falling sick, which he attributed to the soil being impregnated with saltpetre, and moreover, (which always appears to have been an important consideration,) the arrack that had been brought for the use of the soldiers was expended, and no fresh supply could be got in their present situation.

Notwithstanding these strong arguments, *Major Coote* determined not to leave *Chuprah* until he received further instructions from *Colonel Clive*. At last, on the 12th, a letter arrived from that officer, directing the return of the party to *Patna*, upon which arrangements were made for immediate departure. On the morning of the 13th, the whole of the troops, *Europeans* and *Sipahis*, were embarked in the boats, together with the guns and ammunition ;—the baggage, stores, and cattle being directed to follow by land ;—and so rapid was the current at this season of the year, that the detachment reached *Patna* by noon on the same day, a distance of 44 miles.

A. D. 1757.
August.

The subject of the letter received from Colonel Clive was one of considerable importance, containing directions from the Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán for a coalition between Major Coote and Mahomud Ahmee Khán, and Meer Kossim Khán, with a view to seizing Rajah Ram Narain, and depriving him of his government;—the Nawaub having been alarmed at the reports he received from his kinsmen, relative to the ambitious designs of that Rajah; reports which were confirmed by the difficulties and opposition experienced by the British detachment throughout the province, where Meer Jaffier Khán's orders and purwánahs were treated with perfect contempt, especially when opposed to the views or wishes of Ram Narain. On arrival at Patna, Major Coote immediately sent for Mahomud Ahmee Khán and Meer Kossim Khán, and consulted with them as to the course to be adopted. The Major himself suggested an immediate attack upon the Citadel where Ram Narain resided, the garrison of which did not exceed two thousand men; but Mahomud Ahmee Khán reported that the force at his command, and that of Meer Kossim Khán, was at present very small, though it might be daily expected to increase; and as the English detachment was not sufficiently numerous to invest the place, he proposed to defer the attempt until he should have been joined by 1500 of Ram Narain's troops, with whom he was then in treaty to desert and come over to him.

In the mean time, the Rajah, who had doubtless heard from his agents at Moorshedabad what were the intentions with regard to himself, was naturally much alarmed, and the sudden return of the English detachment served greatly to confirm his fears.

He now determined to adopt a very different line of conduct from that he had hitherto pursued, and lavished all the civility and attention in his power upon Major Coote. On the 15th, that officer visited him for the first time, and was received with every mark of respect and politeness, and presented with a handsome khilut, consisting of a dress, horse, arms, and jewels.*

* Ives, pp. 172-3.

In the mean time, counter instructions were received from Meer Jaffier Khán, who, weak and vacillating, now began to entertain even greater fears with regard to his brother Mahomud Ahmee Khán, whom he suspected of traducing Ram Narain, and exaggerating his conduct, with a view to securing the government of the province for himself, and ultimately proclaiming his independence. Such appears to have been the leading motive for Meer Jaffier Khán's decision, to which he was probably encouraged by Ram Narain's agents at the Durbar; certain it is that he ordered a suspension of all hostilities, and directed Major Coote to endeavour to arrange matters amicably with the Rajah, and, if this could be done, to leave him in the government of the province. A communication was speedily entered into between Ram Narain and Major Coote; and, on the 21st, the latter visited the Rajah, when all points were finally discussed, and Ram Narain offered to swear fidelity and allegiance to Meer Jaffier Khán, if the English would guarantee his safety, honour, and position,—to which the Major pledged himself. Accordingly, on the following day, a public Durbar was held for the adjustment of all differences, to which Mahomud Ahmee Khán and Meer Kossim Khán were invited, and at which Major Coote, with Mr. Peakes, and all the Civil and Military officers attended. After some mutual accusations and explanations, Rajah Ram Narain sent for a Brahmun, and solemnly swore, according to the Hindoo custom, allegiance and fidelity to the Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán, and friendship and good will towards Mahomud Ahmee Khán and Meer Kossim Khán,—who, in their turn, pledged themselves on the Koran to bear no ill-will or to attempt in no way to injure him. Upon this, they embraced each other, and then all embraced Major Coote as the general mediator.* Thus were matters satisfactorily arranged; for, though neither of the rival parties placed any faith in the protestations of the other, however sacred their form, yet each felt security in the power and good faith of the English, and determined to abide by their present resolution as long as it suited their several interests.

A. D. 1757.
August.

A. D. 1757.
September.

Major Coote also received a very complimentary letter from Shoojah-oo-dowlah, expressing his extreme regard and respect for the English, and stating that, unfortunately, the French party had already passed out of his dominions, before he received the Major's letter, or he would certainly have secured them and surrendered them to the English. Positive intelligence was, however, subsequently received of their being still in the province, and supported by the Nawaub, a circumstance of which it was not considered advisable to take any further notice. On the 1st of September orders were received from Moorsheadabad for the return of the detachment; on the following day the guns, baggage, cattle, and Lascars were dispatched by land, under the charge of a Jemadar and small party of Sipahis, and on the 7th, a sufficient number of boats having been procured, the whole force embarked and commenced their downward voyage. On the following day, Major Coote, feeling himself very unwell, made over the command to Captain Grant, and on the 13th, having had a very rapid and favourable passage, the whole detachment arrived at Moorsheadabad.*

Here they found Colonel Clive, who ordered them to be stationed in the factory at Kossimbazar, when all the other troops were moved down to Chandernagore, where they were quartered, that being considered a more healthy locality than Calcutta.

Thus ended this expedition, which, although the immediate object was not accomplished, was satisfactory and beneficial in its results; and which, when the circumstances connected with it are taken into consideration, must always be regarded as an extraordinary instance of military hardihood and perseverance: a mere handful of troops pursuing an enemy, little inferior in numbers and equipments, for nearly 400 miles, through a country almost unknown, and either secretly or openly hostile, with continued obstacles and difficulties occurring at every step, and this too at the most unhealthy and trying season of the year.

* Orme, vol. 2. p. 195.—Ives, p. 174. The account of this expedition under Major Coote, has been chiefly obtained from Ives' interesting Narrative, who devotes an entire chapter to its details.

It is advisable to mention here what had become of A. D. 1757, Monsieur St. Frais and his party after the defeat at Plassey. It may be considered fortunate that this officer did not listen to the advice of *Sausure* and endeavour to form a junction with Monsieur Law: had he done so,—and there appears to have been no sufficient obstacle to the attempt,—the French party would have been as strong as their pursuers, with the great advantage of acting in a friendly country, where every aid and assistance would be at their disposal. Instead of adopting this course, St. Frâis retreated into the district of Bheerbhoom, where he was allowed by the native authorities to remain unmolested, and was subsequently joined by many of his countrymen, who had either escaped from the several French factories, or from their nominal confinement in Calcutta, where not a few had taken advantage of the liberal treatment they experienced and had broken their *parole*. Another party established themselves in the district of Rungpore, under the command of Monsieur Courtin, the late chief of the factory at Dacca, who, after the defeat of Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, collected the soldiers and agents of the establishment, and intrenched himself in that district, on the bank of the Testa, near the foot of the hills.*

In the mean time, Meer Jaffier Khán had discovered that his accession to the Soobahdaree had not placed him on a bed of roses. He had many friends and dependents to provide for, who eagerly looked forward to partaking in his good fortunes, whilst all who had been in any way instrumental in bringing about the recent revolution, considered themselves entitled to share in its benefits: but unfortunately, the stipulations he had made with the English had completely exhausted the treasury, and to have rewarded his party by conferring on them situations of trust and command, could only be done by removing present incumbents, which would have been an impolitic breach of faith, as all who submitted to his government were guaranteed in the situations and advantages they then enjoyed, and any attempt of this nature

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 268.

A. D. 1757. would have alarmed all parties and caused a general insurrection. His promises to the English had been made like those of all Native Princes, with the intention of only performing so much of them as he could not avoid, and he fully trusted that the liberal donations he had made to the leading individuals, would have induced them to be less exacting in the fulfilment of the public conditions. But Clive, who had not solicited the handsome presents he had received, was not to be swayed by them from his public duties, and was firm in demanding the fulfilment of the terms agreed upon; he not only insisted upon the adoption of measures for the full payment of the stipulated sums, of which the first instalment was not yet completed, but refused to sanction any measures of an unjust or arbitrary nature, which were likely to endanger the tranquillity of the Government. The Nawaub felt these restrictions most irksome, and looked upon them as degrading; in which view he was encouraged by his favorites, whom he was unable to gratify by acts of injustice; and he appears at an early date to have resolved on emancipating himself from the thralldom of English ascendancy. When however, he reflected on the confederacy which had raised him to power, he saw the necessity for caution and preparation. As a preliminary step, he determined upon the destruction of the influence of the several Hindoos of rank, who had been mainly instrumental in placing him on the musnud; a measure of policy which presented another strong inducement, as the wealth of the country was chiefly in the hands of this party, the confiscation of which would gratify his avarice and afford the means for further operations. Rajah Doolub Ram, who was looked upon as the head of the Hindoo party, was the first marked out for destruction; but this affair required delicate management, and dreading the sagacity of Colonel Clive, Meer Jaffier determined to attempt nothing until that officer had left Moorshedabad. The better to disarm all suspicion on the part of the English, the Nawaub and his son Meerun affected an appearance of confidence and frankness with the Colonel, and showed every attention to him and to the other English gentlemen at the capital. As a preliminary measure, however,

Rajah Ram Ram Singh, the governor of Midnapore, was summoned to Moorshedabad to settle the accounts of his district, of which, as usual with Native Governments, a considerable balance stood against him on the books of the Treasury.*

A. D 1757.
September.

On the 14th of September, Colonel Clive left Moorshedabad for Calcutta, and on the 17th, news was received by the *Revenge*, which had made an extraordinary run from Fort St. David, of the arrival of a powerful French Squadron on the Madras Coast, under the command of Monsieur Bouvet, having on board a large military force for the purpose of strengthening the French possessions in India. Further advices speedily followed, together with solicitations from the Madras Presidency for the return of the troops which had been sent round with Colonel Clive. Urgent as were these requisitions, compliance at this juncture was impracticable, as such a measure would have endangered not only the observance of the treaties made with Meer Jaffier, but the very existence of the British power in Bengal, it being considered very probable that a French force might arrive in that province, which would have been joined by the several details under Messieurs Law, St. Frais, and Courtin, and supported by Monsieur Bussy, who was at the time in force at Chikakole.

These considerations rendered the French prisoners in Calcutta an object of solicitude; their number amounted to upwards of 200, of whom 50 being persons of respectability and better condition, were not confined, but simply prisoners on parole. This indulgence had been grossly abused, many individuals having forfeited their parole and joined the parties in the district; and of those who remained, a portion were suspected of being in communication with Messieurs Law and Bussy. Under these circumstances, it was decided to send all those of higher rank to Pondicherry, on their promise not to serve against the English during the war or until exchanged. Accordingly, in the beginning of October, thirty-four of these gentlemen, of whom two were Jesuits, were em-

A. D. 1757. barked on board a vessel called the *Restitution*; trusting to their parole and their grateful sense of the liberality with which they were treated, no guard was sent with them, the crew consisting entirely of Lascars, with only three Englishmen on board, the Captain and his two Mates. But scarcely had the vessel got out to sea, when this party, unmindful of every feeling of honour, rose upon the crew, whom they easily overpowered, and carried the ship into Masulipatam, where they declared themselves free, and the vessel a lawful prize.*

Notwithstanding the submission of the officers to Colonel Clive's decision in July, relative to the distribution of the prize money, great discontent still existed amongst the troops at finding their share so much inferior to that of the corresponding grades in the Navy, in consequence of which, the question of admitting that portion of the Squadron that served with the Army to a share of the Military donation, was renewed, and took a very acrimonious turn. Colonel Clive, with a view of adjusting the matter, proposed to make a proportionate deduction from the share of each officer, beginning with himself,—a measure to which Major Kilpatrick and several other officers readily acceded, but to which the majority offered a most determined opposition. Colonel Clive appears to have issued an order on the subject, which Captain Armstrong of the Bombay detachment, who commanded that portion of the troops stationed in Calcutta, refused to publish.

Colonel Clive immediately ordered him to be brought to a Court Martial; but so strong was the feeling amongst the officers composing the Court, that he was acquitted; a finding which the Colonel declined to approve.

In a letter written shortly afterward to Colonel Adlercron at Madras, he makes the following remarks on the subversion of the principles of discipline involved in Captain Armstrong's conduct :—

“ You, Sir, will be the best judge whether, setting aside my order, by any indirect and underhand methods, to serve a self-interested view; whether assembling the officers together without a proper authority, and even

* Orme, Vol. 2, p. 268.

disputing the rank of the officers given by me, especially in the case of Lieutenant Corneille, be consistent with the duty and obedience which is due to the commanding officer; and I cannot help thinking it was the duty of Captain Armstrong to have given out my orders, when ordered to do so by the Governor, even if he thought them unjust: for if officers are allowed to disobey the orders of their superiors (unless in cases of an extraordinary nature,) there must be an end to all discipline and subordination. If I took upon me to act wrong, justice was open to them by complaining to you, Sir, or any of my superiors."* A. D. 1757.
October.

In the month of October, the force sustained a great loss by the death of Major Kilpatrick, commanding the Bengal Troops, and Military Member of the Council at that Presidency. He was a brave and intelligent officer, universally respected, and by his mediation on several occasions, had done excellent service in reconciling the jarring elements composing the force.

The great amount of prize money obtained by the troops began to produce the most injurious effects upon the health of the men, who plunged into every description of debauchery, which unfortunately, they had such ample means of doing; the consequence was a most serious mortality in the ranks, particularly at Calcutta and Chandernagore; and, as a proof of its extent, it is sufficient to mention that, at Major Kilpatrick's death, only 5 men of the 230 who had come round with him the preceding year, remained alive. Had it not been for the opportune arrival of several vessels from England with recruits, the force would have been rendered totally inefficient. The detachment stationed at Kossimbazar, notwithstanding the fatigue and exposure they had undergone in their expedition to Patna, suffered comparatively much less than the others, owing to the great superiority of the climate at that Station, for their conduct and mode of life appear to have been very similar to that of their comrades.†

[In the mean time, the organization of the Sipahis was steadily progressing, the 2d Battalion was now ready to take the field, and the foresight and judgement of Colonel Clive in the formation of this force, was speedily demonstrated by the great efficiency they had so speedily attained.]

* Malcolm, vol. 1, note, pp. 319-20.

† Orme, vol. 2, p. 275.

A. D. 1757.

Moorshedabad had now become a scene of complicated intrigue, the effects of which were exhibited in a general disaffection throughout the Soobahdaree; Rajah Doolub Ram to whom Meer Jaffier Khán was so deeply indebted for frequent and most essential aid, was the chief object of his designs, and though from a dread of offending Colonel Clive, he dared not proceed to open violence, the breach between them was gradually widening and becoming apparent to all parties. As already stated, Meer Jaffier Khán had ordered Ram Ram Singh, the Rajah of Midnapore, to come to Moorshedabad and give an account of his Government, and although the latter was strongly advised by Rajah Doolub Ram to comply, he sent his brother and nephew in his place, who were immediately thrown into prison,—a proceeding which Meer Jaffier Khán justified to Colonel Clive, by representing that Ram Ram Singh had been an active enemy of the English, and the medium of communication between the late Nawaub and Monsieur Bussy. Upon this, Ram Ram Singh assembled his troops, amounting to 2000 Horse and 5000 Foot, and wrote to Colonel Clive, to say that if attacked, he would take refuge in the jungles and fastnesses of his district, and hold out to the last; but at the same time proffering, if the Colonel would guarantee his security, to make his obeisance in person to the Nawaub, and pay the sum of one lakh of rupees. Clive, who was desirous to preserve tranquillity, urged the Nawaub to accede to these terms and agree to a reconciliation. About the same time a more serious opposition was threatened in Parneah;—Meer Jaffier Khán in breach of his promise, had nominated one of his relations, Kuddum Hoosein, a man of rapacious and tyrannical disposition, to the Government of that province, in supercession of Hazir Ali Khán, who, in conjunction with, and by the aid and guidance of, his Dewan, a Hindoo of considerable ability named Okhul Singh, had during the period of general confusion consequent on the late revolution, driven out Mohun Lall, the Governor appointed by Sooraj-oo-Dowlah, and taken possession of the Government, at the same time acknowledging himself a tributary and dependent of the Durbar,—Okhul Singh finding remonstrance

vain, assembled a force, and in the name of his pageant master, A. D. 1757. prepared to oppose the newly appointed Governor.*

Both these insurrections occurring under Hindoo leaders, increased Meer Jaffier's animosity to that party, and strengthened his determination to rid himself of Rajah Doolub Ram, who was suspected of having fostered these discontents. Kuddum Hoosein was immediately ordered to march with a force of 6000 Horse and Foot towards Purneah, and Kojah Haddee, with a smaller force, to Midnapore; the latter detachment marched on the 6th of October, as directed; but the force under Kuddum Hoosein refused to move until they had received their arrears of pay, and finally broke out into open mutiny; the City was now thrown into a state of ferment, and Rajah Doolub Ram, assembling his forces, retired to his own quarters, and refused to visit the Nawaub; whilst, to add to the confusion, intelligence was received that Rajah Ram Narain was in treaty with Ali Verdee Khán's widow, and had solicited the assistance of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, the Nawaub of Oude, with the intention of opposing Meer Jaffier Khán. Rajah Doolub Ram's regard for, and intimacy with, the widow of his former master, led to the suspicion that he was also concerned in this affair. Colonel Clive who foresaw the evils that might accrue from these reports, ordered the troops at Kossimbazar to be ready to assist the Nawaub at the first summons, and promised to march himself with the whole force at Chandernagore and Calcutta, if necessary.

These measures had the effect of tranquillizing the tumult, and through Mr. Sraffton's mediation, an ostensible reconciliation was brought about between Meer Jaffier Khán and Rajah Doolub Ram on the 17th of October, after which the Nawaub ordered his whole army to encamp at Gheriah, about 6 miles from Moorshedabad.†

Scarcely was this disturbance quelled, when another attempt at revolution broke out at Dacca.—When Ali Verdee Khán had overcome and slain Sirfiraz Khán some years before, two sons of the latter were left alive. One, a dull inoffensive

* Orme, vol. 2, p 209; Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 7-8. † Orme, vol. 2, p. 286.

A. D. 1757. man by name Hafiz Ali Khán, remained at Moorshedabad in great proverty, but nevertheless an object of jealousy and fear to Meer Jaffier; but the other Ahmanee Khán, of a bolder and more active disposition, determined to assert his claims, and make one daring effort for power;—to which the general discontent and confusion throughout the country, held out every encouragement. The heavy demand for money at Moorshedabad had drained the means of the Governor of Dacca, and he was only enabled to keep up a force of about 200 troops, ill paid and worse equipped. A plot was laid by which Ahmanee Khán was to surprize this miserable garrison, seize the Governor and proclaim himself Nawaub, and the 22d of October was fixed upon for the attempt. A treacherous confederate made timely revelation of the whole plot; upon which the Governor seized Ahmanee Khán, and some of his principal supporters, and applied to the English factory for assistance. Sixty Buxarries or irregular Sipahis, were immediately sent to him, and a Company of the 1st Native Battalion was speedily marched from Calcutta across the country to Dacca.*

These several attempts in different quarters, alarmed and disconcerted the Nawaub, whilst the condition of his own troops was little more satisfactory. Although the tumult raised in the force had subsided without violence, only 3000 men had marched with Kuddum Hoossein, and these were halted at Rajmahal, waiting for the remainder of the detachment and the discharge of their own arrears. Three months' pay was due to the whole Army, and though they were all ordered to encamp at Gheriah, Rajah Doolub Ram under pretence of sickness, remained in his own house, and would not suffer his Division, consisting of 10,000 Horse and Foot, to leave the City. This example was followed by the rest of the force, which refused to move unless they were paid up in full. The Nawaub was obliged to distribute amongst them such sums as he could raise, and as an example and incentive to their obedience, he himself pitched his tents and displayed his standard in the camp, where he determined to await the arrival of Colonel Clive with the English detachment.

Clive was desirous of joining at once, but the sickness amongst the troops was so great, two-thirds of those stationed at Calcutta and Chandernagore being in hospital, that he was unable to move until the 17th November, when he embarked the whole of the available Force in boats at Chandernagore. This detachment amounted to 400 Europeans and about 1300 Sipahis,* all Company's troops,—the detachment of H. M.'s 39th Regiment having objected to march, although Admiral Sir George Pococke had placed their services at Colonel Clive's disposal. The latter, however, ascertaining their distaste to the expedition, which was shared by all the officers, except Major Coote and Captain Weller, who volunteered to accompany him, determined not to force any unwilling agents, and accordingly left them to garrison Calcutta and Chandernagore, together with the sick of the Company's force and a few Companies of the Madras Sipahis. The following extract of a letter to the Admiral, dated the 16th of November, exhibits Colonel Clive's sentiments on this subject:— ✓

A. D. 1757.
November.

“ Notwithstanding your offer of putting the King's detachment under my command on this expedition, I am sorry to inform you I cannot accept it, without prejudicing the service; for all the officers (Captain Weller and Captain Coote excepted) had expressed by letter a disinclination to go upon it. Under these circumstances, I think it is better for the Company to be served by those who are willing, and may be attached to their service, than by persons who seem to have lost all remembrance of what they owe to them! For my own part, though I have before represented to you the many disadvantages I must labour under, during the present expedition, I shall endeavour to surmount them and be ready to render the Company all the service, which every well-wisher to his country, is bound to do. † ”

Previous to leaving Calcutta, Colonel Clive had persuaded 'Rajah Ram Ram Singh to come from Midnapore and visit him; and sent a detail of European troops to escort him from Piple, when becoming a guarantee for his personal safety, the Colonel induced him to accompany the force to Moorshedabad. ‡

In the mean time, Meerun, who had been left in charge of

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 275.—Malcolm, vol. 1, p. 321.

† Malcolm, vol. 1, pp. 321-2.

‡ Orme, vol. 2, p. 273.

A. D. 1757.
November.

affairs in the city whilst his father was in camp, industriously circulated reports of other insurrections, attributing them all to the intrigues of Rajah Doolub Ram and the other Hindoos of influence. Rajah Ram Narain was stated to have marched from Patna with 12,000 men, and the Nawaub Shoojah-oo-dowlah to have taken the field from Lucknow, together with the party under Monsieur Law, intending to act in conjunction with Ram Narain. A Mahrattah invasion in the direction of Orissa was rumoured to be in contemplation, at the instigation of Rajah Doolub Ram, who was accused of having offered the cession of the province of Orissa as the price of the services to be obtained by this incursion in his favour. Intrigues were also said to have been set on foot at Delhi with a view to preventing the Royal assent being given to the accession of Meer Jaffier Khán, and to obtaining it in favor of Meerza Mehdee, an infant brother, of the late Sooraj-oo-dowlah. Having artfully created alarm by these reports, Meerun sent a band of ruffians, on the evening of the 9th November, to the house of the widow of Ali Verdee Khán, with whom resided the widow of Zeindee Ahmud and her infant grandson Meerza Mehdee. They murdered the child, and gave out that they had also slain the two Begums, and in the morning three biers were publicly conveyed through the city, as for interment, amidst the general grief and horror of the populace;—the two Begums, independent of their high birth and position, being generally respected and beloved on account of their exemplary characters and munificent dispositions. The result was a general tumult in the city, that was only quelled by the appearance of the English Detachment stationed at Kossimbazar, which was called out to maintain tranquillity, and by a confession from Meerun,—when upbraided for his conduct by Mr. Scrafton the British Resident,—that the two Princesses were still alive, and had been sent by water to Dacca. Still, the murder of the child was sufficient to create a strong popular feeling of indignation; and Meer Jaffier Khán apprehensive of the results, and also desirous to avoid the reproaches of Colonel Clive, solemnly denied all knowledge of, or participation in, the transaction, and Meerun pleaded the alarm he felt at the report of the in-

trigues said to be carrying on at Delhi, the propagation of which he endeavoured to fix upon the Seths, who indignantly repudiated the assertion. Anxious to maintain tranquillity, Mr. Scrafton acted as mediator, and once more brought about a formal reconciliation between Meerun and Rajah Doolub Ram, when vows of friendship and mutual confidence were publicly exchanged, upon which Doolub Ram sent the greater portion of his force into the Nawaub's camp, and Meer Jaffier Khán commenced his march from Gheriah towards Rajmahal on the 17th, where the detachment under Kuddum Hoossein was still loitering, instead of crossing the River as ordered, and attacking the rebels in Purneah.*

A. D. 1757.
December

✓ Colonel Clive, with the English troops, reached Moorshedabad on the 25th of November, bringing Ram Ram Singh with him. Meerun, previous to his arrival, had released the brother and nephew of that chief, and now received him, when introduced by Colonel Clive, with great courtesy; towards the Colonel his conduct was humble and obsequious in the extreme. ✓ Clive was anxious to induce Rajah Doolub Ram to march with him and join the Nawaub, but the Hindoo urged the state of his health and the pressure of public business as his excuse, and the Colonel, perceiving that his mistrust of Meer Jaffier Khán was the real cause of his objection,—for which there were sufficient grounds,—acquiesced in the delay required, and promised to effect a perfect reconciliation between them.

On the 30th, Colonel Clive left Moorshedabad, having been joined by the Detachment stationed at Kossimbazar, comprising 250 Europeans, all in excellent health, whilst of those he had brought with him, so many had fallen ill during the trip, that he was compelled to leave more than one hundred behind, who, together with a portion of the Madras Sipahis, were stationed as a garrison in the factory at Kossimbazar. The detachment under his command now consisted of little more than 550 Europeans, including the Company of Artillery, with a detail of Lascars attached, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Sipahis, amounting to about 1,500 men.†

* Orme, vol 2, p. 273.

† Ibid, p. 275.

A. D 1757.
December.

On the 3d of December, they reached Rajmahal, and encamped about a mile and a half from the Nawaub's Army. On the following day, Meer Jaffier Khán visited Colonel Clive in state, when the whole detachment was drawn out to receive him and went through their exercise and a variety of evolutions, with which he was much gratified and surprised, and ordered 10,000 Rupees to be distributed amongst the men.*

A few days previous, Kuddum Hoossein, with 2000 Horse and 5000 Foot, had crossed the Ganges, and moved towards the intrenchment of the rebels in Purneah; the latter, disheartened by the report of the near approach of the English detachment, abandoned their position, and dispersed without striking a blow: shortly afterwards Okhul Singh was made prisoner, and by the middle of December the whole district was reduced to a state of tranquillity, and Kuddum Hoossein placed in quiet possession of the government.

In the mean time, the Rajah of Bheerboom, on learning that the English troops had taken the field, became alarmed on his own account, in consequence of the protection he had given to Monsieur St. Frais and his party: he therefore immediately sent out several bodies of troops to surround and seize them, but they got warning of his intentions, and the greater portion contrived to escape; twenty-four however were made prisoners, and sent to Calcutta,—of these, four were Agents of the French Company, who had forfeited their parole, to which they had been admitted after the capture of Chandernagore.†

The small force left at Calcutta, of which the European portion was further reduced by sickness, was not sufficient to keep up the requisite guards with the necessary strictness, which encouraged the French prisoners to attempt their escape. The building of the gaol itself was limited in its accommodation, and as the inclosure had very high walls, they were permitted to remain at all times in the area; taking advantage of this liberty, they dug a hole under the wall, through which, on the

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 275.

† Ibid, p. 273.

night of the 18th December, the whole party, 90 in number, made their escape, and crossing the river, sought shelter in the Dutch and Danish Factories at Chinsurah and near Hooghly. A month afterward, 15 were re-taken at Midnapore, and in the March following, 30 more were apprehended at Cuttack, on their way to join Monsieur Bussy, then in the province of Chikakole.*]

A. D. 1757.
December.

The suppression of the disturbances in Midnapore, Dacca, and Purneah, and the appearance of the English troops in the field, reduced the province of Bengal to perfect subjection, and enabled Meer Jaffier Khán to turn his whole attention to the state of affairs at Patna, whither he determined upon immediately proceeding, and removing Rajah Ram Narain from the Government of Behar. But Colonel Clive, who had quietly watched for this opportunity, refused to accompany him until all the arrears then due to the Company should be paid up, and certain other articles of the late treaty fulfilled. This placed Meer Jaffier Khán in a dilemma; he was perfectly aware that he could not hope to succeed in what had now become a favorite object, except by the aid of the English, and it was equally impossible to comply with their demands, without the assistance of Rajah Doolub Ram, through whom, as Dewan, all financial arrangements must pass. Under these circumstances, he readily acquiesced in Colonel Clive's proposition for a reconciliation with his Minister. Doolub Ram was accordingly written to, and on the Colonel's guarantee, came into camp on the 23rd of the month, and on the 30th, a solemn renunciation of their mutual suspicions and animosity took place, and a fresh agreement of reconciliation and confidence was entered into.†

These preliminaries being arranged, the claims of the English remained to be settled. Of the original payments, including the first periodical instalment, nearly twenty-three lakhs were now due. Orders on the Treasury at Moorsheda-
bad were given for twelve and a half lakhs, and tunkhwás‡ for the remaining portion, on the Rajahs of Burdwan and Kishna-

* Orme, vol. 2, pp. 285-6.

† Ibid, p. 276.

‡ Assignments on the revenues.

A. D. 1758.
January.

gur, and the Foujdar of Hooghly; in like manner, tunkhwás were given on the same districts for the ensuing payment of 19 lakhs of rupees, which would fall due in the following April, and orders were issued for the cession of all the lands south of Calcutta, which had been agreed upon in the treaty, on the payment by the Company, of an annual rent of Rs. 222,958, at which sum they had previously been assessed.*

These points being all satisfactorily disposed of, Colonel Clive announced his readiness to proceed, but at the same time urged his strong opinion against the course contemplated by the Nawaub, of removing Ram Narain and bestowing the Government on some of his own family or favorites. He pointed out that a persistence in this scheme, would throw the province into a state of confusion and insurrection, and compel Ram Narain to seek assistance from Shoojah-oo-Dowlah; and further, he added the more important argument, that the English Army was at any time liable to be recalled to Calcutta, should the French make an attempt to enter Bengal. Under these circumstances, he strenuously recommended an accommodation; and, as in former cases, proffered his services as mediator. The Nawaub being unable to adduce any argument against this sound, but most unpalatable, advice, was forced to give an unwilling consent, and the Colonel immediately wrote to Ram Narain, advising him to come personally and pay his respects to the Nawaub, assuring him of safety and favour; but at the same time, preparations were made for advancing slowly towards Patna.

On the 2nd of January, 1758, the army commenced its march from Rajmahal. The English detachment formed the advance,—Rajah Doolub Ram with his own force of 10,000 men, and the Artillery of the state, came next,—the Nawaub with the main Army amounting to 40,000 men brought up the rear. Each division was attended by a separate fleet of boats, and for the greater convenience of obtaining provisions and encamping ground, it was agreed that they severally should remain one march apart from each other.

The route followed was the same as that taken by Major Coote's detachment during the preceding rainy season, but the progress now made was very slow, the English being compelled to wait for the Nawaub's troops, whose artillery was daily requiring repair, and whose baggage was ever remaining in the rear. A. D. 1758.
February.

Although it was generally reported and believed that Rajah Ram Narain contemplated a determined resistance, he no sooner received the Colonel's letter, than he wrote an immediate reply, stating his intention of proceeding at once to wait upon the Nawaub and Colonel Clive, without making any stipulation or exhibiting any sign of mistrust. Accordingly, on the 22nd of January, he embarked on board his boats, whilst his escort marched along the bank of the river. On the 25th, he reached the English camp, and immediately waited upon Colonel Clive, and the following day he proceeded, accompanied by Mr. Watts, to pay his respects to the Nawaub, who received him with great courtesy, and requested him to march in the rear of his own camp, ostensibly to facilitate their communications on business, but in reality to mark his inferiority and submission;—a circumstance which gave rise to a report that he was placed out of the reach of assistance with a view to his destruction;—which rumour reaching Colonel Clive, who had heard nothing of Ram Narain for some days, rendered him somewhat apprehensive on the subject. However, on the 3rd of February, he was re-assured as to the personal safety of the Rajah, by the receipt of a letter from him. On the 4th, the English troops halted at Jaffier Khán's garden, about two miles from the fort or citadel of Patna, which was situated at the east end of the city. Early on the following morning, a large body of the Nawaub's troops were seen marching to the left of the English camp towards the city, and Colonel Clive received private information that Kojah Haddee who commanded them, had been distinctly ordered by the Nawaub not to permit any troops whatever, to enter the gates, until Meer Jaffier Khán himself should arrive; an arrangement purposely intended to impress the inhabitants with an idea that the English were as subservient to his orders, as his own troops.]

A. D. 1758.
February.

Clive who saw through the object of this manœuvre, waited until Kojah Haddee had entered the Fort and taken possession of the gate, when he immediately marched with his whole force and demanded admission. That officer, who had no inclination to dispute the question, mentioned the order he had received from the Nawaub, but observed that it could not of course be supposed to extend to the English troops, and accordingly gave them immediate entrance.* Colonel Clive satisfied with having carried his point, continued his march through the city, to the English factory, which stood near the western gate, where he took up his position.) On the following day a letter was received from the Nawaub, containing a sort of apology for the march of Kojah Haddee's division, and requesting that the English force might be encamped at Bankeepore; Colonel Clive who had intended to remove them to the Company's Garden at that place, readily complied, and the troops proceeded thither at once. On the 7th, another letter requested him to move on to Dinapore, as the Nawaub himself was anxious to encamp at Bankeepore. This apparent design of removing the English troops and placing the whole of the Nawaub's Army between them and the city, gave rise to unpleasant suspicions, which were confirmed by concurrent circumstances and intelligence received from other quarters.) It now became evident that, notwithstanding his promises, Meer Jaffier Khán was bent upon removing Ram Narain from the Government and conferring it upon his brother-in-law Meer Kossim Khán, sharing portions of the province amongst others of his favorites.) To carry out which plan,—promises, intrigues, intimidation, and even bribes were to be put in force towards the English, with a view of obtaining their acquiescence. Rajah Doolub Ram who felt that his own interests were intimately blended with those of Ram Narain, united his counsels and influence with the latter, and a scene of complicated intrigue now occurred. These two chiefs kept Colonel Clive acquainted with the Nawaub's movements and plans, the objects of which they purposely

* Orme, vol. 2, p 279.

exaggerated ; Clive although unable to sift the whole truth of what he heard, felt convinced that there was little faith to be placed in the representations of either party, but determined to be on his guard against treachery, at the same time that he avoided any signs of suspicion or cause of offence. Instead of moving to Dinapore, he crossed the whole of his force, with all the boats and stores, to a large island in the river, nearly opposite Bankeepore, which cut off all communication with the shore, secured his detachment from attack, and prevented the possibility of any collision between his troops and those of the Nawaub. He, however, sent Mr. Watts to remain with the Nawaub, and to remonstrate with him on his conduct towards Ram Narain. On the 12th, Meer Jaffier Khán made his entry into the city in state, attended by Ram Narain who came without any insignia of authority. His army instead of coming to Bankeepore as proposed, remained encamped on the eastern side of the city. On the 14th, Clive visited him for the first time since they had left Rajmahal. Meer Jaffier attributed the delay of Ram Narain's appointment to Rajah Doolub Ram, who delayed the settlement of the accounts of the district ; in which there was apparently some truth, the latter probably conceiving that by these delays the anger of Colonel Clive would be excited and matters brought to a crisis, in which endeavour he over-reached himself. The Colonel urged the necessity of a speedy settlement, to which Meer Jaffier Khán was rendered less averse, by a renewal of the rumour that Shoojah-oo-Dowlah was about to take the field, and also by the arrival of a Mahrattah agent with a demand for the arrears of *chout* due to that nation.*

Accordingly, on the 23d, a grand durbar was held, at which Colonel Clive and most of the English officers and agents attended. Meer Jaffier Khán nominated his son Meerun to the Government of Patna with the title of Nawaub, a mere honorary appointment, which however gave him a claim to certain periodical presents or fees, and Rajah Ram Narain was installed as his Deputy, but in reality as Governor of the province,

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 281.

A. D. 1758.
February.

A. D. 1758.
February.

with his former power and privileges. Ram Narain paid seven lakhs as a compensation, in full of all outstanding balances, and other sums were collected from the several chiefs and principal officers of the district. At the same time heavy fines were exacted from such individuals as had taken advantage of the recent troubles, and had proved insubordinate or refractory. Of these, the principal were Khamghar Khán, Sundáh Singh, and Puhlwan Sing, the two former possessing the government of considerable districts lying between Behar and Bheerboom, and the latter occupying the hilly tracts along the banks of the Karrumnassa. Khamghar Khán, when summoned to the durbar, refused to attend at all, and the other two were only induced to come, on receiving from Colonel Clive, a guarantee of personal security and of justice being done them.*

The Colonel being now on the spot, turned his attention to a subject of great importance to the Company,—the commerce in saltpetre,—which was entirely manufactured in this district. The English traded largely in this article, for which they possessed certain privileges, but the monopoly of the revenues arising from its production, being generally farmed by some Native agent, constant disputes were arising between his people and those of the English factory: for some time past they had been farmed by Kojah Wuzeed, the great merchant at Hooghly, and just before the arrival of the Nawaub, a very serious affray had occurred, in which some of the factory establishment had lost their lives. Colonel Clive took advantage of this circumstance, and proposed to the Nawaub to grant the farm to the Company, offering at the same time the highest terms at which it had ever been rated. This was so far advantageous as regarded the public revenues; but the Nawaub felt a strong disinclination to the arrangement, as he knew that he could not exact the presents and fees which he was heretofore in the habit of wringing from the renters. Clive's offer was however so fair, and the advantages as regarded the improvement of the manufacture and the avoidance of all

collision were so manifest, that he was compelled to accede, A. D. 1758.
reserving for himself a supply of 20,000 maunds annually.* April.

The Agents of the Dutch Company remonstrated strongly against this grant, but Clive met all their objections, by the production of a letter in which they had applied for the monopoly themselves.

[In the mean time the Colonel was not unmindful of military matters, and immediately on his arrival at Patna, commenced the organization of a third Battalion of Sipahis, raised chiefly from the inhabitants of the Bojepore district, and in a few weeks he had enlisted 1,000 fine athletic men, with which he filled up the vacancies occasioned in the two older Corps and created the new one, taking the Native officers and non-commissioned officers from former, as a nucleus for the latter.]

Notwithstanding that affairs had to all appearance been satisfactorily and finally arranged, the Nawaub resumed his plans, for removing Ram Narain and appointing Meer Kossim Khán in his place; but not daring to undertake the measure whilst the English force remained in the province, he endeavored to induce them to return, and promised speedily to follow: but Clive's sagacity was not so easily baffled; he determined not to risk the tranquillity of the Government by leaving Ram Narain in danger; and though he sent on a considerable portion of the force on the 1st April, with orders to proceed by easy marches towards Bengal, he remained behind himself, with a sufficient detachment, and warned Rajah Doolub Ram to keep his troops in the province, until the Nawaub had actually commenced his return. Meer Jaffier Khán finding that Clive was not to be deceived, was compelled to postpone his attempt for the present. On the 14th of April, the *Sunnuds* or patents confirming Meer Jaffier Khán in the Soobahdaree of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, with the title of Nawaub, were received from Delhi, together with a commission for Colonel Clive, appoint-

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 282.

† Ibid, p. 283. This Corps, which was known as Captain Turner's Battalion, that officer having got the command of it at, or soon after, its formation, was destroyed at Patna in 1763.

A. D. 1758. ing him an Oomrah of the Empire, and a Munsubdar or Com-
 May. mander of 6,000 Horse, with several other honorary titles. These were received in Durbar with great ceremony. The next day the Nawaub proceeded towards Behar; when finding that Clive still remained at Patna, he gave up his original intentions of returning there, and moved on to Bhar. The Colonel now considering that all was safe, made his final arrangement and left the city on the 27th, by water,—carrying Doolub Ram and Ram Narain with him. On the 30th they had an interview with the Nawaub at Bhar; when the latter publicly expressed his perfect satisfaction in Ram Narain's integrity and fidelity, and formally dismissed him to his Government. He then sent forward the greater portion of his Army to Moorshedabad, reserving the remainder to accompany him on a hunting excursion in the Hills. Rajah Doolub Ram accompanied Colonel Clive to make arrangements for the payment of the arrears due to the English troops and the instalment of the treaty monies, of which a considerable balance was still outstanding, for though the tunkhwás on the several districts had been accepted, they had not been paid.

Thus ended this political Campaign, in which without firing a shot, Colonel Clive had by his personal sagacity, impartiality, and firmness, obtained great advantages for the Government, had carried every point he desired, restored tranquillity, and created throughout the country, a very favourable impression of the British justice, wisdom and power.

He now pushed on and joined the main body of the troops, when they hastened their return to Moorshedabad. The Kosimbazar river being at this season too shallow to admit the boats accompanying the Force, they were compelled to move on to Bágwangolah from whence they marched across to Moorshedabad, where they arrived on the 15th of May.*

Meerun, who had been left in charge of the Government of Moorshedabad during his father's absence, had been kept regularly informed of the failure of their plans as regarded Ram Narain, and of the protection afforded by Clive to Rajah

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 287.

Doolub Ram. Rash and intemperate, his rage knew no bounds: he circulated various indefinite reports of plots and dangers, and learning that Clive and Doolub Ram were approaching, he professed extreme alarm, withdrawing to his palace at *Motéejheel*, where he summoned all his troops and Artillery, and announced his intention of marching to form a junction with his father. This measure created the greatest terror in the City, the inhabitants not knowing what to apprehend, but from the mystery observed, anticipating something most serious. On the arrival of Colonel Clive he found the shops shut, business suspended, and the populace in a state of tumult and trepidation. Clive immediately wrote to the Nawaub, complaining seriously of this conduct, and threatening to wash his hands of all connection with the Durbar, if these exhibitions of suspicion and folly continued: to this Meer Jaffier Khán replied with much contrition, disavowing all knowledge of the transaction, and announcing his intention to return to Moorshedabad at once. In the meantime, Meerun was brought to his senses by Mr Scrafton, and induced to ask pardon of Colonel Clive in the most submissive terms.*

On arrival at Moorshedabad, the Colonel had received intelligence from Madras of the great accession to the French fleet and force on that Coast, caused by the arrival of Monsieur Lally, and of the indecisive engagement between the fleets of Monsieur D'Arché and Admiral Pococke on the 29th of April, in which one of the enemy's vessels was stranded; of this last circumstance, Clive took advantage, and magnified the accident into a victory, of which he widely circulated the report. This news disinclined him to push matters to any extremity with the Nawaub or his son, and having granted his forgiveness to, and exchanged visits with, the latter, he left Moorshedabad for Calcutta on the 24th of May, taking with him the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Sipahis and a portion of the Artillery, leaving the remainder of the Europeans and the newly raised 3rd Battalion of Sipahis in garrison at Kossimbazar.†

On arrival at Calcutta, Clive found that the new Fort at Govindpore, [the present Fort William,] the site of which

* Orme, vol. 2, pp. 353-4.

† Ibid, p. 350.

A. D. 1758.
May.

A. D. 1758. he had selected previous to his departure for Patna, and
 May. which was commenced in the end of the last year, had progressed but slowly: during his absence he had frequently urged upon the Council the necessity for expediting this work, on which so much depended, more especially as Admiral Pococke had been compelled to return to the Coast with the fleet, and rumours were daily received of the accessions to the strength of the French forces, both naval and military, which rendered an attempt upon Bengal very probable.

In a letter dated so far back as the 12th January previous, he wrote most strongly on the subject, to the following effect:—

“ I cannot conclude without representing to you, gentlemen, in the strongest terms, the great stake the Company have in Bengal, and how much that stake is exposed for want of a fortification. It gives me concern, beyond what I can express, to hear from all hands that the works go on very slowly. At a time like this, no private workmen should be allowed, but all be employed for public service; and if the want of hands arise only from the want of a few pice more, I think such a saving does not merit one moment’s consideration, or that such economy can meet with the Company’s approbation at this juncture. Be assured, gentlemen, if Calcutta be left defenceless through any neglect of ours, and should fall into the hands of our enemies a second time, we shall entail upon ourselves a censure never to be effaced.”*

On arrival, Clive lost no time in completing the outline of the *enciente*, for which purpose he forbade the employment of any workmen by private individuals, until this object should be attained:—a number of detached houses at the southern extremity of the town, which were considered likely to interfere with the defences of the Fort, were pulled down, the proprietors being compensated for the full value of their property, and allowed ground for building in other situations, on favourable terms.

* Malcolm, vol. 1, p. 341.

The plan and erection of this work was intrusted to Captain John Brohier, the senior Engineer in India, next to Mr. Call who had succeeded Colonel Scott as the Company's Engineer General; this officer had been sent round from Madras for the purpose, soon after the battle of Plassey, bringing with him a Mr. MacDonald, as Assistant Engineer, and John Dyer a Master Bricklayer, who had been sent out by the Company two years before. / So rapidly now did the works progress, that in the month of September the *enciente* was completed, as also the Ravelins and the Covered way; the facing of masonry of the escarpment was in a forward state, the Covered way palisadoed, and the bridged and draw-bridges well advanced; the cost of all which has already amounted to nearly twenty-two lakhs of rupees. So badly was the masonry executed, however, that the greater part had subsequently to be rebuilt, when the height of the works also was considerably increased.*

A. D. 1758.
June.

Soon after the death of Major Kilpatrick, Clive had proposed to the Council to offer the command of the Company's troops in Bengal to Major Forde of H. M.'s 39th Regiment, which proposition was acceded to: the appointment was accordingly offered to him and he came round from Madras, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Company's service and Commandant of the Bengal troops, subject to the confirmation of the Court of Directors, and arrived in Calcutta in the month of April.†

On the 20th of June, the *Hardwicke* East Indiaman arrived, bringing some recruits, and orders from the Court for a new organization of the Local Government. By this arrangement, which was decided on in November 1757,—before any intelligence had been received of Clive's brilliant successes,—a Council of ten members was appointed, of whom the four seniors, Messieurs Watts, Manningham, Beecher and Holwell, were to preside alternately, for 3 months at a time:—no notice was taken of Colonel Clive; the Court probably supposing that he had

* Third Report of the Committee of Secrecy, Appendix No. 4.

† Malcolm, vol. 1, pp. 322 and 366.

A. D. 1758.
July. returned to Madras. Such a plan of Government would have been absurd and most inconvenient at any time, as a rotation Presidency would have been incomprehensible to the Native powers, accustomed to treat with one responsible chief ;—but under existing circumstances, particularly with reference to Colonel Clive's position and services, it would have been the height of folly to attempt to carry it into effect. The Gentlemen nominated to the Government all felt this, and wisely and gracefully resolved to request Colonel Clive to accept of the Presidency, subject to the confirmation of the Court, or until some other individual should be named to the office. Clive though deeply hurt at finding himself thus apparently neglected by the Court, accepted the offer, after a little consideration. By the same vessel, intelligence was received that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring recruits to the extent required for the several Presidencies, the Court had made application to Her Majesty's Government, and Mr. Pitt had agreed to send out a Battalion of a thousand men for the use of the Company, to be raised by drafts from other Regiments.*

Orders were also received for the return of Her Majesty's 39th Regiment, but liberty was given to the officers and men to enter the Company's service, if they desired to do so. In consequence of this permission, nearly all the men of the detachment in Bengal, joined the Bengal European Battalion, and the following officers also entered the Company's service, Lieutenants Carnac and Yorke as Captains, and Ensigns Donellan† and Broadbrook‡ as Lieutenants. Colonel Clive finding it impracticable to send back the detachments belonging to Madras and Bombay, to their respec-

* Malcolm, vol. 1. pp. 359-60.

† This unfortunate man was executed at Warwick in 1781, for the supposed murder of his brother-in-law Sir Theodosius Boughton. He was condemned on the evidence of his mother-in-law, who through remorse, on her death bed, confessed that she had administered the poison herself, which deprived her son of life, and declared Mr. Donellan to be innocent.—*Williams*, p. 62.

‡ *Williams* calls this officer "Broadbridge," which is an evident mistake. In the official returns, his name is given "Broadbrook," and also in the General Military Register; but in a list of officers in the service in 1760 it is "Broadburn."

*"Sir John Broadbridge" - to H. O. Army
List for 1758.*

tive Presidencies, determined also to incorporate the men A. D. 1758,
 composing them, into the Bengal Battalion, which was September.
 accordingly done, as far as the Europeans were concerned ;
 but having determined to entertain no Topasses in this
 Battalion, all the men of that class were sent back by the
 first opportunity. The option was given to the officers
 of returning to their own Presidencies or entering the
 Bengal service, which latter alternative appears to have
 been generally adopted, and they were accordingly brought
 on the strength of the Bengal Army from the 1st Septem-
 ber, retaining the rank they held in their own services.
 On the 19th of the same month, the Artillery was reorganiz-
 ed and formed into two Companies,—the command of the
 first, with a general controul of the whole arm, being conferred
 on Captain Jennings,—and the command of the second, on
 Captain John Broadbridge, who obtained that rank on the
 same date by the augmentation. The previous career of this
 officer, cannot be traced, but he most probably came round
 with Captain Barker's detail of Royal Artillery, from Bombay,
 in the preceding year. A 4th Battalion* of Sipahis was also
 raised about this time, and to meet the increasing wants of the
 force, numerous promotions were effected amongst the officers,
 and a considerable accession appears to have arrived from
 England during this year.

Soon after these arrangements were completed, Captain John Govin arrived in Calcutta, who had been sent round by the Bombay Presidency, to take the command of their detachment serving in Bengal. Under these circumstances, Colonel Clive gave him a similar option of returning or remaining, upon which he elected the latter,—when, being considerably senior to all the other officers in the Battalion, and possessing a high military reputation acquired on the Bombay side, Colonel Clive gave him the rank of Major. This was considered an act of unjust supercession by the other Captains of the service, who sent

* The present 5th Regiment N. I. and the second senior Native Corps in the service. The command of this Battalion devolved soon after it was raised, on Lieutenant Hugh Grant, an officer who came round from Bombay, with Captain Govin ; from him the Regiment obtained its name of "*Grant*" or "*Grand ka Pultun*."

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September.

in a strong remonstrance on the subject, but finding that Colonel Clive was determined not to rescind his order, eight of them tendered their commissions in one day; these were Captains Alexander Grant, Thomas Rumbold, John Cudmore, Andrew Armstrong, Archibald Keir, Grainger Muir, Robert Campbell and Peter Carstairs.* The following extract of a letter written shortly after by Colonel Clive to the Council, puts this transaction in a very clear light:—

“ The remonstrating captains, have either wilfully or
 “ ignorantly misrepresented the nature of superseding. An
 “ officer cannot be said to be superseded, unless one of infe-
 “ rior rank, in the same corps, be put over his head. Now,
 “ I can safely aver that I never, during the whole of my com-
 “ mand, have done so by any officer, except in the case of
 “ Captain-Lieutenant Wagner, to whom I refused giving a
 “ vacant company, as I did not think him deserving thereof.
 “ The incorporation of the troops having been deter-
 “ mined on as a necessary measure, the several officers
 “ of the three different establishments being now united,
 “ were, of course, to take rank according to the date
 “ of their respective commissions, in the same manner
 “ as the officers of different corps in His Majesty’s service
 “ when they happen to meet. Now, as Captain Govin had
 “ been ordered here by the Presidency of Bombay, to
 “ take the command of their detachment, without their
 “ knowing that such incorporation was to take place, it is
 “ evident they could have no design of injuring the
 “ officers of this establishment, as has been injuriously
 “ represented; and therefore, to have sent him back, after
 “ having been so formally ordered here, would have been
 “ the highest indignity to the Council of Bombay, as well

* Captains Muir, Carstairs and Campbell were subsequently re-admitted into the service, but with loss of rank. Captain Rumbold, afterward Sir Thomas, was appointed to the Civil service in 1760. Captains Grant and Keir returned to India as Free Merchants, the former died in 1765, a contractor for Military supplies, and the latter entered into several speculations, particularly in salt, the manufacture of which he greatly improved; he re-entered the Army for a few months during the serious mutiny of 1766, but left it again at his own desire, as soon as the call for his services was over.

“ as to the gentleman himself: and, as he remained here, A. D. 1758.
 “ he had an undoubted right to maintain that rank which the September.
 “ seniority of the commission gave him.

“ The truth of the matter is, that most of the gentlemen
 “ who have been so violent in their remonstrances, were
 “ grown sufficiently rich in your service to be desirous of
 “ any pretence for quitting it. They will prove, however, no
 “ great loss, as no services can be expected from men who
 “ have so little spirit and gratitude, as to resign their commis-
 “ sions at this critical time and on ill-grounded pretences.

“ I flatter myself it will be now obvious to every unpreju-
 “ diced person, that I have been unjustly charged by these
 “ gentlemen with having superseded them, the doing of
 “ which, I readily agree, ought to be practised as seldom
 “ as possible. Yet such is the nature of the service in
 “ this country, that the preservation of your settlement
 “ may at times depend upon the taking of such a step;
 “ and as, by the want of field officers, your captains are
 “ often intrusted with the conducting of expeditions of
 “ the utmost importance, in such case, if you be desirous
 “ of insuring success, you must have regard to the man only,
 “ and not the rank.”*

Well might Clive designate the time as *critical*:—
 fresh intrigues and disaffection had arisen at Moorshedabad,
 whilst the daily increasing power of the French on the Coast,
 rendered some diversion in favour of the Madras Presidency
 absolutely necessary.

The real state of affairs in the Carnatic could no longer be
 concealed, and Meer Jaffier Khán watched the course of
 events with secret satisfaction. In the decline of the English
 power, he saw his only chance of freedom, and taking
 advantage of these embarrassments, he assumed a more
 authoritative tone and position, and carried out his measures
 with less regard to the wishes or opinions of the Council in
 Calcutta. The long sought opportunity for removing Rajah
 Doolub Ram was now come at last, and the English had un-
 intentionally furnished the instrument of his disgrace;—

* Malcolm, vol. 1, pp. 384-6.

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September.

Nund Komar, a name of evil omen to an English ear, had come forward when considerable difficulty was experienced in realising the amount of the tunkhwás assigned to the Company on the several districts, and engaged to furnish the full amount, if vested with sufficient authority. This obtained, he commenced a fearful system of oppression and rapacity, not only in fulfilment of the immediate object in view, but for the advantage of his own personal interests. Aware that his conduct could not escape the vigilant observation of Rajah Doolub Ram, he exerted all his influence to effect the removal of that minister. He persuaded the Seths to withdraw their influence, by awakening their fears of being called upon for money to meet the exigencies of the State,—as Rajah Doolub Ram continued to withhold the revenues; and he assured the Nawaub, that the English would not interfere, so long as the money was regularly paid. On the 24th of July, the Nawaub took the long desired step, and appointed Rajah Raj Boolub as Dewan, directing Rajah Doolub Ram to render up the accounts to his successor. Doolub Ram alarmed at the storm he saw gathering around him, applied for permission to retire to Calcutta, which was refused, until he should furnish a sum for the payment of the arrears due to the troops. In the mean time, Colonel Clive, desirous of keeping up the appearance of union and cordiality, had invited Meer Jaffier Khán to pay a visit to Calcutta;—in accordance with which invitation, the Nawaub left Moorshedabad on the 6th August, accompanied by Mr. Watts. No sooner had they departed, than Meerun assembled the troops and attempted to seize Rajah Doolub Ram, but Mr. Scrafton interfered, and calling out the garrison in the factory, saved the ex-Dewan at a critical moment, and sent him to Calcutta under an escort of Sipahis, where he arrived before the Nawaub. The latter, after spending a few days at the Presidency, where he was received with every possible display of pomp and attention, left on the 21st of August, and returned to Moorshedabad on the 1st of September.*

A few days after his return, the festival of the Mohurrum commenced, and on the 13th of the month, a tumult occurred

at a mosque, where the Nawaub had gone to pay his devotions, amongst the troops of Kojah Haddee, when it was declared that an intention had existed of assassinating Meer Jaffier Khán in the tumult, and attributing the event to accident. A letter was produced, purporting to be from Rajah Doolub Ram to Kojah Haddee, instigating him to this attempt, and assuring him of the concurrence of Colonel Clive and the English Authorities. This document bore every evidence of a forgery, and as such Clive at once pronounced it, and suspected that it was a plan of Meer Jaffier Khán and his son to commit Doolub Ram with the English, when had his expulsion from Calcutta taken place, they would have seized upon his person and extorted all his wealth. No investigation took place, Kojah Haddee was dismissed, and shortly afterward murdered at Rajmahal by some followers of Daood Khán, the Nawaub's brother.*

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October.

In the mean time, intelligence was received from Madras of the fall of Fort St. David,—of a second undecided engagement between the two fleets,—that Monsieur Lally was besieging Tanjore,—that Monsieur Bussy was hastening to join him,—and that no doubt remained but that Madras itself would be the next point of attack.

Clive, however, knew that Fort St. George was well supplied with provisions, that reinforcements were daily expected there from England, that nothing could be done against it until the monsoon drove the fleets off the Coast, and consequently he felt but little real anxiety for the safety of that place. He knew the prejudice existing at each Presidency in favour of its own importance and safety, and did not consider it right to trust any portion of his small force, where he could not insure its immediate return, if required; under these circumstances, he deemed it more advisable to render such aid as was in his power, by effecting a diversion at other points,—for which a favourable opportunity was offered just at the time.

When Monsieur Lally had resolved on undertaking the siege of Madras, he had directed Messieurs Bussy and Moracin

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to join him from the Northern Provinces, leaving the Marquis de Conflans, with a Brigade, for the defence of the Ceded Districts and the general controul of the Northern Circars. No sooner had the neighbouring Chiefs ascertained how much the French force in this quarter was reduced, than they prepared to throw off a yoke that was hateful in the extreme. Rajah Anundeeraj, the ruler of Chikakole and Rajahmundree, marched with his troops to Vizagapatam, which being defenceless, he seized, confined the French Agent, hoisted English colours, and wrote to Madras reporting to that Government what he had done, praying at the same time for the assistance of a co-operating force. Failing in his hopes of aid from that quarter, he turned to Bengal, and made similar offers to the Council of Calcutta. Clive, whose extended view of policy embraced more than immediate objects, saw at once the advantages that might arise from a successful diversion in that direction, and determined at all hazards to seize the opportunity; the remainder of the Council who looked only to the difficulties of the undertaking, the dangers besetting the Presidency from other quarters, and the serious evils that must ensue should the expedition prove a failure, viewed the plan as little short of madness, and opposed it to the uttermost; but Clive, who was fully aware of the difficulties of his position, having once made up his mind, was not to be deterred by dangers, by opposition, or the fear of responsibility.

Notwithstanding the evidently hostile feeling of the Moorshedabad Durbar, and the daily spreading rumour of a projected invasion of Behar by the Shahzadah, eldest son of the Emperor Allum Gheer the 2nd, supported by the Nawaub of Oude and the Soobahdar of Allahabad, Clive hastened his preparations, and dispatched a force under the command of Colonel Forde, consisting of 5 Companies of the European Battalion and the Second Company of Artillery, with 100 Lascars attached, and one-half of the Sipahis at the Presidency. The total number of the Europeans, including the Artillery, was 500, and of the Sipahis, 2,000, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Bengal Battalions, and the remnant of the Ma-

dras Sipahis that had come round in 1756, forming a third Battalion. With this force were embarked 6 of the best Six-Pounder Field Pieces in store, and one field Howitzer, four Iron 24-Pounder, and four Iron 18-Pounder Siege Guns, one 8-inch Mortar, and 2 Royals, (5½ inch,) as a Battering Train.*

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This force was embarked on the *Hardwicke* and two other Indiamen, recently arrived from England, on the *Thames* a country ship of 700 tons, and two Pilot Sloops; the *Thames* was also laden with provisions for Madras, whither she was directed to proceed after disembarking the troops. The Military Chest contained only 80,000 Rupees in silver, and 4,000 Gold Mohurs, equivalent to 60,000 Rupees,—as the supplies were to be furnished and the troops paid by Rajah Anundeeraj, according to his agreement. The 5 Companies of the European Battalion were commanded by Capt Adnet, the senior Officer present, Captains Christian Fischer, Martin Yorke, and Molitore, and Captain-Lieutenant Patrick Moran;—the first Native Battalion by Captain Ransfur Lee Knox, a very active and intelligent officer, who appears to have held the command of the Battalion since its formation, and who had obtained the rank of Captain on the late augmentation, his commission dating from the 1st Sept. 1758; the 2nd Battalion, by Captain-Lieutenant Lachlan MacLean;* and the Madras Battalion of Sipahis by a Native Commandant, as usual. This is the first occasion in which the Bengal Sipahis were required to serve beyond Sea, and not the slightest objection appears to have been made on their part, to so doing. In fact the prejudice of the Sipahis to maritime service, which was a feeling of much later date, arose entirely from an unfortunate circumstance, hereafter to be noticed. Several delays occurred in fitting out the

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 314. Grose, p. 295. Cambridge, p. 270.

** + Williams states that the two native Corps employed on this occasion, were the present 1st Regiment and the *Mathews ka pullun*, which was disbanded in 1784, for mutiny. When referring to events of which he was personally cognizant, Williams is an excellent authority, although he wrote from memory; but in the present instance, he has evidently mixed up the services of the 2nd, or as it was afterwards designated "*Tabby's*" Battalion, and the *Mathew's* Battalion, which latter was not raised until some time after the events above alluded to.

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October.

expedition, not the least of which originated in the opposition of the Council ; at last all arrangements were completed,—and on the 12th of October, the troops embarked, when the ships immediately set sail from Calcutta.*

With a view of procuring information and facilitating the political arrangements, Mr. George Gray of the Civil Service, was despatched to Cuttack as the Company's Agent, and Mr. John Johnstone proceeded in advance of the expedition, on board the *Mermaid* sloop, to make the necessary arrangements with Rajah Anundeeraj, he being appointed to act as a Political Assistant to Colonel Forde, and as Commissary to the force ; Mr. Mac-Guire was appointed Paymaster, and accompanied Colonel Forde. Intimation of the projected expedition was duly given to the Madras Presidency.

On the departure of this detachment, the force remaining in Bengal amounted to little more than 300 Europeans, including Artillery, and the 3rd and 4th Battalions of Sipahis, the latter scarcely organized, together with a few independent Sipahi Companies, which at this period began gradually to replace the *Buxarries*, heretofore entertained at the several out-stations ;—these local Companies were generally placed under the command of a Serjeant, and subsequently furnished a nucleus, on which several Corps now in the service were organized.

Towards the latter end of this year, several vessels arrived from England with recruits, and two companies of the 84th, or Colonel Draper's Regiment of Foot,* arrived in the *Warren*,—but reduced as was the force in Bengal, Colonel Clive sent these two Companies to Madras, in the vessel which had brought them out, as also a considerable portion of the recruits, to aid in the defence of that Presidency.†

Mr. Johnstone, who had been sent to make arrangements with Rajah Anundeeraj, arrived on the 12th of September at Vizagapatam, of which place he was immediately put in possession, as the representative of the Company, by the Rajah's officers. Anundeeraj himself was encamped at

* Orme, vol. 2, p. 295,—Cambridge, p. 270.

† Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 375.

In the original MS. of the Calcutta MS. - Orme
 has 1758.

Kossimkottah, a fort 20 miles to the westward of Vizagapatam, and about 15 inland. He expressed great satisfaction at the approach of the English detachment, but gave little ground for hope that he would or could support them, or pay their expenses,—which they had fully relied upon his doing.

A. D. 1758.
November.

On the 20th of October, the vessels with Colonel Forde's force arrived at Vizagapatam, and the men and stores were disembarked without delay: as soon as this was effected, two of the Indiamen returned to Calcutta, leaving only the *Hardwicke*, the *Thames*, and the two sloops to co-operate with the land force. Mr. Johnstone, on his arrival, had dispatched the *Mermaid* sloop to Madras, with intelligence of his proceedings; upon which the Council at that Presidency ordered Mr. Andrews of the Civil Service, to proceed with several Assistants to Vizagapatam, to re-establish the factory at that place, which had formerly been subordinate to Fort St. George; they also sent Captain Callender of the Madras European Regiment, to act as second in command to Col. Forde during the expedition, and to assume military command in the District when the Bengal Force should be withdrawn.*

Colonel Forde having left a small garrison of Sipahis and a few sick Europeans in Vizagapatam, marched with the remainder of his force on the 1st of November, and proceeded to join the Rajah, whose camp he reached on the 3rd of that month.

Here it was determined to proceed and attack M. de Conflans, who was reported to be encamped with the whole French force near Rajahmundree, where he had halted on learning that the English Detachment had arrived. Great delays, however occurred in procuring bullocks, koolies, &c. but more especially from the Rajah's repugnance to furnish any money for the expenses of the force, upon which implicit understanding they had left Bengal. On the 15th, Mr. Andrews reached the Camp, and being personally acquainted with the Rajah, having been for a long time Chief of the factory at Madapolam, he at length succeeded in adjusting matters by a Treaty to the following effect:—

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 376.

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December.

“ 1st. The Rajah to pay the extra expense of the army, during the time they should act together, (amounting to 50,000 rupees per mensem,) and allow the officers double Batta, (amounting to 6,000 rupees per mensem,) to be paid when he should be put in possession of Rajahmundree.

“ 2nd. The Rajah to possess all the inland Country belonging to the country powers, but the Company to retain all the seacoast from Vizagapatam to Masulipatam, with the several towns and ports on that line.

“ 3rd. No treaty for the subsequent disposal or restitution whether of the Rajah's or the Company's possessions, to be made without the consent of both parties.

“ All plunder and prize money to be equally divided.”

These terms having been mutually agreed to and signed, Mr. Andrews returned to Vizagapatam, to organize the establishment of the factory there, and the united forces of the English and the Rajah marched at last with a determination of acting in earnest. On the 3rd of December they came within sight of the enemy, who were encamped in a strong position at Gallaprole, about 40 miles from Rajahmundree, near the fort of Pittapooram, holding the command of the main road. The French force was far superior in numbers to that of Col. Forde, consisting of an European Battalion of 500 men, with between 30 and 40 pieces of cannon, light and heavy, besides several mortars, 500 Native Cavalry and 6,000 Sipahis. The English force, after deducting the men left at Vizagapatam, consisted of 470 Europeans, including Artillery, and about 1,900 Sipahis, with 6 Field pieces. The Rajah had 500 miserable Horse, and about 5,000 Foot, a perfect rabble, some few equipped with fire-arms, but the majority with spears, and bows and arrows; he had however in his service a party of 40 European Artillerymen, deserters and renegades, under the command of an adventurer of the name of *Bristol*, who had 4 Field pieces attached, and this was the only portion of his Army upon which any reliance could be placed. On the 6th, the English forces took possession of a village on an

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eminence called Chambole,* also commanding the high road, about 4 miles from the position of the enemy. Here both armies remained for two days, watching each other, each, thinking the adversary's position too strong to be attacked. Upon this Colonel Forde determined to endeavor to bring the enemy to action, by threatening their communication with Rajahmundree to their rear. A. D. 1758.
December.

Accordingly having concerted his plans with the Rajah, he struck his camp and commenced his march about 4 o'clock on the morning of the 8th December. About 3 miles to the right of Chambole, at the foot of a neighbouring range of low hills, was another village named Condore,† which it was the Colonel's intention to gain; but just as the force approached that place, they were surprised by the sound of a smart cannonade in the direction of their old ground.

The Marquis de Conflans, understanding from a deserter that the English force was chiefly composed of raw and inexperienced soldiers, and that there was a point near their position left unguarded, from which they could be cannonaded with effect, had also determined upon attacking, and had accordingly established a battery of 6 field-pieces at the spot pointed out, and was advancing upon the camp with his whole force, ignorant of the movement of the English. The fire of these guns sadly annoyed the Rajah's troops, who with their usual indolence had not thought of moving, and the Rajah sent messenger after messenger to Colonel Forde, praying for assistance, whilst his people drew off from the field as rapidly as they could; urged by their fears, they soon joined the English in a confused mass, and all marched to Condore, which they reached about eight o'clock.

Here Colonel Forde took up his position again, determined to be guided by the movement of the enemy. Condore was as far from the French camp as the old position at Chambole, but with more advantageous ground to advance upon, and with a village half way, which would serve for an advanced post. M. Conflans imagining that the possession of this

* Probably the "Cheybole" of the Indian Atlas.

† Properly "Kundoor," in the Indian Atlas "Chundoor."

A. D. 1758.
December.

village was the object of the English movement, pushed forward with his whole force to anticipate this supposed intention, and he attributed Colonel Forde's inaction, in letting him seize this post without an effort, to a consciousness of inferiority; fearing that the English might now attempt to regain their old position, he determined upon an immediate attack, and hastily forming his troops in line, advanced towards Condore. His European Battalion was in the centre, as usual, with 13 Field-pieces divided on their flanks; immediately to the left of the Battalion were the 500 Cavalry, and on either wing 3,000 Sipahis, supported by 5 or 6 heavy pieces of cannon.*

Colonel Forde drew up his force in like manner, with the European Battalion in the centre, and the 6 Field-pieces divided, 3 on each flank; to the right was the 1st Battalion of Sipahis commanded by Captain Knox, with half of the Madras Sipahis; to the left the 2nd Battalion of Sipahis commanded by Captain-Lieutenant MacLean, with the remainder of the Madras Sipahis; extended on either flank were such of the Rajah's troops as possessed fire-arms, and the remainder of the rabble in the rear. Captain Bristol with his party and 4 Field-pieces, took post with the 3 Guns to the left of the European Battalion. †

Both sides now advanced,—the English steadily and deliberately, without firing a shot,—the French moving more rapidly, but keeping up a hot cannonade from their Artillery, as they approached; when they came near, the impetuosity of the French Infantry carried them in advance of their guns, upon which the English halted to receive them, and both sides commenced a fire of musketry which lasted for some minutes.

It so happened that when the English line halted, the European Battalion was immediately in rear of a field of Indian corn, which grew so high as to intercept them from the view of the enemy, but the Sipahis on either flank were fully exposed. Colonel Forde, probably with a view of leading the enemy into the very error into which they fell, ordered the

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 378.—Cambridge, p. 273.

† Ibid.

Sipahi Battalions to furl their small colours, of which one was allowed to each Company, and to lay them on the ground. This circumstance, and the men being dressed in scarlet uniform, resembling that of the Europeans, for which the French were unprepared,—the English Sipahis on the Madras side wearing the Native dress,—led them to suppose that the Europeans were divided on the flanks; the French Battalion as their line advanced, instead of moving directly forward, obliqued to the left, to engage the 2nd Native Battalion, which they thus mistook for Europeans. When they arrived within the distance of 200 yards, they halted, dressed their ranks, and commenced firing by platoons; Colonel Forde, who perceived their error, rode up to the 2nd Battalion to encourage the men to stand,—but the latter observing the enemy's line of Sipahis outflanking them to the left and gaining their rear, and being dismayed at finding themselves opposed to Europeans, began to fire in a hurried and irregular manner, and finally to give ground, retreating in the direction of the village of Chambole. Flushed with this success, the French Battalion advanced rapidly, though in a disorderly manner, to follow up their advantage; Colonel Forde, who anticipated what would occur, had hastened to the European Battalion, and forming them in line to the left upon the left Company, commanded by Captain Adnet, advanced and took the French in flank, just as they were clearing the field of Indian corn; as the several Companies came up into their new alignment, they poured in a deadly fire of musketry upon the enemy, which did great execution; half the French Grenadiers went down at the first volley from Captain Adnet's Company, and being taken completely by surprise and thus roughly handled, the whole French Battalion went about in great confusion, and hastened to regain the support of their field-pieces, which they had left nearly half a mile behind. Although uncertain as to the success of the 1st Native Battalion on the right, Colonel Forde determined to take advantage of the ardour of the Europeans and follow up this success, he accordingly moved on in pursuit as rapidly as possible, the Battalion marching in column of Companies left in front. The 4th Company under

A. D. 1758.
8th Dec.

A. D. 1758.
8th Dec.

Captain Yorke following more steadily in the rear, to act as a reserve. The French rallied at their Guns, 13 in number, which were scattered about the plain in details, as they had been left when the advance commenced; these guns opened their fire on the English as soon as their own troops were clear, and killed and wounded several men. Captain Adnet fell mortally wounded at the head of the leading Company, but the men were not to be denied,—the enemy's fire only induced them to hasten to the charge, and forming line, they rushed on with the bayonet, drove the enemy from their guns, and once more put the French Battalion to flight.

The day, if not completely gained, was at least secured from reverse by the possession of the enemy's Field Artillery and the flight of their European Battalion; but much yet depended on the conduct of the 1st Native Battalion. When the European Battalion advanced, its field-pieces had been left with this Corps, encouraged by which support, and the spirit of their gallant commander, Captain Knox, the Sipahis, though opposed by nearly four times their own number, stood their ground nobly; taking advantage of the cover of some embankments in their front, they kept up a warm fire upon the enemy,—to which the latter replied with great spirit, until they saw their own European Battalion driven from the guns and in disorderly flight, when they also began to retreat. Captain Knox now advanced with his Battalion and the six field-pieces, to join the Europeans. The enemy's right wing of Sipahis and the Cavalry had retreated as soon as they saw the French Battalion defeated, without making any attempt to follow up the 2d Native Battalion,—which having rallied, also joined the advance. Colonel Forde now determined to push on, and complete his success by attacking the enemy's camp, to which they had all retreated, and he sent to the Rajah to beg that he would advance, particularly with his Cavalry, which would have been of the greatest use in following up the broken troops of the enemy;—but the Rajah and all his force were cowering in the hollow of a large tank during the action and could not be induced to stir.

Colonel Forde having made his arrangements, now advanced

with his own troops, but the ground being very bad, the guns, drawn by bullocks, were unavoidably left considerably in the rear.*

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A deep hollow way passed along the skirt of the camp, behind which all the French troops had rallied, supported by their heavy guns, placed so as to command the line of advance ; but just as the English troops had taken up their position to attack, and the leading Company had stepped out to give their fire, the field-pieces came in sight, and the enemy as if panic struck, went to the right about, and fled again in the utmost confusion, leaving their camp and the remainder of their guns in the hands of the victors ; but the English following them up rapidly, many threw down their arms and surrendered themselves prisoners. No victory could have been more complete ; the enemy were totally routed and dispersed ; thirty-two pieces of Artillery, including seven mortars, of from 13 to 8 inches calibre, 50 ammunition carriages, a large supply of shot and shell, 1000 draught bullocks, and the whole of the camp equipage and stores were captured ; 6 French officers and 70 Europeans were killed or mortally wounded, and about 50 more slightly wounded ; 6 officers and 50 Europeans, rank and file, were taken prisoners, and the loss of their Sipahis must also have been considerable. On the side of the English, Captain Adnet, 15 Europeans and 100 Sipahis were killed ; Mr. MacGuire the Pay Master, Mr. Johnstone the Commissary, who had joined the Grenadiers, and two other officers, were wounded, as also 20 Europeans, and above 100 Sipahis.† The Marquis de Conflans had in the early part of the action sent off 4 of the lightest field-pieces, and the military chest laden on camels, to Rajahmundry, and as soon as he perceived the defeat was complete, he mounted a fresh horse, and accompanied by the Commandant of the French Artillery, galloped off and reached Rajahmundry that night, a distance of 40 miles, and the following

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 381.

† Orme, vol. 3, p. 382. Cambridge, p. 275. Grose, vol. 2, p. 296.

A. D. 1758. day hastened on to Masulipatam. The beaten force fled by
December. different routes in the direction of Rajahmundree.

The English troops being greatly fatigued, having been marching and fighting for eight hours, the Colonel halted at Pittiporam for that day, and having made the necessary dispositions for the safety of the camp, dispatched all the officers' palanquins and the doolies, to bring in the wounded of both armies.

The French officers taken prisoners, were admitted to parole, and together with the sick and wounded men on both sides, were sent to Kokanara, a Dutch factory on the coast about 20 miles distant.

Thus ended the battle of Condore, one of the most brilliant actions on military record ; which, however, is generally but little known or mentioned in the service, and by a strange chance, not one of the Corps employed have ever received any distinction for this most important victory, whilst the 1st Madras European Fusiliers, of which not an officer or man, excepting Captain Callender, was present, have the word "Condore" emblazoned on their colours and appointments.* The Corps properly entitled to this distinction are the present 1st Bengal European Fusiliers, the 1st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, and the Bengal Artillery : the 2nd Native Battalion is no longer in existence, and the Madras Sipahis present were never organized as a regular Corps.†

Captain Lieutenant Oswald obtained his Company in succession to Captain Adnet, and Ensign John Nollikins was promoted to the vacant Lieutenantcy.‡

Colonel Forde now sent out the Cavalry of Anundeeraj as scouts, to obtain information of the movements of the flying enemy, and in the afternoon he sent forward Captain

* A similar anomaly is to be found in the honorary badges of the Bengal Fusiliers, amongst which is the word "Guzerat," whilst no European Infantry from Bengal were attached to General Goddard's Division, for the services of which force that badge was accorded.

† This account of the Battle of Condore, and in fact of the whole of this campaign, is chiefly compiled from Orme, Cambridge and Grose, who agree closely in all the leading details.

‡ Bengal General Military Register.

Knox, with the 1st Battalion of Sipahis, to follow up the pursuit and prevent any attempt at rallying in the neighbourhood. They marched on towards Rajahmundree, and the following morning, the Colonel having learned that the French had stopped at that town, also sent forward the remainder of the Sipahis under Captain MacLean, whilst he followed more slowly with the Europeans and Artillery.

A. D. 1758.
December.

The whole of the Sipahis, with Captains Knox and MacLean, reached Rajahmundree, a distance of 40 miles, by day-break on the 10th.*

This town which is the capital of the province, is situated on the eastern bank of the Godavery, about 40 miles from its embouchure. In the centre of the town, close to the river, was a large mud fort of little strength; here the French had established a depôt for stores, and maintained a garrison for the defence of the place; and hither the greater part of the fugitives hastened after the action of the 8th. Having lost their best Artillery on that day, the fort was ill calculated to stand a siege, and the approach of the Sipahis being magnified into that of the whole army, they had commenced to evacuate the place during the night of the 9th. Much delay occurred, however, in crossing over the river, and when Captain Knox arrived in the morning, he found 15 Europeans, and the greater part of the stores, not yet embarked, all of which were immediately seized; a boat laden with another party of Europeans, 4 light field pieces, and a thirteen inch mortar, had only just reached the opposite shore; the Sipahis observing this, commenced a fire of musketry across the stream, and turned some of the guns in the fort upon this party, which compelled them to leave their charge and attend to their own safety, when a party of the Sipahis procured some boats, and going across, brought back all 5 pieces of ordnance.†

A further supply of guns, stores, ammunition and baggage, were found in the fort, together with 500 bullocks, and a few horses and camels.

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 382.

† Orme, vol. 3, p. 383. Cambridge, p. 276.

A. D. 1759.
January.

Colonel Forde and the remainder of the force arrived on the 11th, but the Rajah and his troops did not come up until the 16th of the month, having made a great ceremony of burying the few men belonging to their army, who had fallen by the random shot during the action. On arrival, Colonel Forde set aside the ordnance, ammunition and military stores for the Company and the Rajah, all the remaining articles were sold by auction on the spot, and the proceeds reserved for future division amongst the troops. /

Colonel Forde now called upon the Rajah to make his first payment for the support of the force, which he had engaged to do when put in possession of Rajahmundree,—on the faith of which promise, the Colonel had advanced him the sum of 20,000 Rupees from the Military chest, to enable him to march from Kossimkottah ; this loan and a supply to the factory at Vizagapatam, had exhausted the whole sum brought round from Bengal, and the Colonel had nothing but the Rajah's promises to look to, for the payment of the troops and the maintenance of his force. However, either trusting still to them, or with a view to shame the Rajah into the fulfilment of his engagements, the English force crossed the Godavery on the 23rd, Colonel Forde being most anxious to reach Masulipatam, before the enemy should have recovered the effects of their recent defeat. But the Rajah neither supplied funds nor moved himself with his troops ; and as it would have been impossible to proceed without these aids, Colonel Forde was compelled to recross the stream on the 26th. Anundeeraj conscious of his own breach of faith, imagined that the English were returning to punish him for his conduct, and immediately fled to the hills that skirt the province to the northward. Colonel Forde upon this, retraced his course towards Vizagapatam, and halted at Peddapore, a village situated about 10 miles to the westward of Condore ;—here he established himself with a view to more easy communication with the factory. On learning the state of affairs, Mr. Andrews sent him 20,000 rupces from Vizagapatam, and came into camp himself on the 13th January, from whence he proceeded to the Rajah's camp in the

hills, which he reached on the 15th. Here he found that the dread of the Colonel, and the disinclination to furnish any supplies, had completely superseded all anxiety as to the success of the expedition. This was a most perplexing dilemma, as the intelligence that the French were besieging Madras with a powerful force, had ruined the English credit in that part of the country, which the Rajah's name and support only could restore. Under these circumstances, Mr Andrews was obliged to consent to an alteration of the original treaty, of the real substance of which, the Rajah pleaded ignorance, laying the blame on his interpreter. It was now agreed that "whatever sums the Rajah should furnish, should be considered as a loan, and that the revenues of all the districts south-west of Godavery, which might be reduced, should be equally divided between the Company and the Rajah, excepting those belonging to the French." He was now induced to return to the English camp, and to engage to advance upon Masulipatam; but another week was lost in arranging with the Shroffs, before he could be persuaded to furnish 6000 Rupees in cash, and bills at ten days for 60,000 more. At length, on the 28th January, the united forces moved from Peddapore, having lost more than six weeks; one-half of which, if properly employed, would probably have accomplished all the objects of the expedition,—whereas in the interim, the enemy had found time to recover from the effects of their recent defeat, and to make their preparations for future operations. Captain Bristol was left in command of the Fort of Rajahmundree, with a small garrison of the Rajah's troops. The sick and wounded, together with the spare ordnance and a portion of the military stores and baggage, were also lodged there under his charge.*

The *Hardwicke* and the two sloops had been sent to cruise along the coast after the action, whilst the *Thames* had proceeded on to Madras with stores and provisions. The former captured a snow, having on board all the Agents and property of the French factory at Yanam, they having embark-

* Cambridge, p. 277.

A. D. 1759.
February.

ed on receiving intelligence of the defeat of M. Conflans at Condore; these vessels cruised along the coast, extending between the several mouths of the Godavery, and finally proceeded to Masulipatam roads, where they captured some small vessels conveying grain to Pondicherry and to the French Army besieging Madras.*

On the 6th of February, the English force reached Ellore, a considerable town with a strong fort, situated near the Kolair Lake; this was the capital of one of the four provinces ceded, some time before, by Salabut Jung to Monsieur Bussy. The French had formerly kept a garrison here, which M. Conflans had withdrawn during his retreat to Masulipatam. The long delay of the English on the eastward of the Godavery had enabled M. Conflans to organize a field force, composed of the garrisons of Rajahmundry, Ellore and the neighbouring posts, consisting of 200 Europeans, and 2000 Sipahis with 4 field pieces, which he called his Army of Observation, the command of which he entrusted to one of his best officers, Monsieur Du Rocher; whilst with the remainder of the force at his disposal, he took post himself at Masulipatam. The Rajah's troops not having arrived, Colonel Forde whilst waiting for them at Ellore, dispatched Captain Knox with the 1st battalion of Sipahis, to reduce the French factory at Narseepore, where there was a garrison of 100 Europeans, and between 3 and 400 Sipahis, and which Monsieur Panneau, the officer in charge, seemed determined to defend. Colonel Forde wrote to the Zemindar of the district, threatening the destruction of his country if he aided the French, but offering to enter into alliance with him if he would join the English. This Chief readily accepted the latter alternative, and joined Captain Knox on the road with his own troops. The garrison, who had calculated upon his assistance, on receiving intelligence of this defection, abandoned the factory, and made their escape by water to join the Army of Observation, which lay about 30 miles from Ellore. Two 24-pounders, three 12-pounders, and a few field pieces, with a

supply of marine stores and some small vessels, were captured at Narseepore; but M. Panneau had sunk all the ammunition that he could not carry away.* Leaving a few men, together with some of the Zemindar's troops to garrison the place, Captain Knox returned to Ellore, where, on the 18th, the Rajah joined the camp, and the next day the Zemindar of Narseepore came in with 1500 men. Notwithstanding that time was so precious, and that so much had been already wasted, Anundeeraj was not ready to advance until the 1st of March.

A. D. 1759.
March.

The united forces now marched across the Kolair Lake, or rather marsh, which at the time was nearly dry; and on the 3rd, encamped near a fort called Konkale, in which the French had left a small garrison under a Serjeant, consisting of 13 Europeans, and two Companies of Sipahis. Captain Lieutenant MacLean was detached with six Companies of the 2nd Battalion of Sipahis to attack this fort. The garrison had received a promise of assistance from Monsieur Du Rocher, relying on which, they made a determined defence. Captain Lieutenant MacLean had neither scaling ladders nor guns, but he opened a hot fire of musketry on the ramparts, whilst a party endeavoured to force open the gate with crowbars, in which, after two desperate attempts, they failed and were driven back. Captain MacLean now sent to the camp for a couple of guns, which arrived in the evening, under the charge of an Artillery officer, who immediately took them up to the gate under a heavy fire of small arms and blew it open. The Sipahis, enraged at the resistance they had experienced and the loss they had sustained, rushed into the fort and bayoneted all they met without mercy; the European portion of the garrison, however, concealed themselves until the firing and slaughter were over, when they surrendered themselves prisoners.† A few hours after the fort was taken, intelligence was brought of a reinforcement from the French Army of Observation being on the way to relieve the place, consisting of 40 Europeans and a detachment of Sipahis; Captain MacLean

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 475.

† Orme, vol. 3, p. 477. Cambridge, pp. 278.

A. D. 1759. immediately moved out to encounter them ; but the officer
 March. commanding the party, learning that the fort had surrendered, retired to join M. Du Rocher. A small party of Sipahis was now left to garrison Konkale, and the remainder of the force marched on towards Masulipatam, before which they arrived on the 6th of March. On the same day, they received the cheering intelligence that Monsieur Lally had been compelled to raise the siege of Madras on the 17th of the preceding month.*

The fort of Masulipatam was situated in N. Lat. $16^{\circ} 10'$ and E. Long. $81^{\circ} 14'$; it stood nearly a mile and a half from the sea-shore, on the edge of a sound or inlet of the sea, surrounded on the other three sides by a morass or swamp of considerable extent, formed partly by this inlet and partly by a branch of the Kistnah, which disembogued to the westward of the fort; this swamp varied in depth in different parts, and at different seasons, from 3 to 18 feet, with a muddy bottom, and the inlet to the south side of the fort was upwards of 500 yards in breadth.

The shape of the fort might be considered an irregular parallelogram, with an average length of about 800 yards, and a breadth of from 500 to 600; the eastern side receding in an obtuse re-entering angle, and the western side projecting to nearly a corresponding extent; the outline of the works consisted of eleven bastions of various sizes and shapes, connected by long curtains; round the whole was a palisadoed berm and a wet ditch, but no glacis. The ramparts were of earth, faced with masonry, as also was the counterscarp. The French, who had taken possession of this place in 1751, had greatly improved and modernized its defences, and rendered it a very formidable fortification. The southern side, which rested on the sound or inlet of the sea, and was not easily assailable, had no defences except the bastions at either extremity. A range of sand hills extended on either side of the fort to about half a mile inland, where they bordered the morass; on the eastern side, these approached to within 800 yards of the fort,

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 477. Cambridge, p. 280.

which was the nearest available point from which the place could be assailed, and a nullah or creek formed the boundary between these sand hills and the morass. The town or pettah of Masulipatam, was situated about a mile and a half to the north-west of the fort, on a spot of rising-ground, and was also surrounded by the morass; the communication between the fort and the pettah was by means of a narrow raised causeway, about 2000 yards in length, which led to the north-west bastion of the fort, in which was the only gateway; about 120 yards of this causeway, nearest to the fort, was formed into a long caponniere, which terminated in a ravelin or flèche, the faces and short flanks of which, as well as the sides of the caponniere, were further strengthened by a ditch all round.*

A. D. 1752.
March.

The Marquis de Conflans, leaving a sufficient guard in the fort, was encamped with the remainder of his force in the pettah, for the greater convenience of water, as there was none in the fort except what was contained in cisterns. But as soon as the English appeared, notwithstanding that his own force was superior in numbers, consisting of 500 Europeans and 2000 Sipahis, independent of the Army of Observation under Monsieur Du Rocher, he retreated from the pettah without a struggle. The troops of Anundeeraj and the Zemindar of Narseepore encamped in the pettah, and the English force took up a position on the range of sand hills to the north-east of the fort.

Any regular approaches were out of the question, when the nature of the ground and the limited means at Colonel Forde's disposal were considered; he therefore determined to erect Batteries on the sand bank, at the nearest approachable point, which position, moreover, had the advantage of vicinity to the ships, from whence the ordnance and stores had to be disembarked.

Three Batteries were accordingly thrown up on the sand bank, unconnected by any trench, as there was little fear from any sortie of the Garrison across the morass. One Bat-

* This description of the fort is chiefly taken from Orme. Vide, Plate IV.

A. D. 1759.
March.

tery was situated at the south-western angle of the bank, close to a fishing village, bordered on the south by the sea, and on the west or front, by the nullah or creek already mentioned; in this Battery were placed two 24-pounders, two 18-pounders, and three mortars of 13, 10, and 8 inches each.

To the north of this Battery, at a distance of about 400 yards, resting on the bank of the nullah, another Battery was erected for two 24-pounders and two 18-pounders: and between the two, but about 100 yards to the rear, was a third Battery for two 12-pounders, which had been previously captured from the enemy.*

The front of the fort thus attacked, consisted of 4 Bastions with the connecting curtains. Of these, the one in the south-east angle, resting on the sound, was called the *Francois*, mounting 10 guns; from hence the line of works receded, owing to the nature of the soil, and formed a re-entering angle, as already noticed, in which was situated a Bastion without flanks, the faces affording sufficient defence to the curtains on either side; this was called the *Dutch Bastion*: further on was the *St. John Bastion*, mounting 8 guns, and to the north-east angle of the fort was another Bastion, called the *Camelion*, mounting 10 guns. The southern English Battery played upon the *Francois* and *Dutch Bastions*, the centre Battery, on the *St. John*, and the northern on the *Camelion*:—but their fire was far inferior to that of the Batteries in the fort, and no other guns were available, except the 9-pounders with which the *Hardwicke* was armed, and some old honey-combed pieces belonging to the Rajah.

As soon as the plan of attack was developed, and the Batteries fairly commenced upon, the enemy erected a powerful Battery on the other side of the inlet, which firing across the water, took them all three in flank; but as this detached work was liable to a night attack by boats, the garrison was weakened by the necessity of establishing a strong guard there, both of Europeans and Sipahis.

After the action at Condore, the Marquis de Conflans had

* Orme, vol. 3, pp 479-80.

written to Salabut Jung, the Soobahdar of the Deccan, re- A D. 1759.
 questing his assistance against the English, and the refrac-
 tory chiefs who had revolted to their common enemy. Sala-
 but Jung, being desirous of obtaining the aid of M. de Con-
 flans and his force, to enable him to coerce his brother Nizam
 Ali,—who, on the departure of M. Bussy, had risen into
 rebellion,—readily listened to this request, and was now ac-
 tually on his march to raise the siege, with a large Army,
 which was joined on the Kistnah by his other brother Bis-
 salut Jung,—their united forces amounting to 15,000 Horse
 and 20,000 Foot.

The French Brigade under Monsieur Du Rocher, as soon
 as Colonel Forde had reached Masulipatam, crossed the coun-
 try to Ellore, and thence proceeded to Rajahmundree, where the
 sick of the English Army, amounting to 25 Europeans and 40
 Sipahis, had, as already stated, been left under the charge of Mr.
 Bristol; and what was of the greatest importance, a large sum
 of money in gold and silver, which had been sent round from
 Bengal for the use of the force, then so greatly in want of it,
 had just arrived there on its way to Masulipatam. As soon
 as Mr. Bristol received intelligence of the approach of the
 French troops, he sent off the treasure to Kokanara, placing
 it under the charge of the Dutch Agents at that Factory,
 and directed such of the invalids, as were equal to the fatigue
 of marching, to proceed to Vizagapatam. Du Rocher thus
 obtained undisputed possession of Rajahmundree, and ad-
 vanced two or three marches beyond that place, giving out
 that he intended to attack Vizianagaram, the capital of
 Anundeeraj and the English factory at Vizagapatam; his real
 object, however, was to intimidate the neighbouring Zemin-
 dars and petty chiefs, and extort money from their fears; but
 finding that even with the exercise of great severity, he could
 not collect enough to pay his expenses, he retraced his steps
 and proceeded to form a junction with Salabut Jung.*

The intelligence of Du Rocher's movements and intentions
 greatly alarmed Anundeeraj for the safety of his own posses-

* Orme, vol. 3, pp. 180-1. Cambridge, p. 280.

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sions, and he could not be induced to advance either money or credit for the wants of the British troops,—which were now becoming most urgent; the treasure chest was completely empty, Colonel Forde and all the officers of the force had advanced whatever sums they possessed, and the prize money had been used and all expended in procuring provisions, whilst the troops were several months in arrears of pay.*

Such was the condition of the English detachment—besieging a superior force, which was well supplied with all the means and material for defence, in a place of acknowledged strength,—themselves with the most scanty material, ill supplied with provision, and entirely without funds;—whilst the enemy possessed a separate force without the wall, which crippled their resources, and prevented the arrival of the money sent from Bengal;—in addition to all which, a powerful Army was advancing to the relief of the place. /

With these disadvantages to encounter, the enemy ridiculed all the efforts made by the besiegers, and the troops themselves were dispirited at the prospect before them, and the privations they had to endure. At last their distress became so great, that the European Battalion broke into open mutiny, and on the 19th of March turned out with their arms and threatened to march away. Colonel Forde, with much difficulty, persuaded them to return quietly to their tents, and to select a certain number of deputies from amongst their body, to represent their wants and grievances. These deputies declared that they were determined not to serve any longer, unless they were paid their arrears, as also the amount of prize money already due to them, and were guaranteed the whole booty in case Masulipatam should be taken. Colonel Forde informed them that money was on the way from Bengal, and that as soon as it was received they should be paid their arrears and the amount of prize money already due; but, as by the regulations, they were entitled to only half of the prize money taken in any fort, the remaining half belonging to the Company, he was unable to guarantee the whole

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 481.

amount as demanded, but he promised urgently to recommend to the Government, to relinquish their share, in consideration of the dangers, difficulties, and privations the troops had to endure. These promises, and the persuasions of their officers, induced the men to return once more to their duty, which they did with undiminished ardour ; but such was the want of means for carrying on a siege, that the Batteries with every exertion were not completed until the 25th of the month, eighteen days after their arrival before the place.*

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In the mean time, Salabut Jung was gradually approaching, and had sent letters to Anundeeraj and the Zemindar of Nar-seepore, ordering them immediately to leave the English and join his standard. On the 27th, intelligence were received of his arrival at Beezoara on the Kistnah, about 40 miles from Masulipatam, and on the same day the news arrived that Du Rocher had taken possession of Rajahmundree and was preparing to advance upon Vizianagaram.

These reports so terrified Anundeeraj, that he marched off the following morning, without giving any notice,—intending to regain his own districts. Colonel Forde sent Mr. Johnstone to him, to represent the folly of his conduct, in thinking alone to escape from or to oppose the numerous cavalry of Salabut Jung, on the one-hand, or the French Army of Observation on the other,—which latter lay immediately in his route,—and pointing out that his only chance was to remain with the English, when, if Masulipatam was taken, all would go well, and if compelled to retreat, he would have their support and assistance, without which he would be helpless.

The truth of these representations was too evident to admit of denial, and he was accordingly induced to return once more to his old quarters in the pettah.

Colonel Forde, though with little hopes of any good result, determined to try the effect of negociation with Salabut Jung, which might at least serve to amuse him for a time and delay his advance upon Masulipatam : he accordingly entered into communication with him, stating that the English had no

* Orme, vol. 3, pp. 481-2.

A. D. 1759. ^{April.} views or intentions, beyond driving the French out of the Province, and taking possession of their factories and forts on the Coast, without any desire to obtain or keep up their influence or possession in the inland districts, and requesting permission to send a deputy to his camp to represent the views and interest of the English, and to enter into final arrangements and a treaty. Salabut Jung consented to receive a deputy, and accordingly Mr Johnstone proceeded to his camp on the 1st of April. These negotiations had the desired effect of retarding his march, which was all that Colonel Forde anticipated from them.*

In the meantime, the English pressed the siege with great energy, as far as their limited means would permit: the Batteries, which had kept up an uninterrupted fire since the 25th of March, had effected several breaches in the enemy's works, but these were as quickly repaired during the night: the greatest effect was produced by the three mortars, which destroyed a number of the buildings, and committed considerable execution amongst the garrison. On the 5th of April a severe storm with heavy rain, brought in the southern monsoon, and added considerably to the depth of the morass. On the 6th, the weather cleared again, and news was brought that Salabut Jung was advancing from Beezoara, and that the Army of Observation under Du Rocher was also close at hand, ready to form a junction with the Soobahdar, or to intercept the English retreat; the same day the Artillery officers reported that not more than sufficient ammunition for two days' service of the Batteries remained in store,—400 barrels of powder having been expended during the siege.†

The position of the English was now most critical; retreat by the route they had come was impossible, in the face of a force so greatly superior, harassed as they would assuredly be by the Nizam's powerful Cavalry, and though the European troops might have been embarked in the *Hardwicke* and the two sloops, it would have been difficult to provide for the

* Orme, vol. 3, pp. 482-3.

† Orme, vol. 3, p. 483. Cambridge, pp. 280 l.

Sipahis, and their Allies must have been abandoned, as also the guns, stores and baggage : such a proceeding Colonel Forde considered too disgraceful even to be entertained, and accordingly resolved to make a desperate effort to carry the fort by assault. He directed the Artillery officers to keep up a fire from the Batteries with increased alacrity, and ordered all the troops to be under arms by 10 o'clock on the night of the 7th. The depth of water in the ditch of the fort was dependent on the state of the tide ; and as the ebb was to take place at midnight, it was calculated that there would not be above 3 feet of water in it at that time ; this circumstance, and there being no glacis nor any outworks, greatly facilitated the approach to the breaches. These had been repaired by the garrison during the night of the 6th, but the fire of the Batteries had been so continued and effective during the whole of the 7th, that there was every reason to hope they would be found practicable, and all the Bastions had been equally fired upon, so as to confound the enemy as to the intended point of attack. On the other side of the fort, in the south-west angle, between the Bastion resting on the sound called the *St. Michael*, and the one to the north of it, named the *Saline*, there was no ditch,—this portion of the works being covered by a broad swamp, bounded externally by a small nullah, which, under the circumstances, was considered a sufficient defence. A native servant of Captain Yorke, who had formerly lived in Masulipatam, informed his master that he had occasionally seen the natives employed in the fort wading over the quagmire between the two Bastions. Captain Yorke reported this circumstance to the Colonel, who authorised his examining the passage, accompanied by Captain Knox. On the night of the 6th, these two officers taking with them a hundred Sipahis, proceeded quietly to the spot, and placing the men in small parties in a line with each other, proceeded across the quagmire, which they found was not more than knee-deep, but the mud very tenacious, and the passage though practicable, a matter of difficulty. They returned undiscovered before morning, and their report determined Colonel Forde to make a separate attack at that

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point, which would at least serve to distract the enemy's attention. With the same view, it was arranged that the Rajah's troops should proceed along the causeway and make an attack upon the detached Ravelin, situated near its extremity. The real attack was to be made on the north-east Bastion, the *Camelion*.—Captain Knox was appointed to lead the false attack with his own (the 1st) Battalion, and a detail of the Madras Sipahis; whilst the main attack was to be made by the Europeans and the remainder of the Sipahis. These points being all arranged, the troops were ordered to be in readiness on their respective grounds, so as to commence operations by midnight, and the fire from Captain Knox's party was to be the signal for the other two parties to attack.

The strength of the European Battalion on this occasion was 812 men, to whom were added 30 Artillerymen from the Batteries, and 30 Sailors from the *Hardwicke*. The Sipahis consisted of Captain Lieutenant Maclean's Battalion and a further detail of the Madras Sipahis, making a total of little more than 700 men;—a considerable portion of the Madras Sipahis being distributed in the Garrisons left at the several posts in the district. Captain Knox's party amounted only to the same strength; sickness and casualties having considerably reduced the force since its landing on the coast. No counter-attack being anticipated, the Camp and Batteries were left under a guard of the Rajah's troops. The party under Captain Knox having farthest to march, started first, and making a long detour round the fort, arrived at their position, and commenced their attack exactly at midnight. The Rajah's troops, at this signal, commenced firing upon the detached Ravelin, and made sufficient noise, if they did nothing more. The main attack was in 3 divisions; the 1st consisting of the European and Native Grenadiers under Captain Fischer, with the Artillerymen; the 2d of the other four Companies of the European Battalion and the Sailors, under Captain Yorke; and the 3rd of the remainder of the Sipahis under Captain Lieutenant Maclean. They were delayed for some time after all was in readiness to march, by the absence of Captain Callender, the second in command,—who had

been appointed to lead the assault, but who was nowhere to be found ; after a fruitless search, the troops moved off without him, crossing the morass considerably to the north of the Batteries, and marching nearly in a direct line upon the *Camelion* ; as they approached the ditch, they were joined by the party of Artillery, who, to avoid creating suspicion, had remained in the Batteries until the last moment. They now heard the fire from Captain Knox's party and from the Rajah's troops, and hastened to gain the fort,—but the passage of the morass was tedious and fatiguing, the mud being over their knees at every step, and in the ditch it was above their waists ; the leading division, however, succeeded in gaining the berme, and had commenced tearing up the palisades, when they were discovered by the enemy, who immediately thronged to the breach, and also opened a fire of Artillery upon them from the adjoining Bastions, the *St. John* on the east side, and that called the *Little Gate* on the north side,—a name derived from its having a small sally port in one face. This opposition only increased the ardour of the assailants, and whilst Captain Fischer's Division were busy destroying the palisades and clearing the breach, Captain Yorke's division kept up a smart fire of musketry upon the adjoining Bastion of *St. John*, and Captain Maclean's Division of Sipahis replied to that from the *Little Gate* Bastion. At length, in spite of all obstacles and opposition, the leading Division forced its way up the breach, and gained complete possession of the *Camelion*, although not without loss : here they waited until the 2d Division had mounted, when they proceeded along the ramparts to their right, towards the *Little Gate* Bastion, with a view to clearing the northern face of the fort. On taking possession of the *Camelion*, Captain Moran discovered a light field-piece on the ramparts, which, at his suggestion, Captain Yorke turned along the east face of the fort, to sweep the ramparts on that side ; and as soon as a sufficient number of the rear Division had ascended the breach, he proceeded to follow in the same direction, marching along the ramparts towards the Bastion of *St. John*. Just as he was starting, he descried a

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body of troops advancing below, between the ramparts and the buildings in the body of the place ; this was a party of Sipahis, who had been sent to reinforce the garrison at the *Camelion*, by Monsieur Conflans,—who, distracted by the various attacks, had taken post with his European Grenadiers and some other troops at the Arsenal, which was situated on the south side of the fort, not far from the *Francois* Bastion ;—Captain Yorke, on observing these troops, with great presence of mind rushed down the ramparts, and seizing the French officer in command of the party, desired him immediately to order his men to lay down their arms, or they should all be destroyed, as the fort was taken ; the order was given and obeyed without hesitation, and the whole were made prisoners and sent up into the *Camelion*, where they were placed under the charge of the 3d Division. Captain Yorke perceiving that the road below was broader and less liable to obstruction than the line of the ramparts, brought down his Division and marched along to the rear of the *St. John*, leaving the gun with a few Artillerymen to keep the rampart clear above. The *St. John* Bastion contained a party of 20 Frenchmen and more Sipahis, who remained sheltered within the work from the fire of the field-piece, which kept up a continued discharge along the terreplein of the curtain ; but as soon as Captain Yorke's Division gained the gorge of the Bastion, they came forward, poured in a volley of musketry upon the party, which did considerable execution, and then immediately cried out that they would surrender. Notwithstanding this treacherous conduct, Captain Yorke generously spared their lives, and making them lay down their arms, sent them to the *Camelion* under a small guard, where they also were made over to the charge of the 3d Division, from which a reinforcement was brought up and posted in the *St. John*.

The 2d Division now pushed on to gain the *Dutch* Bastion : this was held by a party of the same strength as that in the *St. John*, who were guilty of similar iniquitous conduct, delivering a volley of musketry as the party advanced and then immediately surrendering. They however met the

same humane treatment, and were in like manner sent prisoners to the *Camelion*, from whence another detail of Sipahis was withdrawn, and with a few of the Europeans, left to maintain the *Dutch Bastion*. The Division now moved on to the *Francois*, situated at the south-east angle of the fort; but as they proceeded, they passed a small expense Magazine situated under the ramparts, when some of the party entered, and one man crying out 'a mine,' the whole division, which had hitherto behaved with such extraordinary coolness and gallantry, were suddenly seized with a panic, and rushed back in confusion towards the *Camelion*, in spite of the exhortations and entreaties of the officers. Captain Yorke seized the two drummers, and made them beat the Grenadier's march: but finding all efforts unavailing, he was obliged to follow the party, whom he found in the greatest confusion and consternation, some even proposing to evacuate the fort altogether. Seeing this state of affairs, Captain Yorke immediately rushed to the top of the breach, and threatened to kill the first man who should attempt to descend, and reviling them for their cowardice, endeavoured to persuade them to return, pointing out the folly of their alarm. At last some of the men, who had served with him in the 39th Regiment, declared themselves ready to follow him wherever he pleased, and others encouraged by their example, did the same: he then immediately advanced with about 40 men, leaving the remainder to follow, as their officers could collect them and bring them on. They now pushed forward rapidly, but these delays had afforded time to the officer in command at the *Francois* to make arrangements for their reception; he had brought down a gun loaded with grape, and pointed in the direction the party were moving; they were allowed to approach within a few yards, when the piece was fired, and committed sad havoc amongst the advance party, killing several and wounding sixteen more; Captain Yorke fell severely wounded with a ball through each thigh, and the two drummers were killed at his side: but others of the Division coming up, brought off their Captain and wounded comrades, and retreated with

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them to the *Camelion*: the details at the *Dutch* and *St. John's* Bastions, however, maintained their ground firmly and steadily, waiting the result,—and fortunately the enemy were too much confounded to take advantage of this adverse circumstance. Colonel Forde had in the mean time, proceeded with a reinforcement to the *St. John* Bastion, where he took up his position, receiving reports from, and issuing orders to, the several Divisions and details:—here he collected all the prisoners, and sent them down to the Ditch, under a guard of Sipahis, with orders to fire upon the first man that moved; but notwithstanding their numbers, they remained perfectly quiet. All this time, the Rajah's troops kept up an incessant fire upon the detached Ravelin, which though it did little execution, had the good effect of distracting the attention of the garrison, and detaining a portion of their force in that outwork, which would have been better employed in the defence of the body of the place.—Captain Knox, with his party, had also called off the attention of a considerable portion of the defenders to the quarter of his attack; but finding them well prepared, he was unable to cross the swamp, and could only fire upon the ramparts, and his ammunition now began to run low, having been so long engaged. But what served most effectually to distract and confuse the garrison, was the double attack of the main body, sweeping round the fort in opposite directions. The leading Division, it has already been stated, had turned to their right after the *Camelion* was gained; they proceeded along the rampart, and reached the gorge of the *Little Gate* Bastion, which was in bad repair, just as Captain Maclean, with a party of his Battalion, was scaling the rampart from the berme. The guard of this Bastion immediately fled to the next, called the *Church Yard* Bastion, from which they kept up an irregular and hurried fire;—but as the 1st Division firmly approached, they laid down their arms, and asked for quarter, which was granted, and the prisoners were sent to join the others. The north side of the fort being thus cleared, the Division now moved down the western side to the *Great Gate* Bastion,

which communicated with the detached Ravelin; under this work was the grand parade, which was the usual rendezvous in cases of alarm, and hither most of the officers and men, not otherwise occupied, had assembled to the number of about 100, waiting for orders: as Captain Fischer's Division advanced, they joined themselves to the Guard of the Bastion, and commenced an irregular and ill-directed fire upon the English, who moved on steadily until they were within a few paces, when they poured in a destructive volley, and then with a rapid charge of bayonets cleared the Bastion; this was no sooner done, than Captain Fischer closed the gate leading to the detached Ravelin, and thus isolated the party employed in the defence of that work and prevented their escape. Whilst he was forming his men for a further advance, Captain Callender suddenly appeared, no one knew from whence, and assumed the command; they then moved on to the next Bastion called the *Pettah*, from which a few dropping shots were fired, one of which killed Captain Callender on the spot, and Captain Fischer resumed the command. All opposition appeared now nearly at an end, and a message was received from Colonel Forde, ordering a cessation of the attack, as the Marquis de Conflans had surrendered. That officer receiving reports that his principal works had fallen, both to the right and left, sent an officer to Colonel Forde, offering to capitulate on honorable terms. To this the Colonel replied that he would allow of no terms but a surrender at discretion, and that if the garrison continued to offer resistance, now that the place was taken, he would put the whole to the sword. The result was an immediate and unconditional surrender, and a cessation of all firing on both sides. The English now collected their prisoners on the parade, and leaving 100 Europeans and 200 Sipahis with 2 field-pieces to guard them, proceeded to make arrangements for the safety of their valuable conquest. In the morning, the details in the detached Ravelin and in the Battery across the inlet were brought in, and the whole were secured; the British flag was hoisted on the ramparts, and thus Masulipatam passed under the English rule. The number of prisoners far exceeded that of the assailants, amounting to about

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500 Europeans, of whom 409 belonged to the French Battalion; the remainder were Officers, Agents of the Company, or Merchants, together with 2,537 Caffrees, Topasses, and Sipahis. Their loss during the attack, though not especially stated, must have been heavy, and some estimate may be formed of it, from the fact that the muster rolls of the previous day, taken in the fort, exhibited 522 Europeans in Battalion, actually in the garrison, giving a loss in that Corps of 113 killed,—the wounded being included amongst the prisoners. The loss of the assailants was also considerable, Captains Callender and Molitore, and one Lieutenant, whose name is not recorded, were killed, as also 22 Europeans and 50 Sipahis; and 62 Europeans and 150 Sipahis were wounded.* The conduct of the troops, notwithstanding the one instance of panic mentioned, was admirable,—and the Sipahis, both in the real and false attacks, emulated the Europeans in gallantry. The Rajah's troops had also lost several men from the fire of the garrison, and appear to have behaved better than was expected from them. A large supply of Military stores was found in the Fort, including 120 pieces of Ordnance, of which one was a 32-pounder, and five were 24-pounders. A considerable quantity of merchandize and public property was also captured. The private property of the garrison was generously restored to the owners, with exception to merchandize; all the remaining booty was divided,—one-half given to the Army, and the other half reserved, pending the decision of Government, as promised by Colonel Forde. The French officers and gentlemen were admitted to their parole, and treated with respect and generosity. Lieutenant Thomas Robertston obtained the Company vacant by the death of Captain Molitore, and Ensigns John Mathews and Francis Cozens, the two vacant Lieutenancies:† Captain Lieutenant Maclean and Ensign Anthony Casteel were also promoted for their

* This account of the storm and capture of the Fort is taken almost and entirely from Orme and Cambridge, both of whom give full details, especially the former.

† It does not appear that any of these three officers were with the force; but they obtained their promotion as the seniors in the Army. Ensign Mathews was

conduct on this occasion, their commissions bearing date one day subsequent to those who were promoted by the casualties.*

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When the whole of the attendant circumstances are considered,—the numerical superiority of the enemy,—the strength of the place, and the disadvantages under which the English force was laboring,—as also the great importance of the conquest,—few achievements on Indian record can be compared with this brilliant affair, which is surely deserving of commemoration; and it is to be hoped that the Corps still in existence, which were employed in that assault, may even at this late date, receive the distinction so justly due, and be permitted to emblazon the word "*Masulipatam*" upon their colours and appointments. These Corps are the Bengal Artillery, the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers, and the 1st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry.

The apparent impossibility and rashness of such an attempt were probably the chief causes of its success, for the garrison was only waiting the arrival of Salabut Jung and the Army of Observation, to commence a concerted and combined attack upon the English force, which they already looked upon as completely in their power, and consequently treated all its efforts with perfect contempt.

Salabut Jung and his advisers were equally surprised and vexed when they heard of the fall of Masulipatam, and their chagrin was increased by the conviction that a little more energy and activity on their part might have prevented it. A communication was immediately entered into with Monsieur Du Rocher, as to their future proceedings, when it was agreed to wait the arrival of a reinforcement daily expected from Pondicherry, and with that assistance, to attempt the recovery of the place. Anundeeraj dreading some such measure, proposed to return to his own country, and Colonel Forde, not sorry to be quit of so useless and contemptible an ally, made no objection to his so doing; accordingly,

* Bengal General Military Register.

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on the 12th of April he took his departure, and in two forced marches crossed the Godavery with his whole army.*

On the 15th, two large vessels were observed standing into the roads under French colours, these were the *Haarlem* and the *Bristol*, from Pondicherry, having on board the expected reinforcement, consisting of 300 Frenchmen and Topasses, and nearly as many Sipahis, under the command of Monsieur Moracin. Captain Sampson, who commanded the *Hardwicke*, was on shore at the time, superintending the embarkation of the prisoners, of whom 40 were already on board; his brother, who was chief mate of the vessel, immediately weighed anchor on observing the strange sails, and standing out to sea, managed to get to windward of them. Captain Sampson, on receiving this information, entered his boat, accompanied by eight Artillerymen of the force, lent by Colonel Forde to aid in working the guns, and speedily got on board his ship: being to windward of the enemy, he determined to try their metal before leaving them masters of the field; he lay to until they approached and exchanged a few broadsides, when finding that they were too strong to leave him a chance, he again hauled to the wind, and working his ship with great dexterity, was soon out of reach, and the following morning bore away for Bengal, bringing the prisoners and the news of Colonel Forde's successes. The two French vessels sent a catamaran with letters on shore, which were immediately seized, but receiving no answer, they suspected what had occurred, and the following morning made sail to the northward, proceeding to Ganjam, which place they reached five days after.

Salabut Jung had arrived with his whole force within 15 miles of Masulipatam, and learning that the French vessels had appeared in the roads, he sent forward a large body of Mahratta Horse, which he had taken into service, to facilitate the landing of the expected reinforcement. Colonel Forde, leaving a sufficient guard over the prisoners, boldly moved

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 490.

out of the fort and took up his old position on the sand hills, which served to keep the Mahrattas at a respectful distance ; they remained in the neighbourhood, however, for two or three days, in expectation of the return of the French ships, and burned and destroyed all around before retiring.*

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Salabut Jung, losing all hopes of the reinforcement, and convinced of the impossibility of retaking Masulipatam, now offered to treat in earnest, and at his request, Colonel Forde proceeded to his Camp to arrange terms,—where he was received with great attention and respect. Independent of the hopelessness of success, Salabut Jung had another and more important motive for desiring to conclude terms without delay ; his brother Nizam Allee had assembled a large force at Hyderabad, and was preparing to make an effort to obtain the Soobahdaree. Any further assistance from the French was now out of the question, and the Nizam's object was to obtain the aid of the English, or at any rate to secure their not acting against him. A treaty was accordingly drawn out and signed on the 12th May, the advantages of which were entirely in favour of the British ; territory extending 80 miles along the coast and 20 miles inland, affording an annual revenue of four lakhs of rupees, was ceded to them,—the French troops were to be compelled to cross the Kistnah, no longer to be entertained in the Nizam's service, and not to be allowed to settle in the province. Anundeeraj was not to be molested, and each party was bound not to support the enemies of the other.†

As soon as this treaty was concluded, Salabut Jung earnestly endeavored to persuade Colonel Forde to aid him with a part of the force against his brother Nizam Allee, a request which the Colonel met by claiming his assistance to follow up and destroy the French detachment under Monsieur Du Rocher. Neither party was inclined to comply with the request of the other, and on the 18th, Salabut Jung commenced his march to Hyderabad, in great disgust with the

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 491.

† Vide Appendix K.

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Colonel Forde now sent for the treasure deposited at Kokanara, which enabled him to pay the troops, and with the booty obtained in the assault, put them into good humour again. The Madras Presidency assumed the direction of the newly acquired province, and restored the factory at Masulipatam, which they placed under the charge of Mr Andrews. They also directed Colonel Forde to proceed to Madras with the European portion of the force under his command, to aid in the contemplated hostilities against the French; but that officer had received peremptory orders from Colonel Clive, who had anticipated that such a requisition would be made, not to comply, as the state of affairs in Bengal rendered it absolutely necessary that the troops should be at hand to return there when required. The Colonel, however, sent the remnant of the Madras Sipahis who had come round with Colonel Clive in 1756, and who were desirous of returning to their homes; these were now reduced to between 4 and 500 men. Their absence was, however, in some measure, compensated by the enlistment of about 50 Europeans from amongst the French prisoners; but whether from excess, or the effects of climate, considerable mortality occurred amongst the Battalion during the ensuing rainy season.†

In the mean time, Monsieur Moracin with his detachment was not idle; they had arrived at Ganjam on the 23d April, as already stated. Here the French had for a long period maintained a small branch factory, and M. Moracin, acquainted with the politics of the country, endeavored to form a league with Narain Deo, the Rajah of the district, whose residence was at Mohurree, about 30 miles from Ganjam and 12 from the coast. This Chief had an hereditary feud with Anundeeraj, taking advantage of which, M. Moracin proposed that they should unite their forces and march against Vizagapatam and

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 493.

† Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 20.—Orme, vol. 3, p. 558.

Vizinagaram, that they should then proceed and join Salabut Jung and M. Du Rocher, and endeavor to retake Masulipatam,—succeeding in which, Narain Deo should be placed in possession of all the districts and advantages held by Anundee-raj. Narain Deo agreed to these terms, determining to carry out so much of the plan as suited his own convenience; he having no reason to regard the French,—under whose authority, during Monsieur Bussy's Government of the province, he had greatly suffered,—with any degree of good will.

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The French detachment having expected to land at Masulipatam, where stores of all sorts were abundant, had come unprovided with camp equipage and other equipments necessary for a campaign; their stock of money was very limited, and they were soon reduced to great distress for want of provisions and stores. In the detachment were 43 English soldiers, who having been taken prisoners on the coast, had entered the French service: 30 of these men deserted within a few days of their arrival, and after encountering great difficulties and privations, reached Kuttack in the middle of May, from whence Mr. Gray, the Company's agent there, sent them to Calcutta. Seven more arrived in June, together with several other deserters of various nations.*

In the beginning of July, Monsieur Moracin commenced his march, accompanied by Narain Deo, but the French troops were compelled to plunder the villages they passed, in order to obtain subsistence; this created a strong feeling against them in the country, as also on the part of the Rajah, and a fray occurring in the small town of Burrampore, about six miles from Narain Deo's capital, in which lives were lost on both sides,—that Chief withdrew with his force, and calling upon all the neighbouring zemindars for assistance, prepared to attack the French detachment, which was now compelled to return to Ganjam; but on the retreat, an action took place with Narain Deo's troops, in which the latter were speedily routed, their numbers being of little avail against European discipline. Monsieur Moracin now took post about 8 miles from

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 555.

A. D. 1759.
October.

Ganjam, at Marmakottah, in the neighbourhood of which supplies both of cattle and grain were abundant; here he recommenced a negociation with Narain Deo,—in furtherance of which a French officer named Darveu, accompanied by 40 Europeans and the same number of Sipahis, was sent to conclude terms; on their return, this party was treacherously attacked, and all the Europeans slain, except three. Monsieur Moracin immediately returned to Ganjam, and threw up works round the factory for the defence of the troops and establishment, which Narain Deo and his allies speedily invested. Of the two vessels which had brought the detachment to Ganjam, the *Haarlem* had been dispatched to Arrakan for provisions, and the *Bristol* was driven ashore in a gale. On the stocks, however, was a large *snow*, and several small vessels were in the river belonging to the factory; in these it was determined to embark and proceed to Pondicherry when the Northern monsoon should set in, and the English squadron should have quitted the coast. In the mean time Narain Deo had written to Colonel Clive soon after the commencement of hostilities, requesting assistance, with which he stated that the French force might easily be destroyed or captured,—a statement which was confirmed by the reports of the deserters who had arrived. The state of affairs in Bengal at the time precluded the possibility of sending any large reinforcement, the troops available being insufficient for the duties of the Presidency; but it was not considered politic to neglect this opportunity altogether. Accordingly, Colonel Clive dispatched Captain Sampson with his ship the *Hardwicke*, the crew of which was completed from the other vessels in the river to 100 men, and well supplied with arms: on board of this vessel were also embarked 30 Artillerymen and 30 of the European Battalion, each detail under a Subaltern officer.* This vessel left Calcutta on the 30th of September and entered the roads at Ganjam on the 7th of October, under Dutch colours. Two French officers came on board to learn the news and were immediately made prisoners. Cap-

* Orme, vol. 3, p. 556.

tain Sampson now went on shore under a passport from Monsieur Moracin, to whom he magnified the strength of the force he had brought, and recommended him to avoid unnecessary bloodshed by a surrender; but Monsieur Moracin being better informed on these points, was not to be so easily entrapped. Captain Sampson then sent messengers and letters to Narain Deo, proposing a conjoint operation; but that chief who had in the interim entered into a fresh agreement with the French that hostilities should cease on both sides, and who knew that they would shortly leave the coast, was not inclined to revive the war; he, however, made abundance of promises;—but Captain Sampson seeing clearly that nothing was to be done, set sail on the 20th of October, and returned to Bengal.*

A. D. 1759.
November.

In the beginning of November, Monsieur Moracin embarked with 40 Europeans in a small sloop, and proceeded to Kokanara, where, as also at Yanam, close by, the French prisoners taken at Masulipatam, and who had been admitted to parole, were residing, waiting for an opportunity to return to Pondicherry. From them he learned that the neighbouring districts south of the Godavery were under the government of Jaggapetteeraj, a relative of Anundeeraj, between whom there was a feud,—the former having espoused the side of the French when the latter attached himself to the English cause. Monsieur Moracin now endeavored to enter into an alliance with this chief, mentioning the expected arrival of the remainder of his detachment from Ganjam, and promising further reinforcements from Pondicherry; the Rajah received the proposal favorably, but rendered no assistance to the French detachment, who, from want of provisions, were driven to their usual course of violence, and nearly the whole party were either made prisoners by the neighbouring zemindars, or deserted and took service with them. Monsieur Moracin in this distress re-embarked with the five or six men remaining, on the 19th of November, and in a few days reached

* Orme, vol. 3, pp. 556-7.

A. D. 1759.
November.

Pondicherry. The command of the detachment remaining at Ganjam had devolved on the Chevalier Poete, and now consisted of about 250 Europeans and Topasses and 100 Sipahis; they fitted up the *Snow* with the stores of the *Bristol*, and embarking in her and two small sloops, abandoned Ganjam entirely, and arrived at Kokanara on the 19th of December; here the Chevalier sent a party of 50 Europeans and the whole of the Sipahis on shore, to try the inclinations of Jaggapetteeraj:—the same day the two sloops were driven on shore by a gale and destroyed.*

At Masulipatam, the English troops had remained quiet during the rains, and had received orders to return to Bengal as soon as circumstances would permit; they were directed to march along the coast and endeavor to destroy the party under Monsieur Moracin, either at Ganjam or wherever they could fall in with them; but owing to the state of the roads and rivers, they were unable to move until the beginning of November. Colonel Forde,—whose appointment to the command of the Company's troops in Bengal had not been approved of at home,—embarked for Calcutta in October, accompanied by Captain Knox,† leaving the command of the force to Captain Fischer, the senior officer present. The strength of the detachment was now reduced to about 300 Europeans and 800 Sipahis. They marched by the route they had advanced in the preceding year,—the Godavery and other streams being still too swollen near their mouths to admit of the shorter route by the sea coast being adopted. On reaching Rajahmundree, they received intelligence that the French detachment under Chevalier Poete had arrived at Kokanara.

Anundeeraj and Jaggapetteeraj had each assembled their forces on their respective frontiers, and were carrying on hostilities after their own fashion; as the latter had the promise of French support, the former applied for assistance to his old allies the English; but Captain Fischer, recommending Anundeeraj's officers to act on the defensive, pro-

* Orme, vol. 3, pp. 557-8.

† Ibid, p. 558.

ceeded himself with all practicable expedition to Kokanara. A. D. 1760.
 The Chevalier Poete had, strange to say, landed no more of ^{January.}
 the detachment than the 50 Europeans and the Sipahis already mentioned, and these were encamped at a village inland, about two miles distant from the Dutch fort and factory. As Captain Fischer approached the place on the 27th of December, he sent forward Captain Yorke with the European Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion of Sipahis, to prevent the embarkation of this party. The French heard that a party of English were advancing, but had no certain intelligence of their strength, and waited until they could distinguish the number of Captain Yorke's detachment; that officer, as he drew near, sent the Sipahis round to endeavour to gain the enemy's flank, and advanced himself with the Grenadiers; the French remained to give one round of musketry, and then fled as fast as they could, to gain the Dutch fort, into which they were immediately received. Captain Yorke now invested the place, the defences of which were very slight, and Captain Fischer arriving in the evening, with the main body, demanded the surrender of the French party,—threatening to storm the fort if they were not given up. The next day, the 28th, this demand was complied with, under a formal protest, and the whole party were made prisoners.* On the 26th, the Chevalier Poete sailed with the remnant of his force for Pondicherry, where he arrived after a most disastrous passage;—and thus terminated the French efforts in that direction.

Captain Fischer, with his detachment, now marched to Vizagapatam, which he reached on the 16th of January 1760. A few days after, the Europeans, both Infantry and Artillery, were embarked on two English vessels, which they found waiting in the roads, and sailed for Bengal, where they arrived in the end of the month. The two Battalions of Sipahis, under the command of Captain MacLean, continued their route by land, marching via Ganjam and Kuttack, and arrived in Bengal in the month of March 1760.

Thus terminated this brilliant expedition, during which

* Orme, vol. 3, pp. 559-60.

A. D. 1759. the troops obtained all the objects contemplated, diverted the attention and means of the French from the prosecution of the war at Madras, gained one glorious and complete victory in the field, took one of the strongest forts in that part of India, captured upwards of 200 pieces of cannon, acquired a most valuable and extensive tract for the Company, drove the French completely out of the Northern Provinces, and destroyed their influence at the Court of the Nizam,—and all this, in the face of a superior force of regular troops, and in spite of difficulties and obstacles of the most serious nature. Viewed under all the circumstances attending it, and the results obtained, this may be considered one of the most successful and important expeditions ever undertaken by this Army, although the details have been slightly passed over by historians generally.

It is now necessary to return to the state of affairs in Bengal, from the date of the departure of Colonel Forde's expedition in October 1758.

Notwithstanding the paucity of the force left there, it has been shown that Colonel Clive spared no exertions to aid the Madras Presidency, not only in sending on the two Companies of H. M.'s 84th Regiment, which had arrived in the *Warren*, but also a portion of the recruits received during the season for this Presidency.

The following return of the 6th February 1759,* exhibits the effective strength of the European Force in Bengal at this period:—

State of the European Force in Bengal, 6th Feb. 1759.

Doing duty	Captains.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.
Infantry	6	6	9	36	29	20	314†
Artillery	1	8	0	0	5	2	86

* Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 57.

† "Whereof 140 are recruits."

In addition to this force, which was, however, considerably A. D. 1759. increased by arrivals from England during the month, there were two well organized Battalions of Sipahis, and about this time another Corps was raised, which became the 5th Battalion, a number it was not long destined to retain,—as it was annihilated four years subsequently. The command of this Corps was given at, or soon after its formation, to Lieut. George Wilson, whose name it retained during the short period of its existence.*

Some months were passed in organizing and improving the force, and superintending the erection of the works of the new Fort. In the beginning of the year 1759, intelligence was received of the gathering of a fresh storm to the Northward, which threw Meer Jaffier Khán and the Moorshedabad Durbar into a state of extreme alarm, and required all the energy and ability of Colonel Clive to meet and counteract.

[The authority of the Emperor of Hindostan had been rapidly declining since the death of Aurungzebe, the seeds of decay having been sown during the lifetime of that bigotted though able monarch. A continually contested succession, a series of civil wars, the revolt and dismemberment of the more distant provinces, the dreadful invasion of Nadir Sháh, the constant and harassing incursions of Ahmed Sháh Abdálee, and finally the growing power and extended conquests of the Mahrattas, had reduced the Emperor to a mere shadow of his former position, little being left save the name of that once dreaded authority,—which was freely used by whatever power was uppermost, even to its own destruction.] Allum Gheer Saneé, or the Second, now occupied the pageant throne of Delhi, and was a mere tool in the hands of his minister Gházee-oo-deen Khán, generally entitled “Omaid-ool-Moolk,” grandson of the celebrated Nizam-ool-Moolk. The Monarch’s eldest son Allee Gohur, better known as Sháh Allum, by which title he subsequently ascended the throne, impatient of the control in which his father and family were retained by that powerful and unscrupulous Minister, contrived to make his

* The exact date of the raising of this Corps is not to be traced, but it appears to have been formed, either at the end of 1758, or very early in 1759.

A. D. 1759. escape from Delhi, and flying into Rohilkund, raised his standard and began to collect a party, to which many adventurers thronged, allured in a great measure by the reputation of Allee Morad Khán, whom he had appointed his minister.

Several Chiefs were inclined to support his cause, and it was considered advisable as a primary step, to take possession of the provinces of Bengal and Behar, which it was supposed, after the recent revolution, and the insecure position of Meer Jaffier Khán, would prove an easy and profitable conquest. Of those who cast an eye upon this acquisition, the foremost was Mahommud Khoolee Khán, the Nawaub of Allahabad, to which he was greatly instigated by Bulwunt Singh, the Rajah of Benares, and Sunder Singh and Pulhwán Sing, two powerful Zemindars occupying the southern and eastern portions of Behar and the Hilly districts in that direction, together with Kamghar Khán, the Nawaub of ~~Ti-~~
~~poorah~~,—all of whom had their private interests to serve in proposing and assisting in this expedition. Shoojah-oodowlah, the Nawaub of Oude, also encouraged the measure, but took no prominent part in the arrangements, his object being a double one, to avail himself of any advantages to be gained in Behar or Bengal, and to take the occasion of the absence of his kinsman, Mahommud Khoolee Khán, from his Government, to seize upon the Fort of Allahabad, which had long been an object of his desire. With such support, the Shah Zadah moved into the Doab in the beginning of the year and made his preparations for advancing upon Patna.

The rumour of these proceedings reached Moorshedabad in an exaggerated shape, and excited the greatest consternation; fears were entertained of the fidelity of Rajah Ram Narain, and yet even in the midst of these dangers the scheme for his removal was revived. The Nawaub's own troops, who were in arrears, and had been suffering under a series of exactions and injustice, broke out into a state of mutiny and refused to march, unless Colonel Clive would interfere and guarantee them redress and regular payment. The folly of Meer Jaffier Khán and the excesses of his son had emptied the treasury, and the Juggut Seths, probably in expectation of a

call upon their finances, departed upon a pilgrimage to Puras- A. D. 1759.
náth; a report was spread that they were in communication
with the Shah Zadah, upon which Meer Jaffier Khán sent to
stop and bring them back,—but such was the influence of
their wealth, that they proceeded in defiance of the Nawaub's
orders, escorted by his own troops, whose arrears they paid
up, and whose officers were all in their interests. Oppressed
by his fears, Meer Jaffier Khán now applied for assistance to
the Mahrattas, and even meditated buying off the projected
invasion by the payment of a large sum of money, when it
could be raised, to the Shah Zadah and his supporters,—and
finally, in his despair, threw himself upon the English,
against whose power and influence he had so lately been
intriguing, looking to them now as the only quarter from
which any real assistance could be expected.

Colonel Clive, whose insight into the native character and
policy, soon convinced him of the uncertain nature of the Shah
Zadah's support,—composed as it was of such heterogeneous
materials, each influenced by individual and jarring interests,—
saw that the danger would be most easily overcome by boldly
meeting it, and announced his readiness to march at once to
Patna with his whole force, in support of the Nawaub's army.
He pointed out the madness of forcing Ram Narain to join
the opposite party, by the exhibition of any suspicious or
hostile intentions; he expressed his own conviction of that
Governor's good faith, and wrote to him promising to march
speedily to his assistance, encouraging him in the line of
duty and fidelity; he also interfered to bring the Nawaub's
troops into order, obtained payment of their arrears, and
promises of better treatment for the future; above all, he
strongly resisted every idea of buying off the invasion,
pointing out that such a course would not only lead to a
speedy renewal of the same measure, but would hold out a
premium to invasion by any power who could get together a
sufficient body of troops.

Before commencing his march, the Shah Zadah had written
to Colonel Clive, requesting his aid and assistance as an
Omrah of the Empire, not only in the meditated expedition

A. D. 1759.

against Meer Jaffier Khán, but in subsequent and more extended measures for the restoration of the Imperial power, holding out at the same time the most liberal terms and promises both to the Colonel individually and the English nation generally.

To these Colonel Clive replied in a decided but respectful manner, that as an Omrah of the Empire he was bound to exert himself to suppress any rebellion, and that the Prince must be aware that he himself was acting in opposition to the orders of, and in hostility to, his father the Emperor; and that, putting this aside, it was not the custom of the English to prove faithless to those with whom they had entered into terms of alliance, as in the case of the Nawaub of Bengal; he therefore stated frankly, that he would exert himself to the utmost, to oppose the invasion, and requested that no further communications might be made to him. Aware of the fears and jealousies of Meer Jaffier Khán, he immediately laid before him the whole of this correspondence.*

Letters were also received from the unfortunate Emperor, soliciting the assistance of the Nawaub and Colonel Clive against "his misguided and rebellious son;" these were of course, written under the direction of the Minister Omaid-ool-Moolk, who accompanied them by stronger missives in his own name; but whatever might have been the feelings of the Emperor towards his son, his orders were positive and authoritative, and removed all appearance of rebellion on the part of the Nawaub and the English, who in the course they adopted on this occasion, were acting only in obedience to orders, and upholding the (nominal) Imperial authority.†

On Colonel Clive's refusal of assistance, the Prince made overtures to Monsieur Law, who was then at Chatterpore with his detachment, having taken service with the Rajah of Bundelkund.

On the 25th of February 1759, the English troops marched

* First Report of the Select Committee, p. 112.—Malcolm, vol. 1, pp. 401-2.

† Ibid, pp. 412-13.

from Calcutta, and reached Moorshedabad in the beginning of the ensuing month; the force amounted to about 450 Europeans, including Artillery, with 2,500 Sipahis,* composing the 3rd and 4th Battalions, which had lately been considerably augmented, and apparently from the strength, a portion of the 5th Battalion,—the remainder of that Corps being left in Bengal, together with a detail of Artillery, and the sick and least effective recruits of the European Battalion. This small force, supported by the Militia and Volunteers, afforded the only defence of the Presidency during the absence of the main-body;—a bold risk, considering it was a time of war and enemies all round. At Moorshedabad, the Colonel arranged matters for future proceedings with the Nawaub, to whom he spoke freely and seriously regarding the mismanagement and evils of his administration.

A. D. 1759.
March.

Meer Jaffier Khán remained at Moorshedabad, but the greater part of his army marched with Colonel Clive on the 13th of March, under the command of Meerun, who was generally designated by the English as the Chota Nawaub; intelligence had in the mean time been received that the Shah Zadah had crossed the Karramnassa with his whole force, and was advancing upon Patna. Some delay occurred on the road, owing to an attempt on the part of Meerun to obtain possession of the person of Kuddum Hoosein, the Nawaub of Purneah, to whom he had now taken a violent dislike, and whom he was desirous to remove from his Government. He summoned that chief to meet him on the road:—but knowing the treacherous and unscrupulous character he had to deal with, and aware of the feeling that existed against him, Kuddum Hoosein refused to come, except under a guarantee of personal safety from Colonel Clive. Receiving this, he arrived on the opposite side of the Ganges, and a meeting took place in boats in the middle of the river, when Colonel Clive managed to arrange matters satisfactorily, at least for a time. On arrival at

* Clive's letter to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 12th March 1759, quoted by Malcolm, vol. 1, pp. 407-8.

A. D. 1759. Shahabad, a report reached Camp that Rajah Ram Narain had gone over to the enemy, which was so circumstantially detailed and strongly corroborated, as even to stagger the faith of Colonel Clive, who immediately wrote the Rajah, upbraiding him for his conduct, pointing out his folly, and exhorting him to return to his duty; to this a reply was promptly received from Ram Narain, explaining the whole circumstances, exculpating himself, and announcing his intention of holding out at Patna to the last extremity in the expectation of speedy relief.*

The fact was that Ram Narain, though an able man, possessed but little physical courage, and the approach of the Shah Zadah with a force numerically formidable, and which it was generally expected would be joined by Monsieur Law with his party of Frenchmen, greatly alarmed him for his own safety and position,—and not altogether without cause. The city of Patna was not a defensible place, and the works far too extensive for his means; the force at his command was small and not very efficient, and the only troops on whom any dependence could be placed were a few independent Companies of Sipahis, under the command of European Sergeants, maintained for the defence of the English factory; but what was most important, no intelligence had been received of any arrangement or movements for his support, on the part either of the Nawaub or the English. In this dilemma he applied for advice to Mr Amyatt, the chief of the English factory at Patna, stating his individual inability to cope with the Shah Zadah's Army. Mr. Amyatt frankly told him, “that as to himself, if assistance arrived he would remain at Patna, but if not, on the near approach of the enemy, he would retire some days journey towards Bengal, and await the orders of Council or the contingency of events; that as for Ram Narain, he ought to try and amuse the enemy as long as he could, until orders or assistance arrived from the Nawaub; but in the event of being hard pushed, he should act as he found most to his

* Malcolm, vol. 1, p. 409.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 51.

“own advantage.” Proceeding on this advice, Ram Narain A. D. 1759. pitched his camp to the south of the city, in a central situation, so as to be equally ready to join the Nawaub’s force or the Shah Zadah, according to circumstances. He wrote to the Nawaub and Colonel Clive, that he only waited the arrival of reinforcements,—which he urgently solicited,—to give the enemy battle, being unable to cope with them single-handed, and at the same time he sent messengers to the Shah Zadah, expressing his good will and regard to that Prince.*

When it was known that the Shah Zadah had positively crossed the Karamnassa, Mr. Amyatt with the other gentlemen of the factory, embarked on board their boats, and proceeded some 50 or 60 miles down the river; upon which Ram Narain, instigated by his own fears and the councils of most of those about him, determined on visiting the camp of the Prince, where he was received with marked respect, and having proffered his submission and obedience, was invested with a khelut, and confirmed in the Government of Behar. His natural shrewdness and observation, however, soon convinced him that the power of the Shah Zadah had been over-estimated, he quickly detected the hollow fidelity and interested motives of those about the Prince, and saw by how slight a bond they were held together; he also felt convinced that, amongst the hungry claimants for the Royal favours and rewards, his own chance would be a poor one, even were the Prince successful. He accordingly made up his mind as to the course to be pursued, and bent his whole exertions to gain time by every artifice, and to delay the Prince’s march. He remained in the camp for some days with this view, and at last returned to Patna, nominally to prepare for the Prince’s reception, but in reality to arrange for the defence of the place; here he managed to create further delays, even after the Army had encamped in front of the city, his endeavours being fortunately seconded by the occurrence of the festival of the Now Roz, which was observed in the Prince’s camp with all the pomp and display that could be

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 51.

A. D. 1759. mustered. At last, when his duplicity could no longer be
 April. concealed, and he was well assured of the advance of Meerun
 and Colonel Clive, he threw off the mask, openly bid defiance
 to the enemy, and prepared for immediate and active defence.
 Hostilities commenced on the 23d of March, when the enemy
 made a general but rash attack, and were repulsed with con-
 siderable loss ; this induced them to adopt a more cautious
 mode of proceeding, and they commenced the siege of the
 place in form, according to the native custom, keeping up a
 cannonade from several heavy inefficient pieces of artillery,
 and pushing forward galleries with the intent to mine the
 walls. In this they so far succeeded as to undermine one of
 the bastions or towers, called the *Mehdeegunge*, on the 4th of
 April, when a desperate assault was made. The besieged
 defended themselves gallantly, and the factory Companies of
 Sipahis, who had been left to aid the garrison, hastened to
 the breach and particularly distinguished themselves ; the
 enemy however pressed on with great courage and increased
 numbers, but were so warmly received by the steady fire of the
 Sipahis, and so annoyed by powder bags, shells, and boiling
 pitch thrown down upon them, that they were finally compell-
 ed to retreat with heavy loss.* The position of the defenders,
 however, was a very precarious one, they had also suffered
 considerably in the assault, the walls had been breached in
 several places, and had another attack been made, it would in
 all probability have been successful ; but on the 5th of April,
 a reinforcement arrived, consisting of a detachment of
 English Sipahis commanded by Ensign John Matthews,
 a young officer of great intelligence and ability, whom Colo-
 nel Clive, on learning the danger of the city, had sent for-
 ward by forced marches to its relief.†

The Army of the Shah Zadah now raised the siege, and com-
 menced their retreat : on the first march, they were joined by
 Monsieur Law with his force, who had hastened from Chatter-
 pore on receiving the Prince's invitation ; he urged them to
 return, and engaged to carry the place in an hour, if support-

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 76.

† Malcolm, vol. 1, p. 410.

ed ; but Mahommed Khoolee Khán had just received intelligence that Shoojah-oo-Dowlah had obtained possession of his Fort of Allahabad, and was in consequence bent on an immediate return. The whole force broke up and dispersed in different directions ; Kamghar Khán and Pulhwán Singh returned to their own districts ; Sunder Singh had been assassinated at the commencement of the campaign by one of his own officers : Mahommed Khoolee Khán hastened towards Allahabad, but was attacked on the way and made prisoner by Bulwunt Singh, under the orders of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, by whom he was ultimately put to death. The unfortunate Prince, accompanied by Monsieur Law, remained in the neighbourhood for a few days, and after writing a most humble letter to Colonel Clive, announcing his utter destitution, and praying for some pecuniary assistance to enable him to effect his retreat, received a present of five hundred gold mohurs, and took his departure with the French party for Chatterpore, where he sought refuge with the Rajah of Bundelkund. Colonel Clive with his whole force, accompanied by the Nawaub's army under Meerun, reached Patna on the 8th, and immediately set to work to repair the defences of the city, and bring matters once more into order. In a few days, after the necessary arrangements had been made, he marched with the English force and a portion of the Nawaub's army, including the whole of the Cavalry, to the banks of the Karamnassa, to clear that part of the country from detached parties of the enemy, which were still wandering about, subsisting by plunder. Having reduced these districts to order, he moved towards the Southern hill districts, where Pulhwán Singh and some other Zemindars were still in arms, and having brought them into a state of subjection, partly by intimidation, and partly by negociation, he returned to Patna in the end of April. Here he received letters from the Emperor of Delhi and his minister, thanking him for the part he had taken in suppressing the rebellion of the Shah Zadah.*

A. D. 1759.
May.

* Malcolm, vol. 1, pp. 420-1.

A. D. 1759.
June.

Meer Jaffier Khán, on receiving intelligence that Ram Narain had gone over to the Prince, had marched with all the remaining troops at his disposal, to reinforce his son and the Colonel, and had actually proceeded as far as Rajmahal, when he heard of the safety of Patna and the dissolution of the Prince's Army. His gratitude to Colonel Clive for his conduct on this occasion was unbounded, and for the time probably sincere; in the first impulse of this feeling, he conferred upon him, as a personal Jagheer, the Zemindaree of the whole of the districts south of Calcutta, then rented by the Company, which grant, generally known as "Clive's Jagheer," was long a subject of contention and legal proceedings between that officer and the East India Company.

In the month of June, Colonel Clive returned to Calcutta with the English force, accompanied by Meer Jaffier Khán and his son,—having left a detachment at Patna consisting of a Company of European Infantry, a detail of Artillery with two Field-pieces, and 5 Companies of regular Sipahis taken apparently from the several Battalions, which, with the 3 local Companies of the factory, formed a tolerably strong temporary Battalion, the whole under the command of Captain Cochrane of the European Battalion with two or three subalterns.*

It has been stated that in his first alarm, Meer Jaffier Khán made application to the Mahrattahs for assistance, upon which invitation, a party of that nation were already advancing in the direction of Kuttack. Finding that their services were no longer required, they seemed inclined to turn their visit into one of hostility, and commenced plundering the Midnapore district; but the appearance of a considerable body of the Nawaub's troops, supported by a detachment of the English force, soon induced them to withdraw.

Within a few months after Colonel Clive's return to Calcutta, a new danger, and one of a most serious nature, threatened the Company's establishment in Bengal. The immense advantages obtained by the English, both politically

* First Report, p. 30.—Asiatic Annual Register, vol. 2, pp. 8-10.

and commercially, had not been regarded by the Dutch without jealousy and dissatisfaction, and when previous to the late occurrences, they had observed the growing coldness and hostility of Meer Jaffier Khán towards his allies, they had not failed to take advantage of a circumstance that afforded an opportunity of stepping forward and putting in a claim to some share of power and influence in the province. Their measures were secretly and skilfully arranged, and the opportunity for action was patiently waited for. It is difficult to say to what extent Meer Jaffier Khán was actually implicated in these plans and intrigues, but this much is certain, that he gave countenance and promises of support to their proposition for the introduction of a powerful force into the province, which if he did not intend to employ actively and immediately against the English, he certainly looked upon as likely to prove an useful check and counterpoise to the obnoxious influence of his too powerful and exacting allies. The valuable aid he had received from the latter during the late invasion, and the good faith and generosity they had then exhibited, most probably induced him to regret the steps he had previously adopted, but it was now too late to remedy them, and as events progressed and his feelings of gratitude became blunted, he seemed inclined to let matters take their course without further interference, and to avail himself of circumstances as they might occur.*

A. D. 1759.
August.

The Dutch had on more than one occasion complained of the advantages of trade and the monopoly of the saltpetre enjoyed by the English, and also the right exercised by the latter in searching vessels proceeding up the river, and allowing no pilots but those of their own service to be employed. The two former complaints were easily answered, and the authority exercised in the river was declared to be a measure rendered necessary for the security of the province, and one which was sanctioned by the Nawaub and exerted only in his name.†

* Clive's "Narrative of the disputes with the Dutch in Bengal," quoted by Malcolm, vol. 2, pp. 74-75.

† Malcolm, vol. 2, pp. 71-2.

A. D. 1759. In the month of August, rumours reached Calcutta that the Dutch Government at Batavia was preparing a powerful armament, which was understood to be destined for Bengal. The report, however, neither Colonel Clive nor the members of Council were inclined to credit, as they had invariably treated the Dutch with great consideration, especially in interfering in their favour at the commencement of Meer Jaffier Khán's reign, who was then greatly offended with them, and moreover, there was no immediate probability of hostilities between Holland and England to justify any act of, or preparation for, hostility on either side in India.

In the month of August 1759, the rumours on this subject received some degree of support by the arrival of a Dutch vessel in the river, having on board a number of European and Malay troops.* Colonel Clive now informed the Nawaub of the rumours current, and of the arrival of the vessel in question. Meer Jaffier Khán was much embarrassed at this intelligence, but at the request of Colonel Clive he sent a perwánnah to the Dutch Government, forbidding any attempt at hostilities, or the introduction of any additional troops, and ordering them to co-operate with his own forces and those of the English, to oppose the introduction or landing of any foreign troops whatever; the Nawaub also directed Omar Beg Khán, the Foujdar of Hooghly, to join and aid the English, and made a formal call upon the latter, by virtue of existing treaties, to render assistance in preventing any foreign troops or ships from coming up the river. The Dutch Governor and Council at Chinsurah replied to the Nawaub's perwánnah in the most respectful style, promising implicit obedience to his orders, and stating that the vessel then in the river had put in by accident, having been driven by stress of weather from Negapatam, which was her destined port, and that as soon as water and provisions had been supplied, she should depart with all the troops then on board. Notwithstanding these assurances, it was deemed advisable to post parties at Tannah's Fort and Charnock's Battery, opposite to each other on either side of the river, to stop and search all boats and

* Clive's Narrative, p. 75.

vessels passing upwards ; and detachments were sent out to watch the roads on both sides, and prevent the advance of any troops by land. The Dutch Master Attendant, Mynheer Lucas Sydland, refused to allow his boat to be searched when passing up, and struck the officer on duty at Charnock's Battery, for which he was put into the guard, and on searching his *Budgerow*, 18 Malay soldiers were found concealed on board ; these were sent back to their ship, and Mynheer Sydland was then released ; formal remonstrances were now received from the Dutch, to which equally formal replies and arguments were returned. At length the vessel departed, and matters returned to their usual state of quiet.*

In the beginning of the month of October following, Meer Jaffier Khán came to Calcutta on a visit to Colonel Clive, during which period, the intentions of the Dutch were put beyond a doubt, by the arrival of seven vessels at the mouth of the river, full of troops, both Europeans and Malays. This circumstance greatly disconcerted the Nawaub, who felt conscious how deeply he was implicated in the matter ; he, however, affected to treat it lightly, and announced his intention of proceeding to Hooghly, bringing the Dutch to reason, and compelling them to send away these ships and troops, or else severely chastising them and driving them altogether out of the province. On the 19th of the month, he left Calcutta, but instead of proceeding to Hooghly, he took up his quarters in Kojah Wuzeed's garden, half way between that place and Chinsurah, which clearly proved that he had no apprehensions as regarded himself : here he received the Dutch agents most graciously, and had several conferences with them, after which he wrote to Colonel Clive that he had granted them certain indulgences as regarded their trade, and they had agreed to send away the ships and troops as soon as the season would permit. As the season was then favorable for their departure, it was evident that no such measure was contemplated ; instead of which, intelligence was received that the vessels were moving up the river, that they had permission to land the troops, and that

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October.

A. D. 1759.
October.

the Dutch agents were busily employed in enlisting Sipahis at Chinsurah, Kossimbazar and Patna. The force on board the Dutch vessels was alone superior to that of the English, and consisted of 700 European Infantry and 800 Malays, regular soldiers, well trained and equipped ;* in addition to which the Dutch had a garrison at Chinsurah consisting of about 150 Europeans, including Artillery, and a considerable body of Sipahis. The whole effective English force available, amounted only to 250 European Infantry, a Company of Artillery about 80 strong, with Lascars attached, and about 1,200 Sipahis ; one Company of European Infantry and 500 Sipahis were at Patna ; another detail of the Battalion, and a considerable body of Sipahis were stationed at Midnapore, to protect that province from any incursion of the Mahrattas, and considerable Detachments of Sipahis were stationed at Chittagong, Dacca, Moorshedabad and Burdwan. Orders were issued calling in all the available men from these posts, but little advantage could be expected from this measure, as it was evident affairs must come to a crisis before any of them could arrive. The Militia of Calcutta, consisting of the European, Armenian, and Portuguese inhabitants, were called out for the defence of the fort and town, amounting to about 300, of whom nearly 250 were Europeans, the whole under the command of Mr. Holwell ; and a body of volunteers was formed from amongst the respectable class of English, of whom between 20 and 30 formed a troop of Horse, and about as many more an independant Company of Foot, who were available for any service.† The only vessels in the River were three Indiamen, the *Duke of Dorset* of 544 tons, Captain Forrester ; the *Calcutta* of 761 tons, Captain Wilson ; and the *Hardwicke* of 573 tons, Captain Sampson, with the *Leopard*, a small snow, Captain Barclay. The latter vessel was immediately sent off with an express to Admiral Cornish, then cruising on the Arrakan coast, requesting immediate assistance. The

* Clive's Narrative, pp. 77, 86 and 87.—First Report for the Select Committee, p. 27.

† Clive's Narrative, pp. 83-4.

emergency was a trying one, and required all the nerve and tact which Colonel Clive so eminently possessed:—to allow the Dutch troops to land and form a junction with the garrison at Chinsurah, was to admit the establishment of a rival and superior force in the province, which, coupled with the conduct of the Nawaub, was to submit to the certain ruin of the English influence and power in Bengal:—to prevent this, which could only be done by force, was to commence hostilities with a Nation, with which the mother country was at peace: true, the Nawaub had neither recalled the troops he had sent to Calcutta under Omar Beg Khán, nor countermanded his orders to prevent the landing of the Dutch troops. Fortunately Clive was not a man to be easily appalled by difficulties; he saw the Company's interests in imminent danger, and resolved to defend them at all hazards. Independent of the moral courage displayed in taking upon himself this serious responsibility, it required some degree of physical courage to risk a struggle with a force in every way so superior.*

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November.

It was, however, the only safe course, and he boldly adopted it: he ordered up the three Indiamen to aid in the protection of the town, and reinforced the parties at Tannah Fort and Charnock's Battery with the best of the troops, regulars and volunteers. The arrival of Colonel Forde and Captain Knox from Masulipatam was an opportune circumstance; to the former he committed the command of the whole available force, which that officer, though at the time in bad health, and having just cause of complaint against the Company—who had unceremoniously dismissed him from their employ,—readily accepted under the circumstances. To Captain Knox was intrusted the command of the parties at Tannah Fort and Charnock's Battery.†

* It is also greatly to the credit of Colonel Clive, that his decision was completely opposed to his personal interest,—for at the time, a large portion of his wealth was invested in Dutch securities, and the payment of some Bills drawn by the Dutch Local Government, in his favor, were actually under contest, by the Dutch East India Company.

† Clive's Narrative, pp. 83 4.

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The Dutch, considering that the time for action had now arrived, laid aside all disguise, and forwarded an insolent remonstrance to Calcutta, recapitulating the list of all alleged grievances, insisting upon an equality in all respects, and threatening immediate and full revenge, if the English persisted in searching their boats or vessels, or offered any molestation to their ships or troops now coming up the river. To this Colonel Clive replied, that there was no desire to injure the Dutch trade or privileges, or to insult their colours, but as to allowing their vessels or troops to pass, this was impossible under existing treaties with the Nawaub, by whose orders and those of his master the Emperor, the English were acting. He therefore referred them to those Authorities, and offered his services as a mediator on the occasion. This coolness and audacity only enraged the Dutch; but in assuming it Clive was not without anxiety, he clearly saw the dangers and difficulties of his position, and as he himself has recorded, "most anxiously wished the next hour would bring news of a declaration of war with Holland." Fortunately, the Dutch themselves relieved him from one of his greatest sources of anxiety, by first commencing hostilities; they attacked and seized seven small trading vessels laden with grain, under English colours, transferring the cargoes and stores to their own ships, and making the crews prisoners;* as they advanced, they landed at Fulta and Raepore, attacked the English factories, burned the houses and destroyed the effects of the Company which they found there, and tore down the English colours, and finally, they fired upon and captured the *Leopard* snow, carrying the express to Admiral Cornish. From this conduct, Clive inferred that they must have received information which had not yet reached the English, of war having been declared between Great Britain and Holland, which recent intelligence had rendered not an improbable event; and his mind being now at ease, he prepared for active hostilities. On the 20th of November,

Colonel Forde seized the Dutch factory at Barnagore, and then crossed the Hooghly with the force under his command, accompanied by 4 field-pieces, and marched towards Chandernagore, with the intention of keeping a check upon the garrison at Chinsurah, and also to be ready to intercept the Dutch troops, in the event of their disembarking and endeavouring to gain that place by land.*

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24th Nov.

In the mean time, the Dutch vessels continued gradually advancing, which they were obliged to do with great caution, having no pilots; on the 21st, they anchored off Sunkeral reach, just out of cannon shot from the English Batteries; on the 23rd, they landed their troops on the Western bank, and the vessels dropped down to Melancholy point, below which the three English ships were at anchor. These vessels had been steadily following the enemy, and had been ordered to come up and anchor off the Batteries; but the Dutch Commodore, Mynheer J. James Zuydland, sent to Captain Wilson, who, being the senior officer, acted as Commodore to the English fleet, threatening to fire upon him if he attempted to pass, which the latter, having no orders to engage, did not attempt. On learning this state of affairs, Colonel Clive wrote to Commodore Wilson, directing him to send a protest to the Dutch Commodore, demanding immediate restitution for the English property, a full apology for the insults to the English flag, and immediate withdrawal from the river; if these terms were not complied with, which was not to be expected, he was directed to engage their fleet at all risks. This order was responded to with true English spirit; on the 24th, the demand was made and at once refused, upon which the three English ships weighed anchor, and notwithstanding the enemy's superiority,—who had seven ships† to three, and four of these heavy vessels, mounting each 36 guns,—boldly came along side and attacked them; a desperate action ensued which lasted for two hours: Captain For-

* Clive's Narrative, p. 84.—Grose, vol. 2, p. 370.

† The following is the list of the Dutch fleet:—the *Vlissingen*, *Bleiswyk*, *Weggelegen*, and the *Princess of Orange* of 36 guns each; the *Elizabeth Dorothea* and *Waereld* of 26 guns each, and the *Mossel* of 16 guns.—Grose, vol. 2, p. 374.

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21th Nov.

rester in the *Duke of Dorset* commenced the action, and took up his position along side the Dutch Commodore, and owing to a failure in the wind, was for some time unsupported by the other two vessels, but at last, after two hours' close fighting, compelled him to strike. In the mean time, the *Calcutta* and *Hardwicke* having at length got along side of the enemy, commenced so hot a fire, that in a short time two of the smaller vessels cut their cables and ran, and one was driven on shore. After the Dutch Commodore had struck, all the other vessels followed his example, with the exception of that of the second in command, who fought his way gallantly and got clear off, dropping down to Culpee, the English ships being too much crippled to follow; here, however, he was captured by the *Oxford* and *Royal George*, which had just arrived in the river, and having been met by orders from Calcutta, were making their way up as fast as possible. The loss of the enemy in this brilliant affair was considerable, amounting to upwards of 100 men; on board the Dutch Commodore's Ship, the *Vlissingen*, upwards of 30 men were killed and double that number wounded; the *Duke of Dorset* was riddled through and through, 90 shot were in her hull, her rigging cut to pieces, but not one man was killed, though several were wounded.* On the same day, Colonel Forde had an engagement with the garrison of Chinsurah; he had marched in the morning from the French Gardens, intending to encamp between Chandernagore and Chinsurah; in passing through the former place, he was suddenly attacked by the enemy, who had marched from Chinsurah the previous evening with 120 Europeans and 300 Sipahis, and taken up a position amongst the buildings and ruins of Chandernagore, supported by four field-pieces. The English, however, soon dislodged them from their position, took their four guns, and pursued them with considerable slaughter to Chinsurah; in the afternoon, Captain Knox joined, who, on the

* Clive's Narrative, pp. 85-6.—Grose, vol. 2, pp. 374-5.—The English had adopted the expedient of lining their quarters with bags of saltpetre, to screen the men from the enemy's fire, which expedient appears to have answered well, though it was a dangerous one, considering the chances of fire.

landing of the Dutch troops, had been directed by Colonel Clive to hasten with the detachments under his command to the support of Colonel Forde. In the evening the latter officer received intelligence, that the Dutch force was advancing ; being well acquainted with the ground, he considered it advisable to attack them on the plain of Bedarrah, where, from the constitution of the two forces, he would have the advantage of position. He accordingly wrote off to Colonel Clive, stating his views, and as the attack of an European force so superior in number, belonging to a nation against whom war had not been declared as far as was known, was a matter of great responsibility, he requested an official order. Colonel Clive received this letter at night whilst playing cards ; without quitting the table, he wrote on the back of the note in pencil, " Dear Forde, fight them immediately. I will send you the order of Council to-morrow."* Colonel Forde received this reply early in the morning of the 25th, and immediately marched to take up the position he had in view ; this was an excellent one, and well calculated to develope the full advantage of his Artillery and Cavalry ; it commanded the direct road to Chinsurah, the flanks were protected on one side by a village, on the other by a mangoe tope, both of which were occupied, and along the whole line ran a small but deep nullah ; whilst the enemy advancing in the plain in front, were of necessity exposed to the fire of the English Artillery and open to attack from their Cavalry. A small detachment was left to watch the garrison of Chinsurah : the remainder of the force consisted of 240 European Infantry, with 50 European Volunteers, horse and foot, 80 Artillery with 4 field-pieces, and about 800 Sipahis, composed of Head Quarters of the 3rd and 4th Battalions, several Companies of each being detached, together with 150 of the Nawaub's Cavalry.† At 10 o'clock the enemy appeared in sight, and boldly advanced to the attack ; they were commanded by Colonel Roussel, a French soldier of fortune ; their force consisted of 700 Europeans

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25th Nov.

* Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 97.

† Clive's Narrative, p. 87.

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25th Nov.

and 800 Malays, with a considerable number of Sipahis recently levied, who had been sent to join them. The action was short, bloody, and decisive; in half an hour the enemy were completely defeated and put to flight, leaving 120 Europeans, and 200 Malays dead on the field, 150 Europeans and as many Malays wounded, whilst Colonel Roussel and 14 other officers, 350 Europeans, and 200 Malays were made prisoners.* The troop of Horse and the Nawaub's Cavalry,—which latter did nothing during the action,—were very useful in pursuing the fugitives afterward, which they did with such effect, that only 14 of the enemy finally escaped and reached Chinsurah.† The loss of the English on this occasion was comparatively trifling. The advantage of a skilfully chosen position, the effect of a well directed and well served Artillery, and finally the aid of Cavalry, all tended to render this victory so decisive and complete, in despite of the disparity of numbers. Colonel Forde proceeded immediately after the action to Chinsurah, which he invested at once, and sent to Colonel Clive for further orders.‡

Such was the brilliant victory of Bedarrah, marked by an extraordinary degree of skill and courage, and most important in its results,—and yet the name of the action is scarcely ever mentioned, and in no way commemorated. The Corps now in the service which can lay claim to the honour of having been engaged in this glorious affair, are the Bengal Artillery, the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers, and the 5th Regiment of Native Infantry.§

* Clive's Narrative, p. 87. † First Report of the Select Committee, p. 28.

‡ For the Dutch account of this action, vide Appendix L.

§ Williams states that the present 1st Regiment N. I. and the *Mathews ka Pullun* were engaged in this action. The former corps, it has been shown, was at the time in the Northern Circars, and the latter was not raised until two years after. The part borne by Captain Knox in the action, probably led to the mistake as regards the 1st Battalion, which he had commanded; and there is reason to believe that Lieutenant Mathews was at this period attached to, and possibly commanded the then 4th Battalion, (*the present 5th Regiment*), and that from this circumstance the early services of that Regiment have been confounded with those of the Battalion that Captain Mathews subsequently raised, and which long bore his name.

The Dutch, overwhelmed by these sudden and unexpected disasters, were now as abject in their submission as they had been insolent in their supposed superiority. They applied immediately to Colonel Forde and to the Council in Calcutta, requesting a cessation of hostilities, and expressing their readiness to enter into any terms; Clive whose conduct was always generous on such occasions, considering that they had been sufficiently chastised and humbled, readily acceded to their request; all active measures were put an end to, deputies were appointed on both sides and a treaty was speedily arranged,—the Dutch being willing to place themselves in the wrong, with a view of obtaining milder terms, and the English, under the circumstances, not being disposed to push matters to any extremity. Three days after the battle of Bedarra, the Nawaub's son, Meerun, arrived from Moorshedabad with a force of about six thousand Horse, and with reference to the turn affairs had taken, breathed nothing but destruction and extermination to the Dutch; aware of his ferocity and treachery, the Council at Chinsurah were thrown into a state of great alarm at his arrival and threats. Colonel Clive, at their request, immediately proceeded to Chinsurah, and his interference speedily brought matters to a satisfactory settlement. By the terms of the treaty between the Dutch and the English, the former disavowed the conduct of their fleet, acknowledged themselves the aggressors, and agreed to pay 10 lakhs of rupees as an indemnification for the injuries done to the Company and the expenses of the war; whilst the English on their part, upon the fulfilment of these terms, agreed to restore the ships, stores and prisoners they had captured, with exception to such of the latter as desired to enter their service. The treaty between the Dutch and the Nawaub was to the effect that the former should immediately, on the restoration of their ships and prisoners by the English, send away the vessels with the European and Malay troops, that they should discharge the Sipahis they had raised, that they should never carry on hostilities, or enlist, or introduce troops, or erect fortifications in the province; that they should be permitted

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to keep up 125 European soldiers for the protection of their factories at Chinsurah, Kossimbazar, Patna, and Balasore, and that they should be allowed to carry on their commerce on its former footing. These terms were ratified by the several parties on the 5th, 6th, and 8th of December 1759.*

Thus fortunately ended an affair, which at one time threatened the most serious consequences to the interests of the English, and which, but for the energy and decision of Colonel Clive, the skill of Colonel Forde, and the gallantry of the troops and crews of the Company's vessels, must have resulted in the utter destruction of the English power in Bengal. On this point Colonel Clive observed in his narrative, "had the Dutch gained the same advantage over us, we have now the most convincing proofs to conclude that the remembrance of Amboyna would have been lost in their treatment of this Colony." † The whole affair underwent a searching investigation in Europe, special Commissioners being nominated by the two nations : but the Dutch local authorities had not only been the aggressors, but had so fully and publicly acknowledged the fact, and the conduct of Colonel Clive, although so determined, had been at the same time so prudent and cautious, that it was in no way to be impugned, and he received unqualified thanks and commendation for the course he had adopted.

Colonel Clive had now fully determined upon returning to Europe : his health for some time past had been seriously impaired, and his constitution required a change, as did his mind a relaxation from the cares and anxieties by which he had for so long a period been overwhelmed.

When he found that the Court of Directors would not sanction the appointment of Colonel Forde to the command of the force in the Bengal Presidency, he immediately looked about him for some officer qualified to take his place, and ascertaining that Colonel Eyre Coote, who had just returned to India, with increased rank, in command of H. M.'s 84th Regiment,

could not conveniently be spared from the Coast, his choice fell upon Major Caillaud of the Madras service, an officer of high character, considerable ability, and great experience, who had earned a reputation by a long course of active service on the Coast. With the consent of the Council, he offered him the appointment, subject to the confirmation of the Madras Government, to whom he wrote upon the subject; and as the power and influence of the French was rapidly on the decline, and considerable reinforcements had been received from England, consisting of H. M.'s 79th and 84th Regiments, besides a large body of recruits, all of which had been retained at Madras, although originally destined for the two Presidencies, he requested that such portion of the force as could be spared should be transferred to Bengal: accordingly 200 men, consisting chiefly of foreigners and recruits, were ordered round to Calcutta in the end of October, and arrived under the command of Major Caillaud on the 27th of November, two days after the battle of Bedarrah.* Several officers accompanied this detachment, and the whole were at once transferred to the Bengal establishment. Amongst these officers, the only names that can now be traced are those of Captains Thomas Fenwick and James Spier, who from their standing, became the two senior Captains of the Bengal Army. This reinforcement, and the arrival in the following month of the European detachment from the Northern Circars under Captain Fischer, served to place the force in Bengal on a much more respectable footing; in addition to which, a considerable number of the prisoners taken at Bedarrah, a large proportion of whom were Germans, entered the Company's service, and some recruits were received during the season. Arrangements were also made for increasing the Native force by completing the Battalions to 1,000 men each, not only as regarded the three actually in the Province, but also by enlisting for the 1st and 2d Battalions, then on their

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November.

* First Report from the Select Committee, p. 29.

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December.

way back to Bengal, under the command of Captain MacLean, and we find by the official records, that in the course of the following year (1760) the European force, consisting of one Battalion of Infantry and two Companies of Artillery, amounted to upwards of 1,000 men, and the Native force, of five Battalions, to 5,000 men. The paucity of European officers had hitherto rendered it very difficult to provide for the Native Battalions, but the establishment being now increased, the latter were about this time put upon a more efficient footing, each Battalion being allowed one Captain as Commandant, one Lieutenant and one Ensign as Staff, and four European Serjeants.*—Such was the state of the force.

As regarded the probability of future hostilities, the power of the only two European nations that were likely to enter the field had been broken by recent events; the fidelity of the Nawaub of Moorshedabad was now more to be relied upon than heretofore, as he had no longer any other aid to look to, and was more than ever dependent on the English Government; the Sháh Zadah, it was true, was again in the field threatening the Northern Provinces, but the recent expedition of Colonel Clive had destroyed the prestige at first attached to his name, and had exhibited how little was to be feared from that quarter. At Madras, the French influence was rapidly declining, and on the Bombay side the affairs of the Company were prosperous. Under these circumstances, Colonel Clive now considered himself justified in putting into effect his long contemplated measure of resigning the Government, and made his final arrangements accordingly.]

A knowledge of the characters and prejudices of his colleagues in Council induced him to send for Mr. Vansittart from Madras, who was senior to them all, whom he nominated his successor as Governor of Bengal, a proceeding

* Even this small complement of officers was considered extravagant by Major Carnac, who saw no necessity for giving the command to a Captain, when Subalterns were available. Vide 8th Report of the Committee of Secrecy, p. 122.

which, however, it may have been justified by circumstances, gave great offence to those who considered themselves superseded and aggrieved by it. It is, however, but justice to some amongst his colleagues, to state that they, like himself, had announced their intention of returning to Europe, of whom was Mr. Holwell, the senior member; whilst of others, Colonel Clive entertained and has recorded, the highest opinion of their intelligence and abilities, particularly in the case of Messrs. Watts and Hastings, but he considered them far too young in the service to occupy so important a position as that of the Government of the Presidency.

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January.

These points being all arranged, Colonel Clive considered it necessary that measures should be taken for opposing the advance of the Sháh Zadab, who had again been joined by most of his old supporters, more especially by Kamghar Khán, who now took the leading part in the expedition: for this purpose he ordered Major Caillaud to march from Calcutta in the middle of December, with a force consisting of 300 European Infantry, and 50 Artillery with 6 field-pieces, as also a complete Battalion of Sipahis, 1,000 strong.* With this detachment Major Caillaud reached Moorshedabad on the 26th December, where he was ordered to halt until the arrival of Colonel Clive, who came on the 6th of January, 1760, and introduced the Major to Meer Jaffier Khán, as the Commandant of the English forces, and an officer in whom he placed implicit confidence, which he trusted the Nawaub would do likewise. Here he directed the Battalion of Sipahis then stationed at Moorshebadad, to join Major Caillaud, and subsequently ordered 200 more Europeans from Calcutta to follow and join the force.† / The two Native Battalions employed on this expedition, appear to have been the 3d (*no longer in existence*) and the 4th (*now the 5th Regiment N. I.*) A large portion of the Nawaub's army, under the

* First Report from the Select Committee, p. 29.

† Colonel Clive's letter to Major Caillaud, dated 20th January, 1760.—Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 136. This reinforcement of Europeans did not join the force, being subsequently required to aid the Nawaub and to watch the enemy in the neighbourhood of Burdwan.

A. D. 1760.
February.

command of Meerun, was ordered to join the Major and march with him to Patna, but considerable difficulty occurred in raising money and putting the force in a condition to move : on this occasion Colonel Clive's assistance and advice was required, and at last the Army, consisting of 15,000 Horse and Foot, with 25 pieces of Artillery, was ready to advance, which they did on the 18th of January, Colonel Clive having himself taken his farewell of Meer Jaffier Khán and returned to Calcutta on the 14th.*

Here he completed his arrangements, and having resigned the Government to Mr. Holwell, pending the arrival of Mr. Vansittart, he took his departure from India on the 25th of February, 1760. [In the course of three years he had raised the Bengal Presidency from a state of apparent ruin to one of extreme prosperity; on his arrival he found a band of miserable fugitives living on board their vessels at Fulta, without a foot of land that they could call their own :—he left them with extensive territory and complete controul over the whole province, their losses repaired, their trade renewed, their treasury replenished, their factories established all over the country, and protected by a well organized and respectable force, whilst the character of the English arms had been upheld by a series of brilliant actions, performed under extraordinary difficulties and disadvantages, in the face of enemies greatly superior in numbers, not only as regarded natives of the country, but the European troops of the French and Dutch.]

[Clive's departure was considered a serious evil by all parties. In the words of a cotemporary observer, quoted by Sir John Malcolm, "*It appeared as if the soul was departing from the body of the Government of Bengal.*"]

* First Report from the Select Committee, p. 30.

CHAPTER IV.*

FROM THE DEPARTURE OF COLONEL CLIVE IN 1760, TO THE RESTORATION OF MEER JAFFIER KHAN AND THE CLOSE OF MAJOR ADAM'S CAMPAIGN IN 1763.

WE now turn to the movements of Major Caillaud and his party in progress to Patna. As already stated he marched from Moorshedabad on the 18th January, 1760, with a force of 300 European Infantry, the whole or greater part of the first Company of Artillery with 6 field-pieces, and the 3rd and 4th Battalions of Native Infantry. A. D. 1760.
January.

The Nawaub's force under the command of Meerun accompanied him, consisting of 15,000 Infantry and Cavalry and 25 guns. Although, through the interference of Colonel Clive, the Nawaub's troops had been induced to march, there was still much discontent amongst them, promises of payment and advances made at Moorshedabad being still unfulfilled. On the 30th of January, the united force reached the pass of Sikreegullee, where they were detained for upwards of a week in negotiations with Kuddum Hoosein, the Nawaub of Purneah. The jealousies between this chief and Meerun, which had in a similar manner caused a delay when

* The works that have chiefly furnished materials for this chapter are:—

The Seir Mutakherin, Calcutta edition, vol. 2.

Carracioli's Life of Lord Clive, 4 vols., 8vo.

Malcolm's Life of Lord Clive, vol. 2.

Vansittart's Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal, 3 vols., 8vo.

Original Papers relative to the affairs in Bengal, 2 vols., 8vo.

Colonel Ironside's Narrative of the Military Transactions in Bengal in 1760-61. Asiatic Register.

Grose's Voyage to the East Indies, vol. 2.

Franklin's Life of Shah Allum, 1 vol., 4to.

Holwell's Indian Tracts, 1 vol., 8vo.

Williams' Bengal Native Infantry, 1 vol., 8vo.

First, Second and Third Reports of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1772.

Reports of the Committee of Secrecy appointed by the House of Commons, 1773.

Annual Register, various years.

Hansard's Parliamentary History, various years.

General Military Register of the Bengal Establishment, 1 vol., folio, Calcutta, 1795.

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February.

Colonel Clive was advancing to Patna during the previous year, had now increased to such an extent as to render a rupture apparently inevitable. Meer Jaffier Khán and his son had threatened the removal of Kuddum Hoosein from his Government, a resolve that the vindictive nature of Meerun was not likely to abandon when his personal animosity was concerned, and Kuddum Hoosein, under these circumstances, had for his own protection withheld all payment of the revenues for some time past, and had levied a force of about 6,000 men, with which he now appeared on the opposite side of the river, threatening in his turn to declare for the Sháh Zadah, unless he received a confirmation of his authority, and a promise that all intention of removing him should be abandoned; at the same time that he professed his willingness to remain faithful to Meer Jaffier Khán if unmolested, and to render an account of his revenues as heretofore.

Major Caillaud, though greatly annoyed at this delay, was sensible of the danger of leaving so powerful an enemy in his rear, and used his utmost influence to adjust these differences; he finally succeeded in bringing about an agreement, by which Kuddum Hoosein was guaranteed the continued possession of his Government, and in return engaged on his part to pay up all arrears of revenue, to discharge his accounts regularly for the future, and to remain faithful to the cause of Meer Jaffier Khán. This arrangement being completed, Kuddum Hoosein returned to Purneah, and on the 7th of February the united forces of the English and the Nawaub re-commenced their march towards Patna.*

It is necessary that the state of affairs in that quarter should now be adverted to. When the Sháh Zadah originally meditated this second invasion of Behar, it was the last desperate resource of a broken adventurer; but whilst he was preparing for this apparently hopeless attempt, with a handful of followers whose fortunes were as desperate as his own,

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 8.

an event occurred which made an important change in his circumstances and position. Allum Gheer Sanee, the reigning Monarch, if such a term be applicable to so miserable a shadow of royalty, after having been for years the prisoner and the puppet of Omaid-ool-Moolk, at last fell a victim to the passions of that ambitious minister, who caused him to be put to death in the end of the year 1759, and proclaimed a younger son, under the title of Sháh Jehán Sanee, as Emperor. The news of this event reached the Sháh Zadah just as he had crossed the Karramnassa, when, by the advice of those around him, he immediately assumed the emblems of royalty, and caused himself to be proclaimed Emperor under the title of Sháh Allum ; he wrote to all the Rulers of the several provinces of the Empire, Meer Jaffier Khán included, calling upon them to acknowledge his title, and sent a khelut with a complimentary letter to Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, offering him the appointment of Vuzier to the Empire,—an honorary, rather than an executive office, under existing circumstances,—which was readily accepted by the Nawaub of Oude, who, without delay, assumed the title conferred, and caused coin to be struck in the name of the new Monarch. To Nujeeb-oo-Dowlah, the powerful Rohilla Chieftain, the Prince also sent a khelut, and conferred on him the title of Ameer-ool-Omrah, and on various other Chieftains, who had heretofore espoused his cause, or were likely to assist his future views, he, in like manner, conferred titles and offices according to their several ranks and merits. He also wrote a supplicatory letter to Ahmed Sháh Abdálee, who was once more advancing into Hindostan to oppose the Mahrattas, requesting his assistance and support, and begging that his title might be acknowledged. As Emperor by hereditary right, with the probability of the Abdálee Monarch's support, and the public acknowledgment of the powerful Nawaub of Oude, his position was very different from that of the desperate adventurer acting in opposition to the orders of his father and Sovereign ; the consequence was that numbers now flocked to his standard, foremost amongst whom was his old supporter Kamghar Khán, Nawaub of Tirhoot, who joined him with between five and six thousand horse ;

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A. D. 1760. February. with him came two able and experienced officers, Dileer Khán and Assálut Khán, sons of Ameer Khán who had been a distinguished officer under Ali Verdee Khán, and who, with his two sons, had been amongst the principal supporters of Meer Jaffier Khán on the revolution which gave him the Soobahdaree; but notwithstanding their services, they had not only experienced ingratitude from the Nawaub, but insult and injury from his son Meerun, and now, burning with revenge, they joined the ranks of the Prince with a considerable body of horse, and by their reputation for skill and daring added greatly to the influence of his party.*

The conduct of the Nawaub, of Rajah Ram Narain, and of the English in opposing him, was now open rebellion to the lawful Sovereign of the Country, but as this title had long been merely nominal, and all parties had disregarded it when opposed to their own views and interests, it caused no compunction in the present instance, nor does the circumstance appear ever to have been adverted to, or regarded in the correspondence or measures that ensued at the time, though subsequently brought forward when it suited the purpose of those who employed the argument.

The Emperor's force being now sufficiently strengthened, he moved towards Patna in the end of January and arrived in the neighbourhood of that city in the beginning of February. Ram Narain, who had treated his first intentions with contempt, had latterly become seriously alarmed under the altered state of affairs; he appears however to have behaved in this instance with considerable firmness and decision; he summoned all the neighbouring Zemindars to come to his assistance, collected all his troops from the district and enlisted as many more as offered themselves. He marched out of the City with his whole force, supported by the party of English troops under Captain Cochrane, and took up a strong position, which he intrenched, not far from the walls close to the Dehva Nullah. Here he remained acting on the defensive for some days, in obedience to the orders of the

* The Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 98-9.

Nawaub and Major Caillaud, by whom he was directed to avoid hazarding an engagement on any terms until the English and Nawaub's troops arrived.* Skirmishes took place daily between the two armies with varying results, but Ram Narain maintained his prudent line of conduct until the arrival of a considerable body of horse from Moorshedabad, under the command of Rehim Khán, a Rohilla officer, who had been sent forward in the beginning of January to reinforce the garrison. His army now amounted to 40,000 men, more than equal to that of the enemy,—and flushed by some trifling successes, he could not resist the temptation to hazard an engagement, and secure the whole merit of the victory before the expected reinforcements should arrive: accordingly, on the 9th of February, he moved out of his intrenchments and offered the enemy battle on the plains of Musseempore. His force was drawn up in three lines, the first commanded by Rehim Khán the Rohillah and Ahmed Khán Koreishy; the second by Rajahs Moorlee Dhur and Pulhwán Singh, who had joined Ram Narain with a large force of Bodjeporians; the third by Ram Narain himself.† The English detachment, whose orders were confined to the protection of Ram Narain, was in reserve; Captain Cochrane strongly urged the Rajah to take post with his detachment, but at this Ram Narain's pride revolted. The party consisted of only one Company of European Infantry and a detail of Artillery, now reduced together to 70 men, with two field-pieces, and 8 Companies of Sipahis, including 3 local Companies belonging to the factory, amounting altogether to about 700 or 800 men.

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On the Emperor's side, the attack was made in two large bodies on either flank, the one commanded by Kamghar Khán, the other by Dileer and Assalut Khán; the Emperor with his own immediate followers formed the reserve.‡ The action was well contested: after a little mutual skirmishing, Dileer Khán and his brother made a dashing charge on the Rajah's troops and carried every thing before them, at the same time that Pulhwán Singh passed over to the

* Ironside's Narrative, pp. 8-9.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 99. ‡ Ibid.

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Emperor's side, and turned to assail the English party, whilst Morad Khán, a Belooch Chief, also deserted, and attacked the Rajah's troops in the rear; Ahmed Khán Koreishy, and several other officers, either from treachery or cowardice fled the field at the commencement of the fight.* The remainder of the Rajah's troops, however, stood their ground boldly, and the tide of the action was for some time gallantly maintained by Captain Cochrane's party, the close and deadly fire of whose muskets emptied many a saddle in the opposing force; amongst those who fell in this part of the action were Dileer Khán and Assalut Khán, both of whom died in charging the English.† Kamghar Khán on his side had not been idle, he had been opposed to Rehim Khán and Moorlee Dhur, both of whom were taken prisoners. Ram Narain himself was now surrounded, his best officers had fallen around him, and himself had received several severe wounds; in this distress he sent to Captain Cochrane stating his dangerous situation, and praying for assistance, and that officer, whose orders were to protect the Rajah's person, marched with 4 Companies of Sipahis to his support. This unwise division of the English force, caused its destruction; the party under Captain Cochrane forced their way to the Rajah and covered his retreat; but being attacked on all sides, they were overwhelmed by numbers, and the only 3 officers present, Captain Cochrane, Ensign Wincklebeck, and Mr. Barwell, who served as a volunteer, were slain; the Sipahis now left without a leader, were discouraged, and Kamghar Khán's Cavalry making a desperate rush, charged in upon them, and the whole party was cut to pieces, — 1 Serjeant and 25 Sipahis alone succeeding in fighting their way back to the European detachment.‡ These last, supported by the other Companies of Sipahis, had also been severely assailed, but continued to hold their ground: the officer left in charge of the Infantry, as also the Subaltern in command of the Artillery, who appears to have been Lieutenant Buck, were both killed; the only European officer

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 100-1.

† Ibid.

‡ Ironside's Narrative, p. 9.—First Report, p. 30.

now surviving was Dr. W. Fullerton, the Surgeon of the Agency, who assumed the command. Finding that the day was completely lost, this little party commenced their retreat to the city, surrounded by the enemy, but by the coolness and steadiness of their conduct keeping the latter at a respectful distance. One of the two gun carriages having broken down, they were compelled to spike the piece and leave it on the field, but the tumbril of the other having upset, Dr. Fullerton halted the party, deliberately righted it, and then resumed his march; by their cool and daring behaviour, this remnant of the party succeeded in making good their retreat to Patna.* Fortunately, the Emperor contented himself with causing the royal music to play in token of rejoicing, and then gave orders for the burying of the dead, who were numerous on both sides. This delay in following up his victory saved the city, which had been thrown into a state of extreme consternation: but Ram Narain, though severely wounded, exerted himself to put the place into the best state of defence, with the view of holding out until relieved; nor did he neglect his old system of creating delay by entering into negotiation, excusing himself on the plea of his wounds for not proceeding to pay his respects to the Emperor. The place was, however, invested by the victorious army, but the siege was not pushed with much vigour, nor was it of long duration, for on the 19th of February, intelligence was received that Major Caillaud and Meerun were within thirty miles of Patna. On the following morning, the Imperial army moved out to meet them, and in the evening the advanced parties of either force were in sight of each other; on the 21st, Major Caillaud proposed to attack the enemy, but Meerun having consulted his astrologers, found the stars unfavorable, and the action was delayed until the next day. On the morning of the 22nd, the troops commenced their march, but owing to the delays of Meerun, the morning was so far spent before they had got near the enemy, that Major Caillaud determined upon deferring the action until the following day. He accordingly formed his camp about

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* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 101.

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three miles from that of the enemy, and whilst the tents were pitching, he rode forward to examine their position. Finding all quiet in their camp, he took possession of two villages about a mile in advance of his own position, but situated rather obliquely to that of the enemy; in each of these he placed a Company of Sipahis, and the remainder of the same Battalion he posted about 400 paces to the rear as a support. The enemy observing these movements, brought out their heavy cannon and some troops to the front, upon which the Major directed the reserve Battalion to advance and protect the villages, and added a Company of Europeans and 2 field-pieces to reinforce them.* In this state, matters remained quiet for upwards of an hour, when the enemy were observed to be in motion once more. Major Caillaud now ascended a small eminence towards the left, from whence he had a good view of their position, when he perceived that they had struck their camp, and were in full march against him; he immediately sent notice to the young Nawaub, and desired him to prepare for action, whilst he moved up the whole of his own force and formed his line between the two villages already occupied, which covered his flanks; the Europeans were as usual posted in the centre with three guns on each side, and the 3d and 4th Battalions of Sipahis on either flank, the villages being still held by the Companies originally posted in them. His little force had been reinforced by the junction, on the previous day, of the remnant of the party that had escaped from the action of Musseempore on the 9th. †

A large body of the enemy's horse were now observed moving directly upon the villages, and in this order the Major steadily awaited their approach. It had been previously arranged that the Nawaub should draw up his troops in a second line, in rear of, and covered by the English, with his Cavalry extending on either flank, so as to be ready to act as required; but instead of adhering to this simple and judicious arrangement, he massed his whole force, horse and foot, in one dense column to the right, and a little to the rear of the

Major's troops, presenting a front of only 200 yards with a force of 15,000 men.

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On the other side, the enemy drew up their troops in three bodies, the first commanded by Khádir-dad-Khán Tooranee and Goolam-i-Sháh of Lucknow, the second by Kamghar Khán, and the third or reserve by the Emperor himself.*

Kamghar Khán led his troops against the English left, which they attacked with considerable spirit, though in separate bodies; upon this Major Caillaud advanced his field-pieces a few paces, and obliquing them to the left, kept up so hot a fire upon the advancing parties as effectually to repress their ardour; a portion of this body now moved off to the right, whilst another party worked their way round the village to the left, and got into the rear, where they remained without making any further attempt: but the attention of the Major was now forcibly called to another direction. Whilst Kamghar Khán with a portion of his force, was amusing the English to the left, Khádir-dad-Khán and Goolam-i-Sháh were bearing down upon the Nawaub's troops to the right, and were subsequently supported by the remaining portion of Kamghar Khán's division; on perceiving this movement, Major Caillaud moved up his 6 field-pieces to the right village, so as to protect the front of Meerun's position by a flanking fire, whilst the Nawaub's Artillery drawn up in front of his own column opened directly on the advancing enemy. Notwithstanding the effect of this cross fire, the Emperor's Cavalry came on gallantly, and the Nawaub's artillery being speedily deserted, whilst 4 of the English gun carriages broke down in the rough heavy ground in which they were posted, the Mogul horse charged in amongst the unwieldy mass opposed to them, and compelled Meerun to give ground, a movement which was rapidly passing into a flight. At this critical juncture, Major Caillaud, leaving the Europeans and the left Battalion, with the 2 remaining field-pieces, to hold their own position, took the right Battalion of Sipahis, and placing himself at their

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 104.

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head, led them to the Nawaub's assistance ; they advanced to within 40 paces of the enemy's flank, when, having formed line, they poured in a deadly volley of musketry, quickly followed by a second, and then charged with the bayonet, when the enemy, disconcerted and broken by the steady and regular fire with which they had been so unexpectedly assailed, recoiled upon each other in a confused mass, and fell in numbers under the cold steel of the Sipahis, who used it most effectually.* This seasonable relief gave time to the Nawaub's Cavalry to rally and return to the charge, which they did with considerable vigour, when the enemy broke and fled in all directions, nor were their leaders ever again able to rally them ; in half an hour, not one enemy was to be seen, and the plain was clear of all, save the dead and wounded and the usual fragments of a battle-field. Whilst this struggle was going on, the party of the enemy which had passed to the rear of the English position during the heat of the engagement, succeeded in plundering the camp, which had been left standing, and carrying off the cattle and baggage, but the greater portion was fortunately recovered during the pursuit, which continued until nightfall. The action lasted altogether about 4 hours, and nothing could exceed the cool and steady conduct of the British troops, Europeans and Natives, and fortunately their loss was inconsiderable,—what did occur, falling chiefly upon the right Battalion of Sipahis. The Nawaub's force and the enemy suffered more considerably ; Meerun was slightly wounded in the face and neck by arrows, and his maternal uncle Mahommud Ameer Khán was killed. On the enemy's side, Goolam-i-Sháh and Azeezoolah-Khán, two of the best and bravest officers in their Army, were slain.† The Emperor with his beaten troops retreated to Behar, which was only about 16 miles distant, where they arrived at night. Such was the battle of Seerpore, so called from the larger of the two villages on the field, an action that was highly creditable to the conduct and skill of the English troops and their

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 11.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 106.

leader, and which if followed up, might have decided the campaign; but this course, the conduct of Meerun precluded, ^{A. D. 1760.} ^{March.} who, though he had shewn more timidity than courage in the field, considered it indispensable that he should retire to Patna, to cure his scratches and enjoy the honour of his victory. Major Caillaud urged him to follow up his success before the enemy should have time to recover from their defeat, but finding all advice and remonstrance futile, he begged the assistance of a small body of Cavalry, with which, and the English troops alone, he offered to undertake the duty; this was also refused,—the jealousy of Meerun taking alarm, lest the reputation of the Major should be increased by any success, to his own disparagement.*

Thus the English saw the opportunity lost, and the whole advantage of their victory thrown away. Major Caillaud encamped his troops near the river, between Patna and the town of Bar, for the greater convenience of being near the boats, which contained the heavy stores of the force; here he repaired his gun carriages and replenished his stores, preparatory to further operations; whilst Meerun's Army lay in and around Patna, and the young Nawaub gave himself up to sensuality and dissipation.

At length, having afforded the enemy all the leisure they required, and having satiated himself with his pleasures, Meerun listened to the advice of Major Caillaud when too late, and on the 29th of the month he marched out of Patna and joined the English force; they now moved together upon Behar, but no exhortations could induce the young Nawaub to expedite his movements: on the 2nd of March they reached that town, and found that the Emperor with his whole army had already made two forced marches towards Bengal. This was a manœuvre, the practicability and even the probability of which the Major had already endeavored to impress upon Meerun, but the latter treated the idea with ridicule, and

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 12.—First Report, p. 30.—The account of this action is taken chiefly from Colonel Ironside's Narrative and the Seir Mutakherin, both of which scribe the operations in detail, though under different views.

A. D. 1760. though urgently requested, would take no steps to ascertain the
 March. intentions of the Emperor or prevent the measure in question.* This movement on the part of the enemy was at once a wise and bold one, the English force in Bengal was much divided, and Moorshedabad, the population of which was inclined to disaffection, as was also a portion of the troops stationed there, was left nearly defenceless; a large Mahrattah force was in possession of the province of Midnapore, another body of that nation was in the neighbourhood of Burdwan ready to co-operate with the Emperor; the faith of the Burdwan Rajah was somewhat more than doubtful; Kuddum Hoosein in Purneah was again in open revolt, and, together with the Bheerboom Rajah and several other powerful Zemindars, had sent invitations to the Emperor to enter the province, promising to join his standard. Even Meerun now saw the necessity of active measures, and the united troops commenced the pursuit of the Emperor with all practicable speed; both took the route by the river, the English embarking in their boats, which proceeded faster by the aid of the current than troops could march; on the 6th, they had closed considerably upon the Emperor, who was delayed by his Artillery and heavy baggage, and Major Caillaud solicited the Nawaub to furnish him with a party of Cavalry with which he proposed to make a forced march upon the Emperor's Camp and surprise it at night, but to this Meerun, influenced by his jealousy and constitutional obstinacy, gave a direct refusal.†

The Emperor, now finding that his route by the river was likely to be intercepted by the English, who availing themselves of the speed of their boats, might get ahead of him and occupy the passes of Terreabgully or Sikreegully, took the resolution of sending off the whole of his guns and heavy baggage, and with the remainder of his force, which chiefly consisted of Cavalry, striking across the hilly country to the South East; accordingly, on the 8th of the month, when at the foot of the Kurruckpore hills, he changed the direction of his march, and adopted this new and more direct course,

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 13. + First Report, Caillaud's Evidence, p. 30.

through hills and jungles never before traversed by an army, but little known to either his own or the Nawaub's troops, and to the English a perfect *terra incognita*. Major Caillaud, who dared not leave the young Nawaub unsupported, was compelled to follow the same course, and disembarking his troops once more, joined Meerun and commenced the pursuit. The route was however a most difficult one, through thick jungle of the wildest description, across unbridged streams, over hills and valleys, and through difficult and unknown passes; for days together a road had to be made for the field-pieces, and the troops suffered extreme fatigue and privations, which they bore without a murmur; their zeal and exertions, coupled with the energy and resources of the Commander and his officers, surmounted all obstacles, and enabled them to keep so closely on the track of the enemy, that on the 22d of March, having passed through one of the most difficult defiles, they arrived on the ground which the Emperor had quitted only two days before.*

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But in the mean time it is necessary to look to the state of affairs in Bengal at this period.

When Meerun and the Major were advancing to Patna, and hostilities with Kuddum Hoosein appeared inevitable, Meer Jaffier Khán marched from Moorshedabad towards Rajmahal to support his son if necessary, taking with him the 200 European Infantry which Colonel Olive had originally ordered up to reinforce Major Caillaud; these were under the command of Captain Spear, who had come round from Madras with the detachment in the preceding November. Terms having been arranged in the interim, with Kuddum Hoosein, the Nawaub's attention was turned in another direction by the appearance of a Mahratta force on the eastern frontier, under the command of Sheobut, a chief who appears to have been ever ready to take advantage of any troubles in Bengal. He gave out that he came to support the cause of the Emperor, and advancing towards Midnapore, defeated Khooshál Singh, the Nawaub's officer in charge of

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 13.

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that province, made himself master of the neighbouring districts, and pushed forward detachments to Keerpoy and Bissunpore; from the former of which he threatened Calcutta and Hooghly, and from the latter commanded Burdwán, and secured the means of joining the Emperor in the event of his advancing towards Moorshedabad. These proceedings caused considerable alarm at that place and in Calcutta; in the latter the Militia were again called out, and all armed natives not in the Company's service ordered to quit the settlement;* it being reported that Rajah Doolub Ram, then in Calcutta with a host of followers, was in communication with Sheobut, and had instigated his advance. The Nawaub returned to Moorshedabad, and it was suggested that he should send a force to Burdwán to protect that province; to this he agreed, and requested the support of the European detachment under Captain Spear, which was not only granted, but 100 Europeans and 200 Sipahis, with a detail of Artillery and 2 field-pieces, were added to the party.† Meer Mahommud Kossim Alee Khán, the Nawaub's son-in-law, was appointed to this duty, with a party of 1500 Horse; instead of moving at once to Burdwán and driving out the Mahratta detachment at Bissunpore, Meer Jaffier Khán ordered Kossim Alee Khán to halt with the whole force at Kutwah, which was considered the key to Moorshedabad, as regarded any force advancing from the southward and westward; and it was with great difficulty that his fears were sufficiently overcome to authorise the detachment proceeding at last to its original destination; nor did they reach Burdwán until the middle of March. Intelligence was now received that the Emperor had given the Nawaub's and the English troops the slip, and was rapidly advancing upon Moorshedabad, where all was confusion and alarm. Meer Jaffier Khán actuated by his fears, changed his plans daily; one time he proposed to march towards Rajmahal and join his son, at another to proceed to Burdwán and oppose the Emperor's advance with the aid of the English party, and again he would resolve on awaiting the enemy's approach and defending the city; finally, he des-

* Holwell's Indian Tracts, p. 28.

† Ibid, p. 27.

patched an agent with a letter to the Emperor, couched in the most respectful terms, and disavowing all wish or intention of opposing the Imperial authority. This last proceeding, however, he kept secret from the Government in Calcutta, and at their urgent suggestion he at length proceeded in the end of March, with his whole force, towards Burdwán to form a junction with Kossim Allee Khán and Captain Spear. The latter officer, on the news of the Emperor's approach, was reinforced from Calcutta by Captain Fischer with 200 more Europeans, 300 Sipahis, and 4 field-pieces,* which marched on the 23rd of the month, having been delayed until then for want of carriage and camp equipage; this brought up Captain Spear's detachment to a total of 500 Europeans, 500 Sipahis, and 6 Field-pieces; 20 Europeans, and 20 Sipahis were subsequently added. The remainder of the Force consisting of about 250 Europeans and 500 Sipahis was held in readiness under the command of Captain Yorke, who had now sufficiently recovered from his wounds, for the protection of the settlement, or to act if necessary in the direction of Midnapore and Keerpoy.† In the mean time, Captain MacLean was returning from the Northern Circars with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Sipahis, and his movements and safety were an object of some anxiety to the Government, as the greater part of his route was in a measure commanded by the Mahrattas; he reached Kuttack with his two Battalions on the 21st of March, where he found instructions awaiting him, advising him of the state of affairs, impressing the necessity of due caution on his march, and directing him to follow the coast road as far as Balasore, from whence he was ordered to strike off towards the Northward and proceed with all practicable expedition viâ Midnapore and Keerpoy to Burdwán, where he was desired to place himself under the orders of Captain Spear, or should he have arrived, of Major Caillaud. As the Mahratta force in the districts he had to pass through, consisted almost entirely of horse without any guns, there was no

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* Hollwell's Indian Tracts, pp. 33-4.

† Ibid, pp. 31-32.

A. D. 1760. thing to fear with his two tried and excellent Battalions in an open fight ; the only cause for alarm was from sudden attack, treachery, or a system of harassing the line of march ; he was directed, should opportunity offer, to endeavor to bring the enemy to a general action, but to avoid any unnecessary delay. The Agency and factory at Kuttack were withdrawn, and marched under his escort as far as Balasore, whence they proceeded by sea to Calcutta, whilst the detachment followed the line of march directed.*

Such was now the state of affairs ; the Emperor was advancing southward towards Burdwán, followed by Meerun and Major Caillaud. The Nawaub and Captain Spear lay to the north of Burdwán on the Adjee River, about equidistant from Burdwán and Kutwah ; Sheobut with the main body of the Mahrattahs was at Bissunpoor, and Captain MacLean with his detachment was advancing northward through Midnapore. On the 1st of April, the Emperor arrived within a few miles of the Nawaub's force ; he had already marred the original and masterly plan, as first contemplated, by not striking off to the eastward when he arrived in the parallel of Moorshedabad, and proceeding viâ Nagore, Sooree and Seerpore, to that city, which was perfectly defenceless, and the possession of which would have done more than any thing else to strengthen his power and reputation ; instead of this, he passed Nagore to his left, and proceeded by Lakarakhoondah and Okerrah to Maunkore, near the Damoodah, where he committed the still more serious error of halting and hesitating to attack the Nawaub before he could be joined by his son and Major Caillaud, who were fast following in his own rear. Whether this hesitation arose from timidity or dissension in his camp, has never been explained, but whatever may have been the cause, it ruined his only prospect of success. † Had he attacked the Nawaub's party, the brunt of the action would have fallen on the English troops, for sufficient evidence subsequently transpired to prove that the Nawaub would have made but a

* Holiwell's Indian Tracts, pp. 36-8.

+ Ironside's Narrative, p. 16.

feeble defence, if he did not entirely desert or even turn against his allies, and join the Emperor,—with whom he was then in treaty. On the 4th of April, however, Major Caillaud and Meerun joined the Nawaub at Mongolkote on the Adjee.* At the present time, it is impossible to trace the exact route followed by the Emperor and his pursuers, but the general direction is clearly ascertainable by certain villages passed, then and now possessing the same names; turning from the Ganges near the junction of the Mahanee with that River, their road lay through Mellypore, Deoghur, Operabanda, Lakarakoonda and Okerrah, from whence the Emperor proceeded to Maunkore, and the English to Mongolkote. Major Caillaud, immediately on joining the Nawaub, detached 200 Europeans of Captain Spear's detachment, under the command of Captain Fischer, for the defence of Moorshedabad, and proposed with the remainder of the force to attack the united armies of the Emperor and the Mahrattas, and either destroy them entirely or drive them out of the province. The whole force accordingly marched on the following day; on the 6th, they made a long march to Beerpore, where they ascertained that the Emperor was encamped about 7 or 8 miles distant on the other side of the Damoodah River, and the Mahrattas at a little distance from him; upon this, the Major urged the Nawaub to attack his camp at once; but the latter declined, on the plea that the day was far spent and the troops too much fatigued. Major Caillaud then requested that a small body of Cavalry might be placed at his disposal, and a sufficient number of horses to mount the Europeans, with whom alone he offered to undertake the enterprise, but this also was refused.† On the following morning, they marched to Belkoss, opposite to the Emperor's encampment, and endeavored to bring him to action; the Europeans and Sipahis formed in columns and prepared to ford the stream, supported by the fire of the Artillery, which played upon the opposite bank, and was en-

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* Ironside's Narrative, p. 14.—First Report, Caillaud's Evidence, p. 30.

† Ibid.—Hollwell's Indian Tracts, p. 41.

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swered by a few discharges from the enemy's guns; but the Nawaub showed an unaccountable backwardness to move; in vain Major Caillaud sent to beg that he would send over a party of Cavalry to keep the enemy in play until the English troops could cross the stream:—not a man moved. The firm appearance of the English columns was, however, sufficient for the Emperor; he drew off his troops, set fire to his camp, and retired with his Mahratta allies to Bissunpoor, and the English, having no Cavalry of their own and receiving no support from that of the Nawaub, were unable to follow.* Thus, through the apathy, pride, or treachery, of Meer Jaffier Khán the opportunity of a decisive action was lost. On the 10th, the Emperor recrossed the Damoodah higher up the stream, and finding that he had lost the chance of surprising Moorsheda-bad, and that he was unable to cope with the English, and probably disappointed in obtaining the aid he was led to expect, he returned by the same route he had come, and hastened back to Patna. This movement was not known to the English for several days; but as soon as it was positively ascertained, Major Caillaud, anxious for the safety of Patna, which was left with only Ram Narain's troops and a small detachment of Sipahis, immediately determined to send a party for its relief. (This he entrusted to Captain Knox; and Captain MacLean's detachment having previously joined, he formed a force consisting of 200 picked Europeans of Captain Spear's party, Captain Knox's old Battalion, the 1st, (*the present 1st Regiment,*) and a detail of Artillery with 2 six-pounders, which started on the 16th of April, under orders to proceed to the northward towards Rajmahal with all practicable expedition, from thence to follow the river route, and when clear of the Purneah districts to cross to the other side, so as to avoid the chance of interruption from any parties of the Emperor's troops, and proceed along the northern bank until opposite to Patna; when arrived there, to recross the river and aid in the defence of the city. ✓)

The greater part of the Mahratta force accompanied the

* Hollwell's Indian Tracts, pp. 40-1.—First Report, Caillaud's Evidence, p. 30.

Emperor on his march, under the command of Sheobut in person, but a portion still remained in the Bissunpore province; in consequence of which, and the generally disturbed state of the neighbouring districts, Major Caillaud and the Nawaub remained at Dignuggur for some days, but finally leaving a detail of Sipahis at Burdwán they proceeded to Moorshedabad about the end of April. The attention of the Nawaub was now drawn towards Purneah, where Kuddum Hoosein was again in open revolt, and had declared in favour of the Emperor, and Major Caillaud having pointed out the necessity for immediate and active operations, with the view of preventing a junction between the troops of Kuddum Hoosein and the Emperor, Meerun once more took the field with his own troops, and the English, notwithstanding their recent fatigues, and the heat of the season, embarked on their boats at Moorshedahad on the 16th of May, and reached Rajmahal, the appointed place of rendezvous, on the 23rd,* where they joined Meerun's force, and thus united, prepared to march against Kuddum Hoosein, who had already advanced towards Patna. This chief had collected a number of boats for the conveyance of his baggage and stores, which were held in readiness on the opposite side of the river; of this Major Caillaud received information, and immediately dispatched a Battalion of Sipahis to the spot, who succeeded, after a slight resistance on the part of the guard left with the fleet, in seizing the whole, which they immediately burned, together with a large quantity of ammunition and military stores that was on board, and effected their retreat without loss.)

Meanwhile the affairs at Patna were in a very precarious condition; the Emperor, as already mentioned, was hastening back to invest that city, which was ill prepared for a siege. Ram Narain's own troops were dispirited by their former encounter with the Emperor, and the only regular force in the place consisted of one Company of Local Sipahis at the factory; two other Companies were distributed about the district, at Sarun, Chuprah and other places, for the protection

* First Report, p. 30.—Ironsides's Narrative, p. 16.

A. D. 1760. of the commercial agents and salt depôts, and these were now
 April. all called in.* To add to the alarm already existing in the city, intelligence was received of the near approach of Monsieur Law and his small party, who were hastening from Chatterpore to join the Emperor : this officer encamped close to the walls, but fortunately he was ignorant of its defenceless condition, and of the consternation that reigned within, consequently he never contemplated the possibility of attacking it with his small force, which, under the circumstances, would have been quite sufficient for the purpose ; for such was the terror pervading all ranks, that it is probable no defence would have been attempted. Monsieur Law, however, moved on to Behar, where learning that the Emperor was on his return, he halted and employed the time in re-organizing and equipping his little force, manufacturing gunpowder, repairing his carriages, and making other preparations for the expected campaign.† Here he was soon joined by the Emperor and Kamghar Khán, when the whole force proceeded towards Patna, which they immediately invested. The time thus obtained had admitted of some preparations for defence ; the English Sipahis, now all collected, amounted to about 300 men, and Rajah Shitab Roy, a Hindoo officer of courage and ability, who was destined to occupy a distinguished position in the subsequent history of the British connection with Bengal, had organized a small body of 300 picked men, who, animated by his own spirit and example, proved of eminent service during and after the siege. Ram Narain had also assembled the best of his troops, and allotted their several positions around the city, but their numbers were considerably reduced by casualties and desertions ; what remained, however, were of the better description, and behaved with great courage and determination.

The arrangements of the siege on this occasion were very different from the former unscientific and dilatory proceedings, the ability and energy of Monsieur Law being chiefly instrumental in occasioning this change : the city was invested

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 109-10.

† Ibid.

on all three sides, and batteries were opened with considerable effect; after five days of open trenches, Monsieur Law resolved upon an assault on the south side, but the breach not being perfectly practicable, he supplied his party with scaling ladders, and having destroyed the flanking defences covering the point to be attacked, he made the assault in broad day, and that in so sudden and unexpected a manner, that the party had gained the wall before the alarm was given. At the first intimation of this attempt, Doctor Fullerton, who had so greatly distinguished himself in the action of Musseempore, hastened with English Sipahis to the spot, accompanied by several of the Gentlemen of the factory, who volunteered their services as officers on the occasion; when they arrived, they found the ladders planted and some of the French troops actually on the ramparts; a fortunate discharge of rockets, and the fire of the Sipahis, quickly drove them back, and Rajah Shitab Roy making a judicious sally at the same moment from one of the neighbouring gates, took them in flank, and compelled them to retreat with considerable loss.* A practicable breach was now made on the east side of the city, which being effected, Monsieur Law concentrated his Artillery on the west side, and commenced a heavy cannonade from both guns and mortars, which did great execution amongst the buildings and inhabitants, and was rapidly bringing down the walls in that direction also. Whilst the attention of the garrison was attracted to this quarter, another assault was made at the breach, on the eastern side, by Zyn-ool-ábideen Khán, one of the bravest officers in the Emperor's Army, who, attacking the place on the morning of the 28th of April, succeeded in gaining the top of the ramparts and planting his standard upon them; here he was quickly encountered by Poor-dil Khán, a Belooch officer in Ram Narain's service, who made a gallant defence, and the firing having speedily brought Doctor Fullerton and his gallant little band of Sipahis to the spot, a desperate conflict ensued. At length Zyn-ool-ábideen Khán fell, his leg

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* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 101-2.—Ironside's Narrative, p. 15.

A.D. 1760. being shattered by a musket ball, and his followers, disheartened by this circumstance, retreated to their entrenchments, carrying off the body of their leader.*

April.

Notwithstanding these successes, the garrison was now completely disheartened, the walls were open in every direction, the enemy's artillery were causing an incessant destruction of life and property, the troops were harassed and worn out, and fresh assaults might be hourly expected in any direction; rumours had also reached the city that Kuddum Hoosein was advancing to join the Emperor. About noon a cloud of dust was observed on the opposite side of the river, and the advance of a body of troops was soon discernible; this was at first supposed to be the expected force of Kuddum Hoosein, but as they approached, the regularity of the march, the colour of the uniforms, and the glitter of the lines of bayonets, soon convinced the delighted garrison that it was an English reinforcement: and as they arrived opposite the city, the British colours, and the cheerful sound of the fife and drum, soon put the matter beyond the possibility of a doubt. Boats were immediately sent across the river with refreshments for the party, in which they were ferried across before the evening closed. This welcome aid consisted of Captain Knox's little party, who, in the incredibly short space of 13 days, had arrived from Burdwan, a distance of 300 miles, under a burning sun, having crossed the Ganges twice, and experienced great difficulties and privation. Captain Knox himself had marched the whole way on foot, at their head, with a view to encourage them the more readily to endure the fatigues which he thus voluntarily shared with them.† When they had crossed the river, he marched his party through the town with colours flying and drums beating, and their determined and soldier-like appearance, in spite of their fatigues, diffused universal confidence throughout the city; 'all ranks,' (in the words of the Native historian of the period, himself

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 112-4.

† First Report, p. 30. — Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 113.

a witness to the transaction,) “gave up their apprehensions
 “about an escalade and about an assault, and said openly
 “that now the English were within their walls, the enemy
 “would not dare to come to attack again.” At night, the
 indefatigable Knox accompanied by two of his officers,
 proceeded with a guide to reconnoitre the enemy’s position,
 and having made himself master of its strength and weakness,
 and of the several roads leading to it, he returned into the
 city to take that rest he so much required. The following
 day, he resolved to avail himself of the observations he had
 made, and waiting until noon, when the enemy were, as usual
 with Native armies, enjoying their siesta or preparing their
 mid-day meal, he sallied out with his party, and suddenly at-
 tacked Kamghar Khán’s quarter with so much spirit that the
 troops fled from their intrenchment at the first discharge of
 musketry, and Kamghar Khán himself escaped not without
 difficulty.* Having made himself master of the colours, guns,
 and stores he found in the entrenchment, Captain Knox re-
 turned in triumph to the city. Not approving of so close a
 vicinity to such an enterprising enemy, Kamghar Khán now
 pitched his camp at a considerable distance, and two or three
 days after the Imperial Army raised the siege and retreated
 to Gyah Maunpore.†

Whilst Patna was thus rescued by the exertions and courage
 of Captain Knox, Kuddum Hoosein was in full march to join
 the Emperor. Aware that matters had gone too far to admit
 of any reconciliation with Meer Jaffier Khán, he had thrown
 himself wholly and boldly into the opposite scale; but before
 leaving Purneah, he had extorted a very large sum of money
 from all ranks, and literally plundered the town and district;
 by this means he accumulated a very considerable treasure,
 with which he was enabled largely to increase his force, now
 consisting of 6,000 Cavalry, 10,000 Infantry, and 30 Guns,
 well equipped and supplied. On the approach of Meerun
 and Major Caillaud, he pushed forward to form a junction
 with the Emperor; the English and the Nawaub’s troops

* Ironside’s Narrative, p. 15.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 114. † Ibid, p. 115.

A D. 1760. marching in the same direction, on the southern bank of the
 June. Ganges. Major Caillaud finding it impossible to overtake him, owing to the start he had gained in advance, and to his being well supplied with baggage cattle, wrote to Captain Knox to endeavour to intercept or delay his march in any manner he found practicable; that officer on receiving intelligence that Kuddum Hoosein had reached Hajeepore, crossed his little force over to that side of the river on the 15th of June, and determined to oppose his passage. (Ram Narain and all the inhabitants of Patna were perfectly astounded at this resolution, conceiving it impossible that such a handful of troops could for a moment stand against a powerful and well equipped force like that now advancing against them; a reinforcement of the Rajah's troops was, however, ordered to co-operate, but terrified at the hopeless prospect, none could be found bold enough to venture across, with exception to Rajah Shitab Roy, who joined Knox with his detachment, which, as it consisted chiefly of Cavalry, was most acceptable. At night, hearing that the enemy had approached to within about 10 miles of his camp, Captain Knox proposed to Shitab Roy to march early the following morning and fall unexpectedly upon them before the day-break, to which the Rajah readily acceded, and soon after midnight they started; unfortunately their guide lost his way, and they wandered about in the dark for some hours, when finding that day was breaking and all hopes of a surprise consequently at an end, they returned to camp. Scarcely had the troops had an hour's repose after this fatiguing march, when the advance of Kuddum Hoosein's army appeared in sight, and as their columns debouched on the plain, it was evident that they were more numerous than had been rumoured or supposed; but Captain Knox, undismayed by these formidable odds, left one company of Sipahis as a guard to the camp, and advancing towards the enemy, took up a good position, well suited to his limited means, and there drew up his little force, consisting of 200 Europeans, and a Battalion of Sipahis, which deducting the camp guard and probable casualties could not have exceeded 800

men, 5 field pieces, (having added 3 at Patna to his original detail) and 300 of Shitab Roy's Cavalry.* The Purneah troops, as they advanced, filed to the right and left, and having completely surrounded this little band of heroes, commenced the attack, which lasted for six hours; during the whole time, column after column of Cavalry charged down on the English detachment, which steadily received them with a discharge of grape or at the point of the bayonet. On one occasion the little party were nearly overwhelmed, but a brilliant charge of the Grenadiers of Knox's own Battalion repulsed the enemy and saved the party. At length, tired of these fruitless attempts, which had been attended with considerable loss, Kuddum Hoosein was compelled to retreat, leaving behind him 400 dead on the field, 3 Elephants, and 8 pieces of cannon, which fell into the hands of the victors.† Not contented with this success, Captain Knox continued to follow up the retreating enemy until evening closed in upon him, capturing a number of their ammunition tumbrils, which he blew up on the spot. The loss of the English on this occasion was, under the circumstances, remarkably small, consisting of only 16 Europeans killed; the number of Sipahis is not stated, but it was probably proportionate to that of the Europeans; as they appear to have had their full share of the conflict:—of the number wounded no record is available; only one officer, Lieutenant John McDowall, appears to have fallen in this affair. At the commencement of the action, a party of Kuddum Hoosein's troops attacked the English camp and destroyed the small party left to guard it; the affrighted camp followers fled to the river side, and getting into the boats stationed there, pushed over to Patna, bringing intelligence that the English were annihilated; the terror-stricken inhabitants were consequently astonished to hear the sound of a continued cannonade, and to witness the explosions of the captured tumbrils, but still, though these circumstances denoted a protracted resistance, they never supposed that any chance of victory existed; and

A. D. 1760.
16th June.

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 16.

† Ibid.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 120-2.

A. D. 1760. when at night Captain Knox and Shitab Roy arrived begrimed
 June. with dust and smoke, it was long before they could persuade their hearers that the enemy had been completely defeated, or that they themselves were not fugitives from a disastrous field. When the truth at last broke on them, their joy knew no bounds, and from that day the English acquired a reputation for determination and invincibility that did them good service in many a subsequent action. The conduct of Shitab Roy on this occasion was admirable, and Captain Knox was lavish in praise of the courage he had displayed and the exertions he had made, and from thenceforward his character was held in high esteem by all ranks of the English.*

This gallant and remarkable action bears no distinguishing name; but it appears to have taken place near the site of the present village of Bheerpore. The troops engaged were portions of the Bengal Artillery and 1st Bengal European Fusileers, with the whole of the present 1st Regiment of Native Infantry.

↳ Captain Knox having made his report and arranged for supplies, returned to his detachment and continued to follow Kuddum Hoosein, who having been thus baffled in his attempt to join the Emperor, directed his route to the north west through the Champaran district into that of Bettiah. On the 22nd of June, Meerun and Major Caillaud arrived, and Captain Knox's party were then relieved and returned to garrison Patna. Kuddum Hoosein having been defeated by the smaller detachment, felt himself no match for the more powerful force now in pursuit of him, and continued to advance with all practicable speed, intending to cross the Gograh higher up, near the Nepaul Mountains; but being impeded by his artillery and an immense quantity of baggage and stores, the English and Nawaub's troops came in sight of him on the 25th of the month. He immediately halted and formed his troops, as if determined to hazard an action, taking up a strong position covered by several villages and a large grove, and supported by the whole of his artillery, which were drawn up

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 123-4.

in line; Major Caillaud immediately prepared to attack, and sent to Meerun to hasten up with his troops in support. The enemy's guns opened on the English as they advanced, who replied with their field pieces, but without halting their line, continuing to push on in this determined manner, they carried the villages and grove, when the enemy fled in a body, leaving behind them 22 pieces, comprising the whole of their artillery, a large quantity of ammunition and stores, and all their heavy baggage.* It now appeared that Kuddum Hoosein's sole object had been to keep the English in play, whilst he transferred his treasure and more valuable property from the carriages on which they had hitherto been conveyed, to Elephants and Camels, and carried it off with him. The young Nawaub and his troops on this occasion behaved with worse than their usual misconduct, remaining about a mile in the rear without firing a shot; had they joined in the attack or had their Cavalry followed up the retreating enemy, the treasure could not have been carried away; which treasure, though probably not nearly so great as the credulity of the English on this subject led them to imagine, must still have been considerable.†

A. D. 1760.
June.

But no entreaties could induce Meerun to hazard a party in advance for this purpose; whilst the English, having no Cavalry, and fatigued with an eight hours' march prior to the action, were unable to attempt it. Notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, the Major determined to carry on the pursuit, which he did for several days, the track of the fugitives being plainly marked by the quantity of baggage left behind, and it is probable that his perseverance would finally have been crowned with success, but for an awful and unexpected event which completely deranged his plans. On the night of the 2nd of July, the periodical rains were ushered in by one of those storms so common at that season in India. The troops were encamped in a large saul forest at the foot of the hills, scattered about wherever room

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 17.

† Holwell's Indian Tracts, pp. 83-4-5.—First Report, Caillaud's Evidence, p. 80.

A. D. 1760.
2nd July.

was afforded for their tents. The violence of the storm had induced Meerun to quit the large tent he usually occupied, and take up his quarters in a small shooldaree, when, sending for one of his domestics to shampoo his limbs, whilst a story-teller was reciting some tale to lull him to sleep, the tent was struck by lightning, and in a moment, together with his followers, he lay a blackened corpse.* Thus perished Meerun at the age of 21, who, in the short interval of three years' authority, had exhibited almost every vice and every weakness that could disgrace human nature,—rash without courage, cruel and suspicious without cause, fickle in his regards and vindictive in his dislikes, false and treacherous without an object, avaricious without economy and extravagant without liberality, sensual in the worst and lowest sense of sensuality and luxurious without taste. Possessing all the vices of his predecessor Sooraj-oo-Dowlah without any of the personal advantages or any of the redeeming traits in that unfortunate prince's character. In a word, a monster who was only maintained in power and existence by the English influence and English arms. His demise was a cause of general rejoicing, the more so that, after his death, a long list was found, containing the names of all the best and most influential chiefs in the country whom he had marked out for subsequent destruction.†

Some of his servants entering the tent soon after the accident, discovered the three lifeless bodies. Intimation was immediately conveyed to Major Caillaud, who lost no time in making the best arrangements he could under the circumstances. In an Indian army, the death of the leader is generally the signal for the dissolution of his force, and in the mutinous and discontented spirit of the Nawaub's troops, at the time in heavy arrears, and having other causes of complaint, such an event was the more to be feared if some immediate and judicious measures were not adopted.

* First Report, p. 31.—Ironsides's Narrative, p. 17.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 127-8.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 134.

Major Caillaud immediately sent for such of the Nawaub's A. D. 1760. officers as he knew to be well inclined to the English interests, communicated to them the catastrophe that had occurred, and solicited their keeping the troops together. Through their influence, supported by promises on the part of the Major that he would report the condition of the force to the Nawaub and the English Government at Calcutta, with a view to obtaining the liquidation of their arrears, the troops were retained to their standard;—a most fortunate circumstance, for had they dispersed, the entire province would have been left at the mercy of the Emperor and the Nawaub of Purneah. Major Caillaud was invested with the command of the whole force, pending the receipt of orders from Moorshedabad, and a brother of Rajah Ram Narain was associated with him in the charge of the Durbar troops. In the condition and temper of the force, the Major considered it unadvisable to continue the pursuit of Kuddum' Hoosein, or to undertake any further operations; and immediately commenced his return towards Patna, taking the town of Bettiah by the way, in order to compel the Rajah of that district to pay up certain arrears due to the Nawaub's Government, which in the hurry of the advance, there had not been leisure to enforce. This done, the united forces continued their march to Patna, where they arrived on the 29th of July, having suffered much inconvenience from the periodical rains, which had set in with unusual violence for some time previous.* On arrival, the troops were distributed into quarters in the city and factory, and the Campaign closed for the season. The Emperor was now in position on the Soane, and Kamghar Khan was busily occupied in levying contributions in the district from all the neighbouring zemindars and landholders.

The promises of Major Caillaud had succeeded for the time in partially pacifying the Nawaub's troops, but now that they had arrived at Patna, there appeared little prospect of any immediate payment of their long arrears, the consequence was their discontent increased, and numbers deserted and joined the Emperor. Even the English troops were three or four months

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 18.

A. D. 1760.
September.

in arrears and suffering considerable inconvenience; some of the Sipahis caught the infection and deserted also. Major Caillaud exerted himself to procure funds and bring the troops to order, but his arrangements were interrupted by a summons to proceed without delay to Calcutta, to meet Mr. Vansittart the new Governor, who had arrived in the latter end of July from Madras. He accordingly resigned the command of the force to Captain Knox, the next senior officer, and quitted Patna on the 31st of August, proceeding to Calcutta with all practicable dispatch, where he arrived on the 10th of September.* †

The condition of the Nawaub's and Company's affairs in Bengal was a matter of serious consideration, and required the immediate attention of the new Governor. The administration of Meer Jaffier Khán was decidedly unpopular throughout the country, his own follies and excesses had weakened the Government, whilst the atrocious cruelties of his son Meerun had excited a general feeling of dread and dislike amongst all classes. (The inhuman massacre of nearly all the relatives of the preceding Soobahdars, who had been collected and retained prisoners at Dacca, was the crowning act of Meerun's atrocities, and it requires little stretch of imagination to believe with the native historian of that period, that this foul act had filled the cup of his iniquities, and that his own quick succeeding fate exhibited the indignation and punishment inflicted by Providence on such a monster. Amongst those who fell in this massacre, were the two daughters of Ali Verdee Khán, Gaseetah and Ameenah Begums, the former the widow of Shah Ahmud Jung, the latter the widow of Zyndah Ahmud Khán, and mother of Sooraj-oo-dowlah; Morad-oo-Dowlah, the son of Khoolie Khán, and adopted son of Shah Ahmud Jung, and Lootfoon-Nissah, the widow of Sooraj-oo-dowlah, with her infant daughter. These were all cruelly murdered under Meerun's orders in the month of June: some alleged attempt to favour the escape of Morad-oo-Dowlah being the only plea for this act of atrocity.†) The

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 1, p. 83.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 130-3.—First Report, p. 124.—Indian Tracts, pp. 60-2.

weakness and crimes of the Durbar led to revolts and disturbances in every quarter, and nothing but the English influence maintained the Nawaub on the musnud. A.D. 1760.

But what more seriously affected the Government in Calcutta, was the fact that the misrule and extravagance of the Nawaub and his son had so completely exhausted the treasury and the resources of the Country, that not only did a considerable portion of the sum originally promised by the treaty of 1757, still remain unpaid, but the expenses of the troops which had for some months been in the field, continued undischarged; nor could the most urgent solicitations elicit payment from Meer Jaffier Khán; whilst so exhausted was the treasury in Calcutta, that there were literally no means of meeting the current demands. The enormous sums paid by Meer Jaffier Khán soon after his accession, were in a great measure beneficial only to individuals, the sum stipulated for the Company in reality covered little more than their previous losses and expenditure, and a large portion of it was at once remitted to the Madras Presidency, to defray the expenses of the war in that quarter: whilst a general impression of wealth was created, which led to the entertainment of extravagant establishments, and luxurious and expensive habits were introduced throughout the services and the community generally; the revenue of the territorial acquisitions were not nearly sufficient to meet the additional cost of the increased Civil and Military establishments rendered necessary, and the very successes of the Company seemed likely to entail their destruction. The credit of the English Government was at a very low ebb, Mr. Holwell in vain endeavoured to procure a small loan from the Juggut Seths,* and the machinery of Government was only kept going by heavy drafts on England, which placed the Company at home in a most difficult position, and very nearly brought the Court of Directors into the Gazette, compelling them actually to apply for time to meet the amount of the bills drawn upon them as they became due.

Mr. Holwell, during his short Government, had seen the ne-

* Holwell's India Tracts, p. 58.

A. D. 1760. cessity for some change in the administration of the Soobah-daree, and was openly disposed to remove Meer Jaffier Khán from his situation, partly from prejudice and partly from a natural contempt for the character of the man. On the arrival of Mr. Vansittart, the former Gentleman, when resigning his charge and preparing for his departure to England, laid before the Council an abstract of the state of affairs, containing much truth and sound sense, though somewhat coloured by party and personal prejudice, in which the vices and weakness of the Nawaub and his son were exhibited; their various instances of treachery to the English forcibly dwelt upon, particularly as regarded their negociation with the Mahrattas, the Dutch, and more recently with the Emperor; the inefficient state of the existing government of the province, its abuses, unpopularity and continued disturbance, clearly shown; and finally the ruinous effect of this misrule upon the Company's affairs was pointed out, as also the absolute necessity for some immediate and radical change.*

Such was the difficult and perplexing prospect which the new Governor found awaiting his arrival; one of his first measures was, as already stated, to send for Colonel Caillaud, with whom he had been personally acquainted at Madras, and on whose integrity and experience he greatly relied. This officer, [who found the intimation of his promotion from England to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel awaiting his arrival,] had advocated the support of the existing Government as long as was practicable, but he now felt convinced of the necessity for a change in the administration of affairs, as he saw plainly that no reformation or improvements were to be expected from Meer Jaffier Khán. He recommended a plan somewhat similar to that previously entertained by Mr. Holwell, for entering into a treaty with the Emperor, reducing the Nawaub to his legitimate position as an officer of the Court of Delhi, compelling him to cede certain districts to the Company for the payment of their claims, to dismiss some of his more obnoxious ministers, discharge a large portion of the rabble army he maintained, which was a very heavy drain on his

* First Report, pp. 33 and 112-5.—Holwell's India Tracts, pp. 11-20.—Vansittart's Narrative, pp. 46-63.

finances, and generally to introduce reform and retrenchment into his administration.*

A. D. 1760.
July.

But in the mean time, affairs were fast approaching a crisis ; on intelligence being received of Meerun's death, the troops at Moorsledabad had broken out into open and serious mutiny, scaled the walls of Meer Jaffier Khán's palace, invaded the sanctity of his Zenana, loaded him with reproach and abuse, and threatened not only his administration but his life ; for two days the whole city was in a state of tumult and disorder, and tranquillity was only restored by the intervention of Meer Mahommud Kossim Allee Khán, the Nawaub's son-in-law, who brought about an accommodation with the troops, procuring a promise for the early and full payment of their heavy arrears, for which he himself became responsible. This appeased the tumult for the time, but discontent and disorder still pervaded the whole force. At Patna, on the departure of Colonel Caillaud, the Nawaub's troops stationed there became more uncontrollable than ever, their clamours and disaffection were loudly and continually proclaimed, whilst great numbers of them from day to day deserted to the Emperor. In every district of the Government, open independence or a nominal adherence to the cause of the Emperor were proclaimed, and the whole country was one general scene of anarchy and confusion.

After the mutiny at Moorsledabad, Meer Kossim Khán, who had previously been an object of dislike to the Nawaub, owing apparently to some jealousy on the part of Meerun, whose own sister he had espoused, now gradually obtained the favour of Meer Jaffier Khán, and as the constitution of the latter was infirm, and his remaining children were infants, Meer Kossim Khán was looked upon as presumptive heir to the Soobahdaree, an impression which, if Meer Jaffier Khán did not sanction, he did not attempt to oppose. Meer Kossim Khán was now sent to Calcutta on the part of the Nawaub, to welcome the new Governor, and to arrange other matters of business, and being a man of very considerable

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 1, pp. 66-8.

A. D. 1760.
September.

shrewdness and ability, well acquainted with the state of affairs and the opinions and views of the English, he played his cards with such skill, acknowledging the existence of the evils of the administration, pointing out their causes, the means of improvement and the obstacles to reform, that he was looked upon as the fittest person to restore the efficiency of the Government; and on the 27th of September 1760, a treaty was entered into between him and the Select Committee, by which it was arranged that he should be appointed the Nawaub's Deputy, and possess the whole power and influence of the Government; but that Meer Jaffier Khán during his life time, was to be permitted to enjoy the personal advantages and the rank and honours of Soobahdar, with a liberal allowance for his state and maintenance: that Meer Kossim Khán should receive the support of the English and the aid of their forces when required; that all arrears due by Meer Jaffier Khán should be promptly paid up, that the expences of the force should be regularly discharged, for which purpose the districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong were to be assigned to the Company, who were to sustain the losses or obtain the profits that might accrue between the revenues of these provinces, as realized, and the sums for which they were given in assignment. Other advantages to the Company were stipulated in the treaty; a quantity of jewels that had been pledged by Meer Jaffier Khán, were to be redeemed by cash payments without delay, and one-half of the Chunam produced at Sylhet, was to be allowed to the Company on purchase, free of all duties, which alone afforded a considerable revenue; no arrangements were to be made with the Emperor without the mutual consent of the contracting parties.* Other terms, though not included in the treaty, were understood as binding; the exaction of batta on Calcutta Rupees was to be forbidden, under severe penalties, throughout the provinces; the ill-armed and insubordinate rabble composing the greater portion of the Nawaub's Army were to be reduced, and the force placed upon a limited but more efficient footing; Meer Jaffier Khán's fa-

* For the actual treaty, vide Appendix N.

vourites, Keenoo Ram, Mohun Loll and Cheekoon, a set of A. D. 1760.
menial upstarts who had monopolized nearly the whole October.
of the revenue administration of the country, were to be discharged, and a rigorous and active system of Government introduced throughout the Provinces. Nor were the personal interest of the Members of the Select Committee forgotten;—though no precise stipulations appear to have been made, liberal presents were promised by Meer Kossim Khán, and notwithstanding, an affectation of coyness and reluctance in accepting them at his installation, when, in fact, he was unable to provide the means, they were considered as sums which he was pledged to pay when able, and which before very long, were actually received. These sums were severally as follows:—to Mr. Vansittart as Governor and President of the Select Committee, 500,000 Rupees; to Mr. Holwell, 270,000; to Mr. Sumner, 255,000; to Mr. McGuire, 255,000; to Colonel Caillaud, 200,000; to Mr. Culling Smith, 134,000; to Captain Yorke, 134,000 Rupees.* The receipt of these presents,—a disgraceful case of plunder which even the loose ideas and practice of the period cannot extenuate,—was much the most objectionable part of the transaction, as it gave an undoubted colour of personal interest, to what was otherwise defensible as a measure of wisdom and necessity. In justice to Colonel Caillaud, however, it should be stated, that although he ultimately received the benefit of the arrangement, he joined conscientiously in the original refusal, and can scarcely be considered as a party to the transaction, as his share of the donation was received by Mr. Vansittart, after himself had left Bengal, and was transmitted to his agents in England, from whom he first learned that such a sum was standing at credit.†

Preliminaries being now all arranged, it only remained to carry the contemplated measures into execution.

Meer Kossim Khán set out from Calcutta on the 20th of September, three days after signing the treaty, and proceeded to Moorshedabad to prepare for the approaching

* 2nd Report of the Select Committee, p. 20.—Carraccioli, vol. 2, p. 195.

† First Report, pp. 33-4.

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revolution. On the 2nd of October, Mr. Vansittart and Colonel Caillaud started, proceeding to Moorshedabad by easy marches, accompanied by a detachment under the command of Captain Yorke, who had previously been appointed Town and Fort Major; (the first occupant on record of that situation.) This detachment was composed of 2 Companies of the European Battalion, the 1st or Captain Jennings' Company of Artillery, with 4 Field pieces, and the 2d Battalion of Native Infantry, then commanded by Captain James Tabby, who had succeeded Captain MacLean, and who retained the command of this Battalion as long as it existed, from which circumstance it was generally known by his name. To obviate any suspicion in the mind of the Nawaub, it was given out that this detachment was intended to reinforce the Army at Patna.* On the 14th, the whole party reached Kossimbazar, and on the following day, Meer Jaffier Khán paid Mr. Vansittart a visit, when a long conference ensued, in which the latter expatiated on the disordered state of the country, the deficiencies of the revenues, the malversations of the Nawaub's favourites, and the dangers threatening the Government and the whole province. To this Meer Jaffier Khán listened attentively, acknowledged the full extent of the evils, promised compliance with the wishes or directions of the English Government, and expressed his willingness to accede to the introduction of any measures of reform that might be considered necessary. Mr. Vansittart, softened by these professions, appears to have wavered in his resolve, and after advising the Nawaub to consider attentively what he had said, and recommending Meer Kossim Khán to his notice as the most fitting minister and coadjutor in the projected reforms, he bade farewell to Meer Jaffier Khán, who immediately returned to his palace and closeted himself with his old ministers and favourites, Keenoo Ram, Mohun Loll, and Cheekoon; these men excited his fears and indignation against Meer Kossim Khán and persuaded him to resist all propositions that the Governor might make.

* Vansittart's Narrative, p. 108.

On the 16th, the Governor returned the Nawaub's visit; the interview was merely one of form. On the evening of the 18th, Meer Jaffier Khán visited Mr. Vansittart by appointment, to discuss and arrange matters; the latter again placed the ruinous state of affairs before the Nawaub, and submitted three official documents recapitulating these complaints and embodying the substance of the wishes of the English Government. With great difficulty Mr. Vansittart persuaded the Nawaub to send for Meer Kossim Khán, but on the arrival of the latter, Meer Jaffier Khán treated him with such marked dislike and jealousy, that it was evident, unless the power of the Deputy was made absolute, no reform could be introduced.

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Meer Jaffier Khán returned to his palace on the other side of the river, and Meer Kossim Khán with great justice pointed out that matters had now gone too far for his own safety, and that unless he was vested with absolute power in the administration, as originally intended, he must decline all interference and retire from Moorshedabad for his personal security. Mr. Vansittart could not but acknowledge the truth of these statements, and it was accordingly resolved to carry out the original plan.*

The 19th was allowed to the Nawaub for consideration and reply to the letters addressed to him; but no answer being received, Colonel Caillaud proceeded between 3 and 4 o'clock on the following morning, with Captain Yorke's detachment, crossed the river and joined Meer Kossim Khán's force, when they together surrounded the Nawaub's palace before daybreak. The English detachment was drawn up in the court-yard without exciting any alarm or disturbance, but the inner gates were shut; Colonel Caillaud then sent in a letter from the Governor, containing the final propositions for the removal of the three obnoxious favourites, and the resignation of the entire administration to Meer Kossim Khán, as his Deputy and successor. On receipt of these proposals, the old Nawaub burst into a paroxysm of rage, and gave his decided refusal to the propositions, announcing his intention

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 1, pp. 117-8

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to resist to the last and abide his fate rather than comply with them. The Colonel, however, forbore all hostilities, and as the Nawaub's rage became exhausted, the representations of Messrs. Hastings and Lushington brought him to a more reasonable sense of his situation. He at length sent for the Colonel, and though he remained inflexible in his determination not to accede to the terms proposed, declaring that he knew his life would not be safe for a day, were his son-in-law invested with the whole authority of Government, he at the same time expressed his readiness to resign the administration entirely, to transfer all the ensigns of authority to Meer Kossim Khán, and to retire to a private station under the protection of the Company. This alternative was accepted at once, the Nowbut sounded in honour of the new Soobahdar, who was immediately proclaimed throughout the city, and the old Nawaub came out to the Colonel, declaring that his life was in the hands of that officer. Boats were immediately provided, on which he embarked at once with all his property and family, declaring that he would not trust himself in his palace, to the mercies of Meer Kossim Khán, for even a single night: at his own request an European guard was posted for the security of his person and property in the boats, and on the following morning he started for Calcutta, escorted by a Company of Europeans and two Companies of Sipahis, under the command of Captain Thomas Robertson. A couple of houses were provided for himself and suite at Chitpore, and a liberal allowance settled upon him by Meer Kossim Khán.* Had the old man possessed but a very little philosophy or common sense, he would have been infinitely more happy than amidst the cares and troubles of his former exalted but precarious situation;—and though he may not exactly have felt this, he appears to have been content in his new position.

In the mean time Meer Kossim Khán had been seated upon the vacant Musnud and invested with all the usual insignia of the Soobahdaree under the title of Nusseer-ool-Moolk,

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 23.

Imtiáz-oo-dowlab, Meer Mohommud Kossim Allee Khán, and Nusrut Jung. The Governor and all the English officers gave him their congratulations and the usual compliments, and all the officers of the Durbar and the principal men of the city hastened to do the same, expressing their joy at the change that had taken place.

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Meer Kossim Khán was now Nawaub of Bengal, and a few words regarding his character as then known and subsequently developed, may not be out of place. He was a man of considerable ability, far above the ordinary run of his countrymen, active and energetic, an excellent man of business and attentive to all details himself; he was shrewd and of quick discernment, expert in estimating the characters of those with whom he had to deal, and where his own immediate interests or passions were not concerned, he appears to have had the good of the province generally at heart, and to have administered the government both in the Judicial and Revenue departments with vigour and justice;—but, on the other hand, he was violent in his passions, ambitious, avaricious, and unscrupulous as to the means he employed to gain his ends: he was, further, deficient in physical courage, and cruel in his resentments; although indebted to the English for his rise to power, he was jealous of their influence and dreaded their encroachments and growing ascendancy. Under more fortunate circumstances he might have proved an able, if not a good ruler; as it was, his pride was wounded and his passions excited in the earliest stages of his administration, which, though marked with much ability, was stamped with treachery and cruelty that long rendered his name a bye-word to English ears.

But to revert to his accession to power:—he knew that every thing depended upon raising funds to meet the demands of the English, who were not likely to be patient, nor to be very particular as to the means he employed, so that the result was satisfactory; it was also necessary that the clamours of the Army should be silenced by the early payment of at least a portion of their arrears. In addition to the terms he had agreed to in Calcutta, he had pledged himself on ob-

A. D. 1760. taining the Soobahdaree, to advance 5 lakhs of rupees to the
November. Company for the expences of the war on the Coast, where

money was urgently required. To meet all these demands, he found in the treasury only about 50,000 rupees, and plate and jewels to the amount of between 3 and 4 lakhs more ; the latter were immediately converted into coin. The revenue accounts were in a state of inextricable confusion, and Keenoo Ram, Mohun Lall, and Cheekoon, who had monopolized the sole management of this branch of affairs, declared that very little was due on this account to the Treasury ;—but Meer Kossim Khan thought differently, and having these individuals in his power, he speedily made them disgorge a considerable portion of their ill-gotten gains, stripped them of their authority, and confiscated their estates ; and he followed the same course with all their subordinate employés. By this means, and by a somewhat rigorous exercise of his authority generally, he procured means to satisfy the troops at Moorshedabad, to advance two and half lakhs to the Company for remittance to Madras, where it arrived most opportunely, and to make over 7 lakhs of rupees to Colonel Caillaud for the payment of the troops at Patna, 2 of which were for the English detachment and 5 for the Nawaub's army. *

In the meantime, whilst this revolution was in progress, Major Carnac arrived in Bengal and hastened to join the Governor and Colonel at Moorshedabad ; this officer had embarked for England with Lord Clive, but on arrival at St. Helena, he received intelligence of his appointment to the command of the Bengal Troops, with the rank of Major, in the room of Major Caillaud, who was at the same time promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and directed to return to the Coast, and assume the command of the Madras Army in succession to Colonel Lawrence. Major Carnac immediately returned to Bengal, where he arrived in the middle of October. Mr. Vansittart, however, directed that Colonel Caillaud should for a time retain the general command, as the senior officer, and because his services and experience were required

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 1, p. 140.

in the settlement of the important measures then in con-
templation. A. D. 1760.
September.

Colonel Caillaud started for Patna on the 4th of November, with this much required supply of money, accompanied by Major Carnac, to whom it was arranged he should make over the command as soon as matters were in a tolerably settled condition. Mr. Vansittart left Moorshedabad on the same day, and arrived at Calcutta on the 7th of November, Captain Yorke being left in charge of the detachment at Kossimbazar. ✓ It should be mentioned here, that prior to the final completion of the treaty with Meer Mahommud Kossim Allee Khan in Calcutta, Colonel Caillaud proposed, on the 22d of September, a modification of the European portion of the force, which then amounted to about 1200 Infantry; by which it was arranged that 2 Troops of European Dragoons and 1 of Hussars should be formed from the Infantry, as also two additional Companies of Artillery, and the remainder of the force reduced to 10 Companies, including 2 Grenadier Companies.* This arrangement as regarded the Artillery, was never carried into effect, but the 3 Troops of Cavalry were ordered to be raised, though on a reduced scale, and the best men were selected for the purpose; the establishment of each Troop of Dragoons consisted apparently of 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, and 1 Cornet, with 60 non-commissioned, rank and file; the Hussars, who also acted as a Body Guard, of 1 Lieutenant, 1 Cornet, and 36 non-commissioned, rank and file. Very great difficulty was experienced in procuring horses for mounting these men, and their numbers, even when complete, which they never were, would have been too weak to be of much service; the consequence was, that the efficiency of the Infantry was greatly impaired by the formation of a most expensive body of almost nominal and perfectly useless Cavalry. ✓

On returning to Patna in the end of July previous, Colonel Caillaud having experienced throughout the campaign the great want of a body of Cavalry, had commenced raising two troops of Mogul Horse, each consisting as appears from an

A. D. 1760. early return of 1 Russildar, 3 Jemadars, 6 Duffadars, 2 Trumpeters, 1 Nishan-burdar and 90 Privates, which force, though also on an extravagant scale of pay, was found useful on several occasions, and was subsequently largely increased. No European Officers or Serjeants appear to have been attached to these Troops in the first instance.*

Mr. Vansittart on his arrival in Calcutta, laid the whole of the proceedings connected with the recent revolution before the Council, when the measure was assailed by a strong and unexpected opposition in that body. Notwithstanding the obvious advantages already obtained, and the improved prospects held out by the change, the personal interests of the opponents led them to condemn the whole proceeding, and a series of disgraceful disputes commenced, which were finally productive of the destruction of many of those concerned, and of the most disastrous consequences to the interests of the Company generally, from which they were only rescued by the gallantry of the Army and the ability of its leaders.

Foremost amongst the opponents of Mr. Vansittart, who was rendered generally unpopular by his having been brought from another Presidency, was Mr. Amyatt, the senior Member of Council next to Mr. Holwell, [who was on the eve of departure ;] this gentleman never forgave the fact of his own supercession ; he was supported by Mr. Ellis, who had just arrived from England with Major Carnac, a man of violent passions, and who took offence at Mr. Vansittart's refusal to appoint him to succeed Mr. Amyatt at Patna, a situation which was conferred on Mr. McGuire ; Major Carnac joined this party, his pride having been wounded by Mr. Vansittart's resolution to retain Colonel Caillaud in the command of the troops until affairs were settled. Mr. Smyth and Mr. Verelst also took the same side, considering themselves slighted as Members of Council in not having been officially informed of the arrangements in contemplation, which were entirely conducted by the Select Committee.

It is also but natural to suppose that all these parties felt some annoyance at finding themselves excluded from sharing

* Ninth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, p. 509.

in the pecuniary advantages accruing from the revolution. Mr. Vansittart however possessed the majority in Council, being supported by Mr. Sumner, Mr. McGuire, Mr. Hastings, and Colonel Caillaud. A. D. 1760.
November.

After Colonel Caillaud's departure for Patna, measures were adopted for reducing the several disturbed districts into subordination. Captain Martin White was sent with a detachment of Europeans and Sipahis and a detail of Artillery to Midnapore, which province he speedily brought into order after very little resistance, and leaving a detail of Sipahis for its support and controul, and re-organizing the local Companies stationed there, he proceeded Northward towards Beerbhoom, the Rajah of which province was in open rebellion. In the meantime, Meer Kossim Khán had himself advanced from Moorshedabad with a considerable force, supported by Major Yorke's detachment, with a view, of bringing that district, as also the province of Burdwan, into a state of tranquillity and obedience.*

The Camp was for some time formed at Boodgaon watching the movements of the Beerbhoom Rajah's troops, who had taken up a strong position in a difficult part of the country, near Kerwah, where, under the command of Assud Zémán Khán, they were intrenched to the number of 5,000 Horse and 20,000 Foot. On ascertaining these circumstances, Captain Yorke wrote to Captain White, who was then encamped to the Northward of Burdwan, acquainting him with the nature and strength of the Enemy's position, and directing him to take a circuitous route to the North-East and fall upon their rear, whilst he engaged their attention in front with his own and the Nawaub's troops. This duty Captain White executed with such celerity and skill, that he completely surprised the enemy, who, confident of the strength of their position, never anticipated the possibility of any attack in the rear, and consequently were ignorant of his approach until they found the English party in the centre of their camp.

Their confusion and consternation was then excessive, and the sound of the firing serving as a signal for Captain

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 156-8.

A. D. 1760.
December.

Yorke, he advanced with his detachment, followed at some distance by Meer Kossim Khán's troops, and carried the lines without difficulty; the Enemy were completely defeated and fled in all directions, after suffering very heavy loss.*

This victory effectually broke the power of the Beerbhoom Rajah, and whole province, as well as that of Burdwan, was speedily brought into a state of obedience and tranquillity.

The conduct of his own troops on this occasion convinced Meer Kossim Khán of their utter inefficiency, and he immediately set about a reform of his army, in which, though no soldier himself, he was eminently successful.

In the mean time, Colonel Caillaud had arrived at Patna with the welcome supply of money for the troops. The English detachment was at once paid up, and the Nawaub's Army received a portion of their arrears, but the whole sum was too heavy to be liquidated at once, and unfortunately the spirit of discontent was not eradicated from amongst them.

One of the Colonel's first measures was to reinforce the party left at Mongheer under Ensign John Stables, a young officer of great ability, who had come round as a volunteer from Madras with Colonel Caillaud, in November 1759. On the arrival of the reinforcement, he was directed to attack the Kurrukpore Rajah, who still remained in open opposition to Meer Kossim Khán's authority. His detachment when complete, consisted of 3 Companies of Sipahis; a party of about 50 or 60 pseudo Europeans in the Nawaub's service, composed of renegade deserters, Armenians, Portuguese, and Topasses, with the 2 Troops of Mogul Horse, making a total force of about 550 men. In the beginning of December, the Rajah hearing of this reinforcement sent his Bukshee with 2000 men, Horse and Foot, to oppose the party. This officer encamped about 3 miles from Mongheer, intending to make an attack the following day; but Ensign Stables hearing of his approach determined

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 159.—Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 270.

to anticipate him, and getting his little party under arms, at one o'clock the next morning he marched to surprise the enemy's camp.*

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The alarm however speedily spread, and he found the enemy strongly posted under cover of an old intrenchment; but he did not hesitate to attack them, and finally succeeded through the gallantry of the Sipahis in forcing the Camp at the point of the bayonet, and putting the enemy to flight; in this affair he lost several men, but upwards of 100 of the enemy lay dead in the intrenchment.† By this time the day was beginning to break, and finding his men in high spirits and flushed with their success, he determined to follow up his blow by advancing directly upon the Rajah's position at Kurrukupore, a distance of about 16 miles farther; he accordingly sent forward his Cavalry in pursuit of the fugitives, and advanced more steadily with his Infantry. After about 4 hours' march, they arrived within three miles of Kurrukupore, where they found the Rajah posted to oppose them with his whole force, including the fugitives from the morning's attack. Ensign Stables appears to have made an excellent disposition of his little party, and attacking the enemy's flank he soon put the whole to the rout, and followed them to the village or town of Kurrukupore, when they rallied and made a desperate stand in the Rajah's palace; but here also they were again completely defeated, though not without loss to the assailants, who having dispersed the enemy, set fire to the town and palace and reduced the whole to ashes.‡

The following morning they returned to Mongheer, having in one day, marched upwards of 20 miles, been engaged three times, and completely destroyed the force of an enemy ten-fold their own number,—a proceeding that speedily resulted in the submission of the Rajah and the restoration of tranquillity in the district. This gallant affair was the making of Ensign Stable's fortune; being a protegee of the Colonel, that officer

* Ninth Report of the Select Committee, p. 71.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

A. D. 1761. made a very favourable report of his conduct to the Council, who transmitted the report with a further recommendation to the Court of Directors; the latter body expressed their sense of Ensign Stable's conduct in very strong terms, and that officer having risen to the rank of Captain in October, 1763, and retired from the service in January 1769, was in 1781 appointed by the Court of Directors, a Member of Council in Bengal, on account of the high reputation he possessed.*

Colonel Caillaud employed the short time he was at Patna in reorganizing and equipping the force stationed there, but his presence being urgently required at Madras, to take the command of the Company's forces at that Presidency, vacant by the retirement of Colonel Lawrence, he left Patna on the 31st of December for Calcutta, from whence he proceeded to join his new appointment.†

Major Carnac now assumed the command of the Bengal force, and that officer determined upon an immediate attack on the Emperor, who in this long interval of rest, had considerably increased his power and military strength. The fact of having been so long able to maintain his ground had added to his influence, as also had the feeling of veneration still attached to the Imperial name, whilst the desertions from the Nawaub's army had contributed materially to strengthen his force.

His head quarters were established at Behar, but Daoudnuggur on the Soane, and Gyah on the Fulgo, were also occupied by large detachments of his troops, and the revenues of the province were collected in his name up to within a few miles of the city of Patna. The great obstacle to Major Carnac's operations, existed in the disorganised and mutinous state of the Nawaub's troops. In addition to the five lakhs of rupees Colonel Caillaud had brought up, in part payment of their arrears, the Nawaub, upon a further representation from that officer, sent three lakhs more with Nobut Roy, who was ordered to examine into and settle their accounts, and he also made arrangements for the remittance of six lakhs additional in December,

* Ninth Report of the Select Committee, p. 74. † Ironside's Narrative, p. 23.

January, and February, for the expense of the united forces. A. D. 1761.
 But insubordination once introduced into an army is not January.
 easily eradicated, except by the most severe measures; and the Nawaub's troops, now habituated to clamour and discontents, continued to exhibit this feeling after the grounds for complaint were either removed or in evident and immediate course of removal. Aware of this state of feeling, Major Carnac when he had made up his mind to march, addressed them on the subject, requested their co-operation, pointed out that their circumstances would not be improved by remaining at Patna, where supplies were daily becoming more scarce and expensive, and that their best chance was to move into the districts now occupied by the enemy. To these arguments they turned a deaf ear, although it was pointed out to them, that by refusing to march they forfeited all claims to the Nawaub's consideration, and to the portion of their arrears still due. The Major therefore determined to move with his own troops only, thinking it more than probable that the fear of being left alone would induce his *allies* to march also; this anticipation proved perfectly correct, for they immediately followed his example and joined him on the first march.* In the mean time, the Emperor had concentrated his force at Behar, where he was joined by Kamghar Khán, Rajah Booniad Singh, and several officers and Zemindars of influence and distinction; but Rajahs Pulhwán Singh and Bulwunt Singh held aloof, from a jealousy of Kamghar Khán, who exercised paramount influence over the Emperor. On the 15th of January 1761, the English and Nawaub's troops arrived on the banks of the Mahanee, or rather a branch of that River, about 3 coss west of the city of Behar, near the village of Suan,† when they found

* Ironside's Narrative, pp. 23-4.

† Mill places the scene of this action near Gyah, misled in all probability by the subsequent negotiation taking place near that town. Lieutenant Ironside's journal places it on the river Soane, but this is evidently a misprint, as shown by the context, and more especially by the following remark:—"A river which runs about 3 coss west to the city of Behar;" it is probable that the stream on the banks of which it occurred, was called from the village close to the English position the "*Suan*," which, by a typographical error, has passed into the "*Soane*." The branch of the stream in rear or east of the village is now called the Banowra.

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15th Jan.

the Emperor's troops drawn up in position on the opposite side. The English Artillery under the command of Captain Broadbridge, immediately took up a position close to the stream, and opened their fire upon the enemy, under cover of which the Major crossed over the whole of his own force, when the enemy retired without offering any opposition, and took up a fresh position at some distance, protected by several ditches and banks; this movement excited a suspicion in the Major's mind, that some treachery was intended by the Nawaub's troops; but as they remained on their original ground on the Western bank, he considered the river a sufficient protection for his rear, and as soon as his Artillery had crossed, he pushed on to drive the enemy from their new position; this was abandoned, as soon as the English had arrived within musket range, and another occupied in the rear equally tenable, from which they were in like manner driven to a third, when having unaccountably relinquished these several advantages of ground, they finally drew up in tolerable order on the plain. The Major now formed his troops for attack, the Europeans in the centre, with a Battalion of Sipahis on either flank, having the guns in the intervals, and the remaining Battalion of Sipahis, with the small body of Cavalry in a second line, as a reserve. The guns pushed forward and opened their fire to cover the advance, when just as a large body of the enemy's Horse were preparing to charge, a lucky shot from one of the 12-pounders wounded the Elephant on which the Emperor was mounted, and killed the Mahout, when the beast smarting with pain, and freed from controul on the loss of his driver, immediately turned about and rushed towards the rear, creating general alarm and confusion.* Taking advantage of this circumstance, Major Carnac formed his Artillery in one battery to the flank, and under the cover of their fire, which was delivered with admirable effect, he pushed forward with the Infantry, before which the enemy began gradually to recoil, and finally broke and dispersed in all directions. The English

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 24.

continued to pursue them, but speedily came in contact with Monsieur Law, who, with his party, had taken up a position to cover the retreat. This gallant and able officer, apparently wearied of the hopeless and toilsome life he had been leading for the last three years, seems to have made up his mind to make one final and desperate stand on this occasion, and either to succeed or perish in the attempt. The English immediately advanced against this detachment, which was drawn up in line, with their Artillery, consisting of 6 pieces, in front; the Major whose own guns were in the rear, pushed on steadily with the Infantry; as the columns approached, the French guns opened upon them, but fortunately at such an elevation that almost all the shot flew over the heads of the English, who closed upon them rapidly but steadily with *shouldered arms*, without attempting to return a shot, and leaving a party to secure and guard the captured guns as they passed, rushed on to encounter the line of French Infantry;* but the latter, astonished at this coolness and determination, broke at once and fled in disorder, leaving Monsieur Law with 13 or 14 of his officers, and some 50 men who stood by their commander and their colours. This gallant little band of gentlemen and soldiers appeared determined to sell their lives dearly, and prepared for a desperate resistance; but Major Carnac with Captain Knox and the other English officers, respecting this spirited conduct, halted their own men and advanced alone to the little party, raised their hats and saluted them with the courtesy they merited; the Major then requested Monsieur Law to surrender, pointing out the utter hopelessness of resistance and the inutility of attempting it, when all had been done that skill or bravery could effect. Monsieur Law replied that if permitted to surrender as they were, he would agree that they should be considered prisoners of war, but that he would only give up his sword with his life. Anxious to save the lives of such brave men, the Major readily consented, and Monsieur Law and his officers gave themselves up, but were permitted to retain their swords;

A. D. 1761.
15th Jan.

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 25.

A. D. 1761.
15th Jan.

the English Officers immediately advanced towards them, shook them by the hand, complimented them on their conduct, and entertained them as friends in their own tents, by which conduct they raised their reputation, even amongst the Native powers, far more than they had done by their most daring hardihood and success.* The English were too much fatigued to follow up the retreating enemy, and no support could be obtained from the Nawaub's troops, who had kept carefully in the rear during the whole action. The consequence was, that though the victory was complete, the Emperor was enabled to collect his beaten troops and retire with a force, but little diminished to the Northward of Behar. The Corps engaged in this action were a portion of the European Battalion (*now the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers*); the 2nd Company of Artillery, no longer in existence, the 1st Battalion of Sipahis, under Captain Lieutenant Broadbrook, (*now the 1st Regiment of N. I.*), the 3rd Battalion of Sipahis, under Lieutenant William Turner, subsequently destroyed; and the 4th Battalion of Sipahis, under Lieutenant Hugh Grant (*now the 5th Regiment of N. I.*), together with the small details of European and Native Cavalry.

The Emperor now proceeded Northward towards the Ganges, with the apparent intention of pushing for Patna, which was left nearly unprotected, and thence to the Soane; but Major Carnac, suspecting this design, by forced marches got between him and the city, and thus compelled him to turn once more to the southward, through the districts that the exactions of his officers and the excesses of his troops had nearly devastated; the consequence was, that the Imperial army was reduced to extreme difficulties for provisions, and numbers began to desert. The English, whose arrangements for supplies were better managed, followed close upon his track. Immediately after the action at Suan, on the 15th

* Ironside's Narrative, pp. 24-5. For the Native version of this transaction, vide Appendix O.—This Monsieur Law whose adventurous career always exhibits him in the light of a gallant soldier and honorable gentleman, was a son of the famous John Law, the Scotch financier in the French Service, better known as "Mississippi Law."

of January, the Major had sent Rajah Shitab Roy to the Emperor, to open negotiations and offer terms, but owing to the ascendancy of Kamghar Khán, whose interests were opposed to any pacific arrangements, these offers were rejected; Shitab Roy on taking his leave of the Emperor expressed his regret at the failure of his mission, and observed that he felt convinced "His Majesty would himself shortly seek those terms of pacification, which he now refused, and would not find them; or if he found any at all, they would fall short of those now proffered, and not redound so much to His Majesty's honour and advantage."* As thus foretold, so it speedily occurred;—oppressed by the difficulties of his situation, the falling off of his followers, and the harassing and unwearied pursuit of the English force, the Emperor on the 29th of January sent his Bukshee Fyz Oolah Khán to the Major to enter into terms; Major Carnac replied that he was not authorised to enter into the details of any treaty, but if as a preliminary step, the Emperor would discharge Kamghar Khán, the prime mover in these troubles, and would immediately cross the Soane with his troops, he would refer the matter to the Council in Calcutta, would himself suspend all hostilities, and Rajah Rám Narain should afford the means of subsistence to the Emperor whilst he remained on the other side of the Soane. In the mean time, the English relaxed not in their pursuit, and on the 2nd of February they came up with the Emperor's camp; the latter drew out his troops in preparation for action, but sent to Major Carnac requesting him to halt; instead of complying with which, the English force advanced to the attack, when the Emperor and his whole army fled in consternation, and his Majesty proceeded upwards of 20 miles without halting. This measure had the desired effect, the unfortunate Sháh Allum immediately wrote to express his readiness to enter into the terms proposed, dismissed Kamghar Khán at once, and offered to repair to the English camp in person, if permitted to do so. Perceiv-

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January.

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February.

ing that the Emperor was now in earnest, the Major halted his force, and after various preliminaries and messages, a meeting took place on the 6th of February between Sháh Allum and the Major, at a spot situated between the two camps, at no great distance from Gyah; on the following day the Emperor visited the English camp, where he was treated with every mark of compliment and respect, and was so well pleased with his reception, that on the 8th of February, he came over and took up his residence entirely with the English, pitching his Camp close to their's. It was now agreed that pending instructions from Calcutta, all hostilities should cease, that Sháh Allum should be treated as Emperor of Hindustan, and that he should be allowed by Ram Narain 1,000 Rupees a day for his subsistence.* These objects having been thus happily obtained, the Major's next care was to bring the Emperor to Patna; and, accordingly, having left a detachment at Gyah of 2 Companies of European Infantry, 6 Companies of Sipahis, a detail of Artillery, with 2 field pieces, and one of the troops of Mogul Horse, the whole under the command of Captain Alexander Champion, together with a considerable portion of the Nawaub's army under Rajah Doolub Ram, for the protection of the southern portion of the province of Behar, he commenced his march to Patna, where he arrived with the Emperor on the 14th of February. The latter established his quarters at Bankeepore, and the English detachment encamped between him and the city near the Western gate. It had been arranged that Sháh Allum should take up his residence in the Citadel, but from this he was deterred by the apprehensions of his followers, who suspected that some treachery was meditated; at length, tired of these delays and excuses, Major Carnac refused to see him except in the Fort, and threatened a suspension of his daily allowance if this exhibition of suspicion continued. This hint had the desired effect, and on the 22nd of the month he made his entry into the

* Ironside's Narrative, pp. 25-6.

city, attended by his officers and principal followers and 300 Mogul Horse, due precautions having been taken to prevent any disturbance. Satisfied at last that no injury to his person was intended, he now urgently requested that coin might be struck and the kootbah read in his name, which acknowledgment of his title, coming from the English, whose power was now beginning to be understood and respected throughout the country, would, he stated, be of the greatest advantage to his cause, would raise the spirits of his followers, would fix the wavering, and induce many parties to declare in his favour. He was also most desirous to persuade the English to embrace his claims, and support him with a force to enable him to advance upon Delhi and take possession of his capital and throne; he represented that he had been acknowledged by Ahmed Sháh Abdálee previous to the withdrawal of that Monarch from Hindoostan, that many of the principal chiefs were ready to join him, that the power of the Mahrattas was completely broken by their recent terrible defeat and slaughter at Paneeput, on the 7th of January preceding, and that with the English assistance he was certain of success. He also begged for an increase to his daily stipend which he represented as too small for the support of his large establishment and force. To these requests Major Carnac and Mr. McGuire, who had now arrived at Patna as Chief of that Agency, declared their inability to comply without orders from Calcutta, but they took upon themselves to increase his stipend by an additional daily allowance of 300 rupees.* The prospect of an advance upon Delhi and the advantages to be expected from restoring the Monarch to his throne, appear for a moment to have dazzled the eyes of the Council, and to have been considered as feasible, but it was finally abandoned, partly from a conviction of the want of means and material, and partly owing to the dissensions and disputes in Council, in which any plan proposed by one party was certain of meeting with opposition from the other.

As matters stood, the Military establishment was found

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 26.

A. D. 1761. quite inadequate to the demands upon it, the whole force was now in the field, with exception to a small detachment at the Presidency, and the Local Companies at Midnapore, Burdwan, Dacca, Chittagong, and Kossimbazar. Accordingly, two new Battalions of Sipahis were ordered to be raised, one at Patna and the other at Chittagong, both of which appear to have been originally intended as Local Battalions, and to have been formed upon the Local Companies at those stations. The raising and command of the former was entrusted to Captain Giles Stibbert, and it was numbered the 6th Battalion, [*now the 9th Regiment of N. I.*] Under this able officer its organization and discipline progressed rapidly, and it was reported fit for service, long before the arms and accoutrements were received for its use.* The other Battalion was raised and commanded by Lieutenant John Mathews, and numbered the 7th Battalion. Its number was frequently changed, and it was finally disbanded for mutiny in the year 1784, being then the 4th Regiment, but it was generally known as the *Mathews-ka-Pultun*, and was during the twenty-three years of its existence, one of the most distinguished corps in the Bengal Army.†

Meer Kossim Khán, who had remained in the Lower Provinces settling the affairs of the Burdwan, Beerbhoom, and adjacent districts, now began to feel very uneasy at the attention paid to the Emperor at Patna; being fully aware that every favor and concession to that Prince must fall entirely upon his own treasury and revenues,—and being thoroughly acquainted with the state of parties in the English Council, he foresaw that the opponents of the Governor would gladly put forward the Emperor's interest with the object of prejudicing his own. He therefore hastened to Patna, where he arrived on the 1st of March, accompanied by the detachment under Major Yorke, who had recently been promoted to that grade, and fixed his quarters at Bykantpore.

* Williams, p. 117.

† Ibid, pp. 14-60. Captain Williams gives a very interesting account of this Corps, but as already stated, he assigns it too early an origin, and gives it credit for services performed by other Corps before it was in existence.

On arrival, he was visited by Major Carnac, and the long series of discussions and disputes which followed, appears to have commenced at the first interview. Meer Kossim Khán felt or affected to feel great dread of the Emperor's intentions towards himself, and positively refused to visit him in the city; moreover previous to his arrival, he had sent orders withdrawing all his troops that had been left by Major Carnac for the protection of the southern portion of the province. The Major was naturally offended that such a step should have been taken without any intimation being conveyed to him, as by this proceeding, the safety of the English detachment under Captain Champion was compromised; the latter officer was in consequence immediately ordered to return to Patna, a measure which in its turn excited the indignation of the Nawaub, who remonstrated against it, and asserted, that as he paid for the services of the English troops, he was entitled to employ them in any manner he thought proper, and that the Major was in such points bound to obey his orders: to this the latter replied, that he was perfectly ready to yield obedience in all points consistent with the honour of the service and the safety and efficiency of the force under his command, but no farther.* The result was, however, that Captain Champion was remanded with his detachment to Gyah; but the withdrawal of the Nawaub's troops had induced Kamghar Khán to descend from the hills, where he had taken refuge, and to plunder and devastate the southern portion of the province, which he was enabled to do with impunity for some time; he took possession of the small fort of Bellara and was occupied in the siege of the more important position of Kooseerah, where at length Captain Champion by forced marches, fell unexpectedly upon him, gave him a severe defeat, and drove him once more to seek safety in the hills.† In the mean time, arrangements were made to bring about an interview between the Emperor and the Nawaub for the formal settlement of certain points agreed upon. This was a

A. D. 1761.
April.

* Ironside's Narrative, p. 27.—Vansittart's Narrative, vol., pp. 85-6.

† Ironside's Narrative, p. 28.

A. D. 1761.
March.

matter of considerable difficulty, and Meer Kossim Khán appears to have thrown every obstacle in the way to any accommodation, whilst on the other hand, Major Carnac pressed somewhat hardly on his pride and prejudices. At length it was finally agreed that the meeting should take place on the 12th of March at the English factory. Here a temporary throne was erected in the hall or principal room, on a couple of dining tables covered with broad cloth, and the floor being spread with carpets and the walls hung with rich stuffs, the room presented a very handsome appearance. The English troops were all drawn up outside to receive the noble visitors ; on the approach of the Emperor, Mr. MacGuire, Major Carnac, and all the English Officers and Civilians proceeded on foot to meet him and escort him to his throne, and when seated, they all presented nuzzurs and made their obeisance ; in about an hour Meer Kossim Khán arrived and made his obeisance in like manner, offering at the same time a nuzzur of one thousand and one Gold Mohurs, and a handsome present of one hundred and one trays of jewels, shawls, silks, &c. He was then seated near the Emperor, Mr. MacGuire and the Major being seated on the other side, and the Emperor presented him with a handsome Khelut, and invested him in form with the Soobahdaree of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, for which he agreed to pay His Majesty a yearly sum of twenty-four lakhs of rupees ; after the usual compliments and mutual protestations of regard and fidelity, in which there was but little sincerity on either side, the Durbar broke up ; the Emperor returning to the citadel and the Nawaub to his encampment.*

Shortly after, Sháh Allum finding the English were not to be persuaded to support his cause further than they had already done, and that the Nawaub continually found excuses for delaying the public proclamation of his authority, accepted the invitation of Shoojah-oo-dowlah, Nujeeb-oo-dowlah and other chiefs of the Empire, to advance towards Delhi and make an effort for the recovery of his capital ; in

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 170-2.

prosecution of which plan, he marched from Patna in the month of June, escorted to the boundaries of the province by Major Carnac, with a large portion of the force, having received a considerable present in money from the Nawaub, who was glad to procure his absence on any terms. On crossing the Karramnassa, he was met by the Nawaub of Oude, who treated him with every respect and also made him a handsome present. After a short visit to Lucknow he proceeded on his expedition, an account of the varied and finally unfortunate results of which, does not come within the province of this work.

A. D. 1761.
June.

We now come to a most unfortunate and disgraceful period of the annals of the British connection with Bengal, which, except in as far as it affects the details of the Military history of the period, we willingly pass over in the most cursory manner possible. The heavy drains that had already been made upon Meer Kossim Khán's treasury, had exhausted the sums he had with much difficulty collected, and he now cast his eye upon the supposed treasures of Rajah Ram Narain, who had during his long administration accumulated a considerable sum; Meer Kossim Khán called on him to produce his accounts, which were several years in arrear, declaring, that a large sum was due to the public treasury: the Rajah denied that anything was due, and expressed his readiness to render his accounts to the English authorities, who might be considered the more impartial judges of their correctness; knowing at the same time that the latter were little disposed or able to go through the intricate and extensive details connected with them. It now became a struggle not only for power and place but for life; the Nawaub using every means and exertion to get Ram Narain into his power, and to convince Mr. Vansittart that he was a designing intriguer who had defrauded the revenues, and now was desirous to create a party against him, to avoid rendering an account; whilst, on the other hand, Ram Narain exerted all his ingenuity to widen the breach between the Nawaub and the Major, and to enlist the English agents at Patna in his cause. In the original instructions given to Major Carnac by the Governor and Council, that officer was

A. D. 1761. distinctly informed of the understanding and friendship existing between Ram Narain and the English Government, and though, it was stated, that there was no reason for supposing the Nawaub intended to offer him any injury, the Major was directed to afford him any protection that might be necessary;* and upon this authority, supported by his own party prejudices, he openly took the part of the Rajah against the Nawaub; whilst on the other hand, the Governor and his party, yielding to the representations of Meer Kossim Khán, were inclined to relax their original orders for his support and protection.

In the month of April, Lieutenant Colonel Eyre Coote arrived in Bengal with a portion of his Regiment.† This officer had gone home with the remnant of H. M.'s 39th Regiment in 1757, and soon after his arrival in England, he was appointed to the command of H. M.'s 84th Regiment, a new corps formed by drafts from other Regiments, purposely for service in India; with this Regiment he arrived on the Coast in October 1759, and after bearing a distinguished part in the military operations in that quarter, and the war there being at an end, he had now come round as Commander-in-Chief to Bengal. His Regiment was in the interim considerably reduced by the casualties incidental to a long service and an Indian climate, and it is probable, that volunteers were allowed to enter the Company's Battalion at Madras; the remainder amounting to between 300 and 400 men, were embarked in two ships to accompany the Colonel to Bengal, but unfortunately, on arrival at the Sandheads, one of these vessels, the *Futty Islam*, foundered, and nearly every soul on board perished.‡ The remnant of the Corps was on arrival quartered in Calcutta. Colonel Coote now assumed the general command of the force, with a seat in Council, but Major Carnac still retained the subordinate command of the Company's troops. As the strong bias of the latter officer against the Nawaub excluded all hope of unanimity,

* First Report of the Select Committee, pp. 39 and 154.

† Ibid, p. 38.—Williams, p. 63.

‡ Williams, p. 64.

Mr. Vansittart and his party were most anxious that Colonel Coote should proceed and take the command of the Army in the field, and in compliance with their request, he started from Calcutta on the 22d April, and shortly after arrived at Patna. Colonel Coote had, previous to leaving Madras, formed his own opinion on the late revolution, which differed from the views of Mr. Vansittart, and on taking the command at Patna, the representations and arguments of his old friend and brother officer, completely won him over to the opposition. Meer Kossim Khán and Ram Narain both quickly ascertained his views, the former writing to Mr. Vansittart, complaining of the Colonel's conduct, the latter exerting all his ingenuity to increase the prejudices of the English Commander against the Nawaub, whilst Major Carnac, who appears to have entertained all the feelings of a violent partizan, fanned the flame too successfully. In the instructions given by the Governor and Council to Colonel Coote, the protection of Ram Narain was again especially mentioned, but at the same time it was notified, that as the support of a subordinate against his chief and master was objectionable, justice should be done to both parties, that Ram Narain should be made to render the accounts of his Government, and that the support afforded should, as far as possible, consist of private intimation to Meer Kossim Khán of the long connexion existing between the Rajah and the English, and the promises of protection that had been made by Colonel Clive, which the existing Government were bound to observe.*

It was however evident, that Meer Kossim Khán was determined upon his destruction, of which the strongest proof was afforded by his offer of large bribes to Colonel Coote and Major Carnac, to induce them to abandon the cause of the Rajah; the former distinctly stated in his evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons that he was offered seven and half lakhs of rupees,† and of his veracity there can be no doubt; Major Carnac alludes to the overtures made to him in more general terms, but from the evidence

* First Report, p. 154.

† Ibid, pp. 39 and 156.

A. D. 1781 in the one case, there is little reason to doubt the fact in the other.* Ram Narain on his part spared neither falsehood nor intrigue, and his insinuations, supported by Major Carnac's prejudiced representations, appear to have completely blinded the Colonel's frank and open disposition.

At length the Emperor took his departure, escorted as already stated, by Major Carnac with a strong detachment; previous to his leaving Patna, it had been arranged that on the day of his crossing the Karramnassa, the Nawaub should take possession of his quarters in the Citadel, and that coin should be struck and the Kootbah read in the name of Sháh Allum. Meer Kossim Khán wrote to Colonel Coote to beg that when he took up his residence in the Fort, the guards and sentries of Europeans and Sipahis should be withdrawn; a reasonable request in his own Fort, more especially, as such had been done by Colonel Clive when Meer Jaffier Khán occupied the same quarters two years before, and [which was the plea particularly assigned,] as the rigid discipline, and probably some degree of insolence and hauteur on the part of the English troops, particularly the Sipahis, was likely to prove offensive to his ministers and officers, who were liable to require ingress and egress at all hours; Ram Narain however, persuaded the Colonel, that Meer Kossim's object in requesting the withdrawal of these guards was to enable him to obtain possession of the Fort, with a view to commencing hostilities with the English, which intention, improbable as it was, the Colonel was induced to credit, more especially with reference to the reduced state of his own force, which, in consequence of the large escort with the Emperor, and the detachments under Captains Champion and Hart, latter having been recently sent into the Sarun district, did not then amount to above 150 Europeans and 500 Sipahis, the whole under the command of Captain Thomas Robertson;† he accordingly refused to take off the guards, which gave Meer Kossim Khán the greatest offence, and induced him

* Second Report, pp. 5 and 47.

† Vansittart's Narrative, p. 239.—Second Report, Appendix 14.

to decline living in his own palace in the Fort, and also to refuse to coin money or read the Kootbah in the Emperor's name, until he should have taken up his residence there. Ram Narain now persuaded Colonel Coote that Meer Kossim Khán meditated an attack upon the city, which a report of some movement in the Nawaub's camp, studiously magnified, served to confirm. The consequence of this alarm was that the troops were under arms with double sentries during the night of the 16th of June, but no signs of hostilities being apparent, the following morning before sunrise the Colonel proceeded to the Nawaub's camp, attended by the Troop of Hussars, which served as his Body Guard, under the command of Captain Eiser, together with a Company of Sipahis ; here finding all quiet, he proceeded to Meer Kossim Khán's suite of tents, and dismounting with his pistols in hand, entered the Durbar or public tent, inquiring for the Nawaub, having previously placed a couple of the Hussars as sentries outside, to prevent any one cutting the tent ropes ; here he remained a short time, when finding that the Nawaub was asleep in his private tent, he returned to the city with his escort. This unfortunate intrusion and display of suspicion was deeply felt by Meer Kossim Khán, who in detailing the account of it to the Governor in Calcutta, represented it as a forcible invasion of the sacred privacy or his Zenana, declaring that the Colonel entered the tents in a great passion, "with a cocked pistol in each hand, uttering *God damns*;" * the whole outrage he attributed to the designs of Ram Narain, speaking of whom in one of his letters, he says, "this wretch sits here fomenting dissensions and giving my life and fortune a prey to my Sipahis. For God's sake let not go my hand in the middle of the sea, but assist me as you have always done ; write in the most pressing terms to the Colonel, and send an order of the Council that he oppose not the removal of the Naib of this place and leave the country in my hands. After this, I will finish all the accounts."† The Governor and his party now came to the resolution of recalling both Colonel Coote and Major Carnac from Patna, and most unwisely to abandon Ram Narain to

A. D. 1761.
June.

* Vansittart's Narrative, pp. 216-7.

† Ibid, p. 201.

A. D. 1761. the Nawaub's power. There is little doubt that the Rajah
 July. had embezzled a considerable portion of the revenues, that he avoided rendering any account, that he made away with the books and was, by his intrigues, the main cause of the dissensions between the English Commanders and the Nawaub; but on the other hand, his long fidelity to, and connexion with the English, had entitled him to that protection from personal injury which had been several times guaranteed to him. This was the grand mistake of Mr. Vansittart's government,—it afforded a handle for reproach and insinuation to his enemies, whilst it weakened the faith of the natives in the English word and support, the more so as it was but too evident that a desire to share indirectly in the confiscated wealth of Ram Narain, was a leading motive for the consent accorded,—for by that means alone Meer Kossim Khán declared himself able to fulfil his outstanding engagements with the Company.

Colonel Coote on receiving the summons of the Governor and Council to leave Patna, started for Calcutta without any unnecessary delay, in the early part of July, making over the command of the troops to Major Carnac, with directions to follow him as soon as possible with the main body of the force, leaving by the orders of Council, a detachment of 200 European Infantry, the European Dragoons and 50 of the Artillery, with 2 Battalions of Sipahis at Patna, the whole under the command of Captain Carstairs, the senior officer present; *—Major Yorke and Captain Knox having previously gone back to Calcutta. Major Carnac had just returned from escorting the Emperor, who had crossed the Karramnassa on the 21st of June, on which occasion he made an offer of the Dewánee of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa to the Company, on payment of the usual regular tribute. †

The Major remained at Patna for nearly a month, during which time the detachments under Captains Champion and Hart were called in, and preparations made for the march of the main body of the troops. Even in this short period

* Second Report, Appendix No. 13.

† First Report, p. 151.—Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 1, pp. 255-6.

he managed to add to the insults already offered to the Nawab, and to resist the orders of Council as far as practicable, to which body he wrote the most intemperate letters. Mr. MacGuire requested that the detachment left at Patna might be efficient, and particularly begged that an old Battalion of Sipahis might be substituted for Captain Stibbert's new Battalion, the 6th.* But the Major refused compliance, stating, that he considered the latter fit for any service, and that as it was especially raised for the defence of the factory, it should remain there; he also insisted upon including all the sick of the detachment in the 200 Europeans ordered to be left. On a representation of these circumstances to the Council, he was directed to leave 4 complete effective Companies of the European Battalion, the second company of Artillery under Captain Broadridge, and the 2d and 3d Battalions of Sipahis under Captains Tabby and Turner; he was further ordered to make them over at once to the command of Captain Carstairs, and to march himself with the remainder without further delay.† The 4 Companies of European Infantry selected for this duty, were those of Captain Peter Carstairs, commanding the whole, Captains Charles E. Joecher, Ambrose Perry, and Henry Somers; these were each completed to the full establishment, which then consisted of 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 2 Ensigns, 4 Serjeants, 3 Drums and Fifes and 48 rank and file; the whole detachment amounted to about 240, including the officers, of whom an Adjutant, a Quartermaster, and a Surgeon, were allowed as staff. The Company of Artillery amounted to about 60 men, exclusive of the officers, of whom there were 1 Captain, 4 Subalterns, 1 Commissary of Ordnance, and 1 Adjutant. The Sipahi Battalions were also completed to the full establishment of officers, with the addition of an Adjutant to each, 4 Serjeants, and 1090 Native officers and men.

In the beginning of August, the Major commenced his march to the Presidency; where, on arrival, the 1st Company of Artillery, the European Cavalry, the European Battalion, with a wing of the 5th or Captain Wilson's Battalion, were stationed in and about the Fort. The 1st, or

A. D. 1761.
August.

A. D. 1761. Sept. Captain Broadbrook's Battalion (*now the 1st Regiment, N. I.*) was stationed at Ghyrettie, with the 1st Troop of Mogul Horse; the 4th or Captain Hugh Grant's Battalion (*the present 5th Regiment, N. I.,*) was stationed at Chandernagore; a detail of European Infantry and Artillery, the 3 Burdwan independent Companies and the remainder of the 5th or Captain Wilson's Battalion, were at Burdwan, where they had been left by Major Yorke when he advanced with the Nawaub to Patna in the beginning of the year; this detachment was under the command of Captain MacLean; the 6th or Captain Stibbert's new Battalion, was detached to Jellasore* with the 2nd Troop of Mogul Horse and 3 Companies of European Infantry, the whole under the command of Captain Knox; and the 7th or Captain Mathews' Battalion, remained at Chittagong.†

Major Yorke resigned the service and returned to England about this time, and Lieutenant Gilbert Ironside succeeded him as Town Major. Such was the distribution of the English force, amounting altogether to about 200 European and 200 Native Cavalry, nearly 200 Artillery, about 900 European Infantry, exclusive of the 84th Regiment; and about 8400 Sipahis, including the Local or Independent Companies; in addition to which there were nearly 100 European Invalids, Infantry and Artillery, stationed in the fort. The Engineer establishment consisted of 3 officers, who were chiefly occupied in superintending the buildings in the new fort, which were gradually progressing.

Meer Kossim Khán, now that the Emperor was gone and the Colonel and Major removed, turned his whole attention to Ram Narain; he first suspended him from his rank and authority as Naib of the province, pending the settlement of his accounts, and finally threw him into confinement and confiscated his property. Ram Narain however, who had long watched the coming of this storm, had distributed his wealth in various ways and under different names, but the

* From the circumstance of its being stationed at Jellasore for some time after its formation, this Corps received its present designation of the Jellasore or *Jullasur ka Pultun*.

† For a detailed return of the force, at a period shortly subsequent, vide

Nawaub succeeded in tracing out a considerable portion of A. D. 1761. it, and the attempt at concealment only involved those concerned in the Rajah's ruin; all his confederates and subordinates in the Government fell under the Nawaub's displeasure, and were either punished or compelled to purchase exemption by disgorging the greater portion of their accumulated profits. Amongst the principal sufferers on this occasion was Rajah Moorlee Dhur, who was thrown into prison and finally sent to Moorshedabad; his fate and that of his principal agent, Mahommud Afak, the Kutwál of the city, was a cause of general rejoicing amongst the populace, by whom they were both detested for their cruelties and extortion: Rajah Sunder Sing, who had been an active agent of Ram Narain, was seized and confined, as also Gunga Bishen his cash keeper, and Munseeram Sahoo the principal banker in the city, with whom a considerable portion of Ram Narain's treasure had been deposited.

Rajah Shitab Roy also fell under suspicion and was threatened; but he boldly offered to meet any charge brought against him, collected his followers, and shut himself up in his house with a determination of defending himself to the last. The regard borne towards this nobleman by the English of all ranks and parties saved him from destruction. Mr. MacGuire and Captain Carstairs interfered in his behalf, and it was agreed that he should proceed to Calcutta, where the charges urged against him could be examined by Council. The result of this enquiry was, that Shitab Roy was protected from injury or confiscation, but was directed to quit the Nawaub's territory; he accordingly returned to Patna, made his arrangements, and then started for Lucknow, escorted as far as the Gogra by a Battalion of the English Sipahis. From Lucknow he joined the Emperor, in whose service he remained until circumstances admitted of his return to Behar.

A great change now took place in the Council Board. Previous to Lord Clive's departure he had penned a very severe and insulting letter to the Court of Directors, to which the several Members of the then Select Committee had also put their names; the Court were naturally in-

A. D. 1762. dignant at this conduct, and the prime mover being beyond their reach, they determined to punish the parties who remained ; accordingly all those still in the service, who had signed the letter in question, were peremptorily dismissed. Mr. Holwell had already gone home, but Messieurs Playdell, Sumner and MacGuire, all supporters of the Governor, were removed and ordered to England. By this change, not only did the opposition party obtain the majority in the Council and Select Committee, but Mr. Ellis, the most violent and intemperate of that party, succeeded to the charge of the factory at Patna, where he was thrown into more immediate contact with the Nawaub, towards whom his personal animosity was notorious.

Meer Kossim Khán having obtained his objects at Patna as far as regarded Ram Narain and his confederates, recruited his exhausted treasury, and was thus enabled to discharge the sums due to the Company. He now turned his attention to the more distant and hitherto neglected tracts to the southward of Behar, and also to the Sarun, Champarun, and Tirhoot districts. Bunniad Singh, Futteh Sing, and several others of the principal zemindars, who had for several years maintained a degree of independence, and mixed themselves up in every disturbance that occurred, were seized and confined. Khamgar Khán, Pulwhán Singh, and some others attempted resistance, but were severally defeated and driven out of the country, their estates confiscated, and their governments and zemindaries conferred on more attached and faithful dependents, generally Moosulmáns,—as Meer Kossim Khán appears to have entertained a prejudice against the Hindoos, with whose influence and intrigues during the recent revolutions he was well acquainted, and of which he appears to have dreaded a recurrence.

Having thus restored his authority throughout the provinces, he endeavored to introduce some degree of order and security in their internal administration, in which praiseworthy attempt, considering the number of obstacles opposed to it, he appears to have been very successful. He also exerted himself to reform and strengthen his army,

discharging the greater number of the old irregular troops and enlisting others upon a different footing, a considerable portion of which were disciplined and equipped upon the English model.*

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Scarcely had Mr. Ellis assumed charge of the factory at Patna, than disputes commenced between the Nawaub and himself, and though the former may have been too ready to take offence, and may have exaggerated many acts of the English Agent, it cannot be denied that the latter afforded him serious cause for annoyance, and that his conduct throughout was captious and insulting,—in which line of proceeding he was supported by the majority of the Council in Calcutta. It is also not improbable, that the Nawaub's officers may have occasionally afforded ground of complaint, but instead of making any, either to the Council or to the Nawaub, Mr. Ellis took the adjudication of all such cases into his own hands, and though a party concerned, gave judgment and ordered punishment as dictated rather by his passions than his discretion. Of this, one extraordinary and gross instance may be mentioned : the Company had in Colonel Clive's time, as already related, obtained the monopoly of the saltpetre trade, an exception in favour of the Nawaub to the extent of his own consumption, or 20,000 maunds, being understood and hitherto allowed, though not expressly noticed in the treaty. On this understanding, an officer of the Nawaub had purchased 5 maunds of saltpetre, which Mr. Ellis chose to consider as an infringement of the Company's privileges, seized the unfortunate man, and sent him down to Calcutta in irons ; Mr. Vansittart, as also Mr. Hastings, who was now the Governor's only supporter, remonstrated against this measure, but were met by a demand from the more violent of the opposition, that the unfortunate man should be publicly whipped and his ears be cut off. Shortly after this occurrence, a vague report reached Mr. Ellis that two English deserters were concealed in the fort of Mongheer, which belonged to the Nawaub and was garrisoned by his troops :

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 2, pp. 185-6.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 185-6 and 190.

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he immediately sent a Company of Sipahis under a Serjeant to search the fort; these were refused admittance by the Keelahdar, and this was construed by Mr. Ellis into an act of hostility; whilst the Nawaub also sent a strong representation to the Council regarding this insult offered to his authority. A long dispute arose in the Council, which was finally compromised by Lieutenant Gilbert Ironside, the Town Major, being specially sent to search the fort, which he was permitted to do by the Nawaub, when, after a strict investigation, it appeared that no deserters were or had been concealed there, the only European in the place being an old French Invalid.* Mr. Hastings was sent up at the same time to endeavor to arrange the disputes between the Nawaub and Mr. Ellis; but though the former received him very favourably at Sahseram, where he was encamped at the time, Mr. Ellis refused to see him at Patna and rejected all overtures towards any accommodation. Mr. Hastings being fettered by his instructions and by certain exorbitant demands of the Council, was obliged to return to Calcutta, leaving matters in a worse condition than he found them.

✓ But the most fertile source of dispute, and the heaviest cause of complaint on the part of the Nawaub, arose from the abuses of the English privileges of trade.

The Company had for a series of years enjoyed under various firmáns, an exemption from the ordinary transit duties on their traffic passing through the country, although this was confined to articles of import and export, with which alone they had any concern; but the servants of the Company had with the sanction of the Government, frequently engaged in the inland trade of the country, in carrying on which, they were subject to the same duties as natives and other foreign merchants. After the revolution which placed Meer Jaffier Khán on the musnud, the English taking advantage of their increased power and influence, claimed exemption for all goods when passing under the English flag, and with a certificate or dustuck signed by the Governor or the agent at any of the factories; this innovation,

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 2, pp. 9-10.

which began on a small scale, was not opposed, but the advantages attending upon it were so great, that it quickly held out an inducement to all grades in the service to enter into commercial speculations, as they were thus enabled to pass their goods free, where the natives or other merchants paid a duty from 10 to 20 per cent. This system had now grown to such an extent, that the greater part of the commerce of the country had fallen into the hands of the English or was carried on under their name; almost all the Civilians and many of the Military were openly engaged in trade on their own account, or in partnership with European free traders or native merchants; or they lent their names to natives for a consideration. But injurious as this must have been to the revenues, the evil was further increased by the insolence and rascality of the Gomashtas employed by the English throughout the country, who took advantage of their master's authority and passed their own goods under their employer's name; the river was covered with fleets of boats proceeding up and down under English flags, with small guards of Sipahis and English dustucks; and a system speedily obtained amongst the native merchants of using the same dustuck over and over again, and finally of forging them; also of dressing up their own followers as English Sipahis, the domineering and insolent conduct attributed to which class, they soon learned to imitate and to exceed. If the Nawaub's collectors attempted to check this system or to detect abuses, they were immediately seized by the nearest English agent, confined and punished. The consequence was that the respectable class of native merchants were ruined, the revenues of the country nearly destroyed, confusion and disturbance generally introduced, and the Nawaub's authority set at nought throughout the country. Again and again did Meer Kossim Khán represent these glaring evils to the Governor and Council, and point out his inability to carry on the Government and fulfil his engagements, if his chief source of revenue was taken away and his authority thus disregarded. Mr. Vansittart, powerless from the strength of the opposition, in vain remonstrated and endeavored to alleviate or restrain

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the abuses ; the other Members of Council were too deeply interested in the trade to hear of any restrictions. The Nawaub prayed to be delivered from the labour and responsibility of his Government if redress was not to be granted, as it was impossible to go on upon the existing system. At length these abuses and the disputes and enormities arising out of them, had grown to such a height, that it was agreed Mr. Vansittart should proceed and pay a visit to the Nawaub, and there personally arrange some terms to meet the wishes of both parties. Mr. Vansittart accordingly started from Calcutta with, as he imagined, full powers to act according to his own discretion. He found the Nawaub at Mongheer, smarting under the injuries and insults he had received ; but at length after much discussion, it was agreed that the servants of the Company should be allowed to carry on the inland private trade, on payment of a fixed duty of 9 per cent. on all goods, which was much below that paid by other merchants, and that to prevent abuses in the indiscriminate employment and transfer of dustucks and in the use of false ones, that they should be signed by the agents of the several factories through whose circles the goods passed, and countersigned by the Nawaub's collectors in the same districts. Meer Kossim Khán agreed to these terms very unwillingly, and expressed his apprehension that they would neither be observed nor remedy the evils complained of ; he however declared himself willing to give the experiment a fair trial, but announced his firm determination if the system was found not to answer, to abolish all duties and throw the whole trade open, so that his own subjects should be placed on an equal footing with the Company's servants.

Mr. Vansittart, after paying a hurried visit to Patna, returned to Calcutta on the 16th of January, having left the Nawaub at Mongheer, about to start on an expedition to Nepal.* On submitting to the Board the result of his negotiations, the Governor found that instead of affording satisfaction, his measures were entirely disapproved and con-

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 2, p. 184.

demned; and the indignation of the Members of Council was excited by reports received at the same time from the agents all over the country. On the conclusion of the agreement with Meer Kossim Khán, Mr. Vansittart had given him a copy of the terms, bearing his signature, but did not contemplate their being acted upon until after his own arrival in Calcutta, when arrangements could be made for giving effect to them on both sides; but the Nawaub, as soon as the affair was settled, sent copies of the Governor's agreement to all his officers and collectors throughout the country, precipitately directing that these arrangements should be acted upon at once. The consequence was that the English goods then in transit, were stopped all over the country and duty claimed upon them; in many cases this was resisted, and a general scene of disturbance and outrage ensued. The English agents were furious and wrote violent complaints to the Council; the latter refused to acknowledge Mr. Vansittart's agreement, and declared that all goods under an English dustuck should pass free, with exception to salt, upon which, as a proof of their liberality, they agreed to pay $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty; they also decided that all disputes should be referred to the English agents, who being the parties chiefly concerned, were thus constituted the judges in their own case. The Nawaub was made acquainted with this resolution on his return from an unsuccessful expedition into Nepaul, and as may be supposed, was highly exasperated; he inveighed against the measure as a breach of faith and an act of injustice toward himself and his subjects, and finally executed his threatened resolution of abandoning all transit duties and throwing open the whole inland trade of the country. "The conduct of the Company's servants upon this occasion," observes Mr. Mill, "furnishes one of the most remarkable instances upon record of the power of interest to extinguish all sense of justice and even of shame. They had hitherto insisted, contrary to all right and all precedent, that the government of the country should exempt their goods from duty. They now insisted that it should impose duties upon the goods of all other traders, and assumed it as guilty of a breach of peace toward

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A. D. 1763. "the English nation, because it proposed to remit them."*
 March. Not only was the Nawaub's conduct looked upon as an act of hostility, but it was determined that preparations should be made for resisting his measures and declaring war against him if he persisted; and troops were collected and recruits raised to meet the threatened storm. Collision and outbreaks occurred in all parts of the country, but more especially in Behar, where the violence of Mr. Ellis led to the employment of force on the most trivial occasions. A continued course of bickering and dispute had been carried on between that gentleman and the Nawaub. On one occasion, a detachment of 3 Companies of Sipahis, under the command of Lieutenant John Downie, had been sent into the district to seize one of Meer Kossim Khán's agents, and having accomplished their object, left a detachment of a Havildar and 12 men in the town of Tajpore to protect the salt depôt there; the Nawaub's troops, who had arrived too late to prevent the seizure of the agent, wreaked their vengeance upon the little party left at Tajpore, who defended themselves with great resolution, until 4 of the 12 men being killed, most of the remainder wounded, and their ammunition exhausted, they were made prisoners and brought to the Nawaub,—who to his credit, though highly indignant at the insult offered to him, released them as merely instruments in the outrage.† On another occasion a Soobadar and 50 Sipahis were attacked at Gyah, but repulsed the enemy, though not without loss.‡ Another cause of quarrel arose from the Nawaub shutting up a small wicket in the city walls at Patna, situated near the factory, called the Burbunnah gate. This was done in the first instance on account of a complaint from the Factory that some deserters had entered the city by that gate; but, as it was more convenient to the English establishment for communicating with the city, than going round by the Western gate, Mr. Ellis wished to have it re-opened. This the Nawaub refused to allow, and further, caused a stock-

* Wilson's Mill, vol. 3, p. 337.

+ Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 3, pp. 51-2.

‡ Ibid, pp. 88-9.

aded intrenchment to be formed from that part of the wall to- A. D. 1768.
wards the river, with the alleged object of strengthening May.
the defences of the city. This was regarded by Mr. Ellis and his supporters as a preparation for hostilities, and the former gentleman applied to the Council to be permitted to take aggressive measures, should he find the Nawaub was bent on commencing a war, which he declared it to be his opinion was the case. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Governor and Mr. Hastings, this permission was granted, and Mr. Ellis commenced making preparations, which it was but too evident he would take the first opportunity of turning to account. As a last resource, it was agreed that a deputation should be sent to the Nawaub, who was then at Mongheer, to endeavor to arrange terms with him and induce him to countermand his order for the abolition of all transit duties; Messieurs Amyatt and Hay were selected for this duty, and left Calcutta on the 4th of April, with an escort of a Company of Sipahis, and proceeded to the Nawaub's camp. Little advantage appears to have been expected from this mission, but on its results the Council resolved to regulate their decision for peace or war, for the latter of which alternatives they made every preparation. Mr. Ellis was informed of this measure, and warned to commit no act of aggression, even should the mission be unsuccessful, until Messieurs Amyatt and Hay were out of the Nawaub's power.

This party did not reach Mongheer until the 14th of May, having been delayed some time at Moorshedabad. They found the Nawaub determined not to withdraw his orders on the subject of throwing open the trade, or to agree to the other propositions submitted to him, at the same time that he expressed his desire to avoid hostilities, which he stated his conviction the English were determined to force upon him. Whilst these attempts at negotiation were going on, several boats arrived with arms and military stores, intended for the force at Patna: this circumstance, coupled with the open preparations of Mr. Ellis at that place, led the Nawaub to believe that an attack on the city was contemplated, and

A. D. 1763. he refused to let the boats proceed. The gentlemen of
 June. the mission were treated with civility and respect, but were under a strict surveillance; and as it daily became more clear that an immediate rupture must take place, their situation was rendered a very dangerous and embarrassing one. Rumours continually reached Mongheer of Mr. Ellis' preparations and menaces to attack Patna, and the Nawaub now insisted, as the only chance of maintaining peace, that the detachment at that city should be withdrawn and stationed at Mongheer, where they would be under the check of his own force. This the Council peremptorily refused to comply with. Considerable desertions took place amongst the Sipahis at Patna, which were attributed to the intrigues of the Nawaub's officers, and Mr. Ellis, in order to keep the troops in good humour, warned the whole force for service on the 6th of June, by which they became entitled to batta; this appears to have had the desired effect of putting a stop to the desertions.*

Such was the state of affairs in June 1763, when all parties were awaiting the crisis that appeared inevitable.

It is now advisable to say a few words relative to the strength and resources of the two parties, who were thus rapidly verging towards a struggle, which promised to be one of a deadly nature, and which it was evident must inevitably lead to the total destruction of one of them. From the first engagement in the Beerbhoom province, when Major Yorke and Captain White gained their victory over the troops of the Beerbhoom Rajah, Meer Kossim Khán, although himself no soldier, —being destitute of the indispensable qualification of physical courage,—perceived the utter inefficiency of his own troops, and the necessity for a thorough reform; and as soon as the state of his finances admitted of it, he set himself strenuously to work to carry out this important measure. He discharged by degrees the whole of the ill-armed and disorderly rabble that had hitherto constituted the standing army of his predecessors, and entertained new troops upon a perfectly dif-

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 3, pp. 275 6.

ferent footing. The Cavalry was formed into Regiments and A. D. 1763. Rusalluhs, ~~not~~ but efficient men were admitted, and great attention paid to the manner in which they were mounted; the organization of this branch appears to have been somewhat similar to that of the Irregular Cavalry Regiments now in the Company's service; the pay was liberal, and the ranks were chiefly filled by Afgháns, Rohilla's, and other Northern races, chiefly Moosulmán's, the Commanders being almost exclusively of that nation; the total strength of this force was limited to about 16,000, but the increased efficiency thus obtained amply compensated for the diminution of numbers.

The Infantry was formed in a great measure upon the model of the English Sipahi Battalions, and was composed of two classes, Nujeebs and Telingahs, the former retaining the Native dress and being armed with matchlocks, but otherwise disciplined and organized as regulars, divided into Regiments and Companies, each with a fixed proportion of officers and subordinates; the Telingahs were organized in closer imitation of the Sipahi Battalions; their uniform and equipments being exactly copied from the European models, and they appear to have been of a very efficient description; the muskets with which they were armed were manufactured in the Country, and from trials subsequently made between them and the Tower-proof arms of the Company's troops, the reader will be surprised to learn, that they were found to be superior to those of English manufacture, particularly in the barrels, the metal of which was of an admirable description; the flints also were of a very excellent quality, composed of agates found in the Rajmahal Hills, and were much preferred to those imported.*

The Artillery was in like manner organized on the European model, the Ordnance, chiefly brass, was for the most part cast in the Country, though several European pieces were in the park, as also a number of iron guns, which had been brought

* Second Report, p. 10.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 185-91.—Carraccioli, vol. 1, pp. 83-4 and 92.

A. D. 1763. out by vessels of different nations and sold ; a description of traffic in great favour with irregular traders, although forbidden by the English Government. The Carriages were all made in the Country, furnished with elevating screws, and quite equal to their originals,* though this probably is not saying much for them ; the best description in use with the English Army being, at that period, cumbersome and weak. The powder was of excellent quality, the shot and shell partly imported and partly manufactured in the Country ; the latter are said to have been cast, but this is very doubtful ; the shot were most probably hammered, and the shell, if any were cast, of soft metal, or made of stone, as is the case in several Native Armies at the present moment. Magazines and manufactories were formed in different parts of the Country. Mongheer appears to have been the principal depot.

These important changes were in a great measure carried out under the superintendence and through the agency of several European and Armenian officers ; the principal of whom were Khajah Gregore or Shircore, generally known by the name of Goorgheen Khán, an Armenian, brother to Khajah Petroos, the great Armenian merchant in Bengal ; Markar, also an Armenian, and Walter Raynaud, better known to the English reader as Sommers or Sumroo. Goorgheen Khán had the general controul of the force, and the military arrangements, acting in a double capacity as Commander-in-Chief and War Minister. To his ability and exertions the improvements introduced were in a great measure to be ascribed, and it was probably through the agency of his brother Khajah Petroos, that the greater portion of the European munitions of the Army were obtained ; he appears to have been a man of intelligence and sound sense, and attached to his employer, whom he served with fidelity ; he exerted all his influence to restrain the Nawaub's indignation against the insults of the English agents, and to induce him to postpone hostilities, until he should be fully prepared for the event ; his constant advice was " bear and forbear ; you are not yet fledged ;

* First Report, p. 43.—Second Report, p. 10.

“ reserve your anger till the time when you shall have feathers A. D. 1763.
 “ to your wings.”* Peculiar circumstances soon occurred to frustrate this wise counsel. Markar was also an able man, but he had only the command of a Brigade or Division of all arms. Sumroo was in the same condition, he had a Brigade of 4 Battalions of Infantry, a Regiment of Cavalry and a Company of Artillery, the remnant of which, after an existence of more than three quarters of a century, and a varied and extraordinary, but never brilliant career, was reduced a few years ago at Sirdhana, on the demise of the Begum Sumroo, the widow of this very individual. † Of the history of this adventurer but little is known ; he appears to have been an Alsatian, having been born or at least bred up at Strasburgh, where he followed the occupation of a butcher for some years, and to have originally come to India in the Swiss Company of Infantry under the command of Captain Zeigler, attached to the Bombay European Regiment ; with that Company he most probably came round to the Coast, where he deserted and finally found his way to Bengal, apparently in the French service ; possessing a certain degree of intelligence and military skill, though his whole career shows him to have been destitute of enterprise or dashing courage, he rose to the command of a Brigade in Meer Kossim Khán's service, to whom he chiefly recommended himself by his unscrupulous obedience and his deadly animosity to the English. Whilst in the Swiss Company, he had acquired from his swarthy complexion and sullen, ferocious look, the soubriquet of Sombre, which always adhered to him, modified by the Natives into “ Sumroo,” and by the English into “ Somers.” † To the instigations of this man may be attributed most of the atrocities that were subsequently committed by the Nawaub. Several other Foreigners held subordinate commands in the Army, and most of the regular Native Regiments had one or more attached, either in command or as drill instructors ; whilst the Artillery was almost entirely manned by Europeans, consisting of Frenchmen, Germans, Portuguese, Armenians and Topasses,*

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 186.

† Asiatic Annual Register, vol. 2.—Miscellaneous Tracts, pp. 30-2.—Smith's Sketch of the Foreign Regular Corps, p. 4.

** Not really Armenian
 nor Topasses as Europeans!*

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amounting altogether to between two and three hundred, amongst whom were a number of deserters from the Company's service.*

Several able Mahomedan officers held commands in the force, their Brigades generally consisting of Cavalry and Nujeebs.

Confident in his Military strength, it has been already stated that Meer Kossim Khán engaged in hostilities with Nepaul. In the beginning of the year 1763, he invaded the province of Bettiah, and flushed with his success in that quarter, he pushed into the Hills to the north of that district, with the passes of which he had made himself acquainted through information derived from Fakeers and Pilgrims from Lassa; he penetrated the country for four marches, as far as Muckwampore, when he was encountered by the Nepaul Army; a desperate action ensued, in which the Nepaulese displayed the greatest bravery, but the discipline and efficiency of Goorgheen Khán's Battalions prevailed over the physical strength and courage of their adversaries, and the Nawaub gained the victory, although attended with heavy loss on both sides; but during the night after the action, whilst his troops lulled into security by their success, were locked in sleep, without having taken the necessary precautions to guard against surprise, the Nepaulese made a sudden attack upon the camp, penetrated to Goorgheen Khán's tent, and committed great slaughter. Though finally repulsed, this proof of their daring and enterprise, coupled with the unexpected difficulties that had been experienced in this mountain warfare, discouraged the Nawaub, and he commenced his retreat, which was not effected without difficulty and loss, the enemy harrassing the force until they were clear of the hills.† The losses sustained in this expedition were however quickly repaired, and the experience gained was beneficial to the Army in shewing the necessity for due precaution, and lowering their vanity and opinion of their own prowess and efficiency, which had grown to a considerable height. Such was the composition and character of the force with which the Bengal Army was about to be engaged.

* 2nd Report, p. 8.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 263.

† Kirkpatrick's Nepal, p. 25.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 215-6.

In the latter force, no very considerable changes had taken place during the last year, but as matters assumed a hostile aspect, considerable exertions were made to increase the numerical strength particularly that of the native portion.

The European Infantry had remained on much the same footing; and consisted of 12 Companies, each of 55 non-commissioned, rank and file. Of these, the 4 Companies left at Patna by Major Carnac still remained there; the Company at Burdwan had been withdrawn, but the 3 Companies at Jellasore were still stationed in that district under Capt. Champion; 5 Companies were at the Presidency, chiefly quartered at Ghyrettie. A Company of French Rangers had also arrived from Madras, commanded by Monsieur Claude Martine. The history of this small body is curious;—at the capture of Pondicherry, the French European force consisted of Lally's Body Guard and three Regiments of Infantry, viz., Lally's Irish Regiment, the Regiment of Lorraine, and the Regiment of Pondicherry. The Body Guard deserted to the English during the siege, and when the other Corps were made prisoners, a large proportion of the men took service in the Company's Army. Those of Lally's Regiment, who were chiefly of Irish birth or extraction, entered the Madras European Regiment, the remainder were formed into three separate Companies, two of which were retained at Madras, and subsequently accompanied the expedition under Admiral Cornish and Colonel Draper to Manilla; the third Company was raised by M. Martine, who had been a *Sous officier* in the Body Guard, and when completed, was sent round to Bengal; on the passage they were shipwrecked, but owing to the exertions of M. Martine, they were nearly all saved, and arrived in boats at Calcutta.† M. Martine was immediately admitted into the Company's service, in which he received a Subaltern's commission, and retained the command of his Company.—The 84th Regiment, amounting to nearly 400 men, was stationed in the new Fort. The two Com-

* For the strength and distribution of the force in February 1763, vide Appendix Q.

† Williams, p. 21.—Asiatic Register.—Characters, pp. 84-5.

A. D. 1763. Companies of Artillery were stationed, the 1st or Captain Jennings' Company at the Presidency, their Head Quarters, with 8 officers and 66 men, in the Fort, a detail of 32 men under Captain Lieutenant John Green at Ghyrettie, another detail of 24 Artillerymen, with 2 Field-pieces, under a young Subaltern, at Midnapore, and a Serjeant's party at Chittagong, making a total of 132 non-commissioned, rank and file, with 11 officers; the 2nd or Captain Kinch's Company, (Captain Broadridge having died in October 1761,) consisting of 7 officers and 66 men, were still at Patna. The whole of the European Cavalry were quartered at the Presidency. Thus the total European Force in Bengal amounted to about 1500 men.

The strength of the Native Infantry had been gradually increasing, ;—the 3 Burdwan Independent Companies, had been raised during the year 1762, to the strength of a Battalion, which was commanded by Captain MacLean, who had the military charge of that province; this was the 8th Corps formed, though it never appears to have received that number, but to have borne the designation it still retains of the Burdwan Battalion, (*now the 2nd Grenadier Regiment.**) The increasing probability of hostilities led to a further extension of this force, and early in 1763, a second Battalion was raised upon the first, the command of which was soon after given to Captain Thomas Smith, this was designated the 2nd Burdwan Battalion or Chota Burdwan-kapultun, (*now the 8th Regiment of Native Infantry.†*) These two Corps were both stationed in the Burdwan Province. The independent Companies at Midnapore were gradually increased, and in the beginning of 1763 were also formed into a Battalion, the command of which was given to Lieutenant Archibald Swinton; this, which appears to have been the 10th Corps raised, is now *the 3rd Regiment of Native Infantry.‡* Another Battalion was raised at

* Williams, p. 63.—Who erroneously assigns an earlier, though indefinite origin to the Corps, which the returns clearly disprove. The same may be said in regard to his account of the origin of the present 3rd, 8th and 10th Regiments, noticed immediately.

† Williams, pp. 138-9.

‡ Williams, p. 89.

* Not then. Trevanion in his journal
 to Capt. and Lieut. 1763, and the old
 and the old. I. of the 21st Regt. 1763.
 and the 4th or Captain Hugh Grant's
 Battalion, which were severally
 stationed in the Fort and at Ghyrettie:
 this was the twelfth Battalion raised,
 and the command of it was given to
 Captain John Trevannion.

Chittagong, the command of which was given to Lieutenant Lewis Brown, and which was long known as the Chittagong Local Battalion, though for some years it was numbered in the Corps of the line ; it is now no longer in existence, having been reduced with several other Local Corps in 1786,* in the months of April or May 1763, another Battalion was raised in Calcutta, by drafts from the 1st or Captain Broadbrook's and the 4th or Captain Hugh Grant's Battalion, which were severally stationed in the Fort and at Ghyrettie : this was the twelfth Battalion raised, and the command of it was given to Captain John Trevannion : it is now *the 10th Regiment of Native Infantry*.† From having greater advantages of equipment, owing to its situation at the Presidency, it was speedily organised and rendered fit for service. During the latter part of the year 1762, the 5th or Captain Wilson's Battalion, had been sent to Patna to reinforce the detachment under Captain Carstairs. Such was the constitution and strength of the Bengal Army when the war was about to commence ; consisting of about 1500 Europeans and 10,000 Natives,—for though the nominal establishment of the Sipahi Battalions was above 1000 men each, most of the new Corps were incomplete, and the old Battalions had been weakened by drafts required for the recently formed Regiments.]

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June.

The distribution of this force was as follows. At Patna. 4 European Companies of Infantry and 1 of Artillery, with 3 Battalions of Sipahis, commanded by Captains Tabby, Turner and Wilson, amounting after making allowance for desertions, to about 300 Europeans and 2500 Sipahis. At Burdwan, 2 Native Battalions, amounting to about 1500 men ; in the Midnapore district, 3 Companies of European Infantry, a detail of Artillery, a Troop of Mogul Horse, and 2 Battalions of Sipahis, under Captain Stibbert and Lieutenant Swinton, making together about 180 Europeans and 1800 Natives. In the Chittagong, Dacca, and Luckeepore districts, 2 Native Battalions and the Independent Companies at Dacca and Luckeepore, amounting to little

* Williams, p. 14. † Williams, pp. 183-4.

A. D. 1763. more than 1800 Sipahis, with a few artillery men. At the
 June. Presidency, H. M.'s 84th Regiment, 5 Companies of the European Battalion, the Company of French Rangers, 3 weak Troops of European Cavalry, (2 of Dragoons and 1 of Hussars), the Commander-in-Chief's Body Guard, (a newly raised Troop of 30 European Cavalry,) 1 Troop of Mogul Horse, 1 Company of Artillery, a Company of European Invalids, and 3 Battalions of Sipahis, viz. those of Captains Broadbrook, Grant, and Trevannion ; making together about 1000 Europeans, and little more than 2400 Natives ; these were stationed between Calcutta and Ghyrettie ; 2 or 3 Companies of Sipahis in addition to the Local Companies were at Kossimbazar, and a Local Company was stationed at Malda.

So early as the middle of April, arrangements were made for the expected campaign, and in the proceedings of Council on the 14th of that month, it was resolved—" That if a rupture
 " does happen, Major Adams shall march with the King's Regi-
 " ment and all the Company's troops at Gherettee and Cal-
 " cutta, Captains Broadbrook and Maclean's Battalions of See-
 " poys compleated, also Captain Champion's Company of Mi-
 " litary from Jellasore, together with the following Artillery,
 " viz. 2 twelve-pounders, 6 six-pounders, and 2 howitzers.
 " The Major is therefore desired to make the necessary lists of
 " stores accordingly, and it is further resolved that 7 Compa-
 " nies of Seepoys from Jellasore and 3 from Burdwan shall in
 " such case be ordered to Calcutta, to compleat the two Batta-
 " lions to go with Major Adams, and serve for the duties of the
 " Presidency."* These details however, were subsequently considerably modified.

— In the middle of June 1763, the Council came to the decision that nothing now remained but to commence hostilities, and Messrs. Amyatt and Hay were directed to leave the Nawaub immediately, and either to proceed to Patna or return to Calcutta as they found most practicable ; they were ordered to inform the Agent at Patna of their departure, that he might be on his guard, and ready to act as circumstances dictated ;

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 3, p. 164.

and as soon as their safety of the mission was insured, it was decided that active operations should be commenced upon, as it was known the Nawaub was busy on his part enlisting troops all over the province and reinforcing his detachments at Patna and other stations.

A. D. 1763.
June.

On the 18th of June the Council came to the following resolution:—" It is agreed, in order to form a front for the " protection of the Company's aurungs and lands, to secure " their investment and revenues in the best manner possible, " and to endeavor to collect what we can from other pro- " vinces to answer the expence of the war, that our troops be " immediately prepared for taking post, according to the fol- " lowing disposition :

" Captain Knox, with his detachment, in the Province of " Beerbhoom ; a detachment of 200 of the Company's troops " and 300 Seepoys, in the province of Nuddea or Kishnagur ; " the body of the army from Gherettee, at Cossimbuzar, to " possess themselves of the city of Moorshedabad. That in " this disposition the troops shall march as nearly as possible " in a line, so as to be able to support each other, and the " whole to act under the orders of Major Adams.

" The distance of Captain Knox's present stations at Jel- " lasore being considerable, agreed, that while the other pre- " parations are making, he be directed to march to Midnapore " and there wait with his party in readiness for moving until " he shall receive our further orders, leaving behind him one " Company of Seepoys and two or three gunners, to defend " the post at Jellasore."*

In accordance with these instructions, Captain Knox march- ed from Jellasore with 2 Companies of the European Bat- talion, and the 6th or Captain Stibbert's Battalion of Sipahis, leaving a Company of the latter Corps for the protection of that post, and proceeded to Midnapore, where Lieutenant Swinton's Battalion and the 2d Troop of Mogul Horse were stationed : here he halted awaiting further orders. Captain Champion, with one of the 3 Companies that had for the last

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 3, pp 277-8.

A. D. 1763. year been stationed at Jellasore, proceeded to Calcutta. A
 June. small European detachment from Luckeepore, and the 7th
 Battalion from Chittagong, then commanded by Lieutenant
 John Stables, who had succeeded Captain Mathews on the death
 of that officer in the end of 1762, were ordered to proceed to the
 Presidency with all practicable dispatch. At a Council held
 on the 20th of June, it was resolved that Meer Jaffier Khán,
 who, notwithstanding his past experience, still exhibited a
 puerile anxiety to regain the shadow of authority he had
 resigned, should be restored to the Musnud, on condition of
 his confirming all the privileges granted originally by Meer
 Kossim Khán, and also those which that Prince now refused
 to sanction, including freedom of trade for the English, to the
 exclusion of all other parties.

On the 23rd of June a letter was received from Messieurs
 Amyatt and Hay, dated the 14th of the same month, men-
 tioning that the Nawaub had announced that the question of
 peace or war depended on the removal of the English troops
 from Patna, that his mind was evidently made up to the lat-
 ter alternative, that he was sending reinforcements towards
 Beerbhoom and Patna; that he had agreed to allow Mr. Amyatt
 and a part of the mission to return to Calcutta, but had expressed
 his resolution to detain Mr. Hay and several other gentlemen,
 as hostages for the safety of such of his officers and servants
 as were in the hands of the English, but in reality for the safety
 of Khajah Petroos, the brother of Goorgheen Khán, a connec-
 tion that rendered him obnoxious to the Government. A letter
 dated the 19th, from the same gentleman, held out hopes of
 a more peaceable arrangement, the Nawaub having agreed to
 release the boats of arms and military stores, and having
 shown a disposition to treat on more favourable terms. This
 was the last regular communication received from the party
 at Mongheer. Reports now arrived of troubles at that place
 and at Patna, and on the 30th of the month, information was
 received from the factory at Kossimbazar that the dáks were
 stopped, and that a large force was advancing towards Moor-
 shedabad. Letters were also received from Meer Kossim
 Khán up to the 22d of June, repeating his anxiety to main-
 tain tranquillity, but stating that Mr. Ellis was evidently bent

on commencing hostilities, and that he hourly expected to hear that the City of Patna had been attacked. Rumours to this effect were now generally prevalent, and on the 2d of July orders were given for the movement of the Army from Ghyrettie, where the whole force was encamped.* An advance detachment had previously marched on the 25th of June for Amboa near Kulna, consisting of 1 Company of the European Battalion, 3 Companies of Sipahis, the 1st Troop of Mogul Horse, and a detail of Artillery, with 2 Field-pieces; the whole under the command of Captain Long of H. M.'s 84th Regiment.† On the 4th of July, the following note in cypher, directed to Mr. Ellis, was brought to Calcutta by mistake, instead of the one addressed to the Board, which had gone on to Patna:—"We are made prisoners as far as seizing our boats and surrounding of us can make us—the boats of arms were stopped a few miles from hence. Mongheer, June 21st, 1763."‡—Reports of a more positive nature now arrived, that Mr. Ellis had attacked Patna, and that Mr. Amyatt, after leaving Mongheer had been attacked and murdered, both of which circumstances were shortly confirmed. Mr. Amyatt, with Messrs. Amphlet, Wollaston, Hutchinson, Lieutenants Jones, Gordon, Cooper, and Doctor Crooke, were permitted to depart on the 23d, Messrs. Hay and Gulston being detained as hostages at Mongheer; but two or three days after, Meer Kossim Khán hearing that hostilities had commenced at Patna, sent orders to have Mr. Amyatt's party arrested; when near Moorshedabad their boats were stopped, and Mr. Amyatt refusing to land or to surrender, directed his sipahis to fire upon the Nawaub's boats which were approaching to compel them; a short and desperate struggle ensued, the English boats were finally boarded and the whole party destroyed or made prisoners, with exception to a Havildar and one or two sipahis, who made their escape, and brought the melancholy intelligence to Calcutta.§

* Original Papers, vol. 1, p. 48.

† Second Report, p. 8.

‡ Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 3, pp. 314-5.

§ Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 86.—Seir Mutakherin, vol 2, pp. 68 69.—2nd Report of the Select Committee. Appendices, Nos. 56 and 57.

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June.

The circumstances attending the attack on Patna, which led to this catastrophe, were as follows. On the 24th of June, Mr. Ellis having learned that a detachment of considerable strength was advancing from Mongheer to reinforce the Nawaub's garrison at Patna, and having been given to understand that there was no chance of an accommodation with Meer Kossim Khán, and that Messrs. Amyatt and Hay were to have left Mongheer on the 23d, determined with reference to the permission given to him by the Council, to attack the place before the expected reinforcement should arrive. Preparations for the coming struggle had been making for some time, and scaling ladders had been constructed; most of the outpost detachments, which had been furnished by Captain Wilson's Battalion, had been called in, and the troops were now all assembled in the factory, with exception of the sick, who were in the Chehel Sitoon, a stone building in the city, erected by Zyn-oo-deen-Ahmud-Khán, where they were under the charge of Dr. Fullarton. The Nawaub's garrison in the city was commanded by Meer Mehdee Khán, who had been appointed Naib of the district. All being now ready, the troops got under arms at the factory early on the morning of 25th of June, and marching out quietly, reached the walls of the city just before day-break. The garrison was locked in sleep and security, and the English silently planted their ladders and ascended the walls without opposition or discovery; when, as soon as a sufficient party had made a lodgment, they descended from the ramparts and opened the gate for their comrades, who now advanced in two columns through the principal streets of the city. The alarm had in the meantime spread amongst the garrison, but surprised and confounded by the sudden and unexpected nature of the attack, they made but little resistance, delivering an irregular and hurried fire as the English advanced, and then taking to flight. Meer Mehdee Khán himself had escaped at the first alarm, bending his way towards Mongheer. The English were now in possession of the whole city, with exception to the Chehel Sitoon, into which Mahommud Ameen, one of the Nawaub's officers, had thrown himself with

his own troops, where he held out gallantly, and as the Euro-^{A. D. 1763.}
pean sick were in his power, it is probable that the English ^{June.}
were not inclined to drive him to any desperate extremity,
but rather looked to induce him to capitulate when he should
find no hope of relief remaining. The citadel was also held
by Lall Sing, a Hindoo officer of the Nawaub, who muster-
ed all the troops he could collect, closed the gate and announc-
ed his determination to hold out to the last extremity. The
English however, flushed with their easy success, appear
to have considered their work accomplished, and instead of
pressing the attack of the citadel, whilst the garrison was
still under the influence of panic, Mr. Ellis and the gentle-
men of the Agency, accompanied by Captain Carstairs and
several of the officers of the detachment, returned to the factory
to breakfast, when the troops broke into the town and gave them-
selves up to plunder, which they carried on without scruple.

In the mean time, Meer Mehdee Khán had in his flight
reached Futwah, where he met the advanced guard of Markar's
Brigade advancing to the support of the place. Learning that
the citadel and Chehel Sitoon still held out, Markar determined
to attempt the recovery of the city, and pushing on the advanc-
ed guard, they arrived at the eastern gate in a couple hours.
Here a detail of Artillery had been stationed with a couple of
field-pieces, and the officer in command, collecting all the
troops in the neighbourhood, threw open the gate, and planting
the two guns in the entrance, drew up the troops in line be-
hind them and boldly awaited the attack. The enemy's ad-
vance was commanded by an officer named Meer Nusseer, who
conducted the assault with intrepidity and skill, and being
every moment reinforced by advancing parties of their main
body, the fire of their rockets and musketry became so heavy
that the English detachment was at length compelled to re-
treat, spiking the two guns, which they abandoned; the enemy
now forced into the city, and the English troops, surprised and
panic-struck in their turn, and scattered in all directions, took
to flight, and hastened to regain the factory, abandoning their
recent and ill-concerted conquest, as easily as it had been
acquired.

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Markar now invested the factory, and having gained considerable military experience in Europe, where he had served during the war in Holland, he pushed the attack with great vigour; he mounted upon the ramparts all the guns he could bring to bear against the factory, and kept up a continued cannonade with very considerable effect, whilst his numerous musketry prevented the besieged from showing themselves at the windows or on the walls of the factory; the English, however, contrived to mount a few light pieces of artillery in the upper story of the building, but they produced little effect when opposed to the heavier fire from the ramparts. Mr. Ellis now endeavored to effect a retreat to Bankeepore, but in this he was frustrated by the vigilance of Markar; for four days the English remained cooped up in this manner, when finding their provisions running very short, they determined to cross the river, and try to reach the territories of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, the Nawaub of Oude, who being on terms of amity with the Company, would, they trusted, afford them protection. Boats being available, they crossed the river during the night of the 29th of June, and immediately commenced their march towards Chupprah.*

The rains, however, had now set in with great violence, the whole country was under water, and the detachment destitute of provisions and ill supplied with ammunition, found their march harassed by the enemy, who speedily followed in pursuit; the inhabitants in all directions rose against them, and a strong Brigade under Sumroo crossed from Buxar to intercept their retreat. Notwithstanding these difficulties, they fought their way as far as Manjee, where they were fairly surrounded by the enemy. Here on the 1st of July, Captain Carstairs drew out his shattered force to meet the attack; the Europeans upon a rising ground in the centre, Capt. Turner's Battalion on the right, Capt. Tabby's on the left, and Capt. Wilson's in the rear, as a reserve. The enemy commenced the action, when Captain Turner's Battalion having expend-

* This account of the seizure and re-capture of Patna is compiled from Williams.—The Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2.—Caraccioli, vol. 1; and Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 3.

ed their ammunition, made a gallant charge with the bayonet and compelled the enemy to give ground ; had they been supported by the remainder of the force, it is probable that the fate of the day would have been changed, whatever might have been the final result ; but the Europeans, worn out with fatigue and want of nourishment, refused to charge,* and the Sipahis being discouraged by this example, and by the arrival of a reinforcement to join the enemy, the whole force laid down their arms and surrendered themselves prisoners ; not, however, until Captain Carstairs and seven or eight other officers with 50 Europeans, and a number of Sipahis, had fallen.† Thus, through the rashness of one man, was the Army deprived of a large portion of its strength, and a Company of Artillery, four Companies of Infantry and three of the oldest Native Battalions in the service were annihilated. Of the Sipahis, a considerable portion subsequently took service with Meer Kossim Khán, and the remainder were stripped of their equipments and property and released ; of the Europeans also, numbers of the Foreigners entered the enemy's ranks ; but the officers and gentlemen of the factory, and the whole of the English troops, were made prisoners and carried to Patna, where they were afterwards cruelly massacred ; Dr. Fullarton and 4 Serjeants alone escaping out of the whole party. Judging from two official returns of the force shortly prior to its destruction, it appears that nearly 300 Europeans and upwards of 2500 Natives must have been killed or surrendered on this occasion, and that 7 officers of Artillery and 29 officers of Infantry were slain on the field, died of their wounds, or were made prisoners and subsequently perished. It is now impossible to trace out the names of all those that were involved in this misfortune, but after a long and diligent search, the following have been discovered with tolerable certainty. Of the Artillery Captain John Kinch ; 1st Lieutenants George F. Hockler and Richard Perry ; Lieutenant Fireworkers, John Brown, Ardean Deckers, John Read, and Benjamin Adamson ;— one of the First Lieutenants appears to have been Ad-

A. D. 1768.
July.

* Williams, pp. 125-6.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 87.

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jutant and the other Commissary of Ordnance.—Of the Infantry, Captain Peter Carstairs, Charles Ernest Joecher, Ambrose Perry, Henry Sommers, James Tabby, William Turner, and George Wilson; Lieutenants John Downie, Richard Holland, Maurice Roach, George Alston, and Sir William Hope; Ensigns John Greentree, Robert Roberts, Duncan Macleod, William Crawford, William Hincles, Isaac Humphries, John Robert Roach, John Perry, Walter Mackay, and Dr. Anderson.*

The acquisition of the military stores, ordnance, arms, and equipments, were of essential benefit to the Nawaub's force.

On the 7th of July, the following letter dated the 28th June 1763, was received by the Governor and Council from Meer Kossim Khán, which confirmed the rumour then prevalent that some severe disaster had befallen the Patna detachment:—

“ In my heart I believed Mr. Ellis to be my inveterate enemy,
 “ but from his actions, I now find he was inwardly my friend,
 “ as appears by this step which he has added to others. Like
 “ a night robber he assaulted the Kella of Patna; robbed and
 “ plundered the bazar, and all the merchants and inhabitants
 “ of the city, ravaging and slaying from the morning to the
 “ third pahr (afternoon.) When I requested of you 2 or 300
 “ muskets laden in boats, you would not consent to it. This
 “ unhappy man, in consequence of his inward friendship, fa-
 “ vored me in this fray and slaughter with all the muskets and
 “ cannon of his army, and is himself relieved and eased from
 “ his burthen. Since it was never my desire to injure the af-
 “ fairs of the Company, whatever loss may have been occa-
 “ sioned by this unhappy man to myself in this tumult, I pass
 “ over; but you, gentlemen, must answer for any injury which
 “ the Company's affairs have suffered; and since you have un-
 “ justly and cruelly ravaged the city, and destroyed the people,
 “ and plundered effects to the value of lacs of rupees; it be-
 “ comes the justice of the Company to make reparation to
 “ the poor, as formerly was done for Calcutta. You, gen-

* This list is compiled from various sources, the most important of which is, the Bengal General Military Register. For a detailed Return of this Detachment on the 30th April preceding, vide Appendix R.

“ tlemen, are wonderful friends; having made a treaty, to which A. D. 1763.
 “ you pledged the name of Jesus Christ; you took from me July.
 “ a country to pay the expences of your army, with the con-
 “ dition, that your troops should always attend me, and pro-
 “ mote my affairs. In effect you keep up a force for my de-
 “ struction; since, from their hands, such events have proceed-
 “ ed, I am entirely of opinion, that the Company should favor
 “ me in causing to be delivered to me the rents for three years
 “ of my country. Besides this, for the violences and oppres-
 “ sions exercised by the English gomastahs for several years
 “ past, in the territories of the Nizamut, and the large sums
 “ extorted, and the losses occasioned by them, it is proper and
 “ just that the Company make restitution at this time. This
 “ is all the trouble you need take; in the same manner as you
 “ took Burdwan and the other lands, you must favor me in
 “ resigning them.”*

On the same date, arrangements having been made with Meer Jaffier Khán, the following proclamation was issued by the Governor and Council, and distributed throughout the adjacent districts:—

“ The Nabob Meer Mahomed Cossim Allee Cawn having
 “ entered upon, and committed acts of open hostility against
 “ the English nation, and the interest of the English Unit-
 “ ed East India Company; we, on their behalf, are reduced to
 “ the necessity of declaring war against him; and having come
 “ to a resolution of placing the Nabob Meer Mahomed Jaffier
 “ Cawn Behader again in the Government; we now proclaim
 “ and acknowledge him as Subahdar of the provinces of Ben-
 “ gal, Bahar, and Orissa: and further, as the said Cossim Allee
 “ Cawn has likewise exercised acts of violence and oppres-
 “ sions over many of the principal merchants and inhabitants
 “ of the country to their entire ruin, we do hereby require all
 “ manner of persons under our jurisdiction, and also invite all
 “ other officers and inhabitants of the country, to repair to the
 “ standard of Meer Mahomed Jaffier Cawn Behader, to assist
 “ him in defeating the designs of the said Cossim Allee Cawn,
 “ and finally establishing himself in the subahdarree.

* Vausittart's Narrative, vol. 3, pp. 330-2.

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“ Given in Council at Fort William, the 7th day of July 1763, under our hands, and the seal of the said United East India Company.”*

On the following day, intelligence was received from Kosimbazar that a large detachment of the Nawaub's troops had arrived at Moorshedabad, that the factory was invested, and that an attack was expected the following morning, which the limited force stationed there was ill calculated to sustain with any hope of success.

Every exertion was now made to enable the Army to march, but the greatest difficulties were experienced in procuring carriage, cattle, and other necessaries, and above all money; the treasury in Calcutta was empty, and Major Adams took the Field with only 10,000 Rupees in his Military chest.

The Army marched from Ghyrettie on the 5th of July, and consisted of the European Cavalry, in all less than 100 men, His Majesty's 84th Regiment about 400 strong, 4 Companies of the European Regiment and the French Rangers, making together about 250 men; the 1st or Captain Jennings' Company of Artillery, with 10 Field pieces, and three weak Battalions of Sipahis under Captains Broadbrook, Grant, and Trevannion (*the present 1st, 5th, and 10th Regiments N. I.*) making a total of less than 850 Europeans and 1500 Natives; Captain Long, with 1 Company of the European Battalion, 3 Companies of Sipahis, and the 1st Troop of Mogul Horse, was in advance at Amboa, on the Hooghly, nearly due East of Burdwan; Captain Knox was directed to march from Midnapore, via Burdwan, with the 2 Companies of the European Battalion, Captain Stibbert's and Lieutenant Swinton's Battalions of Sipahis, (*the present 9th and 3rd Regiments N. I.*) the detail of Artillery, and the 2nd Troop of Mogul Horse, so as to form a junction with the Army at Moorshedabad, leaving a sufficient detail of Sipahis at Midnapore; and Lieutenant Stables with the Matthews' Battalion, was on the way from Chittagong to join

* Captain Jennings' - 4th Co. 10th Regt. N. I. - He was a Lieutenant in the 10th Regt. N. I. - (see vol. 1. p. 357)

the army. Captain MacLean was also directed to despatch one of the Battalions under his command from Burdwan, to escort a supply of treasure and a convoy of cattle and provisions, which Mr. Johnstone the agent in that province, had collected for the use of the Army. One Company of the European Battalion, chiefly composed of sick and convalescents, together with the sick of H. M.'s 84th Regiment, the Company of Invalids, a few Gunners, and a detachment of Native Infantry, were left at Calcutta: the Militia were again called out, and a Company of Volunteers was formed from amongst that body, to co-operate with the Army, under the command of Captain Wedderburn, which Company subsequently left Calcutta in charge of a fleet of store boats, and continued to perform that duty to the close of the operations. Such were the preparations on the English side for this memorable campaign.

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In the mean time, Meer Kossim Khán had not been idle; as already stated, he had dispatched a force to Moorshedabad to support the division already stationed there, which was under the command of Syud Mahommud Khán, the Governor of that city; this powerful reinforcement consisted of 3 Irregular Brigades under the command of Jaffier Khán, Aalum Khán and Sheik Hybut Oolah; their united forces immediately attacked the factory at Kossimbazar, which was garrisoned by 2 or 3 Companies of Regular and 1 or 2 of Local Sipahis, with a small detail of Europeans, who being unable to resist the means and force brought against them, were overpowered in the first attack; the survivors surrendered themselves prisoners, and were all sent to Mongheer, where the Europeans were joined to their unfortunate comrades from Patna, who had also arrived at that place: the Sipahis were either taken into Meer Kossim Khán's service or dismissed. Mahommud Tuckee Khán, one of the best of the enemy's native Generals, was in command of his own Brigade in the Beerbhoom province, and was now directed to proceed and join the force at Moorshedabad, when the whole were to move out and oppose the advance of the English:—he accordingly marched to Moorshedabad, and then pushed forward in advance on the eastern side of the river,

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July. and took post in the neighbourhood of Plassey, to watch the movements of the English main body, whilst the other three Commanders took up a position on the western bank, with a view of intercepting the detachment coming from Burdwan.

The English army under Major Adams now advanced, though very slowly, owing to the want of carriage and stores. On the 17th of July they crossed the river and reached Agurdeep* where they were joined by Meer Jaffier Khán, who having finally arranged terms with the Government on the 12th of the month, had left Calcutta on the following day. The tenor of this treaty was, that he should confirm all the privileges granted by Meer Kossim Khán and rescind such ordinances as were considered obnoxious, that he should levy the ancient duties upon all except English traders, that he should maintain a force of 12,000 Horse and 12,000 Foot, that he should pay the Company thirty lakhs of rupees for the expenses of the war, and reimburse all losses sustained by private individuals, and permit no Europeans to erect fortifications in the country except the English. A donation of twenty-five lakhs to the Army, and half that sum to the Navy, was subsequently demanded and agreed to.†

The first action that took place was on the 17th of July, near the banks of the Adjee river, and afforded a happy omen of future success. The detachment sent by Captain MacLean from Burdwan, consisted of the 2nd Burdwan Battalion (*now the 8th N. I.*), under the command of Lieutenant William Glenn; this officer had with him treasure to the amount of two lakhs of rupees, and a convoy of cattle and grain, all of which were urgently required by the English troops, to whose camp at Agurdeep he was hastening, when he was met by the forces of Jaffier Khán, Aalum Khán, and Sheik Hybut Oolah, to the number of 17,000 men, horse and foot. Not-

* It should be borne in mind that, although in consequence of the changes in the course of the river, Agurdeep is now on the western bank, the stream formerly ran on the other side of that town.

† Second Report, p. 20.—For the full details of the treaty made on this occasion, vide Appendix S.

withstanding this vast disparity of numbers, Lieutenant Glenn, who has been described by a foreign writer, a cotemporary of his own, as "one of the bravest men ever produced in a country so fertile in intrepid men," drew up his little force to the best advantage that circumstances permitted, and coolly awaited the attack ; this unequal contest lasted for upwards of four hours, and was most desperately and gallantly maintained. Fortunately the enemy had no artillery with them, whilst the English field-pieces, admirably served, dealt destruction in their ranks whenever they advanced to charge ; the ground also was broken, and not well adapted to the movements of Cavalry, of which arm a considerable proportion of the opposing force consisted. The enemy however behaved with great courage ; and maddened at the unexpected resistance they encountered, and at the idea of having so valuable a prize, and what they had regarded as a certain and easy victory, snatched from their grasp, they redoubled their efforts, and made charge after charge, hoping by their numbers to overwhelm the small body of their opponents ; but the gallantry of the Sipahis and the steadiness of the Artillery baffled all their efforts : every onset was received with a withering discharge of grape from the guns or with a deliberate volley and an impenetrable row of bayonets from the Battalion. Three times were the guns and treasure captured, and as often rescued by a desperate charge of the Sipahis, until at length the enemy having suffered an exceedingly heavy loss, were rendered hopeless of success, and sullenly drew off, leaving the gallant Glenn master of the field, with his stores and treasures untouched. His loss, however, was severe, and most of his small detail of Artillerymen and European Serjeants were slain. This was the first action the *present 8th Regiment of N. I.* was engaged in, and it is one of which the Corps may well be proud. The guns which they had so gallantly saved were subsequently attached to the Regiment, as a distinction.*

After giving his men a few hours' rest, Lieutenant Glenn

* The details of this gallant affair are chiefly taken from Caraccioli, vol. 1, pp. 345-9, and the *Seir Mutakherin*, vol. 2, pp. 256-7.

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continued his march, and the same evening arrived at Kutwah, where he expected to find Major Adams, who however had, as already stated, crossed the river, and was encamped on the opposite side ; but finding that the garrison in the fort of Kutwah was not a numerous one, and that their troops were dispirited by the result of the recent action, he boldly attacked the place, which after a feeble defence, was evacuated by the enemy. Within the fort was found a considerable supply of grain, and a number of bullocks, which were most acceptable, and together with what he had brought with him, placed the Army, which he joined the following day, on a comparatively efficient footing. On the 19th, the whole force moved on to encounter Mahommud Tuckee Khán, who had advanced and taken up a strong position nearly opposite to Kutwah. Fortunately some jealousy and dissension existed between Mahommud Tuckee Khán and the other three Commanders, who instead of joining his division, although they had crossed the river after their defeat by Lieutenant Glenn, now took up a position at some distance in rear of his left flank, too far off to be able to render any effectual support. As the English advance appeared in sight, Mahommud Tuckee Khán, who was a man of great courage, hastened to meet them without waiting for his colleagues ; he had in his Brigade a corps of Jezailchees, composed of picked men, chiefly Afghans, Rohillaes, and Persians, which corps bore a very high character in the Army. The English advance, which was supported by the whole of the small body of Cavalry, was very roughly handled and lost a number of men from the fire of these Jezails, and that of a corps of rocket men which the enemy brought up, so much so as to be compelled to retire upon the main body. Encouraged by this appearance of success, Mahommud Tuckee Khán formed up his troops for a general attack, riding amongst his ranks and stimulating his soldiers by exhortations, promises and example, to follow up their present advantage with spirit and alacrity—and by this one victory effectually put an end to the campaign and to all foreign power in Bengal.* The troops excited by the address

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 258.

of their favourite and gallant Commander, loudly cheered him, and rushed on boldly to the attack, vying with each other to get in advance, and vowing either to sacrifice their lives or obtain the victory. On the other hand, the English main body, which had now arrived, marched steadily on with less noise and excitement, but with equal determination and greater discipline. The action soon became general and for a time was desperately contested; the numbers of the enemy, the deadly fire of the Jezailchees, and the advantage they possessed in a numerous and well-mounted Cavalry, told greatly in their favour; but the deliberate and effective fire of the British Artillery, which dealt destruction in the enemy's ranks, and the steadiness and discipline of the Infantry, who received the frequent and impetuous charges of the Northern horsemen with the bayonet, rolling them from their saddles with a biting fire, as, baffled by the impenetrable iron wall, they were compelled to retreat,—more than counter-balanced these advantages. Still, however, cheered by their brave Commander and confident in their own courage and numbers, the enemy fought on gallantly, renewing charge after charge undismayed by their repeated checks and losses. The British Cavalry were so completely outnumbered as to be useless; and at one time a wavering was observed in the English ranks. This circumstance did not escape the eagle eye of Mahommud Tuckee Khan:—although his horse had fallen under him just before, killed by a cannon shot which grazed the sole of his own foot, causing the most excruciating pain, he mounted a fresh animal, and taking a chosen body of Afghan horse, moved to attack the right of the British line; but the skill and foresight of the English leader had prepared for this movement; that flank was covered by a small nullah with a low jungle on its bank, in which Major Adams had posted a Company of Sipahis, and as Mahommud Tuckee Khan with his followers dashed into the stream, this little party rose from their ambuscade, and poured in an unexpected and deadly fire of musketry, which checked their advance and sent most of the leading files into eternity. Mahommud Tuckee Khan fell with a bullet through his brain,

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A. D. 1763.
19th July.

and expired with an unfinished curse on the cowardice of his fellow-commanders upon his lips.* The death of their leader discouraged the enemy and decided the fate of the day; they now gave way in all directions, and left the English masters of the field, and of a complete though hard-won victory. The loss of the enemy was very heavy, and had the British Cavalry been more numerous and effective, their destruction would have been complete; as it was, they lost the whole of their Artillery and stores, and a number of cattle, which latter were most acceptable to the victors. The fugitives rallied around the Brigades of Sheik Hybut Oolah and his colleagues, who had remained at a distance the whole time, spectators but not participators in the action. Had they supported Mahommud Tuckee Khán, a very different result might have ensued. The loss of the English was also considerable, and two out of the small proportion of officers were killed; these were Lieutenant Charles Delaserre of the Cavalry, and Lieutenant Smith of the Infantry.†

The Army halted on the field of battle, and Plassey House being in sight, in compliment to that victory, the Parole given out for the night was "Clive," and the countersign "Plassey." Here the troops remained for three days, burying the dead, tending the wounded, and repairing their losses; a magazine of stores was collected at Kutwah, the place put into a more defensible condition, and a sufficient detail of Sipahis left for its protection.

On the 23rd, the Army marched to Moorshedabad and stormed the enemy's intrenchments at Mooteejheel, after which the Governor abandoned the city, and joined the force assembled near Sootee, where Meer Kossim Khán had directed that they should make a final stand; to enable them to do which, he sent them considerable reinforcements, including the regular Brigades under Sumroo and Markar, a formidable body of Cavalry under Assud Oolah Khán, and a corps of rocket-men under the command of Meer Nusseer Khán, who

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 259.—Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 348

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 348.

had led the attack on Patna; 16 field-pieces accompanied these reinforcements, manned by Europeans and topasses.* A. D. 1763.
 On the 25th of July, Meer Jaffier Khán made his triumphal entry into the city of Moorshedabad, and took his seat on the musnud. He fixed his residence in Aly Verdee Khán's palace, and the English troops encamped at Saadut Bagh. Some disturbances occurred in the city, but they were chiefly confined to the lower orders, and originated in attempts at plunder. The more respectable inhabitants submitted quietly if not cheerfully to the change of Government, and the mercantile community welcomed any arrangement that held out a prospect of delivering them from the exactions of Meer Kossim Khán, whose necessities and suspicions of the Hindoos had led him into the commission of great severities towards that class, particularly as regarded the family of the Seths, the members of which wealthy firm he had made prisoners and carried to Mongheer, on account of their supposed connection with the English. 26th July.

On the 27th, the troops crossed the river and were joined in a day or two by the Nawaub, and such followers as he could collect. A sufficient detachment of Sipahis, with the sick and wounded Europeans, was left for the protection of the Kossimbazar factory, and Captain Robert Campbell, the senior officer left in charge, was directed to raise another Battalion of Sipahis, upon which duty he commenced at once, and organized the Corps, *which is now the 6th Regiment of N. I.*, in a remarkably short period.†

Other arrangements were about the same time made by the Government for adding to the Native portion of the force. The details left in the Province of Midnapore were directed to be increased for the better protection of that district, and Captain Gilbert Ironside, the Town Major in Calcutta, was also ordered to raise another Battalion, which he shortly accomplished, which Corps, *now the 11th Regiment N. I.*, still bears his name.†

Whilst at Moorshedabad, the force was joined by Lieute-

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 263.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 349.—Williams, p. 95.

A. D. 1763. nant Stables with the *Mathews'* Battalion, and after they had
 July. crossed the river, Captain Knox joined the army with the detachment from Midnapore.

The force now assembled, amounted altogether to about 1000 Europeans, and nearly 4000 Sipahis ; the European portion consisting of H. M.'s 84th Regiment some 400 strong, the European Battalion, including the French Company, upwards of 350, the European Cavalry about 150, and the Artillery above 120 strong ; the latter appears to have been divided into two Companies about this time, the 1st remaining under Captain Jennings' particular command, assisted by Captain Lieutenant John Green, and the 2nd Company under Captain Ralph Winwood, who had been promoted to that grade in November 1761, most probably with a view to his holding the actual command of the 1st Company, as Captain Jennings was considered in the light of a field officer, and held the general command of the whole of this arm ; in fact, he is generally spoken of at this period as Major, though he did not actually attain that rank until 1765. The Native portion of the force consisted of the 2 Troops of Mogul Horse, a detail of Lascars attached to the Artillery, and 7 Battalions of Sipahis, viz. Captain Broadbrook's (*the present 1st Regiment N. I.*), Captain Grant's (*the present 5th N. I.*), Lieutenant Stables (*the Mathews*), Captain Smith's (*the present 8th N. I.*), Captain Trevannion's (*the present 10th N. I.*), Captain Stibbert's (*the present 9th N. I.*), and Lieutenant Swinton's (*the present 3rd N. I.*) The whole of these Battalions were very weak, owing to the detachments left at the Presidency, in the Midnapore districts, at Kutwah, and Kossimbazar, none of them having previously been complete ; their average strength being only from 5 to 600, little more than half their nominal establishment.

Major Adams held the general command of the whole, and Major Carnac the subordinate command of the Company's troops : Captain Jennings that of the Artillery, and Captain George Hay appears to have commanded the Cavalry, Captain Knox was appointed Quarter-Master-General of the force ; Captain Champion seems to have acted as Brigade-Major,

Captain W. Grant, H. M.'s 84th Regiment, was Field Engineer and Military Secretary to Major Adams; and Lieutenant Glenn, for his gallant conduct on the recent occasion, was appointed Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant James Nicoll held the situation of Adjutant to the whole of the Sipahi Battalions, an appointment corresponding with that of Assistant Adjutant-General at present. The force appears to have been badly off for medical staff, but it had the advantage of a Chaplain, for the first time on record in this army.*

A. D. 1763,
2nd Aug.

A bridge was now thrown over the Banslee Nullah, which the Army crossed on the 1st of August, and on the 2nd they found themselves in front of the enemy, drawn up on the plains of Gherriah, to the number of nearly 40,000 men, of whom upwards of 12,000 were Cavalry, with a powerful Artillery.

The regular Brigades of Markar and Sumroo were formed in line in the centre, commanding the main road; to their right, Meer Assud-Oolah Khán took up his position with a division of between 7 and 8,000 Cavalry and nearly 12,000 Infantry, partly Telingahs and partly Nujeebs. Shere Alee Khán took post on the left of the line with a smaller Brigade, that flank being in a great measure protected by the river.†

The enemy committed a great error in thus advancing to meet the English, which can only be accounted for by their confidence in their own numbers and efficiency; they had in the first instance taken up a strong position near Sootee, which had been intrenched; here their troops sheltered from attack might have chosen their own ground and time for action, whilst the English force ill supplied with every necessary, might have been harassed by the enemy's Cavalry, by whom their supplies could have been cut off, whilst the alternate heat and drenching rain of that season must speedily have told upon the health of the European troops. Instead of taking advantage of these favourable circumstances, the Nawaub's force advanced to meet the English as soon as the latter had crossed the Banslee, by which they

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 350.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 261.

A. D. 1763.
2nd Aug.

not only abandoned their advantage of ground, but also lost in a great measure the benefit of their superiority in numbers, as the English position was in an angle formed by the oblique junction of the Banslee with the Bhágarettee, and consequently its flanks were covered by the two streams. The English line of battle appears to have been much on the usual plan, the Europeans in the centre in two Battalions, the King's to the left and Company's to the right, with 2 pieces of Artillery on either flank; 3 Battalions of Sipahis to the right and 3 to the left, with 2 field-pieces on their flanks, and 1 Battalion of Sipahis, with 2 field-pieces and the Cavalry in reserve. The action commenced early on the morning of the 2nd of August, with a distant canonade, but both sides gradually advanced to closer quarters: the Europeans and the Sipahi Battalions on their immediate flanks, were opposed to the regular Battalions of Sumroo's and Markar's Brigades, which they gradually compelled to give ground, notwithstanding the great superiority of the latter in Artillery; but on the left the action was more dubious. A desperate charge of Cavalry made by Meer Assud-Oolah's division, headed by a chosen body of horse under the command of Meer Budr-oo-Deen, broke the English left wing, and Captain Stibbert's Battalion^a which was on the extreme left of the whole, was cut off and nearly annihilated; this Corps behaved with the greatest gallantry, but overpowered by numbers, they were forced to the banks of the Banslee, in which many were drowned;* Major Adams perceiving their danger, ordered up Major Carnac with the reserve (the *Mathews*,) Battalion^a and two guns to their support, which opportune reinforcement saved the remnant of Captain Stibbert's Battalion and drove back the attacking party; but in the interim a large body of Assud-Oolah Khán's division still led by Budr-oo-Deen, had broken through the English left wing and got to the rear of the left centre, where they attacked the 84th Regiment with great impetuosity in rear and captured the 2 guns on its flank, whilst Meer Nus-

* Seir Mutakberin, vol. 2, p. 262.

seer Khán with his rocket-men assailed them in front; the situation of the English was now exceedingly critical, but fortunately Sheer Alee Khán's Brigade on the enemy's left made so feeble an attack, that Major Adams was enabled to move up the greater portion of his right wing to the aid of the centre, and the Bengal European Battalion inclining to its own left, attacked Meer Nusseer Khán's troops in front of H. M.'s 84th Regiment, whilst at the same time Lieutenant Stables arrived with the *Mathews* Battalion and in turn attacked Budr-oo-Deen: the men of the 84th thus supported, disengaged themselves and recovered the 2 field-pieces on their flank which had been captured by the enemy. Meer Budr-oo-Deen was wounded and his troops discouraged, whilst Assud-Oolah Khán who was advancing to his support, surprised at this change of affairs, wavered, halted, and finally began to retreat. This was the crisis of the day, and Major Adams with admirable skill seized the opportunity, closed the whole line to the centre and advanced with the bayonet to a general charge; the enemy unable to stand before this irresistible line of cold steel, gave ground and speedily fell into confusion, with exception to Markar's and Sumroo's Brigades, which effected their retreat with some degree of order but with little honor; Meer Nusseer Khán with his rocket-men made a bold attempt to check the advance, taking up a position in the bed of a small nullah, but the English bayonet bore down all opposition and his troops suffered very severely; the retreat or rather flight now became general, and the English after a well contested and at one time a very doubtful action, found themselves masters of the field, having gained one of the most brilliant victories on Indian military record; —17 pieces of cannon fell into their hands, besides 150 boats of stores and provisions which were lying in the river. The loss of the enemy was very great, and that of the English was also considerable, it fell however chiefly upon the Sipahis, especially on Captain Stibbert's Battalion. Amongst the slain on this hard-fought field were the gallant Lieutenant William Glenn, who thus early, but honourably closed his brilliant career; Lieutenant Walter Furlong of the European Battalion,

A. D. 1769.
2nd Aug.

A. D. 1763. Ensign Andrews of H. M.'s 84th Regiment and Lieut. G. F. August. Kaylor of the Artillery. Several officers were wounded, amongst whom were Capt. Stibbert, in 8 places; Lieut. Swinton severely, and Ensign Amning who was shockingly mangled.* There is probably no action in which the Bengal Army was ever engaged, more deserving of commemoration than the Battle of Gherriah, whether considered with reference to the desperate nature of the conflict, the stake at issue, or the importance of its results; yet although so many Regiments were honorably engaged in it, none bear any distinction or record of this glorious field. The Corps now existing, entitled to this distinction, are the Artillery, the whole of which was engaged; the 1st Bengal European Fuziliers; and the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th, 9th and 10th Regiments of Native Infantry.

Captain Knox was promoted to the rank of Major for his conduct on this occasion, and Captain Francis Cozens obtained the vacant Company. The Army remained on the field of Battle during the 2nd and 3rd, repairing their losses, burying the dead and collecting the wounded of both Armies, who were sent to Moorshedabad, and on the 4th, which was Sunday, they marched to Aurungabad a little beyond Sootee, where divine service was performed in camp, and thanksgiving returned for the late victory, after which a Royal salute was fired in honour of the occasion.† The Army now continued to advance towards Oodwah Nullah, a strong pass a few miles to the south of Rajmahal, which Meer Kossim Khán had previously caused to be strengthened and strongly defended. Meer Kossim Khán himself still remained at Mongheer, retaining Goorgheen Khán with him, and busily employed in raising new levies, and endeavouring to repair the losses he had already sustained. He now sent order for a determined resistance at Oodwah Nullah, and dispatched considerable reinforcements to the Army, including another

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 350.—The details of this action are chiefly taken from Caraccioli, vol. 1—The Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2—1st and 2nd Reports—The Annual Register for 1764, and Williams.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 350.

regular Brigade of Infantry, well supplied with Artillery, under the command of Aratoon, an Armenian officer, and a body of Northern Cavalry under Meer Nudjuf Khán, a Persian Nobleman of acknowledged bravery and reputation. Meer Himmat Allee the Buckshee, and Meer Medhee Khán who has been Governor at Patna, were also sent forward with the troops under their several commands; and to encourage the force, Meer Kossim Khán announced his intention of proceeding thither himself; but this measure if ever contemplated was soon abandoned, personal courage not being amongst the list of his virtues. Apprehensive of the result of the campaign, he sent his family and treasures to the strong fortress of Rhotas on the banks of the Soane and made his own arrangements for a retreat to Patna if necessary. His disposition appears about this time to have become soured and cruel by his reverses, and he now gave orders for the execution of the Hindoo prisoners in his power; amongst whom were Rajah Ram Narain, Rajah Raj Boolub, the Seths, Rajah Booniad Sing, Rajah Futteh Sing and several other men of rank, all of whom perished about this period. Rajah Ram Narain was thrown into the river with a bag of sand around his neck, and the Seths were precipitated from the top of one of the towers of the fort into the river.*

A. D. 1763.
August.

On the 11th of August the English Army, having been joined by another convoy of stores from Burdwan, under the charge of 3 Companies of Captain MacLean's Battalion, arrived at Pulkeepore, about 4 miles from the enemy's intrenchments, a little in advance of which place, Major Adams formed his Camp nearly parallel to the enemy's line.

The position selected by the enemy was one of exceeding strength, to add to which no pains or expense had been spared. It commanded the main and only road, and extended across the gorge formed between the Ganges and the Rajmahal hills, a steep spur of which ran out and narrowed the pass at this particular point. A deep morass extended along

* Second Report, p. 9.—Scir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 267-8.

A. D. 1769. the front of the lines from near the foot of the hills to within less than 100 yards from the river, along which narrow strip ran the road. The left of the intrenchment rested on the river, from hence it ran in a south-westerly direction for about a mile, when it abutted upon a steep isolated hill which was strongly fortified and garrisoned; from this it again branched off in a more southerly direction up to the main spur of the mountains, amongst the ravines and scarped precipices of which, it finally terminated. The whole of this line of works was of recent construction; the ramparts were about 60 feet thick and 10 high, surmounted by a parapet of about 18 feet thick and 7 high, and in front, along the whole line on the plain, ran a deep ditch of 60 feet wide and about 12 deep. Batteries were erected at convenient intervals, and upwards of 100 pieces of cannon were mounted upon them. Some distance to the rear was the old line of works, and the Oodwah Nullah, from which the pass derived its name, the steep banks of which formed a natural defence of themselves; across this a stone bridge had been thrown, where a strong guard was stationed; and in the interval the whole of the Army was encamped. The force collected here comprised all the troops that had escaped from Gherriah, with the reinforcements sent by Meer Kossim Khán, the whole amounting to upwards of 40,000 men, including the regular Brigades of Sumroo, Markar and Aratoon.*

The only accessible point was along the bank of the river, and to attack this the Army now bent their endeavours. Fascines and gabions were constructed, approaches lined out and batteries thrown up with considerable skill; the troops, Europeans and Natives, working with cheerfulness and alacrity: but the progress of these operations was very slow, owing to the limited means at command; the force was moreover constantly harassed by parties of the enemy stealing out of the intrenchments near the foot of the hills, and fording the morass before daylight; this compelled Major Adams to extend his camp to the left

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 266 and 271.—Caraccioli, vol. 1, pp. 350-1.

and to throw up an intrenchment in front, his right resting on the river and his left on a branch of the morass; the King's and Company's Battalions were in the centre, the Sipahi Battalions divided on the flanks; a strong guard of Sipahis was pushed forward to the right to support the parties in the trenches, to which the Artillery,—the paucity of whose numbers could admit of no relief,—were entirely confined. The Company of Volunteers under Captain Wedderburn and the 3 Companies of Captain MacLean's Battalion, that had recently arrived, were stationed in the boats, for the defence of the stores and the command of the river. In these tedious operations nearly a month was consumed; at length on the 4th of September, 3 Batteries had been erected, the nearest of which was within 300 yards of the fortifications, in the massive ramparts of which the Artillery of the English could make but little impression, although all the siege guns of the force had been disembarked from the boats; a small breach was effected, however, close to the gateway near the river, but of a very imperfect nature, and success if not hopeless appeared very distant.—On that day an European soldier of Meer Kossim Khán's Army, originally a deserter from the Company's service, came in and offered, on condition of pardon, to point out a ford through the morass by which the troops might cross and attack the left of the intrenchment.* That such a ford did exist, the previous attacks of the enemy had proved, and the proposition was readily embraced. Arrangements were accordingly made that night, and the following morning the Grenadiers of the 84th Regiment and those of the European Battalion, with 2 Battalions of Sipahis, of which Captain Broadbrook's (*the present 1st N. I.*) was one, got under arms three hours before daybreak, the whole under the command of Captain James Irving; whilst the remainder of the force, leaving a sufficient guard in camp, moved quietly into the trenches, with the intention of making a false attack to attract the enemy's attention, which was to be converted into a real attack if circumstances

A. D. 1763.
September.

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 272.

A. D. 1763. permitted ; this latter party was commanded by Captain
 5th Sept. Moran, and a reserve column was held in readiness under Major Carnac to act as might be found advisable. The detachment under Captain Irving crossed the morass with great difficulty, the men being obliged to carry their arms and pouches on their heads to save them from getting wet ; they succeeded, however, in reaching the intrenchment without being discovered, and their being no ditch at that point, they planted the scaling ladders they had purposely brought and mounted the rampart: this was close to the isolated hill already mentioned, and as the latter was strongly stockaded on the summit and might be looked upon as the key of the position, Captain Irving determined to ascend and endeavor to carry it by surprise ; strict orders were given to the men on no account to fire, but to trust solely to the bayonet, and several of the enemy who were found lying asleep under the parapet, received their passports into eternity from that silent but deadly weapon. Before the party reached the summit, the alarm was given,—but too late ; the Grenadiers rushed forward, closely followed by the Sipahis, and in a few minutes they were masters of the stockade and not one of the enemy left alive: a mussaul that had been brought for the purpose was now lighted and held aloft as the preconcerted signal for the party in the trenches ;* the Artillery from the advance Battery opened a sudden and heavy fire upon the breach, until the party under Captain Moran had got close to it ; great difficulty was experienced in crossing the ditch, and when this was effected, the breach was found to be very steep and only wide enough for one person: the enemy however distracted by the varied attack made but a feeble resistance, and a sufficient party having ascended by means of scaling ladders opened the gate to their comrades :—the whole force now rushed in and, as previously agreed upon, turned to their left, whilst Captain Irving's party having moved to the right, the whole united and a fearful scene of carnage ensued. It was yet barely day-light and the enemy confounded

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 273.

by the suddenness of the attack coming from several quarters, were thrown into inextricable confusion, to add to which, their own guard stationed at the bridge over the nullah, had orders to fire upon any one attempting to cross, with a view of compelling the troops to resistance,—a duty which was performed with fearful effect; a heap of dead speedily blocked up that passage and forced the fugitives to look for some other channel of escape; many threw themselves into the river and were drowned, others attempted to cross the Oodwah, but the steepness of the banks, and the pressure and confusion of the panic-struck crowd caused a vast sacrifice of life; the greater portion of those who escaped, got off by skirting the hills, and many perished amongst the difficulties and precipices of that route; a few attempted to make a stand in the old lines, but they were speedily overpowered and destroyed; 15,000 are said to have perished in this attack and during the flight. To the credit of the English no unnecessary slaughter was committed; after being once assured of success, none fell by their hands save those in actual opposition: an immense number of prisoners were taken, including several officers of rank, all of whom were kindly treated and subsequently released. The great casualty was chiefly attributable to the panic, the confusion, and the darkness, as also to the usual mode of egress being closed. The loss of the English was comparatively inconsiderable, the only officer whose death is recorded being the gallant Captain Broadbrook, who had so long commanded the 1st Battalion of Sipahis. Lieutenant Hampton was also severely wounded. Upwards of 100 pieces of cannon were captured, besides a vast quantity of military stores, and so complete was the overthrow, that the enemy never attempted to rally either at Rajmahal, which was fortified, or in the Sickreegullee or Tereeahgullee passes,—either of which was equally tenable with that of Oodwah Nullah,—and the wearied fugitives arriving in the neighbourhood of Mongheer, brought the first intelligence to Meer Kossim Khán of the disaster that had befallen his army.*

A. D. 1763.,
5th Sept.

* The details of this assault are chiefly taken from Caraccioli, vol. 1.—The Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2.—1st and 2nd Reports,—and Williams.]

A. D. 1763.
September.

When the difficulties of the undertaking, the enormous disproportion of the forces, and the completeness of the result are considered, this must be acknowledged to have been a most extraordinary and brilliant achievement; and though the success was attributable to the surprise, the siege operations, considering the means, were highly creditable to the army, more especially when it is remembered how little practical knowledge either officers or men could have possessed of that description of warfare.

The officers employed as Engineers on this occasion appear to have been Captain Grant of H. M.'s 84th Regiment. Captain Lieutenant Green of the Artillery, and a Mr. Hugins of the Engineer Department; Captain Lieutenant Green was promoted to the rank of Captain for his conduct, the day after the assault.*

On the 6th of September 1763, the Army marched to Rajmahal, where they halted during the 7th, and an auction was held on the horses, cattle, and stores captured at Oodwah Nullah. The Cavalry were remounted, stores were laid in, and a fortified post was established in a large mosque near the bank of the river, in which all the sick and wounded were placed: on the 8th of September the Army resumed its march towards Mongheer.†

The news of the defeat at Oodwah Nullah excited equal surprise and indignation in the mind of Meer Kossim Khán; on receipt of the intelligence he hastened towards Patna, taking with him the whole of his European prisoners, upon whom he now threatened to wreak his vengeance. The first announcement of this intention was conveyed in the following letter which he wrote to Major Adams, dated the 9th September 1763:

“ That for these three months you have been laying waste
 “ the King's country with your forces, what authority have
 “ you? If you are in possession of any royal sunnud for my
 “ dismissal, you ought to send me either the original, or a

* General Military Register.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1. p. 352.

“ copy of it, that having seen it, and shewn it to my army, A. D. 1763.
 “ I may quit this country, and repair to the presence of his September.
 “ Majesty. Although I have in no respect intended any
 “ breach of public faith, yet Mr. Ellis, regarding not treaties
 “ or engagements, in violation of public faith, proceeded
 “ against me with treachery and night-assaults. All my
 “ people then believed that no peace or terms now remained
 “ with the English, and that wherever they could be found,
 “ it was their duty to kill them. With this opinion it was
 “ that the aumils of Moorshedabad killed Mr. Amyatt, but it
 “ was by no means agreeable to me, that gentleman should
 “ be killed. On this account I write ; if you are resolved on
 “ your own authority to proceed in this business, know for a
 “ certainty that I will cut off the heads of Mr. Ellis and the
 “ rest of your chiefs and send them to you.

“ Exult not upon the success which you have gained mere-
 “ ly by treachery and night-assaults, in two or three places,
 “ over a few jemmadars sent by me. By the will of God,
 “ you shall see in what manner this shall be revenged and re-
 “ taliated.”*

There were not wanting some around Meer Kossim Khán to encourage and approve of this expressed intention, amongst whom was the renegade Sumroo ; but others ventured to advocate a more merciful course. Allee Ibrahim Khán, one of his principal advisers, urged him at least to release the women and children, of whom, horrible to relate, there appear to have been several in his power, but to this he would not listen. On receipt of his letter Major Adams considered it most advisable to act upon his fears, and sent him the following reply :—

“ I received your letter, and understand the contents.
 “ The English having always had in view the articles of the
 “ treaty, endeavoured by pacific measures to reconcile all
 “ differences with you, till the perfidious massacre of Mr.
 “ Amyatt compelled them, contrary to their inclinations, to
 “ declare war against you. You say it was not your inten-

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 3, pp. 368 9.

A. D. 1763. " tion to murder Mr. Amyatt, why then did you not punish
 September. " the aggressors with the utmost severity? There are
 " three months elapsed and nothing done. We have now,
 " by the assistance of Providence, brought your affairs to a
 " very low ebb. It is true you have Mr. Ellis, and many
 " other gentlemen in your power; if a hair of their heads is
 " hurt, you can have no title to mercy from the English, and
 " you may depend upon the utmost fury of their resentment,
 " and that they will pursue you to the utmost extremity of
 " the earth; and should we unfortunately not lay hold of
 " you, the vengeance of the Almighty cannot fail overtaking
 " you, if you perpetrate so horrid an act as the murder of
 " the gentlemen in your custody."*

Mr. Vansittart also wrote to him, pointing out the enormity of his contemplated crime, which was opposed to the law of nations and humanity, and requesting him to remember how differently his officers and soldiers who had fallen into the hands of the English had been treated,—the prisoners released and the wounded tended as carefully as their own people; but unfortunately these remonstrances were of no avail. Whatever may have been the faults of Mr. Ellis and his advisers, the close of their career was honourable to themselves and to the country that produced them; they wrote to Major Adams, expressing their conviction that their fate was sealed, and their readiness to submit to it like men, and begging that no consideration for their position might for a moment interfere with the plans or measures of the English Commander and his troops.

The recurrence of such serious disasters had rendered Meer Kossim Khán suspicious of all his officers, and more especially of Goorgheen Khán, who was reported to be in communication with the English, through the medium of his brother Aga Petroos; this feeling being once manifested, several of those about him who had long viewed the Armenian's ascendancy with jealousy and dislike, spared no exertion to encourage and foster these suspicions. The

* Vansittart's Narrative, vol. 3, pp. 373-4

result was that during the march to Patna, a tumult was excited in camp one night, and Goorgheen Khán was slain; apparently by Meer Kossim Khán's order.—His body was immediately interred without any ceremony, and order was at once restored in camp.*

A. D. 1763.
2nd Oct.

Previous to the storming of the lines of Oodwah Nullah, Meer Kossim Khán had entered into a treaty with Kamghar Khán, by which the estates of that chief were restored, and his services and co-operation secured. In accordance with this treaty, Kamghar Khán levied a force and prepared to make a diversion in favour of Meer Kossim Khán by invading the province of Bheerboom and threatening Burdwan. In consequence of this movement, Major Adams, on the 19th September, directed Major Carnac to proceed to Burdwan and to assume the command of that province; at the same time directing Capt. Witchcot with two Subalterns and his troop of European Hussars, and Meerza Hoosein Beg's Russallah of Mogul Horse, to accompany him as an escort and to reinforce the detachment stationed in that quarter,† whilst other arrangements were made in Calcutta for adding to the strength of that portion of the frontier.

In the mean time the army continued to advance upon Mongheer, which Meer Kossim Khán had made his capital and strongly fortified; as they approached the place, a strong detachment was sent forward to invest it and commence approaches; on the 1st of October the main body arrived, and the batteries which had been thrown up were immediately opened, and maintained a heavy fire all that and the following day, when the breach was reported practicable, and arrangements made for an assault: but that evening Arab Allee Khán the Governor, capitulated, and surrendered himself and his garrison, consisting of 2000 regular Sipahis, prisoners of war.‡

The possession of Mongheer was of importance to the English. Mr. Hugins the Engineer was directed to repair the breach and improve the defences. All the sick and

* The Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 280-1.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 528.

‡ Ibid.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 285.

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October.

wounded were disembarked from the boats and brought from Rajmahal, and a comfortable hospital established; a depot of stores was also formed, of which a considerable quantity was found in the fort, and a detail of Sipahis was left as a guard under the command of Captain John White, who was further directed to organize another Battalion of Sipahis at that place.* Judging from the rapidity with which this Corps was completed and reported fit for duty, it is probable that many of Meer Kossim Khán's troops who had surrendered, took service in it, and equally probable that others helped to fill up the casualties in the existing Battalions. This Corps is now *the 12th Regiment N. I.*, and under the corruption of "*Hote*" still bears the name of its founder. Preparations were now made for the attack of the city of Patna, to which place Meer Kossim Khán had retreated with all his forces. Captain Wedderburn was directed to proceed and make the best of his way to Patna with the boats laden with the battering guns, ammunition, and stores, protected by his Company of Volunteers and the 3 Companies of Captain MacLean's Battalion; Captain Stibbert was sent forward with 2 Companies of the European Battalion, 2 Battalions of Sipahis, including his own, and a detail of Artillery with 4 guns, to throw a bridge over the Sinjeah Nullah; and another party was sent forward to repair the bridge over the Dakra Nullah, which had been broken down by Meer Kossim Khán's order to retard the pursuit.† On the 15th of October, all arrangements having been completed, the army recommenced its march.

But in the interim other circumstances had occurred which require notice.

The intelligence of the fall of Mongheer filled up the measure of Meer Kossim Khán's fury, the surrender being attributed to treachery. He now issued the fatal order for the massacre of his unfortunate prisoners, but so strong was the feeling on the subject, that none amongst his officers could be found to undertake the office, until Sumroo offered his services to execute it.

* Williams, p. 1603.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 329.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 285-6.

The majority of the prisoners were confined in a house belonging to one Hadjee Ahmud, on the site of the present English cemetery in that city. Hither Sumroo repaired on the 5thth of October, with two Companies of his Sipahis, having on the previous day, under pretence of giving the party an entertainment, procured all their knives and forks, so that they were deprived of every means of resistance. Having surrounded the house, he sent for Messrs. Ellis, Hay, and Lushington, who went out with six other gentlemen, and were immediately cut to pieces in the most barbarous manner, and their remains thrown into a well; the Sipahis now mounted the roof of the house, which was built in the form of a square and fired down upon the remainder of the party, who were congregated in the centre court; those who escaped this volley sought shelter in the building, but were quickly followed by Sumroo's Sipahis, and a fearful scene of slaughter ensued; the English, driven to desperation, defended themselves with bottles, bricks, and articles of furniture; and their very executioners, struck with their gallantry, requested that arms might be furnished to them, when they would set upon them and fight them till destroyed, but that this butchery of unarmed men was not the work for Sipahis but for *hullal khores*. Sumroo enraged, struck down those that objected and compelled his men to proceed in their diabolical work until the whole were slain. The following morning their remains were thrown into a well in the courtyard; the men employed in this office found one person, Mr. Gulston of the Civil Service, yet alive, and they seemed inclined to have saved him; but this gentleman, who was an admirable linguist, smarting with his wounds and ignorant of their kindly intentions towards him, gave them abuse and threatened them with the vengeance of his countrymen, upon which they threw him still breathing into the well with his more fortunate comrades: a few of the party, probably the sick and wounded, were in the Chehel Sitoon, and were butchered in a similar manner on the 11th. Neither age nor sex was spared, and Sumroo consummated his diabolical villany by the murder of Mr. Ellis' infant child, from which it may be inferred as probable that Mrs. Ellis was amongst the

A. D. 1763.
5th Oct.

House
15.
by

A. D. 1763.
October.

female sufferers in this dreadful catastrophe. Upwards of 50 Civil and Military officers, and 100 European soldiers, perished on this occasion. A plain monumental column was subsequently erected to their memory, which is still in existence, but it contains no inscription. Dr. Fullarton, whose medical abilities had made him many friends, and even gained the regard of Meer Kossim Khán, was the only person saved from destruction; he was permitted to reside in the Dutch factory, from whence he shortly after made his escape and joined Major Adams' force as they approached Patna. Four Serjeants, the names of three of whom are recorded, Peter Davis, Douglass, and Speedy, also escaped; they had been sent to Purneah and placed under the charge of the Nawaub of that district; but when Meer Kossim Khán contemplated the destruction of the whole party, these men were sent to him in a boat; during the voyage they succeeded in mastering the crew and carried the boat down to Oodwah Nullah, where they joined Major Adams' division. Davis ultimately obtained a commission, and died a Captain at Buxar in 1788.*

These casualties causing a number of vacancies in the Army, and the recent extensive addition to the native portion of the force rendering a larger establishment necessary, every exertion was made to increase the number of officers, and commissions were readily bestowed on any one willing to accept them; several volunteers had joined the army previous to marching from Calcutta, all of whom now obtained promotion; orders were at the same time received from England for the return of H. M.'s 84th Regiment, with a view to its being disbanded, the officers and men being permitted to enter the Company's service if they thought proper. In consequence of this permission, nearly the whole of the men, and many of the officers, were transferred to the Bengal Army. Captains Charles Lang and James Irving of whom mention

* This account of the Massacre is chiefly compiled from Caraccioli, the Seir Mutakherin and Vansittart's Narrative.—For Dr. Fullarton's Official Report to Government, and a detailed account of the escape of the four Serjeants, vide Appendix I.

has already been made, came in as Majors, their commissions A. D. 1769-
 dating from the 20th and 27th of October. Lieutenant Tho-
 mas Goddard, Charles Fielding, John Nelson, Douglas Hill,
 and John Cumming, entered as Captains; and Ensigns A. F.
 Achmuty, Thomas Roper, Christian Knudson, James Skinner,
 Jacob Camac, and J. G. Robinson, as Lieutenants;* several
 Serjeants of the Regiment also obtained commissions as
 Cadets and Ensigns. All the Lieutenants and Ensigns in
 the Company's service who were senior to the officers thus
 admitted, likewise received promotion to obviate their su-
 percession by the new comers; and with a view to adjustment
 of their several standings, a series of promotions were made
 at the rate of a Captain and Subaltern per diem, commencing
 with Lieutenant Lewis Brown promoted to Captain on the 9th
 of October, and ending with Lieutenant John Cumming, ad-
 mitted as Captain on the 13th of November.† The Euro-
 pean Battalion was remodelled, and the men received from
 H. M.'s 84th Regiment were formed into additional Companies.
 The small remainder of that Corps which did not take service
 with the East India Company, remained embodied under the
 command of Major Sherlock, and was ordered to continue with
 the Army till the campaign should be ended. On the 17th of
 September, the Council directed the formation of a 3rd Company
 of Artillery, having experienced "that two Companies were
 "greatly insufficient for this branch of the service when the Army
 "was in the field, which had appeared very evident in that cam-
 "paign," as "60 or 70 men drafted from the King's Regiment
 "and Company's Battalion had been constantly obliged to do
 "duty in that corps;" and as "from the increase of the See-
 "poys they might oftener have occasion to send out small
 "detachments of Artillery."‡ This Company was formed
 at the Presidency, the few Artillerymen left behind and
 15 men recently arrived from Madras, serving as a nucleus,
 to which were added 10 men drafted from each of the Com-

* Williams, p. 64,

† General Military Register.

‡ Ninth Report of the Committee of Secrecy. p. 576.

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October.

pany's ships then in the river. The command of this Company was subsequently conferred by the Governor and Council on Captain Fleming Martin, the Chief Engineer, as a recompense for not giving him the brick contract for which he had applied.* The two Companies in the field were also increased in strength by drafts from the Infantry. The details of Sipahis in the Midnapore district were ordered to be formed into a Battalion, the command of which was subsequently given to Captain Hampton, who having been wounded at Oodwah Nullah, was obliged soon afterwards to return to the Presidency; this Corps, *now the 4th Regiment N. I.*, remained for some time in that Province.† Arrangements were also made for strengthening the Burdwan frontier and increasing the force in that quarter.

On the breaking out of the war in the beginning of July, application had been made for assistance to Madras, in consequence of which, Commodore Tinker with H. M.'s ships *York* and *Medway* of 60 guns each, and the *Argo* and *Liverpool* Frigates of 28 guns, sailed for Calcutta with two complete companies of Royal Marines under Captains Frederick T. Smith and Maurice Wemyss : they arrived during the month of September, when the Marines were immediately landed and encamped at Ghyrettie, from whence, in the middle of October, they marched to Burdwan to reinforce the detachment under Major Carnac, which was now not only threatened by Kamghar Khán but by a large body of Mahrattahs, who ever on the watch for an opportunity to invade Bengal, had readily listened to the overtures of Meer Kossim Khán, and were now hanging about the eastern frontier. In the month of October, the other two French Companies already mentioned as having been formed at Madras after the siege at Pondicherry, from the prisoners taken on that occasion, were also sent round to Bengal; they had previously served with Colonel Draper in the capture of the Island of Manilla, in which operation they had been found serviceable and intelli-

* Ninth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, p. 656.

† Williams, p. 76, who, however, antedates its origin.

gent, but had attempted an act of gross treachery, in which they were fortunately frustrated.* Their numbers certainly added to the strength though not to the efficiency of the Bengal Army, as they were subsequently the source of much trouble and disorder, and the greater portion of them ultimately deserted, which will be mentioned in due course. On arrival, they also were sent to Burdwan to join Major Carnac's detachment, who being thus reinforced, was enabled to act on the offensive.

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October.

In the mean time, the force under Major Adams was steadily continuing its advance upon Patna. On the 15th of October they left Mongheer, and on the 28th of that month arrived at Jaffier Khán's Garden close to that City.

On arrival at Patna, Major Adams directed Major Knox, the Quarter-Master-General of the Army, to examine the enemy's position and the defences that had been recently added to the citadel, with a view to laying down a plan of attack; Major Knox, who possessed considerable skill in military engineering, having been educated at Woolwich, and constantly employed in surveying during his course of service in India, had moreover an intimate acquaintance with the city of Patna, and he recommended that the attack should be made on the north-east angle of the Citadel near the river, as the most assailable point, and as affording cover from the buildings of the suburbs, which extended close up to the walls. This plan having met with the approval of the Engineers, a battery was thrown up, connected with the suburbs by a trench, the right resting on the river, and the left covered by an epaulement: this work proceeded rapidly, with little interruption from the enemy beyond an irregular and not very effective cannonade, until the 31st of October, when the garrison made a sudden and determined sally, moving out quietly from the north-east or water gate, and stealing along unperceived under the banks of the river until they had gained the rear of the battery, when they dashed up suddenly and took the guard in the trenches and the working

* Williams, p. 122,

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party completely by surprise : this guard consisted of a party of Captain Smith's Battalion, (*the present 8th Regiment N.I.*) who, notwithstanding the sudden and unexpected nature of the attack, behaved with great coolness and gallantry, but were compelled by the heavy numerical odds opposed to them, to give ground, which they did disputing every foot ; in the mean time the firing alarmed the camp, and the remainder of Captain Smith's Battalion, who were quartered in the neighbouring buildings, hastened to the trenches and in turn compelled the enemy to retire, but not until they had blown up the small expense magazine established in the battery, and spiked one of the guns which had just been placed in position ; as the enemy retired, the Sipahis followed them up closely, nearly to the gate of the citadel, where they were galled by a heavy fire from the walls, and fortunately were quickly recalled by Major Knox, who had hastened on the first alarm to the battery, taking with him Captain Swinton's Battalion of Sipahis. The enemy, flushed with his partial success, made a second sally with more formidable numbers ; but the besiegers being now better prepared, they were speedily driven back after a sharp contest. The same system was adopted the following day, and three well-planned and desperate sallies were made and as often defeated by the Sipahis, who behaved with the greatest courage and activity ; but so formidable were the attacks, that it was found necessary to add the European Grenadier Companies to the reserve guard of the trenches ; in the last attack a party of the Sipahis had followed the enemy so closely that they got mixed up with them in the gateway, and were there all either killed or made prisoners.*

Major Adams now called a council of war, and put the question whether it would be advisable to take advantage of the present juncture, when the troops were flushed with their success, and to make an attempt to assault the place by the north-east gate, from whence these several sallies had been made, or to wait until a regular breach had been effected.

* Caraccioli, pp. 330-1.

The general opinion wás in favor of the more prudential course,—which was probably fortunate; as an assault of the nature contemplated, even if successful, must have been attended with heavy loss, the garrison being very numerous, well equipped and supplied, and having already shown themselves wanting in neither courage nor enterprise. The loss in the affairs that had already taken place had been considerable, amounting to upwards of one hundred men, including all the Serjeants of Captains Smith and Swinton's Battalions. Captain Swinton himself was severely wounded in the hand, in consequence of neglecting which, he was subsequently obliged to have the whole arm amputated, and Captain Goddard with several other officers also suffered on this occasion.* Meer Kossim Khán himself, on the approach of the Army, had with his usual timidity retired from Patna, and took up a position at Backrim, a small town little more than 20 miles from the city, where he encamped with a portion of his force, including Sumroo's Brigade, and all his Cavalry, leaving a sufficient garrison of picked troops in the citadel for its defence, with orders to hold out to the last extremity,—whilst his Cavalry should cut off the English supplies, and watch the opportunity of harassing the outposts and co-operating with the garrison in the event of attack. This part of the arrangement was however carried out with little spirit, the enemy's horse keeping at a respectable distance from the camp, whilst the Army depended chiefly for their supplies upon water carriage, which so long as they maintained the command of the river, was liable to but little interruption. In the mean time, the battery was completed, and a second also constructed more to the left, the heavy guns landed from the boats and placed in position, and a continued and effective fire opened on the southern and northern angles of the citadel, which was replied to by a continued but somewhat random discharge of Artillery and wall pieces from the ramparts.

The citadel of Patna was an irregular fortification, situated in the north-east corner of the city, of whose outline it form-

A. D. 1768.
November.

* Caraccioli, pp. 331-2.

A. D. 1763.
5th Nov.

ed a part ; in shape it was nearly a rhomboid, the longer side to the east forming a continuation of the line of the city wall, and the side to the north following the direction of the river ; the western and southern sides looked upon the city. The walls had originally consisted of solid masonry, 32 feet in height and 6 feet thick, with a parapet two feet thick at the top ; but as such a mass of masonry might speedily be brought down with a few hours' battering, Meer Kossim Khán had covered the walls on the eastern side with an external rampart of earth, rising against them at a natural angle of about forty-five degrees, protecting the base and covering the whole to a height of upwards of 20 feet ; these walls were strengthened by a number of solid flanking towers, on each of which were mounted several pieces of cannon. In front of the whole ran a deep ditch or rather nullah, about 50 feet wide and 7 deep.*

By the 5th November, two breaches were effected in the walls, one near the water gate, at the north-east angle of the citadel, and the other on the eastern face, near the south-east angle, and not very far from the east gate. On that evening, the storming parties were told off for the assault on the following morning ; the attack was to be made in two columns ;—the one to assail the breach at the angle near the river was placed under the command of Captain Champion, and consisted of the remnant of the 84th Regiment, a new Company of Grenadiers that had been formed in the European Battalion by drafts from the former Corps, which was commanded by Captain Moran, and 5 Companies of Grenadiers from the Sipahi Battalions, each commanded by a Subaltern, and these again under the command of Captain Trevannion ;—the other party, under the command of Major Irving, consisted of the two old Grenadier Companies, of the European Battalion, with as many Grenadier Companies of Sipahis ; both parties were under the general control of Major Sherlock, the officer for duty in the trenches.† The remainder of the force, with exception to the Cavalry, and a sufficient guard for the camp, was held in reserve under Major Carnac.

* Vide Plate 6. Fig. 1.

† Caraccioli, vol. I. p. 332.

On the morning of the 6th, the troops were under arms, and the storming parties marched off about an hour before day-break. The column under Captain Champion reached the northern breach unperceived, and commenced the ascent without a shot being fired; at that moment the alarm was given, and the battery from the tower that flanked the breach, immediately opened with grape, but fortunately the guns were laid so high that the shot all flew over the party, and only one man was killed in getting up. The enemy, however, now mustered thickly from all quarters, and a desperate hand-to-hand conflict ensued at the summit of the breach. In the mean time, the column under Major Irving being unable to cross the ditch opposite to the southern breach, threw down their scaling ladders, and filing to the right, hastened to the northern breach to join their comrades. The whole party now obtained a footing within the Citadel, and whilst one portion moved along the inner foot of the ramparts to the west, Major Irving with the Grenadiers of the Company's Battalion and the Sipahis, scrambled up the rampart, and along the narrow terreplein, to gain possession of the next tower to the southward, from whence the enemy kept up a heavy fire; having seized this point, the place was cleared of the enemy in an instant. Leaving a guard here, Major Irving descended and proceeded with the remainder of the detachment along the foot of the ramparts to gain the eastern gateway and open it so as to admit of the entrance of the whole force. This gateway, however, was defended internally by an intrenched work of masonry, consisting of a square courtyard of about 40 yards extent either way, accessible only by a small wicket, scarcely affording room for two men to go abreast. Here the enemy made a determined stand, and caused the assailants considerable loss. Major Irving fell mortally wounded, his thigh being shattered to pieces by a rocket; Captain Champion was also severely wounded, and carried off; the command now devolved upon Lieutenant Nicoll, the Adjutant of the Native Battalions, who was the next senior officer present, and pushing forward with the Sipahis, supported by Lieutenant

A. D. 1769.
6th Nov.

A. D. 1697.
6th Nov.

Crown, the senior officer left with the Europeans, they forced the wicket and obtained a footing within the court, after considerable loss. The east gate was now thrown open, and a Company of Sipahis left to maintain the post until the reserve should arrive, whilst the detachment pushed on with steadiness and celerity to gain the Bastion at the south-east angle, called the *Burra-moolah*. Captain Scotland now came up with his Company of Grenadiers, and assumed the command of the party; but was almost immediately disabled by a musket ball through the cheek, which broke his jaw, and the command once more devolved upon Lieutenant Nicoll. The *Burra-moolah*, which they were now approaching, was strongly defended on all sides, and here the enemy determined to make a final stand: they turned a large gun in the direction by which the party were approaching, loaded to the muzzle with grape; a cry now arose amongst the troops that their ammunition was expended, and Lieutenant Nicoll sent off a Serjeant for a fresh supply, whilst he directed the non-commissioned officers to collect the cartridges of those men who had fallen, and divide them amongst the pouches of the survivors whilst they were marching; he formed the whole into platoons, and made a rush with the bayonet upon the gun at the *Burra-moolah* which the enemy, struck with a sudden panic, abandoned without firing. Captain Trevannion arrived with the remainder of the Sipahis at this juncture, and the enemy giving up all for lost, fled to the southern gateway, followed by Lieutenant Skinner with the Europeans, to secure that entrance, whilst Captain Trevannion held the *Burra-moolah* with the Sipahis. In the meantime, Major Adams and the remainder of the force had entered by the eastern gate which had been thrown open, and clearing the fort, had moved into the city by the western gate, where they were all paraded, and the Europeans supplied with a dram and a biscuit each, after their fatigues. Lieutenant Nicoll was now sent with a party to collect all the stragglers and prevent any plundering, and a garrison was appointed for the protection of the new acquisition. Upwards of 300 of the enemy were found dead within the fort,

but the loss of the assailants was also considerable. In addition to the casualties already mentioned, Captain Primrose Galliez, who had succeeded to the command of the 1st Battalion of Sipahis on the death of Captain Broadbrook, was shot through the body, and several other officers were wounded. Major Irving died on the 10th, regretted by all ranks, to whom he had endeared himself by his gallant conduct and amiable qualities, and Captain Champion succeeded to the vacant majority, his commission dating from the day of the assault.*

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November.

Major Sherlock was left in command of the citadel, the breaches in which were speedily repaired, and Major Adams with the remainder of the force moved to Bankeepore.

When Meer Kossim Khán received intelligence that the English had effected a breach in the citadel, he knew that the assault would speedily follow; accordingly, on the 5th of the month, he had directed his nephew Meer-Aboo-Alee-Khán and his Buckshee, Roshen-Alee-Khán, to proceed towards Patna with a large body of Cavalry, with orders when the English should attempt to storm the place, to dash into their camp and attack them in the rear:—these two officers made their arrangements, and the following morning arrived on the western side of the city, where they met the fugitives of the garrison and learned that the citadel had fallen, and that the city was also in possession of the English; whilst halting near the walls, debating what was to be done, a Company of Sipahis issued out of the western gate and advanced towards them, when the whole party were seized with a sudden panic and dispersed in all directions; the two Commanders arrived in a miserable plight in Meer Kossim Khán's camp, where they brought the intelligence of the fall of the city.†

Meer Kossim Khán, overcome by this continued series of disasters, gave himself up to the conviction that fortune had turned against him, and abandoned all further plans of resist-

* General Military Register.—This account of the capture of Patna, is taken chiefly from Carraccioli, vol. 1, who gives a detailed narrative of the affair; vide also Williams and the Annual Register, 1764.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol 2, p. 289.

A. D. 1763.
November.

ance. He had still a force of 30,000 men with him in camp, including Sumroo's Battalions, and a powerful body of Cavalry, but the troops were disheartened by their frequent defeats, and the English were now in possession of all his strongholds with exception to Rhotas, in which he had secured his treasures and his family; thither he seemed at first inclined to bend his steps, retreating on the news of the fall of Patna to Mahub-alee-poor, and thence by the route of Sum-surnuggur, where he crossed the Soane to Shahpoora. Here his followers, tired of supporting a losing cause, began to desert him; Meer Mehdee Khán, the former Governor of Patna, went over to the English, and Meer Abdoolah, Ahmed Khán Koreishee and others, soon followed his example. Meer Kossim Khán now abandoned his resolution of holding out in Rhotas, and sent for all his family and treasures from that place, having resolved to throw himself upon the protection of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, the Nawaub of Oude, to whom he sent messengers with a handsome present, announcing his intention, and requesting permission to enter his territories.

On the British side, Major Adams had not been idle; having made all the necessary arrangements for the defence of Patna, collected fresh supplies, and put the army once more into marching condition, he broke ground from Bankeepore on the 13th of November, and commenced a rapid pursuit of Meer Kossim Khán, who he suspected was making for Rhotasghur. On the 19th, they reached Daoodnuggur, when learning Meer Kossim's change of plans, and that he had sent for his family and treasures from Rhotas, the Major directed Captain Smith's Battalion with its two 6-pounders attached, to endeavour to intercept or overtake this valuable convoy.* Unfortunately it was too late, the enemy had got two days start, and as all the women and treasure were carried on camels, they were able to travel with great rapidity. Captain Smith followed them as far as Sahseram, when finding further pursuit useless, he joined the main body which had crossed the Soane, and was now steadily following in the track of Meer

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 336.

Kossim Khán, who was rapidly approaching the Karumnassa. A. D. 1763.
December.
 On arrival at the banks of that river, he received a message from Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, with an invitation to enter his territory, a promise of protection and support, and a copy of the Koran, in the fly leaves of which this promise and his safe passport were written with Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's own hand.*) He now crossed the river against the strong remonstrances of many of his friends and advisers, and having entered the territory of Rajah Bulwund Singh of Benares, who was tributary to Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, he considered himself free from further pursuit. The English Army reached the banks of the Karumnassa on the 5th of December, and as this stream formed the boundary of the dominions of the Nawaub of Oude, they were unable to cross it without committing an act of decided hostility. Major Adams accordingly withdrew the force to Sawunt, then generally called Sant, on the banks of the Durgowtee, where he formed his camp. Here he determined to retain the troops, pending the orders of Council, and the course adopted by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, to whom a remonstrance was sent on the subject of his giving shelter to an opponent of the Nawaub of Bengal, and the murderer of so many English gentlemen. Arrangements were made for facilitating the communication and conveyance of supplies from Patna to the camp, and Lieutenant Nicoll, who had previously been employed under Major Knox in the survey of the Midnapore district, was now sent to survey the line of road between the Karumnassa and Calcutta, with a view to its improvement; on which duty he started on the 8th December.†

In the mean time, Major Carnac having been reinforced by the Marines and the two French Companies from Madras, had moved along the frontier towards Ramghur; but having ascertained that the Mahrattas, on receiving intelligence of Major Adam's successes, had abandoned all intention of

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 292.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 338.

A. D. 1764.
16th Jan.

invading the province, and had withdrawn to their own territories, he directed Captain McLean, with his own Battalion and the two French Companies, to proceed and join Major Adams' force, whilst the Marines were ordered down to Calcutta, whither he himself also repaired by dawk.*

Major Adams, whose health had been much injured by the fatigues, exposure and anxieties of the campaign, and who had been long desirous of returning to England on that account, now considered himself at liberty to do so, as there was no longer an enemy in the province. Accordingly, on the 9th of December, he resigned the command of the Army to Major Knox, and set out for Calcutta, visiting Patna and Mongheer by the way, and making further arrangements for their security. He arrived at the Presidency in the end of the month, and in the beginning of January, as he was about to embark, his constitution gave way, and he expired on the 16th of that month,† deeply regretted by the Government and the Army, having fully earned the thanks and gratitude of the former, and gained in an extraordinary degree the respect and esteem of the latter.

Had Providence been pleased to extend his life, there can be little doubt that he would have occupied a conspicuous position in Indian history; but as it is, amongst the numerous able and distinguished men who have upheld the honor of the English arms in this country, there is not one whose career of success is more remarkable than that of Major Adams. With a limited force, of the native portion of which the majority were raw recruits, ill supplied with stores, and with an empty treasure chest, he entered upon and brought to conclusion a campaign against a Prince who possessed the most perfect and regular Army hitherto seen in India, consisting of disciplined and well appointed Infantry, an organized body of Cavalry, and an excellent park of Artillery, manned by Europeans, with the further advantage of possessing every stronghold in the country, commanding the

* Williams, pp. 24-5.

† General Military Register.

whole line of communication and supply; and last though A. D. 1763. not least, possessing the regard and good will of the people who, whatever may have been his other crimes, had reason to be grateful for the moderation and justice with which they had been invariably treated under his rule. In spite of these difficulties, Major Adams in little more than four months, made himself master of the entire provinces of Bengal and Behar from Calcutta to the Karumnassa,—expelled Meer Kossim Khán from the country,—dispersed his troops, having defeated them in two well-contested pitched battles in the open plain, against fearful numerical odds,—carried four strongly fortified positions by siege or assault,—captured together between 4 and 500 pieces of cannon, and supplied and equipped his army from the enemy's stores.

By these brilliant successes, he obtained every object of the campaign, and placed Meer Jaffier Khán in full possession of his Soobahdarree: an examination of the details of these important events, as far as the limited information available will admit of it, tends to show how greatly these successes were attributable to the personal exertions, ability, and foresight of the Commanding officer, which was nobly seconded by the conduct of his subordinates and soldiers, into whom he had succeeded in instilling his own gallant spirit and—that grand criterion of an able General—a perfect confidence in his plans and operations.

The greater part of a century of continued conquest upon unequal terms, has accustomed us to success under the most adverse circumstances, but notwithstanding the numerous subsequent instances of similar nature, it is impossible to look back without admiration and surprise, upon this march of a handful of European and Native troops, advancing in one uninterrupted course of triumph and success through a hostile country, in the face of a numerous, brave, and disciplined army, marching over such an extent of country in the most trying season of the year, and only ceasing their labours when there was no longer an enemy in the field. What were the boasted Indian triumphs of Darius, of Alexander, or Seleucus Nicanor, with their powerful and disci-

A. D. 1763. plined armies, opposed to unwarlike barbarians, divided amongst themselves, compared to this single campaign? The conquests of Alexander in India, which are hallowed by our boyish admiration and the applauses of twenty centuries, amounted to this, that with upwards of 100,000 disciplined troops, inured to conquest, he invaded the Punjaub and defeated in detail the seven separate nations occupying that territory, not one of which could probably muster so numerous a force as Meer Kossim Khán, and certainly not half so formidable an one, even making every allowance for the difference of times and the changes in the system of warfare; but what is this compared with Major Adams, who with a force less than one-twentieth of that amount, traversed as great an extent of country with even more complete success, under much more powerful opposition. Strip these early records of the classical and romantic prestige that envelopes them, and we shall find that the most wonderful amongst them fall far short of the deeds performed by a handful of Englishmen in modern days, who with the most limited means have conquered and maintained a powerful and wealthy Empire, into which the ancients, with their numerous armies and immense resources, were proud to have conducted a few fruitless inroads.

Amongst all these modern acts of moral and physical daring, we find a pre-eminent place occupied by that small but heroic band who fought and conquered under the able and gallant JOHN ADAMS.*

* *Very fine - only his name was Thomas Adams! (Vol. 21: Epist. 1764) - He was a Major in the 54th, and was previously in the 57th. Brown has given completely of the line, thus trusting to keep Lord Mung. Key.*

CHAPTER V.*

FROM THE CLOSE OF MAJOR ADAMS' CAMPAIGN IN DECEMBER 1763, TO THE CONCLUSION OF MAJOR MUNRO'S CAMPAIGN IN JANUARY 1765.

WHEN Major Adams left the Army on the 9th of December 1763, he delivered over the command to Major Knox ; but this officer was himself so seriously indisposed, having commenced the campaign in a bad state of health, which had been rendered worse by his constant exertions and exposure, that he was in turn compelled to resign the command to Captain Jennings of the Artillery, who was the next senior officer present,—Major Sherlock, who had been left in command of the garrison in Patna, and Major Champion, who had been so severely wounded in the assault, having both gone down to Calcutta. Major Knox also proceeded to the Presidency, where death shortly afterwards closed his honourable and distinguished career.

Scarcely had Major Adams quitted the force, than emissaries from Meer Kossim Khán's Army found their way into camp and commenced tampering with the fidelity of the troops, particularly of the foreigners and the sipahis, endeavouring to persuade them to desert, and holding out the temptations of high pay and command to any who would enter Meer Kossim Khán's or the Nawaub Vuzier's service. The first suspicion created regarding this proceeding, was

* The principal authorities referred to in this Chapter, are:—

The Seir Mutakherin, Calcutta Edition, vol. 2.

Caraccioli's Life of Lord Clive, 4 vols., 8vo.

Malcolm's Life of Lord Clive, 3 vols., 8vo.

Franklin's Life of Shah Allum, 1 vol. 4to.

Williams's Bengal Native Infantry, 1 vol., 8vo.

Second and Third Reports of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1772.

Reports of the Committee of Secrecy appointed by the House of Commons, 1773.

Annual Register, various years.

Asiatic Annual Register, various years.

Hansard's Parliamentary History, various years.

General Military Register of the Bengal Establishment, 1 vol., folio, Calcutta, 1795.

1764. caused by the desertion of three men of the European Battalion, who were however again apprehended two days after. The state of Major Knox's health at the time, appears to have been the cause of their escaping the punishment they merited, to which unfortunate circumstance much of the subsequent troubles may probably be traced.

The distribution of the Army at this period appears to have been as follows:—In the camp at Sawunt, were the European Battalion, including the drafts received from H. M.'s 84th Regiment, and the French Company under Lieutenant Claude Martine, the 1st and 2d Companies of Artillery, the two Troops of Dragoons, the two Rissallahs of Mogul Horse, and 6 Battalions of Sipahis, viz., Captain Galliez, (*the present 1st Regt. N. I.*), Captain Swinton's, (*the present 3d Regt. N. I.*), Captain Stables' (*the Mathews,*) Captain Smith's, (*the present 8th Regt. N. I.*) Captain Stibbert's, (*the present 9th Regt. N. I.*) and Captain Trevannion's, (*the present 10th Regt. N. I.*) The Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán with the greater portion of his force, was encamped at a short distance from the Army. In garrison at Patna, were the remnant of the 84th Regiment, a detail of Artillery belonging to the Companies in camp, with the sick and convalescents of the several Corps in the field, and the residue of the Nawaub's force. Captain MacLean was on the way to join the Army from Burdwan, with the Troop of European Hussars, the two French Companies from Madras, a detail of the 3d Company of Artillery, with two field pieces, and his own or the Burdwan Battalion of Sipahis, (*the present 2d Grenadiers.*) On the departure of this Corps from Burdwan, orders had been given for the raising of another Corps at the same station, which was now in course of organization: this Battalion (*the present 7th Regt. N. I.,*) was entrusted to the command of Captain Witchcott, who had previously held the charge of the Troop of Hussars. At Mongheer, Captain White was in command with the Battalion he had raised at that place, (*the present 12th Regt. N. I.*) and a few gunners; and Captain Campbell, with his Battalion (*the present 6th Regt. N. I.*) formed during the past year at Moorshedabad, was stationed for the defence of the Terriahgullee and

Sickreegullee Passes, with his head-quarters at Rajmahal. A. D. 1764.
 The Battalion ordered to be formed at Midnapore, progress-
 ed but slowly, and at the period referred to, did not muster
 above 400 men, who were quartered at Jellasore under
 a Lieutenant. Captain Lewis Brown's, as also Captain
 Grant's Battalion, were at Chittagong,—details from these
 Corps being stationed at Dacca and Luckeepore: the latter
 Regiment, after the battle of Gherriah, had been ordered
 back for the protection of Moorsheedabad, and subsequently
 moved to the Eastern Frontier, some disturbances in that
 quarter having been expected.* Captain Ironside's Battalion
 (*the present 11th Regt. N. I.*) was at the Presidency, to-
 gether with the 2 Companies of Marines just arrived from
 Burdwan, and which were waiting to embark for England,
 and the 3rd Company of Artillery, with one Company of the
 European Battalion under Captain George Kinloch, besides
 Invalids; there was also a weak Company of European Pi-
 oneers, which had recently been formed, consisting of about
 40 rank and file, under Engineer officers, of which Captain
 Lewis Du Gloss had the command.

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On the breaking out of the war with Meer Kossim Khán
 in July 1763, the Bengal Government had written to Bom-
 bay as well as to Madras, for assistance; and the former
 Presidency, in the month of October, dispatched 2 Com-
 panies of the Bombay European Battalion, under Captains
 MacPherson and Hamilton, amounting together to 270 men,
 of whom about one-half were Topasses, as also a Company
 of Artillery, and 2 Companies of Sipahis, the whole under
 the command of Captain Pemble.†

This detachment was embarked in two Indiamen, the *Lord
 Mansfield* and the *Earl of Middlesex*, which sailed from
 Bombay in the middle of October, and reached Calcutta in
 the end of December. On their arrival, as the campaign
 had been so fortunately concluded, the Company of Artil-
 lery and 30 of the European Infantry were sent to Ma-

* Second Report, Appendix 67.

† Three Years' Gleanings, pp. 152 3.

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January. dras,* as that Presidency was then much in want of troops their Army being at the time engaged in the siege of Madura.

The two Companies of Infantry, reduced to 240 men, and the Sipahis, were still at Calcutta; but it was determined, unless any urgent necessity should arise for sending them to join the Army in Behar, to embark them also for Madras.

Another Battalion of Sipahis was at this time ordered to be formed at Moorshedabad, consequent on the removal of Captain Campbell's Battalion, and Captain Goddard, who had come down to Calcutta on account of his wounds received at Patna, was appointed to raise and command it; this Corps (*now the 13th Regt. N. I.*) still bears his name, though altered to "*Gaurud.*" Such was the state of the Bengal Army at the commencement of the year 1764.†

On taking command of the force at Sawunt, Captain Jennings shifted their encampment from the neighbourhood of the town to the banks of the Durgowtee. On the 24th of January, a detachment of Europeans and Sipahis with a batch of Cadets, lately sent up from the Presidency, arrived in camp from Patna, under the command of Captain Scotland,‡ who had been compelled to remain behind on account of the injuries he had received in the assault of the citadel; and on the 26th of the same month, the detachment under Captain MacLean joined the force, when the two French Companies were broken into three, and the command of them given to Captains Hampton, Wilding, and Scotland; the former officer held his command only for a few days,—being ordered to Calcutta, where he was appointed to the command of the Sipahi Battalion forming at Midnapore, (*now the 4th Regt. N. I.*)§

The French Companies, immediately on their joining the force, commenced to display that bad faith which

* Three Years' Gleanings, p. 153.

† For a return of the force on the 1st March 1764, vide Appendix U.

‡ Carraccioli, vol. 1, p. 386.

§ Ibid, p. 387.

they had previously manifested at Manilla, and were but too successful in disseminating discontent and insubordination amongst their European comrades; the inactivity of the Army and a relaxation of the strict rules of discipline, that appears to have been permitted to creep in during the active operations of the campaign, afforded many facilities for their plans and left the troops in the most favourable condition to suit the views of these designing intriguers, especially as a very large proportion of the force were foreigners, either Dutch, German, Hessians or French. A correspondence was speedily opened with the foreigners in Meer Kossim Khán's service, and the emissaries from that chief, encouraged by this turn of affairs, renewed their exertions in the camp, and increased their temptations.

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The plea brought forward for complaint, arose from the fact that the Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán had, in the month of July previous, promised a donation to the troops as soon as the campaign should be successfully completed, which promise, with the sanction of Council, had been communicated to the troops by Major Adams, for their encouragement under the obstacles and difficulties before them; and as they now considered that their portion of the agreement was fulfilled, they began to murmur and grow clamorous at the non-fulfilment of the Nawaub's promise, which, as the Government had the entire control of his finances and revenues, and had virtually sanctioned the proposed donation, the troops looked upon them as bound to see carried out.

The first exhibition of any openly mutinous conduct occurred on the 30th of January, when the European Battalion, being assembled under arms for a parade, refused to obey the word of command. Captain Jennings immediately rode up to the line and asked the men what they meant by this insubordinate and unmilitary conduct, when their spokesmen stepped forward and stated that before leaving Calcutta, they had been promised this donation by the Nawaub and had been assured that they should receive a dividend as soon as they had reached the Karumnassa,—that it was now more than two months since they had arrived on the banks of that river,—that they had undergone much fatigue and privation,—that

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they had secured Meer Jaffier Khán in his government and driven his enemies out of the province,—and that consequently they considered themselves aggrieved and defrauded by the non-payment of the promised donation, and were determined not to perform any further duty until this injustice had been redressed.*

Captain Jennings, astonished at this sudden and general outbreak on the part of the European troops, and uncertain as to how far the Sipahis, who had equal cause of complaint, might be concerned in this evidently preconcerted demonstration, apprehended that any display of force or severity might be as futile as ill-timed : he therefore addressed the men and pointed out the irregularity of their mode of procedure, even granting that their cause of complaint was a just one ; and exhorted them to return to their duty, promising to write immediately to the Council in Calcutta and advocate their claims ; he also stated that a supply of money was then actually on the way to the army, and that on its arrival, a dividend of the promised donation should immediately be paid. These exhortations and promises appeared to have had the desired effect, and the men returning to their duty, obeyed the words of command, and were finally dismissed, apparently well satisfied. On the ensuing day, Captain Jennings published the following order—‘ It is with the utmost concern
‘ that the Commanding Officer sees any discontent arising
‘ amongst the troops he has the honor to command, he shall
‘ always esteem it a happiness in himself to see them righted
‘ in every respect, as far as he can with justice allow, or they
‘ with prudence demand. As they have hitherto shewed
‘ themselves brave and good soldiers, he hopes that they
‘ will not now be guilty of any rash action that may in any
‘ way sully their former good behaviour. In respect to the
‘ prize-money, he gives his word of honour the payment shall
‘ be made as soon as it arrives ; and in case any other
‘ complaints happen, if they are made in a proper manner, as
‘ becometh a soldier, he will endeavour to give them all the
‘ satisfaction that lies in his power.†

* Carraccioli, vol. 1, p. 387.

† Ibid, pp. 387-8.

[Captain Jennings immediately wrote to the Council, informing them of what had occurred, and urging the necessity of a speedy remittance of the promised donation; at the same time expressing his hope, and if this was done, no further disturbance would occur. With a view of preventing any future combination amongst the troops, he thought it advisable to divide them, and as the Grenadier Companies had taken a prominent part on the late occasion, he detached them on the 3rd of February, with Captain Stibbert's and Trevannion's Battalions, a detail of Artillery with two 6-pounders, and a troop of Mogul Horse, to the Karumnassa,—the whole detachment being under the command of Captain Stibbert.* This precaution, however, had not the desired effect; the feeling of discontent continued to spread, and on the 11th of February, about half past nine o'clock in the forenoon, the assembly was heard to beat on the parade without any orders. This sound alarmed the officers, who immediately hastened to the parade, where they found the whole of the European Battalion, with exception to some of the non-commissioned officers, drawn up in line, with their arms loaded and bayonets fixed. They had already taken possession of the field-pieces of the Artillery, and compelled the lascars and some of the gunners to draw out 6 field guns and place them in position, 3 on each flank of the Battalion. The European Cavalry were also formed on the right, and the Mogul Horse on the left. The Sipahis excited by these movements seemed inclined to follow the example, but the exhortations and advice of their officers, who immediately went amongst them and exerted their influence, kept them quiet in their lines. The Artillery as a body, to their great credit, did not join the other Europeans, owing probably to their being chiefly composed of Englishmen and also perhaps to a personal regard for Captain Jennings. The Battalion had selected, as their leader, an Englishman of the name of Straw, whom they dubbed with rank of Major; and on Captain Jennings' arrival on the parade, he found them drawn up as above-mentioned, Straw being advanced a few paces in front with his firelock

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* Carraccioli, vol. 1, p. 388.

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resting on his arm like an officer of Grenadiers.* On perceiving the approach of Captain Jennings and the other officers, Straw gave the words of command then in use, 'Have a care,' 'Rest your firelocks,' 'Shoulder your firelocks,' which the Battalion immediately obeyed. Captain Jennings then went up to Straw, and asked him by what authority he took upon himself the command; to which Straw replied by the authority of his companions, pointing to the Battalion; upon this, Captain Jennings seized him by the collar and announced his intention of carrying him off to the quarter guard, as the ringleader of the mutiny, when the Battalion immediately moved forward with charged bayonets, to the rescue of their leader. Captain Jennings releasing his hold of Straw, addressed the Battalion and demanded the meaning of this extraordinary and mutinous procedure. They replied that they saw no prospect of receiving their promised donation, or as they termed it, their prize-money, and that they were therefore determined to proceed to Patna: that if it was not paid to them there, they were resolved to march to Calcutta and compel the Governor and Council to do them justice; but that in the first instance, they had determined to go to the Karumnassa and take the Grenadiers with them. Captain Jennings did all in his power to pacify them; he assured them that the whole amount of the donation would shortly be paid, and that he would immediately raise all the money available in camp, from amongst the officers or from the Nawaub, and distribute a dividend of the amount at once; and he earnestly entreated them not to tarnish the high name they had already acquired through their gallantry and good conduct during the campaign, by any further act of insubordination. He also sent Captain Stables to the Nawaub to inform him of what occurred, and requesting him to raise and supply such a sum as he might be able to collect. To his advice and promises the Battalion paid no regard, and clamoured loudly to march; upon which Straw gave them the word of command to face to the right, and the whole party

* At this period, all officers of Grenadiers carried a light fuzil, but those of the Battalion Companies were armed with spontoons.

moved off toward the Karumnassa, to join the detachment under Captain Stibbert, directing their march through the Nawaub's camp. Here they were met by the Nawaub, who offered them one lakh of rupees if they would return to their duty, one-half to be paid on the spot, and the other by one o'clock on that day ; but the intrigues and clamours of the foreigners prevailed, and they continued their march without halting. Captain Jennings seeing this, directed the officers and non-commissioned officers to follow the men, and endeavour to bring them back to their duty, whilst he himself galloped by a more direct route across country to Captain Stibbert's camp, to apprize that officer of what had occurred and to prevent the Grenadiers being drawn into the conspiracy. On his arrival, he immediately got the two Battalions of Sipahis under arms, with the two 6-pounders, and sent off the Grenadiers to the main camp, by a road different from that by which the Battalion was approaching.

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In the mean time, the officers and serjeants followed the Regiment, endeavouring to recall the men to their duty ; and so far succeeded, that they induced nearly one hundred of them to return and receive their promised dividend ; the guns also being ill supplied with draught bullocks, and the lascars and the few Artillerymen attached, having but little inclination to the proceeding, gradually dropped behind, and also returned to camp. The foreigners annoyed by these desertions, now became more violent, and threatened the officers if they continued to follow them,—in consequence of which, the greater portion gave over the attempt. Several amongst them, however, persevered and continued their exertions to bring the men back,—foremost amongst whom were Lieutenant Claude Martine, who commanded the French Company which had originally come round from Madras, Ensigns Thomas Davie and James Allen, the latter of whom had been a Serjeant in the 84th Regiment, promoted to a commission in the Company's service, and appointed Adjutant of the European Battalion. When they had proceeded about half

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way to the Karumnassa, a Frenchman of Lieutenant Martine's Company took him aside, and told him that they had no intention to proceed to Patna as alleged,—that the clamour regarding the donation had been purposely excited and fomented by the French, to cover their real plans,—and that they were determined and now on their way, to join Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, where, in co-operation with the Europeans in Sumroo's Brigade, they would be enabled to make themselves masters of the whole country; that if Lieutenant Martine would join them and put himself at their head, he should be their General. Lieutenant Martine, astonished at learning the extent and nature of the scheme on foot and fearful of exciting alarm by a direct refusal, gave an equivocal answer, and, dropping quietly in the rear, watched his opportunity, and setting spurs to his horse, rode off to camp to apprize Captain Jennings of what he had learned; but he found that officer had proceeded to the Karumnassa, whither he followed him. In the meantime, the mutineers had come within sight of the detachment on the Karumnassa, when Ensigns Davie and Allen halted them, and pointed out that those troops were evidently drawn up to interrupt their march, and once more warned them of the fearful consequences of opposing the Government by force. This for a moment appeared to stagger them; but the French reckless of consequences, shouted "*en avant*," and the whole marched on once more. Ensign Davie now galloped on in advance and joined Captain Jennings, who was with the two Sipahi Battalions, awaiting the approach of the Europeans. The Captain asked Ensign Davie what he thought was the intention of the men, who replied that it was his firm belief they intended to desert. "Oh, no!" replied Captain Jennings, "Englishmen desert? never!—a dram and a biscuit will send them all back again!"—Ensign Davie remarked that this would be true were they all Englishmen, but that two-thirds of them were foreigners. Lieutenant Martine now arrived and communicated the real state of the case. The Battalion in the meantime advanced, and seeing that there was no intention on the part of the Sipahis to oppose them by force, they con-

tented themselves with seizing the two field-pieces of the detachment.*

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¶ Captain Jennings now once more addressed the troops, and requested them, at any rate, to halt and take a dram and a biscuit, which he had already prepared for them. To this they consented,—and whilst they were refreshing themselves, he pointed out to the English the folly of their conduct and the schemes of the French, which were clearly shown by their proposition to cross the Karumnassa. He prayed of them to return to their duty, promising full pardon to all who would do so, and a speedy payment of the promised donation. The consequence of these exhortations was that the greater part of the English, who had no intention of deserting, began to open their eyes to the insidious designs of their foreign comrades, and falling out of the ranks, joined Captain Jennings; but the more determined mutineers, fearful of a further reduction of their numbers, gave the word ‘forward,’ and continued their march across the Karumnassa, to the number of about 300 men. Amongst those who returned to their duty on this occasion, was Straw, who further exerted his influence to bring over all his countrymen, and followed the party to induce the remainder to return, for some few Englishmen still adhered to the mutineers. In the meantime, the Mogul Horse had dispersed and mixed themselves with the men of the two Native Battalions, persuading them to join; and in consequence nearly the whole of the Sipahis of the detachment prepared to march; but the influence and persuasions of Captains Stibbert and Trevannion prevailed upon more than half to give up their intention. About six hundred Sipahis, however, marched off with their arms and accompanied the French.

Captain Jennings now proceeded to the main camp, taking with him the greater part of the officers, and the whole of the Europeans who had returned to their duty,—leaving a few officers to take charge of the Sipahis remaining at the Karumnassa, and to follow the mutineers,—which latter was now a somewhat dangerous office. Amongst those who per-

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, pp. 390-1.

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sisted in the endeavour to bring back their men, were Captain Morgan and Ensign Davie of the European Battalion, Captain Stibbert and his brother Ensign David Stibbert of the Sipahi Battalions, and Lieutenant George Bolton Eyres of the Cavalry. These officers followed the men until it was dusk, and succeeded in bringing back about 80 more of the Europeans and nearly 300 of the Sipahis; Lieutenant Eyres was the last to leave, being very anxious to induce his own men to return, and only quitted them when they threatened to carry him off by force if he came any further. Amongst the non-commissioned officers who had been apparently very active in endeavouring to bring the men back to their duty, was a Serjeant Delamarr;—this man had been a serjeant in the 84th Regiment, and had distinguished himself by his intelligence and conduct during the campaign, but was greatly disappointed in not obtaining a commission when he entered the Company's service, which had been conferred on several other serjeants of that Corps, and which he said had been promised him by Major Adams. He appears to have been one of those chiefly concerned in this conspiracy, although he manifested so much apparent zeal on the occasion; in consequence of which, he had been supplied by one of the officers with a horse, the better to enable him to exert himself. He was born in England of French parents, and spoke the French language with perfect fluency; on which account he was employed as a medium of communication. As long as any of the officers remained with the detachment, he kept up the farce of appearing faithful to his duty; but as soon as Lieutenant Eyres left, he put himself at the head of the party, and drawing his sword, declared that he would show them the way to fortune and glory.*

When he considered himself safe from pursuit, he halted the party for the night and gave out an order that any one who attempted to leave the detachment, should be looked upon as a deserter and hanged upon the first tree. Notwithstanding this resolution, upwards of seventy more Europeans

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 393.—Williams, p. 20.

returned the following day; these were chiefly Germans, who began to think that the French were carrying the matter too far; a few English were also amongst them, and several Sipahis accompanied. There finally remained only 5 serjeants and 152 rank-and-file of the European Battalion, almost all Frenchmen; 16 of the European Cavalry, and about 100 natives, including several of the Mogul horse.* Only 3 Englishmen were amongst them.

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[They continued their march to the Ganges, along the banks of which they proceeded to Allahabad, and joined Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's Army, receiving assistance and supplies during their route from Bulwunt Singh, the Rajah of Benares. Some of them obtained service with the Nawaub Vuzier, and others in Meer Kossim Khán's regular Battalions; but the majority joined Sumroo's Brigade. Many of them finally met the fate they deserved; others fell victims to dissipation and exposure; and a few survivors led an adventurous but wretched life, holding subordinate commands in different native armies, where they obtained a certain degree of unenviable notoriety.]

[On the 12th of February, the day following the mutiny, Captain Jennings having received a lakh of rupees from the Nawaub, and borrowed all the money that could be collected amongst the European officers of the force, issued the following order:—

' A dividend of the Nawaub's donation is to be paid to the
' Army immediately; the Captains or officers commanding
' companies are to be careful that no non-commissioned officers
' or soldiers are to be inserted in their rolls, but those
' that were in the service on the 1st of July last. The share
' of each serjeant is 80 rupees; corporals and bombardiers
' of Artillery the same; corporals of the Battalion and gun-
' ners of Artillery, 60 rupees; private soldiers, matrasses
' and drummers, 40 rupees each; havildars, 12 rupees;
' naicks, 9 rupees; and sepoy, 6 rupees each.†

This prompt and liberal distribution completely satisfied the Europeans, who were moreover, heartily ashamed of their

* Second Report, Appendix, No. 67.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, pp. 393-4.

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past conduct; and now that their eyes were opened, were highly indignant with their foreign comrades, who had so egregiously duped them and nearly led them into the commission of a heinous crime, which they themselves had never really contemplated, and now viewed in its proper light. The superior footing upon which the Artillery were placed, with reference to the Battalion, is worthy of notice,—being one which that branch long continued to enjoy. [But the proportions allotted to the different grades, though highly satisfactory to the Europeans, were quite the reverse to the Sipahis, who were exceedingly indignant at the comparatively small sum allotted to them, which, when it came to be distributed, every corps refused to receive. Clamour and discussion immediately arose in the lines, and profiting by the example so recently afforded them by the Europeans, they resolved to endeavour to right themselves, and appeal rather to the fears than to the liberality of the Government. Accordingly, on the 13th of February at 9 o'clock in the forenoon, in imitation of the Europeans, they assembled under arms on their several parades.]

[Captain Jennings, immediately that he heard of this, ordered the European Battalion and the Artillery to get under arms also, with a view of protecting the magazine and park, and further of preventing any communication betwixt the Europeans and the Sipahis] The last precaution, however, was altogether unnecessary, for the Europeans were most anxious to show their sense of, and to atone for their past misconduct; and the only difficulty was to restrain their violence, and prevent their falling upon the Sipahis for presuming to follow the example they themselves had afforded. [The European Battalion was in the centre of the line, with the Magazine and Park in their rear, and the Sipahi Battalions were drawn up, two on either flank. Capt. Jennings ordered the Europeans to load their arms, and also prepared two field-pieces for action; but gave positive orders that no violence should be used, unless an attack was made. In this state, both parties remained for

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 394.

some time, watching each other,—when suddenly Captain MacLean's Battalion (*the present 2nd Grenadiers*), which was on the extreme left, setting up a shout, rushed down in an irregular body towards the Europeans who had been drawn up in separate Companies across the parade, with the park on their left and two 6-pounders on their right. Captain Jennings anticipating an attack, at first gave orders to oppose the advance of the Sipahis; but observing that they were moving without order and with shouldered arms, having apparently no hostile intention, he directed that they should be permitted to pass through the intervals of the Battalion, if they would do so quietly. This was a nervous moment; the noisy and tumultuous advance of the Sipahis left it somewhat uncertain whether they intended mischief or not, and to admit them in the midst of the ranks, was a dangerous experiment,—whilst on the other hand, the discharge of a single musket would have been the signal for a general and fearful struggle, which must have ended either in the extermination of the Europeans, or the total dissolution of the native portion of the Army, on which the Government were of necessity so deeply dependent. Several officers urged Captain Jennings to resistance, but he was firm, and repeated his order to let the Sipahis pass unmolested. Still, the fact of contrary orders having been issued just before, and the feeling of the European troops at the moment, rendered him apprehensive that some violence or collision might occur. He rode along the ranks, exhorting the men to be steady and quiet, pointing out that the Sipahis evidently only wished to pass through the intervals to the other flank, and he arrived at the right of the line just in time to snatch the match out of the hand of a Subaltern of Artillery, as he was putting it to a 6-pounder loaded with grape.* The result justified his decision,—the Sipahis passed quietly through and proceeded to the other flank, where, on the extreme right, were posted their friends and comrades, the 2nd Burdwan Battalion (*now the 8th N. I.*),

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* Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 394.

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under Captain Smith, when the two corps went off together to the Karumnassa. Thus was the safety of the Army and the Government for a short time dependent upon the decision of a single individual; and to the judgment and presence of mind exhibited by Captain Jennings on that trying occasion, may the present existence of the Native Army be attributed.]

The other two Battalions on the parade were those of Captain Galliez (*the present 1st N. I.*), and Captain Swinton (*the present 3rd N. I.*) One of these corps remained perfectly steady; and the other, though clamorous and excited, did not leave the camp. Captain Stables' Battalion (*the Mathews*), was on duty in the Nawaub's Camp, two or three miles distant; and Captain Stibbert's and Trevannion's Battalions (*the present 9th and 10th N. I.*), were still detached on the Karumnassa. These three last mentioned Battalions all exhibited some symptoms of mutiny; but through the influence and persuasion of their officers, were restrained from any serious outbreak, and were finally, by the concessions made, brought to a state of contentment and tranquillity.

In the mean time Captain Jennings, accompanied by Captains MacLean and Smith with the other officers of the two Battalions that had left camp, followed and endeavoured to persuade them to return, which, after proceeding about a mile beyond the Durgowtee, they did without the loss of a single man; [Captain Jennings having agreed to their not very unreasonable demand, that their share of the donations should be made equal to half that of the corresponding ranks of the European Battalion. Accordingly their shares were raised to 40 Rupees for each Havildar, 30 for each Naick, and 20 for each Sipahi; and when this was generally made known, order and tranquillity was again restored throughout the force.]

These two serious and threatening mutinies having been thus fortunately suppressed, Captain Jennings deemed it advisable, with a view of occupying the troops in some measure,

* Second Report, Appendix, No. 67.

to keep them in motion, retaining them within the district bounded by the Soane and Karumnassa. Accordingly he recalled the detachment under Captain Stibbert to head-quarters, and on the 16th of February, he broke up the encampment near Sawunt, and marched to Sahseram, where he arrived on the 19th. The Nawaub, who had preceded him, arrived at Daoudnuggur on the same date.

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Here they remained for upwards of a fortnight, awaiting the receipt of orders from the Presidency, and intelligence relative to the movements and plans of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah and the Emperor Shah Allum, regarding which, the rumours received began to assume a decidedly hostile character.

As Major Carnac, who had been nominated to the command of the Army on the demise of Major Adams, was daily expected in camp, Capt. Jennings was naturally unwilling to undertake any measures without being acquainted with the views and intentions of that officer. Learning, however, that Meer Kossim Khán had ordered an officer, by name Sheikh Ismael Beg, to proceed with a chosen body of troops and a supply of cattle to Rhotas, with the intention of bringing away the remainder of the treasure and valuables left there, Captain Jennings detached Captain Smith with his Battalion and its two 6-pounders, to intercept the march of this convoy, and if possible, to obtain possession of Rhotasghur. They accordingly started on the 2nd of March, but were subsequently recalled by Major Carnac, just as they had approached the place. On the 5th of March, the force moved to Harriergunge, on the banks of the Soane; where they were joined on the following day by Major Carnac, who assumed the general command. Major Champion also arrived with him.*

On receiving the alarming intelligence of the conduct of the troops at Sawunt, the Council in Calcutta had sent off an express to Commodore Tinker, then in Saugor Roads with a part of his squadron, requesting him to reland the two Companies of Royal Marines which had lately been embarked; but unfortunately the *York* and *Liverpool* had sailed a few

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 377.

A. D. 1764. days before with Captain Smith's Company on board. Captain
 March. Wemyss' Company, however, were still in the river, on board the *Medway* and the *Argo*, and was immediately sent to Calcutta, relanded and together with the Company of Pioneers and Captain Kinloch's Company of Infantry, was ordered up to join the Army, and started as soon as arrangements could be made for camp equipage and carriage, which were not ready until the end of March. The new Battalion raised by Capt. Goddard at Moorshedabad (*the present 13th N. I.*), was also directed to proceed to Patna; and although they had not yet received their arms, they joined the Marines on the march at Kossimbazar, and accompanied that detachment to the army. Captain Grant's Battalion (*the present 5th N. I.*), was also, after some hesitation, ordered up from Chittagong, at Major Carnac's suggestion, as it was an old and well disciplined corps and had not been infected by the recent mutinous spirit which had spread amongst the other Battalions in the field.* It was intended that it should have been relieved by one of the corps then in camp; but this appears never to have been effected, as the only Regiment in that province, for some time after, was Captain Lewis Brown's Battalion, which was originally raised there.

The two Companies of Bombay European Infantry had likewise been embarked for Madras, but fortunately had not sailed; they were now also relanded and with the two Companies of Sipahis from the same Presidency, were immediately ordered up to Patna, under Captain Pemble, who was appointed a Brevet Major. This detachment marched from Ghyrettee on the 17th of March, and reached Patna in the middle of April, when the Europeans joined the army in the field, and the Sipahis remained in garrison in the city.†

As the letters latterly received from Captain Jennings whilst in command, and which were fully confirmed by Major Carnac on his arrival at Patna, announced the apparent intention of the Nawaub Vuzier and the Emperor to invade Behar, in support of Meer Kossim Khán, the Council with the pros-

* Second Report, Appendix, No. 67.

† Ibid.

pect before them of a long and arduous campaign, determined still further to increase the native force ; and two more Battalions were ordered to be raised—one at Moorshedabad, to replace Captain Goddard's Battalion, the command and organization of which was entrusted to Captain Alexander Dow, who afterwards rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, but is better known for his historical and literary acquirements. This corps (*now the 15th Regt. N. I.*) still bears his name.*—The other Regiment was raised in the Midnapore district, apparently at Jellasore, upon drafts received from Captains Hampton and Ironside's Battalions ; and the command of it, when partially formed, was given to Captain James Scotland, by whose name, corrupted into '*Escotten*,' the Corps (*now the 14th Regt. N. I.*) is still designated.†

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It is now necessary to return to the movements in the camp of the enemy, with whom the Army was now about to engage in a campaign of a more extended nature than any the English had yet been concerned in, at least on this side of India.

When Meer Kossim Khán retreated from Behar, he proceeded to Allahabad with the remnant of his force which was still considerable, comprising all his remaining Artillery, his disciplined Battalions of Infantry under Sumroo, and a respectable body of Cavalry ; there he awaited the arrival of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah and the Emperor. The latter, after an unsuccessful campaign for the recovery of his throne and capital,—the details of which, however interesting, are foreign to this narrative,—had sought the support of the Nawaub Vuzier of Oude, and proceeded to the residence of the latter at Lucknow. Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, flattered by the title thus acquired of "protector of the empire," and looking to many advantages to be obtained by espousing the cause of the unfortunate Monarch, expressed his devotion and readiness to render every assistance to the Emperor, whom, at the same time, he determined to render a tool for the prosecution of his own ambitious views, whilst he confined his services to such operations as suited his personal interests. Shah Allum was, how-

* Williams, pp. 153-4.

† Williams, p. 142.

A D. 1764 ever, received and treated with respect. Alliances were entered into with the Rohillas, who had all along been friendly to the royal cause ; and the army moved towards Allahabad, with a view of collecting the revenues of the lower Dooab in the Emperor's name and carrying the war into Bundelkund,—the Rajah of which district had asserted his independence and was extending his conquests into the territories of the Nawaub Vuzier and the Emperor. On arrival at Allahabad, Shoojah-oo-Dowlah proceeded to visit Meer Kossim Khán in great state, at the head of 10,000 chosen horse ; whilst the latter made every preparation to receive his distinguished visitor with every possible display of power and wealth. His regular Battalions and Artillery were drawn up in two lines, forming a street to the reception tent, which was fitted up with great magnificence and filled with his principal officers. As Shoojah-oo-Dowlah approached under a salute from the guns, he was met by Meer Kossim Khán, who conducted him to a throne prepared for him, and after the usual compliments and ceremonies, and the presentation by the Ex-Nawaub of some splendid presents, the two chiefs, mounted on the same elephant, proceeded to visit the Emperor, where Meer Kosim Khán was introduced in form, made his obeisance and presented a liberal nuzzur. The following day Meer Kossim Khán returned the Nawaub Vuzier's visit with equal ceremony. A complicated scene of intrigue now ensued. Notwithstanding the invitation given and the promises made to the ex-Nawaub of Bengal, by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, both he and the Emperor had been for some time in correspondence with Meer Jaffier Khán, and had sent messages of congratulation on his successes. The negotiations between Meer Kossim Khán and the Nawaub Vuzier had been chiefly carried on through the agency of Meer Shums-oo-deen—a correspondence which excited the jealousy of Behnee Behadur, the principal minister of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, and caused him to throw his influence into the opposite scale ; and he had sufficient interest to induce the Emperor with the concurrence of the Nawaub Vuzier, to depute Rajah Shitab

Roy, who had attached himself to the party of this minister and who was naturally opposed to the interest of Meer Kossim Khán, with, a khelut, letters of congratulation and proffers of friendship to Meer Jaffier Khán. Thus the Emperor and the Nawaub Vuzier were at the same time in communication with, and pledged to both the opposing parties; and it appeared doubtful for some time, which side they would finally espouse,—a circumstance that, coupled with the earnest entreaties of Meer Jaffier Khán, who was very sanguine in his expectations on this subject, had so long retained the English inactive, and induced them to refrain from trespassing upon the territories of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah. A. D. 1764.

But Meer Kossim Khán—whose abilities were better adapted to the intrigues or policy of a court than to the active operations of the field,—gradually succeeded in obtaining an ascendancy in the councils of the Emperor and the Vuzier, and enlisting by liberal presents, the majority of those about the court, whose interest was desirable. Shoojah-oo-Dowlah at length agreed to support the cause of his guest with his whole force, but represented the necessity of subduing the Bundeelahs in the first instance. Meer Kossim Khán who well knew the value of time,—which would enable the English to secure and strengthen their recently acquired possessions,—urged a more immediate advance, and offered with his own regular troops to bring the Bundelkund Rajah to submission. This last offer was accepted; and whilst Behnee Behadur, who had been commissioned to undertake the expedition, was thinking about crossing the Jumna, Meer Kossim Khán, with his disciplined brigades, clothed and armed like Europeans, defeated the enemy in several actions, followed them up promptly, dispersed their troops, seized their strongholds, and compelled the terrified and astonished Rajah to sue for peace on the most submissive terms.* The expedition thus successfully brought to a close, he returned to Allahabad. Shoojah-oo-Dowlah no longer hesitat-

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 303.

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ed to render his assistance, and terms were finally arranged, by which it was agreed that from the day the Army crossed the Ganges, Meer Kossim Khán should pay the Nawaub Vuzier the sum of eleven lakhs of rupees per month, for the expenses of the war; that the treasures and property of Meer Jaffier Khán and the English should be divided; and that, when established in the Soobahdaree, Meer Kossim Khán should regularly pay the peishcush to the Emperor, and be always prepared to furnish a body of regular troops to aid the Nawaub Vuzier when required. These points being satisfactorily adjusted, the united forces commenced their march towards Benares, intending to cross the river at that point, and carry the war into the province of Behar.

— Such were the prospects of hostility, when Major Carnac joined the Army at Harriergunge on the Soane, on the 6th of March 1764. Here he found the European Battalion which, notwithstanding the recent desertion, still mustered together about 650 of all ranks effective, the 2 Companies of Artillery, the details of European and Native Cavalry, and 7 Battalions of Sipahis. The troops were in high spirits and appear to have been generally subordinate and contented at that time,—looking forward anxiously to the expected campaign, as likely to afford them an opportunity of wiping out the recollection of their past misconduct, and—as regarded the European portion—of wreaking their vengeance on their treacherous comrades, who had been so successful in duping and leading them away. The only apparent difficulty or obstacle of any serious importance, was the want of provisions: the Bojepore district having been so long the seat of war and disturbance, was completely devastated; the hilly districts to the south were comparatively unproductive, and were moreover in the interests of the enemy, and beyond the Karumnassa, Bulwunt Singh the Rajah of Benares, a feudatory of the Nawaub Vuzier, had gleaned the country for his own purposes, as he had also done in the Ghazeepore districts. Sarun and Hadjeepeer were under the nominal control of Meer Jaffier Khán, but the management was left to one Ram Chund, who was suspected of being in the interest of Meer Kossim Khán and

no assistance in the shape of supplies was furnished from that quarter. The Army was consequently dependent upon the province of Behar proper, and grain and other stores were sent from Patna,—where the price rose in proportion to the demand; whilst the land carriage to the camp, with the profits of the retailers, increased the cost to the consumers more than cent. per cent.,—so that the sipahis and camp followers were reduced to great distress, and could scarcely live upon their pay. There appears good reason to believe that Nund Komar, the infamous but able Minister of Meer Jaffier Khán, was deeply concerned in creating and profiting by this scarcity. Be the cause what it may, the troops suffered severe inconvenience in consequence. Captain Jennings had already represented the circumstance to the Council, and had urged the necessity of forming depots at Moneah, Buxar, and other advantageous points on the Ganges,—supplying them from Patna and the lower stations by water,—and confining the operations of the army as far as practicable to the vicinity at that river. Major Carnac on arrival at Patna, also wrote to the Board on this subject, and urged the transmission of extensive and speedy supplies from Bengal and Burdwan; in compliance with which request, the Board addressed their Agents at Kossimbazar, Burdwan, Purneah, Malda and Dinajepore, directing that the necessary supplies should be collected and forwarded to Patna without delay. The Major further requested that the march of the detachments under Majors Pemble and Wemyss might be expedited, as also that of Captain Grant's Battalion.—He moreover ordered Captain Campbell to hold himself in readiness to join Captain Grant, as the latter passed Rajmahal, and proceed to the army with his Battalion (*the present 6th Regt. N. I.*).—Captain Swinton was appointed Aide-de-camp and Persian Interpreter to the Major, and Captain Benjamin Wilding appears to have succeeded to the temporary command of that officer's Battalion, (*the present 3rd Regt. N. I.*) Lieutenant Thomas Pearson was appointed Secretary, and Major Champion second in command.

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By desire of the Council, Major Carnac turned his early attention to the reorganization of the force; one of the first

A. D. 1764, measures connected with which, was the reduction of the
March, three weak but expensive troops of Cavalry, and forming that branch into a single Troop of more respectable strength, consisting of 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Adjutant, 1 Quartermaster, 1 Riding-master, 4 Serjeants, 4 Corporals and 60 Privates, the command of which was given to Captain George Hay—who appears to have previously commanded the first troop of Dragoons, on which the new Corps was formed; this measure caused a considerable reduction of expense, and left several officers and men available for the European Battalion, to which they were immediately attached.* The Council had also directed the increase of the Native Cavalry, and its formation into regular troops, subject to European discipline, with a liberal supply of European officers; but this plan was found impracticable, as no men of respectability could be induced to enter the service on the terms suggested. Such being the case, the Major proposed to increase the establishment of the irregular Mogul Horse, which had been found useful on several occasions, and to employ for this purpose, the services of Meer Mehdee Khán, the former Governor of Patna, who had come over to Meer Jaffier Khán. This arrangement the Council objected to, expressing their distrust of one who had already proved himself a traitor, and reiterating their opinion that a body of regular Native Cavalry might be raised on the European system, under English officers. As this was the first instance on record in which the question of the better adaptation of the natives of India to Regular or Irregular Cavalry was discussed, the opinion of Major Carnac on this point may be interesting. In his reply to Council he observes, “I shall give up all thoughts of employing Mehdy Aly Cawn, as you disapprove thereof; but must beg leave to differ from you in opinion that a serviceable body of Cavalry can be formed on the plan you propose; the Moguls, who are the only good horsemen in the country, can never be brought to submit to the ill-treatment they receive from gentlemen wholly unacquaint-

* Second Report, Appendix, No 67.

“ ed with their language and customs. We clearly see the
 “ ill effects of this among our Sipahis, and it will be much
 “ more so among horsemen, who deem themselves of a far
 “ superior class ; nor have we a sufficiency of Officers for
 “ the purpose ; I am sorry to say not a single one qualified
 “ to afford a prospect of success to such a project.”*

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Though somewhat anticipating the order of the narrative, it may be mentioned that the Board's plan was abandoned, and the Mogul Horse increased during the year to 1200 men, each Rissallah under native officers, with a few Europeans to the whole : it appears probable that the increase was chiefly effected by drafts from the Nawaub's Cavalry.

The condition of the Sipahi Battalions also attracted the attention of the Council, and Major Carnac was directed to equalize and increase their strength, and as far as possible, to divide some of the older soldiers amongst the newer Battalions. Another Battalion was also directed to be raised at Patna, the command of which was given in April to Captain James Morgan, who afterwards rose to be a Colonel in the service. This Corps, which was a very distinguished one, was finally incorporated in the organization of 1796, with the present 14th and 16th Regiments N. I., up to which date it was always known as the “ *Morgan ka Pultun*,” after its founder ; and as the “ *Morgans*,” the Corps will in future be mentioned in the course of this narrative.†

We must now advert to Major Carnac's operations in the field, the details of which are unfortunately scanty, and the several accounts differ considerably in the views taken of that officer's arrangements,—being tinged with a strong party feeling to which subsequent circumstances gave birth. But after a careful examination of the whole available details, it cannot be denied that there was an apparent want of energy and enterprize throughout,—which contrasted very unfavourably with the preceding campaign under Major Adams, or with that which followed under Major Munro,—although the

* Second Report, Appendix, No. 67.

† Williams, p. 149.—Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 404.

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means at Major Carnac's disposal were vastly superior to those possessed by the first-named officer, and little less than those with which his successor obtained such glorious and complete success. The two principal defects apparent in the Major's operations were a too great regard for his personal ease and comfort, and an unjustifiable distrust in his troops,—in the very men who had fought and conquered at Gherriah and Oodwah Nullah, and toiled through an arduous campaign during the rainy season without murmur, who had only fallen into insubordination when unemployed and led away by evil council and example, and who now were panting for an opportunity to redeem their character.

On the 6th of March, the day of the Major's arrival at Harriergunge, he assembled the troops on parade, and addressed them on the subject of their recent conduct,—expressing his hope that no further disturbance would occur, and pointing out that they would soon have an opportunity of recovering the confidence and esteem of their officers and of the Government, as the enemy were already on the field and about to advance towards them. This speech was received with three hearty cheers, and the troops were delighted at the implied promise thus held out of an early active campaign. An extra dram and a biscuit were issued to the Europeans, which formed the usual accompaniment of all such ceremonial occasions, and the parade was dismissed.*

The ardour of the men was, however, somewhat damped by observing that no preparations were made for marching, as they had confidently expected would be done, and more especially by the circumstance of the commanding officer withdrawing himself altogether from the troops, and pitching his camp on the other side of the river at Daoudnuggur, near the Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán;—in consequence of which arrangement, he was compelled to issue the following remarkable order on the 7th of March:—“All reports to be made to Major Champion, who, when there is anything extraordinary, will make his report to the Commander-in-Chief.”

Captain Stables' Battalion (*the Mathews'*), was ordered over the river as a guard to the Head Quarters. These circumstances rendered the men discontented, and several symptoms of insubordination speedily occurred both amongst the Europeans and Sipahis; a Hayildar of Captain Galliez's Battalion was confined and sent to Calcutta in irons for mutiny and five Europeans were also sent down, who had been some time in custody for desertion and other crimes. Being apprehensive of the conduct of the foreigners, the Major ordered the French Company under Lieutenant Claude Martine to proceed to the Presidency; he also issued a further dividend of the donation, equal to half of what they had already received, giving 20 Rupees to each European private, and 10 to each Sipahi. The Native troops demurred somewhat at receiving their share, which they were given to understand, was all they were to get: one Company declined to take the amount, but two or three of their ringleaders being punished and dismissed, the remainder were brought into order.*

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On the 12th of March, the following order was issued, which may serve as a specimen of the style of the general orders and the system observed in marching at that period:—

“ The Army is ordered to march by the left, the guns in front and rear of the Europeans; the front division of Sepoys is to furnish guards to prevent the baggage from going in front, or on the flanks; the quarter guard with its own Sepoys, is to bring up the rear of the army, and to be very careful in keeping the Doolies together. A Surgeon and one Assistant is to attend them, and see that no man is admitted but what stands in need of them; the Officer of the rear guard is to make his report of the number of men he brings to the new ground.”†

On the 13th, the force marched to Buxar, where they arrived on the 17th, and halted,—the Major having apparently determined to await the attack of the enemy at this point. Arrangements were made for the collection of provisions, and the ground in the neighbourhood of the Camp was prepared as a position

* Second Report, Appendix, No 67.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 399.

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for the troops. A village to their front was levelled and an intrenchment ordered to be drawn up between the fort and nullah, so as to contain the troops within that space and the Ganges. Lieutenant Nicoll was appointed to survey and lay out the line of this intrenchment, but on his representation, supported by that of Captain Jennings, the plan was abandoned, owing to the distance being much too great to be defended by the force available. Intelligence was now received that the enemy had thrown a bridge across the river at Benares, and had commenced crossing to the southern bank. The troops were most anxious to be led against them, and a favourable opportunity was offered by the arrival of intelligence that the bridge had given way, thereby dividing their force for several days, of which only one half had crossed at the time. Major Carnac however, stood fast, and justified his Fabian policy to the Council by representing the great scarcity of provisions and the excellence of his position at Buxar, and also the strong objections entertained by the Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán to crossing the Karumnassa,—as he was at the time carrying on a negociation with Bulwunt Singh the Rajah of Benares,—that they had nearly arranged the terms, and the latter now only required his (the Major's) seal and signature on the part of the English to confirm the agreement. This negociation, it may be mentioned, was a mere ruse of Bulwunt Singh to gain time and occupy the attention of the Nawaub and the English.

The Council in Calcutta were desirous of a more decisive system of operations, and in their letter dated the 12th of March, they observe—“ If these advices (of the Nawaub Vuzier's intended invasion) should prove to have foundation, we think it will be more advisable to carry the war into Sujah-oo-Dowlah's own country, than to wait his entering the province. Immediately therefore, upon such confirmation being received, if you think you can depend on the disposition and affection of the troops, we desire you will march the army across the Karumnassa, and proceed to act against the enemy to the best advantage.”* This letter

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 4-5.

was received by the Major on the 22nd of March, and he accordingly directed an Artillery officer to proceed to the Kar-rumnassa and arrange for throwing a bridge across that stream, to facilitate the passage of the troops. He reported the same day to the Council that he had done so, and that as soon as he had collected a sufficient supply of grain, he would advance towards the enemy and give battle. On the 23rd, he issued an order that "the arms, accoutrements, and ammunition of the line should be reviewed, and each man to have 24 rounds of ammunition, and a good spare flint." On the following day it was "recommended to the officers to send off all their superfluous baggage to Patna, also the soldiers."*

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These preparations and a rumour regarding the tenor of the Board's orders, inspired the troops with hopes that measures would at length be conducted with vigour, as they now found that their Commander was unfettered by the Council,—which body they had imagined to have been the chief cause of the previous inactivity. Still they remained stationary day after day, no preparations were apparent for an advance, and no order of battle was given out, as was usual when an action was expected. On the 25th of March, a Soobadar of Captain McLean's Battalion was detected in a daring attempt to seduce his Company over to the enemy; he was immediately tried by a drum head Court Martial composed of Native officers, found guilty, and sentenced to be blown away from a gun; which was carried into effect the same afternoon, in the presence of the whole force.† On the 3rd of April, the Major received a letter from the Council, dated the 24th of March, in which they stated that "We have paid due regard to the reasons which you urge in your letter for having continued to act so long upon the defensive, but we must say, that they do not carry the same weight with us;" and in which they repeated their desire for more active measures. He now called a Council of War, composed of the several Commanding officers, and laying before them his inability to procure provisions, requested

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 401.

† Second Report, Appendix, No. 67.

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April.

their opinion as to the course to be pursued. These officers were unanimous in their decision, that if provisions could not be procured, it was advisable to return to Patna, where they were now plentiful, owing to the arrangements made by the Government, and the supplies sent thither from all parts of the country; but some of the members could not refrain from expressing their opinion on a deficiency that might with a little timely management have been avoided. Although the enemy was now in full march towards them, the army broke up their camp at Buxar on the 4th of April, and retreated towards Patna.* Lieutenant Nicol~~le~~ was sent in advance to Daoudnuggur to examine the ford across the Soane at that point; but the army, instead of continuing their route in that direction, turned to the left and crossed the river at Moneah, and on the 13th, arrived at Dinapore. As the enemy were hastening upon the other route by Daoudnuggur, Lieutenant Nicol~~le~~ was given up for lost; but having succeeded in surveying the ford, and experienced a narrow escape from the advance parties of the enemy's Cavalry, he arrived safely in Camp several days after. On the 14th of April the Bombay detachment reached Patna, when the two European Companies joined the Camp.

On the 18th, the Major to allay the murmurs which were now rather openly expressed both by officers and men, advanced again towards Daoudnuggur, with the expressed intention of interrupting the enemy in their passage of that river; but unfortunately, he was somewhat too tardy in coming to this resolution, as the enemy had already commenced crossing before he started. Since he ~~first~~ joined the army, Major Carnac had continued the injudicious system of pitching his tent at some distance from the camp, under the protection of the European Troop of Cavalry and the *Mathews'* Battalion, and during the retreat from Buxar he had always marched and encamped in advance. This circumstance had not escaped the remarks and ridicule of the troops, who expressed an opinion on the subject not very flattering to his personal courage. These taunting expressions having reached the Major's

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 404.

ears, he determined to prove that whatever might be the motive for his conduct, a regard for his personal safety was not one, and accordingly he continued the system of encamping in front during this advance. On the 20th, after breakfast whilst engaged at cards with his staff, an amusement to which he appears to have been somewhat addicted, the alarm was given that the enemy were upon them, and on rushing out of the tent, they found a body of about 500 horse driving the troop of Cavalry before them. The Major and his officers immediately ran for safety to the Sipahi Battalion, who hastened to get under arms,—which the enemy observing, withdrew.* The Major affected to make light of this circumstance, but he took care to avoid exposure to a similar annoyance for the future; and it must be confessed that such a complete surprise was not very creditable to him as a commander, it being the first intimation the English received that the enemy had crossed the Soane; and this, it should be remembered, in a friendly province, subject to the Government of their ally, the Nawaub. But what renders it more remarkable is, that a very large sum was monthly paid to the Major for secret intelligence, and to Captain Swinton, his A. D. C., for the pay of an establishment of Hurkarrahs, which sum formed a subsequent cause of complaint by the Government. A reference to the Government accounts exhibits a sum of 2,460 rupees paid that very month for these purposes, as will be seen in the following abstract:—

A. D. 1764.
April.

APRIL, 1764.

To Hurkarrahs attending the Commander-in-Chief...	1,100	0	0
Present to ditto for secret intelligence, &c.....	1,360	0	0
Major Carnac's Table allowance for April... ..	8,631	8	0
Moonshee and Writer for ditto.....	200	0	0
		<hr/>	
		11,291	8 0
Batta at 8 per cent.	903	5	6
		<hr/>	
Total Rs.....	12,194	13	6
		<hr/>	

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 6-7.

A. D. 1764.
April.

A large sum, which appears to have been cheaply earned, and greatly to have exceeded (as did all his other expenses,) the sums charged by Majors Adams or Munro for similar purposes.

Major Carnac now formed a plan to punish the enemy for their temerity. Captain Hay was directed to beat up the quarters of this advance party of their camp at day-break the following morning, and to engage them in a skirmish, when the Dragoons were to retreat to a neighbouring tope of trees pointed out, in which an ambuscade of Sipahis was to be ready formed; and as the Cavalry filed to the right and left of this tope, the Sipahis were to pour in a volley and advance with the bayonet, whilst the Dragoons turning again, were to charge the flanks of the surprised and broken enemy. This arrangement being complete, Captain Hay proceeded the next morning with his troop, surprised and attacked the enemy, and committed considerable slaughter amongst them; but as their numbers increased, he steadily retreated to the tope as previously concerted, where, to his surprise and dismay, not a single Sipahi was to be found; and it was with the greatest difficulty and some loss that Captain Hay, aided by the exertions of his Subalterns, Lieutenants Eyres and Mair, effected his retreat to camp. The want of support in the tope, arose from the Major having changed his mind regarding the plan the night before,—which decision was communicated to the officer appointed to command the Sipahis, but no intimation was given to Captain Hay.*

On the 22nd, a Battalion of Sipahis and two field-pieces were posted to the rear of the camp, which already began to be distressed for supplies; and Captain Smith's Battalion, (*the present 8th Regt. N. I.*) with a gun from the Park, exclusive of the two specially attached to that Corps, was ordered to march to Maharajgunge to escort provisions to the Army.

On the 23rd, the enemy were approaching in force and their Cavalry were hovering all round the camp, when directions were given to retreat to Patna, but no order of battle was laid down in the event of their being forced to action. After

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 7-8.

a harrassing and fatiguing march, the Army reached Patna on the 25th of April, where they took up an intrenched position previously prepared. Captain Smith who had been detached to convoy provisions, as already stated, was attacked by a large body of the enemy, who had got between the Army and Patna. This officer receiving timely intimation of their approach, took possession of a large tank then nearly dry, and forming his men behind the embankments with a field-piece at opposite angles, the convoy being collected within the inclosure, he gave the enemy so warm and unexpected a reception, that they were glad to draw off as quickly as possible, and left him to pursue his route to camp unmolested, where he joined with his charge on the night of the 23rd.*

A. D. 1764.
April.

The position now taken up by the troops was a very judicious and secure one; it had been selected by Meer Jaffier Khán some time before, who remarked with regard to its strength and advantage, that "God had made it for them."†

His own troops had been encamped there for some time, and occupied the strongest part of the line, which had been further secured by a low rampart and a deep ditch. His left rested on the Ganges, and his line swept round the eastern side of the city and a great portion of the south side—the intrenchment being under cover from the fire of the citadel and the bastions of the city wall the whole way. The English left wing joined the Nawaub's line under the south-west bastions of the city, their strongest post being on a slight eminence at this point; the intrenchment was also carried along their front; the line then receded, running nearly parallel to the western side of the city, the right resting on the Ganges, with Meer Afzool's garden in rear of the right wing. A village was levelled in front of this wing, to give a better view of the approach of the enemy; but to the south-west angle in front of the left wing, the ground was open and accessible,—and this being the most vulnerable point of the line, the Europeans were concentrated there. The enemy arrived the next day, and took up a position nearly

* Caraccioli, vol. 1, pp. 405-6.

† Caraccioli, vol. 1, p. 406.

A. D. 1764. parallel to the intrenchment, at about the distance of a mile.
 April. The Emperor Shah Allum formed his camp to the right, opposed to Meer Jaffier Khán, his tent being pitched in Meer Jaffier's garden; Meer Kossim Khán was on the left, with his head-quarters at Bankypore, opposed to the English right wing; and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah drew up his force parallel to the south side of the city, his left opposed to the English left wing, and his right to Meer Jaffier Khán's right wing, his head-quarters being fixed at Lohannapore.*

It should be observed that, in the intrenched position, the Nawaub's army was thrown back and so well covered by the nature of the ground and the fire from the city, that it was only assailable in the direction of the English line, and might therefore, be considered as a reserve; with which view it was further strengthened by a Battalion of the Company's Sipahis, distributed in Companies at intervals along the line. The enemy's force is no where distinctly stated, but it appears to have amounted to upwards of 40,000, of which a large proportion consisted of Cavalry. The force thus invested, consisted of the Bengal European Battalion, the two Bombay European Companies, the Cavalry and Artillery, and the seven Battalions of Sipahis formerly mentioned,—amounting to upwards of 6,000 Regular troops; besides the Mogul horse, together with the Nawaub's force, consisting of about 12,000 men. Within the city of Patna were the Bombay Sipahis and Captain Morgan's Battalion—making a grand total of about 19,000 men. This was the largest Army the English had ever had in the field, and the Commander allowing it to be invested by a force, not superior to that which Major Adams had defeated with comparatively limited means, was considered an extraordinary circumstance and presented a novel spectacle to the native powers.

The arrangements made in the intrenchment, and the system of doing duty, appear to have been judicious. Every evening at sunset one-third of each corps formed a piquet,

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 450.—Williams, p. 27.

which immediately mounted the rampart and sent out a triple row of double sentries,—the farthest about one hundred and fifty yards from the ditch, and the two inner rows at fifty paces distant from each other. If the outward sentries perceived anything which had a suspicious appearance, they were ordered to fire their pieces and retire to the next row, and so on, until the cause of alarm was discovered. At eight o'clock, the remainder of the army mounted the rampart, and after that not a man was allowed to quit the ranks, but all slept on their arms until broad day, when they retired to their tents. The piquets relieved the sentries every hour, and one of the serjeants visited them every half hour between the reliefs.*

A. D. 1764.
31 May.

In this state the two armies remained watching each other for more than a week, when Shoojah-oo-Dowlah learning that Captain Wemyss' detachment was approaching, sent a body of Cavalry to intercept their march, and determined to attack the English before they should be joined by this reinforcement. Accordingly on the 3rd of May, the enemy moved towards the intrenchments soon after day-break, in battle array. Desultory attempts were carried on along the whole line at intervals, but the main attack was at the south-west angle of the intrenchment, and immediately to the right and left of that point.

[The enemy's order of battle was as follows ;—Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, with a chosen body of troops, was on the right, supported by 3000 Rohilla horse, under Inayut Khán, son of the famous Hafiz Rehmut Khán of Bareilly. To his immediate left were the divisions of his Minister Behnee Behadur and Rajah Bulwunt Singh of Benares; and to their left, forming the angle of the line, was a body of 5000 Goseins, led by a noted fanatic,—all perfectly naked and covered with paint and ashes.† At a right angle with these, parallel to the west face of the intrenchment, Sumroo took post with his Europeans and 5 Regular Battalions of Sipahis, supported by 16 pieces of cannon; and further to the left,

* Williams, pp. 28-9.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 313.

A. D. 1764.
3d May.

Meer Kossim Khán was drawn up with the remainder of his own force. The action commenced with a distant cannonade; Shoojah-oo-Dowlah was the first to advance, which he did about noon, under the cover of several buildings and embankments to his front, when an irregular fusilade commenced on both sides. Sumroo next moved forward with his regular Battalions in good order; but as they approached the intrenchment, they were received with so close and warm a fire, that after considerable loss, they drew off and took shelter in a hollow way about 800 yards in front of the intrenchment, where they remained inactive the greater part of the day. The English kept up an occasional cannonade in that direction, but the shot nearly all passed over and fell at first amongst the reserve division under Meer Kossim Khán, who speedily retired out of their range. Several attacks were made on the English right, by parties of Meer Kossim Khán's force, who endeavoured to break through that part of the line and get into the rear of the intrenchment. An advance post occupied by a company of Captain Swinton's Battalion (*the present 3rd N. I.*) then commanded by Captain Wilding, was constantly and vigorously attacked; but this little detachment held their ground unflinchingly and repelled every attempt. Captain Stibbert's Battalion (*the present 9th N. I.*) was also heavily assailed, and suffered severely from the enemy's rockets, it being their main object to turn that flank; this Corps was more or less engaged the whole day, and behaved nobly, the enemy being unable to make any impression upon it. In the mean time, Shoojah-oo-Dowlah having pushed forward the whole of his division and brought up his artillery close to the intrenchment, a heavy fire continued on both sides, and here the action raged with great vigour for some time; but so close and steady was the English fire, that he was unable to make any impression, and was finally compelled to withdraw with loss. Enraged at finding himself unsupported, he sent a messenger to Meer Kossim Khán saying,—“What for are you lagging behind there whilst I am warmly engaged with your enemies? Advance as I do, and engage the

“ enemy on your side as I do on mine. If you cannot advance, send forward at least Sumroo, with his Telingahs and his field-pieces ; send them to me that I may oppose their fire to the English ; and so soon as I see them engaged, I will wheel round with my Cavalry, and take them in flank.”* But though thus strongly urged, Meer Kossim Khán’s constitutional timidity prevailed : he returned a vague reply, and neither advanced himself, nor sent any orders to Sumroo.—Shoojah-oo-Dowlah now directed the Goseins to attack the angle of the British position, which was defended by the Europeans ; and these fanatics rushed impetuously to the charge with wild shrieks and gestures, presenting a formidable spectacle with their painted faces, flowing hair and glittering weapons ; but the English, undismayed by their savage appearance, received them with a close and deadly volley of musketry and grape as they closed upon the intrenchment, which killed and wounded an immense number, and sent the remainder howling to the rear.† This attack was scarcely repelled, when Inayut Khán, with his Rohillas, made a gallant and impetuous charge on the same point, but with no better success ; and many an empty saddle and a heap of slain told how unavailing was the gallantry of the Rohillas against the cool courage and discipline of British troops ;—a fearful lesson which they were doomed to experience on a more extended scale on two subsequent occasions.

Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, who appears to have behaved with great courage and skill throughout the action, though badly supported,—for Behnee Behadur and Bulwunt Singh’s divisions were as inactive as Meer Kossim Khán’s,—did not despair, notwithstanding the repulses he had already received. About 3 o’clock, he advanced his whole force to a general charge, with great determination ; for a moment a wavering was perceptible in the British line,—a part of the intrenchment was forced,—some of the drummers of the European Battalion were actually made prisoners,—but in an instant the ranks were closed, a deadly fire was poured into the enemy’s columns, whilst the guns

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 313-4.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 314.

A. D. 1764.
3d May.

A. D. 1764. from the south-west bastions of the city also opened, and the
 May. Nawaub Vuzier foiled at all points, was compelled to draw off. One last and desperate effort was made by a gallant officer named Sheikh Deen Mahommud; putting himself at the head of his own corps, he rushed gallantly upon the English line, and fell in front of the bayonets of one of the Sipahi Battalions; when his men dismayed by his fall and severely galled by the fire of the Sipahis, hastily retreated.* A north westerly wind now arose, which drove the dust in the face of the Vuzier's retiring troops, and the English line was most anxious to advance and take advantage of it, but Major Carnac restrained their impetuosity. They however moved out of their intrenchments, and followed up their retreating enemy to some distance, galling them considerably with the field artillery. Day was now closing in, and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah sent a reproachful message to Meer Kossim Khán, desiring him to retire with his own and Sumroo's troops, and that he would himself renew the action on the following day, when he hoped to find more effectual support. The whole force now drew off in all directions.

A desultory action had been going on all this time on the English right, and the enemy having been baffled in every attempt to penetrate the line, Captain Stibbert, who was the senior officer present, determined to act upon the offensive, and detached Lieutenant Nicoll with two companies, to dislodge the enemy from an old mosque of which they had taken possession, situated about 500 yards in front of Captain Swinton's Battalion. This duty was effectually performed, and the detachment being reinforced by two other Companies under Lieutenant Davidson, they held the post to the last, though the enemy made several desperate attempts to recover it. When they began to retire in the evening, Captain Stibbert with his own Battalion, (*the present 9th Regt. N. I.*) and those of Captains Swinton and Smith, (*the present 3rd and 8th Regts. N. I.*) which latter had formed the reserve of that wing, moved out to pursue the enemy and to capture a battery of Artillery, which

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 316.

having only bullock draught, was retreating very slowly; and at the same time Lieutenant Nicoll with his detachment hastened to take possession of 2 other field-pieces which had been brought up against his post; but just as these two parties were closing upon the enemy in high spirits, and calculating upon the guns as already in their possession, positive orders were received from Major Carnac directing their immediate return to the intrenchments; which order they were compelled—though most unwillingly—to obey, and the enemy were enabled to withdraw to their camp without further loss or molestation.*

Thus ended the action of the 3rd of May, 1764, which was highly creditable to the conduct of the troops concerned; but it appears to be a matter of regret that the success obtained was not followed up with more vigour by the commanding officer, as there is every reason to believe that had a general advance been permitted after Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's final check, for which the troops were most impatient, the defeat would have been rendered much more complete, and the greater part of the enemy's artillery captured. As it was, little advantage was obtained by the victory. The loss of the British force was not very great, but the exact amount is nowhere stated. Two officers, Captain John Nollikins and Lieutenant Thomas Gardiner, were severely wounded, the latter having both legs broken. The loss of the enemy must have been very heavy; but that also is merely stated in general terms. [Major Carnac, in his report to the Council dated the 4th of May, observes, "all the principal Officers distinguished themselves in their respective stations, and I cannot say too much of the good behaviour of the army in general and in particular of the Sipahis, who sustained the front of the attack."]

The Council in their reply dated the 14th of the same month, stated, "that it is with real satisfaction we have re-

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 9-10.

† This account of the Action at Patna, is chiefly derived from Caraccioli, vols. 1, and 2.—Williams.—The Second Report, and the Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2.

For Major Carnac's official report of the action vide Appendix V.

A. D. 1764. " ceived advice of your success : that so severe a repulse given
 May. " to the enemy in their first attempt, we should hope may be at-
 " tended with the most favourable consequences to our cause ;
 " and that being extremely sensible of the share which may be
 " attributed to your good conduct in this essential service,
 " we beg leave to return you our best acknowledgments :
 " that it gives us pleasure to observe on this occasion, that
 " such a general perseverance and order prevailed among
 " the troops, particularly among the Sipahis ; and we desire
 " that you will return our best thanks to all the officers and
 " men for their bravery and good behaviour."*

But notwithstanding the gallant conduct of the troops, the proof that they had afforded of their superiority over the enemy, and the expectations of the Council as expressed in their letter above quoted, no attempt was made to take advantage of the victory recently obtained,—both sides remaining in the same positions, watching each other. On the 9th of May, the detachment under Captain Wemyss, which had crossed the Ganges to avoid any interruption from Shoojahoo-Dowlah's Cavalry, arrived opposite to Patna. Captain Wemyss was directed to join the force with the Marines, for which purpose boats were sent across for him ; but the remainder of the detachment, consisting of the Company of Europeans now commanded by Captain H. S. Mangan, the Pioneers under Captain DuGloss, and Captain Goddard's Battalion of Sipahis, (*the present 13th Regt. N. I.*) were ordered to proceed under Captain Mangan, as the senior officer, and attack a body of insurgents in the Sarun district, collected by some of the refractory zemindars of that province. This duty was performed with complete success, by which the district was once more brought into subjection to the Nawaub. When this was effected, the detachment joined the army at Patna.† Although neither side seemed inclined to attack, a number of skirmishes occurred from time to time, attended with little results. On the 13th or 14th of the month, a detachment consisting of

* Second Report. Appendix, No. 67.

† Ibid.

120 Europeans and Captain Smith's Battalion of Sipahis, A. D. 1764,
 was sent to the east side of the camp, with a view of sur-
 prising a party of the enemy. In passing under the city
 walls, this party was fired upon by some mistake, when the
 Europeans, who were chiefly foreigners, went immediately to
 the right about and returned to camp, either from the effects
 of panic, or as the Major suspected, from design, though
 the object was not very apparent. The Sipahis, however,
 continued their march and proceeded to the appointed spot,
 where no enemy was to be found.* On another occasion,
 Major Carnac, with several of his officers, were reconnoitering
 the enemy's position, attended only by a Company of
 Sipahis, when they fell in with the Nawaub Vuzier, similarly
 employed, also guarded by a weak escort. A skirmish en-
 sued, when the Major directing his men to keep the enemy
 at bay, sent into the camp for a reinforcement, which speedily
 appeared, upon which Shoojah-oo-Dowlah was compelled
 to fly for his life. In the mean time, some of his escort
 had preceded him to the camp and spread a report that he
 had been surrounded and captured, which created a general
 confusion and alarm. As the English did not attempt any
 pursuit, he soon relaxed the speed of his flight, and col-
 lecting his escort, retreated more steadily towards his camp,
 where he was met by Meer Kossim Khán, hastening to his
 support with a body of troops.†

Major Carnac justified his defensive line of operations to
 the Council, by the following arguments,—that he was in
 constant expectation of a fresh attack from the enemy, which
 he considered it more advisable to receive than to give,
 more particularly as he was convinced that it was the enemy's
 intention to draw him after them, that they might have an
 opportunity of detaching a party to carry off the Nawaub,
 whom he looked upon as dependent on himself for protection,
 —which by retaining his position, he was the better able to
 afford; that by remaining in the intrenchment, he was enabled
 to restrain the Sipahis, whereas when permitted to advance,

* Second Report, Appendix, No. 67. † Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 317.

A. D. 1764. they constantly pressed forward without order or regularity,
 30th May. which it was impossible to prevent, as he had found in several skirmishes that had taken place; and finally, he expressed his want of confidence in a portion of the Europeans, grounded on the misconduct of the party sent out with Captain Smith, as already mentioned. Such were the reasons assigned for allowing the most powerful force the English had ever collected in the field, to be cooped up and invested for more than a month, by a native army inferior to that which his predecessor in command had defeated with half his numbers on the plains of Gherriah, or to that which Major Munro subsequently destroyed with an inferior force at Buxar. The approach of the rains, however, had the effect of compelling the enemy to retreat, a measure which Major Carnac preferred leaving to the elements, rather than to his own exertions. On the 30th of May, the enemy were observed to be in motion, bending their march towards their own left. When it was ascertained that they were actually in full retreat, the Major ordered the drums to beat to arms; but instead of a general pursuit, he merely detached Captain Wemyss with the European Grenadiers and 4 Companies of Grenadier Sipahis, to harass their rear, which was found to be too well protected to admit of any impression being made; and after the ineffectual interchange of a few shots, the detachment returned to the intrenchment.* Shoojah-oo-Dowlah continued his march without further molestation by way of Moneah to Buxar, where he took up a position on favourable ground for the rainy season.

During the period between the action of the 3d of May, and the retreat of the enemy, several overtures were made towards an accommodation by some of the leading men in the Vuzier's Camp, though none directly by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah himself. The Emperor, however, wrote to Major Carnac, and expressed his desire for peace and his readiness to adjust a treaty, and further requested that Captain Swinton, whom he had known when previously at Patna, and who was ac-

* Williams, pp. 29-30.

quainted with the Persian language, might be sent to him to arrange the terms. To this request the Major replied that if an officer of rank was sent as a hostage during Captain Swinton's absence, that gentleman was ready to undertake the duty; but at the same time, it was clearly explained that no terms would for a moment be listened to, until as a preliminary measure, Meer Kossim Khán and Sumroo were given up to the English. This demand put a complete bar to any further proceedings, and the correspondence ceased entirely.

A. D. 1764.
April.

Whilst the army had been subjected to the annoyance of being thus cooped up within their lines, an arrangement had been made by Government for numbering the several Native Corps. When the earlier Battalions had been formed, they had received numbers with reference to the date of their organization, which extended as far as the 7th Battalion raised, which was the *Matthews*. During the end of 1762 and the beginning of 1763, so many Corps had been created almost simultaneously, several of which were intended originally for local purposes,—whilst three of the older Regiments (the 2d, 3d, and 5th,) had been destroyed, that all order as to their several numbers or relative seniority was lost, and each Battalion were designated by the name of its Commanding Officer, and took precedence according to his commission. As this system was found to be productive of much inconvenience and confusion, Government decided upon assigning permanent numbers to the several Battalions, then amounting to eighteen, which were fixed with reference to the seniority of their several Commanding Officers, at the time the regulation came into force. This order was issued by the Board in the month of April 1764, and was carried into effect in the month of May.*

The following statement will show the numbers assigned to the several Corps, with the date of their formation, the name and rank of their several Commanding Officers, their localities at the time, and the numbers they retain at present:—

* Williams, pp. 6-7.

Numbers Assigned.	Names of Commanding Officers.	Date of Commissions.	Stations.	Dates of raising.	Present Numbers.
1	Giles Stibbert	May 1, 1757	Patna	1761	9th Regiment N. I.
2	Lauchlan MacLean	April 9, "	Patna	1762	2nd Grenadiers.
3	Hugh Grant	Oct. 12, 1761	On the march to Patna...	1758	5th Regiment N. I.
4	Robert Campbell	Dec. 20, 1762	Rajmahal	1763	6th Regiment N. I.
5	Thomas Witchcott	June 25, 1763	Burdwan	1763	7th Regiment N. I.
6	John Trevannion	Sept. 24, "	Patna	1763	10th Regiment N. I.
7	Lewis Brown	Oct. 9, "	Chittagong	1763	Reduced in 1786.
8	William Smith	Oct. 10, "	Patna	1763	8th Regiment N. I.
9	Primrose Galliez	Oct. 11, "	Patna	1757	1st Regiment N. I.
10	Gilbert Ironside	Oct. 13, "	Calcutta	1763	11th Regiment N. I.
11	James Morgan	Oct. 15, "	Patna	1764	Incorporated with the 14th and 16th Regiments in 1796.
12	John White	Oct. 15, "	Monghier	1763	12th Regiment N. I.
13	Archibald Swinton	Oct. 18, "	Patna	1763	3rd Regiment N. I.
14	Samuel Hampton	Oct. 20, "	Jellasure	1763	4th Regt. N. I.
15	John Stables	Oct. 22, "	Patna	1764	Disbanded in 1784.
16	James Scotland	Oct. 23, "	Midnapore	1764	14th Regt. N. I.
17	Thomas Goddard	Oct. 24, "	Sarun	1764	13th Regt. N. I.
18	Alexander Dow	April 16, 1764	Moorsheadabad	1764	15th Regt. N. I.

[The numbers thus assigned remained unchanged until the A. D. 1764.
year 1775] June.

It will be observed in the above statement that Captain Stibbert, though apparently promoted to a Company after Captain MacLean, took precedence of him; it may therefore be inferred either that the date assigned for his commission is erroneous, or that Captain MacLean had forfeited rank by a visit to Europe, which was then not unusual, or else, which appears very probable, that Captain Stibbert held a Brevet Majority which gave him the precedence, for he is often spoken of a Major previous to his obtaining the rank regimentally, which event took place on the 22nd May 1764.

On the retreat of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, a detachment was ordered on the 1st of June to cross the Ganges, and marching through the Sarun district, to lay waste the province of Gha-zeepore, belonging to Rajah Bulwunt Singh. The force which was placed under the command of Major Champion, consisted of the Company of Royal Marines, the European Grenadiers, and the 6th and 9th Battalions of Sipahis, [*the present 10th and 1st Regiments*] commanded by Captains Trevannion and Ahmuty,—Captain Galliez being either sick or absent on leave, or other duty. They immediately marched to the English Factory, where they were joined by a detail of Artillery, with eight guns, 6 and 3 pounders, four attached to each of the Sipahi Battalions.* On the 2nd, they crossed the river and commenced their march through the district of Sarun, which they reduced to complete subjection, until they finally reached the banks of the Gograh. Here they were joined by the 15th or Captain Stables' Battalion, (*the Mathews,*) which had been sent from Patna on the 17th of June, to reinforce them;—when the rainy season having set in, they were all compelled to go into quarters: they accordingly retraced their steps, and the Marines and Captain Galliez's Battalion (*the present 1st Regt. N. I.*) halted at Manjee, where the former occupied the fort and the latter the town; whilst Captains Trevannion and Stables' Battalions (*the present 10th Regt.*

A. D. 1764. *N. I, and the Matthews*) went on to Chupprah, where they were cantoned for the season, and the Grenadiers continued their route and joined the Head Quarters of the army established at Bankypore,—Major Carnac having proceeded no further from Patna than that place.*

In vain had the Council endeavoured to stimulate him to more active measures :—to all their injunctions to pursue the enemy, he opposed his old arguments of a want of dependence on the troops, the approach of the rains, the circumstance of the force being so much weakened by the absence of Major Champion's detachment, and finally, his desire to wait until reinforced by the Battalions of Captains Grant and Campbell, which were shortly expected, and the Company of European Volunteers, which had a second time been embodied at the Presidency, [whither they had returned at the close of Major Adams' campaign,] and were now on their way with a fleet of military stores to resume their old duty of keeping the river and guarding the boats of the force, under the command of Captain Wedderburn.† On the 10th of June, the Board wrote as follows :—“ As we are determined to prosecute the war against Sujah-Dowlah, and are of opinion that the rains will not be any impediment to the operations but on the contrary, with regard to the receiving provisions and stores, rather a convenience from the advantage of the rivers. We hereby direct you do immediately put the army in motion, leaving the necessary garrisons in Patna and Monghier, and cross the Soan, and pursue the enemy as far as the Ganges opposite to Banarass, endeavouring, if possible, to bring them to an action.”‡ Again, on the 14th of the same month they write :—“ We think it absolutely necessary to proceed against Sujah-al-Dowlah, without loss of time, nor stop until we have convinced him that we are capable of acting offensively as well as defensively, otherwise we shall, without doubt, be liable to have the province invaded whenever the state of affairs in his own country will admit of his turning his thoughts this

* Williams, p. 32.

† Second Report. Appendix. No. 67.

‡ Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 12.

“ way. We must, therefore (with the exception hereafter A. D. 1764.
 “ mentioned,) repeat our orders of the 11th instant, for June.
 “ the army’s crossing the Soan without delay; and we have
 “ great reason to believe that the plan therein laid down,
 “ will be rendered more effectual by the attacks which it
 “ is probable Sujah-al-Dowlah will receive from Gazy-
 “ Odeen Khawn, the Jauts and Marattas, who are actually
 “ on their march to invade his country.

“ We always have been of opinion that the force under your
 “ command is quite sufficient to act offensively against Sujah-
 “ Dowlah, and yourself was of the same opinion some
 “ time after the mutiny, before you was joined by Cap-
 “ tain Wemyss’s detachment. We must also here repeat
 “ our sentiments, that a spirit of mutiny is much more
 “ likely to break out in an army acting upon a defen-
 “ sive, than an offensive plan. However, as you mention
 “ that the principal officers have all along agreed with you
 “ in the expediency of acting defensively, we desire that you
 “ will now communicate our orders of the 11th of June and
 “ this letter to the other field officers, the commandants of
 “ the King’s troops, of the Bombay detachment, and of the
 “ Artillery, and the three senior captains, which, with your
 “ own, is in all nine voices, and let them give their opinions
 “ in writing separately, whether they think our plan practi-
 “ cable with the force at present under your command; if
 “ not, what addition of troops will be requisite that we may
 “ reinforce you accordingly. It is requisite for the reasons
 “ above mentioned, to act upon the offensive.

“ These opinions, after taking a copy, you will please to
 “ transmit immediately to us; and if two-thirds of your
 “ opinions should concur that the present force is insufficient
 “ for executing the plan proposed, we would not have the
 “ army advance further than the banks of the Soan, until
 “ the reinforcement arrive; and we desire you will, in such
 “ case, caution Major Champion not to advance so far as to
 “ be compelled to engage with a force too superior to his
 “ own.”*

A. D. 1761.
June. On receipt of this letter, Majors Stibbert, Spelman, and Pemble, Captains Jennings, MacLean, and three other officers, were summoned to a council of war, and after a long discussion, orders were issued for the troops to prepare for a march.

In the mean time, despatches were received from England, containing the dismissal of Major Carnac from the Company's service, owing to his conduct in opposing Mr. Vansittart during the previous year; he accordingly left the camp for Calcutta, on the 28th June, the Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán having started the previous day. The command of the army devolved upon Major Champion, then at Chupprah, and the subordinate command of the detachment at Patna upon Major Pemble. The rains having now fairly set in, and the arrival of Major Munro, who had been appointed to the command of the army, being shortly expected, the order for marching was countermanded on the 2nd of July.*

Thus ended the campaign of Major Carnac, and though marked by no positive disaster, there are few military operations on record in the annals of Indian military history, that reflect less credit upon the Commanding Officer; and his military character would have been sufficiently stamped by this campaign, had it not been far more seriously and painfully displayed by his subsequent conduct on the Bombay side, where his name is for ever associated with the disgraceful capitulation of Worgaum.

In the mean time, brighter prospects had begun to dawn upon the army, consequent on the arrival of Major Hector Munro to assume the command. This officer was a Major in H. M.'s 89th Regiment at Bombay, and was on the point of embarkation for England from that presidency with the remnant of his Corps, the officers and men of which, as in the case of all the other Royal Regiments in India, had been permitted to enter the Company's service, of which permission a large majority had availed themselves, when intelligence was received from Bengal of the death of Major Adams, and the

invasion of Behar by the joint forces of the Emperor, Nawaub Vuzier and Meer Kossim Khán, coupled with a request from the Council of Fort William, that Major Munro might be sent round to assume the command of the army in Bengal, with as many troops as could be spared. He accordingly changed his destination, and taking with him the remnant of his own and H. M.'s 96th Regiment, amounting altogether to less than 100 men, he arrived in Calcutta in the end of May. Here he remained a short time to make himself acquainted with the state of affairs, the views of the Government, and the resources of the country; when having had an interview with Major Carnac, and paid a visit to the Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán, he proceeded to join his command at Patna, where he arrived on the 13th of August. The force which had been increased by the arrival of Captains Grant and Campbell's Battalions (*the present 5th and 6th Regiments N. I.*), was distributed in cantonments in the Behar and Sarun districts. The main body of the army was at Bankypore, a strong garrison was in the city of Patna, and a detachment at Futwah; two Battalions had been pushed on to Moneah and two more were at Dinapore. In the Sarun district, the Marines had been withdrawn from Manjee,—which was occupied by Captain Galliez's Battalion alone,—and had moved into temporary barracks, which had been prepared for them at Chupprah; at which place were also stationed the Battalions of Captains Trevannion and Stables (*the present 10th Regt. N. I., and the Matthews*). Captain White with his Battalion (*the present 12th Regt. N. I.*) was still at Mongheer. Another Battalion, numbered the 19th, was ordered to be raised in Calcutta by the Town Major, the command of which, when completed, was given to Captain Douglas Hill.† This Battalion is no longer in existence, having been disbanded for mutiny in 1781.

On the 14th of August, Major Munro inspected the troops at Bankypore, after which he issued the following order:—
 “A regular discipline and strict obedience to orders is the

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 45.

† Williams, p. 60.

A. D. 1764.
August.

A. D. 1764. " only superiority Europeans possess in this country over
 August. " the natives, and, therefore cannot be too much attended
 " to. It is most earnestly recommended by Major Munro
 " to the troops, to submit to it with readiness and cheerful-
 " ness, which will always enable them to be victorious in the
 " brave and gallant manner they hitherto have been, and
 " will not only redound to their own reputation, but will be
 " the greatest satisfaction and honour they can confer on
 " any officer who has the honour to command them."* This
 was followed by a long and well-digested code of orders on
 all the leading points of military duty, many essentials of
 which had been relaxed for some time past. The constant
 and due attention of the officers to all the details of their
 profession was strongly enforced. They were urgently re-
 quested to make themselves acquainted with them, and fur-
 ther, to provide themselves with a copy of the Duke of
 Cumberland's code of standing orders, then in force in the
 Royal army, of which a supply was available in the Brigade
 office, brought up expressly for their guidance by the Major.
 They were also directed to insert all orders issued, in a book
 to be kept for the purpose by each officer, and to set an ex-
 ample to the men by an acquaintance with their duty, and
 a cheerful obedience to all orders. A concise system of
 manœuvres was also laid down, suitable to the service on
 which they were employed; and the several Commanding
 Officers were directed to put them in practice with their
 Battalions every day when the weather would permit; the
 manœuvres practiced at the several cantonments on each
 field day were to be reported to the Commander-in-Chief.
 The articles of war were also to be read at the head of each
 Corps at least once a fortnight.†

Major Munro did not content himself with issuing these
 regulations, but he also took care to see that they were
 obeyed; and by a line of conduct at once firm and
 conciliating, he gradually brought the army into a state
 of order and discipline. [As regarded the Europeans, he ex-

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 46.

† Ibid.

perienced but little difficulty; but with respect to the Sipahis, he met with many serious obstacles; their feelings of discontent had been soothed and smothered, but neither removed nor crushed; and although the majority of the European officers attached to the Native portion of the force, appear to have been men of conduct and ability, their numbers were too limited to ensure an intimate connection with, or a sufficient check over the men. The position and rights of this branch of the army had also for some time been upon a very indefinite footing, subject rather to the caprice of the Commanding officer, than regulated by any fixed system. Murmurs began to arise in different quarters upon the introduction of the new and stricter regulations, and Major Munro determined to check these symptoms of insubordination with a strong hand, and to make a marked example of the first offenders who should give him the opportunity. He however considered it advisable to give them due warning, and to remove one cause of annoyance by more clearly defining their position, and the light in which they were to be regarded. With this view, on the 24th of August, he issued the following order:—

A. D. 1704.
August.

“ From the late behaviour of some of the seapoys, it becomes necessary to have the following orders read and explained to all the seapoys of the army, at their different cantonments, in the presence of their officers.

“ It is Major Munro’s firm resolution to treat the seapoys in every respect as soldiers, to give them all their just rights when they behave well, and their just punishment when they behave scandalously.

“ Although the donation money was an indulgence that none had a right to ask, it has been divided according to the appointment and approbation of the Nabob who gave it, and therefore cannot admit of new alterations.

“ Major Munro is sorry he gave it at all, as the licentious, mercenary and unsoldier-like behaviour of the troops of which the army was then composed, in respect to that donation, will be a reason why no such indulgence will ever be permitted again to them, or any army in India.

A. D. 1764.
September.

“ The seapoys, as well in cantonments or quarters as in the field, shall always be on the same footing as the other soldiers; that is, when the Europeans have full or half batta, the seapoys shall have the same: and when they think themselves aggrieved, they are to apply to their officers in a decent and obedient manner, which will be the surest way of obtaining what they desire.

“ The Major hopes that in future, he shall have reason to praise and thank instead of reproving and punishing them; and as the season approaches for making towards the enemy, the whole army are to hold themselves in readiness to take the field.”*

Such were the measures employed by Major Munro to restore the discipline of the army, which, if not to be effected by reason, he was prepared to enforce by severity.

A mutinous spirit once engendered in an army is only to be suppressed by a strong hand and the unflinching exhibition of a marked example. [The orders and professions of Major Munro had but little effect in quelling the seditious feeling then pervading the greater portion of the native force, which previous impunity and conciliation had only served to foster. The two Battalions stationed at Moneah, were for a short time in a state of actual mutiny, but were speedily brought back to a sense of their duty by the influence of their officers; several other outbreaks occurred at the other stations, but none sufficiently marked or tangible to enable the Major to make such an example of them as he desired. At length, on the 8th of September, a mutiny of a more serious nature occurred in the 9th or Captain Galliez's Battalion (*now the 1st Regt. N. I.*), the oldest corps in the service, then stationed at Manjee. Instigated by some of their native officers, they assembled on parade, and declared their intention of serving no longer, as the promises made to them had been broken; they however retained their arms and accoutrements, and imprisoned Captain Abmuty and the other European officers and serjeants of the Battalion; but they

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 46-7.

do not appear to have offered them any insult or other annoyance; and on the following day, they released the whole, and permitted them to proceed to Chupprah, the nearest station. A. D. 1764.
September.

This violent and insubordinate proceeding appears rather to have resembled the ebullition of temper displayed by spoiled children, than any concerted plan of mutiny;—what the promises which they alleged to have been broken, may have been, are not clearly stated; but probably they alluded to the donation money of which they did not think they had received the full amount. No intention to desert or join the enemy was manifested, and they remained quietly encamped at Manjee, without any apparent definite object.

On the arrival of the officers at Chupprah, an express was immediately sent off to Major Munro; and Captain Wemyss, who was in command at that station, marched at once to Manjee, with the Marines and the 6th or Captain Trevannion's Battalion (*the present 10th N. I.*), the latter officer expressing his full reliance on the fidelity of his men. After two days fatiguing march, the whole country being under water, this detachment reached Manjee at daybreak on the morning of the 11th. Here they found the mutineers bivouacked in a mangoe tope, which, owing to the heavy rains that had fallen, was completely surrounded by water. Captain Wemyss drew up his detachment facing them, and the mutineers being taken by surprise, and probably without any recognized leader, lost their self-possession, and after a short parley, agreed to surrender. Rafts were immediately constructed, and the whole Battalion were made prisoners, deprived of their arms, and marched to Chupprah, where they arrived on the morning of the 18th.

Major Munro, who on receiving intelligence of this mutiny, had immediately hastened from Bankypore to Chupprah, taking with him the Grenadiers of the European Battalion, was awaiting their approach. Having received a communication from Captain Wemyss, stating when he expected to arrive, the Major was on the parade with the Europeans, the Artillery, and the 15th or Captain Stables' Battalion, (*the*

A. D. 1764.
September.

Mathews), drawn up ready to receive them. [He immediately ordered Captain Ahmuty to pick out 50 of the ringleaders; and from these he again selected 24, whom he ordered to be tried at once by a Drum-head Court Martial, composed of native officers of Captains Trevannion and Stables' Battalions. He addressed the members of this Court Martial, explaining to them the heinous nature of the offence committed, and the consequences of such conduct, as regarded the whole service. The result of their decision is to be found in the following General Order of the 13th of September 1764:—“At a General Court Martial held at the cantonments near
“ Chupporah, on twenty-four seapoys of Captain Galliez's
“ battalion of seapoys, confined for being taken in actual
“ mutiny and desertion; the Court having duly weighed the
“ crime alledged against them, found them guilty of the first
“ and third articles of the second and fifth section of the
“ articles of war: and, therefore, sentenced them to be put to
“ death, by being blown away from the guns; which sentence
“ is approved by the Commander-in-Chief, and is to be put
“ in execution accordingly.”

[Major Munro, on receiving the verdict of the Court, immediately ordered 4 of the prisoners to be tied to the 4 six-pounders, when 4 Grenadiers of the party immediately stepped forward and represented that as they had always occupied the post of honor in the field, they claimed the usual priority and right of place on this occasion. The Major complied with their request, the Battalion men were untied, and the gallant but misguided Grenadiers occupied their places; at a signal from the Commander they were launched into eternity and the fragments of their bodies scattered over the plain.

[A thrill of horror ran through all ranks; a murmur arose amongst the whole of the Sipahis, and Captain Williams who was present, states that there was not a dry eye amongst the Europeans, although they had long been accustomed to hard service and fearful spectacles; and amongst the Marines, were two men who had actually been on the firing party at the execution of Admiral Byng, in the year 1757. The officers

commanding the Sipahi Battalions then came forward and represented that their men would not suffer the execution to proceed any further; but Major Munro, a man of remarkably humane and considerate disposition; which qualities he evinced throughout the campaign, felt that he had a high and sacred duty to perform, on which the well being of the whole army and the very Government depended; stifling his own feelings, he determined to proceed in his duty at all hazards; he directed the officers of the Artillery to load the guns with grape, and drawing up the Marines on one side and the European Grenadiers on the other, he dismissed the officers to the heads of their Battalions, and then gave the order for the whole of the Sipahis to ground their arms,—at the same time directing the Europeans and Artillery to fire upon any who refused to obey. This display of resolution and firmness had its due effect; the Battalions instinctively obeyed the word of command, and the Major moving them a short distance from their arms, placed the Europeans and guns in the interval, and then ordered the execution to proceed, when 16 more of the party were, in like manner, blown away; the whole of them marching boldly up to the instrument of their execution and awaiting the fatal signal with firm and unmoved countenances. The remaining 4 were sent to Moneah and there executed in a similar manner in the presence of the two Battalions that had recently evinced a mutinous disposition; and on the return of the Major to Bankypore on the 15th, he caused 6 Sipahis of other Corps, who had been also convicted of mutiny, to be blown away from the guns at that station, in the presence of the assembled troops. This wholesome and well-timed display of resolution and severity, effectually and completely suppressed the spirit of insubordination that had been so long existing in the native army.*

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Captain Galliez' Battalion was weeded of the turbulent characters, and their places filled by drafts from other Corps,

* This account of the mutiny and execution is compiled from Major Munro's evidence as given in the First Report;—Caraccioli, vol. 2;—the Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2;—and Williams.

A. D. 1764. when the Regiment was ordered into Patna, and the com-
 October. mand once more devolved upon Captain Galliez.

Subordination and discipline being restored throughout the force, the Major now turned his whole attention to making preparations for the approaching campaign. Provisions were laid in, and boats and cattle procured from all quarters, the former being placed under the command of Captain Wedderburn, who had joined with his company of Volunteers and a supply of military stores from Calcutta. The Native Battalions were equalized and completed to their complements, and the rains being nearly over and the country passable for troops, Major Munro issued the welcome order to advance towards the enemy on the 6th of October.

He considered that a light and well equipped force, confident in its discipline, and capable of rapid movement, was far preferable to a larger numerical army, whose movements were liable to be cramped by the necessity for a large establishment of baggage, stores, and cattle, and whose efficiency in all respects could not be depended upon. He also thought it very probable that Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, who was not altogether wanting in military ability and enterprize, and who had competent advisers about him, might avail himself of the great advantage he possessed in a large force of Cavalry, and when Major Munro advanced towards the Karumnassa, turn with his whole or a portion of his army, and by forced marches gain the Province of Behar. Under these circumstances the Major resolved to advance with a light and compact force, leaving the remainder for the protection of Patna, and the neighbouring districts. The force he selected for this purpose consisted of the 2 Grenadier and 6 Battalion companies of the European Battalion, amounting to about 500 men—the two Bombay companies amounting to 100 men, Europeans and Topasses. The Marines and details of H. M.'s 84th, 89th, and ~~90th~~ Regiments, making together about 200 men, under the command of Captain Wemyss, with the 1st Company of Artillery, the Pioneers, and the Troop of European Cavalry, making a total of little less than 900 Europeans, rank and file; with these, were 8 Battalions of Sipahis, selected for

their efficiency, viz., the 1st of Major Stibbert's, commanded by Captain Samuel Feake (*the present 9th N. I.*), the 2nd or Captain MacLean's (*the present 2d Grenadiers*), the 3d or Captain Grant's (*the present 5th N. I.*), the 6th or Captain Trevannion's (*the present 10th N. I.*), the 8th or Captain Smith's (*the present 8th N. I.*), the 11th or Captain Morgan's Battalion, the 13th or Captain Swinton's (*the present 3d N. I.*), still under charge of Captain Wilding, and the 15th or Captain Stable's Battalion (*the Mathews*). To these were to be added the Mogul Horse lately embodied, amounting to about 1000 men.

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October.

Of the above force, the Marines and the Battalions of Captains Trevannion and Stables were still at Chupprah, under the command of Major Champion, who was directed to cross the river, and form a junction with the main body on the Soane, at an appointed time. The force left for the defence of Behar, consisted of upwards of 300 European Infantry, the 2nd company of Artillery, about 300 Mogul Horse, and four Battalions of Sipahis—viz., the 4th or Captain Campbell's (*the present 6th N. I.*), the 5th or Captain Witchcott's (*the present 7th N. I.*), the 9th or Captain Galliez' (*the present 1st N. I.*), and the 17th or Captain Goddard's (*the present 13th N. I.*), with the Bombay Sipahis and the sick and convalescents of the Corps in the field, making a total of about 400 Europeans and 3000 Natives.

In the mean time Major Munro had not been inattentive to the political affairs of the Province, and having been given to understand that little or no resistance would be made by the Governor of Rhotas if a sufficient force was sent against the place, he ordered Captain Goddard—who, with his Battalion, had a short time before been detached to Tikarree,—to march from thence to Rhotas, of which stronghold he obtained possession without any difficulty. This event happened at a most opportune moment; for Shoojah-oo-Dowlah had almost at the same time sent a force to seize the place on his own account, which party arrived just in time to see the British colours hoisted on its walls, when they retired more rapidly than they had advanced.*

* Scir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 337-8.

A. D. 1764.
October.

During the rainy season, Shoojah-oo-Dowlah had remained in his intrenched position at Buxar; but jealousies and intrigues were rife in his camp. The Emperor Shah Allum, who had long felt that he was merely a captive puppet in the train of his powerful Vuzier, was anxious to shake off his thralldom at any risks, and most desirous of making terms with the English, whom he had sense enough to see, were rapidly acquiring the ascendancy in Indian politics; and in accordance with this view, he secretly made overtures to Major Munro, and only awaited a favourable opportunity for more decisive measures. Meer Kossim Khán was however in much worse plight; misfortunes were rapidly gathering around him, and the natural consequence was daily experienced in the defection of his friends and followers.*

A coolness had for some time sprung up between him and his host and ally, the Nawaub Vuzier; and the latter affected to believe and feel indignant at a report, which stated that Meer Kossim Khán had ordered his troops to fire upon those of the Vuzier, if they should be defeated by the English at Patna—a report which bore the evident stamp of falsehood on its very face,—for Meer Kossim Khán, though he had shown cowardice on that occasion and was capable of treachery, if it served his purpose, was not so insane as to have turned upon his only hope and support,—more especially when he was fully sensible that no act of his could possibly conciliate or bring about any terms betwixt the English and himself, after what had taken place. But glaring as was the falsehood, there were not wanting some amongst Meer Kossim Khán's own officers ready to give countenance to the report,—foremost amongst whom was the renegade Sumroo, a wretch who appears to have been incapable of entertaining one single feeling of honour or fidelity to any cause.

It will be remembered that when Shoojah-oo-Dowlah

* Seir Mutakberin, vol. 2, pp. 322-37.

agreed to support the cause of Meer Kossim Khán, the latter had promised a monthly payment of eleven lakhs of rupees to defray the expences of the war. This promise had been made under a prospect of success, and probably with the usual Indian want of faith,—which recklessly promises most liberally, with the firm intention of only fulfilling so much of the pledge as may be compulsory ;—certain it is, that the amount was not paid. The unsuccessful result of the campaign had deprived the ex-Nawaub of those resources which he had calculated upon ; and though he had brought a considerable treasure with him when he sought the protection of the Nawaub Vuzier, a large portion had been absorbed in the payment of his own force, other sums and much of his valuable jewellery had been expended in presents and bribes to those about the Vuzier's court, and a very considerable quantity had been plundered by his own dependents, more especially by his steward Meer Sooleemán, who, when convicted of having made away with some of the most valuable jewels, fled to Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, and purchased protection with a share of the spoil. A demand was now made upon the ex-Nawaub, for the payment of the monthly subsidy as also for certain arrears of revenue stated to be due to the Emperor. Meer Kossim Khán expostulated, promised, and intrigued, but all in vain : Shoojah-oo-Dowlah had set his heart upon the supposed treasures of his guest. As a last resource, Meer Kossim Khán endeavoured to work upon the feelings of shame in the breast of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, and assuming the garb of a fakeer, he seated himself outside his tent with the few of his still faithful adherents, clad in like manner.*

This step caused great annoyance to Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, who felt how deeply it compromised him in the eyes of his followers, and he immediately sent messengers and finally went himself to wait upon his guest, apologizing for what had passed and requesting him to resume his former habit, with which Meer Kossim Khán complied. The respite obtained by this

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 325.

A. D. 1764. measure was of a very temporary nature, and the demands and
 October. persecutions were renewed. Meer Kossim Khán was now compelled to give up his regular Brigades, and sending for Sumroo, stated his inability to maintain them longer, but requested him to return the cannon and arms with which he had supplied them : that ungrateful villain, who had already made arrangements with Shoojah-oo-Dowlah for entering his service, insolently refused compliance, coolly stating that the guns and equipments belonged to those who had them in possession and who had the power to keep them ; and immediately, struck his camp, and proceeded with the whole of the regular Brigade, accompanied by Messieurs Gentil, Madoc, and all the other Europeans, and took up a position in the camp of the Nawaub Vuzier, to whom they had already all transferred their services.*

The disgraceful farce was now drawing to a close ; a party of Horse, accompanied by some of Sumroo's Sipahis, proceeded to Meer Kossim Khán's tent, and placing guards over his property and zenana, conveyed him with studied insult to the Nawaub Vuzier's camp, where he was made a prisoner, and closely confined to the tent allotted to him. His money and property were confiscated, and applied to the discharge of the arrears claimed ; and through the treachery of his servants and the fears of his women, who had been made the vehicles of concealment, the greater part of his wealth, which consisted of jewellery, was traced out and seized. One servant however, by name Sheikh Mahomud Ashur, was faithful to his fallen master ; he had been intrusted with a small supply of jewellery, with which he was directed to make his way to Rohilkund, which he effected and there awaited the arrival of his master, to whom he finally made over the charge committed to him, and furnished that wretched chief with the only means that enabled him to spin out a few years of misery and exile.

As Meer Kossim Khán's connection with the English affairs was now closed for ever, it may be as well, before finally

* Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 328-9.

dismissing the subject, to anticipate the order of this narrative, and state that, on the 22nd of October, the day previous to the battle of Buxar, he was released by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah and furnished with a lame elephant, on which he immediately left the camp; that he was exposed to considerable danger from the fugitives of the next day's action, but finally made his escape to Rohilkund. After various vicissitudes of fortune, he became a pensioner on the bounty of Nudjeef-oo-Dowlah, and ended his days in extreme poverty at Delhi, on the 6th of June 1777, his last shawl being sold to pay for his winding sheet; and his women and children plundered of the small quantity of camp equipage and cattle that remained.*

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But to return to Buxar;—the Nawaub Vuzier confident in his own strength and taught by the conduct of Major Carnac to undervalue the power and resources of the English, remained in his encampment, indulging in luxury and making little other preparation to meet the coming storm, than sending a strong party to defend the passage of the Soane and harass the advance of the British army.

On the 9th of October, Major Munro marched with his force from Bankypore;—Major Champion having been previously directed to cross the Ganges at Chupprah, and to form a junction with the main body on the 10th, so as to cover the passage of the Soane at Kulverghát, which point a considerable detachment of the enemy had been sent forward to defend. Captain Goddard was also ordered to march down along the line of the Soane, with his Battalion (*the present 13th Regt. N. I.*) from Rhotas, and join the main body at the same point. These arrangements, so well concerted, were as effectively executed. Having made a long march on the 9th, the main body arrived on the morning of the 10th at Kulverghát, above Moneah, where they found the enemy drawn up to oppose their passage, which was rendered more difficult by breast-works and batteries that had been thrown up, commanding the ford. Almost at the moment of their arrival, they heard the welcome preconcerted signal, which told them that Major Champion was at

* Asiatic Annual Register for 1800 Miscellaneous Tracts, pp. 35-6.

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his post. That officer in obedience to the orders he had received, embarked his detachment on the Ganges at Chupprah, on the 6th of October, in the midst of a heavy storm of wind and rain, which continued all that and the two succeeding days : on the 9th, it cleared up, and he proceeded to the mouth of the Soane, where he disembarked his whole party on the west bank, and encamped for the night. The morning of the 10th, being the time appointed for his reaching Kulverghát, he marched at 2 o'clock, and proceeding along the left bank of the Soane, arrived at the exact moment when his presence was required ; a thick fog hitherto concealed his advance from the enemy, but as this cleared off, both parties obtained a view of each other, when the enemy promptly changing their front, drew up opposite to Major Champion. The latter now ordered three guns to be fired in quick succession, the appointed signal, which was speedily answered from Major Munro's camp on the other side. Major Champion now formed his troops in line, the Marines in the centre, with the guns divided on either flank—Captain Trevannion's Battalion (*the present 10th Regt. N. I.*) on the right, and Captain Stables' Battalion (*the Mathews,*) on the left ; in this order they steadily advanced towards the enemy, who after the interchange of a few shots, retired in the direction of Arrah. The detachment continued its route to the ghát, where they were speedily joined by the Europeans, and two other Battalions of Sipahis from the main body, who had been already ferried over, and the whole force crossed during that and the following day. The passage was effected in an orderly and skilful manner, by means of the boats under the charge of Captain Wedderburn, a guard being stationed at the water side, under the command of Major Stibbert, to preserve order. The whole force, as they crossed, encamped about half a mile from the river, on the road to Arrah.*

They halted on the 12th, and the army was formed into three divisions, under the command of Majors Champion, Pemble, and Stibbert ; the place of each corps and detach-

* Williams pp. 35.—Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 49.

ment was clearly assigned, and the troops were told off into wings, sub-divisions, platoons and firings, in accordance with the arrangements of the period. Captain Goddard having also arrived at the appointed day, was directed to take post with his Battalion, for the defence of this passage ; and on the 13th of October, the army continued its advance in separate columns, marching by double files. Major Champion commanded the advance guard, which consisted of two Companies of Grenadier Sipahis, half of the European Troop of Cavalry, and two Rissallahs of Mogul Horse, with the Quarter-Master Sergeants and camp colourmen of the several corps.

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On reaching the bridge over the Bonass-nullah, beyond Arrah, a body of 4 or 500 of the enemy's horse were observed on the opposite bank. Major Champion immediately ordered the Cavalry under the command of Lieutenant Mair to charge them, which was done without hesitation, the European Dragoons commanded by Mr. Surdal, a Cadet, leading in gallant style. The enemy, after a slight resistance, turned and fled, closely pursued by the English for nearly a mile, until they reached a village, when the fugitives separated right and left, and a volley of musketry was poured in from a large body of the enemy's Sipahis, who had been placed there in ambuscade for the purpose. This unexpected check immediately made the Cavalry wheel about and retreat in turn ; whilst the enemy who had been reinforced by another party hitherto concealed behind the village, followed them up, and committed considerable slaughter. The Mogul Horse panic struck at this change of affairs, broke and fled in confusion in all directions, notwithstanding the exertions of Lieutenants Mair and Hessman, who endeavoured in vain to rally them ; the Europeans held better together, and served in some measure to cover the retreat. Mr. Surdal, who was a powerful man and an excellent horseman, performed wonders : after killing three of the enemy with his own hand, he was attacked by a Pathan, covered with armour ;—in making a cut at this new antagonist, his sword shivered to pieces upon the coat-of-mail ; the blow was quickly returned, but Mr. Surdal saved himself by his dexterity, throwing himself

A. D. 1764. on one side of his horse; the blow was however, given with
 22nd Oct. such good will, that the pommel of his saddle was cut through. Before his enemy could recover his sword, the gallant young man had resumed his seat, drawn a pistol and shot him through the head, after which he effected his escape. Lieutenants Mair and Hessman only saved themselves by leaping their horses over a broad and deep wet ditch, a bold and sporting feat, which none of the enemy dared to imitate.*

Major Champion, as soon as he witnessed this turn of affairs, drew up the two Companies of Grenadier Sipahis in some broken ground, to cover the retreat of the Cavalry, but at such a distance from the bridge, that the enemy were enabled to commit considerable slaughter amongst the fugitives and the Quarter-Master's details, before they could get across the stream. Four Quarter-Master Serjeants were killed, and 10 or 12 of the European Cavalry, and about 60 of the Mogul Horse were killed or severely wounded. The enemy however, did not escape unscathed. Williams mentions an instance of great coolness displayed in a personal encounter with one of the enemy's horsemen by the Quarter-Master Serjeant of the 89th Regt., named George Bennett, who shortly after obtained a commission in the Company's service, and ultimately died a Captain.† This check caused the army to march with greater caution in future, and the advance guard was increased by two Companies of European Grenadiers and a couple of six-pounders. On arriving at their ground, the order of battle to be observed, either if attacked in camp or on the march, was given out, and the troops practised in its formation. This, owing to the superiority of the enemy in Cavalry, was an oblong square, the front and rear lines forming the longer sides. On the 14th, they continued their advance; but as the march by files, had been found to lengthen the columns to an inconvenient extent, they were now ordered to proceed by platoons.

In this order, the army continued to advance until the 22nd of October, on which day they arrived in sight of the

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 50.

† Williams, p. 40.

enemy's intrenched position at Buxar, their march having been a good deal harassed every day by parties of Cavalry, which, however, generally dispersed or retreated as soon as the Artillery unlimbered and gave them a round. On reaching the plain of Buxar about 9 o'clock in the morning, the army of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah was observed drawn up in order of battle, in front of their intrenched position, at the distance of about 3 miles. As the advance arrived, they took ground to the right, followed by the detachment of Royal troops, so as to leave room for the remainder of the force to form up in line. When this was done, Major Munro and his Staff reconnoitered the enemy's position, from whence a few shots were fired, but all fell short, owing to the distance. Both sides remained drawn up, watching each other for more than an hour, when Shoojah-oo-Dowlah withdrew his troops within their intrenchments, and the English being fatigued with a long march, followed the example. The tents were pitched on arrival, and the troops ordered to rest and refresh themselves, but without taking off their accoutrements. Captain Morgan's Battalion of Sipahis was pushed forward to a village about 1000 yards in front of the left of the line, and a Rissallah of Mogul Horse, under Lieutenant Mair, was posted in a tope at nearly the same distance from the right wing: picquets were thrown out, and sentries posted all round the camp.

Major Munro now convened a council of war, and it was decided to give the troops a rest during the following day, and to attack the enemy in their intrenchments by day-break on the 24th; when it was arranged, at the recommendation of Captain Jennings and Lieutenant Nicoll,—who had formerly been employed under Major Carnac in surveying the ground now occupied by the enemy, and were well acquainted with the locality,—that a strong detachment should make a detour by the Torah-nullah, under the guidance of Lieutenant Nicoll, and endeavour to turn the enemy's right flank, whilst the main body attacked in front. All the heavy baggage was sent on board Captain Wedderburn's fleet, and the necessary arrangements made for the coming struggle. The remainder of the day (the 22nd) passed off quietly on both sides.

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It had been decided, with a view to blind the enemy as to the intended nature of the attack, that trenches and false batteries should be commenced opposite their left, as if it was intended to proceed by regular approaches. Accordingly, before day-break on the morning of the 23rd, Major Champion moved out with a detachment, including the Pioneer Company and all the Bildars of the camp, and commenced operations some distance to the front. But Shoojah-oo-Dowlah disconcerted all these arrangements, by boldly and unexpectedly moving out of his intrenchments, to give battle on the plain. The enemy were discovered to be in the motion soon after day-break. Major Champion at first imagined that it was merely a party assembling to interrupt the operations of the false approaches, but as column after column was observed deploying in front of the intrenchments, he soon perceived that something further was contemplated. He accordingly sent word at once to Major Munro, who rode forward and personally ascertained the state of the case, when he returned to camp, and ordered the drums to beat to arms, and the troops to form in the order of battle, already assigned to them.*

The army was formed in two lines, with a small reserve consisting of the two Grenadier Companies of the European Battalion, and the European Cavalry. Captain Morgan's Battalion, which was posted in the village to the left, was recalled into the front line; and Lieutenant Mair with his Rissallah of Cavalry, was withdrawn from the tope to the right, and ordered to join the remainder of the Mogul Horse, and take post in a village to the rear of the left wing, for the protection of the camp and baggage. The front line consisted of the detachment of Royal troops—composed of the Marines and details of H. M.'s 84th, 89th, and 11th Regiments, the whole under Captain Wemyss; the Bombay detachment and two Companies of the Bengal European Battalion, brigaded together, under the command of Captain MacPherson, and four Battalions of Sipahis; with the greater part of the Artillery, consisting of 4 twelve-pounders, 10 six-pounders, and 2 how-

* Williams, p. 43.—Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 53.

itzers. The Europeans were posted in the centre, the Royal detachment to the right and the Company's to the left, and 4 six-pounders between them; on the outward flank of each detachment were 1 twelve-pounder, 1 six-pounder, and 1 howitzer; on either side of the Europeans were two Battalions of Sipahis, with 2 six-pounders between the Battalions; and 1 twelve-pounder and 2 six-pounders on the extreme flanks; the Battalions on the right were Captain Swinton's (*the present 3rd Regt. N. I.*), commanded by Captain Wilding, and Major Stibbert's (*the present 9th Regt. N. I.*), commanded by Captain Feake. On the left of the line, were the 1st Burdwan Battalion (*the present 2nd Grenadiers*), commanded by Captain Nollikins and Captain Morgan's Battalion.

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The rear line consisted of the remainder of the European Battalion and 4 Battalions of Sipahis, with 8 field-pieces, two of which belonged to Captain Smith's Battalion. The Europeans were in the centre, with 2 six-pounders on either flank, and two Battalions of Sipahis forming each wing—having 2 field-pieces on their extreme flanks, of which those on the right belonged to Captain Smith's Battalion, (*the present 8th Regt. N. I.*), that corps and Captain Grant's Battalion (*now the 5th Regt. N. I.*) being on the right, and the *Mathews'* and Captain Trevannion's Battalion (*the present 10th N. I.*) on the left. The reserve was drawn up between the two lines, 50 paces in the rear of the centre of the front line. It was clearly explained that in the event of any attack on either flank, half a Battalion should fall back from the front line, and half a Battalion wheel up from the rear line, and thus complete the oblong square. The right wing of the front line was commanded by Major Champion, the left by Major Stibbert, and the rear line by Major Pemble; Captain George Hay of the Cavalry commanded the reserve, and Lieutenant Vertue was sent with four Companies of Sipahis, one from each of the Battalions of the rear line, to reinforce the Cavalry posted in the village to the rear to guard the baggage.

It was past 8 o'clock before the troops were all in position. To the left, and in front of the left wing, was an extensive morass, and beyond that a village; in front of the right wing

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was a large tope, between which and the village to the left all was clear and open; to the right of the tope, beyond the right flank of the line, was another village:—all these posts were speedily occupied by the enemy.

The position taken up by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah was a formidable one, and as his force amounted to between 40 and 50,000 men, it covered a considerable extent of ground. On the left, resting on the Ganges and occupying the Fort and ruined town of Buxar, was the division of Behnee Behadur, with several Battalions of Nujeebs, under European officers, and a chosen body of Cavalry, raised by the Nuwab Vuzier at Lucknow, and called the Sheikzadees, commanded by Sheik Goolam Khádyr. In the centre were the Brigades of Sum-roo and Madoc, consisting of eight Battalions of disciplined Sipahis, and eight field-pieces, worked by Europeans, renegades and deserters. These were supported by a body of between 6 and 7000 horse and foot, under the command of Shoojah Khoolee Khán, more generally known as Meeah Issa. On either flank of the regular Brigades, were powerful Batteries of the Nawaub Vuzier's Artillery, worked by his own Goolundaz, and consisting for the most part of heavy guns, many of which were of European construction. The right wing was composed of the division of Bulwunt Singh the Rajah of Benares, a considerable body of Rohillas, horse and foot, and a splendid corps of about 5000 Northern Cavalry, known as the Dooranee Horse, many of whom were veterans who had served under Ahmed Shah Abdallee, and some even under Nadir Shah. Shoojah-oo-Dowlah himself commanded the left wing; and a corps of reserve, composed of his own troops—chiefly Cavalry—was posted in the rear. The Emperor was encamped on the other side of the Torah Nullah, and appears to have borne no part whatever in this engagement.

Shoojah-oo-Dowlah advanced slowly but in good order; and from their superior weight of metal, his guns told upon the British line before the English field-pieces could be brought to bear upon them. Major Munro now ordered the whole line to advance, but they had scarcely marched a hundred yards

before they were compelled to incline to the right, to get clear of the jheel or morass. This was a tedious operation, and during the whole time the enemy kept up a heavy cannonade; but as many of their guns were ill served, the loss was comparatively small. Rockets also were discharged in showers, but the British troops remained perfectly steady, whilst their Artillery, which had now got within range, played upon the dense masses of the enemy with admirable effect. The whole force being at length clear of the jheel, the word was once more given to advance, but at that moment a large body of the Dooranee Horse threatened the left flank, and made a daring attempt to penetrate between the two lines. Captain Hay observing this, moved up promptly with the European Grenadiers and Cavalry, whilst at the same time Captains Morgan and Stables each wheeled half a Battalion, so as to close up the whole interval; whilst the Artillery on the left flank of each line were brought into the new alignment. These movements were effected with great precision; and the enemy having been thus unexpectedly met by a murderous fire of grape and musketry, were checked in their headlong charge, recoiled and speedily retired with a heavy loss. Foiled in this attempt, they now made a rapid detour round the jheel, and reinforced by another ghole of Rohilla Cavalry, they fell upon the village to the rear, in which the Mogul Horse and Lieutenant Vertue's detachment were posted. The Mogul Horse, overpowered by numbers, quickly fled, and hastened to seek shelter with the Infantry: Lieutenant Vertue finding himself abandoned, and unable with his small party to resist so powerful a force, coolly retreated with his little body of Sipahis in admirable order, retiring by alternate Companies, as steadily as if on parade; and though pressed by the enemy's Cavalry, regained the main body, but not without some loss. The enemy now made themselves masters of the whole of the baggage and camp equipage, and flushed with their success, the whole body made a desperate charge upon the rear line, the corps composing which, had in the mean time faced about and were ready to receive them, which they did with so warm and close a fire of grape

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A. D. 1764. and musketry, that the enemy were soon repulsed with heavy
23rd Oct. loss.

They, however, behaved with considerable courage, and a large portion repeated the attempt, and charged up so close to the line, that several men were sabred in the ranks, and many of the enemy fell upon the English bayonets, amongst them was the gallant leader of the party, who making a cut at one of the Europeans, was received upon the man's bayonet, and the piece being discharged at the same moment, the unfortunate chief fell a mangled corpse upon a heap of slain. But their daring and gallantry was unavailing, when opposed to English steel and English discipline, and all who persevered went down before the fiery and bristling wall in front of them, and at length the enemy were compelled to draw off, leaving a fearful proportion of killed and wounded behind them.

In the mean time, the front line had not been idle; the enemy made several charges of Cavalry upon both wings, whilst the regular Brigades under Sumroo and Madoc kept up an incessant fire of artillery and musketry: they had also brought up a battery of heavy guns, and posted them in the village to the right, which fired obliquely upon the line and committed great destruction. Major Munro observing some wavering to the right and ascertaining the cause, dispatched one of his aides-de-camp, Captain Gordon, to order Captain Feake to advance with Major Stibbert's Battalion, (*the present 9th Regt. N. I.*), and storm the battery; but this order, though repeated, was not obeyed, either through some mistake or misconduct on the part of the commanding officer; upon which Lieutenant Nicoll, who was Adjutant-General of the Sipahis, was ordered to take the command of the Battalion. This officer putting himself at their head, led them on gallantly, and the men as promptly and boldly followed; making a silent detour at first to the right, they suddenly wheeled, rushed forward, and carried the village and the battery at the point of the bayonet. Major Munro observing that this important point was gained, ordered Lieutenant Harper to advance from the rear line, to their

support, with Captain Smith's Battalion, whilst Lieutenant Nicoll proceeded to attack the enemy's position in the tope already mentioned, situated to the left of the village he had just carried. Here the enemy had posted a large body of Nujeebs and Cavalry, belonging to Behnee Behadur's division, with a number of field-pieces, by which the right wing was much annoyed. Lieutenant Nicoll advanced with Major Stibbert's Battalion in excellent order; but as they approached the tope, they were received in front with a steady fire from a Battalion of the Nujeebs, whilst at the same moment, they were charged on the flanks by a body of Cavalry, thrown into confusion, and compelled to retreat. Major Munro observing this, directed Major Champion to advance with the remainder of the right wing to their support; and that officer, directing Lieutenant Harper to join him from the village advanced in line with the Royal detachment, Captain Swinton's Battalion and Captain Smith's Battalion, (*the present 3rd and 8th Regts. N. I.*), supported by the Artillery. The Infantry were ordered not to fire a shot, but to trust solely to the bayonet.

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In this manner they moved forward until they were joined by Major Stibbert's Battalion, which quickly rallying, took its place on the right flank, and the whole rushing forward, dashed through the tope, when the Nujeebs began to retreat and a close and well directed volley from the whole wing caused them to quicken their movements and abandon the guns, which to the number of 27 were all captured. The Nujeebs, thus driven from the village and the tope, were forced to take up a fresh position to their own right; but in so doing, they came in front of Sumroo's and Madoc's Brigades, which were drawn up more to the rear. These officers immediately took ground to their right, and more in advance, so as to form a new alignment with the Nujeebs, who had again formed in good order; but almost, at the same moment, Meeah Issa, hearing the firing in the tope, and imagining that it was an attack upon the British right wing, thought the moment an opportune one for attacking the left wing; and accordingly, forcing his way with about 6000 horse and foot through the skirts of the morass,

A. D. 1764. attacked the left wing in front and flank with great gallantry.
28rd Oct. This movement, however, was highly advantageous to the English, who were at the moment suffering severely from the artillery of Sumroo's and Madoc's Brigades which were now masked by this attack; whilst Meeah Issa's troops coming up in detail as they straggled through the morass, fell rapidly under the steady fire of the English line. In vain their leader urged them again to the attack and made a succession of fruitless charges; the horses recoiled before the fire that saluted them, and a heap of slain told how unavailing but how determined were their efforts. On a final attempt, the gallant Meeah Issa fell with a grape shot through his brain, and his troops disheartened by his loss, and having suffered fearfully in their daring attempt, were thrown into confusion, broke, and finally fled. Sumroo and Madoc observing this turn of affairs, had already commenced their retreat, which they effected in good order, carrying with them all their artillery. Major Munro perceiving that this was the crisis of the action, gave orders for a general advance. He rode to the head of the troops, thanked them for their conduct, pointed out that the victory was now in their hands, and taking off his hat, gave three cheers, to which the whole army heartily responded. The whole then broke into columns, the left wing under Major Stibbert following the enemy towards the nullah, the right marching upon the intrenchments, and the rear line following with Major Munro as a reserve.

The enemy were now in full retreat, the regular Brigades in good order, but the remainder of the troops fast falling into confusion, which was further increased by the explosion of three of their powder magazines and several tumbrils, which were blown up by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's order. Major Stibbert's and Captain Smith's Battalions (*the present 9th and 8th Regts. N. I.*) were detached to the right, to secure the town and fort of Buxar, and Captain Wilding was sent with Captain Swinton's Battalion (*the present 3rd Regt. N. I.*) to clear the enemy's intrenchment. The former corps, pushing through the streets of the ruined town, came suddenly upon Behnee Behadur and the Skeikhzadee Horse, who were all dismounted, unconscious of the defeat of the main body.

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morning, he left his camp standing and made no arrangements for the removal of his baggage, and all his officers had followed the example. The consequence was, that notwithstanding the Dooranee Horse (experienced plunderers,) had already helped themselves,—an immense booty fell into the hands of the English army: much of course was secreted by individuals, but the amount of public prize-money exceeded twelve lakhs of rupees.]

At sunset the troops were re-called and took up their ground for the night near the fort, where they slept upon their arms.

[Thus ended the famous battle of Buxar, on which depended the fate of India, and which was as gallantly disputed as it was important in its results.] This British force, actually engaged on this occasion, according to Major Munro's own return, was, as follows:—European Infantry, 746 rank and file; Artillery, 71; European Cavalry, 40; making a total of 857 Europeans, exclusive of officers and serjeants; Sipahis, rank and file, 5,297; Mogul Horse, 918,—making a total force of 7,072. The Artillery consisted of a train of 20 field-pieces, in addition to those attached to the Europeans, and Captain Smith's Battalion—making 28 guns altogether. A considerable number of lascars were attached to this branch, who have been omitted in the above return. The casualties were heavy—2 European officers, Lieutenant Spilsbury of H. M.'s 90th regt., and Ensign Thompson of the Bengal Grenadiers, were killed; 7 officers were wounded, amongst whom were Captain Crofton of the 90th regt., and Lieutenant George Thompson of the European Battalion, who lost a leg; 8 European non-commissioned officers were killed and 9 wounded; and of the rank and file, 81 were killed and 78 wounded: total Europeans killed and wounded, 161

Sipahis killed, 205; wounded, 414; and missing, 35; Mogul Horse killed, 45; and wounded, 27: grand total of killed and wounded, 647. 625*

Of the enemy's loss, the same accurate details are not available; but upwards of 2000 lay dead on the field of battle, and more were wounded. Double that number must

have perished in the nullah and during the pursuit ; 133 A. D. 1764.
 pieces of artillery were captured, of which 7 were brought November,
 in the day after the action by one of the foreigners who
 had deserted at Sawunt, for which he received a pardon. A
 number of these deserters were found amongst the slain ; and
 two who were wounded and made prisoners, were hung up
 on a tree in front of the troops, by the Provost Serjeant.
 Thirty-two more guns were found mounted on the works of
 the fort and the intrenchment.*

The intelligence of this victory diffused universal joy in
 Calcutta, and the Council immediately addressed the follow-
 ing letter of thanks to Major Munro, dated the 6th Novem-
 ber 1764 :—

“ SIR,—We have received with great pleasure the first news
 of your success of the 23rd October, against Shujah Dowlah,
 by your note to the President from the field of battle ; and
 yesterday, we were favoured with your letter of the 26th,
 containing the detail of the action, which, from the great
 force of the enemy, and the number of their artillery, is
 one of the most interesting that ever was fought in India.
 The signal victory you gained, so as at one blow utterly to
 defeat their designs against these provinces, is an event
 which does so much honor to yourself, Sir, in particular,
 and to all the officers and men under your command, and
 which, at the same time, is attended with such important
 advantages to the Company, as calls upon us to return you
 our sincere thanks. We shall regard it at once as our plea-
 sure and duty to set forth to the Court of Directors how
 much they are obliged to you for your skill and activity
 in care of the army, before the opening of the campaign ;
 your judgment in leading them into the field in the
 earliest of the season, and your conducting the dispo-
 sition you made for receiving or attacking the enemy.
 We request that you will return our thanks to the other

* These details of the Battle of Buxar are obtained from Major Munro's
 own account as given in the 1st Report of the Select Committee ;—Caraccioli, vol.
 2 ;—Williams ;—The Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2 ;—The Annual Register, vol. 8, and
 Three Years' Gleanings.

A. D. 1764. field officers, and the commandant of the artillery, for their
November. care and vigilance in preserving this disposition, and taking every advantage over the enemy; and to the officers and men in general, for their bravery and good behaviour on this important occasion.

“ Lieutenants Nicoll, Harper, and Bevan, mentioned in your letter to us; and Captains Grant, Winwood, Hay, Stables, and Kinloch; Mr. Hamilton, your aid-de-camp; Lieutenant Duff, of the artillery; Mr. Stuart, your secretary; and Mr. Sage, who acted as Major Pemble’s aid-de-camp, mentioned in like manner in your letter to the President, as meriting your particular notice, have gained great honour. They may be assured that your recommendation shall not be forgot; that they shall receive upon all occasions every encouragement the rules of the service will admit of. We shall also take the first opportunity of writing to the President and Council of Bombay, of the good services of Major Pemble and Captains Hamilton and Macpherson, belonging to that establishment, and shall request of them to take every opportunity of rewarding their merit.

“ For the further operations of the army, we refer you to our separate letter of instructions of this date, and are with great esteem, Sir,

“ Your most obdt. humble Servant,

(Sd.) “ H. VANSITTART, &c.

● “ *Cal., Nov. 6, 1764.*”

Lieutenants Harper and Bevan were both appointed Brigade Majors to the force, for their conduct on this occasion.

The Corps still in existence that were engaged in this action are, the Bengal Artillery, the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers, ~~the~~ 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th, 9th and 10th Regts. N. I.—The Bombay detachment was subsequently incorporated in the Bengal European Battalion, and the details of the Royal troops either took service with the Company, or were reduced on their return to England. Of the native corps employed, the *Mathews* and the *Morgans* are no longer in existence.

The army remained at Buxar until the 27th, busily employed in burying the dead, and collecting the wounded of both sides. Owing to the casualties that had occurred amongst the camp-followers and the number of bearers that had absconded, the supply of doolies was very limited, and such was the paucity of medical officers, that there were not enough to dress the wounds of those who had suffered; and though every thing was done to relieve their wants, many poor fellows lay several days upon the field, before means were available for carrying them to the hospital or attending to their hurts. Major Munro, however, personally visited the field daily, and administered rice and water to these unfortunates. Buxar was put into a proper state of defence, and an Hospital, and Magazine and Commissariat depôts, established within the walls.

A. D. 1764.
October.

On the day after the action, Major Sir Robert Fletcher arrived in camp. This officer having returned from Europe, had been recently sent up from Calcutta with a reinforcement, consisting of 300 European recruits and Captain Ironside's Battalion (*the present 11th N. I.*) He had imagined that Major Munro would not commence the campaign until his arrival; but learning on the way that the army had marched from Patna, he left the detachment under the command of Captain Ironside, and hastened on by dawk, but joined too late to participate in the victory of Buxar. On his arrival, Major Champion was ordered down to the presidency to take the command of the Midnapore frontier, which was again threatened by the Mahrattas who had been invited by Meer Kossim Khán and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah to invade the province. The force placed at his disposal for this purpose consisted of two recently formed companies of the European Battalion, composed almost entirely of recruits, and a detail of the 3rd company of Artillery, with the Battalions of Captains Hampton and Scotland (*the present 4th and 14th Regts. N. I.*)

On the 25th, a detachment under the command of Major Fletcher, consisting of 200 Europeans, 3 Battalions of Sipahis, 2 six-pounders, and 1 twelve-pounder, with 200 of the Mogul Horse, was ordered to march and harass the force of Shoojah-

A. D. 1764.
November.

oo-Dowlah, who, with Sumróo and Madoc's Brigades and all the fugitives he could collect, was reported to be crossing the Ganges opposite Ghazeepore; but intelligence being subsequently received that they had nearly all got over, the detachment was recalled. On the 27th, the whole army crossed the Ganges at Buxar;—the sick and wounded, with 4 companies of Sipahis under a subaltern officer, being left for the protection of the fort. Captain Goddard's Battalion (*the present 13th Regt. N. I.*) was ordered to join the main body, and a Battalion from Patna moved up to take its place on the Soane. The army now advanced towards Benares, marching with the greatest order and discipline. Strict injunctions were issued against plundering or injuring the inhabitants. On the 29th, the following order was published:—"The soldiers are strictly forbidden to go out of their lines; any that are found plundering or setting fire to the villages will be punished with the utmost severity. Major Stibbert will please to have these orders carefully explained to the seapoys."*

This humane and prudent system was not very palatable to the troops, who had never been controlled in this respect whilst under Major Carnac's command, that officer having on the contrary sent the detachment under Major Champion into the Sarun district, with express orders to lay waste the country. The consequence now was the necessity for a repetition of the order on the 30th, when it was further directed that, "no plundering on any account whatever, without a special order, will be permitted; whoever shall be detected therein, contrary to these orders, shall be immediately hanged in front of the whole army:—these orders are to be read and carefully explained to all the black troops."† And with a view of enforcing obedience, "a company of seapoys" was ordered "to attend at the Head Quarters, in order to be posted at the different villages as the army passes, to prevent their being plundered or burnt."

Notwithstanding all these precautions, it was impossible to check the practice altogether; and on the 5th

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 60.

† Ibid.

of November, a non-commissioned officer of the Mogul Horse was detected in the act. As the Major was determined to enforce his orders and maintain a strict discipline, the man was hung in the presence of the whole army, as soon as they arrived at their ground.* On this day they reached the banks of the Goomtee, where they were delayed until the 7th, throwing a bridge across that stream. On the 8th, they reached Benares, and encamped close to the city; and on arrival, the following order was issued to the force:—"None of the troops or followers of the army are on any account whatever to go into the city of Banaras, or out of the limits of the camp, on pain of being severely punished; and if any person is detected plundering, he is to be immediately hanged." The next day, arrangements were made with the shroffs and principal inhabitants of this wealthy city, by which they agreed to pay the sum of 4 lakhs of rupees to the army, as a ransom for the place, which, all things considered, must be looked upon as an exceedingly moderate imposition.

For the further protection of the place, a company of Europeans was ordered into the city, which guard was relieved every 48 hours.

On the day following the battle of Buxar, the Emperor Shah Allum wrote to the British Commander, congratulating him upon the victory, and representing that he himself had been hitherto a mere state prisoner in the hands of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, that he had at length been freed by this fortunate event, and was now only desirous to place himself once more under British protection. To this the Major replied that he was not authorised to enter into any arrangements of the nature proposed, without orders from the Council; but he would send an express to Mr. Vansittart, the Governor, in Calcutta, requesting his orders on the subject. The Emperor now pressed Major Munro to visit him, to which the latter at length consented, upon the express condition, that his so doing was not to be interpreted into any proof of political

A. D. 1764.
November.

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 61.

A. D. 1764.
November.

arrangement or protection. At this interview, the Emperor offered to make over the whole of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's dominions to the English, on payment of the usual *peishkush*, as also the Dewannee of the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa; and in fact to agree to any terms they choose to demand, upon condition that they would afford him their protection and support. Major Munro could only repeat his inability to act or hold out any hopes or promises until he received orders from Calcutta.

Notwithstanding this clearly expressed determination, the Emperor crossed the river after the English, and following their line of march, encamped close to them every day, for better security. On the 19th of November orders were received from Calcutta, authorising Major Munro to enter into terms with the Emperor, and to afford him protection. Accordingly on the 20th, a Battalion of Sipahis was ordered to his camp, which was pitched on the Allahabad road, for the protection of his person; and on the 25th, a treaty was formally signed under a Royal salute; when the Major and his Staff, with most of the officers in camp, waited upon his Majesty to pay their respects. The following order of the 24th November, will show how such matters were managed in those days:—"Such of the officers
" as will be off duty to-morrow, who choose to wait on the
" King and wish him joy of being put in possession of Su-
" jah-al-Dowlah's country by the English, are desired to meet
" at the Head Quarters at 9 o'clock to-morrow morning: it
" is necessary to acquaint them that it is customary to make
" him a salam on the occasion, and the least that should be
" given by a captain, is five gold-mohurs, and three by a sub-
" altern."* The army having been reinforced from Patna by two more companies of the European Battalion, a Company of Cadets, and the Battalions of Captains White and Dow (*the present 12th and 15th Regts. N. I.*), the former of which had been ordered up from Mongheer, and the latter from Moorshedabad; Major Munro ordered a detachment to be

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 82-3.

formed under the command of Major Pemble, to lay siege to the Fort of Chunar, the Governor of which, Mahommud Busheer Khán, still held out for Shoojah-oo-Dowlah; and from the vicinity of the place to the city of Benares, was capable of affording considerable annoyance to the British army. A. D. 1764.
November.

Chunar, a fortress of considerable natural strength, enjoyed at that time a very high reputation. It is situated on an isolated rock, forming the extremity of a low range of hills, about 150 feet high, on the right bank of the Ganges, which forms a considerable angle at this point, at the direct distance of about 18 miles from Benares: its greatest length is about 850 feet, and its breadth varies from 300 to 100 feet. The defences were irregular, following the outline of the eminence on which they were erected; but though several improvements and additions have been made to it, the works are not even now arranged with much skill, neither has full advantage been taken of the means of defence it possesses. Several heavy batteries were mounted on the ramparts, but the garrison trusted more to the inaccessible nature of the approach, and to the facilities it possessed for rolling down stones upon any assailants,—of which missiles a large supply was always held in readiness on the ramparts.

The force destined for this enterprise, consisted of the European Grenadiers, 3 Battalions of Sipahis, of which Captain Dow's Battalion (*the present 15th N. I.*) was one, the company of Pioneers, the company of Cadets, and 50 Artillery-men under Captain Winwood: the train to be employed was composed of 2 iron eighteen-pounders, 2 iron twelve-pounders, 2 six-pounders, 1 eight-inch howitzer, and 2 royals ($4\frac{2}{5}$ -inch Mortars): 300 Lascars were added to the train; and the Engineer's park consisted of 500 Bildars, with pickaxes and mamooties, and 60 carpenters with felling axes. Captain Polier was appointed field engineer to the detachment.*

A. D. 1764.
3rd Dec.

The Europeans, with the ordnance and stores, proceeded by water; and passing the fort at night, effected a landing on the right bank, to the south-west of the place, where they were joined by the Sipahis the following morning. There they formed their camp, and from that side they determined to make the attack. The following day Major Munro, leaving a sufficient guard for the city of Benares, marched with the main body of the army up the left side of the river, and took up a position opposite the fort, near the present cavalry cantonment of Sultanpore.*

Before commencing operations, Major Pemble summoned the place to surrender, sending the Governor an order from the Emperor to that effect. The Governor Mahommud Busher Khan, either from timidity or a disinclination to the cause of the Nawaub Vuzier, was inclined to show his respect to this summons; but the garrison exhibited a much more determined spirit, and turning the Governor out of the fort, appointed the Killedar, an old and gallant officer, to conduct the defence. Every preparation being now completed, two batteries were thrown up,—one against the south-west angle of the fort, the other on the east side, directed against the point of junction of the upper and lower forts. The fire from the field-pieces and the 8-inch howitzers annoyed the garrison, and kept down the fire from the ramparts; but the work of breaching was very slow, owing to its being necessarily confined to the 2 eighteen and 2 twelve-pounders. Two guns were also placed in battery on the north bank of the river, by Major Munro; but did little execution except to the buildings. At length the main breach at the south-west angle being reported practicable on the 2nd of December, it was resolved to make the assault on the following morning, an hour before day-break.

The storming party consisted of the Company of Cadets and the European Grenadiers, with Captain Dow's Battalion (*the present 15th N. I.*); but by a very unusual arrangement, the Sipahis were appointed to lead, to which

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 63.

circumstance the failure may probably be attributed. The whole party left the trenches at the appointed time, and reached the foot of the hill without a shot being fired. They soon found however, that the enemy were fully aware of their intention and prepared for resistance. The Sipahis led the way up the ascent with great coolness and resolution, but they had scarcely proceeded a few yards, before a smart fire was opened upon them from the ramparts and, which was much more effectual in obstructing their progress, large masses of stone were rolled down, not only from the breach, but from the towers on either side; these bounding along with great velocity, crushed to pieces all those on whom they fell, and thus the assailants were swept down by tens and twenties, and hurled, bruised and stunned to the bottom. The Sipahis astonished at this novel mode of resistance from which they suffered so severely, began to relax in their endeavours and finally gave way, bearing back the Cadets in their immediate rear and the European Grenadiers, who supported the whole. Captain Dow did his utmost, by persuasion and example, to induce his men to persevere in the attempt; and he gave them a convincing proof that the breach was practicable, by reaching its summit himself, accompanied by his serjeant-major, where alone they gallantly maintained their footing for several minutes, expecting to be supported. At length the serjeant was killed, and Captain Dow being wounded, was thrown to the bottom of the steep, by which his skull was fractured, and he was subsequently obliged to be trepanned.* There can be little doubt that had the Europeans led and some ten or fifteen established themselves on the summit of the breach, as Captain Dow and his serjeant had done, the place would have been taken.

Major Pemble now drew off the storming party, and prepared for a second assault,—which took place on the night of the 4th. He then changed his arrangements, and placed the Cadets and Europeans in front, supported by the Sipahis; but it was unfortunately too late;—the enemy flushed with

A. D. 1761.
December.

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 61.

A. D. 1764
December.

their recent success, had acquired greater confidence in the strength of their position, to the defences of which they had added materially in the interval. The breach itself was retrenched, a portion of the rock was scarped for several feet, so as to offer a serious obstacle to any approach ; much of the rubbish was removed, and fresh heaps of stones were collected on the summit. The storming party however, advanced boldly, and made several desperate efforts to ascend ; but in reality the breach was no longer practicable, whilst every attempt brought down a crushing shower of stones, from which there was no escape,—and after a display of useless gallantry, the party was once more withdrawn. The Sipahis having the example of the Europeans before them on this occasion, no longer exhibited any want of resolution ; on the contrary, they nobly vied with the Grenadiers, and, in their daring efforts, many lives were lost. One instance of gallantry requires especial notice. In the last attempt, amongst those who fell was a Cadet of the name of Wilding, brother to Captain Wilding, then in command of Captain Swinton's Battalion. This young officer lay fearfully bruised in the breach, when two Sipahis rushed forward and succeeded in extricating him from the masses of stones with which he was covered, and bringing him off under a shower of similar missiles, and a hot fire from the ramparts. Mr. Wilding died the next day, but the two Sipahis were promoted to the rank of Jemmadars for their chivalrous conduct.* The loss in these two assaults was very heavy in proportion to the numbers engaged ; but comparatively few were killed, though very many were disabled for life by the injuries received.

Major Munro hearing that the enemy were collecting again in force, and expecting an attack, recalled the greater part of the detachment across the river on the 5th, on which day he issued the following order :—“ The Commander-in-Chief “ is fully convinced, from the report Major Pemble has made “ him, the two assaults made on Chunar Fort miscarrying,

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 65.

“ was owing to no misbehaviour of the troops, but to the
 “ steepness of the ascent, and to so many being disabled by
 “ the number of large stones which were tumbled down from
 “ the breach. He is much obliged to the officers for their
 “ gallant behaviour, and desires the men may be assured he
 “ shall always regard them in the same manner as if their
 “ endeavour had been attended with success.

A. D. 1764.
 December.

“ As an action is soon expected with the Vuzier, it be-
 “ comes necessary that the detachment should join the army,
 “ leaving a sufficient force to prevent provisions and stores
 “ being brought into the fort: the action being over, the
 “ siege will be carried on again.”*

Fearing that the enemy might make a detour and attack Benares, Major Munro broke up his encampment on the 6th, and retired to that city,—where he took up a new position outside the walls, on the 7th, on which day the order of battle was given out in the event of attack; the several corps being encamped in the positions they were to occupy, with the guns in the intervals. The detachment left to watch Chunar, was withdrawn and rejoined the army. On the 10th, the Major shifted his position to a more convenient spot: a subaltern with 5 companies of Sipahis was detached to take possession of a small eminence and tank to the left of the new position; and a company was thrown into a small fortified building some distance in front of the line: other details were posted in every advantageous spot in the neighbourhood: picquets were thrown out all around the camp, connected by a double row of sentries; and the strictest order and discipline observed. Captain Dow's Battalion was stationed in the Emperor's camp, for the protection of his person. Rumours were in daily circulation of the approach of the enemy, but there was a deficiency of correct information, and the movements of the commander were in some measure fettered by the Council, who were not anxious for any further extension of their conquests, and not unwilling to secure their success by concluding an advan-

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 65-6.

A. D. 1764, tageous treaty with the Nawaub Vuzier, if such could be ar-
December, ranged with honour.

Shoojah-oo-Dowlah himself, paralyzed by his unexpected defeat at Buxar, had on his part been also most anxious to come to terms; and on the arrival of Major Munro at Benares, the Minister Behnee Behadur waited upon him, commissioned to arrange a treaty. Major Munro however, declared it indispensable, before any terms could be entered upon, that Meer Kossim Khán and Sumroo should be given up. Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, who had treated Meer Kossim Khán with such cruelty and indignity, had still sufficient good feeling to look upon his surrender as an act of infamy, and one which would for ever disgrace him in the eyes of his countrymen. He therefore represented that this part of the arrangement was impracticable; but if the English would waive that demand, he was ready to assent to any other terms they might desire to impose, and he himself offered to pay the Company twenty-five lakhs of rupees for the expenses of the war, twenty-five more to be divided amongst the army, and eight lakhs were offered to Major Munro, as a personal gift, if he would exert his influence to bring about the arrangement.* The English commander however, was firm in his demand for the surrender of Meer Kossim Khán and Sumroo, as a preliminary measure. The former, as already stated, had been released by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah the day previous to the battle of Buxar; but his means being limited and his travelling equipage of the most miserable description, his progress had been very slow, and he had not proceeded further than Allahabad, when he heard of these negotiations, in which his safety was so deeply interested. Fearing that Shoojah-oo-Dowlah might ultimately be induced to give him up, he hastened to get out of his reach; and thus the Vuzier was shortly enabled to state with truth, that compliance with that portion of the English demands was no longer in his power. As to Sumroo, faithless to all with whom he connected himself, he had already commenced a secret negocia-

* First Report, p. 42.

tion with the Jauths, for the transfer of the services of his Brigade to their cause. Of this Shoojah-oo-Dowlah had probably some inkling; for though his pride still forebade him to surrender one who was yet in his service, he proposed,—with a strange distinction as to morality or a sense of honour and hospitality,—that two or three British officers, acquainted with Sumroo's person, should be sent to his camp, and that he would cause the miscreant to be murdered in their presence, at an entertainment to be given for the purpose.*

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This proposal, so utterly repugnant to European ideas of propriety and honour, was of course rejected. At the Vuzier's request, Captain Stables, whose knowledge of the language rendered him exceedingly useful on such occasions, was deputed to visit him, but nothing satisfactory resulted from the measure.

Finding all hopes of effecting any satisfactory arrangement were vain, Shoojah-oo-Dowlah determined to prepare for further hostilities. After his defeat, he had despatched several trusty relations and friends to remove his treasures and family from Fyzabad and Lucknow to Bareilly in Rohilkund, where he placed them under the charge of Hafiz Rehmüt Khán, the ruler of that district,—whose faith and friendship on this occasion were subsequently ill repaid. He proceeded himself direct to Allahabad, where he remained awaiting the result of his negociations; but when these failed, he hastened into Robilkund, where he visited or met the most influential chiefs in that quarter, and entered into a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with several of them, amongst the principal of whom were Hafiz Rehmüt Khán, Ahmud Bungush Khán, and Meer Shah-oo-deen Khán, better known by the title of Oomaid-ool-Moolk. By their advice he also formed an engagement with Mulhar Rao Holkur, who, since the defeat of his countrymen at Paneeput, had fixed his head-quarters in the neighbourhood of Gwalior, and possessed himself of all the adjacent districts, extending to the Chumbul and the Jumna.† The liberal

* First Report, p. 42.

† Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 156.

A. D. 1765.
January. promises held out by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, readily induced him to espouse the cause. Thus reinforced and supported, Shoojah-oo-Dowlah marched again into his own territories and approached Benares; but the recollection of Buxar induced him to keep at a respectful distance from the English.

In the meanwhile, Major Munro who was most desirous to leave India by one of the later vessels of that season, had requested to be relieved from his command, and Major Carnac—who had been restored to the service with the rank of Colonel and the title of Brigadier-General,—having opportunely arrived, was ordered up to assume the command of the army; when [Major Munro, having obtained the required permission, left the force on the 6th of January 1765, accompanied by his personal staff and several other officers]. On the day previous to his departure, he issued the following farewell order:—“Major Munro being now to quit
“ the army, once more returns his thanks to the army in
“ general, for their good behaviour since he had the honour
“ to command them; and if ever it be in his power to oblige
“ any of the officers in particular, it will not only give him
“ infinite pleasure, but they will find him both ready and
“ willing.”*

The command of the army in the field now devolved upon Sir Robert Fletcher.

Major Munro met his successor, General Carnac, at Calcutta, and there made him fully acquainted with the state of affairs, military and political, and laid before him his own views and plans upon which he had acted with so much success, and in which, had he remained in command, he had resolved to persevere. This duty performed, he embarked for his native country,—there to receive the rewards his conduct had merited.

It is impossible to regard this glorious campaign as otherwise than highly honourable to the troops employed, and most important to the British Government in its results; but it is to the commander that the greatest merit is due. When first placed at the head of the force, he had no slight

difficulties to contend with; the conduct of his predecessor A. D. 1764. had lowered the reputation of the British arms, and sapped the discipline of the force. On his arrival, he found a powerful and active enemy in the field, flushed with recent success and confident in their strength and resources, whilst the force he came to command was in a state of complete insubordination, which only required a single spark to burst out into open and dangerous mutiny. By a system of immoveable firmness, strict justice, and kind consideration, guided by high military skill and experience, he not only suppressed all symptoms of discontent and insubordination, but completely removed the causes, and eradicated every unmilitary feeling from the minds of the troops. He introduced strict discipline where all had been licentiousness, he looked to the real interests and raised the character of the Sipahi, and for the first time placed the Native soldier of India on his proper footing. But he did more,—he improved the tone of the officers, upon whom so much depended; he taught them to feel an interest in the service, and explained to them the necessity for making themselves thoroughly acquainted with all the details of their profession. Having thus reformed and re-organized the forces under his command, he led them on, confident in their powers and resources, to glorious victory; whilst he taught them that great lesson in the art of war, caution as distinguished from timidity; although he never hesitated to engage the enemy under any numerical disadvantages where an object was to be gained. He never for an instant, even after the most complete success, allowed a feeling of security to relax in the slightest degree that system of vigilance and precaution which he considered at all times so essential. The result was glorious and complete, advantageous to the Government, and honourable to himself and his gallant troops. [To Major Hector Munro the service owes a debt of gratitude; for though others before him had led the way to victory and exhibited extraordinary displays of enterprise, skill and gallantry, he was the first to introduce strict discipline, and to place the Bengal Army on that high footing of efficiency which it has ever since maintained.]

CHAPTER VI.

FROM THE DEPARTURE OF MAJOR MUNRO IN JANUARY 1765,
TO THE CLOSE OF LORD CLIVE'S SECOND ADMINISTRATION IN
FEBRUARY 1767.*

WHILST Major Munro was maintaining the reputation of the British arms on the North-Western Frontier of the province, other and important events were in course of operation at Calcutta and in England, all bearing on the Company's position and progress in Bengal.

It has been already stated, that the Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khán had returned to Calcutta from the camp with Major Carnac in June 1764. This was a measure for which the Council were particularly desirous: the treasury was exhausted, and the only hopes of replenishing it rested on the Nawaub, from whom it was determined to obtain a sufficient supply, or at least as large an one as could be extorted. In addition to the payments stipulated in the treaty of June 1763, which were yet undischarged, a promise had been drawn from him for the payment of five lakhs per mensem, for the expenses of the war, so long as it should last. These arrears had now accumulated to a very heavy demand on the part of the Company, which he was ill prepared to meet: The cession of the districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong to the English, which having been originally

authorities chiefly referred to in this Chapter, are:—

: Mutakherin, Calcutta Edition, vol. 2.

Caraccioli's Life of Lord Clive, 4 vols., 8vo.

Malcolm's Life of Lord Clive, 8 vols., 8vo.

Gleig's Life of Warren Hastings.

Franklin's Life of Shah Allum, 1 vol., 4to.

Williams's Bengal Native Infantry, 1 vol., 8vo.

Verelst's English Government in Bengal, 1 vol., 4to.

Kindersley's Letters, 1 vol., 12mo.

Reports of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1772.

Reports of the Committee of Secrecy appointed by the House of Commons, 1778.

Annual Register, various years.

Asiatic Annual Register, various years.

Hansard's Parliamentary History, various years.

General Military Register of the Bengal Establishment, 1 vol., folio, Calcutta, 1795.

conceded by Meer Kossim Khán had also been insisted upon at the restoration of Meer Jaffier Khán, absorbed a very considerable proportion of the revenues of the Soobahdaree, and together with the monthly payment for the war expenses, left the Nawaub but half the nominal proceeds of his Government, wherewith to meet his own public and private expenses, and the extra demands then pressing upon him. The disturbed state of the country, and the abuse of the English privileges of trade, together with the infamous conduct of the native agents employed by those so engaged, added to the confusion and difficulties in collecting the revenues, and crippled the resources and industry of the country. But the most iniquitous demands, and those that pressed most heavily, were of a more private nature. At the conclusion of the treaty of 1763, a clause had been inserted, by which the Nawaub was bound to indemnify all individuals who had suffered any loss during the recent disturbances, the amount of which compensation, it was stated, would not exceed five lakhs of rupees; but the demand gradually increased to ten—twenty—thirty, and finally to fifty-three lakhs of rupees, chiefly on account of alleged losses by the interruption of an illicit trade. So strong was the prevalence of personal interest over public duty, that although the claims of the Company were still undischarged, more than half of these demands for compensation were extorted from the Nawaub, and the money immediately lent to Government at 8 per cent. interest by their own servants, who—however regardless of private advantage,—were rapidly sinking the pecuniary affairs of the Company into a state of ruin.

According to Mr. Scrafton, the Nawaub was in fact no more than a banker for the Company's servants, who could draw upon him as often and to as great an amount as they pleased. When they had exhausted his resources on their own account, they became clamorous for the interests of the Government; and the unfortunate Meer Jaffier Khán, harrassed and oppressed by importunities and difficulties, worn out in constitution and broken in mind, sickened at Calcutta in the end of the year, returned to Moorshedabad, and sunk into an unhonored grave, in the month of January 1765.

A. D. 1765.
January.

A. D. 1765.
January.

Mr. Vansittart had returned to England previous to these last events and was succeeded in the President's chair by Mr. Spencer, the senior Member of Council. The question of succession to the Soobahdaree was one of considerable importance, both to the Company and its servants. Strictly speaking, the situation being merely a Provincial Lieutenancy at the will of the Emperor, with him alone the appointment ought to have rested ; but in the weakness of the empire the subordinate Governments had acquired strength, and although acknowledging a nominal dependence on the Court of Delhi, they disposed of the succession of their respective kingdoms,—for such they had become,—as they thought proper, without even the form of a reference to the Emperor, beyond a requisition for his acknowledgment of the authority assumed. The succession, except when interrupted by force or intrigue, had thus become established as hereditary, and on such grounds two claimants appeared on the death of Meer Jaffier Khán, and both with equal rights in the eye of the Mahomedan law. These competitors were, the one a son of Meerun, and consequently grandson of the late Nawaub, a boy of about six years of age ; and the other, by name Nudjm-oo-dowlah, the eldest surviving son of Meer Jaffier Khán.

The Emperor had, as already stated, repeated his offer of conferring the Soobahdaree of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, upon the Company, and its acceptance would have been no infringement on the rights of Meer Jaffier Khán's family, and would most probably have been welcomed by the inhabitants of those provinces themselves, who would then have had but one set of oppressors to encounter instead of two, in the agents of the two Governments. But though tempted by the substance, the Council were too modest to accept the shadow ; or possibly they considered that were the Dewannee to pass into the hands of the Company, there would be no Nawaub, from whose treasury they could enrich themselves on the plea of presents, restitutions, compensation, &c.,—the frequent periodical assertion of which demands, had been reduced to system. Although the Council declined the offer of the Emperor for themselves, they never contemplated allowing

him to exercise the privilege towards any other party, and speedily decided the question by placing Nudjm-oo-Dowlah on the musnud. The minority of Meerun's son, which might have thrown the regency into the hands of the Government, seemed to point him out as the fitter selection; a point strongly noticed afterwards by the Court of Directors, who highly disapproved of the election made. Judging by the results, the inference of Mill regarding the motives that actuated the Council in the choice, is probably the correct one: "Nudjm-oo-Dowlah could give presents, the infant son of Meerun—whose revenues must be accounted for to the Company—could not."*

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That the selection was a profitable one to those concerned, is evident from the following list of presents received:—

Mr. Spencer,.....	Rs. 200,000
Mr. Johnstone,.....	237,000
Mr. Senior,.....	172,500
Mr. Middleton,.....	122,500
Mr. Leycester,.....	112,500
Messrs. Playdell, Burdet, and Gray, each	100,000
Mr. Gideon Johnstone,.....	50,000†

Mr. Johnstone, an active, enterprising, but an intriguing and unscrupulous man, had been mainly instrumental in bringing about this arrangement, and his share was consequently so large. Mr. Gideon Johnstone was his brother, and not in the service, which renders his being included in the list not a little remarkable, and strongly shews the influence of the elder brother. All the other recipients were Members of Council.

[Experience during the government of Meer Jaffier Khán having shewn that no assistance could be expected from the military force of the Nawaub, the Government wisely determined to take the defence of the country entirely into their own hands, and to allow only so many troops to be kept up by the State, as were necessary for parade or the collection of the

* Wilson's Mill, vol. 3, p. 358.

† Second Report, p. 21.

A. D. 1764. revenues,—and a formal treaty to this effect was concluded with Nudjm-oo-Dowlah in February 1765. The cession of the revenues of the three Provinces granted by Meer Kossim Khán and Meer Jaffier Khán was again guaranteed, as also the continued payment of five lakhs of rupees during the war, and such portion on its termination as should be rendered necessary to cover the military expenses of the Company. The Civil Government was also in reality vested in the Council, as the Nawaub bound himself to appoint a Deputy or Naib Soobah, who should have the entire management of affairs,—the appointment or removal of whom should be subject to the approval of the Council.

The privilege of inland free trade was granted to all English inhabitants of the province, with the single exception to a duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., leviabie on salt alone. The young Nawaub was exceedingly desirous to appoint as Naib the intriguing Nund Komar, who had obtained great influence over him; but although the Council had in Meer Jaffier Khán's case, refused to listen to Mr Vansittart's objections to the infamous character of that individual, and had then supported his appointment, they having now no similar factious object to serve, wisely refused to sanction his nomination, and appointed Mahommud Reezah Khán, probably the ablest and best man who could have been selected.

In the mean time, the important political and military transactions of the past two years had excited considerable anxiety on the part of the Court of Directors and the Proprietors in England. The intelligence of the disturbances under Meer Kossim Khán,—the factions in the Council,—the declaration of war,—the victories of Major Adams,—the massacre at Patna,—the vacillation of Major Carnac,—the prospect of hostilities with the Emperor and Nawaub of Oude, and the mutiny of the troops, had all come upon them in rapid succession, and they had daily felt more convinced of the necessity for the guidance and control of some superior mind. Notwithstanding that Colonel—now Lord Clive, had ended his career in India with insult and reproach to his employers, the eyes of all not influenced by party

opposition, turned towards him as the fittest person for the A. D. 1764. exigency. His gallantry and success had been acknowledged by his Sovereign, the Ministry, and the Directors; he had been raised to the Peerage by the title of Lord Clive, Baron Clive of Plassey in Ireland, and had also been promoted to the rank of Major-General, and nominated a ~~Companion~~ *Knight* of the Order of the Bath. He now took an active part in the transactions of the Company, in whose funds he had become a very extensive proprietor. There was, however, a strong party opposed to him in the Court of Directors, foremost amongst whom was Mr. Sullivan, the Deputy-Chairman. A curious scene of party intrigue and contention ensued, the details of which would be irrelevant, if not uninteresting; suffice it to say, that Lord Clive was solicited to take upon him the station of President of Bengal, and the command of the Company's military forces, upon his arrival at that Presidency; that he demurred and named conditions,—and finally having carried his several objects, accepted the appointment.

Vested with increased powers, both military and civil, he sailed from England on the 4th of June 1764, accompanied by Messrs. Sumners and Sykes, who, together with General Carnac and Mr. Verelst, then in Bengal, were nominated to form a Select Committee, of which the Governor was to be President, empowered to assemble and act on their own authority, as often as they deemed it expedient, without consulting the Council, or being subject to its control. The new Governor and his assistants were specially instructed to carry out several important reforms, the necessity for which was sufficiently apparent. The glaring and unblushing corruption of the Company's Civil servants was to be put down with a strong hand, as also the whole system of the inland trade; a better administration of justice and revenue was to be introduced and a reduction in the expenses of the Government effected, especially in the Military department. Such was the Augean task to which the new Government and his Committee were to ad-

A. D. 1765. dress themselves, as soon as the war should be concluded
 January. and tranquillity restored.

Whilst they were on their way to India, the successes of Major Munro had made a considerable change in the state of affairs, and rendered an early and satisfactory termination of hostilities, a contingency by no means improbable. Major Sir Robert Fletcher on assuming the command of the Army, issued a general order, confirming all previous orders promulgated by Major Munro, which he directed to be strictly observed, unless specifically reversed by any subsequent general order.* He made a few changes in the dispositions of the camp, and remained quiet for a day or two, waiting to see if the intelligence of Major Munro's departure would encourage Shoojah-oo-Dowlah to make his long threatened attack: but the Nawaub Vuzier had too vivid a recollection of his defeat at Buxar to hazard a second engagement, especially as his force was now far inferior in numbers to the one which he had been enabled to bring into the field on that disastrous occasion; whilst the English Army had been considerably reinforced, both from Patna and Calcutta. He now adopted a wiser arrangement, and taking advantage of his superiority in cavalry, harassed the camp incessantly with bodies of horse, and endeavoured to cut off the communication and supplies. About this time, Nudjuf-Khán, a chief of considerable note and influence, joined the Emperor with a small force from Bundelkund, which helped to strengthen the English in cavalry, the want of which they had hitherto found a serious drawback; and a further detail of Europeans, together with several officers, having joined from Patna, Major Fletcher determined to endeavour to bring the enemy to action. Accordingly, having ascertained by his spies the exact position of the enemy, and that Shoojah-oo-Dowlah and Sumroo were encamped a little apart from each other, he issued an order on the 14th of January for the march of the troops that evening, with the intention of surprising the Nawaub's

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 466.

camp. The order of advance and of battle to be observed was clearly laid down, and the order went on to say—"Sujah-al-Dowlah having said privately to his principal officers, that he will leave his camp standing for our troops to plunder; and as soon as he finds them dispersed, will return and cut them to pieces; it is therefore recommended to the troops in general to avoid plundering, the captains of the seapoy battalions are desired to swear their men on the alcoran, that they will neither plunder nor leave their platoons without orders."*

A. D. 1765.
January.

The troops marched all night, but found themselves at daybreak only a short way from camp,—partly owing to their having lost their road, and partly to the delay caused by the Artillery,—the ordnance bullocks not being able to keep up with the Infantry, or to drag the guns across a dry nullah that interrupted their march. All hopes of a surprise being thus frustrated, the army encamped near the village of Seapoor, where the enemy's horse soon gathered round them, and commenced a series of petty harassing attacks. Sir Robert Fletcher now saw that the only plan to avoid this annoyance, was to commence and maintain a rapid and determined pursuit of the enemy, and with this object in view, he made his arrangements accordingly. He organized an effective bazar, gave the Kutwals strict injunctions to sell no grain to any one except Sipahis or such camp followers as produced an order from an officer: he laid in provisions for seven days, and directed that all officers' servants and camp followers should provide themselves to the same extent. The heavy guns, the Engineers' park, the greater part of the Pioneers, Bildars, and Lascars, were left at Benares, with a strong detachment of Europeans, four Battalions of Sipahis, the 2nd Company of Artillery, and a party of Mogul Horse; Major Stibbert, who had been detached to Lucknow with two Battalions of Sipahis, was recalled to Benares; and with the remainder of the force, consisting of about 800 European

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 466-7.—It must be borne in mind that at this period the majority of the Sipahis were Moosulmans, enlisted from the number of adventurers whom the constant struggles and wars in Bengal had brought down from the Northern Provinces in search of employment.

A. D. 1765. Infantry, the 1st Company of Artillery, 8 Battalions of Sipahis, the European Cavalry, the greater portion of the Mogul Horse, and Nudjuf Khan's Cavalry, he determined to follow up the enemy, and either bring them to action, or drive them out of the country.

On the morning of the 18th, the Major re-commenced his march and reached the enemy's camp, which after a feeble show of resistance, was abandoned, and the army took possession of it. This had scarcely been effected, when it commenced to rain heavily, and the enemy's horse—who had been on the watch for some confusion consequent on the capture of the camp, and the usual plundering to be expected on such occasions—seemed determined to take advantage of this circumstance; calculating that the rain would have rendered the guns and musketry useless, they advanced to charge the right of the camp. A very effective round from the field-pieces soon undeceived them as to the state of the Artillery and they immediately drew off in greater haste than they advanced. Had they persevered, it is probable that the clumsy ill-constructed muskets then in use, would have been found very inefficient at such a moment—an opinion entertained by an officer of the force, who observes, that “had they
“ had the courage to have charged us at this critical mo-
“ ment, when in a manner the Army was deluged, they
“ might have cut off a great number of us, as I do not
“ imagine that one musket in fifty would have gone off.”*

When the rain ceased, the enemy were once more observed in position, upon which Sir Robert Fletcher again advanced, when they finally broke and fled: a large portion was dispersed, and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah was unable to show front again. The loss on either side appears to have been trifling; Lieutenant Volham of the Infantry is the only casualty traceable.† On the 19th, the Major followed in their track, and, on the 20th, encamped at a short distance from Juanpore. Here he was joined by Major Stibbert, with the two Battalions from Lucknow; and ascertaining that Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's force was in full retreat, and greatly reduced, he

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 467.—Annual Register for 1765, p. 13.

† General Military Register.

directed that officer to proceed to Benares, to assume the command of the Brigade stationed there, and to lay siege again to the fort of Chunar; whilst a portion of the heavy guns, ammunition, and Engineer's park, was ordered up by water from Benares to Allahabad, whither he hastened himself with the remainder of his force, having thrown a small garrison into Juanpore. He arrived before Allahabad in the beginning of February, and being joined by the boats with the siege artillery and stores, immediately commenced operations. Nudjuf Khan, who was well acquainted with the defences of this fortress, pointed out a weak spot in the ramparts, which could be easily breached, and was badly flanked. Batteries were quickly erected, the guns placed in position, and a few hours firing brought down the greater part of the wall, against which they were directed. Several heavy guns, which had been found in Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's camp when it was taken on the 18th, were also placed in battery, and assisted materially in the reduction of his own stronghold. The Governor of the fortress, Alee Beg Khan, alarmed at these rapid and determined proceedings, offered to treat; and Major Fletcher, who could ill afford to risk the loss of any portion of his small force at such a distance from support, readily listened to his overtures. Rajah Shitab Roy was deputed to arrange the terms, when it was agreed that the garrison should be permitted to depart whenever they pleased with their private property; and that the fort, with all the ordnance, ammunition, and stores, and all the treasures and property of the Nawaub Vuzier, should be given up to the English. The conditions having been mutually agreed to, Alee Beg Khan surrendered the fort on the 11th of February, and marching out with his garrison, received a safe conduct from Sir Robert Fletcher and the Emperor, to join his master, who had taken refuge in Rohilkund.*

Captain Jennings of the Artillery, who conducted the operations of the siege and who, as Commandant of the Artillery, had for the last two or three years been acting as a Field

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 468.—Annual Register for 1765, p. 14.—Seir Mutakherin, p. 365.

A. D. 1765. ^{February.} Officer, apparently with Brevet Army rank, although still a Regimental Captain, was now promoted to a Majority for his conduct on this occasion, to which grade he was fully entitled by his standing in the service.*

On the same day, intelligence was received that the fort of Chunar had surrendered to Major Stibbert. That officer had lost no time in investing the place, and having more extensive means than were available on the former occasion, the operations were carried on with great energy, and a much better prospect of success. More caution also was exhibited, of which dear bought experience had taught the necessity. Under the able superintendence of Captain Winwood, who commanded the 2nd Company of Artillery, and conducted the attack, three good practicable breaches were effected before any preparations were made for assault; and when all was at length ready, the Killadar offered to surrender. This gallant old soldier, who had so ably resisted the former attack, would not readily have given up now without a struggle, notwithstanding the desperate state of affairs, had he not been compelled to do so by the mutinous conduct of the garrison, who being greatly in arrears of pay and in extreme distress for provisions, refused to hold out any longer, or to serve a master who had fled and left them to perish by famine or the sword. On the 8th of February, the Killadar surrendered the keys of the Fort to Major Stibbert, at the same time saying, with tears in his eyes, "I have endeavoured to act like a soldier; but deserted by my prince, and with a mutinous garrison, what could I do? God and you (laying his hand on the Koran and pointing to his soldiers,) are witnesses that to the faith of the English I now trust my life and fortune." Touched by his gallantry and his time-honoured grey hairs, Major Stibbert and all his officers paid him every compliment and attention in their power, and granted honourable terms to the garrison, a large portion of whom enlisted in the Company's Service.†

* General Military Register.

† Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 468.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 369.—Annual Register for 1765, p. 14.

Thus in one week, by a combination of enterprise and skill, the two most important fortresses in Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's possession fell without loss into the hands of the English; and the judicious arrangements by which these important objects were attained, were equalled by the moderation of the two Commanding Officers, and the steady and good conduct of the men.

A. D. 1765.
February.

The loss of these two strongholds completely damped the hopes of the Nawaub Vuzier's partizans, and the whole country submitted to the Emperor and the English, without any further attempt at resistance.

The thanks of the Governor and Council were shortly afterwards officially notified to the officers and men, for their conduct on these two occasions.

On the 13th of February, Brigadier-General Carnac joined the army at Chunar, having shewn his usual want of alacrity, by remaining in Calcutta and taking two months to join his command, although from the first date of his appointment an action had been almost daily expected. In consequence of this delay, Majors Fletcher and Stibbert gained the honours which he wanted energy to secure; and when he did at length assume the command, he found that there was no longer any enemy in the field, and that little remained for him to do but settle the political and revenue affairs of the provinces now brought under subjection to the Emperor and the Company.*

The first order he had to issue, was an agreeable one, announcing the thanks of the Court of Proprietors in England to the officers and men, who had served under Major Adams, for their conduct during that campaign; in publishing which, he observed—"The Commander-in-Chief has the highest satisfaction in notifying the same, and makes no doubt that the like honour will be conferred upon the army, as soon as the good service, since rendered by it, is known at home."†

The notification itself was as follows:—

"At a General Court of Proprietors, held the 5th May,

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 468.

† Ibid, p. 470.

A. D. 1765. " 1764, it was unanimously resolved that their thanks should
February. " be given to the officers and soldiers, who by their gallant
" behaviour, under the command of Major Adams, were the
" means of saving the Company's Settlements in Bengal
" from immediate danger."

The force in the field at this time amounted to nearly 1000 European Infantry, including the Bombay detachment, the whole divided into 20 Companies, of which that detachment formed one, commanded by Captain Hamilton; the 1st and 2nd Companies of Artillery, which had been considerably increased by recruits and by drafts from the Infantry and from the 3rd Company in Fort William, and now together amounted to upwards of 250, including all ranks; the European Cavalry, upwards of 60 strong; the European Company of Pioneers, with 60 rank and file; the Mogul Horse, upwards of 1200 strong, under the command of Captain Graham, divided into six squadrons, each under a Subaltern officer, and each squadron consisting of three troops, together with 14 Battalions of Sipahis. Of this force, it appears, that about 300 men, or six Companies of European Infantry; the 2nd Company of Artillery, with a large proportion of the Lascars, a detail of the Pioneers, one or two squadrons of Mogul Horse, and six Battalions of Sipahis, formed the Brigade under Major Stibbert at Chunar. It is impossible to trace out exactly the whole of the native corps with this portion of the Army; but the following formed a portion of it, viz.—the 1st or Major Stibbert's Battalion (*the present 9th Regt. N. I.*), under the command of Lieutenant Nicoll, the 3d or Captain Hugh Grant's Battalion (*the present 5th Regt. N. I.*), and the 6th or Captain Duffield's Battalion (*the present 10th N. I.*), [that officer having succeeded Captain Trevannion,*

* The following circumstances attending the death of this gallant officer, are mentioned by Captain Williams.

He had left the army after the battle of Buxar, having been summoned to give evidence before the Council at Calcutta:—

" On his way down, he spent a day with his old friend, Captain John White, who then commanded at Monghyr, and after dinner, they took a walk to the Hill in the Fort, on which the great house now stands, and from which there is a most beautiful prospect. He said to his friend, in a joke, 'that when he died, he should like to be buried there.' Having settled his business with the Honourable

who died on the preceding Christmas-day,] from whom the corps received its present name of the "Duffield," or more commonly "*Dufful-ka-pultun*." There is reason to believe that the other three corps were the 2nd, 12th, and 15th (*the present 2nd, and 12th Regts. N. I. and the Mathews*) Battalions. The remainder of the force was with Sir Robert Fletcher at Allaha-
 bad. One Battalion, apparently the 4th (*the present 6th*), was stationed at Patna for the defence of that province. The 19th Battalion, which had been raised the previous year in Calcutta, was on its way to join the Army in the field, under the command of Captain Hilt, who had also a number of European recruits under his charge; Captain Scotland's Battalion (*the present 14th,*) had moved from Midnapore to occupy its place in Fort William, where the 3rd Company of Artillery and three Companies of European Infantry were also stationed. Captain Hampton's Battalion (*the present 4th*) was still at Midnapore, and Captain Lewis Brown's Battalion at Chittagong.*

A. D. 1765,
February.

General Carnac now prepared for a junction of the whole field force. On the 15th, the breaches in the fort of Chunar were ordered to be repaired, and boats to be collected for the purpose of ferrying the Army across the river, and transporting the heavy stores to Allahabad. On the 18th, the following order was issued:—"The Commander-in-Chief requests
 " that the officers of the army will wear round their arm the
 " usual mark of military mourning, as a just compliment
 " to the memory of Meer Jaffier Ally Cawn; a person to whom
 " the Army is so much indebted. By applying to the
 " Quarter-Master, they will be supplied with crape for that
 " purpose." On the 19th, the artillery and ordnance stores, with Captain Grant's Battalion, crossed the river and encamped on the opposite side. On the 21st, the remainder of the force commenced crossing; and on the morning of the 25th, the whole Brigade marched towards Allahabad. One

Board, he was on his way back to the field; but being taken ill, he died the very day he arrived at Monghyr Ghaut, which was the 25th of December 1764; when Captain White, recollecting the spot he stood on at the time he expressed the wish before mentioned, ordered a grave to be prepared for him, where his bones now lie, under a plain stone, without an inscription, in front of the great house."

* For a detailed return of the force on the 6th February 1765, vide Appendix W.

A. D. 1765.
March.

Battalion of Sipahis, with a small detail of Artillery and Lascars, were left to garrison the Fort of Chunar; and another Battalion remained for the defence of Benares; these appear to have been the 2nd and 12th Battalions, under Captains Nollkens and White. Orders were issued against plundering or ill-using the inhabitants of the villages on the line of march, on pain of being tried for their lives, if soldiers,—or hung on the spot, if camp followers.

On the 1st March the troops halted on the banks of the Ganges opposite to Allahabad, where they were joined by Sir Robert Fletcher, with his Brigade; the 18th Battalion (*now the 15th N. I.*), with a detail of Artillery, having been left to garrison the fort, under the command of Captain Dow. On the 3rd of March, a new division was made of the force, a smaller Brigade being left with Sir Robert Fletcher at Allahabad, independent of the garrison; whilst General Carnac marched on the 5th with the remainder, accompanied by Major Stibbert as his second in command. On the day previous to marching, the following order was given out—
 “ The persons who have hircarrahs with them, are to give
 “ in a list of them immediately, and Captain Swinton who
 “ is appointed to take charge of that business, will supply
 “ such officers as may have occasion for them on separate
 “ commands, for the sake of intelligence; but where the
 “ Commander-in-Chief is, all intelligence is to pass through
 “ him only. In future, hircarrahs’ wages and all demands for
 “ intelligence, are to be paid by Captain Swinton, that there
 “ may be but one hircarrah account.” This must have been
 a tolerably lucrative appointment, as it enabled Captain Swinton to retire in the course of a year, with a fortune of seven lakhs of rupees.*

The General having now no enemy in the field, marched into the Province of Oude, proceeding viâ Pampa and Juggutpore, to Bareilly, a considerable town in that province, where he halted for several days, making arrangements for the collection of the revenues. On the 23d, the army marched to Kundiah Nullah, where they encamped for some time. Here they were joined by Behnee Behadur,

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 470.

the Minister of the Nawaub Vuzier, who represented that finding his master's fortunes desperate, he had left him and now came to offer his services to the Emperor and the English; his knowledge of the financial state of the country rendered his proffered assistance very acceptable, and he was immediately employed in the collection of the revenues of the province. There is reason to believe, however, that his coming in was a plan concerted with his former master, partly to watch the state of affairs in the English camp, and partly to withdraw the attention of the General from Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's proceedings, who was once more preparing for an advance from Rohilkund upon the Lower Doab, supported by the Mahrattas under Mulhar Row Holkar. On the 25th of March, Captain Galliez with his Battalion (*the present 1st Regt. N. I.*) and two field pieces, with a detail of Artillery, was ordered to march, with an officer appointed by Rajah Behnee Behadur, to assist him in collecting the revenues of the district.* On the following day, General Carnac started for Fyzabad, the old capital of Oude, accompanied by the whole of the Cavalry, European and Native, under the command of Captain Graham, and Captain Stables' Battalion of Sipahis (*the Mathews,*) under the command of Captain Nicoll, to serve as his body guard. The Army remained at Kundiah Nullah, under the command of Major Stibbert, until the 7th of April, when they marched first to Daoudpore and then to Ometah, where they were again halted until the 18th. In the mean time, several detachments were sent out to assist the parties selected by Behnee Behadur, for the collection of the revenues. Lieutenant Claude Martine was sent in one direction with five Companies of Sipahis, and Ensign Robert Shand with four Companies to an opposite quarter. The position assigned to this latter officer being at a considerable distance and his presence urgently required, his little party marched 20 kos a day for four successive days, or a total of about 160 miles, and this without a single man being left behind, for which Ensign Shand was thanked in general orders.† It must be remembered, that at this time the Sipahis were not encum-

A. D. 1765.
March.

A. D. 1765. bered with knapsacks, nor were they furnished with camp
 March. equipage]

In the mean time, General Carnac remained at Fyzabad, when he lived in the palace of the Nawaub, and held durbars, seated on the musnud of the fugitive ruler. Here he employed himself in regulating the civil affairs of the province, receiving the submission of the various chiefs and zemindars, arranging the collection of the revenues, and indulging in the state and luxury placed at his command. He also entered into a communication with Monsieur Gentil, a Frenchman, who had for some years been in the service of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, to whom he was still attached, relative to the settlement of terms with the Vuzier. This negociation seemed at one time likely to lead to a speedy and satisfactory settlement of affairs; but the intelligence that a large body of Mahrattas were in full march for Kulpee, and about to enter the province of Korah, broke the communication on both sides. The division under Major Stibbert marched from their camp at Ometah on the 18th, and proceeded to Daoudpore, and on the 19th to Kundiah Nullah, where General Carnac joined them. On the 20th, ~~they~~ they commenced their march for the Doab; and on the 24th they once more encamped at Bareilly, where all the sick were left with a detachment of Sipahis. On the 27th they crossed the Ganges, and on the 28th took up a position at Soojahpore, near the banks of that river.* Shoojah-oo-Dowlah was understood to be advancing, supported by Ghazee-oo-deen Khán and the Mahrattas, but neither Sumroo or the Rohillas had joined him.

On the 27th, a smart skirmish took place between the Cavalry under Captain Graham and an influential Zemindar of the neighbourhood, who had collected a considerable body of horse to oppose the English. The enemy were completely defeated with heavy loss, and the Zemindar himself was killed; but the loss on the side of the English was also heavy; Tar Beg, a Russildar of the Mogul Horse, the best Cavalry officer in the service, being amongst the slain. Nudjuf Khán appears to have gone over to the enemy a short

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 476.

time before this, with his quota of 6 or 700 horse, and to have persuaded two companies of Sipahis to accompany him; but they all returned on the 30th. It appears that they surrendered themselves either through treachery or a want of ammunition, and that Sir Robert Fletcher moved to their support with 100 European Infantry, 4 Battalions of Sipahis and 4 field-pieces.* The particulars attending this desertion and return are enveloped in mystery. On the 1st of May, the following order was issued:—"The main force of the enemy, consisting only of Morattas, who are commonly more for plundering than fighting, seeking only an opportunity for falling upon the baggage and cutting to pieces the defenceless followers of the army; the General recommends it in the strongest terms to the officers to carry no more baggage than is absolutely necessary; that no soldier or seapoy shall carry their women with them, but send them over the river, where sufficient guard will be appointed for their safety."†

A. D. 1765.
3rd May.

On the following day, Sir Robert Fletcher joined the Army with his Brigade and Nudjuf Khán's recovered detachment, having had some difficulty in making his way back to the Ganges. The order of Battle was then given out, the men's arms and ammunition inspected and all prepared for action; and on the 3rd of May, the whole force advanced towards Korah, a distance of about 10 miles.‡

Sir Robert Fletcher, who commanded the advance guard, fell in with the Mahratta force in the neighbourhood of Korah, and a skirmish ensued; but a few rounds from the field-pieces speedily threw the enemy into confusion and they drew off, retreating towards Kulpee. Shoojah-oo-Dowlah finding himself thus deserted, hastened with his own troops to regain the protection of the Rohillas: he had previously pledged himself to pay the Mahrattas the sum of fifty lakhs of rupees for their assistance; but he was so disgusted with their conduct on this occasion, that he announced his intention of withholding the entire amount,—a resolution to

* Second Report, Appendix No. 84.—Malcolm's Life of Clive, vol. 2, p. 323.

† Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 476.

‡ Ibid, p. 477.—Second Report, Appendix No. 84.

A. D. 1765. which he firmly adhered, and which was a constant cause
 May. of dispute between himself and that nation for several years subsequently. The skirmish,—which occurred on the anniversary of the former repulse of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah before the entrenched camp at Patna the previous year,—was reported to the Council in Calcutta, as a considerable victory over the enemy, and was acknowledged as such.

The General, instead of pursuing the Mahrattas, prepared to follow up the diminished force of the Nawaub Vuzier, and on the 6th he encamped at Jarjhmow, near the site of the present Cantonment of Cawnpore. Here an unfortunate affair occurred, which caused the loss of several men. At a little distance from the camp, was a small ghurrie or mud fort, with a ditch and a strong wooden palisade : this was occupied by a small party of the Vuzier's troops amounting altogether to only 14 men, under a native officer. This post was so insignificant as for sometime to escape notice ; but when its existence was discovered, Capt. Swinton was sent with a detachment to take possession of it. • On arrival before the place, he sent for the native officer in command, and insisted upon an immediate surrender, to which the latter objected, except upon honourable terms. A discussion ensued, in which Captain Swinton appears to have lost his temper, and in the most culpable manner to have struck the native Commandant who was thus shamefully driven back to his post. Stung by this insult, the little party determined to sell their lives dearly and made a desperate defence. The detachment under Captain Swinton was repulsed, and he was obliged to send for a reinforcement, with a couple of six-pounders. The guns were now brought up to the gateway, which they blew open, but found the entrance barricaded within. Major Fletcher hearing the firing, now came up with Captains Goddard and Duffield's Battalions and a party of Bildars, who forced a passage across the ditch and over the walls, when the defenders having nearly all fallen, the place was taken, but with a loss in killed alone, amounting to more than double the number of the garrison.*

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 478-9.

(Shoojah-oo-Dowlah had, in the mean time, hastened to Furruckabad, then belonging to Ahmud Khán Bungush, where finding his affairs desperate, he once more turned his attention to obtaining terms.) Major Stibbert was detached on the 11th with a force, consisting of two Battalions of Sipahis, —his own, the 1st (*now the 9th N. I.*) and Captain Stables' (*the Matthews*) still under the command of Captain Nicoll, Lieutenant Eyre's Russallah of Mogul Horse, and a detail of Artillery, with 2 six-pounders, under the command of Lieutenant Collins. The duty assigned to this detachment was the reduction of the Kyrabad district, which on the departure of the British troops from Oude, had broken out into a general insurrection, headed by the principal Zumeendars of the neighbourhood, who resisted all attempts to collect the revenues. On the approach of Major Stibbert they drew their forces together under the command of Munghul Khán, the leading man in these disturbances. A short action ensued on the 2nd of June, in which the enemy were completely defeated, with very heavy loss; Munghul Khán himself with several other Zumeendars was killed. Some loss also occurred on the side of the English, but the result of this action was the complete submission of the insurgents, and the restoration of tranquillity throughout the province. This object having been thus successfully effected, Major Stibbert marched to Lucknow, where he cantoned his detachment during the rainy season.*

A. D. 1765.
May.

In the mean time Captain Douglas Hill, with his new Battalion and the detachment of recruits under his command, joined the force at Jarjhmow; and advices were received from Calcutta, that two other detachments, under Major Champion and Captain Muir, amounting together to 600 Europeans recently arrived from England, had been ordered to form a junction and march from Ghyrettie under the command of Colonel Richard Smith, accompanied by all the field and other officers available, with a view to enabling General Carnac to form a second army or division, to be stationed at Patna or on the Karumnassa, as might be found most advisable. On this point, however, the

* Caraccioli, vol. 2. p. 481.—Second Report, Appendix No. 84.

A. D. 1765. Council observe, "as we can entertain no doubt of your zeal
 May. "for the service, we will leave it to your prudence and discretion to act as circumstances may require, since we at this distance cannot possibly be judges of the exigence of affairs;" but they direct that,— "should a separate corps be judged necessary, Colonel Smith, and the field officers under him, will of course have the command. The rest will join you with all possible expedition."

Colonel Smith, having met with an accident owing to a fall from his horse, the command of this detachment was transferred to Colonel Sir Robert Barker, who marched with the party in the beginning of June, Captain Scotland's Battalion (*the present 14th Regt. N. I.*) having previously been dispatched from Calcutta to reinforce the army.

About this time, Capt. Galliez with his Battalion (*the present 1st Regt. N. I.*) appears to have had a skirmish with the enemy, in the neighbourhood of the camp, but no details of the affair are now to be traced.*

The Mahrattas, who had retreated beyond the Jumna after their check at Korah, finding they were not pursued, and attributing this to weakness, re-entered the Doab and resumed their ravages: one portion proceeding towards Allahabad, which Captain Dow who had been left in command, fully expected would be attacked, whilst the main body carried their devastations to within a few miles of the English camp at Jarjhmow. It thus became evident, that if some more effective check was not given to these active marauders, the whole country would be exposed to their depredations as soon as the English army should be obliged to go into quarters for the rainy season. It was therefore decided to follow them up, and either bring them to action, or drive them out of the province; in accordance with which determination the following order was issued on the 15th of May:—

"The Army is to be ready to march at a moment's warning, as it is not to go far, and will be in the field but a very few days, no person is to carry more baggage than is absolutely necessary."

* Second Report, Appendix No, 84.

“ Captain Hill, with the Battalion under his command, is
 “ to remain on the ground for the protection of the boats
 “ and baggage. He is to be joined by the recruits and awk-
 “ ward men, lately collected into a body under the command
 “ of Ensign Musket; the sick Europeans and Natives are
 “ also ordered to remain behind, under the care of Mr. Dunn,
 “ Surgeon.”* On the following day the Army commenced
 its march in pursuit of the enemy.

A. D. 1765.
 22nd May.

On the 3rd of May, Lord Clive arrived at Calcutta, and took his seat in Council. The news of his arrival reached camp on the 18th, on the morning of which date it was in orders that “ A salute of *twenty* guns is to be fired at
 “ one o'clock in the afternoon, on occasion of Lord Clive's
 “ arrival at Calcutta, to take on him the charge of Governor
 “ and Commander-in-Chief, &c.”†

On the 20th, the Army encamped on the banks of the Jumna opposite to Kulpee, in the vicinity of which the enemy had taken up their position. The 21st was spent in preparations for crossing the river; and on the morning of the 22nd, Sir Robert Fletcher with a strong detachment, was ferried over, and prepared to storm a mud fort on the flank of the enemy's line; this was evacuated before the troops arrived. They then pushed on to another similar post, which the enemy were leaving as they reached it. Sir Robert Fletcher ordered an immediate attack, and a spirited action ensued, during which the British field-pieces and musketry made a great slaughter amongst the enemy's ghoses of horse, whilst the bayonet drove them in rapid succession from every position they attempted to hold. The action, which was a very desultory one, lasted for upwards of an hour, and terminated in the complete defeat of the Mahrattas,—the broken nature of the ground, intersected in all directions by deep ravines, being ill adapted to the movements of Cavalry,

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 481.

† Ibid, p. 482. A salute of an even number of guns was opposed to the practice even of those days, and we have seen by a former order quoted, that the Emperor was only honoured with 19 guns. It is to be supposed that, in fixing upon this number, General Carnac was desirous to approximate the compliment to that of a Royal salute as much as possible.

A. D. 1765.
May. of which their force was almost exclusively composed, and serving materially to embarrass their retreat. Their loss on this occasion is stated to have been very heavy; but the English also suffered considerably, although the amount of the casualties is not recorded. The result of this defeat freed the Doab from any immediate prospect of attack, the enemy making the best of their way towards Gwalior.*

On the following day, orders were given out for the return of the troops in two separate divisions. Sir Robert Fletcher commanded the advance and Major Jennings the rear. The following were the orders on the occasion, dated 23rd May:—
 “ Four hundred Europeans are to march off to-morrow morn-
 “ ing, with eight pieces of cannon to follow at day-break
 “ escorted by Capt. Galliez’s battalion of Sepoys, and a
 “ Rassalla of Cavalry. The Europeans are to march off at
 “ 2 o’clock. The rest of the Army is to follow the next day,
 “ under the command of Major Jennings.”†

General Carnac marched with the advance the first day, and then proceeded to Jarjhmow by dâk. On the 30th, the whole forces had arrived at Jarjhmow, when the army was mustered and paid. Whilst the Camp was stationed at this place, a Court-Martial was held upon Captain Wm. Smith, Captain Sir Alexander MacKenzie, Lieut. Gabriel Harper, and several other officers, for insubordination; the circumstances attendant upon which, arose out of the introduction of Captain MacPherson of the Bombay Service into the Bengal Army, to the supercession of the majority of the Captains then in the field. The worst feature of this transaction was that of its being a pecuniary arrangement with Captain Witchcott, who commanded the 5th (*now the 7th*) Battalion. That officer, in consideration of a sum of 10,000 Rupees, paid him by Captain MacPherson, retired from the service on the 27th February, and Captain MacPherson having sufficient interest, got appointed, not only to his vacancy in the army as a Captain, retaining his standing in the Bombay detachment in which he had been appointed a Captain by brevet on the 2nd October 1763, but also

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 481.—Second Report, Appendix No. 84.

† Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 482.

succeeding to the command of the vacant Battalion. This proceeding created a general feeling of discontent amongst the Bengal officers, who memorialized the Council in strong terms and threatened to throw up their commissions in a body, if the order was not repealed. This feeling continued for two or three months, and at one time the most serious consequences were apprehended, and the Council were at a loss how to act. A compromise was, however, finally effected, by Captain MacPherson offering to come in as junior Captain in the army, which was agreed to, and he was permitted to retain his command of the 5th Battalion.* The officers above mentioned, who had been confined by Sir Robert Fletcher in the end of April and left in arrest at Allahabad during the recent operations, had been amongst the most conspicuous in this confederacy; but they all appear either to have been acquitted, or to have escaped with a mere reprimand, as we find them shortly afterwards performing their duties and receiving promotion.

A. D. 1765
July.

The sick and wounded Europeans and Natives, together with the heavy stores, were now sent down the river in boats to Allahabad, and the whole force was held in readiness to march in the same direction. On the 6th of June, the following order was issued:—"The Bombay detachment and the Pioneer company, Captains Grant and Ironside's battalions of seapoys, the two Rassalahs of black cavalry, and eight pieces of cannon are to march to-morrow morning at day-break to Domonpoor, from whence they are to cross the Ganges as speedily as possible: Mr. Todd, Commissary, is to dispatch down the necessary boats for that purpose."†

On the 8th, Captain Duffield's Battalion crossed the river and on the 11th and 12th, the remainder of the army was ferried over. On the 14th they commenced their march down the left bank, and on the 25th they encamped opposite to Allahabad. On the following day, the force was formed into three divisions, for the purpose of being more conveniently distributed into

* Second Report, Appendix No. 84.—Malcolm's Life of Clive, vol. 3, pp. 25-7.

† Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 482-3.

A. D. 1765.
May. cantonments during the approaching rainy season. One division crossed the river, and was stationed at Allahabad, as a garrison for that important fortress; the second and principal one marched to Juanpore, where they took up their quarters: and the third marched to Benares, where they arrived on the 4th of July.*

It is not to be supposed that operations of this active nature could have been carried on during the hottest season of the year without causing serious loss, especially in the European portion of the force. The European Battalion and the Artillery suffered heavily, but not so much at the time, as on their return to cantonment; and a number of officers appear to have sunk under the fatigues and exposure:—amongst the casualties of this period are to be traced the names of Captains-Lieutenant William Hays and Charles Jerasmall of the Artillery; Captains Henry Spelman, Thomas Bonnaker and Ross of the European Battalion; Lieutenant John Dangerfield of the Cavalry; and Lieutenants Talley and Thomas Sturges, Ensigns William James and Weston Greenwater of the Infantry generally.

It is now necessary to narrate the details attendant on the submission of Shoojah-oo-Dowlah after the defeat of the Mahrattas at Korah. He had, as already stated, retired to Furruckabad, then in the possession of Ahmud Khán Bungush. Here he found his affairs rendered desperate, owing to the coolness of the Robillahs towards his cause, who were not to be induced to maintain a campaign against the Emperor and one in which they had no personal interest, whilst their forces were required nearer home; and to the desertion of Sumroo, who, with his Brigade, had at length taken service with the Jaths, a measure which he had long been negotiating; whilst the conduct of the Mahrattas at Korah had shewn how little dependence was to be placed on their aid and support. Under these circumstances he renewed his efforts to bring about an accommodation with the English and the Emperor, through the medium of Shitab Roy and Monsieur Gentil; when ascertaining that the General and

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 162-3.—Williams, p. 57.

Council were not disinclined to come to reasonable terms, A. D. 1765.
 he made up his mind to surrender in person, and throw
 himself upon their generosity. On the 16th of May he ad-
 dressed the following letter to General Carnac:—

“ It is known all over the world, that the illustrious chiefs
 “ of the English nation are constant and unchangeable in
 “ their friendship, which my heart is fully persuaded of.
 “ The late disturbances were contrary to my inclinations; but
 “ it was so ordered by Providence. I now see things in a pro-
 “ per light, and have a strong desire to come to you: and I
 “ am persuaded you will treat me in a manner befitting your
 “ own honour. You have shewn great favours to others;
 “ when you become acquainted with me, you will see with
 “ your own eyes, and be thoroughly sensible of my attach-
 “ ment, from which I will never depart while I have life.
 “ I am this day, 26th of the moon, arrived at Belgram;
 “ please God, in a very short time I shall have the happiness
 “ of a meeting with you. As for other particulars I refer
 “ you to Monyr-o-Dowlah, and Rajah Shitab Roy.

“ *With his own hand.*

“ MY FRIEND,—I regard not wealth, nor the government
 “ of countries; your favour and friendship is all I desire.
 “ Please God I will be with you very soon, when you will do
 “ for me what you think best.”*

This was received on the 19th of May, and on the 24th the
 General returned the following answer:—

“ I have been favoured with your letter, in which were
 “ some lines wrote with your own hand, declaring your inten-
 “ tions of coming to me; that you was arrived at Belgram,
 “ and expect such a reception as becomes a brave man to
 “ give; and that I will be sensible of the warmth and sincerity
 “ of your friendship, after we become acquainted; and that
 “ you do not look for country nor wealth, but the friendship
 “ of the English nation; and that please God, you will be
 “ very soon with me.

“ The receipt of this letter gave me great pleasure: You

* Second Report, Appendix No. 84.

A. D. 1765. " was before unacquainted with our customs and dispositions ;
 May. " thanks be to God that you are now become sensible of the
 " justice and upright intentions of the English. Now that
 " you are pleased to come to me in a friendly manner, you
 " may depend on the best reception in my power, suitable
 " to our customs : and I will not be deficient in forwarding
 " whatever is reasonable for your interest ; and when your
 " excellency shall shew a real attachment to the English,
 " their friendship towards you in return will be made manifest
 " to the whole world : You may with perfect confidence come
 " here as to your own house, and to those that wish your
 " welfare ; further particulars you will learn from Monyr-o-
 " Dowlah, and Shitab Roy."*

On the 26th of May, the General received intimation that Shoojah-oo-Dowlah was close at hand, and immediately made preparation for his reception ; Captain Swinton and Rajah Shitab Roy were sent to meet him ; and he crossed the Ganges in the afternoon, accompanied by his brother-in-law Salar Jung, a few of his principal officers, and about 400 Household Cavalry ; General Carnac, attended by his staff and the several Commanding Officers, proceeded to the banks of the river to receive him. Here they all dismounted from their horses, and the Nawaub Vuzier alighting from his palkee, embraced the General, who with his officers, met him with every mark of respect, and presented him each with a nuzzur, according to their rank. He was then conducted to a tent prepared for him in camp, where an entertainment was awaiting him, of which he partook ; and after resting himself for two or three hours, returned to his own camp, which had been pitched at the distance of four or five miles from the force.† General Carnac reported the Nawaub Vuzier's arrival to the Governor and Council, and applied for instructions as to the course to be pursued, and the nature of the terms to be entered into.

The Governor and Council expressed great satisfaction at the event and the prospect it afforded of establishing

* Second Report, Appendix No. 84. † Ibid.—Seir Mutakherin, vol. 2, p. 369-70.

permanant tranquillity, and highly approved of the manner in which the Vuzier had been received and treated, enjoined respect and liberality towards him, and directed the General to hold out every prospect of restoration to his dominions upon easy terms. They also, at the same time, authorized him to adjust certain preliminary articles, to serve as an outline for a treaty to be finally concluded ; but distinctly forbade him to come to any definite settlement until the arrival of Lord Clive in camp, who was to leave Calcutta in a few days. The General accordingly acted upon these instructions, and as it was an object of importance to bring about a reconciliation between the Emperor and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, a meeting took place at Manickpore, whither the General and the Nawaub Vuzier proceeded in advance of the Army, and where the Emperor, who had come from Allahabad, awaited them. Matters being amicably arranged, they marched from thence, with the force to Allahabad, where they all fixed their residence, pending intelligence regarding the approach of Lord Clive.

A. D. 1765.
May.

It is now necessary to return to the state of affairs in Calcutta at the period of that Nobleman's arrival in Bengal, which, as already stated, occurred on the 3rd of May. His Lordship was not only accompanied by his colleagues, Messrs. Sumner and Sykes, but by a number of officers, who had been appointed from England by the Court, or brought on by himself from the Cape, to fill up the vacancies which would necessarily be caused by remodelling the Military Establishment, a measure which the Directors had authorized, and for which he had given in a plan previous to leaving England ; the main features of this plan were approved by the Court, but the details modified to a certain extent ; a discretionary power being vested in Lord Clive to make his arrangements according to circumstances. Amongst these officers were Lieutenant-Colonels Richard Smith and Sir Robert Barker,—the latter of whom had long served the Company's Artillery, and greatly distinguished himself during the siege of Madras ;—Majors Peach and Chapman, with several Captains and Sabalterns, some of whom belong-

A. D. 1765. ed to Lord Clive's Staff. Several other Captains and Subalterns
 May. with a number of recruits, had already arrived, and more were on their way. It had been decided by the Court of Directors that the European portion of the force should be broken into three Regiments, the commands of which were to be given to Brigadier General Carnac, Colonel Smith, and Major Knox, [of whose death the Court had not at the time received intelligence,] who was to have been promoted to the rank of Colonel. Sir Robert Barker was to have been appointed Colonel Commandant of Artillery.

Having taken the necessary oaths and been installed as Governor, Lord Clive's first act was to assign rank to these officers, which he did on the 6th of May, and accordingly Brigadier General Carnac was appointed Colonel of Infantry and Commander-in-Chief. The European Infantry was ordered to be divided into three Regiments as soon as circumstances would admit of the arrangement. Lieutenant-Colonels Richard Smith and Sir Robert Barker were nominated to the two remaining Colonelcies of Infantry, the latter in the room of Major Knox; Sir R. Fletcher, Major Peach, and Major Chapman, were promoted to the three Lieutenant-Colonelcies; and Majors Champion and Stibbert to be Majors, the third Majority being left open, to enable General Carnac to nominate an officer for that situation from amongst the Captains serving under him. Major Jennings was confirmed in the command of the Artillery, with the rank he already held. Major Champion appealed against his supercession by Major Chapman, who had been brought round from the Cape without any appointment from home, and Lord Clive stated that he would refer the question to the Court for their decision, with which Major Champion was satisfied. It may be as well to mention here, that Captain Hugh Grant, the senior Captain in the service, was appointed to the third Majority, his commission bearing date from the 27th of May.*

But Lord Clive had more important duties to perform than conferring commissions; he quickly detected the system of cor-

* Second Report, Appendix No. 84.—Malcolm's Life of Clive, vol. 2, p. 320.—General Military Register.

ruption pervading the whole of the Company's Civil govern- A. D. 1765.
ment and service, and boldly determined to give it an effectual June.
check, although perfectly aware of the enmity and obloquy he should excite by so doing. The authority and privileges of the Select Committee had been granted by the Court, under an impression that the new Governor would find the country in a state of active warfare, and were expressly conferred with the understanding that they were only to be employed in cases of emergency; but the state of corruption then prevalent, he considered fully to call for and warrant their exercise; and accordingly, although General Carnac was in the field and Mr. Verelst had not arrived from Chittagong, where he had been for some time employed, Lord Clive at once exhibited his authority, and convened the Committee, consisting of himself as President, and Messrs. Sykes and Sumner as Members. The Members of Council, headed by Mr. Johnstone, opposed this measure, and appeared inclined to dispute their powers, and exhibit the same factious opposition that they had too successfully manifested towards Mr. Vansittart; but they soon found they had a very different character to deal with.

In a purely military history like this, it would be irrelevant to enter into the extraordinary disputes that marked the commencement of Lord Clive's administration; suffice it to say, that he openly arraigned the conduct of the members of Council in the late transactions relative to the appointment of Nudjm-oo-Dowlah to the musnud, and the receipt of presents; and although boldly and ably opposed by Mr. Johnstone, the result was the resignation of that gentleman, as also of Messrs. Burdett, Gray, and Pleydell, and the suspension of Mr. Leycester; while Mr. Billars, the chief of Patna, who had been accused of serious malversation, committed suicide. The vacancies caused in the Council by these arrangements, were filled up by Messrs. Russell, Aldersly, Kelsall, and Floyer, gentlemen of character and ability on the Madras Establishment, for whose services Lord Clive applied to that Presidency. This proceeding greatly enhanced the annoyance and dislike felt towards him by the Civil servants in Bengal. [He also directed

A. D. 1765, and enforced the signature of formal Covenants by all members of the Civil service, binding themselves not to accept presents or pecuniary rewards from any native authorities, a measure which was most unpalatable to the whole service, but which was strongly dwelt upon by the Court as affording the only security against the abuse in this respect, so generally prevalent. These Covenants were first signed by the Governor and members of Council, and then by all the servants, Civil and Military, at the Presidency; whilst blank forms were sent to all those at the out-stations and to General Carnac, for the signature of all the officers with the Army. The General however delayed distributing these until Lord Clive's arrival in camp.

Matters being placed on a more satisfactory footing at the Presidency, Lord Clive left Calcutta for camp, on the 25th of June, to arrange the terms of treaty with Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, and to carry out the changes and reforms in the organization of the Army, which had been sanctioned by the Court of Directors. On his way up the country, he stopped at Moorshedabad and Patna, where all he saw and heard led him to infer that the Military were nearly as deeply involved in luxury, if not in corruption, as the Civilians. In a letter to Mr. Sykes, dated the 29th of June, he observes, "I fear the Military as well as Civil are so far gone in luxury and debauchery, that it will require the utmost exertion of an united Committee to save the Company from destruction. However, let us appeal to the rectitude of our intentions, and we shall be enabled to complete the arduous undertaking with great satisfaction and honour to ourselves."

Hearing of Lord Clive's near approach, General Carnac, with the Emperor and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, came down by water from Allahabad to Benares to meet him, where they arrived on the 21st of July, and were received at the Ghaut by Major Jennings, who commanded there, with all the European troops and a Battalion of Sipahis. Shortly after-

wards the following order was issued, relative to the compliments to be paid to the Magnates then, and about to be, assembled: "All guards are to turn out to Major-General Lord Clive as often as he passes; they are to rest to him and beat a march, and the officers are to salute. All guards that mount with the colours of a Regiment or Battalion are to salute his Lordship with the colours. Brigadier General Carnac, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, is to be received with rested arms, and the drums to beat a ruffle. In the absence of Lord Clive, he is to be received with the same honour (the salute of colours excepted.) Colonels when not Commanding-in-Chief, are to be received with rested arms, and two ruffles. Lieutenant Colonels are to be received once a day with rested arms. Majors are to receive the compliment of shouldered arms. General officers' guards, are not to turn out or pay compliments to inferior officers.

A. D. 1765.
August.

"When the King passes any guard, he is to receive the same honour as Lord Clive. All guards are to turn out to the Nabob Sujah-al-Dowlah, and pay him as often as he passes the same honours as Lord Clive (the salute of the colours only excepted.) Copies of these regulations are to be sent to the commanding officers at Joanpore, Patna, and all the subordinate settlements."*

Lord Clive reached Benares on the 1st of August, and was received with a salute of 19 guns, all the troops at the Station being drawn out. From the parade he was escorted by Captain Scotland's Battalion, which had lately arrived, to Mr. Marriot's house, where a guard of honour, consisting of a Company of European Infantry, awaited him. Here he took up his quarters during his stay at Benares. On the following day, all the officers assembled at the quarters of Major Jennings, to be introduced to his Lordship. No time was lost in directing the execution of the Covenants ordered by the Court, to which effect the following order was issued by Lord Clive on the 3rd of August:—

"A General Court of Proprietors having resolved that

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, pp. 483-4.

A. D. 1765. " certain Covenants should be executed by all officers in their
 August. " service, and the Governor and Council having received the
 " strictest injunctions from the Court of Directors to put the
 " resolution of the said General Court in execution immedi-
 " ately, in obedience to their commands, it is hereby ordered
 " that the said Covenants be immediately executed."*

On the 7th of the month, all the officers at the station were directed to attend at Captain William Smith's quarters, in order to sign the Covenants ; and the necessary copies were sent to Chunar, Juanpore, Allahabad, Lucknow, and other stations, for the signature of the officers at those places. Although General Carnac exerted himself to secure the signature of all the officers of the force, he privately objected to sign the deed himself, on the plea that it was dated some months previous to the time when it was received, which pitiful evasion did not prevent him signing it a few weeks after, when he returned to Calcutta ;—but in the interval he had received two lakhs of rupees from the powerless and impoverished Emperor.†

In the mean time, the terms of the proposed treaty with the Nawaub Vuzier were carefully discussed ; and the better

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 485.

† Professor Wilson, in his edition of Mills' History of India, attempts to defend, or at least to extenuate, this conduct.

He observes—" General Carnac's objection to sign the Covenant was perfectly reasonable," because he had received 70,000 Rs. between the date affixed to the Covenant and that when he was requested to sign it. Surely he might have inserted the actual date, or which would have been more in accordance with a sense of propriety and his knowledge of the views and wishes of the Court, he might have removed the stumbling-block, by restoring the amount.

But whatever may be the value of the plea, it did not restrain him from signing it in Calcutta shortly afterwards, though he had, in direct opposition to the orders of his employers, added so much strength to the objection.

General Carnac, in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, stated, that he considered himself equally bound by the Covenant whether he signed it or not ; and yet, under this impression of his obligation, he received two lakhs of rupees.

True, there was an affectation of coyness in its receipt, and the sanction of the Court was subsequently obtained ; but this was chiefly through the interest of Lord Clive, when General Carnac had returned to England a wealthy man, and had himself become a large proprietor of India stock, and consequently exercised considerable influence on the Court's decision.

The offence was rank, and will not admit of extenuation.

to accommodate matters with the Emperor,—Lord Clive, the General, and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, proceeded without delay to Allahabad. The Select Committee had furnished Lord Clive with a letter of instructions, as to the course they considered should be adopted, of which the following is an extract:—

A. D. 1765.
July.

“ Experience having shewn that an influence maintained by force of arms is destructive of that commercial spirit which we ought to promote, ruinous to the Company, and oppressive to the country, we earnestly recommend to your Lordship, to exert your utmost endeavours to conciliate the affections of the country powers, to remove the jealousy they may have conceived of our ambition, and to convince them, that we aim not at conquest and dominion, but security in carrying on a free trade, equally beneficial to them and to us.

“ With this view, policy requires that our demands be moderate and equitable, and that we avoid every appearance of an inclination to enlarge our territorial possessions. The sacrifice of conquests, which we must hold on a precarious tenure, and at an expence more than equivalent to their revenues, is of little consequence to us; yet will such restitution impress them with a high opinion of our generosity and justice.

“ For these reasons, we think, Shuja Dowlah should be reinstated in the full possession of all his dominions, with such limitations only as he must see are evidently calculated for our mutual benefit, the good of his country, and happiness of his people. We would decline insisting upon any terms that must prove irksome to his high spirit, and imply our suspicion of his sincerity. Retaining possession of any of his strongholds, may be deemed a necessary pledge of his fidelity: for our parts, we would rather consider it as the source of future contention, and an unnecessary burthen to the Company, unless it be proposed one day to resume the thoughts of extending their dominions, —a measure very opposite to the sentiments in which we left the Proprietors and Court of Directors.”*

* Second Report, Appendix No. 84.

A. D. 1765. The result was that Lord Clive proposed to restore Shoojah-oo-Dowlah to all his dominions, with the exception to the fortress of Chunâr, which was retained by the English; and the provinces of Korah and Allahabad, in the lower Doab, which were to be ceded to the Emperor;—a British force to be stationed at Allahabad for the protection of the Emperor, if required. That Bulwunt Singh, who had submitted to the English, and been taken under their protection, should retain the Zumeendarree of the districts of Ghazeepore and Benares, subordinate to the Nawaub Vuzier, on the same terms on which he held them before the war; that a treaty of mutual support in case of attack should be formed between the Nawaub Vuzier, the Nawaub Nazim of Bengal, and the English Company; and in the event of the troops of the latter being required by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah for the defence of his country, that he should bear all expenses attendant upon their employment. That Shoojah-oo-Dowlah should pay the Company fifty lakhs of rupees to cover the expenses of the recent war; that he should engage never to employ or afford protection to Meer Kossim Khán or Sumroo; and that he should permit the Company to trade duty free throughout his dominions, and to establish factories in such places as they considered advisable and convenient.

To all these points Shoojah-oo-Dowlah readily acceded, except to the latter clause regarding the establishment of factories, against which he protested in the strongest terms. He had witnessed the evils and abuses of these establishments in the provinces of Behar and Bengal, particularly with regard to the protection and assistance afforded to those engaged in the inland trade, and the extortionate and tyrannical conduct of many of the individuals in charge. He frankly stated that were he to permit their establishment in his dominions, he could only consider it as laying the foundation of a future rupture, and affording the certain material for an early and serious collision. Observing his feelings so strong on this subject, Lord Clive agreed to concede the point, and to omit all mention of the word *factories*. The other articles being mutually agreed to, a treaty framed on that basis was formally signed on the 16th of August, by the contracting parties

present, and by the agents appointed on the part of Nudjm-oo-Dowlah.* A. D. 1765.
August.

As regarded the Emperor, who was thus somewhat unceremoniously deprived of the Vuzier's dominions, which had been originally conferred upon him,—but which it was sufficiently evident he was perfectly unable to govern or maintain, he—as already stated,—was placed in possession of the provinces of Korah and Allahabad, the revenues of which were estimated at twenty-eight lakhs of rupees yearly, with the support of an English force for their defence, as long as such should be necessary. He was further guaranteed the regular payment, by monthly instalments, of the sum of twenty-six lakhs of rupees per annum, to be paid out of the revenues of Bengal and Orissa, from which he bound himself to pay annually two lakhs of rupees to Nudjuf Khán. In return for these advantages, which placed him in a far more comfortable position than he had ever previously occupied, he granted firmáns, confirming the English in all the possessions they held in his territories, including Lady Clive's Jagheer,—which after much dispute, had been transferred by his Lordship to the Company, on condition of their granting to him or his heirs, the amount of the revenue for a period of 10 years. The Emperor also conferred on the Company the most important grant they ever received, the Dewánnee of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, or in other words, the total revenue proceeds of those provinces, after deducting the twenty-six lakhs of rupees payable to the Emperor, the expenses of the Nizamut or Civil Government, including the support of the Nawaub Nazim, and the military expenses, which already fell upon them entirely. These important documents were duly signed, sealed, and delivered at Allahabad on the 12th of August, 1765.† The annual allowance to be granted to the Nawaub Nazim for his expenses, was, by a separate treaty, fixed at fifty lakhs of rupees.

The receipt of the Dewánnee, which completely changed the position of the Company in India, has been brought

* For the Treaty itself, vide Appendix X.

† For the Treaty with the Emperor and the Firmáns conferring the Dewannee on the Company, vide Appendix Y.

A. D. 1765. forward as matter of accusation against Lord Clive, more
August. particularly as he is stated to have determined upon it on his arrival at Madras, during his passage out. That he did so is not only probable but very natural, and may be considered highly creditable to his judgment. It must not be forgotten that the offer was by no means unexpected or unprecedented; it had been formally tendered by the Emperor as far back as 1761, and again in 1764, on several occasions. It is true that in the first instance, the Court of Directors had approved of its refusal by the local Government, but circumstances had greatly changed since that time. The whole actual control of the provinces had devolved upon the British; it had become evident that by their large Military force, it could alone be maintained; the Nawaub Nazim had gradually sunk into a cypher in the great account; it was only subjecting the inhabitants to a double set of receivers and increased oppression, to leave the revenues to be collected by the Durbar, for the use of the Company. On an impartial review of the whole transaction, it may safely be pronounced the most prudent, just, and—as regarded the inhabitants of the country,—the most humane measure that could have been adopted. It has also been urged against the illustrious nobleman, in whom the measure originated, that having decided upon it, he sent orders to invest the whole of his property in the Company's stock; but this only proves his strong conviction of the wisdom and advantages of the proceeding; and as the Company's stock was open to all the world, there was no reason that he should debar himself from sharing in the expected benefits to accrue to it.

These important matters being decided upon, Lord Clive returned to Benares, where he arrived on the 23rd of August, accompanied by General Carnac and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah. The Emperor remained at Allahabad in the enjoyment of his new possessions; and Colonel Richard Smith was left in command of the troops to be stationed there for his protection, the defence of that fortress and that of the adjacent provinces.

Before leaving Benares for Allahabad to adjust the treaties

concluded there, Lord Clive carried into effect the arrangements for the new organization of the Army. On the 5th of August 1765, an order was issued, forming the whole force into three separate Brigades, of similar strength and composition. As previously mentioned, orders had been issued in the month of May, for dividing the Europeans into three Regiments, but these do not appear to have been carried into effect until now. A large body of recruits arrived very opportunely about this time, raised by six Captains who had been appointed to the Company's Army the previous year, and who were authorised by the Court of Directors to enlist men, to the extent of 200 each; which number they appear to have fully completed.

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August.

The Artillery, which consisted of three Companies of unequal strength, was ordered to be reformed into 4 Companies of similar strength and composition;—a considerable increase had recently been made to the numerical strength of this arm also, by the arrival in June, of Captain Nathaniel Kindersley, with a body of recruits, nearly equal to the strength of a Company, with non-commissioned officers attached. This Officer was a Lieutenant in the Royal Artillery, and obtained a Captain's commission in Bengal for this service.

Two additional Battalions of Sipahis were also ordered to be raised, completing the total number to twenty-one.

The Company of Pioneers and the Troop of European Cavalry, which latter was a most expensive establishment, whilst it was too small to be of any commensurate advantage, were broken up, and the men composing them transferred to the European Infantry and Artillery. A small Body Guard was, however, maintained for the Governor General.

The Mogul Horse were reduced to three Russallahs, each under the command of a Subaltern officer.

Each Brigade was now ordered to consist of one Company of Artillery, one Regiment of European Infantry, one Russallah of Native Cavalry, and seven Battalions of Sipahis; the remaining Company of Artillery being reserved for the duties of Fort William and the Redoubts which had been

A. D. 1765. August. constructed on the banks of the river at Fulta and Budge Budge. The first Brigade was stationed at Mongheer, furnishing the requisite details for the Presidency and Moorshedabad; the second Brigade was stationed at Allahabad; and the third Brigade at Patna, or rather at Bankypore, in the immediate vicinity, which was made the head-quarters. Although the greater portion of each Brigade was concentrated at these head-quarters, they furnished the necessary details for the several outposts, as Lucknow, Juanpore, Chunar, Benares, Midnapore, Chittagong, &c.]

The Colonels of the several European Regiments commanded the Brigades to which they were attached. Brigadier General Carnac accordingly commanded the 1st; Colonel Richard Smith the 2nd; and Colonel Sir Robert Barker the 3rd. As General Carnac's situation, as Commander-in-Chief and member of the Select Committee, required his constant presence at the Presidency, the charge of his Brigade devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher.

By this new organization, each Regiment of European Infantry was constituted of the following strength:—

1 Colonel, commanding the whole Brigade.	
1 Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding the Regiment.	
1 Major.	36 Serjeants.
6 Captains.	36 Corporals.
1 Captain Lieutenant.	27 Drummers.
9 Lieutenants.	630 Privates.
18 Ensigns.	

Each Regiment consisting of 9 Companies, and each Company of 1 Field Officer or Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 2 Ensigns, 4 Serjeants, 4 Corporals, 3 Drummers, and 70 Privates. All the Field Officers held Companies; but the Colonel not doing duty with the Regiment, the Captain Lieutenant had the charge of his Company; the Lieutenant-Colonel and Major commanded their own Companies, except on parades.

The Effective-Staff of a Regiment consisted of 1 Surgeon, 3 Surgeon's Mates, 1 Adjutant and 1 Quarter Master, 1 Ser-

jeant-Major and 1 Quarter-Master Serjeant; the Non-Effective Staff of 1 Drill Serjeant, 1 Drill Corporal, 1 Drum-Major, 1 Fife-Major, 9 Pay Serjeants (1 to each Company), and 9 Camp Colourmen, when marching, or on service. A. D. 1765.
August.

The Artillery, consisting of 4 Companies, was under the general command of a Field-Officer, Major Jennings, who however was allowed to retain the special command of his own, or the 1st Company, of which he had so long held the charge:—

[Each Company was composed of 102 men, exclusive of officers] divided as follows:—

1 Captain.	4 Corporals.
1 Captain-Lieutenant.	2 Drummers.
1 First Lieutenant.	2 Fifers.
1 Second Lieutenant.	10 Bombardiers.
3 Lieutenant Fireworkers.	20 Gunners.
4 Serjeants.	60 Matrosses.

The Effective Staff of each Company consisted of 1 Adjutant, 1 Quarter-Master, 1 Surgeon's Mate, 1 Deputy Commissary and 2 Conductors; the Non-Effective Staff of 1 Serjeant-Major, 1 Quarter-Master Serjeant, 1 Pay Serjeant, 1 Drill Serjeant, 1 Park Serjeant, with 3 Camp Colourmen, a Bullock Serjeant, and an Overseer of Bildars, in time of service, or on the line of march.

To each Company of Artillery, a large but indefinite number of Lascars was attached, to assist in working the guns belonging to the Company, and the field-pieces attached to each Battalion of Sipahis, which consisted generally of 2 three-pounders.

A couple of European Artillerymen, belonging to the Company, were also attached to these Battalion gun details.

The Ordnance with the Company appears to have consisted of 6 light six-pounders and two Howitzers, forming a Battery, or Field train it was then termed, of eight pieces.

Heavy guns and mortars were to be supplied from the Magazines established at the Head-quarters of each Brigade, to such extent as might be required for any particular service,

A. D. 1765. and available in store. The Governor General's European
August. Body Guard consisted of

1 Subaltern Commanding.	2 Corporals.
2 Serjeants.	2 Trumpeters.
20 Troopers.	

The Native Cavalry, consisted of 3 Russallahs or Troops, and each Troop was composed of—

1 European Subaltern in command.	3 Jemadars.
1 Serjeant Major.	2 Naggars.
4 Serjeants.	6 Duffadars.
1 Russaldar.	100 Privates.

The Sipahi Battalions, of which 7 were attached to each Brigade, were composed of 10 Companies each, of which 2 were Grenadier and 8 Battalion Companies.

The establishment of a Battalion was increased from 2 to Subalterns, and consisted of—

1 Captain.	30 Jemadars.
2 Lieutenants.	1 Native Adjutant.
2 Ensigns.	10 Trumpeters.
3 Serjeants.	30 Tom Toms.
3 Drummers.	80 Havildars.
1 Native Commandant.	50 Naicks.
10 Subadars.	690 Privates.

The Non-Effective Staff consisted of 1 Colour Havildar and 1 Pay Havildar, to each Company; 3 Native Doctors were also attached to each Battalion.

The Effective Staff to the whole of the Sipahis of a Brigade consisted of 1 European Adjutant, 1 European Quarter Master, 1 Surgeon, and 2 Surgeon's Mates.

The Staff of each entire Brigade was fixed at 1 Brigade Major, 1 Aid-de-camp to the Colonel, 1 Deputy Judge Advocate, and 1 Surgeon Major.

The Staff of the Army was fixed at 1 Persian Interpreter to the Commander-in-Chief, 1 Secretary, 2 Aides-de-Camp, 1 Quarter Master General, 1 Surgeon General, 1 Town Major of Fort William, 1 Barrack Master of ditto, 1 Fort Adju-

tant of ditto, and 1 Provost and Baggage Master, when the Army was in the Field. A. D. 1765.
August.

The following was the distribution and composition of three Brigades, as far as can be ascertained :—

1st Brigade, Head Quarters, Mongheer.

Brigadier General John Carnac, Colonel, Commander-in-Chief.

Sir Robert Fletcher, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding the Brigade.

Alexander Champion, Major, Commanding the Regiment.

EUROPEAN TROOPS.

1st European Regiment, Major Champion, Commanding.

1st Company of Artillery, Major William Jennings, Commanding.

SIPAHI BATTALIONS.

2nd Battalion (now 2nd N. I.) Capt. Christian Fischer.

3rd „ (now 5th N. I.) Capt. Arthur Ahmuty.

4th „ (now 6th N. I.) Capt. Robert Campbell.

5th „ (now 7th N. I.) Capt. William McPherson.

10th „ (now 11th N. I.) Capt. Gilbert Ironside.

13th „ (now 3rd N. I.) Capt. Benjamin Wilding.

17th „ (now 13th N. I.) Capt. Thomas Goddard.

1st Russalah of Cavalry, Lieutenant James Skinner.

STAFF.

Henry Beavan, Brigade Major.

James Dufbar, Aid-de-camp.

Lieutenant John Petrie, Adjutant of the Regiment.

Ensign George Pogan, Quarter Master of the Regiment.

Lieutenant Robert Kyd, Adjutant of the Sipahis.

Ensign W. Patton, Quarter Master of the Sipahis.

2nd Brigade, Head Quarters, Allahabad.

Richard Smith, Colonel, Commanding the Brigade.

Joseph Peach, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding the Regiment.

Giles Stibbert, Major.

EUROPEAN TROOPS.

2nd European Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Peach, Commanding.

A. D. 1765. 2nd Company of Artillery, Captain Ralph Winwood, Com-
August. manding.

SIPAHI BATTALIONS.

1st Battalion, (now 9th N. I.) Capt. A. F. Achmuty.
7th „ (not existing) Capt. Lewis Brown.
8th „ (now 8th N. I.) Capt. William Smith.
15th „ (not existing) Capt. James Nicoll.
16th „ (now 14th N. I.) Capt. James Scotland.
18th „ (now 13th N. I.) Capt. Alexander Dow.
20th „ (now 16th N. I.) Ordered to be raised.
2nd Russallah of Cavalry, Lieutenant George Bolton Eyres.

STAFF.

Lieutenant Gabriel Harper, Brigade Major.
Lieutenant Thomas Smith, Aid-de-camp.
Ensign Joseph Peake, Adjutant of the Regiment.
———, Quarter Master of the Regiment.
Lieutenant William Virtue, Adjutant of the Sipahis.
———, Quarter Master of the Sipahis.

3rd Brigade, Head Quarters, Bankypore.

Sir Robert Barker, Colonel, Commanding the Brigade.
Charles Chapman, Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding the
Regiment.
Hugh Grant, Major.

EUROPEAN TROOPS.

3rd European Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman,
Commanding.
4th Company of Artillery, Captain Nathaniel Kindersley,
Commanding.

SIPAHI BATTALIONS.

6th Battalion, (now 10th N. I.) Capt. Vernon Duffield.
9th „ (now 1st N. I.) Capt. Primrose Galliez.
11th „ (not existing) Capt. James Morgan.
12th „ (now 12th N. I.) Capt. John White.
14th „ (now 4th N. I.) Capt. Samuel Hampton.
19th „ (not existing) Capt. Douglas Hill.
21st „ (now 17th N. I.) Ordered to be raised.
3rd Russallah of Cavalry, Lieutenant John Mair.

STAFF.

A. D. 1765.
August.

_____, Brigade Major.

_____, Aid-de-Camp.

Ensign William Davis, Adjutant of the Regiment.

_____, Quarter Master of the Regiment.

Ensign F. Robertson, Adjutant of the Sipahis.

_____, Quarter Master of the Sipahis.

GARRISON OF FORT WILLIAM.

3rd Company of Artillery, Captain Fleming Martin.

GENERAL STAFF.

Captain Archibald Swinton, Persian Interpreter.

Captain Thomas Pearson, Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain F. T. Smith, Aid-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain Scipio Carnac, Aid-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain Henry Watson, Quarter Master General.

Captain John Stables, Town Major.

Lieutenant John Margrom, Fort Adjutant.

The Corps of Engineers had been fixed by an order of the 22nd October 1764, at the following establishment:—

One Chief Engineer to rank as Captain.

Two Sub-Directors to rank as Captain Lieutenants.

Four Sub-Engineers to rank as Lieutenants.

Six Practitioner Engineers to rank as Ensigns.

Captain Fleming Martin had been sent out by the Court of Directors as Chief Engineer, when he was at once employed on the buildings of Fort William, and to increase his emoluments received, as already mentioned, the command and allowances of a Company of Artillery. In 1765, when the Army was remodelled, Captain Du Gloss who commanded the Pioneer Company, was thrown back upon this Corps; but though a senior officer to Captain Martin, and one who had seen much service, the latter still retained the situation

A. D. 1765. of Chief Engineer, having received that appointment direct
 August from the Court. He also retained his Company of Artillery
 until his appointment to Majority in the following year.
 At this period the Corps appears to have been composed
 as follows:—

- Captain Fleming Martin, Chief Engineer.
- „ Lewis Du Gloss, Director.
- Captain-Lieut. Anthony Polier, Sub-Director.
- „ John Adams, ditto.
- Lieutenant James Rennell, Sub-Engineer.
- „ John Cameron, ditto.
- „ John Fortnam, ditto.
- „ Lewis Mestayer, ditto.
- Ensign James Hailes, Practitioner Engineer.
- „ Charles Lackham, ditto.
- „ Charles Collins, ditto.
- 3 Practitioner Engineers wanting to complete. J

Such, as far as can be traced at this distance of time, was the constitution of the Bengal Army at the period under review. In a very short time, the number of the Staff appointments gradually increased, but the above appears to contain all that were allowed on the original organization. It will be observed that the proportion of European officers, except to the Sipahi Battalions, was very much more liberal than in the present day; and it is most important to remember, that every officer on the list was effective, all officers on other than regimental employ, being immediately struck off the rolls of the Corps, although,—as [there was but one general roster for promotion in the whole Infantry]—no loss in that respect was sustained thereby. [The Artillery and Engineers rose in a separate body, and were frequently transferred from one to the other; but the promotion in the former Corps was exceedingly slow, a point noticed on several occasions both by the Local Government and the Court of Directors; and in consequence Brevet rank was occasionally bestowed, or a transfer to the Infantry sanctioned, to make up

in some measure for the constant supercession experienced by the officers of this branch.] A. D. 1765.
August.

The composition, equipment, pay, and internal economy of the Army at this period, will be treated of more at length in a separate chapter.

Scarcely were the orders issued for the organization and distribution of the army as above detailed, when the Imperial grant of the Dewannee rendered some change in the force necessary. Three of the regular Sipahi Battalions were ordered to be transferred to the Revenue Department, for the better protection of the detached districts, and the collection of the revenues. One Battalion was taken from each Brigade, and the selection appears to have been made with reference to the localities at which they were stationed at the time. From the 1st Brigade, the Corps selected was the 2nd Battalion, (*the present 2d Grenadiers,*) which was stationed at Moorshedabad. The 7th Battalion, under Captain Brown, was the one transferred from the 2nd Brigade, being then stationed at Chittagong, where it had been raised; and from the 3rd Brigade, the 14th Battalion (*now the 4th N. I.*) was the Corps selected, which was still stationed at Midnapore under Captain Hampton. Though these Corps were placed under civil authority for a specific purpose, and their expenses charged to the Revenue Department, they were still borne on the strength of their respective Brigades, retained their numbers, and suffered no change in their equipment or organization.†

The number of Europeans available, fell very far short of what was required for the three Corps of Infantry. The 1st and 2nd Regiments, however, were tolerably complete, especially the latter, which,—being stationed on the frontier, where hostilities with the Mahrattas were deemed probable,—was considered of the greatest importance. The 3rd Regiment

* The details of this organization have been chiefly obtained from Caraccioli, vol. 2.—Williams.—Malcolm's Life of Clive, vol. 3.—Kindersley's Letters, pp. 208-10.—Second Report of the Select Committee;—and Ninth Report of the Secret Committee.

† Williams, pp. 9, 14, 75, and 77.—Ninth Report, p. 539.

A. D. 1765. was, in consequence, left very weak, and composed almost
August exclusively of recruits.

On the 24th August 1765, the following order was issued, incorporating the Bombay Detachment in the Bengal Army :—

“ His Lordship has directed that all the non-commissioned officers and private men, both Artillery and Military, of the Bombay detachment, are to be immediately incorporated on this establishment, and such of their officers who can obtain permission from Brigadier General Carnac, Commanding Officer of the Army, shall be received as youngest of the rank they now possess.”*

The European portion of the force was incorporated accordingly; the Topasses were sent back to Bombay, but what became of the Sipahis does not appear; they were probably incorporated in the two new Battalions ordered to be raised. Of the officers, Major Pemble came in as a Brevet Major, but was subsequently re-transferred to Bombay as a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1767. Captain Edward Hamilton joined as Captain, but resigned shortly afterward; Captain MacPherson had already been brought on the strength; of the Subalterns no trace can be discovered.

These arrangements being completed, Lord Clive and General Carnac left Benares; and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah having taken leave of them, made a tour through his recovered dominions, to show himself to his subjects, and make all necessary arrangements; and on the 9th of September, he arrived at Lucknow, where Major Stibbert was still stationed with his detachment. Their presence, however, being now no longer required, the Major took his leave of the Nawaub Vuzier on the 14th of the month, and on the 16th marched with the Artillery and Cavalry details, and his own old Battalion, to join the Head Quarters of the Brigade at Allahabad; Captain Nicoll being left with the *Mathews'*

* Caraccioli, vol. 2, p. 488.—The mention of the Artillery would appear to be an error, as the whole of that arm had been sent round to Madras; vide pp. 409-10.

Battalion, at Shoojah-oo-Dowlah's request, to serve as a Body Guard. A. D. 1765
September.

A detail of the European Regiment and a Battalion of Sipahis appears to have been stationed at the Presidency, and the same at Moorshedabad, or rather Moradbaugh, close to that city; these belonged to the 1st Brigade. The 2nd Brigade furnished the Battalion at Lucknow, and one at Chunar. The details at Chupprah, Benares, and Juanpore, appear to have belonged to the 3rd Brigade.

The formation of one of the two additional Battalions must have been commenced upon prior to the date of the order forming the Army into Brigades, as the 20th Battalion (*now the 16th Grenadiers*) was designated the "*Hooseinee-ka-pultun*," owing to its formation commencing during the Mohurram, which occurred that year in the months of June and July. This Corps was raised at Allahabad under the superintendence of General Smith, and when completed, the command appears to have been given to Captain David Scott. The 21st Battalion (*the present 17th N. I.*) was raised by Sir Robert Barker at Bankypore, as soon as the Head Quarters were established there, and the Regiment still bears the name of that able and excellent officer.

On the 7th of September, Lord Clive returned to Calcutta, and resumed his seat in Council.

The Army, by the new regulations, was thus placed upon a much more efficient footing; each Brigade was in itself a complete force, capable of encountering any Native army that was likely to be brought against it; the proportion of officers was considerably increased, especially as regarded the higher grades and the Staff; the division of Staff officers was also better arranged, a more efficient check upon abuses was established, and the good effects of the change were soon rendered generally apparent. In an extensive reform of this nature, it was to be expected that some errors and omissions would occur, but the more important of these were certain to force themselves into notice before long, and were capable of being corrected in detail. In the very first month it became apparent that some separate arrangements were necessary for

A. D. 1765. the payment of the Brigades, and Lord Clive immediately
 September. after his return to Calcutta, laid before the Council a minute upon this subject, in consequence of which, [a Pay-master and a Commissary of musters were appointed to each Brigade. These duties were performed by Civil Servants, partly from an idea that a greater check would be established and less inducement to connivance at fraud would result] but in all probability, from the circumstance of the appointments being particularly lucrative, and consequently too valuable prizes to fall to the lot of the Army. [This system continued in force for many years, although there is little reason to believe that it was found an efficient one, the complaints of fraud and collusion between the Pay-master, the Commissary of musters and officers commanding Corps, being frequent and loud. The duties of both these departments being declared to be very heavy, Deputies were subsequently added to each Brigade. A Military Storekeeper, a Commissary of boats, and a Storekeeper of building stores, were also appointed in Calcutta, which situations were likewise held by Civilians. The Deputy Commissaries of the Artillery Companies had the charge of the Brigade Magazines. No Army Commissaria at this time existed, but all supplies of provisions, cattle, &c. were furnished by contractors, who in their own persons, or those of their agents, were present with the Brigades.*

The Select Committee, in a letter to the Court of Directors, dated the 30th September 1765, reported the satisfactory result of the recent arrangements, explained their deficiencies in men and arms, and requested that drafts might be sent out to complete the establishment, and that a regular annual supply might be kept up for the future, to meet the ordinary casualties. [They further stated, that they had already issued orders for the reduction of the Batta of the troops, and hoped shortly to place the Army on the same footing as that of the Coast.] The following is an extract of the letter in question:—

“ By the regimental returns, which we enclose in the
 “ packet, and which are very exact, you will see, at one view,

A. D. 1765.
September.

“ the deplorable condition of our infantry, to compleat which
 “ agreeable to your directions and to the proposals made by Lord
 “ Clive, not less than nine hundred men will suffice. We
 “ therefore most earnestly request, that you will, next year,
 “ send us twelve or fourteen hundred men for this establish-
 “ ment, giving such peremptory orders as must be obeyed,
 “ that none of this number be detained, upon any considera-
 “ tion, on the Coast of Coromandel. Our numbers once
 “ compleated, we shall require for the security of your immense
 “ possessions in this country, no more than six hundred
 “ recruits, to be sent out annually in the following manner,
 “ viz.—five hundred infantry, sixty artillery, twenty cavalry,
 “ and twenty serjeants for the seapoys: to this number
 “ must be added thirty volunteers and officers; and it
 “ would be of the utmost benefit to our plan, that you also
 “ send out every year six or seven gentlemen from the academy
 “ at Woolwich, for Artillery officers, this being a service that
 “ suffers extremely for want of persons properly instructed
 “ to conduct it, since no officer who knows the benefit of
 “ the Infantry service here, will chuse to quit it for any ad-
 “ vantage the Artillery will afford.

“ 25. Already we feel the good effects of regimenting
 “ your troops; discipline, subordination, and economy, begin
 “ to take place. Had General Carnac’s merit been much
 “ greater, if possible, than it is, he could not effect this of
 “ himself, unassisted as he was by field-officers, and thwarted
 “ as he always has been by the late Governors and Councils.

“ We have already issued our orders for striking off half
 “ the double Batta, and shall, in a very few days, put your
 “ forces entirely upon a footing with the troops on the Coast
 “ of Coromandel, which will be reducing your military ex-
 “ pences as low as they can well bear, consistently with your
 “ interest and the good of the service.

“ 26. Before we quit this subject, we must request, in the
 “ strongest manner, that you will supply us for the first year
 “ with 10,000 stands of small arms, and afterwards with 4,000
 “ annually, which will in future answer all our demands, if
 “ proper care be taken in the purchase. Of late years, the

A. D. 1766. " bad quality of your small arms, in general, has exposed
 " your possessions to the greatest risk and danger. The locks
 " are ill finished, and the metal so badly tempered, as not to
 " stand the heat of the sun in this climate. We are therefore
 " persuaded it would prove in the end much to your advan-
 " tage, if you purchased all your small arms of the same per-
 " sons who furnish the Government, and pay at the rate of
 " twenty-seven, instead of eighteen, shillings per firelock,
 " since experience demonstrates they will continue serviceable
 " for double the time, without being liable to the inconveni-
 " ence above represented."*

[The charges of the medical department which were paid upon Contingent Bills drawn by the Surgeons, amounted to a very large sum, in consequence of which, at the suggestion of Lord Clive, arrangements were made on the 11th of November, for reducing these expences by giving the Surgeons a contract for the supply of medicines, which contract was fixed at the rate of 18 shillings for each European, to include every thing, except clothing, bedding, cots, and lodging; more than double the sum at present allowed.]

Little other change appears to have taken place in the army during the remainder of the year 1765. In the beginning of 1766, Captain Nicoll's Battalion (*the Mathews*) was ordered to rejoin the Head Quarters of the Brigade at Allahabad; and Captain Hill, with the 19th Battalion, was detached from the 3rd Brigade to Lucknow, to relieve them, which latter Corps remained at that station for several years.†

In the beginning of 1766, Sir Robert Barker moved from Bankypore with a considerable detachment of his Brigade into the Betteah country, to reduce a number of the refractory Zumeendars of that district, who, taking advantage of the troubles that had existed for the last two years, had shut themselves up in their strongholds and refused to pay any revenue, of which considerable arrears were now due. The judicious arrangements of Sir Robert Barker and the efficient force at his disposal, led to a speedy and satisfactory

* Second Report, Appendix No. 86.

† Williams, p. 61.

adjustment of affairs in this quarter. Some little resistance A. D. 1766. appears to have been offered at first, but the inutility of such attempts being rendered very apparent, served to prevent any subsequent efforts of the same nature, and in a few months the whole country was brought into a state of complete subjection. Sir Robert Barker, in a letter to the Select Committee, dated from Camp at Rampore, 6th March 1766, gave a very favourable account of the resources of this district, with which even at the present time we are but scantily acquainted. He observes—

“ Betteä will, I think, be of considerable consequence to
“ the Company. Its firs will afford masts for all the ships
“ in India, which must produce a new and considerable trade
“ with the other nations in India, as well as advantage to our
“ own shipping, Gold and cinnamon are also here (the lat-
“ ter we gather in the jungles) ; timbers as large as any I
“ have seen ; musk and elephants’ teeth ; besides many other
“ commodities, I have not yet got the knowledge of.”

The Select Committee reported this circumstance to the Court of Directors, stating that they looked upon it “ rather
“ as an article of curious intelligence, than mere prospect of
“ advantage to the Company.” At the same time, they expressed their determination of pushing the discovery to the utmost advantage, if the advices received met with confirmation.*

The Emperor, who could not rest content with the security and competency he enjoyed, had frequently expressed his anxiety to make an effort for the recovery of his throne and capital, and employed all his influence to induce the English Government to support the attempt ; but Lord Clive, whose extended foresight and extraordinary knowledge of the Native character and resources of the several nations and factions then in the ascendant in the North of India, convinced him of the hopelessness of such an expedition, used every exertion to dissuade the Emperor from undertaking it, and positively refused any support should he resolve to make the attempt. Notwithstanding which, the Emperor entered into corres-

* Verelst, Appendix, pp. 27-8.

A. D. 1765. pendency with the Mahrattas, with a view of procuring their assistance in his darling scheme. This proceeding gave much annoyance to the Government, who directed General Smith to discourage the Emperor's project, and to throw every obstacle in the way of a treaty with the Mahrattas, who would naturally be very ready to seize any excuse for assembling a force and entering the districts of Korah and Allahabad, the recovery of which they were well known to have set their hearts upon.

It was resolved, that as soon as the approaching Poonah or settlement of the revenue accounts at Moorshedabad was over, Lord Clive and General Carnac should proceed up the country, and endeavour to arrange a defensive alliance of the frontier powers with Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, so as to secure his dominions from the probability of attack,—a measure in which it was inferred that the Jaths and Rohillahs would readily concur, as any check to the encroachments of the Mahrattas was to them an object of importance. Shoojah-oo-Dowlah was accordingly instructed to invite them to send agents to attend at the conference, empowered to conclude a treaty to the above effect.

Amongst the instructions given by the Court of Directors to Lord Clive and the Select Committee, were two points on which they expressed themselves in the strongest terms; the more so that frequent orders on the same subjects had hitherto been disregarded; these were the total suppression of the inland trade and the reduction of the Batta allowed to the Army.

To both these points Lord Clive turned his early attention. His conduct as regards the former measure has been severely animadverted upon; but before forming an opinion, the whole of the attendant circumstances should be carefully considered. That the grossest abuses connected with the inland trade had been committed for several years past was undeniable, and the interests of the Company and the inhabitants of the country were alike sufferers. These evils however, were to a great extent attributable rather to the rapacity and injustice of the individuals engaged and their agents, than to the system itself. The salaries of all grades of Civilians

were yet very small, and Lord Clive had with a strong hand A. D. 1765. put down their most important source of emolument, by compelling the execution of the Covenants, thus putting a stop to the general receipt of presents and douceurs. Had he entirely stopped the only remaining resource, derived from the inland trade, a large portion of the service would, though holding most important appointments, have been reduced to comparative beggary, for their actual salaries were barely sufficient to meet the single article of house rent, as then ordinarily paid. He therefore determined to abolish the great evil of individual oppression; but to retain the monopoly of salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, to be carried on, under the orders of Government, by a Committee appointed for the purpose, for the benefit of the Company's Civil and Military services. A duty was to be first deducted on account of the Company, estimated to yield £120,000 annually, and the remaining profits were ordered to be divided into 54 shares, and distributed amongst three classes of recipients. To the first class, 35 shares were allotted, divided as follows—to the Governor 5 shares,* the Second in Council and the Commander-in-Chief each 3 shares, the remaining 10 Gentlemen of Council and the other 2 Colonels of Brigades each 2 shares. To the second class was allotted 12 shares, divided amongst 1 Chaplain, 14 Senior Merchants, and the 3 Lieutenant-Colonels, giving each two-thirds of a share. The third class had 9 shares allotted to it, divided amongst 13 Factors, 4 Majors (including the Major of Artillery), 6 First Surgeons, 1 Secretary to Council, 1 Sub-Accountant, 1 Persian Translator, and 1 Export Ware-house keeper, allowing each one-third of a share.† This arrangement, however faulty it may have been, was a great improvement on the previous system, as it tended greatly to check individual abuses and oppression, transferred the collections to Government, secured a profit to the Company, and a considerable addition to the otherwise

* It must be mentioned to the credit of Lord Clive, that although he fixed five shares as the Governor's allowance, he did so with the declared resolution of not receiving a farthing himself. Vide, Verelst, pp. 126-7.

† Fourth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, Appendix No. 88.

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scanty salaries of the senior servants of Government, Civil and Military. The scale of distribution was subsequently modified, owing partly to the increase of Field Officers; the whole number of shares being fixed at sixty.*

The other point insisted upon by the Court was the reduction of the Batta allowed to the officers of the Army. As this allowance was one of considerable amount, and its withdrawal productive of serious consequences, it becomes necessary to go somewhat more into detail regarding the circumstances attending it. In the earlier days of the Army, the officers in Bengal were on the same footing as those at the other Presidencies, and drew a fixed rate of pay, which formed their net receipts when in Garrison or at the Presidency; when they took the field they were allowed an extra monthly sum to cover the increased expenses incurred thereby, which was denominated Batta, and half this sum was allowed when at a detached station, but not actually in the field. After the battle of Plassey, which placed Meer Jaffier Khán on the musnud, that Prince bestowed upon the officers an additional sum equal to the Batta, which was termed double Batta; and as during his rule the greater proportion of the force was constantly in the field, he continued that allowance with the sanction of Government. Meer Kossim Khán, on his accession to the Soobahdaree, anxious to obtain the good will of the Army, confirmed the grant; but when the Company obtained the assignment of the districts of Midnapore Burdwan, and Chittagong, expressly to cover the extra expenses of maintaining a force in the field for the protection of the Soobahdaree, the Court of Directors issued continued and peremptory orders for the withdrawal of this extra allowance, which would then have caused a considerable saving to their own treasury. In September 1761, the Council in Calcutta appears to have meditated acting upon these orders, and to have instituted an enquiry into the state of the case, and to have formed a code of revised regulations,

* Third Report, Appendix No. 52. Verelst, Appendix, pp. 18-9. For a list of the Military recipients of the first year's profits, vide Appendix Z.

laying down the amount of allowances to be drawn in different situations; at the same time a statement was submitted, showing the difference of allowances between the King's and Company's troops; and a gratuity was authorised, pending the sanction of the Court, placing the Company's officers and soldiers on the same footing as those of the Royal Army. A memorial was, however, submitted, dated 21st September 1761, signed by 39 officers, praying that the allowance of double Batta might not be withdrawn, on account of the heavy expenses to which they were subjected, when serving in the field at a distance from the Presidency; and representing in the words of the memorial—

“ That it would be impossible for an officer to live in a
 “ manner suitable to his station, if that reduction took place;
 “ house-rent and the prices of all provisions being so greatly
 “ increased within a few preceding years, while their allowan-
 “ ces in garrison continued the same: that it was only with
 “ the assistance of what little an officer could save out of his
 “ Full Batta in the field, that he was enabled to subsist
 “ decently the rest of the year in garrison, and fit himself out
 “ for the next campaign; and that it would readily appear
 “ how little could be saved in the field, when the great
 “ expences an officer is there liable to, were considered, to
 “ say nothing of the losses he often met with by the death
 “ of horses, and the desertion and interception of coolies
 “ with his baggage, for which no allowance was made.

“ That it was true the officers on the Coast subsisted on
 “ less Batta, but this was not without much difficulty, though
 “ most kind of provisions are much cheaper there than in
 “ Bengal; that the campaigns of these officers were never at
 “ such a distance from one settlement or other, either Eng-
 “ lish or foreign, as to oblige them to carry so large a stock
 “ of necessaries with them as an officer in Bengal was under
 “ a necessity of doing, since this army was generally 3 or
 “ 400 miles from Calcutta, the only place whence they could
 “ be supplied,—Patna, Cossimbazar, and the other subordi-
 “ nates affording little or nothing: That the being obliged
 “ to carry so much baggage, made the expence of hiring coolies

A. D. 1761. “ run very high; whereas the supplies that are sent to the
 “ camp from the different settlements on the Coast, did not
 “ bear so exorbitant a price, nor were the charges of carriage
 “ so great: That if an officer, by the means of great fruga-
 “ lity, and denying himself the comforts of life, in a long
 “ course of years had it in his power to lay by a little money,
 “ perhaps to maintain a family, or to enable him to revisit
 “ his native country, yet he must pay an extravagant price
 “ before he could get a passage home: That the reduction
 “ of Batta would entirely deprive him of the hope of return-
 “ ing; there being no half-pay allowed, nor any other provi-
 “ sion made, as there is in His Majesty’s service for those who
 “ may be rendered incapable of serving themselves or their
 “ country, by old age, loss of limbs, or other accidents, which
 “ a soldier is always liable to: That in India their rank is
 “ inferior to that of the King’s officers; and that in Europe
 “ they have no military rank at all.

“ That they, therefore, trust in the justice of the Pre-
 “ sidency, not so far to under-rate the service of their military
 “ officers, as to think of reducing their allowance, when they
 “ have already so greatly the disadvantage, in point of interest,
 “ of every other branch of the Company’s servants, that no-
 “ thing but their zeal for the service, and a regard for their
 “ profession, can be supposed to retain them in it.”*

Upon this the Council directed Captains Champion and Broadbridge, the two senior Captains at the Presidency, who had signed the memorial, to deliver in by the next Council day, an estimate of such extraordinary expenses as they judged to be necessary in the field. These officers accordingly prepared and laid before the Board the following curious statement:—

[F]ORT WILLIAM, 25th September, 1761.

[E]STIMATE of expences monthly necessary for a Captain during a campaign :

	<i>Garrison.</i>	<i>Field.</i>	<i>Difference.</i>
Head servant.....	5	10	5
Another ditto....	3	6	3

* Ninth Report, p. 579, and Appendix No. 1.

	<i>Garrison.</i>	<i>Field.</i>	<i>Difference.</i>	A. D. 1761.
Cook.....	4	9	5	
Barber	1	2	1	
Washerman	1	2	1	
Bearers	16	41	25	
Coolies for baggages, eight	0	0	40	
Two Peons	0	0	12	
Horse-keeping	0	0	30	
Difference of the price of liquors.				
<i>is/</i> Madeira 30 bottles, at 1-8	45	0		
Beer 30 ditto 12	22	8		
Arrack 15 ditto 4	3	12		
		—	71	4
Supposing five to mess together, proportion of coolies			40	0
For extraordinary dearthness of provisions, oil, vinegar, &c. &c.....			40	0
Do. wearing apparel..			40	0
			—	
			A. Rs.....	313 0

“ It is to be observed, that no allowance is made for the prime cost of horse and palanquin, which cannot be less than 1,000 rupees, nor for risques, breakage, and losses of all sorts, to which an officer is liable during the course of a campaign.”*

In consequence of this representation, the Council determined to postpone the orders for withdrawing the double Batta, until the pleasure of the Court of Directors should be known. To this reference the Court replied in their general letter to Bengal, dated the 9th of March 1763, in substance to the following effect :—

“ That the extraordinary allowance of Double Batta was what they could not pass over without some animadversions; that such an increase of allowance was not only entirely new to them, but no reasons were given why, of late, it should be deemed more necessary than it was heretofore.

* Ninth Report, p. 580.

A. D. 1763. “ They observed that their compliance therewith is founded
 “ on an estimate, which appears to be of a very extraordinary
 “ nature, with regard to the great number of servants said
 “ to be necessary in the field; to the alleged dearness of
 “ provisions, which the Directors have reason to believe, is
 “ greater on the Coast of Coromandel than in Bengal; and
 “ also to the unprecedented article for wearing apparel.”
 They further remarked that, “ notwithstanding the captains
 “ rate their field expences at 313 Arcot rupees per month,
 “ yet, by the general list of Batta, inserted by the Presidency
 “ among their military regulations of 1761, it appears that
 “ they had even exceeded this estimate, by allowing each
 “ captain 12 Arcot rupees per day for his common field ex-
 “ pences, and 20 when commanding a detachment; and
 “ they alleged, that his Majesty’s troops necessarily expect the
 “ same indulgence, and the Company’s troops at their other
 “ settlements, will think themselves equally entitled thereto:
 “ That, by the account in the consultation of 25th Septem-
 “ ber 1761, the Batta to officers only, on the establishment
 “ at Bengal, amounted to current rupees 209,134-4, in the
 “ year, to November 1760; which, together with the great
 “ additional sum for the allowance of one Arcot rupee
 “ per day to three private men, was an expence which ought
 “ not, without the most absolute necessity, to have been
 “ complied with to such an unreasonable extent: and that
 “ these considerations should have influenced the Presi-
 “ dency so far as not to have supported the rank of the
 “ officers, so much to the prejudice of the Company, more
 “ especially at a time when so great losses and charges
 “ were incurred by the war.” They added that “ they could
 “ not admit the arguments of the officers, advanced in their
 “ letter of the 21st September 1761, in support of their
 “ demands, to be of sufficient force; for that, though
 “ they (the Directors) were desirous to answer their original
 “ engagement with the military gentlemen, and to grant
 “ them encouragement suitable to their merit, yet it could
 “ not be justly expected that they should be enabled to
 “ raise such fortunes as might lead them to quit the service

“ in a short space of time, an inconvenience which of late A. D. “ had frequently happened.”*

Having in other letters written in the interim repeated their orders for the withdrawal of this allowance, the Council at Calcutta in Feb. 1763, appointed a special committee, of which Majors Adams and Carnac were members, to report how far the Company's orders could be carried out, and what reductions could be made; but being then on the eve of a campaign with Meer Kossim Khán, it was not considered advisable to withdraw the allowance of double Batta, a measure which could not fail to create a feeling of discontent in the army, on whose services at the time they were so entirely dependent. [In a letter dated the 1st of June 1764, the Court reiterated their most positive orders that the double Batta should be withdrawn from the date of the receipt of that letter, and the whole army placed on single Batta; and further, that the single Batta should be reduced when circumstances would admit of it, that is in cantonment and in garrison, in the former of which only half single Batta was to be allowed, and in the latter no Batta at all.]

This letter was received in January 1765, and the Council recorded in their proceedings of the 25th of that month, that as the Batta to the Army was thought proper and necessary, on account of their being engaged on actual service of so much consequence, the reduction thereof should be deferred for the present, at least till the arrival of Lord Clive and the other members with the expected Field Officers: and added, “ that they hoped, by the example and “ support of the latter, to meet with less difficulty in this “ undertaking.” †

The war being brought to a close, and the Army re-organized and moved into cantonments, [Lord Clive determined to carry out the Company's views. Orders were accordingly issued, that from the 1st of January 1766, the double Batta should be withdrawn, except as regarded the 2nd

* Ninth Report, p. 580.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid, p. 581.

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Brigade then stationed at Allahabad, “ which, on account of
 “ the high price of provisions at that station, and the expence
 “ of procuring the necessary European articles at so great a
 “ distance from the Presidency, were to be allowed the double
 “ Batta in the field, and the old original single Batta in canton-
 “ ments or in garrison, until they should be recalled within the
 “ provinces,” and this rule was made applicable to all troops,
 when employed beyond the Karumnassa. The rest of the
 Army was to receive single Batta when marching or in the
 field, and half single Batta, when in cantonment or in garrison
 as at Mongheer and Patna; but when at the Presidency or
 its immediate subordinate factories, were to be placed on the
 same footing as the troops on the Coast; that is to say, were
 to receive no Batta at all.* In the latter case however, they
 were furnished with quarters. These arrangements were re-
 ported to the Court of Directors in a letter dated the 31st of
 January 1766, of which the following is an extract:—

“ 6. The opportunity which the restoration of peace affords
 “ for carrying into execution your orders relative to the Batta
 “ allowed to military officers, will contribute greatly to the
 “ increase of your surplus fund. Those orders, although
 “ reasonable and necessary, could not, however, be con-
 “ veniently enforced before the public tranquillity, and mili-
 “ tary discipline and subordination were firmly established.
 “ It was also requisite, before we entered upon a reduc-
 “ tion of pay, to devise the means of their living cheap-
 “ er, and of supplying them with liquors and other stores,
 “ at a more moderate price than those articles had usually
 “ been furnished. We must likewise observe, that regiment-
 “ ing the troops has not only conduced to the reformation
 “ we proposed, but facilitated the reduction of expence you
 “ enjoin; a soldier who knows and performs his duty, will
 “ neither expect nor require the surperfluties and luxuries
 “ of life.

“ Accordingly, we have ordained, that on the first day of
 “ the present month, the customary Batta shall be struck off

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“ from the troops in general, excepting the Brigade station-
“ ed in Shujah Dowlah’s dominions, who, on account of
“ the high price of provisions, and the difficulty of procur-
“ ing stores, will be allowed double Batta in the field, and
“ half double Batta in contonments and in garrison, until
“ they are recalled to the provinces.

“ For the same reasons, Half Batta is continued to the
“ troops quartered at Patna and Mongheer; but the rest of
“ the army, we mean the detachments at subordinate stations
“ and other places, that are not engaged in actual service,
“ are reduced precisely on a footing with the Company’s
“ forces on the coast; even those stationed at Mongheer and
“ Patna receive the same exact Batta as your troops at
“ Trichinopoly.*

“ From such regulations, and also from the check given to
“ the many shameful abuses committed in musters, returns,
“ hospital bills, boats, and other articles, we may affirm with
“ confidence, that the charges of your whole establishment,
“ civil and military, including your fortifications, will fall short
“ of the amount expended during the course of the late war,
“ on your army alone; and yet it is proposed if you supply us
“ duly with recruits, to maintain the complete establishment
“ projected by Lord Clive, and the most formidable army that
“ ever took the field in Bengal. From what causes your mili-
“ tary expences swelled to such immeasurable bounds, requires
“ no explanation. Certain it is that they far exceeded the
“ supplies, so liberally voted by the British Parliament, for an
“ army of auxiliaries employed to oppose the combined forces
“ of the most Powerful Princes in Christendom.

This arrangement will be better understood by the follow-
ing statement, showing the actual amount drawn by each
officer at the Presidency, in garrison, in cantonment, in the
field, or serving beyond the Karumnassa.

TABLE, showing the Pay, Batta, and additional Allowances to the different Ranks of Military Officers, serving on the Bengal Establishment.*

RANK.		Pay per Month in So- naut Rupees, being the net amount in Garrison or at the Presidency.	Half Batta in Can- tonment.	Field Batta within the Carrumnassa or in Cantonment, beyond that river.	Double Batta in the field beyond the Carrumnassa.	
Infantry.	Colonel	310 0 0	387½	775	1550	
	Lieutenant Colonel	248 0 0	310	620	1240	
	Major	186 0 0	232½	465	930	
	Captain	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Captain Lieutenant	62 0 0	93	186	372	
	Lieutenant	62 0 0	62	124	248	
	Ensign	50 0 0	46½	93	186	
Sepoy Officers.	Cadet	31	62	124	
	Captain	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Lieutenant	62 0 0	62	124	248	
Artillery.	Ensign	50 0 0	46½	93	186	
	Captain	148 0 0	93	186	372	
	Captain Lieutenant	90 0 0	93	186	372	
	First Lieutenant	70 0 0	62	124	248	
	Second Lieutenant	70 0 0	62	124	248	
Cavalry.	Lieutenant Fireworker...	60 0 0	46½	93	186	
	Captain	185 0 3	93	186	372	
	Captain Lieutenant	146 6 3	93	186	372	
	First Lieutenant	112 10 6	62	124	248	
	Second Lieutenant	99 13 7	62	124	248	
Staff.	Cornet	99 13 7	46½	93	186	
	Quarter Master General.	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Judge Advocate General.	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Chaplain	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Aid-de-Camp	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Secretary	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Field Engineer	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Brigade Major	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Surgeon	124 0 0	93	186	372	
	Surgeon-Assistant	62 0 0	62	124	248	
	Adjutant	62 0 0	62	124	248	
	Quarter Master	62 0 0	62	124	248	
	Commissary & Conductor	50 0 0	46½	93	186	
	Staff in Garrison. Staff composed from Civilians.	Interpreter	124 0 0	93	186	372
		Paymaster	124 0 0	93	186	372
		Deputy Paymaster	62 0 0	62	124	248
		Commissary of Musters	124 0 0	93	186	372
		Deputy ditto	62 0 0	62	124	248
		Commissary of Boats ...	124 0 0	93	186	372
		Deputy ditto	62 0 0	62	124	248
Town Major		124 0 0	
Garrison. son.	Barrack Master	124 0 0	
	Town Adjutant	62 0 0	

* Compiled from the Ninth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, Appendix 1,

In addition to the above sums every Lieutenant attached to a Sipahi Battalion drew an extra allowance of 62 Rupees, and every Ensign of 50 Rupees, per mensem. A. D. 1766.
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Colonels commanding Brigades drew a table allowance of 40 Rupees per diem.

In the Colonel's absence, the next senior Field officer commanding the Brigade received the batta of the rank above his own, and the table allowance. The Field officers also received their respective shares of the profits of the Inland Trade Association, as already explained.

No tentage or house-rent was allowed at that time, or for several years subsequent; but when marching, officers were supplied with tents, according to their rank, from the public stores, which were carried at the Government expense. In cantonments they found their own quarters; but at the Presidency and subordinate factories, Barracks were found for them. Boats were also supplied them when proceeding by water.

These arrangements came into force in January 1766, as directed, without any apparent demur on the part of the officers. Memorials were sent in from each Brigade, but Lord Clive replied that the Court's orders were positive, and that no modification of the regulation could be permitted. No further signs of discontent were exhibited, and the Government considered that the arrangement, if not satisfactory, was likely to occasion no disturbance.

Whilst the members of Government congratulated themselves on the satisfactory and peaceable operation of their measures for the reduction of the Military expenses, they were not unmindful of the efficiency of the Army. The introduction of so large a number of Field officers had proved very beneficial in bringing about a comparatively high state of discipline amongst the European soldiery, and also imposed an advantageous check upon the junior officers, who had acquired an impatience of control, partly owing to the previous want of strict discipline, and partly to the situations of responsibility and separate command in which, notwithstanding their youth and inexperience, they had hitherto

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been lately so frequently placed. [The reduction of allowances also rendered it necessary to hold out some prospect of higher promotion, as an equivalent for that loss; and this the appointment of the Field officers was well calculated to afford.] The proportion of higher grades was however, soon found to be too limited, more especially as regarded the Sipahi Battalions, which derived but little immediate benefit from their superintendence. In consequence of which, in the early part of 1766, Lord Clive determined to appoint an additional Major to each Brigade, and accordingly Supernumerary Major Pemble was brought in, and the senior Captains William Smith and Primrose Galliez were promoted to that grade. One of the Majors of each Brigade was posted away from the Head Quarters, generally at the principal outpost. Captain Christian Fischer, who was senior to all the above-mentioned officers, but who, owing to his being a foreigner, was debarred from rising beyond the rank of Captain, had been appointed a Brevet-Major, and the command of the force at Mooteejheel, near Moorshedabad, conferred upon him.

The advance of a large body of Mahrattas towards the provinces of Korah and Allahabad, consequent on the prior negotiations of the Emperor with some of their leaders, induced the Government to order General Smith to take up a more advanced position with his Brigade, the better to watch their movements and counteract any attempts that they might make upon those provinces. Accordingly, the greater part of the Artillery, and the whole of the Sipahi Battalions stationed at Allahabad and Korah, were moved into camp at Soorajpore; but owing to the heat of the weather at that season, the 2nd European Regiment remained in garrison.

[Lord Clive left Calcutta in the end of March 1766] to hold the first Poonah or revenue settlement with the young Nawaub, accompanied by General Carnac and the officers of their respective Staffs. [Whilst at Moorshedabad, he received the official announcement that the late Nawaub Meer Jaffier Khan had bequeathed him in his will a legacy of five lakhs of

rupees.] The new covenants prohibiting the receipt of presents could not, strictly speaking, apply to a bequest of this nature, more especially as it was made prior to the execution of that agreement; but [Lord Clive, with a very proper sense of honour and regard to his position, determined not to take advantage of it on his own account, but with great consideration and humanity resolved to apply the amount to the formation of a fund for the relief of officers and men in the Company's Military service, disabled by the climate or by wounds, vesting the appropriation of the fund in the Council of Fort William as perpetual trustees. This determination he announced to the Council in a letter dated from Mootee-jheel, the 8th April, 1766.*] On receipt of this communication, the Council on the 14th of the month, recorded their opinion that the acceptance of the legacy was in no way prohibited by the covenants, and expressed their "lively sense of his generous and well-placed donation to succour distress, which had so long called for relief." Such was the origin of Lord Clive's Fund, the benefits of which have since been experienced by thousands in, or connected with, the Company's Military service; the subsequent details of the arrangement will be noticed more at length in another chapter. This act of liberality on the part of Lord Clive could not, however, exempt him from reproach; and even in modern times, an eminent historian has termed the transaction an *ambiguous* one, and with equal correctness states it to have been the foundation of Poplar Hospital, an institution with which the fund never had the slightest connection, the benefits of which are confined exclusively to the Company's Marine service, and which was in existence many years before Clive was born.

Whilst Lord Clive was thus employed in promoting the interests of the service by this important and beneficial measure, a storm was brewing amongst the officers of the Army, which threatened to annihilate the authority of the Government, to subvert all principles of discipline and sub-

* Third Report of the Select Committee, Appendix No. 2.—Vide Appendix A. A.

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ordination, and to sap the power of the British in India to its very foundation.*

Although the orders for the reduction of the Batta had been carried into effect on the 1st of January, without any apparent difficulty or manifest opposition, a strong feeling of discontent and resentment pervaded the minds of the majority of the officers. The Field Officers—the seniors of whom were in a great measure strangers to the rest of the service, and personal friends of Lord Clive, whilst the juniors amongst them were grateful for their recent and rapid promotion, and satisfied with their positions—were, with one exception, exempt from all participation in or even knowledge of the measures contemplated by the remainder of the service. In fact, their situations were sufficiently lucrative, especially with their shares of the Inland Trade Society, to remove all cause of discontent. Such however, was not the feeling entertained, by the Captains and Subalterns : they had long been accustomed to situations of command and responsibility ; had been in large receipts, not only from their authorised allowances, but from more indirect means, to which the recent execution of the covenants had put an end ; they had formed exaggerated notions of the wealth of the country and the Government ; and having witnessed several of their comrades retiring on considerable fortunes, accumulated in a very few years' service, they not only looked to obtain the same advantages, but regarded them as a right. They consequently considered the present order as a tyrannical and uncalled-for act of positive injustice on the part of their superiors, or in the words of the most eminent Indian Historian, " as a most unworthy attempt to deprive them of a share of those rich advantages for which they had fought and bled, only that a larger share of emolument might flow into the laps of those very men who were the instruments of their opposition." They had not forgotten the success with which for the last six years

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* As the following details of this ~~Meeting~~ are taken almost exclusively from the Ninth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, more especially from Mr. Strockey's Narrative of the Affair and from Caraccioli, it is not considered necessary to lead the succeeding pages with numerous references to authority.

they had resisted the introduction of this very measure, nor the effects of that coalition by which, in the preceding year, they had carried their point in regard to Captain MacPherson's admission into the service. A. D. 1766.
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When the minds of all were in this excited state, it wanted only that some definite plan should be formed to insure the concurrence of the whole. [The first attempt at combination appears to have originated with the 1st Brigade, and to have commenced in the end of December or beginning of January, in which latter month it was communicated to the 2nd and 3rd Brigades at Allahabad and Bankypore.] The latter Brigade, of which a portion was detached in the Betteah country, appears to have entered into the proposed combination without any hesitation. The 2nd Brigade, on receipt of the communication requesting their concurrence, were partly in garrison, and partly in camp at Korah. The letter was addressed to the officers in garrison, who immediately held a meeting to discuss the subject, when a letter was also produced from the 3rd Brigade, announcing their participation in the plan. The officers at Allahabad however, decided upon referring the question to their comrades at Korah, who in like manner took the matter into consideration and decided that, "considering themselves on actual service, they could not in honour immediately join in the defection, but that after the expiration of the present service, they would not continue to hold their commissions to the prejudice of those officers who should resign;" in which opinion the officers in garrison concurred, and their reply was forwarded accordingly. This state of neutrality did not long continue, the sense of honour and propriety gradually gave way to the influence of their own passions, and the urgency of their friends in the other Brigades, and within a few weeks, the whole body, notwithstanding their previous acknowledgment that they could not do so in honour, gave in their full concurrence to the general scheme, and became as deeply involved as the other Brigades, although there was every reason to expect an early advance on the part of the Mahrattas.

The object of this combination was to compel the Government to rescind the order by means of a general and simul-

A. D. 1766.
February.

taneous resignation of their commissions on the part of the Captains and Subalterns of the whole force. This plan, if it did not originate with Sir Robert Fletcher, which it appears to have done, evidently met with his approval, and he was undoubtedly cognizant of the proceedings of the officers throughout the whole affair.

A committee of correspondence was appointed in each Brigade, with full authority to answer all letters that might come from their associates, and agree to, as well as propose, such measures as they should consider advisable. All officers at detached posts or stations were written to by their respective Brigades, and called upon to join in the general confederacy; and in the course of a few weeks nearly two hundred commissions were collected, a number little short of that of the whole of the Captains and Subalterns in the service. These were lodged in the hands of the Adjutants and Quarter Masters of the several Brigades, with a view to their being delivered to the respective Commanding officers on the 1st of June, the day fixed for the general resignation. It was, however, agreed that they should serve as volunteers without pay, until the 15th of that month, by which time the decision of Government would be made known. Every officer joining the confederacy bound himself by a solemn oath to secrecy, and so cautiously were their plans and their meetings arranged, that not a single Field officer in the service appears to have had the slightest suspicion of what was going on, except Sir Robert Fletcher. Every officer moreover, was sworn, even at the hazard of his own life, to preserve and defend the life of any member of the confederacy who might be condemned to death by the sentence of a Court Martial; whilst by refusing the usual advance of pay for June, and resigning their commissions, they considered that they would be absolved from any of the penalties incident to mutiny and desertion.

As an expedient to prevent any recantation, each member of the confederacy was further bound in a penalty of £500 not to accept his commission again, unless the Batta was restored. The following is a copy of the bond to which nearly two hundred officers affixed their signatures:—“Whereas we, the

“ underwritten, have entered into an engagement to resign our A. D. 1766.
 “ commissions in the Honourable Company’s service, and not March.
 “ to resume them unless the batta of the troops is again restored
 “ to what it was in July and August 1763—be it known unto
 “ all men, that we hereby bind and oblige ourselves, several-
 “ ly, not to accept of any commission in the service of the
 “ Honourable Company whatever, either through fear, com-
 “ pulsion, or choice, unless the aforesaid batta is restored ;—
 “ under the penalty of £500 sterling money of England, re-
 “ coverable in any of his Majesty’s courts of justice, by the
 “ majority or any five of the subscribers to this bond. If
 “ the batta is restored to the above-mentioned standard, then
 “ this obligation to be void and of no effect, otherwise to
 “ remain in full force and virtue. In witness, &c., Signed,
 “ sealed, and delivered, where no stamped paper is procu-
 “ rable.”

As a further precaution, a general subscription was raised, every officer subscribing according to his rank, to which a considerable sum, said to amount to Rs. 140,000, was added by the Civilians, who, in their animosity to Lord Clive for compelling the execution of the covenants, looked upon the conduct of the Military with great satisfaction, and held out every indirect encouragement they were enabled to offer. Some of those gentlemen about the Government Offices went the length of corresponding with the mutineers, and giving them information of all that was passing. The sum thus collected, together with what might accrue from forfeiture of the penalty bonds, was intended to form a fund for the support of such members as should stand in need of it, in case the whole of the commissions should be accepted, or, what was considered more probable, in case the ring-leaders should be dismissed the service, even though the officers generally should be solicited to retain their commissions, and the double Batta be restored.

From this fund the expenses of the voyage to Europe for any officer so circumstanced were to be defrayed, and commissions, of equal rank to those they lost, purchased for them in the King’s service, to obtaining which, it never ap-

A. D. 1706.
March.

pears to have occurred to them, that their present mutinous conduct would prove the slightest bar.

Such was the nature of the alarming confederacy into which nearly all the Captains and Subalterns of the Army had entered, with exception to a few officers on Staff employ, and those chiefly at the Presidency; a confederacy that, if persisted in, appeared to leave Government but little option except that of submission, especially as when the officers both of the European and Native Corps were so unanimous, it was a natural inference that they might easily bring the whole of the troops over to their sides. To the credit of the officers however, it must be stated, that not only was no attempt made to influence the men, but that such a measure never appears to have entered into their calculations. Had they done so, there can be little doubt that they would have been successful, and thus supported, they could have forced the Government into any terms they had thought proper to dictate.

Whilst the plot was ripening, the hopes of the mutineers were raised by the intelligence that a force of between fifty and sixty thousand Mahrattas was rapidly approaching, and preparing to invade the province of Korah, a circumstance which it was considered would obviate any chance of opposition on the part of Government. It was owing to this intelligence that General Smith was directed, as already stated, to take post at Soorajpore, with the Artillery and Native portion of the 2nd Brigade.

Such was the state of affairs in the end of March, when, little suspecting the impending danger, Lord Clive and General Carnac proceeded to Moorshedabad.

On the 22nd of April, whilst occupied with the affairs that had brought him to that station, Lord Clive received a letter, dated the 19th April, from Mr. Verelst, who remained in Calcutta, enclosing a memorial from the officers of the 3rd Brigade at Bankypore, who behaved throughout with less violence than the other two Brigades, and who appear to have been desirous of obtaining their object without any unnecessary display of insubordination or opposition. This memorial was without date, and was to the following effect:—

“ MY LORD AND GENTLEMEN,—Induced to believe, by A. D. 1786.
 “ your great zeal for the interest of the Honourable East India April.
 “ Company, that you will not think unworthy your notice
 “ the sufferings of those that serve them, and wish for new
 “ opportunities to advance their power, we take the liberty,
 “ in as few lines as possible, lest we might misapply your
 “ valuable moments, to speak with truth the miseries that
 “ either press, or threaten us every where, in consequence
 “ of the orders of the 31st of December, for the curtailing
 “ of batta.

“ Without necessaries, 'tis presumed, it will not be said
 “ we can subsist in Indostan; and all commodities thence,
 “ notwithstanding, as we are told, your kind endeavours to
 “ the contrary, still bring the usual prices at the Presidency;
 “ and here, as formerly, fifty, sixty, and upwards, to two
 “ hundred per cent., more than at Fort William.

“ The wages of servants too remain unalterable. Nor is
 “ this all, but every black fellow has his peculiar province,
 “ beyond which he cannot be brought to serve. Indeed,
 “ to an officer nothing is new except multiplied distress

“ If we fail here, my lord and gentlemen, to make sufficiently
 “ apparent, how inadequate to the support of an officer is his
 “ present allowance, we will be ready, at any time, to lay
 “ before you an estimate of expences, which we may ven-
 “ ture to promise us, you will think essentially requisite to
 “ the support of nature, and the station he is honoured with;
 “ but 'twere becoming tedious, contrary to our promise, if we
 “ detained you here with the fatigues of an officer in hot
 “ and rainy weather; the necessity of his having an horse
 “ or palanquin, and the present impossibility of his procur-
 “ ing either: therefore waving this, we only beg leave, before
 “ we close, just to mention Madras and Bombay, and the
 “ cheapness of everything at those settlements: Amazing in-
 “ deed, if compared with the price of this: a truth well
 “ known to all, the honourable gentlemen we serve except-
 “ ed; who, as from best authority we have it, think inversely
 “ of this matter, believing that cheapness of necessaries is
 “ chiefly to be met with in Bengal. However, my lord and

A. D. 1766. " and, secure of their concurrence, from arguments unan-
 April. " swerable, will cancel the orders before mentioned of the
 " 31st December, which are already most severely felt; and
 " if not countermanded, must quickly bring poverty and
 " wretchedness on those that are, with the greatest sincerity,
 " My Lord and Gentlemen, your most obedient, &c. :"

CAPTAINS.

Jas. Morgan.
 V. Duffield.
 James Thomas.
 Wm. Nugent.
 Thos. Roper.
 John Coker.

CAPT.-LIEUTENANTS.

Patrick Duff, *Artillery*.
 John G. Robinson.
 John Mair.
 LIEUTENANTS.
 Robt. Davidson.
 George Thomas.
 Henry Williams.
 Chas. Scott, *Artillery*.
 Robt. Shand.
 Wm. Mason, *Artillery*.
 John Grant.
 Thom. M'Donald, *Artillery*.

John Dickson.
 Thos. Dundas.
 John Forbes.
 Wm. Farmer.

ENSIGNS.

Wm. Denman.
 Edwd. Reid.
 J. Scott.
 Jas. Home.
 J. Brown.
 Ralph Middleton.
 Fran. Robertson.
 John Armstrong.
 George Rooke.
 Henry Townley.
 Alex. Shirwin.
 Robt. Stewart.
 N. Davis.
 Chas. Collins.
 Chas. Wre.
 Thos. Bailie.
 Francis Field.
 G. Goodyar.
 Thos. Penning.
 P. Angerstein.

Lord Clive replied the same day, that as the memorial did not appear to have been transmitted through Sir Robert Barker, it should be immediately forwarded to that officer, with an intimation that the Council could not take into consideration any document not brought before them through the proper channel. Should it, however, have been received from the Commanding officer, he recom-

to other previous remonstrances, when the order was first issued, with this addition, that the Council observed that the latter letter was signed by several Lieutenants of the Sipahi Battalions, who were in receipt of the extra allowance of 2 Rs. per diem, which, with their pay and single Batta, amounting to Rs. 248 per mensem, could not be deemed an inadequate subsistence.

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April.

Still, no suspicion existed of the combination on foot, until the 28th of April, when Lord Clive received a letter from Sir Robert Fletcher at Mongheer, dated the 25th of that month, announcing that the officers of his Brigade seemed determined upon making an effort for the recovery of their Batta, and that their commissions were to be forwarded to him before the 1st of the following month, with an intimation of their refusal to draw any advance of pay for the month of May, but of their willingness to serve as volunteers without pay until the decision of Government should be known. He also enclosed a letter which he had received the day before, from Sir Robert Barker at Bankypore, regarding certain discoveries the latter had made of the intention of the officers of his Brigade.

It is here necessary to observe that, although, as subsequently proved, Sir Robert Fletcher had been acquainted with the intentions and proceedings of the mutineers from the end of December—that is, for four months,—this was the first intimation of any description that he had given to Government, and this appears to have been forced from him by Sir Robert Barker's communication.

The latter officer had only just returned from his expedition to Bettiah, and had ordered a Court Martial to investigate the circumstances attending a fire, by which nearly half the Bungalows at the station had been destroyed. This accident originated in a quarrel between Captain-Lieutenant Patrick Duff of the Artillery and Ensign Davis the Adjutant of the 3rd European Regiment, owing to the latter refusing to give up his commission, which Captain Duff endeavoured to force from him, when a scuffle ensued, lights were thrown down, and the Bungalow caught fire. The circumstances attend-

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April.

ing this investigation, aroused the suspicion of Sir Robert Barker, and alarmed the confederates, who fearing a premature discovery, resolved to anticipate the original date of resignation, and to fix the 1st of May, to which both the 1st and 3rd Brigades agreed; but the 2nd was too far distant to receive the intimation in sufficient time. Sir Robert Barker immediately wrote to Sir Robert Fletcher as stated above, mentioning his suspicions, and enquiring if the latter officer had any reason to believe the evil extended to the other Brigades. Sir Robert Fletcher forwarded a copy of his reply to Lord Clive, in which he treated the matter lightly—mentioned that there had been some talk three months ago amongst his officers of resigning, but that he attached no importance to it and imagined it had died away; that he certainly had heard within the last few days that they had some thoughts of resuming their demands, but that he did not consider it a matter for serious notice; and that “at the worst, they could
“ but resign, and afford an opportunity of selecting the
“ best, and turning the worst to the right-about.”

On the day following the receipt of Sir Robert Fletcher's communication, the 29th of April, all doubts as to the existence, and extended nature of the confederacy were put an end to, by the receipt of a letter from the camp at Korah, dated the 15th April, signed “*Full Batta.*” This letter was addressed to Captain Scipio Carnac, who belonged to the 2nd Brigade; and who immediately laid the letter, of which the following is a copy, before Lord Clive:—

“ SIR,—In consequence of the orders of the 31st of De-
“ cember, the officers of the first, second and third Brigades,
“ came to an agreement of resigning their commissions, which
“ are now lodged to the amount of one hundred and thirty.
“ We therefore request you will send your commission to some
“ friend in the first Brigade, and therewith some such direc-
“ tions as you may think proper, as experience has shewn
“ there is no dependence on verbal declarations. All the ab-
“ sentees have been wrote to on this occasion; and we trust,
“ whatever step you take, you will not make this known.
“ A subscription has been opened here for supporting those

“ who may want it, in case the Council may think proper
 “ to accept of all our commissions, or to indemnify those who
 “ may be pointed out as principals and suffer, should the
 “ batta even be restored. We likewise desire to know your
 “ resolution regarding it. Let us have your answer as soon
 “ as possible. Direct to any of us at the regiment at Alla-
 “ habad.

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“ I am, &c.,

“ FULL BATTÀ.

“ *Corah, 15th April, 1766.*

“ P. S.—The enclosed subscription has been signed by
 “ the above one hundred and thirty officers; if you consent
 “ to the above, sign the enclosed, and forward it with your
 “ answer.

“ We the undernamed officers of the second Brigade, do
 “ hereby bind ourselves by our honour to pay a sum of
 “ money, in proportion to our rank we hold in the Company’s
 “ service, in order to defray the expence of going to England,
 “ and purchasing an equal commission in his Majesty’s ser-
 “ vice, for any officer or officers, who may be singled out to
 “ suffer in the cause in which we are now engaged.”

A second letter was also received nearly at the same time from the 1st Brigade, addressed to Captains Frederick Smith and Thomas Pearson, the former A. D. C. and the latter Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, both of whom belonged to that Brigade. The contents of this letter were of a more violent tone than the one already received, and were to the following effect:—

“ GENTLEMEN,—We are now to inform you, that all the
 “ officers here, and those at Patna and Allahabad (except a
 “ few, and those pimps to power too) have resolved to resign
 “ the service, the first day of May next, unless the batta is
 “ restored to what it was in July and August 1763; and
 “ request that you will concur with us in refusing to serve, but
 “ upon those terms. This is no hasty ill-conducted scheme, but
 “ the settled resolution of the THREE BRIGADES, who are,
 “ to a man, resolved to send every officer to everlasting
 “ Coventry, who refuses to join in a cause so just and

A. D. 1766. April. "honourable. We therefore beg that you will, immediately
 "upon receipt of this, transmit your sentiments to some of
 "your friends here, who may communicate them to us. We
 "further beg, that you will consider maturely on this subject
 "before you come to any resolution; for depend upon it, we
 "are determined to go through with it, at the risque of life,
 "fortune, friends, and every thing that is dear and sacred.
 "The gentlemen at Moradbaug may be able to inform you
 "of material circumstances.—Till we have your answer, we
 "are truly and sincerely,

"Your friends,

"THE FIRST BRIGADE.

"*Monghyr, 27th April, 1766.*"

The "gentlemen at Moradbaug" alluded to above, were the officers of the detachment doing duty at Moorshedabad, all of whom were concerned in the projected arrangements.

This sudden and unexpected intelligence of so extensive and powerful a combination, struck the Members of Council with consternation, and was sufficient even to have tried the nerves of Lord Clive; but as truly remarked by Mr. Mill, "It was one of those scenes in which he was admirably calculated to act with success. Resolute and daring, fear never turned him aside from his purposes, or deprived him of the most collected exertion of his mind in the greatest emergencies."

He saw at once that the combination was general, but his knowledge of human nature convinced him that so considerable a number of men, actuated by so many various motives and principles, were not likely to persevere in a course criminal in itself, and, in the event of failure, entailing certain ruin. He knew that a few of the senior officers had acquired considerable fortunes during the late campaigns, and to them the loss of their commissions might be a matter of comparative indifference: but he also knew that the majority were, on the contrary, entirely dependent on the service for support, and that as the excitement wore off, and the crisis approached, they would naturally shrink from throwing aside their hopes of obtaining, not only an independence, but an

sc actual substance. It was true that this very circumstance—were the rubicon once passed,—might render them desperate; and enlisting the troops on their side, a general and fearful mutiny might ensue, which could only be suppressed by a powerful armed force from England, and even then the evils would be of the most serious nature. On the other hand, the slightest concession to a demand made in such a manner was out of the question; it was not only repugnant to the personal character of Clive, but would have been opposed to the practice of his whole career. Such a measure would have evinced the weakness of the Government, and the strength of the Army; a lesson which, once learned by the latter, was not likely to be speedily forgotten. Similar opposition might be made to any future measure of Government with equal success; new demands might arise, and be thus enforced; discipline and subordination would be at an end; and the Civil Government of the country become perfectly subservient to the Military.

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No time, however, was to be lost. On the 29th of April, Lord Clive formed a Special Committee, himself as President, and General Carnac and Mr. Sykes as members, in which it was determined that the demands of the officers should not be complied with, and an express was despatched to Calcutta requesting the Council to write to the Madras Government, informing them of the state of affairs, and urging them to send round as many Captains, Subalterns, and Cadets, as they could possibly spare, holding out every encouragement to the officers of that Army who should prove their zeal for the service, by coming round to Bengal.

A further resolution was passed, that any officer resigning his commission should be precluded from holding any place or situation whatever in the Company's service.

Copies of these resolutions, as conveyed in the letter to Council, were forwarded to the Commanding officers of the three Brigades, with authority to make the contents known to their officers, if they considered that this proof of the firm determination of Government was likely to be attended with success.

A. D. 1766. Lord Clive now determined to proceed to Mongheer and
May. Bankypore himself, as soon as arrangements could be made, and the immediate pressure of urgent business at Moorsheadabad would admit of his departure. He had with him a few officers on his own and General Carnac's Staff, whom he could depend upon; and there were a few more at the Presidency, on whom he could also rely: with these, and the aid of the Field officers, and the few with the Brigades, who had not joined the combination, he calculated upon being able to carry on affairs until the arrival of assistance from Madras. The officers at Moorshedabad had, as already stated, all entered into the combination, but Lord Clive expostulated with them, explained the heinous nature of their offence and the utter hopelessness of their succeeding; and by his representations, he brought them nearly all to a sense of their duty and prevented their resigning their commissions. Captains Sir John Cumming and Sir Alexander Mackenzie appeared inclined to hold out; but finally, on being forced into an explicit avowal of their determination, agreed to retain their commissions; but Lieutenant Silby Padmore of the same Corps, and Lieutenant Fireworker James Clarihue of the Artillery, persisted in resigning their commissions, which were accepted; both were subsequently restored some months after, on expressing contrition for their conduct. Lord Clive also wrote to the Council in Calcutta to endeavour to bring the officers at the Presidency and the neighbouring out-stations to reason, and their efforts also were in a great measure successful. Captain George Kinloch, who commanded a Company of Europeans stationed in Fort William, and Captain Robert Hampton and Ensign John Pillans at Midnapore, persisted in their adherence to the combination, and the resignation of their commissions was accepted. They also were all ultimately restored, but Captain Hampton not until several years after.

No further intelligence arriving for two or three days, Lord Clive began to hope, from this silence, that the officers having become alarmed, had upon mature consideration, abandoned their intention; but on the 2nd of May, he received

a letter from Sir Robert Barker, which convinced him that the 3rd Brigade was as unanimous as the 1st. The proceedings of the Court Martial on Captain-Lieutenant Duff and Ensign Davis accompanied this letter, and Sir Robert Barker reported that he had ordered the prisoners to Calcutta to await His Lordship's decision, and that he also purposed sending down those who appeared to be most active in the combination. To this Lord Clive replied without delay, directing Sir Robert Barker to find out if possible, in whose hands the commissions had been deposited, to put under arrest any officer whose conduct could come under the construction of mutiny, and to detain them at Bankypore until a general Court Martial of Field officers could be summoned, as Sir Robert had expressed his opinion that a trial by their comrades would be ineffectual, whilst it was absolutely necessary that some severe examples should be made. Similar instructions were sent to Sir Robert Fletcher and Colonel Smith; and to secure a sufficiency of Field officers, His Lordship promoted Captains Ironside and Polier to Brevet Majorities. In his letter to Colonel Smith, Lord Clive, in alluding to the letter signed "*The First Brigade*," expressed his determination, should he discover the authors of those anonymous letters to get them shot.

On the 29th of April, Sir Robert Barker wrote again to Lord Clive, stating his increased conviction that all the three Brigades were combined; that with a view of counteracting their plans in some measure by dividing them, and also to put their obedience to the proof, he had ordered a detachment to march towards Benares under Major Grant, to be ready to support Colonel Smith if attacked by the Mahrattas, as well as to preserve that city from any attempt at plunder. He further stated his confidence in being able to manage his own Brigade, but expressed anxiety regarding the 1st Brigade at Mongheer, which appeared to be the most violent of the three. Lord Clive also shared this anxiety, more especially as he had received no letter from Sir Robert Fletcher later than the 25th. He, therefore, wrote to him, repeating his directions for selecting the ring-leaders, whom

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A. D. 1766. he expressed his determination to punish, let the result be
 May. what it might; he further directed that every care should be taken to secure the fidelity of the Sipahis, especially of the Native officers, and finally announced his intention of starting for Mongheer in a couple of days. On that evening, a few lines were received from Sir Robert Fletcher, dated the 1st of May, enclosing a letter from the officers of the 1st Brigade, resigning their commissions, together with his reply; at the same time stating that he felt no apprehension for the conduct of the troops.

Affairs had now come to a crisis, and the date had arrived for the officers to put their plans in execution. Accordingly on the 1st of May, the 1st and 3rd Brigades, at their respective Head Quarters, resigned their commissions. The 1st Brigade sent theirs with the following letter, signed by all concerned:—

“ SIR,—That we might put it out of the power of either
 “ the world or our own consciences to reproach us for desir-
 “ ing leave to resign our commissions in the Company’s
 “ service, we have served four months, in obedience to the
 “ orders of the 31st December 1765, and we are now but
 “ too well convinced that our former suspicions were true: for
 “ notwithstanding the proposed reduction of servants’ wages
 “ and dismissing every unnecessary attendant, we find we
 “ cannot live upon the present allowances, but must every
 “ month run in debt, as long as we have any credit. We
 “ must appear upon the parade as becomes officers, and keep
 “ up our respective ranks, or disobey public orders; we
 “ must eat and drink as befits the climate, or fall sacrifices
 “ to hunger and sickness: and to do all these only in mo-
 “ deration, we must run in debt to every person who will
 “ give us any credit, be they men of honour, or the lowest
 “ in the creation; and so fall under the lash of another
 “ article of war, for behaving unlike gentlemen.

“ You know we have applied for redress in the humblest
 “ manner, and that it has been refused us; it is needless for
 “ us here to call upon you to witness for our attachment
 “ to our masters; our behaviour through a series of severe

“ campaigns must bear down all slander. Some of us have A D. 1766.
 “ eat the Company’s bread for some years, and are deeply May.
 “ concerned ; we can no more do it with honour. All of us
 “ are sorry to be obliged to take this method of preventing
 “ ruin and misery from falling upon ourselves and connec-
 “ tions ; and sincerely wish that our masters may ever meet
 “ with a set of officers as much attached and devoted to
 “ their service as we have always wished to approve our-
 “ selves, and who may maintain the affairs of the Company,
 “ to the latest posterity, in that splendour to which we have
 “ happily raised them. But unless the pay and batta of
 “ their troops is again restored to what it was in July and
 “ August 1763, our prayers are all that we can now give
 “ them.

“ As it is from principle we now resign the service, it
 “ would give us the greatest uneasiness should the affairs
 “ of our honourable masters suffer by so sudden a resignation.
 “ We have therefore resolved to serve them without pay of
 “ any kind, or being esteemed officers in their service, until
 “ the 15th of the present month of May, when an answer
 “ may be had from those gentlemen of the Council who, we
 “ know, have the power of granting us redress, or supplying
 “ our places with other officers, provided you desire it.

“ Our commissions accompany this, and we request you
 “ will keep them till the answer arrives ; and that you
 “ will at the same time direct the paymasters to issue
 “ the pay of the non-commissioned officers and private
 “ men upon unsigned abstracts, to prevent any suspicion
 “ or disturbances arising, which would give us the greatest
 “ uneasiness ; for we seek to live by our services, never to
 “ hurt our masters.

“ We are, with due respect, Sir, your, &c.

“ Benjamin Wilding, Captain.

“ John Mattocks, Ensign.

“ William Paton, Ensign.

“ Edward Rawstone, Ensign.

“ G. Geo. Hoggan, Ensign.

“ James Brown, Ensign.

“ Charles Bowles, Ensign.

“ C. H. Sarney, Ensign.

“ John Ferguson, Ensign.

“ William Bullingbrooke, Ensign.

“ Charles Marsacks, Ensign.

“ John O. Byrn, Ensign.

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>A. D. 1766.
May.</p> <p>“ John Anthony Vaziel, Ensign.
“ John Wood, Ensign.
“ James Dunbar, Lieutenant.
“ John Downes, 1st Lieutenant-
Artillery.
“ Francis Onge, Ensign.
“ Alex. Macpherson, Lieutenant
“ Joseph Bruce, Ensign.
“ G. Stranford, Lieut.-Fireworker,
Artillery.
“ Thomas Borthwick, Lieutenant.
“ William Elliot, Lieut.-Firework-
er, Artillery.
“ John M'Pherson.
“ William Heylon, Lieut.-Fire-
worker, Artillery.
“ C. Ironside, Lieutenant.</p> | <p>“ Thomas James, Lieut. Firework-
er, Artillery.
“ James Broadbent, Ensign.
“ William Henry Rice, Ensign.
“ Thomas Goddard, Captain.
“ Ch. J. J. Fielding, Captain.
“ Arthur Achmuty, Captain.
“ Roger Scarling, Captain.
“ John Stainforth, Captain.
“ J. Skinner, Lieut., Cavalry.
“ James Watts, Lieutenant.
“ P. Knudson, Lieutenant.
“ Horton Briseee, Lieutenant.
“ John Petrie, Lieutenant.
“ John Shrimpton, Lieutenant.
“ Arch. Stuart, 1st Lt., Artillery.
“ Thomas Briton, Lieutenant.
“ Robert Kyd, Lieutenant.</p> |
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“ *Monghyr, 1st May, 1766.*

“ P. S.—The guards shall be relieved this morning, and
“ every thing as usual, to prevent all suspicion.”

To this communication Sir Robert Fletcher returned the
following reply :—

“ GENTLEMEN,—I have received your letter of this date,
“ together with your commissions ; and shall, agreeable to
“ your request, take the most expeditious method of obtain-
“ ing you an answer from our superiors. I agree with
“ you in thinking it better that the soldiers remain ignorant
“ of the measure you have taken, and I desire you to
“ continue to do duty as officers, according to your former
“ respective ranks, until we know the pleasure of the Go-
“ vernor and Council.

“ I am, &c.,

“ ROBERT FEETCHER.

“ *Monghyr, 1st May, 1766.*”

The officers of the 3rd Brigade had, on the 29th of April,
apprized Sir Robert Barker of their intention to resign their

commissions from the 1st of May, but stated their readiness to serve until the 15th of the month without pay, upon which Sir Robert ordered them to assemble at his quarters on the following morning. He then remonstrated with them upon the course they were about to adopt, and represented to them that their conduct amounted to nothing short of mutiny and desertion; he urged them for their own sakes, to reflect upon the consequences, and to relinquish a project which, if persisted in, must inevitably entail ruin and dishonour on all concerned. This advice and exhortation coming from a Commanding Officer, universally beloved and respected, could not fail of having considerable weight, but unfortunately all the officers were too deeply involved; and at the close of the conference they stated frankly, but respectfully, “that they were solemnly bound and engaged with the other Brigades to offer their commissions on the 1st May, and that they could not be off.”

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May.

In accordance with this determination, on the succeeding day, the 1st of May, the officers who were present at Head Quarters, to the number of between fifty and sixty, directed Ensign Robertson, the Brigade Adjutant, to deliver in their commissions, which he did that forenoon, with the following laconic epistle to Sir Robert Barker:—

“SIR,—The enclosed letters were just now brought to me; one of them; directed to you, I send by desire of the officers of the Third Brigade; the other, I believe, you will think not improperly added.

“I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

“F. ROBERTSON, *Adjutant.*

“1st, May 1766.”

The enclosed letters alluded to by Mr. Robertson, consisted of a remonstrance addressed to Sir Robert, recapitulating their grievances, specifying the terms on which alone they would consent to serve in future, stating their readiness to serve as volunteers until the 15th of the month, and expressing their regard and respect for Sir Robert Barker per-

A. D. 1766. sonally : the other was to the following effect addressed to
 May. Ensign Robertson :—

“ TO ENSIGN ROBERTSON.

“ SIR,—We desire that you will, before 12 o'clock to-day, send our commissions to Sir Robert Barker, Colonel of the 3rd Brigade, together with the enclosed letter.

We are, your obedient servants,

“ OFFICERS OF THE 3RD BRIGADE.

“ 1st May, 1766,

“ Eleven o'clock, A. M.”

Sir Robert immediately returned these letters and the commissions, with an assurance that he would put the full penalties of Military law into force, with regard to any one who should misbehave or disobey his orders. He had for some time suspected that the Adjutant was an active member of the association, and in the afternoon he assembled a parade, and intimated to Mr Robertson that he should order him down to Calcutta, together with Captain Vernon Duffield, and two other officers, who had taken a leading part in the transaction. Immediately after the parade, Mr. Robertson sent him the following letter :—

“ Sir,—I did not well understand what last you spoke to
 “ me on the parade, whether it was that you mean to send
 “ me a prisoner to Calcutta, or that you expected I would go
 “ because you desired it. If the first, 'tis well ; if the latter,
 “ I must acquaint you that I, without having done anything
 “ unmilitary or improper, resigned the service this morning,
 “ releasing myself from military orders. You accepted,
 “ examined, but chose to return the commissions, 'mongst
 “ which, mine was one. If I have done wrong, I must be
 “ brought before the civil power, having freed myself from
 “ all military restrictions.

“ To leave this immediately will be to lose all I am worth ;
 “ so that 'twill be necessary to send me a prisoner, that I may
 “ know where to apply hereafter for restitution.

“ I am, Sir, your obedient humble servant,

“ F. ROBERTSON.”

This letter had no effect in altering Sir Robert's reso- A. D. 1766.
lution. Ensign Robertson and the other three officers were May.
sent off by water to Calcutta, and this determined conduct appeared to have a very salutary effect upon the rest of the Brigade, who continued to perform their duty without further disturbance, Sir Robert Barker lost no time in informing Lord Clive of all that had occurred, sending a list of all the officers who had resigned, pointing out those who were most deeply concerned, and requesting that a few officers who could be depended upon might be sent to him.

Matters had now reached a crisis, and Lord Clive, laying aside all other considerations, left Moorshedabad, accompanied by General Carnac, on the 6th of May, the day he received Sir Robert Barker's communication, determining to push for Mongheer by forced marches, which place he hoped to reach by the 14th of the month. He had with him Captains MacPherson, Douglas Hill, Scipio Carnac, John Graham, and Lieutenant Daniel Butler of the Artillery, who had come round from Madras the preceding year, on account of the augmentation. A few days previous, he had sent forward Majors Champion and Polier, with Captains F. Smith, J. Pearson, and Fleming Martin the Chief Engineer; and left orders for Majors Ironside and Fischer, with all the trustworthy officers that could be collected at the Presidency, to follow as speedily as possible. On the evening of the 6th, Lord Clive received a letter from Sir Robert Fletcher, enclosing a letter to his brother, a Captain at Madras, open for his Lordship's perusal, mentioning that the officers at Bengal were about to write to those at Madras, urging them not to accede to any propositions for coming round, by which the whole service would be enabled to demand the full Batta. This scheme was eminently calculated to defeat the objects of Government; but immediately on receiving the intelligence, Lord Clive sent off an express to Calcutta, informing the Council of this circumstance, and recommending them for the present to detain all private letters to and from Madras, except such as could not be suspected to relate to the combination; and in the present excited state of the army, he recommended that similar steps

A. D. 1766. should also be taken in the Calcutta Post Office, for stop-
 May. ping all communications between the different Brigades and the Presidency. Lord Clive, during the first few days of his march, received several letters from Colonels Fletcher and Barker; the former mentioned that he had remonstrated with the officers of his Brigade, but found them more determined than ever, being confident of the success of their communications to Madras; that they continued however, to do duty, and that he had sent down Captain Wilding and Lieutenant Petrie to Calcutta, upon suspicion of their having taken an active part in the combination, but that matters had been so well arranged, it was impossible to detect the ring-leaders. Sir Robert Barker also reported that his officers continued to do duty, and were very orderly and quiet, but that their resolution was not altered; and that he understood they had, upon his returning their commissions, forwarded them all to Government direct. This supposition was correct, for on the second day's march, Lord Clive met an express with a packet addressed to the Governor and Council, which on being opened was found to contain the whole of the commissions, together with a letter dated the 1st of May, tendering their resignation. The letter he immediately forwarded to Council, but retained the commissions.

In the mean time, the Council in Calcutta had confirmed the proceedings of Lord Clive's Committee at Moorshedabad, had followed their instructions, and written to both Madras and Bombay for assistance in Captains, Subalterns, and Cadets. They also applied to the free merchants and others residing at the Presidency to enter the service, either permanently or temporarily, until officers should arrive from the other Presidencies, offering great advantages in regard to free trade to such as would afford temporary assistance; but although in Calcutta alone there were upwards of one hundred gentlemen, young and able bodied, and although they knew that the duty was one merely of parade, and likely to be of very short duration, only two could be found out of the whole number to accept commissions; a sufficient proof of their sentiments on the subject. Neither were the attempts to in-

duce the gentlemen settled up the country to render assistance at this important crisis much more successful, only one or two coming forward; of this small number was Mr. Archibald Keir, who had resigned his commission in 1758 on account of being superseded by Major Govin. He was now engaged in trade at Patna, and offered his services to Sir Robert Barker, who gladly accepted them, granting him a Captain's commission, which he held until matters were peaceably settled, when he returned to his commercial speculations. The Council also drew up a letter dated the 6th of May, addressed to Sir Robert Fletcher, expressing their surprise at the extraordinary and unwarrantable conduct of the officers of the First Brigade, authorising him to accept every commission that was tendered, and to send down in Calcutta every officer who resigned the service, within twenty-four hours of his taking that step.

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This letter was sent to Lord Clive for his approval and signature, as also that of General Carnac, and reached them at Sikreegullee on the 10th of May. They immediately signed and forwarded it, and sent a copy to Sir Robert Barker, that he might intimate to the officers of the Third Brigade this resolution on the part of the Council. The following was the letter in question:—

“ Sir,—The address to you, from the officers of the First
 “ Brigade, which you transmitted in your letter to the Pre-
 “ sident on the 1st instant, may produce surprise, but cannot
 “ shake that firmness with which we are determined to pursue
 “ every measure we think conducive to the interest of our con-
 “ stituents, and necessary to our own honour. That gentle-
 “ men, risen to the rank of captains upon the military esta-
 “ blishment, and who now enjoy greater advantages, and
 “ receive more pay, than field officers in any other service in
 “ the world, should subscribe to an unmilitary dishonourable
 “ combination, to distress the government by which they are
 “ supported, will certainly be no recommendation to His
 “ Majesty's service, and it will be our care that such conduct
 “ be carefully reported to the Court of Directors, to be laid
 “ by them before the Secretary at War.

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“ We are even astonished at the complaints of the subal-
“ terns, who had certainly not reflected upon the situation
“ of His Majesty’s subaltern officers, when they subscribed
“ to this letter of resignation. Let their pay be compared,
“ and it will appear they bear no manner of proportion,
“ after all allowances are made for the difference of climates,
“ and the different nature of the services.

“ Whatever plea there may be for the conduct of the
“ officers of the Battalion, there surely can be no excuse for
“ those who enjoy double posts, or those who are attached
“ to the sepoys.

“ These remarks we offer, not with a view of persuading
“ them to alter a resolution that may subject the service to
“ some inconvenience; on the contrary, we desire you will
“ accept of all such other commissions as are offered; and
“ we farther direct, that you will order down to Calcutta,
“ **within the space** of twenty-four hours, all those who have
“ already resigned, since we can place no great confidence in
“ the zeal of men who have deserted their duty, in a manner
“ inconsistent with the character of officers and gentlemen;
“ for whatever they may think of the service, we are convin-
“ ced that persons of equal merit will be glad to accept it
“ upon the present footing.

“ Humanity obliges us to be truly sorry that the rashness
“ of a few should have precipitated into ruin, a number of
“ gentlemen who might, in a short space of time, have acquir-
“ ed fortunes with reputation and honour; and who will now
“ find that they have forfeited a service superior, even in its
“ reduced condition, to any station in life to which they can
“ possibly form pretensions.

“ We are, &c.

“ *Fort William, 6th May, 1766.*”

On the 11th, a letter was received from Colonel Smith, dated the 20th April, announcing that a considerable detachment of the Mahratta force had moved down the Jumna, and taken up a position nearly opposite Korah; and that Balajee Rao, with 60,000 Horse, had arrived at Kulpee, and was collecting boats preparatory to crossing the river.

General Smith's letter was addressed to the Select Committee ; A. D. 1766.
May,
but as the members of that body were so distributed, and the matter emergent, Lord Clive took upon himself the responsibility of answering it. He immediately invested General Smith with a discretionary power in all matters, military or political, affecting his position ; and also authorised him to exert the same discretion with respect to the officers of his Brigade, should their conduct and the advance of the enemy render any concession absolutely necessary ; this power, however, was only to be exercised in case of the utmost extremity. After recapitulating the conduct of the other two Brigades, Lord Clive observed :—

“ I have been thus particular, in order that you might not
 “ be unacquainted with the proceedings below, as they may
 “ enable you to foresee the consequences of a like combina-
 “ tion amongst the officers of your Brigade. It is confident-
 “ ly asserted that every officer under your command, except
 “ two, have signed an agreement to resign, from the same
 “ motives urged at Patna and Monghyr. But as you are entire-
 “ ly silent upon the subject, and the troops upon actual service,
 “ I entertain some hopes that the gentlemen with you have more
 “ honour than to join in such a mutinous and unmilitary asso-
 “ ciation. It is necessary, however, that you should be prepared
 “ how to act upon so disagreeable an event, if it should hap-
 “ pen. Whilst an enemy threatens to approach, I conclude it
 “ absolutely impracticable to part with your officers, since
 “ their commissions cannot be instantly supplied. In case,
 “ therefore, the Morattoes should still appear to intend an
 “ invasion, or in case you apprehend a mutiny among the
 “ troops, but in no other case, you have my authority to
 “ make terms with the officers of your Brigade, upon their
 “ tendering their commissions. The critical juncture will,
 “ I think, render such a submission on your part unavoida-
 “ ble for the present, if they should dare to take such a step,
 “ which I should imagine they would not, as they are now
 “ in the field, and consequently receive double batta. Be-
 “ sides, it is hardly to be suspected that they would expose
 “ themselves to the hazard of a general court martial, by

A. D. 1766. “ deserting their posts in the very face of the enemy ; al-
 May. “ though their not having entered into a contract to serve for
 “ a limited time may, by construction of the mutiny act,
 “ which certainly supposes such a contract to subsist, give
 “ them hopes of escaping the severity of martial law.”

It should be mentioned here, that to add to Lord Clive's troubles and difficulties, he had received intimation the previous day of the somewhat sudden death of the young Nawaub Nudjm-oo-Dowlah, which took place at Moorshedabad on the 8th of May. Fortunately, through the agency of Mr. Sykes, a brother of the deceased Nawaub, under the title of Syf-oo-Dowlah, was raised to the musnud without any disturbance.

During the next two days, Lord Clive continued to receive satisfactory accounts from both Sir Robert Flecher and Sir Robert Barker. The former wrote strongly of his confidence in the troops, whose conduct he represented as most orderly and obedient, and on whose fidelity he declared his readiness to stake his life. He further reported that he had given commissions to an Assistant Surgeon, two Cadets, and a Serjeant. He reported, however, that the officers had refused to do any further duty ; but that, with reference to Lord Clive's near approach, he had requested them to continue with the Brigade for another day or two, but that some of them had begun to be very troublesome, and exhibited an intention of encamping by themselves and awaiting the arrival of the officers of the other two Brigades, and that he anticipated it would be necessary to employ force with them at last. On the 13th, Lord Clive was detained for a whole day by the sudden rising of the Turmonee Nullah, but on the morning of the 15th he reached Mongheer.

In the mean time, Major Champion and the other officers who had been sent forward from Moorshedabad had arrived there, and found affairs differing considerably from the representations of Sir Robert Fletcher. It was late at night on the 12th of May, when they reached the station, and they were much surprised to hear the drums beating and other signs of disturbance at that hour. On proceeding to Sir Robert's quarters, they found half the European Regiment there drink-

ing and singing and the drummers beating. [The following A. D. 1766.
morning, they went about amongst the officers of their ac- May.
quaintance, endeavouring to recall them to a sense of their
duty, or at least to induce them to remain until the arrival of
Lord Clive. They pointed out the disgrace and ruin that
must attend upon a perseverance in the course adopted,
that their conduct could be considered in no other light than
mutiny; that if the soldiers should follow their example,
bloodshed must ensue, and they would be responsible for the
lives of their countrymen who might be sacrificed, and for
the injury that must accrue to the British interests. That they
could not flatter themselves with any hope of success, as
Lord Clive had determined rather to lose his life than con-
cede one jot to their demands, or to make any terms with a
body who were endeavouring to destroy every principle of
discipline and subordination. They further remonstrated up-
on their ingratitude towards that nobleman personally, after
his late generous donation, in the establishment of a fund
for their benefit.]

The officers generally replied to these arguments by ex-
pressing their regret that matters had gone so far, but
that they were now bound in honour to the other Brigades
to persevere in their intentions; that they had fully ima-
gined their unanimity must have insured success, and had
never contemplated that his Lordship would continue
inflexible under such circumstances; that they had never
heard a word before of his Lordship's donation, Sir Robert
Fletcher having kept the intimation of that circumstance to
himself; that had they been acquainted with it, self-interest
as well as gratitude would have prevented the combination.
This secrecy on so important a subject they attributed to in-
terested motives on the part of Sir Robert Fletcher, of whose
conduct and duplicity they bitterly complained. They declar-
ed that he himself had originated the combination and artfully
made tools of them in carrying out his private views of op-
posing Lord Clive's Government. Several amongst them,
and especially Captain Goddard, lamented the want of an op-
portunity to lay the whole affair personally before Lord Clive;

A. D. 1766. but begged of Major Champion and Captains Smith and Pearson to make him acquainted with the real state of the case. Finally, they volunteered their services in the event of any disturbance arising amongst the European troops, an event of which they admitted the probability, but expressed their determination of using every endeavour to prevent or to put down.
 May.

On the 13th, Major Champion and Captain Pearson proceeded to Kurruckpore, where the Sipahi Battalions were encamped, whilst the other officers of the party remained in garrison to be ready to act in case of a mutiny of the Europeans, which was now much to be apprehended; in consequence of which, Captain F. Smith proceeded to bring up two Battalions of Sipahis from the camp. These arrived about midnight and took up a position on the general parade, where they lay upon their arms until morning, when they proceeded to their own parade, which commanded the principal gate of the fort, and was altogether a more eligible situation—being within the fort itself. The expected arrival of Lord Clive was made the plea for this movement.

In the afternoon, Captain Smith received a message from Sir Robert Fletcher, to get the two Battalions under arms, as the Europeans had mutinied. Captain Smith, who had expected this event, had previously reconnoitred the ground in the vicinity of the European barracks, and had made up his mind to seize the Saluting Battery, which, being situated upon a hillock, completely commanded the barracks; and from its situation, and the guns mounted upon it, was a position of importance. Immediately upon receiving the summons, he paraded the two Battalions, and marched them off to the scene of action, to which, although they knew they were to be opposed to the Europeans, they proceeded without the slightest symptom of fear or hesitation. Captain Smith had no other European officer with him; but on the road, he met one of the resigned officers, whom he directed to take charge of the rear Battalion; but finding that he hesitated to obey, he turned from him and gave the command of it to the Native Commandant, taking charge of the other himself. Instead

of proceeding by the regular road, he made a detour, and, A. D. 1766.
 marching with extreme silence, reached the back of the hill
 without being observed, when, suddenly rushing up, he took
 possession of the Saluting Battery. Here he obtained a
 complete view of what was passing below him. The European
 Battalion had got under arms, and were preparing to leave
 the Fort and follow their officers, and the Artillery were
 about to do the same, but the unexpected appearance of this
 firm line of Sipahis, with their bayonets fixed and arms
 loaded, threw them into some confusion, of which Captain
 Smith immediately took advantage, and warned them that if
 they did not retire peaceably into their barracks he would fire
 upon them at once. Sir Robert Fletcher, who came up at this
 juncture also, harangued the troops, and distributed money
 amongst them. They now became quiet, and said that they had
 expected he would have placed himself at their head, otherwise
 they would not have thought of turning out; that if such
 was not the case, their officers might go where they pleased,
 but they would stay, and live or die with him alone.

Whilst Sir Robert was on the parade, several of the resigned
 officers came up, hearing that the men had mutinied, and offer-
 ed their services to assist him, which he declined and ordered
 them all to leave the garrison within two hours, under pain
 of being sent off in charge of a guard. In the evening, they
 had all left the fort except three, two of whom were confined
 to their beds by sickness. Sir Robert the same day reported
 this occurrence to Lord Clive, dwelling strongly upon, and
 apparently exaggerating the conduct of the officers. His
 letter further contained the following startling paragraph:—
 “ Some have been very troublesome and particularly those
 “ whom I have all along suspected, and *whose confidence I*
 “ *used every art to gain in January last, when I heard that*
 “ *the whole were to form a plan of quitting the Brigade*
 “ *without giving any warning. I even went so far as to ap-*
 “ *prove of some of their schemes, that they might do*
 “ *nothing without my knowledge.*” A strange confession for
 a Commanding Officer, and more especially for one whose
 first intimation to Government of any knowledge of such

A. D. 1766. a scheme being on foot, was dated the 25th of April previous,
May. when it could be no longer concealed.

Lord Clive, however, whose suspicions had previously been excited, did not think it advisable to take any notice of the circumstances at that time. On the following day, the 15th, His Lordship reached Mongheer. The next morning, the whole of the troops were paraded for inspection, the Europeans appearing very clean and orderly. His Lordship examined them attentively, and then addressed himself to the Europeans. He represented to them the nature of the crime the officers had committed, explained the grounds upon which the disaffection had arisen, and the little real cause that existed for complaint. He pointed out that the double Batta was altogether an indulgence, which had been granted under peculiar circumstances, but had never constituted a right, and had never before been claimed as such; that the withholding it was an act of the Company and that the Local Government had only obeyed orders, which they had no power to set aside or to modify; that the combination of the officers was an act of gross insubordination and positive mutiny; that the ring-leaders would suffer the severest penalties of martial law, and the inferior offenders be sent to England by the first available ships. He further observed that he himself was a soldier, that he had always endeavoured to prove himself the friend of the Army and to promote its interests; that he had lately given a strong proof of this regard by establishing a fund for the support of all officers and men who should be invalided or worn out in the service, and also to the widows of those who died; and concluded by exhorting them to sobriety and orderly behaviour, until the arrival of the officers who were then on the road to Mongheer. He then addressed the Sipahis through an interpreter, applauded them for their recent conduct, and the proof that had exhibited of their fidelity and attachment to the Company. Finally he distributed honorary rewards amongst the Native Commandants and officers, and ordered double pay to be issued to the men for the months of May and June.]

The whole Brigade expressed themselves much pleased with the notice taken of them by their Commander-in-Chief; and after giving three hearty cheers, retired quietly and steadily to the barracks and lines.

A. D. 1786.
May.

[The resigned officers had all encamped at a short distance from Mongheer, intending to wait for their comrades of the other Brigades; but Lord Clive ordered them all to proceed to Calcutta forthwith; and to enforce compliance, he sent out a detachment of Sipahis, with orders, if any demur occurred, to take them down by force. This measure had the desired effect, and the detachment soon returned with a report that the whole were on their way in small parties of three and four, some marching, and others proceeding by water. Those officers, chiefly Subalterns, who were at the out-posts, and whose commissions had not been sent in, owing to their absence, were now directed to proceed to Mongheer, where, warned by the example of the others, they exhibited no inclination to resign, but on the contrary, readily undertook the duties of the station, where they were shortly afterwards joined by ten or twelve more officers from Calcutta.]

Affairs being thus satisfactorily settled at Mongheer, Lord Clive sent on as many officers as he could spare to join Sir Robert Barker at Patna, and started himself on the 17th of the month, with the same intention.

Neither the officers or men of the 3rd Brigade had behaved with the same degree of insubordination as those at Mongheer: the former had all resigned according to their agreement, but the influence of Sir Robert Barker, who was respected and beloved by all ranks, prevented them from committing any disturbance, whilst the discipline he had established, kept the European Regiment in excellent order.

The greatest difficulty he experienced was from the Artillery officers, who appear all to have been deeply implicated in the mutiny; but as he had originally belonged to that branch, he took the command of the Company himself, as also of one of the Sipahi Battalions, probably the one he had raised, (*the present 17th N. I.*)

On the 20th of May, Lord Clive and General Carnac reached Bankypore, when the officers, who had for the most part con-

A. D. 1766. continued to perform their duty in the usual manner, and who were
 May. heartily ashamed of their past conduct, and also—from what had occurred at Mongheer and the arrival of the several officers who had been sent forward from that station,—now saw that their chance of success was hopeless, tendered their submissions, and all such as had behaved with moderation were pardoned; when order and subordination were speedily restored to the Brigade.

It now only remains to notice the proceedings of the officers of the 2nd Brigade under the command of Colonel Smith, who being in a measure on service and liable at any moment to be called into the field, placed their Commanding Officer and the Government in a very critical position. Owing to the distance of this Brigade, information could not be conveyed to them in time, of the resolve of the other two Brigades to anticipate the date of their resignation, and to fix the 1st of May for that proceeding. Early in that month, however, they were apprized of what had taken place at Mongheer and Patna, and on the 6th of May, the whole of the officers in the camp at Soorajpore, with two exceptions, wrote to the Colonel, tendering their resignations, some demanding their discharge immediately, but the majority offering to serve without pay until the 1st of June. Colonel Smith was not prepared for this measure, and his surprise at the conduct of his officers was extreme. He immediately issued the following order, expressing his sense of their most unmilitary conduct:—

*“ General orders by Colonel Smith, at the camp in the lines
 “ of Serrajepore, 6th May 1766.*

“ The Colonel cannot find words sufficiently strong to express his astonishment at the conduct of all those officers
 “ who have applied to him for leave to quit the service at
 “ this particular juncture, at a time when an enemy’s army,
 “ and that army so numerous, is encamped at no great distance from us. This is a behaviour so foreign to every
 “ thing that has the least connection with honour, that the
 “ Colonel blushes to find his countrymen can so readily
 “ sacrifice their own reputation to any private views or considerations whatsoever: when these honourable motives

“ have no longer any influence, the service of such officers A. D. 1766.
 “ is by no means desirable. Captains Scott and Auch- May.
 “ muty, Captain-Lieutenants Clifton and Black, Lieutenant
 “ Ellerker, and Ensign Maverly, having requested leave
 “ to resign, are ordered to proceed to Calcutta direct-
 “ ly. All those officers who have been pleased to fix the
 “ 1st of June as the period of their services, shall have an
 “ answer before that day : in the mean time, the Colonel can-
 “ not but remark, that those officers who have requested leave
 “ to resign their commissions, have set a most extraordinary
 “ example to the black troops, and the Colonel, by their con-
 “ duct, will be reduced to the necessity of placing that confi-
 “ dence in the fidelity of the black officers, which hitherto had
 “ been properly reposed in the zeal of his fellow countrymen.

“ RICHARD SMITH.”

This done, he lost no time in writing to the Select Committee, informing them of what had occurred, in the following communication :—

“ MY LORD AND GENTLEMEN,—With surprize and concern
 “ I acquaint you, that the major part of the officers of this
 “ detachment have wrote to me for leave to resign their com-
 “ missions : some have demanded their discharge immedi-
 “ ately, others at the expiration of the month. I transmit
 “ you a copy of the orders of the day, which will shew in
 “ lively colours my opinion of this transaction ; in the mean
 “ time, I request your immediate answer concerning this event,
 “ with your instructions.

“ The officers of the garrison at Allahabad have also
 “ signed a request of the same nature ; but, as it was smug-
 “ gled to me, without coming through the proper channel,
 “ I shall return it to them ; however, it serves to convince
 “ me that this is a general disaffection.

“ If all the officers of this detachment had determined
 “ to turn about on their colours, it should have had no
 “ effect upon my measures. The field officers, and some
 “ two or three others, who have not forgot what they owe to
 “ their own honour, must exert themselves with more ala-

A. D. 1766. " crity. I have the honour to subscribe myself, with much
 May. " respect, &c.

" RICHARD SMITH.

" *Camp in the lines of* }
 " *Serrajepore, 6th May, 1766.*" }

This letter reached Lord Clive on the 15th, the morning of his arrival at Mongheer, who immediately replied to the following effect:—

" SIR,—I have received your letter addressed to the Select
 " Committee, by which I am informed of the mutinous be-
 " haviour of the officers of your brigade, and inclosing your
 " general orders, in consequence of several officers present
 " and upon actual service, and almost in the face of an
 " enemy, desiring leave to resign their commissions.

" Such a conduct, at such a juncture, does these officers
 " as much dishonour as your spirited and soldier-like be-
 " haviour does you honour; and I am persuaded the whole
 " board will join with me in acknowledging your services
 " upon this very interesting occasion.

" My last letter will be a guide for you how to act. Time
 " and circumstances must be considered; but that you
 " may not be ignorant of what is going on in the other bri-
 " gades, I must inform you that on the 7th, the General
 " and I, with several other officers, set out from Sydokbaug,
 " and sent forward Majors Champion and Polier, Captains
 " Smith and Pearson, who arrived here on the 11th. We
 " should have been here ourselves by the 13th at night, or
 " 14th in the morning, but the heavy rains filled the nullas
 " so considerably, that we could not reach Monghyr before
 " this morning. Yesterday afternoon, upon my having or-
 " dered all the Captains down to Calcutta, the officers be-
 " came very riotous: and whilst they were holding their
 " last consultations, the men began to get under arms, de-
 " claring they would follow their officers; but upon Captain
 " Smith's marching down with a battalion of sepoy, and
 " Sir Robert Fletcher's haranguing them, they declared they
 " understood all the officers were leaving the fort, headed by
 " the commander; but upon being assured to the contrary,

“ they promised to behave as soldiers ought, and retired A. D. 1766.
 “ quietly to their barracks. The black sepoy officers, as well May.
 “ as men, have given great proofs of fidelity and steadiness
 “ upon this occasion; and so long as they remain so, no-
 “ thing is to be apprehended from the European soldiery,
 “ even if they should be mutinously inclined. Sir Robert
 “ Fletcher, having had reason to suspect some of the officers
 “ were concerned in stirring up the men, turned them all out
 “ of the fort: they are now encamped at the distance of
 “ three miles, and I have ordered them to depart to-morrow
 “ morning.

“ The day after to-morrow, the General and myself, with
 “ ten or twelve officers, proceed with all expedition to Patna;
 “ and after having settled every thing there, we shall pro-
 “ ceed to Benares and Allahabad. Our chief anxiety is,
 “ lest this disaffection, if known to the Morattoes, should
 “ encourage them to commit hostilities. We expect fifteen
 “ officers from Calcutta, and I hope we shall be able to sup-
 “ ply you in time with a sufficient number to keep your bri-
 “ gade in order, until we receive relief from the Coast.

“ It would be proper, I think, for you to make known to
 “ your Brigade, that I have lately lodged to the amount of
 “ near seventy thousand pounds (a legacy left me by Meer
 “ Jaffier) in the Company's cash, the interest of which I
 “ have established as a fund for the support of officers and
 “ men, who may be disabled or worn out in the service.

“ To a colonel, 500*l.* per annum; to a lieutenant colo-
 “ nel, 300*l.*; to a major, 200*l.*; to a captain, 150*l.*; to a lieu-
 “ tenant, 100*l.*; to an ensign, 70*l.*; to a serjeant, 20*l.*; to a
 “ corporal, 15*l.*; and 10*l.* to a private man; a part of which
 “ pensions is to be continued to their widows.*

“ I have not yet acknowledged the receipt of your letter
 “ to the Select Committee of the 5th instant: I shall ap-
 “ prove of your remaining in the field to the last moment.

“ I am, &c.,

“ CLIVE.

“ *Monghyr, 15th May, 1766.*”

* This establishment was afterwards differently regulated by the Company.

A. D. 1766.
May.

The order issued by Colonel Smith on the 6th of May, called forth the following intemperate and unmilitary letter from the officers of Brigade then in camp:—

“ TO COLONEL RICHARD SMITH, *Commander-in-chief, &c.*
 “ SIR,—When aspersions, unmerited, ungenerous, and un-
 “ just, are publicly cast, with evident intentions to blacken
 “ the reputation of a corps, who have by length of service,
 “ and the most ardent zeal, eminently distinguished them-
 “ selves for their beloved country, the honourable Company,
 “ and their own honour; and who have repeatedly been wit-
 “ ness to the vanity of endeavouring, by representations the
 “ most submissive and most consistent with the character
 “ they are determined to maintain, of hoping the least re-
 “ dress or prospect of relief from grievances insupportable
 “ to their minds, it behoveth them, in vindication of them-
 “ selves, to make this public testimonial. That neither the
 “ supposed enemy, which they despise, nor the design of in-
 “ juring their honourable masters, which they hold dear,
 “ has the least tendency, nor was the smallest motive con-
 “ ducive to the request of any individual of this corps, for
 “ liberty to resign a service, which, with the utmost regret,
 “ they are compelled to relinquish, for that happiness, which
 “ is the only end of their being, in more hospitable climates,
 “ when even hopes are annihilated here. Can it, therefore,
 “ be expected, that any ties can be more binding than the
 “ ties of nature; or that freedom, and the desire of that
 “ liberty we inherit from our fathers, can be denominated dis-
 “ honour or reproach? But though firmly assured of the
 “ justice and probity of our proceedings as individuals, we
 “ cannot behold, without something more than sorrow, the
 “ public orders of the 6th instant, which, as they can be pro-
 “ ductive of no compunction in minds satisfied with them-
 “ selves, we humbly think that, whatever part of them was
 “ intended to stigmatize us with dishonour, had much better
 “ been omitted: as this is a point every gentleman will find
 “ too hard to reconcile to his own breast; we are sorry we
 “ are obliged to give this instance of gratitude to the service,
 “ at the peril of losing that honour, which than life, is to a

“ soldier more dear. In the mean time, we will adhere to A. D. 1766.
 “ our duty, in the manner each has signified for himself: May.
 “ but to continue service without confidence, yea, without
 “ honour, as by imputation we are at present supposed,
 “ were, in reality, to be what we are thought, and to merit
 “ what we do not deserve. We desire therefore that
 “ this may be forwarded to the honourable President and
 “ Council, that by no misrepresentations we may yet suffer in
 “ their esteem, and are still with the greatest respect,
 “ Sir, your most obedient, humble servants,

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| “ David Scott, Captain. | “ Richd. Rice, Ensign. |
| “ A. Forbes Auchmuty, Ditto. | “ Matt. Nail, 2d Lieut., Artillery. |
| “ Ch. Clifton, Capt.-Lt., Artillery. | “ Hen. Lidele, Lieut., F. Artillery. |
| “ Alexr. Black, Ditto Ditto. | “ John Buckley, Ensign. |
| “ E. Ellerker, Lieutenant. | “ Robt. Brooke, Lieutenant. |
| “ C. Maverly, Ensign. | “ Wm. Vertue, Lieutenant. |
| “ Alexr. Dow, Captain. | “ Wm. Benton, Lieutenant. |
| “ James Nicols, Captain. | “ Denis Fieldhouse, Ensign. |
| “ Wm. Fenwick, Lieutenant. | “ Danl. Dow, Ensign. |
| “ John Jones, Lieutenant. | “ Gabl. Harper, Lieutenant. |
| “ G. B. Eyres, Lieutenant. | “ Gabl. Johnstone, Ensign. |

“ 7th May, 1766.”

To this, as before, the Colonel replied by Brigade Order to the following effect:—

“ *General orders,—Camp in the lines of Serrajepore,*
 “ *May, 18th, 1766.*

“ As the first point of the honour in all officers of the
 “ army should be fidelity to the state they serve, so no
 “ private considerations can exculpate or extenuate the
 “ conduct of those officers who can so far forget their duty
 “ as to form an association against their superiors, more
 “ especially at a time when the troops are employed, and
 “ possibly actual service may happen. The Colonel is
 “ therefore invariable in his opinion, and thinks such
 “ conduct is foreign to every thing that has the least con-
 “ nection with honour. For this reason, those officers who
 “ fixed so short a period to their services, were promised an

A. D. 1766. “ answer before the end of the month. The Colonel has
 May. “ received a letter, signed by the major part of the detach-
 “ ment. When officers forget what they owe to their own
 “ honour and the public service, the Colonel is by no means
 “ surprized they should forget the respect due to him ;
 “ therefore, as Captains Dow and Nicols, Lieutenants Eyres,
 “ Benton, and Jones, had acquainted the Colonel with their
 “ intentions to resign at the end of this month, he now
 “ directs those officers to proceed without delay to Calcutta.

“ RICHARD SMITH.”

On the same afternoon, Lieutenant Vertue, the Adjutant of the Brigade, came to Colonel Smith, and desired leave to resign his commission at once. The Colonel told him that, by the order of the 6th, he had been promised a reply before the end of the month, and that he certainly should have, but no permission to resign at once. After some altercation, Lieutenant Vertue told the Colonel that if his commission was not accepted, he should be under the necessity of leaving it there. He accordingly laid it down upon the table, acquainted the Colonel that he had done so, and took his leave. Colonel Smith finding that in spite of his refusal, the Lieutenant had actually left the camp, ordered out a party of Sipahis to arrest him, and sent him down to Patna to be tried by a General Court Martial.

In a few days, the Colonel received Lord Clive's letters of the 29th of April and 2nd of May, and immediately published his Lordship's sentiments, and the resolution of the Select Committee. The officers of the 2nd European Regiment who remained in garrison had also sent in a letter resigning their commissions, upon which the Colonel wrote to Major Smith, who was in command at Allahabad, to use his exertions to bring them to a sense of their duty, and at the same time dispatched to them the following letter himself:—

“ TO THE CAPTAINS AND SUBALTERNS OF THE SECOND RE-
 “ GIMENT OF INFANTRY, IN GARRISON AT ALLAHABAD.

“ GENTLEMEN,—If the public service could possibly dis-
 “ pense with my absence from the camp, most assuredly I

" would repair to Allahabad, for I cannot read your letter A. D. 1766.
 " to me, wherein you declare your intentions of resigning May.
 " your commissions, without feeling the utmost concern: as I
 " cannot therefore assemble you together in person, I must
 " take this method of offering my sentiments. I entreat of
 " you, Gentlemen, for your own honour, for my honour, and
 " for the honour of the regiment, to weigh well this matter;
 " view it I beseech you, divested of prejudice, and suffer not
 " yourselves to be trifled with against your better judgment.
 " I have transmitted Major Smith, the commanding officer at
 " Allahabad, the fixed determination of Lord Clive and the
 " Committee, with some other papers relative to this matter,
 " which he will communicate to you. It is impossible for me
 " to see, without the most alarming reflections, all those in-
 " evitable consequences which must ensue, if you persist in
 " this improper measure. I conjure you, therefore, not wan-
 " tonly to abandon your fair prospects in this service; and as
 " I have not yet transmitted your request to the Committee,
 " I cannot receive a juster satisfaction than a desire from you
 " to suppress it.

" To my situation in the field you are no strangers; let me
 " but hear you are again steady in your duty, and I shall send
 " orders for many of you to join me with the utmost expedi-
 " tion, that if the enemy should attempt to enter these provin-
 " ces, we may share the honour of defeating their intentions.

" With real regard I am, Gentlemen, your most obe-
 " dient, humble servant,

" RICHARD SMITH.

" *Head Quarters, in the lines of* }
 " *Serajepoor, 12th May, 1766.* }

This letter, instead of inducing the officers to return to their duty, only elicited the following insolent reply:—

" TO COLONEL RICHARD SMITH.

" SIR,—Your letter addressed to us, and that of the honour-
 " able Committee to the Council, have been made public to
 " us by the Major this morning; and we are no ways surpriz-

A. D. 1766. " ed, that after the infamy you have attempted to brand us
 May. " with in the order of the sixth (May), you should entertain
 " the mean opinion of us, that we should be frightened from
 " any resolutions we have already testified to the public.
 " The temerity of an order of this kind is what principally
 " surprized us, as we can conceive no good end it would an-
 " swer to the service, while opposite consequences may be
 " evident; you have therefore put it out of our power to
 " render the honourable Company those voluntary services
 " we had before offered; so that we are come to a final
 " determination of proceeding downwards, as we plainly
 " perceive, by your not transmitting our letters to the Council,
 " that we are trifled with; and we are unanimously resolved
 " to set out for Calcutta on the 20th instant.

" We are, Sir, with due respect,

' THE GENTLEMEN OF THE 2ND REGIMENT.'

This announcement of their resolution not to serve after the 20th of May, placed Major Smith in a most difficult and painful position. Every Captain and Subaltern in the Regiment had entered into the combination, with exception to Lieutenant Delafield, and many of them behaved in such an insolent and turbulent manner, as to lead him to believe that they were rather inclined to promote than discourage a mutiny amongst the men. The letter to the Colonel above quoted, was of so insolent a nature, that the Major had intended to have put them all in arrest, but he was apprehensive that if he did so, they would excite the soldiers to open sedition. Under these circumstances, he sent off an express to Soorajpore, requesting that his own old Battalion (*the present 8th N. I.*), on whose conduct he knew that he might safely rely, might be ordered into Garrison immediately. With this request, the Colonel instantly complied, and the Battalion left Camp without delay, under the command of Lieutenant Brooke, making the march to Allahabad, a distance of 104 miles, in the surprisingly short space of time of two days and six hours, including halts and delays.

In the mean time, however, Major Smith had induced most of the officers to agree to remain, according to their

original intention, to the end of the month; but this return A. D. 1766.
May. to a more moderate line of conduct did not long continue.]

On the 22nd of the month, Lieutenant Monsell and Ensign North came to him, deputed by the rest of the Corps, requesting him to dismiss Lieutenant Peake from the appointment of Adjutant to the Regiment, and to forbid his appearance at the Major's table, owing to his having receded from the engagement, which they considered a breach of honour, and sufficient to preclude him from the society of gentlemen.

[Major Smith, enraged at this additional proof of disaffection and insult to himself personally, immediately placed Lieutenant Monsell and Ensign North under arrest, and ordering Lieutenants Delafield and Brooke to get the 8th Battalion of Sipahis (*the present 8th Regt. N. I.*) under arms, he then proceeded to the barracks, and placed the whole of the officers there under arrest also, except four, who were more moderate than the others. He then dictated an apology for the affront offered to his authority, and warned them that if they attempted to break their arrest, or to excite any disturbance amongst the Europeans, the Sipahis should be ordered to put every one of them to death. This spirited behaviour produced an immediate submission, when, upon signing the apology, he released the whole party with exception to six of the ringleaders, including Lieutenant Monsell and Ensign North, whom he sent to Patna to stand their trial.]

[At the same time, Colonel Smith adopted a similar course of procedure in the camp: finding that the Mahrattas did not seem inclined to advance, and confident in the fidelity of the Sipahis, he dismissed all the more turbulent of the European officers, and sent them down to Calcutta: leaving only about half the original number, who had agreed to continue to do duty until the end of the month.] This decided measure, the absence of the instigations of the more violent parties, and the intelligence of the submission of the 1st and 3rd Brigades at Mongheer and Patna, soon brought all these gentlemen to their senses, and they also hastened to tender their submission, and express contrition for their past conduct.

Lord Clive had sent forward several officers from Banky-

A. D. 1766. pore to assist Colonel Smith; but on their arrival, they found that their services were fortunately no longer required. The Colonel had been vested with authority to pardon and reinstate such officers as he might consider deserving of the indulgence, of which privilege he availed himself, restoring all those who had behaved with any degree of moderation, and whose characters were not otherwise objectionable.

[Repentance and humiliation now became general, and the great majority of those who had resigned, or had been dismissed and sent down to Calcutta, with the view to their being sent on to England, now gave in petitions, praying to be restored to the service.] With exception to the ringleaders of each Brigade, their requests were generally granted, especially as regarded the Subalterns, most of whom were reinstated before the end of the year: but Lord Clive, with his usual sagacity, affected to hesitate for some time, and increased the value of the boon, by making the applicants feel the dread of losing their commissions, on which they were alone dependent for their livelihood, but which they had so rashly perilled. This delay also carried with it a just but severe punishment, as not only did they lose all allowances for the time being, but from the influx of officers from Madras and Bombay, of whom a large number were sent from each Presidency, especially from the latter, they lost considerable standing, as those who had come round entered with the rank they held in their former service, whilst those who had resigned or been dismissed, lost so much time of service, and in some cases were compelled to enter at the bottom of their respective grades.

Several of those officers who had taken a conspicuous part in the combination, but had been restored to the service by the local Government, were shortly after, under orders from the Court of Directors, prohibited from rising above the grades they then held. This restriction was not long observed, and several of those so situated, rose to high rank and command, and atoned for their conduct on this occasion, by a subsequent career of gallantry and subordination. In March 1776, Lieutenant Francis Robertson, who had been cashiered, was

restored to the service with the rank of Captain, which gave A. D. 1766 him his full standing in the service, and on that occasion a general amnesty was sanctioned by the Court of Directors and subsequently proclaimed in Government Orders of the 27th September of that year, towards all who had been concerned in the combination.

To prevent any recurrence of similar conduct, it was ordered after the suppression of the mutiny, that every officer restored to the army, as also all such as entered it in future, should execute an agreement not to quit the service under a period of three years, and not then without giving a year's notice of their desire to do so. Of which contract the following is a copy:—

“ Know all men by these presents, that I, *A B*, for and in
 “ consideration of a captain's commission, in the service of
 “ the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England,
 “ trading to the East Indies, to me given by the President and
 “ Council of Fort William in Bengal in the East-Indies; and
 “ the sum of ——— rupees to me in hand paid by the President
 “ and Council, the receipt whereof I do hereby acknowledge,
 “ being the amount of one month's pay as captain in the
 “ service of the said Honourable United East India Com-
 “ pany, have contracted and agreed, and by these presents
 “ do covenant, contract and agree, with the said President
 “ and Council of Fort William, for and on behalf of the
 “ said United East India Company, to serve them in a milita-
 “ ry capacity for the space of three years, to be computed
 “ from the day of the date hereof; and also that I will not
 “ then, or at any other time, quit the said service without
 “ giving twelve months' previous notice, in writing, of such
 “ my intentions, to the President and Council of Fort William
 “ aforesaid, for the time being, and obtaining their permis-
 “ sion for that purpose.

“ In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
 “ seal, at Calcutta, in Bengal aforesaid, this day of
 “ in the year of our Lord.

“ *Signed, sealed, and delivered, at Calcutta aforesaid,*
 “ *where no stamped paper is to be had, in the presence of*

“ *C. D.*

A. D. 1766. **O**f the ringleaders, several were tried by a Court Martial at Patna, of which Colonel Smith was nominated President, and with one exception were sentenced to be cashiered; amongst them was Lieutenant Vertue, the Field-Adjutant of the 2nd Brigade : he refused to plead, and denied the authority of the Court to try him, on the ground that he had resigned his commission, and was no longer amenable to the articles of war. But the members refused to admit this plea, and he was sentenced to be cashiered.

The officer who escaped the sentence of this Court Martial, was Captain John Neville Parker, but he was ordered to be dismissed by the Governor in Council, and was immediately sent home. Soon after his arrival he brought an action against Lord Clive for the loss of his commission and allowances, but without success. However, in 1769, he was restored to the service with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, in which grade he subsequently commanded in the brilliant action at Korah in 1776, and ultimately fell in action at the Bhoire Ghaut in 1781.

Amongst those who were cashiered and ordered to England, were Captain Vernon Duffield and Ensign Robertson, the Adjutant of the 3rd Brigade. These officers protested against being sent on board the *Lord Camden*, the vessel appointed for their reception, appealed to the Mayor's Court and civil authorities, and finally shut themselves up in a house in Calcutta, which they barricaded, having laid in a stock of provisions that they calculated would last them until the *Camden* should have sailed,—which vessel, as she was to carry despatches, they did not think it probable Government would detain solely on their account. Lord Clive, however, was not to be daunted by their protests or appeals to civil authority, but placed an officer's guard around the house, with orders not to break in or commit violence, but to apprehend them whenever they should come out, which they did as soon as they ascertained that the *Camden* had sailed. They were then immediately seized and put on board the *Anne* sloop, in which they were sent to Madras, and from thence viâ Bombay to England. They subsequently attempted to pro-

secute Lord Clive in England, but the proceedings fell to the ground. Captain James Nicoll and Ensign Davie, who endeavoured to remain in the country as free merchants, were subsequently seized and sent home after a strenuous resistance to, and protest against, this exercise of authority. A. D. 1766

Thus was this extraordinary and dangerous combination put down, chiefly by the ability and determination of Lord Clive. Amongst the "events which have never happened," few would afford greater material for speculation than the one in question. To what lengths the army would have gone had they been successful, it is impossible to say, but it is certain that in the first flush of their hopes of success, and in connection with the civilians,—who, as a body, were in their favour, aiding and abetting their attempts,—they had resolved to demand three other points of concession besides the restoration of the Batta: viz., 1st, the abolition of the new Covenants regarding the receipt of presents from Natives of rank; 2nd, the annihilation of the powers of the Select Committee; and 3rd, a solemn promise from the Governor and Council and a standing order of the Board, that none of the officers in Bengal should in future be superseded by any others appointed by the Court of Directors in England, or from either of the other Presidencies.

As a proof of the feeling borne by the Civilians towards this attempt on the part of the Military, it may be sufficient to mention that Mr. Higginson, the Sub-Secretary to Government, and Mr. Grindall, one of the assistants in the office, were convicted of writing anonymous letters to individual members of the combination, encouraging them in their attempts, and giving information as to the views and intentions of the Government. But of all these anonymous communications, there was one, the authorship of which could never be clearly brought home to any individual, although Lord Clive was most anxious to discover the writer and appears to have had strong suspicions on the subject. The letter in question was addressed to the officers of the 3rd Brigade at Patna, and it was to the following effect:—

"You are very prudent, gentlemen, in acting as volun-

A. D. 1766. “ teers, a circumstance that will highly please his Lordship,
 “ and assist him in dismissing you all, and to keep it a
 “ secret from the men, by whose assistance you can only
 “ be successful; for if they do not join, he is fully resolved
 “ not to give the point up to you, but accept of all com-
 “ missions. What then will be the consequence if he gets
 “ the better of this? Eternal slavery and bondage, with
 “ shame to you all.—Let the men join, and that will oblige
 “ him to come into your terms. You can always put a stop
 “ to them before they do much mischief; but take care your
 “ terms are moderate. What a pimp your c——l is, I wonder
 “ you don't flog him: Can it be possible you have let Duf-
 “ field, &c. be sent to Calcutta? If you have, you are a
 “ dastardly set. How will the civilians laugh at you, if you
 “ don't get the better?

“ The following is a conversation between his Lordship
 “ and the General, which send to the other brigades; I over-
 “ heard it myself:—

“ *General.* What will your lordship do with the army?

“ *Clive.* Hang one-half for an example to the other.

“ *General.* How will you be provided with officers?

“ *Clive.* Send to Madras and Bombay for all they can
 “ spare; and make serjeants and corporals for the pre-
 “ sent.

“ *General.* Our serjeants and corporals will never do for
 “ officers.

“ *Clive.* They will do till we get better.

“ *General.* And when you have got better, what will
 “ your lordship do with them?

“ *Clive.* Why, reduce one-half to their former station,
 “ and for fear the other half should be too strong, I will
 “ order them to Calcutta, clap them on board ships, and
 “ send them to Bencoolen, where they shall do private duty,
 “ as before.

“ *General.* Your lordship will be liable to prosecutions
 “ at home.

“ *Clive.* I'll be d—d then; for I'll send such instructions
 “ to the governor, that few shall remain to tell the story.

“ *General.* If the men join, what will you do ?

A. D. 1766.

“ *Clive.* By G—d I must give them their own terms ; but
“ the gentlemen, by acting as volunteers, seem determined
“ to prevent that. Let them do so a little while longer, and
“ by G—d I’ll do for them.

“ The above is an absolute fact, but I cannot sign, for fear
“ of discovery ; however, the light is not truer. For God’s
“ sake act with spirit : else adieu, as military men, to every
“ thing !

“ *Calcutta.*”

Amongst the officers who were tried on this occasion was Captain John Stainforth, who had come out the preceding year from England with that rank. He was accused of having uttered threatening expressions against Lord Clive, and proposing in the presence of Captain Wilding, Lieutenants Petrie, Hoggan, and Dunbar, to throw dice with any other member or members of the combination to decide who should take Lord Clive’s life ; and when those officers, shocked at his proposal, sent Mr. Hoggan to him the next morning to remind him of what he had said and ascertain his intentions, that so far from denying having made use of such language, he avowed having made the proposal, and declared that he still entertained the same sentiments and intentions ; and that some time afterwards, when a review was expected on the occasion of his Lordship’s arrival at Mongheer, he (Captain Stainforth) proposed that the officers should all carry fuzils instead of spontoons, which might give him the opportunity of getting rid of his Lordship by a ball. Upon these charges he was confined, and sent to Patna for trial, when the Court came to the following decision :—

“ The court having taken into mature consideration the
“ evidence for and against the prisoner, together with his
“ defence, are unanimously of opinion that he is guilty of
“ the crime laid to his charge ; which they judge to be a
“ breach of the first part of the third article of the second
“ section of the articles of war. But the prisoner’s extreme
“ backwardness to enter into the combination having evi-

A. D. 1766. " dently appeared, and that the proposal, shocking as it is,
 June. " was mentioned at only one particular point of time ;
 " also the evidence in support of the charge having deposed
 " that they thought him then either drunk or mad ; and it
 " being plain those evidences imagined that no accident
 " could ensue from so rash a project, as the court have not
 " heard that they made any report to their commanding
 " officer of it.

" Those arguments added to the prisoner's former good
 " character, prevailed on the court only to cashier him ; and
 " he is hereby sentenced to be cashiered.

" THOMAS PEARSON, *Judge-Advocate.*

" RICHARD SMITH, *President.*"

He was accordingly cashiered and ordered to England, when he expressed great contrition, and petitioned to be restored, to which Lord Clive replied through his Secretary, pointing out in kind, though decided terms, the impossibility of compliance with his request. It may be mentioned here, that he was subsequently restored to the service in 1771, and died at Cawnpore a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1781.

The most remarkable and interesting trial of the whole however, was that of Sir Robert Fletcher.

We have seen that in his letter to Lord Clive dated in May, he acknowledged incidentally that he had for some time past been acquainted with the mutinous intentions of the officers, besides which, several startling facts regarding his conduct and the incorrectness of some of his representations had been brought to Lord Clive's knowledge at Mongheer ; but that Nobleman, in the state of affairs then existing, did not think it advisable to take notice of them, unless compelled to do so. When the mutiny was suppressed and subordination restored, the conduct of Sir Robert Fletcher became the general topic of conversation amongst all ranks ; and on the 19th of June, Lord Clive received the following anonymous letter, of which Mr. Bagot, Surgeon to the first Brigade, subsequently acknowledged himself to be the author :—

" Though an anonymous letter has but an indifferent appearance, yet your Lordship knows that, in some cases, it

“ may be the only channel through which truth can be con- A. D. 1766.
 “ veyed. This is particularly addressed to you, Sir, being June.
 “ the fountain of justice, from one who feels his own, and
 “ the hardships which many of his brother officers are likely
 “ to suffer on this occasion. Be it known then to your
 “ Lordship, that we have been led into the resignation of
 “ our commissions, and therewith our whole support, by a
 “ man who now stands behind the curtain, deriding those
 “ miseries which his deluding arguments have brought upon
 “ us. The plain matter of fact is this; that when Sir Robert
 “ Fletcher found a resignation was not likely to go forward
 “ by his private hints and encouragement, he at last ven-
 “ tured to recommend it publicly, at a table of a dozen officers;
 “ telling them, that the brigade major, and his aid-du-camp,
 “ should first set the example; and that their discontents,
 “ joined to that of the civilians, would inevitably deprive your
 “ Lordship of all power; adding, that he was well acquainted
 “ with the Madras counsellors,* who he was sure would
 “ all join against you. He farther attempted to raise our in-
 “ dignation, by saying that the army was insulted, their ser-
 “ vices rewarded with ingratitude, and that your Lordship's
 “ design was evidently to reduce us to contempt and beggary.
 “ Above all things, he beseeched us to be speedy in the affair,
 “ lest the Europe ships should carry home the news of your
 “ Lordship's having accomplished what had been in vain at-
 “ tempted by former governors. Your Lordship's impartial-
 “ lity will now clearly point out who was the more culpable,
 “ we for following the advice of our commanding officer, or
 “ he for leading us into this ruinous measure, merely to gra-
 “ tify his private purposes. Justice and honour do now call
 “ upon your Lordship; you will not, nay you cannot, sup-
 “ press a strict enquiry into this affair, the fate of many inno-
 “ cent people depending upon it. You will then find what is
 “ here asserted, confirmed beyond all doubt, with many aggra-
 “ vating circumstances. Your Lordship has been imposed

* The four gentlemen, whom Lord Clive and the Select Committee had been under the necessity of calling from Madras to fill up vacancies in Council at Bengal.

A. D. 1766. " on in the account of his conduct to the Du Carrels ;* it was
 June. " he alone who endeavoured to promote a combination against
 " them, which to your Lordship, 'tis apprehended, he made a
 " merit to break. Such other instances could be given to your
 " Lordship of his duplicity, hypocrisy, injustice, and rapaci-
 " ousness, as would make a man of common honesty blush
 " to see human nature so degraded, in this individual. If
 " this relation seems exaggerated, bring it to the test."

Lord Clive paid no attention to this anonymous communi-
 cation, especially as it bore a strong stamp of personal enmity
 to Sir Robert Fletcher, at the same time that he could not but
 observe with regret that the main points of the accusation
 corresponded very closely with what had come under his own
 knowledge, and had reached his ears, by public report or
 private information. A few days after he received the follow-
 ing letter from Sir Robert himself, which convinced him that
 the general tenor of the accusation was founded on truth :—

" MY LORD,—With great uneasiness I learn, that reports
 " have reached your Lordship of my having assisted and en-
 " couraged the officers in their late combination ; and I confess
 " my concern is aggravated, when by a mature considera-
 " tion of my conduct, I find I have acted with an imprudence
 " that leaves matter, which, in the hands of my enemies,
 " might turn to my prejudice ; at the same time, that I could
 " take a most solemn oath of my having acted entirely from
 " principles and motives that I then judged necessary to the
 " public good, and such as would have been called good policy
 " in a commanding officer not surrounded, as I have been,
 " with a crowd of enemies, whose province it is to snatch up,
 " to my prejudice, the very expressions which they themselves
 " know were calculated to deceive them, and which I hope
 " my latter conduct hath sufficiently proved. As for the
 " combination itself, it was near the end of April, before

* Captain Cottie Du Carrel and his brother Gerard Gustavus Du Carrel of the Civil Service ; the former had refused to join the combination from the first, and the latter had withdrawn his signature from an appeal drawn up by several members of his service ; in consequence of which they had both been subjected to much annoyance and ill usage.

“ I knew any thing of it. I condemned it immediately A. D. 1766.
 “ as a mutinous act, used every endeavour to extricate all July.
 “ those from it, for whom I had any kind of regard; and
 “ when I found I could not prevail, I informed your Lordship
 “ of all that I knew of their schemes; contrary to a promise
 “ of secrecy, on which condition alone I found I could gain a
 “ knowledge of their intentions. If the reports I mention,
 “ have prejudiced me in your Lordship’s opinion, I earnestly
 “ request you will give me such information as may enable me
 “ to clear myself to the world and to you, whose good opinion
 “ I should be highly concerned to forfeit, and to be disap-
 “ pointed in the end to which all my endeavours to promote
 “ the service have always tended. I have the honour to be,
 “ with great respect, &c.

“ ROBERT FLETCHER.

“ *Monghyr, 23rd June, 1766.*”

Sir Robert was at this time under orders to proceed immediately to Patna, where he was required as a member of the Court Martial ordered upon the ringleaders in the combination, and also to assist at a Committee for the formation of a new code of regulations, rendered necessary by the late mutiny. Under these circumstances, Lord Clive deferred replying to the above letter until Sir Robert’s arrival. In the mean time, however, Captain Goddard had brought forward a regular and formal accusation of mutiny against him, in consequence of which he was placed in arrest on his arrival at Patna, which took place on the 3d of July, upon charges framed by the Judge-Advocate-General.

Immediately upon receipt of Lord Clive’s order to consider himself under arrest, Sir Robert addressed the following letter to His Lordship, praying that he might not be tried by a Court Martial, but by the Governor and Council in Calcutta:—

“ MY LORD,—Colonel Barker has sent me orders from
 “ your Lordship, which I have just now received, for my
 “ going in arrest; but I most earnestly request your Lord-
 “ ship will be pleased not to insist upon this, as I imagine
 “ it is intended to bring me to a trial for my conduct re-

A. D. 1766.
July. “ regarding the combination, but indulge me with the privilege of repairing to Calcutta, where I may have the honour of being tried by your Lordship and the Council, before whom I have not the least doubt of clearing myself with honour and credit. The nature of my defence is such, as I would by no means wish should come before a court martial here.

“ I have the honour to be with great respect, &c.,

“ ROBERT FLETCHER.

“ *Patna, 3rd July, 1766.*”

To this extraordinary request, Lord Clive returned the following considerate and judicious reply :—

“ SIR,—I have received your letter of this day's date. You will not, I hope, entertain the least doubt of my willingness to oblige a gentleman in your situation, in any request that can with propriety be granted. But that of your repairing to Calcutta, in order to be tried by the President and Council, upon an accusation, your exculpation from which depends merely upon military law, is totally unprecedented, and therefore improper for me to comply with. That you may not, however, imagine, that I intend to take any other part, upon this occasion, than what my public station requires, be assured that the court martial to be held upon your late conduct will be assembled by an order from the board, and sentence confirmed or disproved of by them.

“ I am, Sir, &c.,

“ CLIVE.

“ *Meer Absels, 3rd July, 1766.*”

This, however, did not satisfy Sir Robert Fletcher, who on the following day again addressed him, soliciting that a Court of Enquiry consisting of the Governor and Council might previously be held upon his conduct. This request was conveyed in the following communication :—

“ MY LORD,—I have been honoured by your Lordship's letter of yesterday; and although no precedent of the like kind, perhaps from the want of opportunity, hath hitherto happened, yet I had some hopes that my situation might

“ induce you to comply with my request, which I made for A. D. 1766,
 “ reasons that your Lordship and every sensible man cannot July.
 “ but admit, who knows the nature of courts martial in this
 “ country; when they are too often in a great measure com-
 “ posed of gentlemen whose birth and former lives have
 “ given them no opportunity of acquiring an education suffi-
 “ cient to comprehend and to judge in cases that require the
 “ most serious deliberations of men of knowledge and abili-
 “ ties; and for the same reason, I beg your Lordship will per-
 “ mit me now to request that a court of enquiry may first be
 “ held, whereby you or the Governor and Council, may
 “ judge whether I merit the disgrace of being brought to
 “ a court martial, which, whether culpable or not, can never
 “ redound to my credit.

“ I am, with great respect, My Lord, &c.

“ ROBERT FLETCHER.

“ *Patna, 4th July, 1766.*”

It was certainly an unreasonable and unprecedented request, that an officer should be tried on a charge of mutiny, under the articles of war, by a Court composed almost entirely of Civilians, and for the same reasons a Court of Enquiry so constituted would have been equally inapplicable and absurd. To this last request Lord Clive returned no answer, but forwarded the correspondence with the following letter to the Council in Calcutta :—

“ GENTLEMEN,—On the 3rd instant, I had the honour to
 “ inform you of my having ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Sir
 “ Robert Fletcher in arrest. I am now farther to acquaint
 “ you, that I have directed the Judge-Advocate General to
 “ give him notice that the crime for which he will be tried,
 “ is mutiny. Enclosed are copies of two letters which I re-
 “ ceived from him since his arrest; and also a copy of my
 “ answer to the one of the 3rd instant. To that of the 4th,
 “ I have not thought proper to reply. As it is very probable,
 “ that in the course of the examination by court martial, it
 “ may appear that an intention to affect my honour and go-
 “ vernment was one of the first motives of the late combina-
 “ tion, delicacy forbids my taking any part that can possibly

A. D. 1766. " bear the imputation of private pique, or personal resent-
 September. " ment : I must, therefore, request that the warrant for hold-
 " ing a general court martial upon Lieutenant-Colonel Sir
 " Robert Fletcher, may be issued by the President and
 " Council, and the sentence be confirmed or disapproved by
 " them.

" I have the honour to be, &c.

" OLIVE.

" *Myr Absels, 5th July, 1766.*"

In consequence of this request, a warrant for the trial of Sir Robert Fletcher was signed by the Board and transmitted to Patna, and the trial followed that of the other officers concerned.*

The chief evidences brought forward were those of Captains Goddard and Roper, Lieutenants Watts and Francis; and tended to prove, that not only was Sir Robert Fletcher fully acquainted with the designs of the officers to form a mutinous combination for the recovery of their Batta, as early as the month of January preceding, but that he did himself, at Captain Goddard's table, actually suggest the course subsequently adopted, prompting the officers to resign their commissions and serve as volunteers; that he pointed out the greater chance of success at the particular period, owing to the strong feeling of dissatisfaction existing in the Civil Service, consequent on the new covenants and the introduction of the four counsellors from Madras. That he taunted Captain Goddard personally, for not joining, expressing his surprise that an officer bearing the reputation of so much spirit had not been foremost on the occasion; and holding out the example of his own personal staff, who, notwithstanding the advantages of their appointments, were ready to enter into the combination.

Captain Bevan and Lieutenant Dunbar also gave evidence to prove that in addition to his earlier acquaintance with the intention of the officers, he was made acquainted by them

* As this was a trial of great importance, and one of the earliest and most interesting that has taken place in this Army, the details which may perhaps prove acceptable, will be found in the Appendix B. B.

between the 18th and 20th of April of these intentions having been acted upon, and that the combination had been fully organized in the three Brigades; that he dissuaded them from joining, but took no public measures to suppress it; and it has been shown that he never gave the slightest hint to Government of what was passing or in contemplation, until the 25th of April, and then only on receipt of Sir Robert Barker's letter of the 21st April, when he found the matter could no longer be concealed.

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October.

His defence tended to confirm these facts, but ascribed his conduct to a particular and certainly not a very straight-forward or soldier-like motive, viz. a desire to possess himself of the secret intentions of the mutineers, by affecting similar sentiments and opinions, and also a wish to get rid of the bad characters in the Brigade, by involving them in the unpardonable crime of mutiny. He dealt chiefly with the minor and immaterial points of the evidence against him, and endeavoured to invalidate the truth of Captain Goddard's statement, to impugn his motives, and to decry his character: an unfortunate line to adopt, as regards the opinion of posterity, his own subsequent conduct at Madras affording a marked contrast to Goddard's brilliant and honourable career.

The evidences for the defence consisted of Messrs. George Vansittart and the Hon'ble Charles Stuart, both civilians, and Captain Henry Watson, the Quarter Master General, who testified to having heard Sir Robert Fletcher complain of the licentiousness and want of subordination in the Army. Captain Bevan his Brigade Major, Lieut. Dunbar his Aide-Camp, Lieutenants MacPherson and Shrimpton, and Ensign Patten, all deposed to his having persuaded them to withdraw their names from the combination, and that he offered to advance them the money to pay their penalty bonds. Ensign Moses Crawford, formerly a Surgeon's Assistant, and Lieutenant Fireworker Philip Muskard, formerly a Conductor, deposed that when in their previous situations, Sir Robert Fletcher had offered them commissions, and persuaded them to enter the service. Captain F. T. Smith and Serjeant Philip Daniel gave evidence in favor of Sir Robert's exertions to suppress the mutiny in the 1st European Regiment.

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Such was the substance of the testimony brought forward by the prisoner in his defence; having concluded which, the Judge Advocate addressed the Court in a very few words, merely observing that most of the points which it had been attempted to prove against Sir Robert Fletcher remaining uncontroverted, he did not trouble the court with the examination of any evidences in reply. He only begged leave to observe, that it appeared to the Court, upon the joint evidence of Captain Goddard, Captain Roper, Captain Bevan, Mr. Dunbar, and other witnesses, that a scheme of resignation of commissions came to the knowledge of Sir Robert Fletcher in the month of January last, and that the prisoner had not made it appear to the court, that he, at that or any period of time, made Lord Clive or General Carnac or the Governor and Council, acquainted therewith.

To this Sir Robert replied, recapitulating his former arguments, referring to his correspondence with Lord Clive, and repeating his assertions as to the motives that influenced his conduct. Finally, as if conscious of the weakness of his arguments on the broader ground, he reverted to that adopted by Lieutenant Vertue, relative to the legality of officers resigning their commissions at pleasure, where no previous contract had been entered into, and consequently the absence of mutiny in merely advising an act that was not illegal. These arguments, however, were unavailing, and the Court Martial gave the following verdict and sentence:—

“ The President and Members, having taking into mature
“ consideration the whole evidence for and against the pri-
“ soner, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher, together
“ with his defence, are of opinion, that he is guilty of mu-
“ tiny, the crime laid to his charge, by a breach of the
“ third and fourth articles of the second section of the arti-
“ cles of war; the prisoner having excited sedition, and
“ after coming to the knowledge of a mutiny, having delayed
“ to give information thereof to his commanding officer: the
“ court do, therefore, adjudge him, and he is hereby adjudged,
“ to be cashiered.”

The sentence being confirmed by the President and Council, Sir Robert Fletcher was cashiered, and proceeded to Eng-

land. It may scarcely be necessary to observe, that within a few years afterwards, he was restored to the Company's Service by the Court of Directors,—having considerable influence and wealth, and the tide of public opinion in England at the time setting strongly against Lord Clive. He was then sent out to Madras as Commander-in-Chief, where he took a prominent part in the deposition and confinement of Lord Pigot, one of the most extraordinary acts of insubordination that probably was ever committed.

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November.

Several officers in the Bengal Army, forgetful of the danger they had so recently escaped, signed an address to him after he had been cashiered, for which they were all dismissed the service.*

Lord Clive having completely suppressed the mutinous combination of the officers, and restored order in the several Brigades, took the opportunity,—whilst the Court Martials assembled at Patna were carrying on their proceedings,—of starting for Chupprah, accompanied by General Carnac, where he was met by Nawaub Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, and the Emperor's Vakeel, together with the agents from the Jath and Rohillah Chiefs. Here a congress was held, and a treaty entered into between these parties, for their mutual defence against any aggression on the part of the Mahrattas. Agents from the latter nation were also present, and Lord Clive who had a remarkable talent for penetrating the entangled web of native policy, speedily ascertained that the recent assemblage of the Mahrattas on the Jumna had originated entirely in the pressing invitations they had received from the Emperor. Considering that little benefit was to be derived from an alliance with the Rohillahs or Jaths, in the event of a Mahratta invasion, and being anxious to take his departure for Calcutta without further delay, he left the terms to be arranged by Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, subject to the final approval of the President in Council.

The Nawaub having now complied with the greater part of the terms agreed to in the previous year, the 2nd Brigade

* Verelst. Appendix, p. 48.—General Military Register.

A. D. 1766. was recalled from Allahabad, and General Smith was directed to take up a position and canton the troops at Daoudnugur and Sahseram, where they would be conveniently situated to cover the Province of Behar, or to advance in the event of a Mahratta invasion, supported as they would then be by the 3rd Brigade at Bankypore*.

Permanent barracks for the 3rd Brigade, both Europeans and Natives, were ordered to be erected at Bankypore, and similar buildings at Berhampore, which was now made a station of importance, and shortly afterwards became the Head Quarters of the 1st Brigade; a respectable force still remaining at Mongheer. In both cases, however, the barracks for the Sipahis were subsequently countermanded, owing to the heavy expense attending the erection of these Cantonments.

It has been already mentioned that one Battalion of Sipahis from each Brigade had been turned over to the Revenue Department; but this not being found nearly sufficient to meet the demands from the several districts, and no more troops being available from the Brigades, which were already much harassed by out-post duties in support of the collections, Lord Clive ordered six new Corps to be raised for this especial purpose, which were designated *Pergunnah Battalions*; these Corps were numbered from the 22nd to the 27th Battalions inclusive, and were allotted two to each Brigade, the 22nd and 25th to the 1st Brigade, the 23rd and 26th to the 2nd Brigade, and the 24th and 27th to the 3rd Brigade. Two more Battalions of the same nature were ordered to be raised shortly after, numbered the 28th and 29th, and attached to the 1st and 2nd Brigades; and in the following year an additional Corps was raised, numbered the 30th, and attached to the 3rd Brigade, making a total of nine Pergunnah Battalions, besides the three turned over from the regular Brigades. These latter, as already mentioned, were stationed, the 2nd at Moorshedabad, the 14th at Midnapore and the 7th at Chittagong. The Head Quar-

* Verelst. Appendix, p. 32.

ters of the new or Pergunnah Battalions, were fixed, three A. D. 1766. at Moorshedabad, one of which [the 30th,] was raised and stationed at Calcutta, three at Patna, one at Chittagong, one at Midnapore, one at Burdwán. Details of these Corps, however, were scattered all over the district for the collection of the revenues and the protection of the farmers,—those at Chittagong furnishing details to Dacca and the neighbouring stations; those at Moorshedabad to the Presidency, to Maldah, Rungpore, Oodwahnullah, Terreahgullee, and Sikreegullee; those at Midnapore to Jellasore, Ballasore, Ambore, and the neighbouring posts; and those at Patna to Gurruckpore, Rhotas, Darbongah, Tirhoot, and the Bettiah districts. The influx of officers brought round from the other Presidencies, in consequence of the mutiny, served to provide for these Corps, and was probably an additional motive for their formation. Each Battalion was allowed a Captain to command and two Lieutenants, but no Ensigns; with a Serjeant Major and four Serjeants. The three Battalions, the 2nd, 7th, and 14th, transferred from the regular Brigades, remained on their old footing, as regarded the number of officers and the amount of pay and allowances. The three Battalions at Patna received half Batta in Cantonment, and full Batta when detached; the other Battalions were not so well off; the Native officers and Sipahis received no batta at all, under any circumstances, but the European officers and serjeants were allowed full Batta in the field, but none whatever in quarters.* Several improvements were also introduced into the Regular Brigades, including the formation and publication of a code of regulations, and a fixed standard of allowances for officers in all situations, as also of all contingent and contract allowances,—the expences of which were considerably reduced,—and generally, the establishment of a more strict system of discipline. In these reforms, General Smith and Sir Robert Barker took an active part.

Lord Clive returned to Calcutta in the beginning of September, and one of his first measures was the formation of

* Verelst. Appendix, p. 38. —Williams, pp. 8-9

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a new agreement for the ensuing year, for the Inland Trade Association. His proceedings in that matter during the previous year had not been approved of by the Court of Directors; but his Lordship, considering that they were not sufficiently acquainted with the real state of the case, took upon himself to sanction it for another year, explaining his motive for so doing, and the whole of the circumstances attending the transaction; a proceeding for which he was much blamed afterwards, and which constituted one of the accusations brought against him.

The profits of the concern were again divided into sixty shares, of which three were allotted to the Commander-in-Chief and two to each of the other Colonels. The Lieutenant Colonels had two-thirds of a share, and the Majors and Surgeons one-third of a share each. Owing to the promotions that took place during the year, these portions had to be again subdivided. Generals Carnac and Smith divided the Commander-in-Chief's share, and General Smith, Colonels Sir Robert Barker and Joseph Peach the two Colonels' shares. The three Lieutenant Colonels' shares were distributed between Colonel Peach, Lieutenant Colonels Chapman, Champion and Grant; the six Infantry Majors' shares between Lieutenant Colonels Champion, Grant, Majors Pemble, Smith, Galliez, Ironside, Morgan and Fischer. The Artillery Major's share fell to Major Winwood who had succeeded to the command of that arm, early in 1766, on the death of Major Jennings. The three Surgeons' shares were allotted to Messrs Anderson, Hunter and Williams as before,—although Mr. Hunter was for a time suspended from the service on account of his connection with the mutiny. As each whole share amounted to about 10,000 rupees, this arrangement made a great addition to the Field officers' allowances.

[The large increase to the native portion of the Army, which circumstances had rendered unavoidable, had caused a great numerical disproportion between the Sipahis and the European troops, which was further increased by the European Regiments being still very weak; an application was in consequence made to Madras, from which Presidency a large body of recruits was transferred to Bengal. The

Court had also sent out a considerable number of recruits from England during the year; but one vessel, the *Falmouth*, containing a large portion of them, was lost on the passage and a great mortality occurred amongst the other transports, owing to the bad arrangements made for the men on board and the manner in which they were crowded together. The rainy season was, moreover, very unhealthy this year at all the stations, and the casualties amongst the troops considerable. This reduction of the European force caused some alarm, and the Select Committee, in their letter of the 9th December, after alluding to the circumstances above mentioned, expressed their apprehensions on the subject and urged an early and large supply from Europe. They observed that

“ The dismissal of the Nabob’s useless military rabble, and
 “ of those troops kept up by the Rajahs and the Fouzdars
 “ in their several districts, for the purpose of enforcing the
 “ collections, hath obliged us to raise eight battalions of
 “ independant Sepoys; so that, notwithstanding the great
 “ number of recruits sent out this year from England, not-
 “ withstanding the liberal supply of troops granted by your
 “ Presidency at Fort St. George, so general was the mortality
 “ on board the transports, so great the loss on the *Falmouth’s*
 “ misfortune, and so fatal the effects of the late unhealthy
 “ season, that we cannot avoid being alarmed at the extra-
 “ ordinary disproportion of numbers between your European
 “ and black infantry.” The very signal instance of fidelity
 “ and attachment exhibited by the sepoy, during the late
 “ mutiny of the officers, might indeed, be sufficient to quiet
 “ our apprehensions, and remove all suspicion of their con-
 “ duct, if experience the preceding year of their dangerous
 “ insolence and turbulent spirit, had not evinced the neces-
 “ sity of keeping the black troops in awe and subjection.”

“ We therefore, most earnestly request that you will try
 “ by every possible means, to complete the European in-
 “ fantry to the number specified in our address by the *Ad-
 “ miral Stevens*; and that effectual measures may be taken
 “ to prevent crowded ships, to dispatch your recruits at an
 “ early season, and to guard against the infamous practices

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A. D. 1766. " of owners, husbands, and officers of ships, whereby the
 " lives of hundreds of men are sacrificed, whose services
 " would be valuable to the nation, and altogether invalua-
 " ble to the Company."*

As the Mahrattas still continued hovering on the frontiers, the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were ordered in November to advance to the Karrumnassa to watch their movements, where after remaining some time, the 3rd Brigade, under Sir Robert Barker, proceeded to Allahabad, at the request of the Emperor and Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, to garrison that fortress and protect the Korah district, when the 2nd Brigade under Colonel Smith, moved into Cantonments at Bankypore, thus effecting a relief of those two Brigades. A strong Garrison continued in Chunar, one Battalion, the 19th, remained stationed at Lucknow, and two Battalions at Benares.

All these arrangements being now completed, Lord Clive, whose health had been materially injured by his recent exertions during and subsequent to the mutiny, began to make his preparations for returning to England. When he had accepted the Government two years previously, he had done so with the resolution and the clearly defined understanding that he was to return home when the specific objects of his appointment had been accomplished. Such was now the case; the war with Shoojah-oo-Dowlah had been brought to a satisfactory conclusion before his arrival, but much had remained for him to perform; foremost amongst which measures, were the great reform in the Civil Service and the complete reorganization of the Army, both of which he carried out with so much skill, firmness and wisdom, and with such beneficial results. **T**he unexpected and alarming mutiny of the officers, was the next object of his attention, and to his judicious conduct on that occasion, the Government owed its safety and integrity, and in all human probability, the British Empire owed its existence in India. Peace and order were now restored throughout the Company's dominions, the most powerful enemy, Shoojah-oo-Dowlah, had been taught to feel

the superior power of the British, and through Lord Clive's A. D. 1766. judicious arrangements had been converted from a dangerous enemy to a valuable ally. The influence that still adhered to the name of the Emperor had been enlisted in the English cause, whilst the gratitude of that Monarch, and the favourable opinion of all the people of India, had been won by the liberality and generosity with which he was treated by the English, when placed completely in their power. In the internal administration of the country, the power of the Nawab Nazim had passed into a mere nominal authority, and the Provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, had from the date of the Emperor's grant of the Dewannee, been transferred permanently and entirely to the East India Company. The revenues were in a flourishing condition, and the establishment of the large Military force recently created, facilitated the collections to an extent previously unknown. Reform, economy and efficiency had been introduced into all departments, and where Lord Clive had found a chaotic mass of insubordination, corruption and extravagance, he left a regular and well-defined system of comparative order, probity, and economy.

His Lordship had announced to the Court of Directors his intention of resigning the Government as soon as circumstances would admit of his doing so without inconvenience to the State, and in December 1766, he received a very gratifying letter from that body, dated the 17th March 1766, urgently requesting him to prolong his stay in India, which communication contained the following flattering expression of the Court's sentiments regarding the value of his services:—

“ When we consider the penetration with which your
 “ Lordship at once discerned our true interest in every branch,
 “ the rapidity with which you restored peace, order and tran-
 “ quillity, and the unbiassed integrity that has governed
 “ all your actions, we must congratulate your Lordship
 “ on being the happy instrument of such extensive bles-
 “ sings to those countries; and you have our sincerest
 “ thanks for the great and important advantages thereby
 “ obtained for the Company.

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“ We have the most perfect sense of your Lordship’s disin-
 “ terestedness in every part of your conduct, and we shall not
 “ fail to represent this to the proprietors, and shall at the same
 “ time inform them of the many great advantages your Lord-
 “ ship has obtained for the Company ; but we fear, my Lord,
 “ past experience will teach them, as it does us, that the per-
 “ manency of those advantages will depend much on your
 “ Lordship’s continuing in India till you have seen the re-
 “ gulations firmly established for the conducting of those
 “ important affairs. Another year’s experience and peaceable
 “ enjoyment of our acquisitions might fix them on a basis
 “ that might give hopes they may be as lasting as
 “ they are great ; and there is no doubt, my Lord, but the
 “ general voice of the proprietors, indeed we may say of
 “ every man who wishes well to his country, will be to
 “ join in our request, that your Lordship will continue
 “ another year in India. We are very sensible of the sa-
 “ crifice we ask your Lordship to make, in desiring your con-
 “ tinuance another year in Bengal, after the great service
 “ you have rendered the Company, and the difficulties you
 “ have passed through in accomplishing them, under cir-
 “ cumstances in which your own example has been the prin-
 “ cipal means of restraining the general rapaciousness and
 “ corruption which had brought our affairs so near the brink
 “ of ruin. These services, my Lord, deserve more than ver-
 “ bal acknowledgments ; and we have no doubt that the pro-
 “ prietors will concur with us in opinion, that some solid
 “ and permanent retribution, adequate to your great merits,
 “ should crown your Lordship’s labours and success.”*

Clive was not the man to be insensible to these commenda-
 tions, and doubtless, had he seen any necessity for remaining,
 he would have unhesitatingly acceded to the Court’s request,
 at the sacrifice of his own health and convenience. But
 such was not the case :—true it was that events had occurred,
 and dangers and difficulties arisen, of which the Court were
 ignorant at the time of their writing, but these had happily
 been all surmounted and satisfactorily arranged.

* Second Report from the Select Committee. Appendix No. 54.

Little remained to be done, that ordinary capacity and firmness were not equal to undertake, and as his health was daily breaking, and his illness seriously impeding the transaction of business, he made up his mind to depart in the beginning of the next year. The Court had vested him with discretionary authority to dissolve or continue the power of the Select Committee, and he unhesitatingly decided on their continuance, appointing as Members, Mr. Verelst who was to succeed him as Governor, Colonel Richard Smith who was nominated Commander-in-Chief, to succeed General Carnac—who was also going home,—Mr. Carter, Mr. Sykes, and Mr Beecher.

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On the 16th of January 1767, he, for the last time, attended the Committee himself, when he finally carried these arrangements into effect and officially announced his intended immediate departure. On this occasion he laid before the Committee a valuable minute on the state of affairs at the time, and the dangers and difficulties most to be guarded against; the following extracts from which, and from a supplementary minute of the 23rd of the same month, may not be out of place, as illustrating at once the condition of the country and his Lordship's policy and judgment. Speaking of the danger that would accrue to the Government if they ever sanctioned any revival of that course of extravagance and corruption, which he had with so much difficulty, but so effectually put down, he observed—

“ It has been too much the custom in this government
 “ to make orders and regulations, and thence to suppose
 “ the business done. To what end and purpose are they
 “ made, if they be not promulgated and enforced? No
 “ regulation can be carried into execution, no order obeyed,
 “ if you do not make rigorous examples of the disobedient.
 “ Upon this point I rest the welfare of the Company in
 “ Bengal. The servants are now brought to a proper sense
 “ of their duty. If you slacken the reins of government,
 “ affairs will soon revert to their former channel: anarchy
 “ and corruption will again prevail, and, elated with a new
 “ victory, be too headstrong for any future efforts of Go-

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“vernment. Recall to your memories the many attempts
 “that have been made in the civil and military departments
 “to overcome our authority, and to set up a kind of inde-
 “pendency against the Court of Directors. Reflect also
 “on the resolute measures we have pursued, and their
 “wholesome effects. Disobedience to legal power is the
 “first step of sedition; and palliative measures effect no
 “cure. Every tender compliance, every condescension on
 “your parts, will only encourage more flagrant attacks, and
 “will daily increase in strength, and be at last in vain resist-
 “ed. Much of our time has been employed in correcting
 “abuses. The important work has been prosecuted with
 “zeal, diligence and disinterestedness; and we have had
 “the happiness to see our labours crowned with success.
 “I leave the country in peace. I leave the civil and military
 “departments under discipline and subordination: it is
 “incumbent upon you to keep them so. You have power,
 “you have abilities, you have integrity; let it not be said
 “that you are deficient in resolution. I repeat that you
 “must not fail to exact the most implicit obedience to your
 “orders. Dismiss or suspend from service any man who
 “shall dare to dispute your authority. If you deviate from
 “the principles upon which you have hitherto acted, and
 “upon which you are conscious you ought to proceed, or
 “if you do not make a proper use of that power with which
 “you are invested, I shall hold myself acquitted, as I do now
 “protest against the consequences.”

And again he remarks:—

“The people of this country have little or no idea of a
 “divided power; they imagine all authority is vested in
 “one man. The Governor of Bengal should always be look-
 “ed upon by them in this light, as far as is consistent with
 “the honour of the Committee and Council. In every
 “vacant season, therefore, I think it expedient that he takes
 “a tour up the country in the quality of a supervisor-gene-
 “ral. Frauds and oppressions of every sort, being by this
 “means laid open to his view, will in a great measure be
 “prevented, and the natives preserve a just opinion of the

“ importance and dignity of our President, upon whose
 “ character and conduct much of the prosperity of the Com-
 “ pany's affairs in Bengal must ever depend.”* .

A. D. 1767.
 January.

On the 29th of January, 1767, he embarked on the Ship *Brittannia*, accompanied by General Carnac and several other friends, and on the 17th of the following month, Mr. Verelst took the oaths as his successor.]

On his departure, the Select Committee, in a letter to the Court of Directors, observed with reference to that event:—

“ We should be wanting in the just praises of superior
 “ merit, and in gratitude for the essential services per-
 “ formed by Lord Clive, if we failed to acknowledge that,
 “ to the prudence and vigour of his administration, you
 “ are chiefly to ascribe the present flourishing condition
 “ of your affairs. Firm and indefatigable in his pursuits,
 “ he joined, to the weight of personal character, a zeal for
 “ your service, and a knowledge of your interests, which
 “ could not but ensure success.

“ It would be unnecessary to remind you of the deplorable
 “ situation in which his Lordship and the Committee found
 “ this settlement.

“ We beheld a Presidency divided, headstrong and licen-
 “ tious; a government without nerves, a treasury without
 “ money, and a service without subordination, discipline,
 “ or public spirit. We may add that, amidst a general
 “ stagnation of useful industry and of licensed commerce,
 “ individuals were accumulating immense riches, which they
 “ had ravished from the insulted Prince and his helpless
 “ people, who groaned under the united pressure of dis-
 “ content, poverty and oppression.

“ Such was the condition of this Presidency and of these
 “ provinces, at the time his Lordship and the Committee
 “ entered upon the arduous task of reformation. Your pre-
 “ sent situation need not be described. The liberal supplies
 “ to China, the state of your treasury, of your investments,
 “ of the service, and of the whole country, declare it to

A. D. 1767. " be the strongest contrast to what it was. And the most
 " pleasing assemblage of fortunate circumstances, and of
 " prosperous events, that occurred at any period."*

The above forms the best summary of the conduct of this illustrious nobleman, to whom India owes so much, and to whom the Bengal Army may be said to be chiefly indebted, not only for its excellence but for its very existence.]

In the middle of July, his Lordship reached England, where he was warmly received by all parties; in September the Court of Proprietors, in consideration of his important services, authorized the Court of Directors to grant to him and his heirs a further enjoyment of the benefits of his Jagheer for a space of ten years, in addition to the ten years for which it had been previously guaranteed to him, on his surrendering it to the East India Company.

A few years after, however, a numerous and hostile party, headed by Mr. Johnstone, his old opponent in Bengal, created a strong feeling against him, and exposed him to severe trials and annoyance, the details of which do not come within the scope of this work. In the present day, when the prejudices of party have passed away, his conduct will be better appreciated, especially by those acquainted with India. That he had his faults is not to be denied; were it otherwise would be to suppose him more than human; but of his faults the greater portion were the result of circumstances and peculiar to his situation and his time. When, however, we look to his whole career, advancing himself unaided, save by his own abilities and courage, from a subordinate station to be the arbiter of princes and the founder and preserver of a magnificent Empire, we cannot deny him the qualities of a most able and gallant soldier, and of an eminent statesman; and after a careful review of his whole conduct, it is difficult to decide in which capacity he was the most successful and distinguished.

Many able and eminent men have succeeded him in this country, but in none were these united qualities so remark-

ably blended, and in few were either one of them exhibited in an equal degree. He found Bengal a ruined Commercial Agency in 1756, he left it ten years after a magnificent and powerful Empire, and this chiefly attributable to his own exertions, with very limited means, and in spite of serious opposition.

A. D. 1767.
January.

As long as India remains an Empire, so long will the name of Clive be connected in all minds with its rise and prosperity, and [whilst the Bengal Army continues in existence, so long should his name be mentioned by its members, with reverence and affection, as its founder, supporter and best friend.]

As already stated, General Carnac accompanied him to England, and General Richard Smith succeeded to the command of the Army and a seat in Council. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Peach was promoted to the vacant Colonelcy, and Major Hugh Grant to the Lieutenant-Colonelcy, as Major Giles Stibbert, whose tour of promotion it was, had applied for permission to retire from the service, which he did immediately afterwards. About the same time Major Pemble was re-transferred to his former Presidency at Bombay, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and Majors Fischer and Polier were brought on the effective strength of the establishment.

With the departure of Lord Clive closes the first, and not the least eventful epoch in the History of the Bengal Army.

APPENDIX.



A P P E N D I X.

A. PAGE 32.

THE following extracts from Bruce's Annals of the East India Company, relative to the progress and character of Sir William Norris' Embassy, may prove interesting, as illustrative of the customs and ideas of state at that period:—

“ Sir William Norris set out on his journey towards the Mogul's camp, on the 26th January 1701, with a retinue of sixty Europeans, and three hundred Natives:—on the 8th February, he arrived at ‘Kokely,’ sixty-six coss from Surat: at this place he was informed by Sir Nicholas Waite, that Sir John Gayer and the London Company's servants had been seized and imprisoned by the Governor of Surat, but at the same time, that their Vakeel had gone to Court, to negotiate for them, with a credit of two lakhs of rupees.

“ On the 14th of February the Ambassador reached ‘Bancolee,’ and despatched a messenger to Sir Nicholas Waite, desiring to know by whose authority Sir John Gayer and the London Company's servants had been seized, as necessary information for him, to direct his applications to the Mogul.

“ On his journey, a mutiny took place among the Peons attending him at a time and in situations, where the appearance of the armies of the Hindoo Chiefs, in the vicinity of his small camp, and the Mogul troops keeping them in check, endangered his progress. It is remarkable, that, even in this early period, the discipline of the small body, which formed the Ambassador's guard kept both in awe; nor were those dangers lessened by the reports of Sir Nicholas Waite from Surat, that a demand had been made on him, by the Governor, for a security against the pirates in the Southern Indian Seas; that is, for obligations precisely the same with those which the London Company's servants had been obliged to grant:—this he could evade, only by offering his security for any vessels which might be taken by the London Company's ships, as the Ambassador was on his way to Court, to arrange all those points with the Emperor.

“ Sir William Norris, on the 19th February, proceeded on his journey as far as ‘Gelgawn,’ near Aurungabad, from which he expressed his fears to Sir Nicholas Waite, that should Sir John Gayer and the London Company's servants be released from confinement, they would, in revenge for the injuries they had sustained, probably blockade the port of Surat; an event which would excite the Mogul's anger, and con-

sequently frustrate the objects of the Embassy ;—he therefore recommended, that a ship should constantly be stationed off the port, to prevent this measure being resorted to, by the London Company. On the 21st February, the Ambassador reached ' Damondavee,' where he received authority from Sir Nicholas Waite, to pay such sums as might be necessary to obtain the privileges, it being advisable to give any amount for them, before the arrival of Dr. Davenant, who might counteract the whole of the negotiation ; and to induce the Mogul to accede to his requests, he was empowered to offer six thousand maunds of lead per annum, at six rupees per maund.

" On the 3rd March, 1701, the Ambassador reached ' Brampore,' at which it became expedient to pay a visit in form, to the Vizier, Gazedee Khan ;—a short time was spent in adjusting the ceremonials, the Ambassador requiring to be admitted to a conference, preceeded by drums, trumpets, &c., which the Vizier refused as being inconsistent with Eastern usages on such occasions. This refusal the Ambassador held to be derogatory to his dignity, and left Brampore, without having a conference with the Vizier, and reached ' Parnella' on the 7th April, 1701, near which the Mogul's camp was situated.

" As soon as the Ambassador's arrival was notified, an order was issued, granting him permission to encamp."

" In this early stage of the business he received information of the Act of Parliament, continuing the London Company a Corporation, and (as might be supposed) this event produced hesitation respecting the basis upon which it had been agreed he was to open his negotiation, or the substitution of the English Company for the London Company, after Michaelmas 1701. On consultation with the principal persons attending the Embassy, it was agreed, that it would not be lawful for the Ambassador to represent to the Mogul, that the London Company were to determine in September 1701, notwithstanding his previous assertion of this circumstance to the Governors of the provinces, and to the Mogul's Ministers: this resolution occasioned difficulties, respecting the manner in which he was to open the business to the Emperor ; but it was impossible to retract, for already the time had been fixed for his audience, and the ceremonials of his procession had been settled.

" The order of the Procession, on the 28th April, 1701, was as follows :—

Mr. Cristor, Commander of his Excellency's artillery, on horseback.

Twelve carts, wherein were carried the twelve brass guns, for presents.

Five hackeries, with the cloth, &c., for presents.

One hundred cohurs and measures, carrying the glass-ware and looking-glasses, for presents.

Two fine Arabian horses, richly caparisoned, for presents.

Four English soldiers, on horseback, guarding the presents.

The Union flag.

The Red, White, and Blue flags.

Seven state horses, richly caparisoned, two with English furniture, and five with Indian.

The King's and his Excellency's Crests.

One state palanquin, with English furniture, of silver tissue, brocaded.

Two other Crests.

The music, with rich liveries, on horseback.

Mr. Basset, Lieutenant of his Excellency's foot guards, on horseback.

Ten servants, in rich liveries, on horseback.

The King's and my Lord's Arms.

One Kettle-Drum, in livery, on horseback.

Three Trumpets, in liveries, on horseback.

Captain Symons, Commander of his Excellency's guards.

Twelve Troopers, every way armed and accoutred after the English mode.

Mr. Beverley, Lieutenant of his Excellency's horse guards.

The King's and my Lord's Arms, richly gilt, and very large; the first being borne by sixteen men.

Mr. John Mill and Mr. Whitaker, on horseback, in rich laced coats.

Mr. Hale, Master of the Horse, richly drest, carrying the Sword of State, pointed up.

His Excellency, in a rich palanquin,—Indian embroidered furniture.

Four pages, two on each side of his Excellency's palanquin, richly drest.

Edward Norris, Esq, Secretary to the Embassy, in a rich palanquin, carrying His Majesty's letter to the Emperor; on each side, Mr. Wingate and Mr. Shettleworth, in rich laced coats, on horseback.

Mr. Harlewyn, Treasurer, wearing a gold key
 Mr. Adiel Mill, Secretary to his Excellency } in a Coach."

"The Ambassador, on being received by the Emperor, requested that Phirmaunds might be granted to each of the Presidencies of Surat, Masulipatam, and Húghly, with an exemption from the bonds given by the London Company, for the security of the seas. The Emperor's orders were issued for these grants, and in return for these favors, the Ambassador paid another visit of state to the Mogul, and presented him with two hundred gold mohurs. The Phirmaund for Bengal was more extensive than those for Surat or Masulipatam, because it granted a total exemption from payment of duties, and permission to have a mint; but the authority with which the Consuls, or Presidents, were to be vested, was the same at each Presidency."

B. PAGE 36.

THE following extracts from the correspondence of the gentlemen attached to the Embassy, [copied from Auber's Rise and Progress of the British power in India,] will serve to illustrate the difficulties attending the mission,—the course of diplomacy—and in some measure the manners of the period.

“The 4th, we arrived at Barrapoola, three coss from the city, sending the Padre before to prepare our reception, that, if possible, we might visit the King the first day, even before we went to the house which was got for us. Accordingly, the 7th in the morning we made our entry with very good order, there being sent a munsubdar of 2,000 munsub with about 200 horse and peons to meet us, bringing likewise two elephants and flags. About the middle of the city we were met by Syud Sallabut Caun Behauder, and were by him conducted to the palace, where we waited till about twelve o'clock, till the King came out, before which time we met with Caundora Behauder, who received us very civilly, assuring us of his protection and good services. We prepared for our first present, *viz.* 100 gold mohurs; the table-clock set with precious stones; the unicorn's horn; the gold scrutoire bought from Tendency Caun; the large piece of ambergris; the afo, and chellumche, Manilla work; and the map of the world; these with the Honourable the Governor's letter were presented, every one holding something in his hand as usual. Considering the great pomp and state of the kings of Hindostan, we were very well received. On our arrival at our house, we were entertained by Syud Sallabut Caun, sufficient both for us and our people; in the evening he visited us again, and stayed about two hours. The great favour Caundora is in with the king, gives us hopes of success in this undertaking; he assures of his protection, and says the king has promised us very great favours. We have received orders, first, to visit Caundora as our patron, after which we shall be ordered to visit the grand Vizier, and other Omrahs. We would have avoided this if we could, fearing to disoblige the Vizier; but finding it not feasible, rather than disoblige one who has been so serviceable, and by whose means we expect to obtain our desires, we comply with it.—*Delhi or Sha Jehanabad, July 8th, 1715.*”

“Your Honour, &c. was before informed that three days after our arrival at the city, the king left it under a pretence of worshipping at a noted place, six coss from Delhi, but his real design was to get clear from the fort, where he thought himself not so free to command, which he might be by this journey, as appeared after. He went round the city, eight or ten days, and the Omrahs petitioned him to return, it being an unseasonable time to go further; he refused to consent, sometimes saying he would go to Lahore, and sometimes to Ajmere. We were startled at this news, looking back on the risk and trouble of bringing the present hither, although at the King's charge.

“How to remove it, or to pretend to enter on our negotiation without delivering it,” we could not tell; but after due consideration, we concluded the best way was to deliver the present as fast as possible, though the King was abroad; and accordingly we carried all the japan scrutoires, Japan earthen and lacquered ware, fire-arms, and cutlery-ware, with us to the camp, and presented it. The second day, we delivered in a note for four hundred pieces of broad cloth, ordinary; the third day, another, for three hundred pieces aurora, and sixty pieces ordinary yellow; the following day, the fine reds, superfine scalet, &c., after this, we returned to the city to prepare what was behind, and brought with us to the camp five standing clocks, twelve looking-glasses, and the map fitted up, which were presented; but after his Majesty's perusal, the clocks were ordered to be sent back to us, to be taken care of till he returned to the city; this order hindered us from delivering any more goods. Since the King gave out he designed to proceed no farther than about forty coss from Delhi, to a noted place for worship, from whence he would immediately return, we concluded that we ought to attend his Majesty, leaving Mr. Stephenson and Mr. Phillips to take care of the goods remaining in the city; that we should give notice to the several Omrahs we intend to present; and afterwards, under the favour of proceeding to commence our negotiation withal, in case the King should exceed the designed journey, that then Mr. Stephenson might hire carriages, and bring the goods after us. Pursuant to this consultation, we are now with his Majesty twenty coss from the city; we are preparing our petitions to be delivered. God send they may meet with the desired success.

“We have, from time to time on the way, and since our arrival there, desired sufficient supplies of money to enable us to go on with our business. It is impossible for us now to enlarge more on that head, but that it is certain, if we are not supplied, we shall be in no ways able to effect any thing at this court; all that we can possibly do is to advise your Honour, &c. of our pressing necessities. We were in hopes to supply our honourable masters with a large sum from the private goods with us, but the King's leaving the city, no merchant is to be had for them, so hitherto that method has been impracticable.—*Twenty coss from Delhi, 4th August, 1715.*”

“We wrote you the welcome news of the King's recovery. As a clear demonstration to the world he washed himself the 23rd, and accordingly received the congratulations of the whole court. As a reward for Mr. Hamilton's care and success, the King was pleased (the 30th) to give him in public, *viz.* a vest, a culgee set with precious stones, two diamond rings, an elephant, horse, and 5,000 rupees, besides ordering, at the same time, all his small instruments to be made in gold, *viz.* gold buttons for coat, waist-coat, and breeches, set with jewels: the same day Coja Surhaud received an elephant and vest as a reward for his attendance on this occasion. Monsieur Mar was to have received a reward the same day with Mr.

Hamilton; but considering it was not for the credit of our nation to have any one joined with him, especially since he had no hand in the business, we got his reward deferred till three days afterwards, when he had a vest, elephant, and 1,000 rupees; a favour purely owing to his Majesty's generosity, and because he was his servant.

"We have esteemed this a particular happiness, and hope it will prove ominous to the success of our affairs, it being the only thing that detained us hitherto from delivering our general petition; so pursuant to the orders we received from Caundora, the King's recovery was succeeded by the giving in the remainder of our present (reserving a small part only till the ceremony of his marriage should be over), and then delivered our petition to Caundora, by his means to be introduced to his Majesty. Syud Syllabut Caun, who has all along managed our affairs under Caundora, being at that instant and some time before much indisposed, we were obliged to carry it ourselves, without taking care to have his recommendation annexed. Since the delivery, Coja Surhaud has been frequently with Caundora, to remind him of introducing it to his Majesty, but has always been informed no business can go forward till the solemnization of the King's wedding is over, when he has promised a speedy despatch. All offices have been shut up for some days, and all business in the kingdom must naturally subside to this approaching ceremony; so that we cannot repine at the delay.—*Delhi, 7th Dec., 1715.*"

C. PAGE 36.

THE following is a translation of the Firman obtained from the Emperor Furrookhseer :—

The Emperor Ferokshere's Phirmaund for Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa.

A. D. 1717. A. H. 1129.

To all Governors and their Assistants, Intelligencers, Jaggerdars, Phousdars, Collectors, Guardians of the Ways, Keepers of the Passages, and Zemeendars, that are at present, or hereafter may come, in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa, at the port of Húghly, &c. ports in the provinces aforesaid;

By these presents know ye, from the favour of the Imperial Majesty, that, at this time of conquest, and in this flourishing reign, Mr. John Surnam and Coja Surhaud, gomashtahs (factors) of the English Company, have humbly presented their petition, setting forth, That, according to Sultan Azzim Shah Bahauder and his former Sunods, they are free of customs throughout the whole conquered empire, the port of Surat excepted; and that they do annually pay into the treasury, at the port

of Húghly, a pishcash of 3,000 rupees, in lieu of customs; they hope that, according to the tenor of former Sunods, they may be favoured with a gracious Phirmaund confirming them. **COMMANDED AND ORDERED** That all their mercantile affairs, together with their gomash-tahs, have free liberty, in all Subahships, to pass and re-pass to and fro, either by land or water, in any port or district throughout the several provinces abovesaid. And Know, they are custom free; and they have full power to buy and sell at their will and pleasure; and that there yearly be received into the treasury a pishcash of 3,000 rupees, as has been customary heretofore: that if in any place, or at any time, robberies are committed on their goods, they be assisted in the getting of them again, that the robbers be brought to justice, and the goods be delivered to the proprietors of them. In whatsoever place they have a mind to settle a factory, fairly to buy and sell goods in, they have liberty; and be assisted. That on whomsoever, merchants, weavers, &c., they have any demands, on whatsoever account, let them be aided, and their debtors brought to a true and fair account, and be made to give their gomashtahs their right and just demands. That no persons be suffered to injure and molest their gomashtahs wrongfully and unjustly. And for customs on hired boats (*cutcarrah*), &c. belonging to them, that they be not in any manner molested or obstructed.

They further petition, That if the petty Duans of Subahship demand sight of the original Sunods and Perwannas, under the seals of the Duans and Subahs, the original Sunods cannot possibly be produced in any place without a great deal of difficulty, they desire that a copy from under the seal of the Chief Cauzee be sufficient sight of the original Sunods not being demanded, nor they forced to take Sunods and Perwannas under the Duan and Subah their seals. That the rentings of Calcutta, Chuttanutty, and Govindpore, in the Purgana of Ameirabaud, &c. in Bengal, were formerly granted them, and bought by consent from the Zumeendars of them, and are now in the Company's possession, for which they yearly pay the sum of 1,195 *R. 6 A.* That thirty-eight towns more, amounting to 8,121 *R. 8 A.* adjoining to the aforesaid towns, which they hope the renting of may be granted, and added to those they are already in possession of; that they will pay annually the same amount of them. **COMMANDED** That the copy under the seal of the Chief Cauzee be regarded; that the old towns formerly bought by them remain in their hands as heretofore; and that they have the renting of the adjacent towns petitioned for, which they are to buy from the respective owners of them; and that the Duan and Subah give permission.

They still petition, That from the reign of Aurengzebe, Madras coins were received into the Subahship's treasuries for under value, and are

by they are great losers; they hope the Imperial order may be given for them to be received into the treasuries as Surat rupees are, in case they are as good. That any person, being servant to the Company, eloping from them, from whom debts and accounts are due, they desire that whosoever so deserts be delivered back to the Chief of their Factory. That their gomashahs and servants are molested and troubled for phousdarry, (*abuab munnua*,) &c. impositions which they request they may be exempted from. **COMMANDED AND ORDERED** That from the fifth year of this blessed reign, if Madras rupees are made the same goodness as Surat siccas, there be no discount on them. That whosoever of the Company's servants, being debtors, desert them; seize them, and deliver them to the chief of their Factory. That they be not molested for phirmaushes and impositions.

They petition, That in Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa, the Company have Factories; and that in other places they likewise design to settle Factories: they accordingly desire, that in any place where they have a mind to settle Factories they may have forty begahs of ground given them for the same. That it often happens ships at sea meet with tempestuous winds, and are forced into ports, and are sometimes driven ashore and wrecked, the Governors of the ports injuriously seize on the cargoes of them, and in some places demand a quarter part salvage. That in the island of Bombay, belonging to the English, European siccas are current; they request that, according to the custom of Madras, they may at Bombay coin siccas. **COMMANDED AND ORDERED** That, according to the custom of their Factories in other Subahships, execute; these people having there Factories in several ports of the kingdom, and commerce to the place of the royal residence, and have obtained very favourable Phirmans custom free. Let there be particular care taken that there be duly assistance given them about goods and wrecks, on all occasions. On the island of Bombay, let there be the glorious stamp upon the siccas coined there; passing them current, as all other siccas are, throughout the whole empire. To all these render punctual obedience, observing and acting pursuant to the tenor of this gracious Phirman, and not contrary in any respect whatsoever; not demand yearly new sunods. Regard this particularly well.

Written the 27th of the moon Mohurram, in the fifth year of this glorious and ever happy reign.—*East-India Records*, Book No. 593.

D. PAGE 68.

From Mr. Holwell's interesting Narrative, the following list of the sufferers and survivors on the fatal evening of the 20th of June 1756, is extracted.

"LIST of the SMOTHERED in the BLACK-HOLE Prison, exclusive of Sixty-nine (consisting of Dutch and English Serjeants, Corporals, Soldiers, Topazes, Militia, Whites, and Portugeeze, whose names I am unacquainted with), making on the whole, one hundred and twenty-three persons :—

Of Council.

E. Eyre, }
Wm. Baillie, } Esqs.

The Reverend Jervas
Bellamy.

Gentlemen in the Service.

Messrs. Jenks
Revely
Law
Coales, Ens. Mil.
Valicourt
Jeb
Toriano

Messrs. E. Page
S. Page
Grub
Street
Harod
P. Johnstone
Ballard

Messrs N. Drake
Carse
Knapton
Gosling
Bing
Dod
Dalrymple.

Military Captains.

Messrs. Clayton
Buchanan

Mr. Witherington.

Lieutenants.

Messrs. Bishop
Hays
Blagg

Messrs. Simson
Bellamy.

Ensigns.

Paccard
Scot
Hastings

C. Wedderburn
Dumbleton, Ens. Mil.

Serjeants.

Serjeant Major.....
Quarter-Master Ser-
jeant

Abraham
Cartwright
Bleau

} Serjeants of Militia.

Sea Captains.

Hunt
Osburne
Purnell, survived
the night, but
died the next day.

Messrs. Carey
Stephenson
Guy
Porter
W. Parker

Caulker
Bendall
Atkinson
Leech, &c., &c.

LIST of those who SURVIVED in the BLACK-HOLE Prison.

Messrs. Holwell	Capt. Mills
Court	Capt. Dickson
Secretary Cooke	Mr. Moran
Lushington	John Meadows, and 12 Military and
Burdet	Militia Blacks and Whites, some of
Ens. Walcott	whom recovered when the door was
Mrs. Carey	opened."

E. PAGE 69

The following is the statement of *Syud Goolam Hoosein Khan*, the Author of the *Syur-ool Mootakhereen*, as given in Raymond's translation, regarding the seizure and restoration of several English Ladies at the capture of Calcutta.—After a very cursory allusion to the attack and surrender of Fort William, he goes on to say,—“To all appearance it is in this affair that some Bibies, amongst the women of the English, fell into the hands of Mirza Emir Beg. This was a gentleman attached to Mir Djaafer-qhan, one of the Generals of the Army. The Mirza, with all the abstinence and reserve that become a man of education and honor, kept them decently and untouched, but in secret; and at night he informed his master of the whole matter, who gave him a *Bhovahiah*, or swift boat, in which he put the Bibies, and let his boat, drive as if by accident with the stream: being soon got past the Army guards, he rowed with vigour, and in a little time arrived at twelve cosses below, where Mr. Drake's ship lay at anchor. There he delivered the Bibies; and these ladies having rendered an honorable testimony to Emir Beg's modest behaviour, made such an impression on their husbands, that the latter, though nearly destitute themselves, collected some jewels, to make him a handsome present, in acknowledgment of his generous conduct: but it was refused by the Mirza, who said to one of them: “Gentlemen, what I have done was not for the sake of a present; for as you are a chief man in your nation, and a man of distinction and sentiments, so I am a gentleman in my own nation, and a man of honour and humanity. I have done nothing but what was required by a sense of honour and what might entitle me to your remembrance.” After saying this, he got into his boat, and rowing all night, he rejoined his master before day break.”

F. PAGE 102.

The following copy of the treaty made by the Nawaub Sooraj-oo-dowlah, with Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, is taken from Ives' excellent Narrative :

" GOD AND HIS PROPHETS ARE WITNESSES, THAT I NEVER WILL DEVIATE FROM THE TERMS OF THE TREATY I HAVE NOW MADE WITH THE ENGLISH COMPANY, AND THAT I WILL ON ALL OCCASIONS SHUEW THEM MY FAVOUR, RELYING ON YOUR FAITH TO OBSERVE INVIOLABLY YOUR PART OF THE TREATY.

ARTICLES *acceded to, signed, and sealed, by the NABOB, 9th of February, 1757.*

I. Whatever rights and privileges the king hath granted to the *English Company* in the *Phirmaunds** and *Husbhalhookums†* sent from *Delhi* shall not be disputed, or taken from them, and the immunities therein mentioned stated, good and be acknowledged. Whatever villages are given by the *Phirmaunds* to the Company, shall likewise be granted, notwithstanding they have been denied them by former *Soobahdars*, but the *Zemindars* of these villages are not to be hurt or displaced without cause.

I do agree to the terms of the Phirmaund.

II. All goods passing and repassing through the country by land or water, in *Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa* with *English Dustucks*, shall be exempt from any tax, fee, or imposition from *Choquedars, Gaulivahs, Zemindars‡* or any others.

I agree to this.

III. All the Company's factories seized by the *Nabob* shall be returned. All the money, goods and effects belonging to the Company, their servants and tenants, and which have been seized and taken by the *Nabob* shall be restored. What has been plundered and pillaged by his people shall be made good by the payment of such a sum of money as his justice shall think reasonable.

I agree to restore whatever has been seized and taken by my orders and accounted for in my Sincany§.

IV. That we have permission to fortify *Calcutta* in such a manner as we think proper without interruption.

I consent to it.

V. That we shall have liberty to coin *Siccas* both of gold and silver, of equal weight and fineness to those of *Muxadabad*, which shall pass current in the province, and that there be no demand made for a deduction of *Batta*.

*. Patents or papers signed by the *Mogul*.

+ Papers signed by the *Vizir*.

‡ Officers belonging to the customs and revenues.

I consent to the English Company's coining their own Bullion into Siccas.

VI. That the treaty shall be ratified by signing, sealing, and swearing, in the presence of God and his *Prophets* to abide by the articles therein contained, not only by the *Nabob*, but his principal officers and ministers.

I have sealed and signed the articles in the presence of God and his Prophets.

VII. That Admiral *Charles Watson* and Colonel *Robert Olive* on the part and behalf of the *English* nation and of the Company, do agree to live in a good understanding with the *Nabob*, to put an end to the troubles, and be in friendship with him, whilst these articles are observed and performed by the *Nabob*.

I have signed and sealed the foregoing articles, upon these terms, that, if the Governor and Council will sign and seal them with the Company's seal, and will swear to the performance on their part, I then consent and agree to them."

Then followed the *Nabob's* seal, and *Meer Jaffier* and *Rajah Dullub*, two of his general officers, also undersigned it.

The Governor and Council's agreement with the Nabob of Bengal.

"We the *English East India Company*, in the presence of Excellency the *Nabob Munferood Muluk Serajah Dowlah*, *Soubahdar* of the provinces of *Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa*, by the hands and seal of the Council, do agree and promise in the most solemn manner, that the business of the Company's factories, which are in the jurisdiction of the *Nabob*, shall be transacted as formerly; that we will never do violence to any persons without cause; that we will never offer protection to any persons having accounts with the government, to any of the king's *Fuluckdars* or *Zemindars*, to any murtherers or robbers, nor will ever act contrary to the tenor of the articles granted by the *Nabob*; we will carry on our trade in the former channel, and never in any respect deviate from this agreement."

G. PAGE 114.

The following were the terms of the capitulation for the surrender of Chandernagore on the 23rd March, 1757:—

"*Articles of Capitulation proposed by the Director and Council for the French East India Company's Affairs at Chandernagore, to Vice-Admiral Watson; with his answers, March 23d, 1757.*

ART. I. The lives of the deserters shall be saved.

ANS. *The deserters shall be absolutely given up.*

II. All the officers of this garrison shall be prisoners on their parole of honor; and shall have liberty to carry with them all their effects, and go where they please, on promising they will not serve against his Britannic Majesty during the present war

A. *The Admiral agrees to this.*

III. The soldiers of the garrison shall be prisoners of war, so long as the present war continues ; and when peace is made between the King of *France* and the King of *England*, they shall be sent to *Pondicherry*, and till then be entertained at the expence of the *English* Company.

A. *The Admiral likewise agrees, with this difference only, that instead of sending the soldiers to Pondicherry, they shall be sent to Madras, or to England, as the Admiral shall hereafter think proper ; and that such foreigners, who are not of the French nation, and chuse voluntarily to enter into the English service, shall have liberty.*

IV. The Sepoys of the garrison shall not be prisoners of war ; they shall have leave, on the contrary, to return to their own country on the coast.

A. *The Admiral agrees to this.*

V. The officers and men of the Company's *European* ship *St. Contest*, shall be sent to *Pondicherry* in the first *English* ship, which goes to the coast.

A. *The officers and men of the European ship shall be upon the same footing as the soldiers, and be sent to Madras or to England as soon as possible.*

VI. The *French Jesuit* fathers shall have liberty to exercise the functions of their religion in the house which has been assigned them since the demolishing of their church ; the silver ornaments and every thing that belongs to the church, shall be given them, and also their effects.

A. *The Admiral cannot agree to any Europeans residing here ; but the French Jesuits may go to Pondicherry, with all the ornaments of their church, or wherever they please.*

VII. All the inhabitants, of what nation or quality soever, as *Europeans*, *Mustees*, *Christians*, *Blacks*, *Gentils*, *Moors*, and others, shall be put in possession of their houses, and of all in general as shall be found belonging to them, either in the fort, or on their estates.

A. *This article to be left to the Admiral, who will do justice.*

VIII. The factories, of *Cassimbuzar*, *Dacca*, *Patna*, *Jeuda*, and of *Ballasore*, shall remain at the command of the chiefs who direct them.

A. *To be settled between the Nabob and the Admiral.*

IX. The directors, counsellors, and those employed under them, shall have leave to go where they please, with their cloaths and linen.

A. *The admiral agrees to this.*

The Admiral expects an answer by three o'clock this afternoon, and that the British forces may take possession of the fort by four.

The abovementioned propositions have been accepted of by the council ; in consequence of which, we have delivered up the fortress of *Chandernagore* to Admiral *Watson*."

Chandernagore, the 23rd of March, 1757.

P. RENAULT, LA-PORTIERE, M. FOURNIER,

H. PAGE 115.

Mr. Ives gives the following affecting account of the death of Mr. Speke and of the sufferings of both father and son on the melancholy occasion :—

‘ The behaviour of Captain *Speke* and his son, a youth of 16 years of age, was so truly great and exemplary on this glorious but melancholy occasion, that I must beg leave to describe it with some of its most interesting circumstances.

‘ When Admiral *Watson* had the unhappiness to see both the father and son fall in the same instant, he immediately went up to them, and by the most tender and pathetic expressions tried to alleviate their distress. The Captain, who had observed his son’s leg to be hanging only by the skin, said to the Admiral, “ indeed, Sir, this was a cruel shot, to knock down both the father and the son !” Mr. *Watson*’s heart was too full to make the least reply ; he only ordered them both to be immediately carried to the surgeon. The Captain was first brought down to me in the afterhold, where a platform had been made ; and then told me how dangerously his poor *Billy* was wounded. Presently after, the brave youth himself appeared, but had another narrow escape, the quartermaster, who was bringing him down in his arms after his father, being killed by a cannon ball : his eyes o’erflowing with tears, not for his own, but for his father’s fate, I laboured to assure him, that his father’s wound was not dangerous, and this assertion was confirmed by the Captain himself. He seemed not to believe either of us, until he asked me *upon my honor*, and I had repeated to him my first assurance in the most positive manner. He then immediately became calm ; but on my attempting to enquire into the condition of his wound, he solicitously asked me if I had dressed his father, for he could not think of my touching him, before his father’s wound had been taken care of. I assured him, that the Captain had been already properly attended to : “ *Then* (replied the generous youth, pointing to a fellow-sufferer,) *Pray, Sir, look to and dress this poor man, who is groaning so sadly beside me !*” I told him that he already had been taken care of, and begged of him with some importunity, that I now might have liberty to examine his wound ; he submitted to it, and calmly observed, “ *Sir, I fear you must amputate above the joint !*” I replied, my dear, I must ! Upon which, he clasped both his hands together, and lifting his eyes in the most devout and fervent manner towards heaven, he offered up the following short, but earnest petition : “ *Good God, do thou enable me to behave in my present circumstances, worthy my Father’s son !*” ————When he had ended this ejaculatory prayer, he told me that he was all submission. I then performed the operation above the joint of the knee ; but during the whole time the intrepid youth never spake a word, or uttered a groan that could be heard at a yard’s distance.

‘ The reader may easily imagine, what, in this dreadful interval, the brave, but unhappy Captain suffered, who lay just by his unfortunate

and darling son. But whatever were his feelings, we discovered no other expressions of them, than what the silent, trickling tears declared; though the bare recollection of the scene, even at this distant time, is too painful for me.—Both the father and the son, the day after the action, were sent with the rest of the wounded back to *Calcutta*. The father was lodged at the house of *William Mackett*, Esq., his brother-in-law; and the son was with me at the hospital. For the first eight or nine days, I gave the father great comfort, by carrying him joyful tidings of his boy; and in the same manner I gratified the son in regard to the father. But alas! from that time, all the good symptoms which had hitherto attended this unparalleled youth, began to disappear! The Captain easily guessed, by my silence and countenance, the true state his boy was in; nor did he ever after ask me more than two questions concerning him; so tender was the subject to us both, and so unwilling was his generous mind to add to my distress. The first was on the tenth day, in these words, ‘*How long my friend, do you think my Billy may remain in a state of uncertainty?*’ I replied, that “If he lived to the 15th day from the operation, there would be the strongest hopes of his recovery.” On the 13th, however, he died; and on the 16th, the brave man looking me stedfastly in the face, said, ‘*Well, Ives, how fares it with my boy?*’ I could make him no reply;—and he immediately attributed my silence to the real cause. He cried bitterly, squeezed me by the hand, and begged me to leave him for one half hour, when he wished to see me again: and assured me, that I should find him with a different countenance, from that he troubled me with at present. These were his obliging expressions.—I punctually complied with his desire; and when I returned to him, he appeared, as he ever after did, perfectly calm and serene.

‘The dear youth had been delirious the evening preceding the day on which he died; and at two o’clock in the morning, in the utmost distress of mind, he sent me an incorrect note, written by himself with a pencil, of which the following is an exact copy. ‘*If Mr. Ives will consider the disorder a son must be in, when he is told he is dying, and is yet in doubt whether his father is not in as good a state of health. If Mr. Ives is not too busie to honour this chitt.* which nothing but the greatest uneasiness could draw from me. The boy waits an answer.* Immediately on the receipt of this note, I visited him, and he had still sense enough left to know who I was. He then began with me.—“*And is he dead?*”—Who my dear? *my father, Sir.* No my love; nor is he in any danger, I assure you; he is almost well. “*Thank God!—Then why did they tell me so? I am now satisfied, and ready to die.*” At that

* A Note in *India* is called a *Chitt*.

time he had a locked jaw, and was in great distress, but I understood every word he so inarticulately uttered ; he begged my pardon, for having (as he obligingly and tenderly expressed himself,) disturbed me at so early an hour, and before the day was ended surrendered up a valuable life.

The following exquisite simile so finely illustrates the beauty and untimely death of this incomparable young man, that I am persuaded every good-natured reader will excuse my inserting it :—

“ As a gay flower, with blooming beauties crown'd,
 “ Cut by the shear, lies languid on the ground :
 “ Or some tall poppy, that o'ercharg'd with rain
 “ Bends the faint head, and sinks upon the plain ;
 “ So fair, so languishingly sweet he lies,
 “ His head declin'd, and drooping as he dies. *”

Mr. Speke was buried in the old cemetery, and his tomb is one of the few allowed to remain there on the erection of St. John's Cathedral, where it is still to be seen. Captain Speke recovered from his wound, and subsequently commanded the “ *Resolution* ” in the action off *Belleisle*, where he greatly distinguished himself, capturing the “ *Formidable*,” a vessel of superior force. The “ *Resolution* ” was wrecked on a shoal the night after the action, but all hands were saved.

Captain Speke was soon afterwards appointed to the “ *Modeste*,” in command of which he died at Lisbon in the 48rd year of his age, highly esteemed and respected throughout the service.

I. PAGE 131.

The following is a translation of the treaty made by Meer Jaffier Khán with the Select Committee of the Council, as given by Orme.

“ The treaty written in Persian, and signed by Meer Jaffier Khán is thus translated :—

‘ I SWEAR BY GOD, AND THE PROPHET OF GOD, TO ABIDE BY THE TERMS OF THIS TREATY WHILST I HAVE LIFE.’

These words were written by Meer Jaffier in his own hand, and undersigned by him with his name. The following were as usual in the hand of a scribe :—

‘ *Treaty made with Admiral Watson, Colonel Clive, and the other Counsellors, Mr. Drake and Mr. Watts.*—

* Purpureus veluti cum flos succisus aratro
 Languescit moriens ; lassove papavera collo
 Demisère caput, pluvîâ cum fortê gravantur.

ARTICLE I. — Whatever articles were agreed to in the time of peace with the Nabob Surajah Dowlah, I agree to comply with.—II. The enemies of the English are my enemies, whether they be Indians or Europeans.—III. All the effects and factories belonging to the French in the province of Bengal, the paradise of nations, and Bahar, and Orixá, shall remain in the possession of the English, nor will I ever allow them any more to settle in the three Provinces.—IV. In consideration of the losses which the English Company have sustained by the capture and plunder of Calcutta by the Nabob, and the charges occasioned by the maintenance of the forces I will give them one crore of rupees.—V. For the effects plundered from the English inhabitants for Calcutta, I agree to give fifty lacks of rupees.—VI. For the effects plundered from the Gentoos, Moors, and other inhabitants of Calcutta, twenty lacks of rupees shall be given.—VII. For the effects plundered from the Armenian inhabitants of Calcutta, I will give the sum of seven lacks of rupees. The distribution of the sums allotted to the English, Gentoos, Moor, and other inhabitants of Calcutta, shall be left to Admiral Watson, Colonel Clive, Roger Drake, William Watts, James Kilpatrick, and Richard Becher, Esquires, to be disposed of by them, to whom they think proper.—VIII. Within the ditch, which surrounds the borders of Calcutta, are tracts of land belonging to several Zemindars: besides these, I will grant to the English Company 600 yards without the ditch.—IX. All the land lying south of Calcutta, as far as Culpee, shall be under the Zemindary of the English Company: and all the officers for these parts shall be under their jurisdiction. The revenues to be paid by the Company in the same manner as other Zemindars.—X. Whenever I demand the assistance of the English, I will be at the charge of the maintenance of their troops.—XI. I will not erect any new fortifications near the river Ganges below Hughley.—XII. As soon as I am established in the three Provinces, the aforesaid sums shall faithfully be paid.—Dated the 15th of the month of Ramazan, in the second year of the present reign.”

The treaty written and signed by the English, contained the sense of all these articles, but not expressed in the same words; and it likewise had one more of the following tenor:—

“ XIII. On condition Meer Jaffier Cawn Bahadar solemnly ratifies and swears to fulfil the above articles, we the underwritten do, for and in the behalf of the Honourable East India Company, declare on the Holy Evangelists, and before God, that we will assist Meer Jaffier Cawn Bahadar with our whole utmost force, to obtain the Subahdarship of the Province of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixá, and further that we will assist him to the utmost against all his enemies whatever, whensoever he calls upon us for that purpose, provided that when he becomes the Nabob, he fulfils the above articles.”

J. PAGE 153.

The following is the statement made by the translator of the Seir Mutakherin, in a note, pp. 773-4 of vol. 1, regarding the alleged plunder of 8 Kurors of Rupees from Sooraj-oo-dowlah's Treasury, after the battle of Plassey.

"As we have been ourselves, in the very next year, in the Company's service, as Linguists to Colonel Clive, in whose camp we were, we remember to have heard from the mouth of Mr. John Walsh, who was Commissary in that army, that himself went into that treasury, with Mr. Watts, Mr. Lushington, Ram-chund, the writer or Divan, and Labekishun, the Moonshy or Persian Secretary, and found it to contain one hundred and seventy-six lacs in silver, two and thirty lacs in gold, two chests of gold ingots, four of jewels set, and two lesser ones of loose stones and gems: but what is singular and yet true, this was only the outer treasury: and those renowned English, who look down with contempt on the intellects and abilities of the Bengalees, and yet are perpetually bubbled and duped by them, did not know any thing of the inner treasury, said to contain eight corors, and which, pursuant to a custom well known in India, and which is ordinary even to private men, was kept in the Zenana, or women's apartments. This inner treasury was made away with between Mir-djaafer, Emir-beg-qhan, Ram-chund, and Labekishun, whose silence was purchased by a share in the contents, or who, it was said, made away with the Colonel's share. This much is certain, that ten years after, Ram-chund, who in 1758 was only a writer at sixty rupees per month, died worth seventy-two lacs in cash and bills; four hundred large water-pots, eighty of which were of gold and the rest of silver: eighteen lacs in landed property, and twenty lacs of jewels; in all a coror and a quarter. All this immense property, which then became notorious, and which Mr. Barwell rated at only eighty lacs, could not have been made under Vansittart, whose Divan he became; for Vansittart himself, who had brought a lac of property into Bengal, and left it with no more than nine (a sum which his very salary and commission could have easily made up), was far from being worth one-tenth of the property of his Divan, although both that Governor and Hastings were so much cried down at that time for having sold Bengal to Mir-cassem-qhan for twenty-two lacs: an assertion, proved to be an atrocious calumny, when Vansittart, after a four years' administration, set out for England with less than ten lacs; and Hastings, his associate, proved to be so poor, that having in vain applied to his Divan (Cantoo) for a supply of twelve thousand rupees, for present subsistence in England, he was at last obliged to receive that assistance from Aga Bedross (Coja Petruce), but without being able to repay it sooner than ten years after, when Hastings came second to Madras. If then these two omnipotent men made no money by a four years' administration, and

by a revolution which put every thing in their power, of course Ram-chund, who was only their servant, could make but little himself, if any at all: the coror and quarter then must have been the Colonel's share, which he sunk in his own pocket. This assertion will be much corroborated by the incredible sum which Labekishun (in Colonel Clive's time, a man at sixty rupees per month, as well as Ram-chund) is said to have expended at his mother's funeral (nine lacs), and by the immense fortune which Menni-begum, the favorite consort of Mir-djaafer-qhan's, is known to be possessed of to this day. This fortune, which is computed by corors, could not be made anywhere, but at that precise occasion: for her husband is known to have lived and died poor, distressed, and enormously indebted; so much so, that his troops more than once endangered his life for their pay, and at last conspired against him with Mir-Cassem, his son-in-law."

K. PAGE 243.

The following is a copy of the treaty made between the Nizam Salabut Jung and Colonel Forde; extracted from *Cambridge's War in India*,
"TREATY WITH SALABATZING SOUBA, OR THE VICEROY OF THE DECKAN.

SEAL OF SALABATZING.

"The whole of the Circar of Massulipatam, with eight districts, as well as the Circar of Nizampatam, and the districts of Codaver and Wacalmannar, shall be given to the English Company, as the Enam, (or free gift) and the Saneds granted to them in the same manner as was done to the French.

"Salabatzing will oblige the French Troops which are in this country, to pass the river Ganges within fifteen days, or send them to Pondicherry, or to any other place out of Deckan country, on the other side of the river Kristna. In future, he will not suffer them to have a settlement in this country on any account whatsoever, nor keep them in his service, nor assist them, nor call them to his assistance.

"The Souba will not demand or call Anunderaj to an account for what he has collected out of the Circars belonging to the French, nor for the computation of the revenues of his own country, in the present year, but let him remain peaceably in it in future, and according to the computation of revenues of his country, before the time of the French, agreeable to the custom of his grandfather and father, and as was then paid to the Circar, so he will now act and pay accordingly to the Circar, and if he (the Raja) does not agree to it, then the Souba may do what he pleases. In all cases the Souba will not assist the enemies of the English, nor give them protection.

"The English on their part will not assist the Souba's enemies or give them protection.

"Dated moon Ramadan 16th, Hegira 1172, which is the 12th of May, 1759."

In the Souba's own hand.

"I swear by God and his Prophet, and upon the Holy Alcoran, that I with pleasure agree to the requests specified in this paper, and shall not deviate from it even an hair's breadth."

L. PAGE 270.

The following is the account of the battle of Bedarra, as given by the Dutch East India Company, copied from *Grose's Voyage to the East Indies, vol. 2, page 376.*

"On the 25th, when the troops and other bands, which, on the 22d before, were gone on shore, were, in their projected march, come near Chandanagore, they were there met by the English; who, according to their own account, to the number of 1170, were posted very advantageously, and provided with a numerous artillery. No sooner were those troops come within cannon-shot, but they were fired on by the English: and though all the people were extremely fatigued by a very long march, which they were obliged to make for the space of three days; yet, with much bravery, they stood the fire of the English; and, though unprovided of any artillery, marched up, with a full and steady pace, to the enemy: but meeting in their way a broad and deep ditch which they were constrained to pass, to avoid being destroyed by the artillery of the English, the troops, in passing that ditch, fell into some disorder: the English, taking advantage of this circumstance, redoubled the fire of their artillery and musquetry; and the disorder, already arisen, being thereby increased, caused the slaughter of a part of those troops; another part was made prisoners; and the rest were constrained to retire."

See "*An authentic account of the proceedings of their High Mightinesses the States of Holland and West-Friezland, on the complaint laid before them by his Excellency Sir Joseph Yorke, his Britannic Majesty's ambassador at the Hague, concerning hostilities committed in the river of Bengal.*"

M. PAGE 271.

The following were the articles drawn up and agreed to, between the English and Dutch, and the Nawaub and the Dutch, after the defeat of the latter at Bedarrah. Extracted from *Goose's Voyage*, vol. 2, pp. 377-84:—

“ARTICLES OF ACCOMMODATION, CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE COMMISSIONERS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND COUNCIL AT FORT WILLIAM, AND THOSE FROM THE DIRECTOR AND COUNCIL OF FORT GUSTAVUS.

In the name of the Holy Trinity, Amen

Be it known to all and sundry, whom these presents shall or may concern.

The honorable and respectable President and Council at Fort William, and the honourable and respectable Director and Council at Fort Gustavus, in these parts, testifying an ardent desire of allaying all the contests arisen in Bengal, of obviating calamities so often experienced, putting an end to, ceasing, and removing out of the way, all difference arisen, and re-establishing their several possessions in perfect quiet, have for that end nominated, empowered and deputed to Garetty, the place appointed for conference, the following honourable gentlemen, viz.;

The honourable and respectable President and Council at Fort William, Messrs Richard Becher and John Cooke, Counsellors: the honourable and respectable Director and Council of Fort Gustavus, Messrs John Bacheracht and John Charles Kist, members of the polity and judiciary Council.

Who, after having previously certified each other mutually of their full powers, and given in the same in due form, and also having deliberated on the points, which their principals had judged necessary to be inserted therein, came at length, upon mature deliberation, to agree to a pacification, from which has arisen a full cessation of all hostilities, both by sea and land, to be concluded under the following conditions:—

DEMANDS OF THE ENGLISH,

ANSWERS BY THE DUTCH.

I.

I.

The Director and Council at Chinsura, shall give a sufficient satisfaction to the President and Council at Fort William, both on account of the dishonor done to the English flag, and of divers of our ships being stopt at the mouth of the river, by the commanders of the Dutch ships, contrary to all the treaties and alliances subsisting between the two nations;

The Director and Council at Chinsura testify, that as they have always entertained pacific sentiments, in order to suppress the contests arisen which have interrupted the good harmony that subsisted between the two nations; and produced, and are still capable of producing in them a most sincere regret: and that all that was done in the mouth of the river,

and also of many other hostilities committed by their ships.

II.

The Director and Council at Chinsura, shall make good all the damage done by their ship-masters, whether with or without their orders, both to the Honourable Company, and to private persons, and shall instantly deliver up all our ships, military stores, and effects.

Done at Garetty, the 1st of December, 1759,

Signed.

RICHARD BECHER
and JOHN COOKE.

DEMANDS OF THE DUTCH.

I.

That the English, as being at peace with the Nabob, shall prevail with him either to return back, or at least to keep quiet in his camp, without giving us any molestation; and to accept the articles of our agreement, so far as they regard him, both for the present and the future.

II.

A reciprocal amnesty of all that has happened during the late contests; moreover a full assurance

with regard to the English flag and dishonor put upon it, was done without their order and to their great mortification, by the ships crews, just upon their arrival, and by mistaking their orders; with this representation they hope the Governor and Council will be pleased to rest fully satisfied.

II.

As the Dutch ships have also suffered great loss and considerable damage, it seems hard to insist on an indemnification; but what is still in being shall be freely returned: we request the Governor and Council to take it into their just consideration, and in case their honors chuse not to depart therefrom, we shall endeavour to make satisfaction.

Done at Garetty the 1st of December, 1759,

Signed.

JOHN BACHERACHT
and J. C. KIST.

ANSWERS OF THE ENGLISH.

I.

We have already employed all our interest with the Nazim, and shall continue endeavouring to persuade him to march back his army, as soon as the Dutch government shall have fulfilled his orders. The articles agreed on between the English and Dutch, must not be confounded with the treaty which the government of Hughly is to conclude with the Nazim.

II.

Approved, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the treaty we have entered into with the Nazim

that friendship, good faith, and harmony, shall be kept up by the respective superiors of both nations, without permitting any acts of hostility, under what pretext soever, to be committed.

That both shall mutually exert themselves to maintain a good harmony, and as far as possible, lend a helping hand to promote whatever shall tend to the prosperity of each other, without directly or indirectly countenancing those, who may seem inclined to do any detriment to the one or the other.

III.

As the dispute hath been carried on, neither by virtue of any declaration of war, nor of any particular commission, our troops and seamen cannot be considered as prisoners of war, subject to a capitulation; so that they must be set at liberty, and suffered to march out with all the honors of war.

IV.

That we be left in the free, peaceable, and undiminished possession of our settlements, commerce, privileges, and prerogatives.

V.

That all the ships, vessels, servants, possessions, settlements, territories, houses, &c., appertaining as well to the Honourable Company as to particular persons and whatever is connected therewith, be declared free, and given up in the presence of reciprocal commissioners, appointed for that purpose.

of the country, and so long as the Friendship between our two Sovereigns holds good in Europe.

*III.

The Dutch officers and troops are not considered by us as our prisoners of war, but solely as those of the Nazim; and consequently we are clear to set them at liberty, as soon as the Dutch shall have concluded their treaty with the Nazim, excepting, however, those who are willing to enter into our service, or claim the protection of our flag.

IV.

We have in no manner disturbed the gentlemen of the Dutch Company in their rights and privileges, nor ever had the intention of doing it.

V.

All the ships and vessels which are in our possession, shall be restored as soon as our demands shall be complied with; or that we obtain security from the Director and Council at Hughly, that they shall be complied with.

VI.

That as soon as possible, the ratifications be, upon the approbation of the respective Directors, exchanged on both sides.

VII.

And lastly, the two nations mutually guarantee the foregoing articles.

Done at Garetty the first day of December, 1759.

JOHN BACHERACHT

and J. C. KIST.

VI.

GRANTED.

VII.

We cannot apprehend the necessity of this article.

Done at Garetty, the third day of December, 1759.

RICHARD BECHER

and JOHN COOKE.

ENDORSED on the Back.

Unanimously determined, That the use of the French language, in some copies of this agreement, and its future use in the execution of these presents, shall not be a precedent, which the principals, and respective masters of the contracting parties, shall be obliged to follow; but that in future it shall be optional to the principals of the two parties, to grant and receive such treaties in a language different from the French.

This treaty, and the appendix, are of the same force and obligation, as if the same regulation were complied with therein; and the separate articles, which may be added thereto, shall in like manner have the same force, as if they were inserted in the treaty.

In witness whereof, we the undersigning deputies of the honorable and respectable President and Council at Fort William, and of the honorable and respectable Director and Council at Fort Gustavus, members of their respective assemblies, have signed this appendix or endorsement, and ratified it with our seals.

Thus done in our place of conference, at Garetty, the third day of December 1759.

Signed

(L. C.) JOHN BACHERACHT.

(L. C.) RICHARD BECHER.

(L. C.) F. C. KIST.

(L. C.) JOHN COOKE.

RATIFICATION.

We the undersigning by these presents accept the foregoing articles of mutual agreement, negotiated and determined, in order to a general pacification, between the settlements and servants of our respective masters and principals, by our deputies appointed for that purpose, viz., on the one side, Messrs John Cooke and Richard Becher, Counsellors at Fort William; and on the other side, Messrs John

Bacheracht and John Charles Kist, members of the polity and justiciary council, at Fort Gustavus ; approving, confirming, and ratifying the same in the name, and with the approbation, of our aforesaid masters and principals in Europe, promising, that we shall, as soon as may be, faithfully put in execution the reciprocal restitution, agreed on in the aforesaid articles, in order to put an end to all the contests and misunderstandings which have arisen to this present date ; and moreover, make the contents of these presents, as far as is needful, known, by a solemn publication to our dependents, that the same may, in all the principal points, be religiously observed, avoiding every thing which, in process of time, might interrupt the friendship and peaceable neighbourhood, now so happily re-established between our respective possessions.

In token of which, we have subscribed these presents, and ratified them with the seals of the two Honorable East India Companies, established here.

Given at Hugly, the 6th of December 1759.—Underneath the Seal of the Dutch Company, in red wax.

Signed,

A. BİSDOM,
G. L. VERNET,
R. H. ARMENAUŁT,
M. İSİNCK,
J. L. SCHEVIKHAVEN,
S. DE HOOG, and
O. W. VALK.

Given at Calcutta, the 8th of December 1759.—Underneath the arms of the English Company, in red wax.

Signed,

ROBERT CLIVE,
C. MANNINGHAM,
J. V. FRANKLAND,
THOMAS BODDAM,
J. V. B. SUMMER, and
J. Y. M. Q. WIERE.

COPY OF THE DUTCH PROPOSALS MADE TO THE CHUTA-NABOB. WITH HIS ANSWERS, RATIFIED THE 5TH OF DECEMBER 1759.

Article I. That the purchases and sales of the Dutch Company be again made in the same manner as in former times.

Answer. The purchases and sales of the Dutch Company shall be carried on according to custom ; excepting the saltpetre of Azimabad, which shall be purchased by the means of Raja Ramnarain Bahadar, nor shall any one molest them.

Art. II. That nobody cause any obstruction in the provision of cloth, &c., at the Aurungs, on account of the Dutch Company.

Ans. Nobody shall obstruct the provision of cloth, &c. according to the custom of the Aurungs, nor use any violence.

Art. III. That the goods and treasure of the Dutch Company be allowed to pass and repass with

Ans. The merchandize of the Dutch Company shall pass and repass, by land or water, free from

the Dutch Dustuck ; that nobody any unprecedented impositions ; obstruct them ; nor any longer nor shall any one demand illicit demand illicit customs. customs.

Art. IV. That payment be made by the officers of the mint of Murshedabad of the balance due to the Company. Ans. The officers of the mint of Murshedabad shall be made to pay whatever balance is justly and truly due.

Articles agreed upon by the Dutch Company with the Nabob, and ratified under the hands and seals of the Dutch Director and Council, and the seal of the Company.

- I. We will immediately send away the Europeans and Buggoses, whom we brought hither on board of our ships ; and discharge all the Europeans, Telingas, musketeers, and foot soldiers, lately taken here into our pay.
- II. We will never bring any troops into this country of Bengal, or carry on war therein, or make any preparation for that purpose.
- III. We will keep no more than 125 European soldiers in the factories of Bengal, Patna, or Ballasore.
- IV. We will peaceably continue to carry on our commerce in the same manner as formerly ; and in case, which God forbid, any obstruction or dispute should fall in its way, cause the Soubah to be acquainted therewith ; and solicit from him the necessary redress in regard thereto.

Given the 14th year of the month Rabbie Ussane, of the year 1172 ; or the 5th of December, 1759.

Signed A. BISDOM ; G. L. VERNET ; R. H. ARMENAUULT ; M. ISINCK ; J. L. V. SCHEVIKHAVEN ; JOHN BACHERACHT ; S. DE HOOG ; J. C. KIST, AND O. W. VALK."

N. PAGE 310.

The following was the treaty formed in Calcutta in September 1760, between the Governor and Select Committee and Meer Mahommud Kossim Allee Khan, as given in the 1st Vol. of Vansittart's Narrative, Vol. 1. pp. 100-4.

" COPY OF THE TREATY CONCLUDED BETWEEN MR. VANSITTART, THE GENTLEMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE, AND THE NABOB MEER MAHOMED COSSIM ALLEE CAWN.

" FIRST, The Nabob Meer Mahomed Jaffier Cawn shall continue in the possession of his dignities, and all affairs be transacted in his name, and a suitable income shall be allowed for his expences.

" SECOND, The Neabut of the Soubadarree of Bengal, Azimabad, and

Orissa, &c., shall be conferred by his Excellency the Nabob, on Meer Mahomed Cossim Cawn. He shall be vested with the administration of all the affairs of the provinces, and after his Excellency he shall succeed to the government.

“THIRD, Betwixt us and Meer Mahomed Cossim Cawn, a firm friendship and union is established. His enemies are our enemies, and his friends are our friends.

“FOURTH, The Europeans and seepoys of the English army shall be ready to assist the Nabob Meer Mahomed Cossim Cawn in the management of all affairs, and in all affairs dependent on him, they shall exert themselves to the utmost of their abilities.

“FIFTH, For all charges of the Company, and of the said army, and provisions for the field, &c., the lands of Burdwan, Midnapoor, and Chittagong, shall be assigned, and sunnuds for that purpose shall be written and granted. The Company is to stand to all losses, and receive all the profits of these three countries; and we will demand no more than the three assignments aforesaid.

“SIXTH, One-half of the Chunam produced at Silhet for three years shall be purchased by the Gomastahs of the Company, from the people, of the government, at the customary rate of that place. The tenants and inhabitants of that place shall receive no injury.

“SEVENTH, The balance of the former tuncaws shall be paid according to the Kistbundee agreed upon with the Royroyan. The jewels, which have been pledged, shall be received back again.

“EIGHTH, We will not allow the tenants of the Sircar to settle in the lands of the English Company. Neither shall the tenants of the Company be allowed to settle in the lands of the Sircar.

“NINTH, We will give no protection to the dependants of the Sircar in the lands or factories of the Company, neither shall any protection be given to the dependants of the Company, in the lands of the Sircar; and whoever shall fly to either party for refuge shall be given up.

“TENTH, The measures for war or peace with the Shahzada, and raising supplies of money, and the concluding both these points, shall be weighed in the scale of reason, and whatever is judged expedient shall be put in execution; and it shall be so contrived by our joint counsels that he be removed from this country, nor suffered to get any footing in it. Whether there be peace with the Shahzada or not, our agreement with Meer Mahomed Cossim Cawn, we will, by the grace of God, inviolably observe, as long as the English Company's factories continue in the country.

Dated the 27th of September, 1760,

O. PAGE 326.

The following is the narrative of the surrender, of Monsieur Law, given by the Native Historian of the period, Syud Goolam Hoosein Khan, in the Sier Mutakherin, vol. 2, pp. 164-6.

“ Mooshur Lass finding himself abandoned and alone, resolved not to turn his back : he bestrode one of his guns, and remained firm in that posture, waiting for the moment of his death. This being reported to Major Carnac, he detached himself from his men, with Captain Knox and some other officers, and he advanced to the man on the gun without taking with him either a guard, or any Talingas at all. Being arrived near, his troop alighted from their horses, and pulling their caps from their heads, they swept the air with them as if to make him a *salam* : and the salute being returned by Mooshur Lass in the same manner, some parley ensued in their own language. The Major, after paying high encomiums to Mooshur Lass for his perseverance, conduct, and bravery, added these words : ‘ You have done every thing that could be expected from a brave man ; and your name shall be undoubtedly transmitted to posterity by the pen of history : now loosen your sword from your loins, come amongst us and abandon all thoughts of contending with the English.’ The other answered, ‘ That if they could accept of his surrendering himself just as he was, he had no objections ; but that as to surrendering himself with the disgrace of being without his sword, it was a shame he could never submit to ; and that they might take his life if they were not satisfied with that condition.’ The English commanders, admiring his firmness, consented to his surrendering himself in the manner he wished ; after which, the Major with his officers shook hands with him, in their European manner, and every sentiment of enmity was instantly dismissed on both sides. At the same time the commander sent for his own palky, made him sit in it, and he was sent to camp. Mooshur Lass, unwilling to see or to be seen, in that condition, shut up the curtains of the palky for fear of being recognised by any of his friends at camp ; but yet some of his acquaintance hearing of his being arrived, went to him ; these were Mir-abdollah and Mustepha cooli-qhan. The Major, who had excused him from appearing in public, informed them that they would not see him for some days, as he was too much vexed, to receive any company. Ahmed-qhan-coreishi, who was an impertinent talker, having come to look at him, thought to pay his court to the English by joking on the man’s defeat : a behaviour that has nothing strange, if we consider the times in which we live and the company he was accustomed to frequent ; and it was in that notion of his, doubtless, that with much pertness of voice and air he asked him this question : *And Biby Lass, where is she ?* The Major and the officers present, shocked at the impropriety of the question, reprimand-

said, ' has fought bravely and deserves the attention of all brave men, the impertinencies which you have been offering him may be customary amongst your friends and your nation, but cannot be suffered in our's who has it for a standing rule never to offer an injury to a vanquished foe.' Ahmed-qhan, checked by this reprimand, held his tongue, and did not answer a word. He tarried about one hour more in his visit and then went away much ashamed; and although he was a commander of importance, and one to whom much honour had been always paid, no one did speak to him any more, or made a show of standing up at his departure. This reprimand did much honour to the English; and it must be acknowledged, to the honour of those strangers, that as their conduct in war and in battle is worthy of admiration, so, on the other hand, nothing is more modest and more becoming than their behaviour to an enemy, whether in the heat of action, or in the pride of success and victory: these people seem to act entirely according to the rules observed by our ancient commanders, and our men of genius."

A General Return of the Honorable Company's Troops on the Bengal Establishment, 21st January, 1782.

BATTALIONS.	EUROPEAN OFFICERS.						AS COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.						Total as Commissioned Officers.
	Commissioned.			Serjeants.			Doing Duty.		On Command.		Sick and Absent.		
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Fit for Duty.	On Command.	Sick.	Total.	Subadars.	Jamaders.	Subadars.	Jamaders.	
At the Presidency { 1st. Capt. Broadbrook's ..	1	1	1	1	8	..	1	4	10	25	1	1	87
At Patna { 5th. Capt. Willson's	1	..	1	1	5	18	..	1	24
{ 2nd. Capt. Tabby's ..	1	1	1	..	8	3	5	16	..	2	36
{ 3rd. Capt. Turner's ..	1	1	1	..	2	2	6	18	36
At Burdwan { 4th. Captain Grant's, at Chandernagore ..	1	1	4	4	9	26	2	2	37
{ 5th. Capt. Willson's ..	1	1	2	2	3	10	..	1	14
At Midnapore { 3 Independent Companies	1	12
{ 6th. Capt. Stibber's ..	1	1	4	4	3	7	2	1	36
At Chittagong { 3 Independent Companies	3	..	3	3	2	10	..	2	15
At Cosimbazar { 7th. Capt. Matthew's	1	1	7	9	20
{ One Independent Company	1	1	1	8	4
Total..	7	8	9	1	23	..	1	24	55	149	43	6	271

A General Return of the Honorable Company's Troops on the Bengal Establishment, 14th February, 1763.

CAVALRY.	Officers.						Volunteers.	Sergeants.		Drummers and Trumpeters.		Effective Rank and File.				Total Non Commissioned			Horses.			
	Commissioned.			Staff.				Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Farriers.	Total.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Total.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Total.	
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Riding Masters.																
Body Guard to the Commander in Chief	2	4	1	1	2	1	2	2	8	28	1	29	84	42	4	46	212	21	238	4	46	
Dragoons, Two Troops	2	4	2	1	2	1	2	7	4	85	16	101	112	124	13	137				13	137	
Hussars	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	29	4	33	37	46	4	50				4	50	
Total..	2	5	4	1	2	1	2	12	8	142	20	163	183	212	21	238				21	238	

Black CAVALRY.		At Ghyrottee		At Midnapore		Total	
Rissalahdars.	Jemmadars.	Duffadars.	Privates.	Total.	Horses.	Total.	Horses.
1	3	6	93	103	99	103	99
1	3	6	93	103	103	103	103
2	6	12	186	206	202	206	202
Total.....		Total.....		Total.....		Total.....	

A General Return of the Honorable Company's Troops on the Bengal Establishment, February 14th, 1763.—continued.

	Officers.										Sergeants and Corporals.			Drums.		Bombardiers.		Gunners.		Matrosses.		
	Commissioned.					Staff.					Volunteers.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Total Non-Commissioned and Private.
	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	1st Lieutenants.	2d Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.															
At the Presidency	1	1	2	2	1	1	4	..	5	1	11	5	26	5	66			
At Ghylrottee	1	..	1	1	..	2	..	1	..	5	..	6	..	18	..	32			
At Patna	1	4	1	2	..	8	1	9	1	33	5	60			
At Midnapore	1	9	..	2	..	16	..	23			
At Islamabad.....	2	..	3	..	6	..	11			
Total..	2	2	3	4	5	2	1	2	2	18	7	..	18	1	31	6	99	10	192			

ARTILLERY.

1 Captain Lieutenant as Engineer
 1 Second Lieutenant as Sub-Engineer
 1 Ensign as Practitioner Engineer
 } Not included in the above Return.

A General Return of the Honorable Company's Troops on the Bengal Establishment, February 14th, 1763.—continued.

	Officers.										Effective Rank and File.				Total Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates.		
	Commissioned.					Staff.					Sergeants.	Drums.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.		Total.	
	Major.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Surgeons.	Volunteers.	Fit for Duty.							Sick.
at the Presidency	1	5	1	8	7	1	1	2	6	27	3	20	20	162	80	242	292
at Patna	4	..	4	7	1	1	1	1	15	1	11	11	171	21	192	220
at Midnapore	3	..	2	4	1	1	1	..	8	..	5	5	98	9	107	120
Total..	1	12	1	14	18	3	3	4	7	50	4	36	36	481	110	641	832

INFANTRY.

N. B.—Two Officers belonging to the French Company, who bear no rank in the Service, not included in the above Return.

1 Captain
 1 Lieutenant
 5 Sergeants
 3 Corporals
 2 Bombardiers

2 Gunners
 9 Dragoons
 8 Matrosses
 40 Centinels
 21 Topazes

Invalids not included in the above Return.

A General Return of the Honorable Company's Troops on the Bengal Establishment, February 14th, 1763.—continued.

	European Officers.				As Commissioned Officers.			Drummers and Trumpeters.			Effective Rank and File.				Total, including Black Officers.				
	Commissioned.		Non-Commissioned.		Fit for Duty.			Fit for Duty.			Fit for Duty.		Sick.						
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Sergeants.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Trumpts.	Trumpts.	Trumpts.		Havildars.	Najaks and Sepoys.	Havildars.	Najaks and Sepoys.
At the Presidency.....	1	1	1	1	4	9	26	2	1	38	27	9	86	57	875	7	77	1,016	1,090
At Ghyrettee.....	1	1	1	1	3	8	23	1	4	36	26	8	96	61	907	3	37	1,008	1,082
At Patna.....	8	9	2	1	11	25	68	..	5	98	69	24	94	163	2,333	7	127	2,630	2,822
At Burdwan.....	..	1	1	..	2	8	24	32	24	8	32	56	804	1	44	905	969
At Midnapore.....	1	1	1	..	5	11	32	1	4	48	30	18	48	77	1,189	8	86	1,860	1,456
At Islamabad.....	1	1	1	..	2	8	20	..	2	30	24	8	32	58	501	1	69	624	686
On the Expedition to Meckly.....	..	2	2	..	4	8	25	1	..	34	24	8	32	56	817	1	31	905	971
At Luckapore.....	1	1	3	4	3	1	4	7	106	118	121
At Dacca.....	1	1	3	4	8	1	4	7	106	118	121
Malda.....	1	1	3	53	56	57
At Cossimbazar.....	1	1	8	4	8	1	4	7	106	118	121
Total..	7	10	9	1	34	80	238	5	16	329	233	86	322	547	7,797	28	471	8,843	9,494

(Signed) JOHN CABNAC,
Major.

SEPOYS.

Battalions.	European Officers.				As Commissioned Officers.				Drums and Trumpets.				Effective Rank and File.				Total including Officers.	Commandants.	Black Adjutants.	Lasgars.	Linguists.	Writers.	Watermen.	Black Doctors.	Armourers.	
	Commissioned.	Staff and Non-Commissioned.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Subahdars.	Jemadars.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Drums.	Trumpets.	Drums.	Trumpets.	Sick.	Total Drums and Trumpets.	Haveldars.	Nairs and Sepoys.										Haveldars.
2nd ..	1	1	1	4	9	24	3	36	26	9	1	36	61	929	325	1018	1090	1	1	9	1	1	1	9	3	4
3rd ..	1	1	1	4	9	26	1	36	27	8	1	36	64	911	43	1018	1090	1	1	9	1	1	1	9	3	4
5th ..	1	1	1	2	4	12	1	16	12	4	1	16	27	461	18	497	529	1	1	4	1	1	1	4	2	2
Total..	3	2	2	10	22	62	5	88	65	21	1	88	152	2301	476	2533	2709	3	2	22	3	3	3	22	8	10

(Signed) PETER CARSTAIRS,
Capt. in the Company's Infantry.

S. PAGE 370.

Articles of a Treaty and Agreement, concluded between the Governor and Council of Fort William, on the part of the English East India Company; and the Nabob Shujaa-ool-moolk Hissam-o-Dowla Meer Mahomed Jaffier Cawn Behader Mohabut Jung.

ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY.

“We engage to reinstate the Nabob Meer Mahomed Jaffier Cawn Behader, in the Subahdarree of the provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, by the deposal of Meer Mahomed Cossim Cawn; and the effects, treasure, jewels, &c., belonging to Meer Mahomed Cossim Cawn, which shall fall into our hands, shall be delivered up to the Nabob aforementioned.

ON THE PART OF THE NABOB.

First,—The treaty which I formerly concluded with the Company, upon my accession to the Nizamut, engaging to regard the honor and reputation of the Company, their Governor and Council as my own, granting perwannahs for the currency of the Company's trade, the same treaty I now confirm and ratify.

Secondly,—I do grant and confirm to the Company, for defraying the expences of their troops, the chucklas of Burdwan, Midnapoor and Chittagong, which were before ceded for the same purpose.

Thirdly,—I do ratify and confirm to the English, the privilege granted them by their firmaun, and several husbul-hookums, of carrying on their trade by means of their own dustucks, free from all duties, taxes and impositions, in all parts of the country, excepting the article of salt, on which a duty of two and a half *per cent.* is to be levied on the Rowana or Hooghly market price.

Fourthly,—I give to the Company half the salt-petre, which is produced in the country of Poornea, which their gomastahs shall send to Calcutta; the other half shall be collected by my fougedar, for the use of my offices; and I will suffer no other person to make purchases of this article in that country.

Fifthly,—In the chucla of Silhet for the space of five years, commencing with the Bengal year 1170, my fougedar, and the Company's gomastah, shall jointly prepare Chunam, of which each shall defray half the expences; and half the Chunam so made, shall be given to the Company, and the other half shall be for my use.

Sixthly,—I will maintain twelve thousand horse, and twelve thousand foot in the three provinces; and if there should be occasion for more, the number shall be increased proportionably to the emergency. Besides these, the force of the English Company shall always attend me when they are wanted.

Seventhly,—Wherever I shall fix my court, either at Moorshedabad or

ber of English forces I may have occasion for, in the management of my affairs, I will demand them, and they shall be allowed me; and an English gentleman shall reside with me, to transact all affairs between me and the Company; and a person shall also reside on my part at Calcutta, to negotiate with the Governor and Council.

Eighthly,—The late perwanna issued by Cossim Allee Cawn, granting to all merchants the exemption of all duties, for the space of two years, shall be reversed and called in, and the duties collected as before.

Ninthly,—I will cause the rupees, coined in Calcutta, to pass in every respect equal to the siccas of Moorshedabad, without any deduction of batta; and whosoever shall demand batta shall be punished.

Tenthly,—I will give thirty lacks of rupees to defray all the expences and loss accruing to the Company, from the war and stoppage of their investment; and I will reimburse to all private persons the amount of such losses, proved before the Governor and Council, as they may sustain in their trade in the country; if I should not be able to discharge this in ready money, I will give assignments of land for the amount.

Eleventhly,—I will confirm and renew the treaty which I formerly made with the Dutch.

Twelfthly,—If the French come into the country, I will not allow them to erect any fortifications, maintain forces, or hold lands, zemindarrees, &c. but they shall pay tribute, and carry on their trade as in former times.

Thirteenthly,—Some regulations shall be hereafter settled between us, for deciding all disputes which may arise between the English agents and gomastahs in the different parts of the country, and my officers.

In testimony whereof, we the said Governor and Council have set our hands, and affixed the seal of the Company to one part hereof; and the Nabob afore-named, hath set his hand and seal to another part hereof; which were mutually done, and interchanged at Fort William, the 10th day of July, 1764.

(Signed) HENRY VANSITTART,
JOHN CARNAC,
WILLIAM BILLERS,
JOHN CARTIER,
WARREN HASTINGS,
RANDOLPH MARRIOTT,
HUGH WATTS."

Demands made on the part of the Nabob Meer Mahomed Jaffier Cawn, to the Governor and Council, at the time of signing the Treaty.

"*First*,—I formerly acquainted the Company with the particulars of my own affairs, and received from them repeated letters of encouragement with presents. I now make this request, that you will write in a proper manner to the Company, and also to the King of England, the

particulars of our friendship and union; and procure for me writings of encouragement, that my mind may be assured from that quarter, that no breach may ever happen between me and the English; and that every Governor and Counsellor, and Chief, who are here, or may hereafter come, may be well disposed and attached to me.

Secondly,—Since all the English gentlemen, assured of my friendly disposition to the Company, confirm me in the Nizamut; I request, that to whatever I may at any time write, they will give their credit and assent, nor regard the stories of designing men to my prejudice, that all my affairs may go on with success, and no occasion may arise for jealousy or ill-will between us.

Thirdly,—Let no protection be given, by any of the English gentlemen, to any of my dependents, who may fly for shelter to Calcutta, or other of your districts; but let them be delivered up to me on demand. I shall strictly enjoin all my fougedars and aumils on all accounts, to afford assistance and countenance to such of the gomastahs of the Company, as attend to the lawful trade of their factories; and if any of the said gomastahs shall act otherwise, let them be checked in such a manner, as may be an example to others.

Fourthly,—From the neighbourhood of Calcutta to Hooghly, and many of the pergunahs bordering upon each other, it happens, that on complaints being made, people go against the taalookdars, reiat, and tenants of my towns, to the prejudice of the business of the sircar; wherefore, let strict orders be given, that no peons be sent from Calcutta on the complaint of any one, upon my taalookdars or tenants; but on such occasions, let application be made to me, or the Naib of the fougedarree of Hooghly, that the country may be subject to no loss or devastation. And if any of the merchants and traders which belonged to the buxbunder and azimgunge, and have settled in Calcutta, should be desirous of returning to Hooghly, and carrying on their business there as formerly, let no one molest them. Chandernagore, and the French factory, was presented to me by Colonel Clive, and given by me in charge to Ameer Beg Cawn. For this reason, let strict orders be given, that no English gentlemen exercise any authority therein, but that it remain as formerly, under the jurisdiction of my people.

Fifthly,—Whenever I may demand any forces from the Governor and Council for my assistance, let them be immediately sent to me, and no demand made on me for their expences.

The demands of the Nabob Shujaa-ool Moolk, Hissam-o Dowla, Meer Mahomed Jaffier Cawn Behader, Mohabut Jung, written in five articles. We the President and Council of the English Company do agree, and set our hands to, in Fort William, the 10th of July, 1763."

Signed, &c.

The following is the Extract from Dr. Fullarton's Letter to the Board as given in Vansittart's Narrative, Vol. 3, page :—

“ Mr. Ellis, with the rest of the gentlemen, were inhumanly butchered by Shimroo,* who came that evening to the place with two companies, (he had the day before sent for all the knives and forks from the gentlemen,) he surrounded the house with his people, and went into a little outer square, and sent for Messrs. Ellis, Hay and Lushington, and with them came six other gentlemen, who were all terribly mangled and cut to pieces, and their bodies thrown into a well in the square, and it filled up; then the seepoys were sent into the large square, and fired on the gentlemen there, and rushing upon them, cut them into pieces in the most inhuman manner, and they were thrown into another large well, which was likewise filled up.

The 7th, the Nabob sent for me, and told me to get myself in readiness to go to Calcutta, for that though he had been unlucky in the war, (which he asserted with great warmth, had not been of his seeking, nor had he been the aggressor, reproaching the English with want of fidelity, and breach of treaty) yet he said, he had still hopes of an accommodation; he asked me what I thought of it. I told him, I made no doubt of it. When some of his people, who were present, mentioned the affair of Mr. Amyatt's death: he declared, that he had never given any orders for killing Mr. Amyatt; but after receiving advice of Mr. Ellis's having attacked Patna, he had ordered all his servants to take and imprison all the English in the provinces, wherever they could find them; he likewise added, that if a treaty was not set a foot, he would bring the King, the Morattas, and Abdallas against us, and so ruin our trade, &c. He had finished his letters, and ordered boats, and a guard to conduct me; when, upon the advice of some of his people, he stopped me, and said, there was no occasion for me to go. After his sending for me at first, he ordered the seepoys, in whose charge I was, to go to their quarters, two moguls and twelve hircarras to attend me, but to let me go about the city where I pleased. I then applied for liberty to stay at the Dutch factory, which was granted. I applied to Mehdee Allee Cawn, for his interest in behalf of the gentlemen in the Chelston, who were seven in number, and were not killed till the 11th of October; but when he was petitioned about them, he gave no answer; but still sent orders to Shimroo, to cut them off. I likewise applied to Allee Ibrahim Cawn, who interceded for them; but he gave him no answer either, tho' I was present when Ibrahim Cawn petitioned for them.

The 14th of October, on the approach of our army, Cossim Allee decamped with his troops in great confusion, and marched as far as Fulwarree, five coss to the westward of the city. The hircarras that were with me having no orders about me, I gave them some money, which made them pretty easy.

The 25th, after giving money to a jemmadar, that had the guard to the westward of the Dutch factory, by the riverside, I set out in a small pulwar, and got safe to the boats, under command of Captain Wedderburn, that were lying opposite to the city, on the other side of the river, and at 11 o'clock that night arrived at the army, under the command of Major Adams, lying at Jonsy."

The following is the account of this massacre as given by the Author of the *Seir-ool-Mootakhereen*:—

"A few days after that, on hearing that the English had possessed themselves of the fortress of Monghyr by treason, his temper, soured by misfortunes and perfidies, broke all bounds: Incensed beyond measure at so unexpected a reverse, and mistrusting the future still more than the past, he gave orders to Somro, the European, to put to death all the prisoners of that nation; and that man, of a flint-like heart, without any regard to the ties which bound him to those unfortunates, who were of the same Christian religion with him, accepted the commission without horror, and without reluctance. That stony man repaired to the house, then called Hadji-ahmed's, where those ill-fated people were confined, (and which having become the burying-ground of the English since that day, has had its name altered accordingly); and without the least hesitation, or the least remorse, he ordered all those unarmed men to be killed with musket-balls. It is reported, that in such a moment of distress and perturbation, those unfortunate men, without losing courage, marched up to their murderers, and, with empty bottles, and stones, and brickbats, fought them to the last man, until they were all killed. It appears, that two or three days before this event, they had contrived, by the means of their servants, to procure abroad a number of muskets equal to their number, with ammunition sufficient for their purpose. But they did not come to hand: for, had they succeeded in this attempt, they were resolved to make their escape by main force; and if not, to kill so many men in their own defence, as should avenge their death, and do honour to their memory. Of all the prisoners, not a man remained alive, save Doctor Fullarton, who, by assisting professionally most of the grandees of the court, had endeared himself to them: he even had Mir-cassem himself for an acquaintance and friend."

The circumstances of the escape of the four Serjeants are thus narrated by Captain Williams:—

"When Cossim Ally had determined upon the destruction of the prisoners, he sent orders to Purnea for these men to be put to death. The Nabob, who happened to be a humane, good man, and being highly pleased with the conduct of the serjeants whilst with him, declined putting the orders in execution. He, however, wrote to Cossim Ally,

entreating that he would recall his mandate, because he feared, if he was still determined upon it, it would be a difficult matter (as the men were beloved by all his people) to find one that would undertake the task. Cossim Ally, on the receipt of the letter, flew into a violent rage, and directed another order to be sent to the Nabob, in which he told him, that if he had not spirit himself to put his command in force against those faithless and treacherous Englishmen, to send them immediately to Patna, where ample justice should be done, for the crimes they had committed.

“On this letter being delivered to the Nabob, he sent for the serjeants, and with tear in his eyes informed them of the severe order he had received, and of the steps he had taken to preserve their lives; that he must now send them to Patna, where he hoped by the time they got there, the rage of Cossim Ally might be cooled, and that they might probably escape death. They were accordingly embarked on a Pattella boat, in charge of a jemadar and twelve burkendasses, and dropped down a small stream called the old, or little Coosy, which falls into the Ganges a little below Bissunpore Gola, and nearly opposite to Sickra Gully. Here the serjeants had determined to have a chance for their lives. As soon as the boat had reached the Ganges, and hoisted sails for Patna, it being the height of the rains, two of them went up on the chopper, or roof, and saw the jemadar and three or four of his men asleep, with their faces covered. This they thought a favourable opportunity. They gently seized two of their swords which were near them, drew them from the scabbards, and having at the same time secured the matchlocks, one of them ran up to the Manjee (helmsman), seized him by the arm, and threw him overboard: they then gave a hurra, which was the signal for the two below, who, in the meantime, were not idle. The noise waked those upon deck, who seeing the serjeants with drawn swords, fell upon their knees, and begged their lives, which were granted provided no further resistance was made. The jemadar instantly called to his men below to surrender, which they did; so that the serjeants were in possession of the boat in less than ten minutes from their first going upon deck. The Manjee having caught hold of the rudder, entreated to be taken on board, and promised that he would conduct them down the river. His request was complied with, and the moment he was placed in his former situation, the sails were hauled down, the boat put about, and the crew taking to the oars, the gallant fellows had the good fortune, by sunset, to meet the British army under Major Adams, then advanced to Udda Nulla.”

General Return of the Honorable Company's Troops on the Bengal Establishment, Fort William, March 1st, 1764.—continued.

		I N F A N T R Y.																			
		Officers.							Rank and File.							Total Non-Commissioned and Private.					
		Commissioned.				Staff.			Sergeants.		Drums and Trumpets.		Rank and File.								
		Major.	Captain.	Captain Lieutenant.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Surgeons.	Mate	Cadets.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Total Rank and File.	Total
the Presidency.....	2	3	2	6	1	6	10	2	27	15	42	62		
the Bahar Province	13	..	4	18	1	1	3	..	5	8	53	8	40	1	612	8	699	801		
the Burdwan Province.	
the Jellesore Province	
the Chittagong & } Dacca Provinces	1	1	1
Total..	2	16	..	7	24	2	1	4	5	14	68	10	1	49	1	639	102	741	864		

A General Return of the Honorable Company's Troops on the Bengal Establishment, Fort William, March 1st, 1764.—continued.

A R T I L L E R Y.

	Officers.										Total Non-Commissioned and Private.																
	Commissioned.					Staff.																					
	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	1st Lieutenants.	2d Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fire-works.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Commissaries.	Deputy ditto.	Cadets.	Conductors.	Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Bombardiers.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Gunners.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Matrosses.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.
At the Presidency.....	1	1	1	4	..	4	..	5	29	5	3	..	8	..	29	5	56		
In the Bahar Province ..	2	3	3	3	9	1	1	3	3	1	9	9	8	19	2	4	38	4	67	8	163		
In the Burdwan Province.	1		
In the Jellesore Province..		
In the Chittagong and Dacca Provinces	1	1	2	..	4	..	8		
Total..	3	3	3	3	10	1	1	1	..	3	3	14	1	11	..	10	1	23	2	4	48	4	100	13	227		

SEPOYS.

	Europeans.			Officers.		Sergeants.		Subadars.		Jemindars.		Drums and Trumpets.		Rank and File.				Total Rank and File.		Total including Officers.		Non-Effective.					
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Havildars.	Naics and Sepoys.		Sick.	Total Rank and File.	Total including Officers.	Black Adjutants.	Sircars.	Writers.	Linguists.	Black Doctors.	Watermen.	Armourers.	
															Fit for Duty.	Sick.											
At the Presidency.....	1	..	2	..	4	10	..	2	28	2	20	2	28	42	8	701	73	824	884	1	6	1	1	3	6	4	
In the Bahar Province ..	7	10	3	1	40	69	4	9	218	9	179	9	344	414	20	5,374	344	6,152	6,634	7	62	7	7	18	60	28	
In the Burdwan Province	1	..	3	4	17	..	12	..	17	28	..	408	17	453	486	..	4	4	5	
In the Jellesore Province..	..	1	2	3	1	1	12	1	8	1	35	18	4	331	35	388	413	1	3	1	..	1	3	2	
In the Chittagong and } Dacca Provinces	1	2	2	7	..	4	21	4	20	7	57	49	2	713	57	821	880	1	7	1	1	..	7	..	
Total..	9	13	6	1	51	93	5	16	296	16	239	10	526	551	34	7,527	526	8,638	9,297	10	8	10	9	22	80	39	

(Signed) GILBERT IRONSIDE,
Town Major of Fort William.

(Signed) HENRY VANSITTART.

V. PAGE 445.

The following is Major Carnac's official report to the Council of the Action fought on the 3rd May, 1764, in the lines before Patna:—

GENTLEMEN,—The united forces of the enemy, who were exceeding numerous, and had with them a considerable number of cannon, presented themselves before us early yesterday, in order of battle; and after cannonading some time at a distance, began a little before noon a very vigorous and warm attack. Sombre, with the choice of the infantry, supported by a large body of cavalry, made an attack upon our front; but not being able to advance upon so heavy a fire as we gave them, they lay under cover, waiting for the success of the assault upon our rear where the enemy exerted their principal efforts: it was sun-set before we had completely repulsed them: our people were so extremely fatigued with the labour of the day, and having been up most part of the preceding night in expectation of the attack, that they were not able to pursue, and the enemy took the opportunity of the dusk to carry off their cannon: I had enough to do to look to every quarter, as I was obliged to divide my attention between the city, the Nabob's camp, and our own post. All the principal officers distinguished themselves in their respective stations; and I cannot say too much of the good behaviour of the army in general, and in particular of the seapoys, who sustained the front of the attack. The enemy must have met with an immense loss, as our fire was very close, and extremely well distributed. I have not yet been able to get an exact account of ours, in Europeans it is inconsiderable: Captain Nollkens and Lieutenant Gardiner are the only officers wounded, but both dangerously; the former has received such a wound as, it is thought, will occasion the loss of a leg; and the latter has had both his legs broke.

I wait with impatience to know what effect this success will have upon the designs of the enemy.

I am, with great respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble servant,

JOHN CARNAC.

Camp, near Patna, the 4th May, 1764.

ARTILLERY.

	Commissioned Officers.				Staff.			Cadets and Conductors.	Sergeants.		Corporals.		Drummers.		Bombardiers.		Gunners.		Matrosses.		Total Non-Commissioned and Private.
	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	1st Lieutenants.	2nd Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Adjutant.	Quarter Master.		Surgeons.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	
At the Presidency	1	2	1	1	2	1	3	..	2	1	4	1	2	1	39	12	69
At the Camp	1	1	3	3	17	1	1	2	12	1	12	3	10	2	22	5	42	11	88	85	298
Total.....	2	3	3	3	18	1	1	2	14	2	15	3	12	3	26	6	44	12	122	47	307

N. B.—Pioneer Company; One Captain, One Ensign, Two Sergeants, Two Drummers, and 60 Rank and File, not included in the above.

A General Return of the Forces on the Bengal Establishment, 6th February 1765.—continued.

		I N F A N T R Y.																
		Commissioned Officers.				Staff.			Cadets.		Sejeants.		Drummers.		Rank and File.		Total Rank and File.	Total Non-Commissioned and Private.
		Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter Master.	Surgeons.	Cadets.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Rank and File.	Total Rank and File.	Total Non-Commissioned and Private.
at the Presidency	3	..	1	1	9	2	6	1	130	76	206	224	
at the Camp		3	19	11	36	1	1	8	29	50	17	42	6	535	194	729	844	
Total..		3	22	11	37	2	1	8	29	59	19	48	7	665	270	935	1,068	

N. B.—Captains Muir and Ross, Lieutenant Thomson, Ensign Buckley, and Lieutenant Fureworker Jewel, with 9 Cadets lately arrived from Europe, not included in the above.

A General Return of the Forces on the Bengal Establishment 6th February 1765.—continued.

S E P O Y S.

	European Officers.		Serjeants.		Subedars.		Jemadars.		Havildars.		Tomtoms & Trumpeters.		Rank and File.		Total Rank and File.		Total, including Black Officers.		Non-Effective.					
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Total Rank and File.	Total, including Black Officers.	Black Adjutants.	Sicars.	Writers.	Linguists.	Doctors.	Watermen.	Armourers.
the Presidency	2	6	..	12	1	22	2	58	..	16	..	720	26	746	853	1	8	1	1	5	6	5
the Camp	1	15	17	66	6	168	9	297	32	680	..	492	21	9,460	971	11,087	12,185	17	145	15	16	45	149	12
Total.....	1	17	17	72	6	175	10	319	34	733	..	508	21	10,180	997	11,833	13,038	18	158	16	17	50	155	17

A General Return of the Forces on the Bengal Establishment, 6th February 1765—continued.

	Commissioned Officers.			Staff.			Serjeants.		Drummers & Trumpeters.		Rank and File.		Total Non-Commissioned and Private.
	Captain.	1st Lieutenant.	2d Lieutenant.	Adjutant.	Quarter Master.	Riding Master.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	
EUROPEAN CAVALRY.	1	1	:	1	1	1	4	:	4	:	44	8	61
	Officers in the Cavalry. Captain <i>Muir</i> , Lieutenants <i>Knot</i> , " <i>Hesman</i> , " <i>Eyre</i> , " <i>Dangerfield</i> , " <i>Martin</i> , and Cornet <i>Wroe</i> .												
BLACK CAVALRY.	2	36	67	20	:	:	1,185	:	1,260	Total.			
	Russildars.	Jemmidars.	Dumildars.	Vackels.	Volunteers.	Private.	Total.						

(Signed) JOHN MARGROM,
Fort Adjutant.

X. PAGE 531.

Treaty between Nabob Shujah-ul-Dowla, the Nabob Nudjum-ul-Dowla, and the English Company, executed at Illahabad, August 18th, 1765.

(Sealed and approved by the King.)

Whereas the Right Honourable Robert Lord Clive, Baron Clive of Plassey, Knight Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Major-General and Commander of the Forces, President of the Council, and Governor of Fort William, and of all the settlements belonging to the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, in the Provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orixá; and John Carnac, Esq., Brigadier General, Colonel in the service of the said Company, and Commanding Officer of their Forces upon the Bengal establishment; are invested with full and ample powers on the behalf of His Excellency the Nabob Nudjum-ul-Dowla, Subahdar of Bengal, Behar, and Orixá, and likewise on behalf of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, to negotiate, settle, and finally to conclude a firm and lasting peace with His Highness, the Nabob Shujah-ul-Dowla, Vizier of the Empire: be it known to all those to whom it shall, or may in any manner, belong, that the above-named plenipotentiaries have agreed upon the following articles with His Highness.

1. A perpetual and universal peace, sincere friendship, and firm union, shall be established between His Highness Shujah-ul-Dowla and his heirs on the one part, and His Excellency Nudjum-ul-Dowla and the English East India Company on the other; so that the said contracting powers shall give the greatest attention to maintain between themselves, their dominions, and their subjects, this reciprocal friendship, without permitting on either side any kind of hostilities to be committed from henceforth, for any cause, or under any pretence whatsoever; and every thing shall be carefully avoided which might hereafter prejudice the union now happily established.

2. In case the dominions of His Highness Shujah-ul-Dowla shall at any time hereafter be attacked, His Excellency Nudjum-ul-Dowla and the English Company shall assist him with a part or the whole of their Forces, according to the exigency of his affairs, and so far as may be consistent with their own security; and if the dominions of His Excellency Nudjum-ul-Dowla, or the English Company, shall be attacked, His Highness shall in like manner assist them with a part or the whole of his Forces: In the case of the English Company's Forces being employed in His Highness's service, the extraordinary expence of the same is to be defrayed by him.

3. His Highness solemnly engages never to entertain or receive Cossim Ally Khan, the late Subahdar of Bengal, &c., Sombroo the assassin of the English, nor any of the European deserters, within his dominions, nor to give the least countenance, support, or protection to them: he likewise solemnly engages to deliver up to the English, whatever Europeans may in future desert from them into his country.

4. The King Shah Aalum shall remain in full possession of Korah, and such part of the province of Illahabad as he now possesses, which are ceded to His Majesty as a royal demense, for the support of his dignity and expences.

5. His Highness Shujah-ul-Dowla engages in the most solemn manner to continue Bulwantsing in the Zemindarees of Benâres, Ghazepore, and all those districts he possessed at the time he came over to the late Nabob, Jaffier Ally

Khan and the English, on condition of his paying the same revenue as heretofore.

6. In consideration of the great expence incurred by the English Company in carrying on the late war, His Highness agrees to pay them (fifty) 50 lacks of rupees, in the following manner, viz.—(twelve) 12 lacks in money, and a deposit in jewels to the amount of (eight) 8 lacks, upon the signing of this treaty; (five) 5 lacks by monthly payments, so as that the whole may be discharged in (thirteen) 13 months from the date hereof.

7. It being firmly resolved to restore to His Highness the country of Benâres and the other districts now rented by Bulwantsing, notwithstanding the grant of the same from the King to the English Company; it is therefore agreed that they shall be ceded to His Highness in manner following; viz., they shall remain in the hands of the English Company, with their revenues, till the expiration of the agreement between Bulwantsing and the Company, being on the 27th November next; after which His Highness shall enter into possession; the Fort of Chunar excepted, which is not to be evacuated until the 6th article of this treaty be fully complied with.

8. His Highness shall allow the English Company to carry on a trade, duty free, throughout the whole of his dominions.

9. All the relations and subjects of His Highness, who in any manner assisted the English during the course of the late war, shall be forgiven, and no ways molested for the same.

10. As soon as this treaty is executed, the English Forces shall be withdrawn from the dominions of His Highness, except such as may be necessary for the garrison of Chunar, or for the defence and protection of the King in the city of Illahabad, if His Majesty should require a force for that purpose.

11. His Highness the Nabob Shujah-ul-Dowla, His Excellency the Nabob Nudjum-ul-Dowla, and the English Company, promise to observe sincerely and strictly all the articles contained and settled in the present treaty; and they will not suffer the same to be infringed, directly or indirectly, by their respective subjects; and the said contracting powers generally and reciprocally guarantee to each other all the stipulations of the present treaty.

Signed, sealed, and solemnly sworn to, according to their respective faiths, by the contracting parties at Illahabad, this 16th day of August, in the year of our Lord 1765, in the presence of us.

Edmund Maskelyne,
Archibald Swinton,
George Vansittart.
Fort William, September 30th, 1765.
(A true Copy.)
Alex. Campbell, S. S. C.

Clive (L. S.)
John Carnac (L. S.)
Shujah-ul-Dowlah's Seal (L. S.)
and ratification.
Mirza Cossim Khan,
Rajah Seetabroy,
Meer Mussahala."

Y. PAGE 531.

Articles of Agreement between the King Shah Aalum and the Company, relating to the tribute to be paid to him from the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriza, dated August 19th, 1765.

The Nabob Nudjum-ul-Dowlah agrees to pay to his Majesty out of the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriza, the sum of 50 lacks of rupees, in the following manner, viz.—(twelve) 12 lacks in money, and a deposit in jewels to the amount of (eight) 8 lacks, upon the signing of this treaty; (five) 5 lacks by monthly payments, so as that the whole may be discharged in (thirteen) 13 months from the date hereof.

without any deduction for Batta on bills of exchange, by regular monthly payments, amounting to rupees 216,666-10-9 per annum, the first payment to commence from the 1st September of the present year; and the English Company, in consideration of his Majesty's having been graciously pleased to grant them the Dewannee of Bengal, &c., do engage themselves to be security for the regular payment of the same. It shall be paid month by month from the factory of Patna to Rajah Shitabroy, or whomsoever his Majesty may think proper to nominate, that it may be forwarded by him to the court; but in case the territories of the aforesaid Nabob should be invaded by any foreign enemy, a deduction is then to be made out of the stipulated revenues, proportionable to the damage that may be sustained.

In consideration of Nudjuf Khan's having joined the English forces, and acted in his Majesty's service in the late war, his Majesty will be graciously pleased to allow him the sum of two lacs of rupees a year, to be paid by equal monthly payments; the first payment to commence from the 1st of September of the present year; and in default thereof the English Company, who are guarantees for the same, will make it good out of the revenue allotted to his Majesty from the territories of Bengal. If the territories of Bengal should at any time be invaded, and on that account a deduction be made out of the royal revenue, in such case a proportionable deduction shall also be made out of Nudjuf Khan's allowance.

(A true Copy,)

ALEXANDER CAMPBELL, S. S. C.

Dated the 19th of Aug., 1765. }
Fort William, 30th Sept., 1765. }

" Firman from the King Shah Aalum, granting the Dewannee of Bengal, Behar, and Oriza, to the Company. Dated August 12th, 1765.

At this happy time, our royal firman, indispensibly required obedience, is issued: that whereas, in consideration of the attachment and service of the high and mighty the noblest of exalted nobles, the chief of illustrious warriors our faithful servants and sincere well-wishers, worthy of our royal favours, the English Company, we have granted them the Dewannee of the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Oriza, from the beginning of the Fussul Rubby of the Bengal year 1171, as a free gift and ultungau, without the association of any other person, and with an exemption from the payment of the customs of the Dewannee, which used to be paid to the court. It is requisite that the said Company engage to be security for the sum of twenty-six lacks of rupees a year, for our royal revenue, which sum has been appointed from the Nabob Nudjum-ul-Dowla Bahadar, and regularly remit the same to the royal Sircar: and in this case, as the said Company are obliged to keep up a large army for the protection of the provinces of Bengal, &c., we have granted to them whatsoever may remain out of the revenues of the said provinces, after remitting the sum of twenty-six lacks of rupees to the royal Sircar, and providing for the expences of the Nizamut: It is requisite that our royal descendants, the Viziers, the bestowers of dignity, the Omrahs high in rank, the great officers, the Muttasuddies of the Dewannee, the managers of the business of the Sultanut, the Jagheerdars and Croories, as well the future as the present, using their constant endeavours for the establishment of this our royal command, leave the said office in possession of the said Company, from generation to generation, for ever and ever; looking upon them to be insured from dismission or removal, they must on no account whatsoever give them any interrup-

tion, and they must regard them as excused and exempted from the payment of all the customs of the Dewannee, and royal demands. Knowing our orders on the subject to be most strict and positive, let them not deviate therefrom.

Written the 24th of Sophar of the 6th year of the Jaloos (the 12th Aug. 1765.)

Contents of the Zimmun.

Agreeably to the paper which has received our sign manual, our royal commands are issued: That, in consideration of the attachment and services of the high and mighty, the noblest of exalted nobles, the chief of illustrious warriors, our faithful servants and sincere well-wishers, worthy of our royal favours, the English Company, we have granted them the Dewannee of the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa, from the beginning of the Fussul Rubby of the Bengal year 1772, as a free gift and Ultungau, without the association of any other person, and with an exemption from the customs of the Dewannee, which used to be paid to the court on condition of their being security for the sum of twenty-six lacs of rupees a year for our royal revenue; which sum has been appointed from the Nabob Nudjum-ul-Dowla Bahadar; and after remitting the royal revenue, and providing for the expences of the Nizamut, whatsoever may remain we have granted to the said Company.

THE DEWANNEE OF THE PROVINCE OF BENGAL.
THE DEWANNEE OF THE PROVINCE OF BAHAR.
THE DEWANNEE OF THE PROVINCE OF ORIXA.

Z. PAGE 550.

The following is an extract from the list of sharers in the Profits of the Inland Trade Association for the year from 1st September 1765 to 31st August 1766, and includes all the Military:—

Brigadier General John Carnac	8	Shares.
Colonel Richard Smith	2	"
Colonel Sir Robert Barker	2	"
Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Peel ..	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Champion.....	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Major Giles Stibbert.....	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Major Alexander Champion	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Major Hugh Grant	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Major Winwood	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Major Pemble	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Major William Smith	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Major Primrose Galliez	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Surgeon Thomas Anderson	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Surgeon Robert Hunter	$\frac{2}{3}$	"
Surgeon Andrew Williams	$\frac{2}{3}$	"

A. A. PAGE 561.

Fort William General Consultations, 14th April, 1766.

TO WILLIAM BRIGHTWELL SUMNER, ESQUIRE, &C. GENTLEMEN OF
COUNCIL AT FORT WILLIAM.

GENTLEMEN,—I have the honour to inform you, that upon a supposition that the receipt of a legacy was not intended to be prohibited by the new covenants, I have received from the Begum, wife of the late Nabob, Meer Jaffer, an obligation for the sum of five lacks of rupees, which was bequeathed to me by his Excellency a few hours before his death, in the presence of many witnesses, whose attestation shall, as soon as possible, be laid before the board. When this obligation is discharged, I shall immediately pay the amount into the Company's Treasury at Calcutta. The interest arising therefrom, I propose, shall be annually distributed in such proportions as I establish, among a certain number of officers, non-commission officers, and private men, who are disqualified from further service, by wounds, length of service, or diseases contracted in the service of the Company, and whose fortunes may be too scanty to afford the former a genteel, the latter a comfortable subsistence in their native country. I intend further, that the widows of all such officers and soldiers as shall have been entitled to this bounty, or whose husbands shall have lost their lives in the service, shall receive a certain proportion of the same during their widowhoods. The governor and council of Fort William will be perpetual trustees for the appropriation of this fund in India, and the court of directors in England. On my return to the presidency, or sooner, if business will permit, I shall have the honour to lay before you such regulations as I may think best adapted to the fulfilling my purposes above-mentioned; and on my arrival in England, the same shall be confirmed, with a proper instrument or deed of gift of the principal and interest of the said five lacks of rupees for ever, agreeable to the due forms of law, unless the Company should think proper to claim, and be able to prove, a right to the same under the new covenants.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient and most humble servant,

CLIVE.

Mootejyt, 8th April, 1766.

B. B. PAGE 614.

The following is taken from Mr. Henry Strachey's narrative of "*The proceedings of the General Court Martial, which sat upon the trial of Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher for mutiny.*"

Thomas Goddard, late Captain in the First Regiment of Infantry on the Bengal establishment, being duly sworn, deposed:—That in the latter end of

versation in a company consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher, Captains Roper and Parker, Lieuts. Watts, Dunbar, Bevan, and Francis, and Mr. Bagot, Surgeon, who dined with him in one of those months : that soon after dinner, to the best of his recollection, the reduction of the batta, and the memorial that had been presented for the recovery of it, was the first subject spoken on by some of the officers present ; upon which Sir Robert Fletcher said, he thought they would have no effect, although the orders of the Company on that head were not positive ; that Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher then declared, there was one method to recover it, and that was by a general resignation, which could not fail of success, as the dissension of the civil, joined to that of the military, would carry every thing, and he knew the Madras counsellors, being his friends, would join against Lord Clive. That the discourse then turned upon the method of resigning, when Lieut. Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher said, "send me your commissions and I will receive them," and advised the scheme should be put in execution, before the next ships sailed for England, as their carrying home accounts of the batta being reduced, would strengthen Lord Clive's interest so much, that it would be in vain to attempt the recovery of it hereafter ; and, at parting, he intimated that it might be prejudicial to him to have that conversation repeated. Captain Goddard farther deposed, that Sir Robert Fletcher, the same evening, when he went out in a chaise with him, pointed out the readiness of Lieutenant Bevan's joining in the resignation, who enjoyed a double post [Brigade Major] : and at another time he remembers that Sir Robert Fletcher told him, he knew of all the meetings of the officers, and what passed at them. The same evidence afterwards deposed, farther, that he declared to Captains Smith, aid-de-camp to General Carnac, that Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher was the person who induced him to enter into the combination ; that his motive for making such a declaration to Captain Smith, was the arguments made use of by Sir Robert Fletcher, at his table, already mentioned ; particularly Sir Robert Fletcher's advancing, that the measure could not fail of success ; added to his pointing out the readiness of his brigade-major to resign, and another person telling him, in the presence of Sir Robert Fletcher, that he (Captain Goddard) wanted to get a majority, by the resignation of others, or words to that purpose ; and that until that time, Captain Goddard had always been averse to the combination ; that Sir Robert Fletcher, publicly at table, that day expressed his surprise, that he (Captain Goddard) had not joined in the combination, as he thought an officer of his spirit should have been the first to have engaged in it ; or words to that effect.

*Captain Frederick Thomas Smith, Aid-de-camp to General Carnac, being duly sworn, deposed,—*That on the 13th or 14th of May, Captain Goddard acquainted him in the course of conversation that he had been led into the resignation of the service by the persuasion of Sir Robert Fletcher, contrary to his own inclinations and opinion ; the particulars of whose conduct towards him he had made known to Major Champion and Captain Pearson, and insisted upon Captain Smith's acquainting Lord Clive and General Carnac with this, in case he should not have an opportunity of seeing them

Thomas Roper, late Captain in the Third Regiment of Infantry, being duly sworn, deposed,—That at Captain Goddard's table about the latter end of January, or beginning of February last, when the reduction of the batta, together with the memorial or remonstrances for its recovery, that either were presented to the board, or about to be so, became the subject of conversation; Sir Robert Fletcher gave it as his opinion that they would prove ineffectual: at the same time intimated, that he did think it recoverable; that this produced a desire of knowing how it was to be accomplished; that Sir Robert Fletcher said, it was not for him to point out a method, but observed, upon some of the company's mentioning a resignation, that that was the only method, and that the present dissensions amongst the civilians in Calcutta, would greatly favour such a measure—or words to that effect; that Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher said, in the course of that day's conversation, that he would accept of the commissions, and that whatever was to be done, ought to be finished before the ships sailed. Mr. Roper further deposed, upon the questions being put to him by the court, that he did hear Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher mention the Madras counsellors, but could not recollect upon what account; that Captain Goddard was averse to the measure (of resignation) before that day, and that he afterwards came into it, but whether from what passed that day he could not determine.

Mr. James Watts, late Lieutenant in the First Regiment of Infantry, being duly sworn, deposed,—That in the month of December 1765, or January 1766, he dined with Captain Goddard; Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher was in company. That the conversation happening to turn upon the reduction of the batta, remonstrances and a general resignation were talked of to remove it; when Sir Robert Fletcher gave it as his opinion, that if a general resignation should take place, the batta would be restored; and farther said, that he believed the orders respecting the batta were not positive: That he proposed the commissions should be delivered up at the commencement of a month; that the officers should receive no pay, but serve as volunteers till the determination of the Governor and Council should be known, and that upon those conditions he would accept of the commissions of the officers of the first brigade. Mr. Watts farther deposed, upon the questions being put to him by the court, that he heard the departure of the ships for Europe mentioned by Sir Robert Fletcher in that conversation, but that he did not recollect what he said upon the subject; nor did he recollect what Sir Robert Fletcher said concerning the dissensions amongst the civilians proving favourable to the resignation, though he recollected to have heard the word dissension mentioned; that he did not recollect that he ever declared he was influenced to resign his commission, by Lieut.-Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher; but that upon the strength of what Captain Goddard had told him, he might have declared that Captain Goddard was influenced to resign his, though he did not recollect when, or to whom, he ever had made such a declaration.

James Francis, Lieutenant in the First Regiment of Infantry, being duly sworn, deposed,—That in conversation which passed some time in December

Goddard what he was afraid of ; that he told him there was a method of getting the batta again. Captain Goddard said he did not know how. Sir Robert Fletcher again said, there was a method, but it was not his place to point it out. That a little time after, Sir Robert Fletcher proposed the officers should all resign their commissions, and serve as volunteers till an answer should come from the Board, and said there were four counsellors come from Madras, and he would be bound to get their interest for the officers ; and then said, that as it was well known to the company that Lord Clive was no friend of his, he hoped that discourse would go no further.

*Captain Henry Bevan, Brigade-Major to Sir Robert Fletcher, being duly sworn, deposed,—*That he never made Sir Robert Fletcher acquainted with the meetings held by the officers of the first brigade, to carry on the business of the resignation ; that he did not recollect he ever acquainted Sir Robert Fletcher that letters were frequently written, and proposals made to the officers of the two other brigades, on the subject of the resignation, or that the officers of the second and third brigades had joined with those of the first, before the 20th of April, about which time the affair was the subject of public conversation, and he possibly might have mentioned it. That about the latter end of December, or beginning of January, Sir Robert Fletcher came into his room (he at that time kept his bed) and told him that he heard the officers intended to resign their commissions, on account of the batta being reduced : that Sir Robert Fletcher advised him not to enter into it ; and to enforce his advice, said, he thought it would be rather an advantage than a disadvantage to the officers that expected to rise high in the service, as it would probably hinder a number of officers coming from Europe over their heads ; and that about the 21st of April, he informed Sir Robert Fletcher, that he had been applied to for his commission, when Sir Robert repeated the same advice he had before given.

Mr. James Dunbar, late Aid-de-camp to Sir Robert Fletcher, being duly sworn, and questioned by the Court, deposed, to the best of his recollection, that between the 18th and 20th day of April, he acquainted Sir Robert Fletcher, in a private conversation, that the officers had had a meeting, and received favourable accounts from the other brigades. He farther deposed, that he did not doubt, but he had mentioned to Sir Robert Fletcher, between the eighteenth and twentieth of April, that the officers received letters from the other brigades, and also wrote letters to them on the subject of the resignation. That Sir Robert Fletcher knew his intentions to enter into the association, and advised him against it. That in the month of January, a conversation passed between Sir Robert Fletcher and him, upon the subject of a general resignation, when Sir Robert Fletcher told him, that should a general resignation take place, he thought it would be no prejudice to those officers who merited well, and might be an opportunity of weeding the army ; and that Sir Robert Fletcher always advised him against the measure.

The extracts of the evidence in support of the charge have been short, though faithful ; the material particulars of Sir Robert Fletcher's defence also, might be extracted in a very narrow compass. But that all imputations of impartiality may be avoided, the whole of Sir Robert Fletcher's

“ MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN,—It is alleged against me, that in a conversation at Captain Goddard’s, the end of December or beginning of January, I made use of many arguments to persuade the officers to a general resignation ; and some of the evidences particularly depose—that I pointed out to them the dissensions amongst the civilians, and observed that the Madras counsellors were my friends, and would join against Lord Clive. The appointment of the Madras gentlemen was not known at Calcutta till the ninth of January, and consequently could not be known at Monghyr till the fifteenth or sixteenth. It must have been several days afterwards before the dissensions among the civilians could have been heard of ; and as to the Madras gentlemen joining against Lord Clive, they did not take their seats till the twelfth of February. There is an evident contradiction, therefore, between part of these arguments, and the time they are said to have been made use of. Allowing, however, that the evidences have only been mistaken in the time, and that I really made use of the arguments in question, it must have been not in pursuance of my own opinion, but for the reasons I shall hereafter explain, for I never apprehended that the dissensions among the civilians could make any alterations in the resolutions of the Board, with regard to the allowances of the military ; nor could I ever have been so absurd, as really to have imagined that the Madras gentlemen could possibly have suffered themselves, in contradiction both to their duty and their interest, to be influenced in such an affair by friendship for me : To which I may add, that I never wrote to them on the subject, as I must necessarily have done, if I had really meant to influence them.

“ The Governor and the Council having thought proper to reduce the battalions, loud complaints were made by the officers. Various schemes were proposed for the recovery of it ; and, among others, a general resignation was talked of in the month of January, not only at Monghyr, but (as I have been informed) at Patna and Allahabad also, and even at Calcutta. When these rumours came to my hearing, I spoke to Lieutenants Bevan, Dunbar and Kyd, on the subject, and used my utmost endeavours to dissuade them from joining in such a step ; not doubting, if I had succeeded with them, but that many others would have been induced to follow their example ; and I observed to them, that such officers as had the allowances attached to double posts (which included adjutants, quartermasters, and sepoy subalterns) would more particularly incur the displeasure of the Governor and Council ; but all was in vain : they told me they were determined to resign with the rest. The same advice I often repeated afterwards, but it was all to no purpose. Finding, therefore, that I could not prevail with those gentlemen, who being in my family and enjoying double posts, would be the least affected with the reduction of battalions, and over whom I had more influence than over any others, and seeing to what a violent degree the officers in general were exasperated, I thought the best thing I could do for the public good, was to dissemble my own opinion, to try to keep in their confidence till they had come to some final resolution ; and to moderate the rage with which they were actuated. To have endeavoured to stem the torrent, would be productive of no other consequence than that they would have gone on in their own way, without letting me know any thing at all of the matter. I remem-

bered the violence with which they had engaged, during the months of March, April, and May 1765, in an association for resigning, on a much more trifling cause (the affair of Captain McPherson) and at a time when the war with Sujah Dowla was unfinished.

“ As Captain McPherson’s appointment to this establishment, in a station which another gentleman resigned in order to make room for him, drove them to such extremities, and as they persevered in them, even after Captain McPherson had for the sake of peace voluntarily consented to have his former appointment annulled, and to come in youngest captain, what might not have been expected from them in the present case, when they were deprived of advantages which they had ever before enjoyed, and when numbers of them were involved in debts, from which they had no prospect of extricating themselves, and were really reduced to much distress by the scantiness of their allowances? Unreasonable as that association was, it was a matter of great doubt, whether it would not have been carried on to the most dangerous lengths, had not Lord Clive’s arrival, the high opinion the officers in general entertained of him, and his particular influence over several individuals fortunately put a stop to it. Thus convinced that it was really not in my power to stop the officers in their career, I at the same time thought their resignation, if carried on in so moderate a manner as not to occasion any disturbance among the troops, would rather be an advantage than a disadvantage to the service.

“ Immediately on my joining the army on this establishment, in October 1764, I remarked, with much concern, the great want of order and subordination amongst the officers. My endeavour to effect a reformation as far as lay in my power, have been unintermitted; and it is well known how I continually complained of the trouble I met with from the obstinacy and licentiousness of some of them, and how happy a circumstance I thought it would be for the good of the service, if such could be got rid of. Finding admonitions useless, I deemed it necessary to have recourse to courts martial, in order to enforce discipline in the brigade which I commanded, and to prevent the officers absenting themselves from duty. For this I received a check from my superiors; and was informed by General Carnac, in a letter he wrote to me on the 6th of November, that “ he would have courts martial reserved for heinous crimes only, and such as merited exemplary punishment.” My hands being thus tied up, I began to despair of introducing the discipline I so much wished for; and therefore, when the officers talked of resigning, I comforted myself with the hopes that the step, if carried on with moderation, would at least be productive of one good consequence; that it would be the means of weeding the army of those gentlemen who most obstructed the necessary reformation. I doubted not but his Lordship would think it requisite to oppose with firmness the demands of the officers; and these, when they found they could not carry their point, would be glad to accept of their commissions again: they might wish to make their own terms: but as the sole dependence of many of them was on the Company’s service, they must in the end be obliged to content themselves with what terms they could get. While such were my sentiments, I was informed by Lieutenant Kyd, that Captain Goddard seemed averse to join in the scheme

of resignation ; and that his reason was supposed to be, his not having been so particularly consulted on the occasion, as from his rank in the service he thought he had a right to expect. I expressed my surprize at his not being engaged in it ; and said, I imagined he would have been the foremost in all such undertakings ; and to the best of my recollection, Lieutenant Kyd at the same time observed to me, and I agreed with him in opinion, that it was not likely he would long persist in his present resolution. During the course of my acquaintance with him, I had so many proofs of the violence and fickleness of his disposition, that I made not the least doubt but he would heartily join with the rest of the officers, the moment they paid him the compliment he thought his due. I remembered how readily he had entered into the former association, in 1765 ; and I recollected having seen his name signed to it in letters most distinguishingly large, by way of shewing, I imagine, how much he glorified in the measure. Two or three days after this conversation with Lieutenant Kyd, I dined at Captain Goddard's in company with Captains Roper and Parker, and Lieutenants Watts, Dunbar, Francis, Ironside and Mr. Bagot (I think, about the 20th or 25th of January). After dinner Captain Goddard suddenly addressed himself to me, in the following words, or words to the same purpose :—"What would you do if we were to leave you alone with the brigade ?" I answered, I did not think that would be a good scheme ; that, however, there was a method for the recovery of their batta, but it was not my business to point it out : enquiry being made of me what that method was, I advised that they should send in their commissions to me at the beginning of a month, and serve as volunteers, without pay, till the determination of the Governor should be known. Captain Parker here interrupted me, by calling out to Captain Goddard, that "he smelt a majority :" upon which he seemed much offended, and replied—"That his not being consulted, as oldest officer in the Brigade, was rather slighting him." I then told Captain Goddard, that I thought there was nothing to fear, and that the officers would probably carry their point, if they acted prudently, and finished their business before the sailing of the Europe ships. I afterwards mentioned some other reasons (but what, I do not recollect,) why it appeared likely that the batta might be restored if the officers consented to serve as volunteers ; and told them, that upon that condition I would accept of their commissions. This, to the best of my recollection, is an exact account of the conversation which then passed ; and when the company broke up, I desired that what I had there said might go no farther ; to which, I think, Captain Goddard promised upon his honour it should not. I have already mentioned the opinion which I had before conceived of the violence with which the officers were disposed to act ; and such a question as that which I have thus related being so publicly put to me, gave me additional cause to be alarmed.

"Not doubting, therefore, the propriety of the resolution I had formed, in consequence of my not being able to dissuade even the gentlemen of my own family from joining in any schemes of resignation, I used my endeavours to prevail upon them, instead of leaving me at once to serve as volun-

concluding, that between the time of their lodging their commissions in my hands, and their receiving a final answer from the Governor and Council, many of them would reflect more seriously upon what they were about, and apply for their commissions again ; and knowing that it would at least give me time to take measures with the non-commissioned officers, for preventing any disturbance among the troops ; and afford some leisure to the Governor and Council to supply their army, if necessary, by giving commissions to free merchants, and by sending for officers from the other presidencies.

“It was with these views only I said at Captain Goddard’s, that the officers, if they would adopt the plan I proposed, would probably carry their point. That such was not my real opinion will appear beyond all contradiction, from my avowed sentiments during the former association, and what I said to different gentlemen during the present one. As to my persuading the officers to do what they were determined on before the latter ships were despatched, I had several motives for doing it, with which I believe it will be needless for me to trouble the court. The most powerful one was the consideration of the profound tranquillity which then reigned throughout the provinces, and which there was no prospect of an enemy to disturb : I deemed it certain, that the officers would attempt the recovery of their batta, and thought there could not be a time less likely for such an attempt to be productive of any mischief to the public. My desiring that what I said at Captain Goddard’s might go no farther, is insinuated as a proof that I was sensible I had been acting in an unjustifiable manner ; but it proceeded merely from recollecting a little that what I had said, might, perhaps, if known, be misconstrued to my disadvantage ; and my present situation, accused of mutiny for a matter in which I acted for the public good, has too well convinced me that I ought to have been more on my guard. After this I heard nothing more of the matter, but various unsettled reports, till about the 20th of February, when they were finally determined to address the Governor and Council. Their representation was accordingly forwarded about the 25th. From that time I was totally ignorant that any other schemes were carrying on, till about the 20th of April : Lieutenant Dunbar then informed me that the officers both of the first and third Brigades had determined upon resigning their commissions, and that he had agreed to the resolution. I reprimanded him in the strongest manner for entering into such an association without my knowledge, and contrary to my repeated advice. I told him how little probability there was of the officers carrying their point ; and used many arguments, both with him and many others with whom I had any influence, to dissuade them from persevering in it. As to Captain Bevan, it was not in his power to give me much intelligence ; having refused to join with them, he was not acquainted with their proceedings, nor could advise me of any thing but by hearsay. After the 20th, it began to be reported that the officers of the second Brigade had engaged in a like association ; but I do not recollect any thing certain of them, till the 24th or 25th ; when talking with a gentleman who had joined with the rest, and pretending to be acquainted with every thing before, I learned from him that, and many other circumstances ; particularly that the 1st of May was fixed upon for resign-

ing, and that the officers had some thoughts of serving as volunteers till the pleasure of the Governor and Council should be known. While this association was carrying on, the officers concealed from me with the utmost care, their meetings and all their measures; and were extremely enraged when they found that I had received some information concerning them; a strong proof that all I said at Captain Goddard's was not sufficient to acquire me their confidence; and that they by no means looked upon me as a favourer of their proceedings.

"The particulars of what happened after this, it is needless for me to relate. It is well known with how much care I used every possible precaution to prevent any mischief from happening, when the officers should leave their brigade. At the same time, both by letter and word of mouth, I constantly declared myself perfectly secure on that head; and how active I was in bringing back the European troops to their duty, when on the 14th of May they took to their arms, and seemed disposed to follow their officers, in consequence (as they themselves declared) of their having been made to believe that I was going with them.

"I will not trouble the court with any remarks on the justness of my opinion concerning the spirit of violence with which the officers in general were actuated, as so many incontestible proofs of it since appeared; but I must beg leave to mention a few circumstances, to evince how true were my sentiments of Captain Goddard, and how improbable is his assertion that he should not have joined in the association had I not persuaded him to it. He made himself a member of the secret committee, to carry on a correspondence with the other brigades, and offered to carry off his battalion, if the rest would do the same; declaring he was sure it would follow him all over India. About the 12th of May, taking a ride in my chaise with Mr. Bevan, I stopt at a tope (or grove) where Captain Goddard was; and in the course of conversation, having expressed my opinion, that Lord Clive would never give up the point to them, he answered by using some expressions which I repeated to Captain Bevan immediately, and which the more convinced me of his violence. After these instances of his ungovernable temper, let it be considered whether it is not much more likely that he was induced to join with the rest by his own disposition, than by the few arguments I used at his table, where I should not have said any thing at all had I not been apprehensive of greater violences, both from him and from the rest of the officers, and had not he in a manner obliged me to do it, by asking me the question I have related. If he acted in pursuance of my advice, why did he so carefully conceal from me all the measures that were carrying on in April? And why did he strictly enjoin Serjeant Hardy, who was employed to carry some of their secret committee letters, to be particularly careful that I did not come to the knowledge of them? As to Captain Goddard's assertion, that I pointed out to him in the chaise Captain Bevan's readiness to join in the association; and Mr. Bagot's, that at Captain Goddard's table I told them Messrs. Bevan and Dunbar should be the first to resign; they are certainly mistaken. I am very sure I never said any such thing; indeed it is not to be conceived that I should: for I all along used my utmost endeavours to prevent those gentlemen from having

concern in the measures that were taken. I cannot but think it a little strange that Mr. Bagot who sat next to Captain Parker at the lower end of two tables, whilst Captain Goddard and I sat at the upper end, should be the only person to remember so remarkable a circumstance.

“ Captain Goddard’s assertion, relative to memorials, must also be a mistake. The conversation in question happened about the 20th or 25th of January ; and the first memorial presented was dated about the 25th of February. I do not recollect indeed that memorials were at all mentioned ; however it is a matter of no consequence ; for if they had, I should certainly have advised against them, as I concluded that Lord Clive and the Council would not repeal their resolution ; and imagined the officers, who seemed determined upon the recovery of the batta, would only be exasperated the more.

“ Captain Goddard must also be mistaken in what he mentioned of my advising the scheme to be put in execution before the next ships sailed, as their carrying home accounts of the batta being reduced, would strengthen his Lordship’s interest so much, that it would be impossible to attempt the recovery of it afterwards. The *Grenville* and *Kent*, which carried the news of the reduction of the batta, were dispatched the 29th of January, and it was thought would have been dispatched much sooner ; so that it was impossible for any scheme to have been put in execution in time. To this I may add, that I can bring proofs, if necessary, that I have not been actuated with that spirit of party which Captain Goddard seems to insinuate. I am astonished at Captain Goddard’s asserting, that he wanted to make known the circumstances of his present deposition to Lord Clive and General Carnac, but was prevented by being ordered away from Monghyr. After the conversation which I have already mentioned to have passed between us, the 12th or 13th of May, he told me he intended going to Patna. Being very glad to get rid of him, I encouraged him in his intention, and advised him to go that very evening. Soon after leaving him, I met Captain Pearson walking with another gentleman, and told him I should send orders to Major Champion, to appoint him to the command of Captain Goddard’s battalion. To the best of my recollection, while I was talking to Captain Pearson, Captain Goddard came galloping up, and said he had altered his mind, and would not go to Patna. I told him he was very fickle, and then proceeded on to Monghyr. In the evening, he came into the fort, in contradiction to express orders, which had been given out, that no officer should leave the detachment. Apprehending he came with some bad design, I placed hircarabs (or spies) upon him, to give me intelligence what he was about ; and some time afterwards, finding he did not go out of the fort of his own accord, I sent Captain Smith to order him out. The next morning, in consequence of directions I had received from Lord Clive, to send down to Calcutta such of the captains as had been most active, I ordered Captain Goddard and five other officers to prepare themselves to set out for Calcutta at five o’clock in the afternoon. An hour or two afterwards I received another letter from Lord Clive, hoping the officers would remain on duty till his arrival ; whereupon I immediately wrote a letter to Captain

Captain Goddard in one of the squares, engaged in altercation with Captain Stainforth, whom he accused of intending to stay behind the rest of the officers. After some other conversation, I asked him whether he had shewn my letter to the officers. He told me that I should soon have an answer to it. Some time after, while I was sitting at dinner, he came to me with Captain Lieutenant Skinner. I asked them if the officers intended complying with my request. Captain Skinner told me that he believed they would; upon which Captain Goddard immediately said to him, 'Answer for yourself, I do not believe they will.' I asked him who would not? He replied, 'Captain Goddard will not.' I have since been informed, that at the meeting that was held to consider of it, he declared, that if nobody else would, he would go alone.

"These circumstances I have mentioned thus particularly, in order to show how little foundation there is for his asserting, that he was prevented from informing Lord Clive, &c., by being ordered away from Monghyr.

"As to my expressing my surprise, that an officer of Captain Goddard's spirit did not join in the resignation, I do not recollect such an expression was made use of by me at the conversation held at Captain Goddard's tent.

"It is very true, that about the 30th of April, I told Captain Goddard that I knew of all the meetings of the officers, and what passed at them. Some particulars came to my knowledge, as I have already related, about the 24th or 25th of April, and some about the 27th. However, I have since learned, there were many other circumstances with which I was then unacquainted.

"Whether Captain Nowlan ever made the speech which Mr. Watts mentions, I do not know, but I am certain that I never heard him.

"I do not recollect that Lieutenant Dunbar ever informed me, before he went to Patna, of more than one meeting, and that was in the month of January.

"There is one circumstance I must take the liberty of mentioning, by way of proof, that I have the good of the service at heart, and am not capable of advising any measure detrimental to it, to gratify my private purposes. I offered to pay out of my own pocket the penalty bonds of six gentlemen, Captain Stainforth, Lieutenants Shrimpton, M'Pherson, Dunbar, Kyd, and Ensign Patton, amounting to 24,000 rupees, in order to quit the association, although I was at the same time sensible of its being very uncertain, whether or not those gentlemen would ever be able to repay me.

"I am sorry to have troubled the court with so long a detail, nor should I have done it, had not I judged it necessary in order to show how much the whole tenor of my conduct contradicts the charge which has been brought against me. I have only one thing more to remark; that in the conversation which passed at Captain Goddard's, I never advised any association, much less such violent ones as afterwards took place; and that I have often expressed my opinion, that the officers who were determined upon resigning, should have sent in their commissions one by one, instead of combining to do it in a body.

"Can officers in the Company's service, not bound by any contract, legally resign their commissions without the consent of the Governor and Council

guilty of mutiny in only advising them to it ?—Our government itself, I think, has in a great degree acknowledged, that the officers might resign their commissions, by resolving to oblige them in future to sign contracts, and by putting the resignation of the officers of the 1st brigade in public orders at the presidency.

“But I will dwell no longer on this subject, of which you, gentlemen, must be the best judges, as I am very happy in the clearness of my own conscience and in confidence, that I shall be able to justify my own conduct, without having recourse to such arguments by the testimony of the witnesses, which I now beg leave to call upon.”

It now remains to be shewn how far Sir Robert Fletcher hath, by the testimony of witnesses, justified his conduct.

*Mr. George Vansittart, Factor in the Company's Service, being sworn by the Court, and questioned by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That during the time he was with Sir Robert Fletcher, in the months of January and February 1765, he often heard him complain of the irregularities of many of the officers, and their inattention to their duty ; and that he has frequently repeated the same complaints, in letters which he has received from him in the course of the year 1765. As to wishing to get rid of some of them for the public good, he was certain that Sir Robert Fletcher often spoke of the great plague and trouble he met with from some of them, and the difficulty of getting them to comply with their duty ; and that he understood, from the general tenor of Sir Robert Fletcher's words and letters, that he did wish to get rid of some of them, that he might the more easily establish a proper discipline : That as to the late association, he never wrote to him for or against it : That with regard to the association in 1765, he wrote to him, on the 14th of May, that he entirely disapproved of it, and that the Governor and Council must either support their authority or give it up : That with regard to the civil disputes, he received a letter from Sir Robert Fletcher, in November 1765, mentioning his having heard of the disputes at the Board, and wishing that all dissensions were put an end to there, for the public good, as peace and unanimity were established at home ; and that this was the only letter he remembered to have received from Sir Robert Fletcher on civil disputes : That he did not recollect to have heard Captain Goddard declare his opinion of the reduction of the batta ; he remembered, a few days after his arrival at Calcutta, his speaking of the officers serving as volunteers, as a measure that had obstructed their success.

*Captain Bevan being questioned by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That Sir Robert Fletcher, before he dined at Captain Goddard's, advised him (Bevan) in the strongest terms, not to be concerned in the resignation : That in December previous to this advice, he assured him that neither he, nor the other gentlemen of his family, Lieutenants Kyd and Dunbar, should lose by the reduction of the batta, as he would take care to make it up to them another way : That, notwithstanding all Sir Robert Fletcher's arguments against a resignation, he believes he told him, in the month of January, when Sir Robert came into his room, that he could not but resign with the rest : That Sir Robert Fletcher has frequently complained of the irregularities, of the officers ; and to the best of his knowledge, he, Sir Robert Fletcher,

has wished to get rid of some of them, in hopes of reforming the rest : That he dined with Lieutenant Shrimpton the same day Sir Robert Fletcher dined with Captain Goddard, in January ; that he did not remember to have heard mention made of an intention of the officers to serve as volunteers, before that day : That in January, when the officers of the first brigade complained of the reduction of the batta, he imagined they seemed determined at all events to recover it or quit the service : That, to the best of his recollection, when it came to Sir Robert's knowledge, in April, that the officers had engaged in an association, he expressed his surprise at its being carried on without his knowledge ; and that he believed Sir Robert then expressed his firm belief, that a resignation of commissions had been entirely laid aside : That a day or two after the time when he (Bevan) was applied to for his commission, he thinks Sir Robert Fletcher might have said, that he could not then believe the resignation would actually take place : That, towards the latter end of April, he heard Sir Robert Fletcher use arguments with Lieutenant Knott, to prevent his joining with the rest : That on the morning when Sir Robert Fletcher heard that the officers had written to Madras, to prevent those of that establishment from coming to Bengal, he immediately wrote a letter to his brother, and forwarded it to Lord Clive.

The original letter, which was laid before the Court, was as follows :

“ MY DEAR BROTHER,—Having been this moment informed, that letters
 “ are written to Madras by some of our military gentry, advising those
 “ of your establishment, that an association will certainly take place here,
 “ for resigning all commissions, unless the double batta be restored ; and
 “ representing to you the hardships of the service in such strong colours
 “ as to prevent, if possible, your complying with orders that may be sent
 “ for the removal of some of your officers hither ; I must entreat you by
 “ every tie, public as well as private, to exert yourself in rendering such
 “ letters ineffectual, and to prevail on your brother officers to fly to Ben-
 “ gal with the same zeal and cheerfulness as if you were taking a voyage
 “ for the defence of your native country.

“ I remain, &c.,

(Signed) “ ROBERT FLETCHER.

“ *Monghyr, 3rd May, 1766.*”

Captain Bevan, the questions being still put to him by Sir Robert Fletcher, farther deposed,—That he believed Sir Robert Fletcher told him, on the 24th or 25th of April, that he had received private intelligence from a gentleman, that the officers were to deliver in their commissions to him on the first of May ; that a day or two before the resignation, Sir Robert Fletcher told him he had heard of an intended mutiny, but could give no credit to the report ; that after the affair of the resignation became public, he often heard Sir Robert Fletcher say, it was his firm belief that Lord Clive would never give up the point to the officers ; that he believed Sir Robert Fletcher after the resignation took place, mentioned to him, that Lord Clive had got a fine opportunity of weeding the Army, which would be of great ad-

Fletcher and he (Bevan) rode out in the chaise, they stopt in the tope (or grove) where Captain Goddard was encamped ; that Sir Robert Fletcher talked to Captain Goddard in private about eight or nine minutes, and immediately returned to his chaise ; soon after which, to the best of his recollection, he informed him, that Captain Goddard had asked leave to go to Patna, to avoid, as he said, seeing Lord Clive and General Carnac, and that he had not only granted it, but urged his setting off that very evening ; that he also said he was happy in the thought of having Captain Pearson at the head of his battalion ; that when Captain Goddard came into the fort that night, contrary to orders, Sir Robert Fletcher expressed his fears that he would be about no good, and ordered him (Bevan) to place hircarabs (or spies) over him ; that he remembers Sir Robert Fletcher soon after sent Captain Smith, he believed, with orders to Captain Goddard to leave the Garrison ; and that he, that night, sent secret orders to Major Champion to be watchful over Captain Goddard's battalion ; that he had often heard Sir Robert Fletcher, in January and afterwards, speak of Captain Goddard in very unfavourable terms ; that he believes that, towards the latter end of April, Sir Robert Fletcher gave it as his opinion, that Lord Clive would find no difficulty in getting as many officers to return to the service as he pleased ; that on the 14th (May) in the morning, after Sir Robert Fletcher had ordered Captain Goddard and some other officers to set off for Calcutta by five o'clock that evening, he wrote a letter to Captain Goddard, and the rest of the officers of the brigade, requesting it as a favour they would remain till next day, when he assured them Lord Clive would arrive ; that he believes, when Sir Robert Fletcher, in the month of January advised him against joining in the resignation, he told him, that those in particular who enjoyed double posts would incur the displeasure of the Governor and Council, and not be re-admitted into the service ; that to the best of his knowledge, after the first of May, when the officers had given in their commissions to Sir Robert Fletcher, he (Sir Robert) expressed his surprise that they had sent them in a bundle, observing, that he expected every one would have given in his own, or words to that purpose.

*The Honourable Charles Stuart, Writer in the Company's Service, being sworn, and the questions being put by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That he had often heard Sir Robert Fletcher, particularly in November 1765, complain of the licentiousness of many of the officers, and wish to get rid of them, in hopes thereby of establishing discipline and good order among the rest.

*Captain Henry Watson, Quarter-master General, being sworn, and questions being put by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That he often heard Sir Robert Fletcher complain of the irregularities of the officers of the first brigade, and their inattention to his orders ; that this was a little while before the association ; and that he even heard him mention the same some months before that time ; but that he cannot charge his memory with Sir Robert Fletcher's having wished to get rid of some of them, in hopes thereby of establishing discipline among the rest.

*Mr. James Dunbar being re-called into Court, and the questions being put by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That whilst he acted as Sir Robert Fletcher's Aid-de-Camp, Sir Robert often expressed his uneasiness to him on

account of the irregularities of some of the officers of the first brigade ; that he frequently said he was determined at all risques, for his own peace and quiet, to effect a reformation, or words to that purpose ; that upon receipt of a letter from General Carnac, regarding courts martial, he said he was made uneasy by it, or words to that purpose ; that, to the best of his recollection, in the month of January, before he dined with Sir Robert Fletcher at Captain Goddard's, Sir Robert told him, if those who held double posts resigned the service, they in particular would not be re-admitted, or words to that purpose ; that, to the best of his recollection, he told Sir Robert Fletcher he could not subsist without his double post, or words to that effect ; that when he told Sir Robert Fletcher, in the month of April, that he had agreed to join with the rest of the officers engaged in the resignation, Sir Robert reprimanded him for so doing in the strongest terms and told him that he expected a very different conduct both from him and Mr. Kyd, or words to that purpose ; that, to the best of his recollection, the day he dined in Captain Goddard's tent with Sir Robert Fletcher, he sat next to Captain Roper, who sat next to Captain Goddard ; that with regard to the conversation between Captain Goddard and Sir Robert Fletcher, the first thing that passed was Captain Goddard's asking Sir Robert Fletcher what he would do, supposing all the officers of the brigade were to leave him ; to which Sir Robert Fletcher replied, that would not be a good scheme. He said, better give in your commissions to me, and serve as volunteers till the pleasure of the Governor and Council is known ; and that then, a little after this, Sir Robert Fletcher said, if the officers resigned before the ships sailed for Europe, it was probable they would carry their point or words to their purpose ; that he understood, from Captain Goddard's conversation, that he thought himself ill used in not being consulted on the occasion, he being the oldest Captain present ; that, to the best of his recollection, he heard Sir Robert Fletcher, in January, give Lieutenant Kyd advice against resigning the service ; that he was present at a meeting of the officers, when, upon Sir Robert Fletcher and Captain Bevan passing through the square, where it was held, the doors were immediately shut, and the lights put out, to prevent its coming to Sir Robert Fletcher's knowledge.

*Mr. James Watts being re-called into Court, and the questions being put by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That he heard Captain Goddard say, as a reason for his not joining sooner with the officers in the resignation, that he thought himself slighted, in not being particularly consulted, as the oldest officer, or words to that purpose ; that he has heard Captain Goddard make use of some such expressions as these ; viz. that it was the officers' own fault if they did not carry their point ; that he has heard some officers say, before the first of May, but he cannot remember who, that they were apprehensive Sir Robert Fletcher would make them prisoners, and not accept of their commissions ; that, supposing the public officers of Sir Robert Fletcher's family had not entered into the association, he cannot pretend to say what effect their example might have had upon him before he had engaged himself in the association ; but after he had, neither their example, nor what Sir Robert Fletcher could have said, would have prevented him from

adhering to his engagements ; and that, during the time he was at Monghyr, Sir Robert Fletcher dined with him once only.

*William Patton, Ensign in the First Regiment of Infantry, being duly sworn and questioned by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That if the public officers of Sir Robert Fletcher's family had not entered into the association, this deponent would not have engaged in it ; that in the beginning of January, when the officers first had a meeting, the reason given by the officers why Captain Goddard did not join with the rest was, that he (Goddard) thought he should have been particularly consulted ; and as he was the oldest Captain, he expected the rest of the officers should have met at his tent ; that Sir Robert Fletcher sent for this deponent about the 22nd of April and advised him to have no concern in the association ; that Sir Robert Fletcher proposed to advance him £500, in order that he might pay the penalty bond, provided he would disengage himself from the association ; but that he could not accept the offer, as he considered himself as farther bound ; that when the officers were carrying on the scheme of resignation, they used much precaution to keep it from the knowledge of Sir Robert Fletcher ; that towards the end of April, when the officers first knew their proceedings had come to the knowledge of Sir Robert Fletcher, they seemed afraid of being sent down to Calcutta, and expressed great resentment against the informer ; that on the 14th of May, when the officers were deliberating upon Sir Robert Fletcher's letter, requesting they would stay till the arrival of Lord Clive, this deponent heard Captain Goddard say, that, though all the officers should agree to stay, he would go away alone ; and that when Sir Robert Fletcher advised him against resigning, he (Sir Robert) told him, that as he enjoyed a double allowance as a Sepoy officer, he would, by quitting the service, so far incur the displeasure of the Governor and Council as never to be admitted into the service again, or words to that effect.

*Allen M'Pherson, Lieutenant in the First Regiment of Infantry on the Bengal Establishment, being duly sworn and questioned by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That the officers seemed determined to have the batta restored, or quit the service ; that he thinks, if the public officers of Sir Robert Fletcher's family had not entered into the association, he should not have engaged in it ; that Sir Robert Fletcher sent to this deponent, between the 20th and 25th of April, and advised him to have no concern in the association ; and that Sir Robert sent for him again in May, and advised him by no means to suffer this deponent's brother to leave the brigade, and at the same time offered to advance him money to pay the £500 penalty which he would be liable to incur by retracting.

*John Shrimpton, Lieutenant in the First Regiment of Infantry on the Bengal Establishment, being duly sworn and questioned by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That, about the 20th or 25th of April, Sir Robert Fletcher sent for this deponent, and assured him, that it was his (Sir Robert's) opinion, Lord Clive would never give way to the combination of the officers ; and that, to the best of his knowledge, he told Sir Robert Fletcher, that he could not retract at that time ; and that in the beginning of May Sir Robert Fletcher offered to advance this deponent money to pay the £500 penalty, which he was liable to incur by retracting.

*Captain Frederick Thomas Smith, being re-called into Court, and the questions being put to him by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That, during the time he was at Monghyr (between the 11th and 17th of May, 1766) Sir Robert Fletcher's conduct, in regard to his preventing and quelling disturbances amongst the officers and soldiers, was, in every respect, becoming the character of a good officer; that Sir Robert Fletcher sent this deponent with positive orders to turn Captain Goddard out of the fort at Monghyr; and that on the 14th of May, about dinner time, Sir Robert Fletcher shewed Captain Goddard Lord Clive's letter, requesting the officers to stay till his Lordship's arrival at Monghyr.

*Moses Crawford, late Surgeon's Assistant, now Ensign in the First Regiment of Infantry on the Bengal Establishment, being duly sworn, and questioned by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That Sir Robert sent for this deponent twice, and made use of several arguments with him to accept a commission, which at last induced him to enter into the Army; and that Sir Robert Fletcher appointed two serjeants to act as officers at the same time.

*Phillip Muscard, Lieutenant Fire-worker in the First Company of Artillery, being sworn, and the questions put to him by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That Sir Robert Fletcher sent for this deponent on the 14th of May, at which time he was a Conductor of Artillery; and also sent for Mr. Rashfield, another Conductor, and offered to appoint them to act as officers.

*James Crawford, Lieutenant in the Fourth Battalion of Sepoys, being sworn, deposed,—*That on the 13th of May he received orders from Sir Robert Fletcher, dated the 10th or 11th of May, to join the Brigade with all possible expedition; and that he began his march on the 13th (May) in consequence of orders from Lord Clive, dated the 9th of May; that he arrived at Monghyr, which is between 50 and 60 coss distant from his post, on the 17th; and that, upon his arrival, Sir Robert Fletcher used many arguments with him to continue in the service.

*George Brown, Lieutenant, in the First Regiment of Infantry, being sworn, deposed,—*That on the 1st of May he was stationed at Tarrapore, and that he received orders from Sir Robert Fletcher for re-calling him to Monghyr; that he arrived there on the 16th or 17th of May, and that upon his arrival, Sir Robert Fletcher used many arguments with him to remain in the service.

*Alexander Hardy, late Ensign in the First, now of the Second Regiment of Infantry on the Bengal Establishment, being sworn, and questioned by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That he copied a letter for Captain Goddard, addressed to the officers of the third brigade; and that Captain Goddard enjoined him to conceal the contents of it from every one, particularly from the Colonel; and being asked, who did he suppose, Captain Goddard meant by the Colonel? he replied, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher.

*Thomas Carnegie, Surgeon to the Patna Factory, being sworn, and the questions put to him by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That about the latter

talked of at Calcutta, that the officers intended to resign and send down their commissions.

*Philip Daniel, Serjeant in Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher's Company in the First Regiment of Infantry, on the Bengal Establishment, being sworn, and questioned by Sir Robert Fletcher, deposed,—*That on the 14th of May he observed a great part of the regiment got under arms, in a tumultuous, mutinous manner, and soon after, Sir Robert Fletcher appeared on the parade, and demanded the reason of their unsoldier-like behaviour: he told them, that it was his desire they should return to their barracks; and assured them, that if every officer of the brigade should leave them, he would stay with them; upon which the regiment did return to their barracks: the deponent further said, he has heard a good many of the regiment, he believes the major part of them, say, that if it was not for the particular regard they had for the Colonel, they would, every man, have gone away with the officers; and that on the 14th of May two volunteers, Messrs. Haldam and Skinner, were appointed to act as officers.

The sum of these evidences is, that Sir Robert Fletcher had frequently complained of the irregularities of many of the officers, and their inattention to their duty—that he wished to get rid of some of them, in order to establish a proper discipline;—that, before the time of his dining with Captain Goddard in January, he advised his Major of Brigade (Captain Bevan) not to be concerned in the resignation; and in April following, expressed his surprise, that an association was formed, his expectation being, that the officers would each deliver in his own commission, and not resign in a body—that upon Captain Goddard's asking him what he would do, if all the officers of the brigade were to leave him? he replied, that would not be a good scheme—that they had better give in their commissions to him, and serve as volunteers till the pleasure of the Governor and Council should be known—and that, if they resigned before the ships sailed for Europe, it was probable they would carry their point—that he used arguments with several of his officers, to dissuade them from resigning—that, in order to prevail upon Messrs. Patton, M'Pherson, and Shrimpton, to continue in the service, and to indemnify them for relinquishing the association, he offered to advance to each of them the £500 which they were severally liable to pay for retracting—that on the 3rd May he wrote a strong letter to his brother on the Coast, conjuring him to counteract the efforts making by the Bengal officers, to prevent those of Madras from coming to supply their places—that upon the 14th May, in consequence of a letter from Lord Clive, he desired the officers to do duty till next day, when his Lordship would arrive—and that, when the European Regiment (the 14th May) got under arms in a tumultuous manner, he exerted himself to preserve discipline and prevent a mutiny.

Sir Robert Fletcher having acquainted the Court, that he had no more evidences to call upon, the Judge Advocate replied,—“That most of the points which had been endeavoured to be proved against Sir Robert Fletcher remaining uncontroverted, he did not trouble the Court with the examination

Captain Bevan, Mr. Dunbar, and other evidences, that a scheme of resignation of commissions came to the knowledge of Sir Robert Fletcher in the month of January last, and that Sir Robert Fletcher had not made it appear to the Court, that he, at that or any other period of time, made Lord Clive, or General Carnac, or the Governor and Council, acquainted therewith." Upon which Sir Robert Fletcher made the following observation :—

"As I was not charged, in the course of the evidence against me, with neglecting to give due information to Lord Clive, &c. in January last, I did not think it at all necessary to trouble the Court on that head. In answer to the first part of the Judge Advocate's observation, I must remark, that no scheme of resignation came to my knowledge in January last : nor was any scheme formed. Mr. Dunbar did mention something to me of a meeting of the officers in January last ; but at that meeting not a word of resignation was mentioned nor any scheme whatever proposed. In this state of uncertainty did things continue until a day or two after I dined with Captain Goddard, when I was assured that the officers had determined to address the Governor and Council, and it was my wish, that so disagreeable a subject should go from themselves rather than from me, to his Lordship : as a proof of which, I advised their sending their address immediately (and not through me) to the General. The General's answer was in the like manner addressed to them. Had the talk of a general resignation been confined to Monghyr, I should certainly have written to his Lordship as soon as I heard of it ; but at that very time, the subject was publicly spoken of every where else ; and as I was then well informed, particularly in Calcutta, and could not possibly escape his Lordship's ears, I thought it therefore much better for me to remain quiet, and keep in their confidence till they had come to some determination, than prematurely to trouble his Lordship with rumours which I knew were public, and for which I imagined I should not have been thanked, particularly as I had but a short time before got a severe reprimand from the Committee, for writing on the subject of the batta of the Commanding Officers of the brigades ; and, as a farther proof of the justness of that opinion, I shall observe to the Court, that, when his Lordship was at Chuprah, I mentioned, in one of my letters to him, that the officers of the regiment complained again of the insufficiency of their allowance, for which I got another reprimand, and was told, that he was surprised at my mentioning a subject which I knew the Board was determined to discourage. It was not till very near the time of my dining with Captain Goddard that I gave over hopes of dissuading my own family, by which I should have brought the whole to nothing ; and it was my resolution to have given Lord Clive an account of that day's conversation immediately, had I not found, that, instead of adopting the scheme which I proposed, they had determined to address the Board. About the 24th of April, I informed his Lordship, that the officers had three months before talked of resigning, if their batta was not restored ; and his Lordship at that time entirely approved of my conduct. In like manner, when the officers' determination to resign came to my knowledge, about the 20th of April, I first of all used my endeavours to break it off myself, by persuading all over whom I had the least influence not to per-

sist in it ; till, finding I could not succeed, and being assured, by the additional information which I received the 24th or 25th, that they would certainly put their scheme in execution, I then gave immediate notice to his Lordship. I must remark, that in one of my letters to his Lordship, before his arrival at Monghyr, about the 12th or 13th of May, I did inform him, that I had once pretended to enter into some of their intended measures, in order to gain their confidence, and mentioned it again to him at Monghyr. I farther beg leave to inform the Court, that Lord Clive found it needless to answer my letter of the 12th or 13th of May, because his Lordship expected to be in Monghyr himself the next day. On the 15th, when his Lordship arrived, I, among other remarks, repeated to his Lordship what I mentioned in that letter, and his Lordship expressed himself entirely satisfied with my conduct."

The Court then enquired of Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher, if he could produce any proofs of Lord Clive's having expressed himself entirely satisfied with his conduct ; to which Sir Robert Fletcher replied—No, he could not, as it was a private conversation between Lord Clive and him ; and this did not occur to Sir Robert Fletcher, until the President asked him if Lord Clive answered his letter of the 12th or 13th of May.

Sir Robert Fletcher then begged leave to lay before the Court, an extract from his letter to Lord Clive, dated the 25th of April, together with his Lordship's answer, and desired that the Court would admit of their being entered upon the face of the proceedings ; which being agreed to, they were entered accordingly.


The foregoing includes all the actual proceedings of the Court Martial, as given in Mr. Strachey's narrative. The finding and sentence of the Court have been given in the body of the work.



BATTLE of PLASSEY
 GAINED BY COLONEL CLIVE
 June 23rd 1757.

PL II

Scale 1 1/2 inches = 1 mile.



Reference.

- A. Position of the British Army at 8 in the Morning.
- B. Four Guns advanced to check the fire of the French Party at the Tank D.
- C. The Nuwab's Army.
- D. A Tank from whence the French Party cannonaded till 3 in the afternoon, when part of the British Army took Post there and the Enemy retired within their Entrenched Camp.
- E & F. A Redoubt and Mound taken by Assault at 1/2 past 4, and which completed the Victory.
- G. The Nuwab's Hunting House.


MAP
of the
NORTHERN CIRCARS
to illustrate
COLONEL FORD'S
OPERATIONS
with the
BENGAL DETACHMENT,
during the years
1758-9.



PLAN OF THE ATTACK OF OODANALA

BY THE BRITISH ARMY
commanded by
MAJOR ADAMS
in the Month of August 1763

SCALE OF YARDS



Here the
Enemy frequently
Paraded.

Profile of the New works



Reference.

- A & B Track of the main body of the battery guards, pursuing the fugitives.
- NB. In this place were found 180 pieces of

