

LIFE
OF
NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE.

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THE
LIFE
OF
NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE,
EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH.

WITH A
Preliminary View of the French Revolution.

BY SIR WALTER SCOTT.

— Sed non in Cesare tantum
Nomen erat, nec fama ducis; sed nescia virtus
Stare loco; solusque pudor non vivere bello.
Acer et indomitus, quo spes, quoque ira vocasset,
Ferre manum, et nunquam temerando parcere ferro.
Suo casso argere suos: instare favori
Numinis, impellens quidquid sibi summa petenti
Obstaret, gaudensque viam fecisse ruina.

LUCANI *Pharsalia*, Lib. I.

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WHILE these scenes were passing in the vicinity of France, the Emperor was using every

effort to bring forward, in defence of her territory, a force in some degree corresponding to the ideas which he desired men should entertain of the Great Nation. He distributed the seventy or eighty thousand men whom he had brought back with him, along the line of the Rhine, unmoved by the opinions of those who deemed them insufficient in number to defend so wide a stretch of frontier. Allowing the truth of their reasoning, he denied its efficacy in the present instance. Policy now demanded, he said, that there should be no voluntary abatement of the lofty pretensions to which France laid claim. The Austrians and Prussians still remembered the campaigns of the Revolution, and dreaded to encounter France once more in the character of an armed nation. This apprehension was to be kept up as long as possible, and almost at all risks. To concentrate his forces would be to acknowledge his weakness, to confess that he was devoid of means to supply the exhausted battalions; and, what might be still more imprudent, it was making the nation itself sensible of the same melancholy truth; so that, according to this reasoning, it was necessary to keep up appearances, however ill seconded by realities. The allied sovereigns, on the other hand, were gradually approaching to the right bank of the Rhine their immense masses,

which, including the reserves, did not perhaps amount to less than half a million of men.

The scruples of the Emperor of Austria, joined to the respect entertained for the courage of the French, and the talents of their leader, by the coalition at large, influenced their councils at this period, and before resuming a train of hostilities which must involve some extreme conclusion, they resolved once more to offer terms of peace to the Emperor of France.

The agent selected on this occasion was the Baron de St Aignan, a French diplomatist of reputation, residing at one of the German courts, who, falling into the hands of the allies, was set at liberty, with a commission to assure the French Emperor of their willingness to enter into a treaty on equal terms. The English government also publicly announced their readiness to negotiate for a peace, and that they would make considerable concessions to obtain so great a blessing. Napoleon, therefore, had another opportunity for negotiating, upon such terms as must indeed deprive him of the unjust supremacy among European councils which he had attempted to secure, but would have left him a high and honourable seat among the sovereigns of Europe. But the pertinacity of Napoleon's disposition qualified him ill for a

negotiator, unless when he had the full power in his own hand to dictate the terms. His determined firmness of purpose, in many cases a great advantage, proved now the very reverse, as it prevented him from anticipating absolute necessity, by sacrificing, for the sake of peace, something which it was actually in his power to give or retain. This tenacity was a peculiar feature of his character. He might, indeed, be brought to give up his claims to kingdoms and provinces which were already put beyond his power to recover; but when the question regarded the cession of anything which was still in his possession, the grasp of the lion itself could scarce be more unrelaxing. Hence, as his misfortunes accumulated, the negotiations between him and the allies came to resemble the bargain driven with the King of Rome, according to ancient history, for the books of the Sibyls. The price of peace, like that of these mysterious volumes, was raised against him upon every renewal of the conferences. This cannot surprise any one who considers, that, in proportion to the number of defeats sustained and power diminished, the demands of the party gaining the advantage must naturally be heightened.

This will appear from a retrospect to former negotiations. Before the war with Russia, Napoleon might have made peace upon nearly

his own terms, providing they had been accompanied with a disavowal of that species of superior authority, which, by the display of his armies on the frontiers of Poland, he seemed disposed to exercise over an independent and powerful empire. There was nothing left to be disputed between the two Emperors, excepting the point of equality, which it was impossible for Alexander to yield up, in justice to himself and to his subjects.

The Congress at Prague was of a different complexion. The fate of war, or rather the consequence of Napoleon's own rashness, had lost him an immense army, and had delivered from his predominant influence both Prussia and Austria; and these powers, united in alliance with Russia and England, had a title to demand, as they had the means of enforcing, such a treaty as should secure Prussia, from again descending into a state which may be compared to that of Helots or Gibeonites; and Austria from one less directly dependent, but by the continuance of which she was stripped of many fair provinces, and exposed along her frontier to suffer turmoil from all the wars which the too well-known ambition of the French empire might awaken in Germany. Yet even then the terms proposed by Prince Metternich stipulated only the liberation of Germany from French influence, with the restoration of the Illyrian provinces. The

fate of Holland, and that of Spain, were remitted till a general peace, to which England should be a party. But Buonaparte, though Poland and Illyria might be considered as lost, and the line of the Elbe and Oder as indefensible against the assembled armies of the allies, refused to accept these terms, unless clogged with the condition that the Hans towns should remain under French influence; and did not even transmit this qualified acquiescence to a treaty, until the truce appointed for the purpose of the Congress had expired.

After the loss of seven battles, and after the allies had redeemed their pledge that they would not hear of farther negotiation while there was a French soldier in Germany, except as a prisoner, or as belonging to the garrison of a blockaded fortress, it was natural that the demands of the confederated sovereigns should rise; more especially as England, at whose expense the war had been in a great measure carried on, was become a party to the conferences, and her particular objects must now be attended to in their turn.

The terms, therefore, proposed to Napoleon, on which peace and the guarantee of his dynasty might be obtained, had risen in proportion to the success of his enemies.

The Earl of Aberdeen, well known for his

literature and talents, attended, on the part of Great Britain, the negotiations held with the Baron St Aignan. The bases of the treaty proposed by the allies were—That France, divesting herself of all the unnatural additions with which the conquests of Buonaparte had invested her, should return to her natural limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, which of course left her in possession of the rich provinces of Belgium. The independence of Italy, Germany, and Holland, were absolutely stipulated. Spain, whom the power of Great Britain, seconded by her own efforts, had nearly freed of the French yoke, was to be in like manner restored to independence, under Ferdinand.

Such were the outlines of the terms proposed. But it is generally admitted, that if Buonaparte had shown a candid wish to close with them, the stipulations might have been modified, so as to be more agreeable to him than they sounded in the abstract. There were ministers in the cabinet of the allied sovereigns who advised an acquiescence in Eugène Beauharnais, of whom a very favourable opinion was entertained, being received as king of the upper part of Italy, while Murat retained the southern half of that peninsula. The same counsellors would not have objected to holding Holland as sufficiently independent, if the conscientious Louis Buonaparte were

placed at its head. As for Spain, its destinies were now beyond the influence of Napoleon, even in his own opinion, since he was himself treating with his captive at Valencey, for re-establishing him on the throne. A treaty, therefore, might possibly have been achieved by help of skilful management, which, while it affirmed the nominal independence of Italy and Holland, would have left Napoleon in actual possession of all the real influence which so powerful a mind could have exercised over a brother, a son-in-law, and a brother-in-law, all indebted to him for their rise to the rank they held. His power might have been thus consolidated in the most formidable manner, and his empire placed in such security, that he could fear no aggression on any quarter, and had only to testify pacific intentions towards other nations, to insure the perfect tranquillity of France, and of the world.

But it did not suit the high-soaring ambition of Napoleon to be contented with such a degree of power as was to be obtained by negotiation. His favourite phrase on such occasions, which indeed he had put into the mouth of Maria Louisa upon a recent occasion, was, that he could not occupy a throne, the glory of which was tarnished. This was a strange abuse of words; for if his glory was at all impaired, as in a military point of view it certainly was, the depreciation arose from his having

lost many great battles, and could not be increased by his acquiescing in such concessions as his defeats rendered necessary. The loss of a battle necessarily infers, more or less, some censure on the conduct of a defeated general; but it can never dishonour a patriotic prince to make such sacrifices as may save his people from the scourge of a protracted and losing warfare. Yet let us do justice to the memory of a man so distinguished. If a merited confidence in the zeal and bravery of his troops, or in his own transcendent abilities as a general, could justify him in committing a great political error, in neglecting the opportunity of securing peace on honourable terms, the events of the strangely-varied campaign of 1814 show sufficiently the ample ground there was for his entertaining such an assurance.

At this period, Maret, Duke of Bassano, invited the allies to hold a congress at Manheim, for considering the preliminaries of peace; and, on the part of Great Britain, Lord Castlereagh, a cabinet minister, was sent over to represent her on this important occasion. Faction, which, in countries where free discussion is permitted, often attaches its censure to the best and worthiest of those to whose political opinions it is opposed, has calumniated this statesman during his life, and even after his death. This is one of the evils, at the expense of which freedom is purchased; and it

is purchased the more cheaply, that the hour of confutation fails not to come. Now, when his power can attract no flattery, and excite no odium, impartial history must write on the tomb of Castlereagh, that his undaunted courage, manly steadiness, and deep political sagacity, had the principal share in infusing that spirit of continued exertion and unabated perseverance into the councils of the allies, which supported them through many intervals of doubt and indecision, and finally conducted them to the triumphant conclusion of the most eventful contest which Europe ever saw.

In the mean while, both parties proclaimed their anxiety for peace, well aware of the advantageous opinion which the French public in particular could not fail to entertain of that party, which seemed most disposed to afford the world the blessings of that state of rest and tranquillity, which was now universally sighed for.

A manifesto was published by the allied monarchs, in which they complain, unreasonably certainly, of the preparations which Buonaparte was making for recruiting his army, which augmentation of the means of resistance, whether Napoleon was to look to peace or war, was equally justifiable, when the frontiers of France were surrounded by the allied armies. The rest of this state paper was in a better, because a truer tone. It stated that

victory had brought the allies to the Rhine, but they meant to make no farther use of their advantages than to propose to Napoleon a peace, founded on the independence of France, as well as upon that of every other country. "They desired," as this document stated, "that France should be great, powerful, and happy, because the power of France is one of the fundamental bases of the social system in Europe. They were willing to confirm to her an extent of territory, greater than she enjoyed under her ancient kings; but they desired, at the same time, that Europe should enjoy tranquillity. It was, in short, their object to arrange a pacification on such terms as might, by mutual guarantees, and a well-arranged balance of power, preserve Europe in future from the numberless calamities, which, during twenty years, had distracted the world." This public declaration seemed intended to intimate that the war of the coalition was not as yet directed against the person of Napoleon, or his dynasty, but only against his system of arbitrary supremacy. The allies further declared, that they would not lay down their arms until the political state of Europe should be finally arranged on unalterable principles, and recognized by the sanctity of treaties.

The reply of Buonaparte is contained in a letter from Caulaincourt to Metternich, dated 2d December. It declared that Buonaparte

acquiesced in the principle which should rest the proposed pacification on the absolute independence of the states of Europe, so that neither one nor another should in future arrogate sovereignty or supremacy in any form whatsoever, either upon land or sea. It was therefore declared, that his Majesty adhered to the general bases and abstracts communicated by Monsieur St Aignan. « They will involve,» the letter added, « great sacrifices on the part of France, but his Majesty would make them without regret, if, by like sacrifices, England would give the means of arriving at a general peace, honourable for all concerned.»

The slightest attention to this document shows that Napoleon, in his pretence of being desirous for peace on the terms held out in the proposals of the allies, was totally insincere. His answer was artfully calculated to mix up with the diminution of his own exorbitant power, the question of the maritime law, on which England and all other nations had acted for many centuries, and which gives to those nations that possess powerful fleets, the same advantage which those that have great armies enjoy by the law martial. The rights arising out of this law maritime had been maintained by England at the end of the disastrous American war, when the Armed Neutrality was formed for the express purpose of depriving

her, in her hour of weakness, of this bulwark of her naval power. It had been defended during the present war against all Europe, with France and Napoleon at her head. It was impossible that Britain should permit any challenge of her maritime rights in the present moment of her prosperity, when not only her ships rode triumphant on every coast, but her own victorious army was quartered on French ground, and the powerful hosts of her allies, brought to the field by her means, were arrayed along the whole frontier of the Rhine. The Emperor of the French might have as well proposed to make the peace which Europe was offering to him depend upon Great Britain's ceding Ireland or Scotland.

Neither can it be pretended that there was an indirect policy in introducing this discussion as an apple of discord, which might give cause to disunion among the allies. Far from looking on the maritime law, as exercised by Britain, with the eyes of jealousy, with which it might at other times have been regarded, the continental nations remembered the far greater grievances which had been entailed on them by Buonaparte's memorable attempt to put down that law by his anti-commercial system, which had made Russia herself buckle on her armour, and was a cause, and a principal one, of the general coalition against France. As Buonaparte, therefore, could have no hope

to obtain any advantage, direct or indirect, from mixing up the question of maritime rights with that of the general settlement of the Continent, and as mere spleen and hatred to Great Britain would be scarce an adequate motive in a mind so sagacious, we must suppose this inadmissible stipulation to have been thrown in for the purpose of enabling him to break off the negotiation when he pleased, and cast upon the English the unpopularity attending the breach of it. It is very true, that England had offered to make sacrifices for obtaining a general peace; but these sacrifices, as was seen by the event, regarded the restoration to France of conquered colonies, not the cession of her own naval rights, which, on no occasion whatsoever, a minister of Britain will, can, or dare, permit to be brought into challenge. Accordingly, the acceptance by Buonaparte of the terms transmitted by St Aignan being provided with a slip-knot, as it were, by which he could free himself from the engagement at pleasure, was considered, both by the allies, and by a large proportion of the people of France, as elusory, and indicating no serious purpose of pacification. The treaty therefore languished, and was not fairly set on foot until the chance of war had been again appealed to.

In the mean while, the allies were bringing up their reserves as fast as possible, and Buonaparte on his side was doing all he could to

recruit his forces. His measures for this purpose had been adopted long before the present emergency. As far back as the 9th October, the Empress Maria Louisa, in the character of Regent, presided in a meeting of the Senate, held for the purpose of calling for fresh recruits to the armies. She was an object of interest and compassion to all, when announcing the war which had broken out betwixt her father and her husband; but the following injudicious censure upon her country was put into the mouth of the young sovereign, without much regard to delicacy. «No one,» she said, «can know so well as I what the French will have to dread, if they permit the allies to be conquerors.» The closing paragraph was also much criticised, as attaching more importance to the personal feelings of the sovereign, than ought to have been exclusively ascribed to them in so great a public extremity. «Having been acquainted for four years with the inmost thoughts of my husband, I know with what sentiments he would be afflicted if placed on a tarnished throne, and wearing a crown despoiled of glory.» The decree of the Senate, passive as usual, appointed a levy of two hundred and eighty thousand conscripts.

When Buonaparte arrived at Saint Cloud, after having brought the remains of his once great army to Mentz, his affairs were even in a worse state than had been anticipated.

But before we proceed to detail the measures which he took for redeeming them, it is necessary to take notice of two parties in the state, who, in consequence of the decay of the Imperial power, were growing gradually into importance.

The first were the adherents of the Bourbons, who, reduced to silence by the long-continued successes of Buonaparte, still continued to exist, and now resumed their consequence. They had numerous partisans in the west and south of France, and many of them still maintained correspondence with the exiled family. The old noblesse, amongst whom such as did not attach themselves to the court and person of Napoleon, continued to be staunch royalists, had acquired, or rather regained, a considerable influence in Parisian society. The superior elegance of their manners, the seclusion, and almost mystery of their meetings, their courage and their misfortunes, gave an interest to these relics of the history of France, which was increased by the historical remembrances connected with ancient names and high descent. Buonaparte himself, by the restoration of nobility as a rank, gave a dignity to those who had possessed it for centuries, which his own new creations could not impart. It is true that, in the eye of philosophy, the great man who first merits and wins a distinguished title is in himself infinitely more valuable and respectable

than the obscure individual who inherits his honours at the distance of centuries; but then he is valued for his personal qualities, not for his noblesse. No one thought of paying those mareschals, whose names and actions shook the world, a greater degree of respect when Napoleon gave them titles. On the contrary, they will live in history, and be familiar to the imagination, by their own names, rather than those arising from their peerages. But the science of heraldry, when admitted as an arbitrary rule of society, reverses the rule of philosophy, and ranks nobility, like medals, not according to the intrinsic value of the metal, but in proportion to its antiquity. If this was the case with even the heroes who had hewed a soldier's path to honours, it was still more so with the titles granted by Buonaparte, "upon carpet consideration," and the knights whom he dubbed with unhacked rapier. It might be truly said of these, that

Their fire-new stamp of honour scarce was current.

When, therefore, the republican fury died away, and Buonaparte directed the respect of the people at large towards title and nobility, a distinct and superior influence was acquired by those who possessed such honours by hereditary descent. Napoleon knew this, and courted, and in some degree feared, the remainder of the old noblesse, who, unless he

could decidedly attach them to his own interest, were exposed to surveillance and imprisonment on circumstances of slight suspicion. They became, however, so circumspect and cautious, that it was impossible to introduce the spies of the police into their *salons* and private parties. Still Napoleon was sensible of the existence of this party, and of the danger which might attend upon it, even while his followers had forgot perhaps that the Bourbons continued to live. « I thought him mad,» said Ney (whose head, according to Fouché, could not embrace two political ideas), « when, taking leave of the army at Smorgony, he used the expression, ‘The Bourbons will make their own of this.’ »¹

This party began now to be active, and a royalist confederation organized itself in the centre of France as early as the month of March, 1813. The most distinguished members are said to have been the Dukes of Duras, Tremouille, and Fitzjames; Messrs de Polignac, Ferrand, Adrien de Montmorency, Sosthène de La Rochefoucault, Sesmaison, and La Roche-Jacquelin. Royalist commanders had been nominated in different quarters — Count Suzanet in the Lower Poitou, Duras in Orleans and Tours, and the Marquis de Rivière in the

¹ *Les Bourbons s'en tireraient.* Memoirs of Fouché, vol. II. p. 149. 8vo. Paris, 1824.

province of Berri. Bordeaux was full of royalists, most of them of the mercantile class, who were ruined by the restrictions of the Continental System, and all waited anxiously a signal for action.

Another internal faction, noways desirous of the return of the Bourbons, yet equally inimical to the power of Napoleon, consisted of the old Republican statesmen and leaders, with the more zealous part of their followers. These could not behold with indifference the whole fruits of the Revolution, for which so much misery had been endured, so much blood spilled, so many crimes committed, swept away by the rude hand of a despotic soldier. They saw, with a mixture of shame and mortification, that the issue of all their toils and all their systems had been the monstrous concoction of a military despotism, compared with which every other government in Europe might be declared liberal, except perhaps that of Turkey. During the monarchy, so long represented as a system of slavery, public opinion had in the parliaments zealous advocates, and an opportunity of making itself known; but in Imperial France all was mute, except the voice of hired functionaries, mere trumpets of the government, who breathed not a sound but what was suggested to them. A sense of this degraded condition united in secret all those who desired to see a free government in France, and

especially such as had been active in the commencement of the Revolution.

This class of politicians could not desire the return of the family in whose exile they had been active, and had therefore cause to fear the re-action with which such an event might be attended ; but they wished to get rid of Napoleon, whose government seemed to be alike inconsistent with peace and with liberty. The idea of a regency suggested itself to Fouché and others, as a plausible mode of attaining their purpose. Austria, they thought, might be propitiated by giving Maria Louisa the precedence in the council of regency as guardian of her son, who should succeed to the crown when he came to the age of majority. This expedient, it was thought, would give an opportunity, in the mean while, to introduce free principles into the constitution. But while it does not appear how these theorists intended to dispose of Napoleon, it is certain that nothing but his death, captivity, or perpetual exile, would have prevented such a man from obtaining the full management of a regency, in which his wife was to preside in the name of his son.

A great part of the population of France, without having any distinct views as to its future government, were discontented with that of Buonaparte, which, after having drained the country of men and wealth, seemed about to

terminate, by subjecting it to the revenge of incensed Europe. When these were told that Buonaparte could not bear to sit upon a tarnished throne, or wear a crown of which the glory was diminished, they were apt to consider how often it was necessary that the best blood of France should be expended in washing the one, and restoring the brilliancy of the other. They saw in Napoleon a bold and obstinate man, conscious of having overcome so many obstacles, that he could not endure to admit the existence of any which might be insurmountable. They beheld him obstinately determined to retain every thing, defend every thing, venture every thing, without making the least sacrifice to circumstances, as if he were in his own person independent of the laws of Destiny, to which the whole universe is subjected. These men felt the oppression of the new taxes, the terrors of the new conscription,¹ and without forming a wish as to the mode in which he was to be succeeded, devoutly desired the Emperor's deposition. But when an end is warmly desired, the means of attaining

¹ It has been given as sufficient answer to these complaints, that Buonaparte is falsely accused of having drained France of her youth, since, upon the whole, the population is stated to have, on the contrary, increased. This may be the case; but it is no less certain that the wars of Buonaparte consumed at least a million of conscripts, and it does not occur to us that the population of

it soon come to occupy the imagination; and thus many of those who were at first a sort of general malcontents, came to attach themselves to the more decided faction either of the royalists or liberalists.

These feelings, varying between absolute hostility to Napoleon, and indifference to his fate, threw a general chillness over the disposition to resist the invasion of the strangers, which Buonaparte had reckoned on as certain to render the war national amongst so high-spirited a people as the French. No effort was spared to dispel this apathy, and excite them to resistance; the presses of the capital and the provinces all adopted the tone suggested by the government, and called forth every one to rise in mass, for defence of the country. But although, in some places, the peasants were induced to take arms, the nation at large showed a coldness, which can only be accounted for by the general idea which prevailed, that the Emperor had an honourable peace within his power, whenever he should be disposed to accept of it.

a country increases under such circumstances, like the growth of a tree subjected to much pruning; still less that the general result would satisfy parents for the slaughter of their children, any more than the sorrow of a mother who had lost her infant would be assuaged by the information that her next-door neighbour had been safely delivered of twins.

In the mean time, new burdens were necessary to pay the expenses of the approaching campaign, and recruit the diminished ranks of the army. Napoleon, indeed, supplied from his own hoards a sum of thirty millions of francs; but, at the same time, the public taxes of the subject were increased by one moiety, without any appeal to, or consultation with, the Legislative Body, who, indeed, were not sitting at the time. In a Council of State extraordinary, held on the 11th November, two days after his return to Paris, Napoleon vindicated the infliction of this heavy augmentation on a discontented and distressed country. « In ordinary times,» he said, « the contributions were calculated at one-fifth of the income of the individual; but, according to the urgency of events, there was no reason why it should not rise to a fourth, a third, or a half of the whole income. In fact,» he concluded, « the contribution had no bounds; and if there were any laws intimating the contrary, they were ill-considered laws, and undeserving of attention.»

There was then read to the Council a decree of the Senate for a new conscription of three hundred thousand men, to be levied upon those who had escaped the conscription of former years, and who had been considered as exempted from the service. There was a deep and melancholy silence. At length a

counsellor spoke, with some hesitation, though it was only to blame the introductory clause of the senatorial decree, which stated the invasion of the frontiers as the cause of this large levy. It was, he suggested, a declaration too much calculated to spread alarm.

«And wherefore,» said Napoleon, giving way to his natural vehemence, and indicating, more strongly than prudence warranted, the warlike and vindictive purposes which exclusively occupied his breast,—«wherefore should not the whole truth be told? Wellington has entered the south; the Russians menace the northern frontier; the Prussians, Austrians, and Bavarians threaten the east. Shame!—Wellington is in France, and we have not risen in mass to drive him back. All my allies have deserted me; the Bavarians have betrayed me—They threw themselves on my rear to cut off my retreat—But they have been slaughtered for their pains. No peace—none till we have burned Munich. A triumvirate is formed in the north, the same which made a partition of Poland. I demand of France three hundred thousand men—I will form a camp of a hundred thousand at Bordeaux—another at Metz—another at Lyons. With the present levy, and what remains of the last, I will have a million of men. But I must have grown men—not these boy-conscripts, to encumber the hospitals, and die of fatigue upon the highways—I

can reckon on no soldiers now save those of France itself.»

« Ah, Sire,» said one of the assentators, glad to throw in a suggestion which he supposed would suit the mood of the time, « that ancient France must remain to us inviolate.»

« And Holland!» answered Napoleon, fiercely. « Abandon Holland! sooner yield it back to the sea. Counsellors, there must be an impulse given—all must march—You are fathers of families, the heads of the nation; it is for you to set the example. They speak of peace; I hear of nothing but peace, when all around should echo to the cry of war.»

This was one of the occasions on which Buonaparte's constitutional vehemence overcame his political prudence. We might almost think we hear the voice of the Scandinavian deity Thor, or the war-god of Mexico, clamorous for his victims, and demanding that they be unblemished, and worthy of his bloody altar. But Buonaparte was unable to inspire others with his own martial zeal; they only foresaw that the nation must, according to the system of its ruler, encounter a most perilous danger, and that, even in case of success, when Napoleon reaped laurels, France would only gather cypress. This feeling was chiefly predominant in the Legislative Assembly; as every representative body, which emanates

however remotely from the people, has a natural aptitude to espouse their cause.

It is true, that the Emperor had, by every precaution in his power, endeavoured to deprive this part of the state, the only one which had retained the least shadow of popular representation, of every thing approaching to freedom of debate or right of remonstrance, and, by a recent act of despotic innovation, had even robbed them of the power of choosing their own president. He is said also to have exerted his authority over individuals by a practice similar to that practised by James the Second upon members of parliament, called *closeting*, admitting individuals of the Legislative Body to private interviews, and condescending to use toward them that personal intercession, which, coming from a sovereign, it is so difficult to resist. But these arts proved unsuccessful, and only tended to show to the world that the Legislative Body had independence enough to intimate their desire for peace, while their sovereign was still determined on war. A commission of five of their members, distinguished for wisdom and moderation, were appointed to draw up a report upon the state of the nation, which they did in terms respectful to Napoleon, but such as plainly indicated their conviction that he would act wisely to discontinue his schemes of external

ambition, to purchase peace by disclaiming them, and at the same time to restore to the subject some degree of internal liberty. They suggested, that in order to silence the complaints of the allied monarchs, which accused France of aiming at general sovereignty, the Emperor should make a solemn and specific declaration, abjuring all such purposes. They reminded him, that when Louis XIV. desired to restore energy to the nation, he acquainted them with the efforts he had made to obtain peace, and the effect answered his wishes. They recommended the example to Napoleon. It was only necessary, they said, that the nation should be assured, that the war was to be continued for the sole object of the independence of the French people and territory, to reanimate public spirit, and induce all to concur in the general defence. After other arguments, tending to enforce the same advice, the report concluded with recommending that his Majesty should be supplicated to maintain the active and constant execution of the laws, which preserve to Frenchmen the rights of liberty, and security both of person and property, and to the nation the free exercise of its political privileges.

Like the mute prince, who recovered his speech when his father's life was endangered, the extremity of the national distress thus gave the power of remonstrance to a public body,

which had hitherto been only the passive agents of the will of a despotic sovereign. Yet, comparing the nature of the remonstrance with the period of extremity at which it was made, Napoleon must have felt somewhat in the situation of the patriarch of Uz, the friends of whose former prosperity came in the moment of his greatest distresses with reproaches instead of assistance. The Legislative Body had been at least silent and acquiescent during the wonderful period of Buonaparte's success, and they now chose that of his adversity to give him unpalatable advice, instead of aiding in this emergency to inspire the nation with confidence. A philosophical monarch would nevertheless have regarded the quality of the course recommended more than the irritating circumstances of time and manner in which it was given; and would have endeavoured, by frank confidence and concessions, to reconcile himself with the Legislative Body. An artful and Machiavelian despot would have temporised with the deputies, and yielded for the time, with the purpose of afterwards recovering, at a fitting period, whatever point he might at present be obliged to cede. But Napoleon, too impetuous for either policy or philosophy, gave way to the full vehemence of a resentment, which, though unreasonable and imprudent, was certainly, considering those to whom it was addressed, by no means unna-

tural. He determined instantly to prorogue the Assembly, which had indicated such symptoms of opposition. Their hall was, therefore, shut against them, and guarded with soldiers, while the deputies, summoned before the throne of the Emperor, received the following singular admonition:—« I have prohibited the printing of your address, because it is seditious. Eleven parts of you are good citizens, but the twelfth consists of rebels, and your commissioners are of the number. Lainé corresponds with the Prince Regent of England; the others are hot-headed fools, desirous of anarchy, like the Girondins, whom such opinions led to the scaffold. Is it when the enemy are on the frontiers that you demand an alteration of the constitution? Rather follow the example of Alsace and Franche-Comté, where the inhabitants ask for leaders and arms to drive the invaders back. You are not the representatives of the people—You are only the representatives of the individual departments Yet you seek in your address to draw a distinction betwixt the sovereign and the people. I—I am the only real representative of the people. Which of you could support such a burden?—The throne is merely a piece of wood covered with velvet. I—I alone hold the place of the people. If France desires another species of constitution, which does not suit me, I will tell her to seek another monarch. It is at me

the enemies aim, more than at France; but are we, therefore, to sacrifice a part of France? Do I not sacrifice my self-love, and my feelings of superiority, to obtain peace? Think you I speak proudly? If I do, I am proud because I have courage, and because France owes her grandeur to me. Yes—your address is unworthy of the Legislative Body, and of me. Begone to your homes. I will cause your address to be published in the *Moniteur*, with such notes as I shall furnish. Even if I had done wrong, you ought not to have reproached me with it thus publicly. People do not wash their dirty linen before the world. To conclude, France has more need of me than I have of France.»

With this philippic, which we have but slightly compressed, he spurned the members of the Legislative Body from his presence. It displays in a remarkable degree his natural vehemence of temper; his view of the constitution as a drama, in which he filled up every part, and performed at once the part of the prince and of the people; his consciousness of his own extraordinary powers, which he boldly weighed in the balance against all France; and the coarse and mean taste of some of his expressions. The suspension of the Legislative Body, the only part, we repeat, of the Imperial constitution which had the least pretence to a popular origin, was not qualified to increase the confidence of the public, who

now saw want of unity between the Emperor and the popular representatives, added to the other threatening circumstances of the time, and became yet more distracted in their opinions, and unwilling to exert themselves for the common defence.

To give a more favourable impulse to the mind of the nation, Napoleon had recourse to an expedient, which, in the time of the Republic, had been attended with universal effect. He sent special commissioners, twenty-seven in number, into the different departments, to arouse the dormant energies of the inhabitants, and induce them to take up arms. But the senators and counsellors, chosen for this purpose, were altogether void of the terrible energies of the Republican proconsuls; and, though endowed like them with the most arbitrary powers, they had neither the furious zeal, nor the contempt of all the prejudices of humanity, which had been displayed by those ferocious demagogues. Their mission, therefore, produced but little effect. The conscription, too, failed to be the ready source of levies which it had so often proved. The lancet had been so often used, that the blood no longer followed it so readily.

The unceasing activity of Napoleon laboured to supply these deficiencies. By day he was incessantly engaged in actively reviewing troops, inspecting stores, and all the prepara-

tions for a desperate resistance. By night, the lights were seen to glimmer late and long in the windows of his private apartment, in the upper story of the Tuileries. He succeeded in levying twelve fresh regiments, and prepared to augment his veteran force by withdrawing Suchet from Catalonia, and making draughts from Soult's army on the frontiers, which he designed to supply by fresh levies.

The *Moniteur*, and the other newspapers, magnified the success of the Emperor's exertions, described armies in reserve which had no existence, and dilated upon the *beau désespoir* which was driving all France to arms, while, in fact, most of the provinces waited with apathy the events of the war.

One of the strongest symptoms of Napoleon's own consciousness of approaching danger, was his calling out and arming the National Guard of Paris, a force to which he would not have appealed, save in the case of the last necessity, but to which he now felt himself obliged to have recourse. Aware, however, that to mark any want of confidence in the armed citizens at this moment, would be to give occasion to the disaffection which he dreaded, he solemnized his departure to the frontier by convoking a meeting of the officers of the National Guard at the Tuileries. He appeared among them with his Empress and his infant child, and in a tone which penetrat-

ed every bosom, announced that, being about to place himself at the head of his army, he committed to the faith of the citizens of Paris the security of his capital, his wife, and his child. Whatever complaints might be justly entertained against Napoleon's political conduct, none were so ungenerous as to remember them at that moment. Many of the officers shared in the emotion which he testified, and some mingled their tears with those of the alarmed and sorrowing Empress.

This scene took place on the 23d of January; on the 25th Napoleon left that abode of royalty, to which he was doomed not to return until he had undergone strange changes of fortune. His mind was agitated with unusual apprehensions and anticipations of misfortune; feeling also, what was unsuspected by many, that the real danger of his situation arose from the probability of the nation's wishing to recal the Bourbons. He had even, according to his own account, resolved to arrest « the person of a man of great influence, »¹ whom he supposed most likely to promote this design. His counsellors persuaded him to forbear this arbitrary action at a moment when his power was becoming daily more obnoxious, and reminded him that the suspected person had as much reason to fear

¹ Talleyrand is intimated; for Fouché, to whom the description might otherwise have applied, was not at this time in or near Paris.

the restoration of the Bourbons as he himself had. The Emperor yielded the point but not without strongly repeating his fears that his advisers and himself would both have to repent of it; and not without charging Cambacérès to make sure of that individual's person, in case any crisis should take place in the capital.

Thus, full of melancholy presages, he hastened to the field, where he had but inadequate means to oppose to the accumulated force which was now precipitating itself upon France.

CHAPTER II.

Declaration of the Views of the Allies in entering France.

—They enter Switzerland, and take possession of Geneva.—Prince Schwartzberg crosses the Rhine.—Apathy of the French.—Junction of Blucher with the Grand Army.—Proceedings of the Crown Prince of Sweden.—Tardiness of the Allies.—Inferiority of Napoleon's numerical Force.—Battles of Brienne—and La Rothière.—Difficulties of Buonaparte, during which he meditates to resign the Crown.—He makes a successful Attack on the Silesian Army at Champ-Aubert.—Blucher is compelled to retreat.—The Grand Army of the Allies carries Nogent and Montereau—attacked by Napoleon, and Schwartzberg sends him a Letter of Remonstrance.—Montereau is taken by Storm.—Buonaparte's violence to his Generals.—The Austrians resolve on a general Retreat, as far as Nancy and Langres.—Their motives.—Consequent indignation and excesses of the Austrian Troops.—Answer of Napoleon to the Letter of Prince Schwartzberg.—Prince Wenceslaus sent to Buonaparte's head-quarters, to treat for an Armistice.—The French bombard and enter Troyes on 23d February.—Execution of Gouault, a Royalist.—A Decree of Death is denounced against all wearing the Bourbon emblems, and all Emigrants who should join the Allies.—Retrospect of Movements upon the Frontiers.

It was time that Buonaparte should appear in the field in person, for the eastern frontiers of

his empire, assaulted on every point, were yielding an almost unresisted entrance to the invading armies. The allied sovereigns had commenced their operations upon a system, as moderate and prudent in a political point of view, as it was bold and decisive considered under a military aspect.

They had not been too much elated by the successes of the late campaign. These had been bought at a high price, and events had shown, that if Napoleon could be resisted and defeated, it could only be by outnumbering his veteran armies, and accumulating such force against him as even his skill and talents should find irresistible. They recollected, also, the desperate efforts of which France and Frenchmen were capable, and were prudently desirous to express the moderation of their purpose in such a form as should have no chance of being mistaken.

Their manifestos disclaimed the intention of dictating to France any particular form of government. They only desired that she should remain within the limits of her ancient territory, a peaceful member of the European commonwealth, allowing to other states, as well as claiming for herself, the full immunities of freedom and independence. The allied sovereigns desired that there should be an end put to the system which decided the fate of kingdoms, not according to the better right,

but the longest sword. They wished a total suppression of all domination of the powerful over the weak; of all pretext of usurpation founded on alleged natural boundaries, or, in other words, on the claim of a powerful state to rend from a weak one whatever suited its convenience to possess. In a word, they aimed at the restoration of the balance of power, which had been long the political object of the wisest statesmen in Europe. It is singular, that of the three nations who were now united to oppose the aggressions of Buonaparte, Austria and Russia had themselves been the first to set an example of violent and unprincipled spoliation in the partition of Poland; and that they had reaped an abundant punishment in the measure of retribution dealt to them by the instrumentality of the very man, whose lawless outrages they, in their turn, were now combined to chastise.

With respect to the nature of the changes which might take place in the internal arrangements of France, in order to bring about the restoration of the balance of power, the allied monarchs professed themselves indifferent. If Napoleon should reconcile himself to the general pacification they proposed, they did not pretend any right to state objections to his remaining in authority. It was the military system of usurpation, not the person of Buonaparte, against which they made war. If, on

the other hand, France could not return to a state of peace without a change of her ruler, it was for France herself to consider what that change should be. The allied sovereigns were determined she should no longer work her uncontrolled will upon other states; but they left her at full liberty to adopt what government, and what sovereign she pleased, within her own territories.

At the same time, having limited the purpose of their armament to such a just and moderate object, the allies resolved to put such activity in their measures as to satisfy the French that they had the power of enforcing their demands; and for that purpose they determined to enter the frontier. From Basle to Mentz, from Mentz to the mouth of the Scheldt, the frontier of France and Belgium is defended by the Rhine, a strong natural boundary in itself, and covered by a triple row of an hundred and forty fortresses, some of them of the very first class. Above Basle, where the Rhine divides France from Switzerland, the frontier is more accessible. But then this upper line could not be acted upon without violating the neutrality which Switzerland had asserted, which Buonaparte had admitted as affording protection for the weakest part of the threatened frontier, and which, upon their own principle of respecting the rights of neutrals, the allies were under a sort of necessity

of acknowledging. Nevertheless, the extreme facility of entering France on this side led Austria and Prussia to form the wish to set aside scruples, and disregard the neutrality of Switzerland.

These two powers remembered how little respect Napoleon had shown to neutral rights in the campaign of Ulm, when he marched without hesitation through the Prussian territories of Anspach and Bareuth, in order to accomplish the demolition of the Austrian army; nor did they fail to quote his forcible interference in the affairs of the Cantons of Switzerland, at an earlier period of his history. Russia did not for some time acquiesce in this reasoning; but when some plausible grounds were alleged of breach of neutrality on the part of the Swiss, the scruples of Alexander were removed; and it was resolved that the Austrian Grand Army should traverse the Swiss territory for the purpose of entering France. They halted before Geneva, and took possession of the town, or rather it was yielded to them by the citizens.

The Canton of Berne, also, which resented some alterations made by Napoleon to the prejudice of their feudal claims upon the Pays de Vaud, received the Austrians not as intruders but as friends. Buonaparte, in his manifestoes, insisted vehemently upon the injustice of this aggression upon the territories

of the Swiss. Undoubtedly the transaction was of a questionable character; but it was inconsistent in Napoleon to declaim against it, since in the case of the arrest of the Duke d'Enghien, he had laid it down as national law, that the violation of the territory of Baden was an offence pleadable by no other than the sovereign of that territory. On his own doctrine, therefore, it was incompetent in any other nation to resent on behalf of the Swiss that which the Swiss did not resent for themselves.

Upon the 21st December, Mareschal Prince Schwartzenberg crossed the Rhine with the Austrian army at four points, and advanced upon Langres, as had been previously agreed. Moving with the extreme slowness and precision which characterize Austrian manœuvres, paying always the same respect to fortresses without garrisons, and passes without guards, as if they had been in a posture of defence, the Austrians, instead of reaching Langres on 27th December, did not arrive till the 17th January, 1814. A serious intention had been for some time manifested to defend the place, and it was even garrisoned by a detachment of Buonaparte's old Guard. The approach of the numerous Austrian reinforcements, however, rendered the preparations for defence of the town unavailing, and Langres was evacuated by all the French troops, saving

about three hundred men, who surrendered to General Giulay on the 17th. A division of the Austrians was immediately advanced to Dijon.

The apathy of the French at this period, may be estimated from the following circumstance:—Dijon, summoned by a flying party of cavalry, returned for answer, that a town containing thirty thousand inhabitants, could not with honour surrender to fifteen hussars, but that if a respectable force appeared before its walls, they were ready to give up the keys of their city. This reasonable request was complied with, and Dijon surrendered on 19th January.

The city of Lyons, the second in the empire, had itself nearly fallen into the hands of the Austrians; but the inhabitants showed a disposition to defend the town, and being reinforced with troops sent to secure a place of such importance, the Austrian general Bubna retired from under its walls. It is allowed, that more activity on the part of the allies might have saved this repulse, which was of considerable importance. It was the only one which they had yet sustained.

While the Grand Army, under Schwartzenberg, was thus advancing into France, the army of Silesia, which was the name given to that commanded by the veteran Blücher, consisting, as formerly, of Prussians and Russians,

had made equal progress, though against greater resistance and more difficulties. His army advanced in four columns, or grand divisions, blockading the strong frontier fortresses of Metz, Sarre-Louis, Thionville, Luxembourg, and others, passing the defiles of the Vosges, and pushing forward to Joinville, Vitry, and Saint Dizier. The army of Silesia was thus placed in communication with the Grand Army, the advanced divisions of which had penetrated as far into France as Bar-sur-Aube.

There was yet a third army of the allies, called that of the North of Europe. It was originally commanded by the Prince Royal of Sweden, and consisted of Swedes, Russians, and Germans. But the Crown Prince, whose assistance had been of such material consequence during the campaign of 1813, did not, it appears, take an active share in that of 1814. There may have been two reasons, and weighty ones, for this inactivity. To assist in driving the French out of Germany, seemed a duty which the Prince of Sweden could not as such decline, when the welfare of Sweden demanded it. But an invasion of his native soil might seem to Bernadotte a service unpleasing and unpopular in itself, and in which he could not be so rightfully engaged, at least while the freedom of Germany and the north opened another field of exertions, where his military

efforts could be attended with no injury to his personal feelings. Denmark was still in arms, and Davoust still held out Hamburgh; and the presence of the Swedish army and its leader was necessary to subdue the one, and clear the north from the other. It must also be remembered, that Sweden, a small kingdom, was not in a condition to sustain a war at a great distance from its frontier, and arising out of causes in which it was more remotely concerned. Her armies could not be recruited with the same ease as those of the greater powers; and Bernadotte, therefore, rather chose to incur the censure of being supposed cold in the cause of his confederates, than the risk of losing the only body of troops which Sweden had been able to fit out, and upon preserving which his throne probably depended. The allied sovereigns, however, directed, that while the Crown Prince remained in the north, a part of the Russian and Prussian corps, who were placed under his command, should be ordered to march towards France, for the purpose of augmenting the force which they already possessed in Holland and Belgium. The Crown Prince having, by a short war with Denmark, compelled that power to yield up her ancient possession of Norway, left Bennigsen to continue the siege of Hamburgh, and advanced in person to Cologne, to assist in the complete liberation of Belgium.

The French troops, which had been drawn together, had been defeated at Merxem by General Bulow and Sir Thomas Graham; and although the French flag was still flying at Antwerp and Bergeu-op-Zoom, Holland might be considered as liberated. General Winzengerode, at the head of the Russian troops, and the Saxons, under Thielmann, being the corps detached, as above-mentioned, from the army of the North of Germany, soon reached the Low Countries, and entered into communication with Bulow. General Sir Thomas Graham, with the English and Saxons, and with such Dutch and Flemish troops as could be collected, was left to blockade Bergeu-op-Zoom and Antwerp, whilst Bulow and Winzengerode were at liberty to enter France on the northern frontier: and thus, in the hour of need, which soon afterwards arrived, they were to act as a reserve to the army of Silesia under Blucher. They pushed on as far as Laon.

These advances, which carried the armies of the allies so far into the bosom of France, and surrounded with blockades the frontier fortresses of that kingdom, were not made without an honourable though ineffectual opposition, on such points where the French military could make any stand against the preponderating numbers of the invaders. The people of the country in general neither welcomed nor opposed the allies. In some places

they were received with acclamation—in a few others some opposition was tendered—they encountered desperate resistance nowhere. The allies did all that discipline could to maintain strict order among their troops; but where there were so many free corps,—Hulans, Croats, and Cossacks,—whose only pay is what they can plunder, occasional transgressions necessarily took place. The services of these irregular troops were, however, indispensable. The Cossacks, in particular, might be termed the eyes of the army. Accustomed to act in small parties when necessary, they threaded woods, swam rivers, and often presented themselves unexpectedly in villages many miles distant from the main army to which they belonged, thus impressing the French with an idea of the numbers and activity of the allies far beyond the truth. These Arabs of the North, as Napoleon termed them, always announced their party as the advanced guard of a considerable force, for whom they ordered provisions and quarters to be prepared; and thus awed the inhabitants into acquiescence in their demands. They are not reported to have been cruel, unless when provoked, but were not in general able to resist temptations to plunder. The excursions of these and other light troops were of course distressing to the French territory.

On the other hand, in two or three cases,

armed citizens in the towns, summoned by small parties of the allies, fired upon flags of truce, and thus justified severe reprisals. It was said to be by Buonaparte's strict orders that such actions were committed, the purpose being, if possible, to excite deadly hatred betwixt the French and the allies. Indeed, in the reverse of the circumstances in which each had formerly stood, Napoleon and the Austrian generals seemed to have exchanged system and sentiments. He now, as the Archduke Charles did in 1809, called out every peasant to arms; while Schwartzenberg, like Napoleon at that earlier period, denounced threats of military execution, without mercy or quarter, to every rustic who should obey the summons. The impartial historian must proclaim, in the one case as in the other, that the duty of resistance in the defence of our native country, does not depend on the character of a man's weapons, or the colour of his coat; and that the armed citizen is entitled, equally with the regular soldier, to the benefit of the laws of war, so long as he does not himself violate them. But from these various causes, it was plain that the present apathy of the French people was only temporary, and that some sudden and unforeseen cause was not unlikely to rouse so sensitive and high-spirited a people into a state of general resistance, by which the allies could not fail to be great sufferers.

Rapidity in their movements was the most obvious remedy against such a danger; but this was the military quality least proper to coalitions, where many people must be consulted; and, besides, was inconsistent with the well-known habits of the Germans, but especially of the Austrians.

It seems also, that the allies, having safely formed an almost complete military line from Langres to Châlons, found themselves at some loss how to use their advantages. Nothing could be better situated than their present position, for such a daring enterprise as was now termed a *Hourra* upon Paris; and as all the high-roads, departing from various points of the extensive line which they held, converged on the capital as a common centre, while the towns and villages, through which these roads passed, afforded an ample supply of provisions, this march might have been accomplished almost without opposition, but for the tardy movements of the Grand Army. The real weakness of Napoleon had been disguised by the noisy and exaggerated rumours concerning his preparations; and now when the allies learned that such an opportunity had existed, they learned, at the same time, that it was well nigh lost, or at least that the road to Paris must first be cleared by a series of bloody actions. In these the allies could not disguise from themselves the possibility

of their receiving severe checks; and under this apprehension they began to calculate the consequences of such a defeat, received in the centre of France, as that which they had suffered under the walls of Dresden. There was here no favourable screen of mountains to secure their retreat, no strong positions for checking a pursuing army, as in the case of Vandamme, and turning a defeat into a victory. The frontier which they had passed was penetrated, not subdued—its fortresses, so strong and numerous, were in the greater part masked, not taken—so that their retreat upon the Rhine must be exposed to all the dangers incident to passing in disorder through a country in complete possession of the enemy.

General councils of war seldom agree upon recommending bold measures. In this sense Solomon says, that in the multitude of counsellors there is safety; meaning that the most cautious, if not the wisest measures, are sure to have the approbation of the majority.

Accordingly, this spirit predominating in the councils of the allies, led to a degree of uncertainty in their movements on this momentous occasion, which, as is usual, endeavoured to disguise itself under the guise of prudence. They resolved that the Grand Army should halt a short space at Langres, in hopes either that Napoleon, renewing the negotiation, the scene of which was now to be

transferred to Châtillon-sur-Seine, would avert his present danger, by acquiescing in the terms of the allies; or that the French nation, an event still less likely to happen, would become tired of the military monarch, whose ambition had brought such distress upon the country. In the mean while, the allies declined the offers of such Royalists as came forward in the name, and for the interest of the exiled family, uniformly replying, that they would give no weight to any expression of the sentiments of the French people, unless it was made in some quarter of the kingdom where it could not be supposed to be influenced by the presence of the allied army. They trusted chiefly at that moment to the effect of negotiation with the present possessor of the throne.

But Napoleon, as firmly determined in his purpose as the allies were doubtful, knowing himself to be the soul of his army, and absolute lord of his own actions, felt all the advantage which a bold, active, and able swordsman has in encountering an opponent, whose skill is less distinguished, and whose determination is more flexible than his own. The allies had presented in the Grand Army a front of 97,000 men, Mareschal Blucher one of 40,000, affording a disposable force of 137,000. To oppose this the French Emperor had only, of old troops, independent of those under Suchet in Catalonia, under Soult near Bayonne, and also

of garrisons, about 50,000 men; nor could he hope to add to them more than 70,000 conscripts. Nay, in fact his levies, so far as they could be brought into the field, fell greatly short of this number; for the allies were in possession of a considerable part of the kingdom of France, and, in this moment of general confusion, it was impossible to enforce the law of conscription, which was at all times obnoxious. It was soon proved, that he who so lately had led half-a-million of men to the Vistula, and 300,000 to the banks of the Elbe, could not now muster, for the protection of the capital of his own empire, a disposable force of more than 70,000 men.

The defensive war had no doubt considerable advantages to one who knew so well how to use them. The highways, by which the allies must advance, formed a half or quarter circle of rays, converging, as already mentioned, on Paris as a centre. A much smaller army might, therefore, oppose a large one, because, lying between Paris and the enemy, they must occupy the same roads by a much shorter line of communication than the invaders who were farther from the centre, where the roads diverged to a greater distance from each other. With this advantage of collocation to balance a great inferiority in numerical force, Buonaparte advanced to play for the most momentous stake ever disputed, with a

degree of military skill which has never been matched.

Arrived at Châlons on the 26th January, Buonaparte took the command of such an army as he had been able to assemble, by the concentration of the troops under the Marshals Victor, Marmont, Macdonald, and Ney, all of whom had retreated from the frontier. So much were the French corps d'armée reduced, that these great and distinguished generals, who, in former times, would have commanded 60,000 or 70,000 men each, had under them all, when concentrated, but a total of 52,000, to which Napoleon was only able to add about 20,000 brought from Paris. But no one ever understood better than Buonaparte the great military doctrine, that victory does not depend on the comparative result of numerical superiority in general, but on the art of obtaining such a superiority on the field of action itself.

Blucher was, as usual, the foremost in advance, and Napoleon resolved to bestow on this active and inveterate enemy the terrible honour of his first attack, hoping to surprise the Silesian corps d'armée before it could receive succour from the army of Schwarzenberg. The marshal was apprised of the Emperor's purpose, and lost no time in concentrating his forces at the village of Brienne, near the source of the Aube. This is a small

village, seated on the ascent of a hill. The place has but two streets, one of which ascends to the Château, occupied formerly as a Royal Academy for young persons designed for the army; the other conducts to Arcis-sur-Aube. The Château is partly surrounded by a park or chase. It was at the military school of Brienne that Napoleon acquired the rudiments of that skill in the military art with which he had almost prostrated the world, and had ended by placing it in array against him; and it was here he came to commence what seemed his last series of efforts for victory;—like some animals of the chase, who, when hard pressed by the hunters, are said to direct their final attempts at escape upon the point from which they have first started.

The alert movements of Napoleon surpassed the anticipation of Blucher. He was at table with his staff in the Château. General Alsufieff, a Russian, occupied the town of Brienne, and General Sacken's corps was drawn up in columns, on the road from Brienne to La Rothière. At once a horrible tumult was heard. The Russian cavalry, two thousand in number, were completely driven in by those of Napoleon, and at the same moment Ney attacked the village; while a body of French grenadiers, who, favoured by the wooded and broken character of the ground, had been enabled to get into the park, threat-

ened to make prisoners all who were in the Château. Blucher, with his officers, had barely time to reach a postern, where they were under the necessity of leading their horses down a stair, and in that way made their escape with difficulty. The bold resistance of Alsufieff defended the town against Ney, and Sacken advanced to Alsufieff's assistance. The Cossacks also fell on the rear of the French in the park, and Buonaparte's own safety was compromised in the mêlée. Men were killed by his side, and he was obliged to draw his sword in his own defence. At the very moment of attack, his attention was engaged by the sight of a tree, which he recollected to be the same under which, during the hours of recreation at Brienne, he used, when a school-boy, to peruse the *Jerusalem Delivered* of Tasso. If the curtain of fate had risen before the obscure youth, and discovered to him in the same spot, his own image as Emperor of France, contending against the Scythians of the desert for life and power, how wonderful would have seemed the presage, when the mere concurrence of circumstances strikes the mind of those who look back upon it with awful veneration for the hidden ways of Providence! Lefebvre Desnouettes fell, dangerously wounded, in charging at the head of the Guards. The village caught fire, and was burned to the ground; but it was not until

eleven at night that the Silesian army ceased to make efforts for recovering the place, and that Blucher, retreating from Brienne, took up a position in the rear of that village, and upon that of La Rothière.

The result of the battle of Brienne was indecisive, and the more unsatisfactory to Buonaparte, as the part of Blucher's force engaged did not amount to 20,000 men, and the sole advantage gained over them, was that of keeping the field of battle. Napoleon's principal object, which was to divide Blucher from the Grand Army, had altogether failed. It was necessary, however, to proclaim the engagement as a victory, and much pains was taken to represent it as such. But when it was afterwards discovered to be merely a smart skirmish, without any material results, the temporary deception only served to injure the cause of Napoleon.

On the 1st of February, Blucher, strongly reinforced from the Grand Army, prepared in his turn to assume the offensive. It would have been Napoleon's wish to have avoided an engagement; but a retreat across the Aube, by the bridge of l'Esmont, which was the only mode of passing that deep and scarce fordable river, would have exposed his rear to destruction. He therefore risked a general action. Blucher attacked the line of the French on three points, assaulting at once the

villages of La Rothière, Dienyville, and Chaumont. The conflict, in which the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg distinguished himself, was hard fought during the whole day, but in the evening the French were repulsed on all points, and Buonaparte was compelled to retreat across the Aube, after losing 4000 prisoners, and no less than seventy-three guns. Ney, by the Emperor's orders, destroyed the bridge at l'Esmont. The allies were not aware of the amount of their advantage, and suffered the French to retire unmolested.

A general council of war, held at the castle of Brienne, now resolved that the two armies (although having so lately found the advantage of mutual support) should separate from each other, and that Blucher, detaching himself to the northward, and uniting under his command the division of Yorck and Kleist, both of whom had occupied St Dizier and Vitry, should approach Paris by the Marne; while Prince Schwartzenberg and the Grand Army should descend on the capital by the course of the Seine. The difficulty of finding provisions for such immense armies was doubtless in part the cause of this resolution. But it was likewise recommended by the success of a similar plan of operations at Dresden, and afterwards at Leipsic, where the enemies of Buonaparte approached him from so many different quarters, as to render it impossible

for him to make head against one army, without giving great opportunity of advantage to the others.

Buonaparte reached Troyes, on which he retreated after crossing the Aube, in a disastrous condition; but his junction with his old Guard, whose appearance and high state of appointments restored courage to the dejected troops who had been beaten at La Rothière, gave a new impulse to the feelings of his army, and restored the young levies to confidence. He resolved, taking advantage of the division of the two armies of the allies, to march upon that of Blucher. But, in order to disguise his purpose, he first sent a small division upon Bar-sur-Seine, to alarm the Austrians with an attack upon their right wing. Schwartzenberg immediately apprehended that Buonaparte was about to move with his whole force in that direction; a movement which in fact would have been most favourable for the allies, since it would have left the road to Paris undefended, and open to the whole. But, terrified by the idea that his left flank might be turned or forced, the Austrian general moved his chief strength in that direction; thus at once suspending his meditated march on the Seine, and increasing the distance betwixt the Grand Army and that of Silesia. Buonaparte having deceived Schwartzenberg by this successful feint, eva-

cuated Troyes, leaving the Mareschals Victor and Oudinot to oppose the Austrians with very inadequate means, while he directed his own march against Blucher.

Blucher, in the mean while, having left Napoleon in front of the Grand Army, and not doubting that the Austrians would find him sufficient employment, hurried forward to the Marne, forced Macdonald to retreat from Château-Thierry, and advanced his headquarters to Vertus; while Sacken, who formed his van-guard, pushed his light troops as far as Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and was nearer to Paris than was the Emperor himself. General d'Yorck had advanced as far as Meaux, and Paris was in the last degree of alarm.

Even Buonaparte himself was so much struck by the inextricable situation of his affairs after the defeat of La Rothière, that a thought occurred to him, which posterity, excepting on his own avowal, would hardly give credit to. The plan which suggested itself was that of sacrificing his own authority to the peace of France, and of abdicating the crown in favour of the Bourbons, while he had yet the means of resistance in his possession. He felt he had reigned and combated long enough for his own glory, and justly thought that the measure of his renown would be filled up by such an act of generous self-denial. But a maxim occurred to him (sug-

gested, he says, by Mr Fox), that restored monarchs could never forgive those who had occupied their place. Probably his thoughts turned also to the murder of the Duke d'Enghien; for there was no other point of personal offence betwixt Buonaparte and the exiled family, which their restoration, if the event took place by his intervention, might not have fully atoned for. If our conjecture be real, it serves to show how such a crime operates in its consequences to obstruct its perpetrator in future attempts to recover the path of virtue and honour. Had Napoleon been really capable of the generous act of self-denial which he meditated, he must have been ranked, in despite of the doubtful points of his character, as one of the greatest men who ever lived.

But the spirit of egotism and suspicion prevailed, and the hopes of accomplishing the discomfiture and defeat of the Silesian army appeared preferable to meriting, by one act of disinterested devotion, the eternal gratitude of Europe; and the philosopher and friend of humanity relapsed into the warrior and conqueror. There is, no doubt, something meritorious in the conceiving of great and noble resolutions, even although they remain unrealised. But this patriotism of the imagination does not rise to a higher scale of merit, than the sensibility of those who can-

not hear a tale of sorrow without weeping, but whose sympathy never assumes the expensive form of actual charity.

The army of Napoleon was now to be transferred from the high-road leading from Paris to Troyes, to that leading from Châlons to Paris, on which Blucher was operating, and that by flank marches through an impracticable country; but which, if they could be accomplished, would enable the French Emperor to attack the Silesian army at unawares in flank and rear. The lateral cross-roads, which connect one highway with another through France, are generally scarce passable in winter, even for the purpose of ordinary communication, much less for an army with its carriages and artillery. Buonaparte had to traverse a country intersected with thickets, marshes, drains, ditches, and impediments of every kind; the weather was execrable, and but for the extraordinary exertions of the Mayor of Barbonne, who collected five hundred horses to extricate the guns, they must have been abandoned on the road. But by dint of perseverance, Buonaparte accomplished this forced march, on 10th of February, and the flank of the Silesian army was in consequence placed at his mercy. They were moving on without the least suspicion of such an attack. Sacken led the advance, the Russian general Alsufieff followed, and Blucher himself brought

up the rear with the main body. All intent upon the advance to Paris, they were marching with careless haste, and had suffered such large intervals to take place betwixt their divisions, as to expose them to be attacked in detail.

Buonaparte fell upon the central division of Alsufieff, at Champ-Aubert, surrounded, defeated, and totally dispersed them, taking their artillery, and 2000 prisoners, while the remainder of the division fled into the woods, and attempted to escape individually. The whole force of the Emperor was now interposed between the advanced guard under Sacken, and the main body under Blucher. It was first directed towards the former, whom Napoleon encountered sooner than he expected, for Sacken, on hearing of the action at Champ-Aubert, instantly countermarched his division to assist Alsufieff, or at least to rejoin Blucher; but he was overwhelmed by the superior force of the French, and having lost one-fourth of his division, about 5000 men, was forced to leave the high-road, upon which Blucher was advancing, and retreat by that on Château-Thierry. At this village Sacken was joined by General Yorck and Prince William of Prussia; but, still unable to make a stand, they could only secure a retreat by destroying the bridge over the Marne. War began now to show itself in its most hideous forms. The stragglers

and fugitives, who could not cross the bridge before its destruction, were murdered by the peasantry, while the allied soldiers, in revenge, plundered Château-Thierry, and practised every excess of violence. The defeat of Sacken took place on the 12th of February.

Blucher, in the mean while, ignorant of the extent of the force by which his van-guard had been attacked, pressed forward to their support, and, in a wide and uninclosed country, suddenly found himself in the front of the whole army of Napoleon, flushed with the double victory which they had already gained, and so numerous as to make a retreat indispensable on the part of the Prussians. Blucher, if surprised, remained undismayed. Having only three regiments of cavalry, he had to trust for safety to the steadiness of his infantry. He formed them into squares, protected by artillery, and thus commenced his retreat by alternate divisions; those battalions which were in motion to the rear, being protected by the fire of the others then standing fast, and covering them with theirs while they retired in turn. The French cavalry, though so strong as to operate at once on the flanks and rear, failed in being able to break a single square. After the Prussians had retired several leagues in this manner, fighting every foot of their way, they were nearly intercepted by a huge column of French horse, which, having made

a circuit so as to pass them, had drawn up on the causeway to intercept their retreat. Without a moment's hesitation, Blucher instantly attacked them with such a murderous fire of infantry and artillery, as forced them from the high-road, and left the passage free. The Prussians found the village of Etoges, through which they were obliged to pass, also occupied by the enemy; but here also they cleared their way by dint of fighting. This expedition of the Marne, as it is called, is always accounted one of Napoleon's military chefs-d'œuvre; for a flank march, undertaken through such a difficult country, and so completely successful, is not perhaps recorded in history. On the other hand, if Blucher lost any credit by the too great security of his march, he regained it by the masterly manner in which he executed his retreat. Had the army which he commanded in person shared the fate of his van-guard, it is probable there would have been no campaign of Paris.

The Parisians, in the mean time, saw at length actual proofs that Napoleon had been victorious. Long columns of prisoners moved through their streets, banners were displayed, the cannon thundered, the press replied, and the pulpit joined, in extolling and magnifying the dangers which the citizens had escaped, and the merits of their preserver.

In the midst of the joy natural on such an

occasion, the Parisians suddenly learned that the town of Fontainebleau was occupied by Hungarian hussars, and that not Cossacks only, but Tartars, Baskirs, and Kalmouks, tribes of a wild and savage aspect, a kind of Asiatic Ogres, to whom popular credulity imputed a taste for the flesh of children, had appeared in the neighbourhood of Nangis. These renewed signs of approaching danger, arose from the Grand Army of the allies having carried, at the point of the bayonet, Nogent and Montereau, and advanced the head-quarters of the monarchs to Pont-sur-Seine. This alarm to Paris was accompanied by another. Schwartzberg, learning the disasters on the Marne, not only pushed forward from three directions on the capital, but dispatched forces from his right towards Provins, to threaten Napoleon's rear and communications. Leaving the pursuit of Blucher, the Emperor counter-marched on Meaux, and, marching from thence to Guignes, he joined the army of Oudinot and Victor, who were retreating before Schwartzberg. He here found the reinforcements which he had drawn from Spain, about 20,000 in number, tried and excellent troops. With this army he now fronted that of Schwartzberg, and upon the 17th February, commenced the offensive at all points, and with success, possessing himself of Nangis, and nearly destroying the corps under Count Pahlen at Mor-

mant. The Prince Royal of Wirtemberg was forced to retreat to Montereau.

So alarmed were the allies at the near approach of their terrible enemy, that a message was sent to Napoleon from the allied sovereigns, by Prince Schwartzenberg's aide-de-camp, Count Parr, stating their surprise at his offensive movement, since they had given orders to their plenipotentiaries at Châtillon to sign the preliminaries of peace, on the terms which had been assented to by the French envoy, Caulaincourt.

This letter, of which we shall hereafter give a more full explanation, remained for some days unanswered, during which Napoleon endeavoured to push his advantages. He recovered the bridge at Montereau, after a desperate attack, in which the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg signalised himself by the valour of his defence. In the course of the action, Napoleon returned to his old profession of an artilleryman, and pointed several guns himself, to the great delight of the soldiers. They trembled, however, when the fire attracted the attention of the enemy, whose balls began to be aimed at the French battery. "Go, my children," said Buonaparte, ridiculing their apprehensions; "the ball is not cast that is to kill me."

Having taken the place by storm, Buonaparte, dissatisfied with the number of men he

had lost, loaded with reproaches some of his best officers. Montbrun was censured for want of energy, and Digeon for the scarcity of ammunition with which the artillery was served; but it was chiefly on Victor, the Duke of Belluno, that his resentment discharged itself. He imputed to him negligence, in not having attacked Montereau on the day before the action, when it was unprovided for resistance; and he ordered him to retire from the service. The *mareschal* endeavoured to obtain a hearing in his own defence, but for some time could not succeed in checking the stream of reproaches. At length they were softened into a charge of broken health, and the love of repose, incident to wounds and infirmities. « The best bed,» said the Emperor, « which the quarters afford, must now be sought out for the once indefatigable Victor.» The *mareschal* felt the charge more severely in proportion as it became moderated within what was probably the bounds of truth; but he would not consent to quit the service.

« I have not,» he said, « forgot my original trade. I will take a musket. Victor will become a private in the Guard.»—Buonaparte could not resist this mark of attachment. He held out his hand — « Let us be friends,» he replied. « I cannot restore to you your *corps d'armée*, which I have given to Gérard; but I will place you at the head of two divisions of

the Guard. Go—assume your command, and let there be no more of this matter betwixt us.»

It was upon such occasions, when he subdued his excited feelings to a state of kindness and generosity, that Buonaparte's personal conduct seems to have been most amiable.

The allies, in the mean time, remembering, perhaps, though somewhat of the latest, the old fable of the bunch of arrows, resolved once more to enter into communication with the Silesian army, and, concentrating near Troyes, to accept of battle if Buonaparte should offer it. The indefatigable Blucher had already recruited his troops, and, being reinforced by a division of the army of the North, under Langeron, moved southward from Châlons, to which he had retreated after his disaster at Montmirail, to Méry, a town situated upon the Seine, to the north-east of Troyes, to which last place the allied monarchs had again removed their head-quarters. Here he was attacked with fury by the troops of Buonaparte, who made a desperate attempt to carry the bridge and town, and thus prevent the proposed communication between the Silesian army and that of Schwartzenberg. The bridge, which was of wood, was set fire to in the struggle. The sharpshooters fought amid its blazing and cracking beams. The Prussians, however, kept possession of Méry.

A council of war was now held by the allies.

Blucher urged the fulfilment of their original purpose of hazarding an action with Napoleon. But the Austrians had again altered their mind, and determined on a general retreat as far as the line between Nancy and Langres; the very position on which the allies had paused when they first entered France. The principal cause alleged for this retrograde movement, by which they must cede half the ground they had gained since their entering France, was, that Augereau, who had hitherto contented himself with his successful defence of Lyons, had been recruited by considerable bodies of troops from the army of Suchet, which had been employed in Catalonia. Thus reinforced, the French marshal was now about to assume the offensive against the Austrian forces at Dijon, act upon their communications with Switzerland, and raise in a mass the warlike peasantry of the departments of the Doubs, the Haute-Saône, and the Vosges. To prevent such consequences, Schwartzenberg sent General Bianchi to the rear with a large division of his forces, to support the Austrians at Dijon; and conceived his army too much weakened by this detachment to retain his purpose of risking a general action. It was therefore resolved that if the head-quarters of the Grand Army were removed to Langres, those of Blucher should be once more established on the Marne, where, strengthened by the arrival of the northern army, which

was now approaching from Flanders, he might resume his demonstration upon Paris, in case Buonaparte should engage himself in the pursuit of the Grand Army of the allies.

This retrograde movement gave much disgust to the Austrian soldiers, who considered it as the preface to a final abandonment of the invasion. Their resentment showed itself, not only in murmurs and in tearing out the green boughs with which, as in sign of victory, they usually ornament their helmets and schakos, but also, as is too frequently the case in similar instances, in neglect of discipline, and excesses committed in the country.

To diminish the bad effects arising from this discontent among the troops, Schwartzberg published an order of the day, commanding the officers to enforce the strictest discipline, and at the same time explain to the army that the present retreat was only temporary, and that on joining with its reserves, which had already crossed the Rhine, the Grand Army would instantly resume the offensive, while Field-Mareschal Blucher, at present moving northward, so as to form a junction with Winzengerode and Bulow, should at the same time attack the rear and flank of the enemy. The publishing this plan of the campaign went far to rouse the dejected confidence of the Austrian army.

On the evening of the 22d February, an

answer to the letter of Schwartzenberg was received, but it was addressed exclusively to the Emperor of Austria, and while its expressions of respect are bestowed liberally on that power, the manner in which the other members of the coalition are treated shows unabated enmity, ill-concealed under an affectation of contempt. The Emperor of France expressed himself willing to treat upon the basis of the Frankfort declaration, but exclaimed against the terms which his own envoy, Caulaincourt, had proposed to the plenipotentiaries of the other powers. In short, the whole letter indicated, not that Napoleon desired a general peace with the allies, but that it was his anxious wish to break up the coalition, by making a separate peace with Austria. This counteracted in spirit and letter the purpose of the confederates, distinctly expressed in their communication to Napoleon.

The Emperor Francis and his ministers were resolved not to listen to any proposals which went to separate the Austrian cause from that of their allies. It was therefore at first resolved that no answer should be sent to the letter; but the desire of gaining time for bringing up the reserves of the Grand Army, who were approaching the Swiss frontier under the direction of the Prince of Hesse-Homberg, as also for the union of the army of the north, under Bulow and

Winzengerode, with that of Silesia, determined them to accept the offer of a suspension of hostilities. Under these considerations, Prince Wenceslaus of Lichtenstein was sent to the head-quarters of Napoleon, to treat concerning an armistice. The Emperor seemed to be in a state of high hope, and called upon the Austrians not to sacrifice themselves to the selfish views of Russia, and the miserable policy of England. He appointed Count Flahault his commissioner to negotiate for a line of demarcation, and directed him to meet with the envoy from the allies at Lusigny, on 24th February.

On the night of the 23d, the French bombarded Troyes, which the allied troops evacuated according to their latest plan of the campaign. The French entered the town on the 24th, when the sick and wounded, left behind by the allies, were dragged out to grace Napoleon's triumph; and a scene not less deplorable, but of another description, was performed at the same time.

Amid the high hopes which the entrance of the allies into France had suggested to the enemies of Buonaparte's government, five persons, the chief of whom were the Marquis de Widranges, and the Chevalier de Gouault, had displayed the white cockade, and other emblems of loyalty to the exiled family. They had received little encouragement to take so

decided a step either from the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg, or from the Emperor Alexander; both of whom, although approving the principles on which these gentlemen acted, refused to sanction the step they had taken, or to warrant them against the consequences. It does not appear that their declaration had excited any corresponding enthusiasm in the people of Troyes or the neighbourhood; and it would have been wiser in Napoleon to have overlooked such a trifling movement, which he might have represented as arising from the dotage of loyalty, rather than to have, at this critical period, called the public attention to the Bourbons, by denouncing and executing vengeance upon their partisans. Nevertheless Napoleon had scarce entered Troyes, when the Chevalier de Gouault (the other Royalists having fortunately escaped) was seized upon, tried by a military commission, condemned, and immediately shot. He died with the utmost firmness, exclaiming, « *Vive le Roi!* » A violent and ill-timed decree promulgated the penalty of death against all who should wear the decorations of the Bourbons, and on all emigrants who should join the allies. The severity of the measure, so contrary to Napoleon's general conduct, of late years, towards

¹ It has been said that Napoleon had been persuaded to save his life. But the result was similar to the execution of Clarence.

the Bourbons and their followers, whom he had for a long period scarce even alluded to, made the world ascribe his unusual ferocity to an uncommon state of apprehension; and thus it gave farther encouragement to those into whom it was intended to strike terror.

At this period of the retreat of Schwartzenberg from Troyes, and the movement of Blucher towards the Marne, we must leave the armies which were contending in the interior of France, in order to retrace those movements upon the frontiers, which, though operating at a distance, tended at once to reinforce the invading armies, and to cripple Napoleon's means of defence.

It is difficult for the inhabitants of a peaceful territory to picture to themselves the miseries sustained by the country which formed the theatre of this sanguinary contest. While Buonaparte, like a tiger hemmed in by hounds and hunters, now menaced one of his foes, now sprung furiously upon another, and while, although his rapid movements disconcerted and dismayed them, he still remained unable to destroy the individuals whom he had assailed, lest, while aiming to do so, he should afford a fatal advantage to those who were disengaged,—the scene of this desultory warfare was laid waste in the most merciless manner. The soldiers on both parts, driven to desperation by rapid marches through roads

blocked with snow, or trodden into swamps, became reckless and pitiless; and, straggling from their columns in all directions, committed every species of excess upon the inhabitants. These evils are mentioned in the bulletins of Napoleon, as well as in the general orders of Schwartzenberg.

The peasants, with their wives and children, fled to caves, quarries, and woods, where the latter were starved to death by the inclemency of the season, and want of sustenance; and the former, collecting into small bodies, increased the terrors of war by pillaging the convoys of both armies, attacking small parties of all nations, and cutting off the sick, the wounded, and the stragglers. The repeated advance and retreat of the different contending parties exasperated these evils. Every fresh band of plunderers which arrived was savagely eager after spoil, in proportion as the gleanings became scarce. In the words of Scripture, what the locust left was devoured by the palmer-worm—what escaped the Baskirs, and Kirgas, and Croats, of the Wolga, and Caspian and Turkish frontier, was seized by the half-clad and half-starved conscripts of Napoleon, whom want, hardship, and an embittered spirit, rendered as careless of the ties of country and language, as the others were indifferent to the general claims of humanity. The towns and villages, which were

the scenes of actual conflict, were frequently burnt to the ground; and this not only in the course of the actions of importance which we have detailed, but in consequence of innumerable skirmishes fought in different points, which had no influence, indeed, upon the issue of the campaign, but increased incalculably the distress of the invaded country, by extending the terrors of battle, with fire, famine, and slaughter for its accompaniments, into the most remote and sequestered districts. The woods afforded no concealment, the churches no sanctuary; even the grave itself gave no cover to the relics of mortality. The villages were everywhere burnt, the farms wasted and pillaged, the abodes of man, and all that belongs to peaceful industry and domestic comfort, desolated and destroyed. Wolves, and other savage animals, increased fearfully in the districts which had been laid waste by human hands, with ferocity congenial to their own. Thus were the evils, which France had unsparingly inflicted upon Spain, Prussia, Russia, and almost every European nation, terribly retaliated within a few leagues of her own metropolis; and such were the consequences of a system, which, assuming military force for its sole principle and law, taught the united nations of Europe to repel its aggressions by means yet more formidable in extent than those which had been used in supporting them.

CHAPTER III.

Retrospect of Military Events on the French Frontiers.—
 Defection of Murat, who declares in favour of the Allies
 —Its consequences.—Augereau is compelled to abandon
 Gex and Franche-Comté.—The North of Germany
 and Flanders lost to France.—Carnot intrusted with the
 command of Antwerp.—Bergen-op-Zoom nearly taken
 by Sir Thomas Graham, but lost by the disorder of the
 troops in the moment of success.—The Allies take, and
 evacuate Soissons.—Bulow and Winzengerode unite
 with Blucher.—The Duke of Wellington forces his way
 through the Pays des Gaves.—State of the Royalists in
 the West of France.—Discontent of the old Republicans
 with Napoleon's Government.—Views of the different
 Members of the Alliance as to the Dynasties of the Bour-
 bons and of Napoleon.—Proceedings of the Dukes of
 Berri and Angoulême, and Monsieur, the two latter of
 whom enter France.—The French defeated by Welling-
 ton at Orthez.—Bordeaux is voluntarily surrendered to
 Marshal Beresford by the inhabitants, who mount the
 white cockade.—Details of the Negotiations of Châ-
 tillon.—Treaty of Chaumont, by which the Allies bind
 themselves of new to carry on the war with vigour.—
 Napoleon presents a singularly unreasonable *contre-
 projet* at Châtillon.—Congress at Châtillon broken up.

WHILE Napoleon was struggling, in the cam-
 paign of Paris, for his very existence as a
 monarch, events were taking place on the

frontiers, by all of which his fate was more or less influenced, and in almost all of them unfavourably. Of these events we must give a brief detail, mentioning, at the same time, the influence which they individually produced upon the results of the war.

The defence of Italy had been committed to Prince Eugène Beauharnais, the viceroy of that kingdom. He was entirely worthy of the trust, but was deprived of any means that remained to him of accomplishing his task, by the defection of Murat. We have often had occasion to describe Murat as distinguished on the field of battle—rather an undaunted and high-mettled soldier than a wise commander. As a sovereign he had little claim to distinction. He was good-tempered, but vain; limited in capacity, and totally uninformed. Napoleon had not concealed his contempt of his understanding, and after the retreat from Russia, had passed an oblique, but most intelligible censure on him, in a public bulletin. In writing to the wife of Murat, and his own sister, Napoleon had mentioned her husband disparagingly, as one who was brave only on the field of battle, but elsewhere as weak as a monk or a woman. Caroline, in answer, cautioned her brother to treat her husband with more respect. Napoleon, unaccustomed to suppress his sentiments, con-

tinued the same line of language and conduct.

Meanwhile Murat, in his resentment, listened to terms from Austria, in which by the mediation of that state, which was interested in the recovery of her Italian provinces, England was with difficulty induced to acquiesce. In consequence of a treaty formed with Austria, Murat declared himself in favour of the allies, and marched an army of 30,000 Neapolitans to Rome, for the purpose of assisting in the expulsion of the French from Italy. He speedily occupied Ancona and Florence. There was already in Italy an army of 30,000 Austrians, with whom the viceroy had fought the indecisive battle of Roverbello, after which he retreated to the line of the Adige, on which he made a precarious stand, until the war was concluded. The appearance of Murat's army on the side of Austria, though he confined himself to a war of proclamations, was calculated to end all French influence in Italy. Counter-revolutionary movements, in some of the Cantons of Switzerland, and in the mountains of Savoy, tended also to close the door through which Buonaparte had so often transferred the war into the Italian Peninsula, and from its northern provinces into the heart of Austria herself.

The defection of Murat had the further ef-

fect of disconcerting the measures which Napoleon had meditated for recovery of the south-eastern frontier of France. Augereau had received orders to advance from Lyons, and receive the reinforcements which Eugène was to have dispatched from Italy across the Alps. These, it was calculated, would have given the French mareschal a decisive superiority, which might have enabled him to ascend towards the sources of the Saône, call to arms the hardy peasantry of the Vosgesian mountains, interrupt the communications of the Austrian army, and excite a national and guerilla warfare in the rear of the allies.

To stimulate more highly the energies of his early comrade in arms, Napoleon caused the Empress Maria Louisa to wait upon the young Duchess of Castiglione (the mareschal's wife), to prevail on her to use her influence with her husband, to exert all his talents and audacity in the present crisis. It was a singular feature of declension of power, when it was thought that the command of the Emperor, imposed upon one of his mareschals, might require being enforced by the interposition of a lady; or rather, it implied that Napoleon was sensible that he was requiring of his officer something which no ordinary exertions could enable him to perform. He wrote, however, to Augereau himself, conjuring him to remember his early victories, and to forget that he

was upwards of fifty years old. But exhortations, whether by a sovereign or lady, cannot supply the want of physical force.

Augereau was unable to execute the task imposed upon him, from not receiving the Italian reinforcements, which, as matters stood in Italy, Eugène could not possibly spare. Detachments from Suchet's Spanish veterans did indeed join the mareschal at Lyons, and enable him to advance on General Bubna, whom he compelled to retreat to Geneva. But the arrival of General Bianchi, with a strong reinforcement which Schwartzemberg had dispatched for that purpose, restored the ascendancy of the allied armies on that frontier, especially as the Prince of Hesse-Homberg also approached from Switzerland at the head of the Austrian reserves. The last general had no difficulty in securing the passes of the Saône. Augereau in consequence was compelled to abandon the country of Gex and Franche-Comté, and again to return under the walls of Lyons. Napoleon was not more complaisant to his old comrade and tutor, than he had been to the other mareschals in this campaign, who had not accomplished tasks which they had not the means to achieve. Augereau was publicly censured as being inactive and unenterprising.

The north of Germany and Flanders were equally lost to France, and French interest. Hamburgh indeed still held out. But, as we

have already said, it was besieged, or rather blockaded, by the allies, under Bennigsen, to whom the Crown Prince of Sweden had left that charge, when he himself, having put an end to the war with Denmark, had advanced towards Cologne, with the purpose of assisting in clearing Belgium of the French, and then entering France from that direction, in support of the Silesian army. The Crown Prince showed no personal willingness to engage in the invasion of France. The causes which might deter him have been already conjectured. The Royalists added another, that he had formed views of placing himself at the head of the government of France, which the allied monarchs declined to gratify. It is certain that, whether from motives of prudence or estrangement, he was, after his arrival in Flanders, no longer to be considered as an active member of the coalition.

In the mean time Antwerp was bravely and scientifically defended by the veteran republican Carnot. This celebrated statesman and engineer had always opposed himself to the strides which Napoleon made towards arbitrary power, and had voted against his election to the situation of Consul for life, and that of Emperor. It does not appear that Napoleon resented this opposition. He had been obliged to Carnot before his unexampled rise, and afterwards he was so far mindful of him, as

to cause his debts to be paid at a moment of embarrassment. Carnot, on his part, took the invasion of France as a signal for every Frenchman to use his talents in the public defence, and, offering his services to the Emperor, was intrusted with the command of Antwerp.

Bergen-op-Zoom was also still occupied by the French. This city, one of the most strongly fortified in the world, was nearly taken by a coup-de-main, by Sir Thomas Graham. After a night-attack of the boldest description, the British columns were so far successful, that all ordinary obstacles seemed overcome. But their success was followed by a degree of disorder which rendered it unavailing, and many of the troops who had entered the town were killed, or obliged to surrender. Thus an enterprise, ably planned and bravely executed, miscarried even in the moment of victory, by accidents for which neither the general nor the officers immediately in command could be justly held responsible. General Graham was, however, reinforced from England, and was still enabled, with the help of the Swedes and Danes, as well as Dutch and Flemish corps, to check any sallies from Bergen or from Antwerp.

The liberation of the Low Countries being so nearly accomplished, Bulow pressed forward on La Fère, and finally occupied Laon. Here,

upon the 26th of February, he formed a junction with Winzengerode, who, bequeathing Juliers, Vanloo, and Maestricht, to the observation of the Crown Prince, marched through the forest of Ardennes. Soissons offered a show of desperate resistance, but, the commandant being killed, the place was delivered up. This was on the 13th February, and the allies ought to have held this important place. But in their haste to join Prince Blucher, they evacuated Soissons, which Mortier caused to be presently re-occupied by a strong French garrison. The possession of this town became shortly afterwards a matter of great consequence. In the mean time, Bulow and Winzengerode, with their two additional armies, entered into communication with Blucher, of whom they now formed the rear-guard, and more than restored to him the advantage he had lost by the defeats at Montmirail and Champ-Aubert.

On the south-western frontier the horizon seemed yet darker. The Duke of Wellington having entered Spain, was about to force his way through the strong country, called the *Pays des Gaves*, the land, that is, of the ravines formed by rivers and torrents. He maintained such severe discipline, and paid with such regularity for the supplies which he needed from the country, that he was voluntarily furnished with provisions of every kind; while

the army of Soult, though stationed in the marshal's own country, obtained none, save by the scanty and unwilling means of military requisition. In consequence of this strict discipline, the presence of the British troops was far from being distressing to the country; and some efforts made by General Harispe, to raise guerillas among his countrymen, the Basques, to act on the Duke of Wellington's rear, became totally ineffectual. The small seaport town of St Jean de Luz supplied the English army with provisions and reinforcements. The activity of English commerce speedily sent cargoes of every kind into the harbour, where before were only to be seen a few fishing-boats. The goods were landed under a tariff of duties settled by the Duke of Wellington; and so ended the Continental System.

In the mean time, the state of the west of France was such as held out the highest political results to the British, in case they should be able to overcome the obstacles presented by the strong entrenched camp at Bayonne, on which Soult rested his right flank, extending a line of great strength upon the Adour and the neighbouring Gaves.

We have mentioned already the confederacy of Royalists, which was now in full activity, and extended by faithful agents through the whole west of France. They were now at their post, and preparing every thing for an

explosion. The police of Buonaparte were neither ignorant of the existence or purpose of this conspiracy, but they were unable to obtain such precise information as should detect and crush it. The two Messrs de Polignac were deeply engaged, and, becoming the subjects of suspicion, it was only by a dexterous and speedy flight from Paris that they eluded captivity, or perhaps death. They succeeded in reaching the army of the allies, and were, it is believed, the first who conveyed to the Emperor Alexander an exact state of the royal party in the interior of France, particularly in the capital, which made a powerful impression on the mind of that prince.

Throughout the west of France there started up a thousand agents of a party, which were now to awake from a sleep of twenty years. Bordeaux, with its loyal mayor, Count Lynch, and the greater part of its citizens, was a central point of the association. A great part of the inhabitants were secretly regimented and embodied, and had arms in their possession, and artillery, gunpowder, and ball, concealed in their warehouses. The celebrated La Roche-Jacquelin, made immortal by the simple and sublime narrative of his consort, solicited the cause of the royalists at the English head-quarters, and made repeated and perilous journeys from thence to Bordeaux, and back again. Saintonge and La Vendée were organized for

insurrection by a loyal clergyman, the Abbé Jaqualt. The brothers of Roche-Aymon prepared Périgord for a struggle. The Duke of Duras had engaged a thousand gentlemen in Touraine. Lastly, the Chouans had again prepared for a rising under the Count de Vitray, and Tranquille, a celebrated leader called *Le Capitaine sans peur*. Numerous bands of refractory conscripts, rendered desperate by their state of outlawry, were ready at Angers, Nantes, and Orleans, to take arms in the cause of the Bourbons, under the Count de Lorge, Monsieur d'Airac, Count Charles d'Autichamp, the Count de Suzannet, and Cadoudal, brother of the celebrated George, and his equal in courage and resolution. But all desired the previous advance of the *Blue-Flints*, as they called the English, their own being of a different colour. Trammelled by the negotiation at Châtillon, and various other political impediments, and anxious especially not to lead these high-spirited gentlemen into danger by encouraging a premature rising, the English ministers at home, and the English general in France, were obliged for a time to restrain rather than encourage the forward zeal of the Royalists.

Such caution was the more necessary, as there existed at the same time another conspiracy, also directed against Buonaparte's person, or at least his authority; and it was of importance that neither should explode until

some means could be found of preventing their checking and counteracting each other. This second class of malcontents consisted of those, who, like Buonaparte himself, owed their political consequence to the Revolution; and who, without regard to the Bourbons, were desirous to get free of the tyranny of Napoleon. These were the disappointed and degraded Republicans, the deceived Constitutionalists, all who had hoped and expected that the Revolution would have paved the way for a free government, in which the career of preferment should be open to talents of every description,—a lottery in which, doubtless, each hoped that his own abilities would gain some important prize. The sceptre of Napoleon had weighed harder upon this class than even upon the Royalists. He had no dislike to the principles of the latter, abstractedly considered; he felt some respect for their birth and titles, and only wished to transfer their affections from the house of Bourbon, and to attach them to that of Napoleon. Accordingly, he distributed employments and honours among such of the old noblesse as could be brought to accept them, and obviously felt pride in drawing to his court names and titles, known in the earlier periods of French history. Besides, until circumstances shook his throne, and enlarged their means of injuring him, he considered the number of the Royalists as small, and their power as despicable. Bu

from those active spirits, who had traded in revolution after revolution for so many years, he had much more both to fear and to dislike, especially as they were now understood to be headed by his ex-minister Talleyrand, with whose talents, both for scheming and executing political changes, he had so much reason to be acquainted. To this class of his enemies he imputed the hardy attempt which was made, not without prospect of success, to overthrow his government during his absence in Russia. « You have the tail, but not the head, » had been the words of the principal conspirator, when about to be executed; and they still rung in the ears of Buonaparte. It was generally supposed, that his long stay in Paris, ere he again took the field against the allies, was dictated by his fear of some similar explosion to that of Malet's conspiracy. Whether these two separate classes of the enemies of Buonaparte communicated with each other, we have no opportunity of knowing, but they both had intercourse with the allies. That of Talleyrand's faction was, we believe, maintained at the court of London, through means of a near relation of his own, who visited England shortly before the opening of the campaign of which we treat. We have no doubt, that through some similar medium Talleyrand held communication with the Bourbons; and that, in the same manner as the

English Restoration was brought about by a union between the Cavaliers and Presbyterians, there was even then upon foot some treaty of accommodation, by which the exiled monarch was, in regaining the crown, to have the assistance of those, whom, for want of another name, we shall call Constitutionalists, it being understood that his government was to be established on the basis of a free model.

It was of the greatest importance that both these factions should be cautious in their movements, until it should appear what course the allied monarchs were about to pursue in the impending negotiation with Buonaparte. The issue of this was the more dubious, as it was generally understood, that though the sovereigns were agreed on the great point of destroying, on the one hand, the supremacy of France, and, on the other, in leaving her in possession of her just weight and influence, they entertained a difference of opinion as to the arrangement of her future government.

The Prince Regent of England, from the generosity of his own disposition, as well as from a clear and comprehensive view of future possibilities, entertained views favourable to the Bourbons. This illustrious person justly conjectured, that free institutions would be more likely to flourish under the restored family, who would receive back their crown under conditions favourable to freedom, than

under any modification of the revolutionary system, which must always, in the case of Buonaparte's being permitted to reign, be felt as implying encroachments on his imperial power. The Bourbons, in the case presumed, might be supposed to count their winnings, in circumstances where the tenacious and resentful mind of Napoleon would brood over his losses; and it might be feared, that with a return of fortune he might struggle to repair them. But there were ministers in the British cabinet who were afraid of incurring the imputation of protracting the war by announcing England's adoption of the cause of the Bourbons, which was now of a date somewhat antiquated, and to which a sort of unhappy fatality had hitherto been annexed. England's interest in the royal cause was, therefore, limited to good wishes.

The Emperor Alexander shared in the inclination which all sovereigns must have felt towards this unhappy family, whose cause was in some degree that of princes in general. It was understood that Moreau's engagement with the Russian monarch had been founded upon an express assurance on the part of Alexander, that the Bourbons were to be restored to the Crown of France under the limitations of a free constitution. Prussia, from her close alliance with Russia, and the personal causes of displeasure which existed be-

twixt Frederick and Napoleon, was certain to vote for the downfall of the latter.

But the numerous armies of Austria, and her vicinity to the scene of action, rendered her aid indispensable to the allies, while the alliance betwixt her Imperial house and this once fortunate soldier threw much perplexity into their councils. It was believed that the Emperor of Austria would insist upon Buonaparte's being admitted to treat as Sovereign of France, providing the latter gave sufficient evidence that he would renounce his pretensions to general supremacy; or, if he continued unreasonably obstinate, that the Emperor Francis would desire that a regency should be established, with Maria Louisa at its head. Either course, if adopted, would have been a death's-blow to the hopes of the exiled family of Bourbon.

Amid this uncertainty, the princes of the house of Bourbon gallantly determined to risk their own persons in France, and try what their presence might do to awake ancient remembrances at a crisis so interesting.

Although the British ministry refused to afford any direct countenance to the schemes of the Bourbon family, they could not, in ordinary justice, deny the more active members of that unhappy race the freedom of acting as they themselves might judge most for the interest of their cause and adherents. To their

applications for permission to depart for France, they received from the British ministry the reply, that the princes of the house of Bourbon were the guests, not the prisoners, of Britain; and although the present state of public affairs precluded her from expressly authorising any step which they might think proper to take, yet they were free to quit her territories, and return to them at their pleasure. Under a sanction so general, the Duke d'Angoulême set sail for St Jean de Luz, to join the army of the Duke of Wellington; the Duke de Berri for Jersey, to correspond with the Royalists of Brittany; and Monsieur for Holland, from which he gained the frontiers of Switzerland, and entered France in the rear of the Austrian armies. The movements of the two last princes produced no effects of consequence.

The Duke de Berri paused in the Isle of Jersey, on receiving some unpleasant communications from France respecting the strength of the existing government, and on discovering, it is said, a plot to induce him to land at a point, were he must become the prisoner of Buonaparte.

Monsieur entered France, and was received at Vesoul with great enthusiasm. But this movement was not encouraged by the Austrian commandants and generals; and Monsieur's proposal to raise corps of Royalists in Alsace and Franche-Comté was treated with cold-

ness, approaching to contempt. The execution of Gouault at Troyes, and the decree of death against the Royalists, struck terror into the party, which was increased by the retrograde movement of the Grand Army. The enterprise of Monsieur, therefore, had no immediate result, though undoubtedly his presence had a decisive effect in consequence of ultimate events; and the restoration would hardly have taken place, without that prince having so adventured his person.

The arrival of the Duke d'Angoulême in the army of the Duke of Wellington had more immediate consequences. His Royal Highness could only be received as a volunteer, but the effect of his arrival was soon visible. La Roche-Jacquelin, who had dedicated to the royal cause his days and nights, his fortune and his life, soon appeared in the British camp, urging the general to direct his march on the city of Bordeaux, which, when delivered from the vicinity of Soult's army, would instantly declare itself for the Bourbons, and be followed by the rising of Guienne, Anjou, and Languedoc. Humanity, as well as policy, induced the Duke of Wellington still to hesitate. He knew how frequently patriotic enthusiasm makes promises beyond its power to fulfil; and he cautioned the zealous envoy to beware of a hasty declaration, since the conferences at Châtillon were still continued,

and there was a considerable chance of their ending in a peace between the allies and Napoleon. La Roche-Jacquelin, undeterred by remonstrances, continued to urge his suit with such intelligence and gallantry, as to receive at last the encouraging answer, « Remain a few days at head-quarters, and you shall see us force the Gaves. »

Here, accordingly, commenced a series of scientific manœuvres, commencing 14th February, by which the Duke of Wellington, pressing step by step on that part of the French army which were on the left side of the Adour, drove them successively beyond the Gave de Mauléon, and the Gave d'Oleron. On the right side of the latter Gave, the French took a position on very strong ground in front of the town of Orthez, where, joined by Clausel and a strong reinforcement, Soult endeavoured to make a stand. The Duke of Wellington commenced his attack on the enemy's right, storming and taking the village by which it was commanded. The desperate resistance which the enemy made on this point occasioned one of those critical movements, when a general is called upon, in the heat of battle, to alter all previous arrangements, and in the moment of doubt, confusion, and anxiety, to substitute new combinations to supersede those which have been planned in the hours of cool premeditation. A left attack

upon a chain of heights extending along General Soult's left, was substituted for that to which Wellington had at first trusted for victory.

At the same time, the appearance of General Hill's division, who had forded the river, or Gave, above Orthez, and threatened the enemy's flank and rear, made the defeat complete. For some time Mareschal Soult availed himself of the alertness of his troops, by halting and taking new positions, to preserve at least the form of a regular retreat; but at length, forced from one line to another by the manœuvres of the British, sustaining new losses at every halt, and menaced by the rapid approach of General Hill's division, his retreat became a flight, in which the French suffered great loss. Whole battalions of conscripts dispersed entirely, and in many left their muskets regularly piled, as if intimating their fixed resolution to retire altogether from the contest.

Another action near Aire, by General Hill, and the passage of the Adour, under Bayonne, by the Honourable Sir John Hope, a manœuvre which might well be compared to a great battle fought, gave fresh influence to the British arms. Bayonne was invested, the road to Bordeaux laid open, and Soult, left with scarce the semblance of an army, retreated towards Tarbes, to secure a junction with

such French corps as might be returning from Spain.

The battle of Orthez, with the brilliant and masterly manœuvres which preceded and followed it, served to establish the superiority of the British forces in points wherein they had till then been deemed most deficient. Since the victories in Spain, it was no longer uncommon to hear a French officer allow, that in the extreme tug of conflict the English soldier, from physical strength and high energy of character, had perhaps some degree of superiority over his own impetuous but less persevering countryman. But he uniformly qualified such a stretch of candour, by claiming for the French superior skill in contriving, and promptitude in executing, those previous movements, on which the fate of battles usually depends. The victory of Salamanca, though gained over a general distinguished as a tactician, and in consequence of a previous contest of manœuvres, was not admitted to contradict the opinion with which Frenchmen were generally impressed. Yet, since the commencement of the campaign on the Adour, the French army, though under command of the celebrated Sault (*le Vieux Renard*, as he was familiarly called by his soldiers), was checked, turned, out-marched, and out-flanked upon every occasion; driven from position to position, in a country that

affords so many of peculiar strength, without having it in their power to injure their victors by a protracted defence ; and repeatedly defeated, not by main force or superiority of numbers, but by a combination of movements, at once so boldly conceived and so admirably executed, as left throughout the whole contest the palm of science, as well as of enduring energy and physical hardihood, with the British soldier. These victories, besides adding another laurel to the thick-woven chaplet of the English general, had the most decisive effect on the future events of the war, as well as upon the public mind in the south of France.

Bordeaux being thus left to follow the inclinations of the inhabitants, and encouraged by the approach of an English detachment of 15,000 men, under Field-Marshal Beresford, poured out its multitudes to receive the Duke of Angoulême. The numbers which thronged out of the city were computed to be at least 10,000 persons. The mayor, Count Lynch, in a short speech, told the English general that if he approached as a conqueror, he needed not his interposition to possess himself of the keys of Bordeaux ; but if he came as an ally of their lawful sovereign, he was ready to tender them up, with every token of love, honour, and affection. Field-Marshal Beresford reiterated his promises of

protection, and expressed his confidence in the loyalty of the city of Bordeaux. The mayor then uttered the long-forgotten signal cry of *Vive le Roi!* and it was echoed a thousand times from the thousands around. Count Lynch then, pulling the three-coloured cockade from his hat, assumed the white cockade of the Bourbons. All imitated his example, and at a concerted signal the old ensign of loyalty streamed from the steeples and towers of the city, amid general acclamation.

The enthusiasm with which the signals of loyalty were adopted, and the shouts of *Vive le Roi* repeated on all hands, mingled with blessings upon the heads of the English and their leaders, formed a scene which those who witnessed it will not speedily forget. It was a renewal of early affections and attachments, which seemed long dead and forgotten,—a general burst of feelings the more generous and affecting, because they were not only as disinterested as spontaneous, but might eventually be deeply fraught with danger to those who expressed them. Yet they were uttered with a generous enthusiasm, that placed the actors far above the apprehension of personal consequences.

The same lively acclamations hailed the entrance of the Duke d'Angoulême into this fine city. At the prince's entry, the inhabitants crowded round him with enthusiasm.

The archbishop and clergy of the diocese recognized him; *Te Deum* was sung in full pomp, while the united banners of France, Britain, Spain, and Portugal, were hoisted on the walls of the town. Lord Dalhousie was left commandant of the British; and if excellent sense, long experience, the most perfect equality of temper, and unshaken steadiness, be necessary qualities in so delicate a trust, the British army had not one more fit for the charge.

Brilliant as these tidings were, they excited in Britain the most cruel apprehensions for the fate which Bordeaux might incur, if this declaration should unhappily prove to be premature. The treaty at Châtillon seemed to approach a termination, and vessels are said to have been dispatched to the Gironde, to favour the escape of such citizens as might be most obnoxious to the vengeance of Buonaparte. Many of those who wished most for British success were tempted to regret that the victory of Orthez had taken place; so great were their apprehensions for those who had been encouraged by that success, to declare against the government of Napoleon ere his power of injuring them was at an end. That we may see how far those fears were warranted, we shall hastily review the progress of this remarkable negotiation, of which, however, the secret history is not even now entirely known.

The propositions for peace had begun with the communication of the Baron de St Aignan, which had been discussed at Frankfort. The terms then proposed to Napoleon were, that, abandoning all his wider conquests, France should retire within the course of the Rhine and the barrier of the Alps. Napoleon had accepted these conditions as a basis, under a stipulation, however, which afforded a pretext for breaking off the treaty at pleasure, namely, that France was to be admitted to liberty of commerce and navigation; an implied challenge of the maritime law, as exercised by the British. To this, the Earl of Aberdeen, the able and accomplished representative of Britain, replied, that France should enjoy such liberty of commerce and navigation as she had any right to expect. A subject of debate, and a most important one, was thus left open; and perhaps neither of those powers were displeased to possess a means of disturbing the progress of the treaty, according to what should prove the events of the war.

Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, the minister of foreign affairs, was the representative of Napoleon at Châtillon, upon this most important occasion. His first instructions, dated 4th January, 1814, restricted him to the basis proposed at Frankfort, which assigned Belgium to France, thus conceding to the latter

what Napoleon now called her natural boundaries, although it certainly did not appear why, since victory had extended her frontiers by so many additional kingdoms, defeat should not now have the natural effect of retrenching them. But after the inauspicious commencement of the campaign, by the battle of Brienne, in which Napoleon gained little, and that of La Rothière, in which he was defeated, he saw that as peace, like the Books of the Sibyls (to the sale of which the negotiation has been compared), would rise in price, circumstances might render it necessary, also, that peace should be made by Caulaincourt without communication with Napoleon. Depending upon the events of war, it might be possible that a favourable day, nay, an hour being suffered to elapse, might put the treaty out of his reach. For these reasons, Caulaincourt was intrusted, over and above his instructions, with a definitive and unlimited *carte-blanche*, in which he was empowered to « bring the negotiation to a happy issue, to save the capital, and prevent the hazards of a battle, on which must rest the last hopes of the nation.»

Caulaincourt reached Châtillon-sur-Seine, which had been declared neutral for the purpose of the conferences. At this memorable Congress, Count Stadion represented Austria, Count Razumowski Russia, Baron Humboldt

Prussia, and Great Britain had three commissioners present, namely, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart. Every politeness was shown on the part of the French, who even offered the English ministers the advantage of corresponding directly with London by the way of Calais; a courtesy which was declined with thanks.

The commissioners of the allies were not long in expressing what Napoleon's fears had anticipated. They declared that they would no longer abide by the basis proposed at Frankfort. « To obtain peace, France must be restricted within her ancient limits, » which excluded the important acquisition of Belgium. Baron Fain gives us an interesting account of the mode in which Napoleon received this communication. He retired for a time into his own apartment, and sent for Berthier and Marcet. They came—he gave them the fatal dispatch—they read, and a deep silence ensued. The two faithful ministers flung themselves at their master's feet, and with tears in their eyes implored him to give way to the necessity of the time. « Never, » he replied, « will I break the oath by which I swore, at my coronation, to maintain the integrity of the territories of the *Republic*, and never will I leave France less in extent than I found her. It would not only be France that would retreat, but Austria and Prussia.

who would advance. France indeed needs peace, but such a peace is worse than the most inveterate war. What answer would I have to the Republicans of the State, when they should demand from me the barrier of the Rhine? No—write to Caulaincourt that I reject the treaty, and will rather abide the brunt of battle. » Shortly after he is said to have exclaimed, « I am yet nearer to Munich than they are to Paris. »

His counsellors were not discouraged. In a cooler moment, the ministers who watched his pillow obtained from him permission that the treaty should proceed. He directed that the articles proposed by the allies should be sent to Paris, and the advice of each privy counsellor taken individually upon the subject. With one exception, that of Count Lacuée de Cessac, all the privy counsellors agreed that the terms proposed at Châtillon ought to be subscribed to. Thus sanctioned, Caulaincourt, on the 9th of February, wrote to the commissioners of the allies, that if an immediate armistice were entered into, he was ready to consent that France should retreat within her ancient limits, according to the basis proposed. He offered, also, that France should cede instantly, on condition of the armistice being granted, some of the strong places, which their acceptance of the terms

offered obliged her to yield up. But this offer of ceding the fortresses was clogged with secret conditions, to be afterwards explained. The allies declared their readiness to adhere to these preliminaries, and for a day the war might be considered as ended.

But, in the mean time, the successes which Napoleon obtained over Blucher at Montmirail and Champ-Aubert, had elevated him in his own opinion above the necessity in which he stood after the battle of Brienne. From the field of battle at Château-Thierry, he wrote to Caulaincourt to assume an attitude less humiliating among the members of the Congress; and after the defeat of the Prince of Wirtemberg, at the bridge of Montereau, and the retreat of the Grand Army from Troyes, he seems to have entirely resolved to break off the treaty.

When Schwartzenberg, as we have seen, demanded the meaning of Napoleon's offensive movement, contrary to what had been agreed upon by the Congress at Châtillon, he answered, by the letter to the Emperor of Austria, in which he rejected the conditions to which Caulaincourt had agreed, and reprobated them as terms which, if known in Paris, would excite general indignation. "It would realize," he said, "the dream of Burke, who desired to make France disappear from the

map of Europe. It was placing England ¹ in possession of Antwerp and the Low Countries, neither of which he would ever surrender.»

In the same spirit, and at the same time, Napoleon wrote from Nangis to Caulaincourt, that, « when he had given him *carte-blanche*, it was for the purpose of saving Paris, and Paris was now saved; it was for avoiding the risk of a battle,—that risk was over, and the battle won; he therefore revoked the extraordinary powers with which his ambassador was invested.»

We will not stop to inquire into the diplomatic question, whether Caulaincourt had not effectually exercised, on 9th February, those powers which were not recalled until the 17th, seven days after; and, consequently, whether his master was not bound, by the act of his envoy, beyond the power of retracting. Enough remains to surprise us in Napoleon's headstrong resolution to continue the war, when, in fact, it was already ended upon terms which had been recommended by all his counsellors, one excepted. His obligation to the Republic of France, to maintain the integrity of its territories, could scarcely remain binding on one, by whom that very republic had been destroyed; and at any rate, no such

¹ This alluded to the match, then supposed to be on the tapis, betwixt the late Princess Charlotte of Wales and the Prince of Orange.

engagement can bind a sovereign from acting in extremity as the safety of the community requires. Far less could the terms be said to dishonour France, or strike her out of the map of Europe, unless her honour and existence, which had flourished for twelve centuries, depended upon an acquisition which she had made within twenty years. But the real case was, that Buonaparte always connected the loss of honour with the surrender of whatever he conceived himself to have a chance of being able to retain. Every cession was to be wrung from him; he would part with nothing willingly; and, like a child with its toys, that of which there was any attempt to deprive him became immediately the most valuable of his possessions. Antwerp, indeed, had a particular right to be considered as inestimable. The sums he had bestowed on its magnificent basins, and almost impregnable fortifications, were immense. He had always the idea that he might make Antwerp the principal station of a large navy. He clung to this vision of a fleet, even at Elba and Saint Helena, repeating often, that he might have saved his crown if he would have resigned Antwerp at Châtillon; and no idea was more rivetted in his mind, than that his refusal was founded on patriotic principles. Yet the chief value of Antwerp lay in the event of another war with Great Britain, for which Buonaparte was thus pre-

paring, while the question was, how the present hostilities were to be closed; and surely, the possibility of a navy which had no existence, should not have been placed in competition with the safety of a nation deeply imperilled by the war now waging in the very centre of his kingdom.¹ This he saw in a different light from that of calm reason. « If I am to receive flagellation,» he said, « let it be at least under terms of compulsion.»

Lastly, the temporary success which he had attained in the field of battle was of a character, which, justly considered, ought not to have encouraged the French Emperor to continue war, but, on the contrary, might have furnished a precious opportunity for making peace, before the very sword's point was at his throat. The conditions which he might have made in this moment of temporary success would have had the appearance of being gracefully ceded, rather than positively extorted by necessity. And it may be added, that the allies, startled by their losses, would have probably granted him better terms; and certainly, remembering his military talents, would have taken care to observe those which they might fix upon. The reverses, therefore, in the month of February, which obscured the

¹ See *Journal, etc. par le comte de Las Cases, tome IV. partie 7ième.*

arms of the combined monarchs, resembled the cloud, which, in Byron's Tale, is described as passing over the moon, to afford an impenitent renegade the last and limited term for repentance.¹ But the heart of Napoleon, like that of Alp, was too proud to profit by the interval of delay thus afforded to him.

The truth seems to be, that Buonaparte never seriously intended to make peace at Châtillon; and while his negotiator, Caulaincourt, was instructed to hold out to the allies a proposal to cede the frontier fortresses, he received from the Duke of Bassano the following private directions:—"The Emperor desires that you would avoid explaining yourself clearly upon every thing which may relate to delivering up the fortresses of Antwerp, Mentz, and Alexandria, if you should be obliged to consent to those cessions; his Majesty intending, even though he should have ratified the treaty, to be guided by the military situation of affairs:—wait till the last moment. The bad faith of the allies in respect to the capitu-

¹ There is a light cloud by the moon—
 'T is passing, and will pass full soon—
 If, by the time its vapoury sail
 Hath ceased her shrouded orb to veil,
 Thy heart is not within thee changed,
 Then God and man are both avenged.

Siege of Corinth.

lations of Dresden, Dantzic, and Gorcum, authorises us to endeavour not to be duped. Refer, therefore, these questions to a military arrangement, as was done at Presburg, Vienna, and Tilsit. His Majesty desires that you would not lose sight of the disposition which he will feel, *not to deliver up those three keys of France*, if military events, on which he is willing still to rely, should permit him not to do so, *even if he should have signed the cession of all these provinces*. In a word, his Majesty wishes to be able, after the treaty, to be guided by existing circumstances, to the last moment. He orders you to burn this letter as soon as you have read it.»

The allies showed, on their side, that the obstinacy of Napoleon had increased, not diminished, their determination to carry on the war. A new treaty, called that of Chaumont, was entered into upon the 1st of March, between Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, by which the high contracting parties bound themselves each to keep up an army of 150,000 men, with an agreement on the part of Great Britain to advance four millions to carry on the war, which was to be prosecuted without relaxation, until France should be reduced within her ancient limits; and what further indicated the feelings of both parties, the military commissioners, who had met at Lusigny to settle the terms of an armistice, broke up, on pre-

tence of being unable to agree upon a suitable line of demarcation.

The principal negotiation continued to languish at Châtillon, but without much remaining hope being entertained, by those who were well-informed on either side, of the result being favourable.

On the 7th March, Rumigny, a clerk of Buonaparte's cabinet, brought to the Emperor, on the evening of the bloody battle of Craonne, the ultimatum of the allies, insisting that the French envoy should either proceed to treat upon the basis they had offered, namely, that France should be reduced within her ancient limits, or that Caulaincourt should present a *contre-projet*. His plenipotentiary requested instructions; but it appears that Buonaparte, too able not to see the result of his pertinacity, yet too haughty to recede from it, had resolved, in sportsman's phrase, to die hard. The 10th day of March having passed over, without any answer arriving from Buonaparte to Caulaincourt, the term assigned to him for declaring his ultimatum was extended for five days; the plenipotentiary of France hoping, probably, that some decisive event in the field of battle would either induce his master to consent to the terms of the allies, or give him a right to obtain better.

It is said that, during this interval, Prince Wenceslaus of Lichtenstein was again dis-

patched by the Emperor Francis to the headquarters of Napoleon, as a special envoy, for the purpose of conjuring him to accommodate his ultimatum to the articles settled as the basis of the conferences, and informing him that otherwise the Emperor Francis would lay aside those family considerations, which had hitherto prevented him from acceding to the dispositions of the other allied powers in favour of the dynasty of Bourbon. It is added, that Buonaparte seemed at first silenced and astounded by this intimation; but, immediately recovering himself, treated it as a vain threat held out to intimidate him, and said it would be most for the interest of Austria to join in procuring him a peace on his own terms, since otherwise he might again be forced to cross the Rhine. The Austrian prince retired without reply; and from that moment, it has been supposed, the Emperor resigned his son-in-law, without further effort in his favour, to the consequences of his own ill-timed obstinacy.

Caulaincourt, in the mean time, played the part of an able minister and active negotiator. He kept the negotiation as long afloat as possible, and, in the mean while, used every argument to induce his master to close with the terms of the allies. At length, however, he was compelled to produce a *contre-projet*,

which he hoped might have at least the effect of prolonging the negotiation.

But the plan he offered was not only too vague to serve the purpose of amusing the allies, but too inconsistent with the articles adopted by all parties as the basis of the conference, to be a moment listened to. He demanded the whole line of the Rhine—he demanded great part of that of the Waal, and the fortress of Nimeguen, which must have rendered the independence of Holland purely nominal—he required Italy, and even Venice, for Eugène Beauharnais, although this important article was not only in absolute contradiction to the basis of the treaty, but peculiarly offensive and injurious to Austria, whom it was so much Buonaparte's interest to conciliate. The possession of Italy embraced, of course, that of Switzerland, either directly or by influence; so that in future wars Austria would lie open to the incursions of France along her whole frontier, and, while concluding a victorious treaty upon French ground, would have been placed in a worse situation than by that which Buonaparte himself dictated to her at Campo Formio! There were stipulations, besides, for indemnities to Jérôme, the phantom-king of Westphalia; to Louis, Grand Duke of Berg; and to Eugène, in compensation of his alleged rights on the

Grand Duchy of Frankfort. Nay, as if determined to show that nothing which he had ever done, even though undone by himself, should now be considered as null, without exacting compensation at the expense of the rest of Europe, Buonaparte demanded an indemnity for his brother Joseph, not indeed for the crown of Spain, but for that very throne of Naples, from which he had himself displaced him, in order to make room for Murat! The assembled Congress received this imperious communication with equal surprise and displeasure. They instantly declared the Congress dissolved; and thus terminated the fears of many, who considered Europe as in greater danger from any treaty that could be made with Buonaparte, than from the progress of his arms against the allies.

It was the opinion of such men, and their number was very considerable, that no peace concluded with Napoleon could be permanent, and that any immediate terms of composition could be only an armed truce, to last until the Emperor of France should feel himself able to spend the remainder of his life in winning back again the conquests which he had spent the earlier part of it in gaining. They insisted that this was visible, from his breaking off the treaty on the subject of Antwerp; the chief

utility of which, to his empire, must have been in the future wars which he meditated with Britain. It was seeking war through peace, not peace by war. Such reasoners were no doubt in many cases prejudiced against Napoleon's person, and inclined to consider his government as a usurpation. But others amongst them allowed that Napoleon, abstractedly considered, was not a worse man than other conquerors, but that a run of success so long uninterrupted had made war and conquest so familiar to his soul, that, to use an expression of the poet, the « earthquake voice of victory » was to him the necessary and indispensable breath of life. This passion for battle, they said, might not make Napoleon hateful as a man, for much, far too much, allowance is made in modern morality for the thirst of military fame; but it must be allowed that it rendered him a most unfit monarch for those with whose blood that thirst was to be stanchèd. Such reflections are, however, foreign to our present purpose.

It was not the least remarkable contingency in these momentous transactions, that as Caulaincourt left Châtillon, he met the secretary of Buonaparte posting towards him with the full and explicit powers of treating which he had so long vainly solicited. Had Napoleon adopted this final decision of submitting him-

self to circumstances but one day earlier, the treaty of Châtillon might have proceeded, and he would have continued in possession of the throne of France. But it was too late.

CHAPTER IV.

Difficulties of Buonaparte—He marches upon Blucher, who is in possession of Soissons—Attacks the place without success.—Battle of Craonne, on 7th March, attended by no decisive result.—Blucher retreats on Laon.—Battle of Laon on the 9th.—Napoleon is compelled to withdraw on the 11th, with great loss.—He attacks Rheims, which is evacuated by the Russians.—Defeat at Bar-sur-Aube of the French divisions under Oudinot and Gérard, who, with Macdonald, are forced to retreat upon the great road to Paris.—Schwartzenberg wishes to retreat behind the Aube—but the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh opposing the measure, it is determined to proceed upon Paris.—Napoleon occupies Arcis.—Battle of Arcis on the 20th.—Napoleon is joined, in the night after the battle, by Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard.—Nevertheless he retreats along both sides of the Aube, with little loss.

THE sword was now again brandished, not to be sheathed or reposed, until the one party or the other should be irretrievably defeated.

The situation of Buonaparte, even after the victory of Montereau, and capture of Troyes, was most discouraging. If he advanced on the Grand Army of the allies which he had in front, there was every likelihood that they

would retire before him, wasting his force in skirmishes, without a possibility of his being able to force them to a general action; while, in the mean time, it might be reckoned for certain that Blucher, master of the Marne, would march upon Paris. On the contrary, if Napoleon moved with his chief force against Blucher, he had, in like manner, to apprehend that Schwartzenberg would resume the route upon Paris by way of the valley of the Seine. Thus, he could make no exertion upon the one side, without exposing the capital to danger on the other.

After weighing all the disadvantages on either side, Napoleon determined to turn his arms against Blucher, as most hostile to his person, most rapid in his movements, and most persevering in his purposes. He left Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard, in front of the Grand Army, in hopes that, however inferior in numbers, they might be able to impose upon Schwartzenberg a belief that Napoleon was present in person, and thus either induce the Austrian to continue his retreat, or at least prevent him from resuming the offensive. For this purpose the French troops were to move on Bar-sur-Aube, and occupy, if practicable, the heights in that neighbourhood. The soldiers were also to use the cry of *Vive l'Empereur*, as if Napoleon had been present. It was afterwards seen, that as the mareschals

did not command 40,000 men in all, including a force under Macdonald, it was impossible for them to discharge effectually the part assigned them. In the mean while, Napoleon himself continued his lateral march on Blücher, supposing it possible for him, as formerly, to surprise his flank, as the Prussian marched upon Paris. For this purpose he moved as speedily as possible to La Ferté-Gaucher, where he arrived 1st March; but Sacken and Yorck, who would have been the first victims of this manœuvre, as their divisions were on the left bank of the Marne, near to Meaux, crossed the river at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and formed a junction with Blücher, who now resolved to fall back on the troops of Bülow and Winzengerode. These generals were, it will be remembered, advancing from the frontiers of Belgium.

A sudden hard frost rendered the country passable, which had before been in so swampy a condition as to render marching very difficult. This was much to the advantage of the Prussians. Napoleon detached the forces, under Marmont and Mortier, whom he had united with his own, to press upon and harass the retreat of the Prussian field-mareschal; while he himself, pushing on by a shorter line, possessed himself of the town of Fismes, about half way betwixt Rheims and Soissons. The occupation of this last place was now a matter

of the last consequence. If Blucher should find Soissons open to him, he might cross the Marne, extricate himself from his pursuers without difficulty, and form his junction with the army of the North. But if excluded from this town and bridge, Blucher must have hazarded a battle on the most disadvantageous terms, having Mortier and Marmont on his front, Napoleon on his left flank, and in his rear, a town, with a hostile garrison and a deep river.

It was almost a chance, like that of the dice, which party possessed this important place. The Russians had taken it¹ on 15th February, but being immediately evacuated by them, it was on the 19th occupied by Mortier, and garrisoned by five hundred Poles, who were imagined capable of the most determined defence. On the 2d March, however, the commandant, intimidated by the advance of Bulow's army of 30,000 men, yielded up Soissons to that general, upon a threat of an instant storm, and no quarter allowed. The Russian standards then waved on the ramparts of Soissons, and Blucher, arriving under its walls, acquired the full power of uniting himself with his rear-guard, and giving or refusing battle at his pleasure, on the very moment when Buonaparte, having turned his flank, expected to

¹ See p. 82.

have forced on him a most disadvantageous action.

The Emperor's wrath exhaled in a bulletin against the inconceivable baseness of the commandant of Soissons, who was said to have given up so important a place when he was within hearing of the cannonade of the 2d and 3d, and must thereby have known the approach of the Emperor. In the heat of his wrath, he ordered Soissons to be assaulted and carried by storm at all risk; but it was defended by General Langeron, with 10,000 Russians. A desperate conflict ensued, but Langeron retained possession of the town.

Abandoning this project, Napoleon crossed the Aisne at Bery-au-Bac, with the purpose of attacking the left wing of Blucher's army, which, being now concentrated, was strongly posted betwixt the village of Craonne and the town of Laon, in such a manner as to secure a retreat upon the very strong position which the latter town affords. Blucher imagined a manoeuvre, designed to show Buonaparte that his favourite system of turning an enemy's flank had its risks and inconveniencies. He detached ten thousand horse under Winzengerode, by a circuitous route, with orders that when the French commenced their march on Craonne, they should move round and act upon their flank and rear. But the state of the roads, and other impediments, prevented

this body of cavalry from getting up in time to execute the intended manœuvre.

Meantime, at eleven in the morning of the 7th March, the French began their attack with the utmost bravery. Ney assaulted the position on the right flank, which was defended by a ravine, and Victor, burning to show the zeal which he had been accused of wanting, made incredible exertions in front. But the assault was met by a defence equally obstinate, and the contest became one of the most bloody and best-sustained during the war. It was four in the afternoon, and the French had not yet been able to dislodge the Russians on any point, when the latter received orders from Blucher to withdraw from the disputed ground, and unite with the Prussian army on the splendid position of Laon, which the mareschal considered as a more favourable scene of action. There were no guns lost, or prisoners made. The Russians, in despite of a general charge of the French cavalry, retreated as on the parade. As the armies, considering the absence of Winzengerode with the detachment of cavalry, and of Langeron with the garrison of Soissons, were nearly equal, the indecisive event of the battle was the more ominous. The slain and wounded were about the same number on both sides, and the French only retained as a mark of victory the possession of the field of battle.

Napoleon himself followed the retreat of the Russians as far as an inn between Craonne and Laon, called l'Ange Gardien, where he reposed for the night. He indeed never more needed the assistance of a guardian angel, and his own appears to have deserted his charge. It was here that Rumigny found him when he presented the letter of Caulaincourt, praying for final instructions from the Emperor; and it was here he could only extract the ambiguous reply, that if he must submit to the bastinado, it should be only by force. At this cabaret, also, he regulated his plan for attacking the position of Blucher on the next morning, and thus ridding himself finally, if possible, of that Silesian army, which had been his object of disquietude for forty-two days, during the course of which, scarce two days had passed without their being engaged in serious conflict, either in front or rear. He received valuable information for enabling him to make the projected attack, from a retired officer, Monsieur Bussy de Bellay, who had been his school-fellow at Brienne, who lived in the neighbourhood, and was well acquainted with the ground, and whom he instantly rewarded with the situation of an aide-de-camp, and a large appointment. When his plan for the attack was finished, he is said to have exclaimed, "I see this war is an abyss without a bottom, but

I am resolved to be the last whom it shall devour.»

The town of Laon is situated upon a tableland, or eminence flattened on the top, which rises very abruptly above a plain extending about a league in length. The face of the declivity is steep, shelving, almost precipitous, and occupied by terraces serving as vineyards. Bulow defended this town and bank. The rest of the Silesian army was placed on the plain below; the left wing, composed of Prussians, extending to the village of Athies; the right, consisting of Russians, resting on the hills between Thiers and Semonville.

Only the interval of one day elapsed between the bloody battle of Craonne and that of Laon. On the 9th, availing himself of a thick mist, Napoleon pushed his columns of attack to the very foot of the eminence on which Laon is situated, possessed himself of two of the villages, termed Semilly and Ardon, and prepared to force his way up the hill towards the town. The weather cleared, the French attack was repelled by a tremendous fire from terraces, vineyards, windmills, and every point of advantage. Two battalions of Yagers, the impetus of their attack increased by the rapidity of the descent, recovered the villages, and the attack of Laon in front seemed to be abandoned. The French, however, con-

tinued to retain possession in that quarter of a part of the village of Clacy. Thus stood the action on the right and centre. The French had been repulsed all along the line. On the left Marshal Marmont had advanced upon the village of Athies, which was the key of Blucher's position in that point. It was gallantly defended by Yorck and Kleist, supported by Sacken and Langeron. Marmont made some progress, notwithstanding this resistance, and night found him bivouacking in front of the enemy, and in possession of part of the disputed village of Athies. But he was not destined to remain there till day-break.

Upon the 10th, at four in the morning, just as Buonaparte, arising before day-break, was calling for his horse, two dismounted dragoons were brought before him, with the unpleasing intelligence that the enemy had made a *hourra* upon Marmont, surprised him in his bivouack, and cut to pieces, taken, or dispersed his whole division, and they alone had escaped to bring the tidings. All the mareschal's guns were lost, and they believed he was himself either killed or prisoner. Officers sent to reconnoitre brought back a confirmation of the truth of this intelligence, excepting as to the situation of the mareschal. He was on the road to Rheims, near Corbeny, endeavouring to rally the fugitives. Notwithstanding this great loss, and as if in defiance of bad fortune,

Napoleon renewed the attack upon Clacy and Semilly; but all his attempts being fruitless, he was induced to relinquish the undertaking, under the excuse that the position was found impregnable. On the 11th, he withdrew from before Laon, having been foiled in all his attempts, and having lost thirty guns, and nearly ten thousand men. The allies suffered comparatively little, as they fought under cover.

Napoleon halted at Soissons, which, evacuated by Langeron when Blucher concentrated his army, was now again occupied by the French. Napoleon directed its defences to be strengthened, designing to leave Mortier to defend the place against the advance of Blucher, which, victorious as he was, might be instantly expected.

While at Soissons, Napoleon learned that Saint Priest, a French emigrant, and a general in the Russian service, had occupied Rheims, remarkable for the venerable cathedral in which the Kings of France were crowned. Napoleon instantly saw that the possession of Rheims would renew the communication betwixt Schwartzenberg and Blucher, besides neutralizing the advantages which he himself expected from the possession of Soissons. He moved from Soissons to Rheims, where, after an attack which lasted till late in the night, the Russian general being wounded, his followers were discouraged, and evacuated the

place. The utmost horrors might have been expected during a night attack, when one army forced another from a considerable town. But in this instance we have the satisfaction to record, that the troops on both sides behaved in a most orderly manner. In his account of the previous action, Napoleon threw in one of those strokes of fatality which he loved to introduce. He endeavoured to persuade the public, or perhaps he himself believed, that Saint Priest was shot by a ball from the same cannon which killed Moreau.

During the attack upon Rheims, Marmont came up with such forces as he had been able to rally after his defeat at Athies, and contributed to the success of the assault. He was, nevertheless, received by Napoleon with bitter reproaches, felt severely by a chief, of whose honour and talents no doubt had been expressed through a long life of soldiership.

Napoleon remained at Rheims three days, to repose and recruit his shattered army, which was reinforced from every quarter where men could be collected. Jansaens, a Dutch officer, displayed a particular degree of military talent in bringing a body of about 4000 men, draughted from the garrisons of the places on the Moselle, to join the army at Rheims; a movement of great difficulty, considering he had to penetrate through a country which was in a great measure possessed by the enemy's troops.

The halt of Napoleon at Rheims was remarkable, as affording the last means of transacting business with his civil ministers. Hitherto, an auditor of the Council of State had weekly brought to the Imperial headquarters the report of the ministers, and received the orders of the Emperor. But a variety of causes rendered this regular communication during the rest of the campaign, a matter of impossibility. At Rheims, also, Napoleon addressed to Caulaincourt a letter, dated 17th March, by which he seems to have placed it in the power of that plenipotentiary to comply in full with the terms of the allies. But the language in which it is couched is so far from bearing the precise warrant necessary for so important a concession, that there must remain a doubt whether Caulaincourt would have felt justified in acting upon it, or whether, so acting, Napoleon would have recognized his doing so, if circumstances had made it convenient for him to disown the treaty.¹

While Napoleon was pursuing, fighting with, and finally defeated by Blucher, his lieute-

¹ The words alleged to convey such extensive powers as totally to recal and alter every former restriction upon Caulaincourt's exercise of his own opinion, are contained, as above stated, in a letter from Rheims, dated 17th March, 1814. "I have charged the Duke of Bassano to answer your letter in detail. I give you directly the authority to

nant-generals were not more fortunate in front of the allied Grand Army. It will be recollected that the Mareschals Oudinot and Gérard were left at the head of 25,000 men, exclusive of the separate corps under Macdonald, with orders to possess themselves of the heights of Bar-sur-Aube, and prevent Schwartzberg from crossing that river. They made the movement in advance accordingly, and after a sharp action, which left the town in their possession, they were so nigh to the allied troops, who still held the suburbs, that a battle became unavoidable, and the mareschals had no choice save of making the attack, or of receiving it. They chose the former, and gained, at first, some advantages from the very audacity of their attempt; but the allies had now been long accustomed to stand their ground under greater disasters. Their numerous reserves were brought up, and their long train of artillery got into line. The French, after obtaining a temporary footing on the heights of Vernonfait, were charged and driven back in disorder. Some fine cavalry, which had been brought from the armies

make such concessions as shall be indispensable to maintain the continuance (*activité*) of the negotiations, and to arrive at a knowledge of the ultimatum of the allies; it being distinctly understood that the treaty shall have for its immediate result the evacuation of our territory, and the restoring prisoners on both sides."

in Spain, was destroyed by the overpowering cannonade. The French were driven across the Aube, the town of Bar-sur-Aube was taken, and the defeated *mareschals* could only rally their forces at the village of Vandœuvres, about half-way between Bar and Troyes.

The defeat of Oudinot and Gérard obliged *Mareschal Macdonald*, who defended the line of the river above Bar, to retreat to Troyes, from his strong position at La Ferté-sur-Aube. He therefore fell back towards Vandœuvres. But though these three distinguished generals, *Macdonald*, *Oudinot*, and *Gérard*, had combined their talents, and united their forces, it was impossible for them to defend Troyes, and they were compelled to retreat upon the great road to Paris. Thus, the head-quarters of the allied monarchs were, for the second time during this changeful war, established in the ancient capital of Champagne; and the allied Grand Army recovered, by the victory of Bar-sur-Aube, all the territory which they had yielded up in consequence of *Buonaparte's* success at *Montercau*. They once more threatened to descend the *Seine* upon Paris, being entitled to despise any opposition offered by a feeble line, which *Macdonald*, *Oudinot*, and *Gérard*, endeavoured to defend on the left bank.

But *Schwartzenberg's* confidence in his position was lowered, when he heard that *Napo-*

leon had taken Rheims; and that, on the evening of the 17th, Ney, with a large division, had occupied Châlons-sur-Marne. This intelligence made a deep impression on the Austrian council of war. Their tactics being rigidly those of the old school of war, they esteemed their army turned whenever a French division occupied such a post as interposed betwixt them and their allies. This indeed is in one sense true; but it is equally true, that every division so interposed is itself liable to be turned, if the hostile divisions betwixt which it is interposed take combined measures for attacking it. The catching, therefore, too prompt an alarm, or considering the consequences of such a movement as irretrievable, belongs to the pedantry of war, and not to its science.

At midnight, a council was held for the purpose of determining the future motions of the allies. The generalissimo recommended a retreat behind the line of the Aube. The Emperor Alexander opposed this with great steadiness. He observed, with justice, that the protracted war was driving the country people to despair, and that the peasantry were already taking up arms, while the allies only wanted resolution, certainly neither opportunity nor numbers, to decide the affair by a single blow.

So many were the objections stated, and so

difficult was it to bring the various views and interests of so many powers to coincide in the same general plan, that the Emperor informed one of his attendants, he thought the anxiety of the night must have turned half his hair gray. Lord Castlereagh was against the opinion of Schwartzenberg, the rather that he concluded that a retreat behind the Aube would be a preface to one behind the Rhine. Taking it upon him, as became the minister of Britain at such a crisis, he announced to the allied powers, that, so soon as they should commence the proposed retreat, the subsidies of England would cease to be paid to them.

It was, therefore, finally agreed to resume offensive operations, for which purpose they proposed to diminish the distance betwixt the allied Grand Army and that of Silesia, and resume such a communication with Blucher as might prevent the repetition of such disasters as those of Montmirail and Montereau. With this view, it was determined to descend the Aube, unite their army at Arcis, offer Napoleon battle, should he desire to accept it, or move boldly on Paris if he should refuse the proffered action. What determined them more resolutely, from this moment, to approach the capital as soon as possible, was the intelligence which arrived at the head-quarters by Messieurs de Polignac. These gentlemen brought an encouraging account of the

progress of the Royalists in the metropolis, and of the general arrangements which were actively pursued for uniting with the interest of the Bourbons that of all others, who, from dislike to Buonaparte's person and government, or fear that the country, and they themselves, must share in his approaching ruin, were desirous to get rid of the Imperial government. Talleyrand was at the head of the confederacy, and all were resolved to embrace the first opportunity of showing themselves, which the progress of the allies should permit. This important intelligence, coming from such unquestionable authority, strengthened the allies in their resolution to march upon Paris.

In the mean time, Napoleon being at Rheims, as stated, on the 15th and 16th March, was alarmed by the news of the loss of the battle of Bar, the retreat of the three *mareschals* beyond the Scine, and the demonstrations of the Grand Army to cross that river once more. He broke up, as we have seen, from Rheims on the 17th, and sending Ney to take possession of Châlons, marched himself to Epernay, with the purpose of placing himself on the right flank, and in the rear of Schwartzenberg, in case he should advance on the road to Paris. At Epernay, he learned that the allies, alarmed by his movements, had retired to Troyes, and that they were about to retreat upon the Aube, and probably to Langres. He also learn-

ed that the Mareschals Macdonald and Oudinot had resumed their advance so soon as their adversaries began to retreat. He hastened to form a junction with these persevering leaders, and proceeded to ascend the Aube as high as Bar, where he expected to throw himself into Schwartzenberg's rear, having no doubt that his army was retiring from the banks of the Aube.

In these calculations, accurate as far as the information permitted, Buonaparte was greatly misled. He conceived himself to be acting upon the retreat of the allies, and expected only to find a rear-guard at Arcis; he was even talking jocularly of making his father-in-law prisoner during his retreat. If, contrary to his expectation, he should find the enemy, or any considerable part of them, still upon the Aube, it was, from all he had heard, to be supposed his appearance would precipitate their retreat towards the frontier. It has also been asserted, that he expected Mareschal Macdonald to make a corresponding advance from the banks of the Seine to those of the Aube; but the orders had been received too late to admit of the necessary space being traversed so as to arrive on the morning of the day of battle.

Napoleon easily drove before him such bodies of light cavalry, and sharpshooters, as had been left by the allies, rather for the pur-

pose of reconnoitring than of making serious opposition. He crossed the Aube at Plancy, and moved upwards, along the left bank of the river, with Ney's corps, and his whole cavalry, while the infantry of his guard advanced upon the right; his army being thus, according to the French military phrase, *à-cheval*, upon the Aube. The town of Arcis had been evacuated by the allies upon his approach, and was occupied by the French on the morning of the 20th March. That town forms the outlet of a sort of defile, where a succession of narrow bridges cross a number of drains, brooks, and streamlets, the feeders of the river Aube, and a bridge in the town crosses the river itself. On the other side of Arcis is a plain, in which some few squadrons of cavalry, resembling a reconnoitring party, were observed manœuvring.

Behind these horse, at a place called Clermont, the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, whose name has been so often honourably mentioned, was posted with his division, while the élite of the allied army was drawn up on a chain of heights still farther in the rear, called Mesnil la Comtesse. But these forces were not apparent to the van-guard of Napoleon's army. The French cavalry had orders to attack the light troops of the allies; but these were instantly supported by whole regiments, and by cannon, so that the attack

was unsuccessful; and the squadrons of the French were repulsed and driven back on Arcis at a moment, when, from the impediments in the town and its environs, the infantry could with difficulty debouche from the town to support them. Napoleon showed, as he always did in extremity, the same heroic courage which he had exhibited at Lodi and Brienne. He drew his sword, threw himself among the broken cavalry, called on them to remember their former victories, and checked the enemy by an impetuous charge, in which he and his staff-officers fought hand to hand with their opponents, so that he was in personal danger from the lance of a Cossack, the thrust of which was averted by his aide-de-camp, Girardin. His Mameluke Rustan fought stoutly by his side, and received a gratuity for his bravery. These desperate exertions afforded time for the infantry to debouche from the town. The Imperial Guards came up, and the combat waxed very warm. The superior numbers of the allies rendered them the assailants on all points. A strongly-situated village in front, and somewhat to the left of Arcis, called Grand Torcy, had been occupied by the French. This place was repeatedly and desperately attacked by the allies, but the French made good their position. Arcis itself was set on fire by the shells of the assailants, and night alone sepa-

rated the combatants, by inducing the allies to desist from the attack.

In the course of the night, Buonaparte was joined by Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, with the forces with which they had lately held the defensive upon the Seine; and the anxious question remained, whether, thus reinforced, he should venture an action with the Grand Army, to which he was still much inferior in numbers. Schwartzberg, agreeably to the last resolution of the allies, drew up on the heights of Mesnil la Comtesse, prepared to receive battle. On consideration of the superior strength of the enemy, and of the absence of some troops not yet come up, Napoleon finally determined not to accept a battle under such disadvantageous circumstances. He, therefore, commenced a retreat, the direction of which was doomed to prove the crisis of his fate. He retired as he had advanced, along both sides of the Aube; and though pursued and annoyed in this movement (which was necessarily executed through Arcis and all its defiles), his rear-guard was so well conducted, that he sustained little loss. A late author,¹ who has composed an excellent and scientific work on this campaign, has remarked,—“In concluding the account of

¹ *Memoirs of the Operations of the Allied Armies in 1813 and 1814.* London, Murray, 1822.

the two days thus spent by the contending armies in presence of each other, it is equally worthy of remark, that Buonaparte, with a force not exceeding 25,000 or 30,000 men, should have risked himself in such a position in front of 80,000 of the allies, as that the latter should have allowed him to escape them with impunity.» The permitting him to retreat with so little annoyance has been censured in general by all who have written on this campaign.

CHAPTER V.

Plans of Buonaparte in his present difficulties considered.

—Military and political Questions regarding Paris.—Napoleon determines to pass to the rear of the eastern Frontier, and crosses the Marne on 22d March.—Retrospect of Events in the vicinity of Lyons, etc.—The Allies advance upon Paris.—Defeats of the French in various quarters.—Marmont and Mortier, with their discouraged and broken Forces, retreat under the walls of Paris.—Paris, how far defensible.—Exertions of Joseph Buonaparte.—The Empress Maria Louisa, with the civil Authorities of government, leave the city.—Attack of Paris on the 30th, when the French are defeated on all sides.—A truce is applied for, and accorded.—Joseph Buonaparte flies, with all his attendants.

THE decline of Napoleon's waning fortunes having been such as to turn him aside from an offered field of battle, and to place him betwixt two armies, each superior in number to his own, called now for a speedy and decisive resolution.

The manœuvres of Schwartzenberg and Blucher tended evidently to form a junction; and when it is considered, that Buonaparte

had felt it necessary to retreat from the Army of Silesia before Laon, and from the Grand Army before Arcis, it would have been frenzy to wait till they both closed upon him. Two courses, therefore, remained;—either to draw back within the closing circle which his enemies were about to form around him, and, retreating before them until he had collected his whole forces, make a stand under the walls of Paris, aided by whatever strength that capital possessed, and which his energies could have called out; or, on the contrary, to march eastward, and, breaking through the same circle, to operate on the rear of the allies, and on their lines of communication. This last was a subject on which the Austrians had expressed such feverish anxiety, as would probably immediately induce them to give up all thoughts of advancing, and march back to the frontier. Such a result was the rather to be hoped, because the continued stay of the allies, and the passage and repassage of troops through an exhausted country, had worn out the patience of the hardy peasantry of Alsace and Franche-Comté, whom the exactions and rapine, inseparable from the movements of a hostile soldiery, had now roused from the apathy with which they had at first witnessed the invasion of their territory. Before Lyons, Napoleon might reckon on being reinforced by the veteran army of Suchet, arrived from Cata-

lonia; and he would be within reach of the numerous chain of fortresses, which had garrisons strong enough to form an army, if drawn together.

The preparations for arranging such a force, and for arming the peasantry, had been in progress for some time. Trusty agents, bearing orders concealed in the sheaths of their knives, the collars of their dogs, or about their persons, had been detached to warn the various commandants of the Emperor's pleasure. Several were taken by the blockading troops of the allies, and hanged as spies, but others made their way. While at Rheims, Buonaparte had issued an order for rousing the peasantry, in which he not only declared their arising in arms was an act of patriotic duty, but denounced as traitors the mayors of the districts who should throw obstructions in the way of a general levy. The allies, on the contrary, threatened the extremity of military execution on all the peasantry who should obey Napoleon's call to arms. It was, as we formerly observed, an excellent exemplification, how much political opinions depend on circumstances; for, after the second capture of Vienna, the Austrians were calling out the *levée-en-masse*, and Napoleon, in his turn, was threatening to burn the villages, and execute the peasants, who should dare to obey.

While Napoleon was at Rheims, the affairs

of the north-east frontier seemed so promising, that Ney offered to take the command of the insurrectionary army; and, as he was reckoned the best officer of light troops in Europe, it is not improbable he might have brought the levées-en-masse on that warlike border, to have fought like the French national forces in the beginning of the Revolution. Buonaparte did not yield to this proposal. Perhaps he thought so bold a movement could only succeed under his own eye.

But there were two especial considerations which must have made Napoleon hesitate on adopting this species of back-game, designed to redeem the stake which it was impossible to save by the ordinary means of carrying on the bloody play. The one was the military question, whether Paris could be defended, if Napoleon was to move to the rear of the allied army, instead of falling back upon the city with the army which he commanded. The other question was of yet deeper import, and of a political nature. The means of the capital for defence being supposed adequate, was it likely that Paris, a town of seven hundred thousand inhabitants, divided into factions, unaccustomed to the near voice of war, and startled by the dreadful novelty of their situation, would submit to the sacrifices which a successful defence of the city must in every event have required? Was, in short, their

love and fear of Buonaparte so great, that without his personal presence, and that of his army, to encourage, and at the same time overawe them, they would willingly incur the risk of seeing their beautiful metropolis destroyed, and all the horrors of a sack inflicted by the mass of nations whom Napoleon's ambition had been the means of combining against them, and who proclaimed themselves the enemies, not of France, but of Buonaparte?

Neither of these questions could be answered with confidence. Napoleon, although he had embodied 30,000 national guards, had not provided arms for a third part of the number. This is hinted at by some authors, as if the want of these arms ought to be imputed to some secret treason. But this accusation has never been put in any tangible shape. The arms never existed, and never were ordered; and although Napoleon had nearly three months' time allowed him, after his return to Paris, yet he never thought of arming the Parisians in general. Perhaps he doubted their fidelity to his cause. He ordered, it is said, two hundred cannon to be provided for the defence of the northern and eastern line of the city, but neither were these obtained in sufficient quantity. The number of individuals who could be safely intrusted with arms was also much limited. Whether, therefore, Paris was, in a military point of view, capable of

defence or not, must have, in every event, depended much on the strength of the military force left to protect it. This Napoleon knew must be very moderate. His hopes were therefore necessarily limited by circumstances, to the belief that Paris, though incapable of a protracted defence, might yet hold out for such a space as might enable him to move to its relief.

But, secondly, as the means of holding out Paris were very imperfect, so the inclination of the citizens to defend themselves at the expense of any considerable sacrifice, was much doubted. It was not in reason to be expected that the Parisians should imitate the devotion of Zaragossa. Each Spanish citizen, on that memorable occasion, had his share of interest in the war which all maintained—a portion, namely, of that liberty and independence for which it was waged. But the Parisians were very differently situated. They were not called on to barricade their streets, destroy their suburbs, turn their houses into fortresses, and themselves into soldiers, and expose their property and families to the horrors of a storm; and this not for any advantage to France or themselves, but merely that they might maintain Napoleon on the throne. The ceaseless, and of late the losing wars, in which he seemed irretrievably engaged, had rendered his government unpopular; and it was plain to all,

except perhaps himself, that he did not stand in that relation to the people of Paris, when citizens are prepared to die for their sovereign. It might have been as well expected that the frogs in the fable would, in case of invasion, have risen in a mass to defend King Serpent. It is probable that Buonaparte did not see this in the true point of view; but that, with the feelings of self-importance which sovereigns must naturally acquire from their situation, and which, from his high actions and distinguished talents, he, of all sovereigns, was peculiarly entitled to indulge,—it is probable that he lost sight of the great disproportion betwixt the nation and an individual; and forgot, amid the hundreds of thousands which Paris contains, what small relation the number of his own faithful and devoted followers bore, not only to those who were perilously engaged in factions hostile to him, but to the great mass, who, in Hotspur's phrase, loved their own shops or barns better than his house.

Thirdly, the consequences of Paris being lost, either from not possessing, or not employing, the means of defence, were sure to be productive of irretrievable calamity. Russia, as had been shown, could survive the destruction of its capital, and perhaps Great Britain's fate might not be decided by the capture of London. But the government of France had, during all the phases of the Revolution, de-

pended upon the possession of Paris, a capital which has at all times directed the public opinion of that country. Should the military occupation of this most influential of all capitals bring about, as was most likely, a political and internal revolution, it was greatly to be doubted, whether the Emperor could make an effectual stand in any other part of his dominions.

It must be candidly admitted, that this reasoning, as being subsequent to the fact, has a much more decisive appearance than it could have had when subjected to the consideration of Napoleon. He was entitled, from the feverish anxiety hitherto shown by the Austrians, upon any approach to flank movements, and by the caution of their general proceedings, to think that they would be greatly too timorous to adopt the bold step of pressing onward to Paris. It was more likely that they would follow him to the frontier, with the purpose of preserving their communications. Besides, Napoleon at this crisis had but a very slender choice of measures. To remain where he was, between Blucher and Schwartzenberg, was not possible; and in advancing to either flank, he must have fought with a superior enemy. To retreat upon Paris, was sure to induce the whole allies to pursue in the same direction; and the encouragement which such a retreat must have given to his opponents,

might have had the most fatal consequences. Perhaps his partisans might have taken more courage during his absence, from the idea that he was at the head of a conquering army, in the rear of the allies, than during his actual presence, if he had arrived in Paris in consequence of a compulsory retreat.

Buonaparte seems, as much from a sort of necessity as from choice, to have preferred breaking through the circle of hunters which hemmed him in, trusting to strengthen his army with the garrisons drawn from the frontier fortresses, and with the warlike peasantry of Alsace and Franche-Comté, and, thus reinforced, to advance with rapidity on the rear of his enemies, ere they had time to execute, or perhaps to arrange, any system of offensive operations. The scheme appeared the more hopeful, as he was peremptory in his belief that his march could not fail to draw after him, in pursuit, or observation at least, the Grand Army of Schwartzenberg; the general maxim, that the war could only be decided where he was present in person, being, as he conceived, as deeply impressed by experience upon his enemies as upon his own soldiers.

Napoleon could not disguise from himself, what indeed he had told the French public, that a march, or, as he termed it, a *Hourra* upon Paris, was the principal purpose of the

allies. Every movement made in advance, whether by Blucher or Schwartzenberg, had this for its object. But they had uniformly relinquished the undertaking, upon his making any demonstration to prevent it; and therefore he did not suspect them of a resolution so venturous as to move directly upon Paris, leaving the French army unbroken in their rear, to act upon their line of communication with Germany. It is remarked, that those chess-players who deal in the most venturous gambits are least capable of defending themselves when attacked in the same audacious manner, and that, in war, the generals whose usual and favourite tactics are those of advance and attack, have been most frequently surprised by the unexpected adoption of offensive operations on the part of their enemy. Napoleon had been so much accustomed to see his antagonists bend their attention rather to parry blows than to aim them, and was so confident in the dread impressed by his rapidity of movement, his energy of assault, and the terror of his reputation, that he seems to have entertained little apprehension of the allies adopting a plan of operations which had no reference to his own, and which, instead of attempting to watch or counteract his movements in the rear of their army, should lead them straight forward to take possession of his capital. Besides, notwithstanding objec-

tions have been stated, which seemed to render a *permanent* defence impossible, there were other considerations to be taken into view. The ground to the north of Paris is very strong, the national guard was numerous, the lower part of the population of a military character, and favourable to his cause. A defence, if resolute, however brief, would have the double effect of damping the ardour of the assailants, and of detaining them before the walls of the capital, until Buonaparte should advance to its relief, and thus place the allies between two fires. It was not to be supposed that the surrender of Paris would be the work of a single day. The unanimous voice of the journals, of the ministers of the police, and of the thousands whose interest was radically and deeply entwisted with that of Buonaparte, assured their master on that point. The movement to the rear, therefore, though removing him from Paris, which it might expose to temporary alarm, might not, in Buonaparte's apprehension, seriously compromise the security of the capital.

The French Emperor, in executing this decisive movement, was extremely desirous to have possessed himself of Vitry, which lay in the line of his advance. But as this town contained a garrison of about 5000 men, commanded by an officer of resolution, he returned a negative to the summons; and Napoleon,

in a condition to attempt a *coup de main* on a place of some strength, passed the Marne on the 22d of March, over a bridge of rafts constructed at Frigineour, and continued his movement towards the eastern frontier, increasing the distance at every step betwixt him and his capital, and at the same time betwixt him and his enemies.

In the mean time, events had taken place in the vicinity of Lyons, tending greatly to limit any advantages which Napoleon might have expected to reap on the south-eastern part of the frontier towards Switzerland, and also to give spirits to the numerous enemies of his government in Provence, where the Royalists always possessed a considerable party.

The reinforcements dispatched by the Austrians under General Bianchi, and their reserves, brought forward by the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, had restored their superiority over Augereau's army. He was defeated at Macon on the 11th of March, in a battle which he had given for the purpose of maintaining his line on the Saône. A second time, he was defeated on the 18th at St George, and obliged to retire in great disorder, with scarce even the means of defending the Isère, up which river he retreated. Lyons, thus uncovered, opened its gates to Bianchi; and, after all that they had heard concerning the losses of the allies, the citizens saw with astonishment and

alarm an untouched body of their troops, amounting to 60,000 men, defile through their streets. This defeat of Augereau was probably unknown to Napoleon, when he determined to march to the frontiers, and thought he might reckon on co-operation with the Lyonnese army. Though, therefore, the Emperor's movement to Saint-Dizier was out of the rules of ordinary war, and though it enabled the allies to conceive and execute the daring scheme which put an end to the campaign, yet it was by no means hopeless in its outset; or, we would rather say, was one of the few alternatives, which the crisis of his affairs left to Buonaparte, and which, judging from the previous vacillation and cautious timidity displayed in the councils of the allies, he had no reason to apprehend would have given rise to the consequences that actually followed.

The allies, who had in their latest councils wound up their resolution to the decisive experiment of marching on Paris, were at first at a loss to account for Napoleon's disappearance, or to guess whither he had gone. This occasioned some hesitation and loss of time. At length, by the interception of a French courier, they found dispatches addressed by Buonaparte to his government at Paris, from which they were enabled to conjecture the real purpose and direction of his march. A letter, in the Emperor's own hand, to Maria

Louisa, confirmed the certainty of the information. The allies resolved to adhere, under this unexpected change of circumstances, to the bold resolution they had already formed. To conceal the real direction of his march, as well as to open communications with the Silesian army, Schwartzemberg, moving laterally, transferred his head-quarters to Vitry, where he arrived on the 24th, two days after it had been summoned by Napoleon. Blucher, in the mean time, approached his army from Laon to Châlons, now entirely re-organized after the two bloody battles which it had sustained.

As a necessary preparation for the advance, General Ducca was left on the Aube, with a division of Austrians, for the purpose of defending their dépôts, keeping open their communications, and guarding the person of the Emperor Francis, who did not perhaps judge it delicate to approach Paris in arms, with the rest of the sovereigns, while the city was nominally governed by his own daughter as Regent. Ducca had also in charge, if pressed, to retreat upon the Prince of Hesse-Homburg's army, which was in triumphant possession of Lyons.

This important arrangement being made, another was adopted equally necessary to deceive and observe Napoleon. Ten thousand cavalry were selected, under the enterprising generals, Winzengerode and Czernicheff, who,

with fifty pieces of cannon, were dispatched to hang on Buonaparte's march, to obstruct his communications with the country he had left, intercept couriers from Paris, or information respecting the motions of the allied armies, and to present on all occasions such a front, as, if possible, might impress him with the belief that their corps formed the van-guard of the whole army of Schwartzemberg. The Russian and Prussian light troops meanwhile scoured the roads, and intercepted, near Sompuis, a convoy of artillery and ammunition belonging to Napoleon's rear-guard, when twenty pieces of cannon, with a strong escort, fell into their hands. They also cut off several couriers, bringing important dispatches to Napoleon from Paris. One of these was loaded with as heavy tidings as ever were destined to afflict falling greatness. This packet informed Napoleon of the descent of the English in Italy; of the entry of the Austrians into Lyons, and the critical state of Augereau; of the declaration of Bordeaux in favour of Louis; of the demonstrations of Wellington towards Toulouse; of the disaffected state of the public mind, and the exhausted condition of the national resources. Much of these tidings was new to the allied sovereigns and generals; but it was received by them with very different sensations from which the intelligence was calculated to

inflict upon him for whom the packet was intended.

Blucher, in the mean while, so soon as he felt the opposition to his movements diminished by the march of Buonaparte from Châlons to Arcis, had instantly resumed the offensive, and driven the corps of Mortier and Marmont, left to observe his motions, over the Marne. He passed the Aisne near Bery-au-Bac, repossessed himself of Rheims by blowing open the gates and storming the place, and, having gained these successes, moved towards Châlons and Vitry. His course had hitherto been south-eastward, in order to join with Schwartzemberg; but he now received from the King of Prussia the welcome order to turn his march westward, and move straight upon Paris. The Grand Army adopted the same direction, and thus they moved on in corresponding lines, and in communication with each other.

While Buonaparte, retiring to the east, prepared for throwing himself on the rear of the allies, he was necessarily, in person, exposed to the same risk of having his communications cut off, and his supplies intercepted, which it was the object of his movement to inflict upon his enemy. Marmont and Mortier, who retreated before Blucher over the Marne, had orders to move upon Vitry, probably because that movement would have placed them in the

rear of Schwartzenberg, had he been induced to retreat from the line of the Aube, as Napoleon expected he would. But as a very different course had been adopted by the allies, from that which Napoleon had anticipated, the two *mareschals* found themselves unexpectedly in front of their Grand Army near La Fère Champenoise. They were compelled to attempt a retreat to Sézanne, in which, harassed by the numerous cavalry of the allies, they sustained heavy loss.

While the cavalry were engaged in pursuit of the *mareschals*, the infantry of the allies were approaching the town of La Fère Champenoise, when a heavy fire was heard in the vicinity, and presently appeared a large column of infantry, advancing chequer-wise and by intervals, followed and repeatedly charged by several squadrons of cavalry, who were speedily recognized as belonging to the Silesian army. The infantry, about 5000 in number, had left Paris with a large convoy of provisions and ammunition. They were proceeding towards Montmirail, when they were discovered and attacked by the cavalry of Blücher's army. Unable to make a stand, they endeavoured, by an alteration of their march, to reach La Fère Champenoise, where they expected to find either the Emperor, or Marimont and Mortier. It was thus their misfortune to fall upon Scylla in seeking to avoid Charybdis.

The column consisted entirely of young men, conscripts or national guards, who had never before been in action. Yet, neither the necessity of their condition, nor their unexpected surprise in meeting first one, and then a second army of enemies, where they looked only for friends, could induce these spirited young men to surrender. Rappatel, the aide-de-camp of Moreau, and entertained in the same capacity by the Emperor Alexander, was shot, while attempting, by the orders of the Emperor, to explain to them the impossibility of resistance. The French say, that the brother of Rappatel served in the company from which the shot came which killed the unfortunate officer. The artillery at length opened on the French on every side; they were charged by squadron after squadron; the whole convoy was taken, and the escort were killed, wounded, or made prisoners.

Thus, the allies continued to advance upon Paris, while the shattered divisions of Mortier and Marmont, hard pressed by the cavalry, lost a rear-guard of 1500 men near La Ferté-Gaucher. At Crécy they parted into two bodies, one retreating on Meaux, the other on Lagny. They were still pursued and harassed, and at length, the soldiers becoming desperate, could hardly be kept together, while the artillery-men cut the traces of their guns, and mounted their draught-horses, to effect their

escape. It is computed that the French divisions between La Fère Champenoise and Lagny, lost 8000 men, and eighty guns, besides immense quantities of baggage and ammunition. Indeed, surrounded as they were by overpowering numbers, it required no little skill in the generals, as well as bravery and devotion in the soldiers, to keep the army from dissolving entirely. The allies, gaining advantages at every step, moved on with such expedition, that when, on the 27th March, they took up their head-quarters at Coulommiers, they had marched upwards of seventy miles in three days.

An effort was made, by about 10,000 men of the national guards, to stop a column of the army of Silesia, but it totally failed; General Horne galloping into the very centre of the French mass of infantry, and making prisoner the general who commanded them with his own hand. When Blucher approached Meaux, the garrison (a part of Mortier's army) retreated, blowing up a large powder magazine. This was on the 28th March, and on the evening of the same day, the van-guard of the Silesian army pushed on as far as Claye, from whence, not without a sharp action, they dislodged a part of the divisions of Marmont and Mortier. These marshals now retreated under the walls of Paris, their discouraged and broken forces forming the only regular troops, except-

ing those of the garrison, which could be reckoned on for the defence of the capital.

The allied armies moved onward, on the same grand point, leaving, however, Generals Wrede and Sacken, with a corps d'armée of 30,000 men, upon the line of the Marne, to oppose any attempt which might be made for annoying the rear of the army, and thus relieving the metropolis.

Deducing this covering army, the rest of the allied forces moved in columns along the three grand routes of Meaux, Lagny, and Soissons, thus threatening Paris along all its north-eastern quarter. The military sovereigns and their victorious armies were now in sight of that metropolis, whose ruler and his soldiers had so often and so long lorded it in theirs; of that Paris, which, unsatisfied with her high rank among the cities of Europe, had fomented constant war until all should be subjugated to her empire; of that proud city, who boasted herself the first in arms and in science. the mistress and example of the civilized world, the depositary of all that is wonderful in the fine arts, and the dictatress as well of taste as of law to continental Europe.

The position of Paris, on the north-eastern frontier, which was thus approached, is as strongly defensible, perhaps, as can be said of any unfortified town in the world. Art, however, had added little to the defence of the

city itself, except a few wretched redoubts (called by the French *tambours*), erected for protection of the barriers. But the external line was very strong, as will appear from the following sketch. The heights which environ the city on the eastern side, rise abruptly from an extensive plain, and form a steep and narrow ridge, which sinks again as suddenly upon the eastern quarter of the town, which it seems to screen as with a natural bulwark. The line of defence which they afford is extremely strong. The southern extremity of the ridge, which rests upon the wood of Vincennes, extending southward to the banks of the river Marne, is called the heights of Belleville and Romainville, taking its name from two delightful villages which occupy it, Belleville being nearest, and Romainville most distant from Paris. The heights are covered with romantic groves, and decorated by many pleasant villas, with gardens, orchards, vineyards, and plantations. These, which in peaceful times are a favourite resort of the gay Parisians, on their parties of pleasure, were now to be occupied by other guests, and for far different purposes. In advance of these heights, and protected by them, is the village of Pantin, situated on the great road from Bondy. To the left of Romainville, and more in front of Belleville, is a projecting eminence, termed the *Butte de Chaumont*. The ridge there sinks, and admits

a half-finished aqueduct, called the Canal de l'Ourcq. The ground then again rises into the bold and steep eminence, called Montmartre, from being the supposed place of the martyrdom of St Denis, the patron of France. From the declivity of this steep hill is a level plain, extending to the river Seine, through which runs the principal northern approach to Paris, from the large village of Saint Denis. The most formidable preparations had been made for maintaining this strong line of defence, behind which the city lay sheltered. The extreme right of the French forces occupied the wood of Vincennes, and the village of Charenton upon the Marne, and was supported by the troops stationed on the heights of Belleville, Romainville, and on the Butte de Chaumont, which composed the right wing. Their centre occupied the line formed by the half-finished canal de l'Ourcq, was defended by the village of La Villette, and a strong redoubt on the farm of Rouvroi, mounted with eighteen heavy guns, and by the embankments of the canal, and still farther protected by a powerful artillery planted in the rear, on the heights of Montmartre. The left wing was thrown back from the village called Mouçaux, near the north-western extremity of the heights, and prolonged itself to that of Neuilly, on the Seine, which was strongly occupied by the extreme left of their army. Thus, with the right extremity of the

army resting upon the river Marne, and the left upon the Seine, the French occupied a defensive semi-circular line, which could not be turned, the greater part of which was posted on heights of uncommon steepness, and the whole defended by cannon, placed with the utmost science and judgment, but very deficient in point of numbers.

The other side of Paris is almost defenceless; but, in order to have attacked on that side, the allies must have previously crossed the Seine; an operation successfully practised in the following year, but which at that period, when their work, to be executed at all, must be done suddenly, they had no leisure to attempt, considering the great probability of Napoleon's coming up in their rear, recalled by the danger of the capital. They were, therefore, compelled to prefer a sudden and desperate attack upon the strongest side of the city, to the slower, though more secure measure, of turning the formidable line of defence which we have endeavoured to describe.

Three times, since the allies crossed the Rhine, the capital of France had been menaced by the approach of troops within twenty miles of the city, but it had uniformly been delivered by the active and rapid movements of Napoleon. Encouraged by this recollection, the citizens, without much alarm, heard for the fourth time that the Cossacks had been seen at

Meaux. Stifled rumours, however, began to circulate, that the divisions of Marmont and Mortier had sustained severe loss, and were in full retreat on the capital; a fact speedily confirmed by the long train of wounded who entered the barriers of the city, with looks of consternation and words of discouragement. Then came crowds of peasants, flying they knew not whither, before an enemy whose barbarous rapacity had been so long the theme of every tongue, bringing with them their half-naked and half-starved families, their teams, their carts, and such of their herds and household goods as they could remove in haste. These unfortunate fugitives crowded the Boulevards of Paris, the usual resort of the gay world, adding, by exaggerated and contradictory reports, to the dreadful ideas which the Parisians already conceived of the approaching storm.

The government, chiefly directed by Joseph Buonaparte, in the name of his sister-in-law Maria Louisa, did all they could to encourage the people, by exaggerating their means of defence, and maintaining with effrontery, that the troops which approached the capital composed but some isolated column which by accident straggled towards Paris, while the Emperor was breaking, dividing, and slaughtering, the gross of the confederated army. The light could not be totally shut out, but such rays as were admitted were highly coloured with hope,

having been made to pass through the medium of the police and public papers. A grand review of the troops, destined for the defence of the capital, was held upon the Sunday preceding the assault. Eight thousand troops of the line, being the garrison of Paris, under General Girard, and 30,000 national guards, commanded by Hulin, governor of the city, passed in order through the stately court of the Tuileries, followed by their trains of artillery, their corps of pioneers, and their carriages for baggage and ammunition. This was an imposing and encouraging spectacle, until it was remembered that these forces were not designed to move out to distant conquest, the destination of many hundreds of thousands which in other days had been paraded before that palace; but that they were the last hope of Paris, who must defend all that she contained by a battle under her walls. The remnants of Marmont and Mortier's corps d'armée made no part of this parade. Their diminished battalions, and disordered state of equipment, were ill calculated to inspire courage into the public mind. They were concentrated and stationed on the line of defence already described, beyond the barriers of the city. But the *mareschals* themselves entered Paris, and gave their assistance to the military councils of Joseph Buonaparte.

Preparations were made by the government to remove beyond the Loire, or at least in that

direction. Maria Louisa had none of the spirit of an Amazon, though graced with all the domestic virtues. She was also placed painfully in the course of a war betwixt her husband and father. Besides, she obeyed, and probably with no lack of will, Napoleon's injunctions to leave the capital, if *dangér* should approach. She left Paris, therefore, with her son, who is said to have shown an unwillingness to depart, which, in a child, seemed to have something ominous in it. Almost all the civil authorities of Buonaparte's government left the city at the same time, after destroying the private records of the high police, and carrying with them the crown jewels, and much of the public treasure. Joseph Buonaparte remained, detaining with him, somewhat, it is said, against his inclination, Cambacérès, the Chancellor of the Emperor, whom, though somewhat too unwieldy for the character, Napoleon had, in one of his latest councils, threatened with the honours and dangers of the colonelcy of a battalion. Joseph himself had the talents of an accomplished man, and an amiable member of society, but they do not seem to have been of a military description. He saw his sister-in-law depart, attended by a regiment of 700 men, whom some writers have alleged had been better employed in the defence of the city; forgetting of what importance it was to Napoleon that the person of the Empress should be protected

alike against a roving band of Hulans or Cossacks, or the chance of some civic mutiny. These arrangements being made, Joseph published, on the morning of the 29th, a proclamation, assuring the citizens of Paris that « he would remain with them;» he described the enemy as a single straggling column which had approached from Meaux, and required them by a brief and valorous resistance to sustain the honour of the French name, until the arrival of the Emperor, who, he assured the Parisians, was on full march to their succour.

Between three and four o'clock on the next eventful morning, the drums beat to arms, and the national guard assembled in force. But of the thousands which obeyed the call, a great part were, from age, habits, and want of inclination, unfit for the service demanded from them. We have also already alluded to the scarcity of arms, and certainly there were very many of those citizen-soldiers, whom, had weapons been more plenty, the government of Buonaparte would not have intrusted with them.

Most of the national guard, who were suitably armed, were kept within the barrier until about eleven o'clock, and then, as their presence became necessary, were marched to the scene of action, and arrayed in a second line behind the regular troops, so as rather to impose upon the enemy, by an appearance of

numbers, than to take a very active share in the contest. The most serviceable were, however, draughted to act as sharp-shooters, and several battalions were stationed to strengthen particular points of the line. The whole of the troops, including many volunteers, who actively engaged in the defence of the city, might be between 10,000 and 20,000.

The proposed assault of the allies was to be general and simultaneous, along the whole line of defence. The Prince Royal of Wirtemberg was to attack the extreme right of the French, in the wood of Vincennes, drive them from the banks of the Marne and the village of Charenton, and thus turn the heights of Belleville on the right. The Russian general, Rayefski, making a flank movement from the public road to Meaux, was to direct three strong columns, with their artillery and powerful reserves, in order to attack in front the important heights of Belleville and Romainville, and the villages which give name to them. The Russian and Prussian body-guards had charge to attack the centre of the enemy, posted upon the canal de l'Ourcq, the reserves of which occupied the eminence called Montmartre. The army of Silesia was to assail the left of the French line, so as to turn and carry the heights of Montmartre from the north-east. The third division of the allied army, and a strong body of cavalry, were kept in

reserve. Before the attack commenced, two successive flags of truce were dispatched to summon the city to capitulate. Both were refused admittance, so that the intention of the defenders of Paris appeared fixed to hazard an engagement.

It was about eight o'clock, when the Parisians, who had assembled in anxious crowds at the barriers of St Denis and of Vincennes, the outlets from Paris, corresponding with the two extremities of the line, became sensible, from the dropping succession of musket-shots, which sounded like the detached pattering of large drops of rain before a thunder-storm, that the work of destruction was already commenced. Presently platoons of musketry, with a close and heavy fire of cannon, from the direction of Belleville, announced that the engagement had become general on that part of the line.

General Rayefski had begun the attack by pushing forward a column, with the purpose of turning the heights of Romainville on the right; but its progress having been arrested by a heavy fire of artillery, the French suddenly became the assailants, and, under the command of Marmont, rushed forward and possessed themselves of the village of Pantin, in advance of their line; an important post, which they had abandoned on the preceding evening, at the approach of the allied army. It was in-

stantly recovered by the Russian grenadiers, at the point of the bayonet; and the French, although they several times attempted to resume the offensive, were driven back by the Russians on the villages of Belleville and Ménilmontant, while the allies pushed forward through the wood of Romainville, under the acclivity of the heights. The most determined and sustained fire was directed upon them from the French batteries along the whole line. Several of these were served by the youths of the Polytechnic school, boys from twelve to sixteen years of age, who showed the greatest activity and the most devoted courage. The French infantry rushed repeatedly in columns from the heights, where opportunities occurred, to check the progress of the allies. They were as often repulsed by the Russians, each new attempt giving rise to fresh conflicts and more general slaughter, while a continued and dispersed combat of sharp-shooters took place among the groves, vineyards, and gardens of the villas, with which the heights are covered. At length, by order of General Barclay de Tolly, the Russian commander-in-chief, the front attack on the heights was suspended until the operations of the allies on the other points should permit it to be resumed at a cheaper risk of loss. The Russian regiments which had been dispersed as sharp-shooters, were withdrawn and again formed in rank, and it

would seem that the French seized this opportunity to repossess themselves of the village of Pantin, and to assume a momentary superiority in the contest.

Blucher had received his orders late in the morning, and could not commence the attack so early as that upon the right. About eleven o'clock, having contented himself with observing and blockading a body of French troops, who occupied the village of St Denis, he directed the columns of General Langeron against the village of Aubervilliers, and, having surmounted the obstinate opposition which was there made, moved them by the road of Clichy, right against the extremity of the heights of Montmartre, whilst the division of Kleist and Yorck marched to attack in flank the villages of La Villette and Pantin, and thus sustain the attack on the centre and right of the French. The defenders, strongly entrenched and protected by powerful batteries, opposed the most formidable resistance, and, as the ground was broken and impracticable for cavalry, many of the attacking columns suffered severely. When the divisions of the Silesian army, commanded by Prince William of Prussia, first came to the assistance of the original assailants upon the centre, the French concentrated themselves on the strong post of La Villette, and the farm of Rouvroi, and continued to offer the most desperate resistance in de-

fence of these points. Upon the allied left wing the Prussian Guards, and those of Baden, threw themselves with rival impetuosity into the village of Pantin, and carried it at the point of the bayonet. During these advantages, the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, on the extreme left of the allies, had forced his way to Vincennes, and threatened the right of the French battalions posted at Belleville, as had been projected in the plan of the attack. General Rayefski renewed the suspended assault upon these heights in front, when he learned that they were thus in some measure turned in flank, and succeeded in carrying those of Romanville, with the village. Marmont and Oudinot in vain attempted a charge upon the allied troops, who had thus established themselves on the French line of defence. They were repulsed and pursued by the victors, who, following up their advantage, possessed themselves successively of the villages of Belleville and Montmontant, the Butte de Chaumont, and the fine artillery which defended this line.

About the same time the village of Charonne, on the right extremity of the heights, was also carried, and the whole line of defence occupied by the right wing of the French fell into possession of the allies. Their light horse began to penetrate from Vincennes as far as the barriers of Paris, and their guns

and mortars upon the heights were turned upon the city. The centre of the French army, stationed upon the canal de l'Ourcq, had hitherto stood firm, protected by the redoubt at Rouvroi, with eighteen heavy pieces of cannon, and by the village of La Villette, which formed the key of the position. But the right flank of their line being turned by those troops who had become possessed of Romainville, the allies overwhelmed this part of the line also, and carrying by assault the farm of Rouvroi, with its strong redoubt, and the village of La Villette, drove the centre of the French back upon the city. A body of French cavalry attempted to check the advance of the allied columns, but were repulsed and destroyed by a brilliant charge of the black hussars of Brandenburg. Meanwhile the right wing of the Silesian army approached close to the foot of Montmartre, and Count Langeron's corps was preparing to storm this last remaining defensible post, when a flag of truce appeared, to demand a cessation of hostilities.

It appears that, in the morning, Joseph Buonaparte had shown himself to the defenders riding along the lines, accompanied by his staff, and had repeated, to all the corps engaged, the assurance that he would live and die with them. There is reason to think, that, if he did not quite credit that such ex-

tensive preparations for assault were made by a single division of the allies, yet he believed he had to do with only one of their two armies, and not with their united force. He was undeceived by a person named Peyre, called, by some, an engineer officer attached to the staff of the governor of Paris, and, by others, a superintendant belonging to the corps of fire-men in that city. Peyre, it seems, had fallen into the hands of a party of Cossacks the night before, and was carried in the morning to the presence of the Emperor Alexander, at Bondy. In his route he had an opportunity of calculating the immense force of the armies now under the walls of Paris. Through the medium of this officer, the Emperor Alexander explained the intentions of the allied sovereigns, to allow fair terms to the city of Paris, provided it was proposed to capitulate ere the barriers were forced; with the corresponding intimation, that if the defence were prolonged beyond that period, it would not be in the power either of the Emperor, the King of Prussia, or the allied generals, to prevent the total destruction of the town.

M. Peyre, thus erected into a commissioner and envoy of crowned heads, was set at liberty, and with danger and difficulty found his way into the French lines, through the fire which was maintained in every direction.

He was introduced to Joseph, to whom he delivered his message, and showed proclamations to the city of Paris, with which the Emperor Alexander had intrusted him. Joseph hesitated, at first inclining to capitulate, then pulling up resolution, and determining to abide the chance of arms. He continued irresolute, blood flowing fast around him, until about noon, when the enemy's columns threatening an attack on Montmartre, and the shells and bullets from the artillery, which was in position to cover the attempt, flying fast over the heads of himself and his staff, he sent Peyre to General Marmont, who acted as commander-in-chief, with permission to the marshal to demand a cessation of arms. At the same time Joseph himself fled with his whole attendants; thus abandoning the troops, whom his exhortations had engaged in the bloody and hopeless resistance, of which he had solemnly promised to partake the dangers. Marmont, with Monçey, and the other generals who conducted the defence, now saw all hopes of making it good at an end. The whole line was carried, excepting the single post of Montmartre, which was turned, and on the point of being stormed on both flanks, as well as in front; the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg had occupied Charenton, with its bridge over the Seine, and pushing forward on the high-road from thence to Paris, his advanced

posts were already skirmishing at the barrier, called the Trône; and a party of Cossacks had been with difficulty repulsed from the Faubourg St Antoine, on which they made a *Hourra*. The city of Paris is merely surrounded by an ordinary wall, to prevent smuggling. The barriers are not much stronger than any ordinary turnpike-gate, and the stockade with which they had been barricaded could have been cleared away by a few blows of the pioneers' axes. Add to this, that the heights commanding the city, Montmartre excepted, were in complete possession of the enemy; that a bomb or two, thrown probably to intimidate the citizens, had already fallen in the Faubourg Montmartre and the Chaussée d'Antin; and that it was evident that any attempt to protract the defence of Paris must be attended with utter ruin to the town and its inhabitants. Marshal Marmont, influenced by these considerations, dispatched a flag of truce to General Barclay de Tolly, requesting a suspension of hostilities, to arrange the terms on which Paris was to be surrendered. The armistice was granted, on condition that Montmartre, the only defensible part of the line which the French still continued to occupy, should be delivered up to the allies. Deputies were appointed on both sides, to adjust the terms of surrender. These were speedily settled. The French regular troops were

permitted to retire from Paris unmolested, and the metropolis was next day to be delivered up to the allied sovereigns, to whose generosity it was recommended.

Thus ended the assault of Paris, after a bloody action, in which the defenders lost upwards of 4000 in killed and wounded, and the allies, who had to storm well-defended batteries, redoubts, and entrenchments, perhaps about twice the number. They remained masters of the line at all points, and took nearly one hundred pieces of cannon. When night fell, the multiplied and crowded watch-fires, that occupied the whole chain of heights on which the victors now bivouacked, indicated to the astonished inhabitants of the French metropolis, how numerous and how powerful were the armies into whose hands the fate of war had surrendered them.

CHAPTER VI.

State of Parties in Paris.—Royalists—Revolutionists
 Buonapartists.—Talleyrand—his plans and views —
 Châteaubriand—influence of his eloquence in favour
 of the Royalists.—Mission to the Allied Sovereigns
 from the Royalists —Their answer.—Efforts of the
 Buonapartists —Feelings of the lowest classes in Paris
 —of the middling ranks.—Neutrality of the National
 Guard. Growing strength and confidence of the Royal-
 ists —They issue Proclamations, and White Cockades
 —Crowds assemble at the Boulevards to witness the
 entrance of the Allies.—Mutability of the French Char-
 acter —The Allies are received with shouts of welcome
 —Their Army retires to Quarters, and the Cossack-
 bivouac in the Champs Élysées

THE battle was fought and won; but it re-
 mained a high and doubtful question in what
 way the victory was to be improved, so as to
 produce results of far greater consequence than
 usually follow from the mere military occu-
 pation of an enemy's capital. While the mass
 of the inhabitants were at rest, exhausted by
 the fatigues and anxieties of the day, many se-
 cret conclaves, on different principles, were

held in the city of Paris upon the night after the assault. Some of these even yet endeavoured to reorganize the means of resistance, and some to find out what modern policy has called a *Mezzo-termine*, some third expedient, between the risk of standing by Napoleon and that of recalling the banished family.

The only middle mode which could have succeeded would have been a regency under the Empress; and Fouché's Memoirs state, that if he had been in Paris at the time, he might have succeeded in establishing a new order of things upon such a basis. The assertion may be safely disputed. To Austria, such a plan might have had some recommendations; but to the sovereigns and statesmen of the other allied nations, the proposal would only have appeared a device to obtain immediate peace, and keep the throne, as it were, in commission, that Buonaparte might ascend it at his pleasure.¹

¹ The passage is curious, whether we regard it as really emanating from Fouché, or placed in the mouth of that active revolutionist by some one who well understood the genius of the party. «Had I been at Paris at that time (the period of the siege, namely), the weight of my influence, doubtless, and my perfect acquaintance with the secrets of every party, would have enabled me to give these extraordinary events a very different direction. My preponderance, and the promptness of my decision, would have predominated over the more slow and mysterious influence of Talleyrand. That elevated personage could

We have the greatest doubts whether, among the ancient chiefs of the Revolution, most of whom had, as hackneyed tools, lost credit in the public eye, both by loss of principle and political inconsistency, there remained any who could have maintained a popular interest in opposition to that of the Royalists on the one hand, and the Buonapartists on the other. The few who remained steady to their democratic principles, Napoleon had discredited and thrown into the shade; and he had rendered many of the others still more inefficient, by showing that they were accessible to bribery and to ambition, and that ancient demagogues could, without much trouble, be transmuted into supple and obsequious courtiers. Their day of power and interest was past, and the exaggerated vehemence of their democratic opinions had no longer any effect on

not have made his way unless we had been harnessed to the same car. I would have revealed to him the ramifications of my political plan, and in spite of the odious policy of Savary, the ridiculous government of Cambacérès, the lieutenantancy of the puppet Joseph, and the base spirit of the Senate, we would have breathed new life into the carcase of the Revolution, and these degraded patricians would not have thought of acting exclusively for their own interests. By our united impulse, we would have pronounced before the interference of any foreign influence, the dethronement of Napoleon, and proclaimed the Regency, of which I had already traced the basis. This conclusion was the only one which could have preserved the Revolution and its principles. *Mémoires de Fouché*, tome II, pp. 282-3. 8vo. Paris, 1824.

the lower classes, who were in a great proportion attached to the empire.

The Royalists, on the other hand, had been long combining and extending their efforts and opinions, which gained, chiefly among the higher orders, a sort of fashion which those of the democrats had lost. Talleyrand was acceptable to them, as himself noble by birth, and he knew better than any one how to apply the lever to unfasten the deep foundations of Napoleon's power. Of his address, though not successful in the particular instance, Las Cases gives us a curious specimen. Talleyrand desired to sound the opinion of Decrès, about the time of the crisis of which we are treating. He drew that minister towards the chimney, and opening a volume of Montesquieu, said, as if in the tone of an ordinary conversation, « I found a passage here this morning, which struck me in an extraordinary manner : here it is, in such a book and chapter, page so and so. *When a prince has raised himself above all laws, when his tyranny becomes insupportable, there remains nothing to the oppressed subject except— —*»

« It is quite enough,» said Decrès, placing his hand upon Talleyrand's mouth, « I will hear no more. Shut your book.» And Talleyrand closed the book, as if nothing remarkable had happened.

An agent of such extraordinary tact was not

frequently baffled, in a city, and at a time, when so many were, from hope, fear, love, hatred, and all the other strongest passions, desirous, according to the Roman phrase, of a new state of things. He had been unceasingly active, and eminently successful, in convincing the Royalists, that the King must purchase the recovery of his authority by consenting to place the monarchy on a constitutional footing; and in persuading another class, that the restoration of the Bourbons was the most favourable chance for the settlement of a free system of government. Nor did this accomplished politician limit his efforts to those who had loyalty to be awakened, and a love of liberty to be rekindled, but extended them through a thousand ramifications, through every class of persons. To the bold he offered an enterprise requiring courage; to the timid (a numerous class at the time), he showed the road of safety; to the ambitious, the prospect of gaining power; to the guilty, the assurance of indemnity and safety. He had inspired resolution even into the councils of the allies. A note from him to the Emperor Alexander, in the following words, is said to have determined that prince to persevere in the march upon Paris. « You venture nothing,» said this laconic billet, « when you may safely venture every thing — Venture once more.»

It is not to be supposed that Talleyrand wrought in this deep intrigue without active coadjutors. The Abbé de Pradt, whose lively works have so often given some interest to our pages, was deeply involved in the transactions of that busy period, and advocated the cause of the Bourbons against that of his former master. Beurnonville and other senators were engaged in the same cabals.

The Royalists, on their own part, were in the highest state of activity, and prepared to use their utmost exertions to obtain the mastery of the public spirit. At this most critical moment all was done by Monsieur de Châteaubriand, which eloquence could effect, to appeal to the affections, perhaps even the prejudices of the people, in his celebrated pamphlet, entitled, Buonaparte and the Bourbons. This vigorous and affecting comparison between the days when France was in peace and honour under her own monarchs, contrasted with those in which Europe appeared in arms under her walls, had been written above a month, and the manuscript was concealed by Madame de Châteaubriand in her bosom. It was now privately printed. So was a proclamation by Monsieur, made in the name of his brother, the late King of France. Finally, in a private assembly of the principal Royalists, amongst whom were the illustrious names of Rohan, Rochefoucault, Montmorency, and Noailles, it

was resolved to send a deputation to the allied sovereigns, to learn, if possible, their intention. Monsieur Douhet, the gentleman intrusted with this communication, executed his mission at the expense of considerable personal danger, and returned into Paris with the answer, that the allies had determined to avoid all appearance of dictating to France respecting any family or mode of government, and that although they would most joyfully and willingly acknowledge the Bourbons, yet it could only be in consequence of a public declaration in their favour. At the same time, Monsieur Douhet was furnished with a proclamation of the allies, signed Schwartzenberg, which, without mentioning the Bourbons, was powerfully calculated to serve their cause. It declared the friendly intention of the allies towards France, and represented the power of the government which now oppressed them, as the only obstacle to instant peace. The allied sovereigns, it was stated, sought but to see a salutary government in France, who would cement the friendly union of all nations. It belonged to the city of Paris to pronounce their opinion, and accelerate the peace of the world.

Furnished with this important document, which plainly indicated the private wishes of the allies, the Royalists resolved to make an effort on the morning of March 31st. It was

at first designed they should assemble five hundred gentlemen in arms; but this plan was prudently laid aside, and they determined to relinquish all appearance of force, and address the citizens only by means of persuasion.

In the mean time, the friends of the Imperial government were not idle. The conduct of the lower classes, during the battle on the heights, had assumed an alarming character. For a time they had listened with a sort of stupefied terror to the distant thunders of the fight, beheld the wounded and fugitives crowd in at the barriers, and gazed in useless wonder on the hurried march of troops moving out in haste to reinforce the lines. At length the numerous crowds which assembled in the Boulevards, and particularly in the streets near the Palais Royal, assumed a more active appearance. There began to emerge from the suburbs and lanes those degraded members of the community whose slavish labour is only relieved by coarse debauchery, invisible for the most part to the more decent classes of society, but whom periods of public calamity or agitation bring into view, to add to the general confusion and terror. They gather in times of public danger, as birds of ill omen and noxious reptiles are said to do at the rising of a tropical hurricane; and their fellow-citizens look with equal disgust and dread upon faces and figures, as strange to them as if they had issued

from some distant and savage land. Paris, like every great metropolis, has her share, and more than her share, of this unwholesome population. It was the ~~frantic~~ convocations of this class which had at once instigated and carried into effect the principal horrors of the Revolution, and they seemed now resolved to signalize its conclusion by the destruction of the capital. Most of these banditti were under the influence of Buonaparte's police, and were stimulated by the various arts which his emissaries employed. At one time horsemen galloped through the crowd, exhorting them to take arms, and assuring them that Buonaparte had already attacked the rear of the allies. Again they were told, that the King of Prussia was made prisoner, with a column of 10,000 men. At other times, similar emissaries, announcing that the allies had entered the suburbs, and were sparing neither sex nor age, exhorted the citizens, by placards pasted on the walls, to shut their shops, and prepare to defend their houses.

This invitation to make the last earthly sacrifices in behalf of a military despot, to which Zaragossa had submitted in defence of her national independence, was ill received by the inhabitants. A free state has millions of necks, but a despotic government is in the situation desired by the Imperial tyrant—it has but one. When it was obvious that the Emperor Napo-

leon had lost his ascendancy, no shop-keeper in Paris was fool enough to risk in his cause his shop, his family, and his life, or to consent to measures for preserving the capital, which were to commence by abandoning to the allied troops and the scum of their own population all that was, to him individually, worth fighting for. The placards we have mentioned were pulled down, therefore, as fast as they were pasted up; and there was an evident disposition, on the part of the better class of citizens and the national guards, to discourage all counsels which tended to stimulate resistance to the desperate extremity therein recommended.

Nevertheless, the state of the capital continued very alarming, the lower classes exhibiting alternately the symptoms of panic terror, of fury, and of despair. They demanded arms, of which a few were distributed to them; and there is no doubt, that had Napoleon arrived among them in the struggle, there would have been a dreadful battle, in which Paris, in all probability, would have shared the fate of Moscow. But when the cannonade ceased, when the flight of Joseph, and the capitulation of the city became publicly known, this conflict of jarring passions died away into silence, and the imperturbable and impassive composure of the national

guard maintained the absolute tranquillity of the metropolis.

On the morning of the 31st, the Royalists were seen in groups in the Place Louis Quinze, the Garden of the Tuileries, the Boulevards, and other public places. They distributed the proclamations of the allies, and raised the long-forgotten cry of *Vive le Roi!* At first, none save those engaged in the perilous experiment, durst echo back a signal so dangerous; but by degrees the crowds increased, the leaders got on horseback, and distributed white cockades, lilies, and other emblems of loyalty, displaying banners, at the same time, made out of their own handkerchiefs. The ladies of their party came to their assistance. The Princess of Léon, Vice-comtesse of Châteaubriand, Comtesse of Choiseuil, and other women of rank, joined the procession, distributing on all hands the emblems of their party, and tearing their dress to make white cockades, when the regular stock was exhausted. The better class of the bourgeois began to catch the flame, and remembered their old royalist opinions, and by whom they were defeated on the celebrated day of the Sections, when Buonaparte laid the foundation of his fame, in the discomfiture of the National Guard. Whole picquets began to adopt the white, instead of the three-coloured

cockade; yet the voices were far from unanimous, and on many points parties of different principles met and skirmished together in the streets. But the tendency to discord was diverted, and the attention of the Parisians, of all classes and opinions, suddenly fixed upon the imposing and terrible spectacle of the army of the allies, which now began to enter the city.

The Sovereigns had previously received, at the village of Pantin, the magistrates of Paris, and Alexander had expressed himself in language still more explicit than that of their proclamation. He made war, he said, on Napoleon alone; one who had been his friend, but relinquished that character to become his enemy, and inflict on his empire great evils. He was not, however, come to retaliate those injuries, but to make a secure peace with any government which France, might select for herself. "I am at peace," said the Emperor, "with France, and at war with Napoleon alone."

These gracious expressions were received with the more gratitude by the citizens of Paris, that they had been taught to consider the Russian prince as a barbarous and vindictive enemy. The measure of restoring the Bourbons seemed now to be regarded by almost every one, not particularly connected with the dynasty of Napoleon, like a haven on the leeward,

unexpectedly open to a tempest-tossed and endangered vessel. There was no loss of honour in adopting it, since the French received back their own royal family—there was no compulsion, since they received them upon their own free choice. They escaped from a great and imminent danger, as if it had been by a bridge of gold.

An immense crowd filled the Boulevards (a large wide open promenade, which, under a variety of distinctive names, forms a circuit round the city), in order to witness the entrance of the allied sovereigns and their army, whom, in the succession of four-and-twenty hours, this mutable people were disposed to regard as friends rather than enemies,—a disposition which increased until it amounted to enthusiasm for the persons of those princes, against whom a bloody battle had been fought yesterday under the walls of Paris, in evidence of which mortal strife, there still remained blackening in the sun the unburied thousands who had fallen on both sides. There was in this a trait of national character. A Frenchman submits with a good grace, and apparent or real complaisance, to that which he cannot help; and it is not the least advantage of his philosophy, that it entitles him afterwards to plead that his submission flowed entirely from good-will, and not from constraint. Many of those who, on the pre-

ceding day, were forced to fly from the heights which defend Paris, thought themselves at liberty next morning to maintain, that the allies had entered the capital only by their consent and permission, because they had joined in the plaudits which accompanied their arrival. To vindicate, therefore, their city from the disgrace of being entered by force, as well as giving way to the real enthusiasm which was suddenly inspired by the exchange of the worst evils which a conquered people have to dread for the promised blessings of an honourable peace and internal concord, the Parisians received the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia with such general and unremitting plaudits, as might have accompanied their triumphal entrance into their own capitals. Even at their first entrance within the barriers, we learn from Sir Charles Stewart's official dispatch, the crowd was already so enormous, as well as the acclamations so great, that it was difficult to move forward; but before the monarchs had reached the Porte St Martin to turn on the Boulevards, there was a moral impossibility of proceeding; all Paris seemed to be assembled and concentrated in one spot—one spring evidently directed all their movements. They thronged around the monarchs, with the most unanimous shouts of «*Vive l'Empereur Alexan-*

dre!—Vive le Roi de Prusse!» mingled with the loyal exclamations, «*Vive le Roi!—Vive Louis XVIII!—Vivent les Bourbons!*» To such unexpected unanimity might be applied the words of Scripture, quoted by Clarendon on a similar occasion,—«God had prepared the people, for the thing was done suddenly.» The procession lasted several hours, during which 50,000 chosen troops of the Silesian and Grand Army filed along the Boulevards in broad and deep columns, exhibiting a whole forest of bayonets, mingled with long trains of artillery, and preceded by numerous regiments of cavalry of every description. Nothing surprised those who witnessed this magnificent spectacle, more than the high state of good order and regular equipment in which the men and horses appeared. They seemed rather to resemble troops drawn from peaceful quarters to some grand or solemn festival, than regiments engaged during a long winter campaign in constant marches and countermarches, as well as in a succession of the fiercest and most sanguinary conflicts, and who had fought a general action but the day before. After making the circuit of half of Paris by the interior Boulevards, the monarchs halted in the Champs-Élysées, and the troops passed in review before them as they were dismissed to their quarters in the city. The

Cossacks of the guard established their bivouac in the Champs-Élysées themselves, which may be termed the Hyde Park of Paris, and which was thus converted into a Scythian encampment.

CHAPTER VII.

Fears of the Parisians.—Proceedings of Napoleon—He is informed of the dissolution of the Congress at Châtillon.—Operations of the French Cavalry in rear of the Allies.—Capture of the Austrian Baron Weisseberg.—The Emperor Francis is nearly surprised.—Napoleon hastens on to Paris, and reaches Troyes on the night of the 29th March.—Opinion of Macdonald as to the possibility of relieving Paris.—Napoleon leaves Troyes on the 30th, and meets Belliard, a few miles from Paris, in full retreat.—Conversation betwixt them.—He determines to proceed to Paris, but is at length dissuaded—and dispatches Caulaincourt to the Metropolis, to receive terms from the Allied Sovereigns.—He himself returns to Fontainebleau.

WHEN the enthusiasm attending the entrance of the allies, which had converted a day of degradation into one of joy and festivity, began to subside, the perilous question occurred to those who found themselves suddenly embarked in a new revolution, Where were Napoleon and his army, and what means did his active and enterprising genius possess of still re-establishing his affairs, and taking vengeance on his revolted capital? That terrible and

evil spirit, who had so long haunted their very dreams, and who had been well termed the Night-mare of Europe, was not yet conjured down, though for the present he exercised his ministry elsewhere. All trembled for the consequence of his suddenly returning in full force, combined either with the troops of Augereau, or with the garrisons withdrawn from the frontier fortresses. But their fears were without foundation; for, though he was not personally distant, his powers of inflicting vengeance were now limited.—We proceed to trace his progress after his movement eastward, from the neighbourhood of Vitry to St Dizier, which had permitted the union of the two allied armies.

Here he was joined by Caulaincourt, who had to inform him of the dissolution of the Congress at Châtillon, with the addition, that he had not received his instructions from Rheims, until the diplomatists had departed. Those subsequently dispatched by Count Frochet he had not received at all.

Meanwhile, Napoleon's cavalry commenced the proposed operations in the rear of the allies, and made prisoners some persons of consequence, who were travelling, as they supposed, in perfect security, between Troyes and Dijon. Among these was Baron Weissemburg, who had long been the Austrian envoy at the court of London. The Emperor Francis was

nearly surprised in person by the French light troops. He was obliged to fly in a *drosky*, a Russian carriage, attended only by two domestics, from Bar-sur-Aube to Châtillon, and from thence he retreated to Dijon. Napoleon showed every civility to his prisoner, Weissenberg, and dispatched him to the Emperor of Austria, to solicit once more his favourable interference. The person of the present King of France (then Monsieur) would have been a yet more important capture, but the forays of the light cavalry did not penetrate so far as to endanger him.

On the 24th March, Napoleon halted at Doulevant, to concentrate his forces, and gain intelligence. He remained there also on the 25th, and employed his time in consulting his maps, and in dictating new instructions for Caulaincourt, by which he empowered him to make every cession. But the hour of safety was past. Upon the morning of the 26th, Napoleon was roused by the intelligence, that the allies had attacked the rear of his army under Macdonald, near St Dizier. He instantly hastened to the support of the mareschal, concluding that his own scheme had been successful, and that his retreat to the eastward had drawn after him the Grand Army of the allies. The allies showed a great number of cavalry with flying guns, but no infantry. Napoleon ordered an attack on them, in which

the French were successful, the allies falling back after slight opposition. He learned from the prisoners, that he had been engaged, not with Schwartzberg, but with Blucher's troops. This was strange intelligence. He had left Blucher threatening Meaux, and now he found his army on the verge of Lorraine.

On the 27th, by pushing a reconnoitring party as far west as Vitry, Napoleon learned the real state of the case; that both the allied armies had marched upon Paris; and that the cavalry with which he had skirmished were 10,000 men under Winzengerode, left behind by the allies as a curtain to screen their motions, and engage his attention. Every word in this news had a sting in it. To hasten after the allies, to surprise them, if possible, ere the cannon on Montmartre were yet silenced, was the most urgent thought that ever actuated the mind even of Napoleon, so accustomed to high and desperate risks. But the direct route on Paris had been totally exhausted of provision, by the march and countermarch of such large armies. It was necessary to go round by Troyes, and, for that purpose, to retrograde as far as Doulevant. Here he received a small billet in cipher, from the Postmaster-general, La Valette, the first official communication he had got from the capital during ten days. « The partisans of the stranger,» these were the contents, « are making head, seconded by secret

intrigues. The presence of Napoleon is indispensable, if he desires to prevent his capital from being delivered to the enemy. There is not a moment to be lost.» The march was precipitated accordingly.

At the bridge of Doulaincourt, on the banks of the Aube, the Emperor received dispatches, informing him that an assault on Paris was hourly to be expected. Napoleon dismissed his aide-de-camp, Dejean, to ride post to Paris, and spread the news of his speedy arrival. He gave him two bulletins, describing in extravagant colours a pretended victory at Arcis, and the skirmish at St Dizier. He then advanced to Troyes, which he reached on that same night (29th March), the Imperial Guard marching fifteen leagues in one day. On the 30th, Mareschal Macdonald gave to Berthier the following sound and striking opinion:— «It is too late,» he said, «to relieve Paris; at least by the route we follow. The distance is fifty leagues; to be accomplished by forced marches, it will require at least four days; and then in what condition for combat is the army like to arrive, for there are no dépôts or magazines, after leaving Bar-sur-Seine. The allies, being yesterday at Meaux, must have pushed their advanced guards up to the barriers by this time. There is no good reason to hope that the united corps of the Dukes of Treviso and Ragusa could check them long

enough to allow us to come up. Besides, at our approach, the allies will not fail to defend the passage of the Marne. I am then of opinion, that if Paris fall under the power of the enemy, the Emperor should direct his march on Sens, in order to retreat upon Augereau, unite our forces ~~with~~ his, and, after having reposed our troops, give the enemy battle on a chosen field. If Providence has then decreed our last hour, we will at least die with honour, instead of being dispersed, pillaged, taken, and slaughtered, by Cossacks." Napoleon's anxiety for the fate of his capital did not permit him to hearken to this advice; though it seems the best calculated to have placed him in a condition, either to make a composition with the allies, or to carry on a formidable war in their rear.

From Troyes, Napoleon dispatched to Paris another aide-de-camp, General Girardin, who is said to have carried orders for defending the city to the last, and at all risks,—an accusation, however, which, considering the mass of unimaginable mischief that such an order must have involved, is not to be received without more proof than we have been able to obtain.

On the 30th March, Napoleon left Troyes, and, finding the road entirely unoccupied by the enemy, threw himself into a post-carriage, and travelled on at full speed before his army, with a very slight attendance. Having in this

way reached Villeneuve L'Archevêque, he rode to Fontainebleau on horseback, and, though it was then night, took a carriage for Paris, Berthier and Caulaincourt accompanying him. On reaching an inn, called La Cour de France, at a few miles distance from Paris, he at length met ample proof of his misfortune in the person of General Belliard, with his cavalry. The fatal intelligence was communicated.

Leaping from his carriage, Napoleon turned back with Belliard, exclaiming,—« What means this? Why here with your cavalry, Belliard? And where are the enemy? »—« At the gates of Paris. »—« And the army? »—« It is following me. »—« Where are my wife and son?—where Marmont?—where Mortier? »—« The Empress set out for Rambouillet, and thence for Orleans. The mareschals are busy completing their arrangements at Paris. » He then gave an account of the battle; and Napoleon instantly ordered his carriage for Paris. They had already proceeded a mile and a half on the road. The same conversation proceeded, and we give it as preserved, because it marks the character of the principal personage, and the tone of his feelings, much better than these can be collected from his expressions upon more formal occasions, and when he had in view some particular purpose.¹

¹ It is taken from a work which has remarkable traces

General Belliard reminded him there were no longer any troops in Paris. « It matters not,» said Napoleon; « I will find the national guard there. The army will join me to-morrow, or the day after, and I will put things on a proper footing.»—« But I must repeat to your majesty, you cannot go to Paris. The national guard, in virtue of the treaty, mount guard at the barriers, and though the allies are not to enter till seven o'clock in the morning, it is possible they may have found their way to the outposts, and that your Majesty may find Russian or Prussian parties at the gates, or on the Boulevards.»—« It is all one—I am determined to go there—My carriage!—Follow me with your cavalry.»—« But, Sire, your Majesty will expose Paris to the risk of storm or pillage. More than 20,000 men are in possession of the heights—for myself, I have left the city in consequence of a convention, and cannot therefore return.»—« What is that convention? who has concluded it?»—« I cannot tell, Sire; I only know from the Duke of Treviso that such exists, and that I must march to Fontainebleau.»—« What is Joseph about?—Where is the Minister at War?»—« I do not know; we have received orders from neither of them during the whole day. Each

of authenticity, entitled *Mémoires, pour servir à l'Histoire de la Campagne de 1814, par le Général Kock*. See also, *Memoirs of the Operations of the Allied Armies*, already quoted.

mareschal acted on his own responsibility. They have not been seen to-day with the army—At least not with the Duke of Treviso's corps.»—«Come, we must to Paris—nothing goes right when I am absent—they do nothing but make blunders.»

Berthier and Caulaincourt joined in trying to divert the Emperor from his purpose. He never ceased demanding his carriage. Caulaincourt announced it, but it did not come up. Napoleon strode on with hurried and unequal steps, asking repeated questions concerning what had been already explained. «You should have held out longer,» he said, «and tried to wait for the arrival of the army. You should have raised Paris, which cannot surely like the entrance of the Russians. You should have put in motion the national guard, whose disposition is good, and intrusted to them the defence of the fortifications which the minister has caused to be erected, and which are well furnished with artillery. Surely the citizens could have defended these, while the troops of the line fought upon the heights and in the plain?»—«I repeat to you, Sire, that it was impossible. The army of 15,000 or 18,000 men has resisted one of 100,000 for four hours, expecting your arrival. There was a report of it in the city, which spread to the troops. They redoubled their exertions. The national guard has behaved extremely

well, both as sharp-shooters and in defence of the wretched redoubts which protected the barriers.»—« It is astonishing. How many cavalry had you? »—« Eighteen hundred horse, Sire, including the brigade of Dautencourt. »—« Montmartre, well fortified and defended by heavy cannon, should have been impregnable. »—« Luckily, Sire, the enemy were of your opinion, and approached the heights with much caution. But there was no occasion, we had not above seven six pounders. »—« What can they have made of my artillery? I ought to have had more than two hundred guns, and ammunition to serve them for a month. »—« The truth is, Sire, that we had only field-artillery, and at two o'clock we were obliged to slacken our fire for want of ammunition. »—« Go, go—I see every one has lost their senses. This comes of employing people who have neither common sense nor energy. Well! Joseph imagines himself capable of conducting an army; and Clarke, a mere piece of routine, gives himself the airs of a great minister; but the one is no better than a ——, and the other a —— ——, or a traitor, for I begin to believe what Savary said of him. »—The conversation going on in this manner, they had advanced a mile farther from the Cour de France, when they met a body of infantry under General Curial. Napoleon inquired after the Duke of Treviso, to whose

corps d'armée they belonged, and was informed he was still at Paris.

It was then, that, on the pressing remonstrances of his officers, who saw that in going on to Paris he was only rushing on death or captivity, Napoleon at length turned back; and having abandoned the strong inflexible impulse which would have carried him thither at all adventures, he seems to have considered his fate as decided, or at least to have relaxed considerably in the original vehemence which he opposed to adversity.

He returned to the Cour de France, and gave orders for disposing the forces, as they should come up, on the heights of Longjumeau, behind the little river of Essonne. Desirous, at the same time, of renewing the negotiation for peace, which, on successes of an ephemeral description, he had broken off at Châtillon, Napoleon dispatched Caulaincourt to Paris, no longer to negotiate, but to receive and submit to such terms as the allied sovereigns might be inclined to impose upon him. He returned to Fontainebleau the same night. He did not take possession of any of the rooms of state, but chose a private and more retired apartment. Among the many strange transactions which had taken place in that venerable and ancient palace, its halls were now to witness one the most extraordinary.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Allied Sovereigns issue a Proclamation that they will not treat with Buonaparte.—A Provisional Government is named by the Conservative Senate, who also decree the forfeiture of Napoleon.—This decree is sanctioned by declarations from all the Public Bodies in Paris.—The legality of these proceedings discussed.—Feelings towards Napoleon, of the Lower Classes, and of the Military.—On 4th April, Buonaparte issues a document, abdicating the throne of France.—His subsequent agitation, and wish to continue the war.—The deed is finally dispatched.

WHILE Napoleon breathed nothing save the desire of recovering by war what war had taken from him, or at least that of making such a peace as should leave him at the head of the French government, political events were taking place in Paris which pointed directly at the overthrow of his power.

His great military talents, together with his extreme inflexibility of temper, had firmly impressed the allied monarchs with the belief, that no lasting peace could be made in Europe while he remained at the head of the French nation. Every concession which he

had seemed willing to make at different times, had been wrung from him by increasing difficulties, and was yielded with such extreme reluctance, as to infer the strongest suspicion that they would all be again resumed should the league of the allies be dissolved, or their means of opposing his purposes become weaker. When, therefore, Caulaincourt came to Paris on the part of his master, with power to subscribe to all and each of the demands made by the allies, he was not indeed explicitly refused audience; but, before he was admitted to a conference with the Emperor Alexander, to whom his mission was addressed, the sovereigns had come under engagements which precluded them altogether from treating with Napoleon.

When the Emperor of Russia halted, after the progress of the allied sovereigns through the city, it was at the hotel of Talleyrand. He was scarcely arrived there ere the principal Royalists, and those who had acted with them, waited on him to crave an audience. Besides the Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwartzenberg, were present General Pozzo di Borgo, Nesselrode, Lichtenstein, the Duke Dalberg, Baron Louis, the Abbé de Pradt, and others. Three points were discussed. 1. The possibility of a peace with Napoleon, upon sufficient guarantees.

2. The plan of a regency. 3. The restoration of the Bourbons.

The first proposition seemed inadmissible. The second was carefully considered. It was particularly urged that the French were indifferent to the cause of the Bourbons—that the allied monarchs would observe no mark of recollection of them exhibited by the people of France—and that the army seemed particularly averse to them. The united testimony of the French gentlemen present was offered to repel these doubts; and it was at length agreed, that the third proposition,—the restoration of the ancient family, and the ancient limits,—should be the terms adopted for the settlement of France. A proclamation was immediately dispersed, by which the sovereigns made known their determination not to treat with Buonaparte or any of his family.

But more formal evidence, in the shape of legal procedure, was necessary to establish the desire of the French people to coincide in the proposed change of government. The public body which ought naturally to have taken the lead on such an important affair, was the Legislative Assembly, in whom Napoleon's constitution vested some ostensible right of interference when the state was in danger; but so far had the Emperor been from recognizing such a power in practice, that the

instant when the Assembly assumed the right of remonstrating with him, though in the most respectful terms, he suspended their functions, and spurned them from the footstool of his throne, informing them, that not they, but HE, was the representative of the people, from whom there lay no appeal, and beside whom no body in the state possessed power and efficacy. This legislative council, therefore, being dispersed and prorogued, could not take the initiative upon the present occasion.

The searching genius of Talleyrand sought an organ of public opinion where few would have looked for it,—in the Conservative Senate, namely, whose members had been so long the tools of Buonaparte's wildest projects, and the echoes of his most despotic decrees,—that very body, of which he himself said, with equal bitterness and truth, that they were more eager to yield up national rights than he had been to demand the surrender, and that a sign from him had always been an order for the Senate, who hastened uniformly to anticipate and exceed his demands. Yet when, on the summons of Talleyrand, who knew well with whom he was dealing, this Senate was convoked, in a meeting attended by sixty-six of their number, forming a majority of the body, they at once, and without hesitation, named a Provisional Government, consisting of Talleyrand, Beurnonville, Jaucourt, Dal-

berg, and the Abbé de Montesquieu; men recommended by talents and moderation, and whose names, known in the Revolution, might, at the same time, be a guarantee to those who dreaded a renovation of the old despotic government with the restoration of the ancient race of kings.

On the 2d and 3d of April, the axe was laid to the roots. A decree of the Senate sent forth the following statement:—1st, That Napoleon, after governing for some time with prudence and wisdom, had violated the constitution, by raising taxes in an arbitrary and lawless manner, contrary to the tenor of his oath.—2d, That he had adjourned without necessity the Legislative Body, and suppressed a report of that assembly, besides disowning its right to represent the people.—3d, That he had published several unconstitutional decrees, particularly those of 5th March last, by which he endeavoured to render national a war, in which his own ambition alone was interested.—4th, That he had violated the constitution by his decrees respecting state prisons.—5th, That he had abolished the responsibility of ministers, confounded together the different powers of the state, and destroyed the independence of judicial authorities.—6th, That the liberty of the press, constituting one of the rights of the nation, had been uniformly subjected to the arbitrary censure of his police;

while, at the same time, he himself had made use of the same engine to fill the public ear with invented fictions, false maxims, doctrines favourable to despotism, and insults upon foreign governments.—7th, That he had caused acts and reports, adopted by the Senate, to be altered by his own authority, before publication.—8th, That instead of reigning, according to his oath, for the honour, happiness, and glory of the French nation, he had put the finishing-stroke to the distresses of the country, by a refusal to treat on honourable conditions—by the abuse which he had made of the means intrusted to him in men and money—by abandoning the wounded, without dressing or sustenance—and by pursuing measures, of which the consequences have been the ruin of towns, the depopulation of the country, famine and pestilence. From all these inductive causes, the Senate, considering that the Imperial government, established by the decree of 28th Floréal, in the year XII, had ceased to exist, and that the manifest desire of all Frenchmen was to obtain an order of things, of which the first result should be peace and concord among the great members of the European family: therefore, the Senate declared and decreed, 1st, That Napoleon Buonaparte had forfeited the throne, and the right of inheritance established in his family.—2d, That the people and army of France were disengag-

ed and freed from the oath of fidelity, which they had taken to Napoleon and his constitution.

About eighty members of the Legislative Body, at the summons of the Provisional Government, assembled on the 3d April, and formally adhered to the above Decree of Forfeiture. The consequences of these bold measures showed, either that Napoleon had in reality never had more than a slight hold on the affections of the people of France, or that the interest they took in his fortunes had been in a great degree destroyed by the fears and passions excited by the immediate crisis. Even before the Senate could reduce its decree into form, the Council-General of the department of the Seine had renounced Napoleon's authority, and imputed to him alone the present disastrous state of the country. The decree of the Senate was followed by declarations from all the public bodies in and around Paris, that they adhered to the Provisional Government, and acquiesced in the Decree of Forfeiture. Numerous individuals, who had been favoured and enriched by Buonaparte, were among the first to join the tide when it set against him. But it had been always his policy to acquire adherents, by addressing himself rather to men's interests than to their principles; and many of his friends so gained, naturally became examples of the po-

litic observation, « that if a prince places men in wealthy circumstances, the first thing they think of, in danger, is how to preserve the advantages they have obtained, without regard to his fate to whom they owe them.»

We do not believe that it occurred to any person while these events were passing, to question either the formality or the justice of the doom of forfeiture against Napoleon; but Time has called out many authors, who, gained by the brilliancy of Napoleon's reputation, and some of them bound to him by ties of gratitude or friendship, have impugned, more or less directly, the formality of the Senate's procedure, as well as the justice of their sentence. We, therefore, feel it our duty to bestow some consideration upon this remarkable event in both points of view.

The objection proposed against the legality of the Senate's acting as the organ of the people, in pronouncing the doom of forfeiture, rests upon the idea, that the right of dethroning the sovereign, who shall be guilty of oppression beyond endurance, can only be exercised in a peculiar and formal manner, or, as our law-phrase goes, « according to the statute made and provided in that case.» This seems to take a narrow view of the subject. The right of redressing themselves under such circumstances does not belong to, and is not limited by, any peculiar forms of civil govern-

ment. It is a right which belongs to human nature under all systems whatsoever. It exists in every government under the sun, from that of the Dey of Algiers to the most free republic that ever was constructed. There is, indeed, much greater latitude for the exercise of arbitrary authority, in some governments than in others. An Emperor of Morocco may, with impunity, bathe his hands to the elbows in the blood of his subjects, shed by his own hand, but even in this the most absolute of despotisms, there are peculiar limits which cannot be passed by the sovereign without the exercise of the natural right of resistance on the part of his subjects, although their system of government be as arbitrary as words can declare it to be, and the Emperor is frequently dethroned and slain by his own guards.

In limited governments, on the other hand, like that of Great Britain, the law imposes bounds, beyond which the royal authority shall not pass; but it makes no provision for what shall take place, should a monarch, as in the case of James II., transgress the social compact. The constitution averts its eyes from contemplating such an event—indeed, it is pronounced impossible; and when the emergency did arrive, and its extrication became a matter of indispensable necessity, it was met and dealt with as a concurrence of circumstances which had not happened before, and

ought never to be regarded as being possible to occur again. The foreigner who peruses our constitution for the forms of procedure competent in such an event as the Revolution, might as well look in a turnpike act for directions how to proceed in a case resembling that of Phaeton.

If the mode of shaking off an oppressive yoke, by declaring the monarchy abdicated or forfeited, be not a fixed form in a regular government, but left to be provided for by a convention or otherwise, as a case so calamitous and so anomalous should demand, far less was it to be supposed that a constitution like that of France, which Buonaparte had studiously deprived of every power and means of checking the executive, should contain a regular form of process for declaring the crown forfeited. He had been as careful as a despot could, to leave no bar in existence before which the public might arraign him ; but will it be contended, that the public had therefore forfeited its natural right of accusing and of obtaining redress? If he had rendered the Senate the tame drudges which we have described, and prorogued the Legislative Body by an arbitrary coup d'état, was he therefore to escape the penalty of his misgovernment? On the contrary, the nation of France, like Great Britain at the time of the Revolution 1688, was to proceed as it best could in taking

care, *Ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*. The Senate was not, perhaps, the best organ for expressing public opinion, but it was the only one Napoleon had left within reach, and therefore it was seized upon and made use of. That it was composed of men who had so long gone on with Napoleon's interest, and now were able to keep up in course with him no longer, made his misrule even yet more glaring, and the necessity of the case more evident.

It is of far more importance to be enabled to form an accurate judgment respecting the *justice* of the sentence of forfeiture pronounced against this eminent man, than upon its mere formality. That we may examine this question with the impartiality it deserves, we must look upon it not only divested of our feelings as Britons, but as unconnected with the partisans either of the Bourbons or of Buonaparte. With these last there could be no room either for inquiry or conviction. The Royalist must have been convinced that Napoleon deserved, not deprivation only, but death also, for usurping the throne of his rightful sovereign; and the Buonapartist, on the other hand, would hold it cowardly treason to desert the valiant Emperor, who had raised France to such a state of splendour by his victories, more especially to forsake him in the instant when Fortune was looking black upon his cause. There could

be no argument between these men, save with their good swords in a fair field.

But such decided sentiments were not entertained upon the part of the great bulk of the French nation. A large number of the middle classes, in particular, remembering the first terrors of the Revolution, had showed their willingness to submit to the yoke which gradually assumed a despotic character rather than, by a renewed struggle for their liberties, to run the risk of reviving the days of Terror and Proscription. It is in the person of such an individual, desirous of the honour and advantage of his country, and anxious, at the same time, for the protection of his own family and property, that we now endeavour to consider the question of Napoleon's forfeiture.

The mind of such a person would naturally revert to the period, when Buonaparte, just returned from Egypt, appeared on the stage like a deity descending to unloose a perplexing knot, which no human ingenuity could extricate. Our citizen would probably admit that Napoleon used the sword a little too freely in severing the intricacies of the noose; or, in plain words, that the cashiering the Council of Five Hundred, at the head of his grenadiers, was an awkward mode of ascending to power in a country which still called itself free. This feeling, however, would be

greatly overbalanced by recollecting the use which was made of the power thus acquired; the subjugation, to wit, of foreign enemies, the extinction of civil dissensions, the protection of property, and, for a time, of personal liberty also. Napoleon's having elevated France from the condition of a divided and depressed country, in the immediate apprehension of invasion, into that of arbitress of Europe, would at once justify committing the chief authority to such able hands, and excuse the means he had used for attaining it; especially in times when the violent and successive changes under which they had long suffered had made the nation insensible to irregularities like those attached to the revolution of the 18th Brumaire. Neither would our citizen probably be much shocked at Napoleon's assuming the crown. Monarchy was the ancient government of France, and successive changes had served to show that they could not fix on any other form of constitution, labour how they would, which was endowed with the same degree of permanence. The Bourbons had, indeed, the claim by birth to mount that throne, were it to be again erected. But they were in exile, separated by civil war, party prejudices, the risk of reaction, and a thousand other difficulties, which seemed at the time absolutely insurmountable. Buonaparte was standing under the canopy, he grasped

the regal sceptre in his hand; his assuming the royal seat passed almost as a matter of course.

Our supposed Parisian has next to review a course of years of such brilliancy as to baffle criticism, and charm reason to silence, till the undertakings of the Emperor seem to rise above each other in wonder, each being a step towards the completion of that stupendous pyramid, of which the gradations were to be formed by conquered provinces, until the refractory and contumacious isle of Britain should be added to complete the pile, on the top of which was destined to stand the armed form of Napoleon, trampling the world under his foot. This is the noble work which France and her monarch were in the act of achieving. It requires the sacrifice of children or relatives to fill their ranks; they go where Honour calls and Victory awaits them. These times, however, are overclouded; there come tidings that the stone heaved by such portentous exertions so high up the hill, has at length recoiled on him who laboured to give it a course contrary to nature. It is then that the real quality of the fetters, hitherto gilded over by success, begins to be felt, and the iron enters into the soul. The parent must not weep aloud for the child—the Emperor required his service;—the patriot must not speak

a word on public affairs—the dungeon waits for him.

While news of fresh disasters from Spain and Moscow were every day arriving, what comfort could a citizen of France find in adverting to past victories? These had brought on France the hatred of Europe, the tears of families, the ruin of fortunes, general invasion, and well nigh national bankruptcy. Every year had the children of France undergone decimation—taxes, to the amount of fifteen hundred millions of francs yearly, had succeeded to the four hundred millions imposed under the reign of the Bourbons—the few remaining ships of France rotted in her harbours—her bravest children were slaughtered on their native soil—a civil war was on the point of breaking out—one half of France was overrun by the foreign enemy. Was this most melancholy state of the country brought about in defending strongly, but unfortunately, any of the rights of France? No—She might have enjoyed her triumphs in the most profound peace. Two wars with Spain and Russia, which gave fire to this dreadful train of calamities, were waged for no national or reasonable object, but merely because one half of Europe could not satisfy the ambition of one man. Again, our citizen inquires, whether, having committed the dreadful error

of commencing these wars, the Emperor has endeavoured to make peace with the parties injured? He is answered, that repeated terms of peace have been offered to Napoleon, upon condition of ceding his conquest, but that he had preferred hazarding the kingdom of France, to yielding up that which he termed his *glory*, a term which he successively conferred on whatever possession he was required to surrender; that even at Châtillon, many days passed when he might have redeemed himself by consenting that France should be reduced within the limits which she enjoyed under the Bourbons; but that the proposal, when half admitted, had been retracted by him in consequence of some transient success; and finally, that in consequence of this intractability and obstinacy, the allied sovereigns had solemnly declared they would not enter into treaty with him, or those who acted with him. Our citizen would naturally look about for some means of escaping the impending danger, and would be informed that the peace which the allied princes refused to Buonaparte, they held out with ready hand to the kingdom of France under any other government. He would learn that if these terms were accepted, there was every prospect that a secure and lasting peace would ensue; if refused, the inevitable consequence would be a battle between two large armies fought under the walls of Paris, which

city was almost certain to be burnt, whichever party got the advantage.

In consequence of this information, the citizen of Paris would probably be able to decide for himself. But if he inquired at a jurist, he would be informed that Napoleon held the crown not by right of blood, but by the choice, or rather permission of the people, as an administrator bound to manage for their best advantage.

Now every legal obligation may be unloosed in the same way in which it is formed. If, therefore, Napoleon's government was no longer for the advantage of France, but, on the contrary, tended plainly to her ruin, she had a right to rid herself of him, as of a servant unfit for duty, or as if mariners had taken aboard their vessel a comrade intended to act as pilot, but who had proved a second Jonas, whom it was necessary to sacrifice to appease a storm which had come upon them through his misconduct. Upon such reasoning, certainly neither unwise nor unpatriotic, the burghers of Paris, as well as all those who had any thing to lose in the struggle, may be supposed to have acted.

The lower, or rather the lowest class of inhabitants, were not accessible to the same arguments. They had been bequeathed to Buonaparte as an heirloom of the Republic, of which he has been truly called the heir.

His police had industriously maintained connexions amongst them, and retained in pay and in dependence on the government, their principal leaders. Names had changed around men of that ignorant condition, without their feeling their situation much altered. The Glory of France was to them as inspiring a watch-word as the Rights of Man had been; and their quantum of sous per day, when employed, as they frequently were, upon the public works, was no bad exchange for Liberty and Equality, after they had arrived at the discovery of the poor cobbler, who exclaimed, — « Fine Liberty, indeed, that leaves me cobbling shoes as she found me! » Bulletins and *Moniteurs*, which trumpeted the victories of Napoleon, were as animating and entertaining to the inhabitants of the suburbs as the speeches of republican orators; for in such triumphs of a nation, the poor have a share as ample as their wealthier neighbours. The evils of the war were also less felt by the poor. Their very poverty placed them beneath taxation, and the children, of whom they were bereaved by the Conscription, they must otherwise have parted with, in all probability, that they might seek subsistence elsewhere. In the present circumstances, he hatred to foreigners, proper to persons of their class, came to aid their admiration of Buonaparte. In a battle, they had some-

thing to gain and nothing to lose, saving their lives, of which their national gallantry induced them to take small heed. Had Napoleon been in Paris, he might have made much use of this force. But in his absence, the weight of property, prudently directed, naturally bore down the ebullitions of those who had only brute strength to throw into the balance, and the overwhelming force of the allied army kept the suburbs in subjection.

The disposition of the military was a question of deep importance. Accustomed to follow Napoleon through every climate, and every description of danger, unquestionably their attachment to his person was of the most devoted and enthusiastic kind. But this can only be said in general of the regimental officers, and the soldiers. The mareschals, and many of the generals, were tired of this losing war. These, with many also of the inferior officers, and even of the soldiers, began to consider the interest of their general, and that of France, as having become separated from each other. It was from Paris that the changes had emanated by which the army was governed during every revolutionary crisis; and they were now required to engage in an undertaking which was likely to be fatal to that metropolis. To advance upon the allies, and fight a battle under the capital, was to expose to destruction the city,

whose name to every Frenchman has a sacred and inviolable sound. The *mareschals*, in particular, were disgusted with a contest, in which each of them had been left successively without adequate means of resistance, to stem, or attempt to stem, a superior force of the enemy; with the certainty, at the same time, to be held up to public censure in the next bulletin in case of failure, though placed in circumstances which rendered success impossible. These generals were more capable than the army at large of comprehending the nature of the war in which they were likely to be engaged, and of appreciating the difficulties of a contest which was to be maintained in future without money, ammunition, or supplies, excepting such as should be extorted from that part of the country over which they held military possession; and this, not only against all the allies now in France, and the insurgent corps of Royalists in the west, but also against a second or reserved line of three or four hundred thousand Russians, Austrians, and other allied troops, which had not yet crossed the frontier.

Besides, the soldiers with which an attack upon the allied army must have been undertaken, were reduced to a disastrous condition, by their late forced marches, and the want of succours and supplies of every description; the cavalry were in a great measure dismount-

ed; the regiments not half complete; the horses unshod; the physical condition of the army bad, and its moral feelings depressed, and unfit for enterprise. The period seemed to have arrived, beyond which Napoleon could not maintain his struggle, without destruction to himself, to Paris, and to France. These sentiments were commonly entertained among the French general officers. They felt their attachment to Napoleon placed in opposition to the duty they owed their country by the late decree of the Senate, and they considered the cause of France as the most sacred. They had received intelligence from Beurnonville of what had passed at Paris, and considering the large proportion of the capital which had declared against Buonaparte, and that an assault on Paris must have occasioned much effusion of French blood, and have become the signal of civil war, the mareschals and principal general officers agreed they could not follow Napoleon in such an attack on the city, or against the allies' line of defence around it, both because, in a military point of view, they thought the attempt desperate, considering the state of the army, and because, in a political position, they regarded it as contrary to their duty as citizens.

In the night betwixt the 2d and 3d of April, Caulaincourt returned from his mission to Paris. He reported, that the allies persisted

in their determination to entertain no treaty with Buonaparte; but he was of opinion, that the scheme of a r egency by the Empress, as the guardian of their son, might even yet be granted. Austria, he stated, was favourable to such an arrangement, and Russia seemed not irreconcilably averse to it. But the abdication of Buonaparte was a preliminary condition. As this news circulated among the mareschals, it fixed them in their resolution not to march against Paris, as, in their opinion, the war ought to be ended by this personal sacrifice on the part of Napoleon.

Buonaparte had not, probably, expected this separation between the duties of a soldier and of a citizen. On the 4th April, he reviewed a part of his troops, addressed them on the display of the white colours in France by some factious persons, reminded them that the three-coloured cockade was that of victory and honour, and that he intended to march on the capital, to punish the traitors by whom it had been vilified. He was answered by shouts of « Paris, Paris! » and had no reason to fear that the troops would hesitate to follow him in his last effort. The orders were given to advance the Imperial quarters from Fontainebleau to Essonne.

But after the review was over, Berthier, Ney, Macdonald, Caulaincourt, Oudinot, Bertrand, and other officers of the highest rank,

followed the Emperor into his apartment, and explained to him the sentiments which they entertained on the subject of the proposed movement, their opinion that he ought to negotiate on the principle of personal abdication, and the positive determination which most of them had formed, on no account to follow him in an attack upon Paris.

There is no doubt that, by an appeal to officers of an inferior rank and consideration, young Seids, who knew no other virtue than a determined attachment to their chief, through good or evil, Napoleon might have filled up, in a military point of view, the vacancy which the resignation of the mareschals must have created in his list of generals. But those who urged to him this unpleasant proposal, were the fathers of the war, the well-known brave and beloved leaders of large armies. Their names might be individually inferior to his own; but with what feelings would the public hear that he was deprived of those men, who had been so long the pride and dread of war? and what was likely to be the sentiments of the soldiery, upon whom the names of Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot, and others, operated like a war-trumpet?

With considerable reluctance, and after long debate, Napoleon assumed the pen, and, acquiescing in the reasoning pressed upon him, wrote the following words, which we

translate as literally as possible, as showing Napoleon's power of dignity of expression, when deep feeling predominated over his affectation of antithesis and orientalism of composition :—

“The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to quit France, and even to relinquish life, for the good of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from those of the regency in the person of the Empress, and from the maintenance of the laws of the empire. Done at our Palace of Fontainebleau, 4th April, 1814.”

Caulaincourt and Ney were appointed to be bearers of this important document, and commissioners to negotiate with the allies, concerning the terms of accommodation to which it might be supposed to lead. Caulaincourt was the personal representative of Napoleon; and Ney, who had all along been zealous for the abdication, was a plenipotentiary proposed by the rest of the marshals. Napoleon, it is said, wished to add Marmont; but he was absent with the troops quartered at Essonne, who, having been withdrawn in consequence of the treaty of Paris, were disposed of in that position. Macdonald was suggested as the

third plenipotentiary, as an officer whose high character best qualified him to represent the army. Napoleon hesitated; for though he had employed Macdonald's talents on the most important occasions, he knew that the *mareschal* disliked upon principle the arbitrary character of his government; and they had never stood to each other in any intimate or confidential relation. He consulted his minister, Maret. « Send the Duke of Tarentum, » replied the minister. « He is too much a man of honour not to discharge, with religious fidelity, any trust which he undertakes. » *Mareschal* Macdonald's name was added to the commission accordingly.

When the terms were in the act of being adjusted, the *mareschals* desired to know upon what stipulations they were to insist on Napoleon's personal behalf. « Upon none— » said Buonaparte. « Do what you can to obtain the best terms for France; for myself, I ask nothing. » They were instructed particularly to obtain an armistice until the treaty should be adjusted. Through the whole scene Buonaparte conducted himself with firmness; but he gave way to a natural emotion when he had finally signed the abdication. He threw himself on a sofa, hid his face for a few minutes, and then looking up, with that smile of persuasion which he had so often found irresistible, he implored his brethren of the field

to annul the resolutions they had adopted, to destroy the papers, and follow him yet again to the contest. "Let us march," he said; "let us take the field once more! We are sure to beat them, and to have peace on our own terms." The moment would have been invaluable to a historical painter. The marshals were deeply affected, but could not give way. They renewed their arguments on the wretched state of the army,—on the reluctance with which the soldiers would move against the Senate,—on the certainty of a destructive civil war,—and on the probability that Paris would be destroyed. He acquiesced once more in their reasoning, and permitted them to depart on their embassy.

CHAPTER IX.

Victor, and others of the French Mareschals, give in their adhesion to the Provisional Government.—Marmont enters into a separate Convention; but assists at the Conferences held at Paris, leaving Souham second in command of his Army.—The Commanders have an Interview with the Emperor Alexander.—Souham enters, with his Army, into the lines of the Allies; in consequence, the Allied Sovereigns insist upon the unconditional Submission of Napoleon.—His Behaviour on learning this result—and reluctant acquiescence.—The Terms granted to him—Considerations as to their Policy.—Disapprobation of Lord Castlereagh.—General Desertion of Napoleon.—The Empress Maria Louisa returns to her Father's Protection.—Death of Joséphine.—Singular Statement made by Baron Fain, Napoleon's Secretary, of the Emperor's attempt to commit Suicide.—After this he becomes more resigned.—His Views respecting the best Policy of the Bourbons, as his successors.—Leaves Fontainebleau, on his journey to Elba, on 28th April.

THE plenipotentiaries of Napoleon had been directed to confer with Marmont at Essonne, in their road to the capital. They did so, and obtained information there which rendered their negotiation more pressing. Several of

the generals who had not been at Fontainebleau, and had not had an opportunity of acting in conjunction with the military council which assembled there, had viewed the act of the Senate, adhered to by the other public bodies, as decisively closing the reign of Buonaparte, or as indicating the commencement of a civil war. Most of them were of opinion, that the interest of an individual, whose talents had been as dangerous to France as the virtues of Cæsar had been to Rome, ought not to be weighed against the welfare of the capital and the whole nation. Victor, Duke of Belluno, had upon these principles given in his personal adhesion to the Provisional Government, and his example was followed by many others.

But the most important proselyte to the royal cause was the Mareschal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, who, lying at Essonne with ten or twelve thousand men, formed the advance of the French army. Conceiving himself to have the liberty of other Frenchmen, to attend at this crisis to the weal of France, rather than to the interest of Napoleon alone, and with the purpose of saving France from the joint evils of a civil and domestic war, he made use of the position in which he was placed, to give a weight to his opinion, which that of no other individual could have possessed at the moment. Mareschal Marmont, after negotiation

with the Provisional Government on the one hand, and Prince Schwartzenberg on the other, had entered into a convention on his own account, and that of his corps d'armée, by which he agreed to march the division which he commanded within the lines of cantonment held by the allies, and thus renounced all idea of further prosecuting the war. On the other hand, the mareschal stipulated for the freedom and honourable usage of Napoleon's person, should he fall into the hands of the allies. He obtained also a guarantee, that his corps d'armée should be permitted to retreat into Normandy. This convention was signed at Chevilly upon 3d April.

This step has been considered as a defection on the part of General Marmont; but why is the choice of a side, betwixt the Provisional Government and the Emperor, more a desertion in that general than in any other of the mareschals or authorities who presently after took the very same step? And if the Duke of Ragusa by that means put further bloodshed out of question, ought it not to be matter of rejoicing (to borrow an expression of Talleyrand's on a similar occasion), that the mareschal's watch went a few minutes faster than those of his colleagues?

When Macdonald and Ney communicated to Marmont that they were bearers of Napoleon's abdication, and that he was joined with

them in commission, that mareschal asked why he had not been summoned to attend with the others at Fontainebleau, and mentioned the convention which he had entered into, as acting for himself. The Duke of Tarentum expostulated with him on the disadvantage which must arise from any disunion on the part of the principal officers of the army. Respecting the council at Fontainebleau, he stated it had been convened under circumstances of such sudden emergency, that there was no time to summon any other than those mareschals who were close at hand, lest Napoleon had in the mean while moved forward the army. The commissioner's entreated Marmont to suspend the execution of the separate convention, and to come with them to assist at the conferences to be held at Paris. He consented, and mounted into Mareschal Ney's carriage, leaving General Souham, who, with all the other generals of his division, two excepted, were privy to the convention, in command of his corps d'armée, which he gave orders should remain stationary.

When the mareschals arrived in Paris, they found the popular tide had set strongly in favour of the Bourbons; their emblems were everywhere adopted; and the streets resounded with *Vive le Roi*. The populace seemed as enthusiastic in their favour as they had been indifferent a few days before. All boded an

unfavourable termination for their mission, so far as respected the proposed Regency.

The names and characters of the commissioners instantly obtained their introduction to the Emperor Alexander, who received them with his natural courtesy. « On the general subject of their mission,» he said, « he could not treat but in concert with his allies.» But he enlarged on the subject of Napoleon personally. « He was my friend,» he said; « I loved and honoured him. His ambition forced me into a dreadful war, in which my capital was burnt, and the greatest evils inflicted on my dominions. But he is unfortunate, and these wrongs are forgotten. Have you nothing to propose on his personal account? I will be his willing advocate.» The *mareschals* replied, that Napoleon had made no conditions for himself whatever. The Emperor would hardly believe this until they showed him their instructions, which entirely related to public affairs. The Emperor then asked if they would hear a proposal from him. They replied with suitable respect and gratitude. He then mentioned the plan, which was afterwards adopted; that Buonaparte should retain the Imperial title over a small territory, with an ample revenue, guards, and other emblems of dignity. « The place,» continued the Emperor of Russia, « may be Elba, or some other island.»

With this annunciation the commissioners of Buonaparte were dismissed for the evening.

Mareschal Marmont had done all in his power to stop the military movement which he had undertaken to execute, thinking it better, doubtless, to move hand in hand with his brethren, than to act singly in a matter of such responsibility; but accident precipitated what he desired to delay. Napoleon had summoned to his presence Count Souham, who commanded the division at Essonne in Marmont's absence. No reason was given for this command, nor could any thing be extracted from the messenger, which indicated the purpose of the order. Souham was therefore induced to suspect, that Napoleon had gained intelligence of the Convention of Chevilly. Under this apprehension, he called the other generals who were in the secret to a midnight council, in which it was determined to execute the Convention instantly by passing over with the troops within the lines of the allies, without awaiting any farther orders from Mareschal Marmont. The division was put in movement upon the 5th of April, about five o'clock, and marched for some time with much steadiness, the movement being, as they supposed, designed for a flank attack on the position of the allies; but when they perceived that their progress was watched, without being interrupted,

by a column of Bavarian troops, they began to suspect the real purpose. When this became known, a kind of mutiny took place, and some Polish lancers broke off from the main body, and rode back to Fontainebleau; but the instinct of discipline prevailed, and the officers were able to bring the soldiery into their new quarters at Versailles. They were not, however, reconciled to the measure in which they had been made partakers, and in a few days afterwards broke out into an actual mutiny, which was not appeased without considerable difficulty.

Meanwhile the commissioners of Buonaparte were admitted to a conference with the allied sovereigns and ministers in full council, but which, it may be conjectured, was indulged to them more as a form, that the allies might treat with due respect the representatives of the French army, than with any purpose on the part of the sovereigns of altering the plan to which they had pledged themselves by a proclamation, upon the faith of which thousands had already acted. However, the question whether to adopt the projected regency, or the restoration of the Bourbons, as a basis of agreement, was announced as a subject of consideration to the meeting. The marshals pleaded the cause of the Regency. The generals Beurnonville and Dessolles were heard in reply to the commissioners from Fontaine-

bleau, when, ere the debate had determined, news arrived of the march of Marmont's division to Versailles. The commissioners were astounded with this unexpected intelligence; and the Emperor took the opportunity to determine that the allies would not treat with Buonaparte save on the footing of unconditional abdication. With this answer, mitigated with the offer of an independent principality for their ancient commander, the mareschals returned to Fontainebleau, while the Senate busied themselves to arrange the plan of a free constitution, under which the Bourbons were to be called to the throne.

Napoleon, in the retirement of Fontainebleau mused on the future with little hope of advantage from the mission of the mareschals. He judged that the sovereigns, if they listened to the proposal of a regency, would exact the most formidable guarantees against his own interference with the government; and that under his wife Maria Louisa, who had no talent for public business, France would probably be managed by an Austrian committee. He again thought of trying the chance of war, and might probably have settled on the purpose most congenial to his nature, had not Colonel Gourgaud brought him the news that the division of Marmont had passed into the enemy's cantonments on the morning of the 5th April. "The ungrateful man!" he said.

« But he is more to be pitied than I am. » He ought to have been contented with this reflection, for which, even if unjust to the marshal, every one must have had sympathy and excuse. But the next day he published a sort of appeal to the army on the solemnity of a military engagement, as more sacred than the duty of a patriot to his country; which he might more gracefully have abstained from, since all knew already to what height he carried the sentiments of arbitrary power.

When the marshals returned, he listened to the news of the failure of their negotiation, as a termination which he had expected. But to their surprise, recollecting his disinterested behaviour when they parted, he almost instantly demanded what provision had been made for him personally, and how he was to be disposed of? They informed him that it was proposed he should reside as an independent sovereign, « in Elba, or somewhere else. » Napoleon paused for a moment. « Somewhere else? » he exclaimed. « That must be Corsica. No, no—I will have nothing to do with Corsica.—Elba? Who knows any thing of Elba? Seek out some officer who is acquainted with Elba. Look out what books or charts can inform us about Elba. »

In a moment he was as deeply interested in the position and capabilities of this little islet,

as if he had never been Emperor of France, nay, almost of the world. But Buonaparte's nature was egotistical. He well knew how little it would become an Emperor resigning his crown to be stipulating for his future course of life, and had reason to conclude, that by playing his character with magnanimity, he might best excite a corresponding liberality in those with whom he treated. But when the die was cast, when his fate seemed fixed, he examined with minuteness what he must afterwards consider as his sole fortune. To turn his thoughts from France to Elba, was like the elephant, which can transport artillery, applying his trunk to gather pins. But Napoleon could do both easily, because he regarded these two objects not as they differed from each other, but as they belonged, or did not belong, to himself.

After a night's consideration, the fallen Chief took his resolution, and dispatched Caulaincourt and Macdonald once more to Paris, to treat with the allies upon the footing of an unconditional abdication of the empire. The document was couched in these words: "The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, he declares that he renounces for himself and his heirs the throne of France and Italy, because

there is no personal sacrifice, not even that of life itself, which he is not ready to make for the interest of France.»

Notwithstanding his having adopted this course, Napoleon, until the final adjustment of the treaty, continued to nourish thoughts of breaking it off. He formed plans for carrying on the war beyond the Loire—for marching to join Augereau—for penetrating into Italy, and uniting with Prince Eugène. At one time he was very near again summoning his troops to arms, in consequence of a report too hastily transmitted by a general much attached to him (General Alix, we believe), stating that the Emperor of Austria was displeased at the extremities to which they urged his son-in-law, and was resolved to support him. On this report, which proved afterwards totally unfounded, Napoleon required the marshals to give him back his letter of abdication. But the deed having been formally executed, and duly registered and delivered, the marshals held themselves bound to retain it in their own hands, and to act upon it as the only means of saving France at this dreadful crisis.

Buonaparte reviewed his Old Guard in the court-yard of the castle; for their numbers were so diminished that there was space for them in that narrow circuit. Their zealous acclamations gratified his ears as much as ever; but when he looked on their diminished ranks,

his heart failed ; he retired into the palace, and summoned Oudinot before him. « May I depend on the adhesion of the troops ? » he said.— Oudinot replied in the negative, and reminded Napoleon that he had abdicated,— « Ay, but under conditions, » said Napoleon.— « Soldiers do not understand conditions, » said the marshal ; « they look upon your power as terminated. »— « Then on that side all is over, » said Napoleon ; « let us wait the news from Paris. »

Macdonald, Caulaincourt, and Ney, soon afterwards arrived at Fontainebleau, with the treaty which they had concluded on the bases already announced by the Emperor of Russia, who had taken the principal share in drawing it up. Under his sanction, the commissioners had obtained such terms as never before were granted to a dethroned monarch, and which have little chance to be conceded to such a one in future, while the portentous consequences are preserved by history. By these conditions, Buonaparte was to remain Emperor, but his sway was to be limited to the island of Elba, in the Mediterranean, in extent twenty leagues, and containing about twelve thousand inhabitants. He was to be recognized as one of the crowned heads of Europe— was to be allowed body-guards, and a navy on a scale suitable to the limits of his dominions ; and to maintain this state, a revenue of six

millions of francs, over and above the revenues of the Isle of Elba, were settled on him. Two millions and a half were also assigned in pensions to his brothers, Joséphine, and the other members of his family,—a revenue more splendid than ever King of England had at his personal disposal. It was well argued, that if Buonaparte deserved such advantageous terms of retirement, it was injustice to dethrone him. In other points, the terms of this treaty seemed as irreconcilable with sound policy as they are with all former precedents. The name, dignity, military authority, and absolute power of an Emperor, conferred on the potentate of such Liliputian domains, were ludicrous if it was supposed that Napoleon would remain quiet in his retreat, and hazardous if he should seek the means of again agitating Europe.

It was no compliment to Buonaparte's taste to invest him with a poor shadow of his former fortune, since for him the most honourable retirement would have been one which united privacy with safety and competence, not that which maintained a vain parade around him, as if in mockery of what he had formerly been. But time fatally showed, what many augured from the beginning, that so soon as his spirit should soar beyond the narrow circle into which it had been conjured, the imperial title and authority, the assistance of devoted body-guards and experienced counsellors, formed a

stake with which, however small, the venturesome gamester might again enter upon the hazardous game of playing for the kingdoms he had lost. The situation of Elba, too, as the seat of his new sovereignty, so near to Italy, and so little removed from France, seemed calculated on purpose to favour his resurrection at some future period as a political character.

The other stipulations of this extraordinary treaty divided a portion of revenue secured to Napoleon among the members of his family. The most rational was that which settled upon Maria Louisa and her son the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, in full sovereignty. Except this, all the other stipulations were to be made good at the expense of France, whose Provisional Government were never consulted upon the terms granted.

It was not till the bad effects of this singular treaty had been experienced, that men inquired why and on what principle it was first conceded. A great personage has been mentioned as its original author. Possessed of many good and highly honourable qualities, and a steady and most important member of the great European confederacy, it is doing the memory of the Emperor Alexander no injury to suppose, that he remembered his education under his French tutor, La Harpe, and was not altogether free from its effects. With

these there always mingles that sort of showy sensibility which delights in making theatrical scenes out of acts of beneficence, and enjoying in full draughts the popular applause which they are calculated to excite. The contagious air of Paris,—the shouts,—the flattery,—the success to a point hitherto un hoped for,—the wish to drown unkindness of every sort, and to spread a feast from which no one should rise discontented,—the desire, to sum up all in one word, to show MAGNANIMITY in the hour of success, seem to have laid Alexander's heart more open than the rules of wisdom or of prudence ought to have permitted. It is generous to give, and more generous to pardon; but to bestow favours and forgiveness at the same moment, to secure the future fortune of a rival who lies prostrate at his feet, to hear thanks and compliments on every hand, and from the mouths even of the vanquished, is the most fascinating triumph of a victorious sovereign. It is only the consequences which teach him how thriftless and unprofitable a prodigality of beneficence often proves, and that in the attempt so to conduct great national measures that they shall please and satisfy every one, he must necessarily encroach on the rules both of justice and wisdom, and may occasion, by a thoughtless indulgence of romantic sensibility, new trains of misfortune to

the whole civilized world. The other active parties in the treaty were the King of Prussia, who had no motive to scan with peculiar scrutiny a treaty planned by his ally, the Emperor Alexander, and the Emperor of Austria, who could not in delicacy object to stipulations in favour of his son-in-law.

The marshals, on the other hand, gladly received what probably they never would have stipulated. They were aware, that the army would be conciliated with every mark of respect, however incongruous, which could be paid to their late Emperor, and perhaps knew Buonaparte so well as to believe that he might be gratified by preserving the external marks of imperial honour, though upon so limited a scale. There was one power whose representative foresaw the evils which such a treaty might occasion, and remonstrated against them. But the evil was done, and the particulars of the treaty adjusted, before Lord Castlereagh came to Paris. Finding that the Emperor of Russia had acted for the best, in the name of the other allies, the English minister refrained from risking the peace which had been made in such urgent circumstances, by insisting upon his objections. He refused, however, on the part of his government, to become a party to the treaty farther than by acceding to it so far as the territorial arrangements

were concerned; but he particularly declined to acknowledge, on the part of England, the title of Emperor, which the treaty conferred on Napoleon.

Yet when we have expressed with freedom all the objections to which the treaty of Fontainebleau seems liable, it must be owned, that the allied sovereigns showed policy in obtaining an accommodation on almost any terms, rather than renewing the war, by driving Napoleon to despair, and inducing the mareschals, from a sense of honour, again to unite themselves with his cause.

When the treaty was read over to Napoleon, he made a last appeal to his Mareschals, inviting them to follow him to the Loire or to the Alps, where they would avoid what he felt an ignominious composition. But he was answered by a general silence. The generals whom he addressed knew but too well that any efforts which he could make must be rather in the character of a roving chieftain, supporting his condottieri by the plunder of the country, and that country their own, than that of a warlike monarch, waging war for a specific purpose, and at the head of a regular army. Napoleon saw their determination in their looks, and dismissed the council, promising an answer on an early day, but in the mean time declining to ratify the treaty, and de-

manding back his abdication from Caulaincourt; a request which that minister again declined to comply with.

Misfortunes were now accumulating so fast around Napoleon, that they seemed of force sufficient to break the most stubborn spirit.

Gradually the troops of the allies had spread as far as the banks of the Loire. Fontainebleau was surrounded by their detachments; on every side the French officers, as well as soldiers, were leaving his service; he had no longer the power of departing from the palace in safety.

Paris, so late the capital in which his will was law, and where to have uttered a word in his disparagement would have been thought worse than blasphemy, was become the scene of his rival's triumph and his own disgrace. The shouts which used to wait on the Emperor were now welcoming to the Tuileries Monsieur, the brother of the restored King, who came in character of lieutenant-general of the kingdom;—the presses, which had so long laboured in disseminating the praises of the Emperor were now exerting all their art and malice in exposing his real faults, and imputing to him such as had no existence. He was in the condition of the huntsman who was devoured by his own hounds.

It was yet more affecting to see courtiers,

dependents, and even domestics, who had lived in his smiles, dropping off under different pretexts to give in their adhesion to the Bourbons, and provide for their own fortune in the new world which had commenced at Paris. It is perhaps in such moments, that human nature is seen in its very worst point of view; since the basest and most selfish points of the character, which, in the train of ordinary life, may never be awakened into existence, show themselves, and become the ruling principle, in such revolutions. Men are then in the condition of well-bred and decorous persons, transferred from an ordinary place of meeting to the whirlpool of a crowd, in which they soon demean themselves with all the selfish desire of their own safety or convenience, and all the total disregard for that of others, which the conscious habits of politeness have suppressed, but not eradicated.

Friends and retainers dropt from the unfortunate Napoleon, like leaves from the fading tree; and those whom shame or commiseration yet detained near his person waited but some decent pretexts, like a rising breath of wind, to sweep them also away.

The defection included all ranks, from Berthier, who shared his bosom councils, and seldom was absent from his side, to the Ma-

meluke Rustan, who slept across the door of his apartment, and acted as a body-guard. It would be absurd to criticise the conduct of the poor African,¹ but the fact and mode of Berthier's departure must not escape notice. He asked permission to go to Paris about some business, saying he would return next day. « He will *not* return,» said Napoleon, calmly, to the Duke of Bassano.—« What!» said the minister, « can these be the adieus of Berthier?»—« I tell you, yes—he will return no more.» The abdicated Sovereign had, however, the consolation of seeing, that the attachment of several faithful servants was only tried and purified by adversity, as gold is by fire.

The family-connexions, and relatives of Napoleon, as well as his familiar friends, were separated from him in this general wreck. It will not be forgotten, that on the day before the battle of Paris, several members of Napoleon's administration set out with the Empress Maria Louisa, to escape from the approaching action. They halted at Blois, where they were joined by Joseph, and other members of the Buonaparte family. For some time this reunion maintained the character and language of a council of Regency, dispersed proclama-

¹ The man had to plead his desire to remain with his wife and family, rather than return to a severe personal thralldom.

tions, and endeavoured to act as a government. The news of the taking of Paris, and the subsequent events, disposed Joseph and Jérôme Buonaparte to remove themselves to the provinces beyond the Loire. But Maria Louisa refused to accompany them, and while the point was yet contested, Count Schouwalow, one of the Austrian ministers, arrived to take her under his protection. The ephemeral Regency then broke up, and fled in different directions; the brothers of Buonaparte taking the direction of Switzerland, while Cardinal Fesch and the mother of Napoleon retreated to Rome.

Maria Louisa made more than one effort to join her husband, but they were discouraged on the part of Napoleon himself, who, while he continued to ruminate on renewing the war, could not desire to have the Empress along with him in such an adventure. Shortly afterwards, the Emperor of Austria visited his daughter and her son, then at Rambouillet, and gave her to understand that she was, for some time at least, to remain separate from her husband, and that her son and she were to return to Vienna along with him. She returned, therefore, to her father's protection.

It must be also here mentioned, as an extraordinary addition to this tale of calamity, that Joséphine, the former wife of Buonaparte,

did not long survive his downfall. It seemed as if the Obi-woman of Martinico had spoke truth; for at the time when Napoleon parted from the sharer of his early fortunes, his grandeur was on the wane, and her death took place but a few weeks subsequent to his being dethroned and exiled. The Emperor of Russia had visited this lady, and showed her some attention, with which Napoleon, for reasons we cannot conjecture, was extremely displeas- ed. She was amply provided for by the treaty of Fontainebleau, but did not survive to reap any benefit from the provision, as she shortly after sickened and died at her beautiful villa of Malmaison. She was buried on the 3d of June, at the village of Rueil. A vast number of the lower class attended the obsequies; for she had well deserved the title of patroness of the poor.

While we endeavour to sum the mass of misfortunes with which Buonaparte was overwhelmed at this crisis, it seems as if Fortune had been determined to show that she did not intend to reverse the lot of humanity, even in the case of one who had been so long her favourite, but that she retained the power of depressing the obscure soldier, whom she had raised to be almost King of Europe, in a degree as humiliating as his exaltation had been splendid. All that three years before seemed in-

alienable from his person was now reversed. The victor was defeated, the monarch was dethroned, the ransomer of prisoners was in captivity, the general was deserted by his soldiers, the master abandoned by his domestics, the brother parted from his brethren, the husband severed from the wife, and the father torn from his only child. To console him for the fairest and largest empire that ambition ever lorded it over, he had, with the mock name of Emperor, a petty isle, to which he was to retire, accompanied by the pity of such friends as dared express their feelings, the unrepressed execrations of many of his former subjects, who refused to regard his present humiliation as an amends for what he had made them suffer during his power, and the ill-concealed triumph of the enemies into whose hands he had been delivered.

A Roman would have seen, in these accumulated disasters, a hint to direct his sword's point against his breast; a man of better faith would have turned his eye back on his own conduct, and having read, in his misuse of prosperity, the original source of those calamities, would have remained patient and contrite under the consequences of his ambition. Napoleon belonged to the Roman school of philosophy; and it is confidently reported, especially by Baron Fain, his secretary, though it

has not been universally believed, that he designed, at this extremity, to escape from life by an act of suicide.

The Emperor, according to this account, had carried with him, ever since the retreat from Moscow, a packet containing a preparation of opium, made up in the same manner with that used by Condorcet for self-destruction. His valet-de-chambre, in the night betwixt the 12th and 13th of April, heard him arise and pour something into a glass of water, drink, and return to bed. In a short time afterwards, the man's attention was called by sobs and stifled groans—an alarm took place in the château—some of the principal persons were roused, and repaired to Napoleon's chamber. Yvan, the surgeon who had procured him the poison, was also summoned; but hearing the Emperor complain that the operation of the potion was not quick enough, he was seized with a panic terror, and fled from the palace at full gallop. Napoleon took the remedies recommended, and a long fit of stupor ensued, with profuse perspiration. He awakened much exhausted, and surprised at finding himself still alive; he said aloud, after a few moments' reflection, «Fate will not have it so,» and afterwards appeared reconciled to undergo his destiny, without similar attempts at personal violence. There is, as we have

already hinted, a difference of opinion concerning the cause of Napoleon's illness, some imputing it to indigestion. The fact of his having been very much indisposed is, however, indisputable. A general of the highest distinction transacted business with Napoleon on the morning of the 13th of April. He seemed pale and dejected, as from recent and exhausting illness. His only dress was a night-gown and slippers, and he drank from time to time a quantity of tisan, or some such liquid, which was placed beside him, saying he had suffered severely during the night, but that his complaint had left him.

After this crisis, and having ratified the treaty which his mareschals had made for him, Napoleon appeared more at his ease than he had been for some time before, and conversed frankly with his attendants upon the affairs of France.

He owned, that, after all, the government of the Bourbons would best suit France, as tending to reconcile all parties. «Louis,» he said, «has talents and means; he is old and infirm; he will not, I think, chuse to give his name to a bad reign. If he is wise, he will occupy my bed, and content himself with changing the sheets. But,» he continued, «he must treat the army well, and take care not to

look back on the past, otherwise his reign will be of brief endurance. »

He also mentioned the inviolability of the sale of the national domains, as the woof upon which the whole web depended; cut one thread of it, he said, and the whole will be unravelled. Of the ancient noblesse and people of fashion, he spoke in embittered language, saying they were an English colony in the midst of France, who desired only their own privileges, and would act as readily for as against him.

« If I were in Louis's situation, » he said, « I would not keep up the Imperial Guard. I myself have treated them too well, not to have insured their attachment; and it will be *his* policy to dismiss them, giving good pensions to such officers and soldiers as chuse to retire from service, and preferment in the line to others who incline to remain. This done, he should chuse another guard from the army at large. »

After these remarkable observations, which, in fact, contained an anticipation of much that afterwards took place, Napoleon looked around upon his officers, and made them the following exhortation :—« Gentlemen, when I remain no longer with you, and when you have another government, it will become you to attach yourselves to it frankly, and serve it as faith-

fully as you have served me. I request, and even command you to do this; therefore, all who desire leave to go to Paris have my permission to do so, and those who remain here will do well to send in their adhesion to the government of the Bourbons.» Yet, while Napoleon used this manful and becoming language to his followers, on the subject of the change of government, it is clear that there lurked in his bosom a persuasion that the Bourbons were surrounded with too many difficulties to be able to surmount them, and that Destiny had still in reserve for him a distinguished part in the annals of Europe.

In a private interview with Macdonald, whose part in the abdication we have mentioned, he expressed himself warmly satisfied with his conduct, regretting that he had not more early known his value, and proposed he should accept a parting gift. «It is only,» he said, anticipating the mareschal's objections, «the present of a soldier to his comrade.» And indeed it was chosen with great delicacy, being a beautiful Turkish sabre, which Napoleon had himself received from Ibrahim Bey while in Egypt.

Napoleon having now resigned himself entirely to his fate, whether for good or evil, prepared, on the 20th April, to depart for his place of retreat. But first, he had the painful

task of bidding farewell to the body in the universe most attached to him, and to which he was probably most attached,—his celebrated Imperial Guard. Such of them as could be collected were drawn out before him in review. Some natural tears dropped from his eyes, and his features had the marks of strong emotion while reviewing for the last time, as he must then have thought likely, the companions of so many victories. He advanced to them on horseback, dismounted, and took his solemn leave. «All Europe,» he said, «had armed against him; France herself had deserted him, and chosen another dynasty. He might,» he said, «have maintained with his soldiers a civil war of years, but it would have rendered France unhappy. Be faithful,» he continued (and the words were remarkable), «to the new sovereign whom France has chosen. Do not lament my fate; I will always be happy while I know you are so. I could have died—nothing was easier—but I will always follow the road of honour. I will record with my pen the deeds we have done together. I cannot embrace you all, but I embrace your general»—(he pressed the general to his bosom).—«Bring hither the eagle,»—(he embraced the standard, and concluded,)—«Beloved eagle, may the kisses I bestow on you long resound in the hearts of the brave!—Adieu, my chil-

dren,—Adieu, my brave companions,—Surround me once more—Adieu.* Drowned in grief, the veteran soldiers heard the farewell of their dethroned leader; sighs and murmurs broke from their ranks, but the emotion burst out in no threats or remonstrances. They appeared resigned to the loss of their general, and to yield, like him, to necessity.

CHAPTER X.

Commissioners appointed to escort Napoleon—He leaves Fontainebleau on the 20th April.—His interview with Augereau at Valence.—Expressions of popular dislike towards Napoleon in the South of France—Fears for his personal safety.—His own alarm, agitation, and precautions.—He arrives at Fréjus—and embarks on board the *Undaunted*, with the British and Austrian Commissioners.—Arrives at Elba on 4th May—and lands at Porto Ferrajo.

UPON his unpleasant journey, Napoleon was attended by Bertrand and Drouet, honourably faithful to the adverse fortunes of the master who had been their benefactor when in prosperity. Four delegates from the allied powers accompanied him to his new dominions. Their names were,—General Schouwaloff, on the part of Russia; the Austrian general, Kohler; Colonel Sir Niel Campbell, as representing Great Britain; and the General Baron Truchsess Waldbourg, as the commissioner of Prussia. Napoleon received the three first with much personal civility, but seemed to resent the presence of the representative of Prussia, a country which had been at one time the subject of his scorn, and always of his hatred. It galled him that she should assume an immediate share in deciding upon his fate.

He received the English commissioner with particular expressions of esteem, saying he desired to pass to Elba in an English vessel, and was pleased to have the escort of an English officer. « Your nation, » he said, « has an elevated character, for which I have the highest esteem. I desired to raise the French people to such a pitch of sentiment, but——. » He stopt, and seemed affected. He spoke with much civility to the Austrian general, Kohler, but expressed himself somewhat bitterly on the subject of Russia. He even hinted to the Austrian, that should he not be satisfied with his reception in Elba, he might possibly chuse to retire to Great Britain; and asked General Kohler, whether he thought he would not receive protection from them. « Yes, sire, » replied the Austrian, « the more readily, that your Majesty has never made war in that country. »

Napoleon proceeded to give a farewell audience to the Duke of Bassano, and seemed nettled when an aide-de-camp, on the part of General Bertrand, announced that the hour fixed for departing was arrived. « Good, » he said. « This is something new.—Since when is it that our motions have been regulated by the watch of the Grand Mareschal? We will not depart till it is our pleasure—perhaps we will not depart at all. » This, however, was only a momentary sally of impatience.

Napoleon left Fontainebleau the 20th April, 1814, at eleven o'clock in the morning. His retinue occupied fourteen carriages, and required relays of thirty pairs of post-horses. On the journey, at least during its commencement, he affected a sort of publicity, sending for the public authorities of towns, and investigating into the state of the place, as he was wont to do on former occasions. The cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were frequently heard, and seemed to give him fresh spirits. On the other hand, the mayors and sub-prefects, whom he interrogated concerning the decay of many of the towns, displeased him by ascribing the symptoms of dilapidation to the war, or the conscription; and in several places the people wore the white cockade, and insulted his passage with shouts of *Vive le Roi*.

In a small barrack near Valence, Napoleon, upon 24th April, met Augereau, his old companion in the campaigns of Italy, and in some degree his tutor in the art of war. The Mareschal had resented some of the reflections which occurred in the bulletins, censuring his operations for the protection of Lyons. When, therefore, he issued a proclamation to his army, on the recent change, he announced Napoleon as one who had brought on his own ruin, and yet dared not die. An angry interview took place and the following words are said to have been exchanged between them:— « I have thy proclamation,» said Napoleon. « Thou hast

betrayed me.»—«Sire,» replied the marshal, «it is you who have betrayed France and the army, by sacrificing both to a frantic spirit of ambition.»—«Thou hast chosen thyself a new master,» said Napoleon.—«I have no account to render to you on that score,» replied the general.—«Thou hast no courage,» replied Buonaparte.—«'T is thou hast none,» replied the general; and turned his back, without any mark of respect, on his late master.¹

At Montelinart, the exiled Emperor heard the last expressions of regard and sympathy. He was now approaching Provence, a region of which he had never possessed the affections, and was greeted with execrations and cries of,—«Perish the Tyrant!»—«Down with the butcher of our children!» Matters looked worse as they advanced. On Monday, 25th April, when Sir Niel Campbell, having set out before Napoleon, arrived at Avignon, the officer upon guard anxiously inquired if the escort attending the Emperor was of strength sufficient to resist a popular disturbance, which was already on foot at the news of his arrival. The English commissioner entreated him to protect the passage of Napoleon by every means possible.

¹ *Itinéraire de Buonaparte*, p. 35. Augereau was an old republican, and had been ready to oppose Buonaparte on the day he dissolved the Legislative Body. He submitted to him during his reign, but was a severe censurer of his excessive love of conquest.—See Vol. VII. pp. 505-506.

It was agreed that the fresh horses should be posted at a different quarter of the town from that where it was natural to have expected the change. Yet the mob discovered and surrounded them, and it was with difficulty that Napoleon was saved from popular fury. Similar dangers attended him elsewhere, and, in order to avoid assassination, the Ex-Emperor of France was obliged to disguise himself as a postilion, or a domestic, anxiously altering from time to time the mode of his dress; ordering the servants to smoke in his presence; and inviting the commissioners, who travelled with him, to whistle or sing, that the incensed people might not be aware who was in the carriage. At Orgon, the mob brought before him his own effigy dabbled with blood, and stopped his carriage till they displayed it before his eyes; and, in short, from Avignon to La Calade, he was grossly insulted in every town and village, and, but for the anxious interference of the commissioners, he would probably have been torn to pieces. The unkindness of the people seemed to make much impression on him. He even shed tears. He showed also more fear of assassination than seemed consistent with his approved courage; but it must be recollected, that the danger was of a new and peculiarly horrible description, and calculated to appal many to whom the terrors of a field of battle were familiar. The

bravest soldier might shudder at a death like that of the De Witts. At La Calade he was equally nervous, and exhibited great fear of poison. When he reached Aix, precautions were taken by detachments of gendarmes, as well as by parties of the allied troops, to insure his personal safety.¹ At a château called Bouillidou, he had an interview with his sister Pauline. The curiosity of the lady of the house, and two or three females, made them also find their way to his presence. They saw a gentleman in an Austrian uniform. « Whom do you wish to see, ladies? »—« The Emperor Napoleon. »—« I am Napoleon. »—« You jest, sir, » replied the ladies.—« What! I suppose you expected to see me look more mischievous? Oh yes—confess that, since fortune is adverse to me, I must look like a rascal, a miscreant, a brigand. But do you know how all this has happened? Merely because I wished to place France above England. »

At length he arrived at Fréjus, the very port that received him, when, coming from Egypt, he was on the verge of commencing that astonishing career, now about to terminate, to

¹ This, indeed, had been previously arranged, as troops in considerable numbers were posted for his protection at Grenoble, Gap, and Sisteron, being the road by which he was expected to have travelled; but, perhaps with a view to try an experiment on his popularity, he took the route we have detailed.

all earthly appearance, at the very point from which he had started. He shut himself up in a solitary apartment, which he traversed with impatient and hasty steps, sometimes pausing to watch from the window the arrival of the vessels, one of which was to transport him from France, as it then seemed, for ever. The French frigate, the *Dryade*, and a brig called the *Inconstant*, had come from Toulon to Frejus, and lay ready to perform this duty. But, reluctant perhaps to sail under the Bourbon flag, Napoleon preferred embarking on board his Britannic Majesty's ship the *Undaunted*, commanded by Captain Usher. This vessel being placed at the direction of the British commissioner, Sir Niel Campbell, he readily acquiesced in Napoleon's wish to have his passage in her to Elba. It was eleven at night on the 28th ere he finally embarked, under a salute of twenty-one guns. « Adieu, Cæsar, and his fortune, » said the Russian envoy. The Austrian and British commissioners accompanied him on his voyage.¹

During the passage, Buonaparte seemed to recover his spirits, and conversed with great

¹ The Prussian Commissioner wrote an account of their journey, called *Itinéraire de Buonaparte, jusqu'à son embarquement à Fréjus*, Paris, 1815. The facts are amply confirmed by the accounts of his fellow-travellers. Napoleon always reckoned the pamphlet of General Truchsess Waldbourg, together with the account of De Pradt's

frankness and ease with Captain Usher and Sir Niel Campbell. The subject chiefly led to high-coloured statements of the schemes which he had been compelled to leave unexecuted, with severe strictures on his enemies, and much contempt for their means of opposition. The following particulars are amusing, and, so far as we know, have never appeared :—

He was inquisitive about the discipline of the vessel, which he commended highly, but assured Captain Usher, that, had his power lasted for five years longer, he would have had three hundred sail of the line. Captain Usher naturally asked how they were to be manned. Napoleon replied, that he had resolved on a naval conscription in all the seaports and sea-coast frontier of France, which would man his fleet, which was to be exercised in the Zuyder Zee, until fit for going to the open sea. The British officer scarce suppressed a smile as he replied, that the marine conscripts would make a sorry figure in a gale of wind.

To the Austrian envoy, Napoleon's constant subject was the enlarged power of Russia, which, if she could by any means unite Poland

Embassy to Poland, as the works calculated to do him most injury. Perhaps he was sensible that during this journey he had behaved beneath the character of a hero, or perhaps he disliked the publication of details, which inferred his extreme unpopularity in the South of France.

into a healthful and integral part of her army, would, he stated, overwhelm Europe.

On a subsequent occasion, the Emperor favoured his auditors with a new and curious history of the renewal of the war with England. According to this edition, the Isle of Malta was a mere pretext. Shortly after the peace of Amiens, he said, Mr Addington, then the English Prime Minister, proposed to him a renewal of Mr Pitt's commercial treaty with France; but that he, Napoleon, desirous to encourage the interior industry of France, had refused to enter into such a treaty, excepting upon terms of reciprocity; namely, that if France received so many millions of English import, England was to be obliged to take in return the same quantity of French productions. These terms were declined by Mr Addington, on which Napoleon declared there should be no treaty at all, unless his principles were adopted. "Then," replied Mr Addington, as quoted by Buonaparte, "there must be hostilities; for, unless the people of England have the advantages of commerce on the terms they are accustomed to, they will force me to declare war."—And the war took place accordingly, of which, he again averred, England's determination to recover the advantages of the treaty of commerce between Vergennes and Pitt, was the real cause.

"Now," he continued, kindling, as he spoke,

« England has no power which can oppose her system. She can pursue it without limits. There will be a treaty on very unequal terms, which will not afford due encouragement to the manufactures of France. The Bourbons are poor devils——» he checked himself,— « they are Grands-Seigneurs, content to return to their estates and draw their rents; but if the people of France see that, and become discontented, the Bourbons will be turned off in six months.» He seemed again to recollect himself like one who thinks he has spoken too much, and was perceptibly more reserved for the rest of the day.

This curious ebullition was concocted according to Napoleon's peculiar manner of blending what might be true in his narrative, with what was intended to forward his own purpose, and mingling it with so much falsehood and delusion, that it resembled what the English poet says of the Catholic Plot,

Some truth there was, but mix'd and dash'd with lies.

It is probable that, after the peace of Amiens, Lord Sidmouth might have wished to renew the commercial treaty; but it is absolutely false that Napoleon's declining to do so had any effect upon the renewal of hostilities. His prophecy that his own downfall would be followed by the English urging upon France a

disadvantageous commercial treaty, has proved equally false; and it is singular enough that he who, on board the *Undaunted*, declared, that entering into such a measure would be the destruction of the Bourbons, should, while at St Helena, ridicule and censure Lord Castlereagh for not having secured to Britain that commercial supremacy, the granting of which he had represented as the probable cause of such a result. Thus did his colouring, if not his facts, change according to the mood of the moment.

While on board the *Undaunted*, Napoleon spoke with great freedom of the facility with which he had outwitted and defeated the allies during the last campaign. «The Silesian army,» he said, «had given him most trouble. The old devil, Blucher, was no sooner defeated than he was willing to fight again.» But he considered his victory over Schwarzenberg as certain, save for the defection of Marmont. Much more he said, with great apparent frankness, and seemed desirous to make himself in every respect agreeable to his companions on board. Even the seamen, who at first regarded him with wonder, mixed with suspicion, did not escape the charm of his affability, by which they were soon won over, all excepting the boatswain Hinton, a tar of the old school, who could never hear the Emperor's praises without

muttering the vulgar but expressive phrase, « *Humbug.* »¹

With the same good-humour, Napoleon admitted any slight jest which might be passed, even at his own expense. When off Corsica, he proposed that Captain Usher should fire a gun to bring-to a fishing-boat, from which he hoped to hear some news. Captain Usher excused himself, saying such an act of hostility towards a neutral would *denationalize* her, in direct contradiction of Napoleon's doctrine concerning the rights of nations. The Emperor laughed heartily. At another time, he amused himself by supposing what admirable caricatures his voyage would give rise to in London. He seemed wonderfully familiar with that species of satire, though so peculiarly English.

Upon the 4th of May, when they arrived within sight of Porto Ferrajo, the principal town of Elba, which has a very fine harbour, they found the island in some confusion. The inhabitants had been recently in a state of insurrection against the French, which had been quieted by the governor and the troops giving in their adhesion to the Bourbon government.

¹ The honest boatswain, however, could understand and value what was solid in Napoleon's merits. As he had to return thanks in name of the ship's company, for 200 louis with which the Emperor presented them, he wished his honour good health, and better luck the next time.

This state of things naturally increased Napoleon's apprehensions, which had never entirely subsided since the dangers he underwent in Provence. Even on board the *Undaunted*, he had requested that a sergeant of marines might sleep each night on the outside of his cabin-door, a trusty domestic also mounting guard within. He now showed some unwillingness, when they made the island, to the ship running right under the batteries; and when he first landed in the morning, it was at an early hour, and in disguise, having previously obtained from Captain Usher, a sergeant's party of marines to attend him.

Having returned on board to breakfast, after his incognito visit to his island, the Emperor of Elba, as he may now be styled, went on shore in form, about two o'clock, with the commissioners, receiving, at leaving the *Undaunted*, a royal salute. On the beach, he was received by the governor, prefect, and other official persons, with such means of honour as they possessed, who conducted him to the *Hôtel de Ville* in procession, preceded by a wretched band of fiddlers. The people welcomed him with many shouts. The name of Buonaparte had been unpopular among them as Emperor of France, but they anticipated considerable advantages from his residing among them as their own particular sovereign.

CHAPTER XI.

Elba—Napoleon's mode of life and occupation there.—
 Effects produced by his residence at Elba upon the
 adjoining Kingdom of Italy.—He is visited by his Mother
 and the Princess Pauline—and by a Polish Lady.—Sir
 Niel Campbell the only Commissioner left at Elba.—
 Napoleon's Conversations on the State of Europe.—His
 pecuniary Difficulties—and fears of Assassination.—His
 impatience under these causes of complaint.—Motley
 nature of his Court—He withdraws himself within
 Court-forms from intercourse with Sir Niel Campbell.
 —Symptoms of some approaching crisis.—A part of
 the Old Guard disbanded, who return to France.—
 Napoleon escapes from Elba.—Fruitless pursuit by Sir
 Niel Campbell.

ELBA, to the limits of which the mighty em-
 pire of Napoleon was now contracted, is an
 island opposite to the coast of Tuscany, about
 sixty miles in circumference. The air is healthy,
 excepting in the neighbourhood of the salt-
 marshes. The country is mountainous, and,
 having all the florid vegetation of Italy, is,
 in general, of a romantic character. It pro-
 duces little grain, but exports a considerable
 quantity of wines; and its iron ore has been

famous since the days of Virgil, who describes Elba as

Insula inexhaustis chalybum generosa metallis.

There are also other mineral productions. The island boasts two good harbours, and is liberally productive of vines, olives, fruits and maize. Perhaps, if an empire could be supposed to exist within such a brief space, Elba possesses so much both of beauty and variety, as might constitute the scene of a summer-night's dream of sovereignty. Buonaparte seemed to lend himself to the illusion, as, accompanied by Sir Niel Campbell, he rode in his usual exploring mood, around the shores of his little state. He did not fail to visit the iron mines, and being informed the annual produce was 500,000 francs, «These then,» he said, «are mine.» But being reminded that he had conferred that revenue on the Legion of Honour, he exclaimed, «Where was my head when I gave such a grant! But I have made many foolish decrees of that sort.»

One or two of the poorer class of inhabitants knelt, and even prostrated themselves when they met him. He seemed disgusted, and imputed this humiliating degree of abasement to the wretchedness of their education, under the auspices of the monks. On these excursions he showed the same apprehension

of assassination which had marked his journey to Fréjus. Two couriers, well armed, rode before him, and examined every suspicious spot. But as he climbed a mountain above Ferrajo, and saw the ocean approach its feet in almost every direction, the expression broke from him, accompanied with a good-humoured smile, « It must be confessed my isle is very little.»

He professed, however, to be perfectly resigned to his fate; often spoke of himself as a man politically dead, and claimed credit for what he said upon public affairs, as having no remaining interest in them. He professed his intentions were, to devote himself exclusively to science and literature. At other times, he said he would live in his little island, like a justice of peace in a country town in England.

The character of Napoleon, however, was little known to himself, if he seriously thought that his restless and powerful mind could be satisfied with the investigation of abstract truths, or amused by the leisure of literary research. He compared his abdication to that of Charles V., forgetting that the Austrian Emperor's retreat was voluntary, that he had a turn towards mechanical pursuits, and that, even with these means of solace, Charles became discontented with his retirement. The character of Buonaparte was, on the contrary,

singularly opposed to a state of seclusion. His propensities continued to be exactly of the same description at Elba, which had so long terrified and disquieted Europe. To change the external face of what was around him; to imagine extensive alterations, without accurately considering the means by which they were to be accomplished; to work within his petty province such alterations as its limits permitted; to resume, in short, upon a small scale, those changes which he had attempted upon that which was most magnificent; to apply to Elba the system of policy which he had exercised so long in Europe, was the only mode in which he seems to have found amusement and exercise for the impatient energies of a temper, accustomed from his early youth to work upon others, but apt to become lethargic, sullen, and discontented, when it was compelled, for want of other exercise, to recoil upon itself.

During the first two or three weeks of his residence in the island of Elba, Napoleon had already planned improvements, or alterations and innovations at least, which, had they been to be carried into execution with the means which he possessed, would have perhaps taken his lifetime to execute. It was no wonder, indeed, accustomed as he had been to speak the word, and to be obeyed, and to consider the improvements which he meditated as

those which became the head of a great empire, that he should not have been able to recollect that his present operations respected a petty islet, where magnificence was to be limited, not only by utility, but by the want of funds.

- In the course of two or three days' travelling, with the same rapidity which characterized his movements in his frequent progresses through France, and showing the same impatience of rest or delay, Napoleon had visited every spot in his little island, mines, woods, salt-marshes, harbours, fortifications, and whatever was worthy of an instant's consideration, and had meditated improvements and innovations respecting every one of them. Till he had done this he was impatient of rest; and, having done so, he lacked occupation.

One of his first, and perhaps most characteristic proposals, was to aggrandize and extend his Liliputian dominions by occupation of an uninhabited island, called Rianosa, which had been left desolate on account of the frequent descents of the corsairs. He sent thirty of his guards, with ten of the independent company belonging to the island, upon this expedition—(what a contrast to those which he had formerly directed!) sketched out a plan of fortifications, and remarked, with complacency, « Europe will say that I have already made a conquest.»

In an incredibly short time Napoleon had also planned several roads, had contrived means to convey water from the mountains to Porto Ferrajo, designed two palaces, one for the country, the other in the city, a separate mansion for his sister Pauline, stables for one hundred and fifty horses, a lazaretto, buildings for accommodation of the tunny fishery, and salt-works on a new construction at Porto Longone. The Emperor of Elba proposed, also, purchasing various domains, and had the price estimated; for the inclination of the proprietor was not reckoned essential to the transaction. He ended by establishing four places of residence in the different quarters of the island; and as his amusement consisted in constant change and alteration, he travelled from one to another with the restlessness of a bird in a cage, which springs from perch to perch, since it is prevented from winging the air, its natural element. It seemed as if the magnitude of the object was not so much the subject of his consideration, providing it afforded immediate scope for employing his constant and stimulated desire of activity. He was like the thorough-bred gamester, who, deprived of the means of depositing large stakes, will rather play at small game than leave the table.

Napoleon placed his court also upon an ambitious scale, having more reference to what he

had so long been, than to what he actually now had been reduced to, while, at the same time, the furniture and internal accommodations of the imperial palace were meaner by far than those of an English gentleman of ordinary rank.¹ The proclamation of the French governor, on resigning his authority to Napoleon, was well and becomingly expressed; but the spiritual mandate of the Vicar-general Arrighi, a relation of Buonaparte's, which was designed to congratulate the people of Elba on becoming the subjects of the Great Napoleon, was extremely ludicrous. «Elevated to the sublime honour of receiving the anointed of the Lord,» he described the exhaustless wealth which was to flow in upon the people, from the strangers who came to look upon the hero. The exhortation sounded as if the isle had become the residence of some non-descript animal, which was to be shown for money.

The interior of Napoleon's household, though reduced to thirty-five persons, still held the titles, and affected the rank, proper to an imperial court, of which it will be presently seen the petty sovereign made a political use. He displayed a national flag, having a red bend dexter in a white field, the bend

¹ On these subjects we are enabled to present the public with an accurate and interesting report, drawn up by Edward Hawke Locker, Esq., now secretary of Greenwich Hospital.

bearing three bees. To dignify his capital, having discovered that the ancient name of Porto Ferrajo was Comopoli (*i. e.* the city of Como), he commanded it to be called Cosmopoli, or the city of all nations.

His body-guard, of about 700 infantry and 80 cavalry, seemed to occupy as much of Napoleon's attention as the Grand Army did formerly. They were constantly exercised, especially in throwing shot and shells; and, in a short time, he was observed to be anxious about obtaining recruits for them. This was no difficult matter, where all the world had so lately been in arms, and engaged in a profession which many, doubtless, for whom a peaceful life had few charms, laid aside with regret, and longed to resume.

As early as the month of July, 1814, there was a considerable degree of fermentation in Italy, to which the neighbourhood of Elba, the residence of several members of the Buonaparte family, and the sovereignty of Murat, occasioned a general resort of Buonaparte's friends and admirers. Every day this agitation increased, and various arts were resorted to for disseminating a prospect of Napoleon's future return to power. Sundry parties of recruits came over to Elba from Italy to enlist in his guards, and two persons employed in this service were arrested at Leghorn, in whose possession were found written lists, containing the

names of several hundred persons willing to serve Napoleon. The species of ferment and discontent thus produced in Italy was much increased by the impolitic conduct of Prince Rospigliosi, the civil governor of Tuscany, who re-established in their full force every form and regulation formerly practised under the Dukes of Tuscany, broke up the establishment of the Museum, which had been instituted by Buonaparte's sister, and, while he returned to all the absurdities of the old government, relaxed none of the imposts which the French laid on.

Napoleon's conduct towards the refugees who found their way to Elba may be judged from the following sketch. On the 11th of July, Colomboni, commandant of a battalion of the 4th regiment of the line in Italy, was presented to the Emperor as newly arrived. «Well, Colomboni, your business in Elba?» — «First, to pay my duty to your Majesty; secondly, to offer myself to carry a musket among your guards.» — «That is too low a situation; you must have something better,» said «Napoleon, and instantly named him to an appointment of 1200 francs yearly, though it appears the Emperor himself was then in great distress for money.

About the middle of summer, Napoleon was visited by his mother, and his sister the Princess Pauline. At this time, too, he seems to have

expected to be rejoined by his wife Maria Louisa, who, it was said, was coming to take possession of her Italian dominions. Their separation, with the incidents which happened before Paris, was the only subject on which he appeared to lose temper. Upon these topics he used strong and violent language. He said, that interdicting him intercourse with his wife and son excited universal reprobation at Vienna—that no such instance of inhumanity and injustice could be pointed out in modern times—that the Empress was detained a prisoner, an orderly officer constantly attending upon her—finally, that she had been given to understand before she left Orleans, that she was to obtain permission to join him at the island of Elba, though it was now denied her. It was possible, he proceeded, to see a shade of policy, though none whatever of justice, in this separation. Austria had meant to unite the child of her sovereign with the Emperor of France, but was desirous of breaking off the connexion with the Emperor of Elba, as it might be apprehended that the respect due to the daughter of the house of Hapsburg would, had she resided with her husband, have reflected too much lustre on the abdicated sovereign.

The Austrian commissioner, General Köhler, on the other hand, insisted that the separation took place by the Empress Maria Louisa's con-

sent, and even at her request; and hinted that Napolcon's desire to have her society was dictated by other feelings than those of domestic affection. But allowing that Napoleon's view in so earnestly desiring the company of his wife might be political, we can see neither justice nor reason in refusing a request, which would have been granted to a felon condemned to transportation.

We have not thought it necessary to disturb the narrative of important events by noticing details which belong rather to romance; but as we are now treating of Napoleon in his more private character, a mysterious circumstance may be mentioned. About the end of August, 1814, a lady arrived at the Isle of Elba, from Leghorn, with a boy about five or six years old. She was received by Napoleon with great attention, but at the same time with an air of much secrecy, and was lodged in a small and very retired villa, in the most remote corner of the island; from whence, after remaining two days, she re-embarked for Naples. The Elbese naturally concluded that this must have been the Empress Maria Louisa and her son. But the individual was known by those near Napoleon's person to be a Polish lady from Warsaw, and the boy was the offspring of an intrigue betwixt her and Napoleon several years before. The cause of her speedy departure might be delicacy towards Maria Louisa, and the fear of affording

the court of Vienna a pretext for continuing the separation of which Napoleon complained. In fact, the Austrians, in defence of their own conduct, imputed irregularities to that of Buonaparte; but the truth of these charges would be no edifying subject of investigation.

About the middle of May, Baron Kohler took farewell of Napoleon, to return to Vienna. He was an Austrian general of rank and reputation; a particular friend and old schoolfellow of Prince Schwartzenberg. The scene of Napoleon's parting with this gentleman was quite pathetic on the Emperor's side. He wept as he embraced General Kohler, and entreated him to procure, if possible, his reunion with his wife and child—called him the preserver of his life—regretted his poverty, which prevented his bestowing on him some valuable token of remembrance—finally, folding the Austrian general in his arms, he held him there for some time, repeating expressions of the warmest attachment. This sensibility existed all upon one side; for an English gentleman, who witnessed the scene, having asked Kohler afterwards what he was thinking of while locked in the Emperor's embraces—« Of Judas Iscariot, » answered the Austrian.

After the departure of Baron Kohler, Colonel Sir Niel Campbell was the only one of the four commissioners who continued to remain at Elba by orders of the British Cabinet. It

was difficult to say what his office really was, or what were his instructions. He had neither power, title, nor means, to interfere with Napoleon's motions. The Emperor had been recognized by a treaty—wise or foolish, it was too late to ask—as an independent sovereign. It was therefore only as an envoy that Sir Niel Campbell could be permitted to reside at his court; and as an envoy also, not of the usual character, for settling affairs concerning the court from which he was dispatched, but in a capacity not generally avowed, the office, namely, of observing the conduct of that at which he was sent to reside. In fact, Sir Niel Campbell had no direct or ostensible situation whatever, and of this the French minister of Elba soon took advantage. Drouot, the Governor of Porto Ferrajo, made such particular inquiries into the character assumed by the British envoy, and the length of his stay, as obliged the latter to say that his orders were to remain in Elba till the breaking up of the Congress, which was now settling the affairs of Europe; but if his orders should direct him to continue there after that period, he would apply to have his situation placed on some recognized public footing, which he did not doubt would be respectable.

Napoleon did not oppose or murmur at the continued, though equivocal, residence of Sir Niel Campbell at Elba; he affected, on

the contrary, to be pleased with it. For a considerable time he even seemed to seek the society of the British envoy, held frequent intercourse with him, and conversed with apparent confidence upon public affairs. The notes of such conversations are now before us; and though it is, on the one hand, evident that Napoleon's expressions were arranged, generally speaking, on a premeditated plan, yet, on the other, it is equally certain, that his ardent temperament, when once engaged in discourse, led him to discover more of his own private thoughts than he would on cool reflection have suffered to escape him.

On the 16th September, 1814, for example, Sir Niel Campbell had an audience of three hours, during which, Napoleon, with his habitual impatience of a sedentary posture, walked from one end of the room to the other, and talked incessantly. He was happy, he said, that Sir Niel remained in Elba, *pour rompre la chimère* (to destroy, namely, the idea that he, Buonaparte, had further intention of disturbing the peace of Europe). « I think, » he continued, « of nothing beyond the verge of my little isles. I could have supported the war for twenty years, if I had chosen. I am now a deceased person, occupied with nothing but my family, my retreat, my house, my cows, and my poultry. » He then spoke in the highest terms of the English character,

protesting it had always had his sincere admiration, notwithstanding the abuse directed against it in his name. He requested the British envoy to lose no time in procuring him an English Grammar.—It is a pity Mr Hinton, the boatswain, was not present, to have accompanied this eulogy with his favourite ejaculation.

In the rest of the conversation the Elbese Emperor was probably more serious. He inquired with eagerness after the real state of France. Sir Niel Campbell informed him that all the information he had been able to collect ascribed great wisdom and moderation to the sovereign and government; but allowed that those who had lost good appointments, the prisoners of war who had returned from abroad, and great part of the army who remained embodied, were still attached to Napoleon. In answer, Buonaparte seemed to admit the stability of the throne, supported as it was by the mareschals and great officers; but he derided the idea of affording France the benefit of a free constitution. He said, the attempt to imitate that of Great Britain was a farce, a caricature. It was impossible, he observed, to imitate the two Houses of Parliament, for that respectable families, like those composing the aristocracy of England, did not now exist in France. He talked with bitterness of the cession of Belgium, and of

France being deprived of Antwerp. He himself spoke, he observed, as a spectator, without hopes or interest, for he had none; but thus to have mortified the French showed an ignorance of the national character. Their chief feeling was for pride and glory, and the allies need not look forward to a state of satisfaction and tranquillity under such circumstances as France was now placed in. « The French, » he said, « were conquered only by a great superiority of number, therefore were not humiliated; and the population had not suffered to the extent alleged, for he had always spared their lives, and exposed those of Italians, Germans, and other foreigners. » He remarked that the gratitude of Louis XVIII. to Great Britain was offensive to France, and that he was called in derision the King of England's Viceroy.

In the latter months of 1814, Sir Niel Campbell began to become sensible that Napoleon desired to exclude him from his presence as much as he possibly could, without positive rudeness. He rather suddenly entrenched himself within all the forms of an imperial court; and without affording the British envoy any absolute cause of complaint, or even any title to require explanation, he contrived, in a great measure, to debar him from opportunities of conversation. His only opportunity of obtaining access to Napoleon was on his re-

turn from short absences to Leghorn and Florence, when his attendance on the levee was matter of etiquette.

On such occasions, the tenor of Napoleon's prophecies was minatory of the peace of Europe. He spoke perpetually of the humiliation inflicted upon France, by taking from her Belgium and his favourite object, Antwerp. On the 30th of October, while enlarging on these topics, he described the irritable feelings of the nation, saying, every man in France considered the Rhine to be their natural boundary, and nothing could alter this opinion. There was no want, he said, of a population in France, martial beyond any other nation, by natural disposition, by the consequences of the Revolution, and by the idea of glory. Louis XIV., according to his account, notwithstanding all the misfortunes he had brought upon the nation, was still beloved, on account of the éclat of his victories, and the magnificence of his court. The battle of Rosbach had brought about the Revolution. Louis XVIII. totally mistook the character of the French in supposing, that either by argument, or by reasoning, or indulging them with a free constitution, he could induce them to sink into a state of peaceful industry. He insisted that the Duke of Wellington's presence at Paris was an insult on the French nation; that very strong discord prevailed in the country, and that the king had

but few friends, either in the army or among the people. Perhaps the king might try to get rid of a part of the army by sending them to Saint Domingo, but that, he observed, would be soon seen through; he himself had made a melancholy trial, with the loss of 30,000 men, which had proved the inutility of such expeditions.

He then checked himself, and endeavoured to show that he had no personal feeling or expectation from the revolutions he foretold. « I am a deccased man,» he said; « I was born a soldier; I have mounted a throne; I have descended from it; I am prepared for any fate. They may transport me to a distant shore, or they may put me to death here; I will spread my bosom open to the poniard. When merely General Buonaparte, I had property of my own acquiring—I am now deprived of all.»

On another occasion, he described the ferment in France, which he said he had learned from the correspondence of his guards with their native country, and so far forgot the character of a defunct person, as to say plainly, that the present disaffection would break out with all the fury of the former revolution, and require his own resurrection. « For *then*,» he added, « the sovereigns of Europe will soon find it necessary, for their own repose, to call on ME to tranquillize matters.»

This species of conversation was perhaps

the best which could have been adopted, to conceal his secret purpose from the British commissioner. Sir Niel Campbell, though not without entertaining suspicions, judged it, upon the whole, unlikely that he meditated any thing eccentric, unless a tempting opening should present itself on the part of France or Italy.

Napoleon held the same species of language to others as well as the British resident. He was affable, and even cordial (in appearance), to the numerous strangers whom curiosity led to visit him; spoke of his retirement as Dioclesian might have done in the gardens of Salonica; seemed to consider his political career as ended, and to be now chiefly anxious to explain such passages of his life as met the harsh construction of the world. In giving free and easy answers to those who conversed with him, and especially to Englishmen of rank, Buonaparte found a ready means of communicating to the public such explanations concerning his past life, as were best calculated to serve his wishes. In these he palliated, instead of denying, the scheme of poisoning his prisoners in Syria, the massacre at Jaffa, the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, and other enormities. An emperor, a conqueror, retired from war, and sequestered from power, must be favourably listened to by those who have the romantic pleasure of hearing him plead

his own cause. Milder editions of his measures began to be circulated in Europe, and, in the curiosity to see and admire the captive sovereign, men forgot the ravages which he had committed while at liberty.

As the winter approached, a change was discernible in Napoleon's manners and habits. The alterations which he had planned in the island no longer gave him the same interest; he renounced, from time to time, the severe exercise in which he had at first indulged, used a carriage rather than his horse, and sunk occasionally into fits of deep contemplation, mingled with gloomy anxiety.

He became, also, subjected to uneasiness, to which he had hitherto been a stranger, being that arising from pecuniary inconveniences. He had plunged into expenses with imprudent eagerness, and without weighing the amount of his resources against the cost of the proposed alterations. The ready money which he brought from France seems to have been soon exhausted, and to raise supplies, he commanded the inhabitants of his island to pay up, in the month of June, the contributions of the last year. This produced petitions, personal solicitations, and discontent. It was represented to him, that, so poor were the inhabitants of the island, in consequence of want of sale for their wine for months past, that would be driven to the most extreme straits if the

requisition should be persisted in. In some of the villages, the tax-gatherers of the Emperor were resisted and insulted. Napoleon, on his side, sent part of his troops to quarter upon the insurgent peasantry, and to be supported by them at free cost, till the contributions should be paid up.

Thus we recognize, in his government of this miniature state, the same wisdom, and the same errors, by which Buonaparte won and lost the empire of the world. The plans of improvements and internal ameliorations which he formed were probably very good in themselves, but he proceeded to the execution of that which he had resolved with too much and too reckless precipitation; too much of a determination to work his own pleasure, and too little concern for the feelings of others.

The compositions proving a weak resource, as they were scarce to be extracted from the miserable islanders, Napoleon had recourse to others, which must have been peculiarly galling to a man of his haughty spirit. But as his revenue, so far as tangible, did not exceed 300,000 francs, and his expenditure amounted to at least a million, he was compelled to lower the allowances of most of his retinue; to reduce the wages of the miners to one-fourth; to raise money by the sale of the provisions laid up for the garrisons; nay, even by selling

a train of brass artillery to the Duke of Tuscany. He disposed, also, of some property, a large house which had been used as a barrack, and he went the length of meditating the sale of the Town-House at Porto Ferrajo.

We have said, that Napoleon's impatience to execute whatsoever plans occurred to his fertile imagination, was the original cause of these pecuniary distresses. But they are not less to be imputed to the unfair and unworthy conduct of the French ministry. The French administration were, of all others, most intimately bound in conscience, honour, and policy, to see the treaty of Fontainebleau, as forming the footstool by which Louis XVIII. mounted his restored throne, distinctly observed towards Napoleon. The sixth article of that treaty provides an annuity, or revenue of two millions five hundred thousand francs, to be registered on the Great Book of France, and paid without abatement or deduction to Napoleon Buonaparte. This annual provision was stipulated by the Mareschals Macdonald and Ney, as the price of Napoleon's resignation, and the French ministers could not refuse a declaration of payment without gross injustice to Buonaparte, and at the same time a severe insult to the allied powers. Nevertheless, far from this pension being paid with regularity, we have seen no evidence that Napoleon ever received a single remittance to

account of it. The British resident observing how much the Ex-Emperor was harassed by pecuniary straits, gave it, not once but repeatedly, as his opinion, « that, if these difficulties pressed upon him much longer, so as to prevent him from continuing the external show of a court, he was perfectly capable of crossing over to Piombino with his troops, or committing any other extravagance.» This was Sir Niel Campbell's opinion on 31st October, 1814, and Lord Castlereagh made strong remonstrances on the subject, although Great Britain was the only power among the allies, who, being no principal party to the treaty of Fontainebleau, might safely have left it to those states who were. The French were not ashamed to defend their conduct on the technical objection, that the pension was not due until the year was elapsed; a defence which we must consider as evasive, since such a pension is of an alimentary nature, the termly payments of which ought to be paid in advance. The subject was mentioned again and again by Sir Niel Campbell, but it does not appear that the French administration desisted from a course, which, whether arising from a spirit of mean revenge, or from avarice, or from being themselves embarrassed, was at once dishonourable and impolitic.

Other apprehensions agitated Buonaparte's mind. He feared the Algerine pirates, and re-

requested the interference of England in his behalf. He believed, or affected to believe, that Brulart, the Governor of Corsica, who had been a captain of Chouans, the friend of George, Pichegru, etc. was sent thither by Louis XVIII.'s administration, for the purpose of having him assassinated, and that fitting agents were dispatched from Corsica to Elba for that purpose. ¹ Above all, he pretended to be informed of a design to dispense with the treaty of Fontainebleau, and to remove him from his place of refuge, to be imprisoned at St Helena, or St Lucie. It is not impossible that these fears were not altogether feigned; for though there is not an iota of evidence tending to show that there was reason for believing the allies entertained such an unworthy thought, yet the report was spread

¹ Buonaparte had particular reason to dread Brulart. This Chouan chief had been one of the numbers who laid down their arms on Napoleon assuming the Consulate, and who had been permitted to reside at Paris. A friend of Brulart, still more obnoxious than himself, was desirous of being permitted to return from England, to which he had emigrated. He applied to Napoleon through Brulart, who was directed by the Emperor to encourage his friend to come over. Immediately on his landing in France, he was seized and executed. Brulart fled to England in grief and rage, at being made the means of decoying his friend to death. In the height of his resentment he wrote a letter to Napoleon, threatening him with death by his hand. The recollection of this menace alarmed Buonaparte, when he found Brulart so near him as Corsica.

very generally through France, Italy, and the Mediterranean, and was encouraged, doubtless, by those who desired once more to place Buonaparte in action. He certainly expressed great anxiety on the subject, sometimes declaring he would defend his batteries to the last; sometimes affecting to believe that he was to be sent to reside in England, a prospect which he pretended not to dislike personally, while he held out sufficient reasons to prevent the course from being adopted. "He concluded," he said, "he should have personal liberty, and the means of removing prejudices entertained against his character, which had not yet been fully cleared up;" but ended with the insinuation, that, by residing in England, he would have easier communication with France, where there were four of his party to every single Bourbonist. And when he had exhausted these topics, he returned to the complaints of the hardship and cruelty of depriving him of the society of his wife and child.

While Buonaparte, chafed by poverty, and these other subjects of complaint, tormented too by the restlessness of a mind impatient of restraint, gave vent to expressions which excited suspicion, and ought to have recommended precaution, his court began to assume a very singular appearance, quite the opposite of that usually exhibited in the

courts of petty sovereigns upon the Continent. In the latter there is an air of antiquated gravity, which pervades the whole establishment, and endeavours to supply the want of splendour, and of real power. The heavy apparatus designed for the government of an independent state is applied to the management of a fortune not equal to that of many private gentlemen; the whole course of business goes slowly and cumbrously on, and, so that appearances are maintained in the old style of formal grandeur, the sovereign and his counsellors dream neither of expedition, conquest, or any other political object.

The court of Pórtó Ferrajo was the reverse of all this. Indeed, the whole place was, in one sense, deserving of the name of Cosmopoli, which Napoleon wished to impose on it. It was like the court of a great barrack, filled with military, gendarmes, police officers of all sorts, refugees of every nation, expectants and dependents upon the court, domestics and adventurers, all connected with Buonaparte, and holding or expecting some benefit at his hand. Rumours of every kind were buzzed about through this miscellaneous crowd, as thick as notes in sunshine. Suspicious characters appeared, and disappeared again, without affording any trace of their journey or object. The port was filled with ships from all parts of

Italy. This indeed was necessary to supply the island with provisions, when crowded with such an unusual degree of population; and, besides, vessels of all nations visited Porto Ferrajo, from the various motives of curiosity or speculation, or being compelled by contrary winds. The four armed vessels of Napoleon, and seventeen belonging to the service of the miners, were constantly engaged in voyages to every part of Italy, and brought over, or returned to the Continent, Italians, Sicilians, Frenchmen, and Greeks, who seemed all active, yet gave no reason for their coming or departure. Dominico Etori, a monk who had escaped from his convent, and one Theologos, a Greek, were considered as agents of some consequence among this group.

The situation of Sir Niel Campbell was now very embarrassing. Napoleon, affecting to be more tenacious than ever of his dignity, not only excluded the British envoy from his own presence, but even threw obstacles in the way of his visiting his mother and sister. It was, therefore, only from interviews with Napoleon himself that he could hope to get any information, and to obtain these Sir Niel was, as already noticed, obliged to absent himself from the island of Elba occasionally, which gave him an opportunity of desiring an audience, as he went away and returned. At such times

as he remained on the island, he was discountenanced, and all attention withdrawn from him; but in a way so artful, as to render it impossible for him to make a formal complaint, especially as he had no avowed official character, and was something in the situation of a guest, whose uninvited intrusion has placed him at his landlord's mercy.

Symptoms of some approaching catastrophe could not, however, be concealed from the British resident. Napoleon had interviews with his mother, after which she appeared deeply distressed. She was heard also to talk of three deputations which he had received from France. It was besides accounted a circumstance of strong suspicion, that discharges and furloughs were granted to two or three hundred of Napoleon's Old Guard, by the medium of whom, as was too late discovered, the allegiance of the military in France was corrupted and seduced, and their minds prepared for what was to ensue. We cannot suppose that such a number of persons were positively intrusted with the secret; but every one of them was prepared to sound forth the praises of the Emperor in his exile, and all entertained and disseminated the persuasion, that he would soon appear to reclaim his rights.

At length Mariotti, the French consul at Leghorn, and Spannoki, the Tuscan governor

of that town, informed Sir Niel Campbell that it was certainly determined at Elba, that Buonaparte, with his guards, should embark for the Continent. Sir Niel was at Leghorn when he received this intelligence, and had left the Partridge sloop of war to cruize round Elba. It was naturally concluded that Italy was the object of Napoleon, to join with his brother-in-law Murat, who was at that time, fatally for himself, raising his banner.

On the 25th of February, the Partridge having come to Leghorn, and fetched off Sir Niel Campbell, the appearance, as the vessel approached Porto Ferrajo on her return, of the national guard on the batteries, instead of the crested grenadiers of the Imperial guard, at once apprised the British resident of what had happened. When he landed, he found the mother and sister of Buonaparte in a well-assumed agony of anxiety about the fate of their Emperor, of whom they affected to know nothing, except that he had steered towards the coast of Barbary. They appeared extremely desirous to detain Sir Niel Campbell on shore. Resisting their entreaties, and repelling the more pressing arguments of the governor, who seemed somewhat disposed to use force to prevent him from re-embarking, the British envoy regained his vessel, and set sail in pursuit of the adventurer. But it was too

late; the Partridge only attained a distant sight of the flotilla, after Buonaparte and his forces had landed.

The changes which had taken place in France, and had encouraged the present most daring action, form the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER XII.

Retrospect.—Restoration of the Bourbons displeasing to the Soldiery, but satisfactory to the People.—Terms favourable to France granted by the Allies.—Discontents about the manner of conceding the Charter—Other grounds of dissatisfaction.—Apprehensions lest the Church and Crown Lands should be resumed.—Resuscitation of the Jacobin faction.—Increased Dissatisfactions in the Army.—The Claims of the Emigrants mooted in the Chamber of Delegates.—Mareschal Macdonald's Proposal.—Financial Difficulties.—Restrictions on the Press.—Reflections on this Subject.

WE must now look back to the re-establishment of the Bourbons upon the throne in 1814, an event which took place under circumstances so uncommon as to excite extravagant expectations of national felicity; expectations which, like a premature and profuse display of blossom, diminished the chance of the fruit ripening, and exasperated the disappointment of over sanguine hopes. For a certain time all had been gay and rose-coloured. The French

possess more than other nations the art of enjoying the present, without looking back with regret on the past, or forward to the future with unfavourable anticipations. Louis XVIII., respectable for his literary acquirements, and the practice of domestic virtues, amiable also from a mixture of *bonhomie*, and a talent for saying witty things, was received in the capital of his kingdom with acclamations, in which the soldiers alone did not cordially join. They indeed appeared with gloomy, sullen, and discontented looks. The late Imperial, now Royal Guard, seemed, from the dark ferocity of their aspect, to consider themselves rather as the captives who were led in triumph, than the soldiers who partook of it.

But the higher and middling classes in general, excepting those who were direct losers by the dethronement of Napoleon, hailed with sincere satisfaction the prospect of peace, tranquillity, and freedom from vexatious exactions. If they had not, as they could hardly be supposed to have, any personal zeal for the representatives of a family so long strangers to France, it was fondly hoped the absence of this might be supplied by the unwonted prospect of ease and security which their accession promised. The allied monarchs, on their part, did every thing to favour the Bourbon family, and relaxed most of the harsh and unpalatable conditions which they had annexed

to their proposed treaty with Buonaparte; as if to allow the legitimate heir the credit with his people, of having at once saved their honour, and obtained for them the most advantageous terms.

The French readily caught at these indulgences, and, with the aptitude they possess of accommodating their feelings to the moment, for a time seemed to intimate that they were sensible of the full advantage of the change, and were desirous to make as much of it as they possibly could. There is a story of a French soldier in former times, who, having insulted his general in a fit of intoxication, was brought before him next morning, and interrogated, whether he was the person who had committed the offence. The accused replied *he* was not, for that the impudent rascal had gone away before four in the morning,—at which hour the culprit had awaked in a state of sobriety. The French people, like the arch rogue in question, drew distinctions between their present and former selves, and seemed very willing to deny their identity. They were no longer, they said, either the Republican French, who had committed so many atrocities in their own country, or the Imperial French, that had made such devastation in other nations; and God forbid that the sins of either should be visited upon the present regenerate race of Royalist Frenchmen, loyal

to their native princes, and faithful to their allies, who desired only to enjoy peace abroad and tranquillity at home.

These professions, which were probably serious for the time, backed by the natural anxiety of the monarch to make, through his interest with the allied powers, the best terms he could for his country, were received as current without strict examination. It seemed that Buonaparte, on his retirement to Elba, had carried away with him all the offences of the French people, like the scape-goat, which the Levitical law directed to be driven into the Wilderness, loaded with the sins of the children of Israel. There was, in all the proceedings of the allied powers, not only moderation, but a studied delicacy, observed towards the feelings of the French, which almost savoured of romantic generosity. They seemed as desirous to disguise their conquest, as the Parisians were to conceal their defeat. The treasures of art, those spoils of foreign countries which justice loudly demanded should be restored to their true owners, were confirmed to the French nation, in order to gratify the vanity of the metropolis. By a boon yet more fatal, announced to the public in one of those moments of romantic, and more than questionable generosity, which we have alluded to, the whole French prisoners of war in the mass, and without inquiry concerning their

principles, or the part they were likely to take in future internal divisions, were at once restored to the bosom of their country. This was in fact treating the French nation as a heedless nurse does a spoiled child, when she puts into its hands the knife which it cries for. The fatal consequences of this improvident indulgence appeared early in the subsequent year.

The Senate of Napoleon, when they called the Bourbons to the throne, had not done so without making stipulations on the part of the nation, and also upon their own. For the first purpose they framed a decree, under which they «called to the throne Louis Stanislas Xavier, brother of the last King,» but upon condition of his accepting a constitution of their framing. This assumed right of dictating a constitution, and naming a king for the nation, was accompanied by another provision, declaring the Senate hereditary, and confirming to themselves, and their heirs for ever, the rank, honours, and emoluments, which in Napoleon's time they only enjoyed for life.

The King refused to acknowledge the right of the Senate, either to dictate the terms on which he should ascend a throne, his own by hereditary descent, and to which he had never forfeited his claim; or to engross, as their own exclusive property, the endowments provided to their order by Buonaparte. He, therefore, assumed the crown as the lineal and true re-

presentative of him by whom it was last worn; and issued his own constitutional charter as a concession which the spirit of the times demanded, and which he had himself no desire to withhold.

The objections to this mode of proceeding were, practically speaking, of no consequence. It signified nothing to the people of France, whether the constitution was proposed to the King by the national representatives, or by the King to them, so that it contained, in an irrevocable form, a full ratification of the national liberties. But for the King to have acknowledged himself the creature of the Senate's election, would have been at once to recognize every ephemeral tyranny, which had started up and fretted its part on the revolutionary stage; and to have sanctioned all subsequent attempts at innovation, since they who make kings and authorities must have the inherent right to dethrone and annul them. It should not be forgotten how the British nation acted on the great occasions of the Restoration and Revolution; recognizing, at either crisis, the right of blood to succeed to the crown, whether vacant by the murder of Charles I., or the abdication of James II. In principle, too, it may be observed, that in all modern European nations, the king is nominally the source both of law and justice; and that statutes are promulgated, and sentences

executed in his name, without inferring that he has the despotic right either to make the one, or to alter the other. Although, therefore, the constitution of France emanated in the usual form of a royal charter, the King was no more empowered to recal or innovate its provisions, than King John to abrogate those of the English Magna Charta. Monsieur, the King's brother, had promised in his name, upon his entrance to Paris, that Louis would recognize the basis of the constitution prepared by the Senate. This pledge was fully redeemed by the charter, and wise men would have been more anxious to secure the benefits which it bestowed, than scrupulously to cavil on the mode in which they had been conferred.

In fact, Louis had adopted not only the form most consonant to ancient usage, but that which he thought most likely to satisfy both the royalists and the revolutionary party. He ascended the throne as his natural right; and, having done so, he willingly granted to the people, in an irrevocable form, the substantial principles of a free constitution. But both parties were rather displeased at what they considered as lost, than gratified at what they gained by this arrangement. The royalists regarded the constitution, with its concessions, as a voluntary abandonment of the royal prerogative, while the revolutionary party ex-

claimed, that the receiving the charter from the King as an act of his will, was in itself a badge of servitude; and that the same royal prerogative which had granted these privileges might, if recognized, be supposed to reserve the power of diminishing or resuming them at pleasure. And thus it is, that folly, party-spirit, pride, and passion, can misrepresent the best measures, and so poison the public mind, that the very granting the object of their desires shall be made the subject of new complaints.

The formation of the ministry gave rise to more serious grounds of apprehension and censure. The various offices of administration were, upon the restoration, left in possession of persons selected from those who had been named by the Provisional Government. All the members of the Provisional State Council were called to be royal ministers of the state. Many of these, though possessed of reputed talents, were men hackneyed in the changes of the Revolution; and were not, and could not be, intrusted with the King's confidence beyond the bounds of the province which each administered.

Talleyrand, Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose talents and experience might have given him claim to the situation of Prime Minister, was unpopular from his political versatility; and it was judged, after a time, most expedient

to send him to the Congress at Vienna, that his diplomatic skill might be employed in arranging the exterior relations of France with the other powers of Europe. Yet the absence of this consummate statesman was of great prejudice to the King's affairs. His having preserved life, distinction, and frequently power, during so many revolutionary changes, proved, according to the phrase of the old Earl of Pembroke, that he was born of the willow, not of the oak. But it was the opinion of the wisest men in France, that it was not fair, considering the times in which he lived, to speak of his attachment to, or defection from individuals, but to consider the general conduct and maxims which he recommended relative to the interests of France. It has been truly said, that, after the first errors and ebullitions of republican zeal, if he were measured by this standard, he must be judged favourably. The councils which he gave to Napoleon were all calculated, it was said, for the good of the nation, and so were the measures which he recommended to the King. Much of this is really true; yet, when we think of the political consistency of the Prince of Beneventum, we cannot help recollecting the personal virtue of a female follower of the camp, which consisted in strict fidelity to the grenadier company.

Dupont was promoted to the situation of

Minister at War, owing, perhaps, to the persecution he had undergone from Buonaparte, in consequence of his surrender at Baylen to the Spaniards. Soult was afterwards called to this important office; how recommended, it would be vain to inquire. When Napoleon heard of his appointment from the English resident, he observed, that it would be a wise and good one, if no *patriotic* party should show itself in France; but if such should arise, he intimated plainly that there would be no room for the Bourbons to rest faith upon Soult's adherence to their cause; and so it proved.

To add still farther to the inconveniences of this state of administration, Louis XVIII. had a favourite, although he had no prime minister. Count Blacas d'Aulps, minister of the household, an ancient and confidential attendant on the royal person during his exile, was understood to be the channel through which the King's wishes were communicated to the other ministers; and his protection was supposed to afford the surest access to the favours of the crown.

Without doing his master the service of a premier, or holding either the power or the responsibility of that high situation, De Blacas had the full share of odium usually attached to it. The royalists, who pressed on him for grants which were in the departments of other ministers, resented his declining to interfere

in their favour, as if, having satisfied his own ambition, he had become indifferent to the interest of those with whom he had been a joint sufferer during the emigration. The opposite party, on the other hand, represented Count Blacas as an absolute minister, an emigrant himself, and the patron of emigrants; a royalist of the highest class, and an enemy, of course, to all the constitutional stipulations in favour of liberty. Thus far it is certain, that the unpopularity of Monsieur de Blacas, with all ranks and parties in the state, had the worst possible influence on the King's affairs; and as his credit was ascribed to a blind as well as an obstinate attachment on the part of Louis, the monarch was of course involved in the unpopularity of the minister of the household.

The terms of the peace, as we have already hinted, had been studiously calculated to recommend it to the feelings of the French people. France was, indeed, stripped of that extended sway which rendered her dangerous to the independence of other European nations, and reduced, generally speaking, to the boundaries which she occupied on the 1st of January, 1792. Still the bargain was not harshly driven. Several small additions were left with her on the side of Germany and the Netherlands, and on that of Savoy she had the considerable towns of Chambéry, Annecy, Avignon, with the Comtat-Venaissin and Mont-

belliard, included in her territories. But these concessions availed little; and, looking upon what they had lost, many of the French people, after the recollections had subsided of their escape from a dreadful war, were naturally, however unreasonably, disposed to murmur against the reduction of their territories, and to insist that Belgium, at least, should have remained with them. This opinion was encouraged and pressed by the Buonapartists, who considered the cession of that country with the more evil eye, because it was understood to have been a point urged by England.

Yet if England played a proud, it was also a generous part. She had nothing to stipulate, nothing of which to demand restitution, for she had sustained no territorial loss during the whole period of hostilities. The war, which had nearly ruined most other nations, had put Britain in possession of all the colonies of France, and left the latter country neither a ship nor a port in the East or West Indies; and, to sum the whole, it was not in the power of united Europe to take from England by force any one of the conquests which she had thus made. The question, therefore, only was, what Britain was voluntarily to cede to an enemy who could give her no equivalent, excepting the pledge to adopt better principles, and to act no longer as the disturber of Eu-

rope. The cessions were such in number and amount, as to show that England was far above the mean and selfish purpose of seeking a colonial monopoly, or desiring to destroy the possibility of commercial rivalry. All was restored to France, excepting only Tobago and the Mauritius.

These sacrifices, made in the spirit of peace and moderation, were not made in vain. They secured to Britain the gratitude and respect of other states, and, giving to her councils that character of justice and impartiality which constitutes the best national strength, they placed her in a situation of more influence and eminence in the civilized world, than the uncontrolled possession of all the cotton-fields and sugar islands of the east and west could ever have raised her to. Still, with respect to France in particular, the peace was not recommended by the eminence to which it had raised England. The rivalry, so long termed national, and which had been so carefully fostered by every state paper or political statement which Buonaparte had permitted to be published, rankled even in generous and honourable minds; and so prejudiced are the views of passion, that by mistaking each other's national feelings, there were many Frenchmen induced to believe that the superiority attained by Great Britain was to a certain degree an insult and degradation to France.

Every thing, indeed, which ought to have soothed and gratified the French people, was at last, by irritated feelings and artful misrepresentation, converted into a subject of complaint and grievance.

The government of Napoleon had been as completely despotic as it could be rendered in a civilized country like France, where public opinion forbade its being carried to barbaric extreme. On the contrary, in the charter, France was endowed with most of the elementary principles of a free and liberal constitution. The King had adopted, in all points of a general and national tendency, the principles proposed in the rejected constitutional act of the Senate.

The Chamber of Peers and Chamber of Deputies were the titles applied to the aristocratical and popular branches of the constitution, instead of the Senate and Legislative Body. Their public duties were divided something like those of the Houses of Peers and Commons in England. The independence of the judicial order was recognized, and the military were confirmed in their rank and revenues. The Chamber of Peers was to be nominated by the king, with power to his Majesty to create its members for life, or hereditary, at his pleasure. The income of the suppressed Senate was resumed, and vested in the crown, excepting confiscated property, which was restored to

the lawful owners. The catholic religion was declared to be that of the state, but all other christian sects were to be protected. The King's authority was recognized as head of the army, and the power of making peace and war was vested in him exclusively. The liberty of the press was established, but under certain restraints. The conscription was abolished—the responsibility of ministers recognized; and it may be said, in general, that a constitution was traced out, good so far as it went, and susceptible of receiving the farther improvements which time and experience might recommend. The charter was presented to the Legislative Body by the King in person, and with a great speech, which announced that the principles, the which it recognized were such as had been adopted in the will of his unfortunate brother Louis XVI.

Yet though this charter contained a free and open transfer of great part of the royal rights which the old race of Bourbons had enjoyed, as well as of all the arbitrary power which Napoleon had usurped, we have seen that it was unacceptable to an active and influential party in the state, who disdained to accept security for property and freedom under the ancient forms of a feudal charter, and contended that it ought to have emanated directly from the will of the Sovereign People. We have no hesitation in

saying, that this was as reasonable as the conduct of a spoiled child, who refuses what is *given* to him, because he is not suffered to *take* it; or the wisdom of a hungry man, who should quarrel with his dinner, because he does not admire the shape of the dish in which it is served up.

This is the common-sense view of the subject. If the constitution contained the necessary guarantees of political freedom, and security of life and property; if it was to be taken to as the permanent settlement and The ark of the liberties of France, and considered as a final and decided arrangement, proposed to be improved by the joint conference of the sovereign, and the legal represent-

The first subject, but not to be destroyed parties or all of these authorities, it was a matter of unimportance, whether the system instead of being in the form of a charter granted by the King, or that of conditions dictated by the subject. But if there was to be a retrospect to the ephemeral existence of all the French constitutions hitherto, excepting that under which Buonaparte had enthralled the people, then perhaps the question might be entertained, whether the feudal or the revolutionary form was most likely to be innovated; or, in other words, whether the conditions attached to the plan of government now

adopted were most likely to be innovated upon by the King, or by the body who represented the people.

Assuming the fatal doctrine, that the party in whose name the conditions of the constitution are expressed, is entitled to suspend, alter, or recal them, sound policy dictated that the apparent power of granting should be ascribed to the party least able and willing to recal or innovate upon the grant which he had made. In this view of the case, it might be reckoned upon that the King, unsupported unless by the Royalists, who were few in number, unpopular from circumstances, and for the present divested, excepting nominally, of the great instrument of achieving despotic power, the undisputed command, namely, of the army, would be naturally unwilling to risk the continuance of his authority by any attempt to innovate upon those conditions, which he had by his own charter assured to the people. On the contrary, conditions formed and decreed by the Senate of Buonaparte, might, on the popular party's resuming the ascendancy, be altered or recalled by the Chambers with the same levity and fickleness which the people of France, or at least those acting as their representatives, had so often displayed. To give permanence to the constitution, therefore, it was best it should emanate from the party most interested in preserving it, and least able to

infringe it; and that undoubtedly, as France stood at the time, was the sovereign. In Great Britain, the constitution is accounted more secure, because the King is the source of law, of honour, and of all ministerial and executive power; whilst he is responsible to the nation through his ministers, for the manner in which that power is exercised. An arrangement of a different kind would expose the branches of the legislature to a discordant struggle, which ought never to be contemplated as possible.

The zealous liberalists of France were induced, however, to mutiny against the name under which their free constitution was assigned them, and to call back Buonaparte, who had abolished the very semblance of freedom, rather than to accept, at the hands of a peaceful monarch, the degree of liberty which they themselves had acquired. The advantages which they gained will appear in the sequel.

Thus setting out with varying and contradictory opinions of the nature and origin of the new constitution, the parties in the state regarded it rather as a fortress to be attacked and defended, than as a temple in which all men were called to worship.

The French of this period might be divided into three distinct and active parties—Royalists; Liberals of every shade, down to Republicans; and Buonapartists. And it be-

comes our duty to say a few words concerning each of these.

The ROYALISTS, while they added little real strength to the King by their numbers, attracted much jealous observation from their high birth and equally high pretensions; embroiled his affairs by their imprudent zeal; embittered his peace by their just and natural complaints; and drew suspicion on his government at every effort which he made to serve and relieve them. They consisted chiefly of the emigrant Nobles and Clergy.

The former class were greatly reduced in number by war and exile; insomuch, that to the House of Peers, consisting of one hundred and seventy, and upwards, the ancient nobles of France supplied only thirty. The rest were the fortunate mareschals and generals, whom the wars of the Revolution had raised to rank and wealth; and the statesmen, many of whom had attained the same station by less honourable means of elevation. The old noblesse, after their youth had been exhausted, their fortunes destroyed, and their spirits broken, while following through foreign countries the adverse fortunes of the exiled Bourbons, beheld the restoration, indeed, of the monarchy, but were themselves recalled to France only to see their estates occupied, and their hereditary offices around the person of

The monarch filled, by the fortunate children of the Revolution. Like the disappointed English cavaliers, they might well complain that though none had wished more earnestly for the return of the legitimate prince, yet none had shared so little in the benefits attending it. By a natural, and yet a perverse mode of reasoning, the very injuries which the nobility had sustained, rendered them the objects of suspicion to the other ranks and parties of the state. They had been the companions of the King's exile, were connected with him by the ties of friendship, and had near access to his person by the right of blood. Could it be in nature, it was asked, that Louis could see their sufferings without attempting to relieve them; and how could he do so in the present state of France, unless at the expense of those who occupied or aspired to civil and military preferment, or of those who had acquired during the Revolution the national domains which those nobles once possessed? Yet the alarm was founded rather on suspicion than on facts. Of the preferment of emigrants in the army, we shall speak hereafter; but in the civil departments of the state, few of the old noblesse obtained office. To take a single example, in the course of eleven months there were thirty-seven prefects nominated to the departments, and the list did not comprehend a single one of those emigrants who returned to France

with Louis; and but very few of those whose exile had terminated more early. The nobles felt this exclusion from royal favour, and expressed their complaints, which some, yet more imprudently, mingled, with threatening hints, that their day of triumph might yet arrive. This language, as well as the air of exclusive dignity and distance which they affected, as if, the distinction of their birth being all that they had left to them, they were determined to enforce the most punctilious deference to that, was carefully remarked and recorded against the King.

The noblesse were supposed to receive particular encouragement from the princes of the blood, while, upon the whole, they were rather discouraged than brought forward or distinguished by Louis, who, as many of them spared not to say, was disposed to act upon the ungenerous maxim of courting his enemies, and neglecting those who could not upon principle become any thing save his friends. They did not, perhaps, make sufficient allowance for the great difficulties which the King incurred in governing France at so critical a period.

The state of the Clergy is next to be considered. They were, generally speaking, sincerely attached to the King; and had they been in possession of their revenues, and of their natural influence upon the public mind, their attachment would have been of the utmost

consequence. But without this influence, and without the wealth, or at least the independence, on which it partly rests, they were as useless, politically speaking, as a key which does not fit the lock to which it is applied. This state of things, unfortunate in many respects, flowed from a maxim adopted during the Revolution, and followed by Buonaparte, who had his reasons for fearing the influence of the clergy. « We will not put down the ecclesiastical establishment by force; we will starve it to death. » Accordingly, all grants and bequests to the church had been limited and qualified by so many conditions and restrictions, as to intercept that mode of acquisition so fruitful in a catholic country; while, on the other hand, the salary allowed by the state to each officiating curate was only five hundred livres (26l. 16s. 8d.) yearly. No doubt each community were permitted to subscribe what they pleased in addition to this miserable pittance; but in France, when the number of those who care for no religion at all, and of those whose zeal will not lead them the length of paying for it, is deduced, the remainder will afford but a small list of subscribers. The consequence was, that at the period of the restoration, many parishes were, and had been for years, without any public worship. Ignorance had increased in an incalculable degree. « We are informed, » was the communication from Buonaparte to

one of his prefects, « that dangerous books are distributed in your department.»—« Were the roads sown with them, » was the answer returned by the prefect, « your Majesty need not fear their influence; we have not a man who would or could read them.»—When we add to this the relaxed state of public morals, the pains taken in the beginning of the Revolution to eradicate the sentiments of religion, and render its professors ridiculous, and the prevalence of the military character, so conspicuous through France, and so unfavourable to devotion; and when it is further remembered that all the wealth of the church had fallen into the hands of the laity, which were fast clenched to retain it, and trembling at the same time lest it should be wrested from them, —the reader may, from all these causes, form some notion of the low ebb of religion and of the church in France.

The disposition of the King and Royal Family to restore the formal observances of the Romish Church, as well as to provide the suitable means of educating in future those designed for the ministry, and other religious institutions, excited among the Parisians a feeling of hatred and contempt. It must be owned, also, that though the abstract motive was excellent, there was little wisdom in attempting to bring back the nation to all those mummeries of popish ceremonial, which, long

before the Revolution, only subsisted through inveterate custom, having lost all influence on the public mind.

This general feeling was increased by particular events. Alarming tumults took place, on the subject of enforcing a rule unworthy of christianity and civilization, by which theatrical performers are declared in a constant state of excommunication. The rites of sepulture being refused to Mademoiselle Raucour, an actress, but a person of decent character and morals, occasioned a species of insurrection, which compelled from the government an order for interring her with the usual forms.

The enforcing of the more regular observation of the Sabbath, an order warranted alike by religion and good morals, gave also great offence to the inhabitants of the capital. The solemn obsequies performed for the death of Louis XVI. and his unfortunate queen, when their remains were transferred from their hasty grave to the royal mausoleum at Saint Denis,—a fraternal action, and connected with the forms of the catholic church,—was also construed to the King's prejudice, as if, by the honour paid to these poor relics, he had intended to mark his hatred of the Revolution, and his recollection of the injuries he had sustained from it. Some honours and attention bestowed on the few surviving chiefs of La

Vendée were equally the subject of misrepresentation. In short, whatever Louis XVIII. did, which had the least appearance of gratifying those who had lost all for his sake, was accounted an act of treason against freedom and the principles of the Revolution.

None of the circumstances we have noticed had, however, so much effect upon the public feeling as the fear which prevailed, that Louis, in his veneration for religion and its members, might be led to form some scheme of resuming the church lands, which, having been confiscated by the decrees of the National Assembly, were now occupied by a host of proprietors, who watched, with vigilant jealousy, incipient measures, which they feared might end in resumption of their property. Imprudent priests added to this distrust and jealousy, by denunciations against those who held church lands, and by refusing to grant them absolution unless they made restitution or compensation for them. This distrust spread far wider than among the actual proprietors of national domains. For if these were threatened with resumption of the property they had acquired under authority of the existing government for the time, it was most probable, that the divine right of the clergy to a title of the produce of the earth might next have been brought forward,—a claim involving the

interest of every landholder and farmer in France to a degree almost incalculable.

It is plain, from what he have stated, that the Royalist party, whether lay or clerical, were so little in a condition to be effectually serviceable to the King in the event of a struggle, that, while their adherence and their sufferings claimed his attachment and gratitude, every mark which he afforded them of those feelings was calculated to render his government suspected and unpopular.

Whilst the Royalists rather sapped and encumbered than supported the throne to which they adhered, their errors were carefully pointed out, circulated, and exaggerated, by the Jacobin, or, as they called themselves, the PATRIOTIC PARTY. This faction, small in numbers, but formidable from their audacity, their union, and the dreadful recollection of their former power and principles, consisted of ex-generals, whose laurels had faded with the republic; ex-ministers and functionaries, whose appointments and influence had not survived the downfall of the Directory; men of letters, who hoped again to rule the state by means of proclamations and journals; and philosophers, to whose vanity or enthusiasm abstract principles of unattainable liberty, and undesirable equality, were dearer than all the oceans of blood, and extent of guilt and misery, which

they had already cost, and were likely again to occasion. It cannot be denied, that, in the discussion of the original rights of humanity, and constitutions of society, several of this party showed distinguished talent, and that their labours were calculated to keep up a general love of liberty, and to promote inquiry into the principles upon which it is founded. Unfortunately, however, their theoretical labours in framing constitutions diverted their attention from the essential points of government, to its mere external form, and led them, for example, to prefer a republic, where every species of violence was practised by the little dictator of the day, to a limited monarchy, under which life, person, and property, were protected. The chiefs of this party were men of that presumptuous and undoubting class, who, after having failed repeatedly in political experiments, were as ready as ever again to undertake them, with the same unhesitating and self-deceptive confidence of success. They were never satisfied even with what they themselves had done; for as there is no end of aiming at an ideal perfection in any human establishment, they proceeded with alterations on their own work, as if what Butler says of religion had been true in politics, and that a form of government

was intended

For nothing else but to be mended.

Danger did not appear to the sages of this school. Many of them had been familiar with, and hardened to the perils of the most desperate revolutionary intrigues, by their familiar acquaintance with the springs which set each in motion, and were ready to recommence their desperate labours with as little forethought, as belongs to the labourers in a powder-mill, which has exploded ten times during their remembrance, and destroyed the greater number of their comrades. In the character of these self-entitled philosophers and busy agitators, vanity as well as egotism were leading principles. The one quality persuaded them, that they might be able, by dint of management, to avert danger from themselves; and the other rendered them indifferent respecting the safety of others.

During the government of Buonaparte, this jacobinical party was repressed by a strong hand. He knew, by experience of every sort, their restless, intriguing, and dangerous disposition. They also knew and feared his strength, and his unscrupulous use of it. The return of the Bourbons called them into life, like the sun which thaws the frozen adder; but it was only to show how they hated the beams which revived them. The Bourbon dynasty,

with all the remembrances it combined, seemed to this faction the very opposite to their favourite revolution; and they studied with malignant assiduity the degree of liberty afforded by the national charter, not in order to defend or to enjoy it, but to discover how it might be made the vantage-ground for overthrowing both the throne and the constitution.

Carnot and Fouché, formidable names, and revolutionists from their youth upward, were the ostensible leaders of this active party, and most of the surviving revolutionists rallied under their standards. These agitators had preserved some influence over the leas of the people, and were sure to find the means of augmenting it in the moment of popular commotion. The rabble of a great town is democratical and revolutionary by nature; for their vanity is captivated with such phrases as the sovereignty of the people, their sense of poverty and licentious fury tempted by occasion for uproar, and they regard the restraints of laws and good order as their constant and natural enemies. It is upon this envenomed and corrupted mass of evil passions that the experimental philosophers of the Revolution have always exercised their chemical skill. Of late, however, the intercourse between the philosophers of the Revolution and this class of apt and docile scholars had been consider-

ably interrupted. Buonaparte, as we have hinted, restrained with a strong hand the teachers of the Revolutionary school; while, by the éclât of his victories, his largesses, and his expensive undertakings, in which many workmen were employed, he debauched from them great part of their popular disciples, who may be said, with the inconsequence and mutability belonging to their habits, principles, and temper, to have turned imperialists, without losing their natural aptitude to become jacobins again on the next tempting opportunity.

The party of Imperialists, or BUONAPARTISTS, if we lay the army out of view, was small and unimportant. The public functionaries, whom the King had displaced from the situations of emolument which they held under the Emperor, — courtiers, prefects, commissioners, clerks, and commissaries, — whose present means and future hopes were cut off, were of course disobliged and discontented men, who looked with a languishing eye towards the island of Elba. The immediate family connexions, favourites, and ministers of the late Emperor, confident in the wealth which most of them had acquired, and resenting the insignificance to which they were reduced by the restoration of the Bourbons, lent to this party the activity which money, and the habit of political intrigue, can at all times communi-

cate. But the real and tremendous strength of the Buonapartists lay in the attachment of the existing army to the abdicated general. This was the more formidable, as the circumstances of the times, and the prevailing military character of the French nation, had raised the soldiers from their proper and natural character of servants of the state, into a distinct deliberative body, having interests of their own, which were in their nature incompatible with those of the commonwealth; since the very profession of arms implies an aptitude to a state of war, which, to all other ranks in the state, the army itself excepted, may indeed be a necessary and unavoidable evil, but never can be a real advantage.

The King could not be accused of neglecting to cultivate the affections, soothe the prejudices, and gratify the wishes of the army. The fact is, that the unprecedented difficulties of his situation forced him to study how to manage by flattery, and by the most imprudent indulgences and favours, the only part of his subjects, who, according to the rules of all well-governed states, ought to be subjected to absolute authority. Every effort was made to gratify the feelings of the troops, and the utmost exertions were made to remount, re-establish, and reclothe them. Their ranks were augmented by upwards of 150,000 prisoners of war, whose minds were in general actuated

by the desire of avenging the dishonour and hardship of their defeat and captivity, and whose presence greatly increased the discontent as well as the strength of the French army.

While the King cultivated the affections of the common soldiers with very imperfect success, he was more fortunate in attaching to himself the mareschals, whom he treated with the utmost respect and kindness. They were gratified by his attentions, and, having most of them some recent reason to complain of Napoleon, it is possible that, had they possessed absolute, or even very extensive interest with the army, that disturbance in the state of the nation which ensued could not possibly have taken place. But while Napoleon had preserved towards the mareschals the distance at which a sovereign keeps subjects, he was often familiar with the inferior officers and soldiers, and took care to keep himself in their eye, and occupy their attention personally. He desired that his generals should resemble the hilt of the sword, which may be changed at pleasure while the army was the blade itself, and retained the same temper, notwithstanding such partial alteration. Thus, the direct and personal interest of the Emperor superseded, in the soldier's bosom, all attachment to his lieutenants.

It would be wasting time to show reasons, why the French army should have been attached to Napoleon. They could not be sup-

posed to forget the long career of success which they had pursued under his banner, the pensions granted in foreign countries which were now retrenched, and the licensed plunder of their Emperor's unceasing campaigns. At present, they conceived the King proposed to reduce their numbers so soon as he could with safety, and imagined their very existence was about to be at stake.

Nor was it only the selfish interests of the army which rendered them discontented. The sense of honour, as it was called, or rather the vanity of military ascendancy and national aggrandizement, had been inspired by Buonaparte into all classes of his subjects, though they were chiefly cherished by his companions in arms. According to their opinion, the glory of France had risen with Buonaparte, and sunk with him for ever; not, as they fondly contended, through the superior force of the enemy, but by the treachery of Marmont, and the other generals whom Napoleon trusted. This sentiment passed from the ranks of the soldiers into other classes of society, all of which are in France deeply susceptible of what is represented to them as national glory; and it was again echoed back to the soldiers from fields, from workshops, from manufactories. All began to agree, that they had received the Bourbons from the hands of foreign conquerors; and that the King's reign had only commenced,

because France had been conquered, and Paris surrendered. They remembered that the allies had declared the restoration of the ancient family was combined with the restriction of France within the ancient limits; and that, accordingly, the first act of Monsieur, as lieutenant of the kingdom, had been to order the surrender of upwards of fifty fortresses beyond the frontiers, which Buonaparte, it was supposed, would have rendered the means of reacquiring the conquests, of which fortune or treachery had for a time bereft him. The meanest follower of the camp affected to feel his share in the national disgrace of losing provinces, to which France had no title save that of military usurpation. The hope that the government would at least endeavour to reconquer Belgium, so convenient for France, and which, as they contended, fell within her natural boundaries, served for a time to combat these feelings; but when it was perceived plainly, that the government of France neither could nor would engage in external war, for this or any other object, the discontent of the army became universal, and they might be pronounced ripe for any desperate enterprise.

Among the soldiers, the late Imperial Guards were distinguished for their sullen enmity to the new order of things, and deemed themselves insulted at the guard of the King's person being committed to a body of household troops

selected as approved loyalists. The army were also much disgusted, that the decorations of the Legion of Honour had been distributed with a profusion, which seemed intended to diminish its value. But the course of promotion was the deepest source of discontent. The princes of the blood royal had been early declared Colonels General by the King; and the army soon discovered, or supposed they discovered, that under their auspices the superior ranks of the army were likely to be filled by the emigrant nobility, whose military service was considered as having been continued, while they were in attendance upon the King during his exile. The most indecent competition was thus excited between those whose claims were founded on their devoted attachment to the house of Bourbon, and those who had borne arms against that family, but still in the service of France. The truth is, that the derangement of the finances, and the jealousy of the ministers, each of whom claimed the exclusive patronage of his own department, left the King no means so ready for discharging his debts of gratitude, and affording the means of subsistence to his ancient friends and adherents, as by providing for them in the army. The measure, though perhaps unavoidable, was in many respects undesirable. Old men, past the age of service, or young men who had never known it, were, in virtue of these claims,

placed in situations, to which the actual warriors conceived they had bought a title by their laurels and their ~~services~~. The appearance of the superannuated emigrants, who were thus promoted to situations ill-suited to age and infirmity raised the ridicule and contempt of Buonaparte's soldiers, while the patrician haughtiness, and youthful presumption, of the younger nobles, excited their indignation. The agents and friends of Buonaparte suffered not these passions to cool. « There is a plot of the royalists against you, » was incessantly repeated to the regiments, upon which these new officers were imposed. « The Bourbons cannot think themselves safe while those who shared the triumphs of Napoleon have either honour or existence. Your ranks are subjected to the command of dotards, who have never drawn a sword in battle, or who have served only in the emigrant bands of Condé, or among the insurgent Chouans and Vendéens. What security have you against being disbanded on a day's notice? And if the obligations of the government to you bind them, as it would seem, so slightly, will you consider yours to them as of a stricter description?» Such insinuations, and such reasoning, inflamed the prejudices of the army; disaffection spread generally through their ranks, and, long before the bold attempt of Napoleon, his former soldiery were almost universally

prepared to aid him in the recovery of his power.

The state of active political parties in France we have thus described; but, as is usual, the mass of the population were somewhat indifferent to their principles, unless in moments of excitation. Parties in a state are to the people at large what the winds are to the ocean. That which predominates for the time rolls the tide in its own direction; the next day it is hushed, and the waves are under a different influence. The people of France at large were averse to the Republicans, or Jacobins. They retained too awful an impression of the horrors of the tyranny exercised by these political fanatics, to regard them otherwise than with terror. They were as little Buonapartists; because they dreaded the restless temper of him who gave name to this faction, and saw that while he was at the head of the French government, the state of war must be perpetual. They could not be termed Royalists, for they comprehended many with whom the name of Bourbon had lost its charms; and a very large proportion of the country had their fortune and prosperity so intimately connected with the Revolution, that they were not disposed to afford any countenance to the re-establishment of the monarchy on its ancient footing.

Upon the whole, this class of Frenchmen,

who may be called Moderates or Constitution-
alists, and who contained the great bulk of
the men of property, substance, and education,
hoped well of the king's government. His
good sense, humanity, love of justice, modera-
tion, and other valuable qualities, recommend-
ed him to their esteem, and they thought his
restoration might be considered as the guarantee
of a lasting peace with the other nations of Eu-
rope. But they dreaded and deprecated that
counter-revolutionary *re-action*, as the esta-
blished phrase was, which was regarded as the
object of the princes of the blood, the nobility,
and the clergy. The property of many of the
constitutionalists was vested in national do-
mains, and they watched with doubt and fear
every step which the emigrant nobility and
clergy seemed disposed to take for recovery of
their former rights.

On this subject the moderate party were
sensitively jealous, and the proceedings which
took place in the Chamber of Deputies threw
striking light on the state of the public mind.
We must, therefore, turn the reader's atten-
tion in that direction.

A petty riot, concerning precedence, had
arisen in a church called Durnac, between the
seigneur of the parish and the mayor of the
commune. The mayor brought the affair be-
fore the Chamber of Deputies by a violent
petition, in which he generalized his com-

plaint against the whole body of emigrants, whom he accused of desiring to place themselves above the constituted authorities, and to treat France as a conquered country. The Chamber, 20th November, 1814, treated the language of the petition as calumnious, and the squabble as unworthy of their notice. But the debate called forth expressions which intimated a suspicion that there existed a dark and secret system, which tended to sow the seeds of discord and anarchy among the citizens, and to resuscitate pretensions incompatible with the laws. « It was, » said the member who made this statement, « important to impress every class of Frenchmen with the great idea, that there was no safety for France, for the King, for every member of society, but in the maintenance of those constitutional principles on which were founded the laws for protecting the whole. »

The claims of the emigrants for restoration of their forfeited property were, abstractedly, as just and indubitable as that of the King to the throne. But the political considerations in which they were involved rendered any general attempt to enforce those claims the certain signal of civil war; a civil war almost certain to end in a second expatriation, both of the royal family and their followers. In this dilemma, government seems to have looked anxiously for some means of compromise

which might afford relief to the emigrants, without innovating on that article of the charter which ratified the sale of national domains. Monsieur Ferrand brought forward in the Chamber of Delegates, a motion for the restoration of such estates of emigrants as yet remained unsold. But this involved a question respecting the rights of the much more numerous class whose property had been seized upon by the state, and disposed of to third parties, to whom it was guaranteed by the charter. Since these gentlemen could not be restored *ex jure*, to their estates, as was proposed towards their more fortunate brethren, they had at least a title to the price which had been surrogated in place of the property, of which price the nation had still possession.

These proposals called forward Monsieur Durbach, who charged Ferrand with the fatal purpose of opening the door on the vast subject of national domains. "Already," continued the orator, "the two extremities of the kingdom have resounded with the words of the minister, as with the claps which precede the thunderbolt. The effect which they have produced has been so rapid and so general, that all civil transactions have been at once suspended. A general distrust and excessive fear have caused a stagnation, the effects of which even the royal treasury has

felt. The proprietors of national property can no longer sell or mortgage their estates. They are suddenly reduced to poverty in the very bosom of wealth. Whence arises this calamity? The cause of it is the declaration of the minister, that the property they possess does not legally belong to them. For this is, in fact, the consequence of his assertion, that the law recognizes in the emigrants a right to property which always existed.»

The celebrated Mareschal Macdonald, a friend at once of monarchy and freedom, of France and the Bourbons, undertook to bring forward a plan for satisfying the emigrants, as far as the condition of the nation permitted; and giving, at the same time, some indemnity for the pensions assigned by Buonaparte to his veteran soldiers, which, during his reign, had been paid from countries beyond the verge of France, until after the retreat from Moscow, when they ceased to be paid at all. The mareschal's statement of the extent of the sale of the national domains shows how formidable the task of undoing that extensive transference of property must necessarily have been; the number of persons directly or indirectly interested in the question of their security, amounting to nine or ten millions. « Against this Colossus, » continued the mareschal, « whose height the eye cannot measure, some impotent efforts would affect to

direct themselves; but the wisdom of the King has foreseen this danger, even for the sake of those imprudent persons who might have exposed themselves to it." He proceeded, in a very eloquent strain, to eulogize the conduct of the emigrants, to express respect for their persons, compassion for their misfortunes, honour for their fidelity, and proceeded to observe, that the existence of these old proprietors, as having claims on the estates which had been acquired by others, placed them in a situation which ought not to exist. He therefore proposed that the nation should satisfy the claims of these unfortunate gentlemen, if not in full, at least upon such terms of composition as had been applied to other national obligations. Upon this footing, he calculated that an annuity of twelve millions of livres yearly would pay off the claims of the various emigrants of all descriptions. He next drew a picture of the distressed veteran soldiers; pensioners of the state who had been reduced to distress by the discontinuance of their pensions, bought with their blood in a thousand battles. Three millions more of livres he computed as necessary to discharge this sacred obligation.

There was wisdom, manliness, and generosity in the plan of Mareschal Macdonald; and, could it have been carried into decisive execution, it would have greatly appeased the

fears and jealousies of the proprietors of national domains, and shown an impartiality betwixt the claims of the emigrants and those of the army, which ought to have conciliated both. Unhappily, funds were wanting, and the royal government, so far from being able to incur a new expense of fifteen millions yearly, was not in a condition to discharge the various demands upon them, without continuing the oppressive tax of *les droits réunis*.

It is, indeed, on the subject of finance and taxation, that almost all revolutions among civilized nations have been found to hinge; and there is scarce any judging how long actual oppression may be endured, so long as it spares the purse of individuals, or how early a heavy tax, even for the most necessary objects, will excite insurrection. Without the heavy taxation of the Spaniards, the Dutch would scarcely have rebelled against them; it was imposts which fired the blood of the Swiss against the Austrians; without the stamp-act the American Revolution might have been long postponed; and but for the disorder of the French finances, Louis XVI. need never have summoned together the National Assembly. France was now again agitated by one of those fever fits, which arise from the sensitiveness of the subject's purse.

A report on the state of the public finances, by the Abbé de Montesquieu, had given a

singular instance of Buonaparte's deceptive policy. Annual expositions of national receipt and expenditure had been periodically published since he assumed the reins of government, which were, to outward appearance, unchallengeably accurate; and, as they seemed to balance each other, afforded the fair prospect that, the revenues of the state being realized, the expenses could not fall into arrear. But in reality, a number of extraordinary expenses were withheld from the view of the public, while, on the other hand, the produce of the taxes was over-estimated. Thus the two budgets of 1812 and 1813, upon close examination, exhibited a deficit of upwards of three hundred and twelve millions of livres, or thirteen millions sterling. Buonaparte was not ignorant of this fact, but concealed it from the eyes of the nation, in hopes of replacing it, as in his more successful days, by foreign tribute, and, in the meantime, supplied himself by the anticipation of other funds; as an unfaithful book-keeper makes up a plausible balance to meet the eye of his master, and covers his peculations by his dexterity in the use of ciphers. Upon the whole, the debts of France appeared to have increased in the course of thirteen years to the extent of 1,645,469,000 francs, or more than sixty-eight millions and a half of sterling money.

These financial involvements accorded ill with the accomplishment of an unfortunate and hasty promise of *Monsieur*, that the severe and pressing taxes called *les droits réunis* should be abolished, which had been made when he first entered France, and while, betwixt hope and despair, he essayed every inducement for the purpose of drawing adherents to the royal cause. On the other hand, the king, upon ascending the throne, had engaged himself, with perhaps too much latitude, to pay all the engagements which the state had contracted under the preceding government. To redeem both of these pledges was impossible, for without continuing this very obnoxious and oppressive tax, the crown could not have the means of discharging the national debt. A plan was in vain proposed by Jalabert to replace this oppressive excise by a duty on wines; the motion was referred to a committee of the Chamber of Representatives, but the substitution seems to have been found impossible. Louis naturally made the promise of his brother give way to his own more deliberate engagement. But it is not the less true, that by continuing to levy *les droits réunis*, many, not otherwise disinclined to the royal government than as it affected their purses, were enabled to charge the king with breach of faith towards his subjects, and would listen to no defence upon a topic on which few peo-

ple are disposed to hear reason against their own interest.

There remained yet another subject of alarm and dread, to excite the minds not only of those who were desirous of revolution, or, according to the Roman phrase, *cupidi novarum rerum*; but of others, who, devotedly attached to the welfare of France, desired to see her enjoy, under the sway of a legitimate monarch, the exercise of national liberty. They had the misfortune to see that liberty attacked in the point where it is most sensitive, namely, by imposing restraints upon the public press.

Buonaparte had made it part of his system to keep this powerful engine in his own iron hand, well aware that his system of despotism could not have subsisted for six months, if his actions had been exposed to the censure of the public, and his statements to contradiction and to argument. The Bourbons having unloosed the chain by which the liberty of the press was confined, the spirit of literary and political controversy rushed out with such demoniacal violence, as astonished and terrified those who had released it from confinement. The quantity of furious abuse poured out against the Bourbons might have authorised the authors to use the words of Caliban,—

You taught me language, and my profit on't
Is—I know how to curse.

Eager to repress the spirit which displayed itself so unequivocally, a motion was made on the 4th of July, 1814, for establishing a censorship upon pamphlets under a certain length, and placing all journals and newspapers under the direction of government.

This important subject was discussed with great manliness and talent in the Assembly; but it is one of the many political maxims which the British receive as theorems, that, without absolute freedom of the public press (to be exercised always on the peril of such as misuse it), there can neither be enlightened patriotism nor liberal discussion? and that, although the forms of a free constitution may be preserved where this liberty is restricted, they will soon fail to have the necessary beneficial effects in protecting the rights of the community and the safety of individuals. The liberty of the press affords a channel through which the injured may challenge his oppressor at the bar of the nation; it is the means by which public men may, in case of misconduct, be arraigned before their own and succeeding ages; it is the only mode in which bold and undisguised truth can press its way into the cabinets of monarchs; and it is the privilege, by means of which he, who vainly lifts his voice

against the corruptions or prejudices of his own time, may leave his counsels upon record as a legacy to impart to posterity. The cruelty which would deafen the ear and extinguish the sight of an individual, resembles, in some similar degree, his guilt, who, by restricting the freedom of the press, would reduce a nation to the deafness of prejudice and the blindness of ignorance. The downfall of this species of freedom, as it is the first symptom of the decay of national liberty, has been in all ages followed by its total destruction, and it may be justly pronounced that they cannot exist separately; or, as the elegiac poet has said of his hero and the country to which he belonged—

Ille tibi superesse negat; tu non potes illi.

We must own, at the same time, that as no good comes to us unmixed with evil, the unlimited freedom of the press is attended with obvious inconveniences, which, when a nation is in a certain state of excitation, render the exercise of it peculiarly dangerous. This is especially the case when a people, as then in France, are suddenly released from a state of bondage, and disposed, «like youthful colts broke loose,» to make the most extravagant use of their liberty. With minds unprepared for discussion; with that degree of political misinformation which has done this age more dire mischief than absolute ignorance itself

could have effected; subject to be influenced by the dashing pamphleteer, who soothes their prevailing passions, at the orations of their popular demagogues soothed those of the Athenians, — it has been the opinion of many statesmen, that to withhold from such a nation the freedom of the press, is a measure justifiable alike by reason and necessity. We proportion, say these reasoners, liberty to the power of enjoying it. The considerate and the peaceful we suffer to walk at liberty, and armed, if their occasions require it; but we restrain the child, we withhold weapons from the ruffian, and we fetter the maniac. Why, therefore, they ask, should a nation, when in a state of fever, be supplied, without restriction, with the indulgences which must necessarily increase the disorder? Our answer is ready, — that, granting the abuse of the liberty of the press to exist in the most fearful latitude (and we need not look to France for examples), the advantages derived from it are so inestimable, that, to deprive us of them, would be as if an architect should shut up the windows which supply light and air to a mansion, because a certain proportion of cold, and perhaps of rain, may force their way in at the aperture. Besides, we acknowledge ourselves peculiarly jealous of the sentiments of the members of every government on this delicate subject. Their situation renders them doubtful friends

to a privilege, through which alone they can be rendered amenable to the public for the abuse of their power, and through which also they often see their just and temperate exercise of authority maligned and misconstrued. To princes, also, the license of the press is, for many reasons, distasteful. To put it under regulation, seems easy and desirable, and the hardship on the community not greater (in their account), than the enforcing of decent respect and subordination,—of the sort of etiquette, in short, which is established in all courts, and which forbids the saying, under any pretext, what may be rude or disagreeable to a sovereign, or even displeasing to be heard. Under these circumstances, and in the present state of France, men rather regretted than wondered that the ministers of Louis XVIII. were disposed to place restrictions on the freedom of the press, or that they effected their purpose of placing the light of nations under a censorial bushel.

But the victory thus obtained brought additional evils on the government. The law was evaded under various devices; the works which it was intended to intercept, acquired circulation and importance from the very circumstance of their being prohibited; while the whole tenor of the measure impressed many who had otherwise been friendly to the Bour-

bon family, with distrust respecting their designs upon the national liberty.

Thus split into parties, oppressed with taxes, vexed with those nameless and mysterious jealousies and fears, which form the most dangerous subjects of disagreement, because alike incapable of being explained and confuted, France was full of inflammable materials; and the next chapter will show that there was not wanting a torch to give kindling to them.

CHAPTER XIII.

Carnot's Memorial on Public Affairs.—Fouché fails to obtain the favour of the King, and joins the Jacobins —Various Projects of that Party; which finally joins the Buonapartists.—Active Intrigues commenced.—Congress of Vienna—Murat, alarmed at its proceedings, opens an Intercourse with Napoleon.—Plans of the Conspirators. Buonaparte's Escape from Elba—He lands at Cannes, and advances through France—Is joined, at Grenoble, by 3000 Troops —Halts at Lyons, appoints a Ministry, and issues several Decrees.—Dis-may of the Royal Government.—Intrigues of Fouché.—Treachery of Ney.—Revolt of the Bourbon Army at Melun.—The King leaves Paris, and Buonaparte arrives there—His reception.

CARNOT has been repeatedly mentioned in this history as having been the associate and colleague of Robespierre during the whole Reign of Terror. His admirers pretend that, charging himself only with the conduct of the foreign war, he left to his brethren of the Committee of Public Safety the sole charge of those measures, for which no human language affords epithets of sufficient horror, through which they originally rose to power, and by which they main-

tained it. According to these fond advocates, their hero held his course through the Reign of Terror unsullied by a bloody spot, as Arethusa rolled her waters through the ocean without mingling with its waves! and the faith of most readers will swallow the ancient miracle as easily as the modern. Carnot, however, had the independence of spirit to oppose Napoleon's seizure of the throne, and remained in obscurity until 1814, when he employed his talents as an engineer in defence of Antwerp. He gave in, late and reluctantly, his adherence to the restoration, and was confirmed in his rank of inspector-general of engineers. But this did not prevent him from being extremely active in conspiring the downfall of the monarch to whose allegiance he had submitted himself, and who afforded him subsistence and rank.

Carnot gave his opinion upon public affairs in a Memorial, made public in December, 1814. which was at once an apology for the Jacobin party, and a direct attack on the reigning dynasty. This document we must necessarily consider at some length, as it conveys the ostensible reasons on which the author, and many thousands besides, having in their anxious consideration the interests of the freedom of France, thought these interests would be best provided for by destroying the sway of a mild and somewhat feeble monarch, whose reign

was identified with peace and tranquillity, in order to recal to the throne an absolute sovereign, ruling on military principles only, and whose first step under the canopy of state must necessarily be followed by war with all Europe.

In this singular, and, as it proved, too effective production, every fault committed by the restored family is exaggerated; and they, with the nobles, their personal adherents, are, under a thin and contemptuous veil of assumed respect towards the King, treated alike as fools, who did not understand how to govern France, and as villains, who meditated her ruin. The murder of the King is, with irony as envenomed as unjust, stated to have been occasioned, not by the violence and cruelty of his persecutors, but by the pusillanimity of his nobility, who first provoked the resentment of the nation, and them fled from the kingdom, when, if they had loved their sovereign, they should have rallied around him. This plea, in the mouth of a regicide, is as if one of a band of robbers should impute an assassination not to their own guilty violence, but to the cowardice of the domestics of the murdered, by whom that violence might have been resisted. No one also knew better than Carnot by what arts Louis XVI. was induced by degrees to abandon all means of defence which his situation afforded him, and to throw himself upon the sworn faith and allegiance of those by whom he was

condemned to death. As whimsical and un-logical were the examples and arguments referred to by Carnot in support of the condemnation of Louis. Cicero, it seems, says in his Offices, « We hate all those we fear, and we wish for the death of those we hate.» On this comprehensive ground, Carnot vindicates the orator's approbation of the death of Cæsar, notwithstanding the clemency of the usurper; and Cato, indeed (continues the colleague of Robespierre), went farther, and did not think it possible there should be a good king. Of course, not Louis XVI. alone, but all monarchs, might be justly put to death in Carnot's estimation; because they are naturally the objects of fear to their subjects—because we hate those we fear—and because, according to the kindred authority of Shylock, no man hates the thing he would not kill. The doctrine of regicide is said to be confirmed in the Old Testament; families were massacred,—monarchs proscribed,—intolerance promulgated, by the ministers of a merciful Deity: wherefore, then, should not the Jacobins put Louis XVI. to death? If it was alleged, that the persons of kings were inviolable by the laws of all civil governments, those of usurpers certainly were not so protected; and what means were there, said Carnot, for positively distinguishing between an usurper and a legitimate king? The difficulty of making such a distinction was no doubt a suf-

ficient vindication of the judges of Louis XVI.

Trash like this had scarce been written since the club-room of the Jacobins was closed. But the object of Carnot's pamphlet was not to excuse a deed (which he would probably have rather boasted of as laudable), but by the exaggerations of his eloquence, and the weight of his influence with the public, to animate the fury of the other parties against the Bourbons and their adherents. The King was charged with having been ungrateful to the call of the nation (a call which assuredly he would never have heard but for the cannon of the allies),—with having termed himself King by the grace of God,—with resigning Belgium when Carnot was actually governor of Antwerp,—with preferring Chouans, Vendéans, emigrants, Cossacks, or Englishmen, to the soldiers whose victories had kept him in exile, and in consequence of whose defeat alone he had regained the throne of his fathers. The emigrants are represented as an exasperated, yet a contemptible faction. The people, it is said, care little about the right of their rulers,—about their quarrels,—their private life, or even their political crimes, unless as they affect themselves. All government, of course, has its basis in popular opinion; but, alas! in actual history, «the people are only regarded,» says Monsieur Carnot, «as the victims of their chiefs; we witness nothing but the contest of subjects

for the private interest of their princes,—kings, who are themselves regicides and parricides,—and priests who invite mankind to mutual slaughter. The eye can but repose on the generous efforts of some brave men who consecrate themselves to the deliverance of their fellow-countrymen; if they succeed, they are called heroes,—if they fail, they are traitors and demagogues.” In this and other passages, the author plainly intimated what spirits were at work, and what was the object of their machinations. The whole pamphlet was designed as a manifesto to the French public, darkly, yet distinctly, announcing the existence of a formidable conspiracy, the principles on which its members proceeded, and their grounds for expecting success.

Carnot himself affected to say, that the Memorial was only designed for circulation among his private connexions. But it would not have answered the intended purpose had it not been printed and dispersed with the most uncommon assiduity. Small carts traversed the boulevards, from which it was hawked about among the people, in order to avoid the penalties which booksellers and stationers might have incurred by dealing in an article so inflammatory. Notwithstanding these evasions, the printers and retailers of this diatribe were prosecuted by government; but the *Juges d'Instruction* refused to confirm

the bill of indictment, and this failure served to encourage the Jacobin faction. The official proceedings, by which the ministers endeavoured to suppress the publication, irritated rather than intimidated those who took interest in it. It argued, they said, at once a timorous and a vindictive spirit to oppress the inferior agents in an alleged libel, while the ministers dared not bring to trial the avowed author. In this unquestionably they argued justly; for the measures corresponded with that paltry policy, which would rather assail the liberty of the press, than bring to fair trial and open punishment those by whom it is misused.

It would have been as impossible for Fouché to have lived amid such a complicated scene of political intrigue, without mingling in it, as for the sparks to resist flying upwards. He was, however, ill-placed for the character he desired to act. After having lent Buonaparte his aid to betray and dethrone the Directors, he had long meditated how to dethrone and betray Buonaparte, and substitute in his place a regency, or some form of government under which he might expect to act as prime minister. In this undertaking, he more than once ran the peril of life, and was glad to escape with an honourable exile. We have already stated that he had missed the most favourable opportunity for availing him-

self of his political knowledge, by his absence from Paris when it was taken by the allies. Fouché endeavoured, however, to obtain the notice of the restored monarch and his government, and to render his services acceptable to Louis. When the celebrated Revolutionist appeared in the ante-chamber on his first attendance at court, he observed a sneer on the countenance of some royalists who were in waiting, and took the hint to read them a lesson, showing, that a minister of police, even when he has lost his office, is not a person to be jested with. « You, sir, » said he to a gentleman, « seem proud of the lilies with which you are adorned. Do you recollect the language you held respecting the Bourbon family some time since in such a company?— And you, madam, » he continued, addressing a lady, « to whom I gave a passport to England, may perhaps wish to be reminded of what then passed betwixt us on the subject of Louis XVIII. » The laughs were conscience-struck, and Fouché was introduced into the cabinet.

The plan which Fouché recommended to the King was, as might have been expected, astucious and artificial in a high degree. He advised the King to assume the national cockade and three-coloured flag; to occupy the situation of chief of the revolution. This, he said, would be the same sacrifice by

Louis XVIII. as the attending on the mass by Henry IV.—He might have added, it was the sacrifice actually made by Louis XVI., who lost his life in requital.—What Fouché aimed at by this action is evident. He desired to place the King in a situation where he must have relied exclusively on the men of the revolution, with whom he could not have communicated save by the medium of the Duc d'Otranto, who thus would become prime minister at the first step. But in every other point of view, the following that advice must have placed the King in a mean and hypocritical attitude, which must have disgusted even those whom it was adopted to conciliate.

By assuming the colours of the Revolution, the King of France must necessarily have stained himself with the variation of each of its numerous changes. It is true, that the Revolution had produced many excellent improvements in France, affecting both the theory and the practice of government. These the sovereign was bound carefully to preserve for the advantage of the nation. But while we are grateful for the advantages of increased health and fertility that may follow a tornado, and treasure up the valuable things which an angry ocean may cast upon the shore, none but a blinded heathen worships the tempest, or sacrifices to the furious waves. The King, courting the murderers of his brother, could

inspire, even in them, nothing save disgust at his hypocrisy, while it would justly have forfeited the esteem and affection, not of the royalists alone, but of all honest men.

Further to recommend himself to the Bourbons, Fouché addressed a singular epistle to Napoleon, in which he endeavoured to convince him, that the title of Sovereign, in the paltry Islet of Elba, did not become him who had possessed an immense empire. He remarked to Napoleon, that the situation of the island was not suitable to his purpose of retirement, being near so many points where his presence might produce dangerous agitation. He observed, that he might be accused, although he was not criminal, and do evil without intending it, by spreading alarm. He hinted that the King of France, however determined to act with justice, yet might be instigated by the passions of others to break through that rule. He told the Ex-Emperor of France, that the titles which he retained were only calculated to augment his regret for the loss of real sovereignty. Nay, that they were attended with positive danger, since it might be thought they were retained only to keep alive his pretensions. Lastly, he exhorted Napoleon to assume the character of a private individual, and retire to the United States of America, the country of Franklin, Washington, and Jefferson.

Fouché could scarcely expect that this monitory epistle should have much effect upon his once imperial master; he knew human nature and Buonaparte too well. But as it might tell to advantage with the royal family, he sent a copy of it to Monsieur, with a corresponding commentary, the object of which was to point out (what, indeed, circumstances had made evident), that the tranquillity of the countries and sovereigns of Europe could never be secured while Napoleon remained in his present condition, and that his residence in the Isle of Elba was to France what Vesuvius is to Naples. The practical inference to be derived from this was, that a gentle degree of violence to remove the person of Napoleon would have been a stroke of state policy, in case the Ex-Emperor of France should not himself have the patriotic virtue to remove himself to America. The honourable and generous prince, to whom Fouché had addressed himself, had too noble a mind to adopt the hint; and this attempt to ingratiate himself with the Bourbon family entirely failed. But plotting was Fouché's element; and it seems to have signified little to him whom he had for partners, providing he had a stake in the political game. He retired to his country-house, and engaged himself with his old friends of the jacobin party, who were not a little glad to avail themselves of his extensive

acquaintance with all the ramifications of political intrigue.

It was the policy of the party to insist upon the faults of the Royal Family, and enlarge on their prejudices against the men and measures of that period when France was successful in foreign war, against the statesmen who directed, and the soldiers who achieved, her gigantic enterprises. The King, they said, had suffered misfortune without having learned wisdom; he was incapable of stepping beyond the circle of his Gothic prejudices; France had received him from the hand of foreign conquerors, surrounded by an emaciated group of mendicant nobles, whose pretensions were as antiquated and absurd as their decorations and manners. His government went to divide, they alleged, the French into two classes, opposed to each other in merits as in interests;—the emigrants, who alone were regarded by Louis as faithful and willing subjects; and the rest of the nation, in whom the Bourbons saw, at best, but repentant rebels. They asserted, that, too timid as yet to strike an open blow, the King and his ministers sought every means to disqualify and displace all who had taken any active share in the events of the Revolution, and to evade the general promise of amnesty. Under pretext of national economy, they were disbanding the army, and removing the officers of government,—depriving thus

the military and civil servants of France of the provision which their long services had earned. Louis, they said, had insulted the glory of France, and humiliated her heroes, by renouncing the colours and symbols under which twenty-five years had seen her victorious; he had rudely refused a crown offered to him by the people, and snatched it as his own right by inheritance, as if the dominion of men could be transferred from father to son like the property of a flock of sheep. The right of Frenchmen to chuse their own ruler was hereditary and imprescriptible; and the nation, they said, must assert it, or sink to be the contempt, instead of being the pride at once and dread of Europe.

Such was the language which nettled, while it alarmed, the idle Parisians, who forgot at the moment that they had seen Napoleon take the crown from the altar at Notre Dame, and place it on his own head, with scarcely an acknowledgment to God, and not the shadow of any towards the nation. The departments were assailed by other arts of instigation. The chief of these was directed to excite the jealousy so often alluded to, concerning the security of the property of national domains. Not content with urging everywhere that a revocation of the lands of the church and emigrants was impending over the present proprietors, and that the clergy and nobles did

not even deign to conceal their hopes and designs, a singular device was in many instances practised to enforce the belief of such assertions. Secret agents were dispatched into the departments where property was advertised for sale. These emissaries made inquiries as if in the character of intending purchasers, and where the property appeared to have been derived from revolutionary confiscation, instantly objected to the security as good for nothing, and withdrew their pretended offers;—thus impressing the proprietor, and all in the same situation, with the unavoidable belief, that such title was considered as invalid, owing to the expected and menaced revocation of the Bourbon government.

It is generally believed that Buonaparte was not originally the object designed to profit by these intrigues. He was feared and hated by the Jacobin party, who knew what a slender chance his iron government afforded of their again attempting to rear their fantastic fabrics, whether of a pure republic, or a republican monarchy. It is supposed their eyes were turned in preference towards the Duke of Orleans. They reckoned probably on the strength of the temptation, and they thought, that in supplanting Louis XVIII., and placing his kinsman in his room, they would obtain, on the one hand, a king who should hold his power by and through the Revolution, and,

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on the other, that they would conciliate both foreign powers and the constitutionalists at home, by chusing their sovereign out of the family of Bourbon. The more cautious of those concerned in the intrigue recommended, that nothing should be attempted during the life of the reigning monarch; others were more impatient and less cautious; and the prince alluded to received an intimation of their plan in an unsigned billet, containing only these words,—«We will act it without you; we will act it in spite of you; we will act it FOR you;»¹ as if putting it in his choice to be the leader or victim of the intended revolution.

The Duke of Orleans was too upright and honourable to be involved in this dark and mysterious scheme; he put the letter which he had received into the hands of the King, and acted otherwise with so much prudence, as to destroy all the hopes which the revolutionary party had founded upon him. It was necessary to find out some other central point. Some proposed Eugène Beauharnais as the hero of the projected movement; some projected a provisional government; and others desired that the republican model should be once more adopted. But none of these plans

¹ « Nous le ferons sans vous ; nous le ferons malgré vous ; nous le ferons pour vous. »

were likely to be favoured by the army. The cry of *Vive la République* had become antiquated; the power once possessed by the Jacobins of creating popular commotion was greatly diminished; and although the army was devoted to Buonaparte, yet it was probable that in a civil commotion in which he had no interest, they would follow the marshals or generals who commanded them, in opposition to any insurrection merely revolutionary. If, on the contrary, the interests of Napoleon were put in the van, there was no fear of securing the irresistible assistance of the standing army. If he came back with the same principles of absolute power which he had formerly entertained, still the Jacobins would get rid of Louis and the charter, the two chief objects of their hatred; the former as a king given by the law, the latter as a law given by the king.

These considerations speedily determined the Jacobin party on a union with the Buonapartists. The former were in the condition of a band of house-breakers, who, unable to force an entrance into the house which they have the purpose to break into, renew their undertaking, and place at their head a brother of the same profession, because he has the advantage of having a crow-bar in his hand. When and how this league was formed,—what sanction the Jacobin party obtained that Bu-

naparte, dethroned as a military despot, was to resume his dignity under constitutional restrictions, we have no opportunity of knowing. But, so soon as the coalition was formed, his praises were sung forth on all sides, especially by many who had been, as Jacobins, his most decided enemies; and a great part of the French public were disposed to think of Buonaparte at Elba more favourably than Napoleon in the Tuileries. Gradually, even from the novelty and peculiarity of his situation, he began to excite a very different interest from that which attached to the despot who levied so many conscriptions, and sacrificed to his ambition so many millions of victims. Every instance of his activity, within the little circle of his dominions, was contrasted by his admirers with the constitutional inertness of the restored monarch. Excelling as much in the arts of peace as in those of war, it wanted but (they said) the fostering hand and unwearied eye of Napoleon to have rendered France the envy of the universe, had his military affairs permitted the leisure and opportunity which the Bourbons now enjoyed. These allegations, secretly insinuated, and at length loudly murmured, had their usual effects upon the fickle temper of the public; and, as the temporary enthusiasm in favour of the Bourbons faded into indifference and aversion, the general horror of Buonaparte's ambitious and

tyrannical disposition began to give way to the recollection of his active, energetic, and enterprising qualities.

This change must soon have been known to him who was its object. An expression is said to have escaped from him during his passage to Elba, which marked at least a secret feeling that he might one day recover the high dignity from which he had fallen. « If Marius, » he observed, « had slain himself in the marshes of Minturnæ, he would never have enjoyed his seventh consulate. » What was perhaps originally but the vague aspirations of an ardent spirit striving against adversity, became, from the circumstances of France, a plausible and well-grounded hope. It required but to establish communications among his numerous and zealous partisans, with instructions to hold out such hopes as might lure the Jacobins to his standard, and to profit by and inflame the growing discontents and divisions of France; and a conspiracy was almost ready formed, with little exertion on the part of him who soon became its object and its centre.

Various affiliations and points of rendezvous were now arranged to recruit for partisans. The ladies of the Ex-Emperor's court, who found themselves humiliated at that of the King by the preference assigned to noble birth, were zealous agents in these political intrigues; for offended pride hesitates at no

measures for obtaining vengeance. The purses of their husbands and lovers were of course open to these fair intriguers, and many of them devoted their jewels to forward the cause of revolution. The chief of these female conspirators was Hortensia Beauharnais, wife of Louis Buonaparte, but now separated from her husband, and bearing the title of the Duchess of Saint Leu. She was a person of considerable talents, and of great activity and address. At Nanterre, Neuilly, and Saint Leu, meetings of the conspirators were held, and Madame Amelin, the confidante of the duchess, is said to have assisted in concealing some of the principal agents.

The Duchess of Bassano, and the Duchess of Montebello (widow of Mareschal Lannes), were warmly engaged in the same cause. At the meetings held in the houses of these intriguing females, the whole artillery of conspiracy was forged and put in order, from the political lie, which does its work if believed but for an hour, to the political song or squib, which, like the fire-work from which it derives its name, expresses love of frolic or of mischief, according to the nature of the materials amongst which it is thrown. From these places of rendezvous the agents of the plot sallied out upon their respective rounds, furnished with every lure that could rouse the suspicious landholder, attract the idle Parisian, seduce

the *Ideologue*, who longed to try the experiments of his Utopian theories upon real government, and above all, secure the military, —from the officer, before whose eyes truncheons, coronets, and even crowns, were disposed in ideal prospect, to the grenadier, whose hopes only aimed at blood, brandy, and free quarters.

The lower orders of the populace, particularly those inhabiting the two great suburbs of Saint Marceau and Saint Antoine, were disposed to the cause from their natural restlessness and desire of change; from the apprehension that the King would discontinue the expensive buildings in which Buonaparte was wont to employ them; from a jacobinical dislike to the lawful title of Louis, joined to some tender aspirations after the happy days of liberty and equality; and lastly, from the disposition which the lees of society everywhere manifest to get rid of the law, their natural curb and enemy. The influence of Richard le Noir was particularly useful to the conspirators. He was a wealthy cotton-manufacturer, who combined and disciplined no less than three thousand workmen in his employment, so as to be ready at the first signal of the conspirators. Le Noir was called by the Royalists Santerre the Second; being said to aspire, like that celebrated suburban brewer, to become a general of Sans-culottes. He was

bound to Buonaparte's interest by his daughter having married General Lefèbvre Desnouettes, who was *not the less the favourite of Napoleon* that he had broken his parole, and fled from England when a prisoner of war. Thus agitated like a lake by a subterranean earthquake, revolutionary movements began to show themselves amongst the populace. At times, under pretence of scarcity of bread or employment, tumultuous groups assembled on the terrace of the Tuileries, with clamours which reminded the Duchess d'Angoulême of those that preceded the imprisonment and death of her parents. The police dispersed them for the moment; but, if any arrests were made, it was only of such wretches as shouted when they heard others shout, and no efforts were made to ascertain the real cause of symptoms so alarming.

The police of Paris was at this time under the direction of Monsieur Dandr , formerly a financier. His loyalty does not seem to have been doubted, but his prudence and activity are very questionable; nor does he seem ever to have been completely master either of the duties of his office, or the tools by which it was to be performed. These tools, in other words, the subordinate agents and officers and clerks, the whole machinery as it were of the police, had remained unchanged since that dreadful power was administered by Savary,

Buonaparte's head spy and confidential minister. This body, as well as the army, felt that their honourable occupation was declined in emolument and importance since the fall of Buonaparte, and looked back with regret to the days when they were employed in agencies, dark, secret, and well-recompensed, unknown to a peaceful and constitutional administration. Like evil spirits employed by the spells of a benevolent enchanter, these police-officers seem to have served the King grudgingly and unwillingly; to have neglected their duty, when that could be done with impunity; and to have shown that they had lost their activity and omniscience, so soon as embarked in the service of legitimate monarchy.

Under the connivance, therefore, if not with the approbation of the police, conspiracy assumed a more open and daring aspect. Several houses of dubious fame, but especially the Café Montansier, in the Palais Royal, were chosen as places of rendezvous for the subordinate satellites of the cause, where the toasts given, the songs sung, the tunes performed, and the language held, all bore allusion to Buonaparte's glories, his regretted absence, and his desired return. To express their hopes that this event would take place in the spring, the conspirators adopted for their symbol the violet; and afterwards applied to Buonaparte himself the name of Corporal

Violet. The flower and the colour were publicly worn as a party distinction, before it would seem the court had taken the least alarm; and the health of Buonaparte, under the name of Corporal Violet, or Jean d'Épée, was pledged by many a Royalist without suspicion of the concealed meaning.

Paris was the centre of the conspiracy; but its ramifications extended through France. Clubs were formed in the chief provincial towns. Regular correspondences were established between them and the capital,—an intercourse much favoured, it has been asserted, by Lavalette, who, having been long director-general of the posts under Buonaparte, retained considerable influence over the subordinate agents of that department, none of whom had been displaced upon the King's return. It appears from the evidence of Monsieur Ferrand, director-general under the King, that the couriers, who, like the soldiers and police-officers, had found more advantage under the imperial than under the royal government, were several of them in the interest of their old master. And it is averred, that the correspondence relating to the conspiracy was carried on through the royal post-office, contained in letters sealed with the King's seal, and dispatched by public messengers wearing his livery.

Such open demonstrations of treasonable practices did not escape the observation of the Royalists, and they appear to have been communicated to the ministers from different quarters. Nay, it has been confidently stated, that letters, containing information of Napoleon's intended escape, were actually found in the bureau of one minister, unopened and unread. Indeed, each of these official personages seems scrupulously to have entrenched himself within the routine of his own particular department, so that what was only of general import to the whole was not considered as the business of any one in particular. Thus, when the stunning catastrophe had happened, each endeavoured to shift the blame from himself, like the domestics in a large and ill-regulated family; and although all acknowledged that gross negligence had existed elsewhere, no one admitted that the fault lay with himself. This general infatuation surprises us upon retrospect; but Heaven, who frequently punishes mankind by the indulgence of their own foolish or wicked desires, had decreed that peace was to be restored to Europe by the extermination of that army to whom peace was a state so odious; and for that purpose it was necessary that they should be successful in their desperate attempt to dethrone their peaceful and constitutional sovereign, and to reinstate the

despotic leader, who was soon to lead them to the completion of their destiny, and of his own.

While the royal government in France was thus gradually undermined and prepared for an explosion, the rest of Europe resembled an ocean in the act of settling after a mighty storm, when the partial wrecks are visible, heaving on the subsiding swell, which threatens yet further damage ere it be entirely lulled to rest.

The Congress of representatives of the principal states of Europe had met at Vienna, in order to arrange the confused and complicated interests which had arisen out of so prolonged a period of war and alteration. The lapse of twenty-five years of constant war and general change had made so total an alteration, not merely in the social relations and relative powers of the states of Europe, but in the habits, sentiments, and principles of the inhabitants, that it appeared altogether impossible to restore the original system as it existed before 1792. The Continent resembled the wrecks of the city of London, after the great conflagration in 1666, when the boundaries of individual property were so completely obliterated and confounded, that the King found himself obliged, by the urgency of the occasion, to make new, and in some degree arbitrary, distributions of the ground, in order to

rebuild the streets upon a plan more regular, and better fitted to the improved condition of the age. That which proved ultimately an advantage to London, may perhaps produce similar good consequences to the civilized world, and a better and more permanent order of things may be expected to arise out of that which has been destroyed. In that case, the next generation may reap the advantages of the storms with which their fathers had to contend. We are, however, far from approving some of the unceremonious appropriations of territory which were made upon this occasion, which, did our limits admit of entering into the discussion, carried, we think, the use of superior force to a much greater extent than could be justified on the principles upon which the allies acted.

Amid the labours of the Congress, their attention was turned on the condition of the kingdom of Naples; and it was urged by Talleyrand, in particular, that allowing the existence of the sovereignty of Murat in that beautiful kingdom, was preserving, at the risk of future danger to Europe, an empire, founded on Napoleon's principles, and governed by his brother-in-law. It was answered truly, that it was too late to challenge the foundation of Murat's right of sovereignty, after having gladly accepted and availed themselves of his assistance, in the war against Buonaparte.

Talleyrand, by exhibiting to the Duke of Wellington a train of correspondence between Buonaparte, his sister Caroline, and Murat, endeavoured to show that the latter was insincere, when seeming to act in concert with the allies. The duke was of opinion, that the letters did not prove treachery, though they indicated what was to be expected, that Murat took part against his brother-in-law and benefactor, with considerable reluctance. The matter was now in agitation before the Congress; and Murat, conceiving his power in danger, seems to have adopted the rash expedient of changing sides once more, and again to have renewed his intercourse with Napoleon. The contiguity of Elba to Naples rendered this a matter of little difficulty; and they had, besides, the active assistance of Pauline, who went and came between Italy and her brother's little court. Napoleon, however, at all times resolutely denied that he had any precise share or knowledge of the enterprise which Murat meditated.

The King of France, in the mean while, recalled by proclamation all Frenchmen who were in the Neapolitan service, and directed the title of King Joachim to be omitted in the royal almanack.

Murat, alarmed at this indication of hostile intentions, carried on a secret correspondence with France, in the course of which a letter

was intercepted, directed to the King of Naples, from general Excelsman, professing, in his own name and that of others, devoted attachment, and assuring him that thousands of officers, formed in his school and under his eye, would have been ready at his call, had not matters taken a satisfactory turn. In consequence of this letter, Excelsman was in the first place put on half-pay and sent from Paris, which order he refused to obey. Next he was tried before a court-martial, and triumphantly acquitted. He was admitted to kiss the King's hand, and swear to him fidelity *à toute épreuve*. How he kept his word will presently appear. In the mean time the King had need of faithful adherents, for the nets of conspiracy were closing fast around him.

The plot formed against Louis XVIII. comprehended two enterprises. The first was to be achieved by the landing of Napoleon from Elba, when the universal good-will of the soldiers, the awe inspired by his name and character, and the suspicions and insinuations spread widely against the Bourbons, together with the hope of recovering what the nation considered as the lost glory of France, were certain to insure him a general good reception. A second, or subordinate branch of the conspiracy, concerned the insurrection of a body of troops under general Lallemand, who were quartered in the north-east of France,

and to whom was committed the charge of intercepting the retreat of the King and royal family from Paris, and, seizing them, to detain them as hostages at the restored Emperor's pleasure.

It is impossible to know at what particular period of his residence in Elba, Napoleon gave an express consent to what was proposed, and disposed himself to assume the part destined for him in the extraordinary drama. We should suppose, however, his resolution was adopted about that time when his manner changed completely towards the British envoy residing at his little court, and when he assumed the airs of inaccessible and imperial state, to keep at a distance, as an inconvenient observer, Sir Niel Campbell, to whom he had before seemed rather partial. His motions after that time have been described, so far as we have access to know them. It was on Sunday, 26th February, that Napoleon embarked with his guards on board the flotilla, consisting of the *Inconstant* brig, and six other small vessels, upon one of the most extraordinary and adventurous expeditions that was ever attempted. The force, with which he was once more to change the fortunes of France, amounted but to about a thousand men. To keep the undertaking secret, his sister Pauline gave a ball on the night of his departure, and the officers were unexpectedly summoned, after

leaving the entertainment, to go on board the little squadron.

In his passage Napoleon encountered two great risks. The first was from meeting a royal French frigate, who hailed the *Inconstant*. The guards were ordered to put off their caps, and go down below, or lie upon the deck, while the captain of the *Inconstant* exchanged some civilities with the commander of the frigate, with whom he chanced to be acquainted; and being well known in these seas, was permitted to pass on without farther inquiry. The second danger was caused by the pursuit of Sir Niel Campbell, in the *Partridge* sloop of war, who, following from Elba, where he had learned Napoleon's escape, with the determination to capture or sink the flotilla, could but obtain a distant view of the vessels as they landed their passengers.

This was on the first of March, when Napoleon, causing his followers once more to assume the three-coloured cockade, disembarked at Cannes, a small seaport in the gulf of Juan, not far from Fréjus, which had seen him land, a single individual, returned from Egypt, to conquer a mighty empire; had beheld him set sail, a terrified exile, to occupy the place of his banishment; and now again witnessed his return, a daring adventurer, to throw the dice once more for a throne or a grave. A small party of his guard presented

themselves before Antibes, but were made prisoners by General Corsin, the governor of the place.

Undismayed by a circumstance so unfavourable, Napoleon instantly began his march at the head of scarce a thousand men, towards the centre of a kingdom from which he had been expelled with execrations, and where his rival now occupied in peace an hereditary throne. For some time the inhabitants gazed on them with doubtful and astonished eyes, as if uncertain whether to assist them as friends, or to oppose them as invaders. A few peasants cried *Vive l'Empereur!* but the adventurers received neither countenance nor opposition from those of the higher ranks. On the evening of 2d March, a day and a half after landing, the little band of invaders reached Cérénon, having left behind them their small train of artillery, in order to enable them to make forced marches. As Napoleon approached Dauphiné, called the cradle of the Revolution, the peasants greeted him with more general welcome, but still no proprietors appeared, no clergy, no public functionaries. But they were now near to those by whom the success or ruin of the expedition must be decided.

Soult, the minister at war, had ordered some large bodies of troops to be moved into the country betwixt Lyons and Chambéri, to

support, as he afterwards alleged, the high language which Talleyrand had been of late holding at the Congress, by showing that France was in readiness for war. If the marshal acted with good faith in this measure, he was at least most unfortunate; for, as he himself admits, even in his attempt at exculpation, the troops were so placed as if they had been purposely thrown in Buonaparte's way, and proved unhappily to consist of corps peculiarly devoted to the Ex-Emperor's person. On the 7th of March, the seventh regiment of the line, commanded by Colonel Labédoyère, arrived at Grenoble. He was young, nobly born, handsome, and distinguished as a military man. His marriage having connected him with the noble and loyal family of Damas, he procured preferment and active employment from Louis XVIII. through their interest, and they were induced even to pledge themselves for his fidelity. Yet Labédoyère had been engaged by Cambrone deep in the conspiracy of Elba, and used the command thus obtained for the destruction of the monarch by whom he was trusted.

As Napoleon approached Grenoble, he came into contact with the outposts of the garrison, who drew out, but seemed irresolute. Buonaparte halted his own little party, and advanced almost alone, exposing his breast, as he exclaimed, « He who will kill his Emperor,

let him now work his pleasure." The appeal was irresistible—the soldiers threw down their arms, crowded round the general, who had so often led them to victory, and shouted *Vive l'Empereur!* In the mean while, Labédoyère, at the head of two battalions, was sallying from the gates of Grenoble. As they advanced, he displayed an eagle, which, like that of Marius, worshipped by the Roman conspirator, had been carefully preserved to be the type of civil war; at the same time, he distributed among the soldiers the three-coloured cockades, which he had concealed in the hollow of a drum. They were received with enthusiasm. It was in this moment that Mareschal de camp Des Villiers, the superior officer of Labédoyère, arrived on the spot, alarmed at what was taking place, and expostulated with the young military fanatic and the soldiers. He was compelled to retire. General Marchand, the loyal commandant of Grenoble, had as little influence on the troops remaining in the place; they made him prisoner, and delivered up the city to Buonaparte. Napoleon was thus at the head of nearly three thousand soldiers, with a suitable train of artillery, and a corresponding quantity of ammunition. He acted with a moderation which his success could well afford, and dismissed General Marchand uninjured.

When the first news of Napoleon's arrival

reached Paris, it excited surprise rather than alarm; but when he was found to traverse the country without opposition, some strange and combined treason began to be generally apprehended. That the Bourbons might not be wanting to their own cause, Monsieur, with the Duke of Orleans, set out for Lyons, and the Duke of Angoulême repaired to Nismes. The Legislative Bodies, and most of the better classes, declared for the royal cause. The residents of the various powers hastened to assure Louis of the support of their sovereigns. Corps of volunteers were raised both among the Royalists and the Constitutional or moderate party. The most animating proclamations called the people to arms. An address by the celebrated Benjamin Constant, one of the most distinguished of the moderate party, was remarkable for its eloquence. It placed in the most striking light the contrast between the lawful government of a constitutional monarch, and the usurpation of an Attila, or Genghis, who governed only by the sword of his Mamelukes. It reminded France of the general detestation with which Buonaparte had been expelled from the kingdom, and proclaimed Frenchmen to be the scorn of Europe, should they again stretch their hands voluntarily to the shackles which they had burst and hurled from them. All were summoned to arms, more especially those to whom liberty

was dear; for in the triumph of Buonaparte, it must find its grave for ever.—« With Louis,» said the address, « was peace and happiness; —with Buonaparte, war, misery, and desolation.» Even a more animating appeal to popular feeling was made by a female on the staircase of the Tuileries, who exclaimed, « If Louis has not men enough to fight for him, let him call on the widows and childless mothers who have been rendered such by Napoleon.»

Notwithstanding all these demonstrations of zeal, the public mind had been much influenced by the causes of discontent which had been so artfully enlarged upon for many months past. The decided Royalists were few, the Constitutionals lukewarm. It became every moment more likely, that not the voice of the people, but the sword of the army, must determine the controversy. Soult, whose conduct had given much cause for suspicion, which was augmented by his proposal to call out the officers who since the restoration had been placed on half-pay, resigned his office, and was succeeded by Clarke, Duke of Feltre, less renowned as a soldier, but more trust-worthy as a subject. A camp was established at Melun—troops were assembled there—and as much care as possible was used in selecting the troops to whom the royal cause was to be intrusted.

In the mean time, Fortune had not entirely

abandoned the Bourbons. That part of the Buonapartist conspiracy which was to have been executed in the north was discovered and disconcerted. Lefèbvre Desnouettes, discreditably known in England by his breach of parole, with the two Generals Lallemand were the agents in this plot. On the 10th March, Lefèbvre Desnouettes marched forward his regiment to join Buonaparte; but the officers having discovered his purpose, he was obliged to make his escape from the arrest with which he was threatened. The two Lallemands put the garrison of Lille, to the number of six thousand men, in motion, by means of forged orders, declaring there was an insurrection in Paris. But Mareschal Mortier, meeting the troops on the march, detected and defeated the conspiracy, by which, had it taken effect, the King and Royal Family must have been made prisoners. The two Lallemands were taken, and to have executed them on the spot as traitors might have struck a wholesome terror into such officers as still hesitated; but the ministers of the King did not possess energy enough for such a crisis.

The progress of Buonaparte, in the mean time, was uninterrupted. It was in vain that at Lyons, Monsieur and the Duke of Orleans, with the assistance of the advice and influence of Mareschal Macdonald, endeavoured to re-

tain the troops in their duty, and the inhabitants in their allegiance to the King. The latter, chiefly manufacturers, afraid of being undersold by those of England in their own market, shouted openly, « *Vive l'Empereur.* » The troops of the line remained silent and gloomy. « How will your soldiers behave? » said Monsieur to the colonel of the 13th Dragoons. The colonel referred him to the men themselves. They answered candidly, that they would fight for Napoleon alone. Monsieur dismounted, and addressed the soldiers individually. To one veteran, covered with scars, and decorated with medals, the prince said, « A brave soldier like you, at least, will cry, *Vive le Roi!* »—« You deceive yourself, » answered the soldier. « No one here will fight against his father—I will cry, *Vive Napoleon!* » The efforts of Macdonald were equally vain. He endeavoured to move two battalions to oppose the entry of Buonaparte's advanced guard. So soon as the troops came in presence of each other, they broke their ranks, and mingled together in the general cry of *Vive l'Empereur!* Macdonald would have been made prisoner, but the forces whom he had just commanded would not permit this consummation of revolt. Monsieur was obliged to escape from Lyons, almost alone. The guard of honour formed by the citizens, to attend the person of the second of

the Bourbon family, offered their services to Napoleon; but he refused them with contempt, while he sent a cross of honour to a single dragoon, who had the loyalty and devotion to attend Monsieur in his retreat.

Buonaparte, now master of the ancient capital of the Gauls, and at the head of seven thousand men, was acknowledged by Macon, Châlons, Dijon, and almost all Burgundy. Marseilles, on the contrary, and all Provence, declared against the invader, and the former city set a price upon his head.

Napoleon found it necessary to halt at Lyons for the refreshment of his forces; and, being joined by some of the civilians of his party, he needed time also to organize his government and administration. Hitherto, the addresses which he had published had been of a military character, abounding with the oriental imagery which Buonaparte regarded as essential to eloquence, promising that victory should move at the charging step, and that the eagle should fly with the national colours from steeple to steeple, till she perched on the towers of Notre Dame. The present decrees were of a different character, and related to the internal arrangement of his projected administration.

Cambacérès was named his minister of justice; Fouché, that of police (a boon to the revolutionists); Davoust was made minister

of war. Décrees upon decrees issued forth, with a rapidity which showed how Buonaparte had employed those studious hours at Elba, which he was supposed to have dedicated to the composition of his Memoirs. They ran in the name of Napoleon, by the grace of God, Emperor of France, and were dated on the 13th of March, although not promulgated until the 21st of that month. The first of these decrees abrogated all changes in the courts of justice, and tribunals, which had taken place during the absence of Napoleon. The second displaced all officers belonging to the class of emigrants, and introduced into the army by the King. The third suppressed the order of St Louis, the white flag and cockade, and other royal emblems, and restored the three-coloured banner, and the imperial symbols of Buonaparte's authority. The same decree abolished the Swiss Guard and the household troops of the King. The fourth sequestered the effects of the Bourbons. A similar ordinance sequestered the restored property of emigrant families, and was so artfully worded as to represent great changes of property having taken place in this manner. The fifth decree of Lyons suppressed the ancient nobility and feudal titles, and formally confirmed proprietors of national domains in their possessions. The sixth declared sentence of banishment against all emigrants not

erased from the list previous to the accession of the Bourbons, to which was added confiscation of their property. The seventh restored the Legion of Honour, in every respect as it had existed under the Emperor, uniting to its funds the confiscated revenues of the order of St Louis. The eighth and last decree was the most important of all. Under pretence that emigrants who had borne arms against France, had been introduced into the body of the peers, and that the Chamber of Deputies had already sat for the legal time, it dissolved both Chambers, and convoked the Electoral Colleges of the Empire, in order that they might hold, in the ensuing month of May, an extraordinary assembly of the *Champ-de-Mai*. This convocation, for which the inventor found a name in the history of the ancient Franks, was to have two objects: First, to make such alterations and reformatations in the constitution of the empire as circumstances should render advisable; secondly, to assist at the coronation of the Empress and of the King of Rome.

We cannot pause to criticise these various enactments. In general, however, it may be remarked, that they were admirably calculated to serve Napoleon's cause. They flattered the army, and at the same time heated their resentment against the emigrants, by insinuating that they had been sacrificed by Louis to the inte-

rest of these his followers. They held out to the Republicans a speedy prospect of confiscations, proscriptions, and revolutions of government; while the Imperialists were gratified with a view of ample funds for pensions, offices, and honorary decorations. To the proprietors of national domains was promised security; to the Parisians, the spectacle of the *Champ-de-Mai*; and to all France, peace and tranquillity, since the arrival of the Empress and her son, so confidently asserted to be at hand, must be considered as a pledge of the friendship of Austria. Russia was also said to be friendly to Napoleon, and the conduct of Alexander toward the members of Buonaparte's family was boldly appealed to as evidence of the fact. England, it was averred, befriended him, else how could he have escaped from an isle surrounded by her naval force? Prussia, therefore, alone, might be hostile and unappeased; but, unsupported by the other belligerent powers, Prussia must remain passive, or would soon be reduced to reason. The very pleasure in mortifying one, at least, of the late victors of Paris, gave a zest and poignancy to the revolution, which the concurrence of the other great states would, according to Buonaparte, render easy and peaceful. Such news were carefully disseminated through France by Napoleon's adherents. They pre-

ceded his march, and prepared the minds of men to receive him as their destined master.

On the 13th, Buonaparte recommenced his journey, and, advancing through Macon, Châlons, and Dijon, he reached Auxerre on the 17th March. His own mode of travelling rather resembled that of a prince, who, weary of the fatigue of state, wishes to extricate himself as much as possible from its trammels, than that of an adventurer coming at the head of an army of insurgents, to snatch a crown from the head of the lawful monarch who wore it. He travelled several hours in advance of his army, often without any guard, or, at most, attended only by a few Polish lancers. The country through which he journeyed was favourable to his pretensions. It had been severely treated by the allies during the military manœuvres of the last campaign, and the dislike of the suffering inhabitants extended itself to the family who had mounted the throne by the influence of these strangers. When, therefore, they saw the late Emperor among them alone, without guards, inquiring, with his usual appearance of active interest, into the extent of their losses, and making liberal promises to repair them, it is no wonder that they should rather remember the battles he had fought in their behalf against the foreigners, than think on the probability that his presence

among them might be the precursor of a second invasion.

The revolutionary fever preceded Buonaparte like an epidemic disorder. The 14th regiment of lancers, quartered at Auxerre, trampled under foot the white cockade at the first signal; the sixth regiment of lancers declared also for Napoleon, and, without waiting for orders, drove a few soldiers of the household troops from Montereau, and secured that important post, which commands the passage of the Seine.

The dismay of the royal government at the revolt of Lyons was much increased by false tidings which had been previously circulated, giving an account of a pretended victory obtained by the Royalist party in front of that town. The conspiracy was laid so deep, and extended so widely through every branch of the government, that those concerned contrived to send this false report to Paris in a demi-official form, by means of the telegraph. It had the expected effect, first, in suspending the preparations of the loyal party, and afterwards in deepening the anxiety which overwhelmed them, when Monsieur, returning almost unattended, brought the news of his bad success.

At this moment of all but desperation, Fouché offered his assistance to the almost defenceless King. It is probable, that the more he

reflected on the character of his old master, Napoleon, the deeper became his conviction, that they knew each other too well ever to resume an attitude of mutual confidence. Nothing deterred, therefore, by the communications which he had opened with the Imperialists, he now demanded a secret audience of the King. It was refused, but his communications were received through the medium of two confidential persons deputed by Louis. Fouché's language to them was that of a bold empiric, to whom patients have recourse in a moment of despair, and who confidently undertake the most utterly hopeless cases. Like such, he exacted absolute reliance on his skill—the most scrupulous attention to his injunctions—the most ample reward for his promised services; and as such, too, he spoke with the utmost confidence in the certainty of his remedy, whilst observing a vague yet studious mystery about the ingredients of which it was composed, and the mode in which it would operate. He required of Louis XVIII., that he should surrender all the executive authority to the Duke of Orleans, and all the ministerial offices to himself and those whom he should appoint; which two conditions being granted, he undertook to put a period to Buonaparte's expedition. The Memoirs of this bold intriguer affirm, that he meant to assemble all that remained of the revolutionary party, and op-

pose the doctrines of Liberty and Equality to those of the Glory of France, in the sense understood by Buonaparte. What were the means that such politicians, so united, had to oppose to the army of France, Fouché has not informed us; but it is probable, that, to stop the advance of 10,000 armed men, against whom the revolutionists could now scarce even array the mob of the suburbs, the ex-minister of police must have meditated the short sharp remedy of Napoleon's assassination, for accomplishing which, he, if any man, could have found trusty agents.

The King having refused proposals, which went to preserve his sceptre by taking it out of his hands, and by further unexplained means the morality of which was liable to just suspicion, Fouché saw himself obliged to carry his intrigues to the service of his old master. He became, in consequence, so much an object of suspicion to the Royalists, that an order was issued for his arrest. To the police agents, his own old dependents, who came to execute the order, he objected against the informality of their warrant, and stepping into his closet, as if to draw a protest, he descended by a secret stair into his garden, of which he scaled the wall. His next neighbour, into whose garden he escaped, was the Duchess of St Leu; so that the fugitive arrived, as if by a trick of the stage, in the very midst of a

circle of chosen Buonapartists, who received him with triumph, and considered the mode of his coming among them as a full warrant for his fidelity. ¹

Louis XVIII., in his distress, had recourse to the assistance of another man of the Revolution, who, without possessing the abilities of Fouché, was perhaps, had he been disposed to do so, better qualified than he to have served the King's cause. Mareschal Ney was called forth to take the command of an army destined to attack Napoleon in the flank and rear, as he marched towards Paris, while the forces at Melun opposed him in front. He had an audience of the King on the 9th of March, when he accepted his appointment with expressions of the most devoted faith to the King, and declared his resolution to bring Buonaparte to Paris like a wild beast in an iron cage. The Mareschal went to Besançon, where, on the 11th March, he learned that Buonaparte was in possession of Lyons. But he continued to make preparations for resistance, and collected all the troops he could

¹ In the *Mémoires de Fouché*, it is avowed that this order of arrest was upon no political ground, but arose from the envy of Savary, who, foreseeing that Fouché would be restored to the situation of minister of police, which he himself desired, on account of the large sums which were placed at the disposal of that functionary. hoped, in this manner, to put his rival out of his road.

from the adjoining garrisons. To those who objected the bad disposition of the soldiers, and remarked that he would have difficulty in inducing them to fight, Ney answered determinedly, «They *shall* fight; I will take a musket from a grenadier and begin the action myself;—I will run my sword to the hilt in the first who hesitates to follow my example.» To the minister at war he wrote, that all were dazzled by the activity and rapid progress of the invader; that Napoleon was favoured by the common people and the soldiers; but that the officers and civil authorities were loyal, and he still hoped «to see a fortunate close of this mad enterprise.»

In these dispositions, Ney advanced to Lons le Saunier. Here, on the night betwixt the 13th and 14th March, he received a letter from Napoleon, summoning him to join his standard, as «bravest of the brave,» a name which could not but awake a thousand remembrances. He had already sounded both his officers and soldiers, and discovered their unalterable determination to join Buonaparte. He therefore had it only in his choice to retain his command by passing over to the Emperor, or else to return to the King, without executing any thing which might seem even an effort at realizing his boast, and also without the army over which he had asserted his possession of such influence.

Mareschal Ney was a man of mean birth, who, by the most desperate valour, had risen to the highest ranks in the army. His early education had not endowed him with a delicate sense of honour, or a high feeling of principle, and he had not learned either as he advanced in life. He appears to have been a weak man, with more vanity than pride, and who, therefore, was likely to feel the loss of power more than the loss of character. He accordingly resolved upon adhering to Napoleon. Sensible of the incongruity of changing his side so suddenly, he affected to be a deliberate knave, rather than he would content himself with being viewed in his real character, of a volatile, light-principled, and inconsiderate fool. He pretended that the expedition of Napoleon had been long arranged between himself and the other mareschals. But we are willing rather to suppose that this was matter of mere invention, than to think that the protestations poured out at the Tuileries, only five days before, were, on the part of this unfortunate man, the effusions of premeditated treachery.

The mareschal now published an order of the day, declaring that the cause of the Bourbons was lost for ever. It was received by the soldiers with rapture, and Buonaparte's standard and colours were instantly displayed. Many of the officers, however, remonstrated,

and left their commands. One, before he went away, broke his sword in two, and threw the pieces at Ney's feet, saying, "It is easier for a man of honour to break iron than to infringe his word."

Ney was received by Napoleon with open arms. His defection did incalculable damage to the King's cause, tending to show that the spirit of treason which possessed the common soldiers had ascended to and infected the officers of the highest rank in the army.

The King, in the mean while, notwithstanding these unpromising circumstances, used every exertion to induce his subjects to continue in their allegiance. He attended in person the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies, and was received with such enthusiastic marks of applause, that one would have thought the most active exertions must have followed. Louis next reviewed the National Guards, about 25,000 men, who made a similar display of loyalty. He also inspected the troops of the line, 6000 in number, but his reception was equivocal. They placed their caps on their bayonets in token of respect, but they raised no shout.

Some of those about Louis's person continued to believe that these men were still attached to the King, or that, at any rate, they ought to be sent to the camp at Melun, which

was the last remaining point upon which the royal party could hope to make a stand.

As a last resource, Louis convoked a general council at the Tuileries on the 18th March. The generals present declared there could be no effectual opposition offered to Buonaparte. The royalist nobles contradicted them, and, after some expressions of violence had been uttered, much misbecoming the royal presence, Louis was obliged to break up the meeting, and prepare himself to abandon a capital, which the prevalence of his enemies, and the disunion of his friends, left him no longer any chance of defending.

Meantime the two armies approached each other at Melun; that of the King was commanded by the faithful Macdonald. On the 20th, his troops were drawn up in three lines to receive the invaders, who were said to be advancing from Fontainebleau. There was a long pause of suspense, of a nature which seldom fails to render men more accessible to strong and sudden emotion. The glades of the forest, and the acclivity which ascends to it, were full in view of the royal army, but presented the appearance of a deep solitude. All was silence, except when the regimental bands of music, at the command of the officers, who remained generally faithful, played the airs of *Vive Henri Quatre*,—*O Richard*,—*La Belle*

Gabrielle, and other tunes connected with the cause and family of the Bourbons. The sounds excited no corresponding sentiments among the soldiers. At length about noon a galloping of horse was heard. An open carriage appeared, surrounded by a few hussars, and drawn by four horses. It came on at full speed; and Napoleon, jumping from the vehicle, was in the midst of the ranks which had been formed to oppose him. His escort threw themselves from their horses, mingled with their ancient comrades, and the effect of their exhortations was instantaneous on men, whose minds were already half made up to the purpose which they now accomplished. There was a general shout of *Vive Napoléon!*—The last army of the Bourbons passed from their side, and no further obstruction existed betwixt Napoleon and the capital, which he was once more—but for a brief space—to inhabit as a sovereign.

Louis XVIII. had anticipated too surely the defection which took place, to await the consequence of its actual arrival. The King departed from Paris, escorted by his household, at one in the morning of the 20th March. Even at that untimely hour, the palace was surrounded by the national guards, and many citizens, who wept and entreated him to remain, offering to spend the last drop of their blood for him. But Louis wisely declined accepting of sacrifices, which could now have availed nothing.

Escorted by his household troops, he took the way to Lille. Mareschal Macdonald, returning from the fatal position of Melun, assumed the command of this small body, which was indeed augmented by many volunteers, but such as considered their zealous wishes, rather than their power of rendering assistance. The King's condition was, however, pitied and respected, and he passed through Abbeville, and other garrison towns, where the soldiers received him with sullen respect; and though indicating that they intended to join his rival, would neither violate his person nor insult his misfortunes. At Lille he had hoped to make a stand, but Mareschal Mortier, insisting upon the dissatisfied and tumultuary state of the garrison, urged him to proceed, for the safety of his life; and, compelled to a second exile, he departed to Ostend, and from thence to Ghent, where he established his exiled court. Mareschal Macdonald took leave of his Majesty on the frontiers, conscious that by emigrating he must lose every prospect of serving in future either France or her monarch. The household troops, about two hundred excepted, were also disbanded on the frontiers. They had been harassed in their march thither by some light horse, and, in their attempt to regain their homes in a state of dispersion, some were slain, and almost all were plundered and insulted.

In the mean while, the revolution took full

effect at Paris. Lavalette, one of Buonaparte's most decided adherents, hastened from a place of concealment to assume the management of the post-office in the name of Napoleon, an office which he had enjoyed during his former reign. He was thus enabled to intercept the royal proclamations, and to announce to every department officially the restoration of the Emperor. Excelsman, the oath of fealty to the King, *à toute épreuve*, scarce dry upon his lips, took down the white flag, which floated on the Tuileries, and replaced the three-coloured banner.

It was late in the evening ere Napoleon arrived in the same open carriage, which he had used since his landing. There was a singular contrast betwixt his entry and the departure of the King. The latter was accompanied by the sobs, tears, and kind wishes of those citizens who desired peace and tranquillity, by the wailing of the defenceless, and the anxious fears of the wise and prudent. The former entered amid the shouts of armed columns, who, existing by war and desolation, welcomed with military acclamations the chief, who was to restore them to their element. The inhabitants of the suburbs cheered in expectation of employment and gratuities, or by instigation of their ringleaders, who were chiefly under the management of the police, and well prepared for the event. But among the immense

crowds of the citizens of Paris, who turned out to see this extraordinary spectacle, few or none joined in the gratulation. The soldiers of the guard resented their silence, commanded the spectators to shout, struck with the flat of their swords, and pointed their pistols at the multitude, but could not even by these military means extort the expected cry of Liberty and Napoleon, though making it plain by their demeanour, that the last, if not the first, was returned to the Parisians. In the court of the Carrousel, and before the Tuileries, all the adherents of the old Imperial government, and those who, having deserted Napoleon, were eager to expiate their fault, by now being first to acknowledge him, were assembled to give voice to their welcome, which atoned in some degree for the silence of the streets. They crowded around him so closely, that he was compelled to exclaim, — « My friends, you stifle me! » and his adjutants were obliged to support him in their arms up the grand staircase, and thence into the royal apartments, where he received the all-hail of the principal advisers and abettors of this singular undertaking.

Never, in his bloodiest and most triumphant field of battle, had the terrible ascendancy of Napoleon's genius appeared half so predominant as during his march, or rather his journey, from Cannes to Paris. He who left the same

coast, disguised like a slave, and weeping like a woman, for fear of assassination, returned in grandeur like that of the returning wave, which, the farther it has retreated, is rolled back on the shore with the more terrific and overwhelming violence. His looks seemed to possess the pretended power of northern magicians, and blunted swords and spears. The Bravest of the Brave, who came determined to oppose him as he would a wild beast, recognized his superiority when confronted with him, and sunk again into his satellite. Yet the lustre with which Napoleon shone was not that of a planet duly moving in its regular sphere, but that of a comet, inspiring forebodings of pestilence and death, and,

— with fear of change,
Perplexing nations.

The result of his expedition was thus summed by one of the most eloquent and best-informed British statesmen. ¹

“Was it,” said the accomplished orator, “in the power of language to describe the evil? Wars which had raged for twenty-five years throughout Europe; which had spread blood and desolation from Cadiz to Moscow, and from Naples to Copenhagen; which had wasted the means of human enjoyment, and destroyed the

¹ Sir James Mackintosh.

instruments of social improvement; which threatened to diffuse among the European nations the dissolute and ferocious habits of a predatory soldiery,—at length, by one of those vicissitudes which bid defiance to the foresight of man, had been brought to a close, upon the whole happy beyond all reasonable expectation, with no violent shock to national independence, with some tolerable compromise between the opinions of the age and the reverence due to ancient institutions; with no too signal or mortifying triumph over the legitimate interests or avowable feelings of any numerous body of men, and, above all, without those retaliations against nations or parties which beget new convulsions, often as horrible as those which they close, and perpetuate revenge and hatred and blood from age to age. Europe seemed to breathe after her sufferings. In the midst of this fair prospect, and of these consolatory hopes, Napoleon Buonaparte escaped from Elba; three small vessels reached the coast of Provence; their hopes are instantly dispelled; the work of our toil and fortitude is undone; the blood of Europe is spilt in vain—

Ibi omnis effusus labor's

CHAPTER XIV.

Various attempts to organize a defence for the Bourbons fail.—Buonaparte, again reinstated on the throne of France, is desirous of continuing the peace with the Allies—but no answer is returned to his letters.—Treaty of Vienna.—Grievances alleged by Buonaparte in justification of the step he had taken.—Debates in the British House of Commons, on the renewal of War.—Murat occupies Rome with 50,000 men—his Proclamation summoning all Italians to arms.—He advances against the Austrians—is repulsed at Occhio-Bello—defeated at Tolentino—flies to Naples, and thence, in disguise, to France—where Napoleon refuses to receive him.

WHEN Paris was lost, the bow of the Bourbons was effectually broken; and the attempts of individuals of the family to make a stand against the evil hour was honourable indeed to their own gallantry, but of no advantage to their cause.

The Duke of Angoulême placed himself at the head of a considerable body of troops, raised by the town of Marseilles, and the Royalists of Provence. But, being surrounded by General Gilly, he was obliged to lay down his arms, on condition of amnesty to his followers, and free permission to himself to leave France.

General Grouchy refused to confirm this capitulation, till Buonaparte's pleasure was known. But the restored Emperor, not displeased, it may be, to make a display of generosity, permitted the Duke d'Angoulême to depart by sea from Cete, only requiring his interference with Louis XVIII. for returning the crown-jewels which the King had removed with him to Ghent.

The Duke of Bourbon had retired to La Vendée to raise the warlike royalists of that faithful province. But it had been previously occupied by soldiers attached to Buonaparte, so judiciously posted as to render an insurrection impossible; and the duke found himself obliged to escape by sea from Nantes.

The Duchess d'Angoulême, the only remaining daughter of Louis XVI., whose childhood and youth had suffered with patient firmness such storms of adversity, showed on this trying occasion that she had the active as well as passive courage becoming the descendant of a long line of princes. She threw herself into Bordeaux, where the loyalty of Count Lynch, the mayor, and of the citizens in general, promised her determined aid, and the princess herself stood forth amongst them, like one of those heroic women of the age of chivalry, whose looks and words were able in moments of peril to give double edge to men's swords, and double constancy to their heart. But

unhappily there was a considerable garrison of troops of the line in Bordeaux, who had caught the general spirit of revolt. General Clausel also advanced on the city with a force of the same description. The Duchess made a last effort, assembled around her the officers, and laid their duty before them in the most touching and pathetic manner. But when she saw their coldness, and heard their faltering excuses, she turned from them in disdain:— « You fear,» she said— « I pity you, and release you from your oaths.» She embarked on board an English frigate, and Bordeaux opened its gates to Clausel, and declared for the Emperor. Thus, notwithstanding the return of Napoleon was far from being acceptable to the French universally, or even generally, all open opposition to his government ceased, and he was acknowledged as Emperor within about twenty days after he landed on the beach at Cannes, with a thousand followers.

But though he was thus replaced on the throne, Napoleon's seat was by no means secure, unless he could prevail upon the confederated sovereigns of Europe to acknowledge him in the capacity of which their united arms had so lately deprived him. It is true, he had indirectly promised war to his soldiers, by stigmatizing the cessions made by the Bourbons of what he called the territory of France. It is true, also, that then, and till his death's-

day, he continued to entertain the rooted idea that Belgium, a possession which France had acquired within twenty years, was an integral portion of that kingdom. It is true, Antwerp and the five hundred sail of the line which were to be built there, continued through his whole life to be the very Dalilah of his imagination. The cause of future war was, therefore, blazing in his bosom. But yet at present he felt it necessary for his interest to assure the people of France, that his return to the empire would not disturb the treaty of Paris, though it had given the Low Countries to Holland. He spared no device to spread reports of a pacific tendency.

From the commencement of his march, it was affirmed by his creatures that he brought with him a treaty concluded with all the powers of Europe for twenty years. It was repeatedly averred, that Maria Louisa and her son were on the point of arriving in France, dismissed by her father as a pledge of reconciliation; and when she did not appear, it was insinuated that she was detained by the Emperor Francis, as a pledge that Buonaparte should observe his promise of giving the French a free constitution. To such bare-faced assertions he was reduced, rather than admit that his return was to be the signal for renewing hostilities with all Europe.

Meantime Napoleon hesitated not to offer to

the allied ministers his willingness to acquiesce in the treaty of Paris; although, according to his uniform reasoning, it involved the humiliation and disgrace of France. He sent a letter to each of the sovereigns, expressing his desire to make peace on the same principles which had been arranged with the Bourbons. To these letters no answers were returned. The decision of the allies had already been adopted.

The Congress at Vienna happened fortunately not to be dissolved, when the news of Buonaparte's escape from Elba was laid before them by Talleyrand on the 11th March. The astonishing, as well as the sublime, approaches to the ludicrous, and it is a curious physiological fact, that the first news of an event which threatened to abolish all their labours, seemed so like a trick in a pantomime, that laughter was the first emotion it excited from almost every one. The merry mood did not last long; for the jest was neither a sound nor safe one. It was necessary for the Congress, by an unequivocal declaration, to express their sentiments upon this extraordinary occasion. This declaration appeared on the 13th March, and, after giving an account of the fact, bore the following denunciation:—

« By thus breaking the convention which had established him in the island of Elba, Buonaparte destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended; and, by appearing

again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe, that there can be neither peace nor truce with him.

« The powers consequently declare, that Napoleon Buonaparte has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance. They declare at the same time, that, firmly resolved to maintain entire the treaty of Paris of the 30th of May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by that treaty, and those which they have resolved on, or shall hereafter resolve on, to complete and to consolidate it, they will employ all their means, and will unite all their efforts, that the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled; and to provide against every attempt which shall threaten to replunge the world into the disorders of revolution.»

This manifesto was instantly followed by a treaty betwixt Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, renewing and confirming the league entered into at Chaumont. The first article declared the resolution of the high contracting parties to maintain and enforce the treaty of Paris, which excluded Buonaparte

from the throne of France, and to enforce the decree of outlawry issued against him as above mentioned. 2. Each of the contracting parties agreed to keep constantly in the field an army of 150,000 men complete, with the due proportion of cavalry and artillery. 3. They agreed not to lay down their arms but by common consent, until either the purpose of the war should have been attained, or Buonaparte should be rendered incapable of disturbing the peace of Europe. After other subordinate articles, the 7th provided, that the other powers of Europe should be invited to accede to the treaty; and the 8th, that the King of France should be particularly called upon to become a party to it. A separate article provided, that the King of Great Britain should have the option of furnishing his contingent in men, or of paying instead at the rate of 30*l.* sterling per annum for each cavalry soldier, and 20*l.* per annum for each infantry soldier, which should be wanting to make up his complement. To this treaty a declaration was subjoined, when it was ratified by the Prince Regent, referring to the eighth article of the treaty, and declaring that it should not be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war, with the view of forcibly imposing on France any particular government. The other contracting powers agreed

to accept of the accession of his Royal Highness, under this explanation and limitation.

This treaty of Vienna may be considered in a double point of view, first, upon principle, and, secondly, as to its mode of expression; and it was commented upon in both respects in the British House of Commons. The expediency of the war was denied by several of the Opposition members, on account of the exhausted state of Great Britain, but they generally admitted that the escape of Buonaparte gave a just cause for the declaration of hostilities. The great statesman and juriconsult, whom we have already quoted, delivered an opinion for himself, and those with whom he acted, couched in the most positive terms.

« Some insinuations,» said Sir James Mackintosh, « had been thrown out, of differences of opinion on his side of the House, respecting the evils of this escape. He utterly denied them. All agreed in lamenting the occurrence which rendered the renewal of war so probable, not to say certain. All his friends, with whose sentiments he was acquainted, were of opinion, that, in the theory of public law, the assumption of power by Napoleon had given to the allies a just cause of war against France. It was perfectly obvious, that the abdication of Napoleon, and his perpetual renunciation of the supreme authority, was a

condition, and the most important condition, on which the allies had granted peace to France. The convention of Fontainebleau, and the treaty of Paris, were equally parts of the great compact which re-established friendship between France and Europe. In consideration of the safer and more inoffensive state of France, when separated from her terrible leader, confederated Europe had granted moderate and favourable terms of peace. As soon as France had violated this important condition, by again submitting to the authority of Napoleon, the allies were doubtless released from their part of the compact, and re-entered into their belligerent rights.»

The provocations pleaded by Buonaparte (which seem to have been entirely fanciful, so far as respects any design on his freedom), were, first, The separation from his family. But this was a question with Austria exclusively; for what power was to compel the Emperor Francis to restore his daughter, after the fate of war had flung her again under his paternal protection? Napoleon's feelings in his situation were extremely natural, but those of the Emperor cannot be blamed, who considered his daughter's honour and happiness as interested in separating her from a man, who was capable of attempting to redeem his broken fortunes by the most desperate means.

Much would depend upon the inclination of the illustrious person herself; but even if some degree of paternal restraint had been exerted, could Napoleon really feel himself justified in renewing a sort of Trojan war with all the powers in Europe, in order to recover his wife, or think, because he was separated from her society by a flinty-hearted father, that he was therefore warranted in invading and subduing the kingdom of France? The second article of provocation, and we admit it as a just one, was that Napoleon was left to necessities to which he ought not to have been subjected, by France withholding his pension till the year should elapse. This was a ground of complaint, and a deep one; but against whom? Surely not against the allies, unless Buonaparte had called upon them to make good their treaty; and had stated, that France had failed to make good those obligations, for which he had their guarantee. England, who was only an accessory to the treaty, had nevertheless already interfered in Buonaparte's behalf, and there can be no doubt that redress would have been granted by the contracting parties, who could not in decency avoid enforcing a treaty, which had been of their own forming. That this guarantee gave Napoleon a right to appeal and to complain, cannot be denied; but that it gave him a right to proceed by violence, without any expostu-

lation previously made, is contrary to all ideas of the law of nations, which enacts, that no aggression can constitute a legitimate cause of war, until redress has been refused. This, however, is all mere legal argument. Buonaparte did NOT invade France, because she was deficient in paying his pension. He invaded her, because he saw a strong prospect of regaining the throne; nor do we believe that millions of gold would have prevailed on him to forego the opportunity.

His more available ground of defence, however, was, that he was recalled by the general voice of the nation of France; but the whole facts of the case contradicted this statement. His league with the revolutionists was made reluctantly on their part, nor did that party form any very considerable portion of the nation. «His election,» according to Grattan, «was a military election; and when the army disposed of the civil government, it was the march of a military chief over a conquered nation. The nation did not rise to assist Louis, or resist Buonaparte, because the nation could not rise against the army. The mind of France, as well as her constitution, had completely lost, for the present, the power of resistance. They passively yielded to superior force.»

In short, the opinion of the House of Commons was so unanimous on the disastrous consequences of Napoleon's quitting Elba, that

the minority brought charges against Ministers for not having provided more effectual means to prevent his escape. To these charges it was replied, that Britain was not his keeper; that it was impossible to maintain a line of blockade around Elba; and if it had been otherwise, that Britain had no right to interfere with Buonaparte's motions, so far as concerned short expeditions unconnected with the purpose of escape; although it was avowed, that if a British vessel had detected him in the act of going to France with an armed force, for the purpose of invasion, the right of stopping his progress would have been exercised at every hazard. Still, it was urged, they had no title either to establish a police upon the island, the object of which should be to watch its acknowledged Emperor, or to maintain a naval force around it, to apprehend him in case he should attempt an escape. Both would have been in direct contradiction of the treaty of Fontainebleau, to which Britain had acceded, though she was not one of the contracting parties.

The style of the declaration of the allies was more generally censured in the British Parliament than its warlike tone. It was contended, that, by declaring Napoleon an outlaw, it invoked against him the daggers of individuals, as well as the sword of justice. This charge of encouraging assassination was warn-

ly repelled by the supporters of ministry. The purpose of the proclamation, it was said, was merely to point out Napoleon to the French nation, as a person who had forfeited his civil rights, by the act of resuming, contrary to treaty, a position in which, from his temper, habits, and talents, he must again become an object of suspicion and terror to all Europe. His inflexible resolution, his unbounded ambition, his own genius, his power over the mind of others,—those great military talents, in short, which, so valuable in war, are in peace so dangerous, had afforded reasons for making the peace of Paris, by which Napoleon was personally excluded from the throne. When Napoleon broke that peace, solemnly concluded with Europe, he forfeited his political rights, and in that view alone the outlawry was to be construed. In consequence of these resolutions, adopted at Vienna and London, all Europe rang with the preparations for war; and the number of troops with which the allies proposed to invade France were rated at no less than one million and eleven thousand soldiers.¹

Before proceeding farther, it is requisite to say a few words on the subject of Murat. He

¹ The contingents of the various powers were as follows:—Austria 300,000 men; Russia 225,000; Prussia 236,000; States of Germany 150,000; Great Britain 50,000; Holland 50,000: in all, 1,011,000 soldiers.

had been for some time agitated by fears naturally arising from the attack made upon his government at the Congress, by Talleyrand. The effect had not, it was true, induced the other powers to decide against him; but he seems to have been conscious that the reports of General Nugent and Lord William Bentinck, concurred in representing him as having acted in the last campaign, rather the part of a trimmer betwixt two parties, than that of a confederate, sincere, as he professed to be, in favour of the allies. Perhaps his conscience acknowledged this truth, for it certainly seems as if Eugène might have been more hardly pressed, had Murat been disposed to act with energy in behalf of the allies. He felt, therefore, that the throne of Tancred tottered under him, and rashly determined that it was better to brave a danger, than to allow time to see whether it might not pass away. Murat had held intercourse with the Isle of Elba, and cannot but have known Buonaparte's purpose when he left it; but he ought, at the same time, to have considered, that if his brother-in-law met with any success, his own alliance would become essential to Austria, who had such anxiety to retain the north of Italy, and must have been purchased on his own terms.

Instead, however, of waiting for an opportunity of profiting by Napoleon's attempt, which could not have failed to arrive, Murat

resolved to throw himself into the fray and carve for himself. He placed himself at the head of an army of 50,000 men, and, without explaining his intentions, occupied Rome, the Pope and cardinals flying before him; threatened the whole line of the Po, which the Austrian force was inadequate to maintain; and, on 31st of March, addressed a proclamation to all Italians, summoning them to rise in arms for the liberation of their country. It seemed now clear, that the purpose of this son of a pastry-cook amounted to nothing else, than the formation of Italy into one state, and the placing himself on the throne of the Cæsars. The proclamation was signed Joachim Napoleon, which last name, formerly laid aside, he reassumed at this critical period. The appeal to the Italians was in vain. The feuds among the petty states are so numerous, their pretensions so irreconcilable, and their weakness has made them so often the prey of successive conquerors, that they found little inviting in the proposal of union, little arousing in the sound of independence. The proclamation, therefore, had small effect, except upon some of the students at Bologna. Murat marched northward, however, and, being much superior in numbers, defeated the Austrian general Bianchi, and occupied Modena and Florence.

Murat's attitude was now an alarming one to

Europe. If he should press forward into Lombardy, he might co-operate with Buonaparte, now restored to his crown, and would probably be reinforced by thousands of the veterans of the Viceroy Eugène's army. Austria, therefore, became desirous of peace, and offered to guarantee to him the possession of the kingdom of Naples, with an addition he had long coveted, the marches, namely, of the Roman See. Britain, at the same time, intimated, that, having made truce with Joachim at the instance of Austria, it was to last no longer than his good intelligence with her ally. Murat refused the conditions of the one power, and neglected the remonstrances of the other. « It was too late,» he said; « Italy deserves freedom, and she shall be free.» Here closed all hopes of peace; Austria declared war against Murat, and expedited the reinforcements sent into Italy; and Britain prepared a descent upon his Neapolitan dominions, where Ferdinand still continued to have many adherents.

Murat's character as a tactician was far inferior to that which he deservedly bore as a soldier in the field of battle, and he was a still worse politician than a general. A repulse sustained in an attempt to pass the Po near Occhio-bello seems to have disconcerted the plan of his whole campaign, nor did he find himself able to renew the negotiations which he had rashly broken off. He seemed to

acknowledge, by his military movements, that he had attempted a scheme far beyond his strength and understanding. He retreated upon his whole line, abandoning Parma, Reggio, Modena, Florence, and all Tuscany, by which last movement he put the Austrians in possession of the best and shortest road to Rome. In consequence, he was pressed on his retreat in front and rear, and compelled to give battle near Tolentino. It was sustained for two days (2d and 3d of May), but the Neapolitans could not be brought into close action with the iron-nerved Austrians. It was in vain that Murat placed field-pieces in the rear of his attacking columns, with orders to fire grape on them should they retreat; in vain that he himself set the example of the most desperate courage. The Neapolitan army fled in dispersion and discomfiture. Their guns, ammunition, treasure, and baggage, became the spoil of the Austrians; and in traversing the mountains of Abruzzo, Murat lost half his army without stroke of sword.

The defeated prince was pursued into his Neapolitan dominions, where he learned that the Calabrians were in insurrection, and that an English fleet, escorting an invading army from Sicily, had appeared in the bay of Naples. His army, reduced to a handful by repeated skirmishes, in which he had behaved with such temerity as to make his followers think he de-

sired death, was directed to throw itself into Capua. He himself, who had left Naples splendidly appavelled, according to his custom, and at the head of a gallant army, now entered its gates attended only by four lancers, alighted at the palace, and appeared before the queen, pale, haggard, dishevelled, with all the signs of extreme fatigue and dejection. His salutation was in the affecting words, « Madam, I have not been able to find death.» He presently found, that remaining at Naples, which was about to fall into other hands, would compromise his liberty, perhaps his life. He took leave of his queen, whom circumstances were about to deprive of that title, cut off his hair, and, disguising himself in a gray frock, escaped to the little island of Ischia, and reached, on 25th May, Cannes, which had received Napoleon a few weeks before. His wife, immediately afterwards, alarmed by the tendency of the Neapolitan mob to insurrection, surrendered herself to Commodore Campbell, of the Tremendous, and was received on board his vessel.

A courier announced Murat's arrival in France to Buonaparte, who, instead of sending consolation to his unhappy relative, is said to have asked with bitter scorn, « Whether Naples and France had made peace since the war of 1814?» The answer seems to imply, that although the attempts of Joachim and Napoleon coincided

in time, and in other circumstances, so punctually as to make it evident they had been undertaken in concert, yet that there had been no precise correspondence, far less any formal treaty, betwixt the adventurous brothers. Indeed Napoleon at all times positively denied that he had the least accession to Murat's wildly-concerted project (*levée de bouclier*), and affirmed that it was essentially injurious to him. Napoleon's account was, that when he retired to Elba, he took farewell of Murat by letter, forgiving all that had passed between them, and recommending to his brother-in-law to keep on good terms with the Austrians, and only to check them if he saw them likely to advance on France. He offered also to guarantee his kingdom. Murat returned an affectionate answer, engaging to prove himself, in his conduct towards Napoleon, more an object of pity than resentment, declining any other guarantee than the word of the Emperor, and declaring that the attachment of his future life was to make amends for the past defection. « But it was Murat's fate to ruin us every way,» continued Napoleon; « once by declaring against us, and again by unadvisedly taking our part.» He encountered Austria without sufficient means, and, being ruined, left her without any counterbalancing power in Italy. From that time it became impossible for Napoleon to negotiate with her.

Receiving the Emperor's account as correct, and allowing that the brothers-in-law played each his own part, it was not to be supposed that they acted entirely without a mutual understanding. Each, indeed, was willing to rest on his own fortunes, well knowing that his claim to the other's assistance would depend chiefly upon his success, and unwilling, besides, to relinquish the privilege of making peace, should it be necessary, at the expense of disowning the kindred enterprise of his brother-in-law. Notwithstanding the splendid details which the *Moniteur* gave of Murat's undertaking, while it yet seemed to promise success, it is certain that Buonaparte endeavoured to propitiate Austria, by the offer of abandoning Murat; and that Murat, could his offers have obtained a hearing after the repulse of Occhio-bello, was ready once more to have deserted Napoleon, whose name he had so lately reassumed. Involved in this maze of selfish policy, Murat had now the mortification to find himself contemned by Napoleon, when he might, indeed, be a burden, but could afford him no aid. Had he arrived at Milan as a victor, and extended a friendly hand across the Alps, how different would have been his reception! But Buonaparte refused to see him in his distress, or to permit him to come to Paris, satisfied that the sight of his misery would be a bitter contradiction to the

fables which the French journals had, for some time, published of his success. Fouché sent him a message, much like that which enjoined the dishonoured ambassadors of Solomon to tarry at Jericho till their beards grew. It recommended to Murat to remain in seclusion, till the recollection of his disgrace should be abated by newer objects of general interest.

Buonaparte had sometimes entertained thoughts of bringing Murat to the army, but was afraid of shocking the French soldiers, who would have felt disgust and horror at seeing the man who had betrayed France. « I did not,» he said to his followers at St Helena, « think I could carry him through, and yet he might have gained us the victory; for there were moments during the battle (of Waterloo), when to have forced two or three of the English squares might have insured it, and Murat was just the man for the work. In leading a charge of cavalry, never was there an officer more determined, more brave, and more brilliant.»

Murat was thus prohibited to come to the court of the Tuileries, where his defection might have been forgiven, but his defeat was an inexpiable offence. He remained in obscurity near Toulon, till his fate called him elsewhere, after the decisive battle of Waterloo.¹ From this episode, for such, however

¹ It is well known that Joachim Murat, escaping with

important, it' is in the present history, we return to France and our immediate subject.

difficulty from France, fled to Corsica, and might have obtained permission to reside upon parole in the Austrian territories, safe and unmolested. He nourished a wild idea, however, of recovering his crown, which induced him to reject these terms of safety, and invade the Neapolitan territories at the head of about two hundred men. That his whole expedition might be an accurate parody on that of Buonaparte to Cannes, he published swaggering proclamations, mingled with a proper quantum of falsehood. A storm dispersed his flotilla. He himself, October 8th, landed at a little fishing town near Monte Leone. He was attacked by the country people, fought as he was wont, but was defeated and made prisoner, tried by martial law, and condemned. The Sicilian royal family have shown themselves no forgiving race, otherwise mercy might have been extended to one, who, though now a private person, had been so lately a king, that he might be pardoned for forgetting that he had no longer the power of making peace and war without personal responsibility. Murat met his fate as became *le beau sabreur*. He fastened his wife's picture on his breast, refused to have his eyes bandaged, or to use a seat, received six balls through his heart, and met the death which he had braved with impunity in the thick of many conflicts, and sought in vain in so many others.

CHAPTER XV.

Buonaparte's attempts to conciliate Britain.—Plot to carry off Maria Louisa fails.—State of feeling in France with regard to Buonaparte's return—the Army—the Jacobins—the Constitutionals.—Fouché and Siéyes made Peers.—Freedom of the Press granted, and outraged.—Independent conduct of Comte, editor of *Le Censeur*.—Disaffections among the lower orders—Part of them attached to Buonaparte—These assemble before the Tuileries, and applaud the Emperor.—Festival of the Federates.—New Constitution—It is received with dissatisfaction—Meeting of the *Champ-de-Mai* to ratify it.—Buonaparte's Address to the Chambers of Peers and Deputies—The spirit of Jacobinism predominant in the latter.

WHILE Murat was struggling and sinking under his evil fate, Buonaparte was actively preparing for the approaching contest. His first attempt, as we have already seen, was to conciliate the allied powers. To satisfy Great Britain, he passed an act abolishing the slave trade, and made some regulations concerning national education, in which he spoke highly

of the systems of Bell and Lancaster. These measures were favourably construed by some of our legislators, and that they were so, is a complete proof that Buonaparte understood the temper of our nation. To suppose that, during his ten months of retirement, his mind was actively employed upon the miseries of the negroes, or the deplorable state of ignorance to which his own measures, and the want of early instruction, had reduced the youth of France, would argue but little acquaintance with his habits of ambition. To believe, on the contrary, that he would, at his first arrival in France, make any apparent sacrifices which might attract the good-will of his powerful and dangerous neighbours, is more consonant with his schemes, his interest, and his character. The path which he chose to gain the esteem of Britain was by no means injudicious. The abolition of negro slavery, and the instruction of the poor, have (to the honour of our legislature) been frequent and anxious subjects of deliberation in the House of Commons; and to mankind, whether individually or collectively, no species of flattery is more pleasing than that of assent and imitation. It is not a little to the credit of our country, that the most avowed enemy of Britain strove to cultivate our good opinion, not by any offers of national advantage, but by appearing to concur in general measures of benevolence, and attention

to the benefit of society. Yet, upon the whole, the character of Napoleon was too generally understood, and the purpose of his apparent approximation to British sentiments too obviously affected, for serving to make any general or serious impression in his favour.

With Austria, Napoleon acted differently. He was aware that no impression could be made on the Emperor Francis, or his minister Metternich, and that it had become impossible, with their consent, that he should fulfil his promise of presenting his wife and son to the people on the *Champ-de-Mai*. Stratagem remained the only resource; and some Frenchmen at Vienna, with those in Maria Louisa's train, formed a scheme of carrying off the Empress of France and her child. The plot was discovered and prevented, and the most public steps were immediately taken, to show that Austria considered all ties with Buonaparte as dissolved for ever. Maria Louisa, by her father's commands, laid aside the arms and liveries of her husband, hitherto displayed by her attendants and carriages, and assumed those of the house of Austria. This decisive event put an end to every hope so long cherished by Napoleon, that he might find some means of regaining the friendship of his father-in-law.

Nor did the other powers in Europe show themselves more accessible to his advances.

He was, therefore, reduced to his own partisans in the French nation, and those won over from other parties, whom he might be able to add to them.

The army had sufficiently shown themselves to be his own, upon grounds which are easily appreciated. The host of public official persons, to whom the name under which they exercised their offices was indifferent, provided the salary continued to be attached to them, formed a large and influential body. And although we, who have never, such mutations of our political system, been put to the trial of either abandoning our means of living, or submitting to a change of government, may, on hearing quoted names of respectability and celebrity who adopted the latter alternative, exclaim against French versatility, a glance at Britain during the frequent changes of the 17th century may induce us to exchange the exclamation of poor France! for that of poor human nature! The professors of Cromwell's days, who piously termed themselves followers of Providence, because they complied with every change that came uppermost; and the sect of time-servers, including the honest patriot, who complained at the Restoration that he had complied with seven forms of government during the year, but lost his office by being too late of adhering to the last,—would have made in their day a

list equally long, and as entertaining, as the celebrated *Dictionnaire des Girouettes*. In matters dependent upon a sudden breeze of sentiment, the mercurial Frenchman is more apt to tack about than the phlegmatic and slowly-moved native of Britain; but when the steady trade-wind of interest prevails for a long season, men in all nations and countries show the same irresistible disposition to trim their sails by it; and in politics as in morals, it will well to pray against being led into temptation.

Besides those attached to him by mere interest, or from gratitude and respect for his talents, Napoleon had now among his adherents, or rather allies, not as a matter of choice, but of necessity, the Jacobin party, who had been obliged, though unwillingly, to adopt him as the head of a government, which they hoped to regenerate. To these were to be added a much larger and more respectable body, who, far from encouraging his attempt, had testified themselves anxious to oppose it to the last, but who, conceiving the cause of the Bourbons entirely lost, were willing to adhere to Buonaparte, on condition of obtaining a free constitution for France. Many of these acted, of course, on mixed motives; but if we were asked to form a definition of them, we should be induced to give the same, which, laying aside party spirit, we would ascribe to

a right English Whig, whom we conceive to be a man of sense and moderation, a lover of laws and liberty, whose chief regard to particular princes and families is founded on what he apprehends to be the public good; and who differs from a sensible Tory so little, that there is no great chance of their disputing upon any important constitutional question, if it is fairly stated to both. Such, we believe, is the difference betwixt rational Constitutionalists and Royalists in France; and undoubtedly, while all the feelings of the latter induced them to eye with abhorrence the domination of a usurper, there must have been many of the former, who, fearing danger to the independence of France from the intervention of foreign powers, conceived, that by advocating the cause of Napoleon, they were in some degree making a virtue of necessity, and playing an indifferent game with as much skill as the cards they held would permit. Many patriotic and sensible men, who had retained a regard for liberty during all the governments and all the anarchies which had subsisted for twenty years, endeavoured now to frame a system of government, grounded upon something like freedom, upon the difficulties of Buonaparte. Pressed as he was from abroad, and unsupported at home, save by the soldiery, he would, they conceived, be thrown by necessity under the protection of

the nation, and obliged to recruit his adherents by complying with public opinion, and adopting a free government. Under this persuasion a great number of such characters, more or less shaded by attachment to a moderate and limited monarchy, were prepared to acknowledge Buonaparte's re-established authority, in so far as he should be found to deserve it, by concessions on his part.

The conduct and arguments of another portion of the friends of the constitution rather resembled that which might have been adopted in England by moderate and intelligent Tories. Such men were not prepared to resign the cause of their lawful monarch, because fortune had for a time declared against him. They were of opinion that, to make a constitution permanent, the monarch must have his rights ascertained and vindicated, as well as those of the people; and that if a usurper were to be acknowledged upon any terms, however plausible, so soon as he had cut his way to success by his sword, the nation would be exposed to perpetual revolutions. Louis, these men might argue, had committed no crime whatever; he was only placed in circumstances which made some persons suppose he might possibly be tempted to meditate changes on the constitution, and on the charter which confirmed it. There was meanness in deserting a good and peaceable king at the command of a revolted army,

and a discarded usurper. They regretted that their prince must be replaced by foreign bayonets; yet it was perhaps better that a moderate and peaceful government should be restored even thus, than that the French nation should continue to suffer under the despotic tyranny of their own soldiery. Those reasoners ridiculed the idea of a free constitution, which was to be generated betwixt Buonaparte, who, in his former reign, never allowed freedom of thought, word, or action, to exist unrepressed, and the old Revolutionists, who, during their period of power, could be satisfied with no degree of liberty, until they destroyed every compact which holds civil society together, and made the country resemble one great bedlam, set on fire by the patients, who remained dancing in the midst of the flames.

Such we conceive to have been the principles on which wise and moderate men on either side acted during this distracted period. It is easy to suppose, that their opinions must have been varied by many more and less minute shades, arising from temperament, predilections, prejudices, passions, and feelings of self-interest, and that they were on either side liable to be pushed into exaggeration, or, according to the word which was formed to express that exaggeration,—into Ultraism.

Meantime, Napoleon did all that was possible to conciliate the people's affection, and to

show himself sincerely desirous of giving France the free constitution which he had promised. He used the advice of Carnot, Siéyes, and Fouché, and certainly profited by several of their lessons. He made it, notwithstanding, a condition, that Carnot and Siéyes should accept each a title and a seat in his House of Peers, to show that they were completely reconciled to the Imperial government; and both the ancient republicans condescended to exchange the *bonnet rouge* for a coronet, which, considering their former opinions, sate somewhat awkwardly upon their brows.

But although the union of the Imperialists and popular party had been cemented by mutual hatred of the Bourbons, and was still kept together by apprehension of the King's adherents within, and his allies on the exterior, seeds of discord were soon visible between the Emperor and the popular leaders. While the former was eager once more to wield with full energy the sceptre he had recovered, the latter were continually reminding him, that he had only assumed it in a limited and restricted capacity, as the head of a free government, exercising, indeed, its executive power, but under the restraint of a popular constitution. Napoleon, in the frequent disputes which arose on these important points, was obliged to concede to the demagogues the principles

which they insisted upon. But then, for the safety of the state, involved in foreign and domestic dangers, he contended it was necessary to invest the chief magistrate with a vigour beyond the law, a dictatorial authority, temporary in its duration, but nearly absolute in its extent, as had been the manner in the free states of antiquity, when the republic was in imminent danger. Carnot and Fouché, on the other hand, considered, that although it seemed natural, and might be easy, to confer such power at the present moment, the resumption of it by the nation, when it was once vested in the hands of Buonaparte, would be a hopeless experiment. The Emperor, therefore, and his ministers, proceeded to their mutual tasks with no mutual confidence; but, on the contrary, with jealousy, thinly veiled by an affectation of deference on the side of Buonaparte, and respect on that of his counsellors.

The very first sacrifice which the Emperor gave to freedom proved an inconvenient one to his government. This was nothing less than the freedom of the press. It is true, that the influence of his minister of police managed by indirect means to get possession of most of the journals; so that of sixty writers, employed generally, if not constantly, in periodical composition, five only were now found friendly to the royal cause. The other pens, which

a few days before described Napoleon as a species of Ogre, who had devoured the youth of France, now wrote him down a hero and a liberator. Still, when the liberty of the press was once established, it was soon found impossible to prevent it from asserting its right of utterance; and there were found authors to advocate the cause of the Bourbons, from principle, from caprice, from the love of contradiction.

Napoleon, who always showed himself sensitively alive to the public censure, established inspectors of the booksellers. The minister of police, a friend of liberty, but, as Comte, the editor of *Le Censeur*, neatly observed, only of liberty after the fashion of Monsieur Fouché, used every art in his power to prevent the contagion of freedom from spreading too widely. This Monsieur Comte was a loud, and probably a sincere advocate of freedom, and had been a promoter of Buonaparte's return, as likely to advance the good cause. Seeing the prevailing influence of the military, he published some severe remarks on the undue weight the army assumed in public affairs, which he hesitated not to say, was bringing France to the condition of Rome, when the empire was disposed of by the Prætorian guards. This stung to the quick—the journal was seized by the police, and the minister endeavoured to palliate the fact in the *Moniteur*,

by saying, that though seized, it had been instantly restored. But Comte was not a man to be so silenced; he published a contradiction of the official statement, and declared that his journal had not been restored. He was summoned the next day before the prefect, alternately threatened and wheedled, upbraided at one moment with ungrateful resistance to the cause of the Emperor, and requested at the next to think of something in which government might serve him. Steeled against every proffer and entreaty, Comte only required to be permitted to profit by the restored liberty of the press; nor could the worthy magistrate make him rightly understand that when the Emperor gave all men liberty to publish what pleased themselves, it was under the tacit condition that it should also please the prefect and minister of police. Comte had the spirit to publish the whole affair.

In the mean while, proclamations of Louis, forbidding the payment of taxes, and announcing the arrival of 1,200,000 men under the walls of Paris, covered these walls every night in spite of the police. A newspaper, called the *Lily*, was also secretly but generally circulated, which advocated the royal cause. In the better classes of society, where Buonaparte was feared and hated, lampoons, satires, pasquinades, glided from hand to hand, turn-

ing his person, ministers, and government, into the most bitter ridicule. Others attacked him with eloquent invective, and demanded what he had in common with the word Liberty, which he now pretended to connect with his reign. He was, they said, the sworn enemy of liberty, the assassin of the republic, the destroyer of French freedom, which had been so dearly bought; the show of liberty, which he held was a trick of legerdemain, executed under protection of his bayonets. Such was his notion of liberty when he destroyed the national representation at St Cloud—Such was the freedom he gave when he established an oriental despotism in the enlightened kingdom of France—such, when abolishing all free communication of sentiments among citizens, and proscribing every liberal and philosophical idea under the nickname of Ideology. «Can it be forgotten,» they continued, «that heaven and hell are not more irreconcilable ideas, than Buona-parto and Liberty?—The very word Freedom,» they said, «was proscribed under his iron reign, and only first gladdened the ears of Frenchmen after twelve years of humiliation and despair, on the happy restoration of Louis XVIII.—Ah, miserable impostor!» they exclaimed, «when would he have spoke of liberty, had not the return of Louis familiarized us with freedom and peace.» The

spirit of disaffection spread among certain classes of the lower rank. The market-women (*dames de la halle*), so formidable during the time of the Fronde, and in the early years of the Revolution, for their opposition to the court, were now royalists, and, of course, clamorous on the side of the party they espoused. They invented, or some loyal rhymers composed for them, a song,¹ the burden of which demanded back the King, as their father of Ghent. They ridiculed, scolded, and mobbed the commissaries of police, who endeavoured to stop these musical expressions of disaffection; surrounded the chief of their number, danced around him, and chaunted the obnoxious burden, until Fouché being ashamed to belie the new doctrines of liberty of thought, speech, and publication, his agents were instructed to leave these Amazons undisturbed on account of their political sentiments.

While Buonaparte was unable to form an interest in the saloons, and found that even the *dames de la halle* were becoming discontented, he had upon his side the militia of the suburbs; those columns of pikemen so famous in the Revolution, whose furious and rude character added to the terrors, if not the dignity, of his reign. Let us not be accused

¹ *Donnez-nous notre paire de gants*, equivalent in pronunciation to *notre Père de Gand*.

to wish to depreciate honest industry, or hold up to contempt the miseries of poverty. It is not the poverty, but the ignorance and the vice of the rabble of great cities, which render them always disagreeable, and sometimes terrible. They are entitled to protection from the laws, and kindness from the government; but he who would use them as political engines, invokes the assistance of a blatant beast with a thousand heads, well furnished with fangs to tear and throats to roar, but devoid of tongues to speak reason, ears to hear it, eyes to see, or judgment to comprehend it.

For a little time after Buonaparte's return, crowds of artisans of the lowest order assembled under the windows of the Tuileries, and demanded to see the Emperor, whom, on his appearance, they greeted with shouts, as *le Grand Entrepreneur*, or general employer of the class of artisans, in language where the coarse phraseology of their rank was adorned with such flowers of rhetoric as the times of terror had coined. Latterly, the numbers of this assembly were maintained by a distribution of a few *sous* to the shouters.

However disgusted with these degrading exhibitions, Buonaparte felt he could not dispense with this species of force, and was compelled to institute a day of procession, and a solemn festival, in favour of this description

of persons, who, from the mode in which they were enrolled, were termed Federates.

On 14th May, the motley and ill-arranged ranks which assembled on this memorable occasion exhibited, in the eyes of the disgusted and frightened spectators, all that is degraded by habitual vice, and hardened by stupidity and profligacy. The portentous procession moved on along the Boulevards to the court of the Tuileries, with shouts, in which the praises of the Emperor were mingled with imprecations, and with the revolutionary songs (long silenced in Paris),—the *Marseillaise* Hymn, the *Carmagnole*, and the *chant du départ*. The appearance of the men, the refuse of manufactories, of work-houses, of jails; their rags, their filth, their drunkenness; their ecstasies of blasphemous rage, and no less blasphemous joy, stamped them with the character of the willing perpetrators of the worst horrors of the Revolution. Buonaparte himself was judged by close observers to shrink with abhorrence from the assembly he had himself convoked. His guards were under arms, and the field-artillery loaded, and turned on the Place du Carronsel, filled with the motley crowd, who, from the contrasted colour of the corn-porters and charcoal-men distinguished in the group, were facetiously called his Gray and Black Mousquetaires. He hastened to dismiss his hideous minions, with a suffi-

cient distribution of praises and of liquor. The national guards conceived themselves insulted on this occasion, because compelled to give their attendance along with the federates. The troops of the line felt for the degraded character of the Emperor. The haughty character of the French soldiers had kept them from fraternizing with the rabble, even in the cause of Napoleon. They had been observed, on the march from Cannes, to cease their cries of *Vive l'Empereur*, when, upon entering any considerable town, the shout was taken up by the mob of the place, and to suspend their acclamations, rather than mingle them with those of the pekins, whom they despised. They now muttered to each other, on seeing the court which Buonaparte seemed compelled to bestow on these degraded artisans, that the conqueror of Marengo and Wagram had sunk into the mere captain of a rabble. In short, the disgraceful character of the alliance thus formed between Buonaparte and the lees of the people was of a nature incapable of being glossed over even in the flattering pages of the *Moniteur*, which, amidst a flourishing description of this memorable procession, was compelled to admit, that, in some places, the name of the Emperor was incongruously mingled with expressions and songs, which recalled an era *unfortunately too famous*.

Fretted by external dangers and internal disturbances, and by the degrading necessity of appearing every night before a mob, who familiarly hailed him as *Père la Violette*, and, above all, galled by the suggestions of his philosophical counsellors, who, among other innovations, wished him to lay aside the style of Emperor for that of President, or Grand General of the Republic, Napoleon, to rid himself at once of occupations offensive to his haughty disposition, withdrew from the Tuileries to the more retired palace of the *Élysée Bourbon*, and seemed on a sudden to become once more the Emperor he had been before his abdication. Here he took into his own hands, with the assistance of Benjamin Constant, and other statesmen, the construction of a new constitution. Their system included all those checks and regulations which are understood to form the essence of a free government, and greatly resembled that granted by the Royal Charter¹ Nevertheless, it

¹ The following is an abridgement of its declarations:—

The legislative power resides in the Emperor and two Chambers.

The Chamber of Peers is hereditary, and the Emperor names them.

Their number is unlimited.

The Second Chamber is elected by the people, and is to consist of 629 members—none are to be under 25 years. The President is appointed by the members, but approved of by the Emperor.

was extremely ill received by all parties, but especially by those who expected from Napoleon a constitution more free than that which they had dissolved by driving Louis XVIII. from the throne. There were other grave exceptions stated against this scheme of government.

First, The same objection was stated against this Imperial grant which had been urged with so much vehemence against the Royal charter, namely, that it was not a compact between the people and the sovereign, in which the former

Members to be paid at the rate settled by the Constituent Assembly.

It is to be renewed every five years.

The Emperor may prorogue, adjourn, or dissolve the House of Representatives.

Sittings to be public.

The Electoral Colleges are maintained.

Land-tax and direct taxes to be voted only for a year; indirect may be for several years.

No levy of men for the army, nor any exchange of territory, but by a law.

Taxes to be proposed by the Chamber of Representatives.

Ministers to be responsible.

Judges to be irremovable.

Juries to be established.

Right of petition is established—freedom of worship—invulnerability of property.

The last article says, that « the French people declare that they do not mean to delegate the power of restoring the Bourbons, or any prince of that family, even in case of the exclusion of the Imperial dynasty.»

called the latter to the throne under certain conditions, but a recognition by the sovereign of the liberties of the people. The meeting of the *Champ-de-Mai*, had indeed been summoned (as intimated in the decrees from Lyons), chiefly with the purpose of forming and adopting the new constitution; but, according to the present system, they were only to have the choice of adopting or rejecting that which Napoleon had prepared for them. The disappointment was great among those philosophers who desired « better bread than is made of wheat;» and could not enjoy liberty itself, unless it emanated directly from the will of the people, and was sanctioned by popular discussion. But Napoleon was determined that the convention on the 10th May should have no other concern in the constitution, save to accept it when offered. He would not intrust such an assembly with the revision of the laws by which he was to govern.

Secondly, This new constitution, though presenting an entirely new basis of government, was published under the singular title of an « Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Empire,» and thereby constituted a sort of appendix to a huge mass of unrepealed organic laws, many of them inconsistent with the Additional Act in tenor and in spirit.

Those who had enjoyed the direct confidence of the Emperor while the treaty was

framing, endeavoured to persuade themselves that Napoleon meant fairly by France, yet confessed they had found it difficult to enlighten his ideas on the subject of a limited monarchy. They felt, that though the Emperor might be induced to contract his authority, yet what remained in his own hand would be wielded as arbitrarily as ever; and likewise that he would never regard his ministers otherwise than as the immediate executors of his pleasure, and responsible to himself alone. He would still continue to transport his whole chancery at his stirrup, and transmit sealed orders to be executed by a minister whom he had not consulted on their import. ¹

The Royalists triumphed on the publication of this Additional Act: « Was it for this, » they said, « you broke your oaths, and banished your monarch, to get the same, or nearly similar laws imposed on you by a Russian ukase or a Turkish firman, which you heretofore enjoyed by charter, in the same manner as your ancestors, called freemen by excellence, held their rights from their limited sovereigns; and for this have you exchanged a peaceful prince, whose very weakness was your security, for an ambitious warrior, whose strength is your weakness? For this have you a second time

¹ *Letters from Paris, written during the Last Reign of Napoleon*, Vol. I. p. 197.

gone to war with all Europe—for the Additional Act and the *Champ-de-Mai*?»

The more determined Republicans, besides their particular objections to an Upper House, which the Emperor could fill with his own minions, so as effectually to control the representatives of the people, found the proposed constitution utterly devoid of the salt which should savour it. There was no acknowledgment of abstract principles; no dissertation concerning the rights of government and the governed; no metaphysical discussions on the origin of laws; and they were as much mortified and disappointed as the zealot who hears a discourse on practical morality, when he expected a sermon on the doctrinal points of theology. The unfortunate Additional Act became the subject of attack and raillery on all sides; and was esteemed to possess in so slight a degree the principle of durability, that a bookseller being asked for a copy by a customer, replied, He did not deal in *periodical publications*.¹

Under these auspices the *Champ-de-Mai* was opened, and that it might be in all respects

¹ It was subjected, notwithstanding, with the usual success to the Electoral bodies, whose good-nature never refused a constitution which was recommended by the existing government. The number of those who gave their votes were more than a million; being scarce a tenth part, however, of those who had qualifications.

incongruous, it was held on the 1st of June. Deputies were supposed to attend from all departments, not, as it had been latterly arranged, to canvass the new constitution, but to swear to observe it; and not to receive the Empress Maria Louisa and her son as the pledge of twenty years' peace, but to behold the fatal eagles, the signal of instant and bloody war, distributed by the Emperor to the soldiers.

Napoleon and his brothers, whom he had once more collected around him, figured, in quaint and fantastic robes, in the *Champ-de-Mai*; he as Emperor, and they as princes of the blood,—another subject of discontent to Republicans. The report of the votes was made, the electors swore to the Additional Act, the drums rolled, the trumpets flourished, the cannon thundered. But the acclamations were few and forced. The Emperor seemed to view the scene as an empty pageant, until he was summoned to the delivery of the eagles to the various new-raised regiments; and then, amid the emblems of past, and, as might be hoped, the auguries of future victories, he was himself again. But, on the whole, the *Champ-de-Mai*, was, in the language of Paris, *une pièce tombée*, a condemned farce, which was soon to be succeeded by a bloody tragedy.

The meeting of the Chambers was the next

subject of interest. The Chamber of Peers did not present, like the corresponding assembly in Britain, members of long descent, ample fortunes, independence of principle, and education corresponding to their rank of hereditary legislators. It consisted in the princes of Napoleon's blood royal, to whom was added Lucien, long estranged from his brother's councils, but who now, instigated by fraternal affection, or tired of literary leisure, having presented his epic poem to a thankless and regardless public, endeavoured to save his brother in his present difficulties, as by his courage and presence of mind he had assisted him during the revolution of Brumaire. There were about one hundred other dignitaries, more than one half of whom were military men, including two or three old Jacobins, such as Siéyès and Carnot, who had taken titles, decorations, and rank, inconsistently with the tenor of their whole life. The rest had been the creatures of Buonaparte's former reign, with some men of letters devoted to his cause, and recently ennobled. This body, which could have no other will than that of the Emperor, was regarded by the Republicans and Constitutionalists with jealousy, and by the citizens with contempt. Buonaparte himself expressed his opinion of it with something approaching the latter sentiment. He had scarce formed his tools, before he seems to have been con-

vinced of their inefficacy, and of the little influence which they could exercise on the public mind. †

It was very different with the second Chamber, in which were posted the ancient men of the Revolution, and their newer associates, who looked forward with hope that Buonaparte might yet assume the character of a patriot sovereign, and by his military talents save France for her sake, not for his own. The latter class comprehended many men, not only of talent, but of virtue and public spirit; with too large a proportion, certainly, of those who vainly desired a system of Republican liberty, which so many years of bloody and fruitless experiment should have led even the most extravagant to abandon, as inconsistent with the situation of the country, and the genius of the French nation.

The dispute of the Chamber of Representatives with the executive government commenced on June 4th, the first day of their sitting; and, like those of their predecessors, upon points of idle etiquette. They chose Lanjuinais for their president; a preferment which, alighting on one who had been the defender of Louis XVI., the active and determined resister of the power of Robespierre,

† The punsters of Paris selected Labédoyère, Drouot, Ney, and Lallemand, as the *quatre pairs fides* (*perfides*), while Vandamme and others were termed the *pairs siffles*.

and especially, the statesman who drew up the list of crimes in consequence of which Napoleon's forfeiture had been declared in 1814, could not be acceptable to the Emperor. Napoleon being applied to for confirmation of the election, referred the committee for his answer to the chamberlain, who, he stated, would deliver it the next day by the page in waiting. The Chamber took fire, and Napoleon was compelled to return an immediate though reluctant approval of their choice. The next remarkable indication of the temper of the Chamber, was the *extempore* effusion of a deputy, named Sibuet, against the use of the epithets of Duke, Count, and other titles of honour, in the Chamber of Representatives. Being observed to read his invective from notes, which was contrary to the form of the Chamber, Sibuet was silenced for the moment as out of order; but the next day, or soon afterwards, having got his speech by heart, the Chamber was under the necessity of listening to him, and his motion was got rid of with difficulty. On the same day, a list of the persons appointed to the peerage was demanded from Carnot, in his capacity of minister, which he declined to render till the session had commenced. This also occasioned much uproar and violence, which the president could scarce silence by the incessant peal of his bell. The oath to be taken by the deputies was next

severely scrutinized, and the Imperialists carried with difficulty a resolution, that it should be taken to the Emperor and the constitution, without mention of the nation.

The second meeting, on June 7th, was as tumultuous as the first. A motion was made by Felix Lepelletier, that the Chamber should decree to Napoleon the title of Saviour of his Country. This was resisted on the satisfactory ground, that the country was not yet saved; and the Chamber passed to the order of the day by acclamation.

Notwithstanding these open intimations of the reviving spirit of Jacobinism, or at least of opposition to the Imperial sway, Napoleon's situation obliged him for the time to address the unruly spirits which he had called together, with the confidence which it was said necromancers found it needful to use towards the dangerous fiends whom they had evoked. His address to both Chambers was sensible, manly, and becoming his situation. He surrendered, in their presence, all his pretensions to absolute power, and professed himself a friend to liberty; demanded the assistance of the Chambers in matters of finance, intimated a desire of some regulations to check the license of the press, and required from the representatives an example of confidence, energy, and patriotism, to encounter the dangers to which the

country was exposed. The Peers replied in corresponding terms. Not so the second Chamber; for, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the Imperialists, their reply bore a strong tincture of the sentiments of the opposite party. The Chamber promised, indeed, their unanimous support in repelling the foreign enemy; but they announced their intention to take under their consideration the constitution, as recognized by the Additional Act, and to point out its defects and imperfections, with the necessary remedies. They also added a moderating hint, directed against the fervour of Napoleon's ambition. «The nation,» they said, «nourishes no plans of aggrandizement. Not even the will of a victorious prince will lead them beyond the boundaries of self-defence.» In his rejoinder, Napoleon did not suffer these obnoxious hints to escape his notice. He endeavoured to school this refractory assembly into veneration for the constitution, which he declared to be «the pole-star in the tempest;» and judiciously observed, «there was little cause to provide against the intoxications of triumph, when they were about to contend for existence. He stated the crisis to be imminent, and cautioned the Chamber to avoid the conduct of the Roman people in the latter ages of the empire, who could not resist the temptation of engaging furiously in ab-

stract discussions, even while the battering-rams of the common enemy were shaking the gates of the capital.»

Thus parted Buonaparte and his Chambers of Legislature; he to try his fortune in the field of battle, they to their task of altering and modifying the laws, and inspiring a more popular spirit and air into the enactments he had made, in hopes that the dictatorship of the Jacobins might be once again substituted for the dictatorship of the Emperor. All men saw that the Imperialists and Republicans only waited till the field was won, that they might contend for the booty; and so little was the nation disposed to sympathize with the active, turbulent, and bustling demagogues by whom the contest was to be maintained against the Emperor, that almost all predicted with great unconcern their probable expulsion, either by the sword of Buonaparte or the Bourbons.

CHAPTER XVI.

Preparations to renew the War.—Positions of the Allied Forces, amounting in whole to One Million of Men.—Buonaparte's Force not more than 200,000.—Conscription not ventured upon.—National Guard—their reluctance to serve.—Many Provinces hostile to Napoleon's cause—Fouché's Report makes known the widespread disaffection.—Insurrection in La Vendée quelled.—Military resources of France.—Napoleon's Plan of Campaign.—Paris placed in a complete state of defence.—The Frontier-Passes and Towns fortified also.—Generals who accept Command under Napoleon.—He announces his purpose to measure himself with Wellington.

WE are now to consider the preparations made for the invasion of France along the whole eastern frontier—the means of resistance which the talents of the Emperor presented to his numerous enemies—and the internal situation of the country itself.

While the events now commemorated were passing in France, the allies made the most gigantic preparations for the renewal of war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer of England had achieved a loan of thirty-six millions, upon terms surprisingly moderate, and the command

of this treasure had put the whole troops of the coalition into the most active advance.

The seat of the Congress had been removed from Vienna to Frankfort, to be near the theatre of war. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, with the King of Prussia, had once more placed themselves at the head of their respective armies. The whole eastern frontier was menaced by immense forces. One hundred and fifty thousand Austrians, disengaged from Murat, might enter France through Switzerland, the Cantons having acceded to the coalition. An army equal in strength menaced the higher Rhine. Schwarzenberg commanded the Austrians in chief, having under him Bellegarde, and Frimont, Bianchi, and Vincent. Two hundred thousand Russians were pressing towards the frontiers of Alsace. The Archduke Constantine was nominated Generalissimo, but Barclay de Tolly, Sacken, Langeron, etc., were the efficient commanders. One hundred and fifty thousand Prussians, under Blucher, occupied Flanders, and were united with about eighty thousand troops, British, or in British pay, under the Duke of Wellington. There were also to be reckoned the contingents of the different princes of Germany, so that the allied forces were grossly computed to amount to upwards of one million of men. The reader must not, however, suppose, that such an immense force

was, or could be, brought forward at once. They were necessarily disposed on various lines for the convenience of subsistence, and were to be brought up successively in support of each other.

To meet this immense array, Napoleon, with his usual talent and celerity, had brought forward means of surprising extent. The regular army, diminished by the Bourbons, had been, by calling out the retired officers, and disbanded soldiers, increased from something rather under 100,000 men, to double that number of experienced troops, of the first quality. But this was dust in the balance; and the mode of conscription was so intimately connected with Napoleon's wars of conquest and disaster, that he dared not propose, nor would the Chamber of Representatives have agreed to have recourse to the old and odious resource of conscription, which, however, Buonaparte trusted he might still find effectual in the month of June, to the number of 300,000. In the mean time, it was proposed to render movable, for active service, two hundred battalions of the National Guard, choosing those most fit for duty, which would make a force of 112,000 men. It was also proposed to levy as many Federates, that is, volunteers of the lower orders, as could be brought together in the different departments. The levy of the National Guards was ordered by an Imperial de-

creed of 5th April, 1815, and commissioners, chiefly of the Jacobin faction, were sent down into the different departments, Buonaparte being well pleased at once to employ them in their own sphere, and to get rid of their presence at Paris. Their efforts were, however, unable to excite the spirit of the country; for they had either survived their own energies, or the nation had been too long accustomed to their mode of oratory, to feel any responsive impulse. Liberty and fraternity was no longer a rallying sound, and the summons to arms, by decrees as peremptory as those relating to the conscription, though bearing another name, spread a general spirit of disgust through many departments in the north of France. There and in Brittany, the disaffection of the inhabitants appeared in a sullen, dogged stubbornness, rather than in the form of active resistance to Napoleon's decrees. The National Guards refused to parade, and, if compelled to do so, took every opportunity to desert and return home; so that it often happened that a battalion, which had mustered six hundred men, dwindled down to a fifth before they had marched two leagues.

In the departments of La Sarthe, Maine et Loire, and Loire-Inférieure, the white flag was displayed, and the tree of liberty, which had been replanted in many places after the political regeneration of Buonaparte, was cut down.

The public mind in many provinces displayed itself as highly unfavourable to Napoleon.

A report, drawn up by Fouché, stated in high-coloured language the general disaffection. Napoleon always considered this communication as published with a view of prejudicing his affairs; and as that versatile statesman was already in secret correspondence with the allies, it was probably intended as much to encourage the Royalists, as to dismay the adherents of Napoleon. This arch-intriguer, whom, to use an expression of Junius, treachery itself could not trust, was at one moment nearly caught in his own toils; and although he carried the matter with infinite address, Napoleon would have made him a prisoner, or caused him to be shot, but for the intimation of Carnot, that if he did so, his own reign would not last an hour longer.¹

¹ The particulars of this intrigue show with what audacity, and at what risk, Fouché waded, swam, or dived, among the troubled waters which were his element. An agent of Prince Metternich had been dispatched to Paris, to open a communication with Fouché on the part of the Austrian government. Falling under suspicion, from some banking transaction, this person was denounced to Buonaparte as a suspicious person, and arrested by his interior police, which, as there cannot be too much precaution in a well-managed state, watched, and were spies upon, the general police under Fouché. The agent was brought before Buonaparte, who threatened to cause him be shot to death on the very spot, unless he told him the

Thus Buonaparte was already in a great measure reduced to the office of Generalissimo

whole truth. The man then confessed that Metternich sent him to Fouché, to request the latter to send a secure agent to Bâle, to meet with a confidential person on the part of the Austrian minister, whom Fouché's envoy was to recognize by a peculiar sign, which the informer also made known. «Have you fulfilled your commission so far as concerns Fouché?» said the Emperor.—«I have,» answered the Austrian agent.—«And has he dispatched any one to Bâle?»—«That I cannot tell.»—The agent was detained in a secret prison. Baron Fleury de Chaboulon, an auditor, was instantly dispatched to Bâle, to represent the agent whom Fouché should have sent thither, and fathom the depth and character of the intrigue betwixt the French and Austrian ministers. Fouché soon discovered that the agent sent to him by Metternich was missing, conjectured his fate, and instantly went to seek an audience of the Emperor. Having mentioned other matters, he seemed to recollect himself, and begged pardon, with affected unconcern, for not having previously mentioned an affair of some consequence, which, nevertheless, he had forgotten amid the hurry of business. «An agent had come to him from the Austrian government,» he said, «requesting him to send a confidential person to Bâle, to a correspondent of Metternich, and he now came to ask whether it would be his Majesty's pleasure that he should avail himself of the opening, in order to learn the secret purposes of the enemy.» Napoleon was not deceived by this trick. There were several mirrors in the room, by which he could perceive and enjoy his perfidious minister's ill-concealed embarrassment. «Monsieur Fouché,» he said, «it may be dangerous to treat me as a fool; I have your agent in safe custody, and penetrate your whole intrigue. Have you sent to Bâle!»—«No, Sire.»—«The happier for you; had you done so,

of the State; and there were not wanting many, who dared to entreat him to heal the wounds of the country by a second abdication in favour of his son,—a measure which the popular party conceived might avert the impending danger of invasion.

In the mean time, about the middle of May, a short insurrection broke out in La Vendée, under d'Autichamp, Suzannet, Sapineau, and especially the brave La Roche-Jacquelin. The

you should have died.”—Fleury was unable to extract any thing of consequence from Werner, the confidant of Metternich, who met him at Bâle. The Austrian seemed to expect communications from Fouché, without being prepared to make them. Fleury touched on the plan of assassinating Buonaparte, which Werner rejected with horror, as a thing not to be thought of by Metternich or the allies. They appointed a second meeting, but in the interim, Fouché made the Austrian aware of the discovery, and Baron Fleury, on his second journey to Bâle, found no Mr Werner to meet him.

Buonaparte gives almost the same account of this intrigue in his *St Helena Conversations*, as Fouché in his *Memoirs*. But Napoleon does not mention Carnot's interposition to prevent Fouché from being put to death without process of law. “You may shoot Fouché to-day,” said the old Jacobin, “but to-morrow you will cease to reign. The people of the Revolution permit you to retain the throne only on condition you respect their liberties. They account Fouché one of their strongest guarantees. If he is guilty, he must be legally proceeded against.” Buonaparte, therefore, gaining no proof against Fouché by the mission of Fleury, was fain to shut his eyes on what he saw but too well.

war was neither long nor bloody, for an overpowering force was directed against the insurgents, under Generals Lamarque and Travot. The people were ill prepared for resistance, and the government menaced them with the greatest severities, the instructions of Carnot to the military having a strong tincture of his ancient education in the school of terror. Yet the chamber of Deputies did not in all respects sanction the severities of the government. When a member, called Leguevel, made a motion for punishing with pains and penalties the royalists of the west, the assembly heard him with patience and approbation propose that the goods and estates of the revolters (whom he qualified as brigands, priests, and royalists) should be confiscated; but when he added, that not only the insurgents themselves, but their relations in the direct line, whether ascendants or descendants, should be declared outlaws, a general exclamation of horror drove the orator from the tribune.

After a battle near La Roche Servière, which cost the brave La Roche-Jacquelin his life, the remaining chiefs signed a capitulation, by which they disbanded their followers, and laid down their arms, at the very time when holding out a few days would have made them acquainted with the battle of Waterloo. Released from actual civil war, Napoleon now had leisure to prepare for the external conflict.

The means resorted to by the French government, which we have already alluded to, had enabled Carnot to represent the national means in a most respectable point of view. By his report to the two Chambers, he stated, that on 1st April, 1814, the army had consisted of 450,000 men, who had been reduced by the Bourbons to 175,000. Since the return of Napoleon, the number had been increased to 375,000 combatants of every kind; and before the 1st of August, was expected to amount to half a million. The Imperial Guards, who were termed the country's brightest ornament in time of peace, and its best bulwark in time of war, were recruited to the number of 40,000 men.

Stupendous efforts had repaired, the report stated, the losses of the artillery during the three disastrous years of 1812, 1813, 1814. Stores, ammunition, arms of every kind, were said to be provided in abundance. The remounting of the cavalry had been accomplished in such a manner as to excite the surprise of every one. Finally, there was, as a body in reserve, the whole mass of Sedentary National Guards, so called, because they were not among the chosen bands which had been declared movable. But the bulk of these were either unfit for service, or unwilling to serve, and could only be relied on for securing the public tranquillity. Corps of Federates had been

formed in all the districts where materials could be found of which to compose them.

From these forces Napoleon selected a grand army to act under his personal orders. They were chosen with great care, and the preparation of their matériel was of the most extensive and complete description. The numbers in gross might amount to 150,000; as great a number of troops, perhaps, as can conveniently move upon one plan of operations, or be subjected to one generalissimo. A large deduction is to be made to attain the exact amount of his effective force.

Thus prepared for action, no doubt was made that Buonaparte would open the campaign, by assuming offensive operations. To wait till the enemy had assembled their full force on his frontier, would have suited neither the manner nor the moment. It was most agreeable to his system, his disposition, and his interest, to rush upon some separate army of the allies, surprise them, according to his own phrase, in delict, and, by its dispersion or annihilation, give courage to France, animate her to fresh exertions in his cause, intimidate the confederated powers, and gain time for sowing in their league the seeds of disunion. Even the Royalists, whose interest was so immediately connected with the defeat of Buonaparte, were dismayed by witnessing his gigantic preparations, and

sadly anticipated victories as the first result, though they trusted that, as in 1814, he would be at length worn out, by force of numbers and reiterated exertions.

But though all guessed at the mode of tactics which Napoleon would employ, there was a difference of opinion respecting the point on which his first exertions would be made; and in general it was augured, that, trusting to the strength of Lille, Valenciennes, and other fortified places on the frontiers of Flanders, his first real attack, whatever diversion might be made elsewhere, would take place upon Mannheim, with the view of breaking asunder the Austrian and Russian armies as they were forming, or rather of attacking them separately, to prevent their communication in line. If he should succeed in thus overwhelming the advance of the Austrians and Russians, by directing his main force to this one point, before they were fully prepared, it was supposed he might break up the plan of the allies for this campaign.

But Buonaparte was desirous to aim a decisive blow at the most enterprising and venturous of the invading armies. He knew Blucher, and had heard of Wellington; he therefore resolved to move against those generals, while he opposed walls and fortified places to the more slow and cautious advance of the Austrian

general, Schwartzberg, and trusted that distance might render ineffectual the progress of the Russians.

According to this general system, Paris, under the direction of General Haxo, was, on the northern side, placed in a complete state of defence, by a double line of fortifications, so that, if the first were forced, the defenders might retire within the second, instead of being compelled, as in the preceding year, to quit the heights, and fall back upon the city. Montmartre was very strongly fortified. The southern part of the city on the opposite side of the Seine was only covered with a few field-works; time, and the open character of the ground, permitting no more. But the Seine itself was relied upon as a barrier, having proved such in 1814.

On the frontiers, similar precautions were observed. Entrenchments were constructed in the five principal passes of the Vosgesian mountains, and all the natural passes and strong-holds of Lorraine were put in the best possible state of defence. The posts on the inner line were strengthened with the greatest care. The fine military position under the walls of Lyons was improved with great expense and labour. A *tête-de-pont* was erected at Les Brotteaux; a draw-bridge and barricade protected the suburb la Guillotière; redoubts were erected between the Saône and Rhine,

and upon the heights of Pierre Encise and the Quarter of Saint John. Guise, Vitry, Soissons, Château-Thierry, Langres, and all the towns capable of any defence, were rendered as strong as posts, palisades, redoubts, and field-works, could make them. The Russian armies, though pressing fast forward, were not as yet arrived upon the line of operations; and Napoleon doubtless trusted that these impediments, in front of the Austrian line, would arrest any hasty advance on their part, since the well-known tactics of that school declare against leaving in their rear fortresses or towns possessed by the enemy, however insignificant or slightly garrisoned, or however completely they might be masked.

About now to commence his operations, Napoleon summoned round him his best and most experienced generals. Soult, late minister of war for Louis XVIII., was named major-general. He obeyed, he says, not in any respect as an enemy of the King, but as a citizen and soldier, whose duty it was to obey whosoever was at the head of the government, as that of the Vicar of Bray subjected him in ghostly submission to each head of the church *pro tempore*. Ney was ordered to repair to the army at Lille, "if he wished," so the command was expressed, "to witness the first battle." Macdonald was strongly solicited

to accept a command, but declined it with disdain. Davoust, the minister at war, undertook to remove his scruples, and spoke to him of what his honour required. « It is not from you, » replied the mareschal, « that I am to learn sentiments of honour, » and persisted in his refusal. D'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard, and Monton Duvernet, acted as lieutenant-generals. The cavalry was placed under the command of Grouchy (whom Napoleon had created a mareschal). Pajol, Excelsmans, Milhaud, and Kellermann, were his seconds in command. Flabault, Dejean, Labédoyère, and other officers of distinction, acted as the Emperor's aides-de-camp. The artillery were three hundred pieces; the cavalry approached to twenty-five thousand men; the Guard to the same number; and there is little doubt that the whole army amounted in effective force to nearly 130,000 soldiers, in the most complete state as to arms and equipment, who now marched to a war which they themselves had occasioned, under an emperor of their own making, and bore both in their hearts and on their tongues the sentiments of death or victory.

For the protection of the rest of the frontier during Napoleon's campaign in Flanders, Suchet was intrusted with the command on the frontiers of Switzerland, with directions

to attack Montmellian as soon as possible after the 14th of June, which day Buonaparte had fixed for the commencement of hostilities. Masséna was ordered to repair to Mentz, to assume the government of that important fortress, and the command of the 3d and 4th divisions. All preparations being thus made, Napoleon at length announced what had long occupied his secret thoughts. "I go," he said, as he threw himself into his carriage to join his army, "I go to measure myself with Wellington."

But although Napoleon's expressions were those of confidence and defiance, his internal feelings were of a different complexion. "I no longer felt," as he afterwards expressed himself in his exile, "that complete confidence in final success, which accompanied me on former undertakings. Whether it was that I was getting beyond the period of life when men are usually favoured by fortune, or whether the impulse of my career seemed impeded in my own eyes, and to my own imagination, it is certain that I felt a depression of spirit. Fortune, which used to follow my steps to load me with her bounties, was now a severe deity, from whom I might snatch a few favours, but for which she exacted severe retribution. I had no sooner gained an advantage than it was followed by a reverse." With

such feelings, not certainly unwarranted by the circumstances under which the campaign was undertaken, nor disproved by the event, Napoleon undertook his shortest and last campaign.

CHAPTER XVII.

Army of Wellington covers Brussels—that of Blucher concentrated on the Sambre and Meuse.—Napoleon reviews his Grand Army on 14th June—Advances upon Charleroi—His plan to separate the Armies of the two opposing Generals fails.—Interview of Wellington and Blucher at Brie.—British Army concentrated at Quatre-Bras.—Napoleon's plan of attack.—Battle of Ligny, and defeat of Blucher on 16th June—Action at Quatre-Bras on the same day—the British retain possession of the field.—Blucher eludes the French pursuit.—Napoleon joins Ney.—Retreat of the British upon Waterloo, where the Duke of Wellington resolves to make a stand.—Localities of that celebrated Field.

THE triple line of strong fortresses possessed by the French on the borders of Belgium served Napoleon as a curtain, behind which he could prepare his levies and unite his forces at pleasure, without any possibility of the allies or their generals being able to observe his motions, or prepare for the attack which such motions indicated. On the other hand, the frontier of Belgium was open to his observation, and he knew perfectly the general disposal of the allied force.

If the French had been prepared to make their meditated attack upon Flanders in the

month of May, they would have found no formidable force to oppose them, as at that time the armies of the Prussian general, Kleist, and the hereditary Prince of Orange, did not, in all, exceed 50,000 men. But the return of Napoleon, which again awakened the war, was an event as totally unexpected in France as in Flanders, and, therefore, that nation was as much unprepared to make an attack as the allies to repel one. Thus it happened, that while Napoleon was exerting himself to collect a sufficient army by the means we have mentioned, the Duke of Wellington, who arrived at Brussels from Vienna in the beginning of April, had leisure to garrison and supply the strong places of Ostend, Antwerp, and Nieuport, which the French had not dismantled, and to fortify Ypres, Tournay, Mons, and Ath. He had also leisure to receive his reinforcements from England, and to collect the German, Dutch, and Belgian contingents.

Thus collected and reinforced, the Duke of Wellington's army might contain about thirty thousand English troops. They were not, however, those veteran soldiers who had served under him during the Peninsular war; the flower of which had been dispatched upon the American expedition. Most were second battalions, or regiments which had been lately filled up with new recruits. The foreigners

were fifteen thousand Hanoverians, with the celebrated German Legion, eight thousand strong, which had so often distinguished itself in Spain; five thousand Brunswickers, under their gallant duke; and about seventeen thousand Belgians, Dutch, and Nassau troops commanded by the Prince of Orange.

Great and just reliance was placed upon the Germans; but some apprehensions were entertained for the steadiness of the Belgian troops. Discontents had prevailed among them, which, at one period, had broken out in open mutiny, and was not subdued without bloodshed. Most of them had served in the French ranks, and it was feared some of them might preserve predilections and correspondencies dangerous to the general cause. Buonaparte was under the same belief. He brought in his train several Belgian officers, believing there would be a movement in his favour so soon as he entered the Netherlands. But the Flemings are a people of sound sense and feeling. Whatever jealousies might have been instilled into them for their religion and privileges under the reign of a Protestant and a Dutch sovereign, these were swallowed up in their apprehensions for the returning tyranny of Napoleon. Some of these troops behaved with distinguished valour; and most of them supported the ancient military character of

the Walloons. The Dutch corps were in general enthusiastically attached to the Prince of Orange, and the cause of independence.

The Prussian army had been recruited to its highest war-establishment, within an incredibly short space of time after Buonaparte's return had been made public, and was reinforced in a manner surprising to those who do not reflect, how much the resources of a state depend on the zeal of the inhabitants. Their enthusiastic hatred to France, founded partly on the recollection of former injuries, partly on that of recent success, was animated at once by feelings of triumph and of revenge, and they marched to this new war, as to a national crusade against an inveterate enemy, whom, when at their feet, they had treated with injudicious clemency. Blucher was, however, deprived of a valuable part of his army by the discontent of the Saxon troops. A mutiny had broken out among them, when the Congress announced their intention of transferring part of the Saxon dominions to Prussia; much bloodshed had ensued, and it was judged most prudent that the troops of Saxony should remain in garrison in the German fortresses.

Prince Blucher arrived at Liége, with the Prussian army, which was concentrated on the Sambre and Meuse rivers, occupying Charleroi, Namur, Givet, and Liége. The Duke of Wellington covered Brussels, where he had fixed

his head-quarters, communicating by his left with the right of the Prussians. There was a general idea that Napoleon's threatened advance would take place on Namur, as he was likely to find least opposition at that dismantled city.

The Duke of Wellington's first corps, under the Prince of Orange, with two divisions of British, two of Hanoverians, and two of Belgians, occupied Enghien, Braine le Comte, and Nivelles, and served as a reserve to the Prussian division under Ziethen, which was at Charleroi. The second division, commanded by Lord Hill, included two British, two Hanoverian, and one Belgian, divisions. It was cantoned at Halle, Oudenarde, and Grammont. The reserve, under Picton, who, at Lord Wellington's special request, had accepted of the situation of second in command, consisted of the remaining two British divisions, with three of the Hanoverians, and was stationed at Brussels and Ghent. The cavalry occupied Grammont and Nieve.

The Anglo-Belgic army was so disposed, therefore, as might enable the divisions to combine with each other, and with the Prussians, upon the earliest authentic intelligence of the enemy's being put in motion. At the same time, the various corps were necessarily, to a certain degree, detached, both for the purpose of being more easily maintained (espe-

cially the cavalry), and also because, from the impossibility of foreseeing in what direction the French Emperor might make his attack, it was necessary to maintain such an extensive line of defence as to be prepared for his arrival upon any given point. This is the necessary inconvenience attached to a defensive position, where, if the resisting general should concentrate his whole forces upon any one point of the line to be defended, the enemy would, of course, chuse to make their assault on some of the other points, which such concentration must necessarily leave comparatively open.

In the mean time, Napoleon in person advanced to Vervins on 12th June, with his Guard, who had marched from Paris. The other divisions of his selected Grand Army had been assembled on the frontier, and the whole, consisting of five divisions of infantry, and four of cavalry, were combined at Beaumont on the 14th of the same month, with a degree of secrecy and expedition which showed the usual genius of their commander. Napoleon reviewed the troops in person, reminded them that the day was the anniversary of the great victories of Marengo and Friedland, and called on them to remember that the enemies whom they had then defeated were the same which were now arrayed against them. « Are they and we,» he asked, « no longer the same men?» The address produced the

strongest effect on the minds of the French soldiery, always sensitively alive to military and national glory.

Upon the 15th June, the French army was in motion in every direction. Their advanced guard of light troops swept the western bank of the Sambre clear of all the allied corps of observation. They then advanced upon Charleroi, which was well defended by the Prussians under General Ziethen, who was at length compelled to retire on the large village of Gosselies. Here his retreat was cut off by the second division of the French army, and Ziethen was compelled to take the route of Fleurus, by which he united himself with the Prussian force, which lay about the villages of Ligny and St Amand. The Prussian general had, however, obeyed his orders, by making such protracted resistance as gave time for the alarm being taken. In the attack and retreat, he lost four or five guns, and a considerable number in killed and wounded.

By this movement the plan of Napoleon was made manifest. It was at once most scientific and adventurous. His numbers were unequal to sustain a conflict with the armies of Blucher and Wellington united, but by forcing his way so as to separate the one enemy from the other, he would gain the advantage of acting against either individually with the gross of his forces, while he could spare enough of de-

tached troops to keep the other in check. To accomplish this masterly manœuvre, it was necessary to push onwards upon a part of the British advance, which occupied the position of Quatre-Bras, and the yet more advanced post of Frasnes, where some of the Nassau troops were stationed. But the extreme rapidity of Napoleon's forced marches had in some measure prevented the execution of his plan, by dispersing his forces so much, that, at a time when every hour was of consequence, he was compelled to remain at Charleroi until his wearied and over-marched army had collected.

In the mean time, Ney was detached against Frasnes and Quatre-Bras, but the troops of Namur kept their post on the evening of the 15th. It is possible the French mareschal might have succeeded had he attacked at Frasnes with his whole force; but hearing a cannonade in the direction of Fleurus (which was that of Zieten's action), he detached a division to support the French in that quarter. For this exercise of his own judgment, instead of yielding precise obedience to his orders, Ney was reprimanded; a circumstance curiously contrasted with the case of Grouchy, upon whom Napoleon laid the whole blame of the defeat at Waterloo, because he *did* follow his orders precisely, and press the Prussians at Wavres, in-

stead of being diverted from that object by the cannonade on his left.

The manœuvre meditated by Napoleon thus failed, though it had nearly been successful.— He continued, however, to entertain the same purpose of dividing, if possible, the British army from the Prussians.

The British general received intelligence of the advance of the French, at Brussels, at six o'clock on the evening of the 15th, but it was not of sufficient certainty to enable him to put his army in motion, on an occasion when a false movement might have been irretrievable ruin. About eleven of the same night, the certain accounts reached Brussels that the advance of the French was upon the line of the Sambre. Reinforcements were hastily moved on Quatre-Bras, and the Duke of Wellington arrived there in person at an early hour on the 16th, and instantly rode from that position to Bric, where he had a meeting with Blucher. It appeared at this time that the whole French force was about to be directed against the Prussians.

Blucher was prepared to receive them. Three of his divisions, to the number of 80,000 men, had been got into position on a chain of gentle heights, running from Bric to Sombref; in front of their line lay the villages of the Greater and Lesser St Amand, as also that

of Ligny, all of which were strongly occupied. From the extremity of his left, Blucher could communicate with the British at Quatre-Bras, upon which the Duke of Wellington was, as fast as distance would permit, concentrating his army. The fourth Prussian division, being that of Bulow, stationed between Liége and Hainault, was at too great a distance to be brought up, though every effort was made for the purpose. Blucher undertook, however, notwithstanding the absence of Bulow, to receive a battle in this position, trusting to the support of the English army, who, by a flank movement to the left, were to march to his assistance.

Napoleon had, in the mean time, settled his own plan of battle. He determined to leave Ney with a division of 45,000 men, with instructions to drive the English from Quatre-Bras, ere their army was concentrated and reinforced, and thus prevent their co-operating with Blucher, while he himself, with the main body of his army, attacked the Prussian position at Ligny. Ney being thus on the French left wing at Frasnes and Quatre-Bras, and Buonaparte on the right at Ligny, a division under d'Erlon, amounting to 10,000 men, served as centre of the army, and was placed near Marchiennes, from which it might march laterally either to support Ney or Napoleon, whichever might require assistance. As two

battles thus took place on the 16th June, it is necessary to take distinct notice of both.

That of Ligny was the principal action. The French Emperor was unable to concentrate his forces, so as to commence the attack upon the Prussians, until three o'clock in the afternoon, at which hour it began with uncommon fury all along the Prussian line. After a continued attack of two hours, the French had only obtained possession of a part of the village of St Amand. The position of the Prussians, however, was thus far defective, that the main part of their army being drawn up on the heights, and the remainder occupying villages which lay at their foot, the reinforcements dispatched to the latter were necessarily exposed during their descent to the fire from the French artillery, placed on the meadows below. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, by which the Prussians suffered much, Napoleon thought the issue of the contest so doubtful, that he sent for d'Erlon's division, which, as we have mentioned, was stationed near Marchiennes, half-way betwixt Quatre-Bras and Ligny. In the mean while, observing that Blucher drew his reserves together on St Amand, he changed his point of attack, and directed all his force against Ligny, of which, after a desperate resistance, he at length obtained possession. The French Guards, supported by their heavy cavalry, as-

cended the heights, and attacked the Prussian position in the rear of Ligny. The reserves of the Prussian infantry having been dispatched to St Amand, Blucher had no means of repelling this attack, save by his cavalry. He placed himself at their head, and charged in the most determined manner, but without success. The cavalry of Blucher were forced back in disorder.

The Prince Mareschal, as he directed the retreat, was involved in one of the charges of cavalry, his horse struck down by a cannon shot, and he himself prostrated on the ground. His aide-de-camp threw himself beside the veteran, determined to share his fate, and had the precaution to fling a cloak over him to prevent his being recognized by the French. The enemy's cuirassiers passed over him, and it was not until they were repulsed, and in their turn pursued by the Prussian cavalry, that the gallant veteran was raised and remounted. Blucher's death, or captivity, at that eventful moment, might have had most sinister effects on the event of the campaign, as it may be fairly doubted, whether any thing short of his personal influence and exertion could, after this hard-fought and unfortunate day, have again brought the Prussian army into action on the eventful 18th of June. When relieved, and again mounted, Blucher directed the re-

treat upon Tilly, and achieved it unmolested by the enemy, who did not continue their pursuit beyond the heights which the Prussians had been constrained to abandon.

Such was the battle of Ligny, in which the Prussians, as Blucher truly said, lost the field, but not their honour. The victory was attended with none of those decisive consequences which were wont to mark the successes of Buonaparte. There were no corps cut off or dispersed, no regiments which fled or flung down their arms, no line of defence forced, and no permanent advantage gained. Above all, there was not a man who lost heart or courage. The Prussians are believed to have lost in this bloody action at least 10,000 men; the *Moniteur* makes the number of the killed and wounded 15,000, and General Gourgaud, dissatisfied with this liberal allowance, rates them afterwards at no less than 25,000, while writing under Napoleon's dictation. The loss of the victors was, by the official accounts, estimated at 3000 men, which ought to have been more than tripled. Still, the French Emperor had struck a great blow,—overpowered a stubborn and inveterate enemy, and opened the campaign with favourable auspices. The degree of advantage, however, which Napoleon might have derived from the Prussian retreat, was greatly limited by the

indifferent success of Ney against the forces of Lord Wellington. Of this second action we have now to give some account.

Frasnes had been evacuated by the British, who, on the morning of the 16th, were in position at Quatre-Bras, a point of importance, as four roads diverge from it in different directions ; so that the British general might communicate from his left with the Prussian right at St Amand, besides having in his rear a causeway open for his retreat. On the left of the causeway, leading from Charleroi to Brussels, is a wood, called Bois de Bossus, which, during the early part of the day, was strongly contested by the sharpshooters on both sides, but at length carried by the French, and maintained for a time. About three o'clock in the afternoon, the main attack commenced, but was repulsed. The British infantry, however, and particularly the 42d Highlanders, suffered severely from an unexpected charge of lancers, whose approach was hid from them by the character of the ground, intersected with hedges, and covered with heavy crops of rye. Two companies of the Highlanders were cut off, not having time to form the square; the others succeeded in getting into order, and beating off the lancers. Ney then attempted a general charge of heavy cavalry. But they were received with such a galling fire from the British infantry, joined to a battery of two guns, that

it could not be sustained; the whole causeway was strewed with men and horses, and the fugitives, who escaped to the rear, announced the loss of an action which was far from being decided, considering that the British had few infantry and artillery, though reinforcements of both were coming fast forward.

The French, as already noticed, had, about three o'clock, obtained possession of the Bois de Bossus, and driven out the Belgians. They were in return themselves expelled by the British Guards, who successfully resisted every attempt made by the French to penetrate into the wood during the day.

As the English reinforcements arrived in succession, Mareschal Ney became desirous of an addition of numbers, and sent to procure the assistance of d'Erlon's division, posted, as has been said, near Marchiennes. But these troops had been previously ordered to succour Buonaparte's own army. As the affair of Ligny was, however, over before they arrived, the division was again sent back towards Frasnés to assist Ney; but his battle was also by this time over, and thus d'Erlon's troops marched from one flank to the other, without firing a musket in the course of the day. The battle of Quatre-Bras terminated with the light. The British retained possession of the field, which they had maintained with so much obstinacy, because the Duke of Wellington con-

ceived that Blucher would be able to make his ground good at Ligny, and was consequently desirous that the armies should retain the line of communication which they had occupied in the morning.

But the Prussians, evacuating all the villages which they held in the neighbourhood of Ligny, had concentrated their forces to retreat upon the river Dyle, in the vicinity of Wavres. By this retrograde movement, they were placed about six leagues to the rear of their former position, and had united themselves to Bulow's division, which had not been engaged in the affair at Ligny. Blucher had effected this retreat, not only without pursuit by the French, but without their knowing for some time in what direction he had gone.

This doubt respecting Blucher's movements occasioned an uncertainty and delay in those of the French, which was afterwards attended with the very worst consequences. Napoleon, or General Gourgaud in his name, does not hesitate to assert, that the cause of this delay rested with Mareschal Grouchy, on whom was devolved the duty of following up the Prussian retreat. «If Mareschal Grouchy,» says the accusation, «had been at Wavres on the 17th, and in communication with *my* (Napoleon's) left, Blucher would not have dared send any detachment of his army against me on the 18th; or if he had, I would have destroyed them.»

But the Mareschal appears to make a victorious defence. Grouchy says, that he sought out the Emperor on the night of the 16th, so soon as the Prussian retreat commenced, but that he could not see him till he returned to Fleurus; nor did he obtain any answer to his request of obtaining some infantry to assist his cavalry in following Blucher and his retreating army, excepting an intimation that he would receive orders next day. He states that he went again to head-quarters in the morning of the 17th, aware of the full importance of following the Prussians closely up, but that he could not see Buonaparte till half-past seven, and then was obliged to follow him to the field of battle of the preceding day, previous to receiving his commands. Napoleon talked with various persons on different subjects, without giving Grouchy any orders until near noon, when he suddenly resolved to send the Mareschal with an army of 32,000 men, not upon Wavres, for he did not know that the Prussians had taken that direction, but to follow Blucher wherever he might have gone. Lastly, Grouchy affirms that the troops of Gérard and Vandamme, who were placed under his command, were not ready to move until three o'clock. Thus, according to the Mareschal's very distinct narrative, the first orders for the pursuit were not given till about noon on the 17th, and the troops were not in a capacity to obey them until three hours after

they were received. For this delay Grouchy blames Excelmans and Gérard, who commanded under him. His corps, at any rate, was not in motion until three o'clock upon the 17th.

Neither could his march, when begun, be directed with certainty on Wavres. The first traces of the Prussians which he could receive seemed to intimate, on the contrary, that they were retiring towards Namur, which induced Grouchy to push the pursuit in the latter direction, and occasioned the loss of some hours. From all these concurring reasons, the Marschal shows distinctly that he could not have attained Wavres on the evening of the 17th June, because he had no orders to go there till noon, nor troops ready to march till three o'clock; nor had either Napoleon or his general any foreknowledge of the motions of Blucher, which might induce them to believe Wavres was the true point of his retreat. It was not till he found the English resolved to make a stand at Waterloo, and the Prussians determined to communicate with them, that Napoleon became aware of the plan arranged betwixt Wellington and Blucher, to concentrate the Prussian and English armies at Waterloo. This was the enigma on which his fate depended, and he failed to solve it. But it was more agreeable, and much more convenient, for Napoleon to blame Grouchy, than to acknowledge

That he himself had been surprised by the circumstances in which he unexpectedly found himself on the 18th.

Meantime, having detached Grouchy to pursue the Prussians, Napoleon himself moved laterally towards Frasnes, and there united himself with the body commanded by Mareschal Ney. His purpose was to attack the Duke of Wellington, whom he expected still to find in the position of Quatre-Bras.

But about seven in the morning, the Duke, having received intelligence of the Prince Mareschal Blucher's retreat to Wavres, commenced a retreat on his part towards Waterloo, in order to recover his communication with the Prussians, and resume the execution of the plan of co-operation, which had been in some degree disconcerted by the sudden irruption of the French, and the loss of the battle of Ligny by the Prussians. The retreat was conducted with the greatest regularity, though it was as usual unpleasant to the feelings of the soldier. The news of the battle of Ligny spread through the ranks, and even the most sanguine did not venture to hope that the Prussians would be soon able to renew the engagement. The weather was dreadful, as the rain fell in torrents; but this so far favoured the British, by rendering the ploughed fields impracticable for horse, so that their march was covered from

the attacks of the French cavalry on the flanks and the operations of those by whom they were pursued were confined to the causeway.

At Genappe, however, a small town, where a narrow bridge over the river Dyle can only be approached by a confined street, there was an attack on the British rear, which the English light cavalry were unable to repel; but the heavy cavalry being brought up, repulsed the French, who gave the rear of the army no farther disturbance for the day.

At five in the evening, the Duke of Wellington arrived on the memorable field of Waterloo, which he had long before fixed as the position in which he had in certain events determined to make a stand for covering Brussels.

The scene of this celebrated action must be familiar to most readers, either from description or recollection. The English army occupied a chain of heights, extending from a ravine and village, termed Merke Braine, on the right, to a hamlet called Ter la Haye, on the left. Corresponding to this chain of heights there runs one somewhat parallel to them, on which the French were posted. A small valley winds between them of various breadth at different points, but not generally exceeding half a mile. The declivity on either side into the valley has a varied, but

On the whole a gentle slope, diversified by a number of undulating irregularities of ground. The field is crossed by two high-roads, or causeways, both leading to Brussels,—one from Charleroi through Quatre-Bras and Genappe, by which the British army had just retreated, and another from Nivelles. These roads traverse the valley, and meet behind the village of Mont St Jean, which was in the rear of the the British army. The farm-house of Mont St Jean, which must be carefully distinguished from the hamlet, was much closer to the rear of the British than the latter. On the Charleroi causeway, in front of the line, there is another farm-house, called La Haye Sainte, situated nearly at the foot of the declivity leading into the valley. On the opposite chain of eminences, a village called La Belle Alliance gives name to the range of heights. It exactly fronts Mont St Jean, and these two points formed the respective centres of the French and English positions.

An old-fashioned Flemish villa, called Goumont, or Hougoumont, stood in the midst of the valley, surrounded with gardens, offices, and a wood, about two acres in extent, of tall beech-trees. Behind the heights of Mont St Jean, the ground again sinks into a hollow, which served to afford some sort of shelter to the second line of the British. In the rear of this

second valley, is the great and extensive forest Soignies, through which runs the causeway to Brussels. On that road, two miles in the rear of the British army, is placed the small town of Waterloo.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Napoleon's expectation that the Alliance would be broken up in case of his defeating the English in Belgium.—The English army take up their ground on 17th June, and the French next morning.—Strength of the two armies.—Plans of their Generals.—THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO commenced on the forenoon of the 18th June—French attack directed against the British centre—shifted to their right—charges of the Cuirassiers—and their reception—Advance of the Prussians—Ney's charge at the head of the Guards—His repulse—and Napoleon's orders for retreat.—The victorious Generals meet at La Belle Alliance.—Behaviour of Napoleon during the engagement.—Blucher's pursuit of the French.—Loss of the British—of the French.—Napoleon's subsequent attempts to undervalue the military skill of the Duke of Wellington answered.—His unjust censures of Grouchy.—The notion that the British were on the point of losing the battle when the Prussians came up shown to be erroneous.

THERE might be a difference of opinion, in a mere military question, whether the English general ought to have hazarded a battle for the defence of Brussels, or whether falling back on the strong city of Antwerp, it might have been safer to wait the arrival of the reinforcements which were in expectation. But in a moral and political point of view, the protect-

ing Brussels was of the last importance. Napoleon has declared, that, had he gained the battle of Waterloo, he had the means of revolutionizing Belgium; and although he was doubtless too sanguine in this declaration, yet unquestionably the French had many partisans in a country which they had so long possessed. The gaining of the battle of Ligny had no marked results, still less had the indecisive action at Quatre-Bras; but had these been followed by the retreat of the English army to Antwerp, and the capture of Brussels, the capital city of the Netherlands, they would then have attained the rank of great and decisive victories.

Napoleon, indeed, pretended to look to still more triumphant results from such a victory, and to expect nothing less than the dissolution of the European Alliance as the reward of a decided defeat of the English in Belgium. So long as it was not mentioned by what means this was to be accomplished, those who had no less confidence in Napoleon's intrigues than his military talents, must have supposed that he had already in preparation among the foreign powers some deep scheme, tending to sap the foundation of their alliance, and ready to be carried into action when he should attain a certain point of success. But when it is explained that these extensive expectations rested on Napoleon's belief that a single defeat of the Duke of Wellington would occasion a

total change of government in England; that the statesmen of the opposition would enter into office as a thing of course, and instantly conclude a peace with him; and that the coalition, thus deprived of subsidies, must therefore instantly withdraw the armies which were touching the French frontier on its whole northern and eastern line,—Napoleon's extravagant speculations can only serve to show how very little he must have known of the English nation, with which he had been fighting so long. The war with France had been prosecuted more than twenty years, and though many of these were years of bad success and defeat, the nation had persevered in a resistance which terminated at last in complete triumph. The national opinion of the great general who led the British troops was too strongly rooted to give way upon a single misfortune; and the event of the campaign of 1814, in which Napoleon, repeatedly victorious, was at length totally defeated and dethroned, would have encouraged a more fickle people than the English to continue the war notwithstanding a simple defeat, if such an event had unhappily occurred. The duke had the almost impregnable fortress and seaport of Antwerp in his rear, and might have waited there the reinforcements from America. Blucher had often shown how little he was disheartened by defeat; at worst, he would have

fallen back on a Russian army of 200,000 men, who were advancing on the Rhine. The hopes, therefore, that the battle of Waterloo, if gained by the French, would have finished the war, must be abandoned as visionary, whether we regard the firm and manly character of the great personage at the head of the British monarchy, the state of parties in the House of Commons, where many distinguished members of the Opposition had joined the ministry on the question of the war, or the general feeling of the country, who saw with resentment the new irruption of Napoleon. It cannot, however, be denied, that any success gained by Napoleon in this first campaign would have greatly added to his influence both in France and other countries, and might have endangered the possession of Flanders. The Duke of Wellington resolved, therefore, to protect Brussels, if possible, even by the risk of a general action.

By the march from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo, the duke had restored his communication with Blucher, which had been dislocated by the retreat of the Prussians to Wavres. When established there, Blucher was once more upon the same line with the British, the distance between the Prussian right flank, and the British left, being about five leagues, or five leagues and a half. The ground which lay between the two extreme points, called the

heights of St Lambert, was exceedingly rugged and wooded; and the cross-roads which traversed it, forming the sole means of communication between the English and Prussians, were dreadfully broken up by the late tempestuous weather.

The duke dispatched intelligence of his position in front of Waterloo to Prince Blucher, acquainting him at the same time with his resolution to give Napoleon the battle which he seemed to desire, providing the prince would afford him the support of two divisions of the Prussian army. The answer was worthy of the indefatigable and indomitable old man, who was never so much disconcerted by defeat as to prevent his being willing and ready for combat on the succeeding day. He sent for reply, that he would move to the Duke of Wellington's support, not with two divisions only, but with his whole army; and that he asked no time to prepare for the movement, longer than was necessary to supply food and serve out cartridges to his soldiers.

It was three o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th, when the British came on the field, and took up their bivouac for the night in the order of battle in which they were to fight the next day. It was much later before Napoleon reached the heights of La Belle Alliance in person, and his army did not come up in full force till the morning of the 18th. Great part of the

French had passed the night in the little village of Genappe, and Napoleon's own quarters had been at the farm-house called Caillou, about a mile in the rear of La Belle Alliance.

In the morning, when Napoleon had formed his line of battle, his brother Jérôme, to whom he ascribed the possession of very considerable military talents, commanded on the left—Counts Reille and d'Erlon the centre—and Count de Lobau on the right. Mareschals Soult and Ney acted as lieutenant-generals to the Emperor. The French force on the field consisted probably of about 75,000. The English army did not exceed that number, at the highest computation. Each army was commanded by the chief, under whom they had offered to defy the world. So far the forces were equal. But the French had the very great advantage of being trained and experienced soldiers of the same nation, whereas the English, in the Duke of Wellington's army, did not exceed 35,000; and although the German Legion were veteran troops, the other soldiers under his command were those of the German contingents, lately levied, unaccustomed to act together, and in some instances suspected to be lukewarm to the cause in which they were engaged; so that it would have been imprudent to trust more to their assistance and co-operation than could not possibly be avoided. In Buonaparte's mode

of calculating, allowing one Frenchman to stand as equal to one Englishman, and one Englishman or Frenchman against two of any other nation, the inequality of force on the Duke of Wellington's side was very considerable.

The British army thus composed, was divided into two lines. The right of the first line consisted of the second and fourth English divisions, the third and sixth Hanoverians, and the first corps of Belgians, under Lord Hill. The centre was composed of the corps of the Prince of Orange, with the Brunswickers and troops of Nassau, having the Guards, under General Cooke, on the right, and the division of General Alten on the left. The left wing consisted of the divisions of Picton, Lambert, and Kempt. The second line was in most instances formed of the troops deemed least worthy of confidence, or which had suffered too severely in the action of the 16th to be again exposed until extremity. It was placed behind the declivity of the heights to the rear, in order to be sheltered from the cannonade, but sustained much loss from shells during the action. The cavalry were stationed in the rear, distributed all along the line, but chiefly posted on the left of the centre, to the east of the Charleroi causeway. The farm-house of La Haye Sainte, in the front of the centre, was garrisoned, but there was not time to prepare

it effectually for defence. The villa, gardens, and farm-yard of Hougoumont, formed a strong advanced post towards the centre of the right. The whole British position formed a sort of curve, the centre of which was nearest to the enemy, and the extremities, particularly on their right, drawn considerably backward.

The plans of these two great generals were extremely simple. The object of the Duke of Wellington was to maintain his line of defence, until the Prussians, coming up, should give him a decided superiority of force. They were expected about eleven or twelve o'clock; but the extreme badness of the roads, owing to the violence of the storm, detained them several hours later.

Napoleon's scheme was equally plain and decided. He trusted, by his usual rapidity of attack, to break and destroy the British army before the Prussians should arrive on the field; after which, he calculated to have an opportunity of destroying the Prussians, by attacking them on their march through the broken ground interposed betwixt them and the British. In these expectations he was the more confident, that he believed Grouchy's force, detached on the 17th in pursuit of Blucher, was sufficient to retard, if not altogether to check, the march of the Prussians. His grounds for entertaining this latter opinion were, as we shall afterwards show, too hastily adopted.

Commencing the action, according to his usual system, Napoleon kept his Guard in reserve, in order to take opportunity of charging with them, when repeated attacks of column after column, and squadron after squadron, should induce his wearied enemy to show some symptoms of irresolution. But Napoleon's movements were not very rapid. His army had suffered by the storm even more than the English, who were in bivouac at three in the afternoon of the 17th June; while the French were still under march, and could not get into line on the heights of La Belle Alliance until ten or eleven o'clock of the 18th. The English army had thus some leisure to take food, and to prepare their arms before the action; and Napoleon lost several hours ere he could commence the attack. Time was, indeed, inestimably precious for both parties, and hours, nay, minutes, were of importance. But of this Napoleon was less aware than was the Duke of Wellington.

The tempest, which had raged with tropical violence all night, abated in the morning; but the weather continued gusty and stormy during the whole day. Betwixt eleven and twelve, before noon, on the memorable 18th June, this dreadful and decisive action commenced, with a cannonade on the part of the French, instantly followed by an attack, commanded by Jérôme, on the advanced post of Hougomont.

The troops of Nassau, which occupied the wood around the château, were driven out by the French, but the utmost efforts of the assailants were unable to force the house, garden, and farm-offices, which a party of the Guards sustained with the most dauntless resolution. The French redoubled their efforts, and precipitated themselves in numbers on the exterior hedge, which screens the garden wall, not perhaps aware of the internal defence afforded by the latter. They fell in great numbers on this point by the fire of the defenders, to which they were exposed in every direction. The number of their troops, however, enabled them, by possession of the wood, to mask Hougoumont for a time, and to push on with their cavalry and artillery against the British right, which formed in squares to receive them. The fire was incessant, but without apparent advantage on either side. The attack was at length repelled so far, that the British again opened their communication with Hougoumont, and that important garrison was reinforced by Colonel Hepburn and a body of the Guards.

Meantime, the fire of artillery having become general along the line, the force of the French attack was transferred to the British centre. It was made with the most desperate fury, and received with the most stubborn resolution. The assault was here made upon

the farm-house of Saint Jean by four columns of infantry, and a large mass of cuirassiers, who took the advance. The cuirassiers came with the utmost intrepidity along the Genappe causeway, where they were encountered and charged by the English heavy cavalry; and a combat was maintained at the sword's-point, till the French were driven back on their own position, where they were protected by their artillery. The four columns of French infantry, engaged in the same attack, forced their way forward beyond the farm of La Haye Sainte, and, dispersing a Belgian regiment, were in the act of establishing themselves in the centre of the British position, when they were attacked by the brigade of General Pack, brought up from the second line by General Picton, while, at the same time, a brigade of British heavy cavalry wheeled round their own infantry, and attacked the French charging columns in flank, at the moment when they were checked by the fire of the musketry. The results were decisive. The French columns were broken with great slaughter, and two eagles, with more than 2000 men, were made prisoners. The latter were sent instantly off for Brussels.

The British cavalry, however, followed their success too far. They got involved amongst the French infantry, and some hostile cavalry which were detached to support them, and

were obliged to retire with considerable loss. In this part of the action, the gallant General Picton, so distinguished for enterprise and bravery, met his death, as did General Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry.

About this period the French made themselves masters of the farm of La Haye Sainte, cutting to pieces about two hundred Hanoverian sharpshooters, by whom it was most gallantly defended. The French retained this post for some time, till they were at last driven out of it by shells.

Shortly after this event, the scene of conflict again shifted to the right, where a general attack of French cavalry was made on the squares, chiefly towards the centre of the British right, or between that and the causeway. They came up with the most dauntless resolution, in despite of the continued fire of thirty pieces of artillery, placed in front of the line, and compelled the artillerymen, by whom they were served, to retreat within the squares. The enemy had no means, however, to secure the guns, or even to spike them, and at every favourable moment the British artillerymen sallied from their place of refuge, again manned their pieces, and fired on the assailants,—a manœuvre which seems peculiar to the British service.¹ The cuirassiers, however, continued

¹ Baron Muffling, speaking of this peculiarity, says,—
« The English artillery have a rule not to remove their

their dreadful onset, and rode up to the squares in the full confidence, apparently, of sweeping them before the impetuosity of their charge. Their onset and reception was like a furious ocean pouring itself against a chain of insulated rocks. The British squares stood unmoved, and never gave fire until the cavalry were within ten yards, when men rolled one way, horses galloped another, and the cuirassiers were in every instance driven back.

The French authors have pretended, that squares were broken, and colours taken; but this assertion, upon the united testimony of every British officer present, is a positive untruth. This was not, however, the fault of the cuirassiers, who displayed an almost frantic valour. They rallied again and again, and returned to the onset, till the British could recognize even the faces of individuals among their enemies. Some rode close up to the bayonets, fired their pistols, and cut with their swords with reckless and useless valour. Some stood at gaze, and were destroyed by the

guns, when attacked by cavalry in a defensive position. The field-pieces are worked till the last moment, and the men then throw themselves into the nearest square, bearing off the implements they use for serving the guns. If the attack is repulsed, the artillerymen hurry back to their pieces, to fire on the retreating enemy. This is an extremely laudable practice, if the infantry be properly arranged to correspond with it.*

musketry and artillery. Some squadrons, passing through the intervals of the first line, charged the squares of Belgians posted there, with as little success. At length the cuirassiers suffered so severely on every hand, that they were compelled to abandon the attempt, which they had made with such intrepid and desperate courage. In this unheard-of struggle, the greater part of the French heavy cavalry were absolutely destroyed. Buonaparte hints at it in his bulletin as an attempt made without orders, and continued only by the desperate courage of the soldiers and their officers. It is certain, that in the destruction of this noble body of cuirassiers, he lost the corps which might have been most effectual in covering his retreat. After the broken remains of this fine cavalry were drawn off, the French confined themselves for a time to a heavy cannonade, from which the British sheltered themselves in part by lying down on the ground, while the enemy prepared for an attack on another quarter, and to be conducted in a different manner.

It was now about six o'clock, and during this long succession of the most furious attacks, the French had gained no success, save occupying for a time the wood around Hougoumont, from which they had been expelled, and the farm-house of La Haye Sainte, which had been also recovered. The British, on the

other hand, had suffered very severely, but had not lost one inch of ground, save the two posts now regained. Ten thousand men were, however, killed and wounded; some of the foreign regiments had given way, though others had shown the most desperate valour. And the ranks were thinned, both by the actual fugitives, and by the absence of individuals, who left the bloody field for the purpose of carrying off the wounded, and some of whom might naturally be in no hurry to return to so fatal a scene.

But the French, besides losing about 15,000 men, together with a column of prisoners more than 2000 in number, began now to be disturbed by the operations of the Prussians on their right flank; and the secret of the Duke of Wellington was disclosing itself by its consequences. Blucher, faithful to his engagement, had, early in the morning, put in motion Bulow's division, which had not been engaged at Ligny, to communicate with the English army, and operate a diversion on the right flank and rear of the French. But although there were only about twelve or fourteen miles between Wavres and the field of Waterloo, yet the march was, by unavoidable circumstances, much delayed. The rugged face of the country, together with the state of the roads, so often referred to, offered the most serious obstacles to the progress of the

Prussians, especially as they moved with an unusually large train of artillery. A fire, also, which broke out in Wavres, on the morning of the 18th, prevented Bulow's corps from marching through that town, and obliged them to pursue a circuitous and inconvenient route. After traversing, with great difficulty, the cross-roads by Chapelle Lambert, Bulow, with the 4th Prussian corps, who had been expected by the Duke of Wellington about 11 o'clock, announced his arrival by a distant fire, about half-past four. The first Prussian corps, following the same route with Bulow, was yet later in coming up. The second division made a lateral movement in the same direction as the fourth and first, but by the hamlet of Ohain, nearer to the English flank. The Emperor instantly opposed to Bulow, who appeared long before the others, the 6th French corps, which he had kept in reserve for that service; and as only the advanced guard was come up, they succeeded in keeping the Prussians in check for the moment. The first and second Prussian corps appeared on the field still later than the fourth. The third corps had put themselves in motion to follow in the same direction, when they were furiously attacked by the French under Marechal Grouchy, who, as already stated, was detached to engage the attention of Blucher,

whose whole force he believed he had before him.

Instead of being surprised, as an ordinary general might have been, with this attack upon his rear, Blucher contented himself with sending back orders to Thielmann who commanded the third corps, to defend himself as well as he could upon the line of the Dyle. In the mean time, without weakening the army under his own command, by detaching any part of it to support Thielmann, the veteran rather hastened than suspended his march towards the field of battle, where he was aware that the war was likely to be decided in a manner so complete, as would leave victory or defeat on every other point a matter of subordinate consideration.

At half-past six, or thereabouts, the second grand division of the Prussian army began to enter into communication with the British left, by the village of Ohain, while Bulow pressed forward from Chapelle Lambert on the French right and rear, by a hollow or valley called Frischemont. It became now evident that the Prussians were to enter seriously into the battle, and with great force. Napoleon had still the means of opposing them, and of achieving a retreat, at the certainty, however, of being attacked upon the ensuing day by the combined armies of Britain and Prussia. His ce-

lebrated Guard had not yet taken any part in the conflict, and would now have been capable of affording him protection after a battle, which hitherto he had fought at disadvantage, but without being defeated. But the circumstances by which he was surrounded must have pressed on his mind at once. He had no succours to look for; a reunion with Grouchy was the only resource which could strengthen his forces; the Russians were advancing upon the Rhine with forced marches; the Republicans at Paris were agitating schemes against his authority. It seemed as if all must be decided on that day, and on that field. Surrounded by these ill-omened circumstances, a desperate effort for victory, ere the Prussians could act effectually, might perhaps yet drive the English from their position; and he determined to venture on this daring experiment.

About seven o'clock, Napoleon's Guard were formed in two columns, under his own eye, near the bottom of the declivity of La Belle Alliance. They were put under command of the dauntless Ney. Buonaparte told the soldiers, and indeed imposed the same fiction on their commander, that the Prussians whom they saw on the right were retreating before Grouchy. Perhaps he might himself believe that this was true. The Guard answered for the last time, with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur*,

and moved resolutely forward, having for their support four battalions of the Old Guard in reserve, who stood prepared to protect the advance of their comrades. A gradual change had taken place in the English line of battle, in consequence of the repeated repulse of the French. Advancing by slow degrees, the right, which, at the beginning of the conflict, presented a segment of a convex circle, now resembled one that was concave, the extreme right, which had been thrown back, being now rather brought forward, so that their fire both of artillery and infantry fell upon the flank of the French, who had also to sustain that which was poured on their front from the heights. The British were arranged in a line of four men deep, to meet the advancing columns of the French Guard, and poured upon them a storm of musketry which never ceased an instant. The soldiers fired independently, as it is called; each man loading and discharging his piece as fast as he could. At length the British moved forward, as if to close round the heads of the columns, and at the same time continued to pour their shot upon the enemy's flanks. The French gallantly attempted to deploy, for the purpose of returning the discharge. But in their effort to do so, under so dreadful a fire, they stopt, staggered, became disordered, were blended into one mass, and at length gave way, retiring, or rather flying,

in the utmost confusion. This was the last effort of the enemy, and Napoleon gave orders for the retreat; to protect which, he had now no troops left, save the last four battalions of the Old Guard, which had been stationed in the rear of the attacking columns. These threw themselves into squares, and stood firm. But at this moment the Duke of Wellington commanded the whole British line to advance, so that, whatever the bravery and skill of these gallant veterans, they also were thrown into disorder, and swept away in the general rout, in spite of the efforts of Ney, who, having had his horse killed, fought sword in hand, and on foot, in the front of the battle, till the very last. That mareschal, whose military virtues at least cannot be challenged, bore personal evidence against two circumstances, industriously circulated by the friends of Napoleon. One of these fictions occurs in his own bulletin, which charges the loss of the battle to a panic fear, brought about by the treachery of some unknown persons, who raised the cry of *« Sauve qui peut. »* Another figment, greedily credited at Paris, bore, that four battalions of the Old Guard, the last who maintained the semblance of order, answered a summons to surrender, by the magnanimous reply, *« The Guard can die, but cannot yield. »* And one edition of the story adds, that thereupon the battalions made a half wheel inwards, and dis-

charged their muskets into each others' bosoms, to save themselves from dying by the hands of the English. Neither the original reply, nor the pretended self-sacrifice of the Guard, have the slightest foundation. Cambrone, in whose mouth the speech was placed, gave up his own sword, and remained prisoner; and the military conduct of the French Guard is better eulogised by the undisputed truth, that they fought to extremity, with the most unyielding constancy, than by imputing to them an act of regimental suicide upon the lost field of battle. Every attribute of brave men they have a just right to claim. It is no compliment to ascribe to them that of madmen. Whether the words were used by Cambrone or no, the Guard well deserved to have them inscribed on their monument.

Whilst this decisive movement took place, Bulow, who had concentrated his troops, and was at length qualified to act in force, carried the village of Planchenois in the French rear, and was now firing so close on their right wing, that the cannonade annoyed the British who were in pursuit, and was suspended in consequence. Moving in oblique lines, the British and Prussian armies came into contact with each other on the heights so lately occupied by the French, and celebrated the victory with loud shouts of mutual congratulation.

The French army was now in total and in-

extricable confusion and rout; and when the victorious generals met at the farm-house of La Belle Alliance, it was agreed that the Prussians, who were fresh in comparison, should follow up the chase, a duty for which the British, exhausted by the fatigues of a battle of eight hours, were totally inadequate.

During the whole action, Napoleon maintained the utmost serenity. He remained on the heights of La Belle Alliance, keeping pretty near the centre, from which he had a full view of the field, which does not exceed a mile and a half in length. He expressed no solicitude on the fate of the battle for a long time, noticed the behaviour of particular regiments, and praised the English several times, always, however, talking of them as an assured prey. When forming his Guard for the last fatal effort, he descended near them, half down the causeway from La Belle Alliance, to bestow upon them what proved his parting exhortation. He watched intently their progress with a spy-glass, and refused to listen to one or two aides-de-camp, who at that moment came from the right to inform him of the appearance of the Prussians. At length, on seeing the attacking columns stagger and become confused, his countenance, said our informer, became pale as that of a corpse, and muttering to himself, "They are mingled together," he said to his attendants, "All is lost for the present," and

rode off the field; not stopping or taking refreshment till he reached Charleroi, where he paused for a moment in a meadow, and occupied a tent which had been pitched for his accommodation. ¹

Meantime the pursuit of this discomfited army was followed up by Blucher, with the most determined perseverance. He accelerated the march of the Prussian advanced guard, and dispatched every man and horse of his cavalry upon the pursuit of the fugitive French. At Genappe they attempted something like defence, by barricading the bridge and streets; but the Prussians forced them in a moment, and although the French were sufficiently numerous for resistance, their disorder was so irremediable, and their moral courage was so absolutely quelled for the moment, that in many cases they were slaughtered like sheep. They were driven from bivouac to bivouac, without exhibiting even the shadow of their usual courage. One hundred and fifty guns were left in the hands of the English, and a like number taken by the Prussians in course

¹ Our informer on these points was Lacoste, a Flemish peasant, who was compelled to act as Buonaparte's guide, remained with him during the whole action, and accompanied him to Charleroi. He seemed a shrewd sensible man in his way, and told his story with the utmost simplicity. The author saw him, and heard his narrative very shortly after the action.

of the pursuit. The latter obtained possession also of all Napoleon's baggage, and of his carriage, where, amongst many articles of curiosity, was found a proclamation intended to be made public at Brussels the next day.

The loss on the British side during this dreadful battle was, as the Duke of Wellington, no user of exaggerated expressions, truly termed it, *immense*. One hundred officers slain, five hundred wounded, many of them to death, fifteen thousand men killed and wounded (independent of the Prussian loss at Wavres), threw half Britain into mourning. Many officers of distinction fell. It required all the glory, and all the solid advantages of this immortal day, to reconcile the mind to the high price at which it was purchased. The commander-in-chief, compelled to be on every point of danger; was repeatedly in the greatest jeopardy. Only the duke himself, and one gentleman of his numerous staff, escaped unwounded in horse and person.

It would be difficult to form a guess at the extent of the French loss. Besides those who fell in the battle and flight, great numbers deserted. We do not believe, that of 75,000 men, the half were ever again collected under arms.

Having finished our account of this memorable action, we are led to notice the commu-

nications and criticisms of Napoleon himself on the subject, partly as illustrative of the narrative, but much more as indicating his own character.

The account of the battle of Waterloo, dictated by Napoleon to Gourgaud, so severely exposed by General Grouchy as a mere military romance, full of gratuitous suppositions, misrepresentations, and absolute falsehoods, accuses the subordinate generals who fought under Buonaparte of having greatly degenerated from their original character. Ney and Grouchy are particularly aimed at; the former by name, the latter by obvious implication. It is said they had lost that energy and enterprising genius by which they had formerly been distinguished, and to which France owed her triumphs. They had become timorous and circumspect in all their operations; and although their personal bravery remained, their greatest object was to compromise themselves as little as possible. This general remark, intended, of course, to pave the way for transferring from the Emperor to his lieutenants the blame of the miscarriage of the campaign, is both unjust and ungrateful. Had they lost energy, who struggled to the very last in the field of Waterloo, long after the Emperor had left the field? Was Grouchy undecided in his operations, who brought his own division safe to Paris, in spite of all the obstacles opposed

to him by a victorious army, three times the amount of his own in numbers? Both these officers had given up, for the sake of Napoleon, the rank and appointments which they might have peacefully borne under the Bourbons. Did it indicate the reluctance to commit themselves, with which they are charged, that they ventured on the decided step of joining his desperate career, not only abandoning all regard to their interest and their safety, but compromising their character as men of loyalty in the face of all Europe, and exposing themselves to certain death, if the Bourbons should be successful? Those who fight with the cord around their neck, which was decidedly the case with Grouchy and Ney, must have headed the forlorn hope; and is it consistent with human nature, in such circumstances, to believe that they, whose fortune and safety depended on the victory, personally brave as they are admitted to be, should have loitered in the rear, when their fate was in the balance?

He who was unjust to his own followers can scarce be expected to be candid towards an enemy. The Duke of Wellington has, upon all occasions, been willing to render the military character of Napoleon that justice which a generous mind is scrupulously accurate in dispensing to an adversary, and has readily admitted that the conduct of Buonaparte and his army on this memorable occa-

sion, was fully adequate to the support of their high reputation. It may be said, that the victor can afford to bestow praise on the vanquished, but that it requires a superior degree of candour in the vanquished to do justice to the conqueror. Napoleon, at any rate, does not seem to have attained, in this particular, to the pitch of a great or exalted mind, since both he and the various persons whom he employed as the means of circulating his statements, concur in a very futile attempt to excuse the defeat at Waterloo, by a set of apologies founded in a great degree upon misrepresentation. The reader will find these scientifically discussed in a valuable article in the Appendix.¹ But it may be necessary, at the risk of some repetition, to take some notice of them here in a popular form. The allegations, which are designed to prove the incapacity of the British general, and to show that the battle of Waterloo was only lost by a combination of extraordinary fatalities, may be considered in their order.

The first, and most frequently repeated, is the charge, that the Duke of Wellington, on the 15th, was surprised in his cantonments, and could not collect his army fast enough at

¹ Vide an account of the action of Waterloo, equally intelligible and scientific, drawn up by Captain Pringle of the Artillery, which will amply supply the deficiencies of our narrative.

Quatre-Bras. In this his Grace would have been doubtless highly censurable, if Napoleon had, by express information, or any distinct movement indicative of his purpose, shown upon which point he meant to advance. But the chivalrous practice of fixing a field of combat has been long out of date; and Napoleon, beyond all generals, possessed the art of masking his own movements, and misleading his enemy concerning the actual point on which he meditated an attack. The duke and Prince Blücher were, therefore, obliged to provide for the concentration of their forces upon different points, according as Buonaparte's selection should be manifested; and in order to be ready to assemble their forces upon any one position, they must, by spreading their cantonments, in some degree delay the movement upon all. The duke could not stir from Brussels, or concentrate his forces, until he had certain information of those of the enemy; and it is said that a French statesman, who had promised to send him a copy of the plan of Buonaparte's campaign, contrived by a trick of policy to evade keeping his word. ¹

¹ This was Fouché, who seems to have been engaged in secret correspondence with all and sundry of the belligerent powers, while he was Minister of Police under Napoleon. In his Memoirs, he is made to boast that he contrived to keep his word to the Duke of Wellington, by sending the plan of Buonaparte's campaign by a female, a

We do not mean to deny the talent and activity displayed by Buonaparte, who, if he could have brought forward his whole army upon the evening of the 15th of June, might probably have succeeded in preventing the meditated junction of Blucher and Wellington. But the celebrated prayer for annihilation of time and space would be as little reasonable in the mouth of a general as of a lover, and, fettered by the limitations against which that modest petition is directed, Buonaparte failed in bringing forward in due time a sufficient body of forces to carry all before him at Quatre-Bras; while, on the other hand, the Duke of Wellington, from the same obstacles of time and space, could not assemble a force sufficient to drive Ney before him, and enable him to advance to the support of Blucher during the action of Ligny.¹

Flemish postmistress, whom he laid wait for on the frontier, and caused to be arrested. Thus he

— kept the word of promise to the ear,
And broke it to the sense.

This story, we have some reason to believe, is true. One of the marvels of our times is how Fouché, after having been the mainspring of such a complication of plots and counterplots, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary intrigues, contrived after all to die in his bed.

¹ Some people have been silly enough to consider the Duke of Wellington's being surprised as a thing indisputable, because the news of the French advance first reached him in a ball-room. It must be supposed that these

The choice of the field of Waterloo is also charged against the Duke of Wellington as an act of weak judgment; because, although possessed of all the requisites for maintaining battle or pursuing victory, and above all, of the facilities for communicating with the Prussian army, it had not, according to the Imperial critic, the means of affording security in case of a retreat, since there was only one communication to the rear—that by the causeway of Brussels, the rest of the position being screened by the forest of Soignies, in front of which the British army was formed, and through which, it is assumed, retreat was impossible.

Taking the principle of this criticism as accurate, it may be answered, that a general would never halt or fight at all, if he were to refuse combat on every other save a field of battle which possessed all the various excellencies which may be predicated of one in theory. The commander must consider whether the ground suits his present exigencies,

good men's idea of war is, that a general should sit sentinel with his truncheon in his hand, like a statue in the midst of a city market-place, until the tidings come which call him to the field.

Free is his heart who for his country fights;
He on the eve of battle may resign
Himself to social pleasure—sweetest then,
When danger to the soldier's soul endears
The human joy that never may return.

HOME'S *Douglas*.

without looking at other circumstances which may be less pressing at the time. Generals have been known to chuse by preference the ground from which there could be no retiring; like invaders who burn their ships, as a pledge that they will follow their enterprize to the last. And although provision for a safe retreat is certainly in most cases a desirable circumstance, yet it has been dispensed with by good generals, and by none more frequently than by Napoleon himself. Was not the battle of Essling fought without any possible mode of retreat save the frail bridges over the Danube?—Was not that of Wagram debated under similar circumstances?—And, to complete the whole, did not Napoleon, while censuring the Duke of Wellington for fighting in front of a forest, himself enter upon conflict with a defile in his rear, formed by the narrow streets and narrower bridge of Genappe, by which alone, if defeated, he could cross the Dyle?—It might, therefore, be presumed, that if the Duke of Wellington chose a position from which retreat was difficult, he must have considered the necessity of retreat as unlikely, and reckoned with confidence on being able to make good his stand until the Prussians should come up to join him.

Even this does not exhaust the question; for the English general-officers unite in considering the forest of Soignies as a very advantageous

feature in the field; and, far from apprehending the least inconvenience from its existence, the Duke of Wellington regarded it as affording a position, which, if his first and second line had been unhappily forced, he might have nevertheless made good against the whole French army. The hamlet of Mont Saint Jean, in front, affords an excellent key to the position of an army compelled to occupy the forest. The wood itself is everywhere passable for men and horses, the trees being tall, and without either low boughs or underwood; and, singular as the discrepancy between the opinions of distinguished soldiers may seem, we have never met an English officer who did not look on the forest of Soignies as affording an admirable position for making a final stand. In support of their opinion, they refer to the defence of the Bois de Bossus, near Quatre-Bras, against the reiterated attacks of Marschal Ney. This impeachment of the Duke of Wellington may therefore be set aside, as inconsistent with the principles of British warfare. All that can be added is, that there are cases in which national habits and manners may render a position advantageous to soldiers of one country, which is perilous or destructive to those of another.

The next subject of invidious criticism is of a nature so singular, that, did it not originate with a great man, in peculiar circumstances of

adversity, it might be almost termed ludicrous. Napoleon expresses himself as dissatisfied, because he was defeated in the common and vulgar proceeding of downright fighting, and by no special manœuvres or peculiar display of military art on the part of the victor. But if it can afford any consolation to those who cherish his fame, it is easy to show, that Napoleon fell a victim to a scheme of tactics early conceived, and persevered in under circumstances which, in the case of ordinary men, would have occasioned its being abandoned; resumed after events which seemed so adverse, that nothing save dauntless courage and unlimited confidence could have enabled the chiefs to proceed in their purpose; and carried into execution, without Napoleon's being able to penetrate the purpose of the allied generals, until it was impossible to prevent the annihilation of his army;—that he fell, in short, by a grand plan of *stratégie*, worthy of being compared to that of any of his own admirable campaigns.

To prove what we have said, it is only necessary to remark, that the natural bases and points of retreat of the Prussian and English armies were different; the former being directed on Maestricht, the other on Antwerp, where each expected their reinforcements. Regardless of this, and with full confidence in each other, the Prince Mareschal Blucher, and the

Duke of Wellington, agreed to act in conjunction against the French army. The union of their forces, for which both were prepared, was destined to have taken place at Ligny, where the duke designed to have supported the Prussians, and where Blucher hazarded an action in expectation of his ally's assistance. The active movements of Napoleon, and the impossibility of the English force being sufficiently concentrated at Quatre-Bras to afford the means of overpowering Ney and the force in their front, prevented their making a lateral march to relieve Blucher at that critical period. Otherwise, the parts of the bloody drama, as afterwards acted, would have been reversed, and the British army would have moved to support the Prussians at Ligny, as the Prussians came to the aid of the British at Waterloo.

Napoleon had the merit of disconcerting this plan for the time; but he did not, and could not, discover that the allied generals retained, after the loss of the battle of Ligny, the same purpose which they had adopted on the commencement of the campaign. He imagined, as did all around him, that Blucher must retreat on Namur, or in such a direction as would effectually accomplish a separation betwixt him and the English, as it was natural to think a defeated army should approach towards its own resources, instead of attempting further offensive operations. At all events, Napoleon

was in this respect so much mistaken, as to believe that if Blücher did retire on the same line with the English, the means which the Prussian retained for co-operating with his allies were so limited, and (perhaps he might think) the spirit of the general so subdued, that Mareschal Grouchy, with 32,000 men, would be sufficient to keep the whole Prussian force in check. The Mareschal was accordingly, as we have seen, dispatched much too late, without any other instructions than to follow and engage the attention of the Prussians. Misled by the demonstration of Blücher, he at first took the road to Namur, and thus, without any fault on his part, lost time, which was inconceivably precious.

Buonaparte's subsequent accounts of this action blame Mareschal Grouchy for not discovering Blücher's real direction, which he had no means of ascertaining, and for not obeying orders which were never given to him, and which could not be given, because Napoleon was as ignorant as the Mareschal, that Blücher had formed the determination at all events to unite himself with Wellington. This purpose of acting in co-operation, formed and persevered in, was to the French Emperor the riddle of the Sphinx, and he was destroyed because he could not discover it. Indéed he ridiculed even the idea of such an event. One of his officers, according to Baron Muffling, having

hinted at the mere possibility of a junction between the Prussian army and that of Wellington, he smiled contemptuously at the thought. «The Prussian army,» he said, «is defeated—it cannot rally for three days—I have 75,000 men, the English only 50,000. The town of Brussels awaits me with open arms. The English Opposition waits but for my success to raise their heads. Then adieu subsidies, and farewell coalition!» In like manner, Napoleon frankly acknowledged, while on board the *Northumberland*, that he had no idea that the Duke of Wellington meant to fight, and therefore omitted to reconnoitre the ground with sufficient accuracy. It is well known, that when he observed them still in their position on the morning of the 18th, he exclaimed, «I have them, then, these English!»

It was half past eleven, just about the time that the battle of Waterloo commenced, that Grouchy, as already hinted, overtook the rear of the Prussians. A strong force, appearing to be the whole of the Prussian army, lay before the French Mareschal, who, from the character of the ground, had no means of ascertaining their numbers, or of discovering the fact, that three divisions of Blucher's army were already on the march to their right, through the passes of Saint Lambert; and that it was only Thielmann's division which remained upon the Dyle. Still less could he know, what could only be

known to the Duke and Blucher, that the English were determined to give battle in the position of Waterloo. He heard, indeed, a heavy cannonade in that direction, but that might have proceeded from an attack on the British rear-guard, the Duke being, in the general opinion of the French army, in full retreat upon Antwerp. At any rate, the mareschal's orders were to attack the enemy which he found before him. He could not but remember, that Ney had been reprimanded for detaching a part of his force on the 16th, in consequence of a distant cannonade; and he was naturally desirous to avoid censure for the self-same cause. Even if Napoleon was seriously engaged with the English, it seemed the business of Grouchy to occupy the large force which he observed at Wavres, and disposed along the Dyle, to prevent their attempting any thing against Napoleon, if, contrary to probability, the Emperor should be engaged in a general battle. Lastly, as Grouchy was to form his resolution under the idea of having the whole Prussian force before him, which was estimated at 80,000 men, it would have been impossible for him to detach from an army of 32,000 any considerable body, to the assistance of Napoleon; and in attacking with such inadequate numbers, he showed his devotion, at the risk of being totally destroyed.

He engaged, however, in battle without any

hesitation, and attacked the line of the Prussians along the Dyle on every accessible point; to wit, at Wavres, at the mill of Bielge, and at the village of Limale. The points of attack were desperately defended by the Prussians under Thielmann, so that Grouchy could only occupy that part of Wavres, which was on his own side of the Dyle. About four o'clock, and consequently when the fate of the battle of Waterloo was nearly decided, Grouchy received from Mareschal Soult the only order which reached him during the day, requiring him to manœuvre so as to unite himself to the right flank of the Emperor, but at the same time acquainting him with the (false) intelligence, that the battle was gained upon the line of Waterloo. A postscript informed Grouchy, that Bulow was appearing upon Napoleon's right flank, and that if he could come up with speed, he would take the Prussian *flagrante delicto*.

These orders were quite intelligible. But two things were necessary to their being carried into execution. First, that Grouchy should get clear of Thielmann, the enemy with whom he was closely engaged, and who would not fail to pursue the French mareschal if he retreated or moved to his left flank, without having repulsed him. Secondly, it was indispensable he should pass the small river

Dyle, defended by Thielmann's division, since the road leading through the woods of Chappelle Lambert, was that by which he could best execute his march towards Waterloo. Grouchy redoubled his efforts to force the Dyle, but he could not succeed till night, and then but partially; for the Prussians continued to hold the mill of Bielge, and remained in force within a cannon-shot of Grouchy's position.

In the morning, the mareschal, anxious to learn with certainty the fate of Napoleon, though believing, according to Soult's letter, that he was victorious, sent out reconnoitring parties. When he learned the truth, he commenced a retreat, which he conducted with such talent, that though closely pursued by the Prussians, then in all the animation of triumph, and though sustaining considerable loss, he was enabled to bring his corps unbroken under the walls of Paris. Weighing all these circumstances, it appears that Buonaparte had no right to count upon the assistance of Grouchy, far less to throw censure on that general for not coming to his assistance, since he scrupulously obeyed the orders he received; and when at four o'clock, that of attacking and pressing the Prussian rear was qualified by the directions of Soult, to close up to Buonaparte's right wing, Grouchy was engaged in an obsti-

nate engagement with Thielmann, whom he must necessarily defeat before he could cross the Dyle, to accomplish the junction proposed.

The movement of Blucher, therefore, was a masterpiece of courage and judgment, since the Prince Mareschal left one division of his army to maintain a doubtful onset against Grouchy, and involved himself with the other three in that flank movement through the woods of Saint Lambert, by which he paid with interest the debt which he owed Napoleon for a similar movement, previous to the affairs of Champ-Aubert and Montmirail, in 1814.

The same system which placed Blucher in motion, required that the Duke of Wellington should maintain his position, by confining himself to a strictly defensive contest. The British, as they were to keep their place at all risks, so on no temptation of partial success were they to be induced to advance. Every step which they might have driven the French backward, before the coming up of the Prussians, would have been a disadvantage as far as it went, since the object was not to beat the enemy by the efforts of the English only, which, in the state of the two armies, might only have amounted to a repulse, but to detain them in the position of La Belle Alliance, until the army of Blucher should come up. When Napoleon, therefore, objects to the conduct of the

Duke of Wellington on the 18th, that he did not manœuvre in the time of action, he objects to the very circumstance which rendered the victory of the day so decisive. He was himself decoyed into, and detained in a position, until his destruction was rendered inevitable.

It has been a favourite assertion with almost all the French, and some English writers, that the English were on the point of being defeated, when the Prussian force came up. The contrary is the truth. The French had attacked, and the British had resisted, from past eleven until near seven o'clock; and though the battle was most bloody, the former had gained no advantage save at the wood of Hougoumont, and the farm-house of La Haye Sainte; both they gained, but speedily lost. Baron Muffling has given the most explicit testimony, « that the battle could have afforded no favourable result to the enemy, even if the Prussians had never come up.» He was an eye-witness, and an unquestionable judge, and willing, doubtless, to carry the immediate glory acquired by his countrymen on this memorable occasion, and in which he had a large personal stake, as high as truth and honour will permit. At the time when Napoleon made the last effort, Bulow's troops were indeed upon the field, but had not made any physical impression by their weapons, or excited any moral dread by their appearance. Napoleon an-

nounced to all his Guard, whom he collected and formed for that final exertion, that the Prussians whom they saw were closely pursued by the French of Grouchy's army. He himself, perhaps, had that persuasion; for the fire of Grouchy's artillery, supposed to be a league and a half, but in reality nearly three leagues distant, was distinctly heard; and some one of Napoleon's suite saw the smoke from the heights above Wavres. « The battle,» he said, « is won; we must force the English position, and throw them upon the defiles.—*Allons! La Garde en avant!*»¹ Accordingly, they then made the attack in the evening, when they were totally repulsed, and chased back upon, and beyond, their own position. Thus, before the Prussians came into serious action, Napoleon had done his utmost, and had not a corps remaining in order, excepting four battalions of the Old Guard. It cannot be therefore said that our allies afforded the British army protection from an enemy that was totally disorganized; but that for which the Prussians do deserve the gratitude of Britain and of

¹ He gave the same explanation when on board of the Northumberland. General Gourgaud had inaccurately stated that the Emperor had mistaken the corps of Bulow for that of Grouchy. Napoleon explained that this was not the case, but that he had opposed a sufficient force to those Prussians whom he saw in the field, and concluded that Grouchy was closing up on their flank and rear.

Europe, is the generous and courageous confidence with which they marched at so many risks to assist in the action, and the activity and zeal with which they completed the victory. It is universally acknowledged, that the British army, exhausted by so long a conflict, could not have availed themselves of the disorder of their enemy at its conclusion; while, on the contrary, nothing could exceed the dexterity and rapidity with which the Prussians conducted the pursuit. The laurels of Waterloo must be divided,—the British won the battle, the Prussians achieved and rendered available the victory.¹

¹ Baron Muffling's account of the British army must interest our readers:—«There is not, perhaps, in all Europe, an army superior to the English in the actual field of battle. That is to say, an army in which military instruction is entirely directed to that point, as its exclusive object. The English soldier is strongly formed and well-fed, and nature has endowed him with much courage and intrepidity. He is accustomed to severe discipline, and is very well armed. The infantry opposes with confidence the attack of cavalry, and shows more indifference than any other European army when attacked in the flank or rear. These qualities explain why the English have never been defeated in a pitched field since they were commanded by the Duke of Wellington.

«On the other hand, there are no troops in Europe less experienced than the English in the light service and in skirmishes; accordingly, they do not practise that service themselves. The English army in Spain formed the standing force round which the Spaniards and Portuguese

rallied. The Duke of Wellington acted wisely in reserving his English troops for regular battles, and in keeping up that idea in his army.

« If, on the one hand, a country is worthy of envy which possesses an army consisting entirely of grenadiers, that army might, on the other hand, experience great disadvantage if forced to combat unassisted against an able general, who understands their peculiarities, and can avoid giving them battle excepting on advantageous ground. However, it is to be supposed that the English will seldom make war on the Continent without allies, and it appears their system is established on that principle. Besides, such an army as the English is most precious for those they may act with, as the most difficult task of the modern art of war is to form an army for pitched battles.» The Baron adds in a note upon the last sentence,—« The people who inhabit other quarters of the world, and are not come to the same state of civilization with us, afford a proof of this. Most of them know better than Europeans how to fight man to man, but can never attain the point of gaining a battle over us. Discipline, in the full extent of the word, is the fruit of moral and religious instruction.»—*Histoire de la Campagne de l'Armée Anglaise, etc. sous les ordres du Duc de Wellington, et de l'Armée Prussienne, sous les ordres du Prince Blucher de Wahlstadt, 1815.* Par. 6. de 10. Stuttgart et Tubingue. 1817.

APPENDIX.

REMARKS ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815.

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BY CAPT. JOHN W. PRINGLE, OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.

THE following observations were hastily made, at a time when much public interest was excited by the various accounts of the Campaign of 1815, edited by several individuals, all claiming the peculiar distinction of having been dictated by Napoleon, or written under his immediate direction. With some slight exceptions, and occasional anecdotes, they nearly correspond, as far as relates to the military details.¹ The 9th volume of the *Memoirs of Napoleon*, published by O'Meara, is perhaps

¹ Liv. ix. *Mémoires Historiques de Napoléon*. London, Sir R. Philips, 1820.—*Montholon, Mémoires de Napoléon*. Colburn, London, 1823.—*Las Cases*, London, 2 vols.—*Gourgaud*, War of 1815. London, 1824.—Many passages in these works will be found quite parallel; for instance, Montholon, vol. ii. p. 272—289, with Liv. ix. p. 43. Grouchy, page 4, designates these works from St Helena, as containing, « des instructions et des ordres supposés; des mouvements imaginaires, » etc.; also, « des assertions erronnées, des hypothèses faites après coup; » see also p. 26. P. 22. He says, with justice, of these authors: « Des individus qui se persuadent que l'aurole de gloire d'un grand homme, en les éclairant un moment, les a transformés en irrécusables autorités, et ne voyant pas qu'un éclat d'emprunt qui ne se réfléchit sur aucun fait d'armes connus, sur aucuns services éminens, ne sert qu'à mieux faire ressortir la présomptueuse impéritie des jugemens qu'ils prononcent.»

the original from which the greatest part of the other productions are derived. It is now generally acknowledged to have been, to a certain extent, composed by Buonaparte.

These works have had one particular object,—the defence of an unfortunate and a great man. The individual, however, is always held up to view; the actions are softened or strengthened to suit this purpose, and in the extension of this design, the reputation of his own officers, and a strict adherence to facts, are occasionally sacrificed. The military features of the campaign have remained unanswered; whilst the wounded honour and fame of his generals have called for some counter-statements, which throw curious light on the whole campaign, and on the machinery of a system which so long alarmed the world. These last are little known in Britain.

Whoever has perused the mass of military works by French officers, most of them ably written, and many artfully composed, must feel how much they tend to encourage a peculiar feeling of national superiority in young minds, in a country where only their own military works are read. In these works they never find a French army beaten in the field, without some plausible reason; or, as Las Cases terms it, '« a concurrence of unheard-of fatalities, »' to account for it. Upon the minds of young soldiers, this has an effect of the most powerful description.

Great care appears to have been taken in these various works, to meet the accusations of military men respecting the disposition and employment of the French army. Where a fault is admitted, the error is at least transferred from Buonaparte to the incapacity or remissness of his generals. The talents and honour of the British commanders are rated at a low state; their success attributed more to chance than to military skill, and the important result of the battle, less to the courage of the British troops, than to the opportune arrival of the Prussians, whom they allege to have saved the British army from de-

¹ Vol. ii. p. 15.

struction. What are now termed liberal ideas, seem to have made it a fashion to assert, and give credence to these accounts; and it is no uncommon occurrence to meet with Englishmen who doubt the glory and success of their countrymen on that eventful day. A wounded spirit of faction has contributed to this feeling, and in the indulgence of its own gratification, and under the mask of patriotism, endeavoured to throw a doubt over the military achievements of our countrymen, eagerly laid hold of any faults or failures, palliating, at the same time, those of their enemies, and often giving that implicit belief to the garbled accounts of the French, which they deny to the simple and manly dispatch of a British general.

There does appear in this a decay of that national feeling, and jealousy of our country's honour, the main spring of all great actions, which other nations, our rivals, cling to with renewed ardour. No man could persuade a Frenchman that it was British valour which has conquered in almost every battle, from Cressy down to Waterloo; and it is impossible to forget that national pride, so honourable to the French name, which could make their unfortunate emigrants even forget for a while their own distresses, in the glory which crowned the arms of the Republicans at that Revolution, which drove them from their homes.

The British works on the campaign, with one exception, are incomplete productions, written by persons unacquainted with military affairs, and hastily composed of rude materials, collected from imperfect sources. ¹

Whoever has endeavoured to analyse the accounts of modern actions, and to separate in them what can be

¹ Batty.

² The best account of the campaign is by an anonymous author, C. de W., published at Stutgard, 1817, and is attributed to Baron Muffling. It does honour to its illustrious author, from its candour and manliness, though he naturally wishes to give more effect to the Prussian attack on the 18th, than was actually the case; that is, he brings them into action, with their whole force, considerably too early in the day.

proved to be facts, from what is affirmed to be so, or to compare the private accounts (too often indiscreetly published,) with the official documents, and the information procured from proper sources, will not be surprised to find in these home-made accounts of this campaign, fulsome praises lavished on individuals and regiments; tales of charges, which one would imagine must have annihilated whole corps, and yet find not more than fifty or sixty men killed and wounded in a whole regiment.¹

Our officers, whatever their corps may be, should be above the idea of vain boasting or exaggeration. It is much that we can claim, during a long period of eight years, the praise of having successfully contended with troops of the first military power in Europe; while our soldiers have disputed the palm of valour; and our officers, with less trumpeted claims than their boasted marshals, have shown as great military skill; and our armies, in the moment of victory, a spirit of humanity and moderation, not frequently evinced by their antagonists.

In the following observations, it is not pretended that any new matter can be given on a subject already so much discussed; still some facts and considerations are treated of, which have not been perhaps fully or fairly appreciated. Many charges of blame have been brought forward against the generals of the allied forces; and superior talent in profiting by their mistakes has been attributed to their opponents, which might well be accounted for, as arising from the situations in which they were relatively placed. In order to judge, for instance, of the credit given to Napoleon, of having surprised their armies in their cantonments, it is necessary to be aware of the

¹ It is well remarked, in liv. ix. p. 150,—« Ces détails en appartient plus à l'histoire de chaque régiment qu'à l'histoire générale de la bataille.»

² Rogniat, p. 147, speaking of charges, says,—« S'ils marchent à la baïonnette, ce n'est qu'un simulacre d'attaque; ils ne la croisent jamais avec celle d'un ennemi qu'ils craignent d'aborder, parcequ'ils se sentent sans defense contre ses coups, et l'un des deux partis prend la fuite avant d'en venir aux mains.»—Such is the case in all charges.

state of both countries (France and Belgium), and the objects, besides the mere watching of the frontiers, to which the attention of the allied commanders was necessarily directed previous to the commencement of the war, and whilst it may be supposed as still in some measure doubtful.

Françe, as is well known, is, on the Belgian frontier, studded with fortresses. Belgium, on the contrary, is now defenceless. The numerous fortresses in the Low Countries, so celebrated in our former wars, had been dismantled in the reign of the Emperor Joseph; and their destruction completed by the French, when they got possession of the country at the battle of Fleurus, 1794, with the exception of Antwerp, Ostend, and Nieuport, which they had kept up on account of their marine importance. These circumstances placed the two parties in very different situations, both for security and for facility of preparing and carrying into execution the measures either for attack or defence.

The French had maintained their own celebrated triple line of fortresses; extending, on that part of the frontier, from Dunkirk to Philippeville, and which had been put into a state of defence during the war in the preceding year¹—these gave every facility for the concentration and formation of troops—for affording a supply of artillery, and every requisite for taking the field, and for concealing their movements—particularly from the French organization of their national guards, which enabled the latter immediately to take the garrison duties, or relieve and occupy the outposts along the frontiers—such was the relative situation of the frontiers at the period of Napoleon's return from Elba.

The necessity of re-establishing the principal fortresses on the Belgian frontier, which commanded the sluices and inundation of the country, had indeed already been evident, and decided upon whilst Napoleon was yet in Elba. A committee of British engineers had been employed in examining the country for that purpose, but

¹ Liv. ix. p. 36.

only the general plans and reports had been prepared, when Buonaparte's sudden return and rapid advance upon Paris, and the probability of a speedy renewal of the war, called for expeditious and immediate means of defence. The declaration of the Congress of Vienna, of the 13th March, reached Paris on the same day he arrived there, which must have convinced him he would not be allowed quietly to repossess his throne.

It may be well supposed, that the general impression in Belgium was, that he would lose no time to endeavour to regain a country which he considered as almost part of France; important to him from the resources it would have afforded, and perhaps still more so, as it would deprive his enemies of so convenient a base of operations, for the preparation of the means for attacking France. The discontent in Belgium, and the Prussian provinces on the Rhine, also amongst the Saxon troops who had served in his army, were known. ¹ The mutinous spirit of these troops appeared to be in concert with the movements of the French forces on the frontiers; so much so, that they were disarmed and sent to the rear. ² In the former, the discontent was particularly favoured by the number of French officers and soldiers, who had been discharged as aliens from the French army, in which they had served nearly since the Revolution, and now gave themselves little care to conceal their real sentiments and attachments. The flight of Louis from Lille, through Flanders, added to this feeling in Belgium—such appeared to be the prevailing spirit. The force the British had to keep it in check, and resist an invasion, amounted only to 6 or 7000 men, under the orders of Sir Thomas Graham, consisting chiefly of second battalions, hastily collected, a great portion of our best troops not having yet returned from America. There were also in Belgium the German Legion, together with 8 to 10,000 men of the new Hanoverian levies. The organization of the Belgian troops had been just commenced, so that the force of the Prince of Orange might amount to about 20,000 men.

¹ Liv. ix. p. 58—61.

² Muffling, p. 5.

The Prussian general, Kleist, who commanded on the Rhine and Meuse, had 30,000 men, afterwards augmented to 50,000, which, however, included the Saxons.¹

These generals had immediately agreed to act in concert; but from what we have mentioned, had Napoleon concentrated 36,000 men at Lille on the 1st April, which he says was possible for him to have done,² and advanced into Belgium, it is certainly probable he might have obtained the most important results; for the Prince of Orange, who had united his troops at Ath, Mons, and Tournay, was not strong enough to have covered Brussels, and must have either fallen back on Antwerp, or formed a junction with the Prussian general, Kleist. The intelligence of Napoleon having landed at Cannes on the 1st March reached Brussels on the 9th. Preparations were, immediately made for the defence of the country. The British troops under General Clinton concentrated, with their allies, near Ath, Mons, and Tournay; and these places, with Ypres, Ghent, and Oudenarde, were ordered to be put in a state of defence consistently with the exigence of the moment. To effect this, every use was made of what remained of the old fortifications. New works were added, and by taking advantage of the great system of defence in that country, which is generally under the level of some canal, or the sea, and consequently capable of being inundated. The sluices which commanded the inundations were covered by strong redoubts.

The inundation of the country near the sea, admits of being made in two ways. The canals or rivers are drains for the fresh water of the country to the sea. The sluice-gates are opened for its egress at low water, and shut to prevent the ingress of the salt water at the return of the tide. It is evident, therefore, that we could have laid the country under water, and so covered their fortresses on two or three sides, which would prevent the necessity of their having large garrisons to defend them.³ But

¹ Ibid. 1—3. ² Montholon, vol. ii. p. 281. Liv. ix. p. 53.

³ The salt-water inundation could be raised at Ghent, so as to place the Great Square five feet under water.

salt-water inundation ruins the soil for several years, and it was determined only to employ it as a last resource; and in the mean time the sluice-gates were merely kept shut to prevent the egress of the fresh-water, which in that wet season soon accumulated; and the fresh-water inundation only destroyed the crops of one season.

About 20,000 labourers, called in by requisitions on the country, were daily employed on the works, in addition to the working parties furnished by the troops. The necessary artillery and stores were supplied from England and Holland. Troops arrived daily, and were immediately moved to the frontiers, where, from the movements that were constantly taking place, it is probable that exaggerated accounts were transmitted to the enemy. By these vigorous and prompt measures, confidence became restored—the panic amongst the people of Belgium was removed—they saw that their country was not to be given up without a severe struggle—It fixed the wavering, and silenced the disaffected. In less than a month, most of the frontier places were safe from a coup-de-main.

The Duke of Wellington had arrived at Brussels from Vienna, early in April, and immediately inspected the frontier and the fortresses; after which, he agreed on a plan of operations with the Prussians, by which they concentrated their troops along the Sambre and Meuse, occupying Charleroi, Namur, and Liège, so as to be in communication with his left. The Prussians had repaired the works round Cologne, which assured their communications with Prussia, and gave them a tête-de-pont on the Rhine. The small fortress of Juliers afforded them the command of the Roer on the same line, and they held Maestricht on the Lower Meuse. It was important to occupy Liège and Namur, though their fortifications had been destroyed. They afforded a facility to act rapidly on either side of the Meuse, and a choice of the strong positions along the banks of that river. The disaffection in the provinces on the Rhine, which had been recently added to Prussia, was considered even greater than in Belgium. The fortress of Luxembourg was the great key which Prussia possessed for their preservation; and her

interest would have led her to make that her dépôt and base of operations, for the invasion of France: but besides being so far distant from Brussels, that armies occupying such distant points could not act in concert, the roads in that part of the country, between the Meuse and the Moselle, were in a state almost impracticable for artillery, and for the general communication of an army. On the other hand, the roads and communications to cross the Rhine at Cologne are good, the town itself could be put in a state of defence, and have become the best and safest line of communication. Reference to the map will elucidate these observations, and show that the cantonments of the Prussians, along the Sambre and Meuse, enabled them to act in concert with our army; to cover their line of communication with Prussia; and to move rapidly into the provinces of the Moselle, in the event of the enemy advancing from Mentz. ¹

The Russians were to have come into the line at Mentz, but they did not reach the Rhine until June, and then only the first corps; so that, for the present, a gap existed from the Prussian left at Dinant, to the Austro-Bavarian right at Manheim.

It was an important object to cover Brussels; and it is to be considered, that this city forms, as it were, a centre to a large portion of the French frontier, extending about seventy miles from the Lys to the Meuse, viz. from Meuin to Philippeville or Givet; that it is about fifty miles distant from these extreme points; and that it was necessary to guard the entry from France by Tournay, Mous, and Charleroi; and also to prevent Ghent, a very important place, from being attacked from Lille. The protection of all these distant points, with the difficulty of subsisting troops, particularly cavalry and artillery, are sufficient causes to explain why the armies were not more united in their cantonments. ² Buonaparte appears to have at-

¹ Such, however, could only be a desultory attack, for the *Chaussée* by Charleroi and Givet was the nearest entry from France on this side. The country from this to Mentz was then nearly impracticable for large armies. Good roads have since been made through it.

² Buonaparte blames the allied generals for not having formed a

tached much importance to the occupation of Brussels, as appears by the bulletins, found ready printed in his baggage, which was captured. It was therefore of much importance in every point of view, to prevent even a temporary occupation of this city, and this could only be done by risking an action in front of it. The Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blucher had also separate views in preserving their lines of operation, — the one by Cologne, with Prussia; the other with England, by Brussels, which neither were disposed willingly to abandon. This probably may have been the cause why Quatre-Bras and Ligny were chosen as positions covering both.

It is evident, that an army placed in cantonments, so as to meet all these objects, could only be concentrated in a position covering the city, by the troops in advance being able to keep the enemy in check, so as to afford time for that concentration, which was certainly accomplished. The positions on the different roads of approach from the French frontier had been attentively reconnoitred; that of Mont St Jean, or Waterloo, very particularly; and no precaution appears to have been omitted, by which an offensive movement of the enemy was to be encountered.

Some movements were observed on the French frontier, between Lille and Bergher, as if preparing for offensive operations, about the end of March, at which period the troops, cantoned near Menin, had orders, after making due resistance, and destroying the bridge on the Lys,

camp in front of Brussels, as he alleges might have been done in the beginning of May. The wet season, and difficulty of subsisting so large a body of troops, is some reason against it. Besides which, Buonaparte might have made demonstrations in front, and sent 20,000 men from his garrisons to ravage Ghent and the country beyond the Scheldt, and cut off our communications with Ostend. In 1814, when the Prussians were concentrated near Brussels, this had been done with effect from Lille. Though little advantage might have resulted to the enemy from such a measure, much blame would have been attached for not taking precautions against it. To cover Brussels, the capital of the country, was certainly of great importance; and had that been the only object, a camp in its front would have certainly been the best means of effecting it.

to fall back on Courtrai, their point of assembling: and then, after such a resistance as would not compromise their safety in retreat, to endeavour to ascertain the object of the enemy's movements, and give time for the troops to assemble. They were to retire on Oudenarde and Ghent, opening the sluices, and extending the inundation. About the beginning of May similar movements were also observed, but less was then to be apprehended since, by the advanced state of the works at Tournay, the tête-de-pont at Oudenarde and Ghent, we then commanded the Scheldt, and could have assumed the offensive.

Great credit is undoubtedly due to Napoleon, for the mode in which he concealed his movements, and the rapidity with which he concentrated his army. The forced marches he was obliged to make appear, however, to have paralysed his subsequent movements, from the fatigue his troops underwent. The numerous French fortresses favoured his plans in a very great degree, by affording him the means of employing the garrison and national guards to occupy the advanced posts along the frontier,¹ and opportunity afterwards to make demonstrations across the frontiers near Lille, whilst he assembled his army on the Sambre. They were also somewhat favoured by the circumstance, that hostilities were not actually commenced, which prevented our advanced posts (even if they suspected a change in the troops opposed to them) from obliging the enemy to show himself, or, by bringing on a skirmish, to obtain from prisoners intelligence of their movements. He had another advantage of powerful consequence. The army he commanded were mostly old soldiers of the same nation, under a single chief. The allied armies were composed of different nations, a great portion young levies, and under two generals, each of such reputation, as not likely to yield great deference to the other.²

On the night of the 14th June, the French army bivouacked in three divisions, as near the frontier as pos-

¹ Liv. ix. pp. 68—85. Montholon, vol. ii. p. 132.

² Buonaparte himself has remarked,—« L'unité de commandement est la chose la plus importante dans la guerre.»

sible, without being observed by the Prussians; the left at Hau-sur-heure, the centre at Beaumont, where the head quarters were established, and the right at Philippeville.¹

At three o'clock, A. M. on the 15th June, the French army crossed the frontier in three columns, directed on Marchiennes, Charleroi, and Châtelet. The Prussian outposts were quickly driven in; they, however, maintained their ground obstinately at three points, until eleven o'clock, when general Ziethen took up a position at Gilly and Gosselies, in order to check the advance of the enemy, and then retired slowly on Fleurus, agreeably to the orders of Marshal Blucher, to allow time for the concentration of his army.² The bridge at Charleroi, not having been completely destroyed, was quickly repaired by the enemy. Upon Ziethen's abandoning the Chaussée, which leads to Brussels through Quatre-Bras, Marshal Ney, who commanded the left of the French army, was ordered to advance by this road upon Gosselies, and found at Frasnes part of the Duke of Wellington's army, composed of Nassau troops, under the command of Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar, who, after some skirmishing, maintained his position.³ The French army was formed on the night of the 15th, in three columns, the left at Gosselies, the centre near Gilly, and the right at Châtelet. Two corps of the Prussian army occupied the position at Sombref on the same night, where they were joined by the 1st corps,

¹ Buonaparte, liv. ix. p. 69, rates his force at 122,400 men, and 350 guns.—Muffling, p. 17, at 130,000. Other accounts make it smaller, and Batty 127,400, with 350 guns.

² Grouchy, 59, speaks of the rapidity with which Blucher assembled his army. It is also adverted to by several French military writers.

³ Ney might probably have driven back these troops, and occupied the important position at Quatre-Bras; but hearing a heavy cannonade on his right flank, where Ziethen had taken up his position, he thought it necessary to halt, and detach a division in the direction of Fleurus: This brings forward a remarkable case, as he was severely censured by Napoleon, for not having literally followed his orders, and pushed on to Quatre-Bras. This was done in the presence of Marshal Grouchy,—(see Grouchy's Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815, par Général Gourgaud, published at Philadelphia 1818), who gives it as a reason (pp. 32, 33, 61), for acting in the manner he did on the 18th and not moving to his left to support Napoleon at Waterloo.

and occupied St Amand, Bry, and Ligny; so that, notwithstanding all the exertions of the French, at a moment where time was of such importance, they had only been able to advance about fifteen English miles during the day, with nearly fifteen hours of day-light. The corps of Ziethen had suffered considerably, but he had effected his orders; so that Marshal Blucher was enabled to assemble three corps of his army, 80,000 men, in position early on the 15th, and his 4th corps was on its march to join him that evening.

The Duke of Wellington seems to have expected an attack by the Mons Chaussée,¹ and, on his first receiving information of the enemy's movements, merely ordered his troops to hold themselves in readiness; this was on the evening of the 15th of June, at six o'clock. Having obtained farther intelligence about eleven o'clock, which confirmed the real attack of the enemy to be along the Sambre, orders were immediately given for the troops to march upon Quatre-Bras; a false movement of the English general to his right, at that period, could not have been easily remedied in time to have fought in front of Brussels, and to have effected his junction with the Prussians; and in such a case, as Marshal Blucher only fought at Ligny, on the expectation of being supported by the Duke of Wellington, it is probable that that action would not have taken place. He had, however, a safe retreat on Bulow's corps and Maestricht, as had the Duke of Wellington on Ghent and Antwerp, or else the plan afterwards adopted of concentrating at Waterloo and Wavres could not have been easily executed. It is, indeed, a matter of surprise, that Buonaparte did not make a more important demonstration on the side of Lille and Mons. The duke, in deciding on these movements, was under the necessity of acting on the intelligence given by spies or deserters, which can only be so far depended on, as it is confirmed by reports from the

¹ Rogiat, p. 311, says that a great portion of the French army only reached Charleroi late on the 15th, and Fleurus at 11 A. M. on the 16th.—See Grouchy, p. 36.

² Official Dispatch.—Muffling, pp. 8, 10, 18.

outposts, who may be themselves deceived.¹ What was true at their departure, may be entirely changed at their arrival with the information; and whatever may have been the case formerly, few or no instances occur at present of a person in the confidence of the cabinet, particularly of a military officer, betraying the confidence placed in him.

The Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre-Bras on the 16th, at an early hour, and immediately proceeded to Bry, to concert measures with Marshal Blucher, for arranging the most efficient plan of support. It appeared at that time, that the whole French attack would be directed against the Prussians, as considerable masses of the enemy were in movement in their front. Blucher was at this time at the wind mill of Bry, about five English miles from Quatre-Bras.² The duke proposed to advance upon Frasnes and Gosselies, which would have been a decided movement, as acting on the French communications, and immediately in rear of their left flank; but as the troops could not be ready to advance from Quatre-Bras before four o'clock, the attack must have been too late, and in the mean time the Prussians would have to sustain the attack of nearly the whole French army. Marshal Blucher, therefore, judged it more desirable, that the duke should form a junction with the Prussian right, by marching direct by the Chaussée from Quatre-Bras to Bry.³

The object of the enemy on the 16th, as may be seen by the general orders of Napoleon, communicated by Soult to Ney and Grouchy, was to turn the Prussian right, by driving the British from Quatre-Bras, and then to march down the Chaussée upon Bry, and thus separate

¹ Muffling, p. 17. Yet a story is told of Fouché, who is said to have sent intelligence of Buonaparte's movements to Lord Wellington. The courier was attacked and waylaid, as supposed by Fouché's contrivance, so that he had an excuse ready for both parties.

² Muffling, p. 10.

³ Muffling, p. 64, allows that the position at Ligny was too much extended to the left, but the object of this was to have a line of communication with the Meuse and Cologne; a fault alluded to as arising from having two armies, and two chiefs with different objects in view.

the two armies.¹ For this purpose Ney was detached with 43,000 men.² On reference to the above orders, it appears that not much resistance was expected in getting possession both of Sombref and Quatre-Bras.³ Ney has been accused of delaying to attack, but reference to those orders will show, that Ney had not been commanded to attack⁴ until 2 o'clock, p. m., in consequence of the allies having assembled in force at Quatre-Bras. The plan was excellent, and if Ney had been successful, would have led to important results. After obtaining possession of Quatre-Bras, he was to have detached part of his forces to attack the Prussian right flank in rear of St Amand, whilst Buonaparte was making the chief attack on that village, the strongest in the position, and at the same time keeping the whole Prussian line engaged. Half of Ney's force was left in reserve near Frasnès, to be in readiness either to support the attacks on Quatre-Bras or St Amand, and in the event of both succeeding, to turn the Prussian right by marching direct on Wagnele or Bry.⁵

The village of St Amand was well defended; it formed the strength of the Prussian right, and, from the intersection of several gardens and hedges, was very capable of defence; although so much in advance of the rest of the Prussian position. The face of the country in front of this position possesses no remarkable features; the slopes towards the stream are gentle, and of easy access. After a continued attack for two hours, the enemy had only obtained possession of half the village of St Amand, and a severe attack was made upon Ligny, which was taken

¹ See orders in the Appendix to Batty, ix to xiii. Page 150 to 153.

² Liv. ix. p. 103, Official Papers.

³ See Grouchy, p. 47. Gourgaud, Liv. ix. p. 102.

⁴ It is hardly to be supposed that an officer of Ney's bold and enterprising character, with so much at stake, would have hesitated to attack at Quatre-Bras, if he had had his troops in readiness, but it appears that he could not have had time to move to that point at the early hour stated by Buonaparte. Ney had, also, too much experience of the nature of the troops he was opposed to, to act rashly.

⁵ The French did not attack until 3 p. m., the different corps not being arrived to make the necessary arrangements at an earlier hour.—Grouchy, p. 36. Rogiat, p. 341.

and retaken several times.¹ At this time Buonaparte sent for the corps of reserve left by Ney at Frasnes; before, however, it reached St Amand, in consequence of the check they had sustained at Quatre-Bras, it was counter-marched, and from this circumstance became of little use either to Buonaparte or Ney. Buonaparte having observed the masses of troops which Blucher had brought up behind St Amand (and probably in consequence of the corps above mentioned being necessary at Quatre-Bras²,) appears to have changed the disposition of his reserves, who were marching upon St Amand, and moved them towards the right, to attack the Prussian centre at Ligny, which they succeeded in forcing, and so obtained possession of that village.³ A large body of French cavalry, and another of infantry, then pushed forward to the height between Bry and Sombref, immediately in the rear of Ligny, and quite in the heart of the Prussian position, where they were attacked by Blucher at the head of his cavalry; this attempt to re-establish the action failed, and the Prussian cavalry were driven back upon the infantry.⁴ It was now nine o'clock, about dark, which prevented the French from advancing farther, and they contented themselves with the occupation of Ligny. The Prussians did not evacuate Bry before three o'clock A. M. on the 17th.⁵ In the course of the night, the Prus-

¹ Ney's letter to the Duc d'Otranto. Paris, 1815.—Muffling, p. 14.

² Muffling, p. 15—64.—Blucher had employed his reserves to support his right at St Amand, and was not prepared for this change of attack. Muffling, however, considers, that, instead of his cavalry, had he moved his infantry from St Amand to retake Ligny, he would have succeeded and gained the action.

³ Grouchy, p. 10, shows how little decisive the battle was. « La bataille de Ligny n'a fini que vers neuf heures du soir; seulement alors la retraite des Prussiens a été présumée.»

⁴ Here it was that Blucher was so nearly falling into the hands of the French cavalry.

⁵ Grouchy, p. 11, says, that, even on the 17th, it was supposed the Prussians had retired upon Namur, so feebly were they followed; the light cavalry of General Pajot pursued them in this direction on the 17th, captured a few guns, which, with some stragglers, as are found in all armies, was his whole success.

sians fell back on Tilly and Gembloux. The loss of the Prussians, according to their own account, amounted to 14,000 men, and fifteen pieces of artillery. The French official account in the *Moniteur*, to 15,000,¹ The French acknowledge to have lost 7000. It is evident that Buonaparte, in changing the point of attack from the Prussian right at St Amand, to the centre at Ligny, in a manner forced the Prussians, if defeated, to retreat upon the British army, and give up their own line of operations; but still, at that hour in the evening, when the situation of the armies is considered, the change of attack appears to be the only hope he had of obtaining even a partial success; under such circumstances it was perhaps the best course he could pursue.²

It is not easy to conceive that a defeat, in any case, would have been such as to prevent their junction, since each army had such considerable reinforcements moving up, and close upon them; but even in an extreme case, they could each have retired on their fortresses, and formed entrenched camps of perfect security, with every means of repairing the losses they sustained.³

¹ The St Helena productions raise the amount to 20,000 men, 40 guns, standards, etc. See Grouchy on that subject, in answer to Gourgaud, pp. 48, 49.—Montholon says they lost 60,000.—Liv. x. 148, says that the Prussian army was reduced to 40,000 men by the loss they had sustained; 30,000 men killed and wounded, and 20,000 men, who had disbanded, and ravaged the banks of the Meuse, and by the detachments sent to cover their retreat, and that of the baggage, in the direction of Namur.

² The intention of the allied marshals to remain together, whatever might be the issue, is known. Lord Wellington had ordered the inundations of Antwerp to be effected to their utmost extent. The fortresses were to have been abandoned to their own strength, and had the events of the 16th been such as to necessitate a retreat, and give up Brussels, Maestricht is probably the point on which both armies would have retired.

³ Had earlier or more positive information of the enemy's plans been received by Lord Wellington, and the troops put in movement on the evening of the 15th, the combinations of the two allied chiefs would have been perfect. Nothing more is necessary to show how well their plans had been laid, but which were not carried into full effect, by one of those accidental occurrences which no human foresight can prevent.

The force of the enemy, at the time the Duke of Wellington left Quatre-Bras to communicate with Blucher, appeared to be so weak, that no serious attack was at that time to be apprehended; but on his return to that position, about three o'clock, he found they had assembled a large force at Frasnes, and were preparing for an attack, which was made about half past three o'clock by two columns of infantry, and nearly all their cavalry, supported by a heavy fire of artillery. The force at that time under his orders was 17,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, of which about 4500 were British infantry, the rest Hanoverians, and Belgians, and Nassau troops. ¹ They at first obtained some success, driving back the Belgian and Brunswick cavalry; their cavalry penetrated amongst our infantry before they had quite time to form squares, and forced a part to retire into the adjoining wood; they were, however, repulsed. At this period of the action, the third British division, under General Alten, arrived about four o'clock, soon after the action had commenced. They consisted of about 6300 men, and were composed of British, King's German Legion, and Hanoverians. They had some difficulty in maintaining their ground, and one regiment lost a colour. ² They succeeded, however, in repelling the enemy from the advanced points he had gained at the farm of Gemincourt and village of Pierremont.

Ney still, however, occupied part of the wood of Bossus, which extends from Quatre-Bras, on the right of the road

¹ Liv. ix. p. 103. Buonaparte says, that Ney attacked with 16,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 44 guns, leaving 16,000 infantry, 4500 cavalry, and 64 guns, in reserve at Frasnes.

² This belonged to the 69th regiment, not to the 42d, as Liv. ix. states, p. 104, and was almost the only one captured during the whole war. It may here be remarked, that if the French had carried one quarter the number of eagles with their regiments that we have of colours, a much larger proportion would now be found at Whitehall. A weak battalion of English infantry always carries two large colours, very heavy and inconvenient, whilst a French eagle, about the size of a blackbird, was only given to a regiment composed of several battalions, which was easily secured in case of defeat.

towards Frasnes, to the distance of about a mile. This favoured an attack on the right of our position, which he accordingly made, after having been repulsed on the left. At this moment the division of General Cooke (Guards), 4000 strong, arrived from Enghien, and materially assisted to repel this attack, which, after considerable exertions, was done, and the enemy driven back upon Frasnes, in much confusion. This affair was severely contested, and though the enemy were repulsed, the loss on each side was nearly equal, owing to the superiority of the French in artillery. The loss, however, inflicted on the French by the fire of musketry, which their attacking columns were exposed to, was very considerable, and counterbalanced the advantage they derived from their artillery. It required great exertions to maintain the important post of Quatre-Bras, in the present relative situations of the two armies. It is certain that, if Ney had advanced as rapidly as Buonaparte says he might have done, he would have obtained his object. Ney, however, in his letter, contradicts the possibility of his having done so, which seems to be confirmed by Soult's letter to him, dated at 2 o'clock P.M. where he tells him that Grouchy is to attack Bry with the 3d and 4th corps, at half past 2 P.M.;¹ that he is to attack the corps in his front, and afterwards to assist Grouchy; but that if he (Ney) defeats the troops in his front first, Grouchy would be ordered to assist his operations. It is most probable that the corps left at Frasnes, which Ney complains was taken away without his knowledge, was destined to assist either attack as might be found necessary.

Even had Ney got possession of Quatre-Bras at an early hour, he would scarcely have been able to detach any sufficient force against the Prussians, seeing, as he must have done, or at least ought to have calculated, that the British forces were arriving rapidly on the point which we suppose him to have occupied. The British could have still retreated on Waterloo, and been concentrated on the 17th at that position; and there was nothing to prevent the Prussians retreating on Wavres, as they afterwards did.

¹ See Official Papers in the Appendix to Batty.

Though Buonaparte says, ' that on the 15th every thing had succeeded as he wished, and that the Duke of Wellington had manœuvred as he would have wished him to do ; yet one corps of the Prussian army had so far kept him in check, that he was not able to reach Fleurus ; and on the 16th, could not commence the attack until three hours after mid-day. He did not gain possession of Quatre-Bras until the forenoon of the 17th. He had sustained a severe check with one part of his army, and gained an indecisive action with the other ; the loss of the allies not exceeding his own, whilst they had the advantage of retiring leisurely on their resources and reinforcements, and by the retreat, gave up no place or position now of consequence to the pursuing enemy. The result of the operations of the 16th produced no important consequences to the French. The celebrated engineer, General Rogniat, does not hesitate to term it an indecisive action. The success of the British in repelling the attack of Quatre-Bras, tended to make them meet the renewed attack at Waterloo with more confidence, and probably had a contrary effect on the enemy ; whilst the manner in which the Prussian corps of Thielmann received the attack of Grouchy on the 18th, who had superior forces, showed how little the confidence of the Prussians had been shaken by the action at Ligny. It may be observed, that the forces engaged at Ligny were nearly equal, even deducting d'Erlon's corps, which was left at Frasnes, as not engaged. The French passed the frontiers with about 125,000 men—Blucher had 80,000—and at the close of the day Lord Wellington had 30,000.² The commanders of the allied armies ap-

¹ Liv. ix, p. 209.

² Liv. ix. p. 60. Buonaparte remarks that the numbers of the allied army must not be rated at their numerical force. « Parceque l'armée des alliés était composée de troupes plus ou moins bonnes. Un Anglais pourrait être compté pour un Français ; et deux Hollandais, Prussiens, ou hommes de la confédération, pour un Français. Les armées ennemies étaient cantonnées sous le commandement de deux généraux différens, et formées de deux nations divisées d'intérêts et de sentimens. » His army, on the contrary, was under one chief, the idol of his soldiers, who were of the best description—veterans who had fought in the

pear not to have overrated what was to be expected from their troops, which was not exactly the case with their opponents.

The outline of the operations, and the strategy on the part of Napoleon to separate the two armies, was no doubt finely conceived, and, as we have seen, was nearly successful; yet it is presumed, that, had it been so, even to the extent Buonaparte could hope or expect, the allies had still a safe retreat, and sufficient resources. On all sides, it was a calculation of hours. It is hardly possible to know the point an enterprising enemy means to attack, especially on so extended a line; and here the assailant has the advantage. Fault has been found with the Duke of Wellington for having no artillery and very few cavalry upon the 16th. No portion of either were with the reserve at Brussels, which is remarkable, particularly as regards the artillery. ¹

The spirited manner in which the allied Marshals adhered to their plans of defence previously agreed on, and extricated themselves from the difficulties which they found themselves placed in, by the sudden and vigorous attack they had to sustain, and which their distinct commands tended rather to increase, must command admiration; and since war is only a great game, where the movements are influenced by many events which occur during their execution and progress—events which human calculation cannot foresee—it becomes easy to criticise when the operations are passed, when all the data on which they rested, or might have rested, are known; but to form a good plan of attack, or a campaign—to act with decision and firmness, and with a “*coup d’œil*,” so as immediately to profit by the changes which incessantly take place, can be said of very few men of the many who have ever arrived at the command of an army.

brilliant campaign of 1813-14, and draughts from the numerous garrisons who had since entered France from Antwerp, Hamburgh, Magdeburg, Dantzic, Mentz, Alexandria, Mantua, etc., with the numerous prisoners from England. Liv. ix. p. 201.

¹ Three brigades of iron eighteen-pounders were preparing at Brussels, but not in a state of forwardness to be sent to Waterloo.

On the morning of the 17th, the British troops remained in possession of Quatre-Bras, where the rest of the army had joined the Duke of Wellington, who was prepared to maintain that position against the French army, had the Prussians remained in the position of Ligny, so as to give him support.

Marshal Blucher had sent an aide-de-camp to inform the duke of his retreat, who was unfortunately killed; and it was not until seven o'clock on the 17th, that Lord Wellington learned the direction which the Prussians had taken. A patrol, sent at day-light to communicate with the Prussians, advanced beyond Bry and Sombref, which confirmed how little of the Prussian position had been occupied by the French. The Prussians had fallen back very leisurely on Wavres, their rear-guard occupying Bry, which they did not evacuate before three o'clock on the morning of the 17th. Buonaparte, in deceiving the French people, by the accounts he gave of the defeat of the Prussians at Ligny, seems almost to have deceived himself. He must have known that the action was not a decisive one—that the enemy had retired in excellent order—that he had not been able to pursue them—and that his own loss must have considerably weakened his army, whilst the Prussians were falling back upon their reinforcements—and, above all, that Marshal Blucher commanded them. The Prussian army was concentrated at Wavres at an early hour, and communication took place between the Duke of Wellington and Blucher, by which a junction of the army was arranged for the succeeding day at Waterloo.¹ The retrograde movement of the Prussians rendered a corresponding one necessary on the part of the British, which was performed in the most leisurely manner, the duke allowing the men time to finish their cooking. About ten o'clock, the whole army retired, in three columns, by Genappe and Nivelles, towards a position at Waterloo—a rear-guard was left to occupy the ground, so as to conceal the movement from the enemy, who, about mid-day, de-

¹ Muffling, p. 20, says, "that Blucher only asked for time to distribute food and cartridges to his men."

ployed their troops in columns of attack, as if expecting to find the English army in position there. They immediately followed up the retreat with cavalry and light-artillery. An affair of cavalry occurred at Genappe, where the 7th bussars attacked a French regiment of lancers without success; upon which the heavy cavalry were brought up by the Marquis of Anglesea, who checked the enemy's advance by a vigorous and decisive charge.

As the troops arrived in position in front of Mont Saint Jean, they took up the ground they were to maintain, which was effected early in the evening. The weather began to be very severe at this period. The whole French army, under Buonaparte, with the exception of two corps under Grouchy (32,000 men, and 108 guns), took up a position immediately in front; and, after some cannonading, both armies remained opposite to each other during the night, the rain falling in torrents. The duke had already communicated with Marshal Blucher, who promised to come to his support with the whole of his army, on the morning of the 18th. It was consequently decided upon to cover Brussels (the preservation of which was of such importance, in every point of view, to the King of the Netherlands), by maintaining the position of Mont St Jean. The intention of the allied chiefs, if they were not attacked on the 18th, was to have attacked the enemy on the 19th.

Since we are now arrived at the position of Mont St Jean, it may be necessary to offer a few remarks as regards the position itself, which has been considered as a bad one by some writers, and some loose allusions to its defects thrown out; but more particularly fixing upon its not affording a secure retreat, in the event of the enemy's attack having proved successful. Previous, however, to entering into any disquisition as to the merits of the position of Mont St Jean, it may be well to consider a few of the conditions that are judged essential in a greater or less degree, for every position taken up by an army. The first requisite is, that the ground in front, within cannon-shot, should be well seen; and every point of approach

1 Montholon, vii. p. 134. Liv. ix. pp. 123-207. Gourgaud, p. 131.

with musket-shot, well discovered.—2d, That the ground which is occupied should admit of a free communication for troops and guns, from right to left, and from front to rear, in order to move supports wherever they may be wanted; also that, by the sinuosities of the ground, or other cover, such movements may be made unseen by the enemy.—3d, That your flanks rest on some support, secure from being turned—And, lastly, that your retreat be insured, in the event of your position being forced or turned.

The site of the position of Mont St Jean, and the features of the ground round it, have been so often and well described, that we may conclude it to be familiar to most people; and hence the possession of these necessary conditions will be already evident. The easy slope from our front into the valley, from whence it rises in an ascent equally gentle and regular, to the opposite heights, on which the enemy were posted at the distance of about a mile, or a mile and a half, gave it, in an eminent degree, the condition stated in the first remark. The two chaussées, running nearly perpendicular to our line,—the valley immediately in rear of our first line, and parallel to it, with two country roads passing in the same direction; also the openness of the country,—gave the position the requisites mentioned in the second. The same valley afforded cover for the support of the first line; also for its artillery, and spare ammunition-waggons; whilst the second line and reserves, placed on and behind the next ridge, and about 500 or 600 yards in rear of the first, were unseen from the enemy's position, although certainly so far exposed, that many of his shot and shells, which passed over the first line, ricoched into the second, and amongst the reserves. The fourth requisite, as far as regards the security of the flanks, was completely obtained, by the occupation of the village of Braine la Leude on its right, which would have been entrenched, but for an accidental misunderstanding of orders; and La Haye and Ohain on the left; also by both flanks being thrown back on the forest of Soignies.

That our retreat, in case of a reverse, was sufficiently provided for, we trust, notwithstanding the criticism

above noticed, to establish in a satisfactory manner. Our position was sufficiently in advance of the entrance of the chaussée into the forest, to give a free approach from every part of the field to that point; which the uninclosed state of the country afforded the troops every means of profiting by. Had our first position been forced, the village of Mont St Jean, at the junction of the two chaussées, afforded an excellent centre of support for a second, which the enemy would have had equal difficulty in carrying;—besides which there is another farmhouse and wood immediately behind Mont St Jean, and in front of the entrance of the forest; which would have enabled us to keep open that entrance. By occupying these points, we might have at any time effected a retreat; and with sufficient leisure to have allowed all the guns, that were in a state to be moved, to file off into the forest. Undoubtedly, had our centre been broken by the last attack of the enemy, † a considerable part of our artillery must have been left behind, a number of guns disabled, and many men and horses killed and wounded; these must have fallen into the enemy's hands; also the brigades at the points attacked, which were placed rather in front of the infantry, and remained until the last, firing grape-shot into the enemy's columns. The men and horses would have saved themselves with the infantry, and soon found a fresh equipment in the fortresses. The troops at Hougomont would have been cut off had that attack succeeded, but their retreat was open, either upon the corps of 16,000 men left at Halle to cover Brussels, or upon Braine la Leude, which was occupied by a brigade of infantry, who had strengthened their post; between which and our right flank a brigade of cavalry kept a communication open. From Braine la Leude there is a very good road through the forest by Alembert to Brussels, by which the troops and artillery of our right flank could have effected their retreat. If we now suppose, that the enemy, instead of our right centre, had broken our left centre by the great attack he made on it

† About half past seven.

at three o'clock, Ohain afforded nearly the same advantage to the left of our army, that Braine la Leude would have done on the right. A road leads from it through the forest to Brussels; or that wing might have retired on the Prussians at Wavres; so that, had either of these two grand attacks succeeded, the retreat into the defiles of the forest need not have been precipitated. It is no fault of our troops to take alarm and lose confidence, because they find themselves turned or partially beaten. Of this many instances might be given. The best proof, however, is, that the enemy can scarcely claim having made a few hundred prisoners during the whole of the last war. No success on the part of the enemy, which they had a right to calculate on, could have then precipitated us into the forest in total disorder. The attacks we sustained to the last on the 18th were as determined and severe as can be conceived. Still, to the last, a part of the reserve and the cavalry had not suffered much; whereas the French cavalry (heavy) had all been engaged before five o'clock, and were not in a state, from the severe losses they had sustained, to take advantage of a victory.'

But suppose we had been driven into the wood in a state of *déroute*, similar to what the French were, the forest did not keep us hermetically sealed up, as an impenetrable marsh did the defeated troops at Austerlitz. The remains of our shattered battalions would have gained the forest, and found themselves in security. It consists of tall trees without underwood, passable almost anywhere for men and horses. The troops could, therefore, have gained the *chaussée* through it, and when we

¹ See Liv. ix. p. 196. «Ainsi à cinq heures après midi, l'armée se trouva sans avoir une réserve de cavalerie. Si, à huit heures et demi, cette réserve eut existé,» etc., etc.

It is singular how great soldiers, in reporting military actions, will contradict each other. Napoleon ascribes the loss of the battle in great measure to his cavalry being so soon and generally engaged, that he had not a reserve left to protect his retreat. General Foy, on the contrary, affirms, that it was not the French, but the British cavalry, which was annihilated at Waterloo.—*Guerre de la Péninsule*, p. 116, *Note*.

at last came to confine ourselves to the defence of the entrance to the forest, every person, the least experienced in war, knows the extreme difficulty in forcing infantry from a wood which cannot be turned. A few regiments, with or without artillery, would have kept the whole French army in check, even if they had been as fresh as the day they crossed the frontiers. ' Indeed, the forest in our rear gave us so evident an advantage, that it is difficult to believe that an observation to the contrary was made by Napoleon. Could he quite forget his own retreat? It little availed him to have two fine chaussées, and an open country in his rear; his matériel was all abandoned, and not even a single battalion kept together.

The two farms in front of the position of M^{ont} St Jean gave it its principal strength. That of Hougomont, with its gardens and inclosures, could contain a force sufficient to make it a most important post. La Haye Sainte was too small for that purpose; otherwise its situation in the Genappe Chaussée, in the centre of the position, rendered it better adapted for that purpose. These farms lay on the slope of the valley, about 1500 yards apart, in front of our line; so that no column of the enemy could pass between them, without being exposed to a flank fire. Indeed, without these posts, the ground gave us little advantage over our enemy, except the loss he must be necessarily exposed to in advancing in column upon a line already fixed.

From these observations it will appear that our retreat was well secured, and that the advantages of the position for a field of battle were very considerable; so that there was little risk but that it would have been successfully defended, even if the Prussians had by « some fatality » been prevented from forming a junction. The difficulties of the roads, from the severe rains, detained them

¹ On the 16th, at Quatre-Bras, the 33d regiment (British), and afterwards two battalions of the Guards, when obliged to give way to an attack of the enemy, and pursued by the French cavalry, saved themselves in the wood of Bossus, formed along the skirts of it, and repelled the enemy, with severe loss.

from joining us at least double the time that was calculated upon. We had therefore to sustain the attack of a superior army so much longer; yet they were not able to make any impression. Every attack had been most successfully repulsed; and we may safely infer that, even if the Prussians had not joined in time, we would still have been able to maintain our position, and repulse the enemy, but might have been perhaps unable, as was the case at Talavera, to profit by this advantage, or to follow up our success. ¹

The morning of the 18th, and part of the forenoon, were passed by the enemy in a state of supineness, for which it was difficult to account. The rain had certainly retarded his movements, more particularly that of bringing his artillery into position; yet it was observed, that this had been accomplished at an early hour. In Grouchy's publication, we find a reason which may have caused this delay; namely, that Napolcon's ammunition had been so much exhausted in the preceding actions, that there was only a sufficiency with the army for an action of eight hours. Buonaparte states ² that it was necessary to wait until the ground was sufficiently dried, to enable the cavalry and artillery to manœuvre; ³ however, in such a soil, a few hours could make very little difference, particularly as a drizzling rain continued all the morning, and indeed after the action had commenced. The heavy fall of rain on the night of the 17th to 18th, was no doubt more disadvantageous to the enemy than to the troops under Lord Wellington; the latter were in position, and

¹ The armies were now placed under their favourite commanders, as the military of both nations had long wished; and on an arena which may be considered as fair a one as could well have offered in the chances of war. The British troops, however, were not composed of our best regiments, at least our infantry, nor equal to that army which had been in the preceding year in the south of France. Many of the most efficient regiments had been sent to America; first a brigade from Bordeaux to Washington; another to Canada; and afterwards a force from Portsmouth to New Orleans. None of these returned in time for Waterloo, though they were on *their way*.—Liv. ix. p. 208. It has been shown how the French army was composed.

² Liv. ix.

³ Montholon, b. ii. p. 136.

had few movements to make; whilst the enemy's columns, and particularly his cavalry, were much fatigued and impeded by the state of the ground, which, with the trampled corn, caused them to advance more slowly, and kept them longer under fire. On the other hand, the same causes delayed the Prussians in their junction, which they had promised to effect at eleven o'clock; and obliged Lord Wellington to maintain the position alone, nearly eight hours longer than had been calculated upon.

About twelve o'clock, the enemy commenced the action by an attack upon Hougoumont, with several columns, preceded by numerous light troops, who, after severe skirmishing, drove the Nassau troops from the wood in its front, and established themselves in it. This attack was supported by the constant fire of a numerous artillery. A battalion of the Guards occupied the house and gardens, with the other inclosures, which afforded great facilities for defence; and after a severe contest, and immense loss, the enemy were repulsed, and a great part of the wood regained.¹

During the early part of the day, the action was almost entirely confined to this part of the line, except a galling fire of artillery along the centre, which was vigorously returned by our guns. This fire gradually extended towards the left, and some demonstrations of an attack of cavalry were made by the enemy. As the troops were

¹ Buonaparte, liv. ix. 142, says, that he saw with pleasure that the English Guards were placed on our right, as they were our best troops, which rendered his premeditated attack on our left more easy. Our Guards are not, as is the case in other armies, the élite of our army; they are not selected, as in other services, from the best soldiers in other regiments, but are recruited exactly as troops of the line, except that they are required to be somewhat taller. It may be here remarked, the great superiority in appearance, that the French and other troops possessed over ours at the close of the war. The mode of recruiting accounts for this. Even our militia were much superior in this point of view to the troops of the line, and most of the best men were obtained from them. Our recruits were in general composed of the population of large cities, or of manufacturing towns, certainly not the best specimens of our population; the military service is not in any estimation amongst our peasantry, whilst the French army was composed of the picked men of thirty millions, and other nations in proportion.

drawn up on the slope of the hill, they suffered most severely from the enemy's artillery. In order to remedy this, Lord Wellington moved them back about 150 or 200 yards, to the reverse slope of the hill, to shelter them from the direct fire of the guns; our artillery in consequence remained in advance, that they might see into the valley. This movement was made between one and two o'clock by the duke in person; it was general along the front or centre of the position, on the height to the right of La Haye Sainte.

It is by no means improbable, that the enemy considered this movement as the commencement of a retreat, since a considerable portion of our troops were withdrawn from his sight, and determined in consequence to attack our left centre, in order to get possession of the buildings, called Ferme de M. St Jean, or of the village itself, which commanded the point of junction of the two chaussées. The attacking columns advanced on the Genappe chaussée, and by the side of it; they consisted of four columns of infantry (d'Erlon's corps, which was not engaged on the 16th), thirty pieces of artillery, and a large body of cuirassiers (Milhaud's). On the left of this attack, the French cavalry took the lead of the infantry, and had advanced considerably, when the Duke of Wellington ordered the heavy cavalry (Life Guards) to charge them as they ascended the position near La Haye Sainte. They were driven back on their own position, where the chaussée, being cut into the rising ground, leaves steep banks on either side. In this confined space they fought at sword's length for some minutes, until the enemy brought down some light artillery from the heights, when the British cavalry retired to their own position. The loss of the cuirassiers did not appear great. They seemed immediately to re-form their ranks, and soon after advanced to attack our infantry, who were formed into squares to receive them, being then unsupported by cavalry. The column of infantry, in the mean time, pushed forward on our left of the Genappe chaussée, beyond La Haye Sainte, which they did not attempt in this attack to take. A Belgian brigade of infantry, formed in front,

gave way, and these columns crowned the position. When Sir Thomas Picton moved up the brigade of General Pack from the second line (the 92d regiment in front), which opened a fire on the column just as it gained the height, and advanced upon it, when within thirty yards, the column began to hesitate; at this moment a brigade of heavy cavalry (the 1st and 2d Dragoons) wheeled round the 92d regiment, and took the column in flank; a total rout ensued; the French, throwing down their arms, ran into our position to save themselves from being cut down by the cavalry; many were killed, and two eagles, with 2,000 prisoners, taken. But the cavalry pursued their success too far, and being fired upon by one of the other columns, and at the same time, when in confusion, being attacked by some French cavalry, who had been sent to support the attack, the British were obliged to retire with considerable loss. In this attack the enemy had brought forward several pieces of artillery, which were captured by our cavalry; the horses in the guns were killed, and we were obliged to abandon the guns. General Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry, was killed. The gallant Sir Thomas Picton also fell, leading on his division to repel this attack. 'The number of occurrences which crowded on the attention rendered it impossible for any individual to see the whole action, and in the midst of noise, bustle, and personal danger, it is difficult to note the exact time in which the event happens.'¹

It is only afterwards, in discussing the chances and merits of each, that such questions become of interest, which may in some measure account for the discrepancy of the statements of officers present, as to the time and

¹ Rogniat, p. 231, blames both generals for the too early employment of their cavalry. In the case here mentioned, he says, the success was « contre toute probabilité, » as the cavalry charged unbroken infantry. The head of the attacking columns had, however, been already shaken by the charge of the 92d regiment, which took place nearly at the moment the cavalry charged.

² Muffling, p. 26, observes, « La fumée était si épaisse que personne ne voyait l'ensemble de l'action. »

circumstances of some of the principal events. From this period, half past two, until the end of the action, the British cavalry were scarcely engaged, but remained in readiness in the second line.¹ After the French cuirassiers had re-formed, and were strongly reinforced,² they again advanced upon our position, and made several desperate attacks upon our infantry, who immediately formed into squares, and maintained themselves with the most determined courage and coolness. Some time previous to this, about three o'clock, an attack was made upon La Haye Sainte, which is merely a small farmhouse; it was occupied by two companies of the German Legion. The enemy had advanced beyond it, so that the communication was cut off for some time, and it could not be reinforced. The troops having expended their ammunition, the post was carried. A continued fire was kept up at this point, and the enemy was soon afterwards obliged to abandon it, without being able to avail himself of it as a point of support for his attacking columns. The house was too small for a sufficient number of troops to maintain themselves so close to our position, under such a heavy fire.

The French cavalry, in the attack on the centre of our line, above mentioned, were not supported by infantry. They came on, however, with the greatest courage, close to the squares of our infantry, the artillery, which was somewhat in advance, kept up a well-directed fire upon them as they advanced, but on their nearer approach, the gunners were obliged to retire into the squares, so that the guns were actually in possession of the enemy's cavalry, who could not, however, keep possession of them, or even spike them, if they had the means, in consequence of the heavy fire of musketry to which they were exposed. The French accounts say, that several squares were broken, and standards taken, which is decidedly false; on the contrary, the small squares constantly repulsed the

¹ Liv. ix. 209. Buonaparte says, « L'infanterie Anglaise a été ferme et solide. La cavalerie pouvait mieux faire.»

² Roguati, 231, says, they amounted to 12,000, including other heavy cavalry.

cavalry, whom they generally allowed to advance close to their bayonets before they fired. They were driven back with loss on all points, and the artillerymen immediately resumed their guns in the most prompt manner, and opened a severe and destructive fire of grape-shot on them as they retired. ¹

. After the failure of the first attack, the French had little or no chance of success by renewing it; but the officers, perhaps ashamed of the failure of such boasted troops, endeavoured repeatedly to bring them back to charge the squares; but they could only be brought to pass between them, and round them; they even penetrated to our second line, where they cut down some stragglers and artillery-drivers, who were with the limbers and ammunition waggons. They charged the Belgian squares in the second line, with no better success, and upon some heavy Dutch cavalry showing themselves, they soon retired.

If the enemy supposed us in retreat, then such an attack of cavalry might have led to the most important results; but by remaining so uselessly in our position, and passing and repassing our squares of infantry, they suffered severely by their fire; so much so, that, before the end of the action, when they might have been of great use, either in the attack, or in covering the retreat, they were nearly destroyed. ² The only advantage which appeared

¹ The cavalry came up to one of the squares at a trot, and appeared to be hanging back as if expecting our fire: they closed round two sides of it, having a front of seventy or eighty men, and came so close to one angle, that they appeared to try to reach over the bayonets with their swords. The squares were generally formed four deep, rounded at the angles; on the approach of the cavalry two files fired, the others reserving their fire; the cavalry then turned, and it is not easy to believe how few fell,—only one officer and two men; no doubt many were wounded, but did not fall from their horses. Many squares fired at the distance of thirty paces, with no other effect. In fact, our troops fired too high, which must have been noticed by the most casual observer.

² It has been said, that if the enemy had brought up infantry and light artillery, our squares must have given way. This would no doubt have been preferable; but then our reserve and cavalry would have been moved forward to check the cavalry, and the squares would have probably repelled the attack of the infantry. The enemy had

to result from their remaining in our position, was preventing the fire of our guns on the columns which afterwards formed near La Belle Alliance, in order to debouche for a new attack. The galling fire of the infantry, however, forcing the French cavalry at length to retire into the hollow ground, to cover themselves, the artillerymen were again at their guns, and, being in advance of the squares, saw completely into the valley, and, by their well-directed fire, seemed to make gaps in them as they re-formed to repeat this useless expenditure of lives. Had Buonaparte been nearer the front, he surely would have prevented this useless sacrifice of his best troops. Indeed, the attack of cavalry at this period, is only to be accounted for by supposing the British army to be in retreat; he had had no time to avail himself of his powerful artillery to make an impression on that part of the line he meant to attack, as had always been his custom, otherwise it was not availing himself of the superiority he possessed; and it was treating his enemy with a contempt, which from what he had experienced at Quatre-bras, could not be justified.¹ He allows, in Liv. ix. p. 156, that this charge was made too soon,² but that it was necessary to support it, and that the Cuirassiers of Kellermann, 3000 in number, were consequently ordered forward to maintain the position. And at p. 196 and 157, Liv. ix. he allows that the Grenadiers-à-cheval, and Dragoons of the Guard, which were in reserve, advanced without orders; that he sent to recal them, but, as they were already engaged,

tried to bring guns with the attacking column, on our left, early in the day; the consequence was, that the horses were killed before they had advanced far, so that they could not follow the movements of the infantry, and were left behind. A similar attempt was made in the south of France, in the attack of Lord Hill's corps on the Nive; the guns were harnessed, so as to allow them to fire as they advanced, but the horses were soon killed or disabled, and the guns were abandoned when the attack was repulsed.

¹ This was what Marmont had done at the Aripiles, at the battle of Salamanca, and for which he suffered so severely.

² Muffling, p. 27, says, after this attack, which he states to be at four o'clock, « La bataille avait été tres sauglante, mais il n'y avait point de danger pour l'armée Anglaise. » He says it was then five o'clock.

any retrograde movement would then have been dangerous. Thus, every attack of the enemy had been repulsed, and a severe loss inflicted. The influence this must have had on the « morale » of each army, was much in favour of the British, and the probability of success on the part of the enemy was consequently diminished from that period.

The enemy now seemed to concentrate their artillery, particularly on the left of the Genappe chaussée, in front of La Belle Alliance, and commenced a heavy fire (a large proportion of his guns were 12 pounders) on that part of our line extending from behind La Haye Sainte towards Hougomont. Our infantry sheltered themselves, by lying down behind the ridge of the rising ground, and bore it with the most heroic patience. Several of our guns had been disabled, and many artillerymen killed and wounded, so that this fire was scarcely returned; but when the new point of attack was no longer doubtful, two brigades were brought from Lord Hill's corps on the right, and were of most essential service.

It may here be proper to consider the situation of the Prussian army, and the assistance they had rendered up to this time, about six o'clock.

The British army had sustained several severe attacks, which had been all repulsed, and no advantage of any consequence had been gained by the enemy. They had possessed part of the wood and garden of Hougomont, and La Haye Sainte, which latter they were unable to occupy. Not a square had been broken, shaken, or obliged to retire. Our infantry continued to display the same obstinacy, the same cool, calculating confidence in themselves, in their commander, and in their officers, which had covered them with glory in the long and arduous war in the Peninsula. From the limited extent of the field of battle, and the tremendous fire their columns were exposed to, the loss of the enemy could not have been less than 15,000 killed and wounded. Two eagles, and 2000 prisoners, had been taken, and their cavalry nearly destroyed. We still occupied nearly the same position as we did in the morning, but our loss had been severe, perhaps not less than 10,000 killed and wounded. Our

ranks were further thinned by the numbers of men who carried off the wounded, part of whom never returned to the field; the number of Belgian and Hanoverian troops, many of whom were young levies, that crowded to the rear, was very considerable, besides the number of our own dismounted dragoons, together with a proportion of our infantry, some of whom, as will always be found in the best armies, were glad to escape from the field. 'These thronged the road leading to Brussels, in a manner that none but an eye-witness could have believed,' so that perhaps the actual force under the Duke of Wellington at this time, half past six, did not amount to more than 34,000 men. We had at an early hour been in communication with some patrols of Prussian cavalry on our extreme left. A Prussian corps, under Bulow, had marched from Wavres at an early hour to manœuvre on the right and rear of the French army, but a large proportion of the Prussian army were still on the heights above Wavres, after the action had commenced at Waterloo.² The state of the roads, and the immense train of artillery they carried, detained Bulow's corps for a remarkably long time; they had not more than twelve or fourteen miles to march. At one o'clock,³ the advanced guard of this corps was discovered by the French; about two o'clock the patrols of Bulow's corps were discovered from part of our position. The French detached some light cavalry to observe them, which was the only diversion that had taken place up to this time. At half-past four, Blucher had joined in person Bulow's corps, at which time two

¹ See Muffling, 32, who makes the number amount to 10,000, and there is little doubt but that he is correct. A regiment of allied cavalry, whose uniform resembled the French, having fled to Brussels, an alarm spread that the enemy were at the gates. Numbers of those who had quitted the field of battle, and,—let the truth be spoken,—Englishmen too, fled from the town, and never halted until they reached Antwerp. This fact is too well attested to be doubted.

² Muffling, 29. At four o'clock, he says, « Il n'avait pas encore paru un homme de cette armée.»

³ See Soult's Letter to Grouchy, dated from the field of battle at one o'clock.

brigades of infantry and some cavalry were detached to act on the right of the French. ¹ He was so far from the right of the French, that his fire of artillery was too distant to produce any effect, and was chiefly intended to give us notice of his arrival. ² It was certainly past five o'clock before the fire of the Prussian artillery ³ was observed from our position; and it soon seemed to cease altogether. It appears they had advanced, and obtained some success, but were afterwards driven back to a considerable distance by the French, who sent a corps under General Lobau to keep them in check. ⁴ About half past six, the 1st Prussian corps came into communication with our extreme left near Ohain.

The effective state of the several armies may be considered to be as follows :—

The army under the Duke of Wellington amounted, at the commencement of the campaign, to 75,000 men, including every description of force, ⁵ of which nearly 40,000 were English, or the King's German Legion. Our loss at Quatre-Bras amounted to 4500 killed and wounded, which reduced the army to 70,500 men; of these about 54,000 were actually engaged at Waterloo; about 32,000 were composed of British troops, or the King's German Legion, including cavalry, infantry, and artillery; the remainder, under Prince Frederick, took no part in the action, but covered the approach to Brussels from Nivelles, and were stationed in the neighbourhood of Halle. The French force has been variously stated, and it is not easy to form a very accurate statement of their strength. Batty gives it at 127,000; that is the number which crossed the frontiers. Liv. ix. p. 69, it is given at 122,000. Gourgaud reduces it to 115,000; of these, 21,000 were

¹ See Muffling, p. 30, 31, near Frichefont.

² Ibid. p. 31.

³ Bulow's corps.

⁴ Liv. ix. 155. Buonaparte says it was seven o'clock when Lobau repulsed them.

⁵ Of these, about 12,700 were cavalry.

cavalry, and they had 350 guns. Let us, however, take the statement in Liv. ix., and say.

122,000	
5,300	Deduct left at Charleroi. Liv. ix. 92. ¹
<hr/>	
116,700	
10,350	} Loss at Quatre-Bras and Ligny, Liv. ix. 100, and 106.
<hr/>	
106,350	
3,200	} Left at Ligny. (Grouchy, p. 8.) Liv. ix. 193; this is stated at 3,000.
<hr/>	
103,150	
32,000	With Grouchy. (Grouchy, p. 8.)
<hr/>	
71,150	Engaged at Waterloo.

¹This number, however, is certainly underrated; and there is little doubt but Buonaparte had upwards of 75,000 men under his immediate command on the 18th June. ²

Buonaparte, Liv. ix. 162, 117, states the Prussian force concentrated at Wavres to be 75,000 men. Grouchy, p. 9, makes it 95,000. It is, however, generally understood that they had not above 70,000 with the army at Wavres.

It may be necessary here to refer to the operations of the corps under Grouchy, who were detached in pursuit of the Prussians. It appears, that at 12 o'clock on the 17th, Buonaparte was ignorant of the direction the Prussian army had taken. ³ It was generally supposed that it was towards Namur. At that hour, Buonaparte ordered Grouchy, ⁴ with 32,000 men, to follow them. As the troops were much scattered, it was three o'clock before they were in movement, and they did not arrive at Gembloux before

¹ Liv. ix. 193. This force is stated « 4 à 5000 hommes.»

² Muffling, p. 58, mentions, that Buonaparte stated to some general officer on the morning of the 18th, that he had 75,000 men, and the English only 50,000. Liv. ix. 193, by taking Buonaparte's own account in this part of the book, upon calculation it will be seen that he there allows that he had upwards of 74,000.

³ Grouchy, 13.

⁴ Grouchy.

the night of the 17th, when Grouchy informed Buonaparte of the direction the Prussian army had taken. He discovered the rear-guard of the Prussians near Wavres about twelve o'clock on the 18th, and at two o'clock he attacked Wavres, which was obstinately defended by General Thielmann, and succeeded in obtaining possession of a part of the village. By the gallant defence of this post by General Thielmann, Grouchy was induced to believe that the whole Prussian army was before him. Blucher, however, had detached Bulow's corps (4th) at an early hour upon Chapelle Lambert, to act on the rear of the French army. The movement of this corps was, however, much delayed by a fire which happened at Wavres, and by the bad state of the roads; so that they had great difficulty in bringing up the numerous artillery they carried with this corps, which prevented them from attacking the enemy before half past four o'clock.¹

The 2d Prussian corps marched upon Chapelle Lambert and Lasne; and at a later period of the day,² the 1st corps moved in the direction of Ohain. The 3d corps was also to have supported the 4th and 2d corps. Blucher was not aware of the large force under Grouchy who attacked the 3d corps, as it was preparing to leave Wavres; and obliged it to take up a position on the Dyle, between Limale and Wavres, where he afterwards ordered it to maintain itself as well as it could.

The British army, at this eventful period of the day, amounted to about 34,000 men (allowing 10,000 killed and wounded, and 10,000 more who had left the field);³ 18,000 of whom were English. The enemy may have had about 45,000 immediately opposed to us, allowing 20,000 killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; and 10,000 men detached to act against the Prussians.

The assistance of the Prussians had been expected at an

¹ See Muffling, 22, 31, 62. Gourgaud, pp. 98 and 99, says it was half past four when General Dumont informed Buonaparte of their arrival.

² Lib. ix. 168, 169, Buonaparte makes Bulow's attack after sunset.

³ See Muffling, 32.

early hour,¹ which had induced Lord Wellington to accept the battle; so that the British army had to bear the whole brunt of the action for a much longer period than was calculated. Lord Wellington, however, showed no anxiety as to the result. The corps of Lord Hill, several Belgian battalions, and a considerable portion of the cavalry, had been little engaged. He knew the troops he had under his command, and seemed confident to be able to maintain his position, even if the Prussians did not arrive before night. The army was not aware of their approach, nor did he think it necessary to animate their exertions by this intelligence. Buonaparte, on the contrary, thought proper to revive the drooping spirits of his troops, even of his Guards, who had not yet been engaged, by sending his aide-de-camp Labédoyère to inform them, as they were about to advance,² that Grouchy had joined their right flank, and even deceived Ney himself by this false intelligence.

The above detail has been entered into for the purpose of showing the state of the armies towards the close of the day. Buonaparte was now aware of the powerful diversion the Prussians were about to make, but at the same time seems to have imagined that Grouchy would be able to paralyse their movements. He therefore resolved to make a last desperate effort to break the centre of the British army, and carry their position before the attack of the Prussians could take effect.

The Imperial Guard had been kept in reserve, and had been for some time formed on the heights extending from La Belle Alliance, towards Hougoumont, which supported their left flank. They had not yet been engaged.

About seven o'clock they advanced in two columns,³ leaving four battalions in reserve. They were commanded by Ney, who led them on. At the same time, they pushed

¹ Muffling, 62, says, it was hoped the Prussian army could have attacked at two o'clock, but that it was half past four before a cannon was fired by them.

² Liv. ix, 167. Ney's letter.

³ See Lord Wellington's dispatches.

on some light troops in the direction of La Haye. The advance of these columns of the Guards was supported by a heavy fire of artillery. Our infantry, who had been posted on the reverse of the hill, to be sheltered from the fire of the guns, were instantly moved forward by Lord Wellington. General Maitland's brigade of Guards, and General Adam's brigade (52d and 71st regiments, and 95th rifles), met this formidable attack. They were flanked by two brigades of artillery, who kept up a destructive fire on the advancing columns. Our troops waited for their approach with their characteristic coolness, until they were within a short distance of our line, when they opened a well-directed fire upon them. The line was formed four deep. The men fired independently, retiring a few paces to load, and then advanced and fired, so that their fire never ceased for a moment. The French, headed by their gallant leader, still advanced, notwithstanding the severe loss they sustained by this fire, which apparently seemed to check their movement. They were now within about fifty yards of our line, when they attempted to deploy, in order to return the fire. Our line appeared to be closing round them. They could not, however, deploy under such a fire; and from the moment they ceased to advance, their chance of success was over. They now formed a confused mass, and at last gave way, retiring in the utmost confusion. They were immediately pursued by the light troops of General Adam's brigade. This decided the battle. The enemy had now exhausted his means of attack. He had still, however, the four battalions of the Old Guard in reserve. Lord Wellington immediately ordered the whole line to advance to attack their position. The enemy were already attempting a retreat. These battalions formed a square to cover the retreat of the flying columns, flanked by a few guns, and supported by some light cavalry (red lancers).

The first Prussian corps had now joined our extreme left. They had obtained possession of the village of La Haye, driving out the French light troops who occupied it. Bulow, with the fourth corps, had some time previous to this made an unsuccessful attack upon the village of

Planchenoit, in the rear of the enemy's right wing, and being joined by the second corps (Pirch's), was again advancing to attack it.¹ In the mean time, the square of the Old Guard maintained itself, the guns on its flank firing upon our light cavalry, who now advanced, and threatened to turn their flank. Our light troops were close on their front, and our whole line advancing, when this body, the « élite, » and now the only hope of the enemy to cover their retreat, and save their army, gave way, and mixed in the general confusion and rout, abandoning their cannon and all their matériel. It was now nearly dark. Bulow, upon being joined by Pirch's corps, again attacked Planchenoit, which he turned; and then the enemy abandoned it. He immediately advanced towards the Genappe chaussée, and closed round the right of the French,² driving the enemy before him, and augmenting their confusion. His troops came into the high-road, or chaussée, near Maison du Roi, and Blucher and Wellington having met about the same time near La Belle Alliance, it was resolved to pursue the enemy, and give him no time to rally. The loss of the Prussians on the 18th did not exceed 800 men. The brunt of the action was chiefly sustained by the troops of the British and King's German Legion, as their loss will show. In stating this, it must be allowed, that much support was afforded by the other contingents; but they were chiefly raw levies, newly raised, who could not be depended upon in a situation of importance. Some behaved ill, as is publicly known. None were in the first line, except the Nassau troops at Hougoumont, and some on our extreme left. They were placed in the second line, and in the valley behind the first line, and on the right, at Braine la Leude. They had generally been formed with the British brigades of the different divisions (in the manner Lord Wellington found so advantageous with the Portuguese troops); but these arrangements had just been made. The different brigades in a division had not any knowledge of,

¹ Gneissau says, it was half past seven o'clock before Pirch's corps arrived.—See Blucher's dispatches.

² Liv. ix. p. 169.

or confidence in, each other. Many battalions, particularly some Belgian troops, in the rear of the first line, stood with firmness against the French cavalry, and drove them back. They suffered more severely, perhaps, than the first line, from the fire of the enemy's artillery, and, at the close of the action, advanced in support of the first line with great steadiness and regularity.

The Prussians, who had made only a short march during the day, pursued the enemy with such vigour, that they were unable to rally a single battalion. The British army halted on the field of battle. They once attempted to make a show of resistance at Genappe, where, perhaps, if they had had a chief to direct them, they might have maintained themselves until day-light, the situation of the village being strong; this might have given them the means of saving at least the semblance of an army. The second Prussian corps was afterwards detached to intercept Grouchy, who was not aware of the result of the battle until twelve o'clock next day. He had succeeded in obtaining some advantage over General Thielmann, and got possession of Wavres. He immediately retreated towards Namur, where his rear-guard maintained themselves against all the efforts of the Prussians, who suffered severely in their attempt to take the place. This served to cover his retreat, which he executed with great ability, keeping in a parallel line to Blucher, and having rallied many of the fugitives, he brought his army without loss to Paris. He had been considered as lost, and his army made prisoners; this belief was a great cause of the resignation of Buonaparte; otherwise, with this army he could have mustered 70 or 80,000 men; with the fortifications and resources of Paris, which was sufficiently secure against a coup-de-main, it is not likely he would have so easily submitted without another struggle, after the brilliant defensive campaign he had made the preceding year. The great central dépôts of Paris and Lyons gave him great advantages, as is well shown in the introductory chap, Liv. ix. and p. 181. There are always some turns of fortune in the events of war; he might at least have made terms. The southern and eastern parts of France were certainly in his favour; he

his army had been well received there only a few weeks before. That army, and a great part of the population, would ~~not~~ have been glad to make sacrifices to endeavour to re-establish the sullied lustre of his arms. At least, the honour of falling sword in hand was in his power.

The time of the arrival and co-operation of the Prussians, has been variously stated. ¹ The above account is perhaps as near the truth as can be. The French writers make it at an early hour, to account more satisfactorily for their defeat. The Prussians also make it somewhat earlier than was actually the case, in order to participate more largely in the honours of the day. Their powerful assistance has been acknowledged to its full extent. They completed the destruction of the French army, after they had failed in all their attacks against the British, which continued upwards of seven hours, after their cavalry had been destroyed, their Imperial Guards driven back, and eagles and prisoners taken, and when their means of further attack may be considered as exhausted. The British army had suffered severely, and was not in a state to have taken great advantage of the retreat of the French. But its safety was never for a moment compromised, and no calculation could justify the idea, that we would have been so easily defeated and driven from our position, but that the enemy would have been so much crippled, that he could not have taken much advantage of our reverses. Even in such a case, the arrival of the Prussians must have obliged him to have retired. Muffling has observed, that the bold movement of Blucher on the 18th has not been sufficiently appreciated. ² It was bold and masterly. Even when he was told that Grouchy was in

¹ Liv. ix, says it was eleven o'clock when the Prussians joined. Gourgaud and Montholon copy this. The letter from Soult to Grouchy dated half past one o'clock, stating that they were informed by a prisoner of Bulow's march, and that they thought they discovered his advanced posts at that hour, complètement contradicts this. Liv. ix.

² Muffling, p. 61. « Il ne s'agit pas de savoir ce qu'un général ordinaire aurait fait ; mais une nouvelle de cette nature aurait pu entraîner le général le plus distingué à prendre des précautions, on la résolution de changer l'offensive vigoureuse en simple démonstration.»

his rear with a large force, his plans were not shaken, though this might have somewhat retarded his movements. The skilful veteran knew that it was on the field of Waterloo where the fate of the day was to be decided, and if even Grouchy had attacked Bulow's corps, there was nothing to prevent the first and second corps from joining the British army by Ohain. Grouchy could only, at farthest, have checked the third and fourth corps. There cannot be a moment's doubt of the anxiety and exertions of the Prussians to assist on the 18th. The cordiality and friendship of the Prussians have been felt and acknowledged by every officer who has had occasion to visit Prussia subsequently; this has been particularly the case with the military.

This short campaign of «Hours» was a joint operation. The honours must be shared. On the 16th, the Prussians fought at Ligny under the promise of our co-operation, which could not, however, be given to the extent it was wished or hoped. On the 18th, Lord Wellington fought at Waterloo, on the promise of the early assistance of the Prussians, which, though unavoidably delayed, was at last given with an effect, which perhaps had never before been witnessed. The finest army France ever saw, commanded by the greatest and ablest of her chiefs, ceased to exist, and in a moment the destiny of Europe was changed.

