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Manchurian Incident

Reference Regarding the Despatch and Withdrawal
of the Army and Navy Forces.

(Operational Movements of the
Kwantung Army)

Manchurian Incident

Reference regarding the Despatch and Withdrawal
of the Army and Navy Forces.

The Outline and Progress of the KWANTUNG Army
Strategical Military Movements.

KWANTUNG Army Headquarters
March 3, 1932.

The Outline of the KWANTUNG Army Strategical
Military Movements
(From 19 Sept. 1931 to early Feb. 1932)

- 1.) The Disposition of the KWANTUNG and the CHINESE
Armies in MANCHURIA prior to the Incident.

The disposition of the KWANTUNG Army prior to the
Incident was as of supplementary map #1; and those of the
Northeastern Border Defence Army /T.N. Chinese/ was as of
supplementary map #2.

Therefore, the Army /T.N. KWANTUNG/ undertook to study
emergency measures to meet the successive occurrences of Anti-
Japanese events which rose frequently prior to the Incident,
and thereby completed preparations against any unexpected
happenings.

- 2.) Dispatching of the KWANTUNG Army.

The Determination to set-out.

At 11:46 P.M. of the 18th, September, the Chief of
Staff of the /T.N.: KWANTUNG/ Army received the following
telegram from the MUMDEN Special Duty Organ /TOKUMU-KIKAN/.

"In accordance to the information received that
outrageous CHINESE Troops destroyed the Manchurian Railway
Lines; attacked our guards; and clashed with our guard troops,
on the west-side of the North Barracks /T.N. PEI TAI YING/
located north of MUMDEN a little past 10 o'clock on the night
of the 18th, the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the MUMDEN Independent
Garrison is now on its way to the location.

Soon after, the Chief of Staff further received the
following telegram from the MUMDEN Special Duty Organ at 00:28
of the 19th.

"The CHINESE troops at the North Barracks /T.N. PEI TAI YING/ blasted the Manchurian Railway Lines. Their forces number 3 to 4 infantry companies, and they have successively fled into their barracks. Our HUSHIHTAI Co. have been combating against 500 to 600 enemy troops of the North Barracks /T.N. PEI TAI YING/ after 11:00, and although having occupied a corner of the barracks, the enemy is increasing their machine guns and infantry guns.

The company is fighting a desperate battle. 1st Lieut. NODA has been seriously wounded."

In such a way, the Japanese and Chinese Army clashed. Moreover, now that we have been challenged by them, we shall positively concentrate our main force in MUKDEN; deal a blow on the CHINESE Army; eradicate the root of evil; and thus determine to fulfil the duty of the Army. In all, the strength of our KWANTUNG Army guarding the approximately 1000 kilometers of the Manchurian Railway Lines at that time totalled only 10,000 men (of which about 1500 were stationed at MUKDEN) while the enemy strength at MUKDEN alone numbered 19,000 regular troops. Furthermore, if the Irregulars /T.N. Reserves?/ were added to the regular troops, the actual strength of the four Eastern provinces would, indeed, number 220,000 men. Therefore, in order that we may fully protect this long extending railway and also preserve the lives and properties of our 1,000,000 countrymen (in time of emergency, we must concentrate the main force of the Army most speedily; annihilate the enemy's most highly trained troops in the vicinity of MUKDEN by taking the initiative; and, control the backbone of the four Eastern provinces, which is the only way left for us. Moreover, we must secure the countenance of the Manchurian Railway Lines south of MUKDEN, so as to maintain the freedom of executing our military operations; particularly, to avoid delay in transporting reinforcements from the directions of KOREA. For this matter, it is necessary that we should mop-up as quickly as possible the Chinese troops in the neighborhood of FENG HUANG CHENG, ANTUNG and YINKOW which lies adjacent to the Manchurian Railway Lines.

Battle in the Vicinity of MUKDEN.

At that time, Staff Officer Colonel ITAGAKI, happened to be in MUKDEN. As soon as the incident broke out, the Colonel made determination to attack the North Barracks /T.N. PEI TAI YING/ without waiting for the main force to concentrate and that, on his own authority.

However since we were to attack the enemy at the North Barracks /T.N. PEI TAI YING/ it became urgent for us to attack, simultaneously, the enemy within the walls of MUKDEN holding positions to the flanks, so that we may be able to ensure the safety of the rear. For this matter, the 2nd Infantry

Battalion of the Independent Garrison was ordered against the enemy at the North Barracks /TN: PEI TAI YING/ and the 29th Infantry Regiment was ordered to attack the enemy within the walls of MUKDEN.

The Chinese troops of the North Barracks /T.N. PEI TAI YING/ resisted stubbornly, but due to the speedy and sharp fighting of our troops; and particularly, since our troops were trained for night combats, and that because the enemy within the walls of MUKDEN resisted individually and lacked coordination; they were beaten separately, one after the other. The battle lasted for 8 hours and at about 6:00 A.M. of the 19th, the walled city of MUKDEN and the North Barracks /TN: PEI TAI YING/ fell completely into our hands.

Thereafter, with the successive arrival of our main force, enemy troops in the vicinity of the walled city of MUKDEN; Arsenal, Airfield, East Barracks /TN: TONG TAI YING/ etc; were mopped and at about 2:00 P.M. of the 19th, the mopping-up of the enemy was almost completed.

The routed enemy retreated in the direction of the SUNGHAI Railway with its main force. A section of the enemy stopped in the vicinity of FUSHUN; another section seemed to have retreated in the direction of HSIAMIN.

Battle in the Vicinity of CHANGCHUN.

The 3rd Infantry Brigade, (minus the 29th Infantry Regiment) which was stationed at CHANGCHUN, upon learning that a battle was being fought between the Japanese and Chinese troops at 00:15 A.M. of the 19th in the vicinity of MUKDEN, decided to advance immediately southward to MUKDEN with its main force; but, while making its preparations, received orders from the Commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY at 3:05 A.M. to remain in CHANGCHUN and keep surveillance over the enemy. However, the Brigade Commander judged that as the battle had already commenced in the MUKDEN area, it would be dangerous to bide the time wantonly against the enemy in the vicinity of CHANGCHUN, which was several times in number. Therefore, at his own authority, he ordered a sudden attack be carried out at once on the Chinese troops, but the enemy took position in the barracks and resisted stubbornly. With the coming of dawn, we were compelled to fight a desperate battle. The wounded and killed increased steadily.

At 6:00 A.M., the Commander of the Independent Garrison completed entraining at the KUNGCHULING Station with the main force of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison. (the delay in time of this entraining was due to the cause that the train was composed and forwarded from CHANGCHUN).

He learned that until that time, our troops fighting in the vicinity of MUNDEN met with success, whereas those in the vicinity of CHANGCHUN were in adverse situations. Thereon, on his own authority, he ordered the main force of the 1st Battalion of the Independent Garrison to proceed to CHANGCHUN as reinforcement, while he, himself, proceeded southward to MUNDEN with one platoon of guards. Thus, the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison advanced toward the Chinese Barracks in MANUNG; and, in cooperation with a part of the 4th Infantry Regiment, commenced attack. Fierce battles were fought and such as the 3rd company lost 38 men out of its 64 combatants.

Reinforcements by the 39th Mixed Brigade.

The Army Commander /T.W. KWANTUNG/ arrived in MUNDEN at noon of the 19th. He learned most of the aforementioned conditions and thereupon despatched the 30th Infantry Regiment and the main force of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, as reinforcements, to CHANGCHUN. Prior to this, the Army Commander having determined to punish the Chinese troops, had already requested the Commander of the KOREAN Army for reinforcements. In compliance to the Commander's request, the KOREAN Army sent as reinforcements, to the KWANTUNG ARMY, 5 infantry battalions, 2 artillery battalions, a unit with a troop of cavalry and a company of engineers as its cadre, and 2 squadrons of airforce (a squadron of reconnaissance and combat planes) which were under the command of the 39th Infantry Brigade Commander. Moreover, learning that the said units (exclusive of the airforce) will arrive at the MUNDEN station sometime between daybreak and 2:00 P.M. of the 20th, he detailed the said units after its arrival to guard the vicinity of MUNDEN, relieving the 2nd Division. The 2nd Division was advanced to CHANGCHUN and preparations were begun to have it advance into HARBIN and KIRIN which had gradually become disorderly. At the same time, a unit was despatched to the neighboring areas of CHENGCHIATUN and HSINMIN. It was decided to secure the crossing points of the LIAO-HO River. But, as the situation had become so aggravated, it became necessary for the Army to take further steps and maintain order in the three Eastern provinces and protect the Japanese residents there. In order to do this, it was thought that maintenance of order not only along the Manchurian Railway Lines, but also in KIRIN and HARBIN was absolutely necessary.

In light of the enemy conditions in TONAN; TUNGUAO and its vicinity; and the CHINCHOW area, the possession of CHENGCHIATUN; HSINMIN and its vicinity; and the crossing point of the LIAO-HO was necessary from the point of ensuring the Manchurian Railway Lines.