


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
JAPANESE PRISON STATISTICS

JANUARY 1943 - SEPTEMBER 1947


A. MONTH-END POPULATION



B. POPULATION COMPONENTS



C. PRISONER DEATH RATES PER 1000 POPULATION



SOURCE:
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
GRAPH NO. 3
RESTRICTED
PREPARED BY:
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

PUBLIC SAFETY

Since the end of the war there have been approximately 4.5 million more persons repatriated to Japan than from Japan. This, together with a natural population increase of 1.5 million births over deaths, is responsible for an increase of nearly six million persons since the end of the war. This population increase is another source of a larger number of offenses reported. This cumulatively distorted picture of offenses reported is eliminated by consulting crime rates -- offenses per so many persons. (Crime rates as offenses reported per 100,000 population are shown in the inset of Part B, Graph No. 2, opposite p. PSD-8, for the period Jan 46 through Aug 47.)

4. Control of Illegal Newspaper Activities

Two-Month Drive aimed at "Ruffian" Newspapers

Noting an increase in illegal newspaper activities coincident with the recovery of the press from wartime controls and shortages, the Police Bureau, Home Ministry, on 20 Oct 47 issued a directive to all prefectural governors and prefectural police calling their attention to such activities and ordering a control campaign to last until the end of 1947. The directive also called for an interim report of results up to 30 Nov and a final report to be submitted to the Home Ministry by 15 Jan 48. Necessary controls will be maintained beyond the conclusion of this campaign.

Targets of the police campaign were listed in the Home Ministry directive as (1) those who blackmail others by threat of printing derogatory information about them, "taking advantage of their (victims' trifling foibles," (2) those who demand contributions through their newspapers on the false pretense of sponsoring charitable works, (3) those who demand advertising from others at exorbitant rates (presumably enforcing their demands by threat of libel), (4) those who demand subscriptions by the same means, (5) those newspaper representatives who commit economic crimes with regard to illegal distribution and price of paper and (6) other persons who take illegal advantage of their newspaper power and privileges.

The police have been directed to place first emphasis on malicious offenders but were warned to inspect and investigate thoroughly and to maintain close liaison with the procurator's office in each case to preclude unfavorable inference that the police are attempting to curtail freedom of the press. Further special emphasis has been placed on blocking operations of so-called "ruffian" (gorotsuki) or gang newspapers, which are either tools of illegal Oyabun-Kobun groups or are linked with such groups.

5. Traffic Safety Week in Tokyo

Police Data Shows Favorable Effect of Safety Drive

For the dual purpose of improving traffic safety and training the public in traffic safety, the Tokyo police carried out a comprehensive traffic safety drive throughout Tokyo-To in the period 21-24 Oct 47. In order to augment safety, orders were given to all chiefs of police stations to see that road obstructions were cleared and road conditions improved. Through liaison with the Tokyo Provost Marshal's office and the Tokyo-To Construction and Traffic Bureaus, some readjustment of traffic control equipment was effected, especially with regard to street-car safety zones and the erection of pedestrian crossing signs.

During the drive an extensive education program was carried out through the newspapers and radio, by demonstration and warning to pedestrians and drivers on the part of policemen and by means of a one-day safe driving course attended by some 6,000 Japanese drivers in Tokyo. Provisions were also made for commendation of drivers with long safety records.

Data presented by the police shows a drop in traffic accidents from 42 during the period 14-17 Oct (week before the drive) to 23 in the period of the drive (21-24 Oct). Of the former total, some 20 accidents involved Occupation vehicles; however, only seven accidents during the safety drive involved Occupation vehicles.

PUBLIC SAFETY

No. 22

PRISON

1. Prison Statistics

-
- a. Total Population Up 2.5 Percent
 b. Executions
 c. Prison Capacities and Overcrowding
 d. Prisoner Death Rate Drops to New Low
-

a. Total Population Up 2.5 Percent: During September the total population of Japan's prisons rose for the twenty-third consecutive (except for Dec 46) month to reach 82,789 on 30 Sep 47. Table A, below, compares the components of this total with those of the total population on 31 Aug, showing the numerical difference and the percent changes in the components from 31 Aug 47 to 30 Sep 47:

Components	Population 31 Aug	Population 30 Sep	Difference Aug-Sep	Percent Diff. Aug-Sep
Convicted				
Adults: Male	57,824	59,561	+ 1,737	+ 3.0%
Fem.	1,300	1,359	+ 59	+ 4.5%
Juveniles: Male	3,381	3,434	+ 53	+ 1.6%
Fem.	153	179	+ 26	+ 17.0%
Death Sentence:	22	22	0	0.0%
TOTAL CONVICTS:	62,680	64,555	+ 1,875	+ 2.5%
Awaiting Trial:	16,806	16,799	- 7	0.0%
Suspects:	1,247	1,435	+ 188	+ 15.1%
GRAND TOTAL	80,733	82,789	+ 2,056	+ 2.5%

The slight decrease in persons awaiting trial as of 30 Sep 47 from the August figure may be indicative of another downward trend in number of offenses reported, although such a trend cannot yet be confirmed inasmuch as the Home Ministry record of offenses reported lags behind the Justice Ministry prison population report. (See Graph No. 3, opposite p. PSD-9, and par. 3, p. PSD-8.)

b. Executions: Although the number of persons awaiting execution was 22 on both 31 Aug and 30 Sep 47, two persons were executed during September (See CIS Periodical Summary No. 21, par. 2, p. PSD-16.), and their places among the waiting were filled by two new death sentences ordered by the courts. All such decisions are subject to long review by all judicial echelons, including the Justice Minister himself. Executed by hanging at Miyagi Prison, Sendai, on 28 Oct 47 was Kin Hei-to, 29-year-old Korean wanderer and thief who stopped for the night of 21 Jun 45 at a woodmen's dormitory in Akita Prefecture and during the night murdered the sleeping owner and his wife, afterward burning the building so as to conceal his crime. He was convicted 27 Feb 46. Also hanged at the same prison on the following day, 29 Oct, was a 29-year-old habitual criminal, Kawai Kanae, who murdered a sleeping woman the more easily to rob a store in Tokyo where he was a guest on the night of 1-2 Feb 45. He was convicted on 10 Jun 46.

c. Prison Capacities and Overcrowding: Since the total capacity of the prison system did not increase during September, except for the opening of two very small branch prisons, the overcrowding, reported in CIS Periodical Summary No. 21 in detail, was made worse by the September increase in population. On 31 Aug 47 the five houses of detention were filled to 218 percent of their combined capacity; by 30 Sep these same institutions were filled to 224 percent of their combined capacity. The most overcrowded institution of the system on 30 Sep 47 was Toyotama Prison (Urawa, Saitama Prefecture), filled to 445 percent of capacity, followed by Kobe House of Detention with population equal to 430 percent of capacity, Osaka House of Detention (Pop. 408% of cap.), Kokura Branch Prison (Fukuoka Prefecture; pop 378% of cap.), Hiroshima Prison (Pop.

PUBLIC SAFETY

No. 22

302% of cap.), Shizuoka Prison (Pop. 285% of cap.), Kobe Prison (Pop. 279% of cap.) and Utsunomiya Prison (Pop. 254% of cap.). The combined population of these eight institutions on 30 Sep was 14.36 percent of the total population of all 152 institutions of the prison system.

d. Prisoner Death Rate Drops to New Low: While the total prison population was rising during September, the prison death rate again dropped, from 0.9 deaths per 1,000 prisoners per month for August to 0.7/1,000/month for September. There were 75 prisoner deaths in August (Corrected from figure of 72 reported previously by Justice Ministry and published in CIS Periodical Summary No. 21), while the September total dropped to 62. Simultaneously the number of persons temporarily released from prisons, primarily for illness, during September was one less than the total of 123 experienced in August, causing the release rate to decline from 1.52 per 1,000 prisoners per month in August to 1.47/1,000/month in September.

2. Prison Officials' School

61 Students Begin Four-Month Course in Tokyo

On 13 Oct 47 the first regular postwar class of the Central Institute for Prison Officials met to begin a four-month course in general prison work. Although the institute has conducted postwar classes since early in 1947, previous classes consisted of higher prison officials and experienced guards who assembled for refresher courses and for study of democratic prison methods. The 61 members of the first regular class earned their assignments to the school through competitive examinations administered on 1 Sep to 236 junior guards and officials in main prisons all over Japan. Two members of the class are law college graduates, 15 are university and college graduates and 17 have completed work at commercial, agricultural, technical and vocational schools.

Principal subjects to be taught during the course are the Constitution of Japan, administrative law, prison regulations, prison administration, prison policy, the Prison Law, the Code of Criminal Procedure, other criminal laws and the Calculation Law. Supplementary lessons will deal with economics, sociology, pedagogy, psychology and statistics. Part of the course will also be occupied with special lectures and exercises in practical business.

3. New Reformatories Planned

One Opened, Four More Need Approval

The Justice Ministry on 1 Nov 47 added another new reformatory for boys to the 11 reformatories and eight branch reformatories already operated by the Government through that ministry. The new institution, named Haruna Juvenile Reformatory (Haruna Shonen-in), is located in Ogo City (cho), Seta District (gun), Gumma Prefecture, five miles east of Maebashi, and occupies the site of a former private reformatory. The area covered by the institution is slightly more than eight acres, of which about half an acre is occupied by the buildings, while the capacity is eventually to be 100 boys under 18 years of age. Present capacity, however, is limited to 20 because beds and bedding for more are not yet on hand.

Four additional reformatories for girls are in the planning stage at the Justice Ministry and are to be located in the Sendai, Tokyo, Osaka and Fukuoka areas. Budgets for these institutions have yet to gain Finance Ministry and Diet approval. Three of the four proposed sites are presently private reformatories which are financially unable to continue in operation; however, some additions to the existing structures will be necessary. The planned capacity of each of the four institutions is 100 girls under 18 years of age.

PSD -11

R E S T R I C T E D

PUBLIC SAFETY

No. 22

4. Action to Speed Trials

Justice Ministry to Aid Courts in Reducing Confinement

In view of the extensive numbers of persons held in Japanese prisons awaiting trial and because of the overcrowded condition of those prisons, the Justice Ministry has evolved a plan of action designed to shorten the term of unconvicted detention of such persons. The Ministry plans to assist the Supreme Court in the establishment of more temporary courts, in assigning temporarily idle civil-law judges to criminal cases, in promoting trials which have been delayed, in increasing the number of branch courts and the number of judges and in exercising executive control over cases awaiting court action. Strengthening of procurators' offices and increases in the number of procurators are also planned, while the Ministry plans to inform the Supreme Court of the condition of unconvicted detention throughout Japan at regular intervals. Additional use of the bail system is also projected in order to reduce confinement.

5. Japanese Juvenile Correctional Institutions

Government Operated Institutions Shown

Shown on Map Plate No. 2, opposite this page, are those juvenile correctional institutions of Japan which are operated by agencies of the National government or the prefectural governments. Institutions in this category include 10 juvenile prisons (Shonen Keimusho), 12 National reformatories (Shonen Kyoseiin, or Shonen-in) and eight branch reformatories, and one National and 47 prefectural houses of juvenile correction (Shonen Kyogoin; there are two in Tokyo-To.). The last group of institutions is administered indirectly by the Welfare Ministry and directly by the Welfare Sections of the various prefectural governments. The other institutions are administered directly by the Justice Ministry.

The map plate does not purport to show all institutions concerned with correction of wayward juveniles. Certain juveniles awaiting trial and some older convicted juveniles are confined in ordinary prisons. Also, less serious offenders below the age of 18 are usually committed to the so-called private reformatories.

The graph inset shows the fluctuation in numbers of juveniles cared for in each type of institution shown on the Map Plate since Dec 46. The pie-chart shows the relation of the number of juveniles in these institutions to the total number of juveniles under institutional care. The graphic curve of juvenile prisons does not include juveniles awaiting trial in juvenile prisons, while the curve of reformatory populations does include juveniles awaiting court action. The curve of house of juvenile correction populations includes those awaiting court or gubernatorial action and also includes children released on parole, which group is not included in the juvenile prison or reformatory curves.

6. Prison Affairs Committees Organized

Central and Eight District Groups to Ponder Prison Problems


Pursuant to the provisions of a Cabinet Order, the Justice Ministry has formed a Central Prison Affairs Committee and eight District Prison Affairs Committees throughout Japan for the purpose of inquiring into and deliberating important prison matters. The Central Prison Affairs Committee will function at the direction of the Justice Minister, while the District Prison Affairs Committees will operate under the superintendents of the eight prison administrative districts.

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

JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS OPERATED BY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TYPES, LOCATIONS, POPULATIONS

1 NOV 47

JUVENILE INSTITUTIONAL POPULATIONS SEP 46-SEP 47



JUVENILE POPULATION ALL INSTITUTIONS SEPTEMBER 1947



SOURCE:
MINISTRY OF WELFARE
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

MAP PLATE NO.2

PREPARED BY:
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

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

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JAPANESE FIRE LOSSES

(YEN LOSSES PER 1,000 PERSONS)

BY PREFECTURE AUGUST 1947

AUGUST YEN LOSSES BY CAUSE



LEGEND

- UNDER ¥1,000
- ¥1,000 - ¥4,000
- ¥4,001 - ¥7,000
- ¥7,001 - ¥11,000
- OVER ¥11,000

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

MAP PLATE NO.3

PREPARED BY: PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

RESTRICTED

FIRE

1. Iida City-Planning InspectionFire Administrator Revisits Scene of Apr 47 Holocaust

A PSD Fire Investigator revisited the city of Iida in Nagano Prefecture during the first week of October in a follow-up inspection of the results of city-planning there. Iida will be remembered as an unfortunate city which survived the war unscathed but was two-thirds destroyed by a terrible fire on 20 Apr 47, in which some 4,000 houses valued at ¥1.6 billion were lost. (See CIS Periodical Summary No. 16, 15 May 47, par. 1, p. PSD-15, for details.)

Following an earlier fire in Jul 46, a PSD Fire Administrator had warned Iida city officials that further serious conflagrations might result unless fire hazards were reduced and poor fire protection improved. No heed was paid to the warning, and the Apr 47 holocaust was made possible by the conditions mentioned. The April fire made more impression upon the citizens and officials of Iida, and, aided by PSD Fire Administrators, they drew a city plan designed to eliminate many of the hazards and improve fire protection facilities.

On inspecting progress of the city-planning, the Fire Investigator found that actual work on the city plan had been temporarily suspended owing to a lack of funds, and that promised money had not been received from the Home Ministry. He found that four of the city's streets had been widened as recommended in the plan, the main street being almost twice its former width. Temporary shacks and shops which had been built into these widened areas after the fire had been eliminated by October.

The Fire Investigator found also that very little work had been done to improve the water system or to provide emergency water supplies for fire fighting, as advised in the city plan. Leakage in the water system had been reduced, however, and some work had been done toward creation of a dam and reservoir in a large ravine running through the city. Reconstruction of destroyed areas was at least 50 percent complete early in October, but many people were still living in the school buildings although several barrack-type buildings were under construction for them. Little improvement had been made in the size or equipment of the Iida Fire Department, which still consisted of eight paid firemen whose best equipment was two 13-year-old converted Ford pumpers in poor condition.

The visiting PSD Fire Investigator was also given details of two recent Iida fires. The first, occurring on 9 Sep, was caused by an overheated chimney and resulted in destruction of seven houses and supplies of yeast and factory utensils together valued at ¥1,640,000. Another fire on 14 Sep destroyed 21 houses, including a factory, with a loss estimated at ¥19,870,000. The fire was caused by an overheated motor.

2. Tokyo Fire36 Buildings Destroyed in Night Blaze

As shown in the pictures following p. PSD-14 and Graph No. 4, a fire on the night of 3-4 Nov 47 swept through 36 buildings near Memorial Hall in Tokyo, causing the deaths by electrocution of three Japanese, one a policeman. The fire, believed to have started in a warehouse on the lower floor of a two-story building with residence upstairs, was made worse by wind and by the consumption of stocks of stored gasoline and rubber. Some 19 Japanese pumpers and a fireboat, in addition to a U.S. Army pumper, were required to quell the flames. The destruction seen in this one fire is typical of that resulting from hundreds of fires yearly in Japan, most of them caused by carelessness or ignorance, two faults which the Japanese people cannot afford to have with regard to fire hazards in a land of highly inflammable construction.

JAPANESE FIRE STATISTICS
No. of Fires, Yen Damage & Casualties
By Prefecture, Aug 47

Prefecture	No. of Fires	Estimated Yen Damage	Casualties		
			Dead	Injured	Total
Hokkaido	44	32,385,610	2	27	29
Aomori	11	1,249,000	0	0	0
Iwate	7	67,568,600	0	1	1
Miyagi	16	20,122,950	0	1	1
Akita	12	1,613,760	0	0	0
Yamagata	15	43,518,336	0	0	0
Fukushima	23	8,415,500	0	2	2
Ibaraki	23	8,971,400	0	0	0
Tochigi	28	3,359,000	0	2	2
Gunma	17	755,180	0	0	0
Saitama	21	2,646,385	0	0	0
Chiba	21	1,794,550	12	0	12
Tokyo	120	42,631,894	3	15	18
Kanagawa	53	12,116,295	0	3	3
Niigata	18	2,372,700	0	4	4
Toyama	11	2,174,100	2	0	2
Ishikawa	17	6,275,250	0	0	0
Fukui	23	2,403,900	0	1	1
Yamanashi	9	1,816,200	0	0	0
Nagano	45	4,686,150	1	3	4
Gifu	22	4,467,850	0	3	3
Shizuoka	24	7,479,000	0	3	3
Aichi	27	3,664,180	0	1	1
Mie	10	5,410,600	1	4	5
Shiga	13	610,300	0	1	1
Kyoto	25	11,408,700	0	0	0
Osaka	76	85,007,302	1	10	11
Hyogo	67	14,423,190	8	11	19
Nara	12	531,700	0	0	0
Wakayama	21	22,421,800	1	6	7
Tottori	12	12,123,400	0	1	1
Shimane	19	482,300	0	1	1
Okayama	34	1,002,080	1	1	2
Hiroshima	59	41,307,600	1	11	12
Yamaguchi	21	2,158,000	0	0	0
Tokushima	9	493,000	0	0	0
Kagawa	17	10,932,750	0	0	0
Ehime	34	1,917,610	5	2	7
Kochi	3	6,743,000	0	0	0
Fukuoka	41	11,467,875	1	5	6
Saga	12	667,600	0	0	0
Nagasaki	14	2,623,420	0	0	0
Kumamoto	14	1,934,900	0	0	0
Oita	31	2,458,700	0	0	0
Miyazaki	13	4,072,500	1	0	1
Kagoshima	19	11,214,500	0	0	0
TOTAL	1,183	534,100,617	40	119	159


SOURCE: Ministry of Home Affairs

TABLE No. 1


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JAPANESE FIRE LOSSES JANUARY 1946 - AUGUST 1947


A. NUMBER OF FIRES



B. DAMAGE VALUE (MILLIONS OF YEN)



C. CASUALTIES JAN 1946 - AUG 1947



SOURCE:

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS


GRAPH NO. 4

PREPARED BY:

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

RESTRICTED

TOKYO FIRE TAKES THREE LIVES
3 November 1947



GASOLINE AND RUBBER STOCKS
ADD TO FLAMES DESTROYING TWO-BLOCK
AREA



BROKEN WIRES ELECTROCUTE THREE
AS 21 PUMPERS FIGHT WIND-
FANNED BLAZE



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IV SUMMATION

IV SUMMATION**HIGHLIGHTS**

15 Nov 47

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE NCIU: Communists strong in NCIU since beginning. NCIU program includes Communist projects; specific disputes follow CP line. Seven of 18 NCIU member unions Communist dominated, eight believed under Communist influence, only three judged free from Communist leadership. NCIU structure centers on National Convention, Executive Committee, Secretariat. Top leaders changed in July to mask real leadership; top Communists resign but maintain influence. Reports indicate CP infiltration in local chapters. NCIU, Communist interest in youth groups parallel; NCIU affiliates have youth departments; "action" groups emphasized. Possibility of JFL-NCIU merger slight, but Communists strive for this end, attempt to spread influence in JFL. NCIU, Communists use same instructions for "October Offensive." Communist influence in labor hampers Japan's democratization.

ALL JAPAN GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS UNION: Zentei, strongly Communist, has enormous power; one of NCIU's most important member unions. Founded Nov 45 with Dobashi Kazuyoshi as leader; membership now listed at 334,323. Zentei unions based on 12 branches of communications activity, each operating on local levels. Zentei had major role in abortive 1 Feb 47 strike. Many CP members or sympathizers key Zentei men in position to control policies on both national and local levels. Zentei strike plans of isolated local disputes eventually engulfing whole nation conform with CP offensive scheme. Recent sitdown strikes indicate Zentei labor offensive may have started; outcome good yardstick in estimating JCP labor tactics.

CAN THE COMMUNISTS SEIZE KOREA? Korean independence issue before UN General Assembly; US asks formation of Korean government under UN supervision before withdrawal; military equipment to be controlled only by this government. Communists in Korea have party solidarity, military preparedness. North Korean Army may move to Manchuria if dissolution demanded. US vulnerable because North controls electricity, Rightists fail to cooperate, Communists in North and South well organized. Korean Red Army well trained, advised, instructed by Soviets; developed out of police, constabulary forces; bolstered by Coast Guard. People's Army now estimated at 125,000/150,000 men; Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry hold key staff, command positions. "Kilton Army" of Koreans in Manchuria has organic relationship with People's Army.

SUM - 1

S E C R E T

SUMMATION

No. 22

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SUMMATION

No. 22

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE NCIU

1. Background to the Situation
2. Unions Affiliated with the NCIU
3. NCIU Structure
4. High Command of the NCIU
5. Local Communist Influence in the NCIU
6. The NCIU and Communist Youths
7. Possibilities of JFL-NCIU Merger
8. NCIU and the Autumn Labor-Offensive
9. Estimate of the Situation

1. Background to the Situation:

In postwar Japan the Communists have worked hard to influence and control labor organization and activity. The organization to which the Japan Communist Party has devoted its greatest effort and which it took a major part in establishing is the National Congress of Industrial Unions (Zenkoku Sangyobetsu Rodo Kumiai Kaigi) usually called Sanbetsu. The NCIU includes national unions of workers in almost all vital industries such as steel, coal, electric power, communications, transportation, newspapers and radio, publishing and printing. The Party has been strong in the NCIU from the beginning. During its organizational stage, Ito Kenichi and Kasuga Shojiro, CP Central Committeeman, sat with Kikunami Katsumi on the 15-man NCIU preparatory committee. Kikunami, chairman of the union until last July only admitted CP membership after resigning from his NCIU post. Ito later became a prominent member of the NCIU's "Supreme Struggle Committee" which directed the Communist-sponsored labor offensive last winter.

The Communists had officially announced the formation of a congress of industrial unions to be their immediate labor aim as early as Mar 46. The preparatory conference led by Kikunami Katsumi attacked leaders of the Japan Federation of Labor, chiefly led by Socialists, as "traitors of the working class." They formulated an 18-point program with many communist slogans. A printed handbill distributed at the inaugural meeting of the NCIU on 21 Aug 46 described the union as "...a body for setting the labor movement in postwar Japan on the right course, for uniting the Japanese working class into a single national organization and for realizing the strongest possible unity and organizational power among workers. Its slogan is the creation of a solid front in labor's battle line through the organization of a single industrial union. The amalgamation of all workers through the liquidation of factionalism and the transcending of political creeds and ideologies would be a great stride forward toward the ideal of a solid front on labor's battle line."

a. Communist-NCIU Relationship: Events of the past year have indicated that the NCIU is strongly dominated by the Communist Party through its fractions in the Sanbetsu headquarters and in the various NCIU affiliated unions. This domination also is shown in directives and instructions issued by CP headquarters to fractions and cells in labor unions. The close relationship between the CP and the NCIU is apparent in their parallel activities in specific labor disputes. Also the union has adopted and carried out many policies closely following the CP line. (a)

Originally every union involved in the projected 1 Feb 47 general strike, the largest joint labor offensive ever attempted in Japan, was either affiliated with or influenced by the NCIU to some degree. Just before the strike deadline the JFL withdrew, leaving the CP dominated NCIU in complete control. The strike was organized behind communist slogans and political policies. Over two-thirds of the top general strike leaders were Communists or Communist sympathizers. In many cases Communists were instrumental in instigating strikes by Sanbetsu unions even when differences between labor and management could have been settled by discussions. (b)

(a) M/R, 11 Jun 47, CIS, G-2, "Communist Party Strategy in NCIU"

(b) Sp Rpt, CIS, G-2, 28 Mar 47, "Communist Influence in Threatened General Strike of 1 Feb 47."

SUMMATION

No. 22

Another evidence of the NCIU's ties with the JCP is the peculiar personnel relationship in the Party and the Union. Many of Sanbetsu's leaders are CP members. While others are not actually Party members, they are sympathetic to the Communist labor policy. This is true now as it was in the old NCIU leadership. After the failure of 1 Feb strike, Communists became more cautious in their activities within unions. At its national convention in July the NCIU changed some of its leaders while the Communists attempted to mask their leadership behind these changes. Essentially, however, the NCIU still has nearly the same composition as it did when it led last winter's offensive. (c)

At meetings of Communist NCIU leaders in Hyogo Prefecture in Sep 47, representatives spoke of the CP and NCIU interchangeably. One man who said that "democracy" must be established in the operation and guidance of both the JCP and the NCIU also asserted that the Party and the Sanbetsu was intended to be controlled by the class organized state. Prominent Party members attended the meetings. Among them were Konno Yujiro and Shiga Yoshio, members of the CP Central Committee. (d)

2. Unions Affiliated with the NCIU:

The NCIU now has 18 member unions. It represents more than 1,170,000 workers in nearly all vital industries in Japan. The largest of these is the All-Japan Communication Worker's Union (Zen Nippon Teishin Jugyoin Kumiai) commonly called Zentei. Their 334,323 members are headed by Dobashi Kazuyoshi, former vice chairman of the Sanbetsu. Dobashi admits no political affiliation although much of his activity follows the Communist line. His union is one of the most Communist dominated in Japan, both on national and local levels. (e)

Six more unions are Communist dominated in addition to Zentei. They are: (1) the All-Japan Machine and Tool Workers Union (Zen Nippon Kikai Kigu Rodo Kumiai) 113,024, (2) the Japan Electric Industry Workers Union (Nippon Denki Sangyo Rodo Kumiai) 109,628, (3) the Japan Chemical Workers Union (Nippon Kagaku Rodo Kumiai) 63,600, (4) the All-Japan Electrical Workers Union (Zen Nippon Denki Kogyo Rodo Kumiai) 83,799, (5) the All-Japan Medical Treatment Workers Union (Zenkoku Iryo Jugyoin Kumiai) 18,258 and (6) the All-Japan Screen and Stage Workers Union (Zen Nippon Eiga Engeki Rodo Kumiai) 10,848. Communist elements have the power in these unions to control their major policies and activities.

Eight other unions are believed to be under varying degrees of communist influence but not necessarily under their dominance. They are: (1) The All-Japan Coal Miners Union (Zen Nippon Tanko Rodo Kumiai) 87,852, (2) the All Japan Iron and Steel Industry Workers Union (Zen Nippon Tekko Sangyo Rodo Kumiai) 68,866, (3) the All-Japan Transportation Workers Union (Zen Nippon Tsun Rodo Kumiai) 96,232, (4) the All-Japan Rolling Stock Workers Union (Zen Nippon Sharyo Rodo Kumiai) 32,000, (5) the All-Japan Harbor Workers Union (Zen Nippon Kowan Rodo Kumiai) 28,000, (6) the All Japan Newspaper and Radio Workers Union (Zen Nippon Shimbun Tsushin Hoso Rodo Kumiai) 26,597, (7) the All-Japan Occupation Forces Employees Labor Union (Zen Nippon Shinchugun Yoin Kumiai) 24,759 and (8) the All Japan Printing and Publishing Workers Union (Zen Nippon Insatsu Shuppan Rodo Kumiai) 17,307.




Only three member unions at present are judged to be free from communist leadership or strong influence. They are: (1) the All-Japan Lumber Industry Workers Union (Zen Nippon Mokusai Kogyo Rodo Kumiai) 38,399, (2) the All-Japan Life Insurance Workers Union (Zen Nippon Seimei Hoken Jugyoin Kumiai) 15,000 and (3) the Japan Marine Food Product Labor Union (Nippon Suisan Shokuryo Rodo Kumiai) 4,700. (f)



(c) Semi-Weekly Rpt on Labor Sit. No. 69, 441st CIC, CIS, 12 Aug 47

(d) S/I, CIC Area 9, 13 Oct 47, "Possible Communist Party Split"



(e) See pages SUM 11-16

(f) Sp Rpt, CIS, G-2, 4 Aug 47, "New Leadership of NCIU"








NCIU SPECIAL DEPARTMENTS : CHIEFS



LEGEND: —

1. CHIEFS APPOINTED BY SECRETARIAT PRIMARILY FROM MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
2. KNOWN J. C. P. MEMBERS MARKED RED







UNIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF INDUSTRY


ORGANIZATION

1. JAPAN MARINE PRODUCTS LABOR UNION

(NIPPON SUISAN SHOKURYO)



LEGEND: —
 1. CHIEFS APPOINTED BY SECRETARIAT PRIMARILY FROM MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
 2. KNOWN J. C. P. MEMBERS MARKED RED



AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONS

ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP

(NIPPON SUISAN SHOKURYO)

4,700		
-------	--	--

- | | |
|---|---|
| 2. ALL JAPAN SCREEN AND STAGE WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON EIGA ENGEKI RODO KUMIAI) |
| 3. ALL JAPAN LIFE INSURANCE WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON SEIMEI HOKEN JUGYOIN KUMIAI) |
| 4. ALL JAPAN MEDICAL TREATMENT WORKERS UNION | (ZENKOKU IRYO JUGYOIN KUMIAI) |
| 5. ALL JAPAN PRINTING & PUBLISHING WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON INSATSU SHUPPAN RODO KUMIAI) |
| 6. ALL JAPAN NEWSPAPER AND RADIO WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON SHIMBUN TSUSHIN RODO KUMIAI) |
| 7. ALL JAPAN HARBOR WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON KOWAN RODO KUMIAI) |
| 8. ALL JAPAN LUMBER INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON MOKUZAI KOGYO RODO KUMIAI) |
| 9. ALL JAPAN ROLLING STOCK WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON SHARYO RODO KUMIAI) |
| 10. ALL JAPAN OCCUPATION FORCES EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION | (ZEN NIPPON SHINCHUGUN YOIN KUMIAI) |
| 11. JAPAN ELECTRIC INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION | (NIPPON DENKI SANGYO RODO KUMIAI) |
| 12. ALL JAPAN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON TEKKO SANGYO RODO KUMIAI) |
| 13. ALL JAPAN CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON KAGAKU RODO KUMIAI) |
| 14. ALL JAPAN COAL MINERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON TANKO RODO KUMIAI) |
| 15. JAPAN TRANSPORTATION CO. WORKERS UNION | (NIPPON TSUM RODO KUMIAI) |
| 16. ALL JAPAN MACHINE AND TOOL WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON KIKI RODO KUMIAI) |
| 17. ALL JAPAN COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON TEISHIN JUGYOIN KUMIAI) |
| 18. ALL JAPAN ELECTRICAL WORKERS UNION | (ZEN NIPPON DENKI KOGYO KUMIAI) |

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

INTO THE

N. C. I. U.

(ZEN NIPPON SANGYOBETSU RODO KUMIAI KAIGI)

(ZEN NIPPON EIGA ENGEKI RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON SEIMEI HOKEN JUGYOIN KUMIAI)
 (ZENKOKU IRYO JUGYOIN KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON INSATSU SHUPPAN RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON SHIMBUN TSUSHIN RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON KOWAN RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON MOKUZAI KOGYO RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON SHARYO RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON SHINCHUGUN YOIN KUMIAI)
 (NIPPON DENKI SANGYO RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON TEKKO SANGYO RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON KAGAKU RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON TANKO RODO KUMIAI)
 (NIPPON TSUUN RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON KIKI RODO KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON TEISHIN JUGYOIN KUMIAI)
 (ZEN NIPPON DENKI KOGYO KUMIAI)

	10,848	
15,000		
	18,258	
		17,307
		26,597
		28,000
38,399		
		32,000
		24,759
	109,628	
		68,866
	63,600	
		87,852
		96,232
	113,024	
	334,323	
	83,799	
TOTALS	58,099	878,723
		263,370

TOTAL MEMBERSHIP 1,173,192





INFILTRATION

TO THE

C. I. U.

(ZEN NIPPON INSATSU RODO KUMIAI KAIGI)

LEGEND

-  KNOWN COMMUNIST
-  PROBABLE COMMUNIST
-  POSSIBLE COMMUNIST
-  NON-COMMUNIST

UNIONS

- COMMUNIST DOMINATED RED LETTERS
- COMMUNIST INFLUENCED RED UNDERLINE
- NON-COMMUNIST BLACK LETTERING

1, OCTOBER, 1947

PUBLICATIONS BRANCH, OPERATIONS DIVISION, CIS

SUMMATION

No. 22

In membership the communist-dominated unions far surpass the others. The seven communist-dominated unions have over 730,000 workers or nearly five-eighths of the total NCIU membership. The communist-influenced unions have nearly 400,000 while the three unions believed to be free from communist leadership have less than 60,000.

The chairman of five member unions are known Communists: Goto Reizo (Medical), Kameda Togo (Chemical), Ochiai Hideichi (Electrical Industry), Kodama Shigeru (Occupation Workers) and Maseba Yoshizo (Harbor Workers). Six other unions are headed by probable Communists. They are: Kawazoe Takayuki (Newspaper & Radio), Ono Kenzo (Transportation), Ito Takeru (Screen & Stage), Dobashi Kazuyoshi (Communications), Kawaguchi Takaharu (Electrical Workers) and Mochizuki Hideichi (Rolling Stock). Of these Maseba, Kodama, Ochiai, Kameda, Ito and Ono are members of the present NCIU Executive Committee.

3. NCIU Structure:

The NCIU welds its 18 member unions into a national organization designed to operate for the benefit of all the members. At the center of the structure are the National Convention, the Executive Committee and the Secretariat.

The stated role of the NCIU in relation to the member unions is one of co-ordination and planning. The national body does not have the authority to make decisions or give commands requiring local action by the unions. Supposedly such decisions are made by local unions and communicated to the national headquarters. In practice, however, the Secretariat and the Executive Committee of the NCIU proposes policies to the member unions which usually accept them.

Supreme NCIU legislative authority rests in the annual National Convention which is the link between separate unions and national headquarters. It decides on policy and elects the Executive Committee. When the Convention is not in session the Executive Committee with 45 members is charged with its responsibilities. This committee meets every month. Members are selected on the following basis: unions with less than 50,000 members get two representatives, unions having between 50 to 100 thousand members get three representatives and unions with more than 100,000 get four.

The Executive Committee elects a 15-man Secretariat from among its own members. The Secretariat in turn elects four officers from among its members. These officers are: the chairman, two vice chairmen and the secretary general. Among these four the secretary general has the greatest degree of power. All correspondence, directives, appointments and statements of policy and propaganda pass through him. The Secretariat conducts the business of the NCIU, appoints the Sanbetsu staff and is responsible for the conduct of the union between meetings of the Executive Committee and of the Convention. It meets once a week.

There are nine special departments in the NCIU headquarters. They are concerned with organization, education, research, finance, youth and women, organ press, culture, welfare and information and propaganda. Department heads are chosen by the Secretariat subject to approval by the Executive Committee. They are appointed usually from Executive Committee members and carry out NCIU administrative functions.

4. High Command of the NCIU:

a. Changes Mask Leadership: At its National Convention in July the NCIU made several changes in its leaders and the Communists attempted to mask their leadership behind these changes. (g) Top leaders such as Kikunami Katsumi, Chairman, Dobashi Kazuyoshi and Matsumoto Shinichi resigned, but 20 percent of the former Executive Committee were re-elected including several Communists and probable Communists. Most of the present

(g) Semi-Wkly Rpt on Labor Sit. No. 69, 441st CIC, CIS, 12 Aug 47.

SUMMATION

members, however, are new to NCIU leadership. While known Communist representation in the Executive Committee has decreased since last July, 11 of its 45 members are CP members. There are evidences that seven others are probable and five others possible Communists.

Communists are even more solidly entrenched in the 15-member Secretariat with five known, three probable and three possible communists. This gives the Party 11 potential votes out of 15, a decisive majority. Known Communists are: Kameda Togo, Yoshida Sukeharu, Matsumura Hiroshi, Takayama Keitaro and Nakahara Junkichi. Kameda and Nakahara were re-elected from the old Executive Committee on 13 Jul 47.

b. Deployment of Communists in NCIU: Of more significance than the actual number of Communists and fellow travelers is the manner of their deployment within the NCIU. Power in the Sanbetsu funnels up from the Convention to the Executive Committee and reaches its highest concentration in the Secretariat, where it is further concentrated in the four top officers. The Chairman of the Secretariat and of the NCIU at present is Kan Makoto, a relatively unknown figure in the national labor movement. He represents the strongly communist All-Japan Machine and Tool Workers Union. Kan apparently is not a Communist. Kameda Togo, a vice-chairman, admittedly is a Communist. He heads the All-Japan Chemical Workers Union. He also is chairman of the Education Department in the Sanbetsu headquarters. Matsumura Jinsuke, the other vice chairman, is alleged to be a Communist. Meanwhile, Yoshida Sukeharu, secretary general, has been a Party member active in labor since 1928. In 1929 he was arrested for violating the Peace Preservation Law and was sentenced to six years in prison. He has been active in the All-Japan Machine & Tool Workers' Union since early 1946. (h) His comparatively long experience with the Party is significant in view of the importance of his position. It can be assumed that where Party interests and labor interests conflict he will use his influence for Party interest. He may be the central figure in the Communist fraction in Sanbetsu headquarters.

Meanwhile three of the nine departments in NCIU headquarters currently are headed by known CP members. The departments and their Communist heads are: Organization, Nakahara Junkichi; Education, Kameda Togo; and Culture, Saga Zempai. Nakahara and Kameda are in the Secretariat. Both held important posts in the old Secretariat also. Three other departments are headed by alleged communist members of the Secretariat. They are: Research, Matsumura Hiroshi; Youth and Women, Kikuchi Ryugo and Organ Press, Kida Yasuji. (i)

This balance of power in the high command of the NCIU gives the Communist Party great weight. Due to Sanbetsu's size communist influence there has a disproportionate effect on the other labor organizations.

c. Secret CP Members Obscure Picture: There are fewer known Communists among union officials than before last July but so many of them occupy important positions that they still exert strong influence. Furthermore the number of known Communists in the NCIU is only a crude index of Communist influence in the union. Secret Party members, whose affiliations can only be guessed, obscure the picture of actual communist control. An outstanding example of use of secret Communists is Kikunami Katsumi, until last July Sanbetsu chairman. From the organization of the union and as long as he held office Kikunami persistently denied that he was a Communist. Only after resigning did he admit CP membership. Although previously many disbelieved him he had drawn considerable strength from posing as an independent with no proved relationship with the JCP. Although he no longer holds NCIU office he exerts great influence in the labor movement. He was re-elected by the Executive Committee on 22

(h) M/R, CIC Area 25, 18 Jun 47, "Yoshida Sukeharu"

(i) Sp Rpt, CIS, G-2, 4 Aug 47, "New Leadership of NCIU"

SUMMATION

No. 22

Jul 47 to represent the NCIU on the Central Labor Relations Committee. (j) At the July National Convention Kikunami and Dobashi Kazuyoshi, former NCIU vice chairman and suspected secret CP member, were rumored to have been retained as Union advisers. It is not known how many more secret Party members are active in the NCIU to further Party interests.

d. Known Communists Decrease: The decrease in known communist representation in the new leadership roster of the NCIU after Jul 47 is no indication that the Communist Party has less influence in the NCIU now. The proportion of Communists in the new line-up of Sanbetsu leadership is based on a policy change dictated by CP headquarters. This policy change was designed to counteract the wave of criticism directed toward Communist labor leaders following the failure of the 1 Feb 47 general strike attempt. Communists were directed not to take top leadership positions in labor organizations and in the future to execute Communist policies through cells and fractions on lower leadership levels. Several pro-Communist leaders resigned, although they are capable men who could have retained their positions or acquired others of equal responsibility if they had so desired. Despite these moves by the NCIU the Communist Party's hold on the NCIU is as firm as ever. There is little doubt that Communist former NCIU leaders will continue to exercise some influence through their friends and followers who still hold important positions in all levels of the NCIU structure. (k) Among the new leaders elected in July, also, probably there were several not generally recognized as Communist who could constitute the new communist fraction in the Sanbetsu leadership. (l)

5. Local Communist Influence in the NCIU:

Detailed information on Communist membership and control of local NCIU chapters is lacking. No full study has been made of this subject. Therefore, only scattered reports are available based on activity at the local level which has been so unusual as to draw the attention of CIC. This sampling, however, indicates a very considerable communist infiltration into prefectural branches and local chapters. There is a Sanbetsu branch headquarters in nearly every prefecture in Japan. For example, in the Executive Committee of the Hokkaido Chapter of the NCIU five of the nine members including the chairman, vice chairman and secretary general are Communists. (m) At Saitama headquarters of the NCIU two vice chairmen are CP members, while in Yamagata the secretary general is a Communist. (n) (o) Other places from which Communist infiltration has been reported are Ehime Prefecture (p) and Osaka. In Osaka the president and secretary general of the local council of the All-Japan Communications Workers Union are CP members. (q)

The Japan Communist Party has entrenched its cell workers in enough local unions as well as at the higher levels of the Sanbetsu organization to be able strongly to influence the policies and tactics of many unions along Party lines. This gives them power far out of proportion to their actual numbers and threatens the democratization of Japanese labor unions.

6. The NCIU and Communist Youth:

One method of Communist infiltration is through youth groups organized within the labor unions. Outstanding examples of this endeavor are the Young Communist League and the Youth Action Corps. The Young Communist League is a separate subordinate part of the Japan Communist Party

- (j) S/I, CIC Area 25, 31 Jul 47, "Labor Union Activities"
- (k) Same as (h)
- (l) S/I, CIC Area 25, 14 Jul 47, "National Congress of Industrial Unions"
- (m) S/I, CIC Area 37, 2 Oct 47, "Annual Convention, Hokkaido NCIU"
- (n) Spot Rpt, 441st CIC, 10 Oct 47, "CIO Meeting Yamagata Prefecture"
- (o) Spot Rpt, 441st CIC, 9 Oct 47, "Formation of Saitama Hdqs, NCIU"
- (p) S/I, CIC Area 6, 27 Sep 47, "Labor Situation-Ehime Prefecture"
- (q) S/I, CIC Area 27, 23 Sep 47, "Communist Influence in Unions"

SUM - 7

SECRET

SUMMATION

No. 22

organization. It is active in the propagation of communist teachings, in CP membership drives and generally has supported the Party cause within whatever organization its members are found. The Youth Action Corps as its name implies, has supplied "action" groups of militant youths to agitate strikers and to provide fighters against those who oppose the Party's objectives. These groups have been especially active in labor unions during strikes.

The NCIU has concerned itself with youth groups within its organization from the beginning. Among its special departments is the Youth and Women's Department. Presently this department is headed by Kikuchi Ryugo, reportedly a Communist and a member of the NCIU Secretariat. This department is concerned with all members under 25. It attempts to counter rightist teachings, organizes study groups, gives lectures and plans recreational programs for youths.

a. Affiliates Have Home Youth Departments: Nearly every Sanbetsu affiliate has a youth department in its organization. Young people have been major targets of the Communist fraction activities within labor unions. The Communist Party has attempted to unify such movements among these departments. As a step in this direction, the various youth and women's organizations were organized into a national council on 17 Jan 47. This council actually is a liaison organ. It is used by the Young Communist League to play an important role in labor disputes. Affiliated with this council are the youth and women's department of such labor unions as the All-Communications Workers Union, the Electrical Workers Union, the All-Japan Screen and Stage Workers Union, the All-Japan Electrical Industry Workers Union, the All-Japan Newspaper and Radio Workers Union, the All-Japan Chemical Workers Union, the All-Japan Machine and Tool Workers Union, the All-Japan Printing and Publishers Workers Union, the Government Railway Workers Union, the Government and Public Employees Union and the Shipbuilding Workers Union. All except the last three are affiliated with the NCIU. Further expansion of this movement has occurred since then. (r)

b. YCL "Squads" in Fukuoka: The Young Communist League in Fukuoka established a new "squad" in the electrical industries on 6 Sep 47. The head of this group is a member of the Fukushima area struggle committee of the JCP. He is also chief of the Youth Action Corps of the All-Japan Electric Industry Workers Union in Fukuoka. Two other leaders of this group belong to the organizers group of the Fukuoka JCP which has been responsible for Communist activities in three Fukuoka electric power plants. The new group is sponsoring "sliding wage scale" demands, membership drives for the Party and an organ magazine. They say: "People who want to fight against the cabinet are gathering together under one flag of struggle. We the working class, especially the ambitious youth, who are eager and enthusiastic for the establishment of eternal peace of the world, will rescue the motherland from the verge of destruction. History is made by the hands of youth. Youth symbolizes passion, progress, justice and truth. The youth of the working class who used to conduct themselves by the simple movements of passion are grasping strong theories for their practice now...Marx's theory is a great aid to the world's proletariat in their fight for the destruction of the capitalistic Slave Wage System..." (s)

c. Prefectural Youth Branches: In Yamagata Prefecture Communists claim that "Young laborers have sufficient power to act as a strong driving force in the Sanbetsu..." Communists in the Prefecture have

(r) S/I, CIC Area 25, 22 Sep 47, "October Offensive"

(s) S/I, CIC Area 3a, 7 Oct 47, "YCL in Fukuoka Organize New Squad in Electrical Industry"

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SECRET

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organized these "young laborers" to sponsor lectures on youth and culture movements, promote class consciousness, encourage anti-Social Democratic Party movements and maintain liaison between the NCIU, the Young Communist League and the Japan Farmers Union. Leaders of the youth labor federation are usually members of the Young Communist League. (t)

Various prefectural youth branches of the All-Japan Communication Workers Union met on 21-22 Oct 47 in Gumma Prefecture. Nozaka Sanzo, prominent Communist Party leader, attended the meeting. Most of the participants reportedly were Communists or Party sympathizers, but no definite decision was reached at the meeting regarding active participation by the youth organizations in strikes or walkouts. (u)

7. Possibilities of JFL-NCIU Merger:

For over a year the NCIU and the Japan Communist Party have been agitating for a merger between the NCIU and the Japan Federation of Labor, the two largest labor organizations in Japan. At present this merger seems improbable. The JFL always has been generally non-Communist, except perhaps chapters in the Hokkaido region. It is considered a stabilizing force of great importance in the Japanese labor movement. The JFL answer to NCIU merger proposals always has been: "a merger will be considered only on the condition that the NCIU rid itself of all 'communist factions' and communist influence, due to the fact that the policy of seeking precipitation of disputes on the basis of an ideology advocating revolution by violence...is entirely incompatible with us." Under this condition the JFL would hardly concede to merge with the communist-laden NCIU. (v)

On the national scale there has been organized the All-Japan Labor Union Liaison Council (Zen Nippon Rodo Kumiai Kyogikai). Theoretically all labor unions are represented on the Council. Actually, however, the organization is a Sanbetsu front through which the NCIU hopes to influence other unions presently outside of its control. Most of the representatives on the Council are from NCIU affiliated unions. Its leaders are pro-Communist Sanbetsu men. (w)

There is a further factor which affects the future relationship of the NCIU and the JFL. This is the extent to which communists or Party sympathizers have been or will be able to infiltrate into positions of leadership and influence in the JFL. At present the most that NCIU can hope for is to win over the neutral elements of the JFL and to establish a strong faction in sympathy with Sanbetsu tactics within the JFL leadership. There is a strongly leftist faction in the Social Democratic Party. If the present group of Social Democrats who control the JFL should ever be removed from their position of leadership, however, it is likely that the communists would be able to establish a considerable measure of control over the JFL as they have already done in the NCIU. Under such circumstances it is likely that the two labor organizations would be merged. Then the stabilizing influence of the more conservative JFL upon the labor movement would be removed.

8. NCIU and the Autumn Labor Offensive:

Since August the Japan Communist Party has been actively promoting labor disputes and strikes. It has endeavored to work through unions

(t) M/R, CIC Area 32, 4 Sep 47, "October Offensive"

(u) CIC Spot Rpt, 441st CIC, 22 Oct 47, "All Japan Communication Workers Union Meeting"

(v) CIC Spot Report, 441st CIC, CIS, 7 Oct 47, "Meeting of Tochigi JFL"

(w) Spot Intell Rpt, G-2, SCAP, FEC, 14 Feb 47, "All-Japan Labor Union Congress (Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Kaigi)"

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under Communist leadership or influence. Communists have been active especially within the NCIU and the Government Workers Union. They have attempted to gain the support of non-Communist workers by focusing their demands around the current great economic distress. With this support they had hoped to precipitate a series of separate strikes scattered throughout the country. If successful these independent strikes in total effect would have amounted to a general strike. Actually, their schedule seems to have bogged down and the offensive appears to have been postponed.

Chapters of the following Sanbetsu affiliated unions were involved in disputes and strikes in the fall labor offensive: All-Japan Printing and Publishing Workers Union, All-Japan Newspaper and Radio Workers Union, All-Japan Rolling Stock Workers Union, Japan Electric Industry Workers Union, All-Japan Iron and Steel Industry Workers Union, All-Japan Electric Workers Union and All-Japan Communication Workers Union. All of these unions are under Communist domination or influence.

The NCIU issued Directive No. 16 to the labor unions on 28 Jul 47 as a guide in presenting their demands to employers. This directive outlined a plan for wage increase demands based on local conditions, provision of adequate food rations, formation of a livelihood Cooperative Union and opposition to the dismissal of employees. It is significant that the Communist Party directives for the so-called "October Offensive" included the same instructions. (x)

9. Estimate of the Situation:

Communist influence in the NCIU is an established fact. In the high command of the organization Communists occupy nearly 25 percent of the Executive Committee seats. They compose 35 percent of the more powerful Secretariat and hold two of the top four positions in the NCIU. In addition to known Communists there probably are many secret members and officers who constitute a new Communist fraction in the NCIU headquarters who can tip the balance of power in favor of the Party. Furthermore, numerous Communists and Party liners are strongly entrenched at the regional levels of the NCIU organizations as well as in the local branches of member unions.

The Communists hold sufficient key posts and dominate the leadership of sufficient key unions in the NCIU to throw the country into economic and social chaos if they can get the support of the rank and file. Their position can be strengthened further if they also can work with other leftist-influenced unions, especially the Government Workers and Public Employees Union. On the other hand it is believed that Japanese labor as a whole is conservative and anti-communist. Consequently the picture of communist infiltration into labor unions is not as red as listing of communist-held posts might seem. The future success of Communist attempts to use organized labor to cause social and economic chaos during the coming winter should show more clearly the effectiveness of their infiltration.

Certainly the Communists will continue their labor union activities. They hope some day through economic disruption to rally the people around them and seize the government. Their activity in organized labor, especially in such a powerful labor organization as the NCIU, definitely handicaps the early and complete democratization of the Japanese labor movement. Unless the Japanese themselves can eliminate this influence it may postpone this democratization indefinitely.

(x) S/I, CIC Area 25, 22 Sep 47, "Directive No. 16, Executive Committee, NCIU"

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No. 22

ALL JAPAN GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION WORKERS UNION

-
1. Introduction
 2. Background of Communication Workers Union
 3. Communist Elements in Zentei
 4. Union Tactics for Coming Offensive
 5. Conclusion
-

1. Introduction:

The capacity to interrupt the telephone, telegraph and mail systems of Japan at will patently gives enormous power to the All Japan Communication Workers Union (Zen Teishin Jugyoin Kumiai). Should Zentei, as this union is commonly called, choose to use its vast power capriciously or pervert it for the tactical uses of the Communist Party, the effect both on the conduct of the Occupation and on the interests of the Japanese public would be grave. There is reasonable concern that the leaders of this great union even now are attempting to use their power according to the directions of the Japan Communist Party.

Zentei is a nationwide organization which in only two years has succeeded in unionizing the overwhelming majority of the workers in its field. Workers in the postal, telephone and telegraph services are combined with the government life insurance, money order service and the communication training schools into one big union.

Zentei is one of the most important members of the Communist-influenced NCIU, and is itself one of the most Communist dominated unions in Japan. Under the militant leadership of Dobashi Kazuyoshi, strong Communist sympathizer if not secret Party member, the union was selected by the Communist Party to take a leading part in their planned autumn offensive, just as they played a dominant role in the abortive 1 Feb general strike. Even while union headquarters were submitting grievances to the Central Labor Relations Committee for mediation they were placing primary emphasis on organization of regional waves of strikes in line with the Communist program of instigating seemingly isolated local strikes until they engulf the country. Events of the past weeks seem to show that Zentei's autumn offensive began to get under way, but then collapsed, possibly due to strong counter action of the Japanese Government and known opposition of the Occupation authorities and possibly also of rank and file opposition.

2. Background of Communication Workers Union:

a. History: The Communication Workers Union was formed in Tokyo in Nov 45 by Dobashi Kazuyoshi and a few friends. In Jan 46 the fledgling union held its first general meeting with representatives from the Tokyo Metropolitan area and Kanagawa, Chiba and Saitama Prefectures. Dobashi was unanimously elected president. Since that modest beginning the union has grown phenomenally. (a) The union early established its reputation with the workers when by a threatened strike it won a 200 to 300 percent pay raise from the Government for all communication workers. (b) Zentei pledged itself in Mar 46 to participate in the formation of the Japanese NCIU. Through strong and intelligent leadership Zentei gradually became the best organized and one of the most powerful unions in Japan. Its membership is reported at about 334,323, representing more than 90 percent of all government communication employees. From the beginning Dobashi has remained the actual as well as the titular leader of the union and is one of the key labor leaders in Japan. (c)

-
- (a) M/R, CIS, G-2, 12 Apr 46, "All Japan Communication Workers Union"
(b) S/R, CIS, G-2, 25 Mar 47, "All Japan Communication Workers Union"
(c) S/R, CIS, G-2, 5 Aug 47, "New Leadership of the National Congress of Industrial Organizations (NCIU)"

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b. Organization: Zentei's structure is founded on craft type unions. The work of the Communications Ministry is separated according to functions, and local unions are organized accordingly. The 12 different branches of communications activity are represented by 12 separate unions at the local level. They are: (1) Special Post Office, (2) Railway Post Office, (3) Engineering Department, (4) Postal Business Division, (5) Telegraph, (6) Telephone, (7) Post Office Insurance, (8) Postal Savings, (9) Communications Education Branch, (10) Communications Administration, (11) Electrical Research Laboratories and (12) Medical Department. There is a variable number of such local unions in each prefecture and in each of the six largest cities in accordance with population and weight of business.

Representatives of these 12 functionally separated local unions meet in two different types of councils. All unions are represented in prefectural and city councils, which serve to represent and foster the interests of all Zentei members and unions in their district regardless of functional variation. Additionally, there are prefectural, large city and national councils representing these semi-craft unions on a functional basis to foster their specialized craft interests.

The various prefectural councils elect representatives to the annual National Convention. They are allowed one delegate for every 760 members. This National Convention is the basic legislative body of Zentei, and all national powers are vested in it. Since normally it only meets once a year, however, its functions chiefly are: (1) to elect the members of the Central Committee, (2) to elect the officers of the National Headquarters, (3) to ratify or reject the executive acts of the National Officers during the previous year and (4) to debate and legislate on broad, general policy.

The Central Committee, each member of which represents 2,000 local members, possesses all the fundamental legislative power of the National Convention when the latter is not in session. There are 164 members of the Central Committee which meets only three times a year.

The Central Executive Committee is next higher in Zentei authority. It has quasi-legislative and quasi-executive powers. Since it numbers about 70 members scattered over Japan, it is impossible for this body to meet constantly or to take regular executive action. The CEC is made up of (1) the five officers of the National Headquarters, who have no vote, (2) 47 representatives of the Prefectural Councils (there being two from Hokkaido), (3) the 12 heads of the functional (semi-craft) councils at the national level, (4) three representatives of the special Youth Section and Women's Section of the National Headquarters Staff and (5) such other members as shall be determined by the Central Committee.

The National Headquarters consists of three parts. (1) There is the headquarters proper, consisting of a chairman, three vice chairmen and a secretary general. In Zentei, largely because of the personality and history of Dobashi Kazuyoshi, the chairman rather than the secretary general is the dominating figure. (2) There is a four-man staff of Accountants and Inspectors who are of but not actually in the headquarters. They do not have executive authority. (3) There is a Secretariat, consisting of 12 bureaus, under the immediate direction of the secretary general.

The bureaus of the Secretariat are (1) General Affairs, (2) Organization, (3) Accounts, (4) Education, (5) Information and Publicity, (6) Welfare, (7) Publications, (8) Liaison and Negotiations, (9) Special Post Office, (10) Research, (11) Business Study and (12) the Management Council. The Management Council is especially important. It is a standing grievance committee which meets regularly with a committee from the Communications Ministry to discuss and adjust grievances of all kinds for their settlement before drastic action is taken. That there are five members of the Communist Party out of the seven members of this committee seems to be a tribute to its importance.


Two special bureaus, in addition to the regular 12 bureaus of the Secretariat, are the Youths' Section and the Women's Section. Their pur-

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
S E C R E T

ALL JAPAN COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS



STRUGGLE COMMITTEE








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


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


JAPAN COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS UNION



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



ACCOUNTANTS & INSPECTORS



HEADS



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CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE


District conference (functional) heads	- - - - -	12 members
District conference (prefectural)	- - - - -	47 members
Youth Section	- - - - -	3 members
Womens Section	- - - - -	3 members
Central Executive Committee	- - - - -	5 officials
		70

Additional representatives as determined by C.C.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
164 members

(1 delegate per 2000 members of Zentei)
meets three times annually

NATIONAL CONVENTION 1 delegate per 760 members in Pref. Councils
Annually in May.



**ORGANIZATION OF
THE
ALL JAPAN COMMUNICATIONS
WORKERS UNION**

(ZEN NIPPON TEISHIN JUGYOIN KUMIAI)

OCTOBER 1947

LEGEND - :

OFFICIALS RECOGNIZED AND INDICATED THUS - ■ LACK OF INFORMATION.

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

1. C P MEMBERS :
 - A. ADMITTED
 - B. PROBABLE

2. C P SYMPATHIZERS
 - A. ALLEGED
- PRECISE NUMBER IM

NOV.

PUBLICATIONS BRANCH,

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

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DISTRICT CONFERENCES
(Prefectural)

DISTRICT CONFERENCES
(Functional)

UNIONS



LEGEND - :

OFFICIALS RECOGNIZED AS COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS INDICATED THIS - ■ LACK OF DESIGNATION ONLY INDICATES LACK OF INFORMATION.

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE :

- I. C P MEMBERS :
 - A. ADMITTED BY DOBASHI — 10
 - B. PROBABLE — 16
- 2. C P SYMPATHIZERS AND FELLOW TRAVELERS
 - A. ALLEGED — 49

PRECISE NUMBER IMPOSSIBLE OF DETERMINATION.

NOV. 1 1947

PUBLICATIONS BRANCH, OPERATIONS DIVISION, C I S

OF

MUNICATIONS

UNION

GYOIN KUMIAI)

947

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMATION

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pose seems to be to propagandize and organize younger men and the women into stronger supporters of the Union's activities. They have direct connections with the communist-organized national council of youths.

Zentei establishes a special "Struggle Committee" in times of crisis which takes over many of the functions of the National Headquarters. Currently such a Struggle Committee is in operation. It consists of the five Headquarters Officers and seven selected bureau heads, as well as such others as are designated by the CEC. (d)

c. February General Strike: Zentei played a major role in the abortive 1 Feb 47 general strike. The proposed strike involved approximately 2,000,000 government workers. The Railroad Workers Union and the Communication Workers Union were the most active and militant of the 11 unions involved and spearheaded the movement. (e) Zentei in particular was geared to launch a nation-wide strike that would have paralyzed the entire communication system of the country. Some of the more communist-dominated branches of the union such as the Osaka and Niigata locals were almost fanatical in their support of the impending strike. (f) The general strike was cancelled only at the last moment through the direct orders of SCAP. The Communist Party took an active part in trying to promote the strike and so to discredit the Occupation authorities. (g) In addition to Chairman Dobashi, Hoshino Saku, just elected a Zentei vice chairman on 5 Nov 47, was a member of the Joint Struggle Committee which attempted to force this general strike.

Zentei continued more active than any of the other government workers unions following the February strike ban. Plans for an independent strike on 24 Feb were carried on through secret code between union headquarters in Tokyo and their various branch headquarters. Zentei at all times is able to maintain close liaison between its branches through control of communication channels. This union therefore is able to direct unified action by all its branches more rapidly than other unions. Once again however, their plans were cancelled on the "advice" of SCAP. The union leaders settled down to further negotiations with the Government but agreed to drop their state of "strike preparedness" in March when the Struggle Committees of the union were dissolved. As in the case of the railroad workers union, Zentei gained most of its economic demands either in whole or in part through negotiations. (h)

d. Key Men: Dobashi Kazuyoshi, 41-year-old head of Zentei and until recently vice chairman of the NCIU is one of Japan's outstanding labor leaders. Despite his meteoric rise in labor politics, his political affiliations remain obscure. Although once considered a "political neutral" and one of the most democratic labor leaders in Japan, (i) during the past year he has directed his union along Communist Party tactical lines. This may have been due to strong pressure from Communist elements within his own union. His conduct and public statements for some time, however, have branded him as a strong Communist sympathizer if not a secret Party member. (j) Born of fairly well to do parents, Dobashi is a graduate of Meiji University Law School. He has been a minor official in the Tokyo Central Post Office for the past 13 years. Unusually cool and resourceful, his diplomatic ability is widely acknowledged among Japan's labor leaders. (k)

- (d) The Constitution of the All Japan Communication Workers Union
 (e) S/R, CIS, G-2, 4 Apr 47, "Communist Influence in Threatened General Strike"
 (f) Spot Intell Rpt, CIS, G-2, 21 Feb 47, "Communication Workers Union"
 (g) Same as (e)
 (h) S/R, CIS, G-2, 16 Jan 47, Labor Trends Since 1 Feb Strike Cancellation"
 (i) M/R, CIS R&A Sect., 12 Apr 46, "All Communication Workers Union"
 (j) M/R, CIS S/A, 1 Jul 47, "Communication Workers Union Convention"
 (k) S/I, CIS, G-2, 10 Apr 47, "Labor Leaders of Post-War Japan"

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Of the three vice chairmen, Takahara Shinichi is a known CP member. He is a graduate of Port Arthur College in electrical studies and is now on the staff of the Tokyo Electrical Laboratory. Young and fiery, Takahara has taken a leading role in union affairs for over a year. Besides being chief of the Education Bureau last year, he was standing member of Zentei's Central Struggle Committee for the February General Strike.

(l) Takahara was recently placed in charge of a new committee to lead the overall activities of the union in its proposed autumn offensive. Ebihara Tetsu, another vice chairman, was elected as Takahara's deputy and assistant. (m) Hoshino Saku, elected a vice chairman on 5 Nov 47, replaced Party member Tamura Sankichi. There is no evidence that Hoshino, an old timer in the union, is a Communist although he followed the Party line in preparing for the 1 Feb strike. (n)

3. Communist Elements in Zentei:

The extent of Communist influence in the communication union should not be underestimated. Many union members are neither Communists nor Communist sympathizers but recent reports indicate Communists are more firmly entrenched than ever in key posts and are sufficiently powerful to control Zentei's policies and activities. Some sources consider Zentei the most strongly Communist of all big unions in Japan. (o) The degree of Communist control in the union can be seen in a recent report based on information from Japanese Government sources. Among 92 prominent labor leaders in the communication union, 62 are listed as Communist Party members. (p) Communist success in Zentei is attributed to clever use of fractions and cells. The "fraction method" is the placing of a few influential Party members or sympathizers in positions of leadership where they can influence or control the policies of the governing bodies of the union. (q)

a. Communist Influence on a National Scale: Communist domination of the union on a national level is established. At the top of the ladder, three of the five top union officials are Communists or Communist sympathizers. (See chart) Dobashi, a self-acknowledged admirer of Soviet Russia and communism, to all intents and purposes seems to be a Communist. (r) Ebihara also follows the Communist line and has been listed by several informants as a secret Party member. Takahara is a well-known CP member. The political affiliations of Hoshino and Nagaoka Mitsuhara, the secretary general, are unknown although Nagaoka is said to be a Socialist. An eight man committee was formed in September to lead the activities of the union in the proposed autumn offensive. Headed by Takahara and Ebihara, all but one of the eight are listed as Communists. (s) Five and possibly six of the members of the new Management Committee also are reported to be Communists. (t) A strong Communist fraction is known to exist in the Central Executive Committee. Dobashi says the number of Communists in this Committee is 10. A confidential informant claims that of the 69 elected members constituting the new CEC, 16 are CP members and four are Socialists. The remaining 49, however, while supposedly neutral in reality are nearly all pro-Communists, according to this unconfirmed source. (u)

- (l) S/I, CIC Area 25, 5 Sep 47, "All Japan Comm. Workers Union"
 (m) S/I, CIC Area 25, 8 Sep 47, "Leaders in the All Communication Workers Union's October Offensive"
 (n) CIC Spot Rpt, 5 Nov 47, "Meeting of All Comm. Workers Union"
 (o) S/I, CIC Area 10, 25 Sep 47, "November Offensive"
 (p) S/I, CIC Area 25, 9 Sep 47, "Reports on Ideological Inclinations of the Employees of the Ministry of Communications"
 (q) Same as (e)
 (r) Same as (k)
 (s) Same as (m)
 (t) S/I, CIC Area 25, 8 Sep 47, "Management Committee of the All Japan Communication Workers Union"
 (u) S/I, CIC Area 25, 6 Oct 47, "Communist Influence in the Government Office Workers Unions"

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Whatever the actual ratio, the Communists have maintained control at the top despite considerable criticism of Communist influence from within the union. For example, the Kanagawa prefectural branch, which had voted previously to propose withdrawal from the NCIU, presented their proposal at the Zentei National Convention at Matsue in Jun 47. After a strong appeal by Communist Hase Takamaro, CIC member, the proposal was promptly rejected. (v)

b. Communist Influence in Lower Echelons: Communist influence in lower echelons is difficult to determine partly because of the lack of full information on local unions. Many reports show that the Communists have strengthened their position within union branches this year and have succeeded in obtaining important and influential positions on all levels of the union's governing bodies. Recent elections held by the Osaka District Council shows this clearly. At a general meeting in Osaka on 25 Sep 47, attended by approximately 430 representatives from the various district branches, the following officials were elected:

President	Murakami Hiroshi	CP member
Vice Presidents	Toge Shiromi	CP sympathizer
	Kotani Sadajiro	Politics unknown
Secretary	Mori Hideo	CP member

Guest speakers at the meeting were Mitani Hideji, CP member and executive of the Osaka Regional Labor Committee; Shida Shigeo, Osaka Region Committee member of the CP; and Kimura Ichizo, member of the Communist Party and chief of the All Communication Workers Kinki Regional Federation. (w) Murakami has been active in union strike agitation during the past three months. (x) The most active and influential member of the Communications workers union in the Osaka area, however, is reported to be Tsuji Fumio, leader of the Communist Party Osaka District Cell Council. Tsuji operates behind the scenes in the communication union and it is believed that Murakami carries out his orders. (y)

At least half of Zentei district branches probably are controlled by Communists or pro-communist elements. Only those in Aichi, Gifu and Kochi Prefectures are free from Communist influence, according to one source. (z) The Tohoku regional branch of Zentei is completely Communist dominated says another informant. The chairman and secretary general of the Tohoku union federation are both CP members. Among the five prefectural branches in that region, Aomori and Miyagi are the most strongly controlled by Communist or pro-communist elements. (aa)

4. Union Tactics for Coming Offensive:

a. Zentei Plans Divided Front Offensive: The Communication Workers Union is considering a nation-wide strike by local chapters in November or December, according to available information. On a national level, Zentei followed legal procedures in presenting its demands, primarily aimed at raising the ¥1,800 wage scale. After the demands were turned down by the Government, they were submitted to the Central Labor Relations Committee for mediation without success. Zentei became free to strike on 26 Oct. Final strike decisions were expected to be made at a national conference beginning 2 Nov, but as yet no such decisions have been made. (bb)

- (v) Same as (j)
 (w) S/I, CIC Area 9, 15 Oct 47, "Second Meeting of the All Comm. Osaka District Council"
 (x) Spot Rpt, CIC Area 9, 15 Sep 47, "Assembly and Demonstration of the All Communication Workers Labor Union"
 (y) S/I, CIC Area 9, 2 Oct 47, "Tsuji Fumio"
 (z) Same as (u)
 (aa) S/I, CIC IX Corps, 13 Oct 47, "All Japan Comm. Workers Union, Tohoku Region"
 (bb) M/I, S/A, CIS, CIRC Public Mediation Hearing, 31 Oct 47

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The main efforts of the union have been directed toward initiating sporadic local strikes. This plan, circumventing SCAP orders prohibiting general strikes, conforms to the CP scheme of starting isolated strikes until they engulf the entire country. The total effect would amount to a general strike. The overall policies for the local offensive were formulated at a Central Committee meeting on 27 Aug 47 when it was decided to arrange for a "strike wave" by regions. The Osaka region, being the best organized and strongest would open the "strike wave." (cc) Since then, union branches have been preparing for the "strike wave." The scope of this plan can be seen from the central headquarters directives sent to union branches:

(a) Each prefectural branch is to initiate its own struggle demands and strike activities. Union leaders are to demand salary increases for workers enabling them to obtain 2,400 calories a day.

(b) Each prefectural group will organize a struggle committee which will issue orders to sub-branches.

(c) All echelons will maintain close liaison with each other and with other prefectural branches so that in time of dispute they will all be able to unite and begin a national struggle.

(d) Union tactics will be directed by union headquarters through informal verbal orders or other undercover methods. (dd)

(e) Local unions will make every effort to get local governments to grant their demands without prior Central Government approval. This is to confuse officials by incessant demands from local unions.

(f) Local unions will use as an excuse for not working the fact that the workers are undernourished. (ee)

b. Recent Strike Waves Possible Start of Offensive: Recent events indicate Zentei's labor offensive may have started. Small-scale walk-outs, slow-downs and absenteeisms have appeared in Kobe, Osaka, Nagoya and Tokyo. These spread rapidly and by the end of October had caused considerable disruption of mail and telephone communications both in Osaka and Tokyo. Although these strikes were claimed by union officials to be unauthorized and spontaneous, they gave every indication of being part of an organized program. Slow-downs and organized absenteeism rather than strikes have been widely prevalent among the members of this union, especially in Osaka, Nagoya and Tokyo.

The confusion and delay caused in government communications in Tokyo had become so serious that on 23 Oct the Cabinet was forced to issue a sharp warning to communication workers on their "deliberate idleness." By the end of October, most absent workers had returned. Minor slow-downs, however, continued. (ff) Reports of continuous district conferences and local workshop meetings indicate these sabotage tactics may be only the opening skirmishes of Zentei's autumn offensive.

On 4 Nov 47, delegates to Zentei's 4th National Convention voted to pursue "zonal negotiation methods," a program by areas developed by Communists in the union and given union approval at the August CP Central Committee meeting. Conference representatives reported "wild-cat" slow-down tactics were spreading throughout the country, including Hokkaido cities, Sendai, Nagoya and Okayama. (gg)

5. Conclusion:

Whether Zentei can succeed with its original strike program is subject to debate. That this union is one of the most Communist dominated in Japan seems well established. The outcome of Zentei's program will serve as a yardstick in estimating labor union tactics of the JCP.

(cc) S/I, CIC Area 25, 8 Sep 47, "Central Committee Meeting of All Comm. Workers Union"

(dd) Spot Rpt, CIC Area 25, 14 Oct 47, "Semi-Annual Meeting of Tohigi Regional Conference of All Comm. Workers Union"

(ee) Same as (aa)

(ff) CIC Spot Rpt, 23 Oct 47, "Possible Sabotage Strike, Tokyo Central Post Office"

(gg) M/R, S/A, CIS, G-2, 5 Nov 47, "Zentei's Zonal Negotiation Method"

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CAN THE COMMUNISTS SEIZE KOREA?

1. The Problem
2. The Communist Program
 - a. Party Solidarity
 - b. South Korea Military Preparedness
 - c. Plans to Invade South Korea
 - (1) Outline of Instructions
 - (2) Sabotage, Terror, Chaos
 - d. Strategic Hinterland
3. American Vulnerability
 - a. North Controls Electric Power
 - b. Opposition From the Right
 - c. Trained and Armed North Koreans
4. Building Korean Red Army
 - a. Training Korean Fighting Men
 - b. Russian-Korean-Chinese Military Cooperation
 - c. Extent of Soviet Influence
 - d. Political Indoctrination
 - e. Police and Constabulary
 - f. Military Forces and Leaders
5. Korean Forces in Manchuria
6. Conclusions

1. The Problem:

The American Government has thrown the issues of Korean independence into the United Nations General Assembly for decision. Countering a Soviet proposal for joint withdrawal early in 1948, an American resolution for election of a National Korean Assembly next March and formation of a Korean government under United Nations supervision is before the UN Political and Security Committee. During the debate at Lake Success the US asked that when Soviet and American forces are withdrawn no military equipment of any kind shall be left behind which is not under the effective control of the new Korean government. To hope to have this new government act with sovereign independence while there exists in North Korea a well-equipped army not under its control would be naive.

Whether acceptance of the American proposals can avert seizure of all Korea by the Communists is debatable. Consideration of their strengths and capacities seems desirable. There is reason to fear that even though reasonably honest elections are held, and the Soviet and American armies do withdraw simultaneously the Communists will have the strength to seize power almost immediately. Perhaps this hazard cannot be avoided, but it seems well to understand it.

2. The Communist Program:

The Communists' strength has three main bases: (1) their own solidarity and discipline of organization, (2) the support of the military and political power of the Soviet Union, and (3) a Korean Communist Army in being. Soviet military power needs no comment. The communist's strength stemming from their own organization backed by a growing army will be discussed here.

a. Party Solidarity: The core of communist organization and discipline in Korea passes under the name of North Korea Labor Party and South Korea Labor Party, outwardly separate entities but merely different wings of the same organization, the Korea Communist Party. The South Korea Labor Party operates under some handicaps since it is in the American zone, but nevertheless it is believed to have the most disciplined solidity of any party in the American zone because of its connection with the Communist Party and government in North Korea. The various rightist parties in South Korea suffer from mutual antagonism, short-

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sighted hostility towards the American command, numerical diversification and lack of discipline. None of them has any sort of military force behind it. Presumably the South Korean police, constabulary and coast guard could be counted on to support rightist elements in South Korea in a North-South battle, but there is lack of unity among and even antagonism between the police and constabulary, while in part the Constabulary and Coast Guard are believed to have been infiltrated by Communists. In any case they have no organic connection with the South Korea rightist parties.

Short of honest elections there can be no solid estimate of the popularity of the various parties in South Korea. Current estimates, however, place the combined membership of the South Korea Communist Labor Party and the Democratic People's Front (including the various leftist and pro-communist organizations) at nearly a million. (a) Some estimate that these communists and fellow travellers could get as much as one-third of the votes in a free election in South Korea. Even though this estimate may be too high, the communist strength in the south joined to the solid communist strength in the north probably would give predominance to the Communists throughout the Korean peninsula were Korea united under present conditions. Should the Communist influence in the south be much less than this estimate, however, so long as the Communist government in the north possesses an army they should not have great difficulty in overwhelming the non-communist south.

b. South Korea Military Preparedness: The Communists in South Korea have several agencies for espionage and sabotage to aid in any North Korean program to seize power. (See CIS Periodical Summary No. 21, 15 Oct 47, pages SUM 17-23.) Their Youth Corps, the Democratic Youth Alliance now going under the name of the Democratic Patriotic Young Men's Association (b), presumably would be the spearhead of local action, although many other Koreans have and will in the future infiltrate from the north to execute special missions. Documents have been captured within the past month indicating an attempt by the Communists to organize a military force in South Korea. The evidence in this case is not corroborated, but it is sufficiently strong to be noted. According to these documents, taken from a member of the South Korea Labor Party acting for the North Korea Peoples Committee, a fairly elaborate program for the organization and training of military units throughout South Korea has been projected by the Communists. (c)

c. Plans to Invade South Korea: The North Korean Communists are making definite plans for the invasion of the South. Reliable information shows that they have the necessary forces, and that their plans are geared to the Russian proposals for the joint US-USSR withdrawal. They consider the possibility of the Americans remaining in Korea alone, or in reverse the necessity of appearing to disarm the North Korean forces in order to get the Americans out. They have a plan which will give the semblance of disarming while still permitting them to retain their army, and so enable them to invade and conquer the South as soon as the Americans have sailed away. (d)

(1) Outline of Instructions: Plans for the conquest of South Korea by the North Korean Communist troops were discussed at two formal meetings, one on 24 Jun and one on 6 Sep 47, attended by the top leaders of the North Korean Security Forces including the Peace Preservation Corps. A third meeting to discuss the detailed plans was scheduled for 20 Oct. Information is not available to show whether this meeting was held or what was decided.

- (a) XXIV Corps G-2 Summary No. 111, 20 Oct 47
- (b) XXIV Corps G-2 Summary No. 111, 26 Oct 47
- (c) USAFIK CIC, 16 Oct 47, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin
- (d) XXIV Corps G-2 Summary No. 110, 15 Oct 47

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The substance of the instructions given at this first meeting by the Chief of the Department of Internal Affairs of the North Korean People's Committee are as follows: "...I want all of you commanding officers... to remember that the North Korean Peace Preservation Corps forces will go to South Korea following the setting up of the Korean Democratic Provisional Government... promised by the Moscow Decision. The Joint Commission will set up this... Government according to the democratic demands of the Soviet Delegation. (Thereupon)... our mission is to take over all South Korean police organizations in place of the reactionary South Korean... National Police... When the war against the South Korean reactionaries comes we shall shut off the electric power to South Korea. All of South Korea will then be in darkness, which will make it convenient for us to attack..."

The second conference, on 6 Sep 47, which included a larger number of officers, was held at the headquarters of the North Korean People's Committee in Pyongyang. Among those present were Kim Il-sung, head of the North Korea Labor Party (the Korean Communist Party); and Tchei Yong-keun, the commander-in-chief of the North Korea People's Army.

Kim Il-sung had called this extraordinary meeting to discuss the Soviets planned proposal for a joint US-USSR withdrawal from Korea, which General Shitkov later presented on 20 Sep. Following the opening remarks of Kim Il-sung, a vice-chairman of the North Korea People's Committee Presidium, Pak Il-oo gave an inflammatory propaganda address, chiefly concerned with the deadlock in the Joint Commission in Seoul, attributing its failures to American and Korean reactionaries, and citing the success of the "great Soviet Proletarian people (who) won a victory over the strong bourgeois class through the power of progressive democracy." Similarly, said Mr. Pak, the "...world's proletarian class will destroy imperialistic America under the leadership of the great USSR." "Arm your minds and the minds of your members, for the time for fighting has already arrived. We will attack the South Korean reactionaries regardless of anything, even though a coalition government is established or the UN demand that we settle the Korean problem through a general election..." (e)

(2) Sabotage, Terror, Chaos: Following the two civilian leaders General Tchei Yong-keun discussed the tactics of the coming operation. Substantially they were to be as follows: A special, initial group of saboteurs would enter South Korea and through sabotage and assassinations create terror and chaos. At the moment of their entry into South Korea the electric power from North Korea would be cut off so that most cities would be in darkness to assist the saboteurs and to add to the popular terror. These advance agents would have instructions to kill all possible police, constabulary and South Korea officials.

The second phase of the operation would follow shortly. The North Korean Army would move into South Korea, rapidly destroying all resistance, and occupying the principal centers. Following this military conquest would come the third phase, when the police and counter intelligence forces entered South Korea to take charge of liquidating the remaining South Korean leaders and other "reactionaries." Dr. Rhee Syngman, his Occidental wife and Kim Koo were mentioned by name as targets. (f)

This plan appeared to envisage a situation in which the Americans and the Russians had withdrawn from the peninsula, but at a time when the UNO representatives would have attempted to disarm the North Korean Army. Although these North Korean Communists probably are fanatical enough to attempt to carry out this program even with American soldiers still in Korea, it doesn't seem likely that the Soviets would permit them to try. At this meeting the officers present were instructed to be cruel not only towards Korean reactionaries but also towards "our foreign enemies." Presumably they meant Americans. While it is possible that

(e) XXIV Corps, G-2 Summary No. 110, 15 Oct 47

(f) XXIV Corps, G-2 Summary No. 110; CG USAFIK to War, 23 Oct 47

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some border unit might precipitate a local action on its own responsibility it does not seem possible that the Soviets would permit the North Korean Army to launch an all out campaign against the south until after the American forces had left the country.

d. Strategic Hinterland: At the end of this session the representatives were directed to return to their posts and prepare for eventual invasion of South Korea the moment the signal was given, which would be when the United Nations decided that the North Korean Army must be disbanded. (g) There is some other evidence, however, that the North Koreans have considered another plan. They have considered withdrawing the North Korean Army into Manchuria if the demand for its dissolution is presented. Since already there are some Korean troops in Manchuria, chiefly in the Chientao region, reportedly serving primarily as line-of-communication units, and since there is close liaison between the Chinese Communist forces and the Soviets and Koreans, such a movement would not be too difficult and would be easy to arrange. Even though the Soviets accepted the American proposal to disarm all forces now in Korea, it would be possible to retain the North Korean Army intact by removing it from the country for a few months until the North Koreans were ready to invade the south following the evacuation of the American forces. (h)

3. American Vulnerability:

a. North Controls Electric Power: Since a great proportion of the electric power used in South Korea flows south on the lines from the Northeast built by the Japanese either the Russians or the Korean Communists could plunge a great portion of metropolitan South Korea into darkness at will. Currently, the American command is negotiating on the payment for this power. At the last reported conference in Pyongyang with representatives of the North Korea People's Committee the attitude of the North Koreans towards the American representatives was truculent. They made open threats to turn off the electric power going to South Korea. (i) Coupled with the known plan to cut off this power at the moment of sending saboteurs across the boundary preparatory to a southern drive this truculent attitude is not reassuring.

b. Opposition from the Right: Complicating the position of the American command in Korea is the hostile and even subversive conduct of the extreme rightist groups in South Korea. For example, on the railways from which most of the leftist agitators had been eliminated, in late October the rightists were engaging in "go slow" tactics so that at least once the Americans had to resort to threats of force to get a train moving. The extreme Korean rightists, led by Dr. Rhee Syngman, appear to be so intense about independence that they are hardly less hostile towards the Americans than they are towards the Russians. (j) These are the people who are marked as the first targets of the terrorists and soldiers of the North Korean Communists when the assault day comes. Their capacity to control Korea or to control the other rightist parties in the face of attack by the Korean Communists may be gauged by their incapacity to work with the American authorities during these extremely difficult days of negotiation for a truly sovereign and independent Korea. The Korean Communists know without any doubt that they are on the side of the Soviets, but the Korean non-communists appear incapable of being on any side but their own, which is a weak one indeed.

c. Trained and Armed North Koreans: Left to themselves the North Korean Communists in conjunction with those of South Korea appear to have

- (g) CG USAFIK to War, 23 Oct 47
- (h) XXIV Corps G-2 Wkly Sum. No. 39, 30 Jan 47
- (i) CG USAFIK to War, 28 Oct 47
- (j) CG USAFIK to State, 69181, 30 Oct 47

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sufficient strength to seize control of the whole peninsula after the Soviets and the Americans evacuate the country. Under Soviet guidance they have been developing and building up police and military forces ever since the Japanese surrender. About a year ago these Korean troops appeared along portions of the 38th Parallel for the first time, and ever since the Americans have had increasing contact with them. As one of many examples the Commanding General in Korea reported on 23 Oct, "Scattered light rifle fire emanating from positions north of 38th Parallel are increasingly disconcerting to American patrols south of the parallel. (At a designated place)...on three successive nights, 25, 26, and 27 Oct, three rounds each were fired at a U.S. border platoon bivouacked in that vicinity. Firing...appeared to be directed rather than haphazard..." The report went on to say that the firing might have been due to trigger happiness or attempts of the North Korean Constabulary to discourage refugees from crossing into South Korea. (k)

Whatever the cause of this firing, and of many similar incidents, they indicate considerable Korean military activity along the 38th Parallel. While this activity currently may be only an irritant to United States forces it may well be the forerunner of active southward assault when the Americans withdraw.

4. Building Korean Red Army:

The combat weapon of the Korean Communists is an army and a militarily trained police and constabulary, supported by a small naval force, the Coast Guard. For practical purposes it is unsound to consider the South Korean Communists apart from the North Korean Communists, for in effect these military forces are the armed instruments of both branches of the Korean Communist Party. They are located physically in the north, and draw their recruits and officers chiefly from the north. Many Southern Communists, however, have slipped north to join these forces, or to be trained in one of the several military, political or espionage schools there. (See CIS Periodical Summary No. 21, 15 Oct 47, pages SUM 17-24.)

In any future battle between Korean Communists and rightists selected members of the South Korea (Communist) Labor Party or the Democratic Youth Alliance are expected to serve as saboteurs, terrorists and members of assault squads.

Estimates of the numbers of trained men currently available to the Korean Communist military and police forces vary considerably. The picture is confused in part by movement of troops both north and south of the Manchurian border, by use of cover names by the Korean military forces to conceal their true purposes and numbers, and by disparity between men available and in training and the numbers of men actually trained and organized into competent tactical units.

Conservative estimates place the number of trained soldiers deployed in tactical units at 125/150,000 with another 75,000 men in the police, constabulary and coast guard services. Possibly 50,000 more Koreans are serving in Manchuria while probably many more have received some sort of military training. (1)

a. Training Korean Fighting Men: Although most Korean men had seen no military service prior to the surrender of Japan, the Soviets did have a sizeable pool of trained and battle hardened military personnel. In addition to those trained by the Japanese the Koreans had organized a small, independent Army in Manchuria to fight the Japanese, while still more had been trained by the Chinese Nationalists to fight the Chinese Communist Forces. Additionally, there were the Red Army troops of Korean ancestry. With these militarily experienced men as a nucleus the Soviets started to build up a Korean Red Army soon after they had entered North Korea. First they developed a police force and a constabulary, and only

(k) CG USAFIK to War, 68697, 29 Oct 47

(1) XXIV G-2 Wkly Intell Sum, North Korea, No 45, 30 Sep 47 and No 39, 30 Jun 47; ESD Shanghai Intell Rpt No ZCA-1313, 20 Oct 47

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began developing an army as such late in 1946. Their chief source for officers was among Soviet Koreans, who were serving in the Red Army, and among Koreans who had served in the Chinese Communist Forces, either in the Korean Volunteers or as an integral part of Chinese units.

They established military schools to develop officers quite early and now, two years later, they have had a considerable crop of junior officers who are graduates of these schools. Additionally they do have a very considerable number of higher Korean officers with combat experience either in the Soviet or Chinese Communist Armies.

The highest military school in North Korea is the Pyongyang Military Academy (Pyongyang Hak Won). The most recent class to graduate received their commissions on 5 Oct. About 680 men and about 180 women were commissioned, all as first lieutenants. (m)

These Korean troops receive basic infantry training, but few have had tactical training in units larger than a battalion. Their arms at first were Japanese weapons, but in the spring of 1947 the People's Army began receiving Soviet arms, including submachine guns, rifles, light machine guns and limited quantities of heavy machine guns. Their field pieces seem to be 76mm but their mortars go as high as 120mm. Their transportation consists of a heterogeneous assortment of Soviet, American and Japanese motor vehicles, together with horse drawn wagons. Their engineering, communications and fire control equipment is very poor. They are considered to have good morale, nevertheless, to be well led, and to be a force entirely adequate for their mission: the conquest of South Korea from the unorganized and disorganized Korean rightists after the Americans leave. (n) Their capacity must be judged in terms of their intended enemy rather than in terms of the American army.


b. Russian-Korean-Chinese Military Cooperation: The Soviet Military Command obviously is the key to military development and strength of the Korean Communist forces. There is close liaison, however, between the Chinese Communist Forces, the Soviet Army and the Korean Communist Forces. The Joint Military Council (Koon Sah Hap Tohak Ui Won Hae) was functioning by late Feb 47. The Soviet Command in North Korea and its Political Affairs Section, (politodyel), the Chinese Communist Party and its military commanders, and the North Korean (Communist) Labor Party and its military leaders are all represented on this Council. The Joint Military Council is a policy group to coordinate and implement the activities of the three military commands, including the transfer of troops and solution of common logistical problems. As a result of agreements made in this council there was a flow of Korean troops into Manchuria last spring. One unconfirmed source reports that 30,000 Korean troops were moved into Manchuria during the period 5-30 Apr alone. Here is a very practical and functional Comintern which has been little noted. (o)


c. Extent of Soviet Influence: Consideration of the North Korean People's Army aside from the Soviets is artificial. The former is based on the latter. The Soviets have supervised the growth and training of the People's Army closely at all levels. Supervision at policy-making levels has resulted in a rate of growth at all times in accordance with the available manpower and training facilities. The Soviets have maintained a nice balance of armed strength approaching the maximum that the economy of North Korea can support. Soviet advisers and instructors have been both those permanently assigned such duties and those drawn from adjacent garrisons serving on a temporary basis. Soviet advisers permanently assigned to staff sections of Korean units operate under the "opposite

(m) USAFIK, CIC-K 34, 17 Oct 47, Pyongyang Hak Won, 5 Oct 47, Grad Ceremonies & CIC-K 34, 17 Oct 47, Pyongyang Hak Won, New Courses at

(n) XXIV G-2 Weekly Intell Sum, North Korea, No 45, 30 Sep 47 and No 39, 30 Jun 47

(o) ISNK, No 39, 30 Jun 47





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
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NORTH SEA COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS
WONSAN

Possible new organization
in solid box.



Unconfirmed (Possibility that the Ind. Mixed Brigade has become the 3rd Division.)

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**COMMUNIST
NORTH KOREAN
POLICE AND
MILITARY
FORCES**

OCTOBER, 1947

PUBLICATIONS BRANCH,
OPERATIONS DIVISION
CIS

SOUTH KOREA LABOR PARTY
(Communist Party)

AGENTS

DEMOCRATIC
YOUTH
ALLIANCE

AGENTS

SABOTEURS


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possibility that the Ind. Mixed Brigade
rd Division.)

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number" system whereby the Soviet adviser works alongside the Korean officer. (p)

d. Political Indoctrination: Beyond the bounds of rigid Soviet military control there seems to be a considerable degree of harmony between these Soviet and Korean officers. Part of this harmony probably is due to the adoption by the Korean People's Army of the Soviet Army system of political commissars and political departments. The Soviets had available a very considerable number of Yen-an-trained Korean Communists as well as Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry, of whom they made maximum use to insure the needed political indoctrination. Training schedules of the Korean army include instruction in the Soviet Party line. US and South Korean leaders are portrayed as vicious reactionaries and fascists. The Korean soldiers develop cohesion in part by being taught bitter hatred of a common enemy. (q)

e. Police and Constabulary: The North Korean army has been developed out of the police and constabulary forces, although today they both exist side by side. The Department of Internal Affairs, which nominally controls the army, is charged with all police and local security matters. This department functions through two sections, the Public Safety Section and the Constabulary Section. The Public Safety Section (Boan Cho) operates the police, the plain clothes and political detectives, and keeps both criminal and political files and dossiers. The Constabulary Section (Kyong Bi Chon) controls the Police Constabulary (Boan Dai), the Railway Constabulary (Gholto Kyungbi Dai), the Coast Guard (Soosan Kyung Bi Dai) and the Fire Brigades (So Baeng Dai). The Police Constabulary are attached to every police box in North Korea, and frequently appear at the Parallel. The Railway Constabulary has guard duties on railway lines, tunnels, bridges and railway stations. Both of these constabulary forces can be considered as reserves for the army. Coast Guard detachments are located in most of the port cities and towns with functions normal to such organizations. Their current strength of about 12,000, however, seems high for an organization assigned solely to such duties. There are some hints that the Coast Guard either is becoming, or that elements from the Coast Guard are, the nucleus of the North Korean Navy. Should such a Navy be established, however, it probably would be limited to launches and small gunboats. (r)

f. Military Forces and Leaders: The People's Army (Inmin Gun) has been developed under an unusual cover. The Peace Preservation Officers' Training Schools Staff (Boan Kanboo Hulyun So) was established in Sep 46. Actually, this was the cover name for a military force which has steadily grown until today it numbers 125,000/150,000 men. By a decision made in Mar 47 the cover was to have been thrown off in Sep 47, with the use of the name People's Army (Inmin Gun). The old name is still used, however, along with the new one, and it is not clear whether the one has completely superceded the other, or whether the old cover name of Peace Preservation Forces is still used only to confuse outside observers.

The Peace Preservation Officers Training Schools Staff functioned under the General Headquarters of the Peace Preservation Forces (Boan Taedae Boo) with headquarters in Pyongyang. Probably the GHQ Peace Preservation Forces has been changed to the Department of Military Affairs (Koon Jung Boo) and the Peace Preservation Officers Training Schools, with their training battalions, to the People's Army. Such was the plan as of last spring. Since the People's Army has been activated it seems reasonable to assume that the other elements of the plan likewise have been put into effect.

(p) ISNK, No. 45, 30 Sep 47

(q) ISNK, No. 45, 30 Sep 47

(r) XXIV Corps Intell. Sum., North Korea, 30 Sep 47, No. 45

SUMMATION

No. 22

The Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army is General Tchei Yong-keun, who formerly served with the Chinese Communist Forces. His deputy and chief of artillery is Kim Moo-jung, also a former commander of the Korean Volunteer Army with the Chinese Communist Forces. The Chief of Staff is An Kil, Soviet Korean formerly an officer in the Soviet Army. He is said to have been a Soviet captain. A considerable number of Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry hold key staff and command positions throughout the People's Army.

The People's Army has a General Headquarters, at Pyongyang, with headquarters troops consisting of a guard battalion with a mission similar to that of a praetorian guard. The tactical units are two infantry divisions plus one independent mixed brigade. Evidence indicates either that this brigade has been expanded into a third infantry division, or that an additional infantry division is being formed. Most of these organizations and units are posted well back of the 38th Parallel, but on occasion some of them appear along that line. Usually, however, it is difficult to determine whether the Korean border troops are from the People's Army (or Peace Preservation Corps) or whether they are Constabulary troops. (s)

5. Korean Forces in Manchuria:

Whether the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army has any command authority over the Korean forces, the "Kilton Army" in Manchuria is doubtful. They appear to be under the orders of the Chinese Communist Forces. Nevertheless, there is an organic relationship between the People's Army and this Korean force on foreign soil. The Kilton Army, most of which appears to be assigned to line of communication duties rather than to combat, is believed to be commanded by a Soviet Korean, formerly a captain in the Red Army. The existence of this force, chiefly in the Chientao-Kirin area, however, makes easy the execution of the alternative invasion plan mentioned earlier whereby the Korean Communists could retain their army in being while nominally disbanding it. They could openly disband the less well trained elements, while withdrawing the greater body of their men and all their trained units across the Manchurian border into an area where the fiat of the United Nations could not possibly reach. Then at will they could march their army south again, being limited in their rate of advance more by problems of transportation and logistics than the military capacity of any Korean enemy. (t)

6. Conclusion:

The Korean Communists of North and South Korea are both parts of the same well organized, disciplined organization. No consideration of the strength of Korean Communists south of the 38th Parallel is reasonable which does not consider the strength of the Communists north of that line. The North Korean People's Army is as much the military instrument of the South Korean Communists as of the North. This army and its police and constabulary auxiliaries are so well organized, armed, trained and disciplined that the South Korean Rightists, or their brethren in the north, hardly could resist successfully for any period of time. Regardless of the Soviet forces, and assuming that they have withdrawn from Korea, it seems that upon the withdrawal of the United States Army from Korea the Korean Communists have the capacity to conquer and rule the Korean peninsula as another satellite state of the Soviet Union.

(s) XXIV Corps Intell. Sum., North Korea, No. 45, 30 Sep 47
(t) ISNK, No. 39, 30 Jun 47

CHARTS AND TABLES

THE KATAYAMA CABINET

AGENCIES OF THE PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE

FOREIGN NATIONALS IN JAPAN

1. DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS BY PREFECTURE
2. DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN TOKYO-TO
3. KOREANS, FORMOSANS, AND CHINESE IN TOKYO-TO

These charts, showing the distribution of all Foreign Nationals by Prefecture in Japan and a more detailed breakdown in Tokyo-To, will appear in the Periodical Summary as evidence of change or interest in Foreign Nationals make it of sufficient informational value.

S E C R E T

(CHART 1)

ASHI
KURI
MORI
HIRA
TOMI
YONE
*SAIT
*NISH


BUREAU OF LEGISLATION
(法制局)

Director (長官): SATO Tatsuo (佐藤達夫)
Vice-Director (次長): IDE Seizo (井出成三)

1st Department (第一部)
Chief (部長): MIYAUCHI Kan (宮内 乾)

2nd Department (第二部)
Chief (部長): IMAEDA Tsuneo (今枝常男)

3rd Department (第三部)
Chief (部長): SAMEJIMA Tadao (鮫島英男)



Prepared by: Compilation Branch
Operations Division
CIS, G-2

KATAYAMA CABINET (as of 15 October 1947)

KATAYAMA CABINET (片山内閣) Premier (總理大臣): KATAYAMA Tetsu (片山哲) State Ministers (國務大臣) ASHIDA Hitoshi (芦田均) KIMURA Kozoemon (木村小左衛門) KURUSU Takeo (栗橋越夫) SUZUKI Yoshio (鈴木義男) MORITO Tatsuo (森戸辰男) HITOTSUMATSU Sadakichi (一松定吉) HIRANO Rikizo (平野力三) MIZUTANI Chozaburo (水谷長三郎) TOMABECHI Yoshizo (若菜池義三) MIKI Takeo (三木武夫) YONEKUBO Mitsuhide (米窪満藏) *SAITO Takao (斎藤隆夫) *SASAMORI Junzo (笹森順造) *NISHIO Suehiro (西尾末廣) *HAYASHI Heima (林平馬) *---State Ministers Without Portfolio

CABINET SECRETARIAT (内閣官房) Director General (内閣官房長官): NISHIO Suehiro (西尾末廣) Vice Directors General (内閣官房次長): TAKIGAWA Sueichi (瀧川末一) SONE Eki (曾根益)

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大臣) (次長) (長官) (局長) (課長) (主任)

MINISTRY OF WELFARE (厚生省) Minister (大臣): HITOTSUMATSU Sadakichi (一松定吉) Parliamentary Vice-Minister (政務次官): KANEMITSU Yoshikuni (金兼義邦) Vice-Minister (次官): ITO Kinji (伊藤 健二) Minister's Secretariat (大臣官房) Public Health Bureau (公衆保健局) Chief (局長): MIKI Kaji (三木 哲治) Medical Bureau (医務局) Chief (局長): AZUMA Ryutaro (東 龍太郎) Disease Prevention Bureau (豫防局) Chief (局長): HAMANO Kikuo (濱野 燧雄) Social Welfare Bureau (社会局) Chief (局長): KASAI Yoshisuke (河井 清資) Child Welfare Bureau (児童局) Chief (局長): YONEZAWA Tsunemichi (米沢 宗道) Insurance Bureau (保険局) Chief (局長): MIYAZAKI Taichi (宮崎 大一) Repatriates Relief Board (帰国援護院) Chief (長官): SAITO Soichi (斎藤 惣一) Relief Bureau (援護局) Chief (局長): ONO Renji (大野 連治) Medical Inspection Bureau (検疫局) Chief (局長): ABE Shigeo (阿部 繁雄)

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE & FORESTRY (農林省) Minister (大臣): HIRANO Rikizo (平野力三) Parliamentary Vice-Minister (政務次官): INOUE Ryoji (井上 良次) Vice-Minister (次官): SASAYAMA Shigetaro (笹山茂太郎) Minister's Secretariat (大臣官房) General Affairs Bureau (總務局) Chief (局長): HIRAKAWA Mamoru (平川 守) Agricultural Administration Bureau (農政局) Chief (局長): YAMAZOE Risaku (山添 利作) Forestry & Land Bureau (林野局) Chief (局長): NAKAO Isomu (中尾 勇) Marine Products Bureau (水産局) Chief (局長): FUJITA Iwao (藤田 巖) Sericulture Bureau (養蠶局) Chief (局長): HIRATA Saburo (平田 三郎) Food Bureau (食品局) Chief (局長): MIHORI Saburo (三堀 三郎) Livestock Bureau (畜産局) Chief (局長): ENDO Saburo (遠藤 三郎) Land Reclamation Bureau (開拓局) Chief (局長): ITO Tasuku (伊藤 徳) Food Control Bureau (食糧管理局) Chief (局長): KATAYANAGI Shinkichi (片柳 真吉) Statistics & Research Bureau (統計調査局) Chief (局長): KONDO Yasuo (近藤 康男)

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY (商工省) Minister (大臣): MIZUTANI Chozaburo (水谷長三郎) Parliamentary Vice-Minister (政務次官): TOMIYOSHI Eiji (富吉 繁二) Vice-Minister (次官): OKAMATSU Seitaro (岡松 成太郎) Minister's Secretariat (大臣官房) General Affairs Bureau (總務局) Chief (局長): MATSUDA Taro (松田 大郎) Machinery Bureau (機械局) Chief (局長): SAITO Daisuke (斎藤 大助) Electrical Communication Equipment Bureau (電気通信機械局) Chief (局長): SHIRAZAKI Fumio (白崎 文雄) Chemistry Bureau (化学局) Chief (局長): MIKI Akiyoshi (三木 秋義) Textile Bureau (繊維局) Chief (局長): SUZUKI Juro (鈴木 重郎) Mines Bureau (鉱山局) Chief (局長): SHISEKI Ihei (始関 伊平) Electric Power Bureau (電力局) Chief (局長): KOCHI Shinzo (古地 信三) Essential Materials Bureau (生活物資局) Chief (局長): WADA Taro (和田 大郎) Research & Statistics Bureau (調査統計局) Chief (局長): MASAKI Chifuyu (正木 千冬) Repairs Enforcement Bureau (賠償實施局) Chief (局長): TAMAOKI Keizo (玉置 敬三) Patents & Standards Bureau (特許標準局) Chief (局長): KUBO Keijiro (久保 敬二郎) Coal Board (石炭廳) President (長官): SUGA Reinosuke (菅 礼之助) Vice-President (次長): YOSHIDA Teijiro (吉田 健二郎) Production Bureau (生産局) Chief (局長): WATANABE Makoto (渡辺 誠) Materials Bureau (資材局) Chief (局長): ISHIZAKA Zengoro (石坂 善五郎) Control Bureau (管理局) Chief (局長): HIRAI Tomisaburo (平井 富三郎) Lignite Bureau (亜炭局) Chief (局長): MAKIMORI Shotaro (楳村 正太郎) Foreign Trade Board (貿易廳) President (長官): NAGAI Kataro (永井 亨太郎) Vice-President (次長): ARAI Shigeru (新井 茂) General Affairs Bureau (總務局) Chief (局長): ARAI Shigeru (新井 茂) (acting) Export Bureau (輸出局) Chief (局長): SUZUKI Tomijiro (鈴木 徳三郎) Import Bureau (輸入局) Chief (局長): MOGAMI Shokichi (最上 重吉) Accounting Bureau (経理局) Chief (局長): MURAOKA Nobukatsu (村岡 信勝)

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(片山哲)
 (本村小次衛門)
 (鈴木義男)
 (一松定吉)
 (水谷長三郎)
 (三木武夫)
 (藤原順造)
 (藤原平馬)

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 Chief General Affairs Section (庶務課長):
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2nd Examination Bureau (検査第二局)
 Chief (局長):
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3rd Examination Bureau (検査第三局)
 Chief (局長):
 WATANUKI Kin-ichi (渡邊 謙一)

4th Examination Bureau (検査第四局)
 Chief (局長):
 OYAMA Tsunezo (大山常藏)

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 Director General (内閣官房長官): NISHIO Suehiro (西尾末廣)
 Vice Directors General (内閣官房次長):
 TAKIGAWA Sueichi (滝川 圭一) SONE Eki (曾根 益)

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY (商工省)
 Minister (大臣): MIZUTANI Chozaburo (水谷長三郎)
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Electrical Communication Equipment Bureau (電気通信機械局)
 Chief (局長): SHIRAZAKI Fumio (白崎 文雄)

Chemistry Bureau (化学局)
 Chief (局長): MIKI Akiyoshi (三木 秋義)

Textile Bureau (繊維局)
 Chief (局長): SUZUKI Juro (鈴木 重郎)

Mines Bureau (鉱山局)
 Chief (局長): SHISEKI Ihei (始園 伊平)

Electric Power Bureau (電力局)
 Chief (局長): KOCHI Shinzo (古地 信三)

Essential Materials Bureau (生活物資局)
 Chief (局長): WADA Taro (和田 大郎)

Research & Statistics Bureau (調査統計局)
 Chief (局長): MASAKI Chifuyu (正木 千冬)

Reparations Enforcement Bureau (賠償実施局)
 Chief (局長): TAMAKI Keizo (玉置 敬三)

Patents & Standards Bureau (特許標準局)
 Chief (局長): KUBO Keijiro (久保 敬二)

Coal Board (石炭廳)
 President (長官): SUGA Reinosuke (菅 礼之助)
 Vice-President (次長): YOSHIDA Teijiro (吉田 健二)

Production Bureau (生産局)
 Chief (局長): WATANABE Makoto (渡辺 誠)

Materials Bureau (資材局)
 Chief (局長): ISHIZAKA Zengorō (石坂 善五郎)

Control Bureau (管理局)
 Chief (局長): HIRAI Tomisaburo (平井 重三郎)

Lignite Bureau (亜炭局)
 Chief (局長): MAKIMORI Shotaro (栢 正太郎)

Foreign Trade Board (貿易廳)
 President (長官): NAGAI Kotaro (永井 幸太郎)
 Vice-President (次長): ARAI Shigeru (新井 茂)

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 Chief (局長): ARAI Shigeru (新井 茂) (acting)

Export Bureau (輸出局)
 Chief (局長): SUZUKI Tomijiro (鈴木 重三郎)

Import Bureau (輸入局)
 Chief (局長): MOGAMI Shokichi (最上 幸吉)

Accounting Bureau (経理局)
 Chief (局長): MURAOKA Nobukatsu (村岡 信勝)

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 Minister (大臣): TOMABECHI Yoshizo (若米 池義三)
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 Vice-Minister (次官): SATO Eisaku (佐藤 賢作)

Minister's Secretariat (大臣官房)
 Chief (局長): TEMBO Sukehiko (天坊 祐彦)

Railway Commission (鉄道総局)
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General Affairs Bureau (總務局)
 Chief (局長): NAKADA Fwazo (中田 不破三)

Personnel Bureau (職員局)
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 Chief (局長): KONISHI Keitaro (小西 健太郎)

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Materials Bureau (資材局)
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Railway Liaison Bureau (鉄道渉外事務局)
 Chief (局長): YAMAGUCHI Akira (山口 明)

Railway Public Safety Bureau (鉄道公安事務局)
 Chief (局長): KAWAHARA Michimasa (川原 道正)

Marine Transportation Commission (海運総局)
 Chief (局長): ARITA Kiichi (有田 喜一)

Marine Transportation Bureau (海運局)
 Chief (局長): AKIYAMA Ryu (秋山 龍)

Shipping Bureau (船舶局)
 Chief (局長): OSE Susumu (大瀬 進)

Seamens Bureau (船員局)
 Chief (局長): OKUBO Takeo (大久保 武雄)

Harbor Bureau (港湾局)
 Chief (局長): GOTO Ken-ichi (後藤 謙一)

Land Transportation Superintendence Bureau (陸運整理局)
 Chief (局長): GONO Motohide (郷野 基秀)

MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS (逓信省)
 Minister (大臣): MIKI Takeo (三木 武夫)
 Parliamentary Vice-Minister (政務次官): SHIIKUMA Saburo (指 熊 三郎)
 Vice-Minister (次官): SUZUKI Kyoichi (鈴木 恭一)

Minister's Secretariat (大臣官房)
 Chief (局長): ONO Katsuzo (大野 勝三)

General Affairs Bureau (總務局)
 Chief (局長): ONO Katsuzo (大野 勝三)

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Postal Affairs Bureau (郵務局)
 Chief (局長): OGASAWARA Mitsuju (小笠原 光壽)

Wire Communications Bureau (電務局)
 Chief (局長): NAKAYAMA Jiro (中山 次郎)

Engineering Bureau (工務局)
 Chief (局長): SHINOHARA Noboru (篠原 登)

Savings Bureau (貯金局)
 Chief (局長): MURAKAMI Ko (村上 好)

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 Minister (大臣): MIKI Takeo (三木 武夫)
 Parliamentary Vice-Minister (政務次官): DOI Naosaku (土井 直作)
 Vice-Minister (次官): YOSHITAKE Keichi (吉武 恵市)

Minister's Secretariat (大臣官房)
 Chief (局長): KARAI Saijiro (加来 才三郎)

Labor Administration Bureau (労働局)
 Chief (局長): KARAI Saijiro (加来 才三郎)

Labor Standards Bureau (労働基準局)
 Chief (局長): EGUCHI Midoru (江口 見登留)

Women & Juveniles Bureau (婦人少年局)
 Chief (局長): YAMAKAWA Kikuei (山川 菊栄)

Employment Security Bureau (職業安定局)
 Chief (局長): KAMIYAMA Akira (上山 顕)

Labor Statistics Bureau (労働統計調査局)
 Chief (局長): EGUCHI Midoru (江口 見登留)

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS (内務省)
 Minister (大臣): KIMURA Kozoemon (木村 小次衛門)
 Parliamentary Vice-Minister (政務次官): NAGANO Noghiro (長野 長廣)
 Vice-Minister (次官): SUZUKI Mikio (鈴木 幹雄)

Minister's Secretariat (大臣官房)
 Chief (局長): HAYASHI Keizo (林 敬三)

Local Affairs Bureau (地方局)
 Chief (局長): HAYASHI Keizo (林 敬三)


Police Bureau (警保局)
 Chief (局長): HISAYAMA Hideo (久山 秀雄)

Land Reform Bureau (國土局)
 Chief (局長): IWASAWA Todayasu (岩沢 忠泰)

Research Bureau (調査局)
 Chief (局長): NISHIMURA Naomi (西村 直己)

(CHART 2)

Director-General of Cabinet Secretariat
(内閣官房長官):
NISHIO Suehiro (西尾末廣)
Deputy Directors-General of Cabinet
Secretariat (内閣官房次長):
TAKIKAWA Sueichi (滝川末一)
SONE Eki (曾彌益)



Prepared by: Compilation Branch
Operations Division
CIS, G-2

AGENCIES OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (as of 15 October 1947)

Chief of Cabinet Secretariat
(內閣官房長官):
Suehiro (西尾末廣)
Vice-Chief of Cabinet
(內閣官房次長):
Sueichi (港川末一)
(曾彌益)

PRIME MINISTER
(總理大臣)
KATAYAMA Tetsu (片山哲)

CABINET
(內閣)

Prime Minister's Office
(總理廳)

Prime Minister's Secretariat (總理廳官房)

Pension Bureau (恩給局)
Chief (局長):
MITSUHASHI Norio (三橋則雄)

Statistics Bureau (統計局)
Chief (局長):
MORITA Yuzo (森田優三)

部)
部)
清)
部)
鹿松)
照)

ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT (行政調査部)
President (總裁):
SAITO Takao (齊藤隆夫)

STATISTICS COMMITTEE
(統計委員會)
Chairman (委員長):
KATAYAMA Tetsu (片山哲)

Office of Statistics Committee
(統計委員會事務局)
Chief (局長):
MINOBE Ryokichi (美濃部亮吉)

PUBLIC OFFICE QUALIFICATIONS APPEAL COMMITTEE (公職適否訴願委員會)
Chairman (委員長):
MIYAGI Minoru (宮城 実)

Office of Public Office Qualifications Appeal Committee (公職適否訴願委員會事務局)
Chief (局長):
YOSHIDA Kenkichi (吉田賢吉)

DECORATIONS BUREAU
(賞勳局)
President (總裁):
KO Yasuji (瀨古保次)

ALLOCATION OF PAPER FOR NEWSPAPERS & PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE (新聞及出版用紙割當委員會)
Chairman (委員長): KANDA Itsuo (神田五雄)
Newspaper Sub-committee (新聞部會) acting
Chief (會長): KANDA Itsuo (神田五雄)
Publications Sub-committee (出版部會)
Chief (會長): ---- (Undecided)

Office of Allocation of Paper for Newspapers & Publications Committee
(新聞及出版用紙割當委員會事務局)
Chief (局長): HARADA Jiro (原田右郎)

CENTRAL PUBLIC OFFICE QUALIFICATIONS EXAMINATION COMMITTEE
(中央公職適否審査委員會)
Chairman (委員長): MAKINO Eiichi (牧野英一)




Office of Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee
(中央公職適否審査委員會事務局)
Chief (局長): OTA Takeshi (太田 剛)

IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD
(宮内府)
President (長官):
MATSUDAIRA Yoshitami
Vice-President (次長):
KATO Susumu (加藤)

President's Secretariat
Board of Chamberlains
Grand Chamberlain (侍從長):
OGANE Masujiro (大岡 政史)
Vice Grand Chamberlain (侍從頭):
SUZUKI Hajime (鈴木 英一)

Board of Ceremonies
Chief (頭):
MATSUDAIRA Yasumasa

MINISTER'S OFFICE
(947)



DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS BY PREFECTURES IN JAPAN

	ANAM	ARABIA	ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	BRAZIL	BULGARIA	CANADA	CHINA	CUBA	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	DENMARK	EGYPT	EIRE	ESTONIA	FINLAND	FORMOSA	FRANCE	FRENCH INDO-CHINA	GERMANY	GREAT BRITAIN	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HOLLAND	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ITALY	KOREA	LATVIA	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAY STATES		
AICHI						5				356								269	3		28	4		4		1										29,569		
AKITA		2								30								37			10																1,622	
AOMORI								8		77								53																			1,242	
CHIBA								1		204								55			1	6		2			3										5,296	
EHIME										92								35				1					1										3,346	
FUKUI										36								23				2															6,523	
FUKUOKA						1		3		495				2				304	12		4	2		6							3					37,825		
FUKUSHIMA								17		41								40									3				1						7,086	
GIFU				1						46								42			14																9,148	
GUMMA										164								64				4															2,076	
HIROSHIMA								1		64								159			1	6					2	3									20,484	
HOKKAIDO								1		308								93	10		47	3		4													6,770	
HYOGO	3		11	4	7	1		8		4,975		11	9	5	3	2		1,843	56		215	88	1	6	16	11	46	13	3	4	44		58,416	1	8	4		
IBARAGI								1		132								61	1			5						35									4,942	
ISHIKAWA										79								9			8							1									3,953	
IWATE						6		2		67								72	3		2																2,311	
KAGAWA		1								83								70																			1,426	
KAGOSHIMA							2			335								55				2						3									1,520	
KANAGAWA		2	3	6		11	18	22		2,598	1	8	7	1	1	4	3	168	83		176	91	11	60		3	17			25		14,019			2			
KOCHI										56								2										1									1,918	
KUMAMOTO				1				2		362								36	12		2	1		2		2			3							5,579		
KYOTO						1				928			3					438	7	7	8	8					4	33								41,773		
MIE										131								47										1									5,809	
MIYAGI								35		271								40	5		1																3,110	
MIYAZAKI										88		1						33				1									9						4,073	
NAGANO			4					3		182				2				47	16		99	2								7						5,892		
NAGASAKI						2		3		849			1					159	21		3	14		1			1			2							8,433	
NARA										190								55				4						1										4,160
NIIGATA										151								68			10																	3,515
OITA				1						210								28			3										17						10,692	
OKAYAMA										140								77			5	1		2														7,603
OSAKA						1		5		1,617								2,914	20	2	4	1		1			13	4									104,906	
SAGA										117								13	1			1																4,128
SAITAMA							5	10		170								145			4	2																3,760
SHIGA										75								13			1			4			2											8,909
SHIMANE										157								22			2			1														6,653
SHIZUOKA							2	2		214				2				35	3		5	1		4							3						7,852	
TOCHIGI								1		87								50				1																2,726
TOKUSHIMA										20								35																				759
TOKYO	15	1	8	13	3	5	6			2,140		8	3	6	18	2	2,974	112		175	89	7		13	11	26	65	3		123		21,440	2			1		
TOTTORI				1						19								7										1										2,820
TOYAMA										10								4																				2,767
WAKAYAMA										200								47										7										7,331
YAMAGATA										53								129			2			4														1,463
YAMAGUCHI										127								93			2	5																30,821
YAMANASHI										131								27	1		8							8										3,276
T O T A L	15	3	6	26	27	19	31	20	131	18,877	1	28	23	6	16	24	5	10,990	366	9	840	345	19	6	124	28	89	205	6	4	241		529,742	3	8	7	4	

* DUAL CITIZENS

PREPARED BY COMPILATION BRANCH, C

DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN PREFECTURES IN JAPAN

(NOTE: DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PERSONNEL EXCLUDED)

GREAT BRITAIN	GREECE	GUATEMALA	HOLLAND	HUNGARY	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	IRAQ	ITALY	KOREA	LATVIA	LEBANON	LUXEMBOURG	MALAY STATES	MEXICO	MICRONESIA	NORWAY	PANAMA	PERU	PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC	POLAND	PORTUGAL	RUMANIA	SALVADOR	SPAIN	SWEDEN	SWITZERLAND	SYRIA	TARTAR REPUBLIC	THAILAND	TURKEY	U · S · A	U · S · S · R	YUGOSLAVIA	MISCELLANEOUS	GERMAN-JAPANESE *	STATELESS	WHITE-RUSSIAN	TOTAL					
4			4		1					29,569										1		1										8						2	30,251					
										1,622													1										5							1,706				
										1,242																							6	2						1,389				
6			2			3				5,296																	1				6	10								5,585				
1						1				3,346																9															3,495			
2										6,523																															6,596			
2			6						3	37,825											4							1						4						38,666				
						3			1	7,086				1					5	3														3	4					7,204				
										9,148																												1			9,254			
4										2,076				1																	3		2							2,314				
6				2		3				20,484																		1				6	10								20,737			
3			4							6,770											2					5	1						1	11				21		7,277				
88	1	6	16	11	46	13	3	4	44	58,416	1	8	4			2				4		101	2		18	5	19	13			172	33	39	3			57	158	66,440					
5						35				4,942						2				2																					5,189			
						1				3,953																																4,051		
										2,311																																2,464		
										1,426																1																1,581		
2						3				1,520				2						2														4					1		1,926			
91	11		60		3	17			25	14,019		2		1	2					33	2	60		1	32	6	22		15	9	6	124	50	3			43	133	17,882					
						1				1,918										2					2																1,996			
1			2			2			3	5,579										3	2					3	1														6,019			
8				4		33				41,773									1	5		5				7	2													3	11	43,273		
						1				5,809																																5,993		
										3,110										3																					3,507			
1									9	4,073											1																				4,207			
2									7	5,892										8					7	1	7				19	8	38						2	9	6,353			
14			1			1			2	8,433										4	14	4					1			3										1	11	9,535		
4						1				4,160										8					1																	4,427		
										3,515																																	3,746	
									17	10,692						8												1															10,975	
1			2							7,603																		3														1	7,842	
1			1		13	4				104,906										8		8			5	1				3	34	2	1							14	5	109,569		
1									4	4,128										2																						4,269		
2										3,760																																	4,111	
			4			2				8,909									1	1																						9,014		
			1							6,653																																	6,836	
1			4						3	7,852																					2												8,128	
1										2,726																																	2,867	
										759																																	814	
89	7		13	11	26	65	3		123	21,440	2		1							26	20	12	1		17	11	19	3		31	7	48	35					26	139	180	27,844			
						1				2,820																																		2,864
										2,767											1																						2,782	
						7				7,331										8																							7,593	
			4							1,463																																	1,652	
5										30,821																																	31,067	
						8				3,276																																	3,457	
345	19	6	124	28	89	205	6	4	241	529,742	3	8	7	4	1	2	4	8	7	128	42	194	5	1	98	33	80	16	15	48	219	521	198	8				26	285	511	564,744			

DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN

	AKABANE	AKASAKA	ARAKAWA	ASAKUSA	ATAGO	AZABU	EBARA	FUCHU	FUKAGAWA	HACHIOJI	HARAJUKU	HIGASHI-CHOFU	HIMONYA	HONDEN	HONJO	IKEBUKURO	ITABASHI	ITSUKAICHI	JOTO	KAGURAZAKA	KAMATA	KAMEARI	KANDA	KOIWA	KOJIMACHI	KOMAGOME	KOMATSUGAWA	KYOBASHI	MACHIDA	MARUNOUCHI	MEGURO	MEJIRO	MINAMI-SENJU	MITA		
ANAM																																				
ARGENTINA																																				
AUSTRALIA																														2						
AUSTRIA						2					2														1											
BELGIUM												1													1											
BRAZIL													3																1							
CANADA						1															1													1		
CZECHOSLOVAKIA												1																	1	2						
DENMARK		1																											2							
EIRE																																				
ESTONIA			1								6																									
FINLAND																2																				
FRANCE		1			2	5							10	1						3		7	7					7	8							
GERMANY	2	9					1					17	1				2								30			5	8					1		
GREAT BRITAIN		4				5	2				1	3	3			5				4					3			8		1				1		
GREECE							1																			3										
HOLLAND						1																	7													
HUNGARY																							1	1							1					
INDIA												1													3								3			
INDONESIA	1	1				1				1		1				2							4		1			5	3					2		
IRAN																														1						
ITALY	9	2	9			5						10													7			6						10		
LATVIA		2																																		
LUXEMBOURG																																				1
PHILIPPINE REP.	5		1														3								9				1						1	
POLAND						1																											5			
PORTUGAL						2																														
RUMANIA																																				
SPAIN																																				3
SWEDEN						2																														
SWITZERLAND					1		1					1													1				1							
SYRIA																																				3
THAILAND		11				1							4																				2			
TURKEY																																				
UNITED STATES				1								3													2			4	5						3	
U.S.S.R						4					2						3																	3		5
MISCELLANEOUS																																				
GERMAN JAPANESE	2	3				1						3									5		1										1		1	
NISEI						11			1			2	21	1	1	4					4		1	1	2	7			35					5		
STATELESS		12					2					2													3			10	4							
WHITE RUSSIAN		7				17						8	2	6							30		2	10	1				11	49	14			6		
TOTAL	17	52	14	1	3	59	7		1	7	13	45	50		2	10	42			16	3	31	2	73	8			104	83	29			34	14		

* DUAL CITIZENS

PREPARED BY COMPI

DISTRIBUTION OF KOREANS, FORMOSANS, AND CHINESE IN TOKYO-TO

	KOREANS	FORMOSANS	CHINESE	TOTAL	
AKABANE	146	38	12	196	NISHIARAI
AKASAKA	44	10	14	68	NOGATA
ARAKAWA	874	3	18	895	OGIKUBO
ASAKUSA	125	38	128	291	OI
ATAGO	74	60	35	169	OJI
AZABU	122	13	55	190	OKU
EBARA	469	5	85	559	OME
FUCHU	1,093	14	5	1,112	OMORI
FUKAGAWA	730	7	28	765	OSAKI
HACHIOJI	729	6	1	736	OTSUKA
HARAJUKU	64	23	12	99	SAKAMOTO
HIGASHI-CHOFU	810	177	36	1,023	SEIJO
HIMONYA	318	115	72	505	SENJU
HONDEN	662	42	27	731	SETAGAYA
HONJO	120	27	27	174	SHIBUYA
IKEBUKURO	259	46	23	328	SHIMURA
ITABASHI	484	44	4	532	SHINAGAWA
ITSUKAICHI	243	-	-	243	SUGAMO
JOTO	134	15	3	152	SUGINAMI
KAGURAZAKA	72	22	20	114	TACHIKAWA
KAMATA	720	63	10	793	TAKANAWA
KAMEARI	454	11	57	522	TAKINOGAWA
KANDA	344	69	178	591	TAMAGAWA
KOIWA	226	25	8	259	TANASHI
KOJIMACHI	160	54	51	265	TOMISAKA
KOMAGOME	43	12	12	67	TOKYO-SUIJO
KOMATSUGAWA	613	12	13	638	TOTSUKA
KYOBASHI	24	15	27	66	TSUKIJI
MACHIDA	280	25	12	317	TSUKISHIMA
MARUNOUCHI	3	2	-	5	UENO
MEGURO	387	189	123	699	WASEDA
MEJIRO	565	86	31	682	YANAKA
MINAMI-SENJU	435	-	36	471	YODOBASHI
MITA	222	21	10	253	YOTSUYA
MOTOFUJI	194	60	41	295	YOYOGI
MUKOJIMA	780	10	81	871	
MUSASHINO	494	84	27	605	HACHIOJIMA
NAKANO	222	185	12	419	NIIJIMA
NERIMA	691	43	17	751	OSHIMA
NIHONBASHI	103	30	17	150	
					TOTAL

PREPARED BY COMPILATION BRANCH

OF KOREANS, FORMOSANS & CHINESE IN TOKYO-TO

(NOTE: DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PERSONNEL EXCLUDED)

AREA	TOTAL		KOREANS	FORMOSANS	CHINESE	TOTAL
12	196	NISHIARAI	2,223	11	22	2,256
14	68	NOGATA	297	166	14	477
18	895	OGIKUBO	730	132	79	941
28	291	OI	496	69	30	568
35	169	OJI	436	6	23	465
55	190	OKU	227	1	6	234
85	559	OME	385	5	-	390
5	1,112	OMORI	923	90	116	1,129
28	765	OSAKI	35	25	15	75
1	736	OTSUKA	124	66	19	209
12	99	SAKAMOTO	216	17	11	244
36	1,023	SEIJO	181	21	6	208
72	505	SENJU	493	12	29	534
27	731	SETAGAYA	998	294	134	1,416
27	174	SHIBUYA	233	79	82	394
23	328	SHIMURA	230	15	3	248
4	532	SHINAGAWA	370	26	33	429
-	243	SUGAMO	66	2	8	76
3	152	SUGINAMI	1,016	339	40	1,395
20	114	TACHIKAWA	899	119	8	1,026
10	793	TAKANAWA	179	20	24	223
57	522	TAKINOGAWA	154	8	9	171
78	591	TAMAGAWA	381	30	114	525
8	259	TANASHI	278	23	4	305
51	265	TOMISAKA	371	5	40	416
12	67	TOKYO-SUIJO	33	-	-	33
13	638	TOTSUKA	305	67	41	413
27	66	TSUKIJI	89	28	65	182
12	317	TSUKISHIMA	135	3	6	144
-	5	UENO	315	21	67	403
23	699	WASEDA	142	39	23	204
31	682	YANAKA	46	13	9	68
36	471	YODOBASHI	101	23	43	167
10	253	YOTSUYA	104	19	39	162
41	295	YOYOGI	305	105	32	442
31	871					
27	605	HACHIJOJIMA	-	-	-	-
12	419	NIJIMA	24	-	-	24
17	751	OSHIMA	-	-	-	-
17	150					
		TOTAL	28,035	3,600	2,562	34,197

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1 OCTOBER 1947

APPENDIX

A T I S

LETTERS TO SCAP

ANALYSIS

OF

OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN LETTERS TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

AND TO

OTHER OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES

EDITORIAL NOTE

Evaluation of trends indicated by this analysis should be made with the following reservations. Most opinion-bearing letters are written by a vocal minority whose suggestions fall into the "letter to the editor" category. The type and force of opinions expressed are tempered by their direction to Occupation authorities. A large proportion of letters are personal requests for aid and do not express a direct opinion. A pressure group may often cover one subject with a flood of letters disproportionate to actual public opinion.

Number of letters in this analysis for the month of October..... 6,660
 Total number of letters since 1 September 1946..... 251,557

1. POLITICAL - 388

The Special Municipality Bill continued as the major political interest, but opinion swung from the predominant approval of previous months to a 305 to 18 letter expression of opposition. A new note was injected into the declining number of purge request letters when a number of writers complained of purged officials continuing to exert their influence in local affairs. A few letters called for the reinstatement of purged individuals. Many writers warned of the spread of communism in Japan and the possibility of war with Russia. The few comments on the Katayama Government was almost unanimously in opposition. Typical comments: "absolutely opposed to the organization of Osaka City as a special municipality"...."purged official still acts as high-handedly as he did during the war"...."regret that the purge directive is not being carried out properly since many individuals are concealing their past activities"...."purge of women should be conducted in spite of American policy of respecting women"...."Japan's laborers lean towards communism because they are ignorant"...."behind the iron curtains of Russian occupied territories, the Russians are planning to engulf the world in communism"...."communism interfering with world stabilization"...."advise America to wage immediate war with Russia before Russia discovers the atom bomb"...."women of Japan have no faith in the Katayama Cabinet"...."request that Japan be rid of present ineffective and incompetent administration"...."Emperor System should be abolished with the end of the Occupation".

2. ECONOMIC - 968

Letters requesting the reopening of restaurants fell from 1,407 for last month to 314. Eighty-one writers opposed the establishment of a Government controlled corporation for the rationing of staple food. Farmers continued to voice objections to alleged land reform inequities and to ask for higher prices for farm produce. A proposed increase in recreation taxes brought complaints from 216 writers. Other major topics of discussion were foreign trade, inflation, frozen assets and scanty food rations. Typical comments: "would like to reopen the restaurant which was my only source of income"...."present semiofficial food ration organization has operated smoothly and efficiently"...."Landowners plotting to deprive tenants of their farms by declaring the land part of a residential district"...."land reform measures inadvertently planting the seeds of communism in the minds of naive farmers"...."should be a fair balance between the prices of farm produce and other commodity prices"...."cut the amount of currency in circulation"...."establish a single standard monetary system for the world"...."abolish income taxes".

3. SOCIAL - 1,152

The greater portion of 493 letters requesting wage increases came from Government workers. Another group of 167 writers coupled their wage increase requests with statements opposing the Civil Service Bill now before the Diet. Of the 453 letters concerned with education almost all asked for more school supplies and proper maintenance for overcrowded schools. Other writers discussed the blackmarket, crime, the need for Christian education in Japan and

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R E S T R I C T E D

the shortage of doctors and medical supplies. Typical comments: "need wage increases that will at least guarantee a minimum standard of living"..... "school supplies entirely inadequate"....."educate the educators"....."classrooms are crowded and located in temporary buildings with leaky roofs"..... "Christianity should be spread more widely in Japan"....."prohibit all black-market activities"....."thorough cleanup of gangsterism"....."officials of the Agricultural Association are engaged in blackmarket activities"....."temples still have special powers that influence national ideology".

4. OCCUPATION - 56

Writers expressed their gratitude for American relief given during the recent flood, the opening of foreign trade, distribution of food, and general aid in the democratization of Japan. Occasional writers railed at the actions of specific individuals. Typical comments: "sincerely appreciate General MacArthur's work in guiding the Japanese people toward the just path and goal of life"....."Supreme Commander a living example of the principle of Christianity"....."request that the Occupation forces remain forever"....."Americans and Japanese should become as one through inter-marriages"....."doubt that Japan would have even considered taking care of a defeated people as America is now doing"....."wrist watch stolen by two American soldiers"....."conduct of Occupation soldiers is becoming intolerable".

5. PERSONAL - 3,995

Letters requesting the repatriation of Japanese nationals from foreign soil fell off to 3,918, the smallest number received by SCAP since January of this year. Writers continued to request assistance in solving a wide range of personal problems and to voice grievances against individuals and organizations. Typical comments and requests: "request aid in obtaining compensation from the Nakajima Aircraft Factory for injuries incurred"..... "request a house in which to live"....."am a war sufferer in need of free hospitalization"....."request General MacArthur to locate a family to adopt my three-months old baby girl"....."need financial support to establish a woolen cloth scissors manufacturing company"....."would appreciate a bottle of an American drug called Himrod's Cure"....."forced by the town boss to donate money ostensibly for the purchase of a fire engine"....."cannot sleep because the Yashima Industrial Company operates and makes noises all through the night".


6. MISCELLANEOUS - 110

Writers offer their opinions, plans and requests on a wide range of unrelated subjects. Typical Statements: "Japanese should be permitted to emigrate to foreign lands"....."Japan's proud Bushido spirit has evaporated before the light of peace like dew in the morning sun"....."conclude the War Crimes Trials as soon as possible"....."restrict the use of air rifles used in the wanton killing of pigeons"....."create a world society of scientists to protect humanity from future disasters"....."although Tojo is guilty of war crimes he should be pardoned and made the leader of Japan during its reconstruction".


7. PETITIONS

Twenty-two petitions bearing 17,136 signatures were received. Of these, 12,155 signers made a three point request for the return of straw containers for farm produce, a higher price for rice and revision of the Emergency Bill for the Regulation of Agricultural Production; 3,971 asked for the reinstatement of purged individuals; 328 asked for clemency for war criminals; 320 expressed appreciation for the rapid demobilization of Japanese from the Burma area; 318 requested the return of Etorofu Island to Japan; 44 expressed opposition to the Special Municipality Bill.

LETTERS TO SCAP - OCTOBER 1947



LETTERS TO SCAP
CUMULATIVE SINCE 1 SEPTEMBER 1946



55D 370

December 17, 1947

This Document must be protected by the Health Control Plans

My dear Senator Bridges:

In response to a request made by Senator Knowland at this morning's session of your Committee, I am submitting to you herewith a copy of FEC Paper No. 230 (Policy on Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power in Japan). Your attention is respectfully invited to the fact that this paper is a Far Eastern Commission document and has been classified as "confidential" by that body. For this reason, and for the further reasons set forth below, the Department of State does not have authority to declassify the document, and it is therefore requested that the classified character of the document be respected.

General Frank McCoy, in his capacity as Chairman of and United States Representative to the Far Eastern Commission, has approved the submission to you of the document in its classified form. Moreover, he has informed me that he will promptly submit to the representatives of the other constituent nations a proposal that the document in question be declassified. Pending the decision of the Far Eastern Commission it would be seriously embarrassing to General McCoy and would make much more difficult the conduct of the affairs of the Commission if the document should be made public through an official act of the Administration or of the Congress. General McCoy has pointed out that it is contrary to Far Eastern Commission custom and practice to make public papers of which it is officially seized and which have not reached the point of final adoption. This procedure has been fully respected in the past by all of the member nations. For the United States to depart unilaterally from this procedure would open the door to similar action by the other member nations as to any document which any one of them might for special reasons of its own desire to make public.

In connection with your consideration of this document, I should also like to point out that various aspects of the policy to which it appertains are currently undergoing an extensive review by the Departments of State and of the Army. The purpose of this review is to determine

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The Honorable
Styles Bridges,
United States Senate.

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determine to what extent the policy should be modified in the light of all the circumstances, including developments which have taken place since this policy paper was originally prepared. For this reason and for the further reason that the document will undoubtedly undergo changes in the course of its progress through the Far Eastern Commission, it cannot be assumed that the document in its present form represents final policy.

Sincerely yours,

Frank G. Wisner
Deputy to the Assistant Secretary
for Occupied Areas

Enclosure:
FEC Paper No. 230

cc: Senator Knowland

A-S:FGWisner:asm
12/17/47

Hand carried by Mr. Rudlin 5:30 p.m., 12/17/47



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Tokyo, December 18, 1947.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 1462

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: Text of a Series of Articles by Mr. MacMahon BALL, Former British Commonwealth Member of the Allied Council for Japan.

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose copy of the text of a series of four articles concerning the Occupation prepared by Mr. MacMahon BALL, former British Commonwealth Member of the Allied Council for Japan. The articles were printed in the Argus (beginning with the issue of October 13, 1947), a newspaper in Victoria, Australia, and were recently presented to me by Mr. Patrick SHAW, British Commonwealth Member of the Allied Council. Several statements contained in Mr. Ball's articles are worthy of comment as they indicate an objective understanding of the problems of the Occupation not evident from Mr. Ball's attitude or statements made while he served as a member of the Allied Council.

In the first of the series, Mr. Ball describes the Japanese desire to "play off Russia against America". That such a desire exists may be gathered from translations of articles contained in the Japanese press which often stress the conflict between the two powers as demonstrated in their international relations. According to Mr. Ball, one senior Japanese diplomat recently maintained that the Japanese had been fighting against communism since 1931. Similar statements made by lawyers for the defense during the trials of major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East have been well publicized.

With reference to the second article of the series, it is gratifying to find that, for the first time, Mr. Ball has publicly admitted the limitations with which the Occupation can operate by reason of actions of the

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Tokyo's Despatch No.1462
December 18, 1947.

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Japanese Government, the instrument through which Occupation policy must be effected. He also gives what we believe to be a fair explanation of the practical reasons justifying retention of the Emperor of Japan. In this connection, however, he questions the sincerity of Japanese belief in the denial of divinity made by the Emperor. It is believed that the manner in which the latter has been received by the Japanese people during his repeated trips through the provinces of Japan is sufficient indication to corroborate Mr. Ball's estimate of the Emperor's great popularity and political influence. There is described in the third article of the series an instance of that popularity which occurred on November 3, 1946 during the ceremony of the promulgation of the new constitution, when crowds took the opportunity to gain honor by walking in his footsteps. From these and other indications it appears that the defeat of Japan has not had the effect of discrediting the Emperor in the minds of the people. However, Mr. Ball's statement that the chief Shinto Shrines have a steady stream of worshippers is questionable. It is believed that the volume of visitors to the three major shrines (Meiji, Ise, and the former Yasukuni Shrine) is not more than one-third of that during pre-war years when individual and group visits to those shrines were officially organized and directed. It should also be noted that there is limited significance in the number of visitors to minor shrines which had less direct connection with state and emperor-worship.

Mr. Ball gives an explanation of the considerations leading to the use of agencies of the Japanese Government and civil service by the Occupation and points out what is readily apparent, that a considerable number of the elected representative of the Japanese people have been conservative. He asserts that these representatives derive support from persons who "greatly profit from the present inflation". His statement that the wage and salary earners are the ones who have suffered from inflation might well have been limited to wage earners working for the government or some of its enterprises; other workers have either gained increased wages by collective bargaining, strikes, and "slow-downs"; or, in the usual Japanese manner, have been given economic support by their employers. In addition, many laborers in non-governmental enterprises are paid in kind, a system more satisfactory to the worker during inflationary periods but one which is believed to aggravate black market activities.

Although Mr. Ball's attack (in the third article of the series) upon conservative opposition to economic controls is certainly slanted by his personal political outlook, some such opposition is to be expected and has

undoubtedly


Tokyo's Despatch No. 1462
December 18, 1947.

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undoubtedly occurred. The statement he makes concerning Japanese opinion that inflation and an exhausted economy would be useful in discouraging large reparations or high charges for the cost of Occupation has been repeatedly made and appears to have some foundation in fact. There is truth in his remark that it is difficult to enforce, through Japanese agencies, the measures necessary for economic and social justice. However, Mr. Ball fails entirely to recognize the many achievements in that regard.

In his fourth article, Mr. Ball states that Japanese friendship is a matter of expediency; that Japanese are pro-American on account of American predominance in the Western Pacific; and that economic considerations make continued American support for Japan unlikely. He also implies that Japan's economy will eventually be joined with that of East Asia, which it complements. In view of these considerations, he submits that Japan must not only be made unable to wage war, but unwilling to do so. His conclusion that Occupation emphasis should be on "a world fit for common people to live in" rather than on "the need ...to make Japan a military ally" is obviously a contrast fabricated to imply criticism of American policy, and in consequence, is not consistent with the more friendly outlook demonstrated earlier in the series. It leaves the impression so often suggested in previous Allied Council Meetings, that Mr. Ball is a theoretician who speaks with one eye slanted for effect upon Australian politics.

Respectfully yours,



W. J. Sebald
Acting Political Adviser

Enclosure: ~~///~~

Copy of four articles of a series by Mr. MacMahon Ball, which appeared in the Argus Newspaper, Victoria, Australia.

Original and ozalid to the Department.

Copies to:

American Embassy, London,
American Embassy, Canberra.
American Embassy, New Delhi.
American Legation, Wellington.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 1462 dated December 18, 1947, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled "Text of a Series of Articles by Mr. MacMahon BALL, Former British Commonwealth Member of the Allied Council for Japan."

(COPY)

EXTRACT FROM THE MELBOURNE "ARGUS" DATED 13th OCTOBER, 1947.

The first of a series IN JAPAN TODAY by W. MACMAHON BALL, lately British representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

In Tokyo a few weeks ago I was talking privately with an American general about Australia and Japan. He was anxious to know, for one thing, why Australia seemed unwilling to provide Japan promptly with the quantities and types of wool she had asked for. I was trying to explain Australia's difficulties when my friend cut in impatiently:

"When for Pete's sake, will you seven million Australians realize the importance of having seventy million allies in this country?"

The general's views were simple and logical.

In 1947 he believed that Russia was the enemy, potentially much more powerful and dangerous than Japan had ever been. Japan, he claimed, is no longer a danger to us, but she has immense strategic importance in the event of a conflict between the United States and Russia. Hence our main concern must be to draw her close in friendship and build up her strength.

There has been controversy whether the occupation is a success. Much of the argument on either side seems to me to be confusing and inconclusive. The main reason for this is the over-lap and inconsistency between the aims we stated in 1945 and the aims we pursue today. In 1945 we set out the purpose of the occupation. Negatively, the Japanese were to be demobilised and disarmed. This physical task has been carried out smoothly, and is, for practical purposes, complete. Then we set out our positive aims. We were to try to establish democracy in Japan, built on respect for the worth of the individual. We were to replace a feudal economy by a welfare economy. We were to re-educate the Japanese to love peace and respect international law.

That was in 1945. They have been displaced by a new priority, the need felt so urgent, particularly in America, to make Japan a military ally.

Two years ago the Japanese, aware of the importance of meeting the wishes of their conquerors, declared in their new Constitution that they renounced war and armed forces for ever. They explained that they were happy to rely on peace-loving Allies and on the United Nations for protection.

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No one who has been in Japan this year can regard this Japanese renunciation of war and of armed forces as anything more than a polite surrender gesture.

The restoration of Japanese military forces in some form or other is sympathetically discussed at Allied social gatherings. The Japanese Foreign Office has informally sounded Allied representatives on the chances of being allowed a standing army of 100,000 men and a small air force, for "police duties when the Allied Occupation Forces are withdrawn". When a Japanese diplomat put this proposition informally to me, I reminded him that it would be contrary to the new Constitution.

"Ah, yes," he said, "but the situation has unfortunately changed since we adopted our Constitution."

It was sometimes said that the Japanese have come to hate war and their war leaders. No, they hate losing a war, and they are glad to repudiate the military leaders whom they blame for the defeat. The Japanese today disown unhappy Tojo and his former military colleagues, not for being militarists, but for their blundering "miscalculation of chances."

It would probably be false to say that Japan's present leaders desire another war. They have too fresh a memory of the risks. But they certainly appreciate the atmosphere of hostility between America and Russia. They seek eagerly for every chance to divide the Allies that defeated them. The present atmosphere provides them a superb opportunity to play off Russia against America. They are fully aware of their strategic importance to both these Great Powers.

At present General MacArthur controls Japan, so that it is merely common sense to play up to the United States. The Japanese are anxious to co-operate with MacArthur's headquarters in "processing" Japanese repatriates from Soviet controlled areas. They are eager to co-operate with the Allied Intelligence and counter-intelligence organisations. They know that two years ago these bodies were mainly concerned with catching up on Japanese militarists and ultra-nationalists, whereas today they are almost wholly concerned to catch up with Communists or Russian agents.

Hence Japan's policy today is to exploit in every possible way America's fear and suspicion of Russia and Communism. Two years ago the primary political motive in Japan was to please General MacArthur, in the hope that Japan might thereby win a gentle and short occupation. In the last six months, the emphasis has changed, though not the aim. The primary political motive today is to qualify for American aid in terms of the Truman doctrine:

One senior Japanese diplomat put it this way:

"Well, we Japanese have been fighting Communism in our part of the world since 1931; it is nice to know that the United States is now awake to the importance of helping us in this job."

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(COPY)

EXTRACT FROM "THE ARGUS" DATED 14TH OCTOBER, 1947.

IN JAPAN TODAY.

II.

By W. MacMahon Ball, Lately British representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

Here is the first question we must face if we are to think clearly about Japan.

Do we really want the Japanese to carry out the pacifist provisions of their new Constitution or do we want them to reorganise their national life in a way that will maximise their value as military allies?

Our answer will depend on our view of the whole world situation, and much more on what we think about Russia than on what we think about Japan. The problem of Japan is a fragment of the world problem.

If we believe that the differences between Russia and the Western democracies make war between them a great and early danger, then our military and strategic interests in Japan will override everything else.

Before we can measure the degree of success achieved by the Occupation we must clear up the confusion between Allied aims of 1945 and 1947. But if we need to think more carefully about the end we pursue, we must give equal consideration to the means at our disposal.

It seems to me that a great deal of criticism of General MacArthur is valueless because it fails to recognize that what he can do is severely limited by the instruments through which he must work. It is foolish and unfair to try to assess his achievements without taking account of the limitations his instruments impose on him.

Emperor most important.

MacArthur's first and greatest instrument is the Emperor Hirohito. The Tenno is at once an immense aid and an immense frustration to Allied aims as stated in 1945. There was a good deal of disagreement then in Allied circles about what should be done with the Emperor. Some felt it would be unjust and illogical to grant him personal immunity from investigation for war guilt. The opposing school of thought won the day.

There can

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Part II.

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There can be no doubt that the practical reasons for keeping the Emperor had overwhelming weight. When the Emperor ordered his fighting forces to lay down their arms and to comply meticulously in every order given by their conquerors, his subjects, with negligible exceptions, obeyed instantly and without question. To the devout Japanese it was like a direct command from God. The marvellous completeness of that surrender in every theatre undoubtedly saved the lives of tens of thousands of Allied soldiers.

Occupation was smooth.

During the two years of Occupation there have been no pockets of resistance, even where Allied troops are very thinly spread; there is complete safety for Allied nations, who may move at will throughout Japan; there is rarely any show of resentment at the privileges Allies enjoy; it is almost certainly the most smooth and peaceful Occupation in history.

For all this full credit must be given to General MacArthur's firm benevolence and the generally high standard of conduct of the Occupation troops. But the basic reason why the Japanese are obedient, helpful, and peaceable under the Occupation is because it is the Emperor's will.

Notable efforts have been made to "democratise" the Emperor system. The new Constitution strips the Emperor of all absolute political power; other legislation deprives him and his family of many of the legal and financial privileges they formerly enjoyed; above all, in January, 1946, Hirohito made a public statement disclaiming divinity.

The ideas behind these Allied inspired reforms were estimable. It was hoped to reform the Emperor system on the model of the British Constitutional monarchy. But this effort to graft a quite modern British political idea on to the Japanese idea of a Son of Heaven descended in "a line unbroken for ages eternal" is a ticklish operation.

For my part I could find no evidence that the Japanese people took the Emperor's disclaim to divinity at all seriously.

Emperor stronger in 1947.

It must be remembered that in Japan it is considered good form for a public speaker to end his address, no matter how eloquent and able it may have been, with an apology to his audience for having bored them with so many feeble-minded ideas, presented in such halting and stumbling words. That is the peroration and signal for applause. It is therefore possible that many Japanese regarded the Emperor's disclaimer as a superlative example of good manners.

I feel

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Tokyo's Despatch No.1462
December 18, 1947.

PART. II.

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I feel confident that the real political influence of the Emperor is stronger today than before the war, and probably stronger than that of any Emperor since the Restoration.

✓ He is all the Japanese have left to hold on to. They have lost their Empire and their fighting forces; the wartime political personalities, the admirals and generals are discredited by failure. The Emperor alone remains; he is the divine leader who preserves their national unity and who will restore that leadership among nations that has been temporarily destroyed by the blunderings of their generals and the overwhelming material resources of the United States.

Enclosure to
Tokyo's Despatch No.1462
December 18, 1947

(COPY)

IN JAPAN TODAY.

GENERAL MACARTHUR'S DILEMMA.

III.

By W. MacMahon Ball, lately British representative on the Allied Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

The retention of the Emperor in Japan is inevitable, but it means a price to be paid and a risk to be taken.

Before this war one of the most dangerous features of Japan was the fanatical fusion of religion and patriotism, and both were focused on the person of the Emperor.

During the occupation brave efforts have been made to "democratise" religion. Shintoism is no longer officially linked with the State, and Shrine Shintoism has lost its State subsidies.

It is very hard for the foreign observer to gauge the impact of such measures on the minds of the Japanese. I should not think these reforms have seriously weakened the links which bind religion and the State in the thoughts and loyalties of the ordinary man. The chief Shinto shrines, including the Meiji and Yasukuni shrines in Tokyo, have a steady stream of worshippers.

The ceremony for the promulgation of the new Constitution last year threw some interesting sidelights on this subject. This Constitution was to strip the Emperor of his political power and divine claims, and separate religion and the State.

Yet the day chosen for its promulgation was November 3, the anniversary of the birth of the great Emperor Meiji. Hirohito's first act that morning was to report on the new Constitution to his Ancestors at the three shrines in the Imperial Palace grounds.

Later a great rally of citizens was organised on the Imperial Plaza. After the crowd had accorded polite applause to speeches by political leaders the national anthem was being sung. Suddenly the Imperial coach appeared crossing the bridge over the moat. The Emperor was arriving. The crowd shouted itself hoarse in a fever of devotion. Some Allied newspapermen present told me that they had never heard such banzais since the death-charges of the war. After two minutes the Emperor withdrew, the crowd surged after him, treading many underfoot in their excitement. Priests beat their drums to ward off evil spirits. For hours afterwards the crowd filed over the dais for the honour of treading where the Emperor had trod.

It is

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Part III.

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It is reasonable to expect that when General MacArthur withdraws with his occupation forces the authority of the Emperor will be even greater.

It would be unreal to expect any rapid liberation of the Japanese mind from national fanaticism and superstition in these circumstances. That will take long years of education and social reform. Yet the Emperor remains the indispensable instrument through which the Allies must exercise control over the conduct of the Japanese people.

General MacArthur must not only work through the Emperor; he must work through the Japanese Government and the Japanese civil service.

The Supreme Commander might have tried to rule Japan directly through his own American Military Government officers instead of relying on the Japanese. In fact this was considered impracticable. It would have called for the service of thousands, or tens of thousands, of highly trained Americans, for whom there was already an acute need for military government in Europe.

Language was a far greater barrier than in Europe. It is doubtful whether there are today more than a few dozen occupation officers with full mastery of spoken and written Japanese. Moreover, if the Japanese were to be trained in the methods of democratic government, the sooner they began the better. Hence the decision to use the Japanese Government and civil service.

This decision has imposed close limitations on General MacArthur's actual power. It has, indeed, confronted him with a serious dilemma.

MacArthur has tried sedulously to implant in the Japanese mind a genuine respect for the authority of the new democratic institutions. This means respect for a Government which has the majority support in a Parliament freely elected by universal suffrage.

Two free elections have been held during the occupation, in April, 1946, and April, 1947. But both elections have produced strong conservative majorities. These conservative parties - the "Liberals" and "Democrats" - have won their support mainly from those classes who greatly profit from the present inflation: the farmers and fishermen, who make up about one-half of the total population; the blackmarketeers, and those with assets they can sell.

The classes being impoverished by the inflation are the wage and salary earners. Increases in their rates of pay have failed pitifully to keep pace with the rise in prices. It was quite clear to any objective observer - whatever his political colour - that a number of rigorous economic controls had to be adopted if economic disaster was to be avoided.

But the

A somewhat misleading generalization - of the 3 major parties, one is Communist influenced, another is under control of Socialist right wing (although it may break from Socialist party) and the third - all-Japan Farmer's Union, the smallest, is the only one with Liberal or Democratic Party affiliation. Of course, Farmer's Union is small (but politically influential) population. Furthermore, in 1947 elections, the Socialist's major votes from the farming & fishing prefectures.

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Despatch No. 1462
December 18, 1947.

Part III.

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But the conservative parties stubbornly resisted all efforts to establish a directed economy. However, essential such controls, to restore the economic health of the nation, they appeared to threaten the immediate interests of the classes they represent. They preferred external aid to domestic reform. Moreover, a high degree of inflation and an exhausted economy might make it harder for the Allies to collect reparations and the costs of occupation. The Japanese political leaders have studied carefully the economic strategems the Germans followed after 1918.

That is the dilemma. It is easy to say that General MacArthur should force the Japanese Government to adopt the control measures necessary for economic efficiency and social justice. But he must do this through the Japanese Government. And no Japanese Government with the necessary support of Parliament and people has been found ready to launch such measures. The present Prime Minister Katayama, is making worthy efforts at economic reform, but his Social Democratic Party is outweighed by more than two to one in the Diet.

It is true there have been notable efforts by GHQ to cleanse and reform the Japanese political economic system - the purge, and legislation directed to dissolve the Zaibatsu and rural land reform. I cannot discuss these interesting developments in these articles. Each of these reform programmes is faced with real and formidable difficulties; each has met quiet sabotage from conservative Japanese forces. It is far too soon to have solid hope that such projects will produce any substantial increase in economic welfare or significant redistribution of social and political power.

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Tokyo's Despatch No.1462
December 18, 1947.

(COPY)

IN JAPAN TODAY.

AND THE JAPAN OF TOMORROW?

IV.

By W. MacMahon Ball, lately British representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

As I see it, the following are the most important features of the situation in Japan today:

1. Japan's actual military power has been destroyed.
2. The Occupation is making important contributions to Japan's national vigour and economic strength.

Occupation medical officers are teaching the Japanese the most modern and effective methods in medicine, hygiene, and public health. Their work has already produced notable results in the control of epidemic and reduction of disease.

Occupation scientists are giving the Japanese a new understanding of their country's natural resources, together with training in the most effective techniques for their development.

In production and transport the Japanese are learning new things from the Americans every day. All this should greatly help Japan to become the workshop of East Asia.

3. Although Japan has been provided with the legal framework of a Western democracy, there has yet been no important change in the distribution of economic power, in social structure, or in political and religious ideas.

The men who, within the limits of the occupation, have most influence in Japan today belong to the same class that governed Japan before the war. There are genuinely liberal and radical groups in Japan, but after long years of suppression they have not yet been able to build up the leadership and the organisation necessary to threaten the stronghold of the old ruling classes.

If we accept this picture of Japan today, where do we go from there? Do we conclude that because Japan is at present without military power there is no need to be concerned about the revival of Japanese militarism and aggression in the future?

Surely not..

It is often

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December 18, 1947.

Part IV.

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It is often said that the Japanese today are pro-American and anti-Russian. I believe that they are only pro-Japanese. At the moment it is elementary politics to play along with the United States; in the not too distant future it may be felt practical and expedient to imitate the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and play along with the Soviet. Today that would be fatal, while American predominance is so complete in the Western Pacific.

But can anyone be sure that the American people will be prepared to provide indefinitely the resources necessary to maintain American predominance in the Far East?

To maintain an active and continuous control of Japan would almost certainly involve a heavy tax on the American economy, for there is little that Japan can give America economically. By contrast, East Asia can give Japan the raw materials and the markets she needs for prosperity. Such an economic union might work for the mutual welfare of Eastern peoples. But if it is under the leadership of an unchanged Japan, it holds the seeds of a second "Co-prosperity Sphere".

For all these reasons it is not enough to have a Japan temporarily UNABLE to make war; we must strive for a Japan permanently UNWILLING to make war. That means revolutionary changes in Japan's social and economic system and in her political outlook.

If such changes are to be real and lasting, they must come from the Japanese, not from without. What we can do from outside is to insist that the Japanese Government maintains the framework of political liberty set up under the occupation so that liberal and radical leaders may continue to educate and organise the people without fear of being thrown into gaol once the occupation is over.

If the maintenance of Japanese feudalism and the restoration of Japanese military power is a threat to our future security, it is an equal menace to the future welfare of the Japanese masses. The common people in Japan, like the common people of every country, want above all else "to live out their lives in freedom from fear and from want".

The task of statesmanship today is not to struggle for control of strategic areas, but to make a world fit for common people to live in.

RESTRICTED

Enclosure to Despatch No. 1462 dated December 18, 1947, from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled "Text of a Series of Articles by Mr. MacMahon BALL, Former British Commonwealth Member of the Allied Council for Japan."

(COPY)

EXTRACT FROM THE MELBOURNE "ARGUS" DATED 13th OCTOBER, 1947.

IN JAPAN TODAY

The first of a series by W. MACMAHON BALL, lately British representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

In Tokyo a few weeks ago I was talking privately with an American general about Australia and Japan. He was anxious to know, for one thing, why Australia seemed unwilling to provide Japan promptly with the quantities and types of wool she had asked for. I was trying to explain Australia's difficulties when my friend cut in impatiently:

"When for Pete's sake, will you seven million Australians realize the importance of having seventy million allies in this country?"

The general's views were simple and logical.

In 1947 he believed that Russia was the enemy, potentially much more powerful and dangerous than Japan had ever been. Japan, he claimed, is no longer a danger to us, but she has immense strategic importance in the event of a conflict between the United States and Russia. Hence our main concern must be to draw her close in friendship and build up her strength.

There has been controversy whether the occupation is a success. Much of the argument on either side seems to me to be confusing and inconclusive. The main reason for this is the over-lap and inconsistency between the aims we stated in 1945 and the aims we pursue today. In 1945 we set out the purpose of the occupation. Negatively, the Japanese were to be demobilised and disarmed. This physical task has been carried out smoothly, and is, for practical purposes, complete. Then we set out our positive aims. We were to try to establish democracy in Japan, built on respect for the worth of the individual. We were to replace a feudal economy by a welfare economy. We were to re-educate the Japanese to love peace and respect international law.

That was in 1945. They have been displaced by a new priority, the need felt so urgent, particularly in America, to make Japan a military ally.

Two years ago the Japanese, aware of the importance of meeting the wishes of their conquerors, declared in their new Constitution that they renounced war and armed forces for ever. They explained that they were happy to rely on peace-loving Allies and on the United Nations for protection.

No one

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No one who has been in Japan this year can regard this Japanese renunciation of war and of armed forces as anything more than a polite surrender gesture.

The restoration of Japanese military forces in some form or other is sympathetically discussed at Allied social gatherings. The Japanese Foreign Office has informally sounded Allied representatives on the chances of being allowed a standing army of 100,000 men and a small air force, for "police duties when the Allied Occupation Forces are withdrawn". When a Japanese diplomat put this proposition informally to me, I reminded him that it would be contrary to the new Constitution.

"Ah, yes," he said, "but the situation has unfortunately changed since we adopted our Constitution."

It was sometimes said that the Japanese have come to hate war and their war leaders. No, they hate losing a war, and they are glad to repudiate the military leaders whom they blame for the defeat. The Japanese today disown unhappy Tojo and his former military colleagues, not for being militarists, but for their blundering "miscalculation of chances."

It would probably be false to say that Japan's present leaders desire another war. They have too fresh a memory of the risks. But they certainly appreciate the atmosphere of hostility between America and Russia. They seek eagerly for every chance to divide the Allies that defeated them. The present atmosphere provides them a superb opportunity to play off Russia against America. They are fully aware of their strategic importance to both these Great Powers.

At present General MacArthur controls Japan, so that it is merely common sense to play up to the United States. The Japanese are anxious to co-operate with MacArthur's headquarters in "processing" Japanese repatriates from Soviet controlled areas. They are eager to co-operate with the Allied Intelligence and counter-intelligence organisations. They know that two years ago these bodies were mainly concerned with catching up on Japanese militarists and ultranationalists, whereas today they are almost wholly concerned to catch up with Communists or Russian agents.

Hence Japan's policy today is to exploit in every possible way America's fear and suspicion of Russia and Communism. Two years ago the primary political motive in Japan was to please General MacArthur, in the hope that Japan might thereby win a gentle and short occupation. In the last six months, the emphasis has changed, though not the aim. The primary political motive today is to qualify for American aid in terms of the Truman doctrine:

One senior Japanese diplomat put it this way:

"Well, we Japanese have been fighting Communism in our part of the world since 1931; it is nice to know that the United States is now awake to the importance of helping us in this job."

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(COPY)

EXTRACT FROM "THE ARGUS" DATED 14TH OCTOBER, 1947.

IN JAPAN TODAY.

II.

By W. MacMahon Ball, Lately British representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

Here is the first question we must face if we are to think clearly about Japan.

Do we really want the Japanese to carry out the pacifist provisions of their new Constitution or do we want them to reorganise their national life in a way that will maximise their value as military allies?

Our answer will depend on our view of the whole world situation, and much more on what we think about Russia than on what we think about Japan. The problem of Japan is a fragment of the world problem.

If we believe that the differences between Russia and the Western democracies make war between them a great and early danger, then our military and strategic interests in Japan will override everything else.

Before we can measure the degree of success achieved by the Occupation we must clear up the confusion between Allied aims of 1945 and 1947. But if we need to think more carefully about the end we pursue, we must give equal consideration to the means at our disposal.

It seems to me that a great deal of criticism of General MacArthur is valueless because it fails to recognize that what he can do is severely limited by the instruments through which he must work. It is foolish and unfair to try to assess his achievements without taking account of the limitations his instruments impose on him.

Emperor most important.

MacArthur's first and greatest instrument is the Emperor Hirohito. The Tenno is at once an immense aid and an immense frustration to Allied aims as stated in 1945. There was a good deal of disagreement then in Allied circles about what should be done with the Emperor. Some felt it would be unjust and illogical to grant him personal immunity from investigation for war guilt. The opposing school of thought won the day.

There can

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There can be no doubt that the practical reasons for keeping the Emperor had overwhelming weight. When the Emperor ordered his fighting forces to lay down their arms and to comply meticulously in every order given by their conquerors, his subjects, with negligible exceptions, obeyed instantly and without question. To the devout Japanese it was like a direct command from God. The marvellous completeness of that surrender in every theatre undoubtedly saved the lives of tens of thousands of Allied soldiers.

Occupation was smooth.

During the two years of Occupation there have been no pockets of resistance, even where Allied troops are very thinly spread; there is complete safety for Allied nations, who may move at will throughout Japan; there is rarely any show of resentment at the privileges Allies enjoy; it is almost certainly the most smooth and peaceful Occupation in history.

For all this full credit must be given to General MacArthur's firm benevolence and the generally high standard of conduct of the Occupation troops. But the basic reason why the Japanese are obedient, helpful, and peaceable under the Occupation is because it is the Emperor's will.

Notable efforts have been made to "democratise" the Emperor system. The new Constitution strips the Emperor of all absolute political power; other legislation deprives him and his family of many of the legal and financial privileges they formerly enjoyed; above all, in January, 1946, Hirohito made a public statement disclaiming divinity.

The ideas behind these Allied inspired reforms were estimable. It was hoped to reform the Emperor system on the model of the British Constitutional monarchy. But this effort to graft a quite modern British political idea on to the Japanese idea of a Son of Heaven descended in "a line unbroken for ages eternal" is a ticklish operation.

For my part I could find no evidence that the Japanese people took the Emperor's disclaim to divinity at all seriously.

Emperor stronger in 1947.

It must be remembered that in Japan it is considered good form for a public speaker to end his address, no matter how eloquent and able it may have been, with an apology to his audience for having bored them with so many feeble-minded ideas, presented in such halting and stumbling words. That is the peroration and signal for applause. It is therefore possible that many Japanese regarded the Emperor's disclaimer as a superlative example of good manners.

I feel

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I feel confident that the real political influence of the Emperor is stronger today than before the war, and probably stronger than that of any Emperor since the Restoration.

He is all the Japanese have left to hold on to. They have lost their Empire and their fighting forces; the wartime political personalities, the admirals and generals are discredited by failure. The Emperor alone remains; he is the divine leader who preserves their national unity and who will restore that leadership among nations that has been temporarily destroyed by the blunderings of their generals and the overwhelming material resources of the United States.

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(COPY)

IN JAPAN TODAY.

GENERAL MACARTHUR'S DILEMMA.

III.

By W. MacMahon Ball, lately British representative on the Allied Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

The retention of the Emperor in Japan is inevitable, but it means a price to be paid and a risk to be taken.

Before this war one of the most dangerous features of Japan was the fanatical fusion of religion and patriotism, and both were focused on the person of the Emperor.

During the occupation brave efforts have been made to "democratise" religion. Shintoism is no longer officially linked with the State, and Shrine Shintoism has lost its State subsidies.

It is very hard for the foreign observer to gauge the impact of such measures on the minds of the Japanese. I should not think these reforms have seriously weakened the links which bind religion and the State in the thoughts and loyalties of the ordinary man. The chief Shinto shrines, including the Meiji and Yasukuni shrines in Tokyo, have a steady stream of worshippers.

The ceremony for the promulgation of the new Constitution last year threw some interesting sidelights on this subject. This Constitution was to strip the Emperor of his political power and divine claims, and separate religion and the State.

Yet the day chosen for its promulgation was November 3, the anniversary of the birth of the great Emperor Meiji. Hirohito's first act that morning was to report on the new Constitution to his Ancestors at the three shrines in the Imperial Palace grounds.

Later a great rally of citizens was organised on the Imperial Plaza. After the crowd had accorded polite applause to speeches by political leaders the national anthem was being sung. Suddenly the Imperial coach appeared crossing the bridge over the moat. The Emperor was arriving. The crowd shouted itself hoarse in a fever of devotion. Some Allied newspapermen present told me that they had never heard such bangs since the death-charges of the war. After two minutes the Emperor withdrew, the crowd surged after him, treading many underfoot in their excitement. Priests beat their drums to ward off evil spirits. For hours afterwards the crowd filed over the dais for the honour of treading where the Emperor had trod.

It is

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It is reasonable to expect that when General MacArthur withdraws with his occupation forces the authority of the Emperor will be even greater.

It would be unreal to expect any rapid liberation of the Japanese mind from national fanaticism and superstition in these circumstances. That will take long years of education and social reform. Yet the Emperor remains the indispensable instrument through which the Allies must exercise control over the conduct of the Japanese people.

General MacArthur must not only work through the Emperor; he must work through the Japanese Government and the Japanese civil service.

The Supreme Commander might have tried to rule Japan directly through his own American Military Government officers instead of relying on the Japanese. In fact this was considered impracticable. It would have called for the service of thousands, or tens of thousands, of highly trained Americans, for whom there was already an acute need for military government in Europe.

Language was a far greater barrier than in Europe. It is doubtful whether there are today more than a few dozen occupation officers with full mastery of spoken and written Japanese. Moreover, if the Japanese were to be trained in the methods of democratic government, the sooner they began the better. Hence the decision to use the Japanese Government and civil service.

This decision has imposed close limitations on General MacArthur's actual power. It has, indeed, confronted him with a serious dilemma.

MacArthur has tried sedulously to implant in the Japanese mind a genuine respect for the authority of the new democratic institutions. This means respect for a Government which has the majority support in a Parliament freely elected by universal suffrage.

Two free elections have been held during the occupation, in April, 1946, and April, 1947. But both elections have produced strong conservative majorities. These conservative parties - the "Liberals" and "Democrats" - have won their support mainly from those classes who greatly profit from the present inflation: the farmers and fishermen, who make up about one-half of the total population; the blackmarketeers, and those with assets they can sell.

The classes being impoverished by the inflation are the wage and salary earners. Increases in their rates of pay have failed pitifully to keep pace with the rise in prices. It was quite clear to any objective observer - whatever his political colour - that a number of rigorous economic controls had to be adopted if economic disaster was to be avoided.

But the

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But the conservative parties stubbornly resisted all efforts to establish a directed economy. However, essential such controls, to restore the economic health of the nation, they appeared to threaten the immediate interests of the classes they represent. They preferred external aid to domestic reform. Moreover, a high degree of inflation and an exhausted economy might make it harder for the Allies to collect reparations and the costs of occupation. The Japanese political leaders have studied carefully the economic strategems the Germans followed after 1918.

That is the dilemma. It is easy to say that General MacArthur should force the Japanese Government to adopt the control measures necessary for economic efficiency and social justice. But he must do this through the Japanese Government. And no Japanese Government with the necessary support of Parliament and people has been found ready to launch such measures. The present Prime Minister Katayama, is making worthy efforts at economic reform, but his Social Democratic Party is outweighed by more than two to one in the Diet.

It is true there have been notable efforts by GHQ to cleanse and reform the Japanese political economic system - the purge, and legislation directed to dissolve the Zaibatsu and rural land reform. I cannot discuss these interesting developments in these articles. Each of these reform programmes is faced with real and formidable difficulties; each has met quiet sabotage from conservative Japanese forces. It is far too soon to have solid hope that such projects will produce any substantial increase in economic welfare or significant redistribution of social and political power.

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The task of statesmanship today is not to struggle for control of strategic areas, but to make a world fit for common people to live in.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

File

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12/22/47

TO : OE - Dean Bowman
FROM : A-S - A. B. Moreland
SUBJECT : Japanese Silk.

I am attaching a cable and letter from the Department of the Army on the subject of Japanese Silk which is self-explanatory.

Enclosure:

- 1. Letter from Col. Laux
- 2. Cable to SCAP

AS-3380

748.00119 Central Japan 12-22-47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

TO: MR. *Moreland*
Ret'd by CAD

For necessary action.

Conger

SUSPENSE: *Dec. 24*

GSCAD 091.31

17 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR OCCUPIED AREAS

SUBJECT: Japanese Silk

1. Returned herewith is draft cable Number AS 3380 with covering memo, dated 28 November 1947, from Mr. Moreland.
2. It is believed that the statements from the Minutes of the Inter-Allied Trade Board Meeting should not be forwarded to SCAP for the following reasons:
 - a. A policy of selling silk from Japan on a private trade basis has already been approved in Washington and Tokyo and has been published.
 - b. The receipt of these minutes would be confusing to SCAP, in view of the decisions already made.
 - c. Sales policies which are not in contravention of the broad policies given SCAP, are within the scope of SCAP's administrative authority, and it is believed that such details should be left to the discretion of SCAP, so that adaptations may be made to fit the several circumstances which may arise in connection with the private trade now under way in Japan.
 - d. Silk selling policy which has been adopted makes no distinction as to nationality of buyer, and no advantages or disadvantages regardless of the place of purchase are intended for the traders of any particular nation, as is suggested by paragraphs 2 and 3 of inclosed draft cable.

FOR THE CHIEF, CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION:

Final
Draft Cable AS 3380
and covering memo

0 423 / 7931

3380

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE:

TO : CAD - Executive Officer
FROM : A-S - Mr. Moreland
SUBJECT : Japanese Silk.

The Inter-Allied Trade Board at a recent meeting requested that the attached statement from the Board meetings on the subject of sale of silk be transmitted to SCAP.

Will you kindly secure Department of the Army concurrence and advise me on State 3775.

This cable originated in the State Department.

AS-3380

11/7/47

SCAP

Action

D/PO-USW:CAD-State;CAD

1. Inter-Allied Trade Board in ^{Recent} ~~the~~ meeting ~~unanimously~~ requested that following statement from Board's minutes be transmitted to SCAP:

"The Board considered the feasibility of SCAP arranging for the sale of raw silk to Tokyo to private buyers. The consensus of the Board membership was that SCAP should, in the very near future, make arrangements whereby foreign traders in Tokyo would be able to purchase raw silk, without necessarily purchasing through their respective governments. The chairman pointed out that he was most mindful of the heavy inventories of raw silk in the United States but that he concurred with the views of the other board members since the advantages of such a course more than offset any minor disadvantages. The chairman agreed to inform the U.S. Government of the Board's view, which, he believed, would be transmitted to SCAP with the concurring views of his government."

2. Draft of statement considered by Board included sentence "Private buyers in Tokyo should be offered price and quality opportunities equal to those prevailing in New York." With this general principle there was general agreement, although UK member suggested adding statement to effect that equality of opportunity as to price between buyers in Japan and in
New York

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New York should be defined in light of current intergovernmental agreements re silk pricing. In other words he proposed SCAP sell silk to UK traders at same prices that would be charged if UK Government were purchaser. U.S. member as chairman was noncommittal on UK suggestion but indicated that U.S. could not agree to a proposal which would bind SCAP to offer same terms to private buyers as to their governments.

3. No objections here SCAP arranging for sale raw silk to private buyers in Tokyo. Price policy objective would appear to be to offer silk in Japan at prices and on terms which will not be attractive to buyers who are catering to UK market as long as they can have their orders filled out of stocks already in the US but which will be attractive to buyers who are catering to other markets.

OE:DOBowman:bc
RMPaige
AS:ABMoreland:mds

10/31/47
11/7/47

Commerce Dept
NA A-S

CP IR

AS-3380