

Interr. Td To (25 Jan 46)

DOC 4159

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 25 January 1946, 1405-1600 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hideki Tojo
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator
Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Fihelly

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Q.: You said the other day that the expression "Niki Sansuke" had an unpleasant implication. Why was that?

A.: AS I explained yesterday, the phrase was coined because the impression got about that these five individuals knew their way around in Manchuria and could get things done. That impression, however, was contrary to the facts and was a nuisance since the things that I did in Manchuria and the things that HOSHINO did in Manchuria were the result of orders from the central government and not because of any individual notions we had. The expression was a kind of propaganda.

Q.: Who do you think started this propaganda, and for what purpose?

A.: I don't know who started it or for what purpose. AS for me, I paid very little attention to it.

Q.: But you do know, don't you, that the expression was widely used, both in Manchuria and in Japan proper at this time?

A.: No, I don't think so. When I went to Manchuria, I had never heard of it.

Q.: But by the time you came back from Manchuria, it was used both in Manchuria and in Japan proper, wasn't it?

A.: It did come out in the papers, for example, in Manchuria, and there were some people in Japan proper too that used it, but I didn't pay much attention to it.

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- Q.: In a recent interview, you stated that on or about September 18, 1941, you said in part "abroad we must plan for the mutual prosperity of all races of Greater East Asia". Why was that?
- A.: At that time relations were still bad between Japan and China and it was necessary to promote more friendly relations in those two countries.
- Q.: But you have not answered the question. The text says "abroad we must plan for the mutual prosperity of all the races of Greater East Asia".
- A.: This broadcast was directed toward Manchukuo and by that it was meant that, with regard to China, we should also come to some understanding.
- Q.: But the quotation does not refer only to the Chinese, but says "all the races of Greater East Asia". That includes the Philippines, Thai, the people of the Malay Peninsula and so forth, doesn't it?
- A.: Well, that meaning too could be read into it, but at the time of that broadcast, I intended it to apply to China.
- Q.: But if you intended this to apply only to China and Manchuria alone, why did you use such broad language?
- A.: You have the text there and so that is probably what I said; those are probably the characters that were used, but, speaking from my impression, this was a broadcast directed toward Manchuria on the anniversary of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and what I had in mind was, I believe, Manchuria and China. Previous to the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, as I have already stated, the concept of Greater East Asia was very vague and did not include the Philippines, Thai, or Malaya.
- Q.: In the same speech at the same time, you say "we must march ever forward, despite difficulties, to build the new order in East Asia." What difficulties are you referring to?
- A.: Japan had had to endure many difficulties and sacrifices, including casualties and rights that had been violated.
- Q.: You just said that this concept of the new order was very vague before the outbreak of the war with the United States, but here in this same speech you say that the Manchurian Incident "has become a tocsin proclaiming to all the people that they must march ever forward despite difficulties to build the New Order in East Asia".

Continued

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A.: As I said sometime ago, there were a number of basic causes for the war. The basic policy of Japan for a long time has been to contribute to world peace by the stabilization of Greater East Asia. However, this was not a simple matter to carry out. In China, which was the focus of forces, there were, as I explained before, raw materials, tremendous population, and a center of Oriental culture. For a long time past, West European, American, and Russian influences had been acting upon China. The stability of East Asia and the right of East Asiatic peoples to live were involved in this process, and this was one of the long-range basic causes of the war, I believe. The short-range causes were entirely different. This is an extremely important subject so I hope you will cover it fully. It was vital for Japan to be able to trade with China, especially as regards food materials and other necessities of life. That is one important point. A second point is that Japan, because of her geographic proximity to China, was more affected by conditions of peace or disorder in that country. Disorder and instability in China could spread quickly to Japan. By contrast, England and America were more remote from China and were not seriously affected by chaotic conditions there. Their interests were derived principally from their colonies, in the case of Britain, or various rights which they had, in the case of the United States, and for them the problem was much less serious.

Q.: You state that the basic policy of Japan for a long time has been to contribute to world peace by the stabilization of Greater East Asia. How long had that been the basic long-range policy of Japan?

A.: It has been basic Japanese policy ever since the Meiji period. The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War were all in line with this policy; so also were the Manchurian Incident, the China Incident, and the Greater East Asia War. This is the basic Japanese national policy. However, specific foreign policies are adopted from time to time in accordance with the particular conditions which prevail. The other basic Japanese policy, as I have stated before, is to bring about the happiness of mutual existence and mutual prosperity by a deepening of the relations between the Powers.

Q.: So that there have been times in the past when Japan has gone to war to bring about the stabilization of East Asia?

Continued

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A.: The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War had this as the basis, although there were specific causes. The Manchurian Incident and the China Incident also had this fundamental basis. That the two above points are fundamental national policies is not just my idea. In the Imperial Declaration of War, both points are explicitly included.

Q.: Does not the Imperial Declaration of War between Japan and the United States, that you refer to, state specifically that Japan was declaring war on the United States in order to establish the stabilization of East Asia?

A.: It states that the Japanese national policy is to do that, but it does not say that this is the cause of the war.

Q.: Did not the Japanese Government state, in a message delivered to the American Secretary of State on December 7, 1941, that:

"It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world."

A.: It did, I believe. I believe that the Japanese representative did give such a message to the American Government. If he did, I am of course responsible because I was the Premier.

Q.: Do you not know that this message was sent, even though you were Premier?

A.: Of course I know that a message was delivered, but as to the exact wording of it, I do not know.

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Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR, 11-35-72
(Name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 4 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Yale Maxon
Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of August, 1946.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Myrtle B. Mills
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on 25th day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me TOJO Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, USNR,

Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO
(Place)

12 August 46
(Date)

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25 January 1946
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