

REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

**THE VIET-NAM – CAMBODIA
BORDER ISSUE
BEFORE THE U. N. SECURITY COUNCIL**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Saigon, November 1964

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FOREWORD

For several years frontier incidents between Viet-Nam and Cambodia have recurred, and the Cambodian Government has always systematically held Viet-Nam entirely responsible.

However, it has been proved that these incidents, far from being wittingly provoked by Viet-Nam, had been occasioned by the imprecise border line between the two countries, and by Viet-Cong activities from their operational bases along the frontier.

Viet-Nam has always sought a solution to this state of affairs, which is harmful to good understanding between the two neighboring countries and to peace in this Southeast Asian area. The Government set up after the November 1, 1963, Revolution has proclaimed its sincere wish to improve relations with neighboring countries, particularly with Cambodia.

As a consequence of this policy, although Viet-Nam is not a member of the United Nations, she heartily welcomes the decision of the Security Council to send an investigation mission to the spot in order to find ways and means to disentangle the situation and to lay the foundation for good neighborly relations. Viet-Nam did so although the decision had been taken following Cambodia's complaint against Viet-Nam.

Impartial observers have paid tribute to the cooperative spirit of the Vietnamese Government in helping the U.N. Mission discharge its duties, with a view, to quote Dr. Phan-huy-Quat, Foreign Minister, « to finding a constructive and effective solution, apt to prevent the recurrence of frontier incidents which have been repeated too often to the prejudice of good understanding between the two countries ».

On the other hand, the Cambodian attitude seems to be difficult to understand. It was the Khmer Government which, on May 13, 1964, lodged a complaint against the Republic of Vietnam at the U.N. Security Council for « acts of aggression ». As the initiator of the Security Council's action, Cambodia should logically have subscribed to the recommendations of the Council. Instead, she not only opposed the conclusions of the Investigation Mission, in its report of July 27, 1964 to the Security Council, but also allowed herself to accuse the Mission of « having let itself to be bought by American imperialists ».

The statements of the competent Khmer authorities are self-revealing. Let world opinion compare the facts, and draw a conclusion for itself.

CHAPTER I

CHRONOLOGY OF CAMBODIA'S SO-CALLED « COMPLAINT AGAINST U.S. — SOUTH VIET-NAM AGGRESSIONS »

- April 16, 1964 : Cambodia submits to the Security Council a file on « U.S. - South Viet-Nam aggressions against Cambodian territory and people ».
- May 13, 1964 : Cambodia lodges a complaint at the U.N. Security Council.
- May 19, 1964 : The Security Council meets to discuss the Cambodian complaint. It decides to invite the Republic of Viet-Nam to answer the charge, and adjourns till May 25, 1964.
- May 25, 1964 : Debates on the Cambodian complaint, with participation of a Viet-Nam delegation.
- June 4, 1964 : The Security Council adopts the draft-resolution tabled by Morocco and the Ivory Coast.
- June 5, 1964 : The Investigation Mission of the Security Council is set up.
- June 18, 1964 : The Mission leaves New York.
- June 22, 1964 : The Mission arrives at Nice (France), has business-lunch with Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

- June 26, 1964 : The Mission arrives at Phnompenh.
- July 5, 1964 : The Mission arrives at Saigon.
- July 14, 1964 : The Mission leaves Saigon.
- July 17, 1964 : The Mission arrives at New York.
- July 27, 1964 : The Mission submits its report to the Security Council.
- August 10, 1964 : Prince Norodom Sihanouk demands that the file be « purely and simply » consigned in the filing cabinet.
- August 30, 1964 : Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Royal Government and the two Assemblies of Cambodia lodge a « formal protest » against the report of the Security Council Investigation Mission, because « its recommendations are strictly unacceptable ».

CHAPTER II

SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS

- I. — Security Council Resolution of June 4, 1964.**
- II. — Excerpt from a Report of the Security Council Mission, July 27, 1964 :**
 - Position of the two Governments**
 - Conclusions**
 - Recommendations**

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF JUNE 4, 1964
ON THE COMPLAINT
BY THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA

The Security Council,

Considering the complaint by the Royal Government of Cambodia in document S/5697,

Noting the statements made in the Council in regard to this complaint,

Noting with regret the incidents which have occurred on Cambodian territory and the existing situation on the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier,

Taking note of the apologies and regrets tendered to the Royal Government of Cambodia in regard to these incidents and the loss of life they have entailed,

Noting also the desire of the Governments of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam to succeed in restoring their relations to a peaceful and normal state,

1. Deplores the incidents caused by the penetration of units of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam into Cambodian territory ;
2. Requests that just and fair compensation should be offered to the Royal Government of Cambodia ;
3. Invites those responsible to take all appropriate measures to prevent any further violation of the Cambodian frontier ;
4. Requests all States and Authorities and in particular the members of the Geneva Conference to recognize and respect Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity ;
5. Decides to send three of its members to the two countries and to the places where the most recent incidents have occurred in order to consider such measures as may prevent any recurrence of such incidents. They will report to the Security Council within forty-five days.

EXCERPT

**from a report of the Security Council Mission
to Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam**

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IV. — Positions of the two Governments on the questions in dispute
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51. The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has put forward some other proposals for reducing the risk of further frontier incidents. It has proposed *inter alia* « the establishment of an international police force, or of a group of observers with sufficient personnel and resources to keep the frontier area under surveillance ». Meanwhile, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam assured the Mission that it was prepared to accept measures of any kind which, if objectively and impartially applied would help to improve the situation between the two countries.

.....

V. — Conclusions

52. The Mission believes that it has established the existence of important factors which could serve as a basis for a solution of the various problems at issue. Undoubtedly the two Governments have divergent views on a number of these problems, but it is clear that they are both animated by a spirit of goodwill and are anxious to reach concrete, even if limited, agreements.

53. The Mission found that the two Governments are aware of the need to make an effort to reduce the tension between their two countries. Hence, for example, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has assured the Mission that its armed forces will avoid approaching too close to the frontier in order to avert any possibility of frontier violation.

54. The situation in the frontier region nevertheless remains strained, and the Mission welcomes the fact that the two Governments have taken a positive attitude and have contemplated measures to reduce the risk of further incidents. Although there

are substantial differences between the views expressed on either side, nevertheless there are still points which could be adopted as a basis for a solution acceptable to both Parties.

55. The two main problems to be solved are the resumption of political relations and the dispatch of international observers.

56. As to the first of these problems, the Mission considers that it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that there are differences in political outlook between the two Governments. The obstacles to normal relations derived mainly from pride and mutual distrust — the outcome of age-old rivalries ; the different historical circumstances in which the two States obtained their independence; and more recently, the divergent paths they have chosen in the matter of international politics.

57. Despite this, the two countries are aware of the geographical realities which make it necessary for them, as neighbours, to live on good terms. Indeed, inter-penetration exists at all levels of the two countries' national life. There is a Khmer minority living in the Republic of Viet-Nam, just as there is a Vietnamese minority in the Kingdom of Cambodia. The Mekong is not only the natural highway linking the two countries ; it is also a fount from which could rise up great nuclei of prosperity essential for the well-being and progress of all of the region's inhabitants.

58. Moreover, as the Mission was able to note, both countries have declared that they have no claims with respect to the common land frontier. Each State undertakes to respect the territorial integrity and the political system of the other. The Mission considers that the goodwill thus expressed on both sides constitutes a hopeful start towards the resumption of normal political relations between the two countries.

59. The Mission is compelled, however, to mention the problem of the off-shore islands, which Cambodia raises as a prior condition for the resumption of relations with the Republic of Viet-Nam. The reaction of the latter on this subject is left to be sufficiently conciliatory to justify the hope on the part of the Mission that this question will be satisfactorily disposed of during the first contacts established between the two Governments.

60. It should be noted that the resumption of political relations would be bound to lead to negotiations with a view to agreements on such matters as the delimiting and marking of the frontier.

61. While it is not in a position to say how far the lack of frontier marking may have played a part in the recent incidents, the Mission is of the view that anything that could be done to remedy the present inadequate marking would be most helpful in preventing frontier conflicts or regrettable incidents such as have taken place on Cambodian territory.

62. As regards the principle of international supervision in the frontier area, each of the Parties has made its views on this subject perfectly clear.

63. The Cambodian proposal was conceived in a spirit of evident goodwill, and the Mission believes that, taken as a whole, the proposal represents a real contribution to the problem. The Mission has therefore felt that it should recommend the Security Council to consider a formula that would embrace that proposal by establishing a United Nations observer group, its functions to be as defined in paragraphs 47 and 48 of this report.

64. The ways and means of applying such a formula would, however, have to be the subject of negotiations at a later date. The Mission did not feel called upon to initiate negotiations of this kind; it considered that the Council itself should have a thorough study made of all the points concerning the application of the formula.

65. As to the proposals regarding international supervision put forward by the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Mission considers that inasmuch as they go beyond what is acceptable to the Kingdom of Cambodia, they might not constitute a basis for an agreement between the two countries.

VI. — *Recommendations*

66. In accordance with its terms of reference, which were to consider such measures as might prevent any recurrence of the incidents which have occurred on the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier, within Cambodian territory, and having regard to what has been stated in this report, the Mission submits to the Security Council the following recommendations:

- (i) That the Security Council should decide to establish and send to Cambodia a group of United Nations observers and should entrust the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the implementation of this decision in consultation with the members of the Security Council;

- (ii) That the Security Council should recommend the Governments of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam to adopt whatever measures are necessary to bring about the resumption of the political relations broken off in August 1963 ;
- (iii) That the Security Council should appoint a person of high international standing, approved by the two Parties, to arrange for a preliminary meeting between the two Governments for the purpose of re-establishing relations between the two countries and the resumption of talks on matters in dispute, particularly the delimitation and marking of the common frontier ;
- (iv) That the Security Council should take note of the assurances given to the Mission by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam that the Vietnamese armed forces have been issued definite instructions that every precaution is to be taken to avoid any risk of frontier violations ;
- (v) That the Security Council should take note of the statement by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam that it recognizes and undertakes to respect the neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

Done at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on July 27, 1964.

*Dey Ould Sidi Baba,
Representative of Morocco,
Chairman*

*Manuel Pio Correa,
Representative of Brazil*

*Moise Aka,
Representative of the Ivory Coast.*

CHAPTER III

POSITION OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

- **Excerpt from an address by the representative of the Republic of Viet-Nam at the 1121st session of the Security Council, May 25, 1964.**
- **Excerpt from a speech by Dr. Phan-huy-Quat, Foreign Minister, at the first working session of the Security Council Mission, July 6, 1964, in Saigon.**
- **Foreign Ministry statement on report of U.N. border mission, September 5, 1964.**

EXCERPT

from an address by the Representative of the Republic of Viet-Nam
at the 1121st session of the Security Council, May 25, 1964

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... Of these incidents which have unfortunately recurred at an accelerated rhythm in the last few years, and which we strongly deplore, it is Viet-Nam which has been the victim.

The communist troops have exploited the fact that the borders were badly defined and insufficiently protected to escape the Vietnamese army and to seek refuge on Cambodian territory, after having pillaged peaceful Vietnamese villages and communities located near the border.

Since 1958, the Government of Viet-Nam has repeatedly proposed to the Royal Government of Cambodia to seek through common agreement an adequate solution to these incidents for the purpose of putting an end to a situation which can only be prejudicial to our security as well as to that of Cambodia.

To our deep regret, these attempts were of no avail. However, the Royal Government of Cambodia has submitted to the Security Council three recent incidents which occurred at Mong on 4 February 1964, at Chantrea on 19 March 1964, and at Thlork on 7 May 1964. None of these incidents deserves the attention of the Council since no litigation has arisen concerning them. With regard to the first incident, we have proposed to Cambodia the establishment of a joint commission to carry out an investigation on the spot and to determine together the exact share of responsibility which the Government of Viet-Nam must bear and the amount of compensation our Government must eventually offer.

The Royal Government of Cambodia, however, has indignantly rejected this reasonable proposal, alleging that since a visit on the spot has already been made by the International Control Commission and the military attachés stationed in Phnom-Penh, a second investigation would, consequently, be an insult to the good faith of those who took part in the first one. We, on the contrary, feel that to put an end to the incidents, the best way would have been for the two parties concerned to get together with their opposing views and thus examine the facts by themselves and carry out a true and frank exchange of views. To reach a mutually

satisfying solution it is of no use to resort to publicity campaigns carried out in the absence of one of the parties and to appeal to organizations which are not empowered by any statutory or international rules to deal with the matter. As for the incidents of Chantrea and Thlork Kum, immediately after they took place the Government of Viet-Nam presented its regrets to the Royal Cambodian Government and offered to indemnify the victims. The good faith of my Government and the speed with which it sought to resolve the incidents have surely stripped the Cambodian Government's complaint of its *raison d'être*, if not of its very aim.

A White Paper on these incidents, with all the necessary supporting documents, is being prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet-Nam and will be submitted for the Council's consideration in the very near future.

Allow me at this time to draw the attention of the Council to the root-causes of these incidents, which, by their frequent repetition, have harmed our territorial defence.

At this point I think it well to stress that the border incidents did not always occur in one direction. In fact, numerous cases have been reported in which the Cambodian Armed Forces have violated Vietnamese territory, causing considerable losses in human life and serious physical damage. On 20 April 1962, sixty Cambodian soldiers entered the village of Vinh-Lac, province of An-Giang; they plundered and massacred the population, leaving fifty-two dead, twenty-two wounded and burning down thirty houses. This village is two kilometres from the border, on the banks of a canal which is definitely within Vietnamese territory.

Even more recently, on 19 March 1964, a Vietnamese L-19 observation plane was shot down by two Cambodian T-28 fighter-planes when the Vietnamese observation plane was taking part in an operation against the Viet-Cong in Vietnamese territory. The plane crashed at Phong-Phu, in Kien-Tuong Province, four kilometres from the frontier. The nose of the plane was found to be riddled with holes. This proves that, since its motor would have immediately stopped, the aircraft must have crashed immediately after being attacked over Vietnamese territory.

We recall these two incidents not with any purely recriminatory aim, but to put the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier question in its true light.

In most cases, however, the fundamental causes of the frontier incidents between Viet-Nam and Cambodia arise, on the one hand, from the absence of a well-marked frontier along its whole

length and, on the other, from the violation of Cambodian territory by the Viet-Cong in the course of their aggressive activities against the Republic of Viet-Nam. We shall amplify these two points in dealing with them successively.

First of all, the frontier line between Cambodia and Viet-Nam is still not precisely defined in a number of places. Before 1945, Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos were all included in the Federation of Indo-China, under French administration. The question of the international frontiers between these countries was not then posed as it has been since these countries became independent. It is for this reason that the demarcation lines between these neighbouring countries are not as clear as they should be.

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I shall now proceed to my second point : the use by Viet-Cong guerrillas of Cambodian territory as a place of refuge and supply in their aggressive activities against Viet-Nam.

It is an uncontested fact that the Viet-Cong have frequently crossed the Khmer-Vietnamese border. But they cross it in both directions. It is a matter of small armed groups going into Cambodia seeking supplies, or of larger groups which also slip into Cambodia to avoid the mopping-up operations undertaken by the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam. In other cases, Viet-Cong cadres enter Viet-Nam through Cambodia with a view to training and indoctrinating young people who have been enrolled forcibly in their ranks. This back-and-forth movement of persons has been confirmed by the statements of captured prisoners and also by numerous documents which have been seized. My Government has drawn up a complete list of Viet-Cong violations of the Khmer-Vietnamese border. Our White Paper, which the Council will soon have before it, will include the list of these subversive activities which have been directed from abroad over the last few years, as well as irrefutable evidence and all relevant proof. It will suffice for me to give the Council a few typical examples among the most recent cases in order to convey an idea of the difficulties which my Government has to face with regard to the border.

On 11 March 1964, Viet-Cong coming from Cambodian territory entered the hamlet of Vinh-Xuyen in the Chau-Phu district of An-Giang Province and abducted four inhabitants of that place.

On 4 April 1964, two Viet-Cong battalions equipped with heavy weapons attacked the Vietnamese frontier post of Phuoc-

Tan. The greater part of these Viet-Cong units withdrew into Khmer territory after the attack.

On 14 April 1964, two Viet-Cong battalions coming from Cambodian territory attacked simultaneously four Vietnamese border posts situated in the An-Phu district of An-Giang Province. They then withdrew into Cambodian territory after the attack.

Another equally serious problem which faces my Government concerns the smuggled explosives which move down the Mekong from Cambodia. This is a question of potassium chlorate which is used in making explosives. Examination of hand grenades, mines and shrapnel captured by the Vietnamese forces showed that about 80 per cent of the explosive material contained in these lethal devices was potassium chlorate. This potassium chlorate is smuggled into Viet-Nam from Cambodia.

According to official statistics published by Cambodia, the amount of potassium chlorate imported by Cambodia has increased considerably in the last few years. I should like to cite a few statistics. Annual imports were as follows: 1960, 10 metric tons; 1961, 12 metric tons; 1962, 129 metric tons. In 1963, as of 27 August, the amount was 170 metric tons, which is seventeen times more than in 1960. My Government has been unable to ascertain the reason for such civilian or military increase in requirements of this product.

A similar increase has been noted — and I am still citing official Cambodian statistics — is the import of red phosphorous. No red phosphorous was imported into Cambodia in 1961. In 1962, 2.8 tons were imported; and in the first seven months of 1963 alone, 4.1 tons were brought into Cambodia.

Is there any need to stress the fact that the growing imports of these two products into Cambodia correspond precisely to the intensification of sabotage and guerrilla activities undertaken by the Communists in Viet-Nam?

Moreover, the use of the Mekong as a major highway for these explosives from Cambodia to the Viet-Cong has been proved by captures of explosives on the river. Again, recognizing that the time of the members of the Security Council is valuable, I shall not present at this time a complete list of the explosives captured by the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam. At the moment, I shall cite only a few incidents.

On 19 April 1963, village guards stopped a sampan in which they discovered a kilogramme of red phosphorous and twenty-three bags each containing seventy-five kilogrammes of potassium

chlorate. On two of the bags could be read the words « K.K. Phnom-Penh ». Other bags bore the marking « in transit », and also four Chinese characters meaning « united company ». The interrogation of the six individuals who were on board the sampan revealed that they were inhabitants of the region who had been paid to ferry the explosives from the Cambodian border to the suburbs of Tan-Chau in Vietnamese territory. They were supposed to hand over the explosives at a prearranged place to the persons who had engaged them for this task.

On 21 June 1963, a water-patrol of the Vietnamese navy, aided by the village guards of the post of Long Phu in the Province of An-Giang, seized near that village post a boat carrying 4.080 kilogrammes of potassium chlorate and two cans of red phosphorous containing 15 kilogrammes each. The cargo had been brought from Cambodia to Viet-Nam and then loaded onto the boat where it was hidden under a cargo of bamboo.

It is clear from these few incidents that the Viet-Cong cross back and forth across the border and that the Mekong is used as a major thoroughfare for the bringing to Viet-Nam of strategic materials from Cambodia and for supplying the Viet-Cong troops. Military installations have also been established by the Viet-Cong troops along the entire border straddling the frontier and thus occupying soil on both sides.

The upshot is that the Viet-Cong are the real guilty parties of the border incidents between Cambodia and Viet-Nam. The border violations which they have committed are systematic and premeditated, and are perpetrated with a clearly defined aggressive goal, whereas, if on rare occasions Vietnamese troops have strayed into Cambodia territory, they have done so unwittingly in the heat of battle and in pursuit of the Viet-Cong withdrawing across the border.

These incidents can therefore in no way be imputed to a Vietnamese « aggression ». As everybody is fully aware, the Republic of Viet-Nam must at this time struggle for its very life. It is a victim of communist aggression coming from the north. It cannot even think of committing aggression against its neighbours.

The subversive activities carried out by the communists on the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam are in themselves a serious threat not only to the freedom and national independence of Viet-Nam, but also to the peace and stability of the free world in that great region of Southeast Asia. The proof of the aggression from the north has been irrefutably established by the special report of the International Control Commission, dated 2 June 1962.

A few weeks ago in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who was co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, stated categorically that the subversive activities being carried out at the present time in Viet-Nam are organized by the Communists of North Viet-Nam.

In the struggle that we are waging against red imperialism, we are grateful to the numerous friendly nations of the free world, and in particular to the United States of America, which have willingly answered our call and brought us the comfort of their moral and material assistance in one way or another in the defence of the cause of freedom. On many occasions we have declared solemnly that as far as that aid is concerned, we shall be the first to ask for its withdrawal when the communist aggression has ended in Viet-Nam.

The accusations levelled against our friends as well as the plans for the neutralization of the Republic of Viet-Nam sponsored by the communists are only manoeuvres aiming at the same objective : to isolate the Republic of Viet-Nam and to make things easier for the aggressor. One cannot help wondering what would have been the fate of Europe today if, during the crucial years of the Second World War, the United States had not been able or willing to join the European nations in the common fight against Nazi totalitarianism.

With regard to the border incidents mentioned by the Royal Cambodian Government before the Council, one should analyse them objectively and take into account the real causes which gave rise to them. In order to find an effective remedy, one must trace back to the very sources of the evil itself. As long as there is not a well-defined and well-marked border line, and as long as the Viet-Cong, availing themselves of the absence of any adequate control of this border, go on violating Cambodian territory to carry on their aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam, the border incidents between Cambodia and Viet-Nam can be expected to recur again and again, even if the two parties are guided by good faith and a true spirit of good neighbourliness.

With a view to bringing a final solution to these incidents which harm the good relationships between our two countries, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam proposes, on the one hand, the establishment of a commission of experts to help define and mark the border line between Viet-Nam and Cambodia at all the disputed and imprecise points and, on the other hand, the setting up of an effective system for the control of the border area between Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

First — the establishment of a commission of experts. The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam proposes a commission of experts to be established under the aegis of the United Nations to define clearly and mark the border line between Viet-Nam and Cambodia. This commission would include experts acceptable to the two Governments concerned and representatives of the two Governments. The commission would be entrusted with the task of drawing up a map of the border zone acceptable to the two Governments.

Second — the setting up of an effective system for the control of the border area. The setting up of an effective system for the control of the border area between Viet-Nam and Cambodia is essential to the settlement of the issue which is our concern today. The Royal Cambodian Government has persistently and vehemently denied the presence of Viet-Cong forces in its territory. To prove its good faith, it has proposed in its explanatory memorandum of 22 April 1964 (S/5666), « a generalized control of its borders ».

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam fully endorses such a solution, which goes to the very root of the problem. However, as a concrete measure to implement this proposal, the Royal Cambodian Government has merely suggested the sending of a commission of inquiry on the spot. Such a formula appears both insufficient and inadequate to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. It is indeed obvious that a mere group of investigators, however competent they may be, would be materially and physically unable to keep a constant watch on the entire border line between Viet-Nam and Cambodia at all hours of the day and night and to prevent the clandestine crossing of the border by guerrilla bands.

This is why the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has repeatedly proposed to the Royal Cambodian Government the establishment of joint patrols, composed of military units of both countries, to co-operate in the common task of surveillance of the border area in order to prevent Viet-Cong incursions across the border and to avoid incidents between the two countries.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has always felt, however, that such co-operation was inconsistent with its concept of neutrality, and has therefore rejected our proposal. We trust that the Royal Cambodian Government will reconsider its decision on the matter. In any case, the Royal Government of Cambodia

seems to be more in favour of resorting to the International Control Commission, for which it wishes expanded terms of reference to be discussed at another Geneva Conference.

Practically speaking, however, one must recognize that the troika system governing the International Control Commission, combined with the unanimous agreement required for any binding decision, totally paralyzes that Commission in its role of control and investigation. If any proof is needed, the present-day activities of the Viet-Cong which are on the increase in South Viet-Nam and Laos — in spite of the presence of the International Control Commission — show this beyond any doubt. Furthermore, the International Control Commission itself has admitted, in its special report made in 1962, as has also Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of Great Britain, which is a Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, that North Viet-Nam has systematically violated the Geneva Accords which they signed in 1954. It is purely an illusion to suppose that they would honour in any great degree another Geneva Agreement, whatever it might be.

The tribulations and difficulties encountered in the implementation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 show the uselessness of any formula which would necessitate the calling of another Geneva Conference to guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and neutrality of Cambodia. Therefore, unless the Royal Cambodian Government accepts the formula which the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has proposed to it up till now, namely, the setting up of mixed patrols to supervise the border region, the only effective solution which remains would seem to be the establishment of an international system of control of that border region under the aegis of the United Nations.

Indeed, as a party accused of aggression against Cambodia and of violations of Cambodian territory, we are asking for nothing else but an effective system of international control to prevent the crimes which have been falsely attributed to us and which were rather committed by the Communists. The form of control has yet to be found, but what is essential to us is that this international system of control be objective and effective. We are willing to put forward concrete proposals, if necessary, or seriously to consider any constructive proposal from whatever quarter it may come.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has, as a matter of fact, no other goal than the re-establishment of friendly relations with Cambodia. After the Revolution of 1 November 1963, the Government of Viet-Nam sent two goodwill missions to

Cambodia, the mission of Ambassador Tran-chanh-Thanh in December 1963 and the mission of General Huynh-van-Cao, Member of the Military Revolutionary Council, in March last. Viet-Nam has expressed its wish to renew with Cambodia the diplomatic relations which the Royal Government of Cambodia suspended in August 1963.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has also re-affirmed its intention to discuss with Cambodia, within the framework of bilateral conferences, every question in dispute so as to re-establish an atmosphere of understanding between our two countries. On 18 March 1964, General Nguyen-Khanh, Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Vietnamese Government, stated that he was ready to meet with Prince Sihanouk at any time and anywhere to discuss the problems which involved Cambodia and Viet-Nam. The proposals which are being submitted today to the Security Council are permeated with that spirit of goodwill, and we wholeheartedly hope that they will find a cordial response from our neighbours. According to an old Vietnamese proverb, which certainly must have its equivalent in Cambodia, « distant relatives are not as valuable as close neighbours ».

EXCERPT

**from a speech by Dr. Phan-huy-Quat, Foreign Minister,
at the first working session of the Security Council Mission,
July 6, 1964, in Saigon**

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With due regard to the relations which I was able to establish during my recent mission in New York with U.N. personalities, and particularly with the distinguished members of the Security Council, of whom you are the representatives, may I express here my great pleasure at welcoming you to Viet-Nam. We have long awaited your arrival... Indeed, the Vietnamese delegation to the Security Council has made every effort toward the sending of a Mission here so as to bring to light the frontier incidents, which have too often occurred to the prejudice of Khmero-Vietnamese relations. We hope that this fact will be looked upon as a token of our goodwill, and our desire to reach a constructive and effective solution, apt to prevent further recurrence of the incidents.

a) Although Viet-Nam is not yet a member of the United Nations, she wholeheartedly adheres to the U.N. Charter.

The Vietnamese people, which is friendly with the Cambodian people, only aspires after peace. If Viet-Nam is still at war, it is due to the Communists — from mainland China, and particularly from North Viet-Nam. Their systematic aggression, by means of arms and ideology, under every form and at all places, does not exclude the use of certain areas near Viet-Nam, and probably the Cambodian government ignores it. The outspoken opposition of Hanoi and Peking to your peace mission in this region is a blatant proof of this fact.

b) Our aim is to show you the sorrowful situation into which we have been driven. Our activities and operations, of a purely defensive nature, are the more legitimate because they are necessary to our survival.

My assistants will discuss with you the schedule of your stay here and will give the desired help. We believe in the great effort and the wisdom of the United Nations in the settlement of international disputes. In other words, while the repeated incidents had made us sad, your arrival has made us hopeful.

This belief is shown today in the drafting of a program of briefings and on-the-spot investigations. Needless to say, it will become definite only after your approval. The program includes spheres of activities directly related to the elucidation of border incidents, and others. For each item, oral briefing supported by study of military maps, official documents and memorandum, will be followed by an on-the-spot investigation, and total freedom of movement and gathering of proofs will be assured.

With the only aim to inform you on all issues, we will be very pleased to receive your suggestions regarding the working method as well as the list of items to be studied.

To summarize, we have nothing to hide. You are free to study files, to ask witnesses questions and to visit places. Eye-witnesses will tell you how much we have suffered. You will be able to go and check by your own eyes, and to propose adequate solutions to the tragic situation which has brought Viet-Nam — Cambodia relations almost to breaking point and endangers peace in this part of the Southeast Asian region. For the success of your mission — success which will be also ours — all doors, either Vietnamese or Cambodian, should be wide open for you to step in.

.....

**FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ON REPORT OF U.N.
BORDER MISSION**

In a joint statement on Aug. 30, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Royal Government and the two Cambodian Assemblies, « considering the recommendations are absolutely unacceptable », raised a « formal protest against the report submitted by the Security Council Mission on the Khmer-South Viet-Nam differences ».

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam deems it useful to draw the world's attention to the fact that it was Cambodia itself which brought the affair before the Security Council.

The Vietnamese government for its own part has always declared itself « ready to accept any kind of solutions, provided that their objective and impartial execution would help improve the situation between the two countries », as acknowledged by the Security Council Mission in its July 27 report (Art. 51).

Saigon, September 5, 1964.

CHAPTER IV

POSITION OF THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT

- Excerpt from an article « Recommendations of the Special Mission of the Security Council », La Dépêche du Cambodge, July 27th, 1964.
- Excerpt from « Message of Prince Norodom Sihanouk to both Chambers » (July 27th, 1964).
- Article « D'une Bouche Arrondie » (La Dépêche du Cambodge, July 30th, 1964).
- Excerpt from a speech delivered at Takeo by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, July 30th, 1964.
- Excerpt from an address by Prince Norodom Sihanouk at Kampot, July 31st, 1964.
- Statement by the Royal Government of Cambodia, July 31st, 1964.
- Excerpt from an article « Green light for the U.S.A. and for South Viet-Nam ? » (Neak Cheat Niyum, August 2nd, 1964).
- Excerpt from the Memorandum of August 10th, 1964, from the Chief of State of Cambodia to the Secretary General of the United Nations.
- Cambodian protest against the conclusions of the Security Council Mission on the conflict between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam, August 30th, 1964.
- Excerpt from the opening address of Prince Norodom Sihanouk to the National Congress.

EXCERPT

from an article « Recommendations of the Special Mission of the Security Council »

(La Dépêche du Cambodge, July 27th, 1964)

... The mission and those who have inspired it have wished to make a clean sweep of the past, cross out the Geneva Accords, entrust the U.N.O. with the task normally resting on the organizations created by this historic Conference...

... The Moroccan President Dey Ould Sidi Baba seemed disposed to hear us. The representative from the Ivory Coast, Moise Aka, was perhaps more reticent ; but the Brazilian delegate Manuel Pio Correa, by his reserved attitude, seemed to be hostile to our cause from the beginning...

... The recommendations made by the United Nations Mission are therefore unacceptable for Cambodia. The mission has merely taken up the already old proposals made by Washington and Saigon.

The thousands of dollars spent are thus without any profit for the spirit of justice and equity. Our country asks nothing but justice ! By having recourse to the solutions of our adversaries, by setting the seal of the U.N. to their proposals, the mission has played directly into the hands of the imperialists who are the common enemies of the uncommitted countries...

EXCERPT

from « Message of Prince Norodom Sihanouk to both Chambers »,
on the occasion of the opening of the parliamentary session

(July 27th, 1964)

With regard to the result of the Mission of the Security Council, we have just received some informations on the recommendations it is going to put forward. So I think it my duty to give some details about our position.

First. — They are suggesting international control of the Khmer-Vietnamese frontiers by U.N. observers based in Cambodia.

If this control is likely to prove our good faith, we cannot oppose it. Nevertheless, in order that it does not raise difficulties in the international field, and in particular in our relations with the great powers friendly to us who have given us their assistance, it is indispensable that the Security Council unanimously takes a decision on this point.

If this agreement is reached, we insist that it is specified that this control by the United Nations would not, under any circumstances, replace that of the International Control Commission nor would it make void the Geneva Accords of 1954, constantly violated by the United States and South Viet-Nam to the prejudice of our country.

Finally, under no circumstances, would the controllers of the United Nations form an international police armed force. Their duty would strictly consist in inspecting the border regions of Cambodia which are accused to give shelter to the South Vietnamese rebels.

Second. — The setting up of a joint South Viet-Nam-Cambodia commission is being proposed so as to study the delimitation of the frontier between the two countries. This commission could be entrusted with the task of clearly delimiting the frontier where the marking out on the spot is « indeterminate » (sic).

To this effect, I deeply regret that the Mission of the Security Council did not take into consideration my remarks about the « marking out » of this frontier. We have said times and again to the members of this Mission that the principle of the marking out of the frontiers could not be formulated nor examined by

Cambodia before the official withdrawal by the Saigon Government of its foolish claims on our coastal islands, the formal recognition of the sovereignty of Cambodia on these islands, and the unequivocal recognition of the marking out of the frontier as it is on the maps in 1954.

As I have always emphasized, our position is definite and we cannot compromise on it.

I also regret that the Mission gives a lot of importance to the « place where the marking out on the spot is indeterminate » and has ignored the question of our coastal islands which cannot remain an « indeterminate issue. »

Third. — Finally, I regret that the Mission has sought to support an « aggressive country » — which besides is not a member of the United Nations — which has attacked our territory and violated our air space, by recommending that we should have diplomatic relations with that country.

The exchange of diplomatic relations with either one or the other of the two Vietnamese governments implies as a preliminary, the formal recognition of our frontiers, including our coastal islands which are unjustly claimed by Saigon.

.....

A.K.P. 28-7-1964, No. 4.880, Pp. 5 and 6

ARTICLE « D'UNE BOUCHE ARRONDIE »

(La Dépêche du Cambodge, July 30th, 1964)

Sooner or later, the masks are thrown off. In the precise case of the Special Mission of the Security Council, forty five days had been necessary to unmask its real activities. At the end of a very « diplomatic » investigation under the United Nations flag, with a lot of bows and smiles, these gentlemen of the Mission have grandly reached a conclusion in their report. It is useless to recall the infamous proposals of these inquirers who seemed to have a very « special » idea of right and justice. Let us simply say that their proposals are exactly similar to those of Washington and Saigon. This is enough to explain...

Nothing then is more surprising: a strict marking out of a « badly delimited » frontier, the resuming of political relations with the Saigon regime, the sending of a team of United Nations investigators — such are the main recommendations of a Mission which has succeeded in the feat of changing aggressors and criminals into victims. They had not a word to condemn the American-South Vietnamese hordes which have destroyed our villages and murdered our brothers. They did not write a sentence to denounce the guilt of the Yankee imperialists and of their servants in Saigon. But, on the contrary, they had put forth suggestions, proposals, recommendations to Cambodia, all of them unjust, not to say insulting.

Our enemies are overjoyed by the recommendations of the sending of a team of United Nations investigators to our frontiers. The imperialists well know that thanks to these « investigators », they could later on use the blue flag to proceed with their war of aggression in the countries of the former Indochina. It is the bridgehead that was lacking. Whether civilians or military, these « investigators » or « inspectors » will only be in name, for it is quite certain that C.I.A. agents or Pentagon specialists will not miss a golden opportunity to come and practice in Cambodia,

where they had suffered so many setbacks. The C.I.A., may we recall, is not only recruiting its agents among American citizens.

As for the proposals for a marking out of the frontier and for the resuming of our relations with Saigon, they are clearly insulting for the whole Khmer people. Let us nonetheless award a palm to this Special Mission of the Security Council: it has well deserved of the U.S. imperialists and of their servants. Let us also thank it for having so conspicuously shown its collusion with our aggressors. The Khmer people will owe it all this. More than ever, our people stands on its guard, ready to face every scheme and design which is hatched against us. Our country is relying first and above all on itself! Experience has shown that it is impossible to trust foreign inquirers, controllers or observers. These people have come not to do us justice, but only to do service to the Imperialists and their allies.

(« La Dépêche du Cambodge » is a government paper. Its publisher and editors are high-ranking officials of the Khmer Government, including Ministers and Ambassadors. Ed.)

EXCERPT

**from a speech delivered at Takeo by Prince Norodom Sihanouk
on July 30th, 1964**

... Samdech (Prince Sihanouk) points out that the United Nations Organisation has been informed of this heinous crime (1) by stating, to the intention of our leftist press which criticizes our appeal to the U.N.O., that we do not hope that this organisation will do us justice. But our only goal is to warn international opinion.

Samdech says: «Very soon I shall examine with those responsible for our policy whether it would not be better to withdraw our complaints against the American-South Vietnamese at the U.N.O. The Mission of the Security Council has been indeed for us a positive experience...

A.K.P. 30th July, 1947 — No. 4.883 — p. 3 C

(1) It is the so-called spraying of noxious powder on the territory of Cambodia, about which the Republic of Viet-Nam has proposed the setting up of an Expert Commission of World Scientists so as to clear up the whole case.

EXCERPT

**from an address by Prince Norodom Sihanouk at Kampot,
July 31th, 1964**

... About the report submitted by the team of enquirers of the Security Council, Samdech says :

« We will no longer complain to the U.N. as we have just had a decisive experiment, and we shall use totally different means to oblige our aggressors to respect us, with the permission of our people and of our Clergy.

« On my return from Jakarta, I shall summon all the members of the Government and the Parliament so as to ask their advice on the opportunity to negotiate an Agreement for mutual military help with our Chinese friends (in the case of an attack of our common enemies), which would be explicit enough to make them ponder.

« They might accuse us of departing from our neutrality. But they will have to recognize that they have persisted on blocking in every way our efforts to keep our strict neutrality (such as their obstruction to our intention of reconvening a Geneva Conference — the English who are the main responsables, have gone as far as to claim that by having recourse to the U.N.O., we had given up the Geneva Agreements — intrigues in the U.N.O. and in the Security Council in favour of South Viet-Nam which now looks like a victim of wicked Cambodia !)

« About our frontiers, I also consider the possibility of signing Agreements with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the National Liberation Front and the Neo Lao Haksat. I will also ask the advice of our Government and Parliament about it... »

A.K.P. August 1st, 1964 — No. 4.884

Pp. 2-A and 2-B

STATEMENT
by the Royal Government of Cambodia,

July 31st, 1964

The first indications available from the United Nations, after the report of the Security Council Mission, show that American and South-Vietnamese diplomatic circles are satisfied with the conclusions and recommendations put forth by this mission. It is emphasized, in particular, that the said report « gives satisfaction to the main wish of the Viet-Nam Republic which was the setting up of a group of U.N. observers » « to recognize the good faith and the good will » of the Saigon Government.

The Royal Government takes notice with deep regret, but without surprise, of the fact that the United States and South Viet-Nam have succeeded in imposing their propaganda to the United Nations investigation team.

To this effect, the American-South Vietnamese aggressors have better reasons to express their satisfaction of a report which practically absolves them.

Yet, it will seem paradoxical to these observers, who are well-informed of the actual situation in this part of the world, to see Cambodia, a victim of the bloodiest aggressions from the part of American-South Vietnamese forces, considered by some countries as guilty of being uncompromising towards the Saigon regime. This unjust attitude is a new proof that those who claim to be the servants of the United Nations and the defenders of its Charter, can reveal themselves the accomplices of one of the most aggressive dictatorships in the world.

The Royal Government strongly protests against the conclusions which overtly tend to make Cambodia assume the greater part of the responsibilities of those attacks made by the American-South Vietnamese forces against the civilian population of the Khmer villages along the frontier. Consequently, it would express

the utmost reserve on the recommendations so manifestly inspired by our aggressors.

By lodging its complaint to the Security Council against the deliberate violation of the United Nations Charter by the United States and South Viet-Nam, Cambodia meant to express its confidence in this great organization. But the Cambodian action seemed to have been burked by some imperialist powers, only anxious to exploit the U.N.O. to their profit. The Royal Government is therefore compelled to precise that from now on it intends to defend its independence and its territorial integrity by its own means and with the help of those countries which have always assisted it.

A.K.P. August 1st 1964 — No. 4.884

Pages 11-b and 11-c

EXCERPT
from an article « Green light for the U.S.A.
and for South Viet-Nam ? »

.... The United Nations Investigation team has clearly intended to forget the Cambodian complaint which had been discussed at the Security Council, so as to devote itself to the examination of the dispute between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam, which is only of the exclusive competence of the Geneva Conference. By so doing, the mission was being attentive to the wishes (or orders) of the United States, South Viet-Nam, and Great Britain.

.... In fact, we are not surprised of this injustice. But as Samdech has just stressed, this sad experience will not be useless. We had the right to expect, if not the help, at least the sympathy of representatives of friendly countries such as Morocco and the Ivory Coast. We will not conceal our disappointment to see them take sides with our tormenters and the racists who command them.

Neak Cheat Niyum, August 2nd, 1964.

EXCERPT

**from the Memorandum of August 10th, 1964
from the Chief of State of Cambodia to the Secretary General
of the United Nations**

.... The recommendations of the Security Council Investigation team do not meet the situation and the necessity of solving the problem within the limits of the Cambodian complaint.

So as not to complicate the heavy task of the United Nations Secretary General and Security Council members who are informed of the very grave affair of the Tonkin Gulf and the attack against the D.R.V.N., Cambodia asks for the shelving of its action brought against the United States and South Viet-Nam. Cambodia will therefore reserve the right to defend itself by its own means and with the means granted by its friends, and this, in the respect of the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations.

Phnom-Penh, 10th August 1964.

Signed : Norodom SIHANOUK,
Chief of State of Cambodia.

**Cambodian protest against the conclusions
of the Security Council Mission on the conflict between
Cambodia and South Viet-Nam**

Today, in a joint declaration, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Royal Government and the two Assemblies of Cambodia have officially protested against the report reached by the mission of the United Nations Security Council on the dispute between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

The declaration continues : « Prince Sihanouk, the Government and the Assemblies consider furthermore that the recommendations included in this report are strictly unacceptable for Cambodia ».

This declaration aims at expounding the fact that Cambodia has asked on August 10th, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the « plain shelving of its action against the United States and South Viet-Nam ». The Cambodian declaration points out that the three points in the recommendations of the Security Council Mission have remained a « dead letter », namely :

- (1) the demand for a « just and fair compensation » to Cambodia for the damages and human losses suffered during the raids on its territory ;
- (2) an invitation to those responsible to « take every appropriate measure so as to prevent any new violation of the frontier of Cambodia » ;
- (3) the demand to all the powers concerned to recognize and respect the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

The declaration goes on : « The South Vietnamese have not given effect to the demand for indemnification and have continued their armed raids on the Cambodian territory. The Security Council has proved powerless to give Cambodia the guarantees that it had the right to expect ».

On the other hand the declaration accuses the mission of the Security Council of having assumed the right to settle the problem of frontiers between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam, problem which it was not empowered to settle, and of having sought to recommend without any preliminary the restoration of political relations between the two countries, which constitutes a « clear interference » in the internal affairs of Cambodia.

A.F.P.

Phnom-Penh, August 30th, 1964.

EXCERPT
from the opening address of Prince Norodom Sihanouk
to the National Congress

.... On the other hand, it seems possible to obtain from (Communist) China and the D.R.V.N. (North Viet-Nam) that they both recognize the present frontiers of Cambodia, without specifically mentioning the Cambodian-South Vietnamese frontiers. The implicit support which is attached to such a recognition would make all its value.

But it would result for us in the necessity to recognize the D.R.V.N. *de jure*, and thus the risk to see the U.S. imperialists and their servants avail of this pretext to attack us.

What to do ? If we give up every action to freeze our present frontiers, we would have other risks on our frontiers in the future. Should we give up taking the necessary steps and go back to our claims on the ex-Cochinchina ?

A.K.P. August 31st, 1964
Page 8-E

