


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
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A Syllabus of Ethics

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A SYLLABUS OF ETHICS

BY
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PREFACE.

The present sketch is an outgrowth of work done during several years with my classes in the St. Louis High School. In its present form, however, the sketch has been prepared directly with a view to meeting the needs of the St. Louis Society of Pedagogy in so far as one of the Sections of that Society is organized for the express purpose of studying Ethics.

My aim has been first of all to furnish a guide to what I cannot but regard as a specially fruitful method in the study of Ethics, rather than to present an elaborate scheme of the science of Ethics as such. On the other hand, as in my Syllabus of Psychology, so here, I have omitted details and have sought thus to bring into so much the clearer view the essential aspects of the subject, and have attempted also to indicate the vital relation which those aspects sustain one to another in the organic unity of human life.


It is such emphasizing of already more or less clearly recognized fundamental principles, and this with reference to their practical application, rather

than subtilizing upon obscure points of theory, that is most needed in our general (and for the greater part elementary) educational work. If Ethics is really to be taught to any good purpose in our schools this distinction between the earnest and intelligent pursuit of what is really of practical import, in contrast with the merely dilettantish inquiry after what is at best but curious, must not only be kept clearly in view, it must also be consistently observed in practice by the teacher. And further, no one can successfully teach what he does not explicitly and sincerely believe. Nor is this all; the growing demand for definite Ethical teaching means nothing less than that the teacher is more and more positively expected to have a clearly defined Ethical creed. More than anything else, in fact, could we but look into the heart of it, the great educational revival of to-day means that now at length there is emerging into clearly conscious form a deep-lying universal conviction to the effect that all teaching is merely phantasmal unless it has a genuinely Ethical core.

The teacher can meet this conviction only by sharing it and becoming a leader in the fuller and more reasonable expression of it in its positive import. Let each contribute his mite. As for the present writer, this sketch is the best he has now in form to offer. Nevertheless, imperfect as it is, he hopes it may not be without use; and so it is offered.

Perhaps at some future time he may attempt a more adequate representation of the Science of Human Conduct.

A selected list of hand and reference books will be found at the close of this Syllabus.



A SYLLABUS OF ETHICS.

I. INTRODUCTION.

Like every other science the Science of Ethics is at once both inductive and deductive. In the process of its development as a science it is predominantly inductive and synthetic. In the process of its application it is predominantly deductive and analytical. In the former case search is made, consciously or unconsciously, for a *first principle* that shall really unify knowledge and hence serve as a true, adequate, and hence unvarying standard of judgment in the given field. In the latter case such principle is assumed as already discovered; and what is really striven after is the precise valuation of given particular facts by means of the assumed principle.

In reality, as need hardly be said, the development of the science of Ethics on the one hand and its application on the other have never been and could never be wholly separated. They are but complementary aspects in the development of any degree of life that could properly be called human. And this is evident from the fact that the incessant practical necessity of forming judgments upon given particular

concrete instances has stimulated, and could not but stimulate inquiry concerning the required general principle; while each stage in the clearing up of consciousness as to what the principle really is has served to insure an increase in the adequacy and accuracy of the judgments actually formed.

Looked at as a result Ethics may be defined as the *Science of Human Conduct*. Looked at as a process it may be defined as the *Evolution of the Human Conscience*. In the latter sense there never was a period when Ethics was wholly wanting. In the former sense there never has been and can never be a period when Ethics could be conceived as altogether matured and *finished*.

But further, just as in its very beginning, the Science of Ethics presupposed the actual existence of the Ethical process, and this as being already well advanced, so also in its more mature forms this Science presupposes the existence of other sciences. In its form and method especially, it presupposes the two mutually complementary sciences of Logic and Metaphysics; while in its subject-matter it presupposes more directly the Sciences of Psychology, Social Philosophy, and Theology—that is, the sciences which trace out, first the fundamental, typical nature of the human individual; secondly, the fundamental principles involved in associated human life; and finally, the ultimate nature of the supreme primal Con-

sciousness, together with the chief aspects of man's relationship to that Consciousness. In other words, the Science of Ethics can develop into actual, consistent realization as a Science only in so far as it is logical in method ; only in so far as it frankly meets and solves the metaphysical problems inevitably arising in the course of Ethical investigation; only in so far as it is able to present in their vital relations as well as in their proper form the psychological aspects of its own subject-matter ; only in so far as it clearly recognizes and adequately deals with the complex Ethical aspects involved in human association ; and finally, only in so far as it apprehends, appreciates and proves able to rationally represent the theological trend of all Ethical problems. In doing which it will carefully maintain its own specific limitations in contrast with each and all these sciences.

(It may be noted here in parenthesis that just as Logic is to be regarded as constituting in the stricter sense the science of the rhythm of *Thought*, and as Æsthetics constitutes what may rightly be called the science of the rhythm of *Feeling*, so Ethics may properly be described as the science of the rhythm of *Conduct*. Though it is never to be forgotten that Thought and Feeling and Conduct are the absolutely interfused and mutually complementary aspects of every concrete human life and indeed of all conceivable spiritual life.)

It is next to be remarked that the essential aspects of Ethics are all discoverable through a general (critical) survey of the chief historical forms in which the fundamental Ethical conceptions have found concrete expression from age to age; and to these forms, therefore, it will be well in the next place to give some, however brief, consideration.

II. FUNDAMENTAL HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF ETHICS.

Historically, as was but just noticed, the development of an explicit science of Ethics has always presupposed the Ethical process as already far advanced beyond any mere "beginning." Nor could this order be conceived to be reversed, since the unfolding of any science necessarily presupposes the actual existence of the facts of which the science is but the reasoned account—not to mention the fact that only an Ethical being relatively matured as such is capable of any activity resulting in the unfolding of *any* science, and above all of the science of Ethics as such.

I. MYTHIC ASPECT. But long before there could be a science of Ethics, properly speaking, the Ethical consciousness attained expression—as it will never cease to attain expression—in mythic form. At the basis of all this is the contrast between Light and Darkness. Light stimulates the vital process. The increased vigor thus attained results in added sense

of power, whence arises a feeling of buoyancy. With darkness, on the other hand, the vital process is lowered. Hence a relative sense of weakness and depression.

Such is the physiological explanation of courage in the Light and of fear in the Darkness. But the spiritual factor involved in these experiences is no less real and vital than is the physiological. Indeed there *can be no experience*, properly speaking, that is not itself essentially spiritual in its nature.

The spiritual factor here referred to consists of *Personification*. The human unit differs primarily from the animal unit especially in this: That he knows a *Past* and a *Future*, and in the very fact of knowing them proves able to gather and hold both Past and Future in the *Present*. The actual experiences of the Past can be *known* as past only as they are present in consciousness through the representations of memory.

The possible experiences of the Future can be *known* as future only as they are present in consciousness through the representations of Imagination. And the representations of Memory and of Imagination are constantly interfused in greater or less degree even in the relatively critical mind of modern man. How much more must this have been the case in the uncritical mind of "primitive" man! Hence the confident construction on his part of a

Past that never was and of a Future that never could be. Just as in visual Perception the mind creates "images" consisting of form and color and at the same time projects these subjective products into space and never doubts their objective reality; so primitive man unconsciously mingled human elements with elements drawn from nature and in doing so created Ethical conceptions which he no less unconsciously and confidently projected into a Divine world that in turn became to him a model for the human world.

The central, permanent element of truth in all this, as the sequel should show, is the identity *in type* as between Divinity and Humanity.

II. SCIENTIFIC ASPECT. Ethical consciousness first attained explicit *Scientific* utterance in the mouth of Socrates. And yet this very struggle toward scientific definition could not but result in more or less of exaggeration; and here the special form of excess consisted in the emphasizing of the importance of knowledge as a factor of right-doing until knowledge itself became fairly identified with Virtue, instead of being clearly recognized in its proper limitation as constituting only one of the essential factors of Virtue. It is with Aristotle, in fact, that a true science of Ethics as such has its beginning. He it is who first sees clearly the real clew to a specific and adequate science of human conduct. He, first of all,

sets out with and steadily pursues an inductive study of the facts within this sphere and through such study traces out those fundamental relations which find their unity in the central principle of conscious self-consistency concretely unfolded in a well-poised individual human character. Nevertheless, as the facts of the Hellenic social world only served to give emphasis to the *individual*, so the Ethics of Aristotle is, in reality, simply the Ethics of *Individualism*.

If now we turn to the Roman world we find that it contributes only indirectly to the development of the science of Ethics. At the same time the contribution is none the less valid and valuable. For it is nothing less than the disciplinary conception of conscious conformity to principles concretely unfolded in the various phases of institutional life. So that here we may be said to have the Ethics of *Institutionalism*.

(It is, as we may remark in passing, precisely in this complete subordination of the Individual to Institutions that the stoical aspect of Ethical doctrine, in its negative character as emphasizing resignation, finds its natural and ample ground of development. In the later—Christian—world this aspect finds concrete realization in the monastic orders.)

Again while the ancient Hebrews made no formal presentation of Ethics as a science, yet on the other hand their whole literature is pervaded with the profoundly Ethical presupposition (gradually unfolded

into clear, though still unreflecting, form in the national consciousness through the whole course of their experience as a people) that all human conduct is fundamentally related to the requirements of a primal, infinite (and hence absolutely rational) Consciousness.

The Individual; Institutions, as involving the immediate, concrete relations of individual to individual; the Ideal of a divinely given (i. e., *perfect*) Law as the absolute standard of human conduct—such are the fundamental factors that have fused into organic unity in the modern or Christian Ethical Consciousness. Thus this richer aspect of the Ethical Consciousness is but the more elaborate unfolding (infused union) of the earlier germinal forms, all which may be found to be included under one or other of the three types, Greek, Roman, and Hebrew.

It is only as such well-balanced, organic unity of the earlier and one-sided forms of Ethical Consciousness that the modern consciousness can deal successfully with the problem of the true *Conduct of Life*, infinitely enhanced as it is in complexity. The modern consciousness recognizes more and more clearly that continued and unbiased study of human deeds, and that alone, can bring into ever clearer, more accurate and more adequate (i. e., more truly Scientific) view the whole vital sum of significance involved in the relations of each individual human being (1) to those

fundamental principles which are progressively assuming concrete reality for this world through institutional forms, and (2) to that infinitely vital, typical and eternally perfect Consciousness manifested everywhere in and through the infinitely varied aspects of the World as a Whole. Thus the modern or Christian form of the science of Ethics has unfolded, and must continue to unfold, as the actual process of tracing out the evidence of the divine (absolutely rational) Law as unfolded in the Individual through the medium of Institutions. Only as such concretely rational process can Ethics attain and maintain a genuinely vital character.

III. THE ETHICAL END.

We have next to notice that throughout the whole Ethical process there is necessarily presupposed a definite end or aim toward the realization of which every act of any and every human being is directed. (1) If that end really consists of and is restricted to *Pleasure*, then the Science of Ethics will have for its chief function to discover the utmost measure of significance denoted by the term *Pleasure*, and to point the way to the fullest attainment of that end. Such, in its simplest form, is the view known as *Hedonism* (historically the standpoint of the Greek Sophists, and of course also, later, of the Epicureans; though by no means in the gross sense commonly supposed). (2) If, again,

the chief end of human activity is assumed to be the securing of universal *Well-being* then the Science of Ethics must have for its task to present a consistent and adequate view of what true well-being is, and also to unfold a systematic general view of the media essential to its realization. In which case the Science of Ethics must be of the *Utilitarian* type (represented in modern times especially by J. S. Mill and Prof. Sidgwick). (3) Or it may be that the true aim of human conduct is to be found in the fulfillment of *Duty*; that is, in obedience to a supreme Law as expressive of an ultimate, divine Will. And in this we should have what may be properly named *theological* Ethics (the philosophical ground of which is developed in its most uncompromising form by Kant). (4) If, finally, the true end of human conduct should prove to be that of the *Self-realization* of individual man, then the Science of Ethics is bound to ascertain *first* of all as its ultimate principle, the true nature of man as man, including all the fundamental aspects of that nature; and having formulated this, its *further* task must be to trace in outline a consistent, reasoned estimate of the means and the method necessary to the realization of such true end.

In the former sense our science would be theoretical or *speculative* Ethics. In the latter, *practical* or applied Ethics; and in this sense its fully elaborated form must include an intimation of the fundamental aspects

of the special Sciences of Economics and Politics—in short, the whole range of what has been comprehensively styled Social Philosophy. (In its speculative phase the chief modern representative is T. H. Green. Of the practical aspect the fundamental principles are strongly outlined—though not without bias—in Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts*.)

On reflection, indeed, it would seem by no means impossible that in the actual process of perfecting human life upon the express view of man's ultimate nature, there would be realized the fullest possible measure of all really pleasurable experience, when the whole range of what is to be counted as truly pleasurable is rightly estimated. And further it would seem quite possible that in the same process the utmost attainable degree of Well-being must also be most certainly secured.

In which case all that is valid in the aims of both Hedonism and Utilitarianism must be raised to the highest possible degree of significance through a system of Ethics based on a thorough-going analysis of human nature as manifested in the individual consciousness on the one hand and in the history of the race on the other. If, further, it should turn out that the individual human consciousness is one in type with the ultimate, eternally perfect Consciousness manifested in every phase of the total World-Order, then it would appear that the divine Law as expressive of the ulti-

mate and absolutely holy Will, must be involved in the very nature of the human Will. And thus it must be evident that in the very process of his own self-realization man must be fulfilling the divine Law (as comprehended in and through Reason) and so, performing his highest "duty."

It can only be remarked here that to assume Pleasure as the chief end of human life is to reduce the self-conscious activity of man to its lowest instead of raising it to its highest term. In the very nature of the case any given pleasure is but for the moment. The merely pleasure-seeking life is therefore necessarily an endless search that never ceases from fear and longing. In other words such a life is essentially nothing else than a more or less prolonged self-contradiction. At the same time Utilitarianism, in its highest sense, i.e. in the sense of the utmost attainable extent of Well-being, is after all simply a "general-happiness" principle which only resolves itself into a more subtle Hedonism in which as many individuals as possible are conceived as attaining each the highest degree of more or less refined pleasure or "happiness."

On the other hand the actual attainment of self-perfection, in whatever degree, must thus far involve genuine self-consistency or rhythm of experience—that is, it must involve a corresponding measure of self-satisfaction.

And here (let us note carefully), it is the abiding

self that is satisfied, and satisfied the more, the more fully and clearly it apprehends as certainly possible for itself, unlimited further self-perfection. Whence it would seem that only when self-realization is taken as the real Ethical end, can the end proposed either by Hedonism or by Utilitarianism or by theological Ethics be actually attained. If pleasure, if well-being, if duty—if either or all these together can be justly regarded as constituting *a* worthy motive to human action then much more may self-realization be justly regarded as *the* one highest and really adequate Ethical End, since in the unswerving pursuit of this end and in that alone is it possible that even the lower and less adequate aims can be surely realized in their truest significance. With this understanding, then, there need be nothing invidious in designating the System of Ethics based on this principle (were the system once developed) as *Ideal or Rational Ethics*.

Such system has, indeed, long been in process of development; each succeeding generation will make more or less important contribution to its improvement; the system will be ever approximating completion; it will never be actually completed.

If, now, we reflect upon the profound significance of the statement that "the Kingdom of Heaven is within you"—that is, that in the very nature of the case the "Kingdom of Heaven" is involved in human consciousness and to be realized only through the pro-

gressive unfolding of human consciousness—it would seem that the supreme Ethical principle is already involved in the dogmatic affirmation: “Seek ye first the Kingdom of Heaven and its righteousness and all these things shall be added unto you.” For this would seem to mean nothing else than this:—*Comply unreservedly in the whole range of your activity to the actual demands of Reason as the eternal form of your own true being and all really good things will be yours; for they are but the inevitable result of such compliance.*

IV. COMPLEMENTARY ASPECTS OF ETHICS.

We have next to note that from its very nature as the Science of human conduct Ethics must at every stage present two fundamental and mutually complementary aspects. These are (1) *the Subjective Aspect* and (2) *the Objective Aspect*.

In the ethical *Process* these aspects are of course coincident and even absolutely interfused; for they are but correlative phases of human life. On the other hand in the formulation of the *science* of Ethics these complementary aspects can only be treated serially. It is evident, too, that since the subjective aspect consists of the individual character as the *ethical unit* strictly speaking, this aspect properly falls to be considered first in the formal unfolding of the Science.

For the objective aspect consists of the fundamental relations between individual and individual; and the scientific consideration of these relations must therefore presuppose, as something already explicitly unfolded, the results of a critical and more or less adequate consideration of the essential nature of the individual character constituting the type of ethical units so related. It is here, indeed, that Ethics is found to be in closest relation with Psychology. In the latter science the most comprehensive term is *Consciousness*. In Ethics the most comprehensive term is *Conscience* which is simply consciousness in its ethical aspect. Again while Psychology restricts itself to the simple (but reasoned) representation of the whole individual mind, preserving, as far as possible, perfect balance of all its modes; Ethics, on the contrary, singles out the Will as that mode of mind which predominates in all human conduct, makes a special study of mind in that mode, and carries its investigation over into the sphere of the relations between individual and individual. But while in the latter respect Ethics is contrasted with Psychology it still presents further phases of close relationship to this science in the fact that, besides constantly presupposing the results of psychological investigation, it must still take up certain aspects of mind and press their analysis beyond what is required in Psychology properly speaking. This is especially true in respect

of that fundamental quality of mind known as *Virtue* and which presents its essential phase of differentiation in the so-called "Virtues."

Finally, the objective aspect of Ethics unfolds into a systematic (and reasoned) statement of the essential *Rights* and *Duties* of the individual human being (as involved in his relations to other individuals) together with an analysis of the fundamental forms through which these aspects of human life are brought into ever richer degrees of realization.

It is in this sphere that Ethics is found to expand inevitably so as to include the whole of Social Philosophy in so far as the special subject of consideration is that of the fundamental relations between person and person (1) in Property, (2) in the Family and (3) in the State. At the same time Ethics must take into consideration (4) those special relations between person and person involved in the institution of the Church and in the special ends sought to be attained through that institution. Whence it is evident that here also the science of Ethics tends to fuse with that of Theology. The central interest giving rise to association in the church is that of the ultimate nature and destiny of man. The highest form of the practical unfolding of this interest constitutes Religion.

The science of the principles determining the relations thus involved constitutes Theology. This in

turn reflects back upon the civil aspect of human relations and gives them a distinctly theological trend.

Hence there is nothing surprising in the fact that systems of Ethics have been developed under the specific designation of *Theological Ethics* (e. g. that of Rothe.)

Note, finally, that *Rights* and *Duties* are relations; and, as will appear later on, not merely mutually complementary relations, but mutually complementary aspects of *one and the same* relation. And this is true, not of one but of all ethical relations properly speaking. Every Right is also a Duty. Every Duty is also a Right.

A. SUBJECTIVE ASPECT OF ETHICS.

I. CONSCIENCE. Human conduct is really ethical only in so far as it involves the factor of Consciousness. The mind is a unit of Energy, one and indivisible. It is at once a Power-to-know, a Power-to-do, and a Power-to-feel. And in all these aspects of its actual concrete existence it is in greater or less degree aware of itself or "conscious." But as Will (that is, as a Power-to-do) mind exhibits the characteristic of consciousness in a peculiar form. Here the consciousness is of a relation between a standard apprehended as objectively valid on the one hand, and some action already performed, or contemplated as possible to be performed by the individual himself on the other.

The peculiarity of the aspect of consciousness here manifested is that it consists not merely in the recognition of the given relation, but that it involves the recognition of a binding quality in the relation, such that the individual feels as well as sees that the action (performed or proposed) is inherently *right* or *wrong*—that its essential tendency is for *good* or for *evil* in his own individual life, that its effect is necessarily either constructive or destructive to the very being, and above all to the *well-being*, of the one performing the action. Indeed, to this phase of Consciousness it is always in greater or less degree apparent that the *ill-being* of the individual must ultimately mean the same as his *non-being* (in the sense of utter negation).

It is in this peculiar character that Consciousness properly bears the name of *Conscience* and that it proves to involve this further characteristic— that it prompts the individual to the performance of a given proposed action or restrains him from its performance. So that, as already noted, Conscience is seen to be in truth just the ethical aspect of Consciousness.

(In this connection it is well worth while to note that since Conscience is not merely intellectual, but that it also involves Feeling and Will; and since it can never be said to pertain to Feeling alone or to Will alone—for thus it would exclude the intellectual factor, without which nothing whatever could be known of its existence—then in every case it is evident that the

absolute unity of the mind is seen to be emphasized in high degree not merely by consciousness in general but also by its specially ethical aspect, Conscience.)

We personify Conscience and "listen to its dictates;" rejoice in its "approval" or suffer from its "stings"; we follow its "promptings" or heed its "warnings." In reality, the truth felt-after in such forms of expression is that in its complex unity the mind apprehends (intellectually) with greater or less clearness an objective standard by which to measure its own processes; that the realization by the mind in its own being (through volitional activity) of the ideal presented in that standard necessarily results in a special state of such mind consisting of a sense (feeling) of inner rhythm or of dissonance; and further that even the mere subjective representation of this process of realizing the given ideal in and for one's self is sufficient to awaken a lively sense of rhythm or of dissonance.

But also it is to be noted that, as the ethical aspect of Consciousness, Conscience is primarily crude and is always liable to perversion as well as to arrest of development; just as, on the other hand, there is possibility of indefinite elaboration and refinement of all its positive ethical values through nurture and education.

Conscience, let us note further, is not a "faculty" of the mind. (In truth, there are no "faculties," but

only *modes* of the mind, the mind itself being, as already observed, an indivisible unit of Energy.) On the contrary Conscience is a fundamental aspect of mind in its totality, and hence it must in greater or less degree be present as an essential factor in each and every one of the modes of mind.

The extreme view, even yet so widely accepted, to the effect that Conscience is a kind of supernaturally given and initially perfect "guide" and which therefore is incapable (and wholly without need) of education need here be mentioned only to point out the fact (evident enough to the reflective mind) that such extreme view is possible only upon condition of imperfect knowledge of the deep-reaching significance which heredity bears in the development of human character. And yet, on the other hand, it is not to be overlooked that glimpses of the truth that the character of the individual is dependent primarily upon descent are clearly manifest in many ways in all literature (Hebrew and Christian included). Above all is it manifest in the deeply significant but much misunderstood doctrine of "Original Sin."

Doubtless at the very moment of birth the individual human being is already a real mind with already well defined tendencies, the determining factors of which reach back through an unbroken chain to the "first parents" of such being. But by the very complexity of the process of descent it is also evi-

dent that great differences must exist between one and another such being, even at the moment of birth. So that many a child has "by nature," (i. e. from birth) a refined sense of the ethical fitness of things, such as many another would be wholly unable to attain through a life-time of discipline.

On the contrary, however, it is evident that at the best the "innate" (in the sense of the inherited) Conscience is but elementary and merely instinctive in its character, and that therefore it needs to be awakened into reflection and self-criticism, so that the solution of ethical problems may be reached *knowingly* and not merely through the ethical consciousness in its purely rudimentary form. The Conscience that is not enlightened—that is, unfolded to the degree of deliberate, rational self-examination—is still crude in fact however refined and delicate it may outwardly appear. Only when the Conscience is at once both practically developed so as to insure right action and also enlightened to such degree that the individual is "able to give a [really valid] reason for the faith that is in him"—only then can the Conscience be rightly regarded as matured and trustworthy. It is just the deliberate, persistent neglect to realize one's self as a rational, self-conscious unit—it is precisely this that constitutes the fact of "Original Sin." No doubt this is a negative "fact." But then *all* sin consists in negation, either by way of neglect to realize some

possible form of the essentially Good in man or in nullifying one or another of its actually realized forms. And since Conscience, as the ethical aspect of Consciousness, is in its very nature necessarily the ultimate practical "guide" in all human conduct, it is evidently impossible to overestimate the practical importance of the fullest possible cultivation and rationalization of Conscience. Meanwhile, for our present purpose, the full significance of Conscience can be brought into clear view only through a careful analysis of the mind considered as Will.

II. THE WILL. And here we have to notice at the outset that the discussion in detail of the more specific character and functions of the Mind as Will, together with the special relations which the Will necessarily sustains to the other modes of mind is a distinctly psychological task. Nevertheless, since Ethics as a Science is just the science of human conduct, and since all human conduct consists of nothing else than the endlessly complex forms in which the human mind, as Will, manifests and realizes itself, it is evident that a Science of Ethics from which all consideration of the Will were excluded would be simply a contradiction in terms. And further, it is to be carefully noted that the ethical significance of any act of the Mind as Will depends in any given case upon whether the given act really has its origin within such mind or whether the origin of the act is to be sought

for beyond that mind. Only an act that is really determined by and within a given individual Will can rightly be taken as a valid ground for an ethical judgment concerning such Will. Only as the actual determiner of change (whether within or without itself) can the mind be properly regarded as an ethical unit at all. The moment the individual is conceived as merely instrumental in any given process, that moment it becomes clearly inconceivable that any ethical significance should attach to the part taken by the individual in such process.

Hence to ascertain precisely the manner in which the Will (that is, the Mind as Will,) is determined to activity must be of vital significance to the Science of Ethics. If, indeed, it could be shown that all acts of the Will are determined by some cause lying wholly beyond the Will, then a Science of Ethics, strictly speaking, must be impossible; for thus the human Will would prove to be devoid of ethical significance; there would be no known ethical unit, and hence no real content for a science of ethics.

Thus while the investigation of the Will in its entire range constitutes one fundamental part of the entire task of psychology, it is evident that the science of ethics must also take into consideration the fundamental nature of the Will; though for this science the central, vital question is manifestly that of the precise manner in which the Will is determined to activity—

that is, whether it is self-determined or determined by an external agency or agencies. In its traditional form the question is: Whether the Will is *free* or whether it is compelled to activity by an external power or powers. From this point of view it is Freedom *or* Necessity that is to be predicated absolutely of the Will. And from this point of view doubtless no really scientific answer can ever be attained.

Now the question of the original determination of the Will may take either of two forms. In the one form the question is historical and the search for its answer is resolved into a study of the process through which the individual Will actually arises and unfolds to (or rather toward) maturity.

In its other form the question is metaphysical (in the true sense of that term) and the search for its answer then assumes the nature of a specially careful and searching critical study of the ultimate characteristics seen to be necessarily implied in the known peculiar phenomena of the Will. In the former case the method of inquiry is of course predominantly inductive (i.e. observational); in the latter it is predominantly deductive (i.e. inferential). But it is also a matter of course (as the mutually complementary sciences of logic and metaphysics make plain) that neither of these methods can in any case be pursued to the entire exclusion of the other. Rather are they simply the complementary aspects of all true scientific method.

Pursuance of the inquiry in its historical form has resulted in the discovery of a chain of evidence strongly tending to justify, if not absolutely justifying, the conclusion that man is but the culmination of an evolutionary process, including the whole animal kingdom at the least. Such evidence seems further to justify the conclusion that when this process is looked at in inverse order it is seen to have its beginnings in the interplay of merely mechanical and chemical forces. Again it is the brain which specially serves as the structural form directly organic to mind, while mind is itself a mere function of the brain.

Hence it would seem that the individual mind is predetermined by the whole course of evolution leading up to, and culminating in the existence of, such mind. Such, in briefest intimation, is the result arrived at by the extreme evolutionary school of scientists; and of course the inevitable corollary from such conclusion is that Freedom is a mere illusion when regarded as a characteristic of the individual human Will. So that in strict logical consistency this school must wholly dispense with ethics as a science, since they have eliminated all real ethical content from human activity.

On the other hand the metaphysical aspect of the question cannot be wholly excluded. It needs but a little deliberate reflection to see that a higher (more complex) form of existence can really have

its origin in a lower (less complex) form or series of forms only upon this condition: That a *highest* (i. e. most complex) unit of Energy works with consistency of purpose in, and manifests itself through (and throughout) the whole process leading up to the final result. And if this result consists of a mind in one or another stage of its evolution, then there is presupposed as the origin and essence of the whole evolutionary process, a primal, perfect, and hence eternal and eternally self-unfolding Mind. The evolution of mind, in whatever degree, necessarily presupposes Mind in perfect degree. And Mind in perfect degree is conceivable only as independent of all external conditions. It is conceivable only as including in its own Consciousness every phase of rational relation and of rational purpose. It must therefore be self-poised and self-active in absolute degree.

To nothing less than such perfect Mind can the descent of man be legitimately (that is, by any strictly scientific process) traced.

Consideration of the metaphysical aspect of the question, then, would seem to justify us in concluding that as man (in so far as he is mind) must be conceived as descended from (that is, as arising through, and constituting the culminating aspect of) the creative self-unfolding of the primal perfect Mind, he must be credited with fundamentally the same characteristics as those inhering in the primal Mind itself.

And it has just been noted that self-activity—that

is, self-determination—is the central characteristic of that Mind.

How this characteristic can be conceived as unfolding into reality in man—in other words, how man as man can be conceived as actually coming into existence—this again pertains to the historical aspect of the question as to the way in which the human Will is actually determined. It is of course impossible here to more than barely indicate the chief aspects of the question together with the central conclusions which it seems possible to reach by inquiry along these lines.

Let us note in the first place that by the very conception of a mind evolved through the process of heredity each mind must be unique in the actual degree and in the special trend of its development.

Its actual relations are therefore also unique. Hence its reactions upon the stimuli it receives from its environment cannot be a mere repetition of reactions of any of its ancestors upon the then existing environment. It is at any moment appealed to by many forms of stimuli and in any given case responds to but one. As *mind* its reactions upon stimuli involve intellectual estimate as well as mere momentary impulse or feeling. But intellectual estimate consists in *comparison*—in holding two or more representations in consciousness as forms of possible activity and result; and this in such way as not merely to compare the forms themselves, but also so as to compare the results

of realizing the two forms through one's own individual action and in one's own individual experience. Further, while in such comparison the activity of the mind may be said primarily to take place in time, it is also evident that in all its intellectual representations of possible actions the mind takes up the form of succession (time) into its own activity. Or rather it may be said to unfold that form in the very process of its own activity, seeing that it apprehends the order of succession necessary in a given represented series of acts. Nay in this very fact of representing to itself a *series* the mind includes past and future in the present, and thus transcends time as a mere succession of activities. The mind is not a stretched-out chain of experiences; it is a present, self-unfolding *totality* of experiences.

I am *now* aware of what happened to me *yesterday*: and I *am* now aware of it because whatever has passed hitherto in my consciousness is now *present* in its results in my actual individual (and that means indivisible) conscious existence. My own *consciousness* is always the central factor in every experience I have. That factor (emphasizing as it does the indissoluble, absolutely continuous *unity* of my existence) is, indeed, always undergoing modification in extent, in clearness, in intensity. But it is ever for me the one possible measure of both itself and all other things. (Even when I refer most deliberately to an objectively valid standard I do so, and can do so, only through the fact

that I have taken up into my own consciousness, as one aspect of it, precisely that standard. In becoming aware of it I recognize it as independent of my consciousness; but also in becoming aware of it I appropriate it as a fact of my consciousness.) As a conscious unit the mind does indeed respond to stimuli coming from without, but it responds, and must respond, in its own way. That is, it must, from its very nature as a deliberative unit, decide between one and another possible way of responding to such stimuli. And in just this process of deciding between the various apprehended ways of responding to these stimuli (which as represented in consciousness constitute *motives*) the mind proves itself to be, from its very constitution as mind, a self-active, self-determining unit of Energy.

Indeed, while it deliberates, and in the very fact that it deliberates, upon a given course of action it *refrains from* such course of action. And this very refraining from action is itself a form of self-activity, of self-determination. Nor can it be too strongly insisted upon that it is precisely in such process that the mind proves to be always in its essential, typical nature the one truly self-active, and therefore Ethical unit, and that this typical nature progressively unfolds into realization in each normal (*i.e.*, law-abiding) individual Will.

And this conclusion is confirmed by a study of mind in all its relations, sensuous, social, and cosmic. The

higher the degree of Will considered the more unquestionable becomes the conclusion.

At the very beginning of its own particular existence no doubt the individual mind is merely initial. Its typical nature is as yet, for it, mainly an abstract form, a mere unfulfilled possibility. But every normal reaction upon the environment, in its character of a rational World-Order, only tends to fulfil that possibility and thus empirically to demonstrate in ever higher degree the validity of the abstractly conceived universal or typical form.

It is next to be noted that in the entire process of its self-unfolding the individual mind as Will, no less than in its character as Intelligence, necessarily presents both a subjective and an objective aspect. At the same time only the barest intimation can be given here of the distinction between, and the extent of, these two phases of the Will—phases which, in their various degrees of realization, may be designated respectively as *subjective Freedom* and *objective Freedom*.

When I deliberate and compare any two forms of representation in my own mind I am by that very fact controlling the modes of myself as mind. That is, in such case my activity, whatever its extent, is in its nature self-activity.

It is such inner self-activity that constitutes subjective freedom.

But the representations developed in, as modes of,

my mind and held in consciousness by my own deliberate (and deliberative) act may yet have direct reference to my practical relation to one or another phase of my environment.

I compare a past action with a proposed action and infer the character of the results to be expected in case the proposed action is really performed.

This inference is now a new mode in (and of) my own mind and becomes a positive factor in determining me to act (or to refrain from acting) in the way proposed.

Whence it is evident that my practical relation to my environment is thus far determined by my own practical self-definition (*i.e.*, self-differentiation) as toward any given aspect which such environment may present to me. In my response to stimuli coming to me from my environment I not only apprehend this as it is, but I also, through the interfusion of the particular mode immediately formed in my mind through such response with similar modes already unfolded in my own consciousness through past experiences, create an ideal of what the environment is not but which I conceive it ought to be. And in pursuance of such conception I proceed to exert my power toward shaping the environment into conformity with the ideals I have created. In other words I carry my creative activity into the world (physical and social) by which I am surrounded and in and through which I live and

move and have my being. It is the immediate source of my life. And yet through my reaction upon the stimuli coming from this source my life rises to a degree which can and does in greater or less measure control and reconstitute that world. And further, it is precisely in this fact that the individual mind reveals its truly practical, creative character as one in type with the ultimate divine Source of all Life and above all of all Mind as the culminating phase of Life.

It is in this world-controlling, world-reconstituting activity that the human mind as Will is concretely unfolded and in which it exhibits progressively what may properly be named Objective Freedom.

At the same time the limitations of actually attained freedom, whether subjective or objective, in the case of any individual human Will are evident enough. On the other hand it is equally evident that actual freedom is to be attained, and only to be attained, through conformity to the laws inhering in the very nature of mind. I can *wield* the world only in so far as I *comprehend* the world. I must assimilate the world in my intelligence in order that as a Will I may appropriate it to myself. I must know the *reason of things* (and Reason is of their very essence) before I can command them into forms expressive of *my own* reason. It is only as I think the Thought of the World, out of (and yet within) which I as a thinking unit have arisen; it is only as I will the Will involved in the infinite Thought of that

World, that I give objective proof of my own freedom, which proof consists in my creatively moulding the world into my own image and likeness. But also it is only by forgetting myself in fullest obedience to the Eternal, divine Law of the World that I can, even little by little, attain actual self-realization including the fundamental aspect of freedom both subjective and objective. Only by losing the life of caprice can I find the life of Reason. In this fundamental sense no one ever was or could be *born* free, for Freedom is the goal, the culmination of disciplined self-conscious being.

Absolutely free in point of essential nature every mind must be. Absolutely free in point of perfect realization only *one* can be, and that is the Eternal, perfect Mind.

III VIRTUE AND THE VIRTUES. If in its universal form as a Power-to-do, Mind as Will is seen to be the one really ethical unit, then evidently it is well worth while to inquire more precisely what are the positive phases in which such ethical unit is to realize its actual existence. And first it may be noted that as Conscience is the ethical aspect of Consciousness so Virtue may be said to be the name applied to the Will as already become concretely unfolded. Virtue is concrete; it is concretely differentiated Will. Again it may be said that Virtue consists in a *normal life*—that is, it consists in practical and progressive con-

formity on the part of the individual to the universal norm or type of human life. That norm may be regarded as consisting of the absolute demands of Reason; or again it may be conceived as being identical with the "divine Law." For these can really be scientifically conceived in no other way than as identical. Observe, too, that only through conformity to the true norm of life can the individual develop real force of character, in which Virtue actually consists.

But this universal aspect of Virtue can be really unfolded into concrete form only through differentiation into those specific aspects or modes called "the Virtues." And here it is to be noticed that true Virtue, or realized harmony with the divine Law of Reason, implies (1) knowledge of that Law and (2) obedience to that Law. Virtue can be conceived as pertaining to no other being than one characterized at once by Intelligence and by Will. The first of these is realized as knowledge of the essential aspects of rhythm in the total World-Order. This rhythm again may be described as unison (*a*) in the physical aspects of the World-Order, and (*b*) in its spiritual aspects. It is (as need hardly be said) within the range of the spiritual aspects of the World-Order that Virtue finds its true field of practical exercise and actual development. Nevertheless all knowledge has of itself an ethical aspect, since it cannot be separated from an appreciation (in the form of feeling) of the various

aspects of the rhythm of the World-Order. Beauty and sublimity are not merely *seen*, they are also *felt*. The unison everywhere manifest in the total World-Energy is not merely apprehended, it is also trusted.

But thus far we have only the contemplative aspect of Virtue—the mere intellectual apprehension of the rhythm of the World-Order, together with the experience of simple pleasure in it as thus apprehended. It is the complement of this—the active effort to reproduce that rhythm in human life—with which Ethics has chiefly to do. In this sense Virtue may be defined as actual obedience, in the concrete form of genial responsiveness in practical life, to the demands of the divine Law of Reason (positively, to do what that law demands; negatively, to refrain from doing what it forbids). From this point of view Virtue is seen to present three fundamental and mutually complementary aspects. These are (1) *Temperance* or self-restraint; (2) *Courage* or assured sense of power; and (3) *Justice* or disposition toward the deliberate self-restrained exercise of power to the recognized end of the actual unfolding of rational life in and through the individual Will. We may regard these as the generic aspects of Virtue within the sphere of Ethics strictly speaking (which does not explicitly treat of the special aspects of Virtue known as “theological,” however much these aspects may be presupposed in every phase of ethical inquiry). Only the barest inti-

mation can here be given of the further differentiation of Virtue into its various specific forms constituting the so-called Virtues. All "Virtues," let it be observed, are necessarily *individual in character* and *social in their manifestation*.

A. TEMPERANCE constitutes primarily the *negative* aspect of Virtue. It consists essentially in self-control.

1. As *individual*, Temperance is (*a*) Restraint of the physical appetites within the limits (1) of physical health and (2) of the complete subordination of the physical nature as organ or instrument to the spiritual nature as agent. Again (*b*) it is Restraint of the spiritual appetites (all forms of egoism) within the limits (1) of psychical health and (2) of complete subordination of the lower (less complex, poorer,) to the higher (more complex, richer,) spiritual aims. (The chief, all-inclusive aim of life is Life itself—life in ever richer degree; self-realization in the highest, *i. e.* most adequate, sense of the term.)

2. As *social*, Temperance is (*a*) Restraint of physical appetites within the limits of rights in property and of rights of personal security, comfort and purity on the part of others. Such restraint is manifest under the forms of Truthfulness, Honesty, Civility, Chastity, etc.

Again, as *social*, Temperance is (*b*) Restraint of spiritual appetites (the various subtler forms of egoism

—amounting to egotism—such as Pride, Haughtiness, Arrogance) within the limits of respect due to the personality (that is, to the ideal or divinely constituted nature) of all others. (“*Be a person and respect others as persons.*”)—Such restraint is manifest under the forms of Modesty, Gentleness, Delicacy, Amiability, Sympathy, Forbearance, etc.

B. COURAGE is Virtue in its *positive* aspect.

1. As *individual*, (*a*) it is rationally directed physical energy—the buoyant sense of physical power to shape external conditions (the sensuous environment) into forms that shall serve as efficient means to the highest spiritual life of the individual. But also (*b*) it is rationally directed spiritual energy—the buoyant sense of spiritual power to shape one’s own resolutions in conformity with Right (that is, in conformity with the ultimate, divine Reason).—The special forms here are Sincerity, Propriety, Conscientiousness, etc.

2. As *social*, Courage is (*a*) rationally directed physical energy—the buoyant sense of physical power (1) negatively, to defend one’s family, one’s country, against all unjust attack (to hinder the irrational shaping of the environment), and (2) positively, to contribute to the improvement of these institutional media for self-realization on the part of the individual. Here the special forms are Bravery, Resoluteness, Discretion, etc.

As social, Courage is also (*b*) rationally directed spiritual energy—the buoyant sense of spiritual power (1) negatively to convince others of error and (2) positively to win them to the acceptance of rational modes of life.—The special forms here are Impartiality, Candor, Dignity, etc.

The preceding Virtues (aspects of *Virtue*) are found again and finally, to present their concrete unity in

C. JUSTICE, which is realized rational life, individual and social—that is, human life, conformed to the demands of Reason. Such, in briefest intimation, are the leading characteristics of the subjective aspect of Ethics. (And here we may name the three “theological Virtues”—Faith, Hope and Love—as in truth the factors that really transfigure life—Faith in the divine [rational] order of the world; Hope, of endlessly progressive self-realization; and Love, in the sense of devotion to the purpose of aiding others toward the same self-realization.)

And yet, even in so inadequate a sketch as the one here presented, it has already many times become evident that the subjective aspect must be meaningless and impossible of realization save through its correlative objective aspect. Human life cannot be realized in individual form only. The individual is no more possible without society than is society without the individual. Hence any attempt to develop a system of ethical science must, either explicitly or implicitly, take

into account this reciprocal relation of the two aspects involved. Thus far, indeed, the scientific treatises on Ethics have chiefly emphasized the subjective aspect, while on the other hand in our time much is coming to be said of so-called practical Ethics; by which term, as would seem, it is intended to put chief stress on what is here called the objective aspect of Ethics. In real truth both aspects are equally "practical" and, as just insisted, they are so intimately related as to be absolute reciprocals in every phase and degree of actual life. And hence in any consistent and adequate system of Ethics considered as the science of Right-living this reciprocal relation between the subjective and the objective aspects of actual moral life must of course be brought into clearest possible relief.

B. OBJECTIVE ASPECT OF ETHICS.

It is within the sphere of the subjective aspect of Ethics that the proper place is found for the consideration of Virtue and its various specialized phases, "the Virtues." On the other hand the formal investigation of Rights and Duties falls as manifestly within the sphere of the objective aspect of Ethics. Or rather these constitute the central, essential significance of that aspect. Rights and duties are relations between human beings. Or strictly speaking Right and Duty are but complementary aspects of each and every relation subsisting between human beings.

What is B's right is A's duty; and conversely what is B's duty is A's right. Further, B's actual performance of his own duty to A is a necessary condition of B's own highest interest. In which sense B's duty is also B's right. Again B's right is a necessary condition to his being able to perform his full duty to A. Hence B's right is at the same time B's duty. *I have a right to perform all my real duties; and it is my duty to realize all my essential rights.* Only through the interfusion of Right and Duty can either Right or Duty be more than the merest abstraction. The objective aspect of Ethics, then, has to do with the various forms through which all associated human activity is expressed. And these forms consist of the various institutions to which human society has given rise and through which human society has unfolded. They are (1) Property, (2) the Family, (3) the State, (4) the School and (5) the Church. Ethics in its strictly constructive character as a science has not to describe or account for these institutions. Its task is to trace their significance as media in the unfolding of the human spirit. And before proceeding to indicate the analysis of these several institutional forms it may be remarked that Property presents the form of relation of individual to individual and to the community through things; that the Family constitutes the form of direct relation of individual to individual and of the individual to a limited group

bound together by the (mainly instinctive) bond of consanguinity; that the State consists of an organically realized system of relations between individual and individual and between the individual and the community irrespective of ties of consanguinity, the end being the present security and well-being of the citizens; that the School has for its ethical end to clarify the conscience of the individual and thus to secure consistent, self-conscious, deliberate right-doing on his part; and finally that the Church (in its strictly ethical character) is the progressively realized system of relations between individual and individual and between each individual and the object of worship so far as the latter phase of relationship is unfolded *through the community*. Here the end is evidently the ideal ultimate security and well-being of the individual members of the community.

Evidently, then, Ethics presents an Economic and a Social as well as a religious and theological aspect; just as, on the other hand, Economics, Social Philosophy and Theology are essentially ethical in character and may be classed as specialized departments of the science of Ethics in its wider range.

Without further preliminary the following is offered as a condensed analysis of the various essential phases of the objective aspect of Ethics.

I. PROPERTY. Here two phases are presented in contrast one with the other.

A. *Positive Aspect.* The first of these phases is that in which the Will expresses itself in things as Property; and here there are three distinct degrees of the adequacy in which the Will finds expression in and through things.

(1) The first of these degrees consists in the mere appropriation of objects pertaining to the physical world (including animals). Here it is necessarily presupposed that any object thus appropriated pertains as yet to the "Unclaimed Bounty of Nature." Otherwise there must be developed the Ethical contradiction of conflicting claims on the part of two Wills each seeking self-realization.

Thus it is at once evident that in every case of such appropriation the individual Will, in the very fact of such appropriation, really assumes a specifically new relation to each and every other Will. For such act of appropriation necessarily presupposes the consent of all other Wills. Not otherwise can the act itself be accomplished nor its result (possession) be maintained.

(2) But possession implies *use*, and use again implies adaptation—that is *Modification* in form or in quality, or in both form and quality, of the thing appropriated. Such modification is the visible expression of the individual Will as guided by a purpose. Such purpose, again, is an Ideal; and the modification of the given thing (thus reduced to the grade of mere "Material") consists in shaping it into con-

formity with the given Ideal. The result is an implement (answering the demands of *Utility*) or an artwork (answering the demand for the *Beautiful*). And it is not to be overlooked that both are but *media in the self-realization of mind and have no other real significance*. In such work of transformation the expression of Will is of a highly complex character; and this for the reason that there is involved therein a distinctly higher degree of maturity of Will. And this means that a more adequate practical definition (in the sense of self-differentiation) of Will has been attained through greater clearness and complexity and force of intellectual activity; and not only so, but in every phase of work within this entire sphere the individual Will is brought into specially close and complex relation with other Wills.

On the one hand in working out his own purposes the individual is constantly appealing to others for recognition of his skill as expressed in the forms he gives to the "Material" at his disposal. On the other hand the very ideals which the individual endeavors to work out into full measure of Reality are after all not merely *his* ideals. Rather does he appropriate ideals already formed through the experience of the race. At most he but modifies and recombines such race-formed ideals. Through such work the personality of the individual becomes conformed to that of the race.

(3) A still further and higher degree in the development of Will by means of Property is attained through the medium of a recognized *Sign*. An example of the simplest form of such sign may be found in a brand, as on cattle, or in the name on a package to be delivered (the latter being a form applicable to all merchandise). Such mark is the effective outer form of the Will throughout all civilized countries. On the other hand the most adequate form of the Sign as the outer form of the Will is that of the *Deed* as an instrument giving formal expression to the relation subsisting between an individual Will and the collective Will of the whole community—that is, the State. And this formal expression of such relation is to the effect that the individual is formally recognized as having exclusive right to hold and use during his pleasure (but subject to taxation) a given portion of land. And since all commodities are obtained from the land it is evident that the *Deed* is the form guaranteeing to the individual the right to the prime original means of his own physical self-preservation, which in turn is but the condition precedent to his own self-maturing as a self-conscious unit. The land is “*real*” property—the permanent, real Possibility of all possible forms of property. Hence all activity of the individual in respect of property must refer ultimately to land. But the act of the individual is a *deed*—the outer, organic form of his *Will*. And be-

cause assured possession in use of land is necessary to a production of property of any kind whatever, it is evidently indispensable to the existence of society as the necessary medium for the self-realization of the individual that the universal Will of the community should assume a clearly defined objective form, assuring to the individual such undisturbed use of a given portion of land. It is just this clearly defined objective, organic form of the communal Will in such case that is properly and significantly called a *Deed*. It is the form or instrument in which individual Will and communal Will coincide.

But thus far we have only intimated the essential ways in which Will may realize itself through and embody itself in Property. This is but the positive aspect of the ethical import of Property. The negative aspect is next to be noticed.

B. *Negative Aspect*. This negative aspect consists in *Modes of withdrawing the Will from things as Property*.

(i) As in the positive aspect the simplest phase is mere appropriation; so in the negative aspect the simplest phase is the mere abandonment of what is already in possession. And here it is essential to notice that the abandonment of property is ethically justifiable only when the thing in possession no longer has any real value—only, therefore, when it has ceased to be *real as property*; that is, when it has ceased to

be in any proper sense of the term the outer form of the Will. In this case, then, the withdrawal of the Will in "abandonment" is merely formal. Though there must still remain the Ethical demand that the abandonment shall not be in such manner as to prove an occasion of injury to others.

(2) In withdrawing the Will from things as property through simple abandonment the relation of the individual Will to other Wills is implicit even in precisely the same degree (though in inverse order) as in the expression of the Will in things through simple appropriation. In point of real import, however, the relation is still, even at this stage, a thoroughly real and valid one in both the positive and the negative phase.

In the second stage of withdrawal of the Will from things as property the relation of the individual Will to other Wills (more commonly to one other Will) is explicit and direct. Here the simplest form of withdrawal is that of *Gift*. But this necessarily implies the *acceptance* of the gift.

But thus the actual withdrawal of the one Will from the given object is possible only in so far as at the same moment another Will affirms itself in the same object. The Gift is thus a joint act of two Wills, and can take place upon no other condition.

Such in simplest form, is the ethical ground of the Gift. In point of detail it is impossible in a summarized view like the present to do more than merely in-

dicating the limits of the moral right to give and receive presents: namely, within the family group, including friends who have acquired a relationship similar in character. Beyond this range the gift must be immoral as implying obligation; the greater the property value of the gift the greater the sense of obligation; that is, the greater the hindrance to subsequent free activity on the part of the one receiving the gift; while the one making the gift must suffer moral injury in the form of confused and exaggerated notions as to his own claims upon the one to whom the "gift" is made. Further, the moral quality of a gift must depend in part upon the means of the giver. If in any case, for any purpose, I make a gift of my means to such extent, no matter how limited, as in any measure to put it beyond my power to meet my own just obligations, then the gift is thus far an immoral act.

(3) But a further and still more adequate form of the expression of Will in property is that of *Exchange*. In every case of exchange the entire process of the creation of property is already presupposed (the process itself consisting of the appropriation and transformation of material things rendering them suited to special human uses). Ethically, then, each party to an exchange is presumed to be already rationally developed as a Will. It is further presumed that this process has been *creative of values* the immediate outer concrete form of which is that of the particular articles

to be exchanged. But each has produced more of some one kind of commodity than he can consume and has produced nothing of that kind of property resulting from the work of the other. Yet each requires for his own well-being some part of what the other has produced. Each therefore can without loss give up to the other a part of his own product and receive with advantage a part of the product of the other. Each has what the other lacks and lacks what the other has. An exchange, therefore, will be to the benefit of each. Here, too, the exchange properly speaking is the joint act of the two Wills. Each, in one and the same act, withdraws his Will from one object and affirms his Will in another object.

And further, both Wills act simultaneously; otherwise no exchange is effected, and neither Will has really accomplished its own transfer from one object to another as its own outer form of manifestation.

(4) But also in the very fact that exchange constitutes a highly complex medium for the development of the Will as really *moral*, it also proves to be a ready means for the development of the Will as *immoral*.

Exchange may be unjust as well as just; and it is here to be noted that unjust exchange presents three distinct ethical degrees. These we can here do no more than merely enumerate. The *first* is due to ignorance of the ethical principle applicable in the given case; or more commonly to ignorance of the

actual ethical relations involved. The *second* degree of immoral exchange is presented in cases where there is conscious, deliberate ignoring of the principle involved and where careful effort is made to conceal (from the other parties concerned) the actual ethical relations involved, and to deceive as to the relative values of the objects to be exchanged. This is the degree known as *fraud*. In the *third* place, finally, the immoral purpose may become so wholly unrestrained as to lead to open defiance of the ethical relations necessarily implied and thus to the use of violence in the obtaining of desired objects. Here all pretense of exchange as such really ceases and actual undisguised *robbery* begins.

A glance through even so summary a view of the ethical aspects of Property as that here presented will serve to show that in each and every stage Property is possible only as a form of the manifestation of Will and that as such it necessarily brings each man into relation with all other men. Similarly it is precisely these concrete relations of Will to Will as involved in property that constitute the indispensable media in the elementary stages of the education of the human Will.

And that this relation, again, may be of a moral or of an immoral character is not to be overlooked.

Chiefly then, within this sphere, Ethics as science is the tracing out of the truly rational or just relations of man to man as involved in the appropriation and

adaptation of things to human uses. And even in so meagre a sketch it has already been foreshadowed as impossible that these simple forms of relation through things as property can actually be realized save through the unfolding of the various still more complex forms of direct relation constituting the essence of the social world. For evidently the relations of Will to Will as involved in property can be realized only in so far as they are regulated; and this necessarily implies that the social world is already more or less definitely and consistently unfolded. The forms of relation involved in the social world will therefore next call for analysis.

II. THE FAMILY. The simplest forms of direct relation between human Will and human Will are found in the Family; and here again certain specific phases of relation appear as pertaining to the rational unfolding of the Family as such :

A. The primary phase consists of *Marriage*, that is, the Founding of the Family.

(1) In tracing the relations here necessarily involved it is to be observed at the outset that each of the contracting parties in marriage is a representative (because an organic member) of an already existing family group. Hence whatever each does inevitably affects the entire group of which he is a member. So that in entering into the marriage relation the individual, by uniting his life with another life, adds that other

life to the family group of which he is himself already a member. And because their interests are thus bound up with his own he is morally bound to consult them upon the question of the proposed union. To ignore the convictions and interests of those thus related would amount to denial of the universal character of the Will. It would in reality amount to the extravagance of affirming that the individual's own rights are absolutely without restriction and that therefore the other personages involved have no rights that can hold good in opposition to those claimed by the individual.

And yet this must be nothing less than to assume the more immediate resolutions of the individual Will (that is, the mere determinations of caprice) as the supreme standard. But this could only have for its effect to destroy society and render the maturing of the individual himself impossible.

(2) It is, in fact, only through association that the individual can attain maturity in any degree as a self-conscious, self-determined being. And the family is just that form of association through which alone all the finer qualities of character—fear, tenderness, confidence, love—can be nurtured into full vigor and refinement of reality. And primarily this association consists in the fusing of two individualities into one. This is, in fact, the first step in the clear, unselfish recognition of the essentially rational, universal

nature of Self-hood. It is the forgetfulness of self through apprehending the ideal Self in another self. And when this recognition is reciprocal as between two Wills not otherwise debarred there is present the true moral basis of marriage.

Meanwhile in order that the union may be morally valid and valid in full measure—in order that it may be really efficient as a means to ethical maturity on the part of the personages involved—it is essential that those personalities should bring to the union a substantial basis of common interest in respect of tastes and of moral and religious convictions.

(3) The inequality of the sexes is not to be ignored. Such inequality is at once the product and the measure of civilization. In respect of massiveness of power there can be no question that man is superior to woman. In respect of delicacy of power there can be no question that woman is superior to man. These differences are less in savage races ; greater in civilized races. It is not for advancing civilization to reduce them but to foster them. It is not that massive strength shall become coarse nor that “ delicate ” shall come to be synonymous with “ weak.” Power may become more refined while becoming more massive, and grow more vigorous while increasing in delicacy. It is thus that the man becomes more manly, the woman more womanly. It is through this increasing superiority of each over the other that the rational

equality of the two sexes (their absolute unity in ultimate spiritual type) is to be progressively and most perfectly demonstrated.

(4) It is precisely through the differentiation of the sexes, brought about and constantly emphasized by the whole course of civilization, that the proper sphere of either sex is determined. It is the heavy and highly complex work, requiring prolonged and exhausting nervous tension, that in the true economy of the world falls naturally to man. On the other hand the delicate, intermittent tasks fall no less naturally to woman. Whence it is in the sphere of the Home that woman finds her natural sphere of activity; just as man finds his powers specially suited to the ruder and more exhausting pursuits of Commercial and Political activity.

But because woman's most natural sphere of activity is within the Home, and because the Home is the one medium through which the elements of personality can all be securely and normally unfolded in utmost degree, it is evident that the essential *Rights* of woman are to be realized in precisely that degree in which the Family attains, chiefly through her performance of her *duties*, the true measure of its practical maturity as a human institution. And further, as there is but one Type of Personality, in which all question of Sex as well as of race is completely merged, it is evident that only the monogamic marriage, in

which the essential equality of the contracting parties is explicitly recognized, can be a truly moral one.

But again, genuine Freedom means rational living. And to be truly rational in this practical sense the individual must conform his own Will to the enlightened Will of the Race; and this both in the civil and in the religious sense of the term. Hence, genuinely moral Marriage must have both a civil and a religious sanction. The interests of society require this, and the interests of the individual as a member of society cannot possibly be (morally) separated from the general interest. Ignoring these fundamental organic relations means practical self-contradiction, and practical self-contradiction means nothing less than self-destruction—that is, the absolute inversion of the process of self-realization in one or another degree.

(5) Finally it is to be noted that increased facility for divorce means increased facility for destroying the Family with all the moral values which the Family is the sole medium for realizing. The Mosaic law permitting divorce was truly declared to be because of the “hardness of heart”—that is because of the barbarous condition—of the people of that early time. The law of Reason recognizes the equality in nature of all men—of all human beings. Hence each of the contracting parties in marriage, being recognized as having equal rights (and duties, which are but the obverse side of rights) with the other—being rec-

ognized, that is, as having substantial freedom — is bound to assume the full measure of the consequences of the relationships into which he or she enters. The more enlightened men become the more justly are they to be held rigidly accountable as individuals for what they as individuals do. Increase in facility of divorce, means reversion to barbarism. Only with complete, final estrangement through conduct that already destroys the family as a moral unit can divorce be other than immoral.

B. *The Relation between Parents and Children* constitutes a further fundamental phase of the compound life of the Family.

(1) The central right of the child as toward the parent is, comprehensively, that of a totality of the best conditions available for his own moral and intellectual development. It is especially the moral aspect of his spiritual growth that depends most upon and finds its best medium in the (normally constituted) home.

(2) Nevertheless the more complex phases of the spiritual development of the child demands media of a correspondingly complex and carefully chosen character. These media are those specially known as *educational* and can be best realized only through association in large groups. (The practical questions here are classification of pupils and gradation of their work, with division of labor to the extent of securing

the highest degree of efficiency in teaching.) Here voluntary association is the ethical demand and its highest form is found in the schools supported by self imposed taxation in a free or self-governed community. Further, the relation which on the part of the child is to be counted as a *right*, is also on the part of the parent a *duty*. So also the duty of the parent to secure educational facilities for the child is no less a right on the part of the parent as toward the child, who, by the very fact of his right to these advantages, is under moral obligation to make the best possible use of them.

(3) It is of special importance to note in this connection that the obligations of the parent to the child in respect of moral oversight are absolute and cannot by these or any other means be in the least reduced in degree nor can they, in any measure, be delegated or transferred. The duties of the teacher are *sui generis* and can only be added to, but can never take the place of, those of the parent to the child. To both parent and teacher the child owes the absolute duty of obedience, as he has also the absolute right to be always reasonably commanded by both.

(4) The sacrifices made by the parent in performing his duty toward the child also constitute a means of discipline to the parent himself. So that here, too, in performing his duties he is (however unconsciously) realizing his own highest rights as well.

On the other hand the child, stimulated to increased exertion by his sense of obligation to his parents, is by that fact securing in increased degree his own essential rights in point of intellectual and moral development. — Thus, in this sphere also, and from whatever point of view the relation between parents and children is approached, it is again manifest that every right is also a duty and that every duty is also a right.

C. Rational Dissolution of the Family. As the essential moral purpose of the family is that of means to the maturing of the moral units or individual Wills composing it, it is but inevitable that as this end is accomplished the given family group must dissolve into a number of independent individuals. Thus the children, as they attain moral maturity (i. e. become actual *persons*), form each a new alliance — become each a party to the founding of a new family. (Rational exceptions must be from reasons of health, or of renunciation for the purpose of more perfectly fulfilling a given mission rightly regarded in such exceptional cases as a higher duty.)

The final stage in the normal dissolution of the family group appears in the death of one or other of the parents after having aided the children to the attainment of rational independence.

III. THE STATE. (I) By its own expansion the family becomes many families. These groups again, and the individuals composing them, are necessarily

related one to another. And further, to be rational in the sense of real these relations must become organic.

The organic form assumed by these wider human relations is, on one side, the *State*.

This organic form is a measure of the real extent and character of the political life of a people. What is called a "constitution," if it has vital significance in the state, is but an outer form showing how the people as a political body are *constituted*.

As the state is but the expansion of the family on the side of securing to each individual his rights as toward all other individuals it follows that, as in case of the family, so also here, those in authority are morally bound to secure the best possible conditions for the intellectual and moral development of each and all the members comprising the group.

These conditions are: (a) Settled order involving security against invasion of individual rights whether of person or of property; (b) Security against invasion of social and political rights as against foreign power; and (c) An educational system providing for an intelligent, moral and therefore efficient citizenship.

(2) In all this the ideal is, not repression but rational development of the individual—the fostering and cultivation of his powers toward rational self-government.

Such being the *duty* of the State, the State in that

very fact has also the *right* to demand of every citizen that he shall perform whatever functions may be demanded of him for the realization of these rational ends proposed by the State for the benefit of the individual citizen.

Conversely the citizen has the right to demand of the State security of person and property together with means for his education as a citizen; and such *right* involves the duty on his part to loyal obedience to such commands as the State may give, within such limits, as toward himself.

(3) In the "absolute" monarchy all this is implicit in greater or less degree. The "paternal" aspect implies the "filial." In the nature of the case there are limitations to arbitrary use of power. The more truly paternal the authority the more rapid the advance of the people toward comprehension and appreciation of their rights—that is, the more rapid must be their advance toward maturity of active rational Will which in turn must find articulate expression in the form of a demand for a *constitution* and written laws—that is, the more efficient and reasonable an "absolute" monarchy proves itself to be, only so much the sooner must it dissolve as such and become merged into a "limited" or constitutional monarchy.

(4) Similarly, the more enlightened and efficient the monarchy under its constitutional form, the more rapid the advance of the people in intelligence and

morality—in the elements of real *Freedom*—and hence the sooner must it become merged into a purely *Representative* form of government—the entire government being conducted by the chosen agents of the people themselves.

(5) The *Ideal* of the State is one and continuous. What particular phase of its realization is most efficient or “practical” with any people at any given time must depend upon the stage of intellectual and moral advancement already attained by the people themselves.

A purely representative system must be as impracticable in a barbarous State as an absolute monarchy would be with a highly enlightened people.

IV. THE SCHOOL. Already included in the Family, in the State and in the Church the School is still a distinct institution, with unique, well-defined and increasingly complex functions. The individual Will in its character of Instinct is due to heredity in the more direct sense of the term.

Already at birth, indeed, such Will is a positive, complex unit of energy specially predisposed to action of one or another particular kind. Again in its character as Habit the Will may still be regarded as in large measure the outcome of heredity, though here the inheritance is not only spiritual instead of physical, but it is also of an exceedingly subtle character.

From the moment in which his distinctly individual existence begins, indeed, the human being is not only

surrounded by a humanized nature (the temperature and humidity of the air in the room, as well as the degree of light, are carefully regulated to his needs, to say nothing of specially prepared food and clothing) but he is also ceaselessly bathed in what may be called the spiritual fluid of *Custom*.

This again, in its existing peculiar character, has been evolved through the entire process of human history and to this the individual progressively assimilates himself in those specific qualities of his life which in their outer forms are revealed as his Habits.

But also in every moment of his life the individual is bathed in that subtle, but none the less real "atmosphere" of universal, abiding *relations* constituting the unity of the world, physical and spiritual; which relations are to be more or less securely *apprehended* indeed by the whole being of man; while on the other hand they are to be really *comprehended* by man only through the fullest discipline as well as the utmost and most consistent and persistent exercise of that peculiar mode of mind known as reflective Intelligence, as Thought properly speaking. Only through the fullest cultivation, only through the most persistent exercise of the intellect in its highest modes can human consciousness attain its most adequate degree of maturity. And that amounts to saying that in no other way than through the fullest intellectual development can *Conscience* as the Ethical

aspect of Consciousness become truly enlightened and thus prove a safe guide through the *complexities* of life which to the unenlightened conscience so often prove to be the fatal *perplexities* of life—fatal because in such maze the groping mind loses its way, falls into self-contradiction and unwittingly turns life into death. It is simply impossible to be fully “born again” into the higher forms of life with all their rich significance save through the maturing of the whole mind including the Intellect in fullest measure; and this, as we have just seen, is necessarily involved in, and hence depends upon, the maturing of the whole social organism.

Now the School is just that special aspect of the Social Organism which has for its most immediate specific function to stimulate and guide the individual mind in the intellectual aspect of its development. And the ultimate end here aimed at is two-fold. (1) In the first place it is the function of the school to bring the individual mind as speedily as possible to comprehend its own true worth as being (for itself) the actual focus in which the whole sum of concrete relations constituting its environment have their normal center. The ethical factor in this is the development of Self-respect. (2) In the second place the end aimed at in the intellectual training of the child includes this also, That with least delay and with utmost precision and fulness he shall learn to com-

prehend that toward his own normal development (or abnormal prevention and perversion of development) the whole complex of relations constituting the environment works, and must ceaselessly work, according as the attitude of the individual mind to the whole is rational or the reverse. And here the ethical factor is the development of respect for the environment as the total, infinitely concrete, infinitely complex embodiment of Reason in its ultimate divine nature. Therefore is it that the child is taught the laws of the physical world summarized in the Sciences of Physics, Chemistry and Biology. Therefore is he taught the laws of the Social World as unfolded implicitly, first in the forms of Language, Literature, Art and History; and again as unfolded explicitly in the ethical sciences — Politics, Social Philosophy and Ethics strictly speaking.

For his own fullest security and guidance in the process of his own self-realization individual man must possess developed power of reflection; he must have acquired clearly organized, consistently unfolded knowledge both of nature and of man. And (with rare exceptions at most) it is through the school, and through the school alone that the highest degree of the habit of mind rendering such acquisition of knowledge possible is to be really attained at all. And further, since self-realization is the ultimate ethical end of life, and since the attainment of the fullest

possible measure of organized knowledge of the world of nature on the one hand and of the world of man on the other is a necessary condition to, or rather an essential phase of, such self-realization in its more advanced degrees, then it is evident that the individual has absolute, inalienable moral right to the fullest possible sum of conditions making for the attainment of such knowledge. In other words the individual has absolute moral right to this, That all other individuals shall join in deliberate, concerted, unreserved effort to secure to him the fullest possible sum of conditions tending toward the truest form of his self-realization, and this in richest attainable degree.

And if it be admitted that this is the absolute *Right* of each then inevitably it is equally the absolute *Duty* of each to contribute of his whole being—property, sympathy, thought and deed—to the richest possible realization of this Right for each and every other member of the community (which in the fuller sense is the State, and in the fullest sense is the whole human race).

Here as elsewhere if I refuse to be, in absolute good-faith—in very deed and truth—my brother's *keeper*, then by the very fact of such refusal I become for myself an immeasurable *loser*. Because the individual mind is universal in its nature or type it is not merely included in all, it also and none the less truly includes all within itself. The State is above the In-

dividual only so far as the individual is capricious. In so far as the Individual is rational *he is the State itself*; for there is no rational (*i. e.* truly Ethical) demand which the State can make upon him that is not already present within him as an absolutely vital, unalterable law of his own being. Nay he is more than the State, for there are demands of his nature which the State as such cannot possibly satisfy. Hence are there other institutions organic to man's inner or spiritual nature and indispensable to the full expression or embodiment of that nature.

And the School is one of these institutions. The State can decree the School, and must do so. It can provide the outer form and instrumentalities of the School, and must, on penalty of self-dissolution; but the School in its essential character as the medium through which individual minds are to be stimulated and guided into such self-activity as results in the mastery and very assimilation of the fundamental principles or phases of Reason which constitute the essence of the World, whether of Nature or of Man—in this sense the School is and can only be the creation of the mature individual mind—ripe in its intelligence, refined in its sensibilities, gentle in its assured power as Will, and withal transfused with that genuine “enthusiasm of humanity” which must ever characterize the true *teacher*.

All this every pupil has a right to expect of his teacher

just as, on the other hand, every one who assumes the responsibilities of teacher is in duty bound to fulfil such expectation.

On the other hand in so far as the teacher performs his duty toward the pupil, patiently pointing out to him the essential facts and relations involved in the given stage of the pupil's own development, in so far the teacher has a right to expect of his pupil the fullest measure of attention and patient effort of which he is capable. And further, just as the teacher is in duty bound (negatively) to avoid all that could discourage or embitter the pupil on the one hand, and on the other hand (positively) to make use in kindest way of all proper means to stimulate healthful effort toward self-realization on the pupil's part, so again the pupil is in duty bound to give patient, docile obedience to the directions of the teacher and to bend all his energies to the performance of tasks assigned.

And evidently the enthusiasm of the teacher, his eager, self-forgetful performance of his own duty toward the pupil must ever prove the surest way of securing his own rights in the way of cheerful obedience and eager performance of work on the part of his pupils; just as the earnest performance of duty on the part of the pupil must in general put beyond question the fullest recognition of his rights on the part of the teacher. It is in the rhythm of work performed

in such spirit in the school-room that all bitterness is canceled, all discords annulled, and the beauty of a world of Reason prophesied, and even in some degree made real here and now. It is in such teaching that the finest values in the way of the practical results of Ethical teaching consists.

Though also it cannot be too much insisted upon that the direct ethical function of the School consists in the development of consciousness on the part of pupils of the great central principles involved in human existence, conformity to which means life and disregard of which inevitably entails death. In a word the ethical function of the School is to raise the conscience of the individual pupil from the merely instinctive degree to that of an *enlightened* Conscience. Or again its ethical function is to aid in rendering the progressively unfolding individual Will truly *free* through the complete interfusion of that Will with trained intelligence.

But to this end the religious factor is equally necessary. Hence the objective aspect of ethics must involve a further institution — the Church.

V. THE CHURCH. The State is the expansion of the family *in one of its essential aspects*. The Church is the expansion of the family in another and complementary aspect. The Church cannot be rightly regarded as merely one aspect of the State. Just as out of the rudimentary stage of consciousness (in the pro-

gressive development of the individual) the two cognate and always inseparable, while yet increasingly distinct, modes of mind—Intelligence and Practical Sentiment—are developed; so from the Family as the rudimentary form of the social organism there are found to develop the two cognate and always inter-fused while yet increasingly distinct modes, namely the State and the Church. The State is the organic form which the political life of man assumes while the Church is the organic form into which the religious life of man unfolds.

In either case the functions involved must fail of realization save through the appropriate organic structural form; and those functions constitute life itself. Without the State man must have remained a savage; or rather, could never have become man at all. Without the Church man could never have arisen above the grossest superstition; and even this implies at least a rudimentary Church.

Man can be fully realized as man—can live the life of man in the fullest sense—only by the unfolding of that life in all the organic forms which its nature demands.

Religion has no doubt been rightly defined as the “relation of Man to God.” But man is related to God through all forms of Reality and especially through that most complex form of reality, man him-

self. Individual man rises to God through association with his fellow-man.

In property (looking to the least adequate phases of human creation) man finds himself even there necessarily related to his fellow-man. In Religion (looking to his own direct relation to the Supreme Creator) man still finds himself related to his fellow-man.

Religion is the practical relation of man to God—the *process* by which man fulfills the divine nature in himself and so attains to harmony with the Divine.

Theology is the scientific (or philosophic) tracing out and representation of that practical relation or process in its fundamental principles.

The Church is the direct medium—the organic structural form—through which that process is to be made real.

Thus the Church is itself essentially an educational institution having especially for its purpose to foster and develop the moral qualities of man into conscious conformity with the divine Ideal of all spiritual life—the fusion of the human life with the divine Life.

To this end the Church has the right (and the duty) to demand of each member that he put forth with utmost earnestness and sincerity every possible effort to unfold his intellectual powers so as to comprehend, and his moral powers so as to perform, in the wisest and most efficient manner his unalterable obligations

to the Divinity—such obligations necessarily including all his obligations to his fellow man—financial, social, political, religious. For thus only can individual man hope to fulfil his own obligations to *himself*. It is absolutely true that “he who offends in one offends in all.” Thus it is the duty of the individual to attend with utmost care to the teachings of the Church; and this necessarily implies the absolute right of the individual to be taught by the Church the true lesson of his relation to the Divinity, including all that is of permanent validity in the relation of man to man.

Again the Church as the organic form into which the religious spirit of man unfolds, proves to be itself a *growth*—a form perpetually undergoing modification. Its form therefore will depend—has ever depended—essentially upon the degree and character of the actual religious life of the people.

In primitive ages uniformity was impossible because there was no common standard—not even a common object of worship. As enlightenment increases uniformity seems an impossibility from the multiform divergence of views arising in consequence of the increasingly complex intellectual activity of man.

But the same principle runs through all—to aid man in his efforts to live a more consistently rational, more adequately moral, more richly religious life.

Whence religious teaching must ever involve a distinctly ethical factor. And further, the science of the

object and process of religion must include the presentation of fundamental Ethical principles from the religious (and theological) point of view. Whence Ethics must here appear rather as a department of Theology; just as throughout the Science of Ethics in the ordinary sense there is always and inevitably to be discovered a distinct theological tinge.

Thus Ethics, or the Science of the fundamental principles underlying the relations of man to man, merges into Theology, or the science of the fundamental principles underlying the relations of man to God.

SELECTED LIST OF HAND AND REFERENCE
BOOKS.

The beginner in any department of study can only be bewildered by an extended "bibliography," while a few titles will really serve to introduce him to the subject he proposes to investigate. The following are likely to be most helpful to one entering upon the study of Ethics.

I. For the history of the subject, Sidgwick's *Outlines of the History of Ethics* may safely be balanced by the admirable summaries of ethical theories in Schwegler's handbook of the *History of Philosophy*. (This book ought to be carefully read as a whole, so as to seize the standpoints of the various schools in their proper perspective.)

II. Among elementary presentations of the science of Ethics as such, Muirhead's *Elements of Ethic* will be found specially fresh and suggestive.

III. Of the more extended ethical treatises, ancient and modern, the following may be recommended as best, presenting the various points of view : (1) Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (Trans. F. H. Peters)—presupposed in all ethical theory since his time ; (2) Epictetus, *The Discourses* (Trans. George Long)—highest expression of the Ethics of Stoicism ; (3) Kant's

Theory of Ethics (Trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott); (4) Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts*. The latter is of the utmost importance for the objective aspect of Ethics. To this the present writer is indebted more than to any other single work.*—Kant and Hegel are the chief representatives of the most thorough-going German Idealism; (5) Spencer's *The Data of Ethics*; (6) Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*.—Spencer and Stephen have given the fullest formulation to evolutionary Ethics; (7) Sidgwick's *The Methods of Ethics*—represents Utilitarianism in its most refined form; (8) Lotze's *Microcosmus*, especially Books V–VIII, inclusive.—Lotze's position is independent though idealistic; at the same time it is strongly pervaded by the spirit of modern Science; (9) Emerson's essays on *The Conduct of Life*—No more a formal treatise on Ethics than the *Microcosmus* of Lotze; and yet, a richly suggestive and ennobling view of the essentials of ethical relation; (10) Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, together with his *Introductions* to Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature*, especially that to Vol. II.—Green's works are rigidly philosophical and are not surpassed by any ethical treatise in the English language in point of penetration and stimulating quality; (11) For suggestive intimations of the principles underlying

*Readers not familiar with the German will find this work summarized in "*Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History*" by George S. Morris. Published by S. C. Griggs & Co.

the objective aspect of Ethics it need hardly be said that Plato's *Republic* is invaluable, while as a modern survey of the whole general sphere of social life Mackenzie's *Introduction to Social Philosophy* will be found specially suggestive; and finally (12) Bradley's *Ethical Studies* can scarcely fail to prove specially suited to clear the mind of ethical confusions and thus prepare the way for sound and consistent views in this sphere.

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
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