

16. 2482

Ex 2482

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I M T F E

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent : WACHI, Takaji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet  
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country  
I hereby depose as follows.

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1. I was formerly a lieutenant-general in the Japanese Army and am now being confined at Sugamo prison.

2. I was at Tientsin as a senior staff-officer of the Japanese Garrison Army in China from August of 1936 to the end of July 1937. I was in charge of Intelligence.

3. Therefore, personally experiencing and understanding the state of affairs in North China before and at the time of the Lukouchiao Incident which occurred on July 7, 1937, I should like to state the following facts for reference.

4. First, I will give a few facts for information on the situation in North China prior to the Incident. Around August of 1936 when I arrived at Tientsin to take my new post, there were many unemployed soldiers of the Northeast Army (Chang Hsueh-liang's Army) infiltrating into North China. Ma Chan-shan was also in Tientsin. One day I met him at the home of Fan-fu at the English Concession. The fact that many of these unemployed soldiers had joined the Kintung Government Army was also related in the talk by GORO, Araki who was formerly the advisor of Chang Hsueh-liang in Pei-ping. "In order to attack the Communist Army in Northwest China, Chang Hsueh-liang himself and the Northeast Army were dispatched but these officers and men of the Northeast Army communicated with the Communist Army saying that their enemy was Japan and since Japan was also the enemy of the Communist Army, they should not fight each other. For that reason, the subjugation of the Communist Army did not progress. Therefore, in order to encourage the punitive forces, Chang-Kai-shek himself went to Siam Incident occurred", stated Ma Chan-shan to Hsia Menyun, my secretary.

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Also, these facts stated above were confirmed by other intelligence reports which I gathered.

5. In the spring of 1937 I met Han Fu-chu at Tsinan. He told me that he received an unofficial notification from the central authority that war would break out between Japan and China in the autumn of that year, and that at that time he had to go to Tsientsin. However, he stated that if he should go to Tientsin, the base of Shantung would be captured during his absence. So, for the reason that the Japanese Army might also land at Tsing-tao, we should advance to Meihsien.

6. From about the spring of 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) the attitude of Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of the Kichu Political Committee became more and more inclined to be anti-Japanese. There was an instance when I tried to have an interview with him at the Military Officers Club at Tientsin, but he replied that he could not meet me there because that building had been contributed by Yan Ju-keng (who was pro-Japanese). Communist troops began even gradually to join the third division of the 29th Army under Sung Che-yuan's command. Meanwhile, on the side of Japan, Vice-chief of the General Staff, NISHIO, Toshizo, summoned Colonel Kusumoto of Shanghai, Major Obashi of the Kwantung Army and myself of the Japanese Army stationed in North China and instructed us to assume a passive attitude lest we should cause a disturbance in China. The Chief of Military Operations of the General Staff Headquarters at that time was Major General ISHIHARA, Kanji.

I also informed him fully about our cautious attitude in North China.

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7. After I returned to my post in Tientsin, I guided the attitude of the Japanese Army stationed in North China according to the purport of the instructions which I received at Tokyo. Shortly after, Lieutenant Colonel OKAMOTO, Kiyofuku came to Tientsin from the Headquarters of the General Staff and, upon his return after inspecting the state of affairs of the Japanese garrison in China, he expressed relief that there were absolutely no signs to indicate that our side was ready to cause any disturbances.

8. The Lukouchiao Incident, as is well known, occurred on 7 July 1937, but at that time Lieutenant General TASUERO of the Japanese Army in China had been in bed suffering from heart-asthma since several months before and he was absolutely unable to command his army. He was so seriously ill that he died on the 9th of that month. For the purpose of inspection, the main force of the 2nd Infantry Regiment stationed at Tientsin was dispatched to Shanhaikwan. A greater part of the battalion stationed at Peiping was also at Tung-chow. Major General KAWABE, Shozo, the Commander of the Infantry Brigade at Peiping, together with his subordinates had left Peiping on his way to Shanhaikwan on official business. The amount of arms, ammunition and military supplies in storage at Tientsin which was the Japanese Garrison Base, was exceedingly low.

9. I received a report of the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident at midnight on 7 July. I was ordered to proceed to the spot by HASHIMOTO, Gun, Chief Staff Officer, and on the following day I went to Tung-chow by airplane, and from Tung-chow I entered Pei-ping by car. At Pei-ping I participated in the settlement of the incident at the spot where it occurred with Colonel MATSUI, Takuro. This negotiation was settled the following day on the 9th. As to the settlement of the incident at that spot, the conditions were like conditions of infringement; that is, the incident was settled in the morning on the condition that China withdraw her troops to the Lukouchiao Castle and the grounds around the castle and punish the responsible persons.

10. Since the aforementioned agreement was achieved, I returned to Tientsin to my post via Tung-chow, and at Tung-chow I met Yin Ju-king and HASAKI (Advisor of Ki-tung Government).

At this time Yin said that he was going to muster six battalions of his command at Tung-chow. These six battalions later caused the Tung-chow Incident which occurred on the 29th of this month.

11. After returning to my post at Tientsin, I went to Tokyo on official business by order from Tokyo, and I reported the situation at the scene of the incident to the General Staff Headquarters and the War Ministry.

At that time I reported to TANAKA, Shinichi, Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, as follows:

"Under the Japanese North China Army Authorities, the policy of non-expansion and peaceful settlement is being driven home well. For example; due to the stimulus accorded to the Chinese, the railroad between Pei-ping and Tientsin is prohibited to transport of Japanese troops; the railroad between Fengtai and Pei-ping is also not permitting Japanese troops in uniform to ride; all Japanese passing through the Yungting gate are tolerating interrogation by the Chinese Military Police; six thousand Japanese nationals within the Pei-ping Castle are being guarded by merely two or three platoons of our infantry because of the existing condition whereby Chinese machine-guns are trained on the Japanese buses within the Pei-ping Castle; we also refrained from transporting the wounded into the Pei-ping Castle for surgical operations and the corpses of those killed in action are being neglected. Moreover, in regards to the artillery bombardment by the Chinese, a condition exists whereby it would be possible to fight back immediately. But in spite of all these facts, I am complying fully with the orders of the Army Headquarters at Tientsin and submitting myself to complete humiliation and inconvenience. I am strictly prohibiting action which may act as a provocation to the spread of the incident.

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11. After completing the aforementioned report, I returned to North China about noon on July 28. There I was informed by Major General Giga, the Chief of the Air Group, that the 29th Army had attacked our units at Fungtai the day before, on July 27. Today, the 28th, Tientsin was attacked by Chinese troops and consequently communication between the Tientsin air base and the Tientsin Occupation Army was temporarily severed. Then I was able to return to our original headquarters on the 29th of the same month.

12. While I was on official business in Tokyo, Mr. Nakashima (Tetsuzo), the Chief of the General Affairs Department of the General Staff Headquarters, informally ordered me to become the Regimental Commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment (Kochi) because the emergency in North China was almost settled. However, on August 1 there was a formal order issued and I took up my duties as the commander of the aforesaid regiment.

13. About August 10, 1937 I arrived at the place where the 44th Regiment had been stationed. Three days after my appointment, however, I received an urgent mobilization order and was sent to Shanghai. There I served in the field in the battle of Shanghai and after this, in March 1938, I returned to Japan. I was attached to General Staff Headquarters and given a special assignment in China. Consequently I went to Tokyo and, presenting myself at General Staff Headquarters, received my orders. My assignment was to have a talk with the Chiang Government to put an end to the Incident.

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14. In June 1938, I went to Hong Kong. At the same time I tried to negotiate with the Chiang Government through Hsia-Chenyng in North China whom I knew. They seemed to be looking forward to the matter being settled before the fall of Hankow. At last we reached a single plan. It was as follows: The Manchurian problem be tabled to the future; terminate fighting in China; the personal elements of the Provisional Government in Peiping and the Restoration Government in Nanking to be embraced into the National Government; and that Chiang Kai-shek temporarily leave the scene, etc. That the Japanese would acquire Chinese territory or monopolize Chinese interests, etc., were not included.

15. I came back to Tokyo around the end of August 1938 and reported the above to War Minister Itagaki and the Vice Chief of the General Staff Tada. I was given approval to negotiate with the above as the basis.

16. I went to Hong Kong during September of the same year and when I reported this to Hsia he also agreed with me. I decided on Fu-Chow of Fuchien Province as the site for negotiations and was about to begin the negotiations when Hankow fell in October of the same year and was not able to realize it.

17. Even after this I continued negotiations actively through Sheng's son, Chang Li-luan, and other prominent men endeavoring to get relations between Japan and China back to its natural form. I know that there were a great many men besides me who exerted themselves in this effort also.



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On this 3rd day of April, 1947

At I.M.T.F.I.

DEPONENT WACHI, Takaji (seal)

I, Kiyose, Ichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

on the same date

at same place

Witness : (signed) KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

WACHI, Takaji (seal)