

11 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David N. Sutton  
FROM : Douglas L. Waldorf, Chief  
Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT : HIRATA, Yukihoiro or Yukihiro

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness offered by the Defense:

DEFENDANT - General

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

HIRATA, Yukihoiro or Yukihiro

Curriculum Vitae

2. In the event that this is not complete, the remainder of the data will be forwarded to you without delay as soon as it is received by this office.

3. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialing and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl.  
(Described above)

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF,  
Chief, Investigative Division,  
IPS

HIRATA, Yukihoiro *or yukihiro*

Permanent Domicile: SAITAMA Prefecture, SAMURAI FAMILY

Born: December 3 Meiji 13 (1880)

Nov. 22, 1902	Graduated from the Military College	
Nov. 24, 1902	Ordered to act as a probational officer	
June 26, 1903	Commissioned 2nd lieutenant	Cabinet
	Attached to the 18th Inf. Reg.	War Ministry
Oct. 20, 1903	Granted 8th Court rank, senior grade	
Feb. 1, 1905	Commissioned 1st lieutenant	
Mar. 10, 1905	Granted 7th Court rank, Junior grade	
Apr. 1, 1906	Decorated with the 5th order of Golden Kite, and the 6th Order of the Rising Sun with Single Rays.	
	Received the Meiji 37-38 (1904-05) war medal.	
June 12, 1907	Relieved of duty with Peking Infantry Garrison.	
	Attached to the 18th Inf. Reg.	
Sept. 18, 1907	Relieved of main duties. Appointed adjutant to a garrison in China.	
Nov. 9th, 1908	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed Adjutant of the Peking Infantry Garrison.	
Aug. 20th, 1909	Decorated with the 3rd Order of the Second Double Dragon Star from the China Empire (China) and given permission to wear the above by the Japanese Govt.	
Feb. 28, 1910	Decorated with the Crown Fourth Order of Prussia and permitted to wear the above by the Japanese Government.	
	Decorated with the medal "Officier d'Academie of the French Republic and permitted to wear it by the Japanese Govt.	

Apr. 30, 1910	Granted the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade	
May 20, 1910	Decorated with the 5th Order of Sacred Treasure	War Ministry
Nov. 30, 1910	Commissioned Captain, Inf.	Cabinet
Sept. 8, 1911	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed Company Commander in the 18th Inf. Reg.	Cabinet
Nov. 15, 1913	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed Company Commander in the 1st Inf. Reg. of the Imperial Guards.	War Ministry War Ministry
July 6, 1914	Decorated with the Crown Third Order of Prussia and permitted to wear it by the Japanese Govt.	
May 31, 1915	Granted to 6th Court rank, Junior Grade.	
Nov. 15, 1916	Relieved of main duties. Appointed a Military Adjutant to the Governor-General of Formosa	War Ministry
Apr. 15, 1919	Commissioned Major, Inf.	Cabinet
May 30, 1919	Relieved of main duties. Attached to the 34th Reg. Inf.	War Ministry
July 10, 1920	Decorated with the Fourth Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
Dec. 1, 1920	Granted the 6th Court rank, Senior Grade	
Dec. 1, 1920	Relieved of main duties. Appointed Battalion Commander in the 3rd Reg. Inf.	War Ministry
Apr. 1, 1922	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed adjutant of the 2nd Inf. Brigade.	War Ministry
?	Relieved of main duties. Appointed Adjutant of the 1st Div.	War Ministry
Aug. 6, 1923	Commissioned Lt. Col., Inf.	
Aug. 1, 1925	Granted the 5th Court rank, Junior Grade	
May 25, 1927	Decorated with the 3rd Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
Dec. 16, 1927	Attached to the Hq. of TSU Regimental District	War Ministry
Mar. 8, 1928	Commissioned a Colonel, Inf.	Cabinet

	Appointed Commander of TSU Reg. District.	
Aug. 1, 1930	Appointed Commander of the 29th Inf. Reg.	War Ministry
Sept. 1, 1930	Granted the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade	
Aug. 8th, 1932	Commissioned Major General	Cabinet
	Attached to the H.Q. of the 9th Div.	War Ministry
Aug. 1, 1933	Listed as unemployed.	War Ministry
Aug. 30th, 1933	Listed on reserve duties	War Ministry
Sept. 29, 1933	Special promotion in Court Rank. Granted the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade	
Apr. 29, 1934	Decorated with the 3rd Order of the Golden Kite with an annuity of ¥700 and the Second Order of the Sacred Treasure for service in the SHOWA 6-9 (1931-1934) Incidents.	
Apr. 1, 1939	Listed in 2nd reserve.	

HIRATA, Yukihoiro *or yukihiro*

Permanent Domicile: SAITAMA Prefecture, SAMURAI FAMILY

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Nov. 22, 1902	Graduated from the Military College	
Nov. 24, 1902	Ordered to act as a probational officer	
June 26, 1903	Commissioned 2nd lieutenant	Cabinet
	Attached to the 18th Inf. Reg.	War Ministry
Oct. 20, 1903	Granted 8th Court rank, senior grade	
Feb. 1, 1905	Commissioned 1st lieutenant	
Mar. 10, 1905	Granted 7th Court rank, Junior grade	
Apr. 1, 1906	Decorated with the 5th order of Golden Kite, and the 6th Order of the Rising Sun with Single Rays.	
	Received the Meiji 37-38 (1904-05) war medal.	
June 12, 1907	Relieved of duty with Peking Infantry Garrison.	
	Attached to the 18th Inf. Reg.	
Sept. 18, 1907	Relieved of main duties. Appointed adjutant to a garrison in China.	
Nov. 9th, 1908	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed Adjutant of the Peking Infantry Garrison.	
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Nov. 30, 1910	Commissioned Captain, Inf.	Cabinet
Sept. 8, 1911	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed Company Commander in the 18th Inf. Reg.	Cabinet
Nov. 15, 1913	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed Company Commander in the 1st Inf. Reg. of the Imperial Guards.	War Ministry
July 6, 1914	Decorated with the Crown Third Order of Prussia and permitted to wear it by the Japanese Govt.	War Ministry
May 31, 1915	Granted to 6th Court rank, Junior Grade.	War Ministry
Nov. 15, 1916	Relieved of main duties. Appointed a Military Adjutant to the Governor-General of Formosa	War Ministry
Apr. 15, 1919	Commissioned Major, Inf.	Cabinet
Apr. 1, 1919	Relieved of main duties. Attached to the 54th Reg. Inf.	War Ministry
May 20, 1919	Decorated with the Fourth Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
July 10, 1920	Granted the 6th Court rank, Senior Grade	
Dec. 1, 1920	Relieved of main duties. Appointed Battalion Commander in the 3rd Reg. Inf.	War Ministry
Apr. 1, 1922	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed adjutant of the 2nd Inf. Brigade.	War Ministry
?	Relieved of main duties. Appointed Adjutant of the 1st Div.	War Ministry
Aug. 6, 1923	Commissioned Lt. Col., Inf.	
Aug. 1, 1925	Granted the 5th Court rank, Junior Grade	
May 25, 1927	Decorated with the 3rd Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
Dec. 16, 1927	Attached to the Hq. of TGU Regimental District	War Ministry
Mar. 8, 1928	Commissioned a Colonel, Inf.	Cabinet

	Appointed Commander of 1SU Reg. District.	
Aug. 1, 1930	Appointed Commander of the 29th Inf. Reg.	War Ministry
Sept. 1, 1930	Granted the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade	
Aug. 8th, 1932	Commissioned Major General	Cabinet
	Attached to the H.Q. of the 9th Div.	War Ministry
Aug. 1, 1933	Listed as unemployed.	War Ministry
Aug. 30th, 1933	Listed on reserve duties	War Ministry
Sept. 29, 1933	Special promotion in Court Rank. Granted the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade	
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	Received the Meiji 37-38 (1904-05) war medal.	
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	Attached to the 18th Inf. Reg.	
Sept. 18, 1907	Relieved of main duties. Appointed adjutant to a garrison in China.	
Nov. 9th, 1908	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed Adjutant of the Peking Infantry Garrison.	
Aug. 20th, 1909	Decorated with the 3rd Order of the Second Double Dragon Star from the China Empire (China) and given permission to wear the above by the Japanese Govt.	
Feb. 28, 1910	Decorated with the Crown Fourth Order of Prussia and permitted to wear the above by the Japanese Government.	
	Decorated with the medal "Officier d'Academie of the French Republic and permitted to wear it by the Japanese Govt.	



Apr. 30, 1910	Granted the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade Appointed Commander of 1st Reg. District.	
May 30, 1910	Decorated with the 5th Order of Sacred Treasure Appointed Commander of the 13th Inf. Reg.	War Ministry
Nov. 30, 1910	Commissioned Captain, Inf.	Cabinet
Sept. 8, 1911	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed Company Commander in the 18th Inf. Reg.	Cabinet
Nov. 15, 1913	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed Company Commander in the 1st Inf. Reg. of the Imperial Guards.	War Ministry War Ministry
July 6, 1914	Decorated with the Crown Third Order of Prussia and permitted to wear it by the Japanese Govt. Special promotion in Court Rank. Granted	War Ministry
May 31, 1915	Granted to 6th Court rank, Junior Grade.	
Nov. 15, 1916	Relieved of main duties. Appointed a Military Adjutant to the Governor-General of Formosa Second Order of the Sacred Treasure for	War Ministry
Apr. 15, 1919	Commissioned Major, Inf. (1901-1904) Inducted.	Cabinet
Apr. 1, 1919	Relieved of main duties. Attached to the 34th Reg. Inf.	War Ministry
May 30, 1919	Decorated with the Fourth Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
July 10, 1920	Granted the 6th Court rank, Senior Grade	
Dec. 1, 1920	Relieved of main duties. Appointed Battalion Commander in the 3rd Reg. Inf.	War Ministry
Apr. 1, 1922	Relieved of the main duties. Appointed adjutant of the 2nd Inf. Brigade.	War Ministry
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Aug. 6, 1923	Commissioned Lt. Col., Inf.	
Aug. 1, 1925	Granted the 5th Court rank, Junior Grade	
May 25, 1927	Decorated with the 3rd Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
Dec. 16, 1927	Attached to the Hq. of 13th Regimental District	War Ministry
Mar. 8, 1928	Commissioned a Colonel, Inf.	Cabinet

	Appointed Commander of 13U Reg. District.	
Aug. 1, 1930	Appointed Commander of the 29th Inf. Reg.	War Ministry
Sept. 1, 1930	Granted the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade	
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11 Apr. 47.

Miss Gopstein

Please have your steno write a memo  
from Mr. Waldorf to the ~~language~~ language  
section requesting a translation to English  
of the attached S. V's. of:

KAWAMURA, Kyoichi

and

HIRATA, Yukihiko

thanks - Munro

24 April 1947

*File*  
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. D. N. Sutton ✓

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief  
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

No record of subpoena. Testified 3 Apr 1947.

WITNESS

HIRATA, Yukihiro

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Record  
1786

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

1 Incl  
(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Name: Hirata, Jūzo (Yukihiro)

Record  
1786

Title: Col. Kwantung Army, Sept. 18, 1931

Source: Lytton Report

Testified before Lytton Committee regarding events of  
Sept. 18, 1931, and shortly thereafter.

371

11 April 1947

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DOUGLAS L. WALDORF,  
Chief, Investigative Division,  
IPS *am*

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	Received the Meiji 37-38 (1904-05) war medal.	
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Nov. 15, 1916	Relieved of main duties. Appointed a Military Adjutant to the Governor-General of Formosa	War Ministry
Apr. 15, 1919	Commissioned Major, Inf.	Cabinet
	Relieved of main duties. Attached to the 34th Reg. Inf.	War Ministry
May 30, 1919	Decorated with the Fourth Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
July 10, 1920	Granted the 6th Court rank, Senior Grade	
Dec. 1, 1920	Relieved of main duties. Appointed Battalion Commander in the 3rd Reg. Inf.	War Ministry
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Aug. 6, 1923	Commissioned Lt. Col., Inf.	
Aug. 1, 1925	Granted the 5th Court rank, Junior Grade	
May 25, 1927	Decorated with the 3rd Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
Dec. 16, 1927	Attached to the Hq. of 1SU Regimental District	War Ministry
Mar. 8, 1928	Commissioned a Colonel, Inf.	Cabinet

	Appointed Commander of 1SU Reg. District.	
Aug. 1, 1930	Appointed Commander of the 29th Inf. Reg.	War Ministry
Sept. 1, 1930	Granted the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade	
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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF HIRATA, Yukihiro  
by Mr. Yamada

19,277

The witness stated that he lived in Tokyo and identified Exhibit 2404 as his affidavit. \* The affidavit stated that the witness, as a colonel commanding the 29th Infantry belonging to the Second Division, was sent in April 1931 to Manchuria. On April 16 his regiment was stationed in Mukden and divisional headquarters was at Liaoyang. He served in Manchuria until August 1932 when he was transferred to Japan. He retired as a Major General in 1933.

19,278

While in Manchuria the Mukden incident broke out. In Mukden were stationed the 29th Infantry under the witness and the Second Infantry Battalion of the Independent Railway Guards under Lt. Colonel SHIMAMOTO. The 29th Infantry was charged with ordinary duty, \* the safeguarding of Japanese rights and interests. The Infantry Battalion had the duty of guarding the South Manchuria Railway in the assigned area.

Since the duties were in different directions, they differed some in the scheme of operations. For purposes of effectual cooperation the two units often practiced jointly. Since the witness was senior officer in Mukden, he was in a position to control and direct. With respect to guarding the railway, the Second Infantry Battalion was under the direct command of the Independent Guards commander and the witness did not interfere with that guarding. But with regard to the general defense of the Mukden garrison area, he could take command over SHIMAMOTO.

Before the outbreak of the incident there had never been any plot by the witness or any of his subordinates, either alone or with civilians, to create incidents. The situation in Manchuria was so aggravated that the legal rights of Japanese were infringed and an anti-Japanese attitude prevailed over Manchuria. As a result, the soldiers were in a highly strained state of mind. The witness, in light of his own experiences in the Russo-Japanese war, had cautioned his subordinates to never smear the honor of their predecessors and enforced strict military discipline to prevent disorderly conduct.

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19,280

A month before the outbreak of the incident, the Mukden branch manager of the railway, the president of the Japanese Residents' Association, and of the Japanese Society complained that many children living in the walled city of Mukden were prevented from attending schools because Manchurians stoned them, and they requested that a demonstration march be made in the city so that it would be stopped. The \* witness refused to comply with the request on the ground that this action might create unnecessary misunderstanding.

Just before the outbreak the Northeastern Chinese Army under Chang Hsueh-Liang was steadily increasing in number and had begun to circle the Japanese barracks in the railway zone. They consisted of a mixed brigade of 10,000 in the north, a training regiment of infantry and artillery in the east, in the northwest and southwest outside the wall, three escort battalions, and one battalion with infantry, guns, and machine guns. Inside the walled city there was one guard battalion and a corps of soldiers and to the west there was one battalion. The total regular force was about 15,000 to 16,000.

19,281

In addition there was a police unit of more than 3000, \* which was said to surpass the soldiers in training and equipment and was stationed in strategic positions east of the business section. The equipment was the best in all Manchuria, having four light tanks, many trench mortars and heavy machine guns and airplanes. A large quantity of weapons and ammunition were being stored and gas bombs were being manufactured.

19,282

The Japanese forces, on the other hand, consisted of the witness' regiment about 2000 strong, that is, two battalions and a machine gun unit and, in addition, the infantry battalion of railway guards about 400 strong. The Japanese armament consisted of two armoured cars, some infantry guns, mountain guns, and heavy machine guns, all inferior to the Chinese. They had no military airplanes. Both in quality and quantity the Japanese were constantly conscious of their inferiority and the threat from the Chinese. The spirit of Chang's soldiers was very high \* and General Yei, chief of staff, told the witness that the younger officers were expressing such strong views that he could hardly control them.

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There were then about 20,000 residents in and near Mukden. Some of them had found it difficult to carry on their business and had gone back to Japan. Atrocities had frequently occurred and there were frequent disturbances to the railway. Finally, the anti-Japanese attitude was assumed toward the Japanese army.

19,283

Whenever the Japanese intended to conduct maneuvers with blank cartridges or carry on night maneuvers, they notified in advance Chinese officials, through the Japanese Consulate. Despite a previous notification during night maneuvers in June 1931, some Chinese peace preservation soldiers fired ball cartridges at patrols. In August 1931 during a shooting practice on the outskirts \* Chinese bandits violently attacked a Japanese sentry to rob him and were arrested. The pilots of the Northeastern Army were being instructed by Japanese officers, but their term expired in August 1931 and they returned to Japan on September 1. From that day on Northeastern Army planes flew low over the Japanese barracks threateningly every day. As a result, the Japanese had to construct anti-aircraft protection in the compound. The NAKAMURA incident greatly excited the officers and men.

19,284

In view of these circumstances General HONJO issued instructions that in case of necessity they should take positive action and try not to impair the prestige of the Army. In compliance the witness told his men to muster their courage and to act accordingly. Such being the case, the witness \* early in September ordered that his men, when going on maneuvers, should carry ball cartridges in their back ammunition pouch, should always wear gaiters, and that none should go outside the railway zone alone, but only in groups. More and more intense drills and practices were carried on, frequent night maneuvers were conducted, and emergency drill calls carried out. Day and night maneuvers for defense of the railway zone were conducted. Citizens became accustomed to this and regarded them as nothing extraordinary.

On the night of September 18 the witness was at his official residence at Mukden listening to a report of an officer attached to his regiment who had returned from reconnaissance of the district where the autumnal maneuvers were to be held.

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19,285 At 10:40 PM, Colonel SHIMAMOTO \* reported by telephone that since the Chinese soldiers stationed at the north barracks had blasted the railway and attacked his patrol, the platoon was now returning fire and that his battalion was going to reinforce it in response to an emergency call. The witness then stated he would send an emergency call to his regiment and himself go to the barracks where particulars would be arranged. He immediately ordered the emergency call and hurried to the barracks. Arriving there he called together the battalion commanders and was about to explain when SHIMAMOTO arrived and stated he would attack the enemy in the north barracks with his whole battalion. The witness replied he would attack in the walled city of Mukden. They would do their utmost. They then left.

19,286 The operational plan of the Kwantung Army had been that in case of an emergency the army should concentrate its main forces around Mukden to attack the walled city if occasion demanded. Due to the attitude of the Chinese, those stationed in Mukden thought an emergency might crop up at any moment and they would be in danger of annihilation if they relied mainly on the concentration of their main force.

19,287 The situation at that time was that the Chinese, 20,000 strong, were so disposed as to encircle the railway zone. If the Japanese units of less than 1500 were stationed over the zone of four kilometres and were attacked by the enemy, \* it would take five or six hours for the garrison units at Liaoyang to reinforce them, even if transported by a railway in perfect working order.

It was concluded that to stick to defense positions would mean annihilation and they thought to somehow blunt the point of enemy attack by taking positive action and gain time for the arrival of the main force. They believed that against a strong enemy there was no choice but to get inside his guard and hit his vital spot before he could strike.

There had been frequent cases of disturbances to the railway and in response to these reports there had been two emergency calls and preparation for action. This,

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19,288 however, was the first time that the Chinese had fired ball cartridges. The witness therefore felt, on receiving the report that Chang's army had taken the offensive, that this was according to a definite plan. \* That is why he agreed to SHIMAMOTO's plan.

Through ITAGAKI, who happened to be in the Mukden Special Service Office, they were informed of the Kwantung Army's intention along similar lines. The witness felt that to attack the enemy at its vital spot they could not be successful unless they took the west wall of the strongly fortified inner wall. He asked ITAGAKI to approve his operational plan, pointing out its advantages. ITAGAKI gave his approval.

19,290 The witness then went to the barracks and gave the orders to his subordinate officers, both as to attacking units and guard corps. The guard corps was to maintain peace and order in the railway zone and protect the lives and property of Japanese. \* He warned the soldiers that the enemy was the Chinese army and not the people, and that the people should be reassured.

19,291 The first battalion of his outfit left about 12:40 AM on the 19th and the last at a little past 1:00 AM. Two hours had elapsed since SHIMAMOTO's telephone report. \* On the way to the objectives the Japanese were fired on by detachments of Chinese police, but they went on. By 3:00 AM, the first battalion had occupied the barracks and motor arsenal. The second battalion occupied the northwest corner of the inner castle by 2:30 and captured the west wall by 3:00 AM. In these operations 14 were wounded, while the enemy lost 30, who were killed.

19,292 The witness asked the Special Service Office to report his regimental action to Headquarters of the Second Division. On occupying the west wall he sent an officer to report to the divisional commander. At 5:00 AM \* a divisional staff officer transmitted the order of the division. The witness ordered his units to advance in accordance with that order and they took over the inner castle. They occupied the east wall completely by 6:00 AM. They then rejoined the command of the Division Commander.

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19,293

The guard unit left behind was prepared for the attack of the enemy at Huangkutun. The heavy guns which had been mounted at Mukden belonged to the independent garrison and the witness did not learn about them in detail and the action of his regiment had nothing to do with them.

When the China Inquiry Commission of the League of Nations came to Mukden the witness explained the situation at the time of its outbreak. The military men understood the actual situation quite well.

19,294

When SHIMAMOTO reported to him he stated that to save the troops under his command the units which had proceeded south along the railway had been met by 500 enemy troops with infantry guns and machine guns and there was a heated battle. He was leading his entire force to attack Peitaiying. While he did not know exactly \* what SHIMAMOTO meant when he said "take care of my affairs", he probably meant that he desired the witness to take care of matters after he had left for Peitaiying.

19,296

When asked why he decided to attack the walled city of Mukden the witness stated that when SHIMAMOTO reported to him he felt that his troops were in danger of being annihilated and he decided to attack the walled city of Mukden.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Comyns Carr

19,298

The witness repeated that he had received complaints from various Japanese organizations in Mukden about the hostile behavior of the Manchurians toward them. They wanted a military demonstration within the walled city. The witness replied that a misunderstanding might arise and he could not concede.

19,299

When asked since the other witnesses had stated that the Manchurians were anxious for the Japanese to help them create an independent state why they threw stones at the Japanese, he stated he did not know the reason. As a matter of fact \* he was not aware or informed of any movement for independence. When SHIMAMOTO reported to him, he



Page

did not believe that SHIMAMOTO had been actually on the spot and saw what happened personally. He had heard that Lt. KAWAMOTO had given evidence before the Lytton Commission but had not been directly informed of it. He had not made any direct inquiry from SHIMAMOTO as to where he got his information. He judged that the report was made with SHIMAMOTO assuming the responsibility.

19,300

When asked whether he made an investigation \* as to the truth of the report before ordering the attack, he stated he did not have leeway or time to consider such things. Since they had been menaced constantly by the enemy, he felt that if they wasted time in investigating they would meet a disastrous fate. He had never met KAWAMOTO and did not know where he was. When he met SHIMAMOTO he did not ask him where he received his information, but assumed he received it from subordinates. He did not know that there was any evidence that the Japanese had blown up the railroad. He fully believed SHIMAMOTO's report. The guilty parties \* were soldiers stationed at Peitaiying. When asked if it was ITAGAKI who arranged for the railway to be blown up and whether he knew anything to the contrary, he stated that he did not know anything of such a nature. It would be unthinkable for him to believe that the Japanese would blow up the railway. He had had no time to investigate how much damage had been done to the railway.

19,301

19,302

He learned that the Chinese attacked by firing ball cartridges from Colonel SHIMAMOTO. When it was pointed out that there was nothing about that in the report of SHIMAMOTO as stated in the witness' affidavit, the witness stated that SHIMAMOTO reported the first time the Japanese patrols had been attacked by soldiers at the north barracks. At first \* they had no accurate figures as to the strength of the enemy, but on the second report he learned that the enemy strength was between 400 and 500. They did not know the exact strength of the troops which had fired on the troops in the first place. He had not heard that KAWAMOTO said there were only 5 or 6 and he had not troubled to inquire because he felt that if they delayed it would be disastrous.

19,303

It was not true that he was determined to make this the excuse for starting a major operation. The fact that these Chinese came from the north barracks he believed

Page

19,305

was true from reports received from SHIMAMOTO, but he did not know how SHIMAMOTO knew but believed he had received reports from subordinates. He does not know what KAWAMOTO said. When asked whether he did not know that KAWAMOTO was the man who gave SHIMAMOTO the information, the witness stated he assumed SHIMAMOTO received information from men under his command. \* He repeated there had been no time to make a detailed investigation. He had heard on many occasions that the railway had been attacked by bandits. Twice he had heard these attacks were conducted by troops from the north barracks. He knew that the men who attacked at the time of the incident were not bandits \* from the report made by SHIMAMOTO.

19,306

When asked whether he reported to HONJO, he said at the time he went to contact the Special Service Office DOHIHARA was absent and HANAYA was in charge. It was his intention to report to the commander of the Second Division and to HONJO through HANAYA. When asked whether he knew HANAYA reported to HONJO that the railroad had been exploded by three or four companies of Chinese regulars, the witness stated he assumed that the Special Service Office was already informed of the attack, and he merely asked them to report. \* When asked to answer the question, the witness stated that he did not know that such a report was made.

19,307

HANAYA was not present, but ITAGAKI was, and he asked ITAGAKI to convey the messages. He did not know why ITAGAKI was then in Mukden and he did not know that General TATEKAWA was there. When asked whether it was a fact that ITAGAKI ordered the attacks, the witness stated that ITAGAKI did not have the authority to give him direct orders \* and he did not give him any orders. The witness stated he was unfamiliar with the book called "Outline of the Course of the Manchurian Incident Campaign."

19,309

When asked whether the attack by the first battalion took the Chinese completely by surprise, he said he did not know. He was not in direct command; his subordinates were. He had not heard for sure that they were so taken by surprise that all lights were on in the barracks when the Japanese fired.

Page

19,310

He did not know the details about the installation of the heavy guns at Mukden. He learned of them for certain when the guns were actually fired. He had heard as a rumor that the guns were installed secretly and a story given out that a well was being dug. When asked if the Japanese had a right to install them, why the secrecy, he said he did not know. He said he did not know they were installed to be used

19,311

in this operation. \* He knew that Generals McCoy and Claudel, who he said understood the actual situation, had signed the Lytton Report.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by the President

19,312

When asked if ITAGAKI had no authority to give orders why the witness asked his approval, the witness said he had not asked for it but merely informed him of his resolve to conduct the attack and to inform the commander. When it was pointed out that in his affidavit he had said that he had asked ITAGAKI's approval and had received it, the witness \* stated that ITAGAKI had wanted the attack to stop short of the west wall, while he thought it better to capture it. Because of this difference in views he merely asked that ITAGAKI approve the witness' views. If it were a direct order, regardless of the witness' views he would have to obey it. \* He learned of ITAGAKI's views when he told him of his plan. This he said despite the fact the President had pointed out that he had told ITAGAKI of his plan because of his knowledge of ITAGAKI's contrary views.

19,313

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Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: HIRATA, Yukihiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.

1. My name is HIRATA, Yukihiro.
2. My present address is No. 51, Tairachō, Meguro-ku, Tokyo.
3. It was as the Colonel commanding the 29th Infantry Regiment, which belonged to the 2nd division, that I was dispatched in April, 1931 to Manchuria together with the H.Q. of the same division. My regiment was stationed in Mukden on 16 April and the H.Q. of the division (the divisional commander being Lieutenant General TAMON) was stationed at Liaoyang. Since then I served in Manchuria until August, 1932, when, as the result of the regular change of personnel, I was transferred to Japan to serve with the H.Q. of the

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9th division in the City of Kanazawa. I retired from the active service in 1933. My rank then was Major General.

4. It was while I was thus serving in Manchuria that the Liutiackou Incident (Mukden Incident) broke out and by and by developed into the Manchurian Incident.
5. In those days in Mukden, were stationed the 29th Infantry Regiment under my command and the 2nd Infantry Battalion (the commander being Lieut. Colonel SHIMAMOTO, Shōichi) of the Independent Railway Guards. The former was charged with the ordinary duty of the Manchurian service, that is, the safeguarding of Japanese rights and interests and the protection of the lines and properties of the Japanese residents around Mukden, while the latter was charged with the duty of guarding the South Manchurian Railway within the assigned area. Since their duties were in different directions, there was some difference in the schemes of operation between the two units. However, for the purpose of effectual cooperation in case of emergency, we often practised joint exercises such as emergency call drills and so on. Being the senior officer in Mukden, I was in a position to control and direct, as the commander of the garrison area around Mukden. In other words so far as the guarding of the railway was concerned, the commander of the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Independent Guards was under the direct command of, and acted upon the orders of, the Independent Guards Commander so that in no way did I

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interfere with the guarding; however, with regard to the general defense of the Mukden garrison area, I was authorized to take command over Lieutenant-Colonel SHIMAMOTO himself.

6. The Manchurian Incident broke out more than five months after my arrival in Manchuria with my regiment. Before the outbreak of the Incident, however, there had never been any plot either by myself or by any of my subordinates, either among themselves or in league with civilians to create incidents. The situation in Manchuria had been so aggravated in those days that the lawful rights and interests of Japan were unlawfully infringed upon, while anti-Japanese and insulting words and acts prevailed all over Manchuria. Stimulated by such, my soldiers were in a highly strained state of mind. In view of the situation as I had watched it since my arrival in the Mukden Province, and in view of my own experiences in the Russo-Japanese War in which I served as a Second Lieutenant, I not only cautioned my subordinates never to smear the honour of our predecessors but also enforced strict military discipline to prevent any disorderly conducts. About a month before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, I was approached by the Manager of the Mukden Branch-Office of the South Manchurian Railway Company, the President of the Japanese Residents' Association, and the President of the Japanese Society, who complained that many Japanese school

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children living in the walled-city of Mukden were prevented from attending school because of Manchurians who stoned at them on their way to and from school, and requested me to make a demonstration march in the city, so that this kind of thing would be stopped once and for all. However, I was so meticulous as to refuse to comply with this request on the ground that such action might create unnecessary misunderstanding.

7. Just before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the North-Eastern Chinese Army, or the Chang Hsueh-Liang's Army, stationed around Mukden, side by side with steady increase in its number, had begun to form encirclement around Japanese barracks in the South Manchurian Railway zone. They consisted of one mixed Brigade, about 10,000 strong, at the North Barrack; one training Regiment of infantry and artillery mixed at the East Barrack; in the north-west and south-west districts outside the wall, three battalions belonging to the Escort Unit (one of the battalions being in Peiping with Chang Hsueh-Liang, and another being stationed in two places as the nucleus units in preparation for the reinforcement of the Escort Unit into a regiment), and one battalion with infantry, guns, and machine guns; inside the walled city, one guards battalion and a corps of soldiers armed with hand spears; and to the west at Ko-Ku-Ton, one battalion detached from the North Barrack. The total of the regular force was about

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15 to 16 thousand. Besides, a police unit, more than 3,000 strong, which was said to surpass soldiers in respect of training and equipment, was stationed over various strategic positions east of the business section.

The equipment of these units were the most excellent in whole Manchuria. They were equipped with four light tanks, many trench motors and heavy machine guns, and even with aeroplanes. In addition, a large quantity of weapons and ammunition were being manufactured and stored in the arsenals and the trench motor arsenals. Even gas bombs were being manufactured. On the other hand, the Japanese forces consisted of my regiment, about 1,000 strong, (two battalions of three companies each and a machine gun unit) and one infantry battalion of the Independent Railway Guards, about 400 strong (of four companies, two were stationed away from Mukden). Our armament consisted of no more than two armoured cars, some infantry guns, mountain guns, and heavy machine guns, all of which were inferior to those of the Chinese, and we had no military aeroplanes at all. Under these circumstances, not only in their quantity but also in their quality were we constantly conscious of our inferiority and the threat of the Chinese Army.

8. Thus, the spirit of Chang Hsueh-Liang's soldiers was very high. In fact, General YEI<sup>TAI</sup>, chief of staff, once happened to tell me that while high-ranking officers were mutually understanding, some younger officers were expressing such



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strong views that he could hardly control them.

9. In those days there were about 20,000 Japanese residents in and around Mukden. Because of Chang Hsueh-Liang's pressure, some of them found it so difficult to carry on their business, that they went back to their home country. Atrocities against the Japanese, such as in the Manpausan Incident, frequently occurred. Besides, there were frequent disturbances to our railways. By and by, the Chinese came to assume such anti-Japanese and insulting attitudes also towards the Japanese army.
10. Whenever we intended to conduct manoeuvres, either with blank or with ball cartridges, or to carry out night manoeuvres, we notified them several days beforehand to the Chinese officials through the Japanese Consulate. In spite of our previous notification, however, it happened in the course of night manoeuvres towards the end of June, 1931, that some soldiers attached to the Chinese Peace Preservation Unit fired ball-cartridges at Japanese patrols. Again, in the latter part of August, 1931, when a party from my regiment held a shooting practice on the outskirts of Mukden, it happened that some Chinese bandits violently attacked a Japanese sentry in an effort to rob him of his revolver, and was arrested after a <sup>close</sup> combat. The pilots of the North-Eastern Army were being instructed and trained by Japanese officers. These Japanese instructors, however, their term of office expiring on August 31, returned to

Japan on the morning of the 1st of September.

From that very day onwards, planes of the North-Eastern Army began to fly low over the Japanese barracks in a threatening manner, almost every day. Greatly menaced, we were obliged to construct anti-aircraft establishments in the compound of our barrack. Besides, the Captain NAKAMURA Incident, which became more and more complicated, greatly excited officers and men under my command.

11. In view of these circumstances, General HONJO, newly appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army, issued instructions that in case of necessity, we should take positive action, and should endeavour not to impair the prestige of our army. In compliance with his instructions, I told my men, as described above, to muster up their courage and not to impair the honour of their predecessors.
12. Such being the case, I ordered the soldiers in my regiment early in September, that when going out of our barracks for manoeuvres they should carry ball-cartridges in the back ammunition pouch (containing 15 rounds) attached to the belt; that they should always wear gaiters when going out; that no soldiers should go outside the railway zone alone; and that whenever going into the walled city, they should all go in groups and inform their goings.
13. Consequently, more and more intense drills and practices were carried on. Terrain exercises were held night and day, while frequent night manoeuvres were conducted, often two

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or three times a week. Emergency call drills were also frequently carried out.

Besides, manoeuvres for the defence of the railway zone were conducted night and day. All these were so frequently and intensely carried on that the citizens at large finally became accustomed to them and came to regard them as nothing extraordinary.

14. On the night of the 18th of September, 1931, I was at my official residence at Aoi-Chō, Mukden, listening to the report of a certain lieutenant colonel attached to my regiment who had returned that afternoon from the topographical investigation of the district where the autumnal manoeuvres were expected to be held. At about 10:40 p.m. Lieut. Colonel SHIMAMOTO, commander of the Second Battalion of the Independent Garrison, reported to me over the telephone: "As the soldiers of Chang Hsueh-Liang's army stationed at the North Barracks have blasted the railway and attacked our patrol, the platoon to which the patrol belongs is returning fire now. My battalion is going to reinforce it at once in response to an emergency call."
- "All right!" I replied, "I will send out an emergency call to our regiment and myself go to the barracks. Let's arrange for particulars there." Ringing off, I at once called up the officer of the day and ordered him to make the emergency call. After dressing up, I hurried to the barracks.
- On arriving there, I called together the battalion commander

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and was about to explain the situation, when Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO with arms arrived at the barracks on horseback.

He said, "I will attack the enemy troops in the North Barrack with all the strength of my battalion." "All right!" I replied.

"I will attack the enemy in the walled city of Mukden."

"Let's do our utmost". After exchanging these words we parted.

15. According to what we were instructed prior to this, the operational plan of the Kwantung Army was that, because of strained relations in Manchuria, in case of an emergency the Army should concentrate its main force around Mukden to attack the walled city as occasion demanded. Therefore my regiment had been exerting itself in daily drills and other practices that it might be equal to any emergency. Anti-Japanese sentiments were already prevailing in those days and Chang Hsueh-Liang's Army came to take increasingly provocative attitudes towards the Japanese forces. In view of this we who were stationed in Mukden thought that an emergency might crop up at any moment. Under these circumstances, we should be in danger of annihilation by superior number, if we relied merely on the concentration of our main force. In other words our chief concern was how to fulfil our duties with the troops at hand in Mukden in case of emergency.

The situation at that time was that Chang Hsueh-Liang's Army, 20,000 strong, was so disposed as to encircle the railway zone of Mukden. Suppose our units, totalling less than 1,500 which were stationed at the positions in the railway zone

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extending over 4 kilometres, were attacked by the enemy, it would take at least five or six hours for the garrison unit at Liaoyang, which was closest to Mukden, to reinforce us, even if transported by a railway undamaged and in perfect working order. Therefore, we concluded that to stick to the defense positions would mean our annihilation; hence we should somehow blunt the point of the probable enemy attack by taking positive action and so gain time till the arrival of our main force. Figuratively speaking, the enemy was constantly menacing us with his fist clenched, so that we believed that the enemy shook that fist at us, who had just a weak little body we had no choice but to get inside his guard and bit his vital spot before he could strike our head with his fist.

16. There had been frequent cases of disturbance to the railway, and in response to such reports we had twice sent out emergency calls and prepared for action. But this was the first time that Chang Hsueh-Liang's troops attacked Japanese units by firing ball-cartridges. Therefore, the moment Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO reported to me about the outbreak of the incident, I perceived that just as I had expected Chang Hsueh-Liang's army has taken the offensive against us according to a definite plan. I judged that at last they had lifted their fist to strike us. Thus, when Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO reported to me, "The entire garrison battalion will reinforce my men who are fighting back,"

I agreed and gave my approval.

17. By Itagaki, a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, who happened to be at the Mukden Special Service Office, we were informed of the Kwantung Army intention along similar lines. This made us much elated. However, in order to attack the enemy at their vital spot, I thought we should not be successful unless we took at least the west wall of the strongly fortified inner wall. I therefore asked ITAGAKI to approve of my operational plan stating, "It is natural that if we rout Chang Hsueh-Liang's troops within the outer walls, we should rush by momentum the west wall of the inner castle. To occupy and hold the west wall to-night will be most advantageous for our attack tomorrow. I request your approval of our occupying the enemy's positions as far as the west wall." He gave his approval. Thereupon, I went back to the barracks and gave the following orders to the Lieutenant Colonel attached to my regiment, the Commanders of battalions and the Commanders of machine gun units:

1. The attacking units:

- (a) The First Battalion (less the First Company but reinforced by one platoon each of infantry guns and heavy machine guns) shall attack and occupy the first and third barracks of the guards and the trench motor arsenal.
- (b) The Second Battalion (less the Seventh Company but reinforced by the main force of the machine gun unit)

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shall seize the west wall of the inner castle immediately after capturing the second barracks of the guards and the barracks of the machine gun unit.

- (c) The Seventh Company shall keep watch over the Peace Preservation Unit (the police unit) in the business section and if necessary, shall disarm them.
- (d) The First Company shall remain as reserve for the regiment, but one platoon shall join the main force after disrupting main communication lines leading from the walled city of Mukden.

2. Guard corps:

One squad from each company shall remain and organize a unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel INAMI for maintaining peace and order in the railway zone and protect the lives and properties of Japanese residents, specially the unit should keep strict watch over the enemy stationed at Huangkutun. Then, under the regimental colors, I gave instructions to the battalions one by one as they lined up. I cautioned them particularly that "our enemy is Chang Hsueh-Liang's army and not the Chinese people. The people should be given assurance."

After that, I made all march off one after another. The First Battalion the first to set out, left at about 12:40 a.m. on the 19th, and I started last from the barracks with the reserve force at a little past 1:00 a.m.

18. Over two hours elapsed between the emergency call issued

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after Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO's telephone report and the time I started from the barracks.

19. On their way to the objectives our units were fired upon by detachments of the Chinese police force, but they marched on, either disregarding them or after disarming them. The First Battalion, as ordered, occupied the barracks and trench mortar arsenal by 3:00 a.m. by crushing the resistance made by the Guards. By crushing the resistance of the second unit of the Guards and in defiance of machine gun fire, the Second Battalion occupied the wall at the north west corner of the inner castle at about 2:30 a.m. on the 19th. Then it seized the south-west wall and so on, until at last it captured the west wall completely by about 3:00 a.m. During these clashes, one officer and six soldiers were wounded, two of whom were wounded in the attack by the police unit and the other five in the attack by the regular army, whereas the enemy left about thirty regular soldiers dead.
20. I asked the Special Service Office to report the action of my regiment to the headquarters of the Second Division. As soon as my regiment occupied the west wall, I ordered an officer to go to Mukden Station to report it to the Divisional Commander who was expected to arrive there. I was at the office of the Japanese Residents' Association outside the Hsiaohsienmen gate at about 5:00 a.m. on the 19th, when a staff officer of the Division came along to transmit the purport of the order of the Division. He told



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me that the units under the Commander of the 15th Brigade were expected to march along the south side of the Mukden Castle keeping in touch with my regiment, so that my regiment should advance as far as the east wall of the inner castle at once. So I ordered the units of my regiment to advance as far as the streets within the outer walls north of the east wall of the inner castle, where those units were expected to keep in touch with one another. Pursuant to the order, the Second Battalion advanced, and after accepting the surrender of the Direct Guards unit stationed in the inner castle and disarming it, the battalion occupied also the barracks of the spear unit who had all run away, and then occupied the east wall completely at about 6:00 a.m. The First Battalion occupied the streets in the north area of the outer castle in cooperation with the Second Battalion. Together with the reserve force, I arrived at the Hsiapeimen gate of the inner castle where we came under the command of the Division Commander.

21. On the other hand, the small unit which had remained behind as guards in the railway zone was, under difficult conditions prepared for the attack of the enemy stationed at Huangkutun in cooperation with the police unit and an emergency unit composed of military police and members of the Reservists' Association. These units could thoroughly fulfil their duties, such as maintenance of public order in the railway zone and protection of the lives and properties of the

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Japanese residents.

22. I have already referred to the heavy guns which had been mounted in Mukden. I knew of them, but as they belonged to the Independent Garrison, I had had no time to learn about them in detail. Thus the action of my regiment had nothing to do with them.

23. When the members of the China Inquiry Commission of the League of Nations came to Mukden, I -- as a participant in the Manchurian Incident--explained to them the situation at the time of its outbreak, the gist of which was much the same as that which I have stated above. As might be expected of military men, soldier members of the Committee, Major-General McCoy and General Claudel, apparently understood the actual situation quite well.

On this 28th day of September, 1946,

at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ HIRATA Yukihiro (sealed)

I, BANNO Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ BANNO Junkichi (sealed)

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Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ HIRATA Yukihiro (sealed)

Translation Certificate

I, Tomoji Sasagawa, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Affidavit of HIRATA Yukihiro is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ T. Sasagawa

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.  
Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 March, 1947

/S/ HIRATA Yukihiro (sealed)

Translation Certificate

I, Tomoji Sasagawa, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Affidavit of HIRATA Yukihiro is, to

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

8 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Douglas Waldorf, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS

FROM : Lt. Eric Fleisher, Investigator, IPS

Pursuant to memorandum from Mr. Smith Crowe,  
dated 27 March 1947, the following information regard-  
ing subject is submitted:

✓ OZAKI, Yoshiharu - Staff Officer of the Kwantung  
Army

✓ AMANO, Rokuro - Commanding Officer of a brigade  
at Changchun

✓ Previously the name HIRATA, Tuzo was submitted to  
Mr. Crowe. This is corrected to HIRATA, Yukihiro.

*done on  
10 apr*

ERIC W. FLEISHER  
2d Lt., Inf.  
Investigator, IPS

*Rec'd - SNC. Please <sup>transfer</sup> make above information  
to Manchurian card index.*

*Angus: Add ~~to~~ the above  
date to index cards pertaining  
to Manchurian witnesses  
E.F.*

Name: Hirata, Jūzo (Yukihiro)

Record  
1786

Title: Col. Kwantung Army, Sept. 18, 1931

Source: Lytton Report

Testified before Lytton Committee regarding events of  
Sept. 18, 1931, and shortly thereafter.

11 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David N. Sutton  
FROM : Douglas L. Waldorf, Chief  
Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT : HIRATA, Yukihoiro or Yukihiro

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness offered by the Defense:

DEFENDANT - General

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

HIRATA, Yukihoiro or Yukihiro

Curriculum Vitae

2. In the event that this is not complete, the remainder of the data will be forwarded to you without delay as soon as it is received by this office.

3. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialing and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl.  
(Described above)

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF,  
Chief, Investigative Division,  
IPS