

Doc. 1868

(25)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1868

13 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Chinese Policy (Foreign Ministry
File of Cabinet Meetings, etc.)

Date: April 1937 Original Copy Language:
May 1939 Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SATO; KAWAGOE; OTA; KAMIJURA; NAKANE;
YOSHIDA; SAITO; HIDAKA; SAWADA; MORIUCHI; DOHIMARA;
ITAGAKI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression, China

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

I. Explanation regarding adjustment of Chinese policy
made by Foreign Minister SATO at a cabinet council.

A. The fundamental direction was to establish
mutual dependent relation in economy between China and
Japan.

B. Strive to develop economical resources,
transportation facilities and cultural relation in North
China.

C. Attention to be paid so as not to give China and
the powers the impression that Japan had an intention to
enlarge the armistice region, to push out the Manchukuo
border line on North China or to make North China
independent.

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D. "We shall try to efface the root from which China had come to assume anti-Japanese attitude then gradually make them give up their policies to admit communism and to depend up Europe and America."

II. Telegram from KAWAGOE, Ambassador to China, to Foreign Minister SATO concerning CHANG CHUN's desire to resign from the position as the Foreign Department Head and that he will not accept the position as Mayor of SHANGHAI, 7 April 1937.

III. Telegram from KAWAGOE to SATO. CHANG CHUN disclosed his opinion on four problems concerning relations between Japan and China, 7 April 1937.

A. Manchurian problem.

B. Abrogation of SHANGHAI and TANGKU Armistice Pacts

C. Correction of illegal existing facts as "KITO" Government or free flight in North China.

D. Avoid occurrence of new frictions between Japan and China.

IV. Telegram from KAWAGOE to SATO, KAWAGOE met WANG, new head of the Chinese Foreign Department and exchanged routine compliments, 7 April 1937.

V. Letter from OTA of the Foreign Ministry to SATO. OTA advises SATO to control more strictly articles of newspapers giving impression as Japan was yielding to China some points of adjustment of the SINO-Japanese relation.

VI. KAMIMURA, Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, sends copies of "Practical Chinese Policies" and "Measures to lead North China" to the chiefs concerned of Finance, Navy and War Ministry. This plan was concluded by four ministers of Foreign, Finance, Navy and War, 16 April 1937.

A. Practical Chinese Policies:

1. Policies towards NANKING Regime.
2. Policies towards North China.
3. Policies towards provincial Regimes.
4. Policies towards Inner Mongolia.

B. Measures to lead North China.

1. Attitude in leading North China.
2. Leading CHITSIAM Regime.
3. Leading CHITUNG autonomous Government.
4. Leading SHANTUNG, SHANSE and SUI-YUAN Regimes.
5. Course bearing on economical development.

VII. Telegram from Ambassador KAWAGOE to SATO. WANG CHAO-MING disclosed his opinion to KAWAGOE that the Chinese are assuming the attitude to meet Japan's new compromising Chinese policy.

VIII. Telegram from KAWAGOE to SATO. WANG CHUNG-HUI expresses his opinion to KAWAGOE. WANG wishes Minister SATO will carry out what he declared at the diet session regarding Japan's Chinese policy, 19 April 1937.

IX. Telegram from NAKANE, Acting Consul at KALGAN to SATO. Comment of a newspaper as to SATO's foreign policy, 20 April 1937.

X. Telegram from SATO to Ambassador YOSHIDA (London) and to Ambassador SAITO (Washington). SATO relates news concerning Japan's Chinese policy, 16 April 1937.

XI. Telegram from YOSHIDA to SATO. METZ called on Yoshida and stated the Japanese smuggling in North China decreased without much friction. METZ warned Yoshida that if the attitudes of the Japanese military and government official continued, collision between Japan and Britain might be inevitable, 7 May 1937.

XII. Telegram from SATO to several Embassies and consulates. Decision concerning special trade in CHI-TUNG and unrestrained flight in North China, 12 May 1937.

XIII. Telegram from HIDAKA to SATO. UCHIDA approached WANG CHAO-MING concerning a loan. WANG did not give a definite answer.

XIV. Telegram from HIDAKA to SATO. HIDAKA, saying Japanese recently has undergone too strict control of Chinese officials, requested HO YING-CHIN to pay attention to the phenomenon, 29 May 1937.

XV. Telegram from SAWADA, Embassy to Manchuria, to HORIUCHI, vice Foreign Minister. Opinions of KATO Army concerning the new Chinese policy are disclosed to SAWADA. Opinions by TOJO were also submitted to the military center.

A. Japan's Chinese policy must be decided from the viewpoint of development of Manchukuo and of preparation of war against Russia.

B. Keynote of CHUNG Regime is Anti-Japan.

C. Cultural and economical maneuver regarded the principal aim.

XVI. HORIUCHI and others conversation with TOJO regarding Japan's China policy.

XVII. UMEZU-HO YING-CHIN Pact.
Copy of the pact inserted in this document.

XVIII. The International Association of Japan (NIHON KOKUSAI KYOKAI) submits counter-measures in present Chinese question made by the Society to HORIUCHI. Names of those who participated in the discussion given, 14 April 1938.

XIX. DOHIHARA's opinion submitted to War Minister ITAGAKI DOHIHARA insisted upon Japan giving up the idea of Imperialistic Aggression and China the idea of racial struggle. That both must grasp the idea of "East Asia cooperative body".

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SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *Foreign Ministry*

PERSONS IMPLICATED: *SATO, KAWAGOE, OTA, KAMIMURA, NAKANE,
YOSHIDA, SAITO, HIDAKA, SAWADA, HORIUCHI, DOMIHARA,*
CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: *ITAGAKI*

Aggression, China.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

- I. Explanation regarding adjustment of Chinese policy made by Foreign Minister SATO at a cabinet council.
 - A. The fundamental direction was to establish mutual dependent relations in economy between China and Japan.
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 - C. Attention to be paid so as not to give China and the powers the impression that Japan had an intention to enlarge the armistice

Analyst *2nd Lt. Kobayashi*

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WAH (over)

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II. KAMIMURA, Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, sends copies of "Practical Chinese Policies" and "Measures To Lead North China" to the Chiefs concerned of Finance, Navy and War Ministry. This plan was concluded by four ministers of Foreign, Finance, Navy and War. 16 April 1937.

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1. Attitude in leading North China
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Analyst *240 Lt. Kobayashi*

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WANG wishes Minister SATO will carry out what he declared at the Diet session regarding Japan's Chinese policy. 18 April 1937.
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IX DOHIHARA'S opinion submitted to ^{war Minister} "ITAGAKI".

DOHIHARA insisted upon Japan giving up the idea of Imperialistic Aggression and China the idea of racial struggle. That both must grasp the idea of "East and ~~and~~ cooperative body."

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Proj. No. 198	Foreign Ministry Archives
S.A. No. 15039	from April, 1937 to May, 1939
Sack No. 7	Chinese Policy, General
Item No. 8 B.	

1. April 5, 37 Explanation as regards the adjustment of Chinese policy made by SATO, Foreign Minister, at a cabinet council
- A.) The fundamental direction - Giving up for the present too political problems, at first mutual dependent relation in economy between China and Japan shall be established and then to endeavor gradually to adjust the general relation is preferable.
 - B.) According to this course, to North China,
 1. Avoiding the political manoeuvre, development of economical resources, transportation facility or cultural relation shall be tried.
 2. Attention shall be paid not to give an impression to China or other powers as if Japan had an intention to enlarge the armistice region, to push out the Manchukuan border line on North China or to make North China independent.
 - C.) To the NANKING Regime,
 1. With fair attitude, we shall try to efface the root from which China had come to assume anti-Japanese attitude and

then gradually made them give up their policies to admit communism and to depend upon Europe and America.

- 2. It is desired to solve at the earliest opportunity the pending problem - (a) to control anti-Japanese behavior, (b) to invite Japanese advisers, (c) to reduce the customs (d) to open an airway between SHANGHAI and FUKUOKA (e) to arrest and extradite rebellious Koreans (f) to make a settlement to the inauspicious incidents at SHANGHAI or others.

They are difficult, however, to be settled at a stroke and so, now, the problems of the air-line and customs are conferred among the concerned authorities of the Navy, Foreign and War Ministry.

2. April 7. A telegram from KAWAGOE, Ambassador to China, to SATO, Foreign Minister.

CHANG CHUN told him he wishes to resign from the position of the head of the Foreign Department and he will not take the position of the Mayor of SHANGHAI.

3. April 7. A telegram from KAWAGOE to SATO.

CHANG CHUN disclosed his opinion. There are four problems in the relation between Japan and China - (1) Manchurian problem, (2) abrogation of SHANGHAI and TANKU Armistice Pacts (3) correction of those illegal existing facts as "KITO" Government or free flight in North China (4) to avoid occur-

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ence of new frictions between two countries.

The fourth problem is most urgent. To bring the Manchurian problem to the front is unpreferable because of the different standpoints of both countries. To give a settlement to the second and third questions is most effective in adjustment of the national relation. Moreover, it looks some Japanese are afraid of the settlement of North China problem, that is, after it, the Chinese Government will commence to solve the Manchurian problem, but it's quite useless. It is possible to pass over the Manchurian problem even in the future according to the way how to give a settlement to these (2) & (3) problems.

4. April 7. A telegram from KAWAGOE, Ambassador, to SATO.

KAWAGOE met WANG, (the new head of the Chinese Foreign Department) and exchanged routine compliments.

5. April 9. A letter from DTA (of Foreign Ministry) to SATO.

He advises the Minister to control the articles of newspapers more strictly, which give impressions as if Japan yields to China in some points in order to adjust the Sino-Japanese relation and which stimulate the military that accepted the new practical policy to China unwillingly.

Examples of the articles are inserted here.

6. April 15.

Important pending problems in the First Section of the

Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs at the time when SATO took the position of Foreign Minister. Every title of those problems between Japan and China and Japan and Siam are enumerated here.

7. April 16. KAMIMURA, chief of the First Section of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, sends copies of "Practical Chinese Policies" and "Measures to lead North China" to the Chiefs concerned of the Finance, Navy and War Ministry. This plan was concluded by 4 Ministers of Foreign, Financial, Naval and War, on April 16, 1937.

(I) "Practical Chinese Policies"

"In accordance with the 'Japan's foreign policy' concluded on Aug. 7, 1936, and considering the results of practical Chinese policies decided among the ministries concerned on Aug. 11, 1936 and, moreover, the direction of the Chinese internal situations, the measures shall be assumed for the present as regards the Chinese policy are as follows."

1. Policies towards NANKING Regime

We will assume a just attitude to the Regime and to the movement of China unification led by the regime and at the same time we will try to efface the cause through which China went into the anti-Japanese set-up, and thus we will promote practically that the regime will approach Japan.

gradually giving up its hitherto communism-admitting and depending-on-Europe-and-America policies.

Especially in North China they shall be lead to co-operate of their own accord to realize various establishments as regards the interdependence and concert of Japan, Manchukuo and China.

In acting on the NANKING Regime, we shall take its appearances into consideration, avoiding to drive it into a corner it would be compelled to adopt a platform of anti-Japan out of regard for the people, and at the same time, taking the general public as the object, we shall pay efforts in cultural and economical manoeuvre so as to realize clearly co-existence and co-prosperity, and thus, the base of the adjustment of the national relation between China and Japan shall be constructed.

Further, we anticipate those following pending problems shall be settled as early as possible, pursuing the whole processes of the Japan-China negotiation held at NANKING in the last year, and, also, putting the movement of the Chinese political situations after it into consideration.

- (1) Control of anti-Japanese behavior
- (2) Invitation of Japanese advisers
- (3) Opening of air line between SHANGHAI and FUKUOKA

- (4) Reduce of customs.
- (5) Arrest and extradition of rebellious Koreans
- (6) Settlement of inauspicious incidents in SHANGHAI, etc."

"2. Policies towards North China

The prime object of the policies towards North China consists in making the region the pro-Japanese and-Manchukuan and anti-communistic district substantially, and, at the same time, making it an aid to gain natural resources for national defense and to magnify the transportation facilities, partly for the preparation against the threatening influence of Red and partly in order to give a foundation on which interdependence and concert among three countries will be realized.

We shall endeavor to erase away the inner and outer suspicion and the Chinese uneasy feeling towards Japan, relying chiefly upon the acceleration of various economical manoeuvres in order to attain the said object but not assuming the political measures to plan the independence of North China or other means which may disturb the internal politics of China, and at the same time, we shall try to lead China to co-operate of its own accord to developments of economical resources, of traffics, of cultural relation or of others."

"3. Policies towards another provincial regimes

The chief end of the policies towards the local regimes lies in trying to go in concert with them substantially and to expect development of our rights and interests, and through it, giving rise to general pro-japanese tendency in all China. Accordingly, we shall not adopt such special policy as giving help to these regimes for the purpose of aiding unification or of designing separation."

"4 Policies towards Inner Mongolia

To win the hearts of the people of Mongolia is rendered to be the chief object of policies towards Inner Mongolia. In the execution of them, the last aim consists in leading those Mongolians on base of pro-Japan-Manchukuo to construct Mongolia and in completing the set-up against Soviet, but for the present, we shall devote ourselves to strengthen internally the Inner Mongolian Regime holding SE-MENG (Selingolmeng?) and TSA-MENG as its territory. Further, this manoeuvre must be carried internally and troubles with Chinese side shall be managed as peacefully as possible and thus, attention shall have to be paid to the concert with the policies to Soviet and China."

"(II) Measures to lead North China

(Concluded by 4 ministers of Foreign, Financial, Naval and War, on Apr. 16, 1937.)"

"Direction"

This passage is quite the same one to 2. (p. 6)

"Gists"

"1. Attitude in leading North China.

It cannot be denied that our policies towards North China, hitherto, partly owing to its geographical speciality, have been apt to give such misunderstanding to China and other powers as if Japan had an intention to expand the armistice district, to push forward the border line of Manchukuo or to make North China independent.

Accordingly it is important to be prudent in behavior which may give useless misunderstanding in conducting policies in North China and, too, first of all, to realize devotedly the cultural and economical policies in order to let the people of North China live at ease and work happily, and thus to make them help to attain our expecting purpose.

In developing North China in culture and economy, it is necessary to try to assume open attitude expecting the free penetration of civilian capitals, as well as to meet

always with understanding attitude the demands of NANKING Regime or CHITSIAM Regime which are considered to be just or to be reasonable to save its honour. As regards the problems of special trade in CHITUNG district and of free flight of planes in North China, rapid settlement shall be given."

"2. Leading CHITSIAM Regime:

In leading the Regime, we must make it construct a hopeful region here and try to win the mind of the people with the fairest attitude, liquidating the hitherto military clique-wise maladministration in every matters as finance, economy or military affairs."

"3. Leading CHITUNG Autonomous Government

In leading the Government, we shall try to make it improve in its internal administration as well as develop thoroughly the industries, and at the same time to make it a pattern region of easy living and happy working, being free from exaction and misadministration of military clique, and in these ways, we endeavor to realize actually our just, true intention towards China.

In carrying these policies out, we must not do what will give any hinderance in leading various regimes in North China putting into consideration the fact, too, that the Regime cannot

stand by itself after all."

"4. Leading SHAN-TUNG, SHAN-SE and SUI-YUAN Regimes

In policies towards these Regimes, especially towards SHAN-TUNG, the chief end consists in making closer the connection with Japan through carrying out gradually the cultural and economical manoeuvres that aims at mutual accomodation and concert among Japan, Manchukuo and China.

In carrying them into execution, it is necessary to meet them with fairest attitude and to avoid such political measures as will stimulate the people's feeling and so may give Chinese side the pretext to anti-Japan."

"5. Course bearing on economical development

In economical development in North China, planning to extend our rights and interests principally through free advance of civilian capital and at the same time inducing Chinese capital, we make the situations of Japan and China inseparable founded on the economical profits common to the Japanese and the Chinese and thus we aim at making them contribute to maintain the pro-Japanese attitude in North China throughout peacetime and war time. Especially, munitional resources necessary for national defense (iron, coal, salt, etc.) and equipments concerned such as traffics and electricity must be developed rapidly, if necessary, relying

upon special capital.

In these economical developing, we must make the third party powers esteem our special situation, rights and interests in North China, and at the same time we must esteem their existing rights and interests, and we will pay attention to concert and co-operation with the third party powers, especially with Britain and the U.S.A., if necessary, managing in combination with their establishments or utilizing their capitals and materials."

8. April 17. A telegram from Ambassador KAWAGOE to Minister SATO WANG CHAO-MING disclosed his opinion to KAWAGOE

- (1.) To the Japan's new compromising Chinese policy, the Chinese of influence is assuming the attitude to meet it.
- (2) What was said by a Chinese on the occasion of the Japanese economical mission visited China means that the political problems has to be solved as well as the economical problems
- (3) He will never assume the communism-admitting policy.
- (4) He has been unable to find any evidences in the secret connection between the Chinese Communists and the Comintern.
- (5) Mutual understanding especially of the Japanese situation by the Chinese side is preferable, and WANG is wished to visit Japan.

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9. April 19. A Telegram from KAWAGOE to SATO.

WANG CHUNG-HUI told his opinion to KAWAGOE. WANG wishes Minister SATO will carry out what he declared as regards the Japan's Chinese policy at the diet session. Conference on the Russo-Chinese commercial treaty which has shown no progress till to-day is not reopened yet.

10. April 20, A telegram from NAKANE, Acting Consul at KALGAN to SATO.

A comment of a newspaper as to SATO's foreign policy

11. April 21, A telegram from SATO to Ambassador YOSHIDA (London) and to Ambassador SAITO (Washington) SATO tells about the new Japan's Chinese policy.

12. April 26, do.

SATO is thinking to have a talk with Britain about Chinese problem.

13. April 28 From YOSHIOKA, the acting consul-general at SHANGHAI to SATO.

What was discussed between "Kentwell" and WANG CHUNG-HUI was informed privately to a member of the Consulate.

14, 15, 16. Press comments published on the occasion of KAWAGOE's returning home.

17, May 7. From Ambassador YOSHIDA (London) to SATO.

"meiz" called on YOSHIDA and told him that he said to Eden the Japanese smuggling in North China decreased without much friction with Japanese officials owing to the efforts of Morgan, and he warned YOSHIDA that if the attitudes of the Japanese officials military and governmental ^{hitherto} should be continued in future, collision between Japan and Britain might be inevitable. YOSHIDA answered, the unification of China was attained, the Japanese military's oppression being used as a pretext, and he was afraid the unified China would collapse as soon as the pressure would be removed, and he added Japan wanted to assist China in co-operation with Britain.

18. Press comment asto SATO's interview with foreign pressman

19. MORISHIMA, TOYOTA and USHIROKU orders YOMIURI newspaper to retractate its comment bearing on Chinese question.

20. May 12. From SATO to several Embassies and Consulates.

Decision concerning special trade in CHI-TUNG and unrestrained flight in North China was transmitted.

21. May 13. Materials for SATO's speech at Privy Council.

"On the recent foreign relation" - "For China"

These are founded on the two plans decided on April 16 among four ministers.

22. May 14. From HIDAHA, the acting ambassador (NANKING) to SATO. HIDAHA visited WANG CHAO-MING and talked on general relations between China and Japan.

23. May 24. From OKAMOTO, the Consul-General (SHANGHAI) to SATO. HIDAHA informs his personal impressions he received since his arrival, as to Chinese situations.

24. May 25. From YOSHIDA (London) to SATO. Eden and Craigie told YOSHIDA that Britain impressed KUNG HSIANG-HSI not to be stuck up at Japan's mitigated attitude. KUNG invited YOSHIDA and exchanged opinions.

25. May 26. From HIDAHA to SATO. UCHIDA approached WANG CHAO-MING for giving a loan, to which WANG did not give a definite answer.

26. May 27. From HORIUCHI, the Consul-General (TIENTSIN) to SATO. Press comment (TIENTSIN) is informed.

27. May 29. From HIDAHA to SATO. HIDAHA, saying Japanese recently has undergone too strict control of the Chinese officials, requested HO YING-CHIN to pay attention to the phenomenon.

28. June 2. Colonel SHIBAYAMA transmitted his memo. "Understanding of KAN-TO Army as to 'Practical scheme for China' and 'Measures leading North China'"

1. The Army understands all concerned with the Truces are not

affected for all these plans.

2. The economical development in North China is understood to be carried out so far as it does not hinder the exploitation of Manchukuo.
3. If China reached toward Mongolia, decisive steps can be adopted.
4. Dissolution of CHI-TUNG regime is beyond dispute now.
5. Settlement of CHI-TUNG trade shall be done under the conditions by which the loss completely recovered.
6. As for the cease of free flight, the one by KEI-TSU Co. is understood not to be restrained.

29. June 11. From SAWADA of Embassy to Manchuria to HORIUCHI, the Vice Foreign Minister.

Opinions of KANTO-Army concerning the new Chinese policy are disclosed to SAWADA. The opinions were to be submitted to the center of the military, too, by TŌJŌ. (The Chief of Staff)

1. Japan's Chinese policy must be decided from the viewpoint of development of Manchukuo and of preparation of war against the Soviet. Lately, Chinese communist and National Party are co-operating in anti-Japan and -Manchukuo campaign in Manchukuo and in frontier regions which cannot be passed over in maintaining public peace in Manchukuo.
2. The keynote of CHIANG Regime is anti-Japan. Then,

the readjustment of national relations of Japan and China, so far as we take CHIANG as the other party, cannot be expected at all, unless some grave change between Japan and Britain or Soviet would take place.

3. In the newly decided two plans, cultural and economical manoeuvre are regarded the principal aim. Since old days such plans without political measures has never won success. To replace CHITUNG Regime to CHI-TCHIA Regime which shows pro-Japanese attitude only superficially will give a serious influence on maintenance of peace and feeling of populations of Manchukuo. The Chinese, naturally, will intensify its anti-Japan more and more.

4. Economical exploitation of North China can't be said that it doesn't prevent the expected development of Manchukuo.

5. In the present Chinese situation, from the stand point of completion of preparations of stratagem against Russia, it may be said the best means to give her one blow so as to make her unable to rise again, to eliminate our backward threat. If our force of arms will not allow us to do so, securing the existing facts and with grave decision of not letting her touch any of them, we would rather better to assume the still observing attitude until the completion

of our national defense improvement. To request friendship of NANKING Regime which has no intention to answer our wishes to adjust the national relations, will merely increase their anti-Japanese tendency.

We wish to give a closer examination to these two plans on this occasion when the Cabinet changed.

30. June 16. HORIUCHI and other had a conversation with TOJO as to Japan's Chinese Policy.

1. TOJO - As to Chinese Policy, the two plans were already decided in the central and KANTO Army will observe them, but in two or three matters, KANTO Army holds its understanding (cf. No. 28). ① TANKU Truce. ② Economical development in North China. ③ Mongolian manoeuvre ④ CHITUNG government ⑤ CHITUNG Special Trade concerning those subjects they discussed.

2. TOJO assured KANTO Army will not give rise to a trouble with the Soviet. He wanted, too, to avoid to take measures to flatter the Soviet. He said, KANTO Army will

3. HORIUCHI explained the circumstances of intensifying close relation between Japan and Britain. He added, as for German-Japanese Pact, by only the part published, it would be difficult to persuade the people of its importance,

but in the Government, the pact was regarded as an important national policy.

31. UMEZU-HO YING-CHIN Pact. • A copy of the pact is inserted here.

32. April 14, 1938,

International Association of Japan (NIHON KOKUSAI KYŌKAI) submits the counter-measures in the present Chinese question made by the Society to Kensuke HORIUCHI.

Names of those participated in the discussion are given here.

33. No address, no names, the marks of the sheets of papers are cut off.

(ISHIHARA tactics)

SHŌWA REVOLUTION METHODS Sept. 1, 1938

A. Course of leading

B. Organization of "TŌA RENMEI" (East Asia League)

1. Conditions of organizing League

(a) Sphere

(b) Principle

(c) Attitude

2. Policy for Manchukuo

3. Policy for China

C. Reorganization of Japan itself

1. Politics
2. Economy
3. Society

Several explanation

1. What is SHŌWA Revolution?
2. Difference between China & Manchuria
3. Knocking down reliance upon Europe & America
4. Liquidation of Imperialism
5. Direct Tennō's rule

34. DOHARA's opinion submitted to ITAGAKI, the War Minister

(There is an insertion "received from Baron IKEDA, Feb. 24, 1939." Who did the scribble? - The sign is not understandable, but the Vice Foreign Minister did, likely.)

He insists Japan giving up the idea of Imperialistic Aggression and China the idea of racial struggle, both must grasp the idea of "East Asia co-operative body".

For this end, he says, the present condition which shows the feature of racial struggle must be converted to an idea struggle - that is, between anti-Japanese, pro-communistic and anti-communistic, saving-national - .

At present situation measures should be chosen in order to manage the Incident are only one-to use tactics positively aiming at the internal decay of ^{the} National Party's Government.

For this purpose, to urge WU PEI-FU to participate in this
manoeuvre, giving him power to some degree as ~~the~~
commander-in-chief of "Nation saving" Army, would be
the best way.

(Baron IKEDA said, ITAGAKI agreed to his opinion.)