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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2614

30 August 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Record of Process of Independence Movement, a translation of official report by Japanese 16th Army H.2 to Allied Hdq in Singapore. (Certification is awaited and will be added later)

Date: Original  Copy  Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes  No

Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Netherlands Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOJO, Hideki; KOISO; HATA; NISHIMURA; 16th Army Leaders

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Japanese-Netherlands Relations

QUERIES OF RELEVANT POINTS

This is an official report regarding the process of the Independence Movement made by 16th Army H.2 to the SINGAPORE and SAIGON H.2. It lays special stress upon the situation after the surrender but also contains valuable material re the Independence problem during war time.

Analyst: 2d Lt Blumhagen

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p. 1. (Title)

" RECORD OF THE PROCESS OF THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT "

GUNSEIKANBU.

p. 2. Translator's Note :

This is an official report of the 16th Army H.Q. to the SINGAPORE and SAIGON H.Q. It lays special stress on the situation after the surrender. But also contains some valuable material about the Independence problem during the war-time. This is the only complete record of the matter left now, I suppose.

p. 3. List of the measures taken against the Independence Movement.

Year	Jap. year	Date	Subject	Summary
1942	Showa 17	9/April	Start the "3A" Movement	
1943	Showa 18	9/May	Start the "POETRA" Movement	
"	"	16/June	Declaration of premier "TODJO" on the "Indonesian participation on the Government Affairs".	
"	"	7/July	"TODJO" came to JAVA.	
"	"	1/Aug.	Declaration of the High Commander of the 16th Army (SAI-KO-SHI-KIKAN) on making concrete the "participation in the government affairs".	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Creation of the Consultative Body, central and local.</li> <li>2. Creation of the system of "SAN-YO" (participant or councillor).</li> <li>3. Appointment of the high officials.</li> <li>4. Transfer of the administrative affairs from the Japanese to the Indonesian "Sultans" in the district of SOLO and Djokja.</li> </ol>
"	"	4/Oct.	Appointment of the "SAN-YO"s (participant or councillor)	Seven men were appointed in seven Department ("BU" and "KYOKU").

p. 4.	Year	Jap. year	Date	Subject	Summary
	1943	Showa 18	15/Oct.	Convention of the 1st session of "TJU-0-SAN-GIIN" (Volksraad).	
	"	"	9/Nov.	President and the Vice-President of "TJU-0-SAN-GIIN" and others went to JAPAN.	At TOKYO, SOEKARNO made an earnest request for the permission of using "national" song and flag.
	"	"	15/Nov.	Transfer of the administrative affairs to the Sultan's in SOLO and DJOKJA practised.	
	1944	19	1/March	Beginning of the "JAVA-HOKO-KAI" (Badan Kebaktian Rakyat) (Public Service Body)	
	"	"	29/Apr.	Announcement of the "gist for the construction of the new economic system".	The first session was held on 20th/May.
	"	"	1/Sep.	Begins "the week for spreading the determination to fight through."	This was meant to be the prelude for the coming declaration of the acknowledgement of the Independence.
p. 5.	1944	Showa 19	7/Sep.	The Declaration of the Premier KOISO on the acknowledgement of the Independence.	<p>Before the official declaration (at the end of August) the 16th Army H.Q. were confidentially informed from TOKYO in advance.</p> <p>The main points of the plan which was informed from the section of the Department of War (Who was in charge of this matter) at this moment was as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Area = the whole N.E.I.</li> <li>2. Time = Soon after finishing the necessary preparation</li> <li>3. Form of Government, Nation, name of the Country = follow the will of the people.</li> </ol>

Year	Jap . year	Date	Subject	Summary
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At the same time TOKYO proposed the following steps to be followed after the declaration:

1. To promote the national sense.
2. Permission for using the national song and flag.
3. Permission for establishing an organ for investigating Independence.

To these opinions of TOKYO, the 16th Army H.Q. sent their own viewpoint as follows:

1. "Gist of measures for leading Independence" which offers that the Java should be independent in the first place.
2. Measures for enhancing the national (or race) consciousness, i.e.:
  - a. Establishment of the "KEN-KOKU-GAKUIN" (College for the founding of the nation).
  - b. Expansion of the system of "participant in the government affairs".

The attitude of NAVY for this problem were, in general, half hearted (lack of interest) both at their central office (TOKYO) and each local H.Q.s also.

Afterwards it was proposed to have a meeting for consultation at SINGAPORE, but this plan was postponed.

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1944	Showa 19	17/Nov.	"PANTJA-DARMA (means "FIVE RULES" literally) was resolved at "VOLKSRAAD" for enhancing "the idea of GREAT EAST ASIA".	Several ceremonial events were held in commemoration of the first anniversary of "the Declaration of Great East Asia" by TODJO.
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1944	Showa 19	1/Dec.	Expansion of the system "to participate in the government affairs".	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Appointment of "FUKU-SYU-TJOKAN" (Assistant Resident) in several Residency.</li> <li>2. Increase in the numbers of "SAN-YO" (Participant or councillor).</li> <li>3. Establishment of "SAN-YO-KAIGI" (Dewan SANYO = Conference of the participants).</li> </ol>
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	1945	Showa 20	29/Apr.	1. Opening ceremony of "KEN-KOKU-GAKUIN" (College for the founding of the nation) 2. SOEKARNO visits CELEBES.	The 16th Army H.Q. received telegram from TOKYO that the second meeting for the "conference of the Great East Asia" will not be held.
	"	"	30/Apr.	Conference of all SOMU-BUTJO (The chief of General Affairs in GUNSEI KANBU) from each area under the command of SINGAPORE Army H.Q.	This was a special conference for speaking about the necessary measures on the race-problem in each area. The 16th Army H.Q. explained how the national consciousness of Indonesians was enhanced and stressed that there is no other way than to carry out Independence for winning the confidence of the people.
p.8.	1945	Showa 20	15/May	SAIGON Army H.Q. asked opinions of each local H.Q. about the Independence problem, to which prompt reply was given.	Reply of 16th Army H.Q. 1. Area = the whole N.E.I 2. Time = within this year. Reply of the SINGAPORE Army H.Q.: 1. Area = they evade to state clearly. 2. Time = was the opinion that it is too early to begin.
	1945	"	20/May	Conference of all "Chief of the Staff" of each local army H.Q., at SINGAPORE	From these time on, the situation of war began to turn against Axes, and the progress of Independence problem in French Indo-China inevitably stimulated the Indonesians here. So the H.Q. JAVA also have to take every necessary steps to hasten the Independence
	1945	"	28/May	The inauguration meeting of the "Committee for investigating the preparation for the Independence."	1. The first session: 29/May - 1/June. 2. The second session: 10/July - 16/July.
p.9.	1945	Showa 20	1/June	The joint plan of every Department concerned (i.e. D. of Army, Navy, and the D. of Great East Asia) on the Independence problem came to JAVA H.Q. by telegram.	The contents of the plan were: 1. Area = /whole N.E.I./the 2. Time = As soon as possible. 3. "Committee for the preparation of Independence" should be created quickly.

1945	Showa 20	x/June	H.Q.JAVA replied that they have agreed to the plan proposed. The persons in charge of the matter from each area's gathered at SINGAPORE to advise their opinions to this H.Q.	The opinion of SAIGON H.Q. were: 1. Area = they evaded to state clearly. 2. Time = after the middle of the next year. 3. The "Committee for the preparation of Independence" are to begin at the end of this year, at the earliest.
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"	"	18/June	The 8th Session of "VOLKSRAAD"
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"	"	6/July	Committee for organizing the "new national movement".	The Committee was adjourned because they have clashed with the GUNSEI KANBU on the problem of stating the word "REPUBLIC" in the principles of the new movement. The government had an opposite opinion because this Committee should have no authority to decide the form of government. H.Q.JAVA reported these atmosphere of the Committee and the situation of the Independence Movement which is becoming more and more intensified.
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1945	Showa 20	21/July	The decisive plan from TOKYO came to JAVA.	The plan was: 1. The same as the joint plan of 1/July. 2. But pays special consideration to the necessity for the military operation. 3. The details are to be leaved to the SAIGON H.Q.
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"	"	30/July	Conference of "SOMUBUTJO" (the chief of the general affairs in GUNSEI KANBU) at SINGAPORE H.Q.	The draft of the gist for leading the Independence was decided here.
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"	"	7/Aug.	The establishment of the Committee for the preparation of the Independence was announced.	The contents of the announcement: "The establishment of the Committee, which was founded on the voluntary will of the people, was allowed".
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p.11. 1945 Showa 20

9/Aug. SOEKARNO, HATTA, RA-DJIMAN started to visit SAIGON H.Q. Soviet's entrance into the war.

The points which was showed by Marshal TERAUTJI to the three representatives of Indonesians were:  
1. Area = the whole N.E.I.  
2. Condition = must satisfy the demand for military operation also.  
3. Time = one after another, beginning from the area where the necessary preparation is finished.  
4. SOEKARNO was appointed as chairman of the COMMITTEE. HATTA, the vice-chairman. The other members of the COMMITTEE were also appointed.  
5. The management of the COMMITTEE was leaved in the Chairman's hand.  
6. We hope the Indonesians can get Independence as soon as possible, after finishing the necessary preparation.

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" " 14/AUG. SOEKARNO, HATTA, RA-DJIMAN came back to JAVA.

The names of the members of the COMMITTEE were announced.

The Imperial Decree on the Armistice was announced at TOKYO.

" " 15/Aug. The Emperor's Radio Broadcast about the acceptance of POTSDAM Declaration was heard in JAVA.

" " 16/Aug. SOEKARNO and HATTA was arrested by the Indonesians (early in the morning).

SOEKARNO and HATTA had a meeting with Gen. NISHIMURA and Admiral MAEDA. (Midnight).

They made the draft of "the Declaration of Independence".

The Japanese asked to SOEKARNO and HATTA with stress:  
1. To exercise more prudence at this conjuncture.  
2. The program of the "COMMITTEE" for Preparation should be carried out as previously arranged.



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1945

Showa  
20

17/Aug.

The Indonesians made "Declaration of Independence" of their own.

"

"

18/Aug.

The day for the summon of the members of COMMITTEE for celebration of opening.

16th Army H.Q. got official order to suspend war from the upper H.Q.

Before the opening of the meeting, the members from JAVA was announced privately about the happening of "the new situation". But the Indonesians began their meeting immediately.

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19/Aug.

The high Commander of the 16th Army was called by SINGAPORE H.Q.

The 16th Army H.Q. got official instruction on the problem of Independence from the upper authorities.

GUNSEIKAN communicated that instruction to SOEKARNO and HATTA.

The contents of the Instruction from the upper H.Q. were:

"Explain to the Indonesians the reasons why we can not help Independence any more take proper and necessary action in your area upon your own standpoint hereafter"

The contents of the instructions given by GUNSEIKAN (GEN.YAMAMOTO) to SOEKARNO and HATTA were:

1. We have suspended war.
2. We cannot help you any more.
3. We have to keep on our government and administration as before, and we are to maintain public peace and order.

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The Indonesians have decided:

1. President
2. Vice-President
3. Constitution.

"

"

21/Aug.

The ban was lifted on the publication of the "new situation".

SOMUBUTJO (Gen.NISHIMURA) communicated officially to SOEKARNO and HATTA

The main points of the communication from SOMUBUTJO (Gen.NISHIMURA) to SOEKARNO and HATTA were:

1. We have to maintain the STATUS QUO situation.
2. We have to maintain peace and order.
3. The system of participating in the government affairs will be kept on as before.
5. The Indonesians should

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have a kind of "declaration of peace", instead of the attitude of fighting, to fit themselves to the new situation of the world.

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1945	Showa 20	22/Aug.	The new situation was announced officially by the H.Q.  The High Commander of the 16th Army issued a proclamation on this matter,.
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p. 16. (Title)

A REPORT ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS

A separate volume  
(No.1 - No.7)

12/Dec. '45 (Showa 20th)  
The 16th Army H.Q.

p.17. The table of contents of this separate volume.

- No. 1. Circumstances of the surrender of Japanese Army in East Java District.
- No. 2. Circumstances how the Japanese Army in the Middle Java District lost their arms.
- No.3. List of main issues and events after surrender.
- No. 4. Process of Indonesian Independence movement after surrender.
- No. 5. List of all personnel standing under the command of the 16th Army H.Q.
- No. 6. Situation of the circulation of currency, especially the Japanese War Note.
- No. 7. Situation of health facilities (organizations) and the rescue for the P.O.W. and interned people.

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p.18. Separate Volume No.1.

Report on the circumstances of the surrender of Japanese Army in  
SOURABAJA.  
(Telegram No.1512 of 16th Army Staff Section.)

- 1. As is reported previously, here in SOURABAJA, according to the order of Captain HEUER from Dutch NAVY, the Japanese Army of East Java District and the troops under the command of "The Second Dispatched Squadron of South Sea" had surrendered, and everything that was exclusive possession of the Japanese in the former days had been transferred under the command of Allied Forces. The Captain asked the Indonesians to take custody of these things. Afterwards the Japanese Army were confined and the commander of the Army seemed to be under the control of the captain. But since 8th/Oct. all the communication between the BATAVIA H.Q. was paralyzed.
- 2. After that, by application of the Japanese Army, it seemed that the Allied authorities had ordered to Captain Heuer to recover the communication of the Japanese fleet, but this was not realized. On the contrary, it seemed, that the captain himself was confined by the Indonesian rioters, and so it became impossible to have connection with him. The rioters, even more, have detained all of the Japanese and Dutch people. At the time of the landing of the British Troops at SOURABAJA, the Indonesians forced the Commanders of Japanese Army and Navy to remove from the city, it seemed. Moreover, Colonel MIYAMOTO, the Staff Officer of the 16th Army H.Q., who was sent to SOURABAJA by the Army previously to the landing of the British Troops

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Troops for the purpose of making the landing business more smooth, was also confined by the riotous Indonesians by force. The advance of the Allied Troops became more difficult because the Indonesians stood against them by using the arms which was asked to take custody from Captain HEUER.

3. In those days about 2nd/Oct., the city of SOURABAJA was in the situation of entire chaos and there frequently happened the oppressive action against the Dutch people as well as intimidation to the Japanese Troops to give arms. Under such condition, there came the order from Captain HEUER to surrender. The Japanese Army obeyed that order because they believed they have duty to practise that order founded on the article 2 of the "Document about the surrender of the Japanese Army" (issued at SINGAPORE, on 12th/Sept.) which prescribe the duty to obey to "those representing" Allied Forces.

The SOURABAJA incident was caused by the arbitrary decision of Captain HEUER on one hand, and the lack of Indonesian leaders to practise their own promise which resulted in the rampancy of extremist, on the other hand.-

(End)

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