

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-- Against --

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: MINAMI, Jiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose as follows.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

1. I was born on August 10, 1874 at Hiji-machi, Oita Prefecture. After completing the usual course at a military preparatory school and the Military Academy, I was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant of Cavalry in 1895. I took part in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) as a captain of cavalry. At that time ear trouble developed as a result of concussion of cannon fire and for this reason, I have now lost my auditory sense.
2. In 1924, I became Cavalry Inspector as Lieutenant General; in 1926, Commander of the Sixteenth Division; in 1927 Assistant Chief of the General Staff; in 1929, Commander of the Korean Army; and in 1930, a Supreme War Councilor as full General. On April 14, 1931 when the second WAKATSUKI Cabinet was formed, I was appointed Minister of War. The above a period in which the Japanese Army was reduced by four division to carry into effect the decisions of the Washington Conference, and energetic efforts were made in the retrenchment of the national budget. Especially the cabinets formed by the Minseito Party, viz., the KATO, Takaaki Cabinet (June 1924 - January 1926), the first WAKATSUKI Cabinet (January 1926 - April 1927), the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet (July 1929 - April 1931), and the second WAKATSUKI Cabinet above referred to took internally the policy of financial retrenchment and upheld externally the policy of peaceful and conciliatory diplomacy.

Although I was not a member of the MINSEITO, I had a thorough understanding of its policies because General UGAKI, my intimate senior and by whose recommendation I became his successor, had been in office as War Minister for a long time in the Minseito Cabinets ever since the formation of the KATO Cabinet mentioned above. On August 4, 1931, I called the customary conference of Division Commanders in the War Ministry for the first time since I assumed the office of War Minister. The address of instructions which I delivered on that occasion unexpectedly aroused the opposition of a section of the political circles. As it would be clear from a glance at its contents, I gave expression to nothing more than a view natural to a War Minister -- stating that every effort should be made in the training of soldiers to maintain the efficiency of the Imperial Army under the difficult conditions caused by arms reduction. It appears that an issue was created by the fact that some anti-government elements conspired to overthrow the government by intentionally distorting some of my statements. That I was not opposed to arms reduction may be recognized in the light of the fact that in May 1931, I revised the Army Pay Ordinance, with salary reductions ranging from 5.8 % for First Lieutenants to 12 % for Generals, and that I also endeavored even to effect a cut in pensions. I said no more than this: that,

while the European and American powers had swiffly modernised their armaments as a result of World War I, Japan has left her arms in the same condition as they had been in the previc century, and therefore stressed that in order to perfect our national defense with a minimum of arms, we must effect an improrement in quality. That I did not try to inspire a positive policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia may be best illustrated by the fact that, when an incident broke out later, I strenuously maintained the policy of non-expansion to such an extent that I was attacked for being too passive both by the army on the spot and by the people at home. What I said in my speech was that inasmuch as the pending question in Manchuria and Mongolia exceedingly complicated, and inasmuch as Premier WAKATSUKI and Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA had announced their views toward the new situation, the army also on its own part should not fail to give its attention thereto.

4. In the night on September 18, 1931 I was staying as usual in the official residence of War Minister. About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, I was suddenly awakened by an officer on duty in the War Ministry, and handed a telegram despatched by the Special Service Organ in Mukden. The message said that about 10:30 p.m. of the 18th the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway northwest of Mukden had been destroyed by Chinese troops, that our railway guard unit had

been fired upon and that the Second Battalion of the Independent Garrison had started to move to the spot. About an hour later a telegram came from Commander HONJO which said: "Leave Port Arthur at 3:00 a.m. for Mukden." The telegram was simple and the situation was not clear, but as it was evident that a clash had occurred between the regular Japanese and Chinese troops, I immediately called Lieutenant General SUGIYAMA, Vice-Minister of War, Major General ^{KOISO} Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, and Lieutenant ^{Colonel} KUSHIBUCHI, my private secretary, to my official residence to consider steps to meet the situation. At about 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. I reported the incident by telephone to the Premier, and the Foreign, Overseas and Navy Ministers, and to the Premier, I requested the immediate convening of an extraordinary cabinet meeting.

Meanwhile the General Staff Headquarters had also received a similar telegram and Chief of the General Staff KANAYA, Assistant Chief of the General Staff NINOMIYA and other responsible members of the Headquarters were in conference. At about 7 a.m. Director KOISO of the Military Affairs Bureau representing the War Ministry went to the General Staff Headquarters for liaison. About 9:00 a.m. the two parties came to an agreement, and decided upon the policy of non-expansion. What we feared more than anything else at the time was whether or not the lengthy railway line, the 200,000

Japanese residents and one million Koreans in Manchuria could be protected with the small Kwantung Army force of 10,000 men in the face of the formidable army of CHANG Psueh-lian numbering 250,000. If the Nikolaievsk Incident involving the massacre of several hundreds of Japanese residents in Nikolaievsk by Russians in 1920 were to be repeated, it would be a serious matter and the army would be charged for negligence in proper performance of its duties to the people. For this reason opinion in the Supreme Command strongly favored the despatch of reinforcements for operational reasons and therefore it took some time before the War Ministry could come to a decision on the non-expansion policy. At an extraordinary cabinet meeting held at 10:00 a.m. the foregoing policy was adopted by the Cabinet, and thereafter the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff in turn reported the decision to the throne, and obtained the Imperial sanction. That afternoon, the Chief of the Army General Staff wired this fact as a Supreme Command order to Commander HONJO of the Kwantung Army and I sent telegraphic instructions on the government policy to the Commandant myself. From this time on, the military operations of the army on the spot came under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army General Staff as an exercise of the prerogative of the Supreme Command. At this time, Lieutenant General HAYASHI, Senjuro, Commander of the Korean Army, reported to Tokyo that the

sending reinforcements to Manchuria admitted of no delay, but a stop order was communicated to him through the Chief of General Staff.

5. In the afternoon of the 21st, while I was engaged in consultation with Premier WAKATSUKI after the conclusion of the Cabinet meeting and all cabinet ministers, had retired, a telegram arrived from the Commander of the Korean Army, reporting that, moved with irresistible sympathy over the fervent requests of the Kwantung Army, he had, at his own discretion, order the Shingishu Mixed Brigade to cross the border. After conferring with the Premier, I reported the border crossing of the Korean Army at its own discretion to a cabinet meeting held in the morning of the following day, the 22nd. The Cabinet, taking into consideration precarious position of the Kwantung Army, saw no alternative, but to approve the despatch of the said brigade and the defrayal of expenses accompanying such action. The Prime Minister immediately reported the affair to the Emperor, the Chief of the General Staff following suit, and the Imperial Order, for the crossing of the border was communicated to the Korean Army by the Chief of the Army General Staff. The cabinet meeting on the same day decided that as the action of the

Kwantung Army was a temporary seizure and not an occupation of Manchuria, no military administration was to be established. This decision was communicated to Commander HONJO by myself. Further, on September 26, the Cabinet passed a decision prohibiting Japanese participation in the movement to establish a new government in Manchuria, and telegraphic instructions to this effect were sent by the Foreign Ministry to Foreign Office organs, in Manchuria and to the Kwantung Army by myself. Such instructions were considered necessary, because we had received reports that movements for the independence of Manchuria had suddenly become active with the outbreak of the incident, and especially that those in favor of restoring the Ching Dynasty had started vigorous activities and we were concerned lest the army on the spot should be dragged into such activities. Later, in the early part of November, a person by the name of TOYAMA, Takeo brought me a letter as a messenger of Emperor HSUANTUNG who had been residing in Tientsin. Although I did not personally talk with him, his message which was conveyed to me through my secretary or officer on duty-I do not remember which-was that: the Emperor HSUANTUNG was desirous of effecting^a fundamental correction of the evil administration of the SHANG regime in Manchuria." As there was no reason for me to believe the words of such a messenger, and especially as it was the government's fixed

policy not to interfere in the domestic affairs of China and I did not favour the proposition, I ignored the letter without replying to the letter of Mr. PU YI.

Not only that, on November 15, I sent telegraphic instructions to the Commander of the Kwantung Army stating that: "While various rumors current about the question of Emperor HSUANTUNG, the Kwantung Army must strictly refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of China, and act with utmost caution." Several years later, when CHENG Tsiaehsu, Prime Minister of Manchukuo, visited Japan, I called on him at the Imperial Hotel, and showing him the letter in question, asked him whether the letter was genuine or false. CHENG signed the letter certifying that it was the real handwriting of Emperor HSUANTUNG. I have kept this letter to this day as a souvenir.

6. On September 24, the Japanese Government issued its first statement concerning the Mukden Incident. Prior to this announcements on the situation were being issued, about twice a day by our delegation to the League of Nations. Conditions on the spot, however, were not sufficiently clear even to us cabinet ministers. After the incident, seemed to have been settled, a new situation developed with the result the situation was always ahead of the government statement, placing me in a very awkward position. This was because as

as a principle on which the army was established the War Minister could not interfere with military operations. The Kwantung Army, on the other hand, appealed to us that the situation on the spot was such that, while the army in Manchuria had to abide by the non-expansion policy it was unavoidable for them to take necessary measures for self defense in the face of constant attacks by an enemy whose forces were more than twenty times greater than our own and that unless they did otherwise nothing remained for them but self-annihilation. And yet, when a request came from the Kwantung Army for permission to despatch troops to Harbin for the protection of Japanese residents, we not only persuaded the Chief of the Army General Staff and had it flatly rejected, but also succeeded in having the main force withdraw to the railway zone. However, with the withdrawal of our troops CHANG Hsueh-liang's armies, taking advantage of the situation, advanced to the railway zone, causing disturbances in the rear. Consequently in the beginning of October, a reconnaissance flight was made by our aircraft over Chinchou, the headquarters, of the CHANG army. Then the report was received that as the CHANG forces had opened fire, our aircraft had dropped bombs on them. As the flight was made without any previous notification either to the Chief of the Army General Staff or to me, I immediately

issued a severe warning to Commander HONJO. In November MA Chan-shan's army destroyed a railway bridge over the Nonni River and fired on our units ^{which} went to repair it. As MA's troops failed to comply with our repeated warnings, the Kwantung Army decided to repulse them. Later the central military authorities ordered the Kwantung Army to evacuate immediately from TSITSIHAR and this order was effectively carried out. In the later part of November, when a riot broke-out among Chinese troops in Tientsin, a request came from the North China Garrison for reinforcements. Not only was this request refused, but the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army which had advanced to the neighborhood of Chinchow also was ordered to withdraw to the railway zone near Hsinmintun east of the river Tataoho. About this time, the annual army manoeuvres were held in Kyushu under the personal supervision of the Emperor. Although the War Minister had to accompany His Majesty, I remained in Tokyo with the Imperial permission as I had to attend to the ever changing situation both at home and abroad, and exerted my best efforts to prevent the expansion of the conflict, in close collaboration with Government as well as the Supreme Command. I still remember that when we succeeded in preventing the advance of the Kwantung Army to Chinchow the Prime Minister and I, just the two of us together, drank a toast congratulating ourselves on our success at the Premier's official

residence. Such being the case, I can state with the utmost confidence that at least while I was War Minister, there absolutely never was issued a false statement or a breach of international agreements committed, although because of the rapidly changing situation in Manchuria, the statements of the Japanese Government and the actual conditions on the spot were inverted in point of time and therefore were confused.

7. Aside from the many difficult problems in Manchuria mentioned above, I was informed in the middle of October that there were indications of possible disorder among a group of young officers at home. I had these elements immediately apprehended by the Gendarmerie, and had the matter properly dealt with. Because of the moderate policy of the WAKATSUKI cabinet, voices of dissatisfaction against it grew up both within and without Japan. This led the Prime Minister to try to reorganize the Cabinet by a coalition of the Minseitō and Seiyūkai parties. This attempt failed, however, and the independent action taken by Home Minister ADACHI caused the Cabinet to resign en bloc on December 10 because of disunity in the Cabinet. After my resignation from the office of War Minister, I was given the obscure post of Supreme War Councilor. There was nothing to do except to assemble about twice a year to hear lectures given by the

military authorities. As I had been requested to serve as tutor to the young Prince KAN-IN, I devoted my time to this work, and paid but little attention if any to political and military affairs. Just after three years, on December 10, 1934, I was unexpectedly appointed Ambassador to Manchukuo, and concurrently Governor of the Kwantung ~~Leased~~ Territory and Commander of the Kwantung Army, at the recommendation of the OKADA Cabinet.

8. Being installed in the new posts by the personal command of His Majesty, I went to Hsinking, after consultations with Prime Minister OKADA, Foreign Minister HIROTA, Finance Minister TAKAHASHI, War Minister HAYASHI and Justice Minister OBARA, entrusted with the task of having the government's policy thoroughly carried out in Manchoukuo. Not only had the Japan-Manchuokuo Protocol been concluded and Japan recognized the independence of Manchoukuo the previous year, but the Vatican, the Republic Salvador and the Dominican Republic had also recognized her and Manchoukuo was growing as a new-born independent state. In January of the following year (1935), Foreign Minister HIROTA declared in the Diet the policy of amity toward and on February 3, Replies thereto came from General CHIANG Kai-shek, Mr. WANG Ching-wei and Mr. SUN FO, thus bringing about mutual understanding between China and Japan. This was followed by the satisfactory conclusion of various agreements between Manchoukuo and China

relating to customs, postal and telegraphic matters. In March, Manchukuo entered into agreements with Soviet Russia for the navigation of inland waterways and for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railways, and it was agreed to that a committee be appointed for the settlement of the boundary question. His Field Marshal MUTO, the first Ambassador to Manchukuo, was received by the Emperor of that country on the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month, and General HISEIKA^R the second Ambassador, on the 2nd, 12th and 22nd, I, as the third, had the 3rd, 13th and 23rd of each month as my days for regular audiences. During the period between April 2 and April 27, the Emperor of Manchoukuo visited Japan, and was graciously received by our Imperial Family. Thus as Japan and Manchukuo stood on equal footing, it was the policy of the OKADA Cabinet and also my personal conviction that the independence of Manchoukuo should be completely respected and every encouragement given for her healthy growth as a sovereign state. Hence the Kwantung Army made the maintenance of peace and order as its primary function and for this reason I frequently gave them stern instructions not to meddle in politics or do anything injurious to^{the Prestige} of Manchoukuo. In pursuance of the policy of the government, as soon as I took office, I abolished the Special Service Department of the army and the government of the Kwantung

Leased Territory, and tried my best to simplify the Japanese organs in Manchukuo to every extent possible. During ^{my} tenure of office, there was never a case of Japanese troops crossing the border.

9. In May, 1935, the Japanese Legation in China was elevated to Embassy status and Ambassador ARIYOSHI presented his credentials to President LIN Shen of the Chinese Government. In June, General CHIUNG Kai-shek promulgated the Neighborly Friendship Ordinance which greatly stimulated the growth of friendly sentiments between Japan and China. During the same month, in order to assure peace along the China-Manchoukuo border, the so-called "UMEZU-HO Yin-chin", DOIHARA-CHENG Te-chun" and other agreements were concluded. With regard to these agreements I received reports that they were concluded in an exceedingly friendly atmosphere. Although these agreements were of a local nature, they were concluded with the full approval of the governments of both countries. In July the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Commission was set up to deal with various economic questions on a basis of equality. In August, the Japanese government announced its decision to relinquish Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchoukuo. This was a serious decision on Japan's part, as she was to return to Manchukuo the rights and interests which she had hitherto enjoyed there. During the same

month, Prince TEH of Inner Mongolia came to Hsinking with a request for an audience with the Emperor. It is believed that the Prince, envious of the sound and peaceful development of Manchukuo, desired to make Inner Mongolia independent following the example of Manchoukuo. As for me, I believe that the independence of Inner Mongolia which Prince TEH was planning was not proper both from the standpoint of substance and time, and always refused his requests for assistance. Lieutenant Colonel TANAKA, Ryukichi, then a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, being well acquainted with the conditions in Mongolia because of his duties, was enthusiastic about the question of Mongolia. Even as late as 1942 he visited me in Tokyo with a request that I become the head of an association for assisting the independence of Mongolia. Of course, I refused to comply with the request. For the same reason, with regard to the North China question also, I only devoted my efforts for the maintenance of peace between China and Manchukuo, in accordance with the directions of the central government, and never at any time did I attempt to engage in political negotiations. I heard that the formation of the Hopei-Chahar regime toward the end of the same year was at the initiative of the Chinese government. On February 26, 1936, an armed insurrection broke out in Tokyo, resulting in the assassination of a number of prominent men. Lamenting over this situation,

I voluntarily requested to be relieved from my office. I was relieved of my post on March 6, and placed on the waiting list on April 18, and was transferred to the reserve list on April 22. Soon after my return to Japan, on August 5, I was unexpectedly appointed Governor General of Korea.

10. I think it was my predecessor as Governor General of Korea, General UGAKI, who recommended me as his successor. I took this office not as soldier but as civilian. As all military affairs were under the exclusive charge of the Commander of the Korean Army, I never handled military matters during tenure of office in Korea. As Governor General, I have nothing to say except that I devoted myself entirely to the elevation of the status and conditions of the Korean people.
11. After my retirement as Governor General of Korea on May 29, 1942, I was appointed a Privy Councilor, which post I held until March 1945. During my tenure of office His Majesty consulted the Privy Council with regard to a proposal concerning the revision of the government organization regulations to place the governor-generals of Korea and Formosa under the jurisdiction of Home Minister, in consequence of the establishment of the Ministry of Greater East Asia Affairs in October 1942. At that time, I was appointed a member of the Investigation Committee of this proposal by the President of the Council. Although I did not utter a

a singly word about the Ministry of Greater East Asia tie Affairs, I vigorously opposed the government proposal concerning the office of the governor-general of Korea, on the basis of my personal experience, because I felt apprehensive lest the new measure have various undesirable effects upon colonial administration. However, the proposal was approved over my objection by the majority. I have nothing else to say with reference to my tenure of office as Privy Councillor

12. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society formed during the KONOE Cabinet by the dissolution of all political parties, gradually lost the confidence of the people, and in its place the DAINIPPON SEIJI KAI (Japan Political Association) was established on March 30, 1945. Unlike the former, the latter was not a government serving organization. The chief aim of the new association was to reflect public opinion upon government, and thereby correct the policies of the government and the military. In this respect, the new organization was fundamentally different from the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, which had no link whatsoever with the people. I was recommended to lead this association by those who used to hold leading position in the former Seiyukai and Minseito Parties because in their opinion I ^{was} best qualified to restrain and control government and the military. Realizing intensely the necessity

of guiding Japanese politics in accordance with public opinion in view of the increasingly critical war situation I accepted the offer, pledging my life to the performance of my task. In order to attain the aims of the new association, I began my work as its head by establishing chapters in prefectures, cities, towns and villages throughout the country, with a view to maintaining direct contact, with the people. The expenses of the new society were met by membership fees. No financial support whatsoever was received from the government. In order to hear the true voice of the people, I personally attended the inaugural meeting of local chapters, and as soon as I returned to Tokyo from my trips, I counselled the government and military authorities as to how the people thought and what they wished. Less than six months after the association was formed, the war came to an end and it was dissolved on August 20, 1945.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

On this 8th day of January, 1947

at

Deponent MINAMI, Jiro

I, KONDO, Giichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KONDO, Giichi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon, Chief of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charles D. Sheldon.

Tokyo, Japan

Date 27 Mar. 1947