

1st Demob.

KAGESA, Teisho (or Sadaaki)

Request by: TOJO, Hideki

Address: Dai-Ichi Hospital, Tokyo

Former Lt. General serving as liaison officer between the Japanese Army and the Wang Ching-Wei Government.

He will testify as to the matter of Wang government with special reference to specific measures taken thereby.

1st Witness

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KAGESA, Sadaaki

Request by ITAGAKI

Address: Daichi National Hospital, Wakamatsu Cho
Ushigome-Ku, Tokyo Japan.

Was Major Genl in Jap army; was Chief Military Advisor to
Nankin Govt at time Itagaki was Minister of War

Witness can give testimony concerning; that the basic principle
of the Japanese Govts policy respecting settling the China Incident
was a realization of the Good Neighbor Policy, with recognition
of China's severgnty, mutual help, and equalization of rights; that
there was no intention on the part of Japan to carry on military,
economical or political domination for anylonger time than was necessary
to accomplish realization of such policy; that no puppet govts were
created in China, that many things seized during that period, including
industrial plants, were returned.

The relevancy of this testimony lies in the fact that it will dispute
the prosecutions claim and evidence adduced along that line, that
Japan planned aggressive warfare agains China and set up puppet
governments in order to exploit the country.

KAGESA, Sadaaki

Request by Itagaki

Address: Daichi National Hospital, Wakamatsu Cho
Nishigome-Ku, Tokyo Japan.

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over

Curtis + Lambert

20 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Edward Monaghan
Chief, Investigation Division

FROM: T. C. Liu
Assistant, Chinese Division

SUBJECT: Request Interview of TAJIRI, Akiyoshi, URGENT

1. Reference is made to the defense witness KAGESA, the main witness of sub-division 6 of the China Phase, that is, the puppet regime in China. The Tribunal has ordered that KAGESA's testimony be taken in Commission and Mr. Tavenner has asked Judge Nyi of the Chinese Division to serve for the Prosecution.
2. As you know, the issue of puppet regime was only roughly covered in our case, in fact, merely as a side-issue of the Economic Aggression in China. We therefore decide to make the best use of this opportunity, not only to pin down KAGESA, but to get introduced into evidence several important documents.
3. However, in order to prepare for the cross-examination, we have to be careful in checking up all the data against possible mistake.
4. It has been discovered that Mr. TAJIRI, Akiyoshi, of the Foreign Ministry, was closely connected with the subject in question, as evidenced by IPS DOC 1005, 1519, 1296, 1814, etc. all files of the Foreign Ministry.
5. I have personally read a pamphlet written by TAJIRI last year, and I am inclined to believe that he is sufficiently cooperative.
6. We request, therefore, interviews with Mr. TAJIRI, at immediate present, for the above-mentioned purpose and also at a later date when we will be preparing rebuttal.
7. Your helpful cooperation will be greatly appreciated, as the case is of sufficient importance.

J. L.

to notes

KAGESA, Sadaki

19 Feb 47

Gave copy of Curriculum Vitae to Mr. Dunigan; to be returned to us.

21 February 1947

KAGESA, Sadaaki

Gave copy of Curriculum Vitae to Judge Hsiang, to be returned to us.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Operations, GIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

SUBJECT: KAGESA, Maj. Gen. Sadaaki

Assistant Military Attache to China and Head of the Manchuria-Mongolia Section of the General Staff. Was promoted to Colonel and made Chief of the Military Operations Department in the War Ministry in 1939; promoted to Major General in June 1939; is largely responsible for the setting up of the Hanking puppet government. He specialized in China and economic problems.

SOURCE: (OSS Card File)

Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Office. Has contributed a great deal to the formation of the China Affairs Board; is one of the best authorities in the Army on Modern China.

SOURCE: From an article by Setsuo SUGAWARA in Bungei Shunji, special issue No. 17. (OSS Card File).

KAGESA, Sadaaki

Lt. General Sadaaki KAGESA, Commander of the 38th Division, formerly adviser to the Puppet Government, is deemed a Key Japanese War Criminal.

SOURCE: United Nations War Crimes Commission, List #3, Sept. 1945.

REPORT BY: RICHARD LARSH
27 Dec 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KAGESA, Sadaaki

Address: Daichi National Hospital, Wakamatsu-Cho
Ushigome-Ku, Tokyo, Japan

A Major General in the Japanese Army, he was the Chief
Military Advisor to the Nanking Government at the time ITAGAKI
was Minister of War.

KAGESA is subject of IPS Case File No. 350.

COPIES: 3 File 350
1 Mr. Prout

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

SUBJECT: KAGESA, Maj. Gen. Sadaaki

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SOURCE: United Nations War Crimes Commission, List #3, Sept. 1945.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent : -- KAGESA, Sadaaki

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I, KAGESA, Sadaaki, am an ex-Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and am now in the First Government Hospital of Tokyo owing to ill-health.
2. Immediately after Lieutenant General ITAGAKI's appointment as the Minister of War, in June, 1938, I was transferred from the post of department chief of the General Staff Office to that of chief of the Department of Military Affairs in the Bureau of Military Affairs. Since then, I continued in this office till the end of March, 1939. During this period, as a person in authority, I had to do

- with the question of strengthening the Japan-Germany-Italy anti-communist front.
3. Not only the Government, but also the Army and the Navy had all been at all times very anxious to effect immediate settlement of the China Incident. Considering it as a sine qua non for the settlement of the incident to nullify the menace of the Soviet Union in the north by extricating Japan from her state of international isolation, the three ministries of war, Navy, and Foreign Affairs had eagerly studied the problem of strengthening the Tripartite anti-Comintern Pact before War Minister ITAGAKI's assumption of office.
4. According to my recollection, War Minister ITAGAKI's opinion about foreign policy which he expressed to us when he took office war, on the whole, as below:
- 1) To concentrate every possible endeavour on bringing about the peace with China without a moment's delay and to make this the foundation of our policy.
 - 2) To maintain a state of silence in regard to the Soviet Union, to keep strict guard against having any trouble with her, and at the same time, to watch closely her positive actions.
 - 3) To strengthen friendship with Germany and Italy, and make use of them for alleviating the threat of the

Soviet Union. At the same time, to let these powers take part in the co-operation for realizing the immediate settlement of the China Incident.

4. Attempts were to be made to let Britain, the United States, and other countries understand Japan's real intention, and thus let them restrain their acts of aiding the Kuomintang Government, thereby contributing to the settlement of the incident.
5. War Minister ITAGAKI's idea, about the Tripartite anti-communist Pact all originated from the above-mentioned principle and there was absolutely no other intention involved. Therefore, when the German Foreign Minister made a suggestion in August, 1938, the government replied, according to the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference, that the pact should amount to an extension of the anti-Comintern Pact. Furthermore, when Germany in November of the same year attempted to make the meaning of "the objective power" broader the government, in accordance with the decision of Five Ministers' conference replied as follows:
 - 1) We will regard the Soviet Union as the main objective power.
 - 2) If the situation demands it, Britain, France, and others may be made objective powers. However, whether any

DEF. DOC. #2606

military assistance should be given or not all depends upon the situation.

Thus, while making every effort not to hinder co-operation with Germany and Italy, we, on the other hand, had been exerting ourselves to avoid making Britain, France, and others objective powers. Especially, we had been firmly maintaining the attitude of avoiding military assistance to the utmost.

Moreover, it was quite apparent that, apart from the worst eventuality in which we would have to make Britain, France, etc. objectives, even if we had to make the Soviet our object, this pact was a pure defensive mutual-aid pact against any kind of invasion and did not contain even the slightest hint of positive aggression. After all, the only object of this pact was to make the pact itself serve in the settlement of the China Incident.

On this 22 day of Sep., 1947

At _____

DEPONENT /S/ KAGESA, Sadaaki (seal)

I, YAMADA, Hanzo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

DEF. DOC. #2606

On the same date

At _____

Witness: /s/ YAMADA, Hanzo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KAGESA, Sadaaki (seal)

Page DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAGESA, Sadaaki
by Mr. Roberts

23,970 The testimony of the above witness having been taken
by Commission before the Honorable Mr. Justice Northcroft, the
record of the Commission was received in evidence as Exhibit 2721.
23,972 The witness identified Exhibit 2721-A * as his affidavit and after
making certain minor corrections stated it was true and correct.
* He stated he lived in the First National Hospital and he was
also known by the name of Yoshiaki.

23,976 The witness's affidavit stated * that he is an ex-
Lieutenant-General who had served as Chief of the Chinese Section,
General Staff, from August 1937 and became Chief of the Military
Affairs Section of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, in June
1938. In accord with the decision of the Five Ministers' Council
of April 1939 with respect to Wang Ching-wei's peace movement,
the witness assisted Wang in removing to Shanghai since he had
moved to Hanoi from Chungking and was planning the peace movement.
He had begun to fear his personal danger. The witness helped him
continuously to establish a central government and when it was
established in March 1940 the witness became his highest military
advisor, a post he held until May 1942.

23,977 He was not well acquainted with the peace negotiations
carried on through Trautmann, German Ambassador to China in late
1937 and early 1938, since they were presided over by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs. At one time the National Government was about
to accept Japan's terms, but on January 14th it suddenly sent an
answer contrary to expectations. The attitude of the National
Government can be seen from Wang's essay, "For An Instance,"
published March 27, 1939. On receipt of China's reply, Japan
drew the conclusion that China had no sincerity in the negotia-
tions and announced on January 16th that it would have nothing
to do with the National Government. This was not because Japan
23,978 had abandoned all hope for an overall peace. * She was eager
for it and gave up the effort with the National Government,
which was judged to be unfaithful to general peace. She in-
tended to accomplish the purpose in another way.

In the spring of 1938 Kao, former Director of Bureau
of Asiatic Affairs, and Tung, former section chief, Bureau of
Asiatic Affairs, successively came to Tokyo. The witness met
them in his capacity as Chief of the Chinese Section, Military

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Page 23,979 Affairs Bureau. Their purpose was to make Japan understand that once it disregarded the Chiang Regime, some other person must be sought to invite peace between the nations. No one was better suited for that than Wang Ching-wei, who felt the need of quickly settling the problem. His assertion would never be accepted, however, by the National Government. There was no alternative but to make Chiang listen to the peace talk by launching a peace movement outside the government. Japan seemed to have no objection * to Kao's plan, but they did not make positive overtures to Wang. Nothing further being heard, Japan thought Kao's movement had failed, and did not take trouble to investigate into the matter.

In the autumn of 1938 Colonel IMAI, General Staff, who went to Shanghai on official business, returned with the tentative terms of peace between Japan and China drawn up by Kao and Mei. In Tokyo amendments were made to the tentative plan in accordance with Japanese policy and the witness and IMAI were ordered to proceed with the terms to Shanghai on November 19th and delivered them to Kao in May. Several amendments were made in accordance with their desires.

Page 23,980 The plan differed in form from the KONOYE statement of December 1932, but in substance it was almost the same. In addition, the Chinese proposed * that Wang escape from Chungking according to pre-arranged plan, and then Japan would be expected to announce the terms of peace. This was due to the fact that to give impetus to Wang's peace movement it was necessary to clarify Japan's desires. These matters were transmitted to the superiors and the War Minister reported them to the Five Ministers Council and obtained its assent on November 25th. Wang agreed and escaped from Chungking on December 18, 1938 according to plan, and reached Hanoi on the 20th.

Page 23,981 KONOYE announced his three principles on the 22nd, while Wang, in response to KONOYE's statement, sent circular telegrams containing peace representations to the Central Office of the Kuomintang Party, Chiang, and the Central Executive Committee. He urged * the necessity of peace, the impossibility of resistance, and explained that Japan's attitude had been made clear and further resistance was useless. He desired the earnest reconsideration of the National Government.

With respect to the KONOYE statement, in view of the National Government's attitude a fairly long war was to be expected. It was natural that Japan's demands would increase

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23,982 in proportion to the length of the war and the increase of sacrifice and the growing victories. What Japan wanted of China was co-existence and co-prosperity based on hearty collaboration. In accordance with the various ministers' idea that Japan's grand policy embracing what she desired of China must be decided as the National policy, * the War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers began to draw plans from about July 1938, and it was referred to an Imperial Conference on November 30th. This decided the National policy. The KONOYE statement was the summary of it.

At the time quite a few people of all circles thought reparations for the sacrifices suffered during the incident should be in the form of territory or control of management. It was, therefore, remarkable that the National policy, which seemed rather weak-kneed, was decided upon under such circumstances and abandoned reparations.

23,983 In January 1939, the Kuomintang struck Wang's name off the party register and expelled him from all public offices. Special service agents were sent to Hanoi, threatening him. Tseng, Wang's right-hand man, was assassinated on March 21st. It was reported that Wang's life was in danger every minute. At the Five Ministers Conference it was decided that the witness should see Wang * and if needed, help him to reach a safety zone. The witness reached Hanoi on April 17th by the Hokko Maru, with YANO, Foreign Office Secretary, and INUKAI. He met Wang on April 18th. Wang regretted the outbreak and development of the incident and said he had discussed it with Chiang, in writing and verbally, about the need of cooperation in which he believed, but Chiang had told him it was impossible to have peace, partly because he was suspicious of Japan's real intentions, and partly because of various circumstances.

23,984 Just when he thought there was no way to sway the Chungking Government except by arousing public opinion from the outside, giving up trying to have Chiang change his mind, he was notified by Kao in May of Japan's peace policy. Wang believed it not impossible to obtain public opinion if Japan abide by it. He stated that the KONOYE statement had had a most important effect on the peace movement. * He further stated it was dangerous and meaningless to stay at Hanoi and he wanted to further the movement from Shanghai and he intended to move to Shanghai with the consent of the French Indo-China authorities. He hoped to develop the move after arriving in Shanghai by a

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more advanced method and was considering the plan to be followed. His original plan for the peace movement was to instill peace enthusiasm in the people with the members of the Kuomintang as central figures and make the National Government do away with the anti-Japanese policy. He had no intention of establishing a government.

Wang chartered a French ship with the consent of French Indo-China and boarded it April 25, 1939, at Katoba Island, guarded by the Peace Preservation Bureau of French Indo-China. The ship left the 26th. The Japanese boarded the Hokko Maru at Haiphong. On the 28th they received notice from Wang that he wanted to transfer to the Hokko Maru and that evening he changed ships northeast of Bias Bay. After touching at Keelung they sailed straight for Shanghai, reaching there May 8th. While on board the witness often talked with Wang. He told him and INUKAI certain important things.

23,986

First he told them that the plan of the peace move was to organize a peace body around the Kuomintang members to point out the error of the anti-Japanese theory and to explain that peace was the only way to save China and East Asia. They would enlarge the peace camp by degrees and ultimately make Chungking change its policy. But it was extremely difficult to make Chungking change by discussion alone. His advocacy of peace came from his love of China, but anti-Japanism was also a patriotic expression. Peace advocacy could not be distinguished easily from treason and it is difficult to make the people listen to peace advocacy, which was quite different from the advocacy of resistance. * Peace advocacy could shine only when Japan's policy was endorsed by facts. If the KONOYE statement was put into practice, Chungking's advocacy of resistance would lose its basis. He believed Chungking would have no choice but to turn to peace, swayed by public opinion. The shortest way was to establish a peaceful government and cooperate with Japan in implementing the KONOYE statement. He therefore thought it best to give up the former plan and establish a peace government which would arouse public opinion to the fact that resistance was meaningless, not only by speech to Chungking but through factual proof. In this way Chungking might turn to peace.

If Japan had no objection he wished to change the previous plan and establish a peace government. This government

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23,987 did not aim at destroying Chungking. * If peace can be invited he did not care who held political power. The purpose of the peace move is to influence Chungking to turn to peace and make it cease resistance. It was therefore not desirable to provoke civil war, though it will be necessary to possess military force after establishing the government. If Chungking joins in the future, the purpose will have been attained and he would retire to private life.

23,988 Wang intended to show Chungking and the public that peace advocacy was not groundless by establishing a peace government and creating a living example of cooperation and thus bring about peace and peaceful cooperation with Japan in conjunction with Chungking. With the establishment of his new regime China would be divided into two camps, which would be ultimately reunited. Without this re-union general peace could not be achieved.* This was Wang's guiding principle. This can be seen from his circular telegram of January 16, 1940, in which he said that if Chiang deciding on a far-sighted policy, makes peace with Japan and seeks its concrete facts, Wang and his comrades would join forces with Chiang and bring about peace to the whole country.

Having arrived at Shanghai on May 8, 1949, Wang met Chu, Chow, Fu, Mei and Kao and as a result of the meeting decided to visit Japan. He told the witness of his desire and requested him to communicate with Japan. Wang was drawing up the plans of the movement and studying the points of his demands. When completed, he intended to leave.

23,989 Wang's principal points were * that opinions would be frankly exchanged with KONOYE, HIRANUMA and other ministers, with Wang personally attending to the matters. If as a result peace movement was considered hopeful, certain articles would be implemented by Chou. To further the movement demands concerning the execution of principles of the respect of sovereign rights would be presented to Japan due to the need of making the Chinese understand that Japan had no intention of aggression, control, or of interfering with Chinese internal affairs.

To show that the new government was not formed by Japanese pressure, they must not disrupt the previous judicial system, and Japan will be required to recognize as indispensable that the new government should be called the National Government;

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that the form of its establishment would be "return to the capital;" that Three Peoples' Principles would be made the guiding conception; and the sun-in-the-blue-sky-flag would be used as the national flag.

23,990

Wang left Shanghai by air at the beginning of June 1939 with Chou, Mei, Kao and others. There was also YANO, SHIMIZU, INUKAI and the witness. Shortly after arriving in Tokyo, Wang had an interview with HIRANUMA at which the latter expressed his opinion on cooperation to be based on moral conception, and admired Wang's moral courage in trying to solve the incident. Wang replied that future trouble was meaningless and he was determined to concentrate all energies on materializing peace. He asked HIRANUMA whether Japan had a policy for promoting the peace movement with Chungking for solving the incident and whether it had a policy of directing its activities toward sympathizers in civil circles and excluding Kuomintang members. And whether Japan intended to pave the way by welcoming all persons who gave thought to the future * of both countries regardless of whether they were government or civilian, members of one party or another. He stated he would establish a Peace Government with himself as the center if Japan considered this third method appropriate.

23,991

HIRANUMA replied that his Cabinet had inherited the KONOYE ideas and were adhering to them. He expressed approval of Wang's policy and stated Japan was ready to lend absolute assistance and support. The present witness was present and heard everything. As to interviews with other ministers, the witness had no recollection of any requiring special mention except the statement of ITAGAKI.

23,992

Acting as proxy for HIRANUMA, ITAGAKI on June 15th stated what was expected by Japan. The witness was present * and understood the contents of the conversation. He observed that ITAGAKI was careful in his choice of words to avoid giving any impression to Wang of interfering in Chinese internal policy. ITAGAKI asked Wang's opinion concerning the liquidation of past evils due to the doctrine of "One Nation, One Party". Wang said he agreed and desired to live up to ITAGAKI's expectations by directing matters so as to take in members of all parties and factions since he feared that any dislocation of the juridical system would be an obstacle to future development.

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23,993

ITAGAKI replied that persons belonging to the provisional and restoration governments were faithful to this same idea. They had striven for peaceful cooperation enduring persecution and Japan could not dissolve them without some consideration. He wanted Wang's ideas * in establishing a political council with these two bodies in order to manage Sino-Japanese relations locally.

Wang replied he had no objection to establishing a council in North China, which is far from Nanking and in trusting to it to a certain extent, local administration. There was the Huang Fu example. He was unable, however, to consent to the establishment of anything like this in Central China, but was ready to consider the warm treatment of persons thus affected in that region.

23,994

ITAGAKI stated that many people interpret the doctrine of the Japanese welfare as though it accepted pro-communism and anti-Japanism. He asked if he had any opinion on adjusting this and promoting Sino-Japanese cooperation and anti-communism. Wang agreed. ITAGAKI further stated that most of the Japanese thought that the Chinese flag was the sign of anti-Japanism. If this peace government and its army * had the same flag as the anti-Japan government, unexpected results might occur in military action. Wang was absolutely opposed to changing the flag, stated he would consider a method by which a distinction could be made.

23,995

ITAGAKI asked Wang's opinion on the recognition of Manchukuo. Wang answered that according to the address of Sun Yat-sen in Kobe, the recognition of Manchurian independence is not against doctrine. They should recognize her as independent in view of her present stage of development. He saw no alternative but to recognize Manchukuo. In this interview ITAGAKI considered that so far as internal affairs were concerned, it would be wise to accept Wang's opinion, but since the problem of the national flag and the dissolution of the renovation government were concerned with prosecution of war, * he thought it necessary to make the Japanese Army in China cognizant of Wang's opinion and summoned his staff officers to Tokyo.

Each of these staff officers were opposed to the flag because the Japanese Army had a strong belief that that flag was a symbol of anti-Japanism and made distinction

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between the peace army and the anti-Japan army difficult. They were also opposed to dissolving the renovation government because it would give rise to difficult problems in maintaining public peace.

But as a result of discussions the staff officers understood ITAGAKI's will, ITAGAKI thinking it best to respect fully Wang's will on such internal problems in China, and the officers came to agree with ITAGAKI. They concluded that since the central authorities have resolved to respect Wang's opinions, they must make their subordinates obey. ITAGAKI informed the Five Ministers Conference of these matters and it was decided to respect without reservation Wang's will.

23,996

After these interviews Wang had an interview with KONOYE, who spoke with Wang without an interpreter for hours. As a result of the interview Wang was inspired with much courage and hope as to the future.

Following this the request on realizing the principle of respecting sovereignty was submitted by Chou, and the contention by China was generally admitted by Japan. The most important items were that Japan would not interfere with domestic administration and all negotiations would be carried on through regular diplomatic channels. Advisors were to be provided at China's request only in the Central Government and highest military body. An advisor would answer inquiries and submit occasional opinions to the Chief, but the Chief concerned was to make the decision exclusively.

23,997

In joint enterprises improper property appraisal by China will be corrected and Japanese investment limited. Surplus customs duties in the custody of the Tax Control Bureau and the Yokohama Specie Bank were to be transferred to the Central Government. The Salt Administration was to regain pre-war status on organization of the Central Government. Factories, mines and houses controlled by the Japanese Army were to be promptly returned to China, except those needed militarily.

23,998

The establishment of Wang's regime depended entirely on his own free will and Japan neither asked Wang to establish a government or persuaded him to do so. * This was clear from

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the talk between HIRANUMA and Wang. Also, Wang's New Year statement of January 1, 1940 is witness to this. In that statement Wang stated that as to his positive embarkation on the peace movement, some of his friends approved and others opposed. He was extremely worried by means and ways.

To achieve the great mission common with Japan and China for stabilization and security in East Asia and establishing a new order, the question was: was he to stay out of the government and convert the present anti-Japanese government, or was he to achieve this by establishing a new political power? Or, even in establishing a new regime, was he first to establish it as a local power and then enlarge it to a central government, or was he to establish the central government from the beginning?

23,999

There were many ways conceivable, but he reached the conclusion that the most direct and bold was the most effective to future development and finally decided to establish a central political power. The KONOYE statement of December 22, 1938 was the only data available to Wang with regard to Japanese desire. However, it was too abstract and various opinions would arise therefrom if they were to put it into practice.

If after Wang succeeded in organizing a government, great differences should be found between the drafts submitted by Japan and Wang's understanding of the KONOYE statement, Wang would face a difficult situation resulting in the collapse of his government or his being left in the hands of a puppet political power. In either case, the peace movement would fail.

24,000

In order to show Japan's sincerity toward Wang, and to make the peace movement a success, Japan had to deliberate with Wang * as to the embodiment of the KONOYE statement prior to Wang's organizing a government. In case the conditions of both sides did not agree, Wang had the liberty to suspend establishing his government. The witness presented these views to the government and they were approved and in October 1939 he was shown a tentative plan by the China Affairs Board.

The witness, Admiral SUGA, YANO and INUKAI, and Chou, Mei, Lin and others conducted an exhaustive investigation and discussion. Amendments were made to the draft plan and a con-

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clusion reached on December 30th. Both sides agreed to the amended plan.

24,001

It seemed that even after the issuance of KONOYE's statement, peace negotiations with Chungking were in many instances conducted by unofficial Japanese with the understanding of government authorities, but the witness was not acquainted with this. From about January 1940, under supervision of ITAGAKI,* Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army, peace negotiations with Chungking were actively held, with the view of contributing to a merger of Chungking and Wang's prospective government and thus bring about an overall peace. These negotiations were promoted through Sung Tzu-liang. About the end of March it was seen that the possibility of success was very great, so ITAGAKI, after consulting with Wang, decided to postpone the formal establishment of Wang's government for several days. But finally, the Wang government was formally set up on March 30th.

Even after this Sung's maneuvers for peace were enthusiastically continued by ITAGAKI. The treaty negotiations which started from June 1940 were conducted on a dilly-dallying policy after consulting with Wang. This was also to facilitate the peace maneuvers, but these also proved unsuccessful and in October 1940 it was decided to discontinue the try for peace.

24,002

After the failure of the Sung maneuvers, * MATSUOKA after consulting with Wang, schemed for peace negotiations through Chien Yung-ming and until the results were definitely known, signature of the treaty was withheld. At last, on November 30th that year the treaty was signed by which Japan recognized Wang's government. All through the period, both before and after Wang's government was set up, each Cabinet was concerned about establishing peace with Chungking.

Neither Japan nor its Army and Navy had any organ or mechanism for guarding and supervising Wang's government. Although the Nanking Government had advisors in its Military and Economic Council, they were all appointed by Wang. They were not forced or recommended by Japan. They all acted in accordance with Chinese regulations and gave advice when called upon. They offered opinions occasionally, but never guided or interfered or made investigations. They acted as a medium

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24,003 between Wang and Japan * and made great efforts for prosecuting Wang's policies. The advisors, to avoid temptation as much as possible, assumed an attitude that was rather too passive. This, however, was in accord with Japan's intention and the military to prevent Wang's government from becoming a puppet. Accordingly, affairs were soon left to the free will of the Chinese and no restrictions were exercised.

The same was true with the decision on policies and quite a few were brought to the knowledge of the Japanese only after the decisions were made. Some of the policies proved non-feasible because of military restrictions, but this was unavoidable. It can not be denied that the Japanese Army took the attitude of helping to execute Wang's policies to the greatest extent permissible.

24,004 As to budgets, the Chinese decided them independently and the economic advisors were lending their good offices by giving their views on financial resources. * On the basis of Wang's demands in June 1937 Japan stipulated restrictions to its economic advance into China and in particular the reduction and restriction in percentage of shares to be held by Japanese in joint national policy concerns created considerable repercussions in Japanese economic circles.

It was also promised that many of the established advantages and vested interests would be returned to the Chinese. This caused not a few people in all circles to entertain antipathy and skepticism in Wang's government and some went so far as to call it an anti-Japanese government under the veil of peace. Anti-Wang government atmosphere was created in Japan. This was a reaction to Wang's government having planned for political independence and Japan having assisted in it. This also is proof that Wang's government was not a puppet government.

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAGESA, Sadaaki
by Mr. Yamada, counsel for ITAGAKI

24,005

The witness stated that Wang's first meeting with
ITAGAKI was on the day following the interview with HIRANUMA.

24,006

This meeting was on the 11th of June. ITAGAKI told Wang * that
the Army war aims were not to regard the Chinese as an enemy,
but to fight against the Communists and other troops who were
working in collusion with them. On the 11th Wang submitted to
ITAGAKI the document on the expedient methods to save the situa-
tion.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION BY JUDGE NYI.

24008

* The witness stated that he did not remember the terms of the peace negotiations carried on with the German Ambassador. When asked whether after Nanking had fallen Japan revised its peace terms and that the new ones were more difficult to accept, he stated that the negotiations through the German Ambassador Trautmann were conducted just prior to the fall of Nanking, and he recalled that though the terms were made, they were relaxed. * The latter terms were relaxed, but not heavier or more strict. He denied that the terms from after the fall of Nanking were required to be accepted before the end of the year.

24009

24010

The witness stated that he was familiar with other new regimes before establishing the central government. * He denied participating in forming the so-called Ta-Tao Shanghai Municipal Government. When it was pointed out, exhibit No. 463-A, an official document of the Foreign Ministry, it was stated that KAGESA had been consulted in forming this municipal government, the witness stated * that he did not participate.

24011

24013

After it was pointed out that this was an official document, he stated that as an officer in the general staff he received a report on the manner in which the municipal government was set up, but he did not participate in establishing that government. He received a report on its formation saying it was formed, but never at any time took direct part in forming it. * The only part that he denied was the direct part.

On December 14, 1937, the provisional government was already established in Japanese occupied Peiping. He thought it possible to interpret the facts to mean that the formation of this provisional government had been planned long before the fall of Nanking. The head of the provisional government was Wang-Keh-min.

24014

When asked whether he knew that Wang was the first in Hong Kong and was instructed by KITA and IMAI to go north and set up this government, * the witness stated he did not know the manner of his going north or the circumstances surrounding it.

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When asked what he meant when he said Japan intended to accomplish peace in some other way, the witness stated Japan had no proposal, and among those concerned each had his own proposal. The government had not arrived at any definite plan, method, or procedure.

24018 * The witness stated that the statement of January 16 was KONOYE's statement. KONOYE might have had some other way, but so far as the witness was concerned the some other way was an extremely vague matter, and since he had nothing concrete in mind he had simply used the expression "some other way".

24019 When asked whether it was intended to set up new regimes or to do it through established regimes, * the witness stated that he remembered among the some other ways was a plan which sought for peace through established regimes.

When asked whether it was Japan's policy to have separate regimes rather than a centralized government, he stated Japan's foremost desire for China was a government which was strong and unified and friendly to Japan, and its foremost wish was that the national government change its attitude to friendship toward Japan. Japanese policy had not advanced to as concrete a state of requiring that the local regimes be still maintained. The Japanese ideas were in some measure expressed through the Wang Ching-wei-ITAGAKI conversation.

24020 With respect to the term "some other way", he also recalled the plan he had * as Chief of the Military Affairs Section. Asked how despite the fact a war existed Kao came to Tokyo in the spring of 1938, the witness stated that a friend of his in Shanghai was much taken by Kao's enthusiasm and arranged with the Japanese Army to have him brought to Japan, and an airplane was provided. He could never come without the help of the Japanese Army. Advance notice of his coming came only to the witness as an individual. * The Japanese government had nothing to do with it, only the witness had advance notice. The witness was then Chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Ministry. When asked whether he could direct the airplane without his government having any knowledge of it, the witness stated he had not provided the airplane. This was done by the Japanese Army which was then stationed in China.

24021

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24022 * The witness stated that Kao came to see the witness as an individual, and not in his official capacity. The name of his friend in Shanghai was MATSUMOTO, Shigeharu, of Domei. He negotiated with the army and used his good offices in getting the plane. Before Kao started the witness had a telegram from MATSUMOTO.

24023 The witness had met Kao once in 1932. Before Kao came, the purpose of his visit was unknown to the witness, although he knew he was coming. * Kao was former Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs of the China Foreign Ministry, but the witness did not know whether he held any position at the time.

24024 Although Kao came and was met by the witness as an individual, after talking with him the witness' position changed from that of an individual to an official, and in that capacity reported his information to his superior officers. Asked how his capacity * changed, the witness stated that having had no order or authority when he met Kao, he met him as an individual. After the talk he learned that this related to general peace between Japan and China and that these men were in a position of influence and that their plan was acceptable and effective to use as reference. He reported the contents of his conversation in his official capacity, recommending that something be done to carry the talks through. He reported this to Generals HOMMA and TADA, chief of the Second Division General Staff and Vice Chief of Staff. They had no objections.

24025 All questions discussed with Kao related to general peace, * although he did not know Kao's official position. When asked how he could conduct negotiations in such an atmosphere, he stated that they were not negotiations, but that there should be no hesitation to anyone desiring to bring about peace to engage in such discussions, either privately or officially. It would be extremely valuable to discuss with an individual general peace. He was only sorry there were not many more of them.

The Army at Shanghai thought it advisable to bring Kao by special plane. When not in use there were many planes.

Page

24026 * With respect to the use of the term Japanese Government in the statement that the Japanese Government had no particular objections to Kao's plan, he stated that TADA reported the matter to the War Minister, who reported it to the 5 Ministers Conference, and no one entertained any objections. The War Minister at the time was SUGIYAMA. He could not recall who was Foreign Minister. He would not say they favored the plan, but they had no objection to it. They did not go any further in stating that they had no objection.

24027 * When asked whether prior to that Japan had made frequent overtures to Wang-Ching-wei, the witness stated before that they had not heard about Wang-Ching-wei, and no positive overtures were made. He actually saw only two people, Kao and Tung, to discuss peace.

24028 With respect to the Ta-Tao Shanghai Municipal Government, as stated before * he had not participated in establishing the government, but he did talk with other Chinese about peace. However, he had met only two Chinese in Japan proper with regard to peace. Once, during a trip to Shanghai, he received a visitor, but since his discussion about peace did not amount to much he had not given it any importance * and had not mentioned it.

24029

He went to Shanghai in September, 1937. He did not know the mission of IMAI in Shanghai on official business. He did not think his assignment was to contact Chinese interested in the peace movement for establishing a pro-Japanese regime.

The witness had heard of the Tang peace movement, but did not know who joined or participated in it. This was outside his duties. He did not think IMAI had any connection with it. In the end Tang was assassinated, and his peace movement collapsed.

24030 * Asked whom he meant by the central military authorities who made amendments to the plans proposed by Kao and Mei, the witness stated they were the officers concerned in the Army Staff and the War Ministry. The Chief of Staff at the time was Prince KAN-IN, and ITAGAKI was war minister. Up to April, 1938, the witness was Chief of the Chinese Section of the General Staff. His affidavit should be corrected to read that the

24031 * Chinese Section was in the General Staff.

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At that time the Vice Chief of Staff was TADA, and the Vice-Minister of War TOJO. He recalled that the plan proposed by Kao and Mei was reported by the Minister of War to the 5 Minister's Conference.

Asked how he could take Kao's and Mei's opinions as the official desires of China when he did not know their official position, the witness stated regardless of their position the proposal advanced by them was reasonable. It was his belief that proper measures should be taken to meet them. This was why he would have welcomed thousands of Chinese so that they would be able to understand the desires and views entertained by the people of China. He could not say that Kao's and Mei's views would represent the Chinese view. He had only said that in his affidavit because both were Chinese. He meant that this was the desire of these two particular Chinese, not the Chinese in general. It was clear that these men had connections with Wang Ching-wei.

24033 In November, 1938, the order for the witness to go to Shanghai was issued by the War Minister after consultation at the 5 Minister's Conference. IMAI was sent on order of the Vice-Chief Staff, at the witness' recommendation. The witness had said that since he was going as a representative of the War Ministry, there * should be one from the General Staff. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was General MACHIJIRI, and not SATO, who was below the witness in rank. The witness' assignment was to transmit to the Chinese the terms they desired. The Chinese desired to hear the Japanese terms, and the witness went to convey them. There was some discussion on these terms, but the witness' assignment was to transmit them and to listen to the desires of the Chinese and bring them back to the * proper authorities in Japan.

24034

24035 The purpose of the project was not discussion. The assignment was to convey the Japanese terms to the other party and carry back their desires. The points he principally discussed with Wang's followers was withdrawal or evacuation of troops. * While he did not know their official position, as stated before, they were connected with Wang Ching-wei, who was Vice-Chairman of the Kuomintang and of the National Defense Council. He was also the No. 2 man in China.

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He did not take it that Wang had the power to send people to discuss the evacuation of troops and the military situation in the occupied areas. Wang was a patriot with ardent desires to realize general peace in China, and to realize this peace one important condition was, "What did Japan desire of China?" Because these gentlemen had connection with Wang, he listened to their views.

24036

* There was agreement among them as to the evacuation of troops. The Commander of the Central China Forces had no connection with this. He believed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Force was General YAMADA. There was no supreme headquarters at the time. HATA was not in command. The supreme headquarters was not established until the spring of 1940. He had forgotten who was MATSUI's successor as Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Forces.

24037

* When asked what he meant by a pre-arranged plan when he said that Wang was to escape from Chungking according to a pre-arranged plan, the witness stated on November 9, 1937, Wang had a conference with Chiang Kai-shek at which Kao was present. At that time Wang explained the advantages and disadvantages of war and peace, but because Chiang did not listen Wang came to the conclusion that results could not be achieved by carrying on a peace movement within Chungking, and the only alternative was for him to escape to the outside to carry on the movement. This story was published in the newspapers of January 15, 1938. At that time

24038

Chungking was surrounded * and influenced by the communists, and Chiang Kai-shek could not act on his own initiative, and it was impossible to eradicate the communistic influence. The mission could be taken only outside Chungking.

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It is clear, therefore, that as early as November 9 Wang already had a plan to escape from Chungking.

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This is what the witness meant * by a pre-arranged plan.

24041

* When the Chinese proposed that they were carrying out a pre-arranged plan, he did not know about the pre-arrangement at all. * They mentioned this pre-arranged plan because they wanted the peace terms to be announced after Wang escaped as a pre-arranged plan. This is the reason for the use of the word.

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24042 It was agreed that when they carried out this pre-arranged plan Japan would be expected to announce its terms, and he so informed his government. The KONOYE statement was therefore prepared in view of Wang's escape. * Wang responded to KONOYE's statement on December 29, but the witness had not heard beforehand what the contents of the announcement would be. He had never heard that Wang's response was made on a previously arranged scheme to give the Chinese views on KONOYE's statement.

With respect to the 5 Minister's Conference which decided to send the witness to see Wang, the witness did not remember the date except that it was in the latter part of March. The witness recommended himself for the assignment by telling ITAGAKI he would like to take it.

24043 * Asked whether the instructions specify what would be a safety zone, the witness stated he was ordered that all things should be determined at the initiative of Wang himself. He was instructed to assist Wang to reach a safety zone. By such a zone was meant a zone where it would be most convenient and safe to carry on the peace movement and not a place like Hanoi where Wang's life would be in danger from assassins.

24044 At the time Japan felt it would be most inconvenient for Wang to come to a Japanese safety zone, but that some area outside such a zone would be more preferable. The decision, however, was left to Wang. * Shanghai was decided on in accord with Wang's desire.

With respect to the trip to FIC by the witness, previous information was given to the Japanese consular authorities. Secret code terms were used to hide the witness' identity during the trip. Telegrams were sent by the witness direct from Hanoi, but it may have been that certain telegrams were routed through Formosa. He did not recall that several telegrams were routed through the Formosan Army. He could recall that telegrams sent direct from Hanoi to Tokyo were for technical reasons sent through Formosa. These may have been sent through Formosa for such reasons.

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- 24046 * The witness identified exhibit No. 2721-B as a telegram sent by him under the pseudo name KAWAMURA. The witness also identified exhibit No. 2721-C-1, C-2, and 24049 C-2 as telegrams sent by him. * The witness identified exhibit No. 2721-D as a telegram sent by him. With 24050 respect to exhibits 2721-E-1, E-2, and F-2, * the witness stated that E-1 and E-2 were sent by him; the third was 24051 not. He also identified * exhibit No. 2721-F as a telegram sent by him.
- 24052 Exhibit No. 2721-G * was not drafted by the witness, but was sent by him and he was responsible for it. Exhibit No. 2721-H was sent by the witness.
- 24053 When asked whether YANO went to FIC on the Hokko Maru or whether he flew to Shanghai from Tokyo and went to FIC by another ship, the witness stated that the latter statement was true. * His statement in the affidavit was a mistake.
- The Hokko Maru was a specially chartered ship for the purpose of this trip. The witness, being on intimate terms with YAMASHITA, he requested it and the latter provided it.
- 24054 When asked whether he arrived at Hanoi on the 16th of April, he may have made a mistake by one or two days in his affidavit. He did not remember when YANO arrived, but YANO did arrive at Hanoi before the witness. * he had not heard that the Foreign Ministry sent urgent instructions to the consul in Hong Kong to bring YANO at the same time as the witness arrived. There was no special reason why they did not come together. YANO had the opportunity to go to Hong Kong via plane.
- 24055 When asked why it was necessary that he arrive at Hanoi on the same day as the witness did and whether it was because he was in charge of the secret codes, the witness replied it was not. When the witness met Wang Ching-wei he handed him the letters from ARITA and ITAGAKI and from SUZUKI of the Koa-in, and from YONAI.
- * With respect to the code, the witness recalled that his name was KAWAMURA, but he did not recall other aspects of this inferior and weak code. He remembered that Wang's name was not "cargo" or "freight". There may have been such a name as TAKEUCHI, but he had no recollection of the name given to Wang Ching-wei.

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24056 He thought that there was some other name besides that given to Wang Ching-wei, but since the events had taken place eight years before he did not remember. He had forgotten * that the code name for Hokka Maru was "taxi". He recalled that the code name for Wang Ching-wei's hiding place in Shanghai was "godown", and that code name for Shanghai was "Osaka".

24057 He left Hanoi on the 25th, but Wang did not leave on the same boat. He did not recall the name, but it was a small French ship chartered for him, and Wang's ship also started on the 25th. When asked whether it was arranged beforehand that the two ships * were to meet on the high seas off the Nightingale Islands, the witness stated he did not remember the name of the island but it was south of Hainan, and the two ships were to meet there and to make the balance of the voyage together.

24059 By his affidavit he meant to suggest that the idea of changing ships came from Wang Ching-wei and not because of a pre-arranged plan. When asked whether this was true in view of the pre-arrangement to meet in the Nightingale Islands, the witness said they had agreed to meet at Nightingale Islands. * The plan was for both ships to meet at a point south of Hainan and to proceed to Shanghai side by side.

24060 When they * left Hanoi he had heard that the plan was for both ships to go side by side, an occasion might arise because of navigation difficulties which would make it necessary for Wang to change ships. *Wang was on a very small ship of about 700 tons, and a slight storm even would make it difficult to proceed, while the witness was on a 5,000 ton ship.

24061 The reason that they did not take Wang along on their ship was a very important point considering Wang's political concepts and philosophy. He wanted to serve his country by putting all matters into action in accordance with his own initiative without outside assistance and that he would take a small ship, and would not like to trust his mission to other parties, but even would take his chance on a small ship and would change ships only when travel became impossible.

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24062

* He stated that it was a distortion of facts to say that they used code terms and arranged to change ships to evade public attention and that the Japanese were at the back of the Wang Chingwei movement.

When asked why he used code terms and started on two different ships, the witness stated that in going and coming from to Hanoi to get Wang, all movements were kept in absolute secrecy. Since Wang's life was in danger it was clear that if they were to leave Hanoi with Wang his life would be in danger. This is why codes were used. The decision with respect to the degree of danger at Shanghai was left entirely to Wang. There is no difference if they went on two different ships or on the same ship. They merely met Wang's desires.

When Wang's ship did not join them in the high seas they were anxious, and urgent measures were resorted to to search for his ship. He later heard that the navy had been requested to search for Wang's ship by orders from Tokyo.

24064

* No one from Japan suggested that Shanghai was not a safe place, but he had heard that there was considerable argument among Wang's followers as to the place he should seek refuge. The witness asked the Tokyo authorities that residences be prepared for Wang.

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* This was not done to safeguard Wang, but were established because his circle was so large that several were needed. He had forgotten whether he had asked for guards at the landing, but he had requested that they be placed at Wang's provisional place of hiding.

When his memory was refreshed by exhibit No. 2721-D in which he stated that they wished to carry out their orders according to a fixed schedule, the witness stated that the reason why it was stated that the situation did not permit a delay was that next door to Wang's residence in Hanoi a group of assassins had rented a house under the name of Southwest Airlines Company.

24067

Whether or not Wang would be exposed to more danger in Shanghai was left to Wang. The witness decided that Wang should call on Formosa. * Keelung was in North Formosa. It would ordinarily take about three days for the Hokko Maru to go from Keelung to Shanghai. They left Keelung around May 4 or 5.

Page

He stated it was pure speculation to say that they could have reached Shanghai much earlier than May 8 and they slowed down purposely on the high seas because the residences of Wang were not yet ready.

24068 When asked * whether the boat could have arrived
24069 at Shanghai by the fourth at normal speed but the boat
 was slowed down * so as not to arrive until the 6th,
 the witness stated he did not remember about slowing the
 ship. His memory was not even refreshed when shown a
 telegram. His statement of leaving Keelung about May
 4 or 5 was based on a presumption calculated according
 to the ship's usual speed. It was pure guess work on
24070 his part. He also assisted in transporting Wang's
 associates, * in accordance with Wang's desire.
 The most influential person in his circle was his wife.
 His party was somewhere around 20.

24071 * When asked what he had in mind when he used
 the term in exhibit No. 2721-F "war of telegrams" with
 Chiang, the witness stated it was a battle of words
 between Wang and Chiang, because Chiang insisted on
 resistance against Japan, while Wang insisted on
 peace.

24072 When asked what he meant by terroristic counter-
24073 plot in that telegram, he said some counter-measures
 against terrorism * had to be taken in accordance with
 Wang's plan. * By terroristic counter plots he meant
 defensive measure. The various plans do not refer to
 counter plans against terrorism, but include all steps
 necessary to carry on plans for peace.

24074 * He called it a defensive measure to counteract
 against terroristic activities and to set up headquarters
 at a convenient place to carry out such activities. He
 actually set up headquarters for Wang in accord with his
 wishes on an extension of the International Settlement at
 Shanghai. No. 76 Jessfield Road * was the residence
 headquarters from which Wang carried on his anti-terror-
 istic measures. Ting was in charge of the headquarters.
 Japanese assistance in this work principally included
 liaison with the Kempei Tai in Shanghai, and the
 eradication of any friction between the Japanese gend-
 armerie and Wang's group. The Japanese came under the
 witness' command after arrival in Shanghai.

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- 24076 When asked * whether Japanese terrorists had been sent from Tokyo to Shanghai for this purpose, the witness said he heard of the plan but it was rejected and not a single one came. The witness issued the rejection. They did not come to Shanghai. When asked whether his plan was the rejection of the terrorists or merely a difference as to the time of bringing them in, the witness said * that the telegram was sent on May 3 or 4 through the Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, while the witness was in Formosa. He had received information that there was a plan to send rightist elements from Tokyo to Shanghai. They were extreme nationalists. This was the telegram he had sent in opposition to that.
- 24079
- 24080 When he arrived in Shanghai on May 8, he learned that the group had not arrived. * Asked what were the bitter experiences in the past referred to in the paragraph, the witness said from his association with internal national problems, he was very familiar with the harm that could be done by right wing terrorists.
- 24081 * He hated terrorists and never used them. When asked on what occasion they had been used in the past, he was pointing to the many terrorist incidents that occurred in Japan, but he had never written that he had used terrorists himself.
- 24082 * While in Formosa he received information from the headquarters of the Formosan Army * that there was a report that a terroristic group was going to Shanghai, and he was not informed of the type of organization they belonged to or the names of its members. He had not
- 24083
- 24086 * made any investigation and did not know their political affiliations. After arriving in Shanghai he did not
- 24087 * think it necessary * to investigate the terroristic gangs and did not make any investigation.
- 24088 * He learned that the terrorists were being sent from Japan from a member of the Japanese forces in Taiwan who had recently returned from Tokyo. When asked whether he had asked the man how he got this information, he said he did not think it necessary. * He did not take any steps to obtain any information concerning the sending of terroristic gangs from Tokyo. He did not consider the person whom he had sent the telegram as the person who was sending the terrorists.
- 24089

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24090 When asked why he had sent this person to stop them, he said that the telegram * was sent to a section chief of the General Staff, who had assisted him in preparations for going to Hanoi, and he had nothing to do whatever to the sending of the terroristic gangs.

24091 Wang intimated he wished to go to Tokyo * about May 7 while they were aboard ship, but it was formally decided when they arrived in Shanghai. He was positively sure about May 9. While aboard ship nothing was said about concrete Japanese assistance for establishing a central government. Wang told him of his desire to
24092 establish a central government, but since * the witness did not know Japan's intentions he could say nothing. It was therefore no question of helping or not helping the establishment.

When he learned of Wang's desire for the first time to set up a central government, it was a surprise both for Japan and himself. When the witness was Chief of the Military Affairs Section, Japan had no idea of establishing a central government in China.

24093 When asked whether he knew that when the witness went to North China in the middle of May Wang Ching-wei had approached * the Italian Ambassador to use the Italian Concession in Tientsin for his activities in North China, the witness stated that according to his recollection he was in Shanghai with Wang in the middle of May.

When asked whether the Japanese consular authorities in Shanghai ordered his return to reach a decision about Wang's request to use the Italian Concession, the witness said he had no contact with the Italian Embassy. He had never heard that Wang intended to use the Tientsin Concession for his activities.

24094 Wang * did not make a trip to North China during that period, but only after his return from Tokyo. While in Tientsin he stayed in the Italian Concession. YANO made arrangements with the Italian authorities concerning the house, but he did not know what steps were taken by him. He suggested that YANO had nothing to do with arranging with the Italian authorities with regard to the thing.

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- 24095 * When it was pointed out that there was a telegram in which it was said that the writer was waiting for KAGESA to make arrangements, the witness stated he thought the telegram was a true one.
- 24096 * Although he had not seen it before or had no recollection of its contents, by looking at the telegram he recalled that he had gone to Peking. The telegram was marked exhibit No. 2721-I.
- 24097 * While he was in Peking in the middle of May, as was recalled to him, he had nothing to do with negotiations with the Italian authorities for Wang's use of the Concession. He had no recollection * of having been consulted by the Japanese consular authorities in Shanghai with respect to Wang's proposed use of the Italian Concession. * While the telegram says he was to be consulted after his return to Shanghai, he could not recall having been consulted about the use of the Italian Concession.
- 24098
- 24099
- 24100 He believed that Wang Cning-wei must have left Shanghai about May 31. He requested his affidavit, which stated that Wang left about the beginning of June, be left as it is, * because he was not absolutely sure that it was May 31, and there might be a difference of one or two days.
- Upon being shown exhibit No. 2721-H, he stated he was now sure it was May 31 and had no objection to his affidavit being corrected, and wanted it corrected.

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24,101

Exhibit 2721-H was sent to the DOHIHARA Agency, which was located in Shanghai. Even after DOHIHARA returned to Tokyo in April the office continued to be called the DOHIHARA Agency. The witness did not know DOHIHARA's mission in Shanghai. Being Chief of the Military Section of the War Ministry he had no connection with DOHIHARA's mission * and did not know anything about it. Many of the telegrams were relayed through the DOHIHARA Agency. The DOHIHARA Agency had come to an end but the witness used their building. If he did not use the name of the DOHIHARA Agency he had no access to ciphers so he had to use that name. There was no relation ever between the two missions.

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24,103

The witness had no right to send telegrams so he was forced to use the DOHIHARA name, which did have the privilege. * Although there were other agencies available through which he could send his telegrams, such as the consular authorities, because the building was empty he moved into it and sent telegrams from there because it was the most convenient thing to do. Although DOHIHARA had returned to Tokyo his right to send telegrams still existed. His coded address appeared in the table of ciphers. This is a simple matter for cipher experts to understand.

24,104

* The name being in the code books this gave authority to send telegrams under that name in code. This is why he used it. It is true that at the time there was in fact no DOHIHARA Agency but he merely used the code in the cipher book. He believed that DOHIHARA returned at the end of April. After his departure there were a few clerks who remained behind. He imagined the mission came to an end when DOHIHARA returned to Tokyo.

24,105

There was no connection between the two agencies. Since he did not know DOHIHARA's mission he could not say whether it was the same as his or different.

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The witness had no knowledge that on April 22nd or 23rd DOHIHARA sent a telegram to the Vice Minister of War and Vice Chief of Staff suggesting that Shanghai was not favorable for Wang Ching-wei. * He did not know that he had suggested Tsingtao as a better place. There was no use showing him any telegram because on the 23rd he was either on board a ship or in Hanoi. * He had never heard of the dispatch or its contents until this moment. This document was marked Exhibit 2721-J.

24,107

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24,108 He had no knowledge of the function of the DOHIHARA Agency or how it happened that DOHIHARA was making suggestions.
* After Wang Ching-wei returned from Tokyo to Shanghai in July, the witness opened the office known as the KAGESA Agency and he may have used the name KAGESA Organ. His organ had many names, 24,109 such as the Baikado and the Ume Agency. * They were one and the same agency. This organ did not take care of the funds to finance the Anti-Comintern National Salvation League. He had no knowledge of this League, but if its functions were explained to him he could perhaps say more about it.

24,110 Japan in the form of a loan provided funds to Wang. By the time * his government was established, the witness believed forty million yen had been loaned to him, but he had no recollection of the right amount. The witness was in charge of the details of payments to be made to Wang.

24,111 The witness first named his organ the Bakaido, meaning house of the plum blossoms. From that his staff began to call the office the Plum Agency or Ume Kikan. * He stated his organ was not one belonging to himself as an individual. His office 24,112 consisted * of various elements, from the Army, Navy, Foreign Office, China Affairs Bureau, Members of Parliament and journalists. Army members were under his orders. Those who were not under his command did not like to refer to the organ as the KAGESA organ, but those under his command used that name. Since they needed a name to include all elements, he named it the Bakaido. The General Staff called it the Ume Agency. Neither the Navy or Foreign Office had the obligation to use 24,113 the name given by the General Staff. * All these names had the same value and were commonly used names.

Official documents were the only telegrams sent by the witness to the Army and by the naval officers. His agency belonged to the various ministries separately, but the responsibility of direction rested on him. Simultaneously with the establishment of the Wang government, his organ was dissolved.

24,116 There was also a Matsu Kikan or Pine Agency, * and a Take Kikan or Bamboo Agency. He did not know the functions of these agencies. He had no recollection of the responsible member of the Pine Agency. The Take Kikan or Bamboo Agency must have been a small one because he did not recall its name. He had no relations with them.

Page

24,117 The President of the National Government at Chungking when Wang Ching-wei formed his government was Lin, Sung, and he knew that Wang once suggested that Lin should be named as President of the new government. * When asked whether this was for the purpose of misleading the people to believe the National Government had returned to Nanking, the witness stated that they believed that at some future time the Chungking Government would merge with the new one and there would be general peace. To be prepared for this they wished to name Lin as President. It was not to lead the people to think that the Chungking Government had returned. Until Lin came to Nanking, Wang was to be the acting President.

24,118 Asked what the difficult problems involved in the dissolution of the Renovation Government were, the witness stated that if both the Provisional and Renovation governments were dissolved, the question of personnel of both would present a problem. According to Chinese custom, if the head of one faction were to move, his followers would create a disturbance and affect public peace.

24,119 He had meant in a previous statement to refer only to the Renovation Government. The Provisional and Renovation governments were entirely different things. * When he had said Provisional Government, he meant Renovation Government.

24,120 During Wang's visit to Japan in June 1939, he only met KONOYE once. * There was present the witness, and an interpreter, SHIMIZU. The interview lasted for one hour, after which everyone retired and KONOYE and Wang spoke in private without an interpreter for three hours. SHIMIZU, as a witness, in his affidavit numbered Exhibit 2585, stated he was the interpreter. When asked how he explained his statement with SHIMIZU's that he acted as interpreter, he said both affidavits had to be read together and the truth is revealed. * The two statements combined were the truth. SHIMIZU acted as interpreter for one hour, then retired, and the two spoke for three hours. The witness also had retired. He had stated in his affidavit he did not know the details of the conversation.

24,122 When asked how he knew what took place that inspired Wang with courage and hope as to the future of the peace movement, the witness said he heard that from Wang afterwards.

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KAGESA - Cross

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24,123

The witness attended the inauguration ceremony, going to Nanking about one week before the inauguration. He recalled that there was some dispute about the national flag and was much displeased. He did not protest strongly to Wang because the

24,124

pennant was not wide enough. He had no dispute with Wang. * There was a problem, but no argument. It was not a fact that the witness made a representation. When Wang came to Japan it was promised that a triangular pennant would be put on top of the Chinese national flag. At the ceremony the pennant was not in accord with the promise given. The Japanese asked the witness to request that the pennant be affixed in accordance with the agreement. He took this matter up with Chow and it was immediately settled. Wang did not apologize officially for this and he did not apologize to the expeditionary forces and fleet. The witness acted as intermediary and everything was settled.

24,125

* No apology was made.

24,126

The witness said he went with Wang from Tokyo to North China, where Wang saw the head of the Provisional Government, Wang Keh-ming, and General TADA of the Japanese forces.

24,127

* In the interview with Wang Keh-ming the witness was not present. In the interview with TADA no interpreters were used. He did not know what was said. They spoke in Chinese. However, he later heard from Wang that he spoke to TADA about the central government to be established and reached certain understandings. * He guessed, and guessed only, that one of the topics discussed was the amalgamation of the two existing regimes and the Renovation Government. The views of TADA had nothing to do with the fact that the personnel of the two governments were to be given consideration. This was left strictly to Wang and his policy.

24,128

He believed they discussed it with Wang Keh-ming. *

24,129

While he supposed that such problems were discussed by the two Wangs, he had never heard anything about it at all. Wang did intimate the personnel problem would constitute a very serious problem. This was not done in accordance with the view expressed by ITAGAKI. ITAGAKI had merely mentioned * that the dissolution of the Renovation Government would constitute a peace maintenance problem and the two Wangs did not confer on the basis of what ITAGAKI said.

The witness went to Tsingtao with Wang Ching-wei when he met the leaders of the existing regimes in January 1940. The

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24,130 purpose of the witness's going was that he was to explain the circumstances under which the Central Government was born and other matters concerning the Central Government to the people coming from North China, newspaper reporters, and others. * He did not act as mediator between Wang and the leaders of the two existing regimes. Everything was done by Wang himself.

The function of the China Affairs Board was mainly to decide on Japanese policy regarding politics, economy, and cultural matters. Asked whether it had four liaison offices in China to direct affairs of the new regime, the witness stated the China Affairs Board was not an organ which directed or led anyone.

24,132 The Ume Agency never directed anyone. In fact, Wang himself directed the Ume Agency. * After the establishment of the Wang Government the Ume Agency was dissolved.

24,133 He had not said that the Japanese advisors acted as a medium between the Wang Government and the Japanese in the prosecution of the policies. * He denied that there was an understanding between the China Affairs Board and the Foreign Ministry that he should be posted in China to direct the affairs of the new regime.

24,134 Upon being handed Exhibit 2721-K and asked whether it would refresh his memory * the witness said if the Political Affairs Bureau Chief SUZUKI said these things he was wrong. The witness was never posted in China to direct the affairs of the Chinese regime. It is unthinkable that a person with his qualifications and low position should direct a man like Wang. He had never heard that some people proposed to send MATSUOKA to direct it but SUZUKI thought it enough to have the witness there. The witness would gladly have relinquished his post to MATSUOKA.

24,135 The witness knew TSUDA, president of the Shanghai Liaison Office of the China Affairs Board. * When asked whether he and the liaison office of the China Affairs Board were fighting over naming Japanese advisors, the witness stated that advisors were appointed by Wang's invitation. They did not compete for appointment. The appointment of advisors was left completely to the recommendation of Wang.

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24,136 When shown a telegram from KATO to ARITA to refresh his memory, * the witness said the question was entirely different from the matter discussed. This involved a proposal submitted that the lower rank advisors of the Renovation Regime be employed as advisors to the new regime, and the answer was given that all appointments of advisors should be left to Wang's initiative and the request was refused. The witness, however, did not know the telegram.

24,137 There were temptations on the part of advisors to interfere with the Nanking Government. * He did not know how the advisors heretofore acted and whether they interfered or not, but he did know that the Japanese as a race had the habit of interfering with other people's business.

He had stated there was even an anti-Wang Government atmosphere in Japan. The statement that the reason for this was that the Wang Government was too much a tool of the Japanese Army to the exclusion of the interests of the people, was completely opposite to the actual reasons for the antipathy.

He did not remember that the negotiations he and IMAI carried on were known as the WATANABE plan. The results of the negotiations, however, were virtually the same as KONOYE's announcement. He and IMAI only met Wang's representative once in the fall of 1938.

24,139 When asked whether one of the terms was that Japan was to take possession of the natural resources of North China, he stated * he did not remember the contents, but if one did judge the contents to be the same as KONOYE's statement, he would be right.

INUKAI was in Shanghai when he met with the representatives of Wang Ching-wei. He did not remember whether he and INUKAI had an interview with KONOYE about December 21, 1938, but he frequently met KONOYE. He could not remember that both he and INUKAI met KONOYE and he could not recall telling KONOYE that the secret plot in China would be a success. He did not know what was meant by secret plot.

Exhibits 2721-B to H, inclusive, were received in evidence.

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REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAGESA, Sadaaki
by Mr. Kato, counsel for DOHIHARA

24,145 With respect to the telegram sent about April 22 or April 23, 1939, while the witness was in Hanoi and after DOHIHARA had returned to Tokyo, the witness stated he did not know whether this telegram was sent or not.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Roberts

24,146 The witness stated that he read Wang's New Year statement in a Chinese newspaper while in Nanking. At present there is no Chinese text of this statement, but there is a translation of the section entitled "General Peace," and the book entitled, "Road to General Peace." * He identified the book referred to as Exhibit 2721-L.

24,147

In the spring of 1939 Wang told the witness whether or not he considered Chiang Kai-shek as a real representative of the Chinese people. He stated that the people of China all really desired peace and further stated that it was regrettable that Chiang Kai-shek could not exercise his own initiative and act according to his own will because the communistic influence in Chungking was too strong.

24,149

In Exhibit 2721-F the reference to the plan to wait refers to Wang himself.

24,151

Exhibit 2721-B, telegram dated April 19, 1939 * to the Chief of the General Affairs Section from Chief of Staff, Taiwan Army, stated that Kawamura (KAGESA) had finished commercial dealings and everything was favorable. They were to refer to the TSUCHIDA telegram for details.

24,152

Exhibit 2721-C1, telegram sent * April 20th to the Chief of General Affairs Section from Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, stated that KAGESA visited Wang in his hideout on the 18th with INUKAI and YANO and talked for three hours. They were already well informed of the details through KO and would prefer discussing the main problems at once. They made known their firm determination and informed of their desire to remove quickly to a place safe and convenient for developing their activities. This was a prerequisite condition.

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24,153

After various considerations * it has been decided that the French should be entirely responsible for protection in regard to the escape, that a French steamship should be chartered to carry him to a hideout in the French concession in Shanghai. Japan should previously prepare two or three hideouts in the International Settlement and the Japanese police should be placed around to keep guard. He would request the Foreign Ministry to send instructions to Shanghai to prepare immediately suitable hideouts in the International Settlement and to take necessary protective measures.

24,154

For protection it was advisable to secretly contact Vice-Inspector General AKAGI to have Japanese police guard after arrival. Wang desires proper measures so that he might pass quarantine incognito. ITO will be sent immediately to Shanghai. IWAI will establish connection with SEIKI and take part in the preparations. The Hokko Maru will sail directly to Shanghai * while secretly escorting Wang's steamer. The Japanese will be on board. The Von Forenhoben is decided as the French steamer. The time of departure and of arrival has not been decided. He will be informed later.

24,155

Exhibit 2721-C2, telegram to Chief of General Affairs Section from Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, stated that the hideout in the French concession is to be temporary and it was the intention to remove them to hideouts in the International Settlement as soon as possible. With respect to preparing three houses it is his desire to make the following considerations. * All windows are to be covered tightly with bullet proof sheets of wire, with the upper half made so that they can be folded down; small peeping windows to be made in the outside sheets and covered with screens. Iron grilles to be opened and closed will be installed in various places. One of the houses should be in the Hongkew district and two in the south of the Soochow Creek district.

24,156

Exhibit 2721-C3, telegram from Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, to Chief, General Affairs Section, asked for certain corrections to be made in the KAGESA telegram No. 2. * When the French steamer arrives at Shanghai at the end of the month, the Japanese authorities and Wang's comrades shall be together in charge of the method of disembarkation and transportation of passengers who later boarded the ship.

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It would be convenient if he could be taken directly to the hide-out and not to the French concession in Shanghai. Since ITO and Sergeant KAWASHIMI are going to Shanghai first, the Japanese Agency in Shanghai should deliberate with them.

24,157

Exhibit 2721-D, telegram from Hanoi to ARITA from KAWAMURA (KAGESA), April 24, 1939, stated that the negotiation is completed and plans for loading the cargo have already been arranged. Since the situation does not permit any change in plans, they wish to carry it out according to fixed schedule. He is requested to demand an immediate completion of preparations of at least one of the warehouses in Ocaka (Shanghai) and to take charge of preparations for unloading. May 6th was the date of arrival.

24,158

Exhibit 2721-E1, telegram dated April 29, 1939 from KAGESA to the Imperial Headquarters, stated that he had successfully established liaison with Wang. * The course of the Hokko Maru has been changed from Takao to Keelung, arriving there on the 30th, with future destination to be decided later. He hoped that YAMAMOTO would also change his destination and go to Keelung.

Exhibit 2721-E2 stated that it seemed that Wang was somewhere near Hongkong. He had been successful in establishing liaison and was informed of his safety.

24,159

Exhibit 2721-E3 from Major HARUKI to Colonel USUI, April 30th, stated that preparations for landing and guard of residence will be completed by the evening of the 4th at the latest, * and it was going on satisfactorily with utmost secrecy. It would be very convenient if he could be informed of the approximate time of arrival off Woosung since he hoped to establish liaison directly with KAGESA prior to landing.

Exhibit 2721-F, telegram from KAGESA to Chief of the 2nd Department, through Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, stated that Wang would arrive at Shanghai on the 6th in accordance with pre-arranged plan. He is naturally anticipating after arrival a battle of telegrams with Chiang Kai-shek, and terrorist opposition. He wishes to set himself up as soon as possible at the place most convenient for his various activities.

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24,160

When they arrive at Shanghai * they shall stay for the time being in a house prepared and rely on the Japanese Army and Navy for guard and protection. It is reported that Japanese terrorists have been sent from Tokyo for this purpose, but considering the bitter experiences in the past he wished that they would absolutely stop the plan. It may seem a good plan to wait someplace outside Shanghai until preparations for guards and protection would be finished, but he did not believe it would be finished in two or three months.

Wang intends to call on his followers to decide the future negotiation plan; taking the situation of Shanghai into consideration Wang is contemplating hiring a Japanese ship and leaving China for about a month and hold conferences on board it while cruising. According to KAGESA the available Japanese ship could not accommodate thirty, and it is necessary to prepare another. He asked the General Staff to study the matter.

24,161

Exhibit 2721-G, telegram from KAGESA, DOHIHARA Agency, to the Chief of the General Affairs Section, May 23rd, stated * that Wang will send messengers to Peking and Nanking with his confidential letters to the Provisional and Renovation governments, explaining his reasons for his actions and asking for cooperation. This is aimed to dispel misunderstanding based on various rumors, particularly that his movement is a trick on the part of the Chiang Regime. It will also make clear that Japan will not initiate political negotiations prematurely. Wang realizes that a friendly relation with Wu Pei-Fu would have great influence on his scheme.

24,162

Exhibit 2721-H, telegram from KAGESA, DOHIHARA Agency, to the Chief of the 2nd Department, May 30, 1939, stated * that Wang and a group of 13 would fly on the 31st, resting at Omura and then coming directly to Tokyo. They will land at Yokusuka. KAGESA, ICHIDA, INUKAI and SUGA will accompany them.

18 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Lt. Kurt Steiner

Your attention is invited to

1. Court Exhibit 259, being a part of IPS Document 984. This is a report outlining the control of North Chinese railroads by the Japanese army. It was sent by the Commander-in-Chief of the North China Army TADA, Shun, who is a Defense witness assigned to Messrs. Lopez, Robinson and Edwards. Among the recipients was Major General KAGESA, Sadaaki (or Teisho), a Defense witness assigned to Messrs. Dunnigan, Lopez, Robinson and Edwards.

2. Court Exhibit 195, a part of IPS Document 1242, being a report on the propaganda program to be carried out by the Kwantung Army in North China, including advocacy of separation from Central China. This report was made by General NISHIO, Juzo (or Toshizo), a defense witness assigned to Messrs. Lopez, Robinson, Edwards, Nye and Ao.

Since IPS Documents 984 and 1242 are official War Ministry files which are likely to contain valuable material aside from the excerpts already introduced, it is suggested that these documents be made the subject of further analysis and study for possible use in cross-examination of witnesses from whom parts of these files originated or to whom they were addressed, or for use in rebuttal.

Copies to: Mr. Lopez
Capt. Robinson
Mr. Edwards
✓ Mr. Dunnigan
Dr. Ao
Judge Nye

In Interrogation of TANAKA, Ryukichi, Case 234, Serial 21, page 13.

KAGESA was at one time the Military Advisor to the puppet/uler of China.

KAGESA and SUKUYA were close friends and they were suggested by TANAKA as knowing a lot about the opium buisness of China.

6 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. D. N. Sutton

FROM : Capt. James J. Robinson, Mr. W. E. Edwards, Mr. Pedro Lopez

SUBJECT : Witness - KAGESA, Sadaaki

1. Additional suggested subjects for cross-examination on the puppetry of Wang's Government.

a. IPS Document No. 1519-B - Top Secret telegram from Foreign Minister ARITA to Consul-General MIURA in Shanghai sent on 13 June 1939 stated among others that "after deliberation with Colonel KAGESA it was decided to make the KAGESA Organ and the Embassy help them with movement expenses; and such being the case, I hope you will give them ¥3,000 defraying it from your political movement expenses."

b. IPS Document No. 1519-C - Secret telegram from Consul-General MIURA to Foreign Minister ARITA sent on 10 June 1939 states among others "that DOHIMARA, HARANO, KAGESA, Chen Chia, and Chen Chung-fu acted as mediators for coalition between Wang and Japan"; and "that Wang had a deliberate talk with the leaders of both the Provisional and Renovation Governments, and exchanged their views on a plan for the organization of the central government, but after all both Japan and Wang, that are in a hurry with the establishment of the central government, are going to set up Wu Pei-fu as President and Wang as Premier, and the government seems to be established about the first of September; and that Japan has a secret design at the back of the organization of the central government that she intends to make Wang conclude a humiliating treaty with Japan by taking advantage of these sorts of peace negotiation organs with Japan, and materialize such an underhand design as to 'conquer enemy with enemy' by making a cat's paw of Wang in order to make China a tributary to Japan by controlling China's sovereignty."

c. IPS Document No. 1519-D, -page 3 - Top Secret memorandum from MACHIJIRI, Kazumoto, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the War Ministry, to Mr. SUZUKI, Teichi, Chief of the Administrative Affairs Department, KO-A-IN, mentions Artillery Colonel KAGESA, Sadaaki as the responsible person for movements, adding: "However, the name 'KAGESA, Sadaaki' should be used in case of receiving money."

d. In IPS Document No. 1519-H - Top Secret statements of the interview between Wang Keh-min and Wang Ching-wei. Paragraph 1 on first page there-of mentioned KAGESA as one of those who might arrange for the time and nature of topics to be broached in the interview between Wang Keh-min and Wang Ching-wei; on page 3 of the same document Wang Ching-wei stated that he told the three points to Colonel KAGESA later and he said that he would talk over them in Tokyo, and that at the beginning of April, KAGESA came to Hanoi and advised

him to escape from Hanoi as he was in personal danger; on page 7 of the same document KAGESA was mentioned twice, first with reference to a telegram from SHIMIZU and second with respect to the anxiety of Wang Ching-wei to have "the chief...inform Colonel KAGESA of this secretly"; and page 11 of the same document Wang Keh-min stated that "As for a code, please consult well with Colonel KAGESA."

e. IPS Document No. 1519-I - Top Secret Record of an Interview between Wang Ching-wei and Councillor MORISHIMA dated 3 July 1939 emanating from the KAGESA Organ.

f. IPS Document No. 1519-L - is a Record of an Interview between Wang Ching-wei and OIKAWA dated 4 July 1939 emanating from the KAGESA Organ. On page 4 thereof Commander OIKAWA boasted: "The Japanese Navy is mighty enough to control the whole American fleet triumphantly in the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, the Japanese Navy is prepared enough not to allow the navy of any country to touch even a finger to the Orient. You can march forward without any fear about this point."

Capt. James J. Robinson
Mr. W. E. Edwards
Mr. Pedro Lopez

By: 

17 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. D. W. Sutton
FROM: Lt. Kurt Steiner

Your attention is invited to the following documents:

1. IPS Document 610, being a confidential record of Manchurian affairs. Included (Item 32) is a report about the Manchurian Incident bearing the seal of NISHIO, Juzo or Toshizo, who will be a witness for the Defense and who has been assigned to Messrs. Ao, Edwards, Lopez, Nye and Robinson.
2. IPS Document 614, a confidential record of Mongolia affairs containing an "Outline for the Establishment of a Government in Mongolia," (Item 131) which was, among other persons, addressed to Major General KAGESA, Sadaaki or Teiho, who will be a witness for the Defense and has been assigned to Messrs. Dunnigan, Lopez, Edwards and Robinson.
3. IPS Document 620, a confidential record of Manchurian affairs containing a report of the counseling section of the Kwantung Army's Military Administration Bureau, (Item 102) stating that the announcement by the command of the Kwantung Army that the plans of this Army are of a defensive nature was designed only for the ears of other nations, especially the League of Nations, advising on administration of Manchukuo and suggesting that leaders of Manchukuo should gradually be retired. Major General TADA, Shun, was head of the section from which this report originated. (See analysis of IPS Document 612.) He is a witness for the Defense and has been assigned to Messrs. Lopez, Edwards and Robinson. The report was addressed to War Ministry. The Defendant ARAKI was War Minister at the time.

None of the above mentioned documents has been introduced in evidence.

I suggest that these documents be re-analyzed and examined without delay for use in cross-examination and possible use in rebuttal.

Copies to: Dr. Ao, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Lopez, Judge Nye, Capt. Robinson, ~~Mr. Dunnigan~~

KAGESA, Sadaaki ()

29 Apr. 1934	Minor Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 4th Class	China Inci- dent	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Order of the Compound Light Rising Sun	China Inci- dent	War Ministry
9 May 1934	Manchukuo Order of Chingyun-Chang Decora- tion, 4th Grade	Japanese- Manchurian Amity	Foreign Mini- stry

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation

SUBJECT: KA

Asst
Section of the
Military Oper
General in Jun
puppet govern

SOURCE: (OSS

Chief
a great deal to
authorities in

SOURCE: From
No. 1

KAGESA, Sadaaki

Lt. Col
adviser to the P

SOURCE: United

*Kagesa mentioned in
connection with opium
traffic in file 234-
Serial 21 P 12.*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

SUBJECT: KAGESA, Maj. Gen. Sadaaki

Assistant Military Attache to China and Head of the Manchuria-Mongolia Section of the General Staff. Was promoted to Colonel and made Chief of the Military Operations Department in the War Ministry in 1939; promoted to Major General in June 1939; is largely responsible for the setting up of the Nanking puppet government. He specialized in China and economic problems.

SOURCE: (OSS Card File)

Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Office. Has contributed a great deal to the formation of the China Affairs Board; is one of the best authorities in the Army on Modern China.

SOURCE: From an article by Setsuo SUGAWARA in Bungei Shunji, special issue No. 17. (OSS Card File).

KAGESA, Sadaaki

Lt. General Sadaaki KAGESA, Commander of the 38th Division, formerly adviser to the Puppet Government, is deemed a Key Japanese War Criminal.

SOURCE: United Nations War Crimes Commission, List #3, Sept. 1945.

Re, Kagesa, Sadaaki

See File # 350

As Maj General in Jap Army he was
chief Military Advisor to the Manchu
govt at the time Otagaki was
Minister of War.

1st Demob.

KAGESA, Teisho (or Sadaaki)

Request by: TOJO, Hideki

Address: Dai-Ichi Hospital, Tokyo

Former Lt. General serving as liaison officer between the Japanese Army and the Wang Ching-Wei Government.

He will testify as to the matter of Wang government with special reference to specific measures taken thereby.

REPORT BY: RICHARD LARSH
27 Dec 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KAGESA, Sadaaki

Address: Daichi National Hospital, Wakamatsu-Cho
Ushigome-Ku, Tokyo, Japan

A Major General in the Japanese Army, he was the Chief
Military Advisor to the Nanking Government at the time ITAGAKI
was Minister of War.

KAGESA is subject of IPS Case File No. 350.

COPIES: 3 File 350
1 Mr. Prout

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



*Aspect #3 too broad things not written
#4 if we include Abogaki opinion monthly
#5 Prognosis unless we see Saburo's report*

Sworn Deposition

Deponent ; -- KAGESA, Sadaaki

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country

I hereby depose as follows.

It next belongs in the gen. file

1. I, KAGESA, Sadaaki, am an ex-Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and am now in the First Government Hospital of Tokyo owing to ill-health.
2. Immediately after Lieutenant-General ITAGAKI's appointment as the Minister of War, in June, 1938, I was transferred from the post of department chief of the General Staff Office to that of chief of the Department of Military Affairs in the Bureau of Military Affairs. Since then, I continued in this office till the end of March, 1939. During this period, as a person in authority, I had to do

- with the question of strengthening the Japan-Germany-Italy anti-communist front.
3. Not only the Government, but also the Army and the Navy had all been at all times very anxious to effect immediate settlement of the China Incident. Considering it as a sine qua non for the settlement of the incident to nullify the menace of the Soviet Union in the north by extricating Japan from her state of international isolation, the three ministries of war, Navy, and Foreign Affairs had eagerly studied the problem of strengthening the Tripartite anti-Comintern Pact before War Minister ITAGAKI's assumption of office.
4. According to my recollection, War Minister ITAGAKI's opinion about foreign policy which he expressed to us when he took office war, on the whole, as below:
- 1) To concentrate every possible endeavour on bringing about the peace with China without a moment's delay and to make this the foundation of our policy.
 - 2) To maintain a state of silence in regard to the Soviet Union, to keep strict guard against having any trouble with her, and at the same time, to watch closely her positive actions.
 - 3) To strengthen friendship with Germany and Italy, and make use of them for alleviating the threat of the

Soviet Union. At the same time, to let these powers take part in the co-operation for realizing the immediate settlement of the China Incident.

- (4.) Attempts were to be made to let Britain, the United States, and other countries understand Japan's real intention, and thus let them restrain their acts of aiding the Kuomintang Government, thereby contributing to the settlement of the incident.
5. War Minister ITAGAKI's idea, about the Tripartite anti-communist Pact all originated from the above-mentioned principle and there was absolutely no other intention involved. Therefore, when the German Foreign Minister made a suggestion in August, 1938, the government replied, according to the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference, that the pact should amount to an extension of the anti-Comintern Pact. Furthermore, when Germany in November of the same year attempted to make the meaning of "the objective power" broader the government, in accordance with the decision of Five Ministers' conference replied as follows:
- 1) We will regard the Soviet Union as the main objective power.
 - 2) If the situation demands it, Britain, France, and others may be made objective powers. However, whether any

military assistance should be given or not all depends upon the situation.

Thus, while making every effort not to hinder co-operation with Germany and Italy, we, on the other hand, had been exerting ourselves to avoid making Britain, France, and others objective powers. Especially, we had been firmly maintaining the attitude of avoiding military assistance to the utmost.

Moreover, it was quite apparent that, apart from the worst eventuality in which we would have to make Britain, France, etc. objectives, even if we had to make the Soviet our object, this pact was a pure defensive mutual-aid pact against any kind of invasion and did not contain even the slightest hint of positive aggression. After all, the only object of this pact was to make the pact itself serve in the settlement of the China Incident.

On this 22 day of Sep., 1947

At _____

DEPONENT /s/ KAGESA, Sadaaki (seal)

I, YAMADA, Hanzo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

DEF. DOC. #2606

On the same date

At _____

Witness: /s/ YAMADA, Hanzo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KAGESA, Sadaaki (seal)

Witness file
Kagesa

JCTL:REM

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Edward P. Monaghan, Chief, Investigative Div.
FROM: James C. T. Liu
SUBJECT: Doihara Kikan (Organ)

Mr. Yamamoto has brought me a report of the Japanese Demobilization Bureau signed by Mr. Tanaka. The covering letter said that records were burned--however, he recollects as a sure knowledge, the following:-

1. Matsu Kikan or "The Pine Organ"--it was under Staff Member Okada of the China Expeditionary Force Headquarters in Shanghai for the purpose of collecting information of the Chungking Government. It was incorporated in summer 1942 into a new Shanghai office of the Army.

2. Take Kikan or "The Bamboo Organ"---it was under the accused Doihara in Peking, for the purpose of securing leaders to initiate peace movements and the establishment of a New Central Government. It was established in summer 1938 when the Japanese projects on TANG Shou-Yi and General WU Pei-Fu took place. It was dissolved in Autumn 1939 with the death of WU, while during that period, TANG had already been assassinated. Take Kikan was also known as Doihara Kikan. In this connection, reference is made to the testimony of Kagesa which proves that Doihara Kikan also maintained an office in Shanghai up to March or April 1939.

3. Ume Kikan, or "The Plum Organ", it was under Kagesa, as admitted by himself. However, after its dissolution and the simultaneous establishment of the Wang Government, the Military Advisory Department in the Wang Government, still under Kagesa was sometimes referred to by its old name Ume Kikan. The last point was not admitted by Kagesa.

So far we have no evidence against Doihara on his secret activities in China, it is suggested hereby that an affidavit to the above effect should be taken from Mr. Tanaka or other person who might know even better as to the same.

JAMES C. T. LIU

cc - Mr. Sutton

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAGESA, Sadaaki
by Mr. Roberts

23,970)
23,972) The testimony of the above witness having been taken by Commission before the Honorable Mr. Justice Northcroft, the record of the Commission was received in evidence as Exhibit 2721. The witness identified Exhibit 2721-A * as his affidavit and after making certain minor corrections stated it was true and correct. * He stated he lived in the First National Hospital and he was also known by the name of Yoshiaki.

23,976) The witness's affidavit stated * that he is an ex-Lieutenant-General who had served as Chief of the Chinese Section, General Staff, from August 1937 and became Chief of the Military Affairs Section of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, in June 1938. In accord with the decision of the Five Ministers' Council of April 1939 with respect to Wang Ching-wei's peace movement, the witness assisted Wang in removing to Shanghai since he had moved to Hanoi from Chungking and was planning the peace movement. He had begun to fear his personal danger. The witness helped him continuously to establish a central government and when it was established in March 1940 the witness became his highest military advisor, a post he held until May 1942.

23,977) He was not well acquainted with the peace negotiations carried on through Trautmann, German Ambassador to China in late 1937 and early 1938, since they were presided over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. At one time the National Government was about to accept Japan's terms, but on January 14th it suddenly sent an answer contrary to expectations. The attitude of the National Government can be seen from Wang's essay, "For An Instance," published March 27, 1939. On receipt of China's reply, Japan drew the conclusion that China had no sincerity in the negotiations and announced on January 16th that it would have nothing to do with the National Government. This was not because Japan had abandoned all hope for an overall peace. * She was eager for it and gave up the effort with the National Government, which was judged to be unfaithful to general peace. She intended to accomplish the purpose in another way.

23,978) In the spring of 1938 Kao, former Director of Bureau of Asiatic Affairs, and Tung, former section chief, Bureau of Asiatic Affairs, successively came to Tokyo. The witness met them in his capacity as Chief of the Chinese Section, Military

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Page Affairs Bureau. Their purpose was to make Japan understand that once it disregarded the Chiang Regime, some other person must be sought to invite peace between the nations. No one was better suited for that than Wang Ching-wei, who felt the need of quickly settling the problem. His assertion would never be accepted, however, by the National Government. There was no alternative but to make Chiang listen to the peace talk by launching a peace movement outside the government. Japan seemed to have no objection * to Kao's plan, but they did not make positive overtures to Wang. Nothing further being heard, Japan thought Kao's movement had failed, and did not take trouble to investigate into the matter.

23,979

In the autumn of 1938 Colonel IMAI, General Staff, who went to Shanghai on official business, returned with the tentative terms of peace between Japan and China drawn up by Kao and Mei. In Tokyo amendments were made to the tentative plan in accordance with Japanese policy and the witness and IMAI were ordered to proceed with the terms to Shanghai on November 19th and delivered them to Kao in May. Several amendments were made in accordance with their desires.

23,980

The plan differed in form from the KONOYE statement of December 1932, but in substance it was almost the same. In addition, the Chinese proposed * that Wang escape from Chungking according to pre-arranged plan, and then Japan would be expected to announce the terms of peace. This was due to the fact that to give impetus to Wang's peace movement it was necessary to clarify Japan's desires. These matters were transmitted to the superiors and the War Minister reported them to the Five Ministers Council and obtained its assent on November 25th. Wang agreed and escaped from Chungking on December 18, 1938 according to plan, and reached Hanoi on the 20th.

23,981

KONOYE announced his three principles on the 22nd, while Wang, in response to KONOYE's statement, sent circular telegrams containing peace representations to the Central Office of the Kuomintang Party, Chiang, and the Central Executive Committee. He urged * the necessity of peace, the impossibility of resistance, and explained that Japan's attitude had been made clear and further resistance was useless. He desired the earnest reconsideration of the National Government.

With respect to the KONOYE statement, in view of the National Government's attitude a fairly long war was to be expected. It was natural that Japan's demands would increase

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23,982 in proportion to the length of the war and the increase of sacrifice and the growing victories. What Japan wanted of China was co-existence and co-prosperity based on hearty collaboration. In accordance with the various ministers' idea that Japan's grand policy embracing what she desired of China must be decided as the National policy, * the War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers began to draw plans from about July 1938, and it was referred to an Imperial Conference on November 30th. This decided the National policy. The KONOYE statement was the summary of it.

At the time quite a few people of all circles thought reparations for the sacrifices suffered during the incident should be in the form of territory or control of management. It was, therefore, remarkable that the National policy, which seemed rather weak-kneed, was decided upon under such circumstances and abandoned reparations.

23,983 In January 1939, the Kuomintang struck Wang's name off the party register and expelled him from all public offices. Special service agents were sent to Hanoi, threatening him. Tseng, Wang's right-hand man, was assassinated on March 21st. It was reported that Wang's life was in danger every minute. At the Five Ministers Conference it was decided that the witness should see Wang * and if needed, help him to reach a safety zone. The witness reached Hanoi on April 17th by the Hokko Maru, with YANO, Foreign Office Secretary, and INUKAI. He met Wang on April 18th. Wang regretted the outbreak and development of the incident and said he had discussed it with Chiang, in writing and verbally, about the need of cooperation in which he believed, but Chiang had told him it was impossible to have peace, partly because he was suspicious of Japan's real intentions, and partly because of various circumstances.

23,984 Just when he thought there was no way to sway the Chungking Government except by arousing public opinion from the outside, giving up trying to have Chiang change his mind, he was notified by Kao in May of Japan's peace policy. Wang believed it not impossible to obtain public opinion if Japan abide by it. He stated that the KONOYE statement had had a most important effect on the peace movement. * He further stated it was dangerous and meaningless to stay at Hanoi and he wanted to further the movement from Shanghai and he intended to move to Shanghai with the consent of the French Indo-China authorities. He hoped to develop the move after arriving in Shanghai by a

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more advanced method and was considering the plan to be followed. His original plan for the peace movement was to instill peace enthusiasm in the people with the members of the Kuomintang as central figures and make the National Government do away with the anti-Japanese policy. He had no intention of establishing a government.

Wang chartered a French ship with the consent of French Indo-China and boarded it April 25, 1939, at Katoba Island, guarded by the Peace Preservation Bureau of French Indo-China. The ship left the 26th. The Japanese boarded the Hokko Maru at Haiphong. On the 28th they received notice from Wang that he wanted to transfer to the Hokko Maru and that evening he changed ships northeast of Bias Bay. After touching at Keelung they sailed straight for Shanghai, reaching there May 8th. While on board the witness often talked with Wang. He told him and INUKAI certain important things.

23,986 First he told them that the plan of the peace move was to organize a peace body around the Kuomintang members to point out the error of the anti-Japanese theory and to explain that peace was the only way to save China and East Asia. They would enlarge the peace camp by degrees and ultimately make Chungking change its policy. But it was extremely difficult to make Chungking change by discussion alone. His advocacy of peace came from his love of China, but anti-Japanism was also a patriotic expression. Peace advocacy could not be distinguished easily from treason and it is difficult to make the people listen to peace advocacy, which was quite different from the advocacy of resistance. * Peace advocacy could shine only when Japan's policy was endorsed by facts. If the KONOYE statement was put into practice, Chungking's advocacy of resistance would lose its basis. He believed Chungking would have no choice but to turn to peace, swayed by public opinion. The shortest way was to establish a peaceful government and cooperate with Japan in implementing the KONOYE statement. He therefore thought it best to give up the former plan and establish a peace government which would arouse public opinion to the fact that resistance was meaningless, not only by speech to Chungking but through factual proof. In this way Chungking might turn to peace.

If Japan had no objection he wished to change the previous plan and establish a peace government. This government

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23,987 did not aim at destroying Chungking. * If peace can be invited he did not care who held political power. The purpose of the peace move is to influence Chungking to turn to peace and make it cease resistance. It was therefore not desirable to provoke civil war, though it will be necessary to possess military force after establishing the government. If Chungking joins in the future, the purpose will have been attained and he would retire to private life.

23,988 Wang intended to show Chungking and the public that peace advocacy was not groundless by establishing a peace government and creating a living example of cooperation and thus bring about peace and peaceful cooperation with Japan in conjunction with Chungking. With the establishment of his new regime China would be divided into two camps, which would be ultimately reunited. Without this re-union general peace could not be achieved.* This was Wang's guiding principle. This can be seen from his circular telegram of January 16, 1940, in which he said that if Chiang deciding on a far-sighted policy, makes peace with Japan and seeks its concrete facts, Wang and his comrades would join forces with Chiang and bring about peace to the whole country.

Having arrived at Shanghai on May 8, 1949, Wang met Chu, Chow, Fu, Mei and Kao and as a result of the meeting decided to visit Japan. He told the witness of his desire and requested him to communicate with Japan. Wang was drawing up the plans of the movement and studying the points of his demands. When completed, he intended to leave.

23,989 Wang's principal points were * that opinions would be frankly exchanged with KONOYE, HIRANUMA and other ministers, with Wang personally attending to the matters. If as a result peace movement was considered hopeful, certain articles would be implemented by Chou. To further the movement demands concerning the execution of principles of the respect of sovereign rights would be presented to Japan due to the need of making the Chinese understand that Japan had no intention of aggression, control, or of interfering with Chinese internal affairs.

To show that the new government was not formed by Japanese pressure, they must not disrupt the previous judicial system, and Japan will be required to recognize as indispensable that the new government should be called the National Government;

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that the form of its establishment would be "return to the capital;" that Three Peoples' Principles would be made the guiding conception; and the sun-in-the-blue-sky-flag would be used as the national flag.

23,990

Wang left Shanghai by air at the beginning of June 1939 with Chou, Mei, Kao and others. There was also YANO, SHIMIZU, INUKAI and the witness. Shortly after arriving in Tokyo, Wang had an interview with HIRANUMA at which the latter expressed his opinion on cooperation to be based on moral conception, and admired Wang's moral courage in trying to solve the incident. Wang replied that future trouble was meaningless and he was determined to concentrate all energies on materializing peace. He asked HIRANUMA whether Japan had a policy for promoting the peace movement with Chungking for solving the incident and whether it had a policy of directing its activities toward sympathizers in civil circles and excluding Kuomintang members. And whether Japan intended to pave the way by welcoming all persons who gave thought to the future * of both countries regardless of whether they were government or civilian, members of one party or another. He stated he would establish a Peace Government with himself as the center if Japan considered this third method appropriate.

23,991

HIRANUMA replied that his Cabinet had inherited the KONOYE ideas and were adhering to them. He expressed approval of Wang's policy and stated Japan was ready to lend absolute assistance and support. The present witness was present and heard everything. As to interviews with other ministers, the witness had no recollection of any requiring special mention except the statement of ITAGAKI.

23,992

Acting as proxy for HIRANUMA, ITAGAKI on June 15th stated what was expected by Japan. The witness was present * and understood the contents of the conversation. He observed that ITAGAKI was careful in his choice of words to avoid giving any impression to Wang of interfering in Chinese internal policy. ITAGAKI asked Wang's opinion concerning the liquidation of past evils due to the doctrine of "One Nation, One Party". Wang said he agreed and desired to live up to ITAGAKI's expectations by directing matters so as to take in members of all parties and factions since he feared that any dislocation of the juridical system would be an obstacle to future development.

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23,993

ITAGAKI replied that persons belonging to the provisional and restoration governments were faithful to this same idea. They had striven for peaceful cooperation enduring persecution and Japan could not dissolve them without some consideration. He wanted Wang's ideas * in establishing a political council with these two bodies in order to manage Sino-Japanese relations locally.

Wang replied he had no objection to establishing a council in North China, which is far from Nanking and in trusting to it to a certain extent, local administration. There was the Huang Fu example. He was unable, however, to consent to the establishment of anything like this in Central China, but was ready to consider the warm treatment of persons thus affected in that region.

23,994

ITAGAKI stated that many people interpret the doctrine of the Japanese welfare as though it accepted pro-communism and anti-Japanism. He asked if he had any opinion on adjusting this and promoting Sino-Japanese cooperation and anti-communism. Wang agreed. ITAGAKI further stated that most of the Japanese thought that the Chinese flag was the sign of anti-Japanism. If this peace government and its army * had the same flag as the anti-Japan government, unexpected results might occur in military action. Wang was absolutely opposed to changing the flag, stated he would consider a method by which a distinction could be made.

23,995

ITAGAKI asked Wang's opinion on the recognition of Manchukuo. Wang answered that according to the address of Sun Yat-sen in Kobe, the recognition of Manchurian independence is not against doctrine. They should recognize her as independent in view of her present stage of development. He saw no alternative but to recognize Manchukuo. In this interview ITAGAKI considered that so far as internal affairs were concerned, it would be wise to accept Wang's opinion, but since the problem of the national flag and the dissolution of the renovation government were concerned with prosecution of war, * he thought it necessary to make the Japanese Army in China cognizant of Wang's opinion and summoned his staff officers to Tokyo.

Each of these staff officers were opposed to the flag because the Japanese Army had a strong belief that that flag was a symbol of anti-Japanism and made distinction

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between the peace army and the anti-Japan army difficult. They were also opposed to dissolving the renovation government because it would give rise to difficult problems in maintaining public peace.

But as a result of discussions the staff officers understood ITAGAKI's will, ITAGAKI thinking it best to respect fully Wang's will on such internal problems in China, and the officers came to agree with ITAGAKI. They concluded that since the central authorities have resolved to respect Wang's opinions, they must make their subordinates obey. ITAGAKI informed the Five Ministers Conference of these matters and it was decided to respect without reservation Wang's will.

23,996

After these interviews Wang had an interview with KONOYE, who spoke with Wang without an interpreter for hours. As a result of the interview Wang was inspired with much courage and hope as to the future.

Following this the request on realizing the principle of respecting sovereignty was submitted by Chou, and the contention by China was generally admitted by Japan. The most important items were that Japan would not interfere with domestic administration and all negotiations would be carried on through regular diplomatic channels. Advisors were to be provided at China's request only in the Central Government and highest military body. An advisor would answer inquiries and submit occasional opinions to the Chief, but the Chief concerned was to make the decision exclusively.

23,997

In joint enterprises improper property appraisal by China will be corrected and Japanese investment limited. Surplus customs duties in the custody of the Tax Control Bureau and the Yokohama Specie Bank were to be transferred to the Central Government. The Salt Administration was to regain pre-war status on organization of the Central Government. Factories, mines and houses controlled by the Japanese Army were to be promptly returned to China, except those needed militarily.

23,998

The establishment of Wang's regime depended entirely on his own free will and Japan neither asked Wang to establish a government or persuaded him to do so. * This was clear from

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the talk between HIRANUMA and Wang. Also, Wang's New Year statement of January 1, 1940 is witness to this. In that statement Wang stated that as to his positive embarkation on the peace movement, some of his friends approved and others opposed. He was extremely worried by means and ways.

To achieve the great mission common with Japan and China for stabilization and security in East Asia and establishing a new order, the question was: was he to stay out of the government and convert the present anti-Japanese government, or was he to achieve this by establishing a new political power? Or, even in establishing a new regime, was he first to establish it as a local power and then enlarge it to a central government, or was he to establish the central government from the beginning?

23,999

There were many ways conceivable, but he reached the conclusion that the most direct and bold was the most effective to future development and finally decided to establish a central political power. The KONOYE statement of December 22, 1938 was the only data available to Wang with regard to Japanese desire. However, it was too abstract and various opinions would arise therefrom if they were to put it into practice.

If after Wang succeeded in organizing a government, great differences should be found between the drafts submitted by Japan and Wang's understanding of the KONOYE statement, Wang would face a difficult situation resulting in the collapse of his government or his being left in the hands of a puppet political power. In either case, the peace movement would fail.

24,000

In order to show Japan's sincerity toward Wang, and to make the peace movement a success, Japan had to deliberate with Wang * as to the embodiment of the KONOYE statement prior to Wang's organizing a government. In case the conditions of both sides did not agree, Wang had the liberty to suspend establishing his government. The witness presented these views to the government and they were approved and in October 1939 he was shown a tentative plan by the China Affairs Board.

The witness, Admiral SUGA, YANO and INUKAI, and Chou, Mei, Lin and others conducted an exhaustive investigation and discussion. Amendments were made to the draft plan and a con-

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clusion reached on December 30th. Both sides agreed to the amended plan.

24,001

It seemed that even after the issuance of KONOYE's statement, peace negotiations with Chungking were in many instances conducted by unofficial Japanese with the understanding of government authorities, but the witness was not acquainted with this. From about January 1940, under supervision of ITAGAKI,* Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army, peace negotiations with Chungking were actively held, with the view of contributing to a merger of Chungking and Wang's prospective government and thus bring about an overall peace. These negotiations were promoted through Sung Tzu-liang. About the end of March it was seen that the possibility of success was very great, so ITAGAKI, after consulting with Wang, decided to postpone the formal establishment of Wang's government for several days. But finally, the Wang government was formally set up on March 30th.

Even after this Sung's maneuvers for peace were enthusiastically continued by ITAGAKI. The treaty negotiations which started from June 1940 were conducted on a dilly-dallying policy after consulting with Wang. This was also to facilitate the peace maneuvers, but these also proved unsuccessful and in October 1940 it was decided to discontinue the try for peace.

24,002

After the failure of the Sung maneuvers, * MATSUOKA after consulting with Wang, schemed for peace negotiations through Chien Yung-ming and until the results were definitely known, signature of the treaty was withheld. At last, on November 30th that year the treaty was signed by which Japan recognized Wang's government. All through the period, both before and after Wang's government was set up, each Cabinet was concerned about establishing peace with Chungking.

Neither Japan nor its Army and Navy had any organ or mechanism for guarding and supervising Wang's government. Although the Nanking Government had advisors in its Military and Economic Council, they were all appointed by Wang. They were not forced or recommended by Japan. They all acted in accordance with Chinese regulations and gave advice when called upon. They offered opinions occasionally, but never guided or interfered or made investigations. They acted as a medium

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24,003 between Wang and Japan * and made great efforts for prosecuting Wang's policies. The advisors, to avoid temptation as much as possible, assumed an attitude that was rather too passive. This, however, was in accord with Japan's intention and the military to prevent Wang's government from becoming a puppet. Accordingly, affairs were soon left to the free will of the Chinese and no restrictions were exercised.

The same was true with the decision on policies and quite a few were brought to the knowledge of the Japanese only after the decisions were made. Some of the policies proved non-feasible because of military restrictions, but this was unavoidable. It can not be denied that the Japanese Army took the attitude of helping to execute Wang's policies to the greatest extent permissible.

24,004 As to budgets, the Chinese decided them independently and the economic advisors were lending their good offices by giving their views on financial resources. * On the basis of Wang's demands in June 1937 Japan stipulated restrictions to its economic advance into China and in particular the reduction and restriction in percentage of shares to be held by Japanese in joint national policy concerns created considerable repercussions in Japanese economic circles.

It was also promised that many of the established advantages and vested interests would be returned to the Chinese. This caused not a few people in all circles to entertain antipathy and skepticism in Wang's government and some went so far as to call it an anti-Japanese government under the veil of peace. Anti-Wang government atmosphere was created in Japan. This was a reaction to Wang's government having planned for political independence and Japan having assisted in it. This also is proof that Wang's government was not a puppet government.

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAGESA, Sadaaki
by Mr. Yamada, counsel for ITAGAKI

24,005

The witness stated that Wang's first meeting with
ITAGAKI was on the day following the interview with HIRANUMA.

24,006

This meeting was on the 11th of June. ITAGAKI told Wang * that
the Army war aims were not to regard the Chinese as an enemy,
but to fight against the Communists and other troops who were
working in collusion with them. On the 11th Wang submitted to
ITAGAKI the document on the expedient methods to save the situa-
tion.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION BY JUDGE NYI.

24008 * The witness stated that he did not remember the terms of the peace negotiations carried on with the German Ambassador. When asked whether after Nanking had fallen Japan revised its peace terms and that the new ones were more difficult to accept, he stated that the negotiations through the German Ambassador Trautmann were conducted just prior to the fall of Nanking, and he recalled that though the terms were made, they were relaxed. * The latter terms were relaxed, but not heavier or more strict. He denied that the terms from after the fall of Nanking were required to be accepted before the end of the year.

24009

24010 The witness stated that he was familiar with other new regimes before establishing the central government. * He denied participating in forming the so-called Ta-Tao Shanghai Municipal Government. When it was pointed out, exhibit No. 463-A, an official document of the Foreign Ministry, it was stated that KAGESA had been consulted in forming this municipal government,

24011 the witness stated * that he did not participate.

24013 After it was pointed out that this was an official document, he stated that as an officer in the general staff he received a report on the manner in which the municipal government was set up, but he did not participate in establishing that government. He received a report on its formation saying it was formed, but never at any time took direct part in forming it. * The only part that he denied was the direct part.

On December 14, 1937, the provisional government was already established in Japanese occupied Peiping. He thought it possible to interpret the facts to mean that the formation of this provisional government had been planned long before the fall of Nanking. The head of the provisional government was Wang-Keh-min.

24014 When asked whether he knew that Wang was the first in Hong Kong and was instructed by KITA and IMAI to go north and set up this government, * the witness stated he did not know the manner of his going north or the circumstances surrounding it.

Page

When asked what he meant when he said Japan intended to accomplish peace in some other way, the witness stated Japan had no proposal, and among those concerned each had his own proposal. The government had not arrived at any definite plan, method, or procedure.

24018 * The witness stated that the statement of January 16 was KONOYE's statement. KONOYE might have had some other way, but so far as the witness was concerned the some other way was an extremely vague matter, and since he had nothing concrete in mind he had simply used the expression "some other way".

24019 When asked whether it was intended to set up new regimes or to do it through established regimes, * the witness stated that he remembered among the some other ways was a plan which sought for peace through established regimes.

When asked whether it was Japan's policy to have separate regimes rather than a centralized government, he stated Japan's foremost desire for China was a government which was strong and unified and friendly to Japan, and its foremost wish was that the national government change its attitude to friendship toward Japan. Japanese policy had not advanced to as concrete a state of requiring that the local regimes be still maintained. The Japanese ideas were in some measure expressed through the Wang Ching-wei-ITAGAKI conversation.

24020 With respect to the term "some other way", he also recalled the plan he had * as Chief of the Military Affairs Section. Asked how despite the fact a war existed Kao came to Tokyo in the spring of 1938, the witness stated that a friend of his in Shanghai was much taken by Kao's enthusiasm and arranged with the Japanese Army to have him brought to Japan, and an airplane was provided. He could never come without the help of the Japanese Army. Advance notice of his coming came only to the witness as an individual. * The
24021 Japanese government had nothing to do with it, only the witness had advance notice. The witness was then Chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Ministry. When asked whether he could direct the airplane without his government having any knowledge of it, the witness stated he had not provided the airplane. This was done by the Japanese Army which was then stationed in China.

Page

24022 * The witness stated that Kao came to see the witness as an individual, and not in his official capacity. The name of his friend in Shanghai was MATSUMOTO, Shigeharu, of Domei. He negotiated with the army and used his good offices in getting the plane. Before Kao started the witness had a telegram from MATSUMOTO.

24023 The witness had met Kao once in 1932. Before Kao came, the purpose of his visit was unknown to the witness, although he knew he was coming. * Kao was former Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs of the China Foreign Ministry, but the witness did not know whether he held any position at the time.

24024 Although Kao came and was met by the witness as an individual, after talking with him the witness' position changed from that of an individual to an official, and in that capacity reported his information to his superior officers. Asked how his capacity * changed, the witness stated that having had no order or authority when he met Kao, he met him as an individual. After the talk he learned that this related to general peace between Japan and China and that these men were in a position of influence and that their plan was acceptable and effective to use as reference. He reported the contents of his conversation in his official capacity, recommending that something be done to carry the talks through. He reported this to Generals HOMMA and TADA, chief of the Second Division General Staff and Vice Chief of Staff. They had no objections.

24025 All questions discussed with Kao related to general peace, * although he did not know Kao's official position. When asked how he could conduct negotiations in such an atmosphere, he stated that they were not negotiations, but that there should be no hesitation to anyone desiring to bring about peace to engage in such discussions, either privately or officially. It would be extremely valuable to discuss with an individual general peace. He was only sorry there were not many more of them.

The Army at Shanghai thought it advisable to bring Kao by special plane. When not in use there were many planes.

Page

- 24026 * With respect to the use of the term Japanese Government in the statement that the Japanese Government had no particular objections to Kao's plan, he stated that TADA reported the matter to the War Minister, who reported it to the 5 Ministers Conference, and no one entertained any objections. The War Minister at the time was SUGIYAMA. He could not recall who was Foreign Minister. He would not say they favored the plan but they had no objection to it. They did not go any further in stating that they had no objection.
- 24027 * When asked whether prior to that Japan had made frequent overtures to Wang-Ching-wei, the witness stated before that they had not heard about Wang-Ching-wei, and no positive overtures were made. He actually saw only two people, Kao and Tung, to discuss peace.
- 24028 With respect to the Ta-Tao Shanghai Municipal Government, as stated before * he had not participated in establishing the government, but he did talk with other Chinese about peace. However, he had met only two Chinese in Japan proper with regard to peace. Once, during a trip to Shanghai, he received a visitor, but since his discussion about peace did not amount to much he had not given it any importance * and had not mentioned it.
- 24029 He went to Shanghai in September, 1937. He did not know the mission of IMAI in Shanghai on official business. He did not think his assignment was to contact Chinese interested in the peace movement for establishing a pro-Japanese regime.
- The witness had heard of the Tang peace movement, but did not know who joined or participated in it. This was outside his duties. He did not think IMAI had any connection with it. In the end Tang was assassinated, and his peace movement collapsed.
- 24030 * Asked whom he meant by the central military authorities who made amendments to the plans proposed by Kao and Mei, the witness stated they were the officers concerned in the Army Staff and the War Ministry. The Chief of Staff at the time was Prince KAN-IN, and ITAGAKI was war minister. Up to April, 1938, the witness was Chief of the Chinese Section of the General Staff. His affidavit should be corrected to read that the
- 24031 * Chinese Section was in the General Staff.

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At that time the Vice Chief of Staff was TADA, and the Vice-Minister of War TOJO. He recalled that the plan proposed by Kao and Mei was reported by the Minister of War to the 5 Minister's Conference.

Asked how he could take Kao's and Mei's opinions as the official desires of China when he did not know their official position, the witness stated regardless of their position the proposal advanced by them was reasonable. It was his belief that proper measures should be taken to meet them. This was why he would have welcomed thousands of Chinese so that they would be able to understand the desires and views entertained by the people of China. He could not say that Kao's and Mei's views would represent the Chinese view. He had only said that in his affidavit because both were Chinese. He meant that this was the desire of these two particular Chinese, not the Chinese in general. It was clear that these men had connections with Wang Ching-wei.

24033 In November, 1938, the order for the witness to go to Shanghai was issued by the War Minister after consultation at the 5 Minister's Conference. IMAI was sent on order of the Vice-Chief Staff, at the witness' recommendation. The witness had said that since he was going as a representative of the War Ministry, there * should be one from the General Staff. The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau was General MACHIJIRI, and not SATO, who was below the witness in rank. The witness' assignment was to transmit to the Chinese the terms they desired. The Chinese desired to hear the Japanese terms, and the witness went to convey them. There was some discussion on these terms, but the witness' assignment was to transmit them and to listen to the desires of the Chinese and bring them back to the * proper authorities in Japan.

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24035 The purpose of the project was not discussion. The assignment was to convey the Japanese terms to the other party and carry back their desires. The points he principally discussed with Wang's followers was withdrawal or evacuation of troops. * While he did not know their official position, as stated before, they were connected with Wang Ching-wei, who was Vice-Chairman of the Kuomintang and of the National Defense Council. He was also the No. 2 man in China.

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He did not take it that Wang had the power to send people to discuss the evacuation of troops and the military situation in the occupied areas. Wang was a patriot with ardent desires to realize general peace in China, and to realize this peace one important condition was, "What did Japan desire of China?" Because these gentlemen had connection with Wang, he listened to their views.

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* There was agreement among them as to the evacuation of troops. The Commander of the Central China Forces had no connection with this. He believed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Force was General YAMADA. There was no supreme headquarters at the time. HATA was not in command. The supreme headquarters was not established until the spring of 1940. He had forgotten who was MATSUI's successor as Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Forces.

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* When asked what he meant by a pre-arranged plan when he said that Wang was to escape from Chungking according to a pre-arranged plan, the witness stated on November 9, 1937, Wang had a conference with Chiang Kai-shek at which Kao was present. At that time Wang explained the advantages and disadvantages of war and peace, but because Chiang did not listen Wang came to the conclusion that results could not be achieved by carrying on a peace movement within Chungking, and the only alternative was for him to escape to the outside to carry on the movement. This story was published in the newspapers of January 15, 1938. At that time

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Chungking was surrounded * and influenced by the communists, and Chiang Kai-shek could not act on his own initiative, and it was impossible to eradicate the communistic influence. The mission could be taken only outside Chungking.

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It is clear, therefore, that as early as November 9 Wang already had a plan to escape from Chungking. This is what the witness meant * by a pre-arranged plan.

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* When the Chinese proposed that they were carrying out a pre-arranged plan, he did not know about the pre-

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arrangement at all. * They mentioned this pre-arranged plan because they wanted the peace terms to be announced after Wang escaped as a pre-arranged plan. This is the reason for the use of the word.

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24042 It was agreed that when they carried out this pre-arranged plan Japan would be expected to announce its terms, and he so informed his government. The KONOYE statement was therefore prepared in view of Wang's escape. * Wang responded to KONOYE's statement on December 29, but the witness had not heard beforehand what the contents of the announcement would be. He had never heard that Wang's response was made on a previously arranged scheme to give the Chinese views on KONOYE's statement.

With respect to the 5 Minister's Conference which decided to send the witness to see Wang, the witness did not remember the date except that it was in the latter part of March. The witness recommended himself for the assignment by telling ITAGAKI he would like to take it.

24043 * Asked whether the instructions specify what would be a safety zone, the witness stated he was ordered that all things should be determined at the initiative of Wang himself. He was instructed to assist Wang to reach a safety zone. By such a zone was meant a zone where it would be most convenient and safe to carry on the peace movement and not a place like Hanoi where Wang's life would be in danger from assassins.

24044 At the time Japan felt it would be most inconvenient for Wang to come to a Japanese safety zone, but that some area outside such a zone would be more preferable. The decision, however, was left to Wang. * Shanghai was decided on in accord with Wang's desire.

With respect to the trip to FIC by the witness, previous information was given to the Japanese consular authorities. Secret code terms were used to hide the witness' identity during the trip. Telegrams were sent by the witness direct from Hanoi, but it may have been that certain telegrams were routed through Formosa. He did not recall that several telegrams were routed through the Formosan Army. He could recall that telegrams sent direct from Hanoi to Tokyo were for technical reasons sent through Formosa. These may have been sent through Formosa for such reasons.

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24046 * The witness identified exhibit No. 2721-B as a telegram sent by him under the pseudo name KAWAMURA. The witness also identified exhibit No. 2721-C-1, C-2, and
24049 C-2 as telegrams sent by him. * The witness identified exhibit No. 2721-D as a telegram sent by him. With
24050 respect to exhibits 2721-E-1, E-2, and F-2, * the witness stated that E-1 and E-2 were sent by him; the third was
24051 not. He also identified * exhibit No. 2721-F as a telegram sent by him.

24052 Exhibit No. 2721-G * was not drafted by the witness, but was sent by him and he was responsible for it. Exhibit No. 2721-H was sent by the witness.

24053 When asked whether YANO went to FIC on the Hokko Maru or whether he flew to Shanghai from Tokyo and went to FIC by another ship, the witness stated that the latter statement was true. * His statement in the affidavit was a mistake.

The Hokko Maru was a specially chartered ship for the purpose of this trip. The witness, being on intimate terms with YAMASHITA, he requested it and the latter provided it.

24054 When asked whether he arrived at Hanoi on the 16th of April, he may have made a mistake by one or two days in his affidavit. He did not remember when YANO arrived, but YANO did arrive at Hanoi before the witness. * he had not heard that the Foreign Ministry sent urgent instructions to the consul in Hong Kong to bring YANO at the same time as the witness arrived. There was no special reason why they did not come together. YANO had the opportunity to go to Hong Kong via plane.

When asked why it was necessary that he arrive at Hanoi on the same day as the witness did and whether it was because he was in charge of the secret codes, the witness replied it was not. When the witness met Wang Ching-wei he handed him the letters from ARITA and ITAGAKI and from SUZUKI of the Koa-in, and from YONAI.

24055 * With respect to the code, the witness recalled that his name was KAWAMURA, but he did not recall other aspects of this inferior and weak code. He remembered that Wang's name was not "cargo" or "freight". There may have been such a name as TAKEUCHI, but he had no recollection of the name given to Wang Ching-wei.

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24056 He thought that there was some other name besides that given to Wang Ching-wei, but since the events had taken place eight years before he did not remember. He had forgotten * that the code name for Hokka Maru was "taxi". He recalled that the code name for Wang Ching-wei's hiding place in Shanghai was "godown", and that code name for Shanghai was "Osaka".

24057 He left Hanoi on the 25th, but Wang did not leave on the same boat. He did not recall the name, but it was a small French ship chartered for him, and Wang's ship also started on the 25th. When asked whether it was arranged beforehand that the two ships * were to meet on the high seas off the Nightingale Islands, the witness stated he did not remember the name of the island but it was south of Hainan, and the two ships were to meet there and to make the balance of the voyage together.

24059 By his affidavit he meant to suggest that the idea of changing ships came from Wang Ching-wei and not because of a pre-arranged plan. When asked whether this was true in view of the pre-arrangement to meet in the Nightingale Islands, the witness said they had agreed to meet at Nightingale Islands. * The plan was for both ships to meet at a point south of Hainan and to proceed to Shanghai side by side.

24060 When they * left Hanoi he had heard that the plan was for both ships to go side by side, an occasion might arise because of navigation difficulties which
24061 would make it necessary for Wang to change ships. *Wang was on a very small ship of about 700 tons, and a slight storm even would make it difficult to proceed, while the witness was on a 5,000 ton ship.

The reason that they did not take Wang along on their ship was a very important point considering Wang's political concepts and philosophy. He wanted to serve his country by putting all matters into action in accordance with his own initiative without outside assistance and that he would take a small ship, and would not like to trust his mission to other parties, but even would take his chance on a small ship and would change ships only when travel became impossible.

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* He stated that it was a distortion of facts to say that they used code terms and arranged to change ships to evade public attention and that the Japanese were at the back of the Wang Chingwei movement.

When asked why he used code terms and started on two different ships, the witness stated that in going and coming from Hanoi to get Wang, all movements were kept in absolute secrecy. Since Wang's life was in danger it was clear that if they were to leave Hanoi with Wang his life would be in danger. This is why codes were used. The decision with respect to the degree of danger at Shanghai was left entirely to Wang. There is no difference if they went on two different ships or on the same ship. They merely met Wang's desires.

When Wang's ship did not join them in the high seas they were anxious, and urgent measures were resorted to to search for his ship. He later heard that the navy had been requested to search for Wang's ship by orders from Tokyo.

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* No one from Japan suggested that Shanghai was not a safe place, but he had heard that there was considerable argument among Wang's followers as to the place he should seek refuge. The witness asked the Tokyo authorities that residences be prepared for Wang.

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* This was not done to safeguard Wang, but were established because his circle was so large that several were needed. He had forgotten whether he had asked for guards at the landing, but he had requested that they be placed at Wang's provisional place of hiding.

When his memory was refreshed by exhibit No. 2721-D in which he stated that they wished to carry out their orders according to a fixed schedule, the witness stated that the reason why it was stated that the situation did not permit a delay was that next door to Wang's residence in Hanoi a group of assassins had rented a house under the name of Southwest Airlines Company.

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Whether or not Wang would be exposed to more danger in Shanghai was left to Wang. The witness decided that Wang should call on Formosa. * Keelung was in North Formosa. It would ordinarily take about three days for the Hokko Maru to go from Keelung to Shanghai. They left Keelung around May 4 or 5.

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He stated it was pure speculation to say that they could have reached Shanghai much earlier than May 8 and they slowed down purposely on the high seas because the residences of Wang were not yet ready.

24068 When asked * whether the boat could have arrived at Shanghai by the fourth at normal speed but the boat was slowed down * so as not to arrive until the 6th, 24069 the witness stated he did not remember about slowing the ship. His memory was not even refreshed when shown a telegram. His statement of leaving Keelung about May 4 or 5 was based on a presumption calculated according to the ship's usual speed. It was pure guess work on his part. He also assisted in transporting Wang's 24070 associates, * in accordance with Wang's desire. The most influential person in his circle was his wife. His party was somewhere around 20.

24071 * When asked what he had in mind when he used the term in exhibit No. 2721-F "war of telegrams" with Chiang, the witness stated it was a battle of words between Wang and Chiang, because Chiang insisted on resistance against Japan, while Wang insisted on peace.

24072 When asked what he meant by terroristic counter-plot in that telegram, he said some counter-measures 24073 against terrorism * had to be taken in accordance with Wang's plan. * By terroristic counter plots he meant defensive measure. The various plans do not refer to counter plans against terrorism, but include all steps necessary to carry on plans for peace.

24074 * He called it a defensive measure to counteract against terroristic activities and to set up headquarters at a convenient place to carry out such activities. He actually set up headquarters for Wang in accord with his wishes on an extension of the International Settlement at Shanghai. No. 76 Jessfield Road * was the residence headquarters from which Wang carried on his anti-terroristic measures. Ting was in charge of the headquarters. Japanese assistance in this work principally included liaison with the Kempei Tai in Shanghai, and the eradication of any friction between the Japanese gendarmerie and Wang's group. The Japanese came under the witness' command after arrival in Shanghai.

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24076

When asked * whether Japanese terrorists had been sent from Tokyo to Shanghai for this purpose, the witness said he heard of the plan but it was rejected and not a single one came. The witness issued the rejection. They did not come to Shanghai. When asked whether his plan was the rejection of the terrorists or merely a difference as to the time of bringing them

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in, the witness said * that the telegram was sent on May 3 or 4 through the Chief of Staff, Formosan Army, while the witness was in Formosa. He had received information that there was a plan to send rightist elements from Tokyo to Shanghai. They were extreme nationalists. This was the telegram he had sent in opposition to that.

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When he arrived in Shanghai on May 8, he learned that the group had not arrived. * asked what were the bitter experiences in the past referred to in the paragraph, the witness said from his association with internal national problems, he was very familiar with the harm that could be done by right wing terrorists.

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* He hated terrorists and never used them. When asked on what occasion they had been used in the past, he was pointing to the many terrorist incidents that occurred in Japan, but he had never written that he had used terrorists himself.

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* While in Formosa he received information from the headquarters of the Formosan Army * that there was a report that a terroristic group was going to Shanghai, and he was not informed of the type of organization they belonged to or the names of its members. He had not

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* made any investigation and did not know their political affiliations. After arriving in Shanghai he did not

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* think it necessary * to investigate the terroristic gangs and did not make any investigation.

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* He learned that the terrorists were being sent from Japan from a member of the Japanese forces in Taiwan who had recently returned from Tokyo. When asked whether he had asked the man how he got this information,

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he said he did not think it necessary. * He did not take any steps to obtain any information concerning the sending of terroristic gangs from Tokyo. He did not consider the person whom he had sent the telegram as the person who was sending the terrorists.

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24090 When asked why he had sent this person to stop them, he said that the telegram * was sent to a section chief of the General Staff, who had assisted him in preparations for going to Hanoi, and he had nothing to do whatever to the sending of the terroristic gangs.

24091 Wang intimated he wished to go to Tokyo * about May 7 while they were aboard ship, but it was formally decided when they arrived in Shanghai. He was positively sure about May 9. While aboard ship nothing was said about concrete Japanese assistance for establishing a central government. Wang told him of his desire to

24092 establish a central government, but since * the witness did not know Japan's intentions he could say nothing. It was therefore no question of helping or not helping the establishment.

When he learned of Wang's desire for the first time to set up a central government, it was a surprise both for Japan and himself. When the witness was Chief of the Military Affairs Section, Japan had no idea of establishing a central government in China.

24093 When asked whether he knew that when the witness went to North China in the middle of May Wang Ching-wei had approached * the Italian Ambassador to use the Italian Concession in Tientsin for his activities in North China, the witness stated that according to his recollection he was in Shanghai with Wang in the middle of May.

When asked whether the Japanese consular authorities in Shanghai ordered his return to reach a decision about Wang's request to use the Italian Concession, the witness said he had no contact with the Italian Embassy. He had never heard that Wang intended to use the Tientsin Concession for his activities.

24094 Wang * did not make a trip to North China during that period, but only after his return from Tokyo. While in Tientsin he stayed in the Italian Concession. YANO made arrangements with the Italian authorities concerning the house, but he did not know what steps were taken by him. He suggested that YANO had nothing to do with arranging with the Italian authorities with regard to the thing.

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- 24095 * When it was pointed out that there was a telegram in which it was said that the writer was waiting for KAGESA to make arrangements, the witness stated he thought the telegram was a true one.
- 24096 * Although he had not seen it before or had no recollection of its contents, by looking at the telegram he recalled that he had gone to Peking. The telegram was marked exhibit No. 2721-I.
- 24097 * While he was in Peking in the middle of May, as was recalled to him, he had nothing to do with negotiations with the Italian authorities for Wang's use of the Concession. He had no recollection * of having been consulted by the Japanese consular authorities in Shanghai with respect to Wang's proposed use of the Italian Concession. * While the telegram says he was to be consulted after his return to Shanghai, he could not recall having been consulted about the use of the Italian Concession.
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- 24100 He believed that Wang Ching-wei must have left Shanghai about May 31. He requested his affidavit, which stated that Wang left about the beginning of June, be left as it is, * because he was not absolutely sure that it was May 31, and there might be a difference of one or two days.

Upon being shown exhibit No. 2721-H, he stated he was now sure it was May 31 and had no objection to his affidavit being corrected, and wanted it corrected.

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- 24,101 Exhibit 2721-H was sent to the DOHIHARA Agency, which was located in Shanghai. Even after DOHIHARA returned to Tokyo in April the office continued to be called the DOHIHARA Agency. The witness did not know DOHIHARA's mission in Shanghai. Being Chief of the Military section of the War Ministry he had no connection with DOHIHARA's mission * and did not know anything about it. Many of the telegrams were relayed through the DOHIHARA Agency. The DOHIHARA Agency had come to an end but the witness used their building. If he did not use the name of the DOHIHARA Agency he had no access to ciphers so he had to use that name. There was no relation ever between the two missions.
- 24,102
- 24,103 The witness had no right to send telegrams so he was forced to use the DOHIHARA name, which did have the privilege. * Although there were other agencies available through which he could send his telegrams, such as the consular authorities, because the building was empty he moved into it and sent telegrams from there because it was the most convenient thing to do. Although DOHIHARA had returned to Tokyo his right to send telegrams still existed. His coded address appeared in the table of ciphers. This is a simple matter for cipher experts to understand.
- 24,104 * The name being in the code books this gave authority to send telegrams under that name in code. This is why he used it. It is true that at the time there was in fact no DOHIHARA Agency but he merely used the code in the cipher book. He believed that DOHIHARA returned at the end of April. After his departure there were a few clerks who remained behind. He imagined the mission came to an end when DOHIHARA returned to Tokyo.
- 24,105 There was no connection between the two agencies. Since he did not know DOHIHARA's mission he could not say whether it was the same as his or different.
- 24,106 The witness had no knowledge that on April 22nd or 23rd DOHIHARA sent a telegram to the Vice Minister of War and Vice Chief of Staff suggesting that Shanghai was not favorable for Wang Ching-wei. * He did not know that he had suggested Tsingtao as a better place. There was no use showing him any telegram because on the 23rd he was either on board a ship or in Hanoi. * He had never heard of the dispatch or its contents until this moment. This document was marked Exhibit 2721-J.
- 24,107

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24,108 He had no knowledge of the function of the DOHIHARA Agency or how it happened that DOHIHARA was making suggestions.
 24,109 * After Wang Ching-wei returned from Tokyo to Shanghai in July, the witness opened the office known as the KAGESA Agency and he may have used the name KAGESA Organ. His organ had many names, such as the Baikado and the Ume Agency. * They were one and the same agency. This organ did not take care of the funds to finance the Anti-Comintern National Salvation League. He had no knowledge of this League, but if its functions were explained to him he could perhaps say more about it.

24,110 Japan in the form of a loan provided funds to Wang. By the time * his government was established, the witness believed forty million yen had been loaned to him, but he had no recollection of the right amount. The witness was in charge of the details of payments to be made to Wang.

24,111 The witness first named his organ the Bakaido, meaning house of the plum blossoms. From that his staff began to call the office the Plum Agency or Ume Kikan. * He stated his organ was not one belonging to himself as an individual. His office consisted * of various elements, from the Army, Navy, Foreign Office, China Affairs Bureau, Members of Parliament and journalists. Army members were under his orders. Those who were not under his command did not like to refer to the organ as the KAGESA organ, but those under his command used that name. Since they needed a name to include all elements, he named it the Bakaido. The General Staff called it the Ume Agency. Neither the Navy or Foreign Office had the obligation to use the name given by the General Staff. * All these names had the same value and were commonly used names.

24,113 Official documents were the only telegrams sent by the witness to the Army and by the naval officers. His agency belonged to the various ministries separately, but the responsibility of direction rested on him. Simultaneously with the establishment of the Wang government, his organ was dissolved.

24,116 There was also a Matsu Kikan or Pine Agency, * and a Take Kikan or Bamboo Agency. He did not know the functions of these agencies. He had no recollection of the responsible member of the Pine Agency. The Take Kikan or Bamboo Agency must have been a small one because he did not recall its name. He had no relations with them.

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24,117 The President of the National Government at Chungking when Wang Ching-wei formed his government was Lin, Sung, and he knew that Wang once suggested that Lin should be named as President of the new government. * When asked whether this was for the purpose of misleading the people to believe the National Government had returned to Nanking, the witness stated that they believed that at some future time the Chungking Government would merge with the new one and there would be general peace. To be prepared for this they wished to name Lin as President. It was not to lead the people to think that the Chungking Government had returned. Until Lin came to Nanking, Wang was to be the acting President.

24,118 Asked what the difficult problems involved in the dissolution of the Renovation Government were, the witness stated that if both the Provisional and Renovation governments were dissolved, the question of personnel of both would present a problem. According to Chinese custom, if the head of one faction were to move, his followers would create a disturbance and affect public peace.

24,119 He had meant in a previous statement to refer only to the Renovation Government. The Provisional and Renovation governments were entirely different things. * When he had said Provisional Government, he meant Renovation Government.

24,120 During Wang's visit to Japan in June 1939, he only met KONOYE once. * There was present the witness, and an interpreter, SHIMIZU. The interview lasted for one hour, after which everyone retired and KONOYE and Wang spoke in private without an interpreter for three hours. SHIMIZU, as a witness, in his affidavit numbered Exhibit 2585, stated he was the interpreter. When asked how he explained his statement with SHIMIZU's that he acted as interpreter, he said both affidavits had to be read together and the truth is revealed. * The two statements combined were the truth. SHIMIZU acted as interpreter for one hour, then retired, and the two spoke for three hours. The witness also had retired. He had stated in his affidavit he did not know the details of the conversation.

24,122 When asked how he knew what took place that inspired Wang with courage and hope as to the future of the peace movement, the witness said he heard that from Wang afterwards.

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24,123

The witness attended the inauguration ceremony, going to Nanking about one week before the inauguration. He recalled that there was some dispute about the national flag and was much displeased. He did not protest strongly to Wang because the pennant was not wide enough. He had no dispute with Wang. *

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There was a problem, but no argument. It was not a fact that the witness made a representation. When Wang came to Japan it was promised that a triangular pennant would be put on top of the Chinese national flag. At the ceremony the pennant was not in accord with the promise given. The Japanese asked the witness to request that the pennant be affixed in accordance with the agreement. He took this matter up with Chow and it was immediately settled. Wang did not apologize officially for this and he did not apologize to the expeditionary forces and fleet. The witness acted as intermediary and everything was settled.

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* No apology was made.

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The witness said he went with Wang from Tokyo to North China, where Wang saw the head of the Provisional Government, Wang Keh-ming, and General TADA of the Japanese forces. * In the interview with Wang Keh-ming the witness was not present. In the interview with TADA no interpreters were used. He did not know what was said. They spoke in Chinese. However, he later heard from Wang that he spoke to TADA about the central government to be established and reached certain understandings. *

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He guessed, and guessed only, that one of the topics discussed was the amalgamation of the two existing regimes and the Renovation Government. The views of TADA had nothing to do with the fact that the personnel of the two governments were to be given consideration. This was left strictly to Wang and his policy.

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He believed they discussed it with Wang Keh-ming. * While he supposed that such problems were discussed by the two Wangs, he had never heard anything about it at all. Wang did intimate the personnel problem would constitute a very serious problem. This was not done in accordance with the view expressed by ITAGAKI. ITAGAKI had merely mentioned * that the dissolution of the Renovation Government would constitute a peace maintenance problem and the two Wangs did not confer on the basis of what ITAGAKI said.

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The witness went to Tsingtao with Wang Ching-wei when he met the leaders of the existing regimes in January 1940. The

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24,130 purpose of the witness's going was that he was to explain the circumstances under which the Central Government was born and other matters concerning the Central Government to the people coming from North China, newspaper reporters, and others. * He did not act as mediator between Wang and the leaders of the two existing regimes. Everything was done by Wang himself.

The function of the China Affairs Board was mainly to decide on Japanese policy regarding politics, economy, and cultural matters. Asked whether it had four liaison offices in China to direct affairs of the new regime, the witness stated the China Affairs Board was not an organ which directed or led anyone.

24,132 The Ume Agency never directed anyone. In fact, Wang himself directed the Ume Agency. * After the establishment of the Wang Government the Ume Agency was dissolved.

24,133 He had not said that the Japanese advisors acted as a medium between the Wang Government and the Japanese in the prosecution of the policies. * He denied that there was an understanding between the China Affairs Board and the Foreign Ministry that he should be posted in China to direct the affairs of the new regime.

24,134 Upon being handed Exhibit 2721-K and asked whether it would refresh his memory * the witness said if the Political Affairs Bureau Chief SUZUKI said these things he was wrong. The witness was never posted in China to direct the affairs of the Chinese regime. It is unthinkable that a person with his qualifications and low position should direct a man like Wang. He had never heard that some people proposed to send MATSUOKA to direct it but SUZUKI thought it enough to have the witness there. The witness would gladly have relinquished his post to MATSUOKA.

24,135 The witness knew TSUDA, president of the Shanghai Liaison Office of the China Affairs Board. * When asked whether he and the liaison office of the China Affairs Board were fighting over naming Japanese advisors, the witness stated that advisors were appointed by Wang's invitation. They did not compete for appointment. The appointment of advisors was left completely to the recommendation of Wang.