

Doc. 2152 Evid

Folder 9

(48)

CHARGE OUT SLIP

JUN 24 1946

DATE ~~JUN 22 1946~~

EVILENTIARY LOC. NO. 2152

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. 722

BACKGROUND LOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE J. J. [Signature]

ROOM NO. _____

11
Q. What directions did you, ^{receiving} the
Commander of the 3^d Army, ^{receive} from the
Headquarters of the Kwantung
Army, ~~with~~ ^{concerning} the operation
plans of ^a war against the
Soviet Union?

A. While I was the Commander
~~the~~ I got the instructions
^{only} on ~~defence~~ ^{defence} but ^{3 plans} about the
offensive plans from my
predecessor. plan of

Q. When was the plan of offensive
~~plan~~ ^{changed} ~~into~~ into the
~~defensive~~ plan of defence?

A: The plan of offensive ~~plan~~ was
changed into ^{the plan of} defence ~~one~~
in 1944.

Q. What were the subjects of the training
of ~~the~~ officers while you were the

the commander of the 3^d Army²

a: The practical lessons ^{on the defense of the} ~~with officers~~ ^{frontier fortified areas} were conducted on the maps and and in the field. ~~on the defense~~

~~of fortified areas at the frontier~~ ^{we received}

Then in April-May 1945 Van

Instruction from the Kwantung Army ~~headquarters~~ ~~at~~ ~~headquarters~~ saying that the defence

should be planned deeper in the country, approximately in the ~~area~~ ^{area}

of Mulin. ^{after that we} ~~conducted~~ ^{conducted} ~~lessons~~ ^{lessons} ~~in the said~~ ^{in the said} area.



Certificate
The Town of Khabarovsk

March 28, 1946

I ^{the} undersigned (Krzhozhevskaya Julia Georgievna) hereby certify to the Acting Military Interrogator for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo Colonel Pogranitsky that as a secretary-stenographer I promise to take short hand notes of the minutes of the interrogation ^{of Muzakami Keisaku} and decipher them ~~correctly~~ correctly. I am duly warned that for the purposely false minutes I bear criminal responsibility according to articles 16 and 152 of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

Krzhozhevskaya

The certificate is taken by
acting Military Interrogator for the USSR
at the International Military Tribunal
in Tokyo

Colonel

Pogranitsky

Препровождено на утверждение
и-м. 18 марта 1946 г.

Certificate

The Town of Khabarovsk

March '28', 1946

I, ^{the}undersigned Major ^{a.a.}Pashkovsky hereby certify
 to the Acting Military Interrogator for the USSR at the
 International Military Tribunal in Tokyo ^{Pogranitsky} that I am
~~well~~ ^{well} conversed in the Japanese language
 to make oral translation into Russian ^{correctly} and that
 I give my promise to translate the testimony of
 Murakami Keisaku correctly.

I am duly warned that as an interpreter I bear
 criminal responsibility for purposely false translation
 according to Article 92 of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

Pashkovsky

The certificate is taken by
 acting Military Interrogator for the USSR
 at the International Military Tribunal
 in Tokyo

Pogranitsky

Препека на арест и суд

1-15 В. М. М. М.

Certificate

The town of ~~Vladivostok~~ ^{Khabarovsk}

March 28
~~April 5~~, 1946

I, the undersigned, ^{Murakami Keisaku} ~~Taki~~ ~~Nicoshi~~
hereby certifying ~~this certificate~~ ^{to the}
acting ^{military interrogator} ~~Assistant Prosecutor~~ for the
USSR at the International ^{Pogranitsky}
Military Tribunal in Tokyo

~~to the effect that~~ in the

quality ^{that I} as a witness at the
case of the ~~def~~ ^{principal} war crimi-
nals I promise ^{to} ~~to~~ ^{promise} ~~upon~~

~~myself~~ to tell only the truth.
~~give only true~~

I am ^{duly} warned ~~of the fact~~ that
in case ~~of~~ giving "false ^{testimony}

I bear criminal responsibility accord-
ing to ~~the~~ article 95 of the Criminal
Code of the RSFSR

Murakami Keisaku

Signed ~~Taki Nicoshi~~

~~Signature~~
~~Signature~~
~~Signature~~

The certificate is taken by the acting
^{military interrogator} ~~Assistant Prosecutor~~ for the USSR
at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo
Pogranitsky.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

THE TRANSLATION DIVISION

24 June

1946.

JBA

24 1946

Attached is Document # 2152 which requires: TARANENKO

1 Translation from russian to jap

2 Cutting and proofreading of mimeograph stencil in _____

Affidavit of witness Murakami Keisaku of March 28, 1946.

Russian-Japanese translation in full.

JBA

Document Officer.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2144-2153, inclusive

20 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Documents on Russo-Japanese Relations

Date: 1931-1945 Original () Copy (x) Language: Russian, English & Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x) in part

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

State control Historical Record Office, U.S.S.R.

SOURCE OF COPIES: Russian Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: UMEZO, Yoshijiro; TOGO, Shigenori

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Russo - Japanese Relations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Doc. No. 2144

Communique of the T.A.S.S. published in the newspaper "IZVESTYA" on 27 July 1946, about the KHALHIN-GOL Incident on 1 sheet.

Doc. No. 2145

Affidavit of witness MATSUMURA TOMOKATSU of March 25, 1946, on 15 sheets. Includes charge Gen UMEZO made plans for attack on U.S.S.R.

Doc. No. 2146

Copy of the letter of the Vice-President of the Chinese Eastern Railway Board of 15 December 1934, about the occupation of C.E.R. premises by Japanese forces, on 5 sheets.

Doc. Nos. 2144-2153, inclusive - Page 2 - SUMMARY Cont'd

Doc. No. 2147

Contents of the negotiation between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. (Molotov) and Japan (Togo) on 9 June 1940, about the demarcated frontier between the Mongolian Peoples Republic and MANCHURIA in the area of the KHALHIN-GOL River on 3 sheets with 1 map attached.

Doc. No. 2148

Construction of fortified districts in MANCHURIA from 1934-1945 on 2 sheets with 4 maps in 2 copies. Report by Col. TSIGICHKO.

Doc. No. 2149

Affidavit of witness BATARSHIN, an eye witness of the KHASSAN Lake Incident of 1 August 1938. Affidavit given on 26 Feb 1946.

Doc. No. 2150

Report on the increase of barracks capacity in KOREA from 1931-1945 on 2 sheets with 3 maps in 2 copies. Report by Col. TSIGICHKO.

Doc. No. 2151

Report on the increase of the net-work of railways and highways in MANCHURIA from 1931-1945 on 4 sheets with 7 maps in 2 copies. Report by Col. TSIGICHKO.

Doc. No. 2152

Affidavit of witness MURAKAMI EYSAKU of 28 March 1946.

Doc. No. 2153

Extracts from the affidavit of witness MATSUURA KUSUO of 26 March 1946, on 5 sheets. (In Japanese and Russian -- has not been translated into English)

Analyst: Lt. Goldstein

Doc. Nos. 2144-2153, inclusive
Page 2

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs
 ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

I, MURAKAMI Keisaku, former Lt. Gen of the Japanese Army, born in 1889, take oath and depose as follows:

From March 8, 1943 to December 20, of the same year, I was director of the Research Institute of Total War in TOKYO. The Institute was established in the autumn of 1940 in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance and was a government organ for the research of basic problems of total warfare and for the training of personnel necessary in the various ministries for the conducting of the total warfare. The director of the Institute was under the direct control of the Prime Minister.

On the day of my appointment to that post, I was received by Premier TOJO Hideki in his office at the official residence. TOJO handed me a written order appointing me director of the Research Institute of Total War, and said that, "at present, the Institute should make supreme efforts in the study of the national ideology of the Japanese Empire /NIPPON KOKUTAI KANJEN/ and in order to secure ultimate victory, it is necessary that each student of the Institute be imbued with that ideology". In connection with the above object, Litt. D. YAMADA Takao, Director of JINGU KOGAKUKAN, Dr. HIRAIZUMI, Professor of Tokyo Imperial University and Rear Admiral TERAMOTO, professor of the Naval College were invited to the Research Institute of Total War. The Institute received various secret materials necessary to carry on the research in the various problems concerning total war from all the ministries, and besides, the students of the Institute constantly received additional secret data from their ministries and used them in their researches.

The Institute was sometimes given definite research problems on total warfare from Premier TOJO, but usually, the Institute itself selected the most important problems of the time for investigation. Vice Admiral ENDO, my predecessor in the post of Director of the Research Institute of Total War said to me in March 1943 that "The Research in the administration of the occupied areas in the Greater East Asia territory, occupied by the Japanese Army, was personally entrusted by Premier TOJO". The above secret research, that is, the draft for the administration of the occupied areas in the Greater East Asia Occupation Areas, had been completed before I assumed the post of the Director of the Institute and I read it through. Besides the above, I read through the draft for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere drawn up by the Research Institute of Total War. The said draft provided for the establishment of:

FILE COPY

- (A) The central area including Manchuria, Soviet Maritime Province, and North China which would be united by Japan;
- (B) The Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere, including besides the above, Eastern Siberia, China and Indo-China;
- (C) The Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere, including besides the Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere, Australia, India and Pacific Islands.

The various problems of the further conduct of war by Japan in the near future, i.e., the period from 1943 to 1944, were investigated by the Institute under my direction.

In my interrogation on March 29, 1946, I already stated the plans worked out by the Institute with regard to the increase in the output of aircraft up to 40,000 planes a year, the increase in the construction of vessels with the total tonnage of 1,500,000 tons a year and other matters.

The draft plans worked out by the Institute were sent to the Prime Minister and all the ministries concerned in order to have them carried into practical use. Compared with the other ministries, the War and Navy Ministries were most closely connected with the Institute, and that is why the Institute was headed alternately by a general or an admiral.

When I was director of the Institute, it had about forty students consisting of responsible officials of the respective ministries whose rank were usually equal to the ranks of major or Lt. Col. and some representatives of banks and companies.

At the opening ceremony at the Institute in April 1943, there were present Mr. SUZUKI, Minister of State without Portfolio and concurrently President of the Planning Board, Mr. HASHIDA, Minister of Education and Mr. HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet who participated in the establishment of the Institute in 1940.

Chief of departments and sections concerned of the ministries gave lectures at the Institute, Maj. Gen. ARISUE, Chief of the 2nd Section of the Army General Staff, Col. NISHIURA, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, etc. gave lectures.

When I was director of the Institute, theoretical researches and maneuvers were conducted with the express purpose of rendering practical assistance and data to the Cabinet and the respective ministries. When carrying out these researches and maneuvers, they were conducted under strict consideration of the actual international and internal situations, and were based only on the real strength and resources of the state.

In the summer of 1943, at a conference of the Institute advisors,

matters concerning the students from the respective ministries to be accepted in 1944 were discussed and decided on. HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, and the Vice Ministers of the respective ministries were present at this conference.

At the graduation ceremony in December 1943, TOJO, HOSHINO, SUZUKI and other ministers were present. Prime Minister TOJO stated in his speech at the ceremony that, "the Pacific War has entered into its decisive phase and therefore the personnel of all the ministries must make intense efforts. And as regards a research of the students this term was only a short term research from April to December 1943, the students should not be satisfied with what they had achieved. Although the students were given a firm foundation in the national ideology of the Japanese Empire, this ideology should be thoroughly grasped by the students". Prime Minister TOJO further stressed that they should all endeavor to accomplish the war, firmly believing that Japan would by all means be the winner.

Due to the shortage of personnel, the number was cut down by half in 1944. Furthermore, in 1944, the Institute was ordered to conduct only researches which were considered most important by the Cabinet. The Research Institute of Total War was closed down after TOJO resigned from the post of Prime Minister in 1944.

MURAKAMI Keisaku.

October 20, 1947

TOKYO.

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named MURAKAMI KEISAKU at the MITSUBISHI 21 Building, TOKYO, JAPAN on this 20 October, 1947.

D. WHITE, Captain.

Summary Court Officer.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Steve S. Yamamoto hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said MURAKAMI, Keisaku was duly sworn in my presence and signed said affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 20 day of October, 1947, at Tokyo Japan.

/sg/ Steve S. Yamamoto
C-888916, Capt. Inf.

43872
Doc 2152-A

No. 1

極東國際軍事裁判所
亞米利加合衆國其他
荒木貞八其他ニ對スル

供述書

明治二十二年ニ生シタル元日本陸軍中將村上啓作ハ誓約
ノ下ニ次ノ如ク陳述ス

予ハ昭和十一年三月八日ヨリ同年十二月二十日迄東京ニ於ケル
總力戰研究所長ヲ勤メタリ
總力戰研究所ハ昭和十五年秋勅令ニ依リ設置セラレ總力
戰ニ関スル基本的研究並各省ニ總力戰遂行ニ必要ナル人
員ヲ養成スルヲ目的トスル國家機関ナリ
所長總理大臣ニ直隸セリ

予カ所長拜命ノ日東條英機總理大臣ハ其官邸内ノ事務
室ニ於テ予ヲ引見シ總力戰研究所長任命ノ辞令ヲ手交シ
且次ノ如ク訓示セリ

即特ニ今日ニ於ケル總力戰研究所ハ日本國體觀念ノ研究ニ
最大ノ努力ヲ拂ヒ且必勝ヲ期スル爲各研究生ニ對シ此國體
觀念ヲ徹底セシムルコト肝要ナリト述ヘラレタリ

叙上ノ目的爲ニ神宮皇座館長文學博士山田孝雄東京
帝國大學教授平泉博士並海軍大學教授寺元海軍少
將ヲ總力戰研究所ニ招聘セリ

總力戰ニ關スル諸問題研究ノ爲ニ必要ナル種々ノ秘密資料
ハ各省ヨリ採領シ且研究生ハ常ニ原所屬ノ各省ニ至リ補足

RETURN TO ROOM 361
FILE COPY

的ノ秘密資料ヲ受領シ之ヲ研究ニ利用セリ

研究所ハ時トシテ總力戰ニ関スル具體的研究問題ヲ東條總理大臣ヨリ指示セラレタルモ通常當時ノ研究ノ爲最モ重要ナル問題ヲ研究所自身ニ於テ決定セリ

昭和十八年三月予ノ前任者タル總力戰研究所長遠藤海軍中將ハ日本軍ニ依リ占領セラレタル大東亞地域ニ於テ占領地行政ノ研究ハ東條總理大臣ヨリ直接指示セラレタル旨ヲ予一語レリ

以上ノ秘密研究即大東亞占領地域ニ於ケル占領地行政案ハ既ニ予ノ所長就任前完成セラレアリテ予ハ之ヲ通読シ且以上ノ外總力戰研究所ニ於テ作製セラレタル大東亞共榮圈設立原案ヲ通讀シタリ同案ニ於テハ

a. 日本ニ依リテ連結セラレタル滿洲ソヴェット聯邦ノ沿海州北支ヲ含メル中核圈

b. 以上ノ外東部ニベリア支那印度支那ヲ含メル小共榮圈

c. 小共榮圈ノ外濠洲印度太平洋諸島ヲ含メル大共榮圈
カ予定セラレアリ

近キ將來即昭和十八年ヨリ昭和十九年ニ亙ル間ニ於ケル日本ノ戰爭繼續諸問題ハ予ノ指導サ下ニ研究所ニ於テ研究セラレタリ此間研究所ニ於テ研究作製セラレタル諸案即飛行機年産四万機造船年産百五十万吨及其他ノ計畫ニ就イテハ既ニ昭和二十一年三月二十日ノ顧問調書ニ於テ陳

No. 3

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述セリ

研究所ニ於テ研究作製セラレタル諸計畫案ハ實地ニ利
用スル爲メ總理大臣及關係各省ニ送附セラレタリ
陸海軍両省ハ他ノ各省ヨリモ研究所ノ研究ニ關係深ク此
故ニ研究所長ニハ陸海軍將官カ交互ニ任命セラレタリ
予ノ所長時代ニハ通常少佐中佐ノ階級ニ相當スル各省
責任官吏及若干ノ銀行並會社員ヨリ成ル四名研究生
アリタリ

昭和十八年四月入所式舉行際ニハ鈴木無任所大臣兼
企画院總裁橋田文部大臣及昭和十五年ニ研究所設
立ニ参画セル星野内閣書記官長等出席セリ

以下次頁

Doc 2152-A

研究所ニ於テハ各省ノ關係局長及課長カ講演ニ從事セリ而シテ參謀本部ヨリハ第二部長有末少將陸軍省ヨリハ軍事課長西浦大佐等カ講演セリ予ノ時代ニ於ケル理論ノ研究及演習訓練事項ハ内閣及各省ニ對シ實地ニ利用シ得ル爲ノ資料ヲ提供シ得ル如ク実行セラレタリ是等ノ研究演習ノ実行ニ際シテハ實際ノ國際及國內状況ヲ嚴重ニ考慮シ且現實ノ國力及資源ニ基礎ヲ置キタリ

昭和十八年ノ夏頃研究所ノ參與會議ニ於テハ星野内閣書記官長及各省次官等出席ノ下ニ昭和十九年度各省ヨリ採用スベキ研究生ニ關スル件ヲ審議決定セリ

昭和十八年十二月研究生卒業式ノ際ハ東條星野鈴木及其他ノ大臣出席セラレタリ此際東條首相ノ行ヒタル訓示ニ於テ

「大東亞戰爭ハ今ヤ決定的段階ニ入レリ而シテ各省ノ諸子ハ最善ノ努力ヲ盡ササルヘカラス此學期ニ於ケル研究生ノ研究ハ昭和十八年四月ヨリ同年十二月ニ亙ル短期間ノ研究ナルヲ以テ此研究ヲ以テ満足スヘキニアラス研究所ニ於テ研究生ハ日本ノ國體觀念ニ關シ鞏固ナル基礎ヲ與ヘラレタルモ此觀念ヲ徹底的ニ把握セサルヘカラスト述ベラレタリ

更ニ東條首相ハ日本ノ必勝ヲ信シテ戰爭完遂ニ邁進セサルヘカラサルヒ日ヲ強調セリ

人員不足ノ結果昭和十九年度ノ研究所ノ編成ヲ半減セ

No. 4

No. 5

Doc 2152-A

ラレタリ而シテ研究所ハ昭和十九年度ニ於テハ内閣ニ於
テ重視スル研究文ヲ実行スヘク定メラレタリ
總力戰研究所ハ昭和十九年ニ於ケル東條總理大臣
辭職後廢止セラレタリ

昭和二十二年十月二十日

村上啓作

No. 6

Doc 2152-A

證

余「ステイヴ・エス・ヤマモト」ハ余ガ日本語及ビ英語ニ精
 通セルモノナルコト並ニ本日上記村上啓作ガ余ノ面前
 ニ於テ正式ニ宣誓シ且余ノ面前ニ於テ該宣誓口供
 書ニ署名セシコト又前記宣誓ノ施行並ニ該口供
 書ノ署名ニ関スル事項ハ凡テ眞実ニ且正確ニ日本
 語ヨリ英語ニ又英語ヨリ日本語ニ翻譯セラレ当該
 宣誓口供書ニ充分理解セラレタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ
 證明ス。

署名「ステイヴ・エス・ヤマモト」

歩兵大尉。〇。一八八八九一六

No. 7

Doc 2152-A

右村上啓作ハ昭和二十二年十月二十日日本東京三菱
第三号館ニ於テ下記署名係官ノ面前ニテ宣誓
シ且署名シタルコトヲ證明ス

略式裁判所

歩兵大尉

テイ、テイ、ホワイト

2152

W 122

証人訊問調書

「ハバロラス」市

一九四六年三月二十八日

予、東京國際軍事裁判ソ聯側軍事檢察官
「ボグラーニツキー、ペー、エヌ」少佐ハ通譯「パレコフスキー、
アー、アー」少佐參加シ虚偽、陳述ヲナシタル場合
「ニコラヤ」社會主義聯邦「ソヴィエト」共和國
刑法第九十五條、責ニ任ズベキモノトシテ日 敬告書ニシ
ル上、証人トシテ下名ノ者ヲ訊問セリ、

証人、陳述次、如シ、

1. 姓名(又稱) 村上 啓作 中將

2. 年齢 一八八九年生

3. 職名 第三軍司令官

4. 所屬政黨 如何ナル政黨ニモ団体ニモ屬セス

5. 居住地 「ハバロラス」市

証人、虚偽、陳述及通譯、虚偽、譯ニ對シ責任、
予告ニ関スル者右ハ、訊問調書ニ添附ス

問 君ハ露語が出来るカ?

ア、ウ、ア、エ

2152.

答問答

然り

露語ノ陳述ニ同意スルカ?

然り、同意ス、但、不明又ハ困難ナル個々ノ

表現ハ日本語ニ譯サレ度シ

問

訊問ニ通譯「パシコフスキー」少佐ガ答ニ加

シ貴方ノ因テ通リニナルガソレデヨイカ、

然リ、全リ、

貴方ノ職歴ヲ述ベヨ

答問答

一九〇〇年陸軍士官學校卒業少尉ニ

任官シ近衛師團歩兵第三聯隊小隊

長トシ

一九一三年中尉ニ任官シ陸軍大學校入校ス、

一九一六年陸軍大學校卒業シ所屬聯隊

ニ復歸ス

一九一七年陸軍省、世界大戰研究部ニ

員ヲ命ゼラル

一九一九年歐洲(ポロランド)ラトヴィヤ

独逸、フランス)ニ出張ヲ命ゼラレ、同地ニ於

ス

一三年間戦史の研究ニ従事ス

一九二〇年大尉ニ任官ス

一九二二年帰朝シ戦史教官トナル

一九二五年少佐ニ任官ス

一九二七年参謀本部教育及演習課員ヲ

命ゼラル同課ハ大演習ノ組織及参謀將校教

育ノ業務ヲ管掌セリ

一九二九年再ビ陸軍大學校ノ戦術教官トナ

リ中佐ニ任ゼラル

一九三一年軍務局課員トシテ陸軍省ニ入ル

一九三三年大佐ニ任ゼラ静岡歩兵第三十四

聯隊長トナル

一九三四年歩兵學校教導聯隊長兼教練

教官トナル

一九三五年陸軍省陸軍大學校編成課長

トシテ同年陸軍省軍事課長ニ轉ス

一九三六年戦史教官トシテ陸軍大學校

ニ復歸ス

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一九三九年少將ニ任セラレ一九三八年西南部滿洲
臨時旅團長トシテ滿洲ニ派遣セラル。同地ニ北
支ヨリ支那軍部隊侵入セシヲ以テ松、旅團ハ
秩序維持ヲ命ゼラレタルモナリ。松ハ一年間
該旅團ヲ指揮アリ

一九三九年中將ニ任セラレ中支漢口市ニアル
第三九師團長トナル

一九四一年教育總監ノ隷下ニアリシ陸軍砲工
學校ノ校長トナル

一九四三年總力戰研究所長トシ同年軍事學
校長トシテ滿洲ニ派遣セラル。同學校ニ於テハ大隊
長及聯隊長ニ諸兵種協同動作ニ関スル問題ヲ
教云アリ

一九四四年第一三軍司令官トナリ終戦ニ至ル

問 大學校ニ於ケル戰史教授ノ原則ニツキ述ベヨ
戰史教授ノ根底ヲナス基礎觀念ハ如何ナルモカ?

答 教授事項ハ露軍威カノ研究、露軍統帥
ノ諸問題ニシテ露軍教育ノ細部ヲ知ラシメ

日本大陸ニ於ケル影響の擴大、日本國民ヲ養育シ
工業原料ヲ獲得シ販賣市場ヲ独占スルヲ以テ朝
鮮及滿洲領土ヲ占領シ觀念ヲ欽吹シ

問

ニ見ルト、戦史教育の目的ハ日本將校ニ日本が
將來戦ニ於テ領土ヲ獲得セバハナラズト思想ヲ
植エケルコトニ歸著スルコトア、

答

然リ、

問

日露戦争ハ戦史上最初ニ日本が宣戦布
告ヲ用ヒス露西亞ヲ攻撃シテ、其特色アルコト
アル

予ハ戦史教官タル貴方が此宣戦布告ヲ用
ヒテ敵ニ攻撃ヲ加ヘテ行為ヲ如何ニ字義ニ説以
テヤシ興味ヲ覚テ、貴方が此攻撃ヲ正当トシ
ト考ヘ日本戦略及戦術ノ某程度ノ成功
ト述ベタカ或ハ別ト説明ヲシタカア、

答

此行為ハ國際法ニ反スルモノナリ、然レナラバ
今日マデ日本テハ、此ヲ行ニ述ベラレテ来タ、即チ一
九〇四年二月五日日本ハ露西亞政府ニ最後

通牒ヲ送ツク 是ハ平和關係、斷絶ヲ意味シ
 モ、テアル。予、見解ニヨリ、ハ最後通牒ハ嚴密ニ云
 ハ、宣戰布告デナイ。然シテ、ガラ道德的觀見
 ヲラ最後通牒提示後、討敵攻撃ハ犯罪デナイ
 ト見レルト思フ。此最後通牒ニ、露西亞が日
 本、要求ヲ履行シナイハ、日本ハ自破ス手段
 ヲ採ルデアラウト云フコトが述べテアソト思フ。

問

君ハ其様ニ學生ニ説明シタリカア？

答

日本デハ此自在様ニ考ヘテアソリカラ、私ハ其事
 柄ヲ説明スル必要ガナク、日本デハ此問題ヲ
 極メテ輕ク考ヘテ居タカラ、對米戰ニ於テ、此過
 失ヲ繰返レ、一九四一年十二月八日、パールハーバー
 デ米國艦隊ヲ攻撃シタリ、テアル。

問

日本ハ如何ナル軍事上目的ヲ有シ、又歴史
 教育ニ此等目的ヲ如何ニ反映セシメタラア？

答

日本ハ領土狭ク、生活必需資材ヲ保證シ
 得ナイ故ニ滿洲、支那一部及南方諸島
 ヲ占領シ、我領土ヲ擴張シナケバ、ナラナク。

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問 答

此ノ觀念ガ歴史教育ニ反映サレテキタ

□ 赤書[□]及其内容ニツキ貴方ハ何ヲ知フテ居ルカ?

本書ハ山田ノ前任者武藤元帥及川島ノ時

代ニ教育總監部デ編纂サレ、資料トシテハソウエ

ートノ野外教令ト一九三二年版步兵操典ニ

書ヲ利用シタモトアル

問

□ 赤書[□]ハ如何ナル目的ノ下ニ出版サレタモカ?

答

日本軍ハ赤軍ヲ將來ノ敵ト考ヘテ居リ、赤軍ハ

独得ノ編成ト独得ノ戦術ヲ有ッテ居ル、故ニ赤軍

ト戦フタメニ日本軍ノ戦術ヲ露軍ニ準應ス

ル存ニ建直サナレバナイ、本書ハ日本将校ニ對シ

露軍ニ勝ラヌ、又自己ノ戦術ヲ露軍戦術

ニ對抗セムニ為シ、如何ナル戦術上ノ措置ヲ

採ルベキヤヲ示シテアル

問

全日本軍将校ニ□ 赤書[□]ノ研究ヲ勸奨スヤ

ル軍令ガアツカ?

答

全将校ハ□ 赤書[□]ヲ良ク研究セヨト、教令ハ

總監ノ指示ガアツク

問 君ハ戰術教官トシテ學生ニ對シソレ聯、地圖ヲ使

用ス戰術演習ヲ實施シテコトガアルカ?

答 然リ

問 度々カ?

答 然リ

問 陸軍大學校ニ於ケル戰術演習ヲソレ聯、地圖

ニヨリ實施シテハ何故カ?

答 日本内地ニ於テハ戰爭ハ起ラナイト考ヘテ細心テ

戰術演習ハ他國ノ領土就中ソレ聯及滿

洲領土ノ地圖テ行ッテ

問 圖上演習ノ事實上ノ妨害物トシテハ滿洲ノ如何

ナル部分カ?

答 最モ多ク行ッテ演習ハソレ聯沿海州ニ接スル

東部滿洲ノ地圖ニヨルモノデアル

問 ソレ聯沿海州ニ接スル東部滿洲ノ地圖ニヨル演習ヲ

最モ多ク行ッテハ何故カ?

答 我等ハ此ソレ滿國境ニ於テ戰爭ガ起ル公

ト

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算が最も少イト考ヘツカラテアル

問 一九四三年總ク戰研究所、如何ニ課題ヲ有ツテ
平ヲカア?

答 第三飛行機、生産及工場ヲ最大限ニ拡張スル

問題ニ我等ハ関心ヲ寄セ、飛行機年産四〇、〇〇〇
トシテ課題トシテ

第二ニ海上用艦船生産力ノ擴大問題デアツテ
我等ハ船舶年産一、五〇〇、〇〇〇噸ヲ課題トシテ

第三ニ食糧ヲ滿洲、朝鮮及南方地域ニシテ
中南ヨリ日本ニ輸送スル問題デアツテ日本デハ米
が一年ニ一、五〇〇、〇〇〇噸不足デアツテ

第四ニ空爆ニ備ヘ人民及工場ヲ分散サセ
問題ガ研究サレテ

第五ニ外政上日本ヲ盟主トスル東亞諸國
トシテ強化する問題ガ研究サレテ

問 滿洲要地、對シテ聯攻撃準備ニキ貴イ
ハ何ヲ知ツテ居ツカア?

答 一九四二年ニ滿洲要地カラソレ聯ニ攻撃ヲ加ヘテ計

画ガアッタコトヲ知ツテ居ル。之ガソレ予、関東軍、編
組ヲ強化シ、大道及戰略鉄道ヲ敷キ約二〇〇、飛
行場ヲ建設シ設堡地區、彈藥保存用軍
用倉庫及多数ノ工場ヲ建設シ、例ヘ奉天ニ
ハ戰車工場、自動車工場及航空機工場ヲ、
遼陽ニ爆藥工場ヲ建設スル如キデアル。

問 貴方ハ何處カラ滿洲要地、準備ノ事ヲ知リカ?

答 和ハ臨時旅團長トシテ又後ニ第三軍司令
官トシテ滿洲ニ居リ時、自身、觀察ニヨリテ
戦ヲ準備、帰結ヲ得。

問 滿洲要地カラ如何ナル方向ニ對シテ作戰ヲ行フ

予想デアッタカ?

答 ウオロシーロ市方向ニ對シテ攻撃ノ作戰ヲ行フ予想デ
アッタ

問 何處カラ貴方ハ之ヲ知リカ?

答 和ハ自身ニテ作戰計畫ヲ見テ譯シテハソレガ、前
任第三軍司令官野本將軍カラ日本軍、主政

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撃方向が東部滿洲「ラロニー」方向ナルトヲ聞イタリ。

問 貴方ハ一弟三軍司令部官トシテ關東軍司令部カウ

對シテ戰作戦計畫ニツイテ如何ト指示ヲ受ケテ居

タカ?

答 和、許ハキリシテ六防衛ニ関ス指示ガケテ、攻撃

計畫トハ前任者ヨリ聞イタリテアル。

問 何時攻撃計畫ガ防衛計畫ニ変更サリカ?

答 計畫ガ攻撃カウ防衛ニ変更サリハ一九四四年ニアル。

問 貴方ガ一弟三軍司令部官ガツタ時代將校、演習白

ハ如何ト主題デ行ハレタカ?

答 將校演習ハ地圖ト下國境附近、現地ニ於テ

設堡地區、防衛ニツイテ行ツタ。次ニ一九四五年四月乃

至五月ニ關東軍司令部ヨリ國內ノ畧、穆稜地

區ニ於ケル縱深防衛ヲ計畫スベシト、指令ガ奉

ゲテ、レラニ指令地區デ演習ヲ行フコトニシタリ

問 ソノ聯地圖ニ見戰術演習デ主作戦方向ニ「ブラゴ

ラエシキエンスク」スバツスク「ラオロシーロ」カ向ラシテ

タリ、何時頃、ユトカ?

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答

一九三七年我等が戦術演習、その選定方向は
ホグラーニーヤ、驛、東方の地区である

問

日本軍が「ハルビン、ポーランド」赤軍と衝突を起さる
ハ何故か

答

此處で日本軍の威力を示し、赤軍の力を試験する
カフタカラテアン、然るに全般的に見て是は無駄な事
デアリ、当時和の西南部満洲、旅團長デアリ
一九三九年四月、長春會議に参加し、関東軍
司令官植田將軍、國境決定問題ニツイテは何
事でもソウエー止國境守備隊ニ讓歩シテハナ
ラナイト指示ヲ與へ、若し國境線が不明瞭ナラ
本ニ有利ニ存シ自主的ニ決定スベキデアリト言明
シ、第二三師團長小松原ハ植田、指示ヲ確實
ニ履行シマテノコトデアリ、此事件ノ責任ハ如何
ニ給ラザルモ日本ニ有利ニ存シ自主的ニ解
決ストイフ程ヲ指示ヲ與へ、関東軍司令部ト
植田ガ負フベキモノデアリト和ハ考ル

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問

此戦争ニ於テ日本敗北ノ原因ヲ貴方自身ハ如何ニ判断スルカ?

答

第一ニ此戦争ハ工業力始ナシ有テ部門ニ亘リ日本ノ国力ニ相應セズテアリタ。日本ノ工業ハ極テ弱ク軍ノ需要ヲ保證シ得ナカリタ。

第二ニ戦略上過失テアル。作戰地區ハ一地ニ於テ強化セラルベキモノ拘ハラズ拡大シ過ギタ。

第三ニ外交ノ失敗ナル。独逸ト同盟ハ日本ニ取ッテ不利テアリタ。英國ト同盟シク方が遙ク有利デアリタ。其ノ外、日本が独逸ノ對ソノ戰ヲ抑ヘ得ナカリタ。

又獨ソノ戰開始後ハスターリングラード附近ニ於ケル獨軍ノ敗北以前ニ戦争ヲ終結セシメ得ナカリタ。

第四ニ外交上過失ハ對米戰

争テアル。一九四一年春ハ米國ト和スル絶好ノ機會デアリタ。米國政府ノ回答ハ日本ニ都合ノ好イモノデアリタ。然ルニ日本ハ此回答ニ同意ヲ與ヘズ

却テ戦争ヲ始メタ。次ニ新嘉坡ノ占領ハ英國ト戦争終結ノ好機ナリニ拘ラス之ヲ行フ

トモシテカフタ、

日本、敗戦ニ大志役割ヲ演ジタハ、原子爆弾ト「ラゲ
 オロケト」テアル。我海軍ハ相当強大デアリテ、教、
 艦艇ト空軍ヲ有リテ居ラガ、米軍ガ「ラゲオロケト」テ
 使用スル様ニナリテカラ、我爆撃機ヤ潜水艦ハ事前
 ニ發見サレ、日本軍ハ急襲ノ優越性ヲ喪失シ、夜
 間テモ米軍ハ日本海軍ヲ發見シ、極テ精確ニ射
 撃ヲ加ヘタ、

更ニ細カイ原因ヲ與テハ、經濟組織ノ悪カラソト
 テアル。即個々ノ工業部門ノ業務ヲ統制スベキデア
 リタガ是カ厚シク、

問答

貴方ハ誰ガ戦争ノ主犯者ト思フカア、

天皇ノ主志詔問者ナリ且首相候補ヲ選定ス
 ベキ内大臣木戸侯爵デアリ、木戸侯爵時ノ選定
 シテ候補者が悪カラソ、

次ニ東條首相デアリ、彼ハ對米戦ヲ起シテ陸相
 テアル、

パール・ハーバーノ米海軍ヲ攻撃シテ海相嶋田

提督

參謀總長 杉山(死去)

海軍軍令部總長永野、永野、海上作戰ニ関

ス天皇、諮問者テアル、島田ト共ニ「パール・ハーバー」
ノ米艦隊攻撃ノ責ヲ負フベキナル、外相東郷ハ米國ト交渉ヲ行ツタガ後ニ之ヲ中止
對米宣戰布告ニ同意ス、南次郎ハ樞密顧問官デ對ソレ戰ノ基地特ニ
滿洲要地ノ準備ヲ行ツタ、梅津ハ一九四一年閏東軍司令官タリ日支戰ノ
始ニ對支紛ヲ平ヲ扱ステ大戦ヲトシテ独逸ガ
對ソレ戰ヲ開始スヤ國境ニ大軍ヲ集結シ對
ソレ戰ノ準備ヲ行ヒ赤軍ニ脅威ヲ與ヘテ大島浩ハ戰ヲ平ニ對シ大志責任ヲ有ス、日本ハ同人
ノ提言ニヨリテ防共協定ニ次イテ三國同盟ヲ締
結スリテアル、同人ハ独逸ノ國狀ヲ監視シ独逸ノ
對ソレ攻撃ヲ事前ニ阻止スベキテアルガ之ヲ為

チカフタ

谷正之ハ東條内閣ノ外相デアリ。外相デアルカラハ戰
争責ヲ負フベキハ当然デアリ。同人ハ南京ニ大使トシテ
汪精衛ノ臨時政府ヲ支持シタリ。

本訊問調書ハ私自ラ之ヲ通讀シ、完全ニ了解シ
テ、之ヲ正確ニ記録セルナリ依テ茲ニ署名ス。

證人

中將

村上啓作(署名)

訊問者

東京國際軍事裁判軍事檢察官

少佐 ホグラーニツキー (署名)

通譯 少佐 バスコフスキー (署名)

秘書速記者

クルズジエフスカヤ(署名) 調書第五頁ニ私ノ施

シムンイニギ訂正アリ五〇〇〇〇ヲ

正シトス

訊問開始 一三時一五分 村上啓作(署名)

訊問終了 一七時二〇分 少佐ホグラーニツキー(署名)

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書類才二一五二號

證

余 野 獲 雄 余が 露 西 語 及 ビ 日 本 語
精 通 者 ナリト 並ニ 右 露 語 原 文 及 ビ 日 本 語 原
文ヲ 對 照シ 上 右ノ 本 書 類ヲ 眞 實ニ 且 正 確ニ 翻
譯セシメタルヲ 確 證セシムルニ 茲ニ 證ス

署名 平野 英 雄 (平野)

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E. J.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

15 Aug, 1946

TO: DUPLICATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 2152 for Jaranko.

Arrange for reproduction of 125 copies in English and 90 copies in Japanese as follows:

M. B.

J. V. O.

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

31 July

, 1946

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

JUL 31 1946

Attached is Document No. 2152 A for Taranenko.

Arrange for translation as follows:

Check Russian into Japanese translation.

(Affidavit of witness Murakami Katsuku of March 28, 1946)

HIRANO .8/5

JBA

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

REQUEST FORM

September 1946

INCIDENT - ACCUSED

JUDGE ALBERT WILLIAMS

The undersigned requests the consideration of Document # 2152 (Describe):

Affidavit of Murakami, to translate additionally from Russian into Japanese the certificates of witness Murakami, interpreter Pashkovsky, and secretary-stenographer Krzhizhevskaya.

These certificates were not included by mistake while the affidavit of ~~introduction~~ was being prepared (specific purpose)

~~Staff Attorney~~ FABIANENKO

TO THE DOCUMENT OFFICER:

September 1946

The above document has been approved for processing by you with changes as follows:

Judge Albert Williams

By Secretary

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

REQUEST FORM

1946

INCIDENT - ACCUSED

JUDGE ALBERT WILLIAMS

The undersigned requests the consideration of Document
2152 (Describe):

*Affidavit of Murakami, to translate additionally from
Russian into Japanese the certificates of witness
Murakami, interpreter Pashkovsky, and secretary-stenographer
Kzzhizhevskaya. These certificates were not included by mistake
while the affidavit of Murakami was being translated.*

for introduction in evidence (specify purpose)

Staff Attorney

1946

TO THE DOCUMENT OFFICER:

The above document has been approved for processing by
you with changes as follows:

Judge Albert Williams
Document Control Attorney

By _____
Secretary

AFFIDAVIT OF A WITNESS

Khabarovsk.

March 28, 1946.

I, Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R., at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Major POGRAMITSKY P. N., with Major PASHKOVSKIY A.A. as an interpreter, interrogated and warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony according to Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., as a witness named below, who testified:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Surname, name, father's Name | - Murakami Keisaku
Lieutenant-General |
| 2. Age | - Born 1889. |
| 3. Position held | - Commanding General
of the 3rd Army. |
| 4. What political party belongs to. | - Does not belong to any political party nor any society. |
| 5. Address | - Khabarovsk. |

The certificates of the witness being warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony and of the interpreter for giving false translation are attached to the affidavit.

Q. Do you speak Russian?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree to give testimony in Russian?

A. Yes, I agree. But I request certain difficult or unfamiliar expressions to be translated into Japanese.

Q. It is possible to arrange. Mr. PASHKOVSKIY, an interpreter, takes part in the interrogation. Does it suit you?

A. Yes. Perfectly.

Q. Tell your service record?

A. In 1910 I graduated from the Military Academy, was promoted to the rank of sub-lieutenant and appointed a commander of a platoon of the third infantry regiment of the guards division. In 1913 I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and entered the military College. In 1916 I graduated from the college and returned to the regiment where I served before the college. In 1917 I was appointed an officer of the War Ministry Department for Research of the World War I. In 1919 I was sent on mission to Europe (Poland, Latvia, Germany, France) where I studied military History for three years. In 1920 I was promoted to the rank of captain. In 1922 I returned to Japan and was appointed an instructor of military history. In 1925 I was promoted to the rank of major. In 1927 I was appointed an officer of the Training and Maneuver Department of the General Staff.

This department was responsible for the organization of the Imperial maneuvers and for the training of the Staff officers. In 1929 I was again appointed an instructor of tactics at the military college and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In 1931 I entered the

War Ministry as an officer of the Section of the General Department. In 1933 I was promoted to the rank of Colonel and appointed the commander of the 34th Infantry Regiment in Shizuoka. In 1934 I was transferred to the Infantry Academy as a commander of a training regiment and also as an instructor of field service. In 1935 I was appointed the chief of the War Ministry section for organization of military educational establishments. In the same year I was transferred to the post of the chief of the War Ministry General Department. In 1936 I again returned to the Military College as an instructor of military history. In 1937 I was promoted to the rank of major general and in 1938, I was sent on mission to Manchuria as a commander of a temporary brigade in the Southwest of Manchuria invaded at the time by units of the Chinese Army from the North China, and the task of my brigade was to restore order there. I commanded this brigade for a year. In 1939 I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and was appointed commander of the 39th Division quartered in Central China in the town of Hankow.

In 1941 I was appointed director of the Institute of Military Science and Technique which was under the Inspector of troops training. In 1943 I was appointed director of the Research Institute of Total Mobilization and Warfare. In the same year I was again sent on mission to Manchuria as the Chief of the Military Academy where battalion commanders and regimental commanders were trained in questions of coordination of arms. In 1944 I was appointed Commanding General of the 3rd Army and there I stayed up to the capitulation.

Q. Tell what was the method of teaching history of wars at the College. What main ideas were put into teaching of History?

A. The lectures dealt with the following questions:

1) Power of the Russian Army and 2) organization and structure of this army, study of training of the Russian Army in detail. The following ideas were developed in this course of lectures - ideas of expanding the Japanese influence onto the continent, ideas of the occupation of Korean and Manchurian territories for the purpose of maintaining our nation, obtaining raw materials for industry and for the purpose of obtaining markets.

Q. So the aim of teaching history of wars was to imbue the officers with the idea that Japan needed territories which she had to conquer in future wars?

A. Yes.

Q. The characteristic feature of the Russo-Japanese War is, that for the first time in history Japan attacked Russia without declaring war. I am interested in the following, how you, as a teacher of History of Wars, explained the students this attack on the enemy without declaring war. Did you consider this attack to be right and explained it as a certain achievement of Japanese strategy and tactics or did you explain this fact differently?

A. This action contradicts the international law. Up to the present time it has been explained as follows: On February 5, 1904 Japan sent an ultimatum to the Russian Government. It meant cessation of peaceful relations. I understand that strictly speaking, an ultimatum is not a declaration of war, but from the point of view of morality the attack on the enemy after presenting an ultimatum may not be considered as a crime. It seems that in this ultimatum it was stated that if Russia did not fulfill the demands of Japan, Japan would take measures at her will.

Q. Did you explain it in this way to your students?

A. Everybody in Japan understood it so and therefore I had no need to explain this fact. We did not consider this question to be serious and therefore during the war against America we repeated the same mistake, having attacked the American Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941.

Q. What military aims had Japan, and how these aims reflected in teaching of history?

A. Japan occupies a very small territory which does not provide vitally important resources. Therefore it was necessary to occupy the territory of Manchuria, a part of China and the islands in the South, to extend our territory. This idea was reflected in teaching of history.

Q. What do you know about the "Red Book" and its contents?

A. This book was composed in the Chief Training Inspection Department under Marshal MUTO and KAWASHIMA, the predecessors of YAMADA. As material, two Soviet books were used: Field Service Regulation and Battle Service Regulation of the Infantry of 1936.

Q. For what purpose was the "Red Book" published?

A. The Japanese Army regarded the Red Army as the future enemy. The Red Army had its own organization and its own tactics. Therefore the Japanese tactics had to be adapted to that of the Russian Army to be able to fight against the Red Army. This book gave some instructions to the Japanese officers what tactic methods had to be applied by Japanese in order to conquer Russians and to oppose our own tactics to that of Russians.

Q. Was there an order to the Army which obliged all the officers of the Japanese Army to study the "Red Book"?

A. There was an instruction of the Chief Training Inspector that all the officers should study the "Red Book" thoroughly.

Q. While being the teacher of tactics did you give to the students lessons on tactics on the map of the U.S.S.R.?

A. Yes.

Q. Often?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were the tactic lessons in the Military College given on the maps of the Soviet Union?

A. It was supposed that war would not take place on the territory of Japan proper and therefore all the lessons on tactics were given on the maps of territories of other states, the Soviet Union and Manchuria in particular.

Q. What parts of Manchuria were chosen as objectives for practical lessons on maps?

A. Mostly the lessons dealt with the map of Eastern Manchuria bordering with the Soviet Primorye.

Q. How do you explain that the lessons were mostly conducted on the maps of Eastern Manchuria, bordering with the Soviet Primorye?

A. We considered that most probably the war would break out just on this frontier between Manchuria and the Soviet Union.

Q. What were the tasks of the Research Institute of Total Mobilization in 1943?

- A. First, we were interested in the maximum increase of the production of aircraft and factories, and we set ourselves the task of producing forty thousand aircraft a year. Second, we were occupied with the problem of increasing the production of sea vessels. We set ourselves the task of producing vessels with the total tonnage of one and a half million tons a year. Third, we were interested in exports of products from Manchuria, Korea, and from the Southern regions (Annam, Siam) to Japan. We had a shortage of 1,500,000 tons of rice a year. Fourth, the question of dispersion of the population and industry in case of air raids was studied. Fifth, the sphere of foreign policy we set ourselves the task of studying the problems of consolidation of the bloc of Eastern Asia countries under Japanese hegemony.
- Q. What do you know about the preparations of the Manchurian military base for an attack on the Soviet Union?
- A. I know that in 1942 there was a plan of an attack on the Soviet Union from the Manchurian military base. The strength of the Kwantung Army had been increased beforehand for this purpose, highways and strategic railroads had been constructed, about two hundred airfields had been constructed, as well as fortified areas, ammunition dumps, many plants. As for instance, in Mukden, a tank, an automobile and an aircraft plant, in Laiyang - a plant for production of explosives.
- Q. From what sources do you know about the preparations of the Manchurian military base?
- A. I made my conclusions about the preparations for war from my personal observations when I was Commander of the temporary brigade and later on Commanding General of the 3rd Army in Manchuria.
- Q. In what direction were the military operations against the Soviet Union to be conducted from the Manchurian military base?
- A. Offensive operations were supposed to be conducted in the direction of the town of Voroshilov.
- Q. How do you know about it?
- A. I myself did not see the operation plan, but heard from General NAMOTO, my predecessor in the post of the Commanding General of the 3rd Army, that the eastern part of Manchuria in the direction of Voroshilov was considered the main direction of the offensive.
- Q. What directions did you, as Commander of the 3rd Army, receive from the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, concerning the operation plans of a war against the Soviet Union?
- A. While I was Commander I got the instructions only on defence but I knew about the offensive plans from my predecessor.
- Q. When was the plan of offensive changed into the plan of defence?
- A. The plan of offensive was changed into the plan of defence in 1944.
- Q. What were the subjects of the training of the officers while you were the Commander of the 3rd Army?
- A. The practical lessons with officers on the defence of the frontier fortified areas, were conducted on the maps and in the field. Then in April - May 1945 we received an instruction from the Kwantung Army Headquarters saying that the defence should be planned deeper into the country, approximately in the Mulin area. After that we conducted training in the said area.

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Q. To what period belong the war games on the maps of the Soviet Union where military operations were directed towards Blagovestichensk, Spassk and Voroshilov?

A. In 1937 we chose areas East of Pogranichnaya Station for our tactical exercises.

Q. Why did the Japanese provoke the Nomongan conflict with the Red Army?

A. There was a desire to demonstrate the strength of the Japanese Army and to test that of the Red Army. From the general point of view it was to no purpose. At that time I was a brigade commander in Southwestern Manchuria and participated in a conference in Chiang-Jiang in April, 1939. General UEDA, Commander of the Kwantung Army gave instructions not to yield an inch to Soviet border-guards as far as the questions of determining the frontier were concerned. He said that if frontier was not definite, it should be determined independently in favor of Japan. Commanding General of the 23rd Division, KOMATSUBARA followed UEDA's instructions to the letter. I consider both the Kwantung Army Headquarters and UEDA, who gave the instructions to independently decide any altercations in favor of Japan, responsible for that incident.

Q. And what is your own estimation of the causes of Japan's defeat in this war?

A. First, the war was beyond the strength of Japan in all respects, and in the first place because its industry was too weak and could not satisfy military needs. Second, it can be explained by an error in strategy. The area of military operations was too extended, instead of being fixed to one place. Thirdly, there were some diplomatic errors. The alliance with Germany was disadvantageous for Japan. It would have been far more advantageous to enter into an alliance with Great Britain. Besides, Japan did not succeed in preventing Germany from fighting against the Soviet Union, and when the war broke out could not make Germany cease fighting before the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad. The second diplomatic error was the war with America.

The spring of 1941 was the most convenient time for conciliation with America. The American Government's reply was favorable for Japan, but instead of agreeing with it, Japan started war. Then the capture of Singapore was the proper moment to bring the war with Britain to an end, but it was not done either. The invention of atomic bombs and radio location played a great part in the surrender of Japan. Our Navy was strong enough, it had many ships and aircraft, but as soon as the Americans started using radio location, our bombers and submarines were located beforehand, and the Japanese Armed Forces lost their advantage of surprise. Even in the night the Americans located the Japanese Navy and carried accurate fire.

There were also some smaller factors: poor organizations of economy, it was necessary to coordinate the work of various branches of industry, but we were late in doing it.

Q. Whom do you consider to be the most important war criminals?

A. Lord Privy Seal, Marquis KIDO, who was the chief advisor to the Emperor and was obliged to submit the name for premiership. Marquis KIDO made a bad choice. Then Prime Minister and War Minister TOJO who started the war against America. Navy Minister, Admiral SHIMADA who attacked the American Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Chief of the General Staff, SUGIYAMA. (dead) Chief of the Navy General Staff NAGANO who was the Emperor's adviser on the questions of Navy operations. Together with SHIMADA he bears responsibility for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Foreign Minister TOGO who negotiated with America, then broke the negotiations and gave consent to declaration of war on America. MINAMI, Dairo - Member of Privy

Council. He was preparing a base for a war against the USSR, the Manchurian military base in particular. UMEDZU who was the Kwantung Army Commander in 1941 and at the beginning of the Nippon-Chinese War developed and extended the Chinese Incident, turning it into a big war. After Germany attacked the USSR, he concentrated large armies on the frontier and was preparing for a war against the Soviet Union, threatening the Red Army. OSHIMA Hiroshi is greatly responsible for the war. On his proposal, Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact and later the Tripartite Alliance. He did not follow the situation of Germany, and did not prevent Germany in due time from attacking the Soviet Union. TANI Masayuki who was Foreign Minister in TOJO Cabinet and as such is naturally responsible for the war. He had been Ambassador in Nanking and supported the Provisional Government of WAN-TZIN-WEI. The minutes of interrogation are read by me personally, are quite clear to me, are written down from my words correctly and to this I sign my name.

WITNESS:

Lt. Gen. MURAKAMI KEISAKU.

INTERROGATED:

Acting Military Interrogator of the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo

Major POGRANITSKY.

INTERPRETER:

Major PASHKOVSKY.

SECRETARY-STENOGRAPHER:

Miss KRZHISEVSKAYA.

The interrogation began 13:15 and finished 17:00. On page 5 of the minutes, I made a correction, read: 1,500,000.

Signed: MURAKAMI KEISAKU.

Major POGRANITSKY.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. MENSHOVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Merishove (signed)

C E R T I F I C A T E

March 23, 1946

The Town of Khabarovsk.

I, the undersigned Major A.A. Pashkovsky hereby certify to the Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo Pogranitsky that I am well conversed in the Japanese language to make oral translation into Russian and that I give my promise to translate the testimony of Murakami Keisaku correctly.

I am duly warned that as an interpreter I bear criminal responsibility for purposely false translation according to Article 92 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code:

Pashkovsky.

The certificate is taken by acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Pogranitsky.

C E R T I F I C A T E

The Town of Khabarovek.

March 28, 1946.

I, the undersigned Julia Georgievna KRZHIZHEVSKAYA, hereby certify to the Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo POGRANITSKY that as a secretary-stenographer I promise to take short hand notes of the minutes of the interrogation of MURAKAMI KEISAKU correctly and decipher them correctly

I am duly warned that for the purposely false minutes I bear criminal responsibility according to Articles 16 and 192 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

KRSHIZHEVSKAYA.

The certificate is taken by
Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R.
at the International Military Tribunal
in Tokyo.

POGRANITSKY.

C E R T I F I C A T E

The town of Kharbarovsk March 28, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Murakami Keisaku hereby certify to the acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo Pogranitsky that I as a witness to the case of the principal war criminals promise to tell only the truth.

I am duly warned that for giving false testimony I bear criminal responsibility according to article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: Murakami Keisaku

The certificate is taken by
Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R.
at the International Military Tribunal
in Tokyo.

POGRANITSKY.