

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
Military Analysis Division

RESTRICTED

Answers to the MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION questionnaire No. 10, The PHILIPPINES.  
19 February 1944 to 15 August 1945.

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I. Army Air Forces in the PHILIPPINES on 19 Feb 1944.

1. Army Air Forces in the PHILIPPINES on 19 Feb 1944 are as follows:

22 DOKURITSU      52 DOKURITSU HIKOCHUTAI      107 KYOIKU HIKODAN

2. Chain of Command  
CG of 14th Army

CG of 22nd      CG of 197th DOKURITSU  
DOKURITSU HIKODAN      KYOIKU HIKODAN

3. Units, types of plane, number of planes, and airbases.

a) 52 DOKURITSU HIKOCHUTAI

Type 99 Army Reconnaissance - 12 planes - based at MANILA.

4. Senior Officers:

Col. UEDA, KYOGI, CO, 22nd DOKURITSU HIKODAN

5. Person available for interrogation:

Major KAWAMOTO, HIROSHI, Senior Staff Officer of the 14th Army.

II. Air Force mission in the PHILIPPINES.

1. Mission.

a) In general, the establishment of air bases in preparation for the air operations in the PHILIPPINES by the 14th Army.

b) Responsibility for supply and repairs in the south, especially in the Southwestern Area. (Manila Army Air Depot)

c) Training of aircrews (107th KYOIKU HIKODAN) for liaison and submarine patrols (22nd DOKURITSU HIKODAN, 52nd DOKURITSU HIKO-CHUTAI) in the PHILIPPINES

2. Manila Army Air Depot.

a) Functions.

Responsibility for supply and repair of airplanes in the Southern Area, especially in the Southwestern area.

b) Installations:

Manila - main depot.

Clark Field - sub-depot.

c) Average repair capacity:

(for a fixed period)

Main depot - about 30 planes a month }--(Total about

Sub-depot - 10 planes a month      }--(40 planes

III. The reinforcement of air units in the PHILIPPINES:

a) Reinforcements were received in the first part of May 1944.

Reason:

(1) To replace the losses expected in the months of June and July and to hold our position until the Naval Air Force could recover its fighting strength, the 2nd HIKOSHIDAN, formerly in MANCHURIA, was assigned to replace the 6th HIKOSHIDAN which lost its combat strength in the fall of HOLLANDIA.

(2) At the time of the above assignment of the 2nd HIKOSHIDAN, the decision to inaugurate air operations in the PHILIPPINES was occasioned by the vigorous counter-offensive launched by American forces.

(b) In the first part of July 1944 the 4th HIKOSHIDAN was sent to the PHILIPPINES.

(c) Reinforcements in the latter part of October 1944.

## Answers to Questionnaire #10 Cont'd.

## Reasons:

Plans were made to reinforce the air defense with only one element due to decreased concern over task force air raids on JAPAN.

(d) Reinforcements in the last part of October 1944.

## Reasons:

Due to the success of the TOKUBETSU KOGEKITAI, approximately 160 planes (14 Squadrons) were sent from the homeland to the PHILIPPINES.

2. Table of units which were transferred to the PHILIPPINES from 19 February to 9 September.

Unit	Former Location	Route	Date of Arrival	Base used in PHILIPPINES	Type of Planes	No of Planes	Air Crew
2nd HIKO-SENTAI	MANCH-URIA	MANCH-URIA SHANG-HAI PHILIP-PINES	Middle of May	CLARK and BACOLOD	Type 100 Recce	24	50
15th HIKO-SENTAI	MANCH-URIA	MANCH-URIA SHANG-HAI PHILIP-PINES	Middle of May	CLARK and DAVAO	Type 100 Recce	24	50
2nd HIKO-SHI-DAN Hq	MANCH-URIA	MANCH-URIA SHANG-HAI PHILIP-PINES	29 May	CLARK and BACOLOD	Transport	5	10
10th HIKO-DAN 27th HIKO-SENTAI	MAN-CHURIA	MAN-CHURIA SHANG-HAI PHILIP-PINES	Early June	BACOLOD	Type 9 Attack Planes	31	65
22th HIKO-DAN, 17th, 19th HIKO-SENTAI	MAN-CHURIA	JAPAN OKINAWA FORMOSA & PHILIPPINES	Early June	MANILA	Type 3 Fighter	42	45
8th HIKO-DAN 14th, 60th HIKO-SENTAI	North of AUSTRALIA	North of AUSTRALIA PHILIP-PINES	Early June	CLARK	Type 97 Heavy Bomber	14 20	80 120
7th HIKO-DAN 12th HIKO-SENTAI	FRENCH-INDO-CHINA MALAY	FRENCH-INDO-CHINA PHILIP-PINES MALAY BORNEO	Late Aug. Early Sept	CLARK BORNEO	Type 97 H. B. Type 1	24 30	150 35

Unit	Former Location	Route	Date of Arrival	Base used in PHILIPPINES	Type of Planes	No of Planes	Air Crew
6th HIKO-SENTAI,	MAN-CHURIA	MAN-CHURIA	Early June	LIPA	Type 1 Fighter	30	35
30th & 31st HIKO-SENTAI		OKINAWA FORMOSA PHILIPPINES	Later June	PRINCESS BORNEO & SINGAPORE	Type 99 Attack Plane	20	60
4th HIKO-SEIDAN	MAN-CHURIA	MAN-CHURIA SHANGHAI FORMOSA PHILIPPINES	Later part of August	MANILA	Transport	4	10
31 FCS	JAPAN	JAPAN FORMOSA PHILIPPINES	Early part of Sept	KUDAT	Type 97 H. B. with Radar	9	50

- IV. (1) Number of planes lost from 19 February to 9 September.
- (a) PHILIPPINES  
Approximately 80 planes (30 fighters, 10 attack planes, 10 bombers, 10 reconnaissance and 20 other).
- (b) Enroute to PHILIPPINES.  
Approximately 50 planes (20 fighters, 5 attack planes, 5 bombers, 5 reconnaissance and 15 others.)
- (2) Reasons for losses.
- (a) Losses in the Philippines were chiefly due to accidents on poorly maintained airfields and to lack of combat training.
- (b) Losses enroute to the Philippines were due to insufficient navigation training, inclement weather, and bad airfields.
- (3) Plane replacements for the Philippines.  
(The movement of units was limited by the operational and training demands).
- About 60 fighters  
" 20 attack planes  
" 30 bombers  
" 20 Recce  
" 20 transports and others
- Total 150 planes

- V. (1) The estimate of the situation, including allied plans and strength, for a Philippines Operation.
- (a) Strength.  
10 ground divisions will be utilized for Philippines landings. (cargo capacity 6,000,000 tons) 1200 out of about 3,000 Naval aircraft will support the operation. (12 to 18 CV and 60 to 80 CVL and CVE.)
- (b) Plan  
After securing advance Naval and Air bases in PALAU and HALLAMHERA, the enemy will probably make landings on the Philippines after November. They will use the combined strength of Nimitz's and MacArthur's forces. There will be numerous attacks on our Philippine Air strength by the Task Force after the early part of September.
- (c) Estimate of the probably landing areas in the Philippines.  
1st plan - CENTRAL PHILIPPINES and LEYTE  
2nd plan - MINDANAO  
3rd plan - LUZON and LAMBON BAY  
The second plan was considered the most probable but with the landing of U.S. forces in MOROTAI and PALAU the 1st plan became more probable. We considered the 3rd plan the least probable.

- VI. 1. Air force units based in the Philippines on 9 September.

4th KOKUGUN

Hq of the 4th KOKUGUN

2nd HIKOSHIDAN

- 2nd HIKOSENTAI
- 15th HIKOSENTAI (main force in Japan proper)
- 31st CHUTAI of the DOKURITSU HIKODAN
- 13th HIKODAN
- 30th HIKOSENTAI
- 31st HIKOSENTAI
- 2nd HIKOSHIDAN Hq

22nd HIKODAN

- 17th HIKOSENTAI
- 19th HIKOSENTAI

6th HIKODAN

- 65th HIKOSENTAI
- 66th HIKOSENTAI

10th HIKODAN

- 27 HIKOSENTAI
- 45th HIKOSENTAI (main force engaged in N. Australia operation)

7th HIKODAN

- 12th HIKOSENTAI
  - 62nd HIKOSENTAI
- (Located in BORNEO)

4th HIKOSHIDAN

- 208th HIKOSENTAI
- 52nd CHUTAI of DOKURITSU HIKODAN
- 107th DOKURITSU KYOIKU HIKODAN
- 108th DOKURITSU KYOIKU HIKODAN

2. Chain of Command.

SOUTHERN ARMY GENERAL HQTS.

14th Area Army

14th KOKUGUN

35th Army

4th HIKOSHIDAN

2nd HIKOSHIDAN

107th KYOIKU  
HIKODAN

208th  
HIKOSENTAI

7th  
HIKODAN

6th  
HIKODAN

13th  
HIKODAN

2nd  
HIKOSENTAI

62 12

66 65

30 31

52nd DOKURITSU  
HIKOSHUTAI

10th  
HIKODAN  
45 27  
HIKOSENTAI

22nd  
HIKODAN  
19 17

15th  
HIKOSENTAI

31st  
DOKURITSU  
HIKOSHUTAI

3. Name of Units, type of Planes, no. of planes and name of bases.

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>TYPE OF PLANE</u>	<u>NO OF PLANES</u>	<u>BASE</u>
4th KOKUGUN Hq			MANILA
2nd HIKOSHIDAN Hq			CLARK
2nd HIKOSENTAI	100 Recce	12	CLARK
31st DOKURITSU HIKOSHUTAI	Type 97 Bomber with Radar	5	KUDATO (BORNEO)
13th HIKODAN	Type 1 Fighter	26	BICOLOD
30th HIKOSENTAI	Type 1 Fighter	24	BICOLOD
31st HIKOSENTAI			
22nd HIKODAN	Type 3 Fighter	38	MANILA
17th HIKOSENTAI	Type 3 Fighter	35	MANILA
19th HIKOSENTAI			

UNITS		TYPE OF PLANE	NO OF PLANES	BASE
6th HIKODAN	65th HIKOSENTAI 66th HIKOSENTAI	Type 99 Attack Type 99 Attack	18 126	SINGAPORE CAGAYAN MINDANAO KUDAT (BORNEO) CLARK
10th HIKODAN	45th HIKOSENTAI 27th HIKOSENTAI	Type 99 Attack Type 2 Twin seater Fighter	12	N. of AUSTRALIA
7th HIKODAN	45th HIKOSENTAI 62nd HIKOSENTAI	Type 97 Hvy Bomber Type 100 Hvy Bomber	21 16	SUNGEI-PATANI ALOR-STAR
4th HIKOSHIDAN Hq 208th HIKOSENTAI		Type 88 Twin-Engine Light Bomber	6	MANILA LIPA
52nd DOKURITSU HIKOSHUTAI		Type 99 Army Recce	6	MANILA
107th KYOIKU HIKODAN		Training plane	200	
108th KYOIKU HIKODAN		Training plane	100	
Total:			570	About 570 planes.

(Includes about 70 planes which were outside the Philippines)

#### 4. Names of Senior Officers

4th KOKUGUN: C. G. Lt. General TOMIYAMA, YASUJI  
 4th KOKUGUN: C of S., Major General TERADA, SEICHI  
 2nd HIKOSHIDAN: CG, Lt. General YAMASE, MASAO  
 2nd HIKOSHIDAN: C/S., Col UCHIDA, KOSEI  
 13th HIKODAN: C.O., Lt. Col. EYAMA, ROKUO  
 22nd HIKODAN: C. O. Lt. Col. YOSHIDA, NAE  
 6th HIKODAN: C.O. Col. ONO, MONNOSUKE  
 10th HIKODAN: CG, Maj General, MITSUNARI, SHOSO  
 7th HIKODAN: CO, Col. AKITA, HIROSHI  
 4th HIKOSHIDAN: CG, Lt. General KINOSHITA, ISAMU  
 4th HIKOSHIDAN: C/S, Col. SARUWATARI, TOKUTA

#### 5. Persons available for interrogation

4th KOKUGUN: C/S, Major Gen. TERADA, SEICHI  
 4th KOKUGUN: Sr. Staff Officer, Col MITSUAE, MASAO  
 2nd HIKOSHIDAN: Sr. Staff Officer, Lt. Col. NONOGAKI, SHIRO

### VII. Plan for defensive air operations in the Philippines as of 9 September.

#### A. General Objective.

In close cooperation with the Naval Air Force we will destroy the enemy convoy which will approach from the seas east of the Philippines, before they can make a landing.

#### B. Operational Plan

(1) Depending on the area where the enemy main force lands, we will divide our command into three parts, South, Central and North.

(2) Our patrols will cooperate closely with the Navy.

(3) Our air force will attack the enemy transport convoys at sea during the landing attempt.

(4) The Naval Air Force will concentrate on attacking the enemy aircraft carriers and the Army Air Force will cover this operation with its full fighter strength.

(5) Our main force will try to prevent surprise attacks by the enemy task force and a small number of planes will be held back for surprise attacks on the enemy carriers.

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(6) The army will be responsible for the air defense of the MANILA area.

(7) One element will attack the planes which are protecting the convoy from submarine attack.

C. Cooperation with the Navy.

(1) Reconnaissance units will divide the area and the army will be responsible for only short patrols.

(2) The attack objectives will include the transport convoys in anchorage. The Navy will be responsible for distant anchorages and the Army for nearby anchorages.

(3) The Navy will concentrate on attacking the enemy aircraft carriers, but the Army will support this operation with their entire fighter strength.

(4) The bases used will be flexible, but the principal users of each will be specified.

(5) The air defense of the MANILA vicinity and anti-submarine measures will be carried out by both the Army and Navy.

D. Air units which will probably be transferred from outside of PHILIPPINES.

(1) From Japan proper:

16th HIKODAN, 51st HIKOSENTAI  
52nd HIKOSENTAI, 200 th HIKOSENTAI  
22nd HIKOSENTAI, 5th HIKODAN  
74th HIKOSENTAI, 95th HIKOSENTAI

All under command of 30th SENTO-HIKOSHUDAN

(2) Air units waiting in the vicinity of OKINAWA.

3rd HIKOSENTAI, 67th HIKOSENTAI  
54th HIKOSENTAI

(3) From various places in the South.

a. From BURMA Area (5th HIKOSHIDAN), All units except 1 Fighter HIKO SENTAI, a light bomber unit and 1 HIKOSENTAI of Hq Recce planes. The combat strength will be 2 HIKOSENTAI of fighters and 1 HIKOSENTAI of Bombers (204th HIKOSENTAI, 33rd HIKOSENTAI, 8th HIKOSENTAI).

b. From PALEMBAND, all units (9th HIKOSHIDAN), excluding 1 HIKOSENTAI and 1 HIKOCHUTAI of fighters. This gave a combat strength of 2 HIKO SENTAI and 2 HIKOCHUTAI of fighter. (26th & 21st HIKOSENTAI )

c. From North AUSTRALIA Area 7th HIKOSHIDAN. All units, 3rd HIKODAN, 75th HIKOSENTAI  
9th HIKOSHIDAN, 24th HIKOSENTAI  
14th HIKOSENTAI, 70th DOKURITSU HIKOCHUTAI  
73rd DOKURITSU HIKOCHUTAI

VIII. (1) Losses from 9 September to 15 October.

a. Losses from aerial combat about 150 planes; personnel about 1,200 men.

b. Losses on the ground about 300 planes.

c. Non-combat losses about 50 planes.

Total: approximately 550 planes.

(2) Date and area of important losses.

a. 9, 10 September, GAGAYAN, MINDANAO Island

b. 15, 16, 17, September, BACOLOD, Negros I.

c. 22, 23, 24, September, MANILA, CLARK, LUZON.

d. 11, 12, 13 October, MANILA, CLARK, LUZON.

IX. (1) Estimate of situation on 15 October. The U.S. plan for landing on the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS is clear with LEYTE as the first probability, and DAVAO as the second possibility. The time will probably be the latter part of October or the early part of November.

(2) The JAPANESE counter-plan. There will be no great changes in the

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plan of 9 September. However, the units (13th HIKODAN) which received great losses will endeavor to regain their fighting strength quickly. We will make further systematic counter-attacks.

(3) Disposition of units transferred.

- a. Transferred units from JAPAN Proper  
16th HIKODAN, 81st HIKOSENTAI  
52nd HIKOSENTAI, 30th DOZOBITSU HIKOCHUTAI  
44th DOKURITSU HIKOSENTAI, 45th DOKORITSU HIKOSENTAI  
and 67th HIKOSENTAI.
- b. From various places in the South. 26th HIKOSENTAI, 204th HIKOSENTAI

(4) Changes.

- a. The strength which had been withdrawn to BORNEO and MALAYA area from units in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS will be moved back gradually
- b. The fighter units which were transferred from JAPAN Proper and from various places in the South will be concentrated and will be responsible for the air defense of the transport convoys in the vicinity of MANILA.

X. (1) Losses from 15th October to 1 December. Losses from aerial combat, 500 planes. Personnel losses, 1,000 men. Losses on ground about 500 planes. Non-combat losses about 200 planes. Total about 1,200 planes.

(2) Date and area of important losses.

- a. 15 October, waters northeast of the PHILIPPINES.
- b. 21, 22 October, PORT PRINCESS, SAN JOSE and PANAY ISLAND.
- c. 24, 25, 26 October, LEYTE Island.
- d. 24, 25 November, LEYTE Island.

XI. 1- REINFORCEMENTS TO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FROM 15 OCTOBER to 1 DECEMBER

UNIT	DATE	TYPE OF PLANE	NO. OF PLANES	BASE USED	CREW
38th HIKO-SENTAI	5 October	Type 100 Hq Rcn	12	BACOLOD	24
HAKKO HQ RCN PLANE	25 November	Type 100 Hq Rcn	6	BACOLOD	12
70th DOKURITSU HIKOCHUTAI	25 October	Type 100 Hq Rcn	2	BACOLOD	4
20th HIKO-SENTAI	25 November	Type one Fighter	36	CLARK	36
33rd HIKO-SENTAI	25 November	Type One fighter	20	CLARK	20
24th HIKO-SENTAI	5 November	Type One fighter	10	BACOLOD	10
54th HIKO-SENTAI	5 November	Type One fighter	36	BACOLOD	36
55th HIKO-SENTAI	15 November	Type Three fighter	36	BACOLOD	36
18th HIKO-SENTAI	25 November	Type Three fighter	35	BACOLOD	35
29th HIKO-SENTAI	25 October	Type Two fighter	40	CLARK	40
22nd HIKO-SENTAI	5 November	Type Four fighter	40	BACOLOD	40

UNIT	DATE	TYPE OF PLANE	RESTRICTED		
			NO. OF PLANES	BASE USED	CREW
12th HIKODAN					
1st HIKO-SENTAI	15 October	Type Four fighter	40	BACOLOD	40
11th HIKO-SENTAI	15 October	Type Four fighter	40	BACOLOD	40
21st HIKODAN					
71st HIKO-SENTAI	15 November	Type Four fighter	40	CLARK	40
72nd HIKO-SENTAI	15 November	Type Four fighter	40	CLARK	40
73rd HIKOSENTAI	25 November	Type Four Fighter	40	BACOLOD	40
200th HIKOSENTAI	25 October	Type Four fighter	80	BACOLOD	80
73rd DOKURITSU HIKOCHUTAI	25 October	Type 99 Army Recon	4	BACOLOD	8
32nd HIKOSENTAI	5 December	Type 99 Assault Planes	25	CLARK	50
3rd HIKOSENTAI	25 October	Type 99 Twin-Engined Light Bomber	22	LIPA	80
75th HIKOSENTAI	25 October	Type 99 Twin-Engined Light Bomber	25	LIPA	100
14th HIKOSENTAI	5 November	Type 97 Hvy Bomber	20	CLARK	120
5th HIKODAN					
74th HIKOSENTAI	15 November	Type 100 Hvy Bomber	25	CLARK	150
95th HIKO-SENTAI	15 November	Type 100 Hvy Bomber	25	CLARK	150
TOTALS:			About 700		About 1,200

Note: Others, 160 Special Attack Planes, Appr. 160 Crew.

2- Replacements for PHILIPPINES forces.

a. No. and type of planes

fighters	420
bombers	80
assault	80
recce	60
transports and others	60
Total:	700

b. Method of Ferrying Planes

Air transport between JAPAN, FORMOSA and the PHILIPPINES was done mainly by forces in JAPAN and FORMOSA.

c. Flight Course.

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JAPAN Proper (TACHIKAWA, KAGAMIGAHARA, SHINDENHARA) to OKINAWA to FORMOSA (TAIHOKU, KAGI, HEITO) to PHILIPPINES (CLARK, MANILA).

- 3- Losses enroute.  
About 100 planes or 20% of the total replacements.

XII. 1. Estimate of the situation on 1 December 1944.

- a. The American forces have secured their base at LEYTE and may take the following steps:
- (1) They may bisect the PHILIPPINES. They will first attack, in succession, CEBU, NEGROS and PANAY, and then will advance to the PALAWAN group.
  - (2) In order to cut off the southern supply route of the Japanese Army, they may advance to BORNEO and PORT PRINCESS.
  - (3) They may move North from LEYTE via SAMAR and establish a beachhead on LUZON at LEGASPI BAY.

The first is the most possible alternative, but the third alternate is possible.

b. To prevent this the JAPANESE will attempt to neutralize the LEYTE base and deny the enemy surface craft use of the waters west of SURAGAI and SAN BERNARDINO Straits.

- c. The following disposition of our forces will be made:
- (1) The 2nd HIKOSHIDAN will be based on NEGROS with 100 planes to prevent enemy surface craft from advancing south of LEYTE and west of the above straits.
  - (2) The 4th HIKOSHIDAN will be based on LUZON with 150 planes to attack LEYTE and the LEYTE area.

2. Estimate of the situation on 1 January.

American forces while rushing completion of the MINDORO base are awaiting shipping and may then attempt a direct assault on MANILA. The main force may attack MANILA BAY, a strong force may move north through the BATANGAS Straits, Units may land at the same time in LINGAYEN, APARRI and RAMON Bay. The enemy may try an enveloping movement.

3. The JAPANESE Counter-Plan.

- a. We must effectively attack the bases at MINDORO and neutralize them to prevent the landing on LUZON anticipated in the latter part of January.
- b. At the time of the enemy landing, our entire force will attack the enemy shipping groups off the landing beaches, closest to MANILA.
- c. The disposition of our forces: We will concentrate 100 effective planes from the main force of the PHILIPPINE Air Force on LUZON to attack MINDORO. We will keep 30 effective planes on NEGROS to continue shipping attacks on the LEYTE area.

4. Estimate of the situation on 1 February.

The American forces that landed at LINGAYEN will move South and strike MANILA while one element will attack the main JAPANESE forces in the BAGUIO area.

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5. The JAPANESE Counter-Plan.

a. Since the decisive phase of the campaign is over, we will conduct only local holding actions.

b. The Air Force will rely on "guerilla" tactics. The air bases on LUZON will be nothing but mobile advanced airfields for a small number of FORMOSA based aircraft.

c. The Disposition of our Forces: The 4th HIKOSHIDAN (about 10 planes) will be on Northern LUZON and the 2nd HIKOSHIDAN (about 10 Planes) will be on NEGROS. No organized air operations will be conducted.

XIII.

1- Losses from 1 December to 1 February.

	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>PLANES</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
Losses in aerial combat		300	500
Losses on the ground		150	
Non-combat losses		<u>60</u>	
Total:		600	

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Losses in aerial combat	100	500
Losses on the ground	50	
Non-combat losses	<u>20</u>	
Total:	170	

Combined Total: 770

2- Units and planes sent to PHILIPPINES each month.

	UNITS	PLANES
February	3	200
January	1	40

3- Units and planes withdrawn each month.

February	7	20
January	10	30

XIV.

1. Disposition of units remaining in PHILIPPINES after 1 February.

a. In the Northern PHILIPPINES area (mainly LUZON) the 4th HIKOSHIDAN was the main unit, and consisted of 10 planes and 30 crewmen. This was gradually decreased until they operated almost exclusively from FORMOSA.

b. In the Central and Southern PHILIPPINES area (mainly NEGROS and MINDANAO) the 2nd HIKOSHIDAN was the main unit. In the first part of February they had about 10 planes and 60 crewmen on NEGROS, but gradually the main elements moved to SINGAPORE via BORNEO, and one element was sent to JAPAN. (En route 20 men were left at ZAMBOANGA).

2. Changes in the Chain of Command.

a. The 4th KOKUGUN was put under the command of the 14th Area Army on 1 January 1945 and was inactivated in the latter part of February.

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m b. The 2nd HIKOSHIDAN based in Central and Southern PHILIPPINES participated in air operations until 11 February. Although it was placed under the command of the CO of the 3rd KOKUGUN (at SINGAPORE), the 2nd HIKOSHIDAN was inactivated in the latter part of May.

c. On 1 January 1945 the 7th HIKOSHIDAN, based in the area north of AUSTRALIA, was transferred to the command of the CO of the 3rd HIKOSHIDAN at SINGAPORE.

XV. The reasons for suicide tactics.

(1) While seeking a certain method of sinking surface craft, the 5th HIKOSENTAI (model 2 Twin-seater fighter) sunk ships by suicide attack during the BIAK campaign of May 1944 and also in the ANDAMAN area in June. These combat experiences convinced various air crews that this was a certain method of sinking ships. With the impending American offensive against the PHILIPPINES we tried to train aircrews in this method of sinking ships. Although we thoroughly indoctrinated half the aircrews, the suicide method was to be used only as a last resort. It was first tried by 3 Model 1 fighters east of LEYTE late in September but the results were not clear.

Even in JAPAN Proper we selected planes suitable for suicide attacks. In the latter part of October we sent to the PHILIPPINES TOKUBETSU KOGEKITAI (1 unit each of type 97 heavy bombers and twin-engined light bombers) commanded by volunteer officers. The CO of the 4th KOKUGUN ordered them to make a suicide attack.

(2) Persons responsible for the decision,  
The decision was made spontaneously by the various aircrews who desired a certain method of sinking ships.

(3) The TOKUBETSU KOGEKITAI in the PHILIPPINES  
We secretly prepared 4 type 1 fighters, and 4 type 3 fighters, 2 type 2 twin-seater fighters, and 3 type 99 assault planes. We carried out suicide attacks from the latter part of September to the first part of October using 3 type 1 fighters and 1 twin-seater fighter. The results were not clear.

b. Two TOKUBETSU KOGEKITAI, one unit of type 97 heavy bombers and one unit of type 99 twin-engined light bombers, were sent from JAPAN Proper. In the 4th KOKUGUN they were known as the TOMICOKU and BANKA units. On 26 October they were ordered to carry out suicide attacks.

c. One unit of 12 to 15 type 1 fighters and one unit of 6 type 99 assault planes were sent from JAPAN and had their initial action on 24 October.

d. Some units already in the PHILIPPINES became TOKUBETSU KOGEKITAI when they decided to make suicide attacks.

e. On 12 December units arrived in the PHILIPPINES from JAPAN.

f. The combine totals: Planes sent from JAPAN Proper - about 160 planes; already in the PHILIPPINES - 100.  
Total - 260

(4) Critique on the suicide attack method,  
Regardless of the bomb load it is generally certain that a direct hit will sink a ship. 50% of the attacking planes will score a direct hit. In general we were able to sink one ship with every 3 planes.