


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
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A.



FIVE BOOKES,

OF

PHILOSOPHICALL COMFORT, FULL

Of Christian consolation, writ-
ten a 1000. yeeres
since.

By *Anitius, Manlius, Torquatus, Senerinus,*
BOETIVS; a Christian Consul
of R O M E.

Newly Translated out of Latine; together
with Marginall Notes, explaining the
obscurell places.



LONDON
Printed by *John Windet*, for MATHEVV
LOWNES. 1609.

Tr. R.

878.9

B673F



TO THE MOST
Vertuous L A D Y, the
Countesse of DORSET
D O V V A G E R.



His excellent Booke, pro-
uing tho shortly, yet sure-
ly, the vanitie of all other
goods; the veritie of mans
onely good to consist in
solely setting his soule on
God the soueraigne, yea sole Good; hauing
proued profitable to all almost neighbour
Nations, as turned into their tongues; I
presume to present vnto our Countrie also
for our common good. Now for that it is
a common vse, in communicating to all a
priuate Inuention or Translation, to appro-
A 3 priate

THE EPISTLE

priate the protection thereof to some one particular Person: in the designing of that Person, vnto me none occurs more proper then your vertuous selfe, not so much for my priuate obligations vnto you (which yet be manifold, I must needs publikely acknowledge), as for a peculiar interest (as I may say) it seems you haue vnto this booke. This Booke (I say) so much esteemed by your late most worthy Lord and Husband, as had his leisure beene answerable to his learning and will, it had beene enobled by a more noble Translatour. This Booke (I say) which though perhaps as Philosophicall for the speculatiue points, may be aboue your vnderstanding, yet as truely Theological for the practicall partes, the principall ende of such speculations, it is I am perswaded according, and vnder your will. And yet also (Madame, for I had rather you should wisely feare, then I foolishly flatter) looke into it as a glasse, not so much to see if most parts be much, as if any bee lesse beautifull. Weigh if in all things and at all times, you haue truely preferred the veritie of goodnesse of God, afore the vanitie of vice of the world: if you haue, continue therein, so
much

DEDICATORIE.

much more carefully, as remaines for you a lesse time of this comberfome carefulnesse. If you haue not, bee carefull now in your last times at the least in the principall points to begin your iourney with such alacritie, as with much speed to make perhaps a long way in a short time. This is the greatest good I your poore Client can wish you, this is the powerfullest patronage and highest commendation you can procure to this Booke; that your selfe doe vertuously no lesse effect in will and worke, then your late loued Lord did affect it in word and vnderstanding. With the which wish to the richest seruice my pauer-
tie can reach vnto,
I remaine.


*Your most meane but not least
denoted seruant*

I. T.

The first thing I should mention
 is that the weather is very
 hot here and the people are
 very friendly. I have been
 here for a few days and
 I am enjoying it very much.
 The food is delicious and
 the people are very kind.
 I have met many interesting
 people and I am learning
 a lot about their culture.
 I am looking forward to
 staying here for a while.
 I hope you are well and
 I will write again soon.
 Love,
 [Name]

I am looking forward to
 staying here for a while.

Love,
 [Name]



To the Reader.



*T*is an old saying, and not so old as true, that *vinno vendibili non est opus hædera*: I would it were as true, that the best things are alway most esteemed, then I would not doubt but that this golden booke of Boethius would be in great request; for I cannot imagine, what fault any man can find with it, that is delighted with Vertue. The subiect of this Discourse is true Felicitie, the way to it, and the remouing of all impediments. All this is explained

To the Reader.

ned by Rhetoricall & Philosophicall discourses. And least any thing should bee wanting, the Poetical Muses are not excluded; Thus are all dispositions satisfied, and profite ioyned with delight. Wherefore well we may say of this worthy Authour: *Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit vtile dulci.* And yet this I will adde more; that the noble, learned and pyons wits and minds, will take most benefite and pleasure in Boethius. The reason is, for that *similis simili gaudet*; Who more noble then Anitius Manlius Torquatus Seuerinus; since fewe of that family deserued not to be Consuls. And they were worthy of the golden chayne, since their Champion wonne it in the field. Titus Manlius Imeane, who tooke it from his French Challengers necke, and put it about his owne, whereby he purchased to himselfe and his posteritie, the syrname of Torquatus.

To the Reader.

quatus. And by another no lesse admirable act of iustice, came to bee called Seuerinus, not sparing his owne conquering some, because he gaue the battell against his fathers commaund. What should I speake of our Boethius his learning? Let these his five Bookes giue sufficient testimonie thereof. Or if this will not suffice, peruse who list his other monuments, fraught with varietie of all Sciences, both humane and diuine. His pietie appeareth in his whole life, but most of all at his death; hee both wrote and dyed for defence of Christ and his faith against the Arians and other hereticks. Finally he was truely Boethius, that is, an helper and relieuer of all innocent and distressed people. And least his Benefite should liue no longer then himselfe, he committed it to writing, and sendeth it to thee, in this his noble, learned, and pious worke. Which that our
Coun=

To the Reader.

Countrey may the better enioy, is now,
(as thou seest) both in English verse and
prose. Which how hard it was to effect,
thou mayest guesse in part: since our
prince of Poets, Chaucer turned it on-
ly into prose. Which will be a sufficient
motiue to take this labour in good part;
and to beare with such faults as cannot
easily be amended. Though thus much
also I doe assure thee, that it will be more
pleasing to the Translatour, to see his
labour rather amended then commended.

As likewise hee will take it more in
patience, to haue it carped
at, then corrupted.

Vale & fructe.

(. . .)

T O



TO THE YONG

Gentlemen Readers, concerning
*the Title of this Booke of Philoso-
phicall Comfort.*

WHo tast those ioyes which fading pleasure yeelds,
His age will rue the follies of his youth:
But if you trauell in the spacious fields
Of learned Arts, there seeking pretious truth,
The sacred Treasure, which you thence haue gained,
In wants and troubles shall your succour proue;
And though your bodies be in dungeons chained,
By wisdomes ayd your minds shall be aboue.
Then since you may be wretched, poore and old,
Let not such infants starue for lacke of care,
Who shall like thankefull children you uphold,
When they more strong, when you more feeble are.
Whereof you by this worke the proofoe may see
In him, whose comforts your instructions bee.

Another



Another of the Authour.

IN thee (Boetius) that true rule appears,
That wise men gaine most fame by suffering paines.
Of all the actions of thy prosperous yeeres
To after-times small memorie remaines:
But when the cloudes of sorrow stroue it obscure
Thy vertues light, then it did clearer shine.
Calamity makes studious minds more pure,
Their glorie groweth, as their states decline.
Thou couldst not in thy ioyes haue pleas'd vs so,
As with this worke, which to thy griefe we owe.

To



To the friendly Reader.

Sonnet.

WHat need my lines to recommend these leaues,
So frequently by learned hands perus'd,
As that I feare they'll seeme to be abus'd,
Since customarie praise suspition weaues.

For I mistrust a gorgeous Frontispice,
Of mercenary penns. If thou doest so,
And art unlearn'd, to better counsell goe.
I, thou, nor any can thinke that amisse.

And lettered though thou bee'st, here mayst thou find,
What other volumes haue not, for thy good:
Some passages explained of that kind
As are, at first, not easily understood.

Friend, let with thanks our Author be rewarded,
Who gaines, nor fame, but thy good hath regarded.

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THE
FIRST BOOKE
OF BOETIUS.

Containing his Complaint
and Miseries.

THE I. VERSE.

Wherein Boetius bewaileth his estate.

I That with youthfull heate did verses write,
Must now my woes in dolefull tunes endite,
My worke is fram'd by Muses torne and rude,
And my sad cheeks are with true teares bedew'd
For these alone no terrour could affray,
From being partners of my weary way,

B


My

Boetius his

My happy and delightfull ages glory,
Is my iole comfort, being old and sory,
Old age through griefe makes v unexpected hast,
And sorrow in my yeares her signes hath plac't,
Untimely heavy haire cou- r my head,
And my loose skin quakes on my flesh halfe dead,
O happy death that spareth sweetest yeares,
And comes in sorrow often call'd with tea- es.
Alas how deafe is he to wretches cries;
And loth he is to close vp weeping eyes;
While trustles chance me with vain fauour crowned,
That saddest houre my life had almost drowned:
Now she hath clouded her decentfull face,
My spriefull daies prolong their weary race,
My friends, why did you count me fortunate?
He that is full'n, ne're stood in jetted state.

THE I. PROSE.

Containing the description of
Philosophy.



While I ruminated these
things with my selfe,
and determined to set
forth my woful com-
plaint in writing; me
thought

folio 2. l. 1. 1. 1.

Muses standing about my bed, and suggesting wordes to my teares, being moued for a little space, and inflaméd with angry lookes; who (sayth snee) hath permitted these Tragical harlots to haue acesse to this sicke man? which will not onely not comfort his griefes with wholesome remedies, but also nourish them with sugred poyson; for these bethey, which with the fruitlesse thornes of ^u affections doe kill the fruitfull crop of reason, and doe accustome mens minds to sicknesse, and not free them. But if your flattery did depriue vs of some prophane fellow, as commonly it happeneth, I should thinke, that it were not so grieuou-ly to be taken, for in him our labors should receiue no harme. But now you haue laid hand of him, who

B 3

hath

^u This is the common fault of Poets, to feede and nourish passion against reason.

x Fleaticis
of Elea, the
City where
Aristotele
studied.

y Note the
force of a
grauē re-
prehension

z Griefe for
temporall
losses dark-
neth and
dulleth the
understand-
ding.

a The way
to be com-
forted is to
give care to
good coun-
sell.

hath beene brought vp in ^x Peripa-
teticall, and Academicall stu-
dies: but rather get you gone,
you Syrens pleasant euen to de-
struction, and leave him to my
Muses to be cured and healed. That
company being thus checked, o-
uercome with griefe, casting their
eyes vpon the ground, and bewray-
ing their bashfulnesse with blush-
ing, went sadly away. And I, whose
sight was dimmed with teares, so
that I could not discern what this
woman might be, so imperious,
and of such authority, was astoni-
shed, and fixing my countenance v-
pon the earth, began to expect with
^a silence what shee would doe af-
terward. Then shee comming
nigher, sat downe at my beds feet,
and beholding my countenance sad
with mourning, and cast vpon the
ground

ground with griefe, complained of
the perturbation of my mind with
these verses.

THE II. VERSE.

Phylosophy bewayleth the pertur-
bation of Boetius his mind.

Al as, how thy dull mind is headlong cast
In deptes of moe, where all her light once lost,
She doth to walke in vttter darkenes hast,
While cares grow great wuh earthly tempests test.
He, that through th'opned heau'ns did freely runne,
And vs'd to trauaile the celestiaik wayes,
Marking the rosie splendor of the sunne,
And noting Cynthiaes cold and watry rayes.
He that did brauely comprehend in verse,
The different spheres, and wandring course of stars,
He that was wont the causes to rehearse,
Why sounding winds doe with the seas make wars,
What spirit moues the worlds well sciled frame,
And why the Sunne, whome forth the East doth bring
In westerne waues doth hide his falling flame,
Searching what power tempers the pleasing spring,
Which mak's the earth her rosie flowers to beare.
Whose gift it is, that Autumnes fruitfull season,

Boetius his

^a The fore-
said Specu-
lation.

^b Affection
to earthly
things and
the passions

*Should with full grapes flow in a plenteous yeare,
Telling of secret Nature euey reason,
Now hauing lost the ^a beauty of his mind.
Lies with his necke compass in pond'rous ^b chaines,
His countenance with heauy waight declin'd,
Him to ^c behold the sullen earth constraines.*

which ensue thereof. ^c To thinke vpon earthly things

THE II. PROSE.

*Phylosophy enquireth of Boetius
his disease.*



Vt it is rather time
(saith she) to apply
remedies, then to
make complaintes:
And then looking
wishly vpon me; Art thou he (saith
she) which being long since nur-
sed with our milke, and brought
vp with our nourishments, wert
come to mans estate? but we had
giuen thee such ^a weapons, as if
thou haddest not cast them away,
would

^a The intel-
lectual and
Cardinall,
or morall
vertues.

would haue made thee inuincible: Doest thou not know me? why doest thou not speake? Is it ^lshamefastnesse or vn^sensiblenesse that makes thee silent? I had rather it were shamefastnesse, but I perceiue thou art become vn^sensible. And seeing me not onely silent, but altogether mute and dumbe; fayre and easily shee laid her hand vpon my breasts saying, ^cthere is no danger, he is in a ^dLethargie, the common disease of deceiued minds: he hath a little forgot himselfe, but he will easily remember himselfe againe, if he be brought to know vs first. To which end, let vs a little wipe his eyes, dimmed with the cloud of mortall things. And hauing said thus, with a ^ecorner of her garment shee dried my eyes which were wet with teares.

^b Shamefastnesse causeth onely silence, vn^sensiblenesse taketh away both speech and memory:

^c He is an ill Physicion who de spayreth o his cure.
Sen l. de Clem.
^d Forgetfulness.

^e Some vulgar sentences which he could not altogether forget.

T H E

THE III. VERSE.

How Boetius began to recouer his
knowledge and memory.

Then fled the night and darkenes did me leane,
Mine eyes their wonted strength receive:
As when the starres withdraw their hasty band,
If hea'ns ore: ast with cloudes doe stand,
The Sunne doth lurke, the earth receiveth night,
Efore the time of starry light.
But if fierce Boreas sent from Thrace make way
For the restoring of the day,
Phabus with fresh and sodaine beames doth rise,
Striking with light our wondring eyes.

THE III. PROSE.

How the persecution of Wisemen is no
new or strange thing.



IN like manner the
mists of sadnesse dis-
solued I came to my
selfe, and recouered
my iudgement, so
that

that I knew my Physicians face: wherefore casting mine eyes vpon her somewhat stedfastly, I beheld my nurse *Philosophy*, in whose house I had remained from my youth, and I said: O Mistresse of all vertues, for what cause art thou come from ^a heauen into this our solitary banishment? art thou come to beare me company in being falsely accused: Should I (saith she) forsake thee my Disciple, and not deuide the burthen, which thou bearest for enuy to my name, by partaking of thy labour? But *Philosophy* thought it not lawfull to forsake the innocent in his trouble. Should I feare any accusation? as though this were any new matter? for doest thou thinke, that this is the first time, that Wisedome hath been exposed to danger by wicked men?

^a *Philosophy* the gift of God.

^b He was put to death at Athens by *crastus*, for acknowledging one God and the immortality of the soule.

^c False opinions acknowledge some sentences of Philosophie in a wrong sense.

men? Haue we not in ancient times before our *Platoes* age, had oftentimes great conflicts with the rashnesse of folly? and while he liued, had not his Master ^b *Socrates* the victory of an vniust death in my presence, whose inheritance, when afterward the *Epicures*, *Stoikes*, and others, (euery one for his own sect) endeuoured to vsurpe, and as it were in part of their pray, sought to draw me to them, exclaiming and striuing against them; they tore the garment which I had wouen with my owne hands, and hauing gotten some little peeces of it, thinking me to be wholly in their possession, departed. Amongst whom, because ^c certaine signes of my apparell appeared, indiscretion supposing that they were my familiar friends, hath peruerted and drawn many

many into the errors of those profane multitudes. But if thou hast not heard of the flight of ^d *Anaxagoras*, the poyson of *Socrates*, nor the torments of ^e *Zeno*, because they are forraine examples, yet thou maiest haue heard of ^f *Cannius* of *Seneca*, of ^h *Soranus*, whose memory is both fresh and famous, whome nothing else brought to their overthrow; but that they had been instructed in our schoole, and were altogether disliking to the humors of wicked men; wherefore thou hast no cause to maruaile, if in the sea of this life we be tossed with boysterous stormes, whose chiefest purpose is to displease the wicked: Of which though there be an huge armie, yet it is to be despised, because it is not gouerned by any ^k Captaine, but is carried vp and downe

^d He was constrained to flie for denying the sonne to be God.
^e He was pounded in a mortar by a tyrant whome he impugned.
^f A Poet put to death by *Cassius* the Emperour.
^g *Neroes* Schoole-master, who caused him to bleed to death.
^h A famous Poet acknowledged God, was crucified by some wicked men.
ⁱ The displeasure of the wicked is rather to be desired then feared.
^k Because they follow not reason.

1 Right rea-
son.
m The other
powers of
the Soule.
n Of Vertue
and con-
templation.
o Tempora-
things.

downe by phantasticall Errour
without any order at all And if at
any time they assaile vs with grea-
ter force, ⁱ our Captaine retireth
^m her bands into ⁿa Castle, leauing
them occupied in sacking ^o vnpro-
fitable baggage. And from aboue
we laugh them to scorn for seeking
to greedily after most vile things
being safe from all their furious
assault, and fortified with that de-
fence, which aspiring Folly cannot
preuaile agan^t.

THE IIII. VERSE.

*How we may resist the persecution of
the wicked.*

WHo mildly can his age dispose,
And at his feet proud destiny throwes:
Who stoutly do: each chance behold,
Keeping his countenance vncontroll'd:
Not him the Oceans rage, and threat,

Sturring

Stirring the waues with angry heate,
 Nor boate ^a Veseuus when he casts
 From broken hilles enflamed blasts;
 Nor fiery thunder can dismay,
 Which takes the tops of towers away.
 Why doe sicke tyrants vs affright,
 Whose rage is farre beyond their might?
 For nothing hope, nor feare thou harme,
 So their weake wrath thou shalt disarmo:
 But he whome hope or terror takes,
 Being a slane his shield forsakes,
 And leaues his place, and doth prouide
 A chame, wherewith his banas are ti'de.

^a A moun-
 taine by
 Naples.

THE III. PROSE.

Euotius discovereth the causes of
 his grieffe.



Vnderstandest thou these
 things (saith she) and doe
 they make imprefsiō in
 thy mind? Art thou ὄνος πρὸς λόγόν? why
 weepest thou? why sheddest thou
 so many teares? ἔξαιδά μὴ κεύθε ἰσθῶ: If
 thou expectest to be cured, thou
 must

*Afinus ad
 Lyram.*

*Eloquere, ne
 ecculset in-
 tellectus.*

must discover thy wound. Then I collecting the forces of my mind together, made her answer in these words. Doth the cruelty of fortunes rage neede further declaration, or doth it not sufficiently appeare of it selfe? doth not the very countenance of this^a place move thee? Is this the Library, which thou thy selfe hadst chosen to sit in at my house? in which thou hast oftentimes discoursed with me of the knowledge of diuine and humane things? Had I this attire or countenance, when I searched the secrets of Nature with thee, when thou describedst vnto me the course of the starres with thy Geometricall rod, when thou diddest frame my conuersation, and the maner of my whole life according to the patterne of the caelestiall order.

^a The first
cause of
Boetius his
griefe was
his banishment
and
misery.

der. Are these the^b rewardes, which thy obedient seruants haue? But thou diddest decree that sentence by the mouth of *Plato*; that common wealthes should be happy, if either the Students of wisdom did gouerne them, or those which were appointed to gouerne them, would giue themselves to the study of wisdom. Thou by the same Philosopher diddest admonish vs, that it is a sufficient cause for wise-men to take vpon themselves the gouernement of the common-wealth, lest if the rule of Cities were left in the hands of lewd and wicked Citizens, they should work the subuersion and ouerthrow of the good. Wherefore following this authority, I desired to practise that by publike administration which I had learned of thee in priuate con-

C

ference.

^b The second
cause, be-
cause he
had not
deserued
them, ha-
uing a
good inten-
tion in a
mitting
promotion

ference. Thou and God him selfe who hath inserted thee in the minds of the wise, are my witnessses, that nothing but the common desire of all good men, brought me to be a Magistrate. This hath beene the^c cause of my grieuous and irreconcilable disagreements with wicked men, and that which freedom of conscience carrieth with it, of contemning the indignation of Potentates for the defence of iustice. How often haue I encountered with^d *Conigastus*, violently possessing him selfe with poore mens goods? How often haue I put backe^e *Triguilla* Prouost of the Kings house from iniuries which he had begunne, yea and finished also? How often haue I protected by putting my authority in danger, such poore wretches, as the vnpu-

^c Thirdly, he deserued the contrary.

^d One of king Theodoricus his chiefest fauorites:

^e Another

vnpunished couetousnesse of the
 f barbarous did vexe with infinite
 reproches? Neuer did any man
 draw me from right to wrong. It
 grieued me no lesse then them
 which suffered it, to see the wealth
 of our Subiects wasted, partly with
 priuate pillage, and partly by pub-
 like tributes. When in the time of
 a great dearth things were set at so
 excessiue and vnreasonable a rate,
 that the Prouince of *Campania* was
 like to bee altogether impoueri-
 rished for the common good, I
 stucke not to contend with the
 chiefe Prætor himselte, and the
 matter was discuffed before the
 king, and I preuailed so farre, that
 it went not forward. I drew *Pauli-
 nus*, who had been Consull, out of
 the very mouth of the gaping
 Courtiers, who like rauenous curs,

f The
 Gothes.

had already in hope and ambition deuoured his riches. That *Albinus* who had likewise beene Consul, might not be punished vpon presumptions and false accusation, I exposed my selfe to the hatred of *Cyprian* his accuser. May I seeme to haue prouoked enmity enough against my selfe? But others should so much the more haue procured my safety, since that for the loue I bare to iustice, I left my selfe no way by the meanes of Courtiers to be safe. § But by whose accusations did I receiue this blow? by theirs, who, long since hauing put *Basil* out of the kings seruice, compelled him now to accuse me, by the necessity which he was driuen to by debt. *Opilio* likewise and *Gaudentius* being banished by the kings decree, for the iniuries and manifold deceites,

§ The fourth cause of his grieft, the basenes of his accusers and the open iniustice of his accusation.

deceites, which they had committed, because they would not obey, defended themselves by taking Sanctuary, of which the king hearing, gaue sentence, that vlesse they departed out of the City of *Rauenna* within certaine daies, they should be branded in the foreheads, and put out by force. What could be added to this seuerity? And yet that very day, their accusation against me went for currant. What might be the reason of this? did my dealing deserue it? or did their condemnation which went before, make them iust accusers? was not fortune ashamed? if not that innocency was accused, yet at least, that it had so vile and base accusers? But ^hwhat crime was laid to my charge? wilt thou haue it in one word? I am said to haue desi-

^h Fifty,
His chiefe
offence
was verus.

red the Senates safety. Wilt thou know the maner how? I am blamed for hauing hindred their accuser to bring forth euidence, by which he should proue the Senate guilty of treason. What thinkest thou O Mist esse? Shall I deny this fault, that I may not shame thee? But it is true, I desired it, neither will I euer cease from hauing that desire. Shall I confesse it? but then I must leaue hindering their accuser. Shall I call it an offence to haue wished the safety of that order? Indeed the Senate with their decrees concerning me, had made it an offence. But Folly alway deceiuing her selfe, cannot change the deserts of things, neither doe I thinke it lawfull for me by the decree of Socrates, either to haue concealed the truth, or granted a lie. But
how

how this may be, I leaue to thine, and wisemens censure. And that the posterity may not be ignorant of the course and truth of the matter, I haue put it downe in writing: for what should I speake of those fainedⁱ letters, in which I am charged to haue hoped for the Roman liberty? The deceit of which would manifestly haue appeared, if it might haue been lawfull for me to haue vsed the confession of my very accusers, which in all busines is of greatest force: for what liberty remaineth there to be hoped for? I would to God there were any? I would haue answered as *Canius* did, who being charged by *Caius Caesar*, sonne to *Germanicus*, that he was priuy to the conspiracy made against him, answered: If I had been made acquainted with it, thou

C 4

shouldest

ⁱ Sixtly He was falsely accused & not permitted to vse the testimony of his very accusers.

shouldest neuer haue known of it. Neither hath sorrow so dulled my wits, that I complaine of the wicked endeouours of sinnefull men against vertue, but I exceedingly maruaile at those things, which they hoped to bring to passe: for the desire of doing euill may be attributed to our weakenesse, but that in the sight of ^k God, the wicked should be able to compass whatsoeuer they contriue against the innocent, is altogether monstrous; vpon which occasion not without cause, one of thy familiar friends demanded, (if saith he) there be a God, from whence proceed so many euils? and if there be no God, from whence cometh any good? But let that passe, that wicked men, which seeke the bloud of all good men, and of the whole

^kSeuenthly
He grieueth
that wicked
men are a-
ble to pre-
uaile a-
gainst the
good.

whole Senate, would also haue ouerthrowne me, whome they saw to stand in defence of good men, and of the Senate: ¹ But did I deserue the same of the Senators themselves? I suppose thou remembrest, how thou being present, diddest alway direct me, when I went about to say or doe any thing. Thou remembrest I say, when at *Verona*, the king being desirous of a common ouerthrow, endeauoured to lay the treason, whereof one's *Albinus* was accused, vpon the whole order of the Senate, with how great securitie of my owne danger, I defended the innocency of the whole Senate. Thou knowest that these things which I say are true, and that I was neuer delighted in my own praise, for the secret of a good conscience

¹ Fightly,
The Senators them
selues of
whome hee
had deserued
so well,
were his e-
nemies.

science is in some sort diminished, when by declaring what he hath done, a man receiue the reward of fame. But thou seest to what passe my innocency is come: instead of the rewards of true vertue, I vndergo the punishment of wickednesse, wherewith I am falsly charged. ^m Was it euer yet seene, that the manifest confession of any crime, made the Iudges so to conforme themselues to seuerity, that either the errour of mans iudgement, or the condition of Fortune, which is certaine to none, did not incline some of them to fauour? If I had beene accused, that I would haue burnt the Churches, or wickedly haue killed the Priestes, or haue sought the death of all good men, yet sentene should haue been pronounced against me present, ha-
uing

^m Ninthly,
all conspi-
red again
him, no
man had
compassi-
on of him.

uing confessed, and being conuicted. ⁿ Now being conuained five hundred miles of, not suffered to make any defence, I am condemned to death and proscription, for bearing the Senate too much good will. O Senate, which deserues that neuer any may be conuicted of the like crime. The dignity of which guilt, euen the very accusers themselves saw, which that they might obscure by adding some kind of fault, they belyed me, that I had defiled my conscience with ^o sacrifice, for an ambitious desire of preferment. But thou, which haddest seated thy selfe in me, diddest repell from the seat of my mind all desire of mortall things, and within thy sight there was no place for sacrifice to harbour; for thou diddest instill into my eares and thoughts

ⁿ 10. He was condemned being absent.

^o 11. He was falsly accused of forcery.

Sequitur
Deum.

thoughts dayly that saying of Pythagoras; ἐπεὶ θεῶν: Neither was it fitting for me, to vse the aide of most vile spirites, whome thou haddest framed to that excellency, that I might become like to God. Besides the innocency which appeared in the most retired roomes of my house, the assembly of my most honourable friends, my holy and worthily renowmed father in Law *Symmachus*, doe cleare mee from all suspition of this crime. But O detestable wickednesse. They the rather giue credite to so great a crime, and thinke me the nigher to such mischieuous dealing, because I am endewed with thy knowledge, and adorned with thy vertues, so that it is not inough that I reape no commodity for thy respect, vnlesse thou beest also dishonoured

p 12 Philo-
sophy and
Learning
dishonou-
red for his
respect.

honoured for the hatred conceiued against me. And that my miseries may increase the more, the greatest part doe not so much respect the value of things, as the euent of fortune, and they esteeme onely that to be prouidently done, which the happy successe commends. By which means it commeth to passe, that the first losse which miserable men haue is their^q estimation, and the good opinion which was had of them. What rumors goe now among the people, what dissonant & diuers opinions? I cannot abide to thinke of them: onely this I will say, the last burthen of aduersity is, that when they which are in misery, are accused of any crime, they are thought to deserue whatsoever they suffer. And I spoiled of all my goodes, bereaued of my dig-

q i. The losse of estimation with the greatest part.

r 14. The
wicked en-
couraged
and the
good dis-
mayed by
his fall.

dignities, blemished in my
good name, for benefites receiue
punishments. And me thinks I see
the ^r cursed cruies of the wicked a-
bounding with ioy and gladnesse,
and euery lost companion deuising
with himselfe, how to accuse others
falsly, good men lie prostrate with
the terror of my danger, and euery
lewd fellow is prouoked by impu-
nity to attempt any wickednesse,
and by rewards to bring it to ef-
fect; but the innocent are not
onely deprived of all security,
but also of any maner of
defence. Wherefore I may
well exclaime.

THE

THE V. VERSE.

Boetius complaineth, that all things are governed by Gods providence, beside the actions and affayres of men.

Creator of the skie,
 Who sittest on thine eternall throne on hie,
 Who doest quicke motion cause,
 In all the heauens, and giu'st the starres their lawes.
 That the pale Queene of night,
 Sometimes receiuing all her brothers light,
 Should shine in her full pride,
 And with her beames the lesser stars should hide;
 Sometimes she wants her grace,
 When the sunnes rayes are in lesse distant place.
 And^a Hesperus that flies
 As Messenger before the night doth rise,
 And oft with sodaine change
 Before the Sunne, as^a Lucifer doth range.
 Thou short the dayes doest make,
 When Winter from the trees the leaues doth take:
 Thou when the fiery Sunne,
 Doth summer cause, mak'st the nights swiftly run.
 Thy might doth rule the yeare,
 As Northerne winds the leaues away doe beare,
 So Zephyrus from West,
 The plants in all their glory doth reuest;
 And^b Syrius burnes that corne,

^a The same starre hath two contrary names, because it appears both in the euening and morning.

Boetius his

b Diuerse
starres
which ap-
peare by
the sunne
in diuers
seasons.

With which^b Arcturus did the earth adorne.
None from thy lawes are free,
Nor can forsake their place ordain'd by thee.
Thou that to certaine end
Gouern'st all things; deniest thou to intend
The Actes of men alone,
Directing them in measure from thy throne?
For why should slipp'ry chance
Rule all things with such doubtfull gouernance?
Or why should punishments,
Due to the guilty light on innocents?
But now the highest place,
Giveth to naughty maners greatest grace,
And wicked people vex:
Good men, and to each vniustly on their necks,
Vertue in darknesse lurkes,
And righteous soules are charg'd with impious works.
Deceives nor Perjuries,
Disgrace not those, who colour them with lies,
For, when it doth them please,
To shew their force, they to their will with ease,
The hearts of kings can scare,
To whom so many crouch with trembling feare,
O thou that soyn'st with loue
All worldly things, locke from thy seat above
On the earthes wretched state,
We men, not the least worke thou didst create,
With fortunes blasts does shake,
Thou careful ruler, these fierce tempests slake,
And for the earth provide,
Those lawes by which thou heau'n in peace dost guide.

THE

THE V. PROSE.

Philosophy sheweth that Boetius is the cause of his owne misery.



When I had vttered these speeches with continued grieſe, ſhee with an amiable countenance, and nothing moued with my complaines, ſaid; when I firſt ſaw thee ſad and weeping, I forthwith knew thee to be in miſery and baniſhment. But I had not knowne how farre of, thou wert baniſhed, if thy ſpeech had not bewrayed it. O how farre art thou gone from thy^a Country, not being driuen away, but wandering of thine owne accord. Or if thou haddeſt rather be thought to haue been driuen out, it hath been onely by thy ſelfe; for neuer could any other but thy ſelfe haue done

D

it;

^a Mans Country is wiſedome, Senec. de remed. Fortun. ſi (apiens eſt non peregrinatur. ſi ſtultus eſt, exulat.

Sed Sicut
Rex est Sicut
Dominus.

it; for if thou remembreſt, of what
Country thou art, it is not gouer-
ned as *Athens* was wont to be, by
the multitude ἀλλὰ εἰς βασιλεὺς εἰσιν, εἰς κοι-
ρανος, It is desirous to haue aboun-
dance of Citizens, and not to haue
them driuen away. To be gouer-
ned by whose authority, and to be
subiect to her lawes, is the greatest
freedome that can be. Art thou
ignorant of that most ancient law
of thy City, by which it is decreed,
that he may not be banished, that
hath made choice of it for his dwel-
ling place : for he that is within her
fort or hold, needs not feare, lest he
deserue to be banished. But who-
soever ceaseth to desire to dwell in
it, ceaseth likewise to deserue so
great a benefite. Wherefore the
countenance of this place moueth
me not so much as thy counte-
nance

nance doth. Neither do I so much require thy Library adorned with yuory feelings, and christall windowes, as the seat of thy mind, in which I haue not placed bookes, but that which makes bookes to be esteemed of, I meane the sentences of my books, which were written long since. And that which thou hast said of thy deserts to the common good, is true indeed, but little in respect of the many things which thou hast done. That which thou hast reported, either of the honesty, or of the falseness of those things, which are objected against thee, is knowne to all men. Thou diddest well to touch but briefly the wickedness and deceit of thy accusers, for that the common people to whose notice they are come, doe more fitly and largely

speake of them. Thou hast also sharply rebuked the vniust Senates deed. Thou hast also grieued at our accusation, and hast bewailed the losse or diminishing of our good name: and lastly, thy sorrow ragged against fortune, and thou complaynedst, that deserts were not equally rewarded. In the end of thy bitter verse, thou desiredst, that the earth might be gouerned by that peace, which heauen enioyeth. But because thou art turmoiled with the multitude of affections, grieffe and anger drawing thee to diuerse partes, in the plight thou art now, the more forcible remedies cannot be applyed vnto thee; wherefore, for a while, we will vse the more easie, that thy affections, which are as it were hardened and swolne with
per-

perturbations; may by gentle handling be mollified and disposed to receiue the force of sharper medicines.

THE VI. VERSE.

Philosophy proueth that order is necessary in all things.

When boat with Phæbus beams,
 The Crab casts fiery gleames,
 He, that doth then with seede,
 The fruitlesse furrowes feede,
 Deceiued of his bread,
 Must be with akornes fed,
 Seeke not the flowry woods,
 For Violets sweet buddes,
 When fields are ouercast
 With the fierce Northerne blast,
 Nor hope then home to bring,
 The branches of the spring.

Boetius his

*If thou in grapes delight,
In Autumne Bacchus might
With them doth decke our clime,
God eu'ry seu'rall time,
With proper grace hath crown'd,
Nor will those lawes confound,
Which he once settled hath.
He, that with headlong path
This certaine order leaues,
An haplesse end receaues.*

T H E V I . P R O S E .

Philosophy discovereth the inward causes of Boetius his grieffe.



First therefore wilt thou let me touch and trie the state of thy mind by asking thee a few questions, that I may vnderstand how thou art to be cured. To which I answered, aske me
what

what questions thou wilt, and I will answer thee. And then shee said, Thinkest thou that this world is governed by happy hazard and chance? or rather dost thou believe that it is ruled by reason? I can (quoth I) in no manner imagine, that such certaine motions are caused by rash chance. And I know that God the Creator doth govern his worke, neither will I ever thinke otherwise. It is so, saith shee, for so thou saidest in thy verse a little before, and bewayledst, that onely men were void of Gods care; for as for the rest, thou diddest not doubt, but that they were governed by reason. And surely I cannot chuse, but exceedingly admire, how thou canst be ill affected, holding so wholesome an opinion. But let vs search further, I gesse thou wantest

test something, but I know not what. Tell mee, since thou doubtest not, that the world is gouerned by God, canst thou tell me also by what meanes it is gouerned? I doe scarcely (quoth I) vnderstand what thou askest, and much lesse am I able to make thee a sufficient answer. Was I (quoth shee) deceiued in thinking that thou wantedst something, by which as by the breach of a fortresse, the sicknesse of perturbations hath entred into thy mind? But tell me, doest thou remember, what is the end of things? or to what the whole intention of nature tendeth? I haue heard it (quoth I) but grieffe hath dilled my memory. But knowest thou from whence all things had their beginning? I know (quoth I) and answered, that from God.

And

And how can it be, that knowing the beginning, thou canst be ignorant of the end? But this is the condition and force of perturbations, that they may alier a man; but wholly destroy, and as it were roote him out of himselfe, they cannot. But I would haue thee answere me to this also; doest thou remember, that thou art a man? why should I not remember it (quoth I?) Well then, canst thou explicate what man is? Do st thou aske me, if I know that I am a reasonable and mortall liuing creature? I knowe and confesse my selfe to bee so. To which shee replyed, doest thou not know thy selfe to bee any thing else? Not any thing. Now I know (quoth shee) another, and that perhaps the greatest cause of thy sicknesse, thou hast forgotten what

^a The cause
and remedy
of excessiue
griefe.

what thou art. Wherefore I haue fully found out, both the^a manner of thy disease, and the meanes of thy recouery : for the confusion which thou art in, by the forgetfulnesse of thy selfe, is the cause, why thou art so much grieued at thy exile, and the losse of thy goods. And because, thou art ignorant, what is the end of things, thou thinkest, that lewd and wicked men be powerfull and happy; likewise, because thou hast forgotten, by what meanes the world is gouerned, thou imaginest, that these alterations of fortunes doe fall out without any guide. Sufficient causes not onely of sicknesse, but also of death it selfe. But thanks be to the author of thy health, that Nature hath not altogether forsaken thee.

We

We haue the greatest nourisher of thy health, the true opinion of the gouernement of the world, in that thou beleeuest that it is not subiect to the euent of chance, but to diuine reason: Wherefore feare nothing, out of this little sparkle will be inkindled thy vitall heat. But because it is not yet^b time to vse more solide remedies; and it is manifest, that the nature of minds is such, that as often as they cast away true opinions, they are possessed with false, out of which the darkenesse of perturbations arising doth make them, that they cannot discern things aright: I will endeouour to dissolue this cloude with gentle and moderate fomentations; that hauing remoued the obscurity of deceitfull affections, thou mayest behold the splendor of true light.

^bDiscretion
to be vsed
in comfort-
ing the
afflicted.

TH**E**

THE VII. VERSE.

Philosophy declareth how the perturbations of our mind doe hinder vs from the knowledge of truth.

When starres are shrowded
 With duskie night,
 They yeeld no light
 Being so clouded.
 When the wind moueth,
 And waues doth reare,
 The Sea late cleare,
 Foul and darke proueth.
 And riuers creeping
 Downe a high hill,
 Stand often still,
 Rocks them backe keeping.
 If thou wouldst brightly,
 See truthes cleare rayes,
 Or walke these wayes,
 Which lead most rightly,
 All ioy forsaking,
 Feare thou must flie,
 And hopes desire,
 No sorrow taking.
 For where these terrors
 Raigne in the mind,
 They it doe bind,
 In cloudy errors.




THE
SECONDD BOOKE
OF BOETIVS.

In which Philosophy apply-
eth the more easie remedies to
Boetius his grieffe.

THE I. PROSE.

Of the deceites and inconstancy of
Fortune.



After this shee remai-
ned silent for a while;
and hauing by that
her modesty made
me attentiuē, began
in

in this wile: If I be rightly en-
formed of the causes and conditi-
on of thy disease, thou languish-
est with the affection and de-
sire of thy former fortune, and the
change of that alone, as thou ima-
ginest, hath ouerthrowne the state
of thy mind. I know the manifold
^a illusions of that monster, exerci-
sing most alluring familiarity with
them, whome shee meaneth to de-
ceiue, to the end shee may con-
found them with intolerable grie-
fe, by forsaking them vpon the sodain,
whose nature, customes and desert,
if thou remembrest, thou shalt
know, that thou neither diddest
possesse, nor hast lost any thing of
estimation in it; and as I hope, I
shall not need to labour much to
bring these things to thy remem-
brance, for thou wert wont, when
shee

^a The de-
ceites of
fortune.

sheewas present, and flattered thee most, to assayle her with manfull words, and pursue her with sentences taken forth of our most hidden knowledge. But euery sodaine change of thinges happeneth not without a certaine wauering and disquietnesse of mind. And this is the cause, that thou also for a while hast lost thy former tranquility and peace. But it is time for thee to take and taste some gentle and pleasant thing, which being receiued may prepare thee for stronger potions; Wherefore let vs vse the sweetnesse of^b Rhetoricall perswasions, which then onely is well employed, when it forsaketh not our ordinances; and with this, let Musicke a little slaue belonging to our house, chaunt sometime lighter and sometime sadder notes. Wherefore O man,
what

^b The true vse of Rhetoricke and Poetry, or Musicke.

^c Fortune
onely con-
stant in be-
ing muta-
ble.

what is it, that hath cast thee into sorrow and griefe? If thou thinkest that fortune hath altered her maner of proceeding toward thee, thou art in an error. This was alway her fashion, this is her nature. Shee hath kept that ^c constancie in thy affaires, which is proper to her, in being mutable, such was her condition when she fawned vpon thee and allured thee with entisements of fained happinesse. Thou hast discovered the doubtfull lookes of this blind Goddesse. Shee, which concealeth her selfe from others, is wholly knowen to thee. If thou likest her, frame thy selfe to her conditions, and make no complaint. If thou detestest her treacherie, despise and cast her off, with her pernicious flatterie. For that, which hath caused thee so much sorrow, should haue brought

brought thee to great tranquillitie. For shee hath forsaken thee, of whom no man can be secure. Doest thou esteeme that happinesse precious, which thou art to loose? And is the present fortune deare vnto thee, of whose stay thou art not sure, and whose departure will breede thy griefe. And if shee can neither be kept at our will, and maketh them miserable, whom shee leaueth, what else is fickle fortune, but a token of future calamitie? For it is not sufficient to behold that, which wee haue before our eyes; wisdome pondereth the euent of things, & this mutabilitie on both sides maketh the threates of fortune not to be feared, nor her flattering to be desired. Finally, thou must take in good part, whatsoeuer happeneth vnto thee within the reach of
E fortune,

fortune, when once thou hast submitted thy necke to her yoke. And if to her, whom of thine owne accord, thou hast chosen for thy Mistresse, thou wouldest prescribe a Law, how long shee were to stay, and when to depart, shouldest thou not doe her mightie wrong, and with thy impatiencie make thy estate more intollerable, which thou canst not better? If thou settest vp thy sayles to the wind, thou shalt be caried not whether thy will desireth, but whether the Gale driueth. If thou sowest thy seed, thou considerest, that there are as well barren, as fertile yeeres. Thou hast yeelded thy selfe to fortunes sway, thou must bee content with the conditions of thy mistresse. Endeourest thou to stay the force of the turning wheele? But thou foolish-

foolishest man, that euer was, if it beginneth to stay, it ceaseth to be fortune.

THE I. VERSE.

Phylosophy describeth the conditions of fortune.

THe pride of fickle fortune spareth none,
 But like the floods of swiss^a Euripus borne,
 Oft casteth mightie Princes from their throne,
 And oft the abiect Captiue doeth adorne.
 Shee cares not for the wretches teares and mone,
 And the sad groines, which she hath caus'd, doeth skorne
 Thus doth shee play, to make her power more knownen,
 Shewing great wonders, when mans fickle state
 One houre, haplesse doeth see, and fortunate.

^a An arme of the Sea betwixt Phocides in Bæotia, and the Ile Eubæa, which ebbs and flows so swiftly 7. times in a day, that it carrieth ships against the wind, yea the very wind it selfe
Plin. lib. 2.

THE II. PROSE.

Fortune sheweth, that shee hath taken nothing from Boetius, that was his.



BVt I would vrge thee a little with Fortunes owne speeches. Wherefore con-

sider thou, if shee asketh not reason. For what cause, O man, chargest thou mee with daily complaints? What iniurie haue I done thee? What goods of thine haue I taken from thee? Contend with mee before any Iudge, about the possession of riches and dignities: and if thou canst shew, that the proprietie of any of these things belong to any mortall wight, I will forthwith willingly graunt, that those things, which thou demandest, were thine. When nature produced thee out of thy mothers wombe, I receiued thee naked and poore in all respects, cheerished thee with my wealth, and (which maketh thee now to fall out with me) being forward to fauour thee, I had most tender care for thy education, and adorned thee with the abundance & splendour
of

of all things, which are in my power. Now it pleaseth mee to withdraw my hand, yeeld thanks, as one that hath had the vse, of that which was not his owne. Thou hast no iust cause to complaine, as though thou hadst lost that, which was fully thine owne. VVherefore lamentest thou? I haue offered thee no violence. Riches, honours, and the rest of that sort belong to mee. They acknowledge mee for their Mistresse, and themselves for my seruants, they come with me, and when I goe away, they likewise depart. I may boldly affirme, if those things which thou complainest to be taken from thee, had beene thine owne, thou shouldest neuer haue lost them. Must I onely be forbidden to vse my right? It is lawful for the heauen to bring soorth faire

E 3 dayes.

dayes , and to hide them againe in darkeſome nights . It is lawfull for the yeere ſometime to compaſſe the face of the earth with flowers and fruites , and ſometime to couer it with clouds & cold . The Sea hath right ſometime to fawne with calmes , and ſometime to frowne with ſtormes and waues . And ſhal the vnſatiabie deſire of men tie me to conſtancie, ſo contrarie to my cuſtome ? This is my force , this is the ſport , which I continually uſe . I turn about my wheele with ſpeed , and take a pleaſure to turne things vpside downe ; Aſcend, if thou wilt , but with this condition , that thou thinkeſt it not an iniurie to deſcend , when the courſe of my ſport ſo requireth . Diddeſt thou not know my faſhion ? VVert thou ignorant how *Crefus* King of the *Lydians* ,
not

not long before a terrour to ^a *Cyrus*, within a while after came to such miserie, that hee should haue beene burnt, had hee not beene saued by a shower sent from heauen. Hast thou forgotten how ^b *Paul* piously bewailed the calamities of King ^c *Persus* his prisoner? What other thing doeth the out-crie of Tragedies lament, but that fortune hauing no respect, overturneth happy states? Diddest thou not learne in thy youth, that there lay two ^d Barrels, th'one of good things, and the other of bad, at *Iupiters* threshold? But what if thou hast tasted more abundantly of the good? What if I be not wholly gone from thee? What if this mutabilitie of mine be a iust cause for thee to hope for better? Notwithstanding loole not thy courage, and living in a

^a King of Persia.

^b *Paulus Aemilius*, Consul of Rome.

^c Or *Perses* King of Macedonia.

^d This is taken out of *Homer. Iliad. lib.*

kingdome which is common to all men, desire not to bee governed by peculiar Lawes, proper onely to thy selfe.

THE II. VERSE.

Fortune complaineth of the vnsatiablenesse of men.

If plenty as much wealth should giue, ne're holliſg back her hand,
 As the fierce winds in troubled Seas doe toſſe up heapes of ſand,
 Or as the Starres, that Heaueſly Orbes in light ſome nights doe grace:
 Yet wretched men would ſtill accuſe their miſerable caſe.
 Should God too lib'ral of his gifts: their greedy wishes beare,
 And with bright honour them adorne: yet all that nothing were,
 Since rati'ous minds deuouring all for more are ready ſtill,
 What bridle can containe in bounds this their contentleſſe will?
 When fill'd with riches they retaine the thirſt of hauiſg more?
 He is not rich, that feares, and grieues, and counts himſelfe but poore.

THE III. PROSE.

Philosophy proueth, that fortune had beene more fauourable, then contrarie to Boetius.



Herefore if fortune should plead with thee thus in her owne defence, doubtlesse thou wouldest not haue a word to answer

answere her. But if there bee any thing, which thou canst alleadge in thy owne defence, thou must vtter it, wee will giue thee full libertie to speake. Then I said, these things make a faire shew, and being set out with pleasant Rhetoricke and Musicke, delight onely so long as they are heard. But those, which are miserable haue a deeper feeling of their miseries. Therefore, when the sound of these things is past, hidden sorrow oppresseth the mind. It is so indeed, quoth she; for these be not the remedies of thy disease, but certaine fomentations to asswage thy grieffe, which as yet resisteth all cure. But when it shall bee time, I will apply that, which shall pierce to the quicke. And yet there is no cause, why thou shouldest thinke thy selfe miserable; Hast thou forgotten, how

how many wayes, and in what degree thou art happie? I passe ouer with silence, that hauing lost thy Father, thou wert prouided for by men of the best sort, and being chosen to haue affinitie with the chiefest of the Citie, thou beganest sooner to be deare vnto them, then to be akinne, which is the most excellent kind of kindred. Who esteemed thee not most happie, hauing so Noble a Father inlaw, so chaste a Wife, and so many Sonnes? I say nothing (for I will not speake of ordinarie matters) of the dignities denied to others in their age, and graunted to thee in thy youth. I desire to come to the top of thy felicitie. If any fruit of mortall things hath any weight of happinesse, can the remembrance of that light bee darkned with any cloud of miseries that

that can ouercast thee? VVhen thou lawest thy two Sonnes being both Consuls together caried from their house, the Senatours accompanying them, & the people reioycing with them, when they sitting in the Senate in their Chaires of estate, thou making an Oration in the kings praise, deseruedst the glory of witte and eloquence. When in publike assembly thou hauing beene Consul thy selfe, standing betwixt thy two Sonnes, diddest satisfie with thy triumphant liberalitie, the expectation of the multitudes gathered together. I suppose thou flatteredst fortune, while shee fawned thus vpon thee, and vsed thee, as her dearest friend. Thou obtainedst more at her hands, then euer priuate man had before thee. VVilt thou reckon with fortune? This is the
first

first time, that euer shee frowned
vpon thee. If thou considerest the
number and measure of thy ioyfull
and sad accidents, thou canst not
chuse but thinke thy selfe happie
still. And if thou esteemest not thy
selfe fortunate, because those things
which seemed ioyfull are past, there
is no cause, why thou shouldest
thinke thy selfe miserable, since
those things which thou takest to
be sorrowfull, doe passe. Commet
thou now first as a Pilgrime and
stranger into the Theater of this
life? Supposhest thou to find any con-
stancie in humane affaires? Since
that man himselfe is soone gone:
for although things subiect to for-
tune seldome keepe touch in stay-
ing, yet the end of life is a certaine
death, euen of that fortune, which
remaineth. Wherefore what mat-
ter

ter is it, whether thou by dying
leauest it, or it forsaketh thee by
flying?

THE III. VERSE.

Philosophy declareth, how all worldly
things decay and fade away.

When Phabus with his Rosie teame
Sheweth his lightsome beame,
The dull and darkened Starres retire
Feelding to greater fire.

When Zephyrus his warmth doth bring,

Sweete Roses decke the spring
Let noysome Anster blow apace,
Plants soone will loose their grace.

The Sea hath often quiet stood,

With an vnmoued flood;
And often is turmoyl'd with wanes,

When boystrous Boreas raues.

If thus the world neuer long tarie

The same, but often varie:

On fading fortunes then relie,

Trust to those goods that flie.

An everlasting law is made,

That all things borne shall fae.

THE

THE IIII. PROSE.

Philosophy proueth, that Boetius is still fortunate, and that no man hath complete happinesse in this life.



O which I answered, the things, which thou reportest are true, O nurse of all vertues, and I cannot denie the most speedy course of my prosperitie, but this is that, which vexeth me most, when I remember it. For in all aduersitie of fortune, it is the most vn-happie kind of misfortune, to haue beene happie. But, quoth shee, thou canst not iustly impute to the things themselues, that thou art punished for thy false opinion. For if this vaine name of casuall felicitie moueth thee, let vs make accompt with how many, and how great things thou aboundest. VVherefore

fore if that, which in all thy reue-
newes of fortune, thou esteemedst
most precious, doeth still by Gods
prouidence remaine safe and vntou-
ched, canst thou, retaining the best,
iustly complaine of misfortune? But
thy Father in-law *Symmachus* (that
most excellent ornament of man-
kind) liueth in safetie, and for the
obtaining of which thou wouldest
willingly spend thy life, that man
wholly framed to wisdom and
vertues, being secure of his owne,
mourneth for thy iniuries. Thy
wife liueth, modest in disposition,
eminent in chastitie, and to rehearse
briefely all her excellent gifts; like
her Father. Shee liueth, I say, and
wearie of her life, reserueth her
breath onely for thee. In which a-
lone I must also graunt, that thy fe-
licitie is diminished, she consumeth
her

her selfe with teares and grieffe for thy sake. VVhat should I speake of thy children, which haue beene Consuls, in whome already, as in Children of that age, their Fathers, or Grand-fathers good disposition appeareth? wherefore since the greatest care, that mortall men haue, is to saue their liues, O happie man that thou art, if thou knowest thy owne wealth, who still hast remaining those things, which no man doubteth to bee dearer then life it selfe? And therefore cease weeping. Fortune hath not hitherto shewed her hatred against you all, neither art thou assailed with too boystrous a storme, since those Ankers hold fast, which permit neither the comfort of the time present, nor the hope of the time to come, to bee wanting. And I pray God (quoth
I)

1) that they may hold fast, for so long as they remaine, howsoever the world goeth, wee shall escape drowning. But thou seest, how great a part of our ornaments is lost. Wee haue gotten a little ground, (quoth shee) if thy whole estate be not irkesome vnto thee. But I cannot suffer thy daintinesse, who with such lamentation & anxietie complainest, that something is wanting to thy happinesse: For who hath so^a entire happinesse, that he is not in some part offended with the condition of his estate. The nature of humane felicitie is doubtfull and vncertaine, and is neither euer wholly obtained, or neuer lasteth alwayes. One man hath great reuenues, but is contemned for his base lineage. Anothers Nobilitie maketh him knownen, but oppressed with penurie,

^a No man hath entire happinesse.

rie, had rather be vnknowen. Some abounding with both, bewaile their vnfitnesse for mariage. Some other well married, but wanting children, prouideth riches for strangers to inherite. Others finally, hauing children, mournesfully bewaile the vices, which their sonnes or daughters are giuen to. So that scarce any man is pleased with the condition of his fortune. For there is something in euery estate, which without experience is not knowen, and being experienced doth molest and trouble. Besides that, those, which are ^b most happie are most sensible, and vnlesse all things fall out to their liking, vnpatient of all aduersitie, every little crosse ouerthrowes them, so small are the occasions, which take from the most fortunate the height of their happinesse.

^b The most
happie are
most sensi-
ble of affi-
ction.

How

How many are there thinkest thou, which would thinke themselves almost in heauen, if they had but the least part of the remnants of thy fortune? This very place, which thou callest banishment, is the Countrey of the inhabitants. So true it is, that nothing is miserable, but when it is thought so; and contrariwise, euery^e estate is happie, if he that beares it, bee content. Who is there so happie, that if he yeeldeth to discontent, desireth not to change his estate? How much bitternesse is mingled with the sweetenesse of mans felicitie, which though it seemeth neuer so pleasant, while it is enjoyed, yet can it not be retained from going away, when it will. And by this it appeareth how miserable the blessednesse of mortall things is, which neither endureth

^c He that is best contented, is most happie.

alway with the contented, nor wholly delighteth the pensue. Wherefore O mortall men, why seeke you for your felicitie abroad, which is placed within your selues? Errour and ignorance do confound you. I will briefly shew thee the
d Center of thy chiefest happinesse. Is there any thing more precious to thee then thy selfe. I am sure thou wilt say nothing. Wherefore, if thou enioyest thy selfe, thou shalt possesse that, which neither thou wilt euer loose, nor fortune can take away; and that thou mayest acknowledge, that blessednesse cannot consist in these casuall things, gather it thus: If blessednesse be the chiefest good of nature endewed with reason, and that is not the chiefest good, which may by any meanes bee taken away, because that,

d The Center of happinesse.

that, which cannot bee taken away, is better; it is manifest, that the^e instabilitie of fortune cannot aspire to the obtaining of blessednesse.

Moreouer, hee that nowe enioyeth this brittle felicitie, either knoweth it to bee mutable, or no; if not, what estate can bee blessed by ignorant blindnesse? And if hee knoweth it, hee must needes feare, least hee loose that, which hee doubteth not, may bee lost, wherefore continuall feare permit- teth him not to bee happie. Or doeth hee thinke, that it were to bee neglected, though hee should loose it? But so it were a very small good, which hee would bee content to loose. And because thou art one, whom I know to be fully perswaded, that the soules

◦ Tempo-
rall things
cannot
make men
happie.

of men are in no wise mortall; and since it is cleare, that casuall felicitie is ended by the bodies death, there is no doubt, if this can cause blessednesse, but that all mankind falleth into miserie by death. But if we know many who haue sought to reape the fruit of blessednesse, not onely by death, but also by afflictions and torments; how can this present life make men happie, the losse of which causeth not miserie?

THE III. VERSE.

Philosophy commendeth a meane estate.


WHow with an heedfull care
 Will an eternall seate prepare,
 Which cannot be downe cast
 By any force of windie blast.
 And will the floods despise,
 When threathing billowes doe arise.
 He not on hils must stand,

Nor

Nor on the dang'rous sinking sand.
 For there the winds will threate,
 And him with furious tempest beate,
 And here the ground too weake
 Will with the heaue burthen breake.
 His then the dangerous case
 Of an vntry'd delightfull place,
 And thy poore house bestow
 In stonie places firme and low.
 For though the winds doe sound,
 And waues of troubled Seas confound,
 Yet thou to rest disposed
 In thy safe lowly vale inclosed,
 Mayst liue a quiet age,
 Skorning the Ayres distemp' red rage.

THE V. P ROSE.

How riches are neither precious, nor
our owne.


 Vt since my reasons beginto
 sinke into thy mind, I will
 vse those, which are some-
 what more forcible. Goe to then,
 if the gifts of fortune were not brit-
 tle and momentanie, what is there

^a Money.

in them, which can either euer bee made your owne, or well weighed and considered seemeth not vile and of no accompt? Are riches either yours, or precious in themselves? What part of them can bee so esteemed of, Gold, or ^a heapes of mony? But these make a fairer shew, when they are spent, then when they are kept. For couetousnesse alway maketh men odious, as liberalitie famous. And if a man cannot haue that, which is given to another, then money is precious, when bestowed vpon others; it is not possessed any longer. But if all the money in the whole world were in one mans custodie, all other men should bee poore. The voice at the same time wholly filleteth the eares of many, but your riches cannot passe to many, except

cept they bee diminished. Which being done, they must needes make them poore, whome they leaue. O skant and poore riches, which neither can bee wholly possessed of many, and come to none without the impouerishment of others. Doeth the glittering of ^b Jewels draw thy eyes after them? But, if there bee any great matter in this shewe, not men but the Jewels shine, which I exceedingly maruaile, that men admire. For what is there wanting life and members, that may iustly seeme beautifull to a nature not onely endewed with life, but also with reason? Which, though by their makers workmanshippe, and their owne varietie they haue some part of best beautie, yet it is so farre inferior to your excellencie, that it did
in

^b Jewels.

c Pleasant
fields.

in no sort deserue your admiration. Doeth the pleasant prospect of the fields delight you? Why not? For it is a faire portion of the fairest worke. So wee are delighted with a calme Sea, so wee admire the skie, the Starres, the Sunne, and the Moone. Doth any of these belong to thee? Darest thou boast of the beautie, which any of them haue? Art thou adorned with May-flowers? Or doeth thy fertilitie bring forth the fruits of Summer? Why reioycest thou vainely? Why embracest thou outward goods, as if they were thine owne? Fortune wil neuer make those things thine, which by the appointment of nature belong not to thee. The fruits of the earth are appointed for the sustenance of liuing creatures. But if thou wilt onely satisfie want,
which

which suffiseth nature, there is no cause to require the superfluities of fortune. For nature is contented with little, and if being satisfied, thou wilt ouerlay it with more then needes, that which thou addest, will either become vnpleasant, or hurtfull. But perhaps thou thinkest it a fine thing, to goe decked in gay^d apparell, which if they make a faire shew, I will admire either the goodnesse of the stuffe, or the iuention of the workman. Or doth the multitude of ^e seruants make thee happie? VVho if they bee vicious, they are a pernicious burthen to thy house, and exceeding troublesome to their Master: and if they bee honest, what shalt thou bee the better for other mens honestie? By all which it is manifestly proued, that none of these goods, which thou
accoun-

^d Apparell.^e Seruants.

accountest thine are thine indeede. And if there be nothing in thē worthy to be desired, why art thou either glad, when thou hast them, or sorrie, when thou loofest them? Or what is it to thee, if they bee precious by nature? For in this respect, they would haue pleased thee, though they had belonged to others. For they are not precious, because they are come to bee thine, but because they seemed precious, thou wert desirous to haue them. Now, what desire you with so much adoe? Perhaps you seeke to driue away penurie with plentie. But this falleth out quite contrarie, for you stand in neede of many supplies, to furnish your selues with varietie of precious ornaments. And it is true, that they which haue^f much neede much, and contrariwise, that they

^f They which haue much, need much.

they neede litle, which measure not their wealth by the superfluitie of ambition, but by the necessitie of nature. Haue you no proper & inward good, that you seeke so much after those things which are outward and separated from you? Is the condition of things so changed, that man, who is deseruedly accounted diuine for the gift of reson, seemeth to haue no other excellency then the possession of a litle household stuffe? All other creatures are content with that they haue of their owne, and you, who in your minds carie the likenesse of God, are content to take the ornamentes of your excellent nature from most base and vile things, neither vnderstand you, what iniurie you doe to your creatour. Hee woulde haue mankinde to excell all earthly things, you

g Man de-
iecteth him-
selfe by le-
uuing world-
ly things.

h Hee is
worle then
beasts,
when hee
knoweth
not him-
selfe.

i Nothing
can be a-
dorned
with the
ornaments
of another.

you debase your dignitie vnder eue-
ry meanest creature. For if it be ma-
nifest, that the good of euey thing
is more precious then that, whose
good it is, since you iudge the vi-
lest things that can be, to bee your
goods, you^s deiect your selues vn-
der them in your owne estimation,
which questionlesse commeth not
vnderdeseruedly to passe; for this is the
condition of mans nature, that then
only it surpasseth other things, when
it knoweth it selfe; and it is^h worse
then beasts, when it is without that
knowledge. For in other liuing
creatures the ignorance of them-
selues is nature, but in men it is vice.
And how farre doeth this errour of
yours extend, who thinke, thatⁱ a-
ny can bee adorned with the orna-
ments of another? Which can in no
wise be. For if any adioyned thing
seeme

seeme precious, it is that, which is praised, but that which is couered and enwrapped in it, remaineth notwithstanding with the foule basenesse, which it hath of it selfe. Moreouer, I denie that to be good, which hurteth the possessour. Am I deceiued in this? I am sure thou wilt say, no. But^k riches haue often hurt their possessours, since euery lewdest companion, who are consequently most desirous of that, which is not their owne, thinke themselues most worthy to possesse alone all the Gold, and lewels in the world. Wherefore thou, who with much perturbation fearest now to be assayled and flaine, if thou hadst entred the path of this life, like a poore passenger, neededst not be afraid, but mightest reioyce and sing euen in the sight of most
rauenous

^k Riches do
often hurt
their pos-
sessours.

rauenous thieues . O excellent hap-
pinesse of mortall riches , which
when thou hast gotten , thou hast
lost thy safetie.

THE V. VERSE.

Philosophy commendeth the former age,
which was free from couetousnesse.

Too much the former age was blest,
When fields their pleased owners failed not,
Who with no slouthfull lust oppress'd
Broke their long fasts with a kornes eas'ly got.
No wine with home mixed was,
Nor did they silke in purple colours steepe,
They slept vpon the whole some grasse,
And their coole drink did fetch from riuers deepe.
The Pines did hide them with their shade,
No Merchants through the dang'rous billowes went,
Nor with desire of gain: full trade
Their trafficke into forraie Countreyes sent.
Then no shrill Trumpets did amate
The minds of Souldiers with their daunting sounds,
Nor weapons were through deadly hate
Dy'd with the dreadfull bloud of gaping wounds.
For how could any furie draw
The mind of man to stirre up warres in vaine,

When

*When nothing, but fierce wounds he saw,
And for his blood no recompence should gaine.*

*O that the ancient maners would
In these our latter happelasse times returne.*


*Now the desire of hauing gold
Doth like the flaming fires of^a Aetna burne.*

*As who was he, that first did show
The heapes of treasure, which the earth did hide;
And Jewels which lay close below,
By which he costly dangers did provide.*

^a A hill in
Seicily.

THE VI. PROSE.

Of dignitie and power.

OW why should I discourse
of dignities & power, which
you not knowing, what
true dignitie and power meaneth,
extoll to the skies? And if they light
vpon wicked men, what fire, though
the very flames of *Aetna* should
breake foorth, or what diluge can
cause so great harmes? I suppose
thou remembrest, how your ances-
stours by reason of the Consuls ar-

G

rogan-

rogancie, desired to abolish that gouernement, which had beene the beginning of their freedome, who before for the same cause had remooued the gouernment of Kings from their citie. And if sometime, which is very seldome, good men bee preferred to Honours, what other thing can giue contentment in them, but the honesty of those, which haue them? So that vertues are not honoured by dignities, but dignities by vertue. But what is this your soesteemed and excellent power? Consider you not O earthly wights, whom you seeme to excell? For if among Mice thou shouldest see one claime iurisdiction and power to himselfe ouer the rest, to what a laughter would it moue thee? And what, if thou respectest the body, canst thou find more weake then
man

man, whom euen the biting of little Flies, or the entring of creeping wormes doth often kill? Now, how can any man exercise iurisdiction vpon any other, except onely vpon their bodies, and that, which is inferiour to their bodies, I meane their fortunes? Canst thou euer imperiously impose any thing vpon a free^a mind? Canst thou remoue a soule settled in firme reason from the quiet state, which it possesseth? When a^b tyrant thought to compell a certaine free man by torments, to bewray his confederates of a conspiracie attempted against him, hee bit off his tongue and spit it out vpon the tyrants face, by that meanes wisely making those tortures, which the tyrant thought matter of crueltie, to bee to him occasion of vertue. Now, ^c what is

^a The mind free.

^b *Nearchus or Diomedon. Zeno Eleata. See Euseb. lib. 10 de prepar. Evang. & Suidas.*

^c Whatsoeuer one can doe to another, another may doe to him.

^d King of
Egypt.

^e *Marcus
Atilius Re-
gulus* a
Consul of
Rome.

^f Dignities
and power
often be-
stowed on
the worst
men.

there, that any can enforce vpon another, which he may not bee enforced to sustaine by another? We read, that ^d *Busirides* went to kill his guesstes, was himselfe slaine by his guest *Hercules*. ^e *Regulus* had layed fetters vpon many *Affricanes* taken in warre, but ere long hee found his owne hands inuironed with his Conquerours chaines. Wherefore thinkest thou the power of that man to bee any thing worth, who cannot hinder another from doing that to him, which hee can doe to another? Moreouer, if ^f dignities and power had any naturall and proper good in them, they would neuer bee bestowed vpon the worst men, for one opposit^e vs^eth not to accompanie another. Nature refuseth to haue contraries ioyned. So that, since there is no doubt, but that

that

that men of the worst sort often enjoy dignities, it is also manifest, that they are not naturally good, which follow most naughtie men. Which may worthily bee thought of all fortunes gifts, which are more plentifully bestowed vpon euey lewde companion. Concerning which, I take that also to bee worthy consideration, that no man doubteth him to bee a valiaunt man, in whome hee seeth valour; and it is manifest, that hee, which hath swiftnesse is i swift. So likewise, Musicke maketh Musicians, Physicke Phisitians, and Rethoricke Rhetoricians. For the nature of euey thing doth that, which is proper vnto it, and is not mixed with contrary effectes, but repelleth all opposites. But neither can riches extinguish vn-satiabable auarice, nor

Boetius his

power make him master of himselfe, whome vicious lustes keepe chained in strongest fetters. And dignitie bestowed vpon wicked men, doeth not onely not make them worthy, but rather bewrayeth and discoucreth their vnworthinesse. How commeth this to passe? Because you take a pleasure in miscalling things, which is easily refuted by the effecte of the things themselues. Wherefore by right, these things are not to bee called riches, power or dignitie. Lastly, we may conclude the same of all fortunes, in which it is manifest, there is nothing to bee desired, nothing naturally good, which neither are alway bestowed vpon good men, nor doe make them good, whome they are bestowed vpon.

THE

THE VI. VERSE.

Philosophy declareth by the example of
Nero, that dignities or power, doe
not make men better.

WE know what stirres he made,
Who did the^a Senate slay, and^b Rome with
Who did his^c brother kill, (fire invade,
And with his^d mothers blood his moistned hãd did fill,
Who could without a teare
Behold her nak't and dead, whose body him did beare.
Yet his dread power controll'd
Those people whom the Sun doth in the East behold,
And those, who doe remaine
In Westerne lands, or dwell under^e Bootes waine,
And those, whose skinnes are tann'd
With Southerne winds, which rost and burne the par-
What? could this glorious might (ched sand,
Restraine the furious rage of wicked Neroes Spight?
But oh misshappe most badde,
Which doth the wicked sword to cruel poyson adde!

^a Nero killed many of the Senators without any cause.

^b He caused Rome to burne for a weeke, that he might conceiue the ouerthrow of Troy.

^c Britannicus, to reign alone.

^d Agrippina.

^e The seven Starres in Vrsa maior, which represent a waine, with seven Oxen, which in old time were called Triones, for which cause these Stars are by Boetius called, *Septemgelidis iriones*, from whence cometh *Septentrio*, to signifie the North.

THE

THE VII. PROSE.

Of glory.



WHEN I sayde : thou thy selfe knowest, that the ambition of mortall things hath borne as little sway with me as with any, but I desired matter of action, least old age should come vpon mee I had done any thing. To which shee answered : This is the only thing, which is able to entice such^a minds as being excellently quallified by nature, are not yet fully brought to the perfection of vertues, I meane desire of glorie, and fame of best deserts towards their common wealth, which how slender it is, and voide of all weight, consider this, Thou hast learned by astronomieall demonstrations, that
the

^a The danger of the most excellent minds.

the compasse of the whole earth compared to the scope of heauen is no bigger then a pinnes point, which is as much to say, as that it hath no bignesse at all. And of this so small a region onely the fourth part is knowne to be inhabited, as *Ptolomæus* proueth. From which fourth part, if thou takest away the seas, and marish grounds, and all other desert places, there will skarcely be left any roome at all for men to inhabit. Wherefore enclosed and shutte vp in this ^b smallest point of that other point, doe you thinke of extending your fame, and enlarging your name? But what great or heroical matter can that glory haue, which is pend vp in so small and narrow bounds? Besides that the little compasse of this small habitation is inhabited by many nations, diffe-

^b The small-
nesse of
glory.

different in language, fashions, and conuersation, to which by reason of the difficulties in traueiling, the diuersitie of speach, and the scarcitie of trafficke, not onely the fame of particular men, but euen of cities can hardly come. Finally in the age of *Marcus Tullius*, as he ^chimselfe writeth, the fame of the *Romane* commonwealth had not passed the mountaine ^d*Caucasus*, and yet it was then in the most flourishing estate, fearful euen to the ^e*Parthyans*, and to the rest of the nations about. Seest thou, how streight and narrow that glorie is, which you labour to enlarge & encrease? where the fame of the *Romane* name could not passe, can the glory of a *Romane* man penetrate? Moreouer, the customes and lawes of diuers nations, doe so much differ the one from the other, that

^a *In sommo Scythias.*

^d A mountaine betwixt *Scythia* and *India*.

^e People of *Asia maior*.

that the same thing, which some commend as laudable, others condemne as deseruing punishment. So that, if a man be delighted with the praise of fame, it is no way conuenient for him to be named in many countreys. Wherefore euery man must be content with that glorie, which he may haue at home, & that noble immortalitie of fame must be comprehended within the compasse of one nation. Now, how many most famous while they liued, are altogether forgotten, for want of writers! Though what doe writings auaille, which perish as well as their authors by continuance and obscuritie of time? But you imagine, that you make your selues immortal, when you cast your eyes vpon future fame. Whereas, if thou weighest attentiuely the
infinite

f Glory lasteth not long.

infinite spaces of eternitie, what
cause hast thou to reioyce at the
prolonging of thy name? For if we
compare the stay of one moment
with ten thousand yeres, since both
be limited, they haue some propor-
tion, though it be but very small.
But this number of yeres, how oft
soeuer it bee multiplied, is no way
comparable to endlesse æternitie.
For limited things may in some
sort bee compared among them-
selues, but that, which is infinite,
admitteth no comparison at all.
So that the same of neuer so long
time, if it be compared with ever-
lasting æternitie seemeth not little,
but none at all. But without po-
pular blasts, and vaine rumours you
know not how to doe well, and re-
iecting the excellencie of a good
conscience and of vertue, you chuse
to

to be rewarded with others tatling. Heare how pleasantly one iested at this vaine & contemptible arrogancie. For hauing assaulted with reprochfull speeches a certaine fellow, who had falsely taken vpon him the name of a Philosopher, not for the vse of vertue, but for vaine glorie, and hauing added, that now he would know whether hee were a Philosopher or no, by his gentle & patient bearing of iniuries. The other tooke al patiently for a while, and hauing borne his contumely as it were triumphing sayed: Doeſt thou now at length thinke mee a Philosopher? To which he biting-ly replied, I would haue thought thee one, if thou haddest holden thy peace. But what haue excellent men (for of these I speak) who seeke for glorie by vertue, what haue wee
(I say)

§ The vanti-
tie of glo-
ry, euen in
the opinion
of Atheists,
and much
more of
Christians.

(I say) to expect by fame after death.
For if contrarie to our beleefe, men
s wholly perish, there is no glorie at
all, since he, to whom it is sayed to
belong, is no where extant. But if
a guiltlesse minde freed from earth-
ly imprisonment, goeth forth with
to heauen, will shee not despise all
earthly traffike who enioying hea-
uen, reioiceth to see her selfe exemp-
ted from earthly affayres.

THE VII. VERSE.

Of the smalnesse and shortnesse of fame.

HE that to honour only seekes to mount,
And that his chiefest end doth count,
Let him behold the largenesse of the skyes,
And on the streight earth cast his eyes,
He will despise the glorie of his name,
Which cannot fill so small a frame.
Why do proud men scorne, that their necks should beare
That yoke, which every man must weare?
Though fame through many nations flie along,
And should be blaz'd by eu'ry tongue,

And

And houses shine with our forefathers stories,
 Yet death contemnes these stately glories,
 And summoning both rich and poore to die,
 Makes the low equall with the high. (prest,
 VWho knows, where^a faithfull Fabrice tones are
 Where^b Brutus and^c strict Cato rest?
 A slender fame now cause their titles vaine
 In some few letters to remaine,
 Because their famous names in bookes we reade,
 Come wee by them to know the dead:
 You dying thus remembered are by none,
 Nor any fame can make you knowne.
 But if you thinke you live euen after death,
 Your names borne up with mortall breath:
 VWhen length of time takes this away likewise,
 A second death shall you surprize.

^a A Consull
 of Rome,
 who made
 warre with
 Pirrhus
 King of the
 Epirotes,
 by whom
 hee could
 not be cor-
 rupted by
 bribes, and
 to whome
 he sent one
 that offerec
 to kill him.
^b The first

Consull of Rome, who reuenged *Lucrecias* rape. ^c A noble Ro-
 mane, whome nothing could corrupt, *Lucan. Vixit causa diis placuit,*
secl vsq; a Catoni, meaning of *Caesar*, and *Pompey*.

THE VIII. PROSE.

Aduersitie more profitable then prosperitie.



V T least thou shouldest
 thinke, that I am at vnpla-
 cable warre with fortune,
 there

there is a time, when this thy deceitfull Goddesse deserueth somewhat well of men, to wit, when she declareth her selfe, when shee disco-uereth her face, and sheweth her selfe in her owne colours. Perhaps thou vnderstandest not yet, what I say. I would vtter a wonderfull thing, insomuch as I can scarcely explicate my minde in words. For I thinke, that ^a fortune when shee is opposite is more profitable to men, then when shee is favourable. For in prosperitie shee falsely counterfeiteth a shew of happinesse, but in aduersitie ^b shee sheweth her selfe truely vnconstant by changing. In that shee decei- ueth, in this she instructeth, in that shee imprisoneth the mindes of men with falsely seeming goods, which they enioy: In this shee set-
teth

^a The vti-
litie of ad-
uersitie.

^b Fortune is
truely
knowne.

teth them at libertie by discou-
 ing the ^c vncertaintie of them.
 Wherefore in that, thou shalt alway
 see men puffed vp, and wauering,
 and blinded with a selfe conceit of
 themselves: in this thou shalt find
 them ^d sober, setled, and with the
 very exercise of aduersitie, wise. Fi-
 nally, prosperitie with her flatte-
 rings withdraweth men from true
 goodnesse, aduersitie ^e recallesh and
 reclaymeth them many times by
 force, to true happinesse. Doest
 thou esteeme it a small benefite,
 that this rough and harsh fortune
 hath made knowne vnto thee the
 minds of thy faithfull ^f friends?
 Shee hath severed thy assured from
 thy doubtfull friends; prosperitie at
 her departure tooke away with
 her those, which were hers, and
 left thee thine. How dearely woul-
 dest

^c The vncertaintie of worldly things is discovered.

^d Men become sober, setled, wise.

^e They are drawn by force to true happinesse.

^f Faithfull friends are discerned.

H

dest

so man is blitard hat


dest thou haue bought this before thy fall, and when thou seemedst to thy selfe fortunate? Desist from seeking to recouer thy lost riches, since thou hast found friends, the most precious treasure in the world.

THE VIII. VERSE.

Philosophy praiseth true loue and friendship.

THat this faire world in settled course her severall formes should vary,
 That a perpetuall Law should tame the fighting seedes of things,
 That Phæbus should the rising day in his bright chariot carry,
 That Phæbe should governe the nights, which Hesperus forth brings,
 That to the floods of greedy seas are certaine bounds assign'd,
 Which them, least they usurpe too much upon the earth, debarre,
 Loue ruling heav'n, and earth, and seas, them in this course doeth bind,
 And if it once let loose their raines, their friendshippe turnes to warre,
 Tearing the world whose ordred forme their quiet motions beare.
 Byt all holy Lawes are mate, and marriage rites are eie'd,
 By it is faithfull friendshippe som'd. How happy mortalls were,
 If that pure loue did guide their minds, which beav'nly Sphaeres doth guide?

THE



THE
THIRD BOOKE
OF BOETIUS.

In which Philosophy beginneth to apply more forcible remedies, and treateth of true felicitie.

THE I. PROSE.

Philosophy promiseth to explicate true felicitie.



Though shee had ended her verse, yet the sweetnesse of it made mee remaine astoni-

shed, attentiuē, and desirous to heare her longer. Wherefore after a while, I saide. O most effectuall refreshment of wearied minds, how much haue I beene comforted with thy weightie sentences, and pleasing Musicke! Insomuch that I begin to thinke my selfe not vnable to encounter the assaults of fortune. Wherefore I am not now afraid, but rather earnestly desire to know those remedies, which before thou toldest mee were too sharpe. To which shee answered, I perceiued as much, as thou sayest, when I sawe thee hearken to my speeches with so great silence and attention, and I expected this disposition of thy mind, or rather more truely caused it my selfe. For the remedies which remaine are of that sort, that they are bitter to the taste, but being inwardly

wardly receiued waxe sweete. And whereas thou sayest that thou art desirous to heare; how much would this desire encrease, if thou knewest, whether we goe about to bring thee! Whether (quoth I.) To true felicitie (quoth she) which thy mind also dreameth of, but thy sight is so dimmed with phantasies, that thou canst not behold it as it is. Then I beseeched her to explicate without delay, wherein true happinesse consisteth. To which she answered, I will willingly doe So for thy sake, but^a first I will endeavour to declare that, which is better knowne vnto thee, that hauing throughly vnderstood it, by reflecting of the contrary thou maiest discover a glimpse of perfect blessednesse.

^a True happinesse the better discerned, if the contrary be first explicated.

THE I. VERSE.

False felicitie must bee forsaken, that
true happinesse may be embraced.

HE that a fruitful field will sow,
Doth first the ground from bushes free,
All Fearre and Eryers likewise mow,
That he his Harvest great may see.
Home seemes sweeter to our tast,
If cloy'd with noysome foode it bee.
Starres cleaver shine, when Notus blist
Hath ceast the rainie stormes to breede.
When Lucifer hath night defact,
The dayes bright horses then succede.
So thou, whom seeming goods doe feede,
First shake off yokes, which so thee presse.
That trueth may then thy mind possesse.

THE II. PROSE.

How all men desire happinesse, but ma-
ny mistake it.



Then for a while looking
stedfast'y vpon the ground,
and as it were retiring her
selfe to the most secret seate of her
soule,

soule, shee beganne in this maner:

^a All mens thoughts, which are turmoyled with manifold cares, take indeede diuers courses, but yet endeavour to attaine the same end of happinesse, which is that good, which being once obtained, nothing can be further desired. Which is the chiefest of al goods, & containeth in it self, whatsoeuer is good, & if it wanted any thing, it could not be the chiefest, because there would something remaine besides it, which might be wished for. Wherefore it is manifest, that ^b blessednesse is an estate replenished with all that is good. This (as we said) all men endeavour to obtaine by diuers wayes. For there is naturally ingrafted in mens minds an earnest desire of that, which is truely good; but deceitfull error withdraweth

^a All men
seeke for
happinesse.

^b What it
is.

c Riches.

d Honours.

e Power.

f Fame.

g Pleasure.

it to that, which falsely seemeth such. So that some esteeming it their greatest good to want nothing, labour by all meanes to abound with c riches : others making more account of d honours, hunt after preferments, to be respected by their inferiours. Others think it the greatest felicitie, to e have great power and authoritie, and these will either raigne themselves, or at least procure to be great with Princes. But they who thinke f fame better then all these, make all speed possible to spread their names farre and neere, by atchieuing some worthy enterprise either in warre or peace. Many measure happinesse by g ioy and mirth, and their chiefest care is, how they may abound with pleasure. Some subordinate one of these to the other, as riches to
power

power and pleasure, or power to wealth & fame. At these and such other doe mens actions and desires aime, as nobilitie and popularity, which make men esteemed, wife and children, which bring pleasure and delight. For holy friendship is rather to be attributed to vertue, then to fortune. Other things for the most part are desired either for power or pleasure. And it is an easie matter to reduce all corporall goods to the former heades. For strength and greatnesse giue habilitie, beautie and swiftnesse, fame, and health yeeldeth pleasure. By all which wee manife'tly seeke for nothing else but happinesse. For that, which euery man seeketh most after, is by him esteemed his greatest good. Which is all one with happinesse. Wherefore he esteemeth
that

Boetius his

that estate happy, which hee preferreth before al other. And thus thou hast in a maner seene the forme of humane felicitie, riches, honour, power, glorie, pleasure. Which the Epicure onely considering; consequently tooke pleasure for his chiefest good, because all the rest seeme to delight the mind. But I returne to the carefull thoughts of men, whose minds though obscured, yet^h seeke after the greatest good, but like a drunken man, know not the way home. For, seeme they to erre, who endeavour to want nothing? But nothing can cause happinesse so much, as the plentifull possession of all that is good, needing the helpe of none, but is sufficient of it selfe. Or doe they erre, whotake that which is best to bee likewise most worthy of respect?

No.

^h All agree
in chusing
that which
is good.

No. For it is no vile or contemptible thing, which almost all men labour to obtaine. Or is not power to bee esteemed good? Why then, is that to be accounted feeble and of no force, which manifestly surpasseth all other things? Or is fame to be contemned? But these two cannot be seperated, that the most excellent seeme also most famous. For to what purpose should I say, that happinesse is not sadde or melancholy, or subiect to griefe and trouble, when euen in smallest matters we desire that, which wee delight to haue and enioy? And these be the things, which men desire to obtaine, and to this end procure riches, dignities, kingdoms, glory and pleasures, because by them they thinke to haue sufficiencie, respect, power, fame, delight
and

and ioy. Wherefore that is good, which men seeke after by diuers desires, in which the force of nature is easily descried, since though there be many and different opinions, yet they agree in chusing for their end that which is good.

THE II. VERSE.

How nature cannot bee wholly changed.

How the strict raines of all things guided are
 By powerfull nature, as the chiefest cause,
 And how shee keepes with a foreseeing care
 The spacious world in order by her lawes,
 And to sure knots, which nothing can untie,
 By her strong hand all earthly motions drawes:
 To shew all this we purpose now to trie
 Our pleasing Verses, and our Musicke sound.
 Although the Lybian Lyons often lie
 Gentle and tame in willing fetters bound,
 And fearing their incensed masters wrath
 With patient lookes endure each blow and wound:
 Yet if their iawes they once in blood doe bathe,
 They gaining courage with fierce noise awake

The force, which nature in them seated hath,
 And from their neckes the broken chaines doe shake;
 Then he, that tam'd them first doeth feele their rage,
 And torne in pieces doth their furie slake.
 The bird shut up in an displeasing cage,
 Which on the loftie trees did lately sing,
 Though men her want of freedome to asswage,
 Should unto her with carefull labour bring
 The sweetest meates, which they can best deuise:
 Yet when on toppes of houses fluttering
 The pleasing shadowes of the groues shee spies,
 Her hated foode shee scatters with her feete,
 And discontented to the woods shee flies,
 And their delights to tune her accents sweete.
 When some streng hand doth tender plant constraime
 With his debased top the ground to meete,
 If it let goe, the crooked twigge againe
 Vp toward heauen it selfe it streight doth raise.
 Phæbus doeth fall into the Westerne maine,
 Yet doeth he backe returne by secret wayes,
 And to the East doeth guide his chariots race.
 Each thing a certaine course and lawes obeyes,
 Striving to turne backe to his proper place;
 Nor any settled order can be found,
 But that, which doth within it selfe embrace
 The birthes and ends of all things in a round.

THE

THE III. PROSE.

*That true happinesse consisteth not
in riches.*



Ou also (O earthly creatures) thogh slightly & as it were in a dreame acknowledge your beginning, and though not perspicuously yet in some sort behold that true end of happinesse, so that the intention of nature lea-
deth you to the true good, and manifold errour withdraweth you from it. For consider, whether those things, by which men thinke to obtaine happinesse, can bring them to their desired end. For if either money, or honour, or any of the rest be of that qualitie, that they want nothing which is good, we will also confesse, that they are able to make men happy. But if they nei-
ther

ther be able to performe that they promise, and want many things which are good, are they not manifestly discovered to haue a false appearance of happinesse? First then, I aske thee thy selfe, who not long since diddest abound with wealth; In that plenty of riches, was thy minde neuer troubled with any injuries? I cannot remember (quoth I.) that euer my mind was so free from trouble, but that something or other still vexed me. Was it not, because thou either wantedst something, which thou wouldedst haue had, or else haddest something which thou wouldest haue wanted? It is true (quoth I.) Then thou desiredst the presence of that, and the absence of this, I confesse I did (quoth I.) And doth not a man want that (quoth shee) which hee
desi-

^a Riches taketh not away want.

^b Money cannot defend it selfe, and therefore needeth something to defend it.

desireth. He doth (quoth I.) But he that wanteth any thing, is not altogether sufficient of himselfe. He is not (quoth I.) So that thou felt'st this insufficiencie, euen in the height of thy wealth. Why not (quoth I.) Then ^a riches cannot make a man wanting nothing nor sufficient of himselfe, and this was that they seemed to promise. But this is most of all to be considered, ^b that mony hath nothing of it self, which can keepe it from being taken from them, which possesse it, against their will. I grant (quoth I.) why shouldest thou not grant it, since that euery day those, which are more potent, take it from others perforce? For from whence proceede so many complaints in Law, but that mony gotten either by violence, or deceit is sought to be
be

be recouered by that meanes? It is so indeed (quoth I.) So that euery man needeth some other helpe to defend his mony. Who denies that? (quoth I.) But hee should not neede that helpe, vlesse he had mony, which he might loose. There is no doubt of that (quoth I.) Now then the matter is fallen out quite contrary, for riches which are thought to suffice of themselues, rather make men stand in need of other he'pes. And after what maner doe riches expell penury? For are not rich men hungry? are they not thirsty? Or doeth much money make the owners senseles of cold in winter? But thou wilt say, wealthy men haue wherewithal to satisfie their hunger, slake their thirst, and defend themselues from cold. But in this sort, though wants may be somewhat relieued

I by

by wealth, yet it cannot altogether betaken away. For if euer gaping and crauing, it bee satiated by riches, there must needs alway remaine something to be satiated. I omitte, that to nature very little, to couetousnesse nothing is sufficient. Wherefore if riches can neither remoue wants, and cause some themselves, why imagine you, that they can cause sufficiency.

THE III. VERSE.

How riches afflict their possessours in life, and forsake them in death.

*A*lthough the rich man from his mines of gold,
Digge treasure, which his mind can neuer fill,
And losse his necke with precious Pearles enfold
And his fatte fields with many Oxen till:
Yet biting cares will neuer leaue his head,
Nor will his wealth attend him being dead.

THE III. PROSE.

That true happinesse consisteth not
in dignities.



Ut dignities make him honourable and Reuerend, on whome they light. Have offices that force to plant vertues and expell vices in the minds of those who haue them? But they are not wont to banish, but rather^a to vphold wickednesse. So that we many times complaine, because most wicked men obtaine them. Whereupon^b *Catullus* called^c *Nonius* a scabbe or impostume though he fate in his chaire of estate. Seest thou, what great ignominie dignities heape vpon euill men! For their vnworthinesse would lesse appeare, if they were neuer aduanced to any honours. Could so ma-

^a Dignities vphold wickednesse.

^b A famous Poet of Verona.

^c A wicked Romane full of vices, whose surname was *Struma*; as appeareth in *Plin. lib. 37. nat. Hist.*

^d Boetius
refused him

^e Dignities
make not
men re-
spected.

ny dangers euer make thee beare
office with ^d *Decoratus* hauing dis-
couered him to be a very varlet and
spie? For ^e wee cannot for their ho-
nours account them worthy of res-
pect, whome wee iudge vnwor-
thy of the honours themselues.
But if thou seest any man endewed
with wisdom, canst thou esteeme
him vnworthy of that respect or
wisdom, which he hath? No true-
ly. For vertue hath a proper digni-
tie of her owne, which she present-
ly endeweth her possessours with-
all. Which since popular prefer-
ments cannot doe, it is manifest
that they haue not the beauty,
which is proper to true dignitie.
In which wee are farther to consi-
der, that if to be contemned of ma-
ny, make men abiect, whom dig-
nities cannot make respected, they
rather

rather make wicked, by laying their defects and ignominy open to the view of the world. But the dignities goe not scot-free, for^f wicked men do as much for them, defiling them with their infectious diseases. And that thou maist plainely see, that true respect cannot be gotten by these painted dignities, inferre it thus, let^s one, that hath beene often Consul goe among barbarous nations, will that honour make those barbarous people respect him? And yet, if this were naturall to dignities, they would neuer forsake their function in any nation whatsoever; as fire, whersoever it bee, alway remaineth hoate. But because not their owne nature, but the deceitfull opinion of men attributeth that to them, they forthwith come to nothing, being brought to

1 3 them,

^f Wicked men defile dignities.

^s Diuersitie of nations make Dignities contemptible.

^h Their
worth de-
cayes by
change of
times.

them, who esteeme them not to be dignities. And this for forraine nations. But doe they^h alway last among them, where they had their beginning? The Præfect-shippe a great dignitie in time past, is now an idle name, and an heavy burthen of the Senates Censure. If heretofore one had care of the peoples prouision, he was accounted a great man; Now what is more abiect then that office? For as wee saied before, that which hath no proper dignitie belonging vnto it, sometime receiueth, and sometime looseth his value at the vsers discretion. VVherefore if dignities cannot make vs respected, if they be easily defiled with the infection of the wicked, if their worth decays by change of times, if diuersitie of nations make them

con-

contemptible, what beautie haue they in themselves, or can they afford to others worth the desiring?

THE IIII. VERSE.

*How Nero being most wicked, was in
greatest dignitie.*

THough fierce and lustfull Nero did adorne
Himself with purple robes, which gems did grace
He did but gaine a generall hate and scorne:
Yet by his power he Officers most base,
Ouer the Ren'rend Senators did place.
Who would esteeme of fading honours then,
Which may be giu'n thus by the wickedst men?

THE V. PROSE.

Of Kings and their favorites.

BUt can kingdomes and the
familiaritie of kings make
a man mighty? VVhy not,
when their felicity² lasteth alwaies?

² King-
domes fall.

I 4.

But

But both former and present times are full of examples, that many kings haue changed their happinesse with misery. O excellent power, which is not sufficient to vphold it selfe. And if this strength of kingdomes bee the author of blessednesse, doeth it not diminish happinesse and bring misery, when it is any way defectiue? But though ^b some Empires extend themselues farre, there will still remaine many nations out of their dominions. Now, where their power endeth, which maketh them happy, there entereth the contrary, which maketh them miserable, so that all kings must needs haue lesse happinesse then misery. That ^c tyrant knowing by experience the dangers of his estate, signified the ^d feares incident to a kingdome,

^b Kingdomes are limited.

^c *Dyonisius*
king of Sicily.
^d Kingdomes full of feares.

dome, by the hanging of a drawne sword ouer a mans head. VVhat power is this then, which cannot expell nor avoid biting cares and pricking feares? They would willingly haue lined securely, but could not, and yet they brag of their power. Thinkest thou him mighty, whom thou seest desire that, which he cannot doe? Thinkest thou him mighty who dareth not goe without his guard, who feareth others more then they feare him, who cannot seeme mighty, except his seruants please? For what should I speake of kings followers, since I shew, that kingdomes themselues are so full of weakenesse? Whome the power of kings often standing, and many times falling, doth overthrow. *Nero* compelled *Seneca* his familiar friend and Master, to make
choice

Aurelius
 Antonius
 Bassianus,
 Caracalla
 slew Papin-
 ianus a fa-
 mous Law-
 yer, and the
 chiefe man
 in his Court
 to whome
 Severus
 chiefly com-
 mended his
 two sonnes.
 the cause of
 his death,
 was for that
 he would
 not excuse
 the mur-
 ther of *Ge-*
 the Emper-
 ours bro-
 ther, and of
 other No-
 ble men.
 f Kings fa-
 uourites
 cannot with-
 draw them-
 selues, when
 they would.

choice of his owne death. *Anto-*
nius caused *Papinianus*, who had
 beene long a gallant courtier, to be
 cutte in pieces with his souldiers
 sword. And they would both haue
 renounced their power, yea *Seneca*
 endeoured to deliuer vp his riches
 also to *Nero*, and to giue himselve
 to a contemplatiue life. But their
 very greatnesse drawing them to
 their distruction, neither of them
 could compasse that, which they
 desired. Wherefore what power is
 this, that the possessors feare, which
 when thou wilt haue, thou art not
 secure, and when thou^f wilt leaue,
 thou canst not avoid. Are wee the
 better for those friends, which loue
 vs not for our vertue, but for our
 prosperity? But whome prosperitie
 maketh our friend, aduersitie will
 make our enemy. And what plague

is able to hurt vs more, then a familiar enemie?

THE V. VERSE.

True power consisteth in conquering our
owne passions.

W Ho would be powerfull, must
His owne affections checke,
Nor let foule raynes of lust
Subdue his conquer'd necke.
For though the Indian land
Should tremble at thy becke,
And though thy dread command
The farthest parts obey,
Unlesse thou canst withstand.
And boldly drive away
Blacke care and wretched moane
Thy might is small or none.

THE VI. PROSE.

That true happinesse consisteth
not in glorie.



S for^a glory, how deceit-
full is it oftentimes, and
dishonest? For which
cause

^a glory of-
ten false,

*O gloria,
gloria, in fi-
nibus san-
ctorum
nullius in
vitam suam
fecisti mag-
nam.*

^b The vanti-
tie of true
glorie.

^c The smal-
nesse of it.

cause the Tragicall Poet deseruedly
exclameth: ὡ δόξα δόξα μύριοισι δὴ βροτῶν εἶλε,
γεγῶσι βίοντων ἄγνωσῶς μέγαν for many haue
bin much spoken of by the false opi-
nions of the common people. Then
which what can bee imagined
more vile? For those who are falsely
commended must needes blush at
their owne praises. Which though
they be gotten ^b by deserts, yet what
adde they to a wise mans consci-
ence; who measureth his owne
good, not by popular rumours, but
by his owne certaine knowledge.
And if it seemeth a faire thing to
haue dilated our fame, consequent-
ly wee must iudge it a foule thing
not to haue it extended. But since
as I shewed a litle before, there must
needes be many ^c nations, to which
the fame of one man cannot arriue,
it commeth to passe, that he, whom
thou

thou esteemest glorious, in the next Countrey seemeth to haue no glory at all. And here now I thinke^d popular glory not worth the speaking of, which neither proceedeth from iudgment, noreuer hath any firmesse. Likewise, who seeth not, what a vaine and idle thing it is to be called noble? Which, for as much as belongeth to fame, is not our owne For^e Nobilitie seemeth to be a certaine praise proceeding from our parents deserts. And if praising causeth fame, they must necessarily be famous, who are praised. Wherefore the fame of others, if thou hast none of thine own, maketh not thee renowned. And if there bee any thing good in nobility, I iudge it onely to be this, that it imposeth a necessitie vpon those, which are Noble, not to degenerate from the vertue of their ancestors.

THE

^d Popular
glorie.

^e Nobilitie.

THE VI. VERSE.

How all, but wicked men, are noble.

THe gen'r all race of men from alike birth is borne,
All things one father hase, who doeth them all adorne,
Who gaue the Sunne his rayes, and the pale Moone her horne
The loftie heauen for Starres, low earth for mortals chose;
He soules^a fetcli's downe from high in bodies did enclose;
And thus from noble birth all men did first compe.
Why bragge you of your stocke? since none is counted base,
If you consider God the authour of your race,
But he, that with foule Vice doeth his owne birth deface.

^a Here Boetius spea-
keth according to the
opinion of
Platonists,
who thought, that the soules were created in heauen, but the truth is
that they are created in the bodies, so soone as they are ready for life.

THE VII. PROSE.

*That true happinesse consisteth not
in pleasure.*



NO W what should I speake
of bodily pleasure, the de-
fire of which is full of anxi-
etic, & the enioying of them breeds
repentance? How many diseases,
how intollerable griefes bring they
forth in the bodies of their posses-
sors,

fors, as it were the fruites of their wickednesse? I know not what sweetnesse their motions haue, but whosoeuer will remember his lusts, shall vnderstand, that the end of pleasure is sadnesse. Which if it be able to cause happinesse, there is no reason, why beasts should not be thought blessed, whose whole intention is bent to supply their corporall wants. That pleasure, which proceedeth from wife and children is most honest; but it was too naturally spoken, that (I knowe not whome) found his children his tormentors, whose condicion, whatsoeuer it be, how biting it is, I neede not tell thee, who hast had experience heeretofore, and art not now free from care. In which I approue the opinion of *Euripides*, who said that they, which haue no children

children, are happy by being vnfortunate.

THE VII. VERSE.

That there is no pleasure without paine.

All pleasure hath this property,
 Shee woundeth those, who haue her most;
 And like vnto the angrie Bee,
 Who hath her pleasant honie lost.
 Shee flies away with nimble wing;
 And in our hearts doeth leaue her sting.

THE VIII. PROSE.

How all temporal goods are mixed with euill, and are small in themselues.

Wherefore there is no doubt, but that these waies to happinesse, are onely certaine by-pathes, which can neuer bring any man thether, whether they promise to leade him. And
 with

how great evils they are besette,
 I will briefly shew. For what?
 wilt thou endeavour to gather^a mo-
 ney? but thou shalt take it away
 from him, who hath it. Wilt thou
 excell in^b dignities? Thou shalt
 crouche to the giuer, and thou,
 who desirest to surpasse others in
 honour, shalt become vile by thy
 basenesse in begging. Wilt thou
 for^c power? Thou shalt be in dan-
 ger of thy subiects treacheries. See-
 kest thou for^d glory? But drawne
 into many difficulties, thou shalt
 loose thy safety. Wilt thou liue a
^e voluptuous life? But who would
 not dispise and neglect the seruice
 of so vile and base a thing, as his
 body? Now they, who boast of
 the^f habilities of their body, vpon
 how vnstedfast a possession doe
 they ground themselves? For can

^a Money.

^b Dignities.

^c Power.

^d Glory.

^e Pleasure.

^f Habilli-
 ties of the
 body.

K

you

you bee bigger then Elephants, or stronger then Bulls? Or swifter then Tygers? looke vpon the space, firmesse and speedy motion of the heauens, and cease at length to haue in admiration these base things. Which heauens are not more to be admired for these quallities, then for the maner of their gouernement. As for the glittering of^g beautie, how soone and swiftly doeth it vanish away? As suddenly decaying and changing as the traile flowers in the Spring. And if, as *Aristotle* sayeth, men had^h *Lynxes* eyes, that they could see through stone walles, would they not iudge that body ofⁱ *Alcibiades* seeming outwardly most faire, to be most foule and vgly by discovering his entrailes? VVherefore not thy nature, but the weaknesse of the beholders eyes

^g Beautie.

^h The beast Lynx hath the quickest sight of any beast. *Plin. lib 32. Hist. nat. cap. 8.*

There was also a man caled *Lyncus*, who did see through walles &c.

Apollonius in Argonauticis, &c.

ⁱ A noble Captaine of Athens.

eyes maketh thee seeme faire. But esteeme the goods of the body as much as you will, so that you acknowledge this, that whatsoever you admire, may be dissolued with the burning of an Ague of three dayes. Out of all which, wee may briefly collect this summe; that these goods, which can neither performe that they promise, nor are perfect by hauing all that is good, doe neyther, as so many pathes, leade men to happinesse, nor make men happy of themselves.

THE VIII. VERSE.

How men are wise in seeking for things of little value, and foolish in finding out their soueraigne good.

A *Las, how ignorance makes wretches stray out of the way!*

Boetius his

You from greene trees expect no golden mines,
nor pearles from vines.

Nor use you on mountaines to lay your net,
fishes to get.

Nor, if the pleasant sport of hunting please,
runne you to seas.

Men will be skilfull in the hidden caues
of th' Ocean waues.

And in what coasts the orient pearles are bred,
or purple red.

Also, what different sorts of fishes store
ech seuerall shore.

But when they come their chiefest good to find,
then are they blind.

And search for that under the earth, which lies
aboue the skies.

How should I curse these fooles? Let thirst them hold
of fame and gold,

That hauing got false goods with payne, they learne
True to discern.

THE IX. PROSE.

Why true felicitie cannot consist in tem-
porall things.



Et it suffice, that wee haue
hetherto discovered the
forme of false felicitie,
which

which if thou hast plainely seene, order now requireth, that we shew thee, in what true happinesse consisteth. I see (quoth I) that neither sufficiency by riches, nor power by kingdomes, nor respect by dignities, nor renowme by glory, nor ioy can be gotten by pleasures. Hast thou also vnderstood the causes, why it is so? Me thinke I haue a little glimpse of them, but I had rather thou wouldest declare them more plainely. The reason is manifest, for that, which is simple and vndeuided of it selfe, is deuided by mens error, and is translated from true and perfect to false and vnperfect. Thinkest thou, that, which needeth nothing, to stand in need of power. No (quoth I.) Thou sayest well, for if any power in any respect bee weake, in this it must necessarily

K 3 stand

stand in need of the helpe of others. It is true (quoth I.) Wherefore sufficiencie and power haue one and the same nature. So it seemeth. Now thinkest thou, that, which is of this sort ought to bee despised, or rather that it is worthy to be respected aboue all other things? There can bee no doubt of this (quoth I.) Let vs adde respect then to sufficiencie and power, so that wee iudge these three to bee one. We must adde it, if we will confesse the truth. What now (quoth she) thinkest thou this to be obscure and base, or rather most excellent and famous? Consider whether, that, which thou hast granted to want nothing, to bee most potent, and most worthy of Honour, may seeme to want fame, which it cannot yeeld it selfe, and for that cause be

be in some respect more abiect. I must needs confesse (quoth I.) That it is also most famous. Consequently then wee must acknowledge, that same differeth nothing from the former three. VVe must so (quoth I.) VVherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can performe al things by his owne power, which is famous and respected, is it not manifest that it is also most pleasant? To which I answered, how such a man should fall into any grieffe, I can by no meanes imagine. Wherefore if that, which wee haue said hitherto be true, wee must needs confesse, that he is most ioyfull and content. And by the same reason it followeth that^a sufficiencie, power, fame, respect, pleasure haue indeede diuers names, but differ not in substance. It follow-

^a Sufficiencie, power, fame, respect and pleasure are all but one and the same thing

b He that
diuideth
them, hath
none of
them.

eth indeed (quoth I.) This then, which is one and simple by nature, mans wickednesse deuideth, and while he endeuoureth to obtaine part of that, which hath no partes, he neither^b getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole, which he seeketh not after. How is this? (quoth I.) Hee who seeketh after riches (quoth she) to avoid want, taketh no thought for power, hee had rather be base and obscure, hee depriveth himselfe euen of many naturall pleasures, that he may not loose the money, which he hath gotten. But by this meanes he attaineth not to sufficiencie, whom power forsaketh, whom trouble molesteth, whom basenesse maketh abiect, whom obscuritie ouerwhelmeth. Againe, he that onely desireth power, consumeth wealth, des-
p seth

piseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and being not able to ridde himselfe, ceaseth to be powerfull, which was the thing he onely ay-med at. The like discourse may be made of honours, glory, pleasures. For since euery one of these things is the same with the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest, obtaineth not that, which hee desireth. V What then? (quoth I) If one should desire to haue them altogether, he should wish for the summe of happinesse, but shall hee find it in these things, which wee haue shewed cannot performe what they promise? No (quoth I) where-

wherefore we must by no meanes
seeke for happinesse in these things,
which are thought to afford the se-
uerall portions of that, which is to
be desired. I confesse it (quoth I)
and nothing can be more true then
this. Now then (quoth she) thou
hast both the forme and causes of
false felicitie, cast but the eyes of thy
minde on the contrary, and thou
shalt presently espie the true happi-
nesse, which we promised to shew
thee. This (quoth I) is euident, e-
uen to him that is blind, and thou
shewedst it a little before, while
thou endeuouredst to lay open the
causes of the false. For, if I bee not
deceiued, ^c that is true and perfect
happinesse, which maketh a man
sufficient, potent, respected, famous,
ioyfull. And that thou maist know
that I vnderstood thee aright, that
which

^c Wherein
true happi-
nesse con-
sisteth.

which can truely performe any one of these because they are all one, I acknowledge without all doubt to be full and perfect happinesse. O my scholler, I thinke thee happy by hauing this opinion, if thou addest this also. What? (quoth I.) Doest thou imagine that there is^d any mortall or fraile thing, which can cause this happy estate? I doe not (quoth I) and that hath beene so proued by thee, that more cannot be desired. Wherefore these things; seeme to afford men the images of the true good, or certaine vnperfect goods, but they cannot giue them the true and perfect good it selfe. I am of the same mind (quoth I.) Now then since thou knowest, wherein true happinesse consisteth, and what haue onely a false shew of it, it remaineth

^d No mortall thing can cause true happinesse.

neth that thou shouldest learne, where thou maiest seeke for this which is true. This is that (quoth I) which I haue long earnestly expected. But since as *Plato* teacheth (in *Timæo*) we must implore Gods assistance euen in our least affaires, what thinkest thou, must wee doe now, that we may deserue to find the seat of that Soueraigne good? we must (quoth I) inuocate the father of all things, without whose remembrance no beginning hath a good foundation. Thou sayest rightly (quoth shee) and withall sung in this sort.

THE IX. VERSE.

Phylosophy craueth Gods assistance for the discouery of true happinesse.

O Thou, that doest the world in lasting order guide,
Father of heaue'n & earth, who mak'st time swiftly
And standing stil thyselfe, yet fram'st all moving laws. (*slide,*
Who to thy worke wert mou'd by no externall cause:

But by a sweete desire, where enuie hath no place,
 Thy goodnesse mouing thee to giue each thing his grace.
 Thou doest all creatures formes from highest patterne take,
 From thy faire mind, the world faire like thy selfe dost make.
 Thus thou perfect the whole, perfect each art dost frame,
 Thou temp'rest elements, making cold mixe with flame,
 And drie thing stoyne with moyst, leaſt fire away should flie,
 Or earth opprest with weight, buried too low should lie.
 Thou in ^a consenting parts fitly disposed hast
 Th' all mouing ^b soule in ^c midst of threefold nature plac't,
 Which ^d cut in seuerall parts, that runne a diff'rent race,
 Into it ^e selfe returnes, and circling doth embrace
 The ^f highest mind, & heau'n with ^g like proportion driues.
 Thou also with like cause ^h doest make the soules, & ⁱ lesser
 And ^k those in ^l charyots beare, and fitly them inspire (Iuses
 Into the heauen and earth, which with returning ^m fire
 Goe backe againe to thee their aouthour and their end.
 Deare Father let my mind thy glorious seat ascend,
 Let me behold the spring of grace and find thy light,
 That I on thee may fixe my soules well cleared sight
 Cast off the earthly weight, wherewith I am opprest,
 Shine as thou art most bright, thou onely calme and rest
 To pious men, whose end is to behold thy ray,
 Who their beginning are, their guide, their bound, and way.
 appointment. ^h Of men. ⁱ Of beasts, &c. ^k The soules of men.
^l In starres according to the Platonists. ^m Of loue and charity.

^a The diffe-
 rent orbes
 of heauen.
^b The An-
 gell, which
 moueth the
 heauen.
^c Betwixt
 God, and
 men.
^d Diuided
 into diffe-
 rent moti-
 ons of di-
 uers hea-
 uens.
^e Knowing
 himselfe.
^f And like-
 wise God.
^g Mouing
 the heauen
 according
 to Gods ap-

THE X. PROSE.

That there is some true happinesse, and
 where it is to be found.



Herefore since thou hast
 seene what is the forme of
 perfect & vnperfect good,
 now

now I think we must shew in what this perfection of happinesse is placed. And enquire first, whether there can bee any such good, extant in the world, as thou hast defined, least contrary to the truth, wee bee deceiued with an empty shew of knowledge. But it cannot bee denied, that there is some such thing, which is as it were the fountaine of all goodnesse. For all, that is said to be imperfect, is so tearmed for the want, it hath of perfection. Whence it followeth, that if in any kind we find something vnperfect, there must needs be something perfect also in the same kind. For if we take away perfection we cannot deuise, how there should be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that which is defectiue and not compleate, but

pro-

proceeding from entire & absolute, falleth into that which is extreame and consumed. And if, as wee shewed before, there bee a certaine imperfect felicitie, of fraile goods, it cannot bee doubted, but that there is some solide and perfect happinesse also. Thou hast (quoth I) concluded most firmly and most truely. Now where this good dwelleth (quoth shee) consider this. The common conceit of mens minds proueth, that God the Prince of all things is good. For since nothing can be imagined better then God, who doubteth but that is good, then which is nothing better? And reason doeth in such sort demonstrate God to bee good, that it conuinceth him to bee ^a perfectly good. For vnlesse hee were so, hee could not bee the chiefe
of

^a God is perfectly good.

of all things. For there would be something better then hee, hauing perfect goodnesse, which could seeme to be more auncient and of longer continuance then he. For it is already manifest, that perfect things were before the imperfect. Wherefore, least our reason should haue no end, we must confesse, that the Soueraigne God is most full of Soueraigne and perfect goodnesse. But we haue concluded, that perfect goodnesse is true happinesse, wherefore^b true happinesse must necessarily be placed in the most high god. I agree (quoth I) neither can this be any way contradicted.

^b True happinesse placed in God.

But I pray thee (quoth shee) see how holily and inuiolably thou approuest that, which we said, that the soueraigne God is most full of soueraigne goodnesse. How? (quoth

(quoth I.) That thou presumest not, that this Father of all things, hath eyther ^c receyued from others, that soueraigne good, with which he is said to be replenished, or hath it naturally in such sort, that thou shouldest thinke, that the substance of the blessednesse, which is had, and of God who hath it, Were diuers. For if thou thinkest, that hee had it from others, thou mayest also inferre, that hee who gaue it, was better then the receiuer. But wee most worthily confesse, that hee is the most excellent of all things. And if he hath it by nature, but as a diuerse ^d thing, since wee speake of God the Prince of all things, let him that can, inuent, who vnited these diuerse things. Finally, that which is different from any thing, is not that, from which it is

L

vn-

^c God hath not receiued his goodnesse from any other.

^d Gods goodnesse is himself.

vnderstood to differ. VVherefore that, which is naturally different from the Soueraigne good, is not the Soueraigne good it selfe. VVhich it were impious to thinke of God, then whom, we know certainly, nothing is better. For doubtlesse, the nature of nothing can be better, then the beginning of it. VVherefore I may most truely conclude, that, which is the beginning of all things, to bee also in his owne substance, the chiefest good. Most rightly: (quoth I.) But it is granted, that the chiefest good is happinesse. It is, (quoth I,) VVherefore (quoth she) we must needs confesse, that our happinesse it selfe is God. I can neither contradict, (quoth I) thy former propositions, and I see this illation followeth from them. Consider (sayeth she)

if

if the same be not more firmly pro-
 ued hence, because there^e cannot be
 two chiefe goods the one different
 from the other. For it is manifest
 that of those goods, which differ,
 the one is not the other, wherefore
 neither of them can bee perfect,
 wanting the other. But manifestly
 that which is not perfect, is not the
 chiefest, wherefore the chiefe goodes
 cannot bee diuers. Now wee haue
 proued that both blessednesse and
 God are the chiefest good, wherefore
 that must needs be the highest hap-
 pineffe, which is the highest Diuini-
 tie. There can be nothing (quoth
 I) concluded, more truely in the
 thing it selfe, nor more firmly in
 arguing, nor more worthy God
 himselfe. Vpon this then (quoth
 she) as the *Geometricians* are wont,
 out of their propositions, which

^e There
 cannot bee
 two soue-
 raigne
 goods.

they haue demonstrated to inferre something, which they call *πορισματα* so will I giue thee as it were a *Corollarium*. For since that men are made blessed by the obtaining of blessednesse, and blessednesse is nothing else but Diuinitie, it is manifest that men are made happy by the obtaining of Diuinity. And as men are made iust by the obtaining of iustice, and wise by the obtaining of wisdom, so they who obtaine Diuinitie, must needs in like maner become Gods. Wherefore euery one that is happy is a God, but by nature there is onely one God, but there may bee many by^f participation. This is (quoth I) an excellent and pretious *πορισμα* or *Corollarium*. But there is nothing more excellent then that, which reason perswaded vs to adde. What (quoth I) since (quoth

f Men become Gods by participation.

(quoth shee) blessednesse seemeth to containe many things, whether they all concurre as diuers partes to the composition of one entire body of happinesse, or some one of them doeth accomplish the substance of blessednesse, to which the rest are to be referred. I desire (quoth I) that thou wouldest declare this point, by the enumeration of the particulars. Doe we not thinke (quoth shee) that happinesse is good? yea the chiefest good, (quoth I.) Thou maiest (quoth shee) adde this to them all. For happinesse is accounted the chiefest sufficiencie, the chiefest power, respect, fame, and pleasure. What then? are all these, sufficiencie, power and the rest as it were certaine members of blessednesse, or rather are they referred to good as to the head? I vnderstand (quoth I)

what thou propolest, but I desire to heare what thou concludest. This is the decision of this matter. If all these were members of blessednesse, they should differ one from another. For this is the nature of parts, that being diuers they compose one body. But wee haue proued, that all these are one, and the same thing. Wherefore they are no members, otherwise happinesse should be compacted of one member, which cannot bee. There is no doubt of this (quoth I) but I expect that which is behind. It is manifest that the rest are referred to goodnesse; for sufficiency is desired, because it is esteemed good, and likewise power, because that likewise is thought to be good; And we may coniecture the same of respect, fame and pleasure. Wherefore ^g goodnesse is the summe and cause

^g Goodnesse
is the sum
and cause
of all that is
desired.

cause of all that is desired. For that which is neither good indeed, nor beareth any shew of goodnesse, can by no meanes be sought after. And contrariwise those things, which are not good of their owne nature, yet if they seeme such, are desired as if they were truly good. So that the summe, origen, and cause of all that is sought after, is rightly thought to be goodnesse. And that seemeth chiefly to be wished for, which is the cause, that other things are desired. As if one would ride for his health, he doth not so much desire the motion of riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore since all things are desired in respect of goodnesse, they are not so much wished for, as goodnesse it selfe. But we graunted that to be happinesse, for which other things are desired, wherefore in

^hgoodnesse
and happi-
nesse al one

ⁱThe sub-
stance of
God consisteth
in
goodnesse.

like manner onely blessednesse is sought after. by which it plainly appeareth, that ^hgoodnesse and happinesse haue one and the selfe-same substance. I see not how any man can dissent. But wee haue shewed that God and true blessednesse are one and the selfe-same thing. It is so (quoth I) we may then securely conclude, that the ⁱsubstance of God consisteth in nothing else, but in goodnesse.

THE X. VERSE.

Phylosophy exhorteth men to embrace true happinesse.

Come hither all you, that are bound,
Whose base and earthly minds are drown'd
By lust, which doeth them tye in cruell chaynes:
Here is a scat for men oppress'd,
Here is a port of pleasant rest;
Here may a wretch haue refuge from his paynes.
No gold, which ^aTagus sands bestow,

^aA riuer in
Portugal or
Spaine.

Nor

*Nor which on^b Hermus bankes doth flow,
 Nor precious stones, which scorched Indians get,
 Can cleare the sharpenesse of the mind,
 But rather make it farre more blind.
 And it in farther depth of darkenesse set.
 For this that sets our soules on worke
 Buried in caues of earth doth lurke.
 But heaⁿ is guided by another light,
 Which causeth vs to shuane the dark,
 And who this light doth truely marke,
 Must needs deny, that Phœbus beames are bright.*

^b A riuer in Lydia.

THE XI. PROSE.

That goodnesse is the end of all things.



Consent (quoth I) for all
 is grounded vpon most
 firme reasons. But what
 account wilt thou make
 (quoth she) to know what good-
 nesse it selfe is. I will esteeme it in-
 finitely, (quoth I) because by this
 meanes I shall come to know God
 also, who is nothing else but good-
 nesse. I will conclude this (quoth
 shee)

Boetius his

ſhee) moſt certainly , if thoſe things be not denied , which I haue already proued . They ſhall not (quoth I .) Haue wee not proued (quoth ſhee) that thoſe things , which are deſired of many , are not true and perfect goods , becauſe they differ one from another , and being ſeparated , cannot cauſe complete , and abſolute goodneſſe , which is only found , when they are vnited as it were into one forme and cauſality , that the ſame may be ſufficiencie , power , reſpect , fame , and pleaſure ? And except they be all one and the ſame thing , that they haue nothing worth the deſiring ? It hath bin proued (quoth I) neyther can it be any way doubted of . Thoſe things then , which when they differ , are not good , and when they are one , become good , are they
not

not made good by obtayning vnity? some thinke (quoth I.) But doest thou grant that all , that is good, is good by pertaking goodnesse? It is so. Thou mayest graunt then likewise , that ^a vnitie and goodnesse are the same. For those things haue the same substance, which naturally haue not diuers effects. I cannot denie it, (quoth I.) Knowest thou then (quoth shee) that ^b euery thing that is, doth so long remaine and subsist , as it is one, and perisheth and is dissolued, so soone as it ceaseth to bee one. How ? As in liuing creatures, (quoth shee) so long as the body and the soule remaine vnited , the liuing creature remaineth. But when this vnity is dissolued by their seperation, it is manifest that it perisheth, and is no longer a liuing creature. The
body

^a Vnity and goodnesse the same.

^b Euery thing continueth onely so long, as it is one.

body also it selfe, so long as it remaineth in one forme by the coniunction of the parts there appeareth the likenesse of a man. But if the members of the body being seperated and sundred, haue lost their vnitie, it is no longer the same. And in like maner it will bee manifest to him that will descend to other particulars, that euery thing continueth so long as it is one, and perisheth when it looseth vnitie. Considering more particulars, I find it to bee no otherwise. Is there^c any thing (quoth she) that in the course of nature, leauing the desire of being, seeketh to come to destruction & corruption? If (quoth I) I consider liuing creatures, which haue any nature to will and to nill, I find nothing, that without externe compulsion, forsake the intētion to remain, and

^c All things
desire to be.

and of their owne accord hasten to destruction. For euery liuing creature laboureth to preserue his health, and escheweth death and detriment. But what I should thinke of hearbs, and trees, and of all things without life, I am altogether doubtfull. But there is no cause why thou shouldest doubt of this, if thou considerest first, that hearbs and trees grow in places agreeable to their nature, where so much as their constitution permitteth, they cannot soone wither and perish. For some grow in fields, other vppon hils, some in fennie, other in stonie places, and the barren sands are fertile for some, which if thou wouldest transplant into other places, they dye. But nature giueth euery one that which is fitting, and striueth to keepe them
from

from decaying so long as they can remaine. What should I tell thee, if all of them, as it were thrusting their head into the ground, draw nourishment by their rootes, and convey substance and barke by the inward pith? VVhat, that alway the softest, as the pith is placed within, and is couered with more firme wood, and last of all the bark is exposed to the weather, as being best able to beare it off: And how great is the diligence of nature, that all things may continue by the multiplication of seede; all which who knoweth not to bee, as it were certaine engines, not onely to remaine for a time, but successiue in a manner to endure for ever. Those things also which are without all life, doth not euery one inlike maner desire that, which appertaineth to their
owne

owne good? For why doth leuitie lift vp flames, or heauinesse weigh downe the earth, but because these places and motions are conuenient for them? And that which is agreeable to euery thing, conserueth it, as that which is opposite, causeth corruption. Likewise those things which are hard, as stones, sticke most firmly to their parts, & make great resistance to any dissolution. And liquid things, as ayer and water, are indeed easily deuided, but doe easily also ioyne againe. And fire flyeth all deuision. Neither doe we now treat of the voluntary motions of the vnderstanding soule, but onely of naturall operations. Of which sort is, to digest that, which wee haue eaten, without thinking of it, to breath in our sleepe not thinking what wee doe.

For

For euen in liuing creatures the loue of life proceedeth not from the wil of the soule, but from the principles of nature. For the will many times embraceth death vpon vrgent occasions, which nature abhorreth; and contrariwise the act of generation, by which alone the continuance of mortal things is maintained, is sometimes bridled by the will, though nature doth alway desire it. So true it is, that this selfe-loue proceedeth not from any voluntary motion, but from naturall intention. For prouidence gaue to her creatures this as the greatest cause of continuance, that they naturally desire to continue so long as they may, wherefore there is no caule, why thou shouldest any way doubt, that al things, which are, desire naturally stabilitie of remaining, and
eschue

eschue corruption. I confesse (quoth I) that I now see vndoubtedly that, which before seemed very doubtfull. Now that (quoth she) which desireth to continue and remaine, seeketh to haue vnity. For if this be taken away, being it selfe cannot remaine. It is^d true (quoth I.) All things then (quoth she) desire vnitie. I granted it to be so. But wee haue shewed that vnity is the same that goodnesse. You haue indeede. All^e things then desire goodnesse, which thou mayest define thus: That goodnesse is that, which is desired of all things. There can be nothing imagined more true. For either all things haue reference to nothing, and being destitute as it were of one head, shall be in confusio without any ruler: or if there be any thing, to which al things haue,

M that

^d All things
desire vnity.

^e All things
desire goodnesse.

that must bee the chiefeft of all goods. I reioyce too much O scholler (quoth shee) for thou hast fixed in thy mind the very marke of veritie. But in this thou hast discovered that, which a little before thou faideft, thou wert ignorant of. What is that? (quoth I.) What the end of all things is (quoth she.) For certainly it is that, which is desired of all things, which since we haue concluded to bee goodnesse, wee must also confesse that ^f goodnesse is the end of all things.

^f Goodnes
is the end
of al thing.

THE XI. VERSE.

*How we may attaine to the know-
ledge of truth.*

HE that would seeke the truth with thoughts profound,
And would not stray in wases which are not right,
He to himselfe must turne his inward sight,
And guid his motions in a circled round,
Teaching his mind, what euer she disigne,

*Her selfe in her owne treasures to possesse :
 So that which late lay hidde in cloudinesse,
 More bright and cleere then Phoebus beames shall shine.
 Flesh bath not quenched all the spirits light,
 Though this obliuious lump holds her opprest,
 Some seede of truth remaiaeth in our brest,
 Which skillfull learning easly doth excite.
 For being askt, how can we answer true
 Vnlesse that grace within our hearts did dwell?
 If Platoes heau'nly muse the truth vs tell,
 We learning things, remember them anew.*

THE XII. PROSE.

How the world is governed by God.



Then I said, that I did verie
 wel like of Platoes doctin,
 for she had brought these
 things to my remembrance now
 the second time. First, because I lost
 their memorie by the contagion of
 my bodie, and after when I was op-
 pressed with the burthen of grieft.
 If (quoth she) thou reflectest vpon
 that, which heretofore hath bene
 granted, thou wilt not be farre of
 from remembering that, which in

a This was
 Platoes o-
 pinien, but
 the truth is,
 that know-
 ledge is got-
 ten by in-
 uention, &
 instruction
 supposing
 that one
 hath the
 light of vn-
 derstanding
 which is ca-
 pable of the

the beginning thou confessedst thy selfe to bee ignorant of. VVhat? (quoth I.) By what gouernment (quoth she) the world is ruled. I remember (quoth I) that I did confesse my ignorance, but though I foresee what thou wilt say, yet I desire to heare it more plainly from thy selfe. Thou thoughtest a little before, that it was not to be doubted, that the ^a world is gouerned by God; neither doe I thinke now (quoth I) neither wil I euer thinke, that is to be doubted of, and I will briefly explicate the reasons, which moue me to thinke so. This world could neuer haue bene compacted of so many diuers and contrarie parts, vnlesse there were one, that doth vnite these so differēt things; and this disagreeing diuersity of natures being vnited, would separate
and

^aThe world
is gouerned
by God.

and diuide this concord, vnlesse there were one that holdeth together that, which he vnited. Neither would the course of nature continue so certaine, nor hold so well ordered motions in due places, times, causalitie, spaces and qualities, vnlesse there were one, who himselte remaining quiet, disposeth and ordereth this varietie of motions. This, whatsoeuer it bee, by which things created continue and are moued, I cal God, a name which all men vse. Since (quoth shee) thou art of this mind, I thinke with little labour, thou mayest be capable of felicity, and returne to thy countrey in safetie. But let vs consider, what we proposed. Haue we not placed sufficiency in happines, and granted, that God is blessednes it selte? Yes truely. VVherefore

^b God disposeth all things by himselfe, that is by goodnesse.

(quoth shee) hee needeth no outward helps to gouerne the world, otherwise, if he needeth any thing, he hath not full sufficiency. That (quoth I) must necessarily bee so. V Wherefore ^b he disposeth all things by himselfe. No doubt hee doeth (quoth I.) But it hath beene proued that God is goodnesse it selfe. I remember it very well (quoth I.) Then hee disposeth all things by goodnesse: since he gouerneth all things by himselfe, whom we haue granted to be goodnesse.

And this is as it were the stearne and gouernement, by which the frame of the world is kept stedfast and vncorrupted. I most willingly agree (quoth I) and I foresaw a little before, though onely with a slender guesse, that thou wouldest conclude this. I beleue thee (quoth shee) for

now

now I suppose thou lookest more watchfully about thee to discern the truth, but that which I wil say is no lesse manifest. What? (quoth I.) Since that God is deservedly thought to governe al things with the stearne of goodnesse, and all these things likewise, as I haue shewed, hasten to goodnesse with their naturall intention, can there be any doubt made, but that they are governed ^cwillingly, and that they frame themselues of their owne accord to their disposers becke, as agreeable and conformable to their ruler? It must needs bee so (quoth I) neither would it seeme an happy gouernement, if it were an imposed yoake, not a desired health. There is ^d nothing then which following nature, endeuoureth to resist God. Nothing (quoth I.) VVhat if any thing

M 4 doeth

^c All things are willingly governed by God.

^d Nothing either will or can resist God.

doeth endeuour (quoth she) can any thing preuaile against him, whom we haue granted to be most powerfull by reason of his blessednesse? No doubt (quoth I) nothing could preuaile. Wherefore there is nothing, which either will or can resist this foueraigne goodnesse. I thinke not (quoth I.) It is then the foueraigne goodnesse, which gouerneth all things strongly, and disposeth them sweetly. When (quoth I) how much (quoth I) doeth not onely the reason, which thou alleadgest, but much more the very words, which thou vstest, delight mee, that folly which bauleth forth great things, may at length bee ashamed of her selfe. Thou hast heard in the^e Poets Fables how the Gyants prouoked heauen, but this benigne fortitude put the also down, as they de-

*e. Ouid Lib.
2. Metamor.
& Macrob.
Lib. 1. Saturnal.*

deserued. But wilt thou haue me
vrge farther by way of disputati-
on? perhaps by this arguing there
will flie out some beautifull sparke
of truth. As it pleaseeh thee (quoth
I.) No man can doubt (quoth shee)
but that God is Almighty. No man
(quoth I) that is well in his wittes.
But (quoth shee) there is nothing,
that he, who is Almighty, cannot
doe. Nothing (quoth I.) Can
God do euil? No (quoth I.) Wher-
fore (quoth shee) ^f Euill is no-
thing, since hee cannot doe it, who
can doe any thing. Doest thou
mocke mee (quoth I) making
with thy reasons an inextricable
labyrinth, that now thou maist go
in where thou meanest to goe out
again, and after goe out, where
thou camest in, or doest thou
frame a wonderful circle of the sim-
plicity

^f Euil is no-
thing.

plicity of God ? For a little before taking thy beginning from blessednesse, thou affirmedst that to be the chiefest good, which thou saydest was placed in God, and likewise thou prouedst, that God himselfe is the chiefest good, and full happines, out of which thou madest mee a present of that inference, that no man shall be happy, vnlesse hee bee also a God. Againe thou toldest me, that the forme of goodnes is the substance of God and of blessednes, and that vnity is the same with goodnes, because it is desired by the nature of all things, thou didst also dispute, that God gouerneth the whole world with the reynes of goodnes, and that all things obey willingly, and that there is no nature of euill, and thou didst explicate all these things with no forreine

reine or farre fetched proofes, but with those which were proper and drawn from inward principles, the one confirming the other; We neither play nor mock (quoth she) and wee haue finished the greatest matter, that can be by the assistance of God, whose aide we implored in the beginning. For such is the forme of the diuine substance, that it neither is diuided into outward things, nor receiueth any such into it self, but as *Parmenides* saith of it:

πάντοθεν ἐν κύκλοις εἶρεν ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκου.
 And if wee haue vsed no farre fetched reasons, but such as were placed within the compasse of the matter we handled, thou hast no cause to marueile, since thou hast learned in *Platoes* schoole, that our^s speeches must be like, and as it were a kinne to the things we speake of.

*Vndique in
 circulis ductis
 sensiem a-
 ceruum.*

§ Our spee-
 ches must
 be like the
 things we
 speake of.

T H E

THE XII. VERSE.

Philosophy exhorteth to perseuerance
in contemplation and vertue.

HAppy is he that can behold
The wel-spring, whence all good doth rise,
Happy is he, that can unfold
The bands, with which the earth him ties.
The ^a Thracian Poet, whose sweete song
Perform'd his wines sad obsequyes,
And forc't the woods to runne along,
When he his mournfull tunes did play,
Whose powerfull musicke was so strong,
That it could make the riuers stay;
The fearesfull Hynds not daunted were,
But with the Lions tooke their way,
Nor did the Hare behold with feare
The Dogge, whom these sweete notes appease.
When force of grieffe drew yet more neare,
And on his heart did strongly seaze,
Nor tunes, which all in quiet bound
Could any iotte their master ease,
Complayning of his gretuous wound,
And Plutoes Pallace visuing,
He mixt sweet verses with the sound
Of his loud harpes delightfull string,
All that he dranke with thirsty draught
From his high mothers chiefeest spring,

^a Orpheus.

All that his restlesse griefe him taught,
 And loue, which giues griefe double aide,
 With this euen hell it selfe was caught
 Whether he went, and pardon pray'd
 For his deare spouse, (unheard request)
 The vgly porter was dismayd,
 Rauiſht with this vnwonted guest,
 The furies, which in tortures keepe
 The guilty soules with paines opprest,
 Moud with his song began to weepe.
 Ixions^b wheele now standing still
 Turnes not his head wth motions ſteepe.
 Though^c Tant alus might drinke at will,
 To quenche his thirſt he would forbear.
 The Vulture full with muſicke ſhrill
 Doth not poore^d Titius liuer teare.
 We by his verſes conquered are,
 Saith the great King whom ſpirits feare.
 Let vs not then from him debarre
 His wife, whom he with ſongs doth gaine,
 Yet leſt our gift ſhould ſtretch too farre,
 We will it with this law reſtraine,
 That when from hell he takes his flight,
 He ſhall from looking backe refraine.
 Who can for louers lawes endite?
 Loue hath no law, but her owne will.
 Orpheus ſeeing in th' end of night
 Euridice doth looſe and kill
 Her and himſelfe with fooliſh loue,
 But you this fained tale fulfill,

Who

^b With which he is tormented in hell for attempting to commit adultery with Iuno.
^c Who killed his own ſonne to entertaine the Gods, and therefore is tormented with hunger & thirſt.
^d Who would haue committed adultery with Lato- na Apolloes mother, or with Diana.

Boetius his

Who thinke unto the day above
To bring with speede your darke some mind.
For if your eyes (conquerd) you move
Backward to Pluto left behind,
All the rich pray, which thence you tooke,
You loose, while backe to hell you looke.

THE





THE
FOURTH BOOKE
OF BOETIUS.

Conteining the reasons, why
God permitteth euill.

THE I. PROSE.

*Boetius merueileth at the impunitie and
prosperitie of euill men.*



When Philosophy had
sung these verses with
a soft & sweete voice,
observing due digni-
tie and grauitie in her
coun-

countenance and gesture, I not ha-
uing altogether forgotten my in-
ward griefe, interrupted her speach,
which shee was about to continue,
and sayed, O thou, who bringest vs
to see true light, those things, which
hetherto thou hast treated of, haue
manifestly appeared to bee Diuine
in their owne knowledge, and in-
uincible by thy reasons, and thou
hast said, that though the force of
griefe had made me forget them of
late, yet heretofore I was not alto-
gether ignorant of them. But this
is the chiefest cause of my sorrow,
that, since the gouernour of all
things is so good, there can either
be any euill at all, or passe vnpunish-
ed. Which alone I beseech thee con-
sider, how much admiration it de-
serueth. But there is another grea-
ter then this, for wickednesse bea-
ring

ring rule and sway, vertue is not onely without reward; but lieth also troden vnder the wickeds feet, and is punished in stead of vice. That which things should be done in the kingdome of God, who knoweth all things, can doe all things, but will doe onely that, which is good, no man can sufficiently admire nor complaine. To which she answered, It were indeede infinitely strange, and surpassing all monsters, it, as thou conceivest, in the best ordered house of so great an housholder, the vilest vessels were made account of, and the pretious neglected, but it is not so. For if those things which were a little before concluded, be kept vnviolated, thou shalt by his helpe, of whose kingdome we speake, know, that the good are alway powerfull,

N and

Boetius his

and the euill alway abiect and weake, & that vices are neuer without punishment, nor vertue without reward, and that the good are alway prosperous, and the euil vnfortunate, and many things of that sort, which will take away all cause of complaint, and giue thee firme and sollide strength. And since by my meanes thou hast already seene the forme of true blessednesse, and knowen where it is placed, running ouer all those things, which I thinke necessary to let passe, I will shew thee the way, which will carry thee home. And I will also fasten wings vpon thy mind, with which shee may rouse herselfe, that al perturbation being driuen away, thou mayest returne safely into thy countrey by my direction, by my path, and with my wings.

THE

THE I. VERSE.

How Philosophy bringeth men to the
contemplation of God.

For I haue swift and nimble wings, which will ascend the lofty skies,
 With which when thy quick mind is clad it wil the loathed earth dispise
 And goe beyond the airy globe, and watry cloudes behind it leaue
 Passing the fire, which scorching heat durt from the heauiens swift course re
 Vntill it reach the starry house, and get to treade bright Phabus wares (ceue,
 loyning it selfe in company with aged Saturnes lightsome rases,
 And trace the circle of the starres, which in the night to vs appeare,
 And hauing staid there long enough goe on beyond the farthest sphere.
 Sitting upon the highest orbe partaker of the glorious light,
 Where highest King his Scepter holds, and the worlde's raines doth guide a-
 And in his Chariot standing firme, doth euery thing in order set. (right.
 Vnto this seat when thou art brought, thy countrey, which thou didst forget,
 Thou then wilt challenge to thy selfe, saying this is the glorious land,
 Where I was borne and in this soile my feet for euermore shall stand.
 Whence if thou pleasest to behold the earthly might, which thou hast left,
 Those Tyrants, which the people feare, will seeme of their true home bereft.

THE II. PROSE.

That good men are powerfull, and euill
men weake.



QH (quoth I.) How great
things doest thou promise?
And I doubt not but thou

Boetius his

^a Good
men are
powerfull,
and euill
men weak

canst performe them, wherefore
stay me not now, that thou hast
stirred vp my desire. First then
(quoth she) that^a good men are al-
way powerfull, and euill men of
no strength, thou mayest easily
knowe, and the one is proued by
the other. For since that good and
euill are contraries, if it be conuin-
ced, that goodnesse is potent, the
weakenesse of euill will be also ma-
nifest; and contrariwise if we dis-
cerne the frailty of euill, wee must
needes acknowledge the firmenes
of goodnesse. But that our opini-
on may be more certainly embrac-
ed, I will take both waies, confir-
ming my propositions, sometime
from one part, sometime from an-
other. There bee two things, by
which all humane actions are ef-
fected, will and power, of which
if

if either be wanting, there can nothing be performed. For if there want will, no man taketh any thing in hand against his will, and if there be not power, the will is in vaine. So that, if thou seest anie willing to obtaine that, which he doth not obtaine, thou canst not doubt, but that he wanted power to obtaine, what he would. It is manifest (quoth I) and can by no meanes be denied. And wilt thou doubt, that he could, whō thou seest bring to passe, what he desired? No. But euery man is mighty in that which he can doe, & weake in that, which he cannot doe. I confesse it (quoth I.) Doest thou remember then (quoth she) that it was inferred by our former discourses, that all the intention of mans will doth hasten to happinesse, though their courses

be diuers? I remember (quoth I) that that also was proued. Remembrest thou also that blessednesse is goodnesse it selfe, and consequently when blessednesse is sought after, goodnesse must of force be desired? I haue that also fixt in my memory. Wherefore all men both good and bad, without difference of intentions endeouour to obtaine goodnesse. It followeth (quoth I.) But it is certaine, that men are made good by the obtaining of goodnesse. It is so. Wherefore good men obtaine what they desire. So it seemeth. And if euill men did obtaine the goodnes they desire, they could not be euill. It is true. Wherefore since they both desire goodnesse, but the one obtaineth it, and the other not, there is no doubt but that good men are
power-

powerfull, and the euill weake. Whosoever doubteth of this (quoth I) hee neither considereth the nature of things, nor the consequence of thy reasons. Againe (quoth shee) if there bee two, to whom the same thing is proposed according to nature, and the one of them, bringeth it perfectly to passe with his naturall function; but the other cannot exercise that naturall function, but after another manner, then is agreeable to nature, & doth not perform that, which he had proposed, but imitateth the other who performeth it: Which of these two wilt thou judge to bee more powerfull? Though I coniecture (quoth I) at thy meaning, yet I desire to heare it more plainly. VVilt thou denie (quoth shee) that the motion of walking is a-

greeable to the nature of men? No
(quoth I.) And makest thou any
doubt, that the function of it doth
naturally belong to the feet? There
is no doubt of this neither (quoth
I.) Wherefore if one, that can go vpon
his feete, doth walke, and another,
who hath not this naturall
function of his feete, endeuoureth
to walke by creeping vpon his
hands: which of these two is de-
seruedly to bee esteemed the stron-
ger. Inferre the rest (quoth I) for
no man doubteth, but that hee
which can vse that naturall functi-
on is stronger then he which can-
not. But (quoth she) the good seeke
to obtaine the chiefest good, which
is equally proposed to badde and
good, by the naturall function of
vertues, but the euill endeuour to
obtaine the same by diuers concu-
piscenses,

piscences, which are not the natural function of obtaining goodnesse. Thinkest thou otherwise? No (quoth I) for it is manifest, what followeth. For by force of that which I haue already granted, it is necessary, that good men are powerful, and euil men weake. Thou runnest rightly (quoth she) and it is (as Physicians are wont to hope) a token of an erected and resisting nature. VVherefore, since I see thee most apt and willing to comprehend, I will therefore heape vp manie reasons together. For consider the great weakenesse of vicious men, who cannot come so farre, as their naturall intention leadeth, and almost compelleth the. And what? If they were destitute of this so great and almost inuincible helpe of the direction
of

of nature? Ponder likewise the immense impotency of wicked men. For they are no light or trifling rewards, which they desire, and cannot obtaine: but they faile in the very summe and toppe of things: neither can the poore wretches compasse that, which they onely labour for nights and daies: in which thing the forces of the good eminently appeare. For as thou wouldest iudge him to be most able to walke, who going on foote could come as farre, as there were any place to goe in: so must thou of force iudge him most powerful, who obtaineth the end of all, that can be desired, beyond which there is nothing. Hence that which is opposite also followeth, that the same men are wicked, and destitute of all forces. For why doe they follow

low vices, forsaking vertues? By ignorance of that which is good? But what is more deuoid of strength then blind ignorance? Or do they know what they should embrace, but passion driueth them headlong the contrary way? So also intemperance make them fraile, since they cannot striue against vice. Or doe they wittingly and willingly forsake goodnesse, and decline to vices? But in this sort they leaue not onely to be powerfull, but euen to be at all. For they which leaue the common end of all things which are, leaue also being. Which may perhaps seeme strange to some, that we should say, that euill men are not at all, who are the greatest part of men: but yet it is so. For I denie not, that euill men are euill, but withall I say that^b purely and simply

^bEuill men simply haue no being at all.

plie they are not.

For as thou mayest call a carcasse a dead man, but not simply a man, so I confesse, that the vitious are euill, but I cannot grant that absolutely they are. For that is, which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but that, which faileth from this, leaueth also to be that, which it is in his owne nature. But thou wilt say, that euill men can do many things, neither will I deny it, but this their power proceedeth not from forces, but from weaknesse. For they can doe euill, which they could not doe, if they could haue remained in the performance of that, which is good. Which possibilitie declareth more evidently that they can do nothing. For if, as wee concluded a little before, euill is nothing, since^c they can onely doe euill, it is manifest, that

^c Euill men
can doe no-
thing.

that they can doe nothing. It is plaine. And that thou maist vnderstand, what the force of this power is; we determined a little before, that there is nothing more powerful then the Soueraigne goodnesse. It is true (quoth I.) But he cannot doe euill. No. Is there any then (quoth she) that thinke that men can doe all things? No man, except he be mad, thinketh so But yet men can doe euill. I would to God, they could not (quoth I.) Since therefore hee that can onely doe good, can doe all things, and they who can doe euill, cannot doe all things, it is manifest, that they which can doe euill, are the lesse potent. Moreouer, wee haue proued that all power is to bee accounted among those things, which are to be wished for, and that all such things haue

refe-

reference to goodnesse, as to the very height of their nature. But the possibilitie of committing wickednesse cannot haue reference to goodnesse. Wherefore it is not to be wished for, & consequently it is manifest, possibility of euil is no power. By all which the power of the good, and the vndoubted infirmitie of the euill appeareth. And it is manifest, that that sentence of ^d Plato is true; that onely wise men can doe that, which they desire, and that wicked men practise indeed what they list, but cannot performe what they would. For they doe what they list thinking to obtaine the good which they desire, by those things which cause them delight, but they obtain it not, because shamefull actions cannot arriue to happinesse.

^dIn Gorgia

THE

THE II. VERSE.

Kings are not potent, if they
be passionate.

THe Kings, whom we behold
In highest glory plac'd
And with rich purple grac'd
Compast with souldiers bold,
Whose count'nance shewes fierce threats,
Who with rash fury chide,
If any curbe the pride
Of their vaine glorious seates.
Yet inwardly opprest
They are with captines chaines,
For filthy lust there raignes
And poysoneth their brest,
Wrath often them perplex,
Raising their minds like waues
Oft sorrow makes them slaves
And sliding hopes them vex.
So many Tyrants still
Dwelling in one poore heart
Except they first depart
Shce cannot haue her will.

THE III. PROSE.

*That good men are not without reward,
nor euill without punishments.*



Este thou then, in what myre wickednesse wallows, and how clearly honesty shineth; By which it is manifest, that the good are neuer without rewards, nor the euill without punishments. For that, for which any thing is done, may deseruedly seeme the reward of that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crowne for which hee runneth, is proposed as a reward. But we haue shewed, that blessednesse is the selfe same goodnes, for which all things are done. Wherefore this ^a goodnesse is proposed as a common reward for all humane actions, and this

^a Goodnes
the reward
of all hu-
mane acti-
ons,

this cannot be separated from those, who are good. For hee shall not rightly be any longer called good, who wanteth goodnesse : wherefore vertuous actions are not left without their due rewards. And how much soeuer the euill doe rage, yet the wise mans crowne wil not fade nor wither. For others wickednesse depriueth not vertuous minds of their proper glory. But if hee should reioyce at any thing which hee hath from others, either he, who gaue it, or any other might take it away. But because euery mans vertue is the cause of it, then only he shall want his reward, when he leaueeth to be vertuous. Lastly, since euery reward is therefore desired, because it is thought to be good, who can iudge him to bee deuoyd of reward, which hath goodnesse for his

O

possef-

possession? But what reward hath hee? The most beautifull and the greatest that can be. For remember that *Corollarium*, which I presented thee with a little before, as with a rare and pretious iewell, and inferre thus: since that goodnesse it selfe is happinesse, it is manifest that all good men euen by being good, are made happy. But we agreed, that blessed men are Gods. Wherefore the reward of ^b good men, which no time can wast, no mans power diminish, no mans wickednesse obscure, is to become Gods. Which things being so, no wise man can any way doubt of the inseparable punishment of the euill. For since goodnesse and euill, punishment and reward are opposite the one to the other: those things, which wee see fall out in the reward of goodnesse,

d Good
men are
Gods.

nesse, must needs be answerable in a contrary maner, in the punishment of euill. Wherefore as to honest men, honesty it selfe is a reward, so to the wicked their very wickednesse is a punishment. And hee that is punished, doubteth not, but that he is afflicted with euill. Wherefore if they would truely consider their owne estate, can they thinke themselves free from punishment, whom wickednesse the worst of all euils; doth not onely touch; but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment, which accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the vertuous. For thou learnedst not long before, that whatsoever is at all, is one, and that vnity is goodnesse, by which it followeth, that whatsoever is, must also bee good. And in this manner, whatsoever falleth

O 2

from

Wicked-
nesse the
punishment
of euil men

^d Full men
ceale to be
that which
they were.

from goodnesse, ceaseth to be, by which it followeth, that^d euil men leaue to be that, which they were. But the shape of men, which they they still retaine, sheweth them to haue beene men, wherefore by embracing wickenesse, they haue lost the nature of men. But since vertue alone can exalt vs aboue men, wickednesse must needes cast those vnder the desert of men, which it hath bereaued of that condition. Wherefore thou canst not account him a man, whom thou seest transformed by vices. Is the violent extortour of other mens goods carried away with his couetous desire? Thou mayest liken him to a wolfe. Is the angrie and vnquiet man alway contending and brauling? Thou mayest compare him to a dogge. Doeth the trecherous fel'ow reioyce
that

that hee hath deceiued others with his hidden fraudes? Let him be accounted no better then a fox. Doth the outrageous fret and fume? Let him bee thought to haue a Lions mind. Is the feareful & timorous afraid without cause? Let him be esteemed like to Hares and Deares. Is the slow and stupide alway idle? He liueth an asses life. Doeth the light and vnconstant change his courses? Hee is nothing different from the birds. Is he drowned in filthy and vncleane lusts? He is entangled in the pleasure of stinking sinne. So that hee, ^e who leauing vertue, ceaseth to be a man, since he cannot be partaker of the Diuine condition, is turned into a beast.

^e Wicked men are beasts.

THE III. VERSE.

That vices are of greater force, then
enchau'tments.

THe sailes, which wise Vlisses bore,
And ships, which in the seas long time did stray,
The Easterne wind draue to that^a shore,
Where the faire Goddesse Lady Circe lay
Daughter by birth to Phabus bright,
Who with enchanted cups and charmes did stay
Her guests, deceiu'd with their delight,
And into sundry figures them did change,
Being most skillfull in the night,
And secret force of herbes and simpls strange,
Some like to sauage bores and some
Like Lyons fierce, which daile vse to range
Vpon the Libyan plaines, become.
Others are charged to the shape and guise
Of rau'nous Wolues, and waxing dumbe
Fse howling in the stead of manly cries,
Others like to the Tigre rore,
Which in the scorched Indian desert lies,
And though the^b winged sonne of Ioue
From these bewitched cups delightfull tast
To keepe the famous Captaine stroke,
Yet them the greedy mariners embrac't

^a The Isle

^b Mercurius.

With much desire, till turn'd to swine
 In steed of bread they fed on oken mast.
 Now in their outward shape no signe,
 Nor shew remaines of any humane grace,
 Onely their minds unchaung'd repine
 To see their bodies in such ugly case.
 O feeble hand, and idle art,
 Which though it could the outward lims deface:
 Yet had no force to change the heart.
 For all the force of men giu'n by Gods arme
 Lyes hidden in their inmost part.
 The poysons therefore, whith within them swarme
 More deeply pierce, and with more might,
 Fer to the body, though they doe no harme:
 Yet on the soule they worke their spight.

THE IIII. PROSE.

Of the misery of wicked men.



When said I, I confesse, and
 perceiue that thou affir-
 mest not without cause,
 that the vicious, though they keepe
 the outward shape of men are in
 their

their inward state of mind changed into brute beasts, But I would haue had them, whose cruell and wicked heart regeth to the harme of the good, restrained from executing this their malice. They are restrained (quoth shee) as shall be proued in conuenient place. But yet if this^a liberty, which they seeme to haue, be taken away, their punishment also is in great part released. For, (which perhaps to some may seeme incredible) euill men must necessarily be more vnhappy, when they haue brought to passe their purposes, then if they could not obtaine what they desire. For if it bee a miserable thing to desire that, which is euill, it is more miserable to be able to performe it, without which the miserable will could not haue any effect, Wherefore since every

one

^a The misery of the wicked encreaseth with their power.

one of these hath their peculiar misery, they must of force bee oppressed with a threefold wretchednesse, whom thou seest desire, be able, and performe wickednesse. I grant it (quoth I) but I earnestly wish, that they may soone be deliuered from this miserie hauing lost the power to performe their malice. They will loose it (quoth Ihee) sooner then perhaps either thou wouldest, or they themselues suppose. For in the short compasse of this life there is nothing so late, which the immortall soule thinketh to expect long, so that the great hope and highest attempts of the wicked are many times made frustrate with a suddaine and vnexpected ende, which in trueth maketh their miserie to bee in some measure,

For

^b The longer a man is wicked, the more miserable he is.

For if wickednes make men miserable, the longer one is wicked, the more miserable he must needs be; And I should iudge him the most vnhappy man, that may be, if death at least did not end their malice. For if wee haue concluded truely of the misery of wickednesse, it is manifest, that the wretchednesse, which is euerlasting, must of force bee infinite. A strange illation (quoth I) and hard to bee granted: but I see, that those things, which were granted before, agree very well with these. Thou thinkest aright (quoth she) but he that findeth difficultie to yeeld to the conclusion, must either shew, that somthing which is presupposed is false, or that the combination of the propositions make not a necessary conclusion, otherwise granting that, which went before, hee hath no reason to doubt of the inference. For this also, which I will conclude now, will seeme no lesse strange, and yet followeth as necessarily out of those things, which are already assumed. What? (quoth I.)

^c That wicked men (quoth she) are more happy being punished, then if they escaped the hands of iustice. Neither doe I now goe about to shew that, which may come into euery mans minde, that euill customes are corrected

^c Wicked men more happy, when they are punished, then when they escape.

Corrected by chastisement, and are reduced to vertue by the terrour of punishment, and that others may take example to auoid euill, but in another manner also I thinke vitious men, that goe unpunished to be more miserable, although we haue no relation, nor respect to correction or example. And what other manner shall this be (quoth I) besides these? Haue we not graunted (quoth she) that the good are happy, and the euil miserable? We haue (quoth I.) If then (quoth she) something that is good be added to ones misery, is not hee happier then another, whose misery is desolate and solitary, without any participation of goodnesse? So it seemeth (quoth I.) What if there be some other euill annexed to this miserable man, who is deprived of all goodnesse, besides, those,

those, which make him miserable, is hee not to bee accounted much more vnhappy then he, whose miserie is lightned by pertaking of goodnesse? Why not? (quoth I.) Then the wicked haue some good annexed when they are punished, to witte, the punishment it selfe, which by reason of iustice is good, and when they are not punished, they haue a farther euill, the very impunitie, which thou hast deseruedly graunted to bee an euill to wickednesse. I cannot deny it. Wherefore the vicious are farre more vnhappy, by escaping punishment vniustly, then by being iustly punished. But it is manifest, that it is iust, that the wicked be punished, and vniust that they should goe unpunished. VVho can deny that? But neither will any man deny
this

this (quoth shee) that whatsoeuer is iust, is good, and contrariwise, that whatsoeuer is vnjust, is euill. This followeth (quoth I) out of that, which hath bene concluded before. But I pray thee, leauest thou no punishments for the soules after the death of the body? And those great too (quoth shee.) Some of which I thinke to bee executed as sharpe punishments, and other as mercifull purgations. But I purpose not now to treat of those. But wee haue hetherto laboured, that thou shouldest perceiue the power of the wicked, which to thee seemed intollerable, to bee none at all, and that thou shouldest see, that those, whome thou complainedst went vnpunished, doe neuer escape without punishment for their
wic-

wickednesse. And that thou shouldest learne, that the licence, which thou wishedst might soone end, is neither long, and the longer, the more miserable, and most vnhappy if it were euerlasting. Besides, that the wicked are more wretched being permitted to escape with iniust impunity, then being punished with iust seuerity. Out of which it followeth, that they are then more grieuously punished, when they are thought to goe scot-free. When I consider thy reasons (quoth I) I thinke nothing can bee said more truely. But if I returne to^d the iudgements of men, who is there, that will thinke them worthy to be beleued, or so much as heard? It is true (quoth shee) for they cannot lift vp their eyes accustomed to darkenesse, to behold the light of
mani-

^d The blind
iudgments
of men.

manifest truth, and they are like those birds, whose sight is quickned by the night, and dimmed by the day. For while they looke vpon, not the order of things, but their owne affections, they thinke that licence and impunity to sinne, is happy. But see, what the eternall law establisheth. If thou appliest thy mind to the better, thou needest no iudgeto reward thee: thou hast ioyned thy selfe to the more excellent things. If thou declinest to that which is worse, neuer expect any other to punish thee, thou hast put thy selfe in a miserable estate; as if by turnes thou lookest downe to the myerie ground; and vpto heauen, all outward things ceasing, by thy very sight thou seemest sometime to be in the durt, and sometime present to the starres. But the com-
mon

men fort considereth not these things. VVhat then ? Shall wee ioyne our selues to them , whom we haue proued to be like beasts? VVhat if one hauing altogether lost his sight , should likewise forget, that hee ever had any , and should thinke , that hee wanted nothing which belongeth to humane perfection; should we therefore thinke them blind , that see his folly ? For they will not graunt that neither, which may be proued by as forcible reasons, ^e that they are more vnhappy, that doe iniury, then they which suffer it. I would (quoth I) heare these reasons. Deniest thou (quoth she) that euey wicked man deserueth punishment ? No. And it is many wayes cleare , that the vicious are miserable. It is true (quoth I.) If then (quoth shee) thou

^e They which doe iniury are more vnhappy, then they which suffer it.

thou wert to examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished, him that did, or that suffred wrong? I doubt not (quoth I) but that I would satisfie him that suffered, with the sorrow of him that did it. The offerer of the iniury then would seeme to thee more miserable, then the receiuer. It followeth (quoth I.) Hence therefore, and for other causes grounded vpon that principle, that dishonesty of it selfe maketh men miserable, it appeareth, that the iniury which is offered any man, is not the receiuers, but the doers misery. But now a dayes (quoth she) orators take the contrary course. For they endeouour to draw the Iudges to commiseration of them, who haue suffred any grieuous afflictions, whereas pittie is more iustly due to the causers there.

of, who should be brought not by angry, but rather by fauourable and compassionate accusers to iudgement, as it were sicke men to a Physition, that their diseases and faults might bee taken away by punishments, by which meanes the defenders labour, would either wholly cease, or if they had rather profite in some sort, they would change their defence into accusations. And the wicked themselues, if they could behold the least part of vertue at some little rift, and perceiue that they might be deliuered from the filth of sinne by the affliction of punishments, in respect of obtaining vertue, they would not esteeme of torments, and would refuse the assistance of their defenders, and wholly resigne themselues to their accusers and Iudges. By which
meanes

meanes it commeth to passe, that
 f in wise men there is no place at all
 for hatred. For, who but a verie
 foole would hate the good? And to
 hate the wicked were against rea-
 son. For as faintnesse is a disease of
 the bodie, so is vice a sicknesse of
 the mind. Wherefore, since wee
 iudge those, that haue corporall in-
 firmities, to bee rather worthy of
 compasion, then of hatred, much
 more are they to be pitied, and not
 abhorred, whose minds are oppres-
 sed with wickednesse the greatest
 malady that may be.

f A wise
 man hateth
 none.

THE III. VERSE.

No man is to be hated, the good are to be
 loued, and the euill to be pittied.

VVhy should we strine to die so many waies,
 And slay our selues with our own hands,

Boetius his

If we seeke death, shee ready stands,
She willing comes, her passage neuer stays.
Those against whome the wild beasts armed be,
Are arm'd against themselves with rage.
Doe they such warres vniustly wage,
Because their liues, and manners disagree,
And so themselves with mutual weapons kill.
Alas, but this reuenge is small.
Wouldst thou giue due desert to all?
Loue then the good, and pittie thou the ill.

THE V. PROSE.

Boetius complaineth, that prosperity and aduersity are common both to good and badde.



See (quoth I) what felicity, or misery is placed in the deserts of honest, and dishonest men. But I consider that there is somewhat good, or euill euen in this popular fortune. For no wise man had rather liue in banishment, pouerty and ignominie, then prosper in his owne countrey, being rich, respected, and powerfull. For in this manner is the office of wisdom performed with more credite and renowne, when the gouernours happinesse is participated by their people;

so

so chiefly because prisons, chaines, and other torments of legall punishments are rather due to pernicious subiects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I much marueile, why these things are thus turned vpside downe, and the punishments of wickednesse oppresse the good, while euill men obtaine the rewards of the good. And I desire to know of thee, what may seeme to be the reason of so vniust confusi- on. For I would marueile lesse, if I thought that all things were disorder ed by casuall e- uents. Now God being the gouernour, my astonishment is encreased, because since that hee distributeth oftentimes that which is pleasant to the good, and that which is dis- tastfull to the badd, and contrariwise aduer- sity to the good, and prosperity to the euill, vnlesse we find out the cause hereof; what difference may there seeme to bee betwixt this, and accidentall chances? It is no mar- ueile (quoth she) if any thing be thought te- merarious and confused, when wee knowe not the order it hath. But although thou beest ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because ^a the world hath a good gouernour, doubt not, but all things are well done.

^a We must thinke that God doth all things wel, though we vnder- stand not the reason of his do- ings.

Boetius his

THE V. VERSE.

Admiration ceaseth, when the causes of things are knowne.

WHo knows not how the stars neare to the poles doe
And how Doctes his slow waie doth guide, (Slide
And why hee fees so late, and doth so carely rise,
May wonder at the courses of the skyes.
If when the moone is full, her hornes seeme pale to sight,
Insefied with the darkenesse of the night
And Stars from whence all grace she with her brightnes tooke,
Now shew themselves while she doth dimly looke.
As a publike error straight through vulgar minds doth passe,
And they with many strokes beate upon brasse.
None wonders, why the winds upon the waters blow,
Nor why late Phabus beams dissolues the snow.
These cause are to know, the other hidden he.
And therefore more our hearts they terrifie.
All strange events, which time so light more seldome brings,
And the same people count as sudden things,
If we our clouded minds from ignorance could free,
No longer would by vs admired be.

a Stephorus
and Pinda
rus thought
that the
moone was
eclipsed by
longe, and
therfore to
hinder it,
they caused
the belles to
be rung out
of oraclee
Iuu. mall.
Satyra, 6.

THE VI. PROSE.

Of prouidence and Fate, and why prof-
peritie and aduersitie are common both
to good and bad.



T is true (quoth I) but
since it is thy profession to
explicate the causes of hid-
den

den things, & to vnfold the reasons, which are covered with darkenesse, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare this miracle, which troubleth me aboue all others. Then she smiling a little saide: thou inuitest me to a matter, which is most ^a hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently declared, for it is such, that one doubt being taken away, innumerable other, like the heads of ^b Hydra, succeed, neither will they haue any end, vlesse a man repressethem with the most liuely fire of his minde: for in this matter are wont to be handled these questions, Of the simplicitie of prouidence, of the course of fate, of sudden chaunces, of Gods knowledge and prædestination, and of free will, which, how weighty they are, thouthy selfe discernest.

^a How hard it is to find out the reason of Gods prouidence

^b Which had 70. or 90. heads. and if one were cut of 2. arose in the place.

But because it is a part of thy cure, to know these things also, though the time be short, yet wee will endeavour to touch them briefly. But if the sweetnesse of verse delight thee, thou must forbear this pleasure for a while, vntill I propose vnto thee some fewe arguments. As it pleaseth thee (quoth I.) Then taking as it were a new beginning, she discoursed in this maner. The generation of all things, and all the proceedings of mutable natures, and whatsoeuer is moued in any sort, take their causes, order, and formes from the stabilitie of the Diuine mind. This placed in the Castle of his owne simplicitie, prefixeth manifolde wayes for all that is to bee wrought or done; which wayes being considered in the puritie of Gods vnderstanding, are

are named prouidence, but beeing referred to those things, which hee moueth and disposeth, they were by the ancients called Fate. The diuersitie of which will easily appeare, if we weigh the force of both. For ^c prouidence is the very Diuine reason it selfe, seated in the highest Prince, which disposeth all things; But ^d Fate is a disposition inhærent in changeable things, by which prouidence connecteth all things in their due order. For prouidence embraceth all things together, though diuers, though infinite; but Fate putteth euery particular thing into motion, beeing distributed by places, formes, & times: so that this vnfolding of temporall order being vnited in the foresight of Gods mind, is prouidence & the same vniting, being digested & vnfolded by times,

^c Prouidence

^d Fate.

times, is called fate. Which although they be diuers, yet the one dependeth on the other. For fatall order proceedeth from the simplicitie of prouidence. For as a workeman conceiuing the forme of any thing in his mind, taketh his worke in hand, and executeth by order of time, that which he had simply and presently foreseene: So God by his prouidence disposeth whatsoeuer is to be done with simplicitie and stabilitie: And by fate effecteth by manifold and temporal waies those very things which he disposeth. Wherefore, ^e whether fate bee exercised by the subordination of certaine Diuine spirits to prouidence, or this fatall webbe be wouen by the seruice of the soule; of all nature, or of the heauenly motions of the Starres; of ^f angelicall vertue, or of diabolicall

^e Diuers opinions of ancient philosophers.

^f This is distinguished from diuine spirits mentioned in the first place, by their mission or outward administration, from which the former are free.

cal industry; or of some or al of these; that certainly is manifest, that providence is an vnmouuable and simple forme of those things, which are to be done; & fate a moucable connexion and temporall order of those things, which the diuine simplicity hath disposed to be done. So that all, that is vnder fate, is also subiect to providence, to which also fate it self obeieth. But some things which are placed vnder providence, are aboue the course of fate. And they are those things, which nigh to the first diuinity being stable & fixe, exceede the order of fatal mobility. For as of Orbes which turne about the same Centre, the inmost draweth nigh to the simplicity of the middest, and is as it were the hinge of the rest, which are placed without it, about which they are turned:
and

Some things aboue the course of Fate.

and the cutmost wheeled with a greater compasse, by how much it departeth from the middle indiuisibility of the Centre, is so much the more extended into larger spaces: but that which is ioyned & coupled to that middle, approacheth to simplicity, and ceaseth to spread & flow abroad. In like maner that, which departeth farthest from the first mind, is perplexed with greater connexions of fate, and euery thing is so much the freer from fate, by how much it draweth nigh to that hinge of all things. And if it sticketh to the stability of the soueraign mind, free from motion, it surpasseth also the necessity of fate. VVherefore in what sort discourse is compared to vnderstanding; that, which is produced to that which is, time to eternity, a circle to the Centre. Such is
the

the course of moueable fate, to the stable simplicity of prouidence. That course mooueth the heauen and starres, tempereth the elements one with another, and transformeth them by mutuall changing. The same reneweth all rising and dying things by like proceeding of fruites and seedes. This comprehendeth also the actions and fortunes of men by an vnloofable connection of causes, which since they proceede from the principles of vnmooueable prouidence, must needs also be^h immutable. For in this manner things are best governed, if the simplicity which remayneth in the Diuine minde, produceth an inflexible order of causes, and this order restrayneth with his owne immutabilitie, things

^h Fate and those things which are vnder it, are immutable as they are referred to prouidence

things otherwile mutable & which would haue a confused course. Whereof it ensueth, that though all things seeme confused and disordered to you, who are not able to consider this order: notwithstanding all things are disposed by their owne measure directing them to good. For there is nothing, which is done for the loue of euill, euen by the wicked themselues, whom, as hath beene abundantly prooued, lewd errour carrieth away, while they are seeking after that, which is good, so farre is it, that order proceeding from the hing of the soueraign goodnesse, should auert any from his first beginning. But thou wilt say, what more vniust confusion can there be, then that both aduersity and prosperity should happen to the good, and in like maner both

desired

ⁱ Nothing is done for the loue of euill.

desired and hatefull things to the wicked. But are men so completely wise, that whosoever they ^k iudge wicked or honest, must needs be so? How then are their censures contrary one to another, so that to diuers the same men seeme worthy of reward and punishment. But let vs graunt, that some are able to discern the good from the euill. Can they therefore behold that inward complexion as it were of soules? For he that knoweth not the cause, may marueile in like maner, why some sound bodies agree better with sweete things, and other with tart. And why some sick men are healed with gentle and some with sharper physicke. But to a Physitian who knoweth the manner and temper both of health and sicknesse, this is nothing strange.

Now,

^k The iudgments of men vncertaine.

Boetius his

Now, what is the health of soules, but vertue? What sicknesse haue they, but vices? And who either conserueth goodnesse, or expelleth euils, but God the ruler and gouernour of mens minds? Who beholding from his high turret of prouidence, seeth what is fitting for euery one, and applieth that, which hee knoweth to bee most conuenient.

Hence proceedeth that strange wonder of fatal order, when he that knoweth what is best, doth that, which the ignorant admire. For to touch briefly some few things of the diuine depth, which humane reason is able to attaine, whome thou thinkest most iust, and most obseruant of equity, seemeth otherwise in the eies of prouidence which knoweth all. And our friend ^m *Lu-*

can noteth, that the cause of the con-
querours

God seeth
what is
most fitting
for euery
man, and
despoueth
accordingly

^m A Poet of
Cordona.

querours pleased the Gods, and that of the conquered, *Cato*. Wherefore whatsoever thou seest done heere against thy expectation, is right order in the things themselves, but a peruerse confusion in thy opinion. But let there be one so wel conditioned, that God and men approue and praise him, yet perhaps he is so weake a minded man, that if he falleth into aduersity, he wil forsake his innocency, which was not able to keepe him in prosperity. Wherefore Gods wile dispensation spareth him that aduersity might make worse, least he should suffer, to whome difficulties are dangerous. There is another complete in al vertues, a Saint and nigh to God, prouidence iudgeth it a sacriledge to lay any afflictions on him, insomuch, that she permitteth him not to be troubled so much

n This is a
 saying of a
 Christian
 diuine, who
 Philology
 acknow-
 ledgeth to
 excell her.
*Viri sacri
 corpus & vir-
 tes adifica-
 uere.*

as with corporall sicknesse. For as
 one, n that excelleth me, saith: *Ανδρας
 ειπε σομαδουραμενσι ιεροδομησι.* It hapneth oftē
 also, that the chiefe cōmand is giuen
 to good mē, that wickednes, which
 otherwise would overflow all, may
 be kept downe. She mixeth for o-
 thers sower with sweete according
 to the disposition of their soules,
 she checketh some, lest they should
 fall to dissolution by long prosperi-
 ty, others she suffereth to be tossed
 with many stormes, that they may
 confirme the forces of their minde
 with the vse and exercise of patience.
 Some are too much afrayde of that,
 which they are able to beare. Other
 make lesse account then there is
 cause of that, which they cannot
 endure, these shee assayeth with af-
 flictions that they may make triall
 of themselues. Many haue bought
 the

the renowne of this world with a glorious death. Some ouercoming all torments, haue shewed by their example, that vertues cannot be conquered by miseries, which things how well and orderly they are done, and how much to their good, to whom they happen, there can bee no doubt. For that sometimes greuous, sometime pleasant things befall in like maner the wicked, proceedeth from the same causes. And as for aduersitie, no man merueileth, because all thinke that they deserue ill, whose punishments doe both terrifie others from the like courses, and moue them to amend themselves: And their prosperitie is a great argument to the good, what they ought to iudge of this happinesse, which they see oftentimes bestowed vpon the wic-

ked. In which this also is to be considered, that peradventure some haue so headlong and vntoward a disposition, that pouertie would rather make him worse, whose disease is cured by prouidence, with giuing him store of money; Another knowing his owne guilty conscience, and reflecting vpon his owne estate, is afraid least the losse of that should be greuous vnto him, the vse of which is pleasant. Wherefore he resolueth to chang his customes, and whiles he feareth to loose his prosperitie, he forsaketh wickednes. The increas of honor vnderuedly obtined, hath throwne some headlong into their deserued destruction. Others are permitted to haue authoritie to punish others, that they may exercise the good, and punish the bad. For as there is

no

no league betweene vertuous & wicked men, so neither can the wicked agree among themselues. Why not? Since they disagree within themselues, by reason of their vices which teare their conscience, so that they many times doe that, which afterward they wish vndon. Frō whence that highest prouidence, often worketh that wonderfull miracle, that euill men make those, which are euill, good. For some considering the iniustice done the by most wicked men, out of their hatred to their enemies, haue embraced vertue, procuring to be contrary to them, whom they hate. For it is onely a Diuine strength, to which euen euill things are good, when by vsing them in due sort, it draweth some good effect out of them. For a certaine order embraceth al things, so that euen

that, which departeth from the order appointed to it, though it falleth into another, yet that is order also, least cōfused rathnes shold beare any sway in the kingdome of prouidēce

*Difficile
autem est
me sermone
explicare.
quem ad
modum De
us ornare
gat et pro-
videntia
disponat.*

Ἀργαλέον δ' ἐμὲ ταῦτα θεῶν ὡς πᾶσι ἀσφραγεῖν. For it is impossible for any man either to cōprehend by his witt, or to explicate in spech al the frames of Gods work. It is sufficient, that we haue seene thus much, that God the authour of all natures, directeth and disposeth also all things to goodnesse, and while hee endeuoureth to reduce those things which he hath produced to his owne likenesse, hee banisheth all euill from the boundes of his common wealth, by the course of fatal necessitye. So that, if thou considerest the disposition of prouidence, thou wilt perceiue that euill, which is thought so to a-
bound

bound vpon earth, hath no place left for it at all. But I see that long since burthened with so weighty a question, and wearied with my long discourse, thou expectest the delight of verses; wherfore take a draught, that being refreshed, thou maiest be able to goe forward.

THE VI. VERSE.

Phylosophy praiseth Gods prouidence.

If thou woudest see
 Gods lawes with purest mind,
 Thy sight on heau'n must fixed be,
 Whose settled course the Starres in peace doth bind.
 The Sunnes bright fire
 Stops not his sisters steame
 Nor doth the Northerne bears desire
 Within the Oceans wawe to hide her beame.
 Though she beheld
 Th'other Starres their couching:
 Yet shee vncessantly is rowl'd
 About the heau'n the Ocean neuer touching.
 The Eu'ning light
 With certaine course doth shone
 The comming of the soady night,
 And Lucifer before the day doth goe.

Boelius his

This mutuall loue
Courses aternall makes,
And from the starry spheres above
All cause of warre, and dang'rous discord takes.

This sweet consent
In equall bands doth tie
The nature of each Element,
So that the moist things yeeld unto the dry.

The piercing cold
With flames doth friendship keepe
The fire the highest place doth held,
And the grosse earth sinkes downe into the deepe.

The flowry yeare
Breathes odours in the spring
The scorching summer earne doth heare
The Autumne fruit from loaden trees doth bring.

The falling rains
Doth winters moisture giue
These rules thus nourish and maintaine
All creatures, which we see on earth to liue.

And when they dye,
These bring them to their end,
While their Creatour sittes on high,
Whose hand the raines of the whole world doth bend.

He as their King
Rules them with Lordly might,
From him they rise flourish and spring,
He as their law and iudge deuises their right.

Those things, whose course
Most swiftly slides away,
His might doth open backward force,

And

And suddenly their wandering motion stay.

Unlesse his strength

Their violence should bound,

And them which else would runne at length,

Should bring within the compasse of a round:

That firme decree

Which now doth all adorne

Would soone destroy'd and broken bee,

Things being farre from their beginning borne.

This powerfull loue

Is common vnto all

Which for desire of good doe moue

Backe to the springs from whence they first did fall.

No wordly thing

Can a continuance haue

Unlesse loue backe againe it bring,

Vnto the cause, which first the essence gaue.

THE VII. PROSE.

All fortune is good.



Erceiuest thou now, what followeth of al, that we haue hetherto said? what? (quoth I.) That (quoth she) all maner of fortune is good: How can that bee? (quoth I.) Be attentiu (quoth she) since that al fortune, be it pleasing or vnrplea-

vnpleasing, is directed to the reward
or exercise of the good, and to the
punishment and direction of the
wicked, it is manifest, it is all good,
since it is all iust, or profitable. Thy
reason is very true (quoth I) and if
I consider prouidence & fate, which
thou diddest explicate a little before,
thy opinion is well grounded. But
if thou pleasest let vs account it a-
mong those, which thou not long
since supposedst incredible. What?
(quoth she) Because men common-
ly vse to say, and repeat, that some
haue ill fortune: Shall wee (quoth
she) frame our speech to the vulgar
phrase, least we seeme to haue as it
were forsaken the vse of humane
conuersation? As it pleaseth thee
(quoth I.) Doest thou not thinke
then, that that is good, which is pro-
fitable? Yes (quoth I.) But that,
which

which either exerciseth, or correcteth, is profitable. It is true (quoth I,) It is good then. Why not? But this is the estate of them, who being either vertuous striue with aduersity, or forsaking vices, betake themselves to the way of vertue. I cannot denie it (quorh I.) Now, what sayest thou to that pleasing fortune, which is giuen in reward to the good, doth the common people account it badde? No, but iudgeth it exceeding good, as it is indeed. And what of the other, which being vnpleasing, restraineth the euil with iust punishment, doeth not the people thinke it good? Yea (quoth I) they thinke it the most miserable that can be. Looke then (quoth shee) how following the peoples opinion, we haue concluded a very incredible matter. What? (quoth I.) For it follow-

followeth (quoth shee) out of that, which is granted, that all their fortune, whatsoeuer it be, who are either in the possession, or encrease or entrance of vertue, is good: and theirs, which remaine in vices, the worst that may be. This (quoth I) is true, though none dare say so. Wherefore (quoth she) a wise man must be no more troubled, when he is assaulted with aduersitie: then a valiant Captaine dismayd at the sound of an alarum. For difficulties are the matter, by which the one must encrease his glory, and the other confirme his wisdom. For which cause vertue is so called, because it hath sufficient strength to ouercome aduersitie. For you, that are proficients in vertue, are not come to bee dissolute with dainties, or to languish in pleasures,

tures, but you skirmish fiercely with any fortune, least either affliction oppresse you, or prosperitie corrupt you, and so procure to stay your selues strongly in the meane. For whatsoeuer commeth either short, or goeth beyond, may well contemne felicity, but will neuer obtaine any reward of labour. For it is placed in your power, to frame to your selues, what fortune you please. For all that seemeth vnfauor-ry, either exerciseth, or correcteth, or punisheth.

THE VII. VERSE.

Phylosophy exhorteth to labours.

Reuengfull ^a Atrous sonne did ten whole yeares employ
 In wars, till he his ^b brothers losse repas'd with ran sacke
 He setting forth the Fleete of Greece vpon the seas (Troy,
 And knowing well, that onely bloud the angry winds would
 Forget a fashers part and with his cruel knife (please,
 Vnto the Gods did sacrifice his dearest daughters life.
 Vlisses wait'd the losse of his most faithfull men
 Whom ^d Poliphemus did deuoure inclosed in his den

^a Agamemnon.

^b Menelau whose wife Helena, Paris tooke away.

^c Iphigenia.

^d A Gyant

in Sicily, hauing but one eye in his fore-head, which Vlisses did put out.


Boetius his

e Halt men
and halfe
horses
f Huge
birde in the
e: called
Stymphalus
in Arcadia.
g The dog
Cerberus
who had 3.
heads.
h Diome-
des King of
Thracia,
who fedde
his hortes
with mans
flesh.

But when his hand by sleight had made the Cyclops blind,
Most pleasant toy in stead of former scars possess his mind.
Hercules famous is for his laborious toyle, (poyle
Who cam'd the Centaurs, and did take the dreadful Lions
He the Stymphalsian birds with piercing arrowes strooke,
And from the wrathful Dragons care the golden apples took
He in a threefold charne, the hellish, orser ledde,
And with their cruell^d masters flesh the savage hortes fedde
He did th'increasing heads of poy'nous Hydra burne,
And breaking Achelous hornes did make him back return
He on the Libyans sands did proud Antæus kill,
And with the mighty Cacus bloud^m Euanders wrath fulfil.
He with the dreadfull Bore, encount' red, and him slew,
Remayning prest, if he were Grg'd his labours to renew.
To beareⁿ Heav'n of his toyles the last was, and most hard,
And for this last & greatest toile the bea'nⁿ was his hreward.
You valiant men pursue this way of high renowne, (crown.
Why yeeld you? ouertome the earth, and you the starres shall

i Who had turned himselfe into the forme of a bull. k The sonne of
Neptune, who by touching the earth recovered strength; and theretore
Hercules held him vp, and so slew him. l Vulcans son, who did cast out
of his mouth fire and smoke. m King of Arcadia. n In stead of
Atlas.

THE



THE
FIFTH BOOKE OF
BOETIVS.

Of chance and freewill, and
how they stand with Prouidence

THE I. PROSE.

Of chance.



Having sayd thus,
she began to turne
her speech to cer-
taine other questi-
ons; when I inter-
rupted her, saying:
Thy

Thy exhortation is very good, and well beſeeming thy authority. But I find it true by experience, as thou affirmedſt, that the queſtion of providence, is entangled with many other. For I deſire to know, whether thou thinkeſt chance to be anything at all, & what it is. I make haſt (quoth ſhee) to performe my promiſe, and to ſhew thee the way, by which thou mayeſt returne to thy cuntry. And theſe other queſtions, though they be very profitable, yet they are ſomewhat from our purpoſe, and it is to be feared, leaſt being wearied with digreſſions, thou beeſt not able to finiſh thy direct journey. There is no feare of that (quoth I) for it will be a great eaſe to me, to vnderſtand thoſe things, in which I take great delight, & withall when thy diſputation is fenced
in

in on every side; there can bee no doubt made of any thing thou shalt inferre. I will (quoth shee) doe, as thou wouldest haue me, and withall beganne in this maner: If any shall define chance to be, an euent produced by a confused motion; & without connexion of causes; I affirme that there is no such thing; and that chance is only an empty voyce without any yeall signification. For what place can confusion haue, since God disposeth all things in due order. For it is a true sentence, that of nothing commeth nothing, which none of the ancients denied, though they held not that principle of the efficient cause, but of the materiall subject; that is of the nature of all formes. But if any thing proceedeth from no causes, that will seeme to haue come from nothing,

ϠϠϠϠϠϠ R which

Boetius his

which if it cannot bee, neither is it possible there should be any such chance, as is defined a little before. What then (quoth I,) is there nothing that can rightly bee called chance, or fortune? Or is there something, though vnknownen to the common sort, to which these names agree? My *Aristotle* (quoth shee) in his bookes of nature declared this point briefly and truely. How? (quoth I.) When (quoth shee) any thing is done for some certain cause, and some other thing hapneth, for some reasons, then that, which was intended, this is called chance: as if one digging his ground with intention to till it, findeth an hidden treasure. This is thought to haue fallen thus out by fortune, but it is not of nothing, for it hath peculiar causes, whose vnexpected & not foreseene
concourse

concourse seemeth to haue brought forth a chance. For vnlesse the Husbandman had digged vp his grounds, and vnlesse the other had hidden his money in that place, the treasure had not beene found. These are therefore the causes of this fortunate accident, which proceedeth from the meeting and concurrence of causes, and not from the intention of the doer. For neither he that hid the golde, nor hee that tilled his ground, had any intention that the money should be found, but, as I said, it followed and concurred, that this man should dig vp that, which the other hidde. VVherefore wee may define ^a chance thus: that it is an vnexpected euent of concurring causes, in those things, which are done to some end and purpose. Now the cause, why causes concurre and

R 2

meete

^a What
Chance is.

meete so together, is that order proceeding with ineuitable connexion, which descending from the fountaine of prouidence, dispoeth all things in their places and times.

THE I. VERSE.

How casuall' events are guided
From the top by prouidence.

In th' Achemenian rocks, where Parthians met their darts
In their dissembled flight, do wound their enemies,
Tigris from the same head doth with Euphrates rise
And forthwith they themselves denide in severall parts:
But if they sayne againe, and them one channell bound,
Bringing together all that both their waues doe beare,
The ships and trees, whose rootes they from the bankes doe teare,
Will meete, and they their floods will mingle and confound
Yet runnes this wandring course in places which are low
And in these sliding streames a settled law remains.
So fortune though it seemes to runne with carelesse rames,
Yet hath it certaine rule, and doth in order flow.

in unexpected event of countenance
causes, in those things, which are
done to some end and purpose. Now
the thing, why causes conuenient and

THE II. PROSE.

Of freewill.



Obserue it (quoth I) and I acknowledge it to bee as thou sayest. But in this ranke of coherent causes, haue wee any free will, or doth the fatall chaine fasten also the motions of mens minds? We haue (quoth she) for there can be no reasonable nature, vnlesse it be endewed with freewill. For that which naturally hath the vse of reason, hath also iudgement, by which he can discern of euery thing by it selfe, wherfore he putteth a difference betwixt those things, which are to bee auoided, and those which are to bee desired. Now euery one seeketh for that, which he thinketh is to be desired, and eschueeth that which in his iudgement

is to be auoyded. Wherefore they which haue reason, haue freedom to will and nill. But yet I make not this equal in al. For the supreme and diuine substances haue both a perspicuous iudgment, & an incorrupted wil, & an effectual power to obtaine their desires. But ^a the minds of men must needs be more free, when they conserue themselves in the contemplation of God, & lesse, when they come ^b to their bodies, and yet lesse when they are bound with earthly fetters. But their greatest bondage is, when giuing themselves to vices, they loose the possession of their owne reason. For hauing cast their eyes from the light of the soueraigne truth to inferiour obscurities, forthwith they are blinded with the cloud of ignorance, molested with hurtfull affections, by yeelding and
confer-

^a This is spoken according to the opinion of the Platonists.

^b Before they enforme then

consenting to which, they increase the bondage, which they layd vppon themselves, and are after a certaine manner captiues by their own freedom. Which notwithstanding that foresight of prouidence, which beholdeth all things from eternity, foreseeeth, and by predestination disposeth of euery thing by their merits.

οὐκ ἴσθηται ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας

*Omnia videt
& omnia
audis.*

THE II. VERSE.

How God knoweth all things.

*S*weete Homer sings the praise
Of Phabus cleare and bright,
And yet his strongest rayes
Cannot with feeble light
Cast through the secret waies
Of earth and seas his sight:
But he, that did the world deuise,
Looketh from high with clearer eyes,
The earths vast depths vnseene
From his sight are not free,
No clouds can stand betwene,
He at one stroke doth see

What are, and what haue bene,
And what shall after bee.

Whom (since he onely vieweth all)
You rightly the true Sunne may call.

THE III. PROSE.

Boetius proposeth the difficulty of con-
cording Gods prouidence with mens
free-will.



Then I conplained, that I
was now in a greater confu-
sion, & more doubtful dif-
ficultie then before. What is that?
(quoth she) for I already coniecture
what it is that troubleth thee. It
seemeth (quoth I) to bee altogether
impossible and repugnant, that God
foreseeth all things, and that there
should be any free-will. For if God
beholdeth all things, and cannot be
deceiued, that must of necessity fol-
low, which his prouidence foreseeth
to be to come. Wherefore if from
eternity he doth not only foreknow
the

the deeds of men, but also their counsels & wils, there can be no freewill; for there is not any other deede or wil, but those, which the diuine prouidence that cannot be deceiued, hath foreseene. For if things can be drawnto any other course, then was foreknowne, there will not be any firm knowledg of that, which is to come, but rather an vncertaine opinion, which in my opinion were impious to belecue of God. Neither do I allow of that reason, with which some suppose that they can dissolue the difficulty of this question. For they say, that nothing is therefore to come to passe, because prouidence did foresee it, but rather contrarywise, because it shall be, it could not be vnkown to prouidence, and in like manner it is necessary, that the other should be true.

For it is not necessarie that those things should happen, which are foreseene, but it is necessarie that those things shoul be foreseene, that are to come. As though our question were, which of them is the others cause, the foreknowledge of the necessitie of things to come, or the necessitie of things to come of the foreknowledge. But let vs endeavour to proue, that howsoeuer these causes be ordered, the event of the things, which are foreknowne, is necessary, although the foreknowledge seemeth not to inferre necessitie of being vpon the things themselves. For if any man sitteth, the opinion which thinketh so, must needs be true, and againe on the other side, if the opinion that one sitteth be true, hee must needs sitte. Wherefore there is necessitie in both
in

in the one of sitting, and in the other of truth. But one sitteth not, because the opinion is true, but rather this is true, because one sitteth. So that though the cause of truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both. And the like is to be inferred of prouidence, & future things. For althogh they be foreseene, because they shall be, and they doe not come to passe, because they are foreseene: notwithstanding it is necessary, that things to come be foreseene, or that things fore seen doe fall out; which alone is sufficient to ouerthrow freewill. Besides how preposterous is it, that the euent of temporall things should be said to be the cause of the euerlasting foreknowledge: And what els is it to thinke, that God doth therefore foresee future things, because they

they are to happen, then to affirme that those things which happened long since, are the cause of that soueraigne prouidence? Furthermore, as whē I know any thing to be, it must needs be: so when I know, that any thing shall be, it must needs be to come. And so it followeth, that the euent of a thing foreknowen cannot bee auoyded. Finally if any man thinketh otherwise, then the thing is, that is not onely no knowledge, but it is a deceitfull opinion, farre from the truth of knowledge; wherefore if any thing is to bee in such sort, that the euent of it is not certaine or necessary, how can that be foreknowen that it shall happen? for as the knowledge is without mixture of falsity, so that, which is conceiued by it, cannot be otherwise then it is conceiued. For this is the
cause

cause, why knowledg is without deceit, because euery thing must needs be so, as the knowledge apprehendeth it to be. What then? How doth God foreknow, that these vncertaine things shall bee? For if hee iudgeth that those things shall happen inevitably, which it is possible shall not happen, hee is deceiued, which is not onely impious to thinke, but also to speake. But if he supposeth, that they shall happen in such sort as they are, so that hee knoweth, that they may equally be done and not be done, what foreknowledge is this, which comprehendeth no certaine or stable thing. Or in what is this better then that ridiculous prophecy of *Tiresia*? Whatsoeuer I say shall either be, or not be, or in what shall the diuine providence exceede humane opinion, if,

if, as men, God iudgeth thole things to be vncertaine, the euent of which is doubtfull? But if nothing can bee vncertaine to that most certaine fountaine of all things, the euent of those things is certaine, which he doth certainly know shall be. Wherefore there is no freedome in humane counsels & actions, which the diuine mind foreseeing al things without errour or falshood, tyeth and bindeth to one euent. Which once admitted, it is euident, what ruine of humane affayres wil ensue. For in vain are rewards and punishments proposed to good and euill, which no free and voluntary motion of their minds hath deserued. And that will seeme most vniust, which is now iudged most iust, that either the wicked should be punished, or the good rewarded, since their
owne

owne will leadeth them to neither, but they are compelled by the certaine necessity of that, which is to come. By which meanes vertues and vices shall be nothing, but rather there will follow a mixt confusion of all deserts. And, then which there can be nothing inuented more impious, since that al order of things proceedeth from prouidence, and humane counsels can do nothing, it followeth, that our vices also shall be referred to the author of goodnesse. Wherefore there is no meanes left to hope or pray for any thing. For what can any man either hope or pray for, since an vnflexible course connecteth all things that can bee desired? Wherefore that onely trafficke betwixt God and men of hope and prayer shall bee taken away. For by the price of iust humili.

humility, we deserue the vnestimable benefite of Gods grace, which is the onely manner, by which it seemeth that men may talke with God, and by the very manner of supplication be ioyned to that inaccessible light, before they obtain any thing: which, if by the admitting the necessity of future things, they bee thought to haue no force: by what shall we be vnited and cleaue to that soueraigne Prince of all things? Wherefore mankind must needes, (as thou saydest in thy verse a little before) being separated and seuered from his fountain, faile & fall away.

THE III. VERSE.

How we come to know the truth.

What cause of discord breakes the bandes of loue?
 What God betweene two truths such wars doth moue?
 That things which seu rally well settled be,

Yet say'd in one will neuer friendly prove?
 Or in true things can we no discord see,
 Because all certainties doe still agree?
 But our dull soule, couer'd with members blind,
 Knowes not the secret lawes, which things doe bind,
 By the drown'd light of her oppress'd fire.
 Why then, the hidden notes of things to find,
 Doth shee with such a tone of truth desire?
 If shee knowes that, which she doth so require.
 Why wisheth shee knowne things to know againe?
 If she knowes not why strives she with blind paine?
 Who after things unknowne will strive to goe?
 Or will such ignorant pursuite maintaine?
 How shall she find them out? or having so,
 How shall she then their formes and natures know?
 Because this soule the highest mind did veiw,
 Must wee needes say, that in all natures knew?
 Now she, though cloudes of flesh doe her debarre,
 Forgets not all, that was her ancient due,
 But in her mind some gen'rall motions are,
 Though not the skill of things particular.
 He that seekes truth, in neither course doth fall,
 Not knowing all nor ignorant of all.
 He marketh gen'rall things which he retaines,
 And matters seene on high doth backe recall.
 And things forgotten to his mind regains,
 And ioynes them to that part, which there remains.

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THE IIII. PROSE.

Phylosophy beginneth to solue the difficulties, which Boetius proposed.

THis (quoth shee) is an ancient complaint of prouidence, vehemently pursued by *Marcus Tullius*, in his distribution of diuination, and a thing which thou thy selfe hast made great and long search after; But hetherto none of you haue vsed sufficient diligence and vigour in the explication thereof. The cause of which obscurity is, for that the motion of humane discourse cannot attain to the simplicity of the diuine knowledge, which if by any meanes wee could conceiue there would not remain any doubt at all, which I will ende-
uour

our to make manifest and plaine,
when I have first explicated that,
which moueth thee. For I demand,
why thou thinkest their solution
vntufficient, who thinke that free-
will is not hindered by foreknow-
ledge, because they suppose that fore-
knowledge is not the cause of any
necessity in things to come. For
fetchest thou any prooffe for the ne-
cessity of future things from any o-
ther principle, but onely from this,
that those things which are fore-
knowne, cannot chuse but happen?
wherefore if foreknowledge impo-
seth no necessitie vpon future e-
uent, which thou diddest grant no-
long before, why should voluntary
actions be tyed to any certaine suc-
cesse? For examples sake, that thou
maiest see what will follow, let
vs suppose that there were no proui-

dence or foresight at all. Would those things which proceede from freewill, be compelled to any necessity by this meanes? No. Againe let vs grant it to be, but that it imposeth no necessity vpon any thing, no doubt the same freedome of will, will remaine whole and absolute. But thou wilt say, though foreknowledge be not a necessity for things to happen, yet it is a signe, that they shall necessarily come to passe. Wherefore now, though there had bin no foreknowledge, the euent of future things would haue beene necessary. For all signes only shew somthing, that is, but cause not that which they designe. And consequently it must first be proued, that all things fall out by necessity, that it may appeare that foreknowledge is a signe of this necessity. For otherwise if there be no
necessity,

necessitie, neither can foreknowledge be the signe of that, which is not. Besides it is manifest that eue-ry firme prooffe must bee drawne from intrinsecall and necessary causes, and not from signes and other farrefetched arguments. But how is it possible, those things should not happen, which are fore-seene to be to come? As though we did beleue that those things will not be, which prouidence hath fore-knowne, and doe not rather iudge, that although they happen, yet by their owne nature they had no necessity of being, which thou maiest easily gather hence. For we see many things with our eyes, while they are in doing, as those things which the Coach-men do while they driue and turne their Coaches, and in like manner other things.

Now doth necessity compell any of these things to be done in this sort? No. For in vain should Art labour, if all things were moued by compulsion. VVherefore as these things are without necessity, when they are in doing, so likewise they are to come without necessity, before they bee done. And consequently there are some things to come, whose event is free from all necessity. For I suppose no man will say, that those things, which are done now, were not to come, before they were done. VVherefore these things being foreseene, come freely to effect. For as the knowledge of things present causeth no necessity in things which are in doing, so neither the foreknowledg in things to come. But thou wilt say, This is the question, whether there can bee
any

any foreknowledg of those things, whose euent is not necessary. For these things seeme opposite, and thou thinkest, that if future things be foreseene, there followeth necessity, if there bee no necessity, that they are not foreknowen, and that nothing can be perfectly knowne, vnlesse it be certaine. And if vncertaine euent be foreseene as certain, it is manifest that this is the obscurity of opinion and not the truth of knowledge. For thou thinkest it to be farre from the integrity of knowledge, to iudge otherwise then the thing is. The cause of which error is, because thou thinkest that all that is knowen, is knowen onely by the force and nature of the things themselues, which is altogether otherwise. For all that is knowne, is not comprehended according to

the force which it hath in it selfe, but rather according to the facultie of them which know it. For to explicate it with a briefe example: the sight, and the feeling doe diuersly discern the roundnesse of a dye. The sight standing aloofe, beholdeth it altogether by his beames; but the feeling vnited and ioyned to the orbe, being moued about the compasse of it, comprehendeth the roundnes by parts. Likewise sense, imagination, reason and vnderstanding doe diuersly behold a man. For sense looketh vpon his forme as it is placed in matter or subiect, the imagination discerneth it alone without matter. Reason passeth beyond this also, and considereth vniuersally the species or kind, which is in particulars. The eye of the vnder-

derstanding is higher yet. For surpassing the compasse of the whole world, it beholdeth with the cleare sight of the mind, that simple forme in it selfe.

In which that is chiefly to be considered, that the superiour force of comprehending embraceth the inferiour; but the inferiour can by no meanes attaine to the superiour: for the sense hath no force out of matter, neither doth the imagination conceiue vniuersall Species, nor reason is capable of the simple forme, but the vnderstanding, as it were, looking downward, hauing conceyued that forme, discerneth of all thinges which are vnder it, but in that sorte, in which it apprehendeth that forme, which can be knowne by none
of

of the other. For it knoweth the vniuersality of reason, and the figure of imagination, and the materiality of sense, neither vsing reason, nor imagination, nor senses, but as it were formally beholding all things, with that one twinckling of the mind. Likewise reason, when it considereth any vniuersallity, comprehendeth both imaginable and sensible things without the vse of either imagination or senses. For she defineth the vniuersallity of her conceit thus: man is a reasonable two-footed liuing creature, which being an vniuersall knowledge, no man is ignorant that it is an imaginable and sensible thing, which she considereth by a reasonable conceiving, and not by imagination or sense. Imagination also, although it began by the senses of seeing and forming

forming figures, yet when sense is absent, it beholdeth sensible things, not after a sensible, but after an imaginary manner of knowledge. Seest thou now how al these in knowing, doe rather vſe their owne force and faculty, then the force of thoſe things, which are knowen? Nor vnderſeuedly, for ſince all iudgement is the act of him, who iudgeth, it is neceſſary that every one ſhould perfect his operation by his owne power, and not by the force of any other.

T H E I I I I . V E R S E .

*That our knowledge is not wholly taken
from the outward obiect.*

Ancients in ſchooles once too obſcurely taught,
That ſenſe and ſhape preſented to the thought,
From outward obiects their impreſſion take.

As

Boetius his

As when upon a paper smooth and plaine,
On which as yet no markes of inke have layne,
We with a nimble pen doe letters make.
But if our mindst o nothing can apply
Their proper motions, but doe patient, lie
Subiect to formes, which doe from bodies flow,
Like to a glasse, rendring the shapes of things,
Who then can shew, from whence that motion springs,
By force of which the mind all things doth know?
Or by what skill are sen' rall things espi'd?
And being knowne, what power doth them deuide?
And thus deuided, doth againe unite?
And with a various iourney, oft a spires
To highest things, and oft againe retires
To basest, nothing being out of sight?
And when she backe vnto her selfe doth moue,
Doth all the fallhoods by the truth reproc,
This vigour needes must be an actiue cause,
And with more powerfull forces must be deckt,
Then that, which from those formes, that do reflect
From outward matter, all her vertue drawes.
And yet in liuing bodies passions might
Doth goe before, whose office is't encuse,
And the first motions in the mind to make.
As when the light vnto our eyes appeares,
Or some loud voyce is sounded in our eares.
Then doth the strength of the dull mind awake
Those phantasies, which she retaynes within,
She stirreth up such motionst o begin,
Whose obiects with their naturcs best agree.
And thus applying them to outward things,

*She ioynes th'externall shapes, which thence she brings:
With formes, which in her selfe included bee.*

THE V. PROSE.

*That reason must yeeld to the simpli-
city of Gods knowledge.*



And if in the discerning of bodies by sense, although the qualities which are objected do moue the organs of sense, and the passion of the body goeth before the vigor of the active mind, prouoking her action to it selfe, and exciting the inward formes, which before lay quiet; if (I say) in perceiuing these corporal objects, the mind taketh not her impression from passion, but by her own force iudgeth of the passiõ it self, which is objected to the body; how much more do those powers exercise the action of their
mind,

minde, and not onely follow the outward objects in their iudgement, which are free from all affections of the body? Wherefore in this sort haue diuers and different substances, knowledges of many kinds. For onely sense destitute of all other, is in those liuing creatures, which are vnmoueable, as some shell-fish, and other which sticke to stones and so are nourished. And imagination in moueable beasts, who seeme to haue some power to couet, and flie. Reason belongeth onely to mankind, as vnderstanding to things Diuine; So that, that knowledge is most excellent, which of it selfe doth not onely know her owne object, but also those which belong to others. What then, if sense and imagination repugne to discourse and reason, affirming that vniuersality

fallity to be nothing, which reason thinketh her selfe to see? For that cannot be vniuersal, which is either sensible or imaginable. Wherefore either the iudgment of reason must be true, and nothing at all sensible, or because they know that many things are subiect to the senses and imagination, the conceit of reason is vaine, which considereth that which is sensible and singular, as if it were vniuersall. And if reason should answer, that she beholdeth in her vniuersallity, al that which is sensible or imaginable, but they cannot aspire to the knowledge of vniuersallity, because their knowledge cannot surpasse corporall figures and shapes. And that wee must giue more credite to the firmer and more perfect iudgement, about the knowledge of things. In this contention,

tention, should not wee, who haue the power of discoursing, as well as of imagination and sense, rather take reasons part? The very like happeneth, when humane reason doth not thinke, that the diuine vnderstanding doth beholde future things, otherwisethen she her selfe doth. For thus thou arguest, if any things seeme not to haue certaine and necessary euent, they cannot be certainly foreknowne to bee to come. Wherefore there is no foreknowledge of these things, and if we thinke that there is any, there shall be nothing, which happeneth not of necessity. If therefore, as we are endewed with reason, wee could likewise haue the iudgement proper to the diuine mind, as we haue iudged that imagination and sense must yeeld to reason, so likewise we
would

would thinke it most reasonable and iust, that humane reason should submitte her selfe to the Diuine mind. Wherefore let vs bee lifted vp, as much as wee can to that height of the highest mind; for there reason shall see that, which she cannot behold in her selfe. And that is how a certaine and definite foreknowledge seeth those things, which haue no certaine issue, and that this is no opinion, but rather the simplicitie of the highest knowledge, inclosed with no bounds.

THE V. VERSE.

Mans body declareth, that his mind was made to contemplate heauenly things.

*What seru' all figures things that liue upon the earth do keepe?
Some haue their bodies stretcht in length, by which the dust
they sweepe*

*T**And*

Boetius his

And do continuall furrowes make, while on their breasts they creepe.
Some lightly soaring up on high, with wings the wind doth smite,
And through the longest ayery space, passe with an easie flight.
Some by their paces to imprint the ground with steps delight,
Which through the pleasant fieldes doe passe, or to the woods do goe,
Whose seu'rall formes though to our eyes they do a difference shew,
Yet by their lookes cast downe on earth their senses heauy grow.
Men onely with more stately shape to higher objects rise,
Who with erected bodies stand, and doe the earth dispise.
These figures warne (if baser thoughts blind not thine earthly eyes)
That thou, who with an vp right face dost looke upon the skie,
Shouldest also raise thy mind aloft, least while thou bearest high
Thy earthly head thy soule opprest beneath thy body lye.

THE VI. PROSE.

The concord of Gods prouidence with
freewill is fully explicated.



Seeing therefore, as hath been
shewed, all that is knowne,
is not comprehended by his
owne nature, but by the power of
him, which comprehendeth it, let
vs see now, as much as we may, what
is the state of the diuine substance,
that

that wee may also know, what his knowledge is. Wherefore it is the common iudgement of all that liue by reason, that God is euerlasting, and therefore let vs consider what^a eternity is. For this will declare vnto vs both the Diuine nature and knowledge. Eternitie is a perfect possession all together of an endlesse life, which is more manifest by the comparison of temporall things, for whatsoever liueth in time, that being present proceedeth from times past, to times to come, and there is nothing placed in time, which can embrace all the space of his life at once. But he hath not yet attained to morrow, and hath lost yesterday. And you liue no more in this daies life, then in that moueable and transitory moment. wherefore whatsoever suffereth the

^a Eternity
what it is.

dition of time, although as *Aristotle* thought of the world) it neuer began, nor were euer to end, and his life did endure with infinite time, yet it is not such, that it ought to be called euerlasting. For it doth not comprehend and embrace all the space of his life together, though it be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fullnesse of an endlesse life together, to which neither any part to come is absent, nor of that which is past, hath escaped, is worthely to bee accounted euerlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in it selfe, it may alway be present to it selfe, and haue an infinity of moueable time present to it. Wherefore they are deceiued, who hearing that *Plato* thought,
that

that this world had neither beginning of time, nor should euer haue any end, thinke that by this meanes the created world should be coeternal with the creator. For it is one thing, to bee carried through an endlesse life, which *Plato* attributed to the world, another thing to embrace the whole presence of an endlesse life together, which is manifestly proper to the Diuine mind. Neither ought God to seeme more ancient then things created by the quantity of time, but rather by the simplicity of his Diuine nature. For that infinite motiõ of tēporal things imitateth the present state of the vn-moueable life, and since it cannot attaine nor equal it, it falleth from immobilitie to motion, & frõ the simplicity of presence, it decreaseth to an infinite quãtity of future & past

and since it cannot possesse together all the fulnesse of his life, by neuer leauing to be in some sort, it seemeth to emulate in part that, which it cannot fully obaine & expresse, tying it selfe to this small presence of this short & swift moment, which because it carrieth a certaine image of that abiding presence, whosoever hath it, seemeth to be. But because it could not stay, it vndertooke an infinite iourney of time, and so it came to passe, that it continued that life by going, whose plenitude it could not comprehend by staying. Wherefore if wee will giue things their right names, following *Plato*, let vs say that God is euerlasting, and the world perpetuall. Wherefore since euery iudgement comprehendeth those things which are subiect vnto it, according to his owne nature,
and

and God hath alway an euerlasting and present state, his knowledge also surpassing all motion of time, remayneth in the simplicity of his presence, and comprehending the infinite spaces of that, which is past and to come, considereth all things in his simple knowledge, as though they were now in doing. So that, if thou wilt weigh his foreknowledge, with which he discerneth all things, thou wilt more rightly esteeme it to be the knowledge of a neuer fading instant, then a foreknowledge as of a thing to come. For which cause it is not called præuidence or foresight, but rather prouidence, because placed farre from inferiour things, it beholdeth all things as it were from the highest toppe of things. Why therefore wilt thou haue those things necessary, which are illustra-

ted by the Diuine light, since that men make not those things necessary, which they see. For doth thy sight impose any necessity vpon those things, which thou seest present? No. But the present instant of men may well bee compared to that of God in this; that as you see some things in your temporall instant, so he beholdeth all things in his eternall presence. VVherefore this diuine foreknowledge doeth not change the nature and propriety of things, and it beholdeth them such in his presence, as they will after come to bee, neyther doth hee confound the iudgement of things, and with one sight of his mind he discerneth as well those things which shal happen necessarily, as otherwise. As you when at one time you see a man walking vpon earth, and the Sun i-

sing

sing in heauen, although they be both seene at once, yet you discern, and iudge that the one is voluntary, and the other necessary. So likewise the Diuine sight beholding all things, disturbeth not the quality of things, which to him are present, but in respect of time are yet to come. And so this is not an opinion, but rather a knowledge grounded vpon truth, whē he knoweth that such a thing shalbe, which likewise he is not ignorāt, that it hath no necessity of being. Here if thou sayest, that cannot chuse but happē, which God seeth shal happen, & that, which cannot chuse but happen, must be of necessity, and so tyeest me to this name of necessity: I will graunt, that it is a most solide trueth, but whereof scarce any but a contemplator of Diuinity is capable.

For

For I will answer, that the same thing is necessary, when it is referred to the diuine knowledge; but when it is weighed in his owne nature, that it seemeth altogether free and absolute. For there be two necessities; the one simple, as that it is necessary for all men to be mortall. The other conditionall, as if thou knowest, that any man walketh, he must needs walke. For what a man knoweth, cannot bee otherwise, then it is knowne. But this conditionall draweth not with it that simple or absolute necessity. For this is not caused by the nature of the thing, but by the adding a condition. For no necessity maketh him to goe, that goeth of his owne accord, although it bee necessary that he goeth, while he goeth. In like manner if prouidence seeth a-

ny

nything present, that must needes be, although it hath no necessity of nature. But God beholdeth those future things, which proceed from freewill, present. These things therefore being referred to the Diuine sight are necessary by the condition of the diuine knowledg, and considered by themselves, they loose not the absolute freedom of their own nature. Wherefore doubtlesse all those things come to passe, which God foreknoweth shall come, but some of them proceede from freewill, which though they come to passe by being, yet they loose not their owne nature, because before they came to passe, they might also not haue happened. But what importeth it, that they are not necessary, since that by reason of the condition of the diuine knowledge, they
come

come to passe in all respects, as if they were necessary. It importeth this, that those things, which I proposed a litle before, the Sunne rising, and the man going, while they are in doing, cannot chuse but bee in doing; yet one of them was necessarily to bee, before it was, and the other not. Likewise those things, which God hath present, haue doubtlesse a beeing, but some of them proceede from the necessity of things, other from the power of the doers. And therefore wee said not without cause, that these, if they bee referred to Gods knowledge, are necessary; and if they bee considered by themselves, they are free from the bonds of necessity. As whatsoever is manifest to senses, if thou referrest it to reason, is vniuersall, if thou considerest

itin it self, singular or particular. But thou wilt say, it is in my power to change my purpose, shall I frustrate prouidēce, if I chance to alter those things, which she foreknoweth? I answer, that thou mayest indeede change thy purpose, but beecaue the trueth of prouidence beeing present seeth, that thou canst doe so, and whether thou wilt doe so or no, and what thou purposest anew, thou canst not auoyde the Diuine foreknowledge; euen as thou canst not auoyde the sight of an eye, which is present, although thou turnest thy selfe to diuers actions by thy freewill.

But yet thou wilt enquire, whether GODS knowledge shall bee changed by thy disposition, so that when thou wilt now one thing, and now another, it should
also

also seeme to haue diuers knowledges. No. For Gods sight preuenteth all that is to come, and recalleth and draweth it to the presence of his owne knowledge; neither doth he vary, as thou imaginest, now knowing one thing and now another, but in one instant without moving preuenteth and comprehendeth thy mutations. Which presence of comprehending, and seeing all things God hath not by the euent of future things, but by his owne simplicity. By which that doubt is also resolued, which thou diddest put a litle before, that it is an vnworthy thing, that our future actions should be said to cause the knowledge of God. For this force of the diuine knowledge, comprehending all things with a present notion, appointeth to euery thing his measure,

sure, and receiue nothing from ensuing accidents. All which being so, the freewill of mortall men remayneth vniuolated, neither are the lawes vniust, which propose punishments and rewards to our wils, which are free from all necessity. There remayneth also a beholder of all things, which is God, who foreseeeth all things, and the eternity of his vision, which is alway present, concurreth with the future quality of our actions, distributing rewards to the good, and punishments to the euill. Neyther doe we in vaine put our hope in God, or pray to him, for if wee doe this well and as we ought, wee shall not loose our labour, or bee without effect. Wherefore flye vices, embrace vertues, possesse your mindes with worthy hopes, offer vp humble
prayers

prayers to your highest Prince.
There is, if you will not dissemble,
a great necessity of doing wel im-
posed vpon you, since you liue
in the sight of your iudge,
who beholdeth all
things.

FINIS.







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