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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

December 8, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. 19

(5)

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

MARSHALL, General George C. (Resumed)

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Saturday, December 8, 1945

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
of counsel, for the joint committee

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

3 The Chairman is detained for a few moments. We will
4 continue.

5 Does counsel have anything to present at this time before
6 General Marshall resumes his testimony?

7 Mr. Mitchell: No, sir.

8 TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

9 (Resumed)

10 The Vice Chairman: General Marshall, do you have anything
11 that you want to bring to the attention of the committee before
12 you resume your testimony?

13 General Marshall: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
14 present two items in the record regarding my testimony yesterday
15 which are incorrect statements as recorded. Is that per-
16 missible?

17 The Vice Chairman: You may proceed.

18 General Marshall: On page 2994, the next to the last
19 sentence reads: "I came to the conclusion that the matter
20 was so important that we must make it a matter of record, and
21 I sent Colonel Clarke", and so forth.

22 I was referring to the discussion I had preliminarily
23 to sending a second letter to Governor Dewey. The first five
24 words on line 24, "it a matter of record" should have read
25 "another effort", so the sentence would read: "I came to

Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
Mr. Gearhart

1
2 the conclusion that the matter was so important that we
3 must make another effort, and I sent Colonel Clarke".

4 The Vice Chairman: That correction will be made.

5 General Marshall: Two pages further on, 2996, line 4,
6 the sentence reads: "Colonel Clark returned to Washington
7 and reported to me that the Governor had read the letter,
8 had discussed it with Mr. Bell in the presence of Colonel
9 Clarke". That is not a correct statement.

10 Line 4 should read, "with Mr. Bell but not in the
11 presence of Colonel Clarke".

12 The Vice Chairman: That correction will be made, General.
13 Is there anything further, sir?

14 General Marshall: Nothing further.

15 The Vice Chairman: The committee has heard with profound
16 sorrow that Senator Brewster's father passed away last night.
17 Necessarily the Senator is absent this morning. The committee
18 extends him its deepest sympathy in this time of bereavement.

19 Senator Brewster would next be entitled to recognition,
20 and of course being unable to be present the Chair recognizes
21 Congressman Gearhart of California, who will now inquire.

22 Mr. Gearhart: General Marshall, I regret the necessity
23 of your being delayed in leaving for the Orient, and I regret
24 especially that I must share a part of the blame for detaining
25 you here, and for that reason I will make my cross-examination

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 very, very short.

3 First I would like to inquire, what was the over-all
4 desire of the Army and Navy during the months of October and
5 November and first part of December in reference to delaying
6 or accelerating the commencement of war with any nation?

7 General Marshall: It was our great desire, speaking
8 specifically for the Army, but I am certain with Naval agree-
9 ment, the agreement of Admiral Stark, to delay in every way
10 the possibility of our being involved in war.

11 Mr. Gearhart: The reason for that was that we were im-
12 proving our defensive and striking capacity very rapidly under
13 our preparedness program of the moment?

14 General Marshall: That, of course, was a prime factor,
15 Mr. Congressman, but it goes a little further than that.
16 Naturally it was our hope that we could avoid a war, but also,
17 as a purely military proposition, it would be highly undesirable,
18 if involved in war, that it should be on two fronts in widely
19 separated parts of the world, and more specifically, that it
20 should develop in the Pacific, where we knew the British had
21 very little available means to resist aggressive action by
22 the Japanese.

23 The British situation, or that of the British Empire,
24 was so serious as to deficiency in men and materiel, particu-
25 larly in planes at that time, and in Naval shipping, which

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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3 was engaged in the effort to keep the Atlantic lanes open
4 for convoys from this country, carrying Lend-Lease supplies
5 which were vital to the successful defense they were then
6 laboring under, that if they became involved in war in the
7 Pacific they were almost bound to weaken themselves in the
8 Atlantic, meaning in Great Britain, at a time when the Germans
9 were exceedingly strong.

10 So a war on two fronts was to be avoided, if it was at
11 all possible to do so. War was to be avoided by us in our
12 own view, if we could manage it, and every effort was to be
13 made to gain us time in case war became inevitable.

14 Mr. Gearhart: And it was your belief, Admiral Stark
15 concurring, that if the war with Japan could be delayed long
16 enough, that our might and power would grow so great that
17 Japan probably would be dissuaded from attacking us?

18 General Marshall: I have a very distinct recollection
19 of my own reactions at the time. I thought if we once had
20 accumulated approximately 100 4-engine bombers in the
21 Philippines the Japanese could not dare to attempt to move
22 to the south of the Philippines, or to make a naval attack
23 on the Philippines, that is to support a landing. I had
24 great confidence in the potential threat involved in a large
25 concentration of heavy bombers.

I might add that at that time no such concentration had

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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ever been made before in the history of war, I think, and although now we think in terms of thousands, at that time 100 was a very large figure.

LaCharity
(1)
10:15

So we were making every conceivable effort to present in the Philippines to the Japanese a concentration of air power that they would not dare hazard active operations to the south in the China Sea or directly against the Philippine Islands themselves.

Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Stark shared those views with you, did he not?

General Marshall: That was my understanding, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: You and he took advantage of every opportunity to call the necessity for delayed action to the attention of the President and the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, did you not?

General Marshall: And the Secretary of State. Admiral Stark, as I believe I testified earlier in my appearance here, which, of course, he can give you authentic evidence on, desired in the discussions with Mr. Hull that, or stated, I believe, that February 1st was the essential date for the Navy in order that they might be able to make the completion of the Fleet's requirements. I hazarded in early September, as I recall, that if we obtained the ships and delivery of planes, that we might or should be ready by December 5 to an extent

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

that would probably deter the Japanese from making an attack.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, during the month of November large convoys, men and materiel were moving towards the Philippines and you had plans for still larger convoys to be moving in that direction for the month of December?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Of 1941.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, convoys were leaving San Francisco as the bombs began to fall in Hawaii; is that not true?

General Marshall: I did not hear the question.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, convoys were moving out of San Francisco at the time the bombs began to fall?

General Marshall: I think that is correct; I also know that a large slow convoy had been headed south toward Torres Strait and was somewhere between Samoa and Hawaii at the time of the outbreak of war.

Mr. Gearhart: In line with your and Admiral Stark's desire to gain time, you jointly prepared a statement which you sent to the President on November 5?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: And the gist of that document was an appeal to the President to use his good offices and the good offices

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

of our Government to prevent an outbreak of war with Japan for the time being?

General Marshall: I think that in general is a correct statement.

Mr. Gearhart: Did you or Admiral Stark, in your presence and hearing, protest at any time to Secretary Hull the sending of his message, the handing of his message of November 26 to the Japanese Envoys?

General Marshall: I have no recollection of such protest.

Mr. Gearhart: Did you know in advance of the handing of that message to the Japanese that Mr. Hull was contemplating the preparation of such a document?

General Marshall: I think I knew he was contemplating the preparation of such a document. I did not know the time and actual date of the document.

Mr. Gearhart: Did you, in any words, written or oral, urge him not to take that step?

General Marshall: I have no recollection of such action.

Mr. Gearhart: When did you first hear that he had handed such a note as the one which bears the date of November 26 to the Japanese Envoys?

General Marshall: I have not a clear recollection regarding that. I imagine it was on November 27 -- or 28th for me, because I was absent on the 27th.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: You were a member of the so-called War Cabinet of the President?

General Marshall: I don't believe I could be considered a member of the Cabinet, but I sat in at the meetings of that group on most occasions.

Mr. Gearhart: Wasn't there an organization informally known as the President's War Cabinet consisting of the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Secretary of State and the two Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General Marshall: That group met in that form on several occasions. What I mean is that the military, I don't believe, would be considered part of the Cabinet, though we were a part of the meeting.

Mr. Gearhart: I will ask you if Secretary Hull, prior to the 26th day of November and prior to his handing the note to the Japanese, informed you and the other members of that so-called War Cabinet of his intention to hand a document at that time to the Japanese?

General Marshall: May I have the first part of the question?

(Question read)

General Marshall: He made, Mr. Hull, that is, made several general statements in regard to whether or not further diplomatic efforts would be practical, but the actual action

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 that he took at that time I do not recall he stating in my
3 presence.

4 Mr. Gearhart: You do not know whether he read the mes-
5 sage to you prior to its delivery to the Japanese envoys?

6 General Marshall: I do not think he did.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Did he read it to you, or was a copy
8 placed in your hands immediately after he delivered it to
9 the Japanese?

10 General Marshall: No, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: But nevertheless you and Admiral Stark
12 on November 27, the very next day, addressed a memorandum
13 to the President in which you again urged upon the President
14 as the most essential thing, the necessity of gaining time.

15 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Was that joint message from the joint
17 Chiefs of Staff to the President inspired by the action
18 of the Secretary of State in handing the message of November
19 26 to the Japanese?

20 General Marshall I have not a clear recollection on that,
21 Mr. Gearhart. I couldn't tell you, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: All right.

23 General Marshall: I certainly haven't an affirmative
24 reaction of what the Secretary of State said he was going
25 to do that caused us to take that particular action. We

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 took it, but possibly Admiral Stark can remember more clearly
3 than I can. I do not recall all the circumstances of it.

4 Mr. Gearhart: I will read you, for the purpose of re-
5 freshing your memory a paragraph from the pamphlet entitled
6 "Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931-1941," the
7 paragraph which appears on page 138:

8 "On November 28 at a meeting of high officials of this
9 Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature
10 of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated
11 that there was no possibility of agreement being achieved
12 with Japan, that in his opinion the Japanese were likely
13 to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force,
14 and that the matter of safeguarding our national security
15 was in the hands of the Army and the Navy."

16 Are you familiar with that?

17 General Marshall: My recollection is roughly that, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Then, the Secretary on the 25th told you
19 and the other members composing this so-called war cabinet,
20 that there was no chance of obtaining an agreement, and that
21 the matter was in the hands of the Army and Navy at that
22 time.

23 General Marshall: I think that is correct.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Isn't that the reason why you and Admiral
25 Stark immediately devoted your attention to preparing the

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

memorandum of November 27 for the President?

General Marshall: That may be, sir. I don't recall exactly the conditions under which we wrote that memorandum.

Mr. Gearhart: Going on and reading further in the same paragraph:

"The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy, and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and coordination."

Do you remember his speaking to you to that effect?

General Marshall: I have no recollection of such detail. I testified yesterday to a very distinct recollection of Mr. Hull saying at one of those meetings, one of the last, "These fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared."

Mr. Gearhart: And to refresh your memory in respect to your having read this pamphlet at some time, or having had conversations in December or November of 1941, let me read one further paragraph from this pamphlet I have in my hands, the succeeding paragraph to that which I just read:

"On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British Ambassador. The Secretary said that 'the diplomatic

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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part of our relations with Japan were virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and the Navy."

Have you any comment to make upon that statement of the Secretary of State?

General Marshall: I have not, Mr. Gearhart. Incidentally, I have never read that pamphlet you are reading from.

Mr. Gearhart: Was it ever called to your attention by anyone who had heard that the Secretary had made that statement?

General Marshall: I don't recall anyone bringing it to my attention; I have a vague recollection of it, which I probably obtained from the newspapers.

Mr. Gearhart: Quoting further from the same page:

"He said further that it would be 'a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly, and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognized that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h5 2 the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the
3 utmost boldness and risks."

4 Do you remember having heard that from anyone of the
5 Secretary having so expressed himself to the British
6 Ambassador?

e3 7 General Marshall: No, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: But you did feel from that which he
9 had to say that war was imminent and you felt also in harmony
10 with the Chief of Naval Operations that everything should
11 be done to delay the commencement of hostilities?

12 General Marshall: That is correct, sir. My under-
13 standing from the Secretary of State was that the situa-
14 tion was most critical, using the word "most" in its
15 accurate meaning, that these "fellows" meaning the Japanese,
16 intended to fight, and that we must be prepared. That is
17 a pretty complete estimate of the situation.

18 Mr. Gearhart: In your memorandum to the President of
19 November 27, 1941, written just after you had heard of
20 the President's message which he had handed the Japanese
21 envoys in Washington, you commenced by using these words:

22 "If the current negotiations end without agreement
23 Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the
24 Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Mari-
25 time Provinces.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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"There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward."

As a matter of fact, General, wasn't it your opinion, and wasn't it the opinion of Admiral Stark and all of the high ranking Naval and Military officers with whom you were in conversation, that the Japanese attack was going to come to the Far East and that there was no thought of it coming at Hawaii?

General Marshall: Our thought at the time -- my thought specifically -- was that the Japanese were engaged in a campaign southward from the China Sea, that that would be their operation. I assumed that Guam would be captured. I assumed that Wake Island would be taken, though there was a little less probability there than there was as regards Guam, because while the Fleet was still in full being, the American Fleet, Wake, I would assume, would be a more difficult task for the Japanese.

We had in mind the possibility of an effort on the Panama Canal. We had in mind the possibility of an effort to strike a blow at our air plants in Seattle, at our air plants in San Diego, and we had in mind the possibility of a blow in the Central Pacific, in the Hawaiian district.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 We thought the latter was the most improbable.

2 Mr. Gearhart: What was the latter?

3
4 General Marshall: The attack against the Hawaiian
5 Islands.

6 Mr. Gearhart: You thought that was improbable?

7 General Marshall: I said the most improbable.

8 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, in the opinion of
9 the people with whom you were in daily conversation, both
10 naval and military, Pearl Harbor was considered impregnable,
11 was it not?

12 General Marshall: Do you mean by that, Mr. Gearhart,
13 it was impracticable as a naval base, or impracticable as
14 a Japanese objective?

15 Mr. Gearhart: Why did we build it?

16 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

17 General Marshall: Did you say impracticable?

18 Mr. Gearhart: Impregnable.

19 General Marshall: I didn't understand.

20 Mr. Gearhart: We built it as a defense against possible
21 trouble with Japan, isn't that right?

22 General Marshall: Yes. I thought you used the word
23 impracticable. We thought it was impregnable against a
24 Japanese landing expedition.

25 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, you were so convinced

h7

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 of that, you wrote in 1940 in your aide memoire the fol-
3 lowing words:

4 "The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its
5 garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed
6 to be the strongest fortress in the world."

7 General Marshall: I didn't write that. It was prepared
8 for me. At the time I think it was a correct statement.

9 Also in the memorandum, the implication is, when we
10 get all the various arrangements there.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Now, referring to your warning message
12 which was sent in slightly different forms to Manila,
13 Hawaii, Panama, and other places, that warning message re-
14 quired the addressees to report to you, didn't it?

15 General Marshall: Required --

16 Mr. Gearhart: The addressees to report to you?

17 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: What they had done in response to your
19 directions?

20 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: General Short reported that he had taken
22 steps in accordance with your part of your directions against
23 sabotage, in his message of November 28th?

24 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

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10:35

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Mr. Gearhart: You received that report, did you not?

2
3 General Marshall: I testified in regard to that, sir.
4 The presumption is I did. The War Department received it
5 and the presumption is that I read it.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Don't you remember whether or not you
7 received such a message of that kind?

8 General Marshall: I do not remember, as I testified,
9 and I did not initial the report.

10 Mr. Gearhart: What did you say?

11 General Marshall: I do not remember, as I testified,
12 and I did not initial the report.

13 Mr. Gearhart: You heard, or were you present in this
14 room when General Gerow testified and accepted full respon-
15 sibility for not having acted on the inadequacy, as he
16 called it, of this report?

17 General Marshall: I was not present in the room and I
18 admire very much his attitude.

19 Mr. Gearhart: I, too, thought it was very generous,
20 but prior to November 28th you had issued a directive to
21 General Gerow and to General Miles, did you not, directing
22 them to send you not only the reports on the messages that
23 they received but to send you the material itself, had you
24 not?

25 General Marshall: The message reads:

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

3 "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated
4 to all practical purposes with only the barest possi-
5 bilities that the Japanese Government might come back
6 and offer to continue. Japanese future action un-
7 predictable but hostile action possible at any moment.
8 If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United
9 States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.
10 This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as
11 restricting you to a course of action that might jep-
12 pardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action
13 you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and
14 other measures as you deem necessary but these measures
15 should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm
16 civil population or disclose intent. Report measures
17 taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the
18 tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain
19 to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret
20 information to minimum essential officers.

(Signed) MARSHALL."

21 Mr. Gearhart: That is correct, but that is not an
22 answer to the question, though, that I propounded to you,
23 General.

24 My question was did you not prior to November 28th issue
25 a directive to General Gerow and General Miles --

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

General Marshall: General Gerow?

Mr. Gearhart: (Continuing) -- where you accepted their evaluations on the messages they intercepted but also to send the material along as well?

General Marshall: Oh, I misunderstood you, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from California yield?

General Marshall: That was, I believe, in the month of August, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: You understand the question, don't you?

General Marshall: I think so. In the month of August are you referring to?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes, in the month of August, that they send the messages and their evaluations, if any, along with them?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Your reason for making that directive to the two Generals was because you wanted to see yourself what was being intercepted and what messages were being received?

General Marshall: That, quite evidently, was my reason.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, can you give any reason now why you did not take exception yourself to the message of General Short's of November 28th?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 General Marshall: I can only say, sir, that that was
3 my opportunity to intervene and have a further check made and
4 I did not take it. Just why I do not know.

5 Mr. Gearhart: You expected immediate attention to be
6 given to your message of November 27th by the various ad-
7 dressees to whom you sent it, didn't you?

8 General Marshall: Yes, sir. That was a command direc-
9 tive for alert against a state of war.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Did you expect General Short to take
11 immediate action?

12 General Marshall: I did, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Then will you explain how he could have
14 taken immediate action and ordered a number 3 alert instantly
15 without creating alarm among the people and disclosing the
16 intent of the United States?

17 General Marshall: I think he could have, sir. We had
18 done such things before out there. We had done it the previ-
19 ous summer. There are a good many ways to get at that.

20 The reconnaissance, for example by air over water, -
21 that was a naval directive responsibility, - could not in any
22 way have alarmed the population. The other matters in regard
23 to planes and, presumably, ships it seems to me would have
24 not alarmed the population.

25 The issue where the people came most closely in contact

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

with the military might be as a change of attitude related to sabotage because that required the posting of a great many detachments in order to avoid action being taken.

I would like to say in regard to this right now it was necessary, we felt, specifically necessary, to include that particular direction regarding the public, both as to Hawaii and as to the West Coast, because it was the strong desire of, I will say, the War Cabinet, certainly of the Army and Navy officials and I am quite certain of the President of the United States, that the Japanese be given no opportunity whatever to claim that we had taken some overt act which forced a state of war upon them.

The feeling was, - I am now speaking as Chief of Staff only, from the point of view I could obtain as Chief of Staff, the feeling was at that time that if the Japanese could have created a situation, however unjustified, however illogical, in which they could have led at least a portion of the people to believe that our overt action had forced them into an act of war and we would have had a divided country, which would have been a terrible tragedy in a war situation.

Therefore, each move we made had to be taken carefully into account to avoid the possibility that the Japanese would instantly make a claim that we had forced the issue, that we had really made the overt act and they were forced to fight

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

us.

Mr. Gearhart: In reply to that I entirely agree with you.

General Marshall: May I finish my statement, sir?

Mr. Gearhart: I entirely agree with you.

The Chairman: Let the General finish his answer.

General Marshall: At that time there was a very -- I believe this is correct -- divided opinion in this country and, of course, the people generally could not know all the inside facts which we had obtained from one source or another about the very aggressive acts that the Japanese were carrying out in the Far East.

So we labored in this state of peace, in this state of normalcy; and, as for example, in Hawaii, in this state of not being able to check them up, for instance, through the 'phone service and things of that sort, in this state of having to allow them to send any information they wished back to their own country, we labored constantly under the obligation that we must have no act committed by one of our officers that would permit the Japanese to claim that we had started the war and, therefore, would to that extent for the time being at least have left us with a divided people on a tragic issue.

Therefore, it was necessary to omit, that those messages

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 to the West Coast and the message to the Hawaiian Islands
3 must have a proviso in them of that character.

4 Mr. Gearhart: I agree with you entirely, General.

5 That was a tremendously important consideration and to further
6 emphasize the arguments that you have made, the constitution
7 of the United States provides that war shall be declared only
8 by the Congress of the United States. If you took any other
9 steps it would have been in violation of the constitution
10 which all of us have taken an oath to uphold. I am just as
11 firm in my agreement with you as I possibly could be on that
12 necessity that you speak of.

13 What I am talking about now is whether or not the mes-
14 sage of General Short's was in line with what should have
15 been done under the circumstances and because of the very
16 reasons that you have cited. "We must not alarm the people
17 or give the Japanese the opportunity to say that we started
18 the war."

19 General Marshall: I gathered the impression from your
20 question, sir, that you thought or were implying that the
21 message was impractical of execution.

22 Mr. Gearhart: No -- oh, yes, that may be touched upon,
23 too. I may be touching upon that, too, for the reasons you
24 have outlined so well.

25 Now, if General Short had placed the Army on a Number 3

Witness Marshall.

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 alert immediately upon receiving your message, that would
2 have required him to fill the air with airplanes, it would
3 have required every soldier on the island to put on a steel
4 helmet and side arms, would it not, and appear on the streets
5 in full war regalia?
6

7 General Marshall: Not necessarily appear on the streets
8 in full war regalia and not necessarily fill the air with
9 planes because deep reconnaissance takes off from the field
10 and goes out over the water. It might be circling over the
11 city, it might be on a training maneuver of any kind. It is
12 not flying all the time; and the pursuit and interceptor
13 planes did not need to take the air; quite the contrary.
14 They needed to be armed and equipped and the pilots ready.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Well, that is exactly what happened when
16 they had a Number 3 alert, isn't it?

17 General Marshall: I don't know what moment they went
18 on the Number 3 alert and I would also like to say, Mr.
19 Gearhart, that I had never seen his various alert messages
20 and they did not arrive here in this country until January.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Wouldn't the Number 3 alert require the
22 men to take up battle positions immediately on the island?

23 General Marshall: It would, yes, sir. I presume that
24 was a Number 3 alert. I have not got the details here be-
25 fore me. General Short can testify about that.

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: That would have required trucks with
3 men with helmets and rifles to ride out to the battle posi-
4 tions from the barracks in which they were then living?

5 General Marshall: Presumably so, yes, sir.

6 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, the sudden ordering of
7 a Number 3 alert would have created a tremendous condition
8 on the island that would have alarmed the civilian population
9 on the island.

10 General Marshall: It seems to me that a Number 3 alert,
11 whatever its exact details were, could have been carried out
12 with certain modifications to attain the general result de-
13 sired.

14 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

15 The Chairman: Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?

16 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

17 Mr. Murphy: A Number 2 alert would have been a defense
18 against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks. They
19 did not need a Number 3. A Number 2 would have made it.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Either 2 or 3.

21 General Marshall: I was not referring to 1, 2 or 3.
22 That was the function of the commanding General in the Hawaiian
23 Department.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Now, when we have maneuvers over
25 there, and we have had them for thirty or forty years, the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 public mind was always prepared for the event, was it not,
3 by prior announcements and by notices, so that they would not
4 become alarmed at the display of military power?

5 General Marshall: I am not the best witness on that.
6 General Herron and possibly General Short himself can testi-
7 fy as to that, and other commanders.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I --

9 General Marshall: You are asking me, sir, for the de-
10 tails of the condition of a command by the individual respon-
11 sible for that command.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

13 General Marshall: There were commands all over the
14 Pacific, there were commands in this country and there were
15 commands in the Caribbean.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

17 General Marshall: I was not familiar with the detailed
18 execution of their plans any more than I was familiar with
19 General MacArthur's plans. I had given certain general di-
20 rectives and as general officers in a responsible position
21 in the outpost he was carrying the duties out.

22 I testified, for example, the other day to an incident
23 illustrative of that, that we only learned through "Magic"
24 his procedure of unloading at night and taking other measures
25 to keep the Japanese in the dark as to what was going on.

1811

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 It is impractical and there are no means in Washington
3 to know all the details of the execution of commands by a
4 higher officer who is given the responsibility of carrying
5 out a defense for air or certain operations.

6
7 Mr. Gearhart: At the present time you do not remember
8 that you had or voiced any objections or criticism to General
9 Short's report?

10 General Marshall: I know specifically I did not.

11 Mr. Gearhart: The evidence shows that the thirteen parts
12 and the pilot message were received and decoded on December
13 6, 1941. All this became available on Saturday night. The
14 President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State and
15 the Secretary of the Navy had it, your subordinates Miles
16 and Bratton had it.

17 How do you explain the fact that none of it was given to
18 your attention on Saturday, December 6, 1941?

19 General Marshall: As I recall -- of course, the message
20 itself will show -- the first thirteen parts were not of the
21 nature of a vital threat as the fourteenth part. That was a
22 message of direct importance to the Secretary of State and of
23 related importance, of course, to the Secretary of War and the
24 Secretary of the Navy who had been collaborating with him in
25 his relationship in the dealings with Japan. The fact of the
matter was it was not brought to my attention.

Witness Marshall

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Do you now feel that General Short was not entitled to have information of that character to guide him in setting up the degree of alert that it was essential to have done?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, that was my view. He was issued a command and directed to do something. Now, if the directive was so written that he could not understand it, that is a matter for judgment. Once you issue an order, amendments or, you might say, codicils are very dangerous business when it is an operational order. In most instances it is far better to cancel the entire order and start anew. The transmission of information from the G-2, for example, of the War Department to G-2, for example, under General Short is another matter. That is informational and that is not directional.

Mr. Gearhart: Whenever a higher command, say the command in Washington, is in receipt of information of great importance to a commander in the field, it is the obligation of the command having that information either to transmit the information or issue directives in the light of that information, is that not correct?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Was that always done by G-2 and by your War Plans Division?

General Marshall: Are you referring to this incident or

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 the whole course of the war?

3 Mr. Gearhart: I am talking about this thick volume of
4 Japanese intercepted messages which throw so much light upon
5 the Japanese attitude towards this country of ours.

6 The Vice Chairman: Exhibit 2.

7 General Marshall: I presume that in searching through
8 that you will locate messages the sense of which might well
9 have been communicated to General Short. However, the analyses
10 of these messages, particularly as relates to the higher
11 diplomatic operations of the government, would properly be
12 made here in Washington. It is the only place where all the
13 information was available.

14 The problem was to keep the commander in the clear, as
15 it were, as to what his action should be and not to confuse
16 it.

17 I recounted in my testimony, I believe, yesterday and
18 doubted for the moment as to whether the one o'clock message
19 of December 7th should be sent out, though it was quickly
20 decided that it was essential that it should go as quickly as
21 possible.

22 There was another message, for example -- no, that does
23 not pertain.

24 The point, I think, that should be made clear, if pos-
25 sible, is that you must avoid confusing the commander with a

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

mass of data.

For example, in this particular case, following General Short's assumption of command, as this record shows, there were a series of letters directly between General Short and myself. Those letters gave me the most definite impression of an extreme sensibility to air and submarine attack. They did not give me an impression of a similar sensitivity to sabotage matters.

Now, following that experience I practically never wrote another letter to any commander in the field and confined it purely to the operational directives. I did not write to General Eisenhower, I did not write to General MacArthur and I did not write to the other commanders virtually at all during the course of the war. I confined myself entirely to the dry directive as to what they were to do.

In this case I gathered the impression from a series of letters which you have in the record, and the directive was issued having that impression, of an essential and understood policy and then the reaction developed, as you have been referring to here, wherein the attention went to sabotage and so on from an air and submarine attack.

Mr. Gearhart: Quite a number of the messages which you caused to be sent and which were sent by subordinates of yours and by Admiral Stark and subordinates of his emphasize

1815

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 the possibilities of hostilities in Indo-China, the Philip-
2 pines, the Kra Peninsula, Thailand, even Guam, but in no
3 message that you sent did you call especial attention to the
4 fact that Hawaii might be threatened.
5

6 General Marshall: Because at that time the opinion
7 which we had most definitely in our own minds from the data
8 available, - in our own minds from the data available was
9 the Japanese threat south through the China Sea. We had it
10 by "Magic". We had it by the actual reconnaissance of con-
11 voys, we had it by reports from other officials in Indo-
12 China and elsewhere, of very positive action which actually
13 did confirm the main, the principal Japanese campaign.

14 Mr. Gearhart: What effect do you think it had upon the
15 minds of Admiral Kimmel and General Short as these several
16 messages went over their desks warning of impending war,
17 true, but always centering attention upon the Kra Peninsula,
18 the Philippines, Indo-China, Borneo, what effect do you think
19 it had on the minds of these two gentlemen warning them as
20 to war and then always directing their attention to another
21 side of the world? Do you think that there was any belief
22 that Washington thought that Hawaii might be attacked?

23 General Marshall: I cannot say, sir. They were both
24 long experienced in the military considerations. They were
25 men of mature judgments and they were men of high rank and

Witness Mashall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 they were in a position of great responsibility. They knew,
2 certainly, why Hawaii was set up in the military way as it
3 was. They knew the capacity of an enemy to do certain things
4 under certain circumstances. We did not have to tell them
5 that.

6
7 Mr. Gearhart: Now, going to your letter which you wrote
8 and had delivered to Governor Dewey, on page 2990 of the
9 transcript, Volume 18, you testified as follows --

10 General Marshall: 90?

11 Mr. Gearhart: 90, yes. Line 21.

12 General Marshall: 90?

13 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, 90.

14 General Marshall: What line, please?

15 Mr. Gearhart: Line 22: (Reading)

16 "The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor mat-
17 ter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplo-
18 matic communications. Over a period of years our crypto-
19 graph people analyzed the character of the machine the
20 Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic mes-
21 sages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built
22 by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we pos-
23 sessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in
24 the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State De-
25 partment - rather than as is popularly supposed, the

1917

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 State Department providing us with the information -
3 but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to
4 intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before
5 December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the
6 following day, December 8th."

7 Is that an entirely correct statement?

8 General Marshall: As to December 8th it was not. It
9 was December 11th, apparently, when I saw the messages I
10 had reference to there. As to the others, after all the
11 files were dug out and the various messages were checked
12 I think it would be proper to say that that was not entirely
13 accurate as to that.

14 As to my information at the time I dictated this letter,-
15 and understand me, Mr. Gearhart, this was dictated in about
16 ten minutes time while I was in the business of conducting
17 the war from the Army side, - that was my recollection of an
18 event four years previously without any records of any kind in
19 front of me, so that at that time I thought it was the day
20 after instead of three days later that this message was shown
21 to me at my desk. I was unaware of that particular message
22 at any other time.

23 There were one or two other messages brought to my at-
24 tention here recently which I was unaware of up to the time
25 they were brought to my attention.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 I would like to say that there is an immense mass of
3 data involved in this and there were an immense number of
4 things going on at this particular time and at the time of
5 the dictation of this letter we were in the throes of the
6 war. I dictated it, as I say, in about ten minutes. I had
7 no records before me at the time, it would take quite a while
8 to assemble them.

9 I think this is reasonably accurate according to my
10 understanding of the facts at the time I dictated the letter.

11 Mr. Gearhart: You realized that you were assuming a
12 tremendous obligation to convey a true and completely accurate
13 picture of the situation to Governor Dewey when you were as-
14 suming to, or when you were asking him to do what was probably
15 very hard for him to consent to do, is that not correct?

16 General Marshall: That is correct. I was thorough-
17 aware of that but I had been in that predicament almost every
18 month through the war and I just did what seemed to me right
19 and that is the best I could do.

20 Mr. Gearhart: But now you admit that the statement you
21 made was grossly inadequate in respect to having received no
22 intercept of Japanese messages which pointed directly to
23 Hawaii?

24 General Marshall: I wouldn't say this is grossly in-
25 accurate. I should say the statement as made here is in-

1519

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 accurate, but only in the matter of three days. It would
2 have no bearing, in general, on the main issue. I made this
3 for the protection of the conduct of our operations by our
4 troops. I did not make it with any regard whatever to a
5 Congressional investigation.
6

7 Mr. Gearhart: In order that the record may be complete
8 I will ask you a rather long question now to which I would
9 like to have your very careful attention. I intend to read
10 from page 12 of exhibit 2, a message from Tokyo to Honolulu
11 dated September 24th, intercepted and decoded on October 9,
12 1941. "Secretly Secret." (Reading)

13 "Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports
14 concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as
15 possible:

16 "1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided
17 roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to
18 your abbreviating as much as you like.)

19 "Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Ar-
20 senal.

21 "Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and
22 west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side
23 of the Island from Area A.)

24 "Area C, East Loch.

25 "Area D, Middle Loch.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

"Area E, West Loch and the communicating water routes.

"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)"

From Honolulu to Tokyo dated 29 September 1941, decoded October 10, 1941. (Reading):

"Honolulu to Tokyo #178.

"Re your #083*

"(Strictly secret)

"The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:

"1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to Washington #48**): KS.

"2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): KT.

"3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.

"4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG, (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.

"Relayed to Washington, San Francisco."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1921

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

There are some markings on it.

I have another message from Tokyo to --

Mr. Murphy; Mr. Chairman, I should think there ought to be the complete message read.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, in the lower left hand corner is an asterisk.

Mr. Murphy: And up above "083" and there is a note at the bottom it is not available.

Mr. Gearhart: "Not available" asterisk "Available" and then "dated 21 August." Lower down: "JD-1: 5730 23312." Over in the right hand corner, "(D) Trans, 10-10-41 (X)."

Another message from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu (Riyoji) 15 November 1941 (Reading):

"#111

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

In the lower right hand corner: "(Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)." In the lower left hand corner: "JD-1: 6991 25644."

Another message from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo, November 18, 1941, decoded December 6, 1941, reading as follows:

"#222.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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3 "1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the
4 15th were as I told you in my #219a on that day.

5 "Area A^b - A battleship of the Oklahama class
6 entered and one tanker left port.

7 "Area C^c - 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class
8 were at anchor.

9 "2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor.
10 The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in
11 Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one
12 of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS'. 4
13 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D^d.

14 " 3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8
15 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their
16 course was as follows: In a single file at a distance
17 of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour,
18 they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the
19 Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which
20 they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time
21 roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, how-
22 ever, one of these destroyers entered Area A after
23 passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

24 "Relayed to _____.

25 "a.- Available, dated November 14. Code under study.

"b - Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 "c - East Loch.

3 "d - Middle Loch."

4 In the lower left hand corner: "ARMY 25817." In the
5 lower right hand corner: "Trans. 12/6/41 (2)."

6 A nother message from Tokyo (Togo) November 18, 1941,
7 to Honolulu (Reading):

8 "#113.

9 "Please report on the following areas as to ves-
10 sels, anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila
11 Bay" -- "Manila Bay" is circled by a pen and up to one
12 side "Honolulu" is written -- "and the Areas Adjacent there-
13 to."

14 "(Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

15 Lower left hand corner: "a - Probably means Mamala Bay."

16 What is Mammala Bay? Is that in the Hawaiian Islands?

17 General Marshall: I think it is, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Lower right hand corner: "Trans. 12/5/
19 41 (S)." Lower left hand corner: "ARMY 25773.)"

20 Another message from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolu dated Novem-
21 ber 20, 1941.

22 "#111 Strictly Secret.

23 "Please investigate comprehensively the fleet --
24 bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military re-
25 servation."

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Geerhart

2 Lower left hand corner: "ARMY 25694 JD 7029." Lower
3 right hand corner: "Trans. 12-4-41 (S)."

4 One more, from Tokyo to Honolu, 29 November 1941.

5 (Reading):

6 "#122.

7 "We have been receiving reports from you on ship
8 movements, but in future will you also report even when
9 there are no movements."

10 In the lower left hand corner: "JD-1: 7086 25823."

11 In the lower right hand corner "(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)."

12 Then appear other messages which were translated after
13 the sixth day.

14 So that it is quite apparent from the reading of those
15 messages that were received, decoded and placed on your desk,
16 read or not read, that many messages directing the attention
17 of our military and naval authorities to Hawaii had been re-
18 ceived, is that not correct?

19 General Marshall: You stated, Mr. Geerhart, as I under-
20 stand you, that it was quite evident that all those messages
21 were placed on my desk. I have no recollection of that, I
22 have a very definite recollection that the message on page 22
23 of the same exhibit was the one which I had in mind when I
24 was writing to Governor Dewey. It was from Honolulu (Kita)
25 to Tokyo and bore the December 4th date and it is that Navy

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

message which was referred to in my testimony yesterday.

I had a definite recollection of that particular message and I have also a very definite recollection it came to my attention after the event and it shows here it was translated on the 11th of December.

The messages which you have just read I had no recollection of whatever at the time. In fact, I first read them in the two days when I was getting ready for this hearing here.

Sheff
Shack
fls 11:18

WARD
JUL. WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 The Chairman: Are you through, Congressman?

3 Mr. Gearhart: General, in conclusion, I direct your
4 attention to the report of the Army Board. I haven't the
5 official publication, but I have here the publication of
6 the United States News of September 1, 1945. On page 56
7 of that particular printing, paragraph 2, "The Chief of
8 Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in
9 his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following
10 particulars

11 "(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
12 Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the
13 Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity
14 for better preparation for war, of which information he
15 had an abundance and Short had little."

16 What have you to say to that?

17 General Marshall: Very much what I have said previously
18 in answer to your question, sir, that we had given General
19 Short a directive to do something which was an alert against
20 the possibility or probability of war. He was a responsible
21 commander; he had a definite task; he had indicated the
22 various concerns he had in regard to that task; they were
23 clear in our minds, and this mass of data which poured
24 in here would normally, I think, merely impose an additional
25 burden on him to undertake the analysis of it, which was

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h2

2 going on at the same time back here.

3 He had a direction to do something; he had a direction
4 to do something, a command direction for an alert. Now
5 the question of how much additional information should go
6 to him is a matter of judgment. As a command direction,
7 I think only the December 7th message of 1 p.m. applied.

8 As to the information which would be passed to his
9 G-2 from the G-2 of the War Department, there is a question
10 of judgment as to how much of that would be desirable.

11 I would say offhand that the messages you just read
12 to me would have been helpful to General Short, but parti-
13 cularly more so to Admiral Kimmel.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Reading further from the report:

15 "(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding
16 General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941,
17 when evidently he failed to realize the import of General
18 Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly
19 that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the
20 message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted
21 his command for war."

22 What have you to say to that?

23 General Marshall: I have nothing to add to what I have
24 ready said to you, Mr. Gearhart.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Reading further from the report:

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h3

2 "(c) To get to General Short on the evening of
3 December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the
4 critical information indicating an almost immediate break
5 with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished
6 this."

7 What have you to say to that?

8 General Marshall: I have nothing to add to what I
9 have already said in regard to that, except possibly this,
10 that the first 13 sections of that message I do not believe
11 had any specific bearing one way or the other on General
12 Short's situation and responsibility with regard to the alert
13 command direction that he had already received.

14 Mr. Gerhart: Reading further:

15 "(d) To investigate and determine the state of
16 readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and
17 December 7, 1941, despite the immediate threat of war."

18 What have you to say to that?

19 General Marshall: I have only this to say, sir, that
20 we had no intimation that that command was not ready, and I
21 think we had every reason to believe that it was ready. With
22 the rapidity of investigations that later became possible,
23 or inspections that later became possible through the ease
24 of air flight, some might have gone out there, but at that
25 time it was not as simple a matter as it became later.

(4)
AL-1

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Incidentally, Mr. Gearhart, I went out to the Hawaiian Department myself at an earlier date while General Herron was in command, and I think I know the Chief of Staff who did go out there prior to the war, and I spent about a week going through every phase of their preparations against attack from the air and against attack from the ground.

I did not go into the details of the Naval concerns in Pearl Harbor itself.

I did go out, though, specifically to make certain that on the arrival of the Fleet, in a maneuver which was to take place by, I believe, submarine action largely and a few destroyers on the Hawaiian side, and the Fleet coming from the West Coast on the Fleet side, to make certain that our heavy bombers were involved in the program regarding which I was, sir, at some doubt, and that was arranged, and that was carried out in that operation, to make it a joint affair for the better cooperation and organization of the Hawaiian defense.

So I was aware of the plans that were in effect at the time General Herron, who was General Short's predecessor, was in command by actual personal investigation.

I was aware shortly prior to that, while I was head of the War Plans Division in the summer and early fall of 1938, of the actual war plans regarding Hawaii. I was only aware

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 thereafter, with General Short's assumption of command, as
3 indicated by the letters General Short himself sent me and
4 by the discussions that came up, brought up by the Air Corps
5 in relation to General Short's arrangements with the Navy,
6 as to the control of the reconnaissance over water, and I had
7 no reason to believe that that command was anything other than
8 highly efficient and alert.

9 That is my view of it.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Thank you, General. That is all.

11 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

12 Senator, before we begin, may I call attention to what
13 I think was an inadvertent mistake made by Congressman Gearhart
14 in one of his questions when he assumed that the 13 parts of
15 the 14-part message and pilot message were all received here
16 on the 6th of December. I refer to page 248 of this pamphlet
17 containing these Pearl Harbor decoded messages, and you will
18 find that the pilot message was translated in Washington on
19 the 7th of December instead of the 6th.

20 Mr. Gearhart: I may have been mistaken, but I was under
21 the impression that there was a message that came on the 6th
22 which carried information to the effect that there would be
23 a directive at 1:00 o'clock, as it turned out on the following
24 day.

25 Mr. Gesell: That is at page 238, number 901.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: I show you Exhibit 41, which shows that the pilot message was decoded, translated and typed at the Army SIS the 6th of December.

The Chairman: I am confused with the message on page 248, which reads as follows:

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United State Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time."

Senator Ferguson: That is the eventual message.

The Chairman: All right. That correction will be made. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: General, in order that we may clear up some points and in order that we may ascertain what was known in the field, the various fields, and what was known here in Washington, that we may, as a committee, ascertain why our forces at Hawaii were surprised, I want to ask you some questions.

I would like to have you refer to Exhibit 42, on page 2 of that Exhibit. I will ask you whether or not you were the Commanding General of the Field Forces?

General Marshall: I was, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And did that include Hawaii?

General Marshall: That did, sir.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: You were directly over General Short then, as I understand it.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And the purpose of the Field Force in Hawaii was to defend Hawaii, defend the Island where Pearl Harbor was, and the Fleet, if the Fleet was in?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now the second part of that Exhibit indicates that if you were absent then your Deputy Chief of Staff was in charge, is that correct?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What is meant by you being absent?

General Marshall: I imagine the best interpretation I can give you on that is "would be available", was I available or not. I say definitely if I am not in Washington I am absent, there is no question whatever about that.

Senator Ferguson: There isn't any question of availability?

General Marshall: I would think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, General, would you say you were available on the morning of the 7th when you were horseback riding?

General Marshall: In one sense, yes; in another sense, no. They could not speak to me until they located me.

Senator Ferguson: Correct. So under this directive your

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Deputy Chief of Staff would be able to act?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: That is correct, is it not?

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir. I must say there, though,
6 Senator, in fairness to him, that if he knew I was on an hour's
7 absence he would have quite a problem to decide whether he
8 would take action then or wait until the expiration of the hour.

9 Senator Ferguson: I would like to get it right there.
10 How far were you at any particular time on that morning from
11 your residence?

12 General Marshall: I would say the present site of the
13 Pentagon.

14 Senator Ferguson: Pardon me?

15 General Marshall: I would say the present site of the
16 Pentagon. That was the most distant point of the horseback
17 trail I took.

18 Senator Ferguson: You would not be over three miles then
19 from your residence at any time?

20 General Marshall: Approximately that.

21 Senator Ferguson: So you would have felt that the
22 Deputy Chief of Staff could have, if he desired, located you
23 because you were within three miles of your residence?

24 General Marshall: I presume so, yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did anyone know your custom of riding,

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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as to where you rode?

General Marshall: At the stables they knew. I do not know as General Bryden, my Deputy, knew specifically where I rode. I never rode with him, I do not think. The variations from that were limited to following the trail along the Potomac down towards the present National Airport, but that was the only variation.

Senator Ferguson: You had regular places to ride?

General Marshall: Well, you are very much limited, you have to ride there unless you cross the river.

Senator Ferguson: Now I will ask you, General, you have stated here that Hawaii was alerted, that the Philippines was alerted.

General Marshall: Correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was Washington alerted? Was your office alerted?

General Marshall: We had an officer on duty at night in the Secretary to the General Staff's office who received any important messages and routed them to the proper person. I am quite certain General Gerow will be able to testify he had a similar officer in the War Plans Division to receive any important messages that might come in.

Senator Ferguson: Then I want to get to this: Your office was alerted and you had a man there all night that

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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could have acted, is that correct?

General Marshall: You used the expression "alerted",
sir. That had been the state of affairs for quite some time.

Senator Ferguson: Now, General, as we go along, if I
use a word that is not correct in Army parlance, will you
correct me?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. I meant by that we had been
doing that all along, just as I had been keeping the telephone
open at 10:00 o'clock in the house.

Senator Ferguson: Would not this be true that on Sunday
morning your office was alerted, or on the alert, the same
as Hawaii, and that the Deputy Chief of Staff would be in a
position to act?

General Marshall: I presume so, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now was G-2 alerted?

General Marshall: You will have to ask General Miles
that. I do not know the details. I do know specifically
about the War Plans Division; because I had so much business
with it I am aware of it.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, he was a deputy under you?

General Marshall: He was Assistant Chief of Staff. A deputy operates directly under me.

Senator Ferguson: That is correct.

General Marshall: These others function up to him, or sometimes directly to me.

Senator Ferguson: He is classed as --

General Marshall: He handles the mass of ordinary business and acts for me in my absence.

Senator Ferguson: Would he get his alert from you?

General Marshall: He would have if I had given him a specific alert. He was responsible with the Secretary of the General Staff. The arrangements were such in that section of the War Department that there was a continuity throughout the night.

Senator Ferguson: Here is what I want to get at, if I can, by questions, to find out the facts. All I am trying to ascertain is what are the facts.

On the 27th, when the message was sent to Hawaii, was G-2, War Plans, and your office alerted so that they knew that war was imminent? As I understand it, Hawaii was notified that war was imminent. Now, were these respective officers of G-2, G-1 -- War Plans was what? G-1?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h2

1 General Marshall: Well, it hasn't any number, sir.

2 War Plans is the designation.

3
4 Senator Ferguson: Was G-2, War Plans, and the Chief
5 of Staff organization alerted at the same time?

6
7 General Marshall: They were all aware of the critical
8 situation and of the issuance of a directive alerting the
9 overseas theatres in the Pacific.

10 Senator Ferguson: Then, how do you account for the
11 fact, if they were alerted, that the 13-parts of the 14-part
12 message -- and we understand each other on that --

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: (continuing) -- and the pilot message
15 were not delivered to the Chief of Staff? Who would be
16 the man that was authorized to act on it, on the evening
17 of the 6th as the Navy had done with their 13-part message?
18 Have you ever looked into it? Have you ever looked into
19 that question to ascertain why that was not done?

20 General Marshall: I did not look into it at all, until
21 here about two days ago, or three days ago, at the time
22 General Miles was testifying. That was my first oppor-
23 tunity to go into these records. The question of the
24 delivery to me of the first 13 parts of that message, I
25 think is a matter of judgment. The final, and 14th part
is quite different, and that I believe did not become

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h3

1 available until the next morning.

2 I want to get myself straight, Senator. You spoke of
3 a pilot message.

4 Senator Ferguson: The pilot message was merely that
5 they would give a time of delivery, not the 1 o'clock mes-
6 sage.

7 General Marshall: I understand, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: It is on page 238 of Exhibit 1.

9 General Marshall: Yes, I understand it now.

10 Senator Ferguson: I wish, General, that you always
11 insist on completing your answers. I am sometimes a little
12 fast with the next question.

13 General Marshall: I understand it entirely now.

14 Senator Ferguson: General, who was in charge, or who
15 is charged with operations in peacetime?

16 General Marshall: There is a section, or there was
17 a section of the General Staff, called the Operations Section,
18 and that was the section from which maneuvers were directed,
19 from which the simulated war training was operated. However,
20 that was not the section of the General Staff which dealt
21 with actual war measures. Those were dealt with in the
22 War Plans Division, which is now called the Operations Divi-
23 sion, and is virtually the GHQ.

24 Senator Ferguson: I have in mind in peacetime.
25

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Marshall: I am speaking of peacetime, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, when would you say your regulations were peacetime, and when did they go over to wartime, so the committee can interpret this Exhibit 42?

General Marshall: In one sense, they did not go over; they remained in their status quo. What I was trying to explain to the preliminary questions was we had a section of the staff called Operations. That deals, however, with peacetime training operations, maneuvers, things of that sort, and organization, but the war measures were handled in the War Plans Division.

The war plans were in the War Plans Division.

The action of the Chief of Staff in relation to those plans would be prepared, presumably, unless he did it himself directly in the War Plans Division, and not at all in the Operations Section. That is a misnomer, so far as the war situation is concerned. So it is the War Plans Division which is now the OPD, the operations of the General Staff.

Senator Ferguson: So that we may be able, when we read these various papers, to know when we were in peace and when we were in war, would you say, the dividing line, the line of demarcation, was the attack, or bombing of Pearl Harbor?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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 2 General Marshall: That was the definite subdivision,
 3 dividing the line between a known status of peace and
 4 a known status of war, but so far as the operations of
 5 the General Staff are concerned, the war measures, the
 6 war plans, the war advice to the Chief of Staff came
 7 directly from the War Plans Division.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, we were acting on a war basis.

General Marshall: In relation to those matters, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And when did we go on that basis?

General Marshall: When you use the expression "war basis" there, you have me a little bit in difficulty, because always the War Plans Division was concerned with war plans, with discussions of the probability of war as to those plans, and the preparation of any instructions to be issued by the Chief of Staff regarding our war plans. They are not operations, of course, in the sense of actual movements, and deployments until you actually engage in war.

But the directions concerning the matter would be generated as a rule in the War Plans Division, unless the Chief of Staff did that himself.

So from that point of view there was no change in the General Staff between the peacetime operation and the wartime operation, so far as the responsibility and the method of doing business was concerned, between the War Plans Division and the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson: General, on page 9 of Exhibit 42, under "b", I wish you would locate the directive, or the duty that would make General Gerow responsible for the reply of Short, where he stated -- that is in Short's reply to

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 your message of the 27th -- that he had alerted against
3 sabotage, and liaison with the Navy. Now will you point
4 out where WPD, the War Plans Division, was made responsible,
5 in this exhibit, just which one of these made Gerow responsible
6 for action on the Short message?

7 General Marshall: Before answering that, Senator, I
8 would like to say this: It was General Gerow's section in
9 which the details of those matters would be concerned and
10 would be carried out, but the responsibility was mine as well
11 as General Gerow's.

12 Now as to this particular paragraph of this section --
13 I will just refer to page 9 --

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes, and anything else that you want.

15 General Marshall: I was trying to get the section number.
16 It would be to a large extent under, I think, subparagraph b(3),
17 "The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the
18 movement of troops to execute the initial deployment to be
19 the duty of the Operations and Training Division)."

20 Also part of it comes under (2), "Estimate of forces
21 required and times at which they may be needed under the various
22 possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the
23 national defense."

24 It does not specifically mention the exact point you are
25 bringing up.

LaCharity
follows.

Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: That is what I was getting at.
3 There is nothing in the directive here that specifically
4 covers Gerow's responsibility on the Short reply?

5 General Marshall: That is correct, sir, in this.

6
7 Senator Ferguson: And under the section, as I under-
8 stand it, as I say, it was part of your responsibility. You
9 mean the Commanding General of the Field was over Short,
10 and therefore you had a right to command him?

11 General Marshall: That is correct.

12 Senator Ferguson: That is in Army parlance?

13 General Marshall: That is correct.

14 Senator Ferguson: Did Gerow have any right to issue
15 orders to Short on a command basis?

16 General Marshall: Certainly, normally, no.

17 Senator Ferguson: In peacetime. I change my question
18 and add, before you answer, in peacetime did he have any
19 right to issue a command to Short?

20 General Marshall: It would have required quite an as-
21 sumption of authority on his part to do that without some
22 confirmation from a senior officer.

23 Senator Ferguson: In other words, that province was
24 in you as a senior officer, or in the case of your absence,
25 it was in your deputy?

General Marshall: That is correct. As to mere matters

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

of detail, of course, we communicated back and forth.

Senator Ferguson Yes.

Did Gerow have authority to order Rainbow 5, or any other War Plan into effect?

General Marshall: He did not, sir. He would have had to assume it.

Senator Ferguson: Who had authority to order a war plan, talking about Rainbow, or any other order, into effect?

General Marshall: The President, the Secretary of War, and myself, and in my absence, the deputy.

Senator Ferguson: General, I would like to go into how the General Staff is made up.

You went in sometime in 1939, is that correct?

General Marshall I joined the War Department General Staff on July 6, 1938, as head of War Plans Division.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: In October of 1938, I was relieved from that job and appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff. I held that office until I became Chief of Staff on the first of July, 1939.

Senator Ferguson: Then, do I understand, the first of July, 1939, you became the Chief of Staff, and at that time was General Miles in G-2?

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Marshall: No, sir, he was not.

Senator Ferguson: Was General Gerow in War Plans?

General Marshall: He was in War Plans but he was not the Chief of Section.

Senator Ferguson: Who was the Chief of Section?

General Marshall: General George V. Strong.

Senator Ferguson: Was he a brigadier general?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. He was a brigadier general. Colonel E. R. Warner McCabe was the G-2 of the War Department General Staff at that time.

Senator Ferguson: Who was at Hawaii? General Herron?

General Marshall: General Herron, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, does the Chief of Staff have the right to select his own G-2, his War Plans officer, his deputy?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was that done in this particular case? Did you select them?

General Marshall: I found Colonel McCabe as G-2 when I became Chief of Staff; and I continued him as such until sometime -- until he was relieved by General Miles. I found General Strong as a brigadier general in the War Plans Division when I joined it as Chief of War Plans Division.

When I left the Division to become Deputy Chief of

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Staff, he automatically became head of War Plans Division.

When I became Chief of Staff -- my first direct appointment was the Deputy Chief of Staff, who had previously been the G-1 Personnel Officer -- that was General Gasser.

From time to time I replaced people for various reasons as their tours expired, or as they retired, and General McCabe, Colonel McCabe rather, now General McCabe, was replaced by General Miles, and General Strong was replaced by General Gerow, I think.

General Gerow was replaced by General Eisenhower. General Miles was replaced by General Lee, shortly thereafter by General Strong. But those were my appointments.

Senator Ferguson: General Miles has told us that he was Acting Assistant for the Chief of Staff in G-2.

General Marshall: That, I think, Senator, was merely a technicality, because under the law we couldn't detail him directly on the General Staff.

Senator Ferguson: Why were you not able to put him on the General Staff?

General Marshall: Well, I can't think of it right offhand but it was merely a technicality.

Senator Ferguson: Was it one of the qualifications that he didn't have, the term of office?

General Marshall: Something of that sort. I think it

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 pertained to how much duty he had had in Washington;
2 something of that sort.
3

4 Senator Ferguson: Was that also true of General Gerow?

5 General Marshall: I don't think it was, sir, but my
6 memory is not clear on that.

7 Senator Ferguson: Was there any more important deputy
8 during this increasing tension that we were having, than
9 your G-2?

10 General Marshall: Well, I should say that it lay
11 between the G-2 and the head of the War Plans Division.

12 Senator Ferguson: So the combination of those two,
13 they were, in your scheme of things, they were very im-
14 portant?

15 General Marshall: Very important indeed.

16 Senator Ferguson: And were you at all times satisfied
17 with the work in G-2?

18 General Marshall: As far as I was aware of the details
19 of the work, I was satisfied.

20 Senator Ferguson: Were you also satisfied with the work
21 in War Plans?

22 General Marshall: I was.

23 Senator Ferguson: So that up until the 7th day of
24 December, you were entirely satisfied as to the heads of
25 these two offices?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now, prior to the 27th, or let's
4 say between the 27th of November, 1941, and the 7th of
5 December, 1941, that is, the period between the warning
6 message and the attack, was there anyone in the War Depart-
7 ment that made a staff survey of the incoming messages,
8 talking about the magic, to see whether the alerts were
9 being carried out in relation to the magic?

10 General Marshall: What were those dates, Senator?

11 Senator Ferguson: The 27th of November and the 7th
12 of December, 1941. That is between the war warning mes-
13 sages and the attack.

14 General Marshall: But when was this period that I was
15 to reply to?

16 Senator Ferguson: That is the period. Did you make
17 any survey during that period, when you had alerted these
18 men, to see whether or not you were getting them at the
19 moment they were being translated?

20 General Marshall: Not that I am aware of.

21 Senator Ferguson: Could you tell me, General, if there
22 was any reason why General Miles left G-2?

23 General Marshall: I don't -- he was relieved, I
24 believe, in February. That is my recollection of the
25 thing. I made several changes in the Chief of Staff. These

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1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 people had been working very hard. We were reorganizing
3 the whole War Department, and General Gerow was given
4 an opportunity with troops and General Miles an opportunity
5 of territorial command. I think that is about the condi-
6 tion.

7 Senator Ferguson: It was then in no way connected
8 with the operation in his office?

9 General Marshall: That is correct.

10 Senator Ferguson: In relation to any of the messages,
11 delivery of them, or not?

12 General Marshall: That is correct.

13 Senator Ferguson: It had nothing to do with that?

14 General Marshall: Nothing to do with that, no, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Would the same apply to General Gerow?

16 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

17 General Ferguson: So that the record may be clear on
18 that.

19 General Marshall: That is correct.

20 As to General Gerow, my difficulty with him was that he
21 conscientiously overworked and stayed at the office late at
22 night, and he was, I thought, exhausting himself, and that
23 the thing couldn't go on. Therefore, I gave him what
24 everybody in the War Department wanted, a troop command, I
25 think the 29th Division. I had brought General Eisenhower in

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h8

1 a few days after December 7, and given him more or less
2 direct responsibility over all Pacific affairs.

3
4 General Gerow not only had the affairs of the war as
5 it pertained to the Atlantic, and, of course, the responsi-
6 bility of General Eisenhower in the Pacific, but he also
7 went through a very gruelling experience at the time the
8 British Chiefs of Staff came here in the latter part of
9 December.

10 So, he was pretty well exhausted, and I therefore gave
11 him a troop command as both an opportunity and as a rest.

12 Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, there was no
13 one specifically designated to see that the magic was
14 translated and put into your hands, and that the alerts
15 were properly carried out?

16 General Marshall: You use the expression "specifically
17 designated."

18 There was an organizational arrangement that had been
19 in existence. For example, you speak of the reply from the
20 theatre commanders to the alert. That would be rather
21 directly in the subsection of the War Plans Division which
22 had immediate charge of all details with reference to the
23 Pacific. That section was headed by Colonel Bundy, who
24 later lost his life when I tried to rush him out to Hawaii
25 shortly after the attack.

LaCharity (3)
follows
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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Then the main, the drafting work, the checking work,
3 the filing work, the reference work, would be carried out as
4 a matter of procedure in that section for General Gerow. Then
5 General Gerow would either bring it or send it to me as Chief
6 of Staff.

7 Just as in G-2, my recollection of the status was that
8 Colonel Bratton was in immediate charge of all magic affairs
9 and was responsible, of course, to General Miles. General
10 Miles was responsible for the bringing of these things to
11 my attention, but in many instances Colonel Bratton, or at
12 least in instances, Colonel Bratton brought them in himself.

13 But the system and procedure started in the section
14 under Colonel Bratton, just as the Pacific affairs started
15 in the section of War Plans Division under Colonel Bundy.

16 Senator Ferguson: Then it is true that General Miles
17 should have had access to all intelligences, State Department,
18 Army, Navy, and all intelligence?

19 General Marshall: That is correct, sir. He was the
20 receipt source and the diffusion source of all intelligence
21 matters in relation to the enemy.

22 Senator Ferguson: Was he also the evaluator of such
23 intelligence?

24 General Marshall: He was responsible for the evaluation
25 which would be done by a group in his section.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Now, was that, the evaluation of these various instruments, all sources, ever taken away from General Miles in G-2?

General Marshall: Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand that your office, you as Chief of Staff, depended on General Miles' estimate of the intelligence?

General Marshall: You use the word "depend". He submitted his views, probably which in turn had been submitted to him by the section which did the laborious analysis, and with which he might or might not agree, or might or might not modify, and that estimate came to me at such times as he thought it was proper that I should be brought up to date or in response to my definite request, and I accepted it or modified it in my own mind, but I had the benefit of that advice.

Senator Ferguson: Before they went out would you approve them?

General Marshall: In some cases they were sent to the President. There I either approved it and sent it to the President or expressed myself so it was clear, I think, that I was submitting it as a view. Whether I expressed concurrence or not I couldn't recall in each instance.

Senator Ferguson: Were there any evaluations, first,

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

between the 1st of November and the 27th of November?

General Marshall: I will have to look at the record.

Senator Ferguson: Will you look at that and check.

General Marshall: The record shows that on November 1st there was an evaluation to the Chief of Staff from General Miles on the subject of a possible Japanese drive into Yunnan.

Senator Ferguson: You made a report to the President about the 5th of November on the same subject.

General Marshall: I made a report.

On November 2nd there was a G-2 estimate on the Far Eastern situation addressed to the Chief of Staff -- no. That was addressed to the War Plans Division. Whether or not I got a copy doesn't show.

On November 13 there was an estimate, signed by General Miles, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, again on the subject of a possible Japanese drive into Yunnan. That estimate was distributed to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, Under Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, the Chief of Staff, Coordinator of Information, Chief of the Army Air Forces, Mr. Lauchlin Currie, who was the President's representative regarding Chinese matters, Division of Defense Aid Reports, Director of Naval Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, that was

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 General Gerow, GHQ, that would be General McNair, Chief of
3 Air Corps -- that would be, I think, General Arnold.

4 Senator Ferguson: General Arnold at that time?

(4) 5 General Marshall: I don't know whether it was General
6 Arnold or not.

7 And General Embick.

8 Senator Ferguson: At least that one would be approved
9 by you.

10 Do you think any were delivered to the President without
11 your approval?

12 General Marshall: I would assume that I would -- well,
13 certainly would have struck out anything that I thought was
14 entirely wrong in it.

15 Senator Ferguson: Therefore if it went through it had
16 your approval insofar as you struck it out?

17 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Any others, General?

19 General Marshall: One dated November 26th, on the
20 subject of Japanese Naval Task Force. A memorandum for the
21 Chief of Staff. Its distribution shows the: Secretary of
22 War, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD -- that is General Gerow --
23 I.B. file, the Far East Section, and the Record Section.
24 That refers to his own, General Miles', department.

25 Senator Ferguson: Would you approve -- before it would

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

go to the Secretary of War it would come over your desk?

General Marshall: No, sir. Normally I would give him the benefit of what I thought and if I thought it was important I would have spoken to the Secretary or written him a note.

Here is one on November 27, a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, on the subject of recent developments in the Far East.

The Chairman: Might I ask the committee if it is willing to sit a little later today, say 12:30, before recessing?

Senator Ferguson: I have no objection.

The Chairman: General, do you have any objection?

General Marshall: No, sir.

The Chairman: We will proceed to 12:30 then.

General Marshall: That estimate, in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, on the recent developments in the Far East, dated November 27, was delivered to the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Chief of Army Air Forces, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, Director of Naval Intelligence, and GHQ, which is General McNair.

Senator Ferguson: You haven't been reading that these went to the Director of Naval Intelligence except in this last one. Do you recall whether any went to the Navy?

General Marshall: I do not presume they did unless it

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 shows in this.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now, were there any between -- is that
4 all up to that date into November?

5 General Marshall: No, one more. November 29, memorandum
6 for the Chief of Staff, on the subject "Brief periodic estimate
7 of the situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942."

8 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

10 Mr. Murphy: The message of November 1st went to the
11 Office of Naval Intelligence, and the message of November 13
12 did, I believe.

13 Senator Ferguson: We would be glad to have that correction
14 on the record.

15 General Marshall: This memorandum covers operations and
16 the situation throughout the world with the various estimates
17 of probabilities or possibilities.

18 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall whether any of these
19 reports indicated an air attack on Hawaii or any kind of an
20 attack on Hawaii?

21 General Marshall: Just at the moment I do not, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Was that all between those dates?

23 General Marshall: That is all, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, were there any, to your knowledge,
25 called to your attention between the 1st of December and the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

7th of December?

General Marshall: There was one on December 6th, estimate of the Japanese strength in Indochina.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know when that one reached you, item 29?

General Marshall: I presume on December 6th. I don't know. I suppose the records of my office in the War Department show that.

Senator Ferguson: Well, that one would have no evidence in it whatever of any idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall: It is devoted entirely to Indochina.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: Then there is another on the 6th of December, estimate of Japanese air and ground forces in Indochina, Thailand and Formosa. That was distributed also to the Secretary of War; the Assistant Chief of Staff, General Gerow.

Senator Ferguson: General, would you say that you had any knowledge over and above those estimates, as far as intelligence was concerned?

General Marshall: I think I would say that they reflected the general state of information which I had. Whether or not I had picked up any additional points of view from my own personal reading of magic I couldn't say. I think in general

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 that is the summation of the information I had at the time.

2
3 Senator Ferguson: Do you know of any case where you ever
4 took up with General Miles magic as to your interpretation of
5 it, that you thought that he may interpret it any other way?

6 General Marshall: I don't recall any, sir. I have had
7 a great many discussions regarding magic along that line, but
8 when they were and what they were I don't recall.

9
10 (5) Senator Ferguson: Would you give to General Miles the
11 intelligence, for instance, that you obtained through the
12 Secretary of War, that he may have obtained from the Secretary
13 of State at the War Cabinet?

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: How did General Miles get the informa-
16 tion of the War Cabinet?

17 General Marshall: That would be presumably only through
18 my giving him the information myself, other than his liaison
19 through his officers with the Department of State, but I
20 don't think that liaison would give him information of that
21 particular character, so he would be more or less dependent,
22 I think, on my personally telling him what I personally had
23 received from Mr. Stimson, or I had gathered by my presence
24 at the conferences.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now, take the conference that Secretary
Hull talked about, where he was at a Cabinet meeting and he

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

called it to the attention of all of the imminence of war and Secretary Knox went out and made a speech, Secretary Welles made a speech, but he says here he didn't make it in relation to that Cabinet meeting, would that kind of an intelligence, that kind of information, would that go to General Miles, specifically?

General Marshall: There was not a specific routing for that procedure. It would depend, I think, on my telling him personally. We had a great many meetings at that time. We had discussions before the Joint Board at which, I think, General Miles was present, and a great many in my office. But there was no direct routing routine that would have carried that message from the discussion at the White House to General Miles personally.

Senator Ferguson: Well now, if you eliminate that kind of a matter from these evaluations, what do we have from these evaluations, if we don't take all of the details from the Secretary of State's office, which was a great source of intelligence, how would we get anything from these evaluations?

General Marshall: I think, though General Miles can testify directly, I think General Miles had daily contact, through a liaison agreement, with the State Department, they have now and I assume they did then, but even that, Senator, I do not think would give them the product of our meetings,

Witness Marshall

3144
Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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PERSONAL meetings with the President, such as you just referred to.

Senator Ferguson: How often did this War Cabinet meet? From the 15th of November to the 1st of December how often would they meet? I mean, to your knowledge. Was it frequent or not?

General Marshall: Well, the actual meetings with the President of the entire group were not frequent in the sense that the meetings between the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, and Mr. Hull were frequent and almost daily, and the attendance of Admiral Stark and I or one other, were.

Senator Ferguson: How often would you say you saw the President between the 15th of November and the 1st of December?

General Marshall: I think the record will show that, but --

Mr. Gesell: They are shown on the exhibit.

General Marshall: Can I see that, please? Will you give me the dates again?

Senator Ferguson: The 15th of November to the 1st of December.

General Marshall: I saw the President on the 15th of November, on the 25th of November, on the 28th of November, on the 7th of December.

Senator Ferguson: Then you have no recollection, this sheet does not show any conferences between you and the President

Witness Marshall

3145
Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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3 from the 28th to the 7th, 28th of November to the 7th of
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6 December?

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11 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

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14 Senator Ferguson: That is the conference you had with
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16 the President after the attack, at 7:00 o'clock?

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21 General Marshall: That was after the attack. I think
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23 the date for that conference was set before the attack.

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28 Senator Ferguson: But you did not see him until after
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30 the attack?

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35 General Marshall: That is correct.

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42 Senator Ferguson: Do you know, General, about when
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44 the first matter of the breaking of the Japanese code, which
45
46 was called magic, was called to your attention?

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53 General Marshall: Do you mean, Senator, my first
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55 knowledge that there was such a thing as magic?

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62 Senator Ferguson: Well, yes, let's have that date
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64 first, about when.

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71 General Marshall: I don't think I was aware of it at
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73 all until I became Chief of Staff.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 job?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, as tension grew were you ever
5 consulted or did you confer with anyone in G-2 about the
6 speed on this intelligence, that it was valuable, there wasn't
7 anything more valuable to the Government than that particular
8 source as far as intelligence was concerned?

9 General Marshall: My recollection is -- I will go back
10 a ways, if I may.

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WARD A PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Marshall

When it first came to my attention, as I recall it, G-2, then Colonel McCabe, not only explained to me that my predecessor thought it was illegal, but he was always concerned about the maintenance of secrecy and possible carelessness in the handling of the papers.

Of course, at that time there was a great deal of purely diplomatic information and no military information as I recall, at that time.

As the situation changed, of course, the military factor became more predominant at least in our minds, and our concern was, as to secrecy, most definitely that of protecting the source.

There were conversations with Colonel McCabe that I recall over the difficulty of securing the proper people to do the work, and also I think with General Miles as to the increasing difficulty and our fear that we were going to lose that source through the, you might say, the subversive action of at least one individual concerned with the work.

We were then discussing, as I recall it, the difficulty of securing people with the proper talents and qualities, and integrity, and also where we could house them so that they could work effectively and at the same time not be unduly conspicuous.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 We continued to have frequent conversations regarding
3 the handling of magic, particularly as to its security, and
4 I recall that I intervened myself very directly and required
5 that it be locked in a pouch and delivered by pouch, the
6 pouch unlocked, and it read by the recipient and put back
7 in the pouch.

8 I have no definite recollection of discussing with
9 General Miles their inability to keep abreast of these
10 translations, and decipherings. I do recall faintly con-
11 versations concerned with the mass of material which pro-
12 sumably had very little import, but which had to be culled
13 away from the general lot, so that the important things came
14 to us.

15 I might say that I have no definite recollection of
16 pressing General Miles to expedite the deciphering and the
17 distribution of magic.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did the fact, as shown by our record
19 here, that this was received and then it would take as high
20 as 20 days to translate, was that called to your attention
21 during the time that you were getting these messages?

22 General Marshall: Not to my recollection.

23 I saw, in the main, these messages that I knew, like
24 those of the fateful day of December 7 and 8, were handled
25 at a very high speed. It seemed to me, knowing the diffi-

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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culties involved.

Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, it was not due to a lack of appropriations that you didn't get these messages fast -- or was it due to that?

General Marshall: I would say, Senator, taking a long back sight, that it was the general combination of things relating to the entire Army, in the building up that we were going through at that time from very small groups to much larger groups.

This, you might say, is a little bit comparable to radar. We could collect men and engineers for a regiment in a comparatively short time as compared for such a complicated business such as radar. That took a long time, and there was a necessity for high selectivity.

That was very much the case in everything concerned with magic, and also we had the difficulty at that time of people not being in a frame of mind such as is common to almost the entire public in time of war, so that you could use them, control them, and get services out of them on quite a very much simpler basis than you could at that time.

There were a great many factors like that involved. I would not say it was lack of appropriations.

Senator Ferguson: General, did you know when the first magic was distributed to England?

Witness Marshall Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4

1 General Marshall: No, sir.

2 Senator Ferguson: When that was taken up with England?

3 General Marshall: I do not know when that occurred,
4
5 sir. General Miles would have to give you that.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not it was
7 prior to any meeting on the ABC or the ABCD arrangement?

8 General Marshall: I don't recall that, sir. I would
9 have to go to the records to get it.

10 Senator Ferguson: You have no personal knowledge?

11 General Marshall: No, I have no personal knowledge of
12 that, no, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, on whose authority could that
14 be done if it wasn't called to your attention, about that
15 arrangement?

16 General Marshall: Well, I would say that the actual
17 exchange of such information as that prior to a state of
18 war in which Great Britain was an ally would have, I think
19 undoubtedly been brought to my attention, probably that
20 of the Secretary of War, but certainly, I think, to my
21 attention.

22 Senator Ferguson: Have you any recollection of this
23 being called to your attention, this matter of giving to
24 the British this magic, or this means of getting the magic?

25 General Marshall: No, sir. It is very hard for me to

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h5

1
2 put my finger on the point when this took place, when
3 this interchange was a matter of business every day. I
4 don't recall that.

5 Senator Ferguson: Isn't it true at first there was a
6 grave question about whether or not it would be given to
7 the British, whether or not we wouldn't keep it and get
8 the information ourselves?

9 General Marshall: That would be a consideration, but
10 I believe, Senator, what we were more concerned about was
11 obtaining from the British the information they had, which
12 was much more extensive than ours.

13 Senator Ferguson: Do you know of any arrangement between
14 the British and America in relation to them giving us
15 other intelligence that they didn't get through magic?

16 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: And was that distributed to us?

18 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: And did they also use magic to
20 get intelligence and give us what they got out of magic?

21 General Marshall: I wouldn't attempt to answer that.
22 I presume they did.

23 Senator Ferguson: That is your assumption?

24 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: When the intelligence was coming to

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

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2 you, it was an over-all intelligence as far as you were
3 concerned?

4 General Marshall: It was an over-all intelligence,
5 presumably, as far as I was concerned, but I wish to make
6 this comment, that for quite a long time we only received
7 the British estimates. We didn't receive the direct in-
8 telligence on which the evaluation was made, as the basis
9 for the estimates.

10 It was a long period before they gave us the direct
11 material, because they were very fearful of our letting
12 them get out of the basis of secrecy.

13 Finally, and I think we were well into the war, a long
14 ways into the war, before they were willing to take the
15 hazard of giving us the direct information, which involved,
16 of course, a knowledge of how they acquired it.

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Witness Marshall

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: So at first we received the estimates.
2
3 Now I will ask counsel, do we have the estimates of the
4 British? We have here given to us the estimates of our In-
5 telligence Department, but do we have the British?

6
7 General Marshall: They were not formal estimates, I
8 think, as a rule of the type that I have been reading here
9 from General Miles.

10 Senator Ferguson: No, they were memoranda.

11 General Marshall: But they were evaluations of these
12 things that they were getting.

13 Senator Ferguson: Do we have, General Mitchell, the
14 evaluations?

15 General Marshall: I am quite certain that would not be
16 in your records, sir, because we have been trying to keep
17 that quiet as much as we could.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, then, General Marshall, do I
19 underst and we are not getting every bit, that certain things
20 are being kept quiet that we are not getting?

21 General Marshall: No, sir, I do not mean that at all.

22 Senator Ferguson: Well, will you explain your answer?
23 I must have misunderstood you.

24 General Marshall: My last answer was that we did not
25 wish to disclose the fact that the British had a capacity and
a method of obtaining information which I referred to in that

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 letter of Governor Dewey's which has now become public,
3 not that they did not give us information.

4 Senator Ferguson: What I am wanting to know is --

5 General Marshall: And now, as I understand it, your
6 question is addressed to the fact whether there is some of
7 that information that bears on this question?

8 Senator Ferguson: On Pearl Harbor.

9 General Marshall: I know of none such. I know of one--

10 Senator Ferguson: How can the committee tell?

11 General Marshall: I know of one message, as I recall,
12 that came through the State Department, I believe, on the
13 afternoon, I think, of December 6th, but I think that is in
14 the record and that is a British estimate specifically re-
15 garding the movement of Japanese ships in the Gulf of Siam.

16 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, do you know, Gener-
17 al, that Admiralty was given direct information by Intelli-
18 gence. Do you know that to be a fact or not?

19 General Marshall: I knew that they were receiving in-
20 formation, just as we were receiving a certain amount and
21 that a part was coming directly from the Navy.

22 Senator Ferguson: Well, did your department, G-2, get
23 the Admiralty information?

24 General Marshall: You will have to ask General Miles
25 that. I could not testify anything about that.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, General, wouldn't it be
3 important when this intelligence came across your desk to
4 know its source?

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

6
7 Senator Ferguson: Was that called to your attention, that
8 we were getting this intelligence from Admiralty?

9 General Marshall: I have no distinct recollection of
10 that, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Has there been any instructions to
12 G-2 that we were not to get all the files in relation to
13 everything on Pearl Harbor?

14 General Marshall: No, sir, none whatever.

15 Senator Ferguson: Then I do not quite understand that
16 previous answer that that probably would not be given to us.

17 General Marshall: Well, I must have misled you. I was
18 referring specifically to a method, a technique, rather than
19 a record.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, it would be an evaluation. If
21 it was an evaluation it would be in writing?

22 General Marshall: Well, Senator, if there is such it
23 is certainly now before your group. I do not know just what
24 the details of that are. I know that there are no instruc-
25 tions in the War Department to hold out any information from
you gentlemen; quite the contrary.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that prior to August 1941
3 Admiral Kimmel was getting certain diplomatic information?

4 General Marshall: No, sir, I was not aware of that that
5 I recall.

6
7 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not at the
8 time Admiral Kimmel was getting certain information prior to
9 August or some time in August that General Short was not get-
10 ting that information?

11 General Marshall: I was not aware of that fact, that
12 what Admiral Kimmel got was not being made available to Gen-
13 eral Short. I am aware of what General Short was receiving.

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, did you know of any rule
15 or regulation that prohibited or delayed or stopped ythis
16 intelligence going to Admiral Kimmel after some time in Aug-
17 ust?

18 General Marshall: I am not aware of the circumstances of
19 that, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Do you know of any reason, anything
21 that happened in August that would stop that?

22 General Marshall: I am not aware of that, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: You are not aware of anything that
24 would stop that?

25 General Marshall: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When did you first get the information

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 that General MacArthur in the Philippines was getting this
3 "Magic"?

4 General Marshall: I could not answer that, sir. I know
5 now what he was getting and the circumstances under which he
6 was receiving it and I am not able to cast my mind back to
7 that time to know exactly what I knew then as to the degree
8 of it.

9 In these Headquarters, in some of them they had a basis,-
10 there was this which confuses the question in my own mind:
11 I knew that in the Pacific from sources in Hawaii and in the
12 Philippines and presumably, maybe, at the minor stations in
13 Puget Sound, possibly in Alaska and at other places, we
14 had quite largely, the Navy had groups who were engaged in
15 intercepting Japanese radio messages but that was done largely
16 for the purpose of locating ship movements, of locating head-
17 quarters from which you might deduce what the actual ship
18 movement was.

19 Now, that was going on throughout the Pacific. That
20 was the naval means of following as closely as they could
21 Japanese shipping, possibly their submarines, certainly their
22 larger naval craft.

23 There then is a confusion in one's mind as to how much
24 of what you knew was that and what you might have known that
25 was the elaboration of the deciphering of these messages which

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 constituted the basis of "Magic".

2
3 The messages on which the "Magic" is based were col-
4 lected throughout the Pacific. I should imagine, though I
5 am not the best witness on this, that the largest portion of
6 that collection occurred in the Philippines because of its
7 proximity to Japan and its ease of interception, but it some
8 times occurred, as in the instance I believe the record will
9 show on the fateful message which gave the hour one P.M.,
10 December 7th, it was intercepted in the Puget Sound region
11 rather than out in the Philippines or out in Hawaii.

12 So in my own mind in trying to reconstruct my knowledge
13 of the data, coming to that period just prior to December
14 7th, there is a confusion as to how much I knew that per-
15 tained to these radio intercepts that located the movement of
16 vessels, how much that I knew of arrangements to intercept
17 the Japanese messages rather than to decipher them and how
18 much I knew regarding the actual deciphering which I know
19 about now.

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes, but did you know in 1941, in the
21 summer of 1941, that General MacArthur had the means of ob-
22 taining the Magic as far as the State Department and various
23 other agencies are concerned, the so-called purple matter?

24 General Marshall: I do not know as I knew it then, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: That he was able to get it direct

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 by means of cryptanalysis in the Philippines?

3 General Marshall: I know that now, sir. I do not know
4 to what degree I knew it then.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, can you place yourself back in
6 1941 to know now whether or not you knew it then? I am try-
7 ing to find out what you knew here in Washington of what he
8 knew there?

9 General Marshall: Yes. I am unable to say that, sir.
10 I rather think I know now what the naval arrangement was in
11 the Philippines as to deciphering through what they called
12 the purple machine of "Magic", at that source, but I do not
13 know how much I knew about that then.

14 Senator Ferguson: But that would be an important letter
15 and would be called to your attention in 1941, would it not?

16 General Marshall: If it were known by General Miles, and
17 I am not positive whether or not he knew it.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, I do not want to pass on the
19 evidence of General Miles.

20 General Marshall: I am telling you --

21 Senator Ferguson: As to whether or not he knew that
22 General MacArthur had this means.

23 General Marshall: Well, my reference to General Miles--

24 Senator Ferguson: But I would like to have you, or if
25 someone can for you, to get General Miles' testimony on that

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

point and show it to you, rather than have me pass on it.

General Marshall: Well, I haven't read it, sir. I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: It is 12:30, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: It is 12:30 and the committee will recess until two o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock P.M., a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

(Resumed)

Senator Ferguson: At this place, General, I would like to offer the statutory duties of the Chief of Staff into the record. I wonder whether you can read them into the record and answer questions as to what you understand to be the statutory duties?

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator, for the purpose of the record, give the source?

Senator Ferguson: Pardon me?

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator, in order to have the record correct, give the source?

Senator Ferguson: Will you look on the back of that? This is the United States Code.

Mr. Murphy: The volume, page and section?

General Marshall: United States Code, 1940 Edition, page 491, paragraph 33. Do you wish me to read this into the record, Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Marshall: "The Chief of Staff shall preside over the War Department General Staff and, under the direction of

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 the President, or of the Secretary of War under the direction
3 of the President, shall cause to be made, by the War Department
4 General Staff, the necessary plans for recruiting, organizing,
5 supplying equipment, mobilizing, training, and demobilizing
6 the Army of the United States, and for the use of the military
7 forces for national defense. He shall transmit to the Secretary
8 of War the plans and recommendations prepared for that purpose
9 by the War Department General Staff and advise him in regard
10 thereto; upon the approval of such plans or recommendations by
11 the Secretary of War, he shall act as the agent of the Secretary
12 of War in carrying the same into effect."

13 Do you wish me to read the various references in paren-
14 thesis?

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes, you might as well.

16 General Marshall: "(June 3, 1916, ch. 134, par. 5,
17 39 Stat. 167; June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch. I, par. 5, 41
18 Stat. 764.)"

19 Paragraph 33-a. "Further duties of Chief of Staff.

20 "Subject to the provisions of sections 32 and 1193 of
21 this title, the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the
22 President, or of the Secretary of War, under the direction
23 of the President, shall have supervision of all troops of the
24 line and of the Inspector General's, Judge Advocate General's,
25 Medical, and Ordnance Departments of the Quartermaster Corps,

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 of the Corps of Engineers, and of the Signal Corps, and, in
3 all matters pertaining to the command, discipline, or adminis-
4 tration of the existing military establishment, of the Adjutant
5 General's Department, and he shall perform such other military
6 duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to
7 him by the President."

8 Those are the two paragraphs I see here on this page 491.

9 Senator Ferguson: You were familiar with the statutory
10 duties of the Chief of Staff?

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: You heard the testimony of General Gerow that he took full responsibility for the action to be taken, and not taken, on General Short's reply to the message of the 27th of November?

General Marshall: I read that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you agree that it was his full responsibility?

General Marshall: I would not say that was his full responsibility. It was his direct responsibility for each department of the General Staff, of which his was one.

Senator Ferguson: Do you, by virtue of your office, share that responsibility?

General Marshall: I think I do, sir.

Senator Ferguson: It is the responsibility of the Chief of Staff when he asks for a reply, and the reply takes a certain form, if any further direction is necessary it is his responsibility to give that direction?

General Marshall: That would be his responsibility, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The Chief of Staff?

General Marshall: The Chief of Staff, that is myself.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, I understand. And that is the kind of a message that General Short's reply was?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.