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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the  
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELER.



NORMAN SHIP.  
(From the Bayeux tapestry.)

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FIELDMARSHAL PAUL VON BENECKENDORFF AND  
HINDENBURG.

By Rumpf.

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## SOME OLD BLUE-LAWS.<sup>1</sup>

BY PRESERVED SMITH.

IF a "blue-law" be defined as the regulation from religious motives of purely private actions, it was not, as many people suppose, an invention of the Puritans, particularly of those who settled in Connecticut. On the contrary, the further back human history is traced the more cerulean does the tint of its jurisprudence become. In primitive societies the whole life of every individual is controlled with minuteness and rigor by a code considered divine. The only criterion of conduct, and therefore of laws governing it, which ever occurs to a savage, is the placation of supernatural powers; the rational motives of protecting public health and order were at first totally wanting. For the hardness of our hearts have the legislators divorced public law and private morality, for in the beginning it was not so. Not only in primitive times, but as late as the formation of the Jewish, Greek and Roman codes, the religious element is preponderant. In the Middle Ages, too, many vexatious ecclesiastical and sumptuary laws carried on the traditions of earlier times.

And yet, after all, there is something in the popular idea connecting the "blue-law" with the Reformation. That movement, by arousing the conscience without proportionately enlightening the understanding, by applying to an old method a new and intensified moral purpose, caused the statute-books to blossom with a whole set of regulations for the conduct of private life,—the "blue-laws" properly so called. This development is one of the many in which

<sup>1</sup> The principal sources for this paper have been the English and Scotch *Statutes of the Realm*, the French *Catalogue des Actes Royaux* (in the *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque Nationale*), Doumergue's life of Calvin, the *Calendars of State Papers*, Baum's *Capito and Butzer*, Egli's *Aktensammlung zur Geschichte der Züricher Reformation*, Firth and Raith's *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum*, and the author's *Luther*.

the Protestant revolt for a time accentuated the tendencies it was destined eventually to undermine. There is no doubt in my mind that the total effect of Luther's movement was progressive and rationalizing; and yet there are in it quite enough returns to the past to give Nietzsche, for example, at least specious reasons for calling it reactionary, "a reduplication of the medieval spirit." As an example of this curious tendency, and also for the part similar statutes have played in American colonial history, it may not be uninteresting to set forth some of the more important "blue-laws" found in European codes during the century between the beginning of the Reformation and the foundation of the English settlements in the New World.

It is not always easy to determine in what class any given law may belong. At times motives of finance and public policy entered into the enactment of measures primarily private and religious. The sumptuary statutes prescribing dress, for instance, were certainly inspired by mixed purposes, and were not uncommon in the Middle Ages. The intention of *An Acte for Reformacyon of Excesse in Apparayle*, passed in 1532, was stated to be "the necessarie repressing and avoydyng and expelling of the inordynate excesse dailye more and more used in the sumptuous and costly araye and apparell accustomedlye worne in this Realm, whereof hath ensued and dailie do chaunce suche sondrie high and notorious detryment of the common Weale, the subvercion of good and politike ordre in knowledge and distincion of people according to their estates, preëminences, dignities and degrees, to the utter impoverishment and undoyng of many inexpert and light persones inclined to pride, moder of all vices." The tenor of the act shows that its main object was to distinguish the various classes by their clothes; the garb appropriate to the royal family, to nobles of different degrees, to citizens according to their income, to servants and husbandmen, to the clergy, doctors of divinity, lawyers, soldiers and players, was all fixed. The law was so often re-enacted that it was apparently unsuccessful. The passion for finery, so characteristic of Tudor England, evaded all supervision, and prompted the citizens of either sex to dress above their class in one way when another was forbidden. About 1560 Roger Ascham complained that people at court appeared in "huge hose, in monstros hattes, in gaurishe colours," and that even "the rabble of mean and light persones," were dressed "in apparell against law, against order, for facion, namelie in hose so without all order as he thought himself most brave that was most monstros in misorder."

The first Scotch edict on the subject that I have noticed is of 1567, "That it be lauchfull to na wemen to weir [clothes] abone [above] their estait except howris." This bill was not only "ap-previt" by King James VI, but was endorsed in his own royal hand with the words: "This act is verray gude."

The contemporary French code is crowded with enactments on the subject of dress, the first promulgated in 1543 forbidding all persons except members of the royal family to wear cloth of gold or silver or embroidery or velvet. This was repeated in 1549, and in a fuller form in 1561, forbidding also "satin, silk, taffeta and all other superfluities" save to a privileged few. But evidently *la superfluité* was *chose très nécessaire* as much in the sixteenth century as in that of Voltaire, for the sumptuary laws had to be repeated with great frequency showing that their spirit, at least, was not obeyed. One of these, of 1564 was for the reform of *grosses chausses*, the "montrous hose" of Ascham's French contemporaries.

It is noticeable that none of these laws were aimed at anything but the expense of dress, and yet the fashions of the sixteenth century was not unobjectionable in other ways. Readers of Rabelais will remember what a vast amount of indecent fun the garments of his fellow-citizens afforded him. Montaigne was probably quite right in saying that the nudity of American savages was far less indecent than the clothing of men in France. Though not so bad, the dress of women, too, was not always modest. The fashion of low-necked dresses, which originated, like so many other styles, in the demi-monde, was just making its way from Italy north of the Alps, where it produced various impressions: Rabelais jestingly proposed that it be enforced by law; when the fashion reached Wittenberg in 1545 it received a scathing, and, for the time being, effective rebuke from Luther. In England it was at once adopted by the upper classes, and was sometimes, at least, carried to excess. The vanity of Queen Elizabeth prompted her to go to such an extreme that once the Spanish ambassador at her court reported that at a reception her Majesty's gown was cut *jusqu'au nombril*.

Such styles were soon taken up by the lower classes, and in 1594 a "Mrs Tomison Johnson," although a pastor's wife, was reprov'd for the following things:

"First the wearing of a long busk after the fashion of the world contrary to Romans xii. 2; 1 Timothy ii. 9-10. Wearing of the long white breast after the fashion of young dames, and so low she wore it that the world call them codpiece breasts....Whalebones in the bodies of peticotes, contrary to the former rules, as also against nature.... A cople crowned hatt with a twined

band, as yong Merchants wives and yong Dames use. Immodest and toyish in a Pastor's wife....The painted Hipocritical brest, shewing as if there were some special workes, and in truth nothing but a shadow...."

In the seventeenth century the low cut of the dress was retained but a guimpe was worn by modest women, the kerchief that plays so large a rôle in the tender passages of early novels.

All civilized nations have found it necessary to supervise inns and other places of public resort, and this police power may easily be used to correct private vices. Thus in France before a breath of the Reformation had penetrated, Francis I in 1526 issued letters patent empowering the governor of Paris to appoint a lieutenant and twenty archers to visit "streets, cross-roads, taverns, cabarets and other dissolute houses where vagabonds, idlers and evil livers are wont to resort, and to arrest and imprison people without calling, players of cards and dice and other forbidden games, blasphemers of God's name, ruffians and sturdy beggars." The preamble of this ordinance sets forth as the reason for this strictness the fact that the streets of Paris had lately become unsafe by reason of murders, robberies, ravishments and other "great insolences." Among the disorders within the taverns gaming occupied the first place. This was entirely forbidden in public houses on the establishment in 1539 of a public lottery. The real reason for this measure was undoubtedly the financial one, for the profits were large, but the law itself only mentions moral considerations, the evils of private gambling, the general desire of the public for honest games, in default of which they were driven to vicious courses. The example of Venice, Florence, Genoa and other cities is cited to show the advantages of a public lottery. The system has worked so well, at least from the fiscal standpoint, that it is maintained to-day in many European states. In 1577 Henri III passed another edict forbidding dice and cards for "minors and other debauched persons" in public houses, and this was followed six years later by a crushing impost on cards and dice. This act is particularly interesting as being one of the first experiments in checking undesirable pursuits through the taxing power, which is to-day the chief method of such regulation. That such was really the object of the excise is set forth in the preamble which declares that experience has shown that games of chance, far from giving the innocent pleasure intended by their inventors, only give rise to "cheating, fraud, deceit, expense, quarrels, blasphemy, murder, debauch, ruin and perdition of families," especially on holidays and Sundays which ought to be left free for the service of God.



Whereas the chief preoccupation of the French laws was the preservation of public order, neighboring Geneva, under the sway of John Calvin, dealt with the same problem in the most drastic spirit of Puritanism. There, in 1546, the inns were put under the direct control of the government and strictly limited to the functions of entertaining—or rather of boarding and lodging—strangers and citizens in temporary need of them. Among the numerous rules enforced within them the following may be selected as typical:

“If any one blasphemes the name of God or says, ‘By the body, ’sblood, zounds [*par le sang, par les playes*]’ or anything like, or who gives himself to the devil or uses similar execrable imprecations, he shall be punished. . . .

“If any one insults any one else the host shall be obliged to deliver him up to justice.

“If there are any persons who make it their business to frequent the said inns, and there to consume their goods and substance, the host shall not receive them.

“Item the host shall be obliged to report to the government any insolent or dissolute acts committed by the guests.

“Item the host shall not allow any person of whatever quality he be, to drink or eat anything in his house without first having asked a blessing and afterwards said grace.

“Item the host shall be obliged to keep in a public place a French Bible, in which any one who wishes may read, and he shall not prevent free and honest conversation on the Word of God, to edification, but shall favor it as much as he can.

“Item the host shall not allow any dissoluteness like dancing, dice or cards, nor shall he receive any one suspected of being a debauché or ruffian.

“Item he shall only allow people to play honnest games without swearing or blasphemy, and without wasting more time than that allowed for a meal.

“Item he shall not allow indecent songs or words, and if any one wishes to sing Psalms or spiritual songs he shall make them do it in a decent and not in a dissolute way.

“Item nobody shall be allowed to sit up after nine o’clock at night except spies.”

Touring Switzerland in Shakespeare’s time was evidently not without its disadvantages.

Merry England, too, became infected with the Puritan spirit at the end of the century. Unlawful games, such as “tennis, play, bowles, cloyse, dysing and carding” were indeed forbidden as early as 1541 but the sole object thereof was to encourage the practice of archery, “for the mayntenance of artyllarie.” Again in 1555 the licences of public houses in which “bowlyng, tenyse, dysyng, White and Black, Making and Marryng” were allowed, were made void, because it was alleged that they became the resort of conspirators. A very different motive inspired the “Acte to re-

straine the inordinate hauntinge and tiplinge in Innes, Alehouses and other Victuallinge Houses," passed in 1603. Here it is written: "Whereas the ancient true and principall use of Innes, Alehouses and Victuallinge Houses was for the Receipte, Reliefe and Lodginge of wayfaring people travellinge from place to place, and for such Supplie of the wants of such people as are not able by greater Quantities to make their provision of Victuals, and not for the entertainment and harbouringe of lewde and idle people to spende and consume their time in lewde and drunken manner," therefore it is forbidden to any person "to contynue drinkinge and tiplinge in the said Inne, Victuallinge House, Tiplinge House or Alehouse, other than such as shalbe invited by any Travailer," or to any other man for more than one hour after dinner. Three years later it was thought necessary to pass "An Acte for repressing the odious and loathsome synne of Drunckennes," which is stated to be on the increase and to be the cause "of enormous [*sic*] Synnes, as Bloodshed, Stabbinge, Murder, Swearinge, Fornicacion and Adulterye." This testimony of the statute-book is particularly interesting when we remember that Shakespeare was accused of being addicted to extreme conviviality, and even that his death in 1616 was attributed to the effects of a hard carouse. The act was repassed in stricter form twice by James I (1609, 1623) and by Charles I in 1625. In this connection it may be remembered that James I wrote a book against the use of Tobacco and that Urban VII (1590) excommunicated patrons of the weed. Under the Commonwealth it was ordered that ministers and schoolmasters commonly found haunting taverns should be ejected.

In 1617 Scotland was also obliged to enact a law "for the restraint of the vyild and destable vyce of drunkenes daylie In-crescing to the heigh dishonor of god." All persons who "haunted taverns" after ten p. m. were to be fined or imprisoned. In 1621 the Scotch parliament also forbade betting large amounts on cards, dice or horse-races. "Honest men," the statute affirms, "ought not expect that anye wyninge hade at anye of the games abone-written can do thame gude," and in order not to belie this maxim all winnings of more than one hundred marks (\$26) within twenty-four hours were confiscated. In England all money won in gambling was declared forfeit by an act of 1657. In 1654 cock-fighting and horse-racing were prohibited.

Another amusement which fell under the ban of some of the Reformers was dancing. There was doubtless something objectionable in many of the dances, and the most scandalous thing

about them was that the Catholic clergy frequently patronized them to the great peril of their professional celibacy. One of the funniest satires in the *Epistolae obscurorum virorum* (1515) is the account sent by Mammotrect Buntmantel, Master of the Seven Liberal Arts and professor at Heidelberg, of the dance—evidently a sort of “bunny-hug”—which he had attended, and the disastrous results thereof. That this sarcasm was not without foundation is abundantly proved. Roger Ascham, for example, wrote from the Netherlands in 1550: “I saw nuns and papists dance at a bridal. . . . It is lawful in that Babylonical papistry to serve Bacchus with what dishonesty they will, so they meddle not with Christ and his word.” A little later the Council of Trent, at its twenty-fourth session, forbade all ecclesiastics to hunt, dance, frequent taverns or gamble.

The opinion of the Reformers on the advisability of permitting this recreation was divided. Luther, the broadest as well as the greatest of them all, was in favor of allowing it, properly chaperoned, because he believed the opportunity given to the youth of both sexes to know each other would lead to happy marriages. He even went so far as to say that the Pope condemned dances because he was hostile to marriage. That great Puritan, Milton, saw no harm in “tripping the light fantastic toe.” But few prominent Protestants agreed with them. Luther’s friend Bugenhagen, parish priest of Wittenberg, denounced the amusement harshly. It was forbidden at Zurich in 1500 and again in 1519 on the advent of Zwingli. Calvin, as usual, was the most austere in this regard. It must be allowed, in estimating his severe ideas, that Geneva appears to have been a particularly licentious city. The dances there were accompanied by embraces and kisses. They were accordingly denounced from the pulpit and then suppressed by law.

The drama, too, has always been considered a proper subject for legal regulation. In this case also Luther showed himself broader than many of his followers, for when the clergy of Magdeburg objected to the plays of Joachim Greff, Luther was in favor of their continuance. Far otherwise was the feeling of Calvin, averse by nature and conviction to all frivolity. At first he was not strong enough to forbid all plays at Geneva. “I see,” he sighed, with evident regret, “that we cannot deny men all amusements, so I devote myself to suppressing the worst ones, but plays are not given with my approval.” The ire of his colleague Cop was aroused afresh by the introduction of the new Italian habit of giving the women’s parts to actresses instead of to boys. Ac-

ording to his view, "the women who mount the platform to play comedies are full of unbridled effrontery, without honor, having no purpose but to expose their bodies, clothes and ornaments to excite the impure desires of the spectators." "The whole thing," he added, "is very contrary to the modesty of women who ought to be shame-faced and shy." With such sentiments as these on the part of the leaders there could be no doubt as to the outcome, and in 1572 the Book of Discipline of the Reformed Church forbade members of that communion to go to any plays whatsoever.

The Latin countries had no such scruples. In 1541 Macchiavelli's *Clizia*, one of the most objectionable pieces of the Renaissance, was acted before the Pope and cardinals. Indeed even the "reforming Popes," Paul III and his immediate successors, maintained a strong troop of musicians, comedians (*improvisatori*), female singers, dancers and buffoons. It is true these diversions did not pass without censure within the church. The Memorial of the Reform Commission of cardinals, drawn up in 1536, proposed forbidding all the clergy to go to the theater, as well as to visit taverns, to gamble and to blaspheme. Another of the public recreations of the Vatican was bull-fighting. Erasmus saw one of these contests presided over by Julius II in 1509, but his protest against it passed unnoticed for nearly a century, when the sport was at last forbidden.

In France there was little supervision of the drama, which was, throughout the century, regarded as a legitimate means of religious instruction. One is rather surprised in reading a patent of Francis I entitled "Licence to the King's Comedians," to find that these comedians were the monks of certain cloisters, who were permitted to give morality plays on stated occasions. Some dramas were distinctly tracts in favor of, or against, the innovating religion. Those not agreeable to the party in power were of course forbidden. Finally in 1641 Louis XIII passed the first act, a much needed one according to modern standards, forbidding the representation of indecent acts, or the utterance of immodest words on the stage.

The tendency to use the drama for partisan purposes was also strong in England. The fashion was set by the court, for on St. Martin's Eve, 1527, Henry VIII attended a play given by the boys of St. Paul's school, representing "the heretic Luther like a party friar in russet damask and black taffety, and his wife like a frow of Almayn in red silk." Fifteen years later the tables were turned when Richard Morison petitioned the king that the plays of Robin

Hood and Maid Marion be forbidden "and others devised to set forth and declare lively before the people's eyes the abomination and wickedness of the bishop of Rome, monks, nuns, friars and such like."

Such "matters of divinity and state" were carefully regulated by the government, which also forbade blasphemy on the stage, but which overlooked almost any amount of indecency. The Puritan spirit protesting against this first made itself felt in the ordinances of the city of London, which in 1559 appointed a censor to eliminate all "unchaste, uncomely and unshamefaced speeches." Again in 1574 the City Council passed an interesting by-law, beginning:

"Whereas heartofore sondrye greate disorders and inconvenyences have bene found to ensewe to this Cittie by the inordynate hauntynge of greate multitudes of people, specialye youthe, to plays, enterludes and shewes; namelye occasyon of frayes and quarrelles, eavell practizes of incontinenyce in greate Innes....withdrawinge of the Quenes Majesties subjectes from dyvynne service on Soundaies & hollydayes, at which tymes such playes weare chefelye used, unthriftye waste of the moneye of the poore & fond persons, sondrye robberies and cuttinge of purses, utteringe of popular, busye and sedycious matter...."

Plays are therefore considered a "great provoking of the wrath of God, the ground of all plagues," and are forbidden within the city limits. They continued to flourish elsewhere, however, and in places so near the city, such as Southwark and Shoreditch, that the citizens of the metropolis could easily attend them. The literature of the times is full of ferocious denunciations of the theater by Puritans, whose triumph in 1642 meant the end of the Elizabethan drama. On September 2 of that year the Long Parliament passed an act forbidding plays during the present distracted state of England, "instead of which are recommended to the people of this land profitable and seasonable considerations of repentance, reconciliation and peace with God." This reduction of the staple of English recreation to meditation and prayer was made perpetual in an act of 1648 which set forth the extreme Puritan view with the greatest severity of language.

Among the matters on the border-line between public and private, the endeavors of the French and Scotch governments to suppress duelling may be considered. On February 9, 1566, Charles IX issued an "Ordinance forbidding all gentlemen and others to give the lie to each other, and, if they do give the lie, not to fight a duel about it." The extraordinary wording of this proclamation, providing for its own violation, reminds one of the mother who said to her son: "Now, Johnnie, don't go out under any circumstances,

but if you do go out, put your overshoes on." Another feature of the edict of Charles IX is said to have been imitated in the notice displayed in a rural railway station: "Gentlemen will not spit; others must not." In 1609 Henri IV was obliged to reinforce his predecessor's command by a more rigid prohibition of duels, and this was repeated by Richelieu in 1626.

James VI of Scotland was also obliged to deal with the subject in 1600. His Majesty and the Estates, "considering the great Libertie that sindrie persones takis I provoking utheris to singular combattis upoun suddan and frivoll querrellis, qlk [which] has ingenderit great Inconveniencies within this Realm; Thairfoir statutis and ordinis that na persone in tyme cumming without his hienes licence fecht ony singular combatt Under pane of dead and his moveable geir escheat." One is reminded of the statement made by one of Dickens's characters, to the effect that duelling was a royal prerogative wrung by King John from the barons at Runnime.

It is with no intention of suggesting that marriage is a kindred subject that it is taken up next. The matter which most exercised the governments of Continental Europe in this regard, was the question of the validity of betrothals without the parents' consent. The practice of allowing young people to select their own consorts, now universal in Anglo-Saxon countries, and apparently prevalent in England for centuries, deeply shocked continental opinion. "Secret engagements," according to Luther, "never have been in the world, but are the invention of the powers of evil. Parents should give their children to each other with prudence and good will, without their own preliminary engagement." Betrothal was a more solemn matter than it is now, and a girl who entered into an engagement with a young man might suffer for it if the promise was later declared invalid. So when, in 1543, a young woman sued her swain who had broken their engagement on the ground of his father's non-consent, the Wittenberg consistorial court condemned him to pay damages for breach of promise. Luther, thinking that immorality was likely to arise from allowing secret engagements—as indeed was sometimes the case—took the matter up with passion, and in a sermon declared:

"I, Martin Luther, minister of this church of Christ, take you, secret troth, and the paternal consent given to you, together with the Pope, whose business you are, and the devil who invented you, tie you all together, and cast you into the abyss of hell in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."

His further intervention with the Elector was successful, for the Saxon government shortly thereafter passed a law forbidding betrothal of young persons without their parents' knowledge and assent.

Almost at the same moment Rabelais was attacking the same dangerous innovation in France. Pantagruel declares that he would rather have God strike him stark dead at the feet of his father Gargantua, than that he, the son, should be found married alive against his parents' wishes. "For," he declares, "I never yet heard that, by any law, whether sacred or profane, it was allowed and approved that children may be suffered and tolerated to marry at their own good will and pleasure." French legislators certainly did not allow this, for in 1556 Henri II proclaimed that, having heard "that marriages are daily contracted by children of good family at their own carnal, indiscrete and disordered will, to the deceit and against the wishes of their parents, without the fear of God," such children may be disinherited (which was otherwise forbidden by French law), and this rule applies to sons up to the age of thirty and to girls until they are twenty-five.

The rights of children on the other hand were guarded in a singular edict of Francis II (1560) forbidding widows who marry a second time to prefer their second husbands or their relatives to children of the earlier marriage.

As the great age of religious controversy, the sixteenth century codes are full of provisions about religion. "An Acte for the Advancement of true Religion and the suppression of the contrary," or its equivalent, is a common occurrence, though precisely what the true religion was no two acts agreed, all contradicting each other, each commanding what the others anathematized, and prohibiting what the others declared the kernel of Christianity. The natural result of this condition of things in provoking doubt is one of the most fascinating and least investigated sides of the Reformation. The essence of Montaigne's skepticism is that where all religions give each other the lie, they may all be wrong. Particularly, he argued, it is setting a high value on our own ideas to put men to death for them. Unfortunately few of his contemporaries shared this modest diffidence. That is one of the most instructive as well as one of the saddest passages in the story of our race which tells that the men who were willing to die for their own faith were equally ready to put other men to death for theirs. Well may Lord Acton say that the greatest achievement of modern times is the emancipation of the individual conscience from the bondage of authority.

However much public opinion still needs further enlightenment in this regard, the laws at least are now thoroughly tolerant.

Though perhaps the lines of investigation just suggested are the most interesting to the philosophical historian of religion, they are not within the scope of the present paper. Here, not the great statutes enforcing faith and conformity, but only the petty regulations of daily life in accordance therewith, can be noticed. In this respect, as in so many others, the German Lutheran movement is found to be the most liberal of all. Attendance at church was enforced by public opinion, but very leniently, if at all, by law. Sunday was regarded as largely a day for recreation and pleasure. In the *Catechism* Luther, with his habitual reckless and winning candor, stated that the strict observance of the Sabbath, or Saturday, enjoined by the Ten Commandments, was a bit of ceremonial law binding on no Christian, and that the setting aside of a part of one day in seven for public worship was a matter of convenience only, not of divine right. After the closing of church service he thought the time might properly be spent in what work or pleasure the individual chose. It was Calvin who first carried through the identification of the Christian Sunday with the Jewish Sabbath that was to produce the English and American observance of that day. At Geneva complete absence from labor and attendance on church was compulsory. Five sermons were offered to the devout every Lord's day; whether hearing all of them was compulsory or only some of them, I have not been able to ascertain. Another innovation of Calvin was the prohibition on pain of fine and imprisonment of all observance of Christmas. Swearing of course was forbidden, in the same class with masks, disguises and gambling.

The French kings contented themselves with punishing "swearing, cursing, blaspheming, imprecations and other villainous oaths against the honor of God," (in 1550 and again in 1574). In 1561 Charles IX felt obliged to forbid all persons "entering into debate, quarreling, or reproaching each other on any religious matter, on pain of death."

England was far more Puritan, though it was the Catholic Bishop Bonner who in 1542 started the ball rolling by prohibiting, with the approval of the government, all the London clergy from frequenting taverns and other evil resorts at time of divine service on Sundays and holidays, and from blasphemy and swearing. In the same year it was enacted that no person "shall take upon him openlie to dispute and argue, to debate and discusse or expounde Holye Scripture." In 1548 the Protestant Edward VI forbade the



eating of meat on Fridays and in Lent, partly because "due and godlye abstynence ys a meane to vertue," partly to save cattle and to give fishermen a livelihood. In 1559 Elizabeth began to enforce attendance on church. In 1624 the Puritan Parliament passed a severe act against swearing and cursing, and in the immediately following years forbade all work on the Lord's day, as well as profanation of the same by "Bearebaiting, Bullbaiting, enterludes, common Playes and other unlawful exercises and pastimes." So far was Sunday observance carried that in 1638 Richard Braithwaite, in the verse often quoted but usually wrongly attributed to Hudibras, satirized it as follows:

"To Banbury came I, O profane one,  
There I saw a Puritane one  
Hanging of his cat on Monday  
For killing of a mouse on Sunday."

Scotland outdid her sister. In 1540 James V ordained that "nane commune or despute of the haly scriptour without thair be theologis appreivit be famous universities." Two years later Mary's Parliament, in an act allowing all men to have "the haly write baith in the new testament and the auld in the vulgar tounge," made the extraordinary proviso that "na man dispute na hald oppuneonis" about it. In 1551 were forbidden "grevous and abominabill aithis sweiring execratiounis and blasphematioun of the name of God, sweirand in vane be his precious blude body passion and woundis." An act first passed in 1551 and frequently repeated thereafter was aimed at "all persounis quhilkis [who] contempnandlie makis perturbation in the Kirk. . . . and will not desist and ceis thairfra for na spirituall monitioun that the Kirkmen may use." All labor was of course forbidden on the Sabbath, as was "gamyng, playing, passing to tavernis and ailhouses selling of meit and drink and wilfull remaining fra the parochie kirk in tyme of sermone." In 1600 it was commanded that all men should communicate at least once every year. It may seem strange to us that in 1587 the followers of Knox also forbade eating flesh in Lent.

The repression of vice hardly lies within the scope of the present paper, and its adequate treatment would require more space than is here available. Nevertheless as the subject is kindred to those dealt with by the "blue-laws," and as it is interesting in itself, particularly in view of the recent efforts of American cities to deal with the social evil, some closing words may sketch the experience of the sixteenth century in the same matter. The ascetic spirit of the Middle Ages of course regarded prostitution with horror, and

yet the disparagement of marriage by the church and the creation of a large class of celibates certainly fostered the evil and connived at it as a necessary one. The concubinage of the clergy became a recognized condition. The same attitude towards prostitution in general was maintained in Catholic countries even after the Protestant Revolt: there was no thought of suppressing it, though men like Loyola might here and there found homes for the reclamation of fallen women.

When the attitude of the church was so lenient that of the state was even more so. Lorenzo Valla defended the institution, proclaiming that a prostitute was a more useful member of society than a nun. The Italian word *cortegiana* or "courteous lady," indicates as tolerant an attitude toward the profession of courtesan, as *bravo* or "brave man" does toward that of assassin. Most cities, not only in Italy but elsewhere, maintained public brothels. At Geneva in the fifteenth century, for example, the women were organized under a queen who was obliged to swear on the Gospels to perform her office faithfully. At the court of Francis I one of the salaried officials was the *gouvernante des filles publiques*.

The Reformation brought in a new spirit of ruthless hostility to the social evil as such. Houses of ill-fame were suppressed at Wittenberg as early as 1521, and this example was followed by many other Protestant towns. Luther was strongly in favor of this course, which he was the first to advocate in his *Address to the German Nobility* of 1520. Twenty years later he wrote a friend: "Have nothing to do with those who wish to reintroduce evil resorts. It would have been better never to have expelled the devil than having done so to bring him back again stronger than ever. . . . We have learned by experience that regulated vice does not prevent adultery and worse sins, but rather encourages and condones them." Melancthon held a similar opinion, believing that the magistrate had a right to suppress harlotry, though he apparently thought it not always wise to exercise this right, and pointed out that even if there were no law against it, the conclusion that the magistrate condoned it would not be valid. At Zurich under the influence of Zwingli the houses of ill-fame were allowed to remain, but were put under the supervision of an officer whose duty it was to see that no married men frequented them,—surely the strangest compromise ever made with the world, the flesh, and the devil. It is interesting to note that the economic factor, recently made so much of, was prominent four centuries ago. When the Reformers Bucer and Capito cleansed the city of Strassburg, the women drew up a

petition stating that they did not exercise their calling for the gratification of their wicked passions but solely as a means of earning their bread. Efforts were made to get honest work for the girls, and even to marry them, but how successful these were cannot certainly be told. As in other matters so in this Calvin's Geneva was the most uncompromising of all the Reformed cities. There the government, served by numerous officers and spies, was extremely efficient, and not only made laws against prostitution but strictly enforced them. The results of their efforts cannot honestly be called encouraging; notwithstanding the severe penalties inflicted for all kinds of immorality, the number of cases which came before the magistrates was appalling. The cities of London (1546) and of Paris (1565) and the realm of Scotland (1567) all made efforts to deal with the same evil, but they were not so drastic as those of the Germans and Swiss, and in all countries they were sooner or later abandoned. The suppression of the social evil has been found impracticable by all those governments which have tried it, and yet in no land can the present condition of things be regarded as anything but bad. Of all the problems at present facing the civilized world, none is more urgent and yet none more difficult than this.

As a whole the "blue-laws" have failed. It is true that there are still, in England and America, statutes forbidding deeds of a purely private nature because they are "to the high displeasure of God," rather than for the protection of the public. The law still prohibits certain acts because they are wicked rather than because they are likely to hurt others than those who do them. But, historically considered, these are abnormal survivals. Whether it is regretted or approved no candid student can deny that the tendency of modern jurisprudence is toward that maximum of individual liberty set forth by Mr. H. C. Wells in *The Modern Utopia* as the ideal. This of course does not mean anarchy, but the restraint of those actions only by which one man infringes on the liberty of another.

# NORWAY AND ITS POLITICAL SITUATION.

BY MARTIN NARBO.


## EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION.

NORWAY is a picturesque country. It is a relatively narrow strip of land sparsely inhabited on account of the rocky character of its territory. Its population counts little more than two millions. With the exception of 15,000 Laplanders and 7000 Finns and Gypsies, the people are of pure Germanic blood and in religion are mostly Lutherans. There are not more than 2000 Roman Catholics and only 700 Jews. Under American influence dissenters have left the established state church and there are now over 10,000 Methodists and 5000 Baptists.

The inhabitants of the country cultivated the soil at an early date, but it was as seafarers and bold conquerors that they gained their fame. Ships of theirs have been found in all parts of the northern seas; one lay buried in the sands of the Baltic, between Düppel and Alsen, and another was discovered in the Seine, not far below Paris. We here reproduce one now preserved in the University of Christiania, a staunch vessel in its time, and one which could easily have held from sixty to eighty armed men.

The habitable portions of the country are the valleys which are hardly accessible except from the sea through the fiords. As a result of this lack of connection, most of the people of Norway are leading a life of isolation which has impressed itself upon their character and prevented the formation of a definite Norwegian language. Almost every valley has a dialect of its own. The literary language had necessarily to come by way of the sea, and so it was but natural that at an early date, in the fourteenth century, Danish became the speech of the pulpit and of the hymns of the church.


In recent times, however, especially after the severance of Norway from Denmark in 1814, Norway began to rebel against



VIKING SHIP PRESERVED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHRISTIANIA.

the Danification of its literature, and some of the leading men worked out plans to have Danish words translated into Norwegian. The spoken language assumed a Swedish pronunciation, and a new era brought out grand possibilities in the dramas of Bjornson, Ibsen and the composer of comedies, G. Heiberg.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia tore away from Sweden the province of Finland, and Russia's aggressive policy is still feared by Sweden and also by Norway. With Denmark the case is different. The Danish royal family is related by marriage to the rulers of both Russia and England, and, in addi-



NORMAN SHIP. From the Bayeux tapestry.

tion, the Danes have a grudge against Prussia for the loss of Schleswig-Holstein.

It is true that the Danes have not yet forgotten England's raid on Copenhagen during the Napoleonic wars when Nelson bombarded the capital for several days and took the whole Danish navy captive for no other reason than that Denmark had proposed to remain neutral in the war between England and France. Further, the Danes claim that in 1864 their king had been abetted by England in refusing the traditional oath to keep the constitution of the duchies Schleswig and Holstein. They declare that they never would have allowed themselves to be confronted with a war against Prussia and Austria if they had not relied on England's promised assistance. And there are many who are willing


to forgive the Prussians for the conquest of the duchies, but are unable to forget that they were left in the lurch by Great Britain in the critical moment. As a result the Danes are not in favor of



LAATE FALLS NEAR ODDE, HARDANGER VALLEY.

either Germany or England and do not share the fear of Russia as do the inhabitants of the Scandinavian peninsula.

There is a peculiar difference between Morway and Denmark



THE MIDNIGHT SUN AT NORTH CAPE.



which comes out in their national hymns. The Danish national hymn indicates that Prussia is their old enemy, and it preaches hostility to Germany, while the Ibsen poem of Norway to which



NAERDAL VALLEY FROM STALHEIM.

Mr. Narbo refers is strongly anti-British. Mr. Narbo writes of it in a personal letter: "I found in the public library a French and an English translation. The tempo of the western coast of Nor-

way which Ibsen so carefully put into it was lost in both translations, and it was just that which made it a masterpiece. Over the English version there was an explanation, stating that it was very unlike Ibsen, gently excusing it and belittling it, but admitting that it was a 'story well told.' The translator omitted and changed materially its strongest expressions, but what is most important is that the French translator did not go to any such trouble."

Our illustrations will serve to give some idea of Norwegian scenery. They show the character of the valleys and glaciers, North Cape, the wonderful midnight sun, a characteristic group of Norwegian laborers in the fields, also a group of Laplanders.



RAFTSUND, LOFODEN, NORWAY.

The author of the present article, Mr. Martin Narbo, of San Francisco, was born in Norway and is the son of a Norwegian schoolmaster. He came to this country as a youth and is proud of having made his living by the work of his hands. He considers himself a laboring man, but the pride he takes in making his living by manual labor did not prevent him from acquiring a fair knowledge of languages. He has traveled extensively on the continent of Europe and gained a wide acquaintance with the characteristics of the common people in different countries. In America he worked as a cowboy and also as a farmer, but after having acquired a homestead sold it again and attended the University of Wisconsin in Madison, where I happened to meet him, and I will say that he

is as singular and interesting as all the Peer Gynts hailing from the rocky land of the midnight sun.

I have had some correspondence with another Norwegian, a graduate of the University of Christiania now living in Minnesota, and he informed me that ninety per cent of the Norwegians are anti-German and pro-British. In order to find out more about Norway, I wrote to Mr. Narbo requesting him to state his view of the situation and this article is his answer.

These two Norwegian correspondents may represent two extreme factions. We leave the final decision to our readers and



DETAIL OF SVARTISEN GLACIER.

abstain from expressing any opinion. It would probably be difficult to state the proportion in definite percentages of those who share either view.

#### MR. NARBO'S STATEMENT.

It is a comparatively easy matter to express one's views to those who have a clear conception of how Norwegians must naturally stand on questions regarding this world issue, but what are we going to do with such people as the Minnesota man who lumps the Norwegian anti-Germanism at 90%? We cannot disregard them, and it is true that those who know are responsible for those

who do not know. The uninformed have been too great a factor in all wars, and they are too great a factor in this war, to be neglected. It is against such as these we must battle, and indeed I am battling every day the best I know how. Thanks to my workingman's experience, and the facts I have gotten from German sources, I have been able to vanquish them by the dozen.

Just to give you an illustration of how impossible it is to generalize a national feeling at a certain per cent without any reservations, I will state my experience in forming an estimate of French national feeling during the two and a half years I was in France, from the point of view of the great mass in society to



NORWEGIANS MAKING HAY.

which I belong, and prior to 1905. Ever since I was a boy I have always been able to feel what another person thought of me, and I consider this as my rarest gift.

Owing to my light complexion I was often taken for an Englishman when I came to France, and equally often taken for a German. I noticed that I excited a certain amount of antipathy in both cases, but with a distinct difference. When they took me for a German, although they tried to hide their feelings, the circuit of thought was very short: it was Sedan, Siege of Paris, an enemy, but accompanied at the same time with a certain amount of self-reproach. When I was taken for an Englishman the circuit of thought was longer. They went over a long list of offenses

they had been taught in school while studying their history. There was robbery, intrigue, unfairness, treachery and sacrilege. With the Germans they were ready to have another bout; but with the English there was not much to be done, or there was a feeling of reluctance to soil their swords with English blood. When they took me for an Englishman they looked at me with contempt and disdain. I could give a hundred specific instances that furnished opportunity to test this feeling, and many of them were very interesting. In some cases I risked my face in making the test. It always brought me a certain amount of relief to tell them that I



FISHING LAPPS OF FINMARK, NORWAY.

was a Norwegian, but there remained the fact that I was a light-complexioned Teuton and resembled an Englishman or a German.

Now how could I be able to estimate these feelings at a certain per cent? The percentage that might be true today probably would be wrong tomorrow. A sociologist would diagnose the anti-English feeling as being dormant, with a chronic character that would prove fatal whenever the conditions happened to be right. There would be a percentage who would at any moment flare up for this reason. The anti-English feeling is of a religious fibre and is not easily done away with. It will act like soot in the chimney whenever English and French will build a fire together. The

quality has everything to do with national feelings and it can only be defined, not counted.

Now in considering the Norwegians, it must not be forgotten that we are just coming out of five hundred years of national misfortunes. I believe one can find in the history of our last five hundred years the reason why I found the Norwegian to be German in Germany, Swiss in Switzerland, French in France and English in England. As soon as they become split up and isolated they lose their identity too quickly. Norway was never conquered, but we became entangled with Denmark through royal intermarriage. Royal love-making left us under the dominion of the royal house of Denmark. The Norwegian officials became Danish. They manipulated with the Danish merchants and sold out the forests of Norway and other natural resources. But the worst of all was that these official parasites insisted that it was not respectable for us Norwegians to talk the language that was so strong and poetic in the mouths of our Viking forefathers. They used their official prestige, and little by little we lost our self-reliance. They taught us to have contempt for our mother tongue and to admire what was foreign to a degree that came close to ending our spiritual existence. Denmark never suffered from the hands of Germany one per cent of what we suffered from the hands of Denmark, but we are trying to forget as fast as we can because Denmark is our Teuton brother. It would be well for Denmark to do likewise and not nourish her grudge against Germany at the risk of her own existence.

Through international complications we became united to Sweden, and for another hundred years the Swedes tried to trick away our liberty. But all that must be forgotten, although the sore is fresh. Now we are just straightening up as an independent country, and some day, if nothing happens again, our Teutonic brothers will be proud of us. But just what can we do in the present case? If we declare ourselves openly on the side of Germany, against Russia and England, England can come along with her navy and destroy our coast cities, and we are more coast than anything else. Russia will have a fine excuse for carrying out her old intentions against Norway. If she could only extend her arms on both sides and make the Baltic a nice little Russian port, how fine! Our five hundred years of outside influence have made us Norwegians timid. We are afraid to make the present situation clear to ourselves, and this timidity is interpreted as pro this and pro that, even pro-Russian. We Norwegians should not deceive

ourselves. For us, disastrous as it looks, we should see that we have only one side to choose.

We are a small nationality, and we have been shifted about; we naturally look for some big brother to protect us. Can we Norwegians look to Russia? Can we trust her word? Do we expect any mercy? Do we expect any fair treatment? Do we look to Russia as a civilizing country? No! England and France may have such illusions, but not the Norwegians; we have been too close neighbors. We have heard directly, without any translation, from the mouths of our brother Finns what Russia is as a master. Do Norwegians forget the sensation of having Russian spies in their midst as they have had at regular intervals? What about the program of the Russification of northern Norway so typical of Slavism? I do not believe in hasty generalizations, but it is safe to lump the Norwegian anti-Russianism at 98%. Yet we are afraid to say so for we must put a plaster on the Russian sore because we are afraid of it. But let us not think for a minute that we can deceive Russia, for Russia expects no good will from the Scandinavians, and that is why she took military precautions against us. Why should we expect anything from her? We are conscious of the fact that she is our natural enemy. When she comes, do we expect that England will skate her navy up over the Norwegian mountains and take a stand in our behalf? No, we are not that foolish. Do we expect the Latin race to protect us? The Latin race had better unite for its own protection. Germany cannot afford to let Norway and Sweden be taken by Russia; it would weaken the effectiveness of the Kiel canal. The Norwegian cause is naturally the German cause, and the German cause is naturally the Norwegian. I would to God the Norwegians would get some of the old Viking daring in themselves and be brave enough to announce that, sink or swim, they would stand by the German cause even at the risk of another disastrous five hundred years—even at the risk of eternal Slav slavery. But there is no danger, says that man who reasons only for his own selfish period of existence. There is only one big brother to whom we can naturally look for effective protection—and that is Germany; if he should be weakened Norway would have no big brother. But there is more at stake than the existence of Norway.

There are two main influences which determine the real feeling in choosing between our Teutonic brothers, England and Germany. One is the spirit of the German Reformation, the other the foreign spirit of emigrants returning with English culture. Perhaps the

only outside influence from which we Norwegians have gained great benefit is the influence of the German Reformation and philosophy. When I was a boy the pictures of Luther and Gustavus Adolphus could be seen on the walls of every peasant home. The deeply religious spirit embodied in the vigorous German hymns, so powerfully sung by Norwegian worshipers, has been a wonderful tonic to Norwegian spiritual life. If it were not for this spirit Norway would not have accomplished her splendid humanitarian results, she would not have her small percentage of criminality, of illiteracy, of divorce, of child mortality, school mortality, and pauperism. In all the years I have been away from Norway I have never felt as much at home in any church as I did in the German Lutheran church when I was in Germany. The closeness of this religious tie between Norway and Germany is immeasurable. In the last few years, this spirit has been opposed by an English spirit coming from Baptistism and Methodism and other isms emanating from the United States. These returned emigrants have started an agitation against the state church with the purpose of ridding Norway of what they call German atheism. They object to the systematic teaching of religion in schools and to the government having a German Lutheran church department as well as a school department.

Intelligent Norwegians realize that one good church is enough—a systematic teaching of morality is just as necessary as a systematic teaching of mentality. This class has been contending against the English-American invasion. I have three cousins in this country who are Lutheran ministers, and one cousin married to a man who was an American Lutheran missionary to China. They are all prating about the German atheistic tendency in Norway. They want to go home and harvest some of the respect that well-brought-up Norwegians are ready to pay the servants of God. Now they are not qualified by the Norwegian church department and so when they come home they have to go about like ordinary mortals, and that is not a pleasant experience to many a one who went out in the world as a little boy expecting to become great. The returning emigrant comes home with the idea that what he has learned while away from home is the only thing the world has to teach, and so he becomes more one-sided than the man who has been staying home taking an interest in other countries as well as England and America. The result is a natural clash, and anyone who knows how every parish in Norway has been visited by returned emigrants will realize that that clash is great. English culture has been mainly represented in Norway by these emigrants who to a



great extent have forgotten their mother tongue and have learned none in its place. Thus English and American culture have not had a good representation in Norway, and in intelligent minds and among religious circles there has grown an aversion to this bragging culture.

It is also an important fact that Norwegians are very loyal to those of their own people who give evidence of superior knowledge. In 1905 the people expected and hoped for a republic; but when those who were their leaders, although in the minority, presented their reasons the public silently acquiesced and chose a kingdom. This same leading class in Norway is today with Germany, but they control their tongues and we do not hear much from them. They are wise; I am sure they know just what they can do, and it is possible they have on a diplomatic cloak, but there is no doubt as to where their hearts are.

In our school readers there is a long poem covering two or three pages which is one of Ibsen's masterpieces. The name is *Terje Viken* and in it he breathes a contempt for the English that never leaves any Norwegian who is worth calling a Norwegian. England has taken active steps in Norway to discourage literature that deals with English misdeeds. One poem about St. Clair in the same reader states that the English burned and slaughtered wherever they went, and that the child was killed in the arms of the mother even while a smile was on its face. We have raised a statue where St. Clair fell, and the poem says *Wch* to every Norwegian who does not get hot when he sees this statue. Both of these poems use such strong language that 95% of the Norwegians in this country as well as in Norway will not forget it. This Norwegian feeling is dormant, but England will feel its effect if ever anything comes along to stir it up. England starved us once, too, with a blockade, and a real Norwegian remembers it. Those who are not Norwegians, those who have lost their identity, are governed by the conditions prevalent in the country where they live, but I venture to predict that in the future politics of this country Germans and Scandinavians will fuse together more and more, and I hope their influence will be felt.

The Catholic church, of course, has caused some dissension where Teutonism is concerned. The Scandinavian press is not vigorous, but rather moderate in its expression—except the Danish which is particularly venomous. The Danish press is often quoted as the Scandinavian press, but this is very misleading. If I had plenty of money I would start a pro-German campaign in the Nor-

wegian language; it would be a relief to do something. Still, with the experience I have gained, I will come along later on when another great issue appears, and it is surely coming. It will be the second chapter of this war.

I believe that the only people who has a right to call upon the God of the Christian for help is the people that has endeavored systematically to do the most for the widows and fatherless. I have had plenty of proof from actual experience that Germany is that country. I looked into the eyes of the German emperor Wilhelm II; he did not avoid my eyes but answered that look only as a good man can, and all the bad that I had heard about him vanished. I lifted my hat and bowed with respect and devotion; he bowed in return and gave me personally a smile that I shall never forget—not because he was the emperor, but because he was a man with tremendous influence for the good. May the God he has a right to call his, be with him!

There are a few things that I see absolutely beyond the slightest doubt. The most ignorant and premature term used today is the term "militarism." Until we agree on an international government backed by an international force strong enough to enforce the will of this government we will have militarism—unless the spirit of the golden rule controls every individual, and then we must all want to be done unto in the same way. Another thing that I think is ridiculous is to be looking for precedents in a war where submarines play an important new rôle. The rules of blockade will never be the same in the future. Neutrals should realize that this is a war of the biggest nations, the rule of catch as catch can. Here in San Francisco there is a mixture of sentiment, also a good collection of foreign papers, and to see how different nationalities treat the same fact is sickening. For instance, *The Toronto World* to-night prints this three column headline: "United States Threatens Germany with Reprisals if Vessels are Attacked." I always enjoy the excitement in *Le Temps*. There is where I get my only laugh. I also find in *The Toronto World*: "United States very mild in note to England. Germany is ordered to respect American rights on seas."

I have one argument, illustrated with much personal experience and studded with German facts, with which I am very successful in my class. I give it as a reason for this war, that years ago the German government with their splendid system took care of the producers of capital by making capital responsible. The effect was the same as when a man takes care of his horse, for that is

better for the man and better for the horse. Both will do better and they will like each other better. The result was that they produced things made in Germany at a lower cost, and this threatened to outclass the irresponsible capitalism of England, France and Russia. I tell them of the barbarism of this capitalism, and I present specific cases that appeal to my class, and I defy them to show me what else Russia, France and the rest have in common except this slovenly, lazy, blood-thirsty, free capitalism. I tell them these countries are too far behind to catch up with the same system and they are doomed, and that is why they fight. I tell them that this is why the press of the United States takes the stand that it does, and they believe me. As to the outcome, I believe in the might that comes from living in the right.

There have not been any incidents of importation of arms to Russia where the government has stepped in. There is no such importation I am pretty sure. From a commercial point of view, Norway is interested in the welfare of her merchant navy. She has felt English competition keenly, but she has also met England in many parts of the world as a brother sailor. The feeling from this point of view can be argued on both sides. I have often seen in Germans a distrust and suspicion of the Norwegians, and I would like something to occur that would show our loyalty to Germany. Some of the Danish dislike may have crept into a certain class of Norwegians, but not many.

## THE THOUGHT OF SOCRATES.

BY WILLIAM ELLERY LEONARD.

### I.

EVERY exposition of Greek thought, from the most pedantic to the most popular, has been divided into the two chapters: "Before Socrates," "After Socrates"; between which has stood a third, devoted to Socrates himself. Though he published no book in prose or verse, no philosophic hexameters on nature, no dialectic treatise on the Absolute, no criticism on ethics, politics, or the divinities that shape or refuse to shape the ends of man, his centrality to the development of speculation, as the mind which, while itself indifferent to the activities of its predecessors, brought to light other principles not only directive for thought in hitherto uncharted realms, but essential for any rational solution of those problems already broached, has been until very recently beyond all dispute, and will always in any case challenge disproof. And the importance of his practical wisdom for the unwritten history of conduct is presumably quite as great. Thus we are now face to face with one of the five or six most impressive and vital questions in the history of intelligence (as opposed to the history of human vanities and insanities—the rise and fall of dynasties and the interminable slaughters on land and sea): just what did this man stand for who lived so long ago under the hill temple-crowned, in the market-place girded by porticoes, within the walls against which even then the hostile armies were more than once encamped?

The question is difficult not alone because it is so much larger than every writer who would answer it; but because it is just here that our sources are so difficult and confusing. Biographical reports, when uncontaminated by miraculous elements or by suspicion of rhetorical purpose or partisanship, when squaring with the public customs and affairs of the times, and finally, when tending toward a consistent portrayal of character and conduct, we may trust, in

default of any contrary evidence. Allowing for some possible ambiguities of imperfect expression, I suppose no scholar would seriously quarrel with the statements of the preceding chapter, as not being founded on serviceable authority. It called for no special gift to note and record the concrete events, whatever gifts were needed to record them beautifully. But to understand thought, thought new and deep, expressed symbolically, whimsically, mischievously, trippingly on the tongue, now to this one, now to that, now here, now there, now touching this matter, now that, did call for an alertness of attention, a keenness of perception, a steadiness of memory, and an objectivity of judgment not present at Athens, nor indeed commensurate with man's limited brains yet anywhere; while to set it all down as if verbatim was, as shown in a previous chapter, the attempt either of self-delusion or of literary fiction. We are shut up forever to reading between the lines and to estimating the cumulative evidence of innumerable hints, which, taken separately, we would have no means of testing, and no right to feel sure of. We can bring the difficulty home to ourselves, if we imagine posterity, without the *Essays*, dependent for its knowledge of Emerson's thought, on (hypothetical) miscellanies of conversation reported and edited by Alcott, Thoreau, Margaret Fuller, and other neighbors of the Concord apple-trees and pines.

The histories of philosophy, despite the imposing names on their title pages, mislead us (to borrow the language of Frau Academia) with the specious clarity of a rationalizing schematismus. Here just what Socrates repudiated and contributed is numbered and sectioned and paragraphed with that illuminating precision which facilitates preparation for the final examination. The studies of Grote and of Zeller, based upon a wide erudition and developed with a philosophic grasp it were pedantry to commend, convey also a misleading impression of certainty, which the contradictory results of the German scholarship of the last fifteen years, of Doering with his Xenophontic Socrates, of Joël who clings to Aristotle, of Roeck who picks his data from portions of Xenophon and from much indirect and elusive testimony in the attitude of contemporaries or in the comment of tradition, tends to destroy, without, however, furnishing any constructive substitution in which we can feel full confidence. The new critics confuse while they help; and the day has gone by when even a popular essayist can content himself with compiling from the old. Tentatively and modestly I will set down my own opinions, which, I suppose, will differ from those of better men in lacking the organization and definitiveness that, though

much to be desired, it is impossible for me with intellectual honesty to reach.

## II.

What thought had been busied with before Socrates is, from the point of view of its dynamic contributions, far more important in the case of Plato in whom unite elements of the Eleatic, the Heraclitic, and the Pythagorean speculation, than in the case of his master who is notorious for his break with the past. From the point of view of a crisis in the human intellect, however, it is necessary to make some mention of that thought here. A few words, then, with the emphasis on antecedents rather than on influence.

During a generation or two preceding Socrates, in the sea-washed colonies to east and west had developed a number of theories of universal nature, as free and large and intangible as the starry heavens and salt winds about them. The search for the universal explanation of things which had begun in the naive materialistic monisms of the Milesians, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, as deductions from the apparent omnipresence of water, the atmospheric indefinite, or air, turned, with that sudden acceleration which characterized Greek progress everywhere in the fifth century, very shortly to rational analysis of concept and sense-impression of the phenomenal world. The Eleatics of Magna Graecia, holding the primacy of reason over sense, discovered the antinomies which forced them to deny reality to change and plurality; the first of metaphysicians, they proclaimed the absolute and pointed a way to scepticism. The great Ephesian, though positing like the physicists of Miletus, a material principle, fire, as the substratum of the multitudinous visible universe, is chiefly notable for paradoxes, as analytically derived as those of the Eleatics, which forced him to deny ultimate and permanent reality to anything but the Logos, the law of change itself, and to affirm relativity, the absolute instability of all things, as the inherent logical implication of being—pleasure conditioned by pain, life by death, thesis by anti-thesis. In the eternal flux there can be no certainty of truth, and Heraclitus, too, points a way to scepticism.

Pythagoreanism, coming after all pretty close to the intellectual basis of the world-ground in its doctrine of numbers, however fantastically applied and involved in that hocus-pocus which so often has accompanied primitive mathematics, is an esoteric cult of religious mystics with liturgy and rites.

Empedocles of Agrigentum, imagining a cosmogony almost as mythical and arbitrary as that of Hesiod, yet peopling it with eternal substances (earth, air, fire, and water) and eternal principles of cosmic energy (attraction and repulsion), is, from our point of view to-day, physicist rather than philosopher. So too chiefly Anaxagoras of Athens, as far as we can judge, who taught infinite atoms and a universal mind-stuff.

Contemporary with Socrates off at Abdera in Thrace Democritus was teaching in numerous books now lost a mechanism of nature—atoms, motion, and the void—which, with modifications and extensions and a more elaborate terminology, is the physics and chemistry of to-day—or at least of yesterday.

These courageous efforts to master experience were all primarily directed outward. The challenge came from the majesty and mystery of the external universe. But in meeting it thought soon became conscious of its own mystery, and man himself became part of the problem. In the irremediable flux of Heraclitus and the cold atomism of Democritus men's minds tend to vanish into mere sensations differing for each: truth is as multiple as humanity: there is no universal principle of knowledge or thinking or conduct: man is the measure of all things. So Protagoras, the sophist. Meantime the later Eleatic, the sophist Gorgias, perhaps in half-jest, has pushed the dialectic reasoning of the school to the negation of being itself.

The path is open to absolute scepticism. The exploration of reason is ending in unreason. Speculation has thus far approached man from without; and that way madness lies. It must make a new start,—with man himself, man in his humble activities and daily round, irrespective of atoms clashing in the void and theories clashing in the brain. The philosophic implications in the simple mental life of an Athenian cobbler or saddler or armor-smith may bring us back to some conviction of permanence and certainty in thought. Thereafter it will be time enough to look again at the cosmos. Socrates, beginning and ending with man, ultimately saves Greek philosophy from self-slaughter. It is not for nothing that he is an Athenian.

But it is easy to present the situation too academically. Scepticism is troubling a few speculative heads. Their notions are abroad in Athens, imported over seas in parchment-rolls, well boxed from the damp salt air, or stalking the streets on the lips of the traveling professors. They are affecting not only the intellects of the abstracted, but doubtless the moral conduct of some of the

active young men; but that Socrates in his new direction was consciously phrasing a philosophic task, or by saving philosophy was saving mankind, are propositions which distort both the larger mission of the sage and the relatively secondary importance of technically philosophic systems for the public health. From Socrates, as must be noted later, most subsequent Greek schools seem directly or indirectly to derive. But he was not aiming to reform philosophy. Nor could his re-formation of philosophy be a revolution—except in philosophy, a fairly negligible phase of human progress, if we take into account the few in any age who mull over its puzzles. No, Socrates's interest was in men and his aim to reform men; and, though he doubtless checkmated philosophic nihilism in more than one aggressive young dupe, he awoke to a sense of their ignorance and their heritage in the laws of the spirit many more, less sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought than ailing from that moral lethargy which still keeps out the kingdom.

It is easy in another matter to misrepresent the situation. It is not as if philosophy and morals came to a standstill, say about 440, to await help from Socrates. Historians distort the chronology. Gorgias, Protagoras, and Anaxagoras were teaching in Athens long after that date, and scepticism itself may not have been full blown when Socrates began his public work. Direct evidence is lacking, but there is plausibility in the conjecture that his first conversations antedated even the first appearance of the sophists. Gorgias, for example, came to Athens in 427, only five years before Socrates was lampooned in the *Clouds*.

In still a third matter the situation may be misrepresented. Socrates, during his long life, was not the only teacher at Athens who held that the proper study of mankind is man. Protagoras himself laid the stress there, as the logical result of his own scepticism, and the later sophists seem to have occupied themselves entirely with intellectual conduct and with moral conduct, like Socrates, independent, as to the former, of cosmic speculations and, as to the latter, of mere tradition. They certainly also used the cross-examining method, associated now with Socrates, on which a word below. As with Socrates, their business was the education of youth.

But Socrates is a greater sophist—not simply because he tarries in Athens, and they wander from city to city; not only because he teaches in the Agora and they in private homes; not altogether because he gives and they sell instruction, nor even because his wisdom is humble that it knows no more and their knowledge sometimes proud in that it learned so much—greater because of greater



moral earnestness. There were honest sophists, although contemporary writers and later anecdotists testify that some even then were the unprincipled jugglers with reason that have given the name its long current and unfortunate association. But none except Socrates made truth and righteousness the be-all and the end-all. A greater sophist, also, it need not be added, because a greater intellect and a greater personality.

And now, if with a little more imagination than poor Wagner, the student has begun

“Sich in den Geist der Zeiten zu versetzen,

let him attempt

“Zu schauen, wie vor uns ein weiser Mann gedacht.”

### III.

The thought of Socrates is implicit in his method. He was not a formal lecturer, as other sophists doubtless were at times, and as Plato and Aristotle were later. He talked, as all Athens was talking; he asked questions, and applied the answers to the business of further questions, as men had done before and have done ever since. He utilized on occasion the keener procedure of the disciplined mind, the dialectic which, applied first by Zeno the Eleatic to abstract matter and motion, etc., it was now the sophists' service to apply to human conduct. He shared, I repeat, his cross-examining method of instruction with the sophists, just as Jesus shared his parabolic instruction with the rabbis. But like Jesus, by a powerful originality he made a common device so much his own that we now connect it only with him.

Aristophanes, as we have seen, represents him as formally teaching his method, but this appears to be a wilful or reckless identification of Socrates with his fellow sophists who we know imparted the art of clever reasoning as a practical instrument, whereas Socrates, according to all other traditions, used it to impart truths beyond itself, teaching method merely by showing it in operation.

“He conducted discussion by proceeding step by step from one point of general agreement to another” (*Memorabilia*, IV, 6), and “by shredding off all superficial qualities laid bare the kernel of the matter” (*Memorabilia*, III, 2). He begins with the point of view of his interlocutor or opponent and, with an irony kindly or irritating according to circumstances and with frequent use of

homely illustrations, leads him on inductively to one admission after another, until he sees the implication in his own thought, that is, until he is face to face with himself as the unwitting possessor of a particular truth. Each man has within him truth, though as yet foetal and powerless to be born; Socrates comes calling himself the midwife. This was presumably his interpretation of the Delphic adage, "know thyself"; and, far from proud of his midwifery, he was "eager to cultivate a spirit of independence in others" (*Memorabilia*, IV, 7). He bored deeper into the strata of thought than the other sophists, and knew better its hidden caverns and springs; and, more than they, tapped it for living waters. The *intellectus sibi permisus*, "the intellect left to itself,"—the phrase is Bacon's—the spontaneous reason of haphazard man he strove to make conscious and self-directive. His aim implied confidence in universals of the truth of which each individual partook, as well as confidence in human nature capable of self-salvation.

All our sources indicate that Socrates was unwearied in his inquiries for the *τί ἐστι*, the What, the essential meaning of a thing. In Xenophon he appears discriminating, defining. The Platonic figure is presumably dramatically true to his intellectual attitude. The nub of the satire of the *Clouds* is rationalizing fanaticism corrupting the youth (for which Aristophanes surely should have borrowed Schopenhauer's Aristophanean coinage applied to Hegel—*Windbeutelei*, windbaggery). And Aristotle says in a famous passage (*Metaphysics*, I, 6, 3) that has caused a deal of trouble: "Socrates discovered inductive discourse and the definition of general terms," in contrast, as the modern critics point out, to the mere grammatical distinctions of the sophists. But our critics have certainly exaggerated what were for Socrates simply short formularies of the factors to be examined, not logic-proof concepts of abstract philosophy. My Socrates was not a *Begriffsphilosoph*, and would have enjoyed the practical joke of Diogenes (of the school of Antisthenes, a disciple of the midwife), who, hearing (as the story goes) of Plato's definition of *homo sapiens* as a featherless biped, plucked a rooster and carried it over to the Academy as an example of Plato's "man."

#### IV.

But these short formularies of the factors to be examined were of prime importance. Socrates emphasized the rational, the cognitive, aspect of virtue, as no other teacher: *τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς ἐπι-*

στήμας ἐποίει—"He made the virtues knowledges" (Aristotle, *Magna Moralia*, I, 1), and since our first historian of philosophy recurs to the theory at length a dozen times (in all three *Ethics*), to explain and refute it, with that modernity and subtilty that forever astonishes us in

"Il maestro di color che sanno,"

we must accept it as true at least to one side of Socrates's thought. Virtue is knowledge. In a sense: "To be pious is to *know* what is due to the gods; to be just is to *know* what is due to men; to be courageous is to *know* what is to be feared and what is not; to be temperate is to *know* how to use what is good and avoid what is evil" (*Encycl. Brit.*).

Various comments difficult to organize crowd upon us for expression. What of this dynamic relation between right thinking and right conduct, between ignorance and evil? How did Socrates arrive at the idea? How far did he admit its modification by other factors in human nature? Has it an element of truth?

The idea, in the first place, were a witness to the character of Socrates, whom a noble serenity of reason dominated like an irrefragable god. It were, too, an idea typically Ionic, Athenian, sprung from that stock which stressed the *λόγος* of life, even as the ideal of the Doric (Sparta) was the *ἐγκράτεια*, the *ἔργα* (deeds).

Socrates saw the actual identity of knowing and being in the theoretical sciences: to know geometry is to be a geometer. He may not have appreciated the difference of aim in the practical arts. He may have said that to know medicine is to be a physician, and thus have construed conduct itself as the science-art of life, so that knowing virtue was the same as being virtuous, and he may not have sufficiently perceived that the aims of the theoretic science are self-inclusive, and those of the practical arts in every case respective somewhats beyond themselves.

However, I do not care to push the Aristotelian critique further, as my imagination is haunted with something like an uncomfortably reiterated and all but inscrutable chuckle of Socrates that yet seems to say: "This great man's subtilty and system takes the old beggar too solemnly. And I didn't reckon in the irrational part of the soul (*ἄλογον μέρος ψυχῆς*)? And the will being in my view subservient to thought, the result is determinism? And was the marketplace, then, such a poorly equipped laboratory that my researches left me so ignorant of the twists and starts and explosions of human nature? And will he deny the larger implications for systematic

thought (if he must make me a system) which may be read out of my dealings with men?"

Granted that Socrates in speech and practice proceeded from the proposition to know is to be, 'applied specifically to conduct; granted that like every new and great thought, like the Copernican astronomy, like Biblical criticism, it was at first formulated too absolutely; granted that Socrates was not a theoretic psychologist and that indeed the psychology of the will and the emotions was not very extensively developed even till long after Aristotle; granted that life is forever in advance of all speculation upon it and that the first serious speculations on morals may as such have been an inadequate or inconsistent phrasing of impulses, motives, and ethical stimulus obvious even in the veriest honey-smearing brat screaming under his mother's sandal in an Athenian alley-way: it is yet impossible to square the thought and service of Socrates entirely with Aristotle's report; it is yet impossible to identify my Socrates entirely with him of the text-books.

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, said the adoring Hebrew; to know the right, as implicit in thy nature, is the beginning of wisdom, doubtless said the quizzical Greek: each in his own tongue. Knowledge is the *sine qua non*: not following a Pythagorean ritual, not following the Attic sires, not in itself following the laws of the state, but ethical insight. Socrates preached the self-reliance of an individual moral vision which was yet founded in universal man.

After the insight, what? For a finely balanced soul, in a sense, nothing. Insight merges into conduct; the initial readjustments of knowledge become, if not considered too curiously by the analytic psychologist, the readjustments of action; there is no fight pending with the world, the flesh, or the devil; he sees and he forthwith is what he sees. This was, I think, Socrates's ideal man. Socrates made less than we do of character up-built by struggle and of the glories of doing one's duty against the grain. He was a Greek; we are Teutons with a Hebraic education.

Note, however, the condition: "for a finely balanced soul." Self-control, balance, poise, is the cardinal Socratic virtue. When present, moral insight is moral conduct. But more than that, its presence is practically identical with moral insight as well. "Between wisdom and balance of soul he drew no distinction"—*σοφίαν καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν* (Memorabilia, III, 9) is Xenophon's comment, and not too much stress is to be laid on the fact that his word is *σοφία* (wisdom), not *ἐπιστήμη* (knowledge). And in a

neighboring passage, "He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom."

Is, then, complete insight itself possible without this balance? If we take Xenophon absolutely, apparently not. Wrong conduct is either blindness or madness, i. e., either failure of insight or lack of soul balance; but these are practically two aspects of the same thing. Balance of soul, insight, right conduct is the Socratic manhood, the not entirely mysterious three-in-one of this pagan anthropologist.

But what of the avowed situation of Ovid's Medea, and of so many others less damned to fame—

"Video meliora, proboque:  
Deteriora sequor"?

Would Socrates have denied the major?—Presumably he would first have questioned it; but often enough he was face to face with gifted men, like Alcibiades, who knew right and did wrong, with intelligent but vicious humanity where the cure, if any, could not be alone merely more intellectuality. He believed in training soul and body to self-mastery, not only as right conduct in itself but as the prerequisite for right thinking and right conduct (cf. *Memorabilia*, IV, 5). This is potent to any one who reads between the lines of our sources; and has perceived that Socrates's identification of different factors, is, if anything, more than an insistence on the primary importance of moral cognition, but an immortal hyperbole of an original mind, not busied with a formal system, and not bothered by its inconsistencies, as when perhaps he said "courageous men are those who have knowledge to cope with terrors and dangers well and nobly," the adverbs seeming to imply the recognition of traits of character antecedent to the knowledge.

He recognized, though he may never have formulated, back of self-control, insight, and conduct, the facts of temperament and environment, without wavering in practice from his belief in the relative teachability of virtue analogous to the teaching of a trade or art. He does not, however, seem to have valued over-much teaching through the emotions. There are hints that he more than once stirred the emulous heart by noble examples cited, but the oft mentioned enthusiasm of his listeners was roused usually either by his sweet reasonableness or the unplanned and unmediated effect of his own brave and kindly personality. Of the blazing passion, in plea or threat, of Mohammed and the Hebrew prophets, or of the

austere yet plangent appeal of the loving Jesus there is not a trace. There are many different voices for the schooling of man.

The new pedagogy stands quite across the world from where Socrates stood. With its experiments on the ethical emotions of cats and dogs, its statistics of innocent nursery prayers and depravities, its questionnaires on the moral agitations at puberty, and its roll-calls of public pensioners in Sing Sing or Fort Leavenworth, it has all but demonstrated the negligibility of knowing as a factor in virtue. And the parlor-philosopher, calling Sunday afternoon, shakes his head and assures me there is no connection between education and morality. Sad. And true, possibly, if by knowing we mean knowing mathematics and by education education in linguistics or the new pedagogy; verbiage, if we mean knowing moral values. The intellectual is still fundamental, and great character is still impossible without just thought as a big block in the underpinning. Meantime the common sense of mankind is rather with Socrates at bottom than with the new pedagogy, unconsciously testifying something of its unshaken view-point in countless familiar turns of speech: "*Know* the right and do it;" "You ought to *know* better;" "Poor fellow, he didn't *know* how disgraceful his actions were;" "What could you expect from a man who never had a chance to *know* the ideals of good citizenship;" "You're wrong, can't you *see* it?" etc., etc., all of which adumbrate the cognitive (without psychologizing it away from the imagination) and neglect the emotional altogether, as dynamic for conduct.

Kant founded the moral life in the good will; Socrates in right thinking. Yet each implies the factor made paramount by the other: Kant says act so that the maxim of thy conduct is fit to become universal law and implies the rationalizing, generalizing, judging, knowing mind; Socrates says a man without self-control is little better than the beasts, and implies that energy of soul to which modern psychology gives the name will. A worthy moral life is impossible without both, but the romantic ethical tendencies of today need the propaedeutic of Socrates more than of Kant. The good will we have always with us, giving often enough, with ghastly best wishes, unwittingly a serpent for a fish and a stone for bread; but the intelligence to see the practical bearings of conduct and to discriminate between higher and lower ideals is too often lacking—to the dwarfing of the individual and to the confusion of society. The fool in Sill's poem (which goes deep) prayed not for the good will, but for wisdom; and therefore the less fool he.

Socrates associated *ἀρετή*, "virtue," with some further ideas

more prominent in his thought than would be presumed from the brief mention that can here be made of them.

He was, I believe, an incorrigible utilitarian. The measure of any thing's worth was to him in its adaptation to use. But after all, the crux is in the content of use; and Socrates recognized only noble uses. Reason as we will, we cannot reason away his implicit idealism: such and such conduct is useful—for what—for making you useful to the state, a brave soldier? for making you worth while to yourself, self-respecting? "But what the use?" We can not go far without standing before the mystery of the approving or condemning moral consciousness itself. Socrates appears never to have thought the matter out; nor need we just here. In spite of his rationalistic bent, he accepted as instinctively as most men the obligation to the ideal.

He preached companionship; and boasted himself to be both lover and the pander too. "I am an adept in love's lore"...the disciples "will not suffer me day or night to leave them, forever studying to learn love-charms and incantations at my lips." These words are found not in Plato's Symposium, but in the prosaic narrative of Xenophon, whose placidity in assuring us in another passage that "all the while it was obvious the going forth of his soul was not towards excellence of body in the bloom of beauty, but rather towards faculties of the soul unfolding in virtue," is a good indication that we have here an element of the historic Socrates. But friendship was founded on character: "In whatsoever you desire to be esteemed good, endeavor to be good" (*Memorabilia*, II, 6); to be a good friend, you must be a good man. Love was also fellow-service: the good friend tried to make his friend better. On the other hand, it was useful to acquire friends—they were the best possessions. The politic utilitarian peeps out again. But useful for what?—for the cult of generous helpers, for the freemasons of the Good. We come round again and again to the center of the Socratic utilitarianism which measured finally the useful things in the moral realm by their usefulness for the ideal manhood. I have employed the vilified name for rhetorical surprise. It has here little in common with its use in modern philosophy, though modern utilitarians have been too ready to exclaim, "Lo, he has become as one of us."

Socrates would not have been a Greek if his ethics had not had a social and political reference. Ideal manhood and ideal citizenship would have been for practical teaching one thing to him. He would have been hugely impressed with the adroit patience and

clever tinkering amid loneliness and deprivation of Robinson Crusoe; he would have admitted doubtless that the brooding, skinclad sailor was not without some insight and some self-control which is of virtue; but for Socrates he would have lacked both the main opportunities and the main ends of good conduct: a state of fellow men. Thus the Athenian stands in almost brutal contrast to those gentle hermits of the inner life who have in times past peopled the caves of Egypt and the crags of the Himalayas.

This is clear for instance in the emphasis he seems to have put upon the ideal of a leader, the man best equipped to manage something, whether the drilling of a chorus for the theater, or the marshalling of soldiers into battle, or the ruling of a commonwealth.

Some aspects of this ideal are to be sure extra-ethical. The Greek *ἀρετή* means human excellence, *Tüchtigkeit*, efficiency, with or without what we would call an ethical connotation, and it illustrates that differing focus of thought, that differing idea-group, that differing line of cleavage that so often strikes the student of a foreign tongue. I have not hesitated, however, heretofore, to translate it "virtue," for it is its aspect of moral efficiency that is so prominent in Socrates, though its absolute sense of simple efficiency doubtless tended in his thinking to specious analogies. Our word "good" offers a modern parallel, both in its double sense and in its sometimes ambiguous and misleading use in thought.

Socrates would not have been a Greek if he had not emphasized the sanctity of the sovereign laws as a guiding principle of conduct. The Greeks often spoke as if the state were the end of man; that is, as if man received his justification only in so far as he contributed to its perfection. That a state is but the wise communal means to opportunity, variety, unfoldment, manhood, of the only earthly reality that counts, individual human beings, is scarcely the point of departure of Plato's Republic or even of Aristotle's Politics, but is the result of a long development in political science, fascinating, but irrelevant here. Just how far Socrates failed to see it as we do, we have no certain knowledge. It is, however, on several grounds, to be confidently presumed that he derived the sanction of the civil law from justice, and not as is often declared, justice from the law. In the corrupt and shifting politics of Athens there were laws which he condemned and deliberately disobeyed in the interests of higher laws. And he would have taken courageously by the arm the Sophoclean Antigone, as she determined to bury her brother Polyneices in spite of the state decree, and have said, "Thou art right, my child; indeed,



'The life of these laws is not of to-day,  
Or yesterday; but from all time, and, lo,  
Knoweth no man when first they were  
put forth.' "

## V.

That Socrates conceived the laws of right thinking and doing as organic and not statutory, as not imposed from without but as implicated in the nature of the organism and as universal as man seems clear from the general tendency and headway of his teachings. A ship may tack more than once in its course, but we measure the meaning and purpose of the voyage correctly only when we have absorbed the casual deviations into a more comprehensive cartography. His conception of virtue has the transcendental implication: it roots in a beyond; conceptually, in the universality of the ideal; categorically, in his naive and unexamined assumption of man's sense of obligation to the ideal when discovered.

This is the thoroughfare from ethics to religion. When the soul, finally conscious of that transcendental implication (though it be named more simply, or named not at all), and awake with rejoicing or dismay to the realization that virtue streams ultimately from the shining foreheads of the gods, it perforce reaches out with trust or prayer. It becomes Micah uttering the finality: "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good: and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God." Nor is the essential attitude altered if for his baffled spirit the Divine Singular or Plural merges into the Infinite Mystery that rebukes our petty vocabularies. There is no other highway. The philosophic reason that, examining the transcendental bearings of logic and nature, arrives at a world-ground, arrives only at the intellectual last, at the speculative satisfaction, which, though it may bulwark religion, can scarcely compel it. The feeling of physical helplessness or dependence or terror, the suggestions of spirit-things from dream or hallucination, or eery winds or nodding tree, may issue in beliefs with incantations and petitions and burnt offerings, reachings out to a Superior or a Host, but this is religion only in the Lucretian sense, denying often enough even the majesty of man himself—

*"Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum."*

A not ignoble morality is possible, unaccompanied by the reaching out which merges it with religion; but religion (apart

from anthropological investigation) gives over not only its dignity and its beauty, but even its meaning if sundered from exalted morality.

If to Socrates was not revealed the transcendental implication of his life, if Socrates reached not out for the justification and sustenance of his ethic towards a Divine, then Socrates, though at the temple door, and though a servant there who worked righteousness and thus, according to bluff and honest Peter, also acceptable to Him, was still not a teacher of religion. His character, his service would remain lofty memorial of humanity, lofty witness of a god unknown; but he were still not a religious mind. This *if* we have yet to consider.

It becomes more and more plausible that the fatal indictment is rooted in observed fact: "Socrates is guilty of not worshipping the gods whom the city worships." If he had been initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries at that time newly popular, his apologists would have risen forthwith against the dicasts. Plato's Apology practically dodged this charge of the indictment. Aristophanes, years before, had formulated it, and we cannot any longer throw Aristophanes peremptorily out of court as a mere irresponsible buffoon in an ugly temper. Satire makes no appeal unless it phrases a common belief: there would be nothing fetching about a satire on Roosevelt as an atheist, or on Emerson as a hunter and rough-rider, except as a cheaply comic inversion of well-known habits and traits, and Aristophanes was hardly perpetrating that sort of jest. His satire on the sordidness of the school-house was founded on the fact of the poor and mean estate of Socrates's person; his satire on the Socratic speculations was founded in the fact of Socrates's perpetual rationalizing; his satire on the corruption of youth on the fact of Socrates's influencing young men to think new thoughts unprescribed by the elders; and his satire on Socrates's irreligion must likewise have been founded on fact—misunderstood fact, possibly, but fact misunderstood only as most of Athens may have misunderstood it. The Socrates of Plato, perhaps, helps us little; but it is to be observed that his remarks on dreams, oracles and the gods have an elusive playfulness or poetry, pointing if pointing at all beyond Plato, to a mind rather mischievously at ease in Zion, but not hostile to contemporary beliefs only because so far above them; and that his beautiful prayer to "Pan and ye other gods who frequent this spot" asks, quite contrary to popular petition, "in the first place to be good within"; and that the nearer Plato's Socrates seems to approach historic reality the more his

religious allusions approach the indefinite "Divine," and the more eloquent is the expression of the moral law. The movement of thought with which Socrates was most nearly associated was away from the folk religion. Socrates was so much with Euripides, the infidel poet of the Enlightenment, that rumor accused him of dramatic collaboration. The chorus at the end of the *Frogs*—a satire on that poet—sings with meaning: "Hail to him who [unlike Euripides] neither keeps company nor gossips with Socrates." And again, the keen intelligence of Socrates, as we have tried to analyze him, consorts awkwardly with the popular Olympians.

Against all this, we have the explicit testimony of the *Memorabilia*: Socrates was the most orthodox son of the state religion; the pillar and deacon of the church; the ambling odor of sanctity, now closeted with this priest now with that, running about from altar to altar with incense and winecup or telling his beads to every saint in the calendar. We share Xenophon's own puzzlement that the state could have condemned to death such a simple-minded old gentleman for impiety.

But this was not the man they condemned. As suggested in the first chapter, it was almost a formula with Xenophon, when he admired a man (and he had in excess the goodly gift of admiration) to extol him for the piety and pious practices which played a dominant part in the eulogist's own life. That he deliberately grafted these domestic pieties upon Socrates is impossible; if he had conceived Socrates as the impious neglecter or defamer of the gods, he would have been the last to attach himself or to rise in defense of the man. But that he absurdly misconstrued him seems patent. Socrates shared, as no other teacher, the life of his city; and the religious rites were so closely associated with folk-habits that he may well have attended them from time to time in the satisfaction of the social instinct of man. He may well not have sloughed off some deep-rooted ancestral prejudices: even Emerson raised his hands with the dismay of all his Puritan sires when he discovered the children in the house playing battledore and shuttlecock one Sabbath morn. He may well have used often enough the current coin of speech, in Greek, as in all languages full of conventional religious phrases. But it was not alone in whatever unconscious relations Socrates may have maintained to the state religion that Xenophon misconstrued him. The profounder interests and ideas and temperament of Socrates he equally misread. Socrates visited everybody and studied everywhere: but he was not necessarily more a hierophant for visiting a seer than he was

a shoemaker for visiting a cobbler. "When any one came seeking for help which no human wisdom could supply, he would counsel him to give heed to divination" (*Memorabilia*, IV, 7): the Socratic irony Xenophon presumably never half mastered. And, again, if Xenophon had asked him if he believed in Zeus and Athene and Apollo, he would doubtless have said yes, without hypocrisy, but also without explaining the ethnic period which lay between Xenophon's meaning of belief and his own. I myself believe in those resplendent deities. The fact is that religious narrowness always naively interprets the religious life of another by its own, unless kept back by clubs and spears. Give it the salute of mere human recognition, and it claims you for its sect. I have heard of an old lady who was moved by the orthodoxy of "that devout man, Mr. Gibbon." Joseph Cook, after an impertinent pilgrimage to Concord, announced so blatantly his conversion of Emerson that the family finally caused a printed denial to be circulated. The evangelist's methods were sometimes disingenuous; but here he seems merely to have fallen victim to his fatuity. The apostle probably asked: "Mr. Emerson, do you believe in sin? in salvation? in the saviour? in rewards and punishments? in the scriptures?" And the patient heathen as probably nodded a winsome assent of infinite detachment. I used to see at Cambridge my revered teacher William James crossing over every morning at nine o'clock to the brief chapel exercises in the yard, and have heard him both commended and ridiculed by students who equally misconceived the simplicity and depth of that analytic yet brooding mind.

But we are approaching a point of view. If Xenophon cannot be taken literally, he adumbrates a positive truth. If Socrates was not religious in the folk-sense, he was religious in a higher sense. He did recognize the transcendental implication. Even Xenophon now and then seems to have caught his larger phrase: "His formula of prayer was simple—Give me that which is best for me." And it is difficult to imagine Plato making an absolute atheist even the dramatic protagonist of an ethical philosophy in which the transcendental implication is consciously conceived as fundamental. But much further it seems impossible to go. Socrates recognized the divine foundation and sanction of the moral law, whether he ever uttered the argument from design so rhetorically developed by Xenophon or not. But the rest is silence. Whether he held to one divine being, as is not unlikely; and whether immortality was more than the high hope of the *Apology*, as seems doubtful—we can not report. An early tradition tells of a Hindu conversing with Soc-

rates (and it is not historically impossible that some soldier from the Indus, impressed into the Persian armies, remained in Greece, as exile or slave, after the defeat). And he said, "Tell me, Socrates, what is the substance of your teaching?" "Human affairs." "But you can not know human affairs if you don't know first the divine." Socrates, though no Oriental, may have assented in his own fashion. Yet the tradition hints at the true situation. He proclaimed the nobility of man, rather than the decrees of a god. He found the divine written in the human heart and brain, not on tablets of stone in the mountains. He came with no avowed revelation; he burned with no wrath against the folk-religion; he inaugurated no specifically religious reform. He was a messenger, a ministrant, a saviour, whose ethical idealism in word and conduct had its conscious religious aspect; but he was not primarily a religious leader. Mohammed passed from Allah down to man; it was man who led Socrates on to Zeus.

Yet the indictment went on to accuse him of introducing gods of his own. Of this there is no evidence in the sense apparently intended. Plato makes Meletus call Socrates during the trial "a complete atheist"; and, when Meletus hung up the indictment he was either wilfully lying or but stating an assumed corollary to what was possibly to him the sum of atheism—denial of the city's gods. Or the historic kernel may be to seek in Socrates's modes of thinking and speaking about the Divine. What's in a name? Everything for popular thought. Emerson's "Brahma" is to many people either a meaningless or a blasphemous poem; change the name to "God" and they would paste it in their hymn-books. Describe with all science and beauty the life-habits and appearance of a flower, and then halt in a momentary slip of memory, and your amateur botanist supposes you an ignoramus because you can't name it. For most people a rose, if named *Symplocarpus foetidus*, would *not* smell as sweet. If the originality of Socrates ever invented new names for divine things, that would have been sufficient grounds for his enemies to suspect him of inventing new divinities; just as his use at other times of familiar names seems to have been a good ground for such friends as Xenophon to suppose him orthodox. For the rest, to me this specification in the indictment is but one more proof that the Socratic message of righteousness was often enough verbally associated with the transcendental implication. For, when we say that Socrates was not primarily a religious teacher we do not forget that he was put to death partially on a charge of religious teaching: the inconsistency is merely formal.

Xenophon refers the charge to a misunderstanding of the *daimonion* which, according to common tradition, Socrates often mentioned as his warning voice or sign. Whether this explanation be in line with a hint in the preceding paragraph or not, may be left to the reader. We are forced, however, to examine the phenomenon in itself. What was the *daimonion* (τὸ δαιμόνιον)? The question is double: what was it to Socrates? what is it for us? Though Socrates seems to have treated it, or pretended to treat it, somewhat like a familiar spirit or good genius, the word has properly no personal or theological meaning. Euripides and Thucydides, both men of the Enlightenment, use it of that which, given by fate, man must adjust himself toward and to. It was not synonymous with "demon"; Cicero rightly translated it *divinum quiddam* (*De divinatione*, I, 54, 122). To Socrates it may have been a literal voice, sounding in the inner ear. Not alone visionaries like Joan of Arc and Swedenborg, have heard voices: Pascal and Luther heard them, though the former was the shrewdest intellect and the latter the soundest stomach of his age, and both men rooted on solid earth. If so, we turn the problem over to the psychologists—without, however, implying the neurotic decadence that becomes the business of the alienist. And they may name it a manifestation of the transcendental ego, or an instance of double personality, or an objectification of an unusually developed instinct of antipathy or of an abhorrent conscience, a non-rational residuum in the most rationalistic of men. Or to Socrates it may have been but a playful mode of referring to his disapproval of whatnots of conduct, ethical or otherwise, a disapproval reasoned out or immediately felt. The suggestion, tentative as it is, is still not an arbitrary assimilation of an ancient mind to modern rationalism. We know the ironic habit of Socrates, ironic not only toward others, but, with that deeper wisdom, ironic toward himself. We know he was given to playful exaggeration, especially to quizzical tropes. His pedagogic method he called midwifery; his faculty for friendship and for bringing friends together he referred to as incantations or pandering, using the most erotic expressions, which, in literal use, referred to things often even from the Greek point of view immoral; so too he seems to have spoken of his mantic, his oracular power, meaning simply foresight or premonition. The conception of the mind and temper of Socrates to which I have come inclines me to number the *daimonion* also among the tropes.

Again, if we take the *Daimonion* literally, what of the Dog? The Platonic Socrates is found of enforcing his asseverations by a

blasphemous canine oath, which sounds like a historic reminiscence and may hint at another source of the charge of impiety and new divinities. "By the Dog they would" (Phaedo); "By the Dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion before we get at the truth of all this" (Gorgias); "Not until, by the Dog, as I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse" (Phaedrus); and "By the Dog" he swears again in the Charmides, in the Lysis, and in the Republic. By what Dog? Molossian hound or Xanthippe's terrier? or some Egyptian deity that barks, not bellows? or Cerberus? More like. Strange and gruesome idolatry, which troubled some patristic admirers of the old pagan, as much as the cock his dying gasp bade sacrifice to Asclepius.

## WHY WE ARE AT WAR.

BY J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

[The labor parties of the world have been growing almost from year to year not only in numbers but also in political influence, and they give fair promise of becoming an international power which will make for peace in the world.

The labor party in Germany is democratic and socialistic. It is a strong peace party, and its leaders were in favor of supporting the peace movement with all their strength. But at the outbreak of the war, after an investigation of the case, the German labor leaders saw clearly that the present war was forced upon Germany with the obvious intention of crushing her for the benefit of her rivals, and they stood by the government and voted in favor of the subsidies for war. They stated their reasons in speeches and published articles, and there can be no better argument for the justice of Germany's cause.

The labor party in England was branded as unpatriotic, and Mr. John Burns resigned his position in the cabinet, while the leader of the advocates of peace in the French labor party was even more quickly and directly disposed of by being shot, the murder being acquiesced in by the public to the extent of letting the assassin escape punishment. There was not even a serious attempt made at investigating the crime or prosecuting the criminal.

The laborers of different countries have formed an alliance which is called "the International," and if it had been only a little stronger it might have been able to prevent the present war; but Germany was the only country in which the labor party was well organized, and there they did not veto the war because they saw that for Germany it was but a war of self-defense.

We here republish from *The Continental Times*, of December 4, 1914, a short article by J. Ramsay Macdonald, M. P., leader of the English labor party and a man well conversant with the inside of English politics. The article is little known, almost unknown, even in England. So far as I know it has never been printed in the United States, and yet it ought to be read. Mr. Macdonald knows whereof he speaks. He states facts, and in the light of these facts he places the responsibility for the war.—EDITOR.]

ON that fatal Sunday, the second of August, I met in Whitehall a member of the Cabinet and he told me of the messages and conversations between foreign secretaries and ambassadors which were to be published for the purpose of showing how we strove



for peace and how Germany immovably went to war. "It will have a great effect on public opinion," he said, and he was right. It is called "Correspondence respecting the European Crisis," but is generally referred to as "The White Paper." I wish to comment upon it for the purpose of explaining its significance.

It begins with a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the German ambassador on July 20 regarding the Austrian threat to punish Servia, and finishes with the delivery of our ultimatum to Germany on August 4. From it certain conclusions appear to be justified, the following in particular:

1. Sir Edward Grey strove to the last to prevent a European war.

2. Germany did next to nothing for peace, but it is not clear whether she actually encouraged Austria to pursue her Servian policy.

3. The mobilization of Russia drove Germany to war.

4. Russia and France strove, from the very beginning, both by open pressure and by wiles, to get us to commit ourselves to support them in the event of war.

5. Though Sir Edward Grey would not give them a pledge he made the German ambassador understand that we might not keep out of the conflict.

6. During the negotiations Germany tried to meet our wishes on certain points so as to secure our neutrality. Sometimes her proposals were brusque, but no attempt was made by us to negotiate diplomatically to improve them. They were all summarily rejected by Sir Edward Grey. Finally, so anxious was Germany to confine the limits of the war, the German ambassador asked Sir Edward Grey to propose his own conditions of neutrality, and Sir Edward Grey declined to discuss the matter. This fact was suppressed by Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith in their speeches in Parliament.

7. When Sir Edward Grey failed to secure peace between Germany and Russia, he worked deliberately to involve us in the war, using Belgium as his chief excuse.

That is the gist of the White Paper. It proves quite conclusively that those who were in favor of neutrality before the second of August ought to have remained in favor of it after the White Paper was published.

That Sir Edward Grey should have striven for European peace and then, when he failed, that he should have striven with equal determination to embroil Great Britain, seems contradictory. But

it is not, and the explanation of why it is not is the justification of those of us who for the last eight years have regarded Sir Edward Grey as a menace to the peace of Europe and his policy as a misfortune to our country. What is the explanation?

Great Britain in Europe can pursue one of two policies. It can keep on terms of general friendship with the European nations, treating with each separately when necessary and cooperating with all on matters of common interest. To do this effectively it has to keep its hands clean. It has to make its position clear, and its sympathy has to be boldly given to every movement for liberty. This is a policy which requires great faith, great patience, and great courage. Its foundations are being built by our own International, and if our Liberal Government had only followed it since 1905 it would by this time have smashed the military autocracies which have brought us into war.

But there is a more alluring policy—apparently easier, apparently safer, apparently more direct, but in reality more difficult, more dangerous, and less calculable. That is the policy of the balance of power through alliance. Weak and short-sighted ministers have always resorted to this because it is the policy of the instincts rather than of the reason. It formed groups of powers on the continent. It divided Europe into two great hostile camps—Germany, Austria, and Italy on the one hand; Russia, France and ourselves on the other. The progeny of this policy is suspicion and armaments; its end is war and the smashing up of the very balance which it is designed to maintain. When war comes it is then bound to be universal. Every nation is on one rope or another and when one slips it drags its allies with it.

As a matter of practical experience the very worst form of alliance is the *entente*. An alliance is definite. Every one knows his responsibilities under it. The *entente* deceives the people. When Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey kept assuring the House of Commons that we had contracted no obligations by our *entente* with France they said what was literally true but substantially untrue. That is why stupid or dishonest statesmen prefer the *entente* to the alliance; it permits them to see hard facts through a veil of sentimental vagueness. Had we had a definite alliance with France and Russia the only difference would have been that we and everybody else should have known what we had let ourselves in for, and that might have averted the war. Italy could keep out of the turmoil because its membership in the alliance imposed only definite

obligations upon it; we were dragged in because our *entente* involved us in an indefinite maze of honorable commitments.

It is interesting to gather from Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3 and the White Paper how completely the *entente* entangled him. There were first of all the "conversations" between French and British naval and army experts from 1906 onwards. These produced plans of naval and military operations which France and we were to take jointly together. It was in accordance with these schemes that the northern coasts of France were left unprotected by the French navy. When Sir Edward Grey evoked our sympathy on the ground that the French northern coasts were unprotected, he did not tell us that he had agreed that they should be unprotected and that the French fleet should be concentrated in the Mediterranean.

These "conversations" were carried on for about six years without the knowledge or consent of the Cabinet. The military plans were sent to St. Petersburg and a Grand Duke (so well-informed authorities say) connected with the German party in Russia sent them to Berlin. Germany has known for years that there were military arrangements between France and ourselves, and that Russia would fit her operations into these plans.

We had so mixed ourselves up in the Franco-Russian alliance that Sir Edward Grey had to tell us on August 3 that though our hands were free our honor was pledged!

The country had been so helplessly committed to fight for France and Russia that Sir Edward Grey had to refuse point blank every overture made by Germany to keep us out of the conflict. That is why, when reporting the negotiations to the House of Commons, he found it impossible to tell the whole truth and to put impartially what he chose to tell us. He scoffed at the German guarantee to Belgium on the ground that it only secured the "integrity" of the country but not its independence; when the actual documents appeared it was found that its independence was secured as well. And that is not the worst. The White Paper contains several offers which were made to us by Germany aimed at securing our neutrality. None were quite satisfactory in their form and Sir Edward Grey left the impression that these unsatisfactory proposals were all that Germany made. Later on the Prime Minister did the same. Both withheld the full truth from us. The German ambassador saw Sir Edward Grey, according to the White Paper, on August 1—and this is our foreign minister's note of the conversation:

“The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions upon which we could remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.”

Sir Edward Grey declined to consider neutrality on any conditions and refrained from reporting this conversation to the House. Why? It was the most important proposal that Germany made. Had this been told us by Sir Edward Grey his speech could not have worked up a war sentiment. The hard, immovable fact is that Sir Edward Grey had so pledged the country's honor without the country's knowledge to fight for France or Russia, that he was not in a position even to discuss neutrality. That was the state of affairs on July 20 and did not arise from anything Germany did or did not do after that date.

Now, the apparent contradiction that the man who had worked for European peace was at the same time the leader of the war party in the Cabinet can be explained. Sir Edward Grey strove to undo the result of his policy and keep Europe at peace but, when he failed, he found himself committed to dragging his country into war.

The justifications offered are nothing but the excuses which ministers can always produce for mistakes. Let me take the case of Belgium. It has been known for years that, in the event of a war between Russia and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, the only possible military tactics for Germany to pursue were to attack France hot foot through Belgium, and then return to meet the Russians. The plans were in our war office. They were discussed quite openly during the Agadir trouble, and were the subject of some magazine articles, particularly one by Mr. Belloc.

Mr. Gladstone made it clear in 1870 that in a general conflict formal neutrality might be violated. He said in the House of Commons in August, 1870: “I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.”

Germany's guarantees to Belgium would have been accepted by Mr. Gladstone. If France had decided to attack Germany through Belgium Sir Edward Grey would not have objected. but would have justified himself by Mr. Gladstone's opinions.

We knew Germany's military plans. We obtained them through the usual channels of spies and secret service. We knew that the road through Belgium was an essential part of them. That was our opportunity to find a "disinterested" motive apart from the obligations of the *entente*. It is well known that a nation will not fight except for a cause in which idealism is mingled. The *Daily Mail* supplied the idealism for the South African war by telling lies about the flogging of British women and children; our government supplied the idealism for this war by telling us that the independence of Belgium had to be vindicated by us. Before it addressed its inquiries to France and Germany upon this point, knowing the military exigencies of both countries, it knew that France could reply suitably whilst Germany could not do so. It was a pretty little game in hypocrisy which the magnificent valor of the Belgians will enable the government to hide up for the time being.

Such are the facts of the case. It is a diplomatist's war, made by about half-a-dozen men. Up to the moment that ambassadors were withdrawn the peoples were at peace. They had no quarrel with each other; they bore each other no ill-will. Half-a-dozen men brought Europe to the brink of a precipice and Europe fell over it because it could not help itself. To-day our happy industrial prospects of a fortnight ago are darkened. Suffering has come to be with us. Ruin stares many of us in the face. Little comfortable businesses are wrecked, tiny incomes have vanished. Want is in our midst, and Death walks with Want. And when we sit down and ask ourselves with fulness of knowledge: "Why has this evil happened?" the only answer we can give is, because Sir Edward Grey has guided our foreign policy during the past eight years. His short-sightedness and his blunders have brought all this upon us.

I have been reminded of one of those sombre judgments which the prophet who lived in evil times uttered against Israel. "A wonderful and horrible thing is committed in the land: The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so; and what will ye do in the end thereof?"

Aye, what will ye do in the end thereof?

## THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR.

CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO HUMAN CONDUCT.

BY ARTHUR J. WESTERMAYR.

FROM the beginning of human thought, fear has been regarded with contempt. To fear, to be afraid, is considered the earmark of cowardice, and as all the world is said to love a lover, so all the world scorns a coward. And because it occupies in our estimation such an unenviable position it serves a useful purpose. Since fear is considered contemptible man tries to divest himself of it; he is ashamed of its existence; he hates its profoundest and most beneficent manifestation. Yet the truth is that this useful emotion occupies an ignominious position unjustly, and should be lifted, by a more comprehensive understanding, to a plane of eminent respectability.

Fear is the great force that prompts to acts of self-preservation and operates as effectively in the brute as in the human animal. Even in plant life we can trace evidences that indicate the presence of a natural law operating very much as fear does upon brute instinct and the human mind.

When we analyze the fundamentals of the world's religions, we find they make their first and final appeal to man's inborn sense of fear. Religion provides a place of punishment and another of reward. The first appeals to man's fear, the second to his venality. The fear of hell and the pictured horrors of a place of eternal damnation, are intended to coerce man into righteous living; and a reward for such righteousness is offered in the form of a place of eternal bliss. On the one hand the fear of evil is calculated to deter, and fear of losing the delights of heaven is intended to lure man from his natural tendency to evil.

This reflection may not be stimulating nor gratifying to human vanity but it is nevertheless true.

Courage, the opposite of fear, readily divides itself into the

moral and the physical. One may be a moral coward yet physically brave; and obversely the physically brave may in certain circumstances prove a moral coward. It is not our purpose to praise the one or condemn the other, for this does not lie within the purview of this discussion.

At risk of incurring the indignant disapproval of the unthinking, it is necessary to say in some respect or particular all men are cowards—all in some circumstances are dominated by fear. The self-sufficient ego will naturally rebel against the charge of cowardice, but in the last analysis, if he is honest with himself, he will find the statement absolutely true, that no man can be in all things fearless.

As men differ physically, so they differ mentally, morally and spiritually, and what will delight the one will leave the other quite unmoved. If yielding to the domination of fear signifies cowardice, then as stated above, every man at some time, in some way, will prove himself a coward. Men living in communities yield their private views to the rigor of convention, and refrain from the pursuit of desires because they fear the condemnation of their fellow men—ostracism. It is due to fear of this condemnation that men observe the conventional laws.

Moreover, obedience to the decalogue is found to be due to the fear of consequences which may be either material or spiritual: thus, those commandments which deal with the spiritual side of man are obeyed because of fear of spiritual consequences already referred to; the other commandments, which involve the natural rights of man, and the breach of which results in criminal punishment, are obeyed by fear of public condemnation, arrest, imprisonment, or death.

The old Blackstonian dictum "that every law must have a sanction," meaning that every law must provide a punishment for its breach, makes its appeal to just that fear in man which causes him to shrink from the unpleasant, and deters him from the commission of acts that must eventuate in the loss of liberty or life.

Fear springs from the biological law of self-preservation. Scientists tell us that this law is necessary for the preservation of species and that it ranks in importance with the "survival of the fittest" and "the struggle for existence." Fear of injury and death makes every rational being fly from danger, and were this otherwise it is easy to believe life would become extinct because unresistingly yielding itself to the destructive forces of nature and human experience.

We may say then that every rational being is dominated by fear of consequences, mental, moral or physical, and only those devoid of rationality can be said to be devoid of this protective emotion. Lunatics, defectives, and those whom powerful emotions temporarily control because the sense of fear is either extinct or in a state of suspension, are without the range of this beneficent law.

We see in zoology constant manifestations of the influence of fear upon brute creation. Thus a lioness will brave dangers to herself in her efforts to protect her offspring. Here the stronger maternal instinct has overpowered the biological law.

It is common nowadays to speak of the man who in a fit of rage commits a murder as emotionally insane—as a victim of brain storm—which translated into plain English means that a state of mind has been created by anger, hate, revenge, blood lust, or a kindred emotion, which for the moment has mastered the natural fear of consequences and placed in suspension the law of self-preservation.

When analysis is made of acts of so-called heroism it will be found that immediately preceding their performance one or the other mental states, hereafter set forth, existed:

1. Absence of imagination whereby the individual becomes incapable of foreseeing, and therefore unable to count and measure danger.
2. Impulse whereby reflection is prevented and the individual unthinkingly assumes the dangers he has disregarded.
3. Superlative egotism which begets an inordinate appetite for the approbation and applause of one's fellow man.
4. Fear of contempt (which is the obverse of the last proposition) impels to conduct seemingly heroic.
5. An idealized selfishness which finds true happiness in the service of others, even though that service necessitates the assumption of serious personal risk.
6. An inordinate vanity whose development is so abnormal that it conquers, for the time, the biological law.

An illustration of each of the foregoing will suffice to make the meaning clear.

*First: Lack of Imagination.* Highly sensitive nervous natures have active imaginations which by emotional stimuli will picture, in exaggerated form, the dangers of the act. Appreciation of these dangers begets the deterrent fear, and an act or non-act results,



which the unthinking call cowardly, and the guilty wretch is spurned as a coward. Experience produces knowledge and knowledge of danger begets fear. A nervous nature in moments of stress exaggerates this knowledge born of experience. Thus a child is wholly fearless of fire until it is burned, but becomes fearful in its presence once experience has taught it that pain will follow from contact.

*Second: Impulse.* An act of impulse is one where the act follows so swiftly upon the will to do, that sufficient time does not intervene for reasoning reflection. Fear of consequences is therefore suspended, and only after the act is done does the danger become apparent. Women will perform heroic acts and then fall into a swoon when all danger is past. The realization of this danger produces the shock to the nerve centers and causes unconsciousness.

*Third: Superlative egotism.* Men attain to states of mind when they believe themselves divinely or otherwise appointed to do some act by which humanity is expected to profit, and that they are appointed to perform the act regardless of the incident danger. History affords many illustrations of this form of superlative egotism, and these, facing dangers, pursue their appointed course conscious of, yet overcoming, the biological law.

*Fourth: Fear of contempt.* In this class may be placed the so-called heroic soldier, who, standing on the firing line is impelled to run away yet stands bravely facing the enemy just because he fears the contempt and condemnation of his fellow men. Here pride overcomes fear and a hero may be the result.

"He is not brave who in great danger knows no fear;  
He is who does, and masters it when danger's near."

*Fifth: An idealized selfishness.* All rational action springs from motive; motive impels the doing of the act. Without motive the act is irrational. What then is the fundamental motive that prompts man to action whether good or bad? Selfishness—self-interest. Thus greed may prompt a robbery and this would be base selfishness; altruism causes acts of beneficence and this we call idealized or refined selfishness. The robber selfishly wants the gold he robs; the altruist wants the approval of his own conscience and the good-will of his fellow man. The robber does an evil act from base selfishness; the altruist does a noble act from idealized or refined selfishness; the robber desires that agreeable state of mind which the satisfying of his greed affords; the altruist acquires a pleasant state of mind from the knowledge of having done right and won the approbation of society. The poverty of our language

makes it impossible for us to use a less odious word than "selfishness" for which fact we take no blame. As there is no other word that accurately describes the antithesis of selfishness we must resort to the use of this word, however unwillingly, and make the meaning reasonably clear by characterizing the one as "base selfishness" and the other as "idealized or refined selfishness."

*Sixth: Inordinate vanity.* The hunger for notoriety is so phenomenally developed in some persons that in the pursuit of its gratification dangers are assumed that the normally constituted persons would shrink from. To this class belong those law-breakers who, guided by vanity, commit crimes in order to attract public attention. In order that they may occupy prominent positions in our daily newspapers which unfortunately pander to their abnormality, these persons will defy law and order, go to prison and submit willingly to shame and disgrace and the odium of public condemnation in order to gratify their inordinate vanity. So long as these persons are influenced to conduct by their vanity, fear of consequences will be held in suspension, and they rise above or fall below (as the reader may prefer) the biological law.

It is not claimed that the foregoing list is by any means complete, but it is hoped it will suffice to make clear what we have contended for all along, namely, that the so-called coward is not nearly so contemptible as the world believes him to be; and that cowardice or fear of consequences, is as much a biological law governing conduct, and as useful in the preservation of the species, as hunger which is a desire for food and therefore provokes to eating, and thirst which is an evidence of the need of drink and therefore prompts to drinking.

Reference should be made to certain abnormal forms of fear for which no excuse can be offered except that they are congenital and perhaps due to ante-natal states of the mother; severe fright of the mother is known to mark the child by an unnatural sensitiveness to certain kinds of danger. As abnormal appetites are thus created, so an unnatural fear may be born in the offspring.

Fear is naturally produced by ignorance. In seeking a reason for an unknown phenomenon the ignorant mind will arrive at conclusions that associate such phenomenon with the supernatural or fearful.

It is said that when the early European explorers first landed on our shores, the aborigines were more terrified at sight of a horse than by a regiment of men. They had never seen a horse, and were ignorant of its innocent character, and therefore their

ignorance ascribed to it supernatural qualities. The same is said of the *Rachshasas* and *Azuras* of pre-historic India.

In ancient times ignorance begot fear of epileptics because supposed to be possessed of devils, and these unfortunates were consequently shunned; to-day man, being better informed, makes these unfortunates objects of pity and medical care. Ignorance of natural law, and priest-made fables, produce fear of death. Yet death is a beneficent law of nature and its terrors are entirely due to ignorance of the unknown hereafter which the vivid imagination of man has peopled with countless horrors, or equally impossible celestial delights.

Reflection on this subject would result in greater justice being done to so-called cowards, and a lessening of the exuberance in our hero worship.

Let us not forget that the real hero is one who in the face of evil is a coward.

## MISCELLANEOUS.

### GERMAN SCHOLARS AND THE LARGER VIEW.

Professor Wilhelm Ostwald, president of the Monistic Alliance, and the right-hand man of Ernst Haeckel, expresses his views on the present war in the official monthly organ of the Monists, *Das Monistische Jahrhundert*, page 860. He shows a conciliatory spirit, and we quote from his article the following paragraphs:

"Amid the noise and hubbub of war the scientifically minded man must not lose sight of the fact that war is after all an abnormal state. Peace is the aim and end of war. But this peace we must endeavor to shape in such a way that it does not render unnecessarily difficult the resumption of normal relations between the great civilized peoples of the earth. We are dependent, materially and spiritually, on other nations and states, as they are on us.

"Above all let us beware of imputing to a race or people the deeds of its government or of small groups of isolated states. Let us guard against generalizations which lead to rash judgments concerning the national character of individual peoples.

"It avails nothing to wage a war which has for its object the wresting of world dominion, or the acquiring of a political hegemony which would be but the prelude to a bitter struggle of the other nations against the formidable dominating people. We are waging war to preserve our independent national existence. We are battling for the life of our political organism, which is the foundation for the further development of German culture.

"We consider the community of German culture, however, as part and parcel of the international fellowship of men throughout the world. We value

our labor of civilization not only as a labor for the German nation but as a contribution to the development of mankind. Even in time of war we must remember that this labor will be the more fruitful, the livelier the exchange of material and spiritual things,—the same interchange which has carried human development to its present stage. An international interchange of culture is the chief essential even for flourishing national civilizations, as well as for the unimpeded progress of man.”

Similar sentiment is to be found in the fourth yearbook of the Schopenhauer Society, where Prof. Paul Deussen writes: “‘Not to my contemporaries,’ says Schopenhauer, ‘not to my countrymen, but to humanity do I commit my work which is now completed, in the confidence that it will not be without value to the race.’ Science, and more than every other science, philosophy, is international. . . . Foolish, very foolish, therefore is the conduct of certain German professors who have renounced their foreign honors and titles. And what shall we say of a member of our society who demanded that citizens of those states which are at war with us should be excluded from the Schopenhauer Society, and who, when it was pointed out that our foreign members certainly condemned this infamous war as much as we Germans, protested that she could not belong to an association in which Frenchmen, Englishmen and Russians took part, and announced her withdrawal from our society, indeed even published her brave resolution in the columns of a local paper in her provincial town. We shall not shed any tears for her having gone.”

---

#### FIELD MARSHAL HINDENBURG.

*The Chicago Tribune* recently published a series of articles by James O'Donnell Bennett which give an excellent pen picture of Field Marshal Hindenburg, Germany's most popular hero. In the first of these Mr. Bennett describes the personal appearance of the German commander as follows:

“His gray-white hair is cropped close at the back and sides of the head and in a wide, flat pompadour on the top, and that emphasizes the squareness of his head. His forehead is low, his nose smallish, his complexion pale, and the skin like fine parchment.

“The notable feature of his face is the eyes. It is they and the big mustache and the strong jaws that give the man his leonine aspect. There are deep, heavy, sad lines under the eyes and at each side of the mouth. Even the large black mustache does not conceal the latter.

“The eyes, too, are sad—small, sad, searching eyes—small, not wonderful when the general's attention is not roused, but at once startling and commanding in their effect when he becomes alert. When he turns them on you, you know it—and the realization is accompanied almost by a gasp. One glance searches a man.

“There is power in the well poised head and in the erect shoulders, and that impression of power is increased because the man moves so little. For many minutes he seems to sit motionless, and when he does move it is with slow deliberation. His countenance is not stern, but melancholy and meditative: not gloomy, though, for there is a sweetness in it that none of the portraits can convey, for the painters are inclined to make him burly. It is the victor of the awful week at Tannenberg whom they paint and not the man of the long years of patient waiting.”


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
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
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