

Prepared by: Capt. Robinson
Comdr. Cole

Date: 19 August, 1947

FUCHIDA, Mitsuo

1. Information in IPS files on witness -

- (a) Requested as witness by: No request for subpoena was received. First notice was service of deposition of witness. (Def. Doc. #1982)
- (b) Present Status: ex-Captain, I. J. N.
- (c) Summary of Personal History: None available. Curriculum Vitae will be attached as soon as it can be obtained.
- (d) Summary of Interrogations:
 - (1) Interrogation by USSBS Case 115, No. 40 -
Witness took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor as an observer. The Japanese used 350 aircraft from six carriers together with 62 additional planes from carriers, battleships and cruisers. Twenty-nine planes were lost.
 - (2) Interrogation by USSBS - Case 115, No. 420 -
Relates solely to operations in 1944. No information of value.
 - (3) Interrogation of USSBS - Case 115, No. 428 -
Relates solely to operations in 1944. No information of value
 - (4) Interrogation by USSBS - Case 115, No. 29
Witness had his first duty as an aircraft pilot at Kasumigaura in 1928 where he was a pilot under instruction. He was an attack bomber pilot on the KAGA in 1931 and from August 1941 was Air Group Commander on the AKAGI.

(FUCHIDA, Mitsuo - prepared by Capt. Robinson and Comdr. Cole, contd)

He participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor in a 97 type horizontal bomber as an observer. He was senior officer of the attack Group. There were about 400 planes in the attack; 220 in the first wave and about 180 in the second wave. As targets first in importance were aircraft carriers, second, battleships. A total of 30 planes were lost.

The rest of the interrogation concerns operations in 1944.

2. Court Exhibits with reference to witness -

The only exhibit in which FUCHIDA is mentioned which can be found is Exhibit 809, ATIS Report "Japan's Decision to Fight" in evidence at Record p. 7,988. On page 75 of Exhibit 809, it is stated that the reconstruction of Task Force Orders relating to Pearl Harbor is based on the recollection of Capt. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (formerly Commander and in command of AKAGI Air Unit). This is apparently the same FUCHIDA who wrote Def. Doc. #1982. He can be interrogated concerning any discrepancies between these Task Force Orders and his present testimony.

3. Analysis of Affidavit -

(1) Captain, IJN

8 Dec. 1941 - Commanded AIR UNIT in Pearl Harbor attack.
25 Aug. 1941 - Transferred to AKAGI at Yokosuka which was the
Flagship of Admiral NAGUMO.
(Paragraph 1 of affidavit)

Sept. 1941 - GENDA brought word of Pearl Harbor plan.
October 1941 - Training for Pearl Harbor attack.
Mid Nov. 1941 - Practice with special torpedoes in Kagoshima Bay
8 Dec. 1941 - (Tokyo time) - Senior officer of the attack group -
Horizontal bombers.
(Par. 2 and 3 of affidavit)

Pearl Harbor plan.

- (a) Objective: to get aircraft carriers and capital ships out of way so American fleet "could not prevent us from completing our operations in the south".
- (b) Very secret (only to MURATA and myself)
- (c) Pearl Harbor shallow - special torpedo rig.
- (d) No paragraph numbered 4.
- (e) Horizontal bombing was included in our Pearl Harbor plan (with torpedoes) because:

(FUCHIDA, Mitsuo - prepared by Capt. Robinson and Comdr. Cole, contd)

- (a) Some flyers not highly trained.
- (b) Fleet at anchor might have torpedo nets.
- (c) Ships two abreast at anchor.
- (d) Lowered bombings. Altitude to minimum for exploding against anchored ships.
(Paragraph 5 of affidavit)

(In Par. 3 and 5) Both the special shallow-water bombs and special plane apparatus for them were completed late, just before departure of Task Force. (Par. 6 of affidavit)

Carriers ZUIKAKU (Sept 25, 1941) and SHOKAKU (Aug. 25, 1941) completed shortly before Pearl Harbor attack. Organized into 5th Air Squadron and incorporated into First Air Fleet. Air crews hurriedly trained so directed -

- (a) to attack airfields (not warships) and
- (b) to attack by daylight instead of dawn as originally planned but changed on my suggestion to my superiors. (Par. 7 of affidavit)

4. Objections to Introduction of Affidavit:

None.

Confirms essential details of prosecution evidence. Court would probably admit over any objection because defense entitled to try to show Pearl Harbor attack was not part of a long-planned conspiracy, but was planned late and quickly.

5. Cross-examination:

Following questions suggested for possible use:

- Q: (Personal experience - China bombing, if any - Any other details from Curriculum Vitae to show age, any contacts with U. S. or Britain, extensive combat as flyer, especially if vs. China)
- Q: Where are you employed now? (2nd Demobilization Bureau)
- Q: What are your duties?
- Q: Did you write this affidavit?
- Q: Where?
- Q: With what assistance?

(FUCHIDA, Mitsuo - prepared by Capt. Robinson and Comdr. Cole, contd)

Q: In your plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, your principal objective was to destroy aircraft carriers?

A: (Said "yes" in USSBS interrogation/^{No. 29}and at bottom page 2 of affidavit).

Q: How many did you expect to find there?

Q: What Japanese Naval source had been supplying you with information about the U. S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

A: (Naval General Staff).

Q: Which carriers by name?

A: (Lexington and Enterprize.)

Q: You had how many carriers in your attacking force?

A: (6)

Q: How many planes?

NOTE: In Exhibit 809 (Record p. 7,988) "Japan's Decision to Fight", p. 84, FUCHIDA stated that the total number of carrier based planes was 414 (not counting 6 reconnaissance planes which were not carrier based). In the USSBS interrogation - Case 115, No. 40, FUCHIDA stated that there were about 412 planes. In the USSBS interrogation, Case 115, No. 29, FUCHIDA stated that there were about 400 planes in the attack.

Q: How many Japanese Naval personnel in the attacking fleet including submarines and all other types of vessels?

Q: How many of these personnel were lost in the attack?

A: (About 30. (See Exhibit 809, p. 73 which gives the figure as 29 and USSBS, Case 115, No. 29, which gives the figure as 30.))

Q: Do you know how many American naval personnel were killed by your attack?

A: (Probably "no").

Q: In your plan for the attack, you based your preparations on finding the American naval vessels at anchor or tied up to the docks according to their usual Sunday morning home-base routine?

A: (Yes)

Q: Your planning, therefore, required, for its complete success, that the attack be a secret attack, without warning, before the ships could weigh anchor or cast off mooring lines?

(FUCHIDA, MITSUO - prepared by Capt. Robinson and Comdr. Cole, contd)

A: (Yes) (See Exhibit 809 - ATIS Report "Japan's Decision to Fight", p. 68, statement by FUCHIDA)

Q: In your planning you therefore were naturally interested in whether the Japanese Foreign Office would give warning?

Q: Was this point discussed by you with anyone?

A: (Yes)

Q: With whom?

Q: At no place in your affidavit do you call the attack a "surprise" attack. Why do you omit the word "surprise" from the affidavit?

Q: You call it a "raid". Why do you use that term instead of "surprise" attack?

Q: What action would have been taken by the Task Force if negotiations had been successful in Washington?

(NOTE: In Exhibit 809, p. 79, the Task Force Ultra secret Operation Order #1 of 23 Nov. 1941, as reconstructed from memory by FUCHIDA states (par. D) that in the event the operation was cancelled while the Task Force was underway, it would return immediately to Hitokappu Bay, Hokkaido or Mitsu-Kainan.)

Q: What action would have been taken by the Task Force if it had been intercepted by the U. S. Fleet en route to Pearl Harbor?

(NOTE: In Exhibit 809, p.78, the Task Force order reconstructed by FUCHIDA states that (par. A) if intercepted by the enemy fleet, or it appears the enemy is going to attack in order to gain the advantage, the Task Force will attack immediately.)

Q: When did you first learn that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was proposed by Admiral YAMAMOTO as early as January 1941?

Personal History

Name: FUCHIDA, Mitsuo

Born: December 3, 1902

Permanent Domicile: No. 1866, UEMAKI, OAZA, UEMAKI-MURA, KITAKATSURAGI-GUN, NARA Prefecture.

Names and birth dates of family members: Wife: HARUKO
 Born: April 21, 1907
 Married: February 7, 1931
 Eldest son: YOSHIYA
 Born: September 29, 1933
 Eldest daughter: MIYAKO
 Born: March 9, 1937

Aug. 26, 1921	Ordered to the Naval Academy.	Naval Academy
July 24, 1924	Graduation from the Naval Academy course certified.	Naval Academy
July 24, 1924	Appointed as Ensign candidate.	Navy Ministry
July 24, 1924	Ordered to become a crew member of the training ship YAKUMO.	"
April 10, 1925	Relieved from the YAKUMO and ordered to the HYUGA.	Navy Ministry
June 20, 1925	Relieved from the YAKUMO and ordered to the ABUKUMA.	"
Dec. 1, 1925	Commissioned an Ensign.	Cabinet
" " "	Ordered to the YAHAGI, training and guard ship.	Navy Ministry
Jan. 15, 1926	Given the senior grade of the 8th court rank.	Imperial Household Ministry.
Sept. 1, 1926	Made a trip to OSAKA for 5 days excluding 2 days travel time to nurse sick mother. Returned on September 15.	
Dec. 1, 1926	Relieved of present duty.	Navy Ministry

Dec. 1, 1926	Appointed a student of the regular course of the Navy Gunnery School.	Navy Ministry
April 13, 1927	Appointed a student of the regular course of the Navy Torpedo School.	"
July 29, 1927	Ordered as a crew of the AKIKAZE.	"
Dec. 1, 1927	Commissioned a Lieutenant Jr. Grade.	Cabinet
" " "	Attached to KASUMIGAURA Naval Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
Dec. 28, 1927	Raised to the junior grade of the 7th court rank.	Imperial Household Ministry
Jan. 10, 1928	Appointed an observation student of the KASUMIGAURA Naval Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
Dec. 10, 1928	Ordered to join the AOBA, 2nd Fleet.	"
Nov. 16, 1928	Conferred the Medal in Commemoration of the Imperial Enthronement in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance No. 188 of 1928.	Bureau of Decoration
Nov. 1, 1929	Ordered to join the KAGA, 1st reserve ship.	Navy Ministry
Nov. 30, 1929	Given the 1st class pay.	
" " "	The KAGA is attached to the combined Fleet.	"
Nov. 1, 1930	Attached to the Sasebo Naval Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
Dec. 1, 1930	Commissioned a Lieutenant.	
Jan. 16, 1931	Raised to the senior grade of the 7th court rank.	Imperial Household Ministry
Jan. 19, 1931	Applied for permission for marriage Permitted on Jan. 27, 1931.	
Aug. 21, 1931	Attached to the 1st Air Unit in the organization of the small naval manoeuvre unit in 1931.	Navy Ministry
Nov. 2, 1931	Ordered to the JINGEI, 1st Fleet.	"
July 6, 1932	Applied to establish self as head of family by establishing a separate home.	"
Nov. 1, 1932	Attached to the YOKOSUKA Naval Station.	Navy Ministry
Nov. 2, 1932	Ordered to duty by the Commander of the Yokosuka Naval Air Unit.	Commander in Chief

Dec. 1, 1932	Appointed a student of the higher course of the Naval Air Training Unit.	Navy Ministry
May 25, 1933	Ordered to the NATORI, 1st Fleet.	"
Oct. 3, 1933	Appointed a division officer of the MAYA, 2nd Fleet.	"
Dec. 1, 1933	Given the 2nd class pay.	"
Nov. 1, 1934	Appointed a division officer of the TATEYAMA Naval Air Unit.	"
April 29, 1934	Granted ¥ 180 for services in the 1931-1934 Incident.	Bureau of Decorations
" " "	Awarded a War Medal of the 1931-1934 Incident.	"
July 1, 1935	Temporarily Ordered to the SAWAKAZE, concurrently.	TATEYAMA Naval Air Unit.
July 9, 1935	Relieved from the temporary and concurrent duty on the SAWAKAZE.	"
July 12, 1935	Temporarily ordered to join the SAWAKAZE concurrently.	TATEYAMA Naval Air Unit
July 16, 1935	Relieved from the temporary and concurrent duty on the SAWAKAZE.	"
Dec. 1, 1935	Given the 1st class pay.	Navy Ministry
Feb. 15, 1936	Raised to the junior grade of the 6th court rank.	Imperial Household Ministry
Sep. 21, 1935	Awarded and allowed to wear the commemoration medal of visit to JAPAN by Emperor of MANCHOUKUO and presented by the Emperor of MANCHOUKUO.	Bureau of Decorations
Oct. 1, 1936	Appointed a division officer of YOKOHAMA Naval Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
Aug. 10, 1936	Given the Sixth Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	Bureau of Decorations
Nov. 16, 1936	Attached to the YOKOSUKA Naval Station.	Navy Ministry
Nov. 21, 1936	Ordered to duty by the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Unit.	Commander in Chief

Nov. 24, 1936	Relieved of duty by order of the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Unit.	Commander in Chief
Dec. 1, 1936	Appointed a Lt.-Commander.	Cabinet
Dec. 1, 1936	Appointed on A Class Student /TN. Graduate trainee/ of the Naval War College.	Navy Ministry
Dec. 30, 1937	Appointed temporarily the officer in charge of the Flying Unit of the Thirteenth Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
Jan. 20, 1938	Relieved of the temporary post as the officer in charge of the Flying Unit of the Thirteenth Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
" " "	Appointed temporarily a staff officer of the Second Combined Naval Air Unit.	"
March 22, 1938	Relieved of the temporary post as staff officer of the Second Combined Naval Air Unit.	"
" " "	Appointed temporarily an instructor of YOKOSUKA Naval Air Unit.	"
April 20, 1938	Relieved of the temporary post instructor of YOKOSUKA Naval Air Unit.	"
Sep. 15, 1938	Appointed a officer in charge of the RYUJŌ Air Unit.	"
Dec. 1, 1938	Appointed a staff officer of the SASEBO Naval Station.	Navy Ministry

/TN. This article is pasted on the original./

Citation.

To the Naval Air Unit, which Participated in the Invasion of CANTON.

On the 12th October, 1938, together with the commencement of the invasion of CANTON the Unit cooperated especially closely with the operations of the Army; the Unit reported speedily and properly the enemy situation, and thus contributed to the guidance of the operations; the Unit destroyed the stubborn enemy in the front, and thus opened a path for the friendly forces; the Unit destroyed distant enemy reinforcement and thus foiled their plan; the unit guarded and covered the rear and flanks of the unit advancing straight to CANTON, and thus eliminated the anxiety over the future; the unit supplied food to the friendly forces travelling on foot on the difficult and roundabout route, and thus aided their movement, etc.

Thus the unit, from the start to the end, acted properly and courageously and thereby speeded up the progress of the invasion. The fact that the Unit made possible the attainment of the objective in about ten days in a distinguished military merit.

I thereby award this Citation. November 15, 1938.

OIKAWA, Koshirō

Commander - in - Chief of the
CHINA Area Fleet.

Nov. 1, 1939	Appointed officer in charge of Navy Ministry the AKAGI Flying Unit.	
Oct. 15, 1940	Attached to the Headquarters of the First Fleet. Navy Ministry	
Oct. 15, 1940	Designated to the AKAGI.	Fleet
Nov. 15, 1940	Appointed a staff officer of the Third Air Flotilla.	Navy Ministry
March 15, 1941	Raised to the Senior Grade of the Sixth Court Rank.	Ministry of Imperial Household
April 10, 1941	By the change of flag-ship, left the RYŪJŌ.	Third Air Flotilla
April 11, 1941	Assigned to the ZUIHO.	"
August 12, 1941	By the change of flag-ship, transferred to HOSHO.	"
August 25, 1941	Appointed Officer in Charge/ of the AKAGI Flying Unit. Navy Ministry	
Oct. 15, 1941	Appointed a Commander.	Cabinet
April 29, 1940	Awarded the Small Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun and granted two thousand Yen for services in the CHINA Incident.	Bureau of Decorations
April 29, 1940	Awarded the CHINA Incident War Medal.	"
July 10, 1942	Took 21 days off for medical treatment at 1106, SAKURAYAMA, ZUSHI-MACHI, MIURA-Gun, KANAGAWA Prefecture as a result of simple fractures of both right and left heels, and sprains of both right and left foot joints.	
July 20, 1942	Attached to the YOKOSUKA Naval Station.	Navy Ministry
August 2, 1942	Took 21 days off from July 10 medical treatment at 1106, SAKURAYAMA, ZUSHI-MACHI, MIURA-Gun, KANAGAWA Prefecture, as a result of injuries of both right	

and left foot joints by explosion.
(First class battle injury)

- July 22, 1942 CERTIFICATE of Authenticity Wournd or Disease:
Sprain of both right and left foot joints.
He was Wounded in action at 7:26 AM June 5, 1942
when the AKAGI was fighting in the EAST PACIFIC Area.
Witnessed by
Commander SUZUKI, Tadayoshi,
Excutive Officer of the AKAGI.
June 5, 1942.
- Oct. 1, 1942 Compltely recovered and went on duty.
- Oct. 6, 1942 Ordered to duty by the order of the commander of the
YOKOSUKA Naval Air Unit. Commander - in - Chief
- Oct. 10, 1942 Appointed an instructor of the YOKOSUKA
Naval Air Unit. Navy Ministry
- Dec. 20, 1942 Concurrently appointed an instructor of Naval
War College. Navy Ministry

/T.N. This article is pasted on to the original/

To the Unit Which Participated in the Naval Battle of
HAWAII. As soon as the war broke out on December 8,
1941, the unit after a long trip suddenly attached the
Naval Harbor of HAWAII; the air unit severely attacked
the main force of the PACIFIC Fleet of our enemy, the
UNITED STATES of AMERICA and also its air forces in the
area and soon destroyed most of them; this action
contributed greatly to subsequent military operations.
I recognize this as/a military merit.

distinguished

I thereby award this Citation. April 15, 1942.

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
Commander - in - Chief of the
Combined Fleet.

- May 20, 1943 Concurrently appointed a military instructor of the
Army War College. War Ministry
- June 20, 1943 Appointed an observer of the Naval General Staff.
Navy Ministry
- June 20, 1943 Relieved of the concurrent post appoint as military
instructor of the Army War College. War Ministry
- Dec. 4, 1943 Ordered dispatched to PHILIPPINE area. Navy Ministry

July 1, 1943	Appointed a staff officer of the First Air Fleet.	Navy Ministry
April 15, 1944	Appointed an observer of Naval General Staff.	"
April 30, 1944	Appointed a staff officer of the Combined Fleet.	"
August 19, 1944	Concurrently appointed a staff officer of the Southern Area Army.	War Ministry
Oct. 15, 1944	Appointed a Captain.	Cabinet
Dec. 1, 1944	Raised to the Junior Grade of the Fifth Imperial Court Rank.	Ministry of Imperial Household
April 25, 1945	Concurrently appointed a staff officer of the Combined Naval Forces.	Navy Ministry
May 1, 1945	Concurrently appointed as staff officer of the Naval Forces and the Combined Fleet.	Combined Navy Ministry
Oct. 10, 1945	Appointed an observer of the Navy Ministry.	"
Oct. 10, 1945	Ordered to duty in the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry,	Minister
Oct. 1, 1945	Appointed a secretary of Committee of Gathering Materials Relating to Military Operations.	
Nov. 30, 1945	Placed on the Reserve.	Navy Ministry
Nov. 30, 1945	General mobilization ordered.	"
Dec. 1, 1945	Appointed a Second Demobilization Official (the third class higher Civil Service) by Imperial Ordinance No. 686.	"
Dec. 1, 1945	Appointed a member of Historical Investigation Department of the Second Demobilization Minister's Secretariat.	Second Demobilization Min.
March 30, 1946	Relieved from the general mobilization.	"

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29 Trans by J. Takai
Checked by Y. Ogita

(1)

Name: FUCHIDA, MITSUO
~~F. H. CHIBA Mitsuo~~

Born: December 3, 1902

Permanent Domicile: No. 1866, UEMAKI, OAZA, UEMAKI-MURA, KITAKATSURAGI-GUN,
NARA Prefecture.

Names and birth dates
~~Name of family members~~ wife: HARUKO Born: April 27, 1907.
 married: February 7, 1931.

Elderest son: YOSHIYA Born: September 29, 1933

Elderest daughter: MIYAKO Born: March 7, 1937.

Date	Career	Name of office
Aug. 26, 1921.	Ordered admitted to the Naval Academy.	Naval Academy
July 24, 1924.	It is certified that Graduation from the Academy course certified	Naval Academy
'24.	Appointed as Ensign candidate	Navy ministry
	Ordered to join become a crew member of the training ship YAKUMO.	

April 10, 1925.	Relieved from the YAKUMO and ordered to the HYUGA. Ordered to join the Hyuga instead of the Yakumo.	Navy ministry
June 20, 1925.	Relieved from the YAKUMO and ordered to the ABUKUMA. Ordered to join the Abukuma instead of the Hyuga.	"
Dec. 1, 1925.	Commissioned as ^{Ensign} second lieutenant	Cabinet
"	Ordered to ^{the YAHAGI} join the Yahagi , training and guard ships.	Navy ministry
Jan. 15, 1926.	^{Given} Promoted to the senior grade of the 8th court rank	Imperial Household ministry
Sept. 1, 1926.	Made a trip to ^{OSAKA} Osaka for 5 days including 2 travel time days for the round trip to ^{nurse} attend to sick mother. Retained Retained on September 15.	
Dec. 1, 1926.	Relieved of present duty. Dismissed from the office.	Navy ministry
"	Appointed ^{as} student of the ^{regular} ordinary course of the Navy Gunnery School.	"
April 13, 1927.	Appointed student of the ^{regular} ordinary course of the Navy Torpedo School.	

July 29, 1927.	(as a crew of AKIKAZE Ordered to join the Akikaze Shikaze	Navy Ministry
Dec. 1, 1927.	Commissioned a 1st Lieutenant Lieutenant Jr. Grade	Cabinet
"	Ordered to be Attached to KASUMIGAURA Kasumigaura Naval	
	Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
Dec. 28, 1927.	Raised to the junior grade of the 7th court rank.	Imperial Household Ministry
Jan. 10, 1928	Appointed ^{an observation} scouting student of Kasumigaura ^{the} KASUMIGAURA	Navy Ministry
	Naval Air Unit.	
Dec. 10, '28.	Ordered to join the AOBA , Aoba 2nd Fleet.	"
Nov. 16, '28.	Conferred ^{the Medal in Commemoration of the Imperial} a Commemoration Commemoration medal ^{Beaureau} of Decorations.	
	Enthronement in accordance with the ^{the} Imperial Ordinance No. 188	
	of 1928.	
Nov. 1, 1929.	Ordered to join the KAGA , Kaga 1st reserve ship.	Navy Ministry
Nov. 30, '29.	Given the 1st class pay	"
"	The KAGA Kaga is attached to the Combined Fleet.	

Nov. 1, 1930.	Ordered to be attached to the Sasebo Naval Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
Dec. 1, '30.	Commissioned ^{a Lieutenant} to Captain.	Cabinet
Jan. 16, 1931.	Raised to the senior grade of the 7th court rank.	Imperial Household Ministry
Jan. 19, '31.	Applied ^(permission for) for marriage and Permitted on Jan 27, 1931.	
Aug. 21, 1931.	Ordered to be attached to the 1st Air Unit ^{in the} during organization of the ^{naval} the purpose of forming small manoeuvre units in 1931.	Navy Ministry
Nov. 2, 1931.	Ordered to join the ^{JINGEI,} Jungei, 1st Fleet.	"
July 6, 1932.	Applied for ^{to establish} to himself as head of family notified that he obtained the headship of his house by establishing a new separate home. by establishing a branch family.	
Nov. 1, 1932.	Ordered to be attached to the Yokosuka Naval Station.	Navy Ministry
Nov. 2, '32.	Ordered to duty by some ^{by order} of the Commander of the Yokosuka Naval Air Unit.	Commander-in-Chief

Dec. 1, 1932	Appointed ^a student of the higher course of the Naval	Navy Ministry
	Training Training Air Unit.	
May 25, 1933	Ordered to join the Natori ^{NATORI} , 1st Fleet.	"
Oct. 3, 1933	Appointed ^{a division} divisional officer of the Maya ^{MAYA} , 2nd	"
	Fleet.	
Dec. 1, 1933	Given the 2nd class pay.	"
Nov. 1, 1934	Appointed ^a divisional officer of the Tateyama ^{TATEYAMA}	"
	Naval Air Unit.	
April 29, 1936	Granted ¥180 ^{for} on recognition of his services in	Bureau of Decorations
	1931-1934 The 1931/34 Incident.	
"	Awarded Granted a War-Medal of the ¹⁹³¹⁻¹⁹³⁴ 1931/34 Incident.	"
July 1, 1935	Temporarily Ordered to join the Sawakaze ^{SAWAKAZE} concurrently.	TATEYAMA Naval Air Unit.
	Temporarily.	Tateyama Air Unit
July 9, '35	Relieved from the temporary and concurrent duty on the Dismissed from the above office SAWAKAZE.	"

TATEYAMA ~~Hawa~~

~~Patagon~~
Air Unit

July 12, 1935. Temporarily) SAWAKAZE
Ordered to join the ~~SAWAKAZE~~ concurrently.

~~and temporarily.~~

July 16, '35. Relieved from the temporary and concurrent duty on the
Dismissed from the above office SAWAKAZE.

Dec. 1, '35. Given the 1st class pay.

Navy ministry.

Feb. 15, 1936. Raised to the junior grade of the 6th court

Imperial Household ministry.

rank.

Translated by K. YAMADA.
Checked by Ogita

(7)

/Leaf 2/

Sep. 21, 1935	Awarded and allowed to Granted to receive and wear the commemoration medal of visiting ^{visit}	
	by Emperor of MANCHOU- KUO and ^{the} Emperor of MAN- CHOUKUO.	Bureau of Decorations
Oct. 1, 1936	Appointed a ^{division officer} Bureau commander of YOKOHAMA Naval Air Group ^{Unit} .	Navy Ministry of Navy
Aug. 10, 1936	Given the ^{sixth class} Imperial Order of the sixth class of the Sacred Treasure	Bureau of Decorations
Nov. 16, 1936	Appointed an officer Attached to the YOKOSUKA Naval ^{Station} District	Navy Ministry of Navy
Nov. 21, 1936	Ordered to duty to be in service by the ^{Commandant of} order of the the YOKOSUKA Naval Air ^{Unit} Group ^{Commander} in-chief	Commander-

Nov. 24, 1936	Relieved of ^{duty} the service by the order ^{order of the} Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Unit.	Commander-in-chief
Dec. 1, 1936	Appointed a Lt.-Commander.	Cabinet
Dec. 1, 1936	Appointed an A Class Student of /TN. graduate trainee/ the Naval Staff ^{War} College	Navy Ministry
Dec. 30, 1937	Appointed temporarily the ^{the officer in} commanding charge of the Flying Unit officer of the Thirteenth Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
Jan. 20, 1938	Relieved of the temporarily commanding ^{post of the} (in charge of the Flying Unit) officer of the Thirteenth Air Unit.	Navy Ministry
))	Appointed temporarily a ^{staff} staff of the Second Combined Naval Air Unit.))
March 22, 1938	Relieved of the ^{temporary post as} temporarily appointed	

officer
staff of the Second Combined Naval
Unit.
Air Group.

»

» Appointed temporarily an instructor
of YOKOSUKA Naval Air ~~Group~~ Unit.

»

April 20, 1938 Relieved of the temporarily ~~appointed~~ ^{post}

instructor of YOKOSUKA Naval Air
Unit.
Group.

»

Sep. 15, 1938 Appointed a commanding officer ^{in charge} of
the RYUJO Air Unit.

»

Dec. 1, 1938 Appointed a staff ^{Officer} of SASEBO Naval
Station.
District.

»

* IN: This article
is pasted on the
original.

Citation.
~~Letter of Approval~~

To the Naval Air Unit
~~Group~~

which Participated ^{Invasion}
Engaged in the Attack of
CANTON.
KWANTUNG.

On the 12th of October, 1938, ^{together}
with the commencement of the invasion of
fire was opened to attack ~~KWAN~~

CANTON the Unit
TUNG, your Air Group cooperated
especially closely with the
with the military operations of the

the Unit reported speedily
Army; so closely that your group
and properly the enemy situation, thus
was of service to the performance
contributed to the ~~direction~~ guidance of
of their military operation by report
the operations; the Unit destroyed the
ing the enemy's position so
stubborn enemy in the front, and thus
promptly and properly, or developed
opened a path for the friendly
the course of the allied army by
forces; the Unit destroyed distant
destroying the stubborn enemy,
frontal

thereby speeded up the progress
 operation of attack was so soon
 of the invasion. The fact that
 developed and the aim of
 the Unit made possible the
 military operation was attained
 attainment of the objective in
 in a decade; I appreciate your
 about ten days is a ~~some~~ distin-
 distinguished military exploit.
 guished military merit.

Hereby I present a letter of
 I thereby award this
 approval to your group.
 Citation.

Fifteenth of November 15, 1938.

OIKAWA, Koshiro
~~KOSHIRO OIKAWA,~~

Commander-in-Chief of the

CHINA
~~CHINESE~~ Area Fleet.

Nov. 1, 1939 Appointed a commanding officer, ^{in charge} of ~~the~~ ^{Navy} Ministry
 the AKAGI Flying Unit of Navy.

Oct. 15, 1940	Appointed an officer Attached to	Navy Ministry
	the Headquarters of the First Fleet.	of Navy
Oct. 15, 1940	Designated to be on ^{the} board AKAGI.	Fleet
Nov. 15, 1940	Appointed a staff ^{officer} of the Third Air Flotilla. Fleet Air Wing	Navy Ministry of Navy
March 15, 1941	Raised to the Senior Sixth ^{sixth} Grade of the Imperial Court Rank	Ministry of Imperial Household
April 10, 1941	By the change of flag-ship, left the RYUJŌ.	Third Air Flotilla. Wing
April 11, 1941	Assigned to the On board ZUIHO.)
August 12, 1941	By the change of flag-ship, transferred to HOSHO.)
August 25, 1941	Appointed a commanding Officer ^{in charge} of	Navy Ministry

the AKAGI flying ~~air~~ Unit

~~of Navy~~

Oct. 15, 1941

Appointed ^a Commander.

Cabinet

April 29, 1940

Awarded
Given the Small Cordon of the Imperial

Order of the Rising Sun and granted
two thousand Yen ^{for services} in recognition

~~of the exploit in the CHINA Inci-~~
dent.

Bureau of
Decorations

April 29, 1940

Awarded
Given the CHINA Incident War
Medal.

Bureau of
Decorations

July 10, 1942

Took ~~off~~ ²¹ days off for
medical treatment ~~at~~ ^{at} 1106, SAKURA-

YAMA, ZUSHI-MACHI, MIURA-^{Gun} District,

KANAGAWA Prefecture ^{as a} ~~by the~~ result of

simple fractures of both right and left heels, ~~bones~~ ^{sprains} and ~~contusion~~ of both right and left foot joints.

July 20, 1942 Appointed an officer Attached to the YOKOSUKA Naval ^{Station} District ~~of Navy~~ Navy Ministry

August 3, 1942 Took ~~off~~ ²¹ days ~~for~~ ^(from July 10) medical treatment at ~~on~~ 1106, SAKURAYAMA, ZUSHI-MACHI, MIURA-Gun District, KANAGAWA Prefecture,

as long as 21 days from July 10 as ^a ~~the~~ result of ^{injuries of} wound by explosion of both right and left foot joints by explosion. (first class ^{battle injury} disease of ~~war wound~~)

July 22, 1942 CERTIFICATE of Authenticity

Wound or Disease: ^{Sprain} Contusion of both

right and left foot joints

(in action at 7:26 AM,)

He was wounded in 7 o'clock 26

minutes a.m. of June 5, 1942, when

the ~~H.M.S.~~ AKAGI was fighting in

the EAST PACIFIC Area.

Witnessed by

SUZUKI, Tadayoshi,

Commander TADAYOSHI SUZUKI,

Executive Officer the
Assistant Commandant of AKAGI

June 5, 1942.

Oct. 1, 1942 Completely recovered and went on

duty.

Oct. 6, 1942 Ordered to be ^{duty} in service by the

Leaf 3/

	order of the commander of the	Commander-
	YOKOSUKA Naval Air ^{Unit.} Group	in-Chief
Oct. 10, 1942	Appointed an instructor of the	Navy Ministry
	YOKOSUKA Naval Air ^{Unit.} Group	of Navy
Dec. 20, 1942	Additionally ^{Concurrently} appointed an instructor	Navy Ministry
	of Naval ^{War} Staff College.	of Navy
	To the forces engaged in the ^{Unit which participated}	
	in the HAWAII Naval Battle of HAWAII.	
	As soon as the war broke out	
	on December 8, 1941, ^{the unit} your forces	
	after a long trip ^{the} suddenly attacked HAWAII Naval	
	Harbor of HAWAII; the air unit,	
	Port after long flight, severely	
	attacked the main force of ^{the} PACIFIC	

T.N. This article is pasted on to the original

Fleet of our enemy, the UNITED STATES
 of AMERICA and also ^{its} air forces in the
 area ~~spot~~ and soon destroyed most of
 them; this ~~activity~~ ^{action} ~~has brought~~ ^{subsequently}
 contributed greatly to
~~about~~ great advantage to the
~~succeeding~~ subsequent military operations.

~~I~~ I recognize ^{this as a} ~~the exploit~~ of
 your forces ^{quite} distinguished.
 military merit.

Hereby I deliver a letter of
 I thereby award this Citation
 approval.

April 15, 1942.

~~ISOROKU~~ YAMAMOTO, ISOROKU

Commander-in-Chief of the

	Combined Fleet.		
May 20, 1943	Concurrently Additional appointed ^{a military} instructor		
	of strategy of the Army Staff	War Ministry	
	College.		
June 20, 1943	Appointed an observer of ^{the} Naval General Staff Boards	Navy Ministry	
June 20, 1943	Relieved of the ^{concurrent post} additional appointment of an instructor of strategy ^{as military}		
	of the Army ^{War} Staff College	War Ministry	
Dec. 4, 1943	Ordered ^{dispatched} to take an official trip	Navy Ministry	
	to PHILIPPINE area.	of Navy	
July 1, 1943	Appointed a ^{officer} staff of the First Air Fleet.		

April 15, 1944	Appointed an observer of Naval General Staff Board	Navy Ministry
April 30, 1944	Appointed a staff officer of the Combined Fleet.	of Navy Navy Ministry
August 19, 1944	Concurrently additionally appointed a staff officer of the Southern Area Army Force.	of Navy War Ministry
Oct. 15, 1944	Appointed a Captain.	Cabinet
Dec. 1, 1944	Raised to the Junior Fifth Grade of the Fifth Imperial Court Rank	Ministry of Imperial Household
April 25, 1945	Concurrently additionally appointed a staff officer of the Combined Naval Forces.	Navy Ministry
May 1, 1945	Concurrently appointed as staff officer of the Combined Naval Forces and the Combined Fleet.	of Navy Navy Ministry
Oct. 10, 1945	Appointed an observer of the Navy Ministry	Ministry of Navy Ministry Ministry of of Navy

Oct. 10, 1945	Ordered to ^{duty} be in service in the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry Bureau of Naval Affairs	Minister
Oct. 1, 1945	Appointed a secretary of Committee of Collecting ^{Gathering} Materials Relating to Military Operations	
Nov. 30, 1945	Placed on the Reserve. Appointed to transfer to the first reserve	Navy Ministry
Nov. 30, 1945	Ordered a General mobilization ordered.	of Navy Ministry of Navy Navy Ministry
Dec. 1, 1945	Appointed ^{official of the} an Second Demobilization official (the third class of higher Civil Service) by No. 686 of Imperial Ordinance No. 686	
Dec. 1, 1945	Appointed a member of Historical	

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF FUCHIDA, Mitsuo
by Mr. Roberts

26,731
26,732

The witness stated he lived in Nara. He identified Exhibit 3008 as his affidavit and verified it. He stated * that he commanded the first air attack unit participating in the raid on Pearl Harbor. On August 25, 1941 he was ordered transferred to the aircraft carrier AKAGI, which was the flagship of the First Air Fleet under the command of Admiral NAGUMO. The First Air Fleet was composed of the first and second air squadrons with two carriers each.

After taking over the post of Chief Flight Officer of the Air Fleet and being ordered to take charge of combined training of all air corps aboard, he was ordered to assume unified command of the air force when it be organized. Up to that time they had carried out air training with respect to individual carrier with the result that the overall strength of the group was not adequately brought out. It was decided to emphasize group training and unified command.

734

26,735

Most of the air corps attached to the First Air Fleet was distributed for training among several bases in southern Kyushu. While carrying on his training duties the witness did not know that the idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor had been conceived. They carried on the training throughout September believing it was so-called annual training. Toward the end of September Commander GENDA, Tactical Staff Officer of the First Air Fleet came under orders instructing that as the negotiations were becoming more critical the idea had been conceived that in the event of war an aerial attack would be made at the outset against the main American fleet at Hawaii, and such studies and training as would enable the aircraft to do this should be secretly carried out. The object was explained as being * to make an aerial attack against the main fleet around Pearl Harbor so as to make it difficult for a time for the United States fleet to cross the ocean and therefore enable Japan to complete its operations in the south during that time. Aircraft carriers and capital ships were to be the primary targets, with local airfields and air forces based there secondary. The instruction was given only to the witness and Lt. MURATA, chief flight officer of one ship. No one else in the air corps knew anything about it.

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MURATA was an expert on torpedo attack and was especially instructed to take part in the study. It was originally intended to use torpedoes principally. Early in October they incorporated the study of the Pearl Harbor attack into the training to determine its plausibility or success. There were many problems of study and training.

26,736

The waters of Pearl Harbor were narrow and only 12 meters deep and it was felt that the ordinary torpedo attack which caused torpedoes to penetrate 60 feet would cause torpedoes to strike bottom and nullify their effect. They worked very hard to develop a torpedo fire for shallow water. Around the middle of November they concluded that the most effective firing method was to have the planes fire from 20 meters with a speed of 160 knots flying parallel to the water. Since they had torpedoes with stabilizing gears, they selected a spot in the narrow waters of Kagoshima Bay where the depth was 12 meters and practiced firing. This was carried out two days prior to the departure of the fleet. * They proved torpedoes with stabilizing gear were most effective when fired in shallow water. However, the total number of needed torpedoes had not been prepared and could not be supplied before departure. One aircraft carrier remained behind for three days and after receiving the torpedoes followed the fleet.

26,737

26,738

The attack demanded the use of as many high accuracy torpedoes as possible. They decided to use horizontal bombing. Although shallow bombing was solved, the firing method required special skill and they were afraid of flyers not highly trained. If the United States fleet was protected by torpedo nets, the torpedoes would be ineffective. They figured American warships would be two abreast and the only possible attack against the one * on the land side would be by bombs. Since horizontal bombing accuracy was not very high they decided on a "probable" bombing method. They reduced the number of planes in formation and decided to reduce the bombing altitude to 3000 meters, which was the minimum calculated for the bombs to pierce the armor of capital ships. They thus felt that they could meet the technical demands of the operation.

26,739

However, the bombs to be used for the operation were 16" shells urgently converted and they had to reconstruct the bombing apparatus of the plane. Supply of bombs was made in time for departure. However, * reconstruction of the bombing apparatus was behind schedule. Workmen were taken on board and they completed

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reconstruction en route from port of departure to the rendezvous point. Two aircraft carriers were completed in late September. The Fifth Air Squadron was organized and incorporated into the First Air Fleet. However, the training of their crews was not adequate and it was decided to use the fliers of the First and Second air squadron in attacks against warships and the fliers of the Fifth squadron were to be used against airfields.

At the beginning it was intended to have the planes take off from the carriers at night so as to attack Pearl Harbor at dawn but training was not believed sufficient to enable a night take-off on group flying. The witness reported this * to his superiors and the original plan was changed so as to have the planes take off at dawn and attack by daylight.

There was no cross-examination of this witness.

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reconstruction en route from port of departure to the rendezvous point. Two aircraft carriers were completed in late September. The Fifth Air Squadron was organized and incorporated into the First Air Fleet. However, the training of their crews was not adequate and it was decided to use the fliers of the First and Second air squadron in attacks against warships and the fliers of the Fifth squadron were to be used against airfields.

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There was no cross-examination of this witness.

Translation of Defense Document

1982 Sandusky

Title

Off - FUCHIDA

, 1947

17 Aug

From Section

I

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
1		after <u>Report</u> : Mitsuo FUCHIDA	No. 365, TAWARA HONMACHI, ISOKI-GUN, NARA PREFECTURE
1	6	delete: December 8, 1941	
1	between 14-15	insert sub-title	Annual Training
2	" 10-11	" " "	Special Training
3	8	Many problems	Four problems
3	between 9-10	insert sub-title	A. Torpedos attack in Shallow Waters
3	28	for Sasaki Bay	for Hitokappu Bay
3	28 to 31	A study - our demands,	Torpedos with stabilization gears were invented on the basis of our demands as result of our research in shallow water torpedo firing,
4	1	delete: for approximately three days	
4	between 24-3	insert sub-title:	B. Joint use of Horizontal Bombing
4	3	5	10.
5	3	Sasaki Bay	Hitokappu Bay
5	between 7-8	insert sub-title: Training Crews of Setsu Organized	(5th Air Squadron)
5	" 17-18	insert sub-title:	D. Group Flight at Night

ASH.

9/15/47

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



Sworn Deposition

Deponent: Mitsuo FUCHIDA

Having first duly sworn an oath as shown on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is Mitsuo FUCHIDA. I formerly was a captain in the Imperial Japanese Navy. I commanded the First Air Attack Unit participating in the raid on Pearl Harbor, December 8 1941.

On the 25th of August 1941 an order was received for my transfer from the post of Staff Officer of the Third Air Squadron to that of Chief Flight Officer of the Aircraft Carrier AKAGI. A few days later I reported for duty aboard the AKAGI at Yokosuka.

At that time the AKAGI was the Flagship of the First Air Fleet and the Commander in Chief was Vice Admiral NAGUMO. The First Air Fleet was then composed of the carriers AKAGI and KAGA (First Air Squadron) and the SORYU and HIRYU (Second Air Squadron.)

2. After taking over the post of Chief Flight Officer of the AKAGI, I was named Senior Chief Flight Officer of the First Air Fleet and ordered to take charge of the combined training of all the air corps aboard the above mentioned four aircraft carriers, as well as to assume unified command of the air force when it should be organized.

Up to that time, there had been a tendency to carry out air training of the fleets in respect to individual carriers, with the result that the over-all strength of the group had not been adequately brought out. It was decided at this point to place special emphasis upon the group training and unified command of all the air corps attached to the First Air Fleet; hence, the above order issued to me in my position as Senior Chief Flight

Officer of the Fleet.

Most of the air corps then attached to the First Air Fleet were distributed for training purposes among several bases located in southern Kyushu.

I carried on my training duties at the Kagoshima Base and at that time neither I nor any of the other members of the flying corps even knew that the idea of the attack on Pearl Harbor had been conceived. We carried on the above-mentioned group training throughout September in the belief that it was our so-called "annual training".

3. Toward the end of September - I do not remember the exact date - Lieutenant Commander Genda, then Tactical Staff Officer of the First Air Fleet, came to me under orders from above with the instruction that as the negotiations with America were becoming more and more critical, the idea had been conceived that in the event of war breaking out between Japan and America, an aerial attack should be made at the outset of the war against the main force of the American fleet located in Hawaiian waters. And hence, that studies and training such as would enable our aircraft to meet the tactical needs of such an attack should be secretly carried out.

It was further explained to me that the object of this operation was to make an aerial attack against the main force of the American Fleet presumably located around Pearl Harbor so as to make it difficult for a time for the American Fleet to come across the ocean, and thereby enable us to complete our operations in the South during that time; and hence that the general plan was to make aircraft carriers and capital ships the primary target with the local airfields and the air force based there the secondary targets in order to preclude their being used in counter-attack.

This instruction was given only to myself and Lieutenant MURATA, who was also a Chief Flight Officer on the AKAGI, and none of the others in the air corps knew anything about it.

Lieutenant MURATA, being an expert on torpedo attack, was especially instructed to take part in this study. It was originally intended to use torpedoes as the principal weapon in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Beginning early in October, we therefore incorporated the study of the idea of the Pearl Harbor Attack into our training to determine whether or not such an attack was plausible or could be successfully executed.

Many problems came up in connection with the study and training concerning the execution of the plan of attack on Pearl Harbor. The waters of Pearl Harbor, being very narrow and only about 12 meters deep, it was felt that the ordinary torpedo attack method, hitherto used in training which caused torpedoes to penetrate the water to a depth of approximately 60 meters, would result in the torpedoes striking bottom and hence nullifying their effect. In our study and training therefore, we worked very hard to effect a torpedo firing method which could be adapted for use in shallow waters.

Near the very end of our training period, around the middle of November, we came to the conclusion, as a result of our studies, that the most effective firing method was to have the planes fire from a height of 20 meters and at an air-speed of 160 knots with the plane flying parallel to the water. As we were then supplied with torpedoes equipped with stabilizing gears, we selected a spot in the narrow waters of Kagoshima Bay where the depth was 12 meters and practiced firing until we gained confidence in shallow water torpedo operation.

This final training was carried out two days prior to the departure of the Fleet from Saeki Bay and barely in time. A study of torpedoes with stabilizing gears, together with research in shallow water torpedo firing, were carried out on the basis of our demands, and it was proved that the above torpedo was most effective when fired in shallow waters. However, the total number of required torpedoes had not been prepared and would not be supplied before the departure of the Fleet. Hence the aircraft carrier KAGA

remained behind for approximately three days in Sasebo, and after receiving the remaining torpedoes followed the Fleet.

5. The attack on Pearl Harbor demanded the use of as many high accuracy torpedoes as possible. It was decided, however, to use horizontal bombing also for the following reasons:

1. Although the problem of shallow firing suitable for the waters of Pearl Harbor was thus solved, such firing method required special skill and we felt some uneasiness in the case of flyers who had not been highly trained.

2. Should the American Fleet at anchor be protected by torpedo nets, the torpedoes we intended to use against them would prove ineffective.

3. It was reckoned that American warships would be lying two abreast while at anchor. In such case the only possible means of attack against the one lying on the landward side would be by bombs.

Since the accuracy of our Navy's horizontal bombing at the time was not very high, we decided on the formation "Probable" bombing method. And in order to increase the number of attacking units we reduced the number of planes per formation from nine to five. In order to maintain the hitting percentage, it was decided to reduce the bombing altitude to 3,000 meters which was the minimum height calculated to enable the bombs which we then intended to use (converted 16 inch shells) to pierce the armor of the American capital ships. Under those conditions it was calculated that such skill of the bombing leaders as we could count upon at the time would make it possible for the tactical demands of the operations against the anchored battle ships to be satisfactorily met.

However, the 800 kilogram armor-piercing bombs which were to be used for this operation were 16 inch shells urgently converted for the purpose. Consequently in the event of their being carried by planes, it necessitated the reconstruction of the

bombing apparatus of the plane structure.

The supply of bombs was made in time for the departure of the Fleet from Saeki Bay. However, the reconstruction of the bombing apparatus of the newly received planes fell behind schedule. Hence the aircraft carriers took workmen on board and en route from the port of departure to the rendezvous point at Hitokappu Bay and completed reconstruction.

7. The aircraft carrier ZUIKAKU was completed on 25 September 1941, and the carrier SHOKAKU a short time earlier. Out of these two, the Fifth Air Squadron was organized and incorporated into the First Air Fleet. But as their crews had to be hurriedly trained, with the training of less than a month, their training and proficiency was not adequate. It was therefore decided to use the flyers belonging to the First and Second Air Squadrons in the attacks against warships since that required special skill, and the flyers belonging to the Fifth Air Squadron were to be used in the attack against the airfields.

It was first intended, at the beginning of the training, to have the planes take off from the carriers at night so as to make the attack on Pearl Harbor at dawn. But the training and proficiency of the flyers, especially when those of the newly organized Fifth Air Squadron was considered, was not believed sufficient to enable them to take off at night on group flight. Hence, when the training ended, I reported this opinion in effect to my superiors and the original dawn attack plan was changed so as to have the planes take off from the carriers at dawn and to make the attack by daylight.

On this 25th day of June, 1947

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (seal)

I, FUCHIDA, Mitsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (seal)