

REPORT ON SEIZO KOBAYASHI (Admiral)

In 1940, when the Taisei Yokusan Kai (IRAA) was organized, Seizo Kobayashi was Governor General of Taiwan. At the end of June 1943, the Secretary General of the IRAA, on behalf of Fumio Goto, V.P. of the IRAA, asked Seizo Kobayashi to become chairman of the Central Cooperation Council (C.C.C.) of the IRAA. The Council was composed of staff members of the IRAA, Government officials and occupational and regional representatives of the people. Its purpose to give free rein to the popular will.

Kobayashi advised with Goto and Minister of Navy, Admiral Shimada. He has claimed that the job was only a nominal one. If so, why was it so difficult to get a proper man? He presided over two meetings, the agenda being:

1. Means of enhancing the fighting spirit
2. Means of expanding munition and food production
3. Means of improving the wartime mode of living

C.C.C. membership embraced a number of eminent personages.

Tojo organized a powerful political party, called the IRAPS, also the National Service Political Council, headed by General Abe, the real progenitor of the IRAPS. Kobayashi was not an original member. However, he was invited to become chairman of the NSPP, which he says he did reluctantly for the chief purpose of saving the IRAPS from dissolution. General Koiso and Admiral Yonai urged his acceptance.

On 19 December 1944, he entered the Koiso Cabinet without portfolio and remained until February 1946.

The statement of ex-Admiral Seizo Sokonji is very convincing in Kobayashi's favor. But, we must always bear in mind that it is the partisan statement of a close friend and political associate. With this in mind, it presents some considerable food for thought.

He very convincingly asserts that Kobayashi was liberal in his views; a consistent exponent of freedom of speech; an anti-war advocate and supporter of the results of the London Naval

Agreement of 1930 and the Washington Conference of 1922.

On the other hand, Kobayashi was prominent politically, but apparently not subversively so. His alleged support of various policies said to be unpopular because liberal and anti-war apparently did not prevent him from being chosen to high offices, such as Governor General of Taiwan and later the Cabinet. We know that the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, which had been formed to supersede the IRAA, and the C.C.C., both willing tools of the Tojo Government, was organized to support a growingly unpopular Tojo Government. The Tojo Government was a war mongering government. It was illiberal in its views. It, through its cabinet and the IRAA and C.C.C., is accused of having deprived the Diet of its true functions and of its proper representation of the common people. It is said that the IRAPS's revolt from Tojo and its President's (General Abe's) departure as Governor General of Korea, directly led to Tojo's downfall. That can be taken with a grain of salt. The fall of Saipan and Tojo's failure to achieve military success, is what led to his downfall. The so-called revolt of the IRAPS merely evidenced the popular revolt against Tojo and the dissatisfaction of the people, because of the military failures. In the last analysis, the friends of Tojo, political and otherwise, even though members of the IRAPS, were a component part of the people, and the people were dissatisfied.

A detailed study of "The Brocade Banner" and the Kokuryukai (The Black Dragon Society) and the Kokuhonsha (National Foundation Society) strengthens the belief that Admiral Seizo Kobayashi has had no war or pre-war career that would warrant his prosecution.

We must distinguish between our subject, Seizo Kobayashi, and Junichiro Kobayashi. In the histories of the three societies above mentioned, the former is conspicuous, by reason of the lack of mention of his name, either as a politician or public personage. He definitely was not prominent publicly and the record presents so little (practically nothing) against him, while there appears so much in his favor that I believe his prosecution would be futile. On the other hand, Junichiro Kobayashi very definitely is subject to prosecution and should be prosecuted.

Thos. D. Aitken

THOS. D. AITKEN

LEGAL SECTION
Investigation Division

16 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Col. Carpenter

SUBJECT: Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI

1. With reference to the G-2 recommendation that Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI be released without preference of charges, it is felt that concurrence should be given.

2. In September of 1946, a telephone call was received from CIS requesting the concurrence of the Legal Section for the release of this individual and an investigative report was opened on him under our No. 855. Mr. Donnell submitted a rather comprehensive report in which the Legal Section concurred in the release of this individual inasmuch as no evidence was found implicating him in either B or C category war crimes. He did take an active part in the IRAA but the activities of KOBAYASHI were that of a patriotic Japanese rather than a planner of aggression.

3. After a review of our investigative report No. 855, it is felt that the Legal Section can properly concur in the release of KOBAYASHI.

L.H.B.
L.H.B.

SECRET

NAME: KOBAYASHI, Seizo.

PRESENT STATUS: Confined in Sugamo Prison.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

President, 1944, of the Imperial Resurrection
Political Society; Minister in the KOISO Cabinet; Commandant of
the Combined and First Fleet, 1933. He became a member-in-Chief of
Military Council as early as 1933. In recent years he was Supreme
the Central Co-operative Council; Adviser, Political Society, member of
of the House of Peers and Minister without Portfolio in the Kato
Cabinet.

REMARKS:

SUBJECT, since his retirement from active naval
service, was generally recognized as one of the "elder statesmen" of
Japan. He was Governor-General of Formosa from 1936 to November 1940,
and, as such, was part and parcel of Japan's southward expansion. Due
to his high position in the Japanese Navy prior to his retirement from
active duty in 1936, and due to his later connections with the IRAA,
the IRAPS, and as Minister without Portfolio in the KOISO Cabinet,
SUBJECT is considered to be one of the key figures, from both a
political and military standpoint, in Japan's military aggression prior
to December 1941. CIS/G-2, FEC, on 7 February 1947 in a report to Legal
Section, and which report references a former Memo by G-2 of 28 August
1946, recommends as follows:
"On the basis of these studies, G-2 again recommends favorable
consideration of KOBAYASHI's release."

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SUBJECT be retained in custody
as a Class A war criminal suspect and tried before an International
Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

SECRET

Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI (Retd.): Former President, Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (now dissolved)

1877 Oct. Born in Hiroshima Prefecture
* Graduated from Naval Academy at head of class
1908 Lieutenant Commander
1909 Graduated from Naval Staff College
1912 Commander
1912 Attache, Japanese Embassy, London
* Attache, Japanese Embassy, Washington
* Instructor, Naval Staff College
1917 Captain
1920 Naval Attache, Japanese Embassy, London
1922 Rear Admiral
1926 Vice Admiral
1927 Delegate, Geneva Naval Conference
* Director, Department of Naval Materials and Technical Affairs
* Commander in Chief, 1st Fleet
* Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet
1930 Vice Minister of Navy
1931-33 Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and 1st Fleet
1933 Admiral; Supreme Military Council
* -1936 Commander, Chinkai Naval Base
1936 Resigned from navy following February 26 army revolt
1936-1940 Nov. Governor General, Formosa

Well versed in colonial administration. Popularity in military circles partly due to father's reputation as Chief of Staff of Japanese Forces in Manchuria during Russo-Japanese War. Described as amiable and energetic. One of most important members of Kenkyukai group of House of Peers. Brother-in-law of Field Marshal Terauchi and Marquis Koichi Kido. (84,85)

REPORT ON : The Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai
(National Policy Research Institute)

PREPARED BY : Lt. Eric W. Fleisher
Investigator, I.P.S.

DATE : 4 June 1947

The Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai, a little heard of organization with the outward appearance of a group devoted to the discussion and study of current events has since 1937 played an extremely important part in advising the various departments in regards national policy, the administration of conquered territory and the utilization of the natural resources and materials available in territories already occupied by Japan, and in those that the association considered should be occupied. Its membership consisted mostly of second rate politicians who were devoted to the cause of Japan ruling not only Asia, but of making the Pacific Ocean a "Mare Nostrum" by occupying Alaska and certain countries of South America along the Pacific Coast and thereby spreading Japan's influence into the interior of South America and through the West Coast of the United States. Lacking in power, themselves, the members of the Association sought to influence the greater political figures of the day and to gain the support of those that favored their policy of aggression and conquest, which they did with considerable success. Such men as MOTO, Akira; KAYA, Okinori; SATO, Kenryo; SUZUKI, Teiichi; GOTO, Shigunori; KISHI; TAKAHASHI; GOTO, Fumio; ABE, Nobuyuki; ISOGAYA; SHIMOMURA; HORIUCHI; SAKURAI; KOPAYASHI, Seizo; ARITA, Hachiro; IWAKURO, Tokue; SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro; MATSUMURA; ARISUE, Seizo; NAGAI, Yatsuji; SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru; and other influential men were affiliated with the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai and many of them made speeches at the meetings or attended them for the purpose of informing the society of recent developments in the political scene in Japan, in the occupied areas, and abroad.

In spite of the fact that the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai claimed to be a private organization under no outside influence, most of its financial backing came from the secret funds or "Kimitsuhi" of the various ministries and departments of the Government and from the larger private concerns. In the early days these contributions rarely exceeded five thousand yen, but later, especially after the outbreak of the "Greater East Asia War" contributions were rarely less and usually well over five thousand yen. The War Ministry and Navy Ministry were the most regular contributors and gave the greatest amounts, but the Greater East Asia Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Cabinet Bureau of Information, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry also gave their support. Out of the almost one hundred private companies that gave financial backing to the KKK, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Asano, Ayakawa, Sumitomo, Tokyo Shibaura Denki and Osaka Seitetsu are the most well known. Extra amounts were collected from these sources on other occasions for special projects. In the end of 1941, or the beginning of 1942, the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai began research on their "Ten Year Plan for the Development of Greater East Asia."

For this project Muto, Akira of the Military Affairs Bureau gave the KKK 20,000 yen out of secret funds, and the same amount was received from Oka, Keijun of the Navy. The Foreign Office and the Cabinet Bureau of Information contributed 20,000 yen but this time only 5,000 yen was received from the Greater East Asia Ministry. From private companies 200,000 yen was collected.

The Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai, although not organized into definite sections for the study of various areas, did have specialists in each field and committees were formed whenever a project was undertaken, headed by these specialists. For example, specialists studying relations with the United States were Ishida, Reisque (Mitsui Bussan); Tojima (Mitsui Bussan); Isogaye, Reisque; and Sato, Naotake; while Okura, Kinmochi; and Kuroda, Kakuchi were the outstanding specialists on Russia.

The sources of information available to the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai were so extensive that no civilian, none government organization could ever have come near it. Much of this information was gathered from prominent members and their more influential friends, but documents too, from government ministries were in the possession of the society. Through Muto, Akira; Yatsugi, Kazuo of the KKK, was able to acquire and retain in his possession many documents of the Military Affairs Bureau, classified as "Top Secret." Yatsugi obtained documents through Muto as Muto was a good personal friend of his, but information was procured from other government ministries and from other high officials. This information was used in drawing up the various plans put out by the KKK.

In regards the United States a committee was formed in 1939 and functioned through 1941 studying U.S.-Japanese relations and conditions in the United States. The KKK published a full report in 1940 on its findings. So thorough was the knowledge of this committee that it was even familiar with the fortification of the Mandated Islands, something that was known only to a circle of the top ranking military and naval men. The material and statistics published by other societies, such as the Showa Kenkyu Kai and the Towa Kenkyu Kai was available to the KKK. An organization known as the Chosa Kenkyu Doin Honbu (Investigation and Research Mobilization Headquarters) acted as liaison between the many associations. Okura, Kinmochi; senior member of the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai was president of the Chosa Kenkyu Doin Honbu and Kanamori, Tokujiro, Chief of the Political Section of the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai was one of the Directors of the Chosa Kenkyu Doin Honbu.

By the end of 1941 the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai had worked on plans to utilize the facilities of the South Seas, Eastern Russia, Alaska, Canada, Central America, South America and India. Many members, influential sponsors, and associates thought that the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai had gone too far. Even Muto was opposed to including India although he approved of evicting the British from Asia. Regardless, the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai had gone ahead with these plans, some of which were later adopted in a modified form, to suit the Army, and the entire area was called the "East Asia Sphere."

In the spring of 1942 the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai began research on its "Ten Year Plan for the Development of Greater East Asia." There were approximately ten different sections covering an extremely wide scope of research on this subject. Yatsugi, Kazuo (IPS witness) was the administrative head of the project, and was responsible for financing it. Takahashi, Kamegichi was the chief investigator and Kanamori, Tokujiro was in charge of the Political Section. At first the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai received much support from the different ministries and from high officials in the Government, but as the future of the "Greater East Asia Sphere" became more and more uncertain this support decreased. The plan was finally completed and a final report published, but it was never adopted, for by this time the tide of battle had turned against Japan and she had her hands full just trying to hang on to what territory she had. With this change in the fortunes of war the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai became less and less active. Government circles became more reluctant to give out information and documents were not easily obtained. Government agencies were no longer receptive to advice or plans for the future as they had their hands full with the War and its outcome. Although by 1944 the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai had lost its influence and had become almost inactive, it nevertheless carried on its meetings and still remained well informed in almost every field. Prominent members of the KKK were familiar even with secrets such as the profits from the opium trade. Satomi, head of the hong at Shanghai, sent the profits to Suzuki, Teiichi who placed them in Tojo's secret fund.

The Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai continued from 1944, when it lost its influence until the end of the War, when it was dissolved, as an organization that was extremely well informed on all matters and could be called on at all times should its need arise.

The foregoing report is based upon the interrogations of Yatsugi, Kazuo and Okura, Kinmochi conducted in June 1946. Okura was again interrogated on 27 May 1947 by this investigator prior to this writing. Documents published by the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai in the possession of the International Prosecution Section were used as reference and background material in the preparation of this report.

Eric W. Fleisher
 ERIC W. FLEISHER
 1st Lt. Inf.
 Investigative Division, I.P.S.

ITEM 3

Four New Members of the House of Councillors Make
Pledges - Mainichi (Saitama Edition) - 22 Apr 47.
Translator: K. Sato (UG)

KOBAYASHI, Eizo (Seizo) - I will strive for the rehabilitation of medium and small industries, and endeavor to make adequate distribution of materials, for they are the foundation of JAPAN's reconstruction.

KOBAYASHI, Seizo
Request by KAYA, Okimori

Address: Confined in SUGAMO prison

A former admiral and formerly President of the Imperial
Rules Political Assistance Association.

He will be able to testify regarding the attitude of the
accused with reference to carrying on negotiations with the
United States, and his opposition to waging war against the
United States.

This testimony will be relevant in relation to the changes
of conspiracy in the indictment and other changes therein.
The witness will also testify to the fact that the connection
of the defendant with the IRPAA was in name only; that he
did not actually participate in the association; further,
that the accused attended the Geneva Disarmament Conference
in 1927 and exerted efforts in concluding the Disarmament
Agreement.

(4)

KOBAYASHI, Seizo

Request by: KAYA, Kinori

address: confined in SUGAMO prison

A former admiral and formerly President of the Imperial Rules Political Assistance Association.

He will be able to testify regarding the attitude of the accused with reference to carrying on negotiations with the United States, and his opposition to waging war against the United States.

This testimony will be relevant in relation to the charge of conspiracy in the indictment and other charges therein. The witness will also testify to the fact that the connection of the defendant with the IRPAA was in name only; that he did not actually participate in the association; further, that the accused attended the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1927 and exerted efforts in concluding the Disarmament Agreement.

REPORT BY: JOHN A. CURTIS
20 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KOBAYASHI, Seizo

Curriculum Vitae on the above named subject is contained in subject's personal file No. 152, serial 12.

COPIES 4 File
1 Mr. Newbill

S. Hirabayashi, LL.B.
Attorney At Law:

Copy for Witness File.

Tokyo: February 1st 1947.

Messrs. International Prosecution Section, SCAP,
Ichigaya, Ushigome-Ku,
TOKYO.

Attention of: Prosecutor Mahoney:

Subject: Release & liberation of
ex-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI, now incarcerated
in Sugamo Prison.

From: Shin-Ichi HIRABAYASHI, LL.B., Attorney At Law;
No. 4, Natsugi-cho, Nishinomiya City.

Tokyo Abode: c/o Okamura Ryokan: No. 14,
Tsukiji 2-Chome, Kyobashi-Ku.
(Tel: 55-1020)

Gentlemen:-

In accordance with your suggestion, I take pleasure in submitting herewith in duplicate the highlights in the memoir (dated March 10th 1943) of ex-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI who is incarcerated in Sugamo Prison since December 1945 as war criminal suspect. The original memoir is in Japanese and is now kept in my hand. I have taken full responsibility of rendering its highlights into English.

Subsequent to the resignation from Governorship of Formosa in November 1940, ex-Admiral Kobayashi did his level best to avert the war between America and Japan. Fundamentally speaking, although he was already on the reserve list, Kobayashi, as is luminously reflected in his memoir, is a pacifist. In respect of the impending war between America and Japan, Kobayashi was far-sighted enough to weigh the potential strength of both countries and had a wide comprehension respecting the superb importance of coming to a definite diplomatic understanding with both America and England covering the China problem. However, Japan was at that time already under the dictatorship of her military gangsters who all conspired to realize their illusion of dominating Japan by military clique under the figurehead of the Emperor, hence there was no room for such a levelheaded pacifist like Kobayashi to occupy any key position in the Central Government. Kobayashi therefore had to carry on his single-handed campaign to avert the war with America. That was the basic reason why he had the interviews with ex-Admiral Oikawa, Navy Minister in the 3rd Konoe Cabinet, and sent the confidential letter to ex-Admiral Shimada, Navy Minister of the Tojo Cabinet, vigorously setting forth his candid views that the war must be averted and avoided at any cost. However, these men in harness, while apparently in thoughts fully concurring in his views, did not manifest their expressions in deeds; hence the endeavours of Kobayashi proved abortive and futile

S. Hirabayashi, LL.B.
Attorney At Law:

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
through no fault of his own. Suffice it to say, however, that Kobayashi is a pacifist not only in thoughts but also in deeds.

It is true that Kobayashi assumed the Ministry of State without portfolio and the Presidency of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in the coalition Cabinet of General Koiso and Admiral Yonai, but that was only after the downfall of the Tojo Cabinet, and was acted by Kobayashi with the sole objective of "turning the evil into good" and of being on the alert to terminate the forlorn War with the maximum advantage to Japan.

It seems to me that the fundamental difference between the Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo Trial lies in the very fact that the former's leading-shoots consisted of the political party gangsters, while the latter's docks are filled mainly with the military gangsters with their satellites of bureaucratic opportunists who masqueraded to have a share in fame, glory, luxury, privilege and wealth under full sail of the warlords for their common objective of aggressive domination. Therefore, insofar as Japan was concerned, the legal aspect of political responsibilities of State Ministers, subsequent to the resignation of the Tojo Cabinet, had faded, as it were, into the twilight on the horizon diametrically opposed to where it marked the down-fall of Tojo and his cohort in the fall of 1944, excepting those militaristic elements that still remained in their desperate and frantic struggle to fight for only fighting's sake with the view to enshrouding the entire Japanese nation under their wings to commit suicide with them. Here I wish to point out to your section that Kobayashi's responsibilities as Minister of State without portfolio in the coalition Cabinet of Koiso-Yonai never constitutes any offense to be particularly tried as a "war crime" in exactly the same significance that ex-Admiral Yonai was immune from his responsibilities as co-Premier with General Koiso because Kobayashi joined that Cabinet at the special recommendation of Yonai to help him carry out the liberation of Japan.

In view of the above, theoretically and factually speaking, Kobayashi acted nothing that would involve him in the constitution of "Crimes Against Peace", "Conventional War Crimes", or "Crimes Against Humanity" such as are provided under "a", "b" & "c" of Article 5, Section II of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal For the Far East. It is therefore sincerely requested that you will immediately release and liberate Kobayashi from his present incarceration in Sugamo Prison.

Yours Most Truly,



Enclosure: Highlights in the Memoir of
Seizo KOBAYASHI.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

SUBJECT: KOBAYASHI, Seizo (Adm.)

1943 Jul 15 Chairman of the Central Cooperative Council / this council was recently divided up into four committees; Shigeru HAZAMA, Kiyoshi GOTO, Viscount Nobutsune ODA, and SHIMADA have been made chairman of the first, second, third, and fourth committees respectively / on July 15, the Council is to hold four simultaneous meetings of these committees.

SOURCE : Tokyo Radio, July 14, 1943, FCC, Daily Report, July 15, 1943.

Former Governor General of Formosa / has been appointed Bank Adviser by KAMIYAMA, President of the Bank of FORMOSA.

SOURCE : Tokyo Radio, FCC, Daily Report, 2 June 1944.

1944 Aug 11 Was formally installed as the new President of the P.A.A. at a ceremony on 11 August 1944 and gave a speech as did Premier KOISO.

SOURCE : Fortnightly Intelligence Report, MOI, New Delhi, 15 Aug 1944.

1906 Apr 1 Decorated with Fifth Order of the Golden Kite. Given a war medal for service in the war of 1904-5.
Decorated with Fifth Order of the Double-rayed Rising Sun.

1912 Aug 1 Conferred medal commemorating the annexation of KOREA.

1934 Apr 29 Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of meritorious services in connection with the Incident in 1931 and 1934.

1944 Sep 29 Awarded a set of silver cups in recognition of meritorious services in connection with the Chinese Incident.

SOURCE : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo Police File, Who's Who in Japan 1941-42.

----The new cabinet was an army and navy coalition affair, led by General KOISO and Admiral YONAI. I had known KOISO

KOBAYASHI, Seizo (Adm)--cont'd.

as the Minister of Overseas Affairs at the time when I was Governor General of TAIWAN, while YONAI was a bosom friend of mine, with whom I shared in the same views respecting the CHINA AFFAIR, the Tripartite Alliance, the Japanese-American peace negotiations and other subjects. It was in the afternoon of the very day the N.S.P.P. directors visited me that I was requested by General KOISO for an interview. Early on the following morning, December 3, I went to the Prime Minister's official residence, where KOISO pleaded with me to accept the presidency of the N.S.P.P., saying that it was also the wish of YONAI. I replied, I had already been approached by N.S.P.P. directors, and had promised to consider the matter, but that I would like to hear on the attitude of the Prime Minister toward political parties and the Diet before I made any decision. I expressed my belief that a policy such as of the TOJO Cabinet to suppress freedom of speech and demand the people's abject submission succeeded only in creating a spurious national unity - a most dangerous thing for the country in war time.

----From December 19, 1944 during my presidency of N.S.P.P., I entered the KOISO Cabinet as Minister without portfolio, and remained until the end of February this year. I did so because I wanted to maintain effective contact between my party and the government, and to see that the latter acted according to popular will, and also because I wanted to stand guard lest the government should miss any chance of restoring peace. But no such opportunity presented itself; and in that respect I was unsuccessful.

SOURCE : Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI--on his Political Career.

Shin-Ichi HIRABAYASHI, LL.B.
Attorney At Law:

*Witnessed
in File.
Kobayashi*

HIGHLIGHTS IN THE MEMOIR
of
EX-ADMIRAL KOBAYASHI SEIZO,
dated
March 10th 1943.
+.....+

PREAMBLE to the Memoir: Since about the outbreak of the "Manchuria Incident", the politics of Japan have been dominated by a demoniacal influence with the series of terroristic acts forming its background and frantically planning speedy realization of her national prosperity. Nevertheless, fundamentally speaking, Japan was utterly devoid of realistic ability, both in point of esprit de corps of her nation as also in the preparedness of her material resources, to drive forth and accomplish such a gigantic ambition. Hence, it has naturally caused those who believe in the eternity of her Empire and her race to lament and grieve from their heart over the situation.

Meanwhile, due to the action of her radical elements, the China Incident broke out which placed Japan between the devil and the deep sea. And yet, those radical and aggressive caste that drove Japan into such an awful mess, while they had not been able even to settle the situation, have again started the "Greater East War", and, with what they have been able to achieve in the initial warfare by taking sheer advantage of the unpreparedness of the enemies, they have deceived the entire nation into believing as if the victory was the result of Japan's real strength; thus the jingoistic caste has finally driven Japan into the fathomless troubled waters. When I come to think of this, I cannot indeed sleep in peace and can only pray to God for His mercy to shew us miracles to turn the evil into good.

This memoir is nothing but a memoir to record the action I have been taking and the view I have adopted since the outbreak of the "China Incident" and is not at all intended for outside reading. It is the outcome of my keenest desire to leave the record to my heir so that he may have an opportunity to discern for himself the truth surrounding the circumstances that existed at those critical times thereby warning him not to repeat that kind of irreparable blunder. I do not know how long I may live and fear that maybe this memoir will be my last writing on the subject. It is therefore sincerely hoped that this memoir may serve to warn my posterity after a century subsequent to my death against any haphazardous attempt that is destined to ruin this country.

The "CHINA INCIDENT" broke out at about a year of my term as Governor of Formosa. I thought the war with China was the most futile and poor policy while Japan had not been able even to consolidate her status in

Manchukuo. Japan should not be dragged into the quagmire of China which apparently was getting substantial support of both America and England and would therefore offer the most dogged resistance for a long period, thereby compelling Japan to dissipate her vitality. My opinion was that Japan should diplomatically come to a definite understanding with both America and England over the China problem. At that time I recommended my idea to a certain influential friend in the Central Government of Tokyo.

THE TRIPARTITE AXIS ALLIANCE versus THE VIGOROUS POLICY AGAINST AMERICA AND ENGLAND. It was undeniable that Germany subsequent to coming into power of Hitler had proved herself to be one of the foremost countries in Europe due to the intrepid and dauntless manner with which she had gone about restituting her national strength and making every military preparation. My opinion was, however, that Germany should be strictly guarded against for the apparent reason that that country was traditionally used to renounce treaties like scraps of paper and act recklessly if such acts were deemed necessary for her own national prosperity; that if Japan entered into an alliance with Germany, Japan might become her cat's paw. Meanwhile, however, the YONAI CABINET was 'assassinated' in July 1940 by the diehards of the military gangsters that clamoured for the alliance amongst Japan, Germany and Italy. At that time, I was on my trip to the suburb of Kagi City, Formosa, for attending the inauguration ceremony of a 100 kilo. broadcasting station. Hearing that the Tripartite Alliance had been concluded by Foreign Minister Matsuoka of the 2nd KONOE CABINET, I lamented from the bottom of my heart because I felt certain that the formation of that Alliance killed forever the opportunity of adjusting Japan's relationship with both America and England and that it had driven Japan far deeper into the quagmire of China and that finally Japan should be compelled to be dragged into the fray of international warfare.

My reason why it was absolutely beneficial for Japan to adjust her diplomatic relation with both America and England and avoid forming alliance with Germany was because of Japan's national strength which was decidedly insufficient to embark upon the adventure of making both America and England her enemies. In this connection, I vividly recall my conversation with the then Finance Minister KAYA during May 1938 when I had come up to Tokyo from Formosa to report the Formosan affairs to the throne. We lunched together at Kaya's official residence and I incidentally asked for his support for the new budget for Formosa. Kaya grinned and said that he was going to resign his post that day and that Mr. IKEDA was going to take his place. Kaya complained the financial difficulty of Japan stressing his conviction that the war with China must be strictly earmarked to the extent of Japan's financial capacity; that he laid his complaints

before the War Minister SUGIYAMA but that, in the meantime, the commanders on the front kept enlarging the theatres of war, and that Kaya was quite at his wit's end to cope with the ever extending situation.

Notwithstanding the above, the war against America and England has been finally declared. Was it due to the new discovery that Japan's resources were sufficiently tough and tenable enough to lead her all through the war? Or was it that the stringent military policies of America and England have forced Japan to resort to her only alternative of armed resistance? The consensus of opinion current in Japan points to the latter theory. As a matter of fact, the Finance Minister KAYA had broadcast in the middle of January (1942?) that had Japan ample resources and strength to withstand this Great War the declaration of war would have been originally decided with only an hour's Cabinet meeting. However, we must reflect deeply and scientifically analyse whether that was the only alternative left to Japan at that time.

EMBASSADOR ADMIRAL NOMURA'S LETTER DATED JUNE 20TH 1941 was received by me sometime towards the end of July 1941. Nomura specially asked me to circularize that letter to the Minister of Navy ADMIRAL OIKAWA, the Chief of Naval Staff ADMIRAL NAGANO and the Foreign Minister ADMIRAL TOYODA. The gist of Nomura's letter was (1) Japan was then standing on the cross-road of war or peace with America, (2) the fundamental ideal for Japan should be to keep peace in the Pacific at any cost, (3) it would be the poorest policy to depend on reaping benefit from the Tripartite Alliance which even the Japanese Government had declared was only a war-preventive alliance, (4) that the withdrawal of forces from China could be stipulated on the basis of a gradual withdrawal commensurate with the establishment and maintenance of peace and order in China.

On or about July 25th 1941, I called on ADMIRAL NAGANO at the Naval Staff Office. He looked extremely 'peak' and sagged as if he had been ill for a long time. Nagano said that he had read that letter of Nomura dated June 20th. However, he said, that the circumstances have completely changed during the next month that followed and Japan had only one alternative, i.e. Japan must stand up to break through the encircling chains of A.B. C & D. I then felt, through the tone of Nagano's speech, that the grave matter had already been decided at a cabinet meeting and that nothing could alter that decision. Therefore, I stopped talking with Nagano and left him lamenting over the unfortunate situation. To the best of my knowledge, the EMPEROR himself was against the War, but he was powerless to control or check the decisions made from time to time at the LIAISON CONFERENCE. I thought to myself that under such circumstances Nomura must have had awful difficulties at Washington and I fully sympathized with him.

THE TROUBLE INSIDE THE NAVY: On or about August 12th 1941, I made a trip up to Hokkaido accompanied by my family. I do not remember exactly whether it was prior to or after my said trip to Hokkaido, but the fact was that I had a surprise visit from MR. ENOMOTO, a Commissioner of Navy. He told me that the decision to march on to French Indo China had been made without consulting the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Construction ADMIRAL TOYODA, also the Chief of the Naval Air Forces ADMIRAL INOUE. That caused the wrath and ire of these two Admirals and the Navy authorities were at their wits' end to pacify them and that, therefore, they thought it best to ask me as a deacon of the Navy to get the understanding of both Toyoda and Inoue. I was quite dumbfounded at the reckless and outrageous action of the Naval Staff for agreeing to and deciding upon that most important move of marching to French Indo China without obtaining the approval of these two Admirals who were then occupying the prominent key positions in the Navy. I then asked for a personal opinion of Enomoto, who said that with the exception of the YOUNG OFFICERS all the higher authorities of the Navy were against the War, but that Admiral Nagano, the Chief of Naval Staff, seemed to be very much influenced by these YOUNG OFFICERS and that, therefore, it would be important to get rid of Nagano from his post if the Navy had to maintain a moderate policy. I then thought that the best way to talk down Nagano to resign his post would be to operate through ADMIRAL SAKONJI who is a very intimate friend of Nagano. I met and asked Sakonji to go approach Nagano, but later learnt that Sakonji could not see Nagano, who, in the meantime, went up to the Boshu district for a change.

THE TRUTH RESPECTING THE RESIGNATION OF THE THIRD KONOE CABINET:
On or about October 15th 1941, Mr. UCHIDA SHINYA (ex-Minister of Communications) visited me and said:- "I dined with KONOE yesterday and learnt from him that he had decided to resign because on October 12th Konoe was visited by the WAR MINISTER and the NAVY MINISTER accompanied by GENERAL SUZUKI of the Planning Board; then TOJO demanded that the negotiations with America be closed forthwith in view of the utter futility of continuing them any longer; that, otherwise, the crisis for battle might be lost on account of the weather condition. I then sent for ADMIRAL TOYODA, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said that the negotiations with America had not yet come to a deadlock and that there was still room enough to continue the negotiations in good faith."

In view of the above, I came to the conclusion that TOJO duly represented the consensus of opinion of the Army and that, therefore, if KONOE forced TOJO to resign, then the Army would refuse to send any one

into the cabinet to assume the War Ministry causing the Konoe Cabinet to face the same fate as that of the Yonai Cabinet.

After luncheon, I visited ADMIRAL OIKAWA at the Navy Office in order to get him express his candid opinion to stop the war with America. Oikawa was against the War, but he is a very 'smooth' fellow not able to express his candid opinion in a conference and I was extremely disappointed to have such a character at the head of the Navy in such critical moment for Japan.

CONCERNING THE NEW NAVY MINISTER ADMIRAL SHIMADA SHIGETARO:

With the formation of TOJO CABINET, the baton of the Navy Minister was handed from Oikawa to Shimada. However, it was apparently the intention of Oikawa to relay his baton to ADMIRAL TOYODA SOEMU, but the latter refused to accept it (some people said that the Army did not like Toyoda because of his notorious heated quarrel with GENERAL ITAGAKI at Tsingtau). It was apparent that Toyoda, from militaristic viewpoint, was vehemently opposed to the occupation of French Indo China. I knew that if Toyoda was appointed the Navy Minister in the Tojo Cabinet, the war with America and England might have been averted because Toyoda is not 'smooth' but is quite outspoken and candid in his character. However, fate ordained Shimada to become the Navy Minister.

On or about November 20th 1941, I visited the New Navy Minister Shimada at his official residence with my written opinion respecting the inadvisability of waging war against America and England. I did not leave copy of that written opinion but was framed essentially on the following points:-

1) The entire Japanese nation is confidently relying upon the Navy; therefore, the Navy must be extremely cautious and prudent in facing the situation.

2) Judging from the actual scene of the great general mobilization subsequent to the decision of marching on to French Indo China, it is patent and manifest that the entire nation is now tired of the war and is decidedly lacking in esprit de corps. It is therefore most dangerous and perilous to drive such a war-weary nation into a gigantic and long drawn warfare against America (including her followers with entente cordiale).

3) Since the outbreak of the China Incident, the influence of the Army upon all phases of Japan, especially upon her industrialists, has become markedly overbearing, so much so that the industrialists are simply currying favour of the Army by pretending the quantity, quality and capacity of their production. It is, therefore, dangerous to enter into the war giving blind confidence to their statements.

4) The war between America and Japan is what General Chiang is craving for; the war would simply make settlement of the China Incident more

difficult. Moreover, it is problematical just how long USSR will keep her neutrality. It is likely that both America and England will not be able to send a great army to the Far East and will have to depend upon USSR and General Chiang for that. If Japan despatch a great army to the South at such time, she may temporarily gain some victory in the beginning but will later be compelled to taste nasty medicine. It is a case of penny wise and pound foolish.

5) We must be prepared for a long range battle from Japan Proper to the South Sea Islands whence Japan expects to draw raw materials. In that case, Japan is sure to be bombed and submarined en-route. Enemy fleet will be squadroneered in Hawaii and it is problematical whether Japanese Navy can efficiently convoy her merchant fleet from the southern area to Japan. To the best of my technical knowledge, the Navy is not fully equipped as yet to accomplish such mission.

6) I believe in Japan's victory over "battles" having regard to the spiritual power of the Navy. However, the war with America is bound to run into a protracted warfare which naturally will consist of "battles" after "battles". That naturally means the absolute necessity of replenishing the ships and ammunitions which can only come out of efficient and high-strung industries. Is Japan sure of success on this score?

7) Some maintain that the initial stage of war with America will be played for acquisition of the requisite resources, e.g. TOJO. It may be admitted that some of the resources in the South can be used in their crude shape, but the majority of them need industrialization which can only be depended on the equipments in Japan proper. Is such industrialization possible in view of the present conditions in Japan covering the manufacture of iron and oil?

8) The southern resources could only be used for the war after being thoroughly industrialized in Japan. Then, how about her power of transportation? Take for instance the case of oil. I understand the total tonnage of Japan's tankers, including the tankers chartered from abroad, is about 400,000 tons. Now our fleet will be aiming at Hawaii and American Continent, hence the fleet will be cruising quite far from the oil producing area. This would mean that at least half of 400,000 tons should be for the absolute replenishment of the Navy, while only 200,000 tons could be available for Japan proper. On the basis of one trip requiring more than one month including loading and unloading, Japan can only import 2,400,000 tons of oil per year. Will this quantity be sufficient for Japan's war and industrial purposes?

9) The Japanese war advocates chortle that if Japan adopts her present policy, she will gradually become poorer and poorer until finally she will be facing the irreparable impasse. I interpret this vindication to refer

to her stock of fuel oil which Japan does not produce. Now, suppose for the sake of argument that Japan can carry on war for X years with her present stock of oil and thereafter to depend on the oil from South. Let us indicate the time required for occupying the oil fields in South by Y. Let us also indicate the time required for repairing the oil fields to be bombed by enemy by Z. Now, the following equation must hold good to maintain the problem of oil in our favour:-

$$X > Y + Z$$

Of course we must be fully aware that the enemies know well the quantity of our stock of oil and will sure to wage war in such a way as to compel Japan to draw heavily on her stock which means that X will become far smaller, whereas the enemies will try to augment the quantities of both Y and Z. If such be the case, the above equation will not hold good which means that Japan would become abruptly meager and impoverished and might likely be drawn into the impasse rolling rapidly! Of course, War is a colossal adventure, but, in view of the above, it would seem the adventure was too risky to hazard.

10) I do not know just exactly what is the real situation governing the diplomatic negotiations with America, but from the tenor of the above-cited personal letter I received from Nomura at the end of last July and which I shewed to both the Chief of Naval Staff and the ex-Minister of Navy, it seems still possible to land on a certain zone where compromise can be reached without endangering the existence of Japan. If unfortunately Japan be defeated in the War, then Japan might lose not only Manchuria and the South Sea Islands, but also her entire possessions overseas such as was not anticipated in Nomura's letter.

With the above points, I strongly recommended SHIMADA to recall the attitude taken by the late Count Admiral Yamamoto at the time of the Russo-Japan War and advised him to take a candid action in facing the situation.

To the above letter of mine, Shimada replied to me under date November 26, 1941 (original is kept in the hand of S. Hirabayashi, LL.B.) as follows:-

"My dear Admiral Kobayashi:-

Today I was in receipt of your esteemed letter expressing your deep concern over the impending situation and you may rest assured that I have read same with a sense of profound appreciation and thanks. I can tell you from my heart that I share the same view with you."

"As you are well aware, I have been away from Japan proper for quite a long period and am therefore not well posted on the general political situation. In spite of my disqualification, I have now assumed heavy responsibilities and judging from common sense I have

"come to the same conclusion with you. You will, however, kindly consider that the present situation has already been "spoiled, distorted and fudged up" and it would appear, in view of the diverse situations prevailing both in and out of Japan, as though we might be compelled to connive at a certain phase which is quite out of common sense. Indeed, this is a situation that can only be termed "complex and mysterious". I sincerely hope to be able to tell you tete-a-tete at the earliest possible opportunity and in the meantime kindly excuse my silence. You may rest assured that I always cherish your high opinion in my heart and do my utmost for its realization."

Yours most truly,

(Signed) SHIMADA SHEGETARO."

To the above reply of Navy Minister SHIMADA, I again wrote to him under date November 28.1941 to the following effect:-

"My dear Admiral Shimada:-

I thank you for your reply to my letter in which I expressed my view of the situation and desire to state that I feel it most satisfactory that you have concurred in my view. While it may be that the present political situation is "complex and mysterious", yet do I sincerely hope that you will not be tempted by such illusion and will step the right footpath forward, Yours etc."

On the other hand, in view of the imminency of a Council in presence of the Emperor, I had occasion to talk to ADMIRAL OKADA the salient points of my first letter to Navy Minister Shimada and was pleased to note that he did approve all of my points therein raised.

Re USA NOTE dated NOV.26.1941:AMBASSADOR KURUSU used to lecture that on Nov.26.1941 he received a grave note from USA which tantamounted to an ultimatum. I wanted to analyse whether that note constituted "a document tantamounting to ultimatum". I could not think so because on the good authority the note was preambled "Tentative" also "Basis of discussion". I received copy of an excerpt of that note from a certain Japanese ex-ambassador. With the exception of Item No.3 on the full evacuation of Japanese forces from China and French Indo China, also Item No.4 on the exclusive recognition of the Chungking Government and Item No.9 regarding the application of the Tripartite Alliance, other items, although less important, might have been rather welcome. Therefore, we could reasonably have made the subjects relating to China and the Tripartite Alliance the basis of discussion. I heard from NOMURA after his repatriation from America that on the day next following the receipt of the Nov.26 Note he visited Cordell Hull and pointed out to him that the full evacuation of

the Japanese forces from China and French Indo China could not be done unless the China incident had been settled. Hull replied that his Government was not demanding immediate evacuation. NOMURA also pointed out to him that it would be impossible for Japan to repudiate the Nanking Government in view of the fact that there were so many conventions and treaties existing between it and Japan. To this HULL replied that China could only be successfully governed by GENERAL CHIANG and that WANG was incompetent in that respect and that would be a misfortune for China too. That view was entertained by some of the eminent Japanese authorities at that time and as I write this memoir the Japanese Government has declared that the Japanese Forces will mainly engage in establishing peace and order and that the Nanking Government will administer politics and economy. Further, the Japanese Government has declared the abolition of extrajurisdiction and the return of the former settlements to China. It seems to me that if Japan manifested such a spirit at the time of her last negotiations with America, the latter should have been more lenient in her proposals. As regards the point relating to the application of the Tripartite Alliance, that would have meant the virtual renunciation of that Alliance. However, as the Alliance had at its background the war-preventive spirit, it could have been settled satisfactorily in some form or other in the last analysis. It seems to me a sheer humbug that, instead of interpreting the provisions of the said Treaty in her own favour, Japan should have primarily interpreted it favourably to her Allies, thereby plunging headlong into War helter-skelter!

It was on November 30th 1941 that TOJO & HIS COHORT, which had been preparing for the War, took that note to mean America's ultimatum intended to force upon Japan a sheer impossibility, lose her national honour, hinder settlement of the China Incident, etc., that a Special Council was held inviting Elder Statesmen (ex-Premiers). After that, TOJO & KIDO reported the result of the Council to the Throne. Whether the Emperor immediately sanctioned the War, I am not in position to know. Anyhow, the Japanese Naval Air Force bombed Pearl Harbour on December 8th at 0615 (Japan time). From that I judge that a surprise attack squadron had been ordered ahead on or about December 1st or 2nd which would indicate that the Imperial Sanction for the War was given immediately after the Elder Statesmen's Council.

The above memoir was recorded based on my firm belief that it was absolutely unfavourable for Japan to wage war against America and England with such resources as was available to Japan at that time. Now that the Imperial Rescript for the War has been promulgated, there is only one alternative for us Subjects to do and that is to simply obey the Imperial

S.Hirabayashi,LL.B.
Attorney at Law:

- 10 -

command for fighting it out to the end.

Dated: March 10.1943.

(SIGNED): HOBAYASHI SEIZO.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

*Careful in cutting budget
and not favor expansion in
China
and not favor Pacific War*



born in Lawg Kido

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: KOBAYASHI, Seizo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. Prior to my retirement in November 1945. I, Seizo KOBAYASHI, held the following positions: Navy Vice Minister; Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet; Full Admiral in 1933 (the 8th Year of Showa); placed on the reserve list in March 1936 (the 11th Year of Showa); appointed Governor-General of Taiwan in September of the same year and retired in November 1940; and State Minister without Portfolio from December 1944 to March 1945.

2. I was present at the Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927 as a Chief attendant from the Navy with

the Japanese delegation and Mr. KAYA was with us as an attendant from the Finance Ministry. In the course of his duties in this connection Mr. KAYA worded out many figures to demonstrate how, when the disarmament treaty is concluded, our naval expenditures necessary in building and maintaining battleships would be cut down; and how the anticipated increase of our naval expenditures could be prevented. His purpose in so doing was to encourage the Japanese delegation to reach an agreement on Naval limitations; he made clear to them how effective and important the conclusion of the treaty was for the lightening of the burden of the treasury and the people and enthusiastically pleaded with the delegation and attendants for the necessity of bringing the Treaty into being.

3. I served as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry from December 1923 to March 1927; as Chief, Naval Technical Dept. from February 1929 to June 1930; and as Vice Navy Minister from June 1930 to November 1931. During this time, when necessary, I negotiated personally with the Finance Ministry officials concerned. Mr. KAYA was giving most careful attention and study. During this period to the War and Navy budgets and was exerting every effort to cut them or check their increase as far as possible.

4. Hailing from the same province as myself, Mr. KAYA had been an intimate friend of mine. In May, 1938, I, who was then the Governor-General of Formosa, came to Tokyo and called on Mr. KAYA, the then Finance Minister, at his official residence to talk with him on the budget for the Government-General of Formosa.

After having carefully listened to my explanation on the budget scheme, he said to me in a serious tone that he understood my point put as he was going to resign his post as Finance Minister that day he would transfer my business to his successor.

It was quite a revelation to me. So I asked him the reason. He answered in substance that when last summer the so-called China Incident broke out at Lukouchiao the Government promptly decided upon a policy of "non-expansion and settlement of the incident on the spot."

In compliance with this Government policy, he said, he endeavored to minimize the military appropriations for the incident, and had taken only temporary, emergency measures in the matter of source of revenues to cover those appropriations. But contrary to their wishes, the incident spread wider and wider with the consequent increase in the military appropriations which the present temporizing revenue measure was incapable of meeting. It would become inevitable to

impose a heavy burden upon the people. The thought, he said, was unbearable to him.

Moreover, as the incident spread there seemed to grow in the influential circle an atmosphere of dissatisfaction with him as Finance Minister, so he made up his mind to resign.

5. On 18 October 1941 the TOJO Cabinet was formed and Mr. KAYA was appointed Finance Minister. On the day following his appointment he came to talk to me. Since the Japanese-American problem had become the subject of much discussion I inquired of Mr. KAYA, in the course of this conversation, how he came to enter the TOJO Cabinet. In reply there-to he stated: "If the TOJO Cabinet is all-out for war of course, I would not have accepted a seat in it. Since that was a matter of utmost concern for me, when I was asked to join his Cabinet the first thing I questioned him was about this. He answered that the U.S.-Japanese negotiations would be continued and that he was resolved to do his best to arrive at an understanding, so I came to accept his offer." I also recall that in the course of this conversation with Mr. KAYA he expressed his desire to bring the U.S.-Japanese negotiations to a peaceful conclusion by all means.

Def Doc No. 2118

On this 12 day of August, 1947

At Ichigaya, Tokyo

DEPONENT KOBAYASHI, Seizo (seal)

I, Kobayashi, Yoshio, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) TAKANO, Tsuruo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KOBAYASHI, Seizo (seal)

6 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Cmdr. Cole; Mr. Wiley; Mr. Sutton**
FROM : **EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,**
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : **Defense Witness**

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT
- KAYA

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

KOBAYASHI, Seizo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI (Retd.): Former President, Imperial Rule Assistance
Political Society (now dissolved)

1877 Oct.	Born in Hiroshima Prefecture
"	Graduated from Naval Academy at head of class
1908	Lieutenant Commander
1909	Graduated from Naval Staff College
1912	Commander
1912	Attache, Japanese Embassy, London
"	Attache, Japanese Embassy, Washington
"	Instructor, Naval Staff College
1917	Captain
1920	Naval Attache, Japanese Embassy, London
1922	Rear Admiral
1926	Vice Admiral
1927	Delegate, Geneva Naval Conference
"	Director, Department of Naval Materials and Technical Affairs
"	Commander in Chief, 1st Fleet
"	Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet
1930	Vice Minister of Navy
1931-33	Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and 1st Fleet
1933	Admiral; Supreme Military Council
" -1936	Commander, Chinkai Naval Base
1936	Resigned from navy following February 26 army revolt
1936-1940 Nov.	Governor General, Formosa

Well versed in colonial administration. Popularity in military circles partly due to father's reputation as Chief of Staff of Japanese Forces in Manchuria during Russo-Japanese War. Described as amiable and energetic. One of most important members of Kenkyukai group of House of Peers. Brother-in-law of Field Marshal Terauchi and Marquis Koichi Kido. (84,85)

5 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Cmr. Cole; Mr. Wiley

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - **KAYA**

WITNESS

KOBAYASHI, Seizo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Press Release

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

ITEM 3

Four New Members of the House of Councillors Make
Pledges - Mainichi (Saitama Edition) - 22 Apr 47.
Translator: K. Sato (UG)

KOBAYASHI, Eizo (Seizo) - I will strive for the rehabilitation of medium and small industries, and endeavor to make adequate distribution of materials, for they are the foundation of JAPAN's reconstruction.

1 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Wiley
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Information in the form of a Staff Study compiled by G-2 has been included in the Investigative Case Files of the International Prosecution Section and is now available on the following witness.

KOBAYASHI, Seizo

who has been requested by

KAYA

E P M

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN
Chief, Investigative Section

1 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Edwards

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - Witness General

WITNESS

KOBAYASHI, Yoshiharu

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Curriculum Vitae

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name in Full: Yoshiharu KOBAYASHI

Date of Birth: August 19, 1886

Social Rank: A 'samurai' in Tokyo

- 1902 Mar. 31 Completed the whole course of the First Prefectural Middle School.
- 1903 Apr. 16 Entered the Preparatory Course of the Tokyo Higher Normal School.
- 1907 Mar. 31 Completed the whole course of the Japanese and Chinese Classic Dept. of the Regular Course of the same.
- Apr. 16 Entered the post-graduate course of the same
- 1909 Mar. 31 Finished the two year course of the post-graduate course of the same (made a special study of pedagogy).
- Oct. 14 Was certified to surpass the graduates of the 1st Dept. of the Preparatory Course of Universities in scholarly attainments through an exam. given at the 1st Higher School.
- Oct. 15 Was admitted into the Literature College of the Tokyo Imperial University.
- 1912 July 10 Graduated from the Literature Dept. (made a special study, of the Japanese Literature) of the same.
- 1913 Jan. 18 Was appointed a teacher of the 2nd Prefectural Middle School of Kanagawa Prefecture. (present Odawara Middle School) The Cabinet.
- Was granted the 10th grade of salary.
Kanagawa Prefecture.
- 1916 Mar. 31 Was conferred the Junior Grade of the 7th Court Rank. The Imperial Household Ministry.
- 1917 Mar. 31 Was granted the 9th grade of salary.
Kanagawa Prefecture.

- 1919 May. 6 Was relieved of the post at my own request.
The Cabinet
- ditto Was granted the 7th grade of salary.
Kanagawa Prefecture.
- May 7 Was appointed Professor of the TOYO /Oriental/ University.
- May. 31 Was appointed lecture of the Tokyo Music Academy.
- 1921 Apr. 8 Was appointed lecturer of the Tokyo Women's College.
- 1922 Mar. 31 Was relieved of the post in the Tokyo Music Academy.
- 1923 Mar. 31 Resigned from the post in the Tokyo Women's College.
- 1925 Apr. 10 Was appointed lecturer of the Literature Dept. of the
Hosei University.
- 1927 Apr. 15 Was appointed lecturer of the Literature Dept. of the
Taisho University.
- 1928 Apr. 10 Was appointed lecturer of the Chiyoda Women's College.
- 1934 Aug. 22 Was appointed assistant professor of the Tohoku Imperial
University, was raised to the 4th rank of the higher
Civil service. The Cabinet
- Was granted the 4 grade of salary and additional allowance of
¥800.- The Education Ministry.
- Was ordered to hold a post in the Law Dept. and occupy the
chair of the 2nd chair on the Japanese literature.
The Education Ministry.
- 1934 Sep. 15 Was raised to the Senior Grade of the 6th Court Rank.
- 1935 Oct. 14 Was appointed professor of the Tohoku Imperial University,
was raised to the 4th rank of the higher civil service.
The Cabinet.
- Was granted the 6th grade of salary; was ordered to hold
a post in the Law Dept. and occupy the Chair of the 2nd
Chair on the Japanese literature.
The Education Ministry.
- 1937 Mar. 1 Was raised to the Junior Grade of the 5th Court Rank.

- 1940 June 1 Was raised to the 2nd rank of the higher civil service.
The Cabinet.
- 1940 Mar. 31 Was granted the 5th grade of salary.
The Education Ministry.
- 1942 July 8 Was decorated with the 4th Order of Merit with the
Sacred Treasure.
- 1944 July 1 Was raised to the 1st rank of the higher civil
service.
The Cabinet.
- 1944 Sep. 1 Was raised to the Junior Grade of the 4th Court Rank.
- 1944 Sep. 12 Was decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure
Treasure.

24 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. David N. Sutton

FROM : Lt. Kurt Steiner

File
Kobayashi, Seizo

1. Your attention is invited to the following documents:

a. IPS Document No. 2279 -- an envelope containing reports by General TADA re military situation in North China. This document has not been used in evidence. TADA is a Defense witness assigned to Mr. Lopez.

b. IPS Documents 2316 to 2322 inclusive -- being secret documents on the Marshal Chang Tsuo-lin Incident including comments by HATOYAMA, Ichiro, who received these documents from General TANAKA, Giichi. One of these documents is a report by General TANAKA to the Throne stating that the assassination of Chang Tsuo-lin was planned and executed by members of the Kwantung Army Staff. These documents have not been used in evidence. HATOYAMA is a Defense witness assigned to Messrs. Comyns-Carr and Brown.

c. IPS Document 2384 -- file of messages on Inner Mongolian Affairs. Among them is a wire from ARIYOSHI to HIROTA dated 25 October 1933 containing reference to the support given to Inner Mongolian leaders by the Japanese Special Service Organization. This document has not been introduced. A person by the name of ARIYOSHI, Chuichi will be a witness for the Defense. The first name of the sender of this wire is Akira. However, the Defense application states that the witness was Ambassador to China which is true for the sender of this wire (ARIYOSHI, Akira), but not for ARIYOSHI, Chuichi. It may therefore be assumed that the first name on the Defense application is an error. The witness ARIYOSHI is assigned to Mr. Brown.

2. Your attention is further invited to the fact that the Russian Division filed with the Document Division a number of affidavits by or implicating persons who are now being called as Defense witnesses. Among them are the following:

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1987

1954

<u>IPS Doc.</u>	<u>Exh. No.</u>	<u>Witness for Whom the Document Originated or Who is Implicated</u>	<u>Attorneys to Whom Assigned</u>
1951	Not Introduced	ASADO, Saburo	Vasiliev, Woolworth
1954	Not Introduced	ISOGAI, Rensuke KOBAYASHI, Seizo KISHI, Shinsuke	Vasiliev, Woolworth, Nyi, Cole, Wiley, Mornane, Dunigan
1970	703	USHIROKU, Jun	Vasiliev, Woolworth
1984	705	TOMINAGA, Kyoji	Vasiliev, Woolworth
1987	684, 1334	ISOGAI, Rensuke KOBAYASHI, Seizo KISHI, Shinsuke	Vasiliev, Woolworth, Nyi, Cole, Wiley, Mornane, Dunigan
1991	701	KAWABE, T.	Vasiliev, Woolworth, Fixel, Lopez, Robinson, Edwards, Crowe, Mornane

3. I suggest that the attorneys to whom the various witnesses are assigned request additional analyses and, if necessary, translation of pertinent documents mentioned above which have not yet been introduced, for use in cross-examination or rebuttal. I suggest further that proper entries be made in all witness files on Defense witnesses who have previously testified in the Prosecution case as stated above.

Kurt Steiner

KURT STEINER

cc:

Judge Nyi
Maj. Gen. Vasiliev
Col. Woolworth
Capt. Robinson
Col. Fixel
Col. Mornane
Comdr. Cole
Mr. Comyns-Carr
Mr. Brown
Mr. Wiley
Mr. Dunigan
Mr. Lopez
Mr. Edwards
Mr. Wagner
Mr. Crowe

Wiley

Date:

Name of Witness: KOBAYASHI, Suigo

Completed as to Items Numbers: 1-2345678

Partially completed as to Items Numbers: - 9

If Item 9 is applicable, state briefly the nature of the investigation conducted: