

Doc. No. 6251 (For the Defense)

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The Department of State  
Conference Series No. 24

THE LONDON NAVAL  
CONFERENCE

1935

Report of the Delegates  
of the United States of America  
Text of the London Naval Treaty of 1936  
and Other Documents

SEAL

United States  
Government Printing Office  
Washington: 1936

MINUTES OF THE TENTH MEETING OF THE FIRST  
COMMITTEE, JANUARY 15, 1936

Present:

The Right Hon. Viscount Monsell, G.B.E., First Lord of the  
Admiralty (in the Chair).

.....

JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON UPPER  
LIMIT OF NAVAL TONNAGE.

(Resumption of Discussion)

THE CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen at the last meeting of the Committee the Japanese Delegation declared their inability to discuss matters relating to the exchange of naval information until there had been a final discussion of the question of quantitative limitation. At subsequent unofficial meetings with the United Kingdom Delegation, the Japanese Delegation made it clear that they desired to return at the first opportune moment to a discussion of their proposal for a common upper limit and that they would like to hear the definitive views of the various Delegations on this question. At those meetings between the two Delegations it was accordingly decided to ask the other Delegations whether, in view of this Japanese request, the Committee would be prepared to resume as their first business the discussion of the Japanese proposal for a common upper limit. This proposal has already been considered at five sittings, but I feel sure that the Committee would be glad to hear any further arguments which the Japanese Delegation may wish to offer in its favour and to learn whether that Delegation have any alternative quantitative proposals they desire to put forward. In their turn the other Delegations will no doubt be prepared to give their full and definitive views on the Japanese proposal. Once this has been done I hope the Japanese Delegation will agree to continue the discussion of the various other important questions before the Conference. Before, however, proceeding with the discussion of the Japanese proposal, I should like to make sure that everyone here is in agreement with the proposal I have just put forward.

As there is no objection I will ask the Japanese Delegation to make a statement of their proposal.

Admiral NAGANO (Translation): I desire to state at the outset that we very much appreciate the opportunity that has been given us to-day to resume examination of the Japanese proposals and, to save time, I shall with your permission have the statement of the Japanese Delegation read to you in translation.

The statement was as follows: -

1. Although I have tried at past meetings of this Committee to explain our proposal at considerable length and in sufficient detail to clarify its purport as well as to point out its implications, it does not appear that I have succeeded in my task to the extent of removing all doubts from the minds of the other Delegations. I wish to be permitted to-day, therefore, to undertake a further elaboration of our plan by supplementing the explanations already given and, in order to assure a more complete understanding of our proposals, to offer our views on certain of the observations which the other Delegations have been good enough to make with reference thereto.

If any part of what I am about to say appears to you to be in the nature of repetition of statements I have already made, I can only ask your indulgence, for I feel that a certain measure of repetition is inevitable if I am to present the Japanese plan to you in the clearest possible light.

I wish further to state - with all due deference to the lofty aims of the other Powers - that Japan is second to no country in her sincere and zealous desire for world peace. It is our guiding principle in international politics that all nations should strive to promote international amity and good will on a basis of mutual understanding, that it should be made possible for all peoples, happily free from anxieties concerning their national security, to work out their respective destinies in an atmosphere of happiness and contentment that can only come as a blessing of peace among nations.

In considering possible measures for attaining agreement upon disarmament, therefore, we have taken as our primary objective the elimination of the menace of war, and the assurance of an equality of security for all Powers concerned. A plan of disarmament, to be adopted, must, of course, be one which does not give rise to the fallacious notion that there can be any justification for discriminatory treatment between nations, and we have taken great care to assure that the plan should moreover be a practical one.

Having devised our plan with due consideration and careful thought to the three points I have just mentioned, I believe that the Japanese proposal is at once fair, just and practical, and is characterised by a high degree of elasticity. So that if the Delegations will examine our proposal carefully and with sympathy, I feel that no serious difficulty will be encountered in discovering therein a reasonable basis for a new agreement on disarmament.

As we are now about to enter on the final examination of the Japanese proposal, I venture to express the hope that the Delegations will find it possible, without undue attachment to existing facts or past circumstances, to approach the task in hand with a firm determination to draft a new and the very best possible plan, and, to that end, to study and discuss the Japanese proposal from every possible angle and with a sympathetic understanding of its spirit and purpose.

II. If any Power were to put forward a claim for a very large naval force in anticipation of a need therefor arising simultaneously in various parts of the world, such a claim might, in effect, amount to a demand for a naval force sufficient to deal with two or more Powers. Such a demand might tend to militate against the chances of reaching agreement on the disarmament question, which should, in any case, be considered on the basis of a "one Power versus one Power" relationship.

If two Powers are to conclude such an agreement on the strength of their naval forces as will give them equal standing and guarantee their mutual security, the most rational principle to be applied is that of equality of armaments. We believe, in fact, that there is no other method which would at once be fair and just, and this is especially true as between two Powers which are separated by oceans and whose defence is wholly dependent on their navies.

Moreover, when we consider the high degree of mobility of naval armaments and the peculiar character of naval warfare, the need of defensive equality for all Powers demands that there shall be equality of naval forces and especially of those categories which form the backbone of the fleet. It is for this reason that the Japanese proposal provides for equality, category by category, in "A" class cruisers and all larger types. But as regards categories whose use is exclusively defensive, suitable adjustments should be made to meet the special circumstances of each Power; hence the provision of the Japanese proposals that, as regards "B" class cruisers and all lesser types, limitation shall be effected globally. It is a peculiar characteristic of naval forces that they can be moved about at will with great facility; and it goes without saying that this characteristic will become more and more pronounced in the future as improvements in the technique of naval construction continue. It is, moreover, a fundamental rule of naval strategy that forces which are scattered over several seas shall be concentrated in a single area whenever necessary for technical reasons. That this can be done - and, what is more, that a Power can concentrate its forces in a particular area so as to constitute a mortal threat to another Power - is borne out by numerous instances in naval history. Consequently, when discussing naval relations between two countries, it is only reasonable that at least all the vessels capable of participating in naval engagements shall be taken into consideration, and, if the total of such vessels of one Power is superior to that of the other, the only possible consequence is that the inferior Power will have its sense of security impaired, while the superior naval Power will be in a position to exceed the actual needs of its national defence, even to the point of becoming a menace to others.

Moreover, in order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate the complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments. To explain more fully, we advocate the abolition of aircraft-carriers and a drastic reduction in capital ships and "A" class cruisers. But if there were a general sentiment in favour of the abolition of capital ships also, we should be ready to give our support thereto.

As regards armaments which are essentially defensive in character and purpose, we believe that each Power should be permitted to equip itself in the manner best suited to its conditions and circumstances.

If this feature of the Japanese proposal were to be put into effect, we believe that naval forces would be largely deprived of their capacity for menacing other Powers. The complete abolition

or drastic reduction of offensive armaments would not only result directly in a very substantial measure of reduction, but it would also have the indirect effect of producing still further reductions all round because the strengthening of the sense of security consequent on the disappearance of offensive types is bound to give rise to a general tendency on the part of the naval Powers to reduce further the sizes of their navies.

III. In order to bring once more to the minds of the Delegations the principal features of the Japanese proposal, I would now undertake to set forth the framework of our formula, somewhat as follows:-

(1) There would first of all be fixed a maximum global tonnage which none of the Powers concerned might exceed. This maximum global tonnage must not only be a suitable one for practical purposes, but it must be fixed at as low a level as possible so as not to be contrary to the spirit of disarmament.

(2) Simultaneously with the determination of the global tonnage, there would be fixed for those categories which are generally recognised to be predominantly offensive in character - namely, capital ships, aircraft-carriers (in the event of their non-abolition), and "A" class cruisers - a common maximum tonnage and a common number of units to be allowed to each Power in respect of each of the three categories separately.

(3) As regards "B" class cruisers and vessels of lesser type, which are generally recognised to be essentially defensive, it should be sufficient to fix a common maximum global tonnage for all of the said categories, so as to make it possible for each Power to determine, in accordance with its own needs, the tonnage which it may deem appropriate in each of those categories.

(4) Any Power which may deem it necessary to do so for reasons of its special circumstances, may voluntarily reduce its tonnage in "A" class cruisers, and increase its tonnage in any of the defensive categories mentioned in paragraph (3). Although there may conceivably be numerous ways of effecting the above-mentioned reduction and increase, we believe it should be made the subject of technical examination.

This provision, together with the provision of paragraph (3), would give to each Power a very wide scope for making adjustments so as to compensate for its vulnerability.

(5) Since the Powers concerned would be left to work out their naval problems according to their own free will within the scope of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the Japanese plan would not necessarily preclude the adoption of such a formula, for instance, as a declaration of naval building programmes.

(6) If there should be any Power which claims the necessity of effecting modifications even beyond the adjustments contemplated in the foregoing paragraphs, such claim would be carefully examined by the Powers concerned, and, if it were proved to be reasonable and well-founded, Japan would not refuse its recognition. But since, as I have repeatedly explained, the establishment of a state of non-aggression and non-menace is at the very basis of our proposal, I think it can be readily understood that, while we might be able to recognise a claim for additional adjustment based on purely defensive needs arising from the special circumstances of the Power concerned, we could in no circumstances consent to an increase in the combatant strength of a navy such as would jeopardise the state of non-aggression and non-menace.

Moreover, it is not intended that, a common upper limit having once been set, all Powers must build up to it. It goes without saying that each should restrict its navy to the smallest size with which its defensive needs can be adequately met. In this regard, goodwill and mutual trust among the various Powers are absolutely indispensable, and I believe the Committee will agree with us that, without such goodwill and mutual trust, agreement on any kind of a disarmament treaty is impossible, no matter by what formula or on what principles the attempt may be made.

If, on the other hand, it should be possible to deprive naval armaments of their capacity to menace other Powers, as is contemplated by the Japanese proposal, the various Powers would not feel the necessity of extensive naval constructions; in fact, there would probably be no Power that would even contemplate huge naval programmes. We believe, in other words, that there is no ground for apprehension that the establishment of a common upper limit will give impetus to a general movement for larger navies.

IV. May I be permitted at this stage to consider in the light of the basic conception underlying the Japanese proposal, which I have just explained, a few of the points raised by the other Delegations in the course of their observations upon our plan, for I feel that the explanation of our plan will be facilitated by my so doing.



The view that a nation, by reason of its being also a Pacific Power, should be entitled to possess in the Pacific a naval strength equal to that of the other Powers in the same waters, in addition to other naval forces which it claims to be necessary in European waters or in the Atlantic Ocean, appears to us tantamount, in effect, to a claim to the right to possess a navy equal in strength to the combined strengths of the navies of two or more countries. Such a claim, it appears to us, may be said to be hardly commendable as a basis for an agreement on disarmament. And, as I have pointed out already, it would not be possible for us to support such a claim, in view of the highly mobile character of naval armaments.

We can readily understand that the possession of greater and more numerous overseas territories and lines of communication may well justify a demand for a greater strength than other Powers in small and purely defensive types of vessels which have no combatant capacity at sea, but which are suitable for coast patrol, defense of harbours and other similar purposes. But, if for the same reason, a Power should demand superiority in naval force as a whole, the sense of security of other Powers would thereby be disturbed. In any case, I believe it is a well-known fact that the conditions of nations whose naval forces are now on a basis of parity are not the same as regards their overseas possessions and lines of communication.

Frequent references have been made to the defensive needs of certain outlying possessions. But we find it difficult to see the reasonableness of a claim for superior forces for the defence of such outlying possessions if, as a consequence, the very heart of another Power will be menaced thereby.

It appears to us quite clear that a nation's ability to protect its overseas possessions and sea routes depends wholly upon whether or not it can control the seas.

Considering the question of overseas possessions and colonies from another angle, it would seem clear that, through the possession of such interests overseas, a nation enjoys the advantage of having bases and sources of supplies located in widely scattered parts of the world. That, we believe, may be an incalculable advantage, not only as regards the protection of lines of communication, but also in facilitating the movement and concentration of naval forces.

If we were to subscribe to the view that has been expressed, that a nation which is dependent on the sea requires a large naval force, it could be said for Japan that she too is wholly dependent on the sea. What is more, she is poor in natural resources and,

with her population exceeding in density that of any other country in the world, is forced to look to countries beyond the seas for the greater part of the supplies necessary to her existence as well as for the raw materials for her industries. There is thus a vast difference between Japan and the countries which, though obtaining part of their supplies from abroad, can nevertheless have most of their needs supplied by their own territorial possessions; and this difference becomes even more pronounced when comparison is made with a country which has an abundance of resources at home and which is for the most part self-supporting and self-sufficient. Considered in that light, it is difficult to see how a country, so situated as Japan is, can be expected to feel secure with a naval force inferior to that of another whose circumstances are far more favourable.

V. By way of conclusion, I desire to say that, while Japan will never cease to hope for the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament, that is not to say that she is going to insist on attaining the impossible.

The plan which the Japanese Delegation has submitted to this Conference was prepared in the light of the experience and results of past disarmament conferences, with due attention to the actualities of the international situation of the day and with careful consideration of the various relevant problems from every possible angle. And it is our conviction that through the adoption of the principles embodied in the Japanese proposal, the Conference would succeed in achieving a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament without serious difficulties.

Once the Japanese proposal is adopted by the Conference, the way could be found for incorporating therein the important features of the other proposals with such modifications as may be deemed suitable. For the Japanese proposal, as a formula for disarmament, is neither rigid nor academic. It is a practical one, marked by its comprehensive character and flexibility.

The Japanese Delegation, in submitting its proposal, was anxious that it should thereby be able to give satisfaction to all the Powers concerned in equal measure. It is only after the most careful study and mature consideration, prompted by our recognition of the urgent world-wide desire for effective measures of disarmament that we have brought ourselves to place our proposal before this Conference.

I therefore desire finally to urge that all the Delegates be good enough to give their most mature consideration to our plan sympathetically and with an open mind.

原文頁一

文書番号六二五一号 辯護團側用

注意

コノ文書ハ檢察側文書番号六二五二号中、尚他、部分  
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原文頁二

國務省會議録オ二四號

一九三五年倫敦軍縮會議

亞米利加合衆國代表委員報告書

一九三六年、倫敦海軍條約ノ原文及其他ノ文書

印

在ワシントン合衆國政府印刷所

一九三六年

原文頁三

一九三六年一月十五日第一委員會第十回會議ノ

議事要録

出席者

海軍大臣 G. B. E. モンセル / MONSELL / 子爵

(議長 長席)

× × × × × × × × × ×

No. 1

軍艦噸數共通最大限度ニ対スル日本ノ提案

(討議續行)

議長。皆サン。前回ノ本委員會會議ニ於イテ日本  
 國代表ハ、總噸數限度問題ノ討議ガ終リナ  
 イ限リ海軍情報交換ニ関スル諸件ノ討議ニ  
 入ルコトハ出来ナイト言明セラレマシタ。其ノ後英  
 帝國代表ト、非公式會談ニ於イテ日本國代表  
 ハ成ルベク速ニ共通最大限度ニ対スル日本側  
 提案ヲ討議ヲ始メタイコト又コノ問題ニ関シ各  
 國代表諸君ノ明確ナル意見ヲ承リタイトイフ  
 コトヲ言ハレマシタ。ソユテ兩國代表者間ノ是等  
 ノ會談ニ於イテ日本側ノ要求ニ鑑ミ、委員  
 會ハ其ノ最初ノ仕事トシテ共通最大限度ニ  
 対スル日本側ノ提案ヲ始メル用意ガア  
 ルヤ否ヤ他ノ國々ノ代表諸君ニ諮ルコトニ決定  
 致シマシタ。

コノ提案ハ五回ノ御打合せヲ行ヒ既ニ御考慮ニナツタコトデアリマス  
 ガ私モ本委員会ハ日本國代表ガ其ノ提案支持ノタメニ引續イテ  
 ナサレト思フ論議ヲ傾聴シ又同代表ガ提案シタイト思フ噸數  
 限及代案ガアルカドウカラ喜ンデ知ラウトシテ居ルト私ハ考ヘマス  
 一方他ノ國々ノ代表方ニ於カセラシテモ必ズヤ日本代表ノ提案ニ対  
 シテ十分ニシテ且明確ナル御意見ヲ御発表ニテ御用意ガ  
 アルコト思ヒマス。コレサヘ済マセシクナラバ日本代表ハ本會議  
 目下他ノ重要諸案件ノ討議ヲ繼續スルコトニ同意セラレル様  
 私ハ希望致シマス。原文頁四然レ日本國代表提案ノ討議ニ入ルニ  
 先立チ私ハ私ガ只今オ諮リ致シマシク提議ニ御去席ノ  
 皆様方が洩レナク御同意ヲト云フコトヲ判然承ツテオキ  
 タイト存ジマス。

及対モガサイマセニカラ。日本國ノ代表ニ御提案ノ御説明  
 ヲ才願ヒ致シマス。

永野海軍大將(翻譯)私ハ先ヅ、日本側提案審議ヲ  
 統ケルタメ本日コノ機会ヲオ與ヘ下サツタコトヲ深ク感謝  
 致ニテ居ルモノデアリコトヲ申上ゲタイト存ジマス。

ソレテ時間節約ノタメオ許シテ得テ日本代表ノ説明ヲ  
 翻譯文ヲ朗読シテ世員ヒタイト存ジマス。

説明ハ次ノ通りデアツク。

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一、私ハ本委員會、從來、會議ニ於テ、我が提案ノ自  
的ヲ明カシ且其ノ趣意ヲオ示シスルタメニ隨分長ク  
又詳細ニ亘ッテ説明致シマシタガ、他ノ代表諸君  
ノ心中ヨリ疑惑ヲ一掃スル程度ニ私ノ仕事  
ニ成功スルニ至ラナカツタ。様ニ思ハシマス。  
ソコデ本日ハ先ニ致シマシタ説明ヲ補足スルコ  
トニ依リマシテ我々ノ計畫ヲ一層詳シシ。我  
々ノ提案ヲ尚十分了解シテ頂クタメニ他ノ  
代表諸君ガ之ニ関シ今迄オ述べ下サツタ  
ゴ意見ニ就テ我々ノ考ヘマスルところヲ申  
上ゲルコトニ致シタイト存ジマス。

若シ私ノ是カラ申シマスコトノウチニ私ガ既  
ニ申シマシタコト、重複スルヤウニ諸君ニ思  
ハレル箇所ガゴザイマシタナラバ、日本ノ計畫  
ヲ出来ルダケ判然タル状態ニ諸君ニ御示  
シスルタメニハ多少ノ重複ハ避ケ得ナイコ  
ト、考ヘマスノデ、コノ点御辛抱ヲオ願  
致シ度イト思ヒマス。

私ハ他ノ國々ノ高キ御目的ニ十分ノ敬  
意ヲ表シハ致シマスガ、世界平和ヲ希  
求スルコトノ眞摯ト熱意トノ上、是ニ於  
テハ他ノ何レノ<sup>も</sup>家ニモ後シテ取ルモノデ  
ハナイコトヲ茲ニ申上ゲタイト存ジマス。

No. 4

總テノ國家ハ相互ノ理解ノ上ニ國際間ニ親善ト好意ヲ増進スベキコト、又總テノ國民ハ夫々ノ國家ノ安全ニ就キ何等ノ危惧スルコトナク各國民間ニ平和トイフ天惠が得ラレタ結果トシテ招来サレル幸福ト満足ノ裡ニ各國民が夫々其ノ使命達成ニ邁進スルコトヲ得ヤルヤウニスルト云フノガ我が國際政策ノ指導精神トナリマス。

原又五頁ノ

ソレ故ニ軍備縮少ニ就テ相互ノ了解ニ達スル可能性ノ方策ヲ種々考慮シタ結果我々ハ關係各國間ニ戰爭ノ脅威ヲ取除キ又安全ノ平等ヲ確保スルコトヲ第一ノ目的ト致シタノデアリマス。勿論採用ヤラルベキ軍備縮少案ハ國家間ノ差別的取扱ヲ正当化スルヤウナ誤ソツタ考ヘヲ全ズルコトノナイモ、イデナクバナリマセン、ソレテ私達ハ其ノ上ニ実行的ナ案デアラトシテ保證出來ルヤウニ特ニ留意ヲ致シマシタ。

No. 5  
私が只今申上げマシタニツノ点ニ就テ十分考慮シ拂ヒ且綿密ニ構想ヲ練ソタ結果我々ノ案ヲ計畫致シタノデアリ、日本ノ提案ハ公平デアリ、公正デアリ、且実行的デアルト同時ニ極メテ彈力性ニ富ムダモ、デアルト信ジマス。ソレ故ニ若シ代表諸君が我が提案ヲ詳細ニ且ツ同情ノ念ヲ以テ俾審査直下サルアラバ、ソノ案ノ中ニ軍備縮少ニ就

テ新タル協定ニ違 スルタメ、無理ノナイ基礎ヲ  
発見スルニ重大ナル困難ニ遭遇セラレルコトハナイト存  
ジマス。

我々ハ今日日本ノ提案ノ最終的、審査直ニ入ラウト  
シテ居ル故ニ私ハ敢テ以下ノ希望ヲ述ベタイト思ヒ  
マス。即チ代表諸君ハ、現存ノ事實及過支ノ  
事情ニ拘泥スルコトナク堅キ決意ヲ以テ、新  
ナル且日取善善ノ成案ヲ得ルタメニ、仕ラシムニ當面  
ニ、其ノ目的ノタメニ、日本ノ提案ヲアラユル角度  
カラ而モ其ノ精神及目的ノ同情アル理解ヲ以テ  
研究討議セラシムコトヲ希望致シマス。

二、若シ何レカノ國家ガ、ソノタメ、世界ノ各所テ同  
時ニ惹起セラレル必要ヲ豫想シテ一大海軍力ノ  
要求ヲ持出ストヤバ、斯ル要求ハ結果ニ於テ二箇  
國或ハ數箇國ヲ相手トスルニ足ル海軍力ノ要  
求ニ匹敵スルコトニナルカモ知レマセン。斯ル要求ハ如何  
ナル場合ニモ「一國對一國」ノ關係ヲ基礎ニ考  
慮サルベキ軍備縮少問題ニ於テ了解ニ違  
スル機會ヲ邪魔スルニ至ルヤモ知レナイデアリマス。



若シニ他國が互に均等ノ立場及相互ノ安全ヲ保障スル  
 マルナ海軍力ニ就キ條約ヲ取極ムルナレバ、其ノ際採用セラルベキ  
 基本的方針ハ軍備ノ均等ト云フコトデアリマス。實際公平ニ  
 シテ且公平ナル方法が他ニナイト私達ハ考ヘマス。ソシテ是ハ  
 海洋ニヨツテ隔テラレ且ツ相互ノ國防が夫々ノ海軍ニノミ依存  
 シテ居ルニ他國間ニ於テ特ニ然リテアル。更ニ高支ノ海軍  
 軍備機動性ト海戰ノ特異性ヲ考慮スルトキ、全列強ノ  
 防禦力ノ均等ノ必要ハ海軍勢力ノ均等殊ニ艦隊根幹  
 ノ成ニ艦種ノ均等ヲ要請スルモノデアル。故ニ日本ノ提議ハ  
 甲級巡洋艦及右以上ノ全大型艦種ニ於テ、各艦種毎ニ、  
 均等ヲ條件トスルモノデアル。併シソノ用途が専ラ防禦的ナ  
 アル艦種ニ限シテハ、各國ノ特種事情ニ適應スル様ニ適  
 宜ノ調が即チ施シテ然ルベキモノデアル。故ニ日本ノ提議ノ條件  
 ハ乙級巡洋艦及是ト以下ノ全小型艦種ニ関シテハ、世界的  
 ニ制限ヲ實施スベシトナスモノデアル。任意ニ容易ニ機動作業  
 ルトイフカ海軍力ノ特異性ナル。マタ、建艦技術ノ改良ガ  
 續ク限リニ於テハ該特異性が將來益々明確ニナルトイフコト  
 ハ言フ所ナイトコロテアル。更ニ數ヶ所ノ海域ニ散在シテ居ル  
 兵力ガ、技術的理由ヲ必要ノ秋ニ隨時單一水域ニ集結  
 出来ルトイフコトハ海軍作戰ノ根本原理デアル。コトが可能  
 ナルトイフコト、而シテ更ニ他國が他ノ國ニ對シテ致命的カ脅威ト  
 成リ得ル様、ソノ兵力ヲ特定水域ニ集結シ得ルトイフ事例ハ  
 海軍史上幾多ノ例ニ依リテ確認サレテ居ルトコロデアル。從ツテ、  
 三國間ノ海軍關係ヲ議スルニ當ツテハ、少クトモ

海戦ニ参加し得ル全艦船が考慮ニ入レラルベキ  
 モノナリトスルコトハ素来ヨリ當然デアリ。マタ、若シ  
 一国ノ斯ル艦船ノ總數が他ノ一国ノソレヨリモ優  
 勢ナルニ於テハソノ唯一ノ可能ノ結果ハ劣勢國ノ安  
 全感ハ毀ハレルニ至リ。優勢海軍國ハソノ国防上實際  
 ノ必要度ヲ超過スル地位ヲ占メ引イテハ他ノ列強  
 ニ対スル脅威トモナルデアラフ

更ニ可及的不可侵不可脅威ノ状態ノ完璧ヲ  
 期サニカ爲。我方ハ攻撃武器ノ完全廢棄乃至  
 ハ徹底的縮減ヲ主張スルモノデアアル。更ニ詳  
 説スレバ、我方ハ航空母艦ノ廢棄ト主力艦  
 及甲級巡洋艦ノ徹底的縮減ヲ主張スルモ  
 ノデアアル。併シモシマタ、主力艦廢棄ヲ支持  
 スル一般的意見カアルナラバ我方ハ之ニ對シ甚  
 ニテ援助ヲ提供スル用意カアル。

性格及目的ニ於テ本質的ニ防禦的デアル軍  
 備ニ關シテハ、各國各々ソノ情勢ト狀況ニ最  
 適ノ方法ヲ自身ニ對スル施設ヲ爲スベキコト  
 ヲ許容サルベキモノト信ズル。

No. 8  
 日本側ノ提議ノコノ主眼カ確實施サレル  
 ナラバ海軍カトイフモノハ他國ヲ脅威ス  
 ル其能力ヲ大部分喪失スルモノト吾々ハ信  
 ズルモノデアアル。攻撃武器ノ完全廢棄  
 乃至思ヒ切ツテ縮減ハ直接ノ結果トシテ縮  
 少ノ極メテ有カナル措置トナルバカリデアナク

Defence Doc.

625 / 尚又各部面ニ亘リ更ニ一層ノ縮少ヲ招来ス  
 ル間接的効果ヲモ齎ラスモノト思フ其故ハ  
 攻撃的艦種ノ消失カラ結果スル安全感ノ  
 増進ハ各海軍國間ニソノ海軍兵力量ヲ更ニ  
 縮減セントスル一般傾向ヲ必ズ醸成スルカ故デ  
 アル。

三代表者諸賢ニ日本側提議ノ主眼ヲ今一  
 應想起シテ貰フ為ニ私ハコレカラ大体次ノ  
 通り我オノ方式ノ骨子ヲ披瀝シテ見度イ  
 一先ツ第一ニ如何ナル關係列強ト雖モ超過ス  
 ルコトヲ許サナイ總括的最大限度總噸數ヲ  
 定メテカール。コノ總括的最大限度總噸數ハ  
 實際的目的ニ副フ適度ノ噸數デアラネ  
 バナラナイバカリテナク軍備縮少ノ精神ニ逆  
 ラハナイ様ニ出来ルダケ低度ノ水準ニ決定  
 シテ置カナケレバナラナイ。

(二) 總括的總噸數ノ決定ト同時ニ、ソノ性質上主トシテ攻撃的ナルト通常見做サレテ居ル艦種一即主力艦、航空母艦（放棄サレタル場合）及甲級巡洋艦ニ對シ一右ノ三種ノ艦種ノ各々ニ関シテ個別的ニ各國ニ許容サルベキ共通ノ最大限噸數及ヒ共通ノ單位數カ決定サレルデアラウ。

(三) 乙級巡洋艦及本質的ニ防禦的ト通常見做サレル之以下ノ小型艦艇ニ関シテハ、各國カ各々ソノ必要ニ應ジテ、ソレ等各艦種ニ適當ト思ハレル噸數ヲ決定スルコトが出来ルヤウニスル為ニ、敘上ノ艦種全部ニ對スル共通ノ總括的ノ最大限噸數ヲ決定スレバ足リルトスルデアアル。

(四) 列強ノイヅレカバソノ特殊事情ノ理由ニ依リ必要ト認メタ場合ハ、任意ニ甲級巡洋艦ノ噸數ヲ減ジテ、第三節ニ述べタ防禦艦種ノ何レカノ噸數ヲ増加シテ差支ナイ。

思フニ上述ノ増減ヲ實施スルニハ幾多ノ方法ガアルデアラウガ、ソレハ技術的調査ノ討議課題タラシムヘキモノト信ズル。

コノ條項ハ第三節ノ條項ト共ニ、各列國ニ、ソノ弱點ヲ填補スル為調節ヲナシ得ル甚ダ廣汎ナル餘地ヲ附與スルヲアラウ。

(五) 關係列強諸國ハ前述各節ノ諸條項ノ範圍ニ於テ、各國自ラノ自由意志ニ從ツテ各自ラノ海軍問題ヲ處理スルヤウ委セラレルヲアルカラス日本案ハ必ズ此モ、例ヘバ、海軍建造案宣言ノ如キ方式ノ採用ヲ阻止スルモノデハナイ。

(六) 前述ノ各節ニ於テ企劃サレタ調節以上ノ修正實施ノ必要ヲ主張スル國ガ若シアツタラバ、斯ル主張ハ關係各列強ニ依ツテ周到ニ検討サレルデアラウ。

サウシテ、若シソレガ合理的デ充分根據ノアルモノト立證サレタラバ、日本ハソノ承認ヲ拒マナイデアラウ。

併シ、私が繰返シテ説明シタ通り、不可侵不脅威ノ状態ノ確立ヨソ我が提案ノ基盤其物タルヲ以テ、關係

國ノ特殊事情カラ生ジタ純然タル防禦的の必  
 要ニ基ツテ追加調節ノ要求ヲ我方ガ認メ  
 得ル方不可侵不脅威ノ状態ヲ危殆ニ瀕セ  
 シムルガ如キ海軍戰鬥力ノ增強ハ如何ナル狀  
 況ノ下ニアツテモ我方ガ到底承服デキナイト  
 イフコトハ直ニ諒解デキルト思フ。

更ニ其ハ共通ノ最高限度ガ一旦設定サレタト  
 シテモ全列強ガ其限度迄必ズ建造シナケレバナ  
 ラナイトイフコトヲ意圖シテイルノデハナイト。各  
 國ガソノ防禦上ノ必要ニ充分應ジ得ル程  
 度ノ最小量ニマデソノ海軍ヲ制限スベキダ  
 トイフコトハ言フ俟タナイト。故ニ列強諸國間  
 ニ於ル友好ト相互信賴コソハ絶対不可缺  
 ノモノデアアル。マタ斯ル友好ト相互信賴無シ  
 ニハ如何ナルノ形式ニ據リマタハ如何ナル原理  
 ニ基イテソノ企画ガナサレヤウトモ如何ナル  
 種類ノ軍備縮少條約ノ締結モ不可能ダト  
 イフコトニ就テ委員會ガ我方ト見解ヲ同ジ  
 クスルモノナリト信ズルモノデアアル。

若シマタ方、日本側提案ニ依ツテ企圖サレテ其ル  
 通り、海軍々備カラ他國ヲ脅威スル能力ヲ奪フ  
 事が出末タナラバ列強諸國ハ廣汎ナル海軍建  
 造ノ必要ヲ感じザクナルデアラウ、事實上、尠大ナル  
 建艦計畫ヲ目論ムガ如キ列強ハ多分無クナルデアラ  
 ウ、換言スレバ、各國正ニ通シ最高限度ノ樹方がヨリ  
 大ナル海軍ヘ一般動向ニ刺戟ヲ與ハルダラウト言フ  
 危虞ノ根據ハ存ニキイト信ズル

四、この段階ニ於テ、私が口ハ今説明申上ゲタ、日本側  
 提議ノ基調ヲナス根本理令ハニ照ラシテ、我方ノ  
 案ニ対スル他ノ列強代表諸賢具ニ依ツテ行ハレタ  
 意、見用陳中、代表諸賢具が向題ニサレタニニ  
 點ニ就テ考察スル事ヲ許シテ、戴キタイト云フハ  
 我方ノ案ノ説明ハサウスル事ニ依ツテ説明ニ易ク  
 ナルト感心スルカラテアリマス。

一國がヨーロッパ水域或は大西洋に於て必要ナリトスル海軍力ニ加ふるニ同國ニ亦太平洋國家タル、故に以て更ニ同水域ニ於ケル列國ノ海軍力ト同等ノ海軍力ヲ太平洋ニ於て保有スル權利ヲ與ハラレルヘキヲアルトスル見解ハ我々ノ見ル所トハ事實上ニ國或ハソレ以上ノ國ノ連合シテ海軍ト同等ノ海軍力ヲ保有スヘキ權利ヲ要求スルニ異ナル所カテイヤウニ思ハレマス。我々ハ斯カル西女ルハ軍備縮小ニ關スル協定ノ基盤トシテハ殆ト推將大ニ得ザルモノト云フテハナイカト思ハレマス。且、我々トシテハ既ニ指摘セル如ク、海軍武力ノ高度ノ可動性ニ鑑ミ、斯カル要求ヲ支持シ得ナイ、テアリマス。

一國がヨリ廣大ナク又ヨリ多數ノ海外領土及ハ交通線ヲ保持スル場合、海上ニ於ケル戦力ヲ有セシ沿岸警備港灣防衛其他斯ノ種ノ用ニ使スルニ適當ナル小型ニシテ純防衛的型式ノ艦艇ニ於テ他ノ列國ヨリ大ナル海軍力ヲ要求スルコトノ正カナンコトハ我々トシテ又容易ニ了解スル所カテリマス。併シテ、右ノ理由ヲ以テ一國ノ海軍力全体ノ優越ヲ要求スルトスレバ、他ノ列強ノ安全感ハ、為ニ脅カサレコトニナリマス。如何ナル場合ニモ現在其ノ海軍力ノ勢力均等ノ基礎ニ上ニ建ツテナル國々ノ條件カ其ノ海外領土



及の交通線ニ関シテハ同一ノコトハ周知ノ事實  
アルト信スルモテアリマス。

或ル遠隔ノ領土ヲ防衛スルニ必要カアルトイフ  
コトノ屢ニ論及サレマシク併シ我々ハ斯ル遠隔ノ

地ニル領土ヲ防衛セシカ高優越シテ武力ヲ要  
ホスルト云フコトハ其ノ結果トシテ他國カ正ニ

其ノ心臓部トスル所ヲカ習カサレルコトトモナレハ  
其ノ正当性ヲ理解スルニ苦ロシムコトトナレテアリマス

一國カ其ノ海外領土及海上交通路ヲ保全  
シ得ルヤ否ヤハ一ニカカレテ同國カ海ヲ制シ得ルヤ

否ヤニルニトハ全ク明カテアルト思ハレテアリマス。  
海外領土及の殖民地問題ヲ他面ヨリ考察

スルトキハ一國カ斯ル關係ヲ海外ニ保持スルコト  
ニヨリ廣ク世界ノ各地ニ散在セル補給ノ基地及

口源ヲ持ツ利益ヲ享有スルコトトナレハ明瞭テアリ  
マス。斯クハ如キハ交通線ノ防護ノミナラス海軍

カノ移動集結ヲ容易トラシムル莫ニ於テハ測リ知  
レヌ利益カアルト信シマス。

若シ我々カ之迄表明セラレ来ツク海ニ依存  
スル國ハ巨大ナル海軍カヲ必要トスルコトイフ見解

ヲ承認スルトスルナラバ日本トシテハ日本モ亦全ク  
海ニ依存シテ居ルコトト云フコトカ出ルモテアリマス更ニ此止ラス

日本ハ天然資源ニ乏シク人口密度ハ世界ノ何レノ國ニ於ケルヨリモ稠密デ其ノ存立ニ必要ナ物資ノ大部分モ其ノ産業ノ原材料モ均シク止ムナク海外諸國ニ依存セザラザ得ナイデアリマス。然レハ一部ノ物資ハ海外ヨリ取得シツツアルモ其ノ大部分ノ必需物資ハ自國領土ヨリ補給ヲ受ケ得ル諸國ト日本トノ間ニハ甚シキ差庭ガアリマス。此ノ懸隔ハ國內ニ豊饒ナル資源ヲ有シ大半ヲ自給自足シツツアル國ト比較スル時ハ一層顯著トナルデアリマス。斯ル見地ヨリシテ日本ノ如キ立場ニアル國カ如何ナレバ、逸カニ有利ナル環境ニアル他國ニ比シ劣勢ナル海軍力ヲ以テシテ尚且ワ女安全感ヲ抱フコトヲ要求セラレ得ルヤ理解ニ苦シム所デアリマス。

五、結論トシテ述ベタイコトハ日本ハアツ迄海軍軍備縮少ノ廣濶ナル協定締結ノ希望ヲ捨テルモノデハナイガ同時ニ不可能事ヲ達成セント主張スルモノデアリマス。

日本代表部ガ當會議ニ提メシク案ハ過去ノ軍備縮少會議ノ經驗ト結果トニ照ラシ今日ノ國際關係ノ現實ニ正當ナ注意ヲ拂ヒ又關聯ナル諸種ノ問題ニテラユル角度ヨリ慎重ナ考慮ヲ加ヘテ上ニテ作製セラレタモノデアリマス。

而シテ我々ノ確信スル所ハ日本ノ提案ノ中ニ盛ラ

レテ諸原則ノ採用ニ依リテ、當會議ニ於テ、予テ、因  
難ヲ伴フコトヲ、海軍軍備縮少ノ、全般的協定  
締結ノ達成ニ成功シ得ルコトヲテアリマス。

當會議ニ於テ一旦日本ノ提案ガ採擇サレヌ上ハ  
適當ト認メラレテ変更ヲ加ヘテ上他ノ諸提案ノ  
重要ナル莫ラ之ニ盛り込マベキ方途ヲ見ユスコト

ニ可能デアリマス。

其ノ故ハ日本ノ提案ハ軍備縮少ノ為、一公式ト

シテ何等ヲ融通ノ利カメテ、テモ又空論ニ走ルモ

ノテモナリカラ、テ下リマス。本提案ハ包括性ト融通

性ニ富ニテ、實際的ナリデアリマス。

日本代表部ハ、ノ提案ノ提出ニ際シ、之ガ均シク関

聯アル全列國ニ満足ヲ與ヘ得ニユトヲ熱望セ致シ

マシテ、我々ハ今回我々ノ提案ヲ當會議ニ提出

スルノ運ビトナリマシテ、ガ之ハ軍備縮少ニ効果ヲ

ル手限ラホメル全世界ノ切ナル希望ニ勵マテシ

ツク最モ慎重ナル研究ト熟慮トヲ經テ、

テアリマス。

然レバ、私ハ最後、各代表部ニ於テ、同措ヲ

以テ、虚心ナル、案ニ慎重熟慮ヲ賜ハラフコトヲ

要請スルモノデアリマス。