

Doc. 2156 Evid.

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Part of I.P.S. Doc. No. 2156-C
(Oshima Interrogation, 7 Mar 1946) is
now I.P.S. Doc # 3355D

Interrogation of
Osuna of 7 March '66

(256 C) extracted and
made parts of IPS 3355

for use as potential evidence

Adkins

EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT # 2156

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi

INCLUDED IN THE FOLDER ARE THE FOLLOWING DATES

5, 6, 7, March 1946

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: (also WHERE IS ORIGINAL?)
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF HELD POINTS (with page references):

Doc. No. 2156. Transcript of original notes of
interrogation of Gen. OSHIMA, Hiroshi by C. D. Hyde and
Capt. Schuyler at Sugano 1 Feb 1946. (Exhibit 227,
Case File #247)

Doc. No. 2157. Transcript of original notes of
the interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi 5-7 Mar 1946
by Mr. Hyde. (Exhibit 228, Case File #247)

Analyst: Lt. Tills

EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT # 2156

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi

INCLUDED IN THE FOLDER ARE THE FOLLOWING DATES

5, 6, 7, March 1946

EXHIBIT NO. 1156
Transcript of original notes on
interrogation of Gen. OSHIMA, Hiroshi by C. J. Hyde and
Capt. Johnson at Saigon 1 Feb 1946. (Exhibit 4273,
Case File 7217)

EXHIBIT NO. 1157
Transcript of original notes on
the interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi 5-7 Mar 1946 by
Mr. Hyde. (Exhibit 4455, Case File 7217)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2156, 2157

21 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogations of OSHIMA, Hiroshi,
5-7 March 46 and 1 Feb 46

Date: As above Original (x) copy ()
Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Doc. No. 2156. Transcript of original notes on
interrogation of Gen. OSHIMA, Hiroshi by G.O. Hyde and
Capt. Robinson at Sugamo 1 Feb 1946. (Exhibit #271,
Case File #247)

Doc. No. 2157. Transcript of original notes on
the interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, 5-7 Mar 1946 by
Mr. Hyde. (Exhibit #455, Case File #247.)

Analyst: Lt. Wilds

Doc. No. 2156
2157

215b

Oshima - Interrogations # 247

1 Feb 46	247-17	Exhibit 271 N(272)
4 Feb 46	247-18	" 271 N(273)
6 Feb 46	247-19	" 271 N(273)
7 Feb 46	247-20	" 271 N(273)
11 Feb 46	247-19	" 271 N(294)
12 Feb 46	247-40	" 271 N(300)
13 Feb 46	247-21	" 271 N(300)
14 Feb 46	247-27	" 271 N(324)
15 Feb 46	247-39	" 271 N(332)
18 Feb 46	247-45	" 271 N(352)
19 Feb 46	247-46	" 271 N(353)
20 Feb 46	247-50	" 271 N(390)
23 Feb 46	247-51	" 271 N(390)
25 Feb 46	247-52	" 271 N(390)
26 Feb 46	247-55	" 271 N(399)
27 Feb 46	247-54	" 271 N(399)
28 Feb 46	247-56	" 271 N(399)
1 Mar 46	247-60	" 271 N(399)
5 Mar 46	247-61	" 455 N(456)
6 Mar 46	247-64	" 455 N(466)
7 Mar 46	247-65	" 455 N(466)

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 5 March 1946, 1340-1555 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer.

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. General, the last time we met you indicated that you wanted to make a statement. You may proceed with this statement.
- A. I have told you so far of all pertinent matters up to the time that the war with the United States began. It is my belief that I have told you all that I know, withholding nothing. However, thinking it over, it seems to me that it might be better if I went ahead and told you a few other facts which occurred after the start of hostilities. This would add the tail to the dragon fly, as we say in Japan, and make it a full rounded story.
- Q. What I had in mind, General, was the fact that, as we were leaving the last time, you indicated that you were going to prepare a statement that night that you wanted to put in the record. Do you have that statement now?
- A. Yes, this statement deals with the matter of interpreting from Japanese into English and vice versa, and is addressed primarily to the interpreter. (Attached hereto is statement and translation thereof, prepared by interpreter.)
- Q. Now, you have indicated that you want to make an additional statement relative to the period subsequent to the commencement of hostilities. You may proceed with the statement.
- A. Before I proceed in my narrative, there is just one point that I would like to go into a bit further. That is about

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File #247

OSHIMA, Hiroshi 3/5/46

the despatch Ott sent to Ribbentrop on December 5, 1941 - of which you told me. I believe you asked me whether Ott had consulted with the Japanese Government before sending this despatch and I said that I did not believe he had done so. Thinking about this matter I have reached the conclusion and am 90% certain that no such discussion with the Japanese Government was entered into. Why do I reach this conclusion? Had this been a despatch based on official information I am sure that Ribbentrop would have brought up the point, particularly as it was in the midst of talks about a no-separate peace pact. The fact that I heard nothing about it bears out my contention that it could not have been an official information, but was something that Ott had received from his own intelligence sources. Regarding matters following the start of hostilities with the United States, it is actually as General Marshall stated in his report and as, I believe I told you on February 15th - there were no detailed joint operations planned or discussed. I only wish to go into these matters in order to bring my story to a close. Point number one, I want to speak about the exchange of arms and supplies between the two nations. Japan received from Germany parts for airplanes and weapons, and in exchange Germany received from Japan such raw materials as rubber and tungsten. In the beginning, this exchange was carried on using German blockade runners. Around 1943, I believe, because of losses and increased activity on the part of the Allies, it became impossible to use ships any longer, and so German and Japanese submarines were used in this work, but I do not believe they were able to carry much. This exchange, however, is not the business of the Embassy and is a direct concern of the Army and Navy. I have only told you of it in so far as my knowledge goes. Point two is that somewhere around the end of 1943, or the beginning of 1944, a trade pact was consummated. This was something like lend-lease and was aimed at doing away with the then existing state of affairs, whereby regular payments were made by both parties for patents, etc. In the summer of 1942, Germany officially requested Japan to enter into the Soviet war. I sent this information to Japan and the Japanese Government stated that due to the conditions then existing it was impossible. In 1943, the matter of the submarines and submarine warfare was brought up by the Germans and followed the lines that I told Captain Robinson about the

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other day. Also in 1943, the Japanese Government officially asked Germany whether it would not be possible for her to carry on a defensive war in Russia and to turn her offensive efforts in the direction of England and the United States. Germany turned down this request on the grounds that it was impossible for her to do anything about it. Now, in the fall of 1944, a despatch came from the Japanese Government asking whether it would not be possible for the Germans to conclude a separate peace with the Soviet Union. This plan was also turned down by the Germans. And lastly, as I told you the other day, joint operations were planned, but never carried out. On April 13, 1945, the German Government asked all Embassies to leave Berlin and to go to Bad Gastein. And that clears up all matters and puts an end to my narrative.

- Q. Now, I have a few questions I would like to ask you, General. Let us go back to the events incident to the coming into being of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In the course of your statement you said the following and I quote: "In 1936, as I stated, the secret pact and the Anti-Comintern Pact were consummated. Following this, while there were no secret pacts in 1937, the German Army and the Japanese Army agreed to furnish each other with intelligence about the Russian military. In this regard it was decided to intensify the use of White Russians who had already been used quite a bit and had been contacted in such spots as Warsaw and Paris. There was no written agreement about this - I believe it was in September or October 1938 - that these discussions came about. With the signing of the Russo-German non-aggression pact there was a temporary cessation of all such activities. These matters were not binding agreements, but more in the form of memoranda." Now, will you tell us how this agreement came into being? Who suggested it and who handled the negotiations for it?
- A. The Japanese military had previously been using White Russians in Warsaw to gather Russian intelligence and following the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact the Russian Section of the General Staff in Tokyo thought that it would be a good idea to further the exchange of information in regard to the Soviet Union. I received orders from the General Staff to approach the Germans and did so. Actual exchange of information was handled by Lt. Col. USUI of my staff.

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Q. You were then Military Attache, were you?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was the head of the Russian Division of the General Staff?

A. I think it was Col. KASAHARA, Tateo - I am not too sure about that first name.

Q. After you received instructions to approach the Germans relative to this, whom did you speak to?

A. Keitel, at that time Lieutenant General.

Q. Then, if I understand you correctly, the negotiations from then on were handled by Colonel USUI of your staff?

A. Yes.

Q. After the negotiations had been concluded and this agreement had been reached, what type of organization was set up to handle these activities?

A. There were many White Russians around Berlin at the time who were willing to sell information and it was simply decided to give them money and procure this information. We were using a Russian from the Caucasus by the name of Bamard (?) as one of the main sources of information.

Q. I take it then that these activities were conducted out of your office in Berlin?

A. Yes, except that USUI because he was doing work of this sort, while under me, operated independently.

Q. He operated under your supervision, did he not?

A. Yes. However, his job was to gather intelligence only and to communicate with the Russian Division of General Staff.

Q. These communications would also go through you as the Military Attache?

A. They would go through my office.

Q. You indicated in your statement the other day that it was decided to intensify the use of these White Russians who had already been used quite a bit. What did you mean by that?

A. We decided to do away with many of the suspicious ones that we had been using up to that time and to pick out only the best and make full use of them.

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Q. In addition to these White Russians, did you use Japanese Agents and German Agents in an effort to obtain intelligence about the Russian military.

A. No.

Q. Can you tell us what type of things these White Russians were directed to do? How they did their work?

A. USUI working with the Germans and using White Russians attempted to get intelligence about the Russian Army, its organization, weapons, etc.

Q. Did you hold any property in Germany?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever have a house or piece of real estate in Falkensee?

A. I understand now what you are talking about. In order to carry on Anti-Soviet propaganda, at one time I negotiated for the purchase of a place where this work could be carried on. This place was not in my name, I believe. However, we did have it.

Q. While this property was not in your own name, did you personally own it?

A. As I said, it was not in my name; the money came from my office.

Q. What type of work did you conduct from this place in Falkensee?

A. They were printing up the propaganda at this place.

Q. How large a place was this?

A. As a matter of fact, I have never been there, so I do not know what its size is, but from what I heard it was a villa or something of the sort and could not have been very large.

Q. What did you do with the propaganda that was printed there?

A. I do not know what the propaganda was, as my connection with it was very slight. This matter was handled by the White Russian Bamard (?) and USUI.

Q. General, how many White Russians did you have there?

A. I do not know. I would tell you if I knew, but I actually had very little to do with it and, hence, do not know.

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Q. But you do know that you had a number of White Russians and they printed propaganda leaflets. Now, tell us what they did with them.

A. These leaflets were given to Bamard (?), who by some means or other tried to get them into Russia.

Q. You know, do you not, General, that you sent some of those leaflets into Russia by means of small balloons when the weather was favorable?

A. I do not know about that; perhaps they did, but I do not know of it.

Q. I assume from what you have told us that Germany must have had some Agents seeking information regarding the Russian military in order to be able to exchange with you, as was suggested in your original statement on this matter. Tell us who was in charge of that activity for the Germans.

A. There was General Keitel and under him Cannaris. Under them was this man who was working with USUI. I can not recall his name at the moment.

Q. General, do you know anything about a Japanese officer that had worked in Afghanistan.

A. Yes.

Q. He was expelled because of suspicion that he had attempted to overthrow the Afghanistan Government, wasn't he?

A. I believe the Japanese officer became friendly with an Afghanistan "garrison commander" and suggested to him that they carry on Anti-Russian activities. This man evidently passed on this word to the Afghanistan Government and suggested that they get rid of the Japanese officer before they were suspected of doing such things.

Q. That man was working under your direction or out of your office in Berlin, was he not?

A. No. I had no connection with him.

Q. But you intended to send someone there to take his place after he was expelled, did you not?

A. No.

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Q. How often have you seen Himmler?

A. Very seldom; I had no official dealings at all with his office.

Q. Do you remember the occasion of a visit he made to your office or to you - I do not know if it was in your office or not - on January 31, 1939, or thereabouts?

A. I have no remembrance of that date.

Q. Maybe I can help you remember it. On that occasion you discussed with him a good many subjects; one of those subjects was the speech that Hitler had made at or about that time; then the next subject you discussed with him was the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle, Germany, Italy, and Japan, into an even firmer mold. I assume that has reference to the Tripartite Pact. Do you remember a discussion on that subject with Himmler?

A. I do not recollect the meeting.

Q. Maybe you will recollect this: according to your statement made the other day, when you first mentioned the White Russians, you indicated that this agreement to obtain intelligence about the Russian military and exchange it with Germany came into being around about September or October 1938. Now, this is about the meeting to which I am referring. It took place either three or four months after this agreement that was entered into that you have already told us about. In addition to the matters I have asked you about, my information is to the effect that you on that occasion also discussed with Himmler the matter of these activities with respect to Russia. I have in my hands, General, a copy of Himmler's report on that meeting and he said that you also told him that, together with German counter-espionage, you were undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. He also said that this organization was to become effective only in case of war. Now, you have already told us that these White Russians were working out of the Caucasus and this was about three months or four months after you entered into the agreement to do this intelligence work with the White Russians. Now, does that help you remember anything about that meeting that you might enlarge upon what I have just told you.

A. I have no recollection of the meeting. I might have spoken to Himmler at sometime, but never of coordinating this type of work or anything of the sort.

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- Q. Did you discuss with Himmler the proposed Tripartite Pact at any time?
- A. I might have spoken to him in the course of a conversation, but certainly not officially, as such matters would be completely outside the ken of his responsibility.
- Q. General, again I must remind you that it is my observation that through your unofficial conversations you have demonstrated great ability to accomplish much for your Government. Now, I don't care whether this was official or unofficial. I do want to know if you had conversation with Himmler in any capacity relative to this proposed Tripartite Pact.
- A. Had it been an official discussion I am sure I would remember it, but as it is a case where I do not even recall the date, I might have talked with him about the three-power pact in the course of our conversation, but that is all.
- Q. Now, if I understand you correctly, you have stated to us today that you did not discuss with Himmler anything regarding these intelligence activities in Russia?
- A. I have no recollection of having had any such discussions.
- Q. Now, maybe this will help you remember. In this same meeting, according to the record of the same meeting I have in my possession, you told Himmler confidentially that you had bought a piece of real estate in Falkensee under the name of a middleman. You have told us the same thing today. Now, how would Himmler know that unless you told him?
- A. I still have no recollection of the meeting. If Himmler knew about the Falkensee place he must have gotten the information from his assistants, as it would be impossible to purchase such a place and use it for the purpose it was used for, unless the Gestapo had been notified about it.
- Q. Well, I have the record of Himmler's report of this conversation, wherein he states that you told him this confidentially. In addition to that, General, Himmler says that at this same meeting you told him that six Russians were employed at this place in Falkensee and that they were writing and printing leaflets, just as you have told us today. You did not tell us how many Russians, but you have told us they were engaged in writing and printing leaflets, and Himmler says you told him that these leaflets were flown into Russia from Poland in small balloons when the wind was favorable; and he also says that you had reports and proofs from Russia that these leaflets

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had arrived in Russia in good condition and they were obviously being passed around among the people very diligently. Now, most of that is substantially what you have told us today. Himmler has signed a report of his conference with you dated January 31, 1939, in which you told these things to him. Are you trying to tell us today you don't remember this conference?

A. I have no recollection of the meeting. If there had been such a meeting it is definitely something I have completely forgotten about.

Q. General, did you ever have a motor boat?

A. No.

Q. Himmler says in this report that you told him that you had bought a motor boat in order to take these leaflets from Rumania to Crimea by way of the Black Sea.

A. As Ambassador in 1939, I would have no connection with matters of this sort. It is very strange that Himmler should write up such a thing if he did.

Q. General, there can be no doubt about the authenticity of this document that I have. It is interesting to note that some of the subject matter that I have read to you as appearing in this document relates to matters that you have told me about as I have questioned you. Now here is one more matter. I asked you about this Japanese officer that had been sent to Afghanistan and who was later expelled from that country. You have told us about that and you have told us about it substantially as it appears in this memorandum signed by Himmler. Now, I am going to read you what Himmler says: "We then discussed the Mohammedan Movement. He told me that a Japanese officer had worked in Afghanistan, but that he had been expelled later because of suspicion that he had attempted to overthrow the Afghanistan Government - I told him that I had a police officer there and that the two could very well collaborate once he again had someone there." A part of what I have just read to you you have told me about. Do you remember talking about this with Himmler.

A. I still have no recollection of the meeting. It is strange because this was after I became Ambassador and had no connection with such matters.

Q. In your use of these White Russians, many of whom I suppose you sent across the frontier to Russia, were any of them

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killed by any chance?

A. I do not know.

Q. Didn't you ever hear anything about some of them being killed?

A. I never heard about it.

Q. According to this record of the meeting between Himmler and you, you told him, that is to say, you told Himmler, that a number of Russians whom you had sent across the border had been shot at the frontier.

A. I have heard about sending Russians, from USUI, but I have no recollection of his having said that any of them were killed. This document that you say you have is very strange to me. Did you procure it from German sources?

Q. The document is authentic. There is no question about it. I want to make this further observation: according to these statements of Himmler as recorded in this document, you, not USUI, sent these Russians across this frontier.

A. It may be written that way there, but I actually had nothing to do with it myself. Further, the date of this document, January 31, 1939, is some three months after I became Ambassador and I would have no connection with the matters that you are now bringing up.

Q. I can not help but observe that you frequently use that means of avoiding responsibility. I also know and I am sure you know, that there have been Ambassadors in other posts than Berlin who, in other wars, have been the directing powers with respect to spy and espionage activities. Now, in fairness to yourself, and I am trying to give you a chance to make a full disclosure of everything, because in my opinion it is to your advantage, you should not seek to avoid responsibility, merely because you held the post of Ambassador. In time of war, when activities of this sort are being practiced, certainly it is not beyond the realm of probability that even an Ambassador might be directing it. Now, one further question, according to this statement signed by Himmler, you stated to him on that occasion that you had succeeded up to January 31, 1939, in sending ten Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. Now, do you know anything about those ten Russians with bombs that were sent across the Caucasian frontier?

A. I know nothing about it.

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- Q. According to Himmler, these ten Russians that had these bombs, to which I have just referred, had a very special mission. He says that they had the mission to kill Stalin. Now, what have you to say about that?
- A. That is very strange. Very, very strange. I have absolutely no recollection of having talked over any such matters with Himmler. However much I may be forgetful, had I sent ten men across the border I would have a remembrance of it now.
- Q. That is my opinion, too, General, that you should remember this. It has been six years since this document was written. The original of this document is in our possession. It is a damaging document in so far as you personally are concerned. It is a very serious document. It is not unlikely that whatever conduct of this type you were engaged in that you had others who instructed you to do these things, that there were others who were directing these activities. Now, the document on its face is very impressive and in the light of what you have told us, very difficult to explain away, because you have already told us of many of the things and subjects that are discussed in this paper. Now, I wish you would be fair to yourself and not assume this attitude of "I can not remember", but rather let us know who it is that is back of all of this. I think you ought to give serious thought to that for your own good. It is also important that you bear in mind this, as you think this over - your agreement entered into with Germany came into being according to your own statement in September or October 1938. In that agreement you were going to obtain information regarding the Russian military. Now this document signed by Himmler, to which I have been referring, was written approximately three months after the agreement that I have referred to came into being. That is a damaging set of facts. Now, I am going to give you a chance to think this over, but I want you to tell us everything that was back of this conference with Himmler and everything about the subjects that were discussed between the two of you on that occasion. We will be back tomorrow and give you a chance at that time to say anything further about this matter that you might wish to say.

二十餘回ニ亙リ優レタル日本語ヲ以テ熟心且ク忠實
ニ通譯勞ヲ取ラレタルヲ謝ス唯陳述セルトモ口外交

及條約等ニ関シ複雑ナル事項多カリシヲ以テ何人ニ雖
モ翻譯困難ナルハ当然ナリ依テ更ニ全部ヲ初ヨリ

復譯ノ所要ニ訂正ヲ行フニトテ希望セルモ時間ノ
關係上之ヲ取止メラル大々助ニ於テ開蕪ナシト思

フモ細部ニ於テ雖クヒカラスル若干ノ相違ハ存在スル之ガ
終ニ之ヲ保留ス

昭和二十一年(一九四六年)三月五日

大島 浩

STATEMENT AND TRANSLATION THEREOF

I thank you for the manner in which, with zeal and integrity, you have interpreted in excellent Japanese for over twenty interrogations. However, the things that have been discussed dealt with diplomacy and treaties, and consequently there were many very complicated matters, which would make it very difficult for anyone to interpret. Therefore, I wish to read over the transcript from beginning to end and correct parts that might have been necessary to change. However, as there does not seem to be enough time, you would not accede to this. In so far as the main points go, I believe there are no mistakes, but there might be some small mistakes on which I wish to retain the privilege of correcting at a later date.

/s/ Hiroshi OSHIMA

5 March 1946.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, LT. COMDR. F. B. HUGGINS, 167619
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 11 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of MARCH, 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lucille C. Brunner hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

L. C. Brunner

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) G. OSMOND HYDE, _____,

and _____,

certify that on 5th day of MARCH, 1946, personally appeared before me (we) OSHIMA, Hiroshi,
and according to LT. COMDR. F. B. HUGGINS, Interpreter,
gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

TOKYO, JAPAN
Place

MARCH 7, 1946
Date

G. Osmond Hyde

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 6 March 194⁶, 1335-1620 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator.
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter.
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer.

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

Q. General, do you care to add anything to what you said yesterday relative to the matter of the meeting that Himmler indicated that he had with you on the 31st day of January 1939?

A. Yes. I thought it over very carefully and dug back into my memory, and I have prepared some statements regarding this, which, if you will permit me, I would like to tell you at this point.

Q. You may proceed.

A. I thought the matter over very carefully and tried very hard to recall this alleged meeting with Himmler, but the more I thought about it the less remembrance I have of any such meeting having ever taken place. As a beginning to my story, it so happens that the occasions on which an Ambassador meets with any of the Ministers of the country to which he is accredited are very far and few between. It is protocol to go through the Foreign Minister whenever one wishes to see any of the other Ministers of State, particularly in Germany the German Government was very strict in this regard. I first met Himmler at the home of Captain Cannaris of the Navy during the summer of 1936. Himmler was a man who was interested in Japan and Japanese arts and our first meeting was mainly devoted to things of this sort. I met Himmler for the second time during the winter of 1936, at which time I invited him to come

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to my home for dinner. At this time a man by the name of TANAKA was in Germany and had come from the Home Ministry in order to make a study of German methods of combating Communism. I was requested to get Himmler's approval and help in assisting this man. The third time I met Himmler was after I became Ambassador for the second time in March 1941. Beyond these three meetings I have absolutely no recollection of ever having met him. These three meetings were the times that he came to see me, and in addition there were four occasions on which I went to see him. As Himmler's organization did not start to function along these lines until after the start of hostilities, it becomes very strange that he should - if he did - take any interest in such matters and come to me, who was Ambassador, rather than go to the man who would be directly connected with these matters.

- Q. At this point, General, I want to remind you that in the statement of Himmler's that we referred to yesterday it is pointed out that this organization that involved Japan and German counter-espionage, which was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia, was to become effective only in case of war.
- A. I recall that statement that you made yesterday. The second point is that Himmler could not possibly discuss the functions of German counter-intelligence, which were strictly the duties of Captain Cannaris' Section. There was very bad feeling between this outfit and Himmler's. Further, this business of using balloons, sending men to kill Stalin, and using a motor boat in the Black Sea, etc., are fairly important things, and had I discussed such matters that would remain in my memory, but I have no such recollection whatsoever. Regarding the Falkensee property, this was bought in the name of a Captain in the office of National Defense, and I believe it was bought about a year before this alleged meeting with Himmler took place. Why I should talk about it at this alleged meeting, when a year had passed, is very strange. Also, regarding the number of White Russians, which you said to be six, I knew nothing about how many they were using or any of the details thereof. Also regarding the matter of the man in Afghanistan, my recollection is that he was expelled for suggesting Anti-Russian movements, whereas you say that the document states he was expelled for trying to overthrow the Afghan Govern-

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ment. That is not my recollection of the matter, and is very strange. In regard to the use of the motor boat and the balloons, this document which Himmler is alleged to have written does not go into details, which would appear very strange, because it would certainly be his interest, if such a thing were true, to find out how and why and in what manner they were to be used. Also in regard to the Stalin assassination matter, I can not see how any man could conceive such a plan and think that it would have any possibility of success. Further, if one man even out of the ten were caught, the whole thing would become public and create an international incident, so that I could not have even thought about doing what it is alleged I did. The fact that this document, which you say exists, contains reference to the Afghanistan matter and also the Falkensee property, it seems to me that in some way or other this misinformation was passed perhaps by USUI to his German counterpart, Major Groskurt, and from there in what fashion I do not know became a document that somebody in the Counter-Intelligence Division wrote up erroneously. However, I am absolutely unable to figure why this alleged document should be credited to Himmler. To finish up on this matter, I just want to say that this matter of using espionage agents is something that every General Staff does and, therefore, I did not consider it important enough to tell you about in detail.

Q. Where is Colonel USUI?

A. USUI was killed at Rangoon, but his successor, who is now a Lieutenant General, I believe, should be around. His name is MANAKI, and also in regard to this matter, if you will speak to KASAHARA and YOSHINAKA, I believe you should be able to get details.

Q. Now, General, I believe you have told us that you returned to Germany as Ambassador the second time on or about February 16, 1941; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had a conference with Ribbentrop very soon thereafter, I believe on February 23, 1941?

A. I do not recall the exact date, but it was around the end of February.

Q. Now, this is the conference, General, that I referred to

in the early days of our interrogation when I gave you the date of February 13. That date should have been February 23, 1941. Now, I have in my possession the records of that conference, and I want to talk to you a little while now about that conference. According to these records, in the beginning of that conference Ribbentrop made some observations to you relative to his desire to compromise with Russia in order to prevent a war on two fronts. Then later in the meeting, talking about the Tripartite Pact that had come into being, he said this: "Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador OSHIMA is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?" I want you to tell us just exactly what the two of you had in mind when on that occasion you were talking about the further development of this pact.

A. I do not recall what we talked about in that regard, but I do not believe it had anything to do with going to war. It was possibly nothing more than the fact that we would continue to abide by its provisions.

Q. General, I want you to bear in mind, as I go through these papers that I am going to talk about, that I have in my hands the actual documents or copies thereof, and I am trying to give you every opportunity to make a full disclosure with respect to everything that took place. I have reminded you of this before, and I remind you of it again now, because I want to be fair and give you a chance to make known everything about the matters I am going to bring to your attention. Later in the conference you discussed the then situation with respect to the war, and Ribbentrop stated that they wanted to finish the war quickly and to force England to beg for peace, and then he said, now I quote: "In this matter cooperation with Japan would be of importance. In its interest it should intervene as soon as possible. A deciding blow would be the attack on Singapore in order to destroy England's key position in the Far East, and to assure Japan the position there, which only a war could attain. The occupation of Singapore should take place in a lightning fashion, if possible, without a declaration of war and in the middle of peace in order to contribute towards finishing up this war and also to prevent America from getting in the war. OSHIMA

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replied that the preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May." Now, I want you to tell us when it was and from whom you learned that the preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May.

- A. I recall his statements relative to Singapore, but I absolutely did not make any statement about plans being ready by the end of May. I would have no way of knowing about such plans, and, further, I definitely say that there were no such plans.
- Q. But, General, you told us the other day that when MATSUOKA was there that the statement was then made that those plans were in the course of being perfected, so that you have already admitted that such plans were in the course of being completed. The document I have here bears the signature of Ribbentrop and there can be no doubt about its authenticity and Ribbentrop is alive today. I am giving you a chance to tell me what was said there and am also asking you to tell me where you got your information. You had only then arrived from Tokyo. You had been back but one week when this meeting took place. Now, it is not unlikely that before you left Tokyo these matters were discussed with you and you, as Ambassador, told what to do. I want to know when you held those meetings, who gave you the instructions, and what the plans were.
- A. I have not heard about any such plans.
- Q. I will tell you something else you said on that occasion. You said also that for security reasons the war would have to be prepared not only against England, but also against America. You said that the occupation of Singapore would have to be coordinated with the operations in Europe. You also said that the attack would have to be made on land because of the difficulty on the seaside and that the occupation of Hongkong and the Philippines had been provided for in case it should be required.
- A. I have no recollection of having made such a statement. However, it is possible that I might have said something along those lines in order to match the tone of Ribbentrop's conversation. It becomes important for me as Ambassador as long as such a thing as the Tripartite Pact exists to keep the Germans happy, and so I might have stated some-

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thing of this sort. However, I can definitely say that I never heard of any such plans from either the Army or the Navy.

Q. Did you hear them from anyone else?

A. No.

Q. Now, General, the document that I am reading from now is a copy of a telegram that was sent by Ribbentrop, among other places, to the German Embassy in Tokyo. Now, if there is anything in this document that is not right, you know and I know that your Ambassador in Tokyo would have been over at that Foreign Office immediately. I think you should give this serious thought and give us a full and complete answer.

A. I am sure that the despatch regarding this meeting was passed to Ott who, no doubt, took it to the Japanese Foreign Office. On my part I think that I also must have sent a despatch to the Japanese Foreign Office about this meeting, and had I done so, I would have said that I had tried to match my talks with the Germans in order to please them. However, I can definitely say that I received no orders from the Japanese Government, nor did I hear anything about any plans from anyone.

Q. It was not very long after this until MATSUOKA was over there and you have already told us that MATSUOKA stated that the plans with respect to Singapore were then in the course of being completed. Now, don't tell us that you have heard nothing about these plans. It can't be other than the opposite. You have admitted sitting down talking about it with Ribbentrop, MATSUOKA and Hitler.

A. You may ask MATSUOKA also. I am sure that he knew nothing of any plans. The Japanese Army and Navy do not reveal their operational plans to anyone outside their staffs.

Q. Let us go on with the matter and see. After what I have just indicated to you had been stated by you, Ribbentrop according to this document remarked to you that it would be better to put off the Philippines project and to execute only the surprise occupation of Singapore, and he said, by proper explanation of motives for the occupation, America would remain out of the war. Do you remember that?

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A. I recall that statement.

Q. What did he mean by surprise attack on Singapore? Did it mean to go down there without any declaration of war?

A. I do not remember or know whether he mentioned a declaration of war or not, but that might have been what he meant along with the necessity of a sudden concentrated attack.

Q. Now, three reasons were discussed by the two of you for quick action, according to this document; one reason was that the occupation of Singapore represented a decisive blow against the very heart of the British Empire; two, that America would keep out of the war because it would not yet be fully prepared and would not risk its fleet west of Hawaii. In case of an American declaration of war you concluded it would not be able to do anything about the occupation of the Philippines. Three, for the coming of the new order in the world Japan should insure herself of the positions which it would want by the end of the war and in time of peace. You discussed also that England would never surrender Singapore by way of negotiations. This record shows that you, Ambassador OSHIMA, fully agreed with these ideas that I have enumerated as one, two and three, and you declared you would do everything in your power to make this policy carry through. Do you remember that?

A. I do not recall having made that statement. From the way that reads I would take it that these were proposals advanced by Ribbentrop.

Q. My point is that whoever advanced them, you agreed with them and you said that you would do everything possible to see that they were carried through. Now, I want to know what you did in order to see that they would be carried through.

A. I did nothing. I would like to explain that these were proposals advanced by Ribbentrop and not by the German Government. If he talks about matters like this I possibly agreed with him rather than get into an argument at this point. However, in the light of subsequent events in which Ribbentrop and the German Government was anxious to get Japan into the war against Russia it would appear that these proposals were simply ideas advanced on Ribbentrop's own volition. To them I acquiesced, but only in order to please him, and did nothing further about it.

Q. Now, what do you think would be the reaction in Tokyo when this despatch was received in Tokyo and it was brought to the

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attention of your Foreign Office that you had agreed to this?

- A. I received no word from the Japanese Foreign Office in regard to this and, as I told you, I believe I sent a despatch about it.
- Q. Here is something else you talked about. You, according to this record, remarked to Ribbentrop that the Japanese Foreign Minister had asked you to take to Berlin as far as possible the concrete proposals, and Ribbentrop then told you it would be good if the Japanese Foreign Minister could bring along the final decision in regard to attack on Singapore in the near future in order to be able to discuss the details.
- A. Although I have no recollection of it, it is possible that Ribbentrop made such proposals in regard to MATSUOKA. However, I definitely received no suggestions or instructions from the Japanese Foreign Minister in regard to possible concrete proposals.
- Q. Then why did you tell Ribbentrop that you did receive such instructions?
- A. That is some mistake.
- Q. There is no mistake about that. That is the record of the conference.
- A. I am sure that these documents would contain mistakes of that kind, because, as I believe I told you the other day, they were not taken down by stenographers, but were dictated later from memory.
- Q. I can't help but observe, General, that every time something comes up with respect to which you apparently do not care to give us any information, you classify it as a mistake. Now, humans might make one or two mistakes, but they did not make a mistake every time that I brought a matter of this sort to your attention, and you know it.
- A. If MATSUOKA had told me to do such and such I would recall what these proposals were, but I did not have any such instructions, so I believe my recollection to be the most accurate.
- Q. Your recollection today and your recollection on the 23d of February 1941, when you talked to Ribbentrop, are exactly

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the opposite. Now, it seems to me, unless you see fit, and it is entirely up to you, to give us more information on these matters, that you may be the one holding the responsibility all by yourself. I am trying to give you every chance to tell a true and correct story about these matters and if you don't want to do it that is entirely up to you.

A. I am telling you all that I know and all that I remember, veraciously and to the best of my knowledge.

Q. According to this document Ribbentrop told you that it would be good if the Japanese Foreign Minister could bring along the final decision in regard to the attack on Singapore in the near future in order to be able to discuss all the details. Did you pass that suggestion on to MATSUOKA?

A. I did not.

Q. Now, I have some more documents; we will get to them in the next day or so, in which reference is made to this matter after MATSUOKA arrived in Berlin. It was a meeting at which this map of Singapore that you told us about the other day was also mentioned. Now, since MATSUOKA did come with some ideas along this line, I again ask you, did you or did you not pass this request on to MATSUOKA that was made to you by Ribbentrop on February 23, 1941, as I have just read.

A. Definitely no.

Q. A little further in this document it indicates that the two of you, that is Ribbentrop and you, discussed the fact that for jointly carrying on of war closest cooperation in all matters was required, particularly in regard to news service and newspapers, in the same manner as was then already being done in Italy, Rumania, Hungaria, Slovakia and Bulgaria, and then it further is recorded that in conjunction with our gentlemen (Ribbentrop speaking), you, Ambassador OSHIMA, intends to create a plan for a more intensive Japanese propaganda. Will you tell us what you had in mind by that?

A. I believe it means that, as Japanese propaganda was very poor, means should be found to better it.

Q. This is the sentence I am particularly interested in: "In conjunction with our gentlemen, Ambassador intends to create a plan for a more intensive Japanese propaganda." Now, that is a plan in conjunction with the Germans. What did you do in that regard?

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- A. A newspaper division was set up within the Embassy and Minister SAKUMA came from Japan to take over as head of it. Naturally, as this propaganda was being prepared in Germany, it would be necessary to work in conjunction with the Germans.
- Q. In the formal report of this conference, as distinguished from this despatch that I have been reading from, referring to this same point, Ribbentrop said this: "As far as speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas." Did you keep up that continuous exchange of ideas?
- A. Actually, there were no such exchanges.
- Q. Well, you have admitted that SAKUMA came to Berlin for the purpose of handling these propaganda matters. Now, since Japan was not in the war, what reason did you have for conducting such a propaganda campaign?
- A. It was necessary for Japan to clarify her position in the world even if she were not at war.
- Q. I can't help but observe, General, that in this matter of propaganda your memory seems to be all right. But when I talk about Singapore your memory always fails you. Now, this document that I have in my hand states that you confided to Ribbentrop that KONOYE and MATSUOKA were of the same opinion - the opinion that it refers to was that Japan decided to maintain its Imperial position and that KONOYE and MATSUOKA were for an attack on Singapore in the near future.
- A. I did not say any such thing to Ribbentrop - I had not heard about it from either KONOYE or MATSUOKA.
- Q. General, you can't pass that off by telling us that you did not say these things when there is a record of it that was made on that occasion. Now, you indicated a while ago that after you had this conference that you maybe sent a telegram to Tokyo explaining the reasons for some of the statements that appear in this despatch that Ribbentrop sent to Tokyo, and I ask you now how did you explain away that statement with reference to KONOYE and MATSUOKA?
- A. I did not say it, nor do I believe that the two men mentioned had such ideas, particularly KONOYE. In any case they never told me about it.

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Q. Why do you say particularly KONOYE?

A. Before I left Japan, as I told you, I had a couple of meetings with him and other members of the Cabinet and the Army and Navy. KONOYE was particularly anxious to maintain peace and only wished to go to war in the event that Japan would have to abide by the provisions of the Tripartite Pact. It is possible that I might have said that both KONOYE and MATSUOKA are aware that if the provisions of the Tripartite Alliance must necessarily be invoked a plan for the attack on Singapore would be ready - at least such a plan would be made.

Q. Now, General, according to the terms of that Tripartite Pact there was no obligation on the part of Japan to do anything with respect to Singapore because Singapore was then under the British and the British were excluded from the terms of that pact. That being true, how do you justify that comment you just made.

A. Strictly speaking, England is excluded from the pact, but it also follows that any nation planning her operations in the event war is unavoidable would include in that planning all kinds of operations. In other words, the Japanese military would of necessity make plans for a Singapore attack at the same time they made plans to be used in the event of a United States-Japanese conflict.

Q. Now, it is almost time to close for today. There is one more thing I want to bring to your attention. You have indicated that MATSUOKA, and you said particularly KONOYE, was opposed to the suggested attack on Singapore. Now, with respect to MATSUOKA, I have before me a record of his conversation with Ribbentrop in Berlin on March 29, 1941, and at one point in this record these words appear: "MATSUOKA then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance. The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador OSHIMA. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer - who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time - could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore." Now, General,

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I want you to think about that tonight and I want you to think of the occasion when Ribbentrop had already discussed these questions with you, and when we come back tomorrow I will expect a detailed story from you relative to those discussions.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, LT. COMDR. F. B. HUGGINS, 167619
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 12 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of MARCH, 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, LUCILLE C. BRUNNER hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~xxx~~) G. OSMOND HYDE, _____,

and _____,

certify that on 6th day of MARCH, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xx~~) OSHIMA, Hiroshi,
and according to LT. COMDR. F. B. HUGGINS, Interpreter,
gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

March 8, 1946
Date

G. Osmond Hyde

問「この協定が如何ニシテ出来タカラ話シテ呉レマ
センカ誰ガ發案シテ誰ガこの交渉ニ當ツタノデス
カ」

答「日本ノ軍ハ以前カラ「ワルソー」チ白系露人ヲ
使ツテ露西亞ノ情報ヲ入手シテ居リマシタ。ソシ
テ防共協定調印後東京ノ參謀本部ノ露西亞班デハ
「ソビエツト聯邦」ニ關スル情報ノ交換ヲ促進スルコ
トガ賢明ナ途ダト考ヘタノデス。私ハ參謀本部カ
ラ獨逸人ニ掛ケ合フ様ニトノ命令ヲ受クソノ命令
通りニシマシタ。實際上ノ情報交換ハ私ノ部下ノ
自井（ハウスイ）中佐ガシマシタ

※※※※※※※※※※※※

問「アナタガ獨逸人ニ掛合フ様ニトノ命令ヲ受ケテ
カラこの命令ニ基イテアナタハ誰ニ話ヲ持チカケ
マシタカ」

答「當時中將デアツタ「カイテル」ニデシタ。

問「交渉ガ纏リコノ協定ガ成立シタ後コレヲ實行ス
ルニ付テドンナ機構ヲ作りマシタカ。」

答「ソノ當時「ベルリン」界限ニハ情報ヲ賣リ込ミ
タガツテ居ル白系露人ガ大勢居マシタ。ソコデ彼
等ニ金ヲ與ヘテコノ情報ヲ入手スルト云フ方法ガ
簡單ニ決マリマシタ。我々ハ「コーカサス」カラ
來タ「バマ」ドハ……」ト云フ露西亞人ヲ主要ナ情
報入手機關トシテ使ツテ居リマシタ。」

2100
問「ソレデハコレ等ノ活動ハ「ベルリン」ノアナタノ事務室デ指圖サレテ居タト受取ツテヨロシイデスネ」

答「ハイ。但シ白井ノ行動ヲ除イテデス。ト申スノハ彼ハ私ノ下ニハ居マシタガ彼獨自ノ立場デ同ジ様ナ仕事ヲシテ居マシタ。」

問「彼ハアナタノ監督ノ下デ働イテキタノデハアリマセンカ。」

答「ソウデス。然シ彼ノ仕事ハ確報ヲ蒐集スル事トソレヲ參謀本部ノ露西亞班ニ通報スル事丈ダツタノデアリマス。」

問「ソレラノ情報通知モ大使館付武官トシテノアナタヲ通ジテ送ラレテキタノデセウネ。」

答「私ノ事務室ヲ通ジテ送ラレテキマシタ。」

問「アナタハ獨逸ニ何カ財産ヲオ持テシタカ」

答「イ、エ」

問「アナタハ「アワルケンゼー」ニ家カ土地ヲオ持ニナツタコトガアリマセンカ。」

答「私ハ今ヤツト御尋ネノ意味ガ解リマシタ反ソ宣傳ヲ實行スル目的デソノ仕事ヲ遂行スルニ要スル場所ヲ或時私ガ買フ交渉ヲシタ事ガアリマス。然シ確カソレハ私ノ名義デハナカツタト信ジマス。然シ兎モ角我々ハソレヲ所有シタ事ガアリマス。」

問「コノ財産ガアナタノ名義デモナイノニアナタハ

ソレヲ勝手ニ使ツテ居タノデスカレ

答「前ニ申上ゲタ様ニソレハ私名義ノモノデハアリ
マセン。金ハ私ノ事務室カラ出シタノデス。」

問「ヘフワルケンヤ」ノニノ場所カラアナタハドシナ
種類ノ仕事ヲ御用シテ居タノデスカレ

答「ココデハ宣傳文書ノ印刷ヲヤツテ居タノデス。」
問「然シ、アナタハ大勢ノ白系露人達ヲ使ツテ居テ
彼等ガ宣傳ピラヲ刷ツテ居タ事ハ御承知ノ筈デス。

今度ハ彼等ガソノピラヲドウ云フ風ニ使ツタカラ
我々ニオ話願ヒマス。」

答「ソコデ作ツタピラハ「バマード」ニ渡シマシタ。
彼ハイロイロノ手段ニヨツテソレヲ露西亞國內ニ
持チ込ム工夫ヲシタノデス。」

問「閣下、アナタハ「アフガニスタン」デ働イテ居
タ日本ノ一士官ノ事ヲ何カ御存知デスカレ

答「ハイ、知ツテ居マス」
問「ソノ士官ハ「アフガニスタン」政府顧問ヲ企テ
タ案ヲ遂行サレタノデアリマセンカ。」

答「私ガ思フノニソノ日本ノ士官ハ或ル「アフガニ
スタン」ノ守備隊長ト仲良シニナリ守備隊ガ反ソ
活動ヲハジメル様ニソノ隊長ニ入智恵ヲシタニ相
違ナイト考ヘマス。コノ隊長ハ明白ニコノ言葉ヲ

「アフガニスタン」政府ニ申達シ守備隊ガソノ様
ナ行動ニ付テ疑ヲ受ケナイ前ニソノ日本將校ヲ放

ナ行動ニ付テ疑ヲ受ケナイ前ニソノ日本將校ヲ放

拂アコトヲ進言シタノデス。レ

問「ソノ將校ハアナタノ指令ノ下ニ既ハ「ベルリン」ノアナタノ事務室カラ遣ハサレテ活動シタノデハアリマセンカ。レ

答「イイエ。私ハ全然彼トハ無關係デス。レ

問「然シアナタハ彼ガ遂にサレテカラ後任ニ誰カラ送ラウト目論ンダデハアリマセンカ。ドウデス。レ

答「イイエ。レ

大島浩訊問書

一九四六年三月五日 PF

二三五、二三七及二三八

2156B

書類番號

第二一五六B一

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）二月一日 大島浩
ノ訊問カラノ抜萃。一六頁。一七頁。一八頁
二一頁。二二頁。

2156B-1

問、君ハ何時初メテリッツベントロツプト知り合ツタノカ

答、初メテ合ツタノハ一九三五年（昭和十年）デス。

問、一九三六年（昭和十一年）ニ何邊モリッツベントロツプト會見シタノハ如何ナル用向デアッタノカ。

答、一九三六年ニ我々ハ防共協定ヲ締結シマシタ、該協定ハ最後ニ武者小路大使ニヨリ訂印サレタノデスガ私ハ此ノ最後ノ取極ニ至ル迄該事項ニ付テ相當回數ノ會談ヲ致シマシタ。

問、其前ニ君ハハツク氏ト提案ノ對露西亞日獨同盟ノ主要事項ニ付テ話シ合ツタコトガアルカ。

答、ハイ、私ハ彼ト話シ合ツタ事ガアリマシタ。此ノ件ニ付テハ若シ御希望ナラバ本協定ガ妥結ニナル迄ノ事情ヲ詳細ニ申上ゲマセウ。本協定ニ關シ私ノ知ツテル限り本協定ニ關スル秘密事項ヲモ込メテ總テヲお話シ致シマセウ。先ヅ申上ゲマスガ一九三五（昭和十）年六月ダツト思ヒマスガハツクガ私ノ處ニ來テ云フノニハ之ハリッツベントロツプダケノ考ヘテ獨逸政府ノ政策トハ關係ハナイノデアルガ露西亞ニ關スル或種ノ防禦同盟ト云フ

カ如キモノヲ日獨固ニ結ブ可能性ハナイダラ
ウカトノコトデシタ。此ノ點ニ付テハ彼等ハ
日本軍ガ亞洲ニ進入リ込ンデ居リ從ツテ上記
ノ如キ同盟ニ興味ヲ持ツデアラウコトヲ承知
シテ居タノデス。ソノツマリ日本軍ガ歐州ノ國
境ニ進出シテ居ルト云フコトガソノ理由ナノ
デス

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×

×

問、君ハハツクガ之等ノ考ヘヲリツベントロツプ
ニ復命スルダラウト考ヘタカ。

答、勿論左様考ヘマシタ。然シ私ハ日本ノ參謀本
部ノ意見ヲ明確ニ知ラナイ以上確タル返事ヲ
スルコトハ出来マセンデシタ。

問、其ノ語ヲ流ケナサイ。

答、此ノ後デリツベントロツプハ私ニ合ヒ度イト
ノコトデ其ノ年ノ十月ハハツクシ察見スル初メテ
彼ト會ヒマシタ。此ノ會見デリツベントロツ
プハ之ハ單ナル自分一個ノ考ヘデアツテヒツ
トライヤ政府ガソレヲ如何様ニ考ヘテ居ルカ
知ラナイト云ツテ居マシタ。ソシテ彼ハ更ニ
ソノ實現ノ可能性ガアル様ニ考ヘラレルト云
ツテ居マシタ。ソシテ彼ハ私ニ日本陸軍カ本

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件ヲ如何様ニ考ヘルダラウカト斷キマシタノ
デ私ハ今之ヲ知ル方懐カナイト申シマシタラ
彼ハ私ニ日本艦隊ノ意嚮ヲハツキリ確カメル
様願ミマシタソシテ本件ニ關スル日本艦隊ノ
意見ヲ明カニスルタメ日本艦隊ニ連絡ヲ取ル
様願ミマシタソコデ私ハ本件ニ付テ行報ヲ參
謀本部ニ打チマシタ。此ノ時リツベントロツ
プハ右ハ彼個人丈ノ考デアルコト、ソシテ萬
一對逸政府ガ彼ヲ支持シナイコトガアツテモ
悪ク思ツテ呉レルナコトヲ念入シテ話シテ居
リマシタ。私モ日本政府ニ付テ同様ノコトヲ
申シマシタ。

問、之ハ本提案付テノ第二回ノ東京ヘノ通信デア
ツタカ

答、ハイ、ソウデス。

問、續ケナサイ。

答、「ハツクハ此ノ會見ノ席ニ居リマシタソシテ
此ノ席ニハ此ノ三人ダケダツタノデス。」
日本ニ打ツタ私ノ此ノ電報ニ對シ參謀本部カ
ラノ返事ハ本提案ニ對シ何等全面的ノ反對ハ
ナイガ乘リ出ス前ニ尙充分ニ本件ヲ拾付シ度
イ其ノ度ニ參謀本部ノ對逸部若松中佐ヲ派遣

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シ度イト云フコトデアリマシタ。日時ハ餘リ
確カニハ覺エデマセンガ、確カニ一九三五年
（昭和十年）十二月初旬ニ此ノ將校ハ伯林ニ
到着シマシタ。此ノ時ニハ私ハリツベントロ
ツプトハ何ノ交渉モ致シマセンデシタ。

問、此ハ通信ニ關シ君ハ日本外務省ト何カ連絡ヲ
取ツタカ。

答、イ、エ、致シマセン。本國ハ單ナル軍事事項
デアリマシタ。若松中佐ノ伯林到着ニ先チ、
ハツクガ私ニ會ヒニ數回ヤツテ來マシタガ私
ハ上記ノ將校ノ到着迄待ツ様ニ彼ニ話シテ居
リマシタ。デ中佐ガ着イタ時ニ私ハ中佐ヲ送
レテリツベントロツプト又ブロンベルグ將軍
ニモ會ヒニ行キマシタ。若松中佐ハ彼等ニ參
謀本部ハ多少一般の條件ノ
居ルガ本件ハ未ダリツベントロツプト個人ノ考
ヘダケノ獄ニナツテ居ルノデ
カドウデアアルノカ之ヲ知ルコトガ自分ノ義務
ナノダト話シマシタ。更ニ又若松ハ日本陸軍
ハ本件ニ賛成デアアルガ愈々實現ニ入ル爲ニ
ハ日本政府ト相談ヲセネバナラナイト云フコ
トモ申シ加ヘマシタ。

昭和二十一年二月一日大島浩ノ訊問調書抜萃

答、。私ガ貴官ニ對シ指摘致シ度イ事ハ日本ノ大使館附隨海軍、武官ハ當該大使ノ管轄下ニ在ルノデハナク、直接ニ東京ニ在ル夫々ノ最高司令部ニ對シ責任ヲ負フテキル點デアリマス。大使館員デアルト言フ點カラスレバ彼等ハ當該大使ノ下ニアルノデアリマスガ彼等ノ職務ニ關スル限り彼等ハ東京ニ於ケルソノ軍首惱者ニ對シ責任ヲ負フノデアリマス。

問、彼等ハ大使館附武館タル地位ニ基キ二□間ノ協約、條約乃至ハ□際協定ニ立到ル様ナ交渉ヲ他ノ□ノ軍部ト試ミル權限ヲ與ヘラレテキマスカ
 答、ソウデス。若シソレガ嚴格ニ軍事ニ關スル事柄ニ就テデアツタラ大使館附武官ハ大使ヲ通サズニソレ等ノ事ヲ論ズルコトガ出來マス。私ハ更ニ進ンデ申述ベル前ニ茲デ強調シテ置キタイ事ハ彼等ハ日本ノ陸軍ノ意見ヲ表明シテキタノデ日本ノ政府ノ意見ヲ發表シテキタノデハナイト言フ點デス。何故ナラバ若シ政府ノ意見デアレバソレハ大使ノ職務權限ニ屬スル事柄デアツタカラデアリマス。

問、勿逸ニ於テ「リツペン」トロツブレソノ他誰カガ若シ日本ノ軍部ヲシテ此ノ考ヲ押附ケルコトガ出來タナラバ日本ノ軍部ハ當時悉ラク外務省ヲ説得シテ右意圖ニ從ハシムルコトガ出來ル様ナ

昭和二十一年二月一日大島浩ノ訊問調書抜萃

答、
 ・・・私ガ貴官ニ對シ指摘致シ度イ事ハ日本ノ
 大使館附陸海軍、武官ハ當該大使ノ管轄下ニ在
 ルノデハナク、直接ニ東京ニ在ル夫々ノ最高司
 令部ニ對シ責任ヲ負フテキル點デアリマス。大
 使館員デアルト言フ點カラスレバ彼等ハ當該大
 使ノ下ニアルノデアリマスガ彼等ノ職務ニ關ス
 ル限り彼等ハ東京ニ於ケルソノ軍首惱者ニ對シ
 責任ヲ負フノデアリマス。

問、
 彼等ハ大使館附武館タル地位ニ至キニ□間ノ協
 約、條約乃至ハ□際協定ニ立到ル様ナ交渉ヲ他
 ノ□ノ軍部ト試ミル權限ヲ與ヘラレテキマスカ
 ソウデス。若シソレガ嚴格ニ軍事ニ關スル事柄
 ニ就テデアツタラ大使館附武官ハ大使ヲ通サズ
 ニソレ等ノ事ヲ論ズルコトガ出來マス。・・・私
 ハ更ニ進ンデ申述ベル前ニ茲デ強調シテ置キタ
 イ事ハ彼等ハ日本ノ陸軍ノ意見ヲ表明シテキタ
 ノデ日本ノ政府ノ意見ヲ發表シテキタノデハナ
 イト言フ點デス。何故ナラバ若シ政府ノ意見デ
 アレバソレハ大使ノ職務權限ニ屬スル事柄デア
 ツタカラデアリマス。

問、
 獨逸ニ於テ「リツペン」トロツブレソノ他誰カガ
 若シ日本ノ軍部ヲシテ此ノ考ヲ押附ケルコトガ
 出來タナラバ日本ノ軍部ハ當時悉ラク外務省ヲ
 説得シテ右意圖ニ從ハシムルコトガ出來ル様ナ

地位ニアツタト言フコトモ亦事實デハアリマセ
ンカ

答、ソウデス。ソレハ一點デアリマシテ陸軍ガ日本
政府ニ此ノ協定ノ締結ヲ押附ケルコトガ出来タ
デアラウ程ノ力ヲ有シテキタコトハ間違ヒアリ
マセン。第二ノ點ハ私ガ曩ニ強調シタトコロデ
「リツベントロツブレ」ハ當時公ノ地位ニ居ナカ
ツタト言フコトデス。特ニコノ點ニ關シ彼ハ日
本ノ陸軍ガ如何ニシテ滿洲ヲ占領シタカラ知ツ
テキマシテ、ソレ故必然ニコノ點カラ日本ノ陸
軍ハコノ種ノ條約ノ締結ヲ推進スル最モ強力ナ
地位ニアルモノト判断ヲ下シテキマシタ。・・・
私ハ若シ陸軍ガコノ協定ヲ欲シナカツタナラバ
コレニ就キ何等ノ條約モ成立シナカツタデアラ
ウト言フコトヲ申上ゲラレマス。

昭和二十一年二月一日大島浩訊問十八頁及十九
頁

大書番號二五六

一九四六年二月四日大島浩ニ対スル訊問 四三四四頁 ^後四五頁

問 三國協定ニ付テ貴方ノ語ヲコレカラ進メテ下サイ

答 コノ協定ガ如何ニシテ出来ラカソノ概念ヲ不語シシヤウ特

ニ詳細ナ説明ヲ御要ボラハ後テ質問ニテ下サイ

先ヅ御承知通り一九三七一年七月ニ支那事変ガ始マラ

事ヲ不語シス。是レニ続キ或ル時期ニ於テ貴方ハ御承知

デナイカセ知シマセンガテ事変ヲ終結サセムルノ日本ハ独逸

ヲ利用セト試ミマシム。コノ時私ハ東京ノ参謀本部カ

ラ命令ヲ受ケマシム。即チ急速ニ物躊リ伝ヘ且結局

行詰ルノミノ事変ハ中止ス可キテアルト言フ意見カラ私ニ独

逸ノ軍部指導者達ニ接近シ彼等ヲシテ更ニ蔭介ス

ノ独逸人軍事顧問達ニ接近サセム程ニ試ミサセリテス。

話ノ順序トシテ先ヅ御託致シマスガ何日デアリカ 確カテ

ナイガ一九三八年一月ト思フ。兎ニ角一月初頃私ハ

「ゾネンブルグ」ノ別荘ニ「リフベントロフ」ヲ訪ネマシム。

私ハ新年ノ挨拶ニ行ツテ「テスガ」其際同氏ハ独逸ト自

本ガ條約其他ノ方法ヲ更ニ緊密ニナル方策ハナイモノ

カト私ニ尋ネマシム。「リフベントロフ」ハ「クリスマス」休職

ヲ彼ノ別荘デ過シ私ハ正月頃彼ヲ訪問シテ事ヲ記

憶シテ居ラス。而シテ此、會見ニ付テノ大略ヲ東京ノ冬謀
 本部へ通達スル事ヲ記憶シテ居ラス。同年六月、私ハ冬
 謀本部、主任部、ローマ字課、カラ通牒ヲ受ケリ。ソレニ依
 ツテ冬謀本部全体ノ聲テハナク、該部ノ関スル限リニ於
 テハ日独協調ノ進展ヲ認ムト云フデアリ。コノ通牒ノ詳
 細ニ付テハ、記憶ヲ居ラヌカ要點ハ、提携運動ニ於テ最
 モ慎重ヲ期ス可キハ、ソレニ「露西亞ニ関スルハ一致行
 動ヲトシト云フ約束ヲナケバナラヌト云フ事」ガ、ト賢エテ
 居ル。七月初旬、アンロリソベントロフ、ハ夏季休暇ヲ再ビ、ソ
 ニ「ル」ヘ行ク準備中デアリテ、ソノ出発前ニ彼カラ「再ホテ面
 會ニ種々ノ事項ニ付テ話シ合フ」ル。此時ハ特使ニ依ツテ
 齋サタ、日本ヨリノ通牒事項ニ関シ何等觸ル事ナク、ソ
 ビエツト「露西亞カラ攻撃ヲ受ケル場合、何等カノ行動
 ニ出ル前ニオ互ニ相談シ合フコトヲ約束」ル。或種ノ協定ヲ
 取結ブコトニ付テ如何ニ考ヘラレカ、私ハ「尋ネテ、ソレベント
 ロフ、ハ一應考ヘサセテ、吳ト云フテ暫ク別レテ、コノ會談
 ノ次ノ段階ハ數日後「ソレベントロフ」ガ私ト會談スル特別
 ノ目的デ、ソレベントロフ「カラ歸ツテ来ル事デアリト記憶スル
 私ノ知ツテ居ル限リニ於テハ、ソノ際彼ノ言ツル事ハ大体次ノ
 通りデアリ。

(1) 彼、言葉ハ「ヒットラ」又ハ他、官吏ト、會談ニ基クモ、デナイ事

(2) 單ニ相談スル事ヲ約スル程度ノ條約ハ、カ一方ノ的デアリ
 充分ニ強カデナイ故、独逸ハ特ニ認メセズ又好ミヌヤ、又
 ント彼ガ感ズル事、

(3) ソノ代リ「ソビエツト」露西亜、シテナク、各國ヲ目標トスル相
 互援助條約ヲ提案スル事、ソリ、彼ガ意味ナク、ハ日独
 協定ガ若シ充分ニ強カデアリナラ、世界平和ノ確保ヲ
 期待スル得ル、ガウ事、独逸ハ、當時特ニ、一種ノ發表ヲ
 好ミテ居ル事

問 ソノ當時「ソビエツト」ハ、独逸政府、如何ナル地位ニテ
 リ、外務大臣、或ハ外務省、一官吏デアリカ。

答 彼ハ、外務大臣、テ、當時、數「月」前、カ、務、メ、テ、居、リ、タ、リ、日本ハ
 露西亜、對、シ、テ、行動スル、準備、ガ、了、ル、文、デ、カ、ラ、全、世界
 ヲ、目標トスル、相互援助ノ、協定ニ、同意スル、ト、言、フ、事、ト、言、フ、事、
 的、ヲ、拡大スル、事、ニ、賛、成、スル、事、甚、ダ、困難ト、思、フ、ト、リ、ソ、ビ、エ、ツ、ト、
 ニ、語、リ、マ、シ、タ、リ、ソ、レ、ニ、答、ヘ、テ、リ、ソ、ビ、エ、ツ、ト、ハ、日本ニ、定、力、以、上、ノ、事、
 ヲ、メ、テ、責、任、度、イ、デ、ハ、ナイ、然、レ、平、和、確、保、ノ、メ、テ、強、カ、ク、協、定、
 是非、共、必要、ガ、ト、言、フ、而、シ、テ、更、ニ、コ、ト、真、ラ、私、ニ、對、シ、カ、説、
 言、ス、ル、ソ、コ、デ、リ、ソ、ビ、エ、ツ、ト、ハ、日、本、陸、軍、ハ、斯、カ、ル、協、定、ニ、

閣下如何ナル意見ヲ有キ居ルカ調ベテ欲シト要ホレ次ニ
 是ニ付テ完全ニ秘密ヲ保持スル様要ホレタ。實ハ此點以
 前防共協定ヲ結ブタメノ打合ヤニ付テ或ル漏洩ガアツタラ
 今度ハ電信ヤ無線ヲ通信スニ誰カ歸國者ヲ吳ソト
 ノ要ホテアリマシタ。コレガタメニ謀本部ノ通信ハ右ニ関
 スル承認取付ニ止ム。七月末頃ニ承認ヲ得ルカウ飛行機ヲ
 笠原少將ヲ派遣ス。是ハ一度ノ會合テハ決定セズニ三
 回ノ會合ヲ要ス。

文書番号(二二五六) 一九四六年二月六日

、訊問

四六並四七頁

問 將軍 三國協定ニ関スル事件ニ就テ談話ヲ進メ

テ下サイ。

答 三國協定が出来ん迄ノ事件ノ大略ヲオ詔シマス

カラ話中デモ又ハ後リデモ御質問ガ有マシタラ仰

言ッテ下サイ。

問 將軍 コノ前吾々が中止シタ所ヲ御記憶デスカ

答 ハイ

問 貴方ハ其処カラ話ヲ進メテ下サイ。

答 望原少將ハ一九三六年八月日本へ到着途中

シंगाポール迄飛行機ニシテカラハ船デ旅行ヲ続ケ

タ 帰國後彼ハ參謀本部ニ歸シ參謀本部ハ

是レヲ当時外務大臣宇垣ニ語ッタ 更ニ外務大

臣ハ本件ニ関シ五閣僚委員ト意見ノ交換ヲ

行ツタ コレハ特ニ重要案件ヲ審議スル閣僚中

ノ委員デアタ。参謀本部ハコノ提案ニ大体
同意シ又五人ノ委員モ諒解シタト云フ電報ヲ
私ハ参謀本部カラ受取リマシタ

問 將軍、是等五人ハ如何ナル大臣デアッタカ御

承知デスカ

答 勿論私ノ記憶カラ文デ絶対ニ確実トハ申セマ
センガ多分五委員ハ近衛總理大臣、宇垣外
務大臣、比田大藏大臣、板垣陸軍大臣並ニ米方
海軍大臣ダツト思フ

答 重原ヲ日本へ派遣シタ私ノ理由ハ單ニ陸軍ノ
意見ヲ得レタマデシタ。然レ尚日私ガ意見シタ
處デハ陸軍ハ当時特ニ支那事変ノ終結ヲ希望
シテ居タノデソノ方向ニ進ム第一歩ナリト信ジ彼等
自身デ外務大臣ニ話シ外相ハ更ニ五委員ニ話ッ
タデヤラス

布レテ四九頁ニ

問 將軍ノ若シ貴方ノ詔ノ理解ニ間違ヒナク
バ東京カラ貴方が受取ラタマフ事ハ參謀總長
カラ奏タモゲタス

答 常ニ參謀總長カラ是ラス

問 鏡ケテ下サイ

答 他ノ電報並ニ般内通信セアリマシタガ彼等
ノ意見ハ調印國ノ一カ理由ナキ侵略ノ犠牲ニナラ
場合相互援助ヲ的ニスル處ノ協定ヲ締結スル事
ヲ希望スルトイフコトデラシク 然シ作ラ日本ハ該協定
ハ和ニ露西重ヲ目標トシ他ノ諸國ハ是レニ次カカ
ニ羨トスル事ヲ希望シテ居マシタ

x x x x x

而シテ五〇・五一・五ニ並ニ五三頁ニ

答 故ハ一九三八年十月ノ頃カラ大使トシテノ公職
ニ就キマシタ リッペントロップニ並ニ獨逸外務省法
務部長ガウストノ協定ニ引キ鏡キ條約ノ大綱ヲ決定

No 8

2156.D

シテカラ私ハ上記概算ヲ公報トシテ日本外務省へ
發送シマシタ

問、將軍、貴下ハ一九三八年（昭和十三年）十月八日
ニ大使ニ任命セラレタト聞イテ喜マスカ。

答、ソノ通りカス

問、貴下ハ直チニ就任ナサイマシタカ。

答、私ノ公ニ任務ヲ開始シタハ十月ノ末デラタト陳
述シマシタソレハ前大使ノ次ノ任地ニ向ケ出發スル
迄公務ニハ就カナイトイフカ日本ノヤリ方アアル
カラカス。

問、將軍、貴下ノ大使ニ就任ナサレタ當時、ソレ迄大使
館附陸軍武官トシテ貴下ヲ通シテ進メシテ来タ
此ノ條約案ノ交渉カ今ヤ東京外務省ノ大使トシテ
資格ニ於ケル貴下ヲ通シヌ貴下ト共ニコノ交渉
ヲ進メテ行ク段階ニ至テ至ラフ中ノ如何ト考ヘラレルノ
カスカ。

答、ソノ通りカス。私ノ大使ニアルトスガ

問、續ケテヨロシイカス。

答、外務省カラ、最初ノ回答ハ外務省並ニ政府ハ
支那事變ノ終結ニ役立テ且ソノ軍隊ノ轉用

7 可能なるに如く兩路兩重事情ヲ明確ニシ (2)
 日本ノ國際的地位ヲ強固ニシ (3) 独逸ヲ技術
 的及經濟的ニ扶助ス度ニ得ルニカニ條約
 二箇ニ同意見ヲ示トイフニテアリタリ。之レ條約ノ
 實際ノ措辭ニ因テハ目下考究中アリト述ビテ
 中ニ之。之ガ最初ノ回答ナリ。

間、軍隊ノ轉用トイフニテ支那ノ事變ノ終結ニ

如何ナル關係ガアリタリカ。

答

モシ「シベリヤ」國境ノ諸問題ノ解決サレバ
由事ニ應ジテコレヲ軍隊ヲ他ノ場所ニ使用出陣
シケラス

問

將軍貴下ノオツシタル意味ハソレ迄「ロシア」國境
ニ沿テ展開シテキタ軍隊ヲソノ時ニ「國境」
撤退サセ支那ニ對シテ使用シ得ルトイフコトヲカ
ス

答

必要ノ場合ニ「カス」實ノ所日本ハ「石三島」
ネラフタルカス

問

才續ケ下サイ

答

コト私ノコレヲ申シタコトニ立ケ度リ要約致シス
ト大體如クヤウカス日本「カス」帰ラ「カス」
知ラ「カス」限リノ政府ノ見解ニツイテ私ニ「カス」
之ハ「カス」私カ「カス」大使トシテ交渉ヲ始メ「カス」
「カス」非公式トモ「カス」扱「カス」
「カス」ト「カス」ト今談シテ後「カス」
日本ニ送リ「カス」電報ヲ受取リ「カス」
要「カス」ハ「カス」計畫ニ「カス」細部ニ「カス」
「カス」中「カス」ニ「カス」

閣下、政府、見解ハ先程貴下ハ済まざるモト同レカ
答 正ニ通リカス。新ハツノ回答ヲ待つカ中々来ナシ。

遂ニ十二月、新ハ外務省ニ何故回答カ来ヌカテ尋
他ノ文書ヲ送リ、ソノ返事トシテ受取リ、大書ノ取
寄ハ目下ノ焦眉ノ問題ハ、ロシヤヲ最重要國ト
シテ指名シ、他ノ諸國ハ重要性之ニ次カモノトシテ
指名スルトイフ件ニ関レテ、アルトイフコトアリマシ
コノ事ニ関シ、外務省ハ、ハツク、トノ間ニ論争カ起
ルコトヲ懸念シ、旨表明シ、コノ事ヲ先カ十分ニ明確ニシ
後交渉ヲ進行セシメ、トテ外務省ヨリ大臣ノ資格
ヲ有スル伊藤博文ヲ参謀本部ヨリ、シタラシ中佐ヲ
軍令部ヨリ、アハレ大佐（現ニ海軍中將トシテ、空一カ
在リテ派遣スル旨云フ）来マシ。新ハ、彼等ト合談
スルヲ命令セシマシ。コノ人々ハ一九三九年（昭和十四
年）二月ノ始メニ、ワルリンニ到着シマシ。一寸話カ座
リ且ツ特ニ日本ニ關係シテ、アルトイフカハ、十一月
年（昭和十三年）九月、日日本カ、作公式ノ承諾ヲ
受ケ、後「トイフ」ハ「タリ」ニ「コノ盟約ニ加ハル様

交渉之下ヲ私ハ知ラテ居リマス「イタリ」ノ回答ハ「ウラ」
ハイカ時期の熟シキルカ如何カハ疑問ナルトシ又之ヲ
熟考スル時同ヲ欲シイトイフヲアリマシム。

問 当時ノ駐伊大使ハ誰ヲアリマシタカ。
日本

答 当時ハ代理大使シカオリマセシタシ。

問 オ續ケ下サイ。

答 「ドウ」ハコノ提審ニツクテ「イタリ」カウ何ノ回答モ
受取リマセシタシ。ソコテ御答ハ日本ヲレテ同ジ提審ヲ

以テ「イタリ」ニ交渉セシムル格ニト私ニ依頼シ且ツ

私ハ「依頼」シ且ツ私「イタリ」ニ赴ク様ニト要請

シマシタ。當時日本側トシテ「イタリ」ニハ代理大使シカ

オラナカラカラス。私ハ外務省ニコノ事ヲナス許可

ヲ要請スル文書ヲ送り承諾ノ返事ヲ受ケ取リシ。

(當時ノ外務大臣ハ確カニ有田ヲシタ) 一九三八年

(昭和十五年) 十二月ノ半バコノ許可ヲ受取ツタ。私

ハ「ロ」ニ赴キ「ム」ニ會ヒ御カラウ書表ニ「イ」

カ受取ツタト同ジ回答ヲ得マシタ。シカレ 一九三九年

(昭和十四年) 一月早ニ私ハ「イ」政府(「リ」ト「ロ」)カウ

イタリ」ハ何時ヲモ参加スル許リニナラセザルトイフ趣旨
ヲ傳ヘテ来タトイフコトヲ南キヨシヨ。

書類 第三二五六号、一九四六年（昭和二十一年）二月七日

汎問 自五四頁至五九頁

問 將軍、昨日休廷ノ際ニ止チアサリ三國同盟ニ

ソイツノ貴下ノ話ヲワケテ下サイ。

書類番号 二一五六㉔

A 昨日中上野ヲコトニツイテ、寓シノウケテ大使トシテ私が日本へ送ツル最初ノ通信ニ関スル次ノトコロヲ読ミ返シテ下サイ。

Q 報告者ニ読ムデ戴キマス。(同部令ヲブラテ一覽読ム)

A 私人大使着任后、カ一ノ電報が日本ニ打タレタ。ソノ自附ハハツキリ覺エテ平ナイガ一九三八年十一月始メガタト處フ返事ガ来ナカッタノデ、申上ゲタ如ク更ニ打電シタ

二回目ノ電報ヲ一九三八年十月ニ打ツタ後ニヤット返信ガアツタ ソレニハ大体ロシヤヲ重要國ニシテア他國ヲ亦ニ位ニオクト言フコトツイテ日本トドイツトノ百ニ意見ノ相違ガ起ルデアラウカラ之ヲ明カニスルタメニ東京カラ使節ヲ送ルト云フコトヲ述べテアツタ。

ドイツ人達ハ彼等ノ希望スルコトヲ、一九三八年十二月ニ私ニ語シタ。彼等ハイタリヤ人ニモ交渉シタ。此ノ使命ヲ実行スルコトヲ許可セラレル様ニ要求シタ私ノ通信ガ一九三八年十二月ニ外務省ニ送ラレ、同月有田外相カラノ返事ガ届イタ。

Q 統ケテ下サイ將軍

A 伊藤使節ハ順路テアツタノテ先ヅイタリニ行キニ三日滞在ノ後、ベルリンニ向ヒ一九三九年二月始メ頃到着シタ。ソノ數日後白鳥大使モイタリニカラベルリンへ来タ

伊藤ハ提議サレタコノ條約ニ関スル政府ノ計画ト希望
事項トヲ携ヘテ居タリ。サテコレハ甚ダ重要ナラズテ、私ハ
詳細ヲ総テハ覽エテナク、伊藤カ持ツテ来タ日本
政府ノ主要ナル希望ヲ概略説明シタイ。ソレハカクノ如キ
モノナル。口ニヤカキ同盟條約ノ第一ノ目的ナルガ又
即ニ義的ナル他ノ國々モ彼等ガ共產主義ニテツク時ニ
ノミ問題トナワテ来ル。言ヒ換ヘバ、例ヘバ、モシ日本ガ
英國ト交戦スル場合ニハ、英國ガ共產主義トナワテ来ルトキ
ニノミ效力ヲ有スルナル。

Q 將軍アナタノ言ハレ他ノ國々トハ何ヲ意味スルノカ明カニシテ
下サイ、他ノ如何ナル國ヲモ指スノテヌカ。

A. コノ同盟ガ合クロシア以外ノ特定ノ國ニ関シテ作りアゲ
ラレル以前ニ交渉ガ中止サレタテ他ノ國々ト云フナル
更ニ詳シク説明スバ、特定ノ國トノ關係ニモ後日
充分ニ觸レル考ヘハアツタナルガ、ソユマデ行ク前ニ交
渉ハ断絶サレタナル。

Q 實際ニドウハ全世界ヲ問題トシテナクハナイカ

A 然リ、ソノ通りナル、シカシ又ドウハ前文ノ第一ノ條ニ
於テアメリカヲ除外スルコトニ同意シタ。

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向、然し當初アナタが日本政府代表者トシテ独逸ノ代表者達ト會日談マシタ時、話が全世界ヲ相手ニスル様ナ條約締結ニ進ミ結局是等ノ國家ノ削除ガテサレルニ至ッタ訳カ

答然リソノ削除ハ日本側ノ要請ニ基キタモノトアル。日本ガ若シ独逸側ノ提案ニカカル條約ヲ受諾スルトセバ、援助條件ハ日本側ニ有利ナ結果ヲ招来シタイカロウト云フコトガ、今(ソノ)上臆テアリマシタナゼトラバ例ヘバ日米戦争ノ場合、独逸ハ日本ニ対シ如何ナル特殊ナ援助ヲ

与ヘルコトガ出来ルデアリマセウカ然ルニ例ヘバ独米戦争ノ場合ニハ日本ハ太平洋ニ於テソノ全カラ傾倒シテケレハタルマイ、コレハ勿論單ナル私ノ辟言ニ過ギナイカラ日本政府ノ意向ト解釋サレテハ困ル。白鳥モ私モ兩人共ソノ日本側ノ

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氣持ハ良ク解ルト言ヒマシタ。然レシテ際若シ日本
が共産主義國家ニ對シテニ對抗スル意見國ヲ
表明シテラバ交渉ハ恐ラク決裂スル外ロウ我々西
人共ソウ感心シマシタ。結局今日迄上述ノ様ナ會談
ハ行ハレナカッタ。上記ノ事項甚ニ私ノ所見ハ之ヲ

一九三九年(昭和十四年)二月中外務省へ急報テ
報告シマシタ。

尙伊藤委員一行が未ダ独逸カ伊太利ニ居タ
時ニソノ急報が送サレタカ。

答然リ、彼等一行がベルリンニ居タ時テス。

尙續イテ先テ話シナサイ

答此報告ニ對スル回答ハ二月末及至三月初旬頃

到着シタが其ノ要旨ハ大畧次ノ通りデアリマシタ

露路西亞ニ對シテハ変更ナキモ其他ノ諸國

ニ對シテハ條約ハ共産主義國ヲニ目標トスル

モノデアルト言フ丈ニ止ラズモト進メテ交渉スベキ

ト然レシ與ハラルベキ援助ハ軍事上ノ助言タルベキコ

ト即チ私人此ノ軍事上ノ助言ト云フコトニコウテ

情報ノ交換、必要ノ場合基地ノ一時的代員與ハ燃料油其ノ他物資ノ輸出並ビニ一般的ニ實際上ノ参戰以外ノ一切ノ援助ヲ指スノデス。換言スレハ是ハ後ニ合衆國ガ一九四二年(昭和十六年)戰事ニ参加スル以前英國ニ對シテ與ヘタ援助ト大体同様ノモノデアリマシタ。

尚續イテ話シテサイ
答比ノ回答ハ「リッベントロップ」並ニ独逸政府へ
移牒サレマシタ。ソレテ伊太利政府へ白鳥カラ
回附サレタモノト思ヒマス。一寸外ノ話ニナリマスガ
今後伊太利ガ重要ナ立役者トシテ登場セヌ
限り私ノ話ハ独逸關係ニ限定シマス。回
答ガ二月末頃到着シタト先刻申上ゲタノハ誤リ
テ三月末知ツタト信ジマス。兎ニ角独逸政府
ハ「リッベントロップ」ヲ通シテ私ニ對シテ露路西亞ニ
關スル限り且又其他ノ國々ヲ第二次的ノモト
スルト莫ニ關スル限り何等問題ナキモ一應日本

國代表者ト會日見ノ上採ラレベキ手段並ニ特定國
 家ノ指定等ニ関シ細目ノ取極ニ入ルコトヲ希
 望スルト申シテ来マシタ。言ヒ換ヘレバ先カ言
 フトコロテハ一般論ノ時期ハ既ニ終ワリカラ細目ノ取
 極ヲ希望スルトコトデアツタ。独逸側ハ更ニ條約文
 ヲ作ル時ニハノ條約が主トシテ陸路國ニ對スルモノ
 デアルコトヲ記述スルトナク全ク一般の性質ノ條約ヲ
 ラシメオキ非軍事的援助等ノ如ク該條約ヲ弱
 体化スル細目ニ觸レサル様希シニスルヒ目ヲモ述ベテ
 タノデシタ。細目取極ノ字メニハ何等カ他ノ方法ニヨル
 コトが出来ルカノウト彼等ハ言フノデシタ
 固アナタハ「リッベントロフ」が細目取極ノ字メニハ何
 等カ他ノ方法ニヨルコトが出来ルダラウト言ツタ

ト言ロレルガ

其ノ時アチタ方兩人ハドウ云フ事ダト考ヘタリ

答此ノ事ニ関シ更ニ進テ論ズルヲバコレハ條約文
ノ作成ニ際シテハ單ニ此ノ條約ノ署名國ニ非ザル他ノ
國家カラ正当ノ理由ヲ以テ攻撃ヲ受ケタ場合ニハ
署名國ハ互ニ援助スル旨ヲ條約文ノ記述シカスベシ
トイフ意味ニ外ニラヌデアル。故ニ表面上コレハ吾
ニ對シテ強カニシテ拘束力ヲ有スル條約ナル如ク見
テアリセシ。勿論該條約ノ一定ノ細目又ハソノコトニ
關スル限リ全條約ノ義ヲ以テアロウガ。然レシラズ
トシテ言フトコロハ關係國家ガ露國ヲイフ場合
ハ非軍事的援助以上ノ援助ハ與ヘタクナイトウ
日本ノ希望ニ就テハ。独逸側ハ實際ノ條約文中
ニ此事ニ觸レテ日本側ト協議ノ上ニシテ
協定シタリト希望カト言フトガツデアリ。條約文中
ニ露國ノ場合ハ如何スベキヤ、露國以外ノ場合ハ
如何スベキヤト云フガ如キ條項ヲ記載スルコトハ
不可能トナル。

No. 21

同。叔スルベントロフノ意見、彼ノ實際ノ意見ハ
独逸ガ他國ノ攻撃ヲ受ケタ場合日本カラ軍事上

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並ニ其他ノ方法ヲ援助シテ實ニタイト云フコトガナラ

ト思ハレルカソレト違ヒナイカ

答、其英ニ就テ今回ハモ少シ詳細ニ話シマセウモウ

一度繰リ返シ説明シテ誤解ノ起ラナイ様ニ且又

アナタガ事情ヲ充分諒解サレル様ニシタイト思ヒマス

(一)公表セラレバキ實際ノ條約ニ関スル限り同題ハナカ

ラ。且ハ單ニ相互援助條約タルベキモデ何等ノ

條件モツイテ居ナカツタ。

(二)日本ハ露西亞以外ノ他ノ國家ニ関シハ秘密

條約カ又ハ他ノ方法ノ何レカニヨリテコトヲ英ノ解決ヲ

計リタイト希望シタ。即チ夫レ等ノ國家ニ対スル

援助ハ軍事上ノ援助迄ニ到ラナイモトセフコトデアル。

(三)独逸ハソウ云フ秘密條約ガ署名カレタ場合ニ

ソレヲ漏レテ其秘密條約又ハ協定ノ存在ガ知レ

渡ソト場合ハ實際ノ條約其モノヲ著シテ弱体化

セシムルデアロウト言フ理由デ之ニ反対ナシ。ソレテ之ニ

対シテ斯カル條約ヲ完成スルヲ先ヅ日独兩國

同ニ會議ヲ開キ、何國ニ対シテハ如何ニスベキヤノ

同題ニ、之ヲ其會議ニ於テ決定スベキコト、並ニ

No. 22

全体ノ條約ヲ修正スベキ拘束力ヲ有スルガ
如キ條約ハ署名スベカラザルコトヲ提案シ
来タツターデアアル。

向、將軍、私達ハ *Public Enemy* リンセントポ
ト

日本政府ノ意見ニツイテ話シテ居リマシタ。ソノ事
ニツイテ貴方自身ハドモモ感^レテ居ラレヌカ知
ランマ。

答、私ハソレハ近寄リノ問題デ、両方ノ考(方)ノ向ニハ
橋渡シガ容易ニ出来ルト感^レジマシタ。

向、實際、將軍、貴方ハ根據地ニ居リ、ソレヲ(ベ)ント
ゾ外相ヲ夜ヲ知ツテ居リ、貴方ハ彼ト親密ニ共ニ働
イテ居タカラ、彼が提出シテ考へ方が十分一層望マ
シイモテアルト、實際ノ所確信キハ其ノカフデスカ?

答、ソノ事ニモテハ感^レテ居ラセシム。

向、ドモテ折マデ感^レジマスカ?、他、答、私ハヒトク一般的
ニモノ事ニ思^レマシマス。私ハ貴方が自身ドモテ感^レシタカ知
リタイデアス。

答、私ハソノ事ハ何等基礎的ノ相違ハナカフ事ト感^レシタ
コト、標^レトシマス、ソレハ軍ニ追ホスル手続カケコトデシ
ソレカラ如何ナル型ノ條約又ハ協約カ兩國国民ニ適
スルガラウカトモ問題が起ツタ。日独兩國ニ協定
ナル計畫ヲ起草スルヲメニ、

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日本大使館カラ宇佐見ト竹内ノ兩名カ独逸ノ
外務省ノ中々ガウスト会合シテ、各種ノ計畫ヲ
立案シタ。コレヲノ何レモ日独兩國ノ何レノ政府ニモ
全ク満足デハアリマセンデシタカ、私ハ絶エズ兩國カ
会合ノデキル繋ギノ橋ヲ見ツケルコトニ努力カシタ。尤モ
コレハ勿論私自身ノ考ヘダケデシタケレド、日本ハ此ノ
條約ノ外ニ他ノ國々ト別ノ秘密協約ヲ締結スルカ
クモ、其締結ノ申込ヲ順次ニ關係ノ國々ニ通報
スル事案ヲ生ジ此ノ別ノ秘密協約デコノ條約ヲ弱
化セント企圖シテ止ト、独逸カ邪推シ始メタト私ハ
信ジタ。日本ノ側デハ独逸カ日本ノ利益視界外
ノ事柄ニ日本ヲ無理ニ曳キズルマントシテ止ト
感シタカモ知シテ也。

問 コノ間始終伊藤委員團ハ何所ニ井タノデスカク、
答 彼等ハ附近ニ暫時井マシタ、ソレテ日本ノ返答ヲ
受取ツタ時モダソコニ井マシタガ、コノ事柄ガアツテカラ
暫クデキツタト思ヒマス。

問 貴大使館ノ両館員カ提案ノ條約ノ草案ノ
準備ヲ始メル前ニ立去リマシタカ？
答 はいソウデス。

問 伊藤委員團ハ一度何ヲ爲シタカト云フコトカ、
今私ハ全ク明白デハナイテ、

(Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, March 5, 1946. pp. 235, 237, and 238)

Q. Now, will you tell us how this agreement came into being? Who suggested it and who handled the negotiations for it?

A. The Japanese military had previously been using White Russians in Warsaw to gather Russian intelligence and following the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact the Russian Section of the General Staff in Tokyo thought that it would be a good idea to further the exchange of information in regard to the Soviet Union. I received orders from the General Staff to approach the Germans and did so. Actual exchange of information was handled by Lt. Col. USUI of my staff.

* * *

Q. After you received instructions to approach the Germans relative to this, whom did you speak to?

A. Keitel, at that time Lieutenant General.

* * *

Q. After the negotiations had been concluded and this agreement had been reached, what type of organization was set up to handle these activities?

A. There were many White Russians around Berlin at the time who were willing to sell information and it was simply decided to give them money and procure this information. We were using a Russian from the Caucasus by the name of Bamard(?) as one of the main sources of information.

Q. I take it then that these activities were conducted out of your office in Berlin?

A. Yes, except that USUI because he was doing work of this sort, while under me, operated independently.

Q. He operated under your supervision, did he not?

A. Yes, However, his job was to gather intelligence only and to communicate with the Russian Division of General Staff.

Q. Those communications would also go through you as the Military Attache?

A. They would go through my office.

* * *

Q. Did you hold any property in Germany?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever have a house or piece of real estate in Falkensee?

A. I understand now what you are talking about. In order to carry on Anti-Soviet propaganda, at one time I negotiated for the purchase of a place where this work could be carried on. This place was not in my name, I believe. However, we did have it.

Q. While this property was not in your own name, did you personally own it?

A. As I said, it was not in my name; the money came from my office.

Q. What type of work did you conduct from this place in Falkensee?

A. They were printing up the propaganda at this place.

* * *

Q. But you do know that you had a number of White Russians and they printed propaganda leaflets. Now, tell us what they did with them.

A. These leaflets were given to Bamard(?), who by some means or other tried to get them into Russia.

* * *

Q. General, do you know anything about a Japanese officer that had worked in Afghanistan.

A. Yes.

Q. He was expelled because of suspicion that he had attempted to overthrow the Afghanistan Government, wasn't he?

A. I believe the Japanese officer became friendly with an Afghanistan 'garrison commander' and suggested to him that they carry on Anti-Russian activities. This man evidently passed on this word to the Afghanistan Government and suggested that they get rid of the Japanese officer before they were suspected of doing such things.

Q. That man was working under your direction or out of your office in Berlin, was he not?

A. No, I had no connection with him.

Q. But you intended to send someone there to take his place after he was expelled, did you not?

A. No.

EXCERPT FROM INTERROGATION OF OSHIMA, HIROSHI, 1 February 1946, pp.18,19.

- A. I wish to point out to you that the Japanese military and naval attaches are not under the jurisdiction of the ambassador, but are directly responsible to the respective staff headquarters in Tokyo. As far as the embassy goes, they are under the ambassador, but as far as their duties go they are responsible to their military superiors in Tokyo.
- Q. Are they authorized by virtue of their position as military attaches to enter into negotiations with the military of another nation, looking towards a pact or a treaty or an international agreement between the two nations?
- A. Yes, if it was a strictly military matter they may discuss these matters without going through the ambassador... Before I go any further I would like to stress here that they were sounding out the opinion of the Japanese army and not that of the Japanese government because if they had been that would have been the ambassador's duty.
- * * *
- Q. Is it not also a fact that if Ribbentrop or any one else in Germany could sell the military of Japan on this idea that the military was then probably in a position whereby they could persuade the Foreign Office to go along with the idea?
- A. Yes, that is one point and quite true that the army had enough power to very probably sell the pact to the Japanese government. The second point is the one I stressed before that Ribbentrop was not in an official capacity at the time. Particularly, in this point, he had seen how the Japanese army had taken possession of Manchuria and, therefore, naturally, concluded from that that the Japanese army would be in the strongest position to push a treaty of this type ...I would say that no treaty could possibly have been made on this if the army had not wished it.

Excerpts of Interrogations of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, dated 4 February 1946, 6 February 1946 and 7 February 1946.

Interrogation of 4 February 1946, pages 43, 44, and 45:

- "Q. You may now proceed with your story regarding the Tri-Party Pact.
- "A. I shall give you the rough overall picture of how this pact came about. Later, if you wish to question me on specific details, please do so. To start with, I would like to tell you that, as you know, in July 1937, the China incident started. Following this, at one time, you may not be aware, that Japan attempted to use Germany in order to bring this incident to a close. At the time I received orders from the General Staff in Tokyo to try and approach German military leaders and have them in turn approach the German military advisors of Chiang Kai-shek with a view to bringing to a close an incident which was rapidly taking on gargantuan proportions and leading only to a stale-mate. As an initial step, I wish to relate how, I believe it was in January 1938, although I am not certain of the date - only that it was early in January, I called upon RIBBENTROP at his villa in Sonnenburg, to pay my New Year's respects, and at the time he asked me if there was not some way in which Germany and Japan might be brought closer together by means of a treaty or otherwise. I recall that RIBBENTROP spent his Christmas Holidays at his villa and my recollection is that I called upon him around the New Year, and I recall passing on the general story of this meeting to General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo. In the same year in June I received a communication from the Division concerned, SHUNINBU, of the General Staff Headquarters, informing me that only in so far as the Division was concerned and not speaking for the General Staff as a whole they approved the furtherance of German-Japanese cooperation. Although I do not remember the details of this communication, I remember that the main point was that in this cooperative movement the thing to be kept uppermost in mind should be an agreement to act in accord in dealing with Soviet Russia. At the beginning of July sometime RIBBENTROP was preparing to go to Sonnenburg again for the summer and before he left I saw him at his request and we talked over various matters. At this time without referring to the matter of the communication from Japan - which had come by courier - I asked him what he thought of an agreement of some sort promising to consult with each other before any action was taken in case of an attack by the U.S.S.R. RIBBENTROP asked me to let him have time to think it over - and we parted for the moment. As the

next step in these talks I recall that a few days later RIBBENTROP returned from Sonnenburg for the express purpose of talking to me. To the best of my knowledge the following is more or less what he said on this occasion: (1) that what he said was not based on talks with HITLER or any other official, and (2) that he felt that Germany would not particularly approve or like a treaty agreeing to consult only, as this was somewhat one-sided and not strong enough, and (3) that he suggested a mutual aid treaty instead aimed not only at the U.S.S.R., but all countries. In other words, what he meant was that a German-Japanese pact would, if strong enough, hope to preserve world peace. Germany was particularly fond of statements of this sort at the time.

"Q. At this time in what capacity was RIBBENTROP in the German Government - the Foreign Minister or an official in the office of the Foreign Minister?

"A. He was Foreign Minister at the time and had been for several months. I told RIBBENTROP that I thought it would be extremely difficult for Japan to agree to expand her objectives to a place where she would agree to a mutual aid pact aimed at the world in general, as she was only prepared to act against Russia. RIBBENTROP in return stated that he did not wish Japan to do anything that was outside her power to do, but that a strong pact was vitally necessary for the preservation of peace and hence urged me further upon this point. RIBBENTROP then asked me to find out how the Japanese Army would feel about such a treaty, and secondly, requested me to maintain absolute security - in this regard there had been some leaks in the previous negotiations leading up to the Anti-Comintern Pact - and to not communicate by wire or wireless with Japan, but to send someone back. Because of this I communicated with the General Staff, simply to get its O.K., and having received it sometime around the end of July, I dispatched Major General KASAHARA to Japan by air. This was not all decided at one meeting. It actually was during two or three meetings.

Interrogation of 6 February 1946, pages 46 and 47:

"Q. General, you may proceed with the recital of the story of the events relative to the Tri-Party Pact.

"A. I shall give you a general picture of the events leading up to the Tri-Party Pact, and if you have any questions during my recital, or afterwards, please interject.

"Q. General, do you remember the point at which you left off when we met last time?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You may proceed from that point.

"A. Major General KASAHARA arrived back in Japan in August 1938, after having flown as far as Singapore and proceeded from there by ship. Upon his return he spoke to the General Staff, who in turn spoke of the matter to the then Foreign Minister, UGAKI. The Foreign Minister in turn discussed the matter with the five Cabinet members committee. This was a committee among the Cabinet ministers which discussed particularly important matters. A telegram was then received by me from the General Staff stating that they were more or less in accord and that the five-man committee was also agreeable to the suggestion.

"Q. General, can you tell us what ministers these five were?

"A. This is simply from my memory and I am not absolutely certain, but I think the 5-man committee consisted of the Prime Minister, KONOYE, the Foreign Minister, UGAKI; the Finance Minister, IKEDA; the War Minister, ITAGAKI; and the Navy Minister, YONAI.

* * *

"A. My reason for sending KASAHARA to Japan was simply to get the views of the Army, but as I discovered later the Army at this time was particularly desirous of bringing to a close the China incident and they felt that this would be a step in that direction so that they took it upon themselves to speak to the Foreign Minister, who in turn spoke to the committee of five.

* * *

(And on page 49):

"Q. If I understood you correctly, General, the reply that you received from Tokyo came to you from the Chief of Staff?

"A. It always comes from the Chief of Staff.

"Q. You may continue.

"A. While there were other telegrams and communications in general, what they said was that they would be willing to conclude a pact in which mutual aid was promised in case one of the signatories was a victim of unprovoked aggression. However, Japan wished to have the pact aimed at Russia primarily, and all other countries would be secondary to this.

* * *

(And on pages 50, 51, 52, and 53):

- "A. I began my official duties as Ambassador about the end of October 1938. Following discussions with RIBBENTROP and GAUS, the head of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Office, and having decided upon the general outline of the treaty I sent an official communication to the Japanese Foreign Office giving in it the aforementioned outline.
- "Q. General, according to my information you were named Ambassador on 8 October 1938.
- "A. Yes.
- "Q. And you assumed your duties immediately?
- "A. I stated I began my official duties towards the end of October because it is Japan's protocol not to take up the official duties until the former Ambassador leaves for his next post.
- "Q. General, I suppose at the time you were named Ambassador the negotiations then with respect to this proposed treaty that had theretofore been carried on through you as Military Attache had now reached the stage where the Foreign Office in Tokyo was carrying on the negotiations through and with you in your capacity as Ambassador?
- "A. Yes, as soon as I became Ambassador.
- "Q. You may continue.
- "A. The first answer from the Foreign Office stated that the Foreign Office and the Government were in agreement regarding a treaty of this sort which would help to conclude the China incident and (1) to clarify the Russian situation so that troops could be deployed elsewhere, (2) to strengthen Japan's international position, and (3) to receive technological and economic aid from Germany. However, regarding the actual wording of the treaty they stated that they were in process of studying it. That was the first answer.
- "Q. What did the deployment of troops elsewhere have to do with the concluding of the China incident?
- "A. If the problems along the Siberian border were settled, then those troops, if necessary, could be used elsewhere.

- "Q. By that time you mean this, General, that troops that had theretofore been deployed along the Russian border could now be withdrawn from that border and used against China?
- "A. In case of necessity, yes. Essentially, Japan wished to kill three birds with one stone.
- "Q. Continue.
- "A. In general, now, to go back over what I have said and to put it into a nutshell KASAHARA, upon his return from Japan, had told me of the view of the Government as he knew them - this was, however, still unofficial because I had not yet started negotiations as Ambassador. Now, following my talks with KASAHARA and RIBBENTROP I sent the aforementioned plan to Japan officially and received a telegram in return. The gist of this communication was that the plan was agreeable, but that they were in the process of studying the ramifications thereof and that they would answer as quickly as possible.
- "Q. The views of the Government then are the views that you have just been talking about?
- "A. That is correct. I waited for the answer which did not come for a long time so that finally in December I sent another communication to the Foreign Office, asking why I did not receive an answer. In return I received a communication to the effect that the most pressing problem was on the matter of naming Russia as the most important concern or subject and other nations as secondary in importance. In this regard the Foreign Office expressed concern that arguments might occur with Germany and they wished to clarify this point fully before proceeding any further, so that they stated they would send a man from the Foreign Office, ITO, Jusshi, who had the rank of a Minister, one man from the General Staff, Lt. Col. TATSUMI, and one man from the Navy General Staff, Captain ABE (he is in Sweden now as a Vice Admiral). I was instructed to talk with them. These men arrived in Berlin in the beginning of February 1939. To go back a bit, although this does not concern Japan particularly, I know that around September 1938, after having received the unofficial O.K. from Japan, Germany approached Italy to join in the pact. Italy's answer was that while she liked the idea she did not know whether the time was ripe and requested time to think it over.
- "Q. Who was the Ambassador to Italy from Japan at that time?
- "A. There was only a charge d'affaires at that time.

"Q. Continue.

"A. Germany received no answer from Italy on this proposal so that they asked me to urge Japan to approach Italy with the same proposition and requested me to go to Italy as the Japanese had only a charge d'affaires at that time. I dispatched a communication to the Foreign Office requesting permission to do this and received in return an O.K. (the Foreign Minister at this time was definitely ARITA). Upon receipt of this permission around the middle of December 1938, I proceeded to Rome and there met MUSSOLINI, getting from him the same answer that Germany had earlier received. However, very early in January 1939, I heard from the German Government (RIBBENTROP) that Italy had communicated with them to the effect that she was ready to join in at any time. . . .

* * *

Interrogation of 7 February 1946, pages 54 to 59:

"Q. General, you may continue with your recital of your story of the Tri-Party Pact from the point where you left off when we adjourned yesterday.

"A. In regard to what I spoke to you about yesterday, I would like to have you read back to me the portion of the transcript following my dispatching the first communication to Japan as Ambassador.

"Q. The reporter will read that portion of the transcript.

(The same was read by Miss Brunner).

"A. The first telegram was sent to Japan after I took office as Ambassador. While I am not certain what its date was, I believe it was in the beginning of November 1938. The answer did not arrive and I sent another one as I told you. Finally, after I sent the second telegram in December 1938, I received the answer which in general stated that because differences might arise between Japan and Germany upon the question of naming Russia as the principal concern and the other nations as secondary, in order to clarify this they would send a Commission from Tokyo. The Germans spoke to me in December 1938, regarding their wish. They had approached the Italians also. My communication to the Foreign Office requesting permission to proceed on this mission was sent in December 1938, and the answer was received from Foreign Minister ARITA in the same month.

"Q. You may continue, General.

- "A. The ITO mission first went to Italy, as it was on their road, and after staying there for two or three days proceeded to Berlin, arriving around the beginning of February 1939. A few days after this Ambassador SHIRATORI also came to Berlin from Italy. ITO had with him the Government's plan and wishes on this proposed treaty. Now, this is a very important point and while I do not remember all the details, I wish to outline the principal wish of the Japanese Government as brought by ITO. That was that, while Russia would be the prime object of this pact the other countries, while remaining secondary, would enter into the matter only if they had gone Communistic. In other words, for example, if Japan were to go to war with England, say, this pact would become effective only if England had also gone Communistic.
- "Q. General, will you clarify what you mean by other countries - do you mean any other country?
- "A. I say other countries, because before this pact was drawn up fully in regard to specific nations other than Russia, negotiations ceased. To explain more fully, while there was the intention to go into the matter of specific nations fully at a later date, before we got around to it negotiations were broken off.
- "Q. Actually, Germany had in mind the entire world, did they not?
- "A. Yes, that is true, although Germany also agreed to delete the Americans in the first statement in the preamble.
- "Q. But when the conversations took place between you as representative of the Japanese Government and the German representatives in the very beginning the conversation then pointed to a pact that would be against the entire world, and subsequently these deletions of nations were made?
- "A. Yes, the deletions were requested by Japan. Another point was that if Japan were to accept the treaty as proposed by Germany the aid proviso would not work to Japan's advantage because, for example, in case of a U.S.-Japan war, what particular aid could Germany give? Whereas, in case of a German-United States war, as another example, Japan would have to throw in her whole might in the Pacific. These are, of course, only examples that I am giving, and not to be construed as having come from the Japanese Government. Both SHIRATORI and I said that we well understood this feeling upon the part of Japan, but we felt that there would be a danger of rupturing negotiations if at this point Japan were to bring up the matter of it being against nations that had gone Communistic only. After all, up to now, there had been no talk such as this. This matter and my thoughts as given above were communicated to the Foreign Office in a dispatch during February 1939.

"Q. Was that dispatch sent while the ITO Commission was still in Germany or Italy?

"A. Yes, while they were in Berlin.

"Q. You may continue.

"A. The answer to this communication arrived around the end of February or the beginning of March, and was roughly as follows: the matter of Russia remained the same; however, in regard to the other countries they would go further than simply stating that the pact would only be aimed at nations embracing Communism, but this aid to be given would consist of military advice -- by this I mean the trading of intelligence, the temporary leasing of bases if necessary, export of fuel oil and other commodities, and in general all aid outside actual participation. In other words, this was something like the aid that the United States later gave to England before she actually became involved in the war in 1941.

"Q. Continue.

"A. This answer was passed to RIBBENTROP and the German Government, and I imagine by SHIRATORI to the Italian Government. To digress a moment -- in the future, unless Italy looms in the picture as an important figure, I shall confine my narration to Germany. I believe that I was in error when I said the answer came around the end of February -- I believe it was the end of March. In any case, Germany through RIBBENTROP told me that there was no argument in so far as Russia was concerned, and also in so far as making the other nations secondary, but that they wished to have a meeting with the Japanese representatives and get down to brass tacks regarding measures to be taken and naming specific nations. To put it differently, they stated that the time for generalities had passed, and they wished to settle details. The Germans also stated that they wished when drawing up the treaty to make no mention of it being primarily against Russia, but to keep it absolutely general, to leave out any details such as non-military aid, etc., which would weaken the pact. They said that some other means could be found to decide upon details.

"Q. General, when you say RIBBENTROP said some other means could be found to decide upon details, what did the two of you have in mind?

- "A. To go into this a little further, this means that when the treaty is drawn up it would simply state that in case of an unprovoked attack by any other nation not a signatory to the pact mutual aid would be given by the signatories. On the surface, therefore, this would appear to the world to be a strong and binding treaty. Of course, certain details of the treaty, or for that matter, the whole treaty would be published, but what RIBBENTROP meant was that in regard to Japan's desire to not give more than non-military aid, if the country concerned was not Russia, the Germans wished to hold a meeting and to mutually agree upon this without including it in the actual treaty. Essentially, it becomes impossible to write up a treaty containing such clauses as what will be done in case it would be Russia or in case it would be some other nation, etc.
- "Q. Now, RIBBENTROP's views, his actual views, were to the effect that he wanted military, as well as the other type of aid from Japan in case of an attack, is that correct?
- "A. I will speak to you a little more fully about that now. To go over this once more so that there will be no errors, and so that the matter will be entirely understood by you: (1) In so far as the actual pact to be published goes, there was no argument. This was to be simply a mutual aid pact, with no strings attached. (2) Japan wished in this regard to settle the matter either by secret pact or other means in regard to the other nations besides Russia. That is to say, that the aid to be given them would stop short of military aid. (3) Germany objected to this on the grounds that should such a secret pact be signed and should there be a leak and the existence of this secret pact or agreement become known it would seriously weaken the actual pact. Therefore, her counter-suggestion was that as there would naturally be meetings between the two nations should such a pact be consummated, the matter of deciding what to do against what country should be left until such a moment, and no binding pact modifying the overall treaty be signed.
- "Q. General, we have been talking about RIBBENTROP's views and we have been talking about the views of your Government. I am wondering with respect to how you personally felt about the matter.
- "A. I felt it was simply a question of the approach and that the bridge between the two ideas could be easily built.
- "Q. Actually, General, you were there on the ground and you knew RIBBENTROP well; you worked very closely with him; were you not as a matter of fact firm in your feeling that the ideas that he advanced were probably the more desirable?

"A. I could not go so far as to say that.

"Q. How far can you go? The other answer seems to me to be extremely general. I want to know what you personally felt.

"A. I repeat that I felt that there was no basic difference; it was simply in the means to be followed. And then arose the problem of what type of treaty or agreement would suit both nations. In order to draw up a plan that would be satisfactory to both Japan and Germany, two men from my Embassy by the names of USAMI and TAKEUCHI met with GAUS from the German Foreign Office and drew up various plans. None of these was entirely satisfactory to either the German or Japanese Governments, but I was continuously trying to find a bridge over which the two might come together and meet. I believe, although, of course, these were only my own thoughts, that Germany began to get suspicious that Japan was attempting to weaken the treaty by a separate secret pact, of which she might in turn inform certain nations of the proposition. Japan on her part might have felt that Germany was attempting to drag her into matters outside the ken of her interests.

"Q. Where is the ITO Commission during all of this?

"A. They were around for sometime and were still there when the Japanese answer was received, but I believe they left sometime after this.

"Q. Had they left before the two members from your Embassy commenced preparing proposed drafts of the treaty?

"A. Yes.

"Q. It is not exactly clear to me now just what the ITO Commission did?

"A. They simply brought me the wishes of the Japanese Government and following that had no duties, although they stayed around in Berlin for a time watching developments.

"Q. Seems to me rather strange it should require that number of men to bring that message.

"A. I believe they were particularly desirous of explaining their position fully, and wished me to understand their ideas completely before proceeding.

"Q. Did it take three men to do that instead of just one?

"A. One could do it, but in Japan it seems to be the thing to send along an Army and Navy man.

"Q. So that actually then they came over to bring the message from the Japanese Government and to also make it definite and clear to you exactly what the Japanese Government wanted and how far they would go, is that correct?

"A. They did not say how far I could go or how far I could not go, but simply said to try to carry out negotiations along this line.

"Q. Do I understand that they wanted you to understand definitely what the views of the Army and the Navy and the Foreign Office in Tokyo were and you were to be governed accordingly?

"A. Yes."