

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CHEMICAL OFFICER

APD 500

18 April 1946

Interrogation of Lieutenant Colonel Susumu Sekiguchi

Lieutenant Colonel Susumu Sekiguchi was interrogated at 1345, 9 April 1946, in the Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, GHQ AFPAC, Tokyo.

Persons present: Lieutenant Colonel Susumu Sekiguchi
Mr. Takashi Matsuzaki, Official Interpreter, 1st
Demobilization Ministry
Lieutenant Colonel John E. Beebe, Jr., CWS,
Interrogator
S/Sgt George Kawaguchi, Interpreter

- Q. State your name, rank and branch of the service.
- A. Susumu Sekiguchi, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry. I have been performing Chemical Warfare duties since 1940.
- Q. I asked you to come here today to discuss Chemical Warfare policies and publications of the Inspectorate General of Military Education concerning chemical warfare.
- A. I am not working for the Demobilization Ministry any more, but I will give you all the information I can. I have worked for several years on military education and training, but as far as policies are concerned I can only express my opinions.
- Q. I have here a document titled "Lessons From the China Incident" No. 5, Chemical Warfare Section, published 13 October 1938, by the Inspectorate General of Military Education, Japanese Army.
- A. At the time this document was published I was working in the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army. I scanned through it at that time. This is the second time I have seen it.
- Q. Do you know where this document was prepared?
- A. By the Inspectorate General of Military Education in Tokyo. General Masataka Yamawaki is the publisher. All the preparations were made by his assistants. The General did not know very much about it as

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

he only stamped his name on it as he did on all other training documents. He was the responsible officer but has no personal knowledge in specialties such as chemical warfare.

- Q. I was told by the Japanese Liaison Section, G-2, GHQ, SCAP, that General Yamawaki was an aged man and lived in a remote place on Shikoku. The Demobilization Ministry requested that you be permitted to substitute for the General, to which I agreed. Were you so advised?
- A. I live in Odawara which is so close to Tokyo that I am called in for all chemical warfare matters. I cannot tell you very much about this book since I had nothing to do with its preparation.
- Q. I will show this document "Lessons From the China Incident", No. 7, Chemical Warfare Section, published 15 April 1939 by the Inspectorate General of Military Education. Do you know anything of the preparation of this document?
- A. This was published by General Masakazu Kawabe, Chief of Staff, Inspectorate General of Military Education to show its official character. This is a reference document.
- Q. Where does the information contained in these documents come from?
- A. Reports came from the Armies to Tokyo and were referred to the Inspectorate General of Military Education for publication. I am not sure whether it was assembled and prepared at the Marashino Chemical Warfare School or in the office of the Inspectorate General of Military Education. It is possible that it was prepared at Marashino Chemical Warfare School for some other documents along this line were prepared there. When the War Ministry or other agency received such material it was sent to the Marashino School for investigation and preparation of any document for publication.
- Q. Who at the Marashino School would have prepared these documents for publication?
- A. The Chief Clerk of the Laboratory Section. There have been about six officers in this position in the last six or eight years. This was usually held by an officer of the grade of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel.
- Q. Would Colonel Yokoyama have more information about these documents?
- A. Yes. He used the books to instruct in the school.
- Q. What other officers might have personal knowledge of the preparation of these books?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know General Kawabe?

A. Yes. I have met him.

Q. At the time General Kawabe was Chief of Staff, Inspectorate General of Military Education, were you connected with chemical warfare?

A. Yes, in the Kwantung Army.

Q. What gases were authorized for use against the Chinese?

A. Tear gas and vomiting gas.

Q. What were the chemical names of these gases?

A. I do not know. Ask General Akiyama.

Q. Was mustard, lewisite or phosgene authorized against the Chinese?

A. I don't know but I don't think so.

Q. When was the use of tear and vomiting gases authorized?

A. I don't know. I know it was used from reading this book (referring to "Lessons From the China Incident", No. 5, 13 October 1938). Tear and vomiting gases were carried for training and gas-mask testing.

Q. Were tear and vomiting gases used by the Kwantung Army against the Chinese?

A. The Kwantung Army was in Manchuria and did not fight against the Chinese.

Q. What about the use of gas against the Russians?

A. No gas was used and neither were smoke screens used.

Q. What are the special smokes referred to in these documents?

A. Sneezing and tear gases.

The interrogation was concluded at this point.

CONFIDENTIAL

Habe. Shunroku.

Memorandum 11 Apr. 46 by Col Beebe

2: key positions in Japanese army -

1. War Minister

2. Chief of Staff about equal in power

"The Inspector General of Military Education
is also a top position;"

The War Minister & Chief of Staff & Mil. Aff. Bureau are
key positions.

How War Minister is chosen -

Retiring War Minister, War Minister, & Chief of
Personnel Affairs Bureau select a candidate
then the retiring War Minister - the Chief
of Staff & the Inspector Gen of
Military Education confer & make
the decision & recommend the man
to the new Premier.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY

HATA, Shunroku (War Minister)

- 7.11.40 E Chungking operation.
- 7.14.40* Mobilization.
- 7.16.40 Submitted resignation.
- 7.18.40 E Recommendation TOJO for War Minister and Tomoyuke YAMASHITA
for Supreme Commander of Air Force.
- 3.4.41 E Military policy.

Mrs Higgins

EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY OF KIDO

REGARDING H.T.A., Shunroku (WAR MINISTER).

13th April, 1934* (Extracts).

The War Minister Hayashi submitted a resignation due to the reason that his younger brother Shirakami was found guilty. The conditions in the political circle, however, required him to stay in the post and the Premier asked him to withdraw his resignation, but the latter's resolution was strong. At that time a military clique headed by Masaki, Hata, Yanagawa, and others, were planning the change of the War Minister, trying to bring back Araki. Such being the case, there must be some controversies in the military circle, and I reported the foregoing to the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal, who said that it would be wise for the Premier to recommend to Prince Kanin, the Chief of General Staff, that General Hayashi remain in the post. When the Premier's idea was conveyed to the Vice-War Minister Yanagawa, he insisted that the military clique would be discontent with General Hayashi's stay and try to drive him out.

29th June, 1934** (Extract)

At 7 p. m. called on Viscount Maeda and there met Mr. Chojuro Onodera, whose story was as follows:- "The responsibility in putting the army into the present condition lies on Masaki and Hata.

"Araki already has lost his popularity since last year.

"At the Divisional Commanders' Conference held this year, several commanders held secret conference among themselves. Since last March, officers between colonel and captain in the army, commander and licut.-commander in the Navy and those officers close to Admiral Togo secretly met together and were planning a reform in the military circle and arrived at a conclusion that there was no way but to ask General Minami to accept the post. Regarding this Hayashi and Osuni were not informed.

"There are no officers in the reserve who can control the military and in reforming the army Masaki will have to be eliminated. Unless this is carried out opportunely with the political change, it would be very difficult, for Masaki is one of the three highest ranking army officers. Minami, I believe, will be able to carry out the task.

"Those with whom I consulted, are the principals of the army and all involved in the October Incident. They were against my opinion at first but of late have begun to agree with it. Ugaki hated this main strength of the army, since he had taken an ambiguous attitude at the time of the violation of the Supreme Command. A person who is able to reform the army is either Minami or Iwane Matsui."