

| <u>English</u> | <u>Hopburn</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| Absenteeism, rate of | Kesseki ritsu | 缺席率 |
| Adjourn | Heikai | 閉會 |
| Administration, Union | Kanri, kumiai | 管理組合 |
| Advise, to | Jogen suru | 助言する |
| Affiliate, to | Kamei suru | 加盟する |
| Affiliated Unions | Kamei kumiai | 加盟組合 |
| Agenda | Giji shidai | 議事次第 |
| American Federation of Labor | Beikoku soodoomei | 米國總同盟 |
| Annual Fee | Nenkaihi | 年会費 |
| Annual Wage, Guaranteed | Hoshoo nenkin | 保證年金 |
| Appeal | Teiso | 提訴 |
| Application Blank | Mooshikomisho | 申込書 |
| Apply, to | Mooshikomi o suru | 申込する |
| Apprentice | Totei | 徒弟 |
| Approval | Zenin (Kyoosan) | 承認(協賛) |
| Arbiter | Chuusaishi | 仲裁者 |
| Arbitration | Chuusai | 仲裁 |
| Arrears, in | Minoo | 未納 |
| Assessment | Fukakin | 賦課金 |
| Auditing | Kaikei kensa | 會計検査 |
| Auditing Committee | Kaikei kensa iinkai | 會計検査委員会 |
| Authority | keni | 権威 |
| Authorization | Ninka | 認可 |
| Authorize, to | Iminsuru | 委任する |
| Authorized Agent | Jusen dairinin | 授權代理人 |
| Award | Saiketsu (Saitai) | 裁決(裁定) |
| Backdoor contract | Uraguchi keiyaku | 裏口契約 |
| Back pay, retroactive | Sokyuuteki kyuuayo | 過去の給与 |
| Bad standing, member in | Mushikaku kumiajin | 無資格組合員 |
| Bad standing, union in | Mushikaku kumai | 無資格組合 |
| Ballot | Toohyoo yooshi | 投票用紙 |
| Bargain | kooshoo | 交渉 |
| Basic Industry | hohon sangyoo | 基本産業 |

| <u>English</u> | <u>Hepburn</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|-----------------------------|--|--------------------|
| Blacklist | Chuuijinbutsu hyoo (burakku risuto) | 注意人物表 (ブラククリスト) |
| Bona fide | Seijitsu | 誠實 |
| Bond | Hoshookin | 保證金 |
| Bonded officer | Hoshoo sareta yakain | 保證社員 |
| Bonus | Shooyo | 賞與 |
| Boycott, Union | Fubai Domei | 下員同盟 |
| Budget | Yosan | 豫算 |
| Bulletin Board | Keijiban | 掲示板 |
| Full session | Shokuba kondankai | 職場懇談会 |
| Bureau | Kyoku | 局 |
| Business agent | Joninshoki | 常任書記 |
| By laws | Saisoku | 細則 |
| Call, (a meeting) | Shocshuu | 招集 |
| Call, pay | Yobidashi chingin | 呼び出し賃金 |
| Campaign, (political) | Undo | 運動 |
| Canvassing worker | Yuzei kumiaiin | 遊説組合員 |
| Caucus | Tooka himitsukai | 党派秘密会 |
| Chairman | Gichoo | 議長 |
| Charge, to bring | Kokuhatsu suru (kokuso suru) | 告発する (告訴する) |
| Checkoff | Tenbiki | 天引き |
| Chief Steward | Shokuba iinchoo | 職場委員長 |
| Child labor | Hensho roodoo | 年少勞働 |
| Civil rights | Minken | 民権 |
| Clean up time | Sooji jikan | 掃除時間 |
| Closed meeting | Himitsukai | 秘密会 |
| Collective agreement | Dantai kyooyaku | 団体協約 |
| Company store | kaisha keiei no mise | 会社経営の店 |
| Company town | kaisha no machi | 会社、町 |
| Company union | Go-yoo kumiai | 御用組合 |
| Conciliation | ..sosh | 斡旋 |
| Condition | Joken | 條件 |
| Conduct, (a public meeting) | Shusai suru | 主催する |

| <u>English</u> | <u>Hebburn</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| Congress of Industrial Organization (U.S.) | Sangyobetsu kumiai kaigi | 産業別組合会議 |
| Constitution | Kiyaku | 規約 |
| Consumers' cooperative | Shoohisha kyodoo kumiai | 消費者協同組合 |
| Consumers' union | Shoohisha kumiai | 消費者組合 |
| Contract, (indenture) | keiyaku | 契約 |
| Convention | Taikai | 大会 |
| Cooling off period | Chinsei kikan | 鎮靜期間 |
| Copy | Utsushi | 寫し |
| Correspondance course | Tsuushin kooza | 通信講座 |
| Cost of living | Sei. atsuhi | 生活費 |
| Cost of production | Seisanhi | 生産費 |
| Craft union | Shokugyobetsu kumiai | 職業別組合 |
| Credential | Ininjoo | 委任狀 |
| Deadlocked | anshoo e noriageru | 暗礁へ乗り上げる |
| Debate | Tooron | 討論 |
| Declaration of vacancy | Ketsuin no sengen | 缺員の宣言 |
| Deem advisable | Tekitoo to minasu | 適当と見做す |
| Defense fund | Hogo shikin | 保護資金 |
| Delegate | Daihyoo in | 代表委員 |
| Democratic party | Minshutoo | 民主黨 |
| Democratic procedure | Minshutoki tetsuzuki | 民主的手續 |
| Department | Bu | 部 |
| Department, national | zenkokubu | 全國部 |
| Discharge, (dismiss) | Kaiko | 解雇 |
| Discipline | Chookai | 懲戒 |
| Disciplinary action | Chookai kooi | 懲戒行爲 |
| Dismissal pay | Kaikoteate (Teishokuteate) | 解雇手当 (退職手当) |
| Dissolve an organization | Dantai o kaisan suru | 団体を解散する |
| Divide and conquer | Bunkatsu seisaku | 分割政策 |
| Division | Ka | 課 |
| Domestic worker | Kaji shiyoonin | 家事使用人 |
| Dues, union | kumiai hi | 組合費 |
| Duty, (public) | Kooteki gimu | 公的義務 |

| <u>English</u> | <u>Hepburn</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Duty, (personal) | Shiteki gimu | 私的義務 |
| Economic security | Keizaiteki hoshoo | 經濟的保證 |
| Efficiency rating | Nooritsu hyooka | 能率評價 |
| Employee | Hiyoosha | 被傭者 |
| Employer | Shiyoosha | 使用者 |
| Enforce, to | Shikoo suru | 施行す |
| Equal terms, negotiate on | Oraji shikaku de kooshoo suru | 同じ資格で交渉す |
| Equal pay for equal work | Doitsu sagyoo niwa doitsu tingin | 同一作業に 同一賃金 |
| Ex officio | Shokken ni yori | 職權に依り |
| Executive board | Shikkoo iinkai | 執行委員会 |
| Expulsion | Jomei | 除名 |
| Fact finding board | Jitsujoo choosa iinkai | 実情調査委員会 |
| Factory Act | Koojoo hoo | 工場法 |
| Faction | Totoo | 徒黨 |
| Far Eastern Commission | Iyokutoo iinkai | 極東委員会 |
| Favortism | Joojitsu | 情実 |
| File | Shorui tsuzuri | 書類綴り |
| Foreman | Shokkoocho: | 職工長 |
| Form | Yooshiki | 様式 |
| Fraternal delegate | Yuugiteki daihyo | 友誼的代表 |
| Full employment program | Kanzen koyoo puroguramu | 完全雇傭プログラム |
| Full time officer | Sennin yakuin | 専任役員 |
| Gangster tactics | Booryokudan senjutsu | 暴力団戦術 |
| General strike | Soodoomei higyo | 総同盟罷業 |
| Good standing, members in | Kanzen shikaku kaiin | 完全資格会員 |
| Good standing, unions in | Kanzen shikaku kumiai | 完全資格組合 |
| Grievance | Fuhei | 不平 |
| Grievance form or slip | Fuhei kinyu yooshi | 不平記入用紙 |
| Grievance machinery | Fuhei shori kikoo | 不平處理機構 |
| Guaranteed minimum earning | Saitei hoshoo shotoku | 最低保證所得 |
| Guild | Girudo | ギルド |

| <u>English</u> | <u>Hepburn</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|--|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| Hazardous employment | Kiken shokugyoo | 危険職業 |
| Hiring through the union | Kumiai o tsujite koyoo suru | 組合を通じて雇う |
| ILO - WFTU | Sekai roodoo kumiai renmei | 世界の組合聯盟 |
| Individual bargaining | Kojin kooshoo | 個人交渉 |
| Industrial union | Sangyobetsu kumiai | 産業別組合 |
| Industry-wise | Sangyoo betsu | 産業別 |
| Information | Jochoo | 情報 |
| Initiation fee | Nyuukai kin | 入会金 |
| In writing | Shorui | 書類 |
| agreement in writing | Shomen kyoyaku | 書面協約 |
| grievance in writing | Shomen fuhei | 書面不平 |
| Interference with the right to organize | Soshikiken e no kanshoo | 組織権の干渉 |
| International union | Kokusai kumiai | 国際組合 |
| Involuntary servitude | Kyoosei shieki | 強制使役 |
| Joint board, regional council | Bengoo iinkai | 連合委員会 |
| Jurisdiction | Kankatsuken | 管轄権 |
| Jurisdictional dispute | Kankatsuken arasoi | 管轄権争い |
| Labor administration | Roosei | 労政 |
| Labor boss | Rodo bosu (darakan) | 労務長(班長) |
| Labor dispute | Roodoo soogi | 労務争議 |
| Labor force | Roodoo shasuu | 労務者数 |
| Labor front | roodoo sensen | 労務戦線 |
| Labor agreement | Rodo kyoyaku | 労務協約 |
| Labor agreement clause | Rodo kyoyaku no jookoo | 労務協約の條項 |
| Labor journalist | Roodoo kisha | 労務記者 |
| Labor lawyer | Roodoo bengoshi | 労務辯護士 |
| Labor relations | Roodoo kankei | 労務關係 |
| Labor supply | Roomu kyookyuu | 勞務供給 |
| Labor textbooks | Rodo kyookasho | 労務教科書 |
| Labor turnover | Rishoku ritsu | 解職率 |
| Labor union | Roodoo kumiai | 労務組合 |

| <u>English</u> | <u>Hepburn</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|---|--|-------------------|
| Labor legislation | Roodoo rippoo | 労働立法 |
| Layoff | Kyuushoku | 解雇 |
| Leave of absence | Shika | 賜假 |
| Levy, to | Chooshuu suru | 徴集 |
| Locals | Tani kumiai | 單位組合 |
| Local union | Tani kumiai | 單位組合 |
| Lockout | Koojoo heisa | 工場閉鎖 |
| Majority | Tasuu | 多數 |
| Majority vote | Kahansuu toohyo | 過半數投票 |
| Maintenance of membership | kumiaiin shikaku iji | 組合員資格維持 |
| Management conference | Keiei kyoogikai | 經營協議會 |
| Manpower | Yuukoosoojinin | 有勤總人員 |
| Mass production | Tairyoo seisan | 大量生産 |
| Mass support | Taishuu shiji | 大眾支持 |
| Maternity leave | Sanzen sango no kyuuka | 産前産後休業 |
| Maximum benefit | Saidai rieki | 最大利益 |
| Meal period | Shokuji jikan | 食事時間 |
| Mediation | Chootei | 調停 |
| Minority | Shoosuu | 少數 |
| Minority vote | Shoosuu toohyoo | 少數投票 |
| Minutes of meeting | Gijiroku | 議事録 |
| Mining act | Koogyoo hoo | 鉱業法 |
| Miscellaneous | Zassoku | 雜則 |
| Motion | Doogi | 動議 |
| National Federation | Zenkoku soodoomei | 全國總同盟 |
| National headquarter | Zenkoku honbu | 全國本部 |
| National union | Zenkeku kumiai | 全國組合 |
| Negotiation | Kooshoo | 交渉 |
| Nomination | Shimei | 指名 |
| Oath of office | Shukumu sensei | 職務宣誓 |
| Occupation | Shokugyoo | 職業 |
| Occupation disease | Shokugyoo byoo | 職業病 |
| Of the people, by the people, for the people | Jinmin no jinmin ni yoru jinmin no tameno | 人民の人民のため 人民のため |

| <u>English</u> | <u>Hepburn</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------|
| Officer | Yakuin | 役員 |
| Open to the public | Kookai | 公開 |
| Organizer | Soshikisya | 組織者 |
| Out of work receipt | Shitsugyo teate | 失業手帳 |
| Overtime pay | Zangyo teate | 残業手帳 |
| Parliamentary procedure | Kaigi tetsuzuki | 会議手帳 |
| Paralysis strike | Mahi (daikibo) suto | 麻痺(大規模)ストライク |
| Participate in a meeting | Kaigi ni sanku suru | 会議に参加する |
| Participate in management | Keiei sanku | 経営参加 |
| Paternalism | Onjooshugi | 人情主義 |
| Per capita tax | Atanawari kumiaihi | 均等組合費 |
| Petition | Chinjoo | 陳情 |
| Physiological leave | Seiri kyuka | 生理休暇 |
| Picket captain | Kanshi cho | 監視長 |
| Picket line | Kanshisen | 監視線 |
| Picket pass | Kanshi tsuukashoo | 監視通過証 |
| Piece work | Dekidaka barai | 出来高払い |
| Platform | Kooryoo | 綱領 |
| Policy statement | Seisaku kooryoo | 政策綱領 |
| Political action | Seiji koodoo | 政治行動 |
| Popular Front | Jinmin sensen | 人民戦線 |
| Portal to portal pay | Mon kara mon e no chingin | 門から門へ賃金 |
| Preamble | Zenbun | 前文 |
| Preferential Union shop | Yuusenteki union shoppu | 優先的組合店 |
| President, union | Kumiaityoo | 組合長 |
| Productivity | Seisanryoku | 生産力 |
| Provision | Jookoo | 條項 |
| Protection of Property | Zaisan hogo | 財産保護 |
| Public hearing | Kotyokai | 公聴会 |
| Public opinion | Yoron | 輿論 |
| Punish your enemy and reward your friend | Yoodoo haii | 擁護排異 |
| Quorum | Teisokusuu | 定数 |
| Rank-and-file | Ippan kumiai taishuu | 一般組合大衆 |

| <u>English</u> | <u>Hepburn</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| Recall | Kaininsei (nikooru) | 解任制 (ニクウ) |
| Recognize, to | Shoonin suru | 承認 (シヨウ) |
| Recommendation | Kankoku (suisen) | 勧告 (カンコウ) |
| Referendum | Ippan tohyo | 一般投票 |
| Register | Tooroku | 登録 |
| Regular meeting | Teiki shuukai | 定期集會 |
| Representative | Daihyosha | 代表者 |
| Resolution | Ketsugi | 決議 |
| Rest period | Kyuukai jikan | 休息時間 |
| Revenue | Shuunyuu | 收入 |
| Roll call vote | Komei toohyoo | 呼名投票 |
| Rotation | Rinbansei | 輪番制 |
| Rubber stamp | Mekura ban | 盲判 |
| Runoff election | Kessen toohyoo | 決選投票 |
| Sabotage | Sabotaji (taigyoo) | サボタージュ (怠業) |
| Safety program | Anzen puroguramu | 安全プログラム |
| Salary | Hokyu | 俸給 |
| Scale of pay | Chingin ritsu | 賃金率 |
| Secede, to | Dattai suru | 脱退 (ダツタイ) |
| Secondary leadership | Shoosoo shidoosha | 少指導者 |
| Secret ballot | Himitsu toohyoo | 秘密投票 |
| Seniority | Menko | 年功 |
| Seniority pay raise | Kinzoku kyuuuyo | 勤続高給 |
| Sergeant of arms | Seiriin | 整理係員 |
| Shop, closed | Kuroogu do shoppu | クローズドショップ |
| Shop committee | Shokuba iinkai | 職場委員会 |
| Shift | Kotai sagyoo | 交替作業 |
| Shop act | Shooten hoo | 高圧法 |
| Shop chairman, deputy, steward | Shokuba iin | 職場委員 |
| Shop steward system | Shokuba iin soido | 職場委員制度 |
| Sick leave | Byooki kyuuuka | 病休 (ビョウキ) |
| Solidarity | Ichhi danketsu | 一致団結 |
| Slave labor | Doreiteki roodoo | 奴隷的労働 |
| Sliding scale | Suraido sei | スライド制 |

| <u>English</u> | <u>Hokuriku</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|
| Soldiering | Tai go | 怠業 |
| Speedup | Supido uppu | スピードアップ |
| Standing committee | Jounin linkai | 常任委員 |
| Statistics | Tookei | 統計 |
| Status quo | Genjo | 現状 |
| Straw boss | Sutoro bosu | ストロウボス |
| Suspension | Shukkin teishi | 出勤停止 |
| Sweat Shop labor | Sakushu roodoo | 搾取労働 |
| Strike benefit fund | Higyo shikin | 罷業基金 |
| Strike kitchen | Higyo kyoodo suiiji | 罷業共同炊事 |
| Strike meeting | Higyo shukai | 罷業集会 |
| Strike breaker, (scab, fink) | Higyo yaburi | 罷業破り |
| Strike vote | Higyo tohyo | 罷業投票 |
| Survey | Chosa | 調査 |
| Sympathy strike | Dojyo higyo | 同情罷業 |
| Teller | Tachiainin | 立会人 |
| Trade union responsibility | Rodoo kumiai sekinin | 労働組合責任 |
| Transfer card | To kin kaado | 転勤カード |
| Time study committee | Taimu sutade iinkai | タイムスタディ委員会 |
| Travel pay and out of town work | Shuchyo ryohi shigai sagyo | 出張旅費 労外 |
| Trial board | Shinsekai | 新集 審査会 |
| Trail procedure | Shinsa tetsuzuki | 審査手続 |
| Unfair | Fukoosei | 不公平 |
| Union button | Kumiai botan | 組合ボタン |
| Union counseling | Kumiai soodan | 組合相談 |
| Union label | kumiai retteru | 組合ラベル |
| Union leader | Kumiai shidoosha | 組合指導者 |
| Union shop | Kumiai kojo | 組合店舗 |
| Union shop card | Kumiai kameiten kaado | 組合加盟者カード |
| United Action | Dantai kodo | 団体行動 |
| Unorganized shop | Misoshiki kojo | 未組織店舗 |
| Unorganized workers | Misoshiki roodoosha | 未組織労働者 |

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|-------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| Vacation with pay | Yuukyuu kyuuka | 有給休暇 |
| Vice president | Fuku kaichoo | 副会長 |
| Vote | Tsohyoo | 投票 |
| Waiting time | Taiki jikan | 待機時間 |
| Wages | Chingin | 賃金 |
| Wage adjustment plan | Chingin choosei hooshiki | 賃金調整方式 |
| Wage-price relationship | Chingin tai bukka kankei | 賃金対物價關係 |
| Walkout | Shokuba hooki | 職場放棄 |
| Wildcat strike | Yamaneke suto (Higoohoo suto) | 山猫スト(非法スト) |
| Withdrawal card | Taishoku kardo | 退職カード |
| Women's auxiliary | Kumiai enjo fujinkai | 組合援助婦人会 |
| Woman in industry | Sangyoo fujin | 産業婦人 |
| Work day | Ichi ni chi roodoo jikan | 一日労働時間 |
| Work permit | Shigoto ninka | 仕事認可 |
| Work week | Isshuu roodoo jikan | 一週労働時間 |
| Work sharing plan | Sagyo wariate keikaku | 作業割当計畫 |
| Yellow Dog contract | Noken keiyaku | 特約契約 |



OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY
UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 29 1947
DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR, SOCIAL AND HEALTH AFFAIRS - ILH

MESSAGE CENTER Tokyo, October 14, 1947.

RESTRICTED

No. 1332

SUBJECT: Transmittal of a Report Concerning a Discussion of Labor Problems at an Asiatic Society Study Group Meeting, October 9, 1947.

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1947 OCT 27 PM 2 07

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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894.504/10-1447

I have the honor to enclose copy of a report containing the substance of remarks concerning the subject, "Japanese Labor's Present Position," made at a meeting sponsored by a study group of the Asiatic Society held on October 9, 1947. Mr. Burton CRANE (New York Times correspondent) presided, and the following special guests were present:

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Mr. [Signature]

Mr. Paul STANCHFIELD,
Acting Chief, Labor Division, Economic and Scientific Section;

Mr. YAMADA Setsuo,
Member, House of Councillors; General Secretary, Sodomei (Japan Federation of Labor);

Mrs. KATO Shizue,
Member, House of Representatives; Member, Central Executive Committee, Social Democratic Party;

Mr. KATO Kanju,
Chairman of the Labor Committee, House of Representatives; Chairman of the Labor Unions Committee, Social Democratic Party;

Mr. SUZUKI Mosaburo,
Chairman of the Budget Committee, House of Representatives; Chairman of the Political and Economic Research Institute, Social Democratic Party; Chairman of the Economic Rehabilitation Committee (a joint business-labor organization);

Mr. KAN Makoto,
President, Sambetsu (National Congress of Industrial Unions);

Mr. MIZOTA

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Tokyo's 1332,
October 14, 1947.

- 2 -

Mr. MIZOTA George,
Interpreter, Second Demobilization Bureau.

Mr. STANCHFIELD expressed this Headquarter's policy of encouraging the growth of a strong labor movement. During the course of the meeting, Mr. KAN and Mr. YAMADA set forth in general terms the principles of their respective unions. In response to a question by Mr. Stanchfield, they both stated that the strike weapon should be used only as a last resort. In the past, however, the expediency of the moment and the immoderate action of pressure groups within the unions have often precipitated strikes before all measures of peaceful settlement have been exhausted (see this Mission's despatch No. 889 of March 4, 1947 concerning the proposed general strike which was planned to begin on February 1, 1947). Furthermore, it appears that Japanese unions interpret the phrase "last resort" in an extremely flexible manner.

In response to questions from Mr. FROMM (World Report correspondent) and Mr. WILSON (Labor Attaché, United Kingdom Liaison Mission), Mr. KATO Kanju stated that curtailment of the right to strike would result in suppressing the whole labor movement. His suggestion for the prevention of strikes was that the government should have more "discussions" with labor officials.

As implied by Mr. J. R. HAROLD (a member of the Labor Division, Economic and Scientific Section), recommendations of the Central Labor Relations Committee, a Japanese counterpart of the National Labor Relations Board, are often summarily rejected by the unions. Mr. Kan's allegation that the Committee discriminates against labor seems to indicate that he does not understand the functions of a mediation body. Attention is invited to Mr. Harold's statement that there are now disputes between the Japanese Government and unions of the electrical workers, teachers, and government railway workers, which will soon come before the Central Labor Relations Committee. In view of intimations appearing in the Japanese press that a "labor offensive" is expected during October, it is felt that these disputes may take on a political color and may grow in magnitude.

In connection with a possible strike by the teachers unions, Mr. Crane asked whether members of such a profession have mutual interests with laborers, whether they have the right to strike, and if they should be permitted to have a closed shop. Mr. Kato implied that the fact that teachers unions exist and that their right to strike has not been denied was a sufficient answer. Mr. Yamada stated that parents would prevent a long school strike.

The Chairman did not summarize the meeting; such a summary would have to take into account the manner in which answers were limited by the phrasing of questions, as well as the attempt of the speakers, while setting forth their opinions vigorously to avoid possible offense to the Occupation authorities. As a result, there was much generalization. Thus Mr. Yamada and Mr. Kato supported strikes only as a means of attaining economic aims, and Mr. Kan apologized for the immaturity of the Sambetsu, an organization which could hardly be considered conservative in its policies. The latter took care to qualify his support of the Labor Relations Committee,


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
Tokyo's 1332,
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suggesting the possibility that the Sambetsu will not hesitate to reject recommendations which may be made by the Committee in the future.

Respectfully yours,


W. J. Sebald,
Acting Political Adviser

Enclosure: 

Copy of report, "Japanese
Labor's Present Position",
October 9, 1947.

Original and hectograph to Department.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 1332, dated October 14, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Transmittal of a Report Concerning a Discussion of Labor Problems at an Asiatic Society Study Group Meeting, October 9, 1947".

COPY

JAPANESE LABOR'S PRESENT POSITION

Meeting Sponsored by a Study Group of the Asiatic Society,
October 9, 1947

PARTICIPANTS:

- Mr. Burton CRANE,
New York Times Correspondent;
- Mr. Paul STANCHFIELD,
Acting Chief, Labor Division, Economic and Scientific
Section;
- Mr. YAMADA Setsuo,
Member, House of Councillors; General Secretary, Sodomei
(Japan Federation of Labor);
- Mrs. KATO Shizue,
Member, House of Representatives; Member, Central
Executive Committee, Social Democratic Party;
- Mr. KATO Kanju,
Chairman of the Labor Committee, House of Representatives;
Chairman of the Labor Unions Committee, Social Democratic
Party;
- Mr. SUZUKI Mosaburo,
Chairman of the Budget Committee, House of Representatives;
Chairman of the Political and Economic Research Institute,
Social Democratic Party; Chairman of the Economic Rehabili-
tation Committee (a joint business-labor organization);
- Mr. KAN Makoto,
President, Sambetsu (National Congress of Industrial
Unions);
- Mr. MIZOTA George,
Interpreter, Second Demobilization Bureau.

Substance of Discussion Follows:

Mr. Crane, provisional chairman of the Asiatic Society's economic study group, introduced the guests named above and explained the purpose of the discussion groups set up by the members of the Asiatic Society. He stated that the discussion for the evening would deal with Japanese labor's present position and pointed out that ideas expressed by Occupation personnel might not be so identified, but that they were not "off the record". First to speak was Mr. Kan.

MR. KAN:

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MR. KAN: Labor organizations today have not grown naturally but are based upon SCAP support. Their membership is thought to be between five and one-half and six million. Of these, 1,200,000 are members of the Sambetsu.

There have been a number of criticisms of the Sambetsu, among them that we lean toward strikes, and that we oppose for the mere purpose of opposing. It should be remembered, however, that the Sambetsu was organized from smaller industrial units and has had little experience in union organization. I must admit that there have been excesses, brought about both by inexperience and reaction to the pitiful labor conditions which have existed since the war.

There are still elements in Japan which are not working toward democracy and the Sambetsu is determined to oppose them. To gain a "new life" we plan to overcome the crisis by organized labor. Our first step will be toward increased production. The first factor necessary to achieve increased production is a minimum wage. No luxuries are expected and we do not reject the life of hardship which the Katayama Cabinet has said is unavoidable. We do not want an inflationary wage-price spiral but we must have a supply of daily necessities for our families. We favor eradication of the black market and improved legal distribution.

With regard to "rationalization of industry" (or decentralization of industry), labor faces mass discharge. We advocate increased production to prevent such hardship, and believe that such an increase can be made at the factory by the efforts of the workers. We have, therefore, recommended unification of the labor front.

Some of the misery of workers may be attributed to lack of educational activity, lack of research facilities, and consequently lack of a scientific basis for action. Such scarcity of cultural activity is due to the extreme poverty of the laborers.

Sambetsu has both a youth section and a woman's section which have often acted independently. There has now been established a committee to "guide" these sections and to coordinate their activities with the policy of Sambetsu.

MR. STANCHFIELD: SCAP's policy toward labor has been generally demonstrated throughout the Occupation. It is well known that SCAP encourages the growth of a strong labor movement. The removal of the restrictions on labor began in December 1945 with the passage of a labor union law by the Diet very similar to the Wagner Act. Recently (September 1947) the Labor Standards Law and the Labor Ministry Law have been passed.

I should like to preface certain questions I have in mind with a basic premise. The achievement of labor rights depends on collective bargaining. The right to strike is a necessary part of labor's power but this right must be conditioned by the state of the nation's economy. The position of Japan's economy at present makes

certain

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certain forms of the strike a hardship on the whole people. For example, a strike in public utilities, in view of Japan's low production, might be an interruption which would postpone the day of recovery. My first question, then, is: to what extent can the right to strike be used when it might create disaster and weaken the labor movement in general? My second question is: to what extent should the leaders of the labor movement use a strike for political purposes not directly connected with the interests of labor (for example, the abortive February 1 general strike)?

MR. YAMADA: As for the first question, it has always been the policy of the Sodomei to use the strike weapon as a last resort when collective bargaining has failed. With regard to the second question, the Sodomei policy has been never to mix trade unions with politics. The function of a union is not to exercise political influence but to obtain economic aims. For this reason, the Sodomei opposed the February strike on account of its political purpose. However, we have presented a united front with the Sambetsu in our economic demands.

MR. KAN: It is the policy of the Sambetsu to carry on collective bargaining to the last ditch and to depend on the Labor Relations Committee, but this course is made difficult by the painful position of labor today and the undemocratic attitude of employers. As for the second question, the Sambetsu has never begun from the standpoint of political considerations but has depended primarily upon economic considerations. In the February strike it became apparent that the destruction of the Yoshida Cabinet was necessary in order to obtain our economic demands. Only certain elements in the Sambetsu had primary political purposes. At our national meeting in June, it was determined to carry out political movements through the Communist and Social Democratic parties.

MR. SUZUKI: I should like to begin with a basic premise: the most important point to consider is that the rehabilitation of Japan requires that each must do his share. Labor should furnish labor, and the owner must turn over all his goods to increase production.

The regrettable features of the Sambetsu's past action have been that (1) they have been more prone to argue than to make constructive decisions and (2) the Sambetsu believes that laborers must carry out the rehabilitation of Japan, but we believe that cooperation between labor and owners is necessary.

With regard to strikes, it should be remembered that the 1,800 yen wage set by the Katayama Cabinet is not sufficient. We must request the Japanese Government to increase wages by November, either by increasing "real" wages or by additional payments in kind. To this end, SCAP permission is solicited.

An increase in wages brought about by a strike (even up to 3,000 yen a month) would not be sufficient. Therefore, labor and employers should depend upon the Labor Relations Committee. Labor cannot obtain

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its aims by strikes in individual industries; only an increase in total production will bring improvement.

MR. KATO: I object to Mr. Crane's statement [in the introductory remarks] that I was an instigator of the February strike. I opposed that strike because its chief purpose was political.

A labor union represents the economic interests of labor and should call a strike for economic purposes. The Social Democratic Party is opposed to a political strike, which should be made in the name of the political party and not the labor organization.

However, a strike by government employees may be mistaken for a political movement since the party opposed is the government. Such a strike may arise from an economic beginning and may be politically tinged (as the February strike was) by the government. Such a tinge may then increase.

MR. CRANE: Since Mr. Kan has explained the fundamental principles of the Sambetsu, Mr. Yamada might like to set forth those of the Sodomei.

MR. YAMADA: The Sodomei was founded as a friendly society in 1913 by Mr. Suzuki, who had been influenced, when in America, by Samuel Gompers. For purposes of concealment, it was set up as a labor school attached to a Christian society. Despite the "public peace measures" and vigorous oppression by the police and the Home Ministry, there were small strikes by the Socialists and Communists among students and teachers in the schools of Japan until 1929. The three major principles of the Sodomei are anti-communism, anti-capitalism, and anti-fascism.

Political policy should be demonstrated through Parliament. We believe in a policy of industrial peace with the strike weapon to be used as a last resort. First, collective bargaining should be utilized, then the Labor Relations Committee, and finally, if necessary, the strike weapon.

At the meeting of the Sodomei, which ended today, it was resolved to remain cautious toward the World Federation of Trade Unions because of the political influences which exist therein. Russia and the Communist Party have too much influence in the Federation and, therefore, the Sodomei does not wish to participate.

MR. FROMM: (World Report Correspondent): What would be the effect of a proposal recently made in the Diet by the Liberal Party to curtail the right to strike? For example, a comparison might be made between the operation of labor unions in the United States and those in Russia where the right to strike has been curtailed.

MR. KATO: A comparison between Russia and the United States is impossible because union policies depend on the conditions in each country. If the strike right were curtailed in Japan, the young inexperienced labor movement would draw into its shell, except for a few enlightened elements which might take action. Labor reactionaries would again return to control. Instead of curtailment of the

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right to strike, we should have discussions between labor and government officials.

MR. WILSON (Labor Attaché, United Kingdom Liaison Mission): Perhaps a comparison would be possible between the use made of the strike weapon in the United Kingdom and in the United States. The United Kingdom is similar to Japan in its need for increasing production. If satisfactory negotiating machinery between government officials and labor existed, would the unions be satisfied to withhold a strike until every means of settlement was explored?

MR. KATO: The need for production in Japan is the same as in the United Kingdom, but the labor movements are very different. Democracy and labor unions are old in England but young in Japan. Government curtailment of the right to strike might bring about unexpected results. Discussion between labor and the government is necessary.

MR. J. R. HAROLD (Member of Labor Division, Economic and Scientific Section): The Communists are now opposing the Social Democrats and attempting to bring about a downfall of the coalition cabinet; the Communists are strong members of the Sambetsu. On this basis, if the Labor Relations Committee makes a recommendation, will the members of the Sambetsu accept that recommendation or will the Communist members of the union, in order to bring about the downfall of the Cabinet, subordinate their union interests to the party line?

In explanation of this question, it should be noted that there are now disputes between the government and unions of the electrical workers, teachers, government railway workers, etc. These disputes will soon come before the Central Labor Relations Committee. Since the management and labor members of that committee usually balance out, the committee recommendation will be the recommendation of the neutral members, and may be expected to be best for the people as a whole.

MR. KAN: The Sambetsu wants improvement of living conditions-- by a strike if it is unavoidable. The Sambetsu will respect the recommendations of the Central Labor Relations Committee, but such decisions are not always favorable to labor. To understand this, one need only look at the membership of the committee. Communist members of the Sambetsu will act as union members in the interests of the union.

MR. ECKERSLEY (First Secretary, Australian Mission): Has any check been made to see if members which belong to one union do not also belong to the other? This might be possible since the Sodomei is divided geographically and the Sambetsu is divided industrially.

MR. YAMADA: There is no duplication of membership.

MR. KAN: Only one instance of such duplication has been found, a 70-member union in Shizuoku Prefecture.

A NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT: Are the needs of teachers sufficiently similar to the needs of other workers to make mutual union membership useful? Secondly, do teachers have a right to strike

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and, finally, do they have a right to a closed shop, in effect, to decide who may teach?

MR. KATO: The first question is answered inasmuch as teachers unions do exist. Their right to strike has not been denied. In February, the teachers planned a strike but on account of the opposition of parents could not carry it out.

MR. YAMADA: The general public (parents) would prevent a long school strike.

MR. KATO: I am not familiar with the labor movement but I have had many conversations with teachers and I have told them that in the United States teachers who have not been paid for as many as four or five months did not strike. Even though living conditions for teachers in Japan are difficult, the nature of their profession makes "red flag waving" wrong.

QUESTION (from the floor): What steps are being taken to educate union leaders that they should not reserve rights to the unions which belong to management? For example, recently made collective bargaining contracts contain provision for a union veto over decisions made by directors and executive officers of the company.

MR. YAMADA: Sodomei wants its leaders trained, but finds that labor-management councils do not work because the employers fail to attend the meetings. Union workers cannot accept the word of minor company officials.

MR. KAN: Sambetsu does not take any general position on union management plans.

The discussion closed without further remarks.



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

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[Handwritten marks]

Tokyo, October 28, 1947.

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No. 1356

DC/P

SUBJECT: Transmittal of a Report Concerning the Relationship of Labor Organizations to the Press and Radio.

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to forward (under separate cover) five copies of a report dated September 23, 1947 prepared by the Analysis and Research Division of the Civil Information and Education Section of this Headquarters, concerning the relationship of labor organizations to the press and radio.

The report contains a brief history of the development of labor organizations among press and radio employees and a description of the attempt of certain elements within such organizations to interfere in the editorial prerogatives of press management. An outline is given of recent progress, following the apparent failure of that attempt, toward a more stable and democratic outlook on the part of press and radio labor organizations.

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Enclosure (under separate cover):

Report, "Some Aspects of Labor Organization in the Press and Radio in Postwar Japan", dated September 23, 1947.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Information and Education Section
Analysis and Research Division

SOME ASPECTS
OF LABOR ORGANIZATION
IN THE PRESS AND RADIO
IN POSTWAR JAPAN

Special Report Prepared by
Information Media Research

AR-292-IM-98-PP-E-24

23 September 1947

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Information and Education Section
Analysis and Research Division

SPECIAL REPORT

SERIAL NUMBER AR-292-IM-98-PP-E-24 23 September 1947

TITLE Some Aspects of Labor Organization in the Press and Radio in Postwar Japan.

SUBJECT The development of labor organizations in the press and radio since the surrender, with reference to their relationship to the growth of a free and responsible press in Japan.

PREPARED BY Information Media Research

DATES OF STUDY 28 April 1947 to 3 July 1947.

PURPOSE OR BACKGROUND

To gather and record materials on the subject, in order to provide information on the background and present status of press and radio employees' unions for the benefit of personnel interested in this aspect of the development of a free and responsible press in postwar Japan.

SCOPE

Limited primarily to labor-management relations in a selected number of enterprises. These enterprises include newspapers that form a cross-section of the Japanese press -- large and small, metropolitan and provincial. They account for more than half of Japan's entire daily circulation -- 9,878,700 out of a total of approximately 17,705,000. Also included are the monopoly Broadcasting Corporation of Japan that reaches the populace through 5,704,256 radio receivers (as of 1 April 1947); and the largest news agency, Kyodo, that serves virtually all of Japan's daily newspapers.

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LABOR ORGANIZATION IN THE PRESS AND RADIO

SOURCES OF DATA

This report is based on documents available in the files of the Civil Information and Education and the Economic and Scientific Sections of SCAP; on conferences with personnel of these sections; on interviews with union and executive personnel in 13 organizations, of which seven are located in Tokyo and the others in Kyoto, Kobe, and Fukuoka; and on Japanese press and publication sources. Open sources only were used. Main document sources within CIE were the Press and Publications and the Radio Units of the Information Division and the Information Media Research and Media Analysis Units of the Analysis and Research Division. Main source of documents within ESS was the Labor Division.

EVALUATION OF DATA

This report consists in large part of factual materials that are believed to be accurate insofar as they go. Sources are indicated in footnotes. A conscientious effort was made to gather as much information on this extensive subject from as many sources as time and facilities permitted. It was obviously impossible, however, either to obtain or to record all of the pertinent facts. Occupation personnel who have been dealing at firsthand with this subject, therefore, inevitably will note lacunae in the chronicle. Statements of opinion by Japanese need to be weighed with two considerations in mind: one, bias derived from position held; two, tendency to say what the speaker believes to be proper under current circumstances. Finally, attention is directed to the fact that the Civil Intelligence Division, G-2, was not consulted. With all of these qualifications, it is believed nevertheless that the overall picture presented is reasonably accurate.

SUMMARY

During the fall of 1945, press unions were organized rapidly and on a wide scale. In a number of instances, the organized pressure of employees forced reorganizations upon the managements and gave the newly formed unions an unprecedented degree of participation in administration.

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INTRODUCTION

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During 1946, some of these unions or their leaders extended their activities to the point of taking over basic management functions, such as determination of editorial policy.

The climax in this process came in October 1946, with the failure of a general press and radio strike called by the All Japan News and Radio Workers' Union. Technically, the strike was designed to protect the job rights of union members who had been discharged on the ground of interference in the editorial prerogatives of management. Actually, the strike was part of a political offensive launched by leftist labor leaders.

The chief trends noticeable since then are two: progress toward labor-management *modi vivendi* in various enterprises; rejection of extremist leadership and policies by the unions. There is little evidence that unions at present actively are exercising improper influence, especially any that works directly against the development of a free and responsible press. In the opinion of some responsible figures of the Japanese press, however, this quiescence on the part of radical leftist elements within press unions is only a temporary and politic withdrawal.¹

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1. Conferences: Bunshiro SUZUKI, former Asahi director and present editor of the Japanese edition of Readers Digest, 18 July 1947; Masanori ITO, president of Kyodo Tsushin, 18 July 1947.

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Chapter 1. THE PROBLEM

THE CONCEPT OF A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS

One of the fundamental problems in guiding Japan toward a democratic society is the development of a free and responsible press. Such a press is essential to the creation of an informed public opinion which, in turn, is essential to the emergence and perpetuation of a sovereign popular authority.

The concept of a free and responsible press has developed out of the experience of free societies in fostering and preserving their systems of popular government. Their experience proves that the press must have freedom of information in order to obtain legitimate news. It must have freedom of expression in order to report and interpret the news.

At the same time, the press must be responsible in the use of its freedoms. The needs of a free society require that reporting be as accurate, objective, complete, and balanced as humanly possible. They require that interpretation be clearly distinguished from reporting, and that it be directed to constructive purposes for the good of a free society.

These responsibilities inevitably are reposed in the owners of the press and in the managers selected by them. It is they who are held accountable, by the free people they serve, for the responsible use of their freedoms. It follows, therefore, that the owners and managers of the press above all are responsible to resist pressures from individuals or groups that seek to monopolize it for their own benefit.

In modern society, the over-all responsibilities of the managers of the press are multiplied by two primary factors. The first is that much of the press has become

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THE PROBLEM

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big business. Only a few people or groups can mobilize the capital and facilities that a newspaper of large circulation requires. The second is that the citizen needs as much information and guidance as possible in order to act intelligently on the complex issues of modern society.

APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT IN JAPAN

These considerations apply with particular force in present-day Japan, where the press has a vital role to play in the reversal of the authoritarian tradition, but is limited by inadequate facilities and an acute paper shortage.²

At best, the concept of a free and responsible press enjoyed only a limited realization in Japan prior to World War II. During the war, any semblance of a free and responsible press vanished in the face of official controls such as censorship, newsprint rationing, amalgamation of competing journals, positive direction of editorial policy, and subsidy of the monopolistic Domei News Agency.³ The Broadcasting Corporation of Japan (BCJ)

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2. The best example of inadequate facilities is that many newspapers started since the surrender are forced to make their press run in the plants of long-established newspaper companies. Thus, two of Kyoto's five newspapers rent their facilities to two others, and the fifth is printed in Osaka. This problem is not acute, however, because of the paper shortage. With the loss of the major source of supply in Saghalien, and the low coal production, Japan's newsprint output was reported by the 1946 Jiji Nenkan to have dropped from 579,701,000 pounds in 1940 to 147,466,000 pounds in 1945. Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP, reports that production of all kinds of paper, including newsprint, in May 1947 was 38.8% of the average in the base period 1930-1934.
 3. For a contemporary account, see Masuo KATO, The Lost War, Alfred Knopf, Inc. 1946, Chapters VIII and X passim.

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LABOR ORGANIZATION IN THE PRESS AND RADIO

presented no problem of control, being a Government-chartered monopoly⁴ under direct official supervision. The major distortion of the concept, therefore, was the result of totalitarian official influence and direction. The fact that the press served official purposes during the war undoubtedly accounts in considerable degree for the unanimity with which the Japanese supported the war, and for the lack of influence on the part of those few who did not. Against this backdrop, the Occupation began.

One of the first concerns of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was to lay the foundations for a free and responsible press. The principal directives to this end included the Press Code of 19 September 1945, that set forth standards of practice for a free press; a directive of 24 September 1945 that ordered the Japanese Government to disassociate itself completely from control or influence over the press; and a directive of 27 September 1945 that specified further steps toward freedom of the press and of speech.⁵

Since the early days of the Occupation, a new threat to the concept of a free and responsible press has arisen, not from the Japanese Government, but from within the ranks of newspaper and radio employees. The threat has been exercised through the instrumentality of employee unions and expressed in influence on editorial policy. In some cases, the threat undoubtedly has been the result of misconception of the freedom of the press on the part of employees. In others, it undoubtedly has been the result of deliberate strategy to gain control of the media of information.

At any rate, the threat has brought criticism upon the employees' unions that formed the channel of influence. This study proposes to survey some aspects of the postwar rise of labor organization in the press and recent trends of the unions; and to set forth some observations about present union organization and activities.

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4. CIE, SCAP, Special Report, Charter of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, 9 March 1946.
 5. Respectively, SCAPIN's 30, 51, and 66.

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Chapter 2. POSTWAR RISE OF LABOR ORGANIZATION

The unionization of workers in newspaper companies and the BCJ, as well as in other enterprises, has been one of the remarkable developments in post-surrender Japan. It is the direct sequence of basic Occupation policy to encourage "the development of organizations in labor, industry and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis."⁶ The SCAP "civil liberties" directive of 4 October 1945 instructed the Japanese Government to remove restrictions on individual liberties, including the right of free assembly. On 11 October 1945, the Supreme Commander told the Prime Minister that the "encouragement of the unionization of labor" was one of the reforms the Japanese Government was expected to institute in order that labor "may be clothed with such dignity as will permit it an influential voice in safeguarding the working man from exploitation and raising his living standard to a higher level..."⁷

"DEMOCRATIZATION" DURING 1945

The organization and self-assertion of employees was particularly early and spectacular in the press. In practice, however, the movement first was directed more toward what its spokesman termed the "democratization" of the Japanese press than toward specific objectives, such as higher wages and better working conditions. The "democratization" movement was most clearly manifested in Japan's three largest and most influential newspapers --the Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri. A number of provincial papers followed suit, but in their cases the changes

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6. Statement of "U.S. Initial Postwar Policy Toward Japan," issued by the White House, September 1945.
 7. PRO, SCAP, Press Release, 11 October 1945.

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LABOR ORGANIZATION IN THE PRESS AND RADIO

apparently have not had such important effects in influence on readers or infringement on editorial policy as in the cases of the three giants.⁸

The Asahi's internal reorganization began in mid-October 1945, when President Nagataka MURAYAMA brought out a plan to change leading editorial personnel.⁹ Six men affected by the proposed change voiced their objections and served him with a demand for his resignation. In addition, the resignations of the entire board of directors and of Seiichi UENO, its chairman, were requested. Finally, the employees wanted one of the editorial staff to be named representative director with authority to reorganize the company.¹⁰ The announced purpose of these demands was to "clarify" war responsibility and to "democratize" the company. A meeting of the employees on 19 October endorsed the demands and in addition proposed the establishment of an employees' union.

MURAYAMA and UENO were and are majority stockholders in the Asahi. When MURAYAMA refused to resign, a movement was initiated among the employees to secure the requested resignations by direct action. The six men to be replaced stuck to their posts; handbills denouncing MURAYAMA were published; and ultimatums were served on him. According to a statement by MURAYAMA,¹¹ the focus of the movement was in the editorial department, but "leftist elements among the employees" seized the opportunity to develop a "radical labor union movement."

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8. For an early summary of the movement, see CIE, SCAP, Special Report, Democratization of Japanese Newspapers, 19 March 1946.
 9. For additional details, see CIE, SCAP, Special Report, The Asahi Shimbun Publishing Company, 10 May 1946, pp. 4-7. Other sources: files of Information Media Research Unit, CIE, SCAP; interviews with Representative Director Tadashi HASEBE and Union Chairman Kyozo MORI; and "Democracy and Journalism," in Contemporary Japan, January-April 1946 issue.
 10. Cited in CIE, SCAP, Press Analysis, 24 October 1945.
 11. On file in Information Media Research Unit, CIE, SCAP.

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POSTWAR RISE OF LABOR ORGANIZATION

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Under such pressure, MURAYAMA agreed to resign in token acceptance of responsibility for the Asahi's war-time record. Further than that he did not want to go. He was not supported by the entire board of directors, however. A compromise was reached by which MURAYAMA, UENO, and all but three directors¹² resigned early in November 1945.

On 3 November 1945, the employees of the Tokyo office of the Asahi organized themselves formally into a union. The origins of the union lay in the beginnings of the dispute in October, when a proclamation appeared in the name of the entire editorial staff. "...The only way to meet the responsibility for our newly acquired freedom of speech is to place the newspaper in the hands of the staff which makes the paper," the proclamation read in part. When the union was formed, it announced that employee participation in management, as well as better wages and working conditions, were its objectives. In March 1946, a "management committee" was instituted in the Asahi, with employee representatives designated by the union.

Early in 1946, director NOMURA requested recommendations from the Asahi staff for nominations for a new board of directors. Each section of the newspaper selected delegates to a nominating committee. The committee passed up to NOMURA a slate of names from among the employees of the paper--six for directors and one for accountant-auditor. These names NOMURA recommended to a shareholders' meeting in April 1946, where they were accepted by acclamation. At the same time, the shareholders voted to designate MURAYAMA and UENO as owners (shashu) without either rights of participation in management or responsibility for the conduct of the paper.¹³

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12. Hideo NOMURA, Junji SUGIE, and Uichiro NITTA, of whom NOMURA acted as chief. All three were honest and respected, according to HASEBE and MORI. Interviews 13 June and 20 May 1947, respectively.
 13. The six directors were T. HASEBE, M. KOMATSU, G. KATO, M. NISHIMURA, I. KAMBE, and S. YONEMURA; the accountant-auditor, G. YAMASHITA. HASEBE, NISHIMURA and KATO are representative directors of the Tokyo,

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Internal reorganization of the Mainichi was a simpler process.¹⁴ Late in August 1945, some of the leading executives of the paper resigned from their posts voluntarily. Subsequent change in the management was facilitated by the fact that the bulk of the shares of the paper were owned by the employees. After a mass meeting of employees on 31 October, the directors resigned, and new ones were selected by an employees' committee from the employees' ranks. Mr. Itsuo KANDA became "representative director" as well as chief of the editorial bureau. The new board of 11 directors included eight bureau chiefs and three auditors. The Mainichi Employees' Union was founded in Tokyo on 22 November 1945, and in the Osaka and Moji offices in December 1945. Management councils including representatives of the union and of management were formed in each of the offices to enable the employees to have a voice in any matters of concern to them in the publication of the paper.

Yomiuri's internal upheaval began on 19 October 1945, when staff members led by Tomin SUZUKI, the chief editorial writer, proposed to organize a union, "democratize" the company, and improve working conditions.¹⁵ On 23 October, a mass meeting of 1,000 employees demanded that the president and majority stockholder, Matsutaro SHORIKI, and other leaders of the Yomiuri resign; and that editorial control be turned over to an employees' committee. Their action was motivated by the fact that SHORIKI had followed since the surrender a policy of suppressing news or editorial comment critical of Japan's wartime leaders and in-

14. Sources: files of Information Media Research Unit, CIE, SCAP; interviews with Managing Editor Masaharu NAGATA and Liaison Department Chief Ichitaro TAKATA; and Contemporary Japan, op. cit.

15. For additional details, see CIE, SCAP, Special Report, Yomiuri Shimbun Publishing Company, 13 March 1947. Other sources: interviews with President Tsunego BABA and Union Chairman Fumitaro WATANABE; and Contemporary Japan, op. cit.; CIE, SCAP, Press Analysis.

Osaka, and Kyushu offices, respectively. In April 1947, a seventh director was added: G. TABATA. Interview with Tadashi HASEBE, 13 June 1947.

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When SHORIKI refused the employees' demands, they seized control of the newspaper, ejected SHORIKI, and turned the columns of the Yomiuri against its legal owner.

On 3 December 1945, SHORIKI was designated for arrest as a war crimes suspect. On 12 December, just prior to his confinement to prison, an agreement with the union was reached through the good offices of an interim mediation committee. The chief provisions of the agreement were the designation of Tsunego BABA, a recognized liberal, as new president of the company; and the organization of a management council. This council, consisting of representatives of the union and of the management, was to "be consulted on important matters related to editing and business."

The net result of the democratization movement of the fall of 1945, outlined briefly above, was fourfold. First, unions were organized in Japan's three leading papers and in many lesser ones. Second, managements were reorganized in many instances in accordance with the demands of the employees. Third, employees gained a theretofore unheard of degree of participation in the conduct of management, including the formulation of editorial policy. Fourth, through company executives chosen by union dictation, employees occasionally controlled financial resources of firms with disregard of the rights of the firms' legal owners (stockholders).

15a. News articles denied publication included discussion of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, criticism of TOJO Cabinet power politics, discussion of constitutional revision, facts about Japan's pre-war foreign policy, information on the treatment of Japanese soldiers taken prisoners, and proposal to dissolve the Zaibatsu. In early October, an attempt was made to prevent publication of the MacArthur-Hirohito photograph. CIS, CCD, SCAP, Special Report on Yomirui-Hochi Newspaper, 8 December 1945.

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Concurrently, the press manifested an increasing willingness or desire to expose unrevealed facts about the war and the role of wartime leaders; to criticize the institutions that had facilitated Japan's going to war; and to discuss the steps necessary to reorient the nation.¹⁶

It would be hasty to conclude that the reorganizations were solely responsible for the new trends in newspaper practice; yet it is probable that they played an important role.

The methods by which these results were won, however, were more questionable. The sense of vulnerability of the owners and executives of the Asahi and Mainichi as wartime leaders undoubtedly cleared the path for the exertion of employee pressure toward reorganization. In these two cases, the changes of management were effected without resistance, though their legality never has been subject to a court decision. The Yomiuri's reorganization was at least partly the result of seizure of the plant by the employees in contravention of the legal rights of the owner. Detention of the president as a war crimes suspect enabled the employees' union to secure a contractual right to share in the functions of management.

EXTENSION OF POWER DURING 1946

The year 1946 witnessed an extension of the influence of newspaper employee unions, both in securing better wages and working conditions and in participating in management functions, including editorial policy determination. In the latter category, the two outstanding cases were those of the Yomiuri and of the Hokkaido Shimbun.

The management council of the Mainichi, and that formed in the Asahi in March 1946, apparently functioned smoothly enough to avoid open collisions on policy. The Mainichi employees' union, or at least printing shop members of the union, in one instance exercised a kind of editorial control. Mimpo, a fledgling paper at the time,

16. See, for example, any issue of CIE, SCAP, Press Analysis for this period, especially November and December 1945.

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was printed on the presses of the Mainichi. On 24 June, the Mimpo edition carried a caricature of the Emperor that was in keeping with the editor's anti-Imperial policy. When the press run was finished, the Mainichi workers refused to allow the issue to be circulated, and burned some 40,000 copies, because, they said, "It is opposed to the editorial policy of the Mainichi union to allow such an outrageous caricature of our Emperor to be in print."¹⁷ Cooler heads in the Mainichi union sought without avail to persuade the printshop members to release the remaining, unburned copies of Mimpo. Occupation authorities admonished the workers that they were denying Mimpo freedom of the press. The remaining copies, however, were not delivered to Mimpo until early in July.¹⁸

Both the Hokkaido Shimbun and Yomiuri cases represented a more extensive and fundamental threat to the freedom of the press than did the Mainichi incident.

Briefly, the story of the Hokkaido Shimbun follows.¹⁹ In February 1946, five employees of the Hokkaido Shimbun, the only paper then published in Hokkaido, appeared in Tokyo and related to SCAP that the editor-in-chief had ordered all subeditors, reporters, and compositors to join the political party (Communist) to which he belonged, or suffer discharge. SCAP told them that such a practice would be not only undemocratic but also contrary to directives.

The directors of the Hokkaido Shimbun appointed a new editor-in-chief. Although no further complaints of political dictation to the employees were heard, the editorial policy and news coverage were so extreme and biased as to incur the anger of the populace. SCAP investigation in June 1946 disclosed that the newspaper was guilty of irresponsible journalism on a number of counts, chief of which was violation of all of the Press Code. The fault lay with the editor-in-chief, a member of the local Communist Party, and with the president and directors who permitted the situation to develop.

- 17. Files of Press and Publication Unit, CIE, SCAP.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

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In defense, the president stated that he had been deceived by his employees, both in the main office and in the Tokyo office, who had not informed him correctly as to SCAP policy.

Told that he must put his house in order, the president on 21 June discharged 25 and suspended 28 editorial employees. Although the employee union's executive committee voted to accept, under the circumstances, the management's action, the men affected subsequently contended that their rights as union members had been infringed upon. The dispute on this point lasted until December 1946, when the local Labor Relations Committee finally decided in favor of the management.

The Yomiuri dispute was more complicated.²⁰ It grew out of the dissipation of editorial responsibility that resulted, in this case, from the institution of the management council. In the six months following the agreement of December 1945, Chief Editor Tomin SUZUKI, who was also chairman of the employees' union and a member of the management council, gained more control over the editorial policy of the Yomiuri than President BABA. SUZUKI generally was recognized to be a Communist sympathizer,²¹ and under his direction the Yomiuri became so leftist in tone that the circulation declined. Moreover, the paper was guilty on numerous occasions of inaccurate reporting. BABA and SUZUKI disagreed both on editorial policy and on means of ensuring accurate news reports. Their disagreement came to a head in June 1946, in the wake of SCAP admonitions over two particularly flagrant violations of the Press Code,

President BABA offered his resignation to the board of directors, stating that he could no longer accept responsibility for the paper under the circumstances. The directors refused to accept it. With their support, the

20. Sources: CIE, SCAP, Special Report, Yomiuri Shimbun Publishing Company, 13 March 1947; interviews with BABA and WATANABE; CIE, SCAP, Press Analysis; files of Press and Publications Unit, CIE, SCAP, and of Labor Division, ESS, SCAP.

21. SUZUKI was a candidate for governor of Niigata Prefecture in April 1947, running on a Communist ticket.

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president on 13 June discharged SUZUKI and five other editorial employees. As subsequent events proved, some 1,800 of the 2,000 employees supported the president's action. Nevertheless, the six men concerned refused to accept discharge unless it were approved by the management council, of which most of them were members. They held that the December 1945 agreement, and subsequent practice, dictated that the president clear such action with the council. Since they did not consider the discharge action legitimate, they forced their way into their offices with the support of members of their faction. This sort of action, however, was stopped on 21 June, when police arrested more than 50 of the disputants.²²

At the end of June, an investigation was begun by the Labor Relations Committee. Even while the committee was deliberating, the dissident faction of workers forced the paper to shut down between 12 and 17 July. The power of this faction appears to have resided in the threat of its printshop members to pie the type. As a result, 31 employees considered responsible for the strike were discharged. Their cases were added to those already under consideration by the Labor Relations Committee.

Meanwhile, the great majority of the employees formed a new and independent union.

On 3 August, the Labor Relations Committee issued its decision. The basic question was one of drawing a dividing line between the actions the management might take to protect its editorial responsibility and the actions the union might take to protect its members from capricious discharge.²³ The Labor Relations Committee held that "the dismissal of SUZUKI and the other five executives was prompted by unavoidable circumstances," i.e.,

22. All but four were released the same day. Those held were dischargees. Charges of illegal entry subsequently filed against them were dropped, and the men released on 2 July 1946.

23. According to Article 11 of the Trade Union Law of December 1946, the employer may not dismiss employees or treat them unfavorably because they are union members.

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was justifiable because they had infringed on the editorial responsibility of the management. As for the other 31 discharged persons, however, the Labor Relations Committee found that "it is necessary to investigate whether or not they involve an 'unavoidable reason.'" In effect, the Committee wanted the management to prove its contention that the 31 men discharged had exceeded proper union activities and constituted a threat to the management's editorial responsibility.

Up to this point, the net effects of the developments in the Yomiuri dispute had been the restoration of editorial control to the management, formation of a new union, and the posing of a problem in labor-management relations peculiar to the newspaper field.

The solution of the problem was delayed more than two months. President BABA refused to reconsider his action against the 31 men because, he asserted, he had to discharge them to assure his editorial control. Vainly, the discharged men and their supporters insisted that this was strictly a question of job rights that had nothing to do with editorial policy. Their strongest point was that they were still considered by the All-Japan News and Radio Workers' Union (AJNRWU) to be the legitimate Yomiuri union, although in fact they constituted a minority and dissident element.

The AJNRWU had, in fact, played a prominent role throughout the Yomiuri dispute. Some clue to the reason for its interest can be derived from its leadership. Its chairman at that time was Katsumi KIKUNAMI, an Asahi editor who played a part in the reorganization of the Asahi in the fall of 1945, and in the establishment of the AJNRWU on 9 February 1946. KIKUNAMI was and is generally considered to be a Communist sympathizer,²⁴ and the majority of the members of the central executive committee dur-

24. He was, for example, prominent in the Communist-sponsored "May Day" and "Food May Day" demonstrations of 1946. Interviewed 12 May 1947, he stated that he sympathized with Communist principles, but had not become a party member because he wished to take a "neutral stand" as chairman of the NCIU.

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ing the Yomiuri dispute were considered to be leftists. In August 1946, the AJNRWU was one of the most active organizations in the establishment of the National Congress of Industrial Unions (NCIU).²⁵ KIKUNAMI became chairman of the NCIU as well as the AJNRWU, and was at the helm of both organizations during the labor "October offensive." From June 1946 on, he espoused the cause of his friend Tomin SUZUKI and of the other men discharged from the Yomiuri, helping to mobilize demonstrations by other labor organizations against BABA and to present the case before the Labor Relations Committee. After BABA regained control of the Yomiuri, the paper frequently pointed out the danger inherent in a leftist-controlled national union of newspaper and radio workers.²⁶ On the eve of the general press and radio strike deadline, 4 October 1946, a Yomiuri editorial justified the discharges of union members on the grounds that they were Communist Party members or sympathizers and that "there is no room for such a foreign element in present press circles... A member of the Communist Party is in no sense a liberal or a democrat."²⁷

SHOWDOWN OF OCTOBER 1946

The militant leadership of the AJNRWU in September proposed a "general strike" of its chapter unions in newspapers, news agencies, and the BCJ with three basic purposes.²⁸ The first was to settle the Yomiuri dispute²⁹ and its close parallel in the Hokkaido Shimbun. The second was the conclusion of labor-management contracts.

25. According to Labor Division, ESS, SCAP.

26. See, for example, CIE, SCAP, Press Analyses for 25, 27, and 29 September 1946.

27. Cited in Press Analysis, CIE, SCAP, 4 October 1946.

28. That is, overt purposes. It was frequently charged, as by the Yomiuri union on 23 September, that the covert purpose was to further the current NCIU campaign to overthrow the YAMADA Cabinet. Kyodo release, 24 September 1946.

29. "...Along the lines of" the 3 August labor relations committee recommendation. Kyodo release, 25 September 1946, i.e., to win the reemployment of at least the 31 men in the second group of discharges.

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The third and least emphasized was to win higher wages and better working conditions.³⁰ The leaders apparently hoped to force the hands of the Yomiuri and Hokkaido Shimbun managements by creating public pressure on them as a result of the interruption of news services.

Although delegates from chapter unions voted for the strike,³¹ there was considerable indecision in the rank and file. It was charged that the strike decision was made arbitrarily and without adequate consultation with the membership of the chapter unions; and it was feared that the proposed strike was designed by the AJNRWU leadership to be more a part of the political "October offensive" of the NCIU than an action for the benefit of the union members.³²

On the eve of the strike, as local chapters were debating whether or not to participate, the Asahi union decided to stay out.³³ According to the present Asahi union chairman, the decision was based largely on the conviction that the AJNRWU was "undemocratic."³⁴ Immediately the Mainichi union followed suit, and in their wake all of the more important members of the AJNRWU.

When 5 October came, only the BCJ union and those of a handful of minor papers throughout the country, including the Communist organ Akahata and the leftist Mimpo, actually went out.³⁵

The effect of this abortive "strike" on the Yomiuri was nil. President BABA and the independent Yomiuri union on 8 October 1946 concluded a collective bargaining contract³⁶ that had been under negotiation since the formation of the independent union. Moreover, an agreement was

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30. Kyodo releases, 17 September 1946. Interview with AJNRWU Chairman Takayuki KAWAZOE, 23 May 1947.
31. Kyodo release, 25 September 1946.
32. See, for example, CIE, SCAP, Press Analyses for 24, 29, and 30 September, 4, 5, 6, and 7 October 1946, et seq.
33. Kyodo release, 4 October 1946.
34. Interview with Kyozo MORI, 19 May 1947.
35. Kyodo release, 6 October 1946.
36. For text, see CIE, SCAP, Special Report, Yomiuri Shimbun Publishing Company, 13 March 1947, Appendix III.

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reached with the dissident Yomiuri elements whereby the original six dischargees were considered to have resigned and therefore were given back pay and retirement allowances; and 31 dischargees were rehired on the understanding that they would resign immediately. Most of the striking faction also were rehired and became members of the independent union.³⁷

The radio strike lasted until 25 October. Its settlement was complicated by the fact that the Minister of Communications placed the BCJ under direct Government control to ensure a minimum schedule of news, weather information, and other essential broadcasts.³⁸ The chief objectives of the BCJ union were to obtain a contract and a number of economic demands. Management was willing to agree to most of the latter, but held that a contract was difficult so long as the BCJ union remained affiliated through the AJNRWU with the NCIU.³⁹ At the conclusion of the strike, the union obtained some 75 percent of its economic demands, but failed to obtain a collective bargaining contract.⁴⁰

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37. Interview with union chairman, Fumitaro WATANABE, 29 May 1947.
38. Kyodo release, 6 October 1946.
39. Ibid., 16 October 1946.
40. Ibid., 25 October 1946; Radio Unit, CIE, SCAP.

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Chapter 3. RECENT TRENDS

The foregoing outlines the high points of the activities of labor organizations in the press during the first 14 months of the Occupation. Some such background is necessary to a more detailed discussion of recent trends and the present status of these organizations.

Since the failure of the "general strike" of press and radio in October 1946, two primary trends stand out in cases observed and reported. First, press unions individually have continued and even accelerated the process of reaching working relationships with management through contracts and regular procedures. Second, they have gone far to reject extremist leadership and policies, both individually and in their national union. The two trends, of course, are interlocked. In general, individual unions seem to have achieved the soundest growth and working relationships in proportion as they have rejected extremism. In the national union, this process was sharply defined and is treated separately, as is the case of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan.

DEVELOPMENT OF WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

The failure of the October 1946 strike seemed to accelerate, if anything, the process of establishing working relationships between press companies and their unions. There appeared to be steady progress toward better-defined contractual relationships and toward the use of consultative machinery for the peaceful resolution of labor-management issues. At the same time, there were indications of a growing understanding among the rank and file of union members of the concept and proper functions of a un-

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ion.⁴¹

In the case of the Asahi,⁴² for example, union leadership was changed soon after the abortive "general strike" of press and radio in October 1946. Kyozo MORI, a life-long newspaperman who was Asahi correspondent in Washington before the war, was elected chairman on 20 October. At the same time, Tomo HIROOKA, editorial writer, was elected a vice-chairman and head of the Tokyo branch of the Asahi union. Both MORI and HIROOKA had opposed Asahi participation in the 5 October strike; HIROOKA had attempted to negotiate a settlement in the Yomiuri dispute. Their election marked a victory for the moderate majority of the Asahi union that had, as much as any other factor, broken the 5 October strike by voting not to participate. Under such leadership, the Asahi union negotiated for and obtained a wage increase in November 1946. Furthermore, negotiations for a contract, in process for some time before the proposed October strike, were brought to fruition on 1 December 1946.

The contract provided, among other things, for the establishment of a management council consisting of 10 union and 10 management representatives. From its inauguration to date, the management council has settled seven items of dispute between the union and the management, items having to do with wage scales, special allowances, vacations and holidays. MORI and HIROOKA have held their positions since their original election in October 1946; the chairman of the Osaka branch was replaced in January 1947, and that of the Kokura branch in April 1947.

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41. As defined by the Chief of Labor Division, ESS, SCAP, "A union is a free, responsible, and self-governing association of working men and women which uses its collective power and influence in all lawful and proper ways to advance the wages, working conditions, and general welfare of its members."
 42. Factual material on this topic supplied by Asahi Union Chairman Kyozo MORI in interviews, 19 and 20 May 1947.

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The Mainichi union⁴³ appears to have gone through more vicissitudes than that of the Asahi in developing toward the relative stability of the present. The union's executive committee has changed four times since October 1946. Although the Mainichi has had a contract since 22 April 1946, these changes of leadership appear to reflect both a working out of labor-management relations and a contest for power within the union itself.

The first of these changes followed closely, as in the Asahi, on the failure of the 5 October "general strike."⁴⁴ A new executive committee, elected 16 October, lasted only a short time. Its chief achievement was to take the Mainichi union formally out of the general strike, but it resigned, partly as a result of criticism by leftist elements within the union,⁴⁵ and partly as a result of differences among the Mainichi union branches.⁴⁶

The next executive committee foundered on a wage increase question. As the chairman favored the figure that the company was willing to grant,⁴⁷ he was criticized by leftists among the union members. The company's figure was finally accepted, but the executive committee resigned on 25 January 1947.

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43. Factual material on this topic supplied by Ichitaro TAKATA, chief of Liaison Department, and Yoshio MIYAMOTO, at time of interview, member of preparatory committee for new union, in interview 16 May 1947.
44. On the early morning of 5 October, even after the union had voted against participation, some 30 members, including the majority of the executive committee, staged a three-hour wildcat strike and prevented the delivery of the Mainichi.
45. Because Mainichi delegates demanded the resignation of Katsumi KIKUNAMI, chairman of the AJNRWU, who had led the abortive strike.
46. The Tokyo and Moji branches favored, while the Osaka branch opposed, participation in AJNRWU-directed anti-YOSHIDA Cabinet demonstrations.
47. A payroll of ¥4,450,000, as opposed to the union request for ¥6,500,000.

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On 6 February, a new executive committee was elected, the majority of whose members were "definitely leftist" in outlook. The election of such men through normal procedures was the result of "leftist maneuvering."⁴⁸ This committee drafted a contract intended to supplement the one already in effect in the Mainichi by binding the management and the AJNRWU in contractual relationship. A general meeting of the union 21 and 22 March rejected the proposal, and the draft never was submitted to the management. The executive committee resigned, and the union embarked on a new course that took it out of the AJNRWU.

The salient features of labor-management relations in the Yomiuri⁴⁹ since October 1946 lie in orderly negotiations on wage and allowance questions. The union has been under the same chairman, Fumitaro WATANABE, since it split off from the AJNRWU in the summer of 1946 during the height of the Yomiuri dispute. The contract of October 1946 provides for a management council which has disposed of 98 percent of the labor-management business. Settlements on wage or special allowances questions were reached in October, November, and December (thrice), 1946, and February, March, April and May, 1947. On two occasions, at least, differences arose that were not easily resolved. Late in 1946 the union requested sight of the company's books with a view to "rationalizing" its wage requests. The management was reluctant to accede, but finally did so in January 1947.⁵⁰ In April 1947, the management council was not able to reach an agreement on union requests for further special allowances. The union set up a special struggle committee (tsoso linkai) that negotiated the matter directly with the management.

In accordance with contract provisions, management consulted the union through the management council on per-

48. According to TAKATA and MIYAMOTO.

49. Factual material on this topic supplied by Union Chairman Fumitaro WATANABE in interview 29 May 1947.

50. President Tsunego BABA commented that the books are so complicated that he is not sure the union has anyone expert enough to comprehend them. Interview 29 May 1947.

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sonnel changes affecting the chief of the technical department (komubucho) in November 1946, two section chiefs in the editorial department in May 1947, and the chief of the general affairs section in May 1947. In the last instance, the union successfully opposed the change. The union's general assembly on 18 May 1947 elected new representatives to the management council, three of them on the basis that section chiefs are too close to the management to represent the union satisfactorily.⁵¹

In the Nihon Keizai Shimbun,⁵² the employees' union since its inauguration in November 1945 has been under the leadership of three leftists, supported by a coterie of about 35 out of the total of 500 members. Apparently the activities of the union were bothersome but not seriously so during 1946. There were 12 separate requests for wage increases, special allowances, and other economic benefits;⁵³ union executives overdid their use of the conference room; and employees tended to become lazy. However, the union did not participate in the October strike, nor did it attempt to meddle in editorial matters. A contract was signed on 31 October 1946.⁵⁴ From December, however, the union leaders presented a number of requests that the president considered excessive. One such wage demand in April 1947 was emphatically and flatly refused. The rejection apparently had the effect of weakening the position of the leaders, rather than the reverse, for they proved unable to deliver what they had promised. At any rate, the three officers of the union withdrew from their concurrent positions as members of the struggle committee that had been set up to win the demand.

The employees' union of the Nishi Nippon Shimbun

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51. Section chiefs (except for the personnel section) are allowed to be members of the Yomiuri union.
52. Factual material on this topic supplied by President Ritoku OBAMA and Hakuei OGIHARA, chief of foreign news section and member of union. Interviews 27 May 1947.
53. All of which were granted and none of which were "unreasonable," according to OBAMA.
54. President OBAMA, who confessed he had not yet read it, said he understood it to be a "model contract." Interview 27 May 1947.

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(Fukuoka) was militant in leadership and policies during 1946.⁵⁵ There was some question as to union participation in editorial affairs, and the paper was accused of untruthful and biased reporting and of excessively leftist editorial policy. It received six warnings for violations of the Press Code during the fall. The union was one of the few throughout Japan, and the only one in western Japan, to participate in the October strike. This action precipitated the adoption of a contract, together with a standard wage scale, on 7 October 1946. Nevertheless, the union chairman resigned in December, partly as a result of the growing sentiment among the rank and file that their walk-out had been "unnecessary."⁵⁶ Poor communications and inadequate understanding of events in Tokyo led the employees to follow the directions of the AJNRWU; and in the end they were "deceived" by the Asahi and Mainichi unions, whose last-minute decisions not to participate broke the strike.⁵⁷ Another reason for the chairman's resignation quite possibly was that the management of the newspaper underwent a major reorganization in December, in the wake of Occupation authorities' warnings against malpractices, and union members deemed it expedient to follow suit.

The present (June 1947) officers and executives committee of the Nishi Nippon Shimbun union were elected at a regular general meeting on 11 April 1947. Since then, the chief business of the union has been to advance a request for a new wage increase, and to work out details of an age limit system scheduled to go into effect on 1 July 1947.⁵⁸

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55. Material on this topic obtained in interviews with leading executive and union personnel in Fukuoka, 6-9 June 1947, and integrated in report dated 16 June 1947, on file in Information Media Research Unit, CIE, SCAP.
56. Statement by present union chairman, Sadao YANO, in interview, 7 June 1947.
57. Ibid.
58. Those more than 55 years of age will be pensioned. Management had agreed in principle to such a system as early as November 1946, as a regular means of retiring older and less efficient employees.

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The primary focus of union-management relationships in the Kyodo News Agency⁵⁹ since October has been negotiation for a contract. Although a draft was initialed early in March, formal agreement had not been reached by July 1947. The chief points of difference lay in the clause fixing hours of work, and in attached provisions for a management council. The issue over the management council lay in disagreement on its scope and functions.⁶⁰ Kyodo executives considered that the union concept for the council would give employees an undue degree of participation in management.⁶¹ In the opinion of the union chairman, the difficulty of reaching a compromise on this point was heightened by belief on the management side that the union's executive committee was still too "leftist" in outlook. Despite the lack of contractual relationship, union and management have negotiated smoothly on a number of questions involving wages and working conditions. Furthermore, there has been informal consultation on personnel changes and on union activities, such as participation in demonstrations.

A survey conducted by the Japan Newspaper Association⁶²

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59. Factual material on this topic supplied by Managing Editor Masuo KATO, interviews 28 and 31 May 1947; and Union Chairman Ishimatsu OBOSHI, interviews 31 May and 2 July 1947.
60. There is no objection to establishing a council, which merely would formalize existing consultative practices, according to both KATO and OBOSHI.
61. In the union draft, one of the objectives of the council would be "to democratize management," and one of the functions would be to discuss "conduct of company business and union activities."
62. Nippon Shimbun Kyokai, sometimes translated as Japan Editors' and Publishers' Society. Membership at time of survey, June 1947, was 120, including virtually all daily newspapers and important news agencies. The figures are incomplete, as five member companies had not answered the association's questionnaires, and some had made partial responses. Survey tabulations on file in Information Media Research Unit, CIE, SCAP.

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revealed that as of 1 June 1947 at least 63 press companies had concluded contracts with their employees' unions. The survey also revealed that at least 47 of these contracts had been concluded during or since October 1946.

REJECTION OF EXTREMISM

The trend toward moderate leadership and policies was most sharply seen in the story of the AJNRWU. After the failure of the October strike, a national convention was held on 22-24 October 1946. Delegates of four locals⁶³ presented a motion of non-confidence in the leaders who had called the strike, and asked that "minority dictatorship" be rejected and that the union be "reorganized along democratic lines."⁶⁴ After turbulent discussion, a compromise was effected under which the motion was withdrawn and the AJNRWU officials resigned. Takayuki KAWAZOE, financial news editor of Jiji Press, was elected chairman. His election was interpreted as a victory for moderates in the union, and it was expected that his main efforts would be directed toward consolidating the badly shaken structure of the union.⁶⁵

The national union next came into prominence in connection with the plans for the 1 February 1947 general strike projected by Government railway and office workers' unions, components of the CIU. Along with other affiliates of CIU, the AJNRWU central committee called a sympathy strike to coincide with the Government employees' walkout. The decision was adopted on 29 January by a vote of 60-4.⁶⁶ The attitude of the locals, insofar as ascer-

63. Mainichi Shimbun, Hokkaido Shimbun, Chubu Nippon, Jiji Shimpō.

64. Jiji Press release, 22 October 1946.

65. Ibid., 25 October 1946. Other officers were drawn from the Mainichi, BCJ, Asahi, Nishi Nippon Shimbun, and Tokyo Shimbun.

66. The four were Akita Sakigake Shimbun, Kahoku Shimpō, Fujin Shimbun, and Gifu Times. Interview with AJNRWU Chairman Takayuki KAWAZOE, 23 May 1947. It is worth noting that the BCJ union had indicated much earlier its intention to participate. Kyodo release, 21 January 1947.

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tained, was based not only on sympathy for the Government workers' demands, but also on the practical basis that publication would be next to impossible if communications and transportation were stopped.⁶⁷ Neither the Government workers' strike nor the sympathy strikes took place on 1 February, because of SCAP intervention. The AJNRWU central committee, however, did not rescind its strike call until 0010 hours on 1 February.⁶⁸ Most locals already had decided independently not to strike. Reviewing the event, a meeting of the central committee on 9 February concluded that "in the future there must be closer cooperation on all matters between headquarters and union locals." The committeemen also saw signs of "inactivity" on the part of union members, and warned, "We must not look too much to leadership which is likely to bring about a centralization. There is a danger of creating union fascism, namely, the despotism of a few of the leading staff."⁶⁹

There is no doubt, however, that the performance of the AJNRWU, as well as the prohibition of the general strike itself, was an important factor in the subsequent censure of its leaders and policies. The first and strongest censure came from the Mainichi union.

As already described (p.27), the Mainichi union was ready to lay a new course after the resignation of its leftist executive committee in March 1947. In proposing a contract between the Mainichi management and the AJNRWU, the committee had raised the question of the employees' attitude toward the AJNRWU itself. Heated debate arose during the 21-22 March general meeting of the union's Tokyo branch as to the AJNRWU and CIU--whether they were "under serious influence of the Communist Party"; whether the

67. Interviews with Asahi Union Chairman Kyozo MORI, 19 May 1947; Nishi Nippon Union Chairman Sadao YANO, 7 June 1947, et al.

68. Interview with Asahi Union Chairman MORI, a member of the committee, 19 May 1947.

69. Shimbun no Shimbun (Newspapers' Newspaper), 15 February 1947. This is a generally reliable trade publication with a circulation of 8,000 every other day to press personnel throughout Japan. It was independently established in 1924.

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leaders had gone too far in the October strike and the attempted February strike; whether the leaders "acted in defiance" of the general will of the members; whether present AJNRWU policy "does not contradict with the employees' loyalty toward the company and their spirit of improving their own paper."⁷⁰ A test vote came on the issue of type of membership in the AJNRWU--individual (kojin kanyu) or group (dantai kanyu).⁷¹ A majority (282-166) favored changing the current individual form of membership to the group form. This action amounted to a vote on non-confidence in the AJNRWU.

The next step in the new course was for the Mainichi union's three branches to send delegates to a meeting in Osaka for the purpose of determining the attitude of the Mainichi union as a whole. These delegates, representing Mainichi at a regular national convention of the AJNRWU in Osaka on 27 and 28 March, advanced a proposal that member unions of the AJNRWU should be free to disassociate themselves from the CIU. When the proposal was not accepted forthwith, the Mainichi delegates announced that they had no alternative but withdrawal from the AJNRWU, a step that automatically severed them also from CIU. Their stand was ratified on 2 May by meetings in the branch of-

70. Memorandum from Ichitaro TAKATA, chief of Liaison Department, 24 March 1947, on file in Press and Publications Unit, CIE, SCAP.

71. According to Article IV of its constitution, the AJNRWU is based on individual members and not on local branches (shibu). However, if an individual newspaper union affiliates with AJNRWU, all of its members become members of the national union. The theory seems to be that group membership (i.e., local) protects the interests of the local more than does individual membership. In other words, under the group membership system, the individual becomes responsible to the leadership of his local rather than to the leadership of the national union. In practice, however, there seems to have been almost complete autonomy on the part of the individual chapter. Thus, the October strike failed because individual chapters voted not to participate, despite the orders of the national union to do so.

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fices, the vote in the Tokyo branch being 237 to 94.⁷²

Concurrently, a preparatory committee was elected to launch a "new" independent union. It came into being on 14 May with Kikutarō IKEDA as chairman and a new constitution and set of by-laws.⁷³

Satisfaction with the course of events was expressed by the Mainichi's management in an editorial in the English Mainichi of 17 April, and a meeting of the board of directors the next day. Withdrawal from the AJNRWU, said the editorial, was an action "rooted in the deep conviction of the Mainichi workers that membership in the AJNRWU is a definite menace to a demonstration of the supreme mission charged to the democratic press and its workers." The editorial criticized AJNRWU for despotic leadership that had in October sought to transform the labor union "into a machine for political revolution." On 18 April, (then) Representative Director Itsuo KANDA told other directors:

.....While newspapers have been suppressed in Europe, many new papers have appeared in Japan to promote the thorough democratization of the country. From this point of view....to let the labor movement have an unnecessarily great voice in editorial, personnel and management rights is a very deplorable matter. Under such conditions, I am surprised that the newspapers have not been ordered to cease publishing altogether. So I am very pleased that the Mainichi labor union has decided to quit the AJNRWU.⁷⁴

Withdrawal of the Mainichi from the AJNRWU might be called the third serious blow the national union had suffered. The first was the withdrawal of the Yomiuri union in the summer of 1946, the second was the failure of the October strike. Now the largest component chapters remaining were those of the Asahi and of the BCJ, with the

72. Letter from Ichitaro TAKATA, 4 April 1947, on file in Press and Publications Unit, CIE, SCAP.

73. Jiji Press release, 14 May 1947.

74. Shimbun no Shimbun, 25 April 1947.

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Asahi union the more important of the two in point of influence.

The future of the AJNRWU, therefore, depended in large measure on the attitude of the Asahi union. At the Osaka convention, Chairman MORI of the Asahi union had criticized the lack of democratic practice in the AJNRWU; nevertheless, the Mainichi's proposal that the press union split from the CIU came as a complete surprise to him and the rest of the delegates. MORI requested that the Mainichi refrain from precipitate action until he could consult the general will of the Asahi members.⁷⁵ When the question was put to vote at the convention, 45 delegates went on record against the Mainichi's motion, and 95 favored postponing decision to the next national convention.⁷⁶ The Mainichi delegates walked out, and the convention was "recessed" until the next session on 27 and 28 May in Tokyo. MORI called a general meeting of the Asahi union for 9 and 10 May to decide on the question.

During the recess, events occurred both within the Asahi and within the AJNRWU that further underscored the trend toward the rejection of extremism. First, the withdrawal of the Mainichi union started a chain of similar actions on the part of smaller chapters. The Shin Osaka union quit AJNRWU on 31 March, with the declaration that it intended to "make a new start in a genuine union movement free from any political affiliations."⁷⁷ Others withdrawing were Akita Sakigake Shimpo (Akita) on 1 April; Godo Shimbun (Okayama) on 12 April; Saga Shimbun (Saga) on 26 April; and Kochi Shimbun (Kochi) on 8 May.

Second, and concurrently, there arose a demand that the AJNRWU and the CIU "re-examine" their leadership and policies.

One token of the rank and file sentiment was the failure of Katsumi KIKUNAMI, chairman of the CIU and former chairman of the AJNRWU, in his campaign for election to the House of Councillors of the Japanese Diet. Al-

75. Interview with Kyozo MORI, 20 May 1947.

76. Kyodo release, 29 May 1947.

77. Jiji Press release, 31 March 1947.

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though his name was well known, and although he ran as candidate from the national constituency, KIKUNAMI finished 104th among the group from which only 100 were to be elected--for of a total of 250 members in the House of Councillors, 150 stand for election from local regions, and 100 are candidates at large (national constituency). "Observers" cited by Jiji Press considered that KIKUNAMI relied too heavily on support from members of the AJNRWU, the majority of whom "appeared to have voted for other candidates of newspaper career."⁷⁸

At any rate, on 6 May Chairman Takayuki KAWAZOE of the AJNRWU formally petitioned the CIU to call a general meeting in order to "re-examine its activities and policies of the past and formulate new clear-cut policies to clarify its stand in the eyes of the general public."⁷⁹ Executive officers of the CIU duly met and discussed the adoption of a "new policy" designed to "eliminate domination of the organization by a particular political party."⁸⁰ The executives confessed to "over-emphasis on strike strategy" and promised "far-reaching democratization" of the CIU. Chief Organizer Tago KAMEDA admitted, among other things, that CIU had "failed to make adequate efforts to negotiate with management" and that it had "given its member unions little time to think before resorting to strikes." KAWAZOE pointed out that "member unions must be strengthened to cope with the critical economic situation."⁸¹

While the AJNRWU and CIU thus were maneuvering to forestall disintegration,⁸² the Asahi union itself was as-

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78. Jiji Press release, 25 April 1947.
79. Kyodo release, 7 May 1947. Other CIU components bringing similar pressure in one way or another included the All Japan Printing and Publishing Workers' Union, National Federation of Coal Mine Workers' Unions, and the General Federation of Government Railways Employees' Unions.
80. Jiji Press release, also Kyodo release, 12 May 1947.
81. Ibid., 14 May 1947
82. Yomiuri commented on 14 May, "...the self-criticism professed in this new move of CIU is merely a step to check further secessions of member unions and does not touch upon any fundamentals...The only man-

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sailed by Nagataka MURAYAMA, former president and one of the biggest stockholders of the paper. On 3 May, MURAYAMA made public a statement⁸³ to the board of directors in which he charged, "The whole Asahi organization is practically being dictated by a union dominated by a Communist minority, which has gone to ludicrous extremes to distort the paper's conception of democracy."

He therefore made three requests of the directors:

1.To take immediate and appropriate steps to have the Asahi employees' union secede not only from the AJNRWU but also from the CIU of Japan, both Communist dominated.
2.To rid the Asahi organization of Communists, totalitarians, and all other destructive elements which constitute a menace to a free press, in order that the editorial policy of the Asahi might become entirely free from influence or domination by labor unions.
3.To put the management back on a reasonable and financially sound basis.

The statement was well timed for maximum effect. The Asahi union had been pondering its attitude toward the AJNRWU and was on the point of adopting a formal decision. Its decision undoubtedly would determine the prospects of the AJNRWU.

The reaction to the statement, however, was not all that MURAYAMA probably had hoped. Four of the six directors described MURAYAMA's assertions as "absurd" and "entirely contrary to fact."⁸⁴ Chairman MORI said his un-

83. On file in Information Media Research Unit, CIE, SCAP.
84. Stars and Stripes, 5 May 1947, UP report.

ner in which CIU can liquidate its past errors is to dissolve altogether the dual nature of the CIU, which is part labor union and part Communist political arm, and have each of its member unions start anew independently."

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ion was prepared to refute all of the allegations, adding, "Mr. MURAYAMA is attempting to force us to adopt the kind of political philosophy which he believes in... Such an attempt should be rejected, as any attempts by a minority group of the workers to take over control of any labor organization."⁸⁵ According to MORI,⁸⁶ MURAYAMA's statement angered rather than cowed the union membership.

At the 9-10 May general meeting, MORI counseled against hasty decisions; he apparently feared that indignation against MURAYAMA might strengthen the left wing of the union. The main decisions of the meeting were to favor the severance of the AJNRWU from CIU, and to uphold the current individual membership system of the AJNRWU.

Meanwhile both MORI and members of the directorate sought to disabuse MURAYAMA of what they held to be the "misinformation" that had guided his action.⁸⁷ On 10 May, an agreement was signed between MURAYAMA and HASEBE that brought the episode to a quiet conclusion. Briefly, MURAYAMA withdrew his allegations that the "Communist-dominated union" controlled the newspaper; the directors took responsibility for editorial "mistakes" and pledged to maintain a "strictly neutral" editorial policy free from interference; and MURAYAMA voiced his full support of the present board of directors.⁸⁸

The net result of the episode was, if anything, to leave the union where it was before. Apparently the union's decision to recommend AJNRWU severance from CIU was its own and not the result of MURAYAMA's pressure.

85. Kyodo release, 7 May 1947.

86. Interview 20 May 1947.

87. MORI stated that he called on MURAYAMA to explain the organization of operations of the union, and to rectify MURAYAMA's misunderstandings. MURAYAMA accepted the explanations and said he was "sorry," according to MORI. Interview 20 May 1947. HASEBE as well as MORI believes MURAYAMA was acting on the basis of misinformation supplied by some interested party. Interview 13 June 1947.

88. Interview with HASEBE, 13 June 1947.

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The announced "self-reflection" policy of the CIU did not check the ebb of AJNRWU strength. A spokesman of the Asahi union made it clear on 13 May that his organization would not change its stand. The Asahi union desired, he said, to form a "united labor front for newspaper workers," including those of the Yomiuri and Mainichi, and the inevitable first step must be separation of the AJNRWU from CIU.⁸⁹ On the eve of the resumption of the AJNRWU convention, the union of the Chugoku Shimbun (Hiroshima) announced that it, like the Asahi union, favored AJNRWU withdrawal and individual membership.⁹⁰ Three more press unions made public on 26 May their decision to withdraw from the CIU but not from the AJNRWU. These were Jiji Shimpō of Tokyo, and Shinshu Mainichi and Yukan Shinshu of Nagano. The Kyodo News Agency union, however, voted to remain a member of CIU if the latter changed its attitude and policies; also to urge AJNRWU to establish a special organ "to work for the unification of the entire labor front."⁹¹

When the AJNRWU national convention resumed in Tokyo on 27 May, therefore, chairman KAWAZOE reported that membership had fallen in the two months since the Osaka convention from 72 locals with 31,695 members to 67 locals with 26,497 members. Only one union--the 65-member organization of the Fukushima Minyu Shimbun--had joined during the period.⁹² Under the circumstances, KAWAZOE and other executives tendered their resignations.

Debate centered on two proposals: one for the deletion of Article 1 of the AJNRWU constitution that stipulated affiliation with CIU; and one for revision of Article 6 to establish membership on a collective instead of an individual basis. On the former question, debate was hot and lines were sharply drawn. Those favoring deletion of Article 1 were led by the Asahi delegates,⁹³ and those

89. Jiji Press release, 13 May 1947.

90. Ibid., 21 May 1947.

91. Kyodo release, 27 May 1947.

92. Jiji Press release, 27 May 1947.

93. Chubu Nippon (Nagoya), Chugoku Shimbun (Hiroshima), Hokkaido Shimbun, Nishi Nippon Shimbun (Fukuoka), Chukyo Shimbun (Nagoya), Jiji Shimpō (Tokyo), Shizuoka Shimbun, and Kyushu Times (Fukuoka).

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opposing were led by the BCJ delegates.⁹⁴

MORI, for the Asahi union, argued that the common interests of press employees required a common front; such a common front would be impossible without participation of the Yomiuri and Mainichi unions and others that objected to AJNRWU because of its affiliation with CIU; and to maintain CIU affiliation only would drive its leadership more to the left.

BCJ delegates held that CIU's "self-criticism" should be accepted at face value; that withdrawal from CIU only would further weaken both CIU and AJNRWU by promoting further withdrawals; and that CIU and AJNRWU "must be defended."⁹⁵

Finally the two sides were able to agree on a proposal advanced by a Nihon Keizai Shimbun delegate. The parties, he suggested, differed only in strategy for achieving a united labor front of press employees.⁹⁶ After confirming its policy for a united front, the convention made the following decisions:

1. To delete the sentence in Article 1 stating that "AJNRWU shall be a member of the CIU." (Passed unanimously.)
2. To remain a member of the CIU. (By a vote of 274-157.)
3. To establish a "labor front unification council" for the purpose of establishing a common front among all press unions, both within and without the AJNRWU. (Passed unanimously.)⁹⁷

 94. Kyodo News Agency, Tokyo Shimbun, Gifu Times, Hokkaido Mainichi (Kanazawa), Jomo Shimbun (Maebashi), Yamagata Shimbun, Shin Iwate (Morioka), and Shikoku Shimbun (Takanatsu). Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 May 1947.
 95. Jiji Press release, 27 and 28 May 1947.
 96. Ibid.; 28 May 1947.
 97. Kyodo release, 29 May 1947. These resolutions had been advanced by Kyodo News Agency delegates. Jiji Press release 29 May added that this resolution contained a provision that AJNRWU would be prepared to break

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Thus the convention struck a compromise intended primarily to bolster the waning strength of the AJNRWU. Although the national press union did not withdraw from CIU, its chapters were free to do so without quitting the AJNRWU. Furthermore, efforts would be made to bring unions like those in the Yomiuri and Mainichi back into the AJNRWU.

On the membership issue, the convention accepted Asahi proposals intended to give individual chapters greater independence. Although individual membership was continued in principle, the "autonomy of each local" was to be recognized. This seemed to mean that each chapter would be entitled to act as a unit, although its members might be, individually, members of the AJNRWU and theoretically subject to its decisions--a confirmation of existing practice.⁹⁸

Another Asahi proposal stipulated that each local should have power to recall its delegates to the AJNRWU central committee and executive committee.⁹⁹

These proposals were to be formally advanced in the next AJNRWU convention scheduled for October 1947.

Finally, the convention elected new officers. KAWAZOE was continued as chairman, and Asahi and BCJ men were given vice-chairmanships.¹⁰⁰

The results of the convention indicated that the delegates compromised to preserve the unity of the AJNRWU at

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98. Interview with Shichiro MORIOKA, accountant-auditor and information officer, AJNRWU, 19 June 1947.
99. Chairman MORI of the Asahi union pointed out that delegates had tended to fall out of line with opinion in the organizations they were supposed to represent. Interview 19 May 1947.
100. Vice-chairmen: Shonosuke SUENAGA (Asahi), Hideo ARAKAWA (Jiji Shimpo), Kazuo OTSUKI (BCJ). Secretary-general: Shichiro MORIOKA (Nishi Nippon). Jiji Press release, 29 May 1947.
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- with CIU "if necessary," a provision to which BCJ delegates objected strenuously.

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the expense of the CIU; and they compromised to preserve the unity of their chapters at the expense of the AJNRWU. Although AJNRWU remained affiliated, individual chapters could sever their affiliation through AJNRWU with CIU. The autonomy of the chapters was recognized, and the AJNRWU thus took a step toward recognizing its actual form as a federation of press unions rather than a unitary industrial union. Moreover, the move toward rapprochement with the non-member press unions suggested a willingness to seek the lowest common denominator of interests and policies for the sake of some kind of a united front.

The alternatives to the convention's compromise well might have been the loss of any semblance of common front both on the national scale and on the chapter scale. A vote either to stay with or to secede from the CIU might have split the convention and also split the individual chapters.

As it is, there are evidences that the unity is none too strong. During the convention, the Asahi delegates served notice that their chapter might in the future secede not only from CIU but also from AJNRWU.

"However," the delegate promised, "any such action will be taken at a general meeting of the AJNRWU."¹⁰¹

According to Ishimatsu OBOSHI, chairman of the Kyodo union, the convention's decision to establish a labor front unification council was 70 percent motivated by the desire to bring the Yomiuri and Mainichi unions back into the fold; this and the decision on CIU affiliation were compromises to avoid splitting the Asahi union.¹⁰²

Early reactions to the AJNRWU actions were not definite. Up to the end of June 1946, no further press unions were reported to have severed connections with either the AJNRWU or with the CIU. On the other hand, there was little evidence of progress in the direction of a common front. The projected unification council was set up with

101. Kyodo release, 29 May 1947.

102. Interview 31 May 1947.

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MORI of the Asahi as chairman¹⁰³ and a hand-picked roster of members.¹⁰⁴

One clue to the attitude of the Yomiuri union might be seen in the Yomiuri's editorial for 30 May,¹⁰⁵ which expressed regret that the AJNRWU had not quit the CIU altogether:

In establishing a council to unify its labor front, the AJNRWU has stipulated that it would secede from the CIU if necessary. However, if the union refuses to make an exhaustive study of its own organization, it would still be difficult immediately to unify the labor front in cooperation with Communist-dominated unions, even though they carry out their condition of seceding from the CIU.

Nothing was heard from the Mainichi union, and the AJNRWU made no public reports of the progress of its program.

THE BCJ--AN EXCEPTION?

Developments in the BCJ since the end of the radio strike in October 1946 suggest that the broadcasting employees' union has lagged behind most press unions in progress toward working relationships and in the rejection of extremism. During the last three months of 1946, the BCJ was preoccupied with a personnel dispute.¹⁰⁶ In the

103. Jiji Press release, 29 May 1947.

104. Members include OBOSHI of Kyodo, and representatives of the unions in Jiji Shimpo, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Tokyo Shimbun, BCJ, and of the unions in eight leading provincial papers. Most of them were recommended by MORI to the AJNRWU central committee. Interview with Kyozo MORI, 27 June 1947.

105. Since the formation of the independent union, there has been no evidence to suggest that the majority of the employees do not agree with the management on attitudes toward AJNRWU and CIU.

106. Factual material on this topic supplied by Radio Unit, CIE, SCAP, except where otherwise noted.

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course of the radio strike, which ended in October, nine section and sub-section chiefs (bukacho) had refused to cooperate in the limited broadcasting schedule that was carried out under State control. All of the colleagues in the Bukacho Kai, an association independent of the BCJ union, had obeyed the 5 October order of President Iwasaburo TAKANO to go to work under State management. Immediately after the strike ended, TAKANO suspended the nine chiefs. The union pointed out that on 25 October TAKANO had reached an informal understanding with the strikers that there would be no discharges or personnel changes as a result of the strike. Both the union and the Radio Advisory Committee¹⁰⁷ sought to obtain the reinstatement of the nine chiefs. The management's action was based on the necessity of disciplining the men concerned.¹⁰⁸

.....We intend to examine the conduct of these nine chiefs while they were occupying their posts as chiefs and not as members of the union. In other words, this matter is being taken up as an absolute necessity in order to reestablish the discipline within the BCJ.¹⁰⁹

Unable to deter the management from some disciplinary action, the union and the advisory committee argued that the nine should be reinstated as ordinary staff members. Eventually, the union appealed the case to the Tokyo District Labor Relations Committee. On 29 December, this committee arrived at the decision that the nine men should be reinstated as ordinary staff members, and the decision was accepted by both parties.

Immediately a new question arose. Reorganization of the BCJ Program Department (hensei kyoku) had been undertaken earlier, in June 1946. This partial reorganization

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107. A committee appointed by the Minister of Communications early in the Occupation to furnish advice on personnel policy. Files of Radio Unit, CIE, SCAP.
108. Technically, the men were suspended pending action by a disciplinary committee appointed by TAKANO without consulting the union.
109. Memorandum from Tetsuro FURUKAKI, general managing director of BCJ, 19 November 1946.

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did not achieve the desired results, and adoption of a more thorough plan was held up by the radio strike and the discipline question. The new plan was approved by the BCJ Board of Directors in January 1947, 110 and practical implementation became possible by the end of February. Apprised of the plan shortly before the intended effective date of 1 March, the union balked. It then advanced its own ideas for the personnel changes involved, including section and division chiefs (three in the news section). The union also sought from management some form of recognition of its right to participate in personnel affairs. At the same time, there remained the unfinished business of a contract, and of wages and special allowances.

On 3 March 1947, the union issued "Directive No. 6" instructing members to disobey orders putting the reorganization plan into effect. When President Iwasaburo TAKANO of BCJ attempted to address the employees over BCJ facilities, the union issued "Directive No. 7," under which union members pulled the jacks and left TAKANO before a dead microphone. These actions raised the question of the relative authority of the union and of the management in respect to personnel questions, and the matter was submitted to the Central Labor Relations Committee (CLRC).

On 5 April, the CLRC advanced a conciliation plan. 111 The union was to lift "Directive No. 6," and management was to give due weight to union representations. Although the CLRC draft specified that "supreme power over the business

110. In brief, functional sections of the Program Department were to be realigned. The sections had done their own planning, performer recruiting, and production. The new plan provided for planning, production and news sections, each of which was to have complementary and non-competing functions in the business of broadcasting. In most cases, the men concerned would continue in the same work; in 24 cases, however, the new plan called for what amounted to changes of function.

111. By agreement, the CLRC concentrated on the personnel question, setting aside contract and pay questions for later discussion.

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operations and personnel matters rests with the President," it proposed that proper organs should be set up to enable employees to participate in management, to consult in personnel matters, and to enable employee opinion to be heard in personnel matters, and to make possible solution of employee complaints. This proposal was rejected on 7 April by the union's executive committee, 20-4.112

Next day, the CLRC offered another conciliation proposal providing that the personnel changes under discussion should be effectuated only "after sincere deliberation of the union proposal on the conduct of personnel affairs and after making prompt revision of the points of the BCJ plan not considered rational." This the union accepted and the management rejected. A third CLRC conciliation proposal was rejected by both parties.

A new approach, therefore, was indicated. At the union's suggestion, with the management's consent, the CLRC directed its efforts toward the conclusion of a contract, the provisions of which would include a settlement of the personnel question. At the end of June, the parties had not yet been able to agree on a draft. The chief points of difference were three.

First, the union wanted to include as members all employees up to department chiefs. Management favored the exclusion from union membership of all executive personnel -- department, section, and division (or sub-section) chiefs. 113

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112. Kanto District branch members of the union voted 527-506 to accept the plan, but the executive committee rebutted that the Tohoku, Kwansai, Chugoku and Shikoku branches voted against it. Files of Radio Unit, CIE, SCAP.
113. Of the 356 department, section and division chiefs, union officials contended that the majority of the 210 division chiefs feel their interests to be closer to those of the union than the management. Such personnel, the union argued, would have the right to join the union if they desire. Interview with Yoshio MATSUBARA, chairman, and Tadao KUNIEDA, member of BCJ union executive committee, 3 July 1947.

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Second, the two disagreed on the form and functions of the proposed management council. The union wanted a council not only for the BCJ as a whole, but also for each department and section, with a labor majority on each panel, and with authority to deal not only with policy matters but also with day-to-day operations. Management preferred one over-all council composed of equal numbers of representatives with authority to handle only the routine labor-management issues.

Third, the union wished to be able to admit to membership persons not employed by BCJ, a stipulation which the management firmly opposed.

Agreement had been reached as of 21 July 1947 on the first of the three points of contention.¹¹⁴ Management succeeded in limiting union membership to a level below chiefs of divisions.

A compromise also had been reached on the second of the points in issue, the form and function of management councils. This would result in the formation of nine labor-management councils and a number of technical committees, one in each department, section and division. The nine councils would consist of a Joint Council of Management in the Tokyo office, seven similar councils in each of the principal district stations, and a Central Committee on Personnel Matters. Each joint council would have management and labor equally represented, and could make recommendations to the chief executive (and, in the case of the district stations, to the central headquarters) on any matters of general policy, with the specific exception of personnel problems. In the latter, decisions would be made by the management, and employees not satisfied then might consult the Committee on Personnel Matters, which would be authorized to make recommendations to the BCJ's executives. The management-labor representation ratio of the Personnel Committee had not been determined. The Technical Committees, of which there would be approximately 350 (see footnote #113), might offer opinion and

114. Information concerning the progress of BCJ contract negotiations to 21 July 1947 was secured in an interview with BCJ general manager FURUKAKI on that date.

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advice on any technical matters such as programming, maintenance of equipment, etc.

The third point of contention, union membership for non-BCJ employees, remains unresolved, and as yet (20 August 1947) no actual contract has been signed embodying the agreements described above.

Third, the union wished to be able to admit to membership persons not employed by BCI, a stipulation which the management firmly opposed. Agreement had been reached as of 21 July 1947 on the first of the three points of contention. The management succeeded in limiting union membership to a level below that of divisions. A compromise also had been reached on the second of the points in issue, the form and function of management committees. This would result in the formation of nine labor-management committees, one in each department, section and division. The nine committees would consist of a Joint Council of Management in the Tokyo office, seven similar councils in each of the principal district stations, and a Central Committee on Personnel Matters. Each Joint Council would have management and labor equally represented, and would take recommendations to the chief executive (and, in the case of the district stations, to the central headquarters) on any matters of general policy, with the specific exception of personnel problems. In the latter, decisions would be made by the management, and employees not satisfied then might consult the Committee on Personnel Matters which would be authorized to make recommendations to the BCI's executives. The management-labor representation ratio of the Personnel Committee had not been determined. The Technical Committee, of which there would be approximately 350 (see footnote #13), might offer opinion and

14. Information concerning the progress of BCI contract negotiations as of 21 July 1947 was secured in an interview with BCI general manager FUKUKI on that date.

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Chapter 4. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON PRESS UNIONS

Japan's press unions range from the 5,815-member organization in the Asahi to the 65-member organization in the Yukan Kyoto. General observations are difficult, because every case is different; but it appears that in general the larger unions have the greatest substance and understanding of their function. The unions of the Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri, like the papers themselves, are in a separate class in respect to size, influence, and degree of organization.¹¹⁵ A second level of unions might be considered to include those in the 500-1,500 member category as in the Kyodo News Agency; Jiji Press; Tokyo Shimbun, Nippon Keizai, Jiji Shimpō; and in the leading provincial papers--Chubu Nippon (Nagoya), Hokkaido Shimbun, and Nishi Nippon Shimbun (Fukuoka), and Kanoku Shimbun (Sendai).

The remainder, in general, do not appear to play an important role either within their own companies or in the AJNRWU. In older papers, like the Kobe Shimbun, relationships tend to be well-established; in post-surrender papers, like Miyako Shimbun (Kyoto), the staffs are likely to be too small and too much engrossed in making their venture succeed to provide fruitful soil for the union management.

The following observations, therefore, apply chiefly to those unions with more than 500 members.

SALIENT ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES

The most striking aspect of press union organization in Japan is that it takes the industrial, or vertical

 115. Mainichi union membership: 5,221, Yomiuri: 2,045.
 The BCJ union also falls in this class, with 7,014.
 Figures as of May 1947.

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form. Members, in most cases, include everybody regularly employed from errand boy to department chiefs.

But the trend is to exclude persons in executive positions from union membership. For example, the Kyodo union originally included everybody except the managing director; now 13 men are excluded out of the total of about 1,350.¹¹⁶ In the reorganization of the Mainichi union that followed its secession from the AJNRWU, department chiefs and chief editors were made ineligible for membership.¹¹⁷ The union of the Nishi Nippon Shimbun (Fukuoka), at the suggestion of the Fukuoka Prefectural Labor Relations Committee, last fall limited its membership to those below the rank of sub-section chief.¹¹⁸

The chief reason given by union representatives for such limitation is that persons in executive positions are too close to management. Management spokesmen, on the other hand, said that they desire to keep union influence out of their councils. A survey conducted by the Japan Newspaper Association in June 1947 (see page 26, footnote 62) showed membership limitations in 89 press unions as follows:

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----|
| No regulation | 2 |
| President and vice-president | 2 |
| Directors and above | 28 |
| Department chiefs and above | 26 |
| Department vice-chiefs and above | 8 |
| Section chiefs and above | 12 |
| Section vice-chiefs and above | 1 |
| Sub-section chiefs and above | 2 |
| Sub-section vice-chiefs and above | 1 |

Several of the above had additional special exceptions. In addition, four press unions had selective limitations,

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116. Managing director, chief editor, three executive editors, traffic and business managers, and six bureau managers. Interview with Managing Editor Masuo KATO, 31 May 1947 and Union Chairman Ishimatsu OBOSHI, 31 May 1947.
117. Interview with Liaison Department Chief Ichitaro TAKATA and Union Official Yoshio MIYAMOTO, 16 May 1947.
118. Interview with Union Chairman Sadao YANO, 7 June 1947.

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and three did not reply. As might be expected, stricter limitations were found in larger press unions.

With the vertical form of organization, however, the unions tend to operate disjointedly--that is, by groups of members in the departments, sections, or sub-sections in which they are located functionally. In the big three and the BCJ, general meetings of the entire membership are virtually impossible, and in the middle strata of unions they are difficult.¹¹⁹

Therefore the theory and practice of representation assume considerable importance. To take probably the most refined example--the Asahi--the closest representation is found in the general assembly of each branch,¹²⁰ where each delegate represents five union members. Since the delegate is selected by colleagues in his functional unit of the newspaper, emphasis is placed upon the interests and attitudes of the employees in terms of their functional location in the company. This proportional representation of the various units of the company's organization is carried up into the branch committee, where each delegate represents 25 members; into the general assembly of the entire Asahi union, where each delegate represents 30 members; and into the central committee, where each represents 300 members.¹²¹ The executive machinery, consisting of branch executive committees and a central executive committee, does not carry functional representation to the same degree as does the "legislative" machinery, but does have the tendency. As a result, the entire Asahi union, like other press unions, tends to be divided into three main groups--editorial, business, and mechanical employees.

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119. General meetings of the Tokyo branch of the Mainichi union are made up of the 400-500 members who can crowd into the newspaper's assembly hall. "We would have to rent Hibiya Hall for a true general meeting." Interview with TAKATA and MIYAMOTO.
120. Asahi union constitution, Article 21. There are three branches--Tokyo (2,335), Osaka (2,350), and Moji (1,130). Interview with union chairman, Kyozo MORI, 19 May 1947.
121. Asahi union constitution, Articles 22, 13, and 14 respectively.

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In general terms, the business employees are the conservatives among union members, whereas the editorial and mechanical departments include personnel whose attitudes range from conservative through indifference to leftist. Representative Director HASEBE of the Asahi estimated that leftist elements may influence up to one third of the entire staff, depending on the specific issue at hand.¹²² When the Asahi union voted against participation in the October 1946 press and radio strike, he pointed out, roughly one third of the membership held out for the strike. This element, in HASEBE's observation, falls into three categories: the ideologically motivated, the malcontents, and the economically depressed. On the issue of participation in the 1 February strike, according to Union Chairman MORI, the initial decision in favor of the strike was adopted by vote of (very roughly) the editorial and mechanical employees against the business employees.¹²³ In the Mainichi, active leftists were estimated¹²⁴ to number approximately 100, most of whom were in the editorial department. In the Nihon Keizai Shimbun,¹²⁵ the union's extremist leadership came from a member of the mechanical department and a reporter, with the support of some 35 men, most of whom were mechanical employees.

THE AJNRWU AND ITS LOCALS

The most notable fact about the national union is the degree to which it has not represented its locals, even although all the requisite machinery is provided.¹²⁶ The

122. Interview, 13 June 1947.

123. Interview, 19 May 1947.

124. Chief of Liaison Department Ichitaro TAKATA and Union Official Yoshio MIYAMOTO, interview 16 May 1947.

125. According to President Ritoku OBAMA, interview 27 May 1947.

126. General meeting convened at least once a year, with each delegate representing 50 members; central committee convened at least every two months, each delegate representing 250 members; central executive committee convened when necessary, composed of 15 members plus national officers elected for one-year term by general meeting. AJNRWU constitution, Chapter VI, sections 1, 2, 3, respectively.

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best proof, of course, lies in the tardiness of the national union in reversing its strike calls in October 1946 and February 1947.

This phenomenon has given rise to two sets of complaints that epitomize the two main attitudes toward the union on the part of its members. One is that the national union is undemocratic; the other is that the locals are too weak. In general terms, those who hold the former view have been seeking to make the national union more representative of its locals; those who hold the latter view have been seeking to strengthen the authority of the national union over its locals.

The conflict between the two attitudes was clearly evident in the events and issues described in Chapter III, "Rejection of Extremism"--events that demonstrate the present trend toward ascendancy of the first attitude. It is worth noting that AJNRWU leaders came to the 27-28 May 1946 general meeting armed with proposals for a revision of the national union's constitution that, if adopted, would have operated to bolster the strength of the national organization at the expense of the locals. The proposals envisaged the creation of a series of councils embracing horizontal strata of union members--regional councils, and councils of youth and women workers and of mechanical workers. In each case, the stated purpose was to "protect the common interests" of the members concerned. The councils would have been empowered to convene general meetings of their members, but any decisions on "important subjects" would have required approval of the AJNRWU central executive committee.¹²⁷ These proposals, along with those of opposite tenor advanced by the Asahi delegate (see page 37), were postponed for formal deliberation at the next general meeting.

Another facet of the AJNRWU organizational plan has been the conclusion of contracts not only between management and union in any one enterprise, but also between management and the AJNRWU itself. It already has been noted (page 23) that the Mainichi union rejected such a supplementary contract. As of May 1946, the AJNRWU had

127. Draft for revised constitution, Chapter VI, sections 3, 4, 5. Supplied by AJNRWU headquarters, 22 May 1947.

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contracts with 18 newspaper firms.¹²⁸ These contracts are couched in general terms. The Asahi-AJNRWU contract¹²⁹ includes standard provisions intended to assure union and job security, and in addition specifies that the Asahi "shall recognize the freedom of union members to join political parties, engage in political activities, or hold public office." An attached understanding, however, sanctions the transfer (ido) of an employee who engages in such activities to the "serious detriment" (hana-hada-shiku shisho) of his newspaper duties. Cases of disagreement are to be settled by collective bargaining. It may be noted, however, that the Asahi union on 12 March 1947 favored the temporary suspension from duty of union members who run for public office.¹³⁰

The point on which the two attitudes toward the AJNRWU seem to agree is the necessity of preserving the organization. Those who want to strengthen the national union's authority and to keep it tied with the CIU well may have been beating a strategic retreat during April and May 1947. It would be natural to expect that radicals would hope to preserve as much as possible of the machinery through which they could try in future to realize their purpose. On the other hand, those who aspire to unite all press unions in a common organization, even at the expense of the CIU and of the original conception of the AJNRWU, profess to be motivated by legitimate labor concerns. Chairman MORI of the Asahi union, has pointed out that individual press unions may not be able to continue to secure their members'

 128. Asahi, Chugoku Shimbun (Hiroshima), Gifu Times, Hyuga Nichinichi (Miyazaki), Ise Shimbun (Tsu), Iwate Shimpō (Morioka), Jiji Press, Jimmin Shimbun (Tokyo), Jomo Shimbun (Maebashi), Kogyo Shimbun (Tokyo), Mimpō (Tokyo), Nishi Nippon Shimbun (Fukuoka), Shimozuke Shimbun (Utsunomiya), Shin Yukan (Tokyo), Shinano Mainichi (Nagano), Too Nippo (Aomori), Yamagata Shimbun, and Yukan Mie (Yokkaichi). Such contracts also had been concluded with Kochi Shimbun and Akita Sakigake Shimbun, which withdrew from the AJNRWU. Interview with Shichiro MORIOKA, AJNRWU accountant-auditor and information officer, 22 May 1947.

129. Appendix I.

130. Shimbun Kyokai-ho, 24 March 1947.

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welfare as they have done so far. Press managements, in his view, are united in the Japan Newspaper Association: they are bound to join in an effort to keep payrolls down and to decrease their staffs. Therefore he considers it essential to meet the managers with a united front on crucial issues.¹³¹

There appear to be serious obstacles to the materialization of any kind of a united labor organization among press employees, let alone the soundest and most legitimate kind. First, there is the incompatibility, most evident in smaller enterprises, between the union concept and the traditional personal relationships of superiors and inferiors. Second, and complementarily, there is the tradition of paternalism, under which a man who once got on the payroll could pretty well count on the employer permanently to assume responsibility for him. This factor is probably stronger in the smaller papers. The Kobe Shimbun is a case in point. There a union was organized on 1 January 1946, "not for the purpose of working against the management," according to its chairman, "but because other newspaper companies had unions and the Kobe Shimbun employees wanted one too."¹³² Actually, as the newspaper's president pointed out, some provision for the welfare of the employees had been made already with the institution of a Mutual Assistance Association (gojokai). The president also stated that his advice usually prevails in union councils.¹³³

Third, there is evidence of appreciation among press employees that they cannot benefit in the long run by forcing their employers into bankruptcy. This sentiment was encountered at nearly every interview. Some executives -- in the Asahi, Yomirui, and Kyodo News Agency, for example -- make it a practice either to give union representatives sight of the company's books or to keep them informed in some detail on its financial status.

Fourth, the press is still fundamentally a competitive industry, even though paper rationing at present makes competition nominal. An employee, therefore, hands an advantage to his rivals when he strikes his own shop without

131. Interview, 27 June 1947.

132. Interview with Union Chairman Mokichi SENDA, 4 June 1947.

133. Interview with President Shido ASAKURA, 4 June 1947.

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improving the ability of his own company to meet his requests. This observation does not apply to the employees of the monopoly BCJ, whose intransigence undoubtedly is augmented by the very importance of their function during this period of paper famine.

Finally, there is the difference in attitudes among the employees themselves, a subject that already has been touched upon.

CHIEF UNION-MANAGEMENT ISSUES

The chief questions at issue between press unions and managements appear to be the standard questions of wages, working conditions, and job security. These questions will may prove more and more difficult to resolve until Japan's overall economic conditions improve, for they are enmeshed with inflation, the newsprint shortage, and the surplus of manpower. Inflation drives salaried men to seek more pay and benefits; the newsprint shortage makes it difficult for management to justify the employment of normal staffs, let alone former employees repatriated since the surrender; and the surplus of manpower makes unions and managements alike reluctant to rationalize staff to needs. Therefore, managements have in general conceded union wage demands, retained unnecessarily large staffs, and sought relief in increased subscription prices, in side-line activities, and in bank loans.

There is no law that forbids the discharge of surplus personnel.¹³⁴ It would undoubtedly be difficult to obtain union consent to a large-scale lay-off plan.¹³⁵ However,

134. Article ii of the Trade Union Law of 21 December 1945 forbids the employers to "discharge or give discriminatory treatment to a worker for his being a member of a trade union, for having tried to form or join a trade union, or for having performed proper acts of a trade union." This would enjoin discharges that aimed to break a union.

135. Most union contracts contain a clause specifying that the union shall be consulted in regard to hiring, firing, rewards, and punishment.

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there appears to be little desire to pare down excessive staffs. A characteristic attitude was voiced by Masaharu NAGATA, representative director of the Mainichi, when he declared that managements feel a responsibility for employees; they are reluctant to discharge surplus personnel because of the lack of adequate Japanese Government programs for the support of the unemployed. Under the circumstances, he added, there might be reason to fear that such discharged personnel would fall prey to radicalism.¹³⁶

As for union wage demands, resentment on the part of management appears to have been limited to clearly excessive proposals. Some persons interviewed asserted that the increases granted at union behest would have been forthcoming whether or not a union existed. "If the union wants to think it won its requests," commented one, "well, let it think so."¹³⁷

Apart from large-scale discharges, a question that has not yet come up, most personnel matters appear to receive fairly routine handling. There have been some complaints of unreasonable union opposition to transfers projected by management. The major instance is the BCJ, where a functional realignment has been under debate since the beginning of March (see Chapter 3, "The BCJ-an Exception"). In mid-May, the management of the Mainichi effected personnel shifts that involved some 40 men in the editorial department of the Tokyo office. A dozen of these men were put on inactive status. The transfers relegated to innocuous positions personnel believed to be ideologically unsuitable for responsible posts.¹³⁸ The action was debated in union councils, where some members objected that the company had acted "under the pretext of establishing editorial rights" against men who had been "very faithful to the workers' union movement."¹³⁹ The majority, however, approved the action.

136. Interview, 23 May 1947.

137. Masuo KATO, managing editor of Kyodo News Agency, interview 28 May 1947.

138. Interview with Managing Editor Masaharu NAGATA, 23 May 1947.

139. Shimbun no Shimbun, 23 May 1947.

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It appears, then, that press employees' unions have made progress toward sound and accepted practices of protecting and advancing the interests of their members in accordance with basic Occupation policy.

There remains the question of union activities that go beyond the basic interests of wages, working conditions, and job security. Contracts commonly include a declaration of purpose to "democratize" the enterprise concerned.¹⁴⁰ It is difficult to obtain from a union member a concrete definition of what is meant by such phraseology. At any rate, there has been little indication of widespread desire to effect sweeping reorganizations in management in the fashion of the "democratization" movement of late 1945. The national union and several locals set up "purge committees" early in 1947 with the intention of recommending candidates for removal in the pending press purge. The AJNRWU committee went so far as to demand that the purge of journalists should be based on its recommendations, and that it should supply some of the members of the government's Central Screening Committee.¹⁴¹ The demands were rejected, and the committee subsequently dissolved.¹⁴² The AJNRWU also contemplated the institution of a newspaper criticism committee, whose functions were undefined.¹⁴³ On 8 February 1947, the BCJ union formally served President TAKANO with a request for the establishment of Conference for the Promotion of Broadcasting (Hoso Shinko Kaigi) organized on a joint union-management basis. Its stated purpose--the realization of "radio for the average man"--was to be attained through joint endeavor in programming, technical functioning, and business administration.¹⁴⁴ As of the end of July, the conference

140. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun contract, for example, states that the union "wishes to democratize thoroughly the media of speech and information in accordance with their public character," and adds as one of its objectives "to promote the participation of union members in management." Chapter I Article 2.

141. Shimbun no Shimbun, 25 March 1947.

142. Interview with AJNRWU Chairman Takayuki KAWAZOE, 23 May 1947.

143. Ibid.

144. Document supplied by BCJ union, 3 July 1947.

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was still on paper.145

As for the determination of editorial policy, no newspaper executive interviewed admitted the existence of union influence at the present time. In some larger organizations, union leaders do not engage in their regular newspaper duties. Thus the chairman of the Asahi union surrendered his position as vice-chief of the political news section in the editorial department when he took union office.146 The chairman of the Kyodo union, a member of the social news section, has devoted himself exclusively to union business.147 On the whole, both union and management personnel in enterprises visited appeared to be well aware that editorial policy determination is a function of management.

The attitudes expressed by management personnel in regard to union locals and the AJNRWU ranged from toleration to distrust. Representative director HASEBE of the Asahi stated that, in his belief, no press union in Japan is more sound and democratic in leadership and practices than that of the Asahi. Nevertheless, he said, he had come to the conclusion that management must abandon its "cooperative" policy and let union and management go their separate ways. As for the AJNRWU, HASEBE gave as his opinion that the national union is now "quite powerless" and unlikely to constitute again the threat it represented in October 1946.148 Of the Yomiuri union, President BABA voiced annoyance with the frequency of union requests for higher wages and special allowances. "Unions are unions the world over," he commented. He regarded the AJNRWU as "dangerous business" in view of its potential power.149

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145. Management agreed "in principle," on the basis that union cooperation in all phases of management was a good idea, provided the cooperation remained consultative and advisory and did not embrace attempts to direct management. Interviews with Managing Director Tetsuro FURUKAKI, 9 July 1947.
146. Interview with Kyozo MORI, 19 May 1947.
147. Interview with Managing Editor Masuo KATO and Union Chairman Ishimatsu OBOSHI, 31 May 1947.
148. Interview, 13 June 1947.
149. Interview, 29 May 1947.

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Masuo KATO, managing editor of Kyodo, considered the Kyodo union "a good thing" so long as it keeps within the sphere of what management is willing to concede. On the whole, he stated, it does not seem likely that radical elements will be able to push press unions into extremist policies.¹⁵⁰

The main concern for the future, a concern that is strong in management and apparently gaining ground among union members, is that press unions should not again fall under the sway of extremist leadership. In Japan, as elsewhere, the unions provide a favorable setting for the machinations of parties whose objectives only incidentally parallel those of labor. The press unions, and particularly the union in the monopoly BCJ, inevitably would invite the attention of leftist elements. Yet the press unions, like the press itself, have a vital role to play in the basic objective of encouraging democratic tendencies in Japan, a role that is recognized in fundamental Occupation policy. From this point of view, the development of press unions organized on a democratic basis and devoted to legitimate purposes assumes double importance.

150. Interview, 28 May 1947.

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As for the determination of editorial policy, no newspaper executive interviewed admitted the existence of union influence at the present time. In some larger organizations, union leaders do not engage in their regular newspaper duties. Thus the chairman of the Asahi union surrendered his position as vice-chief of the political news section in the editorial department when he took union office.¹⁴⁶ The chairman of the Kyodo union, a member of the social news section, has devoted himself exclusively to union business.¹⁴⁷ On the whole, both union and management personnel in enterprises visited appeared to be well aware that editorial policy determination is a function of management.

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148. Interview, 13 June 1947.
149. Interview, 29 May 1947.

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APPENDIX

Article 7. The Asahi Shimbun shall recognize the freedom of union members to join political parties, engage in political activities, or hold public office.

Article 8. The contract shall be valid for one year from the date of conclusion. In case neither of the parties expresses an intention to revise or rescind the contract before its expiration, this contract shall continue to be valid automatically. However, in case both parties reach agreement, the contract may be revised or rescinded regardless of the term of validity.

In case both parties cannot reach agreement on a new contract before the expiration of the term of validity, and either party lays the question before the Labor Committee, this contract shall be valid until the new contract is concluded.

To witness the conclusion of the contract, this contract shall be drawn up in triplicate. The Asahi Shimbun and the union shall keep one copy each, and the third shall be submitted to the administrative authorities.

Representative of the Asahi Shimbun
All Japan News and Radio Workers' Union

MEMORANDUM:

In regard to Article 7, freedom of participation in any political party is recognized. However, if participation causes serious detriment to duty, transfer will be permitted. Any union member will be free to engage in political activities and to hold public office unless there is serious detriment to office duty. These cases will be decided through collective bargaining.

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SOURCES

A major portion of the information upon which this report is based was secured from conferences with newspaper, BCJ, and union officials. These conferences were held in Tokyo, unless otherwise designated, on the dates indicated.

All Japan News and Radio Workers' Union

KAWAZOE, Takayuki, chairman, 12 and 13 May 1947.
MORIOKA, Shichiro, accountant-auditor and information officer, 22 May 1947.
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Asahi Shimbun - 3,353,658 circulation.

HASEBE, Tadashi, representative director and chief editor, 13 June 1947.
MORI, Kyozo, union chairman, 19 and 20 May 1947, 27 June 1947.

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FURUKAKI, Tetsuro, general manager, 9 July 1947, 21 July 1947.
MATSUBARA, Yoshio, chairman of union's executive committee, 3 July 1947.
KUNIEDA, Tadao, member of union's executive committee, 3 July 1947.

Kobe Shimbun (Kobe) - 142,000 circulation.

ASAKURA, Shido, president and chief editor, 4 June 1947.
SENDA, Mokichi, union chairman, 4 June 1947.
YOSHIDA, Denichi, union vice-chairman, 4 June 1947.
MORIOKA, Toshio, reporter, 4 June 1947.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

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SOURCES

Kyodo News Agency

KATO, Masuo, managing editor, 28 and 31 May 1947.
OBOSHI, Ishimatsu, union chairman, 31 May 1947, 2 July 1947.

Kyoto Shimbun (Kyoto) - 124,940 circulation.

TAKAYA, Teichiro, standing director and chief of editorial department, 3 June 1947.
YANO, Mr., editorial department, social news section chief, 2 June 1947.

Mainichi Shimbun - 3,504,790 circulation.

NAGATA, Masaharu, managing editor, 23 May 1947.
TAKATA, Ichitaro, chief of Liaison Department, 1 May 1947.
MIYAMOTO, Yoshio, member of union preparatory committee, 16 May 1947.

Miyako Shimbun (Kyoto) - 71,980 circulation.

SHIOGAI, Junji, president, 3 June 1947.
MURAKAMI, Kay S., reporter, 3 June 1947.
TSUJI, Yutaka, reporter, 3 June 1947.

Nippon Keizai Shimbun - 310,077 circulation.

OBAMA, Ritoku, president, 27 May 1947.
OGIHARA, Hakuei, chief of foreign news section, 27 May 1947.

Nishi Nippon Shimbun (Fukuoka) - 527,748 circulation.

TANAKA, Nariyuki, representative director, 6 to 9 June 1947.
HIRONAKA, Denji, director and chief of printing department, 6 and 7 June 1947.
NAKAHARA, Kotaro, managing editor, 7 and 9 June 1947.
NODA, Shunsaku, shareholder and member of House of Councillors, 9 June 1947.
KIDO, Akira, editorial committee member, 7 June 1947.
YANO, Sadao, union chairman, 7 June 1947.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

SOURCES

61

Shinko Yukan Shimbun (Kobe) - 73,484 circulation.

TAKEUCHI, Mr., president, 5 June 1947.

Yomiuri Shimbun - 1,700,000 circulation.

BABA, Tsunego, president, 29 May 1947.

WATANABE, Fumitaro, union chairman, 29 May 1947.

SHIBATA, Hidetoshi, secretary of the president, 12 June 1947.

MUTO, Santoku, chief of business department, 12 June 1947.

Yukan Kyoto (Kyoto) - 700,000 circulation.

YAMAGUCHI, Shigetaro, managing director, 2 June 1947.

MATSUI, Katsumi, chief of advertising section, 2 June 1947.

NUMATA, Imajiro, union chairman, 3 June 1947.

In addition, information was obtained from the personnel and files of the following offices:

Information Division, Press and Publications Unit and Radio Unit, CIE, SCAP.

Analysis and Research Division, Media Analysis Unit and Information Media Research Unit, CIE, SCAP.

Labor Division, ESS, SCAP.

Japanese press and publications sources are indicated in footnotes.

R E S T R I C T E D

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
RESTRICTED

DATE: November 6, 1947.

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1947

SUBJECT: Japanese Labor Situation.

| | | |
|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| PARTICIPANTS: | Mr. Killan - SCAP GHQ | Mr. Sullivan - ILH |
| | Mr. Howland - ILH | Mr. Evans - IR |
| | Mr. Swayzee - ILH | Mr. Karst - INP |
| | Mr. Horowitz - ILH | Mr. Green - NA |
| | Mr. Wiesman - ILH | |

COPIES TO:

| | |
|------|----------------|
| NA: | Mr. Allison |
| OE: | Mr. Whitman |
| DRF: | Mr. Hunsberger |
| A-S: | Mr. O'Sullivan |

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There follows a summary of the main points made by Mr. Killan, Chief of SCAP's GHQ Labor Division, in his discussion of the Japanese labor situation:

1. Coal shortage

"Most" of Japan's economic ills can be traced back to the shortage of coal. The coal shortage in turn is largely the result of inexperienced and ill-fed labor, lack of mining equipment and a general deterioration of mines brought about by wartime exploitation. Before the war most Japanese mines were operated by Korean and Chinese "slave" laborers who worked a 60-hour week and for whom there were no safety standards. In contrast, today's newly recruited free miners enjoy a 48-hour week and are protected by a comprehensive Labor Standards Act. The experience of SCAP has been that the 8-hour day produces maximum efficiency, particularly under the prevailing primitive mining conditions. Although the degree of absenteeism in the mines is disturbing, there is no widespread unrest. In fact labor relations in the coal mines have, since the war, been so good that SCAP's Labor Division undertook to have incorporated in the Coal Nationalization Bill measures to protect existing collective bargaining procedures. (Comment: Recalling that 3 of the 8 hours are

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| DCR - ITP Unit | |
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| Rev | GM |
| Cat. | BA |
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spent in getting to and from the pit-face and that a slightly greater number of miners today are producing only 30 per cent of 1936 levels, one is led to suspect that labor productivity may have suffered considerably under the impact of trade unionism -- a suspicion not entirely removed by Mr. Killan's emphasis on the deterioration of mining equipment, etc.)

2. Surplus labor

The traditional Japanese concept of family persists in industry. Once on the payroll, the worker is regarded as a member of the company's family. Even if the company is operating on a reduced scale, due to war damage or lack of raw materials, there has been a tendency on the part of employers to retain war workers as well as ex-employee returned servicemen.

Against this background there has been considerable agitation for rationalizing the surplus labor force on the grounds that it has encouraged inefficiency, raised costs and has prejudiced the Japanese competitive position in overseas markets. However, SCAP has opposed any large scale rationalization program because: 1) as long as the workers are employed they are producing something, however small; 2) the Japanese Government has inadequate relief forces and funds to take care of any large number of unemployed; and, 3) the Japanese Government is not strong enough to withstand the political consequences of such a rationalization program. SCAP's policy will continue to be one of encouraging the gradual shift of workers to jobs where they are most needed.

3. Stabilization

Since setting the average composite wage at 1800 yen a month, the index of living has risen 25 per cent and is likely to continue upward as a result of the supplementary budget. It will therefore be impossible for the Government to resist a growing worker demand that the wage scale be adjusted. SCAP's Labor Division has suggested the formula that wage increases be based on production increases with price ceilings being maintained.

4. Communist infiltration in trade unions

The Communist Party definitely controls the electrical workers' union and has made considerable progress in penetrating into the government transport and communications unions.

5. Future

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5. Future of trade unionism in Japan

Mr. Killan spoke with evident conviction along the lines that trade unionism in Japan is only beginning to take hold and that, if the U.S. were to withdraw its control of Japan within the next year or two, trade unionism would be rapidly supplanted by traditional Japanese labor practices. Speaking more generally, Mr. Killan expressed the opinion that unless the U.S. retained direct control of Japan for at least another four or five years, our efforts to bring about a democratic Japan would necessarily fail. (Mr. Killan is presumably unaware of the current thinking in the Department on post-treaty controls over Japan.)

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
POLICY

1948 JAN 14 AM 11 04

Tokyo, December 29, 1947.

No. 1483

MESSAGE CENTER

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DIVISION OF OCCUPIED AREAS
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
JAN 20 1948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Directive Instructing the Japanese Government to
Over-come the Causes of Labor Shortages.

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The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose five copies of a directive issued by this Headquarters (SCAPIN 1832) dated December 19, 1947, informing the Japanese Government that there is a shortage of laborers needed to complete Occupation projects and that the shortage is attributed to inefficient distribution of food and clothing rations, lack of transportation, and financial difficulties of contractors due to delay in payments. The Japanese Government is instructed to take remedial measures by making prompt payments in accordance with contracts, properly supervising equitable distribution of food and clothing rations, and furnishing adequate transportation.

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It is believed that certain of the conditions to which the shortage of laborers is attributed are not limited to the Tokyo area but are to be found in varying degrees throughout Japan. Such conditions appear to be one of the chief causes of labor unrest, inefficiency of labor, and low production levels. As may be gathered from many editorials and communications of the "letter to the editor" type appearing in Japanese newspapers, inefficient and inequitable distribution of food, clothing, fuel, and electricity are of major concern to the people.

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Enclosure:

GHQ, SCAP, directive,
December 19, 1947,
concerning the shortage
of Japanese laborers
(SCAPIN 1832) (five copies).

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSAG 004.06 (19 Dec 47)GD
(SCAPIN 1832)APO 500
19 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Shortage of Japanese Laborers

1. It has come to the attention of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, that a shortage of Japanese labor exists for certain construction being performed for the Occupation Forces. This shortage is most acute in the Tokyo area, and the project suffering the greatest labor shortage is the Grant Heights project. This labor shortage is attributed to inefficient distribution of food and clothing rations, lack of transportation, and financial difficulties of contractors due to delay in payments by the Japanese Government.

2. To correct this situation, it is directed that the Japanese Government initiate remedial measures immediately to include but not to be limited to the following:


a. Payments due on contracts will be kept current in sufficient amounts to enable contractors to pay their employees promptly. Supervision will be such as to insure that employees will be so paid.

b. Positive supervision and control will be exercised to insure an equitable and proper distribution of prescribed food and clothing rations to the laborers.

c. Adequate transportation will be made available to or provided for the laborers.

3. An initial report of progress made in the execution of the foregoing directive will be rendered to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, not later than 30 December 1947.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:


R. H. LEVY,
Colonel, AGD.
Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF
UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR JAPAN

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No. 13

1948 JAN 23 AM 10 14

Tokyo, January 6, 1948.

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MESSAGE CENTER

*Division of
North East Asian
Affairs
JAN 21, 48*

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SUBJECT: Text of a Memorandum Believed to Have Been Prepared by Elements of the Japan Communist Party.

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

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I have the honor to enclose copy of the text (in translation and Japanese) of an undated memorandum which is believed to have been prepared by certain elements of the Japan Communist Party. The paper, which contains the minutes of two meetings of a conference of the "National Fraction of Coal Miners" (held on October 4 and October 12, 1947, respectively), was presented to me informally by Mr. ESAKU Sato, Vice Minister of the Japanese Ministry of Transportation, as evidence that the Japan Communist Party has agents in labor unions and government positions.

From the memorandum it may be seen that Communist elements are endeavoring to encourage labor strife, with the obvious purpose of delaying the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy and preventing increased production. This purpose is revealed by the memorandum in which the "really serious" economic crisis in Japan is welcomed as "helpful to the Party combat". Such crisis is desired, not only because it furnishes conditions favorable to expansion of the Japan Communist Party's strength, but also because development of economic chaos would discredit the policies of the Occupation and simultaneously those of the United States. (That criticism of Occupation policy is considered another means of attacking United States foreign policy is evidenced by the manner in which Soviet propaganda organs link the two by use of such terms as "American Occupation authorities".)

That discrediting the Occupation is an objective of the Soviet Government has already been amply demonstrated by the manner in which the Soviet Member of the Allied Council for Japan has distorted facts. As the Department is aware, he has, at meetings of the Council, repeatedly

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Tokyo's No.13
January 6, 1948

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made statements critical of Occupation policies such as those concerned with education, land reform, public health measures, and the repatriation program. (In connection with the latter, reference is made to this Mission's despatch No. 1471 of December 22, 1947, concerning the proposed prosecution of a Communist Party newspaper for violation of the "Press Code" and previous correspondence concerning Communist misrepresentation of the repatriation program of this Headquarters). The Communist line of the "fraction" which circulated the enclosed memorandum is clearly indicated by repetition of propaganda from Pravda with regard to international affairs. For example, upon the basis of an interpretation of an article from that newspaper, the statement is made that "by a rapid growth of the people's popular influence in Western Europe, the Soviet voice in the United Nations is gaining power every day".

A desire on the part of such Communist elements to discredit the Occupation may further be implied from criticism of policies commonly believed to be supported by this Headquarters. For example, rationalization of industry, anti-monopoly measures, and the "Temporary Agricultural Production Adjustment Law" are each attacked as part of an "intrigue" to orient the Japanese economy toward that of a foreign colony by subsidizing exports through "half-slavery" wages. In addition, the implication that the withholding tax (collection of which has received favorable comment from officials of this Headquarters) has resulted in collection of taxes from labor only, is calculated to cause resentment on the part of employees and may contribute to tax delinquency. The abolition of income taxes, also recommended in the memorandum, would have the effect of preventing the financing of reform programs recommended by this Headquarters. Effectuation of such recommendations would also have serious effects upon the delicate balance of the Japanese Government's financial stability.

A familiar Communist method of attack may be noted in the recommendation that "local struggle and...workshop battles" be used as an election weapon. It is believed that the use of local disturbances rather than a general strike is advised as a means of avoiding repetition of an order such as that issued by General MacArthur on January 31, 1947 prohibiting a proposed general strike.

Of incidental interest is the recommendation contained in the memorandum that support be given to the affiliation of the National Coal Miners Union (Zen Tan) with the National Congress of Industrial Organizations (Sambetsu) an important labor organization in which Communists are believed to be

influential.

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Tokyo's No.13
January 6, 1948

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influential. (In this connection, reference is made to this Mission's despatch No. 1449 of December 12, 1947 with which was transmitted a copy of Periodic Summary No. 22 issued by the Military Intelligence Section of this Headquarters, containing information regarding Communist influence in certain unions.)

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Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald

W. J. Sebald
Acting Political Adviser

Enclosure: *att*

Copy of the text of an undated instruction believed to have been prepared by elements of the Japan Communist Party (in original and translation).

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Original and hectograph to the Department

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ORIGINAL of Enclosure to Despatch No. 13
dated January 6, 1948 from the Office of
the United States Political Adviser for
Japan, Tokyo, entitled "Text of a
Memorandum Believed to Have Been Pre-
pared by Elements of the Japan Communist
Party".



一、九月二十一日東京党本部に於て齎れた炭礦中央フラクシヨン會議を
開催し上京中の地方フラク、党本部、他産別フラクの参加を得て当
面の賃銀闘争を中心とした闘争方針を決定したが十月四日全炭大會
並に炭協全國大會を機に上京中の全國フラクを召集し、九月二十一
日決定に基いて次の如き闘争方針を決定した

二、各地方フラクは此の決定に基いて各地方の情勢に應じて強力に具体
化し、之に基いて夫々のフラク機関にかけて速に其の決定を党本部
、組織活動指導部炭礦フラク宛報告してもらい度い

議 事 録

一、國際國內情勢報告

イ 國際

ソ聯の經濟学者「ヴァルガー」のブラウタ紙に寄せた論拠にも現
はれてゐる如く米の恐慌は拡大化し英はポンド圏を閉鎖し更に
歐洲に於けるマロシヤル經濟政策は一大難関に達着した。一方

口

中西欧の人民民主主義勢力の急速なる増大に伴つて國聯に於けるソ聯の發言権は日を追つて強大となりつつあり、最近の國聯に於てソ聯が頭から米を叩いてゐると云ふ事實は此の事を裏付けるものである。然し此の人民勢力の昂揚と中共の圧倒的な勝利に伴つて日本に対する相対的壓力は極東に於ける拠点として極東に於けるルール化日本の炭礦開發に対する極力、其の力を増しつつある

半れい奴的低賃銀労働に依る輸出に依つて日本經濟を植民地化の方向に再編成しようとする金融独占資本の陰謀は賃加工的輸出産業生産を強行しつつある。企業整備一八〇〇円平均釘付賃銀の固守、資本の集中排除、更に農業生産調整令等は此の一点に連なるものである。此の調整令こそはけふ價格差（シェーレ）を法律的に個定化して農民と労働者とを同時に收奪しようとするものである。然し此の結果労働力は破壊される。職場放棄等は此の現はれである。勞農通信の調査に依ると現在要求を提

三、賃金闘争

出中の大衆は概ね三〇〇万人に上ると言はれており二・一スト
当時より遙かに大きな規模で動いていると云ふ
又今議會に上程される追加豫算は一〇〇億に上るだらう。此
の結果十二月下旬から物價は高騰する。安本では來年四、五月
頃には前大戦後のドイツに於けるマルクの乱発當時に於ける状
態より更に悪化すると見て居り更に來年末頃迄には日銀券の発
行高は四〇〇〇乃至五〇〇〇億に上るだらう。今や日本經濟の
危機は全く深刻である。此の事は闘争に有利である。然し問題
の解決方法は最早や革命的方法以外にはないと云ふ事である。
そこで我々は今次闘争を基本的にはゲリラ消耗戦ストライキパ
ルチサン戦法で闘はねばならない。堅固な敵の防備態勢を正面
攻撃で行くのでは徒らに犠牲多く闘ひは困難である。此処に於
てこそ我々は職場闘争を積み重ねて之を地域闘争に押し進めて
行かなくてはならないのである。而も之をやるのは党細胞であ

基本的には九月二十一日決定を全面的に再確認する。然し只吾々は
 突破資金所得税或は保安確保闘争等の個々の問題を徹底的に個々バ
 ラバラに闘ふのではなく其の場合必ず最低賃銀闘争と結び付けて闘
 ふと云ふ事、最低賃銀制の闘争を如何なる場合でも必ず併行して行
 ふと云ふ事。従つて最低賃銀の闘争だけで単独に闘つて行ける処は
 夫れのみでもドシドシ闘争を展開しなければならぬのである
 吾々は決定的な革命的な闘争を此の最低賃銀獲得闘争を徹底して闘
 ふ事に依つて押し進めて行かなくてはならないと云ふ事を再確認す
 る

此の意味で技術的には中央炭協の要求は

(1) 最低賃銀制の確立 (2) 所得税徹廃 (3) 退職金 (4) 鉱員給與

(5) 保安設備の完備

各地方各山の要求は

(1) 危機突破資金 (2) 所得税會社負担 (3) 保安設備の完備

等が中心となり多角的な各山に應じた闘争を展開する

十月からの大會に於て此の賃銀要求を巡つて炭聯は炭協組織を分裂させる意圖が明らかだ

此處に於て吾々は如何に爲すべきか
(1) 三四〇〇カロリー案と炭聯の二二〇〇カロリーの二本賃銀案を再度下部に流し來るべき大會に於て吾々の要求を一本にするといふ方向で進む之は未だ細胞が完全に此の賃金案をつかんで大衆を動す迄に至つていないからである。其處で吾々フラクとしては細胞が最も活動し易い方向に持つて行かなければならない。其の爲には時をかせいで雙方の案を下部に流さなければならぬのである。此の事によつて吾々は中立組合を廣汎に獲得し炭聯幹部を叩かねばならないのである。
(2) 然し夫れにも拘はらず炭聯が割つて出た時には吾々は吾々の主張に従つて一本で押し進めるが矢張り時をかせぐ方向で行く要するに吾々革命的段階に於ける最低賃銀闘争を貫徹しなければならぬと云ふ事につきる

第(1)の場合北海道は特に残された技能給と地域等でもみ再度北海道

に於ける大會を持つ方向で進み大會のない場合は北海道独自でも闘つて行く

三、國管闘争

大衆の問題として闘争に結び付ける
即ち保安設備の完備、福利厚生施設の確保、退職金の獲得、生産の増強の爲の資材等は總て國管に依つて始めて出来るものである特に中小炭礦に於て然り、此の旨を闘争に結び付けて宣傳啓蒙する。技術的には絶対案を否定し第二次案で行く（國管人民管理を實質的に認めさせる）

更に自由党資本家を叩き社会党官僚をバツロする但し國管促進にはかり氣を取られて大衆に社会党が正しい様を錯覚を與へない様にしななければならぬ
要するに吾々は法案いぢりに傾いては絶対にいけないと云ふ事之を生産闘争と結び付けて賃銀闘争に発展せしめなければいけないと云ふ事になるのである

四 大衆課税反対闘争

現在勤勞所得税以外の大衆課税に於ける税收入は、一事實所得税等を主張したものの、其の二割弱程度しか取り立てられない状態にあり従つて頭から天引される勤勞近得税のみがその対象となつて居り而も之でさへ会社が非常に脱税している従つて追加豫算一一〇〇億が通過すれば増加所得税の四倍従來の九倍近くが徴收される結果になる本年度一一四五億の経営豫算の九〇％は大衆課税である近く全財のフラクから詳細な資料が出されるから吾々は之らの具体的事実をバクロし賃銀闘争と結び付け更に課税反対同盟等を結成して農民市民との提携を圖らなければならぬ其処で吾々は

- (1) 基本的には延期でなく撤廃で行く
 - (2) 而し具体的には黒字になるまで延期で行くとか会社負担とかの技術的操作が取られる
 - (3) 更に納税の義務者は会社であつて延期不納に於ける吾々に対する法的拘束力はないと云ふ事を知つて置く事が有利である
- 兵生産増強闘争及び石炭復興会議対策

九月二十一日決定に於ける保安設備闘争を官憲の弾圧回避の爲にのみ之を前面に出して行くと云ふのではなく保安設備闘争が既に一つの闘争であると云ふ事従つて弾圧を此の面で避けて行くと云ふのではなく凡ゆる闘争に於てだん圧を眞向からはねつけるだけの本質的闘争をしなければならぬと云ふ事幹部だけで闘ふのではなくして大衆と共に立つと云ふ事である

扱吾々は経済復興會議を始め石復會議も總て之を通じて生産復興と云ふ誤つた幻想を紛碎し特に石復の勞資協調的性格を暴露し資本家の提案を悉く叩いて石復をつぶす現在其の條件がそろつてゐる吾々の主体的條件を良く考へて其の弱さを再検討して炭協を通じて戦線統一の具とする

亦吾々は交替制を云々する前に封建的低賃銀労働に依る労働強化が如何に行はれてゐるかを暴露し資本家の徹底的生産サボを糾だんして三千万トン出炭の本質的益路打開闘争を展開し國管と結び付け更に賃銀闘争と結び付ける従つて拘束六時間四交替で配置轉換に反対

し新規採用等の結論を出す前に充分検討しなければならぬ
現に全炭の高萩支部では拘束六時間二交替を要求し立ち上らうとし
ている事実がある

六 組織活動方針

炭協即ち統一の母体であると言ふ既往の誤つた機械的變更性を抹殺
し共闘を通じて統一への基本方針を前面に出し共闘から脱落するも
のを捨つても全国的單一組合を作る各地方毎に共闘委員会を作り更
に全国的共闘委員会を作る此の意味から縣炭統協佐縣協内の全炭派
は何時迄も其の中に止めて置くことはあやまりである
だん圧を排除し強力にしてだん力のある職場闘争を積み重ねた地域
的闘争を執揚に展開し次期選挙闘争に迄結び付けて行く
賃金闘争を始めとして大衆課税反対の闘争保安設備闘争等を推し廣め
て農市民との強力なる提携を圖り決定的な革命闘争を細胞を中心とし
て闘う爲に少しでも有利な條件をフラクに作り出して行かなくてはな
らないのである