THE UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIANS

BY

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Privatdozent of Geography at the University of Lemberg

Translated from the German by

JACOB WITTMER HARTMANN, PH. D.

Assistant Professor of the German Language and Literature at the College of the City of New York

With three explanatory maps.

Jersey City, N. J.
The Ukrainian National Council
1915
ERRATUM:

Page 8, line 10 (from above) for: 750.000 square kilometers, read: 75.000 square kilometers.
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I. PREFATORY.

Ukraine — Ukrainian — are names that mean little to inhabitants of Central and Western Europe. It is the object of these lines to introduce these names to as wide a circle as possible and to restore to them the importance which they have long appeared to lack.

The Ukraine is a vast territory in the southern part of Eastern Europe which is inhabited by the Ukrainian people. As a rule the country is erroneously called "Little Russia", "South Russia", "West Russia". And with just as little reason its inhabitants are called "Little Russians", "South Russians", or, in Austria, "Ruthenians", "Russins", "Russnjaks". Unfortunately, the physical geography and the anthropogeography of this land and people are almost as little known in Europe as their history and their present significance, which results in an utter absence of correct judgement on these matters.

What is offered here is not a scientific anthropogeographical essay, but simply an extremely concise statement of everything that seems important in the bearing of this subject on the present warlike era. Much that appeared indispensable from the scientific standpoint had to be sacrificed to the educational purpose of this paper.

II. GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENT OF THE UKRAINE.

The Ukrainian nation lives in a compact, unbroken country, larger in area than any other European state, Russia alone excepted. The Ukraine extends over 850,000 square kilometers, being therefore one and one-half times as large as the present German Empire.
Its surface includes the southern part of the eastern European plain, resting in the south on the arch of the Carpathians, the Jalia mountains, and the Caucasus, as well as on the shore of the Black Sea from the delta of the Danube to the mouth of the Kuban. Its northern boundary is determined by the great swampy forest of the Polissje on either side of the middle course of the Dnieper. The vast plain extending between these long boundary-lines is the Ukraine, one of the richest countries on this globe, because of its rich black soil and its deposits of coal, iron, petroleum and salt. And this fair land is the domicile of a race that has suffered, during the past ten centuries, a multitude of most severe trials, but which has nevertheless been able, although sometimes but weakly, to conserve its territorial and ethnographic integrity.

The ethnographic boundaries of Ukrainian territory are the following: the western boundary begins at the Sulina section of the Danube Delta, the city of Ismail, passes through Akkerman in Bessarabia, then along the lower course of the Dniester, past Orgiejeff and Bielzy, to Nowosielitza. In the Bukowina, the Ukrainian boundary passes via Storożynetz, Wikow, Moldawitza, Kirlibaba to the source of the Tsheremosh, after which it enters northeastern Hungary. Here it follows the course of the Visso and Theiss rivers, as well as the Gutčíne Mountains, and then, by way of the towns of Ujlak, Beregszasz, Munkacs, Unghvar, Bartfeld, and Lublau, it reaches the Poprad River in Galicia. The boundary line in Galicia between Poles and Ukrainians is indicated by the towns of Grybow, Gorlice, Dukla, Sanok, and by the River San as far as Jaroslaw and Sieniawa. In Russian Poland, the western boundary runs east of the towns of Zamość, Krasnostaw, Łukow, Siedlce, Drohiczyn, finally terminating in the province (government) of Grodno, at the source of the Narew, in the forest of Bialowież.

The northern boundary of the Ukraine, in the governments of Grodno and Minsk, passes along the
Jasiolda River and Lake Wygonoshtsh, to the Pripet, which it follows until that river empties into the Dnieper. The continuation of this northern boundary in the government of Tshernigoff is indicated by the course of the Dnieper as far as Lojeff, then by the cities of Rylsk, Sudsha, Obojan, Korotsha, Oskol; in the government of Voronesh, by the river Don at Ostrohoshk, and the town of Novochopersk.

The eastern line runs, in the basin of the Don, along the river Choper to its mouth, then follows the Kalitwa and the Lower Donetz and the Don as far as Novocherkask, and then, following the Sal past Lake Manytsh and the city of Stavropol, it strikes the northern approaches to the Caucasus. At this point the boundary becomes rather uncertain, for a very active colonizing movement has been drawing Ukrainian peasants into this region for decades, and a thin line of Ukrainian settlements already extends to the Caspian Sea. At any rate the territory along the Black Sea, north of a line drawn through Piatyhorsk, Labinsk, Maikop, Tuapse, is Ukrainian.

If we enter these boundaries on a political map of Europe, we shall note that two nations each enjoy possession of a part of Ukraine. These are Austria-Hungary and Russia. But their portions are very unequal. Austria-Hungary controls but a very small portion of the Ukraine (one-eleventh); Russia has the rest. The boundaries of the provinces and governments, respectively, of the two nations are entirely independent of the ethnographic facts, and it is possible that a reading of the following statistics may give the impression that the Ukrainians have nothing but scattered settlements in alien lands, as far as the outlying portions of the Ukraine are concerned. That is not the case, however. When we read, for instance, that the Ukrainians make up 36% of the population of the government of Voronesh, this is a result of the fact that the southern portion of this government is densely populated by Ukrainians (in the Ostrohoshk District they are 94% of the population,
Bohutshar District 83%, Byrjutsh District 70%, Waluiki 53%, etc.), while the northern part, ethnographically speaking, lies entirely in Russian territory.

I am going to add some statistical data concerning the Ukraine, as I cannot otherwise convey a clear idea of the country. We shall for the present entirely omit that portion of the country that is in the possession of Austria-Hungary (Eastern Galicia, Northwestern Bukowina, Northeastern Hungary, together aggregating 750,000 square kilometers with a Ukrainian population of 4,200,000). We shall devote all our attention to the Russian Ukraine. Our statistical data are taken from the official Russian estimates of 1910, the percentages indicating the relative numerical strength of the various nationalities from the first Russian Census, of 1897. It will scarcely be suggested that any of these statistics were made with a Ukrainian bias.

As we enter Russia, the first important Ukrainian dominion is the government of Volhynia (71,700 square kilometers, 3,850,000 inhabitants). Here the Ukrainians form the basic element of the population: there are 70% of them; other races are: Jews, 13%; Poles, 6%; Germans, 6%; Russian, 3%; Chechs, 1%. Adjacent to this important Volhynian aggregation of Ukrainians, are the western and northwestern march-lands of the Ukraine: the government of Cholm with 390,000 Ukrainian inhabitants, particularly in the neighborhood of Hrubeshif and Tomashif, the southern third of the government of Grodno with 440,000 Ukrainian inhabitants, around Brest, Kobryn, Bielsk, and the southern strip of the government of Minsk with 890,000 Ukrainians around Pinsk and Mosyr.

The neighboring government of Podolia (42,000 square kilometers with 3,740,000 inhabitants) has 81% of its population Ukrainian; Jews, 9%; Russian, 3%; Poles 2%. This Podolian aggregation is contiguous with the outskirts of the Ukrainian portion of the government
of Bessarabia, which, except in these Ukrainian north-west and southwest portions of the province, is inhabited chiefly by Rumanians (460,000 Ukrainians in the vicinity of Chotyn and Akkerman). The third important Ukrainian section is the government of Kieff (51,000 square kilometers with 4,570,000 inhabitants); the Ukrainians here constitute 79% of the population; Jews, 12%; Russians, 6%; Poles, 2%. The government of Cherson seems very much more mixed as to the character of its population (71,000 square kilometers with 3,450,000 inhabitants), 54% are Ukrainians, 21% Russians, 12% Jews, 5% Rumanians, 1% Bulgarians, 1% Poles.

The important Ukrainian provinces to the right of the Dnieper have now been enumerated; those on the left side of that river are also of great significance. In the government of Chernihiv or Chernigoff (52,000 square kilometers with 2,980,000 inhabitants), the Ukrainians constitute 86% of the total population; in the government of Poltawa (50,000 sq. kilometers with 3,580,000 inhab.), 98%; in the government of Charkiv (54,000 sq. km., 3,250,000 inhab.), 70%. The remaining inhabitants are Russians and Jews. Contiguous with these almost purely Ukrainian governments are strips of other governments containing Ukrainians: in the southern part of the government of Kursk are 670,000 Ukrainians; (around Putywl, Hrajworon, Novooskol); in the southern part of the government of Voronesh are 1,210,000 Ukrainians (around Ostrohoshsk, Bohutshar, Byrjutsh, Valuiki); and in the western part of the Don basin there are 980,000 Ukrainians (around Taganrog, Rostov, etc.).

The three remaining important Ukrainian governments (i. e., governments in which Ukrainians are either positively a majority of the population or are, at least, more numerous than any other national element) are: Ekaterinoslav (63,000 sq. km., 3,060,000 inhab.), with 69% Ukrainians, 17% Russians, 5% Jews, 4% Germans, 2% Greeks, 1% Tartars, 1% White Russians, 1% Poles, Tauria (60,000 sq. km., 1,880,000 inabhs.), with 42% U-
ukrainians, 28% Russians, 13% Tartars, 5% Germans, 3% Jews, 3% Bulgarians, 1% Armenians; the Kuban district (92,000 sq. km., 2,630,000 inhab.), with 47% Ukranians, 44% Russians, 9% various Caucasian tribes. In the district of Stavropol, Terek, Black Sea District, which form the outskirts of the Ukrainian population, there are 510,000 Ukrainians. All the sections named after Tauria have, moreover, been for several years the scene of an exceedingly active Ukrainian colonization movement, so that it is a very safe assumption that the percentages of 1897 are hardly applicable at present.

In addition to the above indicated territory, which may be considered as on the whole compactly Ukrainian, there are more than 600,000 Ukrainians in the following governments along the southern course of the Volga: Astrakhan, Saratov, Samara, Orenburg. Further evidences of the vast colonial expansion of the Ukrainian people may be found in the fact that there are 500,000 of them forming a thin chain of settlements through Russian Central Asia and southern Siberia up to the shores of the Pacific Ocean; there are 500,000 in the United States, 200,000 in Canada, 60,000 in Brazil and the Argentine. A grand total of all the Ukrainians on earth in 1910 would read thirty-four and one half million, of which 32,700,000 live in solid Ukrainian territory.

The Ukrainians therefore must be considered as numerically the sixth race of Europe, the five above them being, in order, the Russians, Germans, English, French, and Italians.

III. THE UKRAINIAN NATION.

A host of questions must now assail the critical reader: If this is the case, why is this great race, why are these Ukrainians entirely unknown to the outside world? Perhaps the Ukraine is merely an ethnographic conception? Perhaps these Ukrainians are merely a tribe
of the great Russian race, as Bavarians or Saxons are tribes of the German race? Perhaps they are Russians who became partially polonized during the many years of Polish domination? Or perhaps the ideas of "Ukraine", "Ukrainians", are simply figments of the over-heated brains of a band of enthusiasts, lost in contemplation of a glorious past and a glorious future, who represent the object of their ardent desires as a fait accompli and so forth.

To give a short and decisive answer to questions of this nature is always very difficult, as must necessarily be the case where the subject-matter is so entirely unfamiliar. Yet we shall give this short and decisive answer at once, and shall prove its correctness with a series of evidence.

The Ukrainians constitute a Slavic nation just as clearly and sharply defined as do the Poles, the Russians, the Chechs, or the Bulgarians. Their historic roots extend as far back into the middle ages as do those of the German, French, or English peoples. But, while the evolution of these great European nations has been a steady and uninterrupted process, the Ukrainian people, by reason of their geographical location on the very threshold of Asia, were held back in their development, their growth finally being almost entirely stopped. The ancient Ukrainian state of Kieff was destroyed by Djingis Khan's Mongolian hordes, after which the land, in a horribly devastated condition, came under Lithuanian rule, later under that of the Poles, but neither were strong enough to defend the Ukrainians against the continued incursions of the Tartars. These extended over a period of more than five centuries, thus stunting absolutely the growth of the Ukrainian people, who had at the same time to defend themselves against Polish oppression. It was the instinct for self-preservation that led this race, at this dark stage of its history, to organize that wonderfully efficient belligerent instrument, the army of Ukrainian Cossacks (Saporogs). The Cossack body carried
on victorious wars against Poles, Tartars, Turks, and Russians, and made possible the formation of a new Ukrainian state centuries later (Bogdan Chmelnyzkyj, 1648).

By the Treaty of Perejaslav, the Ukraine was ceded as a vassal state to Russia, with which it had been affiliated by ties of religion (1654). But the latter country managed to break the contracts of suzerainty and to transform the rather loose dependence of the weaker state into abject serfdom. Ukrainian autonomy and the organization of the Cossack system were abolished. The nation lost its upper classes, its aristocracy, its lesser nobility, its wealthy burghers, through Polonization or, later, Russification. It had left only its minor clergy, its lower middle class, and a completely downtrodden peasantry. Thus, at the end of the eighteenth century, it seemed as if the last hour of the Ukrainian people had struck.

But, trained by the misfortunes of a thousand years, the vital energy of the Ukrainian people could not be suppressed. The enslaved Ukrainian peasant had developed an unsuspected faculty for colonization and began toward the end of the eighteenth century, after Russia had reduced the Crimean Tartar state, to occupy the vast steppe regions along the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and to add these districts to ethnographically Ukrainian territory. The spiritual culture of the farmers, more particularly the oral transmission of an exceedingly rich body of popular poetry (Volksdichtung), made possible a mighty flowering of Ukrainian literature in the nineteenth century. In spite of every variety of obstruction on the part of the Poles and of the Russian government, which used the most stringent measures in its opposition to their progress, the ranks of the Ukrainian aristocracy of brains grew more and more numerous; the literature, the art, the science of the Ukrainian people, weakened by ten centuries of suffering, attained remarkable heights. Their actual accomplishment, considered absolutely, or
measured by Western European standards, makes their record appear not very striking for a nation of thirty millions, yet we must not overlook 1) that the Ukrainians are a Slavic race; 2) that they live in Eastern Europe; 3) that they have a relatively small group of intellectuals. Yet this little band of natural leaders for the millions who constitute the masses of the Ukrainian people, are animated by a historical-political tradition of a thousand years, and by a distinctly outlined national ambition.

We must therefore consider the Ukrainians to be a “Kulturvolk” in the sense in which Kirchhoff uses the word, and the immediate future will show whether they have the power of becoming a national race (“Staatsnation”). In a way they have already proved their title to such consideration by organizing two national governments.

There are two strong oppositions, hostile even to each other, of the desire of the Ukrainian people for a realization of their national aspirations. They are the hierarchic ambitions of two states who once ruled, and even now rule over Ukrainian territory, the „state ideas” of Poland and Russia.

Both views coincide in emphasizing one statement: “There is no such country as the Ukraine, there are only Poland and Russia, only the Polish nation and the Russian nation”. But then these two attitudes begin to diverge. The Polish “state idea”, the idea of a Polish Empire extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, would regard the Ukrainian farmers as a portion of the Polish peasantry, distinguished from the latter merely by their religion and their dialect, a good material on which to establish an expansion of Polish culture and political power. But in the Russian national plans, the Ukrainians are called “Little Russians”, a tribe of the Russian race, differing a little from the great mass of the “compact Russian nation”, but only in their dialect. The present Russian state is the only heir of the “ancient Russian” state of Kieff, it has for centuries been rallying the
"Russian" lands about its standard, and now has manifestly the duty of incorporating with the great Russian Empire the only remaining "Russian" land, Eastern Galicia, which is "groaning" under the foreign yoke. "There never has been, is not, and never shall be a distinct Little Russian language", said the Russian Minister of Instruction in 1863. In other words, the Pan-Slavic, Pan-Russian "doctrine of unity" considers the Ukrainians to be Russians at heart, as much as are the inhabitants of Moscow or Tula.

These two views of the Ukrainian situation have until very recently prevailed in all the intellectual circles of Europe, whether among scholars, publicists, statesmen, or others. The rising scholarship and propaganda of the Ukrainians were almost powerless to combat these erroneous conceptions. Things did not begin to show in their real colors until after the opening of the present century.

The following paragraphs can scarcely do more than touch upon the outstanding facts. But even these slight data will probably convince the attentive reader how empty are the Polish and Russian pretentions in this Ukrainian question.

The chief requirements that an independent nation must fill, are the following, beginning with those least important and ending with those most essential: common anthropological indications, a distinct language, common historical-political traditions (in the past) and common aspirations (for the future), an independent civilization and a compact geographical distribution.

IV. RACE.

First, as to the anthropological characteristics. To set up such indications of national cohesion, to regard them as indicative of race, has been almost entirely given up in Western Europe. For ceaseless racial blendings, often capable even of historical proof, have almost entirely
eradicated the original anthropological distinctions in Central and Western Europe. But the case is quite different in Eastern Europe. As is well known, the physical-geographical landmarks, in Western Europe, are quite varied and interesting, as opposed to a great uniformity once we reach Ukrainian soil. The same uniformity, monotony almost, of racial traits is noticeable in that territory also, as opposed to the great variety of racial types west of the Ukraine. The foreign tribes passing through the Ukraine in historic times were exclusively rather small bands of nomads, who devastated the country without establishing themselves in it.

To be sure, even the Ukrainians are, anthropologically speaking, a mixed race, but the mixture is a peculiar one, of exceedingly long standing, and entirely different from the Polish or Russian blend.

Here are a few figures, showing how these three races of Eastern Europe compare:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Poles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Height</td>
<td>1670 mm</td>
<td>1657 mm</td>
<td>1654 mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest</td>
<td>550.4</td>
<td>521.8</td>
<td>541.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of arm</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of leg</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cephalic index</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasal index</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadth of face</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facial index</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color of hair and eyes, in 100 persons:</th>
<th>light</th>
<th>medium</th>
<th>dark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.5 %</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>41 %</td>
<td>46 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures, taken from the latest statistics of Ivanovski and Volkov, should sufficiently answer the contention that the Ukrainians are Polonized Russians.
or Russified Poles. And they contradict equally well the oft-made but erroneous statement that the Ukrainians are a blend of Slavs with Mongolian nomad tribes. The bodily traits of the Ukrainian people present absolutely no traces of Mongolian influence, such as are well-known to be quite pronounced in the case of the Russians.

A single glance at these data will show that the Ukrainians show but very slight relationship with the Russians or Poles. Deniker's division assigns the Ukrainians to the so-called Adriatic (Dinaric) Race, while the Poles and the Russians are to be classified with the so-called Interrelated Races, the Vistula or Oriental Race.

V. LANGUAGE.

An independent nation need not necessarily have a language that distinguishes it sharply from other nations, as is shown by the examples of the United States and Switzerland. But even this means of distinguishing themselves from the surrounding peoples is possessed by the Ukrainians. To be sure the view has been rather widely circulated in Europe that the Ukrainian language is only a peasant dialect of the Polish language, and official Russia has hitherto maintained that it is nothing more than the "Little Russian dialect" of the Russian language. But the philological investigations of Miklosich, Jogič, Potebnja, Żytezky, Ohonowskyi, Shakhmatov, Korsch, Stockyi, and others, have shown conclusively that the Ukrainian language is by no means a mere dialect of the Polish or of the Russian language, but that it is an independent language equal to and distinct from these two languages. Finally, even the Imperial Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg, in its famous decision of 1905, expressed this view, distinctly emphasizing the independence of Ukrainian from Russian, and adding, that the Russian language should not be forced upon the Ukrainians, as the latter possessed a fully developed language and literature.
The Ukrainian written language has a history of fully a thousand years behind it. In the ancient Ukrainian Kingdom of Kieff there arose the so-called Chronicle of Nestor, the Epic of Igor, and other important monuments of Ukrainian Literature. Their language has been built up on the foundation of the Church Slavonic dialect, but presents great linguistic departures, as early as the eleventh century, from the literary works simultaneously produced in the Russian territory to the North.

This promising beginning of the old Ukrainian Literature was almost completely crushed by five centuries of Tartar barbarism. Not until the last years of the eighteenth century did it come into its own again, a change that was perhaps due to the introduction of the pure popular speech in place of the Old-Slavic-Macaronic hitherto used in literature. In the course of the nineteenth century the history of Ukrainian literature has a number of great poets and prose writers to show (Shevchenko, Vovchok, Fedkovych, Franko, Kulish, Vynnychenko, etc.), as well as a considerable number of lesser writers. Their works are characterized by enormous variety and versatility. And the second half of the century was also marked by a very active study of the sciences, leading to the founding of two learned bodies very much along the plan of the so-called "Academies" (in Lemberg and Kieff). In every branch of human knowledge the Ukrainians can already point to publications, books, dissertations, in their language.

The versatility and richness of Ukrainian literature assure it a prominent place among the other Slavonic literatures, thus furnishing proof, if any is needed, that the Ukrainian language really is a language, and not a mere dialect; it is a civilized language in every sense of the word. And the testimony of Ukrainian scholarship strengthens the case beyond all doubt. The roots of the Ukrainian literary language in the speech of the common people make clear that it will be an admirable means of educating the race, in view of their wellknown intelligence,
into an enlightened and progressive nation. But the Russian government has been thoroughly aware of this fact, and has left no stone unturned in its efforts to stop this young literature in its growth, which efforts culminated in the famous ukase of the Czar (1876), forbidding absolutely the publication of any writings in the Ukrainian language. None but a really living and significant literature could have survived these thirty years (1876—1905) of repression. And Ukrainian literature has stood this test!

VI. HISTORY.

The most important distinguishing characteristic of a real nation is the fact that it possesses its own historicopolitical traditions and ambitions for the future, thus furnishing the basis for that constant plebiscite which E. Renan regards as the thing makes a race into a nation.

It is their common historicopolitical tradition that gives the Ukrainians their most important indications of separate national existence. And if it had not been for the dense ignorance that prevails in Western Europe regarding the history of the eastern half of the continent, and for the advertising carried on to this very day, by Russian scholars, in behalf of their propaganda for "Russian" history, which has worked its way into all books on Eastern European history, this real condition of affairs could never have remained obscure so long.

The ancient Kingdom of Kieff, which is called "Old Russian" in all historical treatises, was in reality a state organized by the Southern Slavic races of Eastern Europe, the precursors of the present-day Ukrainians. This State of Kieff was already in existence at the beginning of the ninth century. With the aid of mercenaries from Scandinavia (Varangians) this state grew stronger after the middle of the ninth century, and during the tenth gives
evidences of a remarkable activity of expansion. The Northern Slavic tribes, the forebears of the Russians of today, were subjugated by the Kingdom of Kieff, the nomadic tribes of the steppes were pushed back, commercial and cultural relations were established with the Byzantine Empire, which seem to have been actively carried on, and in the year 988 the Great Prince of Kieff (Vladimir the Great), together with all his people, accepted Greek Christianity from Constantinople, but with Slavic rites. There ensued a great flowering of material and spiritual civilization, which aroused the admiration of travelers from Western Europe.

The fact that the ancient state of Kieff as well as its civilization was produced by Ukrainians is evident not only from the circumstance that the most ancient literary monuments of Kieff already show specifically Ukrainian peculiarities of language. A still more important bit of evidence is the constitution of the ancient Kingdom of Kieff. The power of the Great Prince was limited not only by the influence of his retainers (Drushyna), from which later the caste of the Boyars sprung, but also by the General Assembly of all freemen (the so-called Vitche). The original constitutional — sit venia verbo — yea, almost republican rural government of the Ukrainians had a tremendous influence, with the result that, throughout the history of the ancient Kingdom of Kieff, its Great Princes were engaged in a struggle with the Boyars and the people, for the exercise of their powers. This limitation of the monarchic power turned out to be a disaster for the Kingdom of Kieff. By applying the practice of succession to the throne in accordance with a principle known as that of "seniority", there resulted the formation of numerous petty principalities, all rather loosely, perhaps only nominally, subject to the authority of the Great Prince of Kieff. The Boyar caste and the people were very persistent in their labors to aid in the formation and maintenance of these petty
principalities throughout the southern portion of the Kingdom of Kieff.

In the north, conditions were quite different; there were the little principalities on the Oka, and Moscow. Only the ruling dynasty came from Kieff, the people were a mixture of northern East Slavonic tribes and the aboriginal Finnish-Mongolian population. From this melting-pot the Russian nation takes its origin. The spirit of the people, so different from that of the Ukrainians, enabled the Russian petty monarch to crush the power of the nobility as early as the twelfth century, and to introduce an arbitrary form of government. That is the germ from which the Russian Empire of the present has sprung.

This young Russian nation, whose directing center was first Vladimir and later Moscow, began waging a series of bloody wars against Kieff, weakening that country so lastingly, that the headquarters of Ukrainian political life had to be shifted southward, in the 13th century, to Halitsh on the Dniester.

In fact, the situation of this Kieff country was such as to expose it also to continuous invasions on the part of the nomadic warlike hordes which infested the steppes of the Ukraine. But the nation managed to hold them in check during this weary term of warfare. When, however, the hosts of the Mongol potentate Djingis-Khan appeared in the Pontian steppes, the resources of Kieff and Halitsh were no longer equal to the pressure. In the three days' battle on the Kalka (1224) their army was annihilated, and in 1240 the city of Kieff was razed to the ground. The principality (later kingdom) of Halitsh survived it by almost a century, but could not withstand the continued aggressions of the Tartars on one side, and of the Poles and Lithuanians on the other; in 1340 it was incorporated with Poland by right of succession, and thus ended the first national organization of the Ukrainian people. All the Ukraine, excepting the
forest regions in the northwest, had been completely devastated.

The Polish-Lithuanian State treated the Ukraine as conquered territory. Being now dissenters in the midst of a Catholic State, the Ukrainian nobles were limited in their prerogatives, and deserted their faith and their nationality, in order to have a share in the “golden freedom” of Poland. The burgher class was tyrannized (as was the practice all over Poland), the peasant became a serf. The splendid task of an ecclesiastical union with Rome was solved (Florence, 1439; Brest 1596) in an unsatisfactory manner and bore little fruit at the time. Every Ukrainian was made to feel the Polish government’s iron hand, and their disaffection expressed itself in numerous rebellions (Swidrygiello, Glinskyi, etc.). And yet, the Polish-Lithuanian State was far too weak to protect the Ukraine against the onslaughts of the Tartars. Every year these hordes of riders issued forth from the Crimea and pushed their invasions even as far as Galicia and Volhynia, devastating the country and depopulating it by seizures of slaves conducted in accordance with a systematic plan. The victims of this slave trade filled the markets of the Orient for centuries.

It was inevitable that this sorely tried nation should be forced to defend itself. And its efforts were successful in that they led to the formation of a new independent state, but unsuccessful in that they exhausted its resources and later had a tragical outcome.

The constant state of warfare on the Tartar boundary line forced the Ukrainian population in those parts to adopt a policy of continual “Preparedness”. These people of the marches led a hard life, but they had access to the natural treasures of the virgin lands, and the exploiting Polish officials did not dare venture forth into these dangerous districts. These armed farmers, hunters, fishermen, were very much like the American backwoodsmen, they lived lives of independence and called themselves “cossacks”, i. e., “free warriors”.

In the sixteenth century there arose among these Ukrainian cossacks a military state organization, the center of which was a strongly fortified place below the cataracts of the Dnieper (the Saporog Sitch). This Ukrainian Cossack State was a democratic republic based on absolute liberty and equality. All authority lay in the hands of the general assembly, consisting of all the fighting men, and their decisions were enforced by elective officers. The liberty of the individual was very great, but had to yield to the will of the whole. And in time of war the chief official, the Hetman, had unlimited dictatorial power.

In the aristocratic state organization of Poland there was no room for such a lawless democratic state as that of the Saporogs was in Polish eyes. The entire Ukrainian nation regarded the Saporog cossacks as their natural defenders against the terrible Tartar peril, and likewise as their sole hope as opposed to the oppression practiced by the Poles. An ominous discontent prevailed throughout the Ukraine, and after, the Poles had naturally taken severe measures, a number of cossack revolts occurred in rapid succession, beginning toward the end of the sixteenth century and filling the first half of the seventeenth. In these revolts the cossacks were supported by the oppressed peasantry. But the Polish Kingdom was rather deficient, always, as far as its standing army was concerned, and was obliged to appeal to the Ukrainian cossack organization, which it could not possibly destroy, to aid it in its wars against the Turks, the Russians, and the Swedes.

Finally, in 1648, the Ukrainian cossacks, aided by the entire people, from the Dnieper to the San, raised the standard of rebellion, and under the leadership of Bogdan Chmelnyzkyi, succeeded in annihilating the Polish armies. This victory meant the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state after three hundred years of a foreign yoke.
The new state, surrounded by enemies on all sides, needed calm and quiet to enable it to achieve the necessary internal organization. Chmelnyzkyi negotiated with all the surrounding governments and peoples, with the Poles, the Transylvanians, the Swedes, the Turks, and finally in 1654, concluded the treaty of Pereyaslav, with Russia, with which they were related by ties of religion. This treaty provided that the Ukraine should retain a complete autonomy, as well as their cossack organization, the latter under the suzerainty of the Czar. The Hetman, who was to be elected by the votes of the general assembly, was even to retain the right of conducting an independent foreign policy.

But Russia had no mind to respect the treaty that bound it in dual alliance with the warlike Ukrainian nation. The democratic form of government in the Ukraine was an abomination to Russian eyes. To understand the Russian attitude, we must rapidly trace its development. The young Russian empire of the thirteenth century had also suffered much from the Tartar invasions, but it was rather remote from the southern steppes, in which the Tartar Khans had pitched their tents. The young Russian state was therefore not destroyed by the Tartars, but simply forced to pay tribute. The Great Princes of Moscow went so far, finally, as to solidify their absolute authority under the protection of the Tartar Khans, and in 1480, when the strength of the Tartars was at a rather low ebb, they cast the Tartars out and declared themselves to be the Czars of all the Russias. They arrogated to themselves the right to act as sole rightful heirs of the ancient Empire of Kieff, although the two nations were entirely distinct, as were also their theories of government. While the descendants of the ancient Empire of Kieff were organizing the democratic cossack republic in the Ukraine, the tyranny of Ivan the Terrible was indulging in its frightful orgies in Moscow, ultimately depriving the nobility and the clergy of the last vestige of
their rights, an act in which the servile nature of the Russian people fully supported him.

Once this cossack republic was under the control of Moscow, the Russian government felt that no stone should be left unturned to destroy this dangerous national organism. Their machinations in the Ukraine were aided by Chmelnyzkyi’s untimely death (1657) and the incompetence of his immediate successors. The cossack generals were inspired with prejudice against the Hetman, the common cossacks against their superior officers, and the common people against all who were wealthy and in authority. Huge sums of money were spent, and vast extents of territory granted in fief, in order to bring about this desired end. At every successive election of a new Hetman the autonomy of the Ukraine was cut down, and in the Peace of Andrußow (1667) with Poland, the country was partitioned. Of the two sections, one, that nearest to Poland, which had been dreadfully decimated and depopulated, was ceded to that country, and this section very soon lost its Ukrainian form of government and its cossack organization. The section on the other side, the left side, under its dashing Hetman Mazeppa, made an effort, during the Scandinavian War, to throw off the Russian yoke. Mazeppa made an alliance with Charles XII, King of Sweden. But the Battle of Pultawa (1709) buried all his hopes. Mazeppa had to flee to Turkey with Charles XII, and the Ukrainian rebellion was put down by Peter the Great with the most frightful atrocities, and finally the guaranteed autonomy of the Ukraine was abolished. To be sure the title of Hetman was again introduced after the death of Peter the Great, but it had but a wretched semblance of life. This shadow of autonomy was destroyed in 1764; in 1775 the last bulwark of the Ukraine, the Saporog Sitch, fell into the hands of the Russians through treachery, and was destroyed by them. The rest of the Saporogs were later permitted to settle on the banks of the Kuban in the Caucasus; the
Kuban Cossacks are the only Russian Cossacks who are Ukrainian in origin.

Russia thus succeeded, in the course of about a century and a half, in completely wiping out the later, second, Ukrainian state. The devious policy Russia was simultaneously carrying on in Poland led also to the latter’s downfall. In the successive partitions of Poland (1772—1795), the entire part of that nation which was inhabited by Ukrainians, with the exception of Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina, which fell to Austria, became the property of Russia.

But Russia was not satisfied with political domination alone. Russia already understood, in the seventeenth century, that the Ukrainians differed entirely from the Russians in language, customs, and views of life. The Russian government therefore inaugurated a policy of rigid repression of all these points of difference. As early as 1680, it prohibited any use of the Ukrainian language in ecclesiastical literature. In 1720, the printing of any Ukrainian books at all was forbidden. All Ukrainian schools were closed. In the middle of the eighteenth century there were in the province of Chernigov, 866 schools that had been founded during the period of Ukrainian autonomy. Sixty years later, not one of these was in existence. This, together with the attempt to introduce the Russian language which none of them understands, is the cause of the overwhelming percentage of analphabets among the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian orthodox church, which enjoyed absolute autonomy, with a sort of loose subordination to the Patriarch of Constantinople, was made subject to the Patriarch of Moscow, later to the Holy Synod, and became completely russified. The Greek-United faith, which had many adherents in the Western Ukraine, was completely suppressed by the Russian government, and all who professed it were obliged, by the most awful persecutions, to “return” to the orthodox belief. The Ukrainian people became completely estranged from their former national church, which now is a tool wielded
for purposes of russification, and consequently a new sect — the so-called Стунда, a sort of Baptist denomination — made great progress in the Ukraine.

But the russification of the Ukraine seemed to be making very little headway. To be sure many educated Ukrainians, for the sake of their own personal advantage, or for other considerations, did renounce their nationality; in fact some, like Gogol, became great lights in Russian literature. Yet there always remained the feeling of national independence, together with a living historical tradition. As early as 1791, Kapnist, an emissary of the Ukraine, endeavored to move the Prussian government to make war on Russia, in order to reestablish the autonomy of the Ukraine. And when, after the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian literature began to flourish, the movement attracted some attention. The watchful Russian government began to take repressive measures. The Ukrainian Secret Society in Kieff was discovered in 1847 and its members banished. The poet Shevchenko was sent to Asiatic Russia in penal convoys and there tortured almost to death. And as the Ukrainian movement continued spreading in spite of everything, there was issued the above-mentioned ukase of 1876, which seemed likely to give the movement its final quietus.

But not even this unprecedented measure was able to stop the spread of the idea. The literary and scholarly phases of the movement were transplanted to Galicia, and the youth of the Ukraine filled the ranks of Russian nihilists and revolutionaries. Laboring under the delusion that the liberation of the Ukraine would be best attained by freeing all of Russia from the tyranny of the Czar, the young men of the land sacrificed all their strength for the general revolutionary tendencies of Russia. Only after the Russian Revolution of 1905 did their views become clarified, and then rather powerful progressive national Ukrainian parties were formed, whose activities had of course to remain subterranean. Their object is a free Ukraine, established on democratic principles. There
is also a moderate independence party, but the great mass of the educated classes in the Ukraine has until very recently stood for the principle of an autonomous Ukraine within the frame of the Russian Empire. Whether this moderation has been caused by existing conditions, that is, by the constant, absolute, and ruthless pressure of the Russian government, it would of course be impossible to ascertain at this moment. In recent years the "autonomists" have dwindled considerably as compared with the Independence Party. All that the Russian Ukrainians have succeeded in obtaining is the fact that the Ukase of 1876 is now no longer in actual enforcement (since 1905), although the Russian government is nevertheless doing everything in its power to obstruct the development of Ukrainian literature and culture. The Ukrainian language continues to be prohibited for official and school purposes.

We must still devote some attention to the history of the Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary. Incorporation with Austria was an epoch-making event in the evolution of the Ukrainian national movement, although only a very small strip of Ukrainian territory has enjoyed the advantage of this great piece of good fortune. For the first time in half a millenium the Ukrainians once more began to feel what it meant to have human rights and to be on equal terms with other races. The love which the Galician Ukrainians bear for Austria was magnificently evidenced in 1848, and since then they have been known by the honoring epithet of "the Tyrolese of the East". The Constitutional Era was greeted with delight by the Austrian Ukrainians. But its first fruits were very disappointing. Under a constitutional government it was impossible for a people like the Ukrainians, who, owing to five centuries of Polish domination, consisted merely of peasants and a small handful of cultured persons, to offer any resistance to the Polish element of the population, which possessed a very numerous aristocracy, a wealthy nobility, a middle class (even though it was a
small one), in short, a powerful caste of officials. In addition, the Ukrainians were very universally discriminated against, and entirely lost their influence in the administration of the country, in school matters, in the Parliament, as well as in the Landtag.

By thus holding down the Ukrainians, the ground was cleared for the Pro-Russian activities in Galicia. Russia has never lost sight of the little bit of “Russian” soil which had become Austria’s. The first attempts to sow Panslavic-Russophile notions in Eastern Galicia, proved failures. But beginning with the sixties of the last century, Pro-Russianism began spreading among the intelligent classes of the Ruthenians, chiefly as a reaction against Polish oppression. This tendency was widespread, but not profound, and was chiefly a matter of catchwords, such as “the unity of the Russian nation, from the Carpathians to Kamchatka”, of introducing Old Slavonic as well as Russian words into the literary language, and an adherence with stolid rigidity to the ancient, impractical, “thousand-year-old” orthography, etc., etc. On such ideological foundations a Russophile Party arose, but of course it never attained any serious political importance.

The Russophile Party completely proved its insignificance in the following decades. The rise of a Ukrainian literature based on purity of the popular idiom found a ready echo in Galicia and in the Bukowina. The Ukrainian national consciousness was awakened to vigorous life among the Austrian Ukrainians, and from being a mere handful of young enthusiasts, the Ukrainian National Party was already an important one by the end of the sixties. It at once entered into combat with the Russophiles and carried away with it more and more of the great mass of those who at first were indifferent. This National Party, in the nineties of the nineteenth century, already had possession of the entire cultural and economic life of the Galician and Bukovinian Ukrainians, the Russophiles retaining their importance only in the political field, an importance which they owed in part to
pecuniary subsidies of Russian origin, in part to the pro-
tection of powerful Pol’sh politicians, to whom the growth
of the Ukrainian national consciousness in Eastern Galicia
seemed far more dangerous than a “tame”, “harmless”
Russophilism, which presented no new language difficult-
ies, and asked for no schools, gymnasia, or universities.

The danger which the Ukrainian movement involved
for Russia, forced the latter country to take active steps.
Since the nineties of the nineteenth century, vast sums
of money have been pouring into Galicia, in order to
halt the dissolution of the Russophile Party. This money
was spent for printing russophile newspapers and pamph-
lets, thousands of copies of which were circulated free
among the common people, and for establishing educa-
tional institutions, in which the studious sons of the
peasantry were trained into violent agitators and partisans
of the russophile movement. When the first elections to
the Reichsrat in accordance with the universal suffrage
were held, in 1907, in spite of great Russian subsidies,
they resulted in a decisive defeat of the Russophiles and
a brilliant victory of the Ukrainians; naturally the ex-
ertions made by the Russian government were even
further stimulated. The systematic manner in which the
russophile agitation was carried on is evident from the
history of the first few days of the present war: rus-
sohile agitation had been most active in the north-
eastern part of Galicia, in the country around Brody,
Lemberg, and Sokal, and there the progress of the Russian
armies was comparatively easy.

After 1907 the Russophiles adopted a new pose,
declaring themselves to be “Galician Russians”, although
there are very few persons in the whole party who even
know the Russian language. The party consists today of
a number of lawyers and government officials, very many
priests, those who are provided with the most lucrative
livings, which have been thrown into their laps by the
great landed proprietors whose favorites they may happen
to be, a number of young men educated in russophile
institutions, and several tens of thousands of deluded peasants. The latter cherish the false belief that the Great White Czar speaks the same language as they do, is a member of the same religious faith, and is only waiting for a favorable opportunity to free them from the oppression of Poles and Jews. The hatred the Russophiles bear the Ukrainians is a blind and senseless one; at every election they vote for the Polish candidates merely in order to harm the Ukrainians, disperse Ukrainian meetings, and boycott everything that is Ukrainian, whenever an opportunity offers. And the immunity from punishment on which they may safely count, redoubles their activities along these lines.

But even this latest onslaught of Russophilism has not been able to do lasting damage to the Ukrainian cause in Austria. On the contrary, it resulted in a complete ostracism of the Russophiles, who were considered adherents of a hostile foreign nation, an ostracism that has led even to the dissolving of ties of family and relationship, and this fact has given a wondrous strength to the Ukrainian movement. In noble emulation all the Ukrainian political parties — the National Democratic, the Radical, and the Social Democratic — worked together for the realization of their national ideals. To uplift the country people, great cooperative organizations were founded and developed; to swell the ranks of the Ukrainian cultured classes, private schools and private gymnasia were established, and a great fight was carried on for years for the establishment of a Ukrainian university in Lemberg, — unfortunately without success. Simultaneously the horizons of their political ambitions began to widen. The Ukrainians were in the first ranks in the struggle for the granting of universal suffrage; now the watchword of all parties is national autonomy. The ideal of all parties now is a free Ukraine, bounded by true ethnographic lines. To realize this ideal, they founded Societies of Marksmen (Schützenvereine) and Gymnasts (Turnvereine), which
have grown very rapidly in spite of the financial weakness of the Ukrainians. The road they must travel to attain their goal is clearly defined. The Ukrainians are the only European people who will be directly benefited by a defeat and exhaustion of Russia. Free Ukraine can only be the outcome of a combat with Russia. Even the untrammeled development of the Ukrainian people, aside from their national aspirations, can only proceed outside of the limits of Russian jurisdiction.

VII. CULTURE.

When we speak of culture as a distinguishing mark of a specific nation, we mean, of course, not culture in the widest sense of the word, but those well known cultural peculiarities which characterize every European nation.

The Ukraine lies wholly within the confines of the greater European cultural community. But its great distance from the great culture-centres of Western and Central Europe has of course not been without effect, profound effect. The Ukraine is at a low stage of culture and must be measured by Eastern European standards.

The culture of the Ukrainian peasantry is an extremely ancient culture of a purely agricultural people. Ancient, even Pre-Christian cultural elements are at its base; their ancient pagan Weltanschauung had to accommodate itself to Greek Christianity, when they accepted the latter. Byzantine elements of considerable importance must also be borne in mind, and of course something must have percolated through from Western Europe. This is the blend from which the socalled ethnological culture of the Ukrainian peasantry sprang. It is on an incomparably higher plane than Russian folk culture and has managed to assimilate, Ukrainianize, if one may say so, great bodies of foreign peasant settlers.
in the Ukraine. The higher degree of culture of the Ukrainian peasant has protected him from russification in his Asiatic colonies, even on the borders of the Pacific Ocean. The character of the settlements, buildings, costumes, and mode of life, of the Ukrainian country people is such as to indicate a perfect adaptation to the conditions of agricultural life, which places them on a far higher plane than the Russian peasantry. It is hardly to be wondered at that the Ukrainian peasants do not intermarry with the Russian; in fact, they hardly ever will consent to live in the same village with them. A still deeper chasm is formed between them by their spiritual culture, which, in the case of the Ukrainians, in the wealth of their vast oral traditionary literature, bears excellent witness to their depth of artistic feeling. The philosophical and esthetic Lebensanschauung of these illiterate peasants finds expression in thousands and thousands of pregnant proverbs and parables; their bloody but glorious past is celebrated in numberless epic poems; an incomparable variety of artistically perfect lyrics of love and religion beautifies their daily life. If thousands of these products of popular genius had not been collected — and these are daily supplemented by the appearance of new ones never known before — no one would believe that in this neglected race, oppressed for tens of centuries, such pearls of true poetic inspiration could be born. Their rich ethnological life (manners and customs), their highly developed popular music and popular art (particularly ornamentation), their tolerant, profound religious feeling, so indifferent to mere externals, a pronounced individualism in family life, a higher position for women, and great power of collective activity when on terms of absolute equality — these are the things that distinguish the Ukrainian peasant, and much to his advantage, from his Russian neighbor. There is therefore every reason to believe that the gifted Ukrainian people present an admirable basis for a great future flowering of culture; the fact that they at present occupy a rather
low stage of culture, cannot be a source of surprise to anyone. We know, for instance, what a disastrous effect the Thirty Years' War had on Germany. And the Ukrainian people had five hundred years of the Tartars.

On the broad basis of a popular culture the Ukrainian intellectuals have now been developing their gifts for a century. Long they vacillated between Polish and Russian cultural influences, but finally they had the energy to strike out in independent lines, in order to lead the Ukrainian nation into the full blossom of civilization, with the aid of cultural influences from Western Europe.

VIII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UKRAINE.

We have now to consider the last and most important matter in connection with the Ukrainians, namely, a description of their country. Or, more properly, we are returning to this subject, for the size and territorial boundaries have already been discussed in Section II.

Of course no one will expect to find, in Eastern Europe, a country with boundary lines as distinct and final as are those of Spain, France or Italy. The Ukrainian boundaries, with the exception of the swamps on the north, are open, yet the country has distinct characteristics that enable us to classify it as one of the clear-cut national outlines of Europe, and it has them to a more marked degree than have the other territorial units of Eastern Europe. Such national distinguishing marks are: the Ukraine is a broad hinterland of the Black Sea; it has a uniform series of table-lands extending all the way from the Vistula to the Don; in the Pontus a highly intricate system of rivers and deltas; a peculiar climate, which led the famous French geographer E. de Martonne to set up the climat oukrainien as a descriptive epithet; a great variety of plant and animal life; a population that is racially homogeneous.
Yet it is not our purpose to write a geography of the Ukraine. It is our object merely to indicate the great importance of this country.

Its most important strategic quality lies in the fact that it is situated at the threshold of Western and Central Asia. Russia’s access to the Black Sea depends on her possession of the Ukraine. Of all Russia’s exports, 70% by weight or 65% by value, go by way of the Black Sea. Of all Russia’s commercial steam vessels, 42% of the number or 52% of the tonnage are engaged in the Black Sea trade. The tonnage of the river steamers navigating the Dnieper, is alone as large as the entire commercial tonnage of Austria-Hungary. It is only her possession of the Ukraine that enables Russia to cast envious eyes on the Balkans and the Straits, and to threaten the security of Turkey and of the Mediterranean. It is only through the Ukraine that Russian can control the lands of the Caucasus, oppress the Persians, and seek a short cut to the Indian Ocean. It must not be overlooked that the Ukraine is in the path of the shortest land route from Central Europe to the East Indies, and that it includes a goodly portion of the way thither. This fact may have tremendous importance even in the immediate future.

The situation of the Ukraine is not more significant than the volume of her natural resources. The extremely fruitful black humus covers three-fourths of the surface of the country, and the healthy, yet continental climate is very favorable to agriculture and cattle-raising. In the following account we shall begin with the simpler and more aboriginal modes of economic life.

In addition to a large annual amount of game, the sea fisheries in the Black Sea and in the Sea of Azov yield 24,500,000 kg of fish every year. Fresh water fishing is also very profitable.

The Ukraine has 110,000 sq. km. of exploitable forest lands.
Farming land in the Ukraine amounts to more than 45,000,000 ha, or 32% of all the farm land of European Russia, while the total area of the Ukraine is to that of Russia as 1:6. Of the total area of the Ukraine, 53% is farmed; in Europe only France has a higher percentage (56%). The annual production of the Ukraine in wheat, rye and barley alone, in spite of very primitive methods of exploitation, amounts to 150,000,000 q* annually, or one-third of Russia's output. Other farm products are just as generously abundant. The sugar beet production of the Ukraine is five-sixths that of all Russia. Of tobacco the Ukraine produces over 700,000 q a year. It possesses the largest and finest orchards and vineyards of Russia.

As to stock raising; the Ukraine has 30,000,000 head of cattle, one-third of all European Russia’s; sheep, goats, pigs and poultry are very numerous, in fact, in this matter the Ukraine has 50% of Russia's supply.

These figures show the immense importance of the Ukraine as the grain and meat producer of Russia. And it is also true that the mineral resources of the country play an important part in the economic life of the Russian Empire. Iron, chiefly in the government of Cherson, in the year of revolution, 1905, was turned out to the amount of 31,000,000 q, or 60% of the total output of the entire Russian Empire; in 1905 this percentage had been over 69. Of manganese the Ukraine furnishes one-sixth the world’s production, or 32% of Russia’s production. No other mercury is produced in Russia except the Ukrainian (320,000 kg in 1905). The coal deposits on the Donetz (23,000 sq. km.) produced 130,000,000 q hard coal in 1905, or 75% of the total production of European and Asiatic Russia; of anthracite coal, 99% of Russia’s output is from the Ukraine. Space forbids us to discuss the other forms of the mineral wealth of the Ukraine, such as petroleum, ozocerite, peat, phosphorite, kaolin, etc.

* 1 q (100 kg.) = 1 metric quintal = 220.46 lb.
Factory industries have already reached a fair stage of development in the Ukraine.

Of pig iron, 17,000,000 q were made in 1905 (62% of Russia's production); of steel, 13,000,000 q (58%); crude sugar (80%); refined sugar (59%), etc. How important the Ukrainian grain output is for the world's grain trade, is evident from the figures given above.

Now what is the significance of all these figures? They show that we may just as well throw all our pre-conceived notions concerning the geography of Eastern Europe into our intellectual scrap heap. We were taught to believe that the unity of Russia was the result of geographical conditions, that the grain-rich south needed the industrial central section and vice versa. One has only to consider the above data, to understand the falsehood of that statement. We believe the above figures show, not only that the Ukraine has nothing to gain from its subordination to Russia, but on the contrary, that it loses by being obliged to maintain out of its abundance the really Russian provinces, which are very poor, and whose industry it must patronize. The Ukraine does not need Russia, but Russia needs the Ukraine very much.

At the end of our little book we may safely express the belief that:

Russia has become what she is owing to her possession of the Ukraine; the overwhelming predominance of Russia in Europe can only be broken by separating the Ukraine from its connection with the Russian State.

Vienna, September 9, 1914.
LITERATURE ON THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION.

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1. Teutonic
   - German
   - Dutch
   - Flemish
   - Bohemian

2. Latin
   - French
   - Wallons & Spanish
   - Italian
   - Romance

3. Slavonic
   a. Northern Slav
   b. Southern Slav

4. Letts & Lithuanians

5. Ural-Altaic stock

6. Greeks

7. Albanians

National Boundaries
Racial Boundaries

The object of this map is merely to present the trend outlines of racial distribution in Central and Eastern Europe. Any attempt to indicate the numerous racial minorities and scattered ethnicities in Hungary and the Balkans would necessitate treatment on a far larger scale than the scope of the Round Table permits. Some of the racial boundaries in the Balkans are of necessity somewhat arbitrary, in view of recent events.

In order to help the reader's eye, the Teutonic districts have been left unshaded, while the Slavonic districts are shaded by varying lines.
Note. The clayey & Sandy Soils of the Southern Step are distinguished thus

EUROPEAN RUSSIA. Distribution of Soils

- Swamp & moorland
- Clayey & sandy soils
- Black & brown earth
- Sand
- Siliceous rocks
- Alluvial soil

Legend:
- Swamp & moorland (dark brown)
- Clayey & sandy soils (light brown)
- Black & brown earth (gray)
- Sand (yellow)
- Siliceous rocks (light blue)
- Alluvial soil (dark blue)

Areas:
- Arctic Ocean
- English Channel
- Baltic Sea
- Black Sea
- Ural Mountains
- Crimea
- Danube River
- Volga River
- Dnieper River
- Don River
- Dvina River
- Niemen River
- Baltic Sea

Boundaries:
- Sweden
- Finland
- Gulf of Finland
- Baltic Sea
- English Channel
- Black Sea
- Ural Mountains
- Crimea
- Danube River
- Volga River
- Dnieper River
- Dvina River
- Niemen River
- Baltic Sea

Scale:
- 500 Miles

Maurice Bartle, Russia
THE UKRAINIAN PERIODICAL
PUBLICATIONS IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES:

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N. B. Arrangements have been made for publishing a Ukrainian periodical in ENGLISH, at Lausanne, Switzerland.
BOOKS ON THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION TO BE OBTAINED FROM:
THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL,
83 Grand St., Jersey City, N. J.


MEMORANDUM on the Ukrainian Question in its National Aspect by Yaroslav Fedortchouk. London, 1914.—Net $0.50.

THE UKRAINE AND THE UKRANIANS. By Stefan Rudnitsky, Ph. D. (With three maps). Jersey City, N. J.—Net $0.25.

THE RUSSIAN PLOT TO SEIZE GALICIA (Austrian Ruthenia) by Vladimir Stepankovsky. Second edition enlarged. (With portraits and maps).—Net $0.25.

The following publications on the Ukrainian question are being prepared:

RUSSIA, POLAND AND THE UKRAINE by Prof. Gustaf Steffen (translated from the Swedish).

A SYMPOSIUM ON THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION by Edwin Björkman, Michael Hrushevsky, Prof. Otto Hoetzsch and others.

N. B. Besides those books, there have appeared during the present European war various publications on the Ukrainian question: in Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, and many capitals of neutral states, in the following languages: English, German, Russian, French, Ukrainian, Italian, Hungarian, Bohemian, Roumanian, Bulgarian, Swedish and Turkish.