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5

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

January 21, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



S. Con. Res. 27

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Monday, January 21, 1946.

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee, met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (Chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman) Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

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1 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

2 I have been advised by telephone that the Chairman,
3 Senator Barkley, is unavoidably detained and unable to be here
4 this morning. He had to be out of town over the week end
5 and on account of weather conditions was unable to get back
6 this morning as he had expected and expects to get in during
7 the day.

8 I also understand from Senator Ferguson that Senator
9 Brewster had to be out of town over the week end and on ac-
10 count of weather conditions he was unable to get back this
11 morning as he had expected and will not be able to resume
12 his inquiry at this time. So with that explanation the
13 chair will recognize Mr. Gearhart of California.

14 Before that, however, does counsel have anything at
15 this time to present to the committee?

16 Mr. Richardson: No.

17 The Vice Chairman: Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything
18 you want to present before the examination is resumed?

19 Admiral Kimmel: No, I have not.

20 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman.

21 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart of California will now
22 inquire.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Murphy has something to present at
24 this time.

25 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a re-

1 quest.

2 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

3 Mr. Murphy: I would like to request counsel to pro-
4 duce for this inquiry any word in any testimony by any wit-
5 ness in this proceeding from the date of December 7, 1941 to
6 the present time about a so-called "lost message" to Hawaii
7 alleged to have been sent, apparently, on the night of De-
8 cember 6th, and my reason for bringing that up is the papers
9 of the country have had headlines about a lost message and
10 the quotation by a member whom I do not want to quote until
11 he is present, the distinguished Senator from Maine, and I
12 would like to know what the facts are if counsel can ascer-
13 tain anything. I haven't in reading all the records.

14 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman.

15 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Richardson.

16 Mr. Richardson: All the information we have is what
17 the Congressman heard with reference to the conversation Ad-
18 miral Kimmel had with Secretary Knox on his arrival at Hono-
19 lulu, plus the fact that two people associated with Secre-
20 tary Knox, Rear Admiral Beatty and I think Captain Dillon,
21 who I am informed say that Knox talked to them about having
22 written such a message.

23 My people are endeavoring to get a conference between
24 Dillon and Beatty and me for the purpose of ascertaining
25 whether they know any more than that. Further than that it

1 will be absolutely impossible for counsel to search this re-
2 cord from the beginning to find any piece of testimony at
3 this time. It is all we can do to keep a foot and a half
4 ahead of the examination of the committee on current wit-
5 nesses, but I think that when I talk with Beatty and Dillon
6 I will have gathered together all the proof that we have with
7 reference to the message that Secretary Knox is supposed to
8 have sent to Kimmel.

9 I have instructed my people to go into the Secretary of
10 the Navy's office and ascertain, if they can, any stenog-
11 rapher or person in the executive staff there that could have
12 written any such message and we are going to do all we can
13 to find it and when I do get some information I will let
14 Congressman Murphy know immediately.

15 Mr. Murphy: I may say that, if it will help counsel, I
16 have gone over the record pretty carefully and the only re-
17 ference I see by the witness on the stand to any message of
18 the 6th is a statement that there was a message sent to
19 Admiral Hart but I see not a word of testimony in any pre-
20 vious hearing by the witness referring to any alleged lost
21 message to him.

22 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart will proceed with his
23 examination.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U.S. NAVY (Ret.)

3 (Resumed)

4 Mr. Gearhart: In view of the thorough-going examination
5 of yourself and your comprehensive answers to questions of
6 the distinguished counsel, Mr. Richardson, and the other
7 members of the committee who have preceded me, there are just
8 a few topics that I want to ask you a few questions about by
9 way of emphasis more than as an endeavor to bring out new
10 facts.

11 There has been a very studied effort, it would seem to
12 me, on the part of some members of this committee, almost
13 a frantic effort, to develop the idea that the presence of
14 the Fleet at Hawaii was, in some way or another, a deterrent
15 to the Japanese.

16 I would like to explore that idea a little. My first
17 question is, do you think the presence of the Fleet at Pearl
18 Harbor on December 7, 1941 was a deterrent to the Japanese?

19 Admiral Kimmel: They made an attack, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Do you consider that the presence of
21 the Fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to the Japanese on November
22 27 and November 28, 1941, when the Japanese Fleet left the
23 Kuriles on the attack?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I am unable to state how much of a
25 deterrent it was. I think the facts speak for themselves.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: I will ask you if you think that the
3 presence of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian waters was
4 a deterrent to the Japanese on November 5 and November 7
5 of 1941 when the Japanese Government issued its Operational
6 Order No. 1 and Operational Order No. 2 for the attack on
7 Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

8 Admiral Kimmel: I think the facts speak very well.

9 Mr. Gearhart: I will ask you whether or not the
10 presence of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian waters during
11 the spring and early summer of 1940 was more or less of a
12 deterrent to the Japanese when, by order of the Chief of
13 Naval Operations, your three best battleships, one carrier,
14 four cruisers and nine destroyers were detached from your
15 Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I think it would have been much more
17 of a deterrent had they retained those ships in the Pacific.

18 Mr. Gearhart: If it had any influence upon the Japanese
19 as a deterrent it would have become more so if they had
20 added to your Fleet rather than subtracted from it as our
21 relationships with that country were fastly deteriorating,
22 is that not correct?

23 Admiral Kimmel: I think that is correct, sir.

24 Mr. Gearhart: When the order came for the detachment
25 of those ships you were foreclosed by the Chief of Naval

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Operations from discussing the subject with him by his
3 telling you abruptly that he was not starting an argument,
4 he was telling you what to do?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Now what was the purpose of the Japanese
7 Fleet in making the attack in the Hawaiian area? I ask you
8 to answer that question in the light of hindsight and in the
9 light of all that occurred, and in the light of what they
10 did following the attack.

11 What would you say was their purpose in making the
12 attack in that area?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Their purpose was to do as much damage
14 as they could to the Fleet.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Their purpose was to immobilize
16 the Fleet?

17 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

18 Mr. Gearhart: And in that one objective they were
19 successful, they immobilized our Fleet for practically one
20 year, did they not?

21 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I do not think they were
22 entirely successful in immobilizing the Fleet, because the
23 ships that were most useful in the early stages of the
24 campaign -- and I speak of the carriers, the cruisers and
25 destroyers -- suffered very little damage.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: What you mean by that, Admiral, is that
3 we still, after the attack, had a very powerful Fleet left?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. I mean, too, that the
5 battleships in the early stages of the campaign in the
6 Pacific were not particularly useful. It was only during
7 the latter stages of the campaign that they became useful.

8 Now if we had some battleships in the Pacific with
9 sufficient speed to accompany a fast carrier task force,
10 they would have been useful in the early stages, and they
11 were useful when they finally got ships of that character
12 our there. But the primary ships in the early stages of
13 the campaign, and the ones that did the damage and the ones
14 we thought would be useful, - and I think I pointed that
15 out in my correspondence - were the fast, light, forces,
16 and the carriers and the submarines, of course.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Kimmel

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, and even though conceding that
3 our fleet perhaps was not in condition to go to the re-
4 lief of the Philippines, even if we had not suffered these
5 losses, after we suffered the losses, the opportunity of
6 performing such a mission was eliminated until the ships
7 could be repaired. Is that not correct?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Well, in my opinion, if there had
9 been no damage whatsoever to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor,
10 it would have been disastrous to send the forces that we
11 had in the Pacific to the relief of the Philippines, and
12 I have some distinguished company in that opinion.

13 Mr. Gearhart: I know you have, and that is for the
14 reason that our air defense in the Pacific was not developed
15 so we could risk going through the Japanese Mandated
16 Islands, on many of which we knew they had established
17 powerful bases?

18 Admiral Kimmel: That is true as to air defense.
19 But the Fleet supply train, the oilers, the supplies of
20 all descriptions that are required by big Fleet, we had
21 no means of transporting them over long distances in the
22 Pacific.

23 Mr. Gearhart: But the purpose and the objective of
24 the Japanese, was to make certain that our Fleet was im-
25 mobilized to the extent that it could not go to the aid

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 of the Philippines, or become and remain a menace on their
3 flank while they were doing other things?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Well, yes, in general that is cor-
5 rect.

6 Mr. Gearhart: And the reason they wanted to immobilize
7 the American Fleet for a definite period or it may be for
8 an extended period of time, if not definite, was to give
9 them time to conquer the Philippines and Hongkong, and
10 other bases to the south of the Philippines?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I think so.

12 Mr. Gearhart: And as it turned out, the Japanese
13 were able to complete those conquests in the southwestern
14 Pacific before the American Fleet and the American Army,
15 American forces of all kinds and types were ready to
16 go to the attack?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, that is right.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Then instead of the American Fleet
19 being a deterrent to the Japanese in Hawaiian waters, it
20 was, in effect, a direct invitation to the Japanese Govern-
21 ment to come there and put our Fleet out of commission for
22 a certain length of time, if not permanently, is that not
23 correct?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I am afraid you are indulging in a
25 little hindsight now, sir. What you say was borne out by

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 events, I admit that.

3 Mr. Gearhart: I think so, and of course, we have got
4 to make allowances for hindsight. I am indulging in it my-
5 self, Admiral, as well as asking you to do so at times.

6 Admiral Kimmel: Well, we all do it. We cannot help
7 it.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Now, consider for the moment, the
9 transfer of the fleet to our West Coast. Let us assume
10 that it was transferred to the West Coast at the time that
11 Admiral Richardson asked that that be done; that would not
12 have lessened the problem one whit, insofar as the Japanese
13 were concerned of demobilizing our fleet while they were
14 making their conquest in the southwestern Pacific, the
15 problem, of course, would still have been theirs?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, the problem would still have
17 been theirs.

18 Mr. Gearhart: And the problem of the Japanese would
19 have been a very much more difficult one than the one they
20 confronted at Hawaii, would it not?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I should say so insofar as immobilizing
22 the Fleet on the West Coast is concerned, but as I pointed
23 out here the other day, I think even with the Fleet in
24 Hawaii, they might have done more damage to us had they
25 destroyed the base at Pearl Harbor. You cannot get some-

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1 Witness Kimmel Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 thing for nothing anyway.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Well, there would be no objective for
4 the Japanese to come to destroy the base at Pearl Harbor
5 because that would not relieve them of any of the burdens
6 that they had in the attack to the southwest, would it?

7 Admiral Kimmel: No, that is right.

8 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, if the Fleet was not
9 there, the Japs would not have come, in all probability;
10 is that not correct?

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is a possibility.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. And if they were still intent
13 upon immobilizing the Fleet, and the Fleet was on the
14 West Coast, say at Long Beach, their fleet would have had
15 to travel 2,000 miles more to the attack, and in the travel
16 of 2,000 miles more, the chances of detection of their
17 mission would have been greatly increased, would it not?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, and if it had been on the
19 Coast, the necessity for air patrols, the area to be
20 patrolled would have been halved.

21 Mr. Gearhart: I did not hear the last part of your
22 answer.

23 Admiral Kimmel: I say it would have been halved.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Halved?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Would have been just about half as

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 much, because you had a land mass on one side, and all you
3 had to do was to patrol the sea, whereas in Hawaii, you
4 had 360 degrees to patrol.

5 Mr. Gearhart: You had a circle to patrol in Hawaii?

6 Admiral Kimmel: While we had 180 degrees to patrol
7 on the West Coast.

8 Mr. Gearhart: And furthermore, you had more room to
9 deploy your ships if you were stationed, say, at Long
10 Beach, did you not?

11 Admiral Kimmel: I do not believe I got the question.

12 Mr. Gearhart: You would have had a greater ocean
13 space in which to deploy your ships while in port, would
14 you not?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Well, there were more entrances at
16 Long Beach. They could have gotten out more rapidly.

17 One of the advantages of them stationed on the Coast
18 was that we had several ports in which detachment of the
19 Fleet could go from time to time. There would have been
20 several ports; San Francisco, Long Beach, San Diego --
21 three ports at least in the Southern part, and also the
22 ports in Puget Sound, and there would have been a much
23 better chance, I think, to keep the Japs guessing a little
24 bit, about where they were at all times, because one of
25 the factors -- and there was nothing you could do about it --

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 was we had only that one port in Pearl Harbor where all
3 the ships had to return to sooner or later.

4 Mr. Gearhart: And on the Pacific Coast you had
5 many ports where the Fleet could have been scattered under
6 such conditions that you could have them reassemble at
7 a designated rendezvous, if necessary?

8 Admiral Kimmel: I think that is correct.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Of course it is hard to say what the
10 Japs would have done if the Fleet had been on the West
11 Coast as recommended by Admiral Richardson, and as I think
12 you said you would have liked to have had it, although you
13 knew that had been decided for you in Washington at the time
14 you took command, it is hard to say what the Japs would
15 have done?

16 Admiral Kimmel: That is a speculation, sir.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: Because they have done a lot of foolish
3 things during this war, did they not?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, they did a great many foolish
5 things.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Nothing quite so foolish as their attack
7 on Hawaii, in its consequences?

8 Admiral Kimmel: I think that was the greatest mistake
9 they made.

10 Mr. Gearhart: But it is your opinion, as it is mine,
11 that had they attempted to immobilize the Fleet by coming to
12 the West Coast to attack it, their chances of success would
13 have been reduced almost to the point where even an ensign
14 of the Japanese Navy would probably have considered it too
15 great a chance to have undertaken, is that right?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Their difficulties would have been
17 very much increased; very much increased.

18 Mr. Gearhart: So far as the physical evidence is con-
19 cerned, the physical evidence at Pearl Harbor and on Oahu,
20 the Japanese had only one target and that was the American
21 Fleet?

22 Admiral Kimmel: That is evident from the attack itself.

23 Mr. Gearhart: There is no evidence that they were on
24 a mission to destroy any of the permanent installations on
25 the Island?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Admiral Kimmel: My recollection is that the damage to permanent installations was negligible.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. And much of that might be due to poor marksmanship and excitement, don't you think?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, there was much of it.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, so much for this theory that the presence of the Fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent.

Now, Admiral, you have from time to time during the course of your testimony adverted to several Japanese intercepts which the Washington people had in their possession and within their knowledge, which were not passed on to you as information. Neither was the substance of those intercepts conveyed to you in the way of directives. I will ask you this question: Following that up a little further, when you received a copy for information of the shooting orders which had been issued by Admiral Stark to the Commanders of the Atlantic Fleet, when you received a copy of them, did they call your attention to or send you a copy of a Japanese, Italian and German agreement of November 28, 1940, or treaty of alliance, the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Admiral Kimmel: Of what date was that again, sir?

Mr. Gearhart: I think November 28, 1940.

Admiral Kimmel: Wasn't that September of 1940?

Mr. Gearhart: That is right.

Admiral Kimmel: That was not the Comintern Pact, that was the Three-Power Pact.

Mr. Gearhart: I will have to make that correction. The Tripartite Agreement of 27 of September 1940.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: They called your attention to it.

Admiral Kimmel: Well, of course, that took place before I became Commander in Chief. I do not know whether they called that to the attention of the then Commander in Chief. However, I knew about it. I knew the essential features of it as applied to our business. I don't know where I got the information.

Mr. Gearhart: In view of the fact that it has never to this date been printed in the English language, so far as I know, or infer from the letter from the State Department that I received just a few days ago, whatever you knew about that agreement was hearsay, was it not?

In other words, did you ever have the text of it before you?

Admiral Kimmel: I have never seen anything about it

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 that I can now recall, about the Three-Power Pact, in a
3 communication from the Navy Department, if that is what you
4 mean.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Yes..

6 Admiral Kimmel: But I did know the provisions of the
7 Pact. I am unable to state now when I -- I say I knew the
8 provisions. I knew that Germany, Italy and Japan had agreed
9 to declare war on any nation which attacked any one of the
10 three during the European war, and I think Japan had an
11 exception that she was not going to attack Russia in case
12 she came in. But the Pact was clearly aimed at the United
13 States. I knew that much, and that is about all I did know.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Well, that is the substance of it, but
15 you never had the words, the letter of the treaty, before you?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I have no recollection of it. Whether
17 one was sent to the Commander in Chief or not in September
18 1940 I don't know. Or subsequent thereto.

19 Mr. Gearhart: At this time, Mr. Chairman, I want to
20 read into the evidence this Tripartite Agreement.

21 The Vice Chairman: The gentleman may proceed.

22 Mr. Gearhart: (Reading)

23 "Three-Power Pact Between Germany, Italy and Japan.

24 "The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan consider
25 it as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 nation of the world be given its own proper place. They
3 have therefore decided to stand together and to cooperate
4 with one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia
5 and in the regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime
6 purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things
7 calculated to promote the prosperity and welfare of the
8 peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of the
9 three Governments to extend this cooperation to such
10 nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to
11 give to their endeavors a direction similar to their own,
12 in order that their aspirations towards world peace as
13 the ultimate goal may thus be realized. Accordingly, the
14 Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as
15 follows:

16 "Article 1

17 "Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of
18 Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order
19 in Europe.

20 "Article 2

21 "Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leader-
22 ship of Japan in the establishment of a new order in
23 Greater East Asia.

24 "Article 3

25 "Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake
3 to assist one another with all political, economic and
4 military means, if one of the three Contracting Parties
5 is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the
6 European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

7 "Article 4

8 "For the purpose of implementing the present pacts,
9 joint technical commissions, the members of which are
10 to be appointed by the Governments of Germany, Italy and
11 Japan, will meet without delay.

12 "Article 5

13 "Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid
14 terms do not in any way affect the political status which
15 exists at present between each of the three Contracting
16 Parties and Soviet Russia.

17 "Article 6

18 "The present Pact shall come into force immediately
19 upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years
20 from the date of its coming into force.

21 "At the proper time before expiration of the said
22 term the High Contracting Parties shall, if one of them
23 so requests, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

24 "In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized
25 by their Governments, have signed this Pact and have

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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hereunto apposed their seals."

This is interesting.

"Done in 3 original copies at Berlin, on the 27th day of September, 1940, in the XVIIIth year of the Fascist Era, corresponding to the 27th day of the 9th month of the 15th year of the Showa era.

"Joachim von Ribbentrop

Ciano

(Signature of the Japanese Representative)"

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, might I interrupt
3 for just a moment?

4 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Richardson.

5 Mr. Richardson: May I call attention to the fact
6 that on page 165 of Foreign Relations of the United States
7 which is a book already in evidence, the text of this
8 3-Power Pact which the Congressman has just read, appears
9 as set forth.

10 Mr. Gearhart: The text or the substance?

11 Mr. Richardson: The text.

12 Mr. Gearhart: The text does?

13 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

14 Mr. Gearhart: I was advised by a letter, which is
15 attached to the text I read, that printed copies were
16 not available in the State Department, and so I assumed
17 it had not been printed, although in another part of that
18 document you have just referred to appears a discussion
19 of this instrument, with the assertion that section 3
20 was plainly directed against the United States.

21 Mr. Richardson: I will say, Mr. Chairman, to the
22 Congressman, that glancing at this copy here, it does not
23 contain, in fact, that it was the particular year of the
24 Fascist rule to which you referred. It stops entirely
25 with Article 6.

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: I will ask, Mr. Chairman, that the
3 letters which are attached to this document, which I will
4 hand to the reporter, letter from the State Department
5 dated January 18, 1946, and a further statement in refer-
6 ence to it from the State Department be included in the
7 record with the text of the instrument itself.

8 The Vice Chairman: Without objection, it is so
9 ordered.

10 (The letters referred to are as follows:)

11 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

12 Washington, D.C.

13 January 18, 1946

14 In reply refer to
15 RP 026 American White
16 Book/1-946

17 My dear Mr. Gearhart:

18 Reference is made to your letter of January 9, 1946
19 requesting a copy of a Treaty of Alliance between Germany
20 Italy, and Japan.

21 There is enclosed a copy of a translation prepared
22 in the Department of State of an announcement as published
23 in the Reichsgesetzblatt" of November 28, 1940 containing
24 the text of the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and
25 Japan signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940. Printed copies

Witness Kimmel

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of the text of the Pact are not available in the Department
of State.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Dean Acheson

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Three-Power Pact - Department of State translation.
The Honorable Bertrand W. Gearhart, House of Representatives.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C.

Central Translating Division

(Translation)

TC No. 15150

Source: "Reichsgesetzblatt", Part II, Berlin,
November 28, 1940, No. 41, P.279

ANNOUNCEMENT

concerning the Three-Power Pact
between Germany, Italy and Japan

On November 25, 1940

On September 27, 1940, at Berlin, the Three-Power Pact
between Germany, Italy and Japan was signed by Representa-
tives with full powers of the German, Italian and Japanese
Governments. The Pact came into force upon signature. It

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 is published below.

3 Berlin, November 25, 1940

4 THE REICH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

5 von Ribbentrop

6 - - - - -

7 Mr. Gearhart: Again directing your attention to
8 Article 3, to the words:

9 "They further undertake to assist one another with
10 all political, economic, and military means, if one of
11 the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at
12 present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-
13 Japanese conflict."

14 Within the category and the definition set forth in
15 these words, the United States is plainly included, is
16 that not correct?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Then you considered that as an element
19 in all of the evidence the force and effect of which was
20 that the relationships with Japan were fastly deteriorating?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That was an element, but, again, I
22 felt that Japan would be governed in her action by her own
23 best interests, and she would hesitate to violate that
24 pact if she thought it was to her advantage to do so.

25 Mr. Gearhart: I think you are entirely correct. The

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Japanese would have double-crossed their Axis partners,
3 if they thought they could advance their own interests
4 in the Pacific by so doing.

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Gearhart: And if they could have obtained an
7 agreement from the United States to disregard the John Hayes
8 Open Door policy in China, if they had been able to induce
9 the United States to, by agreement, tear up the Nine-Power
10 Pact, which required all the nations that signed it, 27
11 in number, to respect the territorial integrity and
12 sovereignty of China, and if they could have gotten the
13 United States to tear up the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact
14 which outlawed war as an instrument of international policy,
15 had gotten us to promise in an agreement with them to lay
16 off while they were conquering the Pacific Southwest, they
17 would have double-crossed Germany in your estimation, in
18 the light of hindsight?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, they would have double-crossed
20 Germany any time it was to their advantage to do so.

21 Mr. Gearhart: What would have been your opinion if
22 you had been supplied a copy of the intercept, which was
23 not sent to you, the intercept which appears on page 205
24 of Exhibit 1, in this proceeding, the intercept which
25 contains paragraph No. 3, appearing on the top of page

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Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1
2 No. 206, if they had immediately supplied you a copy of
3 that intercept, which was received by our Washington authori-
4 ties on the 30th day of November, 1941, and translated on
5 the 1st day of December, 1941, would it not have brought
6 back the Tripartite agreement to importance, in your con-
7 siderations, and I read it:

8 3. The proposal presented by the United States on the
9 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever."

10 Referring to the United States.

11 "In it, there is one insulting clause which says no
12 matter what treaty either party enters into with a third
13 power, it will not be interpreted as having any bearing
14 upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the mainten-
15 ance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically
16 the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United
17 States enters the European war at any time, the Japanese
18 Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany
19 and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let
20 alon others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the
21 American proposa] for negotiations. What is more, before
22 the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred
23 with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China -
24 they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the
25 United States is now in collusion with those nations and

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy,
3 as an enemy."

4 Now, if you had had that information conveyed to you
5 on December 1st of 1941, that would have been an important
6 item of evidence, added to the other intercepted messages
7 which were denied you, would it not?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Gearhart: That clearly conveyed the information
10 to the United States, or those who received it in the
11 United States, not you, that Japan was standing up to
12 its obligations under the anti-comintern Tripartite Treaty,
13 and that she regarded the United States as an enemy, and
14 that she regarded our proposals to her as an insult?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Have you analyzed the so-called Hull
17 message to the Japanese of November 26, 1941?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Have I analyzed it?

19 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

20 In other words, have you read all the words, the verb-
21 age, and reached a conclusion as to what it means in sub-
22 stance?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I have gotten a fair good idea
24 of it since I have read it, yes.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Wasn't it just the opposite in effect

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Kimmel

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to the Japanese tendered agreement of November 20, 1941?

Admiral Kimmel: I think it was, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: You will agree that the Japanese agreement would have required the United States to have abandoned the time-honored principle of the John Hayes Open Door policy, it would have required the United States to have torn up the Nine-Power Treaty to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China, and it would have required the United States to have consented to Japan using war as a means of international policy?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

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D. G. MONTGOMERY WASHINGTON, D. C. JULY 6, 1945

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Thank God we didn't do that, and we didn't, did we?

Admiral Kimmel: No.

Mr. Gearhart: By rejecting that we stood up for the highest and noblest of American's traditional principles, did we not?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. I never criticised what they did.

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Hull called that an ultimatum. Now, to turn to his reply to that ultimatum and analyze it. That would have done just the opposite of what the Japs wanted. That would have required the Japanese to have respected the John Hayes open door policy in China and would have opened its ports to the ships of other nations. It would have required Japan to respect the political independence and sovereignty of China. It would have compelled the Japanese to withdraw their armies and abandon the use of force as a means of international policy. Would it not?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: The answer is, of course, apparent: Why is the Hull message, therefore, any less of an ultimatum than the Japanese message, which meant the same thing.

Admiral Kimmel: I think the important part is that the Japanese so regarded it.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 Mr. Gearhart: That is true. That appears all through
3 the Japanese writings and intercepts. And I am proud of
4 the fact that they did, because America was standing up to
5 its time-honored principles. I agree to "millions for defense
6 but not a cent for tribute". I agree with "freedom of the
7 seas" and for every noble aspiration that this country has
8 ever announced to the world. It is a pity that Mr. Hull
9 insists upon saying that it is not an ultimatum.

10 It means, when you say it is not an ultimatum, that we
11 are willing to treat, to compromise, and deal, on those great
12 propositions, and I, as one American, I am not ready to give
13 anything, not one wit on any of those principles.

14 I am not passing upon the question of whether or not
15 the timing of the delivery of that message was right in view
16 of the fact that our military and naval authorities were
17 begging for time. That is an entirely different question.

18 Now, I am going to conclude my examination by reverting
19 to an old subject with you. Just like as to the point of
20 the deterring effect of the presence of the Fleet at Hawaii,
21 certain members of the committee have frantically endeavored
22 to over-stress and give meaning that nobody at the time
23 had accepted, to the so-called war message.

24 Now, I am going to ask you to go along with me and
25 let's analyze this.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Senator Lucas: I wonder who is testifying here this morning, Mr. Chairman.

3

4

Mr. Gearhart: Whenever you hear the wheel squeek it needs a little grease and I am giving it to you right now.

5

6

Well, I don't have the mysterious document, it seems to have gotten out from under my eye at the moment.

7

8

Mr. Murphy: You may use mine.

9

Mr. Gearhart: Yes, here it is.

10

Now, to get the full meaning of a document it is necessary to read it through, is that not correct?

11

12

Admiral Kimmel: I didn't hear that.

13

Mr. Gearhart: I say, to get the full meaning of any document you have to read it through?

14

15

Admiral Kimmel: You have to read all the document, yes, sir.

16

17

Mr. Gearhart: Supposing you got just one line in the message that reached you on November 27, 1941:

18

19

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

20

Would that have told you with whom we were going to have war?

21

22

I am asking you to confine yourself to the words alone.

23

We are going to take this apart right now.

24

You got a message and it said "This is a war warning".

25

You know, as a reasonable individual of considerable educational

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 attainments, that there are around 52 or 54 nations in the
3 world, don't you?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I never thought of it that way.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Well, that line doesn't tell you what
6 country in the world is going to start a war, does it? Let's
7 stick to the letter of the word and go no further and draw
8 nothing on your imagination, but applying the reasoning of
9 a reasonable man. With just those words before him it wouldn't
10 tell you who you were going to war with, how many nations
11 would participate in that war, it doesn't tell you where
12 the war was going to occur, whether it was going to break
13 out simultaneously everywhere, or whether in certain parts
14 of the world, or whether in a single part of the world.

15 Admiral Kimmel: Such a message as that would have been
16 quite indefinite.

17 Mr. Gearhart: So because it doesn't tell us when, where,
18 or who with a war was going to occur, you have to read on
19 to the next sentence, don't you, to get that?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: You have a very general statement before
22 you, with just the phrase "This is a war warning".

23 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

24 Hook
25 follows

1 Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: It is so general, it wouldn't help
3 you at all?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Not very much.

5 Mr. Gearhart: All right. Then, to find out who it
6 is with, we get the next sentence:

7 "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization
8 of conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive
9 move by Japan is expected within the next few days."

10 That puts a lot of nations out of the consideration
11 and centers your thoughts upon Japan and Japan alone,
12 doesn't it?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Gearhart: So this general message has been narrowed
15 down to a very specific message referring to Japan?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

17 Mr. Gearhart: But it doesn't tell you where the war
18 is going to break out, up to now. It doesn't tell you
19 with whom Japan is going to be associated, if with anybody,
20 but it does narrow it down to Japan. So, you have to find
21 out where the war is going to be by reading another line,
22 and you have a right to read it all, and it is your duty
23 to read it all, is it not?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, it must be read all
25 together.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: There is more.

3 "The number and equipment of Japanese troops and
4 the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious
5 expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra
6 Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

7 Now, the war's scope has been restricted from all
8 other nations of the world, down to one nation, and to
9 one place on the face of the earth, hasn't it, and that
10 is the Southwest Pacific.

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. That is what it appears
12 to say.

13 Mr. Gearhart: And that is the interpretation which a
14 reasonable man, acting in the light of experience would
15 give to a document such as that?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I think so, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Now, of course, in designating the
18 Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possible Borneo,
19 that does not exclude Hongkong; it does not exclude the
20 Burma Road; it does not exclude Java, or possibly Singa-
21 pore, because they are all in the same area of the terri-
22 tory which is defined by the places that are mentioned.
23 Isn't that correct?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Well, it would be interesting for you

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 to know that your interpretation of that document as
3 limiting the place of the attack to the Southwestern
4 Pacific, is precisely the same interpretation which the
5 courts would have given that document if it had been sub-
6 mitted to them in a judicial dispute. The rule of inter-
7 pretation which you applied to that is exactly the same
8 interpretation which over a thousand years of jurisprudence
9 the courts have given to documents of that kind.

10 A general statement followed by a specific limita-
11 tion, always limits the interpretation in the courts to
12 the things of the same character of the specific things
13 mentioned.

14 I am not going to spend much time on a lot of intricate
15 legal questions, but this is one of the best settled in
16 all of the lines of decisions of our courts. The rule of
17 interpretation is known as the ejusdem generis rule.

18 Let me quote from one of the standard law books,
19 Black's Law Dictionary, for its interpretation of ejusdem
20 generis, for the benefit of anybody who may read the record:

21 "In the construction of laws, wills, and other instru-
22 ments, the 'ejusdem generis rule' is that where general
23 words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words
24 of a particular and specific meaning, such general words
25 are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to

1 Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
3 general kind or class as those specifically mentioned."

4 And to show how far the courts go in applying that
5 sort of interpretation, I read the second line after a
6 great many cases are cited in this particular legal work:

7 "The rule, however, does not necessarily require that
8 the general provision be limited in its scope to the
9 identical things specifically named."

10 That is why your war message would be enlarged to
11 include the Burma Road, Java, Singapore, and all of those
12 other areas.

13 Mr. Murphy : Will the gentleman yield?

14 Mr. Gearhart: No. The gentleman is not going to
15 start a legal argument. If you want to make a legal speech,
16 you can do it later.

17 Mr. Murphy: You are making a speech about the law,
18 and I would like to correct it.

19 Mr. Gearhart: You would be a great help to the
20 Supreme Court.

21 I turn to Volume 14, of Permanent Edition of Words and
22 Phrases, page 135, under the heading of ejusdem generis:

23 "Principle of 'ejusdem generis' is that general words
24 following enumeration of particular things are applicable
25 only to things of same general nature."

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 That is a case from Oregon.

3 From a case in Texas, we find:

4 "Under 'ejusdem generis rule' general words following
5 particular words will not include things of a superior class."

6 Now, one from California:

7 "The rule of 'ejusdem generis' requires that words
8 of general description following words of particular des-
9 cription be interpreted as applying to things of similar
10 character."

11 And:

12 "Under the rule of 'ejusdem generis' the general
13 words applied to persons or things contained within the
14 general genus of the particular person or things, enumerated,
15 and are not limited to any particular one."

16 That is from a North Dakota case.

17 Then one from Illinois:

18 "The rule of 'ejusdem generis' is that general words
19 following an enumeration of particular cases apply only to
20 cases of the same kind as expressly mentioned."

21 Now, what counsel (Mr. Murphy) was jumping around
22 for, itching to interpose, was to point out to you that
23 it is clearly without the sense of the text, of course, it
24 will not be limited to the precise words. But that brings
25 us to this question of surprise.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h6

2 Even though there is an abundance of evidence for the
3 first several years after this tragic event that nobody
4 was surprised in Washington, the President told about the
5 impending attack, as you remember, was reported in the
6 Stimson Diary, just two or three days before it happened,
7 that we were going to be attacked by Japan.

8 He told Mr. Wilkie that we were going to be attacked
9 in two or three days in the famous letter that was received
10 here in evidence.

11 "You better make plans in the light of the pending
12 attack," that was sure to come. Also, in view of the fact
13 that Mrs. Roosevelt said that they were not a bit surprised
14 in and around the White House, that they sat by the radio
15 listening to the radio. And, I don't know whether it is
16 hindthought or not, but now, in the course of this hearing,
17 Admiral Stark says he was surprised. He was the Commander
18 in Chief, and he was the man who wrote that message to you.

19 Now, if he intended to include Hawaii in that warning
20 to you, would he have been surprised when the attack came?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I am unable to answer that. I think
22 the evidence presented, answers that very well.

23 Mr. Gearhart: General Marshall, so he said, was very
24 much surprised when the attack came.

25 Admiral Kimmel: So I understand.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: And we have been informed by certain
3 witnesses that the President of the United States, the
4 Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States
5 was very surprised when the attack came in Hawaii.

6 The point I am making, and I don't know whether you
7 like it or not, but I want to make it -- I think the
8 American people should know -- how can they condemn the
9 Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for being taken
10 by surprise when everybody above him, the Commander in
11 Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Chief
12 of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, all
13 insisted that they were surprised.

14 I guess you don't want to comment on that.

15 Admiral Kimmel: I think what you say is quite perti-
16 nent, and I think what you say is accurate.

17 Mr. Gearhart: I think that is all. Thank you very
18 much. I see the Senator from Michigan is here, and he
19 will inquire.

20 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will
21 inquire.

22 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Kimmel, you had in your
23 possession certain war plans; is that correct?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Those plans were known as Rainbow 5,

1 Witness Kimmel Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 and the related to the Orange power, which was Japan?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Well, Rainbow 5 included more than
4 that, but it included Japan.

5 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

6 What other powers did it include? Being a war plan
7 it anticipated that certain things would be done if we
8 had a war with what powers?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Well, as I recall, it was Germany,
10 Italy, and Japan. Yes, sir, that is right.

11 Senator Ferguson: And as far as it possibly could
12 be done, you had to carry it out if we got into war, you
13 had to carry out that plan; is that correct?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever get orders to mobilize
16 your fleet?

17 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I never did.

18 Senator Ferguson: Could you have mobilized your
19 fleet without carrying out that war plan or any part of
20 that war plan?

21 Admiral Kimmel: If we had received an order to mobilize
22 that would automatically put into effect the provisions of
23 the war plans short of hostile action.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, did that war plan provide what steps you were to take in case of hostilities with the orange power, or Japan?

Admiral Kimmel: The war plan did provide that, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is, provided there was a war between America and Japan?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is correct.

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

Senator Ferguson: Was there a method of putting that plan into effect after a declaration of war, was there some provision in the plan that after a declaration of war you were to take certain steps?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, as far as the United States was concerned, the only way the United States could declare war was by an act of Congress; isn't that correct?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So that as far as we were concerned that war plan would take effect after we had declared war on Japan?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, yes, sir, but --

Senator Ferguson: But it also provided, did it not, that if Japan declared war on us the war plan would come into

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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effect?

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Admiral Kimmel: I must say right here that after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor I issued an order to all ships and stations to execute the WPL-46 against Japan. I may have anticipated the Congress but I thought it was necessary to warn everybody in unmistakable language, and I did so.

8

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Senator Ferguson: Japan could declare war in two ways upon us, one by her legislative act or body and the executive branch or by an attack?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. I considered that when they attacked Pearl Harbor they declared war on us and took every choice away from us.

14

15

Senator Ferguson: Then the plan was in operation?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: In that kind of case you didn't have to wait for any formal notice from the Secretary of the Navy or from Admiral Stark?

19

20

Admiral Kimmel: I don't know whether I had any legal obligation to wait, but I didn't wait.

21

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23

Senator Ferguson: But prior to that time you had certain duties as a peacetime Commander in Chief, did you not?

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Admiral Kimmel: What was that?

Senator Ferguson: Prior to that time, prior to the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 attack, you had certain duties to perform, as Commander in
3 Chief of our Fleet, in peacetime?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, when they gave you a war warning
6 did they put into effect this plan?

7 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir. I was expressly enjoined to
8 make a preparatory deployment preparatory to carrying out the
9 tasks assigned in WPL-46.

10 Senator Ferguson: So that instead of putting into
11 effect this war plan it went further and warned you only to
12 prepare for putting it into effect?

13 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

14 Senator Ferguson: Is that correct?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. That is what the words say.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did that war plan provide
17 that you were to do in case England or the British possessions
18 were attacked?

19 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever try to find out what
21 you were to do in that case?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Why did you want to know that?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Because I wanted to know what our
25 action would be following war betwixt Great Britain and Japan,

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 and because I knew of the conversations which we had had,
3 and I wanted to definitely know what we would do in case of
4 such a war.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, you knew that in the Atlantic
6 we had what was known as a shooting war?

7 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I knew that.

8 Senator Ferguson: And shooting orders?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: That was in effect in certain parts
11 of the Pacific?

12 Admiral Kimmel: The Southeast Pacific, a restricted
13 area, about 700 miles off the coast of South America.

14 Senator Ferguson: Did that apply to the Japanese as
15 well as the German and Italian Governments?

16 Admiral Kimmel: It did not apply to Japan, no.

17 Senator Ferguson: So there was no shooting war in effect
18 so far as Japan was concerned?

19 Admiral Kimmel: That is my recollection.

20 Senator Ferguson: Anywhere?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

22 Senator Ferguson: But you did want to know then what
23 our attitude would be in case of a war between Britain and
24 Japan?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. Also I wanted to know what

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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our attitude would be in case of war betwixt Russia and Japan.

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Senator Ferguson: And also between the Netherlands

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and Japan?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

6

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever find out?

7

Admiral Kimmel: Not definitely, no sir.

(8)

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Senator Ferguson: When you say "not definitely", did

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you ever find out to any extent?

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Admiral Kimmel: In the letter which I received from

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the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 25 that question

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was still undecided in his mind. I have read that message

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before this committee.

14

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you got an order about

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escorting some ships, did you not, so far as the United States

16

was concerned?

17

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I did.

18

Senator Ferguson: On the bottom of page 28 one of the

19

tasks assigned -- and that is the exhibit put in Saturday,

20

what is that number?

21

Mr. Masten: 129.

22

Senator Ferguson: Have you got it before you? Page 28.

23

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

24

Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

25

"Route shipping of Associated Powers within the Fleet

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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control zone."

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Will you explain that to me. That was one of the tasks.

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, the Fleet control zones were to be established after the outbreak of war and we were to tell them where to go, when to arrive, when to depart, the route they were to take through those zones, so we would know at all times where our own shipping was, and that would be the Associated Powers.

12

13

Senator Ferguson: When you included "our own" you meant also the Associated Powers?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: We were escorting British and Dutch ships?

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Admiral Kimmel: In the Pacific?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: We escorted a Dutch ship, at least one.

Senator Ferguson: There is a message somewhere, and I haven't it at my fingertips now, of what we would have done in case there was an attack on a Dutch ship. Do you recall that message?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I remember something about that.

Senator Ferguson: We were escorting a Dutch ship at that

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3 time?

3 Admiral Kimmel: We did escort a Dutch ship, as I recall,
4 from Pearl Harbor down to Moresby in New Guinea.

5 Senator Ferguson: Do you know about what time we escorted
6 that Dutch ship?

7 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, it was sometime in the summer, I
8 think. I forget the date. That can be determined very readily.

9 Senator Ferguson: I will try and find that message,
10 Admiral.

11 Had you any message or information about the United States
12 sending some Army troops to New Guinea on the Dutch possessions?

13 If I can take a moment I will try and find that.

14 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

15 Senator Ferguson: On the 26th of November did you know
16 that in announcing that the United States would cooperate
17 with the Netherlands in protecting bauxite mines in Dutch
18 Guines and by sending a contingent of the United States Army
19 there, the White House explained that this action was taken
20 "because disturbed conditions in the Pacific made it inadvisable
21 for the Netherlands to strengthen the Dutch Guinea defense
22 by drawing upon the defense forces now stationed in the
23 Netherlands East Indies."

24 Senator Lucas: May I inquire what you are reading from?

25 Senator Ferguson: I am reading from "The Situation in

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 the Far East, a general summary on November 26, 1941, to
3 the Secretary of State."

4 Senator Lucas: Is that an exhibit in this hearing?

5 Senator Ferguson: No, it is not.

6 Senator Lucas: Whose summary is it?

7 Senator Ferguson: It isn't signed. It has got the
8 initials "G.A." Who would that be?

9 Mr. Masten: George Acheson, it might be. I am not
10 sure.

11 Senator Ferguson: Do you want to see it, Senator?

12 Senator Lucas: No, I don't care to see it. I just
13 wanted to identify the document.

14 Senator Ferguson: I am just asking him about it. I
15 don't care to put the instrument in.

16 I am asking if you ever heard of that, Admiral?

17 Admiral Kimmel: I may have heard of it. I don't recall
18 it now. I have no recollection of it at the present time.

19 Senator Ferguson: Had you ever heard of the plan pro-
20 posed to buy New Guinea and give it to the Japs?

21 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I never heard it, and I didn't
22 know anything about -- I don't know anything about it even now.

23 Senator Ferguson: You had never heard of it until I
24 asked the question?

25 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

AL-9

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

2

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

3

4

Mr. Murphy: I was wondering if Dutch Guinea is in the Pacific. It is in the Caribbean.

5

6

Senator Ferguson: It is in the Pacific. Did I say Dutch Guinea? It is New Guinea.

7

8

Admiral Kimmel: I thought you said New Guinea. That is what I took you to mean.

9

10

Senator Ferguson: You had never heard of any such plan?

11

12

Admiral Kimmel: No, sir; I have no knowledge of it.

13

14

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, as to the document I read here, Dutch Guinea is in the Caribbean, the bauxite mines. You understood that?

15

16

Admiral Kimmel: No; I was thinking of the Pacific all the time.

17

18

Senator Ferguson: I want to change that. It reads:

19

20

"In announcing that the United States would cooperate with the Netherlands in the protection of the bauxite mines in Dutch Guinea"-- that is in South America?

21

22

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

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Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

25

" -- by sending a contingent of the United States Army there, the White House explained that this action was taken

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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because disturbed conditions in the Pacific made it inadvisable for the Netherlands to strengthen the Dutch Guinea defenses by drawing upon the defense forces now stationed in the Netherlands East Indies."

Admiral Kimmel: I misunderstood. I had in mind New Guinea. I think I did hear something about that but whether I read it in the newspapers or where I got the information I don't know. But I did know something about that. I did hear something about it but that was outside of my province and I didn't consider it of any great moment to me.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Well, did you know prior to the 7th of December, - and the testimony is under General Marshall here, - that we were putting certain air bases in the Pacific in the British possessions and the Dutch possessions and we were sending bombs there and oil and gas?

Admiral Kimmel: Do you speak of Christmas and Canton?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: I knew that we were undertaking some work out there and I knew that General Short was directed to do certain things and we assisted him in that, particularly in supplying him with fuel, the ships; he brought a ship out there and we had to supply it with fuel, - or chartered a ship I should say.

Senator Ferguson: Now, would it be correct to say that your first and your chief objective in the event of an American-Japanese war was an attack upon the Marshall Islands to divert the Japanese from the Malayan Barrier which comprised vital possessions of the Dutch and the British, who would be our allies?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that Mr. Churchill had on --

Admiral Kimmel: That was if and when we got into the war.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know that Mr. Churchill had on the 25th of August 1941 said: "It is certain that this has got to stop." I had better get the exact quote from the newspaper. I will read from the New York Times as of Monday, August the 25th.

Admiral Kimmel: Of what year, sir?

Senator Ferguson: Monday, August 25, 1941. This was a broadcast:

"It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed, but this I must say, that if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States."

Were you familiar with that?

Admiral Kimmel: Whether I saw that or not I saw some statements made by Mr. Churchill along that very same line.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, what was the Malay Barrier as far as you understood it? What did it consist of?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, as I understood the Malay Barrier it was a general term to include the Malay States,

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Sumatra, Java, Borneo, New Guinea and the adjacent islands.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did it include the Kra Peninsula,
4 the Kra Isthmus?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Well, that is a Malay state, yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And it included Singapore, did
7 it?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

9 Senator Ferguson: Did it include the Dutch East Indies?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, would the attack on the
12 Marshalls accomplish the chief purpose of the American war
13 plan that you then had if that attack occurred after Singa-
14 pore had fallen to the Japanese?

15 Admiral Kimmel: That would have been a little late.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, would it have been a little more
17 than a little late?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Well, it would have been, in my judg-
19 ment, if I had waited too long.

20 Senator Ferguson: I see. Well, now, was that one of the
21 reasons why you were trying to find out in advance what you
22 were to do in case they attacked the Malay Barrier?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: That would have also been late after
25 the Japanese had gone into Borneo and Java, would it not?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Well, now, was the Marshall operation and its value contingent upon it being undertaken before the Japanese had breached the Malay Barrier?

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, certainly before they had had a chance to take those land areas which comprise the Malay Barrier. It had to draw the forces away in time, before they had conquered that country and before they had gone down there really.

11

12

13

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, is that why you were interested in the movement and why the United States was interested in the movement south?

14

15

16

Admiral Kimmel: I was very much interested, yes. I wanted to know what they were doing and where they were headed for.

17

18

19

Senator Ferguson: And did you also want to know what you were to do in case you were sure that they were going south?

20

21

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And did you ever find that out prior to the attack on the 7th?

22

23

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Admiral Kimmel: What I was to do?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, not definitely.

25

Senator Ferguson: Well, now you come back to those words

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 "Not definitely." Did you ever find any information on it?

3 Admiral Kimmel: No, I did not except what has been pre-
4 sented right here, and the war plans and other places. I
5 wanted to know what we were to do. I did not find out.

6 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, in the war plans that
7 Senator Brewster questioned you about, page 35, - or Section
8 35, here was one of the Navy's tasks. It is on page 23 of
9 the appendix.

10 "Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the
11 Far East."

12 Admiral Kimmel: May I find it first, sir?

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Do you have it?

14 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: It is page 23 of the appendix. It
16 is Appendix I. It it is the Joint Army and Navy Basic War
17 Plan Rainbow No. 5, Section 8, "Tasks continued" under 35,
18 Admiral.

19 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I have it now, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, you were to

21 "Support the task forces of the Associated Powers
22 in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from
23 the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of
24 positions in the Marshalls and through raids on enemy
25 sea communications and positions."

287 6

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, did that task depend upon you first knowing that America was in the war by virtue of an attack or declaration of war?

6

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Admiral Kimmel: It did. I had no authority to act until I received definite word from my government. I had no authority to act at all and if the -- I will put it this way: Had the Japanese made an attack on the Kra Peninsula, had they made an attack on Java, I would have been unable to do anything until I got orders to move.

12

13

14

15

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that Admiral Hart on the 6th, - that is on a Saturday, - had inquired about what we were to do in relation to three or four incidents in case of an attack on other than our territory?

16

17

18

19

Admiral Kimmel: My recollection is that he reported to the Navy Department that he had learned from Admiral Phillips of certain commitments made by our government of which he had never been informed and asked for further information.

20

21

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, that very thing you had been inquiring about before, had you not?

22

23

24

25

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you had not found it out?

Admiral Kimmel: I had not found it out.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you know about that inquiry?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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It is in exhibit 40 now before us. Did you know about that

3

inquiry of Admiral Hart prior to the attack?

4

Admiral Kimmel: My recollection is that came to me
after the attack.

6

Senator Ferguson: After the attack?

7

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

8

Senator Ferguson: It reads in this way:

9

"Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed
support under three or four eventualities. Have received
no corresponding instructions from you."

10

11

12

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

13

Senator Ferguson: That is the message introduced in
exhibit 40.

14

15

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

16

Senator Ferguson: But you did not get that until after
the attack?

17

18

Admiral Kimmel: That came to me after the attack.

19

20

Senator Ferguson: Now, were you here when I asked Ad-
miral Turner some questions? Were you here when he was exam-
ined?

21

22

Admiral Kimmel: No, I was not present.

23

24

Senator Ferguson: Well, were you aware that Admiral
Turner had informed the Japanese Ambassador in August -- or,
no, in July, and I think the exact date was July 23rd or 24th,

25

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 that the United States would not tolerate, in view of its
3 policy of aiding Britain and its interpretation of self-
4 defense, a Japanese threat to the Malay Barrier?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I did not know that he had made any
6 such statements.

7 Senator Ferguson: You never had any such information?

8 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, were you ever told that Admiral
10 Stark was called to the White House by the President on July
11 24th and that then he heard a statement by the President to
12 Japan to the effect, - which statement was that if Japan at-
13 tempted to get Dutch oil by force, the British and Dutch would
14 fight and there would then result a most serious situation
15 between the United States and Japan?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I don't remember ever having been in-
17 formed of that conversation.

18 Senator Lucas: Will the Senator yield?

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Is that Stark's testimony?

21 Senator Ferguson: It is in Volume 2 of the Foreign Re-
22 lations.

23 Senator Lucas: Thank you.

24 Senator Ferguson: Had you ever had that information?

25 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now, if you would have had that information in relation to Admiral Turner's conversation, - and, by the way, a copy of that was sent to the President, was sent to the Secretary of State and was never disputed as far as Turner was concerned and he was never called on the carpet, or it was never taken up with him that he was wrong in that, - and this other conversation that Stark heard from the President to the Japanese, - if you had known of that would you then have known the policy of America in case of an attack upon the Malay Barrier?

Admiral Kimmel: It would have been most helpful to me and if I had known all the circumstances and the fact that that was the policy of the government, yes, it would have helped immensely.

Senator Ferguson: Were you as a peacetime Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet trying to carry out the policy of America?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And your endeavor was at all times to learn, if you could, what our policy was?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you also had to know at the same time if you wanted to be an efficient officer what the policy of any proposed enemy or contemplated enemy, let me put it

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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that way, would be?

3

Admiral Kimmel: Well, we wanted to know everything we could about the enemy, everything that was available.

4

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, were you advised that on
6 August 17th, when the President returned from the Atlantic
7 conference, that the President called the Japanese Ambassador
8 to the White House and told him in diplomatic language, and
9 it was rather blunt and in writing, that a Japanese threat
10 or show of force against the Malay Barrier or any movement
11 in the Pacific would compel the United States immediately to
12 take any and all steps necessary to protect our rights?

13

Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I did not know about that.

14

15 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever know that such a mes-
16 sage was delivered after the return of the President?

17

Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

18

19 Senator Ferguson: Any message?

20

Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, not to the best of my recollec-
21 tion.

22

23 Senator Ferguson: Well, were you advised that respon-
24 sible leadership was intercepting secret Japanese messages
25 wherein the Japanese Ambassador was advising his government
that it must expect armed opposition from Great Britain and
the United States should Japan move against the Malay Barrier?

26

Admiral Kimmel: I was never informed of that.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: You never had any information on that?

3

Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

4

Senator Ferguson: Well, were you aware from your own judgment, like Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner have stated here, that Anglo-Dutch-American embargoes on Japan oil supplies, regardless of their justification for such embargoes, constituted an actual and a logical cause of war with Japan?

9

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I thought that the embargoes would irritate Japan considerably and I knew about the embargoes.

11

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you think it would irritate them enough, as has been stated by Admiral Stark, that we should have anticipated war over that?

14

Admiral Kimmel: Not necessarily, no.

15

Senator Ferguson: You did not go that far?

16

Admiral Kimmel: No.

17

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

18

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

19

Mr. Murphy: In the previous hearing the witness said that he thought it was another step on the road to war.

21

Senator Ferguson: Is that the way you want to put it, just another step?

23

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I think there is very little difference betwixt that and what I have just said.

25

Senator Ferguson: Of course, another step would not be

2912

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 definite unless we knew how many steps we were away from war.

3

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

4

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, at that time about how many
6 steps were we away from war, if we can clear that up?

6

7 Admiral Kimmel: That depended upon the attitude of our
8 government and the attitude of the Japanese government and had
9 I known what was known in Washington I could have estimated
10 much more accurately how many steps we were away from war.

10

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, were you fully aware on November
12 the 27th that the Japanese had concentrated for an attack upon
13 the Malay Barrier?

13

Admiral Kimmel: I was so informed.

14

Senator Ferguson: When?

15

16 Admiral Kimmel: Well, in the so-called war warning mes-
17 sage they told me that they were and in the-- well, we had
18 various reports of the Japanese fleet moving. We had the
19 war warning message, we had the ONI bulletin of December 1st
20 and various other information which showed that they were,
21 the fleet was on the move.

21

22 Senator Ferguson: Well, were you aware that such an at-
23 tack, even the obvious preparation for it, was a direct defi-
24 ance of the formal and explicit warning against such movement
25 given by the United States?

25

Admiral Kimmel: I did not know of the formal and explicit

1 Witness Kimmel Questions by: Sen. Ferguson
2 warning given by the United States.

3 Senator Ferguson: So, therefore, you could not evaluate
4 this movement, is that what you are telling us?

5 Admiral Kimmel: No, I could not properly evaluate it.

6 Senator Ferguson: You could not properly evaluate this
7 movement?

8 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, you were advised on November
10 24th to expect an immediate Japanese attack upon the Malay
11 Barrier and any other place in the Pacific?

12 Admiral Kimmel: On November 4th?

13 Senator Ferguson: 24th.

14 Admiral Kimmel: 24th?

15 Senator Ferguson: That is the first message.

16 Admiral Kimmel: I don't think that said Malay Barrier.
17 It said an attack in any direction, or something of that kind.

18 Senator Ferguson: You had better look at it. It is
19 exhibit 37.

20 Mr. Keefe: "A surprise aggressive movement in any direc-
21 tion including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibil-
22 ity." That is what the message of the 24th says.

23 Admiral Kimmel: (Reading)

24 "Indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
25 movement in any direction including attack on Philippines

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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or Guam is a possibility."

3

That was what it said.

4

Senator Ferguson: That is the way the message read?

5

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

6

Senator Ferguson: Now, then, under date of November the 25th Admiral Stark wrote you a letter, did he not, Admiral?

8

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

9

Senator Ferguson: And you got that letter on the third?

10

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

11

Senator Ferguson: You were advised by Admiral Stark after he had a conference at the White House that he was damned if he knew what the United States was going to do should Japan attack the Malay Barrier without at the same time attacking possessions of the United States.

16

Admiral Kimmel: That is the essence of his --

17

Senator Ferguson: That is the essence of what he said?

18

Admiral Kimmel: Of his statement, yes, sir.

19

Senator Ferguson: Now, with that kind of language to you --

21

Admiral Kimmel: I didn't know what we were going to do.

22

Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- and your knowledge that they were going to the Malay Barrier, at least concentrating to do that, you did not know what steps you could or should take under War Plan No. 5 or 46, as the case may be,

25

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 is that correct?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, that is right.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, between the date of that letter
5 and its receipt you had been instructed, had you not, to pre-
6 pare to attack the Marshalls after Japan had committed an
7 overt act against the United States because you got it on the
8 27th? You got a message on the 27th, did you not?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that is right.

10 Senator Ferguson: So between the 25th and the 3rd you
11 had this message, did you not?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that is right.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, in the manner of ordinary naval
14 strategy would the Japanese expect an attack by the Pacific
15 Fleet on the Marshalls in the event the United States should
16 implement its direct and specific warning to oppose a Japan-
17 ese movement against the Malay Barrier?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I think they probably would expect
19 attacks on the Marshalls. That is reasonable, yes. They,
20 of course, I hoped did not know what we were going to do.

21 Senator Ferguson: All right. You always have to anti-
22 cipate, do you not, that Japan knew what our war plan in the
23 Pacific was?

24 Admiral Kimmel: You mean the statements that had been
25 made to them?

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

3 Admiral Kimmel: Well, in broad outline, yes.

4 Senator Ferguson: We knew that they had spies, did we
5 not, not only in America but in Hawaii and on the West Coast
6 in America and for that matter here in Washington?

7 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

8 Senator Ferguson: Or should have anticipated that they
9 had.

10 Admiral Kimmel: Well, even now I doubt if they had ac-
11 cess to our war plans.

12 Senator Ferguson: Did you know or did you anticipate
13 that they could be intercepting our messages?

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is always a possibility.

15 Senator Ferguson: Well, for instance, from Tokyo to Ber-
16 lin on November the 30th we knew here that Japan said this in
17 that message:

18 "What is more, before the United States brought
19 forth this plan they conferred with England, Australia
20 and Netherlands and China. They did it repeatedly.
21 Therefore it is clear that the United States is now in
22 collusion with those nations and has decided to regard
23 Japan along with Germany and Italy as an enemy."

24 That is on page 206, exhibit 1.

25 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I don't know what they referred to

2517

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1

2 there. I never thought that, as I read that that --

3 Senator Ferguson: But you never had that message before
4 the attack, did you?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, no, I never had the message. I
6 mean now, after I know about these things, that it never oc-
7 curred to me that that referred to our war plan, particularly
8 as to details of the war plan. What I took it to mean was the
9 broad plan that we -- put it this way: That message, in my
10 opinion, referred to the collaboration and the fact that we
11 were allying ourselves with Great Britain and the Netherlands
12 East Indies, and so forth. That was what I understood that
13 plan to mean. I had known of that before the attack.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, we had talked here about the
15 so-called missing fleet and I think you said that was a mis-
16 nomer, but it was the ships that at least we did not know
17 about, the carriers, their location. Was your anxiety about
18 the location of these certain missing Japanese units predi-
19 cated in any way on the expectancy of meeting up with such a
20 unit in that projected attack on the Marshalls? You had a
21 war plan, did you not, what you were to do?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. When we started off, - our ex-
23 peditions to the Marshalls were largely to get the units of
24 the Japanese fleets to come over there.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any idea as to how im-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 portant or how vital Singapore was to the Mala y Barrier?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes. I thought it was a very im-
4 portant post out there.

5 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether our leadership in
6 Washington, - did anyone here in Washington advise you on De-
7 cember the 6th that a Japanese invasion fleet of sixty some
8 vessels had been sighted and was within a day or fourteen
9 hours, I think the message read "fourteen hours" - of striking
10 distance of the approaches to Singapore? It is the so-called
11 Winant message.

12 Admiral Kimmel: What message was that?

13 Senator Ferguson: Winant. At 10:40 the State Depart-
14 ment received it here in Washington.

15 Admiral Kimmel: I think I never got that message but
16 I got information along that same line.

17 Senator Ferguson: Would you show him the message?
18 It is the Winant message that came into the State Department
19 on the 6th of December. It reads this way:

20 "British Admiralty reports at 3 A.M. London time
21 this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point sailing
22 slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time.
23 First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers;
24 Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroy-
25 ers. (Signed) Winant."

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Admiral Kimmel: Well, there was a message from the
3 Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to OPNAV on December
4 6th which said:

5 "Report by CINC China '25 ship convoy with escort
6 of 6 cruisers and 10 DD's Lat 08-00 N, 106-00 East at
7 0316 GMT Today. Convoy of 10 ships with two cruisers
8 and 10 destroyers 07-40 North, 106-20 East two hours
9 later. All on course west. Three additional ships 07-51
10 North 105 East at 0442, Course 310. This indicates
11 all forces will make for Kohtron.' Sighted by my scouting
12 force anchored Camranh Bay - 30 ships and one large
13 cruiser."

14 Now, I had that, and Kohtron, where he sighted these
15 ships, was located, - where he said these ships were headed
16 is in Indo-China, not so very far from the Thai border.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, Admiral, now what could that
18 mean to you with the knowledge that you had when you tried to
19 find out what we were going to do if they attacked the British
20 possessions, what could that message, with the other informa-
21 tion, mean to an Admiral Commander-in-Chief?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Well, what it meant to me when I saw
23 this thing, "Forces moving for Kohtron," that was the estim-
24 ate there, we followed out what the Navy Department had told
25 me that the most probable places they would go into was into

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Thai and they were concentrating their forces over there to go into Thai.

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Senator Ferguson: But if you did not know, Admiral, what the United States was going to do in case they attacked there, why in the world would they send you that message? That was another power. We were a separate and distinct nation. Why would that message be sent to you?

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, this message was sent to OPNAV because OPNAV had directed the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to get this information and the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet had carried out his orders to get the information.

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Senator Ferguson: But, Admiral, why would they be sending it to Washington? America is an independent and sovereign power. Why were we concerned if we did not have a war plan in relation to that attack? Why would it be sent here?

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, of course, those were some of the problems there that I had.

20

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Senator Ferguson: I realize they were your problems and you were trying to find out what we were going to do.

22

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I was.

23

24

Senator Ferguson: And you told us now that you never did find out.

25

Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: You were positive about that that you
3 never got an answer as to what we were to do.

4 Admiral Kimmel: The last answer I had on that subject
5 before the attack was what you have just read here a few min-
6 utes ago in Admiral Stark's letter of 25 November, which I
7 received on 3 December.

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

9 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

11 Mr. Murphy: He also had a memorandum which had been
12 given to the President which says that the only plan we had was
13 to conduct a defensive war in connection with the British
14 and the Dutch for the defense of the Philippines and the British
15 and Dutch East Indies.

16 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes, I had that.

17 Mr. Murphy: That is the memorandum of November 5th.

18 Admiral Kimmel: I see.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did that give you information as to
20 what you were to do?

21 Admiral Kimmel: It did not, no, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Or what America was to do in case of
23 an attack only on some other power?

24 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, it did not.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the President by

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 direct order had ordered three ships to go into the Gulf of
3 Siam or off the Coast of China to watch for this movement into
4 the Kra Peninsula?

5 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I did not.

6 Senator Ferguson: If you had known that would that have
7 indicated you did have something to do in case of that kind
8 of an attack?

9 Admiral Kimmel: I knew that the Commander-in-Chief of
10 the Asiatic had been ordered to send some planes over to
11 scout but I did not know that the --

12 Senator Ferguson: Three men-of-war?

13 Admiral Kimmel: (Continuing) -- ships had been sent
14 over.

15 Senator Ferguson: Three men-of-war?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Well, you can call them men-of-war, yes.
17 They had the character of men-of-war, yes.

18 Senator Ferguson: They were ships with sailors and guns?

19 Admiral Kimmel: That was a perfectly natural thing for us
20 to do on the basis that we wanted to know what the Japanese
21 were doing, we wanted to know whether they would come to the
22 Philippines or not.

23 Senator Ferguson: Well, how would it tell you whether
24 they were coming to the Philippines and I would like to have
25 you look at the message on page 49 of exhibit 37:

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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"Minimum requirements to establish identity as U.S. Men-of-War are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice."

The President is even telling them how to make men-of-war.

Admiral Kimmel: I did not see that message.

Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

"Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam."

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. I knew nothing about that.

All I knew about was the airplane scouting out of there of the patrol planes, which was at the time I considered a very good move to find out what they were doing out there and whether they were coming to the Philippines or not.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, if you had known of this message of the President, from OPNAV to CINCAF, information no one mentioned, would that have indicated to you an answer to that question as to what we were going to do in case of an attack upon the Malay Peninsula?

Admiral Kimmel: It would have been useful information. It would have still been short of any authoritative statement of what our intentions were.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 The Vice Chairman: Will the Senator yield for a moment
3 there just for information?

4 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

5 The Vice Chairman: Doesn't our record show that these
6 three ships were never sent?

7 Senator Ferguson: That is right, but the fact of going
8 to send them, ordering them to be sent by the President him-
9 self, would that have been significant to you?

10 Admiral Kimmel: That would have been useful information,
11 yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you know that the presence
13 of the Japanese force before the approaches of Singapore re-
14 quired the responsible leadership in Washington to act im-
15 mediately or to back down from the former position it had
16 taken with Japan as of Sunday, August the 17th, 1941? I will
17 repeat that question. I will repeat it, Admiral.

18 The Vice Chairman: Pardon me just a moment, Senator,
19 before you go into that. I just call attention to the fact
20 that the President's message, I understand, is to be read in
21 the two Houses about twelve o'clock.

22 Senator Ferguson: Do you want to recess now?

23 The Vice Chairman: And Senator George has suggested
24 that we would all like to hear it.

25 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I would.

Witness Kimmel

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The Vice Chairman: I assumed Senator Ferguson would, too.

Senator Ferguson: I am not through, but we will come back later.

The Vice Chairman: I understand that it will probably be agreeable for us to recess at this point until two o'clock.

Senator Ferguson: It is perfectly agreeable and I will try and repeat that question to you this afternoon.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. That is news to me.

The Vice Chairman: We will recess at this time until two o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

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2 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in
3 order. Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

(resumed)

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6 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Kimmel, my last question was
7 did you know then that the presence of this Japanese force be-
8 fore the approaches to Singapore required the responsible
9 leadership in Washington to act immediately or to back down
10 from the former position it had taken with Japan as of Sun-
11 day, August the 17th, 1941?

12 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I did not.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, if you had known that would
14 this fact that they were moving toward the Kra Peninsula made
15 a difference with your action?

16 Admiral Kimmel: Well, that is a difficult question to
17 answer because there were so many things that I did not know
18 but I am quite sure that such a knowledge would have affected
19 my action to some extent.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, you had never had before you -
21 you had nothing before you, had you, that the United States
22 Government intended to back down from any stand or any policy
23 that it had?

24 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I did not.

25 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, if the policy was such

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 that we should have anticipated that if they attacked the Kra
3 Peninsula it would mean war with America should we not have
4 then at the same time anticipated a co-attack on America?

5 Admiral Kimmel: That would appear to be reasonable,
6 yes, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, do you know why no one seems
8 to have anticipated that if they attacked the Kra Peninsula
9 they would not also attack America at the same time?

10 Admiral Kimmel:
11 No, sir, I do not.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, at any time after November the
13 25th, 1941 did the Chief of Naval Operations, that is Admiral
14 Stark, advise you that instead of being damned if he knew
15 what the United States was going to do in the event that Japan
16 attacked the Malay Barrier after by-passing American posi-
17 tions he did know what the United States was going to do?
18 You see, he wrote you that letter on the 25th.

19 Admiral Kimmel: If he had informed me that he knew what
20 the United States was going to do and what they were going
21 to do, it would have been of great assistance to me.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, we had an instrument go in here
23 in evidence last Friday or Saturday. Would you let me have
24 the instrument that went in?

25 Mr. Masten: Which is it?

Senator Ferguson: The one with regard to the disposi-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

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tion in relation to exchange of nationals.

Mr. Masten: Oh, here it is. Exhibit 74-A.

Senator Ferguson: 74-A. It is the 4th of December 1941 and it is "Division of Far Eastern Affairs." Just one sentence from it in relation to an agreement with Japan while we are not at war, to get our nationals out in case we are going to war.

Admiral Kimmel: May I find that on my copy, please, sir?

Senator Ferguson: Yes. It is on page 2. The words, "Such attempt". Britain is trying to get us to take parallel action with them or joint action as our desires may be.

Admiral Kimmel: You mean beginning with "Although it is possible?"

Senator Ferguson: No. "Such an attempt might." Do you find it? Are those pages the same? They may not be the same.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I see it. I have it now.

Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

Such attempt might, at this time, be advisable also in that it would be definite indication to the Japanese Government of the firmness of the American position in the present crisis and would be one means of impressing upon the Japanese Government the seriousness with

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. PHOTOGRAPHY

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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which we view the present situation."

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Now, that being true, that co-action there would indicate to the Japanese government that we were acting with Britain and considering this as one, shouldn't we have anticipated that if they attacked one they would attack both?

Admiral Kimmel: I think that is reasonable, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now we go to the end of it and this is on the end and it is signed by "M.M.H." who, I understand, is Maxwell M. Hamilton:

"As the making of such an approach" -- and they are speaking now about getting nationals out of Japanese territory in China before the declaration of war, before the shooting starts, and I will read:

"As the making of such an approach would be interpreted by the American public as a definite indication" -- then this is inserted in "that this Government" -- meaning America -- "expects war between Japan and the United States, the Secretary may wish to speak to the President in regard to the advisability of this Government's making such an approach at this time."

Now, that is dated on December the 4th, 1941.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, from all that you have learned wherein the messages were intercepted and was known in Wash-

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 ington, have you any doubt that war was imminent and that
3 we knew we were going to war?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I have no doubt, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, did you get this message
6 so that it would indicate that we did not want the American
7 public to know that we were going to war?

8 Admiral Kimmel: I received no such message, no, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: You received no such message?

10 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, can you account for the
12 fact that you did not get any of this other information that
13 it was along the same line, that they did not want the Ameri-
14 can public to know that we were going into war? Would that
15 answer some of these questions?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I do not know why I did not get the
17 information, sir. I have never been able to figure it out.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, you were told this, were you
19 not, that you were to do nothing that would arouse the popu-
20 lation of Hawaii to indicate that we were going to war?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That was contained in messages which
22 came to me, yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, as an Admiral in the Navy
24 how could the fact that General Marshall or Admiral Stark would
25 have alerted you on Sunday morning, say between seven and nine

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 that that message was received, how could the intercepting of
3 that message by the Japs have changed the situation?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I am unable to state. I cannot see how
5 it would have changed the situation in the slightest except
6 that it would have helped us considerably.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes. But suppose the Japanese fleet
8 had learned at seven o'clock in the morning, that is seven
9 our time, on Sunday, which was five and a half, is it, five
10 and a half hours before?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Which is five and a half hours before
13 their ships came in, their airplanes came into Hawaii?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Suppose that they had flashed to that
16 fleet the fact that the Hawaiian Islands were fully alerted
17 and knew that there was something going to happen and our
18 ships would have gone out, how would that have interfered with
19 the Japs other than probably to have stopped them coming in?

20 Admiral Kimmel: I don't understand how it would have
21 interfered in the slightest degree.

22 Senator Ferguson: Well, as an Admiral, then, as an ex-
23 pert you cannot tell us why that would have interfered with
24 our defense?

25 Admiral Kimmel: I think I indicated that very clearly in

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 my statement, sir. I cannot understand why I did not get
3 those messages -- that information, I mean.

4 Senator Ferguson: By the way, did you know that on
5 Saturday night about nine o'clock the President sent a message
6 to the Emperor? Did you get that on the radio?

7 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I did not know that until af-
8 ter the attack.

9 Senator Ferguson: But you did give us the answer that you
10 knew of several other things that were being negotiated back
11 and forth during the period between the 27th and the 7th, that
12 there were negotiations on?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I knew from the public press.

14 Senator Ferguson: That is what I mean.

15 Admiral Kimmel: That is all I got.

16 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Well, now, at any time in the
17 year 1941 and from any authoritative source had you been ad-
18 vised that the task of the Pacific Fleet should be in the
19 event of an outbreak of war in the Pacific which did not in-
20 volve a Japanese attack directly on American possessions, - did
21 you know what your task would be in that case, from any source?

22 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I did not.

23 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any instructions in the
24 event of such a contingency?

25 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know of any instructions or plans for the Asiatic Fleet in such a contingency?

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Admiral Kimmel: I did not get that last.

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know of any instructions to Hart's fleet, the Asiatic Fleet, in such a contingency?

7

Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I did not.

8

9

Senator Ferguson: Did you know or did you not know that the Atlantic Fleet and the South Pacific Fleet were engaged in what the English language has always defined as a war?

10

11

Admiral Kimmel: I knew the shooting orders which had been issued to the Atlantic Fleet and to the Southeast Pacific detachment.

12

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Senator Ferguson: Southeast Pacific, yes.

15

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know of any shooting in the Pacific outside of those two areas, that Southeast Pacific? Did you know of any shooting prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

20

21

Admiral Kimmel: Only the orders I issued myself about depth bombing submarines.

22

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know of any other actual shooting?

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Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I haven't been able during the noon

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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hour to find that mess age in relation to the Netherlands' ship, someone indicating that a definite ship or some Netherlands ship, - that we would go between them in case there was any shooting.

Admiral Kimmel: I recall that.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall that message?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, what kind of an order do you interpret that to be?

Admiral Kimmel: The way I interpret that order is that you would go in betwixt an attacking force and a Netherlands ship and if they shot at you--

Senator Ferguson: You would shoot back?

Admiral Kimmel: Why, I would probably shoot back.

Senator Ferguson: Well, then, that would create at least an incident, would it not, an international incident?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, it probably would.

Senator Ferguson: And there would be little use then of talking about the first overt act, wouldn't there?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, the Japs would have shot first.

Senator Ferguson: I see. Even though you would have run between the mark that he was shooting at and that wasn't our mark, that did not belong to this country, you would consider under those circumstances that the Jap shot first?

Admiral Kimmel: I would have to know all the circumstances first.

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1 Witness Kimmel Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: On the 18th of November, 1941,
3 there is this message, in Exhibit 37 --

4 Admiral Kimmel: What is the date, sir?

5 Senator Ferguson: The 18th of November, 1941.

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: It reads:

8 "In convoy with American Flag vessels, placing of
9 Bloemfontein is authorized. Until international conditions
10 on and subsequent to 25 November become defined, and
11 clarified, however, any further direct, or Great Circle
12 routing between Hawaii and the Philippines should not be
13 used. Until further advised by department routs south
14 of Mandates should be prescribed."

15 Do you know why they used the date there "subsequent
16 to November 25"?

17 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever know that we had a
19 message that we intercepted from the Japs showing that the
20 deadline date was the 25th of November?

21 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I never had anything like
22 that.

23 Senator Ferguson: So then if you received this message
24 what would that 25 November mean? It was for your action --
25 CINCPAC.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: I do not know what November 25 meant,
3 but I was concerned when I received this with the orders
4 I received to put the Bloemfontein in the convoy with
5 American Flag vessels.

6 Senator Ferguson: That was a Dutch ship, was it not?

7 Admiral Kimmel: Sir?

8 Senator Ferguson: That was a Dutch ship.

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Do you think the fact that we put
11 that ship into our convoy would indicate that we were
12 taking parallel action? Did you take it as such?

13 Admiral Kimmel: My memory is not entirely clear, but
14 I think we had some materiel, or personnel, or something
15 on this ship that we wanted to get through, on the Bloemfontein.

16 Senator Ferguson: Do you think we had some soldiers
17 on that ship?

18 Admiral Kimmel: I do not recall that, as to just what
19 it was. On one of these Dutch ships that we used, we
20 had some fliers that were going out to China.

21 Senator Ferguson: I did not get that word.

22 Admiral Kimmel: Aviators.

23 Senator Ferguson: Fliers. I did not get the word at
24 first.

25 Admiral Kimmel: I forget which one it was.

Witness Kimmel

questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Who would know what was on that
3 ship that we were using our convoys to take out?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Well, the only place you could find
5 that now, would be in the Navy Department. I do not recall.

6 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Masten, would you let me have
7 that Formosa information on the Fleet?

8 Mr. Masten: That has not been offered yet.

9 Senator Ferguson: Will you offer it in evidence as
10 Exhibit 130?

11 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, we would like to offer at
12 this time, as Exhibit 130, a collection of memoranda and
13 communications obtained from the files of the State Depart-
14 ment regarding reconnaissance by Japanese aircraft over
15 American possessions in the Pacific, together with a dispatch
16 dated November 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to the Secre-
17 tary of State, forwarding a note from the Japanese foreign
18 office protesting the flight of an American airplane over
19 Tiawan on November 20, 1941, and the reply of the State
20 Department to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo to that message.

21 The Vice Chairman: It will be so received as
22 Exhibit 130.

23 (The document referred to was

24 marked Exhibit No. 130

25 The Vice Chairman: Is that the same document that
was distributed to the committee Saturday?

Mr. Masten: It is.

Follows
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AL-1

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Would you get a copy of it, Admiral?

Admiral Kimmel: I have it.

Senator Ferguson: The first item on that is dated
October 27, 1941 and reads:

"British sources report 2 Japanese aircraft carriers,
one of which is the Kaga, operating in Mandated Islands.
Following planes reported there:"

Now we did not have possession of the Mandated Islands,
did we?

Admiral Kimmel: We did not have possessions in the
Mandated Islands?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: None, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know why this kind of report
was sent to our Navy Department then?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I believe they were exchanging
information about this time.

Senator Ferguson: The next one is dated November 21,
1941:

"SOURCE NEW ZEALAND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE: ON NOVEMBER
16 AND 17 PLANES, APPARENTLY JAPANESE, WERE SIGHTED OVER
GILBERTS."

Were the Gilberts under our control?

Admiral Kimmel: They were British possessions, the

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Gilberts.

3 Senator Ferguson: Was this information sent to you
4 prior to the attack?

5 Admiral Kimmel: I am just trying to read it, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes, if you will read it all.

7 Admiral Kimmel: I do not recall that, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: Then the next one is November 24,
9 1941:

10 "DEPENDABLE REPORTS HERE OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS
11 OVER GILBERT ISLANDS ON NOVEMBER 15 BY MONOPLANE WITH TAPERED
12 WINGS, SINGLE TAILFIN, TWIN ENGINES. NEXT DAY REPEATED BY
13 MONOPLANE FLYING BOAT SILVER COLOR NUMBER OF ENGINES
14 UNOBSERVED."

15 That was not over our territory, was it?

16 Admiral Kimmel: That is the Gilberts again, the
17 British possessions.

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now the next one is a complaint
19 over our planes, where Japan made a complaint. It is dated
20 November 29, 1941.

21 "I have the honor to state that according to a report
22 from the Japanese Naval authorities, an American airplane
23 flew over Garanbi on the southernmost tip of Taiwan Island
24 at 12:30 p.m. November 20, 1941 and after circling at an
25 altitude of 2,000 meters flew away southward at 12:45 p.m. the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 same day.

3 "It is believed that the Japanese Government cannot
4 overlook such a violation of Japanese territory by an airplane
5 and it is therefore requested that the matter be brought to
6 the attention of the United States authorities concerned.

7 "Also I particularly bespeak Your Excellency's solicitude
8 particularly the recurrence of such incidents at this time
9 when the international situation is tense and the untoward
10 events to which they might give rise are unpredictable.

11 "I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your
12 Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration."

13 Signed by Togo, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

14 It is sent to the Department of State only and signed
15 by Grew.

16 Had you known of that wire?

17 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Or that event?

19 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now did you know of our reply where
21 we made a complaint on December 6, 1941?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Where is that, sir?

23 Senator Ferguson: That is the last page. It reads:

24 "Your 1868, November 29, 6 p.m.

25 "The Foreign Office note has been brought to the attention

1 Witness Kimmel

• Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

3 "In connection with this question, you may be interested
4 to know that the Navy Department has been informed by the
5 Governor of Guam that about noon on November 24 an unidentified
6 two-motored airplane circled the southern extremity of Guam
7 for about ten minutes flying at an altitude of approximately
8 15,000 feet."

9 In other words, instead of us replying to the complaint
10 that they made we said, in effect, "One of your planes flew
11 over our territory". That is what it amounts to, doesn't it?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that is what it appears to amount to.

13 Senator Ferguson: Did you know there was any scouting
14 over Guam or Midway?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Guam or Midway, did you say?

16 Senator Ferguson: Guam or Midway. This shows that
17 apparently there was some scouting over Guam.

18 Admiral Kimmel: I have no recollection of any report
19 having been received to that effect. It is possible I did
20 get it, but I am quite sure I never got anything about Midway.

21 Senator Ferguson: Did you know if there was any
22 scouting over the Philippines?

23 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Over our territory?

25 Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will yield.

4 Mr. Murphy: I would like to ask the Senator to ask
5 counsel if they haven't evidence that the Admiral did have
6 knowledge of this business in the South Pacific and also Guam?

7 Admiral Kimmel: I am not positive about Guam.

8 Senator Ferguson: I will ask counsel also to look up
9 any record from the Navy or Army showing any scouting planes
10 or observation planes of the Japs over the Philippines prior
11 to the time of the attack on the Philippines.

12 Mr. Murphy: I think you will find there is definite
13 information about them being over Guam, and there is definite
14 information about them being over the southern route, and
15 that was under discussion, as to whether they should protect
16 the shipping there.

17 Admiral Kimmel: I think you are correct about planes
18 on the southern route. I do not recall exactly, but I have
19 no recollection of this particular message.

20 Mr. Murphy: I do not know about this message.

21 Admiral Kimmel: What is that?

22 Mr. Murphy: I did not know about this message either,
23 Admiral, but I remember something about Guam. I will get it.

24 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, did you know that the Japanese
25 Ambassadors here to America, the Japanese Foreign Minister

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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and Japanese press indicated that they expected the United States to proceed in the Pacific as it had in the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific in the event of an Anglo-Japanese war?

Admiral Kimmel: Will you repeat that, sir?

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Did you know that the Japanese Ambassador here to America, or Japanese Foreign Minister and the Japanese press had expressed themselves to the effect that they expected the United States to proceed in the Pacific as it was proceeding in the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific in the event of an Anglo-Japanese war?

Admiral Kimmel: I do not recall that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You do not recall?

Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, you knew what we were doing in the Atlantic on that shooting order?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I knew what we were doing in the Atlantic, and whether I read anything like that in the newspaper I am unable to say at the present time.

However, I do not think I got it either way.

Senator Ferguson: Did it occur to you at that time, having this example of the Atlantic, that the Japanese naturally and logically would expect the same formula in the Pacific? In other words, did not we have a policy that they should

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 have anticipated and expected we would carry the same thing
3 out in the Pacific?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Well, no, I did not think that they
5 would, because I had been led to believe we were keeping out
6 of war in the Pacific.

7 Senator Ferguson: What brought you to that conclusion?

8 Admiral Kimmel: Well, all the correspondence I had
9 that we did not want to tackle two wars at once. We wanted
10 to confine it to the Atlantic, we did not want to go into
11 the Pacific. That was my impression prior to December 7,
12 that I am talking about now.

13 Senator Ferguson: Then you really did not come to the
14 conclusion at any time prior to the attack that we were
15 going to have war in the Pacific?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I did not come to the conclusion that
17 war was imminent. I did not come to the conclusion that we
18 were forcing the war, or that we were in any way forcing
19 the war. In answer to your question, therefore, I did not
20 consider that the Japanese would expect us to take any such
21 action in the Pacific as had been taken in the Atlantic.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now after reading these intercepts,
23 Exhibit 1 -- do you know what I mean? That is the printed
24 copy.

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir. The intercepts I did not get.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: The intercepts you did not get?

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Admiral Kimmel: No, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Would you say that Japan would anticipate that we were going to carry out the same thing in case they got into a war with England?

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Admiral Kimmel: I think that would have been a reasonable conclusion on their part, or something along that line.

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Senator Ferguson: As of December 6, and as a result of the information and instructions sent to you from Washington, and particularly the Stark letter you got on December 3, which was mailed the 25th, did you visualize naval action in the Pacific by the United States following the pattern of the naval action in the Atlantic?

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Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, I did not, not following the pattern of the naval action in the Atlantic.

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Senator Ferguson: Now Japan had a fighting Navy in the Pacific?

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Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Was this factor the vital one in the difference between the conditions in the Atlantic and those in the Pacific: Germany did not have a fighting Navy in the Atlantic, except submarines, did they?

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Admiral Kimmel: No, sir, they did not. They had certain ships that could have done great damage to our convoys in the

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Atlantic, and the Italians were putting up considerable trouble
3 in the Mediterranean at that time.

4 Senator Ferguson: Because they had a fleet?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, they had a fleet there. Also,
6 in all justice, it must be said there was a question as to
7 what Vichy was going to do, and they had quite a fleet, and
8 that was a factor in the Atlantic.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, were you aware, Admiral Kimmel,
10 that on December 6 information from Singapore to the
11 Asiatic Fleet was to assist the British then in Singapore,
12 and that Admiral Hart was making arrangements to such effect
13 at the time an attack against Singapore was at hand?

14 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I do not believe there is
15 any evidence to that effect. I may be wrong about it. I
16 do not believe there is any evidence before this committee
17 that Admiral Hart was getting ready to assist the British
18 in event of an attack against Singapore.

19 Senator Ferguson: I call to the attention of the Senator
20 that he wired about the talk he had with Admiral Phillips.

21 Senator Lucas: That is right.

22 Senator Ferguson: Then there was an Admiralty message
23 that came from the British Isles to us, and then there was
24 a reply dictated, to be sent according to the memorandum after
25 the actual attack.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Lucas: That is true.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, for the explanation of both Senators, there was an Admiralty dispatch sent to Admiral Kimmel on November 1st about what the British were going to do but not about what we were going to do.

Senator Lucas: The only thing I am making any complaint about at all -- it may not be serious -- is the erroneous assumption that Admiral Hart was to attack. Admiral Hart can testify about that himself.

Senator Ferguson: I am speaking now about the arrangement that he was making. He had sent out these flying missions to get the information, and he asked for the information. The information was made up here before the attack came. So someone knew here in Washington before the attack came what was to be sent to Admiral Hart in reply to his inquiry. Whereas, you had made a similar inquiry and, as I understand it, you had no information sent to you, that you received, or sent to you that you did not receive, prior to the attack.

Admiral Kimmel: Well, I had no information, and I am not familiar with any details of what Admiral Hart did down there, nor what reply he received.

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir.