

INTERP. OF KIDO - (15 Feb. 46)

DOC 4135

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INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 15 February 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

- A I wish to add concerning the reason why ARAKI was replaced. I believe that ARAKI contracted pneumonia for which reason another person took his post.
- Q We were talking a little about this Emperor Organ Theory. I still don't have a very complete picture of that. Will you explain to me again just what Dr. MINOBE was advocating?
- A According to the scholars of constitutional law, the Constitution limits the power and the action of the Emperor for which reason they feel that the Emperor is just an organ although he may actually be said to have unlimited power.
- Q What was new about this theory being advocated? Was he advocating a change in the Government or was it just an abstract discussion about the political set-up in Japan?
- A Because many of the students of Dr. MINOBE became high government officials, for which reason the opposition felt that these high officials had Dr. MINOBE's Emperor Organ Theory in their heads, which would be injurious and so they started saying to that effect. The opposition claimed that they were destroying the Japanese national system or kokutai.

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- Q When you refer to the opposition, whom do you have in mind - the military group, some government group, or just people that were opposed to the Emperor Organ Theory?
- A The Rightists and a section of the Army.
- Q And what was there about the teaching of the Emperor Organ Theory that was inconsistent with the thoughts and principles of the Rightists or the military?
- A There was a theory that the Emperor is not an organ; that Japan exists because the Emperor exists.
- Q It is really inherently a difference between a democratic and party government and Fascism in a broad sense. Is that right?
- A And hitherto, the Emperor had been considered to be the highest authority and the opposition felt that they should clarify the national structure for which purpose, they thought to bring forth internal reconstruction.
- Q Did you and your friends, such as KONOYE and HARADA subscribe to the Emperor Organ Theory as taught by MINOBE?
- A I wasn't a student under Dr. MINOBE but as a student of KYOTO Imperial University, I learned the same thing.
- Q But you subscribed to that principle of Government for the governing of the Japanese Empire that was taught generally among others by MINOBE?
- A Yes.
- Q While the Rightists wanted to vest all power in the Emperor and eliminate constitutional limitations of the Emperor?
- A Yes.
- Q Why was it, according to your diary on March 18, you and your friends were concerned about the movements of Dr. MINOBE and even checked on him with the Metropolitan Police. Why were you checking on him if you were friendly to his teachings?
- A There were many terroristic activities conducted against Dr. MINOBE so I went to inquire about any news concerning it.

Q You were fearful of harm coming to him because of his teaching and that is what you were checking on?

A Yes.

Q This is another example of the extremes to which the Rightists and militarists were going to reorganize the Government. They even tried to intimidate the professors that taught the constitutional theory of government?

A And I wish to add that later on Dr. MINOBE was shot with a pistol but was not seriously injured, however.

Q Do you know who shot him or who was back of the shooting?

A He was not a military man but a Rightist.

Q Do you remember who, in those days, were particularly outspoken against Dr. MINOBE? I realize that there were many men who were Rightists but were there some who were picking on Dr. MINOBE, particularly?

A At that time, KOBAYASHI JUNICHIRO was very active in clamoring for clarification of the national structure.

Q Was he an Army man?

A He is a retired military man.

Q That were Rightists, you would say?

A Yes.

Q Were they among the clique headed by MASAKI?

A He was very friendly with ARAKI.

Q Also with MASAKI, or not so much?

A I do not know about his relationship with MASAKI.

Q On April 15, you mention General DOIHARA. He was a Rightist, was he not?

A He was a strong advocate concerning the China problem.

Q What did he advocate with reference to China.

- A He was greatly active in connection with the Manchurian Incident and he later on became special Mayor of Mukden.
- Q He was quite a prominent General in those days, was he not?
- A Yes.
- Q We would classify him as an expansionist, wouldn't you say?
- A Yes.
- Q Was he closely associated with ITAGAKI in that movement in Manchuria?
- A Yes, ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA.
- Q How about ARAKI and MASAKI? Was he closely related to them in the Manchurian Incident?
- A Yes.
- Q He was also active in the China Incident which came in 1937, was he not?
- A Yes, I believe he was active there also.
- Q Was he active in political affairs at any time in the movement seeking to strengthen the Army control of the Government?
- A I don't believe he became involved so much in problems in Japan proper.
- Q But it was men, such as DOIHARA that brought about the expansion in Manchuria and later on in North China because of their policies and teachings? Is that right?
- A DOIHARA was active in the Special Service organs in China. He did not have any good position in Japan.
- Q And by Special Service, you have reference to the Kwantung Army or the Manchurian Railroad, or the Government of Mukden and things of that kind?
- A It is a special organ of the Army which gathers intelligence and various informations from various districts.

Q He was very active in the political affairs in Manchuria?

A China also. He was very popular in China.

Q Popular with whom? The Chinese or Japanese?

A Chinese.

Q He was one of those who very loudly claimed that Japan's activities on the continent were self-defense. Is that right?

A I do not know that point very well.

Q But if we were going ahead with the list of names of the particular individuals who were most aggressive as expansionists, we would have to include him alongside of ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA.

A Yes.

Q Was he active in the war that broke out in 1941?

A I believe he was an Army commander.

Q Was he still in the China theatre, or did he operate out of Japan proper?

A I believe he went to Malay later on.

Q Was he, to your knowledge, an advocate of driving the British and the Americans out of Asia and did he subscribe to the Asia for the Asiatics theory?

A I do not know because I did not hear a clear-cut statement concerning him.

Q But that principle was generally followed by ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA and people of that type, was it not?

A Yes.

Q Did you know him in those days?

A No, I didn't know him. I never talked to him, I only bowed to him.

- Q Have you in recent years become acquainted with him?
- A I never talked to him.
- Q You did hear him make this lecture in the Imperial presence, as appears in your diary?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you remember anything in particular he had to say about the China situation and Japan's foreign policy in China on that occasion?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q You do recall that he looked with approval upon what Japan had done in Manchuria and China?
- A I believe he may have said that. I believe there was no special significance otherwise I would have noted it in my diary.
- Q On April 23, you have some notations, among which you mention the November incident. What was the November incident? I presume it refers to November, 1934?
- A In November, an attempt was made for a plot and it was not completed. It was an abortive attempt.
- Q Is that the plot we talked about the other day?
- A This is different from the October Incident. This is the November Incident, and it is different.
- Q Well, what do you know about it? Who was back of it and what did they propose to do?
- A I believe it was similar to the other incidents. As far as this incident is concerned, I do not remember very much about it.
- Q Well, did it involve Army personnel?
- A For that incident, the Army officers that were involved had their work suspended; that is, partly like a semi-retired nature.
- Q Who sponsored the movement. Did it contemplate the assassination of certain political leaders?

- A Yes, I believe they had the same plan of attacking the senior statesmen.
- Q Was it the same individuals that were involved in the October Incident or was it an entirely different group?
- A The persons behind it were the same; I believe, but the persons that perpetrated or executed it were younger officers with the rank of captain.
- Q By persons behind it, do you mean HASHIMOTO, NEMOTO, ARAKI and MASAKI?
- A Yes.
- Q Were those the main ones that were really sponsoring what took place, or were there others?
- A This incident never got beyond the planning stage because it was completely quashed down.
- Q On May 2, you mention a conversation with TETSUMA HASHIMOTO. Is that the same HASHIMOTO we have been talking about?
- A No.
- Q Who is this man?
- A He was one of the Ronin.
- Q What were his views with reference to the Emperor Organ Theory which you didn't agree with, according to your diary?
- A Any arguments against the Constitution is usually referred to the Privy Council and this person thought that he ought to inquire of the Privy Council about it but I thought it wasn't absolutely necessary to make an inquiry. I felt that it did not violate the Constitution in question.
- Q I don't think I understand your answer to that. Did he want to personally go before the Privy Council and present some views?
- A At this time, he wanted to inquire of the Privy Council if the Emperor is an organ or not. He requested that the Emperor inquire of the Privy Council whether he is an organ or not. I felt that it is not absolutely necessary to take up the matter of the question whether the Emperor is an organ or not because this question is only an argument of an academic nature, and, therefore it is being used for political intrigue.

Q Who do you think sent him to see you? Who were his associates or followers?

A I don't believe he has much backing, because he acts independently.

Q You don't think he was closely associated with MASAKI?

A No.

Q On May 22, you have some notations with reference to the submission of petitions to the Throne. Under Japanese Government procedure, when is a petition submitted to the Throne and on what type of problem? Who is entitled to submit it?

A There is a regulation concerning direct requests made to the Emperor. The petition that is given to the Emperor is handled by the Office of the Privy Seal.

Q Who is entitled to petition the Emperor and on what type of question?

A Any kind of a question.

Q Give me an example.

A Various current problems and questions are handled there like personnel matters or matters of pay or things like that. Also dissatisfaction in regard to the work of the Government.

Q Can any citizen in Japan petition the Throne whenever he wants to or just certain people?

A Yes, the general public can do it. This was just an ordinary conference.

Q I understand that. I was interested in the procedure involved in petitioning the Throne. Are petitions made to the Throne with reference to military matters?

A I believe every kind of a matter were involved, including military.

Q And are those petitions actually submitted to the Emperor?

A Yes.

Q And passed on by his official office?

A Yes.

- Q Does he refer them to different ministries and branches of the Government for solution?
- A The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal clarifies those various requests and petitions and the important ones are passed on to the Emperor and then given back to the Government.
- Q Does the Lord Keeper have anything to do with the presentation of these petitions or the passing on of these petitions?
- A The Lord Keeper looks at each one of them and presents it to the Emperor and expresses an opinion on the petition.
- A Yes, there are various classifications of those petitions and requests. The most important ones are usually decided upon by the Cabinet in which they have a resolution made through a Cabinet conference and the Cabinet must reply to the Emperor.
- Q Well, when the petition is presented to the Emperor, does he decide and answer the requested petition himself? Is he the final word on whether the petition is granted or disallowed and if granted requires various offices of the Government to comply?
- A Consequently, the Emperor gives it to the Cabinet and the Cabinet is made to make disposition of it, while those matters that concern the Imperial Household, the Imperial Household Ministry handles it.
- Q Is it true that the actual presentation to the Throne is more or less a formality in order to get it sent to the right department of the Government or is it true that the Emperor himself makes decisions as to these petitions as to how they shall be carried out?
- Q There are several classifications and generally the Lord Keeper makes the decisions. Next, it is referred to the Government more or less as a reference saying that such a thing has been requested.
- Q Well, what does the Lord Keeper decide? Does he decide whether the request set forth in the petition shall be granted or disallowed?

- A Because the matters are either concerned with the Imperial Household or the Cabinet, either of those two make the final decision and in order to send them to the respective parties concerned, it is clarified and the most important is decided upon by the Cabinet at a cabinet meeting and presented to the Emperor.
- Q Does the Lord Keeper pass on the merits of a petition or does he just make recommendations and pass them on to Government agencies?
- A The Lord Keeper makes the decision as to its importance and passes it to the Emperor for review and if the Emperor grants it, the Government or the Imperial Household Ministry makes the proper disposition.
- Q Does the Emperor actually decide the question or does he follow the advice given to him by the Lord Keeper or Cabinet, or someone that has gone into the matter for him?
- A To what extent disposition should be made is decided by the Lord Keeper and if the Emperor agrees to it, it is passed on to the Government and the Government makes decisions upon it.
- Q Suppose that some faction in the Government, say in the War Ministry, thought there should be an increase in the Army budget or an increase in the mechanization of the Army. Is that a question that might well be presented to the Emperor by a petition to obtain his views on that subject.
- A Such a petition has never been petitioned yet.
- Q What are the normal types of subjects that petitions are predicated upon?
- A I think most of the things are foolish. There are many inflicted with the mania for submitting numerous petitions.
- Q Can you think of a case where there was an important petition presented to the Emperor and passed on under this procedure?
- A While the Seiyukai and Minseito were in power, I believe that the most important issue was the distribution of Government authority to local authorities. The others were not worth mentioning.

- Q Under May 28, you refer to conversations with Viscount SAKATANI. Who was he?
- A He is my friend connected with the Bank of Japan.
- Q Do you recall what he had to report with reference to Manchukuo?
- A I have no recollection. I believe he spoke upon financial matters.
- Q On May 30, you talk about Japanese stationaries in North China. Who were they?
- A That is a North China garrison Army instead of "stationary".
- Q In those days, did Japan have garrison armies stationed in North China?
- A Yes.
- Q How did they get there in North China?
- A I believe it was a garrison troop specified under regulation after the incident of 1900. I think it was the Boxer Rebellion.
- Q For many years by agreement with China, Japan had certain troops garrisoned in North China?
- A Yes.
- Q Was that to protect the Japanese nationals in North China?
- A Yes, I believe it was under the treaty's regulation.
- Q What was the momentous claim you understood the garrison had submitted to the Chinese Government?
- A I believe it was closely connected with the Dairen Conference and the Shanghai Conference which was conducted by the military officials and I believe they were thinking about putting the central control to the Army instead of in the Foreign Office.
- Q What was this momentous claim to the Chinese Government in the first few lines of your diary?
- A I don't recall what sort of a claim was made. I believe that a strong request has been made because everything depended upon how China would take it.

- Q What was the nature of the request? Did it involve the giving up of territory on the part of China?
- A Because there were incidents of factions in China taking injurious actions against Japan. I believe that the North China garrison Army probably requested that they cease taking any unfavorable and injurious action toward Japan. I do not know the content.
- A
- Q According to your diary, the North China garrison Army was taking things into its own hands, isn't that right, and were making demands on China without consulting with the Chief of Staff in Tokyo or with the Japanese Government?
- A I got this information from the Vice Minister of War, HASHIMOTO, that UMEZU, the Commander of the Japanese garrison troop in Tientsin, and HAYASHI went to Chungking and that HAYASHI, the War Minister is present there for a conference and I felt that that is a good indication that the Army was taking things in their own hands.
- Q This Chief of Staff of the Japanese garrison, SAKAI, was he closely associated with ISHIWARA and ITAGAKI?
- A I believe so. I believe this person had grievances about not receiving any medals and perhaps this dissatisfaction caused him to create an incident.
- Q He was active in the movement to expand Japanese influence in North China, wasn't he?
- A I believe so.
- Q And he and ITAGAKI were insisting upon taking matters in their own hands and not leaving negotiations up to the Foreign Office, isn't that right?
- A There were accusations that they were trying to take away the authorities within the Foreign Ministry to the Army?
- Q Is this another case of the Army in the field, such as the Manchurian Army carrying out a policy of aggression in North China without being first ordered to do so by the staff in Tokyo and by the Government?
- A Yes, I believe this is a symptom of it.
- Q Do you know whether anything was done on it by the Japanese Government to put a stop to those activities?

- A I believe this incident became exposed as a plot of the Japanese Army and that it was more or less settled without further development. I believe it was because UMEZU, the Commander, was a very sturdy and capable man.
- Q But it was an attempt on the part of certain elements in the ^{Army} to determine Japanese policy right there in the field rather than by an ordinary process of the Government, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q On May 30, later on, you refer to Vice Minister of War HASHIMOTO. Is that the HASHIMOTO of earlier days who was involved in these plots?
- A No, this is an entirely different person.
- Q It is not the Ronin HASHIMOTO we mentioned a little while ago?
- A No, he is not a Ronin. This is a Lt. General.
- Q What was the calumny case that you mention in the last part?
- A I have no recollection of it.
- Q Was there, at that particular time, actual fighting taking place in North China between the garrison Army and the Chinese?
- A I believe there was a little clash there but it was settled soon after.
- Q At that time, Japan had not moved into North China out of Manchuria but only had garrison troops stationed there under treaties. Isn't that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Although there were many in military circles that were pressing the moving of troops into North China, wasn't there?
- A At that time, there wasn't any indication that they wanted to go from Manchuria at that time?
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- Q You think that was sort of between the two campaigns? Between the Manchurian and China incidents?
- A Yes.

- Q Was there a great deal of concern in those days that this incident might spread into a war with China and the Army might take this incident as an excuse to move in?
- A I believe that if this incident wasn't handled well, the problem of self-defense may have arisen over it. We were very much worried.
- Q On June 10, you refer to a Mr. YADA who was a councilor to the Manchurian Government. In connection with the creation of the so-called independent Manchurian Government, was it true that Japan had certain councillors present that advised the Government and made it possible for Japan to maintain control indirectly over the Government?
- A Yes, within the Manchurian Government, there are several Japanese councillors and this person was just one of the councillors.
- Q It was really by virtue of the use of councillors that Japan maintained influence and control in Manchuria and really caused it to be what we call a puppet government?
- A Yes, I believe so.
- Q You think the facts pretty nearly speak for themselves that the Manchurian Government was not independent but Japanese controlled, don't you?
- A Yes, it was evident.
- Q And when Japan, as a Government held out to the League of Nations and the world that it really was an independent Manchuria, that was a misrepresentation, was it not?
- A Formerly, it was an independent country. It was proclaimed that Manchukuo is a five-people republic and that Japan has been giving aid and assistance in that respect. It had that sort of a shape or manifestation.
- Q You agree with me that Manchukuo was a puppet state of Japan, do you not?
- A Actually it was so but the Japanese Government as a nation cannot admit the fact that it was a puppet state.

Q Yes, and by refusing so to admit, it was really misrepresenting the true situation in its dealings with the League of Nations and the world at large, was it not?

A Yes.

Q Why, in your opinion, was it that the Government was willing to make that misrepresentation? Was it fear of the military group that caused the Government to take that stand?

A I believe the Government did not have any other recourse because the military situation had become completely unsettled.

Q Japan had the alternative of stating truthfully that she really was in Manchuria and controlling the Empire of Manchuria through councillors rather than trying to take the position that Manchuria was completely independent and could have so said publicly, couldn't she?

A Undoubtedly it can be done. If the civil government took such a stand, the military government will take place and push their program through.

Q It was the militarists in Japan that really forced the foreign office to take that stand in its relation with other nations and the real reason the stand was publicly taken was to admit the truth of the facts would be an admission that the Nine-Power Treaty had been violated. Isn't that true?

A Yes.

Q So the Government of Japan, knowing that the Nine-Power Treaty had been violated deliberately concocted this puppet state theory in order to try to maintain that it had not been violated. That is true, isn't it?

A Yes.

Q Were there any people in the Government in those days that openly advocated taking or expressing the true situation in Manchuria rather than this concoction in order to cover up the violation of the treaty or did everybody agree that this misrepresentation should be made knowingly and purposely?

- A Individually, there were persons that were opposed or indignant about the situation but I do not remember anyone taking an open stand.
- Q When the matter finally came up for discussion, the consensus of opinion was to take the position that Manchuria was totally independent and everybody knew it really wasn't. Is that a fair statement?
- A I believe that those who are well versed in the matter, understood it as an intrigue of the Army.
- Q But they condescended to go along and participated in the intrigue and didn't do anything about bringing it in the open. Is that right?
- A No, it was not publicly said to that respect.
- Q Did the Emperor, himself, voice any objection to this misstatement of the true statement being made in Japan's foreign relations with other nations.
- A The Emperor was very much concerned and he had no other recourse because the Government made various explanations and gave advice and as a consequence, the Emperor had no other course to take.
- Q He had the possible recourse of suggesting and recommending that the true situation be disclosed. It was physically possible for him to take that stand, wasn't it?
- A The Emperor had no recourse because traditionally or as a common practice, the Emperor had to accept everything decided upon by the Government.
- Q The true situation really was that if those in the Government that really wanted to express the true situation in Japan's foreign relations did so, they were afraid that the Government would fall and the military group would take over in greater strength than before?
- A Yes, there was such a fear.
- Q So as between the two alternatives of stating the truth in foreign relations or having the military move into the Government and take over, they chose the course of going along with the military and trying to ward off increase in military control of the Government. That is about what happened, isn't it?

- A Yes, that was of great concern, too. Looking at the course of the Manchurian affairs, one can see that as soon as the Government tried to bring forth some principles, the military brings forth a more stronger principle so all the Government can do it keep the military in check. In consequence, it was more or less dragged along with it. The Government did its utmost to minimize injury and mistakes and evils.
- Q Did you ever recommend or did the Lord Keeper, to your knowledge recommend to the Emperor that Japan should admit in its foreign relations the true situation in Manchuria rather than to try to cover up and conceal the true situation?
- A I have no recollection as to the Lord Keeper making such a blunt stand. I believe it was discussed on the side.
- Q In other words, you feel that the Lord Keeper himself was also dragged along by the military operations and the position that the military had gotten Japan in in connection with its treaties and once Japan had been forced by the military into a violation of the treaty, she decided the best thing to do was to try to explain it away rather than admit it?
- A Yes, it was swept away and the reason was that if any strong opposition were made, it felt that a worse situation would arise.
- Q Wasn't there some of this element involved - although Japan was concerned to some extent with relations with other nations and the League of Nations, it was more concerned with internal affairs which were more important at the moment than what other nations might think about what she was doing ?
- A They felt that if they made a mistake in their course or method, the militarists would take complete control and as a consequence those situations arose.
- Q And the Japanese Government was more concerned with the seriousness of her own internal Government affairs than the seriousness of the violation of treaties. As between the two, the internal affairs were of greater importance.
- A Yes.

- Q On June 15 and 18, I notice you had some talks with Mr. TANI of the Asiatic Bureau about the so-called China incident and Manchurian situation. Do you remember what he had to say on those occasions?
- A I believe he gave a talk on the progress of the North China incident which I have related a while ago and he informed us that it was settled without any serious development.
- Q (19th) Isn't it true that in those days, what the Government was concerned about was the fear that the Army in the field in North China and Manchuria would, without sanction from the Government move forward into China?
- A There was such a worry and if such a situation would arise, the matter of self-defense would come out.
- Q Well, isn't it true that these men in the field, such as ITAGAKI and SAKAI were very belligerent and quite active in fomenting trouble in North China and that the Government was very much concerned that they would start some incident so that the armies could sweep in under the guise of self-defense?
- A Yes, the Government was worried such a thing would arise.
- Q And people that were causing all this trouble for Japan at this particular period were ITAGAKI, SAKAI, ISHIWARA and DOIHARA?
- A I am not clear about DOIHARA.
- Q But the other three you agree with me on?
- A I think so.
- Q The real responsibility for this aggressive expansion that I have been talking to you about, at least in this period, falls on those three men, maybe among others?
- A I believe so and I believe that because the Commander of the Japanese Army, UMEZU, was sturdy and capable, the incident did not develop.
- Q There were a sufficient number of men in Army circles in Japan proper that sympathized with the thought of moving into North China; that the military never did take a very strong stand to make it impossible for these three men and others to create these incidents. Isn't that true?

- A Looking at the results, it appears so.
- Q In other words, you had some very aggressive and vigorous men in the field and then at home you had a staff headquarters which was somewhat sympathetic with moving into North China and a rather weak policy as to controlling these incidents and preventing something taking place that might be an excuse for the Army to move in under the guise of self-defense?
- A The higher-ups in the Army did not agree to this view nor did they support it, but in the middle, that is, among the field grade men, there were many sympathizers and supporters.
- Q Such higher-ups as ARAKI and MASAKI weren't strenuously opposing what was taking place in Manchuria and China, were they?
- A ARAKI and MASAKI were probably sympathizers but the War Minister, at this time, HAYASHI, did not agree to it.
- Q In fact, the situation was so critical, so far as the possibility of incidents breaking out into open war in China, that the Emperor, on June 20 of your diary, even suggested holding a meeting in his presence in order to determine a definite foreign policy with reference to China. Is that correct?
- A The bringing forth of this matter at the Imperial Conference did not settle the problem with the military and on the other hand he felt that it would aggravate the situation, so they felt that a serious study of the matter is required.
- Q In other words, that was the reason that the Emperor didn't call such a conference. He was afraid it would aggravate the situation rather than solve anything? Is that right?
- A Any drafting of a bill for an Imperial Conference would only invite a more drastic bill from the military.
- Q Is it true that in those days, the Emperor himself was so afraid of the military that he feared that if he took a strong position against the military, he might be pushed in the background and a regime like that prior to the Meiji Restoration might come back into vogue in Japan?
- A The Emperor did not fear that a situation like that prior to the Meiji Era would return and I believe that the Emperor did want to clamp down upon the Army more firmly.

- Q The logical question would be, why didn't he do so?
- A The Government felt that a settlement of the matter at an Imperial Conference would bring forth a worse situation because the Government was weak and probably it would be swept away by the military.
- Q As I discuss this situation with you, it always seems to me that the one man in Japan that could have done something about this gradual increase in military authority was the Emperor and he sat by and permitted it all to happen. Although he talked against it privately, he never openly did much to put a stop to it. Is that true?
- A The Emperor has been saying or giving his opinions to the Chief of Staff in the formal audiences and he also has been giving his viewpoint to the War Minister but because they come with various reasons and excuses and other colorings, the Emperor had no other recourse but to go along with them.
- Q If he had taken a firmer stand, he could have, somewhere along the line, no doubt, prevented great increase in military power which finally ended up in a big power, couldn't he?
- A Because the matter of self-defense has always been clamored in relation with foreign nations, the matter becomes difficult for him to handle.
- Q If the Emperor had taken a firmer stand with the military, he no doubt could have suppressed this great increase in military control, couldn't he?
- A The Emperor alone could not do it unless the Government is strong, too.
- Q Don't you think that if the Emperor had taken the stand that he wanted Japan not to be aggressive and not to have great military strength, he was sufficiently respected so that the military would have complied if he was firm in his statement rather than just acquiescing and giving in little by little?
- A Theoretically, the Emperor could do it, but actually due to the situation at this time, he could not.
- Q And is the reason why he could not because the military would not have paid any attention to him? If he called an Imperial Conference and said, "I will have no more incidents in China and if anyone causes an incident in China, I'm going to have him court-marshalled", you don't think that the Army would have paid any attention to a firm stand on his part?

- A Because the situation itself was not clear, the Emperor could not take a clear-cut stand. I believe that the Emperor had been giving very careful advice or caution to them
- Q But they weren't paying any attention to it, were they? They went right ahead with their plans.
- A But the military were making all sorts of excuses and dispatching troops and nothing else could be done.
- Q I can appreciate the first few years that took place the Emperor might well have been misled by it but after some nine or ten years, he was sufficiently intelligent, I'm sure, that he realized a lot of these excuses were false.
- A But at this time, the situation has already been completed, and therefore, the Emperor could not take any action against it. The senior statesmen and the Genro were very active in not interfering with the power of the Government to the military. Even in the case of INUKAI and OKADA, they did their utmost in keeping the military gripping hold of the Government.
- Q Yes, I appreciate that, but as I look at it, it seems to me there comes a time after many years of increase of power in the military, the leading people of the Government, through the Emperor, who was respected, certainly could have taken a firmer stand and must have realized they were being fooled into a program of aggression.
- A Yes, I believe that if the political parties were strong at that time, the situation would have been different.
- Q From what you tell me, although I certainly can't place any blame on the Emperor for creating this increase in military power and aggression, I certain come to the point where I can condemn him for acquiescing in it. Do you see my point?
- A Yes, it could not be helped.
- Q You answer it couldn't be helped but perhaps if he had openly taken a very firm stand and issued some orders to the military, they might have respected his position and avoided at least some of the later military disasters.
- A I cannot feel so. I don't believe the situation was such.

Q Well, then you think had he taken such a stand and ordered the ceasing of the creation of incidents and general withdrawal from the China situation, the military would not have paid any attention to him and would have gone ahead anyway?

A If the Emperor did give such orders, such as the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, it was unfavorable as to what sort of an incident would have developed there and perhaps on the other hand more reinforcements or more dispatches of troops might have been necessary. That is because, then, it was becoming a matter of self-defense because there are so many Japanese nationals there, the problem was very difficult to handle. The Genro and senior statesmen had done their best in taking all those matters into consideration.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred E. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 21 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred E. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S M Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~xxx~~) Henry R. Sackett, _____, _____

~~xxx~~ _____, _____, _____

certify that on the 15th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xxx~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.
Place

15 February 1946
Date

KIDO, Koichi

Extract from Interrogation of (Marquis) KIDO,
Koichi - 15 February 1946.

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Q But if we were going ahead with the list of names of the particular individuals who were most aggressive as expansionists, we would have to include him alongside of ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA.

A Yes.

Q Was he active in the war that broke out in 1941?

A I believe he was an Army commander.

Q Was he still in the China theatre, or did he operate out of Japan proper?

A I believe he went to Malaya later on.

Q Was he, to your knowledge, an advocate of driving the British and the Americans out of Asia and did he subscribe to the Asia for the Asiatics theory?

A I do not know because I did not hear a clear-cut statement concerning him.

Q But that principle was generally followed by ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA and people of that type, was it not?

A Yes.

* * *

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Q According to your diary, the North China garrison Army was taking things into its own hands, isn't that right, and were making demands on China without consulting with the Chief of Staff in Tokyo or with the Japanese Government?

A I got this information from the Vice Minister of War, HASHIMOTO, that UMEZU, the Commander of the Japanese garrison troop in Tientsin, and HAYASHI went to Chungking and that HAYASHI, the War Minister is present there for a conference and I felt that that is a good indication that the Army was taking things in their own hands.

- Q This Chief of Staff of the Japanese garrison, SAKAI, was he closely associated with ISHIWARA and ITAGAKI?
- A I believe so. I believe this person had grievances about not receiving any medals and perhaps this dissatisfaction caused him to create an incident.
- Q He was active in the movement to expand Japanese influence in North China, wasn't he?
- A I believe so.
- Q And he and ITAGAKI were insisting upon taking matters in their own hands and not leaving negotiations up to the Foreign Office, isn't that right?
- A There were accusations that they were trying to take away the authorities within the Foreign Ministry to the Army?