

CIRCULAR

OF

R. W. THOMPSON,

CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESS,

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SEVENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF

INDIANA; COMPOSED OF THE

COUNTIES OF

Hendricks, Putnam, Clay, Parke, Vermillion, and Vigo.

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**TERRE-HAUTE, INDIANA:**

**PRINTED AT THE WABASH EXPRESS OFFICE.**

**1847.**

## CIRCULAR.

FELLOW-CITIZENS:—My competitor, Mr. WRIGHT, and myself, have agreed, that, in consequence of the busy season of the year, we will make no more speeches, nor leave home with the view of electioneering, until the week before the election. This course we think you will approve, especially as it will not call you from your labor, but leave you to the exercise of your judgment, without excitement. I have reserved the right to publish this circular, because my opinions upon several important subjects of public interest, have been misunderstood in portions of the district. And there is an evident propriety in this kind of intercourse between the candidate and voters, as it leaves the latter to judge with candor and to act with deliberation. By placing my opinions before you, in this form, you can, at your homes, canvass them impartially, and then determine how far you suppose them to conflict with the true interests of the country. From the convictions they may thus produce upon your minds, it is your right and duty to act—and when you have so acted, whether the result be *for* or *against* me, you and I will have no quarrel about it. I do not pretend to set up any *claim* to your votes—I have none. If I have heretofore done that which shall entitle me to them, I must be excused for not becoming my own biographer. If, in my former political career, I have accomplished any thing of service to the country, which requires the *trumpet* of praise to be blown, you certainly cannot expect *me* to blow it.

And while I will not speak in praise of myself, I shall be equally studious to avoid speaking, in terms of censure, of my opponent. I do not admire that course of electioneering, which some politicians practice, of making wholesale war upon each other. All men have their faults, and unless one can be found who is wholly blameless, none other has the right to withdraw the mantle of charity which covers them. In politics, as in society, there is much to censure, and a good deal to praise. He who, in either station, is always *finding fault*, is very sure to be wrong himself. I have no fault to find

with Mr. WRIGHT. There is, as you all know, nowever, a radical difference of opinion between us, on great political questions, and it is only to set myself right before you, on these questions, that I adopt this form of addressing you.

It will not be expected that I should discuss, in this circular, *all* the great measures of policy which have, for years past, divided the whig and democratic parties. This would swell it to a size which neither you nor I desire. I shall, therefore, restrict myself chiefly to the question of the war with Mexico, as being of more immediate interest *now*—simply remarking, in regard to others, that I have never heard myself suspected of being otherwise than a consistent *whig*. This word embraces a political meaning, high enough for my ambition—for to be a whig, as I understand the term, is to defend the true interests of the government and people.

In relation to Internal Improvements by the General Government, I will only remark, that by the election of Mr. Polk to the Presidency, the improvement of *western* harbors, of *western* rivers and of the Cumberland Road have been abandoned on *constitutional* grounds.—He has *vetoed* a bill appropriating \$873,000 to objects in which the *west* felt a direct interest. We have now to determine whether they shall remain abandoned. If the *west* will act as if but a single spirit animated all its citizens on this subject, we shall soon be enabled to assert and maintain our rights. It will be my purpose, if elected, to aid in bringing about the consummation of this object. I am opposed to the doctrines of Mr. Polk's *veto* message on this subject, and if I should be a member of the next Congress, and the Presidential election should be brought before the House of Representatives for decision, (and this is a possible case,) I will vote for no man who maintains those doctrines. The administration and its friends occupy a very singular attitude on this question. Mr. Polk says we have *no* constitutional power to make them, *in* the United States; his *or-*

gan, the "Union," says they are only advocated by "Federalists," who want to "DIVERT MEANS FROM THE WAR"; and Mr. Dallas, Vice President, says we have the constitutional power to make a canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico! They subject the Constitution to the same sort of process as did Procrustes the victims of his cruelty, by stretching out his short guests and cutting off his long ones, to make them fit his bed. They enlarge or curtail it, by construction, to suit their party purposes. For my part, I do not think it was ever intended, by the constitution, that Congress should be prevented from removing the snags out of the rivers of the west, or any other part of the Union. I greatly prefer that mode of doing it, to knocking them out with our flat-boats, and loosing the load in doing it.

On the subject of the tariff I shall only have space to say, that I am opposed to the present *free-trade* tariff, and in favor of that of '42—the *whig* tariff. The latter *protects* our home industry—the former *abandons* it and leaves us at the mercy of England. The latter places a high duty on *luxuries*—the former has greatly *reduced* these duties, at the expense of some *nine or ten millions* of dollars to the revenue. The latter is an American tariff—the former is recommended to us by its friends, only because *England* has set the example. The latter, as experience proves, will furnish abundant revenue *at all times*—the former will not. The present state of things furnishes no test of these two measures. The failure of European crops has *temporarily* increased the demand for our products. This has increased the price—also the *exports* and *imports*. When this demand is cut off, we shall be left to our *home market*. If that is destroyed, and it will be if this *free-trade* tariff remains in force, our prices will go down lower than for years. We shall have to buy from England and pay her in *money*. This will drain us of specie and place the balance of trade against us. To avoid this state of things, and furnish revenue to pay off the public debt, I would restore

the whig tariff of 1842, with such modifications as experience may have dictated. And this can be done, if the *whigs* will only do their duty to the country.

We have already a *foretaste* of what we may expect, when the English demand for our produce shall be destroyed. The Steamship Caledonia reached Boston on the 4th day of this month, having left Liverpool on the 19th of June. By her we learn that the crops in England are more promising than for years before; and that the effect is that Flour, American wheat, corn and corn meal have all *declined* in price. This has already affected the American market. In Baltimore it has caused flour to fall from 50 to 56½ cents per barrel, and corn from 8 to 10 cents per bushel. It requires but little sagacity to see that when the English market is *fully* supplied *at home*, we shall reap the fruits of *free-trade* in most *ruinous* prices here.

It is said that we must not inquire into the *causes* of the war. There is an old maxim which prevails in the theory of the British Government, that "*the King can do no wrong*," but there is no such principle in ours. Here there is nothing connected with the affairs of government, which the *people* should not know. If the President could make war, and then send forth his partisans to persuade the people that they have no right to know *how* he did it, he may easily do any thing with impunity. What is there in a state of war to exempt an administration from public scrutiny? Shall we not know whether it is *right* or *wrong*? How shall we know whether it confers honor or dishonor upon us? Shall we take it for granted—just because it exists—that it is all right, and then go on *blindly* in its support, when, in the end, it *may* bring with it nothing but disgrace? For my own part I am unwilling to adopt such sentiments, and shall, therefore, not hesitate to speak plainly of the causes and events which led to the present unnecessary and most expensive one.

The advocates of this war assign so many causes for it, that it is difficult to say upon which they most rely, to defend it.

The most prominent only can now be noticed.

They say it was begun, because Mexico is indebted to us, and has refused to pay. To prove this, they array a long list of grievances of which they complain, and from these they show that Mexico is indebted to us in a sum somewhere between *six* and *eight millions of dollars*. Now, I am not disposed to make an issue with any body about these claims, for it is true that Mexico is indebted to us, and has not paid. That, however, is not the question. It is a higher and a different one. *Are we now at war for these claims? We are not.* And I prove this by *Mr. Polk* himself. For what purpose was our squadron removed by *him* to the coasts of Mexico, and our army sent to Texas? In his message of 2d December, 1845, (the first he delivered,) he says that since the withdrawal of Gen. Almonte, the Mexican Minister, from the U. S. in consequence of the annexation of Texas, Mexico "has been marshalling and organizing armies, issuing proclamations, and avowing the intention to make war on the United States, either by an open declaration, or by invading Texas. Both the Congress and Convention of Texas invited this government to send an army into that territory, to protect and defend them against the menaced attack. The moment the terms of annexation offered by the United States, were accepted by Texas, the latter became so far a part of our own country, as to make it our duty to afford such protection and defence. I therefore, deemed it proper, as a precautionary measure, to order a strong squadron to the coasts of Mexico, and to concentrate an efficient military force on the western frontier of Texas. Our army was ordered to take position in the country between the Nueces and the Del Norte, and to repel any invasion of the Texan territory, which might be attempted by the Mexican forces. Our squadron in the gulf was ordered to co-operate with the army."

Here Mr. Polk gives as the *only* reason for sending the squadron to the gulf, and the army to the Nueces, that it was

necessary "to protect and defend them (the Texans) against the menaced attack" of Mexico. Not one word is said about Mexican indebtedness to us. Did he not know, when he gave these orders, that they would lead to war? The order to Gen. Taylor to march to Corpus Christi was given on the 28th June, 1845, by Mr. Donelson, our Charge d'Affaires in Texas; and that to Com. Stockton was given, by the same gentleman, six days before. Both these orders were directed by Mr. Polk. And they were given too, notwithstanding Mr. Donelson had written to Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, on the 4th June, 1845, several weeks before, that he looked "upon war with Mexico as inevitable." War, for what? Why, for nothing in the world, but because Texas was annexed to the United States. This, Mr. Donelson shows by all his correspondence. It should be recollected, that this opinion of Mr. Donelson, that "war with Mexico was inevitable," was communicated to Mr. Polk before the Convention of the people of Texas met, to consider of the question, whether or no they would come into our Union—it not having met until the 4th of July, 1845. The orders to Gen. Taylor and Commodore Stockton, were also before the Convention. Now, if the President knew when he gave these orders, that war "was inevitable" from the annexation of Texas, is it not clear that he considered war as the price of annexation? Mr. Donelson told him it would lead to war, yet he persisted. And he persisted too without the knowledge of the country.—All these orders were *secretly* issued from Washington. The people knew nothing of them. Does any body suppose that if they had known that to annex Texas, war would have been "inevitable," they would have consented to it? Mr. Clay, it is true, had declared that it would be—that "the annexation of Texas and war with Mexico were identical," but this Mr. Polk and his friends had flatly denied.—Now, however, it is shown, that before the act of annexation was consummated, that is, before Texas had consented to it—the friends of annexation agree amongst

themselves that if Texas is annexed to the United States "*war with Mexico was inevitable*," and yet they go on and annex it, even at the cost of bloodshed! And all this time they say not *one word* about what Mexico owes us? It is all *annexation* and the *protection of Texas*.

Nor does Mr. Polk say one word about our claims against Mexico being the *cause* of war, in his *war* message to Congress, on 11th May 1846. He complains that Mexico had not received our Minister, Mr. Slidell; declares that on the 13th of January 1846 he had ordered our troops to march from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande, and says that *after* Gen. Taylor had "arrived on the left bank of the Del Norte "[Rio Grande,] on the 28th of March 1846, "the Mexican forces assumed a *belligerent* attitude, and on the 12th of April Gen. Ampudia, then in command, notified Gen. Taylor to break up his camp within twenty-four hours and to retire beyond the Nueces river, and *in the event of his failure* to comply with those demands, announced that *arms, and arms alone*, must decide the question." Here the President admits that Mexico did not "assume a *belligerent* attitude" until after Gen. Taylor had reached the Rio Grande; and that Gen. Ampudia had *even then* declared that the question must be settled by "*arms*" only "*in the event*" of Gen. Taylor's refusal to withdraw his troops from the Rio Grande. This admission shows, conclusively, that when this message was communicated to Congress, Mr. Polk considered the march of our troops to the Rio Grande as the *whole* cause of the war: for after telling Congress that General Taylor had arrived on the Rio Grande on the 28th of March 1846, he then tells them that "*no open act of hostilities was committed until the 24th of April*;" twelve days after Gen. Ampudia had requested Gen. Taylor to withdraw his troops. As Gen. Taylor was bound to obey the order of the President, and could not, without the President's consent, withdraw the troops, and as Mexico did not commit any "*open act of hostilities*" until after the army had remained on the Rio Grande, (fortifying Fort Brown, opposite to Matamoros,) from the 28th of March to the 24th of April, it is as clear as noon-day, that our occupation of the Rio Grande was the cause of the war. This occupation of the Rio Grande, Mr. Polk says, was made to "protect and defend" Texas, *in the event of her consenting to be annexed to the United States*. The annexation of Texas, therefore, was the cause of the war.

Is it not little singular, that if this war were brought on in consequence of injuries inflicted on the *United States* by Mexico, not a word is said about these injuries in Mr. Polk's messages *before* the war? Not only is he silent on the subject, but in all the letters which passed between Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Donelson, there is *nothing* to be found about them. *Every where* it is insisted that if we annex Texas, Mexico will invade her, and that *then* we must fight to "*protect and defend*" Texas!

The *first* word we have heard from Mr. Polk on the subject of "the wrongs which we have suffered from Mexico," is in his *second* message to Congress, on the 8th of December 1846. The war was *then* raging with great violence. The battles of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and of Monterey had been fought. We had "captured without bloodshed" "(as Mr. Polk said in this message) "the province of *New Mexico*, with Santa Fe, its capital." We had taken "military possession of the Mexican provinces of New Mexico, New Leon, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and the Californias, a territory larger in extent than that embraced in the original thirteen States of the Union." We had blockaded, with our squadrons the forts of Mexico and had cut off her "import and export trade." We had thus made ourselves conquerors of nearly *two thirds* of Mexico; and in the very message, which announced these facts to Congress, do we hear, for the *first time*, about "the wrongs which we have suffered from Mexico." *After the war is begun* he goes to work, deliberately, hunts up old Congressional reports, to find out some excuse for a *tirade* against Mexico, and presents to the country a most formidable array of grievances. And he no sooner issues this manifesto to his party, than all at once, the whole country is surprised to hear what no body ever before then, suspected—that we are at war with Mexico *because* she owes us money and refuses to pay it! Ever since then his supporters have dwelt wholly upon the "*wrongs*" which we have suffered from Mexico, and it is almost impossible to get them to talk about any thing else. If we talk of the President having made war without the consent of Congress or the people—the only response is, *Mexico owes us and wont pay*. If we talk of the Nueces as the boundary of Texas, we get the same reply. And so to every question growing out of the war. The truth is, that our claims against Mexico had no more to do with the present war, than they have to do with the war in Afghanistan. The President plung-

ed the country into it, recklessly and without cause, and only pitched upon this pretence to escape the consequences of his act. It was an *after-thought*; manufactured as a sort of apology for that which could not be justified.

But is the failure of Mexico to pay us money she owes us, just cause of war? We very well know that the government of Mexico has been in an embarrassed condition for many years, that the people are generally poor, and that they are constantly excited and convulsed by revolutions which follow each other in rapid succession. It is not *criminal* that she should fail to pay, when she has not the means. If it were, the State of Indiana and several other States of the American Union, would be culpable for having failed, for several years to pay their creditors. And the general government itself, would not escape censure. There are innumerable instances of its failure to pay just debts. Take, for example, the case of that glorious old patriot, Col. Francis Vigo, who, when Gen. George Rogers Clark's army was marching through the wilderness, more than fifty years ago, without food, clothes or money, actually advanced \$10,000 in specie to feed, clothe and pay them. Col. Vigo died a short time ago, in *extreme poverty*, and not *one dollar of this money has ever been paid back to him by the U. States.* The government pleads the *statute of limitations!* And yet those who control the government, are now pretending that they are at war with an *impoverished Republic*, because she fails to pay her debts. Such pretence is an insult to the good sense of the country.

But these claims are of old standing. They existed during Gen. Jackson's administration, and he recommended to Congress, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, and settle them in that way. But Congress *refused to do it.* The result was another demand and a treaty in 1839 providing for a joint commission which should sit for 18 months, to settle the amount due. This commission passed upon and adjudicated claims to about \$2,000,000, before the 18 months expired. Another treaty was made and laid before our Senate, when modifications were suggested. These were not consented to by Mexico, and the annexation of Texas cut off the whole negotiation. Had it not been for that, which Mexico considered a national insult, the whole would probably have been adjusted before this time. It is very certain that *no body considered it a cause of war until after the war begun.*

The next cause assigned for the war is, that it was necessary to *repel invasion.* The President in his message of 11th May 1846 says. "But now, after reiterated menaces Mexico has passed the *boundary of the U. States,* [the Rio Grande] has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon *American soil.*" This pretence is equally untrue as the former. The Rio Grande never was the boundary of the United States. All the right which we have acquired to territory beyond the Sabine, was acquired by the annexation of Texas. It will be easy to show that Texas had no claim to the Rio Grande.

It must be agreed by all that Texas had no claim to territory except what she acquired by her *revolution.* This gave her a legal claim to the whole extent of the country participating in the revolution, but no farther. What was this extent? After Mexico had become independent of old Spain, the several Mexican States united together under a confederated form of government resembling our own, all the States being subject to the laws of the general government. The States of Texas and Coahuila, under this arrangement, had a common Congress or legislature for the transaction of their State affairs, but the line dividing them was well defined and understood. It can be seen on any of the old maps. On *Tanner's map of North America,* published in 1827, the line of Texas is laid down as follows; commencing at the mouth of the Nueces river, following the course of that river about 150 miles, thence in a north western direction about 150 or 200 miles and from this point directly *north* to Red river. This *western* line, which ran north and south, was only about 150 miles west of where is now the city of Austin in Texas, and not more than 100 west of San Antonio. All the territory west of this line belonged to the State of Coahuila and all South and South-west of the Nueces to the State of Tamaulipas. On *Mitchell's map of Texas,* published in 1839, three years after Texan independence, this *western* line is extended, but the Nueces is still put down as the line between Texas and Tamaulipas. I have not seen a single map, made *before the war,* on which any other line than the Nueces is marked out. *Mrs. Holley,* in her work on Texas, states that the boundary is the Nueces. Mr. David B. Edwards, in his history of Texas, published in 1836, says that the Nueces is the boundary, and that this river divides Texas from the States of Coahuila and Tamaulipas. Mr. Henry S. Foote, in his work on "Texas and

the Texans," published as late as 1841, says, Texas "extends along the Gulf of Mexico, from the Sabine and Red rivers on the north-east to the Nueces on the south-west, stretching back into the interior to a distance of about *two hundred miles*," and in the same work he frequently speaks of San Antonio and Goliad, both near the San Antonio river, east of the Nueces, as being on the "*western frontier*" of Texas. At one place when speaking of the Mexicans under Gen. Cos having crossed the Nueces and reached Goliad, he calls it "the actual advance of the enemy to the neighborhood of the *Texan boundary*."

Here is a mass of *disinterested* evidence bearing on this question rarely to be found upon any controverted point—and it all proves the same thing, that the *Nueces* is the boundary. It would be sufficient to establish this line by any of the known rules of evidence. But this is not all. Texas, herself, has furnished such evidence as would remove all doubt, if any existed, on the mind of any man who would take the trouble to investigate the question. In 1832 and 1833, she formed a constitution, with a view to separation from Coahuila, and to be formed into a separate *Mexican State*. This constitution made express provision that "*The State of Texas shall include all the country formerly known as the Province of Texas*," this province never having extended beyond the Nueces. It divided the State into Senatorial districts, and *all* these were east of the Nueces. Here is conclusive *Texan* evidence that the Nueces was always considered the boundary. But there is even more than this. The people of Texas, under this new constitution sent Stephen Austin to the city of Mexico to get the "General Congress" to recognize their separate existence as a Mexican State, and in their petition to Congress they assign as a reason for their separation from Coahuila that, "*the wild extent of wilderness, forming a natural boundary between Texas and Coahuila, places an impassable barrier in the way of Coahuila's extending the efficient means of defence she might wish*." This wide "extent of wilderness" it will be recollected, is between the Nueces and the Rio Grande—extending from the Gulf, in a north-western direction, for many hundred miles. Now, I submit to the candid judgment of every man whose mind is not cankered with the rust of party prejudice, whether more conclusive evidence than this is necessary to establish the boundary line of any State in the world. It is of equal

strength with that which fixes the Ohio river as the line between Kentucky and Indiana.

As the Nueces is shown to be the *true* boundary between Texas and Mexico, it is important to know how Texas pretends to justify her claim beyond it. A few words will show this. At the battle of San Jacinto, which took place in 1836 and was the decisive battle of the Texan revolution, Santa Anna was taken prisoner by the Texan army. It was natural that he should have desired his liberty, and to get this, he entered into an "*agreement or compact*" (not a *treaty* as Mr. Polk and his friends call it,) which may be found at length, in the work of Mr. Foote, to which I have referred already. This "*agreement*" pledged Santa Anna, upon his "*inviolable parole of honor*," that he would "*procure*" the ratification of a *treaty* with "*the proper and legitimate government of Mexico*" making the Rio Grande the boundary of Texas. It further required that this *treaty* should be "*negotiated with that government, [Mexico] at the city of Mexico, by ministers Plenipotentiary to be deputed by the government of Texas, for this high purpose*." This admits, upon the part of the authorities of Texas, that *up to that time* they had no title to the Rio Grande, and it also admits that Mexico *had* title. All that Texas could acquire of this territory was to be obtained by a *treaty* to be made thereafter, "*at the city of Mexico*." But this *treaty* was never made. Texas never sent a minister to Mexico to make it. Mexico never sent a minister to Texas. No negotiation of any sort was ever had between the two governments. Santa Anna charged Texas, soon after his release, with a violation of the "*agreement*" and protested against it. Texas, then, to retaliate, passed an act by her Congress, resolving that she *would have* the Rio Grande, *whether Mexico would consent or not*. This it will be seen was not obtaining territory by *revolution*, for the country thus claimed had never revolted against Mexico. It was Mexican territory—inhabited by Mexican citizens, who in the war between Texas and Mexico, had fought on the side of Mexico. This act of the Texan Congress, however, was designed to change the nature of their citizenship—that is, to change them from Mexicans to Texans *against their consent*. And this is the *whole* claim which Texas has or ever had to the Rio Grande. It is this to which Mr. Polk refers, in his *war* message of 11th May 1846, when he says. "The Congress of Texas, by its act of December 19, 1836, had declared the Rio del Norte [Rio Grande] to be the boundary of that

Republic." Does it not appear, to the mind of a plain and honest man, not a little singular that a state can acquire territory simply by *her own legislation*? Mr. Polk claims this territory upon no other ground.

If Texas, then, had no territory beyond the Nueces, what *right*, under the constitution, had Mr. Polk to order Gen. Taylor to march our army to the Rio Grande? Texas had obtained a promise from Mr. Polk, (she had formerly obtained the same of Mr. Tyler;) that in the event that Mexico should *invade* her in consequence of annexation, our army should be marched *into Texas* for her "protection and defence." This agreement was made by the *President*, without the knowledge or consent of Congress, and could only be executed, constitutionally, *after* annexation, and then the President had no power to send the troops beyond the true limits of Texas. The government of Texas made an effort to get General Howard, while he was our Charge d'Affairs in Texas, to remove the troops beyond the Sabine—but he refused to do it, because the President had no constitutional power to move them beyond the line of the United States. This refusal was *before* annexation, but the constitutional power of the President was the same *after* as *before*. After Texas was annexed then, and became a part of the United States, the President had the power to move the troops any where within her just limits, "to protect and defend" her, but as Gen. Howard had decided, he could not go beyond those limits, for he would then be going *out of the United States*.

Now, it being true that the Nueces was always the recognized boundary of Texas; that the territory between it and the Rio Grande had always been in *possession of Mexico* and *never* of Texas; that the citizens of that territory did *not* participate with Texas in her revolution; that Texas had recognized the right of Mexico to it, *after* the battle of San Jacinto; that Mexico never ceded it to Texas by treaty, or in any other mode; that Texas never sent a minister to Mexico to treat for it; and that the United States acquired by the act of annexation no right but what Texas had, is it not incontrovertibly clear that the President had no right or power to march our troops to the Rio Grande, and thereby disturb the *peaceable possession* of Mexico? Was not the march of the troops beyond the Nueces and the great desert, a march beyond the limits of Texas, and, consequently, beyond the limits of the United States? No unprejudiced mind can doubt that it was.—Then the President, as Gen. Howard had previously determined, violated the Constitution by this act of *invasion*. For it was an *invasion* of Mexico—an invasion of territory which was in

*possession* of Mexico, and which Texas had admitted to belong to her. It was *an act of war*. Such an act, to invade a country with an armed force, is considered an act of war by both civilized and savage nations. And that the President *intended* it to be an act of war, several plain facts will prove. I have already shown that Mr. Donelson, as early as June, 1845, had written to the administration, that "*war with Mexico*" was "*inevitable*." On the 2d of June, 1845, he also wrote to Mr. Buchanan that it was best not to "incur the risk of *embarrassing the question of annexation* with the consequences of *immediate possession* of the territory to the Rio Grande." In the same letter, he says—"You will find that I have *guarded every point*." In another letter, on the same day, he explains to Mr. Buchanan, what he means by *guarding every point*. He says "it appeared to me wiser to look for some *advantage* from the *assailing movement* threatened by Mexico." His whole correspondence shows that this "*advantage*" was to be obtained by annexation, (knowing, as he said, that *war* would then be "*inevitable*,") and driving Mexico to an "*assailing movement*" against us, so that our army could *then* march to the Rio Grande and take the country by *conquest*. This is *indicated* in his letter to Gen. Taylor, of the 28th of June, 1845, ordering him to march the army from Fort Jessup to Corpus Christi. He says to General Taylor, "You can *safely* hold possession of Corpus Christi, and all other points up the *Nueces*; and if Mexico attempts to dislodge you, *drive her beyond the Rio Grande*." But it is clearly stated, without equivocation, to Mr. Buchanan, in a letter of 23d of June, 1845, wherein he says, if Mexico undertakes a renewal of the war, *in consequence of the annexation of Texas to our Union*, "she of course puts upon the hazard of war the *whole claim*, and gives us the right of going *not only to the Rio Grande, but wherever else we may please*:" thus avowing that we may then prosecute a war of *conquest*. A war of *conquest* being *confidentially* agreed upon between the administration and Mr. Donelson, he is left to obtain the necessary "*advantage*" over Mexico, so that there may be some shadow of pretext for such a war. They very well knew that if they could get Mexico to fire the *first gun*, this "*advantage*" would be obtained. Accordingly, *before* the people of Texas had met in convention to determine whether or no they would be annexed to the United States, Gen. Taylor is ordered to Corpus Christi. If the Rio Grande was the line of Texas, and his whole object was to extend *aid and protection to Texas*, why did he stop General Taylor at Corpus Christi? Why did he not at once march him to the Rio Grande? The reason is obvious, as explained by Mr. Donelson, it was to obtain some "*advantage*" over Mexico, and then drive her "*not only to the Rio Grande, but wherever else we may please*." Therefore, Gen. Taylor was ordered to stop at Corpus Christi, which he was told he could hold "*in safety*."—



This order was dated 28th June, 1845. General Taylor remained at Corpus Christi until the 11th March, 1846, seven or eight months. After all this delay the President saw, very clearly, that he could get no "advantage" of Mexico by getting her to make an "assailing movement" upon our troops, as she was no more ready to invade Texas than she had been in 1845. He, therefore, issued an order from Washington, on the 13th of January, 1846, while Congress was in session, commanding General Taylor to march to the Rio Grande. General Taylor had no discretion about this movement, and accordingly obeyed it, and took possession of Point Isabel and Fort Brown, on the Rio Grande, about the last of March. At this time there were a plenty of Mexican citizens, but no Mexican soldiers east of the Rio Grande; and Gen. Taylor took possession of the east bank without resistance. He commenced fortifying Fort Brown and pointing our cannon from its battlements towards the city of Matamoros. But Mexico made no attack. I have already shown that Ampudia requested him to withdraw, and that he declined because he had no power to do otherwise. This request was made on the 12th of April, 1846, and if Gen. Taylor had been permitted to exercise any discretion in the matter, and had then marched his army from the country in possession of the Mexicans, it is pretty certain we should have had no war. He had no such discretion, but being ordered by the President, the commander-in-chief of the army, he was compelled to occupy the Rio Grande. What else was it expected that Mexico should do than defend her own possessions? The American army was in the midst of her citizens, and these citizens were fleeing to the west side of the Rio Grande for protection, abandoning their homes and property.—Under such circumstances, if a foreign army were to march into the United States, how many are there who would refuse to fly immediately to arms? Although every American citizen would be then ready to fight, yet we have men in this country who are endeavoring to excite unjust prejudice against Mexico, because she defends her soil—as if patriotism did not prompt every man to defend his home and country, wherever that home or country may be. What right have they to presume that the Mexican does not love his country and kindred? Would we not despise him, beyond measure, if, even in a war with us, he should lie down in tame submissiveness? And yet if any man is bold enough to say that the administration has brought on this war unnecessarily, he is charged with sympathizing with Mexico, and is called a "Mexican Whig"! Such clamorous patriots as these, who urge others to go to war, but take good care to stay at home themselves, are looking out for political capital and it matters but little to them how much blood is shed, so their own remains unspilled. Major Jack Downing, a very sagacious judge of human nature, speaking of these getters up of war, said,

they all professed to be very willing to shed the last drop of their blood for their country, but there were precious few of them willing to spill the first drop.

If the Rio Grande were the boundary of Texas, why did not the Congress of the United States, in the act which annexed Texas to this country, so declare it to be, and thus define the extent of the territory acquired? This would have been treating the question fairly, and would have informed us what our government was about. But such a course of open dealing was not consistent with the designs of the annexation party. Tyler had made a secret treaty, for annexation, with Texas, and this example of secrecy became contagious. It has been practiced to such an extent, in carrying out this project of annexation, that our government has become secretly pledged to defend this title of Texas to the Rio Grande. I say secretly pledged, and the facts will prove it. Texas did not ask us to take her into our Union—we asked her to come in. She had asked to be annexed, during the administration of Mr. Van Buren, but he declined having any thing to do with it. All the solicitations, therefore, came from us. After the rejection of the Tyler treaty, by the Senate, we set to work a system of instrumentalities, to persuade her to consent to annexation. We sent Gen. Murphy as Charge d'Affaires to Texas, to execute this task, and in the prosecution of it he secretly pledged to Texas, that if she would consent to annexation, the government of the United States would defend her claim of title to the Rio Grande. One not acquainted with the arts of diplomacy would have supposed that, when this pledge was made known at Washington, it would have been repudiated at once, for the plain reason, that there was no law of the United States authorizing the President to make such a pledge. But the facts show that it was not repudiated either by Mr. Tyler or Mr. Polk, and that it was the execution of this pledge which led to this war.

On the 6th of August, 1844, after the death of Gen. Murphy, the Secretary of State of Texas wrote to Gen. Howard, the successor of General Murphy, notifying him that Santa Anna was making efforts "to raise funds in Mexico, and an army of thirty thousand men, for the subjugation of Texas," reminded Gen. Howard of "the assurances given to this government [Texas] by Gen. Murphy, Charge d'Affaires of the United States, on the 14th of February," 1844, and requested him, that he would, "as early as convenient, take the necessary steps to cause to be carried into effect these measures, and to extend to Texas the aid which the present emergency requires." What were these "measures" which Gen. Murphy had promised to Texas to "aid" her in that "emergency"? Nothing more nor less than that our troops should be sent into Texas to defend her against Mexico. Now, let every reader of this circular, remark, that these "assurances" of Gen. Murphy were given to Texas on the 14th

of February, 1844, and that the act of our Congress, providing for the annexation of Texas, was not passed until the 2d of December, 1844, *nearly ten months after*, and then let him answer the question, *what right had the administration to make such pledge to Texas*, in the absence of any law to authorize it, and without the knowledge or authority of the people of the United States? It was the giving of this "assurance," that we would send troops to Texas, *before annexation*, and the persisting in it by binding the government to defend the claim of Texas to the Rio Grande, that *brought on this unnecessary war*.

How did Gen. Howard treat this demand of the Texan Secretary of State? Just as any other honest patriot and true hearted man, (as he was,) who did not desire to see his country engaged in such *bargains*, would have done. He desired the annexation of Texas, but he did not wish to have it at the expense of *war and bloodshed*, and he knew that this marching of our troops to Texas would produce war at once—for what business had our troops in Texas *before annexation*? On the same day on which General Howard received the letter of the Secretary, and with great promptness, he replied to it, *positively refusing to execute Gen. Murphy's promises*.—He said to him that he was "not able to perceive that an assurance given that the military power should be used, *so far as it CONSTITUTIONALLY might*, to repel invasion, *during the pending of the treaty*, (to which alone Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Van Zandt seem to have had reference,) *would raise an obligation on the President of the United States to interpose, by affording military aid to Texas, in the present emergency*." Had the decision of Gen. Howard been persisted in by our government, we should not have become involved in those subsequent measures which led to the war. But it was not persisted in. It was *reversed* by Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Tyler's Secretary of State, on the 17th of September. Immediately after Gen. Howard's death, he wrote to Mr. Donelson, Gen. Howard's successor, giving him authority, if he thought fit, "to make requisition on either or all of the commandants of the forces at Forts *Jesup, Towson, or Washita*, for such portions of their respective commands as may be deemed necessary for the purpose, *to be marched and stationed at such points as you* [Mr. Donelson] *may*, on consultation with the Texan authorities, deem best adapted to secure the object, either within the limits of the United States, or, *if requested by the government of Texas*, within its limits, it being understood that the objects are limited to the fulfilment of our treaty stipulations." This made Mr. Donelson commander-in-chief of the army, and having this immense power in his hands, he commenced *trading for annexation* with it. He had now complete power to *pledge* the government. When Mr. Polk came into office, this same power was continued in his hands, for it was upon *his order* that

Gen. Taylor marched to Corpus Christi. And he shows, in his correspondence with Mr. Buchanan, how he used it. In a letter of July 11, 1845, he explains the anxiety of Texas to get our government pledged to defend her claim to the Rio Grande, and speaks of a contemplated movement in the Texas convention to "exhibit in strong terms the *expectation of Texas* that the *Rio Grande will be maintained as the boundary*" in the event of annexation. This contemplated movement, however, was put down, but does any body *now* believe that the pledge to maintain this boundary was not given? He would be very blind to passing events to believe so; for I have already shown that Mr. Donelson wrote to the administration that we might do it, by getting the "advantage" of Mexico, and getting her to adopt "aggressive measures," and then marching "*to the Rio Grande and wherever else we please!*" And thus becoming involved in this promise, Mr. Polk has attempted to execute it, and, without the authority of law or the Constitution, has *brought on this war*. He has undertaken, of his own will, to determine *where* the boundary of Texas is, although the act of Congress annexing Texas, says it *shall* be determined by negotiation and "adjustment" with "other governments"—that is, with Mexico. Who gave him this right? and whence does he derive authority to act in open opposition to a law of Congress? The people must determine these questions. And it is of the highest importance to their *future* prosperity, that they do it *calmly* and without passion.

I can hardly treat with seriousness the argument that the war was brought on by the refusal of Mexico to receive our minister, Mr. Slidell.—Those who make it, know perfectly well that *more than two months before Mr. Slidell demanded his passports, Gen. Taylor had been ordered to march to the Rio Grande, and a strong fleet was assembled in the Gulf!* Why was Mr. Slidell sent to Mexico? General Almonte, the Mexican minister, had withdrawn from this country upon the passage of the act annexing Texas; and after the return of Mr. Shannon, the predecessor of Mr. Slidell, we had no minister there. But the President received *intimations* that the Mexican government would yet receive a *commissioner* to adjust the difficulties growing out of the Texan matter, and Mr. Slidell was sent. He demanded to be received as a *full* minister, but Mexico would not receive him in any other capacity than as *commissioner*, while our army remained in her territory and her ports were blockaded by our fleet. But Mr. Slidell's *dignity* would not let him be called "Mr. Commissioner," and when he found this out he wrote to the administration on 27th December, 1845, "that our differences must be promptly settled, either by negotiation or *the sword*." Now, it is evident that the administration *expected* that Mr. Slidell would be rejected before they sent him to Mexico, and that the course which he should pursue was all agreed upon beforehand. In one of Mr. Buchanan's letters

to him, he says, "Should the Mexican government finally *refuse to receive you*, then demand your passports from the proper authorities, and return to the United States: it will become the duty of the President to *submit the whole case to Congress*, and call upon the nation to assert its just rights and avenge its injured honor." If Mr. Slidell was to go on the *peaceable* mission of minister, why send the army and navy to Mexico? Was Mexico to be *dragooned* to receive him? Would we receive a minister or even *commissioner* on such terms? The truth is, the administration was resolved on *going* to the Rio Grande, and *any* excuse was better than *none*.

But Mr. Buchanan was *right* in one thing, at least. He said it was "the *duty* of the President to submit the whole matter to *Congress*." It *was* his duty. But he did not do it. He made the war of his *own accord*. He told Congress *nothing* about it until the war was begun. In this, then, according to Mr. Buchanan, he violated his "*duty*." And for this the American people will hold him to strict accountability, or else he may violate some *other* "*duty*," and, may be, bring on some *other* war.

An effort, rather impotent I agree, is made by the friends of Mr. Polk, to lay upon the shoulders of Gen. Taylor, the responsibility of directing that the army should be marched to the Rio Grande. It would be sufficient to reply to this, that the administration have studiously withheld *one* of the most important letters of Gen. Taylor. In his reply to a communication dated 8th July, 1845, he says, "I am gratified at reading these instructions as they confirm *my views previously communicated* in regard to the proper line to be occupied at present by our troops." To understand what Gen. Taylor's "*views*" are, we must have this letter. A *whig* House of Representatives may get it, a democratic House *never will*, for it is not to be expected that the party which labored so hard to *censure* the old hero for the capitulation at Monterey, will ever consent to publish that which *censures* their administration!

Instead of publishing this letter which *does* set forth the "*views*" of Gen. Taylor, they claim that his letter written 4th of October 1845, recommends the march to the Rio Grande. That letter says, "If *our government in settling the question of boundary makes the line of the Rio Grande an ultimatum*. I cannot doubt the settlement, will be greatly facilitated and hastened by our taking possession of one or two suitable points on or quite near that river." The plain meaning of this is, that if the government claimed the Rio Grande as the boundary, the settlement of the question would be "facilitated

and hastened" by taking possession of it. And who can doubt it? But is it treating Gen. Taylor with candor and fairness, to withhold his letter which *does* express his "*views*," and to torture into a false meaning one which *does not* express any opinion at all, except that if the *government* intends to claim to the Rio Grande, the sooner the army goes there the better. This throws the whole *responsibility* on the President. Was there ever an instance before, when the highest *civil* officer of the government sought to justify a measure of *civil* policy by the recommendation of a *military* officer? But the President and his friends *well know* that the march of our troops to the Rio Grande *was* the cause of the war, and when they find that *they* are about being held to account for it, they try to lay it on old "*rough and ready*." Let a *whig* Congress bring *all* his letters to light, and then the country can see the whole truth. I venture now to pledge, in advance, that the old veteran of many fights will, in this fight too, come off the *victor*. Why, if you will examine the *whole* of this letter of October the 4th, you will see the question settled by Taylor himself. He refers to his instruction from the war department of June 15th, 1845, directing him to "select and occupy, *on or near the Rio Grande*, such a site &c." Here he shows that the Secretary of War had directed him to go to the Rio Grande as early as June, 1845, but he received the *second* order, that of 13th January 1846, *before he went!* And both these orders were given when General Taylor did not think there was any danger of war with Mexico, from his occupying Corpus Christi. In this letter of 4th of October he says, "*Mexico having as yet made no positive declaration of war, or committed any overt act of hostilities*, I do not feel at liberty, under my instructions, particularly those of July 8, to make a *forward movement to the Rio Grande without authority from the war department*." He saw that all was peace there, and he knew that to go to the Rio Grande would be *war*, therefore, he would not go without positive instructions. And so reluctant was Gen. Taylor to move from Corpus Christi, that on the 7th of January 1846, he wrote to the war department that, "In this part of the country the people are *in favor of peace*, and I should judge of a *treaty with the United States*." And this same idea is conveyed in other letters. But this state of things did not suit Mr. Polk and he disturbed this peace by an act of *war*. But Gen. Taylor puts this whole matter right in a subsequent letter to the War Department.

On 7th of November 1845, speaking of his letter of the 4th of October, he says. "*The intelligence from Mexico, however, tends to modify in some degree the views expressed in that communication.* THE POSITION NOW OCCUPIED BY THE TROOPS, [Corpus Christi] MAY PERHAPS BE THE BEST. WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE PENDING, or at any rate until a disposition shall be manifested by Mexico to protract them unreasonably." From this it will be seen that, if he had ever advised the march to the Rio Grande, this advice was *withdrawn* afterwards, and that this *withdrawal* was before the President at the date of the order of the 13th January, 1846. So far therefore, from the issuance of this order having been advised by Gen. Taylor, it was directly *against his advice* in his letter of the 7th November. So much, then, for Gen. Taylor's agency in bringing on this war. He has done the *fighting part of it*, but had nothing to do with the measures which brought it on. It is an assault upon his fame to insist that he had.

The constitution says, "*Congress shall have power to declare war,*" not the President. The President, then, in ordering Gen. Taylor to march to the Rio Grande, knowing *as he did know*, that it was an act of war, violated this provision of the constitution. Congress, at the time that order was issued, 13th of January, 1846, was in session, and if any movement of the army was intended, the intention should have been made known to the *people's* representatives. But as the *people* had but little to do with the *promises* which led to annexation, it was, probably, thought best, for the purposes of the administration, that they should know *nothing* of the movements of the government, until the *war began*. Then, it being *supposed* that war was always *popular*, their national pride, and their prejudices too, would be appealed to, and the administration would get up a *war fever* in the country, and make *political capital* out of it! This is the whole *secret* of the movement. And being thus in-violation of the constitution and the law, plunged, *without knowing it*—into a war which has cost us the lives of not less than 10,000 of our valuable and patriotic citizens; Mexico, the lives of 15,000 of *her* people, (men, women and children;) which has sent sorrow to many a patriot's heart and mourning all over the land; which has thrown the widow and orphan friendless upon the world; which has drawn every dollar of money from our treasury and heaped up a public debt of probably, \$100,000,000; being engaged in *such* a war, the administration dares to tell the

American people that *they* must not inquire how all this was done; that they are "*traitors*" if they do, giving "*aid and comfort*" to the enemy! And yet while they tell us this, the *President of the United States* deliberately sets down, while Santa Anna, is in *banishment* at Havana, and *permits* him to pass the blockade of our squadron at Vera Cruz, take command of the Mexican army, unite his countrymen in the war *against* us, lead them to the field, and slay our soldiers, all under the pretence that *he* would *prefer* to have Santa Anna to command the Mexicans than *some other General!*

But thanks to old "Rough and Ready" that glorious and patriotic old veteran, and the brave soldiers who stood by him, with a firmness only equalled by that of the old French Guard, even Santa Anna has not been able to trail the "stars and stripes" in the dust. With such men as Taylor and Scott, and with such soldiers as our volunteers and regulars, what is the whole combined power of Mexico to us? No more than is the strength of a single arm to the power of the tornado.

The friends of this war are seeking to avoid a discussion of its *causes*, by insisting that *if* it shall turn out that the government is *wrong*, it will reflect discredit on our army. Not so. The regular army is in Mexico, because it is *obliged* to obey the orders of the President. or be subjected to the punishment prescribed by the rules of war. The volunteers have gone at the *call of Congress*. The first act, declaring that war existed, was passed under an *apprehension* all over the country, that Gen. Taylor and his little army of only 2500 men were about to be *cut to pieces*. And it was to *save* him that these patriotic men left their homes. They did not want to make a *conquest* of Mexico. Their object was simply to act in obedience to the call of the government. We were *in* the war. Congress passed an act in all the forms of the constitution, calling them to the field. They did not look *behind* this, but obeyed the call. Where the censure, then upon them; as patriotic and brave men as ever went to battle, men to whom we should all do honor?

But the administration and its friends have *very lately* acquired this devoted affection for the volunteer soldier. When he was scorching upon the sands of the Rio Grande and had to pack his loaded knapsack on his weary march towards the enemy—marching many miles to get even a drop of water—he could be left without the aid of baggage waggons—compelled to pay *quadruple* prices for every article which he purchased from *partisan* sutlers. When Gen. Taylor was marshalling his

devoted volunteers; fresh with the laurels they had gained at Monterey—for a further advance; when they and the regulars felt a mutual reliance upon each other, what treatment did they *then* receive from the administration? Almost every regular soldier was withdrawn, to be sent to Vera Cruz, under Scott, and Gen. Taylor was left in the very heart of Mexico, with about 5000 volunteers, (and many of them had never been in battle,) and in the immediate neighborhood of Santa Anna with an army of more than 20,000 picked men. Where *then* was their affection for Taylor and his men? Where would that little army of devoted men have been, had not old "Rough and Ready" been there? To *him* and their own invincible courage, not to this administration, do they owe the immortality with which the field of Buena Vista has decked their brows. So long as that sanguinary battle shall be remembered, so long will their countrymen delight to do honor to them and their brave old commander, who "never surrenders." That battle is the proudest event in the world's military history. Notwithstanding a man who called himself a son of Indiana, sought to bring down our brave volunteers to the level of his own cowardice, by ordering a *retreat*, when he should have led them on, *their* fame will remain unsullied, while *he* shall reap his merited reward of infamy and disgrace.

And while so many of our volunteers are now returning amongst us, let *them* look back to Mexico, and see how their old General is treated by this administration; and then tell me what affection it has either for them or him. Since I commenced writing this circular I find it announced in the southern papers, that Gen. Taylor has been *superceded in his command*, and that hereafter, as a mere *subordinate*, he shall report to *General Scott* and *through him* to the war department!—What will the country say to this, that when an old soldier has covered himself all over with glory, has shown a bravery only equalled by his judgment and modesty, the administration of his country is seeking to disgrace him? Most impotent effort! The arm of this administration is too feeble for such a task. In due time the hero of Fort Harrison, Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Monterey and Buena Vista, will receive his reward.

I cannot in this circular, already long, examine all the questions which arise out of this war, which is the *best fought* and *worst managed* war the world ever saw. Having been brought upon the country, unconstitutionally, it has been attended, in its prosecution, with a series of infractions on that instrument. The President has usurped the right of prescribing forms of government for portions of Mexico, of deposing Mexican authorities and substituting for them, *civil* officers of his own appointment; of prescribing the form of allegiance, by Mexican citizens, to the government of the United States, and of punishing those citizens with death, for its violation; he has seized upon the Custom Houses of Mexico, and has levied duties, with no law to authorize it, to be collected

and disbursed by those whom *he* appoints, without the consent of Congress or the people; he has threatened, through his "organ," to sequester the *church* property of Mexico; he has avowed openly, through the party chairmen of the committees on Foreign Affairs, in the Senate and House of Representatives, that he is prosecuting this war for *conquest*; and after having done *all* this, it is now insisted that we should *not* examine into his conduct. If the people of the United States shall suffer these things, with tame submission, the day may not be far distant when greater outrages may be perpetrated.

But what are we to do with the war? The administration and its friends say we must "*conquer a peace*," even by carrying on a war of extermination against Mexico. How is this to be done? By going in debt \$100,000,000 more? By killing Mexican men, women and children, depopulating Mexican towns and cities, and laying waste Mexican fields? Have we not lost enough of *our own* men? Shall we persist, that *others* may be killed? How *long* shall we go on in this work of destruction? These are all questions which *must* be answered *at once*—they cannot be postponed or *dodged*. Mexico is as effectually subdued now as she can be by *fighting*. We have whipped her upon *every* battle field, and shall continue to do it, as long as the war lasts. She is not able to fight us. Why prosecute the war farther *then*? Is it that our army may get glory? It is already clustering thick around it. Is it that the world may know that we are *brave*? The world knows this already. Is it merely that we may spend money? We have got none to spend. Is it that we may make a conquest of Mexican territory? We would not know what to do with it, if we had it. Is it to give a *better* government to Mexico? We have no right to prescribe a form of government for any body but ourselves. Is it to add more *slave* States to the Union? We have got slavery enough now—let the States where it exists be protected in their constitutional rights, but let it *go no farther*. Is it to carry out some "*continental policy*?" The *people* have no such policy—the *President* has no right to have any. Is it to make Presidents, and Cabinet officers, and Congressmen, and Governors? If it is, those who would thus trifle with human life, ought to be hurled from power, under the withering and scorching rebuke of every patriot in the land.

Gen. Taylor, with his far-reaching sagacity, long ago, saw that we could not "conquer a peace"—that to persist in the policy of the administration was ruinous and cruel. As far back as November 9, 1846, he wrote to Gen. Gaines as follows:

"I am decidedly opposed to carrying the war beyond Saltillo in this direction, &c."

"If we are [in the language of Mr. Polk and Gen. Scott,] under the necessity of '*conquering a peace*,' and that by taking the capital of the country, we must go to Vera Cruz—take that place, and then march on to the city of Mexico. To do so in any other direction, I consider out of the

question. *But, admitting that we conquer a peace by doing so—say at the end of the next twelve moths, WILL THE AMOUNT OF BLOOD AND TREASURE, WHICH MUST BE EXPENDED IN DOING SO, BE COMPENSATED BY THE SAME? I THINK NOT—especially if the country is to be given up, and I imagine there are but few individuals in our country who think of annexing Mexico to the United States.* This is the language of as pure hearted a patriot as ever lived. They are the words of a brave old soldier, who will always fight when it is necessary, but who does not delight in bloodshed. He has *seen* the bloody battle-field, and heard the groans of his wounded comrades, and these have sent many a pang of sorrow to his heart. It is ever thus with the *truly* brave. It is not so, however, with the President. He sits *comfortably* in Washington—calls armies to the field—devastates a whole country, and while the brave men, who hearken to his call, are suffering innumerable privations—some of them dying with disease, many miles from their kindred and friends, and others in the deadly breach of battle, no feeling of sorrow or regret comes across his heart.—Taylor looks to his *country and its honor*—the President looks to his *party and its success!*—Taylor says that if we conquer Mexico we will not “be compensated” for “the amount of *blood and treasure*, which must be expended, in doing so,”—the President says we must “conquer a peace,” though thousands more of our brave men may be killed and millions more of dollars may be spent. The country must choose between them.

But Gen. Taylor looked at this matter *practically*. In the same letter he answers the question—“*what is best to be done?*” He recommends that we take possession “of the line we would accept by negotiation,” and prosecute the war of *invasion no farther*. He then says, “a course of this kind, if persevered in for a short time, would soon bring her (Mexico) to her proper senses, and *compel her to sue for peace.*” If our government had taken this course, after the battle of Buena Vista, we should, doubtless, have had peace before now; for, by that battle we convinced Mexico and the world that she could not raise an army capable of driving us back. But instead of this we have advanced towards the capital—taken nearly every city on the line from Vera Cruz—lost many brave men, and spent millions more of money.—What for? To “conquer a peace,” says the President and his friends. But how is this to be done? How long will it take? Suppose we take the capital, is peace conquered? Great Britain once took our capital, and did any body suppose that we were conquered? If Gen. Scott shall be, to-day, revelling in the “Halls of the Montezumas,” there is, at the same time, going up from the glens and mountains of Mexico, mingled with the shrieks of women and children, the rallying cry of “no peace with the invader of our soil!” Santa Anna, feeble though he may be, in the field, is omnipotent in the arts of Mexican strategy. A few days ago he was in disgrace—*now he is dictator* ;

with a solemn pledge *against peace*. So long as he remains in Mexico *no peace can be made*. If Mr. Polk could *get him out* of Mexico, as easily as he *sent him in*, there would be some hope.—But he cannot do it. There he is, rallying his countrymen—not again, perhaps, to open battle, but to a system of *guerilla* warfare which cuts off our men and baggage trains, and which may last for years to come. What, then, is to be done? To this the *army* answers, (both officers and men,) *put a stop to the war—enough blood has already been spilt*. Every lofty principle of patriotism, the spirit of christianity, of benevolence, of magnanimity, of humanity, demands that it shall be *stopped*. The fatherless children and the anguished widows whom it has made, call to the government to *stop* it. Our already exhausted treasury, if it had the power of speech, would cry out, that it be *stopped*; and the *whole country*, if it were not for the clamors of *party*, would respond with a repetition of the cry.

Let the people interfere then—let some line be fixed. (I know not where, nor is it now important,) within which to withdraw the troops; let Mexico have time to form a government, and then let the olive branch of peace be sent there.—Let it not go accompanied with the *sword*. Mexico then, feeling herself subdued, will accept the overture, and we shall stand justified before God and the civilized world. Any other course will cost us “blood and treasure,” for which, as Gen. Taylor says, we never shall be “compensated.”

And this is the *whig* sentiment of the country, let others think and do as they may. I wish I had space to quote from those sterling *whig* journals, the “*National Intelligencer*,” the “*North American*,” the “*Boston Atlas*,” the “*United States Gazette*,” the “*Baltimore Patriot*,” the “*Louisville Journal*,” the “*Cincinnati Atlas*,” the “*Cincinnati Gazette*,” and many others, in evidence of the *whig* opinion of the country, and to show, that on this high ground the *whig* party must stand or fall. There is no *middle ground*. *Here* the battle must be fought. The *whigs* must sustain the position of Gen. Taylor, or the result must be—*God only knows what!* This high position, at the present crisis, to use the language of the “*National Intelligencer*,” is “enjoined equally by justice, humanity and religion.”

And many of those who have sustained Mr. Polk’s administration, becoming alarmed at the condition of things, are throwing off the shambles of party. The talented editor of the “*Journal of Commerce*,” one of the most influential *democratic* papers in the country, David Hale, Esq., has boldly planted himself in opposition to the administration. He says “*every thoughtful man*” must “*startle*” at our “relations with Mexico.” He continues—and let both *whig* and *democrat* ponder well upon his words: “LET MEXICO ALONE! must be proclaimed through the land.” Again—“But whatever my countrymen may please to do or say, I do not intend to live or die with any of the *blood stains of this war upon me.*”

I can say but little more in this circular, and that shall be confined to a full explanation of my own position. While I will not vote for more men or money for the purpose of *farther prosecuting this war of invasion*, and will vote for the withdrawal of the army, within a certain line in Mexico, yet I will vote to pay the soldier the highest price for his services, and I will grant him all necessary supplies, so long as he remains in Mexico. If it shall be necessary that more men and money should be voted, to defend our troops in Mexico, from an attack from superior numbers of Mexicans, I will vote them. Those who are there *must* be protected—they are our friends and brethren. But I will endeavor to withdraw them from the heart of Mexico. If this cannot be done, they must be paid, fed and clothed. The political offences of the President should not be visited upon their heads. The *law* promises them pay, and they should have it. Whether I would vote for the law which made this promise, or not, yet I would fulfil the engagement of the government. The devoted soldier, who goes to battle and exposes his life to its dangers, shall never complain that he is abandoned by *me*. As I would risk my life and all that I have in his hands, so I would increase his love of country by showing him that it could never be ungrateful to those who worship at the shrine of patriotism.

R. W. THOMPSON.

TERRE-HAUTE, IND., JULY 14, 1847.

P. S.—Since the foregoing circular was published in the columns of the "Wabash Express," I find it announced in the eastern papers, that Mr. Trist, the Chief Clerk of our Department of State, has been sent to Mexico, with authority to *suspend all military operations*, prelimi-

nary to the negotiation of peace. That such is the fact is corroborated by a letter published in the "*Kentucky Yeoman*," a *leading democratic paper*, of the 8th inst. The letter is dated "*Perote, Mexico, May 26, 1847*," and, amongst other things, says, that Mr. Trist has reached Perote, that he is a "*political agent*" of our government, and that he is charged with a variety of duties, amongst which is that of "*directing him [General Scott] when to FORBEAR operations, for the alternative of the ambassadorial functions.*"

Here we find the administration planting itself upon *whig* grounds. Finding that the idea of "*conquering a peace*," is all a *humbug*—it has, at last, concluded to "*suspend all military operations*" and "*forbear*," with a view to peace. What now becomes of the position of those who talk of *fighting* on until Mexico is annihilated? They will soon find their argument an "*obsolete idea*." This unwilling and reluctant testimony, by the administration, to the correctness of *whig* policy, will not please *them* very well, however much it may please the country. Most fervently do I hope that the army may *suspend all military operations*, and that peace may soon be made—a peace which shall be honorable to the United States and honorable to Mexico.

R. W. T.

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