

GAINS AND LOSSES FOR THE U.S.,
THE PRC, AND THE USSR RESULTING FROM THE
SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

Leonard Francis Picotte

Thesis
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GAINS AND LOSSES FOR THE U.S., THE PRC, AND THE USSR
RESULTING FROM THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
San Diego State University

In Partial Fulfillment
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by
Leonard Francis Picotte
March 1975

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Approved by:

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PREFACE

That the character of Soviet American relations, Sino-Soviet relations, and China's relations with the West have been altered drastically because of the Sino-Soviet split is undeniable. That the Sino-Soviet split has made possible the achievement of certain foreign policy objectives which would have been almost impossible to attain had the split not existed and that the Sino-Soviet split has caused certain losses for the countries involved also appears to be true.

This thesis will discuss the resultant gains and losses to the United States, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and to the People's Republic of China.

INTRODUCTION

Presently a new order seems to be emerging in Asia which would modify the old two-sides balance-of-power. The key to the emergence of this new order appears to be the Sino-Soviet split which can be interpreted as a foundation for the establishment of a new international order or balance of power--a multi-polar system vice the bi-polar system which has been evident during the past twenty years. Whether the new balance-of-power system will be primarily concerned with a tri-polar relationship--the United States, the Union of Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China¹--or a pentagonal system, which would include Japan and Western Europe, is a question which will be answered in the future. However, the Sino-Soviet split and the ramifications of accompanied Sino-American and Soviet-American relationships could set the stage for future world organization.

The Sino-Soviet split has resulted in gains and advantages for both China and the USSR in the

¹To avoid monotony and wordiness, China will refer below to the People's Republic of China (PRC) unless otherwise specified.

realization of several of their foreign policy goals and has likewise provided the United States with gains and opportunities for realizing some of her foreign policy objectives. However, the split has also weakened relationships between and created losses for the two most powerful Communist countries--two countries which could command vast power and influence if united in a friendly and solid alliance. The split, the resulting Soviet-American detente, and normalization of Sino-American relations have also created losses for the United States in the domestic and international areas.

An evaluation of the extent of the losses of the United States, the PRC, and the USSR may assist in the formulation of predictions of future responses of the countries concerned. If the losses are too great, it seems obvious that the countries involved will in some manner change their policies, thereby modifying to an unknown extent the new balance-of-power system which seems to be emerging.

PART I
GAINS RESULTING FROM THE
SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

In order to recognize the importance of the Sino-Soviet split and the possibilities it presents for the U.S., the USSR, and China, one must understand some of the factors leading to the split as well as some of the more pertinent goals and policies of the major national factors. The following discussion of these factors is general and intended to be a broad background leading to focalization on present problems.

The United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the wreckage of World War II considerably more powerful in economic and technological resources than other nations. They were clearly at the top of the international hierarchy, though with different kinds of resources--geographic, ideological, administrative, economic, military, and industrial--at their disposal. The United States and the Soviet Union became involved in an ideology conflict which led to the cold war and the division of the international world order into basically a bi-polar balance-of-power system. The Communist Bloc and ideology of world communism was seen

by the United States and her allies as their greatest threat and they followed a rigid policy of communist containment.

Bipolarity, though apparently ratified by the Test Ban Treaty and the Hot Line, and sanctified by the writings of such eminent systems theorists as Morton Kaplan,¹ carried within itself the seeds of its own demise. As the strategic relationship between the USSR and the United States became stabilized with the development of effective second-strike strategies, the conceivability of strategic war became less likely, the natural pressures for autonomy among the less powerful states began to reassert themselves, and power in all its aspects began to become more diffused. This occurred, not through a continuous process of nuclear proliferation, as it was thought it might ten years ago, but through more diverse forms of diffusion of initiative and autonomy.

At the end of World War II, China was in the grips of domestic problems and civil war while the United States backed the Chinese Nationalist Forces and the Soviets, rather than supporting the Chinese

¹Alastair Buchan, "The End of Bipolarity," *Adelphi Papers* 91 (November 1972): 22.

Communists, recommended that their Chinese comrades should seek a *modus vivendi* with Chiang Kai-shek, and that they should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army.²

It is important to note that China had traditionally viewed Tzarist Russia as the most pressing threat to her national security, as the most reactionary of any of the Western European countries, and the one country which was least susceptible to any appeal for moderation.³ However, with the introduction of the translated literature of Bolshevik Russia into China, Russia came to be recognized as one who was ready to treat China as an equal and provide assistance which would enable her to become truly independent. In 1949, the communists gained control of mainland China and formally entered into an alliance with the Soviets. This was the first deliberately chosen alliance in China's history. However, the value of the alliance was soon to be tested with the outbreak of the Korean War. As a result of the conditional Soviet support and

²David Floyd, *Mao Against Khrushchev* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 211.

³David S. Nivison, "Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition," in *China's Cultural Legacy and Communism*, ed. Ralph C. Crozier (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 88.

her lack of actual participation, China began to realize that independent action on the international stage was most important because, at that time, her concern was not Korea but Taiwan. The Chinese Communists deliberately presented their revolution as only partially complete until Taiwan was under their control. All indications are that, at that time, China was interested in nothing other than the liberation of Taiwan. The following quotes reinforce that position.

Chou En-lai (1950):

Now, in the name of the Central Peoples' Government of the People's Republic of China I declare: Despite any military steps of obstruction taken by the United States Government, the Chinese people are *irrevocably* determined to liberate Taiwan without fail.⁴

Chou En-lai (1951):

The Chinese people . . . will never give up their sacred duty of liberating Taiwan.⁵

General Chu Te (1952):

Except Taiwan, all Chinese Territory has been liberated and our national defense is more and more consolidated.⁶

⁴James Bond Stockdale, "Taiwan and the Sino-Soviet Dispute" (M.A. thesis, Stanford University), pp. 69-70.

⁵Ibid., p. 29.

⁶Ibid., p. 30.

General Chu Te (1953):

The present situation is that although the Korean War has ceased, American imperialism is still in occupation of our territory, Taiwan.⁷

The issue was undoubtedly an excellent source of patriotic stimulation when it was felt necessary to divert attention from internal problems. The chant continued, almost without regard for the world political situation or the "ebb and flow" of the mainland economy. It is therefore difficult to see why China allowed herself to become involved in Korea, unless she was almost forced into that position by the Soviet Union. There is much evidence to support that interpretation.

The Korean Communist organization, closely supervised by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has existed since the 1920s. Hundreds of Korean Communists had served in the Soviet Army. Others had served with the Soviet intelligence agencies and the NKVD. After World War II, many of these Koreans returned to their country with dual Soviet-Korean citizenship; they maintained close ties with Moscow during the initial "liberation" of North Korea. Many of the senior North Korean Army officers had had extensive experience on active duty with the Soviet Army.

⁷Ibid.

The Commander in Chief, General Kim Il-sung had served in the USSR.⁸ Chief of Staff and Chief of the Security Agency, General Nam Il was a Soviet citizen who had fought the Germans at Stalingrad as Chief of Staff of a Soviet division, and had helped liberate Warsaw.⁹

In 1949, Korean soldiers were trained and equipped in Siberia. Aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons, and naval mines were supplied by the Soviets at that time.¹⁰ On March 17, 1949, a Soviet-Korean trade, technical assistance, and credit agreement was signed. Some sectors of the North Korean economy (notably oil and shipping) came under direct Soviet control through joint-stock companies.¹¹ In short, in the summer of 1950, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) gave every appearance of being a full-fledged Soviet satellite.¹²

⁸David J. Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1961), p. 61.

⁹Pawel Monat, "Russians in Korea: The Hidden Bosses," *Life Magazine*, 27 June 1960, p. 100.

¹⁰Dallin, p. 62.

¹¹Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 42.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 34.

History shows that the relationship between the Chinese and the North Korean Communists was less amicable. Immediately after World War II, the North Korean Communist Party persistently purged and weeded out the anti-Soviet, pro-Chinese cadres.¹³ In early 1950, twelve thousand North Korean troops returned home from China. It has been reported that this was part of the settlement of a Korean-Chinese dispute concerning Soviet-sponsored dam construction on the Yalu River in 1948-49, and was brought about by Soviet good offices. China had asked that these troops be returned as part of an early phase of their demobilization program in response to economic pressures on the mainland.¹⁴ Although the Peking and Pyongyang governments exchanged diplomatic recognition on December 25, 1949, the Chinese ambassador didn't arrive at the North Korean capital until August 13, 1950. He stayed a few months and then returned to Peking, leaving a charge d'affaires. Not until 1955 did an ambassador return. It is almost impossible to construct a case for the idea of North Korea being a Chinese satellite in the summer of 1950.¹⁵

¹³Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Dallin, p. 77.

The best informed observers at the time of the attack on South Korea were unanimous in placing the blame on the USSR and the USSR alone. In July 1950, Secretary of State Acheson spoke of the 38th parallel being part of the iron curtain, and "behind that curtain the Soviet Union established a Communist regime."¹⁶ On October 24, 1952, in the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary Acheson charged the Soviet Union with being the Instigator of the trouble in Korea.¹⁷ Also in the United Nations, United States Ambassador Warren Austin stated his conviction that the influence of the Chinese compared to the Soviets in starting the Korean War was "one to ninety-nine."¹⁸ John Foster Dulles, while a consultant to the Secretary of State, made frequent references to Soviet instigation of the war. In July 1950, he said, "The Communists of North Korea have struck hard with Soviet tanks, Soviet planes, and Soviet heavy artillery."¹⁹

¹⁶U.S., Department of State, *Bulletin*, 10 July 1950, p. 50.

¹⁷U.S., Department of State, *Bulletin*, 3 November 1952, p. 680.

¹⁸Claude A. Buss, *The Far East* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1955), p. 659.

¹⁹U.S., Department of State, *Bulletin*, 10 July 1950, p. 49.

Editorial opinion in Yugoslavia in the fall of 1950 not only blamed the USSR for the attack, but felt that one of its main purposes was to establish hegemony over China in the Far East.

If the Soviet Government wished to assert itself as the big Asiatic power and to make itself the arbiter in the solution of Asiatic problems, then North Korea was a stronghold in Asia on which Moscow could count one hundred percent in such an action. . . . that would be a step along the road of letting China know that there were [not] "two centers," and that China should join the camp headed by Moscow.²⁰

Until about the first of August, 1950, the Chinese Communists were apparently still thinking in terms of an assault on Taiwan. PRC newspapers stressed this point continually. The Korean issue was in the background. In early July, Ambassador Paniffar called on Mao Tse-tung and after their conversation later reported to his government in New Delhi that the Chinese leader was treating Korea as a "distant matter," and was concentrating on Taiwan's future.²¹ An editorial in the *Peking People's Daily* on July 21st said that by ". . . actively preparing for the liberation of Taiwan, we

²⁰M. S. Handler, "Peiping Held Vying for Top Asian Role," *New York Times*, 27 December 1950, p. 1.

²¹Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), p. 117.

shall be giving efficient aid to the support of Korea."²²

It seems then that through at least August of 1950 the PRC was looking at Korea as a distant problem and keeping her main focus on Taiwan. However, an abrupt reversal occurred, the timing of which roughly coincided with a high level Sino-Soviet conference. Four Far Eastern radio news sources (Karachi, Taipei, Hong Kong, and Tokyo) reported the arrival of Vice Premier Molotov in Peking:

Russian Kuzme Derevyanko, chief of the Soviet mission in Tokyo shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War was reported to be in Peking by Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong. . . . Derevyanko, Mao, Molotov, and a well known Japanese communist are reported arguing about using Russian submarines and transport airplanes for an invasion of Taiwan. Mao agreed to delay, but was displeased at his predicament.²³

²²"North Koreans Cross Kum River Push Drive on American Flank; U.S. to Speed Atlantic Rearming," *New York Times*, 15 July 1950, p. 1.

²³Radio Taipei (Voice of Free China), August 27, 1950 (Hong Kong dateline). No confirmation of Molotov's trip has been found. He might have been a logical emissary. He had Communist prestige and was out of work at the time. (His title of Vice Premier was largely honorary; he had been replaced as Foreign Minister after the failure of the Berlin Blockade.) Dallin, p. 9. Agense Grance Presae correspondent Pierre Brisard dismissed the report about Molotov as "a fiction of Nationalist propaganda from Taipei," but felt that high-level conferences were being conducted between the Soviets, the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. Whiting, p. 187.

On the last day of September, the United States Far East daily intelligence summary reported an alleged high-level conference in Peking on August 14th, at which it had been decided to provide 250,000 Chinese troops for service in Korea.²⁴ A U.S. Department of Defense release of December 15, 1954 stated:

In August 1950 . . . a Kremlin directive providing for this Chinese Communist intervention was transmitted to Peiping from Moscow by Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko. On 14 August the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee approved the Kremlin action.²⁵

The point that is being stressed here is that China was reluctantly drawn into a conflict by the USSR when she gave every indication of viewing a prolonged

²⁴Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), p. 758.

²⁵Whiting, p. 187. Yuri A. Rastvorov, ex-Lieutenant Colonel, MVD, who defected to the United States in 1954 reported a conversation with Colonel Pyotr Shibaev in March 1951. Colonel Shibaev had been in the Soviet Embassy in Peking during August 1950 and said that it took a lot of argument to convince Mao Tse-tung that Communist China had an interest in the Korean War. "He said it was not a problem for the Chinese. But Comrade Stalin continued to press him. . . . the two of them were firing stiffer and stiffer messages back and forth between Peking and Moscow. Finally, after long argument they reached an agreement, but only after Stalin promised China all kinds of aid." Yuri A. Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far East," *Life Magazine*, 6 December 1954, p. 178.

war with distaste, always measuring the necessity for any involvement against the long-range benefits.²⁶

A complete understanding of the motives of the Chinese leaders may never be attainable. However, it seems that the Soviets exerted a strong pressure on the PRC to become involved in a conflict in order to prevent complete defeat of the Soviets and the Korean Communists. Initially, the conflict was not of primary interest to the PRC. It caused her to be deterred from her primary goal of liberating Taiwan without receiving any tangible gains. This was China's first major dealing with the USSR. It resulted in little or no gain beyond the fact that from this lesson the Chinese began to realize the value of autonomous action, a lesson which would be reinforced during the Taiwan Crisis of 1958 and which would ultimately bring about the demise of Soviet hegemony in the Communist world.

²⁶Whiting, p. 129. Mao Tse-tung in 1947: "Avoid battles of attrition, in which the gains are not sufficient to make up the losses, or in which gains merely balance losses" Mao Tse-tung, *Turning Point in China* (New York: New Century Publishers, 1948), p. 7. Original manuscript entitled *Present Situation and Our Task*.

Bi-Polarity Becomes Less a Reality

Pressures for autonomy were also beginning to assert themselves in the U.S. sphere of influence. An event showing this occurred during the Cuban Crisis of 1962 when President Kennedy sent Dean Acheson to brief President de Gaulle on the developments of the crisis. President de Gaulle stopped Acheson in mid-summary and stated, "May we be clear before you start. Are you consulting or informing me?" Acheson replied that he was there to inform rather than to consult. De Gaulle's reply was both cryptic and prophetic. "I am in favor of independent decision," he acknowledged.²⁷

As the PRC found she could be pressured into a conflict against her wishes, so too, in the Western alliance, France saw herself involved in a crisis with possible cataclysmic consequences without really having had her say. The logical result of France's move toward autonomy was the development of her own nuclear force. New forces within the global system and the transformation and distribution of power within the Atlantic alliance made the preservation of American hegemony increasingly difficult. France was to have a say in her

²⁷Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1966), p. 96.

future destiny, as was China. France became a major critic of American leadership not only in NATO but wherever French diplomatic influence was significant.

And so bi-polarity was becoming less and less palatable in both the East and the West. The crack in the bi-polar world was growing larger. Rumania became a semi-independent actor within the Warsaw Pact; the economic power and influence of both Japan and the European Community began to rise and along with this rise in power there occurred a more independent approach within the international scene; small countries that had been aligned with the United States had come to realize that the bi-polar world was no longer a feasible or acceptable solution to world problems. Even such trusted and old friends as the Philippines have become aware of this situation. In a recent interview, President Marcos replied in answer to the question, "Is it a fair statement that the Philippines is no longer so anti-Communist as it once was?"

We believe in peaceful coexistence. The cold war divided the world into watertight compartments-- those sympathetic to Communism and those who identified with the free world. Bipolarization has now not only become unfashionable, but there is a new flexibility in the policies of those supporting the conflicting ideologies, Communism and democracy.

We feel it unhealthy for a country to deal only with part of the world when it poses as a modern and

progressive country. We have, therefore, modified and changed our orientation: We cannot close our eyes to the 800 million people of mainland China nor the 200 million people of Russia.²⁸

At the same time that bi-polarity was becoming less of a reality, both the super-powers were for a variety of different reasons experiencing increasing domestic tensions which limited their ability to pursue their own conception of world order.

By 1969 the Sino-Soviet confrontation had reached the point of threatening nuclear involvement over the Ussurri River incidents, which were apparently only patched over by a hastily drawn up eleventh-hour agreement between Kosygin and Chou En-lai.²⁹ Subsequent talks have been relatively unproductive as each side has become increasingly unwilling to compromise.

As China became increasingly powerful the Sino-Soviet split became increasingly evident. China reached the position where she could act more independently as well as pose a greater threat to the USSR. As the degree in which the Sino-Soviet split increased, the PRC

²⁸"Interview with Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines," *U.S. News & World Report*, 5 August 1974, p. 38.

²⁹Tai-sung An, *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), p. 107.

found herself confronted with the major problems of isolation. Isolated to some degree on one side by the Soviets and on the other by the presence and influence of the Americans throughout the Asian sphere, she needed to be accorded the status of a major power to realize her goals of greatness. Although China suffered domestic difficulties throughout the period of the 1960s, with the advent of the 70s, the internal problems which had prevented her from exploiting her position of autonomy had been rectified and she was now ready to move as an independent actor on the international stage. Therefore, President Nixon's 1972 China visit, which had such a dramatic effect on Japan and other Asian countries, resulted from the belated recognition of the forces at work in the international scene and the tendency of statesmen to be always one decade behind in their view of the present. The Nixon Doctrine was merely the recognition of what had been taking place in the international arena between the USSR and the PRC.

In order to see just how far the world has come from being bi-polar in nature, it is important to look at some of what was believed to be the essential characteristics of the bi-polar world. Kenneth Waltz, writing in 1964, judged it to have four characteristics. First,

that super-power competition knew no geographical boundaries, where one power became involved so did the other. Second, that the range of factors included in the competition broadened as its intensity increased--even the smallest losses of territory were inadmissible on either side; economic and social gains or losses were a subject of concern to the other and the grist of major propaganda initiatives. Third, even minor crises had to be settled at super-power level. And fourth, that by reason of the preponderant power of these two states, the system could absorb major political, economic, or technological changes.³⁰ This, I believe, is an excellent analysis of the characteristics of that short period of true bi-polarity of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

However, as these approaches were carried into the 60s, the super-powers found that they were no longer successful. The use of direct economic and military aid which was designed to gain influence and control in the underdeveloped countries was no longer effective. By 1969 it became clear to the USSR and to the U.S. that allegiance could not be purchased and that their attempts

³⁰Buchan, p. 23.

to impose developmental strategies on the poor nations without their full acceptance were doomed to failure.

Therefore, a new approach was needed by each of these nations--an approach which would benefit from the lessons of the past. China and the United States recognized this when President Nixon's trip opened up new opportunities for dialogue between the United States and the PRC. Moscow and Washington also recognized the situation with the President's visit in May 1972 and June 1974 and with the signing of the SALT I agreement which helped to codify the process of negotiation between those two countries. The Nixon trips also suggested to the United States that it might be possible for her to have better relations with both the USSR and the PRC than either could have with the other. It is these relationships and the gains and losses resulting from them which I shall examine in the next chapters.

CHAPTER II

GAINS FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The border incidents of 1968 and 1969 unquestionably caused the most profound soul searching in Peking. At the time real fear of a Soviet nuclear attack apparently existed in Chinese elite circles. All earlier matters dividing the PRC and the USSR now merged into one overwhelming concern, that of national security. Men like Mao and Chou must have sworn that never again would China face the Soviet Union weak in every sense, and hence vulnerable whether in a bargaining situation or in conflict.

The key to a new policy for the PRC was the U.S. Reapprochement with the United States would provide the means for China to enter into the international scene and break out of her isolation. The Chinese sometimes described China's encirclement in a rather picturesque way. They claimed that China was surrounded by an "un-holy alliance" consisting of the "American imperialists, the Soviet social imperialists, the Japanese military revanchists, and the Indian reactionaries."¹

¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign

China's first move to break out of her isolation was to gain recognition in the UN.

Representation at the United Nations earlier had been seen in Peking as desirable for one reason only, to discredit the Nationalists. Although this was no doubt still in the minds of Chinese leaders, there later developed some indications that they saw other values for themselves in a seat on the Security Council. For example, a seat would give them a more effective voice in world affairs, especially when they could no longer count on the Soviet Union to speak for them. The success of such a bid would depend on recognition of the government in Peking instead of that in Taiwan by enough members to make the issue turn on credentials, not on admission as a new member. A Security Council seat would be an important step forward for Peking. Additionally, the move would make the UN more representative of the world community, although it would not necessarily make that community more harmonious or the world organization more effective.

China's rapprochement with the United States did not guarantee the admission of the PRC to the United

Affairs, United States-Republic of China Relations, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 15.

Nations. However, the traditional U.S. stand against the admission of the PRC seemed to be weakening. Some of the delegates to the UN felt that at best the attempts by the U.S. to keep the PRC from being seated were half-hearted, especially since, at the very moment of the vote, President Nixon's Foreign Policy Advisor, Henry Kissinger, was in Peking, a sign which was read by these delegates as a signal of tacit approval of UN admission for the PRC.² Additionally, there was little evidence that the U.S. could have prevented China's seating even had she tried.

Whether the United States' effort to keep the PRC delegation from being seated was a best effort is thus subject to some question. Although the U.S. voted in the negative, when the votes were tallied on October 25, 1971 the Nationalists were expelled and the Albanian Resolution which called for only one China was accepted. The vote on the resolution was 76 for, 35 against, and 17 abstaining,³ which was in excess of the

²Max Frankel, "End of China's Isolation," *New York Times*, 26 October 1971, p. 1.

³Winberg Chai, *The New Politics of Communist China* (Pacific Palisades, Ca.: Goodyear, 1972), p. 165.

two-thirds majority required for an "important question."⁴

Following rapprochement of the PRC and the United States, American allies who had delayed similar actions primarily out of a desire to avoid antagonizing Washington soon began to normalize relations with China. It is symbolic of recent developments that presidents, prime ministers, and emperors, representing a wide political spectrum now visit Peking in a steady stream. The leaders of the United States and Western Europe have made the pilgrimage, as have those of Iran, Greece, and Ethiopia, to mention but a few--taking their places in the guest rolls beside such "old friends" as the Albanians, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese. Nor are the visits confined to political leaders. Americans, Europeans, and Japanese from various circles, together with their counterparts from the Third World, come in great numbers as guests of the PRC. Peking has become an international crossroads, with only the Soviets and their closest supporters currently unwelcome. The

⁴The U.S. had previously succeeded in barring the PRC's entry by introducing a resolution to make the issue an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority in the Assembly.

mystique of Chinese authority and power is correspondingly enhanced.⁵

That is not to say that the PRC is a super-power. In many ways, she is at best a medium-power. In terms of economics, China's GNP of perhaps \$100 billion is roughly the same as that of Italy, to which must be added the footnote that a substantial part of China's production derives from subsistence farming which creates no surpluses. Thus in spite--and to some extent because--of her overgrown population, China's production places her no higher than seventh among the nations of the world.⁶

In military terms, although the PRC is now a significant nuclear power, she is curiously musclebound in her region. She has missiles but as yet is not capable of inter-continental delivery and it is hardly possible that she could employ her nuclear weapons without triggering a response from one or the other of the super-powers. Therefore, the military usefulness of her nuclear arsenal is not all that it might seem.⁷

⁵Robert A. Scalapino, "China and the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1974, p. 350.

⁶George W. Ball, "The Super-powers in Asia," *Adelphi Papers* 91 (November 1972): 4.

⁷Thomas H. Moorer, "General Purpose Forces

To be sure, it no doubt contributes to China's security and state of mind by its presumed deterrent value, yet its utility as an instrument for offensive use or for blackmail purposes is severely limited.

When one concentrates on the political future of a particular geographical region, in this case, Asia, the distinction between a regional medium-power and a super-power largely disappears. The point being that decisions made in Peking may in fact in the long run have a greater impact on Asian politics than anything decided in Moscow or Washington. In order to realize these policies, however, China had to reduce her isolation and vulnerability and explore new opportunities for maneuverability and flexibility. This she was able to do by her rapprochement with the United States after she became isolated as a result of the Sino-Soviet split.

There was undoubtedly debate and uncertainty concerning rapprochement in the PRC. One factor which I am sure was considered by the Chinese leadership was the advanced age of their leaders. The great Chinese Revolution is still being led by its first generation

Compared," *Commanders Digest*, 18 April 1974. An excellent run-down of the military strength of the U.S., the USSR, and the PRC, both conventional and nuclear.

leadership and those leaders are all extremely elderly. It is difficult to exactly determine the current pecking order in Peking, but the decision-makers clearly include Mao, who is as of 1975, in his 81st year; Premier Chou, who is 74; Yeh Chien-ying, who apparently heads the military establishment and who is 77; and 69 year-old Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien. The charmed circle, it is true, also includes three younger persons--Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), now in her late fifties, and the two Shanghai leaders, Chang Chun-chiao, now in his late fifties, and Yao Wen-yuah, in his mid-forties.⁸

Another consideration concerning rapprochement was this: The Chinese leaders no doubt felt it was a serious blunder on their part to conduct policy toward the two leading world powers themselves at odds with one another, and both with powerful forces close to the PRC in such a way as to antagonize both at the same time. Apparently, realizing the error of this policy, and with less to fear from the United States than from the USSR, Chinese leaders decided to relax anti-Americanism and to initiate this policy before they departed the scene.

⁸Mark Gayn, "Who After Mao," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, p. 304.

Furthermore, it was important for China to break out of her isolation and somehow enter into nuclear dialogue with the United States. As China develops a deterrent capability she will acquire a lever to force the two super-powers to widen participation in nuclear arms control talks, and to accept China's participation. By joining in such talks, the PRC will have effectively broken the nuclear duopoly of the two super-powers, prevented the collusion she so much abhors (the two super-powers dividing the world into their own spheres of influence) and gained an opportunity to negotiate a different distribution of power across the globe.

This is not to say that the PRC has broken into the nuclear dialogue. However, she has established a line of communications with the United States and inevitably the question of nuclear armaments will be raised in her dialogue with the United States. To some extent China's position in the nuclear club is reminiscent of the Soviet Union's at the time when the U.S. still held an atomic monopoly. This situation is very well summed up by Soedjatmoko, in an article entitled "China's External Policies: Scope and Limitation."

The Soviet Union . . . resorted to building up a worldwide movement in order to reduce the likelihood of a pre-emptive attack, to increase substantially

the political cost of a pre-emptive attack, even to take the strategic initiative, and abandoned it when the American monopoly was broken. China's rapprochement with the United States, her interest in developing relations with Western Europe, and with Eastern Europe as well, have to do with her deep-seated fear of a Soviet attack, and with her desire to reduce the Soviet threat and pressure on her. This policy is likely to continue, even when talks on nuclear arms control, including China will have reduced any immediate threat to China's security. Secondly, China is bound to continue broadening her relations with other countries to develop a global basis of support which will reduce the likelihood of any attack on China.⁹

China will seek to meet the soviet threat in the years ahead by relentlessly pursuing two primary objectives: (1) a defense in depth against the USSR as the potential enemy, and (2) a major political counter-attack on all fronts to neutralize Soviet containment efforts. On the military front, China will continue her quest for a creditable nuclear deterrent. One key item, an intermediate range interballistic missile capable of reaching Moscow and other parts of Asia has already been developed.¹⁰ On the political front, Chinese actions are directed at undermining Soviet credibility with friend and foe alike, and cultivating any nation bearing a relationship to Soviet power

⁹Soedjatmoko, "China's External Policies: Scope and Limitation," *Adelphi Papers* 92 (November 1972): 11.

¹⁰Moorer, p. 17.

especially those on the Soviet periphery and those within the Soviet sphere of influence. Lastly, China will fight vigorously for the support of the revolutionary world, competing with the USSR in order to represent an alternative socialistic ideology and to influence the underdeveloped and developing Third World.

During the hearings before a House Committee on Foreign Affairs in May 1972, Robert A. Scalapino was asked how the United States fits into this new China policy. He replied:

At present, . . . Peking is determined to thwart Soviet containment policies by resistance rather than accommodations, to enter into dialogue with the United States, thereby increasing its flexibility while at the same time weakening the non-Communist alliance structure in Asia; and to contain Japan militarily, if not economically.¹¹

Professor Scalapino continued:

I think the Chinese presently feel that the best method [of doing these things] is by ending their isolation and moving into a world scene; having a forum through the United Nations; opening up relationships with a number of countries, including some with which they have little in common, ideologically or politically. In this manner, Peking can get out of the position in which they found themselves in 1968 and 1969.¹²

¹¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The New China Policy: Its Impact on the United States and Asia, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 135.

¹²Ibid.

Another advantage that accrues to the PRC as a result of the Sino-Soviet split is that, given her state of internal development, it is extremely helpful, possibly even indispensable, to have a foreign enemy-- both to induce the sacrifices demanded of the Chinese people in this spartan era and to preserve the unity so important in an initial nation-building stage. Moreover, to foreign nations, the Soviet threat explains, even sanctions, China's unrelenting drive to become a major military power, one armed with a full array of nuclear weapons--so that this drive doesn't arouse the fear and hostility it otherwise might. For all of these purposes, the USSR now occupies the position of prime adversary earlier occupied by the United States.

This is not to suggest that the PRC and the U.S. are moving towards a Sino-American alliance. The relationship will probably stop well short of that. However, it is equally important that one should not minimize recent developments. The movement away from isolation and near-total hostility in the mutual relations of China and the U.S. has been both dramatic and healthy. For the present, moreover, the United States and the PRC share several very broad objectives. Both desire a military-political equilibrium in the

Pacific-Asian region that will prevent any single power from dominating the area--because each currently lacks either the will or the capacity to play that role herself. Hence, both states are committed at this point to balance-of-power politics.¹³

The Sino-Soviet split and China's rapprochement with the U.S. become more significant when looked at in the light of specific PRC foreign policy goals. These seem to include (1) maintenance of the security and integrity of the PRC, (2) efforts to seize Taiwan, (3) the unification under the Peking regime of outlying or alienated territories that the leadership considers to be rightfully integral parts of the PRC, (4) the outward adjustment of China's boundaries in the Himalayas and elsewhere, (5) the protection and enhancement of Chinese power and influence, especially in adjoining regions of Asia, and also in competition with the USSR, and (6) the development of "bargain-basement" methods of influencing Asian, African, and even Latin American countries by economic and technical assistance and by advice on guerrilla warfare and political and economic policy. The Sino-Soviet split and the current Sino-American involvement has helped to realize or move towards the

¹³ Scalapino, p. 371.

goals listed above with the exception of number four.¹⁴

In summary then, because of the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC realized that she was hemmed in on both sides--to the east by the U.S. and to the west by the USSR. She realized that she could not exercise her influence nor reach her destiny as a major world power while in this position. She therefore determined to break out of this confinement. The key to that goal was improved relations with the United States and admission to the United Nations. The PRC, by her admission to the United Nations and her possible recognition by the United States has reaped several advantages: the dam of containment and isolation has been broken; she has been recognized as the legitimate government of China; progress has been made towards a settlement of the Taiwan issue; she is no longer threatened by both super-powers at the same time; her relations with Japan have improved; and her prospects of economic trade in the international area appear unlimited.

¹⁴Robert C. North, *The Foreign Relations of China* (Belmont, Ca.: Dickenson, 1969), p. 74.

CHAPTER III

GAINS FOR THE UNITED STATES

To understand the path of foreign policy which the United States is following one must constantly keep in mind the goals of the Nixon Doctrine. The world situation at the time the Nixon administration came to power can best be characterized as one of change. The American public was showing considerable concern over such international issues as the Vietnam War and foreign aid programs. Many foreign countries were not in agreement with United States policies and had shown a reluctance to fully support the U.S. on the international scene. President Nixon was faced with the reality of coming to power at a time when the mood of the American people made retrenchment abroad mandatory. In essence, his problem was to carry out a policy of retrenchment with as little erosion of American influence on the international scene as possible.

An indication of the direction of President Nixon's foreign policy is illustrated by the tone of his first inaugural address:

Over the past twenty years, since I first came to this capital as a freshman congressman, I have

visited most of the nations of the world. I have come to know the leaders of the world, and the great forces, the hatred, the fears that divide the world. I know that peace does not come through wishing for it--that there is no substitute for days and even years of patient and prolonged diplomacy.¹

With building a durable peace as the goal, the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration was guided by three basic principles: partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate.² The Nixon Doctrine maintains that peace is obtainable only through partnership because other nations now have the ability, therefore the responsibility, to deal with local disputes which might have once required U.S. intervention. Consequently, where the success of the U.S. in bringing about peace and stability once depended upon a policy of imparted democracy and prosperity buttressed by American military strength in support of a network of American-led alliances, stability and peace will depend not on the frequency of U.S. involvement but on the strength of her alliances and the ability of her allies

¹U.S., President, Richard M. Nixon, *First Inaugural Address*, January 6, 1968.

²U.S., President, *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace, A Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, February 25, 1971* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 15.

to defend themselves. Partnership, therefore, is the foremost element of the Nixon Doctrine. The thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but America cannot and will not conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defense of free nations of the world.

The second element of the Nixon Doctrine is U.S. strength. The strength of her defense must be based on precise and crucial judgments. She must spend no more than necessary, but she must not fall behind an irreducible minimum of essential military security.

The final principle of the doctrine is negotiation. The U.S. commitment to peace must be convincingly demonstrated by her willingness to negotiate her points of difference in a fair and business-like manner with all countries, both those aligned with her and those with whom she has been antagonistic in the past. That there are enduring ideological differences between nations which bring about difficulty in moderating tensions which arise from clashes of those differences no one can dispute. But all nations must define their interests with special concern for the interests of others. If some nations define their security in a

manner which means insecurity for other nations, then peace is threatened and the security of all is diminished.

The incorporation of the Nixon Doctrine into a policy toward the PRC and the USSR would probably be stated as follows: The primal motive is to seek normalization of relationships between the United States and China. Accordingly, the U.S. has established high level diplomatic talks and initiated cultural and trade exchanges as a step towards normalization. However, the U.S. has indicated to China that normalization cannot take place at the expense of old friends and prior commitments; nor will she take sides in any Sino-Soviet dispute.

Regarding the USSR, the American spirit of detente will continue as demonstrated by Nixon's visits to the USSR in 1972 and 1974, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Therefore, the goal of the U.S. appears to be the improvement of her relations with both powers. More realistically, it appears a major advantage for the U.S. lies in attempting to maintain a middle of the road position vis-a-vis the PRC and USSR thereby enhancing her position when negotiating with either party. In this manner, the U.S. can achieve

her objectives while minimizing her losses and maximizing her gains.

The concept of splitting the PRC and the USSR (or in this case, maintaining the split) is not new. The idea of accentuating Communist Bloc differences appears to be an old one within the U.S. In 1950, U.S. leadership was on the fence as to exactly how this should be done, or if it should be done. Prime Minister Attlee, speaking for the British Government, favored wooing China away from the Soviet Union. President Truman recalled a conversation with Mr. Attlee in December of that year.

In his opinion, the Chinese Communists were potentially ripe for "Titoism." He could not consider that China was completely in the hands of Russia, and therefore the aim ought to be to divide the Russians and the Chinese--who are natural rivals in the Far East. He said, ". . . all of us should try to keep the Chinese from thinking that Russia is their only friend. I want the Chinese to part company with Russia. I want them to become a counter-poise to Russia in the Far East. If we don't accept this theory, if we just treat the Chinese as Soviet satellites, we are playing the Russian game."³

This same philosophy was demonstrated in May 1959 by Senator Hubert Humphrey when he questioned the wisdom of the U.S. Far East policy.

³Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2 vols. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), 2:402.

It seems to me our policies are forcing these people [China and the Soviet Union] to adhere even more rigorously to each other. I don't have any specific answer, but I am dubious as to whether we are promoting the ends which you and I both think we ought to promote.⁴

During the 1960s, as the split between the USSR and the PRC became more evident and the PRC became increasingly powerful, the Soviets began to fear the PRC's militarism⁵ and were apprehensive of Chinese assumption of leadership in the Third World and the PRC found herself increasingly confronted with the major problem of isolation. This situation within the communist world had dissolved the unity of International Communism and had particularly affected the situation of the PRC. In President Nixon's words:

In the last 20 years, the nature of the Communist challenge has been transformed. The Stalinist bloc has fragmented into competing centers of doctrine and power. One of the deepest conflicts in the world today is between Communist China and the Soviet Union. The most prevalent Communist threats now are not massive military invasions, but a more subtle mix of military, psychological and political

⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, p. 65.* Senator Humphrey (D-Minnesota) questioning Assistant Secretary of State Robertson.

⁵China's military strength, primarily her land army, was growing and she was apparently willing to use it along the Sino-Soviet border.

pressure. These developments complicate the patterns of diplomacy, presenting both new problems and new prospects⁶

His statement also included a strong disclaimer of any U.S. wish to sharpen the conflict or to encourage it. Any accusation that the United States would be interested in collusion with one of these powers against the other was described as absurd, and at the same time the President rejected any attempt by either of the two powers to interfere with the policy of the U.S. regarding the other.

However, even though this disclaimer has been articulated by President Nixon, as we have seen from recent Watergate developments, what is being said is not always representative of what is actually happening. This disclaimer of not using the Sino-Soviet split is even more questionable when taken in the context of President Nixon's anti-Communist record. Hans J.

Morgenthau commented:

It is noteworthy . . . that an American President who has consistently built his political career on uncompromising anti-communism at home and abroad traveled to the capitals of the two major Communist powers to replace *confrontation* with *negotiation*.⁷

⁶U.S., President, *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s*, p. 2.

⁷Hans J. Morgenthau, "Superpower Politics After

The point being made here is not a moral one. Rather it is simply that by taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split certain gains would accrue to the Nixon administration in both foreign and domestic policy. This can be more easily explained and understood when one examines the intricacies of both the international and domestic scenes.

Nixon apparently had used the Sino-Soviet split to his advantage during the Vietnam War. He explained during a briefing of several senators in March 1972 that as soon as the U.S. involvement in Vietnam lessened, the United States forces on Taiwan could be reduced and the reduction would serve as an impetus to Peking to exert pressure on Hanoi for a Vietnam settlement and a return of prisoners.⁸ Furthermore, during the same period, the U.S. was putting pressure on the USSR (then suffering an expensive wheat shortage) to aid in a settlement of the Vietnam War. Soviet eagerness to acquire Western technology, particularly American technology, apparently helped induce the Soviets to a significant

the Summits," *Current*, July/August 1972, p. 55 (italics inserted).

⁸"What it Means to the U.S.," *U.S. News & World Report*, 13 March 1972, p. 19.

behind-the-scenes role in encouraging the North Vietnamese to reach a settlement of the war.⁹

The administration further argued that with normalization of relations with the PRC, U.S. forces in Asia could be withdrawn, allowing more dollars to be spent on critical domestic social issues. Few serious students of domestic affairs would argue that any genuine progress could be made towards solutions of massive domestic problems facing the United States without a substantial increase in the allocation of public funds in those areas. Realities dictated that new funds for domestic purposes would have to come through a re-allocation of federal expenditures, in this case, funds which would have been spent on the U.S. involvement in Asia and the Pacific. Probably the essence of the domestic attitude relative to foreign involvement was summed up by a statement by Henry Kissinger:

Perhaps most important to the United States, our undisputed strategic predominance was declining just at the time when there was rising domestic resistance to military programs and impatience for redistribution of resources from national defense to social demands.¹⁰

⁹William R. Kintner and Richard B. Foster, eds. *National Strategy in a Decade of Change* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1973), p. 208.

¹⁰Henry Kissinger, "The Administration's Viewpoint," *Current*, July/August 1972, p. 51.

Furthermore, the normalization of relations with the PRC and detente with the Soviet Union would help the President's policy in congress. There had developed in Congress enough dissatisfaction in foreign policy to effectively curb the administrations efforts. This mood of Congress can be expressed in the words of Senator Fulbright written a few years earlier:

It is not merely desirable, but essential that the competitive instincts of nations be brought under control. . . . America as the most powerful nation, is the only nation equipped to lead the world in an effort to change the nature of its politics.¹¹

A final factor in the domestic politics of these actions was that President Nixon, as leader of the Republican Party, even at that time, had lost prestige for both himself and the Party due to unwise or unpopular decisions. However, he could greatly enhance both his and the Party's position by bringing the war in Southeast Asia to a satisfactory end, by restoring some kind of economic stability and prosperity, and by bringing about some measure of international ability to the troubled areas of the world. If Nixon was successful in these areas, there could be no question that the Democratic Party would have been dealt a severe setback.

¹¹J. W. Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 256.

Nixon's timing on the China visit announcement fit too well with the presidential election to be purely accidental. It is interesting to note that Senator Robert Dole, chairman of the Republican National Committee, predicted the Nixon visit to China would get him many more votes in the Eastern United States in the forthcoming 1972 election.¹² It was hoped that a new China policy might strengthen the Congressional and popular support of the Administration and aid in establishing a more healthy political scene at home. This is not to say that the new approach could be characterized as a cure-all, but perhaps the flexibility and realism it displayed would overlap into other areas.

These then were the domestic issues which appeared to be shaping Nixon's policies towards the PRC and the Soviet Union during the period under consideration.

On the international scene certain developments were taking place which made these overtures towards Moscow and Peking at this time particularly desirable. As initiated by the Nixon Administration and highlighted by the President's trip to Peking during February 21-28,

¹²"Washington Whispers," *U.S. News & World Report*, 8 February 1972, p. 8.

1972, the Sino-American detente had the effect of dampening considerably the incentives for continued communist-non-communist confrontation in Asia. The detente is converting the old rationale for hostility into drives for negotiations, reduced tension and, hopefully, over the long-run, cooperation. The Sino-American detente has allowed China to be brought more directly into the Peking-Washington-Moscow triangular relations and has created additional leverage upon the Soviet Union.

An important aspect to be considered in the Peking-Washington-Moscow triangular relationship is that generally speaking the U.S. may fare better in a multipolar world because her leaders are the products of a political system in which, at every step of their political ascent, they have had to deal with autonomous domestic political forces as these compete in the electoral arena. In the final analysis, the United States, accustomed to pluralism at home, can live with pluralism in international affairs far more comfortably than can the USSR or the PRC. This is not to exaggerate the advantage. Both the Soviets and the Chinese are becoming students of international relations in a pluralistic world. However, the point is that the U.S.

will probably have a slight advantage initially. In the words of Edwin O. Reischauer in hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in May 1972:

It has always been to our advantage to have broad and roughly equal relations with the two great Communist nations. Such a dual relationship enhances our bargaining position with both. I suggest that it was the desire to increase our leverage in dealing with Moscow that loomed largest in the President's mind in moving toward a detente with Peking.¹³

This big-three rapprochement helped towards a settlement in Vietnam because the leaders of Peking, Moscow, and Washington perceived the conflict there as an element in the global confrontation rather than as an isolated event in the Southeast Asian peninsula. In both the Middle East and the Far East, President Nixon bargained for short-term advantages to be paid for in the long-range currencies of great-power rapprochement. For this reason, neither the blockade of North Vietnam nor the intensified bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi (1972) were seriously contested by either Peking or Moscow.¹⁴

¹³U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The New China Policy*, p. 11.

¹⁴Kintner and Foster, p. 216.

In keeping with the policy of not taking sides in any Sino-Soviet dispute, but seeking to improve relations with both sides, the United States has entered into a joint venture with Japan and the Soviet Union to develop Siberian natural resources (gas).¹⁵ Although Sino-Japanese relations have improved since President Nixon's trip and leadership in East Asia appears to be shifting to the PRC and Japan, United States-Japanese-Soviet cooperation in Siberia is certain to cause alarm in the PRC. Action of this type re-opens the danger to Manchuria which is China's bastion of industrial endeavor.¹⁶

In evaluating the potential impact of East-West trade on these triangular relationships, a distinction must be made between essentially short-term trade and any advantages which may accrue to the United States and the long-term implications of greater economic exchange. In the short-term, diplomatic gains can be made by linking trade to other issues. Therefore, strategic considerations suggest that the U.S. and its Western allies could coordinate some aspects of their trade with the

¹⁵"U.S., Japan Work on Siberian Pipeline Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, 30 October 1972, p. A-16.

¹⁶Eric Mettler, "Towards Asiatic Leadership," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, November 1972, p. 2.

USSR and the PRC in order to realize possible short-term gains. In the longer-term, however, it is doubtful whether increased trade will play more than a peripheral role in resolving any of the basic conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between the United States and China. In the past Soviet interest in trade has been a function of Moscow's overall policy line and not a determinant of it. More recently, the PRC has shown the same indications relative to her rapprochement with the United States. One should always keep this basic tenet in mind when dealing with the Chinese and the Soviets.

Therefore, a kind of divide and influence policy towards a new balance-of-power in Asia appears to be the best approach for the United States at this particular point in time. It was used to advantage during the Nixon visit to China and in formulating the United States-Japan-Soviet Union natural resource development program in Siberia. These two events have also brought about improved Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations which tend to keep the wedge firmly entrenched in the Sino-Soviet split. This move also brings out other implications because the three nations have a historic distrust of each other.

The maintenance of the Sino-Soviet split enables the U.S. to reduce her overseas forces in Asia while still retaining a presence in her spheres of influence. This reduction in forces has a tendency to initiate a stronger desire on the part of Japan to once again militarize herself to ensure that her overseas interests are protected and her commercial lines of communication remain open. Japanese rearmament is desired neither by China nor the Soviet Union since they both have had rather unpleasant experiences with Japanese military might. However, remilitarization on the part of Japan could have far reaching advantages for the United States. First it could enable the United States to further help ensure that the settlement of Taiwan was a peaceful settlement. Perhaps most beneficial, due to the degree of Japanese economical interest throughout South Asia and Southeast Asia which dictates that Japan take the same position as the United States on the question of territorial waters in the Straits of Malacca, Japanese sea power would inevitably be dedicated to the maintenance of these sea lanes.

Although the rearmament of Japan is generally opposed by China, it could introduce a force with a vital sphere of interest to counter Soviet naval

expansion in the Indian Ocean. This particular aspect would be beneficial to both China and the United States. For the PRC, it would put a semi-friendly force in the Indian sphere where there is constant strain over border problems. For the U.S., it would put a friendly force in the Indian Ocean at a time when it is not always possible, because of limited units, to keep a force on station in that area.

While Eastern Europe, from a political point of view, stands on the sidelines over the Asian question, her interests and day-to-day relationships are closely related to the Sino-Soviet split. With the relatively high tension along the Sino-Soviet border, the last thing the Soviets want is conflict and hostility on their western border. The two-front-war is not strategically sound. Therefore, as long as the Sino-Soviet split continues, European nations can expect a more conciliatory attitude from the Soviet Union. This then is another benefit of the split for the U.S. in her role as a member of NATO. Although tensions remain high, it is unlikely because of her growing worries in Asia that the USSR will attempt any adventures in Western Europe.¹⁷

¹⁷Mettler, p. 3.

In summary, U.S. opportunities lie in the direction of keeping the Sino-Soviet split perpetuated. The split is the key to the success of some U.S. foreign policy goals. It provides the opportunity for the United States to conduct a retrenchment in her overseas commitments, reduce her overseas forces, and to quiet her domestic turmoil. It appears that the best approach to achieve the goals of the Nixon Doctrine is a policy of playing off one major actor against another while remaining in a relatively neutral position. This "divide and influence" method of maintaining a balance-of-power can enable the United States to achieve her objectives while minimizing her losses and maximizing her gains.

CHAPTER IV

GAINS FOR THE SOVIET UNION

When one examines the gains resulting from the Sino-Soviet split, it becomes obvious that the U.S., the USSR, and the PRC have not received equal gains. The Soviet Union probably gains least from the new multi-polar situation which appears to be developing in the world today. However, the significant point is not that the Soviet Union gains least but that the officials of the Soviet Union have reached the sophistication in world affairs where they no longer feel they have to control or influence every small nation on the globe and that they can see gains in a situation of this type.

The Soviet Union emerged from World War II militarily stronger than she had entered it. She soon realized, as did the United States, that she could not shape or control every situation. Because of this realization, the situation of the 1960s, particularly the Sino-Soviet conflict, was exceedingly important to the USSR. When one assesses the present great-power relationships, one fact relative to international conflict emerges: Wars between Europe and the United

States, between the United States and Japan, or between Japan and Europe, are too implausible for the respective military balances between these pairs to have any important effects on disputes likely to arise among them. Even between the United States (or Europe) and the Soviet Union (or the PRC). Japan and the Soviet Union, or Japan and the PRC, the rapid escalation of any particular dispute to the war-threat level would be rarely if ever warranted, given the costs and risks of this pattern of interaction and the availability (in the system we have postulated) of nonmilitary means of exerting pressure. The only pair for which the military equation may yet be immediately relevant is China and the Soviet Union given the unbroken nature of their border dispute.¹ This fact, I am sure, is not lost on the Soviet Union. Therefore, not wanting to be threatened simultaneously from both the East and the West, she is striving to normalize relations with the United States and is attempting to do this by seeking Soviet-American detente.

The Sino-Soviet split has had a profound effect on the Soviet Bloc as a whole, especially in Eastern

¹Seyom Brown, "The Changing Essence of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, p. 292.

Europe. Because of it, the Soviets have become increasingly more possessive, and the Socialist Camp is increasingly defiant in terms of the interest of the Soviet State rather than the world-wide ideological and/or political movement. Karl Birnbaum summed up the East European position within the Soviet Sphere of influence in an article which appeared in the *Adelphi Papers* in March 1970.

What has changed is the bargaining power of the individual East European governments *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union and in some cases the extent to which the Soviet leadership can manipulate the political process in certain East European states. Without going into details, I would argue that the bargaining power available to the East European governments has been primarily related to the Sino-Soviet conflict and the economic relations with the West. The former could be exploited by them most effectively as long as there was some hope of accommodation between Peking and Moscow. The recent exacerbation of the conflict has limited the margin of maneuver, although it has not prevented Rumania from continuing to demonstrate her middle position between the two Communist world powers. There are some indications that the Soviet Union is trying to extend the validity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to include a possible conflict in the Far East.²

The Soviet Union's difficulties with China obliged the USSR to modify her actions both within and outside her own sphere of influence. As she began to

²Karl Birnbaum, "The Future of the Soviet and American International Systems," *Adelphi Papers* 66 (March 1970): 26.

pursue a sort of appeasement in the West and because of this policy of Soviet-American detente, the Soviet Union began to realize certain significant gains which include certain pertinent agreements which stabilized the Soviet Union's "western front" at a time of acute fears about China's intentions in the East, formed a tacit understanding with Mr. Nixon's administration which reduces the risk of emergence of an anti-Soviet Washington-Peking axis, and gave access to Western technology--worth billions of dollars--which will help modernize the Soviet Union's backward industrial system.³

The Soviets are also realizing other long sought after goals because of detente. NATO has been weakened because detente makes "cold war alliances" seem unnecessary. Detente has also slowed the American defense effort and lessened the U.S. presence in Europe. Additionally, it appears that financial and technical trade with the West will facilitate the Soviet military build-up.⁴

³"Beyond the Summit: The Real Test for Detente," *U.S. News & World Report*, 8 July 1974, p. 14.

⁴"Advantages of Detente to USSR," *Navy Times*, 17 June 1974, p. 14.

Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet split and continued hostile attitude of the PRC⁵ have given the Soviets further latitude and bargaining leverage in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the United States. The Soviets have argued that the unpredictable behavior of the PRC and the size of her population have considerably complicated the nuclear balance. They have stated that the problem lies with the balance which the two super-powers want to maintain and are obliged to keep in their mutual relationships. It is this balance which can be destroyed by one atomic strike from China which is complicating the SALT proceedings and especially worrying the USSR.⁶ The Soviets have therefore argued that they need more than just parity with the U.S. What is

⁵ One of the most recent incidents troubling Sino-Soviet relations is the duel over the Chinese capture of a Soviet helicopter which strayed across the border into Sinkiang in March 1974. The Soviets claim that the helicopter was on a medical rescue mission when it lost its bearings. The Chinese insist that the chopper carried arms and reconnaissance equipment and was involved in espionage activities. Moscow is worried about reports that China will give the captured Soviet crewmen a public show trial and sentence them to long prison terms as spies. "Pointing the Lance," *Time*, 24 June 1974, p. 46.

⁶ Pierre Maillard, "The Effect of China on Soviet-American Relations," *Adelphi Papers* 66 (March 1970): 49; and Johan Jorgen Holst, "Parity, Superiority or Sufficiency? Some Remarks on the Nature and Future of the Soviet American Strategic Relationship," *Adelphi Papers* 65 (February 1970): 25-39.

needed, they argue, are additional weapons to overcome a possible Chinese first strike.

The question, however, is to what degree the Chinese military effort really does effect the military balance of the super-powers. As far as nuclear armaments are concerned, the reasoning to be applied has to be different from that which is applied for conventional armaments. It is inconceivable that in the near future the PRC will attempt a nuclear surprise attack against either the USSR or the U.S. But the real danger and the condition which the Soviet Union is using to her advantage in the SALT proceedings is this: From the moment when China is capable of inflicting substantial damage on either of the super-powers and more so if she can inflict unacceptable damage, the PRC is in the position where she has destroyed the balance-of-terror existing between the U.S. and the USSR. Exactly what type of nuclear arsenal China possesses is unknown beyond the fact that she does possess one. Even though no one would attempt to argue for a moment that the Soviets are pleased with the fact of Chinese nuclear power, the Soviet Union has found a way of using this power for additional leverage in the SALT negotiations.

Furthermore, it has been suggested that the Sino-Soviet split was the catalyst which brought about the emphasis on Soviet naval power. Thus her emphasis on naval power can be seen as the reflection of Soviet intention to free herself from exclusive dependence on her huge land forces limited in effectiveness to areas within which efficient lines of logistics and communications can be easily maintained, and to acquire a military arm which can thrust anywhere in the world, including South Asia and the Pacific.⁷

Additionally, the Sino-Soviet split has somewhat enhanced the Soviet position in Asia. At the present time the USSR has been making friendly approaches to Japan. Some Japanese see a relationship between the USSR and Japan as mutually beneficial. Some Japanese political strategists are attracted by the potential of improved Soviet relations as a counter-balance to the PRC, a warning to Washington, and a hedge against the loss of American support.⁸

The Sino-Soviet split has taught the Soviet Union a lesson in international politics and relations which she will apparently not soon forget. That lesson,

⁷Ball, "The Super-powers in Asia," p. 2.

⁸Ibid., p. 6.

which the Kremlin has learned through long experiences, is simply that gratitude is no more a reliable cohesive among Communist nations than it has been among Capitalist nations. The Sino-Soviet split helped to reinforce that view of the world which is not only pragmatic but which appears to be an accurate assessment. Therefore, Soviet foreign policy, because of her difficulties with China, has in fact become very pragmatic. It is neither pro-Communist nor anti-Capitalist. Because of her setbacks, the USSR appears to be taking a look at the areas of the world and setting a policy for each one. The important consideration for the Soviets appears to be what will be advantageous for the Soviet Union. This seems to be a realistic foreign policy--one not bound by ideological considerations.

Soviet-American detente also has been and is being used to the Soviets' advantage in their relations with the PRC. By her friendly relations with the United States, the Soviet Union is sending the PRC a signal that the Soviet-American relationship has primacy over any other.

The gains for the USSR have not been in the area of foreign policy alone. The increase in arms costs has been worrying the Soviet Union. The effects

of the skyrocketing costs of arms on the domestic economy include delayed projects, planned factories remaining unbuilt, and less consumer goods. If the arms race with the U.S. had not been somewhat controlled the Kremlin would have had to increase the portion of her budget going to defense, already between 20 and 25 percent of the GNP. The trade-off for detente appears to be increased consumer goods, more and better housing for the Soviet citizens, and increased civilian technology.⁹

As did the United States, the Soviet Union apparently felt that it would lose control with the development of a multi-polar balance-of-power world. But as the new balance-of-power began to develop, the USSR began to realize that from this new multi-polarity she could receive certain gains and advantages. Multi-polarity and the subsequent lessening of tensions with the West have helped to relieve the strains and stresses on the Soviet economy which therefore has allowed for domestic change thus relieving the pressures for those changes. The USSR is reexamining to some degree what course it must follow under these evolving conditions of

⁹"Arms Costs Worry Kremlin," *San Diego Union*, 11 July 1974, p. B-6.

multi-polarity. Current Soviet needs of trade, technology, and credits are served by pursuing a policy of detente with the United States and wider relations with the Non-Communist world. Lower tension serves both her European purposes and her Chinese problem. Therefore, as have the other major actors, the Soviet Union has been able to solve domestic problems and make foreign policy adjustments which probably would not have been possible had not the Sino-Soviet split taken place and a new multi-polarity began to develop.

PART II

LOSSES FOR THE U.S., THE PRC, AND THE USSR
RESULTING FROM THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

CHAPTER V

LOSSES TO CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

China and the Soviet Union have suffered both immediate and long-term losses as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. The immediate losses, particularly to China, are well known. The technological assistance and advisors which the Soviet Union withdrew from China in 1960 were sorely missed by China during the early 1960s.¹ The immediate effects of the split on the USSR were probably less pronounced but at the very least the split brought about the beginning of the end of a monolithic communistic ideology controlled and manipulated from the USSR.

The long-term losses of the Sino-Soviet split are those advantages which would have accrued to China and the Soviet Union were some form of Sino-Soviet alliance in existence today. This section will attempt to assess those lost advantages and to relate them to

¹For an excellent analysis of China's economic situation in the early 1960s refer to Albert Ravenholt, "Red China's Sagging Industry," and "The Human Price of China's Disastrous Food Shortage," *American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, East Asia Series*, 10 (Arts. 4 and 5, 1962).

the aims of the governments of the two countries. This endeavor is most certainly visionary but it is an attempt not so much to predict but to identify those factors of power which were lost as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. Additionally, it will look at the losses incurred in the Soviet Union's attempt at an Asian collective security system which does not seem to work without China. Last it will note the costs involved with foreign aid to developing nations as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. Admittedly, this paper is limited in its scope. Several important determinants are left out of this inquiry. For example, the effect of such an alliance on present and future foreign policy is not mentioned. Neither will this paper examine the sociological and psychological aspects which would be involved in such an alliance and which are exceedingly important determinants in themselves. Nor does it analyze what the balance-of-power would be if China and the Soviet Union were allied. This section simply asks the question, How powerful would a Sino-Soviet alliance be?

There seems to be little doubt that such an alliance would be extremely powerful. Just how powerful such an alliance would have been determines the cost of

the Sino-Soviet split to China and the USSR. In order to estimate that cost it is first necessary to determine what factors make an alliance powerful; by what factors can one say "this alliance is powerful" or "that alliance is not powerful"? If we define *power* as the ability of an alliance to enforce its will upon others, the question then becomes, What makes this possible? What factors enable an alliance to hold sway over world politics?

An advantageous geographical situation is the first factor of a powerful alliance. Are the allied countries located near each other? If so, do they share a long, common border? Are the countries involved well protected by natural boundaries? Are there resources for exploitation and are the populations of the countries vigorous and energetic?

The second factor of a powerful alliance is the resource base of the nations concerned. Are industrial raw materials and water power available? If these are abundant, does the alliance contain the capital, labor, and technology needed to develop them?

The third factor is the human element. Other things being equal, great population size is a source of power--labor, military personnel and a broad

agricultural base. But population must be related to a standard of living. If the population is greater than the land can support and capital must be diverted to it at the expense of industrial expansion, a large population becomes a liability. The factors of loyalty and morale also complicate the picture, particularly since these qualities are difficult to diagnose.

The fourth factor is the level of industrial production which has been achieved by the members of the alliance. This is dependent upon the resource base and the availability of supplies of capital, labor, and technology.

A fifth factor is that of agricultural production. The allied countries must be able to feed themselves or one should be able to correct the agricultural deficiencies of the other on a trade basis. For example, industrial exports could be traded for agricultural imports.

Sixth and last is the factor of military strength. Although it seems the most obvious element of power, it does not exist by itself but is almost totally dependent upon all of the other previously mentioned factors regarding the nations involved in the alliance.

The Geographical Situation

Together the Soviet Union and China cover approximately 12 million square miles and more than 20 percent of the land area of the world. China has a total area of approximately 3.7 million square miles, or about 6 1/2 percent of the world's area. She is thus slightly smaller than Canada, somewhat larger than the United States (3 million square miles) and approximately equal to all of Europe.² The USSR has an area of about 8.5 million square miles.³ There is room within the boundaries of the USSR for all of the U.S. including Alaska, plus all of Canada and Mexico. The USSR is so vast that it crosses eleven time zones, has a border which is equal to one and a half times the length of the equator, and is washed by twelve seas and three oceans.⁴

The Sino-Soviet border is the longest commonly shared border in the world. The border line arbitrarily cuts across central and northeast Asia. The topography

²Donald P. Whitaker et al., *Area Handbook for the People's Republic of China* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 11.

³George B. Cressey, *Soviet Potentials* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1962), p. 2.

⁴Novosti Press Agency, *The Soviet Union: Everyman's Reference Book* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, n.d.), p. 4.

ranges from the lofty Himalayan Mountains to the deserts of the Tarim Basin and the Dzungarian Basin which link Western China and Soviet-Central Asia through the famous Dzungarian Gate, a traditionally strategic pass which is actually a ten-mile-long gorge. The fortification of the Sino-Soviet border is one of the most costly results of the Sino-Soviet split. On this border on March 2, 1969, there was a brief but bloody battle over one of the obscure islands in the Ussuri River.⁵ Border clashes had occurred in the past, but this new incident was probably as close to war as two nations can come without actually declaring war. At least the equivalent of a battalion of troops, with full armor and artillery, were used. This was verified when the Soviets admitted that a full colonel had been killed during the conflict.⁶

Today the status of the Sino-Soviet border can best be described as an armed international stand-off. The USSR in the four-year period from 1970-74 has increased her forces in the area from 15 to at least 45 divisions, possibly as many as 48--over one-fourth of

⁵*The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, Keesing's Research Report (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 93.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 117.

her 169 division army. The USSR also has more than one thousand military aircraft in the area. These conventional forces are supported by a substantial number of nuclear missiles which can hit targets anywhere in China. Chinese concentration on defense is equally intense. In Peking an extensive network of underground tunnels and air raid shelters has been constructed twenty-five feet below street level. These have been shown to foreign visitors as evidence of China's determination to stand up against the Soviet threat. China has increased her ground forces on the border from 32 divisions to 45 divisions. Additionally, she has been continually strengthening her air forces and developing at least a first strike nuclear capability.⁷

The costs to maintain and fortify the border must be staggering for both the USSR and China. The Soviet Union spends between 20-25 percent of its GNP on defense and there are rumors that Moscow's spending on arms production and development has militarized the Soviet economy and created widespread discontent among workers reflected in slowdown strikes and demonstrations, and that the Kremlin is becoming more and more

⁷"Russia vs. China in Big War?" *U.S. News & World Report*, 27 August 1973, p. 33.

concerned over the continuing economic drain of weapons spending and its effects on the domestic economy.⁸

The cost to China is equally pressing. The withdrawal of Soviet assistance in the latter half of 1960 began to confront the Maoist leadership with a dilemma. The costs of military modernization impinge primarily on what the Chinese term their "metal processing industry." To the extent that military modernization involves research, new designs, experimentation, new technology, or substantial rearrangement of production processes, it impinges on the available supply of scientists, engineers, skilled technicians and craftsmen, and critical material in other areas. The more the military program has as its objective the attainment of a capability in advanced weapon systems, the greater the impingement on the higher quality end of the spectrum of these resources. The production of investment goods, upon which economic growth depends, also requires research and development and metal processing resources. In China, where there is no excess capacity in these areas, military modernization competes directly with economic growth. Resources devoted to military

⁸"Arms Costs Worry Kremlin," p. B-6; and "Red China Cites Soviet Arms Cost," *Los Angeles Times*, 22 December 1974, p. A-10.

equipment production represent losses in economic growth; resources devoted to investment goods represent losses in the area of military modernization.⁹

An additional loss of the Sino-Soviet split to the Soviet Union has been access to the Pacific. The USSR has the longest Pacific coastline of any country bordering that ocean. However, frozen seas bar access for most of the year. The Soviet Union's climate and topography make it difficult for her to become a Pacific power in her own right. Even the rivers flow in the wrong direction. The Volga ends in the isolated Caspian, and the Ob, Yenisei, and Lena point to the Arctic Ocean. The Amur bends north before joining the Pacific. The Don and the Dnieper enter the Black Sea, but it too is enclosed. Nowhere does the country border on open ice-free ocean except at Nurmansk in the extreme northwest.¹⁰ Unfortunately, the Soviet Pacific coast is not only the longest, but also the most useless. For

⁹U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), vol. 1: *The Mineral Resource Base of Communist China*, by K. P. Wang, Joint Committee Print, p. 164.

¹⁰George B. Cressey, *The Basis of Soviet Strength* (Maidenhead, England: Whittlesey House, 1945), p. 3.

China, by way of contrast, the case is much different. Along the China coast there are no less than two dozen modern seaports. It is obvious because of the recent increase in Soviet naval forces that the USSR desires to become a naval power. To that end it is more than likely that the USSR desires to strengthen her position along the Pacific. However, this will remain the Soviet Union's back door because of severe geographic restrictions and the Sino-Soviet split.

Added to the monetary losses to China and the USSR resulting from a need to fortify the Sino-Soviet border is the loss by China of an ally who possesses a large and powerful fleet and by the Soviet Union of year round access to the Pacific ports.

Natural Resources

It is difficult to evaluate natural resources as they relate to any type of alliance because natural resources are more an individual indication of wealth than a collective indicator. However, this analysis is attempted in terms of what one country has that the other doesn't have and how one could help to make up the deficiencies of the other through trade, aid, etc.

Coal

The USSR and China together have vast coal resources. The USSR has the second largest coal reserves in the world, with estimates ranging from 1.6 trillion tons to 8.6 trillion tons.¹¹ China is the third leading world producer of coal, ranking behind only the U.S. and the USSR in overall production. Its coal output is approximately 500 million metric tons annually.¹² In short, between the two countries, they have enough coal for several hundred years of energy consumption at present usage rates.

Oil

The increasing importance of oil in modern societies is common knowledge. Both China and the USSR have sufficient oil reserves and oil production to be oil exporters. In 1973 China made the transition from oil importer to oil exporter. China is not the Far East's Saudi Arabia, but with proven reserves in the area of 20 billion barrels, Peking expects oil

¹¹Cressey, *Soviet Potentials*, p. 73.

¹²Whitaker et al., p. 441.

eventually to become China's principal foreign exchange earner.¹³

The USSR possesses vast amounts of oil and natural gas reserves. Oil production in the Soviet Union has increased rapidly in the past several years. In 1967 the country produced 288 million tons of oil (one-seventh the world output). At the end of 1970 oil production in the USSR had reached 350 million tons.¹⁴ In recent years huge deposits of oil and gas have been discovered in Western Siberia which will probably be larger than all other known oil and gas deposits.¹⁵

As oil exporters, China and the USSR will be able to benefit politically in today's world in which oil is playing such a gigantic role in international politics. Allied in an economic Sino-Soviet *OPEC* they could exert great power and influence in Asia and throughout the world.

Iron

Both China and the USSR have huge iron ore deposits. However, China's present technology makes only a small percentage of that ore workable. The USSR

¹³"A Victory for Chou--and Moderation," *Time*, 3 February 1975, p. 31.

¹⁴Novosti Press Agency, p. 77. ¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 78.

has the technology and industrial capacity to develop these ores. Iron production in the Urals of the USSR goes back to the days of Peter the Great. Even at that time, iron shipments were made to England.¹⁶ Some type of Sino-Soviet alliance would clearly benefit China in this area.

Other minerals

Modern industry calls for copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, a long list of alloys, and a growing array of accessory metals. The USSR and China have a good supply of most of these. What is important for our purposes is that deficiencies in reserves of a natural resource in one country could be made up by the other if there were a Sino-Soviet alliance. For example, the USSR doesn't have excessive reserves of tungsten or antimony. Tungsten which is an alloy for hardening steel and thus vitally important is present in China in the largest reserves in the world. Antimony is also a material used in steel production. China has been an exporter of antimony since the late 1930s. However, China is deficient in nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash--minerals which are essential in the production of fertilizers.

¹⁶Cressey, *Soviet Potentials*, p. 80.

Fertilizer is essential to China if she is to be able to produce enough food to feed her millions of people. The Soviet Union could make up China's deficits while China could supply tungsten and antimony to the USSR. The USSR ranks high in her reserves of platinum, asbestos, potash, phosphate rock, chromium, and manganese, and has surplus for export.¹⁷

The point being made here should by this time be obvious and it need not be labored further. Either China or the USSR or both rank in the top twenty in the possession of almost every natural resource--including uranium.¹⁸ Together they possess the raw materials necessary to develop a powerful alliance.

Industry

The Sino-Soviet split has cost China dearly in terms of its industrial and technological development. The core of China's program for rapid industrialization was the Soviet commitment to assist China in the building of 291 major industrial plants by 1967. The Soviet

¹⁷Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁸U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, "China: The Transportation Sector, 1950-71," by Philip W. Vetterling and James J. Wagay, Joint Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 174-75.

equipment for these plants was valued at \$3.3 billion, or some \$11 million on the average for each project. This flow of equipment and technical assistance had a vital effect on the quality of China's industrialization, enabling China to produce such prestige items as jet aircraft, submarines, large electric-generating equipment, metal-cutting machine tools, tractors, trucks, and electronic equipment. Soviet aid to China had also included extensive training of Chinese scientists and technicians in the nuclear sciences in both the USSR and China, including the supply of experimental reactors and other nuclear related technology, designed to eventually provide a base which could support native Chinese production of Soviet-designed weapons.¹⁹

The sudden withdrawal of Soviet support in mid-1960 was, in the words of Chinese economic planner Po I-po, like "taking away all the dishes when you have only eaten half a meal." About 20 percent of the Soviet aid plants begun under agreements concluded prior to 1958 were incomplete. Most of the 125 Soviet aid plants contracted for under agreements concluded in August 1958

¹⁹U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), vol. 2: "International Trade of Communist China, 1950-65," by Robert L. Price, Joint Committee Print, p. 591.

and February 1959 and scheduled for completion by 1967 were still in the planning stage.²⁰ Thus, the Chinese were still highly dependent on the Soviet Union for new plants and product designs involving technology not already furnished or with which the Chinese had little experience.

China has not recovered from this interruption to her technological development. Technical manpower in China, especially high caliber technicians, managers, and engineers, is still in short supply. Her technology is particularly deficient in the area of electronics. Although only a little information is available, it appears that China lags up to 10 years behind the U.S. in the production of military electronics. Impressive progress has been made in nuclear and missile programs, but these programs only duplicate U.S. successes achieved years ago. At present China probably cannot manufacture phased array radars, highly accurate inertial guidance systems, or avionics equipment for all weather fighters.²¹

²⁰Ibid., p. 592.

²¹U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, "The Electronics Industry of China," by Philip D. Reichers, Joint Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 106-107.

During the current Five-Year Plan, China expects to increase her production of military electronics to satisfy the demands of her conventional armed forces, nuclear and missile programs, and military aid projects. Small quantities of equipment incorporating integrated circuits should be operational by this year, and airborne radar, if not in production now, should be in production by 1976.²² Despite these gains, China has not likely mastered the production of advanced military electronic equipment such as full integrated navigation and weapons delivery systems for aircraft or computer controlled radar air defense systems. Therefore, China will continue to lag significantly behind the USSR and the U.S. in electronic technology.

In her earlier attempts to achieve rapid industrialization, China depended heavily on Soviet capital, equipment, technical aid, and industrial materials, a large part of which the USSR supplied on long term credit. China has resumed her industrial growth but is still largely dependent on imports. However, she is now dealing with the West and Japan where purchases are primarily paid for in hard currencies.

²²Ibid., p. 107.

There is no question that the Soviet Union has the capability to again assist China in the area of industrialization if the two were united in a Sino-Soviet alliance. Industry constitutes the highest priority sector of the economy in the USSR. In terms of Soviet statistical concepts and valuation practices, industry's share in the economy's total gross output in 1967 amounted to 64 percent, excluding construction, which contributed another 10 percent. It ranks second in size among the industries of the world, surpassed only by that of the United States.²³

Therefore, the Soviet Union is not only capable of furnishing valuable technical aid to China, but there is also indication that she would be willing. Recent articles on China in Soviet newspapers, periodicals, and journals imply that the progress made in the first 10 years of the PRC (when Soviet assistance played a large role in Chinese development) was much greater than it has been in the last 15 years. One of the main themes which is repeated in the analyses of today's China by the Soviet press is the desire of Moscow to resume close Sino-Soviet ties which can only be accomplished on

²³Eugene K. Keefe et al., *Area Handbook for the Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 623.

Soviet terms, i.e., the removal of Maoists. Several articles have recalled the "warm experiences" of Soviet technicians in China.²⁴ What this seems to imply is that the USSR is casting itself as the great friend and benefactor of the Chinese people, that the economic and social problems should be blamed on Maoists, and that Moscow wants to be friends again.

An analysis of the industrial strength of China and the Soviet Union shows additional costs of the Sino-Soviet split. For China, the loss of technical assistance seems to have been acute and lasting. As we have seen, she lags ten years behind the U.S. in electronic technology, an area where it is extremely difficult to catch up because it is an area where cumulative knowledge has been doubling every five years. It would appear that China can quickly catch up with the USSR and the West in the area of industrialization only with the help of the USSR.

Population--China

Population is never a static thing. People are being born and are dying all the time and the factors which might tend to keep their numbers equal are being

²⁴Edward Neilan, "Soviets Seek to Sink Mao," *San Diego Union*, 3 November 1974, p. C-1.

upset by modern technology. China's populace, though large, has in the past been kept down by the combined effects of famine, flood, drought, disease, and revolution. The Communists have made great progress against all of these ills and there is evidence that the Chinese death rate is decreasing. In China's case, this is not necessarily a good thing. Estimates (1971) of the population of China range from 750 million to 850 million; estimates of population growth rate range from 1.5 to 2.5 percent. The U.S. Department of State estimates the current growth rate of the PRC population at more than 2 percent and estimates the current PRC population to be more than 800 million. Males 15-49, 185 million; fit for military service, 105 million; 90 percent of the people live on one-sixth of the land--i.e., more than 700 million live on 600,000 square miles, an average of 1,200 per square mile. Total population per cultivated square mile: 1,800 (compared with U.S.: 130; India: 700; USSR: 260; Japan: 3,700). Urban population is estimated at 15-20 percent.²⁵ With a

²⁵U.S., Department of State, *Information for Travelers to the People's Republic of China*, News Release, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Service, 6 September 1972, p. 1.

population of this size, it is not surprising that China is a poor country.

China's gross nation product of \$105 billion remains far below that of Italy, a country with approximately 7 percent China's population.²⁶ The per capita income is equivalent to approximately US \$100.²⁷ China's own Premier, Chou En-lai, refers to China as "a poor, backward state."²⁸ Generally speaking, life for the average Chinese is difficult and hard by any standard. However, when one speaks of standards of living it is imperative that he remember he is dealing with a relative quality and that even though life in China may be difficult today, in the past life in China was often grim and barely endurable. Prior to the revolution it was sometimes necessary for Chinese parents to sell their children into bondage to escape debt, and female children in many cases were left to die.²⁹ During years of famine millions of people starved to death. Therefore, it was not a light boasting when Chou En-lai

²⁶"A Victory for Chou," p. 22.

²⁷Whitaker et al., p. 373.

²⁸"A Victory for Chou," p. 22.

²⁹Oscar Handlin, *A Pictorial History of Immigration* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1972), p. 154.

recently stated that China has "succeeded in insuring the people their basic needs in food and clothing"³⁰-- an achievement that none of the world's other massive, overpopulated agricultural nations can quite match. The benefits as well as the hardships of China's progress have been distributed with a minimum of inequality. The average factory worker makes a meager \$28 a month; the average peasant living on a commune about half that. Essentials, like food, medicine, and housing, cost next to nothing and to the envy of the rest of the world, have not increased in price in twenty years.³¹ Medical care, in the form of the "barefoot doctor" reaches the rural areas.³² A smaller scale program in urban areas trains "worker doctors." The result of this approach to rural and urban health care has been to make some kind of medical care available to virtually everyone everywhere in China. Therefore, the average person in China is probably better off than at any other time in

³⁰"A Victory for Chou," p. 22. ³¹Ibid.

³²The word "barefoot" symbolizes the identification of paramedical personnel, mostly young men and women selected from poor peasant families, with the poor, often shoeless clients in the countryside. The "barefoot doctors" are taught to recognize and treat common diseases, perform first aid, practice acupuncture, and proclaim their dependence on the thought of Mao.

history, at least to the point where he is fed, and housing, however drab, and rudimentary medical care are available to him.

Many Americans have the tendency to look at morale and loyalty in other countries in terms of their own life styles. There is a tendency to say, "I would hate to live under a Communist regime in this or that country, therefore this or that people must hate it also." When one analyzes loyalty in the PRC it is important to consider that the Chinese people have never been free. They compare the tyranny of a communist regime only with other tyrannies they have known. The old Manchu warlords were dictators in their respective areas, and their rule was harsh or benevolent depending upon their whim. Despite the purple prose heaped upon Chiang Kai-shek during World War II, his dictatorship was from any standpoint worse than that under which the Chinese people live today. An entry in Bodde's diary of June 10, 1949, reads:

In Shanghai a few days ago according to the papers here, more than 200 corpses of workers, students, professors, and other citizens were recovered from a mass grave into which they had been cast shortly before the taking of Shanghai. They had been executed on the orders of the Kuomintang police commissioner.³³

³³Derk Bodde, *Peking Diary* (New York: Henry

Gossip and stories of Chiang Kai-shek's moral dearth are plentiful. One tells of a Kuomintang general who was shot by a firing squad the day after he interfered with Chiang's beating of a servant. Another tells that many Americans can remember recruits for the Nationalist army during the war, seized from their villages and marched to the front with iron collars on their necks, shackled together on a long chain. These stories may or may not be true. The important thing is that they are widespread throughout the peasantry and citizenry of China.

Another essential which most Americans tend to forget is that the Communist victory in China would not have been possible without the support or at least the acquiescence of the majority of the Chinese people. In addition to the positive achievements of the communist regime, there are the combined effects of propaganda and education on the people. The Chinese in today's China are a vast captured audience. The radio blasts out government propaganda from trains, buses, store fronts, wherever a few Chinese are likely to be congregated. When people are not working they are generally required

Schuman, 1950), p. 193.

to attend meetings where they listen to political speeches.

Another powerful stimulus towards supporting the regime is the factor of national progress and pride. China is progressing rapidly, and the Chinese people are impressed with their progress and proud of it. Therefore, it would seem logical to assume that the average Chinese, much as the average American, either actively supports his government or passively acquiesces to it.

Population--USSR

The latest survey (July 1, 1974) showed the total population of the Soviet Union to be 252 million.³⁴ The history of that population as relates to hardship and oppression is probably equal to that of China. Prior to the Russian revolution, the country was ruled by the Czar. The government under him was totally autocratic. The government was the Czar, the Czar was the State, and he owned society and all the facilities of life. The Czar ruled as he wished. If

³⁴"Report of USSR Central Statistical Board on Results of Fulfillment of the State Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR in the First Half of 1974, from *Pravda*," *Reprints from the Soviet Press*, 15-31 August 1974, p. 29.

the Czar was extremely powerful or strong willed, then life became much more difficult. If he was weak, then generally speaking life didn't improve because those in authority under him were equally oppressive. Slavery was abolished in Russia in 1861, however, the style of life for most peasants and laborers did not change significantly in that they were not given the means to improve their lives. After the Revolution, things improved somewhat, but that improvement was followed all too quickly by the terrorism of Stalin, his labor camps, and hundreds of thousands of political executions.

Today life in the Soviet Union, although harder and more difficult than that of the United States, is probably much better than it has ever been for the average Soviet citizen and it appears to be getting better every year. According to Soviet government figures, the average monthly cash earnings of industrial and other workers totaled 139.5 rubles in the first half of 1974, an increase of 4.8 percent over the first half of the previous year. Wages, plus payments and benefits out of the public consumption funds, added up to 188 rubles, an increase of 4.6 percent over the previous year. The wages of collective farmers went up by 6 percent. Payments and benefits received by the population

out of the public consumption funds increased by 6.5 percent. The public consumption funds guarantee the population free education and medical care, pensions and other benefits, student grants, accommodations either free or at reduced rates at sanatoriums and vacation homes, the upkeep of nursery schools and day care centers, paid leaves and other types of social and cultural services.³⁵

Additionally, the class structure, even though it still exists, allows for upward mobility. Khrushchev himself was an example of that upward mobility. Therefore, the average Soviet citizen would compare with the average American citizen (as does the average Chinese) in that he is socialized within the system, carries out his duties, and perceives himself to be sharing the values from the system. Generally, he is satisfied with the system and, equally important, feels that he is making progress.

Therefore, we can say that the average Soviet and Chinese citizen is loyal to his government and actively supports it or at least acquiesces to it. Because of this loyalty to their governments, a

³⁵Ibid., p. 26.

Sino-Soviet rapprochement would in all probability have the support of the Chinese and the Soviet people.

Agriculture

As we have seen, population, when it is as large as China's, is an asset in terms of a ready available storehouse of manpower for industrial and military needs but it is a liability in that it must be fed. Although it is not generally known, China is one of the world's foremost agricultural nations. Because of wide variations in climate, topography, and soils, practically every farm crop and type of livestock can be produced. China produces more rice, millet, sweet potatoes, sesame, and rapeseed than any other nation and ranks second or third in the production of soybeans, tobacco, wheat, and cotton. China also ranks high in animal husbandry although livestock are valued more for draft power and fertilizer than as a source of food. More hogs are grown in China than in any other country in the world. China vies with the USSR for second place behind the U.S. in the value of agricultural commodities produced.³⁶ However, China has two basic problems. The

³⁶U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, "China: Agricultural Development, 1949-71," by Alva Lewis Erisman, Joint Committee Print (Washington, D.C.:

first is the fact that only about 11 percent of China's total area is arable.³⁷ The second is that China's agriculture is labor intensive resulting in relatively low productivity per worker. Although chemical fertilizers are increasingly being used, China's fertilizers consist primarily of animal manure, human excrement, and compost. As previously mentioned, the USSR has a surplus of chemical fertilizers and could be of assistance in this area. The Soviet Union could also assist in the area of mechanization. Since 1949, China has been increasing the number of tractors in use. Units of fifteen horsepower, reported to be 400 in 1949, had increased to 135,000 in 1965, and to an estimated 150,000 in 1967. However, this was far short of the 1.2 million tractors China estimated she needed for full mechanization. Prospective improvement in production has been important in the publicizing of tractors by the mass media, but as late as 1971 there was little direct evidence of the results of their use. In any case, the area under mechanical cultivation was by mid-1971 still small, probably well under 10 percent.³⁸

Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 139.

³⁷Whitaker et al., p. 395.

³⁸Ibid., p. 410.

Mechanization of agriculture in the USSR, although at a lower stage of development than in the U.S., is much further developed than in China. Obviously, this situation would provide commercial opportunities in the area of trade to the USSR and benefits in the form of agricultural development to China. This is not to say that China is not able to feed her 800 million people. She has been able to do this, but China continues to be one drought, or one bad harvest, away from starvation. And although China has been successful in her effort to feed her people, that effort has resulted in the disruption of her biological science research and her education system. There are relatively few highly trained scientists and scholars in China and many of these had to be taken from their research and educational institutions and put on the farms in order to increase crop yields. Most of these scholars are quite elderly and their time would be better spent training a new generation of capable researchers and teachers.³⁹ This is another area where the Sino-Soviet split and the resulting loss of Soviet advisors has been detrimental to China.

³⁹"Red China Crops Reported Ample but Science Lags," *San Diego Union*, 7 October 1974, p. A-6.

China's basic agricultural problem then is that she has too little land and too many people. The only way she can increase the yield of that land is through intense use of commercial fertilizers, mechanization, and increased education of her farmers--all areas where the Soviet Union could be of assistance had the Sino-Soviet split not occurred.

Military

If present trends continue, the United States runs the risk of losing out to the Soviet Union as the world's leading military power in the coming decade. Top Pentagon analysts predict on the basis of current trends that by 1980 or a few years thereafter the U.S. could face the following:

America's land-based missile force would be vulnerable to a "first strike" knockout by Russia's greatly expanded force of powerful launchers with multiple warheads.

NATO, in the face of an all-out Soviet conventional attack, would have the choice of allowing the Russians to overrun Western Europe in a few days or of resorting to use of tactical nuclear weapons in the first hours of war.

American allies in Europe and Asia as well as neutrals, perceiving U.S. weakness and Soviet strength, would orient their policies more and more to favor Moscow rather than Washington.⁴⁰

⁴⁰"American Military Power Sliding into Second Place," *U.S. News & World Report*, 4 November 1974, p. 30.

Pentagon analysts base this picture of the strategic outlook on the following facts:

1. In the U.S., the defense establishment is under pressure from all sides. The atmosphere created by U.S.-Soviet detente and preoccupation with economic troubles is making the public indifferent to the problems of military preparedness, a mood reminiscent of the 1930s.

2. Budget cuts combined with the effects of inflation have drastically reduced the purchasing power of the Defense Department.

3. The switch to all-volunteer forces means that military manpower is barely adequate and extremely costly. The Ninety-fourth Congress is almost certain to be hostile to defense spending at a time of economic crisis.

By contrast, the Soviets, unaffected by public opinion, are increasing their defense budget every year and are expanding the size of their forces despite detente. They are now beginning a massive new missile build-up with the apparent aim of seizing strategic superiority over the U.S. Their armies in Eastern Europe are being beefed up with more men, tanks, and equipment at a time when NATO strength is dwindling.

One can assume that this threat is real, allowing for a certain amount of "wolf-calling" by the Pentagon. To the U.S., the implications of a Sino-Soviet military alignment are many; to the Soviet Union and China, the losses in the military area are numerous.

China was allied militarily with the USSR under a Sino-Soviet mutual assistance treaty signed in February 1950⁴¹--a treaty concluded while the two countries had a warm relationship and which was to be valid for thirty years. For all practical purposes, however, this pact has been inoperative since 1960 because of ruptured ideological and interparty relations between the two countries.

An analysis of the military losses to the USSR and China can be made by relating the potential power of a Sino-Soviet alliance to the power of the U.S. The USSR maintains an impressive active duty force strength of about four million men, backed up by a trained reserve force of at least another four million men who have served with the active forces in the last five years. There are about 20 million men registered in the ground force reserve alone.⁴²

⁴¹Whitaker et al., p. 603.

⁴²Moorer, p. 3. More recent U.S. estimates

Large as it is, the active force of the USSR is not as large as China's active establishment, which has the strength of over four million men and an armed militia of over five million men.⁴³

By contrast, the U.S. maintains a much smaller active force of about two million, supplemented by about one million individuals in selected reserve units plus others who are individually available for immediate mobilization. There are about three million total U.S. reservists, standby, and retired members.⁴⁴

Of course, each of the three countries could, over time, field a much larger force. These figures simply display the force levels which would be available in the initial stages of a major conflict. At the onset, a Sino-Soviet alliance could field approximately 38 million men, whereas the U.S. could field approximately five million.

A Sino-Soviet alliance would be equally impressive in terms of naval strength. Secretary of Navy

increase the number of men under arms in the Soviet Army by as much as a million. L. Edgar Prina, "U.S. Raises Estimate of Red Army," *San Diego Union*, 20 October 1974, p. A-1. Pentagon informants said the new figures were much more the result of previous underestimates than any recent growth of USSR troops.

⁴³Moorer, p. 3. ⁴⁴Ibid., p. 7.

J. William Middendorf has noted that in fiscal year 1976, the number of active ships in the U.S. fleet will drop below 500, compared to 926 on June 30, 1969. The U.S. will have 100 fewer ships on duty in June of 1975 than in 1940, a year before Pearl Harbor. The Soviets, meanwhile, are continuing to enlarge and modernize their fleet with technically advanced, sophisticated weaponry and missile systems. The USSR now has 2,100 combat vessels, many of which are designed for first-strike purposes. The Soviet Union continues to spend three times more than the United States on defense research and development, while continued economic problems are taking a toll on the American fleet.⁴⁵

China's major surface force is still quite small--less than 100 major surface ships and submarines--but it is growing slowly. The largest ships in the PRC fleet are the new guided missile destroyers, the first of which became operational in late 1971. Each ship carries Styx-type missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and antisubmarine weapons. More of these ships

⁴⁵"Budget Cuts Deplored, Strong Navy Necessary," *San Diego Union*, 13 October 1974, p. C-2.

are expected to be operational soon, and others are under construction, or fitting out.⁴⁶

Although it appears that major surface combatants are not receiving the same priorities in the Chinese Navy as was evident only a few years ago, in contrast to the slow progress in the construction of major combat surface ships, China is rapidly expanding its guided missile boat force. By mid-1974 China had over 100 of these small surface combatants. All of these boats are armed with a Chinese version of the highly effective Soviet-designed Styx surface-to-surface missile. This missile boat force significantly enhances the Chinese Navy's capability to engage in coastal operations.⁴⁷

At present China does not have the capability to project its massive land forces beyond the Eurasian land mass. However, combining its massive land army with Soviet sea power would enable a projection to almost any point on the globe.

The USSR has the largest submarine force in the world, approximately 343 boats.⁴⁸ The Soviet submarine

⁴⁶Moorer, p. 13. ⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸David Fairhall, *Russian Sea Power* (Boston: Gambit, 1971), p. 250.

force will continue to be the world's largest throughout the next five years. The total number of submarines, however, is expected to decline as the older diesel submarines are phased out faster than the new, more sophisticated submarines are delivered to the fleet.⁴⁹

China's submarine force, in terms of numbers, is roughly equal to that of the U.S.--approximately 135. However, except for a single modern-design long-range submarine, the Chinese submarine force consists primarily of Soviet-designed, but Chinese-built, medium range Whiskey and Romeo class submarines. Both of these Soviet classes were considered to be excellent submarines at one time, but they incorporated features which now are considered obsolescent by U.S. and USSR standards. China may have produced a new version of the Romeo class. If so, series production of this submarine or possibly even a further-improved version could begin in the near future.

Chinese naval forces will continue to be much smaller and much less capable than those of the U.S. and the USSR. However, if the Chinese navy were to be supplemented by Soviet technicians and advisors plus Soviet hardware, it would be a formidable force capable of

⁴⁹Moorer, p. 13.

projecting its power beyond the China Sea. If we look at numbers alone, a combined Sino-Soviet fleet, both surface and sub-surface, would number about 2,700 units, whereas the U.S. has a combined total of just over six hundred surface and sub-surface vessels.

In analyzing tactical airpower, the picture of a Sino-Soviet alliance is equally formidable. Together their tactical air force would number approximately 5,500 planes. The U.S. has about 5,000 aircraft.⁵⁰ In almost every area of ground support weapons a Sino-Soviet alliance would result in numerical superiority. This includes tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heavy mortars.⁵¹

Both the U.S. and the USSR have large nuclear-capable forces. In terms of missile warheads, the U.S. is substantially ahead of the Soviet Union--roughly 6,922 to 2,337.⁵² In this regard, China is still far behind the U.S. and the USSR, both quantitatively and qualitatively. While the United States and Soviet Union theater nuclear weapons inventories number in the several thousand, the Chinese total nuclear weapons inventory (strategic and theater) probably numbers in

⁵⁰Moorer, p. 8. ⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²"American Military Power," p. 31.

the few hundreds. The Chinese nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to increase rapidly over the next few years, as fissionable material production facilities are expanded.⁵³

The U.S. is at least equal to the USSR in overall nuclear capability and probably still superior in nuclear weapon technology. However, that equality is affected if not overturned when one adds China's significant nuclear capability to that of the USSR.

This brief analysis shows that a Sino-Soviet alliance would represent the most formidable military alliance the world has ever known. If, as many believe, nuclear weapons will never be used, that alliance is even more formidable. Nuclear weapons, in the view of many, have more a psychological than a practical value today. The Soviet-American balance-of-terror and more particularly the ABM treaty, which leaves the populations of both countries almost wholly unprotected, have effectively neutralized their missiles except as political bargaining ploys. The only *usable* form of military power, it is argued, is non-nuclear; the conventional land, sea, and air forces that great and small nations alike are prepared to employ are what make national

⁵³Moorer, p. 16.

power credible. If the preceding argument is realistic, and I believe it is credible, than the Sino-Soviet split has cost the USSR and China a military alliance which would be second to none in the world today, and with it, the political clout which such a force would give in international affairs.

The losses mentioned above were determined in a relatively objective manner. The absence of the Sino-Soviet split and the resultant Sino-Soviet alliance would have given advantages to China and the USSR, possibly not to the extent mentioned, but to a significant degree nonetheless. There are other areas where losses were incurred which are more subjective. One of these has been in the Soviet Union's attempt to form an Asian collective security system.

An Asian Collective Security System

Toward the end of his speech at the World Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow on June 8, 1969, Soviet Party General Secretary Brezhnev, after mentioning the Soviet Union's long-standing proposal for the convening of a conference on European security, noted that "we believe the course of events is also placing on

the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia."⁵⁴

There was no elaboration of this statement by Brezhnev nor by any other official Soviet source at the time. But his terse statement was enough to trigger in capitals throughout the world a flood of speculation about the meaning of this new Soviet departure and the intentions which were behind it.

There were two possible explanations for this new course of events. Only a few months prior to the conference in Moscow the long smoldering Sino-Soviet conflict had ignited into armed conflict in the Ussuri River section of their common border. Most observers believed that the USSR was seeking to organize an anti-China united front in Asia to encircle or contain the PRC just as it was beginning to emerge from the trauma and isolation of the cultural revolution. Others read into Brezhnev's remarks a wider purpose. The Nixon Administration had announced its intention to wind down the war in Vietnam, and the first withdrawal of American forces had already taken place. A change of America's

⁵⁴Arnold L. Horelick, *The Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security Proposal: A Club in Search of Members* (Santa Monica: Rand Corp. [March 1974]), p. 1, quoting *Pravda*, 9 June 1969.

highly visible profile in Asia and a limitation, if not a reduction, of U.S. commitments was generally anticipated. (This was confirmed a month later when President Nixon introduced the Guam Doctrine.) This, and the earlier announcement of Britain's intention to withdraw from East of Suez, led many observers to conclude that the USSR was preparing to move into the vacuum which the retraction of Western power would create, or at least, that Moscow wished to explore Asian receptivity to a Soviet-sponsored collective security system which would replace the old Western security managers, forestall a possible renewal of Japanese imperialism, and prevent China's expansion before she grew too strong.

The objectives of the Soviet "proposal" caused much foreign speculation. U.S. policy planners were cited as believing that

North Vietnam was the keystone of the Soviet strategic design for Southeast Asia, with Moscow hoping to maintain through Hanoi a foothold which would counter China's growing power in post-Vietnam Asia.⁵⁵

Yet no Soviet statement in almost five years since the Asian collective security scheme was first mentioned has specifically mentioned North Vietnam (or North Korea) as

⁵⁵Horelick, p. 5., quoting *New York Times*, 23 June 1969.

a potential partner in the system, and the Communist-ruled Asian states, excepting Outer Mongolia, have not made any independent comment on the Soviet proposal. Indeed, while the Asian collective security system was later represented by Moscow as being Pan-Asian in scope, explicit invitations to discuss it with the USSR have been aimed (again, with the exception of Outer Mongolia) only at non-Communist states.

The USSR's collective security proposal for Asia was in all probability a gigantic trial balloon testing the political climate for a Soviet initiative whose shape, scope, and substance would depend almost entirely on events and reactions. In any case, China's reaction to this proposal was immediate and violent. She denounced it as an imperialist plot to encircle China.⁵⁶ The USSR countered by stating that an Asian collective security system would be created to frustrate Western imperialism, particularly that of the U.S. and potentially that of Japan, and only vaguely referred to Maoist hegemonism. But the widely accepted interpretation of the Soviet proposal as a bid to create an Asian united front against China, fueled by Peking's own self-identification as the target, soon obliged Soviet

⁵⁶Horelick, p. 10.

spokesmen to deny such participation. China is opposed to the Soviet security system whether implicitly included or excluded from it. China's opposition has meant that other Communist-ruled states in Asia, independent and neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict, would also have no part in a Soviet sponsored collective security system as long as it was seen by Peking as being directed against China.

So approximately five years after it was first suggested, the USSR's campaign to seize the diplomatic initiative in Asian security matters cannot be counted a success. To be realized, a successful Asian security structure would require a radical change in the political and military environment of Asia. Chinese hostility virtually guarantees that any proposal to create a formal security structure of which the USSR is a part will not be successfully undertaken. Even an invitation to hold a conference to consider the desirability of such a structure is unlikely to find a nucleus of accepting countries. Only a radical improvement in Sino-Soviet relations (including a settlement of territorial issues on terms acceptable to China and a substantial reduction and redeployment of Soviet military

forces along the border) could conceivably cause the PRC to withdraw its objections to such a proposal.

Soviet and Chinese Foreign Aid

A brief look at the Soviet and Chinese aid programs to the developing world points to another area where excessive costs were incurred as a result of the Sino-Soviet split by both the USSR and China. The Soviet and Chinese aid efforts are in many ways complementary although unwilling and unwittingly so and within limits. In *The Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, Jan S. Prybyla explains:

Chinese material aid and advice focus on agriculture, geological prospecting, light industry, road and rail transportation, and public health. The Soviets specialize in heavy and retractive industries especially metallurgy, machine tool manufacture, power generation and transmission, oil extraction and processing, and coal mining. With few exceptions, Chinese projects tend to be small or medium-sized (textile mills, tannery plants, cigarette and match factories, dry docks for repairing small boats) while the Soviets go in for large-scale projects⁵⁷

It is not necessary to force the argument to show that if the aid China and the USSR give to developing countries is unwittingly and unwillingly

⁵⁷Jan S. Prybyla, "The Sino-Soviet Split and the Developing Nations," in *The Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ed. Roger E. Kanet (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 278.

complimentary at present, its attractiveness to the developing world could only increase if China and the USSR were cooperating in their aid efforts. Not only would the aid be more attractive to the developing world, but it would also represent a real savings to China and the USSR because redundancies in the aid system could be eliminated.

In summary, the losses which have been incurred by the USSR and the PRC as a result of the Sino-Soviet split appear to be very tangible. The Soviet Union has found that an Asia security system is not possible without China. The split precludes a Sino-Soviet military and trade alliance which would seem beneficial to both countries. Each has also incurred the costs of having to fortify a common border of 4,000 miles--costs which are very real because they represent to China alternative programs such as industrial and agricultural development and to the Soviet Union relief from an already staggering military budget.

CHAPTER VI

LOSSES TO THE UNITED STATES

On October 1, 1974, George Meany, President of AFL-CIO, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the subject of detente, spelled out feelings shared by many Americans. He characterized detente in the following manner:

Detente has produced a silly euphoria in the West, . . . [but] is viewed with cold calculation in the Soviet Union. While detente has made anti-communism unfashionable in the West . . . in the East, it means an intensification of the ideological struggle. Here's how the Soviet Union sees detente:

Detente is based on U.S. weakness.

Detente means intensification of ideological warfare.

Detente means an undermining of NATO.

Detente means ultimate Soviet military superiority over the West.

Detente means recognition by the West of the Soviet Union's ownership of Eastern Europe.

Detente means withdrawal of American forces from Europe.¹

Although Meany can hardly be termed a completely objective witness, his views reflect the concern of many Americans and U.S. allies in Europe and Asia who believe that the United States is currently following a course which produces as many losses as it does gains. For

¹Ruthven E. Libby, "No Change Expected in Communist Ideology," *San Diego Union*, 26 January 1975, p. C-6.

example, the President's 1973 report on foreign policy listed among U.S. goals and achievements the battering relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the United States and China. Relative to the Soviet Union, the President explained that the United States had engaged in negotiations designed to produce specific agreements both where differences existed and where cooperation was possible. In this way, the President explained, the U.S. would be able to diffuse the threat of nuclear confrontation. He felt that progress in one area would induce progress in others. In other words, a situation of gathering momentum would be created. The President referred to his May 1972 summit meeting in Moscow as a major step in the direction of a steadier and more constructive relationship. However, the President's report failed to discuss the policy considerations involved in reaching some of these agreements with the Soviet Union and others with China. It did not explain the impact of massive Soviet grain purchases on domestic food prices or indicate whether this factor was considered in reaching the final trade decisions. Nor did the report discuss the implications of closer commercial and industrial relations between two economic systems as

different as those of the United States and the Soviet Union, relations which if they are to flourish would require political and economic considerations on both sides. The report seemed to indicate that it was a foregone conclusion that a type of interdependence would develop which would automatically lead to cooperation. The report seemed to be more an historical over-view than a meaningful discussion of the realities involved.²

Europe

An additional question is what do her Western European allies think of the U.S.-Soviet detente. Most assuredly the Europeans share relief at any lifting of the threat of war. Certainly President Nixon, and more recently, President Ford, and Chairman Brezhnev have created the impression of the diminishing likelihood of an armed conflict.³ However, on the other hand is the question of what the ending of the cold war means in terms of Western Europe's future. Detente apparently carries the promise of change but some European leaders

²U.S., President, Report to Congress, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace," *Federal Register*, 3 May 1973, pp. 1-179.

³Edward Neilan, "Real Issues--Solutions Might Elude Ford in Japan," *San Diego Union*, 17 November 1974, p. C-1.

seem to wonder what that change will be. There is, for example, a concern that Europe's security needs may be overlooked as a result of the U.S.-Soviet detente. To a large extent these needs previously have been met and paid for by the United States. Several divisions of U.S. troops remain stationed in Europe and U.S. nuclear power serves to off-set that of the Soviet Union. By contrast, the Western Europeans, with the exception of West Germany, make minimal expenditures for their common defense under NATO. Moreover, there are only limited British and French nuclear capabilities and the former is derived in part from special arrangements with the United States. As the Europeans see it, detente not only increases the likelihood of U.S. force withdrawals from Europe but also of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear deal which could have a profound effect on Western Europe's security and in which they might not be consulted.

Notwithstanding these fears, the Europeans show little inclination to take up the slack in Western defense in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, French nuclear development excepted. On the contrary, the European leaders see the rapprochement as raising popular pressures within their countries for further

reductions in the already limited European defense effort.⁴

Less openly discussed are European concerns over the commercial consequences of detente. Total Soviet trade with non-communist nations is not great. What there is, however, the Western Europeans have pursued vigorously for many years; in 1971, for example, of a Soviet trade with non-communist nations of \$9 billion, the Western European share was \$4.4 billion.⁵ By contrast, the United States resisted trade with the USSR for many years. Even now there are substantial barriers to the development of that trade.

Only recently has American commerce appeared on the scene, although Western Europe has been hard pressed to compete with such things as the 1972 wheat deal and the 1973 natural gas agreements. In short, detente has cleared the way for a new and powerful competitor for Eastern European trade and this competition helps feed the Western European anxieties created by detente. Additionally, there is the fear that this new U.S.

⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *European Reaction to the Soviet-United States Detente*, a report by Senator Mike Mansfield (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 3.

⁵Ibid., pp. 3-4.

relation with the Soviet Union will coincide with a period of estrangement from Western Europe. That need not be the case. However, the possibility of this happening seems very real because of the suspicion and resistance in Western Europe regarding the U.S.-Soviet detente. Europe seems to be questioning the credibility of the United States commitments to NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty, the "bottom line" of which reads that the U.S. would risk nuclear war over a Western European-Soviet confrontation. It seems that detente has put the U.S., at least in some European ways, in the position of an adversary rather than an ally.

Japan

U.S.-China relations appear to have produced equally serious questions among U.S. allies in Asia. George W. Ball, in an article in the *New York Times Magazine*, points to the Japanese reaction:

Although a year ago Americans would have thought the idea preposterous, some strangely prescient Japanese have long been haunted by the fear that the United States might sometime arrange a rapprochement with China without their intermediation or even their knowledge, leaving them isolated. Last July 15, they saw that nightmare beginning to come true.⁶

⁶George W. Ball, "We Are Playing a Dangerous Game with Japan," *New York Times Magazine*, 25 June 1972, p. 21.

For years the United States had rested the security of Europe primarily on NATO. Equally central to the defense of the Far East has been her alliances with Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. While China remained isolated and discussions with the Soviet Union were concentrated on European affairs there seemed little reason to involve Japan in those diplomatic dealings to the extent that the United States had involved her Western allies. Nonetheless, most Japanese took it for granted that the United States would fully consult their government in advance of any super-power talks which affected Asian power relationships--something the U.S. did not do. Japan expected to be treated as a full-fledged ally. She wasn't.

Suspicion and mistrust of U.S. intentions has resulted in Japan from Nixon's visit to China in February of 1972. The Japanese seem to be convinced that the U.S. has almost certainly reached understandings with the Chinese which could threaten Japanese interest during the fifteen hours of formal talks between President Nixon and Chou En-lai and the longer period Henry Kissinger spent with Chou on his earlier visits. This lack of communication with Japan has also created doubts about the durability of the American

security commitment. U.S. actions may be forcing Japan to make a separate peace with Peking. Any Peking-Tokyo agreement would affect the U.S.-Japanese agreement concerning the use of U.S. air bases on Japanese soil. These arrangements require that Japan must agree to the aircraft's mission before the air field can be utilized. Already the Chinese government has made it clear to Tokyo that no normalization discussions can take place until Japan recognizes Peking as the sole legal representative of the Chinese people, acknowledges that Taiwan is part of China, and abrogates its peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government.⁷

The U.S. must therefore face the hard reality that her lack of communication with Japan could produce a crisis. If the government in Tokyo were to elect to withhold the cooperation needed to enable U.S. aircraft to carry out their missions, the entire Far Eastern defense situation (particularly the defense of Taiwan) could be compromised.

The possibility of a separate Peking-Tokyo peace coupled with the increasingly vocal view of some Americans that Japan is receiving a "free ride" on the

⁷U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The New China Policy*, p. 295.

U.S.-Japanese security commitment, could force the Japanese to rearm--something the U.S. has previously stated Japan should never do. For several years Japan has operated upon a principle of "N-2," which means she keeps her technology up to date so that she could produce an operational nuclear weapon within two years.⁸ The possibility of Japan becoming a nuclear power makes current U.S. diplomatic conduct particularly dangerous. It is one thing to envision a nuclear Japan allied closely to the West. It is altogether something different to have an alienated Japan armed with nuclear weapons. In short, U.S. actions have confused and angered Japan and caused her to mistrust U.S. intentions.

Taiwan

The Taiwanese seem to be equally disturbed by the U.S. policy toward China. Taiwan is an obsession in the minds of the Chinese. The U.S. seemed to feed that obsession when the Nixon Administration extended *de facto* recognition to Peking through the President's visit and other steps to broaden Sino-American contacts. Further, President Nixon stated that "the ultimate

⁸Ibid., p. 298.

relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for the U.S. to decide." The Nixon-Chou communiqué declares that the U.S. government "does not challenge" the position of "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait . . . [that] there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."⁹ Kissinger allowed a glimpse of that new China policy in December 1971 when he said, "The ultimate relationship of Taiwan to the People's Republic of China should be settled by direct negotiations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China."¹⁰ The President confirmed this position in his State of the World Message in February 1972.

It is extremely important not to be misled by these pronouncements. The parties to the negotiations proposed are a nuclear power of about 800 million in one corner and an island state of 15 million in the other. Michael Reisman, in a statement at hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs commented on a possible Taiwanese interpretation of the new U.S. position:

⁹Foreign Policy Association, "The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle," *Great Decisions 1973* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1973), p. 7.

¹⁰U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The New China Policy*, p. 75.

. . . the President's magnanimous promise of neutrality approaches Anatole France's classic characterization of the "majestic equality of the law," forbidding the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets, and steal bread. . . .

It is impossible to imagine that preliminary negotiations with China did not include the question of the Disposition of Taiwan. It is equally hard to believe that the decisive coincidence of Kissinger's trip to Peking and the critical UN vote on the China seat were mere oversights. President Nixon's "state of the world" innuendo about Taiwan on February 9, 1972, repeated almost verbatim Dr. Kissinger's press conference statement 2 months earlier. The joint communiqué confirms the suspicion that the United States has agreed to China's demand for Taiwan¹¹

The new U.S.-China policy has resulted in a blow to the economy of Taiwan. Over the years the U.S. has become an increasingly important trading partner of Taiwan. However, the unseating of the Republic of China from the United Nations and President Nixon's trip to Peking and the Nixon-Chou communiqué have created uncertainties which have begun to slow U.S. investment in Taiwan. Additionally, the Japanese government has suspended the granting of new credits to Taiwan since the UN vote and Japanese investments have also slowed greatly.¹² Economically, the status of Taiwan is not critical to the United States. However, U.S. investment

¹¹Ibid., pp. 80-81.

¹²Ibid., p. 70.

by U.S. investors amounted to approximately \$500 million¹³--10 percent of Taiwan's GNP.

Although the economic status of Taiwan is not critical to the United States, Taiwan is critical to the U.S. Far Eastern defense organization. The importance of Taiwan to the U.S.-Asian defense link should be obvious. A look at the map demonstrates that America's first line of defense is the chain of islands and peninsulas in East Asia running from Singapore to Japan--the so-called Ess-Jay line. Taiwan is the pivot point on this line. With Taiwan in the hands of a potential enemy, the entire Ess-Jay line comes unstuck and the U.S. is compelled to fall back thousands of miles in its strategic planning. This theory has been proven historically. Taiwan was Japan's base of operation when she launched her offensive against Southeast Asia during World War II. From Taiwan, she had control over most of the Pacific and, for a time, isolated Australia and New Zealand. If the Soviet Pacific fleet based at Vladivostok is to be contained, then Taiwan must be in the hands of a government allied to the United States.

¹³Ibid., p. 53.

China has stated that there can be no normalization of relations between Peking and Washington until the U.S. defense treaty of 1954 with the Republic of China is terminated. The United States expresses an intention to carry out the obligation of that treaty but at the same time has set upon a course of normalizing relations with China. It seems that the two courses are mutually exclusive. It is not surprising, therefore, that U.S. allies both in Asia and Europe have begun to suspect that the U.S. is entertaining the possibility of adopting new attitudes towards its treaty commitments.

The U.S. defense commitment to the government of the Republic of China is patterned after similar agreements with the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. At present the credibility of those commitments is also in doubt. The transition from an American centered East Asia towards a multi-polar Asia has proven to be a traumatic experience for many of the U.S. allies and their leaders in Asia. Although no one questions American military power or, for that matter, the strength of the American economy, uncertainties do revolve around the American will to honor her defense commitments and the impact of that uncertainty on

foreign policy. There is fear that the United States is creating an attractive vacuum in Southeast Asia. One need only recall a period in the late 1940s when the United States withdrew its armed forces from Korea and the then Secretary of State and Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff both said that Korea was outside the defense perimeter of the United States which went from Japan to the Philippines and so on. Within six months the North Koreans had launched a massive invasion and the United States was involved in a long and bitter war in Korea. This lesson in history makes current fears understandable.

The U.S. apparently entertains the notion of playing in the margins of the Sino-Soviet split, thus avoiding entanglements which could be dangerous or costly and at the same time playing both the PRC and the USSR to her advantage. Because of her present Sino-Soviet policy, it seems that the United States is the loser in many areas. The Soviets are suspicious of American actions. The Chinese are not merely suspicious but they were convinced as early as 1963¹⁴ that the U.S. policy is directed towards playing the two Communist

¹⁴"No Meddling in Sino-Soviet Differences by U.S. Imperialism," *Peking Review*, July 1963, p. 9.

powers against one another. Rather than a simple balance-of-power relationship which the U.S. seems to be acting on relative to China, the USSR, and the United States, there is one which is much more complex and dangerous and which involves U.S. European and Asian allies. Those allies see the trips to Peking and Moscow as not likely to be in their best interests. They also seem to be convinced that whatever is the visible outcome of these meetings, the unannounced results which could include possible secret agreements will be more important to them than what is said in the resulting communiqué.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The basic thesis of this paper is that the Sino-Soviet split is the catalyst from which Moscow, Washington, and Peking are able to realize certain foreign policy gains and opportunities, and that accompanying these gains are losses, either anticipated or unanticipated. A review of these gains and losses will be useful as we attempt to balance them and to draw conclusions.

Gains for the PRC:

1. Entrance into the international scene as a member of the UN
2. An end to her isolation
3. The establishment of communication with the U.S., especially in reference to nuclear dialogue
4. Establishment of China as a possible leader of the Third World.

Gains for the U.S.:

1. Retrenchment on the international scene allowing a reduction of military forces in Asia

2. A resulting increase in dollars which can be directed towards domestic problems

3. The enhancement of the U.S. negotiating position with either party as a result of her middle-of-the-road approach vis-à-vis Moscow and Peking

4. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet Nam which appears to have been assisted by Soviet-American detente and normalization of relations with China

5. Pluralism in international affairs which appears to be a more comfortable position for the United States than it is for either the USSR or the PRC

6. The possibility of Japanese rearmament, a desirable condition for the U.S. but not for China or the USSR

Gains for the USSR:

1. A reduction of tension in Europe and a corresponding reduction in the pressures for an effective NATO

2. Financial and technical trade with the West

3. Further latitude and bargaining leverage in the SALT proceedings as a result of China's continued hostile attitude

4. The enhancement of the Soviet position in Asia in that some Japanese see the Soviets as a counter-balance to China

5. The redirection of rubles towards domestic projects as a result of the lessening of tensions in Western Europe

Losses for the USSR and the PRC:

1. Cost of fortifying and defending a 4,000 mile common border (these costs can be put in perspective if one considers the political and military difficulties which the United States would have if she were required to fortify and defend the U.S.-Canadian border)

2. The loss of an exceedingly important trading partner especially with reference to raw materials

3. The loss of a military alliance which would in all probability be second to none in almost all areas of military power

4. The costly redundancies in their aid systems to developing countries

Losses for the USSR:

1. An ice-free access to the Pacific

2. The failure of a Soviet sponsored Asian Security System

Losses for the PRC: The loss of Soviet technological aid in the areas of military, industrial, and agricultural development.

Losses for the U.S.:

1. Detente is seen by many Americans as a sign of U.S. weakness

2. Detente means an undermining of NATO

3. Detente means ultimate USSR military superiority over the U.S.

4. Detente is seen by some European leaders as evidence that the United States is no longer prepared to defend Europe at the risk of war

5. Detente, in the eyes of some Western European leaders, has put the U.S. in the position of a new and powerful competitor for Eastern Europe trade

6. Normalization of relations with China has placed the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to some of her allies in doubt

The approach which initially seems to apply to an analysis of gains and losses is that of an accountant. However, it soon becomes obvious that a mathematical approach to a subject as complex as the Sino-Soviet split and a multi-polar balance-of-power is hardly possible. The prime difficulty is that gains

and losses seem to be fixed in time; a short term gain can become a long term loss, and a long term gain can be a loss in the short run. For example, China's new policy of normalization with the United States and her subsequent recognition as a world power can be termed an immediate gain. However, if China should attempt a rapprochement with the Soviet Union at some later date, the Sino-American relationship becomes a deficit which would make it more difficult to affect such a rapprochement. A similar argument can be applied to the opportunities presented to the U.S. by the Sino-Soviet split. Normalization of relations with China has allowed the United States to reduce her military forces in Asia and thereby save badly needed dollars to be used elsewhere. However, because of U.S. withdrawals from Asia, Japan could rearm to a degree not anticipated thereby threatening U.S. interests in Asia. Such an eventuality is an example of what appeared to be a gain in the short run becoming a distinct loss in the long run.

A second difficulty is that a tri-polar interplay (if that is what is developing)¹ is exceedingly more complex than is a bi-polar one and is therefore

¹The developing multi-polar balance-of-power could be pentagonal, including Japan and Western Europe, which would make the situation even more complex.

more difficult to manipulate. It seems to be advantageous because of its stabilizing effect on world politics. However, is this really the case? The developing balance-of-power, be it tri-polar or pentagonal, could in reality constitute a potential threat to whatever stability the world now possesses. Furthermore, the particular features of the psychology of the PRC and her foreign policy gains derived to date from her split with the USSR might induce the PRC to take risks which could be dangerous not only to the USSR but to the United States and to world peace in general. Should that happen, it seems clear that there would have been no gains in the long run.

Chou En-lai made an observation in his report to the Tenth Party Congress which has application to current Sino-American relations. In his condemnation of Moscow he said:

We should point out that necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialistic countries must be distinguished from collusion and compromise between Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism. Lenin put it well: "There are compromises and compromises."²

Chou apparently thinks the compromises of 1971-72 with the imperialistic United States were a necessary matter

²0. Edmund Clubb, "China and the Super-power," *Current History*, September 1974, p. 135.

of expediency. There appears to be little thought that such a compromise represented a permanent commitment. But, what if those compromises were seen by the United States as permanent? The resulting miscalculations could be exceedingly dangerous, even deadly, since they involve countries which have a nuclear capability. The Cuban crisis gave us an example of how dangerous a miscalculation by a nuclear power can be.

When I began this study I expected to find a deep concern for gains and losses, either expressed or implied, in any major foreign policy decision. What I learned instead is that to say a country's foreign policy sometimes appears to be unclear is an understatement. That foreign policy is an entity in itself also appears to be incorrect. Foreign policy seems to be the resultant of domestic pressures, domestic politics, and international influences which come together to either shape foreign policy decisions or to be shaped by them. There appears to be little concern for long term gains or losses in foreign policy. Rather, foreign policy seems to reflect only concern for the immediate goals. One gets the feeling that crisis management is used as a means of arriving at foreign policy decisions. Consequently, we can more easily understand such events

as the Bay of Pigs, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and the Japanese shocks of 1971-72. There appears to be a "we need an answer now, just tell me the good things" approach towards foreign policy. Accompanying this approach is the basic precept of foreign policy which is "a country will do that which appears to be in its immediate best interest." This helps to explain U.S. detente with the USSR and normalization of relations with China in that these particular courses of action allowed the U.S. to direct attention towards her growing domestic problems. Normalization of relations with the U.S. allowed China to break out of her isolation. Detente with the U.S. was particularly attractive to the Soviet Union because of her hostile Eastern border.

What can be said of the losses? In most cases, the losses seem so obvious and so real that the only conclusion one can reach is that these losses were probably discounted, dismissed, or ignored. Therefore, this study reinforces the opinion concerning foreign policy which has been held by many political scientists over the years--"a country will do what it perceives to be in its immediate best interest."

If this analysis of foreign policy is correct, can predictions for the future be made? The most

obvious prediction is that as the new balance-of-power system develops the U.S., the USSR, and China will change or continue their policies to reflect their immediate interests. This statement seems so obvious it appears to be unnecessary. However, in my opinion, there are factors which seem to indicate that change rather than continuation is more likely. The age and failing health of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung threaten the stability of the Peking government and therefore China's future policies. I believe that Chou's moderate policies towards the West are by no means assured of continuation after Chou and Mao pass from the scene. In this same vein, it is well to recall that following her first acceptance of Soviet aid in 1927, China turned out the Soviet advisors as soon as her current objectives had been achieved.³ Once the goals of Sino-American normalization as seen by China are met, China's policy in all probability will change. It is not unreasonable to assume that should a strategic Sino-Soviet association become mutually advantageous, the USSR and China would again form some type of alliance. I feel that this alliance will take place simply because the USSR and China have lost too much as a result of the split,

³Cressey, *Soviet Potentials*, p. 198.

that its continuation is becoming increasingly costly, and that this rapprochement will take place after the deaths of Mao and Chou. Additionally, the Soviet Union has discovered that the Soviet sponsored Asian security system will not be realized without China's participation. Therefore, if the Soviet Union desires to play an increasingly active role in the international politics of Asia (and apparently she does), she will be forced to make this accommodation with China.

In regard to the United States, I believe that the policy of playing in and around the margins of the Sino-Soviet split cannot be continued indefinitely. That policy will become too involved and complex and at some point the U.S. will find herself forced into the position of having to choose one course or the other. A more peaceful world is not guaranteed in any event. As the new balance-of-power system develops, the countries concerned--the U.S., the USSR, and China, and possibly Japan and Western Europe--must evolve some common rules and shared perceptions of the dynamics of this new multi-polar system, or at least develop an understanding of the perceptions, interests, and strategies of the other parties. Therefore, it is likely that the remainder of this decade will be a period of

considerable tension and conflict as each nation maneuvers in an attempt to realize any available advantages and her immediate goals.

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis deals with the new world power structure which seems to be emerging to modify the old two-sided balance-of-power system. The key to the emergence of this new order appears to be the Sino-Soviet split which can be interpreted as a foundation for the establishment of a new multi-polar international system. The Sino-Soviet split and the ramifications of the accompanied Sino-American and Soviet-American relations are seen as setting the stage for this future world organization.

The method used to interpret this possible future world power system is to examine the foreign policy gains and losses for the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States which result from the Sino-Soviet split. The gains and losses are analyzed from the standpoint of both domestic and foreign policy.

The conclusions drawn by this study are (1) foreign policy gains and losses are extremely difficult to fix in time, i.e., a short term gain could very well be a long term loss; (2) the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union will seek a rapprochement but not

until after the deaths of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai;
(3) the United States policy of playing in and around the margins of the Sino-Soviet split can not be continued indefinitely because that policy is too involved and complex and at some point in time the United States will find herself forced into a position of having to choose one course or the other.

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