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NO 2

DUBLON ISLAND, TRUK ATOLL

30 OCT 44

2-5239-82

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TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

TARGET; Dublon Island, Truk Atoll

Mission Rpt # 2
XXI BC

HQ XXI BOMBER COMMAND
HQ 73RD BOMB WING

FIELD ORDER NO. 12

MISSION NO. 2

DATE 30 October 1944

2-5239-82

M2

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H E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
XXI BOMBER COMMAND
APO #234

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

Field Order No. 12
Target: Dublon Island, Truk Atoll

Mission No. 2
30 October 1944

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Field Order

2-5239-82

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73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

F.O. #12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

TACTICAL NARRATIVE

1. Eighteen (18) aircraft, nine each from 497th and 498th Bombardment Groups, took off on 30 October 1944, from Isley Field, Saipan Island, in compliance with 73rd Wing Hqs Field Order No 12, which directed that the participating aircraft bomb the submarine base on Dublon Island, Truk Atoll. Six aircraft carried a total of 36 1000-lb high explosive bombs (six bombs in each aircraft). The remaining twelve aircraft carried a total of 144 500-lb high explosive bombs (twelve bombs in each aircraft). The first A/C departed at 0800, Local time; the last A/C at 0819.

2. The squadrons assembled as planned in a series of three dog-leg turns at $14^{\circ} 35'N - 146^{\circ} 30'E$ at 1500 feet; the task force was not assembled until after the climb was completed. The route out was direct from the assembly point to the I.P., which was an over-water point twenty-seven miles southeast of the Ruo Island in the Murillo Islands. The first squadron made a visual bomb run as planned; the second squadron, because the target was obscured by a cloud formation made a radar bomb approach; when interference made it impossible to complete the radar bomb run, the lead bombardier attempted to sight for range on Eten Island, south of the target. Bombs were dropped and fell approximately two miles beyond the target. There were eighty-four bombs dropped in this non-effective attack, a total weight of twenty-seven tons. One aircraft of the first squadron jettisoned six 1000-lb bombs unarmed, on the target. The remainder of the bombs, twenty-four tons fell in the target area.

3. A single-engine fighter was observed at six o'clock, level. The aircraft followed the formation at a minimum distance of fifteen hundred yards.

4. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was meagre to nil.

5. The route back was made as planned.

6. One aircraft returned two hours after take-off because of carburetor trouble.

7. Weather enroute to target, over target, and during the return flight proved to be 2/10 cloud cover more than had been predicted.

8. Conclusions:

a. The flight was routed to 30,000' after leaving the target in order to determine the amount of windshield frosting to be expected. It was concluded that moderate frosting, especially on the shaded side of the aircraft, would be encountered at that altitude.

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b. On the basis of photographic analysis, approximately nineteen bursts of the eighty visible in the photograph can be seen in the target area. The results, therefore, are only fair. Hits were observed on two piers, three buildings, and the main road.

c. It is evident that in order to take advantage of the radar equipment, as an aid to visual bombing and as a secondary implement for bombing, the unit must continue to work toward a high standard of operation and maintenance.

d. The procedure employed whereby the leader signals before starting to climb, allowing the other aircraft to increase power before the leader, was found to be successful in preventing straggling in the climb.

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73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

P.O. #12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Strike Report: Complete radio silence was ordered for this mission.
2. Fox Messages: No Fox messages were transmitted.
3. Radio Frequencies: Ground station facilities of the 30th Bomb Group were used.
4. Enemy Transmissions: Two possible enemy transmissions were logged: one a possible jamming transmission on 7590 kcs (the primary strike frequency) and a second unidentified signal.
5. Homer Checks: Bearings on the Saipan homer 1 Kw transmitter (1195 Kcs) were taken every 100 miles. Results indicated that reliable homing could be uniformly affected out to 400 miles for the late morning hours. Reliable bearings were picked up at greater distances but were intermittent.
6. IFF: Operation of IFF was, in general, satisfactory.

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73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

F.O. #12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

RADAR EMPLOYMENT AND RADAR EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE

1. General:

- a. Overall radar employment and equipment was satisfactory.
- b. The problem imposed by loss of training time to maintenance personnel during movement to the theatre by water was particularly evident in the contrast in radar equipment performance between the aircraft of the two groups participating. Most of the equipment failures were reported from the group forced to depend solely on water echelon personnel for radar equipment preflight.
- c. Excessive radar interference among aircraft within squadron formations was reported. Revision of the radar employment plan is expected to minimize interference and permit simultaneous radar bombing approaches and scope photography.
- d. Improvement in equipment performance over the previous mission reflected expanding maintenance facilities.

2. Radar Employment:

- a. Number of Radar Navigation Fixes - - - None
- b. Number of Radar Wind Runs - - - 1
- c. Number of Radar Approaches to Target - - - 2 *

* Note: Leaders of both squadrons, other A/C dropped on leader.

3. Radar Equipment Performance:

- a. Number of A/C, Radar Equipped - - - 18
- b. Gross Hours, Radar Operation - - - 39
- c. Average Hours per A/C, Radar Operation - - 2.2
- d. Number of A/C, Radar Unsatisfactory - - - 4
- e. Number of A/C, Radar Satisfactory - - - 12
- f. Performance not Known - - - 2

4. Miscellaneous:

- a. SCR-695 (IFF): No equipment failures reported. Employment was normal.
- b. SCR-718 (Altimeter): No equipment failures reported. Employment was normal.

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5. Recommendations:

a. It is suggested that a study be made to determine the feasibility of providing one radar mock-up per group in VHB wings, packed in a crate suitable as an operating shelter, to provide continuation maintenance training on shipboard and at the combat base, for radar mechanics in the water echelons.

b. Modification of the AN/APQ-13 radar set to permit adjustable sector scan in several directions, similar to the AN/APS-15 radar set, would simplify radar employment in close formations without serious inter-plane interference.

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73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

F.O.#12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

GUNNERY AND C.F.C. REPORT

1. The total number of A/C participating in the mission was eighteen. Nine airplanes reported no malfunctions of gunnery equipment.

2. 94% of turrets and guns used were operative. A total of 7987 rds of cal .50 and 218 rds 20 ma ammunition was expended.

a. Malfunctions of C.F.C. equipment may be divided into two classes:

(1) Mechanical & Electrical failure (95%).

- (a) Link jams due to ejection doors.
- (b) Defective Gun Extractor.
- (c) Sticking nose sight trigger.
- (d) Long round of ammunition (cal .50).
- (e) Booster motor burned out.

(2) Personnel Error.

- (a) Gun covers not closed.
- (b) Tail Guns out at altitude.

b. As the result of an accident that occurred while taxiing, the following procedure has been put into effect: All guns except the tail guns will be cleared of ammunition before landing and the tail guns will be stowed at 30° elevation until ammunition has been removed.

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73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

F.O. #12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

ENEMY OPPOSITION

1. One single engine enemy fighter was observed at six o'clock, level following the formation in the vicinity of the target. The enemy aircraft did not approach closer than 1500 yards.

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73rd Bomb Wing Mission #2 October 30, 1944.

Weather Summary (5 incl.).

The weather at the target for this mission was under the influence of the weak intertropical front lying just to the south. Its exact position and width being very difficult to determine with the data present at the time of forecast. It was expected that its influence on the target weather would not cause more than 3-4/10 cumulus with an occasional cumulonimbus.

A weak shear line was forecast to cross the route at approximately 13 degrees north giving 4/10 swelling cumulus with some light altostratus at 14000 ft. The wind forecast did not present a difficult problem as the entire route was influenced by the same air mass.

The cloud conditions encountered on this mission varied considerably from those forecast. The wind shear line moved considerably further to the SE than anticipated due to the unexpected increase in the high pressure area to the north. Consequently it was encountered at 11 deg N and was more intense than forecast. At the target cloud development was also more than anticipated being built up to 25000 ft and with a total of 5/10 in the target area.


When the first group in this mission arrived at the target a clear space allowed them to make a visual bombing run but by the time the second group over the target it was obscured by a cloud that drifted over it.

As a whole there was considerable more cloud than forecast all increases being on the order of 2/10 cloud cover. The wind forecast was found to be as accurate as could be checked in the navigation.


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
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		ZONE 1	ZONE 2	ZONE 3	ZONE 4	ZONE 5	ZONE 6
A	TRACING	Stripes	Stripes to 15 M	15 M to target	Target	Return	
B	WEATHER	partly cloudy	broken clouds few light showers	partly cloudy	local showers		
C	CLOUDS Amt, Type, Ht	1/10 cumulus bases 2500 ft tops 5000ft 2/10 cirrus	3/10 cumulus bases 2000 tops 6000 becoming 4/10 cumulus bases 2000 tops 9000 cecal 12000 4/10 altostratus 12000 6/10 cirrus	3/10 cumulus bases 2000 tops 6000 cecal 8000 2/10 cirrus	3/10 cumulus bases 2000 tops 8000 cecal 12000 2/10 cirrus	no appreciable change	
D	VISIBILITY	30 miles	6 30 miles except to clouds	30 miles	25 miles, 0 in showers		
E	CONTRAILS						
F	TURBULENCE		light				
G	FRI'ZG LEVEL	16000	16000	17000	17000		
H	ICING	none	none	none	none		
	WIND & TEMP	DIR. VEL. T.(°C)	DIR. VEL. T.(°C)	DIR. VEL. T.(°C)	DIR. VEL. T.(°C)	DIR. VEL. T.(°C)	DIR. VEL. T.(°C)
I	SURFACE	80 15 29	80 15 29	110 12 30	100 16 30		
J	2,000	80 15 25	80 15 25	110 13 26	100 12 26		
K	5,000	80 15 20	80 15 20	100 15 21	100 15 21		
L	10,000	80 15 9	80 15 7	100 15 10	100 15 10		
M	15,000	80 15 2	90 15 2	100 15 3	110 15 3		
N	20,000	80 15 -6	90 15 -6	100 15 -5	100 17 -5		
O	25,000	80 15 -14	90 17 -14	100 17 -14	110 17 -14		
P	30,000	80 15 -24	90 17 -24	100 17 -24	110 17 -24		






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S E C R E T

73RD BOMBARDMENT WING

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Field Order No. 12

Date 30 October 1944

Target Dublon Is. (Truk)

Table I Aircraft Participating

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT

	TOTAL WING	GROUP	
		497th	498th
A/C Scheduled to Take-off	18	9	9
A/C Failing to Take-off	0	0	0
A/C Airborne	18	9	9
Number of Non-Effective Sorties	10	9 a	1 *
Percent of Airborne A/C Non-Effective	56%	100%	11%
A/C Reaching Target	17	9	8
A/C Bombing Target	8	0 a	8
A/C Failing to Return to Home Base	0	0	0

a - 497 - Defective radar in lead aircraft. 32 Bombs hit with a center of dispersion 11,300 feet right, 1,400 feet left, giving a circular error of 11,500 feet. Other bombs not scored.

* - 498 - A/C 614 #2 Engine feathered. Backfired at all power settings.

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73RD BOMBARDMENT WING

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Field Order Number 12

Bombing Data - Effective A/C

Table II Bombing Run NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT

	TOTAL WING	GROUP	
		497th	498th
A/C Reaching Target	17	9	8
A/C Dropping Bombs			
In Formation	8	0	8
Individual	0	0	0
Total	8	0	8
Time of Release:			
Earliest	1100	-	1100
Latest	1103	-	1103
Altitude of Release:			
Lowest	25500	-	25500
Highest	27450	-	27450
Visual Bombing - A/C Sighting for:			
Range & Deflection	1	-	1
Range	1	-	1
Radar Bombing:			
A/C Sighting	0	-	0
A/C Dropping on Leader	0	-	0
A/C Operated By:			
C - 1	1	-	1
Manual	7	-	7

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S E C R E T
73RD BOMBARDMENT WING

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Field Order Number 12

Bombing Data

Table III Disposition of Bombs

GROUP	Type & Weight of Bombs	NUMBER OF BOMBS										Percent of Bombs Loaded Released on Target	
		Loaded		Released*		Jettisoned		Unknown		Returned			
		No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
497	500lb GP AN-M43	60	15			60**	15						
	1000lb GP AN-M44	24	12			24**	12						
498	500 lb GP	84	21	84	21								
	1000 lb GP	12	6	6	3	6	3					96%	89%
Total Wing	500 lb GP	144	36	84	21	60	15					57%	44%
	1000 lb GP	36	18	6	3	30	15						

* On Target.

** See Note a Table I.

Table IV Bombing Accuracy

GROUP	Bombs Released on Target		Number of Hits and Distance from Target									
			0 - 500'		500 - 1000'		1000-2000'		2000 -3000'		TOTAL	
	No.	Tons	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
497	0*	0										
498	90	24	24	27%	36	40%	6	7%	12	13%	78**	87%
Total Wing	* See Note a Table I. ** 12 bombs not estimated.											

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73RD BOMBARDMENT WING
CONSOLIDATED STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Field Order Number 12

Table V Encounters with Enemy Aircraft

DIRECTION	ALTITUDE								
	HIGH		LEVEL		LOW		TOTAL		Total Wing
	497th	498th	497th	498th	497th	498th	497th	498th	
Left									
Front									
Right									
Rear			1				1		1
TOTAL			1				1		1

Note: Enemy A/C did not attack.

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73RD BOMBARDMENT WING

Consolidated Statistical Summary

Field Order No 12

Table VI Fuel Consumption Data

GROUP	AV. FUEL ABOARD	AV. FLYING TIME	AV. DISTANCE AIR MILES	AV. FUEL USED	AV. FUEL REMAINING	AV. GAL. PER HOUR	AV. GAL. PER MILE
497	5659	5:55	1554	3817	1842	646	2.45
498*	6101	5:55	1537	3921	2180	663	2.55
TOTAL WING	5867	5:55	1546	3866	2001**	653	2.50

* Excludes one aircraft returning early.

** Maximum 2474, minimum 1600.

Note: Approximate gross weight 124,000 lbs. Altitude: 30 minutes at 1500 feet, 50 minutes at 26000 feet, 30 minutes at 30000 feet, descent to base.

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HEADQUARTERS
73RD BOMB WING
APO #5666

P. I. REPORT
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY

Approximately 80 bomb bursts are visible on the photographs. 40 of these, apparently from one squadron, have a mean point of impact along the eastern shore of Fefan Island, 12,000 feet to the south of the target.

The bomb pattern of the other 40 bursts is somewhat scattered, approximately 19 bursts being observed in the target area. Each of the 2 piers received 2 direct hits or near misses and 4 bursts are visible in the marsh area to the southeast. In the northern end of the target area 2 bursts are visible in the barracks area and 4 more in the officers' quarters. Approximately 5 bursts can be seen extending across the road just north of the gravel pit. An undetermined number of bombs fell in the wooded area to the north of these. Outside the target area, 21 bursts can be seen, 12 of these being in the water and the remainder north of the target.

CONCLUSION


The results of the bombing are fair, since only 19 out of 80 bursts are in the target area and no bombs hit the aiming point.

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(3) Bomb Plot (prepared by Group P.I. from photographs):



(4) Summary of Bomb Damage:

Observed Results:

- a. Fires None
- b. volume of smoke None
- c. color of smoke None
- d. Height of smoke column when last seen None
- e. Remarks None

P.I. Damage Assessment Evaluation.

None

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SECTION D

BOMB IMPACT DATA (One record for each target):

1. DESCRIPTION AND DIMENSIONS OF TARGET:

a. Landmarks ~~The particular shape of the coral reef enclosing all the islands of the Truk Atoll is roughly that of a triangle. Dublon Island can be identified by (1) the long narrow cove starting on the eastern side and extending into the center of the Island, being the only island with a large town situated thereon.~~

b. Topography ~~Dublon Island is a coral island, fringed by a wide reef and mangrove swamps. While the target area was comparatively level, the mountains rise steeply to the east of it.~~

c. Disposition and size of buildings ~~There are approximately 25 large barrack or warehouse type buildings averaging 30 to 40 feet wide and 150 to 225 feet long plus numerous smaller type buildings. There are all dispersed over the 1000 x 4000 foot area.~~

d. Type of construction ~~The buildings were largely one story and of frame or light steel construction.~~


e. Other comments None

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(16PL875BS-624A/C4M2)(2V 10)(10:30:1100)(12:26,800)(07°23N-151°52' E)(DUBLON TRUK) SECRET-AUTH.CG.73BW



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(158 2708462) (M2) (X) (Y) (3) (10:30:12) (01:24:27) (07:07:22) (01:21) (SUB BASE, DIBLON IS.)
TRUK) SECRET-AUTH CG: 73BW

SA-1

AF42-58

5051 EASTMAN REGULAR SAFETY

5049

5050 EASTMAN REGULAR SAFETY

5048 EASTMAN REGULAR SAFETY

5049 EASTMAN REGULAR SAFETY

5047 EASTMAN REGULAR SAFETY


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SECRET-AUTH CG-738W

5047 EASTMAN REGULAR



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(16PL 874BS4625A/C4M2)(TIME 10:30:1105)(24:16,500)(07°23' N-151°52' E)(DUBLON ISL. TRUK)

SA-2

874BS4625A/
SECRET-AUTH.C



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(16PL 874BS4625A/C4M2)(10:30:1105)(24:16,500)(07°23' N-151°52' E)(DUBLIN TRU
SECRET-AUTH.C.G.73 BW)

SA-2

(16PL 874BS4625A/
SECRET-AUTH.C

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By PT NARA Date 8/26/05

(16PL 874 BS 4625 A/C4M2)(IV) (10:30:1105)(24:16,500)(07°23'N-151°52'E)(DUBLON ISL., TRUK)



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73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

F.O. #12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

BOMBING REPORT

1. Cloud formations in the target area made it necessary for the second squadron to make a radar run on the target. The first squadron bombed visually as planned.

2. The I.P. and A.P. were satisfactory but the cloud layer made them visible only at short intervals.

3. As the leader of the second squadron neared the target on his radar bomb run his scope was distorted by the radar of another ship. The formation released bombs on the leader. Strike photos show that the bombs hit approximately two miles south of target area. One airplane of the first squadron dropped its bomb load of six (6) 1000 lb bombs safe due to a malfunction of the release mechanism.

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CONSOLIDATED BOBING DATA

A/c No.	Bomb Load H.E.				Bomb Load I.B.				No Buba Drgd	No Targ.	No Buba Jett	No Buba Retd		
	Sq No	No	Size	Fuse	No	Size	Fuse	I.B.						
			Nose	Tail			Nose	Tail	H.E.	I.B.				
1603	873	12	M-43	M-103	M-101	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
1614	873	6	M-44	"	"	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	6	0
154A	875	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
2A16	875	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
1624	875	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
5216	874	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
8662	874	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
1625	874	12	M-44	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
1628	870	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
2A12	870	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
1623	870	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
1601	870	6	M-44	"	"	0	0	0	0	6	0	-	0	0
1619	870	6	M-44	"	"	0	0	0	0	6	0	-	0	0
616	870	6	M-44	"	"	0	0	0	0	6	0	-	0	0
2A23	870	6	M-44	"	"	0	0	0	0	6	0	-	0	0
1622	870	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
615	869	12	M-43	"	"	0	0	0	0	12	0	-	0	0
		174								169			6	

SECRET

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CONSOLIDATED MISSION REPORT

TARGET ATTACK DATA

Target No	A/C No.	Time	Alt	Hdg	I.A.S.	Wind Veloc.	Wind Direct.	Bomb Spang	Length of Run in Time	Sighted		Release Method			How Torpede
										Range	Defl	Run.	Cl	Elec.	
	615	1120	26800	215	195	17K	110	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	4622	1120	26970	213	195	19 1/2	110	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	3423	1120	25600	215	196	26	116	400'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	616	1120	27000	210	195	19	110	400'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	4619	1120	25800	210	200	20	105	400'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	4604	1120	26400	210	195	17	110	400'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	4623	1120	26550	220	195	18	110	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	3412	1120	26940	213	195	19 1/2	110	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	4628	1120	26800	219	195	19	110	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	4625	1109	26500	216	198	16	90	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	8662	1109	25500	210	195	32	85	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	5210	1100	26500	200	195	15	110	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	4624	1100	26810	215	195	17	110	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	3416	1102	27450	207	195	17	100	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	4544	1102	26300	219	197	17	110	200'	2 min	-	-	-	-	-	T.S.
	4614	1120	Bombs	Jettisoned					2 min						
	4603	1102	26700	224	188	15	100	200'	2 min						

SECRET

73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

F.O. #12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

PHOTOGRAPHIC DATA

	K-18	K-19	K-20	K-22	K-	K-	Total
A - Cameras installed	1	0	4	7			12
B - Cameras in aborting A/C	0	0	0	1			1
C - Cameras in lost A/C	0	0	0	0			0
D - Camera in A/C not lost but not returning	0	0	0	0			0
E - Cameras with malfunctions	0	0	0	0			0
F - Cameras in operating conditions not taking photos	0	0	1	0			1
G - Cameras taking photos	1	0	3	6			10

Reasons for "F" - K-20 was not used because no occasion arose.

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Fuel Consumption Data

497th Bomb Group

A/C No.	Air Miles	Fuel Used
42-24623	1500	3540
42-24616	1608	3800
42-24619	1595	4112
42-24604	1640	3770
42-63412	1580	3815
42-24622	1548	3800
42-63423	1482	4040
42-24628	1570	3698
42-24615	1460	3780
Average	1550	3817

498th Bomb Group

A/C No.	Air Miles	Fuel Used
42-65210	1440	3990
42-24625	1523	4175
42-24654	1603	3870
42-24621	1527	4350
42-24544	1541	3462
42-63416	1434	3985
42-24614	872	1900
42-24603	1539	3928
42-63428	1690	3606
Average	1538	3921

	Maximum	Minimum	Average
Air Miles Flown	1690	1434	1522
Fuel Used	4350	3462	3970

73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

F.O. #12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT OF
A/C COMPLETING THE MISSION

- A/C # 24625 - #1 & #4 Turbo overspeed controls sluggish at 30,000'; caused fluctuation of RPM and MP.
- A/C # 24624 - Vacuum regulator faulty; low below 8,000' and high above 10,000', #3 carburetor air temperature gauge out, #1 RPM reaches a maximum of 1850 RPM.
- A/C # 24544 - #2 oil temperature goes to 90-100° in "Auto" position. #3 oil temperature goes to 50° in "Auto" position. #1 nose oil pressure oscillates through range of 5 to 7 lbs per square inch. #3 fuel pressure records maximum of 17 lbs per square inch from 10,000 ft to altitude. #1 and #2 nose oil pressure reads 42-46 lbs per square inch. #1 outboard generator out. Top gunners blister blown out. #1 engine runs 20° hotter than others. #2 prop pitch control switch sticks.
- A/C # 63416 - #1 & #4 manifold pressures surged at 30,000 ft when the throttles were retarded to 35" Hg. RPM also surged due to surge of manifold pressure.
- A/C # 24603 - C-1 auto-pilot rudder sensitivity too great. APC-13 transmitter cuts out. Turbo selector had to be set at 9 to give 43.5 inches at 30,000 ft.
- A/C # 63428 - #1 cylinder head temperature gauge on #4 engine out. Pilot's #4 engine tachometer fluctuates. Aileron trim tab frozen at and above 12,000 ft.
- A/C # 24654 - #1 fuel gauge inoperative. #2 rear oil pressure gauge reads 40 lbs. Flux gate compass off 8°.
- A/C # 65210 - #1 & #4 RPM, manifold pressure and nose oscillate. RPM about 200 RPM, manifold pressure 20" Hg. and nose oil pressure 20#.
- A/C # 24623 - Right forward bomb bay door did not close on first attempt after dropping bombs. Left forward door did not close on second attempt. Both closed on third attempt.
- A/C # 24616 - Bomb bay doors failed to open completely. Oil leak on #3 engine. Leaks in oxygen system. API gyro out.
- A/C # 24619 - #2 nose oil pressure fluctuates excessively. #4 fuel pressure .24 lbs per square inch at 1000'.
- A/C # 24622 - #1 carburetor air temperature high. #3 liquidometer inaccurate. Small leak at #2 propeller governor.
- A/C # 63423 - Seal on pilots window loose. Oil quantity gauge broken.

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73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

F.O. #12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

SUMMARY OF ABORTIVES AND LOSSES

1. A/C scheduled to take-off -----	18
2. A/C failing to take-off-----	0
3. A/C airborne -----	18
4. A/C returning to home base early-----	1 *
5. A/C failing to reach target -----	1
6. A/C reaching target-----	17
7. A/C failing to return to home base-----	0
8. A/C returning to home base from target-----	17
9. Operational losses-----	0

* Note: A/C # 42-24614 had defective power "B" jet in carburetor which caused backfiring at all power settings.

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73rd Bomb Wing
1 Nov 1944

F.O. #12
Mission #2
30 October 1944

NAVIGATION SUMMARY

1. Navigation on this mission was accomplished essentially as planned.
2. The navigation consisted primarily of DR supplemented by sunlines.
3. The only difficulties encountered were:
 - a. Determining accurate winds and ground speeds due mainly to the fact that the greater part of the mission consisted of climbs and descents during which accurate determination of winds is difficult or impossible.
 - b. Cloud coverage greatly hampered the reading of drift at altitude. The B-5 Driftmeter has been found completely unsatisfactory for either drift or ground speeds at altitudes over 20,000 feet. It is strongly recommended that future aircraft be equipped with B-3 Driftmeters. This type Driftmeter is also much more satisfactory for observation of bombing results.
4. No technical difficulties arose with either flux-gate compasses or A.P.I.'s.

ROUTE DATA

TIME OF TAKE-OFF FROM Isley Field:

First A/C 2302Z
Last A/C 2319Z

TIME OF LANDING AT Isley Field:

First A/C 0455Z
Last A/C 0510Z

GROUP ASSEMBLY:

Place: 15° 00'N - 146° 05'E
Altitude: 1500'
Time: 2320Z to 2325Z

WING ASSEMBLY:

Place: 14° 35'N - 146° 30'E
Altitude: 1500'
Time: 2330Z to 2335Z

AIRCRAFT RETURNING EARLY:

A/C No 42-24614 -- Squadron No 873 -- Time 1022
Reason: Carburetor Failure

ROUTE OUT:

Isley Field to IP direct
IP to target axis of attack 210°

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ROUTE BACK:

Target Dublon Island direct to Isley Field

I.P. :

08° 06'N - 152° 18'E
Time: 0155Z to 0200Z


TARGETS ATTACK DATA

1. No A/C attacking - - - - - 17
2. Time over target - - - - - 0213Z to 0220Z
3. Heading & Altitude IP to Target - - 210° T 25000'
4. Heading & Altitude over Target - - 210° T 25000'
5. Breakaway to the right on course for home base.
6. Extra length of flight - - - - - None
7. Total length of flight - - 1512 statute air miles.
8. Total average time of flight - - - - - 0548

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
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OLOL IS

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NOMWIN I

MURILO IS

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AP LAP I

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SUBLON I
FANANI

LOSAL IS

5°

5°

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By PT NARA Date 8/26/05

S E C R E T

73d Bomb Wg
SAIPAN
1100 25 Oct 44

PLAN: EASY DOES IT

Maps: Long Range Air Navigational Chart CAROLINE ISLANDS scale 1:3,000,000.

1. a. (1) Moderate Hv AAA target.
(2) 7 single-engine fighters, Zeke type, are known to be based on ETEN ISLAND.
 - b. (1) No friendly ground or surface support anticipated.
(2) No friendly air support.
2. 73d Wg Atks Submarine Base, DUBLON ISLAND, TRUK ($7^{\circ} 23'N - 151^{\circ} 52'E$) target areas D-7 and D-6 Incl 1 JICPOA 47-44, 10 Apr 44.

Aiming point visual: Target 03 area D-7. Radar: extreme Eastern tip of MOEN ISLAND.

Formation: Nine to eleven A/C Section. Route formation to Turn Point ($10^{\circ} 00'N - 155^{\circ} 00'E$). Close formation until return to same point. Route formation to point 14 min from base, close formation until peel-off for landing.

Method of bombing: Section pattern, (A/C drop on Section Leader). Base altitude 25,000 ft. Complete radar bombing procedure then sight visually if possible.

Assembly point: 1500 ft over base. Depart when formed but not later than Zero hr plus 18 min.

Route out: SAIPAN to Point ($13^{\circ} 17'N - 149^{\circ} 7'E$) 1500 ft.
Point ($13^{\circ} 17'N - 149^{\circ} 07'E$) to point ($12^{\circ} 21'N - 150^{\circ} 48'E$)
climb to 15,000 ft.
Point ($12^{\circ} 21'N - 150^{\circ} 48'E$) to point ($11^{\circ} 27'N - 152^{\circ} 26'E$)
cruise at 15,000 ft.
Point ($11^{\circ} 27'N - 152^{\circ} 26'E$) to point ($10^{\circ} 00'N - 155^{\circ} 00'E$)
climb to 26,000 ft.
Point ($10^{\circ} 00'N - 155^{\circ} 00'E$) to IP ($8^{\circ} 06'N - 152^{\circ} 18'E$) cruise
at 26,000 ft.
IP ($8^{\circ} 06'N - 152^{\circ} 18'E$) to target let down to 25,000 ft.

IP: Point ($8^{\circ} 06'N - 152^{\circ} 18'E$)

Axis of Atk: 210° true.

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S E C R E T

PLAN: EASY DOES IT (cont'd)

Rally point: Point (06° 17'N - 151° 28'E).

Route back: Reverse of route out descend at 100 ft/min to 1500 ft.

Cruise control: See annex 3.

3. a. Designated Bomb Gp, 9 to 11 A/C. Take-off Zero Hr proceed and Atk by Section.
 - x. (1) Zero hr approximately sunrise, exact time to follow.
 - (2) Gasoline load: 6,100 gal.
 - (3) Bomb load: 20 x 500 lb GP Fuze: Instantaneous Nose, None Delay Tail.
 - (4) Intervalometer setting: 200 ft.
 - (5) All available Gunsight AP cameras loaded, 200 ft of film per camera.
 - (6) Ammunition: 6,000 Rds .50 cal, 120 Rds 20 mm.
 - (7) EEI: 73d Bomb Wg Memo 56-6.
Preliminary Mission Report submitted per XX AF Manual 55-1.
 - (8) Practice frontal penetration on return route: On signal from Leader each A/C Commander go under the hood for one hour.
4. All A/C serviced with 4,000 gal immediately on landing.
5. a. (1) Annex 1 (Comm)
 - (2) XXI Bomber Command Navigational Aids to Aircraft.
- b. Command Posts:
 - (1) Ground - Hq, 73d Wg.
 - (2) Air - Lead A/C in formation.

By command of Brigadier General O'DONNELL:

BRUGGE
DC/S, Opns & Trng

OFFICIAL:

WALKER
Asst A-3

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PLAN: EASY DOES IT (cont'd)

Annex 1 - Communications
Annex 2 - Formation
Annex 3 - Cruise Control
Annex 4 - Bombing Data
Annex 5 - Take-off and landing procedure

2 Incls:

Incl 1 - JIGPOA Bulletin No 47-44 10 Apr 44.
Incl 2 - JIGPOA ATF No 41-A

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ANNEX NO 1 PLAN "EASY DOES IT" 73rd Bomb Wing

COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

1. Communications Procedure: See XXI Bomber Command SOP (Tentative) dtd 24 Oct 44.

2. Radio Frequencies.

(a) Liaison (AN/ART-13)

Channel Low -- 500 kc (International Distress)
Channel 1 -- 3495kc (30th B.G. A/G)
Channel 2 -- 4475kc (Voice Emergency)
Channel 3 -- 4495kc (Emergency Tower Frequency)
Channel 4 -- 6500kc (" " ")
Channel 5 -- 6970 kc (" " ")
Channel 6 -- 7590kc (30th B.G. A/G)
Channel 7 -- 4420kc (Voice Emergency Secondary)
Channel 8 -- Cancelled
Channel 9 -- 4595kc (AAGS Air-Ground CW)
Channel 10 -- 8200kc (" " " ")

SCR - 522 VHF

Channel A 129.06 mc Bomber to fighter
Channel B 134.10 mc Bomber Common
Channel C 140.58 mc Tower (Pacific Common)
Channel D 127.62 mc Homing

SCR - 274 N

4495kc - Tower
6500kc - Tower

3. Radio Call Signs and call words: see letter Hqs 73rd Bomb Wing, Wing, Subject - "Assignment of call signs and call words" dtd 25 October 1944.

4. Codes, Ciphers, Recognition.

- (a) Air-Ground - GSP 1270CS and authenticator
- (b) Authentication Dumbo and lifeguard - SHAGLE
- (c) Recognition Signals, extract of:
 - 02440 - Key List
 - 02442 Recog. Signal Surface Vessels
 - 02443 " " Submarines
 - 02440 " " Instructions

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)

NND 740120

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5. Contact and Strike Reports - see Tentative SOP Communications, XXI Bomber Command, dtd 24 October 44.

6. Radio Aids to Navigation - XXI Bomber Command Advanced Area Navigational Aids to Aircraft.

7. Bumbo and Lifeguard Procedure.

(a) Reference point - NORTHEAST PASS.

(b) Call 27 October - PICKLE PEELER.
28 October - GLASS CUTTER

Call change at 0000Z (0900 ITEM TIME)

8. IFF - XXI Bomber Command Tentative SOP Communication dtd 24 October 1944.

9. Distress Procedure: See tentative SOP dtd 24 October 44.

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ANNEX NO 2 TO PLAN: EASY DOES IT
FORMATION

1. Route Formation.

- a. Route formation will be as shown.
- b. Airplanes forming the diamond in No's two and three elements will be used to fill any vacancies.
- c. While in route formation, frontal penetration or ascent or descent through an overcast will be accomplished with no additional dispersion other than a vertical dispersion as follows:

No's 1, 5, and 9 will continue at base altitude.

No's 2, 10, and 7 will descend to 500 feet below base altitude.

No's 3, 4, and 11 will ascend to 500 feet above base altitude.

No 8 will descend to 1000 feet below base altitude.

No 6 will ascend to 1000 feet above base altitude.

The leader will obtain his penetration heading and base altitude prior to entering the front. These will be noted by airplane commanders prior to their entering the weather. Each A/C will continue on the heading, level or at the same rate of descent or ascent until visual reference is again obtained at which time the formation will continue on it's mission.

2. Bombing Formation.

Bombing formation will be the same as route formation except that A/C will be closed up and No's 10 and 11 will fill the diamond in their respective elements. Any abortive positions will be filled by airplanes No 10 and No 11.

3. Changing Leaders.

- a. If the leader aborts No 2 A/C will take the lead, No 4 will take No 2, No 5 will take No 4 and No 10 will take No 5. Caution: While this change is taking place no A/C will move to replace an A/C until the A/C being replaced has reached the new position, thus, only one A/C will be changing at a time.

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ANNEX No 2 to Plan EASY DOES IT Cont.

b. If the leader has a malfunction of the Bombsight, G-1 Auto-Pilot or radar equipment, or has any other difficulty which would be detrimental to bombing accuracy but would not necessitate his leaving the formation, he will signal the Deputy Leader (No. 2 A/C) to take the lead. The signal will be visual unless over enemy territory when it will be both visual and radio (VHF). The change will be made as follows: No. 2 A/C moves ahead of the leader one A/C length then assumes the prescribed power settings and air-speed. The old leader immediately assumes No. 3 position, No. 3 crosses under to No. 2 position. Caution: No. 3 does not change his position relative to the old leader until the old leader is settled in No. 3 position on the new leader.

By command of Brigadier General O'DONNELL:

BRUCKE
DC/S, Ops & Trng

OFFICIAL:

WILKINSON
Asst A-3

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-2-



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ANNEX NO 2 TO PLAN EASY DOES IF

ROUTE FORMATION



By command of Brigadier General O'DONNELL:

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
<u>FUEL</u>	
*Wing Tanks	4900 gals
*Front Bomb Bay	<u>1280 gals</u>
Total Fuel Aboard	6180 gals
Est. Fuel Req	4800 gals
Residual Fuel	200 gals
Reserve Fuel	1180 gals
*Note - Front B. Bays will be filled	

SECRET
 ANNEX NO 3 TO PLAN EASY DOES IT
 CRUISE CONTROL
LEAD AIRPLANE

<u>AMMUNITION - BOMBS - LOADING</u>
AMMUNITION:
6000 rds .50 cal @ .31#/rd
120 rds 20 mm @ .8#/rd
BOMBS
20 ea. 540# G.P. Bombs (rear bomb bay)
Approx T.O. Gr. Wt - 132,000#

By command of Brigadier General O'DONNELL:

BRUGGE
 DC/S, O & T



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ANNEX NO 4 TO PLAN EASY DOES IT

BOMBING DATA

1. Bombsight Angle Table - Radar Bombing

Offset Aiming Point - East tip of MOEN ISLAND
Target - Sub Base, DUBLON ISLAND
OAP - Target Dist - 4.10 NM
Indicated Alt - 25,000 ft
Slant Range Release - 7.0 NM (From OAP)

Absolute Altitude	Bombsight Angle
26,000 Ft	66.1°
250 "	65.8°
500 "	65.5°
750 "	65.2°
27,000 "	65.0°
250 "	64.7°
500 "	64.4°
750 "	64.2°
28,000 "	63.9°

2. Final Correction Table - Radar Bombing

a. Bomb Run error measured at: 10.0 NM Slant Range
Final correction begun at: 7.0 NM Slant Range
Radar release circle set at: 7.0 NM Slant Range

b. Final correction Table -
Error Measured Final correction begun
at 10 NM S. Range at 7.00 NM S. Range

For 1° to 14° measured error, final course correction equals measured error.

15°	16°
16°	17°
17°	18°
18°	19°
19°	21°
20°	22°
21°	23°
22°	25°
23°	26°
24°	28°
25°	30°
26°	31°
27°	33°

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Annex No 4 to Plan Easy Does It (Bombing Data) continued

Error Measured Final correction begun
at 10 NM S. Range at 7.00 NM S. Range

28°	-----	35°
29°	-----	37°
30°	-----	40°
31°	-----	42°
32°	-----	45°
33°	-----	49°
34°	-----	54°
35°	-----	62°

By command of Brigadier General O'DONNELL:

OFFICIAL:

WILKINSON
Asst A-3

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DG/S, Opns & Trng

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ANNEX NO 5 TO PLAN EASY DOES IT

TAKE-OFF PLAN

1. Take-off interval: One (1) minute.
2. The leader takesoff and flies on the runway heading for six minutes at which point he starts a 1/4 needlewidth turn to the right if taking off to the east or to the left if taking off to the west. A turn of more than 360° but less than 540° will be made to allow the elements to form. At a point approximately five (5) minutes from base, the leading element will make a 360° - 1/4 needlewidth turn to the left to allow elements No 2 and 3 to form. At the completion of this turn the course to the first turning point will be resumed.

LANDING PLAN

1. The field will be approached in the direction of landing at 1500 ft. At the leader's signal, a series of dives and zooms, the element toward the inside of the traffic pattern will peel off and descend to 1000 ft in the following order: (1) the outside wingman, (2) the airplane in the diamond position if in the element, (3) the leader and (4) the inside wingman. The remaining two elements will circle at 1500 ft. On the second pass over the field the leading element will peel off as above. The remaining element will complete another circle and repeat as above.

By command of Brigadier General O'DONNELL:

BRUCKE
D/C of 3, Opns & Trng

OFFICIAL:

WILKINSON
Asst A-3

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By PT NARA Date 8/26/05

S E C R E T

Hq 73d Bomb Wg
SAIPAN
1500Z 26 Oct 44

FO 12

1. No change
2. 73d Wg executes plan EASY DOES IT with following exceptions:

Route out: Direct to target area.

Route back: Direct to SAIPAN. Climb to 30,000 ft after leaving the target and remain at 30,000 ft for 45 min in close formation.

Cruise Control and Loading will be changed to comply with changes.

Gp Commanders are directed to vary the following on each mission:

Routes, IP, Axis of Atk, Aiming Point, Take-off and Assembly Procedure, and Zero Hr.

3. x. (1) Each Bomb Gp 73d Bomb Wg executes plan EASY DOES IT individually as soon as practical. Each A/C will be dispatched once but not more than twice.
- (2) Zero Hr will be determined by the Gp Commander. This Hqs will be notified 24 hrs in advance of Zero Hr and approximate strike time.

4. No change.

5. No change.

By command of Brigadier General O'DONNELL:

BRUGGE
DC/S, O & T

OFFICIAL:

WALKER
Asst A-3

S E C R E T