

UC-NRLF



B 4 079 583

GIFT OF
JEROME B. LANDFIELD



EX LIBRIS

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR

BY

ELLERY C. STOWELL

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice



BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
The Riverside Press Cambridge
1915

COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY ELLERY C. STOWELL

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Published June 1915

DLIC
57
v.1

PREFACE

In this brief account of the causes of the War of 1914, it has been possible to touch upon only the more important points. After the war is over, the results of patient research may make clear the truth of accusations and counter-accusations. I have, however, made an effort to present the questions from a really impartial and neutral point of view, even though the result may not find approval from the partisans of either side. After all, man as a rational being is most deeply concerned in the rational efforts of mankind to avoid the ills the political body is heir to, and in the end will turn from the din of battle to that preliminary conflict of brains and policies as portrayed in the dispatches of the diplomats.

The importance of the official documents issued by the belligerent Governments has been questioned, and it is well to remember that they are specially prepared for publication, and further, that the diplomats, when reporting to their Governments, do not lose from sight the advantage of having their dispatches in a form suitable for publication at short notice. The most secret and delicate negotiations may occasionally be effected through the intermediary of a special and confidential messenger or by means of the telephone. Nevertheless, the basis and permanent structure of the British diplomacy is doubtless to be found in the papers laid before the Houses of Parliament and in the discussions and explanations given in Parliament. If any doubt as to the value of these public documents has existed, it must have been dispelled by the recent publication of the Austrian Red Book, which confirms in a most remarkable manner almost every important statement of the British White Paper.¹

¹ Some of the official publications relating to negotiations preceding the war give evidence of having been prepared with great haste. No. 141

Documents do not, however, give adequate information of the personal factor which is so important in all matters of diplomacy. The documents are, as it were, the skeleton which needs to be built up with the living flesh of the personal characteristics of the actors; but any attempt to accomplish this successfully must await the results of long and careful investigations. It was only years afterwards, through the publication of letters and memoirs, that the world learned the truth in regard to Bismarck's diplomacy during the formative period of the German Empire.

I shall not attempt in this book to do anything more

of the French Yellow Book speaks of the time limit of the German ultimatum to Belgium as seven hours; the Belgian Gray Paper shows (no. 38) that it was twelve hours. Again, the French Yellow Book (no. 18) speaks of the Russian Ambassador as being about to leave for the country (*pour la campagne*), whereas he was really leaving for his own country, as is shown by no. 55.

In another case it is interesting to note how the same incident, M. Sazonof's proposal of the conditions for a peaceful settlement between Austria and Russia, is treated in the dispatches of three different countries. According to the French Yellow Book (no. 103), M. Sazonof said to the German Ambassador: "The Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal to you in his name"; the Russian Orange Paper (no. 60) gives M. Sazonof's own statement that the German Ambassador asked him if he could not indicate upon what conditions Russia might yet agree to arrest her military preparations; in the British White Paper (no. 97) the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg reports: "German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French of which following is a translation: . . ." The English account, though fuller, coincides with the Russian, while the French conveys a different impression.

In the course of the narrative of events I have referred to some other instances. No. 5 of the French Yellow Book, which was so severely criticized by Drs. Dernburg and Helfferich (*post*, p. 155), is not, as the criticism might lead us to think, a document containing material received July 30, 1913, but a statement drawn up at the French Foreign Office summarizing the correspondence received during the preceding two years in regard to opinion in Germany. An examination of the document in question will suffice to make this clear. (See *Sun*, February 2, 1915.) Another case of error is found in the case of enclosure 3 in no. 105 of the British White Paper (*post*, p. 285).

than draw attention to the more salient traits of the important personages, as disclosed in the documents themselves; and for the sake of clearness shall bring certain of the statesmen and diplomatists before the reader by their official titles only.

In the analysis of the documents, it has seemed better to bring out each successive link of the chain forged to involve the unhappy powers of Europe in this war. Some repetition has been necessary for the sake of clearness, and at times I have been obliged to sacrifice the chronological order so as to adhere to a logical exposition in the unfolding of the events of the opening scenes in the greatest drama of human history.

I have reduced as much as possible the extracts from the various official papers published by Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, and Servia. It is my belief that the piecing together of the documentary evidence under logically arranged headings will be of value to all those with an interest in international affairs, since the perusal of the documents themselves to get at the gist of the material requires a considerable expenditure of time on the part of even an experienced diplomatist. Then, too, almost every one of the original documents treats of a number of different matters or negotiations which by their interrelation confuse the reader. No system of paraphrase and excerpt can, however, replace the use of the original documents. To facilitate comparison with the original source, in each case the reference has been placed in parentheses immediately after the extract, so as to save constant and irritating interruption through the use of footnotes. I must warn the reader that citations not referring to direct or "modified" quotations do not necessarily confirm the statements which they follow, as their purpose is rather to direct him to the documents which bear upon the matter under discussion.

In the "modified extracts" from the British White

Paper, the German White Book, the Russian Orange Paper, the Belgian Gray Paper, the French Yellow Book, the Austrian Red Book, and the Servian Blue Book, the exact sense has been preserved as nearly as possible, although it has often been necessary to transpose or modify the quotation. When an extract has been so treated or modified, the fact is indicated by the marks (‘ ’), — that is, one quotation mark at the beginning and one at the end, — and in addition the source is given in parentheses immediately after, with the words, “modified quotation.” When the words of the documents are quoted *verbatim*, as in direct quotation, it has been shown by the ordinary quotation marks (“ ”), even when within a modified quotation. In the case of a quotation within a quotation, the usual system has been followed.

These extracts were made from the original documents, except in the case of the Servian Blue Book. I have made use of the official, authorized English translation of the German White Book except where the English was either too uncouth or else not clear, when I have retranslated the original German. In the same way I have used the various translations of the London *Times*, the New York *Times*, the official translation of the Austrian Red Book, and the translations published by the British Government as White Papers, attempting, where I have found the translation faulty, to make corrections or to substitute a better. The admirable enterprise of the New York *Times* in placing the important official documents before the general public has been of immense educational value to the whole country, and incidentally has rendered it unnecessary to encumber the appendix of this book by adding reprints of these publications.¹

¹ The American Association for International Conciliation has also reprinted many of the most important publications, and has generously distributed them widely and free of cost. The *American Journal of International Law* prints the official publications in its Supplement, vol. 8, no. 4 (October, 1914); vol. 9, no. 1 (January, 1915). An official translation of the Austrian Red Book has been placed on sale.

Various other documents of general interest, bearing on the causes of the war, have been included in this volume.

I do not attempt to mention all those who have helped in the preparation of this material. I cannot, however, pass over without acknowledgment the assistance I have received from Professors Munroe Smith and John Bassett Moore, of Columbia University, to whom I owe more than one important suggestion, while Professor James T. Shotwell also has given me the benefit of his valued criticism of the subject-matter and the arrangement of the material. Mr. Henry F. Munro has been kind enough to go over the proof, and Miss Isadore G. Mudge, of the Columbia University Library, has greatly facilitated my search for material and examination of sources.

E. C. S.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
May, 1915.

CONTENTS

PART I: INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

1. The European Concert	3
2. Belgian neutrality	4
3. The Triple Alliance and the Triple <i>Entente</i>	7
4. Crises	9
5. Fashoda	10
6. The Algeiras Conference	12
7. The Casablanca affair	18
8. Bosnia and Herzegovina	19
9. Agadir	22
10. The Turco-Italian War	24
11. The Balkan Wars	26
12. The situation just before the War of 1914	34

PART II: ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER II

THE AUSTRO-SERB CONFLICT

1. The terms of the Austrian note	41
2. Efforts of the powers to secure an extension of the time limit	59
3. The powers influence Serbia to make a conciliatory reply	62
4. Serbia's reply	64
5. Austria rejects Serbia's reply	78
6. The powers urge Austria to delay military operations and accept the Servian reply as a basis for discussion	81
7. Austrian assurances	84
8. Austria declares war on Serbia	85
9. Austria explains the purpose of her action	89

CHAPTER III

THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN DISCUSSIONS

1. Russia's interest in the Austro-Servian conflict	96
2. Russia believes Austria's action is directed against herself	105

3. Russia considers immediate action necessary 108
4. Russia partially mobilizes against Austria 109
5. The Tsar asks the Kaiser to try his mediation 112

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY'S SITUATION

1. Germany's interest in the dispute 117
2. Germany declares that the Austrian note was not communicated to her beforehand 119
3. Germany pledged to support Austria 123
4. Germany insists upon the "localization" of the Austro-Servian conflict 126
5. The responsibility Russia will incur by supporting Serbia . . . 131
6. The situation between Germany and Russia becomes acute . . . 133
7. Germany delivers an ultimatum to Russia 142

CHAPTER V

FRANCE SUPPORTS RUSSIA

1. Germany asks France to use her influence with Russia 147
2. France believes Germany intends to precipitate a war 155
3. France supports her ally 163
4. Military preparations in Germany and France 166
5. The German ultimatum to France 174

CHAPTER VI

MOBILIZATION

1. The meaning of mobilization 178
2. The issuance of the order for general mobilization 181
3. Intermediate military preparations 183
4. The fatal succession of mobilizations 184

CHAPTER VII

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CONCERT

1. European diplomacy in the Balkans 195
2. Sir Edward Grey proposes a conference of the powers 197
3. Germany makes objection to mediation 205
4. Russia proposes to Austria to enter upon "conversations" . . . 213
5. The powers employ their good offices at Vienna and St. Petersburg 227

CONTENTS

xiii

6. Efforts to discover a formula for mediation	229
7. Germany asked to "press the button"	231
8. The San Giuliano suggestion for mediation upon Serbia's unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum	234
9. The Cambon suggestion of mediation after Austria's occupation of Belgrade	236
10. The Grey proposal for a collective guaranty of the powers	239
11. Germany asks Russia to propose a formula	242
12. Austria agrees to mediation	252
13. The failure to reach a compromise	264

CHAPTER VIII

SIR EDWARD GREY AND THE ENGLISH DIPLOMACY

1. The important rôle of England	268
2. Efforts to prevent war	270
3. Efforts to organize mediation	270
4. England refuses to take sides	273
5. The Anglo-French <i>Entente</i>	282
6. England declares that she is not interested in a Balkan question	293
7. England warns Germany that she will not hold aloof if France is involved	295
8. Germany's bid for English neutrality	297
9. Divergence of opinion in England	303
10. England's vital interests	311
11. England's inquiry relative to Belgium's neutrality	316
12. England asked to guarantee the neutrality of France	328
13. Germany's detention of English vessels	336
14. Germany invades Luxemburg	337
15. England agrees to protect the French coast	339
16. The British ultimatum	352

CHAPTER IX

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY

1. The history of Belgian neutrality	371
2. The obligation to respect the treaty of April 19, 1839	376
3. The obligation to make good the guaranty of neutrality	387
4. The right to make war and the equality of states	391
5. Anglo-Belgian conversations	395
6. Effect of Belgium's preparations against Germany	411
7. Alleged violations of Belgian neutrality	415
8. The violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg	422
9. Some considerations concerning Belgium's right to resist	431

10. Germany accuses England of misrepresentations in regard to Belgium 441
 11. Germany's plea of necessity 445

CHAPTER X

ITALY REMAINS NEUTRAL

1. Italy desirous for peace 457
 2. San Giuliano's helpful suggestions 462
 3. Italian coöperation with England 465
 4. Italy declares she will remain neutral 467

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

1. The interest of the United States in the war 474
 2. Suggested and alleged causes of the war 475
 3. Displacement of the balance of power 476
 4. The immediate causes of the war 479
 5. The determining causes of the war 491
 6. The world's answer 495
 7. Formation of a Super-Empire 496
 8. The "Peace power" 500
 9. Germany's nationalistic conception 502
 10. Nationalism and internationalism 508
 11. The results 514

PART III: DOCUMENTS AND EVIDENCE

CHAPTER XII

- Questions and answers 519
 Questions without answers 528

CHAPTER XIII

DOCUMENTS

POLITICAL AIMS OF THE POWERS

- Washington's Farewell Address, September 17, 1796. (Extract.) . . . 530
 Bismarck's Speech in the Reichstag, February 6, 1888. (Extract.) . . . 533
 Apocryphal Will of Peter the Great (the Sokolnicki Text) 537
 The Declaration of the American Delegation at the First Hague Conference 539

CONTENTS

xv

THE ALLIANCES

Treaty of Alliance between Austria and Germany, October 7, 1879	540
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan, July 13, 1911	541
Anglo-American coöperation in regard to American affairs. (Extract from speech of the Queen on the opening of Parliament, 1896.)	542
Anglo-American Arbitration. (Extract from speech of the Queen on the opening of Parliament, 1897.)	543
The Monroe Doctrine. (Extract from <i>American Diplomacy</i> , by John Bassett Moore.)	543
Declaration between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, April 8, 1904	544
Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning the interests of their states on the continent of Asia, August 31, 1907	546
Treaty between Japan and Russia guaranteeing the present territory of each, the integrity of China, and the principle of the "open door" in that empire, August 14, 1907	550
Convention between Russia and Japan concerning Manchuria, July 4, 1910	551
The Formation of the Triple <i>Entente</i> . (Diplomatic Correspondence published by the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung</i> , 1914.)	551

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

A German Historian predicts War with England. (Extract from an article by Hans Delbrück, 1912.)	560
The Price of a German-English <i>Entente</i> . (Extracts from an article by Hans Delbrück, 1911.)	561
References to the Anglo-German secret treaty of 1898 relative to the eventual dismemberment of the Portuguese colonies	562
Anglo-German Agreement in regard to the African possessions of Portugal, 1913	562
Portugal won't sell yet; division of her East African Colonies when she does. (<i>New York Times</i> , January 1, 1914.)	563
Interview of October 28, 1908, with Emperor William II. (<i>London Telegraph</i>).	563
Colonial Development and Removal of Conflicting Interests, by Sir Harry Johnston	566
Commercial and Economic Competition, by Karl Rathgen	567
Speech of the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in the Reichstag, December 2, 1914	568
Cardiff Speech of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, October 2, 1914	569

THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN DISPUTE

Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878	572
---	-----

Secret Appendix to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia, February 29, 1912	572
Note addressed to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Government, July 23, 1914	574
Servia's reply to the Austrian note, July 25, 1914	576
Negotiations of the Spanish and American Governments following the destruction of the <i>Maine</i>	579
Comparison between the action of the United States in 1898 and Austria in 1914	583
The Case of Servia. (Extract from a speech by Lloyd George, September 21, 1914.)	586
The Austro-Servian Conflict. (Extract from an article by Constantin Theodor Dumba, 1914.)	587
Criticism of Servia. (Article by Count Albert Apponyi, 1914.)	588

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY

Richelieu rejects a proposal for the partition of Belgium and suggests another plan	595
The Barrier Treaty between Great Britain and Holland, October 29, 1709	596
Belgium and the Balance of Power	597
The Barrier Treaty Vindicated, by Francis Hare, 1712. (Extract.)	598
The Neutralization of Belgium by the Treaty of April 19, 1839; international treaties regulating the neutrality of Belgium	600
Treaty between Great Britain and Prussia relative to the independence and neutrality of Belgium, August 9, 1870	602
Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia relative to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and the Duchy of Limburg, May 11, 1867	603
Declarations made by France and Prussia to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg, July 17, 1870	605
Extracts from Parliamentary Debates regarding the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, 1867; 1870	606
Belgian Neutrality. (Gladstone's letter to Bright, August, 1870).	624
Anglo-Belgian Military Preparations. Documents made public by the German Government after taking possession of the Brussels Archives: (1) Report of General Ducarme to the Belgian Minister of War; (2) Report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to his Government	626
Remarks introductory to the Secret Documents, by Bernhard Dernburg	631
Violation of Belgian neutrality by England and Belgium. (Semi-official view expressed in the <i>North German Gazette</i> .)	634
Statement relative to the publication of the Belgian Documents, from M. Havenith, Belgian Minister at Washington	635

CONTENTS

xvii

The Nature of Neutrality, etc. (Extracts from <i>World Organization as affected by the Nature of the Modern State</i> , by David Jayne Hill.) . . .	638
The Alleged Inherent Right of Self-Preservation (extract), by John Westlake	640
The Queen <i>v.</i> Dudley and Stephens	642
Thucydides: The Melians' Defense of their Neutrality against the Athenians	645

THE WAR

The Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the settlement of international disputes, Article III	651
The Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the opening of hostilities	651
The Larger Meanings of the War. (Extracts from an article by Franklin H. Giddings.)	652
Appeal to the Universities of America, signed by Rudolf Eucken and Ernst Haeckel	653
America and the Issues of the European War, by Charles W. Eliot	655
Germany's Treaty Record: a letter by Bernhard Dernburg answering Dr. Eliot	661

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY	667
LIST OF CITATIONS	686
INDEX	693

THE PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATORS¹

AT LONDON

Mr. Asquith, *British Prime Minister*.
Sir Edward Grey, *British Secretary for Foreign Affairs*.
Prince Lichnowsky, *German Ambassador*.
M. Paul Cambon, *French Ambassador*.

AT BERLIN

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, *German Chancellor*.
Herr von Jagow, *German Secretary for Foreign Affairs*.
Sir Edward Goschen, *British Ambassador*.
M. Jules Cambon, *French Ambassador*.

AT ST. PETERSBURG

M. Sazonof, *Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs*.
Sir George Buchanan, *British Ambassador*.
Count Pourtalès, *German Ambassador*.
Count Szapary, *Austro-Hungarian Ambassador*.

AT VIENNA

Count Berchtold, *Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs*.
Herr von Tschirsky, *German Ambassador*.

AT PARIS

M. Poincaré, *President of France*.
M. Viviani, *Premier of France, and Minister for Foreign Affairs*.
M. Bienvenu-Martin, *Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs*.
Baron von Schoen, *German Ambassador*.

AT ROME

Marquis di San Giuliano, *Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs*.

AT BELGRADE

M. Pashitch, *Servian Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs*.

¹ In this list are included only the most important names which it may be expected that the reader will remember. A complete listing, under both name and office, of all actors in the negotiations, including those here mentioned, will be found with page references in the index.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

THE abbreviations used to denote the various official publications are the following: ¹

- (1) B. W. P. (British White Paper, no. 6, Miscellaneous, 1914.)
- (2) G. W. B. (German White Book, authorized translation.)
- (3) R. O. P. (Russian Orange Paper.)
- (4) B. G. P. (Belgian Gray Paper.)
- (5) F. Y. B. (French Yellow Book.)
- (6) A. R. B. (Austrian Red Book.)
- (7) S. B. B. (Servian Blue Book.)

¹ The British White Paper was also published as a small blue book and the Russian, Belgian and French publications have been issued in a convenient form as British White Papers.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR

PART I

INTRODUCTORY

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

The European Concert — Belgian neutrality — The Triple Alliance and The Triple *Entente* — Crises: Fashoda (1896); Algeciras (1906); the Casablanca affair (1908); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908); Agadir (1911); the Turco-Italian War (1911-12); the Balkan Wars (1912-13) — The situation just before the War of 1914.

1. *The European Concert*

It is impossible to understand the causes of the outbreak of the present war without some knowledge of the salient features of history which led to the alignment of the great powers into two camps known as the Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente*. The questions of the present moment, such as that of the neutrality of Belgium, have their roots deep in the past, and their elucidation must be sought in the history of the relations of the European states.

Modern Europe, as we know it to-day, was patched together at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The principal independent states of Europe, which took part in that settlement, formed the European Concert. They had been drawn together by the common danger of French domination and had succeeded at last in overwhelming Napoleon. During the Congress of Vienna, it looked as if the jealousies over the spoils stripped from France would divide the victors into two camps, and start another war. Russia, wishing to acquire all of Poland, offered to compensate Prussia with territory taken from Saxony. This gave Talleyrand his opportunity, and France, Austria, and England agreed to make common cause, by force of arms if necessary, to

prevent this dangerous aggrandizement of Russia and Prussia. But the powers had had enough of war, and so found a way to settle their differences by a ruthless carving-up of territories in disregard of the principle of nationality, and even that of "legitimacy," a term which served the same purpose of a shibboleth that the "observance of treaties" now fulfills. The able diplomacy of Talleyrand took advantage of this disagreement to reestablish the diplomatic equality of France, and the five powers, — England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, — working together as the Concert of Europe, dictated to all the other states and completed the territorial transformations and adjustments which suited their counterbalancing interests and jealousies. Proceeding with stumbling and halting gait, constantly in danger of falling, the European Concert continued to be, up to the outbreak of the War of 1914, Europe's supreme hope and only protection against the occurrence of a general war. Although acting as a sort of shock-absorber to break the force of the territorial transformations found necessary and inevitable in the course of years, the European Concert has neither maintained the *status quo* nor perfected the balance of power, but by compromising between the two has managed to keep the peace. Throughout this long period, the principal concern of the European Concert has been to watch over Balkan affairs in order to prevent the starting of a conflagration in the Near East.

2. Belgian neutrality

The Congress of Vienna, which stripped France of the immense possessions she had acquired since 1792, divided them up so as to meet the desires and secure the agreement of the coalition which had overthrown Napoleon. Prussia, Austria, and Russia received their parts on the Continent, but England did not desire to place hostages there, and made no demands for territory, seeking her compensation

elsewhere. It was natural that she should keep the colonial possessions captured from France by her fleets. The others could not refuse her what she already held. She wished also to retain certain of the Dutch possessions, as the Cape Colony, which she had seized when Holland was incorporated into the French Empire; at Vienna it was proposed to give the Belgic provinces to Holland as compensation. Austria gladly exchanged her provinces for territories nearer Vienna.¹ But this union of Belgium and Holland under the same king was contrary to the sentiments of the Belgian people, and fifteen years later they revolted.

France was very anxious to take them over, and there was some Belgian sentiment favorable to this plan; but this would not have satisfied one of England's fundamental principles of policy, which for centuries had been to keep the Belgic provinces out of the control of France. Through these provinces and Holland flowed some of the principal rivers of Europe. They possessed besides great importance as industrial centers. Their union with any great power would inconvenience England, because of the facility of attack afforded by the proximity of Belgian and Dutch harbors to her shores, and also because her commerce might thus be excluded from these rich territories drained by their rivers. Lord Palmerston, therefore, in 1831, true to England's traditional policy, strove to give to Belgium an independent position. But it was evident that a small, rich country with a magnificent strategic position would be coveted by her powerful neighbors, France and Prussia; in the course of future campaigns conducted across her territory, she might, at the settlement of peace, fall to one or the other. The interest of England seemed best served, therefore, by making her perpetually neutral;

¹ At the time, Prussia was even more anxious to have a strong "buffer" or "stopper" state to prevent France from invading her territory, and the general distrust of France made all the powers ready to fall in with the proposal.

the other powers had to acquiesce in this project or acknowledge ambitions of aggrandizement, which might lead England to make a coalition against them until she obtained assurances that such designs had been abandoned. Accordingly, it was agreed that Belgium should be perpetually neutral, and the principal powers — England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia — joined in guaranteeing her independence and perpetual neutrality.

It is no secret that France still pursued the main purpose of her diplomacy and military exertions since the time of Richelieu — that is, to annex the neighboring provinces of Belgium and to secure her natural outlet toward the north, thus regaining control of her own fluvial arteries of commerce. Under the great Napoleon she had accomplished the union of Belgium with France and had given the benefits of her reformed judicial system to a country which was already united to her by many ties, such as language and religion. But England came and put asunder these two peoples whom the evolution of history had united.

In the course of years, another Napoleon upon the throne of France had hoped again to incorporate Belgium into France, as was done at the epoch of the Revolution, and the French Ambassador, Benedetti, proposed to Bismarck a partition of Belgium, just as Russia had proposed and successfully brought about the partition of Poland in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Bismarck prevailed upon Benedetti to write out this proposal in his own hand, which he took for reference to the King of Prussia, and on the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War exhibited it to the diplomatic corps at Berlin. The inevitable result was still further to prejudice England against the brilliant adventurer upon the throne of France. Negotiations were entered into with each of the belligerents, and a separate treaty signed with each to make common cause against the other in case of a violation of Belgian neutrality. During the Franco-Prussian War, the perpetual neutrality of Bel-

gium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, the only perpetually neutralized states of Europe, was faithfully respected by all parties. In the course of generations, Europe has become accustomed to this artificial situation and has taken for granted that it would persist.

The general public has not appreciated the difference between ordinary neutrality and perpetual neutrality. In the present war the United States is a neutral in the ordinary sense, but may terminate that condition at any moment by declaring war and becoming a belligerent; or any other power may declare war upon the United States with the same effect. So also in the case of Holland, Germany or England may terminate Dutch neutrality by declaring war against her. Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, on the contrary, are placed under a special régime based on international agreements signed by the powers interested, according to the terms of which their territories must remain perpetually neutral, and this condition may not be modified to suit the convenience of any belligerent or of the perpetually neutral country itself. Such a condition is often spoken of as neutralization.

3. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente

The Franco-German War was the most important event of European history until overshadowed by the outbreak of the present war. Prussia emerged from it at the head of a united German nation. There was a serious dislocation of the old political relations which it took several years to adjust. England, for a time at least, needed not to fear the rivalry of France and devoted her attention to checking the ambitions of Russia. Bismarck made the center of his political conception a firm alliance with Austria. When Prussia defeated her in 1866, Bismarck held back the Prussians from making a triumphal entry into Vienna and was most considerate of Austrian susceptibilities. Later, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, he succeeded in obtaining

for Austria the occupation, administration, and control of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria had also to recognize that German support would protect her from the extreme demands and nationalistic aspirations of the heterogeneous elements embraced in her territories. So she constructed her empire on the double basis of the German and the strongest non-German element, the Magyars, and looked for support to the German alliance to maintain the bond and the balance between these two; Germans and Magyars of Austria, united and backed by the support of Germany, could maintain German supremacy over the numerically superior Slav elements of the Austrian Empire.

The Dual Alliance between Austria and Germany, established in 1879, was joined by Italy in 1883, as a result of Italian pique at France's acquisition of Tunis. The Italians there much outnumbered the French, and Italy had been hoping for its acquisition. It appears that the permission to occupy Tunis was the price Bismarck paid France to make the Congress of Berlin a success by her participation. He probably realized that the jealousy of France it would arouse on the part of Italy and England would strengthen Germany's position.

The effect of the formation of the Triple Alliance was to draw France and Russia together.¹ It is in the nature of things for any two states, separated by a third sufficiently strong to resist conquest and partition, to combine against the medial state, but this natural bond between France and Russia had been weakened by the mistrust of the Emperor Nicholas I of the radical governments of France.²

¹ The text of the Dual Alliance between Austria and Germany was first published in 1888 to check Russia from any attempt at aggression. See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., vol. II, p. 889. For text see Documents, *post*, chap. XIII.

² Another ground of difference resulted from France's adhering to her traditionally sympathetic attitude toward Polish independence, while Bismarck joined hands with Russia in stamping out Polish insurrections on either side the border by an exchange of Polish political refugees.

The Franco-Russian alliance was not merely political, but was further strengthened by financial ties between the parties. Russia found a market in which she could borrow to greater advantage and the thrifty French were glad of the opportunity of securing for their savings a high rate of interest from investments approved and supported by the Republic. It is estimated that as early as 1906, France had become Russia's creditor to the extent of some twelve billions of francs.¹ The alliance was signed August, 1891, but it was not avowed till some time later, and its terms have never been disclosed.

4. Crises

The formation of the Dual Alliance at once reestablished some semblance of a balance of power, based upon a bipartite division of continental Europe, in place of the older association of the relatively equal principal powers, which had formed the Concert of Powers since the Congress of Vienna. How perfect a balance existed could only be ascertained after testing it by diplomacy and the power of arms.²

Although England had always been included in the Concert of European Powers, she had held somewhat aloof, and avoided in any way limiting her freedom of action. Her unique geographical position and unchallenged control of the sea gave her a peculiarly potent influence on the Continent whenever she chose to exert it. When Germany, Austria, France, and Russia, the four powers originally forming the European Concert, together with

¹ Tardieu, *France and the Alliance*, p. 10.

² Von Bülow says of the Triple Alliance: "The three mid-European States are bound to each other by the firm resolve to maintain the existing balance of power in Europe, and should a forcible change be attempted, to prevent it if need be by force. The united strength of Middle Europe stands in the path of any revolution — any European policy which might elect to follow the courses pursued by Louis XIV or Napoleon I. This alliance is like a mighty fortification dividing the Continent in two." (*Imperial Germany*, p. 67, New York, 1914.)

Italy, admitted later on in recognition of her intervention in the Crimean conflict, grouped themselves in the manner indicated, it left England detached and enjoying still the same advantages she had possessed at the time of the formation of the European Concert. Even if the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, on the one hand, and the Triplice, on the other, effected a rough approximation to a balance of power, England, by throwing her weight to either side, could easily disturb it. She did not, however, immediately pursue such a course, but contented herself with her traditional policy of defending the smaller continental states from the aggression of their more powerful neighbors, and checking the free development of any state she feared might become so powerful as to dictate on the Continent.

Englishmen of that epoch predicted and prepared for a conflict with Russia. Russia, they said, was reaching out toward India. Russia it was who had never given up her ambition to secure Constantinople, — who had waited an opportunity to seize Persia and acquire an outlet on the Persian Gulf, — who was ever lying in wait for an opportunity to reach out an arm across Norway and Sweden to an ice-free port north of England, bathed by the warm Gulf Stream.

But trouble arose in another quarter, for shortly after the establishment of the new system of alliances, Europe passed through a series of violent crises.

5. *Fashoda*

The first of these crises nearly involved Great Britain and France in war. France had been vanquished repeatedly in her contest with Great Britain for control of the sea, and in 1815, it seemed that the century-long duel between the countries had been definitely concluded at the downfall of Napoleon, when France was crushed and suffered, together with a great loss of prestige, a curtailment like-

wise of her European and colonial territory. But France's imagination had not been destroyed and French diplomacy remained as effective as ever. In the course of a few years she had acquired Algiers, and decade after decade she kept pace with Great Britain in the scramble for colonial possessions. France made one mistake in not joining England when in 1882 it was found necessary to intervene in Egyptian affairs. England soon acquired control of the Khedive's dominions and directed a joint Anglo-Egyptian expedition to subdue the troublesome tribes infesting the Upper Nile. As rapidly as possible, England pushed forward to secure the strategically important head-waters of the Nile. There had been indications that France hoped to stake out a claim on the Upper Nile by extending her explorations east from the Congo to Abyssinia. By so doing, France thought she might secure a land route across equatorial Africa, and so arrest England's expansion southward to connect the British possessions and prepare the way for the Cape to Cairo route. Such an intercepting cross-road of Africa in the hands of the French would also give them a land and sea route to India almost free from English control.

September 19, 1898, the English forces under General Kitchener, pushing their way up the Nile, found the French flag waving over the island of Fashoda, where a French exploration party under Captain Marchand had established itself. Long years of colonial rivalry had at last brought the two states into direct collision. The only possibility of avoiding the conflict was that one or the other should back down. War hung in the balance and preparations for war were rushed in both countries. France, however, preferred to yield rather than to risk the annihilation of her colonial empire in a one-sided conflict with Great Britain, and accordingly withdrew from Fashoda.

6. The Algeciras Conference

As Russia extended farther eastward, she aroused the fears of England regarding Tibet and the control of China. She also came in conflict with Japan. The Mikado's Empire had learned from bitter experience at the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese War how impotent it was to withstand a European coalition, when Port Arthur and the Liao-tung peninsula had to be given back at the demand of Russia, France, and Germany. Hence Japan was desirous of reaching some agreement with Russia with regard to the extreme East and the control of Korea, for which she had just fought a successful war with China. But Russia thought to continue her triumphal advance and disdained the Japanese offers. The Japanese Embassy, headed by Marquis Ito, which had been sent to St. Petersburg, then proceeded to London, hoping to find there in their common fear of Russia a bond of union. On January 30, 1902, an alliance was signed, according to the terms of which Japan agreed to come to the assistance of England, if she were attacked by more than one power, in the defense of her Eastern possessions and interests.¹ England's subscription to an identical obligation insured Japan against a European coalition similar to that from which she had suffered at the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese War. England now felt less uneasy about Russian aggression, and met halfway the conciliatory advances of Delcassé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose diplomacy was directed toward removing the vestiges of bitterness left in France by the Fashoda humiliation, and securing a working agreement with England for harmonious action throughout the world. In this he was assisted by Edward VII, whose ready tact and real liking for the French

¹ See Documents, *post*, chap. XIII, for the terms of the alliance entered into in 1911. With some modifications this reproduces the terms of the alliance of 1902, renewed first after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.

enabled him to further the plans of the statesmen in both countries working toward an Anglo-French accord. But French public opinion was decidedly cool, and whatever bonds of sympathy there were did not embrace any great number of persons in either country. Nevertheless, on April 8, 1904, France and England entered upon an agreement settling certain of their disputes, as a result of which the century-old conflict in regard to the Newfoundland fisheries, a constant source of irritation, was ended by a compromise. Certain other understandings were reached as to the divisions between the French and English possessions in Africa, and most important of all, France gave assurances that she would abandon the policy of checking the development of English control in Egypt, where she had hitherto been able to prevent English reorganization of the finances and economic conditions of the country through her recognized treaty right to veto any action which might affect the security of the French investments. In return it was understood that England would support France in her designs to develop Morocco.

Germany, of course, perceived the danger of the situation. Having fully outgrown Bismarck's distrust of a policy of settlement colonies, she had been picking up such waste places, still unappropriated, as she could lay hands upon, and probably hoped for some favorable occasion when she might secure control of Morocco. In any event, she had the same interests in maintaining the open door in Morocco as we have in China. Besides this, she realized the danger to her general interests of an agreement between France and England. Hitherto, in spite of some minor disagreements, Germany had made it her policy to remain on good terms with England. She feared lest France, allied to Russia, should become the close friend of England, and German prestige and political influence be diminished, or occasion found, even, by which France might bring about the war of revenge to recover her lost

provinces. Bismarck, instead of following the usual pattern of German constitutional government, and either including the conquered provinces in some one of the states of the German Union or endowing them with a separate constitutional government within the German Federation, designated the territory taken from France as "Reichsland" or "imperial territory."¹ Since then the prevailing opinion in Germany has been that France would tear up the Treaty of Frankfort as soon as she felt strong enough. As long as Germany held Alsace and Lorraine, every German felt he must keep bright his sword to defend this possession. Germany's conquest of Alsace-Lorraine has been up to the present time a constant irritant in the body politic of Europe. France looked forward to recovering the lost provinces, and Germany felt she must protect herself by keeping France weak. Pursuing this policy, the German strategists were anxious to pounce on France in 1875, but even if Bismarck had been willing to desert his precepts and enter upon a campaign of aggression, it would not have been possible, as in 1870, to secure from the other powers of Europe permission to proceed.² The formation of the Dual Alliance tended to

¹ It would have aroused the jealousies of the other German states if Prussia had appropriated Alsace-Lorraine, and she did not care to lessen her superiority by turning the provinces over to any other. To have made a new state would also have diminished Prussia's relative position and made possible in future a stronger combination in opposition to her control of the affairs of the Empire. So the solution adopted was inevitable and resulted in giving Prussia, through her preponderating position in the Empire, a consequent control of the acquired provinces.

² Bismarck always made it a cardinal principle of his policy to avoid any appearance of aggression. "According to Bismarck, the military plan of seizing the first favorable opportunity of crushing France was not abandoned in 1875. 'Later also,' he says, this plan was advocated; but he remained convinced that it was impossible to say that any war was inevitable. No one, he said, 'can look into the cards held by Providence.' (*Memoirs*, p. 442; translation, vol. II, p. 103.) And, as was his wont, he summed up his views in a single pregnant phrase, declaring that offensive war to anticipate a possible attack was, 'in a sense, suicide in apprehension of death.'" (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx [1915], p. 63.)

reestablish the balance of power and prevent any further "bleeding" of France. France for her part seems really to have given up any active intention of pursuing a policy of revenge to recover Alsace-Lorraine. The gradual centralization of political control in the hands of the Radicals and Socialists, especially those of southern France, directed attention toward social reform and colonial expansion and development. She readily accepted as a condition of the alliance with Russia the understanding that the latter's support was not to be counted upon to further a war of revenge. No doubt there were many Frenchmen who, in the words of Gambetta, kept silent about Alsace-Lorraine but thought of it always; yet in any event the Triple and Dual Alliances seemed to be too nearly balanced to hold out any certainty of success in a war of aggression or revenge. England, too, in her splendid isolation might be counted upon to prevent either Russia or Germany from gaining any additional influence in the control of European affairs. From this time on, until the present war, Europe's peace rested upon the balance between the two alliances, and upon England's isolation and intention to check the too great development of any one continental power.

As soon, therefore, as Germany perceived from the trend of affairs in Morocco, after the agreement of 1904, that France had not only received permission to extend her political influence in northern Africa, but at the same time was reaching a better understanding with England, she had to consider her own safety as seriously threatened. Nevertheless, Germany did not think it opportune just then to enter a protest against the Moroccan arrangement. In the German Reichstag, in answer to a question from Count Reventlow why the Government did not take action to protect Germany's interests, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asked whether the interpellator thought the Government should make war for this purpose. So Germany allowed the matter to lie without protest, and

France and England thought that they had successfully carried through and definitely disposed of the Moroccan deal. The fact that this important step did not give rise to an acute crisis would indicate either that the balance in Europe was thought to be very nearly true at that moment or that the combination against Germany was too powerful to be resisted.

Meantime, the Russo-Japanese War, which had broken out the February preceding (1904), began in the winter of 1904-05 pitilessly to reveal Russia's military weakness and inefficiency. Europe was surprised, even startled, to hear of Japan's conspicuous success. The value of Russia's political support to France as an ally was much diminished, and there were indications that Russia's dislike of the socialistic and radical governments in control of France, and of the French criticism of Russia's severity in dealing with political agitation, had considerably weakened the bonds between them and undermined the Dual Alliance.¹ This seemed to the German Government a good occasion to make a move in regard to Morocco. Accordingly, the German Emperor disembarked at Tangier March 31, 1905, on his way east, and, after making a speech and remaining a few hours, continued his voyage on to Constantinople. The attention of the world was at once focused upon the Moroccan dispute, and France rushed forward military preparations to defend her eastern frontier against an anticipated attack from Germany.

England let it be understood that Germany's action in attempting to block France in Morocco would be looked upon as interference with England also, since France, acting in accordance with an understanding reached between the two countries, had a right to count

¹ The ex-Chancellor of the German Empire says: "After the Russo-Japanese War there was a slight coolness in Franco-Russian relations, whereas there was an increase of warmth in those between Russia and Germany." (Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, p. 81. New York, 1914.)

upon English support in Morocco.¹ The whole question was referred to a diplomatic conference at Algeiras in which, it is interesting to note, the United States took part. Thanks to the support of England and the defection of Germany's ally, Italy, France emerged from the combat of wits with a diplomatic victory to her credit. Far from separating France and England, Germany's action only drew them closer together and disastrously affected German prestige, by demonstrating at Algeiras that France had succeeded in forming an *entente cordiale*, or cordial understanding, with England without in any way weakening the Dual Alliance with Russia. Little comfort could be got from the humiliation of France in compelling the resignation of Delcassé, whose foresight and unflinching efforts had brought the foreign policy of France to such a successful culmination. Germany had insisted officially upon interpreting the purpose of his diplomacy as an attack against herself, and had secured his dismissal by a threat of immediate recourse to arms. France was again grievously humiliated, but her experience this time differed from that at Fashoda, for she retained in her grip material solace in her position in Morocco, now made more secure, so as to offer an opportunity for the extension of French influence and control.

Gradually, England had come to the realization that Germany was the most powerful nation on the Continent, and her most active rival for the world's commerce. The great development of Germany's merchant marine and her unprecedented efforts to launch a navy commensurate with this commerce and sufficient to defend it, had aroused British jealousy and had influenced England to appreciate still more highly the friendship with France.

In 1907, a few months after the Algeiras Conference, England entered into a convention with Russia which, like her *entente* with France, eliminated some of their long-

¹ Cf. B. W. P. no. 87. See *post*, chap. VIII, § 5.

standing grounds of difference. Northern Persia was allotted to Russia as being within her sphere of influence, while the southern part fell to England. This practically amounted to a partition of this small weak state just on the point of instituting veritable reforms. A small central portion, it is true, was still left to Persia to constitute a buffer state between Russia and England, and to serve, perhaps, as a sop to English conceptions of international morality.

As a result of all these efforts, the Triple Alliance found itself confronted by the gradually forming Triple *Entente* in which France was linked by an alliance with Russia and a friendly understanding with England. Germany felt herself hemmed in on every side.

7. *The Casablanca affair*

After the agreement reached at Algeciras, it was natural that there should be a certain animus between the French and Germans in Morocco, and in 1908, in the course of the military operations which the French were conducting, six of the members of the French Foreign Legion at Casablanca fled to the German Consulate and were there given protection by virtue of the privilege of extraterritorial jurisdiction which the consuls of the different powers enjoyed in Morocco. The German Consul had intended to extend his protection only to German nationals, but in point of fact three of the deserters were non-German. The consul, not realizing this, signed a safe-conduct for all six to be embarked upon a German ship. While on the way to the ship under the protection of German agents, they were arrested by French officials in spite of the protests of the German Consul, and in the *mêlée* which resulted, the Chancellor of the German Consulate and one of its Moroccan guards were roughly handled. This led to an energetic protest from the German Government and the demand that the deserters be restored to the German authorities. For a while the situation was most threaten-

ing. Germany contended that the rights of her consuls to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over German subjects in Morocco had been violated by the French officials. France, admitting the validity of such extraterritorial jurisdiction, considered, nevertheless, that the right of an armed force to control its members took precedence over the ordinary right to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. France refused to yield to the German demands, but was willing to refer the question to the Hague Tribunal. The award which it rendered in effect sustained the French position, though the language in which it was couched was evidently intended to avoid giving offense to German susceptibilities and to reach a verbal compromise. The decision was accepted by both parties.

8. Bosnia and Herzegovina

When the German Emperor decided to cultivate close relations with the Turk, a great transformation was brought about in the situation of Europe. This policy was really determined by Austria's opposition to Russia's ambitions in the Balkans. Since Russia was known to covet the possession of Constantinople and the control of the Slav states of the peninsula, Austria's easiest method of defense was to support the Sublime Porte; Germany, who likewise feared Russian aggression along her unprotected frontier, was led by this common fear to form the closest of alliances with the Dual Monarchy. Thenceforth, Austria's policy toward Turkey became her own. Gradually England relinquished her rôle of protector of the Turk, to be replaced by Germany. The secondary consequences of this change of policy were important. Germany prevented Greece from acquiring Crete, and shielded the Sultan from the diplomatic intervention of the powers to protect the Christians in Macedonia. Turkish military prestige was high after her defeat of Greece in 1896, and German officers, under the great strategist, Von

der Goltz, trained her forces. Germany in return for this assistance was able to count Turkey as almost an integral part of the Triple Alliance, and to secure concessions in the rich territory of Asia Minor, where she pushed the construction of the Baghdad Railway to link Constantinople with the Persian Gulf.

Suddenly all Germany's plans were upset by the revolution of July 24, 1908, which brought the Young Turks into power. Imbued with liberal doctrines, they turned to England, and the British Ambassador was greeted with cheers wherever he went. In this emergency Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, Germany's astute Ambassador, was worth a whole army to her, for he soon was able to regain for Germany the position which she had before held.

The Young Turks did not show political wisdom in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Empire. They had irritated Bulgaria into seizing the Roumelian section of the Oriental Railway controlled by the Turks;¹ and when Austria found that delegates from Bosnia and Herzegovina were preparing to send representatives to sit in the Turkish Chamber of Deputies, she considered it necessary to reaffirm her virtual sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina by proclaiming their annexation, October 7, 1908. Austria had been playing second fiddle to Germany so long that her prestige as a great power had suffered, and Aerenthal, backed by the energetic Archduke Franz Ferdinand, thought the occasion opportune for showing Europe that Austria still counted. Germany supported her ally loyally. This action was well timed to make the Young Turks, at the moment they were turning their back on Germany and German influence, feel the folly of their course; at the same time it was a unique opportunity to

¹ S. P. Duggan, "The Balkan Problem," *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1913, p. 104. This article gives an admirable summary of recent events in the Balkans.

allow Austria to make an advantageous readjustment without laying Germany open to the accusation of playing Turkey false.

Italy was irritated by the annexation, for she had always feared to see Austria grow too strong in the Balkans and extend her power along the eastern shore of the Adriatic; but Servia most of all was injuriously affected. As long as Bosnia remained nominally under Turkish sovereignty, she had hoped a favorable opportunity might permit her to incorporate its large Serb population into a Greater Servia. Russia obviously would come to the assistance of Servia, or any other state opposed to Austria, and there was a possibility of her attacking Austria. England did not wish to be drawn into any dispute over a Balkan matter, but was disturbed by what she considered Austria's disregard of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin.

Russia protested against this violation of the twenty-fifth article of the Treaty of Berlin and declared that the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina interested all Europe and could not be settled without the assent of the powers signatory to the treaty.¹ Sir Edward Grey supported Russia and pointed out that Austria was also violating the Treaty of London of 1871, the terms of which declare it to be "an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty or modify the stipulations thereof unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable arrangement."²

Diplomatic wrangling was ended when, on March 22, 1909, Germany announced that unless Russia consented to the abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, Austria would invade Servia, to put an end to her preparations for an attack upon Austria. Russia was unprepared

¹ For the terms of Article 25, see Documents, *post*, chap. XIII.

² S. P. Duggan, "The Balkan Problem," *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1913, p. 105.

for war and had to submit, especially since England and France were not ready to be dragged into a war over a Balkan question.

If England and France had been in quest of an opportunity to strike Germany and Austria, they could not have found a better; but both were animated by peaceful intentions, and in Russia there was still a vivid recollection of the recent campaign in the Far East. So Russia yielded to the calming influence of France and England. The idea of a conference was abandoned. Austria's *fait accompli* was accepted, and Servia was even compelled (on March 31, 1909) to make a formal declaration that she would accept the situation, desist from her hostile preparations against Austria, and arrest her propaganda looking to the acquisition of Bosnia. A few months after this, Marschall von Bieberstein succeeded in reëstablishing German influence in Constantinople. For a while a calmer tone prevailed in European affairs, until the corruption in the blood of European politics came to a head again at Agadir.

9. Agadir

The convention adopted by the Algeciras Conference to regulate the situation in Morocco has generally been considered as a defeat of German pretensions. Germany found it necessary at that particular moment to accept its terms, but she reserved the right to interpret them as best she might in her own interest; and just as France had formerly spent every effort to block the development of British control in Egypt, Germany now employed every means to thwart the extension of French influence in Morocco. She had seized upon the Casablanca incident, which gave her some reasonable ground of complaint, to cover demands for a modification of French policy in Morocco; France, by offering to submit the question to arbitration and letting it be perceived that she would resist any attempts at intimidation, succeeded in

restricting the question to its juridical limits and eluding the inconvenient political demands of Germany.¹

Germany's only resource, then, was to continue a policy of diplomatic obstruction and to attempt to work through Spain, who, because of her proximity, was naturally anxious to retain what she considered her legitimate rights to a reasonable influence in Moroccan affairs. France continued to push her policy of extending French influence and control, which necessitated campaigns to overcome the native resistance. As France secured a firmer control, Germany complained that she was ignoring the principle of the open door, and interfering with the rights assured to German citizens. July 1, 1911, the German cruiser Panther appeared off Agadir just as France was pushing a campaign in the interior of Morocco. Germany claimed that it was necessary to send the warship to protect German interests because of the unrest in Morocco, but all Europe recognized that she was putting forth a claim to a greater interest in the Shereefian Empire.

The Panther was soon replaced by a larger German warship, and both England and France sent ships to Agadir. Lloyd George's speech of July 22 made it clear that England would support France against German aggression. For some weeks the situation was most tense, but in the end an acceptable compromise was reached, November 4, 1911, the effect of which was to settle the Moroccan

¹ Germany's interest in the fate of Morocco was more than commercial. To quote from Von Bülow: "In November, 1898, the Emperor William II had said in Damascus: 'The three hundred million Mahommedans who live scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend at all times.' In Tangier the Emperor had declared emphatically in favour of the integrity of Morocco. We should have completely destroyed our credit in the Mahommedan world, if so soon after these declarations we had sold Morocco to the French. Our Ambassador in Constantinople, Freiherr von Marschall, said to me at the time: 'If we sacrifice Morocco in spite of Damascus and Tangier, we shall at one fell swoop lose our position in Turkey, and therefore all the advantages and prospects that we have painfully acquired by the labor of many years.'" (*Imperial Germany*, pp. 100, 101. New York, 1914.)

question once for all on the understanding that Germany should recognize it as a French protectorate and no longer oppose French designs. In return Germany received a cession of part of the French Congo — Ubangi, bordering on her possessions of the Kamerun. The solution was a big disappointment to both countries; Germany had hoped at least to acquire an important port on the Moroccan coast which would have been most valuable to her as a way-station on the commercial routes to South America and South Africa. In France there was a feeling that Germany, by threatening resort to force, had obliged France to give up part of her possessions for a mere recognition of what she already was entitled to. This agreement, however, laid the Moroccan specter.

It had taken three crises threatening the peace of Europe before this satisfactory result was reached; but Europe, relieved of her anxiety in this quarter, had good reason to turn her attention to the Near East, whence have emanated so many baleful international disagreements.

10. The Turco-Italian War

We have already noted how France's seizure of Tunis drove Italy to join the Dual Alliance of Austria and Germany, which thus became the Triple Alliance or Triplice. It was in vain that France intimated that Italy might console herself by taking Tripoli. Italy shut her eyes to the obvious fact that England and France would never allow her to cut the Mediterranean in two and, by controlling the passage between Sicily and the coast of Tunis, to establish a second Gibraltar. Italy went farther afield by attempting a luckless policy of expansion. Her prestige was lowered by a defeat at the hands of Abyssinia, and when the great powers were taking possession of choice morsels of Chinese territory and she cried, "Me too," China faced about and by an emphatic refusal put a quietus on her demands.

Italy had been more successful in building up internally the strength of her country and began to consider favorably the plan to take over Tripoli. In 1900, at the time when France was feeling about for support, Italy came to an understanding with her in regard to the occupation of Tripoli; and now that Germany seemed likely to inherit the land of the Turk, England was not loath to have a power less formidable, like Italy, secure a good parcel. Still Italy seemed in no hurry to make the move until the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908 spurred her on. Thenceforth Italy pushed the pacific penetration into Tripoli with constantly increasing intolerance of Turkish opposition, and shortly after the subsidence of the acute phase of the Moroccan crisis, she took definite action. At 2.30 P.M. on September 28, 1911, the Italian Government demanded that Turkey, in order to terminate the disorders due to her neglect in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, should, within twenty-four hours, consent to Italy's occupying those provinces. Upon Turkey's refusal, Italy declared war at 3 P.M. September 29, and after a long and difficult campaign occupied Tripoli and Cyrenaica. It was hardly to be expected that Germany would relish this onslaught on her Turkish protégé, but she was powerless to object, because she feared that Italy's flirtation with the *Entente* might become really serious and amount to a desertion of her partners in the Triple Alliance; but unofficial criticism of what was called Italy's unprincipled and greedy action was not lacking in the Austrian and German press. The nearest approach to an objection was Austria's seeking and obtaining an assurance that the war would not extend to European Turkey. After several months of hostilities, the Turkish and Italian plenipotentiaries met in Switzerland, in July, 1912, to arrange the terms of peace; Turkey, following her usual tactics, attempted to drag out the negotiations. Meantime the exposure of Turkish weakness had whetted the appetite

of the Balkan States, and they were preparing an alliance against the Sultan. Italy, taking advantage of this situation, presented a demand that the Porte accept her conditions or resume the war. In the face of an impending struggle with her Balkan neighbors, Turkey could do nothing but yield, and agreed, by the Treaty of Lausanne of October 18, 1912, to cede Tripoli and Cyrenaica, while Italy was to return the Ægean Islands upon the understanding that certain reforms should be instituted for the benefit of the Christian inhabitants.

So skillfully had Italy applied her diplomatic anæsthesia to the Triple Alliance, that it did not struggle during the whole operation. Nevertheless, it felt the effects of the shock, for at the same time that Italy showed up the weakness of Turkey, she indicated how loosely she was bound to the Triple Alliance and how free she still felt to direct her foreign policy in patent opposition to Germany's wishes.

11. The Balkan Wars

Before Turkey had settled her conflict with Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Servia, and Montenegro accomplished what had always been considered an impossible feat: an alliance against the Porte. A long experience with the evils of Turkish rule, and the still greater evils of their own mutual antagonisms, had done much for their political education. The Balkan States no longer looked to a benevolent Europe to protect them from the tyranny of the Turk and began to see the folly of their own ceaseless and bloody struggles among themselves. They realized at last the necessity and the feasibility of a combination, of a coalition to rescue their brothers in Macedonia from their intolerable situation. They realized that they might never again find the Turk so weakened as after the Turko-Italian War; they might wait in vain for another occasion such as then presented itself, when jealousies between the

two groups of great powers and the bitter memories of the recent Agadir incident made it difficult for them to present a united front against the allies' attack upon Turkey.

In truth the powers were quick to realize the danger to European peace which a break-up of the Turkish Empire might entail, and on October 8, 1912, they agreed upon a collective note which they presented to the Balkan allies, stating that in event of war they would permit of no modification of the *status quo*.

But the allies, wise in their generation, estimated these representations of the great powers at their true value, and prosecuted their campaign against Turkey. The glorious successes, first of Bulgaria and then of Servia and Greece, made the disastrous rout of Turkey complete. This unexpected result was too much for the feeble Concert to handle. The Triple Alliance could not prevail upon all the members of the Triple *Entente* to force the Balkan States to restore to the Turkish Empire its lost possessions. We have not here to follow the interesting course of events leading up to the Treaty of London, when the representatives of Turkey and of the allies met to discuss terms of peace, while at Sir Edward Grey's suggestion a conference of the ambassadors of the great powers carried on a concurrent exchange of views. Turkey wished to settle with each one of the allies separately, but they decided to make their terms with her first, and later on to divide amongst themselves the ceded territory. Turkey had to give up all of Macedonia and most of her territory in Europe, except a small strip about Constantinople, and leave to the decision of the great powers the disposition of the Ægean Islands.¹

¹ "The introduction of our last Army Bill, which had its origin in the change of situation effected by the Balkan War, shows that Turkey's collapse was a blow to us. I never had any illusions about the limits of Turkish ability to act with effect. For that very reason I strove, for many years successfully, to prevent any serious conflict in the Near East. In 1897, during the Cretan affair, in 1908-09, during the crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia, and in all phases of the Macedonian question, there was great danger that serious trouble in the Balkan Peninsula would have more

When it came to the division of the spoils, the political sagacity of the Balkan allies broke down under the strain. One of the principal difficulties arose from the inconvenient determination of the great powers to establish an independent Albania on the Adriatic coast, south of Montenegro, thus cutting Serbia off from her outlet on the Adriatic, and robbing Montenegro of her long-cherished hope of securing Scutari. Both Italy and Austria had no desire to complicate their political situation by the advent of a new power on the Adriatic littoral, so they seized upon the convenient excuse of Albanian nationality to establish under the collective protection of the great powers the independent state of Albania. Serbia was promised the right of transit and commercial use of port facilities on the Adriatic, but she recognized that the tenure of such a privilege was of necessity precarious, and she felt that she had been robbed of the hope of realizing her legitimate aspiration for an outlet on the sea. For her disappointment she hoped to find some compensation elsewhere, but Bulgaria ungenerously refused to modify the terms of the agreement for the division of conquered territory entered into previously to the war. Greece, for her part, wished to retain territory which Bulgaria considered should fall to her. Bulgaria was supported by Austria, while Serbia and Montenegro relied on the support of Russia. Not content with making enemies of her two allies, Bulgaria further antagonized Rumania by refusing to give any satisfactory assurance as to a compensatory rectification of their common frontier. Rumania, although she had taken no part in the contest, thought that she should receive some accession of territory to retain her relative position in the Balkans, alleging that she might have thrown her army against the unfavourable than favourable results for us, as well as for Austro-Hungary, and would not make the European situation any easier for us to deal with. For many a year Turkey was a useful and important link in the chain of our political relations." (Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, pp. 74, 75. New York, 1914.)

allies, and so have prevented the success of their campaign. Turkey also joined in the attack upon Bulgaria, and Rumania mobilized her forces. Bulgaria's pride was quickly humbled; she appealed to the Rumanian King to intercede with Greece and Servia, and by the terms of the Treaty of Bukharest of August 6, 1913, she was forced to yield up to Servia and Greece larger portions of the conquered territories than they had at first demanded, at the same time that she acknowledged Rumania's claim to a strip of territory of small extent but of great importance from a strategic point of view. Turkey, too, succeeded in regaining Adrianople.

Russia and Austria all but came to blows over the Albanian question, but France and England were unwilling to be drawn into a war over this Balkan question, and considered that Servia should be satisfied with her large accessions of territory even though Austria and Italy had succeeded in thwarting the claims of Servia and Montenegro to the Albanian coast.¹ Europe felt a sense of relief that the map of the Balkans had been made over without the outbreak of war between any of the great powers.

Austria with Italy's support had checked Servia's aspirations for an outlet on the Adriatic, either through union with Montenegro or by the acquisition of part of the Albanian coast, but she could not prevent the extension of Servia's territories, which brought with it greater prestige and made her more dangerous as the champion of the Pan-Serb propaganda, with the avowed purpose of incorporating into a united Servia all Serbs under the Austrian Empire. In other words, Austria could no longer dictate to Servia, but had to contend with a neighbor of no mean strength, who was, besides, backed by Russia. Austria was bitterly disappointed to find her dreams of an outlet on the

¹ Any attempt to support Servia would have been particularly ill-advised, since it would have united Italy strongly in support of Germany and Austria and probably brought on a European war under conditions very unfavorable to the Triple *Entente*.

Ægean through Salonika thwarted by the results of the war and the throwing of a stronger Serbia across her path. Prior to the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga, Serbia had been as much a satellite of the Austrian system as is Portugal now of the British. Afterwards, even though the Government of the regicides was recognized as the pliant tool of Russia, the knife of the assassin could not remove the effect of Austrian proximity and the Dual Monarchy might still entertain a reasonable hope of uniting all the Serbs in one autonomous group like Hungary, while political security would be insured by union with other groups for certain common purposes, such as foreign affairs, war, and the needs of imperial finance. But Serbian successes against Turkey and Bulgaria had destroyed this possibility of coöperation. The new Serbia considered herself free from Austrian tutelage and dreamed of reëstablishing the glories of the ancient Serb Empire.

Even before the Balkan conflict she had nursed this hope, and had attempted in 1906 to escape from Austrian dictation by drawing nearer to France and Russia, and by concluding a convention with Bulgaria, which facilitated the export of Servian goods through the Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea.¹ Austria retaliated by making certain restrictions and discriminatory tariff regulations and held up her exports. This action, which has been known as the "Pig War," quickly whipped Serbia back into the Austrian political fold.

Again in 1908, when Austria proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia was aroused, for she feared that the tightening of Austria's grip on these provinces would put a definite quietus on the political aspirations nearest her heart — that is to say, the incorporation of the Serbs of Bosnia into the Servian Kingdom. Austria also realized that it made more difficult the effecting of a closer union with Montenegro, which should give to Serbia

¹ See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., vol. xxiv, p. 695.

an outlet on the sea, and to the kindred kingdoms, through their united action, the exercise of a much greater political influence. So Servia manifested signs of restlessness as if preparing to open up the whole Balkan question by recourse to arms.

The political situation in 1908 seemed very favorable to Servia's plans, for England was irritated and alarmed at what she considered Austria's disregard of the article of the Berlin Treaty regulating the position of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, too, was vitally interested in everything relating to the balance of power in the Balkans and might have been expected to give Servia her diplomatic and military support. But Russia had recently tasted of the rigors of war and was not eager to begin again; not, at any rate, until she had reorganized her military system in the light of her recent experience in the Far East. England, for her part, was not ready to be drawn into a general war because of this relatively trivial Balkan question. Both Russia and England must have realized that Austria's proclamation of the annexation had not really materially changed the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, since it was well understood that Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, which gave to Austria the occupation and administration of the provinces, had been intended to make her a permanent cession of the territory, yet in such a form as to appear to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Unless the powers had been looking for a pretext, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could hardly have afforded an excuse for launching a general European war. So the Concert of Powers applied themselves to soothing and restraining Servia, and prevailed upon her to agree not to carry on an active propaganda to detach the provinces from Austria.¹

¹ This promise of Servia was made in a note of March 31, 1909, communicated to the powers. See *post*, p. 52.

The powers were not so naïve as to expect that these promises would be effective in restraining Serbia, and no doubt whatever efficacy they may have had was impaired, if not swept away, by the Balkan War. The Minister sent by Russia to represent her at Belgrade became the center of an active propaganda to extend Slav, that is Russian, influence. Another cause of anxiety for Austria was that if Italy should once secure control of the important Albanian port of Avlona, she would make the Adriatic an Italian sea, control the commerce of Trieste, and deprive the Austrian base at Pola of its strategic value. Italy, being nearer at hand, was much better situated for bringing Albania under her influence. Austria had other causes for chagrin, since she had lost prestige and direct influence by backing the losing power in each of the two preceding wars.¹ No sooner had the Turk been worsted than she hoped to find in Bulgaria a counterpoise to Russian influence in the Balkans, but her support of Bulgaria's pretensions and urging her to take an unconciliatory attitude had only been the latter's undoing. Embittered by successive disappointments, Austria was in no mood to bear with patience any further interference with the development of her policy in the Balkans. She felt that her prestige as a great power required that she pursue with success some constructive policy to reestablish her weakened position.²

In Franz Ferdinand, the Dual Monarchy had fortunately what had been lacking for generations — a leader

¹ S. P. Duggan, "The Balkan Adjustment," *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1913, p. 627.

² This attitude on Austria's part is indicated by Count Berchtold's remark to the British Ambassador at Vienna that, "though he had been glad to cooperate towards bringing about the settlement, which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent." (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) These remarks should be considered in the light of ex-Premier Giolitti's recent disclosure regarding Austria's intention of making war upon Serbia in August, 1913.

capable of taking up the direction of the Empire's political affairs. Had he not recently successfully put through the Bosnia-Herzegovina *coup* which had done so much to enhance Austrian prestige? There had been indications that, realizing the hopelessness of maintaining the German-Magyar foundation of the Empire, he was ready to broaden the basis of the Government and give to the principal groups the national independence at present enjoyed by the German and Magyar alone. This would have still further weakened German influence, and would have lessened the racial-political tie with Germany, but it might have made possible the organization in the Balkans of a great federated empire with Constantinople as its seat of government, and united by the overshadowing fear of Russian domination.¹

As a result of the Balkan wars, Turkey and Bulgaria had been too much weakened to offer any effective support against Russian aggression or the spread of Russian influence in the peninsula. The Government of the Tsar could continue to rely upon the loyalty of the new Serbia, strengthened and filled with enthusiasm by two successful campaigns in which she had doubled her territory and acquired Uskub, the ancient capital of the Serb Empire. In Bosnia, there was disaffection toward Austria and an ardent desire for union with Serbia. As Austria would not tolerate any open expression of this desire, so natural on the part of the Serb and Serbo-Croat portion of the population in the provinces bordering on the Servian frontier, it was inevitable that secret organizations and conspiracies should spring up. It was easy for the agitators to cross over the Servian frontier and perfect their organization and plans undisturbed by the ubiquitous Austrian police officers and spies. Furthermore, Serbia did nothing to restrain

¹ See "The War in Europe," *The Round Table*, September, 1914. A remarkably interesting and suggestive article written with a strong anti-Magyar bias.

her citizens from aiding these conspirators, nor did she interfere to prevent Servian citizens from organizing and carrying on an active propaganda for the union of Bosnia with Servia. On her side, Austria redoubled her efforts to prevent any outbreak in Bosnia.

12. The situation just before the War of 1914

Such was the condition when Franz Ferdinand and hismorganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, decided to make a journey to Serajevo. The Servian Government, hearing of his intentions, warned him of the danger of which no doubt he was himself fully aware, but, as it might be considered to Servia's interest to prevent his journey, no significance seems to have been attached to the warning. After the failure of the first attempt on his life, the Archduke made an impassioned speech, in which he notified the authorities that they would be held responsible for his safety. The second attempt was successful, and on June 28, 1914, the fateful shot of Gavrilo Princip shattered the dearest hopes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The news of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Empire of the Hapsburgs, and his wife, at the hand of political conspirators of Servian nationality or sympathy, was flashed over the wires to all parts of the world, and every intelligent individual realized that the removal of Franz Joseph's energetic heir would have some effect upon future events, but there was no general appreciation of the serious consequences threatened as a result of this assassination. Yet, from the moment the Young Turk party came into power in 1908 up to the assassination at Serajevo, there had been one continuous state of crisis in which no one could tell what the next month might bring forth. The chancelleries of Europe had realized already the gravity of the general European situation, and after the assassination they prepared with apprehension to watch attentively the course of events.

Since the outbreak of the war, Giolitti, ex-Premier of Italy, has made public that Austria, in August of 1913, notified the Italian Government that she intended to declare war on Servia with Germany's consent. This indicates how profoundly she had been affected by the changes in the Balkans. But what Austria and Germany designated as a defensive measure Italy considered aggression, and refused to make common cause with her allies. Whether Austria after waiting so long would have commenced a war against Servia without the additional friction resulting from the crime of Serajevo, it is impossible to tell. As Von Bülow himself has said, the collapse of Turkey was a blow to Germany and made necessary the introduction of a new Army Bill. The German-Austrian Empires were making every effort to regain the lost ground. But the other powers were naturally not willing to lose their advantage, and France replied to Germany's extraordinary war taxes to increase her armament, by lengthening the period of military service from two to three years, at the same time that she lent Russia her financial aid to reorganize her army, to build her fleet, and to lay down strategic railways along the German frontier. The German strategists may well have feared that England also would turn her attention toward her army. Germany at the zenith of her military effectiveness was obliged to contemplate the rapid increase of armament in Russia, possibly, too, in England. Another very important factor in the European situation was the bitterness so general in Germany after Agadir.

The French military attaché at Berlin writes: "We discover every day how deep and how lasting are the sentiments of wounded pride and rancor against us, provoked by the events of last year. The treaty of November 4, 1911, is a profound disappointment.

"The resentment felt in every part of the country is the same. All Germans, even the Socialists, resent our having taken their share in Morocco." (F. Y. B. no. 1, Annex 1.)

It is a curious circumstance, not without influence on the events we are considering, that each of the *Entente* Powers was, during July, in the throes of serious internal difficulties. Great Britain was admitted on every hand to be on the verge of a civil war; St. Petersburg was in the midst of a great strike, especially dangerous in a country which represses all expression of political opinion; in France, perhaps, the situation was most serious of all. The attempt to constitute a ministry in sympathy with the plans to strengthen the national defense had failed and the direction of affairs had passed into the hands of the Socialist and more radical groups. The Caillaux affair was disastrously affecting the prestige if not the very security of the Government, and the Minister of War chose the occasion to confess that the army was in a deplorable state of unpreparedness.

Such was the situation in Europe between the assassination, on June 28, and the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, July 23. If Germany and Austria felt war was inevitable, it must be confessed that another opportunity equally favorable could hardly be expected. Nevertheless, the best-informed opinion could not believe in the reality of a great European war.¹

For a few days following the crime, there was a calm such as often precedes a terrific tempest. The tone of the press might have caused alarm, but the accusations made in the Austrian and Servian newspapers were looked upon as a natural consequence of the emotion aroused by the tragedy of Serajevo. It was hoped these ebullitions might

¹ After the event is the day of the scaremongers who proudly point to their prophecies, but if we turned back a few months we should find countless other prophecies unfulfilled. The same is true of the interesting military reports in the French Yellow Book. There must be many such reports in every Foreign Office of especial advantage to spur on the legislators to vote the supplies for increased armaments. Their significance depends upon the extent to which they are borne out by information from other sources. The critic ought also to be able to compare them with similar reports received in previous years.

afford a harmless outlet for pent-up feelings and allow the excitement to subside. In any event, it was thought no action would be taken until the results of the investigation of the outrage had been concluded and the findings made public. But less than a month after the assassination, Austria startled the world by addressing an ultimatum to Servia without any previous warning. It was the opening scene of the most tragic drama of human history.

PART II
ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER II

THE AUSTRO-SERB CONFLICT

The terms of the Austrian note — Efforts of the powers to secure an extension of the time limit — The powers influence Serbia to make a conciliatory reply — Serbia's reply — Austria rejects Serbia's reply — The powers urge Austria to delay military operations and accept the Servian reply as a basis for discussion — Austrian assurances — Austria declares war on Serbia — Austria explains the purpose of her action.

*1. The terms of the Austrian note*¹

ALTHOUGH European diplomatists were alive to the danger of possible complications between Austria and Serbia as a consequence of the assassination of the Archduke, there was no suspicion of any immediate cause for worry. It was expected, perhaps, that Austria would present an angry protest to Serbia and that negotiations would be continued at the ordinary halting gait. Europe looked with anxious gaze farther south, where Austria and Italy were engaged in a diplomatic duel to secure control of the newly constituted state of Albania with its magnificent harbor of Avlona (Vallona) commanding the entrance to the Adriatic. Even in Albania it seemed that the very difficulty of the situation would make the rivals cautious, since England and France could be counted upon to throw their influence for peace, and Germany would not allow either of her allies to seize Avlona, which lay like an apple of discord between them; for a move on the part of either to gain possession would have meant the disruption of the Triple Alliance. So the diplomats took their usual vacations. Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador, was absent from Berlin. The Russian Ambassador to Berlin had turned over his office to a *chargé*. The Kaiser

¹ For the text of the Austrian note and Serbia's answer, see Documents, *post*, chap. XIII.

himself was on his annual cruise to Norway, while President Poincaré and Premier Viviani, who was also Minister for Foreign Affairs, were on an official visit to the Tsar at St. Petersburg.¹

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador at Vienna, in his dispatch of September 1, giving an account of the events preceding the war, says in substance:² 'The presentation of the note, on July 23, was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz (Austrian Foreign Office), and with the exception of the German Ambassador, Von Tchirsky, who must have been aware of the tenor, if not of the actual words, of the note, none of his colleagues was allowed to see through the veil.³ On the 22d

¹ B. W. P. no. 6.

² As has been explained in the Preface, a single quotation is used at the beginning and at the end of the extracts which are somewhat modified so as to make it possible to include them in a running narrative of the events. In other instances the modification has been made so as to separate out from a document the part relating to the question under discussion in the text. The words "modified quotation" in parenthesis with the exact reference are placed at the end of all such quotations to enable the reader to ascertain, by referring to the source, how faithfully the original has been adhered to. Where the ordinary double quotations are employed, the original is strictly followed. The word "extract" is placed in the parenthesis after a direct quotation when a part only of the document is quoted.

³ M. Jovanovitch, Servian Minister at Vienna, stated in a report drawn up after the outbreak of hostilities: "In spite of all, it was known that a note was being framed to the Minister which should contain the grievances and claims of Austria-Hungary against Servia. This work was entrusted to Count Forgach, formerly Minister from Austria-Hungary to Servia. It was generally believed that, of the representatives of foreign countries, only the German Ambassador, Herr von Tchirsky, had been kept informed of the progress of this work, and I have reason to believe that he even collaborated in drawing up the note. Representatives of states favorable to us also agreed with me in thinking that, drafted by these two authors, the note would contain very hard conditions for Servia, and not such as she could accept. When the text of the note was made public, they were all taken by surprise, not to say dismayed." (Extract, August 16, S. B. B. no. 52.)

As early as July 15 M. Jovanovitch telegraphed to Belgrade: "From now on, one thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will make diplomatic representations (*démarches*) at Belgrade as soon as the Serajevo investigation has been completed and the case presented to the tribunal." (Extract, July 15, S. B. B. no. 23.)

In another telegram of the same date the Servian Minister furnishes his

and 23d of July, M. Dumaine, the French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Government with a prophetic analysis of the plans of the Austrian Government:—

“What steps will be taken? In what form? What demands is Austria-Hungary about to make on Servia? I do not believe that even at Ballplatz clear and concise replies could be given to these questions. I think that all this is being worked out at the present time,² and that Count Forgach has become the principal factor in the matter.

“In one of my previous reports, I mentioned that Austria-Hungary had to choose between two courses: that of considering the outrage at Serajevo an internal affair and inviting us to aid her in discovering and punishing the guilty; or, on the other hand, that of turning the tragedy of Serajevo into a case against Servians and Servia and even against the Southern-Slav movement (*jougo-Slave*). Judging from all that is being projected and all that is being done, it seems to me that Austria-Hungary will choose this second course. She will choose it, convinced that she will receive the approbation of Europe; why not profit by it to humiliate us and, up to a certain point, justify the Friedjung trial and that of Agram? Besides, she would justify to her own people and to Europe the severe reactionary measures she intends to take in the country in repressing the Pan-Servian propaganda and the Southern-Slav (*jougo-Slave*) idea. Finally, this Government believes that it will be doing something also for its own prestige, convinced that this will increase the esteem in which it is held both abroad and in the interior of the Monarchy.

“I think that the Austro-Hungarian Government will draw up a memorandum, or rather an indictment of Servia. In this document will be set forth all that has been gathered against us from April, 1909, to to-day, and I believe that it will be sufficiently long. This indictment the Government will send to the Cabinets of the European powers, adding that the facts therein set forth give Austria the right to make certain diplomatic representations at Belgrade, and to demand that Servia fulfill in the future all the obligations of a loyal neighbor. At the same time the Government of Vienna will send a note to us also, in which will be rehearsed all that the Dual Monarchy desires us, without question, to perform.” (July 15, S. B. B. no. 25.)

Even before this, on July 7, M. Jovanovitch, had sent a report of a similar tenor: “In this matter Austria-Hungary will have to choose between two solutions: either to regard the crime of Serajevo as a national misfortune and a criminal act which must be adjudged according to established proof, the assistance of Servia being sought in this task, that the guilty may in no way escape the severest punishment; or else to make of the outrage at Serajevo a Pan-Servian, Southern-Slav (*jougo-Slave*), Pan-Slav conspiracy, with every manifestation of hate on the part of Austria-Hungary toward everything Slav, — hate which up to this time has been dissembled. There are several indications that those competent to act in the matter are being pressed toward this second solution, and it is for that reason that it is necessary to be prepared for defense. In case the first solution should be adopted, we ought to rally to it completely.” (Extract, July 7, S. B. B. no. 17.)

Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austrian Government had not been unavailing and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting state need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the Austrian note (ultimatum) was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had, indeed, Sir Maurice says, confided to him the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time they were speaking.¹

¹ This hardly seems in agreement with the following consular report, which the French Ambassador at Vienna stated (July 19) was "drawn from a source which commands consideration" (F. Y. B. no. 13): —

VIENNA, July 20, 1914.

"I hear from a personage, who is specially well informed with regard to official news, that the French Government would be wrong in heeding the optimism-mongers. Much will be demanded of Servia. The dissolution of several societies engaged in national propaganda will be forced upon her. She will be called upon to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in collaboration with Austrian commissaries, to police her schools with reference to anti-Austrian feeling, and it is really difficult for a Government to agree to act as policeman for a foreign Government. The shifts by which Servia will no doubt wish to delay a direct and clear reply have been taken into account, and that is why a brief delay will be fixed for her to notify her acceptance or refusal. The tenor of the note and its imperative air make it almost certain that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will follow.

"There is here, as in Berlin, a clan which accepts the idea of a conflict on a general scale — in other words, a conflagration. The governing idea probably is that it is necessary to start before Russia can have finished the great improvement of her army and of her railways, and before France has overhauled her military organization.

"But here there is not agreement in high circles. Count Berchtold and the diplomats want at most a localized operation against Servia, but everything has to be considered possible — everything. I have been struck by a curious fact. Generally, the official telegraph agency, in its summaries of the views of the foreign press, disregards all but the official newspapers and the more important organs; it omits all quotations and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. For the last ten days the official agency has daily supplied to the press of Austria-Hungary a complete review of the whole

‘So little had the Russian Ambassador to Vienna been made aware of what was preparing, that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight’s leave of absence about the 20th of July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh

Servian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest and most insignificant newspapers, who, owing to their very insignificance, use language which is freer, more daring, more aggressive, and frequently insulting. The object of this work of the official agency is evidently to arouse opinion, to create an opinion favorable to war. The fact is significant.” (F. Y. B. no. 14.)

On July 14, M. Pashitch, Prime Minister of Servia, sent a telegram to the Servian legations explaining this activity of the Austrian Correspondence Bureau, in stirring up animosity against Servia, by the dissemination of reports of articles published in the Servian press. The dispatch closes with the remark: “No one in Europe would know anything of what our own newspapers print, if the Correspondence Bureau of Vienna did not give it wide circulation for the purpose of injuring Servia.” (Extract, July 14, S. B. B. no. 20.)

Only two days after the assassination, M. Jovanovitch, Servian Minister at Vienna, had sent the following warning to the Servian Government: “More and more evident is the tendency in Vienna to give Europe the impression that the outrage committed against the hereditary Archduke of Austria-Hungary is the outcome of a conspiracy hatched in Servia. It is their intention to use it as a political means against us. It is necessary, therefore, to guard with the greatest care the language of our newspapers about the affair at Serajevo.” (June 30, S. B. B. no. 2.)

As early as July 11, the French Consul at Budapest informed his Government: —

“Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the mass of the public believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have told me that they know that every day guns and ammunition have been sent in large quantities to the frontier. True or not true, this rumor has been reported to me from various quarters with corroborative details. It shows, at any rate, the nature of the general preoccupations. The Government, whether it be seriously desirous of peace or whether it be *preparing a coup*, is now doing everything it can to allay this anxiety. That is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered first by one note and then by two, until now it has become almost optimistic. But the Government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the alarm. Their optimism to order is really without an echo. The nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer one cannot neglect, is a sure proof of that. Stocks, without exception, have fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian 4 per cent was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a price which has never been quoted since the first issue.” (F. Y. B. no. 11; cf. S. B. B. no. 22.)

complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact His Excellency was left completely in the dark.¹ As for Sir Maurice de Bunsen himself, no indication was given him by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that he received on the 15th of July the forecast of what was about to happen, which he telegraphed to his Government the following day.² It is true that during all this time the *Neue Freie Presse* and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia.³ The official *Fremdenblatt*, however, was more

¹ Cf. B. W. P. no. 38.

² It is to be regretted that no mention of this dispatch of the 16th is found in the British White Paper. It would be interesting to know what warning Sir Maurice gave his Government. The omission of the dispatch leaves the reader with the impression that Downing Street (British Foreign Office) had received no information of the forthcoming note to Servia.

³ The London *Times* of July 23 published a dispatch of July 22 from their Vienna correspondent, that 'contrary to expectation, Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, did not answer that evening Count Andrassy's interpellation on the Austro-Servian situation, stating, before the interpellation was brought, he was unable for the time being to reply to it, not considering it in the interests of the country that the matter should be ventilated at that moment. Count Tisza's declaration, which was completely unexpected, was stated to have occasioned great surprise in parliamentary circles in Budapest. The day before, the Austrian funds fell below 79½, the lowest that Government stock had ever touched.' (Modified quotation.)

The *Times* correspondent further gave an account of two important articles which appeared in the Vienna newspapers that day, July 22: 'The first, which appeared in the *Neues Wiener Tageblatt*, read as though it were intended to prepare Servia for what the Austro-Hungarian note would demand of her. This journal, often in close touch with the Ballplatz, advised competent quarters in Belgrade to take steps that the points at issue between Austria and Servia might be placed in a proper light before the Servian people, since the "clarification of the relations of the two countries is absolutely necessary, and we admit that the process will not be a pleasure for Servia; for it will naturally entail a large sacrifice of *amour propre* and cannot fail to wound the exalted vanity of the adherents of the Greater Servia idea." Servia, the article continued, was possessed by an "incomprehensible megalomania," which made her strive to take rank with the great powers. She must, however, make up her mind, in spite of all her politicians and generals, "to remain a middle state." Empty promises, Servia was warned, would not suffice this time, and the article concluded: "The demands which our Government will make are not as yet known, but when they are presented,

cautious, and, till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among the members of the diplomatic corps was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.' (Modified quotation, September 1, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.)

We learn from the report which the Servian Minister at Vienna sent to his Government on July 20, that he was expecting a war. He stated: —

"It is very difficult, almost impossible, to get hold of anything definite here in regard to the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. The watchword in regard to everything that is going on is absolute secrecy. To judge from what our newspapers write, Belgrade is optimistic in regard to our relations with Austria-Hungary. But it is not possible to be optimistic. There is no doubt that Austria-Hungary meditates something serious. What is most to be feared and what is very likely is that she meditates war against Servia. The general conviction here is that for Austria-Hungary once again to take no action against Servia would be equivalent to suicide. Moreover, the idea that Servia, after two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war undertaken against her would be nothing more than an expedition ending in prompt occupation, has taken still deeper root. It is believed also that such a war would be over before Europe could intervene.

Servia will certainly feel that it is not her fate to become a great power at our expense, and that she has already reached the utmost limits of her growth. . . . We are very desirous that the necessary discussion which is impending may find public opinion in Servia in a state of mind to understand all this."

"The other article was published in the *Reichspost*, and was of interest inasmuch as it summed up some of the arguments adduced in quarters which demanded the adoption by the Monarchy of a very energetic attitude in Belgrade. These were briefly that "the acceptance of anything short of an unconditional guarantee for the maintenance of order on the southern frontier of the Monarchy" would be regarded as a sign of weakness, not only by Servia, but also by the adversaries and the friends of Austria-Hungary in Europe. In other words, this opportunity must be taken to demonstrate to the world the strength of Austria-Hungary as a great power.' (Modified quotation, London *Times*, July 23, 1914.)

“Military preparations, which are being made especially on the Servian frontier, are a proof that the intentions of Austria are serious.” (July 20, S. B. B. no. 31.)

On July 23, the very day on which the Austrian note was presented, the Austrian Ambassador at London gave Sir Edward Grey to understand that he would give him next day a paper which would ‘include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.’¹

To this Sir Edward replied that he would not ‘make any comment until he had an official communication, and it seemed to him probably a matter on which he should not be able to make any comment on first sight.’ But when the Ambassador added that ‘he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, Sir Edward regretted it very much. To begin with, because a time limit might inflame opinion in Russia, it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time even if after a few days it should appear that, by giving more time, there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. Sir Edward admitted that, if there were no time limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but he urged that a time limit could always be introduced afterward; and if the demands were made without a time limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited. After a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong, it might be found that the Russian Government would be disposed to use its influence in favor of securing a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

‘The Austrian Ambassador replied that if Servia, in the

¹ Cf. F. Y. B. no. 74, enclosure. This material, with several important annexes, is given in the Austrian Red Book, no. 19.

interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry on her own territory, all this complication might have been avoided.¹

¹ The Austrian Councillor of Legation at Belgrade, on the second day (June 30) following the tragedy, 'directed to the General Secretary of the Servian Foreign Office, M. Gruic, the very pertinent inquiry as to what measures the Servian police had taken or contemplated taking in order to follow the threads of the assassination, which notoriously led over into Servia.

'M. Gruic's reply was that the Servian police had, as a matter of fact, given the matter no consideration.' (Modified quotation, June 30, A. R. B. no. 2.)

In his dispatch of July 23, Count Berchtold instructed the Austrian Ambassador at London to point out to Sir Edward Grey when he communicated the Austrian Circular Note on the 24th instant that "Servia would have had it in her power to ward off the vigorous action which we must have been expected to take if she had spontaneously on her own account taken the necessary steps to establish an investigation on Servian territory against the Servian participants in the assassination of June 28, and to investigate the clues which, in connection with the assassination, have been proved to lead from Belgrade to Serajevo.

"The Servian Government has till to-day, despite the fact that a number of notoriously familiar indications point toward Belgrade, not only undertaken nothing in this matter, but it has rather sought to wipe out the traces at hand.

"Thus it can be gathered from a telegraphic report of our [the Austrian] Embassy at Belgrade that the Servian State official Ciganovic, who has been compromised by the common testimony of the assassins, still sojourned in Belgrade on the day of the assassination, but that three days thereafter, when his name was mentioned in the newspapers, he had already quitted the city. It is well known, too, that the Servian Chief of the Press has already declared that Ciganovitch is utterly unknown in Belgrade." (Extract, June 23, A. R. B. no. 9.)

M. Pashitch, the Servian Prime Minister, in a telegram of July 19, to the Servian Missions abroad, stated:—

"From the beginning the Servian Government has declared itself ready to bring before the courts of justice every Servian subject shown to have taken part in the outrage of Serajevo. Furthermore, the Government has declared that it had prepared a bill to render more efficacious the measures already taken against any misuse of explosives. This bill had already been submitted to the Council of State, but could not be presented to the Skoupchtina, that body having been dissolved. Finally, the Servian Government has declared that it is ready, in the future as in the past, to fulfill all those neighborly duties devolving upon it as a European state.

"Since the outrage was committed, the Austro-Hungarian Government has at no time addressed itself to the Servian Government for the purpose of securing its concurrent action in regard to the matter of the outrage. It has not demanded that one of the accomplices be subjected to a preliminary

In 1909, Serbia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighborhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise. She had stirred up agitation, the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and had made it absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

‘Sir Edward Grey said that he would not comment upon or criticize what the Austrian Ambassador had told him that afternoon, but he could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to him, not only by the French and Russian Ambassadors, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to him that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation.¹ He had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands, and how strong the

examination or be brought to trial. Once only it asked for particulars in regard to the present address of some students who had been expelled from the primary normal school of Pakrac and who had come to Serbia to continue their studies. All the information on this subject which could be gathered was forwarded to the Austrian Government.

“Nevertheless, the campaign against Serbia is continued in the Austro-Hungarian press and public opinion against Serbia is being excited in Austria-Hungary and in Europe. . . . We shall welcome the claims of Austria-Hungary in case she may demand that certain accomplices in Serbia — should any such be found — be brought before our own independent courts to receive judgment.” (Extract, July 19, S. B. B. no. 30.)

Serbia’s action in not instituting any investigation was, under the circumstances, not merely discourteous to Austria, but really insulting. When, on July 4, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris transmitted to M. Poincaré the thanks of his Government for his sympathy at the tragic bereavement of the imperial house, the president of the Republic had ‘expressed the conviction that the Servian Government would come to meet Austria with the greatest possible degree of conciliation in respect to the judicial investigation and prosecution of those found to be accomplices. No state could, he said, evade such a duty.’ (Modified quotation, July 4, A. R. B. no. 4.)

¹ It may perhaps seem somewhat far-fetched to remark that the words of the French and Russian Ambassadors, being members of the Triple *Entente*, would not, of course, have seemed to the Austrian representative so significant as this veiled hint at apprehension on the part of the German Ambassador, who is easily understood as included among “others.” (See B. W. P. no. 11.)

justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great powers of Europe, say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany, were engaged in war, it seemed to him that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial states, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

‘The Austrian Ambassador did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but said that all would depend upon Russia.

‘Sir Edward made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as the present, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. He hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

‘The Austrian Ambassador said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favorable recently.’ (Modified quotations, July 23, B. W. P. no. 3.)

The next day, July 24, the Austrian Government communicated the contents of their note and the reasons for its presentation.¹

‘The note was also published in the Vienna newspapers the same day, and by common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum.’² (Modified quotation, B. W. P.,

¹ The texts of the Austrian note of July 23, and the Servian reply of July 25, will be found among the Documents; see *post*, chap. XIII.

² The effect of an ultimatum is to put an end to discussion by the offering of final terms to be accepted or rejected.

Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) The Austrian note to Serbia began as follows: "On the 31st of March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government: —

"“Serbia recognizes that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the great powers Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last Autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter.” (Extract, July 24, B. W. P. no. 4; cf. A. R. B. no. 8.)

In diplomatic parlance this statement, referred to at the beginning of the Austrian note, was equivalent to an agreement to abandon any active support of the Pan-Serb propaganda, and not to permit the Servian territory to be made use of for any such purpose; but this engagement was taken before the Balkan War had added so materially to the strength of the Servian state and before the hearts of her people had been embittered by Austria and Italy's blocking their access to the sea by way of the Albanian coast. Russia objected that this agreement by Serbia was made "in deference to the advice of the great powers" and was not given to Austria alone. Consequently, its enforcement should likewise have been considered a concern of all the powers. There is much truth in this remark. Besides, every Balkan question has always been looked upon as of general concern.

The Austrian note or ultimatum then went on to complain that Serbia had not carried out this undertaking formally entered into, and had made it necessary for

Austria put an end to the intrigues which menaced her tranquillity by demanding a formal assurance from Serbia. To this effect the Austro-Hungarian Government insisted upon imposing the terms in which Serbia should make an official and most public condemnation of the propaganda complained of, and express regret at its ghastly consequences. In addition the note formulated ten demands. Serbia was required to answer by six o'clock of Saturday evening, July 25, only two days after its presentation. To the note was attached a memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo in as far as it related to the complicity of the Servian officials mentioned in the demands.

The memorandum explaining the complicity of the Servian officials seems to have been a mere statement of what the Austrian officials considered to be the facts which, if adequately supported by copies of depositions, etc., would have borne out the statements of the note. In other words, it added nothing to the say-so of the Austrian Government, which was submitted in writing to the Servian Government to be accepted as true and acted upon within forty-eight hours, without its being furnished with anything worthy of the name of proof in the broadest sense of the word.¹

In communicating this note to the powers, Austria accompanied it with explanations of the nature of the

¹ When M. Sazonof asked the Austrian Ambassador to explain whether or not it had been proved that the series of outrages he mentioned originated in Belgrade, the latter emphasized the fact that they were the result of Servian instigation. (A. R. B. no. 14.)

In a note of July 1, sent to all the Servian representatives, the Servian Prime Minister, M. Pashitch had defended his Government from such an imputation: "At the moment when Serbia was making every effort to bring about better and more friendly relations with her neighbor, the Monarchy, it would be absurd to think that, either directly or indirectly, she could have inspired such acts. On the contrary, it was to the vital interest of Serbia herself that this crime should not have taken place. Unfortunately that was a matter beyond her power, the two authors of the outrage being Austrian subjects." (Extract, July 1, S. B. B. no. 8.)

Servian propaganda of which she complained. It was stated that 'the Servian Government had failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of March 31, 1909, and had acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary. The British Government was informed that the Austrian Government held at its disposal a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th of June.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 4. Cf. F. Y. B. no. 75, Annex; A. R. B. no. 19.)

Sir Edward Grey remarked to the Austrian Ambassador that it seemed a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time he had never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character. Demand number 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia. 'Sir Edward added that he felt great apprehension, and that he would concern himself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not, he said, the concern of the British Government, and such comments as he had previously made had not been made in order to discuss those merits.

'He ended by saying that doubtless the British Government would enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that he must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 5.)

In the absence of the Russian Ambassador the Russian Chargé at Vienna called upon Count Berchtold the morning after the note was presented, before there had been time for instructions from St. Petersburg to arrive, and told him 'as his own personal view, that the Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 7; cf. B. W. P. nos. 17, 32.)

The Servian Government informed the British representative that 'they considered the Austrian demands absolutely unacceptable.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 8; cf. S. B. B. no. 35; R. O. P. nos. 1, 6.)

The experienced diplomat, M. Paul Cambon, thought 'the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10; cf. B. W. P. no. 16.)

'In a long conversation with the Austrian Ambassador on July 26, M. Sazonof pointed out how some of the demands were absolutely inexecutable, even in case the Servian Government should declare its willingness to ac-

¹ "Until Austrian diplomacy emerged into publicity with the ultimatum to Servia on July 23, the Dual Monarchy appeared to have strong claims on neutral sympathy. Continued hostile agitation in Servia; alleged intrigues in Austria's Slav provinces; pledges of more neighborly behavior repeatedly broken; finally, the murder of the successor to the throne, through a conspiracy asserted to have been framed in the Servian capital and to have been abetted by Servian officials — these were indeed grievances. Neutral sympathy was sensibly lessened by the far-reaching demands formulated in the Austrian ultimatum, and even more by the unusual and peremptory tone of this undiplomatic communication. From the diplomatic point of view, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was quite justified in saying that its form was 'scarcely clever' (*peu habile*). (Russian Orange Paper, no. 25.) Even the German Secretary of State confessed that 'the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document.' (British Blue Book, no. 18.) Neutral sympathy began to shift to the other side in consequence of Servia's unexpectedly conciliatory reply and Austria's refusal to recognize Servia's concessions as a possible basis for negotiation or mediation. Instead of turning away wrath, Servia's soft answer elicited a declaration of war." (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy *versus* Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx, [1915] no. 1, pp. 55-56.)

cept them.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 25; cf. B. W. P. no. 44.)

The Russian Ambassador, after his return to Vienna, told Count Berchtold that 'they were absolutely unacceptable by any independent state, no matter how small.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. O. P. no. 41; R. O. P. no. 77.) Even the German Secretary of State 'admitted that the Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18.) In fact the Secretary 'confessed privately he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document and he repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of the note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18; see also B. W. P. no. 25.)

Russia's official protest, dated the 24th, was directed 'against the note's leaving a period to the powers quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that had arisen. A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would, the Russian Government said, render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 13; cf. R. O. P. no. 4.)

Previously to the presentation of the note the Austrian Ambassador at London had, as was said above, admitted that the Austrian note 'would have something in the nature of a time limit which was in effect akin to an ultimatum.' (Cf. B. W. P. no. 3.) But two days later 'he was authorized to explain to Sir Edward Grey that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit, the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and

begin military preparations, not operations.’¹ Sir Edward Grey, with evident satisfaction at this characterization of the note, instructed the British representatives at Paris and St. Petersburg, ‘in case the Austrian Government had not there given the same information, to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; as it made the immediate situation rather less acute.’ (Modified quotations, July 25, B. W. P. no. 14; cf. B. W. P. nos. 25, 26; F. Y. B. no. 36; R. O. P. no. 16.) That same day the report came back from Paris that the ‘French Government had not yet received such an explanation from the Austrian Government, while at the Russian capital M. Sazonof told the British Ambassador the explanations of the Austrian Government did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters.’² (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. nos. 15, 17.)

¹ According to the Austrian Red Book this information was given to Sir Edward Grey in confidence. This would look as though the Austrians expected England to remain quiet while they derived the full benefit of their unjustifiable *coup*. Such a course on England’s part would not have been loyal. Count Berchtold’s instructions to the Austrian Ambassador at London, in his telegram of July 24, were:—

“Try to make it clear at once to Sir Edward Grey that our *démarche* of yesterday in Belgrade is not to be regarded as a formal ultimatum, but that it is a matter of a *démarche* with a term of grace (delay), which, as Your Excellency will communicate in strictest confidence to Sir Edward Grey, — in case the term of grace expires without result, — will be followed for the time being only by a severance of diplomatic relations and by the beginning of necessary military preparations, since we are absolutely determined to carry out our justified demands.

“Your Excellency is authorized to add that certainly if Servia, after the expiration of the term of grace, will yield only under pressure of our military preparation, we must hold it to account for the costs that have accrued to us. As is well known, we were twice [1908 and 1912] obliged to mobilize on account of Servia.” (July 24, A. R. B. no. 17.)

² When the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs asked the German Ambassador “whether the Austrian note bore the character of a mere *mise en demeure* for allowing of discussion or of an ultimatum, the latter replied that he had no personal view on this point.” (Extract, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 28; cf. R. O. P. no. 18.) All this discussion as to whether the Austrian note was a *démarche* (that is, a simple presentation of views with a request added for an answer) with a time limit, or an ultimatum, is of real importance because it indicates that the Austrian Government was either

What are we to think of this discrepancy? Was Austria trying to deceive England for the purpose of arresting her efforts toward diplomatic intervention, or did she wish to offer to Sir Edward Grey an explanation which might assist the British Government to quiet public opinion and resist being drawn in? In any event, in the light of subsequent events, it would seem to show either an inefficient system of diplomacy and double currents in the Government, or an attempt to steal a march on the other powers and put them face to face with a *fait accompli* — a policy she had so successfully engineered in the case of the Bosnia-Herzegovina *coup*.

On the other hand, refreshingly frank is the statement of the German Secretary of State, Von Jagow, that 'he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18.)

'The general opinion in diplomatic circles at Vienna was undecided what its action would be or was trying to convey a different impression of its action at London than at the other capitals.

On July 11, several days before the Austrian note was presented, the French Consul-General at Budapest sent the following report to his Government: —

"Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Servian question, M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a *démarche* at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation.

"With regard to this *démarche* it seems that the word has been given to minimize its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word '*démarche*,' with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression '*pour parler*,' which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace." (Extract, July 11, F. Y. B. no. 11.)

that the Austro-Hungarian Government were determined on war, and that the Austro-Hungarian note had been so drawn up as to make war inevitable.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. nos. 40 and 41.)

2. Efforts of the powers to secure an extension of the time limit

The powers did not, however, lose much time in futile protests against the terms of the Austrian note, but employed all the means at their disposal toward preventing the actual outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Serbia. For they felt, as M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to London, said to Sir Edward Grey, that 'Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.' (Modified quotation, B. W. P. no. 10.)

As soon as the terms of the Austrian ultimatum were known, England, Russia, and France made every effort to secure an extension of the period of forty-eight hours which Austria had imposed as the time limit for the receipt of the Servian answer. While evincing a certain sympathy with Austria's difficulties, the powers besought her to extend the time limit. At St. Petersburg, the British Ambassador expressed to M. Sazonof the opinion 'that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring influence to bear on Austria with that end in view.' His colleague, the French Ambassador, did not agree with this, saying, 'either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, he considered the only chance of averting war was to adopt a firm and united attitude. There was not, he thought, time to carry out the British Ambassador's suggestion.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6.)

On the same date, probably just after that conversation, M. Sazonof telegraphed the Russian Chargé at Vienna

instructions to present the following vigorous protest: 'The communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum to Belgrade leaves to the powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening out of the complications that have arisen. To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all the powers, which may result from the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us above all indispensable that the delay allowed Serbia to reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, in declaring herself disposed to inform the powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government bases its accusations, should at least give them the time to consider them. If after such consideration the powers should be convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. A refusal to extend the period of the ultimatum would render worthless the step taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government in regard to the powers and would be contrary to the basic principles governing international relations.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 13; July 24, R. O. P. no. 4; cf. A. R. B. no. 21.) In communicating this protest to the powers, Russia expressed the hope that similar instructions might be given their representatives at Vienna.

The Russian note sets forth plainly that such an insufficient interval allowed no time for the powers to consider the reasonableness of the Austrian complaint, and so was nugatory of the very purpose of the explanations offered, and contrary to the basic principles of international relations.

Von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, upon receipt, at 10 o'clock in the morning of July 25, of a telegram from the German Ambassador at London, 'immediately instructed the German Ambassador at Vi-

enna to "pass on" to the Austrian Government Sir Edward Grey's suggestion to secure an extension of the time limit,' but, due to the unfortunate absence of Count Berchtold at Ischl, 'there would, he thought, be delay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18; R. O. P. no. 14.)

The Russian Chargé at Vienna, 'seeing the impossibility of arriving at Ischl in time, telegraphed the proposal to extend the delay of the ultimatum' (modified quotation, July 25, R. O. P. no. 11) and received from the Austrian Government an answer refusing to do so.¹ (July 25, R. O. P. no. 12.)

The Italian Ambassador had been given instructions to support the Russian request, but they arrived too late. (July 27, B. W. P. no. 40.) The French Ambassador received similar instructions, so that both at Vienna and at Berlin every effort of diplomacy was made without avail to secure an extension.

After the failure of this effort, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna thought it was useless to press further for an extension of the time limit.² (July 26, B. W. P. no. 40.)

¹ 'Count Berchtold telegraphed Baron von Macchio, the Department Chief of the Austrian Foreign Office, instructions to answer the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in his name that Austria could not agree to an extension of the time limit. Baron von Macchio was further directed to add that Serbia could reach a peaceful solution, even after the breaking-off of diplomatic relations, by unreservedly accepting the Austrian demands, but that the Austrian Government would be constrained in such case to demand from Serbia indemnification for all the expenses and damages forced upon them through the undertaking of military measures.' (Modified quotation, July 25, A. R. B. no. 20; cf. A. R. B. no. 17.)

² An explanation of the attitude of the Austrian Government is found in Count Berchtold's dispatch of July 25 to Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg:—

"For Your Excellency's information and for the regulation of your remarks.

"The Russian Chargé d'Affaires appeared this morning before the First Department Chief in order to express in the name of his Government the wish that the time limit set in our note to Serbia be extended.

"This request was made because it was said that the powers had been surprised by our step and that the Russian Government would consider it a

3. *The powers influence Serbia to make a conciliatory reply*

The powers could hardly have had much hope of the success of their request for an extension of the time limit, and as soon as it was certain that Austria would refuse, another effort was made to prevail upon Austria to delay recourse to hostilities after the expiration of the time limit, and the receipt of Serbia's reply. (B. W. P. nos. 10 and 11.) It was evident, however, that Austrian action would depend in great measure upon the nature of the Servian reply. Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, when he handed the ultimatum to the Servian Minister, had 'added verbally that in case the note should not be accepted in its entirety within a delay of forty-eight hours, he had orders to leave Belgrade with the staff of the Legation.' (Modified quotation, July 23, R. O. P. no. 1.)

The Italian Secretary-General thought 'Austria would only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance of her note by the Servian Government.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 19.)

The only chance appeared, then, 'to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal, and prevailing upon Serbia to reply favorably to as many points as the time limit allowed.' (Modi-

natural token of consideration from the Vienna Cabinet toward the other Cabinets if the latter should be given an opportunity to study the grounds of our announcement to the powers and our *dossier* on the subject.

"The First Department Chief replied to the Chargé d'Affaires that he would bring his statements immediately to my knowledge, but could tell him even then that there was no hope of the granting of a longer time on our part. As for the reasons stated by the Russian Government for its request, he said that they apparently were based on mistaken assumptions. Our note to the powers was not intended to invite them to make known their objective conception of it, but partook merely of the nature of an announcement which we had considered a duty imposed on us by international courtesy. Moreover, we looked upon our action as a matter concerning only ourselves and Serbia, to which we had been forced, in spite of the patience and forbearance evinced by us for years, by the development of the situation which necessitated our defending our most vital interests much against our will." (July 25, A. R. B. no. 21.)

fied quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 12.) Accordingly, the British and French representatives at Belgrade were instructed to use their influence with the Servian Government to work for such a result. (B. W. P. nos. 12 and 15; cf. A. R. B. no. 13.) Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, had declared that 'Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Servia could give an unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, he had suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia; he counseled that a reply favorable on some points be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 11.)

It is of interest to learn, in Sir Edward Grey's instructions to the British representative at Belgrade, his opinion that 'Servia ought to promise that, if it was proved that Servian officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she would give Austria the fullest satisfaction and that she certainly ought to express concern and regret. Although the Servian Minister at London had begged the British Government to express their views, Sir Edward was not willing to incur the responsibility of saying more and did not like to say even that, without knowing what was being said at Belgrade by the French and Russian Governments. Accordingly, he directed the British representative to consult his French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what his views were, as expressed above, to the Servian Government.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 12.)

The same day, July 24, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in a conference with M. Sazonof and the French Ambassador, said that 'it seemed desirable to know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on that

point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6.)

The situation was difficult, for it was probable that a revolution would have broken out in Servia if the 'Government were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 16.) The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had truly remarked that 'no independent state could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.)

The attitude of Servia was most tractable; the Prince Regent telegraphed the Tsar: "We are ready to accept the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the situation of an independent state, as well as those the acceptance of which may be advised by Your Majesty." (Extract, July 24, R. O. P. no. 6.)

4. *Servia's reply*¹

Saturday afternoon, July 25, at 5.58 P.M., only two minutes before the expiration of the time limit (cf. A. R. B. no. 24), the Servian Government handed to the Austrian Minister at Belgrade their answer to the harsh terms of the Austrian ultimatum. The Servian reply accepted the greater part of what Austria demanded, and offered, 'in case the Austrian Government should not be satisfied with their answer, to refer the question to the Hague Tribunal or to the mediation of the great powers that had taken part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian

¹ To bring the emphasis in the right place, to economize space, and spare the reader unnecessary effort, the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, and the Austrian rejoinder or comment have been combined under this heading. The text of the Austrian note and Servian reply will be found among the Documents; see *post*, chap. XIII. No. 84 of the publications of the Association for International Conciliation gives a very interesting comparison of the original texts of the Austrian note and the Servian reply arranged in parallel columns with annotations.

Government March 31, 1909.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 39.)

In spite of the conciliatory nature of the Servian reply, the Austrian Government, nevertheless, considered it unsatisfactory and the Austrian Minister, accompanied by his staff, withdrew from Belgrade. (Cf. A. R. B. nos. 22, 24; S. B. B. no. 40.)

"As soon as it was known later that evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning." (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) To justify their stand, the Austrian Government published a detailed criticism of the Servian reply to show that it was insincere and only "a play for time."

The Servian Government in their reply began by stating that they were not conscious that any protests, such as were made in the national assembly and by the responsible representatives of the Government until cut short by the declaration of the Servian Government of March 31, 1909, had since been made against Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and against their continuance under the actual political and legal conditions which the annexation had created. They further pointed out that the Austrian Government had made no representations, except one concerning a school-book, which was explained to the satisfaction of the Austrian Government.

The Servian Government did not consider that they could be held responsible for the opinions expressed by pri-

¹ When the Servian Minister appealed to the French Foreign Office for advice, it was suggested that Serbia might seek "to escape from the direct clutch of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe." (F. Y. B. no. 26.) The Russian Chargé at Paris reported that 'when the Director of Political Affairs of the French Foreign Office communicated to the Austrian Ambassador the contents of the Servian reply, the latter did not conceal his astonishment that it had not satisfied the Austrian Minister at Belgrade.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 27.)

vate individuals, such as articles appearing in the press and in the ordinary peaceful proceedings and activities of societies, similar to what take place in nearly every country and which are not, as a general rule, subjected to official control.

The Servian Government further expressed pain and surprise at the assertion that citizens of Serbia were concerned in the perpetration of the Serajevo outrage. They declared that they had expected to coöperate in the investigation of the crime and that they were ready to proceed against all persons about whom communications might be addressed to them. In accordance with the wishes of the Austrian Government, the Servian Government expressed a willingness to turn over to the judicial authorities any individual, without regard to official position or rank, against whom any proof of complicity in the Serajevo outrage should be adduced. As for the official publication of the demanded apology, the Servian Government agreed to make, on the first page of their official publication, a statement including the following:—

“The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary; that is to say, all efforts designed ultimately to sever from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy any territory of which it is constituted, and sincerely regrets the sad consequences which have resulted from such criminal machinations.” (B. W. P. no. 39; G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 25; R. O. P. no. 13.)

The Austrian Government declared, in an official rejoinder to the Servian reply published in the German White Book, that no objection in regard to the action of the Servian Government or Servian officials had been raised by Austria, but that Serbia had been charged with disregarding the above-mentioned promise, in that she had not suppressed the unofficial agitation directed against the territorial integrity of Austria. Serbia was, according to the view of the Austrian Government, under an obligation to change her attitude and the entire trend of her policies

by entering into friendly and neighborly relations with Austria-Hungary — merely to refrain from interfering with Austrian control of Bosnia was not enough.

As for the activity of the Servian press and patriotic societies, the Austrian Government considered that the Government of Servia and other states exercised a certain control over the press and provided for the supervision of the organizations of individuals. The Servian Government were to blame for omitting altogether to exercise this supervision in so far as the action of the press and organizations disclosed a purpose hostile to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

As to the complicity of certain individuals in the Serejevo conspiracy, the Austrian Government declared that Servia's assertion was not correct, since the Government at Belgrade had been accurately informed of the suspicion attaching to certain specified individuals, so that it was not only able, but under an obligation under their own laws, voluntarily to institute an investigation, yet the Servian Government had taken no such action.

And as for the expression of regret to be officially published in the Official Journal and publicly announced as the order of the day to the army, the Austrian Government objected that the Servian formula lacked in sincerity and had altered the words of the Austrian note in such a manner as to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary did not really exist, so that later the Servian Government might use this as a subterfuge by saying that they had not condemned the existing propaganda or acknowledged it to be hostile to Austria. This would amount to a contention on the part of the Government that they were under no obligation to suppress in future any propaganda similar to that being carried on at present.

When we come to consider Austria's criticism of the Servian replies to the ten specific demands contained in

the Austrian ultimatum, we find similar quibbling on Austria's part.

First demand. Serbia agreed to pass laws prohibiting the publication in the press of articles inciting to hatred of the Dual Monarchy or directed against the territorial integrity of Austria. Serbia also agreed to amend her constitution so as to permit the enactment of the legislation necessary for the suppression of such publications. (Cf. R. O. P. no. 25; S. B. B. no. 30.)

Austria replied that she had demanded the suppression of every publication which incited to hatred and contempt for the Dual Monarchy, and which was intended to influence the taking of action directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy. Austria had asked the Servian Government to agree to enforce such provisions, whereas Serbia only offered to pass legislation with this end in view. The reply did not even indicate when such legislation would be passed, and a failure to do so would leave everything as it was, especially in the event of the resignation of the Government.

Second demand. The Servian Government declared they had no proof, nor did the Austrian note furnish any, that the members of the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies had been guilty of carrying on a propaganda against the Dual Monarchy, but the Servian Government agreed, nevertheless, to dissolve the society and any other which might direct its action against Austria. (Cf. S. B. B. no. 16.)

The comment of the Austrian Government on this was that it was impossible to accept Serbia's statement that she was unaware of the hostile propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies against Austria, since it permeated the entire political life of Serbia. Furthermore, what the Austrian Government had asked for was not only the dissolution of the societies mentioned, but also the confiscation of their means of propaganda, and the pre-

vention of the reorganization of the societies under other names to continue their activity.¹

Third demand. The Servian Government agreed, as soon as the proofs should be furnished by the Austrian Government, to eliminate without delay from the public instruction in the schools any passages in the textbooks which might be considered as likely to foment the propaganda against Austria.

The Austrian Government objected that Serbia was well aware that the textbooks used in the schools contained objectionable matter. The reply also ignored the essential demand for the dismissal of those teachers engaged in carrying on the propaganda complained of, a large proportion of the teachers, according to Austria's statement, being found in the ranks of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies.

Fourth demand. The Austrian Government had demanded that Serbia dismiss from her army and the governmental employ in general all officers and officials found to be guilty of taking part in the propaganda, the Austrian Government communicating their names and the evidence relating to such complicity.

The Servian Government agreed to do so in the case of those officers and officials whose guilt should be established

¹ See extract from article in the *Outlook*, by Theodor Constantin Dumba, Ambassador of Austria-Hungary to the United States, August 29, 1914, in which he explains how this very thing had occurred in his own experience when Minister at Belgrade.

The Austrian memorandum (A. R. B. no. 19; F. Y. B. no. 75, Annex; see *posi*, chap. XIII; cf. B. W. P. no. 9) to the powers contains a very interesting and specific account of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana which seems to show clearly the insincerity of the Servian answer on this head. Nevertheless, can any instance be found where one Government has answered the ultimatum of another by confessing its fault? However much we may sympathize with Austria in her efforts to resist dissolution, we cannot blame the Serbs for carrying on an active propaganda to incorporate their brothers in a Greater Serbia. When M. Sazonof was discussing the Austrian demands with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, he "spoke with utmost vigor against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana which Serbia would never undertake." (July 24, A. R. B. no. 14.)

as a result of a judicial investigation, assisted by Austria's communication of the names of the officers and officials and the evidence against them.

But again the Austrian Government objected that Serbia agreed to dismiss only those officers found guilty by judicial procedure, which would limit the application to those cases where a statutory crime was charged, whereas the propaganda complained of was not punishable under Servian law. Austria might also have objected that Serbia had ignored that part of the fourth demand in which the Austrian Government communicated to the Servian Government the names of the officers and officials who were to be dismissed. To accept this demand would have been equivalent to agreeing that Austria herself should have the right to specify the names of the Servian officers and officials to be dismissed as objectionable to Austria. Of course, Serbia could not have allowed that. The acceptance and putting into effect of such a demand would make the tenure of every position under the Government, whether civil or military, dependent upon Austrian favor. It would have resulted in placing the political control of Serbia in Austrian hands and Serbia would have become henceforth a political dependency of the Dual Monarchy. The Austrian reply — can it be from shame? — passes over the failure to comply with this part of its original demand.¹

Fifth demand. Austria's fifth demand was that Serbia accept in Serbia the collaboration of agents (*des organes*) of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy.

Servia replied that she did not understand exactly the meaning of the terms employed, but that she was ready to accept such collaboration as should conform to the princi-

¹ M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, made this demand one of the grounds for his objection to the Austrian note. (Cf. A. R. B. no. 31.)

ples of international law and criminal procedure, and help to promote good neighborly relations.

The Austrian rejoinder declared that the question in no way concerned international law and criminal procedure, but related purely to the exercise of the police powers of the state and might properly be settled by special agreement.¹

Sixth demand. The sixth demand was to take judicial proceedings (*enquête judiciaire*) against the accessories to the conspiracy of June 28, found on Servian territory, and to permit representatives (*des organes délégués*) of the Austro-Hungarian Government to take part in the investigation (*recherches*) relating thereto.

¹ 'Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador, admitted to Sir Edward Grey that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had, he said, refused the one thing — the coöperation of Austrian officials and police — which would be a real guaranty that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 48.) It is probably in reference to this same demand that the German memorandum says: ". . . The Servian Government made a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor, through procrastination and new negotiations, to escape from the just demands of the Monarchy, . . ." (G. W. B. p. 5.) Sir Edward Grey's opinion of the fifth demand has been given already. M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, said to the German Secretary of State: ". . . If Peter I [of Servia] humiliates himself, Servia will probably be given over to internal troubles." (July 24, F. Y. B. no. 30.) M. Sazonof told the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that 'the putting into effect of the fourth and fifth demands might result disastrously and lead even to the attempted assassination of members of the royal family and the Premier, M. Pashitch.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 25; cf. A. R. B. nos. 10, 11.)

Count Berchtold's telegram of July 25, to the Austrian Ambassador covers this point: "Since Point 5 of our demands, concerning the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in stamping out the subversive movement in Servia, has aroused special objections from M. Sazonof, will Your Excellency express yourself confidentially in strong terms on this point to the effect that the inclusion of this point was due solely to practical considerations and in no way owing to any contemplated impairment of the sovereignty of Servia. In Point 5 we had in mind a 'collaboration' in the establishment of a secret *bureau de sûreté* at Belgrade, to work along the lines of the similar Russian organizations in Paris, and coöperate with the Servian police and administration officials." (July 25, A. R. B. no. 27.)

In reply, Serbia declared that she considered it her duty to take proceedings against all those who were involved in the conspiracy of June 28, but that she could not permit the participation of Austrian agents or officials specially delegated by the Austrian Government; as it would be a violation of her constitution, and of her legislation relative to criminal procedure. Serbia considered, however, that in certain cases the results of the investigation might be communicated to the agents of the Austrian Government.

Austria thereupon explained that her demands, clear and unmistakable, had been: —

1. That Serbia institute criminal proceedings against those concerned in the outrage;
2. That she allow the participation of Austrian officials in the preliminary examinations (*recherche*) and not in the judicial investigation (*enquête judiciaire*), it never having entered the mind of the Austro-Hungarian Government that its officials would participate in the proceedings before the Servian tribunal. Their coöperation was intended to be limited to the preliminary examination for the purpose of discovering and preparing the material for the investigation.

The Austrian rejoinder accused the Servian Government of having deliberately misunderstood the Austrian demand, and of having ignored the clear distinction between court proceedings in the nature of a trial (*enquête judiciaire*) and a simple preliminary examination conducted by the police. The rejoinder considered that the purpose of this insincerity on Serbia's part was to grasp the only plausible excuse that she could find for refusing the coöperation of the Austrian officials,¹ in order to get rid of any check upon the honesty of the investigation,

¹ The Austrian comment states, "precedents for such police intervention exist in great number." Cf. the statement of Vice-Consul Fischerauer, note, p. 76, and the case of the Maine. See *post*, chap. XIII. See also Ernest Ludwig, *Austria-Hungary and the War*, pp. 64-71.

which would, if properly pursued, have led to disclosures that the Servian Government was most anxious to avoid.

To the impartial observer, however, it does not seem surprising, in view of Austria's third, fourth, and fifth demands, that Servia should misunderstand Austria's intent in asking permission to participate in the action taken against the accessories to the assassination. The participation which the Servian answer understood, though denied in the Austrian rejoinder as that intended, would seem to interfere less with the independence of Servia than did the third demand relating to the dismissal of Servian teachers in the schools. For the investigation of the conspiracy in question was but a single incident which might soon be settled, whereas Austria, if the third and fourth demands were agreed to, might have renewed whenever she chose her demands for the dismissal of any official she objected to, until the entire Servian army and bureaucracy came under her control.¹ This is the significance of the statement made by the Servian Minister at London on the day the ultimatum was presented, that the Servian Government 'was perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the *terrain juridique*.² If the results of the inquiry at Serajevo — an inquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy — should disclose the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organizing plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would, he said, be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent state would, or could, submit to such dictation.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 30.)

¹ Lloyd George emphasized this in the extract from his speech placed among the Documents; see *post*, chap. XIII.

² That is, confined to considerations of a judicial nature.

Seventh demand. The seventh demand related to the arrest of the commander Tankositch and one Ciganovitch, in the employ of the Servian Government, and the Austrian rejoinder accused Servia of bad faith in shielding Ciganovitch by allowing him to escape, and then announcing that 'it had as yet been impossible to locate him.'¹

Eighth demand. The eighth demand related to the smuggling of arms and explosives across the Servian frontier, and the punishment of the officials who had aided the conspirators by permitting them to cross the frontier. Servia's reply, giving ample promises, seems to have been approved and is passed over without comment.

Ninth demand. The ninth demand is for explanations as to unwarranted expressions of hostility toward Austria on the part of certain high Servian officials since the Serajevo assassination.

The Servian Government expressed itself as ready to give the desired explanations in regard to any such remarks as should be brought to its attention by the Austrian Government, with proof of their having proceeded from Servian officials. The Servian Government on its own behalf promised to collect proof and press the conviction of any such officials.

Again the Austrian Government declared the Servian response to be insincere, since it was futile for the Servian Government to pretend it was not aware of the remarks in question. The requiring of proof by Austria was taken as indicating an intention not to comply with the demand.²

¹ Cf. the statement of the Servian Minister at London (B. W. P. no. 30).

² The London *Times* of July 20 publishes under the heading "GREATER SERBIA SCARE," the following from their Vienna correspondent:—

"The Press on both sides of the frontier is taking pains not to allow public interest in Austro-Servian relations to flag.

"To-day, considerable exception was taken by the newspapers of the Monarchy to various recent utterances from Servian official sources. These consist, on the one hand, of statements represented to have been made by M. Pashitch to a correspondent of the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* and hitherto not denied by the Servian Prime Minister, and, on the other hand,

Tenth demand. The tenth and last demand required Serbia to notify the Austrian Government without delay of the execution of the preceding demands, and, in as far as they were not already covered by her answer, the Servian Government agreed to notify the Austrian Government of the putting into effect of the measures in question as soon as accomplished.

The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'speaking of Austria's long official explanation of the grounds on which the Servian reply had been considered inadequate, told the British Ambassador he thought many points besides the explanation — such as a slight verbal difference in the sentence regarding the renunciation of the propaganda — quite childish.' ¹ (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 64.)

of two articles dealing with the 'Greater Servian' idea and the Serajevo crime which have appeared in the Servian Government organ *Samouprava*. Among other statements, M. Pashitch is represented to have said that Servians are so accustomed to see their compatriots in Hungary oppressed and treated in an unfriendly manner that they no longer grow excited about it. 'We do not participate in conspiracies, but we know that time is working for us.' Serbia wanted to be left alone, and, he added, she would not stand isolated if a Great Power attacked her.

"The *Samouprava* counters Austro-Hungarian complaints of a 'Greater Servian' propaganda by declaring that complaints of this kind would be much more justified if made by Serbia who finds herself perpetually face to face with a 'Greater Austrian' propaganda. A second article in the same journal affirmed that the origin of the Serajevo crime is to be found in the Monarchy itself, and denies that Belgrade is a fountain-head of assassinations.

"These utterances have called forth replies the tone of which is in some cases somewhat minatory. Thus the *Neue Freie Presse* declares that, as the remarks attributed to M. Pashitch are not denied, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade will have to ask for their exact text in order that proper steps may be taken to prevent the Minister from approving conspiracies directed against the Monarchy by saying that time is working for the attainment of aims for which the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was murdered.

"The *Reichpost* brands the utterances of the *Samouprava* as rank ingratitude for the present of the Sanjak made to Serbia by the Monarchy, and concludes its article by asking, 'Do our statesmen not yet realize what the position is, and what they have to do?'"

¹ Among the documents at the end of this volume will be found an Eng-

It is true that Serbia did not accept word for word the demands of the Austrian note, but she did go as far as was

lish view of the Austrian demands and the Servian reply, taken from the speech of Lloyd George of September 21. The Austrian view of Serbia's reply has been further explained in an extract of an article by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States, also to be found among the documents at the end of this volume.

The *New York Sun* of October 8, 1914, quotes Dr. Fritz Fischerauer, Austrian Vice-Consul, as saying: —

“By 1909, the two provinces [Bosnia and Herzegovina] had reached a level of culture and development which could not be duplicated on the Servian side of the frontier. Then came unexpected events in the wake of the Ottoman declaration of a constitutional order, which, as every one knows now, was but another name for a military dictatorship. Relying upon its nominal sovereignty rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Young Turk organization started a movement to recover the garden which Austria had made out of the former Turkish wilderness.

“For its own interests and those of civilization, Austria had to meet this movement with energetic action. This action took the form of annexation. But even in this apparently aggressive act the Dual Monarchy acted strictly on the defensive.

“The tragic climax to the Servian campaign of violence was reached on June 28 last, when the hand of a young Serb who had been led to believe he was performing a patriotic duty laid low the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort in Serajevo. The event convinced the Austrian Government that it must act with energy, and act at once, to check a subversive movement carried on from without its borders, which had degenerated into a campaign of assassination. It demanded that Serbia put an immediate stop to the agitation of the *Narodna Odbrana*, that it place the stamp of its formal disapproval upon the crime of Serajevo, and that it punish the authors of that revolting offense against civilization and comity.

“Austria did not impose any terms in its ultimatum which could be regarded as a blow at Servian sovereignty. There is even a parallel in history in which the rôles were reversed; when in 1861 Milos Obrenovic, then the reigning Prince of Servia, was assassinated in the Park of Topschider near Belgrade by the adherents of the present reigning family of Karageorgevich, the trail of the plot was traced to Hungary. The Hungarian Government at the time invited the Servian authorities for a coöperation of the Servian police in the investigation, and this coöperation actually took place in the police investigation on Hungarian territory.

“Another parallel is furnished by the case of William S. Benton, the Englishman who was murdered in Mexico last year. The British and the United States Governments demanded to be permitted to coöperate in the investigation in Mexico of that murder.

“Servia assented to all the other terms of the ultimatum, but in every instance evaded the basic admission of the charge that a crime had been committed against a neighboring state, and that it had been committed by a Servian nationalist organization having its central body in Belgrade. Aus-

possible for the government of any independent state, and evinced a most conciliatory spirit. Even admitting that she knew of the hostile remarks against Austria, and the anti-Austrian propaganda, she could hardly confess to them publicly in her answer to Austria, and make it possible for Austria both to disdain her reply and use the confession as an excuse for aggression. Such a confession, at most, concerned their past relations; what was important to the security of Austria was that Serbia should punish the conspirators and restrain in future any hostile propaganda of whatever nature or designation.

Every statesman in Europe would have admitted that Austria was justified in taking some action to protect herself against Serbia, whose Government was unwilling or unable to restrain a widespread and dangerous propaganda openly directed against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. Such action is nothing but the exercise of the right of a state to protect itself against potential aggression. At the same time every state owes it to the general interests of all the other states not to have recourse to force until every reasonable effort has been made to secure the desired result by peaceful means.¹ Austria referred to Serbia's violation of her promise of March 31, 1909, as indicating that her promises could not be relied upon, but

trian participation in the inquiry, Serbia denied by evasion. Now this clause in the ultimatum was a vital part of it. The Austrian authorities recalled that one of the men chiefly implicated in the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort had been quietly warned out of Serbia by the Servian police after the Austrians had requested his arrest."

¹ In the absence of any organized machinery for determining what constitutes international law and enforcing a respect therefor, it is of the utmost importance that the forms, ceremonies, and even courtesies of international intercourse be strictly observed. In the early history of legal development within each state, the necessity of an unswerving respect for legal forms was well understood. At the present time in the affairs of nations, the greatest protection against the abuse of force and disastrously precipitate action is a strict observance of the forms of procedure. Baron von Macchio, the Austrian General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was not correct in saying: "Interest was sometimes an excuse for not being courteous." (F. Y. B. no. 45.)

in the five years that had elapsed since Serbia had been obliged to make that promise, the whole Balkan situation had been completely changed as a result of the Balkan War. Since the national aims of Serbia and Austria's policy to preserve the political integrity of the Dual Monarchy were in conflict, it was necessary, for the maintenance of peace, either that the Servian Government should restrain the people, or that they should be arrested by the fear of Austria. Serbia's Government was powerless in the face of an all-pervading national enthusiasm for the Pan-Serb propaganda, and the fear of Austria was, to a certain degree, paralyzed by the reliance placed upon Russian support. If Austria would not rely on Serbia's promises, the only remaining possibility of preserving the peace lay in the calming influence of other powers. It may be said that the hope of Europe lay in the mediation of the less interested powers. The course of the subsequent events shows how Austria ignored this situation, and, trading on the sympathy of the world for whatever real grounds of complaint she might have, attempted to subjugate her weaker neighbor under the guise of exacting satisfaction.

It is quite possible that Serbia, advised, that is to say, directed, by the powers, might have been ready to give and live up to assurances adequate to satisfy the reasonable demands of Austria. If Austria, because of her peculiarly perilous situation, considered it impossible to discuss the question and to examine whether the proposed guaranties would not be adequate, we must conclude her action to be a confession that she was herself unable to live up to her international obligations.

5. Austria rejects Serbia's reply

Influenced by Russia (B. W. P. nos. 22 and 46), Serbia had met the advice of the powers more than halfway (B. W. P. nos. 21 and 30), and the powers of the *Entente* had been justified in feeling satisfied with their efforts and

in hoping that a reply so conciliatory would prove acceptable to Austria (cf. R. O. P. no. 33). 'Serbia's attitude had been such as to produce the best impression in Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 27.) Sir Edward Grey said that 'the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 46; cf. R. O. P. no. 42.) Yet Von Tchirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, did not blush when he asked his British colleague 'whether he had been informed that a pretense of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. The Servian concessions he considered all a sham, and Serbia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and the retirement of the Government from Belgrade.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 32.) From St. Petersburg it was learned that the German Ambassador there also 'considered the Servian reply insufficient.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 54.)

Count Berchtold instructed the Austrian Ambassador at London to make clear to Sir Edward Grey that 'Serbia's complaisance was only apparent and was calculated to deceive Europe without giving any guaranty as to the future. Since the Servian Government knew that only an unqualified acceptance of the demands could satisfy Austria, Servian tactics could be easily understood: Serbia in order to influence the public opinion of Europe, was to accept some of the demands with all sorts of reservations, trusting that she would never be called upon to fulfill her agreements. The Ambassador was asked, in his conversation with Sir Edward Grey, to lay stress on the fact that the full mobilization of the Servian army was ordered for July 25 at 3 p.m., whereas the answer to the Austrian note was only handed in just before the expiration of the time

limit; i.e., a few minutes before 6. Before that, the Austrian Government had made no military preparations, but were forced to make them by Servia's mobilization.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 28, A. R. B. no. 39; cf. A. R. B. no. 40.)

July 28, the Russian Government learned from their chargé at Berlin that 'the Wolff Press Agency had not published the text of the Servian reply which had been communicated to it, and that up to the time of sending the dispatch the note had not appeared *in extenso* in any of the local newspapers, which evidently did not wish to print it because they realized what a calming effect its publication would have upon the German public.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. no. 46.) This attitude on the part of the 'German Government was most alarming' (modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 54) in view of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply. For it began to look as though it lacked the will to preserve the peace of which Sir Edward Grey had spoken when he remarked to the Austrian Ambassador that 'in times of difficulty like the present, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel.' (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. P. no. 3.)

The powers must have foreseen that Austria, having refused to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, would probably refuse to accept the Servian reply, conciliatory as it was, and they tried to prevail upon Austria to refrain from having immediate recourse to force while they tried to find a satisfactory solution to the difficulty. July 24, Sir Edward Grey 'urged upon the German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 12.) 'When the Austrian Ambassador, the day following, was authorized

¹ According to the Servian Blue Book this mobilization did not occur till later. (S. B. B. no. 41.)

to inform Sir Edward that the Austrian method of procedure upon the expiration of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations,' it was natural that the British Secretary should say, 'in informing the German Ambassador, that in accordance with what he had urged the day before, it interposed a stage of mobilization before the frontier was actually crossed.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 25.) To the Ambassador at Vienna Sir Edward telegraphed: "Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps." (Extract, July 25, B. W. P. no. 26; cf. R. O. P. no. 16; F. Y. B. no. 40.) The telegram referred to is that from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, asking for an extension of the time limit. (R. O. P. no. 4.)

6. The powers urge Austria to delay military operations and accept the Servian reply as a basis for discussion

In the mean time the negotiations at St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador gave some reason to hope for a pacific solution. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna said that 'in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guaranties which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behavior.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 56.) So that even though Austria should refuse to accept the reply, it was hoped that 'it

¹ This optimistic statement of Russia's optimistic representative does not find any corroboration in the published correspondence.

might constitute a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 62.)

In the mean time, the British representative at Belgrade had been urging the 'greatest moderation pending efforts being made toward a peaceful solution.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 65.) Russia had been pursuing a similar course. In the Tsar's telegram to Prince Alexander, he said, "I have no doubt that Your Highness and the Royal Government wish to facilitate this task by neglecting nothing to arrive at a solution which would prevent the horrors of a new war while at the same time safeguarding the dignity of Servia. So long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must tend toward this object. If, despite our most sincere desire, we do not succeed, Your Highness may be assured that in no case will Russia be unconcerned regarding the fate of Servia." (Extract, July 27, R. O. P. no. 40.) Also the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs assured the British Ambassador that 'he would use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but that her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign state respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 55.) A similar assurance was given at Vienna, where the Russian Ambassador said 'he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place,' and he assured the British Ambassador that 'he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should, it was hoped, suffice to enable a settlement to be reached.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 56.)

The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, perhaps better informed as Austria's ally than the members of the *Entente*,

'saw no possibility of Austria's receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but believed that, if Serbia would even then accept it, Austria would be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such would be the advice of the powers to Serbia, Austria might defer action. Serbia, he thought, might be induced to accept the note in its entirety on the advice of the four powers invited to the conference and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 57.)

When the British Government had learned, July 25 (B. W. P. no. 21), how conciliatory the Servian reply would be, it tried to use every means available to prevail upon Austria to accept it. The forecast of the reply was communicated to the German Ambassador, and Sir Edward Grey said that, 'if the Servian reply when received at Vienna corresponded to the forecast, he hoped the German Government would feel able to take a favorable view of it.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 27.) This conversation was communicated to the British representatives at Berlin, Paris, and St. Petersburg, so that they might exert themselves to secure action along the same line. As soon as the substance of Sir Edward Grey's remarks had been communicated to Italy, July 28, the Marquis di San Giuliano immediately telegraphed the Italian representatives at Berlin and Vienna 'in precisely similar terms.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 63.) Sir Edward Grey probably expressed the opinion of the *Entente* Powers, and Italy as well, when he told the German Ambassador that, 'if Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. The Servian reply should, he said, at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 46.)

7. *Austrian assurances*

But 'Austria refused to accept any discussion on the basis of the Servian note' (modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 81; cf. B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914, p. 2), and to all the efforts of the powers to induce her to postpone hostilities, she replied by defending the justness and necessity of her action, and by giving repeated assurances as to her designs. (Cf. G. W. B. exhibits 5; 10; A. R. B. no. 30.)

Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, told the Russian Chargé at Vienna, on July 24, that 'the Dual Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest of Servia. Austria would not, he said, claim Servian territory, but insisted merely that the action taken was meant to check effectively Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstances, Austria must have a guaranty for the continuation of amicable relations with Servia. It was far from his purpose to bring about a change in the balance of power in the Balkans.' (Modified quotation, G. W. B. exhibit 3; cf. A. R. B. no. 18.)

The statements of the German representatives at the different capitals to the same effect had the double purpose of guaranteeing the Austrian promises and of indicating Germany's firm intention to back up her ally. At St. Petersburg the German Ambassador stated under instructions that Germany would be 'all the more able to support Russia's wish not to allow the integrity of the Servian Kingdom to be called into question, since Austria herself did not call this integrity into question.' (Modified quotation, July 26, G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 7.) July 27, the German Ambassador at Paris, Baron von Schoen, confirmed in writing his declaration of the day before, namely, 'that Austria had declared to Russia that she did not seek acquisitions and was not attacking the integrity of Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. O. P. no. 35; cf. A. R.

B. no. 32.) July 28, he stated that 'Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 59.)

8. Austria declares war on Serbia

In answer to all these efforts to persuade Austria directly and through Berlin, the Austrian Government replied, July 27, 'As peaceable means had been exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defense. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest, such as she had been for the last ten years.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 48; cf. R. O. P. no. 37.) July 28, Count Berchtold told the Russian Ambassador that 'the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer recede or enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 93; cf. B. W. P. no. 61.)

In a telegram to St. Petersburg Count Berchtold related how, 'in reply to the statement of the Russian Ambassador to the effect that Austria would not decrease, but rather increase, the undeniably hostile attitude of Serbia by having recourse to warlike measures, he had given him some light on those relations existing between Austria and Serbia which had made it inevitable for the former state to declare to her restless neighbor with the requisite emphasis, that, quite against her will and without any selfish motives, she was no longer willing to tolerate the continuance of a movement directed against herself and acquiesced in by the Servian Government. The

Austrian Minister added, moreover, that the behavior of Serbia after receiving the Austrian note was not calculated to bring about a peaceful solution, since Serbia, even before handing the Austrian Government her unsatisfactory answer, had ordered complete mobilization and had thus committed a hostile act against that Government; but that Austria, nevertheless, had waited three days. The Austrian Minister further remarked that the Servians had the day before opened hostilities against Austria on the Hungarian border, thereby making it impossible for Austria to continue her patient course with Serbia, or bring about any thorough yet peaceable settlement of her difficulties with that country, — Austria could not, therefore, do otherwise than meet the Servian challenge in a manner befitting the dignity of the Monarchy.' (Modified quotation, July 28, A. R. B. no. 40.)

Previously, July 26, Austria had declared that the withdrawal of her Minister from Belgrade did not imply a declaration of war. (B. W. P. no. 35.)

But the German White Book (p. 6) states that, from the moment Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia, a state of war actually existed. It is perhaps more correct to say that at the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum, and after the formal breaking-off of all negotiations, Austria might have considered herself at liberty to commence hostilities without further notice.¹ There could have been no doubt as to this, had it not been for Austria's assurances 'that her note to Serbia was not an ultimatum, but only a *démarche*² (inquiry) with a time limit at-

¹ A London cable of July 26, published in the New York *Sun* of July 27, 1914, declared that General Pulnik, Servian Chief-of-Staff, was arrested in Hungary, July 25. He was traveling with his daughter in his private capacity on their return from a vacation.

² A *démarche* in diplomatic parlance is a word very difficult to translate. It may mean an inquiry or a request for an explanation or answer in regard to a certain matter; it may likewise include a representation or mild protest made to any other Government. Sometimes it denotes simply action taken, i.e., proceedings or even procedure.

tached.' (B. W. P. no. 14.) It would appear that actual hostilities did follow the rupture of diplomatic relations. For the British Government publish in the White Paper a telegram, dated July 28, from their representative at Belgrade that 'two Servian steamers had been fired on and damaged and two Servian merchant vessels captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 65.)

To avoid any doubt as to their compliance with the terms of Article I of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, Relative to the Opening of Hostilities,¹ Austria delivered, on July 28, the following formal declaration of war against Servia, giving her reasons, as required by the Hague Convention: "In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours was allowed the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are obliged themselves to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and for this purpose to have recourse to force of arms." (July 28, B. W. P. no. 50; cf. A. R. B. no. 37; S. B. B. no. 45.) Austria may also have intended by this course to pursue her favorite *fait-accomplis* policy and to make still clearer to the powers that she would brook no mediation in her dispute with Servia.

The same day, the British Ambassador at Vienna reported to his Government that 'Austria-Hungary had addressed to Servia a formal declaration, according to Article I of the Convention of 18th of October, 1907, Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, and considered herself from

¹ See Documents, *post*, chap. XIII.

then on in a state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary would conform, provided Servia did so, to the stipulations of Hague Conventions of 18th of October, 1907, and to the Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 73.)

It is not quite clear why Austria should have referred to the London Declaration in her note, for Servia, having no navy, would be obliged to submit to any system of dealing with neutral commerce which Austria might apply. Perhaps Austria hoped, by giving official support to the Declaration, to help to secure its general adoption. She may have been preparing for the general war about to occur, and thought the immunity of trade in conditional contraband shipped to belligerents through neutral ports would be an inducement for England to keep out of the war.

'The demeanor of the people at Vienna, and, as the British Ambassador was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there could be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom the momentous step was adopted, gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination of the people, except, presumably, in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races.'¹ (Modified quotation, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.)

¹ The depth of the hostile feeling toward Servia is well illustrated by the following incident as recounted by the Servian Minister at Vienna: "Yesterday, the day when the remains of the Archduke François-Ferdinand and his wife were taken from Serajevo, I caused to be raised and placed at half-mast on my residence the national flag. This gave rise to protests last evening from the doorkeeper, the tenants, the manager, and even the owner of the property, all of whom demanded that the flag be removed. Explanations serving no purpose, recourse was had to the police, who asked, though not officially, the removal of the flag in order to prevent disorder. The flag was kept flying, and this circumstance provoked violent demonstrations in front of the legation last night. The police were active and no damage was done either to the building or to the flag. Toward two o'clock in the morning those who had been engaged in this manifestation were

After Austria's declaration of war and the publication next morning of the Emperor's appeal to his people, the British Ambassador at Vienna agreed with his French and Italian colleagues in thinking there was 'at present no step they could take to stop war with Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 79.)

9. Austria explains the purpose of her action

The Austrian Ambassador at London, speaking on his own account, really expressed the view of his Government when he said that 'as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 48.)

The Austrian Ambassador told Sir Edward Grey that 'the war with Servia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilizing again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandizement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 91; cf. A. R. B. no. 18.)

The same day that the Austrian Ambassador at London told the British Government of the views and intentions of Austria, the German Chancellor informed the British Ambassador at Berlin that 'the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated Sir Edward Grey's opinion, had answered that events had marched too

driven away from my residence. The papers to-day, especially those of a clerical-popular tendency, have published articles under the caption 'Provocative Acts of the Servian Minister,' misrepresenting the whole affair.' (Extract, July 3, S. B. B. no. 11.)

rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon Sir Edward's suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. He had, he said, on receiving their reply, dispatched a message to Vienna, in which he had said that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guaranties that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guaranties, seeing that the Austrian Government had already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs. He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 75. Cf. A. R. B. no. 44.)

If this important communication had been made to the Austrian Government earlier and had been followed up, it might have influenced the Dual Monarchy to accept in time Servia's conciliatory reply, and Austria would undoubtedly have secured guaranties which, while preserving Servian independence, would have checked her Pan-Serb propaganda. This would have constituted a diplomatic victory for Austria, have rendered her Empire more secure, and have added to the prestige of the Triple Alliance. It would also have been useful as a precedent to determine the limits within which one state may allow a political agitation directed against its neighbor to be carried on.

But every one knows that promises made at a time of crisis are not always observed after successful military operations, and the high-handed manner in which Austria

had proceeded did not indicate that she was prepared to give much heed to the wishes or views of the powers. The British representative at Constantinople was so mistrustful of Austria's real intentions as to telegraph Sir Edward Grey: "I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the Sanjak¹ and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonika under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from the Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule." (July 29, B. W. P. no. 82; cf. B. W. P. no. 19; cf. A. R. B. no. 31.)

At the time the Austrian ultimatum was presented, the view was expressed at the Italian Foreign Office that 'the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after many disillusionments which the turn of events in the Balkans had occasioned, to score a definite success.'² (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. P. no. 38; cf. B. W. P. no. 61; S. B. B. no. 25.) This is supported by the statement of the British Ambassador at Vienna, referring to popular feeling, in which he said that 'there had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent

¹ By the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Austria-Hungary was empowered to garrison certain towns in the Sanjak (Turkish province) of Novibazar, though Turkey kept the entire civil administration. The following extract from the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (11th ed., 1911 vol. xix, p. 840) makes clear the situation of the Sanjak, as it is called, in the political geography of the Balkans: "The Sanjak is of great strategic importance, for it is the N.W. part of the Turkish Empire, on the direct route between Bosnia and Salonika, and forms a wedge of Turkish territory between Servia and Montenegro. The union of these powers, combined with the annexation of Novibazar, would have impeded the extension of Austrian influence towards Salonika." As a result of the Balkan Wars, Servia received this important territory, three fourths of the inhabitants of which are Christian Serbs.

² See *post*, p. 107.

Balkan War. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamored impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. . . . So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo.' (Modified quotation, September 1, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.)

The German Ambassador at London said that 'the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a great power.' Sir Edward Grey replied that 'he entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.' When the German Ambassador remarked that 'Austria would not take Servian territory,' Sir Edward 'observed that, without taking territory and while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal state, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 90.) At Berlin the French Ambassador made suggestions as to the possibility of securing guaranties satisfactory to Austria without impairing the independence of Servia. (July 29, F. Y. B. no. 92.) Sir Edward Grey repeated to the Austrian Ambassador his statement to the German Ambassador 'that it would be quite possible,

without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal state.' This the Ambassador deprecated, and 'in reply to some further remarks of Sir Edward's as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, said that, before the Balkan War, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.' ¹ (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 91.)

This last remark touches the very crux of the question. Serbia, as a consequence of the Balkan War, had escaped from the position of a political vassal of Austria, and, from the Austrian point of view, it was perfectly natural that every effort should be made to reëstablish over her Austrian influence and political dictation. So, when the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg said that the German Government was 'willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria,' M. Sazonof replied that 'this might be so, but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstance, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 97.)

The German Memorandum, issued when war with Russia was certain, gives a frank explanation of Austria's motives and states that "Russia, soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavored to form under Russian patronage a union of the Balkan States directed against Turkish integrity. This union, which succeeded in 1911 in depriving Turkey of a greater part of her European possessions, came to grief over the question of the distribution of spoils. Russia was

¹ "The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Serbia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance." (Extract, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 65.)

not dismayed by this failure of her policies. The Russian statesmen adopted the plan of forming a new Balkan union under Russian patronage, directed no longer against Turkey, now crowded out of the Balkans, but against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It was intended that Serbia, in return for Bosnia and Herzegovina, acquired at the expense of the Dual Monarchy, should make over to Bulgaria the parts of Macedonia which she had acquired in the last Balkan War. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan she was to be isolated, Rumania was to be attached to Russia by means of a French propaganda, and Serbia was to be promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

“Under these circumstances Austria could not consider it compatible with her dignity and the preservation of her national security longer to view supinely the working-out of this plan across the border.” (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 4.)

The Marquis di San Giuliano, as soon as he learned that the Russian Government had announced at Berlin her partial mobilization, thought the time was ‘past for any further discussions on the basis of the Servian note.’ The utmost he hoped for was that Germany might ‘use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Serbia’ (modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 86), which meant that she might influence Austria not to make any further demands or take any action which would interfere with the maintenance of Serbia’s independence, thereby affecting the balance of power in the Balkans, and making a general war inevitable.

Meantime, the question of Austria’s mobilization became so important as to overshadow that of the Austro-Servian relations, but as the question of the military preparations involves the relations of all the powers, it will be best to lay it aside until we take up the consideration of Russia’s reply to Austria’s attack upon Serbia.

To the impartial observer who has followed the course

of Austria's action to this point, it may seem inexplicable, even in the face of a most serious grievance against her weaker neighbor, that a civilized state should wish to proceed so far in the abuse of force before there had been any opportunity for an unbiased investigation. It will, perhaps, help to understand the national psychology to compare our own conduct, not so very many years ago, in circumstances somewhat analogous, when the American nation was stirred by the loss of the Maine.¹

¹ Among the documents at the end of this volume has been placed a résumé of the negotiations between Spain and the United States following the destruction of the Maine and a comparison between the action of the United States in 1898 and that of Austria-Hungary in 1914.

CHAPTER III

THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN DISCUSSIONS

Russia's interest in the Austro-Servian conflict — Russia believes Austria's action is directed against herself — Russia considers immediate action necessary — Russia partially mobilizes against Austria — The Tsar asks the Kaiser to try his mediation.

1. Russia's interest in the Austro-Servian conflict

FROM the date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, the efforts which the powers had directed toward settling the Austro-Servian controversy had, of course, the object of preventing Russia's entry upon the scene. It was an A B C of European politics that Russia was deeply interested in the fate of the Slav states of the Balkan Peninsula.

Before taking his departure on leave of absence, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna assured his British colleague that 'any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 7.)

Count Berchtold received Prince Kudachef, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, the morning after the presentation of the ultimatum and 'assured him that he laid special weight upon notifying him as soon as possible of the steps they had taken in Belgrade and making clear to him their point of view in this connection.

'Prince Kudachef, in thanking Count Berchtold for this attention, did not conceal from the Austrian Minister his uneasiness about Austria's categorical procedure toward Serbia, remarking in this connection that they had been continuously preoccupied at St. Petersburg in considering whether the Austrian *démarche* would take the form of a

humiliation for Serbia, which could not take place without affecting Russia.

‘Count Berchtold took occasion to calm the Russian Chargé in this respect. Their goal, he told him, was to clear up the untenable attitude of Serbia toward the Monarchy and for this purpose to influence the Government there, on the one hand, publicly to disavow the currents directed against the present stability of the Monarchy and to suppress them by administrative measures, and, on the other hand, to offer the Austrian Government the possibility of assuring itself of the conscientious execution of these measures. He furthermore dwelt upon the danger which a further tolerance of the Greater Servian propaganda would entail, not only for the integrity of the Monarchy, but also for the balance of power and the peace of Europe, and how much all dynasties, and not least of them the Russian, seemed to be threatened by a popular adoption of this view that a movement which made use of murder as a nationalist means of battle could remain unpunished.

‘Finally, Count Berchtold pointed out that they did not seek for an acquisition of territory, but merely for the conservation of that which existed, a point of view which, he considered, should be understood by the Russian Government.’ (Modified quotation, July 24, A. R. B. no. 18.)

As early as July 24, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg had sounded M. Sazonof as to the course Russia would pursue, supposing Austria, even though the powers ‘joined in making a communication to the effect that her active intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated, should nevertheless, in spite of their representations, proceed to embark on military measures against Serbia. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out, but that a Council of Ministers was being held that afternoon to con-

sider the whole question, and that a further council would be held, probably on the morrow, at which the Tsar would preside, and that then a decision would be reached.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6.)

M. Sazonof, according to the report of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 'made wild complaints against Austria-Hungary and was much excited. What he said most definitely was this: that Russia could not possibly permit the Austro-Servian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.' (Modified quotation, July 24, G. W. B. exhibit 24.)

In the Austrian Red Book, Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, gives the following account of this interview of July 24, with M. Sazonof: "The Minister of Foreign Affairs received me, telling me that he knew what led me to him and that he would declare to me at the outset that he would take no attitude toward my *démarche*. I began with the reading of my instructions. The Minister interrupted me the first time upon the mention of the series of outrages and asked me to explain whether or not it had been proved that all these originated in Belgrade. I emphasized the fact that they were the result of Servian instigation. In the further course of the reading he said that he knew what was at issue; we wanted to make war upon Servia, and this was to be the pretext. I replied that our attitude in recent years afforded ample proof that we neither sought nor needed pretexts in Servia's case." (Extract, July 24, A. R. B. no. 14.)

The Russian Government, in a *communiqué* of July 25, stated that it was 'carefully following the evolution of the Austro-Servian conflict to which it could not remain indifferent.' (Modified quotation, July 25, R. O. P. no. 10.)

Several days later, July 31, M. Sazonof said that 'during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination

of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death.'¹ (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 139.)

When the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg urged upon M. Sazonof the danger of precipitating a German attack if Russia should mobilize, he 'replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.)

On July 27, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, having just returned from St. Petersburg, and being 'well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion,' assured the Austrian Government 'that if actual war broke out with Serbia it would be impossible to localize it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909.' (Modified quotations, July 27, B. W. P. no. 56.) No wonder Sazonof complained to the Austrian Government that its action had caused in his country a feeling of 'profound surprise and general reprobation.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. O. P. no. 41.)

That Serbia was well aware of Russia's interest is indicated by Prince Alexander's telegraphing an appeal for aid to the Tsar. (July 24, R. O. P. no. 6.) In another telegram to the Tsar, Prince Alexander of Serbia says: "These painful moments can only strengthen the bonds of the deep attachment which unites Serbia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of eternal gratitude for the aid and protection of Your Majesty will be piously preserved in

¹ "From the political point of view, it is not by annexation alone that the balance of power is affected. If, as a result of war, Serbia became politically dependent on Austria, or France were seriously weakened, the balance of power would be disturbed." (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy *versus* Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, pp. 75-76.)

the souls of all Servians." (Extract, July 29, R. O. P. no. 56; cf. S. B. B. no. 44.) The Tsar, in answer to this appeal telegraphed: "So long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must tend toward this object. If, despite our most sincere desire, we do not succeed, Your Highness may be assured that in no case will Russia be unconcerned regarding the fate of Servia." (Extract, July 27, R. O. P. no. 40.)

In a telegram of July 28, the Servian Minister at St. Petersburg informed his Government of the manner in which he had informed M. Sazonof of the Austrian declaration of war against Servia: —

"I have the honor of informing you that I have just received from M. M. Pashitch, President of the Council, the following urgent telegram sent from Nish to-day at 2.10 P.M.: —

'The Government of Austria-Hungary declared war to-day at noon in an open [*en clair*] telegram addressed to the Servian Government.'

'PASHITCH.'

"In bringing to your attention this act which a great power unhappily has had the courage to commit upon a little Slav country just now barely emerging from a long series of struggles as heroic as they have been exhausting, I take the liberty, in circumstances so serious to my country, of expressing the hope that this act, which shatters the peace of Europe and shocks its conscience, will be disapproved by the whole civilized world and severely punished by Russia, protector of Servia.

"I pray Your Excellency be pleased to bear to the throne of His Majesty this prayer of the whole Servian people, and to accept the assurance of my devotion and respect." (July 28, S. B. B. no. 47.)

When the Russian Chargé at Belgrade communicated to M. Pashitch the Tsar's promise of protection, the Servian Minister exclaimed: "Seigneur, the Tsar is great

and clement" (extract, July 29, R. O. P. no. 57), and, unable to restrain his emotion, embraced the Chargé.

Count Berchtold showed that he realized how vitally Russia was concerned by summoning the Russian Chargé, the day after the presentation of the ultimatum, 'in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Servia. After going over the historical developments of the last few years, he laid stress on the statement that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest of Servia. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory; that the step was merely a definitive measure against Servian intrigue; that Austria-Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guaranties for the future friendly behavior of Servia toward the Monarchy; that it was far from his intention to bring about a change in the balance of power in the Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who as yet had no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the explanations of the Minister *ad referendum*, promising to transmit them immediately to M. Sazonof.' (Modified quotation, July 24, G. W. B. exhibit 3; cf. A. R. B. no. 18.)

Herr von Tchirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, 'doubted if Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, would act as if she made any such claim.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 32.) To the British Ambassador he expressed his confident belief that 'Russia, having received assurances that no Servian territory would be annexed by Austria-Hungary, would keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary was resolved to inflict.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 32; cf. B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914.) When asked 'whether the Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of a kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he

chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, he thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia was interested, such as the Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Rumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 32.)

Similarly, the German Under-Secretary of State, learning from St. Petersburg that Russia would not remain indifferent 'if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory,' drew the conclusion 'that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 33.)

The German Memorandum admits, however, that 'Germany was fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia into the question and might draw Germany into a war in accordance with her duty as Austria's ally.' (Modified quotation, G. W. B. p. 4.)

The Marquis di San Giuliano had previously, in a conversation with the French representative at Rome, said that 'unfortunately in this whole affair it had been and still was the conviction of Austria and Germany that Russia would not move. In this connection he read a dispatch from the Italian representative at Berlin reporting an interview he had had that day with the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter again repeated that he did not believe Russia would move, basing his belief on the fact that the Russian Government had only just sent an agent to Berlin to arrange about certain financial matters. Furthermore, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin had told his English colleague that he did not believe in a general war, Russia being in neither a mood nor a condition

to make war. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs did not share this opinion, but considered that if Austria confined her action to humiliating Serbia and to exacting in addition to the acceptance of the note, certain material advantages not affecting Serbia's territorial integrity, Russia would still be able to find ground for a settlement with her. If, however, Austria wished either to dismember Serbia or destroy her position as an independent state, he thought it impossible for Russia not to intervene with armed force.' (Modified quotation, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 96.)

Public opinion in Austria well understood Russia's attitude, for during the orderly patriotic demonstrations which followed the news of the rejection of the Servian reply, 'one or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days' (modified quotation, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914), and in Berlin 'after the reception of the news of the mobilization of the Austrian army against Serbia, a large crowd, composed, according to the newspapers, partly of Austrians, indulged in a series of noisy manifestations in favor of Austria. At a late hour in the evening the demonstrators gathered several times in front of the Russian Embassy, uttering cries against Russia. The police were practically absent and took no steps.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 30.)

'At St. Petersburg, M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, begged the German Ambassador to point out the danger of the situation to his Government. He refrained, however, from alluding to the step which Russia would doubtless be led to take if the independence or territorial integrity of Serbia should be threatened. The evasive replies and recriminations of the German Ambassador made an unfavorable impression upon M. Sazonof, who nevertheless gave evidence of his moderation when he re-

marked to the French Ambassador that they must avoid everything which might precipitate the crisis, and that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government should proceed to action against Serbia, they ought not to break off negotiations.' (Modified quotation, July 25, F. Y. B. no. 38.)

July 27, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg informed his Government: "M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues. In spite of public feeling the Russian Government is endeavoring with success to restrain the press. Great moderation in particular has been recommended toward Germany." (Extract, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 64.)

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna was instructed to point out to Count Berchtold 'how desirable it would be to find a solution which, while consolidating the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, should give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy serious guaranties for its future relations with Serbia.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. no. 45; cf. F. Y. B. no. 18.)

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported that M. Sazonof in a previous interview (July 26) with the Austrian Ambassador had been visibly calmed by the latter's assurance that 'Austria Hungary was planning no conquests, and simply wished to secure peace at last on her frontiers.' (Modified quotation, July 26, G. W. B. exhibit 5.)

These extracts show that Russia was ready to acquiesce in some plan by which Austria might be relieved of the constant menace to her security resulting from the Pan-Serb propaganda. But when the Austrian Government was unwilling to discuss with the other powers the conditions of the settlement of her difference with Serbia, M. Sazonof felt that Russia must prepare to insist that she be heard.

2. *Russia believes Austria's action is directed against herself*

Russia employed all her efforts to obtain a pacific issue which would be acceptable to Austria, and satisfy her *amour-propre* as a great power. (August 2, R. O. P. no. 77.)

St. Petersburg considered that 'Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17; cf. F. Y. B. no. 65; B. W. P. nos. 90, 91; R. O. P. no. 75.) Russia seemed to be justified in this view by the terms of the ultimatum and Austria's refusal to modify them, as well as by the hostile demonstrations before the Russian Embassies in Vienna and Berlin.¹ (July 26, R. O. P. no. 25.) Austrian and German expressions of opinion that 'Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war' (modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 71; cf. F. Y. B. no. 96) confirm this impression.

The attitude of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is indicated in the following report which Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, sent to Count Berchtold on July 27: "Have just had a long interview with M. Sazonof. I told the Minister that I had received the impression that there was misunderstanding in Russia regarding the nature of our action, that we were accused of wishing to undertake an advance in the Bal-

¹ This is indicated by the following extract from a cable dispatch of July 25 from Berlin to the New York *Sun*, July 26: "'Down with Russia,' resounds to-night in Unter den Linden, where vast throngs of excited thousands are moving from the Imperial Palace down past the Brandenburger Gate to the famous Avenue of Victory, around the column of Victory, which is largely composed of French cannon captured in 1870. This is faced by huge statues of Prince Bismarck, Field Marshal von Moltke, and Field Marshal von Roon. The immense crowds are singing the 'Watch on the Rhine,' 'Deutschland Ueber Alles,' and the German and Austrian national hymns. In front of the Russian Embassy on Unter den Linden there are constant shouts of 'Down with Russia!' while across the street and almost opposite there are jeers at the French Embassy. The police are trying to keep the crowds constantly moving."

kans, and a march to Saloniki or even Constantinople. Others, I added, went so far as to see in our action the beginning of a preventive war against Russia. I said all this was a mistake, nay, absurd in part; that the purpose of our action was self-preservation and self-defense against a hostile propaganda of words, writings, and deeds which was threatening our national integrity. I said that nobody in Austria-Hungary thought of threatening Russian interests or even of picking quarrels with Russia, but that we were absolutely resolved to achieve the goal which we had set ourselves and that the road we had chosen seemed to us the best. I added that as it was a matter of self-defense, however, I would not attempt to conceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to be turned aside by any consideration of the consequences, no matter what they might be. M. Sazonof agreed with me. He considered that our purpose, such as I had explained it to him, was perfectly legitimate, but it was his opinion that the way we had chosen to achieve it was not the safest; that the note which we had sent was not happy in its form. He said that he had studied it meanwhile, and that if I had time he wished to go through it again with me. I remarked that I was at his disposal, but was not authorized either to discuss the text of the note with him nor to interpret it; that, however, his remarks would be naturally of interest. The Minister then took up all the points of the note, and found to-day that seven out of the ten might be accepted without great difficulty and that only the two points dealing with the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servia and that which dealt with the dismissal of officers and officials to be named by us were unacceptable in their present form. As to the first two points, I was in a position to give an authentic interpretation of them, in the light of Your Excellency's telegram of the 25th inst.; as to the third, I expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand;

moreover, I said that matters were taking their course; that the Servians had already mobilized yesterday; and that I was unaware of what might have happened since." (July 27, A. R. B. no. 31.)

To Russia's proposal for collaboration in finding a solution acceptable to Russia and Austria, Count Berchtold had replied that 'the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Serbia, could now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. no. 45.) 'The prestige of the Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could prevent a conflict.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 61; cf. A. R. B. no. 44.) In an interview of July 29, M. Sazonof, referring to the Austrian demands, told the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szapary, that, "so far as acquisition of territory was concerned, he had allowed himself to be convinced; but, as to sovereignty, he was obliged to keep to the viewpoint that the imposition of our demands would put Serbia in the position of our vassal. He added that this would imperil the balance of power in the Balkans, which constituted the Russian interests in ques-

¹ "It is an interesting and possibly significant fact that the one European power whose 'prestige' seems to have been in question was Austria. In the entire diplomatic correspondence published by the different Governments we find the word used only in reference to this power. It was employed to explain the Austrian attitude, not only by Italian, French, and Russian diplomatists (British Blue Book, nos. 38, 76, and Russian Orange Paper, no. 14), but by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, who told the British ambassador at Vienna, July 28, that the 'prestige of the Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict' with Serbia (British Blue Book, no. 61). Without using the word 'prestige,' the German Foreign Office indicated the existence at Vienna of a degree of touchiness closely related to the soldier's and duelist's sense of honor: Germany hesitated to urge Austria to moderation, because 'any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters.' (British Blue Book, nos. 76, 107, and Russian Orange Paper, no. 51.)" (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy *versus* Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, p. 70. Cf. also S. B. B. no. 25.)

tion. He then returned to the discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, etc., and wished to tell me again that, though he recognized our legitimate interests and wished to satisfy us thoroughly, our demands should be clothed in a form possible of acceptance by Serbia. I said that this was not a matter concerning Russia, but Serbia, upon which M. Sazonof stated that Russian interests in this matter were identical with Serbia's, so that I put an end to the vicious circle (*circulus vitiosus*) by changing to another subject." (Extract, July 29, A. R. B. no. 47; cf. F. Y. B. nos. 52, 96.) Thus Austria not only insisted upon taking drastic action against Serbia, but refused to allow Russia or the powers to consider the question.

3. *Russia considers immediate action necessary*

The British Ambassador expressed the hope that Russia would not 'do anything to precipitate a conflict and would defer the mobilization ukase as long as possible.' In reply the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that 'until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps toward mobilization could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations, if it were deferred too long.' (Modified quotations, July 27, B. W. P. no. 44.)

Russia felt that mediation between Austria and Serbia was urgently necessary, and that meantime 'the military action of Austria against Serbia should be immediately suspended, otherwise mediation would only serve as a pretext to delay inordinately the solution of the question, and give Austria an opportunity of crushing Serbia completely and securing a dominant situation in the Balkans.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. nos. 48; 53.) M. Sazonof declared to the British Ambassador that 'if Serbia were attacked, Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take in respect to Serbia's integrity and independence, and that the order for mobilization

against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed the Servian frontier.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 72.) Russia received notice of Austrian mobilization from her consular and diplomatic representatives in different parts of the Austrian Empire. The Russian Consul-General at Fiume telegraphed his Government 'that a "state of siege" had been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and at the same time the reservists of all classes had been mobilized.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. no. 44.) From Vienna the Russian Ambassador had telegraphed his Government that 'the decree of general mobilization had been signed.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. no. 47.)

The effect of these measures and Austria's declaration of war against Servia on opinion in Russia was great. (Cf. G. W. B., exhibit 21.) The view of Russia's ally is expressed by the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a short résumé of the situation communicated to the French representatives in which he declares that 'in the Austrian capital they wish to keep St. Petersburg amused by the illusion that an understanding might result from direct conversations while they in the mean time are taking action against Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 85; cf. R. O. P. no. 53.)

4. Russia partially mobilizes against Austria

On July 29, Russia, as had been expected and feared, replied to the Austrian mobilization by partial mobilization. (July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) M. Sazonof told the British Ambassador that 'had not Russia by mobilizing shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths,' but at the same time gave him to understand that 'Russia would not precipitate war by crossing the frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before the mobilization was

completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation he considered it necessary that in the interim they should all work together.' (Modified quotations, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) When the British Ambassador referred to Germany's fear of being "taken by surprise" (July 27, B. W. P. no. 43), M. Sazonof explained that 'the mobilization would be directed against Austria only.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.) At Vienna the Russian Ambassador 'expressed the hope that Russian mobilization would be regarded by Austria as what it was, namely, a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he did not know how the Austrian Government were taking it. He said that Russia must have an assurance that Servia would not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary was compelled to exact from Servia measures which would secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 95.)

Turning to the German point of view, we find that, as early as July 25, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had telegraphed his Government his opinion that 'all preparations had been made for mobilization against Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 25, G. W. B. exhibit 6.) 'July 26, the German military attaché reported mobilization at Kieff and Odessa as certain, while at Warsaw and Moscow he considered it doubtful, and elsewhere reported it had probably not been ordered.' (Modified quotation, July 26, G. W. B. exhibit 7.)

The next day, July 27, the Minister of War, acting at the request of M. Sazonof, explained the situation to the German military attaché, and 'gave his word of honor that as yet no mobilization order had gone forth; that for the time being merely preparatory measures were being taken, but that not one reservist had been summoned nor a single horse requisitioned. He said that if Austria should cross

the Servian frontier, the military districts in the direction of Austria — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan — would be mobilized, but that those on the side of Germany — Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg — would not be under any circumstances.' The attaché told the Minister that his Government appreciated Russia's friendly attitude toward them, but must 'look upon mobilization against Austria alone as very menacing.' (Modified quotation, July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 11.) That same day the German Consul in the district telegraphed, "State of war declared in Kovno." (July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 8.) In an interview which he had, on July 29, with the Austrian Ambassador, M. Sazonof concluded by informing the Ambassador, 'that a ukase would be issued that day ordering a somewhat extended mobilization, but that he could assure him absolutely officially that these troops were not destined to attack Austria, but would only be held armed and ready in case Russia's interests in the Balkans should be imperiled. He added that an explanatory note would announce this, since what was contemplated was only a precautionary measure which the Tsar had considered to be justified, not only because Austria had the advantage of being able to mobilize more quickly, but also because she already had so long a start. The Austrian Ambassador called M. Sazonof's attention earnestly to the impression which such a step would make in his country, remarking that he could but doubt whether the explanatory note would soften this impression; whereupon the minister once more gave assurances of the harmlessness (!) of the measure.' (Modified quotation, July 29, A. R. B. no. 47.) The Russian Ambassador, returning to Berlin on July 29, informed the German Government that 'Russia was mobilizing in the four southern districts.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 76.)

5. *The Tsar asks the Kaiser to try his mediation*

While this mobilization had been going on, the Tsar telegraphed the Kaiser: "I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I fear that soon I shall no longer be able to withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I ask you in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far." (July 29, G. W. B. exhibit 21.) The German Emperor responded to this appeal and made efforts at mediation between Austria and Russia. (R. O. P. no. 49; G. W. B. exhibit 23.)

On July 29, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg assured M. Sazonof that 'up to that morning there had been no news that the Austrian army had crossed the Servian frontier.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 93 (2); July 29, R. O. P. no. 49.)

To prevent Russia's further mobilization, the sincerity of Austria's assurances in regard to her designs on Servia were emphasized, and it was pointed out that 'Austria-Hungary had mobilized only against Servia, and at that she had mobilized a part only of her army.' (Modified quotation, July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 23; cf A. R. B. no. 50.) M. Sazonof, 'informing the German Ambassador of the military measures taken by Russia, said that none of them were directed against Germany, and added that they did not indicate aggressive intentions against Austria-Hungary, since they were to be explained by the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.' (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 49.)

That same day, Wednesday, July 29, the German mili-

tary attaché at St. Petersburg reported that the 'Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army had told him that he had just come from the Tsar, and had been requested by the Minister of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained in the same state as the Minister had informed him two days ago. The Chief of the General Staff offered him a written confirmation and gave him his word of honor in the most formal manner that mobilization had begun nowhere, that is to say, not a single man or horse had been levied up to that hour, three o'clock in the afternoon. He stated that he could not answer for the future, but could declare most emphatically that no mobilization was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching on the German frontier. But as the attaché had received many items of news concerning the calling out of the reserves in different parts of the country, including Warsaw and Vilna, he told the General that his statements were a riddle to him. On his honor as an officer, the General replied that the information received by the attaché was incorrect, though possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.' (Modified quotation, July 29, G. W. B., Memorandum, pp. 10-11.) The attaché, informing his Government, commented that 'in view of the abundant and positive information which reached him about the calling out of reserves, he considered this conversation as an attempt to mislead the German Government as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken.' (Modified quotation, July 29, G. W. B. p. 11.)

It would be interesting to know how far this report of the German military attaché was responsible for Germany's preparations and accusations against Russia. There is as yet no available evidence to determine what justification the attaché had for these statements. He might well be expected to emphasize the military preparations, and if, like many of the militarists, he was really anxious to bring on a war, his inclination would have been very likely to

influence his judgment, however sincere his intention. He would have been held responsible if Russia had really got a start toward mobilization without Germany's knowledge. Before such a crushing load of responsibility it would take a man of iron nerves not to pass on for fact what might upon closer investigation have been found to be mere rumors, or exaggerations at least. Perhaps the very efficiency of the Governments in keeping secret their military preparations or arrangements gave rise to baneful rumors, and these, believed and serving as ground for counter-preparations, quickly complicated the situation.

Even as late as July 31, the British Ambassador at Paris informed Sir Edward Grey that 'the Russian Ambassador was not aware that any general mobilization of the Russian forces had taken place.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 117.)

But in a dispatch to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, M. Sazonof said: "Since we cannot accede to the desire of Germany [in regard to arresting military preparation] it only remains for us to accelerate our own armament, and to take measures for the probable inevitability of war." (July 29, R. O. P. no. 58.)

July 31, Sir Edward Grey learned from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that 'it had been decided to issue orders for general mobilization. This decision was taken in consequence of a report received from the Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria was determined not to accept the intervention of the powers, and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia. Russia had also reason, he said, to believe that Germany was making active preparations, and could not afford to let her get a start.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 113.)

‡ July 31, Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that 'the Chancellor had informed him that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna had been

seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He had done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz (Austrian Foreign Office). He could not, however, leave his country defenseless while time was being utilized by other powers; and if, as he had learned was the case, military measures were being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. The Chancellor said he wished to tell him that it was quite possible that in a very short time, that same day, perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor. The Chancellor added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Tsar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 108.)

In reply to the Kaiser's telegram pointing out 'the threatening character of the Russian mobilization,' the Tsar answered, July 31, that it was 'a technical impossibility for Russia to halt her military preparations which had been rendered necessary through Austria's mobilization; that Russia was far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continued with Austria concerning Servia, his troops would not undertake any challenging action. To that he solemnly pledged his word.' (Modified quotation, July 31, G. W. B. p. 12.)

Sir Edward Grey informed the German Ambassador that, 'as regards military preparations, he did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 110.) At the same time he suggested that 'if the Russian Government objected to the Austrians' mobilizing eight army

corps, it might be pointed out that this was not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 110.)

But on August 1, the British Ambassador reported the Russian Ambassador at Vienna as saying that 'the so-called mobilization of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Austria, and that Russia would even now be satisfied with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence, and had no intention of attacking Austria.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 141.)

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY'S SITUATION

Germany's interest in the dispute — Germany declares that the Austrian note was not communicated to her beforehand — Germany pledged to support Austria — Germany insists upon the "localization" of the Austro-Servian conflict — The responsibility Russia will incur by supporting Servia — The situation between Germany and Russia becomes acute — Germany delivers an ultimatum to Russia.

1. Germany's interest in the dispute

AFTER the Austro-Servian dispute had widened into an Austro-Russian conflict, the next consequence was the entanglement of Germany because of her alliance with Austria.

Defining its views, the German Government declared in a confidential communication to the states of the German Empire: "The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation carried on by the Pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which carries with it the shattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance and, in consequence, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our nearest interests, therefore, summon us to the support of Austria-Hungary." (Extract, July 28, G. W. B. exhibit 2.)

The German Memorandum says: "If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under the scepter of Russia would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian Pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could

count and in whom we could have confidence, such as we must have, in view of the increasingly menacing attitude of our neighbors on the east and on the west." (Extract, G. W. B. memorandum, p. 5.)

The attitude of Austria toward Serbia and the intense popular feeling which had been aroused by the assassination of the Archduke were well understood by all the statesmen of Europe. The uncertain factor of the situation was the attitude which Germany would take. In breathless anticipation Europe waited to see to what extent Germany was prepared to support and assume responsibility for the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. It was generally believed, and the opinion was openly expressed in many quarters, that Germany had urged Austria to precipitate a crisis by presenting demands against Serbia which she would find it impossible to accept. However little foundation there may have been for such belief, it was generally considered that Austria could not have taken so decisive a step without coming to a previous understanding with her mighty ally. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that 'Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral, and that she would never have taken such action unless Germany had been first consulted.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6.)

The statesmen of Europe accordingly waited with anxiety to see whether Germany would back up Austria, as she had at the time of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or whether she would discuss the question from the point of view of the European powers, as she had done in the more recent Balkan settlement of 1913, when the Albanian question so seriously threatened the peace of Europe.

2. *Germany declares that the Austrian note was not communicated to her beforehand*

The German Government was fully aware that the other powers would consider that she had had a hand in the preparation of the Austrian note, and she hastened to enter a complete denial. The German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram from his Government saying that 'they had not known beforehand, and had had no more than the other powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 25; cf. R. O. P. no. 19.)

At Paris the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, informed a number of reporters, and called at the Foreign Office to say, that 'there had been no agreement between Austria and Germany over the Austrian note, of which the German Government had been ignorant; although subsequently it had approved it, on receiving communication of it at the same time as the other powers.' (Modified quotation, July 25, F. Y. B. no. 36.)

On July 24, the day after the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, sent his Government the following report of an interview which he had had with the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: —

"I to-day asked the Secretary of State in an interview I had with him if it was true, as was stated in the newspapers, that Austria had sent a note to the powers dealing with her differences with Servia; if he had received it, and what he thought of it.

"Herr von Jagow replied affirmatively, adding that the note was forceful, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having long since exhausted Austria's patience. He considers, moreover, that the question relates to the internal affairs of Austria, and hopes that it will be localized. I continued by saying that, not having received

any instructions, I only wished to have with him an entirely personal exchange of views. I then asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been in complete ignorance of the Austrian demands before they were communicated to Belgrade, and, as he replied that this was so, I expressed my surprise that he should thus undertake to support pretensions, of the limits and nature of which he was ignorant.

“‘It is only,’ said Herr von Jagow, interrupting me, ‘because we are having a personal talk together that I allow you to say that to me.’” (Extract, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 30; cf. F. Y. B. no. 15; B. W. P. no. 18.)

On July 23 the French Minister at Munich reported to his Government that the Bavarian Government were acquainted with the terms of the Austrian note.¹ (F. Y. B. no. 21.)

On July 30, the British Ambassador at Vienna informed Sir Edward Grey that, ‘although he was unable to verify it, he had private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor.’ (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 95.)

According to the remarks of the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Belgian Minister, ‘the Italian Government was surprised, to say the least, not to have been consulted in regard to the whole affair by her two allies.’ (Modified quotation, July 25, F. Y. B. no. 35; cf. B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, p. 1.)

On July 27, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, assured M. Barrère, the French Ambassador, that ‘he had not had any previous knowledge of the note. Although he knew that the note would be strong and forceful, he had no idea it would take

¹ Cf. statement in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* relative to the denial made by the Bavarian Government. (Translation, *War-Chronicle*, December, 1914, p. 19. Published by M. Berg, Berlin.)

such a form.’¹ (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 72; cf. F. Y. B. no. 56.)

On July 25, the Belgian Minister at Berlin told the French Ambassador that ‘he did not believe in the pretended ignorance of the German Government on the subject of Austria’s *démarche*.’ (Modified quotation, July 25, F. Y. B. no. 35.)

This solicitude on the part of Germany to explain her ignorance of the Austrian note seems out of proportion to its significance. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 137.) As M. Jules Cambon remarked—“It is not less striking to note the care which Herr von Jagow and all the other officials under him take to tell every one that they were ignorant of the nature of the Austrian note delivered to Servia.” (Extract, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 30.)

The motive was, undoubtedly, to give to Germany’s support of Austria a more disinterested aspect than it would have appeared to have had she herself taken part in planning a note couched in such terms. The powers, realizing the intimate relations between the two allies, would be much less disturbed by German support of a note, the terms of which she did not approve, than they would have been if Germany herself had taken part in drawing it up. If Germany had admitted her complicity, it might have been more difficult for Austria to maintain that the question was a matter entirely between herself and Servia.

There seems to be no reason why we should not accept the statements of the officials of the German Government that they had not received a previous communication of

¹ July 23, the British Ambassador at Rome ‘gathered that the Italian Government had been made cognizant of the terms of the communication which would be addressed to Servia.’ (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. P. no. 38.) Probably the information of the Italian Government only extended to a general and accurate appreciation of the situation and the probable terms of the note, such as was indicated in the report from the French Consul at Budapest. (July 11, F. Y. B. no. 11.) Because of the previous negotiations, recently disclosed by Giolitti, Italy could accurately gauge Austria’s intentions.

the contents of the Servian note. They make this statement without qualification. We learn from the statement of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, that the contents of the note were communicated to him at about the time of its presentation at Belgrade. (Cf. B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, p. 1.) It seems likely, however, that the note was shown to Von Tchirsky, German Ambassador at Vienna, in his private if not in his official capacity. It will doubtless be a matter of particular interest to ascertain what is the ground for the statement of Sir Maurice de Bunsen that Von Tchirsky, disregarding the procedure of responsible Governments, telegraphed the contents of the note directly to the Kaiser. If there should prove to be any truth in this allegation, it would have an important bearing upon the responsibility of the Kaiser, and show that Germany was afflicted with a secret or irresponsible diplomacy similar to that which was the curse of the old régime in France.

In any event, accepting the statements of the German officials at their full face value, and having due regard for the care which they took to emphasize their ignorance, we are led to the conclusion that the German Government took particular pains to be in a position where it could proclaim its innocence of the terms of the Austrian note. One explanation would be that the German Government considered that it would then be in a better position to say to the other powers, "We have kept out of this affair because it is a matter between Austria and Servia, and we expect the other powers to assume the same attitude." This stand on the part of Germany would be less dictatorial than if she had had a previous acquaintance with the note, and had then insisted upon holding off the powers from any intervention. In such a case she would seem to be a party with Austria in the chastisement of Servia. Such an attitude would have aroused still more the resentment of Russia, and precipitated a conflict. Yet this very precipitancy

was the thing above all others which Germany needed if she were really planning a war. True, it may be said that the German Government had to take care not to proceed in such a way as to lose the confidence of the German people, in seeming to force a war by its aggressive action. It does not seem likely, however — if those who actually controlled the destinies of Germany were determined to have a war at that particular moment — that they would have been at such pains to avoid the appearance of an action which would have helped to force the issue and bring on the conflict.

Germany's solicitude to avoid too great an appearance of aggression may have been with an eye to securing British neutrality. It seems most probable that Germany did not really wish to force a war, and that her real purpose was to secure a diplomatic triumph and force the *Entente* Powers to recognize the paramount influence of Austria in Servia. If Germany had been successful in carrying through this programme, German prestige would have been greatly enhanced in the Balkans, at the expense of Russia. By accepting her dictation in this matter, the *Entente* Powers would have practically opened the way for Austria to expand her influence toward the Ægean, and have permitted the German Empire to develop its great project of expansion in Asia Minor along the line of the Bagdad Railway.

3. Germany pledged to support Austria

The German Memorandum, setting forth the circumstances under which Germany promised Austria her support, goes on to relate how “ Russian policy soon after the events following the Turkish revolution of 1908 was directed towards bringing about, under her patronage, a coalition of the Balkan States armed against the integrity of Turkey. This coalition, which succeeded in 1911 in driving Turkey from the greater part of her European

possessions, came to grief over the question of distributing the spoils. Russia was not discouraged by this failure of her plans. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen, a new Balkan league under Russian patronage should be brought about, directed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkans, but against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It was proposed that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which she had received during the last Balkan War, in exchange for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan, she was to be isolated; Rumania was to be attached to Russia through the aid of a French propaganda, and Servia was promised Bosnia and Herzegovina.

“Under these circumstances it was clear that Austria had to recognize that she could, with due regard for the dignity and preservation of the Monarchy, no longer view with unconcern this agitation across the border. The Austro-Hungarian Government imparted their views to the German Government, and asked for our opinion. We were able to agree most heartily with our ally’s estimate of the situation, and assure her that any action she considered necessary to put an end to the movement in Servia directed against the integrity of the Monarchy would meet with our approval.

“We were perfectly aware that the event of any warlike preparations by Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. Recognizing, however, that Austria’s vital interests were at stake, we could not advise our ally to yield in a manner incompatible with her dignity, or deny her our assistance at this trying time. We were still less able to do so since our own interests were most seriously threatened by the continuation of the Serb agitation. We therefore left Austria an absolutely free hand in dealing with Servia,

and we took no part in her preparations." (G. W. B., Memorandum, pp. 4-6.)

On July 24, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, in a dispatch to his Government said: —

"Herr von Jagow asked me if I really considered the situation serious. 'Assuredly,' I replied, 'for, if what is going on has been pondered over, I do not understand why people have cut their bridges behind them.'

"Everything shows that Germany is prepared to support in a thoroughly energetic manner the attitude of Austria. The weakness displayed for some years past by the Austro-Hungarian ally has undermined the confidence placed in her here. She was found heavy to move. The foolish trials, such as the Agram and Friedjung affairs, made her police odious by covering it with ridicule. All that was asked of her was that she should be strong, but it is now thought sufficient that she should be brutal.

"An article which appeared in the *Lokal Anzeiger* reveals a state of mind in the German Chancellery, to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay enough attention. I refer to the feeling of monarchical solidarity. I am convinced that this point of view must be largely taken into account, in appreciating the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have felt the murder of a Prince who had received him a few days earlier." (Extract, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 30. Cf. G. W. B. Exhibit 20; A. R. B. nos. 13, 18.)

The German Ambassador at Paris declared at the French Foreign Office that 'Austria had presented her note without any previous understanding with Berlin, but nevertheless Germany approved of Austria's views and that certainly "the arrow once flown," to use the Ambassador's own words, Germany would have to be guided in her action by the consideration only of her duties as an ally.' (Modified quotation, July 24, R. O. P. no. 19; cf. B. W. P. no. 25.)

Von Tchirsky, German Ambassador at Vienna, declared to his British colleague that 'Germany knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in the matter.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 32.)

4. *Germany insists upon the "localization" of the Austro-Servian conflict*

The German Government did not limit its support of Austria to a declaration in general terms, but even before the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum the views of the Government were understood by the diplomats and could be discerned through semi-official or inspired articles in the press.¹ (Cf. July 4, F. Y. B. no. 9; July 21, F. Y. B. no. 16.)

This attitude that Austria was entitled to take measures to protect herself found a sympathetic echo in England, where the London *Times*, in its editorial columns, argued that the Austro-Servian dispute was no concern of England's and should be left to the parties immediately concerned; the article did conclude, however, with a warning to Austria against any attempt to use force.²

¹ The London *Times* of July 20 published a dispatch of July 19 from their Berlin correspondent under the heading "PEACE OF EUROPE PARAMOUNT":—

"The *North-German Gazette* observes that the European Press is recognizing more and more that Austria-Hungary's demand for a 'clarification' of her relations with Servia is warranted, and proceeds: 'We associate ourselves with the hope expressed in more than one quarter that a serious crisis will be averted by the Servian Government's giving way in good time. In any case, the interests of Europe as a whole, which have asserted themselves hitherto throughout the long Balkan crisis in the maintenance of peace among the great powers, make it appear desirable and necessary that any discussion which may ensue between Austria-Hungary and Servia should remain localized.' On the Bourse, the impression seems to be gaining ground that the Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade will be such as to cause, at the least, severe tension, and nervousness is aggravated by uncertainty as to Russia's attitude."

These remarks are significant, since the *North-German Gazette* is generally recognized as a semi-official organ of the Government.

² London *Times*, July 16, 1914.

A pamphlet issued by the Austro-Hungarian Consulate-General, New

On July 23, the day of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, sent the following instructions to the German Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg: —

“The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims of the Pan-Serb propaganda and the means which it employs for their realization. After the publication of the facts, the last doubt must disappear that the efforts for the separation of the Southern Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with Serbia are directed from Belgrade, with the connivance, to say the least, of Government officials and officers of the army.

“The Servian intrigues date back several years, but Pan-Serb chauvinism manifested itself in an accentuated form during the Bosnian crisis. Thanks to the perfect self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the intervention of the powers, the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was at that time subjected on the part of Serbia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurances of future good behavior, which the Servian Government gave at that time, have not been kept. Under the very eyes, and with the tacit permission, at least, of Servian officials, the Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door must be laid the

York, entitled “Austria-Hungary and the War,” (p. 32) states: “The aggressiveness of Serbia toward her neighbors was condemned, shortly before the outbreak of the present crisis, by Sir Edward Grey, who said in a conversation with a foreign statesman: ‘Serbia is a perpetual danger to European peace; its groundless aspirations continually threaten the tranquillity of the world. The present dynasty must have external success to remain in power.’ On the eve of the crisis the British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen, observed to the editor of the *Freie Presse* ‘that the entire English nation condemns the crime of Serajevo. No single Englishman has any sympathy left for Serbia. We are thoroughly weary of being thrown into disquietude by this little country, and there is no Englishman who does not wish heartily that Serbia receive a rough, sound lesson.’”

blame for the latest crime, the traces of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy longer to view supinely the doings across the border which constitute a constant menace to the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy. In such a state of affairs, the action and the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be considered as justifiable. Nevertheless, the expressions of opinion in Servia and the attitude of the Government give rise to apprehension that the Servian Government may decline to accede to these demands and allow itself to be carried away into assuming a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. In such an event the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless prepared forever to renounce its position as a great power, would have no choice but to press its demands upon the Servian Government, and, if need be, enforce them by the employment of military measures, the nature of which must be left for its decision.

“I have the honor to request you to express yourself in the sense indicated above [to the present representative of M. Viviani, Sir Edward Grey, M. Sazonof], and therewith give special emphasis to the view that this question relates to matters which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers to insure that it be so restricted. We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict because any intervention on the part of another power would, because of the various treaty stipulations of alliance, lead to inconceivable consequences.

“I shall await with interest a telegraphic report of the result of your interview.” (July 23, G. W. B., exhibit 1b; cf. Memorandum, p. 6.)

In communicating this note, a copy of which he was not willing to leave, to the French Government, the German Ambassador dwelt with particular emphasis on the last

paragraphs, to the effect that the question was a matter to be settled between Austria and Servia alone, and that the German Government ardently desired that the conflict be localized, as any intervention by a third power would be of a nature to entail incalculable consequences.¹ (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 28.) In accordance with the instructions of the Chancellor a similar communication was made at London (cf. B. W. P. no. 9) and at St. Petersburg (cf. R. O. P. no. 18).

Throughout the period of crisis the German Government continued to insist upon the "localization" of the conflict. (Cf. B. W. P. nos. 2, 9, 40, 43, 48, 55, 62; R. O. P. nos. 8, 18, 28, 34, 41; G. W. B., Memorandum, pp. 6, 10, exhibits 1, 2, 10.)

Germany justified her action not only on the ground of her obligation as Austria's ally, but from the general point of view that Austria's action was taken in defense of her very existence. (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10 [1914], p. 2; B. W. P. nos. 7, 48, 61; 91; G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 6, exhibit 1; F. Y. B. no. 93.) German representatives asserted that if Servia did not yield to Austria's just demands, she would have against her European public opinion and would be condemned by the judgment of the whole civilized world. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 9.)

¹ The attitude of the German Government is well illustrated in the interview, between Dr. Spalaikovitch, Servian Minister at St. Petersburg, and the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, as reported by the former in his dispatch to Belgrade July 24 :—

"On leaving the office of M. Sazanof whom I acquainted with the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Ambassador. He appeared to be in very good humor. In the conversation which ensued on the subject of the step which Austria-Hungary had taken, I asked Count Pourtalès to indicate to me a way out of the situation created by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The ambassador answered that it all depended on Servia, since it was a question which ought to be settled by Austria and Servia alone, and in which no one else could interfere. I replied to Count de Pourtalès that he was mistaken and that before long he would be convinced that it was not a question merely between Servia and Austria, but a European question." (July 24, S. B. B. no. 36.)

In a confidential communication to the Governments of the German states the Chancellor stated: "In view of the facts which the Austro-Hungarian Government has published in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne and his wife have fallen victims was prepared in Servia, with the connivance, to say the least, of members of the Servian Government and army. It is a product of the Pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the whole of Europe." (July 28, G. W. B. exhibit 2.)

The German view is summed up in their Memorandum: "From the beginning of the conflict we took the stand that the question was one which concerned Austria, and it would have to be left for her to settle alone with Servia. Accordingly, we devoted our efforts to securing the localization of the war and convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had, through the force of circumstances, been obliged to decide upon an appeal to arms in legitimate self-defense." (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 7.)

In response to the declaration that they desired and aimed at the "localization" of the conflict, the German Memorandum states that the French and English Governments promised action in the same direction.¹ (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 6; cf. B. W. P. nos. 5, 25.)

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna summed up the

¹ Sir Edward Grey declared that he was not concerned in a Balkan question. I do not find any such statement made by the French. On the contrary, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, advised Sir Edward Grey that it was necessary to intervene between Austria and Servia. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 10.)

The German Chancellor has stated: "From the first moment of the Austrian conflict we strove and labored that this conflict might be confined to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All the Cabinets, notably the English Cabinet, took the same ground, only Russia insisted that she would have to say a word." (Extract from Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914. From *What Germany Wants*, by Edmund von Mach, p. 147. See also International Conciliation Pamphlet, no. 84.)

situation when he said that it was not, according to his opinion, a question of "localizing" the conflict, but of preventing it. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 83.)

5. *The responsibility Russia will incur by supporting Serbia*

The German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, when refusing to discuss the Servian note with the British Ambassador, said that 'Austria's standpoint, with which he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern, with which Russia had nothing to do.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 71.) This did not, of course, mean that the German Government was ignorant of the importance to Russia of the maintenance of their prestige in the Balkans. In fact the German Government said: "We are perfectly aware that the possibility of warlike operations on the part of Austria-Hungary toward Serbia may bring Russia into the field, and that we may, therefore, in accordance with our duty as allies, become involved in the war." (Extract, G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 5.)

To quote from the Chancellor's instructions to the German representatives: "Some exponents of Russian opinion regard it as a self-evident right and as the task of Russia to take action in support of Serbia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. For the European conflagration which would result from such a step by Russia, the *Novoe Vremja* believes itself justified in holding Germany responsible in so far as she does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield. In this the Russian press reverses the situation. It is not Austria-Hungary that has evoked the conflict with Serbia, but it was Serbia that, through an unscrupulous fostering of Pan-Serb aspirations, even in the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, has threatened her very existence and created conditions, which eventually found expression in the criminal act at Serajevo. If Russia believes that she must champion the

cause of Servia in this conflict, she certainly has a perfect right to do so. However, she must realize that by so doing she accepts the Servian activities for the undermining of the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as her own, and that she alone becomes responsible, if out of the Austro-Servian affair, which all other great powers desire to localize, there should arise a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is perfectly evident and weighs all the heavier since Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention of acquiring Servian territory or of assailing the stability of the Servian Kingdom, but only desires peace through the cessation of the Servian intrigues which threaten her existence.

"The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly marked out in advance. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs against Austria-Hungary has for its goal, through the destruction of the Monarchy of the Danube, the sundering or weakening of the Triple Alliance and in consequence the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our own nearest interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, likewise, of keeping Europe from a universal war, if at all possible, points to our supporting those endeavors which aim at the localization of the conflict, faithful to the policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.

"If, however, contrary to what we hope, the fire should be spread, through Russia's intervention, as faithful allies, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with all the power of the Empire. Only under compulsion shall we grasp the sword, but when we do, it will be with a clear consciousness that we are not to blame for the calamity which war must bring upon the peoples of Europe." (Extract, July 28, G. W. B. exhibit 2.)

Russia's answer to these arguments of Germany is ex-

pressed in the objection which she opposed to Austria's action in regard to Serbia as has been already discussed.¹

6. The situation between Germany and Russia becomes acute

The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, as early as July 25, 'said all he could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) This situation was perfectly well understood by all the powers. In studying the events and negotiations preceding the war, it must always be borne in mind that, whether justified or not, a general mobilization on Russia's part would bring on war at once.

On July 26, the German Chancellor telegraphed the German Ambassador at London: 'According to reports reaching here, Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists immediately, which would be equivalent to mobilization against us. If this news is corroborated, we shall be forced against our will to take measures to meet it.' (Modified quotation, July 26, G. W. B. exhibit 10.) The next day (July 27) Von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, told the British Ambassador that 'if Russia mobilized against Germany she would have to follow suit.' Sir Edward Goschen asked him what he meant by "mobilization against Germany." He replied that 'if Russia only mobilized in the south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too, and the Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.' (Modified quotations, July 27, B. W. P. no. 43.)

On July 27, when the Russian Minister of War had ex-

¹ See *ante*, chap. III, secs. 1 and 2.

plained to the German military attaché that the military preparations did not constitute mobilization, which would under no circumstances be undertaken on the German frontier, the latter had remarked that 'though Germany appreciated Russia's friendly intentions toward her, they must consider mobilization against Austria even as very menacing.' (Modified quotation, July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 11.) Germany heard of preparations on her frontier; beside the declaration of a state of war in Kovno (July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 11), it was reported that the Warsaw garrison had departed, and that the garrison at Alexandrovo had been strengthened. (G. W. B. p. 8.)

When the Austrian Government learned that Russia would mobilize in the districts bordering on Austria, as a counter-measure if Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, Count Berchtold, on July 28, telegraphed the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin to go at once to the Imperial Chancellor or Secretary of State and inform him of the preparations Russia was making.

"Under these circumstances," Count Berchtold further said, "I wish urgently to request the Berlin Cabinet to consider whether it should not be intimated to Russia in a friendly manner that the mobilization of the districts above referred to would constitute a threat against Austria-Hungary and, should it actually occur, must therefore be answered, on the part of the Monarchy and her ally, the German Empire, by the most extensive military counter-measures.

"In order to make it easier for Russia to acquiesce, it seems to us better that such a step should first be undertaken by Germany alone, though, of course, we would be willing to take part in it with her.

"It seems to me that at this moment plain language would be the most efficacious means for bringing to Russia's attention the consequences of assuming a threatening attitude." (Extract, July 28, A. R. B. no. 42.)

On July 29, M. Sazonof informed the German Ambassador of 'the military measures made necessary by the mobilization of the greatest part of the Austrian army, and explained that none of them were directed against Germany.' (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 49.)

On July 29, M. Sazonof telegraphed the Russian Ambassador at Paris that 'the German Ambassador had communicated to him the resolution taken by his Government to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations, which M. Sazonof declared Russia only took in consequence of the mobilization Austria had already proceeded with, and in view of the evident absence on Austria's part of any desire to find some method of effecting a pacific solution of her conflict with Servia. Since Russia was unable to accede to Germany's wishes, the only remaining course was to accelerate the Russian armament and to make preparations for a war which was probably inevitable.' ¹ (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 58.)

On that same day (July 29) Count Berchtold sent the following telegram to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin: —

"I have just been informed by Herr von Tschirsky that the Russian Ambassador communicated to him that he had been told by his Government that the military districts of Kief, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan had been mobilized,

¹ It is interesting to compare the course pursued by the German government with what Bismarck said regarding the course to be pursued in 1888: —

"You will ask: 'If that is so, what is the use of this expensive allocation of the Russian troops?' That is one of the questions for which one hardly can expect an answer from a ministry of foreign affairs, itself vitally interested. If we should begin to ask for explanations, we might receive forced replies, and our surrejoinders would also have to be forced. That is a dangerous path which I do not like to tread. Allocations of troops are things for which one does not take the other country to task, asking for categorical explanations, but against which one takes counter-precautions with equal reserve and circumspection." (Speech of Bismarck, February 6, 1888; from *What Germany Wants*, by Edmund von Mach, p. 84.)

that Russia's honor as a great power had been impugned, and that she had been forced to take the requisite steps. The Russian mobilization is confirmed by the commanders of our Galician corps, and, following a report from the Austro-Hungarian military attachés, it was also not denied to-day by M. Sazonof to the German Ambassador.

"I request Your Excellency to bring the above immediately to the attention of the German Government and to emphasize in this connection that if the Russian mobilization measures are not immediately stopped our general mobilization will be made necessary at once for military reasons.

"As a last resort, to prevent European war, I considered it desirable that our representative and the German representative in St. Petersburg, and possibly in Paris, be at once instructed to inform those Governments in a friendly manner that the continuation of Russian mobilization would occasion counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which must necessarily lead to serious consequences.

"Your Excellency will please add that it is self-evident that we naturally will not allow ourselves to be deflected in our hostile attitude toward Servia.

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in St. Petersburg and Paris are being instructed to make a similar statement as soon as their German colleague receives like instructions." (July 29, A. R. B. no. 48; cf. A. R. B. no. 46.)

The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the interview referred to above, between Count Pourtalès and M. Sazonof on July 29, said that 'the German Ambassador stated that if Russia did not stop her military preparations, the German army would receive the order to mobilize. M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations had been due, on the one hand, to the persistently uncompromising attitude of Austria; and, on the other hand, to the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps

were already mobilized. The tone with which Count de Pourtalès performed this task had decided the Russian Government to order that very evening the mobilization of the thirteen corps destined to operate against Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 100; cf. R. O. P. nos. 49, 58; G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 10.)

On July 30, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin telegraphed his Government that 'the decree of mobilization of the German army and fleet had just been promulgated.' (Modified quotation, July 30, R. O. P. no. 61.) But he immediately afterwards informed his Government that 'the Minister for Foreign Affairs had just telephoned him to communicate to him that the news just given of the mobilization of the German army and fleet was false; that the newspapers' slips were printed in advance in view of all eventualities and put on sale at mid-day, but that now they had been confiscated.' (Modified quotation, July 30, R. O. P. no. 62.)

It would be interesting to learn whether this was merely a typical example of journalistic enterprise, or an effort to stir up an irresistible war spirit so as to hasten the declaration of war. When the *Berliner Tageblatt* similarly distributed extras with the unauthorized statement that England had declared war against Germany, Von Jagow, apologizing to the British Ambassador, said it was the fault of the "pestilential *Tageblatt*." (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914.)

The British Ambassador at Paris telegraphed Sir Edward Grey: 'President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stopped her mobilization Germany would mobilize. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and is now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilization. The answer given was that she agreed to do

so on condition that Austria-Hungary gave an assurance that she would respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia had not accepted, to an international discussion. The President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 99.)

On July 31, the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, telegraphed the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg: "In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also. By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding of the Empire, to announce that 'danger of war' threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization, however, must follow unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and Austria-Hungary, and gives us definite assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of its communication to him." (July 31, G. W. B. exhibit 24.)

That same day, the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen 'spent an hour with Von Jagow, the German Secretary of State, urging him to accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation of the four disinterested powers (cf. B. W. P. no. 111); but Von Jagow, though he expressed himself as sympathizing with Sir Edward's proposal and appreciating his continued efforts to maintain peace, said it was impossible for the German Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication made that day. Sir Edward Goschen asked the Secretary why the German demand had been made even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking her to demobilize in the south as well, and was told that it was to prevent Russia from saying that all her mobiliza-

tion was directed only against Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 121.)

When the German military attaché at St. Petersburg learned through Prince Troubetzkoy that 'Russia felt she could not forego her mobilization, he told him the blame for the terrible consequences must be laid to the premature mobilization against Austria, engaged after all in a merely local war with Servia. Germany's situation was clear, and the responsibility rested upon Russia for disregarding Austria's assurances that she had no territorial ambitions in Servia. Austria, he said, had mobilized against Servia and not against Russia, and there was no cause for immediate action on Russia's part. He further added that after the horrible crime of Serajevo, it was impossible for Germany to understand Russia's declaration that she could not desert her brethren in Servia; and finally he told the Prince he need not be surprised if Germany's army were to be mobilized.' (Modified quotation, July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 18; cf. A. R. B. no. 50.)

'That evening, July 30, the German Ambassador came again and urged on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not infringe the territorial integrity of Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 103.)

On July 30, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reports his interview with the German Secretary of State. Herr von Jagow said that "he feared that Austria might mobilize completely in consequence of the partial mobilization of Russia, which might bring about the answering blow of total Russian mobilization, and, in consequence, that of Germany.

"I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he himself had said to me that Germany would not consider herself forced to mobilize unless Russia mobilized upon the German frontier, and that such was not the case. He replied

that that was true, but that the heads of the army insisted that all delay was a loss of strength to the German army, and that 'the words I recalled did not constitute a firm engagement on his side.' This interview gave me the impression that the chances of peace were still further diminished." ¹ (Extract, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 109.)

July 30, M. Sazonof told the French and British Ambassadors that the Russian Government had absolute proof that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia — more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. The Minister said that if Austria rejected the proposal he had submitted at Germany's request, 'preparations for general mobilization would be proceeded with, and the inevitable result would be a European war. Public opinion in Russia was stirred to such a pitch that if Austria refused to make a concession, Russia could not hold back, and now that she knew Germany was arming, she could, for strategical reasons, hardly postpone converting partial into general mobilization.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 97.)

'The news of the bombardment of Belgrade during the night and morning of the 30th provoked very deep feeling in Russia. The French Ambassador found it hard to un-

¹ At first appearance this change of attitude on the part of Herr von Jagow lays him open to the charge of insincerity. It has been suggested by Professor Munroe Smith that this dispatch shows that the German Secretary was overborne by the strategists and prevented from adhering to the plans worked out by the diplomatists. (See "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, pp. 71-72.) There seems to have been some sinister influence at work which overbalanced the sincere, though hesitating and awkward, efforts of Von Bethmann-Hollweg toward peace. Perhaps history will show the existence of a court camarilla of military authorities, seconded by Von Tehirsky at Vienna, and working to precipitate a war. This will explain the most extraordinary admission of the German Under-Secretary of State that 'the Foreign Office regretted the sudden return of the Emperor, acting on his own initiative, for fear his sudden return might cause speculation and excitement.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 33.) May not the German Foreign Office have feared that they could no longer control undisturbed the negotiations in progress?

derstand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations, from the beginning of the crisis, had followed without fail Russia's efforts at conciliation, and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between St. Petersburg and Vienna.' (Modified quotation, July 31, F. Y. B. no. 113.)

Germany for her part felt that she must reply to Russian mobilization (cf. B. W. P. no. 98). Von Bethmann-Hollweg told Sir Edward Goschen that 'he could not leave his country defenseless while time was being utilized by other powers; and that if military measures were being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He said that it was quite possible that in a very short time, perhaps to-day, the German Government would take some very serious step, and that he was just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor. The Chancellor added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Tsar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 108.)

Later on in the same day the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, told Sir Edward Goschen that they were informed by their Ambassador at St. Petersburg that 'the Russian army and fleet were being mobilized, and that Germany would at once proclaim *Kriegsgefahr* (danger of war), since the Russian general mobilization could be directed only against Germany. The Chancellor explained that *Kriegsgefahr* signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 112; cf. A. R. B. no. 52.)

Von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign

¹ The telegrams exchanged between the two Emperors and King George are discussed further on.

Affairs, told the Russian Ambassador that 'the *pourparlers* [negotiations] between the two countries, which had been difficult enough in consequence of the mobilization against Austria, became increasingly so in the presence of the serious military measures Russia was taking against Germany; news regarding these, according to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had been received in Germany from every side, and must inevitably provoke analogous measures on the part of Germany.' (Modified quotation, July 31, R. O. P. no. 68.) 'If the German Government had failed to meet the imminent peril confronting them, as a result of Russia's mobilizing her entire land and naval forces, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the existence of Germany.' (Modified quotation, August 1, G. W. B. exhibit 26.)

7. *Germany delivers an ultimatum to Russia*

On August 1, M. Sazonof telegraphed the Russian representatives abroad:—"At midnight the German Ambassador, acting upon the instructions of his Government, declared to me, that if within twelve hours, that is by mid-day of Saturday, we had not begun to demobilize, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be forced to give the order for mobilization. To my inquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it." (August 1, R. O. P. no. 70; cf. F. Y. B. no. 120.)

After the presentation of Germany's ultimatum to Russia, M. Sazonof declared to the British Ambassador that 'the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilization. He said he had forwarded to Vienna his telegram modified in an attempt to meet the suggestion of the British Government, and that he would adhere to it if Sir Edward Grey could obtain its acceptance

before the frontier was crossed by German troops, and that in no case would Russia first begin hostilities. The British Ambassador informed Sir Edward that he now saw no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany could be obtained to keep their armies mobilized on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia had expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.' (Modified quotation, B. W. P. no. 139.)

The Ambassador must have known such a course could have little possibility of fulfillment under the circumstances, unless Germany should suddenly decide to change her course upon finding that England was likely to support the *Entente* Powers.

This same day Sir Edward Goschen tried to convince the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs that since Austria and Russia were, 'as was evident, ready to discuss matters, and since Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to him only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Herr von Jagow replied that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobilization,

and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 138.)

The German Chancellor accordingly sent the following telegram, dated "August 1, 5 P.M., Urgent," to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg:—

'In case the Russian Government gives no satisfactory answer to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit at 5 o'clock this afternoon (Central European time) the following statement:—

'The Imperial Government has endeavored from the beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. In accordance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in coöperation with England, took upon himself the rôle of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without awaiting the outcome, proceeded to mobilize her entire land and naval forces.

'As a consequence of this threatening measure, occasioned by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself confronted by a serious and imminent peril. If the Imperial Government had failed to meet this peril, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the existence of Germany. Consequently, the German Government was obliged to address the Government of the Emperor of all the Russias and insist upon the cessation of all these military measures. Russia having refused to accede to (not having thought it should reply to)¹ this demand, and having manifested by this refusal (this attitude) that her acts were directed against Ger-

¹ The Russian Orange Paper states: "The words between parentheses are in the original. It is to be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance and that by error they were both inserted in the note."

many, I have the honor, by order of my Government to make known to Your Excellency the following communication: —

‘His Majesty the Emperor, my august sovereign, in the name of the Empire, takes up the defiance and considers himself in a state of war against Russia.

‘I urgently ask you to wire the hour, according to Russian time, of arrival of these instructions, and of their carrying out.

‘Kindly ask for your passports and hand over the protection of German interests to the American Embassy.’ (Modified quotations, G. W. B. exhibit 26; R. O. P. no. 76.)

The German orders ‘for the general mobilization of the navy and army, issued August 1, made August 2 the first day of mobilization.’ (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 142.)

August 2, Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey: ‘Secretary of State ¹ has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in

¹ Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, in his speech to the Reichstag on August 4, described the events leading up to the rupture of peace as follows: —

“As soon as the first definite information about military preparations in Russia reached us, we informed St. Petersburg in a friendly but pressing manner that military measures against Austria would find us on the side of our ally and that military preparations against ourselves would oblige us to take counter-measures. But mobilization would be close to actual war.

“Russia formally assured us of her desire for peace and declared that she was making no military preparations against us.

“In the mean time, England, warmly assisted by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

“On the 28th of July, the Emperor, by telegram, asked the Tsar to consider that Austria-Hungary had the duty and the right to defend herself against the Pan-Serb agitation which undermined her existence. The Emperor called the Tsar’s attention to the fact that the interests of all monarchs must be identical in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked him to personally assist him and to smooth over the divergence between Vienna and St. Petersburg. About the same time and before receipt of this telegram, the Tsar asked the Emperor to help him and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands.

a state of war.' (Modified quotation, August 2, B. W. P. no. 144; cf. A. R. B. no. 57.)

"The Emperor accepted the rôle of a mediator.

"But scarcely had the action begun, according to his orders, when Russia mobilized all her forces directed against Austria, while Austria-Hungary only had mobilized those of her corps which were directed against Servia. To the north she had mobilized only two of her corps, far from the Russian frontier.

"The Emperor immediately informed the Tsar that this mobilization of the Russian forces against Austria rendered the rôle of a mediator, which he had accepted upon the Tsar's request, difficult, if not impossible.

"Still we continued to mediate in Vienna, a mediation which in its form went as far as would appear permissible, even for an ally.

"During this time Russia of her own accord renewed her assurances that she was making no military preparations against us.

"The 31st of July has come. The decision is to fall in Vienna. We have already learned, thanks to our representations, that Vienna again has started the direct conversation with St. Petersburg which had already suffered an interruption. But before the final decision is taken in Vienna, the news arrives that Russia has mobilized her *entire* army and navy, *therefore also against us!* The Russian Government, which knew from our repeated statements what mobilization on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this mobilization nor did it even vouchsafe any explanation. Only in the afternoon of July 31, a telegram of the Tsar to the Emperor arrived in which he guaranteed that his army would take no provocative attitude toward us. But the mobilization on our frontiers was in full swing since the night from the 30th to the 31st of July.

"*While we are mediating in Vienna in compliance with Russia's request, the Russian host arises all along our extended and open frontier, and France, though not mobilizing, must admit that she makes military preparations.*

"We had ourselves, up to then, not called in a single man, for the sake of the peace of Europe. Were we now to patiently wait until the nations, between which our country is situated, selected the moment for their attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on the 31st of July, we demanded demobilization from Russia as the only means to still preserve the peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg was besides instructed to inform the Russian Government that in case of our demand meeting with a refusal, we would have to consider the state of war as existent.

"The Imperial Ambassador followed these instructions. *What Russia answered to our demand of demobilization, we have not learned up to this day.* Telegraphic reports on this question have not reached us even though the wire still transmitted much less important information.

"Therefore, the time limit having long since expired, the Emperor saw himself obliged to mobilize our forces on the 1st of August, at 5 P.M." (International Conciliation Pamphlet, no. 84.)

CHAPTER V

FRANCE SUPPORTS RUSSIA

Germany asks France to use her influence with Russia — France believes Germany intends to precipitate a war — France supports her ally — Military preparations in Germany and France — The German ultimatum to France.

1. Germany asks France to use her influence with Russia

At the present time France no longer plays such an important rôle as formerly in Balkan affairs. As in the case of England, the necessity of looking after more immediately important questions has lessened her relative interest in Near-Eastern affairs. As long as the protection of the large French financial interests in this region is secured, France is not immediately concerned with the settlement of the intricate political questions which arise in the Near East. Like England, she has been content to leave Balkan questions to the bi-partisan control of Austria and Russia. If the other powers had left Austria and Russia to settle Balkan questions without their support or interference, Russia's superior strength would have placed Austria at a disadvantage in conducting negotiations and made it possible for Russia to secure the paramount position in the Balkans.

The important event modifying this situation in favor of Russia was the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga of Serbia. Thenceforth the policy of Serbia was frankly Russophile. Although the proximity of Austria kept Serbia still in the condition of economic dependency upon Austria, she partially escaped as a result of a tariff war which opened up new outlets for her commerce through Bulgaria. This condition of hostility between Austria and Serbia smouldered until Austria's annexation of

Bosnia and Herzegovina stirred up the little kingdom, and public opinion clamored for a war against Austria to effect what the Servians considered would be the liberation of their fellow-nationals and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom. They counted upon the aid of Russia, where public opinion accorded them enthusiastic support.

England, though she resented what she considered Austria's violation of the Treaty of Berlin, probably had to acknowledge to herself that Austria's action had not in reality changed the situation in the Balkans, and she was not willing to become involved in a contest, the purpose of which was clearly to dismember the Austrian Empire in Servia's favor.

France very properly gave Russia to understand that, loyal as she was to her alliance and the support of Russia's vital interests, public opinion would not justify her in participating in a war, the immediate purpose of which was the dislocation of the *status quo*. Unfortunately for Russia, her desire to protect her sister state and to foster the expansion of Slav and Russian influence in the Balkans appeared to the impartial observer as a campaign for prestige not warranted by any attack upon her vital interests.

England and France might grumble at Austria's action and extend to Russia an expression of their sincere sympathy, but in their hearts they had to recognize that Germany was justified in standing "in shining armor" beside her ally to protect her from aggression by Servia supported by Russia. Russia was bitterly disappointed, but could not, so soon after her defeat by Japan, undertake a new war against Austria and Germany combined; so she had to yield.

The advantage however which Austria derived from her diplomatic success was short-lived. The kaleidoscopic changes of the successive Balkan Wars from 1912 to 1913

brought to Servia a great accession of territory, while Austria, for her part, had been unsuccessful in saving Turkey from dismemberment and was again disappointed in her efforts at establishing a Greater Bulgaria as a "stopper" state to the extension of Russian influence in the Balkans. All her plans had miscarried, and she found herself hemmed in from any advance in the Balkans by Servia's recent accession of territory. Austria then tried to obtain a modification of the Treaty of Bukharest, which had established these territorial modifications in the Balkans; but Germany would only support her diplomatically, and was not willing to encourage her to undertake a war to effect her purpose.

Throughout this crisis resulting from the Balkan settlements, the less interested powers, Italy, Germany, France, and England, coöperated in a common aim to preserve the peace, and although Austria was discontented with the result, Russia also had to swallow her pill when the conference disappointed the hopes of Servia and Montenegro and established an independent Albania under the collective control of the great powers. We may well believe that in the succeeding months Austria availed herself of every argument to prevail upon Germany to give her better support in regard to Balkan affairs. Russia no doubt was making a similar plea to France and England.

We are too close to the event to know what interesting conversations may have passed in regard to the settlement of the rivalries in the Near East. We can only form our opinions of the understandings reached from the attitude assumed by the powers in the negotiations during the recent crisis; from the very start we find Germany emphasizing her intention to support Austria in the localization of the Austro-Servian dispute, and requesting France to help her by exerting her influence on Russia.

On July 24, acting upon his instructions, Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris, informed M.

Bienvenu-Martin, the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, of the German position, and laid particular emphasis upon the German view that the matter concerned only Austria and Servia, and that the effort of the great powers should be to endeavor to restrict it to them, for any interference of another power would lead to incalculable consequences. (July 24, F. Y. B. no. 28.)

The next day the German Ambassador called again at the Foreign Office, greatly concerned at an article in the *Echo de Paris* which had designated his procedure of the day before as a German threat. Baron von Schoen denied that there was any thought of a threat, and declared that 'the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localize the dispute, and that there was risk of aggravating it should other powers intervene.' M. Berthelot, Acting Political Director, remarked that, 'as no confidential communication had been made to any representative of the press, the *Echo de Paris* alone was responsible for the publication referred to, and that the fact of publication merely indicated that the action taken by Germany appeared to have been known outside of the officials of the Foreign Office. Baron von Schoen made no reply to this allusion.'¹ (Modified quotations, July 25, F. Y. B. no. 36.)

¹ The intimation of M. Berthelot is evidently that the German Ambassador had tried to use the press to influence French public opinion in favor of interference at St. Petersburg. Dr. Karl Helfferich, German Secretary of the Treasury, in a most important and interesting commentary on the official publications relating to the war (*New York Times*, March 14, 1915), says: "When, after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia, the German Ambassador in Paris gave to the French Government the correct and faithful explanation that the German Government regarded the matter as one that should be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and desired urgently the localization of the conflict, since every intervention of another power might, by the natural play of the existing alliances, bring on incalculable consequences, the echo of this communication was an article in the *Echo de Paris*, the intimate relations of which to the Quai d'Orsay are well known. In this article, the step of the German Ambassador was branded as a *menace allemande*. (F. Y. B. no. 36.)"

The next day, July 26, the German Chancellor telegraphed Baron von Schoen as follows: —

“Austria-Hungary having declared officially to Russia that she purposed no acquisition of territory, and did not mean to affect the integrity of the kingdom, the decision whether a European war shall break out rests only with Russia, who must accept the whole responsibility. We rely upon France, with whom we know ourselves to be one in the wish for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, to bring to bear her calming [*in beruhigendem sinne*] influence at St. Petersburg.” (G. W. B. exhibit 10a.)

When, on the afternoon of the 26th, the German Ambassador called at the French Foreign Office to communicate the views of his Government as indicated in the preceding telegram, he added that ‘the prevention of war depended upon the decision of Russia, and that Germany felt that she was at one with France in the ardent desire that peace might be maintained, and did not doubt that France would use her influence for peace at St. Petersburg.’¹ (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 62.)

‘To this “suggestion,” M. Bienvenu-Martin, the French

¹ The exact language employed by the German Ambassador in conveying this message of his Government, as well as the intonations of his voice, would be of the very greatest importance as indicating whether Germany intended to ask for a friendly coöperation toward the maintenance of peace, or to threaten France with the consequences of war if she did not restrain her ally. As we have no information on these points, it seems important, in lieu of more detailed information, to repeat here the terms of the German communication in the exact words of the dispatch in which the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informed M. Viviani of the interview: “En ce moment, la décision, si une guerre européenne doit éclater, dépend uniquement de la Russie. Le Gouvernement Allemand a la ferme confiance que le Gouvernement Français, avec lequel il se sait solidaire dans l’ardent désir que la paix européenne puisse être maintenue, usera de toute son influence dans un esprit apaisant auprès du Cabinet de Pétersbourg.” (F. Y. B. no. 62.)

The Russian Chargé at Paris in a telegram to his Government gave the ambassador’s words as follows: “L’Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la France dans le désir ardent de conserver la paix et espère fermement que la France usera de son influence à Pétersbourg dans un sens modérateur.” (R. O. P. no. 28.)

Minister, replied that Russia was moderate, that she had taken no step such as to cause any doubt of her moderation, and that the French Government were in accord with her in attempting to urge a peaceful solution of the dispute. M. Bienvenu-Martin said that it appeared to them that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to preventing military operations looking toward the occupation of Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 26, F. Y. B. no. 56.)

While the German Government, through its ambassadors at Paris and Vienna, was urging France and Great Britain to influence Russia, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, said to Sir Edward Grey that 'if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers, he had no doubt his Government would be glad to join in it, but he pointed out that England and France could not say anything at St. Petersburg until Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.)

Just what M. Cambon meant by this is not clear, but apparently he was anxious to forestall the making of any formal representations to Russia. For if this should be done, the conciliatory attitude on the part of Russia would be misunderstood and thought to be imposed by the diplomatic intervention of England and France. It was very natural that France should not wish to weaken the influence of her ally in such an important question by taking action before Russia had had a chance to indicate what were her views in regard to a matter recognized as one which primarily concerned her. There was, however, no reason why France and England should not in an informal and confidential manner make any suggestion to Russia which they thought likely to be of use. The powers had just been making similar informal suggestions to Austria, hoping to influence her against adopting too drastic a course with Servia.

The Russian Chargé at Paris reported to his Government (July 26) that 'the Director of Political Affairs had declared that it was his personal opinion that Germany's course of procedure at Paris was intended to intimidate France and bring about her intervention at St. Petersburg.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 29.)

The next day, July 27, the Russian Ambassador, M. Isvolsky, immediately after his return to Paris, had an interview with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at which M. Berthelot, Acting Director of Political Affairs, was also present. Both of them confirmed the information respecting the action taken by Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, which the Russian Chargé had already reported to his Government. That morning the German Ambassador confirmed in writing his declaration of the day before: —

'1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbors no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet.

'2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

'3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia.

'Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of solidarity of Germany and France. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Bienvenu-Martin, was convinced,' so M. Isvolsky reported to his Government, that 'these steps on the part of Germany were taken for the evident purpose of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus affecting Russia's confidence in her ally; ¹ and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility, not on Germany, who was, to believe her own statements, making every effort to

¹ "Compromettre ainsi notre allié à nos yeux."

maintain peace, but on Russia and France.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. O. P. no. 35; cf. F. Y. B. no. 62; also F. Y. B. no. 61.)

The Russian Ambassador at Paris transmitted to his Government, on July 29, a short summing-up of the situation which the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared for President Poincaré upon his arrival: "Austria, fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guaranties, which may assume the form of an occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory. Germany is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be 'localized' between Austria and Servia; that is to say, the question concerns the punishment of Servia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guaranties for the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavored to induce France to agree to undertake joint action with Germany to influence Russia for the preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was given that it was at Vienna that action should be taken, since it was Austria's excessive demands, her refusal to discuss Servia's few reservations, and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a general war. France and England cannot exert any pressure upon Russia to cause her to moderate her action, for so far she has shown the greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Servia to accept as much as possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up the idea of bringing pressure to bear upon Russia only, and inclines toward mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeavoring to have the

question drag along. Germany is opposing the conference without suggesting any other practical course of action. Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, manifestly with the object of procrastinating. At the same time she is taking action, and if permitted to continue, her claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should give entire support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. Otherwise, Austria, under the guise of 'guaranties,' will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern Europe." (July 29, R. O. P. no. 53. Cf. F. Y. B. no. 85.)

2. France believes Germany intends to precipitate a war

The first few dispatches in the French Yellow Book indicate that for several months preceding the Serajevo assassination, many of the French officials had considered that Germany was preparing for a proximate war,¹ and this opinion was strengthened after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand (June 28).

On July 2, the French Ambassador at Vienna reported that 'the investigation of the origin of the crime which it was the desire of the Austrian Government to exact from Servia under conditions impossible for her to submit to with dignity, would, it was said, in case of a refusal, furnish the grounds to justify a recourse to military measures.' (Modified quotation, July 2, F. Y. B. no. 8.)

¹ In the noteworthy article, referred to above, by Dr. Karl Helfferich, German Secretary of the Treasury, published in the *New York Times*, Sunday, March 14, 1915, he says: "... in the case of the French Yellow Book the proof can be regarded as furnished that certain documents there republished were belated fabrications." In a note he gives the following: "Thus the Yellow Book, in its first chapter, entitled 'Avertissements,' contains a series of documents which, beginning from March, 1913, are intended to prove a growing war sentiment in Germany. Among them, designated as no. 5, dated July 30, 1913, is a note of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which is said: —

"M. von Kiderlen fut l'homme le plus haï de l'Allemagne, l'hiver dernier. Cependant il commence à n'être plus que déconsidéré, car il laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa revanche." (Herr von Kiderlen was last winter the best-

A consular report of July 20, which the French Ambassador forwarded from Vienna, contains the following account of the situation shortly before the presentation of the Austrian note: "There is here, and at Berlin as well, a group in favor of a conflict of wide extent, in other words, a conflagration. The controlling motive is probably the necessity of taking action before Russia has completed the extensive improvements of her army and her system of railways, and before France has perfected her military organization. But here [at Vienna] there is no general agreement in high circles: Count Berchtold and the diplomatists do not wish anything more than local operations against Servia, but anything may be considered as possible. A singular fact is pointed out. Ordinarily the official telegraph agency in its summaries and reviews of the foreign press pays attention only to the semi-official newspapers and most important publications. It omits all quotations and all mention of the others. This is a traditional rule; but during the last ten days the official agency has furnished each day to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the smallest and most insignificant newspapers which for that very reason express themselves more aggressively and often more insultingly. This work is undertaken by the official agency with the obvious intention of stirring up public feeling and creating a sentiment favorable to war. The fact is significant." (Extract, July 20, F. Y. B. no. 14; cf. S. B. B. no. 20.)

From its Ambassador at Berlin the French Government learned, July 21, the extreme weakness of the Berlin

hated man in Germany. At present he is beginning to be only disliked [instead of hated], for he allows it to be understood that he will take his revenge [for Morocco].)

"Secretary of State von Kiderlen, who, according to this, began to meditate vengeance in July, 1913, had already died in December, 1912, a fact which was manifestly not realized by that official of the Quai d'Orsay who belatedly fabricated this Yellow Book document." (See above, Preface, p. vi, note.)

Bourse the day before. This M. Cambon attributed to the anxiety in regard to the Servian question. The ambassador reported that 'he had very good reason to believe that, when Austria made the communication at Belgrade which she considered necessary in consequence of the Serajevo assassination, Germany would stand back of her with the weight of her influence, without seeking to play the part of mediator.' (Modified quotation, July 21, F. Y. B. no. 16.)

This impression of the seriousness of the situation was deepened when the French Government learned the terms of the Austrian note and the vigorous support it received from the German Government. In the absence of many of the ambassadors from Berlin the chargés came to see M. Jules Cambon the morning after the presentation of the Austrian note. The Russian Chargé remarked with bitterness that 'Austria had chosen a moment to deliver her note when the President of France and M. Viviani had left St. Petersburg. He thought that public opinion in Germany, in great part, favored war and wished to take advantage of this opportunity when Austria would no doubt be found more united than in the past, and when the German Emperor would be less inclined, because of his feeling of common monarchical interest and horror at the assassination, to show a conciliatory disposition.' (Modified quotation, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 29.)

This last observation relative to monarchical solidarity seems to have impressed the French Ambassador, for in another dispatch sent that same day (July 24) to his Government, M. Jules Cambon states: "An article which appeared in the *Lokal Anzeiger* this evening shows also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must stand together (*sentiment de la solidarité monarchique*). I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the

Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously." (Extract, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 30; cf. A. R. B. no. 18.)

On July 24, also, the French Government received a report from M. Paul Cambon at London, that 'Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, told him how Prince Lichnowsky, on his return from Berlin about a month ago, had expressed pessimistic views in regard to the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. The Prince had remarked the uneasiness caused at the German capital by the rumors of a naval agreement between Russia and England, by the visit of the Tsar to Bukharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. From this the Russian Ambassador had concluded that Germany would not be averse to a war with Russia. The British Under-Secretary of State had been struck, as were they all,' M. Cambon remarked, 'by Prince Lichnowsky's air of anxiety since his return from Berlin. The Under-Secretary considered that Germany, if she had wished, could have prevented the delivery of the ultimatum. In view of these considerations, the French Ambassador considered the situation very serious, and informed his Government that they¹ saw no means of arresting the course of events.' (Modified quotation, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 32.)

The French Government considered that one of the most alarming indications of Germany's aggressive intentions lay in her refusal to join with the other less directly interested powers in a consideration of the means by which the difficulty might be settled. Although the German Government had refused to take part in any mediation in regard to the Austro-Servian dispute, they declared, in a telegram to Prince Lichnowsky, that 'they accepted

¹ When M. Cambon speaks of "they" ["we"] here, he evidently refers to the efforts of Sir Edward Grey, in consultation with the Ambassadors of France and Russia, to find some means of avoiding the conflict.

the distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict. They insisted that the question be localized, by virtue of all the powers refraining from intervention, and they were prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, — reserving their duty as an ally, — to join the other powers in undertaking mediation between Russia and Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 25, G. W. B. exhibit 13; cf. B. W. P. no. 25.)

That same day the German Secretary of State informed the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin that 'if the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with Sir Edward Grey's suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18.)

The French Ambassador at Berlin reported that 'this formula, — i.e., "mediation between Austria and Russia," — to which it seemed that Germany might agree, had the disadvantage of admitting that there was a conflict between the two countries, which up to that time did not exist.' (Modified quotation, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 83.)

The French and Russian Governments considered that Germany and Austria were trying to prolong discussions so as to permit Austria to accomplish her purpose of crushing Servia before the other powers could intervene. (Cf. R. O. P. nos. 48, 53.) The French Yellow Book and the Russian Orange Paper do not make clear exactly what advantage it could be to Germany and Austria to prolong negotiations rather than secure the great advantage which would be theirs from an immediate recourse to arms. At first appearance this statement seems somewhat inconsistent with the accusation that Germany wished to force the war. If, on the other hand, it was meant that Germany and Austria intended to secure a complete diplomatic triumph, or failing that, to have recourse to arms, the

inconsistency might disappear; for Austria, under the pretext of engaging in punitive measures against Serbia, might complete her mobilization, while Germany, with all the influence she could bring to bear at St. Petersburg, restrained Russia from any corresponding preparations. Russia was perhaps afraid that if Austria were allowed to complete her mobilization and commence her attack upon Serbia, the powers might decide to make the best of the situation and bring influence to bear at St. Petersburg in an attempt to get the Government of the Tsar to remain passive while Austria subjugated Serbia.

The views of the French Government are set forth by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in a dispatch which he sent on July 27 to M. Viviani and the French Ambassadors: —

“The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic: On Friday he reads a note in which the German Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and adding that ‘Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localized, since any intervention of another party is bound, because of its alliances, to provoke incalculable consequences’; — the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the powers having, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of a general war, advised Serbia to yield, Herr von Schoen returns to minimize this step, pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does not harbor, ‘since,’ he says, ‘there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards’; — the third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Serbia has yielded, one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German Ambassador reappears on two occasions, to lay stress on Germany’s peaceful intentions, and on her warm desire to coöperate in the

maintenance of peace, after having secured the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis.

“The situation at the moment of writing continues to cause anxiety, because of Austria’s incomprehensible refusal to accept Serbia’s submission, and further because of Austrian mobilization operations, and her threats to invade Serbia. The attitude which the Austrian Government has assumed from the beginning, with German support, and her refusal to enter into any conversation with the powers, practically prevents them from effectively intervening at Vienna, except through Germany as an intermediary. But time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier, it will be very difficult to set limits to the crisis, as it does not appear possible that Russia should tolerate the occupation of Serbia, after the latter has in reality accepted the Austrian note, and given every satisfaction and guaranty. Germany, from the very fact of her taking the stand she has, is in a position to intervene effectively at Vienna and to gain a hearing; if she does not do this, she will have justified all the suspicions [which have been aroused] and will take upon herself the responsibility for the war.” (Extract, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 61.)

The German Government must have realized perfectly what views France entertained in regard to Germany’s intentions. As an assurance of this we have only to recall how M. Berthelot, of the French Foreign Office, speaking, with the permission of the German Ambassador, unofficially and as man to man, said to him that ‘to any simple mind Germany’s attitude was inexplicable unless she aimed to bring about a war.’ (Modified quotation, July 26, F. Y. B. no. 57.) Similarly M. Jules Cambon, speaking to the German Secretary of State, asked him “whether Germany wished for war.” (July 27, F. Y. B. no. 74.)

The French Ambassador at Vienna, in his dispatch of July 28, remarked *apropos* of Austria’s declaration of

war against Servia: "Among the suspicions aroused by Austria's sudden and violent decision, the most disquieting is that Germany has urged her on to take aggressive action against Servia in order to enable Germany herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favorable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered." (Extract, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 83.)

From their Ambassador at Berlin the French Government received a dispatch of the same date betraying a similar mistrust of Germany. In it M. Jules Cambon suggests that 'in consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow toward the making of any *démarche* at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma, by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the powers for the purpose of avoiding war could be brought about.' (Modified quotation, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 81.)

Two days later (July 30) Herr von Jagow, the German Secretary of State, said to M. Jules Cambon that 'in response to Sir Edward Grey's request that Germany draw up a formula for the intervention of the disinterested powers, he had, "to save time," asked Austria directly to state the manner in which the conversations with her might be entered into. M. Cambon considered that this was a pretext for eliminating England, France, and Italy, and entrusting the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude to the German Ambassador at Vienna, Herr von Tchirsky, whose Pan-Germanist and Russophobic sentiments were well known.' (Modified quotation, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 109.)

M. Viviani's dispatch of July 31 to the French Ambassadors contains a severe arraignment of the German Government: "When we consider what has been the constant attitude of Germany, and how, since the beginning of the conflict, though she never ceased to affirm to each

one of the powers her peaceful intentions, she has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement; when we know how she has not ceased, through her Ambassador, to encourage Vienna to maintain an uncompromising attitude; when we perceive how the German military preparations were begun on the 25th of July and have been continued subsequently without cessation; and when we remember Germany's immediate objection to the Russian formula, which Berlin declared unacceptable to Austria even before that power had been consulted, we cannot escape the conviction, driven home by all the impressions derived from Berlin that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disrupt the Triple *Entente*, and that she was prepared if she could not effect her purpose, to make war."¹ (Extract, July 31, F. Y. B. no. 114.)

3. France supports her ally

If the German diplomats really did entertain the hope of separating France and Russia, they made a signal failure. From the very first the French Government strengthened Russia's hand by its unswerving support.²

¹ This translation had to be somewhat free, because of the peculiar construction of the original.

² On July 28, the Russian Ambassador at London communicated to Sir Edward Grey the contents of a telegram of July 27 from M. Sazonof, in the closing paragraph of which the Russian Foreign Minister said: "I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet." (Extract, July 27, B. W. P. no. 53.) Strange to say, the Russian Orange Paper, no. 32, reproduces the first three paragraphs of this note, but omits this concluding statement. I do not understand to what M. Sazonof refers unless it is to M. Bienvenu-Martin's remark about the conditions of France's making representations at St. Petersburg. (See F. Y. B. nos. 56, 62; cf. R. O. P. no. 28.) Perhaps M. Sazonof wished to head off any such possibility, for fear Russia might be forced to yield as she had been in 1908. This may explain why Russia preferred direct conversations with Austria to the mediation of the four less interested powers. (See chap. VII, § 4.) In the Austrian Red Book just published we find M. Bienvenu-Martin telling the German Ambassador that 'the French Government was

When the German Secretary of State said, by way of excuse for not taking part in the proposed mediation, that Germany had engagements with Austria, the French Ambassador replied that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia. (See July 27, F. Y. B. no. 74.)

On July 29, the Russian Ambassador in France telegraphed to M. Sazonof: "Viviani has just assured me of the firm determination of the French Government to act in accord with us. This decision finds the most general support in all circles and all parties, including the Radical Socialists, who have just made him a declaration expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic dispositions of the group. Upon his arrival in Paris, Viviani rushed through a telegram to London, saying that, in view of the cessation of direct *pourparlers* between St. Petersburg and Vienna, it was necessary that the London Cabinet should renew as soon as possible, in one form or another, its proposal for the mediation of the powers. Before seeing me to-day, Viviani received the German Ambassador, who renewed the assurance of Germany's pacific intentions. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany desired peace, she should hasten to adhere to the British proposal for mediation, Baron von Schoen replied that the words 'conference' or 'arbitration' frightened Austria. Viviani answered him that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find another form of mediation. According to Baron von Schoen, in order that the negotiations between the powers might succeed, it would be necessary to ascertain what Austria was going to demand from Servia. Viviani replied that the Berlin Cabinet might very easily inquire about this from Aus-

of the opinion that the Austro-Servian controversy concerned only Belgrade and Vienna, and that it was hoped at Paris that the question might find a direct and peaceful solution.' (Modified quotation, July 24, A. R. B. no. 13; cf. A. R. B. no. 11. See *contra*, E. Durkheim and E. Denis, *Who Wanted War?* Colin, Paris, 1915, p. 15.)

tria, but that in the mean time the Servian note of reply might serve as a basis of discussion; he added that France was sincerely desirous of peace, but that she was at the same time determined to act in full harmony with her allies and friends, and that he (Baron von Schoen) must have convinced himself that this decision would meet with the heartiest approval of the country." (July 29, R. O. P. no. 55.)

That same day M. Sazonof 'instructed the Russian Ambassador to the French Government to express to the French Government Russia's sincere gratitude for the declaration the Ambassador of France had made him in its name to the effect that Russia could count with assurance upon the assistance of her ally, France.¹ In the present

¹ This assurance of support, which France gave to Russia on July 29, is of the utmost significance. The Russian Government had every reason to believe that France would stand behind her ally, but a sudden explosion of anti-war sentiment would have embarrassed the French Government. The purpose of the latter was to strengthen the hand of Russia without encouraging her to take aggressive action; in pursuing this policy public opinion in France and the attitude of the English Government had to be considered. Although France was perfectly justified in supporting the Russian Government to the extent to which she did, it seems that she was so convinced of Germany's insincerity and intention to provoke a war that she failed to make Russia realize the imperative need of keeping always one step behind Germany in her defensive measures. Russia's mobilization in the south was a justifiable counter-move. We cannot, however, make the same statement in regard to Russia's order for a general mobilization on July 31 — before she had received the German ultimatum.

Dr. Karl Helfferich states his reasons for thinking this assurance of France to support Russia was given only after France was convinced that England would support the *Entente* : —

"From no document of the French Yellow Book, and as little from the Russian Orange Book and the English Blue Book, does it appear that France at any stage ventured to give the Russian Government an earnest counsel in a pacific sense, unless it be considered that the expression of the wish that Russia might avoid measures which could give Germany a pretext for mobilization (Yellow Book, no. 102) be regarded as a sincere mediation for peace, while as a matter of fact such wishes are more properly to be regarded as tactical hints to detain Germany until the assurance of armed help from England, toward which France was at that time working with all means at its disposal, should be attained.

"The unconditional safeguarding of the English alliance, not any mediatory activity whatsoever, was in those critical days the goal of the labors of

circumstances, M. Sazonof said, this declaration was particularly precious to Russia.' (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 58; cf. F. Y. B. no. 101.)

4. *Military preparations in Germany and France*

Two days before the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, M. Jules Cambon reported from Berlin that 'he had been assured that the preliminary notices for mobilization, the object of which was to place Germany in an attitude of "attention," as it were, in times of tension, had been sent out to those classes of reservists which would receive them in such circumstances. This was a measure to which, on account of the conditions existing in Germany, the Government could have recourse without giving away its intentions and without exciting the people. The measure was not of a sensational nature, nor was it, as had been shown, necessarily followed by actual mobilization. Nevertheless, it was, as the Ambassador remarked, significant.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 21, F. Y. B. no. 15.)

'On July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived in Germany. The Fourteenth Corps discontinued its maneuvers and returned to garrison duty.'

French diplomats; and as long as this goal was not attained, the decisive word to Russia was also not uttered. No matter if the impression is given a hundred times in the French Yellow Book that French assistance of Russia was axiomatic, so axiomatic that a special declaration on this point to Russia — which one seeks in vain in the French Yellow Book — was not at all necessary — the Russian Orange Book knows better. In this there is contained a telegraphic statement of Sazonof to Isvolsky, printed as of July 29 (Orange Book, no. 58), and that, too, as the last of the ten documents dated July 29, so that we may assume that this telegram was dispatched only late in the evening of July 29.

"From this [citations from R. O. P. no. 58] it appears that France, on the evening of July 29, not earlier and not later, gave to Russia expressly and without conditions its declaration of armed assistance.

"Why not earlier? And why did France on July 29 find the ability to make up its mind to this decisive step?

"The key lies with ENGLAND." (New York Times, March 14, 1915.)

¹ For other reports of German military preparations see F. Y. B. nos. 59, 60, 88, 89.

(G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 8.) While these preparations were in progress, the German Memorandum recounts how the German Government continued its mediatory action between Austria and Russia (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 9, and exhibit 23), though it does not appear that any real steps toward mobilization were undertaken until France considered that Germany's action rendered it necessary; for President Poincaré told the British Ambassador, July 30, that 'France was pacific, that she did not desire war, and that all she had done up to the present was to make preparations for mobilization so as not to be taken un-awares.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 99.)

On the previous day (July 29), the German Chancellor sent the following instructions to Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris: "News received here regarding French preparations of war grows from hour to hour. I request that you call the attention of the French Government to this and accentuate the fact that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening state of war [*drohende Kriegsgefahr*], and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace." (Extract, July 29, G. W. B. exhibit 17; cf. A. R. B. no. 45; F. Y. B. no. 101.)

When the situation became threatening, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, told Sir Edward Grey, on July 29, that 'he anticipated a demand from Germany that France should be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give, being bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 87.)

On July 30, Von Jagow, the German Secretary of State, speaking of the 'Russian mobilization and French military measures which he heard were being taken in France, said that when they mobilized they would have to mobilize on

three sides at once. He said he regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 98.)

That same day, July 30, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed his Government: —

"Herr von Jagow telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news of the German mobilization which had spread an hour before was false, and asked me to inform you of this without delay; the Imperial Government is confiscating the extra editions of the papers which announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.

"It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council, held yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presidency of the Emperor, decided on mobilization, and this explains the preparation of the special edition of the *Lokal Anzeiger*, but that from various causes (the declaration of England that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams between the Tsar and William II), the serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.

"One of the ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw Herr von Zimmerman at 2 o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary of State, the military authorities are very anxious that mobilization should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless, up to the present, the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilization, has been successfully restrained. In any case mobilization may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the *Lokal Anzeiger*, — a paper which is usually semi-official, — premature news calculated to cause excitement in France.

"Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the measures for mobilization which can be taken before the publication of the general order of mobilization have

already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilization first in order to attribute the responsibility to us." (Extract, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 105.)

Still another dispatch of that same day which M. Viviani sent to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, instructed him to inform Sir Edward Grey of the situation relative to the French and German military preparations, so that England might see that, although France was prepared to defend herself (*est résolue*), it was not she who was undertaking aggressive action. The telegram continued:—

"You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.

"Our plan, though based upon the idea of attack, provided, nevertheless, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory undefended against the sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

"In order to be convinced of this, it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before.

"In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons in the interior such as Trèves or Cologne; nothing of this nature has been done in France.

“The making ready of the positions on the frontier (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries, and protection of railway junctions) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in France we are going to begin it, for we can no longer refrain from taking similar measures.

“The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.

“Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars circulate only with permits. These measures constitute the last stage before mobilization. None of them has been taken in France.

“The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occasions yesterday¹ German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole 16th Army Corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Trèves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th Army Corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

“Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier.” (Extract, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 106.)

On July 31, Herr von Jagow, the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, sent for the French Ambassador and told him he was very sorry to inform him that ‘in the face of the total mobilization of the Russian army, Germany, in the interests of the security of the Empire, would have to take serious precautionary measures; that what was called *Kriegsgefahrzustand* (state of danger of war) allowed the authorities, if they deemed it expedient, to proclaim a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and to close the frontier. At the same time he informed the ambassa-

¹ For a discussion of the date of these occurrences see the Preface, and *post*, p. 285.

dor that a demand was being made at St. Petersburg that Russia should demobilize on the Austrian as well as on the German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilize also. Herr von Jagow said that instructions had been sent to Baron von Schoen to inform the French Government of the decision of the Berlin Cabinet, and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt.' (Modified quotation, July 31, F. Y. B. no. 116.)

On the afternoon of August 1, the French Minister of War informed the British Military Attaché at Paris that 'orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilization of the French army. This became necessary, the minister said, because he knew that under the system of *Kriegsgefahrzustand* the Germans had called up six classes. Three classes were sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This he said, being tantamount to mobilization, was mobilization under another name. The French forces on the frontier had opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing and an attack was expected at any moment. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of ten kilometres had, he said, been left between the French troops and the German frontier. The French troops would not attack, and the Minister of War was anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilization was one for purely defensive purposes.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 136; cf. B. W. P. no. 140.)

In his speech before the French Chamber of Deputies on August 4, M. Viviani, President of the Council, speaking of the situation at this time when Russia had in part mobilized,¹ and Germany was maintaining a negative attitude

¹ M. Viviani says that the German ultimatum was addressed to Russia on July 31, "on the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilization." (August 4, F. Y. B. no. 159.) The "pretext" seems to have been a reality.

toward the suggestions brought forward with the hope of reaching a peaceful solution, said: "This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become a certainty. In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July, Germany, by proclaiming 'a state of war,' cut the communications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could justify. For some days past, and in circumstances difficult to explain, Germany had been preparing for the transition of her army from a peace footing to a war footing."

Farther along in the same speech he enumerated the following acts of hostility committed by Germany against France on the same day (July 31) she delivered her ultimatum to Russia: "The rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier. From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the sincerity of the pacific declarations which the German representative continued to shower upon us. We knew that Germany was mobilizing under the shelter of the 'state of danger of war.' We learned that six classes of reservists had been called up, and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier. As these events succeeded one another, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, or rather from hour to hour, the precautions which the situation required; the general mobilization of our forces on land and sea was ordered." (Extracts, August 4, F. Y. B. no. 159.)

The German Chancellor gives a different account of the violation of French territory: "Concerning the one exception I mentioned, I have received the following report from the General Staff: 'As regards the French complaints of our crossing their frontier, only one case we have to acknowledge. Contrary to express orders a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, led, it would seem, by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2. It appears that all were shot except one man, who returned. But long before this isolated instance of crossing the frontier occurred, French aviators had dropped bombs on our railway tracks far into southern Germany, and near the Schluchtpass French troops had made an attack upon our frontier guards. Our troops have obeyed orders and merely defended themselves.' Such is the report of the General Staff."¹ (Extract

¹ M. Jules Cambon, in a dispatch which was sent from Copenhagen August 6, when the ambassador was returning to France, gives the French Minister for Foreign Affairs the following account of an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, relative to this incident: "On the morning of Monday, the 3d of August, after I had, in accordance with your instructions, addressed to Herr von Jagow a protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Coblenz by French aviators, who according to his statement 'had come from Belgium.' I answered that I had not the slightest information as to the facts to which he attached so much importance and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious; on my part I asked him if he had read the note which I had addressed to him with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detachments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a French soldier whom he had met there. After having given my opinion of this act I added: 'You will admit that under no circumstances could there be any comparison between this and the flight of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons animated by that spirit of daring for which aviators are conspicuous.

"An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbor by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an importance of quite a different nature.' [See also F. Y. B. nos. 136, 139, 148.]

"Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was difficult

from Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914.)

5. *The German ultimatum to France*

On July 31, M. Viviani telegraphed the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg: "The German Government decided at mid-day to take all military measures implied by the condition known as the 'state of danger of war.' In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening, Baron von Schoen added that the Government was at the same time requiring that Russia demobilize. If the Russian Government does not give a satisfactory reply within twelve hours, Germany in her turn will mobilize. I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information at all about an alleged total mobilization of the Russian army and navy which the German Government invoked as the reason for the new military measures which they are taking to-day. Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply tomorrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock. I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will consider her interests.¹ The Government of the Republic is, indeed, for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled with the feelings which animated our troops found themselves face to face on either side of the frontier." (Extract, August 6, F. Y. B. no. 155.)

¹ An editorial in the *Journal des Débats*, Paris, contains the remarks: "Under the pretext of being at war with Russia, Germany called on France either to proclaim her neutrality or declare war on Germany. But when we replied that we would remain faithful to our alliance with Russia, Germany did not officially follow up these demands. This reply of ours disconcerted her. She wished us, in pursuance of our alliance with Russia, to declare war on Germany, so that she might say to her own people and to the Italian Government that France had been the aggressor. She wished at one stroke to rouse public opinion in Germany, which seems much less enthusiastic, and to make operative the *casus fœderis* of the Italian-German Alliance." (August 4, 1914, *Journal des Débats*, "La ruée germanique et le devoir des nations.")

under no obligation to give an account of its intentions to any one except its ally. I request you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might render a crisis inevitable or precipitate it." (July 31, F. Y. B. no. 117.)

The German Chancellor's instructions to the German Ambassador at Paris to make the anticipated demand were as follows: 'Kindly ask the French Government whether it will remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Answer must come within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that inquiry is made. Act with the greatest possible dispatch.' (Modified quotation, July 31, G. W. B. exhibit 25.)

The Director of Political Affairs at the French Foreign Office, speaking the next day of the German demand, told the British Ambassador at Paris that, 'although there were no differences at issue between France and Germany, the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered this an extraordinary proceeding. The German Ambassador, who was to see the Minister of Foreign Affairs again that evening, had said nothing about demanding his passports, but stated that he had packed up.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 126.) While it is true that a menacing tone for the German communication was unnecessary, its general tenor could hardly have occasioned any real surprise, especially in the light of what M. Jules Cambon had said. So that this part of the dispatch seems meant more for publication than to convey any important information.

To the repeated inquiry of the German Ambassador as to whether France in case of a Russo-German war would

remain neutral, the French Premier Viviani made the non-committal reply that 'France would take such action as her interests might require.' (Modified quotation, August 1, G. W. B. exhibit 27.)

On August 1, M. Viviani, in a telegram to the French Ambassadors, said: "The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for war against France. Yesterday when Herr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct dispute between France and Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have employed all our efforts for a peaceful solution and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the President of the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough to make arrangements for him personally (*des dispositions pour sa propre personne*); we know also that he has already provided for the safety of the archives of the Embassy. These indications of his intention to break off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and even though he has not received any definitely negative answer, are in keeping with Germany's determination to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed to begin negotiations with Russia." (Extract, August 1, F. Y. B. no. 120.)

In spite of what seemed the beginning of a rupture of peaceful negotiations, the German Ambassador remained at Paris some time longer. On August 3, he asked for his passports. (F. Y. B. no. 148.) Germany in taking this anomalous course¹ was probably influenced by the hope of

¹ It is, indeed, hard to explain the reason why so many ambassadors remained at capitals of states with which their own states or their allies were at war. (Cf. Bunsen's Report, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10 [1914].)

placing her action in a more favorable light, especially in regard to Italy. Undoubtedly any indignity offered to the German Ambassador in Paris would have greatly strengthened Germany's position with Italy.

CHAPTER VI

MOBILIZATION

The meaning of mobilization — The issuance of the order for general mobilization — Intermediate military preparations — The fatal succession of mobilizations.

1. The meaning of mobilization

MOBILIZATION is a system by which a country is enabled to pass from its ordinary condition of peace into a state of full preparation for war. The speed and order with which this operation can be effected are the first considerations. The rapidity of mobilization is a prime factor of the military strength of a country, for whether the preparation be for aggression or defense, the country which can mobilize most rapidly will be able to strike its adversary while it is in the peculiarly disorganized condition incident upon mobilization. The tremendous transformation which occurs in a state passing from a peace to a war footing is one of the most complex and rapid in human society. It is like some of those marvelous, almost instantaneous, metamorphoses of the insect world. The plans have been previously worked out in every detail, and each individual has received the requisite drill and an individual copy of the written instructions informing him of the part he is to play. When the order is given by the head of the state, every prospective soldier, wherever he may be, knows where to go. The system depends upon every individual's performing his part faithfully and expeditiously.

What each state desires is to escape all unnecessary military burdens by reducing the number of effectives as far as possible in time of peace. The more rapid and more efficient the mobilization, the less extensive, under normal conditions, need be the military preparations and burdens.

Rapidity of mobilization, however, is not easy to obtain, for with every gain in time goes a disproportionate increase in expense, not to speak of additional burdens put upon the organizing faculty of the Government. It would be disastrous to have the system of mobilization break down and leave the country at the mercy of a neighbor able to complete his own mobilization in an orderly even though less rapid manner.

The political situation of each state determines in general the military economy which it will adopt. Between the two great neighboring countries, Russia and Germany, the contrast is most striking. Russia has none of the facilities for rapid mobilization. She lacks railways and military stores, and above all, she has no bureaucratic organization sufficiently perfected to mobilize great masses of men with rapidity. To offset these disadvantages, Russia has unlimited resources in good fighting men whom she can place in the field without disorganizing the economic life of the nation, and if Germany or Austria should, through their rapidity in mobilization or any other cause, gain an initial advantage, Russia could retire toward the interior and oblige her adversaries to attempt what Napoleon failed to accomplish — an invasion and conquest of Russia. Even if successful, the invader could keep the country in subjugation only by an immense army of occupation. Just as some of the less highly developed forms of life recover from mutilation and continue their normal life, Russia, when the invader had tired of his efforts permanently to subjugate the country, would resume her customary national life. As a consequence of these conditions, Russia has less reason to dread the advent of war, for she risks less than the other powers.

In Germany we find the exact antithesis of the conditions just described. Military organization and preparation have been carried to the highest point of perfection, and the best thought and effort of an efficient bureaucracy

are utilized to mobilize and maintain the military strength of the country. Germany has a network of strategic railways along her frontiers and has worked out every minute detail of the plans for passing, in the shortest possible time, from a peace footing to complete armament.

Since the formation of the Dual Alliance and the strengthening of the bonds of the Triple *Entente*, Germany has considered that her security against a combination overwhelming in numbers lay in her ability to complete her mobilization and strike her adversaries while they were still in the disorganized state which necessarily accompanies the transformation from a peace footing to that of war. The French system, though slower than that of Germany, lags behind by a few days only, so that Germany in case of war must lose no time and strike her at once with irresistible force, otherwise she would lose the advantage of her rapidity of mobilization. When France should have been crushed, Germany considered that she would still have time to transfer her forces to her eastern frontier and strike Russia before she had completed her military preparations.

The danger of this situation was not lost on France, and she well recognized that Germany intended to make her bear the brunt of any conflict which should occur — make her the “hostage” for Russia’s good behavior. France might have attempted to meet Germany on her own ground by developing plans for a mobilization equally rapid, and to this result she would have been helped by the great advantage she possesses in having only one extent of frontier open to attack, and that relatively short. Except for the Franco-German boundary she is indeed secure from attack. The Pyrenees and the Alps cover all but two vulnerable localities bordering on Belgium and on Switzerland, and the perpetual neutralization of those states constituted a barrier between herself and her powerful neighbor. Even if this neutralization should be disregarded,

France might count on several days before the German forces could break through to her frontier. Such a policy, however, would have imposed burdens which the French taxpayers were unwilling to bear. Having no desire to launch upon an aggressive policy of revenge, they felt that the Dual Alliance with Russia would make Germany hesitate before commencing an attack. Everything considered, the nation preferred to compromise and to maintain their military organization on such a basis as to afford an effective and vigorous resistance to Germany, without attempting to develop a mobilization and a power of attack to equal Germany's. They trusted to the skillfully constructed fortifications on their border to delay the German onslaught until the French forces behind this barrier should have completed their mobilization. Of course, military authorities had to take into consideration the possibility that Germany would not respect the neutrality of Belgium or Switzerland; but in that event, it was evident that France would almost certainly be able to secure the assistance of England. These various considerations were responsible for the situation in which we find France upon the outbreak of the war. The military experts on neither side of the frontier seem to have realized how easy it would be for the perfected German artillery to break down any existing system of fortifications. When war became inevitable, Germany's problem was then to find some way, before France had mobilized, of crushing her with sufficient celerity to allow time to turn against Russia, before the latter could collect her forces. The solution which Germany adopted is bound up with the question of Belgian neutrality, under which we shall consider it more at length.

2. The issuance of the order for general mobilization

The plans of mobilization adopted in the different countries are, thanks to an extensive system of espionage, known to the general staffs of all the European powers.

The respective Governments are able, therefore, to gauge the time at which a full or partial mobilization begins. It is also perfectly well understood that, unless Germany is willing to forego the advantage which she derives from her superior speed, she must undertake her own mobilization the moment either of her neighbors begins. But, as soon as general mobilization has started, it is not practicable to arrest it before completion, since all the individuals withdrawn from their normal activity would have to retrace their steps. While this return to a peace footing was going on, and until the country had resumed its former situation, it could not begin to mobilize again and complete its preparations according to the plans devised, until sufficient time had elapsed to return to the peace footing. Consequently, in the interval elapsing between the moment of arresting mobilization and the complete return to the normal peace footing, the country would be in a most vulnerable condition, which would have disastrous consequences, should it be the object of attack. When, therefore, the mobilization decree had once been issued and the preparations had begun to run their course, Germany could no longer delay, but would have to strike at France before the latter had finished her mobilization. In other words, from the moment France or Germany issues a decree for general mobilization, it might be regarded that war was almost as certain as though a formal declaration had been made;¹ and when Germany felt that she was confronted by the danger of a Franco-Russian coalition against her, she considered that her only feasible plan of campaign consisted, as we have pointed out, in attempting to crush France before Russia should have completed her mobilization.²

¹ Cf. F. Y. B. no. 50.

² In this discussion I am explaining the military situation and basing conclusions on strategic considerations alone. There are other practical considerations of great weight which might have deterred Germany from threatening France even if France would not agree to remain neutral.

This situation makes it necessary, from the moment that a conflict with Russia is inevitable, that Germany should have an assurance from France that she will remain neutral, failing which Germany must without delay declare war against her. This is a very inconvenient situation for Germany, for it forces upon her the appearance of being the aggressor against France whenever her own mobilization is necessitated by Russia's military preparations.

It is evident from this review of the military situation of the Continental powers that the decree for general mobilization on the part of any one of them must, because of the system of alliances, make almost certain a general European conflict. This important fact gives us the explanation why the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of the present war are so intimately related with the question of mobilization.

3. Intermediate military preparations

The country which was able to make the most extensive preparations without the conspicuously hostile act of issuing a decree of general mobilization would gain a considerable advantage from this priority of its military preparations. The operations of mobilization being so extensive and so interrelated with every activity of the community, it is naturally very difficult to specify just where the maintenance of the normal military strength ceases and immediate preparation for war begins. For instance, the purchase of supplies and draft animals is a very important factor in putting a country on a war footing, yet, unaccompanied by mobilization of troops, it in no way constitutes a menace for a neighboring state. In a time of tension, the various efforts made to strengthen the military, financial, and economic condition of the country are apt to be interpreted as indicating an intention to have recourse to arms, and these suspicions stimulate similar military prepara-

tions on the other side. Worst of all, this distrust is magnified by the efforts of each Government to conceal whatever preparations it thinks expedient to undertake. It is very possible that the difficulty of gauging exactly what was occurring in Russia caused Germany to use such vigorous language at St. Petersburg, and the Russian Government might well consider the threatening tone of the German remonstrance as an indication of a hostile attitude. The distrust between France and Germany reached its culmination when Germany declared *Kriegsgefahrzustand*. Although the German Chancellor was careful to explain that this did not constitute mobilization, the French Premier declared that it made it possible to effect important military preparations which appertained to mobilization. The French Premier, M. Viviani, said in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on August 4: "We knew that Germany was mobilizing under cover of the 'state of danger of war' [*Kriegsgefahrzustand*]. We learned that six classes of reservists had been called up and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier." (Extract, August 4, F. Y. B. no. 159.) On the other hand, these assertions were contradicted by the German authorities. No doubt it was impossible for Germany to place herself on a war footing before the issuance of the mobilization decree, though she could mass the troops already under arms wherever she considered it advantageous.

4. *The fatal succession of mobilizations*

We can now sum up and apply what has been said about mobilization to the situation just prior to the outbreak of the present war. As a result of actual, suspected, and anticipated mobilizations, Germany and Russia had been brought to the brink of war. The hope of preserving peace was gone. The contagion of "mobilitis" had overspread

all Europe and threatened to traverse the English Channel as well.

To understand this situation, the first and fundamental consideration to keep in view is that Germany, having, as the German Secretary later told the British Ambassador, the speed, would not be likely to allow this advantage to escape her. Even if the German Government sincerely desired peace, the principal hope of success, as soon as war appeared likely or inevitable, lay in taking advantage of her wonderfully perfected plans for mobilization, and striking before her adversaries should be ready. (B. W. P. no. 138.)

It is evident that this facility of striking before there had been time to organize resistance might be as important for German success as it would be to double the reserves upon which she could draw. Germany has always looked upon this speed in mobilizing as her greatest military asset, and has never felt that she could allow it to be taken from her. Hence, — and mark it well, — the moment she perceives mobilization has been begun by either of her neighbors, Russia or France, she may be expected to insist that it be arrested, and if her demand is not immediately acquiesced in, she is almost certain to declare war with all dispatch. Otherwise every hour's delay will put her more and more at a disadvantage. To allow either Russia or France to commence, continue, and complete mobilization would have bereft Germany of half her strength.

The second important consideration to bear in mind is that Germany, when confronted with a war against Russia and France combined, could count upon three to five weeks before Russia could complete her mobilization, which would leave Germany ample time to strike France before Russia could complete her preparations, and if successful in crushing her, transport the German troops to the eastern frontier to attack Russia.¹ All the diplomats at the

¹ It seems from the reports received that Russia succeeded in mobilizing

various capitals thoroughly understood this situation, for it had been obvious to Europe for years. Therefore Russia was perfectly aware that her mobilization against Austria might bring on a general European war.¹ On the other hand, assuming that Russia did not have such a purpose, if she remained quiescent, she feared that Austria would take advantage of the situation to settle affairs with Servia to the satisfaction of the Dual Monarchy by imposing conditions entirely unacceptable to St. Petersburg.

Sir Edward Grey had recognized the course which Russia must pursue when he declared, on July 25, that 'the sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demand made it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria would have mobilized against each other.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 24.) But this did not prevent the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg from expressing to M. Sazonof the hope that 'the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase as long as possible, and not allow troops to cross the frontier even when it was issued.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 44.)

In the dilemma in which Russia found herself, she tried first to avoid the necessity of mobilizing at all by making it perfectly clear that she would mobilize as soon as Austria attacked Servia. The powers could not consider this anything more than justifiable action to maintain her right to be consulted in the settlement of all Balkan affairs. As was expected, the powers did their best to restrain Austria, even Germany acquiescing to a certain degree in the representations made at Vienna. When, nevertheless, on July 28, Austria partially mobilized (R. O. P. no. 47), as she declared, for an attack upon Servia, Russia considered the mobilization as directed against herself and

more quickly than was expected. See Professor Hans Delbrück: "Germany's Answer," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1915.

¹ Cf. F. Y. B. nos. 67, 101.

felt that she must take action. In the hope of not alarming Germany and causing her to make a counter-move, Russia announced, July 29, that she would mobilize her four southern districts lying in the direction of the Austrian frontier. (G. W. B. Memorandum, p. 9; R. O. P. no. 49.) Thereupon Germany, instigated by Austria (A. R. B. nos. 42, 48), declared Russia's action unjustifiable, since Austria's mobilization was itself undertaken only in reply to Servian mobilization (R. O. P. no. 51). Von Jagow, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had told Sir Edward Goschen, two days before, that 'if Russia mobilized only in the south, Germany would not mobilize, but he added that the Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization, and that Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 43.) When Germany, however, learned of Russia's mobilization in the south against Austria, she notified Russia of her intention to mobilize if Russia did not arrest her military preparation. This threat, instead of deterring Russia, only made her the more anxious to hasten her preparation to complete her armament. (July 29, R. O. P. no. 58.)

Meantime each Government had been laying at the door of another the blame for its own preparations. Russia blamed Austria (R. O. P. no. 51); Austria blamed Servia (R. O. P. no. 51); and Germany blamed Russia and France (July 30, B. W. P. nos. 96 and 98). Each in turn explained or denied the truth of the accusations in regard to its own preparations, but was unshaken in assertions regarding the mobilization of its neighbors. Out of this confusion of accusation and counter-accusation one fact was clear, that whoever might be at fault, Europe on a slippery incline was quickly sliding into war, and yet who wanted war? Vienna, perhaps, was enthusiastic for a campaign against Servia, and at Berlin, too, "Geht's los?" was asked on all sides

amid suppressed excitement, when the relations with Russia became strained. But all through Germany the people were praying for peace.¹ A vote of the whole Austrian people would almost certainly have been overwhelmingly against war. Even the German officials admitted that France did not want war. England was doing everything to prevent it. And all the time Europe was sliding down the incline faster and faster, to be engulfed in war. To her statesmen and diplomats alone she looked to save her. First they had tried to prevent the counter-mobilizations by restraining Serbia, but in the face of Austria's note and her openly avowed intention to chastise Serbia, it was impossible to forbid Serbia's doing what she could to defend herself, and when she mobilized, the diplomats could not, without the aid of Germany, interfere to restrain Austria. The eight army corps which she mobilized were not, as Sir Edward Grey remarked, excessive against 400,000 Servians. (B. W. P. no. 110.)

Once Austria had mobilized these eight army corps, the next move was Russia's. Would she reply in such a way as to bring in Germany? Europe was in suspense. In 1908, Serbia had been left unassisted, and had had to agree to the declaration of March 31, 1909, for Russia had received no encouragement from France or England, while her recent experience in the Far East in the war against Japan had made her cautious. Now, however, she declared that she would not submit to Austrian dictation again as meekly as she had then done. Had she again been as complaisant, the bipartisan Austro-Russian direction of Balkan affairs would have been replaced by an Austrian hegemony, and Russia's prestige as a great power would have suffered. So France and England, anxious as they

¹ When we say Germany wanted war or Germany wanted peace, we have to define what we mean by "Germany" and what we mean by "wanted." Every one wants peace if he can have peace on his own terms. Nine tenths of the people might want peace, yet in a time of crisis it is the great cities that are taken as the interpreters of public opinion.

were to preserve the peace of Europe, could not advise Russia to remain quiescent while Austria worked her will upon Servia. As Sir Edward Grey told the Austrian Ambassador at London, on July 23, 'the amount of influence that could be used at St. Petersburg on behalf of patience and moderation would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands.' (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. P. no. 3.) When, however, the astonished diplomats learned the nature of Austria's demands, which she presented without having allowed them to examine the evidence in support of her assertions, Sir Edward Grey expressed the general opinion of the less interested powers, in the remarks he said he purposed to make to the German Ambassador, that 'he felt that, if Russia took the view of the ultimatum which it seemed to him that any power interested in Servia would take, he should be quite powerless, in the face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence at St. Petersburg in accordance with Prince Lichnowsky's request made privately some days before.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.) From St. Petersburg the British Ambassador reported that 'France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6.) Nevertheless, the British Ambassador did express to M. Sazonof the earnest hope that 'Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until Sir Edward had had time to use his influence in favor of peace.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.)

If Russia had really wanted war, she found it obligingly thrust upon her in accordance with the famous recipe of Bismarck.¹ That she did not, however, want war, we have

¹ "I have always opposed the theory which says 'Yes'; not only at the Luxemburg period, but likewise subsequently for twenty years, in the conviction that even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead

as evidence the expressed opinion of high German officials¹ and the consensus of public opinion throughout the world; but whether she wished for war or hoped to avoid it, her move in reply to Austria seemed forced upon her. She felt that she must make evident the sincerity of her intentions to protect her vital interests in the Balkans by mobilizing (July 29) her four southern districts in reply to Austria. (G. W. B. Memorandum, p. 9; R. O. P. no. 49.) This move put an end to Austria's hope of being

to anticipate historical development according to one's own calculation. It is natural that in the staff of the army not only younger active officers, but likewise experienced strategists, should feel the need of turning to account the efficiency of the troops led by them, and their own capacity to lead, and of making them prominent in history. It would be a matter of regret if this effect of the military spirit did not exist in the army; the task of keeping its results within such limits as the nation's need of peace can justly claim is the duty of the political, not the military, heads of the state. That at the time of the Luxemburg question, during the crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchakoff and France, and even down to the most recent times, the staff and its leaders have allowed themselves to be led astray and to endanger peace, lies in the very spirit of the institution, which I would not forego. It only becomes dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences." (*Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman; being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto Prince von Bismarck, Written and Dictated by Himself after his Retirement from Office.* Translated by A. J. Butler. Vol. II, pp. 101 and 102. London, 1898.)

Cf. also what Bismarck said in 1888:—

"This was in 1866, and in 1867 the Luxemburg problem arose, when only a somewhat firmer reply was needed to bring about the great French war in that year, — and we might have given it, if we had been so strong that we could have counted on success. From then on, during 1868, 1869, and up to 1870 we were living in constant apprehension of war, and of the agreements which in the time of Mr. von Beust were being made in Salzburg and other places between France, Italy, and Austria, and which, we feared, were directed against us. The apprehension of war was so great at that time that I received calls — I was the president of the Cabinet — from merchants and manufacturers, who said: 'The uncertainty is unbearable. Why don't you strike the first blow? War is preferable to this continued damper on all business!' We waited quietly until we were struck, and I believe we did well to arrange matters so that we were the nation which was assailed and were not ourselves the assailants." (Extract from Speech of Bismarck, February 6, 1888, from *What Germany Wants*, by Edmund von Mach, pp. 92, 93. See also Bismarck's Speech, chap. XIII.)

¹ At the beginning of the period of crisis, Germany expressed this opinion. Cf. also F. Y. B. nos. 50, 96.

permitted to deal with Servia without interference, and made the situation at once most critical.

As soon as Russia had mobilized, and Austria had replied by extending her mobilization to Galicia it was Germany's turn to move. Von Jagow, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had declared on July 27, that Germany would not mobilize so long as Russia mobilized only against Austria; that is to say, only in the south (B. W. P. no. 43). It must be observed that if Germany had wanted a general war from the start, she would never have allowed Russia to begin even partial mobilization, even against Austria alone. The statement of Von Jagow above referred to is one of the strongest proofs that the German Foreign Office hoped to avoid war. If she had insisted that no move toward mobilization should be made by either Russia or France as long as Germany herself took no action, she would have forced at once the issue of war, or an agreement to allow Austria to deal directly with Servia. Possibly she was restrained from taking this stand by the fear that such action would seem so unreasonable as to make it appear that Germany was claiming the right to dictate to Europe. Germany would realize that such a pretense to a Teutonic hegemony of Europe would rally England to the support of the Triple *Entente* and the maintenance of the balance of power. Whatever the reason, Germany, though she blamed Russia for her unwarranted move and denied that Austria had furnished any motive, did not at first make Russia's mobilization in the south a *casus belli*. Germany had previously warned Russia that the German Government would have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

On July 29, Germany notified Russia of her intention of mobilizing if Russia did not stop her military preparation. (July 29, R. O. P. no. 58.) Again it was Russia's move. She might, perhaps, have made a conciliatory reply to Germany. Consider, however, that if Russia had not been

making the preparations Germany accused her of, she doubtless would think Germany, in making this unfounded charge, was looking for a pretext to declare war, and must have considered it necessary to redouble her efforts to prepare for the conflict. As M. Sazonof said in his announcement respecting the events leading up to the war: "The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary measures." (Extract, August 2, R. O. P. no. 77.) Almost immediately after this, Germany began to complain that Russia was also mobilizing along the German frontier, and she was troubled by the reports received from France and Russia. Even if the sincerity of these reports should be questioned and later found unsubstantiated, the important point to note was their great significance as indicating on Germany's part either a belief that war was inevitable or an intention to make it so.

According to the dispatch of the Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg, dated July 30, and published in the German White Book (German Edition, exhibit 28) there had been a difference of opinion in the meeting of the Ministerial Council which took place at an early hour July 29, and this difference had caused the postponement of mobilization. Since then, however, there had been a change of sentiment due to the belief that England would certainly support France. This conviction that England could be relied upon to support the *Entente* had, according to the Belgian Minister, given the war party the upper hand, and early July 30 (4 A.M.) the general mobilization of the Russian forces was announced.¹

¹ M. P. Price in *The Diplomatic History of the War* (Scröbner's: 1914, p. 103), sums up the results of his very careful and impartial examination of the documents and other sources of information relative to Russia's Mobilization as follows: —

"Stated concisely, the decision of Russia to mobilize partially was taken on the 24th, directly after the Austrian note to Servia. This was confirmed on the 25th, and during the week-end all military preparations except the

The next day, July 31, Germany declared *Kriegsgefahrzustand*, demanded of France what she intended to do, and delivered her ultimatum to Russia. On August 1, Germany and Russia were in a state of war.

If Russia, prior to the issuance of her mobilization order, really made the preparations against which Germany protested, the reason must have been either that Russia wanted war or else that she was convinced that Germany was preparing to force the issue. In a situation like that, if either Russia or Germany wanted war, it would have been most difficult to have avoided it. If, on the other hand, neither really wanted to precipitate the conflict, there was room for the mediation of a friend of both parties. England and Italy, though deeply interested and to a certain degree partisan, were nevertheless the only great powers that were not immediately involved. Hence they alone were able to offer some assistance. Even though Russia or Germany, one or both of them, were intent upon war, a possible way out might have been found if Italy and England had been willing to commit themselves either singly or conjointly by saying at this last moment to Russia: "Demobilize or at least arrest your preparations, and we will guarantee an adequate consideration for your interests and for the protection of the independence of

calling up of reservists were made, and partial mobilization orders signed but not issued. In spite of rumors there is no direct evidence that reservists were on the move on Monday the 27th. On the 28th several correspondents agree that mobilization was in progress, but that it was partial, and one definite statement comes from Reuter that a partial mobilization order was issued on the night of the 28th. On the 29th it was officially announced, and all through this day proceeded steadily. Rumors grew that the districts on the German frontier were being affected, but we have only one definite statement to this effect from the *Temps* on the 29th, and two other less definite ones. On the 30th, late, a general mobilization order was issued, thus bringing officially the whole military machinery of the Empire into action. It may, therefore, be said that Russia began to put her army from a peace to a war footing early in the week that preceded the outbreak of the general European war, gradually extending the operations till by the 31st the whole machinery was in progress."

Servia in any settlement which may result. Otherwise we will join Germany against you. We insist that Germany also arrest her preparations and come into a conference to settle the Austro-Servian question, unless Russia and Austria can settle their differences by direct negotiations according to the usual method!"

Looking back, we can see that a firm stand taken by England and Italy at this eleventh hour might possibly have avoided the conflict, but independent countries are not willing to involve themselves to such a degree and make it very likely that they will be drawn into a war, the primary cause of which did not in the slightest interest them. What could Sir Edward Grey have said to the British Cabinet, and the Cabinet to Parliament, if by acting with sufficient promptness he had thus involved England in a war? It is just possible that the country might have disavowed him and refused to follow such an adventurous policy; and when Germany had firmly declared that Austria must be left to settle the Austro-Servian dispute without interference, would she have backed down before a threat? And if she had consented, while Russia refused, we should have been treated to the anomalous spectacle of Germany and England combined against France and Russia to humble them after they had made every reasonable effort to preserve the peace threatened by the uncompromising stand of Austria, backed by Germany. We may, then, I think, conclude that at this last moment nothing could have been done to intervene between Germany and Russia to break the fateful chain of mobilizations; and so, uninterrupted, the mobilizations and the futile negotiations accompanying them must needs proceed to their termination.

CHAPTER VII

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CONCERT

European diplomacy in the Balkans — Sir Edward Grey proposes a conference of the powers — Germany makes objection to mediation — Russia proposes to Austria to enter upon "conversations" — The powers employ their good offices at Vienna and St. Petersburg — Efforts to discover a formula for mediation — Germany asked to "press the button" — The San Giuliano suggestion for mediation upon Servia's unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum — The Cambon suggestion of mediation after Austria's occupation of Belgrade — The Grey proposal for a collective guaranty of the powers — Germany asks Russia to propose a formula — Austria agrees to mediation — The failure to reach a compromise.

1. European diplomacy in the Balkans

THE ordinary course of procedure, when a diplomatic difficulty has arisen in Europe, has been to submit it formally or informally to a conference of the powers. This has been the usual method followed since the establishment of the Concert of Europe after the overthrow of Napoleon. In the course of the last hundred years, the powers have taken counsel together from time to time to avoid recourse to arms; and this method of procedure has been considered as peculiarly appropriate whenever affairs of the Near East were concerned. Up to very recent years, the rivalry of England and Russia was focused in the Balkans, and all the threads of European politics were gathered at Constantinople; but Russia was weakened as a result of her war with Japan, and Turkey's affiliation with the Triple Alliance enabled her to check any Muscovite designs upon her capital. These modifications in the political situation relieved England of the burden of checking Russian advance on Constantinople. British statesmen could likewise count upon the Balkan States and Russia to thwart any designs Germany's ally, Austria, might have on Turkish territory, more particularly on Salonika. England felt sure, in the presence

of the balanced rivalries and immediately conflicting interests of Austria and Russia, that the balance in the Balkans would be maintained. Her diplomatic intervention could always be counted upon to prevent either Austria or Russia from acquiring too great an advantage, but England could be expected to keep her hands off unless the influence of either seemed likely to become predominant. This transformation and substitution of a bipartisan Austro-Russian supervision of Balkan affairs, in place of the time-honored Concert of European Powers, explains in part why the last Balkan War was undertaken in open defiance of the powers. The Balkan States found it possible to get between Austria and Russia.¹ England made an attempt, it is true, to prevent that conflict, fearing that it might cause a general European war, but when it resulted in the disruption of Turkey by the other Balkan powers, the new situation must have fallen in marvelously with her plans, for the outcome of it was the creation of stronger Balkan States able to offer some resistance to either Russia or Austria and to prevent a possible Austro-Russian partition of the peninsula. Besides, the weakening of Turkey had left her less valuable as an ally to Germany. Thenceforth the strengthening of the international control and protection of Constantinople would be more necessary than ever to the Turk to resist the ambitious designs of his neighbors. Hence, England, wishing to maintain this condition, was not willing to take part in a collective effort to force the Balkan States to disgorge. As a result of these changes, England, having no longer the same immediate concern in Balkan questions, preferred to economize her efforts by leaving them to the obviously inefficient bipartisan control of Austria and Russia. The recognition of this system as part of the European political situation explains the lack of in-

¹ In reality Russia sympathized with the Allies, though she continued to cooperate with the other great powers. This explains why the Balkan States were not interfered with.

terest that England took in the events preceding the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum.¹ Even as early as the first week in July, it was recognized by the public in Austria-Hungary, and conceded in government circles elsewhere, that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand must inevitably result in some action against Serbia. The unexpected harshness of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum at once made it evident that Austria intended to break with the policy of bipartisan control of Balkan questions, at least as far as Serbia was concerned. The danger of a general war at once loomed up threateningly.

In their efforts to preserve peace, the corps of diplomats, like an army, took up the simultaneous defense of their strongest points, and as one after another fell before the advance of war, they transferred their forces to the redoubts still remaining. When they had failed to secure an extension of the time limit, they tried to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Serbia, and to prevail upon Austria to make the Servian reply the basis of negotiations between herself and Russia. When these attempts had ended in failure, they returned to the suggestion made at the very first: to refer the dispute to the mediation of the powers less directly interested in the Balkan question, in the hope of preventing an immediate clash between Austria and Russia. It will be of interest to trace these successive steps.

2. Sir Edward Grey proposes a conference of the powers

In a conversation with the Austrian Ambassador at London, following his communication of the Austrian ultimatum, and the reasons leading up to it, Sir Edward Grey

¹ This is a real weakness in England's Balkan policy — of trying to shelve responsibility so as to avoid being drawn into some future altercation over a Balkan question. In point of fact, this action left it to Russia to take up the care of British interests, and, as there is not the same confidence in Russia as in England, it made the diplomacy of the Balkans still more difficult and perilous, as the result showed.

ended by saying that 'doubtless they should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that they must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 5.)

That same day (July 24) Sir Edward Grey told the French Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, that 'during the afternoon he was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked him privately to exercise a moderating influence in St. Petersburg; and his intention was to say to him that, of course, if the presentation of the ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, the British Government need not concern itself therein; but that if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to him that any power interested in Serbia would take, he would be quite powerless, in the face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. He would say that he thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, who had no direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously, in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

'M. Cambon replied that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers, he had no doubt his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that they could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But when two days had gone by, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand; and Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia; therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

'Sir Edward Grey said that he had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was

clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. His thought was that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential, for such a step to have any chance of success, that Germany should participate in it.

'M. Cambon considered that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other powers.

'Sir Edward Grey understood M. Cambon to mean a mediation between Austria and Serbia.¹

'M. Cambon replied that that had been his meaning.

'And Sir Edward Grey said that he would talk to the German Ambassador that afternoon on the subject.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.)

This extract from the British White Paper gives, like an overture to a tragedy, a presage of the subsequent events. We note how England is not concerned unless the presentation of the note leads to trouble with Russia, yet Sir Edward Grey could not consider it as in conformity with due respect for Russia's legitimate and vital interests to exercise diplomatic pressure and "moderating influence" to restrain her freedom of action in the face of such a note. Sir Edward considered that the only hope of peace was

¹ It would seem that the first idea of France and Russia was to suggest that England mediate between Austria and Serbia. This is borne out by M. Bienvenu-Martin's telegram, in which he states that Sazonof had advised the Servian Government to ask for the mediation of the British Government, and instructs the French Chargé to urge the British Government to accept. (July 26, F. Y. B. no. 53; cf. F. Y. B. no. 50.) It appears, however, that Serbia was disposed to appeal to the powers, and that when Sir Edward Grey learned of this from St. Petersburg, he adopted the idea and proposed a conference of the four powers. (July 27, F. Y. B. no. 68; cf. F. Y. B. no. 69; S. B. B. no. 35.)

mediation of the four less interested powers simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon agreed to the idea of mediation, but thought it would savor of political dictation to interfere at St. Petersburg before Russia had given some sign; yet before she had had time to do so and the powers to offer their mediation, the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum would have expired, and since the Servians could not accept the Austrian terms, Austria would force Russia to take action. It would then be too late for mediation.

Sir Edward Grey foresaw this, but hoped that the mediation of the four powers might prevail on Austria and Russia to arrest their advance; but he recognized that Germany's coöperation was essential to the success of the plan.

M. Cambon feared, and the event proved the truth of his fear, that it would be too late for successful mediation once Austria had attacked Servia. The mediation between Austria and Servia seemed to him to offer the best chance of success, especially if proposed by Germany, and Sir Edward promised to talk the matter over with the German Ambassador.

Assuming that France and her ambassador were sincerely desirous of avoiding war, it is difficult to understand why M. Cambon thought that Germany would be willing to make such a proposal to Austria, when the very terms of the ultimatum seemed to indicate that every precaution had been taken to forestall any attempt at mediation between Austria and Servia. As for Germany's making the proposal, what was meant evidently was that Germany should be invited to invite the powers to invite Austria and Servia to accept their mediation. In this way, Austria would have the guaranty of Germany that she would receive an equitable treatment, and the fact of Germany's making the suggestion would avoid any appearance of compulsion on Austria with consequent loss of prestige.

That same day, Sir Edward Grey accordingly repeated

to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, almost the same views in almost the identical words that had just passed between him and M. Cambon; and Lichnowsky on his part urged the necessity of securing as favorable a reply as possible from Servia. (July 24, B. W. P. no. 11.)

M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, thought that 'in event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the powers to help them. He was in favor of their making this appeal, and would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1909, to which reference was made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the powers.

'If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17; cf. F. Y. B. no. 26.) These words of the Russian Minister forecast the Servian reply and show how earnestly Russia was working for peace.

When the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg 'expressed his earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until Sir Edward Grey had time to use his influence in favor of peace, M. Sazonof assured him that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and that she would take no action until it was forced upon her, though Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe Germany really wanted war, but her attitude would be decided by that of England.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.)

The Austrian Ambassador at London was authorized to inform Sir Edward Grey that 'the Austrian method of procedure on expiration of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations.' Sir Edward Grey, informing the German Ambassador, 'said this interposed, as he had urged, a state of mobilization before the frontier was actually crossed.' Assured of this, Sir Edward 'felt that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia the peace of Europe was affected, in which case all the powers must take a hand.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 25.) In other words, England could resume her former position that she was not concerned in a dispute confined to the Balkans, and could employ all her diplomatic efforts directly to eliminating any cause of dispute between Russia and Austria, with the object of preventing an outbreak between them.

Sir Edward Grey impressed upon the German Ambassador at London that 'in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone, England could do nothing. The French Government were traveling at the moment, and he had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views, but he was prepared, if the German Government agreed with his suggestion, to tell the French Government that he thought it the right thing to act upon.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 25; see also R. O. P. no. 22.) In so doing, Sir Edward Grey practically offered to make himself surety that France would accept the proposed mediation by the four powers if Germany would agree. It is to be remembered that this offer came when there might have been some fear of Russia's also throwing obstacles in the way of settling the Russo-Austrian difference through mediation. England was asking the closest friend and ally of each of

the principals in dispute to agree to mediation, naturally expecting each one to use its influence to bring the principals to accept this method of procedure.

Sir Edward Grey, in a telegram (July 25) informing the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg of the view he took of the situation, said: "The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly coöperate. No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial, and included the allies or friends of both. The coöperation of Germany would, therefore, be essential." (Extract, July 25, B. W. P. no. 24; cf. F. Y. B. no. 50.)

July 26, Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassadors in Paris, Berlin, and Rome to ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether 'he would be disposed that his ambassador at London join with the representatives of England and the other powers for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications. If the minister consented to do so, it was suggested that the representatives of these powers should, at the same time that they notified the Governments at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, be authorized to request that all active military operations be suspended pending the results of the conference.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 36.)

France agreed to this proposal of Sir Edward Grey's, and sent instructions 'to the French Ambassador at Berlin to

concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. The French Government remarked, however, that until it was known that the Germans had spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Italian,¹ and British Ambassadors to do so.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. nos. 42, 51.)

In confirmation, the French Embassy at London communicated on the day following a note declaring: "The Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorized M. P. Cambon to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London."² (Extract, July 28, B. W. P. no. 52.)

Italy likewise agreed, and the 'Marquis di San Giuliano was ready to recommend warmly to the German Government the suggestion of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the results of the conference' (modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 49), and telegraphed an acceptance of Sir Edward Grey's proposal.³ (July 26, B. W. P. no. 35.)

¹ The British White Paper has "Russian," perhaps meaning "Italian."

² The French note calls the action intervention, but if Germany consented, it could hardly have been anything but mediation.

³ Sir Edward Grey, in a dispatch of July 28, to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, stated: "I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this [direct exchange of views], but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to cooperate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape." (Extract July 28, B. W. P. no. 69.) This suggestion is referred to in B. W. P. no. 78, where M. Sazonof says he thinks the proposal "was one of secondary importance." This may have some relation to M. Jules Cambon's remarks about collective action in Servia. (F. Y. B. no. 92.)

3. Germany makes objection to mediation

In the case of a serious difference between two states it has been generally acknowledged that it falls to the part of third states to try to help the states at variance to come to some agreement which will be acceptable to both sides and preserve the peace. The first step is for a friendly power or powers to employ its good offices, which simply means to take whatever informal and friendly diplomatic means it considers will be helpful. When a third state is on most cordial footing with both states it may perhaps make informal suggestions, or the parties may decide to entrust the question to the mediation of the third state. Such mediation, if agreed to, only means that the parties are prepared to consider carefully and in conciliatory spirit any suggestion which their common friend may put forward as a basis of agreement or compromise. Neither party is bound to accept the proposal; but consideration for the friendly action of the mediator does exercise a certain moral pressure upon the parties, so that in certain instances a state may prefer to retain its entire liberty of action by refusing to accept offers of mediation. Under the guise of mediation, one or more third states may really dictate a solution, but whenever there is any exercise of pressure, mediation ceases and intervention takes place.¹ The facility with which intervention is disguised under a cloak of mediation is another reason why states are very cautious in accepting it when proffered.

Recourse to mediation in the case of a conflict such as that between Austria and Servia would ordinarily have followed the rupture of negotiations, and when the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade, Servia did appeal to the mediation of the powers; but Austria had let it be known for weeks preceding the presentation of her

¹ If the pressure goes no further than diplomatic pressure, it is called diplomatic intervention.

ultimatum that she intended to settle her difference with Servia alone.¹ There was, however, another basis of mediation, which was to prevent an Austro-Russian conflict resulting from Austria's enforcing of her demands against Servia. Whether the mediation was between Austria and Servia, or between Austria and Russia, it was evident that it had no chance of success without the coöperation of Germany (B. W. P. no. 25), for even though Italy was Austria's ally, they had such serious grounds of difference as to make impossible any real sympathy between them. Accordingly, Sir Edward Grey, confident that he could rely upon the support of the other powers, Russia included, launched his proposal for an ambassadorial conference at London. The invitation as issued had not stated whether the mediatory action was to be between Austria and Servia, or between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward had simply asked the representatives of the less interested powers to meet at London in a conference "for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications" (July 26, B. W. P. no. 36); but that mediation was to include all three of the states immediately concerned is indicated by the suggestion that the powers accepting should 'authorize their representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to request that all active military preparations should be suspended pending the result of the conference.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 36; cf. F. Y. B. no. 76.)

M. Viviani, French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, returning from Russia on the France, had learned from telegrams received at Copenhagen and a wireless dispatch from the Eiffel Tower of the "twofold English proposal," received July 28. He telegraphed in reply: "I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir Edward

¹ The publication of the French Yellow Book shows the pains the *Entente* Powers took to impress upon Austria directly and through Germany that she ought not to have recourse to force, and that she should show moderation in dealing with Servia. (Cf. F. Y. B., nos. 10, 15, 17.)

Grey, and I am asking M. Paul Cambon directly to acquaint him with this fact." (Extract, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 76.)

The Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed the British Ambassador at Rome that he 'greatly doubted whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action might be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 57.)

In reply to Sir Edward Grey's statement to the German Ambassador at London, Prince Lichnowsky, on July 24, that 'if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia he had no concern with it' (modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 11), the German Chancellor (in a telegram to Prince Lichnowsky) agreed that 'the distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict was quite correct. Germany wished as little as England to mix in an Austro-Servian dispute; and first and last, took the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the powers from intervention in it. It was, therefore, their earnest hope that Russia would refrain from any active intervention, conscious of her responsibility and of the seriousness of the situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, they were ready, with the reservation of their known duties as allies, to coöperate with the other great powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 25, G. W. B. exhibit 13.) Similarly Von Jagow told the British Chargé at Berlin that 'if the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with Sir Edward's suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18.)

On July 27, — that is, the day after Sir Edward Grey instructed the British representatives to extend to the powers the invitation to the ambassadorial conference, — the German Chancellor telegraphed Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador at London: "Nothing is known here as yet concerning a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey to hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to drag our ally before a European court for the settlement of her difference with Serbia. Our mediatory activity must be confined to the danger of a Russo-Austrian conflict."¹ (July 27, G. W. B. exhibit 12; cf. A. R. B. no. 35.)

Later that same day, when the proposal was officially presented, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Von Jagow, declined it, saying that 'a conference such as Sir Edward Grey suggested would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with Sir Edward's suggestion, desirous though he was to coöperate for the maintenance of peace. Sir Edward Goschen said that he was sure that Sir Edward Grey's idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that the representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. Von Jagow maintained, however, that such a conference as Sir Edward Grey proposed was not practicable, and added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await the out-

¹ The French Chargé at London informed his Government: "It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little conference, Russia, Austria, and Serbia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favorable to it." (Extract, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 68; cf. F. Y. B. no. 69.)

come of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 43; cf. B. W. P. no. 67; F. Y. B. no. 73; B. G. P. no. 6.)

The same day the French Ambassador at Berlin argued forcibly to prevail upon Germany to agree to the quadruple mediation and tactfully proposed 'that the powers advise Vienna "to abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation at the present hour," as this veiled formula obviated the need of mentioning the necessity of refraining from invading Servia; but Von Jagow returned a categorical refusal to the proposal, in spite of the insistence of the French Ambassador, who pointed out the advantage of this suggestion in that the powers would be so grouped as to avoid the opposing of the Alliance by the *Entente*, of which Von Jagow himself had so often complained.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. O. P. no. 39; cf. F. Y. B. no. 74; R. O. P. no. 34.)

In reference to the English proposal, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to his Government, on July 28:—

"I to-day supported the step of my British colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that he could not possibly accept the idea of a sort of conference in London between the ambassadors of four powers, and that another form would have to be given to the British suggestion if it were to be realizable. I pointed out the danger of a delay which might lead to war, and asked him if he wanted war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were begun, and that from now on he expected a favorable result. The British and Italian Ambassadors came together to see me this morning, in order to discuss with me the conversations they had yesterday with Herr Von Jagow on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. The Secretary of State said, on the whole,

pretty much what he said to me; he accepted the principle of joining in a *démarche* common to Italy, England, and ourselves, but rejected all idea of a conference. We are of opinion, my colleagues and I, that there is in this nothing but a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that it should give another label to its proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic *démarche* in Vienna and in St. Petersburg." (Extract, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 81.)

The German Chancellor sent word to Sir Edward Grey that 'he had not been able to accept his proposal for a conference of representatives of the great powers because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had the appearance of an "Areopagus," consisting of two powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 71; cf. G. W. B. Memorandum, p. 8.)

Sir Edward Grey attempted to remove the German objection to the proposed mediation by declaring that 'it would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would, it was declared, be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 67; cf. B. W. P. no. 43.)

After the first breakdown of direct conversations between Austria and Russia the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported to his Government that 'when the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs tried to persuade him that he should urge his Government to participate in a quadruple conference for the purpose of finding means to induce Austria to forego those demands which affected Servian sover-

¹ See statement in *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 25, 1914.

eignty, he had pointed out how Russia was asking Germany to take in regard to Austria the very action which the latter was blamed for taking against Serbia, i.e., a violation of her sovereignty.'¹ (Modified quotation, G. W. B. Memorandum, pp. 9-10.)

In view of this attitude on the part of the German Government, it is hard to understand what Prince Lichnowsky meant when he informed Sir Edward Grey (July 27) that 'the German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four powers. At the same time, he urged Sir Edward to use his influence at St. Petersburg to localize the war and keep the peace of Europe. To which the British Secretary replied that if Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. The Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. Sir Edward said that the German Government should urge this at Vienna. Continuing, he recalled what the German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so, other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace, Sir Edward said he would keep closely in touch. He repeated that after the Servian reply, it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 46; cf. F. Y. B. no. 66.) The emphatic, almost threatening, manner in which Sir Edward Grey spoke

¹ For M. Sazonof's account of this interview see R. O. P. no. 49; B. W. P. no. 93 (2).

seems to have borne fruit, for the German Ambassador was not long in informing him that 'the German Government had taken action in the sense of their conversation.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 67.)

In reply, Count Berchtold requested the German Ambassador at Vienna, Von Tchirsky, to express to Von Bethmann-Hollweg his thanks for the communication of the English proposal of mediation on the basis of the Servian note, but he added that, 'after the commencement of hostilities by Servia and Austria's subsequent declaration of war, the step appeared belated.' (Modified quotation, July 28, G. W. B. exhibit 16; cf. B. W. P. no. 76; A. R. B. nos. 43, 44.)

That same day, July 28, 'the English Ambassador at Vienna, in a most tactful manner and avoiding the word mediation, spoke directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sir Edward Grey's hopes that conversations in London between the four less interested powers might yet lead to an arrangement which the Austro-Hungarian Government could accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. He also said that Sir Edward regarded the Servian reply as having gone far to meet Austria's just demands and that he thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance. Count Berchtold replied that no discussion would be accepted on the basis of the Servian note, that war would have to be declared, and that it was a matter that must be settled directly between the parties immediately concerned.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 62.)

¹ Count Berchtold, according to the Austrian Red Book (no. 41), said in part: "Sir Edward Grey's suggestions concerning the possibility of preventing an outbreak of hostilities are somewhat belated, since, as early as yesterday, the Servians opened fire on our frontier-guards, and also because we declared war upon Servia to-day. Referring to the idea of an exchange of views on the basis of the Servian response, I have to decline the suggestion. We demanded an unqualified acceptance. Servia has endeavored to extricate herself from an embarrassing situation by means of quibbles.

In fine, Germany took the stand that she could not bring pressure to bear to induce Austria to accept the mediation of the powers, since Austria had been obliged to take action in consequence of the unjustifiable conduct of Serbia. After Austria had declared that the settlement of the dispute must be left to the parties concerned, — that is to say to Austria and Serbia, — Germany felt that the prestige of her ally would suffer should she yield on that point. 'Besides, Germany felt that she had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that she was being pressed would be likely to cause her to precipitate matters and place them in the presence of a *fait accompli*. The German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was not sure, he said, that his communication to Austria of Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that the Serbian reply should serve as a basis for discussion had not had such a result in hastening the declaration of war.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 76; cf. F. Y. B. no. 11; R. O. P. no. 51; B. W. P. no. 107.)

4. *Russia proposes to Austria to enter upon "conversations"*

While Sir Edward Grey had been making the effort to constitute a mediatory conference, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had been attempting to reach a solution by direct negotiations with Austria.

On July 26, the day following Austria's rupture of diplomatic relations with Serbia, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg sent the following report of M. Sazonof's efforts at conciliation: —

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. 'I shall show myself ready to negotiate up to the last instant,' he said to me.

"It is in this spirit that he has asked Count Szapary

With such tactics we are only too familiar." (Extract, July 28, A. R. B. no. 41.)

[Austrian Ambassador] to come and see him for a 'frank and loyal explanation.' In his presence M. Sazonof discussed the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, showing clearly the insulting character of the different clauses. 'The intention which inspired this document,' he said, 'is legitimate if you pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory against the agitation of Servian anarchists, but the step to which you have had recourse is not defensible.' He concluded, 'Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee the result.'

"The Austrian Ambassador appeared to be touched by his language, but pending instructions he reserved the opinion of his Government. M. Sazonof, without being discouraged, has decided to suggest this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg with regard to the changes to be made in the ultimatum. This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore think it preferable to any other procedure, and I think it is likely to succeed." (July 26, F. Y. B. no. 54.)

July 26, M. Sazonof, informing the Russian Ambassador at Vienna of this same conversation which he had had with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, said that 'in the interest of the preservation of peace, which, according to the Ambassador's statements, was precious to Austria in the same degree as to all the powers, it would be necessary to put a stop as soon as possible to the strained situation of the moment. With this object in view, it seemed very desirable that the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary should be authorized to enter into an exchange of private views with him, with the object of making in common an alteration (*remaniement*) of some of the clauses of the Austrian note. This proceeding would, the Russian Minister thought, perhaps permit of finding a

formula acceptable for Servia while at the same time giving satisfaction to Austria as to the basis of her demands. Accordingly he instructed the Russian Ambassador to enter into prudent and friendly explanation with Count Berchtold in conformity with these views.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 25; cf. R. O. P. no. 26; B. W. P. no. 56.)

As soon as the Russian Ambassador at London learned of M. Sazonof's proposal, he telegraphed the Minister:—

"Pray telegraph me if in your opinion your direct *pour-parlers* with the Cabinet of Vienna are in line with Grey's proposal concerning the mediation of the four Governments. Having learned from the Ambassador of England at St. Petersburg that you were disposed to accept this combination, Grey decided to give it the form of an official proposal, which he made last night to Berlin, Paris, and Rome." (Extract, July 27, R. O. P. no. 31.)

The British White Paper does not appear to contain any record of Russia's having given her assent to the British mediation proposal before it was officially presented, but M. Sazonof had said to the British Ambassador, July 25: "If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy." (Extract, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) Sir Edward Grey had also that same day, July 25, sent to Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the telegram expressing his view, as we have seen, to the effect that 'the sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* made it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria would have mobilized against each other. In that event, the only chance of peace, in Sir Edward's opinion, was for the other four powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try to

arrange matters. If Germany would adopt that view, he felt strongly that France and England should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly coöperate. No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial, and included the allies or friends of both. The coöperation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 24.)

July 27, Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof 'said that he did not know whether Austria would accept the friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other powers throughout the conversations that would ensue. He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1909,¹ alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the powers. The Ambassador then asked him if he had heard of Sir Edward Grey's proposal with regard to a conference of the four powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, Sir George told him confidentially of Sir Edward's instructions to him, and inquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom Sir George had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

'M. Sazonof replied that he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that Sir Edward Grey would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.'² (Modified quotations, July 27, B. W. P. no. 55.)

¹ The text of the British White Paper has 1908.

² The Russian Minister lost valuable time in not at once throwing his whole influence on the side of Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation,

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris of this interview with the British Ambassador in the following terms:—

“The Ambassador of England called to ascertain if we thought it useful that England should take the initiative in convoking at London a conference of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy, in order to study a solution of the present situation.

“I replied to the Ambassador that I had opened *pour-parlers* with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under conditions that I hope are favorable. However, I have not yet received a reply to the proposal I made for a revision of the note between the two Cabinets.

“If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna prove impracticable, I am ready to accept the English proposal or any other calculated to bring about a favorable solution of the conflict.” (July 27, R. O. P. no. 32.)

Sir Edward Grey showed a total absence of pique that his formal proposal should be set aside¹ and telegraphed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg:—

but, no doubt, he felt that Austria's ignoring of recognized Russian interests in the Balkans would, if allowed to pass unopposed, affect Russia's prestige. Even though the united influence of the powers in conclave should prevent a war, it would appear that they, and not Russia, were the protectors of the small states of the Balkans against Austrian aggression. M. Sazonof's last remark about “keeping in touch” shows some apprehension lest the quadruple intervention might impose a solution objectionable to Russia. It may have been an appeal to England to protect Russia's interests in case of mediation.

¹ On July 27, Sir Edward Grey made a statement in the House of Commons in regard to the European situation and the steps the British Government was taking to preserve the peace. He concluded as follows:—

“The time allowed in this matter has been so short that I have had to take the risk of making a proposal without the usual preliminary steps of trying to ascertain whether it would be well received. But, where matters are so grave and the time so short, the risk of proposing something that is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Servian reply as published this morning in the press is accurate, as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a basis on which a friendly and impartial group of powers, including powers

"It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th of July.

"I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade¹ should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to coöperate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape." (July 28, B. W. P. nos. 69, 78.)

Sir Edward Grey also informed Sir Edward Goschen at Berlin of his agreement with the views expressed by the German Government 'that a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia was the most preferable method of all, and as long as there was any prospect of such an exchange, he said he would suspend every other suggestion.'² (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 67; cf. B. W. P. no. 68.)

As early as July 23, before he knew the terms of the Austrian note, Sir Edward Grey had said to the Austrian Ambassador at London that he 'hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other'; and the Austrian Ambassador had replied that 'he

who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement that would be generally acceptable.

"It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and becomes one in which another great power is involved, it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow; no one can say what would be the limit of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict; the consequences of it, direct and indirect, would be incalculable." (London *Times*, July 28, 1914.)

¹ This seems to refer to some proposal of collective intervention or mediation at Belgrade. See above p. 204, note 3.

² The German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, is quoted as having made the statement: "By dropping her idea of a conference England made it appear that she wished Austria-Hungary, through Germany's mediation, to yield." (The New York *Times*, January 15, 1915, p. 3.)

hoped it would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favorable recently.' (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. P. no. 3.)

At Berlin the Russian Chargé 'urged the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs to support the Russian proposal. Von Jagow replied that he shared the opinion of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that since Count Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador, had begun this conversation he might very well continue it.¹ He said he would telegraph the German Ambassador at Vienna to this effect; but when the Russian Chargé begged him to urge Vienna with more insistence to adopt this conciliatory procedure, Von Jagow answered that he could not advise Vienna to yield.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. O. P. no. 38.)

'July 28, in the afternoon, M. Sazonof received the German and Austrian Ambassadors. The impression he received from his double interview was bad. "Decidedly," he said to the French Ambassador, "Austria does not wish to talk." As a result of a conversation that the latter had with his two colleagues, he received the same pessimistic impression.' (Modified quotation, July 28, F. Y. B. no. 82; cf. R. O. P. no. 43.)

When, on July 28, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, 'acting upon M. Sazonof's instructions, brought to the notice of Count Berchtold how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guaranties for its future relations with Servia, the Austrian Minister replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation, and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the

¹ Ordinarily the Government which makes the proposal would entrust the whole negotiations to its representative at the capital where the proposal was made.

St. Petersburg Cabinet, but that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, having decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede or enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.¹ (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 93 (1); R. O. P. no. 45.)

When the Russian Government learned of Austria's declaration of war against Serbia, M. Sazonof telegraphed the Russian Ambassador at London: "On the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Serbia, it is necessary for England without delay to try her mediation. At the same time Austrian military operations against Serbia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation would only serve as a pretext to drag out the settlement of the question, and afford Austria in the mean time a possibility of crushing Serbia completely and acquiring a predominating position in the Balkans." (July 28, R. O. P. no. 48; cf. B. W. P. nos. 70 (2), 74.)

¹ The Austrian Red Book gives the following account of this interview: "The Imperial Russian Ambassador waited on me to-day to announce to me his return from a short leave of absence in Russia and at the same time to carry out instructions sent to him by M. Sazonof by telegraph. He said that he later had informed him that he had had a long, friendly interview with Your Excellency (Your Excellency's telegram of July 27), during which Your Excellency had with great willingness discussed the various points of the Servian reply. He said that M. Sazonof thought that Serbia had met our wishes to a great extent, but that certain demands seemed to him quite unacceptable and that he had not concealed this belief from you. Under the circumstances, he said, it seemed to him that the Servian reply was suitable for being made the basis for an understanding, toward which the Russian Government would willingly coöperate. Therefore, he said, M. Sazonof wished to propose to me that his exchanges of views with Your Excellency might continue and that Your Excellency might for this purpose be provided with instructions.

"In reply I said emphatically that I could not agree to such a suggestion. No one here would understand or tolerate that we should enter into discussions regarding the wording of a reply already designated by us as unsatisfactory; that such a course was all the more impossible since public opinion was already deeply stirred, as the ambassador knew, and that, moreover, we had declared war against Serbia to-day." (Extract, July 28, A. R. B. no. 40.)

On July 29, before M. Sazonof had heard of the Austrian Minister's rejection of his proposal, he sent off a telegram informing the Russian Chargé at Berlin of a conversation with the German Ambassador in which he had said that he was 'in favor of the direct explanation between Vienna and St. Petersburg, provided the conciliatory counsel from Berlin to which he referred met with a response from Vienna. At the same time M. Sazonof indicated that Russia was prepared to accept the proposed conference of the four powers, which Germany, it seemed, did not entirely approve. The Minister further said that in his opinion the best way to take advantage of every opportunity to effect a peaceful solution would be to parallel the direct negotiations between Austria and Russia by the *pourparlers* of the four powers, Germany, France, England, and Italy, united in a conference, similarly to what was done at the most critical moment of last year's crisis.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 49; cf. R. O. P. no. 50; B. W. P. no. 93 (2).)

As soon, however, as the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had received the telegram from Vienna, telling of Count Berchtold's refusal of the Russian proposal, he sent a second telegram to Berlin explaining that 'at the time of his conversation with the German Ambassador, referred to in his last telegram (R. O. P. no. 49), he had not received word from Vienna of the refusal of the Austrian Government to enter upon a direct exchange of views with

¹ I find it difficult to reconcile R. O. P. no. 50 with B. W. P. no. 70 (2), (R. O. P. no. 48), which is dated July 28. According to B. W. P. no. 70 (2), Sazonof on July 28 took the same stand that direct negotiations were at an end, as R. O. P. no. 50 indicates he took only after he heard that his offer for direct conversations had been refused by Austria. Perhaps the explanation of this discrepancy may be that when Sazonof heard of Austria's declaration of war against Serbia he sent the telegram (R. O. P. no. 48) to London, making it emphatic to impress Sir Edward Grey, and after that (July 29) he had an interview with the German Ambassador which made him hopeful of continuing negotiations with Austria, until he learned of Berchtold's refusal. (R. O. P. no. 45.)

the Russian Government. After that the only course left open to the Russian Government was, M. Sazonof said, to leave to the initiative of the English Government the undertaking of such action as it should consider advisable.' (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 50; cf. B. W. P. nos. 93 (3), 74.) Yet that same day (July 29) the German Ambassador at London was instructed to inform Sir Edward Grey that 'Austria and Russia seemed to be in constant touch, and that the German Chancellor was endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extent of the Austrian proceedings in Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 84; cf. G. W. B. exhibit 22.) This amounted to saying that Austria was willing to continue to negotiate with Russia; but that she was not willing to discuss the terms of her note to Servia, which she persisted in considering as a question purely between herself and Servia. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 62.)

In a dispatch of July 29 to Count Berchtold, Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, states:—

"On information received from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof appeared greatly disturbed by your apparent unwillingness to continue discussions with Russia and by the Austro-Hungarian order of mobilization, which appears to him to exceed the necessary scope and therefore is believed to be directed against Russia, I called upon the Minister in an attempt to clear up misconceptions which seemed to exist.

"The Minister asserted that Austria-Hungary had refused point-blank to discuss matters any further. In accordance with your telegram of the 28th instant, I explained that in view of recent events, you certainly had refused to discuss any further the wording of the notes and our conflict with Servia in general; that, on the other hand, I had to state that I was in a position to open a much wider field for discussion by declaring that we do not wish to in-

terfere with any Russian interests and that we do not intend to take any Servian territory; provided, always, that the conflict be localized between Austria-Hungary and Servia; that, moreover, we did not intend to violate Servia's sovereignty. I expressed my firm conviction that you would always be willing to keep in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests." (Extract, July 29, A. R. B. no. 47.)

The German Memorandum states: "Inasmuch as the Russian Government, in reply to the several inquiries regarding the reasons for its threatening attitude, several times alluded to the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had not yet begun any conversations in St. Petersburg, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, at our request, was directed on July 29 to begin the conversations with M. Sazonof. Count Szapary was authorized to make known to the Russian Minister the contents of the note to Servia which has been, as it were, overtaken by the declaration of war, and to receive any suggestions that might still come from the Russian side, as well as to discuss with M. Sazonof all questions touching directly on the Austro-Russian relations." (Extract, G. W. B. Memorandum, p. 11; cf. A. R. B. no. 49.)

Between the 28th and 30th, Austria undoubtedly assumed a much more conciliatory attitude, for on the latter date Count Berchtold 'again received the Russian Ambassador in a perfectly friendly manner and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg.' (Modified quotation, B. W. P. Miscellaneous, no. 10 [1914]; cf. B. W. P. no. 110.)

On July 30 the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, sent the following instructions to Herr von Tschirsky, German Ambassador at Vienna: —

"The report of Count Pourtalès does not harmonize with the account which Your Excellency has given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government. Appar-

ently there is a misunderstanding, which I beg you to clear up. We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia, with which she is in a state of war. The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake. We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty. As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice. Your Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness.”¹

On July 30, Count Berchtold sent the following telegram to Count Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg: “In reply to Your Excellency’s telegram of July 29:

¹ This telegram was published in the *Westminster Gazette* August 1. See also M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, p. 251. Mr. Price (pp. 6-7) gives the following summary of Germany’s mediatory efforts at Vienna:

“On the other hand, there is evidence to the effect that during the negotiations after the Austrian Note to Serbia, Germany, however stupidly and supinely she handled the Austro-Servian dispute, was fully alive to the danger to Europe of a Russo-Austrian conflict. Thus the telegrams passing between the London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Paris Foreign Offices show that although Germany refused Sir Edward Grey’s suggestion of a Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in London, nevertheless she supported the mediation of Four Powers not immediately concerned at Vienna and St. Petersburg, with a view to inducing Austria and Russia to come to terms with each other. Indeed, Germany was on more than one occasion the means of conveying to Austria proposals concerning the need of moderation in Vienna and about the guarantees which Serbia could reasonably be expected to give. (B. W. P. nos. 18, 95, 98.) The pressure brought to bear on Austria by Germany during the last few days of negotiations is also seen in the German *Denkschrift* and in the *Westminster Gazette* correspondent’s telegram of August 1st. In addition to these, numerous British Press correspondents in Berlin and St. Petersburg, between July 25th and 30th, show that Germany, so far from being an instigator, was doing all she could, having regard to the difficult position in which she was placed, to make her ally come to terms with Russia.

“Germany’s great initial blunder was that she refused to regard the Austro-Servian dispute as one that concerned any other but those two countries, and would not recognize the claim of Russia to be consulted about the fate of Serbia. Hence her interpretation of Four Power mediation was not the same as Russia’s. She wanted mediation to aim at securing for Austria a ‘free hand.’ Russia wanted mediation which would give her a chance of settling the Servian question according to her ideas.”

Sir Valentine Chirol has attacked the authenticity of this communication. See Price: *The Diplomacy of the War*, p. 51.

I am naturally ready now, as I was before, to allow Your Excellency to elucidate to M. Sazonof the various points of the note addressed by us to Servia, though it has been superseded by later events. In this connection I would also make a point of discussing in a frank and friendly way the questions directly concerning our relations with Russia, in accordance with the suggestion transmitted to me by M. Schebeko, which might bring about a clearing up of the doubtful points and a safeguarding of the peaceful development that is so desirable in our neighboring relations." (July 30, A. R. B. no. 49.)

Count Berchtold sent another telegram of the same date (July 30) for Count Szapary's information: "I have explained to M. Schebeko to-day, that it had been reported to me that M. Sazonof was painfully impressed by my flat rejection of his suggestion of a conference between you and himself, and also because no exchange of views had taken place between myself and M. Schebeko. With regard to the first proposal, I had already instructed you by telegraph to give M. Sazonof any explanation he might require concerning our note, although recent events have superseded that note. Such explanation, however, could not go further than a belated elucidation, since we had never intended to abate any point in the note. I also stated that I had authorized you to make our relations with Russia the subject of an amicable exchange of views with M. Sazonof. The complaint that there had been no conference between myself and Schebeko must be based on a misunderstanding, as we — Schebeko and I — discussed the pending questions only two days ago. The Ambassador confirmed this and said that he had sent a full report of our interview to M. Sazonof." (Extract, July 30, A. R. B. no. 50.)

On July 30, also, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to his Government: "With regard to the settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute, it has been agreed that the *pourparlers* shall be resumed in St. Peters-

burg between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary. Their interruption was due to a misunderstanding, Count Berchtold believing that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs demanded that his interlocutor should be given powers enabling him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szapary will only be authorized to discuss what arrangement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige of the two empires, which are to both of them an object of equal care. For the moment, therefore, it will be in this direct form, confined to the two most interested parties, that the examination of the situation will take place which Sir Edward Grey proposed should be undertaken by the four not directly interested powers. Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once told M. Schebeko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure. Repeating the *exposé* he made at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would pay much more regard to the demands of the Monarchy than was supposed. M. Schebeko neglected nothing to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's desire to reach an understanding acceptable to the two empires. The interview was conducted in a very friendly tone, and gave rise to the belief that all hope of localizing the conflict was not lost, and then the news of the German mobilization reached Vienna." (Extract, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 104; cf. B. W. P. nos. 96, 110.)

On July 31, 'Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria on all further conversations.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 137.)

The day following, — that is, the day Germany declared war against Russia, — Sir Edward Grey, encouraged by this friendly attitude of Austria, telegraphed the British Ambassador at Berlin that 'he still believed that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in

time could be gained before any great power began war. The Russian Government had communicated to him the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia, and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which was not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested. Things ought not, he thought, to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia were ready to converse, and he hoped that the German Government might be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 131.)

5. The powers employ their good offices at Vienna and St. Petersburg

While these conversations were going on at St. Petersburg and Vienna, between M. Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador, and between Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador, the less interested powers were trying to use their good offices ¹ at the two capitals to facilitate the course of the conversations or direct negotiations and to prevail upon Austria and Russia to agree to some method to settle their difference, which threatened to involve all Europe.

Although Germany supported Austria in insisting upon the "localization" of her dispute with Servia, the German Government did nevertheless 'instruct Von Tchirsky on July 26 to "pass on" to the Austrian Government Sir Edward Grey's hopes that they might take a favorable view of the Servian reply if it corresponded to the forecast contained in the telegram of July 25 from the British representative at Belgrade.² The German Government con-

¹ "Good offices" merely means the ordinary friendly diplomatic activity which a power carries on with one or both of the powers in disagreement. Such action consists in offering suggestions or giving explanations and friendly counsel, which may lessen the tension or induce the Governments concerned to come to an agreement directly, or to entrust to one or more third powers the more formal office of mediator.

² B. W. P. no. 20.

sidered that the very fact of their making this communication to the Austrian Government implied that they associated themselves, to a certain extent, with the hope expressed by Sir Edward. The German Government could not see their way of going beyond that.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 34.)

Two days later Von Bethmann-Hollweg told the British Ambassador at Berlin that 'Sir Edward Grey could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and at St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation with each other and in a friendly way.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 71; cf. G. W. B. exhibits 14, 15, 22; R. O. P. nos. 38, 51.) When the Austrian Government replied with a polite refusal, the Chancellor 'advised them to speak openly to assure Russia regarding the object of the hostilities about to be undertaken against Serbia. After going so far in giving advice at Vienna, the Chancellor expressed the hope that Sir Edward would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent the danger of European complications.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 75.)

Sir Edward Grey replied appreciatively of these efforts on the part of the Chancellor, and said that 'if he could induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, they should all join in deep gratitude to him for having saved the peace of Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 77.) Sir Edward Grey, in reply to a suggestion from the Marquis di San Giuliano as to a possibly acceptable basis for mediation, said that 'he could do nothing in the face of Austria's refusal to accept any form of mediation as between Austria and Serbia, but that he should be glad if a favorable reception were given to any suggestion he could make there.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 81; cf. B. W. P. nos. 64, 90.) England, France, and Italy realized that Germany, and Germany alone, could speak at Vienna

with any chance of being listened to. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 111.) Accordingly, while they had been urging upon the German Government the imperative necessity of exercising its influence in favor of moderation at Vienna if it was hoped to avoid an Austro-Russian conflict (cf. R. O. P. no. 42), they had kept begging the Russian Government not to precipitate a crisis by mobilizing. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 104; F. Y. B. 101.)

6. Efforts to discover a formula for mediation

The powers continued to exercise at Vienna and St. Petersburg the same restraining influence that they had from the first brought to bear at Belgrade to induce Servia to return a conciliatory reply to the Austrian note, but they realized how much more effective would be their restraining action if they could succeed in giving whatever counsel was offered the united support of the four less interested powers. (Cf. B. W. P. no. 11.)

Even in the face of Germany's refusal of Sir Edward Grey's proposal for an ambassadorial conference at London, Italy, France, and Russia continued to urge Germany to reconsider her decision. Present in the minds of the diplomats was the success of the same plan when adopted during the Balkan crisis the year preceding. At that time the delicate question of Albania and the Servian frontier had been peacefully settled by means of direct negotiations between the two great powers most immediately interested, Austria and Russia, while at London an ambassadorial conference of the less interested powers had collaborated to reach an acceptable compromise. The happy result of those negotiations made the diplomatists hope to employ again that parallel system consisting of direct conversations between Austria and Russia, advised and restrained by the collective counsel of the ambassadorial conference. (R. O. P. nos. 50, 69; B. W. P. nos. 93 (2), 80, 81, 120, 139; F. Y. B. no. 84.) The advice of the powers was

all the more difficult for Austria and Russia to reject in 1913, because it was the resultant of the views of powers possessing different interests and divided sympathies, and was therefore a compromise between the views of the two powers immediately interested in the fate of Servia. But, as Count Berchtold remarked, Austria considered the solution then adopted as "highly artificial," which means that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs considered it unsatisfactory to Austria. Entertaining such a view, he wished, as we understand, to avoid a repetition of the procedure which had forced Austria to acquiesce in the solution adopted in 1913. (B. W. P. Miscellaneous, no. 10, 1914; F. Y. B. no. 70.) In 1913, Germany had been willing to join the other powers in carrying through the parallel procedure of an advisory ambassadorial conference at London, but in 1914 she announced that she could not drag her ally before a "European Areopagus" in which the powers should sit in judgment on Austria, and in which the judges opposed to her would outvote those interested in securing the protection of her interests.

When Germany was pressed, she said that she would join the other powers in exercising a mediatory influence between Austria and Russia (B. W. P. no. 18), but she continued emphatically to refuse to participate in a conference to bring pressure to bear on Austria to induce her to reconsider and modify the terms of her note to Servia. (R. O. P. no. 53; G. W. B. exhibit 13, Memorandum, p. 9; F. Y. B. no. 81.)

In the face of this firm stand of Germany, the other powers sought to replace the proposed ambassadorial conference at London by another method of mediation which might be effective in helping Austria and Russia to find some acceptable compromise (F. Y. B. no. 81); what the diplomats designated as the finding of a "formula."

For a moment, when it was thought that Austria had refused to continue the direct "conversations" with Rus-

sia regarding the settlement of the Servian question, the exercise of the mediatory or moderating influence of the powers seemed the only hope of peace, — though a slender one. (R. O. P. no. 50; B. W. P. nos. 93 (3), 74, 78; R. O. P. no. 54.) But it was quickly explained that Austria had not “banged the door,” and the “conversations” or *pourparlers* were renewed. (B. W. P. no. 137; A. R. B. no. 53.)

7. Germany asked to “press the button”

Finding it impossible to bring forward any suggestion acceptable to Germany, on July 28, Sir Edward Grey had telegraphed the British Ambassador at Berlin: “German Government having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four powers, if necessary I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied.¹ I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we

¹ The following extract from a dispatch of July 27, sent by M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French representatives, shows the feeling of the French Government: —

“The powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield; and thus have done their part; it is now for Germany, who alone is in a situation to obtain a speedy hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and cannot be permitted, for the sake of a matter of detail easy to adjust, to bring about a general war.

“These are the circumstances in which the proposal made by the London Cabinet has been brought forward: M. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Servia to the powers, Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome: the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during this conversation Russia, Austria, and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson [of the British Foreign Office] has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favorable to it; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also, according to all probability, at Rome. Here again it is Germany’s turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her good-will by other means than words.

“I would ask you to come to an understanding with your English colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Government in whatever form appears to you opportune.” (Extract, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 61.)

see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress." (July 28, B. W. P. no. 68; cf. B. W. P. nos. 43, 46, 60.)

On July 29, the British Ambassador at Rome pointed out the inconsistency between Sir Edward Grey's telegram to Sir Edward Goschen of July 27, in which he relates that 'the German Government accepted mediation in principle' (modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 46), and Sir Edward Goschen's dispatch of the same date to Sir Edward Grey, to the effect that 'Germany could not accept the suggestion which the Secretary of State considered would amount to a court of arbitration.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 43.)

At Rome the Italian Government, he reported, had received information that 'what created the difficulty was, so the Marquis di San Giuliano thought, the "conference," rather than the principle, and the Marquis was going to urge, in a telegram which he was sending to Berlin that night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggested that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 80.)

July 29, Sir Edward Grey urged upon Prince Lichnowsky that 'the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed. Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 84; cf. B. W. P. nos. 92, 100; R. O. P. nos. 53, 54.)

July 30, Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey from Berlin that 'he did not know whether the German Government had made any reply to Sir Edward's proposal asking whether they could not suggest any

method by which the four powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. He was informed the night before that the German Government had not had time to send an answer yet. The same day, July 30, in reply to an inquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial German Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, been returned yet.

'The Chancellor had told him, the night before, that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 107.)

On July 30, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg gave the button a good push by instructing the German Ambassador at Vienna 'to impress upon Count Berchtold with great seriousness that Germany would have to refuse to be drawn into a general war resulting from Austria's disregard of Germany's counsel.' (See above, p. 224.)

On the morning of July 31, the last day of European peace, Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, that 'if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, he would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, the British Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; otherwise, he told the German Ambassador that if France became involved, they should be drawn in.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 111; cf. R. O. P. no. 42.) It is much to

be regretted that Germany was unable to reply to this bid for her coöperation in maintaining the peace by suggesting some feasible plan.

8. The San Giuliano suggestion for mediation upon Serbia's unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum

July 28, Sir Edward Grey received a telegram from the British Ambassador at Rome to the effect that 'the Marquis di San Giuliano, as at present informed, saw no possibility of Austria's receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believed that if Serbia would even then accept it, Austria would be satisfied, and that if she had reason to think that such would be the advice of the powers, Austria might defer action. Serbia might be induced to accept the note in its entirety on the advice of the four powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 57; cf. B. W. P. no. 64; F. Y. B. no. 72.) Even this proposal, worthy of the astute and tactful Italian, does not seem to have found favor with Germany or Austria.

Sir Edward Grey, when showing the German Ambassador at London the telegrams exchanged about the San Giuliano suggestion, remarked that 'he had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Serbia would now satisfy Austria, but that there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano

¹ The attitude of the Austrian Government is shown by the following telegram which Baron von Macchio, of the Austrian Foreign Office, received from Count Berchtold: "Russian Chargé d'Affaires telegraphs me that he has been urgently instructed by his Government to ask an extension of time on the ultimatum to Serbia. I ask Your Excellency, therefore, to answer him, in my name, that we cannot agree to an extension of the time. Your Excellency will please add that Serbia can reach a peaceful solution, even after the breaking off of diplomatic relations, by unreservedly accepting our demands, but that we should be constrained in such case to demand from Serbia indemnization for all the expenses and damages incurred by reason of our military measures." (July 25, A. R. B. no. 20.)

had said, to be a method by which, if the powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. Sir Edward said he could, however, make no proposal, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the powers over her dispute with Servia.¹ As to mediation between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand aside while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 90.)

The German Ambassador, according to the dispatch of the British Secretary, did not comment on the San Giuliano proposal, but after expressing his views as to Austria's situation, in conclusion 'said emphatically that some means must be found to preserve the peace of Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 90.)

M. Sazonof, when 'asked if he would raise objections if the Italian suggestion were carried out, replied that he would agree to anything arranged by the four powers, provided it was acceptable to Servia; as he could not be more Servian than Servia. He thought, however, that some supplementary statement or explanations would have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78.)

¹ German critics have impugned the sincerity of Sir Edward Grey's efforts toward peace because he was not more ready, at this stage, to urge mediation. (See above, p. 218, note 2.) Having formally invited the powers to a conference at London, only to have the proposal refused by Germany and Austria, Sir Edward very properly felt he could not make a new proposal unless there was some chance of its being accepted.

*9. The Cambon suggestion of mediation after Austria's
occupation of Belgrade*

On July 29, the French Ambassador at Berlin suggested anew to the German Under-Secretary of State that 'it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for the four disinterested powers to discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. The Under-Secretary of State seemed to think the idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that that would be a different matter from the conference proposed by Sir Edward Grey.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 76.)

That same day, whether or not in consequence of the Cambon suggestion, Sir Edward Grey proposed to the German Ambassador at London that, since it was 'too late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended, it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the powers to mediate between her and Russia.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 88; cf. B. W. P. no 100.) As soon as Von Jagow, German Secretary of State, learned of Sir Edward Grey's proposal, he asked the Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on the basis of the occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point, and issue their conditions from there. After expressing fears that Russia's mobilization might make it diffi-

¹ Mediation or intervention on the basis of the occupation of Belgrade was indicated by M. Sazonof's remark as early as July 25, when he expressed the thought that the Servian Government might retire from Belgrade and appeal to the powers. (B. W. P. no. 17.) I have called it the Cambon suggestion so as to distinguish it, and because it was put forward by M. Jules Cambon.

cult for Austria, who had 'as yet mobilized only against Serbia, but would probably find it necessary also against Russia,' the Secretary said that if Sir Edward could 'succeed in getting Russia to agree to the above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the mean time to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria, he still saw some chance that European peace might be preserved.' (Modified quotations, July 30, B. W. P. no. 98.)

According to the German Memorandum, the German Government, thinking Russia would agree, forwarded to Vienna as a basis of negotiation the proposal brought forward by England that Austria should dictate her conditions from Serbia, i.e., after having marched into Serbia. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 11.)

That same day, July 30, the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey that "the German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of the frontier, to promise not to advance farther, while the powers endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied." (Extract, July 30, B. W. P. no. 103.)

After this interview Sir Edward Grey, following up this plan of mediation between Austria and Serbia on the basis of Austria's occupation of Belgrade, and the cessation of further aggression, telegraphed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg in an effort to secure Russia's consent to this arrangement and acquiescence in an agreement to 'suspend further military preparations on all sides.' Referring to the Russian offer of terms at the request of the German Ambassador as a last effort toward peace, Sir Edward hoped, in spite of the Russian Ambassador's belief that the terms could not be modified, that 'if the Austrian advance were stopped after the occupation of Bel-

grade, the Russian [Sazonof] formula¹ might be changed to read, that the powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian rights or independence.'² (Modified quotations, July 30, B. W. P. no. 103.)

M. Viviani, in accordance with Sir Edward Grey's request, agreed to the English suggestion (Cambon's suggestion),³ and instructed the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg as follows:—

"Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honorable arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers which threaten general peace.

"The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to the powers the duty of examining how Serbia could give full satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the independence of the kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of suspending all military preparations, while the other powers are to act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia and to Austria and to provide for Serbia an acceptable means of issue from the present difficulty.

"I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his

¹ The Russian formula here referred to is that first offered by M. Sazonof at the request of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg. (See *post*, §11.)

² As Mr. Price very truly remarks: "The difference between this and the first [Russian] formula is that the powers are specially mentioned as arbitrators to decide upon those points concerning the sovereignty and independence of Servia." (C. M. Price: *The Diplomatic History of the War*, p. 57.)

³ That M. Viviani refers here to the Cambon suggestion and not to the Grey suggestion appears from F. Y. B. no. 104; cf. F. Y. B. no. 103.

adherence without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself informed." (Extract, July 31, F. Y. B. no. 112; cf. B. W. P. no. 104.)

This mediation, on the basis of the occupation of Belgrade, may have been suggested by what M. Sazonof remarked to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 25, that he 'thought from a conversation which he had had with the Servian Minister the day before, that in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they made, at the same time, an appeal to the powers to help them. The Russian Minister declared that he was in favor of their making that appeal.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17.) The day before the proposal was brought forward by the British Ambassador at Berlin, Von Tchirsky, German Ambassador at Vienna, 'told his British colleague that he thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 100.)

10. The Grey proposal for a collective guaranty of the powers

During the two days preceding Germany's declaration of war against Russia, the diplomatic activity of the powers in their efforts to avoid war seems to have been redoubled and the overlapping of the various proposals made and supported by the different powers makes it very difficult to unravel the web. We have already seen how, on July 30, Austria agreed to renew direct conversations with Russia, while England, with the support of France, brought forward the suggestion originally made by M. Jules Cambon at Berlin.

On July 30, the Marquis di San Giuliano told the British Ambassador at Rome that he was 'telegraphing to the

Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guaranty that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that did not imply success for Austria. It might, on the other hand, be ascertained from Russia what she would accept, and once they knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favor of continuing an exchange of views with the English Government, if the idea of discussions between the four powers was impossible.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 106; cf. B. W. P. no. 79.)

In line with this suggestion Sir Edward Grey telegraphed, July 31, to Sir Edward Goschen: "I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As Your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them.

Russia might be informed by the four powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All powers would, of course, suspend further military operations or preparations. You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal."

The dispatch goes on to recount the previously mentioned offer to collaborate with Germany,¹ and to withdraw from the conflict unless France and Russia were ready to accept any reasonable proposal put forward, and concludes: "You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 111.)

The British Ambassador at Berlin reported the result of this commission as follows: —

"I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

"He expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day (July 31); this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at once.

"I asked His Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization was only directed against Austria.

"His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia

¹ See *ante*, p. 233; (B. W. P. 111.)

was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favorable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

“He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature — but Russia’s mobilization had spoiled everything.” (July 31, B. W. P. no. 121.)

What form of collective guaranty the powers had in mind is perhaps indicated in the conversation which M. Jules Cambon had with Herr Von Jagow, July 29: “The Secretary then remarked that with Eastern peoples one could never have enough guaranties, and that Austria wished to have, over the execution of the promises made to her, a control which Serbia refused to give. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the capital point. I replied to Herr von Jagow that if Serbia desired to remain independent, she was bound to reject the control of a single power, but that an international commission would not present the same character. There was more than one in the Balkan States, beginning with the financial commission in Athens. One might, for example, I said, imagine among other combinations a provisional international commission entrusted with the duty of controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria. It was clear from this example that the Servian reply opened the door to conversations, and did not justify a rupture.” (Extract, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 92.)

11. Germany asks Russia to propose a formula

When M. Sazonof, on July 29, had received from the Russian Ambassador at Vienna information which he con-

sidered as indicating Austria's definite refusal to discuss with Russia the terms of the Austrian note (B. W. P. no. 93), he had told the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that 'he purposed, when informing the German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a conference of four ambassadors, or at all events for an exchange of views between the three ambassadors less directly interested, Sir Edward, and also the Austrian Ambassador if Sir Edward thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would, he said, be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for Sir Edward Grey to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with ambassadors, either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78; cf. R. O. P. no. 48.)

Accordingly, when, shortly after,¹ the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had a conversation with the German Ambassador, he urged him to agree to an ambassadorial conference in London for the purpose of exercising a mediatory influence, at the same time that direct negotiations were being carried on between Austria and Russia; but the German Ambassador objected that the mobilization

¹ There seems to be a confusion in regard to this matter. In B. W. P. no. 93 (2), identical with R. O. P. no. 49, both dated July 29, M. Sazonof proposed to the German Ambassador that direct conversations with Austria should be paralleled by discussions of the four powers. In B. W. P. no. 93 (3), which is identical with R. O. P. no. 50, M. Sazonof says that at the time he made that suggestion he had not learned from M. Schebeko of Austria's refusal to agree to a direct exchange of views (B. W. P. no. 93 (1), identical with R. O. P. no. 45). Yet no. 48 of the Russian Orange Book, sent on July 28, seems to indicate that the Russian Government had already heard of Austria's military action against Servia. From B. W. P. no. 78, dated July 29, we learn that M. Sazonof had heard of the Austrian refusal to agree to direct conversations, and that he told the British Ambassador that he intended, when informing the German Ambassador of this refusal, to urge upon him a return to Sir Edward Grey's proposal of a conference of the four powers.

Russia had undertaken would render this very difficult, and remarked that Russia was asking Germany to take in regard to Austria the very step which she blamed Austria for taking in regard to Servia. Nevertheless he agreed to transmit the conversation. (B. W. P. no. 93 (2); R. O. P. no. 49; G. W. B. Memorandum, pp. 9-10.)

The same day, July 29, Von Tchirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, said, as has been noted above, that "if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other powers." (Extract, July 29, B. W. P. no. 94.)

This effort to maintain direct negotiation, paralleled by mediation or diplomatic intervention¹ through an ambassadorial conference, was wrecked by Austria's refusal, July 28, to continue any discussion with Russia relative to the modifications of the terms laid down in her note, and by her bombardment of Belgrade. As soon as M. Sazonof learned (July 29) of Austria's refusal, he considered that England alone could preserve the peace by exercising her mediatory action. It was under these circumstances that the German Ambassador on July 30² had a second interview with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs at two o'clock in the morning. When the Ambassador perceived that war was inevitable, he broke down completely and

¹ If Austria had really acquiesced, it would have been mediation. If Germany had joined the other powers and forced her to yield, the ambassadorial conference would have constituted diplomatic intervention. The term "diplomatic intervention" is often used for any diplomatic suggestion regarding the relations of other states. It is sometimes hard to distinguish from "good offices," except that diplomatic intervention supposes the possibility that suggestions made may be supported by force.

² According to R. O. P. no. 63, it would seem that this conversation must have taken place on July 29, but R. O. P. no. 60 confirms July 30 as the correct date. As the interview took place at 2 a.m. and was sent immediately (*d'urgence*) to Berlin, the dispatch may have reached the Russian Ambassador at Berlin at the same time as one sent July 29. This may account for the confusion.

appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to the German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to the German Ambassador a formula in French, of which the following is a translation: —

“If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations.”

The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in transmitting this formula, informed Sir Edward Grey that ‘preparations for general mobilization would be proceeded with, if this proposal was rejected by Austria, and the inevitable result would be a European war. The excitement at St. Petersburg had, the Ambassador said, reached such a pitch that, if Austria refused to make a concession, Russia could not hold back, and now that she knew that Germany was arming, she could hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilization.’ (Modified quotation, and extract, July 30, B. W. P. no. 97.)

In the telegram which was immediately dispatched to the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, to inform him of this formula suggested by M. Sazonof at the request of the German Ambassador, M. Sazonof instructs the Ambassador ‘to telegraph him at once the attitude of the German Government after this new proof of the desire of the Russian Government to do everything possible to reach a peaceful solution of the question, for, says the Minister, we cannot permit negotiations such as these to serve only the purpose of affording Germany and Austria time to make their military preparations.’ (Modified quotation, July 30, R. O. P. no. 60.)

In other words, this formula was something in the

nature of a last word or ultimatum from Russia. It is most important to note that according to the documents (R. O. P. nos. 49; 50), this change of tone occurred at or after the interview of the German Ambassador with M. Sazonof on July 29. The Russian Foreign Minister seems to have taken umbrage at the tone employed by the Ambassador upon that occasion, for he said, speaking of the interview, that 'he feared that the German Ambassador would not help to smooth matters over if he used to his own Government the same language he had when speaking to him.'¹ (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 78; cf. F. Y. B. no. 100.) In a telegram sent that day, July 29, to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, he also said, 'since they [Russia] could not arrest their military preparations as Germany desired, it only remained for them to accelerate their armament and to take measures for the probable inevitability of war.' (Modified quotation, July 29, R. O. P. no. 58.)

Although M. Sazonof was not unwilling to continue at this time his efforts toward conciliation and coöperation with the other powers in an attempt to reach a peaceful solution (cf. R. O. P. no. 49), it appears beyond doubt that the war party was gaining headway.² Then came word of Austria's refusal to continue discussions (R. O. P. no. 50), and M. Sazonof informed Sir Edward Grey that the only hope for peace lay in England's initiative. (B. W. P. no. 93.)

The German point of view is that Russia's change of

¹ On July 28, Count Berchtold instructed the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin to urge the German Government to threaten Russia with a counter-mobilization if she persisted in mobilizing the four southern districts against Austria. In closing, Count Berchtold remarks: "It seems to me that at this moment plain language would be the most efficacious means to make Russia realize all the consequences of assuming a threatening attitude." (Extract, July 28, A. R. B. no. 42; cf. A. R. B. no. 48.) The plain language to which the Austrian Minister refers does not seem to have been taken in good part by M. Sazonof when delivered the next day (July 29).

² Cf. Report of the Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg, *ante*, p. 192.

attitude was due to the conviction that England would back her up.¹ Doubtless this belief may have stiffened her attitude, but that is not the question, as long as this stiffening went no further than a proper respect for her dignity and interests, and did not constitute a withdrawal of her coöperation with less interested powers in reaching a peaceful solution.

This change of attitude on England's part is indicated by the telegram of the Russian Ambassador at London, July 30, giving an account of his interview with Sir Edward Grey:—

“Have communicated the contents of your telegrams of the 29th and 30th July to Grey, who considers the situation very serious, but desires to continue the *pourparlers*. I observed to Grey that, since you had proposed to him to accept anything he might propose in favor of the maintenance of peace, provided that Austria would not profit by the delays to crush Servia, the situation in which you found yourself was apparently modified. At that period our relations with Germany were not compromised. After the declaration of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg concerning the German mobilization,² these relations had changed, and her demand had received from you the only reply which a great power could give. When the Ambassador of Germany returned to you and asked for your conditions, you formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I at the same time again insisted with Grey on the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation created by the fault of Germany in consequence

¹ See above, p. 192.

² The motive of this action of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg is explained in the Austrian Red Book (no. 42), which shows that Austria urged Germany to threaten Russia with a counter-mobilization if she mobilized even partially and only against Austria. The paramount interest of the peace of Europe required that M. Sazonof should, like Bismarck, remember that it was a case in which “*Le plus sage cède*” (the wiser yields), and not allow German threats to hasten or increase Russia's preparations.

of the action of the German Ambassador. Grey replied that he understood it, and that he would take these arguments into consideration." (July 30, R. O. P. no. 64.)

When the Ambassador said to Sir Edward Grey that the Russian conditions had been formulated under exceptional circumstances, it was equivalent, in diplomatic language, to saying that it was tantamount to an ultimatum. It was at least a "near"-ultimatum, even if not as "near" as was the Austrian note to Serbia. The conditions laid down by Russia are seen to be that Austria should agree to allow the powers to discuss and modify the terms of her note to Serbia. To have agreed to this would have humbled Austria in the eyes of the world. The Russian Minister cannot for one moment have thought that Austria would accept such a formula. President Poincaré expressed to the British Ambassador his opinion that the 'conditions laid down by Russia would not be accepted.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 99.) The German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not hesitate to declare that he considered the Russian (Sazonof) formula unacceptable for Austria. (July 30, R. O. P. no. 63.)

Sir Edward Grey, speaking of the Sazonof formula in a dispatch to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, said that the Russian Ambassador feared that the conditions laid down could not be modified, but Sir Edward's opinion was that 'if the Austrian advances were stopped after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

'If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory, declared herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement could be arrived at, he hoped that Russia would also consent to a discussion and suspension

of further military preparations, provided that the other powers did the same.

'It was a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one he could suggest if the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs could come to no agreement at Berlin.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 103.)

Upon receipt of Sir Edward Grey's request, M. Sazonov 'sent for the British and French Ambassadors and asked them to telegraph to their respective governments the following formula, as best calculated to amalgamate the proposal made by Sir Edward Grey in his telegram of July 30 (B. W. P. no. 103) with the formula the Russian Minister had previously offered: "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the great powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."' ¹ (Modified quotation and extract, July 31, B. W. P. no. 120; R. O. P. no. 67.)

August 1, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed the modified Russian proposal to Sir Edward Goschen at Berlin, and it was communicated to the other powers. (B. W. P. no. 132.)

It must be remarked that this revised formula substitutes for Russia's original offer "*to stop all military operations*" a promise "*to maintain her waiting attitude.*" This significant modification may have been due to the previ-

¹ The original French text is as follows: "Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, — la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante." (July 31, R. O. P. no. 67.)

ous issuance of an order for the general mobilization of the Russian forces,¹ which would have made it impracticable to arrest the measures when once begun. The Russian Government may also have felt more confident of English support and been unwilling to make a real concession for the sake of peace. Those who sympathize with Russia will consider M. Sazonof's action in modifying what was virtually an ultimatum as a most conciliatory action on his part, while the Russophobes will declare this action was only taken to secure England's support, and that its insincerity was shown by Russia's making no effort to arrest her mobilization. The impartial critic must remember that Germany could not possibly allow Russia to undertake a general mobilization, so that Russia's promise not to commence the war or commit any act of aggression has the appearance more of an attempt to deceive the ignorant than of an effort to calm the apprehensions of Germany. At the very commencement of the crisis, Sir Edward Grey had warned the Russian Government that Germany, to avoid a surprise, must attack Russia if Russia mobilized, and Von Jagow merely repeated what all intelligent observers knew, when he said to M. Jules Cambon that 'the heads of the army were insisting on mobilization, for every delay was a loss of strength for the German Army.' (Modified quotation, July 30, F. Y. B. no. 109; cf. F. Y. B. no. 105.)

Opinions may differ as to whether Germany and Austria had given Russia cause for her action, but I believe an examination of the events and the documents must lead to the conclusion —

(1) That Russia, up to the 29th of July, did everything that could reasonably be expected of her to satisfy Austria, and preserve the peace. It is not going too far to say that the first responsibility of allowing the difference to come to a rupture must be laid at the door of Germany and Austria.

¹ See above, chap. iv, § 7; chap. vi, § 4.

(2) That when, between July 29 and 31, Germany might perhaps have been ready to agree to the proposal for mediation on the basis of Austria's occupation of Belgrade, Russia by undertaking more extensive military preparations, practically forced Germany's retaliatory declaration of war.

I know that it will be urged that Germany might still have made some proposal to avert the rupture instead of embittering the relations between the two countries through the accusations of her Ambassador and the insinuations of her military attaché. If Germany on the one hand had accepted at the last minute the English proposal for mediation on the basis of Austria's occupation of Belgrade, she might very possibly have prevented war. Russia on the other hand was in a position to refrain from mobilizing until she was actually attacked, especially since the very condition of her slowness in mobilizing made it relatively of small importance whether or not she gained a start of a few hours more or less on her adversary.

In one other respect we must criticize the Russian statements; that is, when they accuse the Germans of wishing to drag matters out until they had completed military preparations. This charge might have had some slight foundation in regard to Austria's invasion of Servia, for undoubtedly, if Austria could have crushed Servia before she had to cope with Russia, it would have been a very considerable advantage; but the Servians, by retiring to the mountains, would have made it impossible to vanquish them quickly, and anyway, if Russia had taken more pains to make it clear that she would restrict her mobilization to the Austrian frontier, she could have blocked this move of Austria's. As regards Germany, it does seem unreasonable that she should be accused of delaying matters for the purpose of strengthening her position, when it is an almost self-evident fact that every hour of delay would cost her dear. No; we can only explain what Russia

would designate as German temporization, on the ground either that Germany thought it possible that an acceptable solution might be found without recourse to arms, or else that she feared to have her action appear so aggressive as to alienate a large part of her people. It hardly seems that the latter reason had much force, and we must conclude that up to the date of Russia's more extensive mobilization Germany believed in the possibility of maintaining peace.

12. Austria agrees to mediation

We have seen how Russia, acting on the suggestion of Germany, first proposed direct conversations in place of the mediation conference at London to which Sir Edward Grey had invited the powers, and how Sir Edward held his proposal in abeyance to await the result of the direct negotiations, while the powers continued at the same time to exert their influence for peace and moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg. Austria, however, was determined to prevent any mediation for the purpose of discussing and modifying her note to Servia; accordingly she refused to accept the idea of the conference first suggested by Sir Edward Grey, and rejected Russia's proposal for direct conversations. Then from the powers came various formulas or suggestions as bases for mediation, and Germany at the same time continued her efforts to prevail upon Austria to accept direct negotiations;¹ but just when

¹ The German White Book gives a series of telegrams exchanged between the Kaiser and the Tsar. On July 28 at 10.45 p.m., the Kaiser sent a telegram informing the Tsar of his efforts to induce Austria to "come to a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia." (G. W. B. exhibit 20.) The Kaiser emphasized their common interest in repressing regicide and appealed to the Tsar to cooperate with him. This telegram seems to have crossed with one the Tsar sent the Kaiser next day (July 29) at 1 p.m., in which he expressed great indignation at Austria's action in declaring war on Servia, and asked the Kaiser to help him 'in the name of their old friendship to do everything in his power to prevent his ally from going too far.' (Modified quotation, July 29, G. W. B. exhibit 21.) To this the German Emperor replied that same afternoon (July 29) at 6.30 p.m., defending

this had been accomplished,¹ Russia's attitude, so extraordinarily conciliatory hitherto, changed, and in reply to the

Austria's action and declaring his opinion that Russia might remain an onlooker while the Austro-Servian War continued. He further warned the Tsar that military preparations, which might be construed as a menace to Austria, would be apt to precipitate a crisis and undermine the Kaiser's mediatory action, which the Kaiser said he had willingly undertaken upon the Tsar's appeal to his friendship for assistance. (July 29, G. W. B. exhibit 22.) This was followed a few hours later (July 30, 1 A.M.) by another telegram in which the Kaiser, having received notice of the Russian mobilization against Austria, warned the Tsar that such action on Russia's part might make his position as mediator impossible. The Kaiser ended by declaring that the responsibility of deciding for war or peace lay with the Tsar. (July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 23.) On this same day (July 30, at 1.20 P.M.) the Tsar sent another telegram. (This was evidently dispatched by the Tsar before he had received the Kaiser's telegram of July 30, since Nicholas thanked the Kaiser for his quick reply which must refer to the Kaiser's telegram of July 29.) Therein the Tsar explained that the measures taking place had been decided upon five days ago and were necessary in response to Austria's preparations. He expressed the hope that the Kaiser would not let them affect his mediatory action, which Russia appreciated very highly (July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 23a). On the next day (July 31), the Kaiser and Tsar each sent telegrams at 2 P.M., which therefore crossed. The Tsar declared that it was impossible to arrest the mobilization, but that his troops would not undertake any provocative action (G. W. B. memorandum, p. 8.) The Kaiser accused Russia of making serious preparations for war on his eastern frontier, thus forcing Germany to have recourse to counter-measures of defense. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 8.) It is possible that the menacing tone of the Kaiser's last telegram influenced the Russian Government to take the premature and ever-to-be-regretted step of ordering a general mobilization.

The Russian Government did not apprise France or England of the issuance of her order for general mobilization, but telegrams were exchanged between Prince Henry of Prussia and King George, on July 30, and on the next day the Kaiser telegraphed King George that Russia had ordered the mobilization of her entire fleet and army. (See pp. 28-29 of the Authorized American Edition of the German White Book published by the *Fatherland*.) August 1, at 1.30 in the morning, Mr. Asquith was received by King George (London *Times*, Aug. 3), and two hours later (3.30 A.M.) Sir Edward Grey telegraphed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to apply at once for an audience with the Tsar and to convey to him the following personal message from the King: —

“My Government has received the following statement from the German Government: —

“On July 29, the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor immediately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the Russian Emperor

¹ See above, § 4.

menacing words of Count Pourtalès, the German Ambassador, relative to Russia's mobilization, she stated, almost in

of this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action Russia mobilized against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby his attempt at mediation would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Government continued its mediation in Vienna. In this matter the German Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals made by the German Government in Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them in Vienna for their serious consideration. They were taken into consideration in Vienna this morning. During the deliberations of the (? Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were concluded, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg reported the mobilization of the entire Russian army and fleet. Owing to this action on the part of Russia, the Austrian answer to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against Germany — that is to say, the power whose mediation had been invoked by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious counter-measures to this action, which we were obliged to consider as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the Russian mobilization on our frontier. We have therefore informed Russia that, unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike measures against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilize, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she would remain neutral during a German-Russian war.'

"I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world."

To this the Tsar replied: —

"I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when favorable moment for bringing pressure to bear on

the form of an ultimatum to Austria, what would be her conditions. According to the terms of these, Austria must agree to the mediation of the powers for the purpose of modifying the Austrian note. From the beginning Austria had refused all such proposals and there was little likelihood that she would accept the first Sazonof formula; the modified Sazonof formula, however, was less humiliating for her.

On July 30, Count Berchtold told the Russian Ambassador at Vienna that "he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply." (Extract, July 30, B. W. P. no. 96; cf. F. Y. B. no. 104.)

Count Berchtold sent instructions that same day (July 30) to Count Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to "elucidate to M. Sazonof the various points of the note addressed to Servia, though it has been superseded by later events." (Extract, July 30, A. R. B. no. 49.)

On July 31, M. Sazonof instructed the Russian Ambassador at London that 'he thought it was only at London

Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration of war on Servia forced me to order a partial mobilization, though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a general mobilization owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilize in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilization, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as I had given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued.

"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you." (London *Times*, August 5, 1914.)

that the *pourparlers* would still have some chance of success by facilitating Austria's acquiescence in a necessary compromise.' (Modified quotation, July 31, R. O. P. no. 69; cf. A. R. B. no. 56.)

We have seen how the German Government, yielding to the representations of Sir Edward Grey, had asked Vienna, on July 30, what would satisfy them.¹ (B. W. P. no. 107.)

In reply Count Berchtold sent next day (July 31), the following dispatch to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin:

"I request Your Excellency to thank the Secretary of State most deeply for the information transmitted to us through Herr von Tschirsky and to tell him that we, in spite of the change in the situation occasioned by Russia's mobilization, would be willing to coöperate with Sir E. Grey in his proposal to mediate between ourselves and Servia.

"Our acceptance would naturally be upon the conditions that our military operations against Servia shall meanwhile take their course, and that the English Cabinet prevail upon the Russian Government to arrest the Russian mobilization against us, in which case we would naturally at once countermand in Galicia the defensive military measures forced upon us by Russia's mobilization."² (Extract, July 31, A. R. B. no. 51.)

On July 31, Sir Edward Grey learned from the German Ambassador at London that, 'as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation had taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had also been instructed that he might converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign

¹ See above, p. 233.

² The French Ambassador questions the sincerity of Austria's acceptance of mediation. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 121. See above, p. 260.) This same view is suggested as probable by Durkheim and Denis, *Who Wanted War?* Colin, Paris, 1915, p. 55, note 1.

Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 110. Cf. A. R. B. nos. 49, 50.)

On this same date (July 31), Sir Edward received a telegram, dispatched that day from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, stating:—

“It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization.

“This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

“Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.” (July 31, B. W. P. no. 113.)

On August 1, the following telegram from M. Sazonof, dated July 31, was communicated to Sir Edward Grey and the Governments of the other powers:—

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the great powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.” (August 1, B. W. P. no. 133.)

On August 1, the same day that M. Sazonof's telegram of July 31 was communicated to Sir Edward Grey, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg:—

“Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that, though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of Russia, they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization.

“You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government.” (August 1, B. W. P. no. 135.)

The following dispatch, dated August 1, sent by M. Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs and responsible head of the Government, to the French representatives abroad, gives an account of the Austrian action: —

“Two steps were taken yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors: one rather vague at Paris, and the other at St. Petersburg definite and conciliatory.

“Count Szeesen called upon me and declared that the Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it entertained no territorial ambition and would not touch the sovereignty of the State of Servia; that it also repudiated all intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these declarations of disinterestedness would only preserve their value if the war remained local-

ized to Austria and to Serbia, a European war opening up eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these declarations, let it be understood that although his Government could not reply to the questions of the powers speaking in their own names, it could doubtless reply to Serbia or to a power which asked its conditions on behalf of Serbia. He added that here there might perhaps still be a possibility.

“In St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and communicated to him the consent of his Government to enter upon a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Serbia. The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the conversations should take place in London with the participation of the powers. M. Sazonof had doubtless asked the British Government to take over the direction of the negotiations. He pointed out that it would be very important that Austria should cease her operations in Serbia.

“These facts show that Austria at last says that she is inclined to an arrangement, just as the Russian Government is also ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the English proposal.¹

“Unfortunately these dispositions, which might justify hope in a pacific solution, appear in fact bound to be annulled by Germany’s attitude. This power has, indeed, delivered an ultimatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to agree to demobilization not only on the German frontier, but also on the Austrian frontier. This period expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, since Russia has accepted the English proposal, which implies a suspension of military preparations by all the powers.”² (Extract, August 1, F. Y. B. no. 120.)

¹ The Cambon suggestion. See § 9, *ante*.

² It is not clear to what acceptance M. Viviani refers; Russia had given

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, in his dispatch of August 1, says: —

“My Russian colleague yesterday evening received two telegrams from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg stated that the Austrian Government was ready to discuss with the Russian Government the basis even of the note to Servia. M. Sazonof replied that in his opinion these conversations should take place in London.

“The ultimatum to Russia can but lessen the last chances of peace which seem to be held out by these conversations. It may be asked if in such circumstances Austria’s acceptance was serious, and if its aim were not to make the responsibility for the struggle fall upon Russia.

“To-night my British colleague has made a pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow’s sentiments of humanity. The latter replied that the question was too involved, and that the Russian reply to the German ultimatum must be awaited. Moreover, he said to Sir E. Goschen that the ultimatum demanded the withdrawal of Russian mobilization not only against Germany, but also against Austria. My British colleague showed himself more than surprised, and told him that this last point appeared to be unacceptable to Russia.

“The ultimatum of Germany, intervening just at the exact time at which agreement appeared on the point of being established between Vienna and St. Petersburg, is significant of her bellicose policy.

a qualified acceptance of “anything arranged by the four powers, provided it was acceptable to Servia” (B.W. P. no. 78); but Russia had not agreed to arrest her mobilization. Furthermore this assertion that Russia had accepted the English proposal does not correspond with the statement a few lines above that the Russian Government was ready to negotiate on the basis of the English proposal. (Cf. also the German Chancellor’s note of December 24, 1914, to the German representatives, *New York Times*, January 15, 1915; and Dr. Karl Helfferich’s article in the *New York Times*, March 14, 1915.)

“The dispute existed only between Russia and Austria, Germany having to intervene only as the ally of Austria. In these conditions the two powers chiefly interested being ready to talk, if Germany did not want war on her own account, it would be incomprehensible that she should send an ultimatum to Russia, instead of continuing to work like all the other powers for a peaceful solution.” (August 1, F. Y. B. no. 121.)

According to the report of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, after July 30, when Count Berchtold ‘gave his consent to the continuation of the conversations at St. Petersburg, the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter, the Ambassador stated, an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st of August, he was informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had at last conceded the main point at issue, by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. The Russian Ambassador stated that M. Sazonof had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from actual invasion of Serbia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to Sir Edward Grey on the 1st of August by the Austrian Ambassador at London, to the effect that Austria had neither “banged the door” on compromise nor cut off the conversations. The Russian Ambassador to the end worked hard for peace. He employed the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed Sir Maurice that Count Berchtold as well as Count Forgach, the Austrian Under-Secretary, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her

armies; but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and the Russian Ambassador repeatedly told Sir Maurice that he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

‘Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st of July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st, and on France on the 3d of August. A few days’ delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.’ (Modified quotation, September 1, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10, p. 3.)

It is important to compare these statements with the reports which the Austrian Ambassador sent from St. Petersburg. On July 31, Count Szapary telegraphed Count Berchtold: “Your Excellency will have learned from my telegram of the 29th that I, without awaiting instructions, had resumed conversations with Sazonof practically on the basis now suggested by you, without coming noticeably closer to an understanding.” (Extract, July 31, A. R. B. no. 55.) The next day, August 1, he sent the following report: —

“On my visit to M. Sazonof to-day, I declared that I had received certain instructions, but that I was not aware of the situation created in Vienna by the Russian general mobilization.

“Therefore, in carrying out the instructions which had been dispatched to me before that event, I could not take into account the newly created situation. I said that the two points of your instructions dealt with the misunderstanding arising out of our refusal to discuss matters any further with Russia. As I had said, even before

I was authorized to do so, this conception was erroneous. I pointed out that you were not only willing to enter into negotiations with Russia on a most comprehensive basis, but even to discuss the wording of our note, inasmuch as it was only a question of interpretation.

“I emphasized the point that your instructions once more bore out your good intentions; that I was still ignorant of the effect produced in Vienna by the Russian general mobilization, and that I could but hope that events might not yet have carried us too far. In any case I considered it my duty at the present momentous juncture to furnish another proof of the good-will of the Austro-Hungarian Government.

“M. Sazonof, in reply, expressed his satisfaction at this evidence of our good intentions, but observed that for obvious reasons the neutral ground of London would promise better success for the proposed negotiations than St. Petersburg. I replied that you desired to be in direct touch with St. Petersburg, and that I was consequently unable to give an opinion on the suggestion, but would not fail to convey it to you.” (August 1, A. R. B., no. 56.)

These dispatches do not bear out the statements of MM. Viviani, Cambon, and de Bunsen, that Austria and Russia were on the point of a settlement when the German ultimatum to Russia intervened. Austria was willing to give assurances to Russia that she would not impinge upon either the territorial integrity or the sovereignty of Servia. She would not, however, agree to any modification of the terms of the ultimatum, and insisted upon pursuing her military operations until the ultimatum had been accepted without condition by Servia. Austria had announced that it would not be enough for Servia to accept the terms of the original ultimatum after war had been declared, but that she would have to give, beside, security to indemnify Austria for the expense incurred in mobilizing. (Cf. A. R. B. no. 17.)

At the last moment, July 31 (see A. R. B. no. 51), Austria agreed to consider the Servian answer as a basis for negotiation, on condition (1) that she continue her military operations against Serbia, and (2) that Russia demobilize. On her side Austria would then arrest her preparations in Galicia. It does not appear whether Austria also would have agreed to arrest her advance after she had taken Belgrade. If Russia had demobilized, Austria might have found some new excuse for continuing her conquest, and Russia would then have been in no position to make her protest heard.

Under the circumstances, the Russian Government could not have demobilized against Austria, and it would have been very difficult for it to remain passive while Austria invaded Serbia. It is possible that the fear which Russia may have had that the other powers would ask her to make that sacrifice for the cause of peace hastened the issuance of the general mobilization order after the German Ambassador had threatened a counter-mobilization. At that point both Austria and Russia were playing for the support of the other powers. When Germany, instigated by Austria, threatened Russia, July 29, Russia replied by drawing the attention of England and France to the undiplomatic course pursued by the German Ambassador and, on the 31st, issued the order for a general mobilization.¹

13. The failure to reach a compromise

The principal efforts of the diplomatists had been directed towards securing some solution in regard to the Servian question which would satisfy both Austria and Russia. The powers were able neither to find an acceptable compromise nor to reach any agreement as to the method of procedure for continuing the search further. Mediation had been suggested and refused. Direct conversations

¹ French authorities argue that Austria mobilized before Russia. See Durkheim and Denis, *Who Wanted War?* p. 40, note 2.

had been accepted by Austria and Russia and then terminated because Austria was unwilling to discuss any modification of her terms as laid down to Servia. Meanwhile the various military preparations had increased the tension and diminished the chance of reaching a peaceful solution, while at the same time stimulating the diplomats in their final efforts to find some acceptable compromise. Various formulas were suggested, but in the confusion of the last two or three days it is not possible to decide with any definiteness how far they might have been acceptable if further time for peaceful discussion could have been found.¹ On July 30, Austria, at the solicitation of Germany, explained to Russia that she was ready to elucidate the terms of her note to Servia and to continue direct negotiations with Russia, and Russia on this same day modified the conditions she had laid down in her first formula, but no longer agreed to arrest her military preparations. This Sazonof formula, as we have seen, required Austria to accept the mediation of the powers and eliminate from her ultimatum those conditions which were incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence and integrity. The next day (July 31), just after Germany had launched her ultimatum requiring Russia to demobilize, Sir Edward Grey brought forward his final proposal, which was that Austria and Russia should arrest their military preparations, on the understanding that the powers would

¹ The situation was characterized by the Paris *Journal des Débats* as follows: "All these formulæ of the old Chancelleries have had their day. Let us consider facts only. The Triple Alliance has challenged the Triple *Entente*. The German Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg have just supported the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, declaring that the Governments to which they were accredited must, under penalty of incalculable consequences, allow Austria to enslave Servia. The Cabinets at St. Petersburg, Paris, and London have replied in courteous terms that they would not allow this crime to be consummated. It has gone as far as that. All the formulæ in the world will not change the situation. Austria-Germany must effectively renounce the execution of her plan or the two forces will come face to face." (Extract, July 31, 1914, *Journal des Débats*, Paris, "Le Dessein Austro-Allemand.")

work to find some solution satisfactory alike to Austria and Russia. According to these terms Austria would receive adequate guaranty against the continuance of the hostile Servian propaganda and unfriendly action of Servia, of which she justly complained. With due regard to the rights of Servia and the prestige of her mighty protector, nothing would be accepted which should infringe upon Servia's rights as a sovereign state. It was Sir Edward's thought that Germany might support this proposal at Vienna while the other powers entered into a friendly discussion at London, but although the German Government expressed a favorable opinion of this proposal, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Von Jagow, refused to coöperate at Vienna until an answer to the German ultimatum should be received from Russia. This dashed all hopes, since it was hardly likely that Russia would make a conciliatory reply to an ultimatum couched in such terms.

It is hard to overestimate the place which compromise plays in the affairs of nations. But for the system of mutual "give and take," all international intercourse were well-nigh impossible, and except where there is an intention to force an issue, in all disputes the governments concerned are ready to concede something of their extreme claims for the sake of reaching a half-way and peaceful result.¹ It is the work of the diplomatist to trace this line,

¹ Cf. R. O. P. no. 51, where Von Jagow told the Russian Ambassador at Berlin that he learned that M. Sazonof was "more inclined than previously to find a compromise acceptable to all parties." M. Sazonof had said to the German Ambassador that, "after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation." (Extract, July 29, B. W. P. no. 92 (2).)

Such evidently was not the frame of mind of Baron von Giesl, the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, when two days before the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum he wrote to Vienna: "Half measures, demands, endless debating, and finally a foul compromise, would be the hardest blow to Austria-Hungary's prestige in Servia and her standing as a great power

and for such negotiations a certain length of time is necessary. The more complex and delicate the situation, the longer must be the period allowed. In the present instance the diplomats realized from the very first that in place of weeks, a few days would have to suffice to effect the work of peace. The task would have been difficult enough in an atmosphere of general confidence and good will, but was rendered impossible by the mutual rivalries and distrust of the powers. In his speech in the House of Commons, August 3, Sir Edward Grey said: —

“In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition — at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell — to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace, as far as the great powers (generally) are concerned, is in danger. . . .”

in Europe.” (Extract, July 21, A. R. B. no. 6.) The Austrian Government seem to have taken these words to heart.

CHAPTER VIII

SIR EDWARD GREY AND THE ENGLISH DIPLOMACY

The important rôle of England — Efforts to prevent war — Efforts to organize mediation — England refuses to take sides — The Anglo-French *Entente* — England declares that she is not interested in a Balkan question — England warns Germany that she will not hold aloof if France is involved — Germany's bid for English neutrality — Divergence of opinion in England — England's vital interests — England's inquiry relative to Belgium's neutrality — England asked to guarantee the neutrality of France — Germany's detention of English vessels — Germany invades Luxemburg — England agrees to protect the French coasts — The British ultimatum.

1. The important rôle of England

IN the midst of all these preparations, mobilizations and counter-mobilizations, England with her First Fleet assembled at Portsmouth was the key to the whole European situation. The fears of Austria and Germany and the hopes of France and Russia centered about the probable course of England. No other state was so free from entangling alliances, none was so secure from invasion, and in case of war, no state as a neutral would have had such an opportunity for commercial expansion. But England, having built up an immense empire, required security above everything; so her first desire was to prevent the outbreak of any war between the powers, and if this should not be possible, she still hoped to keep out of it herself.

At this critical juncture the control of England's foreign affairs was in the experienced hands of the broad-minded and large-framed statesman — Sir Edward Grey.¹ In the short period between the presentation of the Austrian note at Belgrade and the British ultimatum at Berlin, Sir

¹ Sir Edward Grey, third baronet, was born April 25, 1862. He was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and has been a member of the Liberal party in Parliament since 1885. In 1892 he became Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, holding office three years. Since 1905 he has held the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Edward is shown by the British White Paper to have had a constant succession of interviews, and to have sent nearly sixty dispatches to the British representatives at the capitals of the great powers. Together with this great tax on his time and energy went the heaviest responsibility which has ever fallen to any single man. Under ordinary circumstances the responsibility of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is heavy enough, when he can refer to his colleagues and gauge the trend of opinion in his party or throughout the country as a whole; but when events move with such rapidity as they did just preceding the outbreak of the present war, he has to make almost instantaneous decisions on very important questions, where any misstep may destroy confidence in his party or even involve his country in war. He has to decide what the country wishes and what the country needs, and act upon it forthwith. It is easily understood that Sir Edward Grey's first object must have been to prevent the outbreak of war, but he had at the same time to be working to keep England out of the war should it prove inevitable. His great responsibility lay in deciding which plans or methods to follow. He had to be sure that he took no step without the support of a Cabinet which was torn by conflicting views; he had further to feel certain that the policy adopted would secure a large non-partisan majority in Parliament and be enthusiastically acclaimed by the press and the whole country. Not a very easy problem in statecraft, as we shall see when we come to examine the intricacies of the political situation and the sudden transformations during the fortnight preceding the declaration of war against Germany.

In the critical week following the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, the diplomats tried one plan after another, and one plan in conjunction with another, and always it was Sir Edward Grey to whom they turned from all sides.

2. Efforts to prevent war

Sir Edward turned his attention from the very first to preventing war between any of the principal powers. As he observed to the German Ambassador at London, "When there was danger of a European conflict, it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it." (B. W. P. no. 90.) He made suggestions, he fathered the proposals of others, he was ceaseless in his efforts for peace. He first advised Austria against an ultimatum, explaining how it would be likely to inflame public opinion in Russia, and could, he said, be introduced later if Servian procrastination made it necessary. When he learned that the time limit of the ultimatum was only forty-eight hours, he had recourse to the telegraph, and worked with France, Russia, and Italy in an attempt to prevail upon Austria, either directly or through the mediation of her ally, Germany, to extend the delay long enough to permit of finding some way out of the threatening complications. When Germany refused to join in making the representations at Vienna, and Austria refused the requested extension, Sir Edward instructed the British representative at Belgrade to bend his efforts toward securing a conciliatory reply from Servia. So successful was the combined influence of Russia, England, and France that for a moment it seemed as if Austria must accept Servia's reply, and forego the war for which her people were clamoring; but in spite of all the persuasion lavished upon her, Austria pronounced the reply unacceptable.¹

3. Efforts to organize mediation

While all this was taking place, Sir Edward Grey had been striving to set up a mediatory conference at London,

¹ Some of the indications of England's disposition to exercise a pacific and restraining influence at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg will be found in the following dispatches: B. W. P. nos. 5, 6, 11, 17, 18, 30, 44, 46, 65, 72, 104, 110, 111; A. R. B. no. 38.

and as soon as he found that several of the powers approved the project, he issued the formal invitation and asked the accepting Governments to urge upon Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to refrain from all aggressive action until the conference should be able to arrive at some solution. Germany agreed to mediation in principle, and declared that she was ready to coöperate in mediation if necessary to keep the peace between Austria and Russia, but said emphatically that Austria and Servia must be allowed to settle their difference without interference from other powers. In place of the British proposal, the German Government suggested to Russia that the Austro-Russian disagreement over the Servian question be made the object of direct conversations. Russia accepted with alacrity, and Sir Edward Grey held his mediation proposal in abeyance in the hope that the direct negotiation might succeed. These conversations were suddenly interrupted when Austria, as if fearing that the negotiations might be successful in robbing her of an excuse for war against Servia, declared that she could not discuss any modification of the terms of the Servian reply, and put Europe face to face with a *fait accompli* by declaring war against Servia. Russia refused to be satisfied by Austria's assurances that she would not impair Servia's independence, and now again Russia, France, and Italy turned to Sir Edward Grey, imploring him to renew his proposal for conferences at London as the only hope of averting war. But Germany again raised objections — she felt that she could not drag her ally before a European tribunal, which would sit in judgment on matters interesting only Austria and Servia. The British Foreign Minister hastened to explain that the conference would not be of so formal a nature, and that nothing would be proposed which had not first been submitted to both Austria and Russia for their approval. In the vain effort to find some basis of mediation acceptable to Austria, it was even suggested that Austria might save

her face by occupying Belgrade, and that she might there agree to a discussion of the terms of settlement.

The natural consequence of Germany's objections and Austria's aggression on Servia had been to call forth a partial mobilization from Russia. When the German Chancellor had previously appealed to Sir Edward Grey to put pressure upon Russia, he had replied in no uncertain terms, warning Germany of her responsibility for backing Austria in her uncompromising attitude, and pointing out that Vienna was the place where a restraining influence was needed. (Cf. R. O. P. no. 42.) Germany seems to have felt the justice or at least the seriousness of these remarks, and to have spoken at Vienna. Whether as a consequence of this influence from Berlin, or because she perceived too late that England was likely to be drawn into the war, the Austrian Government assumed a much more conciliatory attitude, and renewed direct negotiations with Russia. The powers had now faint hope of success from these conversations, and made every effort to bring Germany into a conference at London.

Sir Edward Grey asked Germany herself, since she had agreed to mediation "in principle," to suggest the form it should take, to "press the button," as the British Minister expressed it. When this offer evoked no response from Berlin, except that the Chancellor to save time had passed it on directly to Austria, Sir Edward came forward with the Marquis di San Giuliano's plan that Servia should accept Austria's demands in their entirety, Austria giving to the powers certain explanations as to their meaning and effects.¹ When this fell flat, Sir Edward Grey was ready to ask that Austria should herself suggest an acceptable formula, which would have given the conference more the appearance of an Austrian commission, working to help Austria solve her difficulties, than an Areopagus sitting

¹ See above, chap. vii, § 10, pp. 240-242, where Sir Edward Grey's offer and the Chancellor's reply are given.

in judgment over the prostrate Dual Monarchy. Sir Edward went so far as to say to the German Ambassador at London that 'if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, he would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, the British Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 111.)

4. England refuses to take sides

From the very beginning, France and Russia had been urging England to stand with them, on the ground that it would deter Germany from entering upon a war. The day that he learned the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, M. Sazonof joined the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg 'in pressing the British representative for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Government with the French and Russian Governments. The Ambassador replied that it seemed to him possible that Sir Edward Grey might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both the German and Austrian Governments, and to impress upon them that an attack upon Serbia by Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps he might see his way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that England would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; and that England would have rendered war more likely if she did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped the British Government would express strong

reprobation of the action taken by Austria.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6; cf. B. W. P. no. 24.)

The next day (July 25), M. Sazonof further said to the British Ambassador that 'he did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by England's. If she took her stand firmly with France and Russia, there would be no war. If she failed them now, rivers of blood would flow and England would in the end be dragged into war. The Ambassador replied that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as a friend, who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. M. Sazonof said that, unfortunately, Germany was convinced that she could count upon England's neutrality.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 17; cf. F. Y. B. nos. 31, 47, 92.)

A couple of days later (July 27) the Russian Ambassador at London told Sir Edward Grey that 'in German and Austrian circles the impression prevailed that in any event England would stand aside. He deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 47.)

The President of France also was 'convinced that peace between the powers was in the hands of England. He thought that if the British Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present difference between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.'¹

¹ George Bernard Shaw, in various articles appearing in the press, has presented this view to the public with all his literary skill. We have, however, to remember that, though such may have been the sincere conviction of France, Russia, and Italy, it was also the dearest hope of France and Russia. Under the circumstances the most effective way for the Dual Alliance to bring England to stand with them was to express this view with as much force as possible. Then, in case war did result, France and Russia

When the British Ambassador explained how difficult it would be for the British Government to make such an announcement, M. Poincaré still said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. If there were a general war on the Continent, it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration at that time of England's intention to support France would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 99.)

In a final effort to obtain a declaration of support of France, President Poincaré sent the King of England an autograph letter ¹ dated July 31. M. Paul Cambon,

could maintain with all appearance of reason that the war could have been avoided if England had followed their advice; as a consequence their moral claim on England's assistance would have been very strong. From the German side Sir Edward Grey has been made responsible for the war, on the ground that by standing back of France he encouraged France to promise Russia support, with the result that the latter by ordering a general mobilization precipitated the war. (See Bernhard Dernburg, *Search-Lights on the War*, pp. 28-29; cf. the German Chancellor's speech of December 2, 1915, in the Reichstag.)

Whatever the truth of these conflicting assertions, it is open to doubt whether Germany showed as conciliatory a disposition after July 29 as before. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 92.)

Professor Hans Delbrück writes: ". . . Grey's fault is not that he gave them a promise of help, but that he failed to declare that England would not be on their side. That, and that alone, would have conserved the peace." ("Germany's Answer," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1915, p. 240.)

¹ President Poincaré's letter of July 31, and King George's reply, dated August 1, were published in the London *Times*, February 20, 1915: —

PARIS, July 31, 1914.

Dear and great Friend, —

In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound to convey to Your Majesty the information which the Government of the Republic have received from Germany. The military preparations which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neighborhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every day with fresh vigor and speed. France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the modera-

French Ambassador at London, in a telegram dispatched on that same date (July 31) informs his Government:

tion of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events.

From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the *entente cordiale* would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to Your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable.

But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the *entente* between Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which Your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the Republic and of all France.

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend.

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace.

I beg that Your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely reaffirmed.

Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments.

R. POINCARÉ.

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, August 1, 1914.

Dear and great Friend, —

I most highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and frankly.

“According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to secure that the autograph letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.”¹ (Extract, July 31, F. Y. B. no. 110.)

Even Italy joined in urging England to declare herself on the side of France and Russia. The Marquis di San Giuliano said that ‘as Germany was really anxious for good relations with England, if she believed that the British Government would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect.’ (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 80; cf. F. Y. B. nos. 72, 96.) The following evening, July 30, the Italian Foreign Minis-

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together in endeavoring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue.

It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the terrible events which seem so near may be averted.

I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercising in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one.

I am personally using my best endeavors with the Emperors of Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement.

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon.

Believe me,

M. le Président,

(Signed)

GEORGE R. I.

¹ From the London *Times* of August 3, we learn that Mr. Asquith was received on August 1, at 1.30 A.M., by the King, who had been visited shortly before midnight by M. Paul Cambon.

ter told the British Ambassador at Rome that 'he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that England would act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid an issue with her.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 106.)

When, on the other side, Germany and Austria appealed to England to prevent a European war by declaring that the English Government would not permit the peace of Europe to be disturbed by a Balkan question and that Austria should be allowed to settle her difference with Servia undisturbed, Sir Edward Grey refused.¹ Before the

¹ Cf. above, p. 274, note. An editorial in the *London Times* (December 5, 1914), entitled "The German Premise," makes answer: "There was one minor point in Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech in the Reichstag which deserves noting, not because it needs to be denied, but because it throws light on the German state of mind. The responsibility for the war, he said, falls on the British Government, because it could have made war impossible if it had, without ambiguity, declared at Petrograd that Great Britain would not allow a Continental war to develop from the Austro-Serbian conflict. That, unlike some other statements in the speech, is probably quite true. But if the British Government had made this declaration to the Russians, it would have meant simply that England declared for Germany and Austria against Russia. But, according to that argument, all of the great powers at war are equally responsible because they did not do something different from what they did do. France, for instance, could have prevented the war if she had declined to support Russia; Russia could have prevented it if she had taken no interest in the fate of Serbia; and, finally, Germany could have prevented it if she had refused to support Austria; while as for Austria, she could have prevented it if she had never presented her ultimatum. But the Chancellor's argument, poor as it may seem to the rest of the world, will satisfy the Germans, because for them the Austro-German resolve was something as fixed and unalterable as a force of nature. According to their notion, the problem for France, Russia, and England was not to achieve some compromise, but to adapt themselves to that resolve as best they could. If Russia would not submit to it, it was the duty of France to desert her; and if France preferred to be faithful to her alliance, it was our duty to prevent war by threatening to throw all our power in on the side of Germany and Austria. And since we failed to do that, we are responsible for the war that followed. Given the German premises, we are; but on that condition any power that went to war with Germany in any possible circumstances would be responsible. Even Belgium is responsible because she did not allow her neutrality to be violated. In fact, if another nation exists and Germany prefers that it should not exist, that nation is responsible for any efforts which Germany may make to bring its existence to an end." (Extract.)

presentation of the ultimatum he had made it clear to Austria that the amount of influence he could use with Russia would depend upon the reasonableness of the demands which Austria made upon Serbia. As soon as he was cognizant of the terms of the note, he foresaw — what was, indeed, plain to every one — that Serbia could not accept it unconditionally, and that, in consequence of Austria's probable intention of having recourse to military measures against Serbia, Russia would mobilize. When all this came to pass and Germany persistently urged Sir Edward Grey to influence Russia to arrest her military operations, he replied by renewing his suggestions for quadruple mediation or intervention, but did not consider that he could bring pressure to bear at St. Petersburg alone, since that would not be mediation but intervention in favor of Austria.

At first sight, as one reads the documents, it seems most probable that had Sir Edward Grey announced that England would support France and Russia, he might have prevented the war. I admit frankly that such was my own opinion until I had made a thorough and critical study of the documents and the situation of the respective powers. As a result of this examination I am convinced that Sir Edward would not have been justified in taking any other course than that which he actually pursued. For if he had let it be known that England would stand with France and Russia, his course would have been attended with two dangers. In the first place, if Germany was in her heart of hearts determined to have war unless she could impose on Europe her own solution of the Servian and Balkan question, England's declaration would have made it evident that Germany must strike at once to secure the whole benefit of her speed in mobilization, and this would have been the easier to accomplish, since the popular imagination in Germany would have been instantly fired with hatred of England for her interference. Whereas, by hold-

ing off, Sir Edward forced Germany, even if it were admitted that she was set on war, to weigh the relative advantages of striking at once, thereby drawing England in, or of making a show of negotiation to furnish England with some good excuse for remaining neutral. By holding aloof and prevailing upon the other powers to show a conciliatory spirit, Sir Edward would force even a power bent upon war to lose time¹ and to fence for a position justifying it in the eyes of its own people in commencing the war.

If, on the other hand, Germany had been sincerely and out and out for peace, England by joining France and Russia might have put Germany in the position where she could only yield with loss of prestige, a situation to which there would be no alternative but war. Nor is it certain that France and Russia would not have thought it too good an opportunity to lose and have found some means of bringing on the conflict. I admit that this seems a wild hypothesis in view of all the efforts made by France and Russia to keep the peace, but we do not know what attempts might not have been made to stampede a war if English support was certain. In any event, France and Russia must have been still more anxious for peace, when they were uncertain as to England's stand, than they would have been had they counted upon her support.

There is still another aspect of the affair which we are likely now to forget. It is that England and Germany had been making sincere, if unfruitful, efforts to reach some agreement to eliminate their rivalry, to their own great benefit and for the good of the world's peace.² Sir Edward Grey having, I believe, a right to expect that peace could be maintained, and that the reasonable prospects of maintaining peace outweighed the probability of war up to

¹ Belgium took advantage of this delay to mobilize, July 31; see Charles Sarolea, *How Belgium Saved Europe*, pp. 73-74, 1915.

² See Documents: "Anglo-German Relations," *post*, chap. XIII.

the time of Germany's presentation of her ultimatum to Russia, would not have been justified in destroying the growing confidence between England and Germany. A reciprocal desire upon the part of Germany is indicated by Von Bethmann-Hollweg's remark that 'ever since he had been Chancellor, his policy had been, as Sir Edward was aware, to bring about an understanding with England.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 85.) We can sympathize with Sir Edward in trying to emphasize and appeal to this common desire for coöperation when he instructed Sir Edward Goschen, when refusing Germany's offer to secure England's neutrality, to say most earnestly to the Chancellor, as from him, that 'the one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany was that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if they succeeded in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England would, he believed, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object, adds Sir Edward, the British Government would work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill.'

Sir Edward added further: 'If the peace of Europe could be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, his own endeavor would be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and England, jointly or separately. He had desired this and worked for it, as far as he could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, their relations sensibly improved. The idea had hitherto been too utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe had gone through for generations, be safely passed, he was hopeful that the relief and reaction which would follow might make possible some more definite *rapprochement*

between the powers than had been possible hitherto.¹ (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 101.)

As the Russian Ambassador at London expressed it, 'the English Government was sincerely disposed to collaborate with the German Government in an effort to preserve the peace.' (Modified quotation, July 27, R. O. P. no. 42.)

By taking the stand he did, Sir Edward Grey encouraged, even forced, Germany along the road of peaceful concession, and when she balked herself or blocked the route for others, all the world could judge of the real responsibility for the failure of the negotiations.

5. *The Anglo-French Entente*

England's refusal to take sides involved the delicate question of what were her obligations toward France and Russia by reason of the intangible *Entente*. With what admirable *aplomb* the French Ambassador handled this most difficult discussion! He tactfully pressed Sir Edward Grey to stand with France, and asked for information as to what England's course would be, without ever attempting to tell the British Government what its duty

¹ Following is an extract from some observations upon the report of an interview with the German Chancellor after the outbreak of the war. The publication of the observations was authorized by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: "The German Chancellor spoke to the American correspondent of his 'efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and Germany,' an understanding, he added, which would have 'absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe.' He omitted to mention, what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at Cardiff, that Germany required, as the price of an understanding, an unconditional pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggression against Germany; they were not prepared to pledge their neutrality in case of aggression by Germany. An Anglo-German understanding on the latter terms would not have meant an absolute guaranty for the peace of Europe; but it would have meant an absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as England was concerned, for Germany to break the peace of Europe." (London *Times*, January 27, 1915. Cf. Von Bethmann-Höllweg's speech of December 2.)

What Mr. Asquith said in his Cardiff Speech of October 2 is given in the *Documents, post*, chap. XIII.

was. In an interview, on July 30, M. Paul Cambon reminded Sir Edward of a letter written him two years previously which read as follows:—

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 22, 1912.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR:—

From time to time in recent years, the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, etc.

E. GREY.¹

¹ B. W. P. no. 105; encl. 1.

M. Cambon's translated reply was: —

FRENCH EMBASSY, LONDON, November 23, 1912.

DEAR SIR EDWARD: —

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22d November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.¹

¹ B. W. P. no. 105, encl. 2.

Having thus recalled to Sir Edward's mind the exact nature of the Anglo-French *Entente*, M. Cambon went on to say that 'the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was then. He did not wish to ask Sir Edward Grey to say directly that Great Britain would intervene, but he was desirous of having him say what Great Britain would do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 105.) The Ambassador handed Sir Edward a paper indicating the extent to which Germany had pushed her preparations for an attack upon France and the efforts the latter was making to preserve peace.¹ Sir

¹ The *War Chronicle*, December, 1914, pp. 20-24, gives an English translation of an article which appeared in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (no. 321, December 23, 1914,) attacking the veracity of the documents in the British White Paper on the ground of the inconsistencies contained in no. 105. This criticism, however, was made without reference to the documents in the French Yellow Book.

In making a comparison of the original in no. 106 of the French Yellow Book with the French original of enclosure 3 in no. 105 of the British White Paper, we find that they are almost identical. With the exception of one or two sentences they can be pieced out word for word. This shows beyond question that they are the same dispatch. But the French Yellow Book no. 106 is dated July 30, whereas the first edition of the British White Paper gave the date of its enclosed document as July 31. Directly after the "*hier*" of the French Yellow Book, no. 106, the British White Paper has "*vendredi*" in parentheses. This does not occur in the original French Yellow Book, no. 106, since *hier* — that is, July 29 — would have been Wednesday. Apparently noticing this mistake, the later editions drop out the "*vendredi*."

Another mistake of a similar nature was made in an attempt to explain the "Saturday" mentioned in the second paragraph of enclosure 3 by the addition of "*le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.*" If Saturday the 25th was referred to, it was the day that the Servian reply was handed in, and not the Austrian note. F. Y. B. no. 106 has simply "Saturday, the 25th." This discrepancy is explained in the Blue Book edition of the document by the addition of a note: "*Sic in original.*"

In the later editions of the British White Paper the date of enclosure 3 in B. W. P. no. 105 is omitted.

If F. Y. B. no. 106 and B. W. P. no. 105 are both correctly dated July 30, it must mean that the French dispatch left Paris and reached the French Ambassador at London in time for him to present it to Sir Edward Grey and have him include it in his dispatch of that same date to the British Am-

Edward replied that 'there would be a meeting of the Cabinet next day, in the morning, and that he would see M. Cambon in the afternoon.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 105.)

When M. Cambon, in the interview after the Cabinet meeting, referred to a remark of the French Ambassador at Berlin that 'it was the uncertainty with regard to whether England would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if England would declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favor of peace, Sir Edward said that it was quite wrong to suppose that they had left Germany under the impression that they would not inter-

bassador at Paris. Furthermore, it does not seem that the dispatch (F. Y. B. no. 106) could have been sent by cipher, otherwise the words, when retranslated, would not have been identical.

If we examine F. Y. B. no. 106 closely, we shall notice the statement in the next to the last paragraph: "*Par deux fois, hier, des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire.*" Enclosure 3 of B. W. P. no. 105 has identically the same words, except that the "*hier*" is thrown into the previous sentence. We do not find that the French Government made any protest against this violation of the frontier, but when we come to August 2, we find the telegram from M. Viviani to M. Jules Cambon (F. Y. B. no. 139), directing him to protest against various violations of the frontier. In this M. Viviani says: "*Au nord de Delle, deux patrouilles allemandes du 5^e chasseurs à cheval ont franchi la frontière dans la matinée d'aujourd'hui. . . .*" (F. Y. B. no. 155 recounts the interview in which M. Jules Cambon presented the protest as instructed.) The next day the French Prime Minister indignantly challenged the accuracy of the German Ambassador's statement in regard to French violations of the frontier, and reminded him that he had yesterday sent him a note protesting against the violations of the French frontier committed during the last two days by detachments of German troops. (F. Y. B. no. 148.) In the German Chancellor's speech of August 2, he quotes a report of the General Staff as follows: "Against express orders a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2."

That there should have been some isolated violations of the frontier is easily understood when we read in the telegram that Emperor William sent to King George V, on August 1: "The troops on my frontier at this moment have received orders by telegraph and by telephone to arrest their advance across the French frontier." (F. Y. B., p. 188.)

It is hard to explain these discrepancies, which are patently the result of carelessness and hasty editing, since no falsification would have been uttered with such obvious inconsistencies.

vene, and that he had refused overtures to promise that they should remain neutral. He had not only definitely declined to say that they would remain neutral; he had even gone so far that morning as to say to the German Ambassador that if France and Germany became involved in war, England would be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as entering into an engagement to France, and he told M. Cambon of it only to show that they had not left Germany under the impression that they would stand aside.

'M. Cambon then asked Sir Edward for his reply to what he had said the day before. Sir Edward said that they had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet that day that they could not give any pledge at the present time; that though they should have to put their policy before Parliament, they could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to that moment they did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of England were involved.¹ Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of Belgian neutrality might be, Sir Edward would not say a decisive, but an important factor in determining their attitude. Whether they proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how they stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that Sir Edward would ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

'M. Cambon repeated his question whether England would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

'Sir Edward replied that he could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone then, they could not enter into any engagement.

¹ Cf. B. W. P. no. 87; F. Y. B. nos. 32, 110.

'M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace; that it could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany; that they would then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany; that in 1870, the English had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and that they would now be repeating the mistake. M. Cambon asked Sir Edward whether he could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

'Sir Edward said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at that moment, the only answer he could give was that they could not undertake any definite engagement.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 119; cf. B. W. P. no. 116.)

On August 3, at the end of three days crowded with momentous happenings, Sir Edward Grey, as a preliminary to consulting the House of Commons on the course the Government should take, gave an authoritative account of the formation of the *entente* with France: —

"I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House — and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once — that if any crisis such as this arose, we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honor upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

"There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple *Entente*, for some years past. The Triple *Entente* was not an alliance — it was a diplomatic group. The House will

remember that in 1908 there was a crisis, also a Balkan crisis, originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

“In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty’s Government, when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I — spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office — was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco — a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides — that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

“I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember, almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats;

but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time — and I think very reasonably — ‘If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some “conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.”’ There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

“As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on — I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance — but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

“The Agadir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing,

which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government. [Sir Edward then read his letter to M. Cambon of November 22, 1912. See above pp. 283-84.]

“ . . . That is the starting-point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free and, *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

“Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France — a dispute which concerned France and France primarily — a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France, out of an

agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

“The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence — no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honor cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.”¹

¹ At the same time that the relations of France and England are under discussion, it will be of interest to consider what was the situation between England and Russia. Some very interesting documents bearing upon the negotiations of England with France and Russia have been published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. These appeared in Germany, October 16, and were republished by the *New York Times*, November 8, and on account of their length have been placed among the documents at the end of this volume. (*Post*, chap. XIII.) It is necessary to read them carefully to reach an understanding of the peculiar nature of the hazy *entente*, which “with subtle ingenuity is worded in such a manner that it suits the peculiar English mentality.” To the German editorial writer it looks like an attempt to play a double game, but it is in reality something deeper than an ordinary treaty between two bureaucratic governments; just as between individuals the ties of a sincere friendship are deeper and sometimes better observed than a more formal and legally binding partnership agreement.

6. *England declares that she is not interested in a Balkan question*

Sir Edward Grey had been paralleling his efforts to prevent a war by a second series of efforts to prevent his country from being engulfed, should war prove inevitable.

From the very start he had made the same declaration, contained in his speech of August 3, that England was not concerned in a Balkan question (R. O. P. no. 20; B. W. P. no. 5), and that as long as Austria could settle her affairs with Servia so as not to involve Russia, he had nothing to say. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg told M. Sazonof, that 'direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6; cf. B. W. P. no. 24.)

In conformity with this stand, Sir Edward Grey refused to go into the merits of the Austro-Servian dispute (B. W. P. no. 91), but said that he 'should concern himself with the matter solely and simply from the point of view of the peace of Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 5.) British opinion sympathized with Austria's be-reavement, and could easily believe that a government founded upon regicide and favoring regicides merited the natural suspicions which attached to its evil reputation.

Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador at London that 'of course, if the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, they need not concern themselves about it.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 10.)

Sir Edward, well knowing that France had announced from the start that she would stand back of Russia and that Germany would not allow Russia to crush Austria, realized that an Austro-Russian conflict was almost certain to widen out to include Germany and France, and that when this occurred it would be difficult for England

to keep out of the struggle. (Cf. B. W. P. nos. 6, 24, 25.) As Sir Edward remarked, 'when there was a danger of a European conflict, it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it; even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 90.)

Intending to reserve his independence of action up to the last, Sir Edward Grey told M. Paul Cambon (July 29) that he meant to tell the German Ambassador that day that he 'must not be misled by the friendly tone of their conversations into any sense of false security that they should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which they were then making in common with Germany, failed. But he went on to say to M. Cambon that he thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion in England approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years before. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and England. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which she felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, England would not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and their idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, they had not made up their minds what they should do; it was a case that they would have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honor and interest obliged her to engage. England

was free from engagements, and would have to decide what British interests required her to do. Sir Edward thought it necessary to say this, because, as M. Cambon knew, they were taking all precautions with regard to their fleet, and he was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on their standing aside, but it would not be fair that he should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that they had decided what to do in a contingency that he still hoped might not arise.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 87.)

*7. England warns Germany that she will not hold aloof if
France is involved*

As early as July 27, Sir Arthur Nicolson, English Under-Secretary of State, told the French Chargé at London, in reference to 'the German and Austrian Ambassadors giving it to be understood that England would remain neutral, that Prince Lichnowsky could not, after the conversation he had had with him that day, preserve any doubt as to the liberty of intervention which the British Government intended to keep, should it deem intervention necessary.' (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 63.)

In Sir Edward Grey's dispatch of July 29, to Sir Edward Goschen at Berlin, we learn that he told the German Ambassador at London that 'after speaking to him about the European situation, he wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on his mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved, England had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and he did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of their conversation — which he hoped would continue — into thinking that they would stand aside.

'Prince Lichnowsky said that he quite understood this,

but he asked whether Sir Edward meant that England would under certain circumstances intervene. Sir Edward replied that he did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, the British Government would intervene. There would be no question of their intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But the British Government knew very well that if the issue did become such that they thought British interests required them to intervene, they must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other powers had to be. He hoped that the friendly tone of their conversations would continue as at present, and that he would be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if they failed in their efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, he did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all their conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that they would not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.¹

‘The German Ambassador took no exception to what Sir Edward said; indeed, he told him that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his own view of the situation.’ (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 89; cf. F. Y. B. no. 98.)

¹ We have seen above (p. 294) that Sir Edward Grey had already told the French Ambassador of his intention to give the German Ambassador this warning (cf. B. W. P. no. 87). German partisans have criticized Sir Edward Grey severely for thus taking M. Cambon into his confidence. Dr. Karl Helfferich cites various documents (R. O. P. no. 58; B. W. P. no. 17) in support of his contention that this act, by assuring France of England's support, decided the French Government to promise its support to Russia, (*New York Times*, March 14, 1915; see also Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, *Search-Lights on the War*, The Fatherland Corporation, New York, 1915.)

8. Germany's bid for English neutrality

At the very time (July 29) when the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was explaining to the German Ambassador at London that England would not necessarily come in or stay out, but must, in case of a general European war, decide — and that very rapidly — what her interests dictated, the German Chancellor, just returned to Berlin from Potsdam, was making an offer to the British Ambassador at Berlin to secure England's neutrality. He said that 'should Austria be attacked by Russia, a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded, as Sir Edward Goschen said, to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that the neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial German Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

'When questioned about the French colonies, the Chancellor said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, he said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give the British Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected, if she had not sided against Germany.

'He ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor, the object of his policy had been, as Sir Edward Grey was aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality, in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to the realization of his desire. In reply to an inquiry how he thought this request would appeal to Sir Edward Grey, Sir Edward Goschen said that he did not think it probable that at this stage of events Sir Edward Grey would care to bind himself to any course of action and that he was of opinion that Sir Edward Grey would desire to retain full liberty.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 85.)

To this, Sir Edward Grey replied (July 30) in a telegram to the British Ambassador at Berlin: —

"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

"What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

"From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power, and become subordinate to German policy.

"Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

“The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

“Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.” (Extract, July 30, B. W. P. no. 101; cf. F. Y. B. no. 126.)

Then Sir Edward Grey, in the words referred to above (see above, pp. 281, 282), directed the Ambassador to speak of the need of coöperation between England and Germany and of Sir Edward's hopes that, if they succeeded in preserving the peace, their relations would be improved, and to say that he would work for some arrangement to assure Germany against aggression from any European power.

When the British Ambassador at Berlin read to Von Bethmann-Hollweg Sir Edward Grey's 'answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, the Chancellor was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier that he received the communication without comment. He asked the Ambassador to let him have the message just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. Sir Edward Goschen, therefore, handed to him the text of the message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document. To this the Chancellor agreed.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 109.)

Before Sir Edward Goschen had communicated this

message from Sir Edward Grey, the German Secretary of State learned of England's attitude in a telegram from Prince Lichnowsky *à propos* of which Herr Von Jagow said that it 'contained matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which Sir Edward Grey had spoken. He also told the British Ambassador that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late the night before; had it been received earlier the Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to him in the way he had done.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 98.)

While this exchange was going on, the situation had been growing rapidly worse between Russia and Germany, and on July 31, the German Chancellor informed Sir Edward Goschen that 'if, as he learned was the case, military measures were then being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell the Ambassador, he said, that it was quite possible that in a very short time, that day, perhaps, the German Government would have to take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 108.)

On August 1, the day Germany declared war against Russia, Sir Edward Grey had an important interview with the German Ambassador at London, in which he told Prince Lichnowsky that 'the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in the country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult

to restrain public feeling in England. Sir Edward said that they had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as he was authorized to tell this to Prince Lichnowsky, he gave him a memorandum of it.

'Prince Lichnowsky asked Sir Edward whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, England would engage to remain neutral.

'Sir Edward replied that he could not say that; their hands were still free, and they were considering what their attitude should be. All he could say was that their attitude would be determined largely by public opinion in England, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion. He did not think that they could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

'The Ambassador pressed Sir Edward as to whether he could not formulate conditions on which he would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

'Sir Edward said that he felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and he could only say that they must keep their hands free.' (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 123.)

This second "bid" for England's neutrality shows how far Germany was ready to go to obtain a pledge from England that she would stand aside. It seems likely that Germany would have agreed to respect the neutrality of Belgium and to guarantee the restoration of French territory, colonial as well as European, and also that Germany might have agreed not to attack the northern and western coasts of France. But England could not agree to stay out of the war, much as she hoped to be able to, unless she could be certain that her vital interests would not suffer.¹

¹ Sir Edward Grey has stated that this offer of Prince Lichnowsky was his personal offer and not that of the German Government. If Sir Edward had wished to consider it, the German Ambassador could have learned in a

Again, on August 3, 'just as Sir Edward Grey was leaving for the Cabinet meeting, Prince Lichnowsky called to

few hours whether his Government would confirm it or not. Sir Edward Grey has been attacked by J. Ramsay MacDonald (New York *Evening Post*, September 8, 1914) and others because he did not communicate this offer to Parliament and because he did not make any effort to formulate conditions upon which England could remain neutral. According to the report in the London *Times*, Sir Edward Grey answered Mr. Hardie as follows in the House of Commons on August 27: —

"MR. KEIR HARDIE (Merthyr Tydvil, Lab.) asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made by the German Ambassador (White Paper, p. 66, no. 123), together with his invitation to the Foreign Secretary to put forward proposals of his own which would be acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered by the Cabinet, and, if not, why proposals involving such far-reaching possibilities were thus rejected.

"SIR E. GREY (Northumberland, Berwick) — These were personal suggestions made by the Ambassador on August 1, and without authority to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor in no. 85 in the White Paper — Miscellaneous, no. 6, [1914].

"The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next morning — that is, Sunday, August 2 — the conditions on which we could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be one of these conditions. [Hear, hear!] The German Chancellor had already been told on July 30 that we could not bargain that way.

"On Monday, August 3, I made a statement in the House accordingly. I had seen the German Ambassador again at his own request on Monday, and he urged me most strongly, though he said that he did not know the plans of the German military authorities, not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning, and I had no time to record the conversation, and therefore it does not appear in the White Paper; but it was impossible to withdraw that condition [loud cheers] without becoming a consenting party to the violation of the treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on Belgium.

"After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the communication described in no. 153 in the White Paper about the neutrality of Belgium. Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that communication had not been received when the White Paper was printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the White Paper.

"I have been asked why I did not refer to no. 123 in the White Paper when I spoke in the House on August 3. If I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality I must have referred to no. 85, the proposals made, not personally by the Ambassador, but officially by the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister subsequently, and this would have made the case against the German Government much stronger than I did make it in my speech. [Hear, hear!] I deliberately refrained from doing that then.

— "Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German Am-

urge him to say that the neutrality of England did not depend upon respect for Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward refused to discuss the matter, and the German Ambassador, according to the report of M. Cambon, gave out to the press a *communiqué*¹ stating that if England remained neutral, Germany would forego all naval operation and would not use the Belgian coasts as a supporting base. The French Ambassador informed his Government that he was replying that respect for coasts was not respect for the neutrality of territory, and that the German ultimatum was in itself a violation of neutrality.' (Modified quotation, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 144; cf. F. Y. B. no. 126.)

9. *Divergence of opinion in England*

Up to this point we have been examining certain aspects of the attitude assumed by England when first brought face to face with the European crisis. Sir Edward Grey could be sure of the unanimous support of the country in pursuing a policy which offered some chance of averting a war at the same time that it left open the question of the conditions which might necessitate armed intervention on bassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his Government. He worked for peace; but real authority at Berlin did not rest with him and others like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace failed. [Loud cheers.]

"MR. KEIR HARDIE — May I ask whether any attempt was made to open up negotiations with Germany on the basis of suggestions here set forth by the German Ambassador?"

"SIR E. GREY — The German Ambassador did not make any basis of suggestions. It was the German Chancellor who made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal initiative and without authority, asked whether we would formulate conditions on which we would be neutral. We did go into that question, and those conditions were stated to the House and made known to the German Ambassador.

"MR. KEIR HARDIE [who was received with cries of 'Oh!' from all parts of the House] — May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin repudiated the suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort at all [renewed cries of 'Oh!' and 'Order!'] was made to find out how far the German Government would have agreed to the suggestions put before them by their own Ambassador?" (London *Times*, August 28, 1914.)

¹ See *post*, p. 360.

the part of Great Britain. From the very start it was evident that the Austro-German and the Franco-Russian groups were each acting in the closest accord, and that neither Germany nor France was inclined to exert any pressure upon its ally. In this situation Sir Edward Grey had to use the whole strength of his position to influence and stimulate the peaceful efforts of each group; he was the better able to do this because of England's long-established cordial understanding with France and her relations with Germany, which had gradually been becoming more friendly as a result of the collaboration of the two Governments at the recent conference in London, when they had succeeded in avoiding a Balkan war.¹

Even before the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey had been in discussion with the German Ambassador, pointing out to him that the influence the English Government could exert in Russia would depend upon the nature of the Austrian demands on Serbia. No sooner had the Austrian note been presented than the principal diplomatic effort of all the great powers was directed upon Sir Edward Grey to win his support for one side or the other. He held his ground steadfastly, encouraging now one, now the other. In view of Russia's assuming a most correct and conciliatory attitude and inducing Serbia to astonish the world by the extent of her concessions to the intentionally insulting Austrian demands, he refused to acquiesce in the German Ambassador's attempt to put off on Russia the responsibility for the outcome. In no uncertain terms he imparted to Prince Lichnowsky his characterization of Austria's action in case she should put the Servian reply aside as worthless and march into Serbia, reckless of the consequences. In this same interview Sir Edward Grey promised, as long as

¹ This close sympathy and coöperation was clearly indicated by the Anglo-German discussions relative to an eventual partition of the Portuguese colonial possessions. (See Documents: Anglo-German Relations, *post*, chap. XIII.)

Germany would work for peace, to keep in close touch. (B. W. P. no. 46.) Lest, however, Austria and Germany might believe — as the Russian Ambassador asserted they did — that England would stand aside in any event, Sir Edward rewarded Russia and Serbia for their conciliatory action by publishing the news that the First Fleet had not been dispersed. (July 27, B. W. P. no. 47; July 27, F. Y. B. no. 66.)

Yet Sir Edward did not encourage Russia to relax her efforts to reach a peaceful solution through a feeling that she was certain of England's support; at the same time that he showed his appreciation of Russia's action by informing the Russian Ambassador of the retention of the fleet, he added significantly that his reference to the fleet must not be understood as promising anything more than diplomatic action. (B. W. P. no. 47.)

While Sir Edward continued to declare that England was not concerned in a Balkan question, he proposed various bases for the mediation of the four less interested powers to avoid an Austro-Russian conflict. When Germany refused to participate in a mediation conference, he emphatically declared that if Germany intervened in an Austro-Russian conflict, brought on by the unjustifiable aggression of Austria against Serbia, it would be because Germany, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, could not afford to see Austria crushed.¹ Just so he hinted that other issues might be raised which would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia and would bring other powers in. (B. W. P. no. 46.) This was equivalent to an intimation that, when France came to the support of Russia by reason of her obligation under the Dual Alliance, England might consider that she was under a certain moral obligation to support her partner in the *Entente* against Germany, whose aggressive action would

¹ That is to say, Germany's action would not be based upon the *casus fœderis* of a defensive alliance, but would be a matter of policy.

have dragged her unwillingly into a conflict. Besides, it was clear that England's vital interests might be affected in such a way as to make it very difficult for her to keep out. On the other hand, when Sir Edward Grey informed the French Ambassador of his intention to warn¹ the German Ambassador of the consequences which might result in case Germany supported Austria in her unjustifiably aggressive action, he distinctly told M. Paul Cambon that it would not be fair to let him be "misled into supposing that this meant that they had decided what to do in a contingency that he still hoped might not arise."² (July 29, B. W. P. no. 87.) Against this statement M. Cambon could urge nothing except his understanding of English interests which, he said, required her intervention. England was, indeed, absolutely free to remain out or not as she

¹ The difference between a warning and a threat is, that in a warning, the actual condition of affairs is set forth in an objective manner by one speaking with expert knowledge. Such an exposition makes plain the inevitable consequences of a certain course of action. A threat implies an intentionally retaliatory action, and is a conditional declaration of hostility which often has an injurious effect upon relations hitherto friendly.

² It has been ably argued by Dr. Karl Helfferich (*New York Times*, March 14, 1915) that this declaration decided France to promise her support to Russia (see above chap. v), and that Sir Edward Grey's attempt to play the rôle of an independent mediator was doomed to failure because England was bound by the *Entente* to help France. Yet elsewhere in the same article Dr. Helfferich points out how anxious France was about England's attitude up to August 2, and he concurs with the German Chancellor's opinion that England should have informed Russia that she would not allow a European war to result from the Austro-Servian dispute. (See Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag, December 2, 1914, *post*, chap. XIII.) This would hardly be consistent with England's recognition of an obligation to support France. By notifying France that she might not support her (B. W. P. no. 87), Sir Edward Grey plainly intimated that England was not bound. Before reaching any conclusion about this question, one has to consider the effect of Germany's attitude in regard to Belgium. The whole situation is made clear by Sir Edward Grey's offers of July 31 to desert France and Russia if they refused to coöperate in any reasonable peace proposal put forward by Germany. (B. W. P. no. 111.) To admit that England was bound to support France would have meant that she was pledged to protect Russia from aggression to the same extent as France. It is hard to believe that England would have obligated herself to such an extent without some *quid pro quo*.

should deem best for the protection of her interests.¹ To deny this is to assert that England was obligated to defend Russia from attack whenever the Franco-Russian Alliance forced France to intervene in favor of her ally.

That same day, July 29, arrived the German Chancellor's "strong bid for British neutrality" — another attempt to induce the English Government to depart from its rôle of neutral mediation, and to support Germany by a binding agreement not to intervene in favor of the Dual Alliance in the event of war. Sir Edward Grey refused this offer the following day and declared that 'the one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany was that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 101.)

By Thursday, July 30, the European situation had grown most serious. We have seen how Sir Edward Grey, up to this date, had avoided taking sides, but when M. Paul Cambon reminded him of their understanding that if the peace of Europe was threatened, they would discuss what they were prepared to do, the English Secretary recognized that his Government must give the French as frank a statement as possible, and so Sir Edward told M. Cambon that he would bring the question up in the Cabinet meeting next day, and tell him of the result in the afternoon.

Hitherto we have considered the foreign relations side of the negotiations, without reference to the internal situation, which was, notwithstanding, a factor of the utmost importance. It is impossible to understand what happened in the three days, July 31 to August 2, apart from a consideration of the political situation in England.

The morning of Friday, July 31, 1914, will, I believe, be

¹ The obligation to protect the French coast, which resulted from the concentration of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, is considered, *post*, § 15.

considered the most fateful day of the century, and Sir Edward Grey the principal actor. That day was the culmination of several important movements. Only a few hours before (July 30), Mr. Asquith, in the interest of national harmony, had announced in the House of Commons the decision of the Government to adjourn the second reading of the Amending Bill.¹ This action made possible the union of all parties to support the Government in the adoption of a firm national foreign policy.

A few days before, July 21, the King had summoned the leaders of both parties to a conference at Buckingham Palace, in an effort to reach some compromise to avoid civil war.² The royal intervention was ineffectual, and on the Sunday following these unusual conferences, just when the country was learning of Austria's peremptory rejection of the Servian note, the whole nation was stirred by the news of the fighting at Dublin, where three men were killed and thirty-two wounded.

The agitation of the public during this period is shown by the fact that, since the presentation of the Austrian note on the 23d of July, consols had begun to fall, until the extraordinarily low price of 69 was reached on the 31st — the last day before the Stock Exchange closed. As was to be expected, the Bank of England tried to inspire confidence by retaining its rate at 3 per cent, but on the 30th it was raised to 4 per cent, and on the 31st this was doubled.

During the preceding week, while the powers had been engaged in their great diplomatic struggle, the necessity of quickly coming to a decision in regard to the foreign policy had subjected the governmental political machinery of the different states to a severe test.³

¹ Amending the Home Rule Bill.

² This action on the part of the King gave rise to bitter discussion, in which George V was openly accused of being a Conservative partisan.

³ On the 30th, in Russia, the war party seems to have gained control, and on the 31st, in France, the agitation is shown by the assassination of Jaurès, July 31.

In England the political situation was most complex and difficult, not only because the country was on the verge of war, but also because the Government was in control of the Liberal Party, whose ultra-pacifist proclivities made it willing to try almost any expedient which might be considered as offering a chance of maintaining an honorable peace. They had been working to reach some agreement with Germany and were not ready to believe that war with her was unavoidable.¹ It was the Conservatives who were most strongly inclined toward taking a firm stand in support of the *Entente*. Under the English system, the Foreign Office has never been given over to partisan conception. Whatever the changes in internal politics, in foreign affairs the country has continued to pursue the same general course.

¹ Up to the very day of the presentation of the English ultimatum to Germany the Manchester *Guardian* inveighed against intervention.

The New York *Evening Post*, August 14, 1914, printed the following editorial: "Why England went to War":

"What chiefly surprises one who reads the English newspapers, now at hand, published during the week ending August 5, is the extent and intensity of the feeling against going to war with Germany. There was, of course, an active war party. In the press it was led by the London *Times* and *Daily Mail*. And naval men, it is evident, were hot for striking now that the hour for which they had been watching had come. But there was a powerful anti-war party. Its moderate exponent was the *Westminster Gazette*, a newspaper which has long shown that it stands closer to the Liberal Government than any other. It was all for caution and restraint, and, till the last moment, anxious to keep England out of the war and to find some means of coming to terms with Germany. But the impassioned champion of peace, through all the time when the issues hung in the balance, was the *Manchester Guardian*. This able newspaper — thought by many to be the most influential in England; outside London it certainly is — made a most gallant fight against the war. Day after day it made powerful appeals, arguing that neither English interest nor English honor required the nation to fling itself into the gulf of a European war.

"And this opinion found very wide support throughout the country. A Neutrality League was formed. It at once gained numerous adherents. It spread its protests broadside. And a host of enlightened Englishmen hastened to array themselves against the war party. Among them was the editor of the *Economist*, still the chief financial guide of England, with clergymen, professors, philanthropists, and honorable women not a few." (Extract.)

On July 31, the Cabinet met, and, in spite of the urgent appeals from France, decided that England could not agree to support her.¹ Sir Edward Grey imparted this decision to M. Cambon and refused to commit himself further, except to intimate that the Government were considering asking France and Germany whether they were prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violated it. (B. W. P. no. 114; F. Y. B. no. 110.) Sir Edward further promised to bring up the question of their coöperation with France as

¹ The situation, on that morning, July 31, when the Cabinet met and considered what course to adopt, is well summarized in a *Times* editorial which appeared the following day: —

“Europe was rapidly arming last night, as was foreshadowed by the exceedingly grave disclosures made yesterday by the Prime Minister. He said that the Government had just heard — not from St. Petersburg, but from Germany — that Russia had proclaimed a general mobilization of her army and fleet, and that in consequence martial law was to be proclaimed in Germany. It was understood, he added, that mobilization would follow in Germany if the Russian mobilization continued. We may amplify the Prime Minister’s statement by saying that even yesterday morning there still seemed to be a ray of hope. It was announced in London, in authoritative quarters, that the Russian Foreign Minister and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg were discussing the possibility of settling the Servian question. Even last night ‘conversations’ were reported to be continuing at Vienna.

“Then came the disquieting news of the Russian general mobilization, which meant that four million Russians were being placed upon a war footing. Germany, who had already proclaimed martial law, declared that unless the Russian movement was suspended within twelve hours the German forces would be mobilized also. As a matter of fact, we believe that large bodies of German troops are already massed on the French frontier. Substantial rumors from Paris indicate that there will probably be a general mobilization in France to-day. The Queen of Holland has already signed an urgent decree ordering the general mobilization of the Dutch forces. Belgium has also decided to mobilize. The trend of German thoughts is illustrated by the retention at Hamburg of the great Atlantic liner, the *Imperator*, which was to have sailed yesterday morning for Southampton on her way to New York. Simultaneously the sister ship, the *Vaterland*, was ordered to stay in shelter at New York, where she now is. These and many other indications unfortunately point to the extreme probability that, within a time which may now be measured by hours rather than by days, we may see the beginning of that unprecedented struggle of which Sir Edward Grey has said that ‘it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow.’” (Extract, *London Times*, editorial, “Europe in Arms,” August 1, 1914.)

soon as any modification of the situation should occur. To the German Ambassador Sir Edward Grey had that morning made the promise that, 'if France and Russia should refuse to coöperate in any reasonable peace proposal suggested by Germany, England would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but otherwise, Sir Edward told Prince Lichnowsky that, if France became involved, England would be drawn in.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. W. P. no. 111.)

In spite of the divergence of opinion among the members of the Cabinet, which threatened to split them into two factions, the dire need of the nation kept them together. During this crisis Sir Edward Grey continued to work to present the British foreign policy in such a way as to unite the Cabinet and the country in the furtherance of England's vital interests.¹

10. *England's vital interests.*

Although the Cabinet at its meeting on Friday morning, July 31, had decided not to guarantee England's intervention in favor of France, the probability of war made it necessary for the Government to consider what policy they must adopt to protect England's vital interests. The difficulty in this situation was to find the method of action which was, under the circumstances, best suited to this end. The first desideratum was the preservation of peace without such a loss of prestige or honor as to weaken the Triple *Entente* for the benefit of the Triple Alliance.² Eng-

¹ The Cabinet crisis is related in the *London Times*. See *post*, p. 340, note 1.

² It is a mistake to consider that England and France would not have been ready to yield a matter of mere empty prestige to save the peace of Europe, but they reasoned that to yield at the dictation of Germany, when Austria's aggressive and unyielding attitude was itself excused on the ground of the necessity of protecting her prestige, would only encourage Germany and Austria to take a similarly uncompromising stand on some other question, when England would find the Triple *Entente* weakened, for Russia would be likely to desert the *Entente* and draw nearer to Germany, in disgust at finding that its only purpose was to permit Austria to disregard Russia's

land's next most urgent desire was to keep out of the conflict, provided she could do so without too great a sacrifice.¹ When the Cabinet met on Friday, it seemed improbable that European peace could be maintained, even with Sir Edward Grey's skillful putting-up at a peace-auction the determination whether England should intervene or remain neutral. Up to the actual outbreak of war between Germany and Russia, he allured Germany and Austria with the hope of English neutrality, and Russia and France with that of intervention as the reward to the side which should make the sincerest efforts to preserve the peace.

England might consider the arguments in favor of intervention as coming under three heads: First, on the ground

vital interests in the Balkans. Germany offered England the choice of preserving the peace or the *Entente*, and England was not willing to sacrifice the *Entente* without some security that she would not, next time, find herself in the dilemma of having to choose between peace with the sacrifice of important interests, or war without any allies against Germany and Austria, and possibly with Italy, too, — nay, she might have had to encounter a coalition similar to that which the German Emperor has stated that he prevented during the Anglo-Boer War. (See Documents: Interview of October 28, 1908.)

Dr. Karl Helfferich admits: "On the other hand, it is equally true that, had France and England stood aloof, no matter how such a step may have been formally authorized by treaties and agreements, the triple understanding would have been destroyed, and a new direction given to the policy of all Europe, which necessarily would have led, not to the hegemony of a single nation, but far more to a state of affairs in which every power could have had its due. Confronted with the choice of preserving the *Entente* or preserving the peace of the world, the statesmen at the helm in Great Britain and France, who had by their own acts and words in reality lost their freedom and become entangled, sacrificed the peace of the world to the *Entente*, under pressure from the cliques desiring war, and swept in their wake by far the greater part of the public in their countries by appealing to the sanctity of written and unwritten treaties." (New York *Times*, March 14, 1915.)

¹ No doubt France and Russia would have resented England's remaining neutral, however good an excuse she had, but at the end of a desperate war with Germany, their incapacity to retaliate would have made their hostility less formidable; in any event, it would have been counterbalanced by a better understanding with Germany. What England had most to fear was the disruption of the *Entente*, as the result of a diplomatic triumph on the part of the Imperial Allies, which would have left France and Russia unshorn of their strength and smarting with resentment against England as the "perfidious" cause of their humiliation.

of obligation to France resulting from the *Entente*. It has been shown most clearly from Sir Edward Grey's own arguments that England was not bound to make common cause with France when involved in a war through the Russian alliance. In consequence of the Anglo-French coöperative division of naval forces, England was bound to protect the coasts of France, — perhaps even French commerce in the Atlantic, — but Germany would almost certainly have raised no objection to this qualified participation in the war if she had felt that it would extend no further. The second consideration was the balance of power for which England had been employing her diplomacy and her arms since the time of Wolsey. The development of larger views of world interests and the unity of aim of civilized nations had weakened the support of this principle. Some of the most powerful organs¹ of the press openly raised their voices against the idea of continuing longer to bow down before this fetish which had been responsible for the long duel with France. On this question the country was divided, without any prospect of being able to agree.² There remained the question of Belgian neutrality — a diplomatic jewel for the Foreign Office which sparkled light from its many *facettes*. There was the obligation to make good the guaranty, which was of a nature to rally the support of that very group of advanced Liberals who refused to be drawn into a war for the maintenance of the balance of power. The need of defending a small state against aggression would also influence them. The partisans of a vigorous foreign policy, the supporters of the *Entente*, and the Germanophobes all realized that insistence upon the respect of Belgian territory would lend material strength to the support of their cherished policies or convictions. If Germany agreed to respect Belgian neu-

¹ Notably the Manchester *Guardian*; see editorial of August 3, 1915.

² See "Changes in the Cabinet," London *Times*, August 5, 1914, *post*, p. 340, note. Cf. also above, p. 311.

trality, a great step toward the maintenance of the balance of power would have been assured, and it would have been easier for England to intervene later on if German success should endanger the balance of power; and France, secured from attack through Belgium, would be much better able to resist attack. The respecting of the neutrality of Belgium might thus have left Germany and Austria to fight on fairly even terms against Russia and France. Had Germany agreed to respect Belgian neutrality, the balance of power and the integrity of France might have been maintained by this diplomatic intervention on the part of Great Britain. Germany's refusal would tend to unite all parties in support of British intervention. The only danger — and that a slight one — was that France and Russia might suddenly give in to Germany, through fear that they could not resist, and then nurse their resentment against England.¹ It was, therefore, most important to

¹ The effect of placing the whole question of England's intervention on the broad basis of respect for Belgian neutrality is strikingly shown by the following remark of Henry James, who has lived so long in England as to be classed as an Englishman: "Personally I feel so strongly on everything that the war has brought into question for the Anglo-Saxon peoples that humorous detachment or any other thinness or tepidity of mind on the subject affects me as vulgar impiety, not to say as rank blasphemy; our whole race tension became for me a sublimely conscious thing from the moment Germany flung at us all her explanation of her pounce upon Belgium for massacre and ravage in the form of the most insolent 'Because I choose to, damn you all!' recorded in history." (*New York Times*, Magazine Section, p. 4, March 21, 1915.)

Mr. Clifford Allen, a well-known leader of the Labor Party, bears unintentional testimony to the efficacy of Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy in placing England's intervention on the Belgian basis: —

"What happened, then, when the danger of war loomed ahead? The Prime Minister had told us, and the Foreign Secretary had confirmed his statement, that we were under no secret alliance with any nation, yet, when it came to the point, it became perfectly clear that we considered ourselves under an honorable obligation to France far more binding than Italy's share in the Triple Alliance. Over and over again this has been emphasized since the outbreak of war. We could not leave our neighbor, France, in the lurch, having put her fleet in the lurch long before Belgium was violated. We eventually give her an undertaking to protect her coasts.

"Now, let us be perfectly definite about this business. The question of Belgian neutrality has been raised, with all the ingenuity of the capitalist,

know at once what would be Germany's attitude. Accordingly, Sir Edward Grey decided to ask France and Germany to declare their intentions in respect to Belgium.¹ The making of this inquiry at that time had the further advantage, in case Germany should refuse, of showing plainly to the English people the true nature of German designs. Public opinion would have time to form and unite in support of intervention, so that when war was declared, the whole country, to a man, would respond. It now appears clearly how perfect was the British diplomacy in taking advantage of the Belgian question on that critical Friday morning, July 31. At one stroke Sir Edward Grey showed up Germany's designs, secured an opportunity to urge upon Belgium a timely resistance, united the Cabinet and the country against Germany, intervened in good season for the defense of the balance of power, and came to the aid of the *Entente* soon enough to be sure of the gratitude of Russia and France; yet he had also succeeded in holding off both sides long enough to try the effect of every inducement for peace he could bring forward. It is also probable that the delay robbed Germany of a great part of the advantage she would have had if she could have struck several days earlier.

With a full realization of the importance of Sir Edward Grey's Belgian policy, we can return to an examination of the manner in which it was carried out and the futile efforts of Germany to prevent Sir Edward Grey from tak-

as the great and honorable pretext for our participation in this war. Had that been the only reason, it could have been discussed upon its merits, and upon those merits it could certainly claim a far higher place than any other pretext. But let us make no mistake about it. Belgian neutrality or no Belgian neutrality, Britain would have been involved in this war. Why? Accepting our foreign policy and our view of the balance of power, it was to our interest to join in." (Extracts from Clifford Allen, *Is Germany Right and Britain Wrong?* Second edition, 1914.)

¹ Sir Edward Grey told M. Paul Cambon that "Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia concerning the mobilization of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us [them] to realize the intentions of the German Government." (Extract, July 29, F. Y. B. no. 98.)

ing the steps which brought about the mental and moral mobilization of the country to present against Germany the united strength of the whole people.¹

11. *England's inquiry relative to Belgium's neutrality*

The vital importance to England of maintaining Belgium free from all control of a Continental power is recognized as the principal reason why the régime of neutralization was imposed upon Belgium when she broke away from Holland. Because of the very great importance of Belgian independence to England,² it is natural that Sir Edward Grey should have told the German Ambassador at London that, though England could not agree to stay out of the conflict in any event, even if Belgium's neutrality was respected, they would nevertheless consider it a very important factor. It was because of this attitude on the part of the British Government that Sir Edward Grey had on July 31 telegraphed the British Ambassador at Berlin:—

“I still trust the situation is not irretrievable, but in view of the prospect of mobilization in Germany, it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether the German Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium, so

¹ For a fuller consideration of the question of Belgian Neutrality, see chapter ix.

² See “The Barrier Treaty Vindicated,” Documents, *post*, chap. xiii. Grotius wrote in 1632: “The King of England will give up everything before he allows France to receive the ports of Flanders.” (Dollot, *Les Origines de la Neutralité de la Belgique*, p. 58.) Cf. also *post*, chap. ix, §§ 1, 10. “. . . With characteristic *naïveté* and insular selfishness some jingoes imagine that if only the naval armaments of Germany could be stopped, all danger to England would be averted. But surely the greatest danger to England is not the invasion of England; it is the invasion of France and Belgium. For in the case of an invasion of England, even the Germans admit that the probabilities of success would all be against Germany; whilst in the case of an invasion of France, the Germans claim that the probabilities are all in their favor. It is therefore in France and Belgium that the vulnerable point lies, the Achilles heel of the British Empire.” (Charles Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem*, p. 43. London and New York, 1912.)

long as no other power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to the French Government. It is important to have an early answer." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 114.)

To this Sir Edward Goschen replied: —

"I have seen the Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

"It appears from what he said that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo ¹ already.

"I hope to see His Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

"In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government." (Extract, July 31, B. W. P. no. 122.)

The desire of the German Chancellor to know what reply was returned by France, before giving Germany's answer, may have been explained on the ground that there was some sincere belief in Germany that France intended to violate Belgium's neutrality. In the latter case it does not do much credit to German political acumen or to her secret service, which has been credited with such a high de-

¹ As regards the embargo to which Von Jagow refers, documents in the Belgian Gray Paper explain that a provisional prohibition was placed by the Government on certain articles, but this was not intended to apply to articles in transit, and the German Legation was informed, August 3, that the exportation of the grain had been authorized on August 1. (B. G. P. no. 79.)

gree of efficiency. It may, on the other hand, have been a mere play to hold off British action or to avoid an abrupt refusal.

The British Ambassador at Paris reported to Sir Edward Grey in regard to Belgian neutrality: "On the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon, I sent a message to the Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysée, where a Cabinet council was being held. He took a note of the inquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 124.)

In a telegram immediately following he added: "Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to your inquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows: The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day." (July 31, B. W. P. no. 125; cf. F. Y. B. no. 119.)

On July 31, Sir Edward Grey instructed the British representative at Brussels: —

"In view of existing treaties you should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked the French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other power.

"You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neu-

trality, which I desire and expect other powers to uphold and observe.

“You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.” (July 31, B. W. P. no. 115.)

He received the following reply (August 1):—

“The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday (see B. W. P. no. 115) have been acted upon.

“Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.” (August 1, B. W. P. no. 128.)

When Sir Edward Grey said, “I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost her neutrality, which I desire and expect other powers to uphold and observe,” he gave Belgium official notice that England would support her in her defense of her neutrality. The evident intention was to stiffen her resistance to German aggression by promise of support. The language used might possibly cover a threat as well. Yet this is hard to reconcile with the attitude of the British Minister at Brussels (July 31), who, after informing the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs that France and Germany had been asked whether they would respect Belgian neutrality, evinced in the course of the conversation which followed ‘some surprise at the rapidity with which the Belgian Government had resolved upon the mobilization of their army. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that the Netherlands had taken an identical resolution before they had, and that, on the other hand, the recent date of

the putting into effect of their new military régime and the measures made necessary by this transformation imposed urgent and comprehensive measures upon them. Their neighbors, the guarantor powers, ought to view this action as an evidence of their wish to manifest their profound desire to maintain of themselves their own neutrality. The British Minister appeared satisfied with his reply, and said the British Government awaited this reply and assurance of Belgium's intention to defend her neutrality in order to continue negotiations with France and Germany, the conclusion of which negotiations would, he said, be communicated to the Belgian Government.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. G. P. no. 11; cf. B. W. P. nos. 115, 128.)

'On the morning of July 31, in the course of a conversation which Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General of the Belgian Department of Foreign Affairs, had with Herr von Below, he explained to the German Minister the trend of the military measures which Belgium had taken and told him they were a consequence of Belgium's decision to carry out her international obligations, and that they in no way implied an attitude of defiance toward her neighbors.

'The Secretary-General subsequently asked Von Below whether he had knowledge of the conversation which he had had with the German Minister, his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to make to him.

'In the course of the discussion aroused in 1911 by the consideration of the Dutch scheme regarding the Flushing fortifications, certain newspapers asserted that in the event of a Franco-German war, Belgium's neutrality would be violated by Germany.

'The Department of Foreign Affairs suggested that a declaration made in the German Parliament on the occasion of a discussion of foreign policy would be calculated to appease public opinion and to calm the suspicions,

which are so much to be regretted because of their influence on the relations of the two countries.

'Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg made the reply that he was most appreciative of the motives which had caused Belgium to make this request. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgium's neutrality, but said he considered that by making a declaration publicly, Germany would weaken her military position in respect to France, who, being reassured as to her northern frontier, would direct all her efforts to the east.

'Baron van der Elst, continuing the discussion with Von Below, went on to say that he perfectly understood the objections which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg raised to the suggested public declaration, and he pointed out that subsequently in 1913 Herr von Jagow had given to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag reassuring declarations with reference to the respect of Belgian neutrality.' (Modified quotation, July 31, B. G. P. no. 12.)

As an enclosure in the same dispatch is given a letter of May 2, 1913, from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, which gives an account of Von Jagow's assurance in the following words: —

"I have the honor of informing you, according to the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, of the declarations made in the course of the sitting of the 29th of April of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War with reference to Belgian neutrality.

"A member of the Social Democratic Party said: 'In Belgium the approach of a Franco-German war is viewed with apprehension, because it is feared that Germany will not respect Belgian neutrality.'

"Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied: 'The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international conventions, and Germany is resolved to respect these conventions.'

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow observed that he had nothing to add to the clear statement which he had uttered with reference to the relations between Germany and Belgium.

"In reply to further interrogations from a member of the Social Democratic Party, Herr von Heeringen, Minister of War, stated: 'Belgium does not play any part in the justification of the German scheme of military reorganization; the scheme is justified by the position of matters in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties.'

"A member of the Progressive Party having again referred to Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that his declaration regarding Belgium was sufficiently clear." (Extract, May 2, 1913; enclosure in B. G. P. no. 12.)

It is hard to understand just what the Secretary-General of the Belgian Foreign Office meant when he said that he understood the objections to making a public declaration. On its face it would look as though Belgium recognized that Germany was justified in trading upon the possibility that she might violate her agreement to respect Belgian neutrality so as to hamper France. Such an attitude, if really entertained by Belgium, would be contrary to the principles of neutrality, and would constitute the nearest approach to a departure from a neutral attitude on Belgium's part which has been adduced. The departure from this attitude of neutrality is probably more apparent than real, and merely intended not to offend a powerful neighbor. In this connection it is interesting to note Belgium's attitude at the Second Hague Conference, when her delegation was generally to be found supporting Germany. Belgium's support of a general treaty of arbitration would have been very valuable then, but she preferred to follow the lead of German opposition. Again it is to be remarked that Belgium showed no disposition to facilitate France's

policy in Morocco, but held back her approval of the abolition of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of her consuls. Such an attitude savors of political support of Germany, and as such does not indicate subserviency to French or English dictation. The determining factor in this action was undoubtedly the fear that France might seize the Belgian Congo, and did not indicate the slightest intention of failing to observe the duties of her position as a perpetually neutral state.

On August 1, the French Minister at Brussels made the following verbal communication to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs: "I am authorized to declare that in the event of an international conflict the Government of the Republic will, as it has always declared, respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another power, the French Government, in order to insure its own defense, might be led to modify its attitude." (August 1, B. G. P. no. 15.)

The next day, August 2, at 7 P.M., Von Below, notwithstanding his assurances given two days before, handed the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs Germany's ultimatum: —

"The German Government has received reliable information according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France marching on Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial German Government cannot avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed French march without aid. In this fact there is sufficient certainty of a threat directed against Germany.

"It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy.

"The German Government would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against her-

self the fact that the measures of the enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian territory.

“In order to dissipate any misunderstanding, the German Government declares as follows:—

“1. Germany does not contemplate any act of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium consents in the war about to commence to take up an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government on its part undertakes, on the declaration of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their whole extent.

“2. Germany undertakes under the condition laid down to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.

“3. If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to buy against cash all that is required by her troops, and to give indemnity for the damages caused in Belgium.

“4. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner toward the German troops, and in particular raises difficulties against their advance by the opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse, or by destroying roads, railways, tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

“In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has a justified hope that this contingency will not arise, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the two neighboring states will become closer and more lasting.” (August 2, B. G. P. no. 20; see also B. W. P. no. 153.)

A few hours later, August 3, at half-past one in the morning, the German Minister asked for an interview with the

Belgian Foreign Minister, and made the extraordinary statement that 'he was instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a patrol of French cavalry, violating international law, seeing that war was not declared, had crossed the frontier.'¹

'When asked where these events had taken place, Herr von Below answered, in Germany. The Secretary-General observed that in that case he could not understand the object of his communication. Herr von Below replied that these acts, contrary to international law, were of a nature to make one expect that other acts contrary to international law would be perpetrated by France.' (Modified quotation, August 3, B. G. P. no. 21.)

¹ In reference to these alleged violations of German territory, see F. Y. B. nos. 146, 147, 148, 149, 155. A pamphlet by two distinguished French professors has the following note: —

"As we wished to ascertain whether the German newspapers had given a more detailed account of these occurrences, we consulted five of the principal newspapers (*Vorwärts*, *Arbeiter Zeitung*, of Vienna, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Koelnische Zeitung*, *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*) from the end of July to the 5th of August. First of all we noticed that the aviator who is said to have flown over Karlsruhe is not mentioned. As for the others, the account of them is as vague as it is in the official note. These incidents, given as the cause determining war, take up one line, two or three at the most. *The bombs never left any trace.* One of these aeroplanes, that at Wesel, is said to have been brought down; nothing is said of the aviator and what became of him, nor is there anything about the aeroplane itself. In a word, the Germans took care to draw attention to their arrival in Germany and then never spoke of them again. They were never seen to return to their starting-point.

"But we have still more convincing evidence. We have been able to procure a Nuremberg newspaper, the *Frankischer Kurrier*. On the 2d of August, the day the bombs are supposed to have been thrown, not a word is said about the incident. Nuremberg received the news on the 3d by a telegram from Berlin identical to that published by the other newspapers. Again, the *Koelnische Zeitung* of the 3d, in its morning edition, published a telegram from Munich which read as follows: 'The Bavarian Minister of War is doubtful as to the exactness of the news announcing that aviators had been seen above the lines Nuremberg-Kitzingen and Nuremberg-Ansbach and that they had thrown bombs on the railway.'

"We have been greatly helped in these researches by our colleague J. Hadamard and M. Edg. Milhaud, professor at the University of Geneva, to whom we tender our sincere thanks." (É. Durkheim and E. Denis, *Who Wanted War?* p. 50, note 1. Paris, 1915.)

Apparently the German Government wished to put their action in Belgium in the light of a reprisal or violation of international law in answer to that of France.

At the hour of the expiration of the German ultimatum, Monday morning, August 3, the Belgian Government handed Von Below its answer:—

‘By their note of the 2d of August, 1914, the German Government has made known that according to certain intelligence the French forces intend to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of her good intentions, would not be able without help to beat off an advance of the French troops.

‘The German Government felt it to be its duty to forestall this attack, and to violate Belgian territory. Under these conditions Germany proposes to the Belgian Government to take up a friendly attitude, and undertakes when peace is established to guarantee the integrity of the Belgian Kingdom and of its possessions in their entirety. The note adds that if Belgium raises difficulties about the advance of the German troops, Germany will be compelled to consider her as an enemy and to leave to the decision of arms settlement of the later relations of the two states toward one another.

‘This note caused profound and painful surprise to the Belgian Government.

‘The intentions which it attributed to France are in contradiction with the express declarations which were made to us on the 1st of August, in the name of the Government of the Republic.

‘Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium would fulfill all her international duties, and her army would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.

‘The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium

under the guaranty of the powers, and particularly of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

'Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it respected.

'The attempt against her independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies the violation of that law.

'The Belgian Government would, by accepting the propositions which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe.

'Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the expense of the violation of her neutrality.

'If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her rights.' (Modified quotation, August 3, B. G. P. no. 22.)

The Council of Ministers having decided that 'there was not for the moment reason to appeal to the guaranteeing powers,' (B. G. P. no. 24), the French Minister to Belgium said: 'Without being instructed to make a declaration by his Government, he believed, however, judging by its known intentions, that he could say that if the Royal Government should appeal to the French Government, as a power guaranteeing her neutrality, the French Government would immediately respond to her appeal; if this appeal was not made, it is probable, unless of course the anxiety about their own defense should lead them to take exceptional measures, that the French Government would wait before intervening until Belgium had performed an

act of effective resistance.' (Modified quotation, August 3, B. G. P. no. 24.)

Probably the heroic little people wished first to make a stand for their rights. By this action, in not calling immediately upon the guaranteeing powers, they made it impossible for Germany to claim that Belgium had violated her obligations as a neutral; for if French troops had been rushed to the frontier, it would have been hard to tell just when they had entered Belgian territory.

12. England asked to guarantee the neutrality of France

It will be remembered how Sir Edward Grey in a conversation with Prince Lichnowsky on July 29 had said that there would be no question of England's intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. (B. W. P. no. 89.) Three days after this declaration an important exchange of telegrams took place regarding the neutrality of France. August 1 is the date of Lichnowsky's dispatch informing his Government that 'Sir Edward had just asked him by telephone whether he believed he could declare the German Government would not attack France in case of war between Germany and Russia, provided France remained neutral. To which the Ambassador replied that he believed he could enter into such an agreement.' (Modified quotation, August 1, G. W. B. exhibit 33.)

This brought in response that same day two telegrams, one from the Kaiser: —

"I have just received the communication from your Government offering French neutrality under guarantee of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. On technical grounds my mobilization, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry, your tele-

gram came so late. But if France offers me neutrality which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France." (August 1, G. W. B. exhibit 32.)

Von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed: —

"Germany is ready to accept British proposal in case England guarantees with all her forces absolute neutrality of France in Russo-German conflict. German mobilization has been ordered to-day on account of Russian challenge before English proposal was known here. It is, therefore, now impossible to make any change in strategical distribution of troops ordered to the French frontier. But we guarantee that our troops will not cross the French frontier before 7 P.M. on Monday the 3rd inst. in case England will pledge herself meanwhile." (August 1, G. W. B. exhibit 34.)

In reply to this response, King George telegraphed the same day: —

"In answer to your telegram just received, I think there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided while there is still a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning to ascertain whether there is a misunderstanding on his part." (August 1, G. W. B. exhibit 35.)

This direct exchange of telegrams between the heads of the states was brought about by Prince Henry's telegram of July 30 to King George, informing him of the efforts the Kaiser was making to 'fulfill Nicky's¹ appeal to him to

¹ The authorized English version of the German White Book puts "Nicky" for Nicholas, but the German edition has "Nikolaus."

work for the maintenance of peace'; and urging the King, 'if he really and earnestly wished to prevent the terrible disaster, to use his influence on France and Russia to keep them neutral.' (Modified quotation, July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 29.) King George in his reply of the same date 'expressed pleasure at learning of the Kaiser's efforts, and explained the exertions the British Government were making, by suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if Austria would agree to content herself with the occupation of Belgrade and surrounding territory as a hostage for the satisfactory settlement of her demands, the other countries agreeing meanwhile to suspend their preparations for war.' (Modified quotation, July 30, G. W. B. exhibit 30.)

The foregoing telegrams were published in the *North-German Gazette*, August 20, 1914. A few days later, when Lord Robert Cecil, in the House of Commons, asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether his attention had been called to the publication by the German Government of certain proposals which were alleged to have been made to secure French and English neutrality during the war, and whether the publication was complete and accurate, Sir Edward Grey replied: —

"I have seen an incomplete publication. The circumstances were as follows: It was reported to me one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria and also engage not to attack France if we would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that if the German Government thought such an arrangement possible I was sure we could secure it.

"It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, and as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco-

Russian Alliance, it was not in my power to promise to secure it.

“Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private secretary and told him that as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up he had sent a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first telegram has been published. This second telegram does not seem to have been published.”¹

¹ From the report of the Parliamentary debates in the London *Times* of August 29. An article in the London *Times* commenting on the publication of the letters in the *North-German Gazette* gave the text of the omitted letter, which would indicate that Lichnowsky communicated a copy of his explanation to Sir Edward Grey. Perhaps he felt he was to blame for the misunderstanding, and took this straightforward means of setting his blunder right with Sir Edward.

Shortly after this, the German Government issued from the Government Printing Office in Berlin an official English translation of these letters, among which was included Lichnowsky's telegram of August 2. (See New York *Times*, September 11, 1914.)

The Appendix of the Authorized American Edition of the German White Book (pp. 31-32) contains the following official *communiqué* in reference to this disputed question:—

“The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of September 5, 1914, contains the following official statement:—

“According to news received in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, had made a statement to the effect that the exchange of telegrams between Germany and England, prior to the war, as published by the German Government, was *incomplete*.

“The Secretary alleged that Prince Lichnowsky had cancelled his report anent the well-known telephonic conversation, immediately afterwards, by telegraph, after he had been enlightened that there was a *misunderstanding*. This telegram, however, had not been published.

“Moreover, the *Times*, apparently on information from official quarters, had made an identical statement, with the comment that the *German Government had suppressed* the telegram in question, in order to be able to accuse England of perfidy, and to prove Germany's pacific intentions.

“In contradiction to these statements, we hereby affirm *that a telegram of the alleged contents does not exist!*

“Besides the telegram already published, which was dispatched from London on August 1, 11 A.M., Prince Lichnowsky sent on the same day, the following telegrams to Berlin:—

“(1) At 1.15 P.M.

“The Private Secretary of Sir Edward Grey just called to inform me: The Minister wished to make propositions to me for the neutrality of England, even in the event of our going to war with Russia, as well as with

The explanatory telegram of the German Ambassador, dated August 2, was: —

“Sir E. Grey’s suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for England to keep permanent neutrality, but as they were not based on a previous under-

France. I shall see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will at once report.’

“(2) At 5.30 P.M.

“‘Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration which had been unanimously applied (*sic*) by the Cabinet: —

“ ‘ ‘The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply, as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public opinion in this country.’ ”

“ ‘ ‘To my question, whether he could give me a definite guaranty as to the neutrality of England in case we respected the neutrality of Belgium, the Minister responded that he was unable to do so. However, this question would have an important bearing upon English public opinion. If, in a war against France, we should violate the neutrality of Belgium, it would surely cause a change in public opinion which would make it very difficult for the British Government to maintain an amicable neutrality. So far, there was not the slightest intention to take hostile measures against us. The desire prevailed of refraining from such measures, as far as possible. Yet one could hardly draw a line up to which we might safely proceed, without calling forth British intervention. He repeatedly recurred to the neutrality of Belgium, and said that this question would, at all events, play a great rôle. He said that he had already thought it over whether it would be possible that we and France would, in the event of a Russian war, remain in a state of armed opposition, without attacking each other. I asked him whether he was in a position to declare that France would be prepared to enter such a pact. Since we had no intention of either annihilating France, nor of annexing parts of her territory, I was inclined to think that we might be open for such an agreement which would secure for us the neutrality of Great Britain. The Minister said that he would make inquiries, adding that he did not under-rate the difficulties of maintaining military inactivity on both sides.’ ”

“(3) At 8.30 P.M.

“ ‘ My report of this morning is cancelled by my report of to-night. Since positive English proposals are not forthcoming, further steps in the direction indicated in (Your Excellency’s) instructions are useless.’ ”

“ ‘ Obviously the above telegrams contain no hint whatsoever that there

standing with France and made without knowledge of our mobilization, they have been abandoned as absolutely hopeless." (August 2, G. W. B. exhibit 36.)

At first view one might be inclined to think that the German Ambassador, whose sincerity seems never to have been questioned, could not have made such a mistake unless Sir Edward Grey had made some such proposal, perhaps only tentative. Entirely aside from the reliance which I think may be placed upon Sir Edward Grey's word, it is most improbable that England would have agreed to stand aside and let Germany and Austria unite in an attempt to crush Russia, while England restrained France. France had let it appear clearly that she wanted peace, but that she would, nevertheless, support her ally if attacked by Germany, and England, if she had guaranteed the neutrality of France, would have placed the latter in a dependent and humiliated position. The result of a policy so fatuous might have been to allow Germany to crush Russia, perhaps, and then turn later against England. Again, if we were to question the sincerity of Germany's Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, we might discover a plot to pretend a conversation which had not occurred, and by answering it to put on record material apt to create in Russia suspicions of France and England, and in France distrust of England, so as to break up the cordial coöperation of the members of the *Entente*. But in that case, Sir Edward Grey would not have known anything of Prince

had been a misunderstanding, nor anything about the removal of the alleged misunderstanding, as affirmed by the English statesman."

The same publication contains the following remarks about this exchange of correspondence: —

"... It will be perceived from these documents that Germany was prepared to spare France in case England should remain neutral and would guarantee the neutrality of France.

"The essence of Germany's declarations is contained in Emperor William's telegram to the King of England of August 1st, 1914. Even if there existed a misunderstanding as to an English proposal, the Kaiser's offer furnished England the opportunity to prove her pacific disposition and to prevent the Franco-German War."

Lichnowsky's letter to his Government, explaining his mistake. In reality, it seems then that Prince Lichnowsky must have misunderstood. Sir Edward Grey may perhaps have asked whether, if he prevailed upon France to remain neutral, Germany would hold aloof. Some such remark Lichnowsky may possibly have understood as an offer to secure the neutrality of France; but to believe this makes it impossible to place a very high estimate on the German Ambassador's intelligence. With the best intentions, he was unable to handle the situation as his predecessor Von Bieberstein would have done.¹

¹ The London *Times* of August 27 (p. 5), giving the important parts of the letters published in the *Gazette*, and Lichnowsky's supposed telegram of explanation, comments:—

“PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S BLUNDER

“Prince Lichnowsky's telegram of August 1 was based upon a complete misunderstanding of the subject of a conversation. It was in fact a serious professional blunder of which the only explanation can be that Prince Lichnowsky, who was himself working sincerely and seriously for an Austro-Russian settlement, was not equal to the strain imposed upon him. There was no question of French neutrality in the event of 'a Russo-German war.' Sir Edward Grey was merely making one last desperate effort to see whether Germany could be induced to remain neutral if England secured the neutrality of France.

“We understand that immediately after the telephone conversation, which took place at 11.30 in the morning of August 1, there was an official conversation with Prince Lichnowsky in which it was plainly pointed out that what would be a *casus fœderis* for Germany must imply a *casus fœderis* for France — that if Germany fought, France must fight also. Prince Lichnowsky at once said that he had been under a misapprehension, and telegraphed to Berlin a correction of his previous telegram. His second telegram has simply been suppressed, and the German Government actually publishes the German Ambassador's inaccurate dispatch in order to give a fresh proof of British perfidy and of Germany's eagerness to accept any proposal making for peace.

“Meanwhile we may at any rate be grateful for the publication of the extraordinary telegram sent by the Emperor William when he was given to believe that England was offering to look after France while Germany attacked Russia. So far from remaining quiet herself, Germany was to move her troops from the French frontier in order to employ them 'elsewhere.' There was, moreover, to be no shadow of doubt about France keeping quiet, for England was not merely to procure a declaration of French neutrality — in fact, the destruction

The English Government must have felt justly incensed to learn, on July 31, "not from St. Petersburg, but from Germany, that Russia had proclaimed a general mobilization of her army and fleet."¹ And it is very possible that

of the Franco-Russian Alliance — but was to guarantee French neutrality with the whole strength of the British Army and Navy."

Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, in an article in the *New York Sun* of Sunday, October 11, implies that the British Government left out of the White Paper the so-called "Willy," "Georgie," and "Nicky" correspondence for fear it might prejudice their case. The following Sunday the well-known historian, George Louis Beer, in a vigorous defense of the British Government publication, says of this omission: —

"The explanation is quite simple to one versed in British constitutional practice, but is naturally not so plain to the citizen of a country whose monarch claims to be the direct agent of God. As a result of prolonged struggles the House of Commons ultimately established its predominance in the British Commonwealth, and while leaving most of the powers of the Crown intact, it successfully insisted upon the exercise of those functions by Ministers responsible to it. Hence the essential negotiations prior to the outbreak of war were conducted by the Foreign Secretary. This does not, however, imply that the King's personal influence is not at times used by the Ministry in a delicate diplomatic situation.

"But unquestionably all letters and telegrams from the King to the Kaiser and Prince Henry of Prussia were either drafted by Sir Edward Grey or submitted to him for approval. This is a necessary consequence of the system of a responsible government. Thus Queen Victoria under similar circumstances was at times obliged in her own handwriting to express opinions far other than those she really held. But why, it may be asked, was this ancillary correspondence not published? Here again one runs across some peculiar features of the British Constitution resulting from the adaptation of mediæval forms to democratic conditions. According to British practice a Minister is responsible for every executive act, and the King's name must not be brought into the political discussions either within or without Parliament. It is obvious that if this personal correspondence of the King were laid before Parliament there would be a violation of this fundamental principle, without which the system of responsible government cannot work smoothly. Moreover, these documents were naturally in complete accord with those submitted, and were in no way essential to the formation of a correct judgment by Parliament. Had there been any divergence Dr. Dernburg's query would have some point."

¹ Statement of Mr. Asquith, July 31; see *London Times*, August 1, 1914.

The date of the Austrian general mobilization is in dispute. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 115.) M. Viviani stated: "But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in the negotiations showed a good-will which cannot be disputed, Austria was the first to proceed to a general mobilization." (Extract, F. Y. B. no. 127.) Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence indi-

Sir Edward Grey was negotiating with Prince Lichnowsky in an attempt to find some way of allowing France and England to keep out of the fray, so that Russia might be left to pay the penalty of her ill-timed and precipitate mobilization.¹ In any event, the attitude of the German Government in regard to Belgium and the determination of France to support Russia under all circumstances would have rendered such efforts of no avail.

13. Germany's detention of English vessels

On August 1, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Sir Edward Goschen in reference to the detention of British vessels:—

“We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant ships.

“I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

cates that Russia was the first to order a general mobilization. M. Auguste Gauvin, in his article, on *Les origines de la guerre Européenne*, states: “The posting up of orders completing the bulletins which announced partial mobilization took place only the 1st of August in part of the monarchy.” (Translated from *La Revue de Paris*, December 15, 1914, p. 414, note 1.)

Professors Durkheim and Denis take a different view. (Durkheim and Denis: *Who Wanted War?* p. 40, note 2. Paris, 1915.)

¹ In this connection the remark in the *London Times* of August 27 (see above, p. 334), that Prince Lichnowsky was guilty of a “serious professional blunder,” seems to convey the idea that some very confidential matters were under discussion. The Oxford professors make the following statement: “One more effort to preserve peace in western Europe seems to have been made by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince Lichnowsky whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would promise not to attack her. The impression seems to have prevailed in Berlin that this was an offer to guarantee French neutrality by the force of British arms, and the German Emperor in his telegram to the King gave evidence of the relief His Imperial Majesty felt at the prospect that the good relations between the two countries would be maintained. Unfortunately for such hopes, France had never been consulted in the matter, nor was there ever any idea of coercing France into neutrality, and even the original proposal had to be abandoned on consideration as unpractical.” (Extract from *Why We are at War*, by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History, p. 87. Clarendon Press, 1914.)

The authors of these remarks must have had exceptional facilities for ascertaining what actually took place.

“You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty’s Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.” (August 1, B. W. P. no. 130.)

The German Secretary of State ‘expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance and promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.’ (Modified quotation, August 1, B. W. P. no. 143.) The Secretary said that ‘this must be regarded as a special favor to His Majesty’s Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.’ (Modified quotation, August 2, B. W. P. no. 145.)

The next day, August 2, Sir Edward Grey lodged protest against unloading and holding of British cargoes of sugar (B. W. P. no. 150); but the British Ambassador reported “no information available.” (Extract, August 3, B. W. P. no. 150.)

14. *Germany invades Luxemburg*

On August 2, Sir Edward Grey received the following dispatch from the Minister of State of Luxemburg:—

“I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency’s notice the following facts:—

“On Sunday, the 2d of August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly toward the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armored trains with troops

and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty, the German Emperor, at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin." (August 2, B. W. P. no. 147.)

Sir Edward received a second dispatch the same day:—

"The Luxemburg Minister of State has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French Army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways, which are leased to the Empire." (August 2, B. W. P. no. 129.)

When M. Paul Cambon 'asked Sir Edward about the violation of Luxemburg, he stated to him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867, but when the Ambassador asked what the British Government would say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, the British Minister replied that that was a much more important matter and that they were considering what statement they should make in Parliament next day — in effect, whether they should declare the violation of Belgian neutrality a *casus belli*.' (Modified quotation, August 2, B. W. P. no. 148.)

In reporting this interview, M. Cambon says that 'the Secretary of State reminded me that the convention of 1867 relative to Luxemburg differed from the treaty rela-

tive to Belgium in this sense, that England was bound to uphold this latter agreement without the support of the other guaranteeing powers, while, for Luxemburg, all the guaranteeing powers must act in concert.' (Modified quotation, August 2, F. Y. B. no. 137.)

It seems to have been lost sight of that this violation by Germany of the perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg was contrary to her solemn treaty obligations, and hence a conspicuous violation of international law; for the German Empire had inherited the obligation of Prussia to respect and guarantee the perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg, undertaken by the Treaty of London. The principle of the perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg was "placed under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the powers,"¹ and England has expressly stated that she did not understand the treaty of guaranty to compel her to make war against a guarantor to secure its respect. This is a weakness in the logic of England's stand, for why should she from a legal point of view be any more bound in the case of Belgium? Only because in the latter case her political interests and her obligations under international law coincide. It is to be remarked, however, that it is one thing for a nation to refuse to make war to uphold the neutrality of Luxemburg, and another to be guilty itself of violating it. The violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg will be more fully discussed in the following chapter.²

15. England agrees to protect the French coast

On August 1, Sir Edward Grey told M. Paul Cambon that, when informing the Cabinet that Germany had declared "herself not in a position to reply," regarding Belgian neutrality, he would 'ask for authority to tell the House of Commons on Monday [August 3] that the British Government would not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality. In the second place, Sir Edward said that he

¹ Wicker, *Neutralization*, p. 30. 1911.

² Chap. ix, § 8.

would propose to his colleagues that they should declare that the fleet, the squadrons of which were mobilized, would oppose the passage of the German squadrons through the Straits; or, if they passed the Straits, that they would oppose any attack upon the French coasts. M. Cambon pointed out to the Secretary that if between then and Monday, when the Cabinet would discuss these questions, any serious incident should occur, it would not do to be taken by surprise and that it would be well to consider intervening in time.' (Modified quotation, August 1, F. Y. B. no. 126.)

The morning of August 2, after the meeting of the Cabinet, Sir Edward Grey gave M. Cambon the following memoranda: —

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."¹ (August 2, B. W. P. no. 148.)

¹ An editorial in the *London Times*, August 3, gives a résumé of the situation and sets forth its understanding of England's vital interests: "The whole situation has been revolutionized by the events of yesterday. The doubts which many of us tried hard to cherish as to Germany's real intentions have been dispelled by her high-handed contempt for public law. The Government and the nation now realize that she has been bent on a European war—a European war to be waged in the first instance against France, and through at least one of those neutral States whose safety we have bound ourselves to defend because it is indispensable to our own. The Cabinet, which has been sitting almost uninterruptedly since Saturday morning, reached a decision at an early hour yesterday, which shows that they know what is before us. They have called up the Naval Reserves. They would not have taken this step had they not felt that in this quarrel our interests are now directly at stake. . . . Here at home and in the far-off dominions the sure instinct of our peoples teaches them that the ruin of France or of

'Sir Edward Grey pointed out that Great Britain had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that the Government felt that they could not necessarily bind themselves to declare war upon Germany if war broke out between France and Germany the next day, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. Great Britain, therefore, thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind her to go to war with Germany, unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.' (Modified quotation, August 2, B. W. P. no. 148.)

The British Cabinet, in spite of the dissension among its members,¹ could on August 2 feel more secure in giving the

the Low Countries would be the prelude to our own. We can no more tolerate a German hegemony in Europe than we can tolerate the hegemony of any other power. As our fathers fought Spain and France in the days of their greatest strength to defeat their pretense to Continental supremacy, and their menace to the narrow seas, which are the bulwark of our independence, so shall we be ready, with the same unanimity and the same stubborn tenacity of purpose, to fight any other nation which shows by her acts that she is advancing a like claim and confronting us with a like threat. If any individual member of the Cabinet dissents from this view, the sooner he quits the Government the better. Mr. Asquith may find it no disadvantage to take fresh blood into his Administration, as M. Viviani has undoubtedly strengthened the French Government by the admission of M. Delcassé and M. Clemenceau. The controversy between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that between Austria-Hungary and Russia, have passed away from the eyes of the nation. These are fixed on the German attack upon the French Republic and upon Luxemburg. In that conflict the nation know their duty. With the blessing of Heaven they will do it to the uttermost." (Extract.)

¹ The acute Cabinet crisis which paralleled the European crisis is disclosed in the London *Times*: —

"CHANGES IN THE CABINET

"We understand that Lord Morley, Lord President of the Council, and Mr. Burns, President of the Board of Trade, have resigned office. At a late hour last night efforts were still being made to induce Mr. Burns to withdraw his resignation, but Lord Morley's is final.

"The resignation of these Ministers is the result, of course, of a fundamen-

above assurance, since on that date Mr. Asquith received the following important letter from the leader of the Parliamentary opposition: —

tal difference of opinion with their colleagues over the national policy, as set forth on Monday by Sir Edward Grey, and of a strong desire that at this time of crisis Mr. Asquith should have the support of an absolutely united Cabinet.

“THE INNER HISTORY

“Now that it has reached this point no harm is done by revealing some of the stages leading up to yesterday’s decision. It is already a tolerably open secret, indeed, that throughout last week — while Germany’s intentions were still undeclared and Sir Edward Grey was laboring for the peace of Europe — divergent views were held inside the Cabinet as to the duties and interests of this country in certain — still non-existent — circumstances. There were well-founded rumors of possible resignations — first on one side, then on the other side, of the cleavage. But the Prime Minister — feeling, no doubt, that a change of Government under present conditions was impossible — successfully exerted all his powers to keep his colleagues together; and by Sunday the scale had been turned decisively by the news of Germany’s action in the matter of Luxemburg and Belgium. On the same afternoon the country was definitely committed to the support of France by Sir Edward Grey’s note to M. Cambon, and Monday’s speech announced the decision to the world.

“By that time the dissentient element in the Cabinet had been reduced by the logic of events to very small proportions. Four Ministers out of twenty-one were still unconvinced; but there is reason to believe — if only from their continued attendance at yesterday’s meeting — that two of them have now found it possible to remain in office. The decision of Mr. Burns and Lord Morley was deeper rooted. They had taken it independently and at different stages in the controversy — an important fact which completely dispels the notion that there has been anything like an organized secession. In both cases it is satisfactory to know that one of the strongest motives for resignation was the conviction that any rift in the Cabinet must hamper its freedom of action in a great emergency.

“FILLING THE GAPS

“No steps have yet been taken to fill their places. The project of a Coalition Government, which has been discussed in certain quarters, has no present foundation in fact; and indeed it is open to many of the objections which prevent a general ‘swopping of horses in mid-stream.’ There were renewed rumors yesterday that Lord Haldane was to return to the War Office, but there is reason to believe that they were are least premature. The arguments against such a change, which we set forth elsewhere, are absolutely overwhelming in the circumstances, and the mere thought of it produced a storm of protest in London. On the other hand, the suggestion of the *Times* that Lord Kitchener’s services should be invoked for this purpose was the subject of universal and approving comment in many quarters. No official inspiration attaches to it, but there is reason to believe that, from

2d August, 1914.

Dear Mr. Asquith, — Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honor and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object. — Yours very truly,

A. BONAR LAW.¹

As soon as M. Viviani, French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, learned of this assurance, he instructed M. Paul Cambon that 'in communicating this announcement

members of the Government downwards, the appointment, if it were made, would be received with profound satisfaction and confidence." (*London Times*, August 5, 1914, p. 6.)

¹ This letter was made public at a meeting of the Unionist chairmen held at the Hotel Cecil, December 14, in the course of an address by Mr. Bonar Law. His introductory remarks referring to this letter were as follows: —

"Before the war, as you well know, party differences were as acute as they have ever been in this country; party passions were inflamed to such an extent that I saw no possible outlet which would not be disastrous to the country. In a moment the whole situation was changed. The war cloud which had been gathering over Europe, which for years we had looked upon with growing anxiety, suddenly burst, and we realized that we were face to face with the gravest danger which, as a nation, we have ever encountered. We realized also, that that danger could only be overcome if national resources were utilized to the utmost, and we could act as a united nation. Though the Opposition plays a recognized part in our form of government, it has no official position. We recognized, however, that we represent a large proportion of the members of the House of Commons, and in the days of suspense, especially in the days between the time when war had actually broken out and the position of this country became clear, we came to the conclusion that we were bound to state plainly what our views were, and what action we were prepared to take.

"On the eventful Sunday, the 2d of August, when the decision of the Government was still in doubt, a letter was sent to the Prime Minister on the joint authority of Lord Lansdowne and myself, in which we declared that in our belief it was the duty of this country to join her Allies, and in which we promised, in that case, to support the Government. There can be no harm in publishing this letter, and I think it might interest you to hear its exact wording. It was in these terms. (*London Times*, December 15, 1914.)

to the French Chambers, he purposed to indicate that the assistance which Great Britain had the intention of giving France, with the view of protecting the French coasts or the French mercantile marine, would be so exerted as to afford equal support to the French navy by the English fleet, in case of a Franco-German conflict, in the Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and in the English Channel. He said, moreover, that he would mention that English ports could not be used as points for the revictualing of the German fleet.' (Modified quotation, August 2, F. W. B. no. 138.)

M. Cambon replied: —

"Sir Edward Grey has authorized me to tell you that you may inform Parliament that to-day he made declarations in the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations was as follows: 'If the German fleet cross the Straits, or go north in the North Sea in order to double the British Isles, with a view to attacking the French coasts or the French Navy, or to disturbing the French mercantile marine, the British fleet will intervene in order to give the French marine entire protection, so that from that moment on England and Germany would be in a state of war.'

"Sir E. Grey pointed out that the mention of operations through the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

"The declaration with regard to the intervention of the British fleet, of which I gave you the text in my telegram of August 2, is to be regarded as binding the British Government. Sir Edward Grey assured me of this, and added, that the French Government was therefore in a position to bring it to the knowledge of the Chambers.

"On my return to the Embassy, I learned from your telephonic communication of the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately informed Sir E. Grey of it." (Extract, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 143.)

In his speech in the House of Commons (August 3), Sir Edward Grey, after tracing the history and explaining the nature of the *Entente*¹ with France, said: —

“I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House — and my own feeling — for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France — the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away. I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation — it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations — how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon any one else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

“The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries.

¹ See above, pp. 288–292.

My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing!¹ I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

“But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel, to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying ‘No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict.’ Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences — which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace — in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war — let us assume that out of that come consequences

¹ Sir Edward Grey here acknowledges England’s moral obligation to support France against a German attack upon her coasts, but this was only because France “had not been the aggressor.”

unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defense of vital British interests, we should go to war: and let us assume — which is quite possible — that Italy, who is now neutral, because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise — let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen — and which perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests — make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defense of vital British interests ourselves to fight, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

“Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know — and to know at once! — whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement: —

““I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give

all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.'

"I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us.

"There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France, that I have read to the House, which prevents us from doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, 'We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter' under no conditions — the Belgian Treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France — if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I be-

lieve, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

“My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium,¹ that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment — we know not how soon — to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment’s notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed from which no country in Europe will escape and from which no abdication or neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

“The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that

¹ See *post*, Documents, chap. XIII; also p. 353.

we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week, the House will see from the Papers that will be before it.

“But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia.¹ We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.²

“The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of

¹ Austria declared war against Russia on August 5. (See A. R. B. no. 59.)

² The German Ambassador left Paris the evening of August 3. (See F. Y. B. nos. 147, 148, 157.)

Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country."

The formal assurance which the British Government gave France that her fleets would protect the French coast against a German attack may be looked upon as a conditional declaration of war against Germany, and amounted to England's entry into the war between Germany and France. By the announcement that England made, she intervened just as really as she would have by the sending of troops to defend the French frontiers. Yet if Germany had not invaded Belgium, the war between France and Germany might possibly have been fought out under this condition of English restraint of the German fleet without the exchange of a shot between Germany and England. It is hardly just, therefore, to say that England came into the war because of Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality. A more accurate statement is that when Germany violated Belgium's neutrality, England decided to change from partial and specially restricted intervention in the war to a general engagement of all her forces against Germany. This is no fine-spun theory, but a statement of fact which might have had the most important consequences. For when the British Government, by Sir Edward Grey's speech in Parliament, had notified the German Government of the fact of the assurance it had given to France, Germany, in the course of a war against France, would have been justified in falling upon the British fleet or British commerce, without further warning, at any moment she might choose. That this situation did not escape the advisers of the British Foreign Office is clearly shown by Sir Edward's remarks, and had the general or full war not broken out, Sir Edward Grey must either have required a formal acceptance by Germany of the condition upon which England refrained from active operations, or

else have continued to hold the British fleet constantly prepared for a sudden attack, which could not have been designated as treacherous.¹

16. *The British ultimatum*

In the dispatch which M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, sent to his Government on Sunday,

¹ At the time when Sir Edward Grey, in his speech before the House of Commons (August 3), made public the assurance given to France, he did not know whether Germany had yet declared war on France. The effect of the promise made to France was that when war broke out, England would remain on the watch to prevent the German fleet from making an attack on the French coasts or French shipping. That is to say, upon the outbreak of the war between France and Germany, England was actively involved to the extent of a conditional intervention in case a certain contingency should arise. France, Germany, and England were obligated by their ratification of the Hague Convention "Relative to the Opening of Hostilities" to give a formal notice before attacking, but Germany, when engaged in war with France, was under no obligation to notify England of her intentions in regard to sending her fleet through the Channel or the North Sea to attack France; yet when she attempted to do so, it was certain that she would be attacked by the British fleet. It follows that Germany was free to take any hostile action she thought advisable against England to prevent this interference. In other words, England had made a conditional declaration of war which absolved Germany from the obligation of giving any further notice of an intention to attack England.

Sir Edward Cook says: "This was not a declaration of war, but a contingent obligation to make war." (*Why Britain is at War*, p. 18. Macmillan, & Co., London, 1914.)

The German Secretary of the Treasury, Dr. Karl Helfferich, has recently stated: —

"Therefore, if during the time between August 2 and 4 German warships had passed through the Strait of Calais or the North Sea, a state of war would immediately have arisen between Germany and England, since such an operation would have been immediately taken by the English to mean that the French coast or fleet was to be attacked or, at least, the French merchant marine to be alarmed; and this would have occurred solely because of the obligations which the English Cabinet felt to be imposed upon it by the *entente* with France, which, on its face, bound England to nothing: all this, moreover, quite irrespective of Germany's attitude toward Belgian neutrality.

"One must now deplore that in those days the German fleet did not come out and cause hostile action on the part of the English fleet. Then the fairy tale that England was forced to enter the war solely by the violation of Belgian neutrality at the hands of Germany could never have come up." (*New York Times*, March 14, 1915.)

August 2, to announce the important decision of the English Government to give France the assurance that the English fleet would protect the French coasts from a German attack, he sagaciously added that 'the preservation of Belgian neutrality was considered so important there that England would look upon its violation by Germany as a *casus belli*. This was, he said, a peculiarly English interest, and one could not doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of its policy, would make it prevail, even if the business world, where German influence makes tenacious efforts, tried to exert pressure to hinder the Government from engaging itself against Germany.' (Modified quotation, August 2, F. Y. B. no. 137.)

In his speech in the House of Commons next day (that is, Monday, August 3), Sir Edward Grey, after considering the nature of England's obligation to assist France, turned to the question of the neutrality of Belgium. Beginning with the Treaty of 1839, he outlined the history of the question, including a review of the negotiations in course (see *post*, Documents, chap. XIII), and concluded:—

"It now appears, from the news I have received to-day, — which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form,¹ — that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guaranty were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be pre-

¹ August 3, M. Paul Cambon reported to his Government: "On my return to the Embassy I learned from your telephonic communication of the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately informed Sir E. Grey of it." (Extract, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 143.)

served, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.¹

¹ Sir Edward Grey has been accused of being responsible for the war: —

(1) Because he did not inform Russia and France that England would not allow a European war to develop out of the Austro-Servian dispute. Sir Edward Grey could not have done this without disrupting the *Entente*. He could not have guaranteed that his country would intervene to make good his threat, and it is very possible that France and Russia would have made war together against Austria and Germany rather than permit Austria to overthrow the *status quo* in the Balkans. The disastrous results to England might have been still greater if the war had been thus avoided as a result of England's veto, for Russia and France would have resented England's desertion of them and awaited an opportunity to join Germany in accomplishing her ruin.

(2) Because he did not tell Germany that England would stand by France and Russia. An influential friend and intimate of the Kaiser, Herr Ballin, has recently joined the ranks of those who criticize Sir Edward Grey on this ground. He has said: —

"We all feel that this war has been brought about by England. We honestly believe that Sir Edward Grey could have stopped it.

"If, on the first day, he had declared, 'England refuses to go to war because of the internal questions between Servia and Austria,' then Russia and France would have found a way to compromise with Austria.

"If, on the other hand, Sir Edward Grey had said England was ready to go to war, then, for the sake of Germany, probably Austria might have been more ready to compromise.

"But, by leaving his attitude uncertain and letting us understand that he was not bound to go to war, Sir Edward Grey certainly brought about the war. If he had decided at once, one way or the other, Sir Edward Grey could have avoided this terrible thing." (London *Times*, April 15, 1915, extract from New York *World*, April 16, 1915.)

The London *Spectator* (August 8, 1914, p. 193) adopts this view in an article on "The Revelations of the Blue Book." "But we do say that if we had stated firmly and boldly to Germany from the first that we should undoubtedly stand by our friends, — it was always obvious to people of the least penetration that we must do so in the end, — we should have been saved this appalling war."

The French and Russian diplomatists began to harp on this theme from the moment they learned of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum. I believe it has been shown that the course Sir Edward Grey pursued was much wiser, since he stimulated both sides to make concessions for a peaceful settlement. As soon as it was believed in Russia that England would be upon her side, those in favor of war seem to have acquired a greater influence. (See Reuter dispatch; Price, *Diplomatic History of the War*, p. 338.) There are certain indications that at about this period, July 29, when France and Russia felt confident that England might be upon their side, Germany and Austria hesitated to force the issue. Nevertheless, we do not

“Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King

find that either Austria or Germany put forward a single suggestion which might have served as a possible compromise. In addition to the reasons just given, Sir Edward Grey could not have made such a declaration, because he could not have been sure that the Government and the country would back him up. Even after several days had elapsed, in which the British public might have convinced itself that Austria and Germany were forcing the issue, and that France and Russia were giving every indication of a conciliatory spirit, there was, nevertheless, a strong British sentiment in favor of remaining neutral. There was a serious split in the Cabinet, and it is rumored that Sir Edward Grey himself considered resigning. Not until Germany refused to respect Belgian neutrality was it possible to unite the Government and the country in the firm support of Russia and France against German aggression. Sir Edward Grey must have felt that England would be dishonored if she did not support France against German aggression. He must have known that his country would come to a realization of her mistake as soon as Germany had crushed France, but that it might then be too late to succor France or wash away England's dishonor.

(3) Because he worked to involve England in a war against Germany. The main argument in support of this contention is that he would not respond to Prince Lichnowsky's request to state the conditions upon which England would remain neutral. In point of fact, he did lay down the conditions upon which England would remain neutral, when, on July 31, he said that if Germany brought forward any reasonable proposal which France and Russia would not agree to, he would have nothing further to do with the consequences. The failure to meet this proposal of Sir Edward Grey showed that Germany was making no efforts at coöperation and made plainer than ever her aggressive purpose. In the face of German aggression upon France, England was bound to come to her support both on the ground of the *Entente* and on the ground of her general interests to resist the attempt of any nation to acquire dominion on the Continent by conquest of arms. The vast majority of those who were won over by Sir Edward's maneuvers of springing the Belgian question at an opportune moment must have been very thankful to him for making clear Germany's real designs and saving them from making a colossal blunder. I doubt if the British people will ever consider that Sir Edward Grey deceived them. By focusing attention upon the Belgian question he united the whole country for immediate action. As soon as there was time for reflection, it was seen that Belgium was only one of several reasons for joining France and Russia against Germany.

In any event, Sir Edward Grey did tell Prince Lichnowsky, July 29, that he must not be misled into thinking that England would stand aside (B. W. P. nos. 87, 89). Prince Lichnowsky replied that he had already reported to his Government that such was his estimate of the situation (B. W. P. no. 89), and Herr von Jagow told Sir Edward Goschen that he heard the answer of the British Government to the German proposal (B. W. P. no. 85) not exactly with surprise (B. W. P. no. 98). Neither Sir Edward Grey nor any one else could tell with certainty what would be the attitude of the British Gov-

of the Belgians by our King — King George: 'Remembering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty's friendship
ernment. George Bernard Shaw has given the following picturesque description of the situation: —

"The Lion broods and broods, and deep in his subconsciousness there stirs the knowledge that Germany will never fight unless — unless — unless — the Lion does not quite know what, does not want to know what, but disinterested observers complete the sentence thus: Unless Germany can be persuaded that the Lion is taking a fancy to Germany and is becoming a bit of a pacifist and will not fight. Then the luck that has so seldom failed the Lion sent Prince Lichnowsky as German Ambassador to London. There was nothing wrong in being very friendly to the Prince, a charming man with a very charming wife; there was our Sir Edward Grey, also a charming man, always ready to talk peace quite sincerely at tea parties with all Europe if necessary.

"The Lion knew in his heart that Sir Edward Grey knew nothing of the ways of lions, and would not approve of them if he did, for Sir Edward had ideas instead of the one idea, and Prince Lichnowsky knew so much less of the ways of lions than Sir Edward that he actually thought Sir Edward was the Lion. The Lion said: 'This is not my doing. England's destiny has provided Grey, and provided Lichnowsky; England's star is still in the zenith.' Lichnowsky thought Grey every day a greater statesman and a more charming man, and became every day more persuaded that the lion's heart had changed and that he was becoming friendly, and Grey thought Lichnowsky, perhaps, rather a fool, but was none the less nice to him.

"Then there was Mr. Asquith, the lucid lawyer, the man who could neither remember the past nor foresee the future, yet was always a Yorkshireman with [an] ancient English depths behind his mirrorlike lucidity, in which something of the lioncraft could lodge without troubling the surface of the mirror. Mr. Asquith suddenly found in himself an unaccountable but wholly irresistible impulse to hide and deny those arrangements with the French commanders which had frightened Germany. He said to Sir Edward Grey: 'You must go to the French and say that we are not bound to anything.' Sir Edward Grey, the amiable lover of peace, was delighted. He went, and the French, with imperturbable politeness, made note of it, and then Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward, with good conscience, found themselves busily persuading the world that the Lion was not bound to help France and Russia when the great day of Armageddon came. They persuaded the nation, they persuaded the House of Commons, they persuaded their own Cabinet, and at last — at last, they persuaded Germany. And the Lion crouched.

"Almost before he was ready the devil's own luck struck down the Archduke by the hand of the assassin, and Austria saw Serbia in her grasp. At last she flew at Serbia, Russia flew at Austria, Germany flew at France, and the Lion, with a mighty roar, sprang at last, and in a flash had his teeth and claws in the rival of England and will now not let her go for all the pacifists or Socialists in the world until he is either killed or back on his Waterloo pedestal again." (New York *Times*, December 13, 1914.)

Sir Edward Grey accomplished his task of uniting the Cabinet and secur-

and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just ing the united support of Parliament and the country for his policy at the same time that he retained the respect of France and Russia. Furthermore, his unofficial mediatory action for peace delayed the recourse to hostilities long enough to give time for Belgium to mobilize and save France, while he showed up, beyond all question of doubt, Germany's aggressive action, so that Italy was amply justified in her own eyes and before the neutral world in refusing to support her allies in their aggressive campaign. Had Sir Edward Grey declared that England would be on the side of France and Russia, it is very possible that Italy might have become involved on the side of Austria and Germany.

Recently a distinguished British scholar, Dr. F. C. Conybeare, has entered the lists and declared Russia responsible for the war, placing upon Sir Edward Grey the responsibility for not taking action which would have given Russia pause. He says in part: —

“Meanwhile Grey had great difficulty with the Cabinet, a majority of whom flatly refused to go to war with Germany over Serbia and preferred to throw over Grey's naval and other agreements with France (which on July 30 Cambon urged Grey to execute without delay; see White Paper, no. 105). Grey threatened to resign, but on July 31 agreed to stay on until it was known if Germany would respect or not Belgian neutrality, as to which, on July 29 (White Paper, no. 85), the German Chancellor had spoken ambiguously. If he really feared that France would violate it he should have demanded of us an assurance that we would defend it *vi et armis* against France. We could not have refused such an assurance. But Belgian neutrality was the only thing the majority in our Cabinet really cared about, and unless it — a small country — was violated by Germany — a big one — the English people could not be relied upon to join in any war. Nothing else appealed to them in the least, and not a soul had any idea that Germany had already offered to respect Belgium. Accordingly on the afternoon of July 31 Goschen sounded Von Jagow about Belgium, and he could not answer without consulting the Kaiser and the Chancellor. The Kaiser, ever anxious to keep us out (and probably aware also that Russia would retire across the golden bridge he had built as soon as ever she learned that we were going to be neutral and not help her in her designs), ordered Lichnowsky to offer to respect Belgium and also to guarantee integrity of France and of French colonies, to offer, in short, any conditions in order to keep us out. Our Cabinet, in its turn anxious only to get from Germany a favorable answer about Belgium and to be able to keep the peace with Germany, met early on August 1 and drew up a memorandum about it, which Grey was to submit to Lichnowsky.

“There was perhaps some one in the Cabinet who pointed out that to challenge Germany to respect Belgium, after signifying our intention of supporting France anyhow, was a work of supererogation. It was in effect to say: ‘I am going to war anyhow with you,’ and at the same time, ‘I will go to war with you if you touch Belgium.’ The Germans would probably answer: ‘We may as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb, and if we are, anyhow, to fight you, why should we forego the military advantages of going through Belgium?’

given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.'

"In our White Paper, no. 123, may be read Grey's own abstract of his conversation with Lichnowsky. At about 1.30, on August 1, Lichnowsky freely offered to respect Belgium and also to guarantee the integrity of France and of her colonies, although France (who really needed a strait-waistcoat to keep her out of a quarrel which was not hers) could not complain, if she was beaten, of Germany helping herself to some of her colonies. Grey might have said to Lichnowsky that he could not barter our neutrality against an undertaking by Germany to respect Belgium, seeing that it was anyhow Germany's duty to respect Belgium. However, our Cabinet was in a bartering mood, and they only wanted an excuse for not going to war with Germany. Lichnowsky therefore adopted the bartering tone, and so did Grey. Grey evidently expected Lichnowsky to offer no sort of terms, and when Lichnowsky made the proposals as he did, and furthermore besought him to formulate any conditions on which England would consent to be neutral, Grey refused all on the pretext of keeping his hands free (see no. 123). Lichnowsky must have gone away with the conviction that Grey anyhow wanted war.

"Now, our Cabinet plainly expected Grey to report to them at once any disposition to yield, if Germany showed signs of it. He knew that if he reported Lichnowsky's proposals, the Cabinet would jump at them, and then he would be unable to execute his secret bond to France and Russia. What did he do? He told none of his colleagues of them on August 1, and when the Cabinet met next morning, August 2, he concealed them from the entire Cabinet, as he did from the House of Commons next day, August 3. By doing so he precipitated us into this war. I say he tricked us into war; us, a generous people (who — except for a few rabid chauvinists on the Tory side — were averse to war with Germany with whom we were for the first time since Agadir on cordial terms) into war with you. Take my word for it, Grey will, in good time, be running for his life over this sinister business. Bismarck in 1870 modified a telegram in order to provoke that owl, Louis Napoleon, into a declaration of war; Grey deliberately concealed from his colleagues and from Parliament overtures made by Lichnowsky, which would have been accepted at once; but for Grey's action Belgium would not have been turned into a shambles, and in all probability Russia would have professed her satisfaction that Austria had accepted her terms (dictated by Sazonof to Pourtalès at 2 A.M. on July 30) and have shut up. I consider that Grey acted more criminally than Bismarck ever did.

"Mark the sequel. War ensued over Belgium, and weeks of it ensued before any one knew of the interview given in White Paper, no. 123. As soon, however, as Parliament met on August 27, Keir Hardie, who spotted it, asked Grey whether he had submitted Lichnowsky's proposals to the Cabinet and why they had not been made the basis of peace with Germany. Grey in his answer acknowledged that he had disclosed it to no one at the time and excused himself on the ground that Lichnowsky in no. 123 was speaking *de suo* and without authority from Berlin. He acknowledged that

“Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence — and integrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of

Lichnowsky was actuated in making these proposals by a sincere desire for peace with us, but declared that Berlin in the background was as sincerely working for war. And yet he must have been well aware that Lichnowsky was acting on instructions from Berlin, as Lichnowsky's three dispatches sent to Berlin about that interview at 1.15 P.M., 5.30 P.M., and 8.30 P.M. on August 1 sufficiently prove. Moreover, had Grey not *known* that Lichnowsky's proposals were authoritative and bound, the German Government, he would never have wired them at once to Goschen lest the latter should get at cross-purposes with our Foreign Office in the matter. All Grey's answers to Keir Hardie on August 27 are thus a model of *hard lying, suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*. Naturally the House of Commons, having been utterly hoodwinked by him, applauded. *Presently they will send him to the gallows*. I doubt if even Asquith knew of this crime, for on August 6 he based his whole argument on White Paper, no. 85, but if he really was Grey's accomplice, he will swing too. I fancy Lloyd George — a plastic tool in Grey's hands — begins to smell a rat, for he is going about the country now protesting loudly that he and the English democracy could and would never have been induced to go to war except by the aggression on Belgium.” (*The Vital Issue*, April 17, 1915, vol. II, no. 16.)

If the facts are as stated, and Sir Edward Grey “deliberately concealed from his colleagues and from Parliament overtures made by Lichnowsky, which would have been accepted at once,” he certainly took a very heavy responsibility, — probably greater than any man should be allowed to accept under a free government. In point of fact, however, the very men from whom he is alleged to have concealed the offer probably now realize the reasons for his action. Some of those reasons might have been that: (1) Until Germany met his offer of July 31 and proposed some practical method of procedure to reach a compromise, there was no use in offering terms which would have temporarily tied Great Britain's hands. (2) If Sir Edward Grey had offered his conditions and Germany had chosen to let them be known, Russia might possibly have retreated (as Mr. Conybeare suggests), but the *Entente* would have been sacrificed at German dictation to buy peace for Europe, — not a permanent, but probably only a temporary, peace. (3) British public opinion would have been so confused with the complicated issues as to make it impossible to take united action until it was too late to come to the effective support of Belgium and France, and to preserve the good name of England. It is my opinion that, instead of heaping blame upon Sir Edward Grey, we should accord him the Nobel Peace Prize for his active and intelligent work to preserve peace. He performed the Herculean task of putting off the actual outbreak of hostilities for several days at least. It was not his fault if his great plans could not be carried to a successful culmination. He preserved his country's vital interests, he saved her good name, and he did everything that was possible to preserve peace.

course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller states in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone."

M. Paul Cambon informed his Government: 'In view of events, Sir Edward Grey rendered more precise the declarations he intended to make on the subject of Belgian neutrality. The reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of England made a deep impression on the House. The House would that evening vote credits asked for; from then on its support was acquired to the policy of the Government, which, following public opinion, was growing more and more in their favor.' (Modified quotation, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 145.)

That same day (August 3) Baron Kuhlmann, Councillor of the German Embassy in London, gave to the press the *communiqué* previously referred to:—

"The maintenance of British neutrality would in no way injure France. On the contrary, it might be argued that by remaining neutral Great Britain could give France exactly as much strategic assistance and a good deal more effective diplomatic help.

"As, according to all reliable information, there is no intention of sending British troops to the Continent, and as a few British divisions, considering the enormous numbers engaged, could hardly alter the balance of power, all England can do for France is to protect her North Sea coast from invasion and to prevent the neutral ports of

Belgium and Holland being used as bases of armed aggression against France.

“Germany would be disposed to give an undertaking that she will not attack France by sea in the north, or make any warlike use of the seacoast of Belgium or Holland, if it appeared that Great Britain would make this undertaking a condition of her neutrality for the time being.

“Thus, England, without going to war herself, could render to France the maximum of assistance she could give by going to war. That England, as a neutral power, maintaining an armed neutrality, would diplomatically be a greater asset for France for the termination of hostilities at an early moment than if herself involved in war, is self-evident.”¹

The next day, August 4, Sir Edward Grey transmitted to the British Ambassador at Berlin the text of the Belgian appeal to England for diplomatic intervention, and further stated that the British Government were also informed that ‘the German Government had delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. They also understood that Belgium had categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. The British Government were bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany was a party in common with themselves, and requested an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium would not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality would be respected by Germany. Sir Edward instructed the British Ambassador at Berlin to

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, Tuesday, August 4, 1914. Statement first printed in evening papers, August 3, 1914.

ask for an immediate reply.' (Modified quotations, August 4, B. W. P. no. 153; cf. B. G. P. no. 25.)

On August 4, the German Secretary of State telegraphed Prince Lichnowsky: —

"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. The sincerity of this declaration is borne out by the fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that the German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent the French advance." (August 4, B. W. P. no. 157.)

On August 4, the British Government learned that 'German troops had entered Belgian territory, and that Liège had been summoned to surrender by a small party of Germans, who, however, were repulsed.' (Modified quotation, August 4, B. W. P. no. 158.)

That same day Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador at Berlin: —

"We hear that Germany has addressed a note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

"We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

"In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting

Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning (see B. W. P. no. 153) be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves." (August 4, B. W. P. no. 159.)

Sir Edward Goschen relates in the following words how he called upon the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the afternoon of August 4, and inquired in the name of the British Government whether the German Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality:¹—

"Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed

¹ This dispatch, drawn up on August 8, after Sir Edward Goschen returned to London, supplements the record of the British White Paper.

out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

“During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

“Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave His Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued, Herr von Jagow expressed his

poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

"I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word — 'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper,¹ Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and

¹ The Chancellor, in an interview with the correspondent of the Associated Press, has explained what he meant by the phrase "a scrap of paper." His explanation and Sir Edward Grey's rejoinder are considered in the following chapter.

death' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, 'But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but His Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

"After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never dispatched.¹

"At about 9.30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his

¹ This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

"In the mean time, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

"After order had been restored, Herr von Jagow came

to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behavior of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorized by the Government; in fact the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, 'Certainly not, until the morning.' It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighborhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the 'pestilential *Tageblatt*' which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumors that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

"On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message: —

"The Emperor has charged me to express to Your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from these occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence

of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles.'

"I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

"On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports — which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing — and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

"The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was ex-

ceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

“Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behavior of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamoring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

“I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, His Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.” (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 8 [1914].)

CHAPTER IX

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY

The history of Belgian neutrality — The obligation to respect the treaty of April 19, 1839 — The obligation to make good the guaranty of neutrality — The right to make war and the equality of states — Anglo-Belgian conversations — Effect of Belgium's preparations against Germany — Alleged violations of Belgian neutrality — The violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg — Some considerations concerning Belgium's right to resist — Germany accuses England of misrepresentation in regard to Belgium — Germany's plea of necessity.

1. The history of Belgian neutrality

THE origins of Belgian neutrality may be traced back for centuries. The subject is a most important one, and round it have centered the intense rivalries of the European states. Ever since the Treaty of Verdun, when the grandsons of Charlemagne divided his inheritance into three strips, there has been an incessant conflict between the western division which fell to Charles the Bold, and the eastern which Louis the German received, to divide the intermediate inheritance of Lothair, whose name in the form of Lorraine is still applied to part of the territory which is now the scene of an armed conflict.

France early gained the advantage through her achievement of a strong national state, while Germany remained split up into a lot of independent and semi-independent states under the nominal suzerainty of emperors chosen, as a rule, from the Austrian reigning house. Spain and England played an important part in checking the ambitions of France, and when Spain fell into decadence, the English and the Dutch strove to maintain the balance of power on the Continent. France, by playing upon the fears and jealousies of the minor German states, was able to paralyze the political and military action of the German Empire. England alone was able to persist in her resistance,

and prevented the French from advancing to their goal of occupying the Netherlands.

In the course of generations France had acquired a considerable portion of the middle strip of the inheritance of Lothair, but until the French Revolution she was never able to acquire those provinces on her northeastern frontier which were successively known as Burgundy, the Spanish Netherlands, the Austrian Netherlands, the Belgic Provinces, and Belgium.

As early as 1609 the great Cardinal Richelieu perceived the futility of any immediate efforts of conquest, and proposed that France and the United Provinces of Holland should enter into a treaty with these provinces, according to the terms of which this middle state, made into an independent Catholic republic, should join in a perpetual alliance with its two neighbors to maintain its independence.¹ The great statesman considered such a solution superior to any attempt at partition of these provinces by France and Holland, for the following reasons: (1) It would prevent the maintenance of an expensive system of fortifications between France and the growing Dutch Republic, which Richelieu foresaw would soon acquire a position of great strength. (2) It would do much to remove the causes of war, so difficult to avoid between two powerful coterminous states. (3) It would prevent a coalition of England and Spain to check France. This danger the Cardinal appreciated fully, because he realized the fundamental motives which governed England's policy better than did the English statesmen of the period. (4) An independent republic placed between France and the Dutch Republic would be a factor in preserving peace, because this medial state would understand that the greatest menace to its existence would arise from a conflict between its neighbors.

By insisting that the state so established should be

¹ See Documents, chap. XIII.

Catholic, the Cardinal would have made it extremely difficult for the Dutch to incorporate it in their own territory. But the advantages of this plan of the far-seeing Cardinal were not sufficiently appreciated by his contemporaries, and it had to be abandoned in favor of a less perfect scheme.¹

The purpose of the Dutch was to acquire a sufficient strip of this territory bordering on France to serve as a barrier for the protection of their own province. In pursuit of this policy, they acquired a strip called the Generality or Common Lands, and succeeded in closing the Scheldt, so that Amsterdam and the Dutch cities might be favored over Antwerp. Unable to secure the establishment of a neutralized state, they decided to adopt the system of a "buffer" state, which was then called a *barrière*.² But in the course of time this plan was modified, and took the form of a system of barrier fortresses, located in these provinces and garrisoned by the Dutch and English. At the conclusion of the Wars of the Spanish Succession these provinces passed to Austria. Even before this the Dutch had attempted to establish a similar system of outposts along the Rhine, by holding Ravestein and Rhineburg in defiance of the rights of their lawful possessors, with the object of protecting their frontier on the German side. The negotiations in regard to these barrier posts may be considered as the very crux of the diplomacy between France, England, and Holland. England was generally to be found helping the adversaries of France, so as to maintain the balance of power on the Continent.

¹ Dollot, *Neutralité de la Belgique*, pp. 56-57. Paris, 1902.

² "In order to prevent France from encroaching upon Flanders, since otherwise she would be more to be dreaded than Spain, and to this effect just as the Princes of Christendom secured the equality of the balance on the side of Spain by assisting us, let the same procedure be undertaken against France, and Flanders always kept as a dividing wall." (Extract from the minutes of the Session of the States General of April 19, 1647. See Dollot, *op. cit.*, p. 99.)

The system of barrier treaties, as organized in 1709 and continued by the treaties of 1713 and 1715, provided for the Dutch control of the Scheldt and the shutting-off, in favor of Amsterdam, of the competition of the more favorably located Antwerp; the right to garrison certain of the strong places along the frontier; and the placing upon the Austrian Netherlands of the maintenance of this heavy military burden.

The essential idea of this barrier system was to place upon Belgium the cost of maintaining a foreign garrison intended principally for the protection of the Dutch, though incidentally for Belgium's own security against an invasion from France. The adoption of this system was made possible only through the agreement between England and Holland. It amounted to the imposition of a military servitude on these territories in favor of Holland and England.

England had insisted upon treaty recognition of the application of a similar military servitude applied directly to French territory, and had succeeded in securing it; the Treaty of Utrecht, Article 9, required that the fortifications at Dunkirk should be destroyed and not rebuilt.

As the power of Austria and Holland waned, they were quick to recognize that they could place upon England the principal burden of preserving the independence of the Austrian Netherlands. When England became involved in difficulties, she could no longer sustain the burden of this military establishment, and on April 18, 1782, the last of the Scotch regiments left Namur. The system of the barrier had come to an end, as was tacitly admitted by the Treaty of Fontainebleau of November 19, 1785, which omits all mention of it.¹

When in 1789 Belgium revolted because of the attempt of Emperor Joseph II to introduce certain religious and administrative reforms, Prussia feared that the modifica-

¹ Dollot, *op. cit.*, p. 440.

tion introduced might strengthen Austria's position and affect her political influence. Accordingly, Frederick William favored the project of establishing Belgium as an independent republic; but England, although the scheme was in general harmony with her policy, was not willing to give Prussia her support, not wishing to antagonize Austria.¹ The Belgian revolt was quickly suppressed, only to be succeeded shortly after by another uprising. The efforts of the Provinces to break away from Austria found enthusiastic support in France, and in 1792 the French invaded Belgium to free her, as they considered, from the Austrian yoke. Maurier, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, realized, however, that England would not place much confidence in the French protestations of disinterestedness. England was aroused, but offered no resistance to the French, who acquired control of the country. The French Convention was so lacking in all appreciation of the political situation as to remove the restrictions on the navigation of the Scheldt and thus to goad England on to declare war. This French occupation of Belgium and Holland undoubtedly was a vigorous spur toward urging England on to accomplish the fall of Napoleon. Even during the great conflict which ensued, we trace the formation of the idea of the régime to be applied to Belgium. On January 9, 1805, Pitt remarked to the Russian Ambassador to England: "Belgium can never exist as a separate and independent state."² This thought of Pitt's was put into effect when Holland and Belgium were united for the purpose of forming a "stopper" state against French advance. Certain of the old Dutch barrier forts, which had been destroyed by Napoleon in 1803, were rebuilt, and the old system of the *barrière* was thereby reestablished against

¹ Dollot, *op. cit.*, pp. 452-53.

² *Ibid.*, p. 515. In an article on "The Neutrality of Belgium," by Th. Baty, *The Quarterly Review*, January, 1915, p. 216, is the following note: "Pitt's original plan was to give Belgium to Prussia. Castlereagh preferred to strengthen Holland (Hansard, Nov. 2, 1830, col. 40)."

France, though in a more perfected form, and placed under the general guaranty of the powers. This arrangement was intended to be not merely for the advantage of the English and the Dutch, but to serve as a rampart for all Europe against another revolutionary outbreak on the part of France.

Without repeating what has been said already ¹ about the separation of Belgium from Holland in 1830, we need only recall how the Treaty of November 15, 1831, guaranteeing the neutrality and independence of Belgium, was replaced eight years later by the treaties signed April 19, 1839, after Holland had agreed at last to recognize Belgian independence.

2. *The obligation to respect the Treaty of April 19, 1839*

The obligation to respect the neutrality of Belgium may be considered to rest upon the obligation to respect the Treaty of April 19, 1839, which sets forth this obligation in express terms. To understand the question of observance we must, however, examine the nature of this treaty and of treaties in general. Although there is no good classification of treaties, some of the divisions into which they fall are: (1) political treaties; (2) commercial treaties; (3) treaties of settlement; (4) treaties to take effect in the event of war; and (5) law-making treaties. We cannot here enter into a discussion of the nature of the different kinds of treaties except in so far as it is germane to the question of Belgium.

The treaty of neutralization of Belgium is certainly either a political treaty or a treaty made for the event of war. It may, in fact, belong to both categories.² This dual characteristic of the neutralization treaty is one of the

¹ See chap. I.

² Many authorities regard the stipulations establishing the neutrality of Belgium as a lawmaking treaty. See Oppenheim, *International Law*, vol. I, §§ 555, 558, 18, 492 (2d edition, New York, 1912); and Westlake, *International Law*, part I, pp. 29-30, Cambridge, 1910.

reasons why there is so much discussion as to the requirements in regard to its observance. Let us examine the treaty first from the political aspect in an attempt to determine the conditions under which it may come to an end.

Undoubtedly, this result may be reached by an agreement of all the parties. Any signatory of a political treaty of indefinite extent may by its simple declaration put an end, as far as it is concerned, to the continuance of the treaty. If by so doing it arouse the anger of the other party or parties, the settlement of the question is one of politics like the treaty to which it relates. Let us take, as an example of a political treaty, the alliance existing between Italy and her partners in the Triple. It is for Italy to interpret her obligation, and if Austria and Germany should be dissatisfied, they could only apply such measures of persuasion or of force as they might judge expedient.

The termination of a treaty may be brought about tacitly by its gradually falling into desuetude. Whether a treaty be terminated by an express declaration or whether it gradually wastes away until it is generally recognized to have lost all binding force, every state is required by the fundamental principles of international law to observe good faith in regard to its conventional agreements, as well as in regard to all other relations with its sister states. Treaties would be of no value unless it were generally recognized that every self-respecting state might be counted upon to observe its obligations in those cases in which it had solemnly given its most sacred word of honor.

Governments are not sufficiently wise to foresee all events, and may with the best of faith enter into an agreement, the observance of which would mean the jeopardizing of the existence of the nation. Whatever we might like to urge in theory, the practice of all those states which

now survive and make up the family of nations has then been to prefer their national existence to the scrupulous observance of their plighted troth.¹ It might well be questioned whether the present crude machinery of government is a sufficiently authorized agent of the whole people of the state to engage the responsibility of all the state to the observance of such a treaty. If the Government did not hasten to repudiate its obligation, the nation would cast it out and place the control of its public affairs in other hands.

The determination of the dividing line, where the obligation to observe a treaty ends and the necessity of guarding the national existence begins, cannot be decided with any degree of certainty. The evolutionary process of the ages, working to select the states best fitted to survive in the family of nations, will favor those which have had a government sufficiently intelligent or fortunate to have been caught most rarely by this dilemma. For every time that a state finds it necessary to modify or avoid the obligations to which it has subscribed, its credit will be adversely affected, and the burden of its ill-repute will weigh it down, as compared with the states which have found it possible to survive and adhere more faithfully to their agreements. A certain latitude must be allowed for every state to reconcile the scrupulous observance of its obligations with a necessary regard for its own vital interests.

In another respect treaties are sometimes considered to lapse, when conditions have so essentially altered as to render their stipulations no longer applicable. Any political agreement entered into by two governments must be tacitly understood as intended to apply to conditions similar to those which existed at the time the treaty was entered into. Where there is a gradual modification of conditions, and a continued indication on the part of both

¹ Cf. the remarks of Bismarck in reference to the observance of treaties; speech of February 6, 1888; *post*, chap. XIII.

the parties to the treaty of an intention to observe its terms, it may be said that the original obligation is continued by a tacit prolongation. In the absence of such continuation, an essential modification of the conditions to which the treaty was expected to apply would give rise to a doubt, at least, as to whether it continued to apply. At the present time, for the most part, political agreements are entered into for a short term of years, which in itself may be looked upon as a tacit waiving in great measure of the condition just stated, often spoken of as the rule of *rebus sic stantibus*.

With these exceptions, a treaty entered into must be faithfully observed by all the parties as long as it continues in existence. The exceptions pointed out presuppose that the states will endeavor under all circumstances to avoid any action which may take their co-signatory by surprise. This implies that a state which considers a treaty defunct and no longer binding must refrain from any action which might be misinterpreted by the other party as an expression of an intention to continue to observe the obligation. It would be contrary to a due regard for the proper conduct of international relations to allow such a misunderstanding to arise or persist.

In deciding to what class any particular treaty applies, the safest method will be to inquire what purpose it was intended to serve. Applying this test to the Neutralization Treaty of June 26, 1831, and to its successor of April 19, 1839, we may consider the purpose as twofold: (1) To find, in place of Holland, the large state with which the powers of Europe had hoped in 1815 to block any further danger of French expansion into the rich Belgian territory, another check in the form of a neutralized Belgium whose independence should be guaranteed by all the powers.¹ This purpose is evidently political in its nature.

¹ Perhaps England was the only power really desirous to secure the adoption of this plan in 1831. With all the others it was probably a choice of

(2) The second purpose of the treaty resulting from the neutralization of Belgian territory was intended to protect Belgium from invasion, and make it impossible for France or any other country to use its plains as a highway for military operations. England was, of course, particularly interested, not wishing, as a result of the invasion of Belgium, to have military forces massed so near her own shores. The neutralization of Belgium amounted to the placing upon her territory of a military servitude. As this provision was intended to have its full effect only in the event of war, the treaty must upon this ground be classed as one made in the anticipation of war.¹

Now, treaties made for the event of war are peculiar in their nature, for, just when all normal relations between nations cease, a treaty made in anticipation of war would come into full vigor.² War automatically puts an end to all political treaties, and brings into full effect those made in anticipation of war. What, then, will be the effect of war upon this treaty which seems to be partly political and partly contingent upon the event of war?

Before we answer this, let us examine further the nav-
evils. France preferred an independent Belgium to the former arrangement; besides, she did not wish to have the powers undertake joint intervention to regulate Belgian affairs, for fear Nicholas I and Metternich might attempt to interfere with what they considered the revolutionary government of France.

¹ Baron Kuhlmann in his *communiqué* to the press was careful to explain that Germany would not make any warlike use of the seacoast of Belgium or Holland. (See above, p. 361.) This view of the nature of the treaty of 1839 is maintained by Dr. Th. Niemeyer, "International Law in War": *Michigan Law Review*, Jan. 1915, p. 178.

² Crandall quotes with approval Vattel's remark in reference to the annulling of treaties: "Yet here we must except those treaties by which certain things are stipulated in case of a rupture — as, for instance, the length of time to be allowed on each side for the subjects of the other nation to quit the country — the neutrality of a town or province insured by mutual consent, etc. Since, by treaties of this nature, we mean to provide for what shall be observed in case of a rupture, we renounce the right of cancelling them by a declaration of war." (S. B. Crandall, *Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement*, New York, 1904, p. 244.)

ture of treaties made in anticipation of war. It would be futile, of course, to attempt to incorporate political provisions in a treaty of this kind, since the very object of a war would generally be to modify the political relations of the signatories. What stipulations, then, may we reasonably expect to find in such a treaty? Clearly, only such provisions as both the parties consider it to their common advantage to secure in the event of military operations. For example, both parties might agree not to employ aeroplanes or submarines, or might stipulate that each would permit the citizens of the other to continue their uninterrupted residence in its territories upon the outbreak of war. Any provision made in anticipation of war must be entirely voluntary on the part of both the signatories, and free from any taint of duress.¹ This is a point of capital importance, for in the case of all other treaties, the pressure which compels the signatory government to agree in no wise affects the validity of the agreement.²

The truth of what was said above, that any treaty made to take effect in the event of war must be free from all taint of compulsion, is made evident when we consider that otherwise, by menace or force, one state could make another sign agreements restricting its liberty of action in the event of war. If such a principle were to be admitted, the oppressed state, having recourse to war to rid itself of

¹ Westlake says: "Conspicuous among treaties doomed by their nature to obsolescence are those by which a state defeated in war is obliged to abstain from fortifying or otherwise making free use of some part of its territory, when the restriction is not imposed as forming part of a system of permanent neutrality." (John Westlake, *International Law*, part I, p. 296. Cambridge, 1910.)

² Much confusion results from the drawing of false comparisons between international treaties and ordinary contracts between individuals. In the case of the former, the fact that one of the parties has been more or less under the dominance of force and compelled to subscribe to the stipulations is not necessarily a ground for denying its validity. In a treaty of peace, for instance, the vanquished is under the necessity of accepting the terms which the victor imposes. If he is not willing loyally to accept the conditions, he must prolong the contest as best he may.

the obnoxious pressure, might find its liberty to wage war restricted by these previous agreements imposed upon it with this very purpose in view. Had it happened, in the year 1913, that the states as now existing in Europe had never signed an agreement relating to the neutralization of Belgium, and the *Entente* Powers, feeling their strength sufficient to attack, should have imposed upon the Triple Alliance the acceptance of the neutralization of Belgium and Switzerland, Germany might have found herself in a situation entirely unprepared for war and have had to subscribe to these conditions. When war broke out, however, she would have been perfectly justified in reasserting her full liberty of action. But such is not the actual situation of Belgium. The neutralization of Belgium was desired by Prussia in 1839. She has never since given any official indication that she would not consider herself bound by the terms of the neutralization treaty in the event of war, although she might easily have done so. During the eighty-four years which have intervened since Belgium was first neutralized, she has been universally recognized as enjoying this peculiar status of neutralization, and up to the outbreak of this war had fulfilled her obligations to the apparent satisfaction of the other states.

The Treaty of April 19, 1839, had come to be looked upon as such a fundamental part of the public law of Europe that it no longer bore the political imprint of its origin. As Dr. David Jayne Hill declared, in a book published shortly after his return from Berlin where he had represented the United States: "While this arrangement prevents making their territories the scene of hostilities, it does not deprive these States of the right of self-defense. On the contrary, it imposes upon them the duty of defending their neutrality to the best of their ability; but, as they enjoy the guaranty of the powers that they will aid them in this respect, it is improbable that their neutrality

will ever be violated.”¹ From such a source these remarks are most significant, for no doubt former Ambassador Hill had an opportunity to fraternize with the members of the diplomatic corps at Berlin and to study at first hand the various political views of the powers in regard to the situation of Belgium. In his previous post at The Hague, Dr. Hill had another excellent opportunity to study the question of neutralization.

It has been stated that the Treaty of April 19, 1839, according to the terms of which the principal powers were obligated to defend the neutrality of Belgium, was no longer in effect: —

- (1) Because it had been superseded by the Treaties of 1870, which had also lapsed.
- (2) Because the present German Empire was not a party to the Treaty of 1839.
- (3) Because Gladstone had admitted that England, and hence the other powers, could not be expected to carry out its provisions.
- (4) Because the conditions in Belgium had so altered as to make the treaty of neutrality no longer applicable.

(1) As far as regards the effect of the Treaties of 1870 on the Treaty of 1839, one has only to read the Parliamentary debates to perceive that the British Government had no thought of superseding the Treaty of 1839 as a result of entering into treaties with France and Germany in 1870.² The fact that England found it necessary to enter into separate treaties with France and Germany at that time did not affect the Treaty of 1839, but only made clear, whatever care the British Ministers took to disguise it, that the guaranty, being every power's duty, might fail

¹ See Documents, *post*, chap. XIII, where an extensive extract from David Jayne Hill's *World Organization as affected by the Nature of the Modern State* is given.

² Consult Extracts from the *Parliamentary Debates, post*, chap. XIII.

of execution by any.¹ Austria and Russia had probably never expected to take a very active part in making good the guaranty, so that England must have realized that she alone would have to watch over Belgium's neutrality during the war between Prussia and France. The situation was particularly difficult because one of the belligerents might discover that it might be to his advantage to violate Belgian neutrality, and by doing so he might secure a strong position from which it might be difficult to dislodge him before England could gather her forces together to offer any resistance. The effect of the separate Treaties of 1870 was, that in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality by one of the belligerents, the other could rely upon England as an ally in defense of the Treaty of 1839.

By their own express terms (Article III) the Treaties of 1870 expired one year from the date of the conclusion of peace.² Their introduction shows that the treaties were in no wise at variance with the Treaty of 1839, but supplementary to it, hence the obligations to respect and guarantee the neutrality of Belgium remained after the expiration of the Treaties of 1870, and even during their

¹ In 1855 Palmerston in the course of a discussion about the Danubian Principalities expressed some doubt as to the efficacy of neutralization: "The right honorable Gentleman has thrown out certain suggestions, some of which, no doubt, are deserving of consideration, with respect to the arrangements for the future protection of Turkey, and one of those suggestions was that the Principalities should be declared neutral. There certainly are instances in Europe of such propositions, and it has been agreed by treaty that Belgium and Switzerland should be declared neutral; but I am not disposed to attach very much importance to such engagements, for the history of the world shows that when a quarrel arises, and a nation makes war, and thinks it advantageous to traverse with its army such neutral territory, the declarations of neutrality are not apt to be very religiously respected. But if these Principalities continue to form a part of the Turkish Empire, as I think it is essential they should — for, if separated, they might follow the fate of Poland, and be partitioned to some neighboring State — for their neutrality would be disregarded the moment Russia went to war, that, I think, would be the best guaranty for the safety of the whole." (Extract, June 8, 1855, Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. cxxxviii, pp. 1747-48.)

² For the terms of the treaties, see *post*, chap. XIII.

existence, upon the same footing as before their signature. Furthermore, Austria and Russia were not parties to these other treaties. Strictly speaking, any action on the part of England, France, and Prussia, could not without the consent of the other signatories terminate the perpetual Treaty of 1839.

(2) It is true that the present German Empire was not a signatory to the Treaty of 1839. Prussia, however, signed it, and the German Empire has in general succeeded to the obligations of its component states. In many instances the German Government has claimed the benefit of treaty rights previously enjoyed by the separate states of the Empire.¹

The difficult question as to what treaties survive, when one state is succeeded by another, cannot be answered off-hand. As a general rule, it may be said that the continuance of those treaties which might be denounced, depends upon the intentions of the parties, and that each case is decided more or less upon its merits. As soon as either of the parties avails itself of the provisions of the treaty, it

¹ "Where no new treaty has been negotiated with the Empire, the treaties with the various States which have preserved a separate existence have been resorted to.

"The question of the existence of the extradition treaty with Bavaria was presented to the United States District Court, on the application of a person, accused of forgery committed in Bavaria, to be discharged on *habeas corpus*, who was in custody after the issue of a mandate, at the request of the Minister of Germany. The court held that the treaty was admitted by both Governments to be in existence.

"Such a question is, after all, purely a political one." (Opinion of Chief Justice Fuller, in *Terlinden v. Ames* [1901], U.S. Reports, vol. 184, p. 287, quoting with approval the remarks of Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis contained in his notes to the State Department's compilation of Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other Powers, published in 1889.)

Crandall says: "The Italian government considered the treaties between foreign countries and the two Sicilies terminated, at least for most purposes, on the consolidation of the latter with the Kingdom of Sardinia in 1860, but treaties existing with Sardinia, the nucleus of the Kingdom, it regarded as still binding and applicable to the whole kingdom." (Samuel B. Crandall, *Treaties, their Making and Enforcement*, p. 234. New York, 1904.)

would be considered as evidence of the survival of the treaty. The party availing itself of the treaty or recognizing its efficacy, might be considered as estopped from denying its validity until the other signatories had refused to recognize it.¹ In the case of Belgian neutrality, all the signatories and their successors continued to treat Belgium as a neutralized state, and there can be no doubt as to the continuance of the treaty in force.

(3) What Gladstone said in 1870 in no wise admitted that the Treaty of 1839 was not binding upon all the signatories. His language is somewhat obscure, with the haziness so dear to the practical English statesmen, conscious of their great responsibility and the danger of definition. In this particular instance it seems clear enough that Gladstone was considering the possibility that England alone might be called upon to make good her obligations to guarantee Belgium's neutrality. No one would take so extreme a view as to consider that England was obliged to risk her existence in a combat with all the other powers, should they insist upon a concerted violation of Belgian neutrality. Gladstone admitted the obligations of England to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and would undoubtedly have recognized the duty of taking reasonable action to maintain her inviolability. To that extent he would have been ready to make good England's obligation to guarantee the neutrality.

(4) It has been said that Belgium has so developed in population and influence, through the organization of her

¹ "None of the arguments advanced by Germany's apologists to show that the treaties of 1839, neutralizing Belgium, were no longer binding on Prussia (either because Prussia has become a part of the German Empire, or because provisional agreements, reinforcing these treaties, were made in 1870), has any basis in international theory or practice. Moreover, the intention of Germany to respect these treaties was asserted by the present Imperial Chancellor in 1911 and by the present Imperial Secretary of State in 1913. Cf. Belgian Gray Paper, no. 12, and enclosures." (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx, March, 1915, no. 1, p. 57.)

army and the acquisition of the Belgian Congo, that the system of neutralization could no longer be applied to her territory. Far from being a reason for a discontinuance of the former neutralization applied to Belgium, any increase in strength should be regarded as a justification of the stipulation allowing Belgium to take part in defending her own neutrality. It is doubtful, however, if the relative military strength of Belgium as compared with that of her neighbors has been greatly changed through the course of years. The acquisition of colonies could in no wise affect her neutrality, provided, of course, her colonies were not obtained at the expense of any of the powers.

After due consideration of all these arguments, I have no hesitation in saying that the Treaty of April 19, 1839, in spite of its violation by two of the signatories, is to-day legally binding. It remains to be seen what modification, if any, may be made by the treaty of peace which will terminate the present conflict.

3. The obligation to make good the guaranty of neutrality

When the great powers signed the treaty by which they agreed to respect Belgian neutrality and to guarantee its observance, they took an engagement in express terms to exert what strength they could to protect Belgian territory from invasion. If, as practical students of politics, we try to examine the situation at the time the Treaty of November 15, 1831, was signed, we should recognize that the interests of the signatory powers were varied. To a certain degree the old fear of France still prevailed, and it was the general intention to maintain a "stopper" state to prevent her expansion. The need of this policy became apparent later on when Napoleon III became the most powerful and most feared monarch of Europe.

The main reason why France was led to agree to the neutralization of Belgium was that she preferred a small independent Belgium to the larger border state which it

replaced. France was glad also to avoid complications with Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The French Monarchy, brought in by the revolution of July (1830), was regarded with considerable distrust and apprehension by the reactionary courts of Europe. Louis Philippe was in a difficult situation because French public opinion would not have permitted the Government to acquiesce, much less take part in any collective intervention on the part of the great powers to compel Belgium to continue in the union with Holland. Prussia in 1831 was doubtless glad to have an obstacle to French advance or possible aggression against her. Austria and Russia, obliged to concur in the arrangement, had probably no intention of wasting any strength in maintaining Belgian neutrality, except in so far as should be necessary to prevent a too great aggrandizement on the part of France or England, or any other rival who happened at the moment to arouse their fears.

The views of each of the signatories of the Treaty of November 15, 1831, may be summed up as follows: England intended to keep Belgium really neutral and out of the control of any great Continental power. France agreed to the neutralization because she knew she would not be permitted to absorb Belgium. Prussia looked upon the neutralization as a measure to check France and by means of a buffer state prevent an inconvenient attack upon herself. Austria and Russia considered the régime as a check upon French expansion, even though they regretted the necessity of legalizing a government which had made a revolutionary break in the work of the Congress of Vienna.¹

The only power that may be considered to have entertained the intention to make good the guaranty was Great Britain. The guaranteeing action of the other states could be counted upon only in special circumstances.

¹ See Th. Baty, "The Neutrality of Belgium," *The Quarterly Review*, January, 1915, p. 214.

France and Prussia could each be relied upon to oppose an invasion of Belgium by the other, though they might not have been averse to partition at an appropriate opportunity. Austria and Russia might reasonably expect the whole burden of the obligation to fall on the three nearest powers. As for Holland, she was naturally chagrined at losing half of her territory, and refused to sign the treaty; but long before her stubborn king could be made to accept the inevitable and agree to the separation, the Dutch people were ready to acquiesce. They only awaited the assent of their king to agree to the neutralization of Belgium in accordance with the policy pursued since the time when they secured their independence from Spain.¹ England, then, was the only power which, in 1831, might be considered to have accepted in its full significance the obligation to maintain the neutrality of Belgium against any violator. By April 19, 1839, the powers had come to look upon the neutralization of Belgium with much greater favor. The treaty signed that day, reproducing the articles and stipulations relating to the neutralization of Belgium, may be considered as purged of any insincerity that may have attended the acceptance of its predecessor.

In reference to the guaranty of the Treaty of 1839 it is most important to note what Gladstone said in the House of Commons, August 10, 1870: "But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House, what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guaranty is binding on every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guaranty arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen — such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston — never, to my knowledge, took that rigid and,

¹ The Dutch did not join in the guaranty of the neutrality of Belgium in 1839.

if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of a guaranty." ¹

What Gladstone undoubtedly meant by this was that the English statesmen perceived that the whole brunt of maintaining the Belgian neutrality rested upon their shoulders, and that though they intended to take every means to make good the engagement into which they had entered, they did not feel that England was in honor bound, where the odds were too great against her, to stake her national existence in the defense of Belgian neutrality.

Gladstone has been criticized for this frank expression, and in truth his speech seems to present a confusion of ideas which lays him open to criticism. In reality, however, his stand was perfectly justified, for otherwise, in agreeing to the neutrality of Belgium, England would have been digging a pit into which she herself might later have fallen. Gladstone could not have meant that England would ever shirk her obligation to participate in any reasonable measures to make good the guaranty. England's vital interests would surely recommend such a course; but it would have been an impracticable view of the obligation which would have sent England to her doom in the face of a great Continental combination intent upon violating the obligation imposed by the Treaty of 1839.

At the present time, then, I believe it to be beyond all reasonable doubt that all the signatory states of the Treaty of 1839 were bound not only to respect the neutrality of Belgium, but to collaborate in the undertaking of reasonable measures to guarantee this neutrality. It was a duty which all the states of the world owed to international law to take every reasonable and practical means to prevent Germany from effecting such a gross violation of the rights of a weak state as has resulted from her invasion.

As this latter duty is part of the general obligation on

¹ See *post*, chap. XIII, where the rest of Gladstone's remarks and other extensive extracts are quoted from the *Parliamentary Debates*.

all nations to coöperate toward securing a proper respect for the principles of international law, it may be said to enjoin similar action on the United States.¹ The obligation, though equally binding upon us, cannot require us to act with the same energy and promptness as the powers nearer at hand and more vitally interested. International law, as now in operation, lays upon the states most directly concerned the burden of taking the requisite action to secure respect for its rules.

4. *The right to make war and the equality of states*

International law, as at present applied to the relations between states, is based on the fundamental principle of equality of the separate states before this law of nations. As Pascal said of custom, this principle owes its greatest force, perhaps, to the fact that it is accepted. For accepted it is, with a concurrence of opinion almost reaching unanimity. If an objection to the validity of the principle be raised, we must refer to the authorities and marshal the arguments in its favor.

If, for the purpose of this argument, we accept the principle, it follows necessarily that this equality between the states would have no meaning if the stronger could refuse

¹ The United States is required only to make every reasonable effort to secure respect for Belgium's rights, which are the rights of all humanity: necessarily the rights of Germany, too, if she could but perceive it. It has been argued that we should intervene as signatories of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land. Article I of this convention reads: "*The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.*" This article would apply to a neutralized state like Belgium as well as to a state neutral in the ordinary sense like Holland or Italy in the present war. In the case of Belgium the inviolability is sufficiently covered by the Treaty of April 19, 1839. Germany's ratification of this Hague Convention might, however, be taken as another indication that she expected to recognize the inviolability of Belgian territory. For that matter the convention is for the most part a restating of the recognized rules of international law, but since this treaty was not ratified by all the belligerents, it would not under its terms be applicable. The concern of the United States in the protection of Belgium's rights must therefore rest upon the general principles of international law.

to respect the recognized right of the weaker, or if the stronger could use his might to work his will in violation of the right of the weaker. It follows that no state is justified in making war except in the vindication of its rights. Such is, in truth, the principle recognized and observed by civilized states. What if the strong does, notwithstanding, appeal to arms and disregard the right of a weaker state? Has international law any means to check the violator? Yes; a means less direct and less immediate than in the case of violations of national law, though none the less sure in its effect. Public opinion throughout the world will work against the culprit, and in favor of the oppressed, until perhaps some combination of states is found to intervene and check the aggression. At times it is not easy to discover which side is right, so that other states are cautious lest they make a mistake and lest their intervention be considered a cloak to hide political designs. Unfortunately, in the past the political element in intervention has often been predominant. Each state is eager to protect the policies which lie closest to the hearts of the people, as being the expression of views peculiarly their own; that is, the views which they think right and wish to have adopted. To maintain the law pertaining to all the states and accepted by them does not require the same effort.

When a state has recourse to force, it is not possible to know at once the real motive, and to judge how far the action is justified. It results from this situation that when a state takes the law into its own hands and attacks another, there is no effective way of determining on the instant whether the action is a proper vindication of its rights or a more or less disguised violation of international law. This inability to discern the rights of the question and the consequences which will result from the prevalence of either of the opposing views led to the development of the condition of neutrality. Where two

political views are opposed to each other, it is natural that superior force should have its effect. It is only in the realm of law that the equality of weak and strong is reasonable.¹

In the presence of a conflict between two opposing political views, interest and expediency alone determine whether a given state will throw its support to one side or the other. When in doubt, neutrality would be by far the safest course. Since the greater number of international disputes have related to political questions, neutrality has proved a useful institution, and has developed into a system recognized as part of the law of nations. This system of neutrality could never be meant to justify the nations in standing aside and in letting the strong crush the weak by violating clearly recognized principles of international law. If that were true, neutrality might serve in practice to authorize or make possible any violation of the law of nations. In the face of such a contradiction the whole system of the law of nations would fall to pieces.

The old conception of international law recognized this obligation of the nations, in the event of war, to take up arms against the unjust. In the case of political disputes, which were most frequently the cause of conflict, this principle could not be satisfactorily applied, and the idea of neutrality gradually ceased to be held in disrepute, until to-day it has become the rule for third states to adopt this status upon the outbreak of a war. By a natural confusion of ideas, the general practice of neutrality has been mistaken as a license for any state to have recourse to war at will. This would constitute a right to make war irre-

¹ The great jurist Westlake remarks *à propos* of the action of States in adopting new rules of international law: "Therefore, from time to time new rules have to be proposed on reasonable grounds, acted on provisionally, and ultimately adopted or rejected as may be determined by experience, including the effect, not less important in international than in national affairs, of interest coupled with preponderating power." (John Westlake, *International Law*, part 1, p. 15. Cambridge, 1910.)

spective of the cause. There could be no graver error, since the recognition of such a right would vitiate the highest law of humanity. It would make impossible the continued survival of small states, to the great detriment of mankind.

When we come to the question of settling conflicting views of rights, we find at once a difficulty in that the stronger state always finds some advantage in its strength to secure a better recognition of what it calls its right, sometimes to the total disregard of the superior right of a weaker state. The defect is not in the substantive law of nations, which is sufficiently well defined and discernible to indicate the right. It is due to the fact that when the interests, prejudices, and passions of a strong country cause it to take a view at variance with that held by another state, if this other be weaker, there is no direct means by which it can make good its rights. Its only champion is the opinion of other governments and the public opinion of the world, which may directly or indirectly compel some action in support of the weaker's right. At the present time, when the stronger comes into conflict with the weaker, if its view be not accepted, it often finds it possible to have recourse to war to enforce its views.

As we have seen, international law does not authorize the strong state thus to make use of its force to the disparagement of the right of the weaker. With no means of control for enforcing its rules, except the general public opinion which we have considered, international law has often to leave the conflict to run its course. This situation is to blame for that serious error of those who believe that international law allows the strong to have recourse to war to impose his will; in other words, that it constitutes a right to make war. The only rightful use of force is to establish right. Out of respect to this underlying principle there have slowly been developed certain methods of procedure. No state may rightly have recourse to force

until every peaceful means, reasonably possible of application, has been tried to settle the dispute.

5. *Anglo-Belgian conversations*

A pamphlet called "The Case of Belgium," containing facsimiles of documents found in the Belgian archives after the occupation of Brussels, has been widely circulated, with an introduction by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, and a translation of an article in the *North-German Gazette* commenting upon them. A similar translation has been given out to the press, and may be considered as the inspired or semi-official defense of the German Government.

For the sake of convenience I reproduce here the translation, given in the pamphlet referred to above, of document 2 containing the minutes of a conference between the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, General Jungbluth, and the British Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges:¹—

¹ The other document (1) and the extract of another (3) are given among the Documents (see *post*, chap. XIII). Document 2 is reproduced here because it seems to be the briefest and most important of the three and contains the evidence upon which the charge against Belgium and England is rested. In the following summary adjoined to the documents, the most disputed assertions are contained in the italicized portion and one other sentence which I have underlined:—

"SUMMARY OF THE SECRET DOCUMENTS

"I. The first document is a report of the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducarme, to the Minister of War, reporting a series of conversations which he had had with the Military Attaché of the British Legation, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, in Brussels. It discloses that, as early as January, 1906, the Belgian Government was in consultation with the British Government over steps to be taken by Belgium, Great Britain and France against Germany. A plan had been fully elaborated for the landing of two British army corps in French ports to be transferred to the point in Belgium necessary for operations against the Germans. Throughout the conversation the British and Belgian forces were spoken of as "allied armies"; the British Military Attaché insisted on discussing the question of the chief command; and he urged the establishment, in the mean time, of a Belgian spy system in Germany.

"II. When in the year 1912 Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston had been succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges as British Military Attaché in

“Confidential

“The British Military Attaché asked to see General Jungbluth. The two gentlemen met on April 23d.

“Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that England had at her disposal an army which could be sent to the Continent, composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry — together 160,000 troops. She has also everything which is necessary for her to defend her insular territory. Everything is ready.

“At the time of the recent events, the British Government would have immediately effected a disembarkment in Belgium (*chez nous*), even if we had not asked for assistance.

“The General objected that for that our consent was necessary.

Brussels, and the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducarme, had been succeeded by General Jungbluth as Chief of the Belgian General Staff, the conversations proceeded between the two latter officials. That is to say, these were not casual conversations between individuals, but a series of official conversations between representatives of their respective governments, in pursuance of a well-considered policy on the part of both governments.

“III. The above documents are given additional significance by a report made in 1911 by Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, from which it appears that this representative of the Belgian Government in Berlin was familiar with the plans above set forth and protested against them, asking why like preparations had not been made with Germany to repel invasion by the French and English.

“Taken together, these documents show that *the British Government had the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, of sending troops into Belgium immediately, that is, of doing the very thing which, done by Germany, was used by England as a pretext for declaring war on Germany.*

“They show also that the Belgian Government took, in agreement with the English General Staff, military precautions against a hypothetical German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Government never made the slightest attempt to take, in agreement with the German Government, military precautions against an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium, though fully informed that it was the purpose of the British Government to land and dispatch, across French territory into Belgium, 160,000 troops, without asking Belgium's permission, on the first outbreak of the European war. *This clearly demonstrates that the Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join Germany's enemies.”*

“The Military Attaché answered that he knew this, but that — since we were not able to prevent the Germans from passing through our country — England would have landed her troops in Belgium under all circumstances (*en tout état de cause*).

“As for the place of landing, the Military Attaché did not make a precise statement; he said that the coast was rather long, but the General knows that Mr. Bridges, during Easter, has paid daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostende.

“The General added that we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through.”¹

A confidential report dated December 23, 1911, and probably therefore anterior to document 2, was received at Brussels from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin. The Minister warns his Government of the danger which threatened Belgium from the French side, not only in the south of Luxemburg, but along the entire length of the Belgian frontier, remarking that this assertion was not based upon conjectures, but that the Belgian Government had positive evidence of it. Baron Greindl then proceeds to the reasons for his anxiety in the following terms: —

“Evidently the project of an outflanking movement from the north forms part of the scheme of the *Entente Cordiale*. If that were not the case, then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such an outburst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly con-

¹ Document 2 was published with the following explanatory note: “Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, British Military Attaché in Brussels, was succeeded in his office by Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. Likewise, General Ducarme was succeeded, as Chief of the Belgian Staff, by General Jungbluth. A conversation between Colonel Bridges and General Jungbluth was committed to writing, and that writing was also found at the Belgian Foreign Office. The document, which is dated April 23d and is presumed to belong to the year 1912, is marked ‘*confidentielle*’ in the handwriting of Graf. v. d. Straaten, the Belgian Foreign Secretary.”

cealed by them. Their aim was to be able to transport an English garrison, unhindered, to Antwerp, which means to establish in our country a basis of operation [*sic*] for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to make us throw our lot in with them, which would not be difficult, for, after the surrender of our national center of refuge, we would, through our own fault, renounce every possibility of opposing the demands of our doubtful protectors after having been so unwise as to permit their entrance into our country. Colonel Barnardiston's announcements at the time of the conclusion of the *Entente Cordiale*, which were just as perfidious as they were naïve, have shown us plainly the true meaning of things. When it became evident that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by the pretended danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not entirely abandoned, but modified in so far as the British army was not to land on the Belgian coast, but at the nearest French harbors.

“The revelations of Captain Faber, which were denied as little as the newspaper reports by which they were confirmed or completed in several respects, also testify to this. This British army, at Calais and Dunkirk, would by no means march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from the northwest. That would give it the advantage of being able to begin operations immediately, to encounter the Belgian army in a region where we could not depend on any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle. Moreover, that would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in all kinds of resources, and, at any rate, to prevent our mobilization or only to permit it after we had formally pledged ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the exclusive advantage of England and her allies.

“It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle for the Belgian army also for that possibility. This is necessary in the interest of our military defense, as well

as for the sake of the direction of our foreign policy, in case of war between Germany and France." ¹

This extract from this remarkable report of Baron Greindl is clear and easy to comprehend, and leaves the impression that England and France were in fact preparing to invade Belgium immediately on the outbreak of war for the purpose of attacking Germany. The Belgian Minister was undoubtedly of the opinion that the powers of the *Entente* intended to frustrate any attempt on the part of Belgium to live up to her obligations and defend her neutrality, by preventing her mobilization unless she agreed to violate her sacred obligations by joining in an attack on Germany.

The Baron's report contradicts by implication any idea of an agreement between Belgium and the *Entente* Powers. The Belgian Minister does not, in any event, seem to have the slightest suspicion of such an agreement, though the extract of his report refers to Colonel Barnardiston's plans in regard to the landing of English troops at French ports.

The Belgian Government made answer to the publication of this report through the columns of the *London Times*.²

¹ This document, in so far as made public, is given in the Documents. (See *post*, chap. XIII.)

² The *London Times* of Friday, October 23, 1914, in answer to the publication of these documents in the *North-German Gazette*, published a reply from the Belgian Government of which this is an extract:—

"We have only one regret to express on the subject of the disclosure of these documents, and that is that the publication of our military documents should be mangled and arranged in such a way as to give the reader the impression of duplicity on the part of England and adhesion by Belgium, in violation of her duties as a neutral State, to the policy of the Triple *Entente*. We ask the *North-German Gazette* to publish in full the result of its search among our secret documents. Therein will be found fresh and striking proof of the loyalty, correctness, and impartiality with which Belgium for eighty-four years has discharged her international obligations.

"It was stated that Colonel Barnardiston, the military representative at Brussels of a power guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, at the time of the Algeiras crisis questioned the Chief of the Belgian General Staff as to the measures which he had taken to prevent any violation of that neutrality. The Chief of the General Staff, at that time Lieutenant-General Ducarme,

When the Greindl report and the minutes of the two Anglo-Belgian military conversations were distributed in this country, with a prefatory explanation by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, the Belgian Minister to the United States gave out a statement in which he said: "The Belgian Minister does not know whether or not these published documents are authentic; but, far from discussing their authenticity, he declares that if he had them in his possession he would have published them long ago, as they constitute the strongest proof of the innocence of the Belgian Government."¹

replied that Belgium was ready to repel any invader. Did the conversation extend beyond these limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston, in an interview of a private and confidential nature, disclose to General Ducarme the plan of campaign which the British General Staff would have desired to follow if that neutrality were violated? We doubt it, but in any case we can solemnly assert, and it will be impossible to prove the contrary, that never has the King or his Government been invited, either directly or indirectly, to join the Triple *Entente* in the event of a Franco-German war. By their words and by their acts they have always shown such a firm attitude that any supposition that they could have departed from the strictest neutrality is eliminated *a priori*.

"As for Baron Greindl's dispatch of December 23, 1911, it dealt with a plan for the defense of Luxembourg, due to the personal initiative of the Chief of the First Section of the War Ministry. This plan was of an absolutely private character and had not been approved by the Minister of War. If this plan contemplated above all an attack by Germany, there is no cause for surprise, since the great German military writers, in particular T. Bernhardi, V. Schlivfeboch, and Von der Goltz, spoke openly in their treatises on the coming war of the violation of Belgian territory by the German armies.

"At the outbreak of hostilities the Imperial Government, through the mouth of the Chancellor and of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, did not search for vain pretexts for the aggression of which Belgium has been the victim. They justified it on the plea of military interests. Since then, in face of the universal reprobation which this odious action has excited, they have attempted to deceive public opinion by representing Belgium as bound already before the war to the Triple *Entente*. These intrigues will deceive nobody. They will recoil on the head of Germany. History will record that this power, after binding itself by treaty to defend the neutrality of Belgium, took the initiative in violating it, without even finding a pretext with which to justify itself."

¹ The full statement of the Minister, as it appeared in the *New York Times* of December 22, 1914, is given in chapter XIII, together with the Dernburg charges and explanations to which it refers. See also Emile Waxweiler, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*, Part IV. Lausanne, 1915.

The British Foreign Office gave out Sir Edward Grey's report of his conversation with the Belgian Minister contained in his dispatch of April 7, 1913, to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, which was as follows:¹—

FOREIGN OFFICE,
April 7, 1913.

SIR:

In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible dispatch of German troops through Belgium to France.

I said I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it.² What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops in to Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be re-

¹ Printed in part in the *New York Times* of December 7, 1914.

² Dr. Edmund von Mach puts a peculiar interpretation on this statement. (See *post*, p. 403, note 1. Cf. Bethmann-Hollweg's statement, *post*, p. 455, note.)

spected, and as long as it was not violated by any other power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.

I am, etc.,

E. GREY.

As nearly as I can sum up the assertions made by the defenders of Germany's action in regard to Belgium, they may be set down as follows: —

1. That England intended to violate Belgian neutrality by landing troops in Belgium for the purpose of attacking Germany.
2. That there was an Anglo-Belgian agreement in contravention of Belgian neutrality to make common cause against Germany.
3. That there was a similar agreement between France and Belgium.
4. That England also intended to violate the neutrality of Holland.
5. That the documents discovered at Brussels show that Belgium had violated her neutral obligations, so that Germany could not be expected to observe them, and hence was not at fault in invading Belgian territory.

Beginning with the first of these assertions: In document 1, it is clearly stated that "the entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our [Belgian] neutrality by Germany." This is admitted, but in document 2, supposed to be of the year 1912, the British Military Attaché at Brussels declares that "at the time of the recent events, the British Government would have immediately effected a disembarkment in Belgium, even if we [the Belgians] had not asked for assistance"; and when "the General [Jungbluth] objected that for that our consent was necessary, the military attaché answered that he knew this, but that — since we were not able to prevent the Germans from passing through our country —

England would have landed her troops in Belgium under all circumstances (*en tout état de cause*)."

An examination of the previously quoted extract from document 3 shows plainly that the Belgian Minister at Berlin could not conceal his fear that it might be the insidious design of France and England to make use of Belgian territory in the furtherance of their attack upon Germany, without regard to Belgium's wishes in the matter.¹

A mere superficial perusal of the documents might lead to the conclusion that England did contemplate an attack upon Germany without regard to whether Belgium called for her assistance or not. Such a conclusion seems reasonable after examining the documents, especially the contents of General Jungbluth's report in document 2; and this opinion is strengthened by the evident apprehension of Belgium as to England's intention. If the Belgian Government did not have real cause for anxiety, why, it will be asked, should it have been necessary for Sir Edward Grey to assure the Belgian Minister, in an interview which took place in 1913, that England would not be the first to send troops into Belgium?

To this, doubtless, England will reply that the Belgian Government really could have had no serious grounds for apprehension, but wished to be in a position to demonstrate to Germany how careful and how impartial it had been in providing against the violation of its territory. In the same way that the British Government had been asked

¹ Dr. Edmund von Mach, writing in the Boston *Evening Transcript* of January 6, 1915, declares: "It was exactly the same with the Treaty of 1839. She [England] had been unwilling to declare it either valid or invalid. For years military experts in Europe, both French and German, have talked of the necessity of striking a blow through Belgium, and England never raised her voice in protest nor pointed to an existing treaty. When Sir Edward Grey was charged by the Belgian Government in 1913 that England intended to be the first to invade Belgium, Sir Edward in his reply, published by himself, made no reference to an existing treaty, but contented himself with pointing out that such an action would be unwise." (Cf. Sir Edward Grey's statement above, p. 401.)

to give this formal expression of its intention to respect Belgian neutrality in 1913, the German Chancellor had been approached in 1911 with a request that he make a formal statement of the German attitude toward Belgian neutrality. He replied that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but that it might weaken Germany's military position if he were to make a public declaration to that effect. In other words, he wished to imply that the Belgians would have to rely as best they might on Germany's observance of their neutrality, without any public declaration on his part, because he wished the situation to remain uncertain, so that the French would have to expend part of their resources in fortifying the Franco-Belgian frontier against a possible German invasion.¹ The only other reasonable explanation of his reply that I can perceive is that Germany wished to keep open the possibility of making a successful attack through Belgium.

The British military authorities may have felt so sure that Germany would disregard Belgian neutrality as to be themselves impatient of any further thought of respecting it. This is not by any means to say that the British Foreign Office or British Cabinet would have been willing to violate Belgian neutrality before Germany had done so. If, however, for any reason, Belgium should have decided to cast her lot with Germany, and allowed Germany free transit through her territory, England would then, of course, have been perfectly justified in landing troops in Belgium and forcing Belgium to assist her in resisting the German aggression.

In case Belgium was defending her own neutrality against Germany, and had not made appeal to England or France, the question as to whether England and France would have a right, uninvited, to come to the assistance of Belgium is more open to question; since England and

¹ Cf. B. G. P. no. 12; see above p. 317, 321.

France were guarantors of the Treaty of April 19, 1839, it would seem that they might be expected to take whatever measures were necessary to ward off an attack upon Belgium's neutrality.¹

The next assertion relates to an Anglo-Belgian agreement to make common cause against Germany.² This assertion seems to be entirely without foundation. The alleged agreement between the British Military Attaché and General Jungbluth could not have been binding upon either Government without the concurrence of the responsible authorities.³ Furthermore, there does not seem actually to have been any agreement; otherwise why should it have been necessary for Sir Edward Grey to have assured the Belgian Government that England would not

¹ After such an ultimatum as that delivered by Germany, the other guarantors had a right to take all necessary measures to prevent the consummation of the announced or threatened violation of the neutrality of Belgium. They would have been justified even in invading Belgium, provided Belgium was unable to make an effective resistance.

² "For this reason, Belgium, in 1906, as has now become known, closed with France and England an eventual convention concerning military aid. Belgium did not close such a convention with Germany. This might be explained if Belgium — in spite of the memory of the French plans in 1870 — had been absolutely sure that this neighbor (on the south) at no time and under no circumstances would violate her neutrality. If this had been the reason, Sir Edward Grey would have told the German Ambassador, and would have been obliged to tell him, that France would not violate the neutrality of Belgium and that England was ready to guarantee that France would keep this obligation. Sir Edward did not give such a pledge to the German Ambassador." (Professor Hans Delbrück: "Germany's Answer." *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1915, p. 239.)

³ "When in 1912 (or 1911: the date seems to be uncertain), the British Military Attaché in Brussels told the Belgian general with whom he was conferring that, in case of necessity, the British Government would land troops in Belgium without waiting for any invitation from that country, he neither committed the Belgian Government to any such arrangement, since the Belgian general protested that Belgian consent was necessary, nor did he commit his own Government, because, fortunately, he had no power to do so. He gave, however, a typical illustration of the incapacity of the military man to appreciate the importance of keeping one's country in a correct attitude on the face of the record." [*The Case of Belgium*, p. 12.] (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, p. 80.) See also Sir Edward Grey's remark about the Anglo-French military conversations (above, p. 290).

violate Belgian neutrality? ¹ Baron Greindl's report of December 23, 1911, complaining of the danger of an attack from England and France, would seem to indicate that his Government had not entered into any agreement with the *Entente* Powers. At least it must have been kept so secret as not to have been known by the most important diplomatic officers of the Belgian Government. Although the report of General Jungbluth would seem to be subsequent to Baron Greindl's statement, it does not refer to any change of situation between Belgium and England from that disclosed by document 1, containing the report of a conversation between Colonel Barnardiston and General Ducarme. Even if we were to make the very most of the German arguments and accept the documents brought forward by Germany as genuine, exhaustive, complete, and uncontroverted by other documents which might have been suppressed or withheld, and if we accept for true — what I must consider as a forced interpretation — that they indicate a firm engagement according to the terms of which England and Belgium are to make common cause against Germany, there would still be every reason to believe that this agreement was conditional in nature, and would only come into effect after Germany had violated Belgium's neutrality.²

¹ Cf. Statement of Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian Minister April 7, 1913. (See *ante*, p. 401.)

² A statement in answer to a published interview with the German Chancellor given out with Sir Edward Grey's authorization, contains the following: —

“If the Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him: namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract. The railways were deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium such as was carried out in August last.

“This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between Belgium and the other powers on the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality, unless it was previously violated by another power. On no other footing did Belgium ever have any such communications.

The New York *World* recently published an interview the King of Belgium "gave its correspondent in which he declared that he had the German Military Attaché at Brussels informed that these conversations were taking place.¹ I sought a confirmation of this important statement from the Belgian Minister at Washington, who replied: —

"Concerning the matter referred to in your letter of March 25, I wish to let you know that I am just now in receipt of instructions from my Government to the effect that I am authorized, in reply to your letter, to make the statement herewith enclosed."

[The following is the authorized statement of the Belgian Government enclosed in Minister Havenith's letter.]

"In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of Belgium as having thereby 'abandoned and forfeited' her neutrality, and he implies that he would not have spoken of the German invasion as a 'wrong' had he then known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911.

"It would seem to follow that according to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's code wrong becomes right if the party which is to be the subject of the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations to resist it." (New York *Times*, January 27, 1915.)

¹ King Albert of Belgium, according to the interview in the New York *World*, printed on March 22, 1915, made the following statement regarding the Anglo-Belgian conversations: —

"No honest man could have acted otherwise than I did. Belgium never departed for an instant nor in the slightest degree from the strictest neutrality, and Belgium was always the loyal friend of each and every one of the powers that guaranteed her neutrality. At first, Germany openly admitted that in violating the neutrality of Belgium she was doing a wrong, but now, for the purposes of a campaign of propaganda in neutral countries, an attempt is being made to cast a slur upon Belgium and hold her up to scorn as having perfidiously departed from her neutrality in connection with the so-called Anglo-Belgian convention of which so much is being made.

"I can say this: No one in Belgium ever gave the name of Anglo-Belgian conversations to the letter of General Ducarme to the Minister of War detailing the entirely informal conversations with the British Military Attaché, but I was so desirous of avoiding even the semblance of anything that might be construed as un-neutral that I had the matters of which it is now sought to make so much communicated to the German Military Attaché in Brussels. When the Germans went through our archives, they knew exactly what they would find, and all their present surprise and indignation is assumed." (Extract.)

“With the King’s assent, and in several conversations, the German Minister in Brussels was placed on his guard against the attitude of military attachés who were holding conversations of which the Belgian Government had never been apprised by the only authorized representative of their country.

“A more official communication was impossible, as it would have infringed the rules of diplomacy and lent to these conversations an importance which the Belgian Government could not attribute and never did attribute to them.

“The fact that the military attaché of a power guaranteeing the integrity of Belgium should converse with other military men about military matters, in case of the violation of Belgian neutrality was in no way abnormal. All the representatives of the guaranteeing powers have at all times render[ed] justice to the absolute correctness of Belgium in its international relations. By placing Germany on its guard, Belgium was carrying her loyalty to the most scrupulous extreme.”

It has been asserted that a neutral state has no right to enter into an agreement for its defense. This is true in so far as it means that such a state has no right to join forces with any other state for the purpose of providing against the contingency of a violation of its neutrality. If, however, the preparations to defend its neutrality should be put off until its neutrality had been actually violated, it might then be too late to enter into an agreement with any of the guarantors for combined action against the violator. There is no good reason why, when Belgium or any other neutralized state, obligated to provide for the maintenance of its own neutrality, has reason to anticipate an attack, it should not enter into a conditional agreement by the terms of which it would, in case of an attack, receive immediate assistance, according to pre-

viously specified and elaborated plans.¹ This would be nothing more than common-sense provision for the maintenance of its neutrality. It would be a very different matter, should the neutralized state hand over to its prospective ally complete information in regard to its system of national defense.²

Objection has been made that Germany, knowing that such a plan for concerted action against her existed, could not be expected to come to the assistance of Belgium, had England invaded her territory uninvited. If Germany's action made such preparations for joining forces against her necessary, she would not be relieved from her obligations, though doubtless she would be less disposed to fulfill them. At most, this argument might justify Germany in not going to the assistance of Belgium against England, in case of the latter's invasion of Belgian territory, but would by no means justify her in attacking Belgium unless it was made certain beyond the shadow of a doubt that Belgium was planning to engage with some other power for a concerted and unprovoked attack upon Germany.

The various official documents published seem to indicate that, though Belgium realized that her principal danger of attack lay with Germany, she did not wish to become so dependent on England's protection in case of this attack as to lose her independent position. This attitude is reflected in the policy adopted by the Belgian Government. At the Second Hague Conference of 1907 it was very striking to remark how the Belgian delegates supported Germany in preventing the adoption of a general treaty of obligatory arbitration which England, France,

¹ Cyrus French Wicker, *Neutralization*, p. 59. Oxford, 1911. Wicker also cites Rivier and Arendt.

² Some other alleged proofs of Belgium's secret and unneutral agreement with England have been adduced; see *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 2, 1914, and December 15, 1914; printed in *Der Kriegsverlauf*, November, 1914, pp. 323-31; December, 1914, pp. 427-28; E. Waxweiler, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*, p. 186; "British Aviator's Secret Data," *New York Times*, February 28, 1915.

and the United States favored.¹ In Morocco, too, Belgium did not evince any desire to favor France at the expense of Germany, for she delayed signing the agreement relinquishing the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by her consuls. In fact she was, I believe, among the last of the powers to relinquish this privilege.

It is asserted that England intended to violate the neutrality of Holland, because she proposed to use Antwerp as her base after sweeping the German ships from the North Sea.² England would be amply justified in such a

¹ "The time when the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* supposes an Anglo-Belgian agreement to have been effected is ill-chosen. It is a well-known fact that, toward 1906, the traditional relations of sympathy between England and Belgium were becoming cool. Occurrences during the Boer War, the stupid outrage committed by a youth at Brussels against the Prince of Wales, who a little later was to become Edward VII, and the Morel campaign against the régime in the Congo, had all conspired to bring about ill-feeling between the two countries.

"It is also a well-known fact that, since the beginning of the twentieth century, all the activities of Belgian diplomacy have centered about the Congo Free State. If Germany will but think, she will remember that assuredly it was not German interests which, in the course of those critical years, were sacrificed to English interests in the Belgian Congo, and that it was not in England that companies organized by King Leopold II sought the protection of the laws.

"But why continue?

"Need I say that on the 28th of July last, when the international situation was coming to a head, the instructions given the Belgian Administration in the Congo were aimed to guard against a possible blockade of the river by France and England, as well as against a violation of the frontiers of the colony by Germany? It was not until after the break with Germany that orders were given to concentrate all forces on one side.

"Need I say further, — merely to add to the sheaf of testimony, — that, at the outbreak of war, the Belgian royal family had not yet paid its visit to the royal family of England, although it had already been to Berlin and Vienna?

"Finally, there are the facts making all discussion useless: In August, 1914, Germany violated Belgian neutrality for the sake of strategic advantage, and the march of her armies conformed exactly to plans which were known. In August, 1914, England awaited an overt act before announcing her intervention, and her troops did not enter Belgium until eighteen days later." (Emile Waxweiler, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*, pp. 190-191. Lausanne, 1915.)

² Baron Greindl considers the outbreak in London and Paris against the fortification of Flushing as an indication of these sinister designs. It would

course, provided always that she took no action until Germany had been guilty of a violation of Belgian neutrality. As soon as this violation had occurred, Holland, as one of the signatory states of the Treaty of 1839, would be expected to put no obstacle in the way of the other powers in repelling German aggression and making good their guaranty.¹ If, however, for reasons of policy, Holland decided to remain neutral, she could have no serious ground for complaint against England for using the Scheldt to maintain her connection with Antwerp. In the present war England has been careful to respect the neutrality of the Scheldt, which in reality constitutes part of the neutralized system of Belgium. She knows that if she were to disregard it she would arouse Holland against her, or if Holland were to acquiesce, Germany would probably show her resentment by invading Holland.

The peculiar position which has placed Belgium's principal outlet from Antwerp in the military control of the Dutch is due to historical reasons connected with the whole evolution of Belgian neutrality. It may be maintained with reason that the disregard of the neutrality of Belgium would be a justification for a like disregard of this peculiar provision which restricts the exercise of Belgium's military action.

6. *Effect of Belgium's preparations against Germany*

Aside from the question of conventional agreements on the part of Belgium, France, and England, the German partisans have expressed the view that Belgian military preparations for the defense of her neutrality, instead of

more probably simply indicate apprehension on the part of England at the strengthening of Germany's position on the Continent, since those ports would be most advantageous to Germany if she should overcome the resistance of Holland and Belgium. Germany might conceivably have been able, as the result of possible political transformations, to prevail upon Holland and Belgium to join her in a conflict against the powers of the *Entente*.

¹ It must be remembered that Holland did not sign the article of guaranty.

being impartially directed against the possibility of attack from any of the powers, were made entirely against Germany. This, it is alleged, makes it justifiable to consider the Belgian preparations in the nature of a political coöperation with France and England against Germany, and removes from them entirely the character of an attempt on Belgium's part to live up to her obligations by defending her neutrality.¹

Given the obligation of Belgium herself to provide in the first instance for the maintenance of her own neutrality, it must be admitted that she should have taken care to dispose her means of defense on all sides impartially, so as to protect herself against the possibility of attack from every direction. By so doing she would have indicated the perfect impartiality of her policy, and have prevented any inference that a possibility of attack and consequent violation of the solemn treaty obligation on the part of one nation was more probable than from another. She would thus have silenced the assertion that her neutrality was being weakened because of political affiliation with certain of the guarantor powers in opposition to others.

It is not, however, fair to say that Belgium was fortified toward Germany only, since, as the Belgian Minister has pointed out, the fortress of Namur is directed against France and commands the entrance by Chimay, considered a particularly vulnerable spot in the French frontier.²

¹ It is sometimes alleged by German writers that Belgium forfeited her position as a perpetually neutral state by her construction of fortifications; and in support of this view reference is made to Article III of the Treaty of London of May 11, 1867, establishing the neutrality of Luxemburg, according to the terms of which article the fortresses of Luxemburg were declared to be 'without object because of Luxemburg's neutralization, and that hence they will be destroyed.' In point of fact, this provision received unanimous acceptance by the plenipotentiaries at the London Conference only because of the annexed protocol, containing a declaration of the Belgian plenipotentiary, that this article could not be considered in any way to limit the right of another neutral [neutralized state] to construct fortifications and make other provision for its defense. (See Annex to protocol IV, British White Paper. Luxemburg, 1867.)

² See statement of the Belgian Minister, *post*, chap. XIII.

It will be remembered that Talleyrand attempted at the Conference of London to acquire a strip of Belgian territory to strengthen France's frontier at this point.¹ Just as Liège has been compared to the neck of a bottle from which the railway lines sweep out, Namur is the neck of another such bottle, so that it would be of the utmost importance for France to capture Namur as soon as possible, even if it were merely to prevent an invasion of her territory.

England would, of course, find it difficult to effect a landing in the face of opposition, and Belgium may be excused for not devoting any great part of her resources to defending her coast. She took great pains to make Antwerp as impregnable as possible, and this would have been a protection against aggression on the part of England, Germany, or Holland. In addition, she might reasonably count somewhat upon the Dutch fortifications of the Scheldt to repel any attempt on the part of the English to force a passage through the Scheldt to violate at one and the same time Dutch neutrality and Belgian neutraliza-

¹ ". . . The vulnerable part of the French northern frontier is between the Sambre and the Meuse. Three main lines of railway cross it from north to south — one down the valley of the Sambre, one through the famous *trouée* of Chimay, and one down the Meuse Valley. It was by the *trouée* of Chimay that a combined Russian-Prussian force under Winzingerode advanced on Paris in 1814, and gave a timely hand to Blücher after his thrashing by Napoleon. Formerly closed by the fortress towns of Philippeville and Marienbourg, the *trouée* of Chimay is now an open gap. The frontier drawn in 1815 makes a great loop south on purpose to give Philippeville and Marienbourg to Belgium, just as the northern loop of the Swiss frontier gives Schaffhausen to Switzerland. Chimay is, in fact, the Schaffhausen of Belgium.

"The French, however, unlike the Germans at Schaffhausen, are fully alive to the weakness of this part of their northern frontier, and have recently constructed a powerful fort with outworks at Hirson, in order to command the Chimay-Laon railway. Thirty-five miles farther on, the invaders marching on Paris would encounter, in the second line of the French defenses, the new entrenched camps of La Fère and Laon; and as all the roads and railways from this part of the Belgian frontier converge on these camps, their reduction would be indispensable before an advance on Paris could be made." ("Belgian Neutrality" [extract], in *Fortnightly Review*, CCLXXIII, New Series, September 1, 1889, p. 302; vol. XLVI, July 1 to December 1, 1889.)

tion. Nevertheless it is patent that Belgium has directed her attention principally to fortifying her territory against Germany. In this practical world we can hardly blame Belgium if she spent what money she could afford in strengthening the points at which she was most immediately threatened. Even if we were to consider the English as ready to violate any and every principle of international law, unrestrained by any considerations for the rights of others, we certainly must believe that out of consideration for their own interests they would not be the first to violate the neutrality which they made such efforts to incorporate into the public law of Europe and to place upon a juridical foundation. It seems hardly reasonable to expect that they would have contemplated operations through Belgium unless they were convinced that Germany would in all probability violate Belgian neutrality. In any event, the onesidedness of Belgian defense could at most have constituted but a ground of complaint on the part of Germany.

A study of the events at the commencement of the present war leads me to conclude that from the point of view of the theoretical working of the institution of neutrality, Belgium's action was unjustifiable, and yet, as a practical matter, the need of devoting all her resources to preparation against a German invasion has been clearly demonstrated. Germany, it seems to me, after giving grounds for legitimate apprehension that she might violate Belgian neutrality, has declared that the inevitable Belgian counter-preparations, to which Germany's action gave rise, constituted a perfect justification for the German Government's disregarding Belgian neutrality. In other words, they take as an excuse for the carrying into effect of the unjustifiable German acts which they had previously planned, the perfectly practical and legitimate attempts on the part of the Belgians to defend themselves against this anticipated German violation. It was evident

that Germany was planning such a violation — at least, her expectation of undertaking military operations in Belgium was made perfectly evident. Germany may reply that these preparations were to anticipate a French violation of Belgian territory. The impartial critic will have to form his opinion in part from antecedent probability, and in part from the consideration of the evidence such as that which has been given in the preceding pages.¹

7. *Alleged violations of Belgian neutrality*

Germany has declared that her invasion of Belgium was undertaken only in response to violations of Belgian neutrality on the part of France. The German Government has asserted that the evidences of French preparations to march through Belgium constituted such proof of their intention as to justify an invasion of Belgium on Germany's part.²

¹ "The German Government asserts that Belgium had ceased to be neutral and was virtually in alliance with France and Great Britain. [*The Case of Belgium, in the Light of Official Reports found in the Archives of the Belgian Government*, with an introduction by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg. n. d.] If this assertion could be proved, the strongest prejudice which Germany's conduct of the war has aroused in neutral countries would tend to disappear. In America, at least, few people care whether the Treaties of 1839 were or were not in force and binding upon Prussia. Even if Belgium was no longer a neutralized country, it was apparently a neutral country, and it has been ravaged with fire and steel because so the German armies could reach France most quickly. What, however, has Germany been able to prove? Only that British military attachés had concerted with Belgian military authorities plans of joint action against a German invasion. If, as is insisted, no consultations were held with German military attachés to provide for the defense of Belgian neutrality against a French or British invasion, what does that prove? Only that the Belgians knew well or guessed rightly on which side their neutrality was menaced." (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx [1915], p. 59.)

² "If we had waited longer before taking the offensive, we should not have needed to violate the neutrality of Belgium, nor should we have been able to do it, for by that time the French and English would have been on the way through Belgium; they would have invaded the Rhine country, occupied Aix-la-Chapelle and Trèves, and then, with the strong Belgian strongholds of Liège and Namur as bases, would have been able to push their offensive operations further into the Rhine provinces." (Professor Hans Delbrück, "Germany's Answer," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1915, p. 239.)

In his speech delivered in the Reichstag on August 4, the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, made the statement: "France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary.¹ But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride rough-shod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium." (Cf. B. G. P. no. 35.)

We find here no reference to any overt act by France violating Belgian neutrality. The sole argument upon which the Chancellor relies to justify Germany's action is her necessity arising from this certitude of France's intention. The head of the German Government was perfectly aware that French intentions could not justify German acts.² Germany's justification must then depend upon the validity of the plea of necessity, which we shall discuss farther on.³

¹ The French Minister at Brussels made the following declaration to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on July 31: "I am authorized to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another power, the French Government, to secure their own defense, might find it necessary to modify their attitude." (Extract, B. G. P. no. 15; cf. B. G. P. no. 9.)

² Proof sufficient to convince a government that another intended to have recourse to treachery would justify another government in taking any measures necessary to protect itself against the commission of such acts, but could never justify it in disregarding the rights of a third innocent state. It cannot be presumed that a highly civilized state, with a reputation for observing its international obligations in good faith, will be guilty of treachery. In the face of the solemn declaration of the French Government that it would respect Belgium's neutrality, Germany must be expected to show the clearest proof of the alleged perfidy of France.

³ In his remarks introductory to the secret documents (see *post*, chap. XIII) Dr. Dernburg states: "The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof that if Germany did not march through Belgium her enemies would. This proof, as now being produced, is of the

In any event, France would hardly antagonize England by invading Belgium unless England gave her consent. This consent might be given, but it is not likely that England, if neutral, would be willing to run the risk that one or both of the belligerents might remain in permanent occupation of the Belgian ports.

If France and England were united against Germany, there is a possibility that Germany might have been attacked by the immediate transit of an Anglo-French force through Belgium. If, however, France had contemplated such a possibility, she would have taken care to be in a better state of preparation to send her troops into Belgium than was disclosed at the beginning of this war.

Another important consideration is the difference of view in regard to neutrality and the force of treaties in Germany and France. German authorities have gone the farthest in permitting the freest action to military force when necessary to attain the ends in view.¹

In the present war there were other and stronger reasons why France was unlikely to be the first to invade Belgium.

1. She had just recently given her solemn word that she would not be the first to violate Belgian neutrality, while Germany refused to make a similar agreement.

2. When Germany begged England not to make the respect for Belgian neutrality a condition of her neutrality, it showed that Germany contemplated a violation of it.

3. Germany admitted that France could wait without attacking. In other words, to make her position clear and secure as much neutral sympathy as possible, it was the policy of France to force Germany to attack. France, by remaining within the Franco-Belgian frontier, could force

strongest character. So the Chancellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he had to regret that it violated international law."

¹ See Oppenheim, *International Law*, vol. II, *War and Neutrality*, pp. 83-85, §69, 2d ed.

Germany to violate Belgian neutrality or else to undertake the relatively slow operations necessary to reduce the French fortifications along the Franco-German frontier. This would have lost Germany so much time that she would not have had any great chance of crushing France and turning against Russia before Russia had completed her mobilization. If Germany was not willing to lose this advantage, because a treaty of neutralization stood in the way, she had to accept the onerous responsibility of violating Belgian neutrality. If France believed Germany would take this course, it was to her advantage to allow the Belgians to bear the brunt of the first German onslaught, while she made her preparations and hastened to the assistance of the defenders. The success of the German attack was such that Liège and Namur were taken before the French and English were able to organize any effective resistance to the German advance. This fact itself is one of the best arguments that the French were not, at the time of the Chancellor's speech, in a situation to take advantage of an invasion of Belgium in violation of their treaty obligations with the purpose of attacking the Rhenish provinces.

On August 3, at 6.45 P.M., Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris, in a farewell audience handed a letter to M. Viviani, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, asking for his passports on the ground that French acts of aggression forced the German Empire to consider itself in a state of war with France. The letter contained the following reference to a French violation of Belgian neutrality: "The German administrative and military authorities have remarked a certain number of definitely hostile acts committed on German territory by French military airmen. Several of these latter have manifestly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country." (Extract, F. Y. B. no. 147.)

After receiving this communication, M. Viviani sent a dispatch that same day (August 3) instructing M. Jules

Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to ask for his passports and to protest against Germany's action in violating the neutrality of Luxemburg, in delivering her ultimatum to Belgium, and in making a 'false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by which it had been attempted to justify the existence of a state of war between Germany and France.' (Modified quotation, August 3, F. Y. B. no. 149.)

Germany here makes the accusation that France was responsible for prior violations of Belgian neutrality. This, if substantiated, would be a reasonable justification for Germany's invasion of Belgium. Unfortunately for Germany's defense on this ground, absolutely no evidence worthy of the name has been forthcoming.

The German Chancellor, in his speech of August 4 in the Reichstag, refers to French violations of international law by the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, but makes no mention of any acts contrary to Belgian neutrality. If there had been any serious violation of Belgian neutrality, and the Belgian Government had been delinquent in its prevention, Germany would have been amply justified in disregarding the Treaty of 1839, as well as Belgium's rights as a neutral state. Under such circumstances the Chancellor need not have confessed: "This [Germany's invasion of Belgium] is contrary to international law."

In its ultimatum delivered at Brussels, August 2, the German Government made no reference to the previous violation of Belgian neutrality by France, and declared:—

"Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

"The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost good-will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion

with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guaranty against danger to Germany. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory." (Extract, August 2, B. G. P. no. 20.)

This ultimatum was presented at the Belgian Foreign Office on the afternoon of August 2. A few hours later — that is, in the early morning hours of August 3, before a reply to the ultimatum had been received — the German Minister returned to inform the Belgian Government that 'he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, since war had not been declared. The Belgian Secretary-General asked the German Minister where these incidents had occurred, and was told that it was in Germany. The Secretary-General then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. The German Minister stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that France would commit other acts contrary to international law.' (Modified quotation, August 2, B. G. P. no. 21.)

On August 9, at Montjoie, Von Bülow, General Commander in Chief of the German Second Army, issued a proclamation which said in part: "To the Belgian Nation — We have been obliged to enter into Belgian territory in order to safeguard the interests of our national defense. We are fighting the Belgian army solely in order to force a passage into France, which your Government wrongly refused us, although it tolerated a French military reconnaissance, a fact of which your newspapers have kept you in ignorance." ¹

¹ *Boston Evening Transcript*, December 26, 1915.

Dr. Dernburg asks:¹ “. . . What would American readers say if they knew that as early as July 30 French guns were in Liège where they have been captured alongside of French officers and soldiers? Such is stated in a letter written to Mr. Lehman, house superintendent of the Beecher Memorial Building, from his brother in Germany, who has been on the ground. What would they think if it was proved, as it is recited in the semi-official Government journal, that two wounded Frenchmen had been found in Namur, who said that their regiment, the Forty-fifth, was brought to Namur as early as July 30? In the *Evening Post* of to-day a lady from Boston relates on good authority the landing of British marines in Ostend on the 30th of July.”

Professor Harnack and other well-known Germans have stated that Great Britain stored great quantities of ammunition at the French fortress of Maubeuge before the outbreak of the war. This they consider as evidence that England intended to violate the neutrality of Belgium. The official Press Bureau at London denies that there is any authority for these statements.² Even if the Harnack statement had been true, it might well be considered evidence of justifiable preparations in the event of Germany's disregard of Belgian neutrality.

In the preceding chapter we discussed the charge made by the German Government that Belgium had departed from a neutral attitude by holding up shipments of grain for Germany.³

We must leave this discussion for the present, I think,

¹ The New York *Sun* of October 11, 1914.

² The New York *Times* of October 7, 1914, gives an extract from this statement: “No decision to send British forces abroad was taken till after Germany had violated Belgian neutrality and Belgium had appealed for assistance. No British ammunition or stores had been placed at Maubeuge before these events. Any British ammunition or stores found at Maubeuge was sent there after, and not before, the outbreak of the war and the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.”

³ See *ante*, chap. VIII, § 11.

until Germany has brought forward some evidence substantiating some of these various alleged violations of Belgian neutrality previous to Germany's attack. We must bear in mind, however, that from the moment Germany invaded Luxemburg and disregarded her solemn treaty obligations to respect the latter's neutrality, France would have been perfectly justified, as far as her obligation toward Germany went, in disregarding Belgian neutrality. Nevertheless, as between France and Belgium and as between France and the other guaranteeing powers, a retaliatory violation of Belgian neutrality would not have been justified; nor is there any indication that France proposed to violate Belgian territory in return for Germany's violation of Luxemburg's neutralization on August 2. In any event, the German Government has as yet produced no evidence of this.

8. *The violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg*

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Luxemburg had been given to the King of the Netherlands,¹ and it continued to form a part of the German Confederation until the dissolution of the Confederation in 1866. At that date it was apparent that, upon the death of the King of Holland, the effect of the Luxemburg law governing the succession to the Grand Duchy would bring to an end the personal union of Holland and Luxemburg under one ruler. The London Conference which met in 1867 was successful in reaching an agreement in regard to the settlement of the Luxemburg question. By the terms of the Treaty of Lon-

¹ ". . . This [Luxemburg] had been granted in 1815 to the King of the Netherlands in compensation for his hereditary territories of Orange-Nassau ceded to Prussia. It formed part of the German Confederation, and, as its duke, King William had a vote in the Diet of Frankfort. The city of Luxemburg itself was, moreover, a strong fortress, and commanded the approaches to Lower Germany. The Belgians, however, while consenting to reserve the rights of the German Confederation, claimed Luxemburg as an integral part of their country, and deputies from it took their seats in the Congress at Brussels." (Phillips, *Modern Europe*, p. 192. London, 1902.)

don of May 11, 1867, Luxemburg was constituted into an independent neutral state placed under the "collective guaranty" of the powers.¹

Since Luxemburg was too weak to provide for her own defense, and since neither France nor Prussia would allow the other to garrison her fortresses, it only remained to demolish them. Had they been left standing, in times of tension either France or Prussia, mistrusting the other's intentions, might have been tempted to seize them.²

The question of the guaranty of the perpetual neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is one of the most interesting that has arisen in international law. According to the terms of the Treaty of May 11, 1867, Luxemburg, as I have said, was placed under the "collective guaranty" of the powers. This treaty was signed by the five great powers signatory to the treaties guaranteeing the neutralization of Belgium, with the addition of Italy, who thereupon took her place as the sixth great power in the European Concert. Belgium also signed this treaty, with an express reservation in regard to the neutralization guaranty, the subscription to which was very properly considered as incompatible with her own situation as a neutralized state.

The interest which the British public took in the work of the London Conference was evidenced by the questions which the members of Parliament addressed to the Government, as to the nature of the obligations incurred by Great Britain's agreeing to the collective guaranty of the neutralization of Luxemburg. In Chapter XIII we have given full extracts of the most important portions of this most interesting debate, from which it appears that the responsible ministers of the British Government took the ground that Great Britain was not obligated to make good her guaranty unless all the other signatories should also

¹ See for terms of the treaty, Documents, *post*, chap. XIII.

² See Article III of the Treaty of May 11, 1867, *post*, chap. XIII.

join in collective action for this purpose. As it would be hard to conceive of a violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg on the part of any power other than the signatories of the treaty of guaranty, this interpretation of the British Government of the obligation would make the treaty the most veritable scrap of paper and the greatest trumpery of diplomacy.

This peculiar quirk in British policy, this twisting of the clear intention of the treaty stipulation as generally interpreted by impartial observers,¹ is only comprehensible in the light of the diplomatic situation which led to the conclusion of the Treaty of May 11, 1867. Napoleon III, making Prussia's increase in territory after the defeat of Austria an excuse, sought compensation in order to maintain the relative position of France. The dissolution of the Germanic Confederation caused uncertainty in regard to the situation of Luxemburg, which was further increased by the fact that in the death of the King of Holland the personal union with that country would disappear, because the Luxemburg law of inheritance did not recognize the succession of females except in default of male heirs. Napoleon III found the King of Holland ready to acquiesce

¹ See Milovanovitch, *Les Traités de Garantie au XIX^e Siècle*, pp. 287-88. (Translation.) "We have seen how, taking their stand on this difference in terms, consisting only in the qualification 'collective' given to the guaranty applying to Luxemburg, the English Ministers, Lord Stanley and Lord Derby, built up a theory on the distinction between a collective guaranty and a number of individual guaranties. We shall not repeat here our reasons for finding this distinction without foundation. We will only point out that the terms establishing the guaranty of the neutrality of Luxemburg were retained exactly as the Prussian plenipotentiary had proposed them. Now, this plenipotentiary formally declared, while making his amendment, that he desired to have the neutrality of Luxemburg placed under the same guaranty as that given to Belgian neutrality. It would be strange, therefore, to give to the terms in which he formulated his proposal a real difference as regards the efficacy of the two kinds of guaranties. Assuredly, neither the Prussian plenipotentiary in making his proposal, nor any of the plenipotentiaries who adopted it, suspected that it was possible to attribute to the term 'Collective Guaranty' the meaning given to it in the English Parliament."

in his project to secure Luxemburg, but unwilling to keep the negotiations secret from Prussia. Bismarck, however, showed a complaisant disposition and seemed willing to allow France to secure Luxemburg in return for her neutrality during Prussia's war with Austria. At an opportune moment Bismarck proceeded to make public the negotiations in regard to the cession of Luxemburg and to take advantage of the popular outburst of indignation against France to form defensive alliances with the several German states against the eventuality of a French attack. Supported by a strong public sentiment, Bismarck refused to withdraw the Prussian garrison from Luxemburg,¹ and a Franco-Prussian war seemed on the point of breaking out. The other powers did what they could to prevent the conflict, and at Russia's suggestion a conference was called at London to settle the Luxemburg question on the basis of the neutralization of the territory and the destruction of its fortresses.

Prussia made her participation in this conference conditional upon the adoption of a provision establishing the perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg under a collective guaranty of the powers. The British Government were not at all disposed to shoulder the responsibility of this guaranty. The fate of Luxemburg did not present a vital question like that of Belgium, and it was reasonable for England to strive to keep her treaty obligations and her vital interests coextensive. For the purpose of avoiding the war which threatened, Great Britain accepted Bismarck's terms. As soon as the conference began its work, however, Lord Stanley introduced a draft of a treaty which omitted the provision of the collective guaranty. The British Government perhaps hoped that in the interval the acute feeling in regard to Luxemburg might have sufficiently cooled to make it possible to find some adjustment without accept-

¹ Prussia had been authorized by the Treaty of February 17, 1856, to garrison the forts of Luxemburg.

ing the objectionable clause. The Prussian delegate was not to be put off in this manner, and his objections were sustained by the other delegates to the conference. Great Britain thus had to accept in express terms the provision for a collective guaranty to prevent France and Prussia from deciding their dispute by an appeal to arms. Constrained to take this attitude, the British Government lost no time in attempting to minimize the extent of their obligations. This explains the peculiar language used in the Parliamentary debates on Luxemburg neutrality. Well might Lord Russell say, ". . . We know that the explanations given by the noble Lord, reported as they have been in the newspapers and otherwise, have created a very unpleasant feeling in Prussia, and that it is commonly said there that it is no use to sign a treaty with England, because England will find a means of escaping from the obligations imposed on her by it." ¹ Whatever the official utterances of the British Government, the truth of the situation was, as Lord Derby said, "Whatever the interpretation which I may put on particular words of the treaty, or whatever the interpretation which Her Majesty's Government may put on it, such interpretation cannot affect the International Law by which the terms of all treaties are construed." ² It cannot be denied that the Prussian Government might very naturally have accepted the official utterances of the British Ministers as indicating the probable interpretation which England would put upon its obligations when called upon to make them good. The official British utterances might have served as an excuse to Prussia for violating the treaty, since she could claim that the *quid pro quo* for which she agreed to refer the whole question to the London Conference had been rendered illusory by the interpretation

¹ Extract from *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, vol. CLXXXVIII, House of Lords, July 4, on the neutrality of Luxemburg. (See *post*, chap. XIII.)

² *Ibid.* (See *post*, chap. XIII.)

that the British Government had put upon it, in clear contradiction to the express terms of the treaty.¹

The British Government does not seem to have receded from this view that it was not bound to make good its guaranty to Luxemburg unless all the powers joining in

¹ The London *Times*, in its editorial of December 3, 1914, seems to overlook this when it says:—

“LUXEMBURG — ANOTHER BROKEN TREATY

“The new attempt of the Germans to explain away their acts of aggression to neutral peoples comes as a reminder that the whole case against them has still to be stated. In particular, the brutal treatment of Belgium, the greatest international crime of modern times, has somewhat distracted attention from the perfidy of Germany toward Luxemburg. Yet there are circumstances connected with the violation of the neutrality of the latter which are scarcely to be surpassed in cynical bad faith. Let us recall the facts. The Duchy of Luxemburg was, by the Treaty of 1839, joined by a personal tie to the Sovereign of Holland. In 1866 and 1867 the political position of Luxemburg was the subject of diplomatic correspondence which threatened to precipitate war between France and Prussia, a war which Bismarck at that time desired to postpone. The former wished to purchase the rights of the King of Holland, and he at one time consented to part with them. But, Prussia strongly objecting to the transaction, he withdrew his consent. France pressed Prussia to withdraw her garrison from Luxemburg, which Bismarck met with a refusal. At the instance of Lord Stanley, then Foreign Secretary, a conference was held in London in 1867, and was attended by representatives of all the great powers. Count von Bernstorff, the representative of Prussia, announced at the outset that the invitation had been accepted by her only upon the assumption that a European guaranty of the neutrality of Luxemburg would be given. Lord Stanley at first demurred: the guaranty given by the Treaty of 1839 was, in his view, sufficient, and he was reluctant, as he explained to the House of Commons, to extend the liability of this country. But Count von Bernstorff did not agree with him, and insisted upon the insertion of the words to be found in Article II of the treaty — viz., that Luxemburg was to form henceforth a state perpetually neutral ‘under the sanction of the collective guaranty of the signatories to the present treaty.’ It matters not whether these words substantially differed from those in the Treaty of 1839; Bismarck thought that they did, and insisted upon their insertion as giving an ampler guaranty. What is to be said of diplomacy which deliberately breaks a promise expressed in words of its own choosing in preference to other words conceived to be less binding? The contention of Prussia in 1867 was, ‘We are so anxious about the maintenance of the neutrality of the Duchy that we must have it secured by the strongest possible obligation.’ Could her most diligent historians discover an example of bad faith comparable with her violation in 1914 of the promise which in 1867 she gave, and which she insisted upon the other powers also giving?”

the collective guaranty should take part in the collective action to this effect. This would have limited her obligation to one of mere respect for the treaty, not much of a burden, since it was hardly likely that she would ever contemplate the acquisition of Luxemburg territory or its violation. On the other hand, she has interpreted the Belgian guaranty as requiring her to make every reasonable sacrifice in enforcing upon other powers its respect.

Sir Edward Grey, in a conversation with the French Ambassador just prior to the outbreak of the present war, referred to the distinction between the guaranty of Luxemburg and that of Belgium as explained in the speeches of Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in the Parliamentary debates in 1867, thus reaffirming the untenable view of Great Britain's obligation.¹ (Cf. B. W. P. no. 148.) The truth of the situation would seem to be that a collective guaranty was intended to be much stronger than an ordinary guaranty, in that all the powers would be obligated to take action against the violator, whereas in the case of an ordinary guaranty like that of Belgium, the less interested powers might expect to place upon the shoulders of those more directly interested the particular charge of maintaining the inviolability of the neutrality. The English interpretation is the exact reverse of this. If my interpretation be correct, Germany's invasion of Luxemburg was as great a violation of formal international law as was her action in the case of Belgium. The maxim, *de minimis non curat lex* (the law does not take account of trifles), is equally applicable in international law, so that it is reasonable that a question of the violation of Luxemburg should not be considered of the same concern as would be the more serious interference with the neutralization of Belgium. Nevertheless, the views of the British Government in interpreting its obligations under the Treaty of May 11, 1867, form a curious commentary on the provisions of the protocol,

¹ See above, p. 338.

which, as the result of the efforts of the British Government, was signed at London by the representatives of the powers on January 17, 1871. It reads: "The plenipotentiaries of North Germany, of Austria-Hungary, of Great Britain, of Italy, of Russia, and of Turkey, assembled to-day in conference, recognize that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers by means of an amicable arrangement."¹

When the situation became tense, after the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, M. Eyschen, Minister of State of Luxemburg, asked the French Minister on July 31, 'for an official declaration to the effect that France, in case of war, would respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When the French Minister asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German Government, M. Eyschen answered that he was going to the German Minister to ask for it. Upon his return, M. Eyschen informed the French Minister that the German Minister had replied, "That is a matter of course, but the French Government must make the same promise."' (Modified quotation, July 31, F. Y. B. no. 111.)

The next day M. Eyschen asked both Governments to give Luxemburg an assurance of neutrality. (Cf. F. Y. B. no. 128.) To this, M. Viviani, responsible head of the French Government, replied: —

"Be good enough to state to the President of the Council that in conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867, the Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude.

"The violation of this attitude by Germany would, however, compel France from that time to be guided in her ac-

¹ Translation as laid before Parliament. Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. III, p. 1904. London, 1875.

tion by the necessity of caring for her defense and her interests." (August 1, F. Y. B. no. 129.)

The next day, August 2, M. Eyschen telegraphed the French Government of the German invasion of Luxemburg as follows: "I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency's notice the following facts: On Sunday, the 2d August, very early, German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory especially toward the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armored trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is immediately expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin." (August 2, F. Y. B. no. 131.)

Likewise, on August 2, Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris, delivered the following note from his Government: "The German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not constitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely preventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, are under German administration." (August 2, F. Y. B. no. 133.)

That same day, August 2, the French Ambassador at London informed his Government that 'Sir Edward Grey, in speaking of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg,

had reminded him that the Convention of 1867, relative to the Grand Duchy [Luxemburg], differed from the treaty concerning Belgium, in that England was bound to require the observance of this latter convention without necessarily having the concurrence [*concours*] of the other guaranteeing powers, whereas in the case of Luxemburg all the guaranteeing powers were to act in concert.' (Modified quotation, August 2, F. Y. B. no. 137; cf. B. W. P. no. 148.)

9. *Some considerations concerning Belgium's right to resist*

According to the Treaties of April 19, 1839, between Belgium and the six other powers, Belgium is obligated to preserve a strictly neutral attitude toward all the powers, and to take no action contrary to the spirit of this neutrality. She was not expressly required to defend her own neutrality. Belgium's own interests would, however, impel her to take as active a part as possible in resisting any attempt to violate her territory.¹

Belgium is thus in the situation in which the great Cardinal Richelieu desired to see her, when he thought that a friendly medial state between France and Holland would be ever ready to resist any encroachment upon her independence by either neighbor, and to throw her support wherever it would best help her to maintain her independent position. Besides, this buffer state would exert all its influence to keep the countries which it separated on good terms, since at the outbreak of any conflict between them its own territory would be in great danger of invasion. The great powers, on the other hand, by guaranteeing Belgium's

¹ The treaty signed at London December 14, 1831, by Belgium and the great powers excepting France, placed upon Belgium the obligation to maintain constantly in good order the fortresses which were not demolished. (Article IV; Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. II, p. 883.) Belgium was furthermore recognized as an independent state, except for the obligation to respect her neutralization. (Treaty of November 15, 1831, Article VII; Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. II, p. 863.)

neutrality, agreed to render assistance in maintaining her independence and the inviolability of her territory.

It may be said that all the difficulties which have arisen in regard to Belgium are primarily due to this freedom left to her to provide for her own defense. Such a situation is open to criticism from two points of view. In the first place, as Wicker in his extremely enlightening monograph on neutralization has so well pointed out, the greatest danger that the régime of neutralization may fail is to be found in the provision which makes the continuance of the neutralized condition dependent upon the conduct of the Government of the territory neutralized.¹ The example of Cracow well illustrates how the powers are quick to seize upon the action of the Government of the neutralized territory to make it an excuse for disregarding the obligations to respect its neutrality. Another example of this is afforded by the German arguments against the manner in which Belgium has lived up to her obligations. The system of neutralization, as applied to Belgium, instead of proving an advantage has proved a great calamity to the people. If Belgium had been relieved from all responsibility of providing for the defense of her own neutrality, in case of French or German aggression, Belgium would simply have allowed the occupation of her territory until the conclusion of the conflict between the great powers; and we should not have had to endure the heartrending spectacle of Belgium's suffering which has resulted from her heroic but unavailing efforts to live up to her obligations to prevent the violation of her territory.

Doubtless, if Germany had realized what this resistance would have amounted to, and had appreciated the terrible consequences of her act, she might have hesitated to allow her generals to "hack their way through."² Perhaps Ger-

¹ Cyrus French Wicker, *Neutralization*, p. 23. Oxford, 1911.

² "It is obvious that Belgian resistance has enabled the invaders to use not only the territory, but all the resources of this country in the prosecution of the war, and has opened the way for its annexation in case of final

many's adversaries hoped that this consideration might check German action and help to win for them the support of the world in case Germany should, nevertheless, disregard it. Whatever the reasons for the adoption and continuation of such a system as that applied to Belgium, it was hardly fair to expect a small state to support such a burden.

The acclamations of admiration for Belgian conduct which have gone up throughout the whole world may cheer the hearts of the refugees, but who can be sure that Belgium will ever recover from the effects of the struggle to which she has so nobly sacrificed everything in the vain defense of her home, though in the successful protection of her honor? Even in the midst of our enthusiastic admiration we may be permitted to pause and ask ourselves whether this little nation was called upon to make such a sacrifice for the maintenance of a régime which had the effect of putting upon her a burden so disproportionate to her strength. I believe that if those responsible for Belgium's welfare could have known with certainty what would have been the result of Belgium's resistance, the Government at Brussels might have considered that the burden of maintaining the inviolability of Belgian territory should fall to the guaranteeing powers.

There were reasons, however, which militated in the past against the adoption of such a policy on the part of Belgium. The first and foremost was that England would certainly have considered it a violation of Belgium's obligations in favor of Germany. The consequence would have been to force England to increase her army for the purpose of being able to resist, from the very beginning, a

German victory; but to infer that, in view of these immediate and prospective advantages, the German Government not only reckoned with but hoped for resistance would be to attribute to that Government intentions which it has not avowed and with which it should not be charged without direct evidence." (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy *versus* Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx [1915], no. 1, pp. 77-78.)

German invasion of Belgium. England in all probability would have tried to find some means of reaching an agreement to avoid this difficulty and the burdens it would have imposed. In doing so she might not have had any tenderness for Belgium, whose action would have placed her in that quandary. There is still another aspect of the question, perhaps of more importance, and that is the aspiration of the Belgian people to play as virile a rôle in the affairs of the nations as their numbers and situation could reasonably entitle them to. This ambition of theirs prevented them from taking advantage of their neutralized position. The Belgian Government, without in any way violating its obligations, continued to assert that it possessed the entire freedom of an independent state, except in so far as limited by the obligations immediately resulting from its neutralized position. Had Belgium, instead of attempting to acquire a prominent position as a political power, thrown her whole efforts into making the most of her neutralized position, she would then have limited her political activity to the minimum. Such a policy would have done much to save her the dangers consequent upon her geographical position.

A factor in the situation which has not been sufficiently appreciated is the belief that Belgian fortifications when manfully defended could successfully resist the German onslaught, long enough, at least, to permit reinforcements from England and France to arrive. Belgium must have quickly discovered her mistake, but once having decided to resist, it was not in her nature to stop to weigh the consequences. If the Belgians had foreseen how futile would have been their resistance, I believe that they would have left the responsibility of defending their territory to the powers to settle as best they might, and have limited their action to a negative observance of a strictly neutral attitude. The world is certainly richer by their action, for if they had foreseen these consequences and been influenced

by them, as I think any reasonable people would, we should not have witnessed the noblest example of resistance in recorded history.

It must be remembered that Sir Edward Grey, on August 4, telegraphed to the British Minister at Brussels: "You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guaranty to maintain their independence and integrity in future years." (August 4, B. W. P. no. 155; cf. B. G. P. no. 28.) The Belgian Government must have noticed the "expect" and the mentioning of the maintenance of Belgian "independence and integrity in future years." Any one familiar with diplomatic language might consider this significant. It cannot be called a threat, but it might be taken as a spur to resistance, lest the great power lose interest in maintaining Belgium's independence.¹

¹ The following extract from the *New York Times* of October 1, 1914, gives a semi-official defense from England: "In an interview granted to the correspondent of a Copenhagen paper, Francis Dyke Acland, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, contradicts certain statements made by the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, in an interview recently issued at Berlin. One assertion was that 'England has provoked poor Belgium to make resistance.' 'This leaves it to be inferred,' said Mr. Acland, 'that Belgium, if not provoked, would have allowed herself to be trampled upon. It might have been thought that the nature of the resistance offered by Belgium would be enough to prevent such a libel on a gallant foe. An official statement issued this week by the Belgian Government conclusively proves that no provocation from England or anybody else was needed to make Belgium maintain her rights. The Belgian Government at the time of the Agadir crisis did not hesitate to warn the foreign ambassadors in terms which could not be misunderstood of its intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal.'"

To be just, we must confess that England and France were in a desperate situation; and they probably believed that they would be able to come to Belgium's assistance before Liège could be taken. They perhaps considered that the risk of a devastating invasion that Belgium was made to run was only a fair return for the guaranty of the powers.

Belgium gave every indication that she would have defended her neutrality irrespective of any prodding from abroad. The Belgian Government even delayed calling upon the assistance of the guaranteeing powers (*see* August 3, B. G. P. no. 24). This may have been for the purpose of demonstrating to the world that Germany alone had been guilty of violating her neutrality.

The attitude of Belgium was clearly indicated in Emile Waxweiler's account of the interview which the Belgian Minister at Berlin had with Herr von Jagow: —

"This indeed was just what the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, declared to Baron Beyens, the Belgian minister at Berlin, on the following morning (Monday, August 3), at the beginning of a conversation in which things were said which determined the whole subsequent course of events. It is at Baron Beyens's wish that I record this conversation, the spirited march of which I shall do my best to render.

"Early that Monday morning, the Belgian Minister asked by telephone to be received by the Secretary of State; the interview was immediately granted.

"The Belgian Minister had scarcely pronounced his greetings when Herr von Jagow exclaimed: 'Believe me, it is with anguish in her heart that Germany has resolved to violate Belgian neutrality; and personally I feel the most poignant regret. But what else is possible? It is a question of life or death for the Empire. If the German armies would avoid being caught between hammer and anvil, they must strike a vigorous blow upon the side of France so as to be able to turn then upon Russia.'

“‘But,’ said Baron Beyens, ‘the French frontier is of such an extent as to make passage through Belgium avoidable.’

“‘But that frontier is too well fortified. Besides, what is it we ask of you? Simply to permit us a free passage and not to destroy your railways or your tunnels, and to allow us to occupy the fortified places which we need.’

“‘There is,’ immediately rejoined the Belgian Minister, ‘a very easy way of formulating the only reply admissible to such a demand. It is this: suppose France had preferred the selfsame request and we had yielded. Would not Germany have said that we had basely betrayed her?’

“‘The Secretary of State allowing this clear-cut interrogation to pass without answer, Baron Beyens completed his thought.

“‘Have you,’ he asked, ‘the least thing with which to reproach us? Have we not always, for three quarters of a century, fulfilled toward Germany, as well as to all the great powers guarantors [of the neutrality of Belgium], all our duties of neutrality? Have we not given Germany proof of our loyal friendship? With what coin does Germany repay all this? With making Belgium the battlefield of Europe, and we know what devastation, what calamity modern warfare brings in its train.’

“‘Germany has nothing with which she can reproach Belgium; the attitude of Belgium has always been beyond reproach (*d’une correction parfaite.*)’

“‘You will admit,’ replied Baron Beyens, ‘that Belgium can make no other reply than that which she has already given, without the loss of honor. It is with nations as it is with individuals; there is not a different kind of honor for a people than for one’s self. You must admit,’ urged Baron Beyens, ‘our reply had to be what it is.’

“‘I grant you that as a private individual, but as Secretary of State I have no opinion to express.’

“The interview was at an end. Nevertheless, the Belgian Minister added that in his opinion Germany was deceiving herself: she was going into a war with England, and besides, German troops would not pass Liège as easily, perhaps, as they imagined. And, when the Minister made him understand that there was no doubt of his asking for his passports, Herr von Jagow protested, ‘Do not leave; perhaps we shall still have occasion to converse.’ ‘What is about to take place,’ replied Baron Beyens, ‘is not a matter within our control; from now on it is for the Belgian Government to decide upon the action it will take.’”¹

The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a dispatch of August 4 to the Belgian representatives abroad, relates:

“The ultimatum expired at 7 A.M. on August 3. As at 10 o’clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing powers.

“Toward midday the French Minister questioned me upon this point, and said: ‘Although in view of the rapid march of events I have as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium’s appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that — unless, of course, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defense — the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance.’

“I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Bel-

¹ Emile Waxweiler, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*, pp. 65-67. Lausanne, 1915.

gian Government were making no appeal at present to the guaranty of the powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.

“Finally, at 6 A.M. on August 4, the German Minister made the following communication to me: ‘In accordance with my instructions, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take — if necessary by force of arms — those measures of defense already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.’

“The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the question of an appeal to the powers guaranteeing our neutrality.” (August 4, B. G. P. no. 38.)

The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered that same day to the representatives of England, France, and Russia, the following note: —

“The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to Your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

“The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power.

“Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to coöperate as guaranteeing powers in the defense of her territory.

“There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

“Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defense of her fortified places.” (August 4, B. G. P. no. 40.)

On August 5, the Belgian Government communicated

its views to the members of the diplomatic corps in the following note: —

“By the Treaty of April 18th [*sic*], 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: ‘Belgium shall form a state independent and perpetually neutral.’ Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.

“In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty.

“It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.

“The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of Article 10 of the Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality, such action cannot be considered as a hostile act.

“I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this dispatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing.” (August 5, B. G. P. no. 44.)

The strong are apt to consider as unjustifiable all resistance to their advance, and the Germans have gone so far

as to blame the Belgians for their resistance. We find in Germany many indications of a widely prevailing idea that the Belgians merit the severity of their suffering because of the futility of their resistance. They make somewhat the same distinction that we should make between one who should unfortunately, through no fault of his own, meet with a mishap, and another who deliberately sets himself in front of an advancing, irresistible force. Here again they leave out of account the obligations which Belgium had assumed to maintain her inviolability. Once we admit the validity of these obligations, there can be no reasonable ground for declaring that the Belgians were at fault because they did not weigh the consequences. Quite the contrary: their preëminent glory depends upon this very fact, and makes every sincere admirer and lover of Germany hang his head for shame at this sad page of her history.

10. *Germany accuses England of misrepresentations in regard to Belgium*

In Germany and in England also the British Government have been attacked because they gave as the reason for England's intervention Germany's invasion of Belgium.

The British Government have never, so far as I have noted, made the statement that England entered the war solely to defend Belgium and to make good the guaranty under the Treaty of April 19, 1839. In many instances, however, this reason has been emphasized while the others have been slighted. This is nothing more than the ordinary procedure of every government in time of war. An attempt is made to present its action in such a way as to move the country to come to its support.¹ The mass of men cannot

¹ "That Great Britain had other grounds for declaring war is not disputed. They are indicated in the correspondence published by the British Government (*cf.* British Blue Book, especially nos. 89, 101, 111), and they were frankly stated — and put first — by Sir Edward Grey in his speech in the House of Commons, August 3. (*Ibid.*, pp. 89-96.) If among its various grounds for declaring war, the British Government finally selected that which was formally the best and which would appeal most strongly to pub-

grasp complicated details; consequently, every government presents for popular consumption only one or two main ideas. No doubt England's chief reasons for going into the war were, first, to protect her vital interests, and, second, her good name in observing her treaty obligations. Germany's invasion of Belgium would, however, have stirred all England irrespective of vital interests and treaty obligations, as it has stirred, the world over, every lover of justice who was not already a German partisan.

It is much to the credit of the British people that they are moved by the disregard of Belgium's rights rather than by their more immediate selfish interests. Any one who will read the British White Paper will find that England does not conceal the fact that Belgian neutrality was for her a vital question. One vital question may be enough to justify a war of defense.¹ That England has other reasons

lic sentiment in Great Britain and in other countries, it is not chargeable with insincerity or with hypocrisy. Any other course would have been unintelligent. As far as the appeal to public sentiment is concerned, Austria and Germany acted in the same way; the former in the stress it laid upon the crime of Serajevo, the latter in charging the Russian Emperor with 'perfidy' because his armies were mobilizing while the German Emperor was conducting direct personal negotiations with him. (This was the *casus belli* emphasized in all the German newspapers in the early days of August.)" (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx, [1915], no. 1, p. 58.)

¹ "When we read the official and unofficial explanations of Great Britain's intervention which have been advanced on the part of Germany since the outbreak of the war, and which aim to show that Great Britain had quite other reasons for intervening than Germany's breach of Belgian neutrality, our perplexity increases. When, for example, we are reminded that for centuries it has been Great Britain's policy to promote and support Continental coalitions against any Continental state which threatened to obtain a dominating position, especially if such a state was developing sea power, we wonder why this fact was not taken into account by the German Government before the outbreak of the present war. And when we are told that to Great Britain itself — to take the German Chancellor's most recent explanation of his famous phrase — the Treaty of 1839 was only 'a scrap of paper,' we wonder why, in a country justly renowned for the promotion of historical research, it should be forgotten that the neutralizing of Belgium in 1839, like the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, was chiefly promoted by Great Britain, for the quite intelligible purpose of preventing this part of the European coast line from being used as a base for

is no ground for accusing her of hypocrisy in proclaiming loudest the one that stirs her deepest, or the one that she thinks best calculated to awaken neutral sympathy. Many of the German defenders make the mistake of confusing the question of the violation of Belgian neutrality and the guilt attaching to it with the cause for England's joining in the war. They are two entirely distinct questions.¹

In his speech before the Reichstag on December 2, the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said: "The Belgian neutrality, which England pretended she was bound to shield, is but a mask. On the 2d of August, 7 P.M., we informed Brussels that France's plan of campaign was known to us and that it compelled us, for rea-

military operations against its own territory." (Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xxx [1915], pp. 74-75.)

¹ Mr. Jacob H. Schiff in a published interview makes the distinction: — "I am not defending the violation of Belgian neutrality. This, undeniably was a most unjustifiable action, in spite of German claims that she was forced into it by the necessities of the situation. But I am explaining that, even had it not occurred, still England would have gone to war.

"That was the situation.

"Germany is now fighting for her very existence and I, who am not without knowledge of German conditions, am convinced that never has there been a war more wholly that of a whole people than is this present conflict, as far as Germany is concerned." (New York *Times*, November 22, 1914. Interview with Jacob H. Schiff.)

The former Ambassador of Austria to the United States, Baron L. Hengelmüller, writes in a letter to Colonel Roosevelt, published in the New York *Times* of November 8, 1914: —

"But why has England plunged into this war? Officially and to the world at large she has explained her resolution by Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, and in the royal message to Parliament it was solemnly declared that England could not stand by and passively tolerate such a breach of international obligations.

"No Austrian can read this declaration otherwise than with a mournful smile. Its futility has been exposed by the question which Englishmen of standing and renown have put to their Government, viz., whether they would equally have declared war on France if that violation of neutrality had first come from her side. In face of this question having remained unanswered, and in face of what has come to light since about French preparations in Belgium, there is no need to expatiate on this subject."

This extract illustrates the confusion referred to above.

sons of self-preservation, to march through Belgium; but as early as the afternoon of the same day, August 2, that is to say, before anything was known and could be known of this step, the British Government promised unconditional aid to France in case the German navy attacked the French coast line. Not a word was said of Belgian neutrality. This fact is established by the declaration made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on the 3d of August. The declaration was communicated to me on August 4, but not in full, because of the difficulties experienced at that time in the transmission of telegrams. Besides, the very Blue Book issued by the British Government confirms that fact. How, then, can England allege that she drew the sword because we violated Belgian neutrality? How could British statesmen, who accurately knew the past, talk at all of Belgian neutrality? When on the 4th of August I referred to the wrong which we were doing in marching through Belgium, it was not yet known for certain whether the Brussels Government in the hour of need would not decide after all to spare the country and to retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember that, after the occupation of Liège, at the request of our army leaders, I repeated the offer to the Belgian Government. For military reasons it was absolutely imperative that at the time, about the 4th of August, the possibility for such a development was being kept open. Even then the guilt of the Belgian Government was apparent from many a sign, although I had not yet any positive documentary proofs at my disposal. But the English statesmen were perfectly familiar with these proofs. The documents which in the meantime have been found in Brussels, and which have been given publicity by me, prove and establish in what way and to what degree Belgium has surrendered her neutrality to England. The whole world is now acquainted with two outstanding facts: (1) In the night from the 3d to the 4th of August, when our troops entered Belgian terri-

tory, they were not on neutral soil, but on the soil of a state that had long abandoned its neutrality. (2) England has declared war on us, not for the sake of Belgian neutrality, which she herself had helped to undermine, but because she believed that she could overcome and master us with the help of two great military powers on the Continent.”¹

11. Germany's plea of necessity

The German Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag, August 4, said:—

“Gentlemen, we are now acting in self-defense. Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil.

“Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law.

“The French Government has notified Brussels that it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as the adversary respected it. But we know that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French invasion on our flank and the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The injustice — I speak openly — the injustice we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his All, can only consider the one and best way to strike.”²

¹ [Extract.]— Translation from Pamphlet no. 86 of the American Association for International Conciliation.

² This translation is taken from Pamphlet no. 84, p. 7 of the American Association for International Conciliation. The London *Times* of August 11, 1914, gave the following translation: “Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps [as a matter of fact the speaker knew that Belgium had been invaded that morning] are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for the invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine

Various other pleas in justification of the invasion of Belgium were later brought forward. The arguments in their support have not appealed to impartial minds with the same force as the Chancellor's original pleas of necessity, either because the evidence to substantiate the assertions upon which they rested was trivial and far from the point, or else because the plea of necessity has really struck a responsive chord.¹

might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong — I speak openly — that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one thought — how he is to hack his way through (*wie er sich durchhaut!*)” The version of this part of the Chancellor's speech in the *New York Times Current History of the War*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 219–22, follows closely that of the *London Times*, but the last sentence reads: “Who, like we, are fighting for the highest, must only consider how victory can be gained.”

¹ The following extracts may serve as an illustration of this as well as of the confusion above referred to regarding the motive of England's intervention.

A Dutch professor wrote to the *Koelnische Zeitung*: —

“When Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium I was very indignant. But I was partially conciliated when the Imperial Chancellor said frankly: ‘We are doing the wrong thing, but for military reasons we cannot help but do it.’ Necessity is, at any rate, a strong excuse.

“But that's where the thing should have stopped. Distinct antipathy is provoked when afterward all kinds of little things are dug up to show that Germany had the right to act as she did.” (*New York Sun*, December 27, 1914.)

Professor George W. Kirchwey, of Columbia University, in a letter to the *New York Times*, Thursday, December 24, 1914, says: —

“The pity of it is that Germany really has a case which is obscured and betrayed by arguments such as this. The argument from military necessity urged by the Imperial Chancellor in his address to the Reichstag (immoral though it be) has at least the merit of a certain nobility, and there are not wanting those in this country to whom it makes its appeal. We, too, have our admirers of the strong man or nation that takes what he or she needs, that hews his or her way through every obstacle to success, that lets no trumpery considerations of public morality or humanity stand in the way of the pursuit of his or her ends. But even our Bernhardis can have only contempt for a cause which seeks to justify its grandiose violation of international law and public right by seeking, through the distortion and misrepresentation of facts, to shift the responsibility upon the victim of its high-handed proceedings.”

Professor John W. Burgess in a letter to the *New York Times* (October 28, 1914) says: —

“I find in the British ‘White Paper,’ itself, no. 123, not only ample justi-

In his speech of December 2,¹ before the Reichstag the Chancellor no longer relies on the necessity plea pure and simple, but adds as a justification of Germany's course the charge that Belgium herself was guilty of violating her obligations. We have seen what foundation there was for this serious charge. It is noteworthy that Professor Hans Delbrück, in a recent article in the *Atlantic Monthly* ("Germany's Answer," February, 1915, p. 233), ignores, except for a passing allusion, these efforts to excuse Germany's invasion on the ground of Belgium's guilt, and reverts to the Chancellor's first position, when he says:—

fication, but absolute necessity, from a military point of view, for a German army advancing against France, not only to pass through Belgium but to occupy Belgium. This number of the 'White Paper' is a communication dated August 1 from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin. In it Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Edward Goschen that the German Ambassador in London asked him 'whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we, Great Britain, would remain neutral,' and that he [Grey] replied that he 'could not say that,' that he did not think Great Britain 'could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone'; further, Sir Edward Grey says: 'The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.'

Count Apponyi, the distinguished Hungarian statesman, in an article in the *New York Times* (January 17, 1915), writes:—

"I should like to say one word concerning Belgium. Many are hypnotized by the case of Belgium, and I certainly agree with them so far as to deplore the ruin inflicted on a highly civilized, prosperous country, and the setting aside of international treaties. But if the question of right and wrong is to be decided, you cannot isolate this peculiar fact from the situation in which it originates, and you cannot speak in fairness of Germany as having invaded Belgium in a spirit of wanton aggression and premeditated disregard of international obligations."

Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania, in an article published in *The Fatherland* allows by implication some force to the necessity plea:—

"Germany's breach of neutrality with Belgium, which I do not justify and which Germany herself acknowledges was wrong, but prompted by absolute necessity, could not have been the real, or let us say the only, motive inducing Sir Edward Grey to range England on the side of France and Russia."

¹ See above § 10, pp. 443-45.

“From Sir Edward Grey’s refusal to answer the neutrality question, Germany saw clearly that just as soon as the Russians were near enough, the French, perhaps aided by the English and Belgians, would attack Germany on that flank. Germany, therefore, had to consider which was the lesser of the two evils.

“If she proceeded against Belgium, there was the prospect of gaining large advantages before the Russians entered the conflict — a hope that has only in small measure been realized. On the other hand, there was the disadvantage in this move, that *abroad*, particularly in neutral countries, Germany would appear in the light of peace-breaker.

“If, on the contrary, Germany had waited until the enemy had violated Belgium’s neutrality, she would have had the moral advantage of appearing in the light of the defender of the right, but at the same time would have lost almost all hope of victory against the stupendous odds. Under these conditions Germany chose the odium of appearing to the world as the treaty-breaker, sure that she was so only in appearance, because the treaty had already been broken in fact from the other side.”

Delbrück and Von Bethmann-Hollweg both allege that Germany’s necessity arose from the fact that France intended, by waiting, to take advantage of Germany when she was obliged to divide her forces to repel the Russian advance, and then to invade Belgian territory to strike Germany on the flank. If France had actually attempted to do this, Germany would have been justified in advancing across Belgian soil to meet her treacherous attack, but the clearest and most absolute proof of the mere intention of France to do so would not serve as a justification, though it might afford some excuse. I have examined this question without finding any evidence that France intended any such perfidy — nay, I find every indication that France would have refrained from any violation of Belgian neutrality. She had made an express declaration to the Bel-

gian Government that she would observe the latter's neutrality provided Germany followed a like course, and I know of no case where a formal engagement of this kind has been violated by a civilized state. In the last analysis, then, we must fall back on the only German argument which has any strength — that of necessity pure and simple.

Before we take up the main argument, it may be observed that the excuse of necessity can serve as a justification only when there actually is a necessity. It will not suffice that the one who disregards the ordinary rules supposed such a necessity to exist. In this present war there was really no necessity for violating the neutrality of Belgium, since Germany had another perfectly feasible plan of campaign. She might have confined her offensive operations to the eastern frontier and remained on the defensive on the West, forcing France to adopt the rôle of the aggressor.

For the sake of argument, however, we will admit that Germany could discover no other way to preserve her national independence and integrity except by forcing her way through Belgium to crush France. On this assumption we must examine whether Germany can make out a case to justify her action before the really impartial public opinion of the world. Speaking generally, is there any restriction upon the liberty of one individual to injure another for his own preservation?

By restriction of the liberty to injure another for self-preservation, we mean, of course, a self-imposed restriction — that is, one which will affect the will in such a way as to deter an individual from using strength to the detriment of another person, even though it be for the purpose of preserving existence. The only limit which can be self-imposed on this liberty to injure another must result from respect for principles which are intended either for the direct benefit of the individual himself, or for the pro-

tection of what he considers still more important. For example, except when acting instinctively, an individual would hardly take any action, whether involving injury to another or not, when he felt absolutely convinced that his own existence after the commission of the act would be an intolerable burden for him. We are all brought up with the idea that it is better to die than to live on as a miserable creature despised by all. Pushing this idea still further, we reach the stage when life seems intolerable unless we can preserve and remain true to certain ideals. Suicide is the ordinary outlet when an individual finds this impossible. Consequently, individuals will sacrifice life and property to defend a person or an ideal when a failure to do so would result in making life unbearable. The refusal to injure another, in order to preserve life, would not differ essentially from the case just considered.

So by a projection of his personality into the future, an individual is ready to sacrifice himself rather than retain life upon conditions that he is not willing to accept. This attitude toward the maintenance of certain ideals, becoming widespread and generalized, brings it about that the protection of certain principles or ideals is considered by the better individuals as more important than life itself. In any community those unwilling to put this ideal into practice may, when those who believe in the ideal and adhere to it are sufficiently strong, be punished so severely in one way or another as to act on the public imagination or conscience and to enforce upon individuals the sacrifice of certain primary or brute instincts for the good of all as expressed in the ideal. In other words the community will find a way to make life unbearable to those who do not observe the ideal.

Deeper down than this superstructure of social and ethical ideals, however, is the primary, fundamental love of life, which like any other passion may be so strong in many individuals as to defy the ideals of the enveloping

society. This primary instinct to live and the socially evolved ideal, will be in constant conflict, and if the organized society is once well in the control of those who believe in the enforcement of the ideal, the individual who gives any indications of breaking away will be eliminated from the society, with the result that the ideal becomes better and better observed. We have a good example of this willingness to sacrifice life for an ideal in the patriotic spirit which makes a whole people rush to the defense of the nation without regard to self-preservation.

Now, individuals, in addition to being members of independent states, are also part of humanity, and the independent governments to which they belong merely carry on the principal relations of humanity, each acting as trustees for that part of humanity embraced within the territories it controls. Each government must, in the long run, give expression to the views which prevail and control the action of the individuals composing it. Just as in each such state certain principles will be found to be more appreciated than life, so in the realm of world society, or humanity, individuals may look upon certain ideals as more important than their national life. When this stage is reached, the individuals composing the state will prevent their government from overriding the international or humanitarian ideal even for the preservation of the nation's life. Should the individuals composing a state allow their government to trample upon such humanitarian ideals, the people of other states, acting unitedly and individually through the agency of their governments, will be found discriminating against that people and punishing it so severely as to deter any other state from a similar violation in future. Should mistaken ideals prevail, and attempts be made to exact respect for principles the maintenance of which would not be for the general good, governments attempting to disregard these principles for immediately selfish ends will be successful, and in consequence the un-

workable theory will be discarded. Ideals which have to be discarded as impractical for our present stage of development may be resurrected again when a higher general level of civilization shall have been reached.

In our municipal law we have long left behind the brutal idea that one individual may sacrifice an innocent neighbor to save himself.¹ Our laws do not permit any one to sacrifice another innocent individual to save himself. In the words of the judge who condemned to death for murder two men who had killed and eaten a boy to save themselves: "To preserve one's life is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it."²

The biological test, in my belief, will favor those states which observe most perfectly in their relations with their weaker neighbors this same principle. An occasional instance may doubtless occur, in the course of generations, where the observance of this rule will result in the destruction of the state which is true to the ideal. On the other hand, the ill-repute arising from the sacrifice of a weaker neighbor may be too heavy a burden for the transgressor to bear.

The invasion of Belgium has been compared to the case of a man who is guilty of a trespass in crossing his neighbor's premises to escape from a fire. The purpose of this comparison is to indicate that a lesser right should give way before a greater. This idea of the relativity of rights seems to me perfectly sound, even though the formal rules of our legal system do not accord it the consideration it merits. In the case of Belgium, however, the benefit of this principle of the relativity of rights might be thought to

¹ The eminent jurist, the late Professor John Westlake, of Cambridge University, has stated this so clearly that I will not confuse what he has said by the addition of a single word, but refer the reader to Westlake's own lucid remarks. See *post*, chap. XIII.

² Extracts from this remarkable case, *Queen v. Dudley and Stephens*, will be found among the Documents, chap. XIII.

incline more to the support of the action of Belgium than to that of Germany; for Belgian independence would have been a mere word if she had accepted the terms of the German ultimatum. In such a case, were the Allies to win, they would consider Belgian independence as a trap, which they would remove so that they might not be caught in it again. If, on the other hand, Germany were victorious, Belgium would become a German protectorate.

It would be fairer then, if instead of comparing Germany's action to that of a man who trespasses to save his life, we should compare the invasion of Belgium to the case of a man who does not wait to meet his adversary in a fair fight, but tries to reach him by shooting through the walls of an intervening house without regard to the lives of the helpless inmates.

It may be asked whether the test of time will not favor those little states which hold the defense of their honor higher than the preservation of material existence, and disparage those other states which would sacrifice another for their own preservation.

If the society of nations is to make any further progress, it must be recognized that the good of all the states is more important than the good of any individual state. This principle can have no force unless it means that there are certain fundamental rights, the respect of which all must place before every other consideration. Three of the most fundamental principles of international law I believe to be:

(1) Good faith in the observance of treaties.¹

¹ It is worth while to compare the statement of the present German Chancellor in reference to Belgian neutrality (see above, chap. VIII, § 16), with the words of one of his predecessors: On May 2, 1871, Bismarck declared before the Reichstag: —

“‘There could be no thought,’ said Bismarck at that time, ‘of our making Alsace and Lorraine into a neutral country, like Belgium and Switzerland, for that would have constituted a barrier which would have prevented our ever attacking France; we are accustomed to respect treaties and neutralities.’” (Emile Waxweiler, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*, p. 72. Lausanne, 1915.) Cf. *Les Discours de Bismarck*, vol. III, p. 419. Berlin, 1886.

In explanation of his remark that England was making war on Germany,

- (2) The equality of all the states before the law.¹
- (3) The observance by each state of all reasonably possible formalities and delays before having recourse to force to make good its rights or to impose its views.

It must be left to the impartial observer to answer in

“just for a scrap of paper,” Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said in an interview which he gave, on January 25, 1915, to the correspondent of the Associated Press:—

“I am surprised to learn that my phrase, ‘a scrap of paper,’ which I used in my last conversation with the British Ambassador in reference to the Belgian neutrality treaty should have caused such an unfavorable impression in the United States. The expression was used in quite another connection and meaning from that implied in Sir Edward Goschen’s report, and the turn given to it in the biased comment of our enemies is undoubtedly responsible for this impression.

“My conversation with Sir Edward Goschen,” said the Chancellor, “occurred on the 4th August. I had just declared in the Reichstag that only dire necessity, only the struggle for existence, compelled Germany to march through Belgium, but that Germany was ready to make compensation for the wrong committed. When I spoke I already had certain indications, but no absolute proof, on which to base a public accusation that Belgium had long before abandoned its neutrality in its relations with England. Nevertheless, I took Germany’s responsibilities toward neutral States so seriously that I spoke frankly on the wrong committed by Germany. What was the British attitude on the same question?” said the Chancellor. “The day before my conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey had delivered his well-known speech in Parliament, wherein, while he did not state expressly that England would take part in the war, he left the matter in little doubt. One needs only to read this speech through carefully to learn the reason of England’s intervention in the war. Amid all his beautiful phrases about England’s honor and England’s obligations we find it over and over again expressed that England’s interests — its own interests — called for participation in war, for it was not in England’s interests that a victorious, and therefore stronger, Germany should emerge from the war. This old principle of England’s policy — to take as the sole criterion of its actions its private interests regardless of right, reason, or considerations of humanity — is expressed in that speech of Gladstone’s in 1870 on Belgian neutrality from which Sir Edward quoted. Mr. Gladstone then declared that he was unable to subscribe to the doctrine that the simple fact of the existence of a guaranty is binding upon every party thereto, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for action on the guaranty

¹ This equality refers only to questions of law. In all political questions it is inevitable that the more powerful states should be more generally able to secure the acceptance of their views. See above, p. 393, note 1.

how far Germany has observed these three rules. It must be remembered also that the law of nations is a practical system which has weathered the worst storms of national crises, and he referred to such English statesmen as Aberdeen and Palmerston as supporters of his views.

"England drew the sword," continued the Chancellor, "only because she believed her own interests demanded it. Just for Belgian neutrality she would never have entered the war. That is what I meant when I told Sir Edward Goschen, in that last interview when we sat down to talk the matter over privately man to man, that among the reasons which had impelled England into war the Belgian neutrality treaty had for her only the value of a scrap of paper. I may have been a bit excited and aroused," said the Chancellor. "Who would not have been at seeing the hopes and work of the whole period of my Chancellorship going for naught? I recalled to the Ambassador my efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and Germany, an understanding which, I reminded him, would have made a general European war impossible, and have absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe. Such understanding," the Chancellor interjected parenthetically, "would have formed the basis on which we could have approached the United States as a third partner. But England had not taken up this plan, and through its entry into the war had destroyed forever the hope of its fulfilment. In comparison with such momentous consequences, was the treaty not a scrap of paper?"

"England ought really to cease harping on this theme of Belgian neutrality," said the Chancellor. "Documents on the Anglo-Belgian military agreement, which we have found in the mean time, show plainly enough how England regarded this neutrality. As you know, we found in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office papers which showed that England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government if war had then broken out. In other words, do exactly the same thing for which, with all the pathos of virtuous indignation, she now reproaches Germany. In some later dispatch Grey, I believe, informed Belgium that he did not believe England would take such a step, because he did not think English public opinion would justify such action, and still people in the United States wonder that I characterized as a scrap of paper a treaty whose observance, according to responsible British statesmen, should be dependent upon the pleasure of British public opinion, a treaty which England herself had long since undermined by military agreements with Belgium. Remember, too, that Sir Edward Grey expressly refused to assure us of England's neutrality even in the eventuality that Germany respected Belgian neutrality. I can understand, therefore, English displeasure at my characterization of the Treaty of 1839 as a scrap of paper, for this scrap of paper was for England extremely valuable, as furnishing an excuse before the world for embarking in the war. I hope, therefore, that in the United States you will think clearly enough and realize that England in this matter, too, acted solely on the principle, 'Right or wrong, my interests.'" (Extract.) Space does not permit the addition of Grey's authorized reply; see statement in press, January 27, 1915.

passions and hatred and yet continues on its sublime course. Its true and fundamental rules can no more be disregarded without punishment than can the laws of hygiene. If I am wrong in my criticism of Germany's action, on the ground that she has violated international law, time will disclose the truth and indicate the right path to follow.

CHAPTER X

ITALY REMAINS NEUTRAL

Italy desirous for peace — San Giuliano's helpful suggestions — Italian coöperation with England — Italy declares that she will remain neutral.

1. *Italy desirous for peace*

THE position of Italy is one of the most interesting features of the present war. By its very nature, the Triple Alliance contained within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. For the first interest of Italy, since she obtained her national unity, has been to acquire the neighboring Italian-speaking provinces of Trieste and the Trentino, which she would lay claim to on the basis of the principle of nationality. This aspiration of Italy for what is called "Italia Irredenta" — that is to say, the remnant of Italy unredeemed from Austrian sway — has been a constant source of irritation between the two countries, and it has required all the efforts of Germany to keep the peace. As Count Nigra said to Von Bülow, "Austria and Italy can only be either allies or enemies."¹

The first serious blow to the Triple Alliance was struck when Italy threw her influence against her ally at the Algieras Conference. A still ruder shock was the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The consolidation of Austrian strength in those provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina was most irritating to Italy; but she prepared a subtle diplomatic *coup*, and shortly after, in 1911, launched a war against Turkey, a state which had come to be considered as a component part of the Triple Alliance group. It would have taken the diplomacy of a Bismarck to have extricated Germany from this precarious and involved situation; for any interference on the part of Austria or Ger-

¹ Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*. New York, 1914, p. 69.

many would have thrown Italy into the arms of England and France and made of her an integral part of the Triple *Entente*. So Germany had to stand by and see her Ottoman protégé stripped of her possessions, and her weakness shown up to the world. Perhaps a later and careful study of the diplomacy of this epoch will show that Germany made a great mistake in not insisting upon arresting this conflict; but had she been successful, she would probably have had to prepare in quick succession for an attack from France and Russia, assisted by Italy smarting under her check. So Germany considered that she must stand by, and tolerate Italy's undermining of the Triple Alliance by the dismembering of Turkey.

Still another cause of discord, and consequent weakening of the Triple Alliance, resulted from the settlement of the Balkan conflict. Austria and Italy had checked Serbia's aspiration for control of Albania and had set up an independent state under international supervision, which meant that Austria and Italy would commence a diplomatic duel to secure control. This ground of difference with Austria, added to the ever-present popular aspirations toward "*Italia Irredenta*," increased the difficulty of maintaining the peace of the Adriatic. Even had the War of 1914 not broken out, a conflict between Austria and Italy seemed imminent, or at most a question of a few years — perhaps months. Such was the situation at the outbreak of the war.¹

In the light of conditions we have just outlined, Italy might well consider that the success of the Triple Alliance would mean dictation by Germany and Austria, an increase of Austrian and German power in the Balkans, and consequently Austrian control of Albania and the length-

¹ The recent disclosures of ex-Premier Giolitti have shown how Italy blocked Austria's plans for a war against Serbia in August, 1913, just after Serbia had been so successful in foiling Austrian plans and had emerged from the Treaty of Bukharest with her territory almost doubled. (See *post*, p. 471.)

ening and strengthening of Austria's grip on the Adriatic coast line opposite Italy. From this point of view, Italy's immediate interest would point to her making common cause with the Triple *Entente*; and she had another reason perhaps of more immediate compelling force, in that her extensive coast line offered an easy target to the fleets of France in control of the Mediterranean. Now that Italy had acquired Tripoli, she had given a hostage to the powers in control of the Mediterranean. Italy understands that it is a first consideration of self-preservation for her never to be engaged in conflict with a power in control of the Mediterranean.

Italy's position was further complicated by her inclusion in the Triple Alliance, according to the terms of which Italy is in certain circumstances obligated to come to the assistance of her two allies. It has been much argued whether the present conflict constitutes a *casus fœderis* under the terms of the alliance. To discuss this intelligently, we should have to know what obligations Italy had undertaken toward Germany and Austria.¹ We only know that Italy has considered that Austria and Germany were the aggressors and that she was not obligated to come to their assistance. This is the gist of the whole question, and has been much obscured by the efforts of all parties to avoid any aggressive action, for the very high purpose of influencing Italy's action and at the same time bidding for the support of international opinion.

The fact remains, after all is said and done, that it is very difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy which party is the aggressor in any conflict. If Russia, for example, should mobilize, out of a clear sky, along the German frontier, Germany would certainly have to declare war and put herself technically in the position of the

¹ The terms of the Triple Alliance have not been published, but Bismarck published in 1888 the terms of the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria, which is supposed to be the basis of the triplíce formed by including Italy.

aggressor, but the causal act and incipient aggression would have been entirely Russian. A political, defensive alliance, if it has any real vigor, has always of necessity a tendency to become something more than insurance against attack, and as each member in turn gains from the diplomatic support of its co-allies, the alliance comes in time to be looked upon as forming a new, ill-defined political group. The impartial critic could not deny that, even in the absence of aggression, there would be a certain political obligation upon Italy to support her allies. On the other hand, the actual situation of a country, and the diplomatic premonitions which have been given of the action it intends to adhere to, must always be considered when discussing any question as to the good faith of a nation. The good faith of the Italian Government in observing her treaties has always with reason stood very high.¹ In our own history we had a similar crisis, when we refused to live up to the terms of our alliance with France and join the French Revolutionists against England.

Looked at superficially, Italy, it might be thought, would make common cause with her allies in the event of war. But if Italy supported Germany and Austria, the results of a war, whether victory or defeat, might be disastrous to her. In case of victory, Austria would become dangerously powerful, and the control of the Balkans — and possibly of the mouth of the Adriatic — would tighten her grasp on the Italian portions of her empire. If defeated, Italy would be bereft of Tripoli. On the other hand, Italy's political conscience would not allow her to turn against her allies; and even if she did so she might suffer terribly from the invasion of her northern provinces. Italy, therefore, had more than general objections to the rupture of peace. The Marquis di San Giuliano made every effort to preserve peace, and we need only read the telegrams

¹ The Giolitti disclosures reported in the press indicate that Italy did not leave Austria in doubt as to her intentions. See *post*, p. 471.

from Italy to make clear the quarter from which blew the wind endangering it. (Cf. F. Y. B. nos. 17, 19, 27, 72; B. W. P. no. 80).

On July 17, M. Michailovitch, Servian Minister at Rome, telegraphed M. Pashitch: "I have reliable information that the Marquis di San Giuliano has declared to the Austrian Ambassador that a *démarche* directed against Servia, which did not treat Servia with the respect due from one nation to another, would be condemned by public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government was interested in the maintenance of the complete independence of Servia."¹ (July 17, S. B. B. no. 28.)

On July 25, 'the Italian Ambassador cordially approved of what Sir Edward Grey had said to the German Ambassador, and made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no 29.)

Italy thus showed a general desire to coöperate with Great Britain in her efforts to preserve peace. (See B. W. P. nos. 57, 86, 90.) From the first the Marquis di San Giuliano supported Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a conference of the four powers at London. (B. W. P. nos. 35, 63.)

The importance of Italy's influence for peace is also disclosed by M. Sazonof's telegram to the Russian Ambassador in Italy: 'Italy might play a rôle of first importance in helping to maintain peace, by exercising the necessary influence upon Austria and by adopting an attitude clearly in opposition to the conflict, for it cannot be localized. It is desirable that you express the conviction that it is im-

¹ Mr. Price, referring to Sazonof's proposal to the "effect that France and Germany should fall out of the mediation scheme, and that the good offices of two powers only, England and Italy, should be used," writes: "This seems to mean that Russia was attempting to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance, and then use her as a mediator with England." (M. P. Price, *The Diplomatic History of the War*, p. 31.) The above dispatch of the Servian Minister shows that Servia and hence Russia also were well aware of Italy's attitude and that she had so little sympathy with Austria's projects as to warn her against the course she was about to take.

possible for Russia not to come to the aid of Servia.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 23.)

2. San Giuliano's helpful suggestions

On July 27, the Marquis di San Giuliano returned to Rome, and in a conversation which he had immediately after his arrival, with M. Barrère, the French Ambassador to Italy, 'he spoke to him of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured him that he had not had any previous knowledge of it. He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. The Ambassador asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers alleged, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfill her duties as an ally toward Austria. "In no way," the Minister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such communication to Vienna." The Marquis di San Giuliano thought that Servia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety; that day he still thought that that would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria would not withdraw any of her claims, and would maintain them even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubted whether Germany was disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserted, however, that Germany at that moment attached great importance to her relations with London, and believed that if any power could determine Berlin in favor of peaceful action, it was England. As for Italy, she would continue to make every effort in favor of peace. It was with that end in view that he had adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the ambassadors of those powers which were not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute.' (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 72.)

On July 28, as a result of his conversation with the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Rome, the Marquis di San Giuliano told the British Ambassador that 'he thought that if some explanations were given regarding the manner in which the Austrian agents would require to intervene under Articles V and VI, Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian note. As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Serbia, they might be given to the powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Serbia to accept without conditions. In the Austrian official explanation of the grounds on which the Serbian reply was considered inadequate, the Marquis considered many points besides explanation — such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda — quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that coöperation of Austrian agents in Serbia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Serbia was said to have willfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that the ground might be cleared here. He impressed upon the Ambassador, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with England and Germany had, he said, been given to the Italian Ambassador.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 64.)

On July 29, the British Ambassador at Rome learned of 'information received by the Italian Government that Germany was really opposed to a conference, in spite of the statement of Prince Lichnowsky about Germany's acceptance of it in "principle." The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the ambassadors that he was telegraphing to Berlin to urge adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London, and suggested that the German Secre-

tary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. He was of the opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if the direct communications between Vienna and St. Petersburg failed to have any result. He thought that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communications. He also said that he was informing the German Government that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion in Italy unless they had taken every possible step to avoid war. He was urging that the German Government must lend their coöperation in this. There seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with Great Britain, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect. Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 80.)

On July 29, 'the Marquis di San Giuliano¹ suggested

¹ The London *Times* of December 5, 1914, prints a Reuter dispatch, an extract from which sums up tersely San Giuliano's direction of Italian diplomacy just preceding the war: —

"Since the beginning of July, when, after the murder at Serajevo, the relations between Austria and Serbia became most strained, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, thought it his duty to advise Vienna to use moderation and to avoid the intervention of Russia in support of Belgrade. Austria answered that she did not believe that Russia was sufficiently prepared after the Japanese War to undertake military action in favour of Serbia, bringing forward as an example the attitude of Russia during the whole Conference of London after the Balkan War, when she was unable to make her supremacy in the Balkans felt.

"The Marquis di San Giuliano replied that, according to his information, the situation was changed, and Russia would not tolerate any attempt to limit the independence and sovereignty of Serbia or any diminution of her territory. Austria retorted that in such a case the intervention of Russia would be answered by the participation of Germany in the war. The Italian Foreign Minister pointed out the enormous gravity of this plan, as the action of Germany would inevitably mean the intervention of Great Britain.

"Both Vienna and Berlin replied that they were convinced that at the

that the German objections to the mediation of the four powers, a mediation that was strongly favored by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.' (Modified quotation, July 29, B. W. P. no. 92.) July 30, 'when the Marquis learned that Austria had refused to continue the direct exchange of views, and believing that Germany was then ready to give Austria more conciliatory advice, he suggested that an exchange of views between the four powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 106.)

3. *Italian coöperation with England*

In a conversation, on July 26, with M. Barrère, the French Ambassador at Rome, Signor Salandra said in regard to the attitude the Italian Government would take: "We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent the rupture of peace: our situation is somewhat similar to that of England. It is possible that we might be able to take some action with England toward maintaining the peace." (Extract, July 26, F. Y. B. no. 51.) The advantage of such a collaboration on the part of the two powers least directly involved in the Austro-Servian controversy is evident, because, even after Germany might have become involved in reply to Russian mobilization and have rallied to the support of her ally, these two powers, one from each group, *Entente* and Alliance, could still continue their united efforts in the cause of peace.

At St. Petersburg, on July 26, when M. Sazonof pointed out to the Austrian Ambassador why he considered the Austrian note unacceptable, he remarked that 'it would be

last moment Great Britain would not take upon herself the risk of entering a European war. The Marquis reiterated that such a view was erroneous, having sufficient foundation for the opinion that the exact opposite would occur, but his warning was in vain. Events were precipitated by the ultimatum to Serbia, which was sent without Italy's either being consulted or notified."

useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate the Minister's remarks to his Government.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 44.) A couple of days later, the Marquis di San Giuliano made the various suggestions indicated above; more particularly he hinted that it would have a most salutary effect if England would act with France and Russia; but in case that proved impossible he declared that "he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views." (July 29, B. W. P. no. 80.) Again, on July 30, the resourceful Minister made still other suggestions to the British Ambassador, and concluded by repeating what he had said the day before that 'he in any case was in favor of continuing an exchange of views with the British Government, if the idea of direct discussions between the four powers was impossible.' (Modified quotation, July 30, B. W. P. no. 106.) M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a conversation with the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, August 1, said that he had refused no suggestion held out to him, and enumerated those he had accepted, among them the proposal for mediation by Great Britain and Italy. (Cf. August 1, B. W. P. no. 139.)

Elsewhere in the British White Paper I find no reference to this proposal for the joint mediation of Great Britain and Italy, and am unable to discover whether Italy went any further than merely to make the suggestion. This plan of Anglo-Italian mediation perhaps offered the method best calculated to preserve the peace, and if it could have been possible for these two less directly involved states to declare that they would make common cause against the aggressor, neither Austria, Russia, Germany,

nor France would have dared to traverse their frontiers with hostile intent. But either the time was too short, or the obligations of the alliance too encumbering, to permit of the putting into effect of Anglo-Italian intervention in favor of peace.

4. *Italy declares that she will remain neutral*

Austria and Germany had had occasion to sound Italy in regard to her action in the event of a European war resulting from an attack upon Servia, and although the recent tragedy had strengthened Austria's position in the eyes of Europe, the nature of the Austro-Servian disagreement remained the same.

The *Entente* Powers must, on the other hand, have felt considerable anxiety as to the course Italy would pursue. From the very first days of the crisis, this solicitude is indicated in the reports made by the ambassadors of the *Entente* Powers to their Governments, especially as to whether Italy had been consulted in regard to the *démarche* at Belgrade.

On July 24, — that is, the day after the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, — the Acting Foreign Minister in France, in a telegram sent to Stockholm to reach M. Viviani and President Poincaré, then on their return journey on board the *France*, said: "It appears from the information we obtain that not until to-day was the Austrian note communicated to Italy, and that she was neither consulted nor even informed about it." (Extract, July 24, F. Y. B. no. 26.) July 25, the French Ambassador at Berlin learned through the Belgian Minister that 'the Italian Ambassador, who had just cut short his leave to return to his post, said that Italy was surprised, to say the least, at having been kept in the dark regarding the whole affair by her two allies.' (Modified quotation, July 25, F. Y. B. no. 35.)

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna,

in his report written after his return to London, says: "It might have been supposed that the Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact, His Excellency was left completely in the dark." (Extract, B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10 [1914], p. 1.)

In a telegram sent July 26, transmitted to M. Viviani and the French representatives abroad, the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs states that the Italian Government, "to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday,¹ without any request for support or even advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who does not return until Tuesday [July 28], make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an extension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paléologue [French Ambassador at St. Petersburg] that at Vienna people still nurse the illusion that Russia 'will not hold fast.' It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand." (Extract, July 26, F. Y. B. no. 50.)

A dispatch, however, of the same date (July 26) from M. Barrère, the French Ambassador at Rome, shows that the Acting French Foreign Minister was mistaken, for Signor Salandra stated to him that 'the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment. M. Barrère carried away from his conversation with the President of the Council the impression, gathered from the general drift of his remarks, that the Italian Government would be willing in case of war to keep out of it and maintain an at-

¹ That is July 24, the day after the presentation of the Ultimatum to Servia.

titude of observation.' (Modified quotation, July 26, F. Y. B. no 51.)

Yet, when, upon his return to Rome on the evening of July 27, the Marquis di San Giuliano saw the French Ambassador, he spoke to him of the contents of the Austrian note and formally assured him that he had had no previous knowledge of it.¹ 'He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. The Ambassador asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers alleged, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfill her duties as an ally toward Austria. "In no way," the Minister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such communication to Vienna."' (Modified quotation, July 27, F. Y. B. no. 72.)

We have the statement of the French Ambassador at Rome that 'Italian public opinion was hostile to Austria in the serious situation of affairs.' (Modified quotation, July 26, F. Y. B. no. 52.)

On August 1, the French Ambassador at Rome sent the following dispatch to his Government: —

"I went to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half-past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the results which they may have.

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government to suspend mobilization, and the French Government to inform them as to their intentions; Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours.

¹ Probably the Minister only meant that he had not known about the note before its presentation. It seems, however, from Signor Salandra's statement, that it was communicated to Rome shortly before it was presented at Belgrade.

“Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what were the intentions of the Italian Government.

“The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy would not be able to take part in the war.” (August 1, F. Y. B. no. 124.)

On August 1, the French Ambassador at London made the following communication: —

“In reply to the German Government’s intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied: ‘The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.’

“In making this communication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.” (August 3, B. W. P. no. 152.)

Any suspicion that Italy had not been frank with her allies is disproved by the declaration which Signor Giovanni Giolitti, the former Premier, made in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, December 5, when announcing his approval of the Government’s policy of neutrality: —

“I feel it my duty to recall a precedent showing how correct was the interpretation of the alliance by the Government when the conflict began. During the Balkan War, on

August 9, 1913, being absent from Rome, I received the following telegram from the late Marquis di San Giuliano:¹ "Austria has communicated to us and Germany that it has been the intention to act against Servia, defining such action as defensive and hoping for an application of a *casus fœderis* by the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplicable. I am trying to agree with Germany concerning efforts to prevent Austrian action, but it may be necessary to say clearly that we do not consider such eventual action as defensive, and, therefore, do not think that there exists a *casus fœderis*. Please send a telegram saying whether you approve.'

"I answered Marquis di San Giuliano thus: 'If Austria goes against Servia, a *casus fœderis* evidently does not exist. It is an action she accomplishes on her own account. It is not defensive, because nobody thinks of attacking her. It is necessary to declare this to Austria in the most formal manner, hoping that Germany will act to dissuade Austria from a very dangerous adventure.'

"This was done, and our interpretation of the treaty was accepted by our allies, our friendly relations not being in the least disturbed. Thus the declaration of neutrality, made at the beginning of this conflict, is according to the spirit and letter of the treaties. I recall this incident, wishing to demonstrate the complete loyalty of Italy before the eyes of Europe."²

Not only have Germany and Austria refrained from criticizing Italy for her stand, but Germany's ex-Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, made the following statement in his book published just before the outbreak of the war: "Supposing Italy were not able in every conceivable circumstance to go to all lengths with Austria and us, and if we and Austria likewise were not able to support Italy in all

¹ The late Marquis di San Giuliano was, at the time referred to, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of which Signor Giolitti was Premier.

² From the New York *Times*, December 7, 1914.

complications of international politics, even then each one of the three powers would, by virtue of the existing alliance, be prevented from assisting the enemy. That is what Prince Bismarck meant when he once remarked that it was sufficient for him that an Italian corporal with the Italian flag and a drummer beside him should array themselves against the West, i.e., France, and not against the East, i.e., Austria.”¹

Let me conclude this discussion of Italy's attitude up to the outbreak of the war by an extract from a recent article by William Roscoe Thayer:²

“Too little has been said about Italy's refusal to join Germany and Austria in their war for world power. During the past five months we have heard German apologists offer the most contradictory arguments to prove, first, that Russia, next, that France and Belgium, and, finally, that England began the struggle. The Kaiser himself, with that disdain of fact which is the privilege of autocrats, declared that the sword was forced into his hands. And all the while the mere abstention of Italy from supporting Germany and Austria gave the lie to the Germanic protestations and excuses.

“By the terms of the Triple Alliance every member of it is bound to communicate at once to the other members all international diplomatic transactions which concern the alliance. Germany and Austria failed to do this during the earlier stages in July, when they were preparing for war. Only after they had laid their train so surely that an explosion was almost inevitable did they communicate the documents to Italy and call upon her to take her place in the field with them. But Italy refused; because, after examining the evidence, she concluded that Germany and Austria were the aggressors. Now, the terms of the Triple

¹ *Imperial Germany*, pp. 72-73. New York, 1914.

² This valuable discussion of Italy's relation to the war appeared in the *New York Times*, Sunday edition, January 17, 1915.

Alliance bind its members to stand by each other only in case of attack.

“Italy’s verdict, therefore, threw the guilt of the war on Germany and Austria. She had testimony before her which does not appear even in the ‘White Papers’ and other official diplomatic correspondence; and all the efforts of German zealots and casuists have not subtracted one iota from the meaning of her abstention. Germany and Austria were the aggressors — that is the Italian verdict, which history will confirm.

“But a still further consideration influenced her. It was understood that, if the war in which Germany and Austria engaged should involve England as an enemy, Italy’s obligation to support the Triple Alliance would cease. Since it would be suicidal for Italy to accept the liability of a *casus fœderis* which should expose her to attack by the English and French navies, her participation in the Triple Alliance always carried the proviso that it did not bind her to fight England.”

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

The interest of the United States in the war — Suggested and alleged causes of the war — Displacement of the balance of power — The immediate causes of the war — The determining causes of the war — The world's answer — Formation of a Super-Empire — The "Peace power" — Germany's nationalistic conception — Nationalism and internationalism. — The results.

1. The interest of the United States in the war

THE United States is more than an interested spectator — it is vitally affected by the war. In the early part of July, 1914, hardly any one on this side of the Atlantic realized that trouble was brewing, and when, in the last week of the month, we heard of one threatening move after another, it seemed too terrible to believe. As I look back, the strongest impression I recall of the days just preceding the war is that the renewal of negotiations between Austria and Russia, as reported on July 29 and 30, seemed to point to the probability of a peaceful solution, and the continued sailing of the great German liners gave indication that all hope was not lost. The whole country was horrified at the prospect of such a war, and many, up to the very last, refused to believe it possible.

It was inevitable that war on such a scale should seriously affect our economic interests. Not only were our markets and sources of supplies disorganized by the military operations, but almost all our sea-borne commerce was in the hands of one or the other belligerent, so that we could not depend upon adequate shipping facilities. In fact, many of the ships flying a belligerent flag were American-owned, and their seizure would be a loss to American capital. It is not, however, the serious monetary losses of this country by reason of the war which explain our pe-

cular interest. More significant still is the fact that, of the population of the United States, more than ten millions were born within the territory of the belligerents.¹ The influence, direct and indirect, of these millions permeates this whole country, and deepens our concern in what is taking place beyond the seas. The American people is thoroughly imbued with the idea that any avoidable war is a crime against humanity, and before we blame any of the contending powers, we must make every effort to ascertain what were the causes of the outbreak of the War of 1914.

2. Suggested and alleged causes of the war

The interest of the belligerents in the consideration of the causes of the conflict is much obscured by the all-pervading event itself. It is desirable to consider the causes of the war, if only to help avoid a repetition of the catastrophe. In the United States we are particularly well situated to make this the object of our study. Among the suggested causes of the war are — the monarchical form of government; exaggerated armaments; territorial ambition; England's repression of Germany and Germany's consequent jealousy; capitalistic organization of the state; seizure of private property at sea; tariff barriers; nervous tension resulting from successive alarms; political ignorance and mistrust; unequal speed of mobilization; division of Europe into two groups of alliances; displacement of the balance of power; secret diplomacy; Germany's refusal to join in mediation; Russia's premature mobilization against Germany; national hatred; patriotism; mystic conception of the state; deification of force; England's hesitation in siding with Russia and France.

All these reasons and many another have been adduced. If many English sympathizers declare that Germany in her

¹ This does not include a million and a half of Italians and many millions more of our citizens who have one or both parents from a belligerent country. (*United States Census Report*, on "Foreigners in the United States in 1910.")

lust for empire intended to wage a war for the domination of the Continent, the Germans answer that English jealousy, selfishness, and imperialistic designs threatened to strangle her rival's development. The pacifist blames the competition in armament, while the strategist gives an explanation diametrically opposed, to the effect that the unpreparedness of the *Entente* Powers invited attack, and that the inability of Russia to mobilize with speed forced the issue as soon as she made a move to prepare for her defense. For others, the cause is the inanity of the diplomats. Many a casual student of politics will take upon himself to give an offhand explanation of how certain statesmen or diplomatists might have acted so as to save the peace of the world.

The really significant thing about all these causes, maintained with such sincerity, is their variety, their independence one of another, one might say even their mutual exclusion. It shows that we are in the presence of a great tidal movement in the affairs of men which we find it difficult to appreciate because of the very fact that we are in it and part of it. Under the circumstances, it is very natural for each individual to fasten the blame upon the side with which he has least sympathy, and to select his particular phobia as the basic cause of the conflict.

3. *Displacement of the balance of power*

When everything is considered, it may perhaps be said that one of the most important contributory causes of the outbreak was the disturbance of the balance of power between the two groups, the Triple *Entente* and the Triple Alliance. Ever since the Congress of Vienna, Europe has been slowly working out its political evolution from the necessarily unstable condition of a number of nearly equal powers toward a division of these powers into two great groups.

Great Britain at first held aloof in "splendid isolation."

Later she found that even the two opposed groups on the Continent were gradually becoming conscious of the advantage which would result from sinking their immediate grounds of difference and forming a union to oppose any further extension of British power. The danger of this situation could not fail to impress Great Britain and make her all the quicker to perceive the community of interest which she had with France. Then came the growing rivalry with Germany to hasten the formation of the *Entente*. Without joining in a formal alliance, Great Britain was still true to her traditional policy in throwing her weight against the more powerful continental group, which included her most immediate rival, Germany. Great Britain's association with France was soon followed by an understanding with Russia to form the Triple *Entente*. This policy, taken in conjunction with England's friendly relations with the United States and her alliance with Japan, made it possible for her to turn her principal attention to the settlement of her outstanding differences with Germany. England and France, both rich, conservative powers, wanted to keep what they already had and to get rid of the intolerable burdens of increasing armaments. Germany, on the other hand, considered that disarmament would put an end to her imperialistic aspirations and leave her industrial development at the mercy of England and Russia — Russia with tremendous advantages in her millions of population, and England enjoying her superb geographical situation and her unparalleled financial strength. If Germany had had a Bismarck, she would have talked disarmament with the others, but deferred its actual execution until a satisfactory political adjustment should have been reached. As it was, Germany's refusal, in no uncertain tones, to entertain the thought of any limitation of armament, left to Europe as her only hope of peace the continuance of her system of balancing the Triple *Entente* against the Triple Alliance.

In spite of Germany's tremendous efforts toward the co-ordination and organization of her national strength, the Triple *Entente* was able to exert throughout the world an influence entirely overbalancing that of Germany and Austria. The strengthening of the bonds of union between the members of the *Entente*, the coöperaton of the French and English fleets, and the reorganization of the Russian navy, made it clear that time was working against the Triple Alliance, and that the balance would incline more and more to the side of the Triple *Entente*. The prospect of such a dislocation of the balance of power would have been enough in itself to threaten the peace of Europe, but the equilibrium was further disturbed by Italy's attack upon Turkey and her entering into an agreement with France and England in regard to Mediterranean waters.¹ One more blow was dealt to the tottering edifice when the Balkan allies carved up the Turkish territory in Europe. This was the situation when the crime of Serajevo came as the final jolt. Germany and Austria felt that they were face to face with a dilemma: either they had to accept the *status quo* at what they considered the dictation of the Triple *Entente* and resign themselves to the increase of Russian influence in the Balkans, thus endangering the existence of the Austrian Empire, or they had to strike at once before Russia became too powerful.² There were

¹ Italy held a position of balance between the different groups. Germany had not been willing to make the Triple Alliance cover the Mediterranean, so that Italy had to look for other support in that region. This necessity under which she lay of coming to an agreement with France and England made it possible for her to coquet with France without losing the advantage she derived from her alliance. This difficult rôle of balancing between opposing groups she has played with great skill. At Algeciras she deserted Germany, who could hardly complain at Italy's making use of her liberty of action in Mediterranean affairs, since it was Germany herself who had been unwilling to extend the Triplíce to include them.

² Prince von Bülow says of the Triple Alliance: "The three mid-European States are bound to each other by the firm resolve to maintain the existing balance of power in Europe, and should a forcible change be attempted, to prevent it if need be by force. The united strength of Middle Europe stands in the path of any revolution — any European policy which

many reasons why the situation in Russia, France, and England must have made Germany feel it a good time to strike. So good an excuse for war might not soon again be found, for Germany well knew that a Balkan question was not a vital matter for either France or England, and that England would not willingly be drawn into conflict for such a cause. The German Government seems to have had some hope that England would really hold aloof from the conflict, and that seems to have been the general public opinion throughout Germany. If England had remained neutral, Germany might have been able to increase the strength of the Triple Alliance at the expense of the Dual Alliance between Russia and France.

4. *The immediate causes of the war*

It is easy to recognize as a cause of the war the disturbance of the balance of power between the two European groups. What it really caused was not the war, but a condition of uneasiness and tension which made Germany apprehensive lest she be overpowered by the growing strength of the Triple *Entente* and thwarted in her plans looking to territorial and commercial expansion throughout the world, and, at the moment, through the Balkans into Asia Minor. This state of mind is, then, more truly a cause of the war than is the upsetting of the balance of power. Even so, we must still inquire what were the reasons why the conflict broke out at the particular time and in the particular way it did. In other words, what were the immediate causes of the war.

When we speak of causes, we mean ordinarily the causes resulting from voluntary action. That is what interests us, because by discovering and demonstrating wherein this voluntary action was irrational, we shall make it impossi-

might elect to follow the courses pursued by Louis XIV or Napoleon I. This alliance is like a mighty fortification dividing the Continent in two." (*Imperial Germany*, p. 67. New York, 1914.)

ble of repetition for rational beings. Whatever lies beyond this sphere of voluntary action is also beyond any possibility of blame or responsibility. It is like the play of natural forces.

We have seen how the separate links were forged in the chain of military preparation which involved the powers in quick succession in the coils of war. We find that the condition of Balkan affairs caused aggressive action of the Dual Monarchy toward its weaker neighbor; in the rivalry of Austria and Russia for the maintenance or extension of their influence in the Balkans, we discover the most cogent immediate cause for the break between these two states; while Germany was involved because she could not allow Austria to become engaged in an unequal struggle with Russia and Servia which would have weakened the Triple Alliance and her own influence. Because of the Dual Alliance and the similar need of maintaining the existing balance of power, France could not hold aloof. And Germany ought to have been sufficiently well informed to realize that England could not be relied upon to stand by and allow her partners in the *Entente* to be crushed, as Germany knew they would be if unsupported by England. She should, therefore, have realized that England would probably either come in at the start to protect France, or intervene later to prevent Germany from reaping the benefits of victory. Germany seems indeed to have understood that she could not count upon British neutrality without a definite engagement to that effect, for she made a "strong bid" to secure it, and no doubt she would have doubled or trebled this. England was not to be caught, however, and Germany had to reckon upon English intervention as one of the factors of the situation. With this great potential coalition staring her in the face, the necessity of getting in a telling blow before the *Entente* could collect its forces was of prime importance; and when we take into account the German point of view, philosophy of life, and espe-

cially the large influence of the military class, we see that it was inevitable that respect for Belgium's rights and Germany's own treaty obligations should be brushed aside in order that she lose no time in crushing France.

The consequence of England's refusal to enter into a binding agreement that she would remain neutral was the invasion of Belgium; and the invasion of Belgium, or rather Germany's refusal to give her promise that she would keep out, was again one of the principal causes of England's immediate rally to the support of the *Entente*.¹

If the logic of each of these steps be true, so that each made the succeeding inevitable, the first move would be the cause of all the others. By cause we mean, as has been said, the responsible cause; that is, the action which we look upon as having been voluntarily taken. If, therefore, we wish to get at the cause or causes of this conflict, we must, I repeat, examine in this successive widening of the area of conflict each step to see where there was any opportunity for a rational choice of action.

Looking at it from this point of view, we must conclude that Serbia and her Government could do nothing. The widespread hatred of Austria, and the bitter disappointment in Serbia at being checked by her from securing an outlet on the Adriatic, made it impossible for the Servian Government to hold in check the hostile propaganda directed against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Servian Government might, however, have instituted its own court of investigation of the Serajevo assassination, and this would have made it more difficult for Austria to present an ultimatum drawn in terms so extraordinarily harsh. I doubt, however, if this would have

¹ Since England's action depended upon what Germany promised, and Germany's action depended upon what England promised, it is evident that the real cause of German aggression against Belgium was the belief that England might intervene even if Germany kept out of Belgium, and the cause of the English intervention of August 2 in favor of France was the distrust of Germany and fear that she intended to invade Belgium.

had any real effect. In the first place, it would not have been possible to secure an unbiased and fair conduct of such an investigation on Servian soil, and even if the authorities at Belgrade had accomplished this impossible task, Austrian hatred and ambitions would have caused her to criticize the manner in which it was conducted, and would have accounted this an additional ground of complaint. However little sympathy we may have for the Servians, it is unjust to lay at their door the cause of the conflict. So far as it was able to control the action of the people, the course adopted by the Servian Government, under the leadership of their able Minister Pashitch, was admirable.

When, now, we come to Austria and Russia, we may say that either or both might by their action have obviated contributing causes of the conflict. Russia and Austria had each been intriguing by every possible means to increase its own influence in the Balkans at the expense of the other's. The last moves had all been in Russia's favor, and Austria was smarting at her loss of prestige and fearful for the preservation of the integrity of her empire. Even Russia took into account the difficulty of Austria's position, and, influenced by the *Entente* Powers and the broad vision of her Minister for Foreign Affairs, was led to coöperate in trying to find some way to protect Austria's vital interests without interfering with Austria's integrity and sovereign rights. A difficulty, perhaps, was that Austria probably considered that her vital interest required that she should be free to extend through the Sanjak of Novibazar toward Salonika. The death of M. Hartwig, the Russian Minister to Servia, seemed to remove one of the principal obstacles to the improvement of relations between Austria and Russia. Doubtless Austria was sincere when she said she would not annex any Servian territory, but Russia knew that if her rival were allowed to domineer over Servia, she could find some disguised way of continuing her advance

on Salonika without disturbing the nominal integrity of the Servian Kingdom.¹ We are, therefore, in the presence of a conflict in the policies of expansion. Serbia's propaganda directed against Austria's integrity, if it would not have justified a campaign of conquest against the Serbs, would have excused any measures of force which Austria found necessary to employ in order to establish a *modus vivendi* with her neighbor. If Russia chose to interfere, it would have been merely a case of one ambition in conflict with another. But the point where Austria is to blame — and I would emphasize it most strongly — is in the deliberate manner in which she concealed her intentions and tried to lull to rest the suspicions of the powers, while she prepared an ultimatum which she knew could not possibly be accepted. In this course of action she disregarded the well-recognized forms of diplomatic procedure, according to which one state, before it has recourse to measures of force against another, should state its grievance and give an opportunity for explanation and the voluntary elimination of the cause of complaint. It will be said that this is not a requirement of international procedure specifically set forth, but it will not be denied that it is the course adhered to by civilized states in their dealings with one another, and that, wherever there has been a departure from this method of procedure, it has met with the general condemnation of the society of states. Here, then, in first instance, we must place the blame for the whole war in which Europe is engaged.

Continuing, let us examine whether even after this blameworthy action, which it was the purpose of the conciliatory efforts of the powers to counteract, there were not other acts open to criticism. As soon as Austria presented her ultimatum, it was patent to all that Russia, unless restrained by fear, would hasten to protect her prestige in the

¹ For example, England has been the virtual sovereign of Egypt for years without disturbing the nominal sovereignty of the Porte.

Balkans and save her sister state from annihilation by the Dual Monarchy; and that this would bring in Germany, then France, and possibly England. Germany maintained that Russia by such action would be responsible for the subsequent widening of the conflict. But before blaming Russia for coming to the support of Serbia, we have to ascertain whether any other course lay open to her. Again I believe that it will generally be recognized that Russia could only have kept out of the conflict if some way had been found to prevent the subjugation of Serbia by Austria.

In all Balkan disputes the recognized method of procedure during the last few years has been either to leave the question to be adjusted by mutual agreement of Austria and Russia, or else, in case the problem proved too difficult, to confide it to a conference of the powers. In the present case Austria departed from this procedure and insisted on settling this Balkan question directly with Serbia, without the interference of any other powers, thus contributing another cause for the conflict. In this stand she was abetted by Germany, who, up to the time of the presentation of her ultimatum to Russia, insisted that the settlement of the Austro-Servian question be left to Austria alone. Furthermore, Germany refused to take part in a conference to discuss the question with the hope of reaching some solution. Mr. Asquith was certainly right in saying that if Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a mediatory conference of the four powers who were not directly concerned — Germany, France, Italy, and England — “had been accepted, the actual controversy would have been settled with honor to everybody, and the whole of this terrible welter would have been avoided.”¹ Germany did declare that she was willing to enter into a conference to consider a difference between Austria and Russia, but by refusing to consider that Russia could have any interest in the Austro-Servian dispute, she practically refused to enter into a mediatory

¹ Guildhall speech, September 4. (London *Times*, September 5, 1914.)

conference in regard to the only acute ground of difference which could be considered as existing between Austria and Russia. In taking a stand so opposed to what had been the practice in regard to the settlement of Balkan questions, Germany, it might have been supposed, would make every effort to suggest some equally effective means of preventing actual recourse to arms. Instead, she limited her conciliatory action to urging her ally to continue direct negotiation with Russia, and passing on to her the various suggestions advanced in the vain hope of preventing a war. In adopting this course, she assumed a very great responsibility, and because of the superior development and civilization of the German Empire as compared with the Austrian state, we must apportion to her for this mistake a still larger share of the blame for the terrible consequences.

I do not wish to be misunderstood as thinking that Germany really wished for war; but by her conduct she gave evidence that she intended to back up her ally to secure a diplomatic triumph and the subjugation of her neighbor, which would greatly have strengthened Teutonic influence in the Balkans.¹ She risked the peace of Europe in a campaign after prestige.

Germany accused Russia of making war inevitable by her mobilization just at the moment when, coöperating

¹ Bismarck said: "The Oriental crisis is undoubtedly the most likely to occur, and in this our interests are only secondary. When it happens, we are in a position to watch whether the powers, who are primarily interested in the Mediterranean and the Levant, will make their decisions and come to terms, if they choose, or go to war with Russia about them. We are not immediately called upon to do either. Every great power which is trying to influence or to restrain the policies of other countries in matters which are beyond the sphere of its interests is playing politics beyond the bounds which God has assigned to it. Its policy is one of force and not of vital interests. It is working for prestige. We shall not do this. If Oriental crises happen, we shall wait before taking our position until the powers, who have greater interests at stake than we, have declared themselves." (Speech of Bismarck, February 6, 1888, quoted from translation in *What Germany Wants*, by Edmund von Mach, pp. 86, 87. See *ante*, p. 107.)

with Sir Edward Grey, Germany had prevailed upon Austria to renew direct negotiations with Russia, and was prepared by way of concession to allow a conference of the powers to consider how a satisfactory arrangement with Servia might be effected. The German Government especially blamed Russia for ordering mobilization while the Kaiser, at the request of the Tsar, was trying to use his mediatory influence between Austria and Russia. By this premature mobilization Russia did, I believe, throw away the last remaining chance of peace. The question is, however, the most difficult of all the many knotty problems involved in the negotiations preceding the war. If Russia had continued to the last the extraordinarily conciliatory attitude which was hers up to the 28th or 29th of July, there might possibly — provided, of course, that Germany did not really intend to force a war — have been some way of maintaining peace. Since this precipitate military preparation on Russia's part could have been avoided, we must consider this also a rational cause of the war, and blame Russia accordingly. Yet never did country have greater provocation. After Russia's display of a most unusually conciliatory disposition, and after her declaration that Austria's invasion of Servia would be considered a *casus belli*, Austria was responsible for one high-handed act after another, while she refused every conciliatory suggestion. When at last Russia, in response to Austria's aggression against Servia, partially mobilized on her Austrian frontier, as she had previously declared she would do, Germany took umbrage. At first Germany had said that she would not consider partial mobilization against Austria a cause for war, but now she performed a *volte face* and in menacing tone declared that mobilization even against Austria rendered the situation very difficult. This action on the part of Germany, taken with Austria's refusal to continue direct negotiations and with her bombardment of Belgrade, not to forget the Austrian threat of a general mob-

ilization,¹ had no doubt worn out the patience of the Russian Minister and aroused feeling in Russia. In England, the natural consequence of the attitude assumed by Germany and Austria was to awaken indignation against the latter and sympathy with Russia. After Austria declared war against Servia, Sir Edward Grey spoke emphatically to Germany of the responsibility which she would incur by supporting Austria in her course of action. According to the statements expressed by the French and Italian diplomats, the effect of Sir Edward's warning on Germany was to influence her to a more conciliatory attitude, while in Germany it is believed that the result of the British Secretary's action was to convince Russia that she could count upon England's support, with the result that she became eager to enter upon the war. If this should prove to be the case, which I think is open to question, it would still have to be considered as the natural result of Germany's unjustifiable action in preventing recourse to the ordinary diplomatic procedure for the settlement of Balkan difficulties.

The last and more difficult question — that of England's intervention — has already been thoroughly discussed. It is unthinkable that she should have consented to tie her hands and remain out of the conflict no matter what the result; and, failing such an agreement, Germany was not willing to forego the advantage which she hoped to derive by invading Belgium. If England had wished to keep out of the war, this violation of Belgian neutrality was certain to make her come in, for the reasons previously discussed. Here again Germany is rationally to blame. If she had been willing to agree to remain out of Belgium and prosecute the war upon that condition, it is possible that England would have held aloof, except as regards her condi-

¹ Even if Austria did not issue the order for a mobilization until after Russia had done so, the Austrian threat to reply to Russia's partial mobilization by a general mobilization might be expected to hasten Russia's general mobilization. The effect of Austria's threat would be all the greater because of the difficulty in learning what was really taking place.

tional intervention in regard to her protection of the French coasts and shipping.¹

This plan of the German strategists to make France the hostage for Russia was well understood in France and England, and made it possible for France to remain on the defensive until attacked. Germany had to crush her without delay, and considered the route through Belgium the only feasible way. The objection to this plan was that it forced Germany to take upon herself the responsibility of aggression against France and the violation of Belgian neutrality.²

¹ It is said on all sides that a conflict between England and Germany was inevitable. I doubt it. It used to be said that a conflict between England and Russia was inevitable. Now that England is the ally of France and Russia, it is very natural for all three Governments to emphasize whatever tends to show that England would have joined with France and Russia in any event. The deep feeling of sympathy for an ally makes it difficult for Englishmen now to believe that they would have stayed out under any conditions.

² Professor Hans Delbrück makes this clear in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1915 (p. 238), in which he writes:—

“One very important advantage for Germany, at the outbreak of the war, lay in the fact that it could hardly be expected that Russia and France would be able to open hostilities simultaneously: the Russians, with their cumbersome mobilization, the enormous extent of their empire, and the thinly distributed network of their railways, would not be able to take the field until several weeks later than their allies.

“It was to be anticipated, therefore, that the French would first advance up to the Franco-German frontier (two hundred kilometres in length, and thickly invested by forts and fortresses), and would wait there, without assuming the offensive, until the Russians, arriving from the east, had obliged the Germans to divide their forces. Then, however, as the Germans have amply fortified their French frontiers with fortresses at Strassburg, Metz, and other places, the attack would have followed through Belgium, on the much more exposed lower Rhine.

“Of course, the German General Staff knew that, since they possessed the great mortars which subdued Liège, Namur, Antwerp, and the French northern fortresses, the French fortresses along the Vosges must fall also; but with these places protected by the whole French army, this would take so long that the Russians would have time to arrive. The only possibility of averting from Germany this hazardous double conflict was to break into France, across her much longer and less protected northern frontier through Belgium, and thereby gain such an advantage that a part of the army could be dispensed with and sent against the Russians. Although finally Germany did declare war on Russia because the latter was mobilizing in threatening force on the Austro-German frontier, this danger was in reality much greater than Germany imagined.”

Had Germany withdrawn twenty kilometres from her western frontier, and entrenched herself behind her defenses, she could have employed the greater part of her troops against Russia. In these conditions it is most likely that she could have relied on dividing English sympathy, and could, perhaps, have counted, with reasonable assurance, on the neutrality of England. England might have exerted some influence, not to say pressure, upon France to prevent her attacking Germany. Had France, nevertheless, gone to the assistance of her ally, the sympathy of the world would have been divided. Germany could have stood on the defensive, and could have gradually retreated, if necessary, until she had dealt with Russia.

The idea that England should guarantee the neutrality of France was fantastic, but this other plan would have worked advantageously for Germany. It may be answered that Germany could not be sure of her tremendous military superiority over other nations, and that she did not know how effectively entrenched troops could arrest the advance of greatly superior forces. The consequences of Germany's attack upon Belgium and France show the truth of what Bismarck said when he opposed a policy of aggression, that it was his "conviction that even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon us, and that we cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical development according to our own calculations."¹

It is very possible that the French and English statesmen might have hit upon some plan to prevent the outbreak of the war, but my thorough examination of the documents and my study of European politics has not made it possible for me to discover wherein that possibility lay. We must remember that the French and English statesmen, when they were confronted by Austria's *démarche* and Germany's subsequent stand, must have feared that

¹ Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. II, p. 101. London, 1898.

what Germany really intended was to precipitate a war. Certainly the manner of the Austrian procedure and the uncompromising stand which Germany took lent force to this view. It is evident from the French Yellow Book that the best-informed French diplomats were convinced that Germany intended war from the very start, and it is very possible that we may later learn that the English diplomats were of a similar opinion. Under the circumstances, then, whether or not the French and English statesmen were persuaded that Germany intended to precipitate a war, they had so to lay their course that no suggestion could be seized upon by Germany to force an issue. The French and Russians urged Sir Edward Grey to make common cause with them so as to influence Germany for peace. The result might, and very probably would, have been immediately to bring on war, and this would have been playing into Germany's hands if she intended war, and would have given her an immense advantage if she could have forced the issue at once without wasting several days in diplomatic negotiation.

There might have been one possibility: if Italy and England had declared that they would make war against the aggressor, and had insisted that the difference must be submitted to mediation, I believe that Germany must have yielded. There are indications in the dispatches that Italy was disposed to enter into some kind of diplomatic intervention in conjunction with England. A combination to fight for peace may, perhaps, under the circumstances, have been beyond the realm of possibility. Italy was the ally of Germany and might not have been willing to risk German resentment by taking such a stand,¹ and England, too, perhaps, did not wish to negotiate in such a

¹ Such an agreement between England and Italy could not, however, be considered contrary to the terms of a defensive alliance, to which the Triple Alliance was limited; but it has generally been considered that if the ally did not recognize the *casus fœderis*, she would, at least, remain neutral unless her own vital interests were directly attacked.

way that the aftermath would mean a continuation of bitter relations with Germany. Everything considered, therefore, it does not seem that we are in a position to say that Sir Edward Grey might so have acted as to avoid the war. It was his duty to conduct the affairs of England on the safest basis and according to what was best on general principles. He could not take some desperate chance which, in the light of after events, and looking backward, we may consider offered a possible means of avoiding the conflict.

5. The determining causes of the war

Since our consideration of the immediate causes, in so far as they were based on rational, as opposed to involuntary, action, leads to the conclusion that the countries responsible for the outbreak of the war were first, Austria, second, Germany, and to some slight degree, Russia, it becomes of interest to analyze what considerations or sentiments were decisive in determining these countries to pursue the courses they did. In other words, What was the situation or what were the conditions in each country which determined it to take the action upon which we place the responsibility for the war?

It will not be unjust, I think, to lay at the door of Germany the causes of whatever action was taken on the part of Russia and Austria to bring on the war, for Austria, being a less civilized and less highly developed state than Germany, is less responsible before the bar of public opinion for her unjustifiable violation of international procedure and disregard of the ordinary recognized method for the settlement of Balkan differences; and her ally, Germany, in standing between her and the diplomatic intervention of the other powers, assumed before civilization the full responsibility for Austria's action. By the same token, Germany must shoulder part of the responsibility for Russia's response of counter-military preparations in answer to Aus-

tria's aggression upon Servia. She incurred further responsibility when she changed her ground, and, instead of allowing Russia to effect a reasonable counter-mobilization against Austria, intimated in a threatening manner that she would consider such mobilization as endangering the relations with herself.¹ In the third place, her stand influenced England to support France, against what appeared to be unjustifiable browbeating on Germany's part. It follows, if my analysis has not been unfair to Germany on these various grounds, that she stands primarily responsible for the outbreak of the war, and it becomes of the greatest interest to understand who decided upon the various steps which determined her action. This question is much more difficult to answer than the preceding, because when we come to internal affairs we have a whole world in itself, with the resultant interplay of politics and intrigue between the different forces controlling the action of the state; whereas in international relations the resultant of these different forces finds expression through the recognized diplomatic organs of the Government, and we hold the Government responsible for the action of these agents. To find out who is responsible for any particular line of action is, as has been remarked, most difficult. However, we may discover the influence of certain factors, such as that of the military oligarchy.

There may have been certain men, like the German Ambassador at Vienna, whose uncompromising attitude helped to bring on the crisis and did nothing to appease it, but the search for any personal responsibility for the war will, I believe, prove unavailing. The causes are too complex, the responsibility too divided and widespread. In answer to our inquiry, we shall learn that the real cause of

¹ It seems probable that Russia was to blame for her hasty and excessive mobilization, but Germany's manner of conducting her negotiations was unjustifiably brusque. The recent publication of the Austrian Red Book discloses that Austria urged Germany to assume this menacing attitude toward Russia. (July 28, A.R.B. no. 42.)

the action of the German Government was a result of the state of mind of the nation. As a whole, the German nation thought and still thinks in a manner distinct from the rest of Europe. Because of Germany's geographical position, she suffered for centuries before she could constitute a German state; finally, in the course of European evolution, a period was reached when it was almost inevitable that a strong German state should be constituted, and again the weakness of Germany's geographical position made it necessary, as Sarolea has said, for her to have a strong army and a strong bureaucracy, both of which Prussia gave her.¹ Prussia herself was nothing but the survival of the state fittest to survive the peculiarly disadvantageous conditions of Central Germany. As leader of the Empire, she supplied the German states with the valuable results of her own political experience, and guided them, organized into a confederation, safely through the maze of European politics. Unfortunately for Germany, the statesman who successfully accomplished this great achievement trampled upon the constitutional privileges of his state. If he had not succeeded, he would have paid with exile or death; but when by "blood and iron" he had had his first great success in vanquishing Austria, enthusiastic delegates gave him a vote of confidence. No voice was longer raised to condemn his illegal acts.

The effects of these immoral acts upon the *Staatspolitik* and on the *Weltanschauung* of Germany have been, in my belief, very far reaching. It is an open question whether our entire moral system is not empirical in its nature, and this does but coincide with the doctrines of the pragmatists so widely accepted at the present time. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that this magnificent success of Bismarck should have impressed the imaginations of the peo-

¹ "Two things above all were required to make Germany into a powerful state — a strong army and a well-ordered administration. Prussia has given us both." (Charles Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem*, p. 91.) These words are put into the mouth of a German outside of Prussia.

ple of Germany — we may say, of the whole world. After Prussia under Bismarck had crushed Austria, there followed several years during which he guided the affairs of the Kingdom and of the German Empire. He was in the main outspoken, straightforward, and honest, as might be expected of a man of his intelligence and force of character; but occasionally he stooped to deceit, so subtly executed that it was not discovered by his victims. In the course of years, however, various bits of evidence were pieced together, and his own pride in achievement led him to disclose the methods he had pursued to confound his adversaries. We can well understand the influence of his example on every German youth. Instead of having held up before him the example of a Lincoln, or that other hero who could not tell a lie, the German youth was taught to admire the man who had trampled on the express provisions of the constitution, and the statesman who knew how to suppress a part of the truth,¹ in order to entrap an unprincipled sovereign into an aggressive war. Such an example must have exercised a potent influence in building up a *Realpolitik* — that is to say, a policy of dealing with concrete conditions as they are, as opposed to the following of ideals. But in the minds of many it means the justification of whatever succeeds. Since Bismarck “succeeded” in trampling the constitution under foot, the German people have naturally come to feel that the same procedure might apply to the law binding the nations in their relations to one another. Any statesman might, they think, violate any provision, however sacred, provided he could carry it through. We do not need to point out the application to the present war.

Still other factors have entered into the formation of this point of view. The necessity under which Germany

¹ I refer, of course, to the editing of the Ems dispatch. The unbiased sympathy of the world must be with Prussia at that crisis; France deserved little sympathy, but this does not change the moral effect upon the nation of Bismarck's action.

labors of maintaining a very large army has brought it about that war and the use of armed force is regarded with much higher favor than in other states of equal civilization. Added to this, it is generally conceded that since the accession of the present Kaiser there has been no real chancellor like Bismarck to hold the strategists in check; and although the Emperor has been a sincere worker for peace, which he preserved unbroken up to 1914, the predominant rôle which he plays as military leader of the nation makes it inevitable that the General Staff should exercise a great influence in determining his counsels.

These are some of the conditions which were responsible for a state of mind in Germany, in July, 1914, such as to influence her Government to assume its extremely uncompromising attitude. This refusal to coöperate with her sister states, among whom was her ally, Italy, must, I believe, place upon Germany the first and by far the heaviest responsibility for the war.

6. The world's answer

While every one is attempting to discover the causes of the war, the answer to the riddle is daily being indicated by the movement on all sides toward certain reforms designed to obviate the recurrence of a similar disaster. Everywhere we find in progress the substitution of international ideas, that is, world ideas, in place of the narrow national policy which has hitherto prevailed. Everywhere we hear talk of founding a world organization capable of eliminating the national differences responsible for this conflict. The idea has gained the support of statesmen and well-poised men of affairs.

Up to the present we have been living in an age of national states. The slow evolution of the national state, which began centuries ago in Europe, has reached its culmination in the examples we have before our eyes; but the idea of a national state is exclusive, when pushed to ex-

tremes, of the broader ideals of humanitarian coöperation. This idea of the organization of a national state, which was a crutch to help the development of humanity through one stage, has become a hindrance in the present stage of development. During the last decades the development of internationalism has gone on at a tremendous pace. This development has had to be carried on, one might almost say, in spite of the national states. The governments of the great national states have been intensely jealous of any interference with their sovereign rights, which, when pushed to an extreme, are destructive of the rights of other states. Of necessity they have had to agree to a certain amount of combination for uniform action; but they have resisted all the nobler, broader tendencies which threatened their own lower ideal of national perfection as opposed to the general interests of humanity.

In the Middle Ages, when the serf or laborer in each community had hardly any thought beyond the confines of his town, we find in certain respects a broader internationalism than at the present time. The ideal of chivalry was universal. The conception of the Catholic Church was more widespread than now and more nearly universal. The legal system of the Middle Ages transcended national or feudal divisions. It is only in modern times that the talents of the community have been turned to strengthening national development at the expense of the general interests of humanity.

7. *Formation of a Super-Empire*

Progressing along a course parallel with that of the national states, we find great empire states in which the national state has controlled the destinies of less powerful or less developed communities. These separate, national state empires have become the great politically independent groups of our day. The competition between national states has been transformed into a competition of these

larger units under the name of what is termed *Weltpolitik*. Among these we have Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany, Russia, and Japan; all extending their empires or political control widely over the habitable globe.

The means by which this extension has been accomplished are (1) seizure or acquisition of territory; (2) the throwing of a protectorate over a region, forming what is known as a protected state, which becomes part of the political system of the empire; and (3) the rendering of a country dependent on the financial and military support of the empire state. These different classes of territories might be designated as "owned," "protected," and "influenced." If we trace the evolution of the British Empire in this way, we find that Great Britain actually owns a great part of the globe, and protects another large portion, while many countries reckoned as independent are directly dependent upon her for the support which guarantees their political existence. A similar development may be traced with regard to the expansion of the other empires.

At the same time that this great imperial development has been slowly progressing, the great capitalistic and imperialistic states have come to realize more and more that, since the territory of the earth was pretty well preëmpted, the great desiderata of widely extended and capitalistic empires like those of England and France must be absolute security, to insure constant returns on their capital and to preserve uninterrupted the communications of the empire states with their dependencies, as well as the interrelations of the political groups of the empires among themselves. In other words, they have realized that their aims were one and the same, and the desire to get the biggest return for their effort has made them ready to cooperate in supporting one another, rather than to push their competition to the verge of a great conflict of arms. Great Britain has in consequence decided frankly to accept the Monroe Doctrine, — part of our own imperial-

istic concept, — and to leave the policing and protection of her own interests on this continent mainly to the United States. Her adoption of this policy liberated a considerable portion of her oversea fleet just when Germany began to push her naval construction, and allowed Great Britain to increase her own fleet for immediate maritime competition in Europe without undertaking the tremendous outlay necessary to keep up the old two-power standard of British naval strength.

The next step for Great Britain was the result of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Japan and England found desirable a defensive alliance for mutual protection against the possible designs of Russia on India and the Far East. In reality this defensive alliance went further than the mere terms of its articles would indicate. The understanding upon which it was based allowed Great Britain to leave to Japan to a great extent the policing of her interests in China and the Pacific in the same way that she had previously decided to entrust the protection of her interests in the American continent to the United States.

After almost coming to war with France at Fashoda in 1898, Great Britain turned round in 1904 and formed with her the *Entente Cordiale*. Shortly after this she withdrew a large portion of her Mediterranean fleet, leaving to France in great part the protection of her interests in the Mediterranean, and allowing France in return to withdraw her fleets from the Channel and the Atlantic.

The next stage, brought about through France, was an agreement of Great Britain with Russia to lay their strife in Persia by an apportionment of their spheres of influence, leaving to Persia a buffer strip in the middle.

We find, therefore, at the period of the outbreak of the war, that the American, Japanese, French, and Russian Empires had joined in a coöperative division of spheres of influence with the British Empire, so that there is, in fact, a super-empire composed of all this great organiza-

tion. The basic idea of this empire is that the interests of all in every part of the world shall be cared for by the representative able to act on the spot in the most effective manner — all for the purpose of securing a reasonable observance of the rules of international intercourse. This is an organization for coöperation and the enforcement of international law in the interest of the general prosperity and the greater security of these military and financial empires. This combination allows each empire to restrict its armament to the minimum required for the defense and development of the interests to be protected in its immediate sphere, and has made it possible to avoid the increasing of naval armament at the same rate as the increase of international relations and international commerce.

While this movement has been going on, it has been impossible to lose sight of the possibility of a great war in which one or more of the empires in this super-empire might be involved. The danger of this war was well known to lie in the rivalry between the Triple *Entente*, or the European part of the super-empire, and the Triple Alliance, which includes the only remaining great empire¹ and the only one which has not seen her way to join in this co-operative action and division of the police work of the world. Germany has considered that she could not be content with her position relatively to the other empires, and this discontent with her lot has revealed itself in a pushing of her armament to the greatest extent that her economic resources would bear. Having acquired her national unity later than the others, Germany has been inclined to over-

¹ We cannot call the Triple Alliance a second super-empire because Germany is the only state in the group which is an empire in the same sense as are the other empires, i.e., that has interests in all parts of the world. Italy is rapidly acquiring such a position, and, in so far as she has done so, she has come to an understanding with France and England in regard to her oversea possessions. As for Turkey and Austria, they may be considered as coming within the sphere of German influence and constituting to this extent a part of the German Empire. The Chinese Empire is momentarily in some danger of disintegration.

value this achievement. Her success in reaching results through her efficiency in armament, and her need of a stout defense, owing to her unfavorable geographic position, have led Germany to force the pace of armaments.

She has preferred to turn the cold shoulder to the invitations to join in the development of this great super-empire, which would thus have been rounded out to the long-dreamt-of world state, — this super-empire composed of six great empires: Britain, America, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan, united in a bond as loose and elastic as that of the Triple *Entente*, yet strong through its efficiency to perform the work of humanity as a whole.

8. *The "peace power"*

The gradual apportionment of the earth to the spheres of influence of certain empires requires as a corollary that in its sphere each empire should protect the rights of all the others according to the recognized principles of international law. When, in the face of unjustifiable conduct upon the part of a wayward or less civilized government, the overlord or responsible empire makes an appeal to force, this action can be no longer designated as war, but should be considered as an act of international police — an exercise of what we might call the "peace power."¹ For international peace must be based upon respect for the principles of international law. A great majority of the reasonable pacifists to-day recognize this distinction, and approve the use of force where force is applied to compel respect for international law.² The greatest weakness in this system of

¹ This designation of "peace power" was suggested to me as better than the term "police power" ordinarily employed. I think there are evident reasons for the use of "peace power" instead of "police power," which is also employed in municipal affairs. We might then speak of recourse to force for political purposes as "war power."

² There is much loose reasoning in regard to the use of force in international relations. One party of extremists, headed by the great Tolstoi, has advocated the doctrine of non-resistance, confident that through its inherent truth an idea will persist and conquer; whereas recourse to force will

applying force is the facility with which a government may make use of it as an excuse to cloak some extra-judicial, and hence purely political, design. This difficulty has led governments of good intention to call upon other governments to join with them in substituting joint intervention in place of their own independent action, because joint action is less likely to be for the purpose of abuse.

In the regulation of recent international difficulties there have been numerous instances of this collective action, as for example the action of the powers in China, 1901.

In the Austro-Servian dispute it was the peace power which Austria claimed the right to exercise in regard to Servia; but as her situation made it seem very probable that

stir up opposition and confirm the ignorant and the transgressors in their evil course. As a result of the war now in progress, the most rational supporters of this policy have modified their opinion, without giving up their belief in the necessity of an active propaganda for the peaceful settlement of international difficulties and the avoidance of all causes of strife. Many of these pacifists now believe that international peace can be secured only through the establishment of an international court backed up by an armed force supplied by the independent states. The advocates of this view fall into other errors almost as serious as those of the former non-resistance pacifists whom they replace. The organization of such an international force in the form generally proposed is entirely impracticable.

In the first place, it could hardly be made sufficiently powerful to impose its will without opposition upon the strongest states. A country like the United States would not, in the case of a fundamental question where its conscience was thoroughly aroused, yield to any organized force, though it were the combined armament of three great European powers. The mere anticipation that force will be applied stirs up passions which will yield only before an irresistible force, and such an irresistible force as exists in municipal affairs cannot at present be considered as a practical basis for the police force of an international organization. The states would fear that it might become a veritable international Prætorian guard. Even if we admit that such a force might be constituted, of sufficient strength to impose the decisions of the permanent international court upon all the world, international politics would center round the securing of the appointment of officers who, in the employment of the force under their control, would show a partiality for the partisans of certain opinions. For the present, the safest course to pursue is to establish a permanent international court, and leave the enforcing of its decrees to the public opinion of the world. In the last analysis, public opinion is always the force which exacts compliance with the decrees of every tribunal. (See John Bassett Moore: Opening Address at the 21st Lake Mohonk Arbitration Conference, 1915.)

her action would not be strictly limited to this function, but would cover a political purpose as well, the less interested powers came forward with various proposals, hoping to set in motion collective action for the proper application to Servia of the peace power. Austria and Germany, however, denied the right of the other states to interest themselves in the dispute. They thought that, since the other powers recognized that Servia was at fault, Austria should be allowed a perfectly free hand to impose upon Servia conditions which would guarantee for the future due respect for the rights of the Dual Monarchy. This stand would have been logical if Servia had been within the Austrian sphere of influence, as Austria seemed to believe should be the case.

9. *Germany's nationalistic conception*

While the coöperating empires were elaborating this vast machine of international control to protect the interests of civilization and maintain the peace of the world, Germany, having lately achieved her national unity, looked to the national state as the be-all and end-all of political achievement. This arrested conception of political philosophy has had important practical effects. It has made the Germans feel very bitter because all of the great German emigration of the past became absorbed in other political units and was lost as a factor in their national influence. Another serious consequence has been that, while the rest of the world is thinking in terms of international coöperation,¹ Germany is actuated by ideals of national aggrandizement. The American mind can hardly understand how a German can look upon it as a benefit that heroic little Belgium should be destroyed, even though the German Empire prosper thereby. From the international point of view they are both useful administrative divisions or agents of

¹ Cf. the arguments of the Athenians in their discussion with the Melians, Documents, *post*, chap. XIII.

humanity. On the other hand, if Germany had absorbed Turkey, enlightened opinion in England and elsewhere would quickly have agreed that she was merely taking up the administrative burden of the world and acting for the general good.

The political ideals of Germany and those which we have traced in the formation of the super-empire, being opposed, soon came into conflict. The rest of the world was not willing to turn back the hand of progress and return to the old ideas which they had left behind. Were the growing pains of the Venezuela Message, of the Fashoda incident, of the Dogger Bank to be so soon forgotten? They could not, if they would, have stemmed the onward march of a more perfect political organization on the basis of the supremacy of international over national laws.

Germany was at a parting of the ways, and had to choose between two courses. Either she could bend her policy toward the conservation of her resources, frankly recognizing the inevitable consequences of her geographical situation, which handicapped her in the rôle of a world state, or she could branch out into a policy of search after prestige, with the consequent modification of her situation. If she decided upon the first course, the corollaries would have been to attempt to reach some agreement with France to heal the still open wound of Alsace-Lorraine, and, instead of resisting their expansion, to support England and France in all action tending to affirm and solidify their established control over their extensive dominions. To this end she would have stood with England for a most rigid adherence to the binding force of treaties, and she would have coöperated with England, France, and the United States in the gradual and reasonable extension of obligatory arbitration and the rapid improvement of the procedure of international relations. She would have reverted to that ancient treaty negotiated by her King Frederick the Great and the philosopher Franklin to make

inviolable private property at sea. The strengthening of the ties between the great empires would have made it possible for Germany to bring to bear a strong influence for the "open door" and the lowering of tariffs throughout the world.

However, Germany gave her decision for the opposite course, and determined to create for herself a larger "place in the sun." Especially she aspired to acquire part of the colonies preëmpted by the empires earlier on the field. With such aims it was natural that she should oppose every tendency which strengthened the *status quo*. She went as far as possible in denying the binding force of international law in general.¹ She was unwilling to see international obligatory arbitration embrace the relations of all the states, and she did everything to enhance the respect for might as the foundation of right to hold. She pushed her armaments, and commenced building a great navy, to protect her world-wide commerce. By refusing to work for the adoption of a rule establishing the inviolability of private property at sea, the German Government accepted the responsibility for leaving the vast German merchant fleets at the mercy of the chance of war. The only object was to stimulate enthusiasm for an extensive naval equipment and to make it possible to strike England's weakest

¹ Of course the diplomatic representatives of Germany have not stultified themselves by proclaiming such a theory, but in Germany we find much support for the thoroughly untenable and elsewhere discredited theory of *Kriegsraison*, according to which the laws of war may be set aside in the case of military necessity. A recent illustration of this peculiar nationalistic myopia is found in an article by the distinguished German professor of international law, Dr. Niemeyer, of Kiel University, whose article is translated in the *Michigan Law Review* for January, 1915. He maintains that the 1839 treaty for the neutralization of Belgium must yield before this *Kriegsraison*.

Germany admits the existence of rules of international law, but has in general resisted the development of institutions for their effective enforcement. The result of this policy would be to leave the international law rights of the weak at the mercy of the strong, and to make the strong judge in his own case. We should have, as a consequence of this system, as many different systems of international law as there were powerful states, which shows the *reductio ad absurdum* of the German contention.

spot. Germany hoped to be able in case of war to threaten England's communications and food supply.

In this pursuit of prestige and national expansion, Germany was anxious to acquire new territories, but as she came late into the field, there was very little left for her to glean. Wherever she turned she found some European power well established; and since she had no thought of being barred by this preëmption of the face of the earth, she had to consider where best she could secure the land she coveted. There were several possibilities. She would have preferred, of course, to avoid a conflict with England, and at first turned her thoughts in other directions. There was the great basin of the Congo; but England and France preferred that the King of Belgium should retain its control, rather than have Germany thrust in between them. To have seized the Dutch possessions would again have involved England. From all of South America Germany was shut out by the Monroe Doctrine unless she would do battle with the United States. Accordingly, she directed her attention toward the possessions of the Sublime Porte, and with the help of her able ambassador at Constantinople, the late Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, was able to acquire and maintain an ascendancy over the Turk. It is much to be regretted that the opposition which the other powers were able to exercise at Constantinople was successful in thwarting the development of her plans. This caused Germany to look toward Morocco. Thence she had to withdraw before the combined opposition of England and France. These various checks to Germany's diplomatic policy embittered her citizens and produced a state of mind largely instrumental in influencing her Government to take the uncompromising attitude which was the immediate cause of the war.

Germany, like the vigorous organism that she is, felt the life throb in her veins, a consciousness of strength to do. Her superabundant vitality was evident through her

rapidly growing population, which was due in part to the continued maintenance of a birth-rate high as compared with other equally developed and civilized countries, and in part to the lowering of the death-rate as a result of the efficient paternalism of the German Government.

This great increase in population made it necessary for Germany to consider the policy she would adopt. Could she continue her phenomenal industrial development so as to find employment for her increasing millions, and so as to be able to continue her programme for the progressive uplifting of her masses? Certain signs made her doubt the possibility of maintaining the same rate of increase of industrial development which had hitherto made it possible to absorb the increase of population. In this predicament, three courses of action lay open to the German people.

First, — the simplest and most natural, — was the traditional solution of allowing the surplus population to emigrate. But the German people have resented the loss of their good German stock in the past through emigration. They have remarked that in all parts of the world the German has become a good citizen of his adopted country and has been lost to the Fatherland. It has become a conscious part of German policy to find some means of keeping the whole German population within German governmental control. If Germany had good colonies, the solution would be simple.

The second solution was that which has been adopted in other highly civilized communities, — commonly known as race-suicide, — which means, of course, the restricting of the number of children so as to maintain for the offspring the same or a better standard of living than that enjoyed by the parents. France is the classical example of this system. The idea is revolting to the German consciousness. The Germans are willing to restrict the number of children in the interest of the best development of

the whole German people. They do not advocate that the family should be so large as to make a drudge of the mother with her poverty-stricken horde of children; but they do believe that the family should be large enough to give the fullest enjoyment of motherhood and fatherhood, and to supply every German child with the beautiful companionship of brothers and sisters. And so Germany is not willing to follow in the path of France and our own New England. If she had accepted the *status quo* and bound herself to take no aggressive action, the increase of her population must have been arrested or it would have worked disaster in the Fatherland through the cut-throat competition it would have engendered.

In the face of this alternative, Germany preferred the larger, fuller national life to the quiescent acceptance of the status in which she found herself. She preferred the third solution, which was to make an appeal to her teeming millions to hack their way to a larger place in the world. She was not deterred by the fact that she must rend the prize from the grasp of another state, whose philosophy of race-suicide she considered merited such a fate.

Having decided for this fuller life, even at the cost of the world-condemnation which would follow her aggressive attempts to seize the territory of others, she attempted to secure the results through threats of force without its actual employment. She played for a diplomatic victory over Servia and so on beyond the Balkans into Asia Minor.

If England and France could have been sure that once Germany had expanded over these regions she would subscribe to their own philosophy of the *status quo* and not take advantage of this increase in strength to make it a fulcrum for a further advance, they could, doubtless, have reached some agreement with her, but each side mistrusting the other's purpose, it was most difficult to reach any

compromise. Germany, impatient and apprehensive of delay, said, "I will expand, even at the cost of aggression. If need be I will seek my 'place in the sun' at the point of the sword." To this the Anglo-French super-empire, defending the *status quo*, replied, "Thou shalt not expand until thou puttest aggression behind thee." The issue is being fought out.

10. *Nationalism and internationalism*

Under the old conception of independent and rival national states, we had groups of men swayed by antagonisms to one another, traceable to opposition of interests; in the course of time, other conditions being equal, one such group would be eliminated, which is another way of saying that there is a tendency in the long run for the action of a group of individuals to be based upon their material interests. Where action necessary to the protection of such interests is opposed to the action necessary for the protection of other interests, we may in general predicate a conflict of the groups supporting the opposed interests. When we consider what is the direct motive of the antagonism, we find that it is not so much the interest as a different way of thinking, though in the long run this difference of thinking will arise from the conscious or sub-conscious appreciation of difference of interests, — which restates our previous remark that antagonisms have a tendency to be the expression of differences of interests. Since, as we have seen in the preceding section, Germany's interest was to secure more territory, and since this could only be accomplished by aggression, her interests supported aggression, — which means that she would oppose all rules of international law tending to confirm rights of possession. This she did through the doctrine of national necessity, — that is to say, whatever is necessary for national salvation as interpreted by the state is permissible, — and so we find that the German theory of the superi-

ority of national needs over international rules conforms with her understanding of her interests.¹

We must not, however, confuse that difference of interest which may be the fundamental or underlying cause with the immediate ground of difference, which is psychological. Individuals and groups of individuals differ because they have different ways of thinking, and this it will be found is the real reason for the great human conflicts. Religious wars have been most bitter because the difference of opinion touched upon the most vital questions of human thought. One reason for the peculiarly dreadful nature of civil conflicts is that the disagreement in point of view between the two factions has been more thoroughly brought out and emphasized by the associations and inter-relations of the opposed factions.

The great states of to-day are composed of individuals of all degrees and kinds of opinions, so that an individual will often find closer relations between himself and certain other individuals in a neighboring nation, in regard to the questions which he holds most important, than he will among the generality of citizens of the state to which he belongs. This interrelation of ideas binding the world together by a philosophical network is the only real foun-

¹ Germany, being a highly developed, civilized state, had to observe the rules of international law in her intercourse with her sister states. She found a workable system to obviate the inconveniences of her philosophy by strictly observing the rules of international law, making a reservation only in those exceptional cases when it should be necessary to consummate her national aims. Up to the outbreak of the war, jurists of other countries refused to believe that Germany meant her theory of state necessity seriously. They thought it a half-baked theory due to a lack of critical appreciation and understanding of the true meaning of international law. They realize now the sincerity of the views expressed by German writers on international law and their general acceptance by German men of affairs. Had the world appreciated sooner the true significance of these views and the firm determination of the German Government to apply them, it would have retaliated against her. It would not have continued international relations with her on the same basis as with the other states which accept a common system based upon the supremacy of international law over the needs and policies of any separate state.

dation for considering humanity as a unit. But when a war intervenes, we witness a mental mobilization analogous to the wonderful military transformation previously discussed. The individual oppositions and diversities of opinion for the most part disappear, and in the peculiar psychological condition which prevails, the individuals of the highest mental endowment accept without question the views which are in part the officially promulgated views of their government. These must of necessity in such instances either be in harmony with the prevailing sentiments of the community, or based upon them. To analyze the causes of this peculiar mobilization would carry us too far afield, but if we apply the ever-ready explanation of the evolutionist, we may consider that the communities which lack this power of war-thought could not present an undivided front to the enemy, so that, in the course of countless generations, the surviving representatives of those states possessing the fittest conditions for survival in this world possess this marvelous faculty of united war-thought. The rapidity and the thoroughness with which this mental mobilization can be effected will depend upon many conditions, which it would be interesting to analyze, if space allowed. One of the most important is doubtless the degree of the general realization of the danger with which the community is threatened.

In the present war, Germany has given the most wonderful example of this mental mobilization, for the whole German people have united themselves in support of the fundamental ideas which lie at the basis of Germany's political action — that is, a worship of the national existence expressed in an almost mystical adoration for the state. The rest of the world, perhaps because it has passed through the national stage of development and takes a broader outlook, thinks differently from Germany. Since this difference of thought had gradually been uniting the greater part of the civilized world — with the exception of

Germany — into a company for collaboration on the basis of the unity of mankind, sometimes spoken of as internationalism or international coöperation, this great difference of opinion has become the fundamental basis of separation between the two great masses of men now fighting by land and sea. This difference of point of view explains why Germany's intense national feeling made her oppose every attempt to restrict the freedom of individual state action. Her mystical conception of the divine position of the state prevented Germany from joining with the other powers to hasten the advance of international coöperation. With remarkable consistency Germany remained true to this religion and opposed the various efforts of the other nations to strengthen the actual situation, known as the *status quo*. The Germans saw no reason why they should voluntarily limit the freedom of development of the German state so as to coöperate with England and France in reaffirming this *status quo*.¹ Since they had to recognize

¹ Germany maintains that England's policy was directed toward maintaining the balance of power on the Continent while she remained supreme on the seas. If Germany means that England's policy was to protect the weaker states on the Continent against armed aggression and conquest, no doubt this was true. In his speech of December 2 before the German Reichstag, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said: "The whole situation was as follows: England was willing to come to an understanding with us in individual questions, but the first principle always was that Germany's free development of strength must be checked by the balance of power."

Mr. Asquith has explained that in 1912 England offered the German Chancellor an understanding neither to make nor join in any aggression upon Germany; but the Chancellor asked for a pledge that England would remain neutral whenever Germany went to war. (*London Times*, January 27, 1915.) This shows that England no longer wanted to maintain her old traditional policy of aggressive intervention to impose a balance of power on the Continent, but merely sought to insure herself and France against any attempt on the part of Germany to take from any state its possessions by force. The field of fair commercial competition, in which Germany was succeeding so marvelously, lay open to her.

In his Guildhall speech Mr. Asquith said: "Let me now turn to the actual situation in Europe. How do we stand? For the last ten years, by what I believe to be happy and well-considered diplomatic arrangements, we have established friendly and increasingly intimate relations with two powers — France and Russia — with whom in days gone by we have had in various

that in the affairs of nations the international point of view was necessarily paramount to the national, it was their policy to minimize, in every way, the place of international law. Instead they would set up a right of the strong to control, not, as many think, with brutal excesses, but restrained by a mystic realization of responsibility for the proper application of this force; but what the German mind would not admit was that any control should be placed on the exercise of this force by the voice of any majority. The strong individual, whether man or nation, was to hold a larger freedom in his action because of his superior qualities. The opponent of this point of view considers that its danger lies in the fact that there exists no guaranty that the physical force will be combined with the high moral qualities requisite for the effective control of its employment; since the possessor of physical power might not, perhaps, recognize or admit his own imperfections, but proceed to employ the force at his own will, society would be in imminent peril. To have met this very need has been the culminating triumph of efforts toward the establishing and perfecting of constitutional government. Germany, however, does not appreciate the results of all this human experience, and has refused to allow the society of nations to transfer into the domain of international law those

parts of the world occasions for friction, and now and again for possible conflict. These new and better relations, based in the first instance upon business principles of give and take, matured into a settled temper of confidence and good-will. They were never in any sense or at any time, as I have frequently said in this hall, directed against other powers." (London *Times*, September 5, 1914.)

In spite of this difference of aim the British and German Governments had made real progress toward settling their differences and might have discovered the basis for a long peace if they could have passed this latest and most acute Balkan crisis. When Germany began building her great fleet in the late nineties, it was evident that England would strike very quickly if she intended aggression for a preventative war. Similarly, Germany had to strike in 1914 before Russia and France should become still stronger, or resign herself to accept coöperative action on the basis of the *status quo*. That would have meant the renunciation of all hopes of expansion by force of arms or threat of arms.

restrictions upon the exercise of the national will which, in municipal affairs, have grown up within the modern constitutional states. And so, at the Second Hague Conference, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein opposed the adoption of a general convention of obligatory arbitration, much to the disappointment of the great majority of the delegates there assembled. Furthermore, Germany refused to consider the possibility of limiting her armament by land or sea. Regarding the obligation to respect treaties, Germany has compromised; she has realized full well that any intercourse with her sister states was impossible on any other basis than the respect for treaties, so that, if we except the violation of Belgian neutrality, she has stood high in the faith with which she has observed her obligations. Nevertheless, the general tendency of Germany's action and the opinions expressed by German jurists has been to place the observance upon the grounds of more immediate interest; that is, policy, rather than upon the idea of a sacred obligation. The German system is being put to its own test of effectiveness on the high seas and on the plains of Europe. To me the German view seems an anachronism, and, taking into consideration all the aspects of the subject, the greatest error of mankind; nevertheless, I must admit as a general principle that, where great masses of men have been willing to lay down their lives for an ideal, the results have demonstrated that they were not wholly wrong.

If, as I say, there may be truth on either side, this great country of ours, with its many millions of German citizens and sympathizers, will not fail to have it fully presented; nor, when we remember the hold that liberal democratic doctrines have upon this country, and the part we have taken in international coöperation, the great development of internationalism among our citizens, and the aid our Government has given in maintenance of the principles of international law, will there be any danger that we shall

be led to give an undue place to the narrowing doctrine of nationalism as opposed to internationalism.

11. The results

Germany has clearly violated international law, and, if she does not succeed, even for the moment, in escaping punishment, the lesson will be as salutary as the example of Bismarck was deleterious. Meantime, the manner in which she has held the rest of Europe in check compels the admiration of all beholders. If Europe learns to realize the necessity of finding some means to organize an efficient bureaucracy without destroying the freedom of individual initiative, while Germany learns to take a more cosmopolitan and less nationally narrow point of view, the world may enter upon a new era of efficient government.

Should Germany be successful in carrying out the theories of her Government, and her people, after the war enthusiasm is past, continue to support the Government, which has put through its projects in disregard of its treaty obligations and of the peaceful existence of the individuals composing another nation, the student of events, seeking with impartial view, will have to admit that we are not yet ready for any great step forward; that it is too early to recognize the practical existence of the society of humanity as such, including all peoples. He will perceive that the high-water mark of achievement possible under present conditions is the perfected national state after the type of Germany, where the whole nation to a man unites with absolute devotion and training which indicates science and character. He may regret that the other states which have earlier achieved this national union and passed on, looking toward the next stage, have been doomed to disappointment. Just as for centuries the Germans who dreamed of a great national German state had to be content with a political grouping into smaller and less national units and endure all the inconveniences of such a condition, so must


we sink with despair to that lower level. He will, perhaps, discover, in such an event, that we rushed on with too much hope and idealism, and without a just sense of proportion.

The world will adjust itself to all the miseries of a patchwork of jealous and independent states and wait for the next step, until a broadened experience and a more uniform advance in civilization throughout the world have made it possible to build, on a firmer, saner foundation, a nobler edifice of human government.


But before we yield up our cherished ideals, we will strive, by force of arms if necessary, to meet the force which that marvelously perfected national state has thrown against the foundation of our international order. We will help to overthrow the projects of such a government and recognize none that will not live within the same community of common international ideals.

In the mean time, we are in the midst of a contest between the two great rival systems of thought — national and international — which will be settled in a treaty of peace which is a compromise, as every treaty of peace has always been. In any great conflict neither side has all of the truth, and this new compromise may well be a nearer approximation to the facts of actual conditions, and constitute a better working basis of agreement, in accordance with which the nations of the world may dwell in more perfect peace.

Let us not forget that every ounce of strength that is put forth to defend and maintain the views we believe in will weigh in the balance when the discussion of the terms of peace shall come.



PART III
DOCUMENTS AND EVIDENCE



CHAPTER XII

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question: — Did Austria intend to precipitate the war?

Answer: — If by intent to precipitate the war is meant to bring on a war in any event, we must answer, no. But if we mean, Did Austria take action so as to necessitate a war unless Serbia consented to abase herself, as no independent state could do and yet retain its claims to the respect of the other states? — we must answer that Austria did intend to precipitate a war. Austria, besides imposing humiliating conditions, demanded that Serbia would immediately cease a propaganda which it was practically impossible for her Government to prevent. Thus Austria made it necessary for Serbia to accept her dictation and to become a vassal state if she would avoid a war.

Question: — Was Austria's ultimatum to Serbia intended to be accepted?

Answer: — The form in which the Austrian ultimatum was drawn up, the short delay accorded, and the subsequent action of Austria, make clear that the Austrian ultimatum was intended to be unacceptable to Serbia.

Question: — Was Austria's action toward Serbia reasonable?

Answer: — Austria's action was unreasonable in that she attempted to deal with Serbia, an independent sovereign state, almost as though she were an Austrian province in rebellion. Her action was unreasonable because for many years past it had been recognized that any change in the Balkan affairs was the concern of Europe in general and of Austria and Russia in particular. The assassination of the heir to the Dual Monarchy gave Austria serious ground of complaint against Serbia, but by no means justified her recourse to such extreme measures. Almost any other state would have departed from a conduct strictly reasonable under a similar provocation, and in the face of a similar danger. The manner of Austria's action was at fault rather than the nature.

Question: — Did France first cross the Franco-German frontier?

Answer: — The German Government, in its official correspondence, claims that France first crossed her frontier and was guilty of other acts contrary to international law, making her the aggressor in the Franco-German conflict. As yet it has been impossible to obtain any evidence substantiating this charge, while France has made out by far the best *prima facie* case, because the diplomatic correspondence contains the statement of her Government that she had withdrawn all her troops ten kilometres from the frontier so as to avoid any possibility of conflict with Germany.

Question: — Did France do her whole duty in restraining Russia from endangering the continuance of peace by mobilization?

Answer: — The French Government apparently was so convinced that

Austria's action was intended as an attack on Russia's position in the Balkans, and that Germany would back up Austria, that from the start she made clear to Germany her intention of supporting her ally. Even Germany herself recognized that France did not wish for war. The best evidence of France's peaceful intentions is derived from her action in 1909, when she threw her influence against war, although there was a strong feeling on the part of the *Entente* Powers that Austria, in her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had been guilty of unjustifiable procedure affecting the vital interests of all European powers. Similarly, in 1913, France used her influence for peace in the Balkans. Nevertheless, France does not seem to have been as active in working for peace during this crisis as England and Italy. The reasons for her attitude are made clear in the French Yellow Book. She believed the only hope for peace was for the *Entente* Powers to make a firm resistance to the Austro-German demands. This attitude prevented France from exercising a wholesome restraint upon Russia in regard to a premature mobilization.

Question: — Did France violate, or intend to violate, Belgium's neutrality?

Answer: — Germany has declared that she had proof that France intended to violate Belgium's neutrality. She alleged that French aviators flew over Belgian territory and that France intended to attack Germany by traversing Belgium. Germany has not, as yet, adduced any evidence worthy of the name in support of these claims. Even when the German minister aroused the Belgium Foreign Office in the dead of night during the period that the twelve hours of the German ultimatum to Belgium were running, because he wished to notify them of the violations of international law of which France was guilty, he did not assert that those violations had occurred on Belgian territory. It is conceivable that France may have prepared elaborate plans for traversing Belgium to attack Germany, to be used only in case Germany should be guilty of an unmistakable and serious violation of Belgium's neutrality. Germany's allegations against France have been so frivolous as to create a prejudice throughout the world. The world has had more respect for the straightforward declaration of the Chancellor that Germany's action was based upon "necessity, which knows no law." The best answer to these claims of Germany is the fact that even after Germany had entered Belgium's territory, it was several weeks before the French troops could come up to render assistance.

Question: — Did the German Government know the contents of the Austrian note to Serbia before it was presented?

Answer: — I am convinced that the German Government spoke the truth, and that the note was not previously communicated. From an examination it would seem probable that this ignorance was prearranged. Cf. the Documents, *post*, chap. XIII.

Question: — Did Germany do everything reasonably possible to avoid war?

Answer: — Germany certainly did make serious efforts to avoid war, but they seem, though sincere, to have been misdirected; for example, her

desperate effort at the last moment to mediate between Austria and Russia. But Germany refused to employ the most natural and effective means of avoiding war by referring the question in dispute to a general conference, and, whatever her reasons, she backed her ally in persisting in a course contrary to the generally recognized canons of international procedure. Such conduct was very likely to force a war.

Question: — Was Germany the first to cross the French frontier?

Answer: — The evidence seems to indicate that Germany certainly was the first to cross the French frontier, especially in view of the French Government's declaration that it had withdrawn all its troops ten kilometres from the international frontier. In any event, Germany's entry into Luxemburg, on August 2, was an act of aggression as dangerous to France as a violation of her territory. If France had immediately replied by crossing the international frontier, she could not have been considered the aggressor.

Question: — Was the German Emperor personally responsible for the war?

Answer: — The German Emperor undoubtedly made great efforts to preserve the peace of Europe. For forty-four years, the German Empire has not known a war. As a result of this policy, the Emperor has been severely criticized by the Pan-Germanist party and has been dubbed "William the Poltroon." It is even probable that the Emperor delayed Germany's attack in the present war. But if he may not be held directly responsible for the war, indirectly a large share of the blame falls to him, because he has been so unwise as to wish to retain in his own hands the direction of Germany's foreign affairs. Since he dismissed Bismarck, he has had no real Chancellor of the Empire, but only under-secretaries. William I could listen to the arguments of the military group, headed by Von Moltke and Von Roon, and balance against them what Bismarck had to say. The present Kaiser, being his own Commander-in-Chief and his own Minister for Foreign Affairs, has lost the advantageous position of umpire. Weak as has been German diplomacy, it is inconceivable that those officially in charge of her foreign policy could have allowed her to enter this war at such a disadvantage, from a diplomatic point of view, if they had been able to exercise any real influence upon the German Government. For the great aim of diplomacy is first to avoid war, and, secondly, when war is inevitable, to prepare favorable alliances or relations with the other powers so that war may be entered upon at an opportune moment, and incidentally, to force the adversary to take the position of the aggressor in appearance if not in fact.

Question: — Was Germany back of the Austrian ultimatum?

Answer: — The German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared that he did not know the terms of the ultimatum before it was presented, but he probably had some inkling of its general tenor. The British Ambassador at Vienna believed that his German colleague was closely in touch with Austria's preparations for taking drastic action against Serbia. It may have been thought better that Germany should have no official knowledge of the contents of the Austrian note so that she might be in a better position to

support her ally. Another explanation may also have been that the German Ambassador at Vienna, who was known to be intensely hostile to Russia and to the continuance of Russian influence in the Balkans, was intriguing, through the help of the military party, to bring on a conflict between Germany and Russia. It is hardly possible that Germany would have allowed such a clumsily worded note to be presented if she had known the terms in which it was drawn up. If she had not previously given Austria *carte blanche*, it is not likely that Germany would have approved the note which Von Jagow said "left much to be desired." So we are led to conclude that she was so unwise as to allow her ally a free hand.

Question: — Did Germany believe England would remain neutral?

Answer: — No doubt a large part of the German and Austrian population thought England would keep out of the war, as she would almost certainly have done if France had not become involved. But the German statesmen and men of affairs must have realized that, although England would not interfere in the Balkans, she could not allow Germany to become paramount on the Continent. If there had been any real hope of England's remaining neutral throughout the war, Germany would not have been so insensate as to provoke her by invading Belgium. Germany feared that England would step in at a moment opportune for England and inopportune for Germany, and preferred to secure what immediate advantage she could by violating Belgium's neutrality.

Question: — Was it necessary for Germany to hack her way through Belgium?

Answer: — Although that was the only way by which she could have any hope of rapidly crushing France and vanquishing her enemies in a quick campaign, a better plan for Germany to have pursued would have been to remain on the defensive against France and, in coöperation with Austria, to direct her attack against Russia. If Germany had followed this plan, the Belgian question would not have arisen, and England might have remained neutral. The invasion of Belgium was not necessary, therefore, to the preservation of the German nation.

Question: — Did Russia make every reasonable effort to avoid war?

Answer: — In view of conflicting reports, it is very difficult to arrive at any conclusion. There is, however, no question but that Russia preserved a perfectly correct diplomatic attitude, evincing her willingness to participate in and give her adhesion to any plan which seemed to present the slightest possibility of a peaceful solution. Furthermore, she made suggestions herself. The only ground upon which Russia is at all open to criticism is that she was unnecessarily hasty in mobilizing. Russia's view was that, if she merely protested and took no action, Austria would take advantage of her supineness, thinking Russia was ready to submit to anything to avoid war, and though she was most peacefully inclined, she was not willing to back down again, as she had done when Germany threatened war if she did not acquiesce in what she considered Austria's violation of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. So Russia proceeded to mobilize on her southern frontier bordering on Austria.

In view of the uncompromising attitude of Germany and Austria, we

cannot blame Russia for thinking it necessary to show that she was in earnest, but we must regret that she did not longer delay her mobilization. When, however, we consider that Russia was by no means assured of English support in case of a conflict, — in fact, England was making heroic efforts to keep out of any conflict arising from a Balkan question, — we must realize that Russia was in great peril from a German attack. Russia believed that Germany was intent upon war — Austrian and German action making such an assumption seem very probable — and feared to let Austria complete her mobilization while she herself made no preparation.

On the other hand, Russia must have known that Germany would consider it absolutely essential to strike before her neighbors had completed their mobilization and would look upon even Russia's partial mobilization as necessitating war. Mobilization once begun it was not to be expected that Germany would long delay a declaration of war. On the whole, then, we may say that Russia's mobilization on the Austrian frontier made it impossible for the powers to continue at greater length the diplomatic discussions and negotiations which might possibly have resulted in a solution acceptable to all. On the other hand, we cannot say that Russia's action was unreasonable.

The last two or three days before the war, it appears that the war party in St. Petersburg may have felt that England was sure to support Russia and so have been anxious to precipitate a conflict. It is just possible, if England had intimated to Russia from the very start that she would stand with her in case of German aggression, provided Russia did everything to facilitate negotiations toward peace, that Russia might have been willing to defer her mobilization on the southern frontier; because in case of an actual outbreak of war, she would then have been linked with her ally, France, and also with England, against Austria and Germany, joined possibly by Italy. With such support Russia might have felt more secure of the ultimate result, and have entertained less apprehension of German aggression.

Germany reiterates her charge that the whole conflict was brought on by Russia's mobilization, when she was in the act of mediating in response to the appeal of the Tsar. On the other hand, to this Russia answers that the mobilization which she undertook was a result of a decision made the moment she learned of the terms of the Austrian note. This mobilization in her southern districts would, Russia declared, be undertaken in case of Austrian aggression against Servia.

Once the order given for this mobilization, necessitated by Austria's action, it was, as all military experts know, impossible to arrest it in the middle. Russia assured Germany that the measures were not directed against her, but when Germany began to assume a threatening attitude and to insist that Russia should arrest her preparations, Sazonof became convinced that Germany intended a war, and hastened his preparations. The German Ambassador requested Sazonof to make a suggestion of a formula to Servia as a basis for mediation. This the Russian Ambassador not only did in the special circumstances of the case, which made it amount almost to an ultimatum; but when Sir Edward Grey requested him to change the form so as to make it easier for Austria to accept, and so as not to seem in any way to force Austria and Germany to back down, he did not hesitate to

do so. Then, just as there was some prospect of peace as a result of Austria's suddenly assuming a conciliatory attitude, Russia dashed all hopes by ordering a general mobilization. This gave Germany reasonable ground to launch her ultimatum, after which, of course, there could be but one answer.

The impartial observer cannot get at the truth of this difficult question until he knows more of the facts of the military preparations undertaken by Germany and Russia. An examination of the action of the two Governments is prejudicial in favor of Russia, because of the extremely conciliatory attitude of her diplomacy from the start. Russia did, nevertheless, lose the benefit of this favorable consideration when she became responsible for precipitating the war by ordering a general mobilization.

Question: — Was the protection of Servia of vital interest to Russia?

Answer: — It is hard to define a vital interest with any degree of accuracy, but from the material side, it may reasonably be made to include those economic interests of a country of sufficient importance to affect its whole industrial and commercial development. From the sentimental or immaterial side, it would embrace all those ties of sympathy which are supported by a general consensus of opinion within the country and which a large body of the individuals are willing to help their Government maintain, even to the extent of sacrificing their lives. From a material point of view, it is essential for Russia to secure good port facilities on ice-free seas, and above all to protect her commerce through the Dardanelles. Hence she must consider Austrian supremacy in the Balkans as a menace to her vital interests, and must be prepared to block, at its inception, any move which may lead to such a result. In the Austro-Servian conflict it was evident that Austria, whatever her immediate design might be, intended ultimately to secure control of the Balkans. Even though she should leave Constantinople in Turkish hands or under the collective control of the powers, by securing Salonika she could at will intercept Russia's grain fleets and cruisers as they issued from the Dardanelles.

But strong as is Russia's material interest in the Balkan situation, the real impelling force with the Russian people is sympathy for their Slav brethren. Whenever Russia has made war, the great mass of the Russian people has always believed that it was undertaken solely for the purpose of protecting Christians and upholding Christianity. Russians are especially ready to assist the Orthodox Slavs in the Balkans. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 was, from the Russian point of view, entered upon to protect the Christian states in the Balkans. The war with Japan, it was popularly believed in Russia, was merely a campaign against the infidel. Consequently it would be very difficult, almost impossible, for the Russian Government to resist the popular pressure to come to the aid of the Servians, Bulgarians, or Montenegrins when threatened by Austria. We may conclude that the protection of Servia was a vital interest for Russia, though this does not mean that the Russian Government could not have stemmed the clamor for intervention if it had felt that there were sufficiently weighty reasons to justify such action.

Question: — Should Russia have been satisfied with Austria's assurances that she would not interfere with Servian integrity or independence?

Answer: — Austria, in the assurances she gave to Russia and to the other powers concerning her intentions toward Servia, especially emphasized that she would under no circumstances seize Servian territory, that is, interfere with Servia's integrity; but she was much less specific concerning Servia's independence, though she might perhaps have been willing to enter into a binding agreement not to interfere with Servia's independence. But the demands of the ultimatum, if complied with, would actually have been such an interference, for according to their tenor, Austria would be permitted to name the Servian officials who she considered ought to be dismissed, and there was no guaranty that this procedure, once agreed to, might not be repeated on other occasions until Servia's officials would look to Austria's favor for the security of their positions. But even if these matters could have been arranged satisfactorily and Austria allowed to continue her campaign against Servia, as soon as she had vanquished her weaker neighbor, she might have interpreted her promises in such a way as to render them null and void. The low standard of international integrity and sense of obligation to respect a solemn promise makes it, alas, impossible to place perfect reliance upon them.

Question: — Did Russia mobilize in such a fashion as to threaten Germany and necessitate action by Germany?

Answer: — The answer to this question will be found in the discussion of a previous question regarding Russia's efforts to avoid war.

Question: — Did Russia cross the Russo-German frontier before the declaration of war?

Answer: — With the present lack of information, it seems impossible to ascertain whether this accusation of the German Government is well founded or not, but in a time of such unusual tension isolated instances of violations of territory by a few troops are hard to prevent. Even in time of peace they sometimes occur, and are of trivial importance when undertaken. They should not be magnified and permitted to bring about a general engagement. Russia had every reason to avoid such acts, since she needed all the time that she could get to complete her mobilization before Germany should strike.

Question: — Did Great Britain enter the war against Germany in order to protect Belgium's neutrality?

Answer: — Great Britain did not enter the war solely to protect Belgium's neutrality, and Sir Edward Grey has been careful in his official utterances to say that this was one of the reasons why Great Britain entered the conflict. An approximately correct statement of Great Britain's position may perhaps be made as follows: Great Britain would have found it most difficult, under any circumstances, to have tied her hands not to intervene in the war. In any event, when it came to agreeing upon the conditions of peace, she would have intervened diplomatically to prevent any terms that she considered dangerous to her interests. Even if she had agreed to remain absolutely neutral, the understanding would always have been that Germany must not expect to make any settlement of European affairs violating too flagrantly Great Britain's permanent and vital interests.

The conditions under which Great Britain would have tied her hands

and remained out were so difficult to define and so little likely to have been acceptable to Germany that Sir Edward Grey probably thought it was not worth while to enter into a discussion of them when the German Ambassador asked him upon what terms Great Britain would agree to remain neutral. For this action he was severely criticized by a Labor Member of Parliament who accused him of striving to involve the country in a conflict with Germany. The only attitude that Great Britain could take was that she hoped to keep out of the conflict and that she would make the neutrality of Belgium an important factor. If Germany refused to respect Belgium's neutrality, she intended to enter the conflict at once, and at the same time that she assisted Belgium, she would oppose Germany in the accomplishment of designs which must necessarily conflict with British interests.

It is, then, not entirely correct to say that Great Britain entered the war to protect Belgium's neutrality, for she entered the war to protect her own vital interests. Though the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium was of the greatest importance to her vital interests, she would have gone into the war likewise if it had been a question of Germany's invading Holland. The fact that Great Britain was not obligated by treaty to defend Holland's neutrality would not have entered into consideration, for in the case of an invasion of Holland, England's vital interests would be endangered. The occupation of Belgium, even if it had not involved the violation of a solemn treaty, could not be tolerated by England. England has never considered that she could permit any great Continental power to hold any of the Channel ports. It is more correct, therefore, to say that England went into the war because it was a vital interest for her that no great power should control Belgium. At the same time, it is possible that she might have gone into the war simply because of Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality. The great majority of the English people, however, really believe that the war was undertaken in great measure to protect Belgium. The Germans consider such an attitude as hypocrisy, but they do not realize that they afford an example of a still greater popular error — that their invasion of Belgium was undertaken because the German Government had conclusive proof of the actual and intended violation of Belgian neutrality by France or England.

Question: — Was Belgium neutrality violated by France or England or by Belgium herself in such manner as to justify Germany's disregard of the treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality?

Answer: — The answer to this question is to be found in the chapter on Belgium where an examination of the evidence has been made. The conclusion is that not one bit of evidence worthy of the name has been brought forward by Germany to justify any of these serious charges. So many of the German allegations have been found, upon fuller investigation, to be unsubstantiated, as to raise a reasonable presumption of doubt regarding all the others.

Question: — Was England free to remain out of the war up to the time of her ultimatum to Germany, and was Sir Edward Grey correct in saying that Great Britain was in no wise committed?

Answer: — England was committed to the extent of a conditional participation in the war because of the relations of the *Entente* and the agreement with France. According to the arrangement carried into effect by France and England, the English fleet was withdrawn from the Mediterranean and the policing of English interests left to France, while the French fleets were concentrated in the Mediterranean for this purpose. This placed upon Great Britain an obligation which she was in honor bound to observe of protecting the French coasts from aggression. Hence she was to that extent a conditional ally of France. Sir Edward Grey's remarks in Parliament, and his efforts as shown in the diplomatic documents to make it clear that the British Cabinet could in no wise agree to enter the war even to this extent unless they should receive the support of Parliament, hardly alter the situation, for the British Cabinet is the agent of Parliament, and it would be almost unheard of for Parliament to repudiate the action of its Cabinet in such a crisis. The coöperative division of the fleets was intended only for defensive purposes. If France had been guilty of any aggression or even if she had felt that she must support Russia when the latter was responsible for any act of aggression, England might reasonably have considered that she was no longer bound to help France. Sir Edward Grey first gave Germany what almost amounted to an assurance that Russia and France would join in any reasonable plan to prevent a rupture of peace, and just before the outbreak of war he again offered to leave Russia and France to their fate if they should refuse any reasonable suggestion Germany put forward. Germany did not avail herself of this offer. Under the circumstances Sir Edward Grey was justified in considering Russia's action, upon the whole, as defensive. Hence England was bound to protect the French coasts.

The claim that England was involved in any other way seems to have no serious foundation. No doubt she was tending toward a closer *entente* with Russia, but the whole course of the diplomatic correspondence up to the last three or four days does not indicate that England was in any way bound to Russia. If Russia could have been assured of British support, it is doubtful whether she would have made such great efforts toward peace and have urged Serbia to return an answer so extraordinarily conciliatory. When, however, we come to Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3 in Parliament, the foreign policy of Great Britain had become clearly defined because of Germany's attitude respecting Belgium, and the Government was committed to a conditional participation in the war, unless Parliament had been ready to repudiate its Government on the eve of the most serious crisis the nation had ever faced. Hence, Sir Edward's statement that the country was not committed to enter the war, may be considered mere Parliamentary courtesy or persiflage. There was no deception since the actual facts of the situation spoke for themselves.

Question: — Was England responsible for the result?

Answer: — There can be no question that England was most anxious to avoid a war, and yet Germany would lay at her door the principal responsibility. When we read the diplomatic correspondence, we find the French and Russian diplomats predicting that war will result, unless England announces that she will make common cause with them. And at the end, Sir Edward Grey did not escape censure from a member of Great

Britain's own Parliament, who made the accusation that he was to blame for the rupture of peace between Great Britain and Germany. No intelligent observer, with all the advantage of after-thought and after-sight, has been able to point out how Great Britain might surely have avoided the war. If Sir Edward Grey had followed the suggestions of France and Russia and had announced to Germany that England would support the Dual Alliance in resisting what was patently aggressive action on the part of the two members of the Triple Alliance, she would have played directly into the hands of Germany, provided Germany wanted war, because, by refusing to agree and by making counter-demands, Germany could have precipitated an immediate conflict, giving her the advantage of striking quickly and without delay. This would probably have made war inevitable. But even if Germany, with her backing of the arrogant Austrian demands, had sincerely desired to maintain the peace, France and Russia might have thought it was too good an opportunity to let slip. They might, by undercurrents of resistance, have nettled Germany and have made inevitable the conflict which Great Britain wished to avoid. Sir Edward's refusal to commit the British Government may have had a great deal to do with the remarkably conciliatory attitude of Russia. England's refusal to continue the discussion with Germany of the conditions upon which she might consent to remain neutral has been considered under a previous question.

As was previously noted, there is just a possibility that Sir Edward might have been successful if he had attempted to play more directly the mediatory rôle between Germany and Russia, and had said to Germany that if she would agree to come into a conference upon certain terms, he would secure Russia's consent to demobilize. If England had taken this stand the moment there was danger of Russian mobilization, there might have been, provided always that Germany was not determined upon a war, a reasonable chance of maintaining peace. But such mediation would have been most hazardous, and might have involved England in a war from which she could otherwise have held aloof. There is another consideration, which is that a great power cannot afford to risk its prestige by having its proposals refused too often. Otherwise, when it made a suggestion it would not secure that consideration which is so important a factor in strengthening a state's political action. So it was reasonable that Sir Edward should prefer not to commit England until the last moment. We may then answer that England cannot be considered directly responsible for the result. On the whole, I believe, unsuccessful as the event proved, Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy, as portrayed by the British White Papers, will stand forth as one of England's glories and as a pattern for generations to come.

QUESTIONS WITHOUT ANSWERS

Question: — If Germany wanted to avoid war, why did she insist upon disregarding the usual method of procedure for the settlement of European difficulties?

Question: — If Germany wanted war, why did she lose valuable time in prolonging discussions?

Question: — Did Von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, telegraph the contents of the Austrian note to the Kaiser (cf. B. W. P. no. 95) before it was presented to Servia?

Question: — If Germany considered that Russia was responsible for bringing on the crisis by mobilizing, why could not the German Government have agreed to Sir Edward Grey's last proposal (see chap. VII) on condition that England would guarantee the cessation of further military preparations?

Question: — What did Germany mean by saying that her entry into Luxemburg was not a hostile act?

Question: — Why did Germany invade Belgium?

Question: — As Russia was so much slower to mobilize, why could Germany not have rested on the defensive against France and have appealed to England to prevent war by joining her against Russia unless Russia demobilized?

Question: — Had England been guilty of any commercial oppression of Germany or interference with the expansion of her international trade?

Question: — Why did Sir Edward Grey not find some means of effective collaboration with Italy, so that the two powers might have exercised joint intervention in favor of the maintenance of peace?

CHAPTER XIII

DOCUMENTS

POLITICAL AIMS OF THE POWERS

WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS, SEPT. 17, 1796.¹

. . . OBSERVE good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct. And can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the course of time and things the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?

In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur.

Hence frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The nation prompted by ill will and resentment sometimes impels to war the government contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason would reject. At other times it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility, instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of nations has been the victim.

So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite na-

¹ Extract from Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, vol. 1, pp. 221-24. Washington, 1896.

tion of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill will, and a disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country without odium, sometimes even with popularity, gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.

As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils! Such an attachment of a small or weak toward a great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter. Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people to surrender their interests.

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little *political* connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the Government to support them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.

In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish — that they will control the usual current of the passions or prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations. But if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good — that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism — this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare by which they have been dictated.

How far in the discharge of my official duties I have been guided by the principles which have been delineated the public records and other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself, the assurance of my own conscience is that I have at least believed myself to be guided by them.

In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe my proclamation of the 22d of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice and by that of your representatives in both Houses of Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.

After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the

case, had a right to take, and was bound in duty and interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined as far as should depend upon me to maintain it with moderation, perseverance, and firmness.

The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct it is not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that, according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from being denied by any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually admitted by all.

The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity toward other nations.

The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be referred to your own reflections and experience. With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes. . . .

BISMARCK'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG, FEB. 6, 1888¹

WHEN I say that it is our duty to endeavor to be ready at all times and for all emergencies, I imply that we must make greater exertions than other people for the same purpose, because of our geographical position. We are situated in the heart of Europe, and have at least three fronts open to an attack. France has only her eastern, and Russia only her western, frontier where they may be attacked. We are also more exposed to the dangers of a coalition than any other nation, as is proved by the whole development of history, by our geographical position, and the lesser degree of cohesiveness, which until now has characterized the German nation in comparison with others. God has placed us where we are prevented, thanks to our neighbors, from growing lazy and dull. He has placed by our side the most warlike and restless of all nations, the French, and He has permitted warlike inclinations to grow strong in Russia, where formerly they existed to a lesser degree. Thus we are given the spur, so to speak, from both sides, and are compelled to exertions which we should perhaps not be making otherwise. The pikes in the European carp-pond are keeping us from being carps by making us feel their teeth on both sides. They also are forcing us to an exertion which without them we might not make, and to a union among us Germans, which is abhorrent to us at heart. By nature we are rather tending away, the one from the other. But the Franco-Russian vise within which we are squeezed compels us to hold together, and by pressure our cohesive force is greatly increased. This will bring us to that state of being inseparable which all other nations possess, while we do not yet enjoy it. But we must respond to the intentions of Providence by making ourselves so strong that the pikes can do nothing but encourage us.

What, then, was my surprise and natural disappointment, when gradually a sort of newspaper campaign began in St. Petersburg, attacking the

¹ These extracts, from an English translation, have been taken from *The German Classics*, vol. x, pp. 257-72. I have, however, made one or two slight changes.

German policy, and casting suspicion on my personal intentions. These attacks increased in the following year to the strong request, in 1879, for pressure to be exerted by us on Austria in matters where we could not attack the Austrian rights as such. I could not consent, for, if we should have been estranged from Austria, we should necessarily have fallen into a dependence on Russia, unless we were satisfied with standing entirely alone in Europe. Would such a dependence have been bearable? Formerly I had believed it might be, when I had said to myself: "We have no conflicting interests at all. There is no reason why Russia should ever cancel her friendship." At least I had never contradicted my Russian colleagues when they expounded such theories to me. The Russian behavior as regards the Congress disappointed me and showed me that we could not be sure of not being drawn into a conflict with Russia against our wishes, even if we placed our policy (for a time) completely at her disposal. The disagreement concerning instructions which we had given or had not given to our representatives in the south [Constantinople] grew, until threats resulted, threats of war from the most authoritative quarters.

This is the origin of our Austrian Treaty. By these threats we were compelled to choose between our two former friends, a decision which I had avoided through several decades. At that time I negotiated in Gastein and in Vienna the treaty, published the day before yesterday, which is in force between us to-day.

The publication has been partly misunderstood, from what I read in the newspapers of yesterday and the day before. It has been variously interpreted as an ultimatum, a warning, and a threat. A threat could not possibly be contained in it, since the text of the treaty has been known to Russia for a long while, — not since November of last year only. We considered it due to the sincerity of so loyal a monarch as the Emperor of Russia not to leave a doubt concerning the actual state of affairs.

Personally I do not see how we could have done otherwise than conclude this treaty. If we had not done it, we should have to do it now. It possesses the finest quality to be found in an international treaty, in that it is the expression of the lasting interests of both parties, of Austria as well as ourselves. No great power can for any length of time cling to the wording of a treaty against the interests of its own people; it will at last be forced to declare openly: "Times have changed; we can no longer do this"; and will have to defend its action as best it can before its own people and the other contracting party. For no power will approve a course which leads its own people to destruction, for the sake of the letter of a treaty signed under different conditions. Nothing of this kind, however, is contained in these treaties. The treaty concluded with Austria, as well as similar treaties existing between us and other powers, notably the agreements into which we have entered with Italy, is the expression of common interests in mutual aspirations and dangers. Italy, like ourselves, has been obliged to fight against Austria for her right to establish her national union. At present both of us are living in peace with Austria, sharing with her the wish to ward off the dangers which are threatening all alike. Together we wish to preserve the peace, which is as dear to one as to the other, and to protect our internal development to which all of us are determined to devote ourselves. These aims and our mutual confidence that the treaties will be kept,

and that no nation will be inconvenienced by them further than its own interests permit, make these treaties firm, durable, and permanent.

The extent to which our treaty with Austria is the expression of our mutual interests was shown at Nikolsburg, and in 1870. Already during the negotiations of Nikolsburg we were of the opinion that we could not do for any length of time without Austria in Europe — a strong and vigorous Austria. In 1870, when the war between ourselves and France broke out, many sensitive Austrians whom we had hurt were naturally tempted to make use of this opportunity to take revenge for 1866. The thoughtful and far-seeing diplomats of the Austrian Cabinet, however, had to ask themselves: "What will be the result? What will be our position, if to-day we assist the French, and help them to beat Prussia, or even Germany?" What would have been the result if France with the help of Austria had been victorious over us? If Austria had followed such a policy, she could have had no other aim than to resume her former position in Germany, for this was really the only thing she had given up in 1866. There had been no other important stipulations, and the pecuniary conditions were insignificant. Well, then, what would have been the position of Austria as the presiding power in the German Union, if she had to confess that in alliance with France she had taken from Germany the left bank of the Rhine, that she had reduced the South German States to a renewed dependence on France in the shape of a Rhenish Federation, and had condemned Prussia to an irrevocable dependence on Russia, subject in future to Russian policies? Such a position was unacceptable to all Austrian statesmen not completely blinded with wrath and vengeance.

The same is also true with us in Germany. Imagine Austria struck from the map of Europe. Then we and Italy would be isolated on the continent, hemmed in between Russia and France, the two strongest military powers next to Germany, either continually one against two — and this would be most probable — or alternately dependent on one or the other. But this will not be the case. It is impossible to imagine Austria removed, for a state like Austria does not disappear. She may be estranged if jilted, as was proposed in the Villafranca negotiations, and inclined to offer her hand to that nation which for its own part is the opponent of an unreliable friend.

In short, if we wish to avoid being isolated, which is especially dangerous for Germany in our assailable position, we must have a reliable friend. Thanks to the similarities of our interests, and this treaty before you, we have two such friends. It is not love which makes them reliable, for nations may make war one upon the other because of hate, but it has never yet happened that one nation has sacrificed itself for another for mere love. Nor do they always fight when they hate each other, for, if this were the case, France would have to be fighting incessantly, not only with us, but also with England and Italy. She hates all her neighbors. I believe, however, that the Russian hatred of us, which has been artificially fanned, will not last. We are united with our allies in the love of peace, not only by inclination and friendship, but also by the most cogent interests of a European equilibrium and of our own future.

Then there is another advantage if this bill is passed. The very strength

at which we are aiming necessarily renders us pacific. This sounds like a paradox, but it is not.

With the powerful engine into which we are transforming the German army one does not make an attack. If I were to come before you to-day on the assumption that conditions were different from what I believe they are, and should say, "We are considerably menaced by France and Russia; we shall probably be attacked, and as a diplomat, believing my military information in these matters to be correct, I am convinced that it is better for us to have our defense consist of a bold attack, and to strike the first blow now"; and if I should add: "We can more easily wage an aggressive war, and I, therefore, am asking the Reichstag for an appropriation of a milliard, or half a milliard, marks to engage in a war against our two neighbors," — then I do not know, gentlemen, whether you would have enough confidence in me to grant my request, but I hope you would not have it.

But, if you had, it would not satisfy me. If we Germans wish to wage a war with the full effect of our national strength, it must be a war which is approved by all who take part in it, all who sacrifice anything for it; in short, the whole nation. It must be a national war, a war carried on with the enthusiasm of 1870, when we were foully attacked. I still remember the ear-splitting, joyful shouts in the station at Cologne. It was the same all the way from Berlin to Cologne, in Berlin itself. Waves of popular approval bore us into the war, whether we wished it or not. That is the way it must be, if popular force like ours is to show what it can do. It will, however, be very difficult to prove to the provinces and states of the Empire and their inhabitants that the war is unavoidable, and has to be. People will ask: "Are you so sure? Who can tell?" In short, when we carried on an attack, the whole weight of all imponderables, which weigh far heavier than material weights, will be on the side of our opponents whom we have attacked. France will be bristling with arms away down to the Pyrenees. The same will take place everywhere. A war into which we are not borne by the will of the people will be waged, to be sure, if it has been declared by the constituted authorities who deemed it necessary; it will even be waged pluckily, and possibly victoriously, after we have once smelled fire and tasted blood, but it will lack from the beginning the nerve and enthusiasm of a war in which we are attacked. In such a one the whole of Germany from Memel to the Alpine Lakes will flare up like a powder mine; it will be bristling with guns, and no enemy will dare to engage this *furor teutonicus* which develops when we are attacked. We cannot afford to lose this factor of preëminence even if many military men — not only ours but others as well — believe that to-day we are superior to our future opponents. Our own officers believe this to a man, naturally. Every soldier believes this. He would almost cease to be a useful soldier if he did not wish for war, and did not believe that we should be victorious in it. If our opponents by any chance are thinking that we are pacific because we are afraid of how the war may end, they are mightily mistaken. We believe as firmly in our victory in a just cause as any foreign lieutenant in his garrison, after his third glass of champagne, can believe in his, and we probably do so with greater certainty. It is not fear, therefore, which makes us pacific, but the consciousness of our strength. We are strong enough to protect ourselves, even if we should be attacked at a less favorable moment, and we are in a position to let divine Providence

determine whether a war in the mean while may not become unnecessary after all.

I am, therefore, not in favor of any kind of aggressive war, and if war could result only from an attack—somebody must kindle a fire—we shall not kindle it. Neither the consciousness of our strength, which I have described, nor our confidence in our treaties, will prevent us from continuing our former endeavors to preserve peace. In this we do not permit ourselves to be influenced by annoyances or dislikes. The threats and insults and challenges which have been made have, no doubt, excited amongst us also a feeling of irritation, which does not easily occur in the case of Germans, for they are less prone to national hatred than any other nation. We are trying to calm our countrymen, however, and we shall work for peace with our neighbors, especially with Russia, in the future as we have in the past. When I say, 'especially with Russia,' I express the opinion that France offers us no assurances of success in our endeavors. I will not, however, say that these endeavors are of no use. We shall never pick a quarrel, nor ever attack France; and in the many little incidents which the proclivity of our neighbors for spying and bribing has occasioned, we have always brought about a very courteous and amicable settlement. I should consider it criminal if we were to inflame a great national war for such bagatelles. These are instances when one should say: "The cleverer of the two will yield."

THE APOCRYPHAL WILL OF PETER THE GREAT (THE SOKOLNICKI TEXT)¹

1. NEGLECT nothing to give the Russian nation European forms and customs; with this purpose engage the different courts and the learned of Europe in particular, whether by interested motives or by the philanthropic principles of philosophy, or any other motive, to contribute to this end.

2. Maintain in the state a system of continuous warfare in order to

¹ The ghost of Peter the Great, which has long stalked through Europe in the shape of a so-called "will," setting forth his designs for Russian aggrandizement, can at last be laid to rest, at least in its current versions. Whether Peter did or did not leave behind him some sort of a political testament, we do not attempt to decide, but the source of the document which has masqueraded under his name has been traced beyond cavil, the original having been brought to light from the Public Archives at Berlin, with the name of its utterer, one Sokolnicki. The motive of its fabrication is not far to seek. This Sokolnicki was a Polish officer, a refugee in Paris in 1797, at the time of the Directory, and for the purpose of inciting the French, then posing as the saviors of oppressed peoples, to come to the rescue of his native land, he composed the articles of this instrument, ingeniously contrived to reveal to the French Government the menace of Russian intrigue.

In this brief note it is impossible to go into the picturesque details that attended the birth of the forgery. For them the reader is referred to the authorities given below. It may be well to add that Waliszewski, in his history of Peter the Great, arrives at the same conclusion as to the spuriousness of the will, though he does not seem to be cognizant of the real author of the deception. Yet in a sense the will is genuine, for it merely lends the glamour of pretended prophecy to historical events as they have actually occurred, and in giving expression to the political aims of Russia it states simply what was natural to an empire situated as hers has been, though these aims were immeasurably beyond any dreams of Peter and the Muscovy of his day. I have, therefore, notwithstanding the apocryphal character of the will, given a translation of it in its primitive form, the two later versions (Lesur, 1812, and Gaillardet, 1836) being derivatives, with such variations and embroideries as were convenient at the date of their appearance. See Harry Bresslau, *Das Testament Peter's des Grossen*, in Sybel's *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 41, p. 385 *et seq.* (1879), and K. Waliszewski, *Peter the Great*, English translation (New York, 1900), pp. 548-51.

harden the soldiery and to keep the nation always in training and ready to march at the first signal.

3. Extend by every possible means towards the north along the Baltic, and towards the south. And with this end in view —

4. Arouse the jealousy of England, Denmark, and Brandenburg against Sweden; as a result of which these powers will shut their eyes to the encroachments that may be made on that country, and in the end it will be subjugated.

5. Interest the House of Austria in driving the Turk from Europe, and under this pretext maintain a standing army and establish dockyards on the shores of the Black Sea, and by continually advancing reach out to Constantinople.

6. Keep Poland in a state of anarchy, influence its Diets, and especially the elections of its kings; get a morsel of it at every opportunity, and end by subduing it completely.

7. Contract a close alliance with England, and keep up direct relations with her by means of a commercial treaty; even permit her to exercise a kind of monopoly in the interior; which will lead imperceptibly to an intermingling of our nationals with English merchants and sailors, who will provide all the means for perfecting and enlarging the Russian navy, by the help of which it should soon be our aim to secure the mastery of the Baltic and the Black Sea. . . . This is a point of capital importance upon which depend the rapid execution and success of the plan.

8. At any cost mix in the quarrels of Europe, either by force or by stealth, — especially those relating to Germany. And to this end —

9. Always appear to be the ally of Austria, profiting by the smallest ascendancy that you can get over her to drag her into ruinous wars in order to enfeeble her by degrees; sometimes even succor her, and do not cease to make enemies for her secretly in the interior of the Empire by arousing against her the jealousy of the princes. . . . *Nota.* This article will be all the more easy to carry out since the House of Austria has not ceased up to this time to delude itself with the project of acquiring universal dominion, or at least of reëstablishing the Western Empire, and for that purpose she must before everything begin by subduing Germany.

10. Always choose wives for Russian princes among the princesses of Germany, and thus multiply alliances by the relations of families, interest and influence everywhere in that Empire.

11. Make use of religious ascendancy among the Greek separatists and schismatics who are distributed through Hungary, Turkey, and the southern parts of Poland, bind them to you by every insidious method, get yourselves called their protectors and acquire a title to the sacerdotal supremacy; under this pretext and with their assistance, with Turkey subjugated and Poland encroached upon, the conquest of Hungary will be but a trifle; promising to Austria in the mean while indemnifications in Germany, while the rest of Poland, no longer able to sustain itself either by its own strength, or by political connections, will of its own accord come under the yoke.

12. From then on every moment is precious. Make ready in secret the batteries for the decisive blow and have them put into action with an order, foresight, and rapidity that will give Europe no time to pull herself together. One should begin by proposing separately, very secretly, and with the

greatest circumspection, first to the Court of Versailles and then to that of Vienna, a division of the sovereignty of the universe; calling their attention to this point: that Russia, being in fact the sovereign of the entire East, and having nothing further to gain but the title, can in no wise be open to their suspicion in advancing this proposition. Without doubt this project, on the contrary, cannot fail to flatter them and to enkindle between them a war to the death; a war which will soon become general owing to the connections and the relations extending from these two courts (rivals and natural enemies), and also because of the interest which all the other powers will of necessity take in this quarrel.

13. In the midst of this general turmoil Russia will arrange to be asked for assistance, sometimes by the one, sometimes by the other of the belligerent powers, and after having long hesitated in order to give them time to exhaust themselves and herself to assemble her forces, she will seem finally to decide for the House of Austria, and while she advances her regular troops to the Rhine, she will have them followed immediately by a swarm of her Asiatic hordes; and in proportion as these last advance into Germany, two considerable fleets will set out, the one from the Sea of Azof, the other from the harbor of Archangel, laden with bands of these same hordes, under convoy of the armed fleets of the Black Sea and the Baltic; the fleets will appear unexpectedly in the Mediterranean and on the ocean and will pour forth all these nomad peoples, fierce and greedy for booty, to inundate Italy, Spain, and France, one part of whose inhabitants they will plunder, another part lead off into slavery to repeople with them the deserts of abandoned Siberia; and the rest they will render helpless to shake off the yoke.

THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AT THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

“ON July 25, 1899, the American delegation at the Peace Conference at The Hague, referring to the convention for the peaceful adjustment of international differences, which was then pending before the conference, made in full session the following declaration:

“‘Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.’

“It was under this reserve that the American delegates signed the convention on July 29, 1899.” (Report of the United States Commission, July 31, 1899, Holls’s *Peace Conference at The Hague*, 477, 531. See John Bassett Moore: *A Digest of International Law*, vol. VI, p. 594.)

THE ALLIANCES

TREATY OF ALLIANCE OF OCTOBER 7, 1879, BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY¹

CONSIDERING that their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary and the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, must esteem it to be their unavoidable duty as sovereigns to watch under all circumstances over the safety of their Empires and the tranquillity of their peoples;

Considering that the two Monarchs will be able, by a solid alliance of the two Empires, in the kind of that which previously existed, more easily to accomplish this duty, as also more efficaciously;

Considering, in fine, that an intimate agreement between Austro-Hungary and Germany can threaten no one, but is rather calculated to consolidate European peace as created by the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin;

Their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary and the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, promising each other solemnly never to give any aggressive tendency whatsoever to their purely defensive agreement, have resolved to conclude a reciprocal alliance of peace and protection;

In this aim, their Majesties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: —

For his Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, his real Privy Councillor, the Minister of the Imperial House, as also for Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant Julius, Count Andrassy, etc.;

For his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, his Ambassador and plenipotentiary extraordinary, Lieutenant-General Prince Henry VII of Reuss, etc.;

Who have both entered into relations with each other to-day in Vienna, and, after showing each other their powers duly recognized as good and sufficient, have settled what follows: —

ARTICLE I. If, contrarily to what may be hoped and contrarily to the sincere wishes of the two high contracting parties, one of the two Empires were to be attacked by Russia, the two high contracting parties are bound to lend each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their imperial military power, and, subsequently, to conclude no peace except conjointly and in agreement.

ARTICLE II. If one of the two high contracting parties were to be attacked by another Power, the other high contracting party binds itself, by the present act, not only not to uphold the aggressor against its high Ally, but at the least, to observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the contracting party aforesaid.

If, however, in the case previously mentioned, the Power attacking were to be upheld by Russia, whether by way of active coöperation or by military measures that should threaten the Power attacked, then the obligation of reciprocal assistance with entire military forces — obligation stipulated in Article I of this treaty — would immediately become executory, and the

¹ Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, pp. 128–29. New York, 1908.

military operations of the two high contracting parties would also, in such circumstances, be conducted jointly until the conclusion of peace.

ARTICLE III. This Treaty, in conformity with its pacific character and to avoid all false interpretation, will be held secret by all the high contracting parties.

It may only be communicated to a Third Power with the knowledge of the two parties and after a special agreement between them.

Considering the intentions expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the Alexandrowo interview, the two contracting parties nourish the hope that Russia's preparations will not, in reality, become threatening to them; for this reason, there is at present no motive for communication.

But, if, against all expectation, this hope should be rendered vain, the two contracting parties would recognize that it was a duty of loyalty to inform the Emperor Alexander, at least confidentially, that they must deem any attack directed against one of them as being directed against both.

To testify which, the plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty with their own hand and have affixed their seals thereto.

Made at Vienna, on the 7th of October, 1879.

Signed:

ANDRASSY.

PRINCE HENRY VII OF REUSS.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN ¹

Signed at London, July 13, 1911

PREAMBLE

THE Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely:—

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:—

ARTICLE I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble

¹ *British State Papers*, vol. ciii. London, 1911. The original alliance between the two states was entered into January 30, 1902. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902*, p. 514; *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 1, 1907, Supplement, p. 14. A new agreement was substituted for that of 1902, August 12, 1905. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905*, p. 488; *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 1, 1907, Supplement, p. 15.

of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV. Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

ARTICLE V. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

ARTICLE VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911.

ANGLO-AMERICAN COÖPERATION IN REGARD TO AMERICAN AFFAIRS

THE Government of the United States have expressed a wish to coöperate in terminating differences which have existed for many years between my Government and the Republic of Venezuela upon the boundary between that country and my Colony of British Guiana. I have expressed my sympathy with the desire to come to an equitable arrangement, and trust that further negotiation will lead to a satisfactory settlement.¹

¹ Extract from the Speech of the Queen, on the Opening of the British Parliament, Westminster, February 11. 1896. *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1895-96, vol. 88, p. 1. London, 1900.

ANGLO-AMERICAN ARBITRATION

My Government have discussed with the United States, acting as the friend of Venezuela, the terms under which the pending questions of disputed frontier between that Republic and my Colony of British Guiana may be equitably submitted to arbitration. An arrangement has been arrived at with that Government which will, I trust, effect the adjustment of existing controversies without exposing to risk the interests of any colonists who have established rights in the disputed territory.

It is with much gratification that I have concluded a Treaty for General Arbitration with the President of the United States, by which I trust that all differences that may arise between us will be peacefully adjusted. I hope that this arrangement may have a further value in commending to other Powers the consideration of a principle by which the danger of war may be notably abated.¹

THE MONROE DOCTRINE ²

It must, however, be conceded that the most important political result of the Venezuelan incident was not the decision upon the territorial question, but the official adoption of the Monroe Doctrine by the Congress of the United States, and its explicit acceptance by the principal maritime power of Europe.

An official exposition of the Monroe Doctrine was given by President Roosevelt in his annual message of December 3, 1901, in which he said:—

“The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. . . . This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. . . . We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.”

An occasion for the practical application of this definition soon arose. On December 11, 1901, the German Ambassador at Washington left at the Department of State a memorandum in which it was stated that the German Government proposed to take certain coercive measures against Venezuela for the satisfaction of claims, based partly on breaches of contract and partly on violent wrongs, which it had been found to be impracticable otherwise to bring to a settlement. At the same time the memorandum declared that “under no circumstances” would the German Government consider in its proceedings “the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory.” In acknowledging the receipt of this memorandum, on December 16, Mr. Hay adverted to the fact that the German Ambassador, on his then recent return from Berlin, had conveyed personally to the President, and had afterwards repeated to himself, the assurance of the Ger-

¹ Extract from Speech of the Queen, on the Opening of the British Parliament, Westminster, January 19, 1897. *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1896-97, vol. 89, p. 1, London, 1901. This arbitration treaty failed to receive the assent of the Senate.

² Extract from John Bassett Moore, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 157-59. New York, 1905.

man Emperor that the Imperial Government had no purpose or intention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the South American continent or the adjacent islands; and in view of this circumstance, and of the further assurance given in the memorandum, Mr. Hay declared that the President, while "appreciating the courtesy of the German Government in making him acquainted with the state of affairs referred to," did not regard himself "as called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims in question." The coercive measures contemplated by the German Government were postponed for a year, and were then taken in conjunction with the British Government, which also made to the United States, on November 13, 1902, a frank communication of its purposes. To this communication Mr. Hay replied that the Government of the United States, although it "regretted that European powers should use force against Central and South American governments, could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated." In the hostilities with Venezuela that ensued, the assurances of the powers were honorably kept, but peaceful relations were eventually restored through the frank exercise of the friendly offices of the United States.

DECLARATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE RESPECTING EGYPT AND MOROCCO ¹

Dated April 8, 1904

ARTICLE I. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner, and that they give their assent to the draft Khedivial Decree annexed to the present Arrangement, containing the guarantees considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the Powers Signatory of the Convention of London of 1885.

It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French *savant*.

The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past.

ARTICLE II. The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are continuous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require.

¹ See Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, Treaties Series*, 1905, no. 6; *American Journal of International Law*, Supplement, vol. 1 (1907), pp. 6-8. Upon the same day as this treaty, another was signed settling outstanding differences between the two powers in regard to the Newfoundland fisheries and the boundary lines between their possessions in Africa.

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.

ARTICLE III. His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.

ARTICLE IV. The two Governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An Agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

ARTICLE V. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the same service.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.

ARTICLE VI. In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article VIII of that Treaty will remain in abeyance.

ARTICLE VII. In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

ARTICLE VIII. The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these

interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government.

The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE IX. The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

In witness whereof His Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, duly authorized for that purpose, have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

(L.S.) LANSDOWNE.

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA
CONCERNING THE INTERESTS OF THEIR STATES
ON THE CONTINENT OF ASIA¹

Signed August 31, 1907

HIS MAJESTY the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit: —

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honorable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following: —

Arrangement concerning Persia

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907, part 1, pp. 549-53.*

of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistar and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned Provinces of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms: —

I

Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor of British subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature — such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc. — beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier, at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

II

Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favor of Russian subjects, or in favor of subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature — such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc. — beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

III

Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

IV

It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Telegraphs,

shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement.

V

In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of the present Arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Arrangement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement.

Convention concerning Afghanistan

The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect security on their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following Convention:—

ARTICLE I. His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan.

His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia.

The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognize Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further engage not to send any Agents into Afghanistan.

ARTICLE II. The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March, 1905, that they recognize the Agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Ameer Abdur Rahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to occupy in contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Ameer fulfils the engagements already contracted by him towards His Britannic Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned Treaty.

ARTICLE III. The Russian and Afghan authorities, specially designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

ARTICLE IV. His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian Government affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial

opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for Commercial Agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Ameer's sovereign rights.

ARTICLE V. The present Arrangements will only come into force when His Britannic Majesty's Government shall have notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Ameer to the terms stipulated above.

Arrangement concerning Thibet

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following Arrangement:—

ARTICLE I. The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

ARTICLE II. In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th September, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April, 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement.

ARTICLE III. The British and Russian Governments, respectively, engage not to send representatives to Lhassa.

ARTICLE IV. The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet.

ARTICLE V. The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

Annez to the arrangement between Great Britain and Russia concerning Thibet

Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual installments of the indemnity of 25,000,000 rupees, provided

that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th (31st) August, 1907.

(L.S.) A. NICOLSON.

(L.S.) ISWOLSKY.

TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA, GUARANTEEING
THE PRESENT TERRITORY OF EACH, THE INTEGRITY
OF CHINA, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE "OPEN
DOOR" IN THAT EMPIRE¹

*Memorandum from the Japanese Embassy*²

IMPERIAL JAPANESE EMBASSY, WASHINGTON,
August 14, 1907.

THE Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the Government of His Majesty of all the Russias, being desirous to consolidate relations of peace and good neighborhood which have happily been restored between Japan and Russia, and wishing to remove for the future all causes of misunderstanding in the relations of the two empires, have agreed upon following stipulations:—

ARTICLE I. Each of the high contracting parties engages to respect the actual territorial integrity of the other, and all rights due now both parties by virtue of treaties, conventions, and contracts now in force between them and China, copies of which have been exchanged between the contracting parties (so far as those rights are not incompatible with the principle of equal opportunity) as well as by virtue of the treaty signed at Portsmouth on August 23/ September 5, 1905, and the special conventions concluded between Japan and Russia.

ARTICLE II. The two high contracting parties recognize the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire and engage to uphold and support the maintenance of *status quo* and the respect for the said principle by all pacific means at their disposal.

The undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this convention and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at St. Petersburg this day July 17/30, 1907.

(Signed) I. MORONO.

(Signed) A. ISWOLSKY.

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907*, part II, p. 765.

² Same, *mutatis mutandis*, handed to the Secretary of State by the Russian Ambassador, August 14, 1907.

CONVENTION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN
CONCERNING MANCHURIA¹

Signed at St. Petersburg, July 4, 1910

THE Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan, being sincerely attached to the principles established by the convention concluded between them on July 30, 1907, and being desirous of developing the effects of this convention with a view to the consolidation of peace in the Far East, have agreed to complete the said arrangement in the following manner:—

1. With the object of facilitating communications and developing the commerce of the nations, the two high contracting parties agree to extend to one another their friendly coöperation with a view to the improvement of their respective railway lines in Manchuria and the perfecting of the connecting services of the said lines, and to abstain from all competition prejudicial to the realization of this object.

2. Each of the high contracting parties undertakes to maintain and respect the *status quo* in Manchuria resulting from all the treaties, conventions, and other arrangements concluded up to this date, either between Russia and Japan or between those two powers and China. Copies of the said arrangements have been exchanged between Russia and Japan.

3. In the event of anything arising of a nature to threaten the *status quo* mentioned above the two high contracting parties shall enter each time into communication with each other with a view to coming to an understanding as to the measures they may think it necessary to take for the maintenance of the said *status quo*.

THE FORMATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE²

THE semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of October 16 published correspondence bearing upon the events leading up to the war, with particular reference to what it regards as the long-meditated transformation of the Triple *Entente* into a hard-and-fast alliance.

In view of the efforts of our adversaries, it says, to put the blame for the present war on a German "military party" and German militarism, we publish herewith a number of dispatches of German diplomatic representatives abroad which have for their subject the political and military relations between the powers of the Triple *Entente* before the outbreak of the war. For obvious reasons the exact dates of the dispatches and the offices from which they were sent are not indicated here. The documents speak for themselves.

I

England "the tool of France"

March —, 1913. Tighter and tighter are growing the meshes of the net in which French diplomacy is succeeding in entangling England. It is well known that in the early phases of the Morocco conflict England had made certain promises of a military nature to France which have since grown into positive agreements. Concerning their arrangements with

¹ *American Journal of International Law*, Supplement, vol. 4 (1910), p. 279.

² From the *New York Times*, November 8, 1914. This is not the title of the article as it appeared in the *Times*.

regard to naval coöperation, I learn the following from a generally well-informed source: —

The British fleet undertakes the guarding of the North Sea, the Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean in order to make it possible for France to concentrate her naval forces in the western basin of the Mediterranean, for which operation Malta is placed at her disposal for a naval base. Detailed arrangements have been made with regard to the use of French torpedo craft and submarines in the Channel, and relative to the British Mediterranean squadron, which will be placed under the command of a French Admiral at the outbreak of hostilities.

Meanwhile the attitude of the British Government during the Morocco crisis of 1911 — during which it proved the non-reasoning and obedient tool of French politics and by Mr. Lloyd-George's speech encouraged French chauvinism and inspired it with new hope — offered an opening to the French Government to drive another nail into the coffin in which England's policy of *ententes* has already put to rest her freedom of deciding her own course.

Through a trustworthy source I have obtained knowledge of an exchange of notes which took place between Sir Edward Grey and Ambassador Cambon last autumn, which I have the honor of transmitting herewith, with the request that it be treated as strictly confidential. In these notes, the British and the French Governments agree that, in the event of a threatening attack by a third power, they will at once enter into an exchange of opinions about the question whether common action for preventing the attack is advisable, and, if this should be found to be the case, whether and to what extent the existing military arrangements should be carried out.

With subtle ingenuity the agreement is worded in such a manner that it suits the peculiar English mentality. Formally, England enters into no obligation whatsoever to give armed assistance; according to the letter, she retains full freedom to do whatever her own interests may demand. However, that, in point of fact, England has by this agreement and the existing military arrangements already given herself up beyond salvation to the French *revanche* idea, requires no lengthy explanation.

The British Government plays a dangerous game. By its attitude in the Bosnian and in the Moroccan questions it has twice created a crisis which each time brought Europe to the verge of war. The encouragement which, directly and indirectly, it grants to French chauvinism may on some future day bring forth a catastrophe in which English and French soldiers may have to pay by their blood, on French battlefields, for England's policy of isolation.

King Edward's seed is germinating!

II

Grey's Letter to Cambon

Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon: —

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 22, 1912.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR:—

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood

that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets, respectively, at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to coöperate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

III

Plan for Franco-British action

The French Ambassador Cambon to Sir Edward Grey: —

LONDON, November 23, 1912.

In your letter of yesterday (November 22) you remind me that in recent years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain have consulted together from time to time; that it has always been understood that these conversations did not restrict the liberty of each Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their arms; that on both sides these conversations between specialists were not, and ought not to be, considered as agreements obliging our Governments to act in certain cases; that, moreover, I observed to you that if either Government had serious reasons for fearing an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would become necessary to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other. Your letter answers this observation, and I am authorized to declare to you that, in case one of our Governments should have serious cause for fear, whether the aggression of a third power or some event threatening the general peace, this Government would instantly ascertain whether both Governments ought to act in concert, with a view to anticipate the aggression or to preserve peace. In this case, both Governments would deliberate on the measures they would be disposed to take in common; if these measures warranted action, both Governments would immediately examine the plans of their General Staffs and then decide how these plans should be executed.

IV

King George's visit to Paris

May —, 1914. With regard to the political results of King George's visit to Paris I learn that a number of political questions have been discussed

between Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue. Moreover, it has been suggested on the French side to complete the special military arrangements existing between France and England by an analogous arrangement between England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey has received this suggestion in a sympathetic manner. He has, however, pointed out that he is unable to bind himself without a previous consultation with the Cabinet. It is said that the Minister has been much impressed by the reception accorded to the English guests by the French Government and the French population. It is to be feared that the English statesman, who has made an official visit abroad for the first time, and, as it is affirmed, even left England's soil for the first time on this occasion, may in future succumb to French influence in an even higher degree than he has done heretofore.

V

New Triple Alliance predicted

June —, 1914. The news that, on the occasion of King George's visit to Paris, the suggestion was made to conclude a military arrangement between England and Russia, has been confirmed to me. From a reliable source I learn that M. Iswolsky is responsible for that suggestion. His has been the idea of using the expected high spirits of the days of Paris for transforming the Triple *Entente* into an alliance of the type of the Triple Alliance. If, in the end, Paris and St. Petersburg had to be satisfied with a little less, this has, evidently, been done out of consideration of the fact that in England a large part of public opinion is positively unfavorable to the conclusion of formal alliances with foreign powers. In view of this fact, despite the numerous proofs of British diplomacy's entire lack of power to resist the influence of the *Entente*, — I refer to the servility with which, quite recently, England supported Russia, in the question of the German military mission to Turkey, — it has evidently not seemed advisable to let the cat out of the bag at once. It has rather been decided to advance gradually, by slow steps. In a meeting of the Cabinet Sir Edward Grey has warmly recommended the Franco-Russian suggestion, and the Cabinet has accepted his views. It has been resolved to prepare a naval agreement the negotiations for which are to be conducted in London between the Admiralty and the Russian naval attaché.

Great is the satisfaction among the Russian and French diplomatists. They consider the conclusion of a formal treaty of alliance only a question of time. To accelerate this result, St. Petersburg would even be ready to make certain sham concessions to England in Persia. The differences of opinion in this regard which have recently occurred between the two powers have so far not been settled. As for England's apprehensions with regard to the future of India which have made themselves felt again recently, Russia follows the policy of giving appeasing assurances for the time being.

VI

Disclaimers of the new alliance

June —, 1914. The French indiscretions with regard to the Anglo-Russian naval convention cause a great deal of uneasiness in St. Peters-

burg and London. Sir Edward Grey is afraid that the matter will cause a question in Parliament. The naval attaché, Captain Wolkov, who has spent several days in St. Petersburg with the obvious intention of getting his instructions for the parliamentary debate, has returned to London. Parliament has already opened.

VII

June —, 1914. In the House of Commons the Ministerial side addressed an interpellation to the Government as to whether Great Britain and Russia had recently concluded a naval convention, and whether negotiations with a view of concluding such a convention had recently taken place between the two countries or were going on at present.

Sir Edward Grey in his answer referred to similar questions addressed to the Government in the preceding year. The Premier had at that time, Sir Edward Grey went on to say, replied there were no unpublished agreements with European powers apt to restrain or hem in the free decision of the Government or Parliament as to whether Great Britain was to participate in a war or not. This answer held good to-day, just as it did a year ago. No negotiations with any power had since been concluded which would detract from the truth of the declaration in question; no such negotiations were in progress, nor was it likely, as far as he could judge, that such would be entered upon. In case, however, that an agreement was to be concluded which might necessitate a retraction or alteration of the above-mentioned declaration of the Prime Minister of last year, such an agreement, in his opinion, would have to be and, he felt sure, consequently would be, submitted to Parliament.

The great majority of the English press withholds all comment on this declaration of the Minister.

Only the two radical papers, the *Daily News* and the *Manchester Guardian*, have short editorial articles. The first mentioned expresses satisfaction at Sir Edward Grey's words, saying that they are clear enough to dispel all doubts. England, it says, is not in tow of any other country. She is not a vassal of Russia's, not the ally of France, and not the enemy of Germany. The declaration, it continues, is a salutary lecture to those English journalists who would give currency to the belief that there is a Triple *Entente* of the same nature as the Triple Alliance.

The *Manchester Guardian*, on the contrary, is not satisfied with the declaration of the Minister. The paper finds fault with its tortuous wording, and tries to prove that it admits of interpretations which would not entirely exclude the existence of certain, perhaps conditional, agreements of the rumored kind.

The declarations of Sir Edward Grey correspond with a confidential utterance to the following effect of a person of the Minister's immediate *entourage*: He was in a position to assert most emphatically and decisively that there were no agreements of any military or naval nature whatever between England and France, although the wish for such had been repeatedly expressed on the French side. What the British Cabinet had refused to France it was not likely to concede to Russia. No naval agreement had been concluded with Russia, nor was any going to be concluded.

VIII

June —, 1914. It would seem that Sir Edward Grey felt a need at once categorically to repudiate the remarks of the Manchester *Guardian* in response to his answer to the interpellation made concerning the rumored Anglo-Russian naval *entente*. The *Westminster Gazette* prints in a prominent place, from the pen of Mr. Spender, who is well known to be one of Sir Edward Grey's most intimate political friends, a *démenti* which leaves nothing to be desired as regards emphasis. Therein it is said: That no naval agreement exists, and no negotiations are pending about a naval agreement between England and Russia, and that nobody who knew the character and the methods of Sir Edward Grey could think for a moment that the declaration which he made was intended to veil the truth.

IX

The disclaimers disbelieved

June —, 1914. The fact that Sir Edward Grey's declaration in the House of Commons concerning the Russo-English naval conventions was so readily accepted by public opinion in England has caused great relief here and in St. Petersburg. The wire-pullers in this action had feared that the beautiful dream of the new Triple Alliance had come to an end. By the way, I find it hard to believe that it should have been reserved exclusively for the Manchester *Guardian* to see through the trick which Sir Edward Grey was playing in not answering the questions whether negotiations were pending or in progress about a naval agreement with Russia, and denying the question (which had not been put at all) whether England had entered into binding obligations relative to her participation in a European war. I am, on the contrary, inclined to believe that the English press in this case gave a new proof of its well-known discipline in the treatment of questions of foreign policy, and that it kept silence either in response to a "not d'ordre," or from political instinct. What criticising and fault-finding would the Imperial Government not have been subjected to on the part of the German popular representatives and the German press; what a clamor would not be raised about our foreign policy and our diplomats, if a similar declaration should be made in the Reichstag! In Parliamentary England everybody remains silent when a Minister tries in such an evident manner to mislead his own party, the representatives of the people and public opinion. What is there that England does not sacrifice to her Germanophobia?

X

Anglo-Russian agreement

June —, 1914. From a source which has preserved its old sympathies for Germany, the accompanying notes have been sent to me with a request for strictest secrecy, concerning a conference which took place on the 26th of May of the present year, at which the Chief of the Russian Naval Staff presided, and in which the basic principles were fixed for the negotiations about the Russo-English naval convention. My informant knew nothing as yet about the result to which the negotiations have led until now, but he ex-

pressed grave fears with regard to the promotion which the cause of Russian nationalism would experience if the convention should really materialize. The moment they were sure of England's participation, the well-known Pan-Slavic agitators would not hesitate to seize the first opportunity to bring about a war. Also, M. Sazonof was visibly drifting into the wake of the Russian war party.

(Inclosure)

ST. PETERSBURG, May 13 (26), 1914.

Led by the considerations that an agreement was desirable between Russia and England, with regard to the coöperation of their naval forces in the case of military operations conducted by Russia and England with the participation of France, the conference arrived at the following conclusions:—

As the contemplated naval convention is to regulate the relations in all their details between the Russian and English maritime forces, an agreement must be reached concerning signals and special ciphers, radio-telegrams and the mode of communication between the Russian and English Naval Staffs. Besides this, the two Naval Staffs are to inform each other regularly about the fleets of third powers and about their own navies, in particular about technical data and newly introduced machines and inventions.

Following the example of the Franco-Russian naval convention, a current exchange of opinion is to take place between the Russian and the English Naval Staff in order to examine questions which are of interest to the Naval Minister of both states.

The Russian naval agreement with England, like the Franco-Russian agreement, is to make provision for actions of the Russian and English navies, which, previously agreed upon, are to be fought separately. In respect of the strategic aims, distinction is to be made between naval operations in the Black Sea and the North Sea on the one side, and the expected naval warfare in the Mediterranean on the other. In both spheres Russia must endeavor to get compensation from England for deflecting a part of the German navy upon the Russian fleet.

In the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, temporary activities of Russia are to be considered as strategic operations in case of a war.

Russian interests in the Baltic Sea demand that England shall keep the largest possible part of the German fleet in the North Sea. That would do away with the overpowering superiority of the German fleet as against the Russian, and might make it possible for the Russians to land in Pomerania. In this the British Government could be of essential assistance by dispatching a great number of merchantmen to the Baltic ports before the beginning of warlike operations, so as to make up for the lack of Russian transport vessels.

As regards the situation in the Mediterranean, it is of prime importance to Russia to have an unquestionable superiority of the forces of the *Entente* over the Austro-Italian fleets established. For in case the Austro-Italian forces command the Mediterranean, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the Black Sea would be possible, a contingency which would mean a dangerous blow to Russia. It must be assumed that the Austro-Italian forces are

superior to the French. England would, therefore, have to secure the preponderance of the fighting forces of the *Entente* Powers in the Mediterranean, at least for so long a time as the development of the Russian navy has not made such progress as to be able to undertake this task itself. Russian men-of-war must, through England's consent, be allowed to use the English ports in the eastern Mediterranean as a base, just as the French naval agreement permits the Russian fleet to base itself upon French ports in the western Mediterranean.

XI

Poincaré's visit to Russia

July —, 1914. During the course of my conversation to-day with M. Sazonof, the talk also turned to the visit of M. Poincaré. The Minister laid emphasis upon the pacific tone of the toasts exchanged. I could not refrain from drawing M. Sazonof's attention to the fact that not the toasts that were exchanged at such visits were wont to give material for uneasiness, but the comments made by the press in connection with them. Such press comments had been made this time also, even spreading the news of a reported conclusion of an Anglo-Russian naval convention. M. Sazonof, seizing upon this remark, said, in a vexed manner, that such a naval convention existed only "in the mind of the *Berliner Tageblatt* and in the moon."

XII

July —, 1914. I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the inclosed copy of a letter, dated the 25th inst. at St. Petersburg, sent to a Russian Grand Duke, who is sojourning here for the present, by his adjutant, and about the gist of which I have already made telegraphic report. The letter, which came to my knowledge in a confidential way, is proof, to my mind, that as early as the 24th inst. people in Russia were determined to go to war.

(Inclosure)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 12 (25), 1914.

In St. Petersburg we have had great disorder among the laborers, which strangely coincided with the presence here of the French and with the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Yesterday I heard from the French military agent, General de la Guiche, that he had been told Austria was not innocent of these labor disturbances. But now everything is quickly reverting to normal conditions, and it seems that, encouraged by the French, our Government has ceased to tremble with fear of the Germans. It was about time! It is better once to speak one's mind clearly to the other party than to hide continually behind the professional lies of the diplomats. Austria's ultimatum is of an unheard-of insolence, as all papers here say unanimously.

I have just read the evening papers. Yesterday there was a meeting of the Ministerial Council. The Minister of War spoke very strongly; he confirmed the statement that Russia is ready for war, and the other Ministers agreed. In accordance with this spirit, a report to His Majesty was made up, and this report was acknowledged the same night. To-day a preliminary

communiqué of the Government was published in the *Russky Invalid* to the effect that "the Government is very anxious in consequence of the events that have taken place and the dispatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. The Government is following carefully the development of the Servo-Austrian conflict, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent." This *communiqué* was printed by all papers with very favorable comment.

We are all convinced that this time there will be no Rasputins to prevent Russia from doing her duty. Germany, which is pushing Austria forward, is determined to measure her strength against ours before we build up our fleet, and the Balkan States have not yet recovered from the war. We also must look danger bravely in the face, instead of hiding our heads as during the Balkan War, when Kokovtsoff had no other thoughts than of the purse. At that time war would have been easier, as the Balkan League was fully armed. But in Russia the street demonstrations which were directed against that detestable Austria were dispersed by the police. Now, however, such demonstrations would be gladly welcomed.

Altogether we will hope that the reign of the poltroons and of certain bawlers and mystics is a thing of the past. War is like a thunderstorm. Even though catastrophes should come, it would be better than to endure this sultriness longer. From experience I know to a certainty that for myself the quietest place is at the front, where I can see the danger in its natural proportions, and that is not so terrible. The worst is in the realm where an atmosphere of cowardice prevails, where improbable rumors are abroad, and panics develop. And in the future war the Russian interior will be the rear guard.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

A GERMAN HISTORIAN PREDICTS WAR WITH ENGLAND ¹

. . . PROFESSOR DELBRÜCK begins his statement by a candid avowal of the "highly inflammable state of feeling" now rampant in Germany against England. He asks, "Can an Anglo-German war be averted?" and replies:—

"I begin to think it cannot. We know now that England deliberately planned to fall upon us without formal declaration of war last summer. We know now how near we were to the realization of a British admiral's grim prophecy that 'the Germans would wake up some morning to find that they had once had a fleet.' The nation is so outraged over that revelation that the next Reichstag may be asked to pass a law permitting us to treat as pirates the prisoners of any enemy who begins hostilities under those wanton circumstances — to shoot or hang them at sight! I doubt very much if our Government will be able for long to resist the pressure for more powerful armaments, which are demanded in all patriotic German circles. Morocco proved to the hilt, if further proof were necessary, that England is our inveterate enemy. In the face of such a peril there is only one alternative — more dreadnoughts! We realize that a heavy or sudden increase of our fleet might — probably would — be considered a *casus belli* by England. But people think we must risk that. We cannot and will not ever again tolerate such malicious interference with legitimate German aspirations as Britain's intervention in our negotiations with France over Morocco.

"Our point is that the British Government has stubbornly and consistently declined to negotiate with us, with a view either to coöperation or avoidance of an eventual menace to British interests. Your standpoint is simply blind unyielding opposition — the dog-in-the-manger attitude in its most virulent form. You refuse to associate yourselves with us in financing the project [of the Bagdad Railway], as we invited you to do ten years ago. Then, not satisfied with blocking our progress in that direction, you lose no opportunity to unite Russian and Frenchman against us. Then you seek to undermine us with the Turk, whose only friend is Germany, because we are the only European power which has not despoiled him of territory in the past and has no intention of doing so in the future.

"Let me summarize what I have said: The abandonment of unworthy suspicions; the acknowledgment of our right to grow and to participate in shaping the world's destinies; the expression of an honest desire to reach an understanding; formal diplomatic steps in that direction; simultaneous withdrawal of arbitrary opposition to legitimate German political aspirations — those are the things we mean by an exhibition of British friendship. . . . If you have no inclination to meet us on that ground, if your interests rather point to a perpetuation of the anything-to-beat-Germany policy, so let it be. The Armageddon which must then, some day, ensue will not be of our making."

¹ Extract from an article in the *Literary Digest*, 1912, vol. XLIV, p. 201.

THE PRICE OF A GERMAN-ENGLISH ENTENTE¹

... So soon as Germany perceives that the other powers are no longer making it their object to exclude her from the politics of the world, she will have attained the purpose of her shipbuilding; and she will rejoice to be rid of the necessity of increasing her burden (p. 133).

... So soon as they know that Germany is at one with England, all notion of revolt must vanish. In spite of all differences among the great nations, it is never to be forgotten that they also constitute a vast unity and have common interests. Germany has a large and growing share in the trade of India, and especially of Egypt. A rising in India or Egypt that should fling back these lands into anarchy and barbarism would, therefore, be also an acute injury to German interests. So soon as Germany stands in healthy political relations with England, she has the keenest interest in the preservation of England's rule, which represents civilization, in adjacent countries. President Roosevelt was right in saying that Germany on the Euphrates represented not a weakening, but a strengthening, of England's position on the Ganges and the Nile (p. 134).

... A war between Germany and England can only take one course, viz., that the English vessels blockade the German harbors, and the German ships by force or cunning break through the blockade and endeavor to inflict widespread damage on English merchantmen and harbors. If other powers come into play, Germany might, perhaps, in combination with the Turks, attack the English in Egypt, and the English could strengthen with their land forces an enemy of Germany — the French or the Russians. The landing of English troops in Denmark or Holland could scarcely accomplish much, since the German Empire has at its disposal more than four to five million soldiers, and would therefore be speedily in a position to attack and annihilate any such English army with overwhelmingly superior forces. We could desire nothing better for ourselves than such an isolated landing of English troops. If the English desire to support the French against us, they must allow their army to land in France and unite directly with the French army. A landing elsewhere would be a division of forces which would enable the German army to overcome each in succession (pp. 135-36).

The field, wherein the understanding between England and Germany is to be sought, is that of colonial policy and the Turkish Orient. Germany recognizes that the greatest part of the world is allotted, and there are no longer important colonies to be gained by her; but compensation for this can be obtained in the preservation of the principle of the "open door," where this still exists, and close relations to the rejuvenated Turkey, where Germany may look for no sovereignty, but for influence and commercial activity. If England, instead of placing obstacle after obstacle in the way of the attainment of our purpose, in the fashion sufficiently described by Sir Harry Johnston, will accord her friendly support, every motive for hostile feeling on our part will have vanished and the rivalry of armaments will diminish.

¹ Extracts from an article by Hans Delbrück, in the *Contemporary Review*, 1911, vol. **xcix**, p. 138.

REFERENCES TO THE ANGLO-GERMAN SECRET TREATY OF
1898 RELATIVE TO THE EVENTUAL DISMEMBERMENT
OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES

EVEN the Emperor William's telegram to Mr. Kruger provoked only a temporary storm, and did not hinder the conclusion of a secret treaty which, in 1898, in conditions but little known, disposed of the future of the Portuguese colonies.¹

England should afford Germany certain opportunities for working off her surplus energy, her surplus production in Asia, but should avoid any arrangement permitting her to become a greater rival than she already is along the Atlantic trade routes. Thus, instead of confirming the Treaty of 1898 relative to the eventual dismemberment of the Portuguese colonies, she should seek for a fresh arrangement undoing that dangerous and incomprehensible pact.²

ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT IN REGARD TO THE
AFRICAN POSSESSIONS OF PORTUGAL³

LONDON, December 30. (Special Cable to the New York *Times*.) The New York *Times* is in a position to state that Great Britain and Germany have concluded an important arrangement with regard to the African possessions of Portugal, that is, Angola and Portuguese East Africa.

By this arrangement Angola will become a German protectorate. It is a vast tract of territory, 312,000 square miles in extent, with a native population of 2,000,000, lying north of German Southwest Africa. Its proximity to the German colony is, of course, the factor which made the German claims to it so strong.

With reference to the Portuguese possessions on the other side of the continent, Mozambique in the north and Gazaland in the south, territory extending from the eleventh to the twenty-sixth parallels, the northern part adjacent to German East Africa will pass under German control, and the southern part, regarded as a natural seaboard for the Transvaal, will become British. The boundary will be either the Zambesi River or in its vicinity.

Advices have been received in London from Lisbon to the effect that not only has an agreement been completed, but that the purchase money has already been paid by the two powers to Portugal. It is stated that this amounts to something over \$100,000,000.

The Portuguese Government refrains for political reasons from making public details of the deal. It is felt that any such announcement would endanger the existence of the present Government, which awaits a more favorable time to inform the public of the bargain.

The position of Portugal toward the territories will be much the same under the agreement as that of Turkey with regard to Egypt — suzerainty more in name than anything else.

¹ André Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, p. 47. New York, 1908.

² William Morton Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, p. 264. New York, 1913.

³ From the New York *Times*, December 31, 1913.

There can be no doubt that the discussions which led up to the agreement had an excellent effect in clearing the air between England and Germany. They were, of course, rendered easier by the fact that some time before the Boer War a similar agreement was come to. It was then not carried out, as the war increased the commercial competition between the two countries, and the German naval policy combined to decrease the cordiality of their relations.

PORTUGAL WON'T SELL YET: DIVISION OF HER EAST AFRICAN COLONIES WHEN SHE DOES¹

BERLIN, December 31. The Foreign Office says of the report of an Anglo-German agreement to acquire Angola and Mozambique from Portugal, that should such an arrangement be reached, it would be contingent on Portugal deciding to dispose of her colonies and would concern only the Anglo-German rights of preëmption.

Portugal, however, it is said, does not dream of selling her colonies.

LONDON, December 31. The Foreign Office says there is no truth in the report that Germany and England have agreed to the division of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. It is pointed out that Portugal has not expressed a desire to sell the colonies. Should the Portuguese possessions ever come into the market, the two countries may endeavor to obtain possession of them.

INTERVIEW OF OCTOBER 28, 1908, WITH EMPEROR WILLIAM II

[THIS interview, which the Kaiser gave to a "representative Englishman," appeared in the London *Telegraph*, October 28, 1908, and is reprinted in the New York *Times Current History of the European War*, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 213. It was corroborated by the German Foreign Office, with the comment that it was "intended as a message to the English people." In consequence of the outcry in Germany, . . . and the representations of Chancellor von Bülow, the Kaiser had to declare that his principal imperial task was to "insure the stability of the policies of the Empire, under the guardianship of constitutional responsibility. . . ."]

"You English are as mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are completely given over to suspicions that are quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command in my speech at the Guild-hall that my heart was set upon peace and that it was one of my dearest wishes to live on the best terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions ought to speak for themselves, but you will not listen to them, but to those who misinterpret and distort them.

"This is a personal insult which I resent; to be forever misjudged, to have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scrutinized with jealous, mistrustful eyes taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your press, or at least a considerable

¹ New York *Times*, January 1, 1914.

section of it, bids the people of England to refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other hand holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its will?"

Complaining again of the difficulty imposed on him by English distrust, His Majesty said: "The prevailing sentiment of large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in the minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best element, just as it is in England respecting Germany."

The Englishman reminded the Kaiser that not only England, but the whole of Europe, viewed with disapproval the recent sending of the German Consul at Algiers to Fez and forestalling France and Spain by suggesting the recognition of Sultan Mulai Hafid. The Kaiser made an impatient gesture and exclaimed: "Yes, that is an excellent example of the way German actions are misrepresented." And with vivid directness he defended the aforesaid incident, as the German Government has already done.

The interviewer reminded the Kaiser that an important and influential section of the German newspapers interpreted these acts very differently, and effusively approved of them because they indicated that Germany was bent upon shaping events in Morocco.

"There are mischief-makers," replied the Emperor, "in both countries. I will not attempt to weigh their relative capacity for misrepresentation, but the facts are as I have stated. There has been nothing in Germany's recent action in regard to Morocco contrary to the explicit declaration of my love of peace made both at the Guildhall and in my latest speech at Strassburg."

Reverting to his efforts to show his friendship for England, the Kaiser said they had not been confined to words. It was commonly believed that Germany was hostile to England throughout the Boer War. Undoubtedly the newspapers were hostile and public opinion was hostile. "But what," he asked, "of official Germany? What brought to a sudden stop, indeed, to an absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates, who were striving to obtain European intervention?"

"They were fêted in Holland. France gave them a rapturous welcome. They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people would have crowned them with flowers, but when they asked me to receive them I refused. The agitation immediately died away and the delegates returned empty handed. Was that the action of a secret enemy?"

"Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German Government was invited by France and Russia to join them in calling upon England to end the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust. What was my reply? I said so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to bring pressure against England and bring about her downfall Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a sea power like England.

"Posterity will one day read the exact terms of a telegram, now in the archives of Windsor Castle, in which I informed the sovereign of England of the answer I returned to the powers which then sought to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what my actions were in the hour of their adversity.

"Nor was that all. During your black week in December, 1899, when

disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and affliction and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. I did more. I bade one of my officers to procure as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants on both sides and the actual positions of the opposing forces.

"With the figures before me I worked out what I considered the best plan of campaign in the circumstances and submitted it to my General Staff for criticism. Then I dispatched it to England. That document likewise is among the State papers at Windsor awaiting the serenely impartial verdict of history.

"Let me add as a curious coincidence that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that actually adopted by General Roberts and carried by him into successful operation. Was that the act of one who wished England ill? Let Englishmen be just and say."

Touching then upon the English conviction that Germany is increasing her navy for the purpose of attacking Great Britain, the Kaiser reiterated the explanation that Chancellor von Bülow and other Ministers have made familiar, dwelling upon Germany's worldwide commerce, her manifold interests in distant seas, and the necessity for being prepared to protect them. He said: —

"Patriotic Germans refuse to assign any bounds to their legitimate commercial ambitions. They expect their interests to go on growing. They must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Germany looks ahead. Her horizons stretch far away. She must be prepared for any eventualities in the Far East. Who can foresee what may take place in the Pacific in the days to come, days not so distant as some believe, but days, at any rate, for which all European powers with Far Eastern interest sought to steadily prepare?

"Look at the accomplished rise of Japan. Think of a possible national awakening in China, and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. Only those powers which have great navies will be listened to with respect when the future of the Pacific comes to be solved, and if for that reason only Germany must have a powerful fleet. It may even be that England herself will be glad that Germany has a fleet when they speak together in the great debates of the future."

The interviewer concludes: —

"The Emperor spoke with all that earnestness which marks his manner when speaking on deeply pondered subjects. I ask my fellow-countrymen who value the cause of peace, to weigh what I have written and revise, if necessary, their estimate of the Kaiser and his friendship for England by his Majesty's own words. If they had enjoyed the privilege of hearing them spoken they would no longer doubt either his Majesty's firm desire to live on the best of terms with England or his growing impatience at the persistent mistrust with which his offer of friendship is too often received."

COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT AND REMOVAL OF
CONFLICTING INTERESTS¹

BY SIR HARRY JOHNSTON

ONE thing, at any rate, that the recent German colonization of England has done, has been to build up a remarkable degree of commerce between the British and the German Empires; and a fact which is too often overlooked by British politicians is the value of Anglo-German commerce at the present day. We do a bigger trade with Germany than with all the British Empire over the seas, and similarly German commerce flourishes in all that part of the British Empire governed from London more than it does in the colonial dominions of any other power. An Anglo-German war would be the most dreadful disaster which could possibly happen to either Germany or Britain. It would bankrupt both empires and only profit the United States and Russia.

. . . We have overlooked the fact that it is only because hitherto trade has been so splendidly free and fair to all the world throughout all the British possessions that the rest of the world has permitted without undue grumbling a population of some forty millions only in northwest Europe to arrogate to itself the control of the best parts of Africa, Asia, Australasia, and America. But a reversal of this policy would, in my opinion, eventually unite all the other great commercial powers of the world in league against us.

Germany wants, will have, and must have some day — and is morally entitled to — an outlet towards the Mediterranean and a port on that sea. That outlet can only be, if the balance of power is to remain undisturbed, Trieste. In making such a sacrifice for the benefit of her ally, Austria would require a territorial compensation farther east, and in the course of events must of necessity become a great Slav empire rather than an eastern Germany. These are matters which only concern Great Britain in so far that we might hinder their solution by any stupid, short-sighted interference in the affairs of the Nearest East. Far more important to us, in my humble opinion, than the fate and future history of the Balkan Peninsula, is a good understanding with Germany. It is Germany and Austria together who should be allowed by Britain, France, and Russia to determine the settlement of southeastern Europe north of the Greek frontier. Similarly, nothing should be done by us to block the way of Germany or Austria in any steps they may take which are right and fair and which do not lead to any policy of protection, for the regeneration of Turkey in Asia, providing that due regard is given to the peculiar circumstances of Syria, the necessity for a neutralized Arabia, and British interests in Egypt and the Persian Gulf.

On the other hand, among the British interests of the greatest magnitude are the independence and neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg and the invulnerability of France within her present limits. Any unprovoked attack by Germany on France, and any further encroachment of German power westward in that direction would be a *casus belli*, even — I should imagine — with the Labor and the Irish parties in Great Britain.

¹ Extract from the *Report of Proceedings of the Anglo-German Understanding Conference*, pp. 116-18. London, 1912.

COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION¹

BY PROFESSOR KARL RATHGEN

As I said before, with the rest of the world Germany's foreign trade was stagnant for twenty years from the middle of the seventies to the middle of the nineties. From that time until now an enormous wave of increase of the volume and the value of foreign trade has gone all over the world. It has swelled statistical numbers in England as well as in Germany, but with one difference. The wave began to rise in Germany several years earlier than in England. In these first years of the great wave of increasing exports the start which England had over Germany has been somewhat diminished. About 1889-90 British exports were ahead of German exports by about £100,000,000. Ten years later the difference was only £50,000,000 to £65,000,000. But since that time, during the last fifteen years, the distance has remained the same. Excepting that year of unusual prices, 1907, the value of English exports has been ahead of German exports between £45,000,000 and £65,000,000. In other words, the absolute increase of the value of exports has been the same in the United Kingdom and in Germany between the years of prosperity, 1900, 1911, an increase of £170,000,000 for Germany, £165,000,000 for the United Kingdom, increases both of them much larger than those of any other country in the world. Even in the United States it was only £115,000,000. The comparison of England and Germany appears in less favorable light for the latter, if we compute the proportion of exports per head of the population, because the German population has increased by larger numbers than that of Great Britain. From 1890 to 1911 German exports increased per head by £2, 15s., British exports by £3.

To give an analysis of this increase of exports would take up too much time. But one point you will allow me to illustrate, which is of paramount importance for our object. The direction of these foreign exports has developed in quite a different way for both countries. I have compared for each commercial country of the world the years 1890 and 1910, two years of good business, whether during this period German or British imports show the greater increase. The result is very curious. For no European country excepting Rumania and Greece have imports from Great Britain decreased. But in every European country excepting Portugal, German imports have increased faster than British imports. Here you have the influence of the central continental position of Germany, situated in the heart of Europe, surrounded by other continental countries. Germany has the advantage of its geographical position in Europe. This is confirmed by the fact that about the year 1910 British imports were ahead of German imports in France, in Spain, in Portugal, in Turkey, in Greece; in all the other countries Germany is ahead, and that the more so the closer the continental connection is. We get the inverse impression from the statistics of imports, 1890 and 1910, in countries out of Europe. In each of these countries the imports from Great Britain have increased by a larger sum than those from Germany. An exception is found, besides in the German colonies, only in

¹ Extract from the *Report of Proceedings of the Anglo-German Understanding Conference*, pp. 19-21. London, 1912.

some states of Central America, Mexico, Guatemala, San Domingo; in the Argentine Republic the progress of both countries is nearly equal. Of the increase in the buying power of the non-European countries Britain has profited more than Germany.

Excepting certain parts of Central America and tropical Africa, British exports are far ahead of German exports everywhere out of Europe.

Who would be foolish enough to think that the natural advantage of Germany in Europe, of Britain beyond the seas, might be changed by a war!

If the economic conditions and necessities of England and Germany are more and more similar, does that only mean increasing competition? Does it not mean at the same time similarity and community of interests? The great commercial nations have the same interest, that the whole world should be opened up to civilization and to industrial and commercial enterprises. It has been England which has given the example of opening up new areas to the commerce of all comers in fair competition. It has been the first colonizing power which admitted merchants and goods from other countries, and many are the German merchants who recognize this spirit of fairness and economic wisdom. England has been the principal power to open up the Near and the Far East to European enterprise. Germany has, as soon as the Empire created the possibility of such action, always worked in the same spirit, as shown in eastern Asia and in the opening up of Africa. It has had an essential share in securing fair and equal treatment for all trading nations, from the Congo Act down to the recent Morocco Treaty, where England has left to Germany the privilege of protecting these principles. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make special proposals for coöperation; but how much work is to be done, how much capital is required to civilize the vast expanse of countries beyond the sea and their hundreds of millions of inhabitants! To mention one point only: have we not the same interest to increase the production of other materials of industry like cotton? In the same way as Germany has profited by the action of England, Germany's action profits to England. Small as the volume of commerce with our new colonies is as yet, they afford a market for Great Britain and its possessions which is bound to increase in the future.

SPEECH OF THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR, HERR VON
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, IN THE REICHSTAG,
DECEMBER 2, 1914¹

FREER than France and Russia was England. I have already reminded you how British statesmen in Parliament, again and again, proudly affirmed Great Britain's absolutely unrestricted right to steer her own course. The attempt to come to an understanding, which would have safeguarded the peace of the world, was easiest to make with England.

On these lines I had to act and I did act. I well knew that it was a narrow road, not easy to tread. In the course of centuries, the English insular way of thinking had evolved the political maxim that England had a right to an *arbitrium mundi*, which she could only uphold by an unrivaled supremacy on

¹ Extract from the translation published in the International Conciliation Pamphlet, no. 86.

sea and by the maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent. I never had any hopes that my persuasion could break that old English maxim. What I did hope and thought possible was that the growth of German power and the increase of the risks of a war might open England's eyes to the fact that her old-fashioned maxim had become untenable and impracticable, and that an amicable settlement with Germany was preferable. But that old doctrine of hers more than once stood in the way of a peaceful understanding. The crisis of 1911 gave a new impetus to the negotiations. The English people suddenly realized that they had stood at the brink of a European war. Popular sentiment forced the British Government to a *rapprochement* with Germany. After long and arduous negotiations we finally arrived at an understanding on various disputed questions of an economic character, regarding Africa and Asia Minor. This understanding was to lessen every possible political friction. The world is wide. There is room enough for both nations to measure their strength in peaceful rivalry as long as our national strength is allowed free scope for development. German policy always stood up for that principle. But during the negotiations England was indefatigable in her endeavors to enter into ever closer relations with France and Russia. The decisive point was that beyond the political sphere of action one military agreement after the other was made in view of a possible Continental war. England kept these negotiations as secret as possible. When something about them would percolate, it was declared, both in the press and in Parliament, to be perfectly harmless. But things could not be concealed, as you know from the official papers that were published by me. The general situation was this: England was indeed ready to come to an understanding on single items, but the first and foremost principle of her policy was the "balance of power" as a means of checking German strength in its free development.

CARDIFF SPEECH OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER,
MR. ASQUITH, OCTOBER 2, 1914¹

I WILL not repeat, and I certainly cannot improve upon it, and indeed I am not here to-night to argue out propositions which British citizens in every part of the world to-day regard as beyond the reach of controversy. I do not suppose that in the history of mankind there has ever been, in such a vast and diverse community, agreement so unanimous in purpose, so concentrated, a corporate conscience so clear, so convinced, coöperation so spontaneous, so ardent, and so resolute. Just consider what it means, here in this United Kingdom — England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales — to hear one plain, harmonious, united voice, while over the seas from our great Dominions Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, our Crown Colonies, swell the chorus.

In India, — where whatever we won by the sword we hold and we retain by the more splendid title of just and disinterested rule, by the authority, not of a despot, but of a trustee, — the response to our common appeal has moved all our feelings to their profoundest depths, and has been such as to shiver and to shatter the vain and ignorant imaginings of our enemies. That is a remarkable and indeed a unique spectacle.

¹ Extract from "The War," a pamphlet published by Methuen & Co., London, 1914.

What is it that stirred the imagination, aroused the conscience, enlisted the manhood, welded into one compact and irresistible force the energies and the will of the greatest Imperial structure that the world has ever known? That is a question which, for a moment, it is well worth asking and answering. Let me say, then, first negatively, that we are not impelled, any of us, by some of the motives which have occasioned the bloody struggles of the past. In this case, so far as we are concerned, ambition and aggression play no part. What do we want? What do we aim at? What have we to gain?

We are a great, world-wide, peace-loving partnership. By the wisdom and the courage of our forefathers, by great deeds of heroism and adventure on land and sea, by the insight and corporate sagacity, the tried and tested experience of many generations, we have built up a dominion which is buttressed by the two pillars of Liberty and Law. We are not vain enough or foolish enough to think that in the course of a long process there have not been blunders, or worse than blunders, and that to-day our Dominion does not fall short of what in our ideals it might and it ought and, we believe, it is destined to be. But such as we have received it, and such as we hope to leave it, with it we are content.

We do not covet any people's territory. We have no desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. The British Empire is enough for us. All that we wished for, all that we wish for now, is to be allowed peaceably to consolidate our own resources, to raise within the Empire the level of common opportunity, to draw closer the bond of affection and confidence between its parts, and to make it everywhere the worthy home of the best traditions of British liberty. Does it not follow from that, that nowhere in the world is there a people who have stronger motives to avoid war and to seek and ensue peace? Why, then, are the British people throughout the length and breadth of our Empire everywhere turning their ploughshares into swords? Why are the best of our able-bodied men leaving the fields and the factory and the counting-house for the recruiting-office and the training-camp?

If, as I have said, we have no desire to add to our Imperial burdens, either in area or in responsibility, it is equally true that in entering this war we had no ill-will to gratify, nor wrongs of our own to avenge. In regard to Germany in particular, our policy — repeatedly stated in Parliament, resolutely pursued year after year both in London and in Berlin — our policy has been to remove one by one the outstanding causes of possible friction, and so to establish a firm basis for cordial relations in the days to come.

We have said from the first — I have said it over and over again, and so has Sir Edward Grey — we have said from the first that our friendships with certain powers, with France, with Russia, and with Japan, were not to be construed as implying cold feelings, and still less hostile purposes, against any other power. But at the same time we have always made it clear, to quote words used by Sir Edward Grey as far back as November, 1911, — I quote his exact words, — "One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones. New friendships by all means let us have, but not at the expense of the ones we have." That has been, and I trust will always be, the attitude of those whom the Kaiser in his now notorious proclamation describes as the "treacherous English."

We laid down — and I wish to call not only your attention, but the attention of the whole world to this, when so many false legends are now being

invented and circulated — in the following year — in the year 1912 we laid down in terms carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually quote, what our relations with Germany ought in our view to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German Government, "Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that.

But that was not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and her defensive resources, especially upon the sea. They asked us, to put it quite plainly, for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate the European world.

To such a demand but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave. None the less we have continued during the whole of the last two years, and never more energetically and more successfully than during the Balkan crisis of last year, to work not only for the peace of Europe but for the creation of a better international atmosphere and a more cordial coöperation between all the powers. From both points of view, that of our domestic interests as a kingdom and an empire, and that of our settled attitude and policy in the counsels of Europe, a war such as this, which injures the one and frustrates the other, was and could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes — among the worst of catastrophes, but not the worst.

THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN DISPUTE

EXTRACT FROM TREATY OF BERLIN ¹*Signed July 13, 1878*

ARTICLE XXV. The Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. The Government of Austria-Hungary, not desiring to undertake the administration of the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, which extends between Serbia and Montenegro in a southeasterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitza, the Ottoman Administration will continue to exercise its functions there. Nevertheless, in order to assure the maintenance of the new political state of affairs, as well as freedom and security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the right of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial roads in the whole of this part of the ancient Vilayet of Bosnia. To this end the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve to themselves to come to an understanding on the details.

SECRET APPENDIX TO THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BULGARIA AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA ²*Signed at Sofia, February 29, 1912*

ARTICLE I. In case internal disorders arise in Turkey, of such a character as to endanger the national or state interests of the contracting parties, or of one of them, as for instance in case Turkey should find itself beset by internal or external difficulties which might involve the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkan Peninsula, the first of the contracting parties to arrive at the conviction that military action should be taken on this account, shall make a statement, giving the reasons therefor, to the other party which shall be bound to enter immediately upon an exchange of views, and if the latter party does not agree with its ally, shall give to the ally an answer stating the reasons.

If an agreement is arrived at, this agreement shall be communicated to Russia, and in case that Power does not oppose it, the action shall be undertaken in accordance with the agreement which has been reached, and in accordance with the sentiments of unity and community of interests. In the contrary case, — if an agreement is not reached, — the two states shall appeal to the opinion of Russia, which opinion shall, so far as Russia shall pronounce the same, be binding upon the two parties.

In case Russia does not give its opinion and an agreement between the two contracting parties cannot, even after that, be reached, and in case the party which is in favor of action decides to pursue such action alone and at its own risk, the other party shall be obliged to observe a friendly neutrality towards its ally, to proceed at once to mobilize its troops within the

¹ *Foreign Relations of United States*, 1878, p. 901.

² *American Journal of International Law*, Supplement, vol. 8 (1914), pp. 3-5.

limits provided by the military convention, and to go to the assistance of its ally with all its power, if a third state takes the part of Turkey.

ARTICLE II. All territorial additions which may be secured by common action as provided in articles one and two of the treaty and article one of this secret appendix thereto, shall be under the common dominion (*condominium*) of the allied states. The division thereof shall be made without delay within the maximum period of three months after the re-establishment of peace and upon the following bases: —

Servia recognizes the right of Bulgaria to territories to the east of the Rhodopes and the Struma River; Bulgaria recognizes the rights of Servia to those situated to the north and west of Char-Planina.

As regards territories situated between the Char, Rhodopes, the Ægian Sea, and Ochrida Lake, if the two parties reach the conclusion that it is impossible because of the common interests of the Bulgarian and Servian nations, or for other reasons of domestic or foreign affairs, to organize these territories as a separate autonomous province, they shall be disposed of according to the following provisions: —

Servia agrees not to lay any claim to the territory situated beyond the line traced upon the annexed map, starting from the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier at Mt. Golem (to the north of Kr. Palanka) and following a generally southwesterly direction to Ochrida Lake, passing Mt. Kitka, between the villages of Metejeve and Podarji-kon, by the summit to the east of the village of Nerav, and following the watershed to the peak of 1,000, north of the village of Baschtêvo, between the villages of Liubentzi and Petarlitza, by the peak Ostrich 1,000 (Lissetz-Planina), the peak 1,050 between the villages of Dratch and Opila, by the villages of Talichmantzi and Jivalevo, the peak 1,050, the peak 1,000, the village Kichali, the principal line of the Gradichtê-Planina watershed to the peak Gorichtê, to the peak 1,023, following then the watershed between the villages of Ivankovtzi and Loghintzi, through Vetersko and Sopot on the Vardar. Crossing the Vardar, it follows the ridges toward the peak 2,550 and as far as Mt. Petropole, along the watershed of this mountain between the villages of Krapa and Barbarès to the peak 1,200, between the villages of Yakryenovno and Drenovo, to Mt. Tchesma (1,254), along the watershed of the mountains Baba-Planina and Krouchka-Tepessi, between the villages of Salp and Tzerske, to the summit of Protoyska-Planina, to the east of the village of Belitza, through Bréjani to the peak 1,200 (Ilinska-Planina), along the line of the watershed passing the peak 1,330 to the peak 1,217 and between the villages of Livoichta and Gorentzi to Lake Ochrida near the monastery of Gabovtzi.

Bulgaria agrees to accept this frontier if His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, who shall be asked to be the final arbitrator of this question, decides in favor of this line.

It is understood that the two contracting parties agree to accept as the final frontier the line which His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, within the above indicated limits, may find to correspond the closest to the rights and interests of the two parties.

ARTICLE III. A copy of the treaty and of this secret appendix thereto shall be communicated together to the Imperial Government of Russia, which shall be asked at the same time to take note thereof, as a proof of

the good intentions of the parties thereto in connection with the purposes sought by them, and with the request that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia deign to accept and approve the powers attributed to himself and his government in the provisions of these two documents.

ARTICLE IV. Every difference which shall arise concerning the interpretation and execution of any of the provisions of the treaty, of this secret appendix, and of the military convention, shall be submitted to Russia for final decision, as soon as one of the two parties shall have declared that it believes it impossible to reach an agreement by direct negotiations.

ARTICLE V. None of the provisions of this secret appendix shall be published or communicated to another Power without a prior agreement thereon by the two parties hereto and the consent of Russia.

Done at Sofia, February 29, 1912.

NOTE ADDRESSED TO THE SERVIAN GOVERNMENT
BY THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT
ON JULY 23, 1914¹

(Translation)

On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

“Servia recognizes that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter.”

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

¹ B. W. P. no. 4. In the French Yellow Book, no. 75, will be found the memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government giving the reason for its action. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book, no. 19.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their *Official Journal* of the 13/26 July the following declaration: —

“The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

“The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

“The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.”

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal Army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the *Official Bulletin* of the Army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertake: —

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled "Narodna Odbrana," to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voijs Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the coöperation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

SERVIA'S REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE, JULY 25, 1914¹

(Translation)

THE Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests, which were made both from the

¹ B. W. P. no. 39.

tribune of the National Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State, — protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th [31st] March, 1909, — have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school-book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the *Journal officiel*, on the date of the 13th [26th] July, the following declaration: —

“The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all

such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavor."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake: —

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th [28th] June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Consti-

tution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voijs Tankositch. As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th [28th] June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the inquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later inquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the great powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th [31st] March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 [25], 1914.

NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SPANISH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS FOLLOWING THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE¹

On February 15, 1898, the United States battleship Maine was blown up in Havana Harbor.

February 19, the United States undertook an independent investigation

¹ This comparison between the recent action of the Austrian Government and our own in 1898 was suggested to me last September by Professor Munroe Smith, of Columbia University, who was in Italy at the time of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, and

conducted by American naval officers, and on the same date the Department of State informed Mr. Lee, Consul-General of the United States at Havana, that "This Government will afford every facility it can to the Spanish authorities in whatever investigation they may see fit to make upon their part." (*Senate Doc.* no. 230, p. 89, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 1897-98, vol. 21.)

February 21, without consulting the wishes of the Spanish Government, our Government instituted an independent court of inquiry on board the Mangrove in Havana Harbor. (*Senate Doc.* no. 207, p. 9, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 1897-98, vol. 21.)

February 25, General Blanco, Governor-General of Cuba, suggested that American divers, in making the investigation under the authority of the Spanish Government, should accompany the Spanish divers in making their investigation of the cause of the disaster to the Maine. To this Consul-General Lee replied to the effect that the American examination ought to be made independently, but in harmony with that conducted by the Spanish authorities. (*Senate Doc.* no. 230, pp. 90-91, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 1897-98, vol. 21.)

February 28, three days later, Consul-General Lee cabled to the Department of State at Washington: "Arrangements made both Governments conduct independently investigation Maine disaster." (*Senate Doc.* no. 230, p. 90, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 1897-98, vol. 21.)

March 19, Mr. Woodford, the American Minister at Madrid, cabled to the President: "Unless report on Maine requires immediate action, I suggest that nothing be decided or done until after the receipt of my personal letters 43, 44, and 46. I also suggest that you authorize me to tell . . . that you wish final agreement made before April 15th. If you will acquaint me fully with general settlement desired, I believe Spanish Government will offer, without compulsion and upon its own motion, such terms of settlement as may be satisfactory to both nations. Large liberty as to details should be conceded to Spain, but . . . I now believe it will be a pleasure to the Spanish Government to propose what will probably be satisfactory to you." (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898*, p. 692.)

March 20, the acting Secretary of State replied: "The President is at a loss to know just what your telegram of the 19th covers, whether loss of Maine or whole situation. Confidential report shows naval board will make unanimous report that Maine was blown up by submarine mine. This report must go to Congress soon. Feeling in the United States very acute. . . . President has no doubt Congress will act wisely and an immediate crisis may be avoided, particularly if there be certainty of prompt restoration of peace in Cuba. Maine loss may be peacefully settled if full reparation is

reached Austria early in July. He had occasion to converse with several men prominent in the politics of the Dual Empire; and after the Serajevo assassination he was assured that a war between Austria and Germany, on the one hand, and Russia and France, on the other, was probably inevitable, but that it was not expected that either England or Italy would become involved.

The material of the comparison was prepared by Mr. Henry F. Munro from *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898*, and *Senate Documents*, nos. 207, 230, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 1897-98, vol. 21.

Striking as are the points of similarity between the Austro-Serbian and Hispano-American controversies, the differences are equally well marked and too apparent to require notice.

promptly made, such as the most civilized nation would offer." (*Foreign Relations, 1898*, p. 692.)

March 21, the American inquiry was finished. (*Foreign Relations, 1898*, p. 1036.)

March 25, the American Minister at Madrid made to the Spanish Government the following statement: "I ought, at the beginning of our interview, to say to you that the report on the *Maine* is in the hands of the President. I am not to-day authorized to disclose its character or conclusions. But I am authorized to say to you that, beyond and above the destruction of the *Maine*, unless some satisfactory agreement is reached within a very few days which will assure immediate and honorable peace in Cuba, the President must at once submit the whole question of the relations between the United States and Spain, including the matter of the *Maine*, to the decision of Congress. I will telegraph immediately to the President any suggestions that Spain may make, and I hope to receive within a very few days some definite proposition that shall mean immediate peace in Cuba." (*Foreign Relations, 1898*, p. 698.)

March 25, the Spanish Memorandum of the same date stated: "It now appears that the captain of the United States cruiser *Maine* has asked leave to destroy with dynamite the wreck of his ship, thus annihilating the only proofs which, in case of doubt or disagreement, could be again examined in order to determine, if necessary, the cause and nature of a catastrophe in the midst of which Spanish sailors and officials displayed the greatest abnegation and oblivion of all personal risks and a generous wish to circumscribe or diminish the dreadful calamity which befell the crew of the American vessel." The Memorandum then goes on to protest against the procedure of the American Government in submitting its report to Congress before the receipt of the report of the Spanish Commission, and ends: "The most elementary sense of justice makes it in these cases a duty previously to examine and discuss in an atmosphere of absolute calmness two different inquiries tending to one common end. Only in the supposition of an irreconcilable discrepancy or complete opposition between one and the other would it be proper to submit them as equity demands to evidence less prone to prejudice, and if necessary, to fresh investigations and different judges." (*Foreign Relations, 1898*, p. 711; see also p. 702.)

March 26, the United States report was published, and declared that the catastrophe was due to the explosion of a submarine mine, but did not fix the responsibility on any person. Secretary of State Sherman telegraphed the American Minister at Madrid: "Upon the facts as disclosed, a grave responsibility appears to rest upon the Spanish Government, . . . which, as the sovereign of the place, was bound to render protection to persons and property there, and especially to the public ship and the sailors of a friendly power." Regret was expressed that "circumstances of the case . . . are such as to require of the Spanish Government such action as is due when the sovereign rights of one friendly nation have been assailed within the jurisdiction of another. The President does not permit himself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by the friendly relations of the Governments." (*Foreign Relations, 1898*, pp. 1036-37.)

That same day the Department of State cabled the American Minister at

Madrid: "For your own guidance the President suggests that if Spain will revoke concentration orders and maintain the people until they can support themselves and offer to the Cubans full self-government, with reasonable indemnity, the President will gladly assist in its consummation. If Spain should invite the United States to mediate for peace, and the insurgents would make like request, the President might undertake such office of friendship." (*Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 704.*)

March 27, it was explained to the Spanish Government that Captain Sigsbee's request to blow up the Maine, to which Spain took such exception, was intended for the purpose of getting "at the bodies and guns. But finding his request misunderstood and opposed, he withdrew it under instructions from the Secretary of the Navy." (*Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 1040.*)

March 28, President McKinley's message, transmitting the report on the Maine, was read in both houses of Congress.

The Spanish "report states that the peculiar nature of the procedure followed and the thorough observance of the principle of the extraterritoriality of the Maine have prevented the making such investigations in the interior of the vessel as would furnish the means of deciding, at least hypothetically, the internal cause of the disaster; and this inability was increased by the unfortunate refusal which prevented the establishment of the necessary and appropriate coöperation between the Spanish Commission on the one side, and the commander and crew of the Maine, the American officials commissioned to investigate the causes of the event, and those subsequently charged with the recovery (*salvamento*) on the other side." The report concluded that a further examination would show the explosion to have been produced by an internal cause. (*Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 1040 and 1044-45.*)

March 31, Spain offered to submit the dispute regarding the Maine to arbitration. (*Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 758.*)

April 10, the Spanish Minister communicated to the Government at Washington that his Government had decreed an armistice in Cuba, though he took care to avoid any acknowledgment that this was done in response to American representations. He complained of the "manifest injustice with which a portion of the public opinion of this country claims to discover responsibilities on the part of Spain for the horrible catastrophe which took place on the calamitous night of the 15th of February last." And further stating the attitude of his Government, declared: "As for the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views between the reports of the Spanish and American boards, the Government of Her Majesty, although not yet possessed of the official text of the two reports, has hastened to declare itself ready to submit to the judgment of impartial and disinterested experts, accepting in advance the decision of the arbitrators named by the two parties, which is obvious proof of the frankness and good faith which marks the course of Spain on this as on all occasions." The American Government did not reply to this offer. (*Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 747-49.*)

April 19, Congress passed a joint resolution: —

"Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to civil-

ization, culminating as they have in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11th, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited: Therefore,

“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

“First, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

“Second, That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

“Third, That the President of the United States be, and hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

“Fourth, That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.”¹ (*Foreign Relations, 1898*, p. 763.)

April 20, the Secretary of State instructed the American Minister at Madrid to deliver an ultimatum to Spain to “at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuban waters. . . . If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April, instant, there be not communicated to this Government by that of Spain a full and satisfactory response to this demand and resolution, whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, the President will proceed without further notice to use the power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the said joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry the same into effect.” (*Foreign Relations, 1898*, pp. 762-63.) But before this ultimatum could be presented, the Spanish Government notified our Minister of the rupture of friendly relations. (*Foreign Relations, 1898*, p. 766.)

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1898 AND AUSTRIA IN 1914

ALTHOUGH the Austro-Servian dispute bears little resemblance to our own difference with Spain occasioned by the situation in Cuba and the destruction of the Maine, the incidents of the negotiations present many striking points of similarity. To facilitate the comparison an arrangement in parallel columns has been employed.²

¹ Approved April 20, 1898.

² There are an equal number of points of difference between Austro-Servian and Spanish-American cases, so evident as to need no explanation. For instance, the intervention of the United States was really for the purpose of protecting the weak, and in favor of self-government.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN
DISAGREEMENT (1898)THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN
DISPUTE (1914)*Responsibility for the occurrence*

Public opinion was inflamed as a consequence of the catastrophe of the *Maine*, and although the Spanish Government was not held to be directly responsible, it was nevertheless considered criminally negligent in not having taken adequate measures for the protection of the *Maine*, moored in her harbor.

In July preceding the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, public opinion was much inflamed against Serbia, and there was much enthusiasm for war. The terms of the Austrian and German correspondence make clear that the Serbian Government was held responsible on the ground that it made no effort to prevent the assassination, but allowed the conspirators to perfect their plans within the Serbian frontiers.

Disregard of territorial jurisdiction

The American Government after the destruction of the *Maine*, disregarding the wishes of Spain, arrogated to itself the right to hold, on board the U.S.S. *Mangrove* in Havana Harbor, and therefore within the territorial jurisdiction of Spain, an independent official investigation of the causes of the catastrophe. Nor were the Spanish authorities in their own port allowed to examine the interior of the wreck, but were compelled to base their findings on a superficial inspection of the exterior of the hull.

Austria's demand on Serbia was that she should permit Austrian officials to collaborate on Serbian territory in the proceedings undertaken to suppress the subversive propaganda directed against the territorial integrity of Austria, and that Serbia should likewise take judicial proceedings against the accessories to the crime of June 28, and permit delegates of the Austrian Government to participate. (See Demands 5 and 6 of the Austrian Note.)

Offers to arbitrate

The Spanish Government, on March 31, suggested referring the questions in dispute to arbitration. April 10, a further offer was made to submit the whole question to an impartial tribunal of experts, the Spanish Government agreeing in advance to accept its conclusions. To this offer the United States gave no reply.

At the end of Serbia's reply to the Austrian ultimatum, she offered, should Austria not find her acceptance of the terms of her note entirely satisfactory, to submit to arbitration, or to the mediation of the European powers, any of the remaining questions in dispute. But Austria took no official notice of this offer, and let it be known to the representatives of other states that she considered the reply but a play for time, and that Serbian promises could not be relied upon.

Presentation of an ultimatum

April 20, the American Government instructed its Minister by telegraph to present to the Spanish Government an ultimatum requiring Spain to withdraw from Cuba by noon of April 23. The Spanish Government, however, frustrated this intention by breaking off friendly relations with the United States.

The ultimatum presented to the Servian Government was, like that intended to be presented by the American Government, humiliating to the Government to which it was addressed, and obviously not intended to be accepted, the German Secretary of State admitting that, as a diplomatic document, it left much to be desired.

Effect of the explosion in Havana Harbor and of the assassination at Serajevo in hastening armed intervention

The destruction of the *Maine* exercised an important influence upon our action in Cuba, and led to intervention and war with Spain. If the destruction of the *Maine* had not occurred, Cuban autonomy might perhaps have been accomplished without bringing the two countries to war.

The assassination of Franz Ferdinand led the Austrian Government to force the immediate settlement of their long-standing dispute with Servia. Without the Serajevo assassination, Austria might have continued to get along with her troublesome neighbor until Austro-Servian difficulties were obscured or swallowed up by some larger issue.

Assurances by the United States and Austria that their intervention did not cloak any designs of territorial aggression, and was not intended to interfere with the independence respectively of Cuba and Servia

The joint resolution of Congress of April 20 declares: "That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

Austria and Germany repeatedly assured the powers of the *Entente* that Austria had no intention of interfering with Servian independence.

Effect on public opinion

There can be no question that American public opinion, aroused by the *Maine* disaster, considered that our intervention in Cuba was based upon humanitarian considerations for the purpose of putting a stop to the continued horrors of chronic revolution and Weyler's repressive measures, such as *reconcentrado* camps. But at the same

Public opinion in Germany and Austria considered the action against Servia as a just punishment upon a Government of regicides, which had been protecting bands of conspirators against the safety of a neighboring state. In one point public opinion in Austria differed from that in the United States regarding Cuba. The Austrians realized the full significance

time there was behind this movement the support of certain financial interests, for American capital had invested deeply in the Cuban sugar plantations. Our action was also influenced in some degree by political considerations as to the permanent interests of the United States. Admiral Mahan has pointed out very clearly the tremendous strategic importance to the United States of the control of Cuba.

of the political motives of their Government, and that it was of vital importance for Austria to prevent Serbia from continuing her propaganda for the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But just as there was no general appreciation in the United States of the strategic and financial advantages to be derived from our action in Cuba, so Austrian and German public opinion did not, perhaps, fully realize the use which the Austrian and German Governments hoped to make of this incident to reestablish the prestige of the Triple Alliance.

THE CASE OF SERVIA ¹

BUT Belgium was not the only little nation that has been attacked in this war, and I make no excuse for referring to the case of the other little nation — the case of Serbia. The history of Serbia is not unblotted. What history in the category of nations is unblotted? The first nation that is without sin, let her cast a stone at Serbia — a nation trained in a horrible school. But she won her freedom with her tenacious valor, and she has maintained it by the same courage. If any Servians were mixed up in the assassination of the Grand Duke, they ought to be punished. Serbia admits that. The Servian Government had nothing to do with it. Not even Austria claimed that. The Servian Prime Minister is one of the most capable and honored men in Europe. Serbia was willing to punish any one of her subjects who had been proved to have any complicity in that assassination. What more could you expect?

What were the Austrian demands? She sympathized with her fellow-countrymen in Bosnia. That was one of her crimes. She must do so no more. Her newspapers were saying nasty things about Austria. They must do so no longer. That is the Austrian spirit. You had it in Zabern. How dare you criticize a Prussian official? And if you laugh, it is a capital offense. The colonel threatened to shoot them if they repeated it. Servian newspapers must not criticize Austria. I wonder what would have happened had we taken up the same line about German newspapers. Serbia said: "Very well, we will give orders to the newspapers that they must not criticize Austria in future, neither Austria, nor Hungary, nor anything that is theirs." (Laughter.) Who can doubt the valor of Serbia, when she undertook to tackle her newspaper editors? (Laughter.) She promised not to sympathize with Bosnia, promised to write no critical articles about Austria. She would have no public meetings at which anything unkind was said about Austria. That was not enough. She must dismiss from her army officers whom Austria should subsequently name. But these officers had just emerged from a war where they were adding luster to the Servian arms —

¹ Extract from speech of Lloyd George, printed in the *London Times*, September 21, 1914.

gallant, brave, efficient. (Cheers.) I wonder whether it was their guilt or their efficiency that prompted Austria's action. Serbia was to undertake in advance to dismiss them from the army — the names to be sent in subsequently. Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that? Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to this country. (Laughter.) "You must dismiss from your army and from your navy all those officers whom we shall subsequently name." Well, I think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener (cheers) would go. Sir John French (cheers) would be sent about his business. General Smith-Dorrien (cheers) would be no more, and I am sure that Sir John Jellicoe (cheers) would go. (Laughter.) And there is another gallant old warrior who would go — Lord Roberts. (Cheers.)

It was a difficult situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a great military power who could put five or six men in the field for every one she could; and that power supported by the greatest military power in the world. How did Serbia behave? It is not what happens to you in life that matters; it is the way in which you face it. (Cheers.) And Serbia faced the situation with dignity. (Loud cheers.) She said to Austria: — "If any officers of mine have been guilty and are proved to be guilty, I will dismiss them." Austria said, "That is not good enough for me." It was not guilt she was after, but capacity. (Laughter.)

Then came Russia's turn. Russia has a special regard for Serbia. She has a special interest in Serbia. Russians have shed their blood for Servian independence many a time. Serbia is a member of her family and she cannot see Serbia maltreated. Austria knew that. Germany knew that, and Germany turned round to Russia and said: — "I insist that you shall stand by with your arms folded whilst Austria is strangling your little brother to death." (Laughter.) What answer did the Russian Slav give? He gave the only answer that becomes a man. (Cheers.) He turned to Austria and said: — "You lay hands on that little fellow and I will tear your ramshackle empire limb from limb." (Prolonged cheers.) And he is doing it. (Renewed cheers.)

THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN CONFLICT ²

. . . THE reply, although apparently conciliatory was far from satisfactory in several essential respects. The promise to suppress the agitation was made conditional upon the proof of its existence, when the affirmation of its existence was the basis of the ultimatum. Then, again, the promise to restrain the license of the press in its mendacious attacks upon Austria-Hungary took the form of a vague concession or reform in the law governing the press, but did not contain any pledge to put a stop to the virulently provocative references to the Dual Monarchy.

The Servian Government, on the face of its reply, also undertook the suppression of the *Narodna Obrana*, with its country-wide network of affiliated organizations — only on condition, however, of conclusive proof of its subversive activities. Inasmuch as the affirmation of the existence of these subversive activities formed the sum and substance of the ultimatum,

¹ Extract from an article by Constantin Theodor Dumba, Ambassador of Austria-Hungary to the United States, published in the *Outlook*, New York, August 29, 1914.

such a reply to this phase of its just demands was regarded by Austria as the flimsiest sort of evasion on the part of the Servian Government.

Another point that indicated the insincerity of Serbia's apparent compliance with the terms of Austria's ultimatum was the failure to accept the Austrian suggestion of coöperation between the Austrian and the Servian police in a joint inquiry into the origin and consummation of the crime of Serajevo, to serve as the basis for the judicial proceedings in Servia. As to the judicial phase of the inquiry, Austria never made any suggestion of participating. The coöperation of the Austrian police was essential to a successful and final solution of the problem. The shifty attitude of the Servian police on the entire issue raised by the crime of Serajevo can best be understood when it is remembered that the principal instigator of that offense against the laws of civilization could not be brought to justice because he had been warned out of Belgrade by a Servian prefect of police.

The duplicity characteristic of Servian diplomacy came under my personal observation when I was Minister to Servia in the last year of the reign of King Alexander and the beginning of the rule of the present Karageorgevitch dynasty. At my request, after a peculiarly offensive outbreak of anti-Austrian agitation carried on in Belgrade, the Government suppressed the society responsible for endangering the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia by a campaign of criminal mendacity. Two weeks later, however, the same organization, under another name and with a new secretary, but with the same membership and the same provocative aims, was in full operation in the same assault upon the peace and security of a neighboring friendly state. Such instances of evasion are so frequent in the history of Servian promises to Austria-Hungary that in this case the Austro-Hungarian Government was determined to exact complete and infallible guaranties for the performance of the required pledges. It was all the more necessary to act with final firmness because the Servian conscience, after the butchery of King Alexander and Queen Draga, of which all the authors, well known to every man of any account in Belgrade, were promoted in army rank, was not especially sensitive to the murder of royal personages.

Besides, the Austrian Government had to be determined to obtain a clear and final solution of the problem, because of its knowledge that Servia's recalcitrant attitude was the result of encouragement from the great northern power whose shadow was darkening over the Austrian frontier. Nevertheless, with the certainty that Russia was the actual instigator of Servia's defiant policy, the Austro-Hungarian Government regarded the issue involved as so vital that it did not hesitate to submit it to the final test of war.

CRITICISM OF SERVIA ¹

I CONSIDER it as highly important that the case for Austria-Hungary in the present conflict of nations should be stated before American public opinion with minute precision. We are all agreed in abhorring war and in deploring the outbreak of a catastrophe the like of which history has never witnessed. Those who are responsible for it will forever remain branded with a stigma of infamy which no amount of military or political success can wipe off their

¹ Article by Count Albert Apponyi published in the *Continental Times*, Berlin, October 9, 1914, and reprinted in the *New York Times*, January 17, 1915.

brows. Feeling as strongly as I do on that point, devoted as I am to the peace ideal, I consider myself qualified to proclaim before the whole world that my country is free from guilt in the horrible contest which has been forced upon her and that she can face it with all the moral power of a pure conscience.

This is what everybody feels in Austria-Hungary and in Germany; this is why not a single soul can be found in those countries who grumbles at the horrible sacrifice laid on his shoulders; this is why in Austria-Hungary up to 1,000,000 and in Germany up to 1,300,000 men more offered their services at the first call to arms than are bidden by law to do it; this is why our mentality is one of absolute self-possession and quiet but unflinching resolve; this is why the strife of races, on which our enemies built such hopes, the division of creeds, the conflict of party and faction, everything that engenders division, is clean swept away, why millions feel of one mind in absolute devotion to the great aim of freeing themselves once for all from the gang of perfidious assailants who for the last years have worked in the dark for our destruction, and whose infamy went so far as to organize assassination besides political conspiracy.

If we can do that work of lawful self-protection thoroughly, humanity will enjoy an almost limitless epoch of peace and tranquillity; if we cannot, the world will remain under constant menace of war, unless it submits to the dictates of Muscovite tyranny and to all the misery therein implied. Our cause, so we feel, is the cause of humanity, of liberty, of peace, of progress, of everything that men deserving the name of man value more than their lives.

Now, I am perfectly aware that foreigners cannot be expected to accept our feelings as a base for their judgment, that they want facts and reasons to lean upon. That is what I am going to provide them with presently. But I may put down the perfect unity of feeling, suddenly arisen in countries generally torn by dissension, as one of the facts to be considered. There is at least a strong presumption in favor of a cause which works so powerfully on the psychology of the nations concerned and uplifts their minds above all that is petty and discordant.

But the crucial question, the one which decides the verdict, is the question how and by whose fault the conflict originated and spread. This I have to elucidate by unexceptionable evidence.

The direct cause of the outbreak is Servia's insane ambition to extend her dominion over those southern parts of Austria-Hungary, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to begin with, Croatia and the Slovene countries to follow, where South Slavs live in great numbers. Never could a small country like Servia nourish such designs against a great power, unless it felt sure of being supported by some other great power. Recent developments have shown that Servia had good reasons to expect such support. On behalf of the mad ambitions not warranted even by the claims of racial kinship (since the Roman Catholic Croats generally abhor Servia), a constant agitation was organized in the aforementioned parts of Austria and Hungary. The origin of this agitation can be traced as far back as the accession of the Karageorovich dynasty to the Servian throne.

Under the Obrenovich rule Servia cultivated relations of good neighborhood with Austria-Hungary, to whom she was largely indebted for the recog-

dition of her independence by the Berlin Treaty of 1878. Things took different shape when the last Obrenovich king and his wife were murdered by military conspirators and the present king, Peter Karageorgevich, unhesitatingly accepted the crown from the blood-stained hands of murderers. For a short time the conscience of Europe seemed to wake, or at least a feeling of nausea prevailed among the civilized nations. King Peter found it difficult to enter into diplomatic relations with the Governments of Europe. Russia alone did not scruple to take him for granted. The other powers had to follow; last of all England. Finally recognition became universal.

From that time Serbia has been the seat of a permanent conspiracy against Austria-Hungary. Associations were formed for the "liberation of the South Slavonic brethren" in Austria-Hungary; agents were sent to undermine among our fellow-citizens of South Slavonic race the feelings of allegiance to their country; wherever a traitor could be found among them, his services were enlisted; Bosnia and Herzegovina were almost openly claimed.

These two Turkish provinces had been trusted to Austria-Hungary's care by the Berlin Treaty of 1878, because only the impartial rule of a western power could secure peace and liberty in a country inhabited by Mohammedans, Greek Orthodox, and Roman Catholic Christians. As a matter of fact, they thrived and developed under the enlightened government of Austria-Hungary to a degree of welfare unknown in any other part of the Balkanic Peninsula. Nevertheless, Serbia took hardly any pains to hide covetousness concerning these provinces, where under her rule two thirds of the population would be submitted to the same tyranny of racial and religious intolerance which the unhappy Bulgarians of Macedonia are experiencing at her hands. It was this covetousness which brought us to the verge of war in 1908, when Bosnia and Herzegovina became formally annexed to Austria-Hungary. That was done precisely to shut the door against intrigues feeding on their ambiguous juridical situation, a situation which maintained the Sultan's nominal sovereignty over them, while the whole power and the responsibilities of sovereignty belonged to Austria-Hungary. From the standpoint of international law the annexation was certainly not unexceptionable. Turkey, whose nominal rights were set aside, had a right to protest, and so had the signatory powers of the Berlin Treaty; but Serbia had absolutely no voice in the matter. No right of hers was invaded, no legitimate interest of hers damaged; only mad pretensions were thwarted and unfair opportunities lessened; still, it was Serbia whose outcries, echoed by Russia, endangered the peace of Europe.

Everybody knows how that first outbreak ended. Russia, Serbia's patron and inspirer, recoiled at that time from the conflict with Germany, which aggression against Austria-Hungary would have implied; so Serbia had to declare herself disinterested in the arrangements concerning Bosnia and willing properly to fulfill toward Austria-Hungary the duties of good neighbors. It was largely due to the exertions of the Hungarian Government, to which I belonged at that time, that Austria-Hungary accepted these verbal apologies and pledges, and that peace, or rather the semblance of peace, was preserved for some years more — I almost regret this our decision. Should Serbia's impudent behavior have been chastised then, as it deserved to be, the present general conflict might have been averted. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary would not have shown that almost superhuman for-

bearance, in which lies her clearest vindication. Anyhow it is important to bear in mind that Serbia's pretensions and designs brought matters to a crisis six years ago, and that she escaped punishment only through a solemn promise of correct behavior.

How was that promise kept? By doing worse from year to year, by developing with more energy still the propaganda of high treason among Austria's and Hungary's South Slavonic citizens; and, since the results of such merely political work ripened too slowly, the pace was mended by setting up an additional organization of political assassination, headed by military and non-military officials of the Servian kingdom. The thing would seem almost incredible but for the fact that the present Servian King's rule is based on murder and that murderers are or were among his chief advisers. A Government boasting of an origin like this must be expected to take a lenient view of political assassination.

The matter was brought to light by Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination. This dreadful crime, as has been established by the judicial inquiry, was not the work of a single fanatic's craze; it was the carefully prepared result of a widespread conspiracy, centered in a great Servian national organization, the Narodna Obrana, whose chairman is a general in active service, and whose rules, besides an almost open confession of criminal propagandism among the neighboring power's citizens, contains a paragraph of dark meaning, bidding young men to prepare for some "big deed on behalf of the national cause." Well, Archduke Franz Ferdinand's murderers, all of them affiliated with the aforesaid organization, were prepared for the "big deed," and they also achieved it successfully. All the implements of their murderous deed came from Servian army stores; bombs of the same origin were found hidden in many places; not a single accomplice of the crime could be laid hands upon on Servian ground; they found protection there instead of prosecution.

If circumstantial evidence has any meaning, the case against official Serbia seems to be made out by these facts. But what is more, the lamented Archduke's assassination was not the first, but, within two years, the fourth attempt organized by the same gang of murderers against the lives of faithful public servants in the southern parts of Austria and Hungary. Now, in the name of all that is human and just and fair, for how many years more should we have submitted to this? How many more assassinations should we have left unprevented, unpunished? What nation, big or small, can tolerate the setting up in her neighborhood of a whole machinery of treason and destruction, the organization of a permanent conspiracy against her moral cohesion, with murder lurking at every street's corner, threatening the individual safety of her most valued citizens? Austria-Hungary has tolerated it long enough to feel her strength shaken, to see her power disbelieved, her destruction discounted, and her future ruler murdered.

A little more of this and our fellow-citizens of South Slavonic race would have learned to doubt the Monarchy's capacity for defending the loyal and punishing the traitors, for making herself respected, even by small neighbors. In the face of such weakness on one side and such unscrupulous daring on the other, they might have wavered in their allegiance to a state unable to protect them. It was high time to drag our treacherous assailants from the dark recesses of conspiracy into the broad daylight of plain

speaking and open doing. We had to exact from official Serbia, whose moral complicity was established beyond doubt, efficient pledges, not words which in the case of confirmed liars are valueless — but measures, guaranteeing our tranquillity as a nation and the individual safety of our faithful public servants.

Such pledges Serbia would not give; she evaded the summons in her habitual manner of double-dealing, granting a profusion of words, professions, and promises, the mendacity of which is warranted by experience, but recoiling from every measure really efficient. She was clearly resolved to go on with her work of sneaking aggression and to cultivate further on her well-tried methods of conspiracy. Austria-Hungary would have been the laughing-stock not of her enemies only, but of her own citizens, should she have feigned to believe where bad faith was manifest. There was no help for it; we had to set aside our extreme unwillingness to adopt violent measures. We had to strike or to resign our right to live.

The case was not arbitrable, nor fit to be submitted to an international inquiry. Before giving my support in any warlike step I examined with the utmost care this side of the question, and, devoted though I am to the international peace institutions and to a constant expansion of their activity, I had to own that they were no use in the present case. Their applicability supposes good faith and a wish to do the right thing on both sides; failing this honesty plays the part of a dupe.

What could have been the result of international proceedings against Serbia? A verdict establishing her malpractices and bidding her to desist from them. Serbia, of course, would have professed to submit, just as she professed to be a good neighbor after the crisis of 1908. In fact, she would have persisted in her dark work, somewhat cautiously, perhaps, at the beginning, more daringly afterward. And in a couple of years, maybe after another series of attempted and successful assassinations, matters would again have ripened to a crisis. Should we then again have begun that parody of an international procedure, which settles nothing, because the adverse party hypocritically accepts and bare-facedly evades every decision running against it? Should we have gone on rotting all the while and hastening toward dissolution? Really, we could not do that; international institutions must not be converted into traps where honesty is caught and dishonesty enjoys good fun; they are meant to insure justice, not to further the designs of cheats. In the face of God and man do I proclaim: if ever there was a case of lawful self-defense here you have it.

But what about the universal war which grew out of a local conflict? Who is responsible for its horrors, for its calamities? The answer to this question is perfectly clear. Since Austria-Hungary was in a state of lawful self-defense against Servian aggression, those are responsible for the greater evil who espoused the cause of that aggression. And this is what Russia did. She is the great culprit. Her policy is the main fountain whence torrents of blood and of tears will flow. Her allies have been drawn by her into the concern.

Not that I wish to attenuate the guilt and the disgrace of highly cultured nations like France and England, who became in some way the patrons and the associates of a gang of murderers. But on Russia rests the chief responsibility; on her head falls the great sin against humanity implied in this

war. From her face the mask has fallen, unveiling the lust of power and expansion which inspires her policy and which is the real source of every unrest in Europe.

In her war manifesto Russia tries to personate the chivalrous defender of a weak country against a strong one. That may appeal to the ignorant; in truth it is bare-faced humbugging. When Austria-Hungary had to coerce Serbia, she solemnly declared that her only aim was to win those guaranties of her own tranquillity which Serbia would not grant, but that neither Serbia's territory, nor Serbia's independence would suffer any permanent mutilation. After that solemn declaration, made in the most binding form by a power whose word is as good as any deed, there remained not the smallest pretext for honest interference.

Still Russia did interfere. On whose behalf? On Serbia's? After the pledges freely given by Austria-Hungary Serbia as a nation needed no protection; Austria-Hungary's coercive action was not directed against Serbia, but only against the system of treacherous conspiracies and murderous attempts fostered by her present rulers. It is these dark forces alone that were threatened by our action in Serbia.

It is therefore on behalf of these, not of the weaker nation, which was perfectly safe, that Russia interfered. Russia does not wish Serbia to become a decent country and a loyal neighbor; Russia draws her sword to make it possible that the conspiracies against Austria-Hungary's safety and the plots of murder implied in them should go on undisturbed; Russia stands behind that dark work with all her might and power; it is part of her policy. Through it should Austria-Hungary be kept in a state of constant unrest, economic difficulties and moral decomposition, till she became ripe for receiving the final blow? Because Austria-Hungary must disappear, to make room for the programme now openly proclaimed by the Tsar: the union of all Slavs under Russian rule.

So the mask has fallen, Serbia is a simple outpost; behind her stands the policy of Russia, supporting those treacherous and abominable acts which compelled unwilling Austria-Hungary to make a stand for her dignity and safety. Before the tribunal of human conscience stands Muscovitism unveiled as responsible for the horrors of universal war and for the permanent unrest that consumes Europe's forces. The power of Muscovitism must be broken before peace can be enjoyed with any amount of safety, before peace institutions can work with any degree of efficiency.

Well, since Providence puts its burden on our shoulders, that work will be done with God's help thoroughly. The greatness of the task is felt by every soul throughout Germany and Austria-Hungary, and absolute confidence reigns everywhere that our joined forces are able to fulfill it. Even in Germany there is no peculiar animosity against France. There is more of it against England, whose intervention is considered as a piece of revolting cynicism; but the object of popular resentment is Russia, which only shows the unerring instinct of the masses. And what I hear at home from simple-minded but honest and straightforward people like the day laborers on my own estate, is a passionate desire to have it out once for all with Russia.

It is clear not from facts only, but from the Tsar's explicit confession, that the policy of Russia pursues aims which can be obtained only through uni-

versal war. The union of all Slavs under Russian dominion can be effected only after the disintegration of existing political bodies, Austria-Hungary to begin with, and by subjecting the non-Slav races encompassed between Slavs, such as the Hungarians and the Rumanians. Does n't that mean war, horrible war, universal war, since neither the political bodies concerned will submit to destruction, without making a desperate stand, nor the threatened races to subjection, without fighting to the last? And does n't it imply another confession of complicity with Servia's conspiracies and crimes, which now appear quite distinctly for what they are — pioneer work on behalf of Russia?

But what would Russia's dominion over the whole mass of Slavs, the so-called Pan-Slavist ideals, mean from the standpoint of the great principles and ideals of progressive humanity? What would it mean to the Slavs themselves? It would mean, if a bad pun is to be allowed here, their transformation into slaves; it would mean to those among them who are now enjoying the bliss of civilized western government and liberty a rolling down into the abyss of darkest tyranny, religious oppression to all those who do not conform to the Orthodox creed; a wiping-out of racial differences as wide as the difference between German and Dutch, Italian and Spaniard; loss of every guaranty of individual and political liberty; arbitrary police rule, which makes every man and woman liable to be arrested and transported without a trial, without a judicial verdict.

These and other similar blessings does Muscovitism offer to those who are so happy as to fall into its loving embrace. And to all mankind the grouping of the forces of Slavism under Russia's despotic power would mean the most horrible menace to enlightenment, progress, liberty, and democracy; a peril of retrogression of several centuries, a moral and social catastrophe.

It is to be expected that Germany's and Austria-Hungary's joint forces will save our kind from the peril of falling so low, notwithstanding the damnable support which Muscovitism gets from two blindfolded western powers, one of whom does not even scruple to draw the yellow race into a conflict of Europeans. We have not the smallest doubt concerning the superior value of our armies, even when outnumbered. And we feel able to lay our cause before God, the just, the omniscient. We are conscious of having stood for peace as long as there was the smallest chance of preserving it with honor. We are fighting now the battle of righteous self-defense on the strongest compulsion ever undergone by any nation. We fight the battle of mankind's highest ideals and we fight the battle of peace, which our victory will make secure for generations to come.

So we look forward to whatever is in store for us, with the serene fortitude of men who feel strong in the purity of their conscience.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY

RICHELIEU REJECTS A PROPOSAL FOR THE PARTITION
OF BELGIUM AND SUGGESTS ANOTHER PLAN¹

CARDINAL RICHELIEU was not at all inclined to the acquisition of the Netherlands; he was deterred from it by political considerations of a practical nature, which have since prevented France from taking or keeping them. It was upon this double difficulty of taking and holding the provinces that in June, 1634, the Cardinal based his objection to a partition proposed by the United Provinces. "Even if," said he, "we should with much time, trouble, and expense succeed in it, the preservation of what we had acquired could not be effected except with very-large garrisons such as would render us intensely odious to the inhabitants and expose us for this reason to serious uprisings and perpetual wars. And, even if France should be so fortunate as to keep the provinces which had fallen to her share in voluntary dependence upon her control, it might soon happen that, having no longer a barrier between us and the Dutch, we should be involved in the same quarrel in which they and the Spaniards are now engaged, instead of being as at present in good relations; [which is due] as much to the separation existing between our states as to the fact that we have a common enemy who keeps us occupied, — seeing that we are equally interested in his abasement."

He gave still other reasons drawn from the difficulties and uncertainties of war, the fickleness of the French character, and the interests of Catholicism. He added: "Thus it is that all these reasons lead Cardinal Richelieu to say to the King that the proposal conveyed by the Sieur de Charnacé could not in his opinion be entertained in any form, and that a war for the purpose of conquering Flanders must absolutely not be undertaken." The plan that he proposed was to form an independent Catholic Republic which would offer to the French and to the Dutch the great advantage of getting rid of the Spaniards, without exposing them [the French and Dutch] to the risk of becoming enemies as a consequence of finding themselves out-and-out neighbors. He said, therefore: "That if it should be necessary to attack Flanders, it must be done under the most plausible conditions and those best adapted to facilitate the design which would be entertained, in that case, of expelling the Spaniards. That France and Holland should resolve not to lay claim to anything in all the provinces which are under the sovereignty of the King of Spain except two or three places each (the Dutch, Bréda, Gueldre, and other neighboring places which could be agreed upon) as pledges, and as a bond of the union and of the peace which was going to exist hereafter between the three states. That they would gain enough if they should deliver the provinces from subjection to Spain, and give to them the means of forming a free corporate body, powerful, and capable of establishing a good alliance with them. That a public declaration must be made in the form of a manifesto, which should assure the Cath-

¹ Translated from F. A. Mignet, *Négociations relatives à la Succession d'Espagne*, pp. 174-76. Paris, 1835.

olic religion and the liberty of these peoples in the best form that they could desire, in order to give grounds to the nobles, the cities, and the communities to rise up more boldly. . . .”

He said, moreover: “That if the plan proposed by the Dutch of a complete conquest could succeed in twenty years, it was evident that this other could be carried out in one year, if God granted even his slightest blessing to the undertaking; and, besides, in case of success, so far from finding themselves charged with the garrisoning, as in the first project, and in fear of a war between France and the Dutch (there being no longer a barrier between them) it would even be the means of arresting the perpetual schemes of the Spanish to regain what they had lost.

“That, on the contrary, the garrisons of France could be diminished, because we should not have neighbors as powerful and as evil disposed as the Spaniards.

“That the Catholic provinces, which would then make a body corporate depending solely on itself, would have too much interest in keeping France and the Dutch in union for a quarrel to arise between them.

“And that the power and the forces of Spain, being then no longer next to France, as they are now, need not be feared either.

“Moreover, this new body of Catholic states would be watchful to guarantee us from their evil designs, inasmuch as we should be indispensably necessary to them for preserving their liberty, which was acquired by our means.”

He said further that, “being three bodies united together, it would be easy for us to resist weak and distant enemies, and to live in the future in peace and quiet delivered from those by whose mischievous ambition we have been deprived of it hitherto.”

“THE BARRIER-TREATY” OF OCTOBER 29, 1709, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HOLLAND¹

V. AND whereas, according to the ninth Article of the said Alliance, it is to be agreed, amongst other matters, how and in what manner the States shall be made safe by means of this Barrier, the Queen of *Great Britain* will use her Endeavours to procure, that in the Treaty of Peace it may be agreed, that all the *Spanish Low-Countries*, and what else may be found necessary, whether conquer'd or unconquer'd Places, shall serve as a Barrier to the States.

VI. That to this end their High Mightinesses shall have the Liberty to put and keep Garrison, to change, augment and diminish it as they shall judge proper, in the Places following: namely, *Newport, Furnes*, with the Fort of *Knocke, Ipres, Menin*, the Town and Citadel of *Lisle, Tournay* and its Citadel, *Conde, Valenciennes*; and the Places which shall from henceforward be conquer'd from *France*; *Maubeuge, Charleroy, Namur* and its Citadel, *Liere, Hale* to fortify, the Forts of *Perle, Philippe, Damme*, the Castle of *Gand*, and *Dendermonde*: The Fort of *St. Donas* being join'd to the Fortifications of the *Sluice*, and being entirely incorporated with it, shall remain and be yielded in Property to the States. The Fort of *Rodenhuysen*, on this side *Gand*, shall be demolish'd.

¹ A General Collection of Treaties (English), vol. 2, p. 482. London, 1732.

VII. The said States-General may, in case of an apparent Attack, or War, put as many Troops as they shall think necessary in all the Towns, Places and Forts in the *Spanish Low-Countries*, where the Reason of War shall require.

BELGIUM AND THE BALANCE OF POWER¹

THE peculiar strategical geography of northern Europe the Germans also hold responsible for England's power. The land on either side of the mouth of the Rhine is the key to northern Europe. Belgium controls the shortest route to Paris; Holland is the only point of departure from which an invasion of England is likely to be successful; both countries hold between them the door of the Rhine Valley, the gateway to the heart of Germany. Their possession by any one of the three nations nearest them would give her immediately a most deadly offensive weapon against the other two. To possess them has been the dream of all; to secure them half the wars in European history have been fought. Those two tiny states are now independent because England, France, and Germany cannot permit each other to control them. To the east lies the gateway between France and Germany, Alsace-Lorraine, through whose fair fields pass the roads to Cologne and Berlin, to Frankfort, Leipzig, and Dresden, to Basel, Switzerland, and Italy, to the Danube Valley and Vienna. Its possession permits France to enter the heart of Germany; its possession puts Germany at the very doors of France; it is a potent weapon of offense or defense and enables its holder to begin a war with tremendous advantages. For its possession, France and Germany have struggled for fifteen hundred years. The existence of these strategic points has made England important. If France assailed the Rhine from Lorraine, Germany would ally with England, who could assail Paris from the north through Belgium. If Germany threatened France from the east, the English might be induced to invade Germany from the Netherlands. Should either country obtain the coöperation of England against the other, the most disastrous results were probable. These conditions made England a factor in politics during the Middle Ages, out of all proportion to her actual strength as compared with France or Germany. She was in a position to deliver a deadly flank attack on either; the Channel effectually prevented retaliation; she could have consummated the dynastic ambitions of either; she preferred to thwart the aims of both. When the Netherlands fell into Spanish hands in the sixteenth century and the power of the Hapsburgs threatened to absorb all Europe, the coöperation of the islanders, who controlled the stormy Channel and who could so easily invade the Netherlands, was seen by every one to be the controlling factor in a complex situation. Their assistance would almost certainly decide the war in favor of France or Spain. Not England's strength, but the fact that her position made her valuable to stronger nations, gave her a voice in the days of Henry VIII and Elizabeth. Not her strength, but the evenness of the balance of power in Europe, the rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg, their fear of each other, gave her the casting vote.

¹ Extract from Roland G. Usher, *Pan-Germanism*, pp. 22-25.

THE BARRIER TREATY VINDICATED¹

1. As for the first proposition, the former part of it, that it is in itself, and apart from all other considerations, the true interest of England, that there should be a good and sufficient barrier against France on the side of the Netherlands, is a point so evident in itself, and hath been so constantly received as the known and avowed sense of the nation; that I am ashamed to think there should be any number amongst us who want to have that proved to them now, which hath hitherto been always allowed as a standing maxim of our Government, and is now become our interest more than ever. To have a good barrier against France in the Netherlands is as necessary for us as it is to preserve a balance of power on the Continent, and to prevent all Europe's being enslaved by France. For the situation of the Netherlands is such, with respect to Holland and the Empire, and even to Britain itself, that if France be once suffered to get possession of them, it will not be in the power of all Europe to set any bounds to the progress of her arms. The United Provinces must in that case unavoidably fall a prey to her; as every one must be fully convinced, who will but reflect upon the extremities to which they were reduced by the French king's seizing the Spanish Low-Countries at the death of the late king of Spain. The Empire having by that means lost the assistance of the States, and being cut off from all communication with England, would soon follow the same fate; being, as we see by long experience, hardly able to make head against a handful of French troops, while the main strength of France is diverted and employed on the wars in Spain, Italy, and Flanders; much less can it be thought in any condition to defend itself when it is without allies, and France having rid her hands of other wars is at liberty to pour in her whole force upon it. So that if France could finish her long-laid design upon the Netherlands, she might without opposition carry her conquests as far as she pleased into Germany. Let us next consider the fatal consequences that will attend the loss of the Netherlands with respect to Britain in particular. If France be once mistress of those Provinces, she will from that moment have the command of the narrow seas; so that our trade will neither be able to go out nor to return with any tolerable safety. We see of what consequence it is thought to England that Dunkirk should be taken out of the hands of the French, or at least that the harbor of it should be ruined; and thence we may judge how fatal it would be to this nation to let them get possession of the other Flemish ports, with such an increase of naval strength as that acquisition would give them. Our coasts and river would then be exposed to perpetual insults, and our trade would be in so much danger in the narrow seas that we should soon be obliged to give it over. But this is not all: should France be suffered to be mistress of the Netherlands, it is not to be thought the United Provinces could maintain their independency. They must either become directly the subjects of France, or live in an absolute dependence on that crown; and the unavoidable consequence of that would be that the great naval force of the Dutch, which hath hitherto acted in conjunction with us, would then be turned against us; and such a vast accession

¹ Extract from *The Barrier Treaty Vindicated*. By Francis Hare. London, 1712, pp. 22-28. Halkett and Lang's *Dictionary of Anonymous and Pseudonymous Literature of Great Britain* attributes *The Barrier Treaty Vindicated* (second edition, London, 1712) to Francis Hare.

to the fleet of France would give her such a superiority at sea as no one I suppose is sanguine enough to think we could dispute. We should in that case not only suffer all the inconveniences that necessarily attend our being cut off from the Continent, but we should be perpetually unsafe in our own ports. For our whole strength, when without allies, is in the sea; and therefore when that security is gone, we are in a state perfectly naked and defenceless. And as our riches depend chiefly upon our trade, they also must sink with it. Let therefore France but get the Netherlands, and our ruin needs not wait for that of other countries upon the Continent. If France can force the submission of the States, and have the use of their ports and fleets, England must truckle to France, if the rest of Europe would be content to look on; and if they should not, all the efforts they could make would be of little service to us. For while we have no maritime power on our side, we can have no help at sea, where it would be most wanted; nor any support in case of an invasion, tho' its suddenness and strength should make it of the last necessity; and as for any efforts made in our favor on the Continent, when the States are either slaves to or on the side of France, we may be sure they would be too weak to make any great impression, or to cause any considerable diversion in our favor. So that the ruin of England seems to be the certain consequence of the loss of the Netherlands. We must for want of strength in ourselves, or help from abroad, suffer the fate of other nations; only with so much the greater misery, by how much our present condition is happier than that of others.

If it were sufficient to have reason on one's side, I might think it needless to say any more to prove that it is the true interest of England that there should be a good barrier against France on the side of the Netherlands. But because I write in a time in which authority seems to have much more force than reason, I shall in further proof of this proposition appeal to authority, and show that the Netherlands have in all times past been looked upon as the barrier to England; and that it was always thought our interest to hinder the growth of France on that side. To show this I might go back to the time in which those countries were governed by the House of Burgundy, one of the most ancient and most useful allies to the crown of England against France. But this may seem looking too far backwards into the history of ancient times; and therefore I shall only take notice of one memorable passage in the excellent history of Philip de Commines to this purpose; who speaking in the beginning of his 6th Book, of the conquest of the Dominions of the House of Burgundy by Lewis 11th, who laid the first foundation of the greatness of France, begins his second chapter with these words:—

“Those,” says he, “that hereafter shall read this History, will wonder that the English suffered the King to take the towns bordering so near upon them, namely Arras, Bolloin, Ardes and Hedin, with divers other castles, and to lie so long with his camp before St. Omers.”

And the reasons he gives for this are such as deserve to be remembered, which are these; that

“the King of France in wisdom and sense surmounted far Edward 4th of England then reigning, who was a very corpulent man, and much given to pleasures; and endeavored by all means possible to content him and entertain him by Ambassadors, presents, and smooth words, to the end he should not intermeddle with his affairs. That he

knew well the English, as well Nobles and Commons, as the Clergy, to be naturally inclined to make war upon his realm; therefore he perceived that he must in any wise keep the King of England and his principal servants his friends, whom he saw altogether inclin'd to quietness, and very greedy of his money; for the which cause he paid duly at London the pension of 50,000 crowns, and farther gave yearly 16,000 crowns, besides many goodly presents, to the said King's principal servants; and their acquittances are yet to be seen in the Chamber of Accounts at Paris. Further, he gave goodly presents to all the Ambassadors that came to him, were their messages never so sharp and bitter; and sent them home with goodly words and princely rewards, that they returned well contented; and notwithstanding that some of them understood that he did all this only to win time, the better to achieve his enterprize in the conquest of the Duke of Burgundy's Dominions, yet winked they at it, because of the great riches they received at his hands; and so did the King of England himself, though some of his Council told him plainly it would be very prejudicial to his realm; and in Parliament divers wise men that smelt the dissimulation of France afar off, and received no pension as the others did, were very desirous, and yet the Commons of the realm more desirous, that the King should send aid without delay to the Lady of Burgundy, daughter of Duke Charles. And undoubtedly if the King had not been prevailed upon by these and some other reasons, he would never have suffered the King of France to take places bordering so near upon the English Dominions, but have sought to defend them; and if at the beginning he had declared himself for the said Lady, the King had never weakened this House of Burgundy as he hath."

The whole chapter is very well worth reading, of which this is but an abstract. And upon it I beg leave to make these few remarks: That this History was written about 230 years ago, by a person of great credit, who was not only an eye-witness of these things, but had a principal hand in the transacting of them; which leaves no room to doubt the truth of what he says; that it was then looked on as the known interest of England to hinder the growth of France in the Low-Countries, even in those days, when the French Dominions were bounded by the Soam; when the Dutchy of Britain, with the Port of Brest, was no part of them; and the strength they have now at sea was not so much as begun; that it was then a maxim in our Government to cherish a strict alliance with the House of Burgundy, to prevent the French from extending their Dominions on that side, and making nearer approaches towards us; the dangers being foreseen at that distance, which we have since felt from the neighborhood of a power, which through our own fault we have suffered to grow so very formidable.

.

THE NEUTRALIZATION OF BELGIUM BY THE TREATY OF APRIL 19, 1839: INTERNATIONAL TREATIES REG- ULATING THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

NOVEMBER 15, 1831, at London, was signed a treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, on the one hand and Belgium, on

the other, relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland. Article VII established the independence and perpetual neutrality of Belgium. Article XXV stipulated that the five powers would guarantee the execution of the preceding articles.¹ When at last Holland was ready to assent to the arrangements adopted by the powers in regard to Belgium, the five powers and Holland signed at London on April 19, 1839, a treaty of four articles, which adopted in an annex having the same force as the treaty the first twenty-four articles of the Treaty of London of November 15, 1831. This left out Article XXV containing the guaranty of the first twenty-four articles, but Article II of the new Treaty of April 19, 1839, declares:

“Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, declare that the Articles mentioned in the preceding Article, are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties.”

The effect of this Article was to omit the guaranty contained in Article XXV of the Treaty of November 15, 1831, and to substitute a declaration of the five powers guaranteeing the annexed articles. Hence Article VII is guaranteed by the five powers, but not by Holland. Belgium and Holland also signed a separate treaty on the same day, April 19, 1839. This treaty refers to the treaty of the same date between Holland and the five powers and to the Treaty of November 15, 1831. The first twenty-four articles were the same as those in the annex of the treaty between Belgium and the five powers.²

A third treaty was signed at London on this same day, April 19, 1839, between the five powers and Belgium. The preamble refers to the treaties of November 15, 1831, and the two other treaties of April 19, 1839. Article I is as follows:—

“Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, declare, that the Articles hereunto annexed, and forming the tenor of the Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the Guarantee of their said Majesties.”³

Article II declares the Treaty of November 15, 1831, “not to be obligatory on the High Contracting Parties.”

Though this maze of treaties is hard to follow, the situation which results may be summed up as follows:—

- (1) The treaty of November 15, 1831, has no longer any force.
- (2) The independence and perpetual neutrality of Belgium has been recognized by all the signatories of all three treaties of April 19, 1839.

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1830-31, vol. 18, pp. 645-64.

² Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. II, p. 994. London, 1875.

³ Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. II, p. 997. London, 1875.

(3) Holland and Belgium have not in any of the three treaties guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium.

(4) The five powers have substituted for the original Article XXV of the Treaty of November 15, 1831, containing the guaranty a new guaranty in each of the treaties signed by the five powers with Belgium and Holland.

(5) The situation and obligations of Belgium, according to Article VII of the Annex (same as Article VII of the Treaty of 1831) are as follows: —

“Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an Independent and perpetually Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such Neutrality towards all other States.”

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PRUSSIA,
RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND
NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM²

Signed at London, 9th August, 1870

Reference to Treaties of 19th April, 1839

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn Act their fixed determination to maintain the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium, as provided in Article VII of the Treaty signed at London on the 19th April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which Article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually inserted in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate Treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it; and they have accordingly named as their Plenipotentiaries for that purpose, that is to say:

*Coöperation of Great Britain with Prussia in case of violation of Neutrality of
Belgium by France*

ARTICLE I. His Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that notwithstanding the Hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the Neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said Hostilities the Armies of France should violate that Neutrality, she will be prepared to coöperate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her Naval and Military Forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium.

Great Britain not engaged to take part in War between North German Confederation and France, except as regards Violation of Belgian Neutrality.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to

² Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. III, pp. 1886-88. London, 1875.

take part in any of the general operations of the War now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the Limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of 19th April, 1839.

Coöperation of Prussia with Great Britain in case of Violation of Neutrality of Belgium by France

ARTICLE II. His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to coöperate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his Naval and Military Forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the Neutrality and Independence of Belgium.

Treaty to be binding until conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between France and Prussia

ARTICLE III. This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present War between the North German Confederation and France, and for 12 months after the Ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties; and on the expiration of that time the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article I of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th April, 1839.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM,
FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, PRUSSIA, AND
RUSSIA RELATIVE TO THE GRAND DUCHY OF
LUXEMBURG AND THE DUCHY OF LIMBURG¹

Signed at London, May 11, 1867

Maintenance of Rights of House of Orange-Nassau

ARTICLE I. His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, maintains the ties which attach the said Grand Duchy to the House of Orange-Nassau, in virtue of the Treaties which placed that State under the Sovereignty of the King Grand Duke, his descendants and successors.

The Rights which the Agnates of the House of Nassau possess with regard to the Succession of the Grand Duchy, in virtue of the same Treaties, are maintained.

The High Contracting Parties accept the present Declaration, and place it upon record.

Grand Duchy to form a Perpetual Neutral State under Guaranty of Contracting Parties

ARTICLE II. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th of April, 1839,

¹ Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. III, pp. 1803-05. London, 1875.

under the Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State.

It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other States.

The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present Article.

That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective Guarantee of the Powers signing Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral State.

Luxemburg to cease to be a Fortified City. Troops to be maintained by the King Grand Duke

ARTICLE III. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg being Neutralized, according to the terms of the preceding Article, the maintenance or establishment of Fortresses upon its Territory becomes without necessity as well as without object.

In consequence, it is agreed by common consent that the City of Luxemburg, considered in time past, in a military point of view, as a Federal Fortress, shall cease to be a fortified city.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke reserves to himself to maintain in that city the number of troops necessary to provide in it for the maintenance of good order.

Evacuation of Fortress of Luxemburg by Prussian Troops

ARTICLE IV. In conformity with the stipulations contained in Articles II and III, His Majesty the King of Prussia declares that his troops actually in garrison in the Fortress of Luxemburg shall receive orders to proceed to the Evacuation of that place immediately after the exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty. The withdrawal of the artillery, munitions, and every object which forms part of the equipment of the said Fortress shall commence simultaneously. During that operation there shall remain in it no more than the number of troops necessary to provide for the safety of the material of war, and to effect the dispatch thereof, which shall be completed within the shortest time possible.

Demolition of Fortress of Luxemburg by the Netherlands

ARTICLE V. His Majesty the King Grand Duke, in virtue of the rights of Sovereignty which he exercises over the City and Fortress of Luxemburg, engages, on his part, to take the necessary measures for converting the said Fortress into an open city by means of a demolition which His Majesty shall deem sufficient to fulfil the intentions of the High Contracting Parties expressed in Article III of the present Treaty. The works requisite for that purpose shall be commenced immediately after the withdrawal of the garrison. They shall be carried out with all the attention required for the interests of the inhabitants of the city.

Fortifications not to be restored

His Majesty the King Grand Duke promises, moreover, that the Fortifications of the city of Luxemburg shall not be restored in future, and that no Military Establishment shall be there maintained or created.

Duchy of Limburg to form an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

ARTICLE VI. The Powers signing Parties to the present Treaty recognize that the Dissolution of the Germanic Confederation having equally produced the Dissolution of the ties which united the Duchy of Limburg, collectively with the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, to the said Confederation, it results therefrom that the relations, of which mention is made in Articles III, IV, and V of the Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839, between the Grand Duchy and certain Territories belonging to the Duchy of Limburg, have ceased to exist, the said Territories continuing to form an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

*Ratifications*¹

ARTICLE VII. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged at London within the space of four weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the Seals of their Arms.

Done at London, the 11th day of May, in the year of Our Lord, 1867.

(L.S.) STANLEY.

(L.S.) APPONYI.

(L.S.) VAN DE WEYER.

(L.S.) LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE.

(L.S.) D'AZEGLIO.

(L.S.) BENTINCK.

(L.S.) TORNACO.

(L.S.) E. SERVAIS.

(L.S.) BERNSTORFF.

(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

[During the war between France and Prussia in 1870-71, those powers mutually engaged to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg.]

DECLARATIONS MADE BY FRANCE AND PRUSSIA TO
RESPECT THE NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG,
17TH JULY, 1870²

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville

BERLIN, 17th July, 1870.

MY LORD, —

Baron Thile informed me to-day that he had received a telegram from M. Föhr, the Representative of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg at this Court, stating that the French Government had officially notified their intention to respect the Neutrality of the Grand Duchy, provided that it was likewise respected by Prussia.

His Excellency, by order of Count Bismarck, immediately replied that the North German Government would also respect the Neutrality of the Grand Duchy as long as it was respected by France.

I have, etc.,

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

¹ Ratifications exchanged at London, 31st May, 1867.

² Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. III, p. 1877. London, 1875.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG¹

GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBURG — TREATY OF 1867 — THE COLLECTIVE GUARANTEE QUESTION

LORD HOUGHTON: I rise, my Lords, for the purpose of asking Her Majesty's Government the Question of which I gave notice some days ago, and which has been inevitably postponed in consequence of the absence, through illness, of the noble Earl the First Lord of the Treasury, who has come down here to-day, I trust at no inconvenience to himself. I do not desire to challenge any convenient ambiguity in diplomatic instructions; but it is because there are certain words in the second article of the Treaty respecting the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg which seem to me calculated to raise a doubt to disturb the public opinion of Europe, to destroy the pacific character of the Treaty, and to be irreconcilable with the declaration of the Foreign Minister in the House of Commons, that I venture to put this Question. When on the 7th of May last my Lord Stanley presided at the Conference of the Powers on this subject, he brought forward a proposal to the effect that the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg should be a neutral State, and that the contracting parties should engage to secure that neutrality. Now, this was a very solemn and honourable engagement which we and the other parties to the Treaty were asked to enter into. The Prussian Government, however, was not content, but asked for something more, and the "something more" which they proposed was the sanction of the collective guarantee of the European Powers. That was therefore intended to be something different from, and an increase of, the former obligation which Lord Stanley had proposed. At first Lord Stanley objected to the new proposal; but after a consultation with the Cabinet he agreed to it. Now, what is the practical effect of that guarantee to be when any necessity for action arises? Whether that action is to be of a material or a moral character must from the very nature of things depend on the circumstances which arise. On that point I do not desire that our obligations should be more strictly defined than they are now. But the interpretation placed upon the Treaty the other day was to the effect that if any one of the signatories defied that Treaty and violated the neutrality of the State of Luxemburg, it would by that very act render the Treaty absolutely null, and discharge all the other parties from their obligations. Now, it is perfectly clear that the only parties against whom this Treaty was directed were signatories to it. It was not Spain, or Greece, or Denmark, or Sweden that were the objects of this Treaty as being likely to violate the neutrality of Luxemburg. The Duchy of Luxemburg has, on account of its peculiar local position, acquired an importance which its natural extent and character among the States of Europe would not justify. In the eyes of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg means the integrity of Belgium; while in the eyes of France the neutrality of Luxemburg means the integrity of Holland. Thus grave questions are involved in what is apparently a small and trivial matter. To use the expressive words of the Professor of International Law in the University of Oxford, —

¹ Extract from Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, 3d series, vol. CLXXXVIII, pp. 966 to 979. House of Lords, July 4, 1867.

"If the default of one of the parties to this Treaty does discharge all other parties from their obligations, then the sole case in which assistance can be invoked is a case in which that assistance is impossible."

It appears to me that if the object of the Treaty is nullified by the very act to prevent which it was entered into, you convert into a vague ceremony what was intended to be a solemn act and a responsible obligation. And now, one word on what passed in "another place" in reference to this subject. Lord Stanley stated that in assenting to the Treaty he had done so with more doubt and anxiety than he had ever felt on any public question. The weight of those words is to my mind very much increased by the character of the noble Lord, who is not a man to indulge in exaggerated statements or even in strong language — these are therefore very grave words. I believe that by the words of the Treaty the parties are bound to resist any aggression whether it proceeds from one of the signatories or not. If the aggressor is a signatory, he adds to the aggression a violation of the Treaty. Lord Stanley used the words "limited liability" in reference to this question; but I will leave it to your Lordships to say whether limited liability may not involve a very serious responsibility. The Question which I have given notice to put to the noble Earl is the more important, because I am aware that there is political agitation going on both in France and Prussia with respect to this subject. It would be a most dangerous thing for any one in that or the other House of Parliament to give color to that agitation, and I hope that no interpretation will be given to the Treaty which would convert a sense of security in Europe into one of confusion and alarm. I therefore ask the First Lord of the Treasury, What is the construction which Her Majesty's Government place on the words "Collective guarantee" (*garantie collective*) in the Treaty of the 11th of May, 1867, relative to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg?

THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I regret that in consequence of an attack of illness, from which I am still suffering slightly, I have been obliged to put the noble Lord to the inconvenience of postponing more than once a question to which he appears to attach considerable importance. In the first place, I may be permitted to say, although I am ready to repeat the explanation I have already given of this Treaty, but which does not appear to be satisfactory to the noble Lord, that, whatever the interpretation which I may put on particular words of the Treaty, or whatever the interpretation which Her Majesty's Government may put on it, such interpretation cannot affect the International Law by which the terms of all treaties are construed. I, for one, am very unwilling, as I always have been, to underrate or do away with any responsibility which this country may have incurred. Still less would it be my desire that we should shrink from carrying that responsibility out as far as the means of this country would go, and as far as we are bound by the terms of any treaty into which we may enter. In my reference to the Treaty brought under our notice by the noble Lord, I hope he will not understand me as speaking of moral obligations but of the technical obligations imposed by the Treaty. To the latter only the noble Lord's question has reference, and to them alone shall I apply myself in my answer. I am not much skilled in the ways of diplomatists, but I believe that if there be one thing more clear than another it is the distinction between a collec-

tive guarantee and a separate and several guarantee. A several guarantee binds each of the parties to do its utmost individually to enforce the observance of the guarantee. A collective guarantee is one which is binding on all the parties collectively; but which, if any difference of opinion should arise, no one of them can be called upon to take upon itself the task of vindication by force of arms. The guarantee is collective, and depends upon the union of all the parties signing it; and no one of those parties is bound to take upon itself the duty of enforcing the fulfilment of the guarantee. The noble Lord expressed some surprise that with my noble Relative's views of the limited nature of the guarantee contained in the Treaty of the 11th of May he should have said in "another place" that he never had consented to any measure with greater reluctance than that which he had felt in regard of the guarantee embodied in this Treaty. My Lords, I think it is not very difficult to see why my noble Relative should have entertained that reluctance. It was not till the first day of the meeting of the Conference my noble Relative had an opportunity of knowing the extent of the guarantee expected by Prussia; and what has passed this evening shows that he was not unreasonable in his apprehensions that, however cautious the wording of the guarantee might be, in the opinion of some we might be supposed to have entered into engagements more extensive than those which we had actually undertaken, and be by them held guilty of a breach of faith if we did not carry our responsibility to a greater extent than the terms of the Treaty warranted. I must now call your Lordship's attention to the precise circumstances under which this guarantee was asked for and given. It is quite true that, in the first place, Prussia laid down as one of the bases on which she would enter into the Conference that she should receive a European guarantee for the neutrality of Luxemburg. My noble Relative, in the project of a treaty which he prepared for the Conference, did not use the word "guarantee"; but in reference to the Article declaring that the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg should thenceforth form a perpetually independent State proposed the words "the high contracting parties engage to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Article." Prussia did not think that went far enough; for the Protocol states:—

"The Plenipotentiary of Prussia says that he has in general no objection to make to the project of treaty presented by Lord Stanley, but that he remarks in it a departure from the programme on the basis of which his Government had accepted the invitation to the Conference; that is to say, the European guarantee of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; that, however, as all the Powers represented in the Conference have admitted and accepted that programme, he thinks himself justified in hoping that this omission will be supplied in the discussion of Article II. The Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Russia, confirm the statement of the Plenipotentiary of Prussia that the Powers had accepted as the basis of negotiation the neutrality of Luxemburg under a collective guarantee. Lord Stanley points out that in virtue of the Treaties of the 19th of April, 1839, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is already placed under a European guarantee. As to the terms which, in the project of treaty which he has had the honour of communicating to the Conference, refer to the neutrality to be established for the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, they are identical

with those which declare the neutrality of Belgium in Article VII of the Annex to the treaty signed in London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia on the one part, and the Netherlands on the other part. Count de Bernstorff points out that the Treaty of 1839, although it places the territory of Luxemburg under the guarantee of the Powers, does not guarantee its neutrality. Now, the difference between this guarantee and that given to Belgium is very important; and he expresses the hope of seeing the same guarantee given by the Powers to the neutrality of Luxemburg as is enjoyed by that of Belgium. It is thereupon agreed between the Plenipotentiaries to proceed to an examination of the project of treaty, article by article. To add at the end of the Article the words: — 'That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective (or common) guarantee of the Powers signing, parties to the present treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State.' Baron de Brunnow says that he is authorized by his Court to assent entirely to the principle of placing the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg under a collective guarantee. He hopes that this principle will be admitted and adopted unanimously as the best pledge that can be offered for the maintenance of peace in Europe. Count Apponyi declares that his Government has also accepted the guaranteed neutrality of Luxemburg as the basis of negotiation."

And what does the Plenipotentiary for France say? —

"Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne says that, as far as he is concerned, he has no special instructions respecting the question of a collective guarantee; but that he must agree that this guarantee has hitherto been put forward as the complement of the neutralization of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; and, although, in fact, the engagement which the Powers take to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg has, in his opinion, under the circumstances a value almost equal to that of a formal guarantee, he cannot deny that the Prussian Ambassador is justified in his observations."

I wish the noble Lord, when in asking for an interpretation of the Treaty, had been kind enough to inform us what is his interpretation of the guarantee. I think it would be desirable to know what, in the view of the noble Lord, is the true signification of a collective guarantee, signed by several Powers; because if, as seems to be the noble Lord's inference, each of the parties to such a guarantee is not only bound itself to respect the treaty, but also to enforce individually its maintenance by all the other Powers who were parties to the treaty, I think the French Plenipotentiary would hardly have said the two terms were so similar that one was nearly equal to the other. Let me give your Lordships one or two instances of separate guarantees and of collective guarantees. The first I will take is a very remarkable case — that with regard to the neutrality of Belgium. In the year 1831 a Conference of the five Great Powers laid down twenty-five Articles, which were to determine the relations between Belgium and Holland, and which were to form the basis of a treaty between those two countries. The Powers who were parties to that Conference of 1831 bound themselves to uphold, not collectively, but severally and individually, the integrity of the treaty. That was a separate and individual guarantee. But, notwithstanding, in

1832, when Belgium, who had not been put in possession of the territory assigned to her by that treaty, called on the Powers parties to the Conference to enforce her rights, Prussia, Russia, and Austria declined to interfere by force of arms for that purpose; while, on the other hand, France and England, taking a stricter view of the obligations imposed upon them by the treaty, proceeded to enforce it by combined naval and military operations. In the same treaty there was comprised a guarantee for the possession of Luxemburg by the King of Holland, not in his capacity as King of Holland, but as Grand Duke of Luxemburg. In 1839, after a treaty had been made between Belgium and Holland embodying the main provisions of the Treaty of 1831, a separate one was entered into between the five Powers and Belgium, in which the obligations of the former Treaty of 1831 were repeated and renewed, and the five Powers bound themselves separately to maintain the integrity of Belgium, its neutrality and independence. The Prussian Minister must have been perfectly well aware of the terms of that treaty by which the five Powers, acting individually, guaranteed the independence of Belgium; yet if he thought the one kind of guarantee equal to the other, I want to know why he should have studiously altered the words and asked not for a separate and several guarantee, but for a collective guarantee by the Great Powers for the integrity and independence of Luxemburg? With regard to the difference between a collective and a several guarantee, I may refer to another case in illustration of what I have said. In 1856 an agreement was signed by seven great Powers — Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey — with regard to the independence of Turkey, and these are the terms in which that guarantee is given. The several Potentates —

“declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (*concert*) of Europe. Their Majesties engage,” — and I wish you particularly to observe this, — “each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement, and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.”

The engagement “each on his part” and “guarantee in common” are precisely the terms introduced into the Treaty of May, 1867, on the request of the Prussian Minister, and the security his Government desired to obtain. Are these treaties, then, to be deemed binding on all the Powers, signatories of the treaty, not only individually to respect, but collectively, individually, and separately to guarantee and enforce the neutrality of Luxemburg? I think the answer to that question is given by a treaty signed only fifteen days after that from which I have just quoted; I refer to the tripartite treaty signed between Great Britain, Austria, and France, having for its object the very same purpose as the former treaty — the integrity and independence of the territories of Turkey. Now, if that was secured by the treaty among the seven Powers, signed only a fortnight before, and if that engagement was binding, as I understood the noble Lord contends, upon each of the Powers separately, I say there was no occasion for the second treaty whatever. The very existence of the second treaty admits the insufficiency of its predecessor, and is couched in these terms —

“The high contracting parties guarantee, jointly and severally, the

independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March, 1856."

By this separate treaty the three Powers separately and individually guarantee the same thing which a fortnight before had been collectively guaranteed by the seven Powers. The three Powers found it necessary to sign a treaty which should express an obligation upon each, because the previous treaty was not binding separately and severally upon all the signatory Powers. The treaty goes on to say —

"Any infraction of the stipulations of the said treaty will be considered by the Powers signing the present treaty as *casus belli*. They will come to an understanding with the Sublime Porte as to the measures which have become necessary, and will without delay determine among themselves as to the employment of their military and naval forces."

It is impossible more clearly to appreciate the distinction between a collective guarantee and a several guarantee than by considering the cause, wording, and effect of these two treaties, signed within a fortnight of each other. If the noble Lord [Lord Houghton] is not satisfied with my view of this treaty, — namely, that the integrity and neutrality of Luxemburg rests upon the collective voice and upon the honour of all the Powers who are signatories to it, — I should wish that he give us his interpretation of its effect, and to what extent it is binding upon us. I will put a case to him. Suppose that Prussia with a view of making war on France, or France with a view of making war upon Prussia, were to enter the territory of Luxemburg, — thereby, of course, violating its neutrality by the mere passage of an army, for I am not dealing with the question of occupation or possession, but of violating the neutrality of Luxemburg by passing an army through it, — does the noble Lord mean to say that all the guaranteeing Powers in this Treaty of 1867, or each singly, would be bound by the obligations thrown on them by this treaty to go to war against the Power — whichever it might be — which entered Luxemburg with an army? Would Prussia desire this interpretation of the treaty? Suppose, in anticipation of any invasion by France, Prussia thought it necessary to make defensive advances into Luxemburg, would Prussia contend that all the other Powers would be thereby bound to take part with France in a war against her for the purpose of vindicating the neutrality of Luxemburg? And supposing, in a case, that Russia and Austria held aloof from the fulfilment of their portion of the guarantee in the event of any case for interference arising, does the noble Lord for a moment contend that England — situated as she is, and absolutely unable to put a sufficient military force on the Continent for preserving this neutrality — has contracted the obligation of enforcing the guarantee which she gave in common with all the other Powers of Europe? Such a construction is contrary to all the rules of interpretation, and far beyond what this country should undertake or carry through. Suppose, again, that France and Prussia, for the purpose of coming to a contest, should simultaneously violate the neutrality, in what position would the other Powers be? Should the remaining guarantors or England alone immediately begin a sort of triangular duel, to prevent the violation of the treaty by Powers who had already violated it? It is evident the conditions of the treaty must be construed with a regard to what is reasonable and practicable; and I say again that by a collective guarantee it is well understood that while in

honor all the Powers who are parties to it severally engage to maintain, for their own part, a strict respect for the territory for which neutrality is guaranteed; and although, undoubtedly, any one Power has a perfect right to declare a *casus belli* if she think fit because of the violation of the guarantee, yet a single Power is not bound to take up the cudgels for all the other Powers with whom she gave a collective guarantee. I can give no further interpretation of the treaty than this — that as far as the honor of England is concerned she will be bound to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg; and I expect that all the other Powers will equally respect it; but she is not bound to take upon herself the Quixotic duty, in the case of a violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by one of the other Powers, of interfering to prevent its violation — because we have only undertaken to guarantee it in common with all the other great Powers of Europe. The integrity of the neutrality of Luxemburg must not rest upon the force of arms of any particular one of the guaranteeing Powers; but upon the honor of all the guaranteeing Powers together, upon the general obligation taken in the face of Europe by all the signatory Powers; and if the neutrality should be violated by any one of them, then I say it is not a case of obligation, but a case of discretion with each of the other signatory Powers as to how far they should singly or collectively take upon themselves to vindicate the neutrality guaranteed.

EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I think it very unfortunate that in so short a time after a treaty has been signed there should be a discussion in Parliament as to its precise meaning, and as to how far England is bound by it. It is particularly unfortunate in this instance, because we know that the explanations given by the noble Lord, reported as they have been in the newspapers and otherwise, have created a very unpleasant feeling in Prussia, and that it is commonly said there that it is no use to sign a treaty with England, because England will find a means of escaping from the obligations imposed on her by it. That is a very unfortunate state of things; and I think it also very unnecessary to discuss with regard to the treaty, as the noble Earl has done, what this country is bound to do in a variety of supposed cases. It is hardly possible to suppose a case which shall be exactly what will occur, and I would much rather be contented with the arrangement made. I should have thought that the declaration on the part of all the Powers was sufficient security for the peace of Europe, and I could not be surprised that the French Ambassador should say, on the part of France, "We regard the engagement as very little more than a promise to respect the principles of neutrality as stipulated in the present treaty"; — because supposing all the powers to respect that principle of neutrality, or supposing France and Prussia to respect it, there is very little danger of interference being required. With regard to the technical interpretation of the treaty, I am inclined not to dispute that given by the noble Earl. There can be no better instance by which to interpret the treaty than that to which the noble Earl has referred. The treaty with regard to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was, I remember, the result of discussions which took place at the time. The declaration of Russia always was that she was herself ready to respect the integrity of Turkey, and that she had no intention or wish to violate it; but that she was not inclined to agree to a stipulation that in case that integrity was violated by Persia or any other neighboring Power

to Turkey, Russia should be bound at once to interfere by force of arms to maintain the integrity of Turkey.

THE EARL OF DERBY: Will the noble Earl permit me to say that Russia's declaration was that she would not only for herself respect the integrity of Turkey, but that she should join in a collective guarantee for that object, and that collective guarantee was drawn up in the precise terms introduced into this Treaty of 1856?

EARL RUSSELL: It was for that reason that I said I am not disposed to deny the technical obligation as stated by the noble Earl. The Government of Russia declared, no doubt, that she agreed to a collective guarantee in the form proposed, and that she did not feel bound by that guarantee to interfere by force of arms if Turkey should be attacked. But I think the noble Earl did much in the early part of his statement to do away with any doubts or fears we might before have entertained upon the subject. The noble Earl seemed to imply that because there was no individual guarantee, there was no individual obligation; but he considered that a moral obligation would rest upon this country which might have to be met. Now, with regard to this it strikes me that if there is a moral obligation, that moral obligation must entirely depend for its execution upon the circumstances which at any future time may exist. If one of those two Powers, France or Prussia, were to violate the neutrality of Luxemburg, and the Power which objected and protested against that violation were to appeal to the other Powers, I should myself consider that there would be a moral obligation upon those Powers to call upon the Power so violating the neutrality to withdraw from its position, and to enforce that appeal if necessary by resorting to arms. That appears to be the meaning of a moral obligation, and that such is the meaning is, I think, obvious from the circumstances referred to by my noble Friend (Lord Houghton). I understand that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated in the other House that it was with the greatest doubt, hesitation, and reluctance that he acceded to the proposal of the Prussian Government. The Prussian Government were not content with the proposal originally made, and insisted with great pertinacity on the collective guarantee, and it was upon these representations that Lord Stanley, with much hesitation, agreed to this collective guarantee. Yet for some time we have been told, this House has been told, and Europe has been told, that this article, which was demanded with so much pertinacity by one Government, and assented to with so much reluctance by another, was no more than waste paper, and that if one of these Powers violated this neutrality it was immediately at an end. If this were all, the article would be something less than the engagement respecting the neutrality of the Duchy that already existed. I expect and hope, that the article may be respected, and that the stipulations will be observed by all the parties to the treaty. I do not myself believe that either France or Prussia have any intention of violating their engagements with regard to Luxemburg; but I think it would be a very unfortunate thing if this country were to be led into a mistaken notion of the nature of the obligation incurred under the treaty, and thus be led so to act as to create the impression that we were willing to incur obligations without the intention of fulfilling them when the time arrived for our so doing. I hope that no such occasion may arise; but if it does arise, I trust that whatever may at the

time be found to be the moral obligation of this country will be punctually and faithfully performed.

LORD LYVEDEN said, that the term, a "collective guarantee," appeared to be a misnomer for the treaty to which we had recently been parties. From what had been stated it did not seem to be anything more than an honourable arrangement by which each Power was bound by its own honour to respect its stipulations, but was bound in no other way. He trusted that the construction put upon the treaty by his noble Friend (Earl Russell) was not the one put upon it by the Prime Minister, and that we had not really incurred any such moral obligation as that to which his noble Friend had alluded.

VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE addressed a few observations to the House which were inaudible.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL said, that the answer which the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) had given some few weeks since to a Question which he had put upon the Paper referring to this subject had created some sensation. The noble Earl, in answering his Question, had not referred to what would have to be done supposing the treaty were violated by one of the contracting Powers, and the remainder called conjointly upon England to fulfil the stipulations entered into. In that case he (the Duke of Argyll) believed that the natural interpretation of the treaty would be that we were not only morally, but also legally bound to act with the other Powers. That was not the interpretation put upon it by the Government, and that was so far satisfactory, because they hoped that the present Government might never be called upon to take action in any way in consequence of the treaty; but we had no security that any future Administration would put the same interpretation upon it — they would, of course, put their own interpretation upon it, and act as circumstances required.

EARL GREY thought that these discussions were very greatly to be regretted. He could only express a hope that after the explanation which had been given by the noble Earl at the head of the Government the subject would not be pressed any further, because he felt persuaded that these constant discussions were calculated to do harm, and could only lead to difficulty and misunderstanding.

LORD DENMAN said, that guarantees seldom led to serious consequences where there was perfect good faith and good-will on all sides; but he protested against the House discussing a question of the breach of a guarantee until a breach appeared likely to take place. He was quite certain that in case of the treaty being in danger, there would be a Conference of all the parties to the treaty, and as the consequences of Austria not agreeing to a Conference had been so serious to her, and to many States of Germany, and aggression had been justified on the ground of the refusal to join one, he believed that all would prefer a Conference to disunion. He thought the guarantee perfectly safe, and believed that it was as advantageous to Holland as in the case of the Quadruple Alliance, in which the contracting parties bound themselves to "protect and guarantee all the dominions, jurisdictions, etc., which the Lords, the States-General, possessed against all persons whatsoever."

LORD HOUGHTON, in reply, thought it would be exceedingly presumptuous in him to accept the challenge of the noble Earl opposite and place

his interpretation on the treaty, and the guarantee entered into under it. Much must, of course, be left to the good sense and good feeling of the Powers of Europe; but he accepted the interpretation of the noble Earl (Earl Russell) and of the noble Duke who followed him — that if the neutrality of Luxemburg was invaded by one of the signatories to the treaty, and we were called upon by the other signatories to cease amicable relations with the aggressor, we should be bound in honour to answer that appeal. That, he believed, was the sense in which, in this country and abroad, the treaty would be generally understood.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES REGARDING THE
NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM ¹

House of Commons, August 9, 1870

MR. RYLANDS said in part: It was only the other night, that the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Tamworth (Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer), whose distinguished position gave him great authority on these subjects, had told them of a remarkable circumstance which had naturally excited considerable attention in the country. His right hon. Friend had said that before the ink with which the Treaty of 1831 guaranteeing Belgium was signed was hardly dry, there was a negotiation between the French and Prussian Ambassadors of that day to break its conditions. And just recently there was the proposed Secret Treaty between France and Prussia which had been brought to light not by diplomatists, but by the Press, and which gave us the right to say, notwithstanding every denial and explanation, that the course pursued by France and Prussia was open to grave suspicion. But according to the Prime Minister, the Government had practically given up a Treaty under which the independence of Belgium was guaranteed by the five great Powers, for a separate Treaty with the two very Powers whose agents so recently had been negotiating an infraction of the former Treaty. It appeared that under the terms of the new Treaty if one of the belligerents were crushed and its military forces destroyed, we were to fight alongside that crushed Power, against the victorious Power, should the latter invade Belgium. That was not a satisfactory position. The hon. Member for Leicester seemed to think we ought to defend every small and independent State against aggression; why, then, did we not interfere on behalf of Schleswig-Holstein, of Hanover, and the Duchies and Archduchies which were crushed out of existence by Prussia and by Italy? Did those Sovereigns not excite the sympathies of his hon. Friend?

House of Lords, August 10, 1870 ²

LORD CAIRNS said, in part: . . . Now, I can conceive nothing more likely than that a skilful politician, or an ingenious strategist, would be able without very great difficulty so to arrange matters on behalf of one of the belligerent Powers that it would become absolutely necessary for the other belligerent to commit some act which would be a violation of that neutrality; and then, the moment that that act was done, the coöperation of England

¹ Extract from *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 3d Series, vol. cccii, pp. 1742-43.

² Extracts from *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 3d Series, vol. cccii, pp. 1751-52, et seq.

is secured to that belligerent who has caused and necessitated the very act of which we complain. I ask your Lordships what would be the effect on public opinion in this country if anything of the kind occurred? Suppose one of the belligerents, by this ingenuity,—which I think would not be very difficult — succeeded in making it necessary for the other belligerent, for the sake of its own preservation, to do some act which would be a violation of the neutrality of Belgium; and suppose the people of this country should see, as they certainly would, that the real offender was not the belligerent who actually and mechanically violated the neutrality, but the other, who made that act necessary; what would the country say if it found the Government engaging us in a war on behalf of and in coöperation with that belligerent which was morally the guilty party in the transaction? (Pp. 1751-52.)

EARL GRANVILLE said, in part: My Lords, I have heard the speech of my noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns) with a feeling of very great relief. I expected — and my expectations have certainly been justified — that he would speak with that reserve and fairness towards the Government on a great international question which he was likely to exhibit on such an occasion; but I knew also that, with regard to the particular form of the proposal, every possible objection to it would be exhausted by the ability and the skill of the noble and learned Lord, and I am much relieved at finding what those objections seem to be. The noble and learned Lord very fairly stated what course ought, in his judgment, to have been pursued by Her Majesty's Government. He said we should have entered into no engagement whatever, but have declared, without any menace to the belligerents, our determination to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. Now, I ventured the other day, with regard to the question of menace, to say that I believed the form in which we had put it was less menacing and less offensive to those Powers than any other way in which it could have been put. I will venture to explain my meaning. It is mainly a matter as to form, and not as to substance — because if there were a difference of substance I should own we had put ourselves in the wrong. It is sometimes useful to compare the action of nations and that of individuals, and very often the conduct of a high-spirited nation and of an honourable man is very much the same. I will suppose that one of your Lordships found two persons about to engage in a duel, and at once declared to them both the obligation he would feel under to strike the one who took an unfair part in that duel. I believe that would be regarded by both as an imputation upon their intentions, and might almost encourage them to do that which otherwise they would have thought wrong by being precluded from doing it by menace. But if, instead of that, the third person says to each — “You say, as I have every reason to believe, you mean to fight without any unfair play whatever; but you express a suspicion that fair play will not be exhibited by the person with whom you are engaged in hostilities. If it is any pleasure to you that I should agree with you to strike your opponent if he begins unfair play, I will do so; but, mind, this is a bargain which I must offer to the other equally.” I believe that exactly in proportion as they were confident of their own good faith and suspicious of the bad faith of their opponent they would accept, as France and Prussia have accepted, the proposal so made to them. The

noble and learned Lord says we ought, without menace, to have told them what we were going to do, and then, he says, you should have strengthened yourselves by going to the other great Powers parties to the guarantee of 1839; and this, he says, would have strengthened our position. Now, the facts as they have happened show that the course which he suggests would not have been successful. I stated the other day that we had received the most friendly assurances from both Russia and Austria. Now, it is rather curious that we have since received from Austria her distinct readiness to agree to our proposal, supposing that France and Prussia do not object to sign the Treaty. So that with regard to Austria we have exactly secured the very promise and consent to our proposal which she would not have given to a single menace on our part. From Russia we have received the most friendly assurances; but there is certainly a disinclination on the part of Russia to accede to this proposal; because Russia considers, and says that the original Treaty binds them, and they would wish to have an understanding of a much wider description — on the merits of which I do not now say one word, one way or the other, but which understanding would certainly bring us under obligations we do not hold at this moment. Russia would, therefore, in the same manner, have refused simply and solely to join us in a single menace with regard to the neutrality of Belgium. These facts show that the course advocated by the noble and learned Lord would not have been the most judicious one. (Pp. 1754-55.)

LORD GRANVILLE said, in part: . . . As to this instrument in the slightest degree weakening the effect of the previous Treaty of 1839, I entirely deny it. There is an express reservation of that Treaty; and, besides that, as I mentioned the other day, there is an exact precedent to this case. The seventh Article of the General Treaty of Paris, of March 30, 1856, between England, France, Austria, Italy, Prussia, and Russia, stipulates as follows — I am afraid I must read it in French, as I have no other copy by me —

“Leurs Majestés s’engagent, chacune de son côté, à respecter l’indépendance et l’intégrité territorialé de l’Empire Ottoman; garantiront en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement, et considéreront en conséquence tout acte de nature à y porter atteinte comme une question d’intérêt général.”

But a fortnight after this, without any event of importance having intervened, England, Austria, and France signed, on the 16th of April following, a separate treaty, by the first Article of which —

“Les Hautes Parties contractantes garantissent solidairement entre elles l’indépendance et l’intégrité de l’Empire Ottoman conservés par le Traité conclu à Paris 30, Mars, 1856.”

This, I say, is a most complete precedent, and justifies us in saying that the Treaty now almost concluded does not in the slightest degree weaken the guarantee, whatever that may be, which was given by the Treaty of 1839. (Pp. 1757-58.)

VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE said, in part: . . . I cannot doubt that, while standing to our guarantee of Belgian independence and neutrality without prejudice to our desire of remaining at peace, it is the object of Her Majesty’s Ministers no less than the feeling of the country that we

should keep in our hands as far as possible the means of limiting the range and continuance of the war, and of tendering our mediation with good effect whenever the opportunity occurs. Supposing that either of the two great parties now opposed to each other should obtain an ascendancy dangerous to the balance of power in Europe, and even to the very existence of some independent States, it would surely be desirable that our position should be such as to offer a limit to the excessive pretensions of victory. (Pp. 1760-61.)

.
*House of Commons, August 10, 1870.*¹

MR. GLADSTONE said, in part: . . . I will avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my opinion, if I may presume to give it, that too much has been said by my hon. and gallant Friend and others of the specially distinct, separate, and exclusive interest which this country has in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium. What is our interest in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium? It is the same as that of every great Power in Europe. It is contrary to the interest of Europe that there should be unmeasured aggrandizement. Our interest is no more involved in the aggrandizement supposed in this particular case than is the interest of the other Powers. That it is real interest, a substantial interest, I do not deny; but I protest against the attempt to attach to it the exclusive character which I never knew carried into the region of caricature to such a degree as it has been by my hon. and gallant Friend. What is the immediate moral effect of those exaggerated statements of the separate interest of England? The immediate moral effect of them is this — that every effort we make on behalf of Belgium on other grounds than those of interest — as well as on grounds of interest, goes forth to the world as a separate and selfish scheme of ours; and that which we believe to be entitled to the dignity and credit of an effort on behalf of the general peace, stability, and interest of Europe actually contracts a taint of selfishness in the eyes of other nations because of the manner in which the subject of Belgian neutrality is too frequently treated in this House. If I may be allowed to speak of the motives which have actuated Her Majesty's Government in the matter, I would say that while we have recognized the interest of England, we have never looked upon it as the sole motive, or even as the greatest of those considerations which have urged us forward. There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that Treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen — such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston — never, to my knowledge, took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of a guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give

¹ Extracts from *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 3d Series, vol. ccm, pp. 1786-89.

full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is the common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power whatever. But there is one other motive, which I shall place at the head of all, that attaches peculiarly to the preservation of the independence of Belgium. What is that country? It is a country containing 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 of people, with much of an historic past, and imbued with a sentiment of nationality and a spirit of independence as warm and as genuine as that which beats in the hearts of the proudest and most powerful nations. By the regulation of its internal concerns, amid the shocks of revolution, Belgium, through all the crises of the age, has set to Europe an example of a good and stable government gracefully associated with the widest possible extension of the liberty of the people. Looking at a country such as that, is there any man who hears me who does not feel that if, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandizement, coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right and public law in Europe? But we have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that — which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin? (Pp. 1786-88.)

MR. GLADSTONE said, in part: . . . It is said that the Treaty of 1839 would have sufficed, and that we ought to have announced our determination to abide by it. But if we were disposed at once to act upon the guarantee contained in that Treaty, what state of circumstances does it contemplate? It contemplates the invasion of the frontiers of Belgium and the violation of the neutrality of that country by some other Power. That is the only case in which we could have been called upon to act under the Treaty of 1839, and that is the only case in which we can be called upon to act under the Treaty now before the House. But in what, then, lies the difference between the two Treaties? It is in this — that, in accordance with our obligations, we should have had to act under the Treaty of 1839 without any stipulated assurance of being supported from any quarter whatever against any combination, however formidable; whereas by the Treaty now formally before Parliament, under the conditions laid down in it, we secure powerful support in the event of our having to act — a support with respect to which we may well say that it brings the object in view within the sphere of the practicable and attainable, instead of leaving it within the sphere of what might have been desirable, but which might have been most difficult, under all the circumstances, to have realized. The hon. Member says that by entering into this engagement we have destroyed the Treaty of 1839. But if he will carefully consider the terms of this instrument he will see that there is nothing in them calculated to bear out that statement. It is perfectly true that this is a cumulative Treaty, added to the Treaty of 1839, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli), with perfect precision, described it. Upon that ground, I very much agree with the general opinion he expressed; but, at the same time, peculiar cir-

circumstances call for a departure from general rules, and the circumstances are most peculiar under which we have thought it right to adopt the method of proceeding which we have actually done. The Treaty of 1839 loses nothing of its force even during the existence of this present Treaty. There is no derogation from it whatever. The Treaty of 1839 includes terms which are expressly included in the present instrument, lest by any chance it should be said that, in consequence of the existence of this instrument, the Treaty of 1839 had been injured or impaired. That would have been a mere opinion; but it is an opinion which we thought fit to provide against. (Pp. 1788-89.)

SPEECH MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914¹

AFTER discussing the obligations of England to support France, Sir Edward said: And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration — becoming more serious every hour — there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this is a Treaty with a history — a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that, confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the Treaty in existence — that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these Treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville, on the 8th of August, 1870, used these words. He said: —

“We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we did not think this country was bound either morally or internationally or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium, though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty’s Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country’s honour or to the country’s interests.”

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later: —

“There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that Treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guar-

¹ Extracts relating to Belgium, *London Times*, August 4, 1914.

antee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and a weighty element in the case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever."

The Treaty is an old Treaty — 1839 — and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those Treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the Treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilization was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy — a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply: —

"The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

From the German Government the reply was: —

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor."

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers: —

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks me for the communication, and replies that Belgium will, to the utmost of her power, maintain neutrality, and expects and desires other Powers to observe and uphold it. He begged me to add that the relations between Belgium and the

neighboring Powers were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions, but that the Belgian Government believe, in the case of violation, they are in a position to defend the neutrality of their country."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day — which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form — that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King — King George: —

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the Diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great vital interests in the independence — and integrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in *Hansard*, volume 203, page 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said: —

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guaranty. It is found in the answer to the question whether under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests, to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself — consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often — still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any power.

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And I do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war — all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle — they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us — if that had been the result of the war — falling under the domination of a single power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilization of the fleet has taken place; mobilization of the army is taking place; but we have as yet

taken no engagement, because I do feel that in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors, we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland — and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad — does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions — the Belgian Treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France — if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

GLADSTONE'S LETTER TO BRIGHT¹

. . . On July 25 the *Times* divulged the text of a projected agreement in 1869 (it was in truth 1867) between the French and Prussian Governments in five articles, including one that the incorporation of Belgium by France would not be objected to by Prussia. The public was shocked and startled, and many were inclined to put down the document for a forgery and a hoax. As a matter of fact, in substance it was neither. The Prussian Ambassador a few days before had informed Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, personally and in strict secrecy, that the draft of such a project existed in the handwriting of M. Benedetti. This private communication was taken by Mr. Gladstone to have been made with the object of prompting him to be the agent in producing the evil news to the world, and thus to prejudice France in the judgment of Europe. He thought that no part of his duty, and took time to consider it, in the expectation that it was pretty sure to find its way into print by some other means, as indeed soon happened. "For the sake of peace," Bismarck explained to Lord Granville (July 28, 1870),

¹ Extract from *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, by John Morley. New York, 1911, vol. II (bound in vol. I), pp. 340-42.

"I kept the secret, and treated the propositions in a dilatory manner." When the British Ambassador on one occasion had tried to sound him on the suspected designs of France, Bismarck answered, "It is no business of mine to tell French secrets."

There were members of the Cabinet who doubted the expediency of England taking any action. The real position of affairs, they argued, was not altered: the draft treaty only disclosed what everybody believed before, namely that France sought compensation for Prussian aggrandisement, as she had secured it for Italian aggrandisement by taking Savoy and Nice. That Prussia would not object, provided the compensations were not at the expense of people who spoke German, had all come out at the time of the Luxemburg affair. If France and Prussia agreed, how could we help Belgium, unless indeed Europe joined? But, then, what chance was there of Russia and Austria joining against France and Prussia for the sake of Belgium, in which neither of them had any direct interest? At the same time Ministers knew that the public in England expected them to do something, though a vote for men and money would probably suffice. The Cabinet, however, advanced a step beyond a parliamentary vote. On July 30 they met and took a decision to which Mr. Gladstone then and always after attached high importance. England proposed a treaty to Prussia and France, providing that if the armies of either violated the neutrality of Belgium, Great Britain would coöperate with the other for its defence, but without engaging to take part in the general operations of the war. The treaty was to hold good for twelve months after the conclusion of the war. Bismarck at once came into the engagement. France loitered a little, but after the battle of Wörth made no more difficulty, and the instrument was signed on August 9.

The mind of the Government was described by Mr. Gladstone in a letter to Bright (August 1):—

"Although some members of the Cabinet were inclined on the outbreak of this most miserable war to make military preparations, others, Lord Granville and I among them, by no means shared that disposition, nor I think was the feeling of parliament that way inclined. But the publication of the treaty has altered all this, and has thrown upon us the necessity either of doing something fresh to secure Belgium, or else of saying that under no circumstances would we take any step to secure her from absorption. This publication has wholly altered the feeling of the House of Commons, and no Government could at this moment venture to give utterance to such an intention about Belgium. But neither do we think it would be right, even if it were safe, to announce that we would in any case stand by with folded arms, and see actions done which would amount to a total extinction of public right in Europe."

The idea of engagements that might some day involve resort to force made Bright uneasy, and Mr. Gladstone wrote to him again (August 4):—

"It will be a great addition to the domestic portion of the griefs of this most unhappy war, if it is to be the cause of a political severance between you and the present Administration. To this I know you would justly reply that the claims of conviction are paramount. I hope, however, that the moment has not quite arrived. . . . You will, I am sure,

give me credit for good faith when I say, especially on Lord Granville's part as on my own, who are most of all responsible, that we take this step in the interest of peace. . . . The recommendation set up in opposition to it generally is, that we should simply declare *we* will defend the neutrality of Belgium by arms in case it should be attacked. Now the sole or single-handed defence of Belgium would be an enterprise which we incline to think Quixotic; and if these two great military powers combined against it — that combination is the only serious danger; and this it is which by our proposed engagements we should I hope render improbable to the very last degree. I add for myself this confession of faith. If the Belgian people desire, on their own account, to join France or any other country, I for one will be no party to taking up arms to prevent it. But that the Belgians, whether they would or not, should go 'plump' down the maw of another country to satisfy dynastic greed, is another matter. The accomplishment of such a crime as this implies would come near to an extinction of public right in Europe, and I do not think we could look on while the sacrifice of freedom and independence was in course of consummation."

ANGLO-BELGIAN MILITARY PREPARATIONS

DOCUMENT NO. 1: REPORT OF GENERAL DUCARME, CHIEF OF THE
BELGIAN GENERAL STAFF, TO THE BELGIAN MINISTER OF WAR

Confidential

Letter to the Minister Concerning the Confidential Conversations

BRUSSELS, April 10, 1906.

MR. MINISTER: —

I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations which I had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and which have already been the subject of my oral communications.

The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with regard to the general political situation, and because of the possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.

The Lieutenant-Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded by us. I answered him, that from a military point of view it could not be but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as much a matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it.

Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in Brussels would speak about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs.

He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English troops would take place at the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais, so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing in Antwerp would take much more time, because larger transports would be needed, and because on the other hand the safety would be less complete.

This admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such as railway transportation, the question of requisitions which the English army could make, the question concerning the chief command of the allied forces.

He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the defense of the country during the crossing and the transportation of the English troops — which he estimated to last about ten days.

I answered him that the places Namur and Liège were protected from a "coup de main" and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable of intervention within four days.

After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanations, my visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) that our conversation was entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on his Government; (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he and I were, up to the present, the only ones informed about the matter; (4) that he did not know whether the opinion of his Sovereign had been consulted.

In a following discussion Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received confidential reports of the other military attachés about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English forces; we could depend on it, that in twelve or thirteen days two army corps, four cavalry brigades and two brigades of horse infantry would be landed.

He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the landing army.

He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our field army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from this army to Namur and Liège, because these places were provided with garrisons of sufficient strength.

He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the English army the advantages which the regulations concerning the military requisitions provided for. Finally he insisted upon the question of the chief command.

I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last point and promised him that I would study the other questions carefully.

Later on the English Military Attaché confirmed his former calculations: twelve days would at least be necessary to carry out the landing at the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time (one to two and a half months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp.

Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of the landing in order to begin with the railway transportations, and that it would be better to proceed with these, as when the troops arrived at the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised to give me exact data as to the number of troops that could be landed daily.

As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this question could be easily regulated.

The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the clearer became the details of the problem. The Colonel assured me that one half of

the English army could be landed within eight days; the rest at the conclusion of the twelfth or thirteenth day, with the exception of the horse infantry, which could not be counted upon until later.

In spite of this I thought I had to insist again upon the necessity of knowing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to regulate the railway transportation for every day.

The English Military Attaché conversed with me about several other questions, namely: —

(1) The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding strict secrecy from the Press;

(2) The advantages, which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer to each English General Staff, one interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the British police troops.

In the course of another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German offensive with Antwerp as its object and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our country in order to reach the French Ardennes.

In this question, the Colonel said he quite agreed with the plan which I had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval of General Grierson, Chief of the English General Staff.

Other secondary questions which were likewise settled, had particular reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, photographs of the uniforms, special copies, translated into English, of some Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the import duties on English provisions, to the accommodation of the wounded of the allied armies, etc. Nothing was resolved on as regards the activity which the Government or the military authorities might exert on the Press.

During the final meetings which I had with the British Attaché, he informed me about the numbers of troops which would be daily disembarked at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the last place, which is necessary for technical considerations, will involve a certain delay. The first corps would be disembarked on the tenth day, and the second on the fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transportation so that the arrival of the first corps, either in the direction of Brussels-Louvain or of Namur-Dinant, would be assured on the eleventh day, and that of the second on the sixteenth day.

I again, for a last time, and as emphatically as I could, insisted on the necessity of hastening the sea-transport so that the English troops could be with us between the eleventh and twelfth days. The happiest and most favorable results can be reached by a convergent and simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that coöperation should not take place, the failure would be most serious. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything serving to this end would be done.

In the course of our conversations, I had occasion to convince the British Military Attaché that we were willing, so far as possible, to thwart the movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the beginning.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston on his part told me that, at the time, he had little hope for any support or intervention on the part of Holland. At the same time he informed me that his Government intended to transfer the basis of the British commissariat from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as all German ships were swept off the North Sea.

In all our conversations the Colonel regularly informed me about the secret news which he had concerning the military circumstances and the situation of our Eastern neighbors, etc. At the same time he emphasized that Belgium was under the imperative necessity to keep herself constantly informed of the happenings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I had to admit that with us the surveillance-service abroad was, in times of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, as our Legations had no Military Attachés. But I was careful not to admit that I did not know whether the espionage service which is prescribed in our regulations, was in working order or not. But I consider it my duty to point out this position which places us in a state of evident inferiority to our neighbors, our presumable enemies.

*Major-General, Chief of the General Staff.
(Initials of General Ducarme.)*

Note. When I met General Grierson at Compiègne, during the manoeuvres of 1906, he assured me the result of the reorganization of the English army would be that the landing of 150,000 would be assured and, that, moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has been assumed above.

*Concluded September, 1906.
(Initials of General Ducarme.)*

[Document No. 2 has been given in full in Chapter IX, § 5.]

DOCUMENT NO. 3. REPORT OF BARON GREINDL, BELGIAN MINISTER
IN BERLIN, TO THE BELGIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(COPY)

.....SECTION
No.....
.....ENCLOSURE
Reply to No.
General Department
Office of

BERLIN, December 23, 1911.

Belgian Legation,
No. 3022-1626.

Strictly Confidential

What is Belgium to do in Case of War?

MR. MINISTER: —

I have had the honor to receive the dispatch of the 27 November last, P without docket-number, registration number 1108. . . .

[After the superscription and opening sentence the contents of this document have not been made public except for the following extract. The following explanations of the nature of this document and the reason for withholding the remainder are given:]

On the 23d of December, 1911, Baron Greindl, then and for many years Belgian Minister in Berlin, made a report to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. There was found in Brussels a copy of this report; although a copy, the official character of this third document found in Brussels is evident from the official imprint on the paper on which the copy stands.

"Baron Greindl's report is an extremely long one. Extracts from it were published in the *North German Gazette* of October 13. A facsimile has been made of the first page only of the document, because of its great length.

"From the French side danger threatens not only in the south of Luxembourg, it threatens us on our entire joint frontier. We are not reduced to conjectures for this assertion. We have positive evidence of it.

"Evidently the project of an outflanking movement from the north forms part of the scheme of the *Entente Cordiale*. If that were not the case, then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such an outburst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly concealed by them. Their aim was to be able to transport an English garrison, unhindered, to Antwerp, which means to establish in our country a basis of operation for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to make us throw our lot in with them, which would not be difficult, for, after the surrender of our national center of refuge, we would, through our own fault, renounce every possibility of opposing the demands of our doubtful protectors after having been so unwise as to permit their entrance into our country. Colonel Barnardiston's announcements at the time of the conclusion of the *Entente Cordiale*, which were just as perfidious as they were naïve, have shown us plainly the true meaning of things. When it became evident that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by the pretended danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not entirely abandoned, but modified in so far as the British army was not to land on the Belgian coast, but at the nearest French harbors.

"The revelations of Captain Faber, which were denied as little as the newspaper reports by which they were confirmed or completed in several respects, also testify to this. This British army, at Calais and Dunkirk, would by no means march along our frontier to Longway in order to reach Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from the northwest. That would give it the advantage of being able to begin operations immediately, to encounter the Belgian army in a region where we could not depend on any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle. Moreover, that would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in all kinds of resources and, at any rate, to prevent our mobilization or only to permit it after we had formally pledged ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the exclusive advantage of England and her allies.

"It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle for the Belgian army also for that possibility. This is necessary in the interest of our mili-

tary defense as well as for the sake of the direction of our foreign policy, in case of war between Germany and France."¹

REMARKS INTRODUCTORY TO THE SECRET DOCUMENTS BY DR. BERNHARD DERNBURG

HEREWITH are published facsimiles of papers found among the documents of the Belgian General Staff at Brussels, referring to arrangements between the English Military Attaché and the Belgian Minister of War regarding British intervention in Belgium.

It will be remembered from the British White Book that in November, 1912, a correspondence passed between Sir Edward Grey and the French Minister in London, in which it was stated that British and French military and naval experts had consulted together from time to time as to plans to be followed in case of war, and it was stated in this correspondence that in accordance with such prearranged plans the French fleet would stay in the Mediterranean to safeguard the joint interests there, whereas the British fleet would safeguard their interests in the north. Of this correspondence the members of the British Cabinet remained ignorant until the Cabinet meeting immediately preceding the written statement by Great Britain on August 2 that in case a German fleet attacked the French coast or passed into the channel, England would give all the assistance in her power (British White Papers, no. 148), and it was also, of course, concealed from the British public until the speech of Sir Edward Grey on August 3. It will be remembered that in consequence of this revelation the British Minister of Commerce, Mr. John Burns, and two other members, Lord Morley and Mr. Trevelyan, left the British Cabinet under protest; that the leader of the British Labor Party, Mr. Ramsey MacDonald, resigned from the leadership and that Mr. Arthur Ponsonby in his famous letter denounced Sir Edward Grey's practices.

Mr. Ponsonby said that time and again they had been assured that there were no obligations whatsoever on the part of Great Britain to come to France's assistance and yet they found themselves now so hopelessly entangled that as a matter of fact the British Government could not back out.

The fact of these consultations, by which, of course, all the plans of mobi-

¹ This document with a commentary appeared in the *North German Gazette* of October 13, 1914, and is included as Exhibit 39 in the German edition of the German White Book [*Deutsches Weissbuch mit nachträglichen Ergänzungen*]. The comment reads: "The above exposition, coming from an unprejudiced source, convincingly proves the fact that the same England which is now posing as the protector of Belgian neutrality, has forced Belgium to a one-sided partisanship in favor of the powers of the *Entente*, and that she at one time even thought of a violation of the neutrality of Holland. It is, furthermore, clear that the Belgian government, by lending an ear to the English whisperings, is guilty of a severe violation of the duties incumbent upon it as a neutral power. The right fulfillment of these duties would have compelled the Belgian Government to foresee in her plans for defense the violation of Belgian neutrality by France and to conclude, for this eventuality, with Germany agreements analogous to those concluded with France and England. The discovered official papers constitute a documentary proof of the fact, well known to competent German authorities, long before the outbreak of the war, that Belgium connived with the powers of the *Entente*. They serve as a justification for our military procedure and as a confirmation of the information obtained by the German military authorities about France's intentions. They may open the eyes of the Belgian people with regard to the question to whom it owes the catastrophe which has swept over the unfortunate country."

lization of both the British and French armies were disclosed to the two allies and which include the landing of English troops in France, is now fully established by the annexed documents. They show that these conversations were also held with Belgium, that plans had been concerted to invade Belgium with an army of 100,000 men by way of three French ports — viz., Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne — and that the British plans even considered a landing by way of the Scheldt, thus violating also Dutch neutrality.

The documents, giving all the details as translated and showing that Belgian railway cars were to be sent to the named French ports in order to transport the British troops into Belgium, are dated from 1906.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, a well-known Belgian patriot, protested to his Government. The heading of his protest is also given in facsimile. In it he said that it was not quite safe to trust to the British and French to keep the Belgian neutrality, that it was not wise to take all measures only against a German infraction of Belgian neutrality and that the British spirit was clearly shown by the words of Colonel Barnardiston that the Scheldt might be used for transporting troops into Belgium.

Furthermore, it will be remembered that the British and French Governments violently protested when the plans were made public that the Dutch Government intended to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt in 1906. But in 1912, when the Balkan crisis became acute, the British went one step further. When Colonel Bridges, in a conversation with General Jungbluth, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, said that England was ready to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed, and that they would land them as soon as any European conflict should break out, General Jungbluth protested that for such a step the permission of Belgium was necessary. The cool reply was that the English knew it, but thought that, as Belgium was not strong enough alone to protect herself, England would land troops anyway. General Jungbluth answered that Belgium felt strong enough to protect herself, which is in keeping with her declaration to France, when she offered to protect Belgium by five army corps, as reported in the British White Book. The position of England was therefore that, while in 1906 they had already concerted plans for a joint action, in 1912 England intended action in any case, should a European conflagration break out.

Now, it must be recollected that as early as July 28, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky, as mentioned in his communication to Sir E. Goschen: "The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved, we had not thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests, and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should stand aside." (British White Papers, no. 89.)

This was at a time when the Belgian issue had not been raised at all. It only came about by Sir Edward Grey's notes written on July 31. Thus the British entanglement with France, as evidenced by the British White Book, prevented England taking the same attitude in 1914 which she had taken in 1870, when she made a treaty with France as against the German invasion of Belgium and with Germany as against the French invasion of Bel-

gium. A similar agreement was suggested by Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey on August 1, 1914, as reported in the English White Book, no. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality England would engage to remain neutral, upon which Grey replied that he could not say that.

It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of a German war that was sure to be brought about by Russia's mobilization against Germany, England would go to war against Germany, and it has been proved that the English assurance to that effect has strengthened the hands of the Russian war party, which thereupon got the upper hand and forced the Russian Czar into the war. (See report of Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Brussels, July 30.)

In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without Belgium's will, to land her troops, in violation of Belgium's neutrality, in Belgium, irrespective of whether German-troops were marching through Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been made in 1912 or any time thereafter until August 4 in the German Reichstag. It is further evident that as soon as Russia mobilized, Germany would have to fight Russia as well as France and England and that in such a fight she was forced to draw quickly when she saw her enemies reaching for their hip pockets. And only the prompt action at Liège that put this important railway center commanding the railway connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the English landing and invading Belgium.

The guilt of the Belgian Government in this matter consists, in the first place, in making and concerting plans with the English and French Governments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of the French mobilization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be presumed that the conference between British and French experts was unknown to the British Military Attaché in Brussels. It is furthermore impossible to believe that the French railway for the shipping of British troops from Calais, Dunkirk and Boulogne into Belgium in Belgian cars could have been used without the knowledge of the French authorities. Secondly, that Belgium did not heed the advice of Baron Greindl and did not try to insure her independence in the same way by approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This disposes of the contention that the Belgian conversation had a purely defensive character as against all comers. It shows the one-sidedness of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the placing of all Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier.

The Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that Germany demanded that the Belgian forces should fight with the Germans against the French and the English, and the truth had become known only three full months later, when the Belgian Gray Book was published. Then Belgium was practically occupied territory. While Belgium pretended neutrality and friendship toward Germany, it was secretly planning for her defeat in a war which was considered unavoidable. The poor Belgian people, however, must suffer because of the large ambitions of King Leopold of Congo fame and of a broken-down diplomacy.

The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof that if Germany did not march through Belgium, her enemies would. This proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the Chan-

cellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he had to regret that it violated international law. This law of necessity has been recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent statesman, including Gladstone, and by all teachers of international law, even by the United States Supreme Court's decision, volume 130, page 601, stating in regard to the treaty with China concerning Chinese immigration into the United States: "It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country, but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country." And to strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered in 1908, may be cited, stating that, "while it would be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence."

We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves.

VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY BY ENGLAND AND BELGIUM ¹

THE assertion of the British Government that the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany has caused England's intervention in the present war has already, through Sir Edward Grey's own statements, been proven untenable. The moral indignation with which the entrance of German troops into Belgium was utilized by England to create ill-feeling against Germany in the neutral countries undergoes a new and peculiar elucidation through certain documents which the German army administration discovered in the archives of the Belgian General Army Staff in Brussels.

From the contents of a portfolio which bears the title *Intervention Anglaise en Belgique*, — English intervention in Belgium, — it is clear that as early as 1906 the dispatch of an English expeditionary force to Belgium in case of a Franco-German war had been arranged for. According to a report dated April 10, 1906, the Chief of the Belgian General Army Staff, in collaboration with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, at that time British Military Attaché in Brussels, had, at the latter's instigation, in repeated conferences drawn up a detailed plan for the joint operation of an English expeditionary corps of 100,000 troops with the Belgian army against Germany. The plan was approved by the Chief of the English General Staff, Major-General Grierson. The Belgian General Army Staff was furnished with all the data concerning the strength and composition of the various parts of the British army, the composition of the expeditionary corps, the ports for debarkation, together with an exact computation with regard to the time of transportation, etc. On the basis of these data the Belgian General Army Staff had made careful preparations for the transportation of the English troops into the Belgian line of defense, for their quartering

¹ This is the translation, given out by the German Information Service, of Exhibit 38 of the German White Book [*Deutsches Weissbuch mit nachträglichen Ergänzungen*], which was printed in the *North German Gazette* of October 13, 1914, as an officially inspired statement.

and provisioning. The plans for this coöperation were carefully worked out to the last detail. For instance, a large number of interpreters and Belgian gendarmes were to be put at the disposal of the English forces and the necessary maps delivered to them. Even for the care of the English wounded provision had been made.

Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne had been decided upon as the points of landing for the British troops. From there they were to be brought by Belgian railways to the line of defense. The fact that it had been decided to land those troops in French ports and transport them through French territory proves that the English-Belgian arrangement had been preceded by an agreement with the French General Army Staff. Those three powers, then, had minutely determined the plans for a coöperation of the "allied armies," as they are termed in the document. The fact that a map for use in the French border mobilization was found in the secret archives also testifies to this.

The above-mentioned report contains several remarks of special interest. In one place it is stated that Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston had made the remark that the support of Holland could not be counted on at the time. He had, moreover, given the confidential information that the British Government had the intention of establishing the basis for the English supplies in Antwerp as soon as the North Sea should be swept clean of German warships. Furthermore, the British Military Attaché proposed the establishment of a Belgian spy service in the German Rhine province.

The above-mentioned plans, discovered at Brussels, are supplemented in a most striking manner by a diplomatic document, likewise found among the secret papers. This is a report of Baron Greindl, for many years Belgian Envoy in Berlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which the writer reveals with great astuteness the ulterior motives underlying the English proposal and draws attention to the danger of the situation in which Belgium had become involved by a one-sided partisanship in favor of the powers of the *Entente*. In this very detailed report, dated December 23, 1911 (which may be published in full at some future opportunity), Baron Greindl explains that the plan of the General Army Staff for the defense of Belgian neutrality in a Franco-German war as communicated to him only concerned the question as to what military measures should be adopted in case Germany violated Belgian neutrality. The hypothesis of a French attack on Germany through Belgium had, however, just as much probability in itself.

STATEMENT OF M. HAVENITH, BELGIAN MINISTER TO
THE UNITED STATES, REGARDING THE PUBLICATION
OF THE BELGIAN DOCUMENTS WITH EXPLANATION
BY DR. DERNBURG ¹

THE German Government has at last decided to publish the documents which it says were found in Brussels, and which it claims prove that Belgium violated her neutrality.

As the Belgian Government has no press bureau in the United States to

¹ From the *New York Times*, December 22, 1914.

disseminate its views, the Legation of the King will, on this one occasion, respond to the communication published in the American newspapers on behalf of Germany.

The Belgian Minister does not know whether or not these published documents are authentic; but, far from discussing their authenticity, he declares that if he had had them in his possession he would have published them long ago, as they constitute the strongest proof of the innocence of the Belgian Government.

It seems unnecessary that these documents should have been published with a preface of long explanations. The text itself is the interesting part, and there seems no need to teach the American people to read or to think.

Document No. 1 refers to a conversation between Major-General Ducarme and the English Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston.

"The English Military Attaché went to call on the Belgian General and told him of the anxiety on the part of the English General Staff in regard to the general political situation and the possibility of war. In case Belgium should be attacked the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.

"He [the British Military Attaché] proceeded in the following terms: 'The landing of the British troops would take place on the French coast. . . . The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our [Belgian] neutrality by Germany.'"

It almost seems as if Colonel Barnardiston had foreseen the future. The document continues as follows:—

"My visitor laid emphasis on the following fact: That it was not binding on his Government."

It was thus clearly shown by the British Military Attaché that his communication was simply a conversation; it is, moreover, perfectly well known that military attachés have no power to make conventional agreements.

The document further continues:—

"In the course of another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German offensive with Antwerp as its object, and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our [Belgium] country in order to reach the French Ardennes;"

— an additional proof that the object of the conversation was solely to prevent a violation of Belgian neutrality.

Document 2 refers to a conversation between the British Military Attaché and General Jungbluth, in which the former said that the British troops would effect a landing even if we [the Belgians] did not ask for assistance. This is an additional proof that no agreement or convention had been made.

To this the Belgian General replied that our [Belgium's] consent was necessary, and he added that we [Belgians] were, moreover, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium, showing his anxiety to preserve the neutrality of Belgium.

Document 3 contains, according to Dr. Dernburg, the personal views of the Belgian Minister in Berlin, but it does not in any way indicate the existence of an agreement between Belgium and England against Germany.

The Belgian Minister is unable to see how it can be said that these docu-

ments constitute a proof of an agreement between England and Belgium against Germany, unless one accepts the idea that Germany had a right to violate Belgium's neutrality, and that all measures taken as a precaution against violation of neutrality must therefore have been taken against Germany.

The documents contain merely conversations between military officers in regard to a possible future coöperation of their armies in the event of violation of Belgian territory by Germany. They never even resulted in an agreement between those Governments, military attachés having no authority to make such agreements.

The events that happened last August and the sudden invasion of Belgium by Germany show that the British Government was fully justified in fearing the violation of Belgian territory by Germany. It seems incredible, after what has passed, that the German Government should denounce the British Government for approaching the Belgian military officers and taking precautions against the very thing which eventually happened.

In the preface published with the documents it is said that "only the prompt action at Liège that put this important railway center commanding the railway connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the English landing and invading Belgium."

It is impossible to conceive how the taking of Liège prevented the English from landing and invading Belgium. That statement is hardly a compliment to the intelligence or the geographical knowledge of the American people. The fact is that Liège was taken a long time before the British troops arrived at Calais, and it is still to-day in the hands of the Germans, without in the least interfering with the arrival of British reinforcements in France and in the territory still left in the possession of Belgium.

The fact is that Liège was not taken to prevent the British from entering Belgium, but because it was part of the plan of the German Staff to invade Belgium at once, and, marching across her territory, to crush the army of France as soon as possible, and then turn to attack the Russians on the east. Did not Herr von Jagow say to the British Ambassador that the shortest and easiest way was through Belgium?

The truth is that every step taken by Germany was a clear indication of her intentions against Belgium. Her strategic railroads are concentrated on the Belgian frontier, and her military writers, Von Bernhardt, Von Schlieffenbach, and Von der Goltz, made no secret of her plan to carry on her war by means of an invasion of Belgium's neutral country. Events have shown how, long before the war, preparations had been made to carry this plan into effect.

Dr. Dernburg says that the one-sidedness of the Belgian inclination is indicated by the placing of all Belgian fortresses on the eastern frontier. The distinguished statesman (apparently confused by the ardor of discussion) has already in another article, published in *The Independent* of December 7, 1914, placed Antwerp at the mouth of the Rhine; to-day he places Namur on the German frontier, whereas that fortress is situated near the frontier of France. There are two fortresses in East Belgium — Liège and Namur; Namur being near the French frontier, could menace Germany only in case the Germans should have penetrated about one third of Belgium. It is, in fact, a fortress against France.

No proof has been brought forward to show that if Germany had not invaded Belgium, France or England would have done so.

The advocates of Germany cite a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and attempt to apply it to the case of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality and to justify Germany by the law of necessity. The example chosen (the Chinese question) does not involve massacres, bombardments, nor the burning of towns. It is not an analogous case. The following would be a closer analogy to Germany's action in regard to Belgium: A man, pretending that he has been attacked in the street by a powerful enemy, claims that he is justified in killing an innocent person if by doing so he gets the best of his adversary.

I do not believe that any one could produce a decision of the Supreme Court justifying a crime on the plea that the perpetration of the crime was advantageous to the culprit who committed it.

When a nation has to resort to such arguments to defend its actions, it must realize that its case is desperate.

Germany has converted smiling and peaceful Belgium into a land of sorrow, of mourning, and of ruins. There is not a family that does not mourn one of its dear ones. In the face of the indignation which has aroused the world, Germany to-day endeavors to refute the accusation which rises against her from so many tombs, and she endeavors to throw upon the innocent the terrible responsibility of her own crimes.

The Belgian Minister cannot believe that this course of action will win back Germany the sympathy which she has lost throughout the world.

THE NATURE OF NEUTRALITY¹

... CIVILIZED nations cannot permit barbarities to be perpetrated by their next-door neighbors, any more than individuals living in a community can tolerate lawlessness on the part of other persons. Hence arise the rights of supervision, intervention, and compulsory reform; rights which, upon close analysis, are found to be rather of the nature of public duties.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND SUPERVISION

It was in pursuance of this line of obligation, that the so-called "Concert of Europe" was formed, a syndicate of the Great Powers acting — nominally at least — for the purpose of enforcing order in less perfectly organized and less highly developed States, whose conduct had become intolerable; but, unfortunately, this concert was so frequently actuated in its operations by conflicting national interests as to defeat in great measure the reforms which it professed to be aiming to accomplish. More recently, the United States, in the interest of tranquillity and humanity, without in the least wishing to extend its territories, — but not always fully understood by others as respects its philanthropic motives, — has twice occupied and attempted to regenerate Cuba, and is at present undertaking to maintain order in the Philippines.

It cannot be doubted that these supervisory undertakings are, to a certain extent, guarantees that juristic principles will be applied in portions

¹ Extract from *World Organization as Affected by the Nature of the Modern State*, by David Jayne Hill. New York, 1911, pp. 140-43.

of the world not yet completely brought under the rule of justice as opposed to the rule of force. In so far as they are loyal to the high sense of duty which justifies them, they are to be commended; and should be recognized as among the tasks which fall to the elder brothers in the family of mankind. But it is important that here also international guarantees should be given. As an evidence of high and unselfish purpose, the best form of guarantee is the open door of trade, the equality of rights for all nations in the domain of business enterprise, each protecting State taking only so much revenue from the inhabitants as may be necessary for the support of its administration. By this method, all the outlying portions of the world which might otherwise become the field of conflicting national interests, and even of armed strife, may be taken out of the arena of dispute, and placed under a just and educative police surveillance useful to their inhabitants and beneficial to all mankind.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NEUTRALIZATION

Independent States, which have proved their capacity to maintain a responsible government, being members of the society of States, possess equally perfect rights, without regard to the size of their territory or the extent of their population. Some of them may, however, from a material point of view, require special guarantees of rights which unaided they might not be able to defend against foreign aggression. This necessity has been in some cases recognized, and provided for by "neutralization"; that is, certain States have been declared "neutral" in the conflicts that may arise between their more powerful neighbors, and their independence has by special compacts been taken under the united protection of the guarantors.

Thus Switzerland since 1815, Belgium since 1831, and Luxemburg since 1867 — while retaining their entire political independence, which is guaranteed by the Greater Powers — are by treaty rendered perpetually neutral. While this arrangement prevents making their territories the scene of hostilities, it does not deprive these States of the right of self-defence. On the contrary, it imposes upon them the duty of defending their neutrality to the best of their ability; but, as they enjoy the guarantee of the Powers that they will aid them in this respect, it is improbable that their neutrality will ever be violated. During the entire period since the neutralization of the three countries just named, their right of neutrality has been uniformly respected.¹

By the neutralization of these countries, the Powers which border upon them have voluntarily renounced an apparent advantage in case of war; for, if this restriction did not exist, the border State that could soonest mobilize its forces and take possession of the adjacent territory could thereby cover its own frontiers from attack, and thus obtain a considerable strategic advantage. It is evident, however, that, if defence is the object in question, it is greatly promoted by the erection of such moral barriers; for neutralization not only limits the field of hostilities but diminishes the avenues through which invasion is legally possible. There can be no doubt, that, in every instance where neutralization has been applied, the arrangement has been a wise and useful one for all the Powers concerned.

¹ For the neutralization treaties, with comments, see Wicker, *Neutralization*. London and New York, 1911.

"THE ALLEGED INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION"¹

THE objections which we have urged against the general doctrine of the inherent rights of states must now be followed by an examination of the one of those rights which is recognized on all hands as being the most important, that of self-preservation. We will take the account of what we oppose from Rivier, *honoris causa*, and especially because of his authority in Roman law, the doctrine of which with regard to individuals has been made a foundation for what is asserted in the case of states.

"When," Rivier says, a "conflict arises between the right of self-preservation of a state and the duty of that state to respect the right of another, the right of self-preservation overrides the duty. *Primum vivere*. A man may be free to sacrifice himself. It is never permitted to a government to sacrifice the state of which the destinies are confided to it. The government is then authorized, and even in certain circumstances bound, to violate the right of another country for the safety (*salut*) of its own. That is the excuse of necessity, an application of the reason of state. It is a legitimate excuse."²

We will here pause to remark that an argument which may be good as between a state and a government entrusted by it with its destinies is not necessarily good between it and that government together and another state; or we may put it that no state can entrust its government with wider powers than itself possesses. But Rivier adds:—

"The excuse of necessity has always been allowed to private persons; *a fortiori* it will not be refused to states.—Ulpian, 1. 29, Sec. 3, *Ad legem Aquiliam*, 9, 2: *Item Labeo scribit si, cum vi ventorum navis impulsæ esset in funes anchorarum alterius et nauticæ funes præcidissent, si nullo alio modo nisi præcisâ funibus explicare se potuit, nullam actionem dandam*. The same, 1. 49, Sec. 1, same title."³

In the case so put by Labeo there seems to have been an accidental physical entanglement of two ships which had to be ended in one way or another, but the cases in which the right of self-preservation is invoked to justify the political action of a state are those in which action clearly aggressive in its external character, and not demanded by any physical necessity, is asserted to fall in its intrinsic character within that right. There, whatever may have been the Roman law, British law does not permit a man to ward off danger from himself by transferring it to an innocent person. If he has preserved himself by action externally aggressive against another, he cannot justify his action as intrinsically defensive unless the person against whom it was directed was in fault towards him. Thus it has been held in England that, when a shipwrecked crew is in danger of starvation, it is not lawful for them to kill and eat one of their number, however pressing the necessity.⁴ And it has been held in Scotland that a ship, in harbour during

¹ Extract from John Westlake, *International Law*, Part 1, "Peace." Cambridge, 1910, pp. 309, 310, 311, 312.

² *Principes du Droit des Gens*, t. 1, p. 277. [Westlake's note.]

³ *Ibid.*, p. 278. [Westlake's note.]

⁴ *Queen v. Dudley and Stephens*, 14 Q.B.D. 273; decided unanimously by Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, Justices Grove and Denman, and Barons Pollock and Huddleston. Their lordships stated that they had Justice Stephen's authority for repudiating an inference in

a gale and in want of searoom, may not cut the ropes of another ship and send her adrift even though it is her only means of escape, but must pay compensation.¹ Liability to suffer hurt, whether in person, in property or in rights, and whether by sentence of law or by private action which the law permits, presupposes a duty violated by the person who is to suffer it. When a small injury is inflicted in obedience to an almost irresistible impulse, the law may overlook it, but in principle we may not hurt another or infringe his rights, even for our self-preservation, when he has not failed in any duty towards us.

Self-preservation, when carried beyond this point, is a natural impulse, an effect of the laws to which human nature is subject in the stage of advancement to which it has yet attained. But the office of jural law is not to register and consecrate the effect of the laws of nature, but to control them by the introduction of the principle of justice, where an unreflecting submission to the tendencies which in their untamed state they promote would be destructive of society. In that way human nature itself has been gradually improved, and we may hope will continue to be so; but the contrast between, on the one hand, the generalisations which express whatever with regard to self-preservation may be its actual condition from time to time, and on the other hand the rules to be enforced by government on the same subject, furnish an instructive instance of the difference, too often overlooked, between the laws of nature, which are the generalised expression of what is, and jural laws, which lay down what is to be done.² In the case of a state the impulse or tendency which justice must control is not even that which arises spontaneously on the appearance of danger to natural life or individual welfare, but that which arises from the secondary attachment formed to human institutions. No doubt the state is of all human institutions that to which attachment is the most elevating to the emotions and the moral sentiments, especially when, as is the case of most states, its origin is so remote that the steps which have led up to it are forgotten, and it wears the semblance of being a mould appointed by superior power for the feelings of its members to take shape from. Then those feelings, directed towards it, come nearest to pure altruism, having the smallest ingredient of satisfaction for ourselves or in our own work. But even then, although as a general rule we must admit the truth of Wolff's principle, that a state ought to preserve and perfect itself as an association of its citizens in order to promote their common good, patriotism should not allow us to forget that even our own good, and still less that of the world, does not always and imperatively require the maintenance of our state,³ still less its maintenance

favor of the contrary opinion which had been drawn from some passages in his writings (p. 286). [Westlake's note.]

¹ *Currie v. Allan*, 31 *Scottish Law Reporter*, 814. See the article on that case in 6 *Juridical Review*, 354-61, in which Mr. W. Galbraith Meller criticizes the common view of the Roman law. [Westlake's note.]

² See Westlake: *International Law*, part 1, p. 5. [Westlake's note.]

³ Rivier gets a glimpse of this. *Un état peut-il perdre son droit à l'existence, en être déclaré déchu? C'est à quoi s'exposerait sans doute celui qui violerait d'une manière persistante les règles du droit des gens, qui agirait contrairement à toute bonne foi, à toute humanité; il se mettrait ainsi hors du droit des gens, hors la loi internationale.* Immediately, however, he seems to set up a in the absolute right to existence, by asking *mais qui sera juge?* (*Principes du Droit des Gens*, t. 1, p. 256.) If such a case arose, as it may arise with regard to Turkey, the states called on by the circumstances to deal with it must in the present imperfect organiza-

in its actual limits and with undiminished resources. The first interest of a society, national or international, is justice; and justice is violated when any state which has not failed in its duty is subjected to aggression intended for the preservation or perfection of another.

THE QUEEN *v.* DUDLEY AND STEPHENS¹

INDICTMENT for the murder of Richard Parker on the high seas within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty.

At the trial before Huddleston, B., at the Devon and Cornwall Winter Assizes, November 7, 1884, the jury, at the suggestion of the learned judge, found the facts of the case in a special verdict which stated "that on July 5, 1884, the prisoners, Thomas Dudley and Edward Stephens, with one Brooks, all able-bodied English seamen, and the deceased also an English boy, between seventeen and eighteen years of age, the crew of an English yacht, a registered English vessel, were cast away in a storm on the high seas 1600 miles from the Cape of Good Hope, and were compelled to put into an open boat belonging to the said yacht. That in this boat they had no supply of water and no supply of food, except two 1 lb. tins of turnips, and for three days they had nothing else to subsist upon. That on the fourth day they caught a small turtle, upon which they subsisted for a few days, and this was the only food they had up to the twentieth day when the act now in question was committed. That on the twelfth day the remains of the turtle were entirely consumed, and for the next eight days they had nothing to eat. That they had no fresh water, except such rain as they from time to time caught in their oilskin capes. That the boat was drifting on the ocean, and was probably more than 1000 miles away from land. That on the eighteenth day, when they had been seven days without food and five without water, the prisoners spoke to Brooks as to what should be done if no succour came, and suggested that some one should be sacrificed to save the rest, but Brooks dissented, and the boy, to whom they were understood to refer, was not consulted. That on the 24th of July, the day before the act now in question, the prisoner Dudley proposed to Stephens and Brooks that lots should be cast who should be put to death to save the rest, but Brooks refused to consent, and it was not put to the boy, and in point of fact there was no drawing of lots. That on that day the prisoners spoke of their having families, and suggested it would be better to kill the boy that their lives should be saved, and Dudley proposed that if there was no vessel in sight by the morrow morning the boy should be killed. That next day, the 25th of July, no vessel appearing, Dudley told Brooks that he had better go and have a sleep, and made signs to Stephens and Brooks that the boy had better be killed. The prisoner Stephens agreed to the act, but Brooks dissented from it. That the boy was then lying at the bottom of the boat quite helpless, and extremely weakened by famine and by drinking sea water, and unable to make any resistance, nor did he ever assent to

tion of the world be the judges of their own political action, as the great powers were in 1815, when they justly determined to exclude Napoleon from the throne of France, whatever other government France might give herself. [Westlake's note.]

¹ Law Reports of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Queen's Bench Division, vol. xiv, pp. 273-88.

his being killed. The prisoner Dudley offered a prayer asking forgiveness for them all if either of them should be tempted to commit a rash act, and that their souls might be saved. That Dudley, with the assent of Stephens, went to the boy, and telling him that his time was come, put a knife into his throat and killed him then and there; that the three men fed upon the body and blood of the boy for four days; that on the fourth day after the act had been committed the boat was picked up by a passing vessel, and the prisoners were rescued, still alive, but in the lowest state of prostration. That they were carried to the port of Falmouth, and committed for trial at Exeter. That if the men had not fed upon the body of the boy they would probably not have survived to be so picked up and rescued, but would within the four days have died of famine. That the boy, being in a much weaker condition, was likely to have died before them. That at the time of the act in question there was no sail in sight, nor any reasonable prospect of relief. That under these circumstances there appeared to the prisoners every probability that unless they then fed or very soon fed upon the boy or one of themselves they would die of starvation. That there was no appreciable chance of saving life except by killing some one for the others to eat. That assuming any necessity to kill anybody, there was no greater necessity for killing the boy than any of the other three men. But whether, upon the whole matter by the jurors found, the killing of Richard Parker by Dudley and Stephens be felony and murder, the jurors are ignorant, and pray the advice of the Court thereupon, and if upon the whole matter the Court shall be of opinion that the killing of Richard Parker be felony and murder, then the jurors say that Dudley and Stephens were each guilty of felony and murder as alleged in the indictment."

The learned judge then adjourned the assizes until the 25th of November at the Royal Courts of Justice. On the application of the Crown they were again adjourned to the 4th of December, and the case ordered to be argued before a Court consisting of five judges.

[After hearing argument of counsel, Lord Coleridge, Chief Justice, delivered the unanimous opinion of the court. The Chief Justice reviewed the arguments brought forward for the defendants. He declared that the objections to the jurisdiction of the court were not well taken and that there were no precedents to guide the court. In regard to the opinion of Lord Bacon Lord Coleridge said:]

"The one real authority of former time is Lord Bacon, who, in his commentary on the maxim, '*necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata*,' lays down the law as follows:— '*Necessitas carrieth a privilege in itself. Necessity is of three sorts — necessity of conservation of life, necessity of obedience, and necessity of the act of God or of a stranger. First of conservation of life; if a man steal viands to satisfy his present hunger, this is no felony nor larceny. So if divers be in danger of drowning by the casting away of some boat or barge, and one of them get to some plank, or on the boat's side to keep himself above water, and another to save his life thrust him from it, whereby he is drowned, this is neither *se defendendo* nor by misadventure, but justifiable.' On this it is to be observed that Lord Bacon's proposition that stealing to satisfy hunger is no larceny is hardly supported by Staundforde, whom he cites for it, and is expressly contradicted by Lord Hale in the passage already cited. And for the proposition as to the plank*

or boat, it is said to be derived from the canonists. At any rate he cites no authority for it, and it must stand upon his own. Lord Bacon was great even as a lawyer; but it is permissible to much smaller men, relying upon principle and on the authority of others, the equals and even the superiors of Lord Bacon as lawyers, to question the soundness of his dictum. There are many conceivable states of things in which it might possibly be true, but if Lord Bacon meant to lay down the broad proposition that a man may save his life by killing, if necessary, an innocent and unoffending neighbor, it certainly is not law at the present day."

[The conclusion of the judgment was as follows]:

"Now, except for the purpose of testing how far the conservation of a man's own life is in all cases and under all circumstances, an absolute, unqualified, and paramount duty, we exclude from our consideration all the incidents of war. We are dealing with a case of private homicide, not one imposed upon men in the service of their Sovereign and in the defence of their country. Now it is admitted that the deliberate killing of this unoffending and unresisting boy was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by some well-recognised excuse admitted by the law. It is further admitted that there was in this case no such excuse, unless the killing was justified by what has been called 'necessity.' But the temptation to the act which existed here was not what the law has ever called necessity. Nor is this to be regretted. Though law and morality are not the same, and many things may be immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal consequence; and such divorce would follow if the temptation to murder in this case were to be held by law an absolute defence of it. It is not so. To preserve one's life is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and the highest duty to sacrifice it. War is full of instances in which it is a man's duty not to live, but to die. The duty, in case of shipwreck, of a captain to his crew, of the crew to the passengers, of soldiers to women and children, as in the noble case of the Birkenhead; these duties impose on men the moral necessity, not of the preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others, from which in no country, least of all, it is to be hoped, in England, will men ever shrink, as indeed, they have not shrunk. It is not correct, therefore, to say that there is any absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve one's life. 'Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam,' is a saying of a Roman officer quoted by Lord Bacon himself with high eulogy in the very chapter on necessity to which so much reference has been made. It would be a very easy and cheap display of commonplace learning to quote from Greek and Latin authors, from Horace, from Juvenal, from Cicero, from Euripides, passage after passage, in which the duty of dying for others has been laid down in glowing and emphatic language as resulting from the principles of heathen ethics; it is enough in a Christian country to remind ourselves of the Great Example whom we profess to follow. It is not needful to point out the awful danger of admitting the principle which has been contended for. Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what? It is plain that the principle leaves to him who is to profit by it to determine the necessity which will justify him in deliberately taking another's life to save his own. In this case the weakest, the youngest, the most unresisting,

was chosen. Was it more necessary to kill him than one of the grown men? The answer must be 'No' —

“‘So spake the Fiend, and with necessity,
The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deeds.’

It is not suggested that in this particular case the deeds were 'devilish,' but it is quite plain that such a principle once admitted might be made the legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime. There is no safe path for judges to tread but to ascertain the law to the best of their ability and to declare it according to their judgment; and if in any case the law appears to be too severe on individuals, to leave it to the Sovereign to exercise that prerogative of mercy which the Constitution has intrusted to the hands fittest to dispense it.

“It must not be supposed that in refusing to admit temptation to be an excuse for crime it is forgotten how terrible the temptation was; how awful the suffering; how hard in such trials to keep the judgment straight and the conduct pure. We are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy. But a man has no right to declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself have yielded to it, nor allow compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the legal definition of the crime. It is therefore our duty to declare that the prisoners' act in this case was wilful murder, and that the facts as stated in the verdict are no legal justification of the homicide; and to say that in our unanimous opinion the prisoners are upon this special verdict guilty of murder.”¹

[The following note was appended to the judgment]:

“My brother Grove has furnished me with the following suggestion, too late to be embodied in the judgment but well worth preserving: ‘If the two accused men were justified in killing Parker, then if not rescued in time, two of the three survivors would be justified in killing the third, and of the two who remained the stronger would be justified in killing the weaker, so that three men might be justifiably killed to give the fourth a chance of surviving.’”

THE MELIANS' DEFENSE OF THEIR NEUTRALITY AGAINST THE ATHENIANS²

IN the ensuing summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships, and seized any of the Argives who were still suspected to be of the Lacedæmonian faction, to the number of three hundred; and the Athenians deposited them in the subject islands near at hand. The Athenians next made an expedition against the island of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian, twelve hundred hoplites and three hundred archers besides twenty mounted archers of their own, and about fifteen hundred hoplites furnished by their allies in the islands. The Melians are colonists of the Lacedæmonians who would not submit to Athens like the other islanders. At first they were neutral and took no part. But when the Athenians tried to coerce them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into

¹ This sentence was afterwards commuted by the Crown to six months' imprisonment.

² Thucydides, translated into English, by B. Jowett, vol. II, pp. 167-77. Second edition, revised, Oxford, 1900.

open hostilities. The generals, Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes and Tisias the son of Tisimachus, encamped with the Athenian forces on the island. But before they did the country any harm they sent envoys to negotiate with the Melians. Instead of bringing these envoys before the people, the Melians desired them to explain their errand to the magistrates and to the dominant class. They spoke as follows:—

“Since we are not allowed to speak to the people, lest, forsooth, a multitude should be deceived by seductive and unanswerable arguments which they would hear set forth in a single uninterrupted oration (for we are perfectly aware that this is what you mean in bringing us before a select few), you who are sitting here may as well make assurance yet surer. Let us have no set speeches at all, but do you reply to each several statement of which you disapprove, and criticise it at once. Say first of all how you like this mode of proceeding.”

The Melian representatives answered:—“The quiet interchange of explanations is a reasonable thing, and we do not object to that. But your warlike movements, which are present not only to our fears but to our eyes, seem to belie your words. We see that, although you may reason with us, you mean to be our judges; and that at the end of the discussion, if the justice of our cause prevail and we therefore refuse to yield, we may expect war; if we are convinced by you, slavery.”

Ath. “Nay, but if you are only going to argue from fancies about the future, or if you meet us with any other purpose than that of looking your circumstances in the face and saving your city, we have done; but if this is your intention we will proceed.”

Mel. “It is an excusable and natural thing that men in our position should neglect no argument and no view which may avail. But we admit that this conference has met to consider the question of our preservation; and therefore let the argument proceed in the manner which you propose.”

Ath. “Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine words; we will not go out of our way to prove at length that we have a right to rule, because we overthrew the Persians; or that we attack you now because we are suffering any injury at your hands. We should not convince you if we did; nor must you expect to convince us by arguing that, although a colony of the Lacedæmonians, you have taken no part in their expeditions, or that you have never done us any wrong. But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.”

Mel. “Well, then, since you set aside justice and invite us to speak of expediency, in our judgment it is certainly expedient that you should respect a principle which is for the common good; that to every man when in peril a reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right, and any plea which he is disposed to urge, even if failing of the point a little, should help his cause. Your interest in this principle is quite as great as ours, inasmuch as you, if you fall, will incur the heaviest vengeance, and will be the most terrible example to mankind.”

Ath. “The fall of our empire, if it should fall, is not an event to which

we look forward with dismay; for ruling states such as Lacedæmon are not cruel to their vanquished enemies. With the Lacedæmonians, however, we are not now contending; the real danger is from our many subject states, who may of their own motion rise up and overcome their masters. But this is a danger which you may leave to us. And we will now endeavor to show that we have come in the interests of our empire, and that in what we are about to say we are only seeking the preservation of your city. For we want to make you ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for the interests of us both that you should not be destroyed."

Mel. "It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves?"

Ath. "To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation."

Mel. "But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?"

Ath. "No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness."

Mel. "But are your subjects really unable to distinguish between states in which you have no concern, and those which are chiefly your own colonies, and in some cases have revolted and been subdued by you?"

Ath. "Why, they do not doubt that both of them have a good deal to say for themselves on the score of justice, but they think that states like yours are left free because they are able to defend themselves, and that we do not attack them because we dare not. So that your subjection will give us an increase of security, as well as an extension of empire. For we are masters of the sea, and you who are islanders, and insignificant islanders too, must not be allowed to escape us."

Mel. "But do you not recognize another danger? For, once more, since you drive us from the plea of justice and press upon us your doctrine of expediency, we must show you what is for our interest, and, if it be for yours also, may hope to convince you: — Will you not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals? When they see how you are treating us they will expect you some day to turn against them; and if so, are you not strengthening the enemies whom you already have, and bringing upon you others, who, if they could help, would never dream of being your enemies at all?"

Ath. "We do not consider our really dangerous enemies to be any of the peoples inhabiting the mainland who, secure in their freedom, may defer indefinitely any measures of precaution which they take against us, but islanders who, like you, happen to be under no control, and all who may be already irritated by the necessity of submission to our empire — these are our real enemies, for they are the most reckless and most likely to bring themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot but foresee."

Mel. "Surely, then, if you and your subjects will brave all this risk, you to preserve your empire and they to be quit of it, how base and cowardly it would be in us, who retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything rather than be your slaves."

Ath. "Not so, if you calmly reflect; for you are not fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without disgrace, but you are taking

counsel whether or no you shall resist an overwhelming force. The question is not one of honor but of prudence."

Mel. "But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes impartial, and not always on the side of numbers. If we yield now, all is over; but if we fight, there is yet a hope that we may stand upright."

Ath. "Hope is a good comforter in the hour of danger, and when men have something else to depend upon, although hurtful, she is not ruinous. But when her spendthrift nature has induced them to stake their all, they see her as she is in the moment of their fall, and not till then. While the knowledge of her might enable them to be ware of her, she never fails. You are weak and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do not you be thus deluded; avoid the error of which so many are guilty, who, although they might still be saved if they would take the natural means, when visible grounds of confidence forsake them, have recourse to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles and the like, which ruin men by the hopes which they inspire in them."

Mel. "We know only too well how hard the struggle must be against your power, and against fortune, if she does not mean to be impartial. Nevertheless we do not despair of fortune; for we hope to stand as high as you in the favor of heaven, because we are righteous, and you against whom we contend are unrighteous, and we are satisfied that our deficiency in power will be compensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedæmonians; they cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are their kinsmen, and for the sake of their own honor. And therefore our confidence is not so utterly blind as you suppose."

Ath. "As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as much of their favor as you: for we are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion about divine or men's desires about human things. For of the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. This law was not made by us, and we are not the first who have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and shall bequeath it to all time, and we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as we do. So much for the Gods; we have told you why we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you. And then as to the Lacedæmonians — when you imagine that out of very shame they will assist you, we admire the innocence of your idea, but we do not envy you the folly of it. The Lacedæmonians are exceedingly virtuous among themselves, and according to their national standard of morality. But, in respect of their dealings with others, although many things might be said, they can be described in a few words — of all men whom we know they are the most notorious for identifying what is pleasant with what is honorable, and what is expedient with what is just. But how inconsistent is such a character with your present blind hope of deliverance!"

Mel. "That is the very reason why we trust them; they will look to their interest, and therefore will not be willing to betray the Melians, who are their own colonists, lest they should be distrusted by their friends in Hellas and play into the hands of their enemies."

Ath. "But do you not see that the path of expediency is safe, whereas justice and honor involve danger in practice, and such dangers the Lacedæmonians seldom care to face?"

Mel. "On the other hand, we think that whatever perils there may be, they will be ready to face them for our sakes, and will consider danger less dangerous where we are concerned. For if they need our aid we are close at hand, and they can better trust our loyal feeling because we are their kinsmen."

Ath. "Yes, but what encourages men who are invited to join in a conflict is clearly not the good-will of those who summon them to their side, but a decided superiority in real power. To this no men look more keenly than the Lacedæmonians; so little confidence have they in their own resources, that they only attack their neighbors when they have numerous allies, and therefore they are not likely to find their way by themselves to an island, when we are masters of the sea."

Mel. "But they may send their allies: the Cretan sea is a large place; and the masters of the sea will have more difficulty in overtaking vessels which want to escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt should fail they may invade Attica itself, and find their way to allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach; and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest of a land in which you have no concern, but nearer home, for the preservation of your confederacy and of your own territory."

Ath. "Help may come from Lacedæmon to you as it has come to others, and should you ever have actual experience of it, then you will know that never once have the Athenians retired from a siege through fear of a foe elsewhere. You told us that the safety of your city would be your first care, but we remark that, in this long discussion, not a word has been uttered by you which would give a reasonable man expectation of deliverance. Your strongest grounds are hopes deferred, and what power you have is not to be compared with that which is already arrayed against you. Unless after we have withdrawn you mean to come, as even now you may, to a wiser conclusion, you are showing a great want of sense. For surely you cannot dream of flying to that false sense of honor which has been the ruin of so many when danger and dishonor were staring them in the face. Many men with their eyes still open to the consequences have found the word 'honor' too much for them, and have suffered a mere name to lure them on, until it has drawn down upon them real and ir retrievable calamities; through their own folly they have incurred a worse dishonor than fortune would have inflicted upon them. If you are wise you will not run this risk; you ought to see that there can be no disgrace in yielding to a great city which invites you to become her ally on reasonable terms, keeping your own land, and merely paying tribute; and that you will certainly gain no honor if, having to choose between two alternatives, safety and war, you obstinately prefer the worse. To maintain our rights against equals, to be politic with superiors, and to be moderate towards inferiors is the path of safety. Reflect once more when we have withdrawn, and say to yourselves over and over again that you are deliberating about your one and only country, which may be saved or may be destroyed by a single decision."

The Athenians left the conference; the Melians, after consulting among themselves, resolved to persevere in their refusal, and made answer as follows: — "Men of Athens, our resolution is unchanged; and we will not in a moment surrender that liberty which our city, founded seven hundred years ago, still enjoys; we will trust to the good-fortune which by the favor

of the Gods has hitherto preserved us, and for human help to the Lacedæmonians, and endeavor to save ourselves. We are ready, however, to be your friends, and the enemies neither of you nor of the Lacedæmonians, and we ask you to leave our country when you have made such a peace as may appear to be in the interest of both parties."

Such was the answer of the Melians; the Athenians, as they quitted the conference, spoke as follows: — "Well, we must say, judging from the decision at which you have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the future to be more certain than the present, and regard things unseen as already realized in your fond anticipation, and that the more you cast yourselves upon the Lacedæmonians and fortune and hope, and trust them, the more complete will be your ruin."

The Athenian envoys returned to the army; and the generals, when they found that the Melians would not yield, immediately commenced hostilities. They surrounded the town of Melos with a wall, dividing the work among the several contingents. They then left troops of their own and of the allies to keep guard both by land and by sea, and retired with the greater part of their army; the remainder carried on the blockade.

About the same time the Argives made an inroad into Phliasia, and lost nearly eighty men, who were caught in an ambuscade by the Phliasians and the Argive exiles. The Athenian garrison in Pylos took much spoil from the Lacedæmonians; nevertheless, the latter did not renounce the peace and go to war, but only notified by a proclamation that if any one of their own people had a mind to make reprisals on the Athenians he might. The Corinthians next declared war upon the Athenians on some private grounds, but the rest of the Peloponnesians did not join them. The Melians took that part of the Athenian wall which looked towards the agora by a night assault, killed a few men, and brought in as much corn and other necessaries as they could; they then retreated and remained inactive. After this the Athenians set a better watch. So the summer ended.

In the following winter the Lacedæmonians had intended to make an expedition into the Argive territory, but finding that the sacrifices which they offered at the frontier were unfavorable, they returned home. The Argives, suspecting that the threatened invasion was instigated by citizens of their own, apprehended some of them; others, however, escaped.

About the same time the Melians took another part of the Athenian wall; for the fortifications were insufficiently guarded. Whereupon the Athenians sent fresh troops under the command of Philocrates, the son of Demeas. The place was now closely invested, and there was treachery among the citizens themselves. So the Melians were induced to surrender at discretion. The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the women and children. They then colonized the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own. (B.C. 416.)

THE WAR

HAGUE CONVENTION OF OCTOBER 18, 1907, RELATIVE
TO SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES ¹PART II. — *Good Offices and Mediation*

ARTICLE III. Independently of this recourse, the Contracting Powers deem it expedient and desirable that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute, should, on their own initiative and as far as circumstances may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the States at variance.

Powers strangers to the dispute have the right to offer good offices or mediation even during the course of hostilities.

The exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the parties in dispute as an unfriendly act.

HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1907 RELATIVE TO THE
OPENING OF HOSTILITIES ²

CONSIDERING that it is important, in order to ensure the maintenance of pacific relations, that hostilities should not commence without previous warning.

That it is equally important that the existence of a state of war should be notified without delay to neutral Powers;

Being desirous of concluding a Convention to this effect, have appointed the following as their Plenipotentiaries:

(For names of Plenipotentiaries, see Final Act.)

Who, after depositing their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions: —

ARTICLE I. The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.

ARTICLE II. The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of a notification, which may, however, be given by telegraph. Neutral Powers, nevertheless, cannot rely on the absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war.

ARTICLE III. Article I of the present Convention shall take effect in case of war between two or more of the Contracting Powers.

Article II is binding as between a belligerent Power which is a party to the Convention and neutral Powers which are also parties to the Convention.

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907*, part II, p. 1182. Washington, 1910.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1202-03.

THE LARGER MEANINGS OF THE WAR ¹

IN an address on "The Larger Meanings of the War," delivered before the Institute of Arts and Sciences of Columbia University, Professor Franklin H. Giddings discussed the race characteristics of the Germans and concluded with this striking analysis of the conflict of ideas paralleling the struggle between the Germans and the Allies: —

"But if Germany's achievement in the fields of art and science, though great and admirable, are not yet surpassing, her achievement in the domain of social policy and organization challenges and will continue to challenge the attention of the world. She has repudiated the philosophy of *laissez faire* and flatly denied the maxim that the government is best which governs least. She has developed government as an instrumentality of social welfare on a scale and with a measure of success never before or elsewhere seen. While England and America have been awakening to the humane conviction that ignorance, inefficiency, unemployment, vagabondage and misery ought if possible to be prevented, Germany has said that they can and shall be prevented, and by preventing them she has created a collective efficiency which the rest of Europe will henceforth respect. Whether it has been attained at too great a sacrifice of individual liberty, initiative, and self-reliance, time and the fortunes of war may determine. Perhaps the fate of the contending nations will turn precisely upon this point. Whatever befalls, it is a safe prediction that mankind will presently inquire whether a way can be found to conserve liberty and yet profit by the German invention of competent social government.

"There remain those supposedly important factors of civilization, idealism and morality. What of them? Germany proclaims to the world that her paramount discovery lies in the realm of moral philosophy, and that her true greatness is now to be seen in the fearlessness with which she applies it to life. She has discovered, it seems, as a truth of reason, that 'might' really does make 'right' —and itself is the only right. It had been suspected that Machiavelli taught something like this, but he was an Italian and lived before the publication of the *Origin of Species through Natural Selection*. Darwin wrote the *Origin of Species*, but he was an Englishman, and clung to an old-fashioned morality. Nietzsche, the German, was the first to see that if there really is a struggle for existence in which the strong alone survive and the weak miserably perish, weakness must be essential evil; might, essential righteousness; compassion, the only sin. Not the Christ but the superman must come, and the German is the superman. Treitschke was Nietzsche's disciple and the mantle has fallen upon Bernhardi. Promulgate this philosophy, they have said, embody it in diplomacy, teach it to the army, preach it to the people, and then you shall see *Deutschland über Alles*.

"What can the rest of mankind say? Only this. The tiger and the savage proceed with simple directness to the end of view. Civilized man has assumed that the quality of means no less than the desirability of ends should receive consideration, and this attention to means as well as to ends he has called morality. He has made these assumptions and adjusted his conduct

¹ Extract from an address by Franklin H. Giddings. This address was printed in the *Survey* of November 7, 1914.

to them because, long ago, he stumbled upon two important discoveries. One was, that mutual aid is a more important factor in the struggle for existence than claw or fist. The other was, that mutual aid is possible only among men that can trust one another, who tell the truth and keep their word, abiding by their covenants though they have sworn to their own hurt. And all this seems at least plausible. Outside of Germany it is held to be not only a rather decent folkway, but also, good Darwinism.

"And now we turn to our second question: Do the characteristics of these contrasted civilizations — one the historic Latin-Celtic-Saxon blend; the other, a young and lusty Teutonic — and the terrific conflict in which they are engaged afford us intimations of the future? Must war, increasingly terrible, recur forever, generation after generation, or may we reasonably hope and work for lasting peace?

"One thing stands forth clearly from the foregoing analysis. Peoples and civilizations grow. They are supreme manifestations of 'the will to live.' They must then have place to live and room to grow. Hemmed in and denied, they burst their barriers, exploding in the wrath of war. Now two ways and only two have been found in human experience so far to provide for expansion by a virile people developing its own characteristic civilization. One is the acquisition of territory by conquest or purchase; the other is the removal of commercial barriers. Or, to put it more bluntly and unequivocally, the choice is between war and free trade. There are some millions of men and women in the United States and elsewhere who do not believe this or will not admit it. They will be forced by the facts of life and history to admit it. Until they are ready for world-wide free trade they will waste their breath in praying for world peace.

"Commercial freedom would make peace possible but not certain. The passions of primitive man survive in us all and easily break through the inhibitions that civilization has with infinite difficulty provided. Of all known inhibitions the thinking habit is most to be relied on. It halts us, to look and listen. And the thinking habit is bound up with the time-wasting practice of discussion. This is the priceless contribution of democracy to human progress. Democracy has its own limitations and imperfections but on the whole it is fairly described and defined as the thinking and impulse-inhibiting habit developed in an entire people. Exceptional instances occur to mind, but as a general truth of history popular sovereignty does not hastily make war. Monarchical sovereignty does. If we are to have universal peace the kings, the good ones with the bad ones, must go.

"And one more thing must go. The religion of barbarism must go. The world is weary of it. It has withstood the religion of peace on earth already too long. The trinity of king, cannon and God has outlived its usefulness. If civilization is indeed better than savagery, the God we worship must be a power other and worthier than a mere Head Devil of the Universe."

APPEAL TO THE UNIVERSITIES OF AMERICA¹

In a time when half of the world falls upon Germany full of hatred and envy, we Germans derive great benefit from the idea of our being sure of the friendly feeling of the American universities. If from any quarter in

¹ From the *New York Evening Post*, September 24, 1914.

the world it must be from them that we expect the right comprehension of the present situation and present attitude of Germany. Numerous American scholars who received their scientific training at our universities have convinced themselves of the quality and the peaceful tendency of German work, the exchange of scientists has proved of deepening influence on the mutual understanding, the lasting intercourse of scholarly research gives us the feeling of being members of one great community. This is why we entertain the hope that the scientific circles of America will not give credit to the libels our enemies propagate against us.

Those libels above all accuse Germany of having brought about the present war, she being responsible for the monstrous struggle which is extending more and more over the whole world. The truth points to the contrary. Our foes have disturbed us in our peaceful work forcing the war upon us very much against our desire. We are at a righteous war for the preservation of our existence and at the same time of sacred goods of humanity. The murder of Serajevo was not our work; it was the outcome of a widely extended conspiracy pointing back to Servia where for many years already a passionate agitation against Austria had been carried on, supported by Russia. It was Russia, therefore, that took the assassins under her wings, and some weeks already before the war broke out she promised her assistance to the blood-stained state. Nobody but Russia has given the dangerous turn to the conflict, nobody but Russia is to blame for the outbreak of the war. The German Emperor, who has proved his love of peace by a peaceful reign of more than twenty-five years in face of the imminent danger, tried to intermeddle between Austria and Russia with the greatest zeal, but while he was negotiating with the Tsar Russia was busy with the mobilization of a large army towards the German frontier. This necessitated an open and decisive inquiry that led to the war. This only happened because Russia wanted it so, because she wanted to raise the Moscovites against the Germans and the Western Slavs and to lead Asia into the field against Europe.

France, too, might have kept the peace, the decision resting solely with her. The security of Germany demanded that she should inquire what France would do in the impending war; the answer of France unmistakably betrayed her intention to join in the war. As a matter of fact it was not Germany but France who commenced the war.

England already before the war stood in close relations to France. From the very beginning she has clearly shown that she by no means wanted to keep absolutely neutral. From the very beginning she made endeavors to protect France against Germany. Undoubtedly the German invasion in Belgium served England as a welcome pretext to openly declare her hostility. In reality, before the German invasion already the neutrality of Belgium had been given up in favor of the French. It has been officially stated, e.g., that not only before but also after the outbreak of the war French officers have been at Liège in order to instruct the Belgian soldiers as to the fortification service. England's complaints of the violation of international law, however, are the most atrocious hypocrisy and the vilest Pharisaism. At all times English politics have unscrupulously disregarded all forms of law as soon as their own interest was touched. During the last few weeks the same method has been quite sufficiently manifested in the unlawful cap-

ture of the Turkish warships and still more so in the instigation of the Japanese to undertake the detestable raid upon the German territory in China which needs must end in strengthening the power of that Mongolian nation at the cost of Europeans and Americans.

How is it possible for a nation that in such a way has betrayed precious interests of Western culture as soon as it seems to benefit them, how is it possible for these accomplices of the Japanese robbery to put on the air of being the guardians of morality?

We Germans did not want this war, but as it has been forced upon us we shall carry it on bravely and vigorously. In the face of all envy and hatred, all brutality and hypocrisy Germany feels unshakably conscious of serving a righteous cause and of standing up for the preservation of her national self as well as for sacred goods of humanity, indeed for the very progress of true culture. It is from this conviction that she draws her unrelenting force and the absolute certainty that she will beat back the assault of all her enemies. This conviction does not stand in need of any encouragement from abroad, our country absolutely relies upon itself and confides in the strength of its right.

Nevertheless, the idea of our American friends' thoughts and sympathies being with us gives us a strong feeling of comfort in this gigantic struggle. We both of us feel especially justified in pronouncing this as being the conviction of all German scientists, as so many scientific and personal relations connect us both with the universities of America. These universities know what German culture means to the world, so we trust they will stand by Germany.

JENA, August 31.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.
ERNST HÆCKEL.

AMERICA AND THE ISSUES OF EUROPEAN WAR¹

BY CHARLES W. ELIOT, PRESIDENT EMERITUS OF HARVARD

To the Editor of the New York Times:

The numerous pamphlets which German writers are now distributing in the United States, and the many letters about the European war which Americans are now receiving from German and German-American friends, are convincing thoughtful people in this country that American public opinion has some weight with the German Government and people, or, at least, some interest for them; but that the reasons which determine American sympathy with the Allies, rather than with Germany and Austria-Hungary, are not understood in Germany and are not always appreciated by persons of German birth who have lived long in the United States.

It would be a serious mistake to suppose that Americans feel any hostility or jealousy toward Germany, or fail to recognize the immense obligations under which she has placed all the rest of the world, although they now feel that the German nation has been going wrong in theoretical and practical politics for more than a hundred years, and is to-day reaping the consequences of her own wrong-thinking and wrong-doing.

There are many important matters concerning which American sympathy is strongly with Germany: (1) The unification of Germany, which Bis-

¹ Published in the *New York Times* of October 2, 1914.

marek and his co-workers accomplished, naturally commended itself to Americans, whose own country is a firm federation of many more or less different States, containing more or less different peoples. While most Americans did not approve Bismarck's methods and means, they cordially approved his accomplishment of German unification. (2) Americans have felt unqualified admiration for the commercial and financial growth of Germany during the past forty years, believing it to be primarily the fruit of well-directed industry and enterprise. (3) All educated Americans feel strong gratitude to the German nation for its extraordinary achievements in letters, science, and education within the last hundred years. Jealousy of Germany in these matters is absolutely foreign to American thought, and that any external power or influence should undertake to restrict or impair German progress in these respects would seem to all Americans intolerable, and, indeed, incredible. (4) All Americans who have had any experience in governmental or educational administration recognize the fact that German administration — both in peace and in war — is the most efficient in the world; and for that efficiency they feel nothing but respect and admiration, unless the efficiency requires an inexpedient suppression or restriction of individual liberty. (5) Americans sympathize with a unanimous popular sentiment in favor of a war which the people believe to be essential to the greatness, and even the safety, of their country, — a sentiment which prompts to family and property sacrifices very distressing at the moment, and irremediable in the future; and they believe that the German people to-day are inspired by just such an overwhelming sentiment.

How is it, then, that, with all these strong American feelings tending to make them sympathize with the German people in good times or bad, in peace or in war, the whole weight of American opinion is on the side of the Allies in the present war? The reasons are to be found, of course, in the political and social history of the American people, and in its governmental philosophy and practice to-day. These reasons have come out of the past, and are entrenched in all the present ideals and practices in the American Commonwealth. They inevitably lead Americans to object strongly and irrevocably to certain German national practices of great moment, practices which are outgrowths of Prussian theories, and experiences that have come to prevail in Germany during the past hundred years. In the hope that American public opinion about the European war may be a little better understood abroad it seems worth while to enumerate those German practices which do not conform to American standards in the conduct of public affairs: —

(a) Americans object to the committal of a nation to grave measures of foreign policy by a permanent Executive — Czar, Kaiser, or King — advised in secret by professional diplomatists who consider themselves the personal representatives of their respective sovereigns. The American people have no permanent Executive, and the profession of diplomacy hardly exists among them. In the conduct of their national affairs they utterly distrust secrecy, and are accustomed to demand and secure the utmost publicity.

(b) They object to placing in any ruler's hands the power to order mobilization or declare war in advance of deliberate consultation with a

representative assembly, and of coöperative action thereby. The fact that German mobilization was ordered three days in advance of the meeting of the Reichstag confounds all American ideas and practices about the rights of the people and the proper limits of Executive authority.

(c) The secrecy of European diplomatic intercourse and of international understandings and terms of alliance in Europe is in the view of ordinary Americans not only inexpedient, but dangerous and unjustifiable. Under the Constitution of the United States no treaty negotiated by the President and his Cabinet is valid until it has been publicly discussed and ratified by the Senate. During this discussion the people can make their voice heard through the press, the telegraph, and the telephone.

(d) The reliance on military force as the foundation of true national greatness seems to thinking Americans erroneous, and in the long run degrading to a Christian nation. They conceive that the United States may fairly be called a great nation; but that its greatness is due to intellectual and moral forces acting through adequate material forces and expressed in education, public health and order, agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce, and the resulting general well-being of the people. It has never in all its history organized what could be called a standing or a conscripted army; and, until twenty years ago, its navy was very small, considering the length of its seacoasts. There is nothing in the history of the American people to make them believe that the true greatness of nations depends on military power.

(e) They object to the extension of national territory by force, contrary to the wishes of the population concerned. This objection is the inevitable result of democratic institutions; and the American people have been faithful to this democratic opinion under circumstances of considerable difficulty — as, for example, in withdrawing from Cuba, the rich island which had been occupied by American troops during the short war with Spain (1898) and in the refusing to intervene by force in Mexico for the protection of American investors, when that contiguous country was distracted by factional fighting. This objection applies to long-past acts of the German Government, as well as to its proceedings in the present war — as, for example, to the taking of Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine, as well as to the projected occupation of Belgium.

(f) Americans object strenuously to the violation of treaties between nations on the allegation of military necessity or for any other reason whatever. They believe that the progress of civilization will depend in future on the general acceptance of the sanctity of contracts or solemn agreements between nations and on the development by common consent of international law. The neutralization treaties, the arbitration treaties, the Hague Conferences, and some of the serious attempts at mediation, although none of them go far enough, and many of them have been rudely violated on occasion, illustrate a strong tendency in the civilized parts of the world to prevent international wars by means of agreements deliberately made in time of peace. The United States has proposed and made more of these agreements than any other power, has adhered to them, and profited by them. Under one such agreement, made nearly a hundred years ago, Canada and the United States have avoided forts and armaments against each other, although they have had serious differences of opinion and clashes

of interests, and the frontier is three thousand miles long and for the most part without natural barriers. Cherishing the hope that the peace of Europe and the rights of its peoples may be secured through solemn compacts (which should include the establishment of a permanent international judicial tribunal, supported by an international force) Americans see, in the treatment of the German Government of the Belgium neutralization treaty as nothing but a piece of paper which might be torn up on the ground of military necessity, evidence of the adoption by Germany of a retrograde policy of the most alarming sort. That single act on the part of Germany — the violation of the neutral territory of Belgium — would have determined American opinion in favor of the Allies, if it had stood alone by itself — the reason being that American hopes for the peace and order of the world are based on the sanctity of treaties.

(g) American public opinion, however, has been greatly shocked in other ways by the German conduct of the war. The American common people see no justification for the dropping of bombs, to which no specific aim can be given, into cities and towns chiefly inhabited by non-combatants, the burning or blowing up of large portions of unfortified towns and cities, the destruction of precious monuments and treasures of art, the strewing of floating mines through the North Sea, the exacting of ransoms from cities and towns under threat of destroying them, and the holding of unarmed citizens as hostages for the peaceable behavior of a large population under threat of summary execution of the hostages in case of any disorder. All these seem to Americans unnecessary, inexpedient, and unjustifiable methods of warfare, sure to breed hatred and contempt toward the nation that uses them, and therefore to make it difficult for future generations to maintain peace and order in Europe. They cannot help imagining the losses civilization would suffer if the Russians should every carry into western Europe the kind of war which the Germans are now waging in Belgium and France. They have supposed that war was to be waged in this century only against public, armed forces and their supplies and shelters.

These opinions and prepossessions on the part of the American people have obviously grown out of the ideals which the early English colonists carried with them to the American wilderness in the seventeenth century, out of the long fighting and public discussion which preceded the adoption of the Constitution of the United States in the eighteenth century, and out of the peculiar experiences of the free Commonwealths which make up the United States, as they have spread across the almost uninhabited continent during the past one hundred and twenty-five years.

The experience and the situation of modern Germany have been utterly different. Germany was divided for centuries into discordant parts, had ambitious and martial neighbors, and often felt the weight of their attacks. Out of the war came accessions of territory for Prussia, and at last German unity. The reliance of intelligent and patriotic Germany on military force as the basis of national greatness is a natural result of its experiences. Americans, however, believe that this reliance is unsound both theoretically and practically. The wars in Europe since 1870-71, the many threatenings of war, and the present catastrophe seem to Americans to demonstrate that no amount of military preparedness on the part of the nations of Europe can possibly keep the peace of the continent, or indeed prevent fre-

quent explosions of destructive warfare. They think, too, that preparation for war on the part of Germany better than any of her neighbors can make will not keep her at peace or protect her from invasion, even if this better preparation include advantages of detail which have been successfully kept secret. All the nations which surround Germany are capable of developing a strong fighting spirit; and all the countries of Europe, except England and Russia, possess the means of quickly assembling and getting into action great bodies of men. In other words, all the European states are capable of developing a passionate patriotism, and all possess the railroads, roads, conveyances, telegraphs, and telephones which make rapid mobilization possible. No perfection of military forces, and no amount of previous study of feasible campaigns against neighbors, can give peaceful security to Germany in the present condition of the great European states. In the actual development of weapons and munitions, and of the art of quick intrenching, the attacking force in battle on land is at a great disadvantage in comparison with the force on the defensive. That means indecisive battles and ultimately an indecisive war, unless each party is resolved to push the war to the utter exhaustion and humiliation of the other — a long process which involves incalculable losses and wastes, and endless miseries. Americans have always before them the memory of their four years' civil war, which, although resolutely prosecuted on both sides, could not be brought to a close until the resources of the Southern States in men and material were exhausted. In that dreadful process the whole capital of the Southern States was wiped out.

Now that the sudden attack on Paris has failed, and adequate time has been secured to summon the slower-moving forces of Russia and England, and these two resolute and persistent peoples have decided to use all their spiritual and material forces in coöperation with France against Germany, thoughtful Americans can see but one possible issue of the struggle, whether it be long or short, namely, the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary in their present undertakings, and the abandonment by both peoples of the doctrine that their salvation depends on militarism and the maintenance of autocratic executives entrusted with the power and the means to make sudden war. They believe that no human being should ever be trusted with such power. The alternative is, of course, genuine constitutional government, with the military power subject to the civil power.

The American people grieve over the fruitless sacrifices of life, property, and the natural human joys which the German people are making to a wrong and impossible ideal of national power and welfare. The sacrifices which Germany is imposing on the Allies are fearfully heavy, but there is reason to hope that these will not be fruitless, for out of them may come great gains for liberty and peace in Europe.

All experienced readers on this side of the Atlantic are well aware that nine tenths of all the reports they get about the war come from English and French sources, and this knowledge makes them careful not to form judgments about details until the events and deeds tell their own story. They cannot even tell to which side victory inclines in a long, far-extended battle until recognizable changes in the positions of the combatants show what the successes or failures must have been. The English and French win some advantage so far as the formation of public opinion in this country is concerned,

because those two Governments send hither official reports on current events more frequently than the German Government does, and with more corroborative details. The amount of secrecy with which the campaign is surrounded on both sides is, however, a new and unwelcome experience for both the English and the American public.

The pamphlets by German publicists and men of letters which are now coming to this country, and the various similar publications written here, seem to indicate that the German public is still kept by its Government in ignorance about the real antecedents of the war and about many of the incidents and aspects of the portentous combat. These documents seem to Americans to contain a large amount of misinformation about the attack of Austria-Hungary on Servia, the diplomatic negotiations and the correspondence between the sovereigns which immediately preceded the war, and the state of mind of the Belgian and English peoples. American believers in the good sense and good feeling of the common people naturally imagine, when an awful calamity befalls a nation, that the people cannot have been warned of its approach, else they would have avoided it. In this case they fear that the Emperor, the Chancellery, and the General Staff have themselves been misinformed in important respects, have made serious miscalculations which they are proposing to conceal as long as possible, and are not taking the common people into their confidence. American sympathies are with the German people in their sufferings and losses, but not with their rulers, or with the military class, or with the professors and men of letters who have been teaching for more than a generation that *Might makes Right*. That short phrase contains the fundamental fallacy which for fifty years has been poisoning the springs of German thought and German policy in public affairs.

Dread of the Muscovite does not seem to Americans a reasonable explanation of the present actions of Germany and Austria-Hungary, except so far as irrational panic can be said to be an explanation. Against possible, though not probable, Russian aggression, a firm defensive alliance of all western Europe would be a much better protection than the single *Might of Germany*. It were easy to imagine also two new "buffer" States — a re-constructed Poland and a Balkan Confederation. As to French "revenge," it is the inevitable and praiseworthy consequence of Germany's treatment of France in 1870-71. The great success of Germany in expanding her commerce during the past thirty years makes it hard for Americans to understand the hot indignation of the Germans against the British because of whatever ineffective opposition Great Britain may have offered to that expansion. No amount of commercial selfishness on the part of insular England can justify Germany in attempting to seize supreme power in Europe and thence, perhaps, in the world.

Finally, Americans hope and expect that there will be no such fatal issue of the present struggle as the destruction or ruin of the German nation. On the contrary, they believe that Germany will be freer, happier, and greater than ever, when once she has got rid of the monstrous Bismarck policies and the Emperor's archaic conception of his function, and has enjoyed twenty years of real peace.

ASTICOU, MAINE,
September 28, 1914.

Your obedient servant,
CHARLES W. ELIOT.

GERMANY'S TREATY RECORD¹

BY DR. BERNHARD DERNBURG

To the Editor of the New York Times:

Professor Eliot is conferring a great favor on the exponents of the German side in the present struggle in explaining to them what he thinks of the so-called anti-German feeling in the United States. I am sure his views will be read also in Germany with a great deal of attention, although he will certainly not remain unchallenged in nearly all essential points. The compliment that Professor Eliot pays to the German people as a whole must be specially appreciated, the more so as it comes from a scientist whose great authority is equally recognized on both sides of the Atlantic.

The anti-German feeling, according to Professor Eliot, takes its source from the American objection to the committal of a nation to grave mistakes by a permanent executive. But then, with the exception of France, all the warring nations have permanent executives, professional diplomatists; all their affairs are conducted in secret, and all their rulers have the power, including the President of France, to embroil their nations in war. The German Emperor is in this respect certainly more restricted than the other heads of state, and I have not read that the declaration of war has been expressly sanctioned by the English Parliament, and certainly the mobilization of the English fleet that took place in July, and the mobilization of the Russian army that took place at the same time, have not even been brought to the knowledge of the respective Parliaments. When, therefore, the same conditions prevail in all the warring states, how can they be made the reason for such an anti-German feeling?

The same objection holds good with the American antipathy against the power of rulers to order mobilization or declare war in advance without consultation of Parliament, to which I have only to say that the English fleet was mobilized without consulting the English Parliament, while in Germany the Bundesrat, the representatives of the Federal States, as well as of the Federal Diets, had been duly consulted. I may add that also the party leaders of the Reichstag, which could not be convoked earlier than two days after the declaration of the war, have been continuously informed and consulted.

Against the next paragraph, where Professor Eliot complains of the secrecy of European diplomacy and of international treaties and understandings, the same objection must be made. The state described here as particular to Germany prevails in all European countries, and neither the treaty of the Russian-French alliance nor the arrangements of the Triple *Entente* have ever been submitted to the French or British Parliaments. As regards the American attitude toward armaments, I purposely refrain from adducing the American example into my argument, much as I could show that with a very large part of the American nation the idea of defending the American coast against any invader and the maintenance of a strong Pan-American policy, if need be by arms, is just as fixed a tenet as the German idea that the Fatherland should be held safe from invasion or destruction by the will and the strength of its people. England has always held the same, if not through her army so through her navy, and so did the

¹ Letter to the *New York Times*, October 5, 1914, in answer to Dr. Eliot's letter.

rest of Europe; and there is no argument to be gotten from that for an anti-German feeling.

Americans object to the extension of territory by force. Germany has never done that, even if one goes back as far as Professor Eliot wishes to go. Mr. Eliot is absolutely mistaken as to the history of the incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein into Prussia. Schleswig-Holstein was a dual-dukedom, had never belonged to Denmark, but having a duke, was under the sway of the King of Denmark as long as he belonged to the elder line of the House of Oldenburg. This elder line was extinct when King Christian VIII died without male issue. His successor wanted to incorporate the two German dukedoms into Denmark. Then the people stood up and expressed the desire to remain with the German Federation, to which it had always belonged, and there it is now, of its own free will. The natural dividing line between Denmark and Germany, however, is the river Eider. There are about 30,000 Danes south of the Eider, who have been absorbed against their will, a thing that can never be avoided and that has sometimes given Prussia a little trouble.

As to Alsace-Lorraine, the facts are known to be that it had belonged to Germany until it had been taken, against the will of the people, by France under Louis XIV, and it was returned to Germany as a matter of right, more than three quarters of the population being of German descent and speaking the German language.

But let me ask in return, Mr. Eliot, when did ever in her political career England consult the will of the people when she took a country? Can he say that, when England tore the treaty of Majuba Hill, like a "scrap of paper," and made war on the Boers? Did she consult the people of Cyprus in 1878? Does he know of any *plébiscite*, in India? Has she consulted the Persians, or has France consulted the people of Morocco, or of Indo-China, Italy the people of Tripoli? Since Germany has not acted here in any other way forty years ago than all the other nations, why does Dr. Eliot consider the American people justified in taking anti-German views for reason of such an old date, while he forgives the nations of the party he favors for much more recent infringements of his rule?

"Americans object to the violation of treaties." So do the Germans. We have always kept our treaties, and mean to do so in the future. The fact with Belgium is that her neutrality was very one-sided; that, as can be proved, as early as the 25th of June, Liège was full of French soldiers, that Belgian fortifications were all directed against Germany, and that, for years past, it was the Belgian press that outdid the French press in attacks against Germany. But I can give Mr. Eliot here some authority that he has so far not challenged. When Sir Edward Grey presented the English case in the House of Commons on the 3d of August, he declared that the British attitude was laid down by the British Government in 1870, and he verbally cited Mr. Gladstone's speech, in which he said he could not subscribe to the assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee was binding on every party, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. He called that assertion a "stringent and impracticable" view of the guarantee, and the whole treaty a "complicated question." So Mr. Gladstone, and with him Sir Edward

Grey, has held the Belgian neutrality treaty not binding on every party, when it was against the interest which the particular situation dictated when the war broke out. It was the interest of Great Britain to maintain the treaty, and that is why she acted. It was against German interest to maintain the treaty, and that is why she broke it. That is the British and not the German theory, and I could very well rest my case here. My theory is with the German Chancellor, that I greatly regret the necessity of violating the Belgian neutrality, after Belgium had chosen to repel the German overtures for a free passage.

It is quite certain that the breach of the Belgian neutrality by Germany was used in Great Britain as a powerful instrument to influence the public sentiment. Every war must be borne by national unity, and it is the duty of the nation's leaders to secure such unity by all practicable means. But has it been forgotten that the attitude of Sir Edward Grey caused such excellent men as Lord Morley, John Burns, and Sir John Trevelyan to leave the Cabinet, where they were looked upon as the best and most liberal members of the ruling combination? Bernard Shaw says of Great Britain that she has never been at a loss for an effective moral attitude. Such an attitude is a powerful weapon in diplomatical and actual warfare, and it must be resorted to, if the necessity arises. But that cannot blind us to the fact that the British Government allowed the political interest to be the paramount consideration in this Belgian neutrality matter. The German interest for not acting on the guarantee was just as strong as the English to act for it.

The proof is found in the English "White Paper." I cite the famous reprint of the *Times* (dispatch no. 148 of August 2 to Paris). Here Sir Edward Grey says: "We were considering . . . whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*."

I am an ardent believer in all international arrangements to prevent difficulties and wars between nations, and I rejoice with the American people in the signal success this policy is now having in this country. But international treaties must not be overrated. There are questions which cannot be settled by them. It is too difficult to explain just the nature of such situations as arose in Europe, so I may be permitted for once to ask this question: Does Professor Eliot believe that the majority of the American people think that the unwritten Monroe Doctrine could be made the subject of arbitration, whether it had a right to exist or to be enforced? I must emphatically say, No, it could not. It can be as little arbitrated upon as a matter of religion or of personal morals.

Mr. Eliot thinks a happy result of the war would be that American institutions should prevail in Germany thereafter. Why should Germany only become a representative republic? Does he not demand the same regarding Russia, England, Italy, Austria, and Japan? And if not, why not?

From all this I fail to see the point in the reasons given by Professor Eliot why fair-minded Americans should side with the Allies, because the objections made against German procedure, down to the breach of the Belgian neutrality, must be made against all other European states. British history is just teeming with examples of broken treaties and torn "scraps of paper." The chasing of German diplomatic representatives out of neutral Egypt is a case in point.

I must insist that whatever anti-German feeling there is is not fully explained by Professor Eliot, and his article cannot be made a code by which German behavior could be regulated in the future. Professor Eliot is a scholar; business interests do not come very near him. So he is especially concerned with the ethical aspect of the matter. He believes the Germans think that "might is right." This is very unjust. Our history proves that we have never acted on this principle. We have never got or attempted to get a world empire such as England has won, all of which, with a very few exceptions, by might, by war, and by conquest. The German writers who have expounded this doctrine have only shown how the large world empires of England and France were welded together, what means have been adopted for that purpose, and against what sort of political doctrines we must beware.

As Dr. Eliot makes his remarks for the benefit of his German *confrères*, may I be permitted to say to them what I consider the reason for the American attitude? There is, in the first place, the ethical side. Americans have a very strong sense of generosity, and are, as a rule, very good sports. They think Belgium a small nation, brutally attacked by a much bigger fellow; they feel that the little man stands up bravely and gamely, and fights for all he is worth. Such a situation will always command American sympathy and antagonism against the stronger. Then there is the business side. Americans feel that this war is endangering their political and commercial interests, so they are naturally angry against the people who, they believe, have brought the war about.


As Germany has not had an opportunity to make herself heard as amply as her adversaries, they think that it was Germany which set the world afire, and that is what they resent, and in which they were justified, if it were true. But the question of the hour is not the question of the past, but of the present and of the future, and the people on this side who will give Germany fair play because it is just in them will examine the situation in the light of their interests. Then they will find that Belgium has been in league with the Allies long before the conflagration broke out, only to be left to its own resources when the critical hour arose. They will further find that it is not Germany but England and her allies that are throttling commerce, maiming cables, stopping mails, and breaking neutrality and other treaties to further their aims; that, finally, to-day England has established a world rule on the sea to which even America must submit. They will then soon come to the conclusion that, no matter what happened in the past, the peace of the world can only be assured by a good understanding between Germany and the United States as a sort of counterbalance against the unmeasured aggrandizement of English sea power. Then the feeling toward Germany will be considerably better, and I may add that even now it is not so very bad after all.

I make these remarks with due respect to Professor Eliot and his views, and with great reluctance for being compelled to enter the field against a personality whose undoubted superiority I wish to be the first to acknowledge.

BERNHARD DERNBURG.

NEW YORK, October 4, 1914.

APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY
CITATION OF DOCUMENTS



APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY

- June 24. The Kaiser inaugurates the enlarged Kiel Canal.
- June 28. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenburg assassinated at Serajevo.
- July 2. The French Ambassador at Vienna reports resentment against Serbia because of Serajevo assassination, and preparations to force an issue on Serbia. (F. Y. B. no. 8.)
- July 4. The German Foreign Office gives reasons for being confident that Serbia will give satisfaction to Austria's demands, and thus avoid possibility of tension. (F. Y. B. no. 9.)
- July 6. The intimation of the Austrian representative that his Government may be forced to carry on an investigation on Servian territory is met by indignant warning from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (F. Y. B. no. 10.)
- July 10. M. N. de Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, died suddenly while paying a visit to the Austrian Minister.
- July 11. The French Consul at Budapest sends his Government a remarkable report, discussing the attitude of the Hungarian Government and public toward Serbia, in which he points out the various signs indicating that Austria is preparing a *coup*. He also draws attention to the unprecedented fall of the Hungarian 4 per cents. (F. Y. B. no. 11.)
- July 14. The French Minister of War in the Senate admitted serious deficiencies in the state of preparedness of the army.
- July 15. The French Ambassador at Vienna reports bellicose tone of Viennese press toward Serbia, and opines that the situation in France and Russia affords a favorable opportunity for action. (F. Y. B. no. 12.)
- July 16. Sir Edward Grey learns from Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, a forecast derived from a private source of the "impending storm." (B. W. P. Miscellaneous, no. 10.)
Editorial in the London *Times* criticizing Serbia for her anti-Austrian propaganda, and for not making an inquiry, and declaring that Austria was "entitled to effective guaranties against the support of what is a seditious movement by the subjects of King Peter."
- President Poincaré and Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Viviani depart for St. Petersburg.
- July 17. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs warns Austria against insulting Serbia or interfering with her independence. (S. B. B. no. 28.)
- July 20. The Russian Ambassador leaves Vienna. (B. W. P., Miscellaneous, no. 10.)

French consular report from Vienna, pointing out Austria's plans and reasons for bringing on a general war, and predicting the nature of the Austrian demands. (F. Y. B. no. 14.)

Poincaré and Viviani arrive at Cronstadt.

July 21. Extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse. (F. Y. B. no. 16.)

Von Jagow, alluding to the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade, in conversation with the British Chargé, insisted that the question at issue should be settled between Serbia and Austria alone, and considered it inadvisable that Germany should approach Austria on the matter. (B. W. P. no. 2; cf. F. Y. B. no. 16.)

Meeting of Home Rule Conference in Buckingham Palace at King's suggestions.

Trial of Madame Caillaux at Paris commences.

July 22. The Russian Ambassador, on leaving Vienna for Russia, after receiving reassuring declarations from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, confides to the French Ambassador that Russia will make no objection to Austria's taking steps for the punishment of the guilty and for the dissolution of revolutionary associations, but cannot admit exactions humiliating to Servian national feeling. (F. Y. B. no. 18.)

Von Tchirsky, German Ambassador at Vienna, shows himself a partisan of Austria in her "violent resolution" against Serbia. At the same time he lets it be understood that the German Imperial Chancellor may not be in complete agreement with him. (F. Y. B. no. 18.)

July 23. The Austrian Ambassador at London explains privately to Sir Edward Grey the nature of the Austrian demand. Sir Edward's objection to an ultimatum. (B. W. P. no. 3.)

Austrian ultimatum delivered to Serbia at 6 P.M.

Austria allows forty-eight hours for an unconditional acceptance. (R. O. P. nos. 1, 2.)

According to official statement 120,000 workers in the strike at St. Petersburg.

July 24. Austrian ultimatum communicated. (B. W. P. no. 4.)

Russia learned the contents of the note at 10 A.M. (R. O. P. no. 3.)

Russian Cabinet Council at which it is decided to make military preparations. (G. W. B. Exhibit 23a.)

Germany supports Austria's demands and insists upon the "localization" of the Austro-Servian dispute. (B. W. P. no. 9; F. Y. B. no. 28.)

Sazonof directs protest to be made at Vienna against the short delay of the ultimatum. (R. O. P. no. 4.)

Prince Alexander of Serbia appeals to the Tsar for support. (R. O. P. no. 6.)

Austria assures Russia as to her intentions regarding Serbia. (G. W. B. exhibit 3.)

Russia says that she cannot permit localization of the dispute. (G. W. B. exhibit 4.)

French Ambassador at St. Petersburg gives British colleague to understand that France will support Russia. (B. W. P. no. 6; cf. F. Y. B. no. 22.)

Sazonof and the French and British representatives discuss the action to be taken.

French Ambassador says his Government will support Russia.

British Ambassador explains England's position: no interest in Serbia; concern for European peace; will not make declaration of solidarity with France and Russia; perhaps will make representations to Germany and Austria. (B. W. P. no. 6; cf. F. Y. B. no. 22.)

Sir Edward Grey plans quadruple mediation in event of Russia's mobilization. But M. Paul Cambon advises immediate mediation between Austria and Serbia. (B. W. P. no. 10; F. Y. B. nos. 32, 34.)

Prince Lichnowsky suggests effort to secure favorable reply from Serbia. (B. W. P. no. 11.)

The French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that Serbia propose arbitration "to escape from the direct clutch of Austria." (F. Y. B. no. 26.)

The French Premier Viviani from Reval informs acting Minister for Foreign Affairs for transmission to Vienna, that he has agreed with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to try to prevent a demand on Serbia equivalent to intervention, and wishes to secure coöperation of British Ambassador at Vienna to counsel moderation. (F. Y. B. no. 22.)

Sir Edward Grey criticizes the unusual terms of the Austrian Ultimatum. (B. W. P. no. 4.)

Sir Edward declares he should concern himself from point of view of the peace of Europe. (B. W. P. no. 5.)

The French Foreign Office comments to the Austrian Ambassador upon the effect upon public opinion of the presentation of the Austrian note at a time when the President of the Republic, and the Premier, who is also Minister for Foreign Affairs, were on the high seas. (F. Y. B. no. 25.)

The French Ambassador, at Berlin, in a personal exchange of views, expresses surprise that the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have supported the Austrian pretensions when he was ignorant of the nature and limit of them. (F. Y. B. no. 30.)

The Russian Ambassador at London tells his French colleague he suspects a surprise, and gives the reasons why he thinks Germany wants war with Russia. (F. Y. B. no. 32.)

The First Lord of the British Admiralty stops the demobilization of the First Fleet. (F. Y. B. no. 66.)

Belgium sends note to the Belgian representatives, for use when instructed by telegraph, declaring her intention to fulfill her international obligations in respect to her neutrality. (B. G. P. no. 2.)

July 25. Germany "passes on" to Vienna British suggestion for mediation. (B. W. P. no. 18.)

The German Government makes an official statement of its view regarding the Austro-Servian conflict. (R. O. P. no. 18.)

Russia makes *communiqué* that she is attentively watching the course of events, and cannot remain indifferent to the developments of the Serbo-Austrian conflict. (R. O. P. no. 10.)

Russian Chargé at Vienna telegraphs Count Berchtold, asking Austria to increase the time limit of the ultimatum. (R. O. P. no. 11; F. Y. B. no. 42.)

The French and English representatives at Vienna are instructed to support the Russian request. (R. O. P. nos. 15, 16; B. W. P. no. 26; cf. F. Y. B. no. 44.)

Von Jagow refuses to counsel Austria to extend the time limit. (R. O. P. no. 14.)

Austria refuses to extend the time limit. (R. O. P. no. 12.)

Sir Edward Grey also directs the British Ambassador, in case it is too late to raise the question of extending the time-limit, to try to obtain a stay of operations to serve as a base of discussions. (R. O. P. no. 16; B. W. P. no. 26.)

Sir Edward Grey says he is ready, if Germany agrees to mediation proposal, to tell French Government that he thinks it the right thing to act upon it. (B. W. P. no. 25.)

Austrian Minister informs the Servian Government that the reply is not satisfactory, and leaves Belgrade at 6.30 P.M. (R. O. P. no. 2; B. W. P. no. 23; S. B. B. no. 40.)

If Servia appeals to the powers, Russia is ready to stand aside. (B. W. P. no. 17.)

If situation becomes threatening, Germany is ready to take part in mediation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. (B. W. P. no. 18.)

Germany declares that she had not known about the Austrian note. (B. W. P. no. 18; R. O. P. no. 18; F. Y. B. no. 41; cf. F. Y. B. no. 30.)

Sazonof instructs the Russian representative at London to urge England, in case the situation becomes worse, to stand on the side of France and Russia. (R. O. P. no. 17.)

Prince Lichnowsky says that Germany might be able to accept mediation between Austria and Russia. (B. W. P. no. 25.)

Servian Government and the diplomatic corps leave Belgrade in the evening for Nish. (B. W. P. no. 23; R. O. P. no. 21.)

From Vienna the British Ambassador reports that war is thought to be imminent. (B. W. P. no. 31.)

Austrian Ambassador at London tells Sir Edward Grey that, on breaking off diplomatic relations with Servia, Austria would commence military preparations, but not military operations. (B. W. P. no. 25.)

Count Berchtold goes to Ischl to communicate to the Emperor Servian reply when it arrives. (B. W. P. no. 20.)

Sazonof says Germany's attitude decided by England's, and Germany thinks England will remain neutral. (B. W. P. no. 17.)

England warns Russia that her mobilization might decide Germany to declare war. (B. W. P. no. 17.)

Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Servia and become predominant power in the Balkans. (B. W. P. no. 17.)

The German Secretary of State considers that between Austria and Serbia there was no question of war, but of "execution" in a local matter, and refuses to believe that any danger of a general war exists. (F. Y. B. no. 43.)

The Belgian Minister considers that Austria and Germany are attempting to take advantage of the domestic difficulties of France, England, and Russia, and of the disorganization of the *Entente*. (F. Y. B. no. 35.)

The French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs tells German Ambassador that the terms of his declaration disclose the wish of Germany to thrust herself between the powers and Austria. (F. Y. B. no. 36.)

The German Honorary Aide-de-camp to the Tsar reports Russia making certain military preparations against Austria. (G. W. B. exhibit 6.)

Servia issues the decree for mobilization shortly after 3.00 P.M. (B. G. P. no. 5. Cf. A. R. B. no. 39.)

It is reported that partial mobilization has been begun in Russia. (See M. P. Price, *Diplomatic History of the War*, p. 96; cf. B. W. P. no. 44.)

July 26. Russia advises Servia to appeal to English mediation. (F. Y. B. no. 53.)

Sazonof instructs Russian Ambassador to express to Count Berchtold his hope that the Austrian Ambassador may be authorized to exchange views relative to a modification of the Austrian note. (R. O. P. no. 25; F. Y. B. no. 54.)

Hostile demonstrations before the Russian Embassy at Berlin. (R. O. P. no. 30.)

Emperor William returns to Berlin on his own initiative, and to the regret of the German Foreign Office. (B. W. P. no. 33.)

German Government, in spirit of coöperation, instructs German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Government Sir Edward Grey's hopes that they may take a favorable view of the Servian reply. (B. W. P. no. 34; cf. F. Y. B. no. 68.)

Sir Edward Grey issues invitation to three powers to join a conference at London, and asks them to request Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to suspend all military operations. (B. W. P. no. 36.)

Fighting in Dublin streets, 3 killed, 32 wounded. (*London Times*, July 28.)

The German Ambassador at Paris suggests to the French Foreign Office a *communiqué* to the press. "The German Ambassador, after his *démarche* yesterday with a view to the soothing intervention of France in St. Petersburg, returned, as I have informed you, to the Political Direction, on the pretext that it might be well to communicate a short note to the press showing the pacific and friendly nature of the conversation. He even suggested the following terms: 'The Ambassador and the Minister have had a further interview, in the course of which the means which might be employed for the maintenance of general peace were examined in a

very friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific solidarity.' It was at once replied to him that the terms appeared to be excessive and calculated to create illusions in public opinion as to the actual situation, but that, nevertheless, a brief note of the nature indicated, that is to say, a note, reporting a conversation in which were discussed the means adopted for the safeguard of peace, might be issued if the Minister approved of it. The following is the communication made: 'The German Ambassador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have had a further interview, in the course of which they sought for a means of action of the powers for the maintenance of peace.'" But when issued, it was modified to avoid "solidarity with Germany." (F. Y. B. nos. 57, 62.)

Sazonof asks Von Jagow to influence Vienna to that effect. (R. O. P. no. 26.)

The French Director of the Political Department considers that German action at Paris is intended to intimidate France, and lead to her intervention at St. Petersburg. (R. O. P. no. 29.)

Prince Lichnowsky considers the Servian reply a sham. (B. W. P. no. 26.)

The German military attaché at St. Petersburg reports mobilization as certain in Kieff and Odessa; (in Warsaw and Moscow?) as open to doubt. (G. W. B. exhibit 7.)

July 27. Germany says she cannot accept quadruple conference at London. (G. W. B. exhibit 12; F. Y. B. nos. 73, 74; A. R. B. no. 35.)

Sir Edward Grey warns Austria of the dangers of using force against Servia. (B. W. P. no. 48; A. R. B. no. 38.)

The French Government accepts the British proposal for mediation, and suggests that the success of the British proposal depends upon the coöperation of Germany. (B. W. P. no. 51.)

Von Jagow refuses to agree to the Cambon formula as a basis upon which to constitute the proposed mediation. (R. O. P. no. 39.)

Russia willing to accept quadruple mediation if the direct negotiations with Austria already commenced should fail. (R. O. P. no. 32; B. W. P. nos. 53, 55.)

Austrian Government announces that it is obliged to use force against Servia. (B. W. P. no. 48.)

The Tsar counsels Servia to make every effort to conciliate, and promises Russian support in case of need. (R. O. P. no. 40.)

The British Ambassador at Rome informs Sir Edward Grey of the Marquis di San Giuliano's suggestion that mediation should be based on Servian acceptance of the terms of the Austrian note. (B. W. P. no. 57; cf. B. W. P. no. 64; F. Y. B. no. 72.)

Germany has not yet accepted the British mediation proposal. The Emperor will decide. (B. G. P. no. 6.)

Sir Edward Grey considers mediatory action required by Germany should be taken at Vienna rather than at St. Petersburg, since Austria refuses to consider the conciliatory reply due to Russia's influence. The British Government was ready to coöperate with Germany when wishing for peace, but when Germany

was acting contrarily, the British Government reserved its full liberty of action. (R. O. P. no. 42; B. W. P. no. 46.)

The French Minister of Justice thinks Germany aims to separate Russia and France. (R. O. P. no. 35.)

Austria thought to have purposely delayed French and Russian telegrams about Serbia's reply. (R. O. P. no. 36; cf. F. Y. B. no. 69.)

The Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, returns to Rome, and tells the French Ambassador that he had been aware that the Austrian note would be vigorous, but had no idea that it would take such a form. (F. Y. B. no. 72.)

Germany answers France that she will not consider it necessary to mobilize if Russia mobilizes only on her Austrian frontier. (F. Y. B. no. 67.)

Sir Edward Grey tells the Russian Ambassador that the order to keep the First Fleet concentrated should dispel the idea that England would in any event stand aside. (B. W. P. no. 47; cf. F. Y. B. nos. 63, 65.)

French Fourteenth Army Corps discontinues maneuvers. (G. W. B. exhibit 27.)

The German Chancellor instructs the German Ambassador at London that Russia expected to call reserves immediately; if true, will force Germany to take counter measure. (G. W. B. exhibit 10.)

Russian Secretary of War declares no order for mobilization has been issued. (G. W. B. exhibit 11.)

Servia opens hostilities against Austria on the Hungarian border. (A. R. B. nos. 40, 41.)

July 28. Austria refuses to consider any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the Servian reply. (B. W. P. nos. 61, 74; R. O. P. no. 45; G. W. B. exhibit 16; F. Y. B. no. 83; A. R. B. nos. 38, 40, 41.)

Germany, considering the declaration of war has not altered the situation between Austria and Russia, urges Vienna to elucidate satisfactorily to Russia the object and scope of her action against Servia. (G. W. B. exhibit 14; B. W. P. no. 75.)

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged. (B. W. P. no. 65.)

Austria declares war against Servia. (B. W. P. nos. 66, 71; A. R. B. no. 37; S. B. B. no. 45.)

Servian Chargé at Rome thinks that Servia might be willing to accept the whole Austrian note if Austria should give certain explanations to the powers. (B. W. P. no. 64.)

The German Ambassador at Vienna brings forward the English proposal that Austria accept the Servian note or consider it a basis for negotiation. (A. R. B. no. 43.)

Russia considers that the Austrian declaration of war puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. But the Russian Ambassador at Vienna is not recalled, and considers that the only hope of peace lies in mediation on the basis of a suspension of Austrian military operations against Servia. (B. W. P. no. 70.)

Sazonof says that if Servia is attacked, Russia will not be satis-

fied with any engagement which Austria may take regarding Servian integrity and independence, and that the order for mobilization against Austria will be issued on the day Austria crossed the Servian frontier. (B. W. P. no. 72.)

The German Imperial Government makes a confidential communication to the Governments of the German Empire of its views of the situation, explaining why Germany must support Austria. (G. W. B. exhibit no. 2.)

Sazonof blames Germany for the crisis, and thinks that England is best situated to influence Germany to exert the necessary check on Austria. (R. O. P. no. 43.)

The British and Italian Ambassadors at Berlin hold a conference with the French Ambassador and agree that German objection to the form of mediation might be obviated by change of label. (F. Y. B. no. 81.)

The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin thinks war unlikely, since Russia neither wants nor is in a position to make war. (B. W. P. no. 71.)

Russia receives reports that Austria has mobilized in Slavonia, Croatia, and Fiume, and that the decree for the general mobilization has been signed. (R. O. P. nos. 44, 47; F. Y. B. no. 77.)

In consequence of Austria's declaration of war, Russia informs Germany that she will mobilize the next day, July 29, in the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan, but disclaims any hostile intention toward Germany. (B. W. P. no. 70.)

Austria urges Germany to inform Russia that the latter's mobilization against Austria would be answered by both Germany and Austria. (A. R. B. no. 42.)

July 29. At Germany's suggestion the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg is authorized to enter into conversations with Sazonof. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 7.)

Germany makes offers to guarantee the integrity of France's European territory, to secure England's neutrality in case of a war. (B. W. P. no. 85.)

Sir Edward Grey asks the German Government to indicate what form of mediation would be acceptable. (R. O. P. no. 54.)

The Tsar appeals to the Kaiser to restrain Austria (G. W. B. exhibit 21), to which the Kaiser replies by confirming Austria's declarations as to her intentions, giving his opinion that Russia may well stand aside. The Kaiser says that he agrees to the Tsar's request that he act as mediator between Austria and Russia. (G. W. B. exhibit 22. Cf. also King George to Tsar, *London Times*, August 5.)

Sazonof informs the Russian Ambassador at Paris that the German Ambassador has notified the Russian Government that Germany will mobilize unless Russia ceases her military preparations; and, since they cannot agree, the Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that they must consider war probably inevitable and hasten their armament. (R. O. P. no. 58.)

Sir Edward Grey tells M. Cambon, the French Ambassador,

that he purposes to tell the German Ambassador that they must not feel secure that England will stand aside in case of war, but Sir Edward also tells M. Cambon that England does not consider herself bound to support France if she becomes involved. (B. W. P. no. 87.)

Sir Edward Grey points out to the German Ambassador that mediation might be established on the basis of Austria's occupation of Belgrade. (B. W. P. no. 88.)

Sir Edward Grey, without wanting to say that England will intervene, warns the German Ambassador that if France is involved she may feel that British interests require her to do so. (B. W. P. no. 89.)

The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg informs his Government that from this moment he is able to give assurance that Russia will acquiesce in any step proposed by France and England to safeguard peace. (F. Y. B. no. 86.)

The German Secretary of State tells the French Ambassador that the Servian reply might constitute a possible basis of negotiation, the capital point relating to Servia's guaranties. (F. Y. B. no. 92.)

Poincaré and Viviani reach Paris on return from Russia.

Count Berchtold hands the German Ambassador a memorial explaining the reasons for refusing the English suggestion for mediation communicated by the German Ambassador. (A. R. B. no. 44.)

Viviani, French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, instructs M. Paul Cambon to ask Sir Edward Grey to renew his proposal for mediation. (F. Y. B. no. 97.)

The French Ambassador learns that this action was taken because of the tone employed by the German Ambassador. (F. Y. B. no. 100.)

M. Cambon makes a suggestion of mediation on the basis of Austrian occupation of Servian territory. (B. W. P. no. 76.)

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that Russia would be satisfied if Austria converted the assurances regarding her intentions toward Servia into a binding engagement to Europe, but is convinced that Austria would refuse. (B. W. P. no. 79.)

The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that Germany is opposed to conference, but is going to urge Berlin to adhere to the idea of an exchange of views in London. (B. W. P. no. 80.)

Sir Edward Grey says that he cannot initiate discussions, since Austria will not accept any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply, and he infers that she will accept no mediation between Austria and Servia. (B. W. P. no. 81.)

Because of the failure of direct negotiations, Sazonof suggests return to the British mediation proposal, and says that Russia is ready to agree to any arrangement acceptable to England and France for the carrying on of the conversations. He considers that the only way to avert war is to find some formula that Austria can be induced to accept. (B. W. P. no. 78.)

Sazonof says that Russia will agree to the proposal for a collective guaranty (see B. W. P. no. 57) if acceptable to Servia, but says that some supplementary statement or explanation will have to be made to tone down the sharpness of the Austrian ultimatum. (B. W. P. no. 78.)

Austria and Russia seem to continue in constant touch. (B. W. P. no. 84.)

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg expresses the opinion that after Russia's mobilization, an exchange of ideas proposed by Russia is extremely difficult if not impossible. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 6; A. R. B. no. 46.)

Bulgaria declares her neutrality. (R. O. P. no. 52.)

Sazonof, before he learns of Austria's refusing to continue negotiations, suggests to the German Ambassador that, while Austria and Russia continue a direct exchange of views, the four powers should arrange for a conference to carry on parallel discussions. (B. W. P. no. 93; R. O. P. nos. 49, 50.)

M. Paul Cambon tells Sir Edward Grey that he anticipates a demand from Germany that France remain neutral while Germany attacks Russia. (B. W. P. no. 87.)

The French Government assures the Russian Government of its determination to support Russia, and urges Sir Edward Grey to renew as soon as possible the proposal for mediation. (R. O. P. nos. 55, 58.)

Sir Edward Grey brings to the attention of the German Ambassador the Italian suggestion for mediation (July 28, B. W. P. no. 64), though he does not propose it because of Austria's refusal to consider any proposal. He also says that mediation between Austria and Russia cannot be simply putting pressure on Russia in the interests of Austria. (B. W. P. no. 90.)

The Marquis di San Giuliano advocates that England and Italy, each representing one group, should continue to exchange views even if impossible to induce Germany to take part in mediation. (B. W. P. no. 80.)

Although Austria is not willing to discuss text of note she is ready to discuss Austro-Russian relations. (A. R. B. no. 47.)

The German Secretary of State fears that as a result of his communication of the English suggestion, regarding the discussion of the terms of the note to Servia, Austria has felt that she was being pressed and caused them to present a *fait accompli* by hastening the declaration of war against Servia. (B. W. P. no. 76.)

Sir Edward Grey tells M. Cambon that he has little hope of a pacific solution. (F. Y. B. no. 98.)

The Austrian Ambassador at London remarks that before the Balkan War Servia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence. (B. W. P. no. 91.)

The German Secretary of State and the French Ambassador at Berlin each considers that the other's Government is making military preparations. (B. W. P. no. 76.)

The French Government receives report of military preparation

in Germany and Austria, and of mobilization on the Russian frontier. (F. Y. B. nos. 88, 91.)

Austria urges Germany to make representations at St. Petersburg and Paris that Russian mobilization if continued will lead to counter measures entailing serious consequences. (A. R. B. no. 48.)

The Russian Ambassador returns to Berlin, and informs the German Government that Russia is mobilizing in four southern governments. (B. W. P. no. 76.)

The German Secretary of State tells the British Ambassador that he is much troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia and of certain military measures being taken in France. (B. W. P. no. 76.)

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs explains to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg the necessity of Russia's mobilization. (B. W. P. no. 78; A. R. B. no. 47.)

Belgium makes certain military preparation for defense. (B. G. P. no. 8; F. Y. B. no. 87.)

The German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg considers that the Russian Government is trying to deceive Germany as to the military preparations actually being carried out. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 7; cf. F. Y. B. no. 102.)

The German Chancellor instructs the German Ambassador at Paris to draw the attention of the French Government to the fact that their military preparations, if continued, will necessitate countermeasures such as "Drohende Kriegesgefahr," which would increase the tension. (G. W. B. exhibit 17; A. R. B. no. 45.)

Extraordinary council meets in the evening at Potsdam under presidency of the Kaiser and decides upon mobilization. (F. Y. B. no. 105.) [For various reasons this decision was changed.]

July 30. Austria bombards Belgrade. (F. Y. B. no. 113.)

The Kaiser telegraphs the Tsar that his mission as mediator is rendered difficult if not impossible by Russia's mobilization against Austria. (G. W. B. exhibit 23.)

To which the Tsar explains that the measures are for defense, and hopes that the Kaiser will continue his mediation. (G. W. B. exhibit 23A.)

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg declares that the German Government will guarantee that Austria will respect Servian integrity. (B. W. P. no. 97.)

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg asks M. Sazonof to indicate the conditions upon which Russia could agree to suspend her armament, whereupon Sazonof dictates the following declaration: "If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations." (B. W. P. no. 97; R. O. P. no. 60; F. Y. B. no. 103.)

The German Government declares that it considers (*trouwait*)

the Russian formula (R. O. P. no. 60) proposed by Sazonof unacceptable for Austria. (R. O. P. no. 63; F. Y. B. no. 107.)

Sir Edward Grey gives his reasons for refusing the German Chancellor's proposal to secure British neutrality. He declares that the British Government must reserve its freedom of action, but holds out hope of a general agreement between the powers to prevent aggression against Germany if the present crisis can be surmounted. (B. W. P. no. 101.)

M. Paul Cambon reminds Sir Edward Grey of an exchange of letters agreeing, if the peace of Europe should be threatened, to discuss what they were prepared to do. M. Cambon does not ask Sir Edward to agree to intervene, but asks him to say what the British Government will do in case of aggression by Germany on France. Sir Edward replies that he will see him after the Cabinet meeting next day. (B. W. P. no. 105; cf. F. Y. B. no. 108.)

British Cabinet postpones the second reading of the Amending Bill in the interest of national unity in the face of the European crisis. (*London Times*, July 31.)

The President of the French Republic considers England might prevent war by standing with Russia and France, and says that she will be drawn in the war in any event to protect her vital interests. He further states that all France had done was to make preparations for mobilization. (B. W. P. no. 99; F. Y. B. no. 106.)

As a slender chance of preserving peace, Sir Edward Grey proposes to Russia to modify the Russian formula so as to make it more acceptable to Austria. (B. W. P. no. 103.)

The German Government, when asked to suggest some proposal for mediation, had thought to save time by asking Austria what would satisfy her, but no answer has as yet been received. (B. W. P. no. 107; F. Y. B. no. 109.)

The Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg informs his Government that, feeling at last secure of England's support (G. W. B. exhibit 28), the war party in Russia has the upper hand, and is pushing preparations.

M. Paul Cambon submits to the British Government a memorandum showing the efforts of France to preserve peace, and how she has retired her troops ten kilometers from the frontier. Germany, on the other hand, is accused of aggressively pushing her preparation. (B. W. P. no. 105, enclosure 3; F. Y. B. no. 106.)

A German newspaper issues an extra with a premature announcement of the promulgation of the German order of mobilization. (R. O. P. nos. 61, 62; F. Y. B. no. 105.)

Sazonof says that he has proof of German military and naval preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. (B. W. P. no. 97; F. Y. B. no. 102.)

The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs tells the French Ambassador at Berlin that his saying Germany would not consider herself forced to mobilize unless Russia mobilized on the German frontier did not constitute a firm engagement on his part. (F. Y. B. no. 109.)

Germany urges Austria to exchange views with Russia. (Instructions printed in the *Westminster Gazette*, August 1, see C. M. Price, *Diplomatic History of the War*, pp. 51, 251.)

Count Berchtold tells the Russian Ambassador at Vienna that Austria must as a measure of precaution mobilize in answer to Russia. He says he has no objection to continuation of conversations at St. Petersburg. These communications make a favorable impression on the Ambassador, who was preparing to depart in expectation that Austria would declare war against Russia. (B. W. P. no. 96; F. Y. B. no. 104; A. R. B. 50.)

The German Ambassador at London asks why England is making military preparations, and Sir Edward Grey says that the measures are not aggressive, but the situation is such that each power must prepare. (R. O. P. no. 65; cf. B. W. P. nos. 89, 101, 102; F. Y. B. no. 108.)

July 31. Germany closes bridges across the Luxemburg-German frontier, and the Luxemburg Minister of State asks the French and German Ministers if they will respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. (F. Y. B. no. 111.)

The German Chancellor tells the British Ambassador at Berlin that Count Berchtold replied last night, to a request for an answer to the British proposal, that he would consult the Emperor this morning. (B. W. P. no. 112.)

The Belgian Government call the attention of the German Minister to the assurances that Germany had already given of her intention to respect Belgium's neutrality, and receive the assurance that Germany has not changed her views. (B. G. P. no. 12.)

The German Chancellor instructs the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to present an ultimatum to Russia, threatening, unless she demobilizes within twelve hours, that German mobilization will be ordered. (G. W. B. exhibit 24.)

The German Secretary of State is not ready to answer what course Germany will take regarding Belgium and the British Ambassador at Berlin informs Sir Edward Grey that a definite answer seems remote. (B. W. P. no. 122.)

The British Government unwilling to give any pledge of intervention, but tell France that they will consider the situation again directly there is a new development. (B. W. P. no. 116; F. Y. B. no. 110.)

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs informs England of the German ultimatum to Russia and the impending German mobilization, and asks what will be the attitude of England. (B. W. P. no. 117.)

Assassination of Jaurès in a Paris café.

Bank of England doubles discount rate — 8 per cent.

Sir Edward Grey tells the French Ambassador that the British Government cannot give any pledge at the present time. The neutrality of Belgium might be, Sir Edward would not say a decisive, but an important, factor in determining their attitude. Parliament would wish to know how they stood regarding Belgian neutrality.

Sir Edward also says that he has informed the German Ambassador, that if France and Germany become involved in war, England will be drawn into it, but that that was not the same thing as making an engagement to France. (B. W. P. no. 119.)

Sir Edward Grey suggests that Germany might sound Vienna and he St. Petersburg as to four powers guaranteeing Austria satisfaction from Servia without impairing the latter's sovereignty or integrity, all powers meanwhile suspending military operations and preparations. (B. W. P. no. 111; F. Y. B. no. 112.)

Sir Edward Grey tells Lichnowsky that if France and Russia rejected any reasonable Austro-German proposal, the British Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences. (B. W. P. no. 111.)

Sir Edward Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect Belgian neutrality, and notifies Belgium that he assumes she will defend to the utmost her neutrality, which he expects other powers to uphold and observe. (B. W. P. nos. 114, 115.)

▷ Sir Edward Goschen urges the German Secretary of State to accept mediation after the occupation of Belgrade on the basis of a collective guaranty (see B. W. P. no. 111; F. Y. B. no. 112). But Von Jagow said it was no use to discuss it till Russia had answered Germany's ultimatum. (B. W. P. no. 121.)

The French Minister at Brussels declares to the Belgian Government that French troops will not invade Belgium even if an important massing of troops on the Belgian frontier should occur. (B. G. P. no. 9.)

The French Government declare that they will respect Belgium's neutrality. (B. W. P. no. 125; F. Y. B. nos. 119, 122.)

The Tsar appeals to the Kaiser to continue to exert his mediatory influence. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 8.)

Sazonof communicates to the French and British Ambassadors at St. Petersburg the Russian formula (see B. W. P. no. 97) modified in accordance with Sir Edward Grey's request. (R. O. P. no. 67; B. W. P. no. 120; F. Y. B. no. 113.)

Italy declares, in answer to Germany's interrogations, "The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were, therefore, in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral." (B. W. P. no. 152; F. Y. B. no. 124.)

At the British Foreign Office the French Ambassador is told that Sir Edward Grey will resume the discussion of coöperation with France at the meeting of the Cabinet next day. (F. Y. B. no. 110.)

The arrangements are made for the delivery of President Poincaré's autograph letter to King George. (F. Y. B. no. 110.)

The German Chancellor says that his peace efforts at Vienna are handicapped by Russian mobilization against Austria. (B. W. P. no. 108.)

The German Chancellor says that Germany must shortly take

some serious step in answer to measures Russia is taking against her, and that he was about to have an audience with the Emperor. The news of these preparations arrived just when the Emperor, in answer to the Tsar's appeal, was mediating at Vienna. (B. W. P. no. 108.)

The Kaiser reproaches the Tsar for threatening peace by unnecessarily mobilizing. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 8.)

Sir Edward Grey informs Prince Liechnowsky that he cannot urge Russia to suspend military preparations unless some limit is put on the advance of Austrian troops into Serbia. (B. W. P. no. 110.)

General mobilization decreed in Austria. (F. Y. B. no. 115.)

The mobilization of the Belgian army is ordered. (B. G. P. no. 10.)

The German Chancellor explains to the British Ambassador at Berlin the nature of *Kriegsgefahrzustand*, which he says will be proclaimed at once. (B. W. P. no. 112; F. Y. B. no. 116.)

The German Secretary of State explains why Germany had demanded that Russia demobilize in the south as well. (B. W. P. no. 121.)

Sazonof explains that Russia cannot arrest her mobilization once in progress, but declares that Russia has no hostile intention and will not cross the frontier. (B. W. P. no. 120.)

When Russia learns that Austria will not yield to the intervention of the powers, and that Austria and Germany are making military preparations against her, she decides to give orders for general mobilization. (B. W. P. no. 113; F. Y. B. no. 118; R. O. P. nos. 77, 78.)

A further exchange of telegrams between the Tsar and the Kaiser regarding Russian mobilization. (G. W. B., Memorandum, p. 9.)

The French Ambassador presents Poincaré's letter to King George. (F. Y. B. no. 110; London *Times*, Aug. 3.)

Kaiser telegraphs King George informing him of Russian mobilization.

At midnight the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presents the ultimatum to the Russian Foreign Minister, but when questioned says it does not constitute war, though very near it. (R. O. P. no. 70.)

Aug. 1. At 7.10 P.M. the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presents a note declaring war against Russia. (R. O. P. no. 76; G. W. B. exhibit 26.)

King George telegraphs the Tsar urging the acceptance of mediation.

The Tsar replies he would gladly accept but that Germany has just declared war. (London *Times*, Aug. 5, 1914.)

The Austrian Ambassador at Paris says that his Government is ready to discuss with the other powers the settlement of its conflict with Serbia. (R. O. P. no. 73; F. Y. B. no. 120.)

Sir Edward Grey learns that Austria is ready to consider favor-

ably his proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia, and tells the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that if Russia can agree to stop mobilization it still appears possible to preserve peace. (B. W. P. no. 135.)

The Belgian Government informs the British Minister that they consider themselves in a position to make good their intention of defending their territory against intrusion. (B. W. P. no. 128.)

Sir Edward Grey tells the German Ambassador that they regret Germany's failure to give an assurance that she would respect Belgian neutrality. The Secretary adds that they are considering the course they should take, and that, though respect for Belgium's neutrality would be an important factor, they could not promise neutrality on that condition alone. But when asked, Sir Edward declines to specify what conditions would be satisfactory, though Prince Lichnowsky suggests that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. (B. W. P. no. 123.)

Prince Lichnowsky informs his Government that Sir Edward Grey has just asked him by telephone whether Germany would agree not to attack France if she remained neutral. (G. W. B. exhibit 33.) The Kaiser and Chancellor telegraph to accept the proposal (G. W. B. exhibits 32, 34), but King George telegraphs that there must be some misunderstanding. (G. W. B. exhibit 35.)

France replies to the German inquiry if she will remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, that France will take the course her interests dictate. (G. W. B. exhibit 27; F. Y. B. nos. 116, 117.)

France declares that she will respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. (F. Y. B. nos. 128, 129.)

Austria gives assurances regarding Serbia and informs St. Petersburg that she has not "banged the door" on all further conversations. (B. W. P. no. 137.)

Sir Edward Grey protests against the detention of British vessels at Hamburg (B. W. P. no. 130), which are ordered released. (B. W. P. no. 143.)

Sir Edward Grey tells the Russian Ambassador that he considers the new Russian formula offers the best chance for a peaceful settlement, and that he hopes no power will commence hostilities before examining it. (R. O. P. no. 71.)

Sir Edward Grey telegraphs the British Ambassador at Berlin of the telegram of July 31 from Sazonof, communicated by De Etter regarding Austria's acceptance of mediation and Sazonof's desire that England assume direction of discussions. (B. W. P. no. 133.)

Mobilization of French army ordered. (B. W. P. no. 136.)

General mobilization of the Austrian army and fleet. (B. W. P. no. 127.)

Sir Edward Goschen tries to persuade the German Secretary of State that Germany should hold her hand now that the principals, Austria and Russia, are ready to discuss. But Von Jagow replies that Russia by mobilizing has made this impossible, since Ger-

many, having the speed and Russia the numbers, could not allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. Hence Germany must consider Russia's refusal to demobilize as creating a state of war. (B. W. P. no. 138; F. Y. B. no. 121.)

Germany issues orders for the general mobilization of the navy and army, the first day of the mobilization to be August 2. (B. W. P. no. 142.)

Poincaré tells the Russian Ambassador at Paris that the Austrian Ambassador says that Austria declared to Russia that she was ready to respect not only Serbia's integrity, but also her sovereign rights, and that Russia had, according to the Austrian Ambassador, taken no notice of this declaration. This the Russian Ambassador denied categorically. (R. O. P. no. 75.)

Sazonof states Russia's view in regard to Serbia and the Balkan situation, and compares Russia's conciliatory efforts with obstacles placed in the way of a peaceful solution by Germany. (B. W. P. no. 139.)

Sir Edward Grey learns the text of the Russian formula amended to meet his suggestion. (B. W. P. no. 132.)

The French Government orders mobilization as soon as it learns from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg of Germany's announcement that she had decided to order mobilization that day. (R. O. P. no. 74.)

The French Government thinks that Germany is mobilizing under cover of "*Kriegszustand*." (R. O. P. no. 73.)

Aug. 2. Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium, declaring that she has reason to believe that France is preparing to violate Belgium's neutrality, and demanding that Belgium allow her to pass through her territory. (G. W. B. exhibit 37; B. G. P. no. 20.)

Germany notifies the Belgian Government of the violation of German territory by France as indicating the probability of other violations of international law by France. (B. G. P. no. 21.)

French representatives abroad are informed of German violation of French territory (F. Y. B. no. 136), and the Ambassador at Berlin is instructed to protest. (F. Y. B. no. 139.)

Germany violates the neutrality of Luxemburg. (B. W. P. nos. 129, 146, 147.)

M. Paul Cambon asks Sir Edward Grey about the attitude of the British Government regarding the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium. (B. W. P. no. 148.)

Germany considers state of war exists by reason of Russian troops crossing the frontier. (B. W. P. no. 144.)

Prince Lichnowsky from London telegraphs: "Sir E. Grey's suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for England to keep permanent neutrality, but as they were not based on a previous understanding with France, and made without knowledge of our mobilization, they have been abandoned as absolutely hopeless." (G. W. B., exhibit 36.)

England assures France that if the German fleet comes into the

Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. (B. W. P. no. 148; cf. F. Y. B. nos. 126, 137, 138.)

A. Bonar Law pledges the Unionist Party by writing Asquith that in the opinion of Lord Landsdowne, of himself, and of his colleagues, it would be fatal to the honor and security of England to hesitate in supporting France and Russia. (Published in the *London Times*, December 15.)

The German Government explains that detention of British vessels was due to laying of mines. (B. W. P. no. 145.)

Sir Edward Grey instructs Sir Edward Goschen to protest against the detention of cargoes of sugar unloaded from British vessels. (B. W. P. no. 149.)

Germany informs France that the measures taken in Luxemburg are not hostile, but merely preventive. (F. Y. B. nos. 132, 133.)

- Aug. 3. The German Ambassador at London in *communiqué* to press states that if England remains neutral Germany will forego all naval operations, and will not use the Belgian coasts as supporting base. (F. Y. B. no. 144.)

The German Ambassador at Paris declares that, in view of French violation of Belgian and German territory, the German Empire considers itself to be in a state of war with France. (F. Y. B. nos. 147, 157.)

Belgium appeals to the diplomatic intervention of England to protect her neutrality. (B. G. P. no. 25.)

Sir Edward Goschen telegraphs Sir Edward Grey that no information is obtainable regarding the detention of British vessels at Hamburg. (B. W. P. no. 150.)

Belgium, declining for the present French offers of assistance, announces that she does not intend in the actual circumstances to appeal to the guaranty of the powers. (B. W. P. no. 151; B. G. P. no. 24; F. Y. B. no. 142.)

- Aug. 4. Germany informs Belgium that she is obliged to use force to protect herself against France. (B. G. P. no. 27.)

German troops enter Belgium. (B. W. P. no. 158; B. G. P. no. 30; F. Y. B. no. 140.)

Germany assures England that she will not annex Belgian territory, and excuses the necessity of violating Belgium's neutrality on the ground of an intended French invasion of Belgium. (B. W. P. no. 157.)

England presents ultimatum to Germany demanding assurances regarding the respecting of Belgian neutrality. (B. W. P. no. 159.)

England informs Belgium that she expects Belgium to resist any attempt by Germany to violate her neutrality, and that the British Government will support her, and that they are ready to join with Russia and France to aid her in resisting, and to guarantee and maintain her independence and integrity. (B. W. P. no. 155; B. G. P. no. 28.)

The Belgian Government hands his passports to the German

Minister (B. G. P. no. 31), who turns over the legation to the Minister of the United States. (B. G. P. no. 32.)

England notifies Norway and Holland, as well as Belgium, that she will assist them to protect their neutrality and to maintain their independence. (B. G. P. no. 37.)

The British Government protests to Germany against further detentions of British vessels. (B. W. P. no. 156.)

The French Ambassador at Berlin writes a letter of protest to the German Secretary of State at the treatment he received while returning to France. (F. Y. B. no. 155.)

The Belgian Minister at Berlin transmits to his Government an account of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag, admitting that Germany's action was a violation of international law, but to be excused by necessity. (B. G. P. no. 35.)

CITATIONS OF DOCUMENTS

This list gives the pages on which will be found the extracts or modified quotations from the various official publications relative to the causes of the war. Simple references to documents are indicated by "cf." after the page number.

BRITISH WHITE PAPER	No.	
No. 2:		129 <i>cf.</i>
3:		51; 56 <i>cf.</i> ; 80; 189; 219.
4:		52; 54; 574.
5:		54; 130 <i>cf.</i> ; 189; 270; 293.
6:		42; 59; 64; 98; 118; 189; 270; 274; 293; 294 <i>cf.</i>
7:		55; 96; 129.
8:		55.
9:		69 <i>cf.</i> ; 129 <i>cf.</i>
10:		55; 59; 62 <i>cf.</i> ; 130 <i>cf.</i> ; 152; 189; 199; 293.
11:		50 <i>cf.</i> ; 62 <i>cf.</i> ; 63; 201; 207; 229 <i>cf.</i> ; 270.
12:		63; 80.
13:		56; 60.
14:		57; 87.
15:		57; 63.
16:		55 <i>cf.</i> ; 64.
17:		55 <i>cf.</i> ; 57; 64; 99; 105; 133; 189; 201; 215; 236; 239; 270; 274; 296.
18:		55; 56; 58; 61; 120 <i>cf.</i> ; 159; 207; 224; 230; 270.
19:		62; 91 <i>cf.</i>
20:		227.
21:		78 <i>cf.</i> ; 83 <i>cf.</i>
22:		78 <i>cf.</i>
24:		186; 203; 216; 274 <i>cf.</i> ; 293 <i>cf.</i> ; 294 <i>cf.</i>
25:		56 <i>cf.</i> ; 57 <i>cf.</i> ; 81; 119; 125 <i>cf.</i> ; 130 <i>cf.</i> ; 159 <i>cf.</i> ; 202; 206; 294 <i>cf.</i>
26:		57 <i>cf.</i> ; 81.
27:		83.
29:		461.
30:		73; 74 <i>cf.</i> ; 78 <i>cf.</i> ; 270.
32:		55 <i>cf.</i> ; 79; 101; 102; 126.
33:		102; 140.
34:		228.
35:		86 <i>cf.</i> ; 204; 461.
36:		203; 206.
38:		46 <i>cf.</i> ; 91; 107; 121.
39:		65; 66; 576.
40:		59; 61; 129 <i>cf.</i>
41:		59.
42:		204.
43:		110; 129 <i>cf.</i> ; 133; 187; 191; 209; 210 <i>cf.</i> ; 232.
44:		56 <i>cf.</i> ; 108; 186; 270; 466.
46:		78 <i>cf.</i> ; 79; 83; 211; 232; 270; 305.
47:		274; 305.
48:		71; 85; 89; 129 <i>cf.</i>
49:		204.
50:		87.
51:		204.
52:		204.
53:		163.
54:		79; 80.
55:		82; 129 <i>cf.</i> ; 216.
56:		81; 82; 99; 215 <i>cf.</i>
57:		83; 207; 234; 461.
59:		85.
60:		232 <i>cf.</i>
61:		85 <i>cf.</i> ; 91 <i>cf.</i> ; 107; 129 <i>cf.</i>
62:		82; 129 <i>cf.</i> ; 212; 222.
63:		83; 461.
64:		75; 228 <i>cf.</i> ; 234 <i>cf.</i> ; 463.
65:		82; 87; 270.
67:		209 <i>cf.</i> ; 210; 212; 218.
68:		218 <i>cf.</i> ; 232.
69:		204; 218.
70:		220; 221.
71:		105; 131; 210; 228.
72:		109; 270.
73:		88.
74:		220; 222 <i>cf.</i> ; 231.
75:		90; 228.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>No. 76: 107; 111; 212 <i>cf.</i>; 213; 236.
 77: 228.
 78: 109 <i>cf.</i>; 110; 204; 218; 231;
 235; 243; 246; 260.
 79: 89; 240 <i>cf.</i>
 80: 229; 232; 277; 461 <i>cf.</i>; 464;
 466.
 81: 84; 228; 229.
 82: 91.
 84: 222; 232.
 85: 281; 298; 302; 355; 357;
 359.
 86: 94; 461.
 87: 167; 287 <i>cf.</i>; 295; 296 <i>cf.</i>;
 306; 355.
 88: 236.
 89: 296; 328; 355; 441 <i>cf.</i>
 90: 92; 105 <i>cf.</i>; 228 <i>cf.</i>; 235; 270;
 294; 461.
 91: 89; 93; 105 <i>cf.</i>; 129 <i>cf.</i>; 293.
 92: 232 <i>cf.</i>; 266; 465.
 93: 85; 112; 211; 220; 221 <i>cf.</i>;
 222 <i>cf.</i>; 229; 231; 243; 244;
 246.
 94: 244.
 95: 110; 120; 224.
 96: 187; 226 <i>cf.</i>; 255.
 97: 93; 140; 245; vi.
 98: 141 <i>cf.</i>; 168; 187; 224; 237;
 300; 355.
 99: 138; 167; 248; 275.
 100: 232; 236 <i>cf.</i>; 239.
 101: 282; 299; 307; 441 <i>cf.</i>
 103: 237; 238; 249.
 104: 229 <i>cf.</i>; 239 <i>cf.</i>; 270.
 105: 283; 284; 285; 286; 357; vi.
 106: 240; 278; 465; 466.
 107: 107; 213 <i>cf.</i>; 233; 256.
 108: 115; 141; 300.
 109: 299.
 110: 115; 116; 188; 223 <i>cf.</i>; 226
 <i>cf.</i>; 257; 270.
 111: 138 <i>cf.</i>; 229 <i>cf.</i>; 233; 241;
 270; 273; 306; 311; 441 <i>cf.</i>
 112: 141.
 113: 114; 257.
 114: 310; 317.
 115: 319; 320 <i>cf.</i>
 116: 288 <i>cf.</i>
 117: 114.</p> | <p>No. 119: 288.
 120: 229; 249.
 121: 139; 242.
 122: 317.
 123: 301; 302; 358; 446.
 124: 318.
 125: 318.
 126: 175.
 128: 319; 320 <i>cf.</i>
 129: 338.
 130: 337.
 131: 227.
 132: 249.
 133: 257.
 135: 258.
 136: 171.
 137: 121 <i>cf.</i>; 226; 231.
 138: 144; 185.
 139: 99; 143; 229; 466 <i>cf.</i>
 140: 171 <i>cf.</i>
 141: 116.
 142: 144.
 143: 337.
 144: 145.
 145: 337.
 147: 338.
 148: 338; 340; 341; 428 <i>cf.</i>; 431 <i>cf.</i>
 150: 337.
 152: 470.
 153: 302; 324 <i>cf.</i>; 362; 363.
 155: 435.
 157: 362.
 158: 362.
 159: 363.</p> <p>Miscellaneous, no. 8 (1914): 137; 363-
 370.
 10 (1914): 32; 47;
 52; 65; 84 <i>cf.</i>;
 88; 92; 101 <i>cf.</i>;
 103; 120 <i>cf.</i>;
 122 <i>cf.</i>; 129 <i>cf.</i>;
 176 <i>cf.</i>; 223;
 230; 262; 468.</p> <p>RUSSIAN ORANGE PAPER</p> <p>No. 1: 55 <i>cf.</i>; 62.
 4: 36 <i>cf.</i>; 60; 81 <i>cf.</i>
 6: 55 <i>cf.</i>; 64; 99 <i>cf.</i>
 8: 129 <i>cf.</i></p> |
|---|--|

- No. 10: 98.
 11: 61.
 12: 61.
 13: 66.
 14: 61; 107.
 16: 57 *cf.*; 81 *cf.*
 18: 57 *cf.*; 129 *cf.*
 19: 119 *cf.*; 125.
 20: 293.
 22: 202 *cf.*
 23: 462.
 25: 55 *cf.*; 56; 68 *cf.*; 71; 105 *cf.*;
 215.
 26: 215 *cf.*
 27: 65; 79.
 28: 129 *cf.*; 151; 163 *cf.*
 29: 153.
 30: 103.
 31: 215.
 32: 163; 217.
 33: 79 *cf.*
 34: 129 *cf.*; 209 *cf.*
 35: 84; 154.
 37: 85 *cf.*
 38: 219; 228 *cf.*
 39: 209.
 40: 82; 100.
 41: 56; 99; 129 *cf.*
 42: 79 *cf.*; 229 *cf.*; 233 *cf.*; 272 *cf.*;
 282.
 43: 219 *cf.*
 44: 109.
 45: 104; 107; 220; 221; 243.
 46: 80.
 47: 109; 186.
 48: 108; 159 *cf.*; 220; 221; 243.
 49: 112; 135; 137 *cf.*; 187; 190;
 211; 221; 243; 244; 246;
 246 *cf.*
 50: 221 *cf.*; 222; 229; 231; 243;
 246.
 51: 107; 187; 213 *cf.*; 228 *cf.*; 266.
 53: 108; 109 *cf.*; 155; 159 *cf.*; 230;
 232 *cf.*
 54: 231; 232 *cf.*
 55: 165.
 56: 100.
 57: 101.
 58: 114; 135; 137 *cf.*; 166; 187;
 191; 246; 296.

- No. 60: 244; 245; vi.
 61: 137.
 62: 137.
 63: 244; 248.
 64: 248.
 67: 249.
 68: 142.
 69: 229; 256.
 70: 142.
 75: 105 *cf.*
 76: 145.
 77: 56; 105 *cf.*; 192.

GERMAN WHITE BOOK

MEMORANDUM

- Page 4: 94; 102; 125.
 5: 71; 118; 125; 131.
 6: 125; 128 *cf.*; 129 *cf.*; 130.
 7: 84; 130.
 8: 134; 167; 210 *cf.*; 253.
 9: 167; 187; 190; 211; 230;
 244.
 10: 113; 129 *cf.*; 137 *cf.*; 211; 244.
 11: 113; 223; 237.
 12: 115.
 21: 109 *cf.*
 24: 138.
 25: 66.

EXHIBITS

- Ex. 1: 128; 129 *cf.*
 2: 117; 129 *cf.*; 130; 132.
 3: 84; 101.
 5: 84 *cf.*; 104.
 6: 86 *cf.*; 110.
 7: 110.
 8: 111.
 10: 84 *cf.*; 129 *cf.*; 133; 151.
 11: 111; 134.
 12: 208.
 13: 159; 207; 230.
 14: 228 *cf.*
 15: 228 *cf.*
 16: 212.
 17: 167.
 18: 139.
 20: 125 *cf.*; 252.
 21: 109 *cf.*; 112; 252.
 22: 222 *cf.*; 228 *cf.*; 253.

- Ex. 23: 112; 167; 253.
 24: 98.
 25: 175.
 26: 142; 145.
 27: 176.
 28: 192; 253.
 29: 253; 330.
 30: 330.
 32: 329.
 33: 328.
 34: 329.
 35: 329.
 36: 333.
 38: 634.

FRENCH YELLOW BOOK

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>No. 1: 35.
 5: 155; vi.
 8: 155.
 9: 126 <i>cf.</i>; 129 <i>cf.</i>
 10: 206 <i>cf.</i>
 11: 45; 58; 121 <i>cf.</i>; 213 <i>cf.</i>
 13: 44.
 14: 45; 156.
 15: 120 <i>cf.</i>; 166; 206 <i>cf.</i>
 16: 126 <i>cf.</i>; 157.
 17: 206 <i>cf.</i>; 461 <i>cf.</i>
 18: 104 <i>cf.</i>; vi.
 19: 461 <i>cf.</i>
 21: 120 <i>cf.</i>
 26: 65; 201 <i>cf.</i>; 467.
 27: 461 <i>cf.</i>
 28: 57; 129 <i>cf.</i>; 150.
 29: 157.
 30: 71; 120; 121; 125; 158.
 31: 274.
 32: 158; 287 <i>cf.</i>
 35: 120; 121; 467.
 36: 57 <i>cf.</i>; 119; 150.
 38: 104.
 40: 81 <i>cf.</i>
 45: 77.
 47: 274.
 50: 182 <i>cf.</i>; 190 <i>cf.</i>; 199 <i>cf.</i>; 203 <i>cf.</i>;
 468.
 51: 465; 469.
 52: 108 <i>cf.</i>; 469.
 53: 199.
 54: 214.</p> | <p>No. 55: vi.
 56: 121 <i>cf.</i>; 152; 163.
 57: 161.
 59: 166 <i>cf.</i>
 60: 166 <i>cf.</i>
 61: 154 <i>cf.</i>; 161; 231.
 62: 151; 154 <i>cf.</i>; 163.
 63: 295.
 64: 104.
 65: 93; 105 <i>cf.</i>
 66: 211; 305.
 67: 186 <i>cf.</i>
 68: 199; 208.
 69: 199 <i>cf.</i>; 208 <i>cf.</i>
 70: 230.
 72: 121; 234 <i>cf.</i>; 277 <i>cf.</i>; 461 <i>cf.</i>;
 462; 469.
 73: 209 <i>cf.</i>
 74: 48 <i>cf.</i>; 161; 164; 209 <i>cf.</i>
 75: 54; 69; 574 <i>cf.</i>
 76: 206 <i>cf.</i>; 207.
 81: 162; 210; 230.
 82: 219.
 83: 131 <i>cf.</i>; 159; 162.
 84: 229.
 85: 109; 155 <i>cf.</i>
 88: 166 <i>cf.</i>
 89: 166 <i>cf.</i>
 92: 92; 204; 242; 274; 275 <i>cf.</i>
 93: 129 <i>cf.</i>
 96: 103; 105 <i>cf.</i>; 108 <i>cf.</i>; 190 <i>cf.</i>;
 277 <i>cf.</i>
 98: 296 <i>cf.</i>; 315.
 100: 137; 246.
 101: 166 <i>cf.</i>; 167 <i>cf.</i>; 186 <i>cf.</i>; 229 <i>cf.</i>
 102: 165.
 103: 139; 238 <i>cf.</i>; vi.
 104: 226; 238; 255 <i>cf.</i>
 105: 169; 250 <i>cf.</i>
 106: 170; 285; 286.
 109: 140; 162; 250.
 110: 277; 287 <i>cf.</i>; 310.
 111: 429.
 112: 239.
 113: 141.
 114: 163.
 115: 335 <i>cf.</i>
 116: 171.
 117: 175.
 119: 318 <i>cf.</i></p> |
|---|--|

- No. 120: 142 *cf.*; 176; 259.
 121: 256 *cf.*; 261.
 124: 470.
 126: 299; 303 *cf.*; 340.
 127: 335.
 128: 429 *cf.*
 129: 430.
 131: 430.
 133: 430.
 137: 339; 353; 431.
 138: 344.
 139: 286.
 141: v.
 143: 344; 353.
 144: 303.
 145: 360.
 146: 325 *cf.*
 147: 325 *cf.*; 350; 418.
 148: 176; 286; 325 *cf.*; 350.
 149: 325 *cf.*; 419.
 155: 173; 174; 286; 325 *cf.*
 157: 350.
 159: 171; 172; 184.
 Page 188: 286.

BELGIAN GRAY PAPER

- No. 6: 209 *cf.*
 9: 416 *cf.*
 11: 320.
 12: 321; 322; 386; 404 *cf.*
 15: 323; 416.
 20: 324; 420.
 21: 325; 420.
 22: 327.
 24: 327; 328; 436 *cf.*
 25: 362 *cf.*
 28: 435 *cf.*
 35: 416 *cf.*
 38: 439; vi.
 40: 439.
 44: 440.
 79: 317.

AUSTRIAN RED BOOK

- No. 2: 49.
 4: 50.
 6: 267.
 8: 52 *cf.*

- No. 9: 49.
 10: 71 *cf.*
 11: 71 *cf.*; 164 *cf.*
 13: 63 *cf.*; 125 *cf.*; 164.
 14: 53 *cf.*; 69; 98.
 17: 57; 61 *cf.*; 263 *cf.*
 18: 84 *cf.*; 89 *cf.*; 97; 101 *cf.*; 125
cf.; 158 *cf.*
 19: 48 *cf.*; 54 *cf.*; 69; 574 *cf.*
 20: 61; 234.
 21: 60 *cf.*; 62.
 22: 65 *cf.*
 24: 64 *cf.*; 65 *cf.*
 27: 71.
 30: 84 *cf.*
 31: 70 *cf.*; 91 *cf.*; 107.
 32: 85 *cf.*
 35: 208 *cf.*
 37: 87 *cf.*
 38: 270.
 39: 80.
 40: 80 *cf.*; 86; 220.
 41: 212.
 42: 134; 187; 246; 247; 492 *cf.*
 43: 212 *cf.*
 44: 90 *cf.*; 107 *cf.*; 212 *cf.*
 45: 167 *cf.*
 46: 136 *cf.*
 47: 108; 111; 223.
 48: 136; 187; 246.
 49: 223 *cf.*; 225; 255; 257 *cf.*
 50: 112; 139 *cf.*; 225; 257 *cf.*
 51: 256; 264.
 52: 141 *cf.*
 53: 231.
 55: 262.
 56: 256 *cf.*; 263.
 57: 145 *cf.*
 59: 350.

SERVIAN BLUE BOOK


- No. 2: 45.
 8: 53.
 11: 89.
 16: 68 *cf.*
 17: 43.
 20: 45; 156 *cf.*
 22: 45 *cf.*
 23: 42.

APPENDIX


691

No. 25: 43; 91 *cf.*; 107 *cf.*
28: 461.
30: 50; 68 *cf.*
31: 48.
35: 55 *cf.*; 199 *cf.*
36: 129.

No. 40: 65 *cf.*
41: 80 *cf.*
44: 100 *cf.*
45: 87 *cf.*
47: 100.
52: 42.



INDEX



INDEX

In order to avoid a confusion of unimportant references, in certain instances where the names and titles of the principal diplomats have been included in this index, no accompanying reference to the pages of the volume has been added.

- Abyssinia: 11, 24.
Aeland, *Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs*: 435 *n*.
Adriatic: 21, 28-29, 32.
Ægean Islands: 26-27.
Ægean Sea: 30, 123.
Aerenthal: 20.
Afghanistan: Anglo-Russian agreement concerning, 548-549.
Agadir incident (1911): 22-24; effect on Germany, 35; Grey on English policy regarding, 289-290.
Aggression: condemnation of, 14 *n*, 189-190 *n*, 489; difficulty in determining what constitutes, 459-460; Italy says Triple Alliance does not cover, 470; significance of Italy's stand as showing Austro-German, 472-473; forced on Germany because of hostage policy towards France, 488; fundamental reasons for German, 505-508; England's policy had nothing of, 511-512 *n*; aim of diplomacy to force upon opponent, 521; territorial, denied by United States (1898) and Austria (1914), 585.
Agram: trial at, 43 *n*, 125.
Albania: made independent state by powers, 28-29, 149; designs of Italy and Austria on, 32, 41; question, how settled (1913), 229.
Albert, *King of Belgium*: telegram of, to King George, 355-358; *World* interview with, regarding Anglo-Belgian conversations, 407; defense of Belgian neutrality, 407 *n*.
Alexander, King of Serbia: 30, 147.
Alexander, Prince of Serbia: 82; telegraphs Tsar, 99-100.
Algeiras Conference: 12-18; Grey on English policy at time of, 289-290; Italy at, 457.
Algiers: 11.
Allen, Clifford: England's reason for entering war, 314-315 *n*.
Alsace-Lorraine: effect upon relations of France and Germany, 13-15, 503; inhabitants of, forbidden to cross frontier (July 1914), 170; proposal (1870) to neutralize, 453 *n*.
Ambassador: *see* English, French, German, etc., Ambassador.
America (*see also* United States): and the issues of the European War, 655-660.
American affairs: Anglo-American coöperation in regard to, 542.
American Association for International Conciliation, publications of: 64 *n*, 130 *n*, 445 *n*.
American Delegation at the First Hague Conference: declaration of, concerning Monroe Doctrine, 539.
American Journal of International Law: viii, 541 *n*, 544 *n*, 551, 572.
Andrassy, Count: interpellation on Austro-Servian situation, 46.
Anglo-American coöperation: in regard to American affairs, 542.
Anglo-American treaty: concerning arbitration, 543.
Anglo-Belgian agreement: no reality to, 405-406.
Anglo-Belgian conversations: 395-411; nature of (Munroe-Smith), 405 *n*; *World* interview with King of Belgium, 407; statement of Belgian Government regarding, (transmitted by Havenith), 407-408; German Minister informed of, by Belgian Government, 407-408; Chancellor comments on, 455 *n*.
Anglo-French Entente: formation of, 12; disturbs Germany, 15-16; strength of, shown at Algeiras, 17; England will not support if France rejects reasonable German proposal, 233; Poincaré's letter to King George, 276; Grey-Cambon

- letters 1912, 283-284; Cambon-Grey conversations, 285-288; Grey's speech in Commons Aug. 3, 288-292, 345-352; coöperative disposition of Anglo-French fleets, 498; extent to which England bound to aid France, 527.
- Anglo-German agreement (*see also* Anglo-German relations): Asquith remarks, 282 *n*; obstacle to, 511 *n*.
- Anglo-German conflict: was not inevitable, 488 *n*.
- Anglo-German relations: Delbrück predicts war, 560; price of Anglo-German Entente (Delbrück), 561; secret treaty of 1898 relative to the eventual dismemberment of the Portuguese Colonies, references to, 562-563; colonial development and removal of conflicting interests (Johnston), 566; commercial and economic competition (Rathgen), 567-568; Bethmann-Hollweg's speech in Reichstag regarding, 568-569; Asquith's Cardiff speech concerning, 568.
- Anglo-Japanese Alliance: 12, 498.
- Anglo-Russian agreement, concerning Persia, 17-18, 498, 546-548.
- Anglo-Russian Entente: 292 *n*, 556-557.
- Antwerp: England's intention to use as base, 410.
- Apponyi, Count Albert: *Criticism of Serbia*, 588.
- Arbitration: suggested by Serbia, 64; Sazonof thinks Serbia may propose, 201; Germany thinks Grey's conference equivalent to, 208; Sazonof modified formula, constitutes powers arbitrators, 238 *n*; obligatory, Germany's attitude towards, 503; Biberstein opposes obligatory, at Hague, 513; Anglo-American treaty, 543; offered by Serbia (1914) and Spain (1898), 584.
- Areopagus: German Chancellor objects to, 210; a European, 230; judgment of, 272-273.
- Armament of Powers: increase of, 35.
- Asia: agreement of England and Russia concerning their interests in, 546-550.
- Asia Minor: 20, 123.
- Asquith, *English Premier*: Cardiff speech, 282 *n*, 569; statement, July 31, regarding Russian mobilization, 335; the Cabinet crisis, 341-342; 342 *n*; Shaw on, 356 *n*; England's Entente policy and Anglo-German agreement, 511-512, 512 *n*.
- Assassination: *see* regicide.
- Associated Press: 365 *n*; Grey authorizes statement (Jan. 27) commenting on Chancellor's interview with, 406-407, 407 *n*.
- Atlantic Monthly*: 185-186 *n*; 275 *n*; 405 *n*; 415 *n*; 488 *n*.
- Austria (*see also*, Austrian ultimatum — Austro-Servian conflict — Balkans — Conversations — Localization — Mediation — Mobilization): obtains administrative control of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878), 7-8; joins with Germany in Dual Alliance (1879), 7-8; 540-541; racial and political elements of, 8, 33; joins with Germany and Italy in Triple Alliance (1883), 8; rivalry with Russia in Balkans, 19, 91-94, 96, 147-149; annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908), 20, 30-31, 76 *n*; Entente powers resent annexation of Bosnia by, 21, 457, 520; threatened by Serbia's increased strength, 29-35, 89, 91 *n*, 93, 123-124, 127-128, 148-149; "Pig War," 30, 147; designs of, upon Albania, 32, 41; designs on Salonika, 524; Archduke of, assassinated (June 28) 1914, 34, 155; intends war on Serbia (1913) with Germany's consent, 35; presents ultimatum to Serbia (July 23), 1914, 36-37; prepares public for ultimatum through press, 44-45 *n*, 46-47 *n*, 50, 74-75 *n*, 88-89 *n*, 92, 156; lays on Russia responsibility for a possible European war, 50-51; assumes Serbia responsible to her alone and not to powers, 52, 61-62 *n*, 107-108; furnishes England with special explanation of ultimatum, 56-58; refuses to extend time limit of ultimatum, 61, 234 *n*; rejects Serbia's reply, 65, 78-81; popular feeling in, against Serbia, 65, 85, 88 and *n*, 91-92; rejoinder of, to Servian note, 65-75; 79; begins military prepara-

- tions, not operations, 80-81; urged by powers to accept Servian reply as basis for discussion, 81-83; purpose of, regarding Servia, 84-85, 89-95, 97, 101, 104, 105, 106, 128, 139, 153, 154, 223-224; believes Russia will yield (July 26), 468; declares war on Servia (July 28), 85-89, 100; action of, against Servia for prestige, 91-92, 107, 213; public opinion of against Russia, 103, 105; shares with Russia control of Balkan matters, 147, 188; hegemony of, in the Balkans, 188-189; refuses mediation on basis of Servian note, 212; refuses direct conversations with Russia concerning Servia, 219-222, 226; assumes a more conciliatory attitude, 223-224, 226; exchange of views with Russia, 225-226; did not "bang the door," 226, 231; after rupture Servia must also indemnize Austria, 234 *n.* 263; probably not to be satisfied even with Servia's complete acceptance of ultimatum (Grey), 234-235; Sazonof's remark concerning rupture of conversations by, 243 *n.*; unjust to accuse of dilatory tactics, 251; agrees to mediation, 252-264; Sazonof emphasizes importance of arresting action against Servia by, 257; considers Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia, 258; diplomacy of, described by Viviani, 258-259; might give Servia or power speaking for Servia her terms, 259; agreement with Russia almost in sight, 261, 263; could not be expected to put off attack on Servia (Bunsen), 262; and Russia, agreement of, not interrupted by German ultimatum, 263; limits of concessions of, to Russia, 263; Russia could not allow invasion of Servia by, 264; opposed to compromise, 266-267 *n.*; attitude of, toward mediation, 271-273; believes England will remain neutral, 274; appeals to England to prevent war, 278; declares war on Russia Aug. 5, 350 *n.*; Italy considers action of, against Servia aggressive, 470; to blame for disregarding diplomatic procedure, 483; measures of force justifiable against Servia, 483; threat of, to mobilize as excuse for Russian mobilization, 487 *n.*; responsibility of, for war less than Germany's, 491; claims to use "peace power" towards Servia, 501-502; did precipitate the war? 519; intentions of, concerning Servian independence, 525; action in 1914 compared with action of the United States in 1898, 579, 583-586.
- Austrian Ambassador at Berlin: *see* Count Szogyeny.
- Austrian Ambassador at London: *see* Mensdorff.
- Austrian Ambassador at Paris: *see* Szeesen.
- Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg: *see* Count Szapary.
- Austrian Ambassador to United States: *see* Dumba.
- Austrian Councilor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *see* Macchio.
- Austrian General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: *see* Macchio.
- Austrian Minister at Belgrade: *see* Geisl von Geislingen.
- Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs: *see* Berchtold.
- Austrian Red Book: substantiates statements in British White Paper, v.
- Austrian Ultimatum: (*see also* Austro-Servian conflict — Localization — Servian Note): delivered July 23, 1914, 33-37; secrecy surrounding drafting of, 41-47; tenor of, known by von Tchirsky, 42; did Tchirsky telegraph to Kaiser, 529; foreseen by Servia, 42-43 *n.*, 45, 47-48; activities of Austrian press preceding, 44-45 *n.*; 46-47 and *n.*, 50 *n.*, 74-75 *n.*, 88-89 *n.*, 92, 156; drawn up by Forgach, 42 *n.*; Italy not informed of preparation of, 45, 120-121, 467-468; not communicated to England or Russia until day after its communication to Servia, 48, 51, 60; terms not known to Germany, but Germany back of, 119-125, 520-521; assumes Servia responsible to Austria alone and not to powers, 52, 61-62 *n.*, 107-108; terms of, 52-53;

- text of, 574-576; charges of, against Serbia not proved, 53, 98; time limit of, 53-54, 56; diplomatic consensus of opinion regarding, 54-56, 58-59, 64, 70-71 *n.*, 98, 106, 119; effect of, on neutral sympathy, 55 *n.*; a *démarche* with time limit or an ultimatum? 56-58, 86-87; efforts of powers to secure extension of time limit of, 59-61; Entente powers influence Serbia to make conciliatory reply to, 62-64; Serbia's reply to, rejected by Austria, 65; correlation of, with Serbia's reply and Austrian rejoinder, 64-75; sixth demand of, supported by precedent, 72 *n.*, 76 *n.*; Fischer-auer on, 76-77 *n.*; Lloyd George remarks upon, 586; inevitable mobilization following, 186; Berchtold refuses mediation concerning, 212; discussed by Sazonof, 214; proposed modification of, 214; Berchtold does not agree to discuss modification of, 255; Berchtold authorizes Schebeko to give explanation about, 257; Sazonof announces readiness of Austria to discuss, 257; Austria agrees to submit terms to mediation (Bunsen), 261; Austria not willing to modify, 263; Serbia should have accepted (San Giuliano), 462; not intended to be accepted, 519; affected Servian independence, 525.
- Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: *see* Forgach.
- Austro-German Alliance: treaty of Oct. 7, 1879, 540.
- Austro-Servian conflict: Russia's interest in, 96-104; Dumba on, 587.
- Avarna, Duc d', *Italian Ambassador at Vienna*: kept in dark about Austrian ultimatum, 45-46, 46S.
- Aviators, French: alleged violation by, of German territory, 173-174 *n.*, 325.
- Avlona: designs of Italy and Austria on, 32.
- Bagdad Railway: 20, 123.
- Balance of Power: Dual Alliance helps to effect, 9; reestablished by Dual Alliance, 15; between Entente and Albania, effect on peace of Europe, 15; affected not merely by annexation of territory (Munroe Smith), 99 *n.*; reaffirmation of, 276; English policy of, 313-314; displacement of, cause of the war, 476-479; Germany checked by English policy of, 511 *n.* Belgium and the balance of power (Usher), 597.
- Balance of power in Balkans: Austrian assurances regarding, 84-85, 97, 101, 139; Russian fears regarding, 105-108.
- Balin: criticizes Grey, 354 *n.*
- Balkans (*see also* Bosnia and Herzegovina — Bulgaria — Serbia — Turkey): general concern of Europe, 4, 195-197, 519; Russian and Austrian ambitions in, 19, 91-94, 96, 147-149, 482; attitude of France and England toward, 21, 29, 31, 147, 195-196, 289, 293-295; bi-partisan control of, 147, 188, 195; Bismarck's policy regarding, 485 *n.*; unite against Turkey, 26-27; Treaty of London (1913), 27; quarrel over spoils, 28-29; Treaty of Bukharest (1913), 29; how affected by Balkan wars, 78; Austrian assurances regarding balance of power in, 84-85, 97, 101, 139; Russia's interpretation of Austrian assurances, 105-108, 254 *n.*; English position regarding question of, 278.
- Balkan Wars: 26-34.
- Bank of England: 308.
- Barnardiston, Lieutenant Colonel: 395 *ff.*; perfidious announcements of, 398.
- Barrère, *French Ambassador to Italy*.
- Beer, George Louis: answers Dernburg on "Willy-Georgie-Nicky" correspondence, 335 *n.*
- Belgian Documents (*see also* Anglo-Belgian Conversations): method of publication of, 399 *n.*
- Belgian Gray Paper: viii.
- Belgian Minister at Berlin: *see* Beyens, Greindl.
- Belgian Minister at Washington: *see* Havenith.
- Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs: *see* Davignan.
- Belgian neutrality (*see also* Neutralization — Neutrality): established (1831) by Concert of Powers, 5-6;

- international treaties (1831, 1839, 1870) regulating, 600, 602; respected during Franco-Prussian War, 6-7; English position regarding, 287; part of Germany's bid for England's neutrality, 297-303, 332 *n*, 353-354; affects English opinion, 300-301; diplomatic importance to England of question of, 313-316, 332 *n*; Henry James on violation of, 314; England, France, Germany and Belgium regarding, 316-323, 332 *n*; England's inquiry relative to, 316-328; Germany's reason for not stating attitude, 317, 321, 404; Jagow on, 321-322, 362-364; Germany's ultimatum and Belgium's reply, 323-328, 361-362; violation of, *casus belli* for England, 352-370; violated by Germany (Aug. 4), 362-363; "scrap of paper" (Bethmann-Hollweg), 365-366; (David Jayne Hill), 382; Grey's statement (1913) regarding, 401-402; England's intention of violating, 396-397, 401, 402-405; Grey gives no assurance that France will respect (Delbrück), 405 *n*; right to defend without appeal from Belgium, 405; King Albert's defense of, 407 *n*; attitude of Holland towards defense of, 411; alleged violations of, 415-422; French violations of, 415-422; France not likely to violate, 417-418; right of Belgium to defend, 431-441; Grey calls upon Belgium to defend, 435; and English intervention (Bethmann-Hollweg), 443-445; did France plan violation of, 520; no evidence of violations of, alleged by Germany, 526; parliamentary debates regarding (text), 615 *ff*. Anglo-Belgian military preparations to defend (text of secret documents), 626; documents published by Germany relative to violation of, by England and Belgium, 631, 634.
- Belgian preparations: against German invasion, effects of, 411-415.
- Belgian resistance: reasons for, 434; necessary to preserve independence, 453.
- Belgian Secretary General to Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *see* Elst.
- Belgian spy system: Barnardiston urges adoption of, 395 *n*.
- Belgium (*see also* Belgian neutrality — Belgian resistance — mobilization, Belgian, etc.): Richelieu's proposal regarding, 595; united to Holland by Congress of Vienna (1815), 5; a "buffer" or "stopper" state, 5 *n*; revolts from Holland (1830), 5; England wishes to maintain independence of, 5; made perpetually neutral by Concert of Powers (1831), 6; French designs upon, before Franco-Prussian War, 5-6; mobilization of, 310 *n*; hostile acts of, 317; to maintain neutrality, 319-320; relations with Germany, 322-323, 409-410; at the Hague Conference, 322, 409; German ultimatum to, 323-324; answers German demands, 326-327; Germany violates, 362-363; meaning of Gladstone's statement regarding, 386; changed conditions, effect on treaty of (1839), 387; obligation of United States to protect, 391; England's plans for the invasion of, 398; warns German Minister against unauthorized conversations, 407-408; Minister of, at Washington, transmits statement regarding Anglo-Belgian conversations, 407-408; right to defend neutralization, 431-441; and the balance of power (Usher), 597; England's position in regard to (Grey), 620 *ff*.; Gladstone's letter to Bright concerning incorporation of, by France, 624.
- Belgium, the case of (*see also* Anglo-Belgian Conversations): 624-631.
- Belgium, invasion of: duty of all states to prevent, 390-391; England's plans for, 398; list of German excuses, 402; violation of international law (Bethmann-Hollweg), 445; France not intending, 448; Germany has another feasible plan, 449; compared to trespass, 452; causes influencing Germany to, 480-481; France intends (Delbrück), 488 *n*; forced on Germany because of "hostage" policy towards France, 488; strategic con-

- siderations leading Germany to make (Delbrück), 488 *n*; why Germany provoked England by, 522; not necessary, 522; England's attitude towards, 526; popular error concerning, in England and Germany, 526; effect upon England, as compared with effect of invasion of Holland, 526.
- Belgium, King of: *see* Albert, *King of Belgium*.
- Belgrade: bombardment of, 140, 244; induced to yield by powers, 231; occupation of, 236-239; mediation after occupation of, 236-239.
- Below-Saleske, von, *German Minister at Brussels*: announces that Germany will employ force against Belgium, 439.
- Benckendorff, Count, *Russian Ambassador at London*.
- Benedetti: proposes partition of Belgium, 6; plan of, to incorporate Belgium in France (Gladstone), 624.
- Benton, William S.: 76 *n*.
- Berchtold, Count, *Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs*: on Treaty of London (1913), 32 *n*; tells of Austrian *démarche*, 57; on Servian note, 79; Austrian "prestige engaged," 107; instructions of, to German representatives (July 28), 131-132; refuses mediation proposal, 212; urges Germany to threaten Russia to arrest mobilization, 246 *n*; authorizes Szapary to give explanations about Austrian ultimatum, 257.
- Berthelot, of the *French Ministry for Foreign Affairs*: Germany aims at war (July 27), 161.
- Bertie, Sir Francis, *English Ambassador at Paris*.
- Bethmann-Hollweg, von, *German Chancellor*: efforts of, to preach peace at Vienna, 114-115; speech of, in Reichstag (Aug. 4), 130 *n*, 145-146, 173; announces danger of war, 138, 141; tells of Emperor's mediation, 141; counsel to Austria, 233; blames rupture on Russian mobilization, 242; England responsible for war, 278 *n*; English replies, 278 *n*, 282 *n*; policy of, to effect better understanding between England and Germany, 280-282, 364-366; bids for England's neutrality, 297-299, 307; asks French reply on Belgium, 317-318; Belgian neutrality, 321, 416; telegram on French neutrality, 329; states Germany's position regarding Luxemburg, 338; "just for a scrap of paper," 365-366; Grey's commentary on press interview with, 406-407 *n*; remark in Reichstag about England and Belgian neutrality (speech Dec. 2), 443; text of speech, 568-569; invasion of Belgium, violation of international law, 445; translation of remarks of, concerning necessity, 445-446 *n*; remarks concerning observance of treaties compared with Bismarck, 453 *n*; "scrap of paper" remark causes unfavorable impression in U.S., 454 *n*; remarks on Grey statement of England's intentions toward Belgium, 455 *n*; England's policy to check Germany through balance of power, 511 *n*. (Speech Dec. 2) England's policy prevents agreement, 568-569.
- Beyens, *Belgian Minister at Berlin*: disbelief of, regarding Germany's ignorance of Austrian ultimatum, 121; interview with Jagow, 436-438.
- Bieberstein, Baron, Marschall von: diplomacy of, at Constantinople, 20, 22-23 *n*, 505; opposes obligatory arbitration at Hague, 513.
- Bienvenu-Martin, *French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice*: believes Germany is trying to alienate France and Russia, 153-154; sums up situation (July 29), 154-155; on attitude of Germany and Austria (July 27), 160-161; concerning French representations at St. Petersburg, 163-164.
- Biological test: states favored by, 452.
- Bipartisan control of Balkan affairs: 195.
- Birth control: Germany's view of, 506-507.
- Bismarck: diplomacy regarding proposed partition of Belgium, 6; policy of, toward Austria, 7-8; speech

- (Feb. 6, 1888), 533 ff.; distrust of policy of settlement colonies, 13; against aggression, 14 *n.*, 189-190 *n.*, 489; on mobilization, 135 *n.*; "le plus sage cède," 247 *n.*; remarks about observing treaties compared with Bethmann-Hollweg's, 453 *n.*; anticipated action of Italy, 472; evil consequences of example of, 493-495, 514.
- Black Sea: Bulgarian forts on, 30.
- Bokhara: 93.
- Bombardment of Belgrade: 140, 244.
- Bompard, *French Ambassador at Constantinople*.
- Bonar Law, A: pledges support to Asquith, 343.
- Boppe, *French Minister to Serbia*.
- Boschkovitch, *Servian Minister at London*.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: falls under administrative control of Austria (1878), 7-8; Austria annexes (1908), 19-22, 25, 30-31; Entente powers object to annexation of, 21, 457, 520; Turkish sympathies of (1908), 20; designs of Serbia on, 30, 66-67, 124, 147-148; Young-Turk movement to recover, 76 *n.*
- Bourse (Berlin): 156-157.
- Bresslau, Harry: 537 *n.*
- Bridges, Lieutenant-Colonel: 395 ff.
- Bright: Gladstone's letter to, 624-626.
- British Empire: classification of the possessions of, 497.
- British White Paper: veracity of, v, 285-286 *n.*, 335 *n.*
- British: *see* English.
- Bronewsky, *Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin*: 157.
- Buch, von, *German Minister to Luxemburg*.
- Buchanan, Sir George, *British Ambassador at St. Petersburg*: Russian mobilization means declaration of war by Germany, 133; urges Russia to defer order for mobilization, 186.
- Budapest: 46.
- "Buffer" State (*see also* "Stopper State"): Belgium to serve as, 5 *n.*
- Bulgaria: 20, 26-33, 94, 124, 149; secret appendix to treaty of friendship and alliance with Serbia, 572-574.
- Bülow, Prince von, *Ex-Chancellor of Germany*: the Triple Alliance, 9 *n.*, 478-479 *n.*; Franco-Russian and German-Russian relations, 16 *n.*; Germany's interest in Morocco, 23 *n.*; Germany and the Near East, 27-28 *n.*; Italy and the Triple Alliance, 457, 471-472.
- Bunsen, Sir Maurice: *British Ambassador at Vienna*: account of events preceding war, 42-47; England has no sympathy for Serbia, 127 *n.*; Austria agrees to submit ultimatum to mediation, 261; Sazonof accepts mediation if Serbia is not invaded, 261; Austria could not be expected to put off attack on Serbia, 262; statement at variance with Austrian Red Book, 262.
- Bureaucracy: efficient, of Germany, 514.
- Burns: resigns from Cabinet, 341-342 *n.*
- Cabinet, English: crisis in, 311, 340 *n.*, 355 *n.*; responsibility of, to Parliament (George Louis Beer), 335 *n.*; changes in, 341-343 *n.*
- Caillaux: trial of Mme., 36.
- Cairo: 11.
- Camarilla, court: of military authorities, possibility of, 140.
- Cambon, Jules, *French Ambassador at Berlin*: remarks German efforts to explain ignorance of Austrian ultimatum, 121; on situation July 24, 125; distrust of Germany, 161-162; suggests formula, 209; suggestion for mediation after Austrian occupation of Belgrade, 236-239; German ultimatum significant of bellicose policy, 260.
- Cambon, Paul, *French Ambassador at London*: on Austrian ultimatum, 55; criticism of views of, 200; suggests deferring proposal of mediation to Russia, 200; asks Grey about violation of Luxemburg, 338; violation of Belgium would be considered a *casus belli* by England, 353; negotiations of, with Grey regarding unprovoked attack on France by a third power, 283-288, 290-291.
- Cambon suggestion of mediation after Austria's occupation of Bel-

- grade: 236-239; why so designated, 236 *n*; Jagow thinks possible to accept if Russia does, 236-237; Germany forwards to Vienna, 237; Viviani urges Russia to adhere to, 238-239; Viviani says Russia ready to accept, 259.
- Cape Colony: 5, 11.
- Casablanca Affair (1908): 18-19, 22.
- Causa fœderis*: 459; Italy only bound if consulted beforehand, 468; Italy says Triple Alliance does not include aggressive war, 470; under Triple Alliance Italy considers (1913) aggression on Serbia does not constitute, 470-471; no, for Italy when England involved, 473; for Italy under Triple Alliance, 490 *n*.
- Causes of the war: suggested and alleged, 475-476; significance of variety of alleged, 476; what we mean by, 479; immediate causes, 479, 491; voluntary or rational as opposed to irrational, 479-480; determining causes, 491-495; responsibility of William II, 521.
- Chancellor, German: *see* Bethmann-Hollweg.
- Chimay, Trouée of: 413 *n*.
- China (*see also* Manchuria): 12, 13, 24; collective intervention, 501; treaty of Japan and Russia guaranteeing integrity of, and "Open Door" in, 550.
- Chirol, Sir Valentine: 224 *n*.
- Chronology: 667-685.
- Ciganovic: 49 *n*, 74.
- Citation of documents: 686 *ff*.
- Cities: determine national attitude towards peace, 188 *n*.
- Clarendon, Lord: 338-339.
- Coblentz: 173 *n*.
- Collective action: 204 *n*; purpose of, 501.
- Collective guaranty: *see* Guaranty-Luxemburg.
- Collective note of October 8, 1912: 27.
- Cologne: 169-170.
- Colonial policy of England: 4-5.
- Colonies: Germany desires, 504.
- Commercial competition: of England and Germany, 567-568.
- Commons, House of: freedom of action, 291.
- Communiqué* of Baron Kuhlmann: 360-361.
- Competition: commercial, of England and Germany, 567-568.
- Compromise: Sazonof thinks can reach, at London, 256; Russia ready to accept any reasonable, 262; failure to reach, 264-267; Giesl opposed to, 266 *n*; Jagow says Sazonof more inclined to, 266 *n*; importance of, in diplomacy, 266-267; Austria opposed to, 267 *n*; treaty of peace will be, 515.
- Concert of Powers: formation of, 3-4; ratifies Treaty of Vienna 1815, 3, 4; serves as shock-absorber, 4; establishes Belgian neutrality (1831), 6; effect of Dual Alliance upon balance of power, 9; divides into Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 7-18; position of England in, 9; weakness of, 27; establishes independent Albania, 28; restrains Serbia, 31-32; settlement of Balkan affairs, 195; Italy takes place in, 425.
- Conference: of the powers proposed by Grey, 197-204, 206-207; Sazonof proposes to parallel "conversations" by, 221; urged by powers, 229-231; made difficult by Russian mobilization (Pourtales), 243-244; responsibility of Germany for refusal to participate in, 484.
- Congo: 11, 505.
- Congo Free State: effect on Belgian policy, 410 *n*.
- Congo, French: 24.
- Congress of Vienna (1815): 3-5.
- Conservatives: support Entente, 309.
- Constantinople: Russian ambitions to secure, 10, 19; German influence at, 16, 19-20, 22-23; Austrian ambitions regarding, 33, 106.
- Constitution: Bismarck violates Prussian, 493-494.
- Contemporary Review*: (Delbrück), 561.
- Continental policy of England: 10.
- Continental Times, Berlin*: (Apponyi), 588.
- Convention: *see* Treaty.
- Conversations (*see also* Anglo-Belgian conversations): between Vienna and St. Petersburg, 209-210,

- 213, 227; Sazonof proposes to parallel, by conference, 221; Dumaine explains interruption of, 226; Kaiser urges Austria to continue, 242; Sazonof statement in regard to the breaking off, by Austria, 243 *n*.; Russia receives word of Austria's refusal to continue, 246; Berchtold (July 30) has no objection to continuance of, 255; Austro-Russian, interrupted by German ultimatum, 262; Szapary explains Austria ready to continue, 262-263; Sazonof (Aug. 1) expresses satisfaction that Austria will continue, 263.
- Conybeare, Dr. F. C.: attacks Grey, 357-359 *n*.
- Cook, Sir Edward: 352 *n*.
- Correspondence Bureau. Austrian: activities of, against Serbia, 44-45 *n*.
- Counter-mobilization: *see* Mobilization.
- Crandall, S. B.: succession of treaty obligations, 385 *n*.
- Crete: 19.
- Crimea: 10.
- Crises: European, before war, 9-10.
- Croatia: 109.
- Cyrenaica: 25-26.
- Damascus: 23.
- Dardanelles: Russian commerce through, 524.
- Davignon, *Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs*.
- Davis, J. C. Bancroft: succession of treaty obligations, 385 *n*.
- Declaration of London, February 26, 1909: Austria will observe, 88.
- Defensive alliance: right of neutralized states to enter into, 408; nature of, 460.
- Delbrück, Prof. Hans: Russian mobilization, 185-186 *n*.; Grey responsible for war, 275 *n*.; Grey gives no assurance that France will respect Belgium, 405 *n*.; French and English violation of Belgian neutrality, 415 *n*.; why Germany invaded Belgium, 448; strategic reason for invasion of Belgium, 488 *n*.; predicts war between Germany and England, 560.
- Delcassé, *French Minister for Foreign Affairs*: diplomacy of, after Fashoda, 12; Germany secures resignation of, 17.
- Démarche*: defined, 57 *n* 2, 86 *n* 2.
- Denis: *see* Durkheim and Denis.
- Derby, Lord: 338.
- Dernburg, Dr. Bernhard: Grey responsible for war, 275 *n*, 296 *n*.; criticism of British White Paper and reply of B. L. Beer, 335 *n*.; Bethmann-Hollweg's right to appeal to law of necessity, 416 *n*.; remarks introductory to Belgian secret documents, 631-634; Germany's treaty record, 661-664.
- Destruction of the Maine: negotiations of the Spanish and American governments following, 579, 584.
- Determining causes of the war (*see also* Causes of the war): 491-495.
- Diplomacy: Viviani describes Austrian, 258-259; of England, 268; governments express in foreign relations resultant of internal forces, 492; of Germany, weakness of, 521; aim of, 521; correctness of Russian, 522.
- Diplomatic documents, their veracity: v, vi, 155-156 *n*, 285-286 *n*, 335 *n*.
- Diplomatic intervention: *see* Intervention, diplomatic.
- Diplomatic procedure: powers hope to employ same, as for Albanian negotiation, 230; must be employed before recourse to force, 454; Austria to blame for disregarding, 483.
- Diplomats: efforts of, to preserve peace, 187-188, 197.
- Direct conversations: *see* Conversations.
- Disarmament: reason why Germany opposed, 477; super-empire permits limitation of armaments, 499; Germany refuses to consider, 513.
- Discrimination: against state disregarding ideals of humanity, 451.
- Documents, diplomatic: *see* Diplomatic documents.
- Dollot; *Les Origines de la Neutralité de la Belgique*: 316 *n*, 373-375.
- Draga, Queen, of Serbia: 147.
- Dual Alliance between Austria and Germany: formed (1879), 8; text of, 540-541; becomes Triple Al-

- liance (1883), 8; prestige of, affected by Balkan Wars, 35.
- Dual Alliance between Russia and France: formed (1891), 8-9; effect of, and Triplice in maintaining balance of power, 15; weakened by Russo-Japanese War, 16.
- Dual Monarchy: *see* Austria.
- Ducarne, General: 395 ff.
- Duggan, S. P.: 20 *n*, 21 *n*, 32 *n*.
- Dumaine, *French Ambassador at Vienna*: suspicions of, regarding Germany, 161-162; explains interruption of conversations, 226.
- Dumba, Constantin Theodor, *Austrian Ambassador to United States*: 69 *n*; *The Austro-Serbian Conflict*, 587.
- Durkheim and Denis: 164 *n*, 256 *n*, 261 *n*, 325 *n*, 336 *n*.
- Echo de Paris*: 150.
- Economist*: 309.
- Edward VII: efforts toward Anglo-French accord, 12-13; attempt upon the life of, at Brussels, 410 *n*.
- Efficiency: basis of super-empire, 500.
- Egypt: clash of English and French interests in, 11, 22; Fashoda incident, 11; agreement between France and England regarding, 13.
- Elst, Baron von der, *Belgian Secretary General to Ministry for Foreign Affairs*.
- Emigration: Germany objects to loss by, 502, 506.
- Empires: growth of, 496-497.
- Encyclopædia Britannica*: 8 *n*, 30 *n*, 91 *n*.
- England (*see also* Asquith — Belgium — Belgian neutrality — England's intervention — Grey — Luxemburg): colonial possessions of, 4-5; efforts of, in establishing neutrality of Belgium, 5-6; treaty regarding Belgian neutrality (text), 602; does not at first join continental alliances, 9-10; continental policy of, 9-10, 15, 477; former fear of Russian expansion, 10; rivalry with France for colonial possessions, 11; defensive alliance with Japan against Russia (1902), 12; friendly understanding with France (1904), 12-13, 283-284; understanding with France (1904) respecting Egypt and Morocco (text), 544-546; supports France in Morocco, 16-17; considers Germany as rival, 17; agreement with Russia (1907) regarding Asia, 17-18; (text), 546-550; replaced by Germany as protector of Turkey, 19; supports France at Agadir, 23; increasing friendly relations of, with Germany, 280-282, 304, 364-366; Anglo-German Relations, 560-571; on verge of civil war (1914), 36, 307-308; receives from Austria special explanation of ultimatum, 56-58; endeavors to secure extension of time limit of Austrian ultimatum, 59, 270; influences Serbia to make conciliatory reply, 63-64, 270; tries to delay hostilities between Austria and Serbia, 82-83; and France unable to advise Russia to submit, 189; belief, would support Russia, 192; and Italy possible mediators, 193-194; refuses to take sides — wisdom of this course, 194, 273-282, 286-288, 293-295, 303-307, 310-311, 356 *n*, 367-369 *n*; not willing to fight over Balkan question, 21, 29, 31, 130, 148, 289, 293-295; policy concerning Balkan affairs, 195-196; weakness of Balkan policy, 197; urges mediation on basis of Servian note, 211-212; mediation proposal of, accepted by Russia, 217; proposes Cambon suggestion, 237-239; and France not notified of Russian general mobilization, 253 *n*; important rôle of, 268-269; efforts of, to organize mediation, 270-273; influence for peace, documents showing, 270 *n*; declaration of, to support France, 275; urged by Austria and Germany to prevent war, 278; obligation of, to France (Grey), 288-292; negotiations of, with France and Russia, 292 *n*; warns Germany she will not hold aloof if France is involved, 295-296; Baron Kuhlmann's *communiqué*, 360-361; refuses Germany's bid for England's neutrality, 297-303, 348, 355 *n*; divergence of opinion in, 303-311; Liberal Party in power and opposed to

- war, 309; vital interests of, 311-316, 339-352; position in regard to Belgium (Grey), 620; inquiry of, relative to Belgium's neutrality, 316-328; asked to guarantee neutrality of France, 328-336; responsibility of English Cabinet (Beer), 335 *n*.; merchant vessels of, detained by Germany, 336-337; agrees to protect French coast, 339-352; thus conditionally entering war, 351-352; violation of Belgium *casus belli* for, 352-370; intends to land troops in Belgium without her permission, 396-397; objects to fortification of the Scheldt, 397-398; Anglo-Belgian agreement against Germany (Delbrück), 405 *n*.; violation of the neutrality of Holland, 410; right to use Scheldt as route to Antwerp, 411; Bethmann-Hollweg discusses reasons for intervention, 455 *n*.; abandons "splendid isolation," 476-477; supremacy at sea, 511 *n*.; no policy of aggression towards Germany (Asquith), 511 *n*.; policy to check Germany through balance of power (Bethmann-Hollweg), 511 *n*.; not responsible for the war, 528.
- England's intervention: England's reasons for, 312-313; effect of German attitude towards Belgium, 481; reasons for, 487, 525-526; how Germany might have prevented, 489.
- English: *see also* British.
- English Ambassador at Berlin: *see* Goschen.
- English Ambassador at Paris: *see* Bertie.
- English Ambassador at Rome: *see* Rodd.
- English Ambassador at St. Petersburg: *see* Buchanan.
- English Ambassador at Vienna: *see* Bunsen.
- English Councilor of Embassy at Berlin: *see* Rumbold.
- English Minister to Belgium: *see* Villiers.
- English Minister to Luxemburg: *see* Johnstone.
- English neutrality: Germany's bid for, 297-303, 348, 355 *n*.
- English Premier: *see* Asquith.
- English Secretary for Foreign Affairs: *see* Grey.
- English ultimatum: 352-370. ¹¹
- English Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs: *see* Nicholson.
- Entente: (*see also* Anglo-French Entente — Anglo-Russian Entente — Triple Entente): nature of, 292 *n*.; Jagow's objection to grouping of, against Triplice, 209; England will not sacrifice, 312 *n*.; difficult for English to remember attitude towards, in July, 488.
- Entente cordiale: *see* Anglo-French Entente.
- Ententes: Asquith refers to England's policy of, 511 *n*.
- Equality of states: and the right to make war, 391 *ff*.; invasion of Belgium violates principle of, 390-391; before the law, 454.
- Etter, de, *Russian Councilor of Embassy at London*.
- Europe: evolution towards dual grouping of powers, 8-18, 476-477.
- European Concert: *see* Concert of Powers.
- Expansion: conflict in policies of Austria and Serbia, 483.
- Explanations about Austrian ultimatum authorized by Berchtold, 257.
- Extraterritorial jurisdiction: 19.
- Eyschen, *President of Luxemburg Government*.
- Faber, Captain: revelations of, 398.
- Fait accompli*: Austria brings about a, 271.
- Far East: 22, 31, 188.
- Fashoda: England encounters France at, 10; claim to, yielded by France to England (1898), 11-12, 17.
- Fatherland*: 447 *n*.
- Finland, Gulf of: 140.
- Fischerauer, Fritz, *Austrian vice-Consul*: on Austro-Servian relations and Austrian ultimatum, 76-77 *n*.
- Fiume: 109.
- Fleuriat, de, *French Chargé d'Affaires at London*.
- Flotow, von, *German Ambassador to Italy*.
- Flushing: fortification of, 397; Eng-

- land's view of fortification of, 410, 411 *n.*
- Force: use of, 302; should be considered in political matters, 393; conditions for rightful use of, 394-395; obligation to observe; formalities before employing, 454; measures of, Austria justified in using, 483; use of, more favorably considered in Germany, 495; use of "peace power" to compel respect for international law, 500; danger in the use of, 501.
- Foreign Legion in Morocco: 18.
- Forgach, Count, *Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*: 42-43 *n.*, 44.
- Formalities: obligation of states to observe, 454.
- Formula for mediation: efforts to discover, 229-231.
- Fortnightly Review*: 413 *n.*
- France (*see also* Belgian Neutrality — Bienvenu-Martin — Mobilization — Neutralization, the various treaties — Viviani): wishes to annex Belgium, 5-6; policy toward Belgium, 6; enters into alliance with Russia (1891), 8-9; rivalry with England for Colonial possessions, 11; yields Fashoda to avoid war with England, 11; enters into friendly understanding with England (1904), 12-13, 283-284; attitude toward Germany on account of Alsace-Lorraine, 13-15; relations with Russia undermined by Japanese war, 16; Anglo-French understanding in regard to Morocco confirmed by Algeciras Conference, 17; the Casablanca affair in Morocco (1908), 18-19; Moroccan protectorate by, recognized by Germany (1911), 23-24; position of, in Morocco resented by Germany, 35; increases armament, 35; critical internal situation of (1914), 36; endeavors to secure extension of time limit, 59-61, 270; Ambassador of, at St. Petersburg believes that only firm united action of Entente can avert war, 59; influences Serbia to make conciliatory reply, 62-64, 270; attitude towards Balkan matters, 147-148; asked by Germany to influence Russia against war, 147-155; believes Germany intends to precipitate a war, 155-163; will support Russia (July 29), 163-166; military preparations, 166-174; receives German ultimatum, 174-177; Germany plans to make, hostage for Russia, 180, 488; mobilization system, 180-181; weak spots in frontier, 180-181; and England unable to advise Russia to submit, 189; French representatives instructed to support British proposal, 231 *n.*; England refuses to side with, to prevent war, 273-282; Germany's bid for England's neutrality refused by England, 297-303, 348; respects neutrality of Belgium, 318; England asked to guarantee neutrality of, 328-336; assured of England's support in case of German attack on French coast, 339-352; neutrality of (Oxford Faculty of Modern History), 336 *n.*; why agreed to neutralization of Belgium, 387-388; reasons why unlikely to violate Belgian neutrality, 417-418; Germany accuses, of violating Belgian and German territory, 419-425; offers assistance to Belgium to defend neutrality, 438-439; no intention to invade Belgium, 448; learns Italy is likely to maintain an attitude of observation, 468-469; plan of campaign through Belgium (Delbrück), 488; did she first cross frontier, 519; did she influence Russia for peace, 519-520; peaceful intentions of, 520.
- Franco-Prussian War: readjustment of Europe following upon, 7-9.
- Franco-Russian Alliance: signed (1891), 8-9.
- Frankischer Kurrier*: 325 *n.*
- Franklin: proposal for the immunity of private property at sea, 503-504.
- Franz Ferdinand, Archduke: active in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20; plans of, for political reconstruction, 32-33; assassinated (June 28, 1914), 34, 155.
- Franz Joseph, *Emperor of Austria*: 34.
- Frederick the Great: 503.

- Freie Presse*: 127.
Fremdenblatt: 46.
 French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs: *see* Bienvenu-Martin.
 French Ambassador to Austria-Hungary: *see* Dumaine.
 French Ambassador at Berlin: *see* Cambon, Jules.
 French Ambassador at Constantinople: *see* Bompard.
 French Ambassador to Italy: *see* Barrère.
 French Ambassador at London: *see* Cambon, Paul.
 French Ambassador to Russia: *see* Paléologue.
 French Chargé d'Affaires at London: *see* Fleuriau, de.
 French Coast: obligation of England to protect, 307 *n*.
 French Consul General at Budapest: *see* d'Apchier Le Maugin.
 French frontier: violation of, 170, 173-174, 286 *n*.
 French Minister at Brussels: *see* Klobukowski.
 French Minister for Foreign Affairs: *see* Delcassé.
 French Minister of Justice: *see* Bienvenu-Martin.
 French Minister to Luxemburg: *see* Mollard.
 French Minister to Servia: *see* Boppe.
 French Minister for War (former): *see* Messimy.
 French Ministry for Foreign Affairs: *see* Berthelot.
 French Yellow Book: discrepancies of, vi, 285-286 *n*.
 Friedjung: trial at, 43 *n*, 125.
 Frontier, Franco-German: alleged violations of, 170, 173-174, 286 *n*, 325, 386 *n*.
 Fuller, Chief Justice: *Terlinden v. Ames*, succession of treaty obligations, 385 *n*.
 Fullerton, Wm. Morton: *Problems of Power*, 562 *n*.
 Galicia: 191.
 Gambetta: 15.
 Gauvin: date of Austrian mobilization, 335-336 *n*.
 George V, *King of England*: transmits Kaiser's telegram and appeals to Tsar in interest of peace, 254 *n*; Tsar answers that German declaration of war prevents acceptance of English proposal, 254-255 *n*; letter to Poincaré (Aug. 1), 276-277 *n*; Kaiser's telegram to, 286; efforts of, to avoid civil war, 308; telegram to Kaiser (Aug. 1), 329; telegram (July 30) to Henry of Prussia, 330; visit to Paris relative to Triple Entente, 553-554.
 Gerard, *American Ambassador to Germany*: 370.
 German Ambassador to Italy: *see* von Flotow.
 German Ambassador at London: *see* Lichnowsky.
 German Ambassador at Paris: *see* Schoen.
 German Ambassador at St. Petersburg: *see* Pourtalès.
 German Ambassador at Vienna: *see* Tchirsky.
 German Chancellor: *see* Bethmann-Hollweg.
 German frontier: violation of, 173, 286 *n*, 325.
 German General Staff, Chief of: *see* von Moltke.
 German Minister at Brussels: *see* Below-Saleske.
 German Minister to Luxemburg: *see* von Buch.
 German Minister of War: *see* Heeringen.
 German proposal: England will desert France and Russia if they reject reasonable, 233.
 German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: *see* Jagow.
 German ultimatum to Belgium: 323-326, 353, 361-362; Belgium's reply to, 326-328; Germany justifies, by French intentions and acts, 419-421.
 German ultimatum to France: 174-177.
 German ultimatum to Russia: demands Russian demobilization within twelve hours, 138-139, 142, 174; followed by declaration of war on Russia, 142-145; Jagow refuses to accept Grey formula until Russia answers, 241-242; not justified since Russia agrees to arrest mobilization, 259; signifi-

cant of bellicose policy, 260; effect on Austro-Russian relations, 262-263; only one answer possible, 262. German Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: *see* Zimmerman.

German White Book: vii.

Germany (*see also* Belgian Neutrality—Belgium, invasion of—Bethmann-Hollweg—German ultimatum—Jagow—Localization of Austro-Servian conflict—Mobilization, German—Prussia): gains for Austria administrative control of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878), 7-8; joins with Austria and Italy in Triple Alliance (1883), 8; joins with Austria in Dual Alliance (1879), 8; apprehension at formation of Anglo-French Entente, 12; policy to remain on good terms with England, 13; modifies colonial policy of Bismarck, 13; interest of, in maintaining open door in Morocco and China, 13; sees danger of French-English plans for Morocco, 15-16; Moroccan designs of, thwarted by Algeiras Conference, 17; compels resignation of Delcassé, 17; attitude toward France on account of Alsace-Lorraine, 13-15; development of, on sea, alarms England, 17; hemmed in by Triple Entente, 18; clashes with France over Casablanca affair in Morocco (1908), 18-19; joins Austria in befriending Turk against Russian ambitions, 19; Turkish policies of, threatened by Young Turks (1908), 20; supports Austria in annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20-21; at Agadir, again attacks French Moroccan interests, 22-23; fears Italy will desert Alliance, 25; new Army Bill necessary after Turkey's dismemberment, 27-28, 35; cherishes resentment against France for Morocco, 35; increasing friendly relations of, with England, 280-282, 304, 364-366, 560-571; Anglo-German Relations, 560-571; "passes on" to Austria Grey's suggestion regarding time limit of Austrian ultimatum, 60-61; view of, regarding Ser-

vian note, 79; Servian note not published in, 80; lacks will to preserve peace, 80; backs Austria, 84, 92, 117-118, 123-126, 132, 156-157; public opinion of, against Russia and France, 103, 105 *n*; handicapped in mediation between Austria and Russia by Russian mobilization, 114-115, 523; interest in the dispute, 117-118; denies previous knowledge of Austrian ultimatum, 119-123, 125; situation with Russia becomes acute, 133-142; delivers an ultimatum to Russia, 142-146; asks France to use her influence with Russia, 147-155; believed by France to be precipitating war, 155-163, 490; attitude of, toward mediation, 158-165, 271-273; ultimatum of, to France, 174-277; purpose of, to make France "hostage" for Russia, 180; preparedness of, 181; did not want war, 191; believes war inevitable, 191-192; complains of preparations in France and Russia, 192; coöperation of, necessary to mediation, 200-201, 216; objects to mediation, 205 *ff.*; declines conference, 208-210; warned by Grey of consequences of supporting Austria, 211; influence of, on Austria, 213, 224; discourages direct conversations, 219; position of, as Austria's ally, 223-224; Chancellor advises Austria to speak openly, 228; powers consider, alone able to speak at Vienna, 228; asked to "press the button," 231-234; inconsistency regarding mediation, 232; England will desert France and Russia if they reject reasonable proposal of, 233; Jagow thinks possible to accept Cambon suggestion if Russia does, 236-237; forwards Cambon suggestion to Vienna, 237; refuses to accept Grey proposal till Russia answers ultimatum, 241-242; Kaiser urges Austria to continue conversations, 242; asks Russia to propose a formula, 242-252; readiness to act as mediator, 244; cannot allow Russia to mobilize, 250; by accepting Grey proposal might have avoided war, 251; declaration of war forced

- by Russian mobilization, 251, 254-255; unjust to accuse of dilatory tactics, 251; advantage of, to force issue, 251-252, 267; belief that war could be avoided, 251-252; recommends to Vienna consideration of English proposals, 254 *n*; effect of ultimatum of, upon peace prospects, 259-260; direct conflict with Russia, 262; believes England will remain neutral, 273-278, 286-287, 295; appeals to England to prevent war, 278; warned that England will not hold aloof if France is involved, 295-296; bids for England's neutrality, 297-303, 348; proclaims martial law, 310 *n*; charges violations of frontier, 325; believes England will guarantee French neutrality, 328-336, 355 *n*, 522; detention by, of English vessels, 336-337; invades Luxemburg, 337-339; England will protect France against naval attack of, 339-352; violation of Belgium *casus belli* to England, 352-370; popular demonstration against English Ambassador, 367-370; good faith assailed by the Belgian government, 400; warned by Belgian Government of unauthorized Anglo-Belgium military conversations, 407-408; view concerning sanctity of treaties, 417; calls violation of Luxemburg not hostile but preventive act, 430; consequence and purpose of invasion of Belgium, 432-433; view concerning Belgian resistance, 441; accuses England of misrepresentations in regard to Belgium, 441-445; plea of, of necessity, 445-456; consideration actuating, in regard to invasion of Belgium, 448; diplomacy of, in Turco-Italian War, 458; will not put pressure on Austria (Giuliano), 462; asks Italy her intentions (Aug. 1), 469-470; policy of, 477; dilemma of, requiring immediate decision, 478 *n*; why opportune moment to make war, 479; should have foreseen English intervention, 480; philosophy and military influence led to Belgian invasion, 480-481; sacrifices international law to strategic considerations, 480-481; risked peace of Europe to gain prestige, 485; blames war on Russian mobilization, 485-486; to blame for England's intervention, 487, 489; had a better plan of campaign, 489; responsibility of, for the war, 491; responsible for war, because supported Austria's localization of question, 484; responsible for Russian and Austrian causal action for war, 491; responsibility for change of attitude towards Russian mobilization, 492; thinks differently from rest of world, 493; geographical position, and effects of, 493, 500; refused to join the super-empire, 499-500; nationalistic conceptions of, 502-508, 510-511; at parting of the ways, 503; embittered by diplomatic checks, 505; aggression, reason for, 505-508; increase of population, 506; race-suicide, 506-507; doctrine of national necessity, 508-509; wonderful mental mobilization, 510; opposed to *status quo*, 511; free development checked by balance of power (Bethmann-Hollweg), 511 *n*; national philosophy of force, 512; view of, of international law anachronism, 513; lesson taught by, 514; efforts to avoid war, 520-521; conduct of, likely to force war, 521; aggression against France, 521; weakness of diplomacy of, 521; why did, disregard usual procedure, 528; treaty of alliance with Austria, 540-541; treaty record of (Dernburg), 661.
- Gibraltar: 24.
- Giddings, Franklin H.: *The Larger Meanings of the War*, 652.
- Giesl von Gieslingen, Baron, *Austrian Minister at Belgrade*: opposed to "foul compromise," 266 *n*.
- Giolitti, *ex-Premier of Italy*: Italy refuses (1913) to countenance Austria's intended aggression against Serbia, 35, 121, 470-471.
- Giuliano: *see* San Giuliano.
- Givet: 323.
- Gladstone: binding effect of treaty of 1839, 386; view of obligations regarding Belgian guaranty, 389-390; meaning of obscure statement

- regarding Belgium, 386; letter to Bright concerning Belgium, 624.
- Goltz, von der: 20.
- Good faith: of Germany, assailed by the Belgian Government, 400; in observance of treaties, 453; of Italy, 460.
- Good offices: nature of, 205, 227 *n*, 244; powers employ at Vienna and Petersburg, 227-229; King George appeals to Tsar in interest of peace, 254 *n*; Germany recommends to Austria consideration of English proposal, 254 *n*; Hague Convention (Oct. 18, 1907) relative to, 651.
- Goschen, Sir Edward, *British Ambassador at Berlin*: final interviews in Berlin (Aug. 4), 363-370.
- Governments: trustees for humanity, 451; responsibility of, easier to fix in foreign than internal affairs, 492.
- Grain: Belgian retention of, bound to Germany, 421.
- Great Britain: *see* England.
- Greater Serbia: hope of, 21, 30-31; secret organizations of, 33-34; (*London Times*), 74-75.
- Greece: 19, 26-27.
- Greindl, Baron, *Belgian Minister at Berlin*: aware of English preparations to invade Belgium, 396 *n*-397; necessity of preparations against England, 398-399; consideration of report of, 399; report of, evidence of Belgian good faith, 400; Belgian Government explains meaning of report of, 400 *n*.
- Grey, Sir Edward, *English Secretary for Foreign Affairs*: biographical note, 268 *n*; responsibility of, 268-279; Treaty of London, 27; sees danger of time limit in Austrian ultimatum, 48, 54, 270; fears war, 51; on Servian note, 79, 83; on Russian mobilization, 115-116, 186; "Servia a danger to European peace," 127 *n*; Austrian ultimatum made, powerless to influence Russia, 189; unable to intervene for peace, 194; policy of not taking sides and the preservation of peace, 194, 273-282, 293-295; 303-307, 354-359 *n*; proposes conference of the powers, 197-213, guarantees France will accept mediation, 202; urges moderation at Vienna, 211; warns Germany of consequences of supporting Austria, 211; makes official proposal of mediation, 215-216; approves direct conversations between Russia and Austria, 217-218; deploras European conflict, 217-218; asks Chancellor's aid, 228-229; plan of mediation of powers, 231; says England will support France and Russia only if they do not reject reasonable German proposal, 233; can do nothing in face of Austrian refusal of mediation, 228, 235; Germany criticizes, for not pressing mediation, 235 *n*; approves Cambon suggestion, 237-238; asks Russia to change Sazonof formula, 237-238; proposal of, for a collective guaranty of powers, 239-242; stumbling-block between Austria and Russia, 240; Germany refuses to accept proposal of, till Russia answers ultimatum, 241-242; promises to take into account Germany's unconciliatory attitude, 247-248; Sazonof modifies formula at request of, 249; acceptance of proposal of, might have avoided war, 251; possibility of preserving peace if Russia will arrest mobilization, 258; situation in which he brought forward his proposal, 265-266; gives reasons for failure of peace negotiations, 267; efforts of, to organize mediation, 270-273; influence of England for peace, list of references, 270 *n*; refrains from forcing issue, 279-280; encourages Germany to peaceful concession, 282; letter to P. Cambon, 1912, and his reply regarding unprovoked attack by a third power, 283-284, 290-291, 552-553; account of formation of *Entente*, 288, 291; reserves independence of action, 294-295; warns Germany England will not hold aloof if France is involved, 295-296; refuses Germany's bid for English neutrality, 298-303, 332 *n*, 348; answers Keir Hardie in Parliament Aug. 27, 302-303 *n*, 358-359 *n*; attacked by MacDonald,

- 302 *n*; diplomatic importance of question of, addressed to Belgian regarding neutrality, 311-316, 332 *n*; the question of, to Belgium and its reply, 316-318, 332 *n*; asks assurance of Belgium regarding resistance, 318-320; Lichnowsky incident (guaranty by England of neutrality of France), 328-336, 355 *n*, 358-359 *n*; protests against German detention of English vessels, 336-337; on Luxemburg neutrality, 338-339; agreement to France to protect French coasts, 339-352; England's interest and obligation to protect France (speech in Commons Aug. 3), 345-351; nature of Anglo-French *Entente* (speech in Commons, Aug. 3), 351-352; neutrality of Belgium (speech in Commons, Aug. 3), 353-360, 620; Conybeare's arraignment of, 357-359 *n*; unjustly assailed, 359 *n*; statement (1913) regarding Belgian neutrality, 401-402; authorizes statement (Jan. 27) commenting on Chancellor's associated press interview, 406-407 *n*; call upon Belgium to defend neutrality, 435; Bethmann-Hollweg discusses statement of, concerning Belgian neutrality, 455 *n*; effect of warning to Germany, 487; sane conduct of English policy, 491; attitude regarding German invasion of Belgium, 526; diplomacy of, 527; considers action of Russia defensive, 527; statement of, regarding intervention, persiflage, 527; admirable diplomacy of, analyzed, 528.
- Grotius: 316.
- Gruic, *General Secretary of the Serbian Foreign Office*: 49 *n*.
- Guardian*, Manchester: 309 *n*, 313 *n*, 360-361 *n*.
- Guaranty: Grey proposal for collective, of powers, 239-242; of powers to Austria and Russia, 265-266; England's obligation in regard to Belgium, 386; of neutrality, obligation to make good, 387 *ff*.; of Belgian neutrality, England will not violate first, 401; of England and France under Treaty of (1839), 405; nature of collective, applying to Luxemburg, 423; collective, opinion of Milovanovitch, 424 *n*.
- Hague Conventions: application of, to neutralization of Belgium, 391 *n*; Belgian Government declares resistance under, not hostile act, 440; of 1907 relative to settlement of international disputes (text), 651; of 1907 relative to the opening of hostilities, 87-88, 352 *n*; (text), 651.
- Hague Tribunal: decision of Casablanca affair, 19; Serbia offers to submit dispute with Austria to, 64-65.
- Haldane: 342.
- Hansard: *Parliamentary Debates*, 606-624.
- Hardie, Keir: interrogates Grey in Parliament Aug. 27, 302 *n*, 358-359 *n*; Grey answers, 301-303 *n*.
- Hare, Francis: The Barrier Treaty vindicated, 598.
- Havenith, *Belgian Minister at Washington*: transmits a statement of Belgian Government regarding Anglo-Belgian conversations, 407-408; statement regarding the publication of the Belgian documents with explanation by Dr. Dernburg, 635.
- Heads of state: direct action by, 252-253 *n*.
- Heeringen, von, *German Minister of War*: neutrality of Belgium, 322.
- Helfferich, *German Secretary of the Treasury*: "menace allemande," 150 *n*; authenticity of F. Y. B., 155-156 *n*; why France assured Russia of support, 165-166 *n*, 296 *n*, 306 *n*; the peace of the world vs. the *Entente*, 312 *n*; England's provisional declaration of war, 352 *n*.
- Hengelmuller, Baron L.: reason for England's intervention, 443.
- Henry, Prince, of Prussia: telegraphs King George (July 30), 329-330.
- Herzegovina: see Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Hill, David Jayne: neutrality of Belgium, 382; nature of neutrality, 638.

- Hohenburg, Duchess of: 34, 76 *n.*
- Holland: Congress of Vienna (1815) gives Belgium to, 5; Belgium revolts from, 5; Germany ready to give conditional pledge regarding neutrality of, 297; mobilization of, 310 *n.*; attitude towards the treaty of 1839, 389; violation of the neutrality of, by England, 410; attitude towards defense of Belgian neutrality, 411; colonial possessions of, 505; England's attitude in case of, 526; Barrier Treaty of 1709 with England, 596, 598.
- Holls; *Peace Conference at The Hague*: 539.
- Home Rule Bill: amending of, 308.
- Hostage: Germany plans to make France, for Russia, 488.
- Hostilities: Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the opening of, 87-88, 352 *n.*, 651.
- Humanity: interests of, sacrificed to narrow nationalism, 496; basis of the unity of, 509-510.
- Ideals: maintenance of, 450; survival of fit, 451.
- Imperator, the: 310 *n.*
- Indemnization: Austria requires of Serbia, 234 *n.*, 263.
- Independence: of states, German invasion of Belgium violates principle of, 390-391; of Belgium, resistance necessary to preserve, 453; of Serbia, Italy interested in preserving, 461; of Serbia, Austrian intentions concerning, 525; difference between formal and real, 483.
- India: 10-11.
- "Influenced": (territories of the empire states), 497.
- Intention: of France to invade Belgium, 488 *n.*; of France made justification of German violation, 419-421.
- Intermediate military preparation: *see* Military preparations — Mobilization.
- International commission: to control police inquiry in Serbia, 242.
- International Conciliation Pamphlet* (no. 84): Speech of von Bethmann-Hollweg in Reichstag Aug. 4, 145-146 *n.*
- International coöperation: 513.
- International court: establishment of, 501 *n.*
- International disputes: Hague Convention of Oct. 18, 1907, relative to settlement of, 651.
- Internationalism: development of, 496; German attitude in regard to, 513.
- International law: importance of forms and courtesies to, 77 *n.*; duty of all states to prevent invasion of Belgium, 390-391; enforcing of, 391; sanctions of, 392; status of neutrality according to, 393; method of growth of (Westlake), 393 *n.*; fundamental principles of, 453-456; practical nature of, 455; penalty for violation, 456; German sacrifices, to strategic considerations, 480-481; Bismarck's example encourages to violation of, 494; German attitude tends to minimize, 504; German view of, an anachronism, 513.
- International police (*see also* Peace Power): 500; dangers of, 501 *n.*
- Intervention: mediation distinguished from diplomatic, 205, 244 *n.*, 279; covers political designs, 392; armed, hastened by destruction of Maine (1898) and assassination of Arch-Duke (1914), 583-585.
- Intervention of England: *see* England's Intervention.
- Inviolability of private property at sea: 503-504.
- Ireland: political situation in, 308.
- Ischl: 61.
- Isvolsky, *Russian Ambassador at Paris*: 547.
- Italia irredenta*: 457.
- Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs: *see* San Giuliano.
- Italy (*see also Casus fœderis* — San Giuliano — Triple Alliance): joins Germany and Austria in Triple Alliance (1883), 8; irritated by Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21, 457; policy of expansion, 24-25; deserts allies to wage Turco-Italian War (1911-12), 25-26; acquires Tripoli and Cyrenaica, 26; works with Austria against Serbia and Montenegro, 28-29; designs of, upon Albania,

- 32, 41; refuses (1913) to join in aggression upon Serbia, 35, 470-471; kept ignorant regarding Austrian ultimatum, 45, 120-121, 467-468; joins *Entente* powers in endeavors to extend time limit of Austrian ultimatum, 61, 270; minister for Foreign Affairs of, criticizes Austria for rejecting Servian note, 75; urges Germany and Austria to take favorable view of Servian note, 83; believes Austria determined to punish Serbia, 83; a possible mediator, 193-194; plan for mediation, 234-236; urges England to declare herself on side of France and Russia, 277-278; remains neutral, 347, 467-473; takes her place in European concert (1867), 423; desire for peace, 457-462; obligation to stand with allies, 460; Russian efforts to detach from Triple Alliance (Price), 461 *n*; cooperation with England, 465-467, 490; attitude of observation likely, 468-469; Germany asks intentions of (Aug. 1), 469-470; considers Austrian action aggressive, 470; significance of attitude of, as showing Austro-German aggression, 472-473; not bound by Triple Alliance to join war against England (Thayer), 473; balances between *Entente* and triple alliance, 478 *n*; restricted by Triple Alliance in action upon Germany, 490 *n*.
- Ito, Marquis: 12.
- Jagow, von, *German Secretary for Foreign Affairs*: on Austrian ultimatum, 56, 119-120; declares Austrian intentions on Serbia, 58; passes on suggestion to secure extension of time limit at Vienna, 61; believes Russia will not move, 102; on Russian mobilization "against Germany," 133, 139-140; says conference not practical, 208-209; objects to grouping of *Entente* against Triple Alliance, 209; thinks Cambon suggestion may be acceptable, 236-237; refuses to accept Grey proposal until Russia answers ultimatum, 241-242; on England's refusal of Germany's bid for neutrality, 300; on Belgian neutrality, (Reichstag, April, 1913), 321-322; final interviews with Goschen, (Aug. 4), 363-365; apology of, to Goschen, 367-368; interview with the Belgian Minister, 436-438.
- James, Henry: on violation of Belgian neutrality, 314 *n*.
- Japan: enters into alliance with England (1902), 12; effect of war with, on Russia, 188, 195; treaty with Russia guaranteeing the present territory of each, the integrity of China and the "Open Door" in China, 550; agreement with Russia concerning Manchuria, 551; care for British interests, 498; agreement with Great Britain, 1911 (text), 541-542.
- Jaurès: assassinated (July 31, 1914), 308 *n*.
- Johnstone, Sir A., *British Minister to Luxemburg*.
- Johnston, Sir Harry; *Colonial Development and Removal of Conflicting Interests*: 566.
- Joint intervention: *see* Collective action.
- Joncherey: 173 *n*.
- Jougo-Slave: *see* Southern Slav.
- Journal des Débats*, Paris: 174 *n*, 265 *n*.
- Jovanovitch, *Servian Minister at Vienna*: predicts Austria's action on Serajevo crime, 42-43 *n*, 47-48; recounts attack on Servian flag in Vienna, 88 *n*.
- Jowett, B.: extract from *Thucydides*, 645.
- Jungbluth, General: 396 *ff*.
- Kaiser of Germany: *see* William II.
- Kamerun: 24.
- Karageorgevich: 76 *n*.
- Kazan: 111, 135.
- Khedive of Egypt: 11.
- Kiderlen-Waechte: 155-156 *n*.
- Kieff: 110, 135.
- Kitchener: 11, 342-343 *n*.
- Klobukowski, *French Minister at Brussels*: on intention of France regarding defense of Belgium, 327-328.
- Koelnische Zeitung*: 323 *n*, 446 *n*.
- Korea: 12.
- Kovno: 111.

- Kriegsgefahr* (see also Mobilization): defined, 141, 170-171; proclaimed July 31, 138, 141, 170-171, 184, 193.
- Kriegsraison*: 504 *n*.
- Kriegsverlauf*: 409 *n*.
- Kudachef, *Russian Chargé d'Affaires and Councilor of Embassy at Vienna*: on Austrian Ultimatum, 55; consults with Count Berchtold, 96-97.
- Kuhlmann, Baron: *Councilor of the German Embassy in London: communiqué of*, to press (Aug. 3), 360-361.
- La Fère: 413 *n*.
- Lansdowne: pledges support to Asquith, 343.
- Laon: 413 *n*.
- Law, A. Bonar: pledges support to Asquith, 343.
- Law of Nations: see International law.
- Laws of War: (see also International law): Germany considers *Kriegsraison* superior to, 504.
- Liao-tung: 12.
- Liberal Party (England): 309.
- Lichnowsky, Prince, *German Ambassador at London*: anxiety of, 63, 158; urges localization, 211; personal bid of, for England's neutrality, 300-303, 357-359 *n*; *communiqué* to press Aug. 3, 303, 360-361; mistake of, regarding guaranty by England of French neutrality, 328-336, 355 *n*, 358-359 *n*; Shaw on, 356 *n*.
- Liège: 362.
- Limburg: treaty of the powers (May 11, 1867) relative to the Duchy of, 603.
- Limitation of armament: see Disarmament.
- Lincoln: as example for German youth, 494.
- Literary Digest*: (Delbrück): 560.
- Lloyd George: 23, 73 *n*, 76 *n*; speech on Austrian ultimatum and Serbian reply (text), 586.
- Localization of Austro-Serbian conflict (see also Austrian Ultimatum — Mobilization, German — Mobilization, Russian): possible (Austria and Germany), 101-103, 105; impossible (Russia), 99, 105-111; favored by *London Times*, 126, 126 *n*; Grey and P. Cambon on, 130 *n*, 278; Germany insists upon, 126-130, 149-150, 158-159; Spalaikovitche on, 129 *n*; Russia will be responsible for failure of (Germany), 131-133, 151, 153; Germany asks French intervention with Russia regarding, 151-155; *Echo de Paris* concerning, 150; Bienvenu-Martin on, 163-164 *n*; France will support Russia (July 29), 163-166; Germany declares war on Russia, 143-145.
- Lockal Anzeiger*: 125, 157, 168.
- Lorraine: see Alsace-Lorraine.
- Louis XIV: 9.
- Ludwig, Ernest: 72 *n*.
- Luxemburg: treaty of powers guaranteeing neutrality of (text), 603; declarations (1870) of France and Prussia to respect neutrality of (text), 605; German military preparations extend from, 169; invaded by Germany, 337-338; English interpretation of treaty guaranteeing neutrality of, 338-339, 423-429; history of, 422-423; violation of the neutrality of, 422-431; collective guaranty of neutrality of, 423; law of succession to, 424; invasion of, Germany considers not hostile but preventive act, 430, 529; Germany's invasion of, act of war against France, 521; Parliamentary Debate on the neutrality of, 606.
- Macchio, Baron von, *Under Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office*: "Interest an excuse for not being courteous," 77 *n*.
- MacDonald, J. Ramsay: attack upon Grey, 302 *n*.
- Macedonia: 19, 26-27, 124.
- Mach, Dr. Edmund von; *What Germany wants*: 130 *n*, 135 *n*, 401, 485 *n*.
- Magyars: place in Austro-Hungarian state, and Dual Alliance, 8; Franz Ferdinand's plans regarding, 32-33.
- Mahommedans: 23, 91.
- Mail, London Daily*: 309 *n*.
- Maine, The: 95; negotiations of the Spanish and American Govern-

- ments following the destruction of, 579.
- Manchuria: agreement between Russia and Japan concerning (text), 551.
- Marchand, Captain: 11.
- Maubeuge: presence of British troops and stores at, 421.
- Mediation (*see also* Conference): distinction between, and intervention, 205 *n*, 244 *n*, 279; Hague Convention (1907) relative to (text), 651; efforts of Tsar and Kaiser toward, 112, 115, 145-146 *n*, 252-254 *n*, 329-330; attitude of Germany toward, 158-165; renewal of, 164; England and Italy could offer, 193; of the four less interested powers, 198-200, 203-204; between Austria and Serbia, 199 *n*; Paul Cambon suggests deferring proposal of, 200; Grey guarantees France will accept, 202; Germany objects to, 205 *ff*.; concerning Austrian ultimatum, Berchtold refuses, 212; efforts to discover a formula for, 229-231; principle of, accepted by Germany, 231; Germany inconsistent regarding, 232; San Giuliano suggestions for, 234-235; Bethmann-Hollweg criticizes Grey for not continuing to press, 235; after occupation of Belgrade (Cambon), 236-239; Austria agrees to, 252-264; Berchtold does not agree to discuss modification of Austrian ultimatum, 255; Tsar declares Russian troops will not attack while it continues, 255 *n*; if Russia arrests mobilization Austria will accept, 256; between Austria and Serbia, proposal for, 258; criticism of Viviani's statement concerning Russia's acceptance of proposal for, 259-260 *n*; efforts to organize, 270-273; Germany blames Russia for mobilization during, 523; possibility of England's, between Germany and Russia, 528.
- Mediterranean: Italy cannot control, 24; Triple Alliance does not cover, 478 *n*.
- Melians: defend their neutrality against Athenians, 645.
- Mensdorff, Count, *Austrian Ambassador at London*: on Servian note, 71 *n*; on Austrian policy toward Serbia, 89.
- Mental mobilization: in time of war, 510.
- Messimy, *Former French Minister for War*.
- Metz: 169-170.
- Meuse Valley: 323, 413 *n*.
- Michigan Law Review*: 504.
- Mignet, F. A.: *Négociations relatives à la Succession d'Espagne*, 595.
- Mikado of Japan: 12.
- Milhaud, Edg.: 325 *n*.
- Militarism: heads of German army insist upon mobilization, 250; peculiar view of military men, 405 *n*.
- Military economy: determined by political situation, 179-190.
- Military preparations: in Germany and France, 166-174; intermeditate, 183-184; suspension of, by powers, 259; Anglo-Belgian (text of secret documents regarding), 626.
- Milovanovitch: opinion of, concerning collective guaranty, 424 *n*.
- Minister, *see* English, French, German, etc., minister.
- Ministerial Council, Russian: 192.
- "Mobilitis": Europe afflicted with, 184-185.
- Mobilization: meaning and effect of, 178-181; rapidity of, 179; efforts of statesmen to withhold, 188; issuance of the general order for, 181-183; intermediate preparations, 183-184; *Kriegsgefahrzustand*, nature of, 184; contagion of, 184 *ff*.; fatal succession of mobilizations, 184-194; Germany obliged by strategic considerations to make war once mobilization begun, 185; German attitude towards Russia's partial mobilization, 191; Russia cannot permit negotiations to cover German and Austrian, 245; impossible to arrest, in middle, 250 *n*.
- Mobilization, Austrian: against Serbia, 80-81, 335-336 *n*; how affected by Russian mobilization, 134-136; why Russia feared, 160; previous to Russian (Viviani), 335 *n*; Russia cannot permit negotiations to cover, 245.

- Mobilization, Belgian (July 31): 280 *n*, 310 *n*, 319-320.
- Mobilization, Dutch: 310 *n*, 319.
- Mobilization, French: 166-174, 310 *n*.
- Mobilization, German (*see also* German ultimatum): Germany threatens counter mobilization, 136-137; false alarm of, July 30, 137, 168; "danger of war" declared July 31, 138, 141, 174; made necessary by Russian mobilization, 133-143, 145-146 *n*; ordered August 1, 143-144, 145, 146 *n*; certain reservists called to "attention" July 21 (J. Cambon), 166; against France, 166-174, 310 *n*; excellence of, 180; advantage of, due to rapidity, 185; Russia cannot permit negotiations to cloak, 245; delay of, costly to Germany, 250; officers insist upon, 250; Aug. 1 pending guaranty of French neutrality, 329.
- Mobilization, Russian (*see also* German ultimatum): (July 29), 109-116, 135-136, 310 *n*, 335-336; order for, withheld by Russia, 110-111; alarming reports of, reach Germany, 110-114, 133-134; impossible to halt, 115; "against Germany" defined (Jagow), 133; effect of, on Austria and Germany, 133-142, 146 *n*; Germany threatens counter mobilization, 136, 137; definition of, "against Germany" modified, 139-140; justifiable?, 165 *n*; Buchanan urges Russia to defer order for, 186; reason for, against Austria, 186; against Austria, Grey considers inevitable, 186; date of, 192-193; reasons for, 193; Hollweg says, spoils everything, 242; Pourtalès says makes conference difficult, 243-244; general mobilization will be ordered if Sazonof formula rejected, 245; Russia cannot postpone general, when Germany is arming, 245; Berchtold urges Germany to arrest, by threats, 246 *n*; Sazonof says must hasten, 246; general mobilization, effect of upon term of Sazonof formula, 249-250; Germany cannot allow Russia to undertake, 250; forced Germany to declare war, 251; reasons why Russia could refrain from, 251; ordered, 253; impossible to arrest, 253 *n*; measures decided upon July 25, 253 *n*; general mobilization premature and regrettable step, 253 *n*; effect of menacing tone of Kaiser to Tsar, 253 *n*; general mobilization, France and England not notified of, 253 *n*; general mobilization, England learns of from Germany, 253-254 *n*; general mobilization, Tsar explains why necessary, 255 *n*; if Russia arrests, Austria will accept mediation, 256; Buchanan gives reason for, 257; Grey says possibility of preserving peace if Russia will arrest, 258; German ultimatum not justified since Russia agrees to arrest, 259; Viviani says Russia agrees to arrest, 259; Viviani mistaken that Russia agrees to arrest, 260 *n*; German ultimatum demands demobilization of, 260; Szapary tells Sazonof he ignores effect upon Austria of, 263; perhaps caused by fear of intervention in favor of Austria, 264; why could not be arrested, 264; of army and fleet, 335; precipitate nature of, 336; discussed (Durkheim and Denis), 336 *n*; would necessitate German declaration of war, 459; Germany blames, for war, 485-486; German change of attitude towards partial, 486; destroyed last hope of peace, 486; effects of slow, on German strategy (Delbrück), 488 *n*; effect of Austria's threat to mobilize, 487 *n*.
- Mobilization, Servian: (July 25), 79-80, 86.
- Modified quotation: explanation of term, 42 *n*.
- Mollard, *French Minister to Luxembourg*.
- Monroe Doctrine: why England accepted, 497; excludes Germany from South America, 505; Declaration of American delegates at Hague, 539; American policy of, officially adopted by Congress (1901), 543; official exposition of (1901) (Roosevelt), 543.
- Montenegro: 26, 28-30.
- Moore, John Basset: 539 *n*.

- Morley: resignation of, from Cabinet, 341-342 *n*; *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, 624.
- Morocco: England undertakes to support France in (1904), 13; declaration (1904) of England and France respecting (text), 544-546; coveted by Germany, 13, 505; Franco-English understanding in regard to, frets Germany, 15-16; German Emperor visits (1905), 16; Algeiras Conference confirms French interests, 17; the Casablanca affair, 18-19; decision of Hague Tribunal in regard to Casablanca affair, 19; Agadir incident (1911), 22-23, 289-290; recognized by Germany as French protectorate (1911), 23-24; Grey on English policy toward France regarding, 288-290.
- Moscow: 102, 110, 135.
- Namur: 323.
- Napoleon I: 3-4, 6, 9-10.
- Napoleon III: 387.
- Narodna Odbrana: activities of, 69; dissolution of, demanded by Austria, 68-69, 76 *n*; Serbia's reply regarding, 65-66, 68; Russian sympathies for activities of, 69 *n*. See also documents, 574-578, 586-588.
- National interest: determines national policy, 508.
- National necessity: see Necessity.
- National states: age of, on the point of passing, 495.
- Nationalism: conceptions of, replaced by internationalism, 495-496; Germany's nationalistic conception, 502-508; compared with internationalism, 508-514.
- Nationality: Italy claims of Austrian territory under plea of, 457.
- Nations: see also States — Governments.
- Naval Strength: England's arrangements to maintain, 498.
- Near East: see Balkans.
- "Near" — ultimatum: first Sazonof formula was, 248.
- Necessity: Germany at first justifies violation of Belgium by, 400; law of, Chancellor right to appeal to, 416 *n*; translations of remarks of Chancellor regarding, 445-446 *n*; why Germany supports doctrine of, 508-509; German views in regard to scope of, 417; Germany's plea of, 445-456; attitude of world toward Chancellor's plea of, 520; Germany's invasion of Belgium not a case of, 522.
- Negotiations: of the Spanish and American Governments following the destruction of the Maine, 579, 584.
- Netherlands: see Holland.
- Neue Freie Press*: 46, 75 *n*.
- Neueste Nachrichten*: Leipziger, 74 *n*.
- Neues Wiener Tageblatt*: 46.
- Neutrality: (see also Belgian Neutrality — English Neutrality — French Neutrality — Luxemburg — Neutralization): nature of (Hill), 638; distinction between, and neutralization, 7; reason for, 392; in case of violation of international law, 393; defended by Melians against Athenians (extract from Thucydides), 645.
- Neutrality League: 309 *n*.
- Neutralization (see also Luxemburg — Neutrality — Neutralization of Belgium): difference between, and ordinary neutrality, 7; purpose of Belgian, 379 *ff.*; Palmerston, views on, 384 *n*; Germany bound by treaty (of 1839), 385; obligation to make good guaranty of neutrality, 387 *ff.*; English view regarding treaty of 1831, 388; Wicker criticizes right of neutralized state to defend, 432; application to Alsace and Lorraine, 453 *n*.
- Neutralization of Belgium: intended to establish "stopper state," 387; why France agreed to, 387-388; views of powers regarding (in 1831), 388; application of the Hague Convention, 391 *n*; effect of fortifications on, 412 *n*; evil results of, 432.
- Neutral States: right to enter into defensive treaties, 408.
- Newfoundland: 13.
- News*, London Daily: 555.
- Nicholas, *Tsar of Russia*: telegraphs Servian Prince, 100; appeals to Kaiser to restrain Austria (July 29), 112, 115, 145 *n*, 252 *n*; pledges Kaiser that army will not threaten

- Austria pending negotiations, 115, 146 *n.*, 253 *n.*; appeals to England for support, 255 *n.*; declares Russian troops will not assemble while mediation continues, 255 *n.*; German declaration of war prevents acceptance of English proposal, 254 *n.*
- Nicholson, Sir Arthur, *British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs*: remark to Paul Cambon, 295.
- Niemeyer, Prof., Kiel University: view concerning *Kriegsraison*, 504 *n.*
- Nile, upper: 11.
- Nish: 100.
- Non-resistance: doctrine of, 501 *n.*
- Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*: denial of knowledge of Austrian ultimatum (Bavarian Government), 120 *n.*; semi-official organ of Government, 126 *n.*; advocates localization of Austro-Servian dispute, 126 *n.*; Chancellor condemns conference of the powers as an "areopagus," 210; attacks veracity of B. W. P.; answer to, 285-286 *n.*; documents on Entente negotiations (England, France, and Russia), 292 *n.*, 551; Belgian neutrality, 321-322; telegrams of Kaiser, King George, Prince Henry, 329-330; French neutrality correspondence, 330-333; *Case of Belgium*, 395; challenged by London *Times* concerning secret documents, 399 *n.*; secret agreement of Belgium and England, 409-410 *n.*; formation of Triple Entente (official correspondence), 551-559; Document (3) Anglo-Belgian military preparations, 626 *ff.*; exhibit 38 of German White Book: violation of Belgian neutrality by England and Belgium, 634.
- North-German Gazette*: see *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.
- Norway: 10.
- Novibazar: 91 *n.*
- Novoe Vremya*: 131.
- Nuremberg: 173 *n.*
- Obligation, of England to France: 291-292.
- Obrenovic, Milos: 76 *n.*
- Observation: Italy likely to maintain attitude of, 468-469.
- Occupation of Belgrade: see Belgrade.
- Odessa: 110, 135.
- Oligarchy, Military: 492.
- "Open Door": Germany wants, in Morocco and China, 13; Germany might have exerted influence for, 504; Russo-Japanese treaty guaranteeing in China, 550.
- Oriental Railway: 20.
- Orsova: 87.
- Outlook*: (Dumba), 69 *n.*, 587.
- Oxford Faculty of Modern History: on Lichnowsky incident, 336 *n.*
- Pacifists: some errors of, 501 *n.*
- Pakrac: 50.
- Paléologue, *French Ambassador to Russia*.
- Palmerston, Lord: relations with Belgium; 5-6; views on neutralization, 384 *n.*
- Pan-Serb agitation: 130, 145 *n.*
- Pan-Slav: see Southern Slav.
- Panther, The: German cruiser at Agadir, 23.
- Parliamentary debates: concerning neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, 606 *ff.*
- Pascal: nature of custom, 391.
- Pashitch, *Servian Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs*: declares Servia sincere, 49-50; defends Servian Government from Austrian imputations (July 1), 53 *n.*; statement of, to press (July 1914), 74-75 *n.*; "The Tsar is great and clement," 100-101.
- Peace: of Europe, maintained by balance between Entente and Alliance, 15; the will to preserve, 80; London *Times*, on European, 126; cities determine nation's attitude towards, 188 *n.*; possibility of Anglo-Italian coöperation to secure, 490; treaty of, will be a compromise, 515.
- "Peace power": nature of, 500-502.
- Perpetual neutrality (see Neutralization): difference between, and ordinary neutrality, 7.
- Persia: Russian ambitions to secure, formerly feared by England, 10; partition of, by England and

- Russia (1907), 18; Anglo-Russian agreement concerning, 498; Anglo-Russian agreement (text), 546-548.
- Persian Gulf: 20.
- Peter the Great: apocryphal will of, 537-539.
- Phillips: *Modern Europe*, 422.
- "Pig War": 30, 147.
- "Place in the Sun": 504.
- Poincaré, *President of the French Republic*: France pacific (July 30), 167; believes Sazonof formula will not be accepted, 248; letter to King George July 31, 275 and *n*; visit to Russia relative to Triple Entente, 558.
- Pola: 32.
- Poland: 3, 8 *n*.
- Policies: protection of, of state, 392; of England, France and Germany, 477; political aims of powers, 530 *ff*.
- Political Science Quarterly*: (Munroe Smith), 14 *n*, 55 *n*, 99 *n*, 107 *n*, 140 *n*, 405 *n*, 415 *n*, 433 *n*, 442 *n*, 442-443 *n*; (S. P. Duggan), 20 *n*, 21 *n*, 32 *n*.
- Post*, New York *Evening*: 302 *n*, 309 *n*, 655.
- Port Arthur: 12.
- Portugal: British satellite, 30; Anglo-German discussions relative to eventual partition of colonies of, 304 *n*; references to the Anglo-German secret treaty of 1898 relative to the eventual dismemberment of the colonies of, 562-563.
- Pourparlers: *see* Conversations.
- Pourtalès, *German Ambassador at St. Petersburg*: says Russian mobilization makes conference difficult, 243-244; breaks down when war inevitable, 244-245; appeals to Sazonof for suggestion, 245; change of tone toward Russia (July 29), 246.
- Powers (*see also* Concert of Powers — the various Treaties): neutralize Belgium, 6; note of to Balkan allies, 27; try to secure extension of the time limit, 59-61; influence Serbia to make a conciliatory reply, 62-64; efforts of, to prevent Russian intervention, 96; Jagow's objection to grouping of Entente against Alliance, 209; employ their good offices at Vienna and St. Petersburg, 227-229; urge ambassadorial conference, 229-231; induce Belgrade to yield, 231; collective guaranty of, proposed by Grey, 239-242; guaranty of, to Russia and Austria, 265-266.
- Press: Austrian, 44-45 *n*, 46-47 *n*, 50 *n*, 74-75 *n*, 88-89 *n*, 92, 156; English, 309 *n*, 313; German, 80, 137, 168, 325 *n*; Servian, *see* Press, Austrian.
- Prestige: of Austria engaged, 91, 107, 236; Bismarck condemns policy seeking, 485 *n*.
- Preventive war: England did not engage in, 512 *n*; 1914 best date for Germany to make, 512 *n*.
- Price, M. P.; *The Diplomatic History of the War*: 192-193 *n*, 224 *n*, 238 *n*, 354 *n*, 460-461 *n*.
- Princip, Gavrilo: 34.
- Procedure: *see* Diplomatic procedure.
- Protectorates: 497.
- Prussia: anxious for "buffer" state, 5 *n*; disposition of Alsace-Lorraine, 14; view regarding neutralization of Belgium, 388; what, did for Germany (Sarolea), 493; treaty of, to respect Belgian neutrality (text), 602; promises to respect neutrality of Luxembourg (text of treaty 1870), 605.
- Public opinion: Russia unable to hold back unless Austria makes concession, 245; sanction of international law, 392; in Italy against war, 464; ultimate force which exacts compliance with law, 501 *n*; comparison of effect on, of Serajevo crime (1914), and of Maine disaster (1898), 585.
- Pulnik, General, *Servian Chief-of-Staff*: arrested in Hungary, 86 *n*.
- Quadruple Conference: *see* Conference.
- Quai d'Orsay: 150 *n*, 176.
- Queen Draga: 30.
- Queen *v.* Dudley and Stephens: 452; extracts from, 642.
- Quotation, modified, explained, 42 *n*.
- Race-suicide: German view of, 506-507.

- Railways: military operations regarding, 170; Russia lacks, for rapid mobilization, 488.
- Rapidity of mobilization: *see* Mobilization.
- Rapprochement*: between Germany and England, 281-282.
- Rathgen, Prof. Karl: 567-568.
- Realpolitik*: meaning of, 494.
- Rebus sic standibus*: rule of, 379.
- Regicide: monarchical interest to suppress, 252 *n*.
- Reichsland*: 14.
- Reichspost*: 47 *n*, 75 *n*.
- Reichstag*: 15.
- Relativity of rights: soundness of idea, 452.
- Reservists: of Germany summoned, 170-172.
- Responsibility: Grey promises to Russia to take into account Germany's, 247-248; German theory of, 278 *n*; of Government easier to fix for foreign than for internal affairs, 492; of a nation difficult to determine, 492.
- Responsibility for the war: Austrian, 483; Germany's part in, because of localization policy, 484; Germany's part of, for refusal to join Conference, 484; Russia's, because of mobilization, 486; how to fix, 491 *ff*.
- Resultant: Governments in foreign affairs give expression to, of internal views, 492.
- Results of the war: 514-515.
- Retaliation: against Germany for view of national necessity, 509.
- Reventlow, Count: 15.
- Revue de Paris*: 335-336 *n*.
- Richelieu: proposal for the independence of Belgium, 595.
- Rights of states: *see* International law.
- Rodd, Sir R., *British Ambassador at Rome*.
- Roosevelt, Theodore: message to Congress (1901) concerning Monroe Doctrine, 543.
- Roumelia: 20.
- Round Table, The*: 33 *n*.
- Rumania: 28-29, 94, 124.
- Rumbold, Sir H., *English Councillor of Embassy at Berlin*.
- Russia (*see also* Balkans — German ultimatum — Localization of Austro-Servian conflict — Mobilization — Mobilization, Russian — Nicholas — Responsibility — Sazonof): enters into alliance with France, (1891), 8-9; expansion of, former fears of England for, 10; alliance of England and Japan against (1902), 12; Russo-Japanese war, reveals weakness of Russia, 16; enters into convention with England, (1907), 17-18; rivalry with Austria in Balkans, 19, 28-29, 93-94, 96, 147-149; forced to accept Austria's *fait accompli*, 1908, 21-22, 31; influence of, strengthened in Servia after Balkan Wars, 32-33; increases armament, 35; critical internal situation of (1914), 36; kept ignorant of drafting of Austrian ultimatum, 45; diplomatic opinion of, regarding Austrian ultimatum, 55-56, 64, 70-71 *n*, 106; endeavors to secure extension of time limit of Austrian ultimatum, 59-61, 270; influences Servia to make conciliatory reply, 62-64, 270; tries to delay hostilities between Austria and Servia, 81-83; "protector of Servia," 96-101, 107-108, 131-132, 216-217; interest of, in the Austro-Servian conflict, 96-104; conciliatory attitude of, toward Austria, 103-104, 151-152; believes Austria's action directed against herself, 105-108; considers immediate action necessary, 108-109; partially mobilizes against Austria, 109-111; mobilization of, ordered, 114-115; prestige of, in the Balkans, 131; responsibility of, for supporting Servia, 131-133; situation with Germany becomes acute, 133-142; mobilization of, 138; Germany declares war upon (August 1), 143-145; shares with Austria control of Balkan matters, 147, 188; France will support, (July 29), 163-166; mobilization system, 179, 187; threatens mobilization if Austria attacks Servia, 186; dilemma of, 186; cannot yield to Austrian dictation, 188; distrust of Austria, 188-189; England and France unable to advise submission of,

- 189; war thrust upon, 189; belief that England would support, 192; war party in control, 192; orders general mobilization, 192-193; proposes conversations with Austria, 213-227; interposition of, between Austria and Serbia, 214; interests of, in mediation, 216-217; position of, as protector of Serbia, 216-217; ready to accept England's mediation proposal, 217; interests of, in Balkans, 223; exchange of views with Austria, 225-226; unable to hold back public opinion without concessions, 245; cause of change of attitude, 246-247; Grey promises, to take into account German responsibility for situation, 247-248; efforts to preserve peace up to July 29, 250-251; by mobilization forced German declaration of war, 251; orders general mobilization, 253; France and England not notified of general mobilization by, 253 *n*; believes Germany making active military preparations, 257; mobilization of, 257; cannot accept Germany's ultimatum, 259; criticism of Viviani's statement concerning acceptance of mediation proposal, 259-260 *n*; acceptance of the English proposal, 260; Viviani mistaken as to agreement to arrest mobilization by, 260 *n*; ready to accept any reasonable compromise, 262; German ultimatum did not interrupt agreement of Austria and, 263; limits of Austrian concessions to, 263; could not allow Austria to invade Serbia, 264; fear of intervention in favor of Austria perhaps caused mobilization, 264; England refuses to side with, to prevent war, 273-282; war party gains control (July 30), 308 *n*; proclaims general mobilization, 310 *n*; Austria believes, will yield, 468; fear of Austrian domination over Serbia, 482-483; fears Austrian advance on Salonika, 483; obliged to come to support of Serbia, 484; excuses for action of, in ordering premature mobilization, 486; conciliatory attitude of, 486; consideration of efforts of, to avoid war, 522-524; responsibility of, for the war, 522-524; English assurances to, against aggression might have delayed mobilization, 523; independence of Serbia vital interest for, 524; popular reason for wars of, 524; public opinion in, for intervention, 524; violations of German territory by, 525; Grey considers action of, defensive, 527.
- Russian Ambassador at Berlin: De Swerbécw.
- Russian Ambassador at London: Count Benckendorff.
- Russian Ambassador at Paris: Isvolsky.
- Russian Ambassador at Vienna: *see* Schébéko.
- Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade: Strandtman.
- Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin: *see* Bronewsky.
- Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris: Sevastopoulo.
- Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna: *see* Kudachef.
- Russian Councilor of Embassy at London: De Etter.
- Russian Councilor of Embassy at Vienna: *see* Kudachef.
- Russian formula: *see* Sazonof formula.
- Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs: *see* Sazonof.
- Russian Minister of War: Suchomlinof.
- Russian Orange Paper: confusion in, regarding Sazonof's statement, 243 *n*; date of Pourtalès-Sazonof interview, 244 *n*.
- St. Petersburg: strike in, 36, 111.
- Salandra *Italian Premier*: statement concerning the Austrian Ultimatum, 469.
- Salonika: 30, 91, 106, 195, 524.
- Sambre: 413.
- Samouprava*: 75 *n*.
- Sanctions: of international law, 392.
- San Giuliano, Marquis di, *Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs*: on rejection by Austria of Servian reply, 75; on Russia's probable move, 102-103; on Austrian ultimatum, 120-121; agrees to mediation, 232; suggestion for media-

- tion, 234-235; thinks Serbia may accept ultimatum unconditionally, 234; urges England to side with Russia and France, 277-278; Italy's interest in maintaining independence of Serbia, 461; makes helpful suggestions, 462-465.
- Sanjak, the, of Novibazar: 75 *n.*, 91 *n.*, 258.
- Sarolea, Charles; *The Anglo-German Problem*: Belgian mobilization, 280 *n.*; France and Belgium the Achilles heel of Britain, 316 *n.*; Prussia's gifts to Germany, 493.
- Saxony: 3.
- Sazonof, *Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs* (see also Sazonof formula): on Austrian ultimatum, 55, 64, 70-71 *n.*, 106; endeavors to secure extension of time limit of Austrian ultimatum, 60; Russia ready to leave question to powers, 201; thinks Serbia may propose arbitration, 201; efforts at conciliation, 213-214; trusts Grey will keep in touch, 216-217; ready to stand aside, 216; proposes to parallel "conversations" by conference, 221; will accept any arrangement approved by France and England, 243; statement of, regarding rupture of conversations, 243 *n.*; date of interview with Pourtalès, 244 *n.*; formula (of July 30), 245; Russia cannot permit negotiations to cloak German and Austrian military preparations, 245; hands Pourtalès formula, 245; says Russia unable to arrest mobilization and must hasten preparations, 246; action in modifying first formula, 250; thinks compromise can be reached only at London, 256; emphasizes importance of Austria's arresting action against Serbia, 257; announces readiness of Austria to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum, 257; accepts mediation if Serbia not invaded (Bunsen), 261; (Aug. 1) satisfaction that Austria will continue conversations, 263; Jagow says, more inclined to compromise, 266 *n.*
- Sazonof formula (first): Grey asks Russia to change, 237-238; difference between, and suggested modification, 238 *n.*; handed to Pourtalès, 245; Russia will order general mobilization if rejected, 245; something in nature of ultimatum, 245-246; "near"-ultimatum, 248; will not be accepted (Poincaré), 248; effect of mobilization upon modification of, 249-250; modification of, 250; almost ultimatum, 254-255.
- Sazonof formula (modified): to meet Grey's request, 249; French text of, 249 *n.*; communicated to the powers, 249; less humiliating for Austria, 255.
- Schaffhausen: 413 *n.*
- Schebeko, *Russian Ambassador at Vienna*: absent from Vienna (July 23), 45; optimism of (July 27), 81; on localization of war, 99, 130-131.
- Scheldt: reason why England objects to fortification of, 397-398; right to use in defending Belgian neutrality, 411.
- Schiff, Jacob H.: does not defend violation of Belgian neutrality, 443.
- Schluchtpass: 173.
- Schoen, Baron von, *German Ambassador at Paris*: denies intention to threaten France, 150; puts blame on Russia, 153; asks for passports (Aug. 3), 176-177; leaves Paris (Aug. 3), 350 *n.*
- "Scrap of Paper": Bethmann-Hollweg on Belgian neutrality treaty, 365; use of expression causes unfavorable impression in U.S., 454 *n.*; Bethmann-Hollweg explains meaning of, 454-455 *n.*
- Scutari: 28.
- Secretary for Foreign Affairs: see English, French, German, etc., Secretary.
- Security: desire of England and France, 497.
- Self-preservation: restriction of action for, 449; alleged inherent right of (Westlake), 640.
- Serajevo Crime (June 28, 1914): 34, 36, 53, 66, 73, 75-76 *n.*
- Serbia (see also Austrian ultimatum — Greater Serbia — Mobilization, Servian — Narodna Odbrana —

- Servian note): ambitions of, for a Greater Serbia, 21, 29-31, 127-128; forced to accept Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (March 31, 1909), 21-22, 31, 52, 188; unites with other Balkan states against Turkey, 26-27; secret appendix to treaty of friendship and alliance with Bulgaria (1912), 572-574; Treaty of Bukharest (1913), 29; increased strength of, threatens Austria, 29-30, 89, 91 *n*, 93, 123-124, 127-128, 148-149; "Pig War" with Austria (1906), 30, 147; propaganda for uniting Bosnia to, 33-34, 147-148; Austrian Archduke assassinated in (June 28, 1914), 34; confronted with Austrian ultimatum (July 23, 1914), 36-37; foresees ultimatum, 42-43 *n*, 45, 47-48; Austrian press campaign against, 44-45 *n*, 46-47 *n*, 50 *n*, 74-75 *n*, 88-89 *n*, 156; institutes no investigation of Serajevo crime, 49-50; ready to bring criminals to justice, 49-50; cannot accept Austrian ultimatum — diplomatic consensus of opinion, 54-56; powers endeavor to gain time for, 59-61; Entente powers influence, to make conciliatory reply, 62-64, 270; makes conciliatory reply (July 25, 1914), 64-77; Austria rejects note of, 65; popular feeling in Austria against, 65, 85, 88, 91-92; continually confronted by a "Greater Austrian" propaganda, 75 *n*; England and Russia try to prevent hostilities between, and Austria, 81-83; designs of Austria upon sovereignty of, 84-85, 89-95, 97, 101, 104-105, 132, 139, 153-154, 223, 245, 254 *n*, 258, 263, 525; opens hostilities (July 27), 86; Austria declares war upon (July 28), 86-89, 100; formerly in the Austrian sphere of influence, 93; looks to Russia as protector, 99-101; relations of powers to, 147-149; Sazonof favors Serbia's appealing to powers, 201; sovereignty of, 210, 223, 245, 248, 258, 263, 266; San Giuliano suggestion for mediation after unconditional acceptance by, of ultimatum, 234-235; Tsar says Austria would make a vassal of, 251 *n*; Sazonof emphasizes importance of Austria's arresting action against, 257; Austrian terms might be given to Serbia or power speaking for Serbia, 259; invasion of, 261-262, 264; Russia could not allow Austria to invade, 264; Italy interested in maintaining independence of, 461; should have instituted investigation of Serajevo, 481-482; not to blame for the war, 482; Russia obliged to support, 484; unable to arrest propaganda against Austria, 519; Austria's action in regard to Serbia's answer (1914) compared with American action in regard to the Maine (1898), 583, criticism of (Aponyi), 588.
- Servia, Prince of: *see* Alexander, Prince of Servia.
- Servian Blue Book: viii.
- Servian Minister at Vienna: *see* Jovanovitch.
- Servian Minister at London: *see* Boschkovitch.
- Servian Minister at St. Petersburg: *see* Spalaikovitch.
- Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs: *see* Pashitch.
- Servian Note, July 25, 1914: text of, 576-578; correlated with Austrian ultimatum and Austrian rejoinder, 64-77; satisfactory in opinion of Austrian Ambassador at Paris, 65 *n*; Berchtold on, 79; Dumba on, 587; Fischerauer on, 76-77 *n*; Lloyd George on, 586; Sir E. Grey on, 79, 83; Mensdorff on, 71 *n*; von Tchirsky on, 79; San Giuliano on Austria's rejection of, 75; the case of Austria *v.* Servia summed up, 76-78, *see also* 65-75; not published in German press up to July 28, 80; Sazonof forecasts, 201; a basis for discussion, 212, 217-218; Austria willing to discuss with Russia, 263-264.
- Servian Premier: *see* Pashitch.
- Sevastopoulo, *Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris*.
- Shaw, George Bernard: attack upon Grey, 274 *n*; Grey's diplomacy, 356 *n*; criticizes England's intervention, 356 *n*.

- Shock-absorber: European Concert acts as a, 4.
- Sicily: 24.
- Skoupchtina: 49 n.
- Slav agitation: 32, 43, 148.
- Slavonia: 109.
- Small states: protection of, England's policy, 10, 511 n.
- Smith, Munroe: policy of Bismarck to avoid aggression, 14 n; Serbia cannot accept Austrian ultimatum, 55 n; balance of power, 99 n; Austrian "prestige," 107 n; Jagow overborne by strategists, 140 n; binding force of treaty (of 1839), 386 n; nature of Anglo-Belgian conversations, 405 n; peculiar view of military men, 405 n; German allegations against Belgium, 415; Germany's purpose in invading Belgium, 432-433 n; why England intervened, 441-442 n.
- Socialists, radical: confidence of, in French Government, 164.
- Solidarity, monarchical: 125, 145 n, 157.
- South Africa: 24.
- South America: 24.
- Sovereigns: *see* Heads of State.
- Spain: 23; negotiations with American Government following the destruction of the Maine, 579 ff.
- Spalaikovitch, *Servian Minister at St. Petersburg*: appeal of, to Russia, 100; on localization of Austro-Servian conflict, 129 n.
- Spectator, London*: 354 n.
- Speed of Mobilization: *see* Mobilization.
- Spheres of influence: apportionment of, between empires, 498.
- "Splendid isolation": England abandons, 476-477.
- Spy system, Belgian: 395 n.
- Status quo*: maintained by European concert, 4; note of powers regarding, in Balkans, 27; France believes purpose of war to overthrow, 148; Austria aims to overthrow, in Balkans, 201; Germany had to accept or strike immediately, 478; Germany opposes, 511.
- Stephens and Dudley, Case of Queen against, 642.
- Stock Exchange: Austrian, 45-46 n, 126 n; German, 156-157; English, 308.
- "Stopper" state: Prussia wishes Belgium to serve as, against France, 5; neutralization of Belgium intended to establish, 387.
- Strandtman, *Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade*.
- Sublime Porte: 19, 26.
- Suchomlinof, *Russian Minister of War*.
- Sultan: 26.
- Sun, New York*: 76 n, 86 n, 105 n, 335 n, 421 n, 446 n.
- "Super-Empire": the formation of, 496-500.
- Survival: mental mobilization of war-thought advantage for, 510; of fit ideals, 451.
- Sweden: 10.
- Swerbcew, de, *Russian Ambassador at Berlin*.
- Sybel: *Historische Zeitschrift*, 537 n.
- Szápáry, Count, *Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg*.
- Szécsen, Count, *Austrian Ambassador at Paris*: thought Servian reply satisfactory, 65 n.
- Szogyény, Count, *Austrian Ambassador at Berlin*: believes Russia will not move, 102-103.
- Switzerland: perpetual neutrality of, 7; Treaty of Lausanne, 1912, 25-26; defense of the neutrality of, 413 n.
- Tageblatt, Berliner*: "pestilential" (Jagow), 137, 367; Sazonof on, 558.
- Talleyrand: 3-4.
- Tangier: 16, 23.
- Tankositch: arrest demanded by Austria, 74.
- Tardieu: 9, 540 n, 562 n.
- Tchirsky, von, *German Ambassador at Vienna*: in touch with drafting of Austrian ultimatum, 42, 122; on Servian note, 79; believes Russia will not act, 101-102; "Germany knows what she is about in backing Austria," 125; Pan-Germanist and Russophobe sentiments, 162; declares readiness of Germany to act as mediator, 244; uncompromising attitude of, 492; disturbing action of, 522; did,

- telegraph Austrian ultimatum to Kaiser? 529.
- Tension: national, makes war likely, 479.
- Terlinden *v.* Ames: treaty obligations, 385 *n.*
- Territorial jurisdiction: disregard of by Austria (1914) and the United States (1898), 584.
- Thayer, Roscoe W.: Italy and the terms of the Triple Alliance, 473.
- Thibet: 12, Anglo-Russian agreement concerning, 549-550.
- Threats: difference between and warning, 306 *n.*; Berchtold urges Germany to employ, to Russia, 246; menacing tone of Kaiser to Tsar, effect on Russian mobilization, 253 *n.*
- Times*, London: policies of, 309 *n.*; reports from Vienna (July 22-23), 46-47 *n.*; "Greater Serbia scare," 74-75 *n.*; favors localization of Austro-Servian conflict, 126; Grey in Commons (July 27), 217-218 *n.*; personal messages between King George and Tsar, 255; letters between Poincaré and King George, 275-277 *n.*; editorial, "The German Premise," 278 *n.*; authorized criticism of German Chancellor's published interview, 282 *n.*; Parliamentary debate (Aug. 27) Keir Hardie *vs.* Sir E. Grey, 302-303 *n.*; "Europe in Arms," 310 *n.*; 311 *n.*; 313 *n.*; Grey in Commons on guaranty of neutrality of France, 330-331; publishes Lichnowsky letter omitted by *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, *q. v.* comments on omission, 331 *n.*, 334-335 *n.*, 335 *n.*; English Cabinet crisis, 340 *n.*, 341-343 *n.*; on England's vital interests, 340-341 *n.*; speech of Bonar Law, 343 *n.*; Balin criticizes Grey, 354 *n.*; reply of Belgian Government to German accusations relative to Anglo-Belgian relations, 399-400 *n.*; "Luxemburg — another broken treaty," 427 *n.*; San Giuliano's diplomacy, 464 *n.*; (Asquith), 511 *n.*, 512 *n.*; Lloyd George on ease of Serbia, 586; Grey in Commons (Aug. 3, 1914), 624.
- Times*, N.Y.: enterprise of, in publishing official documents, viii; article by Helfferich, 150 *n.*, 155-156 *n.*, 165-166 *n.*, 296 *n.*, 306 *n.*, 312 *n.*, 352 *n.*, 218 *n.*, 259 *n.*; documents on *entente* negotiations, 292 *n.*, 551, 314 *n.*, 311 *n.*; (George Bernard Shaw), 356 *n.*, 401 *n.*; (Grey on Bethmann-Hollweg), 407 *n.*, 409 *n.*, 421 *n.*, 435 *n.*; (Jacob H. Schiff), 443 *n.*, 446 *n.*, 447 *n.*, 471 *n.*, 472 *n.*; (Formation of the Triple *Entente*), 551-559; (Anglo-German agreement in regard to Portuguese colonies), 562 *n.*, 563 *n.*; (Apponyi), 447 *n.*, 588; statement of M. Havenith regarding publication of Belgian documents, 635; (Eliot, Dernburg), 655.
- Tizza, Count: 46 *n.*, 58 *n.*
- Transcript*, *Boston Evening*: 403 *n.*, 420 *n.*
- Treaties (*see also* "Scrap of paper"): *rebus sic stantibus*, rule of, 379; for the event of war, 380 *ff.*; effect of duress upon, 381; differ from contracts, 381 *n.*; English views regarding *treaty of 1831*, 388; of defense, right of neutralized states to enter into, 408; German view in regard to sanctity of, 417, 503, 513; binding force of, 429; observance of, remarks of Bethmann-Hollweg and Bismarck, 453 *n.*; observance of, fundamental principle, 453-454; Germany's treaty record, 661-664.
- Treaty: Anglo-German secret treaty of 1898 relative to the eventual dismemberment of the Portuguese colonies, references to, 562-563.
- Treaty: "The Barrier Treaty" (Oct. 29, 1709) between Great Britain and Holland, 596.
- Treaty (Nov. 4, 1911): between France and Germany, 23-24; resented by Germany, 35.
- Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878): (Article 25, text), 572; gives to Austria administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7-8, 31; violated by Austria in annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908), 20-21, 31, 148; relative to Sanjak of Novibazar, 91 *n.*
- Treaty of Bukharest (Aug. 6, 1913): 29; Austria tries to modify, 149.

- Treaty of Lausanne (Oct. 18, 1912): 26.
- Treaty of London (June 26, 1831): purpose of Belgian neutralization, 379 *ff.*; England's views regarding, 388.
- Treaty of London (Nov. 15, 1831): relative to separation of Belgium from Holland, 600.
- Treaty of London (April 19, 1839): relative to neutralization of Belgium (text), 600; purpose of Belgian neutralization, 378 *ff.*; reasons why terminated, 383 *ff.*; Germany bound by, 385; binding force of (Gladstone), 386; (Munroe Smith), 386 *n.*; changed conditions of Belgium, effect on, 387; attitude of Holland towards, 389; serves England as excuse for war (Hollweg), 455 *n.*; Niemeyer's view of, 504.
- Treaty of London (May 11, 1867): (text), 603; 338-339, 422-431; England's misinterpretation of, 423 *ff.*
- Treaty of London (Aug. 9, 1870) (*see also* Neutralization): between Great Britain and Prussia, relative to the independence and neutrality of Belgium (text), 602; effect of, on treaty of 1839, 383.
- Treaty of London (Jan. 17, 1871): broken by Austria in annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21, 429.
- Treaty of London (July 13, 1911): between Great Britain and Japan (text), 541-542.
- Treaty of London (May 30, 1913): following Balkan wars, 27, 32.
- (Treaty) Declaration of London (Feb. 26, 1909): 88.
- Treaty of Sofia (signed at Sofia, Feb. 29, 1912): of friendship and alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia, secret appendix to (text), 572-574.
- Treaty of St. Petersburg (July 30, 1907): between Japan and Russia guaranteeing the present territory of each, the integrity of China and the "Open Door," in China (text), 550.
- Treaty of St. Petersburg (Aug. 31, 1907): agreement of England and Russia concerning their interests in Asia (text), 546-550.
- Treaty of St. Petersburg (July 4, 1910): convention between Russia and Japan concerning Manchuria, (text), 551.
- Treaty of Vienna (Oct. 7, 1879): Austro-German Alliance, 540-541.
- Trespas: fallacious comparison of Belgian invasion to, 452.
- Trèves: 169-170.
- Trieste: 32.
- Triple Alliance (*see also Casus Faderis*): formation of, 3-9; treaty (1879) between Austria and Germany (text), 540-541; (Germany, Austria, Italy) established (1883), 8; Bülow explains effects of, 9; Turkey practically a member of, 20; Italy an independent member of, 25-26, 35, 75, 83; increasing armament of, 35; Jagow's objection to opposing of, by the Entente, 209; challenges Triple Entente (Paris *Journal des Débats*), 265; contains seeds of own dissolution, 457; Italy's interests opposed to, 457-459; Italy declares defensive nature of, excludes aggression, 470; Italy refuses to agree to aggression against Serbia, 471-472; Bülow considers, will prevent Italy from attacking Germany, 471-472; member of, required to communicate diplomatic transactions (Thayer), 472; does not apply to Mediterranean, 478 *n.*; stabilizing effect of (Bülow), 478; Triple Entente gaining on, 478.
- Triple Entente (*see also* Anglo-French Entente): formation of, 3-18, 551; declaration (1904) of England and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, 544-546; Convention (1907) between Great Britain and Russia concerning interests in Asia, 546-550; forced to accept Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908), 21-22; increasing armament of, 35; critical internal situation of each power of (1914), 36; endeavors of, to secure extension of time limit of Austrian ultimatum, 59-61, 270; influences Serbia to make conciliatory reply, 62-64, 270; urges moderation on Austria, 82; efforts of, for mediation, 270-

- 273; England refuses to take side of, 273-282, 286-288, 293-295; Grey's account of, 288-292, 313; interest of England to preserve, 311-316; gaining strength over Triple Alliance, 478.
- Triplice: *see* Triple Alliance.
- Tripoli: 24-26.
- Troubetzkoy, *General, Attaché to the Military Household of the Tsar of Russia.*
- Tsar of Russia, *see* Nicholas.
- Tunis: acquisition of, by France, 8.
- Turkey: befriended by Austria and Germany, 19; revolution of Young Turks, 20; Russian designs upon, after (1908), 93-94, 123-124; Turco-Italian War (1911-12), 24-26; Balkan Wars, 26-27; Treaty of London, 27; von Bülow considers importance of, for Germany, 27-28; Treaty of Bukharest (1913), 29; German diplomacy in Turco-Italian War, 458.
- Ubangi: 24.
- Ultimatum (*see also* English ultimatum, German ultimatum to Belgium, German ultimatum to France, German ultimatum to Russia): defined, 51 *n.*, 52; presented by United States (1898) and Austria (1914), 584; first Sazonof formula in the nature of, 245-246, 248.
- United States: obligation to protect Belgium, 391; unfavorable impression caused by "scrap of paper" remark in, 454 *n.*; interest of, in the war, 474-475; understanding with England, 498; place of, in development of international law, 513; negotiations with Spanish Government following the destruction of the Maine, 579, 584; action in case of Maine compared with Austria's action in regard to Serbia, 579, 583.
- United States Census:* 475 *n.*
- Universities of America: appeal to, 653.
- Unter den Linden: 105 *n.*
- Usher, Roland G.: Belgium and the balance of power (extract from *Pan-Germanism*), 597.
- Uskub: 33.
- Vallona: *see* Avlona.
- Vaterland:* 310 *n.*
- Venezuela: difference with England concerning boundary, 542-543.
- Victoria, Queen: speech of, regarding Anglo-American cooperation in American affairs, 542; speech of, regarding Anglo-American arbitration, 543.
- Vienna: Congress of, 1815, 3-4.
- Villiers, Sir F., *British Minister to Belgium.*
- Vilna: 111, 113.
- Violation of Prussian Constitution: Bismarck guilty of, 494.
- Vital interest: definition of a, 524; states should confine policies to, 485 *n.*; independence of Serbia, for Russia, 524; England entered war to protect, 526.
- Vital issue: 357-359 *n.*
- Viviani, René, *Premier of France and Minister for Foreign Affairs:* attitude of Germany (July 31), 162-163; German and French mobilization, 169-172; German ultimatum to France, 174-176; approves Grey's plan of mediation, 206-207; urges Russia to adhere to Cambon suggestion, 238-239; describes Austrian diplomacy, 258-259; says Russia agrees to arrest mobilization, 259; criticism of statement of, concerning Russia's acceptance of mediation proposal, 259-260 *n.*; mistake of, that Russia agrees to arrest mobilization, 260 *n.*
- Vosges: 169.
- Waiting attitude: Russia willing to maintain, 249.
- Waliszewski, K: 537 *n.*
- War (*see also* Causes of the war—Laws of war—Responsibility for the war): European situation preceding, 34-37; German people did not want, 188; efforts to prevent, 188; thrust upon Russia, 189; Germany did not want, 191; avoidance of, by acceptance of Grey proposal, 251; Germany believes can be avoided, 251-252; Germany's declaration of, forced by Russian mobilization, 251; Tsar says German declaration pre-

- vents acceptance of English proposal, 254-255 *n*; treaties for the event of, 380 *ff.*; right to make, 391 *ff.*; and the equality of states, 391 *ff.*; Italy declares Austrian action aggressive, 470; avoidable, considered crime, 475; why moment for, opportune for Germany, 479; responsibility for, 480; Germany declares, because of Russian mobilization, 488 *n*; Grey could not have prevented, 491; responsibility for, not personal, 492; regarded more highly in Germany, 495; danger of, known to lie in European Dualism, 499; cause of, different way of thinking, 508; results of the, of 1914, 514-515; aim of diplomacy to avoid, 521; popular reason for every Russian, 524; public opinion in Russia concerning, 524; Delbrück predicts, between Germany and England, 560; larger meanings of (Giddings), 652; issues of, as affecting America (Eliot), 655.
- War Chronicle*: 120 *n*, 285-286.
- War party: at Vienna, 156.
- War power: distinguished from "peace power," 500-501.
- Warning: difference between, and threats, 306 *n*.
- "War-thought": 510.
- Warsaw: 110, 113.
- Washington: effect of example of, 494; Farewell Address, 530-533.
- Waxweiler, E.; *La Belgique neutre et loyale*: 400 *n*, 409 *n*, 438 *n*, 453 *n*.
- Weltpolitik*: 497.
- Westlake, John: consideration to be given special interest and preponderating power, 393 *n*; the alleged inherent right of self-preservation, 640.
- Westminster Gazette*: 224 *n*, 309 *n*, 556.
- Wicker, Cyrus French; *Neutralization*: extracts from, 339, 432 *n*, 639.
- William II, *Emperor of Germany*: interest in Morocco, 16, 23; tries to mediate between Austria and Russia, 112, 115, 145-146 *n*, 329-330; but hampered by Russian mobilization, 115, 145-146 *n*; affected by monarchical solidarity (J. Cambon), 125, 145 *n*, 157; urges Austria to continue discussion, 242; appeals to Tsar to suppress regicide, 252 *n*; holds Tsar responsible for outcome, 253 *n*; telegram to King George, 286 *n*; telegram regarding French neutrality, 328-329; message to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 5, 368-369; has had no Chancellor, 495; responsibility of, for the war, 521; *Daily Telegraph's* interview with, 563.
- Wolff Press Agency: 80.
- World: answers question of responsibility for the war, 495-496.
- World*, New York: 354 *n*, 407 *n*.
- World organization (*see also* Super-Empire): 495.
- Yellow Book, French: mistakes in, 285-286 *n*.
- Young Turks: 18, 20, 76 *n*.
- Zimmerman, von, *German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*: believes Russia will not act, 102.

The Riverside Press
CAMBRIDGE . MASSACHUSETTS
U . S . A

14 DAY USE
RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED

RETURN TO → CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT
202 Main Library

LOAN PERIOD 1	2	3
HOME USE		
4	5	6

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS
RENEWALS AND RECHARGES MAY BE MADE 4 DAYS PRIOR TO DUE DATE.
LOAN PERIODS ARE 1-MONTH, 3-MONTHS, AND 1-YEAR.
RENEWALS: CALL (415) 642-3405

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW


JUL 13 1990		
AUTO DISC APR 30 1990		
MAY 01 1991		

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
FORM NO. DD6, 60m, 1/83 BERKELEY, CA 94720

S
L
Y
L
Y

LD
61
H
(8796s)

U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES



C024313245

M274508

D
- 1

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

58 70 2 0 4 1 3 6

