

Resource Allocation Practices and Models at International Civil Society Organisations

A report for the Wikimedia Movement Strategy Resource Allocation Working Group

1. Context

In its 2030 strategic direction process, Wikimedia Movement (“WM”) has launched a number of Working Groups looking into aspects of current operations, structures and processes, in order to achieve its 2030 vision to become “the essential infrastructure of the ecosystem of free knowledge and anyone who shares this vision will be able to join”.

The Working Group on Resource Allocation aims “... to create an equitable system of resource allocation. While there are many definitions of equity, we understand equity to be about **Opportunities** (e.g. access to systems and resources), **Power** (e.g. ability to make decisions about resources, ability to change culture) and **Outcomes**.”

The International Civil Society Centre (“The Centre”), owned by 15 of the largest International Civil Society Organisations (“ICSOs”) aims to create higher impact and resilience of ICSOs and provides services to the wider sector on relevant trends and questions.

WM and the Centre have agreed on a service agreement to provide information for the WM Working Group on practices and models of resource allocation at ICSOs, based on the existing knowledge of the Centre. Only in exceptional cases, the Centre has sought additional information through interviews or outreach to its shareholders.

The main questions that WM is trying to address are:

- How does the set of member organisations allocate resources to joint goals or initiatives? What mechanisms do they use (e.g. grants, contracts, investments, incubation, etc.)?
- How centralized / distributed / decentralized is the system/decision making?
- Who makes decisions about resource allocation at a global level? Local level?
- What criteria are used to make these decisions (e.g. impact, equity, innovation, etc.)? Do these vary depending on context, or are consistent across the network?
- What type of risk management and accountability structures are in place within the resource allocation process across different cultures and contexts?
- What mechanisms of resource allocation have not worked or proved problematic?

The report submitted is based on existing pieces of information and studies (ranging from 2015-2019), which provide for outline of trends and structural observations. We also had some in-depth look into particularly interesting cases. It is important to note that the basis for the report are large, mostly confederated international organisations who are rather recipients than makers of grants and hence show some structural differences to the Wikimedia Movement. The report does look into some aspects that might matter more to other WM Strategy working groups (like ‘Roles and Responsibilities’ and ‘Partnerships’). In any case, we hope the report is relevant and informative for the purposes of the WM Movement Strategy.



2. Executive Summary

The submitted report addresses a complex, yet important issue in organisational governance – the processes and systems of decision-making regarding allocation of resources for joint goals and initiatives. While many of the organisations observed have developed a significant level of formalized bureaucracy (through organisational handbooks etc.), there is less clarity and codification on how (controversial) decisions are being made.

The most defined areas are around negotiated (or set) contribution keys for financing joint structures and large joint initiatives. However, there are numerous voluntary opt-in models, or cultures of finding consensus over formal voting procedures. This comes often at the expense of reliability and efficiency, but reflects a strong linkage of processes to organisational cultures. ICSOs are value-driven organisations and demand a significant level of alignment between formal and informal governance structures.

The downside of the strong informal processes are open or hidden power dynamics. These often have to do with resources and money, but can also come from personalities, tradition or the current political climate. It is recommended that those power dynamics need to be taken actively into account and addressed (or changed, where necessary) when designing governance structures and processes.

Assuming a conducive organisation culture (i.e. one that is aligned with the mission of the organisation and the values of their staff), it seems to be a good idea to orient decision making processes actively towards the ultimate beneficiaries / customers / clients, and therefore staying close to the organisational intent. Ideally, this would be linked to strong accountability mechanisms, including feedback from and good dialogue with stakeholders. One observed organisation practices a symbolic act by bringing an empty chair into each senior management meeting and imagining that a young lady (“Alisha”) from the global south would sit there – reminding everybody for whom the decisions have to make a difference. Others have taken more radical steps through engagement tools or associate bodies representing beneficiaries / clients in their formal governance.

Another observation has to do with the highly dynamic nature of organisations and their environment. Governance structures are being changed regularly and frequently, and any design of processes needs to be fit for being adjusted in future to such changes.

And lastly, light, transparent and flexible models and processes seem to be highly desirable in organisational environments which are usually overburdened by internal and external challenges. It is recommended to invest in digital tools (and capacities) to help with such an ambition.

3. Organisational and Governance Structures

In order to understand the contextual environment of the analysis, we will give an overview over existing organisational and governance structures and dwell on opportunities and challenges relating to current models. We will outline attempts to transform existing structures into more nimble and agile models, including the creation of more diversity and shifting power.

The International Civil Society Centre works with large International Civil Society Organisations (ICSOs) who are active in the fields of development, humanitarian aid, environment and human rights work. About 30 of them form



the core clientele of the Centre and are the basis for the submitted analysis. While this is a cross-sectoral group, they have in common a significant outreach, working in dozens (sometimes over a hundred) countries and are strong global brands. They show some distinct differences, e.g. over their degree of decentralization and decision-making structures. A reason for their collaboration under the Centre is the opportunity to exchange and learn from each other on the distinct governance and management structures, which are often in a permanent state of transformation.

The majority of ICSOs are structured in a federated or confederated model (the difference being quite significant, as a confederation is based on voluntary membership with no or weak central governance). Very few international actors maintain a 'singular' organisational structure with a strong – mostly northern based – headquarters and partner offices or subsidiaries in the Global South. Even those often involuntarily transform into smaller, then larger families. Sometimes the opposite happens – confederations become too complex or power imbalances kick in and organisations become re-centralised or brought back under the wings of the largest member entity. Or national entities leave the confederation and form their own operations, sometimes turning into their own networks.

The federated or confederated organisations traditionally show some kind of 'global centre', headquarters or secretariat and a network of supporting and implementing entities (e.g. support offices and country offices). Sometimes there are regional or thematic hubs between those entities. In general, structures and decision-making processes are very cumbersome and complex, rely on large regulatory efforts and/or strong informal networks within the organisations. It is here where the distinction between Governance (with a capital 'G') in form of rules and procedures is outweighed by governance (with a small 'g'), constituted by relationships, networks, informal power, influence, etc.

The relationship between the 'global centres' and the other entities is often characterized with tensions and discussions over the roles and responsibilities. As most 'global centres' are not self-funded and have little opportunity to fundraise, the value of their work and their *raison d'être* is under permanent scrutiny. On the other hand, they often form an invaluable neutral instance between various entities with the (con-)federation, and towards the outside world. In many instances, political advocacy work, brand management and global communications are centralized. Sometimes, common operations or services (like humanitarian assistance) are centralized for reasons of efficiency and neutrality (in politically difficult areas of operation).

The following shows three basic responsibility scopes of the centre vs. other entities.

1. Base scope (Governance Support, Brand Management)
2. Mid scope (the above 1., plus: Network Coordination, Compliance and Assurance, Shared Services to offices)
3. Full scope (the above 1. and 2. plus Programme Office Management, leading on Strategic Planning, implementing Global Work)

(Source: internal benchmarking study of secretariats in global NGOs, 2015)

Most surveyed ICSOs in this study are in the mid scope, with notable exceptions of human rights and campaign organisations towards the full scope. Meanwhile, some more service delivery organisations have moved towards full scope role and leading at least parts of the operations through their central units.



As one might imagine, not only decision-making and authorities are difficult in such complex structures, but governance models and practices are under permanent revision to serve the organisations in the best way. The following shows a few governance characteristics that matter.

- Most ICSSOs have a three-layered Governance structure: an International General Assembly or Members meeting; an International Board and a number of National Boards.
- The organisations vary mostly around the composition of the International Board (possible models are: fully representative of members; including internal and external board members; including national affiliates; including partners or beneficiaries).
- The sharing of responsibilities between General Assembly and International Board, and between International Board and Management varies significantly. There is no clear pattern here, sometimes Boards are completely hands-off, sometimes they limit their involvements to strategic or 'foundation' issues, sometimes they interfere with Management (the most confliguous scenario).
- Over two thirds of interviewed CEOs of ICSSOs are unhappy with their governance in that it is perceived as too slow, too cumbersome or too focused on balancing national interest.
- Two thirds of interviewed ICSSOs are either engaged in governance reform or are planning to do so in the next two years.

(see Annex A: Governance Reforms Questionnaire)

Besides the 'best' or most effective way of structuring and governing a (con-)federated organisation, the question of equal, fair and legitimate governance has become more relevant over the past decades. With the growing capacities of societies in the global South, with stronger self-consciousness and with increased scrutiny over legitimacy of international actors, it has become more important to include Southern voices in governance and decision-making, and also try and include the voices of primary actors and beneficiaries in those structures and processes.

Lastly, ICSSOs are looking for more contemporary, network-type organisational structures in order to reduce the heavy bureaucracies and to increase agility and nimbleness. To our knowledge, none of the traditional ICSSOs have managed those transitions completely, while such models are used by 'newer' and digital organisations.

In all of the above, transformational change processes are an almost constant reality of ICSSOs. It is estimated that only a small percentage of those processes actually succeed in reaching their objective. At the same time, dissatisfaction with current Governance models is rather high, as the figures from the above mentioned survey amongst our stakeholders has shown.

4. Funding Models

The ICSSOs have a variety of financing and funding models, which impact heavily on the allocation of resources. It is necessary to understand the range of opportunities and limitations connected to the respective models, and realistic scenarios for change.



Funding models of the screened ICSSOs vary from almost purely private donor funding (through donations or sponsorships) to mixed funding of private and public donors, sometimes in form of 'block grants' and institutional funding, to organisations who rely on public donors up to 75% of their income. The latter, naturally, have much less leverage of allocating funds to joint goals or initiatives, as bilateral or multilateral donor funding is in most cases restricted to project deliverables, which are sometimes even pre-determined by donors through 'Calls for Proposals'. The in-built overheads of project funds barely suffice to cover the operational costs of the organisations, hence flexibility for investment in innovative or overarching initiatives is very limited. And the number of donors who are willing to invest in collaboration and sector-wide initiatives is shrinking.

The situation becomes more flexible the more private funding is involved. However, large philanthropists and foundations have increasingly become involved in narrower project determination and give fewer flexibility for innovative investments. The organisations with big chunks of private (mass) donations have had the most leverage in allocating resources to innovative, joint or sector-wide initiatives. Of particular importance have been the organisations using child sponsorship models, which have traditionally a much higher (and by their private donors accepted) margin for overheads. It is of no surprise that some of the most significant innovations in the sector have had strong support by child-focused agencies, and by faith-based organisations, whose funding base comes with lower accountability standards than mostly bilateral donor-funded organisations (e.g. the SPHERE project, or the 'Joining Forces-' or 'Do no Harm-' initiatives)¹.

When allocating funds internally, some organisations use creative ways to excite colleagues over the opportunities – e.g. by creating 'innovation challenges' or 'awards'. This works particularly well when the monetary amounts involved are not too high, and internal recognition and publicity serve as added values. Beyond that, very often the mere business dimensions (RoI) takes over – e.g. by providing match funds for promising or large donor grants. Some more ideas are provided further below.

The funding or financing of Global Centres constitutes an important, almost representative case for the allocation in joint initiatives. The budgets for those global centres range from 1 to 30 per cent of global income, hence the true investment in 'joint' initiatives varies heavily (in absolute terms from below 1 M to over 70 M EUR). Most organisations have determined a formula, levy or contribution key for financing their Global Centre – sometimes oriented on flexible income, sometimes on overall income. The (re-)negotiations of such formulas is one of the hardest tasks, hence it is necessary to come up early on with mechanisms that will last. To our knowledge, very few ICSSO have come up with formulas of contributing to their Global Centre through other than monetary indicators. There are few cases where additional criteria weigh in: e.g. the contribution to a Southern Membership Development Fund at organisation 'Y' (see case study below), which includes the responsibilities of so-called 'lead offices' to develop their partner offices into (Southern) members of the organisation. Other 'Global Fund' models are used to provide core funding to its priority thematic areas. The models usually include both grant and loan schemes and the Secretariats and small committees representing various entities within the confederations are mostly the brokers of their use.

¹ The business models and funding implications have been documented in a 2014 publication by the Centre (*'Diversify, Adapt and Innovate'*) with observations about existing and emerging models.



An illustration why criteria other than money should be taken into account in decision-making structures comes from the organisation 'Y' (case study further down): One of their smaller national chapters brings only a marginal amount of funds into the confederation, but provides for almost half of the organisations global number of beneficiaries. Their work in the confederation is therefore so important, why should their participation in global decisions be limited to their relatively small financial value?

5. Power Relations

Open and hidden power dynamics affect every organisation, particularly those who have a decentralized, confederated or federated structure. Power shows in a variety of ways and can be a driving as well as a hindering force for organisational development. While in many cases power is related to financial resources, there are other dimensions that need to be considered. The relationship of Power, Governance and Strategic Intent of the organisation is crucial for decision-making and organisational success.

As mentioned above, discussions among ICSCO leaders suggest widespread dissatisfaction with aspects of their current governance models. Some of the most frequently mentioned complaints include slow and cumbersome decision-making, inconsistent execution of strategic initiatives, and under-representation of important stakeholders that lead to questions of legitimacy. New insights suggest an entirely different paradigm to address these issues; i.e. looking at the inter-relationship among organisational intent, power and governance. By identifying the power dynamics of the organisation and analysing which ones help or hinder the achievement of the organisation's strategic intent, leaders are in a much better position to assess the adequacy of their current governance models and to identify what, if any, reforms are required.

Many of ICSCOs who have engaged in governance reform efforts within the past two years were not convinced that the changes had achieved the desired results and wanted to explore how to reform soft power as well. They were also contemplating changes to their governance models in the future whether by increasing diversity and representation or changing the narrative. However, despite differences in formal governance structures and processes, the issues identified by the individual organisations were strikingly similar.

Looking at the interdependent categories of Power, Governance and Intent, themes and issues that emerged were the following:

- Power is the ability and capacity to make and execute relevant decisions.
- Those who have decision-making power are often not the same as those with the power to implement or block those decisions. Power and governance are experienced and perceived differently as a function of "where you sit" in an organisation and from what culture you come.
- Power is asymmetric – that is, it takes more power to create and build than to destroy or block action and change. Letting go of power is a real issue, particularly with organisational legacy of strong individual power.
- Money and access to resources are major determinants as to who has a voice and influence, they create uneven power relations not only between organisations and their donors, but also within



organisations, when financial contributions of one member organisation result in increased decision-making or voting power.


- There is a difference between “capital G” governance (which tends to be formal and relevant to strategic decision-making) and “small g” governance (which tends to be more operational and execution-focused). Informal power often overrules (or undermines) formal structures and processes, e.g. long tenure with an organisation combined with a loyal network of relationships can create a powerful base of influence for individual actors.
- A powerful reference point for evaluating an organisation’s alignment of power and governance is to assess whether the current formal and informal power dynamics and governance structures help or hinder the realization of the organisation’s intent
- Any significant power shifts and/or meaningful governance reforms require committed and courageous leadership – but accountability as well as checks and balances are critical for effective governance and partnerships – and is often lacking.

The above aspects need to be taken into account when designing governance and decision-making structures.

6. Decision Making

A power mapping survey conducted in 2018 by the Centre among ICSSOs has shown varying practices of decision-making. The following gives an overview about some findings from the survey and preliminary interpretations.

i. Final decisions about project / programme funding are taken by



In the results shown on the graph about who makes final decisions on project and programme funding in the participating organisations, it can be seen that the role of the **Field Offices** in final decision-making diminishes as the projects and programmes grow in financial terms, whereas the role of the **International**



Secretariat and Head Offices steadily grows as the projects and programmes grow financially. The role of **National Affiliates** in the final decision-making for projects and programmes remains nearly the same throughout the different financial ranges.

In the overall responses for funding of **up to \$10,000**, the final decision on project and programme funding is most often taken by the field offices, followed by the National Affiliates and the International Secretariat / Head office of the organisation.

For projects and programs with funding **up to \$100,000**, the overall responses show that the International Secretariat / Head offices make the decision on project and programme funding most often, followed closely by the field offices and finally the National Affiliates.

For projects of **up to \$1,000,000**, the final decision on project and programme funding is taken twice as often by the International Secretariat / Head Office, compared to the field offices and national affiliates.


Finally, in the overall results for projects of **above \$1,000,000**, the International Secretariat / Head Offices are the decision-making entity for project and programme funding that is mentioned most often, four times as often as the Field Offices and nearly three times as often as National Affiliates.

ii. The national and local organisations we support are involved in decision making on

All respondents	Yes	No
Specific set-up of the project / programme we cooperate on	100% (11)	0% (0)
Our overall programme in their home country	90% (10)	10% (1)
Our international programme	30% (3)	70% (8)

In the overall responses from all organisations seen in the table it can be seen that all organisations involve national and local organisations in decision-making when it comes to the **specific set-up of projects and programmes** that are cooperated on. The level of involving national and local organisations in decision-making decreases when it comes to country-level **overall programs** in the home country of supported national and local organisations and decreases even more when the decisions are on the **international programme** level.


iii. Of all decisions taken at our organisation xx% of decision-making power lies with



As can be seen in the chart above showing the combined responses by all organisations, there is great variety between the organisations in terms of where decision-making powers lie in. Whereas organisation 1 reports that nearly all of its decision-making power lies with its national affiliates, the rest of the organisations report a more diverse division of power.

iv. The main reasons for non-implementation of decisions are (%)

On average, 75% of all decisions taken in the organisations who responded to the Power Mapping questionnaire are fully implemented. The figures for individual organisations within this overall average of 75% ranged from 20% to 90%. Reasons for non-implementation are as follows:



The reasons for non-implementation of decisions made within the organisations show great variance. Whereas some organisations only list one or two main reasons for the non-implementation within their organisations (most notably organisation 2 only listing 'others' as the reasons and organisations 1 and 7 listing that the lacking funding by national affiliates accounts to 90% of the reasons for non-implementation), most organisations list a variety of reasons.

The sample size and variety of responses might not give enough data to identify trends or findings that go beyond highlighting the imbalance between central and decentral units, and resourcing entities vs. implementing units. Those dimensions, however, need to be given attention in order to create a system or processes that are less subject to conflicts or challenges.

7. Resource Allocation Practices and Models

Financial and other resources are unevenly distributed in large global organisations, and their use is in many cases not fully systematized. We will outline some practices related to resource allocation within the organisations, and beyond. These come with advantages and challenges.

Overall, the practices of resource allocation in large complex organisations are complicated, often controversial, and fluid. They are impacted by the political 'climate' in the organisations, financial pressures, power dimensions and leadership. The following two Case Studies will shed some light on how decisions over resource allocations for joint initiatives are being taken, but serve only as proxies for a rather large spectrum of practices.



Case 1: Organisation X

X is a 'movement-type' federation with 9 members, working in 67 countries, and a rather small international secretariat. It has an overall income of € 180 Million and is in the middle of an ambitious transformational change process towards a more streamlined operational presence with a joint programmatic approach. Beyond the current phase of transformation, the organisation is aiming for better global balance, a localisation of actions, co-decision making with primary actors, and partners.

Joint initiatives usually come from within the organisation – e.g. proposals from one of the many working groups. An example mentioned was the production of standards and tools around safeguarding for children. Here, a concept note goes directly to the Board (consisting of the CEOs of the National Chapters) for decision. The Board has the option to decide whether this becomes a mandatory collective effort (financed through a contribution key) or an initiative with the possibility to opt-in or out.

Sometimes (but seldom) such initiatives come directly from the Secretariat or the Board itself. There is a threshold for initiatives with lower visibility and lower financial impact to go directly to the Secretariat for implementation.

Criteria for such initiatives (or the decisions over) are not formalized and depend very much on the political temperature (in the case of safeguarding obviously influenced by the 2018 abuse of power at Oxfam and Save the Children). As the organisation does not have a living strategy, the initiatives cannot be linked back to this. This is hoped to change in the future.

Accountability around these initiatives is pretty loose, though the Secretariat maintains a RACI matrix to make sure all stakeholders receive the right level of information. Otherwise, the product / result of the initiative is deemed more important than any formal accountability process.

When asked what works well / not so well, the organisation responds that the initiatives work better if they are owned (and initiated) by the units expected to implement. Also, the closer they are to the beliefs and values of the people, the more likely will they succeed.



Case 2: Organisation Y

Y is a service delivery organisation with 19 national members working in 90 countries. It has an annual turnover of \$ 800 Million and has gone through a governance reform recently. It has stopped an ambitious centralization process and instead now focuses on creating a 'network type' organisation with strong southern voice and membership. It is dominated by one strong member which contributes 50% of the global resources.

The best example to analyse decision making over a joint initiative is the ambitious move to a globally balanced organisation. The international Board of Y decided in October 2014 to have more members from the global South than from the Global North (by 2020). It is important to know that this Board resolution was, in a way, replacing the controversial ambition to unify (and centralize) line management of country offices, which had kept most of the energy of the organisation for the previous years. At the same time, a major Governance reform was announced.

The implementation plan for the 'Global Balance' initiative was presented by the Secretariat to the Board in June 2015, which foresaw a Southern membership selection and development process starting immediate thereafter and bringing up to 10 new Southern members on board by 2020. Y also started working on governance reform and code overhaul. A small team was installed at the Y Secretariat, a budget was planned for and screening of potential Southern members was initiated.

While the Board initiated the process in a climate of political controversy, the national chapters committed to financing and supporting this initiative for the coming years, both through a contribution key and through additional financial and capacity support from leading chapters. A Membership Development Fund (resourced by all members) was initiated (€2 Million EUR for three years).

Drivers for these changes were the necessary increase of legitimacy and a strong moral impetus. But there were many other factors involved: pressure from the country offices (and their directors); the wish of the largest member to replace a centralized line management model by a loose network of peers; and the fear of losing Southern presences (e.g. Y Sri Lanka made itself independent as a new organisation and was about to leave the network).

Because of the above multiple drivers, the project has been fast and successful. A key aspect for the achievement of the goals was the strong and active involvement of the Southern members, and a clear mandate (and resources) given to the Secretariat to the initiative. The 'emotional' and moral aspects must not be overlooked – the admission of four new members to the confederation in 2017 was a memorable and touching moment for members of the General Assembly.

The two case studies shed some light on smaller and bigger decisions being taken in large (con-) federations. While both describe functioning processes, there are many examples for failures. It might be difficult to outline patterns, but a few observations can be identified:



- Formal processes are important and should be codified to a certain extent (contribution keys, voting rights, mandates and roles);
- However, those processes alone do not make an initiative successful (and cannot be relied upon forever);
- More important seems to be the 'rootedness' of the initiative in the value base and sentiments of the organisation and a strong ownership by key actors and those needing to implement the initiatives;
- There is an element of 'the right moment' and the 'right people' initiating joint ambitions;
- There is always the risk of joint initiatives falling victim to changes in the political landscape.

8. Opportunities by creating an equitable system from scratch

WM has the opportunity to analyse and re-define its existing resource allocation model. While examples from the sector can inspire the future practices, some aspects of organisational change will have to be considered in order to succeed with the ambition. We will provide some observations and considerations for the way forward.

No (con-)federation has been invented the way it exists today. The Wikimedia Movement seems to have an opportunity to create systems and processes from scratch, learning from others' mistakes and move into some unconventional, yet future-fit practices, if the political will is there. It is therefore recommended to factor in some key observations:

ICSOs oscillate between highly and less participatory models. These models are dynamic and should be built with a flexibility to foreseeable changes. The models need to resonate strongly with the organisational culture.

Good governance principles come with clarity of mandates between levels. There is a variety of models possible, from more to less 'gravity' of formal Governance. Movements, particularly the more contemporary ones, have an opportunity to focus governance on their customers, clients, beneficiaries and make it participatory, yet light, attractive and digital.

Decision-making needs to consider resources, voting principles (e.g. a principle of double super majorities, which considers both weight and number of parties), consensus-based models and checks and balances. However, the 'culture' of decision-making is the more important one – and needs to be rooted in the organisational culture (or the one that one wants to create). It is recommended to invest in discussing, determining or challenging the organisational culture.

Bottom-up, widely owned and lived decision-making principles is highly relevant for a contemporary civil society organisation. When it comes to accountability, being transparent (or outcome-oriented) seems more important than having strong and heavy accountability mechanisms. And involving the people we are serving adds a strong level of legitimacy and stability to decision-making processes.



9. Annexes

a) Governance Reforms

1. I consider my organisation's governance as <i>(please tick <u>ONLY ONE BOX</u> that best describes your opinion)</i>	Poor	Average	Good	Very good	Excellent	n.a.
Our governance OVERALL is		12	12	7		1
Our INTERNATIONAL governance is	2	7	12	8	3	
The cooperation between International GOVERNANCE and MANAGEMENT is	1	3	9	16	3	
Our NATIONAL governance is	1	13	12	3	1	2
The cooperation between national and international GOVERNANCE is	2	12	13	4		1
The cooperation between national and international MANAGEMENT is	1	5	13	11	1	1

2. My organisation's INTERNATIONAL governance is	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	n.a.
Too slow in taking decisions	10	15	7	
Too cumbersome	9	15	8	
Too inconsistent	3	10	19	
Too much focused on balancing national interests	10	12	10	
Unable to secure implementation of its decisions	4	15	13	
Dominated by our largest national affiliate(s)	8	9	14	1



3. In my organisation's INTERNATIONAL governance the following actors SHOULD be involved	More	Same	Less	Not at all	n.a.
Our DONORS should be involved in our governance	2	15	3	14	
Our BENEFICIARIES should be involved in our governance	18	7	1	4	2
Individual ACTIVISTS should be involved in our governance	10	14	1	4	3
External EXPERTS should be involved in our governance	15	12	1	2	2
Representatives of NATIONAL AFFILIATES should be involved in our governance	8	15	5	2	2