

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7012

June 24, 2009

Honorable William Lynn III  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
1010 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Secretary Lynn:

Beginning this past September, the U.S. Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence Agency assess far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to further our effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technologies, technical studies are being conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects.

Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program (AAITP) and study were first commissioned, much progress has been made with the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace-related findings. Given the current rate of success, the continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technology advancements that in the immediate near-term will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the information surrounding aspects of this program, I require your assistance in establishing a Restricted Special-Access-Program (SAP) with a Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the AAITP.

In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors, intelligence/counterintelligence, and advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these technologies will be applied to future systems involving space flight, weapons, communications, and propulsion, the standard management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are not sufficient. Even the use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project are properly secured. Although not every aspect of AAITP requires Restricted SAP read-on, the following portions should be maintained at the Restricted SAP level:

- **The methodology used to identify, acquire, study, and engineer the advanced technologies associated with AAITP.**
  - Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require nuanced approaches that will undoubtedly be of significant interest if not a top priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (FISS).


- o Undue attention by government, or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.
- **Allocation of personnel, support, and oversight.**
  - o Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk.
  - o Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities or affiliation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny.
  - o Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a properly administered Restricted SAP.
  - o Protection of industry partnerships and participation is critical. Public awareness of an industry's AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry's further participation with the U.S. Government in this program.
- **Application and engineering.**
  - o The nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected, engineered and applied by the U.S. may require senior level government approval. These decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program to those on a strict Bigoted List.
  - o Associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts within the world of quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory, gravitics, and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be used with catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of operational security and read-on discretion is required.

Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, we will require a small, specialized group of DoD personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program are assigned to further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (see Attachment 1). These individuals all currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support to AATIP.

Ultimately, the results of AATIP will not only benefit the U.S. Government but I believe will directly benefit DoD in ways not yet imagined. The technological insight and capability gained will provide the U.S. with a distinct advantage over any foreign threats and allow the U.S. to maintain its preeminence as a world leader.

Thank you in advance from your time and consideration of this request. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Bob Herbert of my staff at (202) 437-3162.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Harry Reid". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

HARRY REID  
United States Senator

HR:rth

**Attachment 1**

**Sponsoring Agency:** Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

**Component-level SAP Central Office:** Undetermined (DEPSECDEF)

**Unclassified Nickname:** Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP)

**Program Length:** FY09-FY13 (Preliminary)

**Program Funding:** FY09-O&M, FY10-FY13-TBD

**SAP Category Designation:** Intelligence, DoD Acquisition

**FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Government Personnel:**

1. Honorable William Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gov't)
2. Honorable Senator Harry Reid of Nevada (Gov't)
3. Honorable Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii (Gov't)
4. [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED]
8. [REDACTED]
9. [REDACTED]
10. Special Agent Luis Elizondo, USDI (Gov't)
11. [REDACTED]

**FY 10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Contractor Personnel funded under the AATIP:**

1. [REDACTED]  
(CTR)
2. [REDACTED]
3. Dr. Hal Puthoff, BAASS (CTR)

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemptions 1 and 5 apply.