

KUWASHIMA, Kazue

Request by: Dohihara

Presently located in Tokyo, Japan.

Often mentioned in many of the exhibits already introduced as evidence in this case dealing with the negotiations between D and Pu Yi. Witness was Jap Consul General in Tientsin, China and can testify to the activities of the accused concerning which said Pu Yi has already testified, as well as explain many of the documents already introduced as evidence in this case.

Testimony believed to be relevant and is specifically concerned with Counts 18 & 19.

KUWA SHIMA, KAZUE

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Testimony believed to be relevant and is specifically concerned with Counts 18, 19

Kasue KUWASHIMA (KUWAJIMA): Former Bureau Chief, Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

1884 March Born Kagawa Prefecture. Son of Yasushi Kuwashima
Married Yaoko, daughter of Tasaburo Aiura.
1906 Graduated Waseda University, Politics
1908 Entered Foreign Service
* Served as Consul at Mukden, Hankow, San Francisco,
Bombay and Chicago.
1923 Chief of American and European Section, Foreign Office
1924 First Secretary, Washington
* Consul General at Honolulu; Consul General at Hankow
1929 Counselor of Embassy at Rome
1930 Consul General at Tientsin
1933-36 Chief, Asiatic Affairs in Foreign Office
1937-38 Minister to Holland
1938-40 Ambassador to Brazil
1942 May Vice Chief General Affairs Bureau and Vice President of
Board of Directors, Greater Imperial Asia Federation
1943-44 Aug Chief, General Affairs Bureau of East Asia Development
Headquarters of IRAA

Address: 170, 2-chome, Harajuku, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo

KUWASHIMA, Kazue

18 Feb 47

Gave copy Curriculum Vitae re subject to Judge Hsiang; to be returned to us.

December 15 Appointed 1st Class Secretary of the Embassy. Granted the rank of 3rd class of the Higher Civil Service (do). Ordered to serve in the United States (Foreign Ministry). Owing to the transfer, the duty as temporary Examiner of the Higher Civil Service Examination was automatically cancelled.

1925 February 17 Left Tokyo.

March 11 Arrived in Washington.

1926 May 5 Appointed Consul-General. Granted the 3rd Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet). Ordered to service at Honolulu (Foreign Office).

July 2 Left Washington.

July 16 Arrived at Honolulu.

1927 April 16 Granted the Order of the Sacred Treasure fourth class (Board of Decoration).

1928 April 13 Permitted to return to Japan on leave (Foreign Ministry).

June 14 Left Honolulu.

June 25 Arrived in Tokyo.

September 3 Ordered to serve in Hankow (do).

October 12 Arrived at Hankow.

November 1 Given the 5th Court Rank, Junior Class. (Imperial Household Ministry).

1929 December 28 Appointed Counsellor of the Embassy. Promoted to the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet). Ordered to serve in Italy (do). Granted the 3rd grade salary. (Foreign M.)

1930 January 20 Ordered to stop at Japan en route to the post (do).

June 11 Left Hankow.

June 19 Arrived in Tokyo.

August 11 Ordered to make an official trip to China.

August 15 Left Tokyo.

December 4 Ordered to stay in TOKYO on official business (F. Min.).

1911 December 27 Was granted the 7th court rank, Junior Class.

1912 January 4 Left TOKYO.

January 11 Arrived at MUKDEN.

February 29 Granted twenty percent of the annual foreign service allowance as an extraordinary allowance based on the Imperial Ordinance of 1898 (F.Min.).

1913 June 30 Granted the 4th grade salary (F.Min.).

July 11 Ordered to service in HANKOW and granted the service allowance of ¥1400.

1913 August 1 Left MUKDEN.

August 15 Arrived at HANKOW.

1915 June 30 Granted 3rd grade salary.

July 20 Ordered to service in San Francisco. Granted the foreign service salary of ¥3500 (F. Min.).

August 27 Left HANKOW.

November 20 Left TOKYO for post.

December 6 Arrived in San Francisco.

December 27 Granted the 6th rank of the Senior Class Official.

1915 December 27 Granted 3rd grade salary (F. Min.)

1916 Feb. 12 Received the 7th Court Rank, Senior Class.

April 1 Decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 6th class. Decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure sixth class and awarded ¥300 in recognition of services in the incidents in 1914 and 1915 (Board of Decorations).

1917 June 30 Appointed Consul. Conferred the 6th Rank of the higher civil service. (Foreign Ministry) Granted the 2nd grade salary. Ordered to service in Bombay.

1917 July 28 Left San Francisco and arrived in Japan en route to the post.

August 14	Arrived in TOKYO.
October 3	Left TOKYO.
November 4	Arrived at post in Bombay.
1918 June 28	Granted the 5th rank of the higher civil service. (Cabinet) Granted 2nd grade salary.
July 31	Granted the 6th Court Rank, Junior Class.
1919 September 8	Ordered to service in Chicago.
September 11	Returned to Bombay.
1919 December 26	Granted 1st grade salary.
1920 March 11	Left Bombay.
April 16	Arrived in Tokyo (en route to post).
August 11	Arrived at post in Chicago and took over the duty.
August 18	Granted the annual allowance of ¥3354 due to the revision of the Senior Officials' salaries.
October 31	Granted the 1st grade salary.
November 1	Decorated with the Order of the Single Rays of the Rising Sun. Decorated with Order of the Single Rays of the Rising Sun and granted ¥550 for the service in the incident of 1915-20 (Board of Decoration).
December 28	Granted the 4th Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet). Granted 2nd grade salary (Foreign Ministry).
1921 January 31	Granted the 6th Court Rank, Senior Class.
May 12	Permitted to make an official trip to Washington and New York (Foreign Ministry).
June 17	Permitted to make an official trip within the jurisdictional area (F. Min.).
1921 April 1	Granted the Order of the Sacred Treasure, 5th class. (Board of Decorations)
1922 June 30	Granted the 1st grade salary.
October 27	Ordered to return to Japan (Foreign M.).
November 19	Left Chicago (F. Min.).
December 12	Arrived home.

- 1923 April 11 Appointed official of the Foreign Ministry (Cabinet).
Conferred the 4th Rank of the Higher Civil Service.
Granted the 2nd class salary (Foreign Ministry).
Transferred to the 3rd Section of the European and American Bureau. (F. Min).
- June 30 Granted the 3rd Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).
Granted the 1st grade salary of the rank (Foreign Ministry).
- July 14 Appointed Secretary of the Foreign Ministry (Cabinet). Received the rank of 3rd class of the Higher Civil Service. Granted the 1st grade salary (Foreign Ministry). Appointed Chief of the 3rd section of the European and American Bureau. (F. Min.)
- July 1 Awarded the Commemoration Medal of the National Power Census based on the Imperial Ordinance No. 270 of 1921 (Board of Decoration).
- September 28 Granted the 5th Court Rank, Junior Class (Imperial Household Ministry).
- November 3 Appointed concurrently Secretary of the Imperial Capital Reconstruction Board (Cabinet).
Granted the third rank of the Higher Civil Service (do).
- November 9 Ordered to serve with the Supplies Section of the Material Supplies Bureau of the Imperial Capital Reconstruction Board (do).
- 1924 February 25 The government organization of the Imperial Capital Reconstruction Board abolished.
Considered as having been appointed secretary of the Reconstruction Bureau by the regulation attached to the Imperial Ordinance No. 26.
Ordered to the Supplies division of the Accounts Section (Home Ministry).
- May 19 Ordered to make an official trip to Hyogo Prefecture.
- May 23 Appointed temporary Examiner of the Higher Civil Service Examination (Cabinet).
- June 6 Ordered to make an official trip to Akita Prefecture.
- December 11 Relieved of the additional post (Cabinet).

December 15 Appointed 1st Class Secretary of the Embassy. Granted the rank of 3rd class of the Higher Civil Service (do). Ordered to serve in the United States (Foreign Ministry). Owing to the transfer, the duty as temporary Examiner of the Higher Civil Service Examination was automatically cancelled.

1925 February 17 Left Tokyo.

March 11 Arrived in Washington.

1926 May 5 Appointed Consul-General. Granted the 3rd Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet). Ordered to service at Honolulu (Foreign Office).

July 2 Left Washington.

July 16 Arrived at Honolulu.

1927 April 16 Granted the Order of the Sacred Treasure fourth class (Board of Decoration).

1928 April 13 Permitted to return to Japan on leave (Foreign Ministry).

June 14 Left Honolulu.

June 25 Arrived in Tokyo.

September 3 Ordered to serve in Hankow (do).

October 12 Arrived at Hankow.

November 1 Given the 5th Court Rank, Junior Class. (Imperial Household Ministry).

1929 December 28 Appointed Counsellor of the Embassy. Promoted to the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet). Ordered to serve in Italy (do). Granted the 3rd grade salary. (Foreign M.)

1930 January 20 Ordered to stop at Japan en route to the post (do).

June 11 Left Hankow.

June 19 Arrived in Tokyo.

August 11 Ordered to make an official trip to China.

August 15 Left Tokyo.

November 26 Returned to Tokyo.

December 5 Awarded the Imperial Metropolis Rehabilitation Commemoration Medal based on Imperial Ordinance No. 148 of 1930 (Board of Decoration).

December 6 Appointed Consul-general with the rank of the 2nd Class of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet) and ordered to serve in Tientsin.

1931 February 21 Left Tokyo.

February 27 Arrived in Tientsin.

June 1 Granted an annual allowance of ¥4650 due to the revision of the Regulations for the Senior Officials' Salaries.

June 30 Ordered home (temporarily) (Foreign Ministry).

August 8 Left Tientsin.

September 28 Ordered to make an official trip to MUKDEN from DAIREN on way back to the post.

September 29 Left Tokyo.

October 11 Returned to Tientsin.

1932 August 17 Ordered home (temporarily).

August 20 Left Tientsin.

August 29 Arrived in Tokyo.

September 9 Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure (Board of Decoration).

September 15 Left Tokyo.

September 26 Arrived at Tientsin.

1933 June 28 Ordered home.

July 15 Left Tientsin.

August 1 Appointed Chief of Asia Section of the Foreign Ministry with the rank of the 2nd Class of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).

August 15 Appointed investigator on the Relief Investigation Committee. (do)

August 24 Appointed a member of the inauguration committee of a Japan-Manchurian Joint News Agency in Manchuria (do).

September 9 Appointed a member of the Committee Investigating Cultural Products vis a vis China (do).

September 19 Relieved of position as member of Japanese-Manchurian Joint News Agency in Manchuria (do).

November 15 Given the 4th Court Rank, Junior Class (Imp. Household Ministry).

1934 March 1 Decorated with and permitted to wear the Order of the National Foundation awarded by His Majesty the Emperor of Manchukuo.

April 29 Decorated with the War Medal based on the War Medal Regulation pertaining to the Incident of 1931-34 (Board of Decorations).

May 9 Decorated with and permitted to wear the Order of Auspicious Clouds awarded by His Majesty the Emperor of MANCHOUKUO (do).

May 12 Ordered to accompany Prince YASUHITO who was sent to MANCHUKUO. (Imp. Household Ministry).

June 1 Appointed Chief of the East Asia Section of the Foreign Ministry with the rank of the 2nd Class of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet). Appointed a member of the Committee Investigating Cultural Projects vis a vis China and an investigator on the Relief Investigation Committee (do).

June 2 Left Tokyo.

June 18 Returned to Tokyo.

July 3 Promoted to the 1st Rank of the Higher Civil Service (do).

1935 January 18 Appointed councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Board (do).

February 21 Appointed a member of the reception committee for the Manchurian Emperor (Im. Household Ministry)

April 1 Granted an increase of ¥600 in the annual allowance (Foreign Office).

June 5 Relieved of duty as investigator on the Relief Investigation Committee (Cabinet).

June 11 Appointed investigator on the Relief Investigation Committee.

- July 3 Appointed a temporary member of the Overseas Colonization Committee (do).
- September 13 Appointed a part-time member of the Committee for the Investigation of Tropical Industries of the government-general of Formosa (Gov't General of Formosa).
- September 21 Decorated with and permitted to wear the Commemoration Order of the Manchurian Emperor's visit to Japan awarded by the Manchukuo Emperor (Board of Decorations).
- 1934 April 29 Decorated with and awarded the 2nd Order of the Sacred Treasure and ¥2000 for service in the 1931-1934 Incident.
- 1936 February 18 Ordered to make an official trip to Manchukuo and CHINA (Foreign M.).
- May 5 Appointed a member of the Government Committee at the 69th Imperial Diet Session in charge of the matters under the Foreign Ministry's jurisdiction (Cabinet).
- May 7 Relieved of duty as a temporary member of the Committee for the Disposition of Government Loans (do).
- September 16 Appointed councillor of Colonization Bureau of Overseas Ministry (do).
- October 2 Ordered to make an official trip to China (Foreign Ministry) and left Tokyo.
- October 13 Returned to Tokyo.
- November 2 Appointed councillor of the Aviation Board (Cabinet).
- December 24 Appointed a member of the government Committee at the 70 Imperial Diet Session in charge of the matters under the Foreign Ministry's jurisdiction (do).
- 1937 January 27 Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. Given the 1st Rank of the Higher Civil Service (do). Accredited to the Netherlands (do). Granted the 1st grade salary (Foreign Ministry). Accordingly relieved of the following duties: Member of the Committee Investigating Cultural Projects vis a vis China, investigator of the Relief Investigation

Committee, councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Board, temporary member of the Overseas Colonization Committee, temporary member of the Committee for the Investigation of Tropical Industries in the government-general of Formosa, councillor of the Overseas Colonization Bureau of the Overseas Ministry, Councillor of the Aviation Board and member of the govt. Committee at the 70th Imperial Diet Session in charge of the matters under the Foreign Ministry's jurisdiction.

February 26 Ordered to make an official trip to the Netherlands East Indies.

February 28 Left Tokyo.

April 11 Returned to Tokyo.

May 27 Left Tokyo.

June 23 Arrived at The Hague.

1938 September 21 Decorated with and permitted to wear the First Order of the Hsia-Kuo-Chang awarded by the Emperor of Manchukuo (B. of Decorations).

November 2 Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary (Cabinet). Accredited to Brazil (do).

November 15 Given the 4th Court Rank, Senior Class (Imperial Household Ministry).

December 26 Left The Hague

1929 January 10 Arrived at Rio de Janeiro and took over predecessor's affairs.

December 27 Decorated with and permitted to wear the Order of the Grande Croix Orange Nassau award by His Majesty the King of the Netherlands.

1940 April 29 Decorated with the 2nd Class Order of the Rising Sun and awarded ¥1100 for service in the China Incident.

August 22 Ordered to return to Japan (Foreign Ministry).

September 26 Left Rio de Janeiro.

November 2 Arrived in Tokyo.

1941 January 16 Relieved of main duty at his own request
(Cabinet).

February 3 Given the 3rd Court Rank, Junior Class (Imperial
Household Ministry). Promoted one class
higher in rank as an act of grace from the
Throne. (Imperial Household Ministry)

1944 September 15 Entrusted with affairs of the Foreign Ministry
(Foreign Ministry). Ordered to make an
official trip to China.

October 10 Left Tokyo.

November 22 Returned to Tokyo.

December 15 Also ordered to make official trip to
Manchukuo.

* * * *

Curriculum Vitae

Name: KUWAJIMA, Kazue.

Date of Birth: 4 March 1884.

29 Mar. 1902: Finished the Takamatsu Middle School, Kagawa Prefecture.

15 July 1903: Completed the Preparatory Course of the Waseda University.

15 July 1906: Graduated from the Political Department of the Waseda University (Economic Course).

7 Oct. 1908: Passed the Examination for Chancellorship of the Foreign Ministry.

14 Oct. 1908: Appointed Chancellor of the Foreign Ministry at the 9th grade salary; assigned to Peking and granted a foreign service allowance of 1000 yen.

27 Nov. 1908: Passed the Higher Civil Service Examination. Enlisted in the Class B.2nd Conscript Reserve of the Infantry Corps as the result of the Physical Examination for Conscription of 1907.

17 Dec. 1908: Appointed Clerk of the Foreign Ministry at the 7th grade salary; attached to the 1st Section of the Commercial Bureau.

29 Mar. 1909: Attached to the 2nd Section of the Commercial Bureau.

1 Apr. 1910: Granted a monthly salary of 37 yen due to the amendment of the "Hannin" Officials' Salary Ordinance.

30 June 1910: Granted the 7th grade salary.

30 June 1911: Granted the 6th grade salary.

14 Oct. 1911: Passed the Examination for Diplomatic and Consular Services.

- 2 Nov. 1911: Appointed Vice-Consul and conferred the 7th Rank of the Higher Civil Service with the 5th grade salary; assigned to Mukden and granted a foreign service allowance of 1400 yen.
- 4 Dec. 1911: Ordered to stay in Tokyo on business.
- 27 Dec. 1911: Conferred the Junior 7th Court Rank.
- 4 Jan. 1912: Started from Tokyo.
- 11 Jan. 1912: Arrived at Mukden.
- 29 Feb. 1912: Granted a special allowance amounting to two-tenths of the yearly foreign service allowance in accordance with provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 177 of 1898.
- 30 June 1913: Granted the 4th grade salary.
- 11 July 1913: Assigned to Hankow and granted a foreign service allowance of 1400 yen.
- 1 Aug. 1913: Started from Mukden.
- 15 Aug. 1913: Arrived at Hankow.
- 30 June 1915: Granted the 3rd grade salary.
- 20 July 1915: Assigned to San Francisco and granted a foreign service allowance of 3500 yen.
- 27 Aug. 1915: Started from Hankow.
- 20 Nov. 1915: Started from Tokyo for the new post.
- 6 Dec. 1915: Arrived at San Francisco.
- 27 Dec. 1915: Promoted to the 6th Rank of the Higher Civil Service and granted the 3rd grade salary.
- 12 Feb. 1916: Promoted to the Senior 7th Court Rank.
- 1 Apr. 1916: Awarded the 6th Class Order of the Sacred Treasure and 300 yen for services in connection with the 1914-15 Incident.
- 30 June 1917: Appointed Consul and conferred the 6th Rank of

the Higher Civil Service with the 2nd grade salary;
assigned to Bombay.

- 28 July 1917: Started from San Francisco for Bombay via Tokyo.
- 14 Aug. 1917: Arrived at Tokyo.
- 3 Oct. 1917: Started from Tokyo.
- 4 Nov. 1917: Arrived at Bombay.
- 28 June 1918: Promoted to the 5th Rank of the Higher Civil Service and granted the 2nd grade salary.
- 31 July 1918: Promoted to the Junior 6th Court Rank.
- 8 Sep. 1919: Assigned to Chicago.
- 26 Dec. 1919: Granted the 1st grade salary.
- 11 Mar. 1920: Started from Bombay.
- 16 Apr. 1920: Arrived at Tokyo on the way to the new post.
- 11 Aug. 1920: Arrived at Chicago and took charge of the affairs of the Japanese Consulate at Chicago.
- 18 Aug. 1920: Granted an annual salary of 3354 yen following the partial revision of the Higher Civil Officials' Rank and Salary Ordinance.
- 31 Oct. 1920: Granted the 1st grade salary.
- 1 Nov. 1920: Awarded the Order of the Single Ray of the Rising Sun and 550 yen for services in connection with the 1915-20 Incident.
- 28 Dec. 1920: Promoted to the 4th Rank of the Higher Civil Service and granted the 2nd grade salary.
- 31 Jan. 1921: Promoted to the Senior 6th Court Rank.
- 12 May 1921: Permitted by the Foreign Ministry to make a travel to Washington and New York.
- 17 June 1921: Permitted by the Foreign Ministry to make a travel through the jurisdiction of the Consulate at Chicago.

- 1 Apr. 1921: Decorated with the 5th Class Order of the Sacred Treasure.
- 30 June 1922: Granted the 1st grade salary.
- 27 Oct. 1922: Ordered home:
- 19 Nov. 1922: Started from Chicago.
- 12 Dec. 1922: Arrived at Tokyo.
- 11 Apr. 1923: Appointed Junior Secretary of the Foreign Ministry and conferred the 4th Rank of the Higher Civil Service with the 2nd grade salary; assigned to the 3rd Section of the European and American Affairs Bureau.
- 30 June 1923: Promoted to the 3rd Rank of the Higher Civil Service and granted the 1st grade salary.
- 14 July 1923: Appointed Senior Secretary of the Foreign Ministry and conferred the 3rd Rank of the Higher Civil Service with the 1st grade salary; assigned to the 3rd Section of the European and American Affairs Bureau as Chief thereof.
- 1 July 1923: Awarded the Medal in Commemoration of the 1st Census-taking in accordance with provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 270 of 1921.
- 28 Sep. 1923: Promoted to the Junior 5th Court Rank.
- 3 Nov. 1923: Appointed additionally Senior Secretary of the Metropolitan Reconstruction Board and conferred the 3rd Rank of the Higher Civil Service.
- 9 Nov. 1923: Assigned to the Supplies Section of the Materials Supply Bureau, Metropolitan Reconstruction Board.
- 25 Feb. 1924: The organization of the Metropolitan Reconstruction Board was abolished.
- Appointed Senior Secretary of the Reconstruction

- Bureau in accordance with supplementary provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 26; assigned to the Supplies Section of the Accountants' Division.
- 19 May 1924: Ordered to make an official trip to Hyogo Prefecture.
- 23 May 1924: Appointed Special Commissioner of the Higher Civil Service Examination.
- 6 June 1924: Ordered to make an official trip to Akita Prefecture.
- 11 Dec. 1924: Relieved of the additional office as Senior Secretary of the Reconstruction Bureau.
- 15 Dec. 1924: Appointed 1st Secretary of Embassy and conferred the 1st Rank of the Higher Civil Service; assigned to Washington.
- Relieved of office as Special Commissioner of the Higher Civil Service Examination due to the transference to Washington.
- 17 Feb. 1925: Started from Tokyo.
- 11 Mar. 1925: Arrived at Washington.
- 5 May 1926: Appointed Consul-General and conferred the 3rd Rank of the Higher Civil Service; assigned to Honolulu.
- 2 July 1926: Started from Washington.
- 16 July 1926: Arrived at Honolulu.
- 16 Apr. 1927: Decorated with the 4th Class Order of the Sacred Treasure.
- 13 Apr. 1928: Permitted to return home on leave.
- 14 June 1928: Started from Honolulu.

- 25 June 1928: Arrived at Tokyo.
- 3 Sep. 1928: Assigned to Hankow.
- 12 Oct. 1928: Assumed office at Hankow.
- 1 Nov. 1928: Promoted to the Senior 5th Court Rank.
- 28 Dec. 1929: Appointed Counsellor of Embassy and conferred the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil Service with the 3rd grade salary; assigned to Rome.
- 20 Jan. 1930: Ordered to stop off in Japan on the way to Rome.
- 11 June 1930: Started from Hankow.
- 19 June 1930: Arrived at Tokyo.
- 11 Aug. 1930: Ordered to make an official trip to China.
- 15 Aug. 1930: Started from Tokyo.
- 26 Nov. 1930: Returned to Tokyo.
- 5 Dec. 1930: Awarded the Medal in Commemoration of the Metropolitan Reconstruction in accordance with provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 148 of 1930.
- 6 Dec. 1930: Appointed Consul-General and conferred the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil Service; assigned to Tientsin.
- 21 Feb. 1931: Started from Tokyo.
- 27 Feb. 1931: Assumed office at Tientsin.
- 1 June 1931: Granted an annual salary of 4650 yen following the partial revision of the Higher Civil Officials' Rank and Salary Ordinance.
- 30 June 1931: Ordered to return home (temporarily).
- 8 Aug. 1931: Started from Tientsin.

- 28 Sep. 1931: Ordered to make an official trip to Mukden from Dairen on the way back to Tientsin.
- 29 Sep. 1931: Started from Tokyo.
- 11 Oct. 1931: Resumed post at Tientsin.
- 17 Aug. 1932: Ordered to return home (temporarily).
- 20 Aug. 1932: Started from Tientsin.
- 29 Aug. 1932: Arrived at Tokyo.
- 9 Sep. 1932: Decorated with the 3rd Class Order of the Sacred Treasure.
- 15 Sep. 1932: Started from Tokyo.
- 28 Sep. 1932: Resumed post at Tientsin.
- 28 June 1933: Ordered home.
- 15 July 1933: Started from Tientsin.
- 1 Aug. 1933: Appointed Director of the Asiatic Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry, and conferred the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil Service.
- 15 Aug. 1933: Appointed member of the Relief Investigation Committee.
- 24 Aug. 1933: Appointed member of the Organizing Committee of the Japan-Manchoukuo Joint Communication Company in Manchuria.
- 9 Sep. 1933: Appointed member of the Investigation Committee on Cultural Work for China.
- 19 Sep. 1933: Relieved of membership of the Organizing Committee of the Japan-Manchoukuo Joint Communication Company in Manchuria.
- 15 Nov. 1933: Promoted to the Junior 4th Court Rank.
- 1 Mar. 1934: Authorized to receive and wear the National

- Foundation Medal of Manchoukuo awarded by its Emperor.
- 29 Apr. 1934: Awarded the War Medal in accordance with provisions of the War Medal Ordinance for the 1931-34 Incident.
- 9 May 1934: Authorized to receive and wear the 2nd Class Order of the "Kei Un" awarded by the Emperor of Manchoukuo.
- 12 May 1934: Appointed member of the suite of H.I.H. Prince Yasuhito, Imperial Messenger to Manchoukuo.
- 1 June 1934: Appointed Director of the East-Asiatic Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry, and conferred the 2nd Rank of the Higher Civil Service.
- Appointed member of the Investigation Committee on Cultural Work for China.
- Appointed member of the Relief Investigation Committee.
- 2 June 1934: Started from Tokyo for Manchoukuo.
- 18 June 1934: Returned to Tokyo.
- 3 July 1934: Promoted to the 1st Rank of the Higher Civil Service.
- 18 Jan. 1935: Appointed Councillor of the Manchurian Bureau.
- 21 Feb. 1935: Appointed member of the Reception Committee for the Emperor of Manchukuo.
- 1 Apr. 1935: Granted an additional yearly salary of 600 yen.
- 5 June 1935: Relieved of membership of the Relief Investigation Committee.
- 11 June 1935: Appointed member of the Relief Investigation Committee.

- 3 July 1935: Appointed special member of the Overseas Colonization Committee.
- 13 Sep. 1935: Appointed special member of the Investigation Committee on Tropical Industry of the Government-General of Formosa.
- 21 Sep. 1935: Authorized to receive and wear the Medal in Commemoration of the Manchukuo Emperor's Visit to Japan awarded by His Majesty.
- 29 Apr. 1934: Awarded the 2nd Class Order of the Sacred Treasure and 2000 yen for services in connection with the 1931-34 Incident.
- 18 Feb. 1936: Ordered to make a trip to Manchukuo and China.
- 5 May 1936: Appointed Government Delegate in the 69th session of the Imperial Diet for affairs under the charge of the Foreign Ministry.
- 7 May 1936: Relieved of the office as special member of the Government's Loan Disposal Committee.
- 16 Sep. 1936: Appointed Councillor of the Oversea Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Oversea Affairs.
- 2 Oct. 1936: Ordered to make a trip to China, and started from Tokyo.
- 13 Oct. 1936: Returned to Tokyo.
- 2 Nov. 1936: Appointed Councillor of the Aviation Bureau.
- 24 Dec. 1936: Appointed Government Delegate in the 70th session of the Imperial Diet for affairs under the charge of the Foreign Ministry.
- 27 Jan. 1937: Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Holland and conferred the 1st Rank of the Higher Civil Service with the

1st grade salary.

Relieved of the following offices as the result of the above transference:-

Member of the Investigation Committee on Cultural Work for China; member of the Relief Investigation Committee; Councillor of the Manchurian Bureau; special member of the Overseas Colonization Committee; special member of the Investigation Committee on Tropical Industry of the Government-General of Formosa; Councillor of the Oversea Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Oversea Affairs; Councillor of the Aviation Bureau; Government Delegate in the 70th session of the Imperial Diet for affairs under the charge of the Foreign Ministry.

26 Feb. 1937: Ordered to make a trip to the Netherlands East Indies.

28 Feb. 1937: Started from Tokyo for the Netherlands East Indies.

11 Apr. 1937: Returned to Tokyo.

27 May 1937: Started from Tokyo for the Hague.

23 June 1937: Arrived at the Hague.

21 Sep. 1938: Authorized to receive and wear the 1st Class Order of the "Kei Kuo" awarded by the Emperor of Manchukuo.

2 Nov. 1938: Appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Brazil.

15 Nov. 1938: Promoted to the Senior 4th Court Rank.

- 26 Dec. 1938: Started from the Hague.
- 10 Jan. 1939: Arrived at Rio de Janeiro and assumed charge of the Japanese Embassy.
- 27 Dec. 1939: Authorized to receive and wear La Grand Croix de l'Ordre d'Orange Nasseau awarded by the King of Holland.
- 29 Apr. 1940: Awarded the 2nd Class Order of the Rising Sun and 1100 yen for services in connection with the China Incident.
- 22 Aug. 1940: Ordered home.
- 26 Sep. 1940: Started from Rio de Janeiro.
- 2 Nov. 1940: Arrived at Tokyo.
- 16 Jan. 1941: Relieved of office at own request.
- 3 Feb. 1941: Promoted to the Junior 3rd Court Rank by His Majesty's special grace.
- 15 Sep. 1944: Entrusted with affairs of the Foreign Ministry; ordered to make a trip to China.
- 10 Oct. 1944: Started from Tokyo.
- 22 Nov. 1944: Returned to Tokyo.
- 15 Dec. 1944: Ordered to make a trip to Manchoukuo.
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Translated by Y. WATANABE
J. Ode

Curriculum Vitae

OK

Full Name: KUWAJIMA Shukei (KAZUE)

Born: 4th March, 1884

1902 Mar 29 Graduated from the TAKAMATSU Middle
School of KAGAWA Prefecture

1903 Jul 15 Finished the ~~course~~ of the Higher Preparatory
course
Dept. of the private WASEDA University

1906 Jul 15 Graduated from the Political Dept. of
the University Dept. of the private WASEDA University (specialized
in political economy)

1908 Oct 9th Passed the examination ^{for ~~as~~ probation} ~~for a~~ ~~chancellor~~ secretary of the Foreign Ministry

Oct 14 Appointed ^{probation secretary} ~~chancellor~~ of the Foreign Ministry and granted the 9th grade salary of the ~~rank~~

Ordered to be ^{on} duty in CHINA and granted the annual salary of ¥1000⁰⁰ 1000

NOV 27 Passed the higher civil service examination.

~~Had taken~~ ^{Underwent the} examination for conscription held in 1907 and ^{was} assigned to the second B. grade, Infantry

1908 Dec 17 Appointed ~~clerk~~^{to} of the Foreign Ministry (3)

~~and~~ Granted the 7th grade salary of the

~~rank~~ (Foreign Ministry)

Assigned to the 1st ~~Dept.~~^{Section} of the

^{Bureau.}
Trade ~~Section~~ (F.M.)

1909 Mar 29 Transferred to the 2nd ~~Dept.~~^{Section} of the

^{Bureau.}
Trade ~~Section~~

1910 Apr 1 Granted the monthly salary of ¥37 due

to the revision of the salary regulation for

the Junior Class officials

1910 Jun 30 granted the 7th ^{class} grade salary ~~if the rank (2)~~ (F. Min)

1911 Jun 30 granted the 6th ^{class} grade salary ~~if the rank (2)~~ (F. Min)

Oct 14 Passed the Diplomatic Civil Service and Consul Examinations

Nov 2 Appointed ~~elementary~~ Consul ~~and given~~ ~~Confidence~~
the 7th Rank of the Higher Civil Service: Received

granted the 5th grade salary and ordered to serve in Mukden. ^(F. Min)
service allowance granted the annual amount of ¥1400 (F. Min)

Dec 4 Ordered to stay in Tokyo on official business (F. Min)

1911 Dec 27 ^{was granted}
~~Confused~~ given the 7th court rank, junior class (5)

1912 Jan 4 Left Tokyo

Jan 11 Arrived at Mukden

Feb 29 Granted ^{twenty percent.} ~~two tenths~~ of the annual ^{foreign} ~~freight~~
service allowance
~~service salary~~ as an extraordinary
allowance based on the Imperial Ordinance
of 1898 (EoMin).

1913 Jun 30 Granted the 4th grade salary of the
~~rank~~ (EoMin)

Ordered
Jul 11 Transferred to the service in HANKOW.

and granted the service allowance of ¥1400

(6)

1913 Aug 1 Left MUKDEN

Aug 15 Arrived at HANKOW

1915 Jun 30 granted ~~the~~ 3rd ~~grade~~ salary of ~~the~~

Jul 20 ~~rank~~ ^{rank} Ordered
~~Transferred~~ to ~~the~~ service ⁱⁿ San Francisco:

granted the foreign service salary of

¥ 3500 (to Min).

Aug 27 Left HANKOW

Nov 20 Left TOKYO for ~~the~~ post

Dec 6 Arrived in San Francisco

Dec 27 ~~granted~~ ^{granted} the 6th rank of the Senior Class
Official

1915 Dec 27 Granted ~~the~~ 3rd grade salary (~~to~~ Min)

1916 Feb 12 ~~Conferred~~ Received ~~from~~ the 7th Court Rank, Senior Class

Apr 1 Decorated with the ~~6th~~ Order of Merit
of the
~~with~~ Sacred Treasure, 6th class.

Decorated with ~~and awarded~~ ~~the~~ ~~6th~~ Order
with class and awarded
to Sacred Treasure ~~and~~ ¥ 300 in recog-

nition of ~~the~~ services in ^{the incidents of} 1914 and 1915

(Board of Decorations)

1917 Jun 30 Appointed Consul ~~and~~ ~~from~~ the 6th
Rank of the higher civil service.

(Foreign Ministry)
granted the 2nd grade salary of ~~the rank~~

Jul 31 Ordered transferred to the service in Bombay

1917 Jul 28 Left San Francisco and Arrived in Japan en route to the post (8)

~~from San Francisco~~

Aug 14 Arrived in Tokyo

Oct 3 Left Tokyo

Nov 4 Arrived at the post in Bombay

1918 Jun 28 ~~Granted~~
Given the 5th rank of the higher civil service (Cabinet)

~~and~~ Granted the 2nd grade salary of the

rank
Granted
~~Confirmed~~
Jul 31 Given the 6th Court Rank, Junior Class

1919 Sep 8 Ordered
~~Transferred~~ to the service in Chicago

Sep 11 Returned to Bombay

1919 Dec 26 granted ~~the~~ 1st ~~grade salary~~ ^{grade salary} (9)

1920 Mar 11 left Bombay

Apr 16 Arrived in Tokyo (en route to the post)

Aug 11 Arrived at the post in Chicago and

took over the duties

Aug 18 granted the annual allowance of ¥3354

due to the revision of the Senior Official's

salary scales.

Oct 31 granted the 1st grade salary
Order of the

Nov 1 Decorated with the Single Rays of the

Rising Sun:

Order of

(10)

Decorated with ~~and~~ granted the Single Rays of
granted

the Rising Sun and ¥ 550 for the service in

the incident of 1915-20 (Board of Decoration)

~~Conferral~~ granted

Dec 28

Given the 4th Rank of the Higher Civil Service

(Cabinet) ~~and~~ granted the 2nd grade

←
salary of the rank (Foreign Ministry)

1921 Jan 31

~~Conferral~~
Given the 6th Court Rank, Senior Class

May 12

permitted to make an official trip to

Washington and New York (Foreign Ministry)

June 17

permitted to make an official trip within

area
the jurisdictional (F.O.M.).

1921 Apr 1 ~~Decorated~~ ^{Granted} the Order of the (11)
~~Decorated with 5th Order of Merit with the~~
5th class.

Sacred Treasure, (Board of Decorations)

1922 Jun 30 granted the 1st grade salary

Oct 27 Ordered to return to Japan (Foreign M.)

Nov 19 Left Chicago (No Min)

Dec 12 Arrived home

1923 Apr 11 Appointed ^{Official} ~~Chancellor~~ of the Foreign Ministry
(Cabinet) ^{Conferred} ~~Given~~ the 4th Rank of

the Higher Civil Service:

^{Class salary}
Granted the 2nd ~~grade salary~~ of the rank
(Foreign Ministry)

Section (12)
Transferred to the 3rd ~~Dept~~ of the European

and American ~~Section~~ ^{Bureau} (F.O.M.)

June 30 ~~Appointed~~
~~Transferred~~ to the 3rd Rank of the Higher

Civil Service (Cabinet)

granted the 1st ^{class} grade salary of the rank

(Foreign Ministry)

July 14 Appointed Secretary of the Foreign Ministry

(Cabinet) ^{Received} with the rank of the 3rd

~~Class~~

Class of the Higher Civil Service:

granted the 1st grade salary of the

~~rank~~ (Foreign Ministry)

Appointed Chief of the 3rd Dept. ^{section (3)}

of the European and American ~~Section~~ ^{Bureau}

(F.M.)

Jul 1 Awarded the Commemorative Medal of

the National Power Census based on

the Imperial Ordinance No 270 of 1921

(Board of Decorations)

Sep 28

~~Confirmed~~
~~Granted~~
the 5th Court Rank, Junior Class

(Imperial Household Ministry)

Nov 3

Appointed concurrently Secretary of the
Capital Reconstruction
Imperial Metropolis Rehabilitation Board
(Cabinet)

Granted
~~Conferred~~ the third rank (14)
~~with the same rank of the~~ Higher Civil Service

(do)

Nov 9 Ordered to serve with Section
Transferred to the Supplies Dept. of the
Distribution Bureau of
Material Supplies Section, the Imperial
Capital Reconstruction
~~Republic Rehabilitation Board~~ (do)

1924 Feb 25 The government organization of the Im-
perial Capital Reconstruction
~~Republic Rehabilitation Board~~ abolished:
Considered as having been
supplementarily maintained in position of
appointed secretary of the
~~the Secretary of the I. R. B.~~ based on
Reconstruction Bureau by the
~~the~~ regulation attached to the Imperial Ordinance

Ordered to the Supplies ^{division} Section of the Accountancy (15)

Section (Home Ministry)

May 19 Ordered to make an official trip to Hyōgo Prefecture

May 23 Appointed temporary Examiner of the Higher Civil Service Examination (Cabinet)

Jun 6 Ordered to make an official trip to Akita Prefecture

Dec 11 Relieved of the additional post (Cabinet)

Dec 15 Appointed 1st Class Secretary of ^{the} Embassy
~~Cabinet~~ ^{Granted}
with the rank of the 3rd Class of the Higher Civil Service (10)

Ordered to serve in the United States (Foreign

Ministry) : ~~Accordingly relieved of the~~
~~temporary~~ Examiner of the Higher Civil Service
 Due to the transfer, the duty as

Examiner was automatically cancelled.

1925 Feb 17 Left Tokyo

Mar 11 Arrived in Washington

1926 May 5 Appointed Consul-General

~~Confirmed~~
 Granted the 3rd Rank of the Higher Civil Service

~~maintained~~ (Cabinet)

Ordered
 Transferred to the service at Honolulu

(Foreign Office)

Jul 2 Left Washington

Jul 16 Arrived at Honolulu

~~Conferred~~ Granted

1927 Apr 16 Decorated with the ~~4th~~ Order of ~~Ancient~~
fourth class
with the Sacred Treasure, (Board of
Decorations)

1928 Apr 13 Permitted to return to Japan on
leave (Foreign Ministry)

Jun 14 Left Honolulu

Jun 25 Arrived in Tokyo

Sep 3 Ordered to serve in HANKOW (do)

Oct 12 Arrived at HANKOW

~~Given~~
~~Conferred the~~ (18)
Nov 1 ~~Given the~~ 5th Court Rank, Junior Class

(Imperial Household Ministry)

1929 Dec 28 Appointed Counsellor of the Embassy

~~Conferred~~ ~~ranked to~~
~~and promoted to the 2nd Rank of~~

the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet)

Ordered to serve in Italy (do)

→ Granted the 3rd grade salary

~~of the rank~~ (Foreign M.)

1930 Jan 20 Ordered to stop ~~at home~~ en route to
at Japan

the post (do)

Jan 11 Left Hankow

Checked by
Biffington (19)

Jun 19 Arrived in Tokyo

Aug 11 Ordered to make an official trip to
China

Aug 15 Left Tokyo

Nov 26 Returned to Tokyo

Dec 5 Awarded Mi Commemorative Medal

Mi Imperial Metropolis Rehabilitation

based on Mi Imperial Ordinance no.

148 of 1930 (Board of Decorations)

Dec 6 Appointed Consul-general with

the rank of Mi 2nd Class of Mi Higher

Civil Service (Cabinet), and ordered ⁽²⁰⁾

to serve in Tientsin

(FEB)

1931 ~~Jan~~ 21 Left Tokyo

Feb 27 Arrived ⁱⁿ Tientsin

Jun 1 Granted ^{an} annual allowance of ¥4650

due to the revision of the Regulations for

the Senior Officials' Salaries

Jun 30 Ordered home (temporarily) (Foreign Ministry)

Aug 8 Left Tientsin

Sep 28 Ordered to make an official trip to
Mukden from Dairen on way back to ^{post} Peking

(21)

Sept 29 Left Tokyo

Oct 11 Returned to Tientsin

1932 Aug 17 Ordered home (temporarily)

Aug 20 Left Tientsin

Aug 29 Arrived in Tokyo

Sep 9 Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit

with the Sacred Treasure (B. of Decoration)

Sep 15 Left Tokyo

Sep 26 Arrived at Tientsin

1933 Jun 28 Ordered home

Jul 15 Left Tientsin

Aug 1 Appointed Chief of Asia Section of
the Foreign Ministry with the rank

of the 2nd Class of the Higher Civil
Service (Cabinet)

Aug 15 Appointed ~~Inspector~~ ^{INVESTIGATOR} of the Policy
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE.
~~Inspector Society (do)~~

Aug 24 Appointed ^a member of the inauguration
committee of a Japan-Manchurian Joint
^{in Manchuria}
News Agency (do)

Sep 9 Appointed a ~~member of the inspection~~
MEMBER OF THE
COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CULTURAL PROJECTS
~~committee of the cultural works for China.~~

~~DIRECTED AT CHINA (DO)~~
HS a HS

RELIEVED OF POSITION AS (23)

Sept 19

~~Appointed a member of~~

MEMBER OF JAPANESE-MANCHURIAN
~~the immigration committee of the~~

JOINT NEWS AGENCY IN MANCHURIA (do)
~~mentioned news agency (do)~~

NO 15

Given the 4th Court Rank, Junior

Class (Imp. Household Ministry)

1934

Mar 1

Decorated with and permitted to wear

the Order of the National Foundation

awarded by His Majesty the Emperor

of Manchoukuo

Apr 29

Decorated with the War Medal based

on the War Medal Regulation pertaining to

(24)

The Incident of 1931-34 (BOARD of Decorations)

May 9 Decorated with and permitted to wear the Order of
Auspicious Clouds awarded by His Majesty the
Emperor of MANCHOUKHO. (do)

May 12 Ordered to accompany Prince Yasuhito
who was ~~SENT~~ ^{SENT} to MANCHOUKHO.

(Imp. Household Ministry)

June 1 Appointed Chief of the East Asia
Section of the Foreign Ministry with
the rank of the 2nd Class of the Higher
Civil Service (Cabinet)

(APPOINTED)

(25)

~~Held the position as a member of the~~

THE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CULTURAL
~~Investigation Society of the Cultural Works~~

PROJECTS DIRECTED ^{WIS & VIS} AT CHINA, ATIDAN
~~for China and a member of the~~

INVESTIGATOR ON THE RELIEF INVESTIGATION
~~Examination Committee of the Relief Society~~

COMMITTEE. (D)

Jun 2 Left Tokyo

Jun 18 Returned to Tokyo

Jul 3 Promoted to the 1st Rank of the

Higher Civil Service (Do)

1935 Jan 18 Appointed councillor of the Manchurian

Affairs Board (Do)

Feb 21 Appointed a member of the reaptori

Committee for the Manchurian Emperor (26)

(Im. Household Ministry)

Apr 1 Granted an increase of the annual al-

lowance, ~~of 100~~ (Foreign Office)

Jun 5 Relieved of the duty as ~~member of~~ ^{(INVESTIGATOR ON}
THE RELIEF INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
~~the Examination Committee of the Relief~~
~~Examination~~

~~Society~~ (Cabinet)

Jun 11 Appointed ~~a member of the Examination~~ ^{INVESTIGATOR ON THE RELIEF}
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE Examination
Committee of the Relief Society (do)

Jul 3 Appointed a temporary member of the
^{COLONIZATION}
Business ~~Committee~~ Committee (do)

Glantz
8.

(29)

Sept 13 Appointed a part-time member of the
COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF
~~Foreign Industry and Trade~~
TROPICAL INDUSTRIES
of the Government-General of Formosa
(GOV'T. GENERAL OF FORMOSA)

Sept 21 Decorated with and permitted to wear the

Commemorative Order of the Manchurian

Emperor's Visit to Japan awarded by the

Manchurian Emperor (Board of Deco^{ration})

1934 Apr 29 Decorated with and awarded the

2nd Order of the Sacred Treasure

and ¥2000 for service in the

(1931-1934 INCIDENT)
~~Incident of 1931-34~~

1936 Feb 18

Ordered to make an official trip to

Manchoukuo and CHINA (Foreign Min.)

May 5

Appointed a member of the Govern-

ment Committee in charge of the matters

under the Foreign Ministry's jurisdiction.

at the 69th Imperial Diet Session

(Cabinet)

May 7

Relieved of ~~his~~ duty as a temporary

MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE FOR

~~member of the Disposition Committee~~

THE DISPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT

LOANS

~~of the Loans (Lo)~~

Sep 16

Appointed councillor of

Colonization ~~in Manchoukuo~~

Bureau of (29)
~~Development~~ Section of the Overseas Developp

~~ment~~ Ministry (do)

Oct 2 Ordered to make an official trip to

China, (Foreign Ministry), and

left Tokyo

Oct 13 Returned to Tokyo

Nov ⁽²⁾ Appointed councillor of the Aviation Board -

(Cabinet)

Dec 24 Appointed a member of the Government

AT THE 70 IMPERIAL DIET SESSION

Committee in charge of the matters under

the Foreign Ministry's jurisdiction, ~~at the~~ 70th (DO)

(30)

~~Imperialist~~ (do)

1937 Jan 27 Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and

Minister Plenipotentiary:

Given the 1st Rank of the Higher Civil

Service (do):

Accredited to the Netherlands (do):

Granted the 1st grade salary ~~of~~

(Foreign Ministry)

Accordingly relieved of the ^{following} duties ~~of~~:

THE COMMITTEE

Member of the ~~Cultural Affairs~~

INVESTIGATING CULTURAL PROJECTS ^{vis a vis} DIRECTED

AT CHINA

~~Investigative Society for China~~ + member

RELIEF INVESTIGATION (31)
INVESTIGATOR of the ~~Examination Committee of the Relief~~
~~COMMITTEE~~
~~Examination Society~~, councillor of the

Manchuian Affairs Board, ~~in~~ temporary
member of the Overseas ~~Development~~ ^{Colonization} Com-
mittee, a temporary member of the

~~COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF~~
~~TROPICAL INDUSTRIES~~
TROPICAL INDUSTRIES
of the Government-General of Formosa, coun-
cillor of the Overseas ^{Colonization Bureau} ~~Development Section~~ of

the Overseas Development Ministry, Councillor

of the Aviation Board and a member of
AT THE 70TH IMPERIAL DIET SESSION
the Govt. Committee in charge of the matters under

(32)

the Foreign Ministry's jurisdiction, at

~~the 7th Imperial Diet Session.~~

Feb 26 Ordered to make an official trip to

the Netherlands East Indies

Feb 28 Left Tokyo

Apr 11 Returned to Tokyo

May 27 Left Tokyo

Jun 23 Arrived at The Hague

1938 Sep 21 Decorated with and permitted to wear the

First Order of the Hsia-Kuo-Chang

awarded by the Emperor of Manchukuo
(B. of Decorations)

(33)

Nov 2 Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and

Ambassador plenipotentiary (Cabinet)

Accredited to Brazil (do)

Nov 15 Given the 4th Court Rank, Senior Class

(Imperial Household Ministry)

Dec 26 Left Trieste

1939 Jan 10 Arrived at Rio de Janeiro and

took over ~~the~~ predecessor's ~~business~~ **(AFFAIRS)**

Dec 27 Decorated with and permitted to

ITERANDE

wear the Order of the ~~Grand~~ ~~House~~

CROIX ORANGE NASSAU

~~Orange Nassau~~ / ~~prop. /~~ award by

THE (34)
His Majesty the King of Netherlands

1940 Apr 29 Decorated with ~~with sword~~ the

THE 2nd Class Order of the Rising Sun
AWARDED

and ¥ 1100 for service in the

China Incident

Aug 22 Ordered to return to Japan. (Foreign
MINISTRY)

Sep 26 Left Rio de Janeiro

Nov 2 Arrived in Tokyo

1941 Jan 16 Relieved of main duty at his

own request (Cabinet)

Feb 3

Given the 3rd Court Rank, Junior Class
(Imp. Household
MINISTRY)

(35)

Promoted one class higher in rank as an

act of grace from the Throne

(Imperial Household Ministry)

1944 Sept 15 Entrusted with ~~the~~ affairs of the

Foreign Ministry (Foreign Ministry):

Ordered to make an official trip to

China

Oct 10 Left Tokyo

Nov 22 Returned to Tokyo

Dec 15 AVS¹ Ordered to make ~~an~~ official trip

to Manchoukuo

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KUWASHIMA, Kazue.

29482

The witness identified and verified Exhibit 3241 as his affidavit. The affidavit stated that the witness was in the diplomatic service from 1908 and was appointed director of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs from August 1933 to January 1937. He was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Netherlands and held the same post to Brazil from January 1939 to November 1940.

He was transferred from the consulate at Tientsin in August 1933 to the directorship of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs. The foreign minister then was UCHIDA. About one month after that UCHIDA resigned and HIROTA succeeded him. Relations with China and the western powers were gloomy at the time of Foreign Minister UCHIDA because of the Manchurian Incident.

29483

* Diplomatic relations with China were half broken off though ministers were still exchanged. It was HIROTA's firm resolution on becoming foreign minister to alleviate the oppressive tension and HIROTA had told the witness that frequently and made newspaper statements to this effect. At the Diet HIROTA made it clear that his policy aimed at alleviating the tense relations with China. People called UCHIDA's diplomacy "burnt ground diplomacy" and that of HIROTA the conciliatory diplomacy.

HIROTA carried out his resolution steadily. The Ambassador to China when HIROTA became foreign minister was ARIYOSHI who was eager for rapprochement. ARIYOSHI had exerted all efforts to alleviate tenseness but could not attain the desired object easily. After the Manchurian Incident the Chinese avoided association with the Japanese and this worked as an important restraint for ARIYOSHI's activities.

29484

* Because of ARIYOSHI's efforts the attitude of the Nationalist-Government toward Japan changed considerably after 1934. It resumed the payment of private loans on a small scale. ARIYOSHI opened conversations with WANG, Ching-wei, Home and Foreign Minister of the Nationalist Government. The ARIYOSHI*WANG conversation progressed. WANG at first maintained that the settlement of the Manchukuo question was a requisite condition for the improvement of relations. ARIYOSHI however explained that Japanese public opinion would not allow the government to retract recognition of Manchukuo since Japan had already recognized it and any government which would venture to do that would find it difficult to exist. WANG seemed to understand Japan's awkward position.

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* The Nationalist Government however had to consider its own public opinion and the main subject of the ARIYOSHI-Wang conversation thereafter lay in harmonizing the contradictory standpoints of both governments. The documents concerned were said to have been lost by fire during the war, but Telegram 368 of April 20 1934 addressed to HIROTA from the Consular General at Nanking escaped the fire and reported the contents of the ARIYOSHI*Wang conversation of April 18. Thus the efforts of HIROTA to improve relations appeared hopeful in 1934.

29486

On April 17 1934 when negotiations between ARIYOSHI and Wang had hardly been open there arose the question of the so-called unofficial statement of spokesman AMAU. At that time Monnet an expert financier of the League Secretariat was in China. The foreign office frequently received information that Monnet was drafting a plan for cooperation to China from which Japan was to be excluded, in concert with those antagonists of Wang, Chin-wei.

The Foreign Office thereupon instructed the Minister to China and other officials to keep in touch with Monnet and restrain his activities in China. Instructions to the same effect were frequently given to the representatives in China from the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs in which rather exaggerated reports were used to impress Monnet strongly.

29487

The statement of AMAU to the newspapermen was a patchwork of the contents of those telegraphic instructions. When this was reported by the press as if it had been a government policy, that gave rise to public discussion. HIROTA told the witness that he had nothing to do with the Amau statement before it was * published and to reprimand AMAU.

HIROTA emphasized his policy for rapprochement between Japan and China as well as his confidence in the nationalist Government in his Diet Address on Jan 22 1935, and in his Committee Statement afterwards. At the Committee he declared he had no doubt about Chiang Kai-shek's sincerity for the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations and aroused public attention.

On the other hand, Wang, Chin-wei, and Chiang-Kai-Shek expressed their intention in response to HIROTA's statement. After that the Nationalist Government resumed control of anti-Japanese movements in real earnest. Trade between the two countries regained its activity.

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29488 Early in May HIROTA took the initiative to submit to the cabinet conference the question of raising the Japanese and Chinese Legations in their respective countries to Embassies. * The Cabinet Conference passed this, the Nationalist Government agreed, and the raising of them to status of legations was decided on May 17th. The exchange of ambassadors had been advocated by pro-Chinese for a long time but when ARIYOSHI returned at the end of April the rumor was already abroad that it would be realized.

The North China situation had generally been calm since the Tangku Truce agreement of May 1932. But it began to change at the beginning of 1935; especially after May, various matters occurred. There were frequent skirmishes between the Kwantung Army and the Chinese near the Jehol border and Hopeh and Chahar provinces which were out of the way places where no foreign office official was stationed. The Kwantung Army and sometimes the North China forces would lodge direct protests with the Chinese government on the ground they were provocative acts.

29489 They would impose strict conditions such as the withdrawal of Chinese forces from these provinces or the extermination of the Kuomintang branches and enforce fulfillment with an ultimatum. The Chinese government regarded these as systematic plots of the Kwantung Army or the North China Forces on small occurrences or troubles. The Foreign Office was not so credulous as to believe everything the Chinese government pleaded but still recognized that the military in China were prone to raise a storm in a teacup. They earnestly hoped they would act more prudently and warned them.

29490 The envoys had hardly returned to Tokyo before trouble arose in defiance of the new policy. The Chi-tung Regime was established demanding self-government against the Nationalist Govt. rule, at the end of November * 1940 the unfortified zones established by the Tangku Truce Agreement, in the border between North China and Manchuria. The foreign office suspected this regime had a close connection with the Kwantung Army.

In November, the foreign office received information the Kwantung Army was concentrating mechanized troops at Shanhaikwan to intimidate North China. They warned the army. In the middle of December the Chi-cha Administrative Committee was formed. The Foreign Office suspected that military authorities in China had a hand in its organization. However this committee corresponded with the Nanking Government and was admitted by the latter to enjoy a degree of independence within the limit that it did not overshadow the sovereignty of the Central Government.

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29491

* The foreign office opposed the establishment of the Chi-tung Regime. The smuggling in North China caused by that regime's low tariff rates was disadvantageous to Japan. The witness engaged directly with the Kwantung Army about this and inspected the actual circumstances when he was sent to Manchukuo and China by orders of Foreign Minister ARITA from the beginning of June to July.

The foreign office took different attitudes toward the Chi-cha Administration Committee. It had nothing to do with its formation but consuls in those areas dealt with it after they learned that the Nanking Government had approved its formation.

29492

* Negotiations for the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations progressed and ambassadors were exchanged in May 1935. The national sentiments of China however seized this opportunity to take an unfavorable turn for Japan and in November and December the situation got serious. Wang Ching-wei barely escaped assassination in November and his cooperator Under-Sec'y for Foreign Affairs, Tang Yu-Jen was assassinated in December. The witness considered such a change in Chinese sentiments due to the activities of the Japanese military against North China.

29493

In HIROTA's address to the Diet Jan 21 1936, the three principles became known to the general public for the first time. But the principles had been decided on on October, 4, 1935, and it was shortly after that HIROTA showed the three principles to the Chinese Ambassador Chiang Tsuo-Pin, and Chiang-Kai-shek's opinion was revealed to Amb. ARIYOSHI in response.

After the announcement of the three principles, the February 26th Incident broke out. The OKADA Cabinet collapsed and HIROTA received an Imperial mandate to form a new ministry.

The Foreign Office was anchoring its hope upon the future development of the negotiation when the SUIYUAN Incident broke out owing to the activities of some officers of the Kwantung Army in Inner Mongolia. The Chinese Government's attitude toward negotiations changed suddenly and went so far as to disapprove the results of the past negotiations on the pretext of this Incident. Negotiations came to a standstill and no progress was made in spite of Japan's efforts.

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29494 The Diet was to open in mid-January of the following year. From the government's political standpoint it was considered untoward to leave the negotiations as they were at a deadlock. The Foreign Office was thus compelled to close the negotiation except for the settlement of the Chengtu and Pakhoi Incidents upon which perfect understanding had been reached.

The HIROTA Cabinet resigned in January 1937 at which time the witness also resigned as director of the East Asia Affairs Bureau and was then transferred to the post of Japanese Minister to the Netherlands.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BLAKENEY, Counsel for UMEZU

The witness stated that he thought the accused UMEZU was Commander of the North China Garrison in the spring of 1935.

29495 * The witness was asked whether he knew of any border incident in the spring of 1935 which was participated in by the North China Garrison. The witness stated that the incidents were small clashes around the borders between Jehol, Chahar and Hopeh Provinces between the Kwantung Army and the Chinese troops and negotiations pertaining to them were conducted principally by that army.

The witness had however been told that at times the military attache in Peking and at times the Tientsin Garrison assisted. The instances he had mentioned of direct negotiations with the Chinese by Japanese forces included the Ho-UMEZU Agreement in the general negotiations. He did not particularly include it with regard to negotiations pertaining to border clashes.

29496 The Ho-UMEZU Agreement did not come about as a result of a border clash. That agreement was in connection with the assassination of a pro-Japanese newspaper man residing in the Japanese concession in Tientsin. Asked whether the Ho-UMEZU agreement was an instance as having been enforced by an ultimatum the witness stated that in his recollection it was the result of a considerable strong demand but he did not think it had a time limit.

29497 At that time UMEZU was about to leave for Hsinking or some other place and his chief of staff SAKAI told him that in his opinion a rather friendly and moderate warning should be given. To this UMEZU was said to have replied if that was the case it would be excellent.

Page CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. OKAMOTO,
Counsel for MINAMI.

29500 * The witness recalled that he visited Manchuria or China in 1936. MINAMI was Ambassador to Manchuria in 1935, under the Foreign Minister, and the witness was Director of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs at that time.

29501 He didn't recall any instance of MINAMI's acting contrary to the Foreign Minister's instructions, nor that MINAMI ever sent an ultimatum to the Chinese contrary to the wishes of the government. The affidavit of the witness had stated that there were frequent skirmishes after May between the Kwantung Army and Chinese forces near the Jehol border and Hopeh and Chahar Provinces, where no Foreign Office officials were stationed. The witness was asked if he remembered the Northern Chahar or Chang Pei Incident in June, 1935. He replied that he didn't remember the details, but remembered that three or four small incidents occurred. * At that time there was a Japanese Consul at Kalgan, but he didn't remember if his name was HASHIMOTO.

29502 Regarding the statement in the affidavit that the Kwantung Army and sometimes the North China Force would lodge direct protests with the Chinese Government, the witness was asked if that statement also applied to the Northern Chahar Incident. The witness recalled that these border incidents were the first and second North Chahar incidents and the first and second Chang Pei incidents. In these the army negotiated directly.

29503 * The witness was quoted a statement of Ching Teh-chun in exhibit 199 describing the incident; which stated that after the departure of four Japanese soldiers retained by the Chinese, Consul HASHIMOTO at Kalgan protested and demanded the punishment and assurance against recurrences. The witness did not recall receiving such information from the Consul at Kalgan. * It was remarked to the witness

29504 that according to exhibit 199, the matter was referred to Japanese garrison Force Headquarters in Tientsin, after Consul HASHIMOTO negotiated, but the witness stated he didn't recall this. He didn't know if the Tientsin Garrison Force was independent from the Kwantung Army, but had heard that this was so. He had never heard that the Northern Chahar Incident was the only case in 1935 of which General Ching Teh-chun made complaint in exhibit 199.

- Page Regarding the statement in his affidavit that
the Kwantung Army or North China Garrison enforced ful-
fillment of these conditions with an ultimatum, the witness
29505 * recalled he got this information from the Peking Legation
and not from U. S. or British newspaper reports. The
witness knew nothing about Ching Teh-chun accusing Japan
of many things in exhibit 199 but never mentioning an
ultimatum.
- 29506 * The witness was reminded of his testimony in
the DOIHARA phase, that he received information from
newspaper articles, conversations, rumors, etc. He was
asked if his information on this occasion was the same as
the statements he had made earlier. He stated that when
he testified relative to DOIHARA's action, the telegram
was actually sent by himself. At that time, the Consulate
made reports to him on information obtained from the
sources mentioned. However, he had no means of knowing
on what basis the telegram sent from the Peking Legation
was made.
- 29507 * Reference was made to testimony at 19792.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. YAMADA,
Counsel for ITAGAKI.

- 29508 The witness stated that regarding the Suiyuan
Incident, the Foreign Office, and especially himself as
Director of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, knew
nothing about it * when it occurred, since it was in a
remote place. It was only when they received a protest
from the Nationalist Government that they first became aware
29510 of it. * The witness immediately sent a query to the
central military authorities concerning it. An officer
there told him that this was the activity of one or two
junior officers in the Kwantung Army.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. COMYNS-CARR.

- 29511 The witness stated that he was always in very
close contact with HIROTA while he was Foreign and Prime
Minister, and believed he always disclosed to him his real
opinions and intentions. * He could testify to anything
HIROTA told him while he was Director of the East Asiatic
Bureau, but since this was over ten years ago his memory
might fail him on some points. He had stated in his
affidavit that it was HIROTA's firm resolution on becoming
Foreign Minister to alleviate the oppressive tension in
Sino-Japanese relations, and that HIROTA carried out his
resolution steadily.

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29512 The witness was quoted a purported statement of HIROTA, that he was constantly trying to work out a smooth * relationship between diplomacy and national defense. In consequence, the war budget problem would become urgent. HIROTA said he intended to clarify his position, standing between as a third party. They would expand their utmost by foreign policy, and when this policy arrived at its limits they would leave the matter to the army and navy for disposal.

The witness was asked if this quoted statement did not represent HIROTA's real opinion and intentions when he first took office as Foreign Minister in 1933. The witness replied he didn't know when and in what connection HIROTA made such a statement, but did know that in September 1933, when HIROTA became Foreign Minister, he told him that because of the critical stage of Sino-Japanese relations it was his intention to bring about closer relations with China and also third powers. HIROTA considered this his sole mission.

29513 * It was suggested to the witness that HIROTA made the quoted statement to Baron HARADA in the Foreign Ministry on 11 October 1933, but the witness said he never heard of such a statement. He recalled that the Prime, War, Foreign, Finance, and Navy Ministers composed the 5 Minister's Conferences.

29514 He was convinced that HIROTA never had any idea of securing Japan's expansion by negotiation if he could, or use threats and ultimatums by the army, to secure compliance with his negotiation demands. When the army conducted negotiations directly with the Chinese, there never was an instance when they consulted either with HIROTA or the Foreign Office. HIROTA never allowed the army and navy to enforce its demands by force. HIROTA's negotiations were all conducted through regular diplomatic channels.

29515 * Regarding the conversation between ARIYOSHI and Wang Ching Wei in which the question of Manchukuo was raised, in which the witness had said in his affidavit that ARIYOSHI told Wang that Japanese public opinion would not allow retraction of Manchukuo's recognition, the witness stated that this was not only HIROTA's or ARIYOSHI's opinion, but the public opinion in Japan at that time. Japan had recognized Manchukuo the previous year.

- Page Wang often asked ARIYOSHI that Japan withdraw recognition. In reply to such requests ARIYOSHI made the statement referred to. The witness was convinced this reply had nothing to do with Japan's attitude toward Manchukuo, but was directed to showing the impossibility of withdrawing recognition which had already been granted.
- 29516 * In his affidavit, the witness had stated that the main subject of conversation lay in how to harmonize the difficult and contradictory standpoints of both governments, and he was asked if he thought chances of harmonizing the two opinions were improved by action taken in Manchukuo by the government of which HIROTA was a member. The witness stated that they had adopted this policy because they felt if the difficult questions were set aside or conversation avoided for the time being and an effort was made to attain mutual understanding in other spheres, the solution of these problems themselves would become much simpler.
- 29517 * It was suggested to the witness that HIROTA and his government took action to strengthen Japan's grip on Manchukuo and made it impossible for any peaceful negotiations to succeed. The witness stated his view was completely different. At the time of the ARIYOSHI-Wang negotiations, one of them compared them to a little boat trying to go upstream; if the rock could be avoided, the boat would succeed. The witness did not know if the Cabinet of which HIROTA was a member greatly strengthened Japan's grip to secure raw materials.
- 29518 * He didn't recall on 22 December, 1933, the East Asia Bureau issued a decision of the Cabinet concerning preparations for enforcing the monarchy in Manchukuo. (exhibit 234). He did hear about a controversy with the U. S. from August 1934 to April 1935, about the establishment of an oil monopoly in Manchuria, but since the negotiations were conducted by the Commerce Bureau he did not know the details.
- 29519 * Asked if he knew that on 5 November, 1934, HIROTA informed the U. S. that control of the oil industry in Manchuria was not within the concern of Japan as it was the act of a state recognized as sovereign and independent, (exhibits 939, 941, 965), the witness stated he had heard nothing about this matter at that time, because the Commerce Bureau was handling it.

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KUWASHIMA - Cross

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Asked if these statements were made by HIROTA or they were false, the witness stated that the matters were not within his confidence, and he could say nothing about it. He could speak with confidence as regards the structure of the Foreign Office. The Commerce Bureau handled economic matters, whereas his Bureau handled mainly political matters.

29520

* His Bureau may have issued a statement on a Cabinet decision on 20 March, 1934, a few months before these discussions began, entitled "The Summary of Japanese-Manchuria-Economical Administration Policy", the economic policy of Japan vis-a-vis Manchukuo was through peaceful exploitation of resources to reap the fruits of happiness for both Manchukuo and Japan.

29521

The witness had no recollection in regard to details of a Cabinet decision, which was that certain enterprises would be operated by special companies which held a dominant position in Manchukuo, and as a general rule they would be directly or indirectly under the Empire. * The witness did not recall if the list of industries to be controlled in that manner included the petroleum industry.

29522

He didn't recall clearly if there was an agreement between Japan and Manchukuo in July, 1935, with regard to economic control, * nor did he remember whether HIROTA attended the Privy Council meeting on 3 July, 1935, to explain this to them. Asked if he would be one of the officials who would go with HIROTA to the Privy Council, the witness stated that he did not remember exactly who went on each occasion, but that on economic matters it was the director of the Commerce Bureau who accompanied him.

29523

When an agreement was actually signed, other bureaus other than the competent bureau would be privileged to see the relevant document, but since the matter was outside his jurisdiction he didn't remember it too distinctly. He did know that a joint Manchukuo-Japanese Committee, to deal with all economic matters, was set up in Manchukuo with four members from each country. * He did not recall whether HIROTA explained to the Privy Council that it was quite all right because one of the Manchukuo members would always be a Japanese who could be trusted to support the Japanese side. (Exhibit 850)

Page Regarding the AMAU statement, the witness heard
from HIROTA that he had reprimanded AMAU, but did not
believe he was punished. What was wrong about the statement
was that the Chief of the Information Bureau, AMAU, pub-
lished the statement in the newspapers without first
29524 receiving HIROTA's understanding. * Also, the statement
was not in harmony with Japan's foreign policy at that
time.

The witness was reminded that he had said that
it consisted of a patchwork of telegraphic instructions
which had been sent to Japanese representatives in China.
The witness stated that from the summer of 1932, the League
sent experts regarding economics.

The Foreign Office received repeated information
that Monnet was drafting a plan for international help to
China, from which Japan was to be excluded. To get Monnet
to stop or put off the plan, the Bureau of East Asiatic
Affairs announced that such a plan would have no good
results for China and that its execution without Japan
would be utterly unacceptable. With such a view, the
Bureau sent telegraphic instructions to carry on negotia-
tions with Monnet on that basis to Ambassador ARIYOSHI in
Nanking and to the consul-general in Shanghai. The telegram
was sent merely as an indication of how to conduct negotia-
tions to get Monnet to stop or put off the plan, and it
29526 * certainly did not represent Japanese foreign policy.

Asked if the reprimand of AMAU was a punishment,
the witness replied that according to Japanese law a rep-
rimand is a punishment, but he did not know whether in
this case it was in that category or not. It was in the
records of his Bureau that HIROTA reprimanded AMAU, but he
recalled that it was not made public.

Asked if AMAU's real fault was that he disclosed
to the world what the Foreign Office was doing in secret,
the witness stated that in his view it furnished an indica-
tion to the representatives in China in negotiating * with
Monnet with a view to discouraging his activities and did
not represent foreign policy. The instructions only
concerned Monnet's activity and not general policy.
29527

The AMAU statement appeared in the morning papers
on 17 April, and in a press conference two or three days
later HIROTA declared it was not government policy.
Immediately after the statement, the U. S. and British
ambassadors appeared at the Foreign Office, and in reply

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Page to their inquiries either HIROTA or the Vice Minister, on HIROTA's instructions, told them more or less the same thing.

29528

* Asked again if AMAU's real fault was that he had disclosed the instructions being sent to the Japanese representatives in China, the witness stated that he believed he was reprimanded not only for having been careless, but also because he made his statement so as to cast suspicion on Japan that that was the real foreign policy, whereas it was not. By saying it was not the real policy, he did not mean it was an instruction to make false statements to Monnet.

29529

The witness was in the Foreign Office on 17 April, 1934, but did not know whether HARADA visited HIROTA then. Asked if HIROTA and SHIGEMITSU told HARADA that the AMAU statement was nothing serious, * the witness stated that since he did not know HARADA came to the Foreign Office and was not actually present if it did take place, he could say nothing about it.

29530

* In his recollection, the instructions were sent only to the diplomatic representative in China.

29531

With regard to the Ho-UMEZU agreement, he did not know about a time limit being set. He knew nothing about that agreement, but since he had heard through documents that in regard to many other minor negotiations they were carried out with ultimatums, he had put in the mention about time limits in his affidavit. He himself had never conducted or participated in such negotiations, and he could not say whether there was a distinction between a strong demand with a time limit and an ultimatum. His interpretation was that in an ultimatum the right was reserved to take free action after the time limit expired. In the case of a demand with a time limit, he believed it was merely a demand to reply within a certain period.

29532

Asked if he didn't know that the demands were accompanied by a threat of military action at the end of the time limit, the witness stated he recalled they were demands to reply by a certain date. He had used the word "ultimatum" in the sense of time limit. Since at that time in the Foreign Office documents referred repeatedly to ultimatums, he included that term in his affidavit. * He agreed that his distinction was that when the threat of force was only a bluff he called it a time limit, and when it was really intended he would call it an ultimatum.

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29533 The witness remembered that when the agitation in favor of an independent North China was created in November, 1935, that the Kwantung Army was concentrating mechanized troops at Shanghaikwan to intimidate North China. However, Japan was not actually conducting agitation to foment an independence movement, for this was done by junior officers of the Kwantung Army. At that time there was a branch office of the Consulate at Tientsin at Shanghaikwan, with a vice-consul, and he received this information from him and immediately called on the central military authorities to express strong * disapproval and to state that such news was alarming. The authorities told him that they had no intention to threaten China.

29534 * In the report from the Vice-Consul, words were used to the effect that that was the ideology of the junior officers, and the military authorities told them also that the junior officers were trying to set themselves up against their superiors. He did not know whether mechanized troops could be concentrated without the orders of MINAMI and ITAGAKI.

The witness did not recall if HIROTA first obtained a promise from MINAMI that troops would not actually be sent beyond Shanghaikwan on the Great Wall without Imperial command. He did remember that liaison officers of the military authorities told him repeatedly words to this effect.

29535 * He did not recall HIROTA's giving instructions to the Foreign Office that the fact troops would not move without Imperial command must not be allowed to leak out to China. Asked if the reasons given were that if it leaked out the Chinese would cause trouble and take the Japanese for fools, the witness remembered something to that effect from the army authorities. He didn't recall if HIROTA's other reason for taking extreme precautions that it did not leak out was that the army would be very angry if it did.

He had never heard that the North China and Kwantung Armies had threatened that if the new independent councils for Hopeh-Chahar and East Hopen were not established by a named day, military action would be taken.

29536 * He had never heard that on 18 November, 1935, DOIHARA announced in China that if autonomy for the North was not proclaimed he was prepared to send five divisions into Hopeh and six into Shantung.

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He did not know that North China authorities, or on behalf of the North China Army, DOIHARA had fixed an ultimatum to expire at noon on 21 November if the formal proclamation to autonomy was not issued. He didn't know that on the same day DOIHARA told newspapermen in Peking that he expected a formal announcement of the new regime shortly. Until the actual establishment of the East Hopeh anti-Comintern Autonomous Regime and the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council, the Foreign Office and East Asia Bureau knew nothing, either verbally or through documents, of the proposed establishment of such regimes.

29537

Asked if he personally made a collection which was filed in the Foreign Office of U. S. and other newspaper reports on this matter. the witness stated maybe his subordinates did this, * but as director he did not know anything about the two regimes until they had been established.

29539

On being handed a document, the witness recognized his own seal, and thought it also looked like SHIGEMITSU's seal on it. It was a report from Charge d'Affaires FUJI in London to HIROTA.

29540

Exhibit 3242, * a telegram from FUJI to HIROTA dated 16 November, 1935. containing the seals of SHIGEMITSU, the witness, and AMAU, of the Information Bureau, stated * that since the previous telegram, newspapers with one or two exceptions had become more quiet. However, considerable attention was aroused by reports on the situation of the independent movement by Japanese military authorities, and that North China had come under Japan's control and that landing of Japanese marines in Shanghai did not give a shock to the Chinese residents, etc.

29541

The witness stated that he had no recollection of his bureau making a file of newspaper reports, but remembered that they received many press telegrams from representatives in Europe and the U. S. * The witness was handed a document and asked if it was not a file of newspaper reports on this subject made in his section. He stated it was compiled by the Information Bureau, but did bear the seal of his Bureau and the seal of the Chief of the First Section. In his recollection, it was not true that newspaper clippings came to the East Asia Bureau, and after study were sent to the Information Bureau for filing. Newspaper and magazine reports went direct to the Information Bureau, and from it were circulated to the various interested bureaus, including his own.

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Page 29542 * The witness had noticed that the document was addressed to HIROTA from Ambassador ARIYOSHI in China.

29543 Exhibit 3242-A, the message identified by the witness dated 22 November 1935, stated that with regard to the North China Autonomous Movement, the gist of the editorial in the "Journal de Shanghai" was reported to HIROTA on 21 November, 1935. Its full text was forwarded to him for reference. * The witness stated that he was sure his Bureau did not see these newspaper reports. He did not recall if he reported to HIROTA on their contents. Even if it was not reported directly to the Foreign Minister, he was sure they reported it to Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU.

29544 Asked if he had forgotten that the reports contained all the matters which he asked about, the witness stated that since they were numerous it was difficult for him to recall their contents. * He did not recall, either from the Evening Post of 18 November 1935 or from consular reports, that DOIHARA had announced that if autonomy for the North was not proclaimed, he was prepared to send five divisions into Hopeh and six into Shantung. * He did not recall from the 20 November 1935 issue of the same paper or from consuls that DOIHARA had announced the ultimatum would expire at noon the next day.

29545 One of the ultimatums to which he had referred in his affidavit did include that ultimatum, but he did not know of the details of the events occurring then. He did not recall, either from the Los Angeles Daily News of 20 November 1935, or from consuls, that DOIHARA informed newspapermen that he expected a formal announcement of the new regime by the Chinese shortly.

29546 * It was not part of the Foreign Ministry's policy to support the army in the move for compelling the Chinese to establish an autonomous government in North China. * The witness did not recall a message received by HIROTA from the Chinese Ambassador on 18 November to the effect that it was desired of the Nanking government to promote negotiations for improving Sino-Japanese relations, or whether Charge d'Affaires Ting had an interview with SHIGEMITSU on the 19th. He did not know if SHIGEMITSU told Ting that he wanted to caution China, particularly about her activities in North China.

29547

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29548

* The witness stated he was convinced that HIROTA's China policy was an endeavor to effectuate conciliation and cooperation and to take steps to prevent the Army in China from taking action which would prevent conciliation. It was absolutely not so that the Foreign Ministry, the witness, HIROTA and SHIGEMITSU were themselves pushing this policy and using army threats to get it adopted.

29549

* He could not believe it would be right for SHIGEMITSU to say that it would be true to some extent that this was the result of a Japanese plot. Asked if it would not be in accord with HIROTA's policy for SHIGEMITSU to tell Ting that for North China to meet her development properly she must strive for harmonious rapprochement of China, Japan, and Manchukuo, the witness replied that it was necessary that Sino-Japanese conciliation be effective all over China, especially in North China, which bordered Manchukuo.

29550

* Asked if Ting denied the truth of that situation, the witness stated he didn't remember this so-called conversation and could say nothing about it. * The witness stated he was in constant touch with Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU, as well as HIROTA.

29551

To the witness were quoted statements that it was desired that the army make an autonomy statement with regard to North China. It was desired to send the Kwantung Army into Shanghaikwan and Hopeh to put a scare into them. It was desired to have everything done the way the army wants it before the Emperor returns.

29552

29553

* The witness was asked if these statements did not represent the real policy of both HIROTA and SHIGEMITSU. * He replied that he was convinced SHIGEMITSU could never have made such a statement. He had never heard HIROTA say on the same day that he would like to have the autonomy declaration issued at such a time that it would not aggravate the Nanking government.

29554

Reference was made to his affidavit where the witness said that meanwhile, during the period when the North China autonomy movement was going on, negotiations for the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations were making steady progress. The witness stated that by "meanwhile" he had not meant during the same period while the autonomous movement negotiations were going on, but meant the word in a general way. * He just meant that relations with China continued generally.

Page
29555

* At the end of December, 1935, HIROTA was as anxious as ever to improve relations. At that time, the Kuomintang government said it was prepared to accept HIROTA's principles as the basis of negotiations, but that because of various incidents in North China it was difficult to continue them. This report came by telegram. Since the Chinese government made this representation, it was difficult for them to continue the negotiations and so it was also difficult for the Japanese.

29556

* He didn't recall that HIROTA was not willing to continue the negotiations, nor had he ever heard that he was hesitating about giving China any decisive reply. Asked if HIROTA's reply was that they should continue the matter only after anti-Japanese movements were under control when the Chinese government proposed a Nanking Conference, the witness stated HIROTA never told him he was not willing to continue negotiations unless anti-Japanese movements were given up.

29557

It was in December, 1936, when HIROTA was Premier, that the so-called Suiyuan Incident broke out, owing to activities of the Kwantung Army in Inner Mongolia. * He knew that HIROTA exceedingly regretted this incident.

To the witness was quoted a statement, that probably a military operation would be impossible in the Suiyuan area due to weather conditions; therefore, he wanted the problem settled diplomatically. They should have the determination to take action in the event the Chinese Central Army entered Chahar. The witness was asked if this was a correct representation of HIROTA's real views about the Suiyuan Incident. The witness stated that since he was a mere Bureau Chief he never asked HIROTA his opinion, but it was his view that since HIROTA while Foreign Minister had striven earnestly for Sino-Japanese rapprochement, it was but natural he would try to solve the Suiyuan and Chahar Incidents through peaceful diplomacy.

29558

Suiyuan is in Inner Mongolia. * Asked if the Japanese established their independent regime under Prince Teh, he stated he had never heard to what extent Japan was concerned with the Mongolia autonomous regime. He had heard that the Kwantung Army did have considerable interest in it to maintain peace and order in Manchuria, and also from other viewpoints.

Page Asked if one of the other viewpoints was that it was a convenient place from which to attack Outer Mongolia, the witness replied he had not made the statement with that in mind. From the viewpoint of maintaining peace and order in Mongolia that was true, but as to the other viewpoints, he stated them in a general way and did not know anything about what was suggested to him.

29559 * Asked if it was the policy of HIROTA's government for a subordinate of Prince Teh to make a secret overture to the Chinese Army, and if HIROTA thought that the combat morale of the enemy would be very high, the witness stated that from the information he obtained, he gathered that the government and military authorities knew nothing about the Incident right up to the moment it occurred.

29560 * The first news he heard of it was that when Mongolian troops had invaded Eastern Chahar from Suiyuan and suffered a heavy defeat by the Chinese, but he could not give the exact date. So far as he knew, the Kwantung Army itself did not participate in the battle, and he never heard that the Inner Mongolian troops operated in conjunction with that army.

29561 * The witness was again quoted a statement that they would expand their utmost by foreign policy, and when this arrived at its limits they would leave the matter to the army and navy for disposal, and he was asked if this was not HIROTA's real policy. He stated that all in the Foreign Office from HIROTA down were convinced they should strive to remove the obstacles the army put in the way of negotiations with China, and to try to settle outstanding issues through diplomacy. They were convinced that these negotiations would bear fruit.

Page REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF KUWASHIMA
BY MR. OKAMOTO
Council for MINAMI

29562 * The witness stated that when he said the Foreign Office did its best to eliminate all obstacles put forward by the Army in the way of peaceful negotiations, he did not mean to limit his answer to any specific individual such as MINAMI.

29564 * RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. KATO
Council for DOHIHARA

29565 * The witness stated that he had never heard that DOHIHARA had anything to do with the East Hopei Regime.

29569 * Exhibit 3243, a telegram from Consul General SUMA in Nanking to Foreign Minister HIROTA received by the Foreign Office on 20 April 1934, stated * that it was addressed to HIROTA from Minister ARIYOSHI. On the 18th ARIYOSHI told Wang Ching-wei that it was a matter of satisfaction that the conversation on radio communication between Japan and China had been started and was making progress. If progress on other questions was made in this manner, it would contribute toward improving the situation. ARIYOSHI explained to Wang HIROTA's peaceful policy and explained the interview HIROTA gave to U.S. correspondents.

29571 He told Wang that if he had any desire to lay before them, he would transmit it to HIROTA on his return to Japan. Wang stated he had great admiration for HIROTA's peace policy and desired to take steps to improve relations. Wang stated that this was not in the nature of a diplomatic proposal but by way of consultation. To improve relations, he thought it would be effective to establish general principles and to proceed in accordance with them. Such principles were the two countries should live and let live and that co-prosperity should be a hundred year policy. If Japan did not treat China as England treated India, but entered into a relationship with China similar to that * between Germany and Austria, co-prosperity would be realized. Japan could profit more than England was in her relations with India. The cause of estrangement

29572



(Translation)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

A F F I D A V I T

Deponent: KUWASHIMA, Kazue.

Date of birth: March 4, 1884.

Domicile: 3-365 Tamagawa Todoroki, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

Having first duly sworn an oath on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

(1) I entered the Diplomatic Service in October, 1908, and, after holding posts in China and the United States as well as in the Foreign Office at Tokyo, was appointed Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs (which changed its name to the Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs after June, 1934) in August, 1933, remaining in that office till January, 1937. I was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Netherlands from June, 1937, to December, 1938, and Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Brazil from January, 1939, to November, 1940. I retired from office in January, 1941.

(2) I was transferred to the office of Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs from consul-general at Tientsin in August, 1933. The then Foreign Minister was Count UCHIDA. On September 14, about one month after that, Count UCHIDA resigned on the ground of ill health, and Mr. HIROTA succeeded him as Foreign Minister. The relations between Japan and China as well as those between Japan and the Western Powers were gloomy and oppressive at the time of Foreign Minister Count UCHIDA, owing to the Manchurian incident. Above all, the diplomatic relations between Japan and China were, in effect, half broken off, though ministers were still exchanged between them. And it was the firm resolution of Mr. HIROTA upon assuming the office of Foreign Minister to alleviate the oppressive tension attending the Sino-Japanese relations. Mr. HIROTA in person told me that very frequently. Besides, he made statements before the newspapermen to the same effect. At the Diet also, he made it clear that his policy aimed at alleviating the tense relations between Japan and China. People called the diplomacy of Count UCHIDA "the burnt ground diplomacy", and that of Mr. HIROTA the conciliatory diplomacy.

(3) Mr. HIROTA carried out his resolution steadily in every sphere of Japan's foreign relations. The Ambassador to China, when Mr. HIROTA assumed the office of Foreign Minister, was Mr. ARIYOSHI, Akira, a veteran diplomat, eager for the rapprochement between Japan and China. He had exerted all his efforts in alleviating the tense relations between the two countries, but could not attain the desired object easily. After the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, it was true that the Chinese, in and out of office, were prone to avoid to associate with Japanese, and such circumstances worked as important restraint for the activity of Minister ARIYOSHI. But, it was indeed favourable for Japan that Mr. HIROTA succeeded Count UCHIDA as Foreign Minister just when such feelings were gradually fading with the lapse of time. Mr. ARIYOSHI also seemed to be much encouraged.

(4) The attitudes of the Nationalist Government towards Japan began to change considerably from the beginning of 1934, owing to the efforts of Minister ARIYOSHI. It resumed, for instance, the payment of several private loans which had been suspended since the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, though in a small scale. Meanwhile, Minister ARIYOSHI opened conversations with Mr. WANG, Ching-wei, the then Home Minister and Foreign Minister of the Nationalist Government, upon the radical improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations. This ARIYOSHI-WANG conversation progressed considerably speedily. Mr. WANG at first maintained, at this conversation, that the settlement of the Manchoukuo question was the requisite condition for the general improvement of the relations between Japan and China. Minister ARIYOSHI, however, explained that the public opinion in Japan would not allow the Government to retract the recognition of Manchoukuo since Japan had already recognized it, and that any Government, if there be any, which would venture to do that, would find it difficult to exist even for one day. Mr. WANG seemed to understand the awkward position of the Japanese Government. The Nationalist Government, however, had to give consideration to the public opinion in its own country, and the main subject of the ARIYOSHI-WANG conversation thereafter, accordingly, lay in how to harmonize the difficult and contradictory standpoints of both Governments with respect to the Manchoukuo question. The documents concerned are said to have been lost in the fire during the war. But the telegram No. 368, under date of April 20, 1934, addressed to the Foreign Minister from the consul-general at Nanking, which miraculously escaped fire, is a precious material reporting the contents of the ARIYOSHI-WANG conversation of April 18.

In this way, the efforts of Foreign Minister HIROTA to improve the Sino-Japanese relations appeared much hopeful in 1934.

(5) On April 17, 1934, when the negotiation for the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations between Japanese Minister to China ARIYOSHI and Chinese Foreign Minister WANG had hardly been opened, there arose a question of the so-called unofficial statement of spokesman AMO.

At that time, Mr. MONNET, an expert financier of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, was staying in China from the end of 1934. The Foreign Office frequently received information from the Japanese Legation at Nanking and other sources that Mr. MONNET was drafting a plan for international cooperation to China, from which Japan was to be excluded, in concert with those antagonists of Mr. WANG, Chin-wei. The Foreign Office, thereupon, instructed the Japanese Minister to China and other officials to keep in touch with Mr. MONNET and discourage him so that his activity in China might be restrained. Telegraphic instructions to the same effect were frequently given to the Japanese representatives in China from the Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs, in which rather exaggerated expressions were used with a view to impress Mr. MONNET strongly.

The so-called unofficial statement of spokesman AMO to the newspapermen was a patchwork of the contents of those telegraphic instructions drawn up for such special purpose by a certain bureau of the Foreign Office. And this, when reported by the press as if had been the policy of the Japanese Government, gave rise to public discussion.

According to what I was told by Foreign Minister HIROTA at that time, he had nothing to do with that unofficial statement of Mr. AMO before it was published and he reprimanded him because of that statement.

(6) Since the Nationalist Government of China was formed at the beginning of the Showa Era, there had been two main currents of opinion within Japan as to the attitudes Japan should take towards the said Government. The one was tinted with pro-Nationalist Government sentiments, claiming to place confidence in the bona fides of the Chinese Government and strengthen the tie of friendship subsisting between the two nations. Upon this basis, all the problems between Japan and China were to be solved. The other was contradictory to the above views. It emphasized that the Nationalist Government was, after all, the Government of the Kwomintang, and, therefore, anti-Japanese. To show friendly attitudes towards such a Government would only encourage and strengthen its despise, and prove destructive to the settlement of various problems between Japan and China. And it insisted upon taking drastic attitudes towards the Nationalist Government. It was a matter of course, therefore, that there were dissenting voices against the above-said attempts of the Foreign Office within Japan. In China also, there were not a few persons who offered opposition to the ARIYOSHI-WANG conversation, not only among the people, but even within the Nationalist Government. But those opposers in both nations took the attitude to contemplate the development of the conversation in 1934.

(7) Foreign Minister HIROTA emphasized his policy for the rapprochement between Japan and China as well as his confidence in the Nationalist Government all the more in his address delivered at the Diet on January 22, 1935, and also in his statement made at a committee afterwards. He declared, at a committee, that he had not the slightest doubt about the sincerity of Mr. CHIANG, Kai-shek, in his exertion for the betterment of the Sino-Japanese relations, and roused public attention. On the other hand, Mr. WANG, Chin-wai, and Mr. CHIANG, Kai-shek, expressed their intention in response to the above-mentioned statement of Foreign Minister HIROTA. From that time on, the Nationalist Government resumed the control of anti-Japanese movements in real earnest. The trade between the two countries, which had been stagnant since the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, regained its activity.

Early in May, the Foreign Minister in person took the initiative to submit to the Cabinet conference the question of raising the Japanese and Chinese Legations in China and in Japan respectively to the status of Embassies. This passed the Cabinet conference, and the Nationalist Government agreeing to the proposal, the raising of the status of the Legations was decided between the two Governments on May 17. The exchange of ambassadors between Japan and China had been advocated by those pro-Chinese for a long time, but at the end of April when Minister ARIYOSHI returned to Japan to make previous arrangements with the Government, the rumour was already abroad that it would be realized. At that time, certain military officers called at my office and expressed their dissention, though unofficially. Some of them pronounced it still premature. And, after the Cabinet conference decided to raise the status of the Legations, not a few military officers came to see me and revealed their anxiety about the influence this decision would exert upon the Kwantung Army.

(8) The situation in North China had been calm on the whole, since the conclusion of the Truce Agreement of May, 1932, at Tangku. But it began to change at the beginning of 1935. Especially after May, when the Legations were raised to Embassies, various matters occurred suddenly. My memory is not quite unerring about the particulars of those old occurrences, but there occurred frequent skirmishes, from May or June onward, between the Kwantung Army and Chinese forces, near the border between Jehol and the provinces of Kopeh and Chahal -- such remote and out-of-the-way place where no official from the Foreign Office was stationed. The Kwantung Army, and sometimes the North China Stationary Force, would lodge protests directly with the Chinese Government, on all such occasions, on the ground that such were provocative

acts on the part of the Chinese Government. They would impose considerably strict conditions such as, for instance, the withdrawal of Chinese forces from the above-mentioned provinces or the extermination of the Kwomintang branches in Hopeh and Chahal, and enforced the fulfilment of these conditions with an ultimatum. The Chinese Government regarded these as systematic plots designed by the Kwantung Army or the North China Stationary Force on small occurrences or some intentionally caused troubles. We were not so credulous as to believe everything that the Chinese Government pleaded, but still we could not but recognize that our military authorities in China were prone to raise a storm in a tea cup. It was our earnest hope that they should act more prudently, and we actually warned them against such destructive activities.

(9) It was early in June that a conference was held among the competent authorities of the Foreign Office, the War Office and the Ministry of the Navy, under the auspices of the Foreign Office. Prior to that, preliminary negotiations were made at a committee consisting of the chiefs of the sections concerned of the respective Ministries. On that occasion, the Foreign Office demanded more prudent attitudes of the Japanese military authorities in China, especially the leaders of the Kwantung Army. In response to this, the delegate of the War Office stated to the following effect in its own defense: (1) He pointed out that there still remained a large troop of CHANG HSUCH-LIANG's private army in North China, which was harassing the Japanese authorities there by taking the lead in the anti-Japanese and anti-Manchoukuo movements. And this caused not a little difficulty in maintaining the public order in Manchoukuo. (2) He called the attention of the delegates to the connection of trade and communications between North China and Manchuria, which had been severed with the outbreak of the Manchurian incident and was not yet restored, causing uneasiness in North China and Manchoukuo. (3) Lastly, he made reference to the Bolshevizing movement of the Chinese Communist Party in North China, which naturally had a grave influence upon the peace and order of Manchoukuo. He said we must take special precautions against such movement directed through Outer Mongolia and Chahal to Manchoukuo, and emphasized that these points must be taken into consideration when negotiating with the Nanking Government. To this, the delegate of the Foreign Office expressed his views as follows: (1) He admitted that the thorough-going control of the anti-Japanese movement was the very ground for the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations, and declared that the Foreign Office was actually negotiating with the Nationalist Government along that line of policy. (2) As to the view that the restoration of the trade and communications between North China and Manchuria was requisite for the peace of these areas, he stated that the Foreign Office was of the same opinion, and pointed out the efforts of the diplomatic authorities in that line. (3) Lastly, as to the control of the Communist movement in China, he emphasized its necessity in Middle China and South China, not to speak of North China. He made it clear that the Foreign Office was actually negotiating with the Nanking Government in accordance with that policy. He maintained, however, that such questions must be brought to settlement through diplomatic negotiations with the Nationalist Government or any organ recognized by the said Government. The Foreign Office could not agree to the settlement of those problems through any other means. Moreover, it was the firm belief of the Foreign Office that, but for the method mentioned above, the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations would be utterly impossible.

(10) The delegates from the Army were Colonel HASHIMOTO, Gun, and Colonel KITA, Seiichi. They were both very sensible men, and understood the desire of the Foreign Office well. Major-General NAGATA, Tetsuzan, the then Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, War Office, and Major-General MATSUDA, Naiji, the then Chief of the Second Department, General Staff Office, assisted the committee. Among the naval officers, Captain HONDA, the then Chief of the Sixth Section, Naval General Staff, also assisted the committee.

An agreement was reached at the committee, in this way, in June. And, on July 2, a tentative plan for the policy towards China was drawn up by the Chief of the Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs, Foreign Office. This was the authority for the so-called HIROTA Three Principles. The committee continued its discussion upon that tentative plan, which was nearly completed in August. Throughout the negotiation, it appeared that the central organs of the Army kept in touch with the Kwantung Army and the North China Stationary Force. The progress of the committee was interrupted, however, by the assassination of Major-General NAGATA. The fixed plan was obtained about one month after the tragic incident. The heads of the said three ministries signed it. The approval of the Premier and the Finance Minister was also obtained by October 4. The Three Principles of the Japanese Policy towards China mentioned in the address of Foreign Minister HIROTA delivered at the Diet on January 21 of the following year, 1936, were based upon the very decision of October 4, 1935.

(11) The Foreign Office was not quite satisfied with the decision of October 4. Nevertheless, it could not but admit that the spirit of the tentative plan of July 2 was living in it. The Foreign Office laid special importance upon it because it guaranteed, by the undertakings of the above-said three ministries and with the understanding of the Premier and the Finance Minister, that the Army, especially the Kwantung Army and the North China Stationary Force, should respect the negotiation which was to be made between the Foreign Office and the Chinese Government in conformity with the very decision.

The three ministries despatched their respective envoys to China, in order to enforce the thorough understanding and respect of the new policy by the various organs in China. The Foreign Office despatched Mr. MORISHIMA, the then Chief of the First Section, Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs. The Army sent Major-General OKAMURA and the Navy Captain HONDA.

(12) Major-General OKAMURA assembled, at Dairen, the chiefs of the staff of the troops stationed at various places in China, and conveyed the decision. On that occasion, Major-General OKAMURA was annoyed by the strong opposition of the Kwantung Army to the new decision. Mr. MORISHIMA, returning back from his trip in China, told that to me. He said he learned it from the aide-de-camp of Major-General OKAMURA.

Those envoys had hardly returned to Tokyo before various troubles arose in succession in China in defiance of the new policy. I have forgotten the particulars about those cases. But to cite several remarkable instances, the Chi-tung Regime was established, demanding self-government against the rule of the Nationalist Government, at the end of November, in the unfortified zones established by the Tangku Truce Agreement, that is, in the border between North China and Manchuria. The Foreign Office had a suspicion that this regime had a close connection with the Kwantung Army. In November, the Foreign Office received information that the Kwantung Army was concentrating its mechanized troops at Shanhaikwan with a view to intimidating North China. The Foreign Office warned the Army against the fact.

And again, in the middle of December, the Chi-cha Administrative Committee was formed. The Foreign Office suspected that the Japanese military authorities in China had a hand in the organization of that Committee. This Committee, however, had correspondence with the Nanking Government and was admitted by the latter to enjoy a certain degree of independence within the limit that it did not overshadow the sovereignty of the central Government.

The Foreign Office was against the establishment of the Chi-tung Regime. The smuggling in North China caused by the exceedingly low tariff rates of the said Regime was a matter greatly disadvantageous to Japan, even judged exclusively from the viewpoint of trade with China. I negotiated directly with the Kwantung Army concerning the matter, and inspected the actual circumstances of smuggling, when I was despatched to Manchoukwo and China by orders of the Foreign Minister ARITA from the beginning of June to the beginning of July.

Towards the Chi-cha Administration Committee, however, the Foreign Office took rather different attitudes. Though the Foreign Office had nothing to do with the formation of the said Committee, the consuls stationed in these areas used to deal with it, after they learned that it had correspondence with the Nanking Government, being formed with its approval.

(13) Meanwhile, the negotiations for the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations made steady progress and attained the realization of the exchange of Ambassadors between the two countries in May, 1935. The national sentiments of China, however, seized this opportunity to take a turn unfavourable for Japan. In November and December, the situation got considerably serious. Mr. WANG CHING-WEI, who had shown such zeal for the rapprochement between Japan and China, barely escaped assassination, in November. And his most faithful friend and co-operator, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs TANG YU-JEN was assassinated in December. Such a change of the national sentiments in China was due, I considered, to the activities of the Japanese military against North China.

The attitudes of the Chinese authorities towards the HIROTA Three Principles were various; some approved, and others opposed. Mr. CHIANG KAI-SHEK, however, is said to have revealed that China could respond to the Japanese proposal with sincerity so long as the HIROTA Three Principles were carried out exclusively through the diplomatic means. And he actually declared to Ambassador ARIYOSHI, in the middle of November, that he had no objection to the negotiation based on the Three Principles. On that occasion, he also warned the Ambassador that it would become impossible to open negotiation if further disturbances were created in North China, and demanded a prudent consideration of the Japanese Government.

(14) It was through Foreign Minister HIROTA's address delivered at the Diet on January 21, 1936, that the Three Principles were let known to the general public for the first time. But the Government had decided the Principles on October 4 of the preceding year, 1935, as I have stated before. It was shortly after that that Foreign Minister HIROTA showed the Three Principles to Chinese Ambassador CHIANG TSUO-PIN. The above-mentioned opinion of Mr. CHIANG KAI-SHEK was revealed to our Ambassador ARIYOSHI in response to this.

Shortly after the official announcement of the Three Principles, the so-called February 26 incident broke out in Japan. The OKADA Cabinet collapsed, and Mr. HIROTA received an Imperial mandate to form a new Ministry.

(15) Mr. ARITA, the then Japanese Ambassador to Belgium, was ordered to succeed Ambassador ARIYOSHI in his office. He left Brussels at the end of 1935 and arrived at his post in Shanghai probably at the end of February, 1936. And one month had hardly elapsed when he was ordered home again, in accordance with the intention of Premier HIROTA who wished to appoint the diplomat whom he placed special confidence in as Foreign Minister. After receiving this order, he had a talk with Mr. CHANG CHUN, the then Chinese Foreign Minister, four times in all during the period from March 16 to 19. They exchanged frank views in order to find out the ground for the

adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations. They were old acquaintances and had a thorough-going discussion about the matter. These conversations convinced Mr. ARITA that there was a hope of compromising with China, through diplomatic negotiations based on the HIROTA Three Principles, if only the activities of the Japanese military against North China could be suppressed. I was told these facts by Mr. ARITA in person.

(16) Mr. ARITA, returning to Tokyo from his trip through North China and Manchuria, assumed the office of Foreign Minister on April 2. Prior to that, when he visited Hsinking on his way home, on March 28, a responsible senior officer of the Kwantung Army conveyed to him the views of the said Army that the rapprochement between Japan and China under the Nationalist Government was impossible so long as the Kwomintang held fast to its anti-Japanese doctrine; that the Kwantung Army was against the negotiation for the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations based on the HIROTA Three Principles because they thought the Principles were too weak to accomplish anything; and that steps should be taken so as to urge the autonomy of North China. He made it clear that these were the opinions of the Kwantung Army. I was informed of this fact by Mr. ARITA in person, and also read a document of the Foreign Office giving a detailed account of the said views of the responsible officer of the Kwantung Army. (Exhibit No. 761).

(17) Mr. ARITA ordered me to negotiate with the central organs of the Japanese Army, with a view to paving the way for the realization of his own policy towards China. His intention was to have me persuade the central organs of the Army to suppress the activities of the Japanese military against North China. The Foreign Minister ordered me also to persuade the Army to withdraw or overhaul "Hokushi Shori Yoko (Gist of the Policy towards North China)" which the War Office had given to the North China Stationary Force on January 3, 1936.

In the light of the circumstances of the formation of the HIROTA Three Principles and the attitude of the military authorities in China towards these Principles, I was well aware of the difficulty to persuade the Army in this connection. Encouraged by the zeal of Foreign Minister ARITA, however, I set about negotiating with the competent authorities of the War Office and the General Staff Office, only to find that it was a difficult task as I had expected. They were not of such drastic opinions as expressed by a responsible senior officer of the Kwantung Army on March 28. But they had no confidence in their own power to enforce the faithfulness of those authorities in China to the decision of the Tokyo Government. They were ready to understand the policy of the new Foreign Minister, but reluctant to put it to practice. Foreign Minister ARITA in person negotiated with War Minister TERAUCHI in this connection. But it was hardly possible to count much upon it, judging from the circumstances of those days. Though I did not know much about the usages of the older days, it was the common sense at least after the Manchurian incident that, if one wished to succeed in persuading the central machineries of the Japanese Army, he had to deal first with the chief sections or bureaus of those central organs.

As regards the "Gist of the Policy towards North China", it was brought to discussion at a committee formed under the auspices of the Foreign Office, consisting of the competent chiefs of sections of those ministries concerned: the Foreign Office, the War Office, the Ministry of the Navy, and this time, the Financial Department in addition. The standpoint of those committee members, however, was almost the same with that of the directors of bureaus with whom I used to negotiate at that time, and naturally they could hardly be expected to consent to the withdrawal or the thorough going amendment of the military instructions of January 3.

(18) The Japanese military authorities in China, in the meantime, did not hesitate, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, to take advantage of the vagueness of the said instructions and proceed with their own programme to encourage an autonomous government in North China. No one could tell what the result might be, if it was left unchecked. The Foreign Office was compelled, in this way, to compromise with the Army on condition that the new policy should be such that the central machineries of the Army could readily accept, and that the fundamental obstacles standing in the way of negotiations with the Nanking Government for the general improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations should be removed as thoroughly as possible. As a result of such compromise, the "Second Gist of the Policy towards North China" was drafted at the said Committee, and was approved by the Foreign, Finance and War Ministers and the Minister of the Navy by August 11.

(19) Foreign Minister ARITA was very much dissatisfied with this decision. When compared with the military instructions of January 3, however, this four ministry plan of August 11 shows clearly the effect of the exertion on the part of the Japanese Foreign Office to get rid of the fundamental obstacles to the anticipated negotiations with the Nanking Government for the adjustment of the general relations between Japan and China. It is also manifest that careful consideration is given therein to the respect of the interests of the Powers in China. For instance, the instruction of January 3 aimed chiefly at the extension of self-governing areas and the repletion of the substance of self-government. It also intended to prevent the influx of the foreign capital. Whereas, the decision of August 11 did not use the term "self-government", but adopted "bun-chi (sectional government)", which denoted a lesser degree of independence than "ji-chi (self-government)". This special term was used in consideration of the circumstances that the Chi-cha Administrative Committee was not permitted to use the term "self-government", but was allowed to enjoy a certain degree of privilege within the limit that it did not harm the sovereign rights of the central Government, through the negotiations with the Nanking Government early in December, 1935. This decision of August 11 also established the maintenance of the Chinese maritime customs system, the respect of the vested interests of the third Powers and the economic cooperation with the nationals of the third Powers.

(20) On August 24, the Chinese mob attacked four Japanese (two were newspapermen and the other two merchants) at Chengtu, killed two of them, and severely injured the other two. And shortly after that, a Japanese shop was mobbed at the port town of Pakhoi, Kwangtung Province, and a Japanese was killed. Then, in September, there occurred bloody cases in succession, such as the murder of a Japanese police officer of the consulate-general at the Japanese settlement of Harkow, the murder of a Japanese sailor at the international settlement of Shanghai, etc. These occurrences, as a matter of course, shocked the Japanese people.

(21) The Foreign Office negotiated with the Nationalist Government of China for the prompt settlement of these bloody cases. Nevertheless, the public opinion pointed out that these cases were not mere occurrences, and that they were rooted deep in the anti-Japanese sentiment original to China, rejecting to deal with them as mere accidents. It maintained, in this way, that the Japanese Government should take this opportunity to settle the anti-Japanese problems perfectly, as well as the general problems between Japan and China. The Foreign Office, therefore, referred those various problems to discussion en bloc, together with the above-mentioned cases of injury, at the negotiations with the Nationalist Government.

(22) The negotiation was made chiefly at Nanking on and after September 8. A detailed account of the progress of the negotiation is given in an official announcement of that period.

Conversations were held about thirty times during the period from September 8 to the end of December between Ambassador KAWAGOYE and Consul-General SUMA representing the Japanese side and Foreign Minister CHANG CHUN and Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs KAO TSUNG-WU representing the Chinese side. I was despatched to Nanking, in the meantime, by orders of the Foreign Minister, to urge the conclusion of the negotiation. By the beginning of December, negotiations had made a considerable progress with regard to various problems pending between the two countries.

(23) The Foreign Office was anchoring its hope upon the future development of the negotiation, when there broke out the so-called Suiyuan incident owing to the activities of a part of the officers of the Kwantung Army in Inner Mongolia. The attitude of the Chinese Government towards the Sino-Japanese negotiations also underwent a sudden change. It went as far as to disapprove the results of the past negotiations on the pretext of the Suiyuan incident. The negotiation was brought to a standstill and no further progress was made in spite of all the efforts on the part of the Japanese Government to urge it.

The Diet was to open in the middle of January of the following year. Judging from the political standpoint of the then Government, it was considered to be untoward to leave the negotiation as it was at a deadlock. The Foreign Office was, thus, compelled to close the negotiation, except that for the settlement of the Chengtu and Pakhoi incidents upon which perfect understanding had already been reached between Japan and China.

The HIROTA Cabinet resigned en masse in January, 1937. I also resigned the office of the Director of the Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs, and then was transferred to the post of the Japanese Minister to the Netherlands.

On this 19th day of August, 1947, at Tokyo.

(Signed) KUWASHIMA, Kazue (Seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned date and place.

(Signed) MORISHIMA, Goro (Seal)

Witness

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Signed) KUWASHIMA, Kazue (Seal)

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KUWAJIMA, Kazue
BY MR. WARREN

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28647

* The witness identified and verified Exhibit 3179 as his affidavit.

28648

* The affidavit stated that the witness was in the diplomatic service in 1931 as Consul General at Tientsin and had held such a post prior to and at the time of the Manchurian Incident. As Consul General, he collected information concerning the Accused DOIHARA in connection with his * actions regarding the Manchurian Incident and wired this to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA or to the Chief of the Asia Bureau. Some of the wires were introduced as Prosecution Exhibits 287 to 293, 295, 296, 300, 304, etc.

28649

Concerning the method used in securing the information, the witness explained that there was disagreement between the Foreign Office and Kwantung Army regarding PU-YI's coming out of retirement. The Army was acting independently and they received no official information from the Kwantung Army as to its activities and they had no means by which they could do so. He could not say whether it was possible that the Foreign Ministry was receiving such information.

The witness was far too busy conducting investigations of the actions of DOIHARA and had to depend upon subordinates to collect what information they could.

28650

* They secured information from such sources as newspaper articles, conversations with Chinese and Japanese, rumors and other information throwing light on the activities of DOIHARA. This information was reported to the witness who sifted it and drew conclusions. His conclusions comprised the contents of the telegrams introduced in evidence. This was the only source of information he had. Because it was large, its authenticity could not be checked. He had to do the best he could as he had no further personal information.

The witness met DOIHARA on two occasions when they exchanged social conversations.

28651

* After receiving reports of the consular police, he never used them as data for telegrams to the Foreign Office. The consular police reports were not immediately

Page used as material.

Concerning the two opinions of the Kwantung Army and the Foreign Office regarding PU-YI's coming out of retirement, the witness stated that according to the Foreign Minister's views and instructions given to the witness, it was not time for PU-YI to appear in Manchuria.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY JUDGE NYI

28652 * When asked if before sending the wires to SHIDEHARA in November 1931, he had been sent instructions to stop the abduction plan of PU-YI and to be on guard, the witness stated that he received instructions from SHIDEHARA to see PU-YI and advise him against going to Manchuria. In accordance with these instructions, he interviewed PU-YI and communicated the advice.

The witness understood the instructions from the Foreign Office to be that it wasn't yet time for PU-YI to appear in Manchuria. That is all he knew about the Ministry's attitude.

28654 * In none of his telegrams had he ever referred to his talking with DOIHARA.

28655 * The consular police brought information to his office daily but it wasn't to be trusted to the extent that it could be used immediately for reporting purposes.

28660 * The witness stated that he had no knowledge that his telegrams not only contained reports from sources of his own but were also corroborated by reports of the Consulates in Shanghai, Nanking and Peiping regarding DOIHARA's activities. He did not know that afterward, because such telegrams were not circulated to his Consulate, * DOIHARA came to the Consulate General and came to the witness' room only once. On that occasion only greetings were exchanged and nothing more. The witness recalled that talks were held with DOIHARA through a member of the staff of the Consulate General on two or three occasions.

28661

Page
28664

* Reference was made to statements of the witness that he had no discussion with regard to the moving of PU-YI with DOIHARA and was asked if it refreshed his memory to read a sentence from a document, beginning with "I told him as my personal opinion." On being shown the document, the witness stated that the personal opinion mentioned was not his opinion but that of one of the Consulate staff. There were words to this effect at the end of the document. This telegram states at the outset that it is according to a report made by a staff member and that at the end are the words he so stated. That was the way he filed the report.

28665

* The witness stated that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of anything he told Tokyo on that occasion, after being read a part of the telegram which stated that the staff advised DOIHARA about relations with China, and that it was his personal opinion and advised him of his personal opinion.

28666

* From Exhibit 300, the witness was read a portion which stated that he had fully talked with DOIHARA twice not to commit rash acts but it appeared he was continuing plans to overthrow Chang and there was apprehension that he might start another Incident in the Peking-Tientsin area. After hearing this, the witness stated he had nothing to answer.

28667

* The Defense referred to Prosecution's Exhibit 245 where it was stated that in order to perform these duties and functions, the Consul General's office availed itself of all possible channels of information. One of the sources was the consular police and it was the duty of their office to draw conclusions from information so obtained.

28669

* Exhibit 3180-A, an excerpt from a volume entitled, "Far Eastern Commission of Inquiry", being a record of an interview with DOIHARA on 3 May 1932, with Lord Lytton, was received in evidence. While the exhibit was not read, it was pointed out that the Lytton Commission had confidence in the veracity of DOIHARA and likewise the people and officials of the places where he was stationed also had confidence in him.

Def. Doc. # 2116

Fast 2 sentences out -
Exh. No.
Translated By
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.



source: information in telegram to 3rd inst
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent : - KUWAJIMA, Kazuo

I, KUWAJIMA, Kazuo, of lawful age, being first duly sworn in accordance with the customs of my country, depose as follows:

My name is KUWAJIMA, Kazuo, and I was graduated from the Waseda University in 1906. In 1911 I passed the diplomatic service examination, entering the diplomatic service in the same year, and was still in the service in 1931, at which time I was Consul General at Tien-Tsin. I held such posts prior to and at the time of the Manchurian Incident.

As Consul General I collected certain information concerning the accused DOHIMARA, Kenji, ~~who~~ I considered to be in connection with his actions with reference to the Manchurian Incident, and wired such information to the then Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, or to the Chief of the Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Some of these wires were introduced in evidence by the prosecution as Exhibits 287, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 300 and 304 etc. In connection with sending these wires, and similar wires, I have been asked concerning the method I employed in securing the information therein contained.

In order to fully understand the situation, it is necessary for me to explain that there was disagreement and friction between the Foreign Office and the Kwantung Army regarding Henry Pu-Yi's coming out of retirement. The Army was acting independently of the Foreign Ministry and we received no official information from the Kwantung Army as to the activities of any of its members; and had no means by which I could do so. It may be possible that the Foreign Ministry was receiving such information, but as to that, I cannot say.

Warren will ask additional questions re Consul's policies was it authorized. It will deny

our exhibit 245 or some such
Marishima

Def. Doc. # 2116

I, as Consul General, was far too busy to conduct any personal investigation of the actions of DOHIMARA and had to depend upon my subordinates to collect what information they could. They secured information from whatever sources were available, such as newspaper articles, conversations held with various people, both Chinese and Japanese, rumor, in short, any information which might tend to throw any light whatever upon the activities, in this instance, of General DOHIMARA. All this information was reported to me and I then sifted the information, and then drew my own conclusions. The conclusions which I drew comprised the contents of the telegrams which were introduced in evidence by the prosecution as having been sent from me to the Foreign Minister, or the Bureau of Foreign Ministry.

This was the only source of information I had, and with the great mass of information, it was quite impossible to check the authenticity of its source. I had to do the best I could under the circumstances as I had no further personal information.

As for my personal contact with the accused DOHIMARA, I recall that I met him on two occasions, at which time we exchanged merely social conversation. I was most favorably impressed by his personality. General DOHIMARA impressed me as a typical military man.

On this 12 day of May, 1947.
At Tokyo

Deponent /S/ Kazue Kuwajima (seal)

I, Kinjiro Ohta, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness : /S/ Kinjiro Ohta (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Kazue Kuwajima (seal)

characte
out

12 September 1947

*copy to
Judge Nye
Burgin
Cul
9-15*

TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Lieut. Kurt Steiner
SUBJECT: Affidavit of KUWAJIMA, Kazue, (Def. Doc. #2116)

1. In an effort to weaken the probative value of the telegrams sent by him to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA which were introduced in evidence by the Prosecution, KUWAJIMA, former Consul-General in Tientsin, in his affidavit deals with the method of securing the information contained in these telegrams. He states that the information was collected by his subordinates "from whatever sources were available, such as newspaper articles, conversations held with various people, both Chinese and Japanese, rumor, in short, any information which might tend to throw any light whatever upon the activities, in this instance of General DOIHARA". He further states that "with the great mass of information it was quite impossible to check the authenticity of its sources".

2. The exhibits he mentions on page 1, third paragraph (exh 287, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 300 and 304) are the total of all telegrams originating from KUAWJIMA, which were introduced by the Prosecution. It will be noted from the description below that the source of the information is mentioned in all telegrams inasfar as such telegrams are based on information and not on the direct knowledge of the sender, except in Exhibit 300, which, however refers to "a secret investigation" which was then conducted. The telegrams, ~~however~~, speak for themselves in this regard and there seems to be no necessity for any explanation on this point.

The telegrams are:

- a. Exhibit 287, page 4,360 - this telegram states as a source of information a Chinese by the name of Yao Chen.
- b. Exhibit 289, page 4,364 - this telegram contains no information obtained from any outside source; on the contrary, it contains the gist of conversations between KUWAJIMA and other persons of the staff of the Consulate on one hand, and DOIHARA on the other, KUWAJIMA tried to dissuade DOIHARA from his plan. The telegram contains in detail DOIHARA's replies to these efforts, e. g. "In order to pretend that Japan has nothing

to do with the abduction of the Emperor it would be needed to land him ashore at Ying Kow and if time was wasted, this port would be frozen". Or, "if the Emperor is resolved to go to Manchuria at the risk of his life, and its method can be provided it will be possible to make it appear like a Chinese movement by enhancing Chinese public opinion and making public the statement to welcome the Emperor". Upon KUWAJIMA's warning that "he had better give up the plan at least for the time being" DOIHARA expressed his scheme to the effect that if it should be clarified by sounding the Emperor's mind, that he had no intention to run the risk, he would leave with the parting remark that there would be no such opportunity in future for the Emperor, and dispatched a telegram to the military authorities at Mukden to the effect that he would consider an alternative as the present plan was hopeless of success".

- c. Exhibit 290, page 4,367. This is a report of conversations between DOIHARA and the staff of the Consulate. DOIHARA threatens that the Kwantung Army might separate from the Government and some grave incident may occur in Japan if the present government tries to prevent the enthronement if the enthronement becomes indispensable in order to save the situation. The telegram contains also a statement that KUWAJIMA advised the Emperor PU YI through his attendants "to act with greater prudence".
- d. Exhibit 291, page 4373 - this telegram states that as source of information regarding the contents of an interview between DOIHARA and PU YI, a Chinese by the name of Chen Chui.
- e. Exhibit 292, page 4,375 a n d
- f. Exhibit 293, page 4,377 - these two telegrams quote Chinese newspapers some of which are mentioned by name in order to show how much of DOIHARA's plans and actions have leaked outside.


- g. Exhibit 295, page 4,381 - this is the report of a statement made at the Japanese Consulate by a representative of the Japanese Army and contains the reply of the Consular officials. The Army representative informed the Consulate that "as both Imperial and Kwantung Armies...desire it, the former Emperor fled from his residence on 10 November, was put in a car, and on 11 November from Tang-Ku was shipped by the steamer AWAJI MARU to Ying Kow". He also stated that "the army will deny all connections with it and they will escape discovery, but if it is discovered they will say that the reason for the incident is the former Emperor's plans, that is 'because he is so fond of Manchuria and because there was a bombing affair recently, feeling that his life was in danger, he started by himself to realize his plan on 8 November and finding a good opportunity he fled from the Japanese concession (at Tientsin) and after several days while his movements were unknown, he appeared in Manchuria'".
- h. Exhibit 296, page 4,384 - this telegram in its main part is a request of approval by the Foreign Minister on the line which the Consul proposes to take in replies to inquiries on the matter of PU YI's departure. It also shows that such inquiries were received by KUWAJIMA from the American Consul General among others.
- i. Exhibit 300, page 4,394 - this is a comprehensive report of DOIHARA's actions. It refers to a "secret investigation of his plotted schemes" which was conducted. KUWAJIMA states: "I have deliberately talked with him (DOIHARA) several times not to commit such atrocities, but it appears that he is continually planning to overthrow CHANG and there is apprehension that he may start another incident in the Peking-Tientsin area in the near future".

j. Exhibit 304, page 4,402 - this telegram states that it is based on a report by the army.

3. On page 1, para. 4 of his affidavit, KUWAJIMA states "We received no official information from the Kwantung Army as to the activities of any of its members". Reference in this respect is made to 295 and 304 (See para. 2-g and j above).

4. In the last paragraph of his affidavit, KUWAJIMA states that he recalls to have met DOIHARA "on two occasions at which time, we exchanged merely social conversation". Reference is made to exhibit 300 (para 2-I above) in which KUWAJIMA states "I have deliberately talked with him several times" and exhibit 289 (para 2-b above) containing the gist of conversation between KUWAJIMA and DOIHARA on the question of PU YI's departure.

5. IPS document 1767, items 39 and 40 which were not introduced in evidence may also be of interest. These telegrams were sent by KUWAJIMA to SHIDEHARA on 11 November 1931 and bear #4-1-277- and #4-1-278 respectively; item 39 states that PU YI escaped on 10 November and that investigation by a Consular official produced an admission by an attendant of the Emperor that he was carried out as a piece of baggage. Item 40 cites police reports from Tang-Ku that a tugboat in the Japanese Army Service arrived from Tientsin loaded with materials such as sandbags and left for the open sea in the afternoon. Later, the information was sent to Tientsin that "the load was delivered to the steamer, AWAJI-MARU". The telegram states that this means that the Army had made these preparations for the Emperor's escape and that he is now on the way to Ying-Kow.


KURT STEINER
1st Lt. Inf.

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Judge Nyl; Dr. Ao; Mr. Sutton** Aiyra. 6 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Judge Nyl; Dr. Ao; Mr. Sutton** Aiyra.
FROM: **EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,**
Investigative Division, IPS
Served as Consul at Manila, Makaw, San Francisco,
SUBJECT: **Defense Witness**
Chief of American and European Section, Foreign Office
First Secretary, Washington

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

- 1937-38 **DEFENDANT** in Foreign Office
- 1937-38 **Minister to Holland - Doihara**
- 1938-40 **Ambassador to Brazil**
- 1943-44 **Vice Chief General Affairs Bureau and Vice President of**

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.
Address: 270, 3-chome, Harajuku, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

KURASHIMA, Kazuo

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

E P M

Incl
(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Kazuo KUWASHIMA (KUWAJIMA): Former Bureau Chief, Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

1884 March Born Kagawa Prefecture. Son of Yasushi Kuwashima
Married Yaoko, daughter of Tasaburo Aiura.
1906 Graduated Waseda University, Politics
1908 Entered Foreign Service
* Served as Consul at Mukden, Hankow, San Francisco,
Bombay and Chicago.
1923 Chief of American and European Section, Foreign Office
1924 First Secretary, Washington
* Consul General at Honolulu; Consul General at Hankow
1929 Counselor of Embassy at Rome
1930 Consul General at Tientsin
1933-36 Chief, Asiatic Affairs in Foreign Office
1937-38 Minister to Holland
1938-40 Ambassador to Brazil
1942 May Vice Chief General Affairs Bureau and Vice President of
Board of Directors, Greater Imperial Asia Federation
1943-44 Aug Chief, General Affairs Bureau of East Asia Development
Headquarters of IRAA

Address: 170, 2-chome, Harajuku, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo