

CHARGE OUT SLIP

EXHIBIT #807  
Original in Court

DATE 29 Aug 1946

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 1230

TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SIGNATURE G. Romano

ROOM NO. 357

CHARGE OUT SLIP

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TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

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SIGNATURE G. Romano

ROOM NO. 357

6x. 3880

Dec. 1230-C.

P1

1. 暗 號 電 報 (暗 號 式)

伯林、外務省、

一九四三年二月 第 號

外務大臣宛

最近ハ首相海軍大臣、軍令部總長、參謀總長、青木・鈴木各大臣等トナシタル會談ヨリ余ハ次ノ全般的印象ヲ得タリ。  
全員其ノ必勝ノ信念ヲ強調シ、獨逸ト出來得ル限リ最モ緊密ナル協力ニ對スル希望並ニ我が軍及ビ我が國民ノ成果ニ對スルソノ完全ナル確信ヲ表明セリ。アラユル出來ル限りノ方法ヲ以テスル日獨間ノ直接提携ノ必要並ニ重要性ガ強調サレ又、我等ノ敵ニ對スル宣傳效果ニ鑑ミ、是ヲ特ニ重視スベキコトガ強調セラレタリ。  
訪問ハ、總ベテ極メテ心カラナル打解ケタルモノニシテ、最初ノ訂整ヨリ長ク續キタリ。  
東條首相ハ露西亞ニ於ケル狀勢ヲ心配シ居ラズト述ベタリ。ソノ際彼ハ北「アフリカ」土耳其古及ビ西班牙ノ狀勢ニ特ニ關心ヲ持ツ。彼ハ凡ユル重大ナル出來事ニ關スル報告ヲ感謝スベク又如何ナル情報ヲモ全ク自由ニ我々ニ與ヘル用意アルベシ。  
現在ノ戰爭ハ武器並ニ神經戰爭ニシテ出來得ル限

FILE COPY  
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P. 2.

リノ最モ緊密ナル協力ガ、特ニ、日獨ノ友誼ヲ弱  
メルタメ凡ユル手段ヲ用イントスル敵ノ宣傳ニ顧  
ミ、絶体ニ必要ナリ。之ニ關聯シテ、彼ハ虚偽ニ  
シテ有害ナル流言ヲ放チ居ル中立國ノ外交官達舉  
グ。首相ハ次イテ余ト中國狀勢ヲ論ジ、ソシテ我  
々ガ將來此等ノ審議ヲ繼續スル様要望セリ。  
余ハ是ニ對スル御承認ヲ乞フ。

(以下次頁へ續ク)

陸相トシテ三國同盟ノ締結ニ重要ナル役割ヲ果セル東條首相ハ、其ノ統御能力ニ依リ、疑モナク日本ノ内閣ニ於ケル最モ強力ナ人物ナリ。是等ノ持質及ビ國民ニ對スル人氣ニモ拘ラズ、彼ハ屢々攻撃サレタリ（六月二日附電報第四七八號參照）。是ハ特異ノ現存ノ狀況ニ依ル。數世紀來ノ天皇ヲ全ク現神トシテ象徴セル事ガ、明治維新以來如何ニ類者ナル權勢家モ比較的頻繁ナル政府ノ交送ヲ良シトスル信念ヲ生ジタリ。決シテ天皇ノ襟相ヲ取り得ザル爲ニ斯カル事情ノ許ニハ東條ハ、其ノ政策ハ現在承認セラレ居ルトハ云へ、一定期間後ニハ、拄冠スルヲ要スベキ事ハ想像シ得ザル事ニアラズ。斯カル拄冠ハ、前記ノ如ク東條ハ原動力的人物ニシテ且ツ又獨逸ノ隔意ナキ友ナルニ依リ、獨逸側ヨリ見レバ、遺憾ナルコトナルベシ。他方、政權ノ更迭ハ、日本ノ運命ハ樞軸諸國ト結バレ居ルコトガ當地ニテハ一般ニ承認サレ居ルニ依リ、三國條約下ニ於ケル日本ノ政策ニハ影響ヲ及ボサザルベシ。

Ex 3861

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一二三〇

暗號電報

東京宛四四年九月七日、八時〇分

最大至急

東京大使館

四四年九月六日附第二〇二八號

密級 B

極秘

貴下電報ニ關シ大使宛親展

八月二十五日附第二三二五號

八月二十八日附第二三四七號

「ロシヤ」トノ單獨講和ニ對スル日本ノ提案

四、是等ノ軍事問題ニ關スル會談ニ引續キ大島ハ獨蘇ノ單獨講和ニ

關スル日本側提案ヲ持出シ、重光ガ貴下ニ爲シタト同シ形式ニ

テ「ロシヤ」トノ單獨講和ニ對スル日本ノ提案ハ、我々ノ側ニ弱點ノアル點左

ト考ヘラルルヲ以テ蘇聯ト全然接觸シ居ラザル旨力説セリ。

日本ハ更ニ、最後ノ勝利ヲ得ル迄ハ、獨逸側ニ立チ、アラユル

情勢下ニ於イテ戰爭ヲ繼續スル意ヲ有ス。尙又赤軍ハ今ヤ一九

四〇年ノ國境ニ達シ、恐ラクハ日ナラズシテ「フィンランド」

及ビ海峽ヲ占領スベク、故ニ蘇聯ハ今ヤ再建ヲ考ヘザルベカラ

ザルニ依リ日本政府ハ「スターリン」ガ目下屈服スル用意アル

ヤモ知レザルコトハ不可能ナラズト思考ス。

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P. 2.

總統ハコレ等ノ提案ニ次イデ、討議終了ノ際、總統ノ同意ヲ得テ余ガ次ギノ通り推斷セル我々ノ立場ヲ陳述セリ。

(イ) 我々ハ蘇聯ハ獨逸ト了解ノ用意アリトノ徵候ヲ認メズ、我々ノ見ル所ニ依レバ、「スターリン」ハ彼ハ最早有利ニ闘フコト能ハズ又ハ彼ノ力ハ獨逸ヲ破ルニ決シテ充分ナラズト確信セル時ニ至リ始メテ了解ニ到達セント試ムベシ。

(ロ) 此等ノ隊謀ガ「スターリン」ニ起ル場合ハ、是ヲ示スベシ。ソノ時ハ新シキ政治狀勢ガ到來シ居ルベク、又ソノ時ハ之ニ就キ如何ニ處スベキカラ見ルベキ時ナルベシ。

(ハ) コレ故ニ、我々ハ日本政府ニ蘇聯ニ對シコレニ關連シテ如何ナル種類ノ手段モ採ラザル様要請ス。

大島ハ、此レニ對シテ、日本政府ハ、我々ノ同意ナクバ此ノ方面ニハ何等ノ指遣モ執ラザルベシト聲明セリ。我々ハ對蘇聯爭目的ヲ變更セシヤ否ヤトノ彼ノ質問ニ、總統ハ、國家ガ分裂スル時ハソレト共ニ一切ガ分裂スト答ハタリ。

蘇聯ノ歩兵ハ悪シク、而シテ一度ヒ蘇聯ノ全構成カ  
 グラツキ始ムレバ、ソノ時ハ、「スラヴ」民族間ニ  
 再三起ル如クアラユルモノハ、分裂スベシ。  
 「スターリン」ハ我々ガ「ドン」河ニ立チシ際ニハ  
 降セザリキ、今ヤ獨逸モ同様ナリ。「カルタゴ」軍  
 ハ、一度ハ「ローマ」ヲ指呼ノ間ニ至ミタルモ、「  
 ローマ」人ハ降伏セズ、遂ニハ「カルタゴ」ヲ屈伏  
 セシメタリ。何時再ビ我々ガ赤軍ニ對シ攻勢ニ出ツ  
 ルヤハ目下言ヒ得ズ。併シ、我々ハ、同時ニ、全歐  
 線ニ於イテ守勢ニ出ヅル能ハズ。大島ハ、重ネテ、  
 日本ハ最後ノ勝利ヲ得ル迄ハ獨逸側ニ立チテ戰フベ  
 キコト並ニ日本ハ、コレガ實現ノタメ、日本ノ最後  
 マデ行クベキ道ハ只一ツノミナルニ依リ最後ノ軍隊  
 ヲモ使用スベキコトヲ聲明セリ。  
 總統ハ次イデ獨軍ニモ亦戰鬪並ニ勝利ニ對スル同様  
 ノ意志殘存シ又兩國ノ斯カル決意ヲ以テスレバ、勝  
 利ハ彼等ノモノタルベシトノ確信ヲ以ツテ會談ヲ終  
 了シタリ。

「フォン・リツベントロツプ」

220807

暗號電報 (G. Ch. V)

「ベルリン」發、五月十五日午後二時二十分

東京著、五月十五日

東京大使館

五月十四日、第一一九七/九號

大使宛親展、鎖錠封印ノ上保管ヲ要ス

六日附電報、第一四一二號ニ關シ、

1230-1

日「ソ」關係ニ關スル貴下ノ電報中ニ取扱ハレ居ル問題ニ關シ、下記事項ハ考慮ヲ要スル即チ「日本ノ安全ノ爲ニ極メテ必要ナル「シベリヤ」沿海州及ビ「ウラジオストツク」奪取ノ機會ハ「ソ」聯ノ綜合國力ガ歐洲戰線ニ於テ極度ニ出シ盡サレタ現在ヨリ好都合ナコトハ之カラ先アルマイト言フコトハ疑ヲ容レヌ。斯カル情勢下ニ於テハ下記ノコトガ成立スル

1230-1

「若シ「シベリヤ」ニ於ケル「ソ」聯兵力ニ對スル日本ノ見込ガ正確デ且日本ガ「ウラジオストツク」ニ於ケル「ソ」聯ノ抵抗ニ打勝ツテ「バイカル」湖ノ方向ニ「シベリヤ」ニ侵入出來ルナラバ斯カル企畫ハ現戰爭ノ爾後ノ發展ニ至大ノ意義ヲ有スルモノトナルデアロウ。日本ハ「ソ」聯領沿海州ヨリスル背後ノ脅威ヲ避ケルコトハ出來ナイ、ソレ故ニ若シ

ノ安全ノ爲ニ「シベリヤ」ニ於ケル「ソ」聯ノ兵力ニ對スル日本ノ見込ガ正確デ且日本ガ「ウラジオストツク」ニ於ケル「ソ」聯ノ抵抗ニ打勝ツテ「バイカル」湖ノ方向ニ「シベリヤ」ニ侵入出來ルナラバ斯カル企畫ハ現戰爭ノ爾後ノ發展ニ至大ノ意義ヲ有スルモノトナルデアロウ。日本ハ「ソ」聯領沿海州ヨリスル背後ノ脅威ヲ避ケルコトハ出來ナイ、ソレ故ニ若シ

日本が出来ルダケ早ク「ウラジオストツク」ヲ攻撃  
 スル決定ニ立至レバ之ニ越シタコトハナイ。此ノ間  
 ノ時間ヲ「ソ」聯ガ「アメリカ」ト協力シテ日本ニ  
 對スル脅威トナル様ナ空軍基地ヲ準備スル爲ニ「シ  
 ベリヤ」沿海州ノ要塞化トイフ唯一目的ノ爲ニ使用  
 スルコトハ疑ナイ。ソレ故ニ「ウラジオストツク」  
 ニ對スル攻撃ガ早ク行ハレレバ行ハレル程斯カル準  
 備ハソレダケ進捗シテ居ナイコトニナル。然シ乍ラ  
 是ハ總ジテ日本ガ此ノ程ノ作戦ニ堪ヘ得ルダケ十分  
 強大デアリ、他方面ノ兵力ヲ放ツテ其ノ結果英米ニ  
 對スル日本ノ地位一例ヘバ「ビルマ」ニ於ケル一ヲ  
 弱化スル様ナ欲目ニナツテハナラナイト言フ前換ノ  
 上ニ立ツテノ話デアル。

「ニ」若シ日本ガ斯カル作戦企圖ニ成功スルニ足ル必  
 要兵力ヲ缺イテ居ルナラバ當然日本ハ「ソビエツト」  
 「ロシア」ト中立關係ヲ維持スル方ガヨイ

「ソ」聯ハドンナ場合ニモ日「ソ」衝突ヲ懸念シ  
 テ東部「シベリヤ」ニ兵力ヲ維持セネバナラナイカ  
 ラ是モ亦我々ノ負擔ヲ輕クスルコトニナル。取分  
 ケドンナモノデモ日本ガ「ソ」聯ニ保證ヲ與ヘル様  
 ナコトヲサセテハナラナイ。

中立ノ維持ニ依ツテ不足ナ兵力ニヨル一途ニ日本内

地ニ對スル空襲ノ危険ヲ伴ツター長期戦ノ冒險ガ避ケラレルデアロウ。斯カル場合ニ於テハ日本ハ戦争ノ共同進行ニ有効ニ寄與スル爲ニハ別ノ方面例ヘバ印度カ「オーストラリヤ」ニ於テ攻勢ニ出ナケレバナラナイ。

之ヲ要スルニ對シテノ立場カラハ次ノ様ニ言フベキデアル節チ「ソビエツト・ロシア」ヲ突如攻撃シテ成功ヲ収メルナラバ、ソレハ三國同盟國ニ對シ爾後ノ戦争遂行上大ナル恩惠トナルデアロウ、然シ乍ラ是ハ成功確實ナ時ニ限ツテ行ハルベキモノデアアル。余ハ貴下ガ下記ノ考慮スベキ事項ヲ強調シ且貴下ノ實報ニ在ル様ナ日本ガ「ソビエツト・ロシア」ヲ攻撃スルコトニヨリテ「アメリカ」合衆國ニ對スベキ利益ニ就イテハ多分ハ遠ヘ目ニセラレンコトヲ希望スル。絶ヘズ日本人ノ注意ヲ向ケサセテ置クベキ點モ重要ナ點ハ

- 一 情勢ハ現在ノ様ニ好都合ノコトハ今迄ニ無カツタコト
- 二 待テバ待ツ程ソレダケ「シベリヤ」ニハ多クノ飛行場ガ建設サレルデアロウト言フコト
- 三 「アメリカ」ハ一度是等ノ設備ガ完成スレバ今日ニ於テ可能ナヨリモ、ヨリ多クノ有効ナ援助ヲ
- 「ソ」聯ニ對シテ與ヘルコトガ出來ルダロウト言

フコト

日「ソ」戦争ハ「ソ」聯ヲ弱化スルコトニナルカ  
 ラ「アメリカ」ハ之ヲ歓迎スルダロウト言フ、貴下  
 ノ電報ノ五ノ4ニ關シテハ現在デハ「アメリカ」ハ  
 「ソ」聯ヲ出來ルダケ強化セントシテ軍需品其ノ他  
 ヲ交付シテ現實ニ「ソ」聯ヲ強化シテ居リ何等「ソ」  
 聯ヲ弱クスルコトナドハ考ヘテ居ナイノデアルカラ  
 余ハ是ノ議論ハ少シ間違ツテ居ルト言フコトヲ注意  
 シタイト思フ。一万「アメリカ」ガ來ルベキ大統領  
 選舉ノコトヲ考ヘテ解決策トシテ何トカシテ日「ソ」  
 戦争ヲデツチ上ゲヨウトスルデアロウト従ツテ日  
 本ハ斯カル衝突ヲ回避シヨウトスルデアロウト言フ  
 コトヲ考ヘネバナラナイト言フ五ノ3ニ述ベラレタ  
 貴下ノ見解ニ余ハ賛成スルモノデアル。

要スルニ我々ノ策略ハ直接ニ結果ヲ強制スルコト  
 ナク日本ヲシテ是等ノ語見解ヲ認識セシメルガ如キ  
 モノデアラネバナラナイ。

「リツベントロツブ」

W D S C A 一八、四

一九四六年／昭和二十一年／三月三十日

「カリフォルニア州」サンフランシスコ」第百〇野戦郵便局、郵便局長氣附」

東京、聯合軍最高司令部、國際檢察部、首席檢察官  
シヨセフ・ビーカー！ナン殿宛」

キーナン 殿

茲ニ添附ノ、一九四六年／昭和二十一年／二月二十七日附覽書竝ニ日本駐獨逸大使、獨逸國外務省  
間ニ交ハサレタル獨逸電報ノ翻譯ヲ載セタル、タイ  
ブライター印刷二十七葉ハ「コロムビヤ」區「ワシ  
ントン」福軸國犯罪檢察部「アメリカ」合衆國主席  
檢察廳ヨリ當處ヘ送付セラレタルモノニ候

本翻譯ニハ左記情報ヲ含ミ居リ候

- (イ) 日本ニ於ケル政治及戰爭ノ狀態竝ニ日本國外務省  
ノ目標ニ關シ東京駐獨逸大使ヨリ獨逸國外務省  
ニ寄セタル勸告
- (ロ) 日本國政府ニ與ヘラルベキ情報ニ關シ外務大臣  
ハ「フオンリツベントロツプ」ヨリ日本駐獨逸  
大使ニ宛テタル訓令
- (ハ) 獨逸共同戰爭及ビ戰後計畫ノ論議

敬 具

戰爭犯罪局東京部首席

軍法會議總理事務局

陸軍中佐「ヴァイクター・シー・スウエアリングエン」

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Translation Section No.

II

translation of  
pages marked

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Doc. No. 1230 (Transcription of pages marked by paper slips)

~~Transcription of pages~~

Translated by Hironae YOSHIDA

Checked by T. Shimizu

W.D.S.O.A. 1184

一九四六年／昭和二十一年／三月三十日

カリフォルニア州・サンフランシスコ 第五〇〇野戦郵便局 郵便局長氣附

Unreliable info  
22/13 info begins with info

東京 聯合軍最高司令部 國際檢察部 首席檢察官

ジョセフ・ヒー・キーナン 殿宛

キーナン 殿

茲ニ添附ノ、一九四六年／昭和二十一年／二月二十七日附覺書並ニ

日本駐劄獨逸大使、獨逸國外務省間ニ交ハサレタル獨逸電報ノ翻譯ヲ載セ

タルタイプライター印刷二十七葉ハ「コロムビヤ區」ワシントン 樞軸國犯罪檢察部

「アメリカ」合衆國主席檢察廳ヨリ當廳ヘ提供セラレタルモノニ候

本翻譯ニハ左記情報ヲ含ミ居リ候

イ、日本ニ於ケル政治及戦争ノ状態竝ニ日本國外務省ノ目標ニ關シ

東京駐劄獨逸大使ヨリ獨逸國外務省ニ寄セタル勸告

ロ、日本國政府ニ與ヘラルベキ情報ニ關シ外務大臣（フォンリッベントロップ）ヨリ日本駐劄獨逸大使ニ宛テタル訓令

ハ、日獨共同戦争及ヒ戦後計畫ノ論議

敬具

戦争犯罪局東方部首席

軍法會議總理事務局

陸軍中佐

ウィクター・シー・スウェアリンゲン

暗號電報 (G. Ch. V.)

ベルリン<sup>1</sup>發、五月十五日午後二時三十分

東京著、五月十五日

東京大使館

五月十四日、第二一九七ノ九號

宛親展

大使<sup>1</sup>鎖錠封印ノ上保管ヲ要ス

六日附電報、第一四一ニ號ニ關シ、

日ソ<sup>1</sup>關係ニ關スル貴下ノ電報中ニ取扱ハレ居ル問題ニ關シ、下記

事項<sup>1</sup>考慮ヲ要スル即チ、日本ノ安全ノ爲ニ極メテ必要ナル、<sup>1</sup>シベリヤ

沿海州及ビ<sup>1</sup>ウラジオストク<sup>1</sup>奪取ノ機會ハ、ソ<sup>1</sup>聯ノ綜合國力が歐洲戰線

ニ於テ極度ニ出シ盡サレタ現在ヨリ好都合ナコトハ之カラ先アルコトニ疑ヲ容レヌ。斯カル

情勢下ニ於テハ、下記ノコトが成立スル

一、若シ、「シベリヤ」ニ於ケル「ソ」聯兵力ニ對スル日本ノ見込ガ正確デ、

且日本ガ「ウラジオストク」ニ於ケル「ソ」聯ノ抵抗ニ打勝ッテ「バイカル」湖ノ

方向ニ「シベリヤ」ニ侵入出來ルナラバ、其時、斯カル企畫ハ現戰爭ノ

爾後ノ發展ニ至大ノ意義ヲ有スルモノトナルデアロウ。日本ハ「ソ」聯領沿海州

ヨリスル背後ノ脅威ヲ避ケルコトハ出來ナイ、ソレ故ニ若シ日本ガ出來ルダケ早ク

「ウラジオストク」ヲ攻撃スル決定ニ立至レバ、之ニ越シタコトハナイ。此ノ間ノ

時間ヲ「ソ」聯ガ「アメリカ」ト協力シテ、日本ニ對スル脅威トナル様ナ空軍基地

ヲ準備スル爲ニ「シベリヤ」沿海州ノ要塞化トイフ<sup>雖</sup>一目的ノ爲ニ使用スルコトハ

疑ナイ。ソレ故、「ウラジオストク」ニ對スル攻撃ガ早ク行ハレバ行ハレル程

斯カル準備ハソレダケ進捗シテ居ナイコトニナル。然シ乍ラ、是ハ總シテ、

日本ガ此ノ種ノ作戰ニ堪ヘ得ルダケ十分強大デアリ、他方面ノ兵力ヲ

放ッテ其ノ結果英米ニ對スル日本ノ位地一例ヘバ「ヒルマ」ニ於ケル一ヲ弱化

スル様ナ破目ニナツテハナライト云フ前提ノ上ニ立ツテノ話デアル。

ニ、<sup>フ</sup>若シ日本ガ斯カル作戰企圖ニ成功スルニ足ル必要兵力ヲ缺イテ居ル

ナラバ、~~東洋~~當然日本<sup>ハ</sup>ソビエトロシアト中立關係ヲ維持スル方ガヨイ。

ソレ聯ハトニナ場合ニモ、日ソ<sup>ハ</sup>衝突ヲ懸念シテ東部<sup>ハ</sup>シベリヤニ

兵力ヲ維持セネバナライカラ、是モ我々ノ負擔ヲ輕クスルコトニナル。取リ分ケ、

ドニナモノデモ、日本ガソレ聯ニ保證ヲ與ヘル様ナコトヲサセテハナライ。

<sup>フ</sup>中立ノ維持ニ依ツテ、不足ナ兵力ニヨル<sup>ハ</sup>殊ニ日本<sup>内地</sup>ニ對スル空襲ノ危険

ヲ伴<sup>フ</sup>ター<sup>ハ</sup>長期戦ノ冒險ガ避ケラレルデアロウ。  
斯ル場合ニ於テハ  
是等ノ關係ハ日本ハ

戦争ノ共同遂行ニ有効ニ寄與スル為ニ、別ノ方面、例ヘバ印度カ<sup>ハ</sup>オーストラリヤ<sup>ハ</sup>、

ニ於テ攻勢ニ出ナケレバナライ。

<sup>フ</sup>之ヲ要スルニ、獨逸ノ立場カ<sup>ハ</sup>次ノ様ニ言フベキデアル。即チ、ソビエト

ロシア<sup>ハ</sup>ヲ突如攻撃シテ成功ヲ收メルナラバ、ソレハ三國同盟國ニ對シ、爾後ノ戦争

遂行上、大ナル恩恵トナルデアロウ、然シ乍ラ是ハ成功確實ナ時ニ限ツテ

行ハルベキモノデアル。

余ハ貴下ガ下記ノ考慮スベキ事項ヲ強調シ且 貴下ノ電報ニ在ル様ナ

日本ガ「ソビエント」ロシア「ヲ攻撃スルコト」ニヨリテ「アメリカ」合衆國ニ歸スベキ利益

ニ就テハ多分ハ 控<sup>へ</sup>目ニセラレニコトヲ希望スル。絶ヘズ日本人ノ注意ヲ向ケ

サセテ置クヘキ最モ重要ナ點ハ――

一、情勢ハ現在ノ様ニ好都合ノコトハ今迄ニ無カッタコト

二、待テバ待ツ程 ソレダケ「シベリヤ」ニハ多クノ飛行場ガ建設サルデアロウト云フコト

三、「アメリカ」ハ一度是等ノ設備ガ完成スルハ今日ニ於テ可能ナヨリモ ヨリ多クノ

有効ナ援助ヲ「ソ」聯ニ對シテ與ヘルコトガ出來ルデアロウト云フコト

貴下日「ソ」戦争ハ「ソ」聯ヲ弱化スルコトニナルカラ「アメリカ」ハ之ヲ歡迎

スルデアロウト云<sup>々</sup> 貴下ノ電報ノ 三ノ 四ニ關シテハ、余ハ是ノ議論ハ

現在デハ「アメリカ」ハ「ソ」聯ヲ出来ルダケ強化セントシテ 軍需品其ノ他ヲ

交付シテ 現實ニ「ソ」聯ヲ強化シテ居リ「ソ」聯ヲ弱クスルコトナドハ ~~思~~考ヘ

何等

テ居ナイノテアルカラ、余ハ是ノ議論ハ少シ間諛~~違~~ッテ居ルト云フコトヲ注意シタイ

ト思フ。一方「アメリカ」ガ来ルヘキ大統領選與~~手~~ノコトヲ考ヘテ 解決策トシテ

何トカシテ ~~日~~「ソ」戦争ヲテツチ上げヨウトスルテアロウコト、從ッテ日本ハ斯カル

衝突ヲ回避シヨウトスルテアロウト云フコトヲ ~~考~~ハナラナイト云フ Ⅱノ3ニ

述ベラレタ貴下ノ見解ニ余ハ賛成スルモノテアル。

要スルニ我々ノ策略ハ、直接ニ結果ヲ強制スルコトナク、日本ヲシテ是等

ノ諸見解ヲ認識セシメルガ如キモノテアラネハナラナイ。

リッベントロップ

*PRIORITY*  
*Major Phillips*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

12 Sept. ,1946

TO : TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 1230 for Taranenko

Arrange for translation as follows:

1. Eng. to Jap. of enclosed telegram No. 1197/9 from Berlin to Tokyo,  
15 May 42.
2. Eng. to Jap. of Swearingen certificate of authenticity dated 30 Mar. 46.

NOTE: Cert. of translator should be attached to document when reproduced.

(Cert. of authenticity by Reeve will follow later)

hhb

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No.

1230

Date

4/9/46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature:

Cables exchanged between German Ambassadors to Japan and the German Foreign Office

Date: 1941-1944

Original ( )

Copy (X)

Language:

English

Has it been translated?

Yes (X)

No ( )

Has it been photostated?

Yes ( )

No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_

Doc Div

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

U. S. Chief of Counsel for Prosec. of Asia Criminality, Washington, D.C.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

Oshima; Suzuki; Tojo; SHIGEMITZU; KAWAHARA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

AGGRESSIVE WARFARE; TRI-PARTITE PACT; GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY LEAGUE

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Translated German cables found in German Embassy in Tokyo as follows:

6-28-41 - Ribbentrop to German Ambassador to Japan outlining program to be followed to influence Japan towards immediate military proceedings against Soviet Russia.

6-28-41 - Ribbentrop to Tokyo re favorable military operations against Russia as additional reason for active Japanese participation

3-26-42 - Ribbentrop to German Ambassador to Japan advising of conference with Oshima in which details of Russian offensive outlined, suggesting future military operations for three powers in Ceylon, Madagascar, Burma, Vladivostok.

Feb. 1943 - German Ambassador at Tokyo to Berlin advising of desire of Japanese cabinet for close cooperation with Germany and of Tojo's conviction of ultimate victory of German arms and his desire for continued Japanese-German friendship and cooperation. Stahmer's opinion as to Tojo's present and future role in Cabinet and effect upon Tri-Partite agreement. (OVER)

Analyst Bettie Renner

Doc. No.

CWSP

4-7-43 - Berlin to Tokyo Embassy directing that detailed explanations re German reverses on Eastern Front with emphasis on German superiority be spread by means of whispering campaign  
8-2-43 - German Ambassador to Berlin outlining: (1) Japan's political, economic, and military situation in Greater East Asia; (2) Japanese-Soviet Relations; and (3) Effects of Italian events.

May 15th - Ribbentrop to Tokyo Embassy re Japanese-Russian relations with especial reference to attack on Vladivostok considering: (1) Situation never more favorable; (2) The longer one waits the more airfields will be built in Siberia; and (3) America will be able to render Russians more effective support when such installations are completed.

2-13-44 - Von Ribbentrop to Tokyo re conference in Tokyo with Japanese foreign minister concerning advisability of Germany's attempt to approach Russia for an agreement in view of Italy's collapse. Discussion of advisability of Germany proclaiming national freedom of occupied countries.

May 11th - Von Ribbentrop to Tokyo concerning propaganda re German peace feelers; suggested anti-propaganda measures.

4-8-44 - Von Ribbentrop to Tokyo re enemy propaganda concerning Tripartite parties. Directing counter measures be taken and forwarding information regarding: (1) **THE MILITARY SITUATION** with special reference to: (a) The Eastern Front, (b) Enemy air force losses, anti-aircraft defenses, and industrial installation dispersment, (c) Invasion precautionary measures, (d) Troop morale, (e) German U-boats, (f) Bombing of English Isles; (2) **THE POLITICAL SITUATION**, with special reference to: (a) Eden and Churchill foreign policies, (b) Distrust among allies, (c) Social and economic difficulties in England and America.

7-23-44 - Berlin to Tokyo outlining Japan's request for German-Japanese explanation of war aims along following lines: (1) All nations should work together for establishing lasting peace; (2) All nations should take rightful place; (3) Recognition of sovereignty of all nations; (4) Practice of open door policy by all nations; (5) Advancement of cultural relationships.

9-7-44 - Von-Ribbentrop to Tokyo discussing in detail Japanese suggestion for separate peace between Germany and Russia.

May 17th - German Ambassador to Tokyo to Berlin discussing: (1) Tojo's trip to Philippines; (2) Philippine defenses; (3) Chiang Kai-Shek and North China reverses; (4) Germany's plan for final attack on Russia; (5) Danger of Bolshevism; (6) Mass execution of Katya and the Polish government.

6-6-44 - German Ambassador to Tokyo to Berlin - Military Attache reports regarding the breaking away of the Soviet Union from the Anti-German Enemy coalition.

4-24-44 - German Ambassador to Tokyo to Berlin - Japanese advances in forming and strengthening Great East Asia Theatre.

Doc. No. 1230

Page 1

## TELEGRAM IN CODE (G. Ch. V.)

From Berlin May 15th 2:20 P.M.  
To Tokyo May 15th.

Tokyo Embassy  
No. 1197/9 of May 14th.

To be kept under lock and seal  
For the Ambassador personally.

Re: Telegram of the 6th, No. 1412.

With respect to the question dealt with in your telegram on Japanese-Russian relations, the following should be taken under consideration: without doubt the opportunity to seize the Siberian Coastal Province and Vladivostok, so vitally necessary to Japanese security, will never be as favorable as at present when Russia's combined strength is strained to the utmost on the European front. In this situation the following exists:

1) If Japanese estimates of Russian forces in Siberia are accurate, and she is able to overcome Russian resistance in Vladivostok and penetrate into Siberia in the direction of Lake Baikal, then such an undertaking would be very significant to the subsequent development of the war. Japan can not evade the threat to her rear from Russian coastal provinces, it would therefore be best if she would arrive at a decision to attack Vladivostok at the very earliest. There is no question that this intervening time is used by the Russians in cooperation with the Americans for the sole purpose of fortifying the Siberian Coastal areas in order to provide air bases which will constitute a threat to Japan. Therefore, the earlier the push against Vladivostok takes place the less progress will have been made in these preparations. However, this is all based on the premise that Japan is sufficiently strong for an operation of this nature and will not have to free other forces which would weaken her position against England and America, as for example, in Burma.

2) If Japan lacks the necessary strength to successfully undertake such an operation then it would naturally be better that she maintain neutral relations with Soviet Russia.

This also eases our burden since in any event Russia must maintain troops in East Siberia in anticipation of a Japanese-Russian conflict. Above all any Japanese assurance to the Russians must be avoided. By maintenance of neutrality,

the risk of a long drawn out war with insufficient forces and particularly with danger of air attacks against the Japanese Home Islands will be avoided. In this respect, Japan must undertake the offensive in some other direction, as for example, India or Australia, in order to contribute effectively to the joint conduct of the war.

In summing up, the following is to be said from the German standpoint: a sudden and successful attack against Soviet-Russia might prove a great boon for the further conduct of the war to the Tripartite Powers, but this should only be undertaken if success can be assured.

I request that you stress the following considerations and perhaps put less emphasis on the advantages which may accrue from a Japanese attack on Soviet Russia to the United States as it appears in your telegram. The most important point which should be constantly brought to the attention of the Japanese are:

1.) that the situation was never as favorable as it is now.

2.) the longer one waits all the more airfields will be built in Siberia and

3.) the Americans will be able to render the Russians more effective support once these installations are completed than is possible today. With reference to III., 4, of your telegram in which you mention that a Russian-Japanese war would be welcomed by America since it would weaken Russia, I wish to note that this argument is somewhat devious since at the present moment the Americans are actually strengthening Russia by the delivery of war materials, etc. in order to strengthen her as much as possible, and by no means think of weakening Russia. On the other hand, I agree with your views expressed in II., 3 that the Americans in the light of coming presidential election will try everything to bring about a Soviet Russian Japanese War as a solution and so it must be reckoned that the Japanese will try to avoid such a conflict.

All in all our tactics must be such as to make Japan aware of these points of view without directly forcing the issue.

RIBBENTROP.

Telegram in Code  
To Tokyo 7. 9.44 08:00  
Citissimo  
Embassy Tokyo  
2028 of 6.9.44  
Disclosure B  
Very Secret  
Exclusively to the Ambassador personally on your Telegrams  
2325 of August 25  
2347 of August 28

Japanese suggestion for separate peace with Russia.  
4) Following the conversation concerning these military questions OSHIMA brought up the Japanese suggestion of a separate peace between Germany and The Soviet Union and needs the same as in the form that Shigemitsu made to you. He underlined hereby that the Japanese Government had in no way contacted the Soviet Union as concerns the possibility of a separate peace, as this could be attributed to us as a sign of weakness. The Japanese government is furthermore determined to continue the war under all circumstance on the side of Germany, until final victory has been achieved. Moreover, the Red Army has now arrived at the borders of 1940, will probably occupy Finland and the Sea Narrows soon, and as the Soviet Union must now think in terms of reconstruction the Japanese government deems it not impossible, that Stalin may be prepared to give in now.

The "Fuhrer" has presented our standpoint following these suggestions which I have gathered as follows, at the conclusion of the discussion with the concurrence of the "Fuhrer".

A) We have no indications that the Soviet Union is prepared for an understanding with Germany, according to our opinion Stalin will only then attempt to come to an understanding when he has convinced himself that he no longer can fight successfully or that his strength does not in any case suffice to beat Germany.

B) When these preconclusions take place by Stalin, this will be shown, then a new political situation will have arrived and then it would be time to see what to do about it.

C) For this reason we ask the Japanese Government, to refrain from taking steps of any kind in this connection with the Soviet Union.

Oshima declared to this that the Japanese Government would take no steps in this direction without our concurrence. On his question whether we had changed our war aim toward the Soviet Union, the "Fuhrer" answered that when a state falls apart therewith everything falls apart. The Infantry of the Soviet Union is bad and when once the entire

structure of the Soviet Union begins to totter, then everything will fall apart, as happens again and again among the Slavs. Stalin did not capitulate when we stood at the Don, the same now holds true for Germany. The Carthaginians stood before Rome once, but the Romans did not capitulate and finally dragged a ploughshare over Carthage. When again we would go on the offensive against the Red Army cannot be said at the moment. But we cannot be on the defensive on all fronts at the same time. Oshima declared once more that Japan would fight on the side of Germany until final victory had been achieved and that it would use its last troops to realize this, as there is only one road for Japan, which it will follow to the end. The "Führer" closed the conversation then with assurance that the same will for fight and victory remained also with the Germans and that with such determination of the two powers victory must be theirs.

Von Ribbentrop

Decoded Telegram (G.Ch.V.)  
Left Berlin on 13-2-44 12:30 o'clock  
Arr. Tokyo on 14-2-44 16:00 o'clock  
Decoded by: Mayer  
Clear copy read by: Mayer  
Telegram No. 318 of 13 Feb. 44.  
Disclosure C.

For the Ambassador personally.

Ambassador KAWAHARA informed Undersecretary HENCKE of the following on February 8.

(1) In a conference with you in Tokyo on January 24 the Japanese Foreign Minister has expressed, that the Japanese Government deemed it advisable if Germany should undertake the attempt to approach the Soviet Union for an agreement as this would have a favorable result upon the overall situation of the Axis. KAWAHARA asked in this direction on the basis of written material and apparently on advice of his government, that the possession of the Ukrain were no longer necessary for Germany, as we have the opportunity in view of the collapse in Italy, to extend our sphere of power to the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Balkans, without consideration of the Italian interest.

(2) In the mentioned conference between you and the Japanese Foreign Minister, the latter has also mentioned the desire, that Germany, just as Japan has done for the nations of East Asia, should proclaim the national freedom of all those countries occupied by her. Such a declaration according to the opinion of the Ambassador, would be favorable for the axis powers in carrying out the war, and also it would underline the agreement of the Japanese and German war aims as concerns the emancipation of the nations of Europe and Asia.

You have answered the Japanese Foreign Minister, that the German Government agrees with the opinion of the Japanese Foreign Minister on the whole, however, before such a proclamation can be made, the expected allied invasion in the West must have been repulsed. Upon this Mr. SHIGEMITSU has answered that in his opinion it may be too late for such a declaration then.

End of the KAWAHARA speech. As a report from you concerning this conversation with the Foreign Minister has not been received, I beg you for a detailed report concerning the suggestion of SHIGEMITSU as well as of the answers you gave.

VON RIBBENTROP

**FILE COPY**

RETURNED TO ROUTING 361

5

IMT 241

1.) TELEGRAM IN CODE (G. Ch. V.)  
Foreign Office, Berlin.  
No. \_\_\_\_\_ of February 1943

To the Foreign Minister.

From conversations which I had recently with the Prime Minister, Ministers of the Navy, Chiefs of the Naval Staff and of the General Staff, with Ministers Aoki and Suzuki, etc. I gained the following overall impression:

All parties stressed their firm conviction in victory and expressed the desire for the closest possible cooperation with Germany, as well as their complete confidence in the accomplishments of our Armed Forces and those of our people. The necessity and importance of direct contact between Japan and Germany in any manner possible was stressed and that this be given special prominence in view of the propaganda effect on our enemies. All visits were extremely cordial and personal, lasting longer than was originally planned.

Prime Minister Tojo stated that he was not concerned by the situation in Russia. He was convinced of the ultimate victory of German arms. At the moment he was particularly interested in the situation in North Africa, Turkey and Spain. He would be grateful for bulletins on all important events and would also be prepared to give us any information whatever quite freely. The war at present is a war of weapons and nerves, and the closest cooperation possible is absolutely essential, particularly in retrospect to enemy propaganda which seeks to use all possible means to weaken Japanese-German friendship. In this connection he mentions neutral diplomats who were spreading false and damaging rumors. The Prime Minister then discussed the Chinese situation with me and requested that we continue these discussions in the future. I request your approval of this.

Prime Minister Tojo who as Minister of War played an important role in the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, is unquestionably the strongest personality in the Japanese Cabinet, thanks to his leadership abilities. Despite these characteristics and his popularity with the people, he has been attacked several times (See Telegram No. 478 as of 6:2). This is due to the unique existing circumstances. Previous centuries of vague representations of the Emperor as a purely spiritual figure led to the belief, since the Meiji Restoration, in comparatively frequent changes of government, so that no outstanding predominating character could in any wise assume the aspects of the Emperor. Under these circumstances it is not inconceivable that Tojo even if his policies are

approved of at present may have to withdraw after a given time. Such a withdrawal would be regrettable from the German point of view, since Tojo, as described above, is a dynamic personality and an outspoken friend of Germany. On the other hand the change in government would not affect the Japanese policy under the Tripartite agreement since it is universally recognized here that Japan's fate is bound up with the Axis Powers.

STAHMER

IMT 241 4-1

IPS DOC. NO. 1230  
EXHIBIT 807

Excerpt consisting of the following:

Telegram 1.2 (G. Ch.V.) from Berlin on 26.3.42, 8:00 o'clock to Tokyo on 26.3.42, 19:15 o'clock.

Embassy Tokyo

No. 878 of 26.3.42

Disclosure B For the Ambassador Personally.

In conference with Ambassador Oshima on 23.3. I have given him a thorough view of the present situation, where I stated, that it stood pretty badly for the Russians, that in England actually an atmosphere of deep depression was existing among the leading political figures, and that in the U.S. with their noisy armaments propaganda actually a terrific confusion was taking place. If now the enemy propaganda sought to prevent us from exploiting our victories, it is most necessary that we in turn should seek to exploit the weakness in the situation of our enemies and that we should bring to a conclusion still in this year even the keenest of imagineable plans. Germany would surely maneuver Russia into a position this year which would exclude her from being a decisive war factor. In further continuity we plan to advance also into the near East in order to shake hands with Japan. Also Japan is placed in the situation that the safeguarding of her conquests can be realized only in the final destruction of our enemies and that therefore the three powers should make further courageous military operations

in this year and also in view of the present weakness of the enemy they could do so, in order to decide the war quickly with the least amount of casualties. I should think that Japan would insure herself that Australia could not be used as an attack base against Japan, that the Japanese fleet advance into the Indian Ocean, occupy Ceylon and establish bases in Madagascar and that Burma should be completely occupied, above all moreover, I think that an advance of the Japanese armies against Vladivostok and in the direction of the Baikal Sea would be of the greatest importance. Naturally we don't want to have Japan do more than her strength permits, as Japan's strength is also our strength. Should Japan moreover, be strong enough this year for an attack upon Russia, then this would be a great aid, in view of the present difficult situation in Russia, in bringing about her final exit as a warring enemy. Already now the food and economic situation in Russia is reported to be so gruesome that the Russians in some regions are literally eating each other as not long ago a captured General reported. Russia has already lost 10 million of her best soldiers while our total losses since the beginning of the war have amounted to round 237,000 dead, and 750,000 wounded, whereby of the latter at least 509,000 to 600,000 have again become useable in the war. In any case the German army is today much stronger than in the past year and prepared for a new offensive, and this in opposition to the terribly declining Russian army. Together with a

common attack of the Axis and Japan to the Indian Ocean, it would bring the war to a decision. If one should proceed in this manner, the British Empire could be brought to a downfall in visible time and then the U.S. could not do anything seriously to either us or Japan.

Ambassador Oshima agrees with my suggestion fully. Although he has received no official communique of the Japanese intentions, an advance against Vladivostok and East Siberia within the year, as he also is of the opinion that a more opportune time will never arrive again.

Following I also talked with the Ambassador concerning the future economic cooperation between the European-African sphere under the leadership of the Axis on one side and the leadership over greater East Asia under Japan on the other side, whereby as aim, I indicated a great economic agreement foresaw the preferences for the partners and thirds, and exclude America as much as possible. The basis for this must be a strong treaty among the three powers. The intentions of such a great economic cooperation should already now be put into a framework.

Oshima noted the special importance that such a treaty would have for the U.S. in the replacements and the movement of the present economic agreements. We have considered a new conference in this matter for the near future.

I am informing you of the preceding for your personal information as well as usage by you in conversation with notable Japanese personages.

Ribbentrop

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1230

9 April 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Cables exchanged between German Ambassador to Japan and the German Foreign Office.

Date: 1941-1944 ; Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated: Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated: Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also ATTACHED if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: U. S. Chief of Counsel for Pros. of Axis Criminality, Washington, D. C.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OHLA; SUZUKI; TOJO; HIRAGATA; MIYAKAWA.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggressive warfare; Tri-Partite Pact; Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity League

SUMMARY OR REVIEW POINTS (with page references):

Translated German cables found in German Embassy in Tokyo as follows:  
6-28-41 - Ribbentrop to German Ambassador to Japan outlining program to be followed to influence Japan towards immediate military proceedings against Soviet Russia.

6-28-41 - Ribbentrop to Tokyo re favorable military operations against Russia as additional reason for active Japanese participation.

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Doc. No. 1230

Page 1

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May 11th - Von Ribbentrop to Tokyo concerning propaganda re German peace feelers; suggested anti-propaganda measures.

4-8-44 - Von Ribbentrop to Tokyo re enemy propaganda concerning Tri-Partite parties. Directing counter measures be taken and forwarding information regarding: (1) THE MILITARY SITUATION with special reference to: (a) The Eastern Front, (b) Enemy air force losses, anti-aircraft defenses, and industrial installation dispersment, (c) Invasion precautionary measures, (d) Troop morale, (e) German U-boats, (f) Bombing of English Isles; (2) THE POLITICAL SITUATION, with special reference to: (a) Eden and Churchill foreign policies, (b) Distrust among allies, (c) Social and economic difficulties in England and America.

7-23-44 - Berlin to Tokyo outlining Japan's request for German-Japanese explanation of war aims along following lines: (1) All nations should work together for establishing lasting peace; (2) All nations should take rightful place; (3) Recognition of sovereignty of all nations; (4) Practice of open door policy by all nations; (5) Advancement of cultural relationships.

9-7-44 - Von-Ribbentrop to Tokyo discussing in detail Japanese suggestion for separate peace between Germany and Russia.

May 17th - German Ambassador to Tokyo to Berlin discussing: (1) TOYO's trip to Philippines; (2) Philippine defenses; (3) Chiang Kai-shek and North China reverses; (4) Germany's plan for final attack on Russia; (5) Danger of Bolshevism; (6) Mass execution of Katya

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and the Polish government.

6-6-44 - German Ambassador to Tokyo to Berlin - Military Attache reports regarding the breaking away of the Soviet Union from the Anti-German Enemy coalition.

4-24-44 - German Ambassador to Tokyo to Berlin - Japanese advances in forming and strengthening Great East Asia Theatre.