


12.091.4

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By Md NARA Date 2/15/12



200cm

SEKISUI JUSHI

JQA

JIS

1級

☉



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By md NARA Date 2/15/12

SECRET Security Information

# GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

## G-2

### FAR EAST COMMAND

FILE NO. 091.4

LINE NO. 1 TO         

DATE JAN TO DEC 52

SECRET Security Information



## LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091.4 Classified

Sheet #1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
rmk 1	Int Div	21 Jan	G-2	IMO: Relationships between COMNAVFE OP 8-51 and Japanese Citizens
dec 2	G2	24 Jan	Gen Ennis	MEMO: Brief of JCS 2180/53, 2 Jan 52, Japanese Relations with China
cd 3	G2	20 Feb	Scty Div	IOM: Japanese Actions and Reactions as expressed in information Media of all types
DEC 4	JG2CG	28 Feb	JSPOG	C/S: Japanese Opinion
DEC 4	Scty Div	28 Feb	Int Div	IOM: Japanese Opinion
pmb 5	G2	6 May	JSPOG	C/S: Japanese Opinion: Reaction to plane crashes in vicinity of populated regions
bed 2				MONTHLY SURVEY OF AMERICAN OPINION ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
kgg 6	CINCFE	20 June	CGSIXCOR	CX50527: Good relationships, instructions will be issued requiring US Armed Forces personnel to avoid meetings, rallies or demonstrations
kgg 7	G2	25 June	G3	C/R: Opinions concerning matters which shall become grounds for US - Japanese Alienation in the US Army's Direction of the NPR
kgg 8	Mil Intel Sec	29 Sep	Gen Ennis	Memo: Brief on "British Attitude on ANZUS Pact"
af 9	G-2	6 Oct	Col Eckman	C/S: CinC's comment re CIC-Japanese Government Relations.
kgg 10	G2	23 Oct	Gen Banfill	C/S: Principles Governing Relationship between Chief, US Diplomatic Mission in Japan, and CinC
af 11	G-2	20 Dec	PsyWar	D/F: Rqst for Information on City Population in N.K.



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By Md NARA Date 2/15/12

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

91589

Subject: Request for Information on City Population in N.K.

TO Psy War

From G-2

Date 30 Dec 52 COMMENT #2  
Lt. Col Wilder 265-510

Attached herewith as Incl #1 are answers to questions contained in  
Comment No. 1.

1 Incl

R. F. E.


M/R: Self-explanatory.

*Wilder*


G-2 FILE COPY ASW/dmf

3  
11

091.4



**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION





**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: Request for Information on City Population in N.K.

Date 30 Dec 52  
Lt Col Wilder 365-210  
COMMENT #2

From G-3

To Rey War

Attached herewith as Inc1 #1 are answers to questions contained in  
Comment No. 1.


1 Inc1

R. F. W.

M/R: Self-explanatory.


*Handwritten initials*

G-3 RITE COPY VSM/qmt



**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

*Handwritten circled number 3*  
0114





**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

091.4 PWS-R

Request for Information on City Population in N.K.

G2

PsyWar Section

6 Dec 52

Major Hess

26-8532

1. This section contemplates a plan directed toward the urban population of the larger cities in North Korea during February, March and April. Specifically it is contemplated to direct this program toward factory workers, merchants and students, and to devote operations for one month toward each category.

2. In support of above plan, information is requested on items listed below as follows:

a. Factory Workers

- (1) What is the length of normal working hours? (At what hours do shifts change?)
- (2) Is the pay commensurate with living costs?
- (3) Must workers attend political indoctrination meetings outside of normal working hours? If so, how much time?
- (4) How are living conditions?
- (5) What are the workers basic grievances and complaints?
- (6) What is the factory workers social and economical status in NK society?
- (7) The general effect of bombing has been what on livelihood?
- (8) What controls are in force to prevent absenteeism?
- (9) What percentage of wages is extracted for taxes?

b. Merchants

- (1) What is the present status of the small merchant in NK society economically and socially?
- (2) What is the status of trade in foodstuffs; garments; necessities; luxuries?
- (3) How are NK merchants affected by black markets?
- (4) What is the incidence of business failures since the war?
- (5) Are merchants drafted for forced labor?
- (6) Have a large number of merchants been forced out of business as a result of bombings? As a result of NKG pressure?
- (7) What taxes are imposed on merchants?
- (8) Must merchants report daily on transactions?

c. Students

- (1) What is the current status of students?
- (2) Has preferential treatment in any way been afforded students?
- (3) What educational facilities exist?
- (4) Is there any apparent anti-communist sentiment among the students?
- (5) What are the greatest vulnerabilities among the students for PsyWar operations?

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

35556



SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

091.4 PWS-R

SUBJECT: Request for Information on City Population in N.K.

TO G2

From PsyWar Section

Date 6 Dec 52  
Major Hess  
26-8532

COMMENT NO. 1

3. It is requested that initial report include all presently available information but prepared so as to reach this office no later than 31 Dec 52, with subsequent reports as additional information is received.

----- K.K.H. -----

TO Psy War

From G-2

Date 30 Dec 52  
Lt Col Wilder 265-510

COMMENT #2

Attached herewith as Incl #1 are answers to questions contained in Comment No. 1.

1 Incl

----- R. F. E. -----

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

35556





SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

091.4 PWS-R

SUBJECT: Request for Information on City Population in N.K.

TO GS  
From PayWar Section  
Date 6 Dec 52  
Major Haas  
26-8532  
COMMENT NO. 1

3. It is requested that initial report include all presently available information but prepared so as to reach this office no later than 31 Dec 52, with subsequent reports as additional information is received.

K.K.H.

TO Pay War  
From G-2  
Date 30 Dec 52  
Lt Col Wilder 265-210  
COMMENT #2

Attached herewith as Incl #1 are answers to questions contained in Comment No. 1.

1 Incl


R. F. W.



SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

32528





**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Information as requested in Comment 1 is listed as follows:

a. Factory workers

(1) The normal working hours range from eight to twelve hours daily (usually 7 days a week). No information is available upon what hours shifts change.

(2) The pay is not commensurate with the cost of living. Pay ranges from 1200NK Won a month for general employees to 3000 NK Won a month for technicians and section chiefs. A food allowance is given by the government to each employee and members of his or her family. This is necessary in order for the worker to survive.

(3) Workers must attend Labor Party meetings sometimes as often as twenty times a month, with meetings of two or three hour duration. Very few meetings are held during normal working hours and are generally held during his non-working time.

(4) Living conditions are extremely poor and mere existence is a twenty-four hour a day job. The high cost of all commodities, low wages, fear of bombing, and the near starvation ration, make the workers plight miserable and morale extremely low. No buildings or billets are provided by the government and the worker and his family must shift for themselves in the bombed out ruins generally surrounding any installation.

(5) The workers basic grievances and complaints are long working hours, low pay, forced labor and political indoctrination. A Union in name only does exist. It is known as the Employment General Union. The union does not live up to its mission, instead it increases the workers misery by Production Increase Drives and other so-called Patriotic Drives.

(6) Socially the factory worker rates between the government worker and farmer. Economically he is at the bottom of the ladder. Government workers receive higher pay and allowances, farmers have crops which they can hold out in order to assure a moderate menu and even the unrecognized merchant can resort to barter trade and blackmarket. The factory work has to depend upon his pay or government dole for a livelihood.

(7) Bombing has seriously affected the worker by destroying factories, limiting raw materials, caused forced displacement to areas safe from bombing. When factories or power installations are bombed-out the authorities force workers to take military training.

(8) The usual communist police measures are used to control absenteeism. The workers theoretically can quit their jobs, but few are allowed this privilege.

(9) About 10% of his wage goes for direct taxes. Bond drives, Patriotic "donations", etc., take up a portion of his already meager salary.

b. Merchants

(1) The small merchant has virtually no status in North Korean society. He is tolerated as a necessary evil. All businesses require licenses, but small peddlers and vendors operate without them and punishment is light if caught. In order to operate any business it is necessary to bribe the appropriate government officials.

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION



**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(2) Trade is continuous in all sorts of commodities. Foodstuffs are generally found on the market in quantity, but prices are high and the people cannot afford to buy much. Garments and clothing are scarce since all local clothing manufacture is exclusively for the army. Luxuries are few and even if available cannot be bought by the people. Numerous items are available on the blackmarket, generally of Chinese, U.S. South Korean, Japanese or Soviet and Soviet Satellite origin.

(3) The blackmarket makes possible the small merchants. Most of the goods bought, sold or traded are through the blackmarket.

(4) No information available.

(5) The merchants like all other segments of North Korean society are subject to forced labor when the exigencies of war warrant their use.

(6) Bombings and destruction of facilities have forced many out of business. The North Korean government tolerates small businesses and blackmarkets and has forced few out of business.

(7) Merchants must pay high taxes. They generally hoard their money because if they bank it, they must buy bonds or pay more taxes. Those caught with large sums of money are punished and forced to pay extra heavy taxes.

(8) Merchants are required to report their transactions, but small vendors and blackmarketeers do not unless caught with large sums of money or large amounts of goods.

**c. Students**

(1) Students hold a privileged status in North Korea as they do in any Communist state. They generally are carefully selected and entrusted to carry on future Communist ambitions and groomed to staff the army and Communist governmental machinery.

(2) Preferential treatment is afforded students and they are generally better housed, feed and clothed than the average populace.

(3) All schools are government run and directed. Most of the schools are of a military nature. Cabinet Decision 106 transferred responsibility for educating all school age children from the jurisdiction of the Education Ministry to the Ministries of National Defense, Heavy Industry, Light Industry and Railway. This was prompted by the war in order to create a new pool of manpower for the governments wartime requirements.

Reports indicate that the number of peoples schools have been reduced by two-thirds in comparison with before the outbreak of war. Middle schools have been reduced by one-half and technical schools by one-third. Universities have been moved to Sinuiju, Kanggye and to Manchuria. The schools in Korea are generally located in private houses or dugouts.

(4) There are no apparent anti-communist sentiments among students, since this is the class most susceptible to Communism, and they are generally selected for their adherence to the Communist cause.



**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

(5) The greatest vulnerability among the students is that which is inherent of all Communist peoples. Students because of ambitions, youthful outlook, lack of maturity and often lack of realistic thinking are highly susceptible to Communist teachings. It is therefore necessary at attack the basic Communist teachings of Marx and Lenin being taught to these students. The aim of our psywar operations should be to bring about disillusionment among the students. Since most schools are in caves or dugouts and students have been subject to bombings and the country wracked by war, it might be well to utilize an attack against one of the basic fears of man, that of utter destruction. This approach might be effectively utilized in a war torn country such as North Korea and aimed at the student segment.

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION



G2 HQ FEC ROUTING SLIP  
(Do Not Detach)  
SECURITY INFORMATION

91589

DEC 6 1952

SUBJECT: Request for info on city population in K

ACofS, G2 _____ ( )	Adm Officer <u>[Signature]</u> ( )	Intelligence Div <u>[Signature]</u> ( )
Deputy _____ ( )	Mil Pers _____ ( )	Security Div _____ ( )
Secretariat _____ ( )	Civ Pers _____ ( )	441st CIC _____ ( )
Dep for Adm & Ex O _____ ( )	Pers Sgt Maj _____ ( )	500 MI Svc Gp _____ ( )
Asst Ex _____ (4) ( )	Files _____ ( )	FEC/LG _____ ( )
Planning Group _____ ( )	T/S Control O _____ ( )	Doc Res _____ ( )
Dep for Navy _____ ( )	Message Center _____ ( )	SSO _____ ( )
Scty Div Gp _____ ( )	Supply _____ ( )	Japanese Liaison _____ ( )
Asst SIA _____ ( )	_____ ( )	
Sp Asst Radio _____ ( )	_____ ( )	
Sp Asst 441 CIC _____ ( )	_____ ( )	
Sp Asst Fiscal _____ ( )		
Sp Asst Comd Rpt _____ ( )		

Action _____ ( )	Comment _____ ( )	Signature _____ ( )
Draft Reply _____ ( )	Concurrence _____ ( )	Initials _____ ( )
Info for Reply _____ ( )	Approval _____ ( )	Dispatch _____ ( )
Brief _____ ( )	Info _____ ( )	File _____ ( )

(REMARKS)

*Recommend Approval*  
*[Signature]*  
*C.R.G.*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Suspense Date 31 Dec 1952

35556


1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By Md NARA Date 2/15/12



Suspense Date

G-2 NOT



82954

SECRET  
Security Information  
///

23 Oct 1952

Brigadier General Banfill

Attached is copy of JCS message 905965, subject: "Principles Governing Relationship between Chief, US Diplomatic Mission in Japan, and CINCPAC", which you requested by telephone a few days ago.

Also attached is copy of DA radio 907124, reference the same subject.

- 2 Incls;
- 1. Cy of JCS 905965
- 2. Cy of DA 907124

G-2 File


15/RFE

RECEIVED  
54 OCT 1952  
SECURITY INFORMATION

8  
10

091.4

SECRET  
Security Information





SECRET  
Security Information

23 Oct 1952

Brigadier General Barfill

Attached is copy of JCS message 90565, subject: "Principles Governing Relationship between Civil, US Diplomatic Mission in Japan, and CINCPAC" which you requested by telephone a few days ago.


Also attached is copy of DA radio 90712A, reference the same subject.

- 2. Copy of DA 90712A
- 1. Copy of JCS 90565
- 2 Incls:

10/17/52  
 24 OCT 1952  
 DEPT. OF DEFENSE  
 4-2 REC

SECRET  
Security Information

10  
4/100





CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

6 Oct 1952

Colonel Eckman


XXXXX

You will no doubt be interested in seeing the  
CinC's comment re CIC-Japanese Government Relations.

7  
7  
8  
7  
0

G2 File RFE/vcr

ISRFE




Feb  
RFE  
M to RIFE

⑨  
091.4

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information





CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT  
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALSHEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500

77718

29 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Ennis

SUBJECT: Brief on "British Attitude on ANZUS Pact"

I. Background

Traditionally Australia and New Zealand have been more conscious of their dependence upon Great Britain than any of the other Commonwealth nations. This is due to their geographic position and small populations; and both countries have desired close ties to Britain in order to guarantee their protection by the British Navy. This attitude is demonstrated by Australia's refusal to ratify the Statute of Westminster until World War II, and then only on the condition that the Duke of Gloucestershire, a brother of the late King, would be appointed Governor-General. Thus virtual independence was acceptable only if strong emotional or psychological ties to the Mother Country were maintained.

The progress of World War II saw the naval strength of the United States, rather than that of Great Britain, emerge as the most dependable source of protection; and before that conflict ended many people were advocating a Pacific Basin collective security arrangement to be led by the United States. Plans for such an arrangement were actually laid with the sanction of high government officials in both Australia and New Zealand, but this sanction was personal and did not represent an official view.

Since the end of World War II, public opinion in Australia and New Zealand has wavered between support of U.S. and of British leadership. Although all historical and psychological ties are to Britain, stark realism has kept a pro-U.S. feeling strong. This stems from the belief that the U.S. will assign a higher priority to the Pacific theatre of operations in the event of a general war than will Britain.

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

BRIEF

29591

G2 file copy

091.4



CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT  
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Great Britain herself has, through the necessity of events, accepted American leadership of the "Western Bloc." This acceptance is on a realistic "must go along" basis, and is not accorded without misgivings. The British fear that the United States, as a relative new-comer to the game of global politics, lacks the caution essential to successful diplomacy. That the British consider us to be rash is probably best illustrated by her misgivings concerning our policy of neutralizing the Straits of Formosa, as well as by her concern over the recent air attacks on North Korean power plants. These are the primary conflicts between the two commonwealths and Britain, and between Britain and the U.S. that underlie the present British reaction to their exclusion from the ANZUS conference at Honolulu.

## II. Reasons for British Exclusion

Several groups in Asia, particularly the opposition Nacionalista Party in the Philippines, have been highly critical of the ANZUS Pact on the grounds that it is a union of white countries that excludes the interests of colored Asiatic peoples. Some of this feeling exists in Formosa and Korea, to say nothing of Japan. Nevertheless both Nationalist China and Korea have shown considerable interest in the Pact, and both have expressed hopes that they would eventually be admitted to the group. The same is true of the Government of the Philippines.

Owing to her long history of colonialism, the British are looked upon by most Asiatics as being the embodiment of the "Asia for the white man" idea. Regardless of the justification for this view, the fact that it is held by most Orientals cannot be denied. American officials have expressed the fear that British attendance at the ANZUS Conference, even in the capacity of an observer, would add fuel to Asiatic fears of a revival of white imperialism.

Another view expressed by American officials is that Britain has no more right to attend the Conference than does any Asiatic country. At present the desire is to keep the membership of the ANZUS Council small, at least until such time as its organization is

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

BRIEF



CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT  
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

more firmly rooted. It is felt that admission of Britain at this time would prematurely open the door to the admission of all non-Communist states in Asia.

### III. British Views

The most commonly expressed British criticism of the ANZUS Pact is that in initiating it the United States has interfered in Commonwealth affairs, that is to say "jumped channels." In view of Commonwealth relationships as established by the Statute of Westminster, this criticism need not be taken too seriously--it is probably expressed by the British themselves with their "tongues in their cheeks." Although the objection is not in itself a serious one, it is a symptom of one of a more fundamental nature.

Although the British Foreign Office has refrained from making an official statement on the question of British exclusion from the recent meeting of the ANZUS countries, officials have publicly expressed their private views. They have stated that the exclusion is "more serious than is generally admitted," and there have been two major criticisms given by them of the Pact.

It is stated that the ANZUS Pact commits Australia and New Zealand to war if the United States should go to war over an incident involving American planes or ships in the Formosa Strait. Britain, because of her mutual interests with the Commonwealth countries, would be drawn into such a conflict. Thus, it is argued, Britain could be drawn into a war without having been consulted -- and over an incident growing out of the Formosa policy of the United States, a policy not highly popular in Britain.

Another British criticism is that the ANZUS Pact is over-rated as an expression of solidarity among the Pact members. It is pointed out that Australia and New Zealand look upon the colored nations of Asia, particularly Japan, as the chief threat to their security; whereas the United States looks upon Japan as a potential member of a Pacific security arrangement.

Despite the absence of official objections, it is clear that the British Government is quite unhappy over having been excluded from the

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

BRIEF



CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT  
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Honolulu meetings. One official called the situation a crisis "as serious as the refusal to share atomic secrets."

#### IV. Conclusions

It is clear that American officials expect further British protests, perhaps of an official nature. Sources close to the delegations at Honolulu have admitted the seriousness of the British exclusion.

Despite British statements to the contrary, there appears to be considerable solidarity of viewpoint among the Pact members regarding Asiatic countries. This is indicated by the wording of the Pact itself, which specifically calls attention to American ties with Japan and the Philippines. Also it appears that British fears of involvement in a Pacific war against her own will are not well founded. Although the Pact does state that an attack on any member constitutes a threat to all, aid to be extended the victim is to be determined "within the constitutional framework" of each country.

Recently some criticism of the ANZUS Pact has developed in the newspapers of the two Dominions, particularly in New Zealand. This appears to be a symptom of the to-be-expected emotional conflict growing out of a violation of traditional Commonwealth loyalties. The existence of this symptom indicates that although Australia and New Zealand, as a result of the realistic appraisal of a situation, are willing to accept American leadership in certain matters, historic ties are still strong and the British Commonwealth is not on the verge of collapse or disintegration. Australian-New Zealand interest in the ANZUS Pact is based entirely on a desire to guarantee a high priority for the Pacific theatre of operations in the event of a global war.

R. R. G.

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

BRIEF



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By md NARA Date 2/15/12

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

DATE: 25 June 1952

FROM: G2

TO : G3

SUBJECT: Opinions concerning matters which shall become grounds for US-Japanese Alienation in the US Army's Direction of the NPR

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER: 014.12 CLASSIFIED

LINE NUMBER: 14

M  
①

FILE NUMBER 091.4 CLASSIFIED

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

200cm  
SEKISUI JUSHI  
JGA  
1級



*adm*

547

HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

G-1 LOD JFT/ch

*Confidential  
Security Information*

20 June 1952

FROM: CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN

201117

TO: CG ONESIXCOR SENDAI JAPAN. . . . . ROUTINE

CG JAPLOGCOM YOKOHAMA JAPAN. . . . . ROUTINE (COURIER)

CG HQSVCOM TOKYO JAPAN. . . . . ROUTINE (COURIER)

COMNAVFE TOKYO JAPAN. . . . . ROUTINE (COURIER)

CG FEFJ TOKYO JAPAN. . . . . ROUTINE (COURIER)

*CX50527*

1. In order to maintain good relationships with the Japanese, and to avoid incidents which may prejudice the interests of the United States Forces in Japan, it is important that personnel avoid participation in or contact with meetings, rallies or other demonstrations of a political or controversial nature.

2. In order that such contacts may be avoided, intelligence information which indicates the time and place of scheduled demonstrations or rallies, when available, will be disseminated expeditiously to personnel in affected localities. In addition, appropriate instructions in conformity with par 1 above will be issued requiring U.S. Armed Forces personnel to avoid such meetings, rallies or demonstrations.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

C. C. B. WARDEN  
Colonel AGC  
Adjutant General

*for*  
BRYAN L. MILBURN  
Maj Gen, GS w/troops  
Asst Chief of Staff, G-1

Copies to: C/S and All Staff Sections


M/R: Approved by C/S 19 Jun 52

Mr Temple/ch 265-744  
G-1 LOD

*Confidential  
Security Information*

*OK.  
091.4*

*Feb 52*





SECRET

Handwritten red mark

From: G-2

To: JSPOG

Date: 6 May 1952

Lt Col F. M. Frey 26-6447

SctyDiv/SMI/FMF/jm

G2 File Copy  
SctyDiv/SMI/FMF/jm

2

1. Review of the questions set forth in Note #1 of Inclosure 1 in the light of information currently available to this section discloses no significant change in Japanese public opinion concerning these matters.

2. There is attached as a matter of possible interest (Incl 2) a press analysis dated 5 May 1952 which reflects current Japanese opinion.

2 Incls

1. n/c added

2. Press Analysis 5 May 52

Handwritten initials RSB/1

Handwritten signature

Handwritten signature

----- R. F. E. -----

MEMO FOR RECORD: JSPOG by C/N #1, subj: "Japanese Opinion," dtd 1 May 52 forwarded to G2 a previous checknote series, same subj, dtd 25 Feb 52 and Note #2, thereto, dtd 28 Feb 52 with 1 Incl. Note #1 above requests info as to any changes in Japanese public opinion since G2 C/N of 28 Feb 52. Previous C/N series (Incl 1) requested public reaction to plane crashes in vicinity of populated regions. Info previously furnished was that Japanese were accustomed to tragedy and viewed the matter philosophically. Press analysis attached hereto as Incl 2 states there is no significant reaction to the crashes and no effort has been made on part of Japanese to secure

Handwritten circled number 3

091-4

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION



SECRET

G2 File Copy  
SctyDiv/SMI/FMF/jm

MEMO FOR RECORD: (Cont'd)

relocation of our bases. However, much publicity has been given to prostitution in vicinity of military installations. Incl 1, is made up of report from MISG/FE, and Opns Branch and PSB (Scty Div).

F. M. F. 26-6447

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION





SECRET

Sety Div

APO 500  
5 May 1952SPECIAL PRESS ANALYSIS

1. During March 1952 several articles in Heiwa to Dokuritsu ("Peace and Independence") attacked such things as damage to farm land resulting from the removal of gravel from the Tama River for use on military roads and runways, the splashing of mud on stores and pedestrians by U. S. Army vehicles in the vicinity of Tachikawa Air Base, damage to fishing grounds by target practice at Hidaka-Monbetsu, and the misconduct of American troops in the Japanese community near Misawa Air Base.

2. The Japanese press, in its reaction to airplane crashes and to other bad consequences of U. S. military operations, has never suggested that these operations be removed to less densely settled areas. The press has heartily approved announcements that U. S. facilities will be shifted from the centers of large cities to outlying districts, but it has not asked for withdrawal to unpopulated areas. Presumably the newspapers recognize that all conceivably usable land in Japan is, by American standards, heavily populated. There has, on the other hand, been considerable emphasis on the moral problems presented by the presence of U. S. personnel wherever they may be.

3. Aside from airplane crashes, military operations as such have attracted no newspaper attention. In recent months all military aircraft disasters have been noted. The space given them has been directly proportional to the amount of property damage suffered in the crash area, but none of these crashes has inspired editorial comment. Although all newspapers have reported Diet discussions on compensation for the victims of such disasters in their regular roundups of the Diet proceedings of the day, this particular aspect of the proceedings has never received headline emphasis.

4. The moral question, on the other hand, has been a persistent topic since late 1951. At least once, every metropolitan paper has discussed the degenerative influence of large concentrations of professional women around U. S. military installations, and there has been much talk about ways to prevent further growth in the "half-breed" population. One writer summed it up by asking for "an Administrative Agreement of the spirit." This problem, however, is not treated as one exclusively affecting thickly settled areas. Although Yokosuka and Tachikawa have figured most prominently in accounts of this sort, the same problem as it affects the sparsely inhabited Gotemba area has by no means gone unnoticed, and the press has noted that, in matters of this kind, trade follows the flag.

G2 File Copy  
Sety Div/SMI/FMF/jm

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION



SECRET

Secy Div

APD 500  
5 May 1952

SPECIAL PRESS ANALYSIS

1. During March 1952 several articles in Haino to Bounrikan ("Peace and Independence") attacked such things as damage to farm land resulting from the removal of gravel from the Tama River for use on military roads and runways, the splashing of mud on stores and beds-frames by U. S. Army vehicles in the vicinity of Tachikawa Air Base, damage to fishing grounds by target practice at Hibaka-Monohara, and the misconduct of American troops in the Japanese community near Misawa Air Base.

2. The Japanese press, in its reaction to airplane crashes and to other bad consequences of U. S. military operations, has never suggested that these operations be removed to less densely settled areas. The press has heartily approved announcements that U. S. facilities will be shifted from the centers of large cities to outlying districts, but it has not asked for withdrawal to unpopulated areas. Presumably the newspapers recognize that all conceivably usable land in Japan is, by American standards, heavily populated. There has, on the other hand, been considerable emphasis on the moral problems presented by the presence of U. S. personnel wherever they may be.


3. Aside from airplane crashes, military operations as such have attracted no newspaper attention. In recent months all military air-raid disasters have been noted. The space given them has been directly proportional to the amount of property damage suffered in the crash area, but none of these crashes has inspired editorial comment. Although all newspapers have reported brief discussions on compensation for the victims of such disasters in their regular roundups of the day's proceedings of the day, this particular aspect of the proceedings has never received headline emphasis.

4. The moral question, on the other hand, has been a persistent topic since late 1951. At least once, every metropolitan paper has discussed the degenerative influence of large concentrations of professional women around U. S. military installations, and there has been much talk about ways to prevent further growth of the "G.I.-breed" population. One writer summed it up as asking for an "initiative Agreement of the spirit." This problem, however, is not treated as one exclusively affecting thickly settled areas. Although in accounts of the sort, the Tachikawa have figured most prominently in accounts of this sort, the same problem as it affects the sparsely inhabited Goshima area has by no means gone unnoticed, and the press has noted that the matters of this kind, trade follows the flag.



Secy Div / SMI / RME / Jim  
GS File Copy

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION





SECRET

Japanese Opinion

28 Feb 52

Sety Div

Int Div

26-7288

Maj Smith

1. Reference is made to your request for Security Division comments concerning the attached C/S from JSPOG. 1

2. The National Rural Police reports that to its knowledge, there has been no significant reaction or criticism to the conduct of military operations in the vicinity of populated areas. There have been complaints of a very minor nature where long convoys have held up traffic for a considerable period of time. In view of recent military plan accidents, there has been some concern expressed when planes fly at very low altitudes.

3. In accordance with the JCP's basic propaganda aims of alienating the Japanese from the U.S. and arousing opposition to maintenance of U.S. military bases in Japan, Japanese Communists for more than a year have been attempting to agitate local residents in the vicinity of military installations in all parts of Japan. This propaganda campaign was intensified after the signing of the security pact, and the Communists have attempted to exploit all incidents such as B-29 accidents, damage to crops, etc., as propaganda material.

Typical examples follow:

a. In July 51 the JCP in Tottori Prefecture decided to take advantage of the reported opposition of farmers in the area adjacent to the Miho Air Base and subsequently issued a steady stream of propaganda against "land confiscation." The propaganda also stressed that the area would become a target in the event of a Soviet-U.S. atomic war.

b. In Nov 51, anti-American handbills were distributed in Nara Prefecture opposing extra work by railway employees alleged ordered by U.S. military authorities.

c. In Dec 51, Communists in Gumma Prefecture issued propaganda opposing the reported construction of an airfield at Koizumi-machi, Ora-gun, which stressed the line that "farmers in the area unanimously opposing construction of the airfield."

d. On 5 Dec 51, the covert JCP newspaper "Peace and Independence" published an article concerning a B-29 crash on 20 Nov, alleging that the Japanese death toll totaled 34 persons and that the villagers were aroused. Similar propaganda was noted in other Communist publications.

e. In Dec 51 in Nagasaki Prefecture, the Communists issued propaganda against the reported expansion of naval installations and activities in the Sasebo area, alleging that business was being damaged and fishing restricted.

091.4

(4)3

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION



SECRET

28 Feb 52

Japanese Opinion

26-7288  
Maj Smith

Int Div

Sety Div

1. Reference is made to your request for Security Division comments concerning the attached U/S from 12909.

2. The National Rural Police reports that to its knowledge, there has been no significant reaction or criticism to the conduct of military operations in the vicinity of populated areas. There have been complaints of a very minor nature where long convoys have held up traffic for a considerable period of time. In view of recent military plan accidents, there has been some concern expressed when planes fly at very low altitudes.

3. In accordance with the JCP's basic propaganda aim of alienating the Japanese from the U.S. and arousing opposition to maintenance of U.S. military bases in Japan, Japanese Communists for more than a year have been attempting to agitate local residents in the vicinity of military installations in all parts of Japan. This propaganda campaign was intensified after the signing of the security pact, and the Communists have attempted to exploit all incidents such as B-29 accidents, damage to crops, etc., as propaganda material.

Typical examples follow:


a. In July 51 the JCP in Fukuoka Prefecture decided to take advantage of the reported opposition of farmers in the area adjacent to the Mito Air Base and subsequently issued a steady stream of propaganda against "land confiscation." The propaganda also stressed that the area would become a target in the event of a Soviet-U.S. atomic war.

b. In Nov 51, anti-American handbills were distributed in Nara Prefecture opposing extra work by railway employees alleged ordered by U.S. military authorities.

c. In Dec 51, Communists in Gunma Prefecture issued propaganda opposing the reported construction of an airfield at Yama-machi Gun, which stressed the line that "farmers in the area unannouncedly opposing construction of the airfield."


d. On 5 Dec 51, the covert JCP newspaper "Independence" published an article concerning a B-29 crash on 20 Nov, alleging that the Japanese death toll totaled 34 persons and that the villagers were aroused. Similar propaganda was noted in other Communist publications.

e. In Dec 51 in Nagasaki Prefecture, the Communists issued propaganda against the reported expansion of naval installations and activities in the Sasabe area, alleging that business was being damaged and fishing restricted.



SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

01.4





SECRET

Japanese Opinion

28 Feb 52

Sety Div

Int Div

26-7288

Maj Smith

4. It should be noted that in addition to propaganda against the U.S. military operations, similar propaganda is circulated among local residents of NPRJ camps.

1  
(Cont)

5. No specific information is available as to the effectiveness of this propaganda in arousing local residents; however, it is believed that the propaganda is fairly effective among labor union members, day-laborer groups and the poorer class of farmers. There is no indication that it has any marked effect on the general populace.

6. A survey of metropolitan newspapers for a period of several days following each of the three recent B-29 crashes shows no significant reaction to these disasters in editorials, columns, or letters to the editor. News coverage and display have always followed normal patterns for other disasters, for example train wrecks, of similar dimensions. The amount of news space devoted to these bomber crashes has varied with the amount of property damage done. Thus, the Kawasaki crash of 29 January, where property damage was relatively light, was given an average four column inches of space in mid-page while the other two crashes, where property damage was higher, took up three to four times as much space in page positions of first and second prominence. Aftermath stories, when they appeared at all, stressed relief activities of US authorities, plans for government compensation, or, in the Kawasaki case, the skill of the pilot in guiding his plane to an open area. There were no stories playing up the plight of the homeless.

From a purely negative angle it might be of interest to note that the third B-29 crash, the Kaneko crash of 7 February, was followed four days later by the third airliner crash in Elizabeth, New Jersey, which brought protests in that city to a head and led to the closing of Newark Airport. No Tokyo newspaper availed itself of this ready-made parallel. In fact, no Tokyo paper reported the New Jersey crashes.

Diet interpellations on compensation for victims of such disasters have been reported in regular accounts of Diet proceedings, but they have not been headlined. This morning's editorials on the contents of the Administrative Agreement discussed neither the bases nor the property compensation provisions.

1 Incl  
a/s

----- E. C. E. -----

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION



aid-751-4-1

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

2  
1  
8  
1  
3

Lt Col Hornby  
26-8321

Japanese Opinion

JSPOG

G2

25 Feb 52

1 1. The CinC has requested information on the advisability of transferring B-29 activities from Yokota AFB to another base in view of the recent B-29 accidents which have occurred in the Kanto Plains.

2. In order to furnish complete information on which a decision may be based, it is considered advisable to consider the opinion of the Japanese toward these incidents. It is believed that the following questions should be answered:

a. Have the Japanese people indicated any significant reaction to the conduct of military operations in the vicinity of populated regions? If so, what has it been? This refers to the reactions of the local residents.

b. Have the local residents indicated any major reaction to the recent B-29 accidents in the Kanto Plain area? To other accidents of combat aircraft in the vicinity of other air bases? If so, what has it been?

c. Have there been any significant reactions in the Japanese press or in the Diet?

3. It is requested that, if information is available on the above questions, answers be furnished JSPOG by 1700, 28 Feb 1952. It is further requested that additional staff sections which might have information on this subject be indicated.

- - - - -E. K. W.- - - - -

2 FROM: G2 TO: JSPOG Col Tait 26-6024  
28 February 1952

1. Reference CN 1. There is no marked reaction, either public or private, on the part of the Japanese to crashes of U. S. aircraft. Like most Orientals, the Japanese are not safety-conscious, and accept accidents of all descriptions with a fatalistic attitude. Many scholars attribute this attitude to the prevalence of earthquake and fire disasters in Japan.

2. Comments from Security division are attached as inclosure 1. As can be noted, these comments substantiate remarks in par 1 above.

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

③  
④

091-4

G2 DWT/pc





SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Japanese Opinion

G2

JSPOG

28 Feb 52

2  
on't) 3. Ref par 3, CN 1, requesting additional staff sections from which information may be available. The Government Section may possibly be able to furnish additional information on this subject.

1 Incl:  
IOM from Sety Div to Int Div

*BSRSB*

----- R. P. E. -----


MEMO FOR RECORD:

JSPOG by CN dtd 25 Feb 52 requests information regarding Japanese Opinion concerning recent accidents of U. S. aircraft in the Kanto Plains. Inst CN is self-explanatory.

DWT \_\_\_\_\_ 26-6024

*F510  
PAR  
c/s To Top Sec  
H Sec Div*

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION





*Confidential*  
*Security Information*

*File*  
*2008*

G-2, GHQ

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM  
(For use within G-2 only)

Japanese Actions and Reactions

File No:

Subject: as Expressed in Informational Date: 20 Feb 52  
Media of all Types

From: G-2

To: Chief  
Scty Div

Phone:  
Name:

Comment  
Number

1. As it is obvious that Communist and other leftist propaganda agencies will capitalize on any unfavorable news stories which involve occupation or security forces, a prompt evaluation of the implications and possible usage by subversive elements of such incidents together with submission of a recommended course of action to CINCPAC is a G-2 responsibility. This responsibility can best be discharged through watchfulness and prompt action on the part of the Security Division with the complete support of all other G-2 agencies.

2. Effective this date, therefore, the Chief, Security Division, is charged with the overall responsibility for such evaluations and recommendations on incidents which, in his judgment, tend to affect seriously:

- a. The security of the Occupation or the Security Forces;
- b. The prestige of the Occupation or the Security Forces, and;
- c. The amicable relationship between the Japanese people and the American Forces.

In addition, the trend of thought of, and opinions expressed by, the Japanese in the Diet, press, radio, etc., vis-a-vis a, b, or c are an integral part of the overall evaluation.

3. The assistance of all G-2 agencies and divisions may be requested by Security Division with special emphasis on the translation and press summary activities of MISG/FE, the clipping and analysis of news media and analysis and evaluation of Diet and Governmental opinion by Japanese Liaison, and all existing liaison established by other G-2 agencies with the Attorney General's Office, Japanese Police, etc. Top priority will be given by all agencies and divisions of G-2 concerned to requests of Security Division, in order that this mission may be accomplished expeditiously on all such occasions.

*R. F. E.*

DISTRIBUTION:

Ex Gp	MISG/FE
Int Div	SSO
FEC/LG	SIA
441st CIC	J/L
	FEC Intel School

- 1 - *me uncl*
- 1 - *Mr Belcher*
- 1 - *Capt Crank*
- 1 - *Col Opman*
- 1 - *Mr Linker*
- 1 - *SIA*
- 10 - *CIC*
- 10 - *T1*
- 3 - *Scty Div*
- 3 - *MISG/FE*
- 3 - *FEC/LG*
- 3 - *Trgt Br*
- 1 - *FEC Intel School*
- 1 - *Geo Br*
- 1 - *Supply*

*Confidential*  
*Security Information*

③D

091.4

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

SEKISUI JUSHI

JGA

15

1級



RESTRICTED

MONTHLY SURVEY OF AMERICAN OPINION

ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Survey No. 132

Developments of APRIL 1952

1. RUSSIA; EASTERN EUROPE p. 1  
 Russia's "peace offensive"--unsupported by deeds--  
 must not deflect the U.S. from its present course,  
 say most observers. The Moscow Trade Conference is  
 held suspect. Aid to escapees is commended.
2. WESTERN EUROPE p. 3  
 Gen. Eisenhower's report on NATO is praised for its  
 "cautious optimism" and warning that American aid  
 cannot be endless.  
 Editors continue to stress the importance of inte-  
 grating West Germany into the Atlantic community.  
 Fear that Russia's election proposals are winning  
 German support leads some to urge the West to call  
 the "Soviet bluff."
3. MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM p. 4  
 Limited comment on the Senate Committee's billion-  
 dollar cut in authorization is mixed. But continuing  
 organization and press support for Point Four is  
 evident.
4. FAR EAST p. 5  
 Editors hail Japan's resumption of sovereignty,  
 but note problems ahead. Position of UN Korea  
 negotiators is staunchly upheld.
5. BOLIVIA p. 8  
 Eventual recognition of Estenssoro regime is expected.
6. U.S. TRADE POLICIES p. 8  
 Editors are concerned about protectionist demands  
 and current inability of NATO partners to sell here.
7. TUNISIA; UNITED NATIONS p. 9  
 U.S. stand on Tunisia in UN receives widespread  
 criticism. U.S. proposals for arms control are  
 favored in limited comment.

DIVISION OF PUBLIC STUDIES

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RESTRICTED

34  
31  
65

091.4



RESTRICTED

## 1. RUSSIA; EASTERN EUROPE

"Peace Offensive" The Kremlin's "seemingly pacific overtures" toward the West during April have been the topic of searching analyses by U.S. press and radio observers. As in the past, commentators have grappled with the possibility that this time the Kremlin may be genuinely seeking peace. But the overwhelming majority of them are still firmly convinced that, if so, its "deeds must cease to do violence to its words." There are a dozen places in the world where the Soviets can demonstrate their desire for peace, commentators emphasize, citing Korea, Germany, Austria, the UN, and other points of tension.

By and large, observers have concluded that if Moscow has decided that a "temporary shift in strategy" is indicated, the reason for it is the degree of unity achieved in the free world and the advanced state of the Western rearmament drive. Because of this conviction, they urge the free world to hold steady to its present course of developing unity and strength, until "a great deal more than verbiage" has issued from the Kremlin. At the same time, however, a large number of editors and commentators have emphasized that the free world should be receptive to any apparent opportunities to ease East-West tensions. "The prime purpose of U.S. policy has been to reach a position of strength in order to negotiate, and there is evidence Stalin thinks we are approaching it," said the Louisville Courier-Journal.

A sizable minority have taken the stand that the Soviet "peace offensive has maneuvered the U.S. into a negative position by forcing it to reject proposals which ostensibly are identical to ours--an end to the cold war, expanded world trade and a unified Germany. This group of observers pose the question: Has U.S. policy been too long preoccupied with the idea of permanent or at least prolonged tension, rather than coexistence with Russia? We must offer "a convincing alternative" to Stalin's formula for world peace, they argue, and some of them maintain that a start can be made by "grabbing up any Soviet overtures" and exploiting them as frauds if they bog down in the face of concrete Western proposals.

Moscow Trade Conference Among the numerous facets of the current "peace offensive," observers appear to have felt most the impact of the Moscow Trade Conference. Almost all have concluded that the Kremlin "scored a propaganda success" by its alleged interest in expanding East-West trade, though many were skeptical of the Kremlin's ability to fulfill more than a small percentage of its promises.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 2 -

As the conference terminated, there were many appeals for U.S. officials and the free world to take it "very seriously, indeed" and to formulate "positive actions" to counter its effect. The pronounced sympathy expressed by commentators for the economic plight of the trade-hungry nations of Europe led many of them to call for 1) a maximum effort to stimulate East-West trade in non-strategic materials, and 2) liberalized U.S. tariff policies. "We cannot coerce Western Europe not to trade with Iron Curtain countries and then for emotional or selfish reasons shut them out from our market," the Providence Journal warned. Others argued: "Some of the barters offered by the Soviets may strengthen the West as much or more than they help the East. To talk of some trade resumption is not to fall for the Soviet Economic Conference. Let the West swap what will not help the Soviets greatly for what will assist the economy of our friends."

Iron Curtain Escapees The President's allocation of \$4.3 million of MSA funds for assistance to Iron Curtain escapees has been enthusiastically commended by a number of editors. It is generally expected that this may prove to be a highly successful and profitable undertaking from the standpoint of the Western defense buildup, which could utilize the special talents of the escapees. Commentators also welcomed it as an incentive to millions of dissatisfied persons behind the Iron Curtain to "build up trouble for the Red regime."

Oatis Case The first anniversary of William Oatis' imprisonment by the Czechoslovak government has prompted a flurry of comment. All express concern that the U.S. has not succeeded in securing his release; but some leading editors join the Directors of AP in voicing appreciation of official U.S. efforts in Oatis' behalf. A larger number of editors and Congressmen are critical--some charging that the President and Department are "only half trying." Few, however, have taken up the earlier demands for retaliation against Tass representatives or for breaking diplomatic relations with Soviet states.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 3 -

2. WESTERN EUROPE

NATO

National attention was directed to NATO, its past achievements and future prospects, by several leading events this past month: General Eisenhower's Report on NATO (April 2), announcement of his resignation (April 11), and the appointment of General Matthew Ridgway as his successor (April 29).

The cordial press and radio reception of the Eisenhower report has reflected the basic support and confidence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization often demonstrated during the past year. Heavy editorial comment was characterized by warm praise for a job well done and recognition that solid grounds exist for satisfaction over the progress of NATO. Nevertheless, it was widely felt that much remains to be done, and editors complimented Gen. Eisenhower for his "cautious optimism" and the "realistic but reassuring" character of his appraisal of NATO progress. Great stress was laid upon his espousal of European unity. Approval also came from a number of observers, previously lukewarm about NATO, who interpreted the General as warning Europe that American aid could not be extended indefinitely.

Announcement of Gen. Eisenhower's resignation prompted renewed tributes to his "truly remarkable achievements" in a "complex and difficult job," as well as discussion of the General's future role and speculation about his successor in NATO.

Appointment of Gen. Ridgway to the NATO post has met with the approval of leading commentators and expressions of general satisfaction from Congressmen. Recognized as possessing the "highest qualifications," General Ridgway was termed "a soldier's soldier," with knowledge of the "latest methods" of Communist warfare. A few observers wondered whether, bringing with him as he does "the smell of hot war," another war scare might be produced in Europe. Before Ridgway's appointment a number expressed high appreciation of the skill and capacity demonstrated by Gen. Gruenther in his testimony before the Congress on the mutual security legislation. A few editors would have preferred him in the NATO post (e.g., Washington Post and New York Times); but these agreed with others that Generals Ridgway and Gruenther represent "an outstanding team."

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 4 -

Germany

The Soviet-Western exchange of notes on Germany has remained the major topic of heavy press and radio discussion throughout April. Russia's second note, delivered early in the month, was generally regarded as little more than a restatement of previous Soviet proposals--already found unacceptable to the West. On the basis of past experience, commentators put little faith in the outcome of any four-power survey of election conditions in Germany, as suggested in the Soviet note. Two other points--Soviet insistence on the present Eastern frontier and the ban against the future German state joining a Western association of nations--were also rejected.

The bulk of articulate comment has continued to stress the great importance of West Germany's integration into the Atlantic community. In this connection, Secretary Acheson's recent speech, affirming our determination to proceed with this policy despite Moscow's efforts to create a diversion, was warmly endorsed. However, there was considerable concern over the apparent "impact" of the Soviet "unity" campaign inside Germany. To some observers, Chancellor Adenauer's statement--calling for four-power talks on German unity--reflected the pressure he is under to satisfy this nationalist sentiment. Accordingly, a number of commentators urged the Western Powers to demonstrate their support for German unity by exploring the question of "free elections" with the Soviets, while at the same time pushing forward current integration plans.

A small and diverse minority has continued to dissent from the prevailing opinion with respect to the Soviet proposals. The Arizona Star, for example, gave sympathetic consideration to the Soviet treaty offer, maintaining: "If we restore Germany with the sanction of Moscow" by setting up a four-power election system, and "even acknowledging the Oder-Niesse line, we will have done something to ease the tension, and fears that cause us to rearm." Several others have deplored the present "bidding" for German favor, The Nation magazine finding the "moral obtuseness" of the Soviet proposals "unfortunately paralleled in the Western response." And the Christian Century called on the U.S. to revise its European policy in the light of the Soviet offer to negotiate a German settlement.

3. MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

During April, discussion of the total Program has been sporadic and apathetic, the chief fillip to editorial comment being provided by the remarks of Mr. Justice Douglas at the Point Four conference. This meeting in Washington, sponsored

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 5 -

by a number of national organizations, drew an enthusiastic audience and editorial response. Justice Douglas' address, in which he advocated U.S. programs of action to promote social and land reforms, received a sympathetic hearing from a number of observers. However, the idea of "peasant revolutions" was shocking to others, who likened such "revolts" to "the Russian way." A few observed tartly that "the difficulty is, you can't always tell how a revolution will turn out."

At month's end, the Senate committee's cut of a billion dollars from the MSP estimates provoked some mixed reaction. Several praised the committee for its "wise" action in making an across-the-board reduction and in demonstrating that "economies can be made." Others were disturbed at the size of the cut, maintaining that U.S. defense costs would rise by more than the amount to be saved on foreign aid. These commentators felt that the Committee on the Present Danger had done a far better job in surveying the situation and recommending appropriation of the full amount.

#### 4. FAR EAST

As was true in March, the peace with Japan has remained the only bright spot in discussion of the Far East, even though many observers feel that Japan's new status poses "serious" problems for the future. Any optimism on an armistice in Korea, which existed during the early part of April, had all but vanished as the negotiators at Panmunjom approached a "showdown" on the UN's new "over-all solution."

Japan As the last formalities for the peace with Japan were concluded, members of the press, radio and Congress joined in greeting our former enemy as an "ally" and welcoming her back "to the family of free nations." Commentators have viewed the "generous and wise" peace treaty and the mutual defense agreements for the Pacific area as establishing a "new pattern for stability and freedom in the Asiatic world." But, many observers have added, the U.S. must not consider its task "done" for many major problems still remain to be solved in this area--chief among them, Japan's political and military adjustment to her reclaimed sovereignty, and Japan's economic survival.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 6 -

While the New York Times and a few other editors were convinced Japan has "changed" and gives every indication that it is "worthy" of its new mission in the Far East, most commentators have warned against "foolish optimism." They have argued that the occupation and Japan's ready acceptance of reform are not "automatically indicative of the future." These observers have emphasized the many "risks" involved in the decision to set Japan free, but have also asserted that if both the U.S. and Japan meet these problems with "patience and forbearance," they can be resolved, as they "must."

The readily recognized need for Japan to export in order to survive has raised some discussion of alternative policies for the U.S. Many observers have appeared sympathetic to Japan's "natural inclination to resume trade with its nearest neighbors, despite their communism." Others, possessing more serious misgivings about trade between Japan and Communist China, have warned that the U.S. must be willing either to import more Japanese goods or to support Japan with large amounts of financial aid for many years to come.

Korea During April, speculation on the chances of an armistice in Korea ranged from considerable optimism in the early part of the month to gloom and a real possibility of all-out warfare at the close of the month. The last few days have found observers anxiously awaiting the Communists' reply to the UN's "last-ditch package-proposal," submitted at the secret plenary session, April 28. The chief point which separates the negotiators, according to all, is the UN position on voluntary repatriation of prisoners-of-war, but an overwhelming majority have consistently upheld the UN stand and would not sanction "any compromise" on this issue. The "startling" results of the poll of prisoners held by the UN--indicating that only about 40% of the Chinese and North and South Koreans combined desire to return to Communist lines, were welcomed as a "shattering indictment" of Communism and a valuable political and psychological asset to the free world. But, it was feared, this very asset only lessened the chances of Communist acceptance of the UN's "compromise solution."

Contributing to the feeling that the Korean situation was at a "most critical" stage was General Ridgway's report on the enemy's military build-up. Several commentators have warned that the possibility of "full-scale fighting must

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 7 -

be faced." Others, seeing no immediate offensive intentions indicated in the build-up but not viewing the prospects of agreement as "good," have concluded that, at best, the UN faces indefinite military stalemate and "empty haggling." Despite the widespread "conviction" that the Communists are not ready to make peace, calls for taking "decisive measures" to bring the war to an end remained at a minimum.

Instead, many spokesmen have cautioned that the "delicate and dangerous" situation in Korea requires greater "coolness and patience." With the scheduled change in military command for the Far East in mind, the Philadelphia Inquirer has stated: "It is incumbent on General Clark to continue to deal with the explosive situation with utmost restraint." General Ridgway's appointment to the NATO post has occasioned many expressions of praise for his performance in Korea and Japan. While most observers have expressed confidence in his successor, some Congressmen are said to believe that Clark should have been sent to Europe so that Ridgway could continue his "statesmanlike" work in the Far East (e.g., Republican Representatives Vorys of Ohio, Smith of Wisconsin).

China Walter Lippmann has again argued that a Korean settlement is not possible until our policy on Formosa is worked out. He proposed that Formosa be made an autonomous state, guaranteed by the UN, and that Chinese suzerainty over the island be recognized in a final peace settlement.

A sizable discussion of the China Lobby followed The Reporter magazine's special issues on the subject. Many editors have called for an investigation by Congress into the lobby's influence on U.S. policy; others have branded the "expose" as a "smear" and an attempt to cover up Administration "blunders" in Asia.

The State Department's release on Americans held captive in Communist China has received a fair amount of publicity but has prompted little comment. The decision to release the names of the 62 Americans imprisoned or under house arrest was interpreted as a confession of "failure" of the Department's attempts to get these people out of China.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 8 -

5. BOLIVIA

Commentators are agreed that representative government and vital foreign investment throughout Latin America have suffered as a result of the Bolivian revolution, but there is little unanimity as to the causes or likely results of the uprising. Some of those commenting shared the Washington Post's view that "much of the responsibility" for the coup may be attributed to the "RFC boycott" of Bolivian tin. However, Business Week suggested that such charges "don't really hold up," for RFC "did its best" to bolster Bolivia's sagging economy. Similarly, the Baltimore Sun argued that the tin controversy did not severely effect Bolivia, because she was able to continue "to mine the tin and borrow on it."

Time magazine thought Estenssoro "almost certainly" intends to nationalize Bolivian mines, although "he apparently means to go slow." Yet most commentators saw in this very hesitancy signs of an awareness by the new regime that Bolivia won't be able to "tap its potentially rich resources and raise the living standards of its dirt-poor people" without U.S. help, and that nationalization might "scare off" any kind of cooperation.

Editors did tend to agree that Washington "is virtually obliged in time to grant recognition to the new Bolivian rulers" (St. Louis Post-Dispatch). As Business Week put it, "Bolivia could starve unless it sells tin to the U.S.," and starving Bolivians "would earn the U.S. tremendous ill will in Latin America."

6. U.S. TRADE POLICIES

"The real test of our postwar world trade policy is now beginning...the matter of putting into practice the principles to which we have subscribed." This opinion, voiced by the New York Journal of Commerce, has been echoed by many other commentators, who are troubled by the rash of "protectionist" requests breaking out among American producers and to a lesser degree by the provisions of the "Buy American Act."

Observers have warned against shackling trade among nations of the free world and have sided firmly with the Secretary of State and Mr. Thorp. A policy of freer multilateral trade has been upheld in almost all press and radio comment noted, but the pages of the Congressional Record continue to be sprinkled with letters requesting

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 9 -

relief from foreign competition. Republican Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, inserting a letter requesting tariff relief for dairy producers, said: "Our farmers, like everyone else, realize that international trade must be a two-way street, but they are mindful of the need for elementary protection of certain industries which might otherwise be completely crippled." A few labor spokesmen have also evidenced some concern about the competitive ability of the U.S.

The great majority of observers have acknowledged the "justice" of foreign protests, advancing the following arguments: We must buy from Europe if she is to pay her own way instead of being subsidized by American aid; economic instability among our partners imperils the free world's security; we are acting in violation of our pledged word; and protection of inefficient industries penalizes the American consumer. Commentators have found yet another source of concern in the Moscow Trade Conference, which seemed to them to point up the danger of refusing to buy from Western Europe at competitive prices.

#### 7. TUNISIA; UNITED NATIONS

Reaction to the U.S. stand on the Tunisian question has been highly unfavorable. Editors of varying political outlook, Congressional spokesmen and representatives of labor and church organizations, have strongly protested against this Government's abstention from voting on the case before the Security Council. Outright supporters of the U.S. position have been few, although some comment displayed sympathy for the "dilemma" which the problem posed for the U.S.

Arguments most frequently advanced by the critics were: 1) that the U.S. abstention amounted to a vote "against free discussion in the UN"; 2) that it was contrary to our traditional support of the aspirations of colonial peoples for self-determination. Among those scoring the U.S. on the first point, the New Republic charged that our abstention was "in effect, just as decisive a veto of free discussion as one of Gromyko's No's." Sen. Hill (D-Ala.), usually considered an Administration supporter, declared: "Our failure to take an open stand would be a negation of the principles of free discussion in the UN."

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 10 -

Many commentators have stressed the "inevitable reverberations" which will follow throughout the Arab and Asian world. Rep. Lawrence Smith (R-Wis.), member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, attacked the State Department for following a "blind policy in support of French colonialism" and thereby "alienating not only Tunisians but other liberty-seeking peoples throughout the world." Among labor groups, a CIO-AFL committee strongly criticized the U.S. decision and pledged its support to Tunisian labor groups.

The minority supporting the U.S. position generally stressed the political and military arguments for standing by France, or called attention to the "dubious" character of some of the Tunisian nationalist leaders. Barron's, business and financial weekly, asserted that U.S. foreign policy "took a step toward maturity," when the U.S. abstained from voting. By this action, Barron's maintained, the U.S. gained the right to advise France as a "friend and ally" rather than as a "hostile critic." Some others sympathetic to the U.S. position expressed the hope that the U.S. will advise France to accelerate its reform measures in Tunisia.

United Nations "The American people have shown that they do not like to see the UN shunted aside by the United States any more than by the Soviet Union," was the lesson which Roscoe Drummond drew from the widespread criticism of the U.S. course in regard to Tunisia. Direct expressions of support for the UN have continued to come from an important segment of the press and from organizations, particularly women's groups and religious organizations. Among the individual leaders who have spoken out recently in favor of the UN have been Sen. Saltonstall (R-Mass.), Sen. Johnson (D-Colo.), Gov. Adlai Stevenson (D-Ill.) and Milton S. Eisenhower.

Sharp criticisms of the UN have come from enough sources to be noted with concern by some friends of the UN. The sharpest attacks have come from voices of the political right. For example, Sen. Jenner (R-Ind.) and Rep. Wood (R-Idaho) have advocated U.S. withdrawal from the UN; Sen. Taft (R-Ohio), while not going so far, has asserted that the UN "is a complete failure as a league to enforce peace." The D.A.R. and several smaller women's hereditary organizations have shown some suspicion of UN activities; but only one of the smaller groups went so far as to advocate U.S. withdrawal from the UN. Most of the attacks by critics of the UN are directed at particular activities of the UN, or the specialized agencies, rather than at the UN itself.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

- 11 -

Arms Control The U.S. proposals for an arms census and progressive stages of disarmament, presented to the UN Disarmament Commission, have drawn sparse editorial comment. The American suggestions are viewed as "realistic" and "skillfully conceived" by leading Eastern editors (New York Times, Boston Herald, Philadelphia Inquirer, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot). Russia's "hair-trigger" dismissal of the American plan and "fraudulent" character of its counter-proposals constitute clear evidence to some observers that the Russians are only interested in propaganda. Commentators foresee a "bleak future" for disarmament planners as long as such "complete mistrust" continues to exist between the Soviet bloc and the UN majority. In the meantime, the West must continue to rearm, it is suggested, in the possible hope that ultimately Moscow may be convinced that "a realistic approach to disarmament is in its interest too" (Boston Herald).

RESTRICTED



### These Surveys

contain analyses of American public opinion on international topics prominent during the month and are based upon material drawn from the following sources:

#### Press and Radio Opinion

Editorials from representative daily newspapers throughout the nation

Columns by leading writers

News stories and feature articles

Some ninety magazines and periodicals

Transcripts of radio comment

#### Congressional Opinion

#### Popular Opinion

Three nation-wide polling organizations--Gallup, Elmo Roper, National Opinion Research Center (Univ. of Chicago); and various state polls

Public comment correspondence received in the Department

#### Leadership Opinion

Statements of political and other leaders

Resolutions and publications of national private organizations--economic, religious, educational, and others interested in foreign affairs



SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

07616

24 January 1952

SUBJECT: Brief of JCS 2180/53, 2 Jan 1952,  
Japanese Relations with China

MEMO TO: General Ennis

1. This paper was prepared to brief President Truman for his conferences with Winston Churchill, which are already concluded, but it contains some important policy statements.

2. The position of the JCS on this matter, which was accepted, is stated as follows:

"In this connection, the United States, as you know, takes the position that Formosa is a portion of the off-shore defense line: Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines-Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, Formosa is important to the security interests of the United States and Japan. For this reason, we have undertaken to provide military and economic assistance to increase the potential of the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa for the defense of this link in the chain".

3. The United States insists that Japan pursue foreign policies in Asia, particularly in relation to China, which are generally compatible with those of the United States.

4. The United Kingdom has consistently maintained that Japan should not recognize the Chinese Nationalist Government as the Government of China.

5. There is a long account of events during November and December 1951, including developments during Mr. Dulles' visit in Tokyo in December, which quotes Premier YOSHIDA and also MIKI Takeo, considered to be the leader of the Opposition, as generally supporting the US policy. It is made clear that the Japanese will negotiate with the Nationalist Government "on the basis of its de facto actual control, avoiding the assumption that it is now in a position to speak for and bind all China".

6. The United States and the United Kingdom have agreed that Japan might well commence negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists looking toward regularization of trade and other practical relationships.

7. However, there is nothing in this paper to indicate any change, despite what appears to have been heavy pressure, in the attitude of the United Kingdom described in para 4.

(Note: General Ennis should read pages 480 to 488, since this matter is coming to a head right now).

1 Incl:  
JCS 2180/53  
Copy No. 78

H.V.W.

*regral to T1  
sent to G-4  
RSB  
file  
KZ*

G2 File Copy KER/cbs

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

3  
②  
091-H

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33



SECRET

04614

G-2, GHQ

SECURITY INFORMATION

# INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

**File No:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Subject:** Relationships Between COMNAVFE OP 8-51 and Japanese Citizens **Date:** LSW/js 21 January 1952

**FROM:** Int Div **TO:** G2 **PHONE:** 26-8582 **NAME:** L. S. Wilson **Comment Number:**

1. Conference with 441st CIC (Col Smith and Dr. Wilson), 17 January 1952 resulted in following:

a. CIC is now satisfied with COMNAVFE's notifications of survey schedule but desires copy of future modifications.

b. CIC is not satisfied with identification of responsible officers authorized to request data from Japanese. Recommends that ID cards authorized by SCAPIN 261 be issued to those officers selected by COMNAVFE who are engaged in OP 8-51.

2. Recommend approval and dispatch of letter to Intelligence Officer; Staff COMNAVFE, attached.

1 Incl  
a/s

-H. V. W.-

G-2 file

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

091.4

File  
Original LTR to IOM  
to Int Div





**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION**

APO 500

**SUBJECT:** Relationships Between COMNAVFE OP 8-51 and Japanese Citizens**TO:** Intelligence Officer  
Staff COMNAVFE  
Navy No. 1165

1. Reference Memorandum from Intelligence Officer, Staff COMNAVFE, to AG of S, G2, GHQ, FEC, subject as above, dated 12 January 1952.
2. The established procedure whereby COMNAVFE advises Headquarters 441st CIC Detachment of the operating schedule of the beach survey teams is satisfactory. All changes in the schedule should be made available to the Commanding Officer of the Detachment in sufficient time to permit the dissemination for which he is responsible. Any additional project information required by CIC field agencies, as well as necessary instructions, will be furnished to them by the Commanding Officer, 441st CIC Detachment, to satisfy project requirements of COMNAVFE.
3. There is still reasonable concern about positive identification of officers designated to request and receive maps, plans, sketches, etc., from Japanese officials. In order to obviate present and potential difficulties it is desired that names and identification photographs of authorized Naval and Engineer Corps personnel designated by COMNAVFE to request data from Japanese citizens and/or organizations be supplied so that identification in accordance with SCAPIN 261 (10 November 1945) can be issued.
4. It is emphasized that with the changing status of Japan, it is essential that all official relations between the U S Armed Forces and the Japanese be of the highest standard. Tact and diplomacy should be observed by all personnel in requesting information, documents or other assistance from the Japanese.
5. It is believed that unusual expenses incurred by Japanese in the future in providing additional information desired for Department of Navy, should be reimbursable.

*RFE*

R. F. ENNIS

Major General, General Staff with Troops  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION***Ennis*



SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Subj, Relationships Between COMNAVFE OP 8-51 and Japanese Citizens


MEMO FOR RECORD;

1. Conference with 441st CIC (Col Smith and Dr. Wilson), 17 January 1952 resulted in following;

a. CIC is now satisfied with COMNAVFE's notifications of survey schedule but desires copy of future modifications.


b. CIC is not satisfied with identification of responsible officers authorized to request data from Japanese. Recommends that ID cards authorized by SCAPIN 261 be issued to those officers selected by COMNAVFE who are engaged in OP 8-51

LSW  
L. S. W.



SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION





SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Subj. Relationships Between COMNAVFE OP 8-51 and Japanese Citizens


MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Conference with 441st CIC (Col Smith and Dr. Wilson), 17 January 1952 resulted in following:

a. CIC is now satisfied with COMNAVFE's notifications of survey schedule but desires copy of future modifications.


b. CIC is not satisfied with identification of responsible officers authorized to request data from Japanese. Recommends that ID cards authorized by SCAPIN 261 be issued to those officers selected by COMNAVFE who are engaged in OP 8-51

L. S. W.



SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION





DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By md NARA Date 2/15/12

SECRET Security Information

SECRET Security Information

