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HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO #234  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Obtain from G-2)

PLACE Tokyo Japan  
DATE 13 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin Morale MFC

Subject: Control measures of ~~the~~ morale during war  
THOUGH T. CONTROL DURING WAR

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

K. Kimura (see attached report) } *representatives of*  
T. Mizuguchi ( " " " ) } *Mr. Koizumi, chief*  
*Police Bureau,*  
*Home Office.*

Where interviewed Meiji Building

Interrogator Lt. R.V. Bowers USNR and Lt (jg) W.H. Sewell USNR

Interpreter Lt (jg) Thorlakson USNR

Allied Officers Present *see above*  
(no others than above)

Summary:

The interview was conducted with Kimura almost exclusively. Neither man knew or claimed to know anything about "control measures". Kimura had had some contact with the morale reporting service, so the interview was pitched on that subject.  
Specific data were hard to obtain; generalization, easy.

COPY A to A



U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
Tokyo

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

This form is to be used for all written communications between divisions of the U.S.S.B.S. It will not be used in transmittal of messages to outside agencies.

Item No.	TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT
1	G-2	Morale Division	14 Nov 45	Attached is a copy of Morale Division interview with K. Kimura and T. Mizuguchi on 12 Nov 45, for your information and disposal.



A. C. ODAHL  
1st Lt. AC  
Asst. Exec. Off



UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
MORALE DIVISION

Tokyo, Japan  
13 November 1945

Interview with K. Kimura and T. Mizuguchi, representing Mr. Koizumi, Chief, Police Bureau, Home Office.

SUBJECT: Control measures of rumor and morale during the War.

TIME : November 12, 1945, 2:00 - 4:45 P. M.

PLACE : Meiji Building.

INTERVIEWERS: Lt. Bowers, USNR, and Lt. (jg) SEWELL, USNR.

RECORDER : Lt. (jg) Sewell, USNR.

INTERPRETOR : Lt. (jg) Thorlaksson, USNR.

Documents from Mr. Kimura: (1) Reconstructed local morale report; (2) Samples of Rumors.

A The interview was held almost entirely with Mr. Kimura who took the role of the senior member. Mr. Kimura's contact with morale matters in the national government was very brief, May - July 1945, but he claimed to have read earlier reports. His contact even during this period was with the morale reporting - analysis service rather than with morale control, about which latter he claimed to know little as it was in another part of the government. Hence the interview was directed away from "control measures" to the content, sources and appraisal of information flowing into Tokyo, with emphasis on rumor. Mr. Mizuguchi's contact with the subject was even slighter, being confined chiefly to American leaflets.

Within this narrower field, the interview's greatest difficulty was in securing specific examples to implement the discussion. Mr. Kimura did not hesitate much, even on time trend questions, so long as he could generalize, mention "types" etc., but when he was asked for examples of specific rumors, even during his May - July 1945 period of contact with the reports, he could not provide them. This did not appear to be a difficulty of interpretation. However in other matters Mr. Kimura seemed to be cooperative.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

K. Kimura: Chief of Foreign Section,  
Chief of the Personnel Affairs Section,  
Governors Secretariat  
TOKYO METROPOLIS.



BACKGROUND INFORMATION (Mr. Kimura, continued)

Work Record

1. July 15, 1945 - Oct. 15, 1945: Secretary of Foreign Affairs Section of the Ministry of Home Affairs. His duties included the protection of foreigners and liaison with foreigners for all of Japan. From mid-July to mid-August was with C.I.C.. These positions were held simultaneously.
2. May 1945 - July 1945: was with thought police in section which had charge of anti-sabotage work (Japanese and foreign), mass meetings, etc. In this division he served again as a secretary. His principal work was compiling information from police chiefs about suspected individuals and on attitudes. This was then reported to high-ups. Another individual collected information on communists; another on political parties; still another coordinated this work.
3. Aug. 1944 - May 1945: was secretary for Minister (without portfolio) Kodomo, who represented the house of representatives in the cabinet.
4. July 1942 - Aug. 1944: with Dept. of Home Affairs. His duties were to supervise and procure materials for road construction.
5. Aug. 1939 - July 1942: with thought police in Hiroshima.
6. 1926 - 1939: with home ministry working on protection of shrines, etc.

Education

Graduate of Tokyo Imperial University.  
Majored in law. Has been in civil service since graduation.

Tatsumi Mizuguchi

1. Dec. 1939 - Nov. 12, 1945: Police Bureau of Dept. of Home Affairs, Tokyo.  
Duties: Protection of foreigners and foreigner's property.  
C.I.C. work Dec 1941 - Aug. 1945: Duties - Compiled reports of spy activities in various Kens and sent these reports to his superiors.

2. Joined police force in Osaka in March 1929 as a policeman. Remained a policeman until 1935.

1935 entered Osaka district police office.

1937 came to Tokyo and attended police school. Studied 6 months mainly in the field of general police work, but had no training



in thought police work.

Sept. 1939 returned to Osaka police office in city of Fuse.

March 1938 returned to district headquarters of Osaka Police.

#### Education

Eleven years (11)

#### Interview

Note: B represents Bowers; K represents Kimura; M represents Mizuguchi.

- B. What do you understand the subject of this interview to be?
- K. The effect of the bombing on the people of Japan.
- B. Tell me about the organization used by the government in its morale program.
- K. I was only responsible for collecting information. Action came through other channels.
- B. How long were you doing this work?
- K. From ~~March 1945~~, <sup>May 3,</sup> 1945 to 15 July 1945.
- B. How was information collected? What sources and methods were employed?
- K. There were three means: (1) written reports which came two or three times per month from cities and daily reports from each Ken; (2) telephone conversations with each district office; (3) direct contacts with thought police in local areas.
- B. Who made up these reports?
- K. Thought police in each Ken.
- B. Where are these reports now?
- K. All destroyed either by fire from bombing or by order of Police in August 1945 .
- B. Are copies available in local areas?
- K. No they were destroyed by order.



- B. What was the contents of these reports?
- K. (1) Reports contained information on: (1) individuals who expressed dissatisfaction to the war as a result of bombing; (2) the effect of bombing on their standard of living (food, travel, etc); (3) attitude of workers toward reporting to work (absenteeism); (4) whether farmers were producing to capacity and effect of bombing on crops; (5) inflation and peoples use of money; (6) condition and attitudes of evacuees - whether they were stirring up agitation in areas to which they were evacuated; (7) condition and attitude of people living in air raid shelters and temporary housing after loss of their homes.
- B. What action did the government take on the basis of these reports?  
(Neither M or K knew about this phase of the work)
- B. Has Mr. K. read the reports which came in before he took office?
- K. Yes.
- B. What changes were there in the problems with which these reports dealt as the war went on?  
(Neither could answer this question)
- B. When was reporting system set up?
- K. I am not sure but I believe it was December 1944.
- B. Did another section of the government collect these reports before this period?
- K. Information was collected for all of Japan by the same organization under another name. The monthly report on thought police activities was established 10 years ago. This was continued until Dec. 1944. These may still be available at my old office (address given). In 1943 the second publication began, it was called "attitudes and Feeling of the People" which was sent in 2 or 3 times a month from Kens and communities. In Dec. 1944, a suppliment was added dealing with the effects of bombing. The latter two were burned by order of the Police.
- B. Did any other department collect similar information?
- K. The Justice department and they worked with our organization.
- B. Any other departments?
- K. The Army and Navy had a similar system but on a smaller scale.



- B. What did they collect?
- K. They limited their activity to sounding out the people on attitudes toward military policy and personnel.
- B. Did your reports include attitudes toward military policy?
- K. Yes, we also reported on anti-military attitudes.
- B. How was information obtained by your department at the local level?
- K. In each area the police office and in each town the station and the men in the police box all kept their ears open and transmitted information up the line.
- B. Did you use any other sources than police?
- K. The individuals served as informants of their own accord.
- B. What about neighborhood associations, leaders?
- K. At monthly meetings people discussed things freely and the local policemen reported these discussions.
- B. What about school officials?
- K. No connection with them. Did not seek this information from them. The Taisei Yokusaukai disseminated government rulings to the people and let the government know what the peoples attitudes toward the government were.
- B. Was this organization a part of the government?
- K. No, privately organized.
- B. When did it start?
- K. Now disbanded -- existed from 1942 to August 1945.
- (Mr. K takes a leak)
- B. Is this similar to the neighborhood associations?
- M. No, they have the same purpose but are not associated organizations. Neither were used for intelligence work. Each Ken had a separate unit of the Taisei Yokusaukai.
- B. What was the nature of the reports which they sent back?
- K. Transcripts of individual opinions (without recording names) about the government and living conditions were sent to the central office.



- B. Is the local policemen present at meetings?
- K. Yes
- B. Do the same people always come to meetings?
- K. No, it varies.
- B. Do they report on themselves or on what they observe?
- K. Either or both, usually both.
- B. How does this association work?
- K. Works down from governor of Ken to Mayors of communities, to neighborhood.
- B. (From these reports) what changes in morale did you observe as the war progressed?
- K. For the first six months after Pearl Harbor spirits rose and the people were ready to try anything. After Guadalcanal their morale dropped. With the loss of Saipan they began to lose faith in the military group and minor grumbling occurred. With loss of the Philippines people thought more of saving their own skins and military control weakened greatly. With Okinawa's loss there was no hope unless Japan could join forces with Russia. With the major air-raids early this year people felt all was lost and were willing to give up regardless of the terms of peace. (No probes used)
- B. Who were the people who first lost faith after Guadalcanal?
- K. Upper classes and intelligentsia.
- B. Would you trace the changes in morale <sup>in various groups</sup> as the war progressed?
- K. (This answer is reported just as Mr. K gave it, without probes)  
 After Saipan the masses of urban people lost faith.  
 After the loss of the Philippines all but farmers lost faith.  
 After Okinawa part of the farmers lost faith.  
 After the big air raids all classes, even farmers, felt that the war was lost.
- B. Among which group was morale strongest at the end of the war?
- K & M. Among the illiterate farmers, school children, and the special attack corps.



- B. Could you reconstruct a typical report? One sent to you by the local groups?
- K. I am leaving copies of two reports which Mr. Koizuma had prepared. One covers rumors the other is a reconstructed report from a Ken.
- B. What are some typical examples of the rumors which caused your department the ~~most trouble~~ most concern?
- K. I have figures on the average number of serious rumors circulating generally throughout Japan:
- 1940 - 2 per month
  - 1941 - 7 per month
  - 1942 - 30 per month
  - 1943 - 55 per month
  - 1944 - 85 per month
  - April 1945 - 111 - (of these rumors in 1945, 52 % were to the effect that the war was lost or anti-military sentiment, only 10% were of this type in the early years)
- (No further records because communications broke down)
- B. What are examples of these rumors?
- (Here gave the break down on figures for 1945 given above)
- B. What types of rumors were found before 1945?
- K. Troop movements and victories in the first 6 months of war. Then up to 1945, unfavorable statements about food and living conditions were the subject of most rumors.
- B. What were some typical rumors since the war?
- K. These are in the list I have submitted.
- B. Is this report based on examples common throughout the country?
- K. Yes.
- B. Is this the type of report sent in to your division or the outline to be followed in preparing reports?
- K. & M. This was reconstructed from memory.
- B. What differences in rumors were found between bombed and unbombed cities?
- K. There was a difference up to 5 May 1945, but after that, because of evacuees going out into the country and spreading rumors, there was no difference.



- B. What do you think were the main sources of rumors?
- K. Prime reason was that individuals wanted to show how much they knew - especially the intelligentsia and the educators. Many rumors were started by people reading leaflets and interpreting them to their neighbors. Only government officials had short wave radios which could pick up U. S. broadcasts, so this was not a source of rumor. Rumors spread in barber shops, trains and neighborhood association meetings.
- B. Did people have long wave radios to pick up our broadcasts?
- K. One or two percent of the population could hear U. S. broadcasts from Siapan after 10:00 P.M. but reception was poor. However, it was an important source of rumor.
- B. As important as leaflets?
- K. No.
- B. What type of leaflets were most effective?
- MARIANA JEHO, RAKKASAN NEWS and MAKOTO
- B. Why do you think so?
- M. Because we could find the basis of rumors in what appeared in the leaflets. The leaflets which told where the U. S. was going to strike were the source of some false rumors, due to confusion about the specific place mentioned. As a result many people voluntarily evacuated from cities other than those mentioned in the leaflets.
- B. What particular rumor caused the government the most trouble during the period you were in charge of this work?
- K. (Much hesitation before answering) Anti-military rumors.
- B. How seriously did the government consider rumors to be, in so far as morale was concerned?
- K. Was not much concerned.
- B. What materials from your reports did the people above you want most or show most interest in?
- K. & M. Listed in order of importance (1) Rumors that war would or should end; (2) Friction between military and civilian personnel; (3) Anti-government activities; (4) Effect of war on factory production; (5) Effect of war on food production.