

COMMUNIST TECHNIQUES OF
INFILTRATING ARMED FORCES
(THE OFFICERS' ORGANIZATION OF THE
TUDEH PARTY)

January 1955

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dissatisfaction with existing conditions--had been persuaded to perform minor acts of espionage and then had been blackmailed or terrorized into continued cooperation.

Apparently many others were genuinely won over by the Communist indoctrination program, which the OO carried out on an individual basis during the preliminary stage (when prospective members were being assessed by the OO) and which continued during a probationary period when the new members took part in an OO cell. From the date of his acceptance as a probationary member the new adherent was expected to perform the duties of a regular Party member: attend OO cell meetings, study Party publications, pay Party (OO) dues, and report to the OO any information about his military unit which would be of interest.

Intelligence targets included all statistical data--names, functions, and locations--of all military, police, and gendarmerie units, lists of ammunition and arms, any confidential instructions issued, any trips or missions of the American military advisers, etc. Information procured from the security services reportedly was that affecting Tudeh Party (or OO) security; i.e., instructions or correspondence concerning pending arrests or surveillances, statements made by arrested Tudeh Party members, etc.

By August 1954, the OO had in its possession detailed information about the strength and disposition of every Army, gendarmerie, police, and Air Force unit in Iran. The OO allegedly knew the location and description of every piece of military equipment supplied by the United States. It can be assumed that all information of possible interest to the Soviets was passed to them. Allegedly there was evidence of a link between the OO and a Soviet intelligence legal resident agent in Iran.

Formation of the OO is stated to have begun about 1941, shortly after the Allied occupation. The OO grew most rapidly under tenure of governments most lenient toward the Tudeh Party, with the greatest expansion occurring under Mossadeq in 1953. To date little has been uncovered about its past achievements, but it is known that the OO dispatched several members to Azerbaijan in 1945 to participate in the revolt there. In 1950 the OO assisted in the escape of ten high-ranking members of the Tudeh Party, most of whom had been imprisoned since the attempt on the life of the Shah in early 1949; the escape operation was undertaken to strengthen the Tudeh Party Central Committee. Some OO members in the Air Force had set fire to several planes of the Iranian Air Force in September 1953, reportedly to build up morale of Tudeh members and to show Mossadeq supporters what the Tudeh was capable of accomplishing. The OO had also given refuge to at least one prominent political offender.

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I. INTRODUCTION: SUMMARY OF DATA AVAILABLE

Disclosure of an extensive Tudeh Party (Communist) network in Iranian security services came about through the arrest on August 16, 1954 of a Tudeh Party member who had been under surveillance by Iranian authorities. Through admissions made by the arrested Communist and through documents which were discovered in his possession, an Officers' Organization (OO) of the Tudeh Party was uncovered and more than 450 additional arrests made possible. Subsequent arrests--made possible by the first one--and raids on OO installations also were productive in uncovering Iranian police, Army, gendarmerie, and Air Force officers who performed responsible roles in the Tudeh Officers' Organization. Among strategic posts occupied by Tudeh activists were: the commandant of the Prime Minister's personal bodyguard, the security officer responsible for clearing names of prospective appointees for Iranian and United States military authorities, and the Iranian Army's chief counter-intelligence officer in the Abadan oil area.

Although to date there appear to have been no officers involved who were higher than the rank of colonel, it is obvious that the Tudeh OO had at its command persons of sufficient influence to assist OO members in obtaining promotions and positions of trust. The OO, if undiscovered, reportedly would have been capable, upon signal, of effecting simultaneous assassinations of the Shah, Prime Minister, most Cabinet members, key members of the Senate and Majlis, most Governors General, and key military commanders.

The two main purposes of the OO seem to have been: (a) to acquire intelligence information of value to the OO itself and to an undetermined Soviet intelligence service, and (b) to expand to the point where successful penetration had been achieved in every unit of the military and police forces for espionage, sabotage, or any other activity deemed necessary by the OO or the Tudeh Party. Continuous activity was carried on by the OO to attract new members, and OO adherents were required to submit reports concerning persons they believed were prospective recruits.

Reportedly some members of the OO had joined it believing at first it was an independent, reformist group; subsequently learning that it was Tudeh-dominated, they are stated to have found themselves so deeply involved in Communist activity that fear of blackmail or other forms of pressure caused them to continue to cooperate. Low morale and pessimism allegedly caused by dissatisfaction with conditions in the Iranian Army and in the other military services led several of these officers to believe they had nothing to lose and possibly something to gain by throwing in their lot with the Communists. Others--also reportedly due to

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The headquarters organization of the OO was patterned after that of a national Communist Party. It included a Central Committee (Committee of the OO), which theoretically held supreme authority in the OO and was composed of OO representatives from the entire country; an Executive Committee (the OO Executive Board or Board of Secretaries); and a Politburo (in the OO, the Three-Man Board), which provided daily direction over administrative and operational activities. Thus, the OO of the Tudeh Party, like its parent organization and like every other typical national Communist Party, was based on the principle of democratic centralism--an OO executive body, once elected, had unquestioned authority and, theoretically at least, exercised collective leadership. Each member of the Executive Board not only headed one of the OO's five principal functional sections--information, propaganda, training, finance, and organization--but also assisted with the direction of one or more of the others.

From mid-July 1954 to the time of the arrests, the Three-Man Board had the primary responsibility for directing OO activities. It was composed of three members of the Board of Secretaries, who provided funds and equipment for OO operations, determined the means of communication, and presented reports and resolutions to the broader directing organ of the OO, the Board of Secretaries or the Executive Board. Approval of the Three-Man Board was necessary before contact could be made between military and nonmilitary Tudeh Party members and before OO members could travel abroad. It maintained an office which operated daily. Presumably the Three-Man Board had been set up because security considerations made smaller, less conspicuous meetings necessary.

The Board of Secretaries (or Executive Board) met once a week and was responsible as a whole for organization, training, information, propaganda, and finance activities. Each one of its members headed a section which carried out one of these activities and in addition was responsible for certain organizational units--such as OO cells in the police, gendarmerie, Air Force, etc. The Board of Secretaries reportedly was elected at a "general meeting of the Organization from among members of the Committee of the Organization." The Board of Secretaries maintained contact with the Tudeh Party Central Committee through a liaison officer who met with the Board at every other meeting.

The Committee of the Organization was made up of Branch Responsibles of the seven Tehran branches (police, gendarmerie, medical, Air Force, and three Army branches--line officers, infantry, and Army school), plus four provincial representatives. Each Committee member or Branch Responsible was in turn responsible for a cell of Cell Responsibles; the latter were each responsible for a varying number of cells. It is not certain that the last Organization Committee elected had ever actually met and functioned as a group, probably because of security considerations.

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A large part of the income for OO activities apparently came from membership dues. Members who received higher salaries and who had fewer expenses paid more than others. Contributions were sometimes made for imprisoned Tudeh Party members or their families. Allegedly, additional sums were acquired for OO purposes by embezzlement carried out by Tudeh Party civilian members employed in certain government-operated firms. There are a few indications that funds for OO use were supplied by foreign sources.

A mixed staff of Tudeh civilian and military personnel was set up following the overthrow of the Mossadeq government on August 19, 1953 to carry out sabotage operations and military training. For a while a program was in effect whereby certain OO members were responsible for giving paramilitary instruction to groups of civilian members of the Tudeh Party. The Party allegedly decided to discontinue this activity a few weeks after the program had been in force; there is some evidence, however, that the training of nonmilitary personnel was discontinued for a time, then resumed.

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II. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS OF THE OO

As stated previously, after mid-July 1954 primary responsibility for everyday direction of OO affairs apparently rested with the Three-Man Board, which consisted of three members of the Executive Board. Responsibilities of the Three-Man Board included (a) providing for the procurement and financing of safehouses and other secret installations, including office space and equipment, (b) presenting reports to the Board of Secretaries (Heyateh Dabiran), (c) determining communication methods and channels, (d) approving any contacts made between civilian members of the Tudeh Party and members of the OO, (e) approving (or disapproving) plans of OO members to travel abroad, (f) approving expenses which were within a nominal sum, and (g) appointing and dispatching inspectors to the provinces. The Three-Man Board was an executive unit which carried out decisions of the Board of Secretaries (or Executive Board). The emphasis of its work appears to have been concerned with finances, organization, and intelligence questions.

1. Board of Secretaries (or Executive Board). Membership of this body was from five to seven members, with each member responsible for either organization, finances, propoganda, training, or information activities. It appears that the Board of Secretaries actually served as a supreme governing body or staff of the OO until July 1954, with the Three-Man Board having that role subsequent to that date. Reportedly the Board of Secretaries had liaison with the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party through one member of the latter who served as a "Political Responsible" of the OO and briefed the Board of Secretaries on current developments and problems of the Tudeh Party.

2. Organization Section. Three members of the Board of Secretaries served as functionaries of the Organization Section. This appears to have been true in the case of each of the other functional sections. As in any other Communist Party organization, the Org Secretary kept the statutes, membership lists, etc. One OO official served as overall chief of the section, while a second functionary of the Organization Section was concerned with security matters and documents and the third with training and provincial affairs. For several weeks prior to the arrest of the officers, all reports directed to the Chief of the Information Section were routed first through the Chief of the Organization Section, allegedly to permit him to excerpt any information of organizational interest. More likely, however, this routing system was arranged to permit the Org Secretary and his assistants to see information pertaining to security and counter-intelligence matters and to take essential precautionary measures.

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3. Finance Section. A gendarmerie colonel who had been affiliated with the OO since 1945 or 1946, and who was also a member of the Three-Man Board, served as Chief of the Finance Section. Allegedly one finance officer of the OO deposited approximately 200,000 rials monthly in a Tehran Bank for the OO. Apparently none of the arrested officers admitted that the OO received foreign financial aid; however, the fact that the OO owned several new automobiles and rented a number of expensive safehouses would indicate that foreign aid was furnished. It seems doubtful that the OO could have afforded these luxuries in addition to its regular monthly expenses, such as aiding families of deserted Army officers, prisoners' families, and so on. (See paragraph 17 for further information about OO finances.)

4. Training Section. Specific details of the supervision over the training program which was provided by this section are currently not known. Apparently it was ideological training rather than paramilitary training over which it had jurisdiction. Presumably arrangements for Tudeh Party civilian instructors to lecture for OO cells were made by this section, working through the liaison with the Tudeh Party Central Committee.

5. Information Section. It is known that this section, through OO members in the various units of the military and security services, had access to all intelligence information of significance in Iran. The officers who were mainly responsible for the functioning of this section apparently escaped arrest and thus details of the operations of this section at the directing level are not known. It seems possible that many of the OO members may have been contributing information which was largely of interest to the Tudeh Party's (and OO's) propaganda activities and that only certain strategically-placed OO members procured information which actually constituted intelligence information. Certain of the latter persons appear to have been drawn into nets or apparatus which worked directly for a Soviet intelligence service.

6. Propaganda Section. One OO officer, assisted by two other members of the Board of Secretaries, reportedly was responsible for the propaganda program of the OO. They prepared articles for Tudeh Party tracts and apparently for a time prior to the arrests of August 1954 published a bulletin for exclusive OO consumption. Reportedly the Tudeh Party took care of the technical details--printing, supply of newsprint, etc.--for all the publications.

7. The "Staff". Following the overthrow of Mossadeq on August 19, 1953 and for an undetermined period of time, the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party set up a joint military-civilian "Staff" for carrying out operations such as sabotage, military training, and other activities the ultimate

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purpose of which was the overthrow of the government. Only two members of the OO apparently served on the "Staff," although the entire program providing for paramilitary training of civilians may have been supervised by an OO member, an infantry officer who is reported to have been in charge of the details of the training and of arrangements for the contact between the instructors and the trainees (nonmilitary Tudeh Party members), a function he accomplished with the assistance of the Provincial Committee.

The "Staff" arranged for the training of civilian Tudeh Party members in 20-man groups by approximately 20 officers of the OO. The instruction provided for training in the use of rifles, pistols, and hand grenades, and in street-fighting techniques, mountaineering, tracking, defense against knife attack, recognition of landmarks, estimation of distances, etc. The "Staff" examined the possibility of starting guerilla warfare in certain forested areas of Iran, but ruled out this action as impractical. Reportedly it was as a result of a "Staff" decision that several Iranian Air Force planes were destroyed in 1953.

8. The Committee of the OO. As previously stated, the Branch Representatives of the seven branches of Tehran, plus four representatives from the provinces, formed the Committee of the OO. In those provinces where the OO had cells of Cell Responsibles, representatives were elected for the Committee; in provinces where there were no cells of Cell Responsibles due to the limited number of members, then the remaining representatives were appointed by the Board of Secretaries to make the Committee's total membership eleven--seven from Tehran and four from the provinces. Candidates for membership in the OO Committee had to be approved by the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party. The Committee's principal function was to examine reports prepared by the five functional sections of the OO (organization, propaganda, training, finance, and information). The reports were discussed first by the Executive Board and then were presented to the eleven-man committee, which studied and criticized them and presented new projects to be carried out by the Executive Board. Theoretically, the Committee of the OO had the right to change or to reelect any member of the Board of Secretaries.

9. Branches of the OO: General. As stated previously, the seven branches in Tehran were: one branch of gendarmerie officers, one branch of police officers, one in the medical corps, one in the Air Force and three Army branches--line officers, infantry, and Army school. A group of OO functionaries responsible for provincial affairs supposedly constituted another branch. In general, the cells and branches were to work toward the OO's two main objectives: (a) expansion, for the ultimate purpose of waging a successful revolution; (b) collecting information of value to the OO's propaganda program and for its military

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goals. Courier service between the individual branches and headquarters units was generally carried out by OO officers not belonging to the branch for which they performed this function.

The seven branches in Tehran each had a cell of Cell Responsibles, with one, two, or three cells subject to each of them. Each cell consisted of three to six members. When the number of members in a cell (presumably an ordinary or base cell) exceeded four or five members, then the cell was divided into sub-cells.

Each cell elected a representative, who, with other representatives, met and formed a cell of Cell Responsibles; cells usually had a second Responsible who was to take over in the absence or transfer of the Cell Responsible. The Cell Responsibles also elected their Responsible, who was called the Branch Responsible. The Cell of Responsibles also had a second (or Deputy) Branch Responsible. The Branch Responsibles were proposed by the Executive Board to the Cell of Responsibles, but the latter were reportedly free to elect the candidate named by the Board or to elect another person to the post.

10. Strength in the Provinces. Much effort was reportedly made to have more OO members located in those provinces where the Tudeh Party was strongest. It was sometimes a problem to locate officers in areas where the OO wanted them because transfers were dependent on Army personnel action. Therefore, although it was desirable to locate them where the Party was strongest it did not always work out that way. When members found themselves in areas not considered important by the OO, the latter ordered them to apply for transfers to provinces in which the OO was interested. Members were instructed to follow up their transfer actions seriously, and wherever possible the OO itself took steps through the local personnel section of a military unit to secure an individual's transfer.

11. Recruitment. For 2 years prior to the arrests of August 1954 the procedure for joining the Tudeh Officers' Organization had been the same as that for joining the Tudeh Party. A somewhat formal introduction procedure was followed whereby members presented to the Board of Secretaries (after July 1954, the Three-Man Board) a report providing a description of the character of the prospective recruit. The latter was first accepted as a sympathizer; during this period he was in touch only with the person sponsoring him and he independently studied literature containing disguised Communist propaganda.

The OO member contacting the new sympathizer did not explain that he was a member of the Organization. When the OO member was convinced of the sympathizer's "integrity" he could send in another report to OO

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headquarters and, if approved, the sympathizer would become a probationary member and would be assigned a probationary member's number--a three-digit number. He remained a probationary member for 6 months or longer, depending on whether he was judged ready to accept OO responsibilities and obligations and on the amount of confidence the Party had in him. When he became a full member he was assigned a four-digit number which was the sum of the number 1,111 and the probationary number.

The sympathizer paid no membership fees, but if willing made contributions, nominally for the relief of poor families who were connected with the Party. Once accepted as a probationary member, he had to attend cell meetings, pay membership fees, observe the discipline of the Organization, carry out the prescribed "self-improvement" activities, take part in the political training program of the cell, acquire information pertaining to his military unit, and submit reports. In general, the reports to be contributed by the trainees were of the same nature as those submitted by official members of the OO. The trainees, like official members, were obligated to report everything they observed in their places of duty.

12. Ideological Training. Until 1951 a candidate for the OO was asked to study the Constitution and Regulations of the Tudeh Party before being accepted as a trainee, but from that date on this step was eliminated. Probably the change in procedure was due to two factors: (1) to ensure better security for the OO by not disclosing it as a Communist organization until the new member had reached a more advanced stage of development, and (2) to avoid alarming or discouraging the sympathizer by revealing the entire subversive and revolutionary aims of the organization before he was completely convinced of the Communist cause.

Among the books used by the OO to win and sustain the loyalty of sympathizers and trainees reportedly were the following: The Economic Life of Man, Know the Society, Economics, etc. Books relating the events of the Chinese Communist revolution were apparently rather commonly distributed among new sympathizers; among these were reportedly The New Democracy, by Mao Tse-tung, and From Semi-Colony to Popular Democracy.

Continuous and consistent efforts were made to cultivate the loyalty of members of the OO throughout their association with the movement. Although the training program of the OO appears to have come largely under the administration of one member of the Board of Secretaries (or Executive Board), the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party also took a direct interest in the ideological training of OO adherents. A short time before the arrests of August 1954, the Central Committee had appointed civilian instructors or speakers who attended meetings of the

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Cell Responsibles of the OO and provided party and political training. "Technical lessons" given during these occasions also included discussions on current international political affairs.¹

13. OO Espionage. Efforts were made by the OO to procure all information which could aid its ultimate objective--to overthrow the monarchical form of government in Iran and establish a People's Democracy. As stated, the intelligence procurement efforts of individual members of the OO were related to the particular post and unit in which they were located. Because of the thorough penetration achieved by the OO, with members in every branch of Iranian military and security services, the intelligence coverage was extremely thorough.

Reportedly in OO possession at the time of the arrests in August 1954 were order-of-battle reports, officer-of-the-guard rosters, Army ordnance figures, statistical reports concerning Iranian artillery units stationed on the northern frontier, etc.

The OO is stated also to have had information about anti-government, pro-Mossadeq groups being formed among Army personnel and to have achieved a partially successful penetration of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), a loose collection of political elements opposed to the present regime.

Specific targets about which OO members had apparently been directed to report were: (a) speeches made by commanding officers, (b) missions or trips made by American military advisers, and (c) confidential circulars or reports distributed by Iranian military and security services.

From its adherents among the police force, the OO wanted information about confidential circulars or correspondence concerning arrests or surveillances. From information of this nature, the OO knew what security precautions it had to take.

¹ It may be recalled here that The Report of the Royal Commission concerning Soviet and Communist Party espionage activities in Canada in the early 1940's showed certain prominent members of the Labour-Progressive Party of Canada (Communist) attending secret party cell (study group) meetings as observers and instructors. In some instances they are known to have used such occasions to do "talent spotting" (for espionage) or to collect information from individuals attending the cell meetings.

14. Information for Propaganda Use. Some of the information collected by OO members was to be used for agitation-propaganda work. Included in this category were reports about embezzlements, bribery, or other incidents of corruption in the Iranian services which were related in Party bulletins. Information of this nature was routed to the Propaganda Section of the OO, where the three responsible functionaries prepared articles for Party and/or OO tracts.

15. Evidence of Soviet Intelligence Connection with OO Activities. Allegedly some of the arrested officers admitted that the OO worked for the Soviets and that its principal activity for them was the procurement of intelligence information. It is reasonable to assume therefore that all information of possible interest to the Soviets was passed to them. As previously stated, there reportedly was some evidence of a link between the OO and a Soviet intelligence legal resident agent in Iran.

16. Communication Channels of the OO. The OO appeared to have relied almost exclusively on couriers for the transmittal of OO communications. A serious defect appears to have been its tendency to rely on too few OO functionaries for this work. Consequently, when one OO courier was arrested, a large portion of the organization was likely to be exposed. For instance, following the arrests of August 1954, it was found that one police officer had served as a communications link with a contact of OO headquarters for five branches of the OO. Not only did he serve as a courier for secret OO correspondence, but for a short time before his arrest he had served also to distribute publications to OO personnel. It is of interest that he did not serve as a courier for the branch of which he was a member.

In the routing of reports from branches and cells to any OO headquarters unit, somewhat disguised designations had been developed to indicate the specific addressee. For instance, envelopes going to the Organization Section were marked "shapely," those going to the Propaganda Section were designated "eloquent," etc. For an undetermined period of time before the arrests there had been, it appears, an increasingly greater tendency to use oral rather than written communications.

Concerning communications with the provinces, it has been reported that these were maintained either by correspondence (presumably via secret mail drops) or through members traveling between Tehran and the provinces. In certain provinces where the Responsible was in contact with a nonmilitary Party member (such contacts were established in the provinces by permission of the Party), the ordinary Party channels were also used for communication between the OO in Tehran and the OO in the province. The OO functionary (in Tehran) in charge of the provincial branches transmitted the letters and/or publications to the Tudeh Party in Tehran; they were

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then sent by the Party to the provinces through Tudeh Party channels. The material was then passed to the person in charge of the OO in that province through the local committee of the Tudeh Party.

Methods of transmitting information procured by the OO to a Soviet intelligence service have not been clarified. There are indications that direct communication channels may have been functioning in Tehran between Tudeh Party intelligence components and an undetermined Soviet intelligence service. It has also been reported that the OO had placed a number of men in a special unit authorized to cross the Soviet border to deal with such incidents as strayed flocks and illegal entrants. These men reportedly formed one channel through which military information was passed to Soviet intelligence.

Liaison between the Tudeh Party and the OO was conducted on the highest echelon by a member of the Central Committee of the Party; at least two civilians--both businessmen--carried out liaison on lower levels.

17. Finances. Reports concerning the monthly income of the OO have varied considerably: one statement quoted the figure at 6,000 to 7,000 tomans monthly (750 to 875 American dollars); another report gave the figure as 3,000 to 4,000 tomans monthly (between \$375 and \$500); it is not possible to know which of these figures is correct. Many of the OO expenses seem to have been met by income which was derived from membership dues and contributions. Money collected for newspapers, books, and other publications was an additional source of income. Allegedly the dues varied according to the income and obligations of the members--those who received higher salaries and who had comparatively few expenses paid more than others.

Money (membership dues, contributions, payments for party literature) was collected by the Branch Responsibles and forwarded to the Chief of the Finance Section. Expenses and payments due were discussed in advance by the Board of Secretaries, and the Finance Officer was authorized to make payments as these were approved by the Board. At the end of each month a financial statement was submitted to the Board of Secretaries. Funds collected were deposited in a Tehran bank in the name of one of the OO members.

Receipts were issued to OO members for payment of dues. These were issued in denominations of 5-, 10-, 20-, 50-, and 100-rial notes which were 3 x 2 centimeters in size (sometimes smaller) and of violet color.

Among expenditures of the OO the following would appear to have been outstanding: (a) rental of an undetermined number of safehouses, (b) purchase and operating expenses of several automobiles, (c) contributions to political prisoners and their families, (d) contributions to families of deserted officers, (e) payment for "technical lessons," which apparently referred to training in political indoctrination given for OO cells by civilian Tudeh Party functionaries.

18. OO Personnel and Security Practices. For each member of the OO a record was maintained showing his post and rating in the Organization, and commendations and demerits which he had received. This allegedly was kept in a code devised on a mathematical system. Commendation was expressed by the cell, the cell of Cell Responsibles, the Board of Secretaries, and by the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party. The highest form of commendation was a statement signed by the Secretary-General of the Tudeh Party and bearing the seal of the Central Committee.

As a reward for good work, members were sometimes promoted to higher rank. OO posts were ordinarily filled by persons voted into office at the time of the general elections (held once every 2 years), but if any member showed outstanding performance and devotion to duty, one or two newly created cells would be placed under his command.

Reportedly the OO had seldom found it necessary to punish its members for work poorly done. When, however, a member failed to perform his duties or showed indifference in establishing contact, he was expelled from the Organization. This was not done abruptly and the member was not told. Gradually the contact with him was broken and eventually he found himself out of the organization.

Because the OO was opposed to foreign travel expected to last more than 6 months, its members were obliged to inform it and to have its consent before going abroad either for continuing their education or for any other purpose. In spite of this ruling, however, certain OO officers apparently did go abroad without OO consent.

To prevent hostile penetration the OO gave studied attention to candidates who were presented for membership in the OO, and serious effort was made to provide for their thorough indoctrination during the early years of their association with the OO. Throughout their association with the OO, members are apparently subjected to systematic and continuing political indoctrination to ensure their absolute loyalty and guarantee their willingness to engage in illegal activities. Meetings appear to be restricted to gatherings of three or four members at a time, with these taking place in members' homes. Meetings between two OO members (couriers) for the purpose of transmitting reports from one to the other apparently occur on busy streets.

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