



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES



EX LIBRIS

Random

SOUTHERN BRANCH,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
LIBRARY
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

THE
ROMANS UNDER THE EMPIRE.

VOL. II.

WORKS BY CHARLES MERIVALE, D.D.

SOMETIME DEAN OF ELY.



HISTORY of the ROMANS under the EMPIRE.
With Maps. 8 vols. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. each.

The FALL of the ROMAN REPUBLIC; a History
of the Last Century of the Commonwealth. With Maps.
Fcp. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

The ROMAN TRIUMVIRATES. With Map. Fcp. 8vo.
2s. 6d. (*Epochs of Ancient History.*)

GENERAL HISTORY OF ROME from the Founda-
tion of the City to the Fall of Augustulus, B.C. 753—
A.D. 476. With 5 Maps. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

SCHOOL HISTORY of ROME. Abridged from Dean
MERIVALE'S General History of Rome, with the sanction of the
Author, by C. PULLER, M.A. With 13 Maps. Fcp. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO. 39 Paternoster Row,
London, New York, and Bombay.

HISTORY
OF THE
ROMANS UNDER THE EMPIRE

BY THE VERY REV.
CHARLES MERIVALE, D.C.L.
LATE DEAN OF ELY



IN EIGHT VOLUMES
VOL. II.

NEW IMPRESSION

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY

1904

APPENDIX TO VOLUME
FOR THE YEAR 1900

DG

276

M54h

1865

v. 2

cop. 2

UC 5-13-36
1923

9.66. 2-8 mic.

CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.



CHAPTER XI.

State of the Parthian Monarchy—Crassus meditates an expedition against the Parthians—First Invasion, A.U. 700—Second Invasion, A.U. 701—He is deceived by the Parthians, and misled by his guides—Fatal engagement beyond Carrhæ—Death of the younger Crassus—Crassus enticed into a conference and slain in a fray—His remains insulted—An Interregnum at Rome—Pompeius prevails on the Tribunes to allow the election of Consuls—Assassination of Clodius—Disturbances in the City—Pompeius appointed sole Consul for the year 702—Trial of Milo—The proceedings of the Forum controlled by an armed force

PAGE

1

CHAPTER XII.

Cæsar's seventh campaign in Gaul, A.U. 702, B.C. 52—Vercingetorix effects a coalition between the Belgians and Arvernians—Cæsar takes Genabum and Avaricum—Wise and spirited policy of Vercingetorix—Siege of Gergovia—Revolt of the Ædui—Cæsar compelled to raise the siege: he effects a junction with Labienus in Belgium, and retreats towards the province—He obtains a victory, and blockades the Gaulish army—Great operations before Alesia—Triumph of the Romans, and submission of Vercingetorix—Cæsar's eighth campaign, A.U. 703, B.C. 51—Partial insurrections in the north, west, and centre of Gaul—Capture of Uxellodunum—The conquest of Gaul completed

30

Longmans

CHAPTER XIII.

Pompeius, as sole consul, undertakes the reform of abuses: his ill success: he connects himself again with the oligarchy by espousing the daughter of Scipio—Cæsar intrigues to obtain the consulship before relinquishing his province—Cicero accepts the government of Cilicia: his civil and military administration—The nobles seek to deprive Cæsar of his command—M. Marcellus insults him by the harsh punishment of a Transpadane Gaul—Pompeius falls sick—Rejoicings for his recovery—Cæsar conciliates the Gauls—Strength and composition of his army: his popularity with the soldiers—Character of the younger Curio: his devotion to Cæsar's interests—Cæsar received with acclamations in Cisalpine Gaul—He fixes his quarters at Ravenna—He offers a compromise with the Senate, which it refuses, and requires him to resign his command—The tribunes interpose, are menaced with violence, and thereupon fly to Cæsar's camp. (A.U. 702—704, B.C. 52—50.) - - - 75

CHAPTER XIV.

The consuls prepare to withstand Cæsar's claims by force—Cæsar crosses the Rubicon—Consternation of his enemies—They abandon Rome, and rally round Pompeius in Campania—Cæsar advances triumphantly—The senate affects to negotiate—Pompeius falls back upon Luceria—Domitius makes a stand at Corfinium: is betrayed and delivered up by his soldiers: pardoned by Cæsar—Effect of Cæsar's clemency—Pompeius is besieged by Cæsar in Brundisium—Escapes across the sea with his troops, the consuls and the senate—Explanation of the apparent pusillanimity of his conduct. (Jan.—March A.U. 705, B.C. 49.) - - - 23

CHAPTER XV.

Cæsar repairs to Rome and convenes the Senate—His moderation and clemency—He plunders the Temple of Saturn—He proceeds to attack the Pompeian armies in Spain—Domitius encourages the Massilians to shut their gates against him—He leaves a force to besiege their city, and crosses the Pyrenees—The Pompeian lieutenants occupy Herda—Military operations before that place—Overflow of the Sicoris and peril of Cæsar—Brutus gains a naval advantage over the Massilians—The Pompeians compelled

	PAGE
to evacuate Ilerda—Further military operations, ending in the capitulation of the Pompeian armies. (A. U. 705, B. C. 49.) - - - - -	164

CHAPTER XVI.

Siege and capture of Massilia—Cæsar receives the submission of Varro, and establishes his power throughout the Spanish provinces—Campaign of Curio in Africa: his defeat and death—Disaster to Cæsar's forces in Illyricum—Administration of Rome by Lepidus and M. Antonius—Cæsar is created Dictator in his absence—He quells a mutiny among his troops at Placentia, and hastens to Rome—His financial and political measures—He is elected Consul, and resigns the dictatorship—Prepares to follow Pompeius across the sea—Advantages of his position compared with that of his adversaries. (A. U. 705, B. C. 49.) - - -	203
---	-----

CHAPTER XVII.

The Senatorial party assemble at Thessalonica—Review of their forces and position—Cæsar crosses over to Epirus—Pompeius throws himself before Dyrrhachium—Maritime operations of Bibulus: his mortification and death—Sedition in Italy, and death of Cælius—Antonius crosses over to Epirus with reinforcements—Cæsar blockades Pompeius within his lines—Operations in Macedonia and Greece—Appius Claudius consults the oracle of Delphi—Cæsar is baffled in his attack on Pompeius, and withdraws into Thessaly—Pompeius follows, and effects a junction with Scipio—Gives battle at Pharsalia—Rout of the Senatorial forces—Flight of Pompeius: death of Domitius: surrender of M. Brutus. (Jan.—Aug. A. U. 706, B. C. 48.) - - -	239
--	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.

Pompeius seeks refuge in Egypt—Treacherous policy of the advisers of King Ptolemæus—Pompeius is enticed from his vessel and murdered—The fugitives from Pharsalia reassemble at Dyrrhachium and Corcyra—Cicero withdraws from the contest—Scipio assumes the command—Cæsar follows in pursuit of Pompeius: receives the submission of C. Cassius: reaches Egypt, and pays honour to the head of Pompeius—Undertakes to settle the affairs of the kingdom—Fascinations of Cleopatra—Discount of the Alex-	
--	--

	PAGE
andrians: they rise against Cæsar and blockade him in the palace — The Alexandrian war: intrigues, defeat and death of Ptolemæus—Cæsar places Cleopatra on his throne —Pharnaces attacks the allies of the Republic, and defeats Calvinus—Cæsar marches against him: he is routed at the battle of Zela, and slain—Arrogance of the conqueror. (A.U. 706, 707, B.C. 48, 47.) - - - - -	298

CHAPTER XIX.

Character of Cæsar's policy in Rome—He assumes the Dictatorship for the third time—He quells a mutiny among his soldiers—The Senatorial party collect their forces in Africa—Cato lands at Cyrene, crosses the Libyan Desert, and joins the forces of Scipio at Utica—Campaign in Africa decided by the victory of Cæsar at Thapsus—Dispersion of the republican forces, and death of their principal leaders—Cato undertakes to defend Utica—His adherents abandon the contest—He commits suicide—The Dictatorship for ten years and other distinctions showered upon Cæsar—On his return to Rome he celebrates four triumphs, and gratifies the people with shows and largesses—Dedication of the Julian Forum—The war renewed by Cnæus Pompeius in Spain—He is supported by Cæsar's discontented soldiers — Cæsar's final campaign, and decisive victory at Munda—Of all the Senatorial leaders Sextus alone remains in arms—Disturbances in Syria. (Sept. A.U. 707—April, A.U. 709, B.C. 47—45.) - - - - -	336
--	-----

CHAPTER XX.

Cæsar's legislation: his sumptuary laws: increase of the number of the Senate: limitation of the term of provincial governments: extension of the franchise: distribution of lands to the veterans: measures for multiplying the free population of Italy: assignment of the *Judicia* to the Senators and Knights, to the exclusion of the *Ærarian* Tribunes: repression of crimes of violence, and abolition of the clubs—Cæsar contemplates the establishment of a uniform system of administration: he proposes to compile a code of laws, and to execute a complete map of the Empire—Cæsar's patronage of literature: his reform of the calendar: his reforms are viewed with jealousy by the nobles: he is accused of pride and arrogance—The demeanour of

	PAGE
Cleopatra tends to make him unpopular; at the same time he is flattered and his clemency extolled—He disbands his soldiers, and relies on the favour of the citizens - -	385

CHAPTER XXI.

Tranquillity of Rome during Cæsar's absence in Spain—
 Character of his principal friends: Balbus, Oppius, Matus, Hirtius—Their Epicurean principles—Cæsar himself a freethinker, but addicted to superstition—His return to Rome, and last triumph—Harsh treatment of Labrius—Honours and dignities showered upon Cæsar—He receives the appellation of *Pater Patriæ*, and the *prænomen Imperatoris*: is elected Consul for ten years, and created Dictator for life, &c.—His magnificent schemes for works of public utility—He manifests symptoms of intolerable pride—Cæsar's urbanity of character—He visits Cicero at his villa—Cicero exhorts him to make war on the Parthians—He prepares to set out on an expedition of foreign conquest, and appoints magistrates for the interval of his intended absence—Cæsar appears to covet the title of King—The people express their disapprobation—He refuses the diadem—A conspiracy is formed against his life by men of both parties in the state—They place Brutus at their head—Assassination of Cæsar on the Ides of March, beneath the statue of Pompeius. (A.U. 709—March 710, B.C. 45, 44.) -

415



MAPS.

MAP OF HISPANIA	} To be placed at the beginning of the volume.
MAP OF PHARSALIA	

Site of *Scotussa*

PHARSALLA

From a Map of Colonel Leake's
with a slight variation in the
position of *Caesar's* Cavalry.



HISTORY

OF THE

ROMANS UNDER THE EMPIRE.



CHAPTER XI.

State of the Parthian Monarchy.—Crassus meditates an expedition against the Parthians.—First Invasion, A.U. 700.—Second Invasion, A.U. 701.—He is deceived by the Parthians, and misled by his guides.—Fatal engagement beyond Carrhæ.—Death of the younger Crassus.—Crassus enticed into a conference and slain in a fray.—His remains insulted.—An Interregnum at Rome.—Pompeius prevails on the Tribunes to allow the election of Consuls.—Assassination of Clodius.—Disturbances in the City.—Pompeius appointed sole Consul for the year 702.—Trial of Milo.—The proceedings of the Forum controlled by an armed force.

BEFORE we revert to the contemplation of the protracted death-struggle of Roman independence, we must turn aside to follow the Parthian expedition of Crassus, one of the most romantic episodes in the history of the martial republic, conspicuous for the most wanton aggression and the most signal chastisement by which her bloody annals are distinguished. The province of Syria offered brilliant opportunities to the ambition or avarice of a Roman proconsul. Its wealth, comparatively untouched by earlier conquerors, was the accumulation of centuries of commercial splendour. Its frontiers were limited by the dominions of the tributary sovereigns of Cappadocia and Palestine, who flourished under the shadow of Roman protection. Beyond them lay the kingdoms of Armenia, placed

Rise of the
Parthian
monarchy.

also in a state of dubious dependence on the republic, and of Egypt, whose freedom at the moment was trembling in the balance. To the east stretched the vast extent of the Parthian empire, with which Rome had never yet measured her strength. The region from which the once mighty name of the Parthians took its rise is an insignificant tract of country watered by the river Ochus, the modern Tedjen, near the south-eastern extremity of the Caspian Sea. On the north a sandy desert separates it from the Oxus and the modern city of Khiva; on the south it is hemmed in by the great mountain chain which connects the Caucasus of the west with the Hindoo Khoosh, or Caucasus of the east. This district had formed the most northern possession of the Macedonian empire; but, upon the partition of the various provinces after the death of Alexander, none of his Greek generals aspired to occupy a throne in so remote and barbarous a region. Parthia fell into the hands of a chief of native extraction, though known by the Greek name of Stasanor: but it continued in a state of precarious dependence on the sovereigns of the Macedonian line, who held their court in Susa. The power of the European dynasties was weakened by their quarrels with one another; and both the Parthians and the Bactrians shook off the yoke in the third century before our era. Arsaces, the founder of a race of Parthian kings, was a man of obscure origin; the conquest of Hyrcania extended his possessions to the Caspian; and when his vigorous chivalry crossed the Caucasus and came in contact with the nations to the south, the successors of Alexander were unable to withstand them, and the whole of the provinces between the Euphrates and the Indus fell in the fourth generation under the sway of the Parthian Mithridates. This powerful tyrant was succeeded by a son who, after some brilliant triumphs over the Greeks in Syria, was defeated and slain by a horde of

invading Scythians. The attention of his successors, as far as they could spare it from their intestine divisions and family intrigues, was principally occupied with checking the progress of these depredators, and supporting the power of Armenia on their north-western frontier, which formed a bulwark against future invasion from that quarter.¹

For his abode the Parthian sovereign selected Seleucia on the Tigris, from among the royal residences of the empire he had overthrown. Scarcely emerged from the tent of his fathers, he at once established himself in all the pomp of the ancient dynasties which had successively held the sceptre of Central Asia. He adopted from the Assyrians the slothful luxury of the priest-kings of the line of Belus; he surrounded himself with slaves, eunuchs, and concubines; dressed more like a woman than a man², and revelled in the charms of odours, wine, and music. From the example of the Medes, he assumed the licence of intermarrying with the nearest members of his own family, a barbarous device for limiting the claimants to the succession. Nor was he less easily seduced by the more intellectual, but hardly less enervating, refinements which the Greeks had introduced into Asia. An exotic literature and a gaudy theatre flourished at Seleucia under the royal patronage: the ritual ceremonies of the most graceful of superstitions were too closely interwoven with the forms of the Grecian drama not to follow in its train. The court of Seleucia presented a motley combination of the manners of different ages and countries, only to be paralleled, perhaps, in the

The Parthian
court at
Seleucia.

¹ This history is concisely detailed by Justin, xli. 4, 5.

² See Plutarch's description of Surenas (c. 24.): *ἐντρίμμασι προσώπου καὶ κόμης διακρίσει*, and comp c. 32.: *ἐσθῆτα βαρβαρικὴν γυναικὸς ἐνδύς*. The flowing dress which the Greeks supposed to be feminine was originally sacerdotal, but its effect must have been to encourage indolence and cowardice.

semi-European fashions of Petersburg and Moscow. But the monarch was surrounded and his throne upheld by the faithful arms of a warlike nobility, among whom these refinements had not penetrated so deeply. For them he had changed the satrapies of Persia and the governments of Alexander into dependent fiefs. When he put forth his whole strength for conquest or defence, he could call upon the services of eighteen vitaxæ, or vassal kings.¹ Every petty chieftain summoned his retainers to his side, who preserved at least in the field the habits of their nomade ancestors, clad themselves in their scaly armour, and bounded upon their horses, equipped with the bow and arrow, equally deadly in the charge or the retreat.²

¹ Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, c. 8.; Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, i. c. 7.

² The Parthian forces consisted principally of cavalry, and both men and horses were clad in chain or scale armour. Justin, xli. 2. These accoutrements became an object of terror to the Romans after their defeat under Crassus, and formed the burden of many popular descriptions. (See Propertius, Martial, and the poets generally.) It is hardly credible that the Parthian horsemen thus equipped could have had great rapidity of movement; and the Armenian cavalry, similarly armed, was defeated and destroyed with ease by Lucullus at Tigranocerta. (Plut. *Luc.* 28.) But their attacks were formidable to the Roman legionary, unless well furnished with archers, slingers, and cavalry on his wings. In the later periods of the empire the Romans adopted this mode of equipment, rather perhaps for show than for service. (Claudian, in *Rufin.* ii. 360.) But the same kind of defensive armour, which we are accustomed to associate with the name of the Parthians, has been very extensively used in various parts of the world. The figures thus clad on the Column of Trajan represent Sarmatians: comp. Tac. *Hist.* i. 79.; Ammian. xvii. 12.; Pausan. i. 21. The Georgians and Circassians use it habitually at the present day, and it was adopted from them by their descendants, the Mamclukes of Egypt. Major Denham discovered a people in Bornou whose king was attended by a body-guard of horsemen in chain-mail. Their horses, he says, were small, but moved with rapidity. Denham and Clapperton's *First Journey*, p. 62—64. His drawings are precisely similar to the specimens of Afghan or Beloochee chain-mail, which may be seen in Sir Samuel Meyrick's collection at Goodrich Court. The chain-mail of the crusaders with which we are familiar was more complete and heavier than any other.

The countenance which the Parthian monarch extended to the manners and usages introduced by his immediate predecessors into the regions beyond the Euphrates was doubtless galling to the spirit of the native race, and rendered him particularly obnoxious to the priestly caste, who worshipped the element of fire in its visible fountain in the heavens. It was to this hostility, perhaps, that the dynasty of Arsaces owes the obscurity which envelopes its history in the native annals. Ferdousi, the poetical historian of Persia, passes it over almost in silence; and other Oriental authorities, while they curtail its duration by two or more centuries, deny the foreign extraction of the founder.¹ This opinion has met with supporters among European scholars; but the passage of Strabo, on which they rely, may be safely pronounced corrupt², and there is no ground for supposing that the Arsacidæ formed an exception to the destiny which has so repeatedly subjected Persia to the sway of foreign masters.³

The dynasty of the Arsacidæ obnoxious to its Persian subjects.

¹ Malcolm's *Hist. of Persia*, l. c. Arsaces is known to the native writers by the name of Ashk.

² Strabo alone of the ancient writers seems to identify the Parthians with the Carduchi (xvi. 1.); but the reading Παρθυαίων is rejected by Groskurd, who, with Tzschukke, Koray and Wesseling, would read Γορδύαλων. The Carduchi, or Kurds, had their central seats about the sources of the river Tigris, but extended also into the plains of Adiabene. Xenophon (*Anab.* iii. 5. 16.) describes them as only nominally dependent on the kings of Persia in his time. Their nomade habits and love of horses (Kinncir, *Geographical Memoir of Persia*, p. 143.) are too common characteristics of an analogous state of society to establish any identity between them and the Parthians. Undoubtedly, however, there was an early connexion between the Armenians, Parthians, Medes and Persians, derived from their common Caucasian origin, and so far both theories may be reconciled.

³ The dynasty of the Arsacidæ was overthrown in the third century by Ardshir, or Artaxerxes, the first of the Sassanidæ, a native race which reigned till the conquest of the Saracens in the seventh.

The progress of the Roman arms in the east had brought them at length into immediate contact with the Parthian outposts, and the line of the Euphrates became through a part of its course the recognised boundary of the two dominions. The Roman province of Syria extended from the south-eastern extremity of Asia Minor, or the Gulf of Issus, to the Libanus, the northern limit of Palestine. It was governed, as we have seen, directly from Rome, while the territories immediately bordering upon it were allowed to retain their own laws, and were subjected to the rule of native sovereigns appointed by the republic. The large force which it was necessary to maintain in a position of such importance, and its distance from the seat of government, invested the proconsul of Syria with almost irresponsible power. Gabinius was nearly the first to whom this charge had been intrusted since the political settlement established throughout these regions by Pompeius. He had gone to his province full of schemes of warfare and plunder. He had quarrelled with the Parthians, who had hitherto cultivated amicable relations with their formidable neighbours, and conducted themselves towards her officers with the respectful frankness of a brave and independent people. He had gone so far as to threaten them with invasion, but had been diverted from his purpose by the superior temptation of restoring Ptolemæus Auletes to the throne of Egypt. It was this capricious project of Gabinius to signalize himself by a war with Parthia that inflamed the vanity of Crassus. The success of the new proconsul in military affairs had hitherto been equivocal; up to this period he had not appeared to affect the character of a great general. But the renown of Pompeius and Cæsar had long rankled in his bosom; he resolved to rival, and he hoped to excel, them; sentiments of military ambition, which were supposed

Crassus sets
out for his
government in
Syria.
A.U. 699.
B.C. 55.

never to have found a place in his cautious and sober disposition, now broke forth in expressions of the wildest arrogance. He talked to his friends with puerile presumption of the exploits he would perform; he would not limit his enterprises to Syria or even Parthia; the victories of Lucullus over Tigranes, of Pompeius over Mithridates, he ridiculed as trifling; while he proclaimed his own resolution to subdue the Bactrians and the Indians, and penetrate, like another Alexander, to the ocean which surrounds the Continent.¹ Cæsar, always on the watch for the errors of his associates, wrote to him from Gaul to stimulate his ambition and feed his hopes.² We may suppose that the advice of the conqueror of the west would be no less audacious in character than that which had so often marked his actions, and that he urged Crassus to put the widest interpretation upon the licence to make war or peace which Trebonius had obtained for him. It was indeed too late to quarrel with the proconsul of Syria for proposing to exercise a power which had been formally conceded to him; nevertheless, the statesmen of the republic were reluctant to throw themselves at the feet of another military despot, and the disclosure of his warlike resolves caused general alarm and discontent among them. In order to evade the effect of their discouragement or remonstrances, Crassus pushed on his preparations, and commenced his journey some weeks before his consulship expired.³ It was resolved to appeal to the feelings of the people by

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 16.

² Plut. *l. c.*

³ He left Rome just before the middle of November, according to the unreformed calendar (Cic. *ad Att.* iv. 13.), the Roman year at this period being just fifteen days in advance of the real time. He probably crossed from Brundisium about a fortnight later, when his armament was assailed by violent stormy weather. Plut. *Crass.* 17.; comp. Drumann, iv. 96. Plutarch contradicts himself in *Pomp.* 52., where he says that Crassus did not leave Rome till the beginning of the following year.

denouncing his meditated aggression as unprovoked and impious. The tribune Ateius met him at the gate of the city, and holding in one hand a brazier of burning coals, and casting incense into it with the other, invoked the curse of heaven upon the enterprise and its leader, and devoted him, in the face of his country, and in the solemn words of the ancient formularies, to the infernal gods.¹ The tribune's curse awakened a sense of justice, or at least a feeling of superstition, among the citizens, by which the soldiers themselves were not unaffected. Remorse and fear conspired to imagine, nor did malice fail perhaps to invent omens and prodigies of direful import, and many such were doubtless reported after the catastrophe they might be supposed to have portended. A story related by Cicero is curious, at least in a philological point of view, for the glimpse it gives us of the Latin pronunciation. While the troops were assembled at Brundisium, a man was heard calling his figs in the street, *Cauneas, Cauneas*; his long and drawling accents were fancifully interpreted into the fatal warning, *Cave ne eas, Beware of going.*² The loss of several vessels, in the passage to Dyrrhachium, with troops on board, was a more serious misadventure. But the journey through Macedonia and the Lesser Asia, with all its cheering sights and pleasant resting-places, revived the equanimity of the soldiers, and Crassus himself was full of confidence and arrogant levity. Deiotarus, king of Galatia, an aged and faithful ally of the Roman people, was building a city in the

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 16.; Dion, xxxix. 39; Flor. iii. 11. 3., where the name Metellus is a mistake. The nobles affected to be displeased with the extravagant zeal of their friend. But Cicero, in a letter to Atticus (iv. 13.), contrasts the slender attendance of friends and well-wishers at Crassus's departure with the enthusiasm which was manifested when Æmilius Paullus left the city to undertake the war against Perseus, king of Macedonia.

² Cic. *de Divin.* ii. 40. Probably the sound was *Caf'neas*.

route of the proconsul. Crassus mocked him for undertaking such an enterprise in his old age. *And thou, too, returned the veteran, art far advanced in years to lead an expedition against the Parthians.*¹

The Roman, indeed, did not delay an instant in making his first campaign. He crossed the Euphrates, and accepted the submission of some towns in Mesopotamia. One place, before which a party of his troops had met with a check, he stormed and ransacked, and was well pleased to receive for so trifling an exploit the acclamations of his army and the appellation of Emperor. But he was soon satisfied with his success, and instead of pushing forward upon the centre of the enemy's power, returned indolently to his province, thus allowing the Parthians, irritated but not seriously injured, to complete their preparations for repelling a second attack. The rule of an upstart race of barbarians fretted the pride of the great old-world cities of Seleucia and Babylon. The first object of an invader according to the military critics of antiquity should have been to present himself before their walls, and proclaim himself the deliverer of voluptuous civilization from the yoke of the rude mountaineers.² During the remainder of the year, the seven-hundredth from the foundation of the city, Crassus occupied himself with the civil affairs of his province, or rather with the extortion and accumulation of treasure. In the pursuit of his object he committed various acts of sacrilege, to the horror of the natives, who carefully registered the omens which

Crassus crosses
the Euphrates,
and gains some
trifling suc-
cesses.
A. U. 700,
B. C. 54.

¹ Crassus was sixty years of age, and his appearance was still older. Plut. *Crass.* 17.; App. *Hist. Rer. Parth.* This work cannot be considered genuine, and is almost a verbal transcript of Plutarch.

² Plut. *Crass.* 27.: Βαβυλῶνος καὶ Σελευκείας, δυσμενῶν ἕξει τοῖς Πάρθοις πόλεων. Dion, xl. 13.: τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συστρατευσάντων σφίσιν Ἑλλήνων ἄποικοι πολλοὶ, βία ἀχθόμενοι, καὶ ἐς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ὡς καὶ φιλέλληνας πολλὰ ἐλπίζοντες, οὐχ ἀκουσίως μεθίσταντο.

portended the vengeance of the gods.¹ He was joined by his son, the gallant lieutenant of Cæsar, with a body of one thousand cavalry from Gaul, a present from the one triumvir to the other. The most experienced of his officers was C. Cassius Longinus, a soldier of approved skill and courage. Thus supported, with an army duly disciplined and equipped, he continued to indulge in sanguine confidence regarding the result of the campaign which he projected for the following year. The character of the Parthian warfare, which became so terrible to the Romans, was as yet little known to them; but the Persian arrow, they might remember, had been no match for the Macedonian sarissa. They had not yet learned to distinguish the mail-clad horsemen of Parthia from the loose-garbed and effeminate human herds which Xerxes had driven with whips before him, which Agesilaus had scattered with a handful of Spartan infantry, or which Alexander had chased from the Hellespont to the Hyphasis.²

¹ Crassus seized without remorse the treasures amassed in the temple of Derceto or Atargatis, in Hierapolis. (Plut. *Crass.* 27.; Strab. xvi. 1. 4.) He made a journey to Jerusalem on purpose to rifle the temple. Its wealth was computed at ten thousand talents. Eleazar the high-priest tried to save it by the offer of a costly bribe. Crassus took the bribe and the treasure both. Joseph. *Antiq.* xiv. 7. 1., *B. Jud.* i. 7. 8.

² Compare the speech of Lentulus in Lucan's poem (viii. 331. &c.), which seems to express a revival of the contemptuous and unfounded prejudices of the Romans, after the defeat of Crassus had been effaced from their recollection:

" Illic et laxas vestes et fluxa virorum
Velamenta vides." . . .

The bow was stigmatized as a cowardly and effeminate weapon compared with the sword:

" Ensis habet vires, et gens quæcunque virorum est
Bella gerit gladiis." . . .

One disadvantage it had:

" Nam Medos prælia prima
Exarmant, vacuæque jubent remeare pharetræ."

No Roman would have escaped from the field of Carrhæ if the

While Crassus was collecting his forces from their winter quarters, Orodes, the king of the Parthians, sent ambassadors to complain of the sudden aggression upon his territories, or, more properly, upon those of Abgarus, king of Osrhoene, a dependency of the Seleucian crown. But their commission was not so much to negotiate with the Roman proconsul as to defy him. The Parthians seem to have been informed of the dislike with which the proceedings of Crassus were viewed by the Roman senate. An attempt had lately been made in that assembly to obtain the proconsul's recall from his province, which was foiled by the interference of Pompeius, seconded by a speech from Cicero.¹ The Parthians affected to draw a distinction between the republic herself and the marauder who had insulted them. With the former, they said, they were prepared to wage war to extremity, if challenged to the field; but if the enterprise were merely the personal act of the old man before them, they would not condescend to harm a hair of his head, but would contemptuously send him back the garrisons he had left beyond the Euphrates. Crassus retorted with the usual taunt of inexperienced commanders; he would discuss these matters in their capital. Wagises, an aged Parthian, pointed to the smooth palm of his hand, and said that hair should sooner grow there than the Romans ever see Seleucia.²

Embassy of
the Parthians.
and mutual
defiance.
A. U. 701,
B. C. 53.

The confidence these expressions indicated was not belied by the power and resolution with which it was backed. Some of the Roman detachments stationed beyond the Euphrates were soon compelled to abandon their posts, and came flying into the camp. They described the vigorous character of the enemy who

Advice of
Cassius and
Artabazes re-
garding the
conduct of the
campaign.

Parthians could have maintained a close blockade of the exhausted legions.

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* v. 8.

² Plut. *Crass.* 18.

had assailed them, the deadliness of his assault, the fruitlessness of pursuing him, the unerring aim of his arrows, the impenetrability of his armour. The Parthians were evidently a people very different in character from the Armenians and Cappadocians, whom Lucullus had so easily routed. These reports caused much uneasiness in the Roman quarters, and Cassius thus early warned his leader of the perils of the enterprise he was about to undertake. But Crassus gave no heed to the warning. Artabazes, the king of Armenia, came into his presence with the offer of all the resources of his country. He promised the assistance of ten thousand cavalry equipped in complete armour, and of thirty thousand infantry; at the same time he strongly urged him to direct his march through his own friendly territories, well supplied with water and provisions, and abounding in hills and streams, which would baffle the dreaded manœuvres of the Parthian horsemen.¹ By this route he would reach the upper waters of the Tigris, from whence he might descend to Seleucia through a fertile and practicable country. But Crassus, though well pleased with the zeal of his ally, would brook no delay, nor adopt a circuitous line of march: moreover he represented that he had still some troops left in occupation of outposts beyond the Euphrates, and these he was hastening to support.

¹ Comp. Lucan, *l. c.*:

“ Parthus per Medica rura,
Sarmaticos inter campos, effusaque plano
Tigridis arva solo, nulli superabilis hosti est
Libertate fugæ: sed non, ubi terra tumebit,
Aspera conscendet montis juga, nec per opacas
Bella gret latebras, incerto debilis arcu:
Nec franget nando violenti vorticis annem.” . .

Yet the Parthians came originally from a hilly country, and the mail-clad cavalry of Armenia, as well as the modern Belooches, were accustomed to mountain warfare.

The writers from whom we derive our accounts of the campaign that followed, lived at least two centuries after the date of the events they relate; and even if the sources from which they drew their materials were trustworthy and accurate, they may very probably have confused and disfigured their statements from their own want of critical spirit. Accordingly, their narratives correspond very imperfectly with the geography of the country through which they profess to guide us. The district of Osrhoene, which comprehends undoubtedly the whole of the route we wish to trace, was confined on the north by the line of the Mons Masius, or Karahjah Dag, running directly east and west from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the parallel of Samosata. The latter of these rivers bounds it to the west and south, as far as its confluence with the Chaboras, which may be considered as the eastern limit of the district. The great highway from Asia Minor to the cities of Persia lay through the town of Zeugma, on the Euphrates, which derived its name from the bridge by which the opposite banks were there connected, and which, in Rome's most prosperous times, when she granted terms to the prostrate empires of the East, was complimented with the pompous title of the *Route of Peace*.¹ The modern village of Roum Kale (the Roman castle) still marks its site, but the caravans now cross the river a few miles lower down at Birs. From Zeugma a military way was directed due east to Edessa, the modern Orfa, the Ur of Scripture, where the king of Osrhoene held his court. At a later period this posi-

Different routes open to the choice of an invading army.

¹ Stat. *Sylv.* iii. 2. 137.: "Zeugma Latinæ Pacis iter." The bridge was originally constructed for the transport of Alexander's army across the Euphrates. Dion, xl. 17.; Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir*, 316. The Euphrates there is deep and rapid and about 130 yards broad.

tion became, in the hands of the Romans, the key of Parthia and Armenia. From hence the road branched into two lines: the one continued in an easterly direction to Nisibis and Nineveh, on the Tigris, and here was the point of departure either for Seleucia or Ecbatana; the other struck more southward, ran through Carrhæ, then turned due south, skirting the little stream Balissus, till it reached the Euphrates at Nicephorium. From this point it was carried on nearly parallel to the banks of that river, and at last terminated at Seleucia, after crossing the narrowest part of the isthmus which separates the Euphrates from the Tigris. These highways were the work of a later age, when the power of Rome was established through the whole of Mesopotamia; but they were laid out, in all probability, in the line of the much more ancient routes frequented in the time of Crassus. It was along one or other of these lines, therefore, that we should expect to trace the march of the invading army. In later times Trajan entered Parthia by the northern, and Julian by the southern route¹; but Crassus, according to our historians, followed neither. We have no choice, but to consider the main incidents of their narrative correct, and we must be content with remarking, as we pass, the minor inconsistencies by which it is encumbered.

The proconsul had collected his troops together, seven legions strong, at Zeugma. Once more the superstition of the soldiers was busy in discovering omens of disaster. Thunders and lightnings, with tempests of wind and

Discouragement of the Roman army.

¹ Mannert, v. 2. p. 200.; Francke, *Gesch. Trajans*, p. 277.; Ammian. xxiii. 3. D'Anville's work on the Euphrates and Tigris is of great service in tracing the ancient geography, but his map is extremely incorrect as regards the course of the former river. That which is appended to Kinneir's *Journey through Armenia, &c.*, seems much more trustworthy.

rain, gave a gloomy presage of ill-success.¹ The bridge broke under the weight of the army and its baggage, at which the troops were much disheartened. But the actions of their leader and the expressions which fell from him were peculiarly significant and unlucky. Crassus, intending to return from the conquests he anticipated by the route of Armenia, paid no attention to the calamity, and uttered the unconscious prophecy, that none of his soldiers would want that bridge again. So, too, in sacrificing, he let the sacred fragments of the victim fall from his hand. Instead of hastening to recover them, and avert the omen by appropriate formulas, he only smiled, and remarked with levity, *See the infirmity of age!*²

As soon as the Roman army had reached the left bank of the Euphrates, it proceeded, if we are correctly informed, not to take the road to Edessa, but to skirt the river for some way down.³ If the object of the general had been to give confidence and support to garrisons stationed along its course, as, for instance, at Barbalissus and Nicephorium, that object, it would seem, might have been more readily attained by approaching the river at the spot nearest to Antioch, his original point of departure, without making a circuit so inconvenient. There could have been no difficulty in throwing a bridge of boats across the stream at either of those places. The counsel of Artabazes having been altogether disregarded, the skill and experience of Cassius now suggested the most feasible alternative,

Preparations
of the Par-
thians.

¹ The Euphrates is subject to violent hurricanes. It was in one of these that Captain Chesney's vessel was lost on his expedition to explore the navigation of that river.

² Plut. *Crass.* 19. : τοιοῦτον τὸ γῆρας.

³ The force which crossed the Euphrates amounted to seven legions with about four thousand cavalry, and as many light-armed troops. Plut. *Crass.* 20. Appian (*B. C.* iii. 18.) raises the number to 100,000 men, and Florus to eleven legions (iii. 11.).

the plan of the campaign. Cassius recommended his leader to keep along the bank of the Euphrates, by which means he could ensure a constant supply of provisions from the flotilla which was in readiness to accompany him, and secure himself against being surrounded. At the same time he advised him to move slowly and with circumspection, not to trust to the rumours which flowed into the camp of the disappearance and meditated flight of the Parthians, but to keep under the shelter of some of his fortified posts till the plans of the enemy could be fully ascertained. The fact was, as Cassius anticipated, that the Parthians designed to maintain the defensive, and did not choose to meet the invaders in a pitched battle on equal terms. It was their object to lead

the Roman army into the sandy plains which intervene between the two rivers, and there hang loosely upon their skirts, till heat, fatigue and want should anticipate the work of the sword. They found an instrument for their design in Abgarus¹, the Osrhoenian, who attended the march of the Roman legions, and wormed himself into their leader's confidence by specious professions of gratitude for the favours he had received from Pompeius. He assured the proconsul that Orodes, despairing of the defence of his country, had left two of his satraps, Surenas and Sillaces, to make a show of resistance, while he was himself in full retreat for Scythia or Hyrcania, carrying off with him all the treasures he could hastily remove. Any appearance, he said, of hesitation on the part of the Romans might restore his confidence, but a sudden

Their stratagem to mislead the enemy.

Surenas, the Parthian general.

¹ He is called by Dion *Ἀβγαρος*, i.e. Abgarus; by the Pseudo-Appian, *Ἀκβαρος*, in which we may, perhaps, recognise the modern Akhbar. This word is said to be a royal title, signifying "great." Several of the name are mentioned in this and the following century as kings of Edessa. Plutarch gives this personage the name of Ariamnes; he also uses the form *Ἰρώδης* for Orodes.

and direct march upon Seleucia would at the moment meet with no effectual opposition. In fact, whether through fear of the Romans, or to show his contempt for them in the most striking manner, Orodes had undertaken himself to chastise the insolence of their Armenian ally, leaving the brunt of the invasion to be sustained by his satraps. But this division of his forces was calculated to lull the enemy into security, and entice him to a perilous movement, where the nature of the country and climate would arm the Parthians with irresistible weapons. Surenas ranked next to the king in birth, wealth and distinction.¹ He was the most eminent of his nation for valour and abilities, nor had he an equal in strength and beauty of person. He went forth, whether in peace or war, with an equipage of one thousand camels, and his wives and concubines followed him in a train of two hundred chariots. His body-guard consisted of one thousand horsemen in mail, and a still greater number of light-armed. His rank and relationship to the throne entitled him to place the diadem on the head of the sovereign. It was to him that Orodes owed his restoration to the supreme power, from which he had been formerly expelled by his own subjects. Surenas had reconquered Seleucia by his own personal valour, and though not yet thirty years of age, he added to all these claims to honour the reputation of the highest wisdom in council and craft in the face of the enemy.

Abgarus, it seems, found no difficulty in persuading the infatuated Roman to abandon the line of the Euphrates, and strike into the plains which separate it from the Tigris, in the face of this formidable opponent. The general character of the country from Zeugma to the

The Roman army is misled by the treachery of Abgarus.

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 21. 24. It seems probable that Surenas, like Abgarus, was a title, and not an appellative.

Chaboras is both level and sandy, but its barrenness is relieved by patches of cultivated and abundantly fertile soil. Nor are there wanting both streams and wells to supply it with water. There seems, therefore, to be no serious impediment to the progress either of a caravan or an army as far as the river Chaboras, beyond which lies the great desert of Sinjar.¹ It is highly improbable that the army of Crassus ever penetrated into this further region, and we cannot resist the suspicion that the common traditions, upon which the historians relied, ascribed to its march far greater difficulties and privations than it really encountered. Soon after leaving the river side, it is said, the country lost every appearance of habitation and fertility. Boundless tracts of light moving sand presented themselves to the eye, without shade or water, undulating like the waves of the sea. The heat was intense, and the spirits of the soldiers sank under the daily repetition of fatigue without refreshment. Artabazes, harassed by the attack of Orodes, excused himself from despatching the promised reinforcements, and entreated the Roman general to turn his course in the direction of Armenia. Crassus denounced the unfortunate prince as a traitor, and threatened him with the vengeance of the republic as soon as he should have leisure to execute it. His conduct to Cassius was marked with contemptuous disregard, and the officers, who foresaw the perils into which they were hurrying, had no other resource than to wreak their ill-humour in bitter reproaches against Abgarus, who retorted with the coolest assurance, asking if they had expected to make a holiday excursion among shady groves and fountains, in a country of baths and hostelries, like their own Campania. At last, on pretence of executing some secret services he quitted the Roman

¹ This is the great desert of Mesopotamia, which Strabo describes as lying beyond the Chaboras (xvi. 1.).

camp, and escaped from the hands of the enemy whom he had entrapped into the desert.¹

It is evident from this account of Plutarch that he considers the expedition to have proceeded several days' march from the point where it left the beaten route to the next locality which he mentions, the passage of the river Balissus. It was here that Crassus was informed by the piquets which he had sent forward that the Parthians were collected in his front in much greater force than he had been led to expect. If this, then, was the extreme limit of his onward progress, he had not left the Euphrates above fifty miles in a straight line behind him; he had not set foot in the sandy desert at all; nor had he given any indication that he meant to pursue a route through the centre of Mesopotamia, for at this point he had not abandoned the highway that leads from Edessa to Nicephorium and Seleucia. We must either consent to regard the whole account we have received of Crassus's errors and misconduct as unworthy of credit, and the charges against him unproved, or we must apply a correction to Plutarch's geography, and believe that he should have pointed out, not the Balissus, but one of the branches, probably the more western, of the Chaboras, for the spot where the army prepared for combat. However this may be, we now find Crassus taken by surprise, and his army thrown at once into confusion. Hasty preparations were made to meet the enemy; the order of battle was a deep square of four fronts, with twelve cohorts on each side, supported by a body of cavalry not only on the flanks, but also in front and rear. A moment only was allowed for refreshment on the bank of the rivulet, contrary to the advice of the most experienced officers, who recommended a halt and an en-

Geographical difficulties respecting the line of Crassus's march.

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 22.

campment for the night. The troops pushed on till they came in sight of the advancing columns of the Parthian cavalry. The enemy had adopted measures to conceal their numbers till the Romans had come close upon them. When the whole of their forces were revealed, with their sweeping clouds of cavalry, glittering, man and horse, in brilliant armour, their banners waving with silk and gold, and the loud clang of their kettle-drums uttering discordant music to European ears¹, the Romans were appalled at the sudden discovery both of their numbers and resolution. Nevertheless, wearied and breathless

The Roman
and Parthian
armies engage.

as they were, they were compelled immediately to accept the proffered combat.

The shower of arrows with which the Parthians began the fray pierced the armour of the legionary through and through. It nailed his buckler to his arm, and his feet to the ground. Thus far, indeed, he suffered no worse than the ordinary peril to which he was exposed from the first discharge of the skirmishers at the commencement of a battle, except that the Parthian arrow was a missile of unusual strength and sharpness. But the Parthian bowman was mounted, and the Roman foot-soldier in vain attempted to close with him. He could shoot as well in the retreat as the charge, and the onset of infantry threw him into no confusion, and afforded not an instant's relief. His quiver was no sooner exhausted than he repaired to his camels in the rear, and quickly reappeared with his stock replenished. Crassus perceived the necessity of employing his cavalry to disperse the enemy, but their numbers were inadequate to such a service. He directed his son Publius to charge, and the gallant young soldier obeyed with too eager

¹ Compare Flor. iii. 11. 8., and Plut. *Crass.* 24. Milton (*Parad. Regained*, iii.) has amassed from the historians and grouped with poetic brilliance the characteristics of Parthian warfare:

“ He look'd and saw what numbers numberless,” &c.

alacrity. The Parthians gave way, and led him on till they had withdrawn him far from the support of the main body, when they wheeled about, surrounded and easily overpowered his scanty squadrons. Young Crassus fought with resolution to the last, and when every hope of victory or rescue had vanished, caused himself to be slain by his shield-bearer. The father had been flattering himself that the field so suddenly cleared by his son's impetuous charge was already his own. He was awakened from his dream by the return of the Parthians, shouting aloud in triumphant exultation, and brandishing the head of their victim on a pike. Crassus stifled his grief and horror with an effort of despair. He hurried from cohort to cohort, uttering such customary words of encouragement as his alarm or sorrow allowed. The death of Publius, he said, was the loss of a son to his father, but only of a citizen to the republic. But spiritless himself, he was incapable of infusing spirit. The Parthians continued throughout the day to harass the Roman army by a repetition of their usual manœuvres. It was not till nightfall that they allowed them any respite. Not being accustomed to construct camps, they never passed the night in the immediate neighbourhood of an enemy, but retired to a distance, leaving the Romans to make what use they could of the few hours which would intervene before their reappearance. Crassus himself, overwhelmed with grief and mortification, if not with fear, was incapable of suggesting any counsel or adopting any resolution. Cassius and the other officers promptly set him aside, and took upon themselves to give the necessary orders. They determined to retreat without a moment's delay. Compelled to leave behind them the wounded, these unfortunate victims, hopeless of receiving quarter, uttered such piercing shrieks as to reach the ears of the Parthian

Death of the younger Crassus, and retreat of the Romans.

spies, who guessed the cause and reported it. Immediately the horsemen sprang to their saddles, and speedily overtook the retiring legions. But it would seem that their horses, after a long day's service, were unable to keep pace with the headlong rush of desperate men. News of the disaster They take refuge in Carrhæ. was speedily conveyed to Carrhæ, and the Roman garrison which was there stationed issued forth to succour and rescue the remnant of the flying army, which it conducted to an asylum of rest and safety. The Parthians contented themselves with the plunder of the camp and the slaughter of the wounded, together with all the stragglers they could intercept, to the number of several thousands.¹

A report was spread in the Parthian cantonments that Crassus and the principal leaders had abandoned the routed army and effected their escape. Surenas was especially anxious to seize the person of the proconsul, for, according to Oriental notions, the death or captivity of the leader was generally considered decisive of the war. Accordingly, he would have pushed forward in pursuit, and left the fugitives behind him in Carrhæ, had he not obtained by a stratagem the information he sought. Having ascertained that Crassus was within the walls, he collected his forces and determined to beleaguer the place. But the Parthian tactics were not adapted either to the siege or the blockade. The Romans, distrusting their slight fortifications, or unprovided with the means of subsistence, or more than ever anxious to get within their own frontier, escaped from the fortress by night. Each officer seems to have been allowed to make the best of his way with his own division; no attempt was made to conduct the retreat in concert. Cassius succeeded in crossing the Euphrates with a small

The Roman army abandons Carrhæ, and disperses in several directions.

¹ *Plut. Crass.* 27.; *Dion*, xl. 25.; *Flor.* iii. 11. 8.

body of horse; Octavius, with a larger division, reached the outskirts of the Armenian hills, and was almost beyond pursuit, when the imminent danger to which the proconsul was exposed behind him induced him to quit his vantage-ground, and descend to save or perish with his general. The Parthians had come up with Crassus, and were pressing closely both upon his rear and flanks. Yet a few hours more, and the shades of evening would receive him within the mountain fastnesses, among which the cavalry of his pursuers would cease to be formidable. Surenas beheld his prey on the point of eluding his grasp; courage and audacity could hardly secure it, cunning and treachery might yet prevail. He allowed some of his prisoners to escape, after duly preparing them for his purpose, by discoursing in their presence of the goodness and placability of Orodes, and assuring them that the Parthians would be satisfied with fair and reasonable terms of accommodation. At the same time he sent messengers to Crassus to propose a capitulation. The escaped prisoners repaired to the camp of their countrymen, and spread among them their own conviction of the good faith and moderation of the enemy. Crassus had the sense to distrust their representations; but the army became clamorous, and began to threaten violence, shaking their arms in a tumultuary manner. The proconsul believed himself compelled to yield, though not without protesting to his officers that he was coerced by the insubordination of his own soldiers, the greatest disgrace that could befall an emperor. The Parthian chieftain made the fairest professions, and arranged that the meeting between them should take place in the company of a few chosen officers on each side. The Roman emperor approached, attended by his staff, but all, it would appear, disarmed and dismounted. Crassus was received at first with the highest demon-

Stratagem of
Surenas to
engage Crassus
in conference.

strations of respect, and Surenas, according to the Parthian custom, ordered a horse with golden housings to be brought forward for his use. The proconsul would have sent for his own charger, but the Parthian offered him one of his own in the name of Orodes the king. The feeble and bewildered old man was lifted abruptly into the saddle, and the Parthian grooms began to goad the steed and urge him towards the enemy. The attendants of Crassus vainly endeavoured to arrest his doom. Octavius and another officer named Petronius seized the reins, while others attempted to cut them. Confusion ensued, and blows were interchanged. Octavius seized a Parthian's sword, and slew one of the grooms, but was immediately cut down by a blow from behind. In the fray Crassus himself received a mortal wound from the hand of a Parthian named Pomaxaithras. Such was the most credible account of the matter, but nothing certain was known. Others of the Romans fell also in the scuffle; the remainder escaped to the army, and the Parthians now suffered the fugitives to make their way unmolested to the hills. Many, indeed, surrendered to Surenas, who assured them that with the death of their general hostilities should cease. We do not hear that they received any ill-treatment; though, from the temper in which, as we shall see, the remains of Crassus were insulted, we cannot suppose that they met with the respect due to honourable captives. Detained for years among their foreign captors, they ended with adopting their customs and manners, intermarried with the families of the barbarians, and renounced the country of their ancestors.¹ It was

A fray ensues.
Crassus and
Octavius are
killed.

¹ Hor. *Od.* iii. 5. 5.:

“Milesne Crassi conjugē barbarā
Turpis maritus vixit,” &c.

And according to Velleius ii. 82. and Florus iv. 10. M. Antonius, in his campaign of A.U. 718, found prisoners from the army of Crassus

calculated that twenty thousand men perished in this calamitous expedition, and that half that number were made prisoners.

The victor sent the head and hand of Crassus to Orodes; but he would have been better pleased to have conducted his prisoner alive into the royal presence, as he is said to have promised. He amused his soldiers, and gratified his own vanity, by the performance of a ceremony in mockery of a Roman triumph. The proconsul was represented by one of the captives, who was supposed to bear some personal resemblance to him. The substitute was tawdrily arrayed in female garments, and compelled to answer to the title of Emperor, with which his fellow-prisoners were ordered to address him. The voluptuous and dissipated habits attributed to Crassus and his officers were made subjects of scornful ridicule, and the licentious books which were found in the Roman tents were paraded with a mockery of indignation.¹ It seems that the Parthians were well pleased to offer such a spectacle to their effeminate Greek subjects: but they, on their part, failed to draw the inference which their masters intended, and thought it inconsistent in Surenas to deride the licentiousness of the Romans, when he was himself accompanied to the field by his battalion of concubines, and rejoiced in the lewd music and dancing of a train of slaves, and when the throne of the Arsacidæ was so often filled by the offspring of strange and disgraceful alliances. They compared, indeed, his array to the figure of a viper, bristling in front with its armed warriors and

The Parthians amuse their subjects with the spectacle of a mock triumph.

in the Parthian service. Compare Justin, xlii. 5. The day of Crassus's death, vi. Id. Jun. or June 8, is fixed by Ovid, *Fast.* vi. 465. See Fischer, p 253.

¹ It should be observed, however, that Crassus himself was unstained with the grosser vices of his class: "Vir cætera sanctissimus, immunisque voluptatibus." Vell. ii. 46.

horses, but disgusting and squalid behind, with its train of women, with their timbrels, and songs, and bacchanalian orgies.¹

While these events were in progress, Orodes came to terms with the Armenian Artabazes, and accepted the hand of his daughter for his own son Pacorus. This auspicious union received new lustre from the triumph of Surenas. The festivals with which it was celebrated were fashioned upon Grecian models; so soon had the rude descendants of Arsaces resigned themselves to the fascinating luxuries of their semi-Hellenic capital. Orodes was well skilled in the language and literature of Greece; Artabazes even composed tragedies after the Grecian model, and wrote historical works in that tongue. When the head of Crassus was brought to the door of the banqueting hall, a Greek actor from Tralles began to recite appropriate verses from the Bacchanals of Euripides; when the bloody trophy was thrown at the feet of the assembled guests, he seized it in his hands, and enacted with it the frenzy of Agave and the mutilation of Pentheus. The story that molten gold was poured into the mouth of the avaricious Roman is not mentioned by Plutarch, from whom we receive such minute details of the insults practised on his remains. But the testimony of an earlier writer shows that it was already currently reported², nor is there any improbability in the circumstance to induce us to disbelieve it.

Such was the end of the unfortunate triumvir. It was many years since a Roman proconsul had thus miserably perished at the head of an army which he had led to destruction.

Reflections on the death of the Crassi, the father and son.

¹ Plut. *Crass.* 32.

² Florus, iii. 11. 11., at the end of Trajan's reign, about one hundred and seventy years after the event. The commentators on this passage have collected several analogous stories from Appian, Pliny, Justin, Zosimus, and more modern writers,

The names of Carrhæ and Cannæ were coupled together on the bloodiest page of the national annals. The fate of the general was held up by poets and historians as a beacon for the warning of ambitious statesmen, and possibly his errors were magnified to screen the want of conduct and discipline in the licentious armies of the east. Not a single voice has been raised through all ages in lamentation over his untimely death, except in so far as it tended to precipitate the confusion of his country's affairs, and the overthrow of her constitution. But the son deserves at least to be exempted from the pitiless scorn which clings for ever to the name of the father, and to be honoured as the gallant Lausus of Roman history.¹ Enough that his memory has found a shrine in the pages of the philosopher whom he most revered, and of the commander whom he strove to imitate.²

At Rome the year 701 had opened with an interregnum, which was itself an important step in the direction in which the intrigues of Pompeius pointed. The interreges were assigned by a committee consisting of the patrician members of the senate.³ Each interrex in turn held the office for five days only; and the principal object of their appointment was understood to be that they might summon and preside over the comitia for the election of consuls. They discharged, however, in the meantime, the general func-

A. U. 701,
B. C. 53.
Interregnum :
the tribunes
prevent the
election of
consuls.

¹ Virg. *Æn.* x. 811.:

“Quo moriture ruis, majoraque viribus audes?
Fallit te incautum pietas tua.”

² Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* ii. 9.: “P. Crassus, adoleseens nostri studiosissimus.” *Ad Div.* v. 8.: “Hoc magis sum Publico deditus quod me maxime sicut alterum parentem et observat et diligit.” *Ad Div.* xiii. 16.: “P. Crassum ex omni nobilitate adolescentem dilexi plurimum.” Compare *Brut.* 81.: “Erat cum institutus optime tum etiam perfecte planeque eruditus; ineratque et ingenium satis aere, et orationis non inelegans copia; prætereaque sine arrogantia gravis esse videbatur et sine segnitia vercundus.” See also Cæs. *B.G.* i. 52., ii. 34., iii. 7.

³ Aseon. *arg. in Milon.* init.

tions of the chief magistrates. But a power so limited in duration was merely nominal. The executive was paralysed, and almost every one was interested in devising means to terminate so disastrous an interruption to the ordinary course of affairs. The cry for a dictatorship rose more and more loud above the murmurs of personal and party interests, for it was only by the creation of a supreme autocrat that the free-state had provided for disentangling the most desperate complications of her affairs. Pompeius affected indifference, and pretended to keep aloof from the confusion, but his creatures were labouring actively in his behalf. The nobles were full of apprehension and anxiety. Cato unravelled and denounced the plot against the liberties of the commonwealth; Cicero was silent.¹ In the meantime the tribunes, or some at least of their number, continued to play into the hands of the triumvir, by obstinately opposing all attempts to assemble the comitia. In former times, the appointment of interreges had been an object of traditional jealousy to the protectors of the plebs, inasmuch as the constitution allowed the plebeians no share in their election.² But now they not only acquiesced in that temporary arrangement, but seemed resolved to perpetuate it, until the senate should be compelled to resort to the creation of an irresponsible ruler. The nobles, however, held out with more than usual firmness, and even took the vigorous step of imprisoning one of the tribunes, Q. Pompeius Rufus, a grandson of Sulla, whose hostile proceedings were the most violent. To put this bold stroke in execution, they were enabled to employ the strong arm of the triumvir himself. In the absence of consuls and prætors, the tribunes, who since the abrogation of Sulla's enactments, had been constantly encroaching

¹ Cic. *ad Qu. Fr.* iii. 9. "Ego quiesco."

² Liv. iv. 43.: "Coire patricos tribuni prohibebant."

upon the functions of the other magistrates, undertook almost the entire management of the affairs of the city. Even Pompeius was offended at their insolent usurpations. The absence of his colleagues, and the disruption of the peculiar ties which bound him to Cæsar¹, gave a freer scope to the aristocratic prejudices of his youth. He was already revolving in his mind the expediency of returning to his former alliances, when he consented to become the instrument of the senate in thus chastising tribunitian dictation.² He waited for the most graceful opportunity for offering his mediation, and interfered at last to bring the matter to a decision, by prevailing on his own friends to give way, and consent to the election of consuls.³ The ostensible causes of its postponement had vanished, and the ground being cleared, it was only decent in one so studious of appearances to prepare the foundation of a new edifice. The Silent Judgment which the senate had instituted upon the conduct of the several candidates had been put off on various excuses, till the public had ceased to be interested in its prosecution; the competitors stood with erect front before the people whose suffrages they demanded; Cicero himself had defended and obtained the acquittal of

Pompeius at length interposes, and consuls are elected

¹ Pompeius was the more free to act without deferring to Cæsar at this moment because he had just lent him one of his own proconsular legions. Cæs. *B. G.* vi. 1.; Dion, xl. 65. Plutarch (*Cæs.* 25.) says two, but this is an error.

² But such a violation of the sacred person of the tribune must have been an act of flagrant illegality, and we look in vain for any further explanation of the circumstances. The story is told by Dion, xl. 45.

³ Plut. *Pomp.* 54.: αἰδεσθεὶς ἐπεμελήθη. Dion, xl. 46. This writer is incorrect in saying that the dictatorship was offered to Pompeius: the offer was proposed by Luceius Hirrus, one of the tribunes, but the question was never formally entertained. Among other suggestions of the tribunes one was to return to the government by military tribunes, a board of several members. Perhaps it was this that induced Pompeius to take the part of the senate.

Æmilius Scaurus; perjury and corruption raised their heads triumphantly; and it might be expected with reason that no public man would ever be condemned again, except upon a charge of murder.¹ The election fell upon Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala, who at last entered upon their office in the seventh month of the year.²

in the seventh month of the year.

Although the blow had thus been averted for a moment, yet the opinion was rapidly gaining ground, in the midst of these dissensions, that affairs were tending irresistibly to the creation of a dictator. The powers of the state could not long exist by the mere counteraction and collision of one with another. The strength of their materials was too sorely tried. The genuine patriotism and singleness of purpose through which alone, and by no nice adjustment of its functions and forces, the machine of government had in reality been in ancient times preserved, were found to have given way altogether. The constitution of the commonwealth stood in need of an organic change; the exorbitant power of individuals could only be balanced by conferring an adequate share of political importance on the wealth and intelligence of a lower class. Probably the establishment of a permanent military police, such as that which the emperors afterwards maintained in the city, was absolutely necessary to secure the freedom of councils and elections; yet the hand to which this force was intrusted could hardly fail to establish a monarchical domination.

General opinion of the necessity of a dictator.

What was it then that still retarded a consummation which seemed so imminent? It would appear that Cicero and the more moderate politicians whom he represented would have

It is only retarded by the recollection of the proscriptions of Sulla.

¹ This was Cicero's own remark at the beginning of these proceedings (*ad Att.* iv. 16.).

² Dion, xl. 45

acquiesced in the temporary appointment of a dictator, according to the old traditional policy of the state, as at least a necessary evil, fondly blinding themselves to the risk of its becoming perpetual. The knights and others of the middle class would doubtless expect the vigour of an irresponsible governor to overflow in measures for the elevation of their own order. The multitude, always apt to applaud a striking change, had no longer that apprehension of a dictator which he was wont to inspire when he was the instrument of the patricians for overruling the insolence of the tribunes. Even the nobles might have remembered that the last dictatorship had been the creation of their own hands, and all its measures directed to their own aggrandisement. Pompeius, however much he had wavered in their cause, was still the pupil, the follower, the admirer of Sulla, the heir to his fame, to his army, to his political career. Besides, the cautious decorum with which he had conducted himself for many years had secured him the reputation, however unmerited, of moderation and humanity, and he might be expected to make a mild, perhaps a bloodless use of absolute authority. Nevertheless, it was from the nobles that the opposition to this appointment principally came. The proscriptions of Sulla and Marius had made an indelible impression on the minds of the generation next succeeding. The dream of blood still flitted before their unclosed eyes; the name of dictator was indissolubly connected with the idea of unimaginable horrors.¹ The life of a citizen was still sacred in the eyes of the conquerors and butchers of the world. Could a Pompeius bear rule in a state in which a Cæsar was a subject? Unless the one were massacred, the other must be overthrown.

¹ Dion, xl. 45.: πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ Σύλλου αἰσθητὰ ἐμίσειον πάντες τὸ πολίτευμα.

Murder would succeed to murder, revolution would breed revolution. The door to violence being once opened could never be shut against the torrents of blood that would dash through it. The conviction was forced upon them that the question was not that of the appointment of a temporary dictator, but of a succession of tyrants.

The weight of these sentiments and reasonings was reinforced by the ponderous mass of selfish voluptuousness, which, with no extended view of ulterior consequences, would not consent to relinquish or abridge its gratifications at the bidding of a social reformer. No aristocracy was ever more short-sighted at the crisis of its fate than the once glorious patriciate of Rome. It clung desperately to its privileges, not from a fond regard to their antiquity, or their connexion with any social or religious prejudices; disdained to invoke the watch-words of patriotism or utility; it took up its ground upon the enactments which Sulla had made to enhance its own wealth and power and depress those of its rivals, and contended with its assailants upon purely selfish considerations. Without a policy and without a leader the nobles went staggering onward in their blind conflict with the forces arrayed against them, and Pompeius, not daring to take the single step which still remained between him and the post he coveted, left everything a prey to suspense and confusion. At last the force of circumstances had thrust the prize even to his feet; he gazed at it and sighed over it, but did not stoop to take it up.

The appointment of consuls had no effect in restoring public order. The senate indeed passed one decree, ostensibly of considerable importance, which forbade the consuls and prætors to assume the government of a province till the fifth year from the expiration of

Selfishness and blindness of the oligarchy.

Tranquillity not restored by the appointment of consuls.

their office in the city.¹ It was hoped, perhaps, that this limitation would materially check the eagerness of the candidates.² This, however, was the only measure of reform that could be carried. The consuls and senate clad themselves publicly in mourning³ when they found that, as in previous years, it was impossible to effect the election of the ordinary magistrates. Among the various candidates, Milo sued for the consulship and Clodius for the prætorship: the violence of the one and the intriguing spirit of the other rendered any decision more than ever unattainable. The new year opened, like the preceding, with an interregnum. It was speedily distinguished from its predecessor by a flagrant crime and its long train of consequences. In the middle of January it happened that Milo was travelling along the Appian Way. He was accompanied in his carriage by his wife, a large retinue of servants was in attendance upon him, and he was followed, according to his wont, by a troop of gladiators. The object of his journey was at least ostensibly peaceful, since he was on his way to perform certain ceremonies attached to his municipal dictatorship at Lanuvium. At a few miles' distance from the city he was met by Clodius, who was on horseback, with a small company of armed attendants. Such modes of travelling were not unusually adopted for the sake of security even in the neighbourhood of Rome; but the lives of men in the position of Milo and Clodius were never safe from sudden violence, and their journeying with military escorts could be no proof that their designs were sinister, or that the meeting was on either side premeditated. Cicero, in his defence of Milo, lays great stress on

A. U. 702,
B. C. 52.

¹ Dion, xl. 46.

² This judicious enactment we shall find revived under the imperial system of Augustus. Dion, liii. 14.

³ Dion, xl. 45.

the nature of his retinue, which he adduces in proof that he had no intention of waylaying his enemy, while, on the other hand, he tries to fasten a suspicion of the kind on Clodius.

However this may be, a quarrel ensued between the servants on each side; blows were exchanged, and Clodius himself, wounded in the scuffle, took refuge in a tavern by the road-side. The fury of Milo was ungovernable. Violence once committed, he resolved to carry it through. He attacked the house, caused his enemy to be dragged from his concealment, and slain. The corpse lay in the road, till it was picked up by a passing friend, and brought to Rome. The adherents of the murdered man exposed it to the view of the populace, who worked themselves into frenzy at the sight. A riot ensued; benches, books and papers were snatched from the curia in which the senate was wont to assemble, and the tumultuary pyre involved part of the forum in its conflagration.¹ The house of Milo and that of the interrex M. Lepidus were attacked, but the assailants were received with coolness and determination, and repulsed with bloodshed. So great was the popular clamour against the murderer, that he dared not at first submit himself to trial. He was preparing to withdraw into voluntary exile; but his friends rallied about him; the violence of the Clodians worked some reaction of opinion in his favour², and a majority of

Affray
between
Clodius and
Milo:

Clodius slain:

Riot and con-
flagration in
the city.

¹ Dion, xl. 49.; App. B. C. ii. 21.; Ascon. *arg. in Milon.*: "Quo igne et ipsa quoque curia flagravit, et item Porcia basilica, quæ erat ei adjuncta, ambusta est." The burning of the Curia Hostilia and the adjoining buildings cleared the space for the improvements introduced afterwards by Cæsar. There was another great fire in the year 703, in the western part of the forum, that is, nearly on the same spot. Oros. vi. 13.

² Ascon. *l. c.*: "Incendium curiæ majorem aliquanto indignationem civitatis moverat quam Clodii cædes."

the tribunes was known to be generally favourable to his party. He was encouraged to remain in the city and try the effect of wholesale bribery, by distributing a largess among the poorer citizens.¹ But riot succeeded to riot, and the populace refused even to listen to the excuses which the culprit pleaded in his defence. The senate, crippled in its executive branch, felt its authority defied by both parties, whom it could neither mediate between nor confront before an equitable tribunal. It adopted the expedient of nominating a commission, consisting of the interrex, the tribunes and Pompeius, to whom it intrusted conjointly the solemn charge of providing for the safety of the state. Pompeius was allowed to collect a military force to overawe the turbulent multitude. The substance of the dictatorship was thus thrust into his hands; for what authority could his colleagues exert against the commander of an army at the gates, or even in the forum? Still, however, the title was withheld; some secret intrigues prevailed to thwart the cherished wish; still Pompeius hesitated to demand it. Cæsar had by this time arrived at Lucca, and was intently watching the crisis.² His immediate vicinity gave a new stimulus to the efforts of his partisans, and honours were lavishly decreed him in acknowledgment of his late victories. So close at hand, the senate was apprehensive of his not only resenting the elevation of his rival to an avowed dictatorship, but claiming a share in the consular dignity for himself. Accordingly, with the sanction of Cato and Bibulus, the nobles invented a middle way to reconcile the conflicting pretensions of the jealous allies, by refusing Pompeius the dictator-

A commission appointed for the trial of Milo. The substance of the dictatorship thrust into Pompeius' hands.

¹ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 22.

² Cæsar, *B. G.* vi. ult.: "Ibi cognoscit de Clodii cæde."

ship, but decreeing his appointment as sole consul.¹ Pompeius himself was absent from the city; but the public appearance of the candidate was dispensed with; the suffrages of the tribes were not solicited; it is even doubtful whether any forms of popular election were maintained.

The trial of Milo was the principal object for which these irregularities were committed, for it required extraordinary measures to give effect to judicial proceedings in such a case. The character of the accused and the influence which he exerted, combined with the ostentatious lawlessness of his enemies to make a fair decision hopeless. It was the part of a vigorous magistrate at least to repress violence, and for this purpose the consul did not hesitate to fill the avenues to the forum, and even the steps and porticoes of the temples which surrounded it, with files of soldiers², a spectacle never before witnessed by Roman eyes. Cicero, on rising to defend the criminal, was assailed with such cries and menaces from the populace as almost to make him quail from the attempt. The sight of the consul's military dispositions was too

He is declared
sole consul.
A. D. 702,
B. C. 52.

The trial of
Milo: intimid-
ation of his
advocates.

¹ Dion, xl. 50. : τῶ Πομπηίῳ τὴν ἰπατείαν, ὥστε μὴ δικτάτωρα αὐτὸν λεχθῆναι, καὶ μόνῳ γε, ἵνα μὴ ὁ Καῖσαρ αὐτῷ συνάρξῃ, δόντες. Appian, *B. C.* ii. 23.; Plut. *Pomp.* 54.; Liv. *Epit.* cvii.: "Cnæus Pompeius a senatu consul tertium factus est, absens et solus, quod nulli alii unquam contigit." To crown this series of irregularities it must be remembered that he was at the same time proconsul. On all these accounts Brutus branded this appointment as a dictatorship, the assignment of irresponsible power by an irresponsible authority. Quintil. *Inst.* ix. 3. 95. "quale apud Brutum *de dictatura Cn. Pompeii.*"

² Plut. *Cic.* 34.; Schol. Bob. in *Milon.* p. 276.; Lucan, i. 319.:

" Quis castra timentī
Nescit mixta foro, gladii cum triste minantes
Judicium insolita trepidum cinxere corona,
Atque auso medias perumpere milite leges
Pompeiana reum clausurunt signa Milonem ?"

novel and alarming to reassure him. He hurried through his speech, abashed and dispirited: his client lost his cause, and was condemned to banishment.¹ On returning to his own house Cicero recovered to a sense of the glorious opportunity he had lost, and sat down to compose the magnificent oration which has descended to posterity as his defence of Milo.² The orator had executed a splendid declamation, and his vanity prompted him to send it to his client at Massilia. The exile perused it, and replied that he esteemed himself fortunate that so convincing a speech had not actually been delivered, *else*, he said, *I should not now be enjoying the delicious mullets of this place*; a reply which may perhaps have passed with Cicero as a pleasant jest, but which, as Dion shrewdly remarks, must have been meant as a bitter sarcasm on the timidity of the orator in the forum and his vanity in the closet.³

Milo goes into exile. Speech of Cicero pro Milone.

¹ The judges, according to a new enactment of Pompeius, were selected by lot to the number of eighty-one: this number was reduced by challenge on either side to fifty-one. On this occasion their votes were given in the following proportions: "Senatores condemnaverunt xii., absolverunt vi. Equites condemnaverunt xiii., absolverunt iv. Tribuni ærarii condemnaverunt xiii., absolverunt iii." Aseon. p. 53.

Immediately after his conviction on the charge *de vi*, Milo was accused of *ambitus*, and condemned in his absence. He was again accused *de sodalitiis*, of conspiracy, and condemned a third time.

² Dion, xl. 54.: χρόνον ποθ' ὕστερον καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναπαρήσας ἔγραψε. The writer of the Scholia Bobiensia mentions that in his time the original speech was existing: "Existit alius præterea liber actorum pro Milone, in quo omnia interrupta et impolita et rudia, plena denique maximi terroris agnoseas." This must have been the "report" of the speech inserted perhaps in the Acta Diurna. See Leclere's dissertation, *Journaux Publics chez les Romains*.

³ Dion, xl. 54.

CHAPTER XII.

Cæsar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul, A.U. 702, B.C. 52.—Vercingetorix effects a coalition between the Belgians and Arvernians.—Cæsar takes Genabum and Avaricum.—Wise and spirited policy of Vercingetorix.—Siege of Gergovia.—Revolt of the Ædui.—Cæsar compelled to raise the siege: He effects a junction with Labienus in Belgium, and retreats towards the Province.—He obtains a victory, and blockades the Gaulish Army.—Great operations before Alesia.—Triumph of the Romans, and submission of Vercingetorix.—Cæsar's Eighth Campaign, A.U. 703, B.C. 51.—Partial insurrections in the North, West, and Centre of Gaul.—Capture of Uxellodunum.—The conquest of Gaul completed.

WE have seen the death of Crassus begin to bear fruit in the mutual alienation of the surviving members of the triple league, and in the renewed approximation of Pompeius to the party from which he had been so long estranged. During the winter, Cæsar, from his retreat at Lucca, had been a close observer of this change in the political game, precipitated as it had been by the proceedings consequent upon the murder of Clodius. The sole consul had undertaken to maintain the position of the Roman oligarchy by an extensive conscription throughout Italy. At the decree of the great council of the nobles, the youth of the peninsula were marshalled in arms; the Etrurians, the Marsians, the Samnites, and the Umbrians were sworn to defend the senate and people¹ of Rome under the auspices of the new Sulla. It re-

A. U. 702,
B. C. 52.
Cæsar's lenient
policy towards
the conquered
states of Gaul.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 1.: "De senatus consulto certior factus ut omnes juniores Italiæ conjurarent," where *conjurare* is a military term for *simul jurare*.

mained to be seen whether the old allies of Marius would prove a source of strength or of weakness to the enemy who had ventured to invoke their aid. At a crisis of such intense interest it was, we may imagine, from no patriotic motives, nor from a stern sense of duty to his country, that Cæsar again withdrew from the focus of action and intrigue to the obscure banishment of a distant province. While he remained unarmed within reach of the city, even his personal safety was at the mercy of his enemies. With less patience and self-control he might have been excited by the adverse turn of circumstances to make a premature appeal to the chances of war. He might have called at once upon his own devoted legions; he might have thrown himself upon the generous impulses of his friends in the city; even the new Pompeian levies he might have summoned in the names of Marius and Drusus, of Pompædius and Telesinus. But his resources were yet only half developed; the Gauls were hostile and still unbroken. The conquest must be thoroughly completed before they could be bent to his ulterior purposes, and made to serve as willing instruments in his meditated career. The proconsul, in fact, now regarded the magnificent country subjected to his rule not merely as a great province which he had attached to the empire, but rather as a private estate to be organized for the furtherance of his own designs. As such, he made it, in the first place, the nursery of his army, levying fresh Roman legions within its limits, without regard to the authority of the senate, and without recourse to the national treasury. With the same view he quartered his friends and partisans upon the conquered land, establishing them in permanent employments throughout the province, and effecting, through their agency, a systematic development of its resources. The subjugated and allied states he treated with studious forbearance, such as

they seldom experienced from other commanders: he endowed their faithful cities with privileges, and encouraged their commerce, which already flourished in the south under his equitable administration.

But a closer view of Cæsar's policy in Gaul, with its principles and results, must be reserved for another opportunity; it is sufficient for the present to indicate thus far the direction in which it lay. The barbarians were easily seduced by these caresses. They solicited with ardour the honour of enrolment in the Julian gens.¹ The parts of the country where the old aristocratic rule had been most impaired were those which submitted with least reluctance to the Roman domination. Wherever the people had an influential voice in the direction of affairs, they showed themselves generally willing to accept a yoke which promised personal security, equal burdens, and all the enervating indulgences which Rome lavished upon her obedient subjects. Brief and inglorious had been the flourishing period of Gaulish democracy. On the other hand, it was the chieftains principally who were impatient of the conquest. Wherever the power of this class was great, as in the recent uncivilized communities of Belgium, the flames of insurrection might be repressed, but were not extinguished. It was from this indomitable spirit of resistance to their conqueror, not less than from their acknowledged character among their own countrymen, that the Belgians merited the testimony Cæsar bore them, as the most warlike people of Gaul. Even among the Arvernians the sentiments of clan-

¹ In the later history of the Empire, we shall meet with an Africanus, an Agricola, a Classicus, a Florus, an Indus, a Saerovir, a Sabinus, and several others, all of Gaulish extraction, and bearing the gentile name of Julius. It was, however, to Augustus, no doubt, that many families owed their introduction into the Julian house, as he also gave to some of his colonies the designation of Julia, in honour of his adoptive parent.

Favourable disposition of the Gaulish democracies towards him.

ship were not extinct, and the gallant appeals of Vercingetorix could still sway the feelings of the multitude, in spite of the decision of their assemblies, and the maturer judgment of the nation itself.

But upon those parts of Gaul in which the resistance had been vigorous, and where the yoke of conquest was still shaken by repeated revolts, the hand of the proconsul lay heavy. The estates of the chieftains, the ornaments of the cities, the hoarded treasures of the temples, were distributed without remorse among his friends and officers. All that he could withhold from their insatiable appetite he reserved to defray his own lavish expenditure in Rome, to bribe the nobles with money, and cajole the multitude with public benefactions. The triumvirs had vied with one another in courting popular applause by pomp and munificence. Cæsar determined to eclipse the theatre of Pompeius by buildings of greater splendour or utility. The spoils of the Gauls were employed to adorn and enlarge the forum, in which their victorious ancestors had encamped; and the remains of the Julian basilica, on the one side, and the contemporary edifice of Æmilius on the other, still indicate to antiquaries the limits of that venerable enclosure.¹

Cæsar lavishes the treasures of Gaul, enriches his dependants, and decorates the city.

¹ Stat. *Sylv.* i. 1. 29.:

“ At laterum passus hinc Julia tecta tuentur,
Illinc belligeri sublimis regia Paulli.”

Cicero (*ad Att.* iv. 16.) says that Oppius and himself were employed as friends of Cæsar to purchase and lay out a space on one side of the forum, which they effected at a cost of 60,000,000 sesterces, by clearing away a great many private dwellings. The Curia and Basilica Julia, which occupied part of this site, were not begun till some years later (see the chronological tables in Bunsen's *Beschreibung Roms*). Cæsar gave orders at the same time for rebuilding of marble the Septa, or polling-booths in the Campus Martius, and surrounding them with an arcade a mile in length.

The magnificent results thus brought before their eyes furnished the Romans with a vivid idea of the magnitude of the labour by which they had been achieved. Nothing in their history could be remembered equal to them, nothing certainly in the recorded transactions between Rome and Gaul, fertile as they had been to the republic in disastrous defeats and ineffective victories. *Marius*, said the popular orator, *arrested the deluge of the Gauls in Italy, but he never penetrated into their abodes, he never subdued their cities. Cæsar has not only repulsed the Gauls, he has conquered them. The Alps were once the barrier between Italy and the barbarians; the gods had placed them there for that very purpose, for by them alone was Rome protected through the perils of her infancy. Now let them sink and welcome: from the Alps to the ocean Rome has henceforth no enemy to fear.*¹

In the midst, however, of these rhetorical flourishes, it so happened that the Gauls also, on their side, conceived that their cause was on the eve of triumph. They had heard of the confusion which reigned at Rome, of the levies of the youth of Italy, and the apparent imminence of intestine war. They were persuaded that Cæsar was retained beyond the Alps by the urgency of public affairs.² They hoped to be forgotten by Rome, at least for a moment, and determined to make the most of the brief respite which might never again recur. Ten legions indeed remained in their country; but Cæsar was absent. It was the general himself, they said, who had con-

Exultation of the people of Rome at Cæsar's victories.

The Gauls flatter themselves with revived hopes of recovering their independence.

Cic. *l. c.* L. Æmilius Paulus was quæstor of Macedonia, prætor A.U. 701, and finally became consul A.U. 704, with C. Marcellus.

¹ Cic. *de Prov. Consul.* 13, 14.

² Cæs. *B.G.* vii.1.: "Addunt ipsi et affingunt rumoribus Galli quod res poscere videbatur, retineri urbano motu Cæsarem."

quered them, and not his army. The proconsul had previously tried the experiment of dispersing his forces through a great extent of territory, and had suffered severe losses in consequence. This winter he concentrated them more closely together; but the tribes which were not awed by their immediate presence were able to carry on their intrigues the more securely, and succeeded in organizing another general revolt; while he was obliged to trust to the fidelity of the Ædui and Arverni, even for the transmission of his couriers and despatches between the head quarters of his army and his own winter residence within the Alps. The Gauls, indeed, were not without hopes of intercepting him on his return alone, or with a slender escort. But the levies which Pompeius was making in Italy, by the authority of the senate, furnished him with an excuse for strengthening his own armaments, and he employed the period of his absence from Gaul in collecting troops for the fresh campaign he anticipated.¹

The execution of Acco furnished a lively subject of complaint at the secret meetings which the Gaulish chieftains convened in their distant fastnesses² to plan measures of revolt. Such, they remarked to one another, might be the fate of any one among them. Who, then, would venture to strike the first blow in a matter which equally concerned all? To the state which should be the first to rise in arms, promises were held out of national gratitude and reward. The Carnutes accepted the post of honour; they only required that the rest should pledge themselves by an oath of more than usual solemnity to join in the enterprise; for their meetings were too hurried and private to admit of the usual precaution of exchanging

They form an extensive confederacy under the command of Vercingetorix.

¹ Cæs. *B. G. l. c.*

² Cæs. *l. c.*: "Indictis inter se principes Galliæ conciliis sylvestribus ac remotis locis."

hostages for each other's good faith.¹ The leaders of the Carnutes, Cotuatus and Conetodunus, are described by Cæsar as men of violent and desperate character; assuredly they plunged their people into the war with more vehemence than reflection. But the first shock of the barbarians was sudden and irresistible. They threw themselves upon the Roman settlers in Genabum, who were driving their usual trade of money-lending, and made an indiscriminate massacre of them. Still more important was the defection of the Arverni, who were excited to arms against the will of their government by Vercingetorix, a son of the ambitious Celtillus, whose life had been forfeited a few years before for the crime of aspiring to the sovereignty.² Expelled from Gergovia, their capital, the young warrior roamed the mountain tracts of the Cantal and the Puy de Dôme, to this day the rudest fastnesses of Gallic independence, inflaming young and old by his generous eloquence, until they were roused to expel in its turn the government which resisted the movement, and greeted their champion with the title of king. Presently the Senones, the Parisii, the Pictones, the Cadurci, the Turones, Aulerci, Lemovices and Andi, all the tribes of the Mid Seine and the Lower Loire, with many others, joined in one loud cry of defiance to the oppressor. They unanimously saluted Vercingetorix as their leader, and submitted to the levies of men, money and arms which he imposed upon

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 2.: "Quoniam in præsentia de obsidibus inter se cavere non possint, ne res efferatur."

² Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 4. Cingetorix, Vercingetorix, and other Gaulish names, may possibly be analysed into several Celtic words, and the compound, in each case, may be an official designation, such as captain, general, generalissimo (Thierry, *Gaulois*, iii. 86.). In the same manner the name Arminius may be the German Heermann or general. But Heermann (Hermann) is a well-known surname, and the same may have been the case with these Celtic appellatives also.

them severally. He knew the people he had to deal with, how fitfully the military spirit kindled and subsided among them, how strangely gallantry and meanness were blended in their composition. His rule was one of terror and severity. Any appearance of supineness in the cause was avenged with flames and tortures. The loss of an eye or an ear was his lightest punishment for trifling offences.¹

It was to be apprehended that the treachery of the Arverni, who had hitherto kept their faith inviolate, would be followed by that of the Cæsar's energy and decision. Ædui, in whose power it lay to close the only route which remained open for Cæsar to communicate with his army. This was the point to which the views of the Gaulish leader were in the first instance directed, and it required the utmost decision and rapidity on the proconsul's part to frustrate them. It was now the depth of winter.² The Cevennes, which rise to their highest elevation at the point where they form the common frontier of the Province and the Arvernian territory, were thickly covered with snow, and at such a season were regarded as an impassable barrier.³ But Cæsar, who had just crossed the Alps, was

¹ So under Napoleon's regime in France, the most searching severity was necessary to raise and keep together an army, which in the field was full of enthusiasm and self-devotion.

² Owing to the confusion of the Roman calendar at this period, which will be explained in a subsequent chapter, the Kalends of January for the year A.U. 702 fell on the 23d Nov. of the year preceding, according to the true reckoning. (Ideler, *Chronol.* ii. 116.) Pompeius assumed the consulship v. Kal. Mart. or Feb. 25. (Ascon. in *Milon.*), corresponding with the middle of January. This was the time of Cæsar's return to Gaul: "Cum jam ille urbanas res virtute Cn. Pompeii commodiorem in statum pervenisse intelligeret" (*B. G.* vii. 6.).

³ Comp. Plut. *Cæs.* 25.: τότε δὲ χειμῶνος ὄρα, πάγοι ποτάμων καὶ νιφετοῖς ἀποκεκρυμμένοι δρυμοὶ, καὶ πέδια χειμάρροισι ἐπιλεημνασμένα, καὶ πῆ μὲν ἀτέκμαρτοι χιόνος ἀτραποὶ, πῆ δὲ δι' ἐλῶν καὶ ρευμάτων παρατρεπομένων ἀσάφεια πολλὴ τῆς πορείας, παντάπασιν ἐδόκουν ἀνεπιχείρητα Καίσαρι τὰ τῶν ἀφισταμένων ποιεῖν. Lucan evidently refers to this

not to be deterred by a less formidable rampart.¹ He forced his way across them with such troops as he had with him, including his new levies.² By this movement he distracted the attention of Vercingetorix, who was at that moment soliciting the alliance of some neighbouring states, and called him back to the defence of his astonished countrymen. Cæsar left Decimus Brutus in a secure position to harass and occupy the enemy, while he hastened himself back again across the mountains to Vienna, the capital of the Province, collected there some more troops, and took the road through the country of the Ædui to the quarters of his legions among the Lingones.³

Thus, by extraordinary exertions and rapid movements, which are often calculated to terrify an enemy more than the most brilliant deeds of arms, Cæsar placed himself again at the head of his forces, assembled in a formidable mass from their scattered cantonments. The leader of the Gaulish confederacy, reeking from the massacres of Genabum, was menacing Gorgobina, the capital of the Boii. These people, a remnant, as has been

He reaches the quarters of his army, leads it into the country of the Carnutes, and takes Genabum.

exploit, where he describes the Cevennes as snowy mountains, i. 434:

“ Qua montibus ardua summis
Gens habitat cana pendentes rupe Gebennas.”

¹ Silius (iv. 745.) says of Hannibal crossing the Apennines:

“ Prior extingui labique videtur
Gloria, post Alpes si stetur montibus ullis.”

² Cæs. vii. 8.: “ Discussa nive sex in altitudinem pedum atque ita viis patefactis summo labore ad fines Arvernorum pervenit.”

³ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 9.: “ In Lingones contendit ubi duæ legiones hiemabant.” We may conjecture the spot to be that of the Roman station of Andematunum, afterwards Lingones, now Langres. This town stands on a hill rising from a central plateau, and its elevation is said to be the highest of any in France: perhaps it may be identified with the station alluded to by Lucan (i. 397.):

“ Castraque quæ Vogesi curvam super ardua rupem
Pugnaces pictis cohibebant Lingonas armis.”

The hills from which the Marne, Meuse, and Saone take their rise were comprehended under the general name of Vogesus.

before mentioned, of the Helvetic migration, had been settled in this district by Cæsar, and placed under the patronage of the Ædui. To attack them was in fact to assail the fidelity of the more powerful nation, which, it was hoped, might be induced by the danger of its clients to join in the general defection from Rome. Anxious to avert this risk, Cæsar rushed to the defence of the Boii, although the season of the year and the scarcity of provisions presented serious obstacles to the movements of an army. His first object was to march upon Genabum, the possession of which place would intercept the communication of the northern and southern states of the confederacy; while he justly expected that the first rumour of his attack would draw off Vercingetorix from the siege of Gorgobina.¹ With his usual celerity he advanced to the walls before the defenders were apprised of his movements. The meditated assault was only postponed for the moment by the late hour of his arrival. But the Gauls within, astounded at the unexpected apparition of their restless enemy, were preparing to evacuate the town by the bridge which crosses the Loire. As soon as the news reached him that they were about to elude pursuit, he led his troops, already on the watch for the signal, to attack the walls. Fire was applied to the gates, and an entrance easily effected, since no resistance was offered. The flying multitude, impeded by the darkness of the night and the narrowness of the bridge, were captured almost without a blow. The exertions of the soldiery demanded a soldier's reward, while the treachery of the inhabitants gave it a sufficient, or at least a plausible, pretext. Cæsar abandoned the place to fire and

¹ Genabum, or Genabus, is the modern Orleans. Gorgobina, sometimes written Gergovia, of the Boii, is to be distinguished from Gergovia of the Arverni. The Boii occupied a portion of the Æduan territory between the Loire and Allier. The site of their capital is undetermined; but Napoleon III. (*Hist. de Cæsar*, ii. p. 248 note) suggests for it the modern village of S. Parize de Châtel.

sword; the whole of the plunder was distributed among the captors.¹

The proconsul immediately crossed the Loire and entered the country of the Bituriges. He took a fortress named Noviodunum, defeated a detachment of Arvernian cavalry, chiefly through the prowess of some German horse, and proceeded to lay siege to Avaricum, the capital of the tribe, a fortification of great size and strength, known in modern times by the name of Bourges.² Vercingetorix, though not dispirited by these successive disasters, now saw the necessity of changing the plan of operations, in which his countrymen had so long blindly confided. He assured them that the fatal termination of every encounter between the Gauls and the Romans was no reproach upon their valour; that no walls could withstand the skill of the Romans in engineering, no array maintain itself in the field against such weapons and such discipline. But he reminded them that through the winter and early spring the soil on which the enemy trod could furnish him with no provisions. He must disperse his troops among the villages and fortresses, and seize for his subsistence the stores there collected. Let there be no more attempts then, he said, to defy him in the open field; let him rather be followed in detail into every corner where he roamed for sustenance; above all, let the towns which served him for magazines be destroyed by the hands of the inhabitants themselves. The effect of such a mode of resistance must be his speedy and disgraceful retreat, and with it the restoration of liberty to central Gaul, and to every

¹ Napoleon (*l. c.*) maintains that the Genabum of Cæsar's time was not at Orleans, but at Gien, and was afterwards removed to the lower site. He argues chiefly from the circuitousness of Cæsar's route from Agedincum (Sens), his point of departure. But if the only bridge was at Genabum, it might be no loss of time to go round by Orleans. Noviodunum of the Bituriges may very well be Saucerre. (1866.)

² As with many other Gaulish towns, the original name became

other state that should have the spirit to make similar sacrifices.¹

The assembled council of Gaulish states assented gallantly to this proposal. In one day twenty fortresses of the Bituriges were levelled to the ground, and similar havoc was made throughout the territories of the allies. But when the fate of Avaricum itself came to be discussed, whether it should be defended or destroyed, the Bituriges could hold out no longer. Their deputies threw themselves at the feet of the assembled Gauls, and interceded with piteous cries for the preservation of their beautiful and, as they deemed, impregnable city. The hearts of the chieftains were moved to compassion. Vercingetorix at first sternly resisted representations which he knew to be delusive. But when the rest gave way, he at last yielded to the general clamour, and consented that the place should be maintained and an ample force assigned for its defence.

They consent to destroy their own towns, but are induced to spare Avaricum.

The site of Avaricum was admirably calculated for defence. It stood on a hill, and a narrow causeway between a river and a morass afforded the only approach to it.² These natural advantages had been improved by art, and the devoted garrison now proceeded to strengthen their defences within the walls. The combined exertions of the Roman legions were applied to draw lines of circumvallation around them, while the principal force of the Gaulish league watched these operations at a short distance, and cut off the supplies destined by the Boii and Ædui for the hostile camp. While the Bituriges within their city were hard pressed by the machinery which the Roman engineers directed against their walls, the forces of the proconsul, on their side, were harassed by the

Avaricum captured by the Romans.

exchanged for that of the people, i. e. Bituriges, and thence the modern Bourges and the name of the province Berri.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 20.

² Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 17 : Dion, xl. 34.

fatigues of the siege and the scarcity of provisions. Cæsar is lavish of praise in speaking of the fortitude with which his soldiers bore their privations: they refused to allow him to raise the siege; and when he at last led them against the enemy's army, and finding it too strongly posted for an attack, withdrew them again within their lines, they submitted to the disappointment, and betook themselves once more without a murmur to the tedious operations of the blockade. The skill of the assailants at length triumphed over the bravery of the defenders. The walls were approached by towers at various points, and mounds constructed against which the combustible missiles of the besieged were unavailing. Finally, a desperate sally was repulsed, and then, at last, the constancy of the Bituriges began to fail. Taking advantage of a moment when the watch on the walls had relaxed its vigilance, Cæsar marshalled his legions behind his works¹, and poured them suddenly against the opposing ramparts. They gained the summit of the walls, which the defenders abandoned without a blow, rallying, however, in the middle of the town, in such hasty array as the emergency would allow. A bloody struggle ensued; both parties were numerous, and, still burning to avenge the massacre of their countrymen at Genabum, the assailants gave no quarter. The Gauls were routed and exterminated, their women and children mercilessly slaughtered, and the great central city of Gaul fell into the hands of the conquerors without affording a single captive for their triumph.²

The influence of the champion of Gaulish independence, far from declining, rather gained strength by this disaster, for he could represent that the defence of Avaricum had thwarted the policy he so warmly recommended,

Vercingetorix
revives the
courage of the
Gauls.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 27.: "Legiones intra vineas in occulto expeditas."

² Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 22—28.

and to which, in that single instance, the allies had refused to accede. He now instructed his followers, abandoning their regular fortresses, to defend themselves with temporary works, according to the Roman practice, which the Gauls had never before adopted. Nor were the rest of the tribes discouraged: many reinforcements arrived, notwithstanding the great losses the cause had sustained; the numbers of the confederates were recruited by new levies, and the Romans found their enemy no less formidable than before in actual strength, and much more so in experience and confidence.

Hitherto the Ædui had acted with great indecision. They had refused assistance to the Bituriges when that unfortunate people, urged to revolt by the Arvernians, had solicited their protection to enable them to remain faithful to Rome. This refusal, veiled by a flimsy pretext, had thrown the Bituriges into the arms of the confederates, and had brought upon them the destruction of their capital. The attack of Vercingetorix upon the Boii was intended to force the Ædui to a declaration of their sentiments; but Cæsar's sudden diversion on the north withdrew the enemy, and relieved them from this pressure. On the other hand, the proconsul complained that the provisions and stores he required came slowly and scantily to his camp, until the capture of Avaricum gave him abundant supplies. The counsels of the Ædui vacillated through internal divisions. At the commencement of the spring they held their annual election of a vergobret, and then these dissensions came to a head. While a faction among the chiefs tried to thrust into the office a noble of the name of Cotus, who, as brother of the late vergobret, was by the law excluded from it, the priests, at the head of the dominant party, selected a youth of birth and distinction, named in the Roman version of his Gaulish appellation

Vacillating
conduct of the
Ædui, and
divisions
among them.
interference of
Cæsar.

Convictolitans. The rival candidates appealed to Cæsar, and consented to abide by his decision. The popular party he probably considered the most favourable to his own policy, and their appointment he accordingly confirmed.¹ But, having performed this act of friendly interference, he demanded his reward: he required the nation to co-operate vigorously with him, and to furnish him with a contingent of ten thousand men.

Having imposed these orders upon his clients, Cæsar proceeded to divide his Roman forces into two armies. He placed four legions under the command of Labienus, whom he charged to take up his quarters in the country of the Senones, and from thence maintain the obedience of the central states; with the remaining six he crossed from the Loire to the Allier, intending to make his way to Gergovia of the Arverni. His vigilant enemy was not off his guard. Vercingetorix had broken the bridges, and was guarding the fords of the latter river. If the energy of both commanders was equal, the skill of the Roman was superior. By a feigned movement he drew off his adversary's attention, and speedily restored the means of crossing. Cæsar's camp was always furnished with implements and workmen, and he owed much of his success to the skill of his engineers. He transported his army across the Allier with his usual celerity; and Vercingetorix, surprised to find his flank thus suddenly turned, cautiously and firmly declined a general engagement. Cæsar held his course along the left bank of the Allier towards Gergovia, the enemy retreating with no less steadiness

Cæsar enters the country of the Arverni, and lays siege to Gergovia.

¹ There is some obscurity in Cæsar's account of this transaction (vii. 33.): "Intermissis magistratibus" I understand, with Hotoman, to refer to the law that two individuals of the same family should not succeed one another in the supreme magistracy.

before him.¹ He arrived before the ramparts on the fifth day, but was foiled in his turn by finding on inspection that the place was too strong in situation and defences to be captured by assault. It was impossible to form a regular siege until the necessary provision for the troops had been collected and forwarded to the camp. He contented himself for the moment with a successful attack upon an important position in the neighbourhood, carrying it by a bold and skilful movement in the night.²

Meanwhile, Convictolitans, the vergobret of the Ædui, had resolved to betray the patron to whom he owed his appointment, and to precipitate his country into war with the Romans. He took his measures with Litavicus, the commander of the levies which his nation had consented to send to Cæsar, and planned a scheme for 'deceiving the soldiers, and hurrying the people blindly into revolt. In the midst of their march Litavicus suddenly caused his men to halt, and brought forward certain persons whom he had instructed to announce that the proconsul had just put his Æduan hostages to the sword, and reserved the same fate for the very troops who were at that moment marching into his toils.³ The stratagem succeeded; the Æduans, seized with indignation, slew all the Romans within their reach, and Litavicus transmitted the news to Bibracte, with representations calculated to inflame the passions of the nation,

The Ædui revolt, massacre the Roman settlers, are reduced and pardoned.

¹ The site of Gergovia of the Arverni is supposed to be a hill near the Allier, four miles south of the modern Clermont Ferrand in Auvergne. The Romans seem to have neglected Gergovia, and to have founded the neighbouring city, to which they gave the name Augustonemetum. The Roman city became known afterwards as Civitas Arvernorum, in the middle ages, Arverna, and then, from the situation of its castle, *clarus mons*, Clermont. See d'Anville, *Notice de la Gaule, in voc.*; Mannert, II. i. 131. Comp. Napoleon, *Hist. de Cæsar*, ii. p. 268.

² Cæs. B. G. vii. 34—36.

³ Cæs. B. G. vii. 38. : Dion, xl. 37.

and strengthen the hands of Convictolitans by committing it irrevocably to the Gaulish cause. A massacre of the Roman settlers ensued, as the ordinary preliminary of revolt. At this moment, the Æduans in the proconsul's camp, the same whom he was represented to have murdered, were contriving a plot for his destruction. The feebleness of one of the conspirators revealed the danger, and Cæsar marched forth with his usual decision to meet the troops of Litavicus, while they were still awaiting fresh orders from Bibracte. Instead of attacking and crushing them by force of arms, he showed them the persons of their countrymen, whose supposed assassination had excited them to revolt. Overwhelmed with surprise and terror, Litavicus threw himself on the proconsul's mercy. The soldiers disowned the authority of their general; the general disclaimed the acts of his government; every one hastened to plead for himself, and to make the most abject professions of obedience for the future.¹ With these professions Cæsar was forced to be content. The adherence of the Ædui was of too much importance to allow him to indulge in vengeance, or even in just retribution for the murder of his countrymen. He led back the contingent of Litavicus to his camp before Gergovia, where his presence was required to revive the courage of the division he had left behind, which had repelled one attack from Vercingetorix, and was in immediate apprehension of another.

It seemed, indeed, notwithstanding this success, that heavy clouds were gathering around Cæsar's position. He was aware that the Ædui still meditated defection, the more so as they could not persuade themselves that he would persist in his clemency when the danger

Engagement
before the
walls of Ger-
govia; Cæsar
defeated.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 38—44.

of the moment was passed. They held the key of the road which led to his legions at Agedincum, and the situation of his forces, thus separated by a wide tract of hostile country, was eminently precarious. He pressed forward to Gergovia; but with no hope of forcing the Gaulish leader to a battle, or making any important impression upon the centre of the confederacy. He was only anxious to perform some creditable feat of arms, and then withdraw his forces northward without the appearance of a check.¹ Vercingetorix had posted his army midway on the declivity, at the summit of which the city stood, and he had imitated so well the science of his enemies in surrounding his position with fortifications that he could not be compelled to fight. He had also taken possession of several elevated spots in the neighbourhood, from which he commanded the Roman camp in every direction. Frequent skirmishes took place between the cavalry on both sides; and Cæsar gained a momentary advantage by deceiving the enemy with a feigned movement, and inveigling him to a distance from his encampment. The bulk of the Roman forces advanced boldly up the hill, penetrated the almost deserted lines, and found themselves, breathless and astonished at their success, beneath the walls of the town. The Gauls within were struck with panic at this sudden apparition. A cry arose among the unarmed population that the scenes of Avaricum were about to be repeated; the women threw their ornaments and treasures over the walls; some even leaped into the arms of the assailants, hoping to earn their mercy by precipitate submission. Meanwhile, Cæsar, satisfied with the achievement of the day, gave the signal for retreat. He had no intention of making a serious attack upon Gergovia, which he could not hope to take, still less to keep if taken.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 44.

But the ardour of his soldiers had led them too far; the hasty return of the Gaulish army placed them between two enemies. But for the prodigious exertions of the tenth legion, which, under Cæsar's immediate command, hung on the rear and flanks of Vercingetorix, they would have been crushed between the pressure of stone walls and overwhelming numbers. The struggle was long and dubious; the several divisions of both armies seemed inextricably entangled with one another; the unequal combat of horse with foot, of the light with the heavy-armed, of one above with another below, of one behind a wall or a hedge with another exposed and defenceless, all contributed to the uncertainty of the issue and rapid fluctuations of success. The Roman general was at last enabled to draw off his troops with ill-concealed precipitation. So great was their loss, so dire their discouragement, that it was only to save the appearance of a rout that Cæsar postponed his retreat for two days. The Gauls abandoned themselves to the full intoxication of a success beyond their most sanguine hopes. Even the Roman writers enumerated this among the few instances in which their illustrious hero was worsted.¹ Cæsar himself passes it lightly over; nor certainly was his defeat of such extent or character as would have done him serious injury under other circumstances than those in which he actually stood.²

¹ Suct. *Jul.* 25.: "Per tot successus ter nec amplius adversum casum expertus: in Britannia classe vi tempestatis prope absumta; et in Gallia ad Gergoviam legione fusa; et in Germanorum finibus Titurio et Aurunculeio legatis per insidias cæsis."

² Cæs. vii. 52, 53. Dion (xl. 36.) takes the same view. Cæsar takes care to mention that he gained the advantage in two cavalry skirmishes before he abandoned his quarters. On the other hand, Orosius says that he lost a large part of his army, which was certainly not the case. Oros. vi. 11. This author, however, is very ill-informed. He confounds Genabum with Avaricum, and Gergovia with Alesia. Florus (iii. 10.) makes the same mistake.

But the delay of only two days threw a serious obstacle in Cæsar's way. The Ædui, vacillating and inconstant, harassed as they were by the intrigues and solicitations of Convictolitans and Litavicus, yielded at once to their persuasions, on the news of their allies' disaster. Their previous indecision gave place to the most vehement activity. The enthusiasm of the people knew no bounds; they exhibited it by the sacrifice, not of such wretched villages or towns as the Bituriges had committed to the flames, but of Noviodunum itself, the second city in their rich and flourishing country, the mart of commerce, the centre of communications, the magazine and arsenal of the deserted foreigners.¹ Their first act was to slaughter the Roman traders and sojourners in the city; they next demolished the bridge over the Loire, for which they knew Cæsar would make, and then consummated the awful catastrophe of patriotism and devotion. Cæsar had now broken up from before Gergovia. He crossed to the right bank of the Allier, entered the country of the Boii, only less exhausted and barren than that of the Bituriges on the left, and traversed the strip of land which separates the parallel channels of the Allier and Loire. He arrived in front of Noviodunum in time to hear the last crash of the sinking bridge, and see the devouring flames rise triumphantly beyond it. His army was exhausted by its rapid march; it was straitened for supplies; the waters of the rivers were swollen with the first melting of the snows, and the ordinary fords had become impassable. Before him lay a powerful people, long ripening, as he knew, for rebellion, the first signal of whose avowed defection he beheld in the flaming masses before him. The alternative of turning southward and retreating into the Province was

Cæsar retreats
to his quarters
in Belgium.

¹ Noviodunum, the modern Nevers.

opposed by many considerations. The roads were difficult, and the passage of the Cevennes would cost much time; moreover, besides the disgrace of thus skulking from the enemy, it would leave Labienus in a position of extreme peril. In this emergency he did not hesitate for a moment. To consume a single day in building a bridge would have been a fatal delay. But a spot was discovered where the Loire could be forded by wading to the armpits; the soldiers could carry their weapons above their heads. The stream was strong and rapid, but the cavalry were ranged above, and broke the current for the infantry below. If the Ædui had made the best of the occasion, they might have defended the bank of the river against the Romans with great advantage. But Cæsar carried everything before him by the terror of his name. He now supplied himself with provisions in the neighbourhood of Noviodunum, and thence continued his march unmolested until he effected his junction with his lieutenant, who came forth, at his summons, from Agedincum to meet him.¹

This well-combined operation revived the drooping spirits of the Roman legions. The forces of Labienus had engaged in a campaign against the Parisii and some neighbouring states, in which their success had at first been dubious. The growing enthusiasm of the Gauls was constantly pouring fresh hosts into the field; almost every day brought the news of further defections. The issue of the siege of Gergovia was rapidly communicated to the tribes in the north. The revolt of the Ædui was made known to them at the same moment. It was generally believed that the baffled invader had turned

Successful
operations of
Labienus.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 55, 56. Agedincum is generally supposed to be the modern Sens. See d'Anville, Mannert, Walckenaer. An essay in the *Mém. Soc. Antiq. de France* (ii. 397.) maintains the opinion of the earlier critics in favour of Provins.

his back upon Gaul, and was hastening to seek an asylum in the Province. This accumulation of successes had inspired the opponents of Labienus with overweening presumption. They had no leader of consummate caution and experience, like Vercingetorix, to head them; their king Camologenus was unable to control their anxiety for instant battle. Once more engaged man to man in the open field, the Romans gained a complete victory, and this triumph counterbalanced in their minds all the disasters of the campaign hitherto.¹ Labienus could now receive his general with troops elated with victory and flushed with plunder, in quarters abounding with stores and provisions, and in the centre of a tract of country where the hydra of revolt lay stunned and prostrate. Perhaps it was from that moment that the lieutenant began to measure himself with his general, and to murmur secretly at standing second to a leader whose disgrace he boasted of having turned into a triumph.

The tranquillity thus temporarily restored in the north afforded indeed a respite of great importance to the proconsul's plans. He had assembled all his ten legions, nor had their complements been much diminished by the checks they had hitherto sustained. But his cavalry had suffered very severely, and he was precluded from the possibility of drawing recruits from the Province. He turned his eyes towards Germany, and the promise of pay and booty allured to his standard several bands of horse, together with the light-armed runners, who were accustomed to combat by their side. But the horses of the Germans were unequal to those of Gaul, and Cæsar did not hesitate to dismount himself and his officers to furnish them with chargers of better quality.² Meanwhile, the confederates re-

Great preparations on both sides.

¹ Cæs. B. G. vii. 57—62.

² Cæs. B. G. vii. 66.

ceived the Æduans into their alliance with open arms. Whatever distrust they might be disposed to entertain towards a people who had betrayed their countrymen in the first instance, and deceived them more than once since, every suspicion must vanish before such devotion to the cause as that which all their public acts now displayed. They had surrendered their ancient claim to precedency among the Gaulish states, and relinquished the command of the combined armies to the brave Arvenian. Having seized at Noviodunum the Gaulish hostages whom Cæsar kept there in honourable custody, they made use of them to confirm the fidelity of some tribes, and to stimulate the sluggishness of others. So successfully did they wield this instrument of coercion, that when the general assembly met at Bibracte, there were only three states, it was said, from whom no deputies arrived. These were the Remi, the Lingones and the Treviri: the first had been uniformly devoted to Rome; the second were controlled by the presence or proximity of the Roman armies; the third had suffered severely in previous struggles, and as they had been left to defend themselves without assistance from the states of Southern Gaul, so they did not now choose to form a combination with them.¹

While Vercingetorix was preparing to march in quest of Cæsar with an overwhelming force, he did not neglect ulterior measures. He sent a division of his troops to organize a diversion against the Romans in the Narbonensis, by a combination of force and intrigue. With the Allobroges he adopted a similar course; though he could not persuade them to unite their arms with his, they took measures to defend the points at which the upper Rhone could be crossed, so as to anticipate any attempt the proconsul might make to regain the

Cæsar retreats from Belgium towards the Province.

¹ Cæs. *B. G.* vii. 63, 64.

Province in that direction.¹ They rightly conjectured the plan which Cæsar's necessities would cause him to adopt. It was impossible for him to remain in his actual position, having lost all communication with the south: but his united forces were formidable, from their numbers as well as their valour, and he might presume on cutting his way to the Province through all opposition. What were his ulterior views he gives us no intimation; but he left no troops in garrison behind him; nothing but the terror of his name and the deep discouragement inflicted by so many triumphant campaigns. He conducted his march without hurry or confusion, and seemed to court rather than avoid the attack of the enemy. But he abandoned the direct route through the territory of the Ædui, and repaired to the left bank of the Saone, expecting perhaps to experience from the Sequani less organized and effective resistance.

Vercingetorix came up with the Roman army in the high country of the Upper Saone; but, adhering still to his old tactics, delayed an engagement. For some days he followed its movements at a short distance; possibly he distrusted the power of the Allobroges to check it on the Rhone; possibly the ardour of the Gallic chieftains was too impetuous to be withstood. In an evil hour, trembling lest his enemy should at length escape him, he, too, was carried away by the vain confidence of the national character, and gave the signal for battle.² Never, indeed, was the chivalrous spirit of a gallant people more thoroughly awakened. The chiefs engaged themselves by mutual oaths not to return from the field till they had twice ridden through the enemy's ranks. Cavalry was the force in which the Romans were most deficient, and in which the Gauls most boasted of their strength; for

A great battle ensues: personal danger of Cæsar.

¹ Cæs. B. G. vii. 65.

² Cæs. B. G. vii. 67.

their horsemen belonged to the class of the rich and noble, better armed and equipped, and inspired with a more martial spirit than the multitudes which followed them to the field on foot. Cæsar, always found at the point where the danger was greatest, was this day engaged with the cavalry, as in his great battle with the Nervians he had done the duty of a legionary. At one moment he was so nearly captured that his sword was wrested from him, and remained in the hands of his enemies.¹ The Arvernians caused it to be suspended in one of their temples, and of all military trophies this assuredly was the noblest.

The steady Roman and the impetuous Gaul were well matched in the desperate struggle of that day. At length a dexterous movement of the German squadrons checked the hot onset of the Gaulish horse, and gave the legionaries room to open their lines and charge in their turn. The unwieldy masses of the barbarian infantry had not yet learnt to face this formidable shock. The men, hastily imagining that they were outflanked, lost their presence of mind, broke their ranks, and fled precipitately. Their careful leader had provided a retreat for them in three camps which he had fortified in the rear. The Gauls rallied, but it was only for a moment; many of their principal chieftains had been slain or taken; the panic became more than ever irretrievable; and Vercingetorix was compelled to abandon the defence of his position, and guide the flying multitudes to the neighbouring city of Alesia. Here, besides the enclosure of the place itself, situated on the level summit of a high escarped hill, a large camp had also been constructed and fortified with every appliance of art for the reception of eighty thousand men.²

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 26.

² *Cæs. B. G.* vii. 69. Alesia is supposed to be the modern Alise Sainte-Reine, to the west of Dijon. Mannert, ii. i. 175. So also Napoleon, *Hist. de Cæsar*, ii. p. 299.

Thus failed the rash attempt to bring the retreating lion to bay. But even though the battle was lost, the cause might have been maintained by recurrence to the harassing system in which the Gauls had hitherto, with one exception, so steadfastly persevered. If their vast forces had been dispersed or drawn out of Cæsar's immediate reach, and the country wasted around him, he would not, we may presume, have ventured to protract an indecisive warfare under pressure of the circumstances which urged him to seek the Roman frontiers. The victory he had gained would in that case have been destitute of any decisive result. But the fatal mistake of assembling the whole Gaulish army in one spot, and there tying it, as it were, to the stake, offered an opportunity for a daring and decisive exploit. Few strokes in warfare have been more prompt and bold than the last Cæsar now made in his retreat, and his turning to attack the enemy and terminate the struggle at a blow. At this moment Cæsar risked every thing; all the plans of conquest which he had established and matured in Gaul; all the schemes of ulterior aggrandisement over which he had so long brooded; his life, his reputation, all were hazarded at this eventful crisis. For if he now escaped into the Province, he might hope to organise a future invasion; another series of campaigns might restore him to that supremacy which he had just forfeited beyond the Rhone; or he might leave the unfinished task to a successor, and hasten himself to retrieve his fortunes by some popular act of audacity in Rome. But he saw the whole flower and strength of Gaul self-cooped in a single encampment, and determined to abide his attack. He had thoroughly calculated his own strength. He was at the head of a larger force than he had ever mustered before; and he collected his energies for one decisive struggle, with just confidence in a crowning success.

Bold resolution of Cæsar to attack the Gauls in their fortified camp at Alesia.

The preparations which Cæsar made to carry out his resolve were on a scale proportioned to its grandeur. He formed a line of circumvallation round the whole of the enemy's works, thus blockading in one sweep both the camp and the city, an army of eighty thousand men, and the population of the place swelled with an innumerable crowd of fugitives. The exultation they had felt at their late triumphs, and their indignation at their recent reverses; the taste of blood they had obtained in the massacres of Genabum and Avaricum; their horror at the slaughter of their countrymen at Noviodunum and Bibracte; all they had done and all they had suffered, had combined to harden the minds of the legionaries, and divest both men and officers of the common feelings of humanity. The Gauls, too, had had their moments of triumph and exasperation, of vengeance and despair; the same causes had produced on them no less frightful effects; the nerves of both parties were strung to the uttermost, and both were equally prepared for every extreme of infliction or endurance.

If it was with these feelings that the two armies faced each other from behind their breastworks, the events of the siege daily added to them fresh bitterness. Vercingetorix, discovering the fault he had committed, made an attempt to break the Roman lines by means of his cavalry. But here again the Germans turned the fortune of the day, and the Gauls, beaten back with loss into their entrenchments, suffered sore discouragement. Their leader felt increasing alarm. He knew how rapid must be the progress of scarcity in such a host as was cooped up with him, which he dared not again lead forth to combat. He dismissed a great part of his horse, with the commission to scour the country far and near, and summon tribes and cities to his assistance.

He forms a blockade: exasperation of both armies.

The Romans successful in a cavalry skirmish: they pass the blockade: desperation of the Gauls.

But this could not be done effectively in the short period during which he might hope to maintain his post; as the operations of the enemy were pressed more resolutely and decisively, it became necessary to repel the approach of famine by extraordinary measures. The Gaulish chieftains were animated with the most desperate resolution; it was deliberately proposed to sanction the killing and eating of human beings. For the present, indeed, this horrible counsel was rejected. But another alternative, hardly less shocking, was adopted: all the non-military population which had crowded within the lines, the women and children, the sick and the aged, were expelled from the city and the entrenchments. The Roman general was unrelenting; he too was steeled in this last struggle against every ordinary feeling of humanity, and he ordered the helpless multitude to be driven back upon their countrymen with showers of stones and darts. Between the trenches of their friends and the bristling ranks of their enemies, the miserable victims perished by wounds or hunger.¹

The Roman general, apprehending the arrival of the enemy's succours, had not only completed a line of circumvallation in front of the Gaulish fortifications, but had strongly entrenched himself in the rear also. The confederate states had hastened to send reinforcements to Vercingetorix; they had not waited for the tardy result of a general levy, which it would have required time to arm and equip, but had furnished each a contingent as far as their means allowed them. A numerous army was thus speedily collected round the circuit of the Roman entrenchments, and a ray of hope gleamed upon the ramparts of Alesia, when the signal was given for a simultaneous

The Romans are attacked by a Gaulish army in the rear, but repulse and disperse them.

¹ *Cæs. B. G. vii. 78.*

advance upon the invaders both from within and from without their lines. The Romans had furnished their fortifications with every implement of defence, in which art they were not less skilful than in that of attack. Pressed as they were by a great superiority of numbers, and scattered themselves along lines of immense extent, their activity and science supplied every deficiency; and, though the danger was imminent, they eventually succeeded in repelling every assault. The conflict, indeed, was repeated from day to day, but always with the same result. The assailants from within, animated by despair, renewed the attack with unabated vigour; but those without, whether worse armed or led by less experienced generals, or unnerved by the means of escape always open to them, gave way before the sallies of the besieged Romans, and at last broke up their camp and retreated in disorder.

The result of the original blockade was now inevitable. It could only remain a question with the Gauls, whether they should die with arms in their hands, or yield themselves to the vengeance of the exasperated enemy. Then, at last, did Vercingetorix come forward and offer to give himself up as a ransom for the blood of the Gaulish nation. If conquered in the open field, no terms, he knew, would be granted to the combatants or their country; but if they capitulated, even at the last moment, some conditions might, perhaps, be extorted from the prudence, if not the clemency, of the conqueror. The wrath of the proconsul might, he hoped, be appeased by a splendid sacrifice. This, indeed, had not been a contest between rival nations; according to the maxims of the republic, the confederation of Gaul was a rebellious conspiracy. Vercingetorix himself had at one time cringed under the power of the intruding government; he was known personally to Cæsar; he had

Vercingetorix
offers to devote
himself for his
country.

received favours from him; and he was marked out for signal vengeance for what was denominated his treason, not less than for his bitter hostility to Rome. The ancient superstition of many nations declared that the self-devotion of the chief is accepted by the gods as an atonement for the people; and Vercingetorix, who had been the principal instigator as well as the most conspicuous leader of the revolt, now claimed the honour of being its last victim.

The Gauls were touched with their hero's generosity. Before accepting his magnanimous offer they sent a deputation to Cæsar to negotiate the terms of a capitulation.

He surrenders himself to Cæsar.

The answer was stern and ominous. It demanded the surrender of their chiefs, the delivery of their arms, the submission of the whole multitude to the discretion of the Roman general. Vercingetorix, with all the gallant gaiety of his nation, clad himself in his most splendid armour, and mounted his noblest charger. Cæsar had drawn up his troops in front of the lines, and had seated himself to receive his captives. The Gaul caused the gates of his encampment to be thrown wide, and galloped forth into the open space, in the attitude of a warrior charging. Having approached close to the proconsul's chair, he dexterously wheeled round, and again returning to the same spot sprang to the ground and laid his arms at the feet of the conqueror. The army was touched with a sense of admiration akin to compassion, but Cæsar himself remained cold and unmoved.¹

The Roman general had now broken the neck of resistance. Whatever further delay there might be in the complete pacification of Gaul, a judicious mixture of forbearance and severity would disarm it of all danger. It was his habit to calculate every movement, nor at this

Harshness of Cæsar, and cruel fate of Vercingetorix.

¹ *Cæs. B. G.* vii. 89.; *Dion*, xl. 41.; *Plut. Cæs.* 41.; *Fior.* iii. 10.

crisis of his fortunes did he allow himself to yield to any impulse of impolitic magnanimity. To gratify the Roman populace he reserved the champion of Gaul to grace his future triumph. To appease the cupidity of his soldiers he allotted to each of them one of his captives as a slave. All the Arvernians and Æduans among them he liberated, with the view of winning back their countrymen to their former state of submission. We read of no punishment being inflicted upon the other Gaulish chieftains, and we may hope that an occasion which casts a deep shade upon Cæsar's character for generosity did not at least tarnish it with the stain of vindictiveness. Nevertheless, the worst remains to be told. At the spot where the triumphal car turned to the left to commence the winding ascent of the Capitoline hill, another path led in a contrary direction to the state prison in the rock. The noble captives who had thus far followed the wheels of the conqueror were here removed from the procession, and put to death in the fatal dungeon at the same moment that he entered the temple of Jupiter. Such had been the custom of the republic from the times of its original barbarism; hallowed by antiquity and perhaps by superstition, the progress of refinement had not availed to soften it; and thus the brave Vercingetorix ultimately suffered death after six years of confinement.¹

¹ Dion, xl. 41.: ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐν δεσμοῖς ἔδησε, καὶ ἐς τὰ ἐπινίκια μετὰ τοῦτο πέμψας ἀπέκτεινε. In the same manner C. Pontius, the Samnite general, was sacrificed at the triumph of Q. Fabius Gurgus, A.U. 464. Jugurtha was cast into prison and starved to death, A.U. 650. But Perseus and other conquered enemies were released. Compare Cicero (ii. *in Verr.* v. 30.): "At etiam qui triumphant eoque diutius vivos hostium duces servant, ut his per triumphum ductis pulcherrimum spectaculum fructumque victoriæ populus Romanus percipere possit; tamen quum de foro in Capitolium currum flectere incipiunt, illos duci in carcerem jubent; idemque dies et victoribus imperii et victis vitæ finem facit." It should be remarked, however, that Dion Cassius is the only authority for this

The lenient policy which the proconsul now adopted towards the Arvernians and the Æduans seems to have been eminently successful. The governing class in both these states had in fact been driven into the war against their own inclination; the elevation of Vercingetorix to supreme command had been a source of much bitter jealousy to the chieftains in both tribes, and they submitted again to the Roman yoke quietly, perhaps even gratefully. The spirit of resistance, however, was not quelled in other parts of Gaul. For the most part, indeed, the better organized governments declined a hopeless and ruinous struggle; but wherever the influence of any single chief was preeminent, or where, as among the Carnutes, the authority of the Druids was all-powerful, the smouldering flames found fuel among a restless and harassed population, and new armies continued to spring up in inexhaustible abundance. From the absence of a presiding spirit, they relapsed indeed into the same want of unity and concert which had paralysed their early efforts at defence.¹ Cæsar flew from state to state with the extraordinary activity which always distinguished him. He crushed the Bituriges by an

A. U. 703,
B. C. 51.

Further disturbances in parts of Gaul. Cæsar's eighth and last campaign.

fact, and that his charges of cruelty against Cæsar, where he can be confronted with the statements of others, are frequently disproved.

¹ Auct. B. G. viii. 1. In the eighth book of the Commentaries on the Gallic war we have no longer Cæsar himself as our guide. Suetonius attributes it to one of his officers, Aulus Hirtius (*Jul.* 56.). The style is formed on the model of Cæsar's, but is inferior to it both in elegance and clearness. But, like the preceding books, it is the work of an eyewitness, and seems to be equally trustworthy. In this place the author gives as a reason for the desultory warfare into which the Gauls relapsed after the loss of Vercingetorix, their despair of overthrowing the enemy in a general engagement, and their hope of wearing out his troops by attacking them in detail. It is more probable that the loss of the only leader who had ever succeeded in uniting them in a common enterprise was irreparable.

incursion into their territory in the depth of winter.¹ No sooner had he regained his quarters than he rushed forth again upon the Carnutes, scattered all opposition, and drove the disaffected beyond their own frontiers to take refuge under the standards of the Belgians.²

It was indeed in this quarter of Gaul, which had taken less part in the exhausting campaigns of the last two years, that the resistance to the Romans was most organized and effective. On the one hand, the Bellovaci and Suessiones combined together, and having no fortified towns to tempt them to defy the military science of their enemy, assembled in vast numbers in a position of peculiar natural strength, a hill enclosed in thick forests, and surrounded by impassable swamps. On the other, the Treviri, always proud to stand alone, defied the foreigner to set foot in their territory. Cæsar undertook the reduction of the first of these opponents, and deputed to Labienus that of the second. He threw causeways across the swamps, drew long lines of entrenchment before the face of the enemy, drove them from one position to another to avoid his circumvallations and the fate of the victims of Alesia, and at last compelled them to join in a general combat, the crisis by which every Gaulish campaign was finally decided. Thoroughly beaten and routed, with the loss of Correus, their king, and a vast number of their fighting population, the Bellovaci hastened to excuse their revolt, under the plea that the senate could not resist the influence which their sovereign possessed with the multitude. This excuse was probably not altogether false; but it suited Cæsar to rebuke it sternly, at the same time

Cæsar defeats
and accepts
the submission
of the Bello-
vaci.

¹ Auct. *B. G.* viii. 2. He began his march the last day of the year 702: "Pridie Kal. Jan. ab oppido Bibraete proficiscitur."

² Auct. *B. G.* viii. 3—6.

that he made a show of clemency, by sparing the nation which he had so effectually humbled.¹

Nor had Labienus in the mean time been less successful in defeating the forces of the Treviri²; so that the campaign in Belgium was speedily reduced to the irregular warfare for which the country was so well adapted.

The Treviri and Eburones again put down: a revolt of the Pictones quelled.

Commius, the Atrebate, at the head of a band of German cavalry, whom he maintained by the plunder of Roman convoys or stations, was constantly flitting from place to place. Ambiorix continued to stimulate the zeal of the small remnant of the Eburones, till they were finally exterminated by a second massacre. In the west of Gaul, amidst loud notes of preparation for a general rising against the Romans, an important diversion was made in their favour by the adherence to them of Duratius, one of the principal chiefs of the Pictones.³ He seized and occupied Lemonum, the capital of their country, and, by so doing, kept both the Andi and the Armoricans in check. The neighbouring tribes assembled in great force to reduce him by a siege; all the troops the Romans could spare were sent to his assistance; and the result of a great battle fought on the banks of the Loire, was the total rout of the confederate army.

Upon the dispersion of this multitude, a small band once more rallied under the standard of a chieftain named Drappes.⁴ The Romans branded them as a handful of robbers, fugitives, and slaves, united only by the hope of plunder, and unworthy of the common rights of war. This little troop crossed the country hastily to the southward, and prepared to attack the north-western frontier of the Province, in expectation of sympathy and aid from various quarters, and especially from

Reduction of Uxellodunum, the last Gaulish stronghold.

¹ Auct. *B. G.* viii 6—22.

² Auct. *B. G.* viii. 26.

³ Auct. *B. G.* viii. 25.

⁴ Auct. *B. G.* viii. 80.

Aquitania. But the speedy arrival of two legions in pursuit forced them to abandon this bold enterprise, and shut themselves up in the strong fortress of Uxellodunum.¹ Here they made a desperate resistance; Cæsar himself hastened from the north to conduct the siege, the last important operation that now remained to be performed; and with the reduction of this stronghold, the conquest of Gaul may be said to have been completed.²

The proconsul, whose policy it now became to soothe by forbearance the passious of the chieftains and regularly organized states of Gaul, made a severe example of the rabble captured in Uxellodunum. He did not put them to death, nor sell them into slavery; in either case their persons would vanish from the sight of their countrymen, and their example be speedily forgotten. As a more permanent memorial of their crimes, and the condign judgment which had overtaken them, he cut off their right hands, and threw them thus mutilated upon the compassion of their neighbours. Gutruatus, a rebellious chieftain among the Carnutes, he sacrificed to the importunate demands of his soldiers. In making these terrible examples, his historian coolly remarks, he well knew his own reputation for clemency, and was satisfied that no one would suspect him of personal cruelty.³ Commius, the champion of the Atrebates, whose romantic adventures invest him with a greater interest than most of his fellow-chieftains, was allowed to surrender himself upon honourable terms. Labienus had acted towards him with signal perfidy. Pre-

¹ Uxellodunum, le Puy, or Puech d'Usolle, in the Quercy, department du Lot. Thierry, *Gaulois*, iii. 195.; d'Anville.

² Auct. *B. G.* viii. 43. Plut. *Cæs.* 75.

³ Auct. *B. G.* viii. 38. 44.: "Cæsar quum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret, neque vereretur, ne quid crudelitate naturæ videretur asperius fecisse," &c.

Cæsar treats
the enemy
with severity.
Final pacifica-
tion of Gaul.

tending that the repeated rebellion of the Gaulish chieftain justified any treachery on the part of his enemies, he had sent Volusenus to meet him in an amicable conference, and to seize the opportunity of assassinating him.¹ Struck on the head and almost stunned, the Gaul was saved by the promptitude of his attendants. Partly through apprehension and partly through indignation, he never ceased to regard the Romans with peculiar horror, and determined never again to meet one on terms of peace. The same Volusenus was afterwards employed to pursue the Atrebate from fastness to fastness: the excitement of the chase was added to the bitterness of their mutual hatred. Commius, constantly reduced to the utmost straits, still succeeded in eluding his pursuer; but Volusenus at length approached his prey incautiously; the hunted chieftain turned at bay, and pierced his enemy through the thigh.² M. Antonius, who was now commanding in Belgium, was anxious to bring these hostilities to an end; and, both parties being equally tired of the unprofitable contest, overtures of reconciliation were made and accepted, Commius only stipulating that, in the amicable arrangement of the conditions, he should never be personally brought into the presence of a Roman.³

The last book of the Commentaries on the Gallic war, which have so long guided us, is supplied by the pen of one of the proconsul's officers; nor is it likely, from the character of the record which Cæsar himself has left, that if he had completed the work with his own hand, he would have chosen to gratify our curiosity with any general delineation of the state of the province at the conclusion of his eight years' labour. A writer of a much later age has thought

Pictures from the ancient writers of the state to which Gaul was reduced.

¹ Auct. B. G. viii. 23.

² Auct. B. G. viii. 48.

³ Auct. B. G. l. c.

fit to embellish a feeble narrative with a picture which might have struck our imagination more had the colours been less elaborate. *Let the reader conceive, says Orosius¹, the languid and bloodless figure of Gaul, just escaped from a burning fever and inflammation of her vital parts; let him remark how thin and pale she is, how helpless and nerveless she lies; how she fears even to move a limb lest she should bring on a worse relapse; for the Roman army rushed upon her as a plague stronger than the strongest patient, which rages the more, the more resistance it encounters. The thirst that consumed her was her impatience at the demand for pledges of her perpetual servitude; liberty was the sweet cold draught for which she burned; she raved for the waters which were stolen from her.* Or let him turn to a passage of a very different character, the cold and dry enumeration of Plutarch, which seems to bear the impress of the very words of Cæsar himself²: *He took more than eight hundred cities by storm, worsted three hundred nations, and encountered, at different times, three millions of enemies, of whom he slew one million in action, and made prisoners of an equal number.* Which ever of these two records be thought the most impressive, the reader will feel that enough has been said to account for the long prostration of the energies of Gaul from this time forward, and for the almost passive endurance with which it submitted to the establishment and development of the provincial administration.

¹ Oros. vi. 12.; comp. Thierry, *Gaulois*, iii. 206.

² Plut. *Cæs.* 15.

CHAPTER XIII.

Pompeius, as sole consul, undertakes the reform of abuses: his ill success: he connects himself again with the oligarchy by espousing the daughter of Scipio.—Cæsar intrigues to obtain the consulship before relinquishing his province. — Cicero accepts the government of Cilicia: his civil and military administration.—The nobles seek to deprive Cæsar of his command.—M. Marcellus insults him by the harsh punishment of a transpadane Gaul.—Pompeius falls sick.—Rejoicings for his recovery.—Cæsar conciliates the Gauls.—Strength and composition of his army: his popularity with the soldiers.—Character of the younger Curio: his devotion to Cæsar's interests.—Cæsar received with acclamations in Cisalpine Gaul.—He fixes his quarters at Ravenna.—He offers a compromise with the senate, which it refuses, and requires him to resign his command.—The tribunes interpose, are menaced with violence, and thereupon fly to Cæsar's camp.—
A. U. 702—704, B. C. 52—50.

WHEN Pompeius entered upon his office as sole consul, he submitted his reputation as a statesman to a crowning trial. His position was in substance that of a dictator, but without the odium of the name. But, in return for the irresponsible power which formed the peculiar feature of this extraordinary charge, no less was expected from him than to direct the stream of public affairs back into the old channels which it had deserted, to repair the youth and vigour of a decaying commonwealth, and to restore the spirit of a constitution which seemed only to survive in forms and traditions. The work of Sulla was the model which the nobles thrust under his eyes, still cherishing the vain hope that he possessed the genius no less than the desire to restore an oligarchical supremacy which the march of events had rendered impossible. But if the champion they had sum-

Comparison of
Pompeius and
Sulla.
A. U. 702.
B. C. 52.

moned to their side was ambitious of wielding the power of his early patron, his motives were merely personal and selfish. The dictator, indeed, had thrown himself in implicit faith upon the principles of his faction. The ascendancy of his class was the object to which his career was devoted; he was no less ready to become the martyr than the champion of his political creed. As the spirit of the two men differed, so did the comprehensiveness of their views, and the vigour of their execution. If Sulla was blinded by his original prejudices to the real evils of his times and their true remedies, he at least felt and acknowledged the responsibility which he assumed. He placed his object steadily before him, and cut out a complete constitution, such as it was, with two or three rough strokes of the chisel. It was the work of a master, complete, consistent, fulfilling its idea. But Pompeius, on the contrary, was satisfied with the tentative palliation of a few prominent abuses; he probed nothing to the bottom; he removed some scandals for the moment, but made no attempt to reach the sources of evil. In one respect only the dictator and the sole consul acted alike; neither the one nor the other submitted to the trammels to which they had subjected their countrymen. Sulla, in his zeal for social reformation, had enacted new and severe laws against violence, immorality, and extravagance; but in his own person he was notorious for the indulgence of prodigal tastes and licentious passions.¹ The correctives which Pompeius applied to social abuses were subtler in their character; but he, too, scrupulous as he was in all matters of public decorum, could not restrain himself from the violation of his own laws for transient political purposes.²

¹ Duruy, *Hist. des Rom.* ii. 297.

² Tac. *Ann.* iii. 28.: "Tum Cn. Pompeius tertium consul, corrigendis moribus delectus, et gravior remediis quam delicta erant,

The methods which the consul devised to protect the political tribunals from undue influence were frivolous in the extreme. The selection which he is said to have made from the three privileged orders of the persons who might be chosen by lot to exercise the functions of judges may have purified the bench from the neediest and most openly profligate of its members; but the vices of venality and partiality were common to the noblest and the most abject, and it was not by merely removing the scum from the surface that the fountains of justice could be really cleansed. The limitation of the number of advocates, and the restriction of the speech of the accuser to two and of the defendant to three hours, were trifling reforms in procedure; but the latter at least deserves notice from the importance subsequently attached to it as forming an epoch in the eloquence of the bar¹; and it may undoubtedly be regarded as a symptom of the desire of wise and thoughtful men to diminish the undue weight of rhetorical appeals to the passions. It had been moreover a common artifice to overawe the judges by bringing forward the testimonies and protestations of distinguished men in favour of the accused. A letter of Cæsar or Pompeius expressing his regard for the culprit, his assurance of his innocence and wishes for his success, might be read in open court with no little effect upon the interested parties in whose hands the decision lay.² This was another instrument in

Reforms introduced by Pompeius.

suarumque legum auctor idem atque subversor, quæ armis tuebatur armis amisit." It is curious to observe the aristocrat of so late an age still clinging to the conviction that the evils of the times were not so great as Pompeius chose to represent them, and that he betrayed his party by the extent to which he carried his reforms.

¹ Auctor *de Caus. Corr. Eloq.* 38. Cicero himself seems to have thought the restriction reasonable and convenient (*Brut.* 94.).

² Asconius in his Commentary on Cicero's pleading for Scæurus (A. U. 700) cites, apparently from the documents of the trial, the names of the personages who used their influence in this way: "Laudaverunt Scæurum consulares novem. L. Piso, L. Volcatius,

the machinery of corruption which the consul considered a fitting object of his specious reforms. But trifling as these matters were in themselves, they combined to assist in breaking down the rude independence of the judicial system, in which the judges and the advocates had played into each other's hands, in defiance both of the government and of popular clamour. Notwithstanding the partial reforms which had been effected since the time of Sulla, the *quæstiones perpetuæ* were still the stronghold of aristocratic monopoly. Every attempt, however superficial, to amend them, contributed to reveal the unfairness of their operation. Degraded in the public estimation, they lost their ancient hold on the feelings of the citizens, and the intrusion of armed soldiers at Milo's trial, though adapted only to the convenience of the moment, and with no ulterior designs, was in fact a significant intimation that the ascendancy of the nobles had fallen for ever under the military domination of generals and dictators.

It is not to be supposed that Pompeius was acting in these proceedings with far-sighted treachery towards the party with whose interests he had connected himself. He considered his own exalted position to rest mainly upon public opinion, and, in the discharge of his

His conduct at the head of affairs.

Q. Metellus Nepos, M. Perperna, L. Philippus, M. Cicero, Q. Hortensius, P. Servilius Isauricus pater, Cn. Pompeius Magnus. Horum magna pars per tabellas laudaverunt qui aberant, inter quos Pompeius quoque; nam quod erat pro consule, extra urbem morabatur. Unus præterea adolescens laudavit, frater ejus, Faustus Cornelius, Sullæ filius. Is in laudatione multa humiliter et cum lacrymis locutus non minus audientes permovit, quam Scaurus ipse permoverat. Ad genua judicum, cum sententiæ ferrentur, bifariam se dividerunt qui pro eo rogabant: ab uno latere Scaurus ipse, et M'. Glabrio, sororis filius, et Paulus, et P. Lentulus, Lentuli Nigri Flaminis filius, et L. Æmilius Buca filius et C. Memmius, Fausta natus, supplicaverunt; ex altera parte Sulla Faustus frater Scauri, et T. Annius Milo, et T. Peducæus, et C. Cato, et M. Octavius Lenas Curtianus."

functions as state reformer, his object was to maintain the influence of the senate, as the inveterate enemy of his own rival Cæsar, just so far as he could do so without sacrificing his own popularity. He would have been content with the praise due to the specious palliatives which he had devised for long-condemned abuses, and neither aspired nor expected to lay the foundations of a new political system. He persuaded his friends that the desertion of Milo, of whose popularity with his party and unreserved devotion to them he was jealous, was a necessary sacrifice to appearances.¹ But having made this specious concession to the demands of outraged law, the consul was anxious to exhibit the impartiality of his justice, and now encouraged proceedings against the friends of Clodius who were implicated in the disturbance.² Even among the nobles indeed Milo had made many enemies; the historian Sallustius resented a private affront, and had been one of the loudest in clamouring for his condemnation.³ He had kept clear, however, of any act which could involve him in the guilt of sedition. Sextus Clodius, less prudent or less fortunate, was accused and condemned for the breach of the public peace; and as soon as their year of office expired, the tribunes Pompeius Rufus and Munatius Plancus, both highly connected and adherents of the senate, were brought nevertheless to the bar of justice. The reformer took no step to avert the punishment of the first of these; but for the other he condescended to write a letter to be read before the judges, thus using his influence precisely in the

¹ Pompeius pretended to believe that Milo had plotted against his life. Ascon. in *Milon.* 67.; Veil. ii. 47.: "Milonem reum non magis invidia facti quam Pompeii damnavit voluntas."

² Dion, xl. 55.: διὰ τὴν τοῦ βουλευτηρίου ἔμπρησιν.

³ Ascor. in *Milon.* Gellius (xvii. 18.), on the authority of Varro, tells the story of Sallust having been discovered by Milo in adultery with his wife, and severely chastised.

way which his own enactments expressly forbade.¹ This indecorous proceeding gave deep offence. It was a manifest breach of the law as well as a gross act of partiality. Cato denounced it with all the weight of his blameless reputation.² The accused thereupon excepted against him as one of his judges; but though his challenge was admitted, he was notwithstanding condemned by a majority of voices. In this suddenly awakened zeal for purity and fair play, the criminals who excepted against Cato were generally condemned, so strong a presumption of guilt did it seem to shrink from the sentence of a judge whose integrity stood so high in public estimation.³ The year of Pompeius's consulship was distinguished by the multitude of cases in which the conduct of men of all shades of political opinion was submitted to judicial scrutiny. He passed a law to compel the prosecution of all the charges of bribery with which the various candidates for office since the year 699 had been menaced.⁴ A curious provision was adopted to stimulate the flagging zeal of the accusers. The culprit who was suffering himself under conviction for a similar crime might obtain remission of his own penalty by conducting to a successful issue a charge against another.⁵

¹ Dion, xl. 52. 55. ; Plut. *Pomp.* 55.

² Val. Max. vi. 2. 5.: "Huic facto persona admirationem ademit. nam quæ in alio audacia videretur in Catone fiducia cognoscitur."

³ Plut. *l. c.*, *Cat. Min.* 48. ; Dion, *l. c.*

⁴ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 48. This was the year of Pompeius's second consulship. Appian (*B. C.* ii. 23.) makes the retrospective operation of this act extend to his first consulship in 684. Cæsar's friends are said to have complained of the indignity of bringing their patron's consulship (695) within the period thus stigmatized for its corruption, and possibly the limit was contracted on this account. Hoeck, *Römische Geschichte*, i. 149.

⁵ This privilege continued under the emperors, and tended to multiply the number of *delators*. Tac. *Ann.* vi. 7.: "Sed Minucius et Servæus dampnati indicibus accessere."

It seems, however, that the alliance of Pompeius with the senate, and the alienation from Cæsar which all his proceedings attested, gave new life and strength to the functions of government. Not only did the consul arm himself to enforce the execution of the laws, but he provided, by a salutary measure, against their violation, in forbidding the citizens to carry weapons within the walls.¹ The riddance which had been made both of Milo and Clodius, together with many of their noisiest adherents, freed the forum from the tumultuary bands by which public business had been so long impeded. The tribunes learned to be more cautious in their opposition, and the people, no longer caressed or menaced by rival demagogues, became good-humoured and manageable. Such was the early promise of the military tyranny which the consul and senate had virtually introduced into the city. The consul's success was obtained by favour perhaps not less than by the display of force. The commission he had received for provisioning the city gave him the opportunity and the means of distributing grain to the populace. This usage, which had originated in the legislation of C. Gracchus², had been turned to the maintenance of the senatorial ascendancy by the astute policy of Cato. Under his direction it had served to soothe the irritation of the people on the defeat of the Catilinarians.³ Fatal as it eventually proved to their liberties, and even to their prosperity, it conciliated them at the time to the governments which fed them, and became a shield in the hands of the oligarchy against the

His administration produces salutary effects.

¹ Plin. *H. N.* xxxiv. 39. If the words are to be taken literally, he forbade even the keeping of arms: "Magni Pompeii in tertio consulatu exstat edictum, in tumultu necis Clodianæ, prohibentis ullum telum esse in urbe."

² Cic. *pro Sest.* 48

³ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 26.; see Hoeek, *R. G.* i. 112.

attacks of demagogues, which they could not refrain from using, notwithstanding the warnings of Cicero and the more far-sighted of their statesmen.¹

Nevertheless, Pompeius was not unconscious of the hollow and unsubstantial nature of the reforms he had devised. The permanence of the little good he had effected could only be assured by the military power on which it was really based. A few months must reveal the imposture, and the termination of his extraordinary office would be hailed as the dethronement of a tyrant. Great as were his abilities in the conduct of affairs, and free as he was from the passions which so frequently cloud the judgment of statesmen, untrammelled by avarice or sensuality, with few personal hatreds or partialities, nevertheless his character exerted no ascendancy over others. Always artful, he had no ingenuity in concealing his artifice. He was suspected by all men, and he could impose upon none. His moral nature was as repulsive to those who came in contact with him as that of his great rival was attractive. He felt that his sole consulship was after all a failure, and he hastened to throw off the responsibility of ineffectual power. Upon the dissolution of his connexion with Cæsar by the death of Julia, he had determined to retrace his steps, and ally himself, by another marriage, with the heads of the oligarchy. He offered his hand to Cornelia, the widow of the younger Crassus², whose father, Q. Cæcilius Metellus Scipio, was one of the leading members of the senate, and a sworn enemy of the

Pompeius, dissatisfied with his position, courts the alliance of the oligarchy.

Marries Cornelia, and associates her father Scipio with himself in the consulship.

¹ Cic. *l. c.*, *ad Att.* i. 16.: "Illa concionalis hirudo ærarii misera ac jejuna plebecula."

² Appian, ii. 25.; Dion, xl. 51.; Plut. *Pomp.* 55., who gives a pleasing account of her character and accomplishments. The warm praises which Lucan lavishes upon her are a testimony to the traditional prejudices of the nobility in her favour.

Marian faction. He now seized the opportunity of cementing this interested alliance by associating his new father-in-law with himself in the consulship for the latter half of the year. The people, if indeed they were consulted in the matter, made no difficulty in accepting his nomination, and the senate was pleased with an act of condescension to its wishes, though it probably despised the weakness which dictated it.¹

But in this proceeding, also, Pompeius betrayed the same disregard for the provisions of his own general policy which we have before remarked. Scipio was himself one of those over whom, as a recent candidate for the consulship, a charge of bribery was impending; and it required the consul's interference to avert the consequences of a prosecution which his own enactment had encouraged. Another instance of the reformer's inconsistency was still more flagrant, and served to crown the impatience of the people, who acknowledged in after times that Cæsar's subsequent treason was provoked by the lawlessness of his rival. It will be remembered that the consuls of the preceding year had obtained the enactment of a law whereby the curule magistrates were forbidden to take a province till after the lapse of five years from the termination of their office. It does not appear whether the framers of this restriction had any other object in view than to check the inordinate ambition of the aspirants to wealth and power; but when Pompeius, in the exercise of his sovereign authority, renewed and confirmed it², his purpose was to deter Cæsar from suing for the consulship. The position of Cæsar's game was so critical, that he was compelled

His inconsistent and arbitrary conduct, and unfairness towards Cæsar.

¹ In divesting his sole consulship of its exclusive character at the end of six months, Pompeius seems to have acknowledged that it was a dictatorship in disguise.

² Dion, xl. 56.

to keep his enemies in check at every move ; if he once allowed the lead to be taken from him he was lost. As long as he was at the head of an army in Gaul, he could despise the impotent clamour of the oligarchy : if he could obtain the consulship without previously laying down his command, he might then enter the city and return to civil life with security. From the curule chair he might descend once more to the proconsular camp, and place himself again at the head of the armies of his country. But the interval which was now appointed to elapse between the two offices which were essential to his safety seemed to threaten him with certain destruction. Pompeius could not indeed suppose that so bold and skilful a statesman would resign himself without a struggle to the prosecutions with which his enemies threatened him, as soon as they could get him within their toils ; but he calculated on his precipitating himself into a revolt against the state, and dashing himself with senseless desperation against the senate, the veterans and the conqueror of Mithridates. Thus, presumptuously confident in his superior resources, he was unconscious of the moral force with which he furnished his rival, when, in the face of this very enactment, he retained his own proconsular appointment, and even caused it to be prolonged to him for another period of five years.¹

The senate, however, exulted in the advance it had made, and believed that its path was now clear before it, and that its mortal enemy must soon fall into its hands. Cæsar, on his part, in the midst of the overwhelming cares and perils of war, kept his eye intently fixed upon the progress of affairs in the city, and saw that his only hope now lay in the errors of his antagonists. His term of government was approaching its close, while his opponents

Critical position of Cæsar.

¹ Dion, xl. 56.

were eagerly pressing to have it cut short at once. At the moment of its expiration, as soon as he should become once more a private citizen, denuded of troops and employments, a charge of malversation would undoubtedly be preferred against him. The conduct of his proconsular government would be subjected to invidious scrutiny, the daring acts of his consulship would be denounced and punished.¹ He could expect neither justice nor mercy from the powers whose position in the city seemed now impregnable. But could he only obtain the consulship, he had yet another stroke to make, in spite of the restriction which his enemies had so craftily devised. He might employ his year of office in reviving the spirits of his own party, in recovering the affections of the people, which had cooled, apparently, during his long absence, in infusing fresh vigour into the tribunes, in forming new alliances, and breaking the phalanx of his enemies by the numerous modes of corruption in which he was so well versed. As a last resource, he might flee from the city like Lepidus or Catilina, and raise his voice from the Alps to the veterans of either Gaul. Though better aware of the strength of his resources than his contemptuous enemies, yet it is evident that he felt the extreme rashness of throwing off his allegiance to the state while he had yet no plausible excuse for it, and that he did not decide upon that course till he had no other alternative, nor till his enemies had revealed to the world the injustice of their conduct, and to himself the weakness of their counsels.

Such then were the prognostications which Cæsar drew from the conduct of his adversaries in their enjoyment of power; such were his resources, and such his hopes. Nor did he delay to act. His first counter moye was to employ some of his friends among the tri-

He intrigues to be permitted to stand for the consulship while still absent from the city.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 30.

bunes to submit a law to the people, authorizing him to sue for the consulship without being present in the city; that is, without laying down his command previously. From a comparison of the various conflicting accounts, the confusion of which throws great uncertainty upon a point of considerable interest, we may conjecture that this authorization was meant to be a special exception in Cæsar's case to the general provisions of the existing law, by which the candidate's presence was required; a law which, as we have seen, had frequently been dispensed with in similar instances; and further, that Pompeius, jealous of the tribunes' interference, took the matter out of their hands, with the promise to settle it by a declaratory enactment, in which the existing law should be confirmed with some provision for special exemptions. This enactment, it seems, had passed; it had been engraven in the usual way on a brazen tablet, and actually deposited in the public offices, before Cæsar's friends observed that the promised exception in his favour had not been distinctly made. A great clamour was raised, and Pompeius was obliged to come forward and acknowledge that an oversight had been committed. The error was reluctantly corrected, by the insertion of the name required; but the transaction could only add to the imputations of treachery and inconstancy under which the consul already suffered with either party.¹

¹ The authorities are strangely contradictory:—

1. Cic. *ad Att.* viii. 3. says: "Pompeius contendit, ut decem tribuni plebis ferrent ut absentis ratio haberetur, quod idem ipse sanxit lege quadam sua."

2. Appian, ii. 25.: τὸν δὲ δημάρχους ἔπεισεν (ὁ Καῖσαρ) εἰσηγήσασθαι νόμον . . . καὶ τοῦθ' ὑποτείνοντος ἔτι τοῦ Πομπηίου καὶ οὐδὲν ἀντεπίοντος, ἐκεκέρωτο.

3. Dion (xl. 56.) speaks of the law as entirely the work of Pompeius, and says that the provisions for exemption were so large as to render it nugatory.

4. Suet. *Jul.* 28.: "Acciderat ut Pompeius legem de jure magistratum ferens, eo capite quo a petitione honorum absentes submo-

The tenor of Scipio's administration of office was quiet and unobtrusive. The only measure attributed to him was the repeal of the popular Clodian enactment which had deprived the censors of one of their most important functions, the power of degrading unworthy members of the senatorial order. But the temper of the times was unfavourable to such delegation of irresponsible power even to an ancient and venerated magistracy. Private character was no longer confided in as a guarantee for the honourable discharge of a public trust. As long as the censor was prohibited by law from noting the infamy of his fellow citizens, his office might seem indeed shorn of its former lustre; but he was exempt himself from the jealousies which so invidious a duty must otherwise have heaped upon him. But when the restriction was removed, he had no longer an excuse for inaction; all connivance at vice was construed into fear of offending the powerful; the reputation of the censor and of his office sank together, and no man with any regard to his character coveted from henceforth a position which had once been the most honourable in the state.¹

Scipio restores
the authority
of the censors.

The consuls were succeeded in the year 703 by M. Claudius Marcellus and Servius Sulpicius Rufus without disturbance or impediment. They both belonged to the party of the oligarchy: the former was animated by peculiar hostility to Cæsar; the other was a man of whom the nobles were justly proud, on account of his great reputation as a jurist.² Their

Consuls for
the year 703.
M. Claudius
Marcellus and
Servius Sul-
picius Rufus;
defeat of Cato.

vebat, ne Cæsarem quidem exciperet, per oblivionem; ac mox lege jam in æs incisa, et in ærarium condita, corrigeret errorem."

¹ Dion, xl. 57.

² Cic. *pro Muren.* 10, 11, 12., *Brut.* 41.; Gell. vi. 12. &c.; Quintil. x. 1.

influence with Pompeius was such as to secure their election against Cato, who had declared himself also a candidate, but whose independence of character was feared by the men in power. The candidates, it is said, abstained from bribery; authority and intimidation may have served instead. But the successful suitors for the suffrages of the tribes had put on the garb of flattery and condescension; to which Cato, who maintained all the stiffness of the antique virtue, refused to bend.¹ His impracticable purism sustained a fatal defeat, and he determined from thenceforth to decline all further competition for public honours, by which conduct he inflicted, probably, a serious injury upon his unfortunate country, which stood so much in need of honesty among its rulers.

The position which Cicero had lost as a political leader might be compensated to the state by the activity and success with which he applied himself to the business of a pleader in political causes. For some years there was, perhaps, no cause of importance in which his eloquence was not put in requisition for the accusation or the defence; and his name grew more and more illustrious, both for the brilliancy and the effectiveness of his harangues. On the one hand, he defended and saved Saufeius, a friend and associate of Milo²; on the other, he did not shrink from accusing Munatius Plancus³, at the risk of offending Pompeius. Nor did he quail before the threat of a public impeachment himself: once released from the persecution of Clodius, who seems to have had a greater mastery over his courage than any other of his enemies, his confidence in his own powers was unabashed, and he defied the malice of the world. Cicero seems indeed

Cicero's activity in pleading.

¹ Dion, xl. 58.

² *Æsc. in Milon.* p. 54.

³ Dion, xl. 55.; *Cic. ad Div.* vii. 2.

to have recovered, in these congenial occupations, some portion of his earlier spirits and sanguine temper. Though in his private correspondence he still expressed himself in despair for his country's destinies, yet that he did in fact retain hopes of better days appears from the interest he continued to take in those, among the rising generation, who seemed to give the greatest promise of goodness and wisdom.¹ Such seems to have been his opinion more particularly of the younger Curio, the son of Scribonius, whom the experienced statesman delighted in educating, to fill hereafter, as he fondly imagined, the highest places in the state, to the advantage of the commonwealth.² Yet this was the young patrician whom Vettius, as we have seen, had implicated in the alleged conspiracy against the triumvirs, and against whom Cicero himself had uttered expressions of no little bitterness: we cannot doubt that his early years were stained by the worst vices of his time, such as, in a more sober period at least, would have left little room for auguring from him a more useful and honourable manhood. But in those times of sudden change, the dissipation of youth might yet give place to better counsels and the growing strength of a manly character: the abilities of Curio were brilliant, and his disposition had some natural bias towards the good; his recent quæstorship of Asia had opened his mind to larger views of interest and duty, and his sphere of action was expanded

His attachment to Curio, and hopes of him.

¹ Abeken (*Cicero in sein. Brief.* p. 186.). It was in this year that he wrote the treatise *de Legibus*. Fiseher, *Röm. Zeittafeln*, p. 260.

² The family of Curio was distinguished for its talents. Plin. *H. N.* vii. 41.: "Una familia Curionum, in quâ tres continua serie oratores exstiterunt." Schol. Bob. in *Clodian. et Curion.* p. 330. ed. Orell.: "Tres illis temporibus Curiones illustri nomine exstiterunt, atque ita in libris adhuc feruntur: Curio avus, qui Servium Fulvium incesti reum defendit, et hic, C. Curio pater qui P. Clodio affuit, et tertius ille Curio tribunitius," &c.

by the death of his father, a man of considerable influence among his order. Cicero exerted himself to the utmost to develop the latent seeds of good in his favourite and pupil; and it would seem that the young man had already made some return for this care, by the zeal with which he had served his monitor in the affair of Clodius.¹

Cicero obtained an honourable reward for the courage he had recently displayed, in the acquisition of the place in the College of Augurs rendered vacant by the death of Publius Crassus.³ Hortensius proposed and Pompeius lent his countenance to this appointment³, and the only drawback to the complacency of the successful candidate was the obscurity of his competitor Hirrus. The office itself he considered one of the most dignified which a citizen could enjoy⁴; and his vanity could plume itself on unsubstantial dignities, when real power eluded his grasp. But the law of Pompeius, which restricted the administration of the provinces to such magistrates as had completed their term of office five years previously, left a gap in the ordinary succession to these governments, which could only be filled by invoking the services of the consuls and prætors of past years, who had already served, or, perhaps, had declined to serve at a distance from Rome. Among the number of the latter was Cicero, whom the alluring temptations of the proconsulate had never yet induced to abandon that position in the city which he considered the only proper sphere for the exercise of his accomplishments. Nor was he less reluctant now to accept the commission which was thus, in a manner, forced upon him. He saw more clearly, perhaps, than others, though few were altogether blind to it,

Cicero obtains a place in the College of Augurs.

Accepts with reluctance the government of Cilicia.

¹ See Cicero's Letter to Curio, *ad Div.* ii. 1.

² Plut. *Cic.* 36

³ Cic. *Brut.* 1.

⁴ Cic. *de Legg.* ii. 12.

the imminence of a decisive struggle between the leaders of party; he was slackening in his attentions to Cæsar, and attaching himself more closely to the culminating fortunes of his rival; and he flattered himself, perhaps, that his own presence might supply the deficiency of public virtue which he still mournfully remarked in his patron's counsels. But to obey the call of the commonwealth was the point of honour with the Roman statesman; and when Syria and Cilicia were assigned to himself and Bibulus, the latter was the province which fell by lot to his hands.¹

The province of Cilicia was of considerable extent, and of no less military importance. It comprehended, besides the narrow district ^{State of Cilicia.} between the Taurus and the sea to which the appellation more properly belonged, the countries of Pisidia, Pamphylia, Isauria and Lycaonia, together with the three districts of Southern Phrygia, distinguished by the names of their respective capitals, Laodicea, Cibyra and Apamea.² To these was added the neighbouring island of Cyprus. From the moment that he reached the frontiers of his government the new proconsul was called upon to exercise the military functions, so foreign to his habits and education, which the republic imposed upon the rulers of her subjects, no less than the administration of her laws. In Lycaonia he met his army, which ought to have consisted of two legions, but was reduced in numbers by the absence of some cohorts.³ It was necessary to advance without an instant's delay to the eastern extremity of the province, in order to check the insolence of the Parthians, who were threatening an irruption into the Roman territory, nor less to control the disaffection of the king of Armenia, who, as we have seen, had lately formed a family alliance with

¹ Plut. *l. c.*² Cic. *ad Div.* xiii. 67.³ Cic. *ad Div.* iii. 6.

the victors of Carrhæ. Cicero stationed himself at Cibystra at the foot of the Taurus.¹ This place was within the frontiers of the dependent kingdom of Cappadocia, where Ariobarzanes II. occupied the throne upon which his father had been placed by the Romans. A conspiracy against him was on the point of breaking out, and it was only by the presence of the proconsul and his legions that it was repressed; but the king was with difficulty able to maintain himself against the rebellious spirit of his subjects, fostered, no doubt, by the intrigues of his Parthian neighbours. Cicero could not afford to detach any troops for the defence of his capital or person; the terror of the Roman name was all the assistance he could lend him; but this was sufficient to check the apprehended revolt. The smallness of the military force which was assigned for the support of the dependent sovereigns, for repressing the discontent of the provincials themselves, for overawing the predatory tribes of Isauria, for withstanding the encroachments of the Parthians or Armenians, cannot fail to move our astonishment. It is calculated certainly to impress us with an exalted notion of the moral influence exercised over the provinces by the vigour of the Roman administration, and the more so at a moment when a large army had so recently been lost almost within sight of the frontiers. It must be remembered, however, that Cicero himself complains of the inadequacy of his forces; and his friend Cælius accuses the uniform misconduct of the senate in leaving its generals in the provinces miserably ill-provided for the services they had to perform.² Cæsar and Pompeius were already draining the ordinary resources of the state, and diverting the flower of the Roman youth into their own camps. The pro-

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* v. 18.

² Cic. *ad Att.* v. 18., and Cælius to Cicero, *ad Div.* viii. 5

consul was obliged to make a levy of Roman citizens in his province, while he trusted to the goodwill of Deiotarus, the king of Galatia, to double his numbers with auxiliary troops. But the expedient of enlistment did not answer his wishes; the number of the Romans in those parts was small, and they were reluctant to quit their lucrative employments for the perils of military service. Bibulus, who made the same complaint in his government of Syria, relinquished the attempt as wholly unprofitable.¹

The apprehensions of a Parthian invasion which the proconsul of Cilicia entertained, were relieved by the high spirit with which Cassius Longinus defied it in Syria with the remnant of the army of Crassus.² After his general's fatal discomfiture, Cassius had retired to Antioch, resolving to provide for the safety as well as the internal administration of the province until he should be superseded by the arrival of a new proconsul. In the preceding year he had repulsed some Parthian squadrons which had ventured to cross the frontiers of the Roman territory. While Cicero was still advancing leisurely from Rome to assume his command in Cilicia, Pacorus, the son of Orodes, appeared again with larger forces, and in a more determined attitude, almost before the walls of the Syrian capital. Cicero claims the merit of having emboldened Cassius by his proximity to bring the enemy to a decisive engagement; but a comparison of dates clearly shows that the victory which the latter now obtained was some weeks previous to Cicero's arrival at the foot of the Taurus.³ Nor did Bibulus

The aggressions of the Parthians checked by Cassius.

¹ See Cicero's complaints in an official despatch to the consuls and senate (*ad Div.* xv. 1.).

² *Liv. Epit.* cviii.; *Dion.* xl. 29, 30.; *Vell.* ii. 46.; *Joseph. Ant. Jud.* xiv. 7.

³ Fischer, *Röm. Zeittafeln*, p. 260.; comp. *Cic. ad Att.* v. 20. with *ad Div.* xv. 4

appear in time to reap any share in his lieutenant's laurels. The Parthians seem to have been sufficiently discouraged by their successive defeats; they refrained from any further demonstrations of hostility; and to pursue them into their own country demanded greater forces, and perhaps bolder leaders, than the Roman power in the east could at that moment furnish. Accordingly, the new proconsul abstained from the prosecution of any military enterprise against the enemy; but he kept a watchful eye upon their affairs, and fomented a family quarrel in the Parthian court, which resulted in the revolt of Pacorus against his father.¹

The citizens of Rome seem to have derived some amusement from contemplating the novel situation of their peaceful philosopher, in the heart of a country swarming with banditti and half-reclaimed pirates, and with clouds of Parthian cavalry rolling in his front. But Cicero was ably supported by his brother and other officers; and when the more serious danger had passed away, he was far from shrinking from the safer though less glorious warfare which the state of his province demanded. He chastised the marauders of the mountains in more than one expedition²; his soldiers complimented him with the title of Imperator, and the senate rewarded him with the honour of a Supplication.³ For his own part he was so much dazzled by his own exploits as to fix his heart on the distinction of a triumph.⁴ Indeed we may reasonably feel at a loss whether most to admire the ability of the man who could thus acquit himself with credit in

Military exploits and civil administration of Cicero.

¹ Dion, xl. 30.

² See Cicero's official despatch (*ad Div.* xv. 4.); comp. Plut. *Cic.* 36.

³ Cælius to Cicero (*ad Div.* viii. 11.).

⁴ Cic. *ad Att.* vi. 6.: "Amicorum literæ me ad triumphum vocant." Comp. *ad Att.* vii. 1., *ad Div.* xv. 6.

a career so alien from the studies of his life, the excellence of the training which enabled his countrymen ordinarily to exchange without disadvantage the gown for the breastplate, the forum for the camp, or again, the perfection of the military system, which seemed to require no more than good sense and firmness in the general to insure the success of his arms. Nor did the moderation and wisdom of Cicero's civil administration belie the lessons of public virtue of which he had been so conspicuous a teacher. On the one hand, we may be assured that the man who resisted the importunities of M. Brutus, seconded by the instances of his own personal friends¹, would exercise a wholesome severity in checking the extortion of less distinguished and less powerful subordinates; on the other, we learn that the expenses of the government were reduced to a scale of the most scrupulous economy², and that a troop of disappointed parasites groaned over the ample surplus which was poured into the national coffers.³

Meanwhile, the consulship of Sulpicius and M. Marcellus was attended with continued tranquillity in the city. The rival parties were intently watching each other, and calculating their next moves with breathless anxiety, and it seemed agreed that the game should be played out by an effort of skill and coolness. The commencement of Cæsar's proconsulate dated from the first of January 696, and the original provisions of the Vatinian law had been extended, by the good offices of Trebonius, to a second term of five years, commencing from the beginning of 701. Accordingly, in the middle of 703 his government had still two years and a half to run. At this mo-

State of parties during the consulship of Sulpicius and M. Marcellus. A. U. 703, B. C. 51.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* v. 21., vi. 1—3. See above, Vol. I. p. 333.

² Cic. *ad Att.* v. 16.; comp. Plut. *l. c.*

³ Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 1.: "Ingemuit nostra cohors omne illud putans distribui sibi oportere."

ment the wars of Gaul, as we have seen, were almost brought to a close; but the remainder of the term he might still advantageously employ in consolidating his influence both in the province and among the needy politicians of the capital. The senate had just carried the election of two of its partizans, L. Æmilius Paulus and C. Claudius Marcellus, who were to enter upon the consulship at the commencement of the ensuing year. It was for a still distant vacancy that Cæsar reserved his pretensions. During the interval he remained entrenched, as it were, behind the provisions of the law which had been extorted from Pompeius, and depended on the exertions of his party to carry his election in the city while he still retained the command of his legions in Gaul. Among the nobles, indeed, there were not a few who felt the obligation to respect so recent and clear an enactment. Others, less scrupulous perhaps on this point, were still unwilling to strip him of his power while his rival, of whom they were hardly less jealous, continued to wield the military government of Spain. Cato himself, exasperated at the slight he had sustained from the creatures of Pompeius, would willingly have pulled down both the rivals together from their proud elevation. But M. Marcellus and the more violent section of the party were for pushing their attack upon the popular leader without disguise, and disregarded all further considerations.

Renewed intrigues for depriving Cæsar of his province.

The consul audaciously proposed that Cæsar's term should be cut short at once by the appointment of a successor. Pompeius masked the approaches by which he hoped to storm his rival's position by assurances of his implicit deference to the will of the senate, at the same time that he affected moderation, and interrupted its deliberations by absenting himself from the city when it was proposed to bring the matter to a solemn debate. At this moment all eyes were turned towards

the tribunitian bench, where some were known to be devoted to Cæsar, and determined to exercise their fatal *veto* in any case of direct attack upon his rights. A correspondent of Cicero reveals to us the feelings with which the election of young Curio to the tribuneship was regarded by the nobles. Already it was surmised that one so giddy in temper, and so needy as he was known to be, might easily be corrupted by the arts of the most accomplished of intriguers; but they trusted in a slight which he was said to have received from Cæsar, and still clung to the hope that he would continue faithful to the policy of his family and friends.¹ They declared boldly that if any tribune protested against the removal of the proconsul of Gaul, they had partisans on the same bench pledged to frustrate the appointment of a successor to any one of the provincial governors, and thus bring matters to a crisis which would demand the intervention of a dictator.²

The younger Curio elected tribune.

At length, on the last day of September, M. Marcellus came forward and proposed that, on the first of March ensuing, the consuls who should have then entered upon office should proceed to the usual assignment of the provinces of the republic.³ The first two months of the year were appropriated to the reception of foreign ambassadors and the regulation of external affairs. The first of March was apparently the ordinary day for assigning the provinces, the most important business connected with the internal

Decree of M. Marcellus about the assignment of provinces aimed directly against Cæsar:

¹ Cælius to Cicero (*ad Div. viii. 4.*): "Curio . . . nihil consilio facit, incutit multis magnum metum, sed ut spero et volo et ut se fert ipse, bonos et senatum malet. . . . quod cum Cæsar . . . valdè contempsit."

² Cælius to Cicero (*ad Div. viii. 5.*).

³ *Ad Div. viii. 9.*

economy of the state.¹ Marcellus had made no express mention of Cæsar's province; but it was well known that he was in reality aimed at, and a second decree was fulminated against any tribune who should venture to impede the proceedings of the senate. It was further provided that the claims of Cæsar's veterans should be taken into immediate consideration; and it was evidently hoped that they might thus be seduced from their allegiance to their beloved commander. Three tribunes protested, notwithstanding, and even Sulpicius expressed

disapproved
by the moderate party,
but supported
by Pompeius.

his disapproval of his colleague's proposition; but the majority of the senate did not hesitate to confirm it, and Pompeius intimated with solemnity that obedience to the senate was the first duty of a citizen. Hitherto, he said, he could not have interfered to abridge Cæsar's term of government, but now his scruples vanished. *What then would he do, asked Marcellus, if the tribunes should interpose, and forbid the law for assigning his provinces to a successor?—It would make no difference, he replied, whether Cæsar refused to obey the senate himself, or prompted his creatures to do so.—And what, urged another, if Cæsar should persist in suing for the consulship, and refuse to abdicate his command?—What, he returned, if my son should raise his stick against me!*² These words were not regarded as sufficiently explicit. They might, indeed, imply a contempt for the restless intriguer too great to condescend to so monstrous a supposition; but, whatever language Pompeius might hold, his intentions were never free from suspicion; and on this occasion there were not wanting some

¹ Compare Cic. *de Prov. Cons.* 15.: "Ex Kal. denique ei Martiis nascetur repente provincia." Perhaps this was a provision of the Sempronian law for the assignment of consular provinces before the consul's election.

² Cælius to Cicero, *l. c.*

to surmise that he had still a private understanding with the common enemy. Cæsar appears to have remonstrated against the injustice of the proceeding, and even, if we may believe the testimony of one writer, to have offered to resign the Transalpine and Illyrian provinces, retaining only the Cisalpine.¹ But the senate gave no heed to him. Exasperated to a pitch of unusual warmth, he could no longer refrain from intimating his resolution to preserve himself, if necessary, by an appeal to arms. When the news was conveyed to him of the determination at which the senate had thus arrived to deprive him of his government on the appointed day, he laid his hand on his sword and exclaimed, *This, then, shall keep it.*²

Cæsar offers to resign the Transalpine and Illyricum.

It still remained to be seen whether these bold assailants would have the courage to abide by this resolution when the time came to put them to the proof. It was, perhaps, the object of a section at least of the party to anticipate the risk of failure by driving the popular leader at once to violence. Such seems to have been the aim of a brutal insult with which the consul Marcellus now provoked him. Cæsar had constituted himself the patron of the Transpadane Gauls, and among other acts by which he had confirmed his interests in that country, he had founded a colony at Novum Comum. The Transpadanes had already obtained the Latin franchise from the republic through the influence of Pompeius Strabo³; a privilege

M. Marcellus insults Cæsar by the ill-treatment of a Transpadane Gaul.

¹ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 25. It may be suspected that Appian anticipates in this place an offer of the kind, which Cæsar undoubtedly made at a later period.

² Appian, *B.C.* ii. 26. Plutarch, however, attributes this sally to one of his soldiers.

³ Strab. v. 1. 6.: Ascon. in *Pisonian.* p. 3. ed. Orell. Novum Comum was the name given to Comum, now Como, when Cæsar founded a second colony there. Drumann thinks that as the first colony of Pompeius Strabo received the *jus Latii*, the second had the complete

which, as is well known, conferred upon all who had held a provincial magistracy the full rights of Roman citizenship. Scourging was a punishment from which a Roman citizen, in the fullest sense, was legally exempt. This immunity was considered as a distinction, and guarded with jealousy. Marcellus caused a freeman of Novum Comum to be seized, upon some pretence, and beaten with rods. The man, it appears, had not served a magistracy¹; he could not legally claim exemption; but the act was not the less offensive to the patron of his countrymen, who felt that it was intended to disparage his influence. Cicero's good sense and moderation denounced it as an act of wanton hostility towards one who deserved at least honourable regard from every citizen of the republic. The indignity was redoubled, when the consul bade the man go and show his scars to the patron who was powerless to relieve him.

It is not improbable that the precarious position in which the proconsul was at this time supposed to be, may have inspired his enemies with courage to hurl this insult at his head. It was reported at Rome that his cavalry had been destroyed in a disastrous engagement; that the seventh legion had suffered a severe defeat; that in his

Supposed peril
of Cæsar's
position in
Gaul.

Roman franchise. There is no authority for such a supposition, and it can only be adopted with the idea that it is required for the point of the story before us. But the act of Marcellus was sufficiently irritating to Cæsar, without supposing a direct violation or denial of a citizen's privileges.

¹ Such are Cicero's express words: "Marcellus fœde de Comensi: etsi ille magistratum non gesserat, erat tamen Transpadanus" (*ad Att.* v. 11.). Appian (ii. 26.) and also Plutarch (*Cæs.* 29.) assert the contrary, but Cicero's authority is of course to be preferred. He goes on to complain of the act as disrespectful to Pompeius, whose father had given the *jus Latii* to the Transpadanes. It could hardly be represented as such, if Marcellus had merely denied Cæsar's power to confer a higher right than had been conceded to his predecessor. Middleton, I observe, makes bad Latin of the passage, reading *gesserit* (it should be *gessisset*) for *gesserat*, in a futile attempt to reconcile it with Appian and Plutarch.

expedition against the Bellovaci he had been cut off with a small detachment from the rest of his forces: whispers as to his fate were circulating in the ranks of the nobility; Domitius put his finger to his lips with a significant look which our informant declines to interpret.¹ But Pompeius at least had more confidence in his rival's ability to extricate himself from his difficulties. When Marcellus proceeded still further, and proposed to send the proconsul's successors into his provinces, even before the time appointed, he interfered with expressions of moderation and respect for so noble a champion of the commonwealth.² At the same time, however, he insisted, without disguise, that the senate should take up the matter in due season, and assume the right of deciding peremptorily upon his claims.

The termination of the conquest of Gaul found the work of pacification already far advanced. The policy of Cæsar was essentially different from that of his predecessors in provincial administration. The provinces on either side of the Alps had been bound to the car of the republic by the iron links of arms and colonies. Large tracts of land had been wrested from the conquered people, and conferred upon such Roman citizens as would exchange for foreign plunder the security of their own homes, and maintain the outposts of the empire in the midst of prostrate enemies. The military spirit which animated these colonists, their discipline, intelligence

Cæsar's mild and conciliatory treatment of the Gauls.

A.U. 704.
B.C. 50.

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* viii. 1. Cælius writes to Cicero, in Cilicia, on the first of June: "Quod ad Cæsarem crebri et non belli de eo rumores sed susurratores duntaxat veniunt: alius equitem perdidisse, quod, opinor, factum est: alius septimam legionem vapulasse; ipsum apud Bellovacos circumsederi, interclusum ab reliquo exercitu: neque adhuc certi quicquam est, neque hæc incerta tamen vulgo jactantur: sed inter paucos, quos tu nosti, palam secreto narrantur: at Domitius,—quum manus ad os opposuit—"

² Appian, *B. C.* ii. 26.

and valour, sufficed to overawe the natives almost without the presence of regular troops. But such a system could not possibly be extended to the vast territories which the state was now suddenly invited to organize. For was it Cæsar's wish to bring Rome thus, as it were, into the provinces; his object was, on the contrary, to approach the Gaulish provincials to Rome, to give them an interest and a pride in the city of their conquerors. The first step towards making citizens of the Gauls was to render the Roman yoke as light as possible. Accordingly Cæsar established no colonies throughout the vast region which he added to the empire. The form of a province which he gave to it was little more than nominal. As Cisalpine Gaul was distinguished by the title of *Togata*, *the gowned*, to indicate its peaceful character and approximation to the manners of the city, so the Province, otherwise called the *Narbonensis*, was contrasted with it by the epithet *Braccata*, or *trousered*, from the uncouth habiliments of its people. So, also, to the whole of the immense country between the Rhone, the Ocean and the Rhine, the acquisition of Cæsar himself, another term of distinction was applied, and it was called *Comata*, from the long wild hair of its native barbarians. But, on the other hand, the conqueror allowed the appearance at least of their original freedom to most of the states within these limits. He was not afraid to trust the most spirited of the Gallic tribes with this flattering boon. Not only the Arverni, the Ædui, the Bituriges, but even the fierce and intractable Treviri, were indulged with the name of free states.¹ They had their own magistrates, senates and deliberations, guided no doubt by Roman agents; and, as we hear in later times, that the subjects of discussion were appointed by the government, and

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 59. ; Plin. *H.N.* iv. 31. 33

the topics and arguments of the speakers strictly controlled¹, so it is probable that Cæsar did not cease to exercise jealous vigilance over the assemblies he permitted to exist. Other states were taken into the alliance of the victorious republic.² The tribute which the provincials paid was softened by the name of military contribution³, and that it might not press heavily upon them, the annual sum was definitely fixed at the moderate amount of forty millions of sesterces.⁴ Upon both cities and chiefs he showered a profusion of honours and more substantial benefits.⁵ But, after all, the manner of the magnanimous Roman won as many hearts as his benefactions. When he saw his own sword suspended, as has been mentioned, in the temple of its Arvernian captors, he refused to reclaim it, saying, with a gracious smile, that the offering was sacred.⁶

Cæsar, indeed, had another enemy in the southern part of his province, the Pompeian faction, whom he feared more than the Gauls themselves, and it was in order to strengthen himself against these that he paid his court to the nations which he had subdued. The stronghold of this party lay in the Narbonensis, where Pompeius had established the base of his operations against Sertorius, and which he had filled with his legionaries and dependents. Narbo Martius, the principal city in the west of the province, was devoted

He conciliates the adherents of the senate in the province.

¹ Tac. *Ann.* iii. 43.; Ukert, *Geog. der Gr. und Röm.* iii. 255.

² Tac. *Germ.* 29.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 25.; Thierry, *Gaulois*, iii. 211.

⁴ Computing the sestertius at 2*d.* and a fraction, this sum will represent about 350,000*l.* of our money.

⁵ Auct. *B.G.* viii. 49.: "Itaque honorifice civitates appellando, principes maximis præmiis afficiendo." Dion's account, indeed, is not so favourable: τοὺς μὲν ἐταπελνωσε, τοὺς δὲ ἡμέρωσε (xl. 43.).

⁶ Plut. *Cæs.* 26.: ἱέρον ἡγούμενος. The writer evidently attributes this generosity to a feeling of superstition.

to the interests of the chief of the nobles; nor was Massilia less attached to the cause of the Roman aristocracy, to which it had looked for alliance and protection during the period of its struggle with the neighbouring tribes. The presence of Marius in those regions for a period of some years, had, indeed, introduced relations with the party of which he was the victorious champion; and when that party had been trampled down by Sulla in Italy, many of its proscribed adherents had taken refuge in the Gaulish province. It was there that Lepidus had hoped to muster allies for his futile attack upon the Roman oligarchy; it was from thence that Perpenna had brought powerful reinforcements to Sertorius in Spain; but after the triumph of Pompeius the south of Gaul was reorganized as a dependency of the ascendant class by a system of cruel confiscations and proscriptions. Milo selected Massilia for his place of retreat, as being a stronghold of his order. For the same reason, perhaps, Catilina pretended to go into banishment there, as a pledge to the senate that he had no views opposed to their interests. Pompeius, after his return to Rome, had still continued in fact to govern the Province, through the agency of Fonteius and other proconsuls, up to the moment of Cæsar's arrival. But the new governor was intently occupied in undoing the work of his predecessors. He exerted himself to recover the favour of the Massilians by doubling the benefits his rival had already conferred upon them. He extended the limits of their territory, and increased the tributes they derived from it.¹ The project, at least, of building a city and forming a naval station at Forum Julii may be attributed to Cæsar, though it is un-

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 35. : "Bello victos Salyas attribuit, vectigaliaque auxit." The Massilians acknowledged that they had received *paria beneficia* from Cæsar and Pompeius.

certain whether he actually completed it.¹ With the ulterior designs he had in view he could not follow the example of Sulla and Pompeius in disbanding his veterans, and establishing them in colonies throughout the country; but we hear of the settlement of a division of the tenth legion at Narbo, of the sixth at Arelate, of the seventh at Biterræ, of the eighth at Antipolis²; and it is probable that he made at least the commencement of an assignment of lands at those places, which was afterwards completed by Augustus.

If the clemency which the Gaulish cities experienced at his hands should fail to procure their acquiescence in the ascendancy with which Rome seemed to be content, the proconsul adopted other means to deprive them of the power of contesting it. He placed himself at the head of the military spirit of the people, and converted the flower of their youth into one great Roman army. The legions with which he had effected the reduction of the country had been principally of Gaulish blood and language; the republic had furnished him with no Italian troops.³ The tenth legion was raised by Pomptinus in the Transalpine province to combat the Allobroges. The seventh, eighth and ninth, which Cæsar found in the Cisalpine, were probably the levies of Metellus in that region, when he was commissioned to close the Alps against the retreat of Catilina.⁴ The eleventh

Cæsar attaches to himself the military spirit of the Gauls.

Composition of his legions.

¹ D'Anville, *Notice sur la Gaule, in voc.*

² Mela, ii. 5.; Plin. *H.N.* iii. 4.; Ukert, *Geog. der. Gr. und Röm.*; Guischart, *Mém. Milit.* iii. 16.

³ Guischart, *Mém. Milit.* iii. § 2.

⁴ Auct. *B.C.* viii. 8. : "Tres veterrimæ legiones." The legions which Pompeius maintained in Spain bore the numbers one to six. The numbers were given according to the date of conscription; but even at this early period the armies of the east and west had no reference to each other, and the legions of Syria were numbered independently of those of Spain and Gaul. Guischart, *l. c.*

and twelfth were the proconsul's hasty conscription in his province at the commencement of his first campaign. The thirteenth and fourteenth were raised from the same countries to oppose the great confederacy of the Belgians. Of these, the latter had been cut to pieces by the Eburones¹; but another fourteenth and a fifteenth also were afterwards levied in the Gaulish provinces. Even the legion which Pompeius had lent to his rival had been raised by him in the Cisalpine, by the order of the senate. Only a small portion of these soldiers could have been of genuine Roman or Italian extraction, with the full franchise of the city; they were levied, no doubt, from the native population of the numerous states which had been endowed with the Latin rights.² It was contrary to the first rule of military service to admit mere aliens into the ranks of the Roman legion, or to form supplemental legions of the unenfranchised provincials. But each of these divisions was attended by an unlimited number of cohorts³, which, under the name of *auxilia*, were equipped, for the most part, in the same manner as itself, and placed under the same discipline and command. The common dangers and glories of a few campaigns side by side had rendered the Gaulish auxiliary no less efficient than the legionary himself. Cæsar surrounded himself with a large force of this kind, and swept into its ranks a great number of the men of note and influence in their respective cities.⁴ One entire legion, indeed, he did not scruple to compose of Gauls alone;

¹ Two legions are said to have been destroyed on that occasion; probably there remained enough of them to be drafted into a single legion.

² Sigon. *de Jur. Ant. Ital.* iii. 2., *de Jur. Prov.* i. 6.

³ The thirty-second cohort of the second legion is mentioned on a medal. Harduin. *ad Plin.* iii. 4.

⁴ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 39: "Nominatim ex omnibus civitatibus nobilissimo et fortissimo quoque evocato."

and of all his audacious innovations, none, perhaps, jarred more upon the prejudices of his countrymen. But in so doing he was carrying out his policy of amalgamation; and he acted on the same principle, when, at a later period, he gave to this whole body the Roman franchise. The soldiers who composed this legion were distinguished by a helmet with the figure of a lark or a tuft of its plumage on the crest, from whence it derived its name *Alauda*.¹ The Gauls admired the spirit and vivacity of the bird, and rejoiced in the omen. Fond of the excitement of a military life, vain of the consideration attached to the profession of arms, proud of themselves and of their leaders, they found united in Cæsar's service all the charms which most attracted them. No captain ever knew better how to win the personal affection of his soldiers, while he commanded their respect. The general severity of his discipline enhanced the favour of his indulgence. Even the studied appearance of caprice, and the rudeness which he could mingle seasonably with his refined accomplishments, hit the humour of the camp, and delighted the fancy of his followers.² Accordingly, he enjoyed popularity among his troops such as seldom fell to the lot of the Roman generals, who maintained discipline by the terror of punishment alone. Throughout his Gaulish campaigns there was no single instance of an open act of insubordination; even the raw recruits of his earliest campaign quailed at the first words of his rebuke. The self-devotion manifested in moments of peril by men and officers astonished even the ample experience of the Romans. It was impossible to make his soldiers, when captured,

Cæsar's
Gaulish le-
gion named
Alauda.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 24.; Plin. *H. N.* xi. 44.; Cic. *ad Att.* xvi. 8.; comp. Drumann, iii. 235.

² Suet. *Jul.* 65. and foll., where he gives several instances of the kind.

turn their arms against him ; and the toils and privations they endured in their marches and sieges more appalled the enemy than even their well-known bravery in the field.¹ This was the secret of their repeated triumphs over numbers and every other advantage ; the renown they hence acquired charmed away the malice or patriotism of the Gauls, and precipitated them once more upon Italy, under the banners of their conqueror.

Through the favour of the senate, though not without the misgivings of some at least of the party, C. Scribonius Curio had succeeded in obtaining the tribuneship. He had been noted, not long before, as one of the most rabid partisans of the oligarchy ; but his character was unstable ; his friend Cicero was absent ; above all, his resources were, as was well known, exhausted by profligacy and profusion. The Pompeians studied to defame with the name of corruption every expression of sentiment adverse to their patron's ascendancy, and doubtless the Gaulish gold had flowed like a stream of molten metal into every corner of the city. The guilt of Curio, even at the time, admitted of no disproof ; at the present day it would be idle to attempt to allay the prevalent suspicion.² There was nothing, however, in his proceedings which might not admit of a more favourable construction. There were others besides himself who insisted that equal measure should be dealt to Cæsar and Pompeius. Curio proposed that both the rivals should lay down their arms simultaneously, and thus

Character and
conduct of C.
Scribonius
Curio.

A. U. 704,
consuls,
L. Æmilius
Paulus and
C. Claudius
Marcellus.

¹ Suet. *Jul. l. c.*

² Appian, *B. C.* ii. 26. ; Dion, xl. 60. Velleius, however, who is generally very temperate and judicious in regard to charges of this kind, declines to express an opinion. "Id gratis an accepto HS. centies fecerit, ut accepimus, in medio relinquemus."

restore the senate to its legitimate supremacy. The nobles embraced his views with alacrity. When C. Marcellus, the consul, moved, on the first of March, that Cæsar should be disarmed by the appointment of a successor, the tribune interposed his amendment, and obtained on a division the overwhelming majority of three hundred and seventy to twenty-two. The people whose affections he had already secured by the promise of measures to relieve them from the charge of their own subsistence, as well as from the ordinary burdens of civil government¹, eagerly applauded him, and strewed the ground before him with flowers, as before an athlete returning victorious from the arena.² Pompeius was absent at the moment, and this discomfiture stunned him. He hastened to appear in the senate, and there made specious professions of his willingness to obey the recent vote, and expressed will of the assembly. *But Cæsar, he interposed, is my friend and connexion; I know that his wishes are for retirement and peace; his eyes are turned towards the city, where his name is held in such deserved honour, where nothing awaits him but congratulations and triumphs. Let us at once invite him among us by decreeing him a successor; I have given my promise to do my part hereafter towards the pacification of all jealousies and troubles.*³ It was not difficult to penetrate this flimsy disguise, and Curio insisted more loudly than ever that, unless

¹ Cælius to Cicero (*ad Div.* viii. 6.): “Levissimè transfugit ad populum et præ Cæsare loqui cœpit; legemque viariam, non dissimilem agrariæ Rulli et alimentariam, quæ jubet ædiles metiri, jactavit.” Comp. Cic. *ad Att.* vi. 1. 25.: “Vedius venit mihi obviam cum duobus essedis et rheda equis juncta et lectica et familia magna: pro qua, si Curio legem pertulerit, HS. centena pendat necesse est.”

² Appian, *B. C.* ii. 27.; Plut. *Pomp.* 58.; *Cæs.* 30.

³ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 28.

both the rivals obeyed at once and together, both should equally be declared enemies of the republic. Pompeius retired, baffled and indignant; yet he could afford to smile at the threat, for the senate had not a legion within a thousand miles of Rome, and it could not put down either Cæsar or himself without the assistance of the one against the other. This it felt, and eventually shrank from a decision: the tribune broke up the assembly.¹ One decree, indeed, it passed, possibly from the very sense of its defenceless state, and to this it took care to give an external semblance of justice. It commanded each of the proconsuls to surrender one legion for the service of the commonwealth in Syria, where it was proposed to muster a large force to oppose the Parthians. Then it was that Pompeius had the assurance to demand back from Cæsar the legion which he had lent him three years before, in addition to that which he was required to furnish to the senate. Nor did Cæsar hesitate to accede to either requisition.² He was assured that the soldiers would not soon forget the general who had covered them with immortal glory, and he confirmed their fidelity by a present of a thousand sesterces to each.³ The Parthian war was a mere pretext; as soon as the legions arrived, the senate quartered them at Capua, and flattered itself for a moment that it could now hold the balance between the rivals with a firm and fearless hand.

The senate requires both Pompeius and Cæsar to surrender one legion.

The cause of Cæsar, however, was not left solely

¹ Appian, *l. c.* 29.; Auct. *B. G.* viii. 53.: "Senatus frequens in alia omnia abiit." Cælius in a letter to Cicero uses precisely the same words.

² Auct. *B. G.* viii. 54.: "Neque obscure hæ duæ legiones uni Cæsari detrahuntur." Comp. Appian and Dion.

³ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 29.

to the defence of the eloquent but profligate Curio. Sulpicius also had lent the whole weight of his authority among his order to the interests of equal justice, and the consul Æmilius Paulus, who built, with the price, it was said, of his treachery¹, the basilica which has immortalized his name, aided in thwarting the Pompeians at every step. But the blindness of his enemies worked better for the advantage of Cæsar than any exertions of his friends. Appius Claudius, one of the censors, was a furious partisan of Pompeius, and he deemed that he served the interests of the oligarchy by rigorously purifying the list of the senate. He instituted a severe examination into the revenues, the extraction, and the personal merits of its members, and pounced with instinctive sagacity upon the knights, freedmen, or impoverished nobles, whose exclusion he thought would benefit his own party. But he only confirmed and embittered the Cæsarean partialities of his victims. Among others, he proscribed Sallust, the historian, on a charge of profligacy, which, as far as it went, was no doubt fully established. But the insulted rhetorician considered himself no worse than those around him, and revenged himself by openly devoting himself to the cause of the enemy.² If his hand was not strong, nor his purse heavy, there were other means he could use in the service of his new patron, and he has covered the Roman aristocracy with eternal infamy in a series of pungent satires under the garb of history.³

Appius Claudius disgusts some of the senatorial party by the severity which he exercises in the censorship.

¹ He received fifteen hundred talents according to Plutarch, *Cæs.* 29. ; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 26. ; comp. Suet. *Jul.* 29. ; Cic. *ad Att.* vi. 3.

² Dion, xl. 63.

³ Little is recorded, and that little is not undisputed, of the private life of Sallust. The spurious *Declamatio in Sollustium* describes him, probably not incorrectly, as living from hand to mouth, scraping means together by the basest methods, to squander them again in the pursuit of office or pleasure. At a later period he obtained a pro-

It was of more importance to sacrifice, if possible, the busy demagogue himself, and Appius would have noted Curio among the unworthy, had not his colleague L. Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, though timid in opposing the party to which he was generally attached, resisted this extreme proceeding.

Abortive attempt to expel Curio from the senate. Marcellus and the oligarchs appeal to Pompeius for support.

Appius contented himself with gravely pronouncing the unworthiness of the tribute in the senate, and the tribune retorted by tearing his robes, in token of the insult done to his sacred office.¹ The consul, C. Marcellus, was not daunted by this demonstration, but put the question of his rejection to the vote of the assembly. Curio defended himself with address, and affected moderation; the senate faltered, and refrained from sanctioning his expulsion. Stung with vexation, the nobles clothed themselves in mourning, and made all the parade of a great national calamity.² They attended their champion Marcellus to the suburban retreat to which under the plea of his proconsular command Pompeius had retired. They there thrust upon him the guardianship of the city, and placed at his disposal the two legions at Capua.³ The cautious statesman required that this charge should be confirmed to him by the sanction of the consuls designated for the ensuing year. These were C. Claudius Marcellus,⁴ a brother of M. Marcellus, the consul of the year 703, and L. Cornelius Lentulus

vincial government in Africa, and there amassed by extortion the enormous wealth for which he became notorious to posterity. This circumstance may serve to illustrate Horace's address to the historian's grand-nephew:

"Latus regnes avidum domando
Spiritem, quam si Libyam remotis
Gadibus jungas et uterque Pœnus
Serviat uni." Hor. *Od.* ii. 2. 9.

¹ Dion, xl. 64.

² Plut. *Pomp.* 59.

³ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 31.; Dion, xl. 64.

⁴ He was cousin to C. Claudius Marcellus, the consul of 704.

Crus. They both expressed their full concurrence in the voice of their party¹, and promised their future support to its chosen protector. It was vainly hoped, from the reports which were said to come from Cæsar's camp, that the proconsul's army would refuse to fight for him, and even that he might be overpowered and destroyed by the indignation of his own troops.² Pompeius was still blindly persuaded that his own position was unassailable, and when pressed to make further levies, contemptuously rejected the advice. *I have only to stamp with my foot, he said, when the occasion requires, to raise legions from the soil of Italy.*³

Such is the infatuation which seems generally to attend the counsels of a proud and dignified aristocracy assailed by a revolutionary leader. Wrapped in their own tranquil composure, they fail to take account of the contagiousness of an aggressive and lawless spirit. They make no due allowance for the restlessness of troops who have been debauched by a long career of plunder and power. They calculate on the mere instruments of a selfish leader being at last dissatisfied with their own unequal share in the combination, and on their willingness to secure their gains by turning against him. But the genius of the successful adventurer is chiefly shown in the ascendancy he gains over his adherents, filling them with his own hopes, moulding them to his own feelings, and imbuing them with the sense of actually partaking in his triumphs. This transcendent operation of mind upon mind can only be fully understood by the same genius which can exert it.

At this crisis, while the more wary among the nobles might still distrust their ability to resist the enemy whom the more violent were driving to desperation, an incident

Pompeius
falls sick at
Neapolis
A.U. 704.

¹ Dion, xl. 66. ² Plut. *Cæs.* 29., *Pomp.* 57. ³ Plut. *Pomp.* 57

occurred which served to confirm their uncertain hopes, and raised them to the highest pitch of temerity. The health of Pompeius was far from robust: he was wont to suffer periodically from the autumnal fevers, which appear in all ages to have been the bane of the Tyrrhenian coast. In the summer of the year 704 he was prostrated by severe sickness at Neapolis, and his life was for a time despaired of. He had now reached the culminating point of his political career, and, having enjoyed, and still more, having surrendered the sole consulship, there remained nothing within the sphere of the laws which could increase his reputation either for power or moderation. The only legitimate boon which fortune might still bestow upon her favourite was an honoured and tranquil old age; but the storms which were gathering in the horizon forbade the hope of so happy a consummation. At such a moment, said the Roman moralists, the gods, in their foresight, offered to remove the great Pompeius beyond the sphere of human change; but the cities and the nations interposed with prayer, and preserved their beloved hero for defeat and decapitation.¹ The people of Neapolis and Puteoli were the first to make a public demonstration of grief and despair. Vows and sacrifices were offered for the sick man's recovery. He was saved, and the same people expressed their delight with festivals and dances, and crowned their heads with chaplets. These, indeed, Cicero might have said, were only Greeks²; but the reserved and sober Italians were no less ardent in their adulation. The roads were thronged; the villages

Enthusiasm
of the Italians
on his re-
covery.

¹ Cic. *Tusc. Qu.* i. 35., from whence the celebrated lines of Juvenal (x. 283.) are taken: "Fortuna ipsius et Urbis Servatum victo caput abstulit;" a sentence of most pregnant brevity. Comp. also Vell. ii. 48.; Senec. *Cons. ad Marc.* 20.; Liv. ix. 17.

² Cic. *l.c.*: "Coronati Neapolitani fuerunt, nimirum etiam Puteolani: ineptum sane negotium et Græculum."

were crowded like cities; the harbours could not contain the vessels which brought strangers from beyond the sea to salute the popular idol as he was transported slowly from place to place on his way to Rome. Pompeius from his litter contemplated this movement of the people with lively satisfaction; he regarded it as a crowning proof of the depth to which his influence had penetrated, as a gauge of the inexhaustible resources of his popularity. Rooted on a foundation so broad and immovable, what should he fear from Cæsar or Cæsar's veterans? There was no one at his ear to whisper how hollow these demonstrations were, to foretell that Italy would surrender to his rival without a blow, and that the voices now loudest in the accents of devotion to him would welcome the conqueror of Gaul with no less fervent acclamations. *But what*, exclaimed a shrewder observer, *are the prospects of a party whose champion falls dangerously sick at least once a year?*¹

Having ascertained the security of his conquests by a residence beyond the Alps through the winter and spring of this year, Cæsar set out in the summer to make a tour of inspection in the Cisalpine province.² His immediate object was to solicit the suffrages of the Roman citizens in these regions in favour of his quæstor, M. Antonius, who was a candidate for a vacant seat in the College of Augurs. The zeal with which this accomplished officer had seconded his operations in Gaul, as well as his intrigues in the city, merited the proconsul's warm support; at the same time he was aware that the nobles had determined to sacrifice Antonius to their hatred of himself. When he learned, before his arrival on the Po, that the suit of his adherent had been crowned with

Cæsar's
triumphant
reception in
the Cisalpine
province.
A. U. 704,
B. C. 50.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* viii. 2.: "In unius hominis quotannis periculose ægrotantis anima positas omnes spes nostras habemus."

² Auct. *B. G.* viii. 50.

success¹, he did not discontinue his journey. With his eye steadily fixed on the consulship, though still in the distance, he wished to make the first essay of his popularity, as the conqueror of Gaul, among the municipia and colonies to which his deeds were most familiar. Nor was he disappointed in his anticipations of the esteem in which he was held among them. Wherever he went the roads were crowded with enthusiastic admirers. The gates of the cities were opened with acclamations, or crowned with triumphal chaplets; victims were sacrificed in token of thanksgiving for his success and safety; the populace was feasted in every market-place, as if in anticipation of the solemn triumph which he had so gloriously earned. The rich spared no profusion in honour of what he had done; the needy thronged around him in hopes of what he might yet do. Having thus traversed the whole of the Cisalpine province, and ascertained the place he held in the affections of its people, he returned to his quarters at Nemetocenna², and assembled all his forces for a grand review. All eyes were turned towards Italy; the progress of hostilities between the rival parties was confessed to the world, and the army, confident in its prowess, devoted to its general, regardless of its moral ties to a city which it only knew by name, awaited with eager

Enthusiasm
of Cæsar's
veterans.

¹ Antonius was elected to the seat in the College of Augurs vacated by the death of Hortensius, which took place in April. Cælius to Cicero (*ad Div.* viii. 13.); comp. Cic. *ad Att.* vi. 2.; and see Fischer, *Röm. Zeitafeln*. The nobles put forward L. Domitius Ahenobarbus to contest the honour, but Curio's influence with the tribes secured the success of Cæsar's nominee. The election took place in the summer: see Cælius to Cicero: (*ad Div.* viii. 14.)

Velleius (ii. 49.) speaks in glowing language of the good fortune of Hortensius and Lucullus in dying before the breaking out of the civil war. The latter had died soon after Cicero's return from exile. Comp. Cic. *de Prov. Consul.* 9.

² Nemetocenna, the Nemetacum of the Itineraries, afterwards Atrebatæ, modern Arras. D'Anville, *in voc.*

expectation the first signal to advance. Thus meeting for the first time altogether, and recounting their several exploits, the legions burned with hardly controllable excitement. But the time was not yet come. Their ardour was tempered to the proper point by promises and flattery, and their attention was amused by moving from place to place, for the alleged convenience of abundant or healthy quarters. Meanwhile, Cæsar deputed Labienus to administer the Cisalpine province, as a faithful friend on whom he could rely for advancing the interests which he had already excited there in his favour. Rumours did not fail to reach him of the attempts his enemies were making to shake the allegiance of his well tried lieutenant as well as of his soldiery; but these he despised or disbelieved. He boldly asserted the justice of his claims as a future candidate for the consulship, under the sanction of the privilege accorded to him, and he maintained, with specious confidence, that the senate would not dare the flagrant iniquity of depriving him of his command.¹

Towards the close of the year the proconsul withdrew once more into Italy, and stationed himself at Ravenna, with a single legion, the thirteenth, for his immediate protection.² The rest of his troops were divided in winter quarters between the Ædúan and the Belgian territories. He had been thus far secured from a hostile vote of the senate by the ability with which Curio had maintained his interests, and the election of Antonius and Q. Cassius Longinus, another of his friends³, to the tribunate for the ensuing year seemed to furnish him with the legitimate means of prolonging his defence. But the act of the consul in delivering to Pompeius the guardian-

Cæsar stations himself at Ravenna, whither Curio betakes himself.

¹ Auct. B. G. viii. 51, 52.

² Auct. B. G. viii. 54.

³ Quintus was brother to Caius Cassius.

ship of the city was in fact a declaration of war. How long would the safeguard of the laws be extended to one who was thus all but openly denounced as a public enemy? Curio's term of office was on the point of expiring, and his personal safety also was compromised. The tribune made a last appeal to the people; he proclaimed aloud that justice was violated, that the reign of law was over, that a military domination reigned in the city; he entreated the citizens to resist this tyranny, as their fathers had done before them, by refusing military service¹; and when he had made this final effort he suddenly left the city, and betook himself without a moment's delay to the camp at Ravenna², as the only asylum of persecuted innocence.

Pompeius, meanwhile, was content to retain in its scabbard the sword which the consul had offered to him. His conduct was incomprehensible to his fiery adherents. He shunned the councils of the nobles, and kept aloof from the city, pleading the state of his health or his military command as an excuse for moving from place to place, while he left his party to maintain without a leader the wordy contests of the forum and the curia. They complained of his apparent inactivity in the bitterest language.³ But he gave no heed to their dissatisfaction, nor deigned to reply to the still fiercer denunciations of his whole career, from his first appearance in public life, with which Antonius commenced his term of tribunitian licence.⁴ It was just at this time that Cicero returned from Asia, where his correspondents had flattered him to the last with hopes of peace, and

The nobles
dissatisfied
with Pom-
peius's in-
action.

¹ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 31.

² Dion, xl. 66.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 5.: "Quos ego equites Rom., quos senatores vidi l qui acerrime quum cætera tum hoc iter Pompeii vituperarent."

⁴ Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 8.: "Antonii concionem . . . in qua erat accusatio Pompeii usque a toga pura," &c.

indulged him in the idea of claiming a triumph. His services, indeed, though not splendid or striking, were fully adequate to sustain such a claim¹; and it might be supposed that the nobles would have been glad to attach another imperator firmly to their side by the gratification of a fair ambition. But either his views were not sufficiently decided for the satisfaction of the party generally, or private jealousies prevailed over the common interests of the class. Even Cato urged formal objections with more than his usual stiffness²: but whatever might have been the result under other circumstances, the impending crisis occupied men's minds to the exclusion of all other business, and the claim was put aside for a future opportunity of discussion, which never arrived.

Cicero appeared in Italy in the military garb, attended by his lictors with laurelled fasces. He could not enter the city, where he would fain have thrown himself at once into the current of affairs; but he was imperfectly informed of the real state of things, and his views regarding them were unsettled. He repaired immediately to Pompeius at his Alban villa, and was received with an appearance of cordiality, and encouraged to persist in his suit for the much-coveted honour.³ At the same time Pompeius advised him not to embark in the discussions of the senate, if it should be convened outside the walls, ostensibly lest he should get entangled in a quarrel with the tribunes, and so prejudice his chance

Cicero's return to Italy, Jan. A. U. 704, B. C. 50. Consuls, C. Claudius Marcellus, L. Cornellius Lentulus Crus.

He confers with Pompeius on the state of affairs.

¹ Abeken (*Cicero in sein. Brief.* p. 242.) shows that Cicero's claim was reasonable. Lentulus had enjoyed a triumph for precisely similar exploits in the same province. Cic. *ad Att.* v. 21. 4.

² Cato to Cicero (*ad Div.* xv. 5.). He had resisted the claim of Appius Pulcher to a triumph from the same province.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 4., and comp. foll.

of success; but in reality, perhaps, lest he should attempt to mediate between parties and interfere for the re-establishment of concord. Cicero, he knew, was still in correspondence with Cæsar, and the Gallic proconsul's letters breathed nothing but sentiments of moderation and public virtue. Cicero himself could hardly be persuaded that a rupture was inevitable; but his cherished hopes were overborne by the honour of Pompeius's confidence, and he resigned himself to the general conviction of his order, that the power of Cæsar must be controlled by force. He unburdened his feelings to Atticus in unavailable lamentations over the infatuation of his party in allowing that power to grow through nine years of victory, when it might have been crushed in its germ.

In the position which he was about to assume, of actual aggressor in a civil war, Cæsar felt the immense advantage of having appearances in his favour. He availed himself, therefore, of every opening which the violence of his enemies gave him for representing the justice of his claims and the innocence of his designs in the mildest language. He prevailed on Curio to return to Rome at the opening of the new year as the bearer of a message of peace.¹ He offered to surrender at once the Transalpine province, together with all the troops by which its submission was secured; he requested no more than permission to retain the Cisalpine and Illyricum, with the moderate force of two legions.² He must have been aware that the passions of his enemies had been lashed into such fury that they would lend no ear to any compromise; they were resolved that Cæsar should not be consul again; the bitterness of his quæstor Antonius in the tribuneship warned them of what they might

Cæsar sends Curio to Rome with the offer of a compromise.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 1.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 32.; Dion, xli. 1.

² Auct. *B. G.* viii. in fin.

expect from the proconsul himself in a still higher place.¹ But the conditions which Cæsar offered were a specious bait for the acclamations of the people, and the consuls were very unwilling to suffer them to be publicly known, while Curio and Antonius took care to communicate them to the world, at the same time that they laid them before the senate.²

In the debate which followed the consuls diverted the discussion to the question of the general safety. They denounced Cæsar's imputed designs as treason undisguised. The ordinary powers of the commonwealth, said Lentulus, are paralysed; for once let forms give way to wholesome violence.³ Nothing remained, he urged, but that Cæsar should surrender his command on a day to be appointed by the senate, and come as a private citizen and sue in the regular course for the suffrages of the tribes. The indulgence which had before been granted him in this particular must bow to the public necessity. It was in vain that voices were still raised for delay, some urging that their party was not yet armed; others, that if Pompeius would depart for his distant province all would be well⁴; there would be no danger of collision between the electric clouds which were about to set the world in a blaze. The decree was put to the vote; the tribunes in Cæsar's interest, Antonius and Q. Cassius, interposed, on the ground of the privilege already accorded him by the people; but their objection was overruled, and the decree was passed triumphantly.⁵ The tribunes protested

The senate refuses Cæsar's offers, and requires him to resign his command.

The tribunes interpose, but are overruled.

¹ This was the remark of Pompeius himself to Cicero. *Cic. ad Att.* vii. 8.

² *Cæs. B. C.* i. 1.; *Dion*, xli. 1.; *Plut. Pomp.* 59., *Cæs.* 30.

³ Cæsar says (*B. C.* i. 5.): "Aguntur omnia raptim atque turbate."

⁴ *Cæs. B. C.* i. 2.

⁵ The vote ultimately was almost unanimous. *Dion*, xli. 2. This rapid fluctuation of majorities marks the habitual deference of the

against its illegality, and proclaimed aloud that they were coerced in the exercise of their official functions. Their opponents retorted by once more declaring the state in danger, and by putting on, as a sign of alarm, the black robes of national mourning. The consuls felt that they had already passed the limits of law, and nothing now remained for them but to carry out their violence with a high hand. The senate was again convened to determine what punishment should be inflicted upon the refractory tribunes; and when it was intimated to them that they would be expelled from the council-hall by force¹, they wrapped themselves hastily in pretended disguise and fled, together with Curio, as if for their lives. The act of leaving the city was in itself a declaration that they threw up their outraged and defenceless office, for the tribune was forbidden to step outside the walls during his term of service. Arrayed in all the dignity of violated independence, they knew that they should be eagerly received in the proconsul's quarters, and paraded throughout his camp as the cause and justification of war.

They leave
the city and
repair to
Cæsar's camp.

Roman assemblies to the opinions of their leaders, which is equally conspicuous in the proceedings of the senate and of the centuries.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 5.: "De sua salute septimo die (Jan. 7.) cogitare coguntur." Dion, xli. 3.: *ὁ Λεντοῦλος ὑπεξελεθεῖν σφισι παρήνεσε.* Appian, *B. C.* ii. 33.: *ἐκέλευον τοῖς ἀμφὶ τὸν Ἀντώνιον ἐκστῆναι τοῦ συνεδρίου, μή τι καὶ δημαρχοῦντες ὕμωσ πάθοιεν ἀτοπώτερον.* Liv. *Epit. civ.*: "Urbe pulsi." The tribunes quitted Rome on the night of Jan. 6—7.—Nov. 18—19 of the corrected calendar.

CHAPTER XIV.

The consuls prepare to withstand Cæsar's claims by force.—Cæsar crosses the Rubicon.—Consternation of his enemies.—They abandon Rome, and rally round Pompeius in Campania.—Cæsar advances triumphantly.—The senate affects to negotiate.—Pompeius falls back upon Luceria.—Domitius makes a stand at Corfinium: is betrayed and delivered up by his soldiers: pardoned by Cæsar.—Effect of Cæsar's clemency.—Pompeius is besieged by Cæsar in Brundisium.—Escapes across the sea with his troops, the consuls and the senate.—Explanation of the apparent pusillanimity of his conduct. (Jan.—March A.U. 705, B.C. 49.)

As long as the claims which Cæsar advanced were supported by champions invested with the prerogatives of the Tribunitian office, the senate, composed of men of every party and various shades of opinion, had acted, as we have seen, with extreme vacillation. Though it had permitted itself to be swayed violently from one extreme decision to another, at the bidding of its most resolute and turbulent members, yet it had shown, at least on many occasions, a disposition to treat both the rival leaders with equal justice. But the abrupt departure of the tribunes, compelled, as they proclaimed, by the ascendancy of the most violent section of the oligarchical faction, changed at once the position of parties, and decided the place of the wavering and neutral. If any voice was now raised for negotiation or even reflection, it was drowned by the din of applause which hailed the indignant reclamations of Scipio, Lentulus and Cato.¹ From this moment the staunchest of the proconsul's

Success of the
vigorous
measures of
the senate.
A. U. 705,
B. C. 49.

¹ Cæs. B. C. i. 3, 4.

adherents in the senate were reduced to silence. If the sacred office had failed to protect the tribunes, what should divert the violence of the consuls from the head of a private partisan? The law had declared itself against Cæsar in the person of its chief organs, the authorities and great council of the state; and the Marian party, the strength of which certainly did not lie in the eminence of its leaders in the city, had neither the courage nor the power to defy it. At the same time, as might be expected, and as doubtless was calculated, the success of violent measures swept along the more moderate councillors, such as Cicero, in the wake of the triumphant leaders of their common party. Even those who had obstinately maintained a neutral position, such as Cato, those who detested and feared both the rival chiefs equally, found themselves reduced to the necessity of embracing the side on which the state had declared itself. In supporting Pompeius at the head of the republic they were compelled to concede to him all his claims, and that entire independence of law and constitutional practice which Cæsar had so plausibly contrasted with the severe treatment he had himself received.

Accordingly, when the consuls convened the senate for the day succeeding the flight of the tribunes, they invited Pompeius to attend their deliberations, which were held outside the walls of the city in the temple of Bellona.¹ Lentulus was roused to action by the pressure of his debts, the prospect of military command, and the lavish bribes administered to him by eastern potentates, impatient for the commencement of anarchy. He boasted among his friends that a second Cornelius was destined to resume the pre-eminence of Sulla. Scipio, as the father-in-law of the general, expected

The consuls review their forces, in the prospect of war.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 6.; Dion, xli. 3.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 34.

at least to share his distinctions. Pompeius himself was impelled to the arbitrament of arms by the consciousness of his own equivocal position as the proconsul of a province at the head of an army in Italy. The nobles were charmed at the echo of their bold defiance, and were determined not to relax the vigour of their policy at the moment when it had gained the ascendant. They listened with satisfaction to the sanguine calculations their leader made of the forces at his disposal. Ten legions he had under arms; seven of these, indeed, were in Spain, where one had been lately levied, in addition to those which the senate had assigned to the proconsul; one only he had in immediate attendance upon his orders in the neighbourhood of Rome, and two more were stationed at Capua, being the same which the government had lately extorted from Cæsar at his bidding. But his strength lay not so much, he affirmed, in the magnitude of the preparations he had made, as in the expectations on which he might confidently rely. A vast portion of the soil of Italy had been parcelled out among the veterans of Sulla, and every motive of gratitude and interest would still attach both them and their descendants to the party which inherited the dictator's principles and obligations. It was on the temper of his rival's forces, however, that Pompeius chiefly relied for the triumphant issue of a struggle he had determined to provoke. The conquerors of Gaul, it was said, were wearied with war, satiated with plunder, discontented with their restless general, dismayed at the prospect of raising their hands against their beloved country.² It is not improbable that notions of this kind were disseminated by members of the great families of whom Cæsar kept so many about his own person throughout his campaigns. Certain of these might be in corres-

¹ Cæs. B. C. i. 4.

² Cæs. B. C. i. 6.; Plut. *Pomp.* 57.

pondence with his enemies, and not disinclined to betray him, at least if his affairs should seem desperate. Some doubtless who, up to this time, had been most distinguished in foreign fields, declined to follow his banners in the unnatural contest of civil war. Among his chief lieutenants there was one at least who was on the point of abandoning his camp, and arraying himself in arms on the other side. So strong was the conviction upon this point entertained in the circles of the senatorial party, that few of them believed that Cæsar would really venture to throw away the scabbard. But there was no more fatal mistake throughout their proceedings than their confidence in the existence of general disaffection to their leader among the officers and soldiers of the Gallic legions.

The senate, though far from expecting the actual collision of arms, decreed its war-measures with ostentatious energy. Orders were issued for the immediate levy of fresh troops; but, at the same time, so secure did it feel of its position and resources that it made no provision for bringing over the large division of its forces quartered in Spain. It was presumed, indeed, that Cæsar could not venture to withdraw his army of occupation from the conquered provinces of Gaul, and the Iberian legions might be left to menace the garrisons which, if he invaded Italy, he must leave behind him in the west.¹ In the assignment of provinces which was made at the same sitting of the senate, no respect was paid to the regulations which had been so recently sanctioned by its own decree. The enactment which required an interval of five years between the discharge of

Assignment of
the provinces
to the leaders
of the senate.

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* xvi. 12.: "Putabamus illum metuere, si ad urbem ire cœpisset, ne Gallias amitteret, quas ambas habet inimicissimas præter Transpadanos: ex Hispaniaque sex legiones et magna auxilia habet a tergo."

office in the city and the assumption of a provincial government was utterly disregarded. Scipio, the consul of the year 702, received Syria, the most important military command in the East. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus was selected to be Cæsar's successor in the Further Gaul, a province which had heretofore been generally reserved for the most devoted partisans of the oligarchy. The Cisalpine Gaul, one of Cæsar's principal strongholds, was confided to Cossidius; Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa, the three granaries of the city, were entrusted to the vigilance of Cato, Cotta, and Tubero. Cilicia, which secured the alliance of the dependent kings of Asia Minor, was placed under the control of P. Sestius. A trifling and inglorious charge, that of the Campanian coast, satisfied the demands of Cicero. He was extremely unwilling to leave the immediate neighbourhood of Rome, where he conceived that his real sphere of usefulness lay.¹ Cato was no less reluctant to relinquish the contests of the forum, in the danger and excitement of which he delighted, for the grave responsibility of arming in a civil contest. He would have resisted every entreaty or menace of Pompeius, but the voice of the consuls spoke to him with an authority which he could not withstand, and his assuming an active share in the war measures of the senate gave the stamp of justice to its cause in the eyes at least of an admiring posterity.²

The personages who were selected for these important charges were for the most part distinguished as the boldest and haughtiest champions of aristocratic ascendancy. Marcus Philippus, a near connexion of Cæsar, and M. Marcellus, who had given offence by his prudent

Men and money raised by arbitrary requisitions.

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* xvi. 11, 12., *ad Att.* vii. 14.

² Plut. *Cat. Min.* 53.; Lucan, i. 128.:

“Victrix causa Deis placuit, sed victa Catoni.”

advice not to rush into war, at least until preparation was fully made, were passed over in the distribution of provinces, though both were entitled to them from their consular dignity.¹ The appeal to the people for the *Lex Curiata*, by which alone the proconsul received legitimate authority for the levy of troops, was omitted in all these appointments as a superfluous condescension to the privileges of the commonalty. The treasury was freely opened to the requisitions of the generalissimo of the republic, and not in Rome only, but throughout Italy contributions were extorted, and even the temples plundered, to expedite the collection of the materials of war which had been so long neglected.²

These measures were the vigorous, or rather the feverish work of a single day. It was not by Curio and the fugitive tribunes, who had left the city the preceding night, that the news of the nobles' defiance was brought to Cæsar's camp. The couriers who set out from Rome one evening later with the account of the next day's debate seem to have outstripped the progress of the private party; and it was upon the receipt of the intelligence which they brought to Ravenna, if we are to believe Cæsar's apologetic statement, that he first determined to draw the sword.³ He did not fall in with Curio, as we shall see, till some days later, and one stage nearer to Rome. Doubt-

Cæsar
harangues his
troops and pro-
claims his
wrongs.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 6.: "Philippus et Marcellus privato consilio prætereuntur."

² Cæs. *l. c.*: "Tota Italia dilectus habentur, arma imperantur, pecuniæ a municipiis exiguntur, e fanis tolluntur, omnia divina humanaque jura permiscuntur." Comp. Dion, xli. 6.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 34.

³ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 7.: "Quibus rebus cognitis," that is, the resolutions of the senate for the division of provinces, by which he was himself superseded, Cæsar harangued his soldiers: it was not till some days later that he met the tribunes at Ariminum (c. 8.). But I am inclined to think that the notices of date here are purposely confused.

less he had calculated every step beforehand: his arrangements were made, his preparations complete, nor did he at the last moment waver. It was apparently on the eleventh of January, as soon as the news reached him, that he assembled and harangued the thirteenth legion, which was all the force he had with him at Ravenna.¹ The statement of his claims and wrongs was received by the soldiers with expressions of the warmest indignation; though he did not even yet indicate publicly the course he had determined to adopt, he felt the pulse of his followers, and satisfied himself once more of their devotion to him. The officers were attached to him from love, hope and gratitude, and the great mass of the common soldiers, of provincial or foreign birth, had no sympathy with the country whose name only they bore. He had already doubled their pay² while yet in comparative poverty; what might they not expect from his munificence when the riches of the world should lie at his disposal?

The city of Ravenna, at which Cæsar had fixed the quarters of his scanty band, though lying out of the direct line of the Æmilian way,

Cæsar prepares to invade Italy.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 7. Appian (*B. C.* ii. 32.) says that Curio reached Rome in three days from Ravenna. We must suppose that couriers left Rome with the news of the debate which took place in the senate on the following day, in the evening of the 7th, and arrived at Ravenna within a similar period. Cæsar's address to the soldiers could hardly be later than the next day, that is, the 11th: yet it does not appear that he crossed the Rubicon before the night of the 15th—16th, if we may depend upon the accuracy of Plutarch's calculation of 60 days from thence to the taking of Brundisium.

² Suet. *Jul.* 26.: "Legionibus stipendium in perpetuum duplicavit." He does not state the exact time, but mentions this among the various artifices by which Cæsar attached different classes of the citizens to his rising fortunes. The legionary's pay in the time of Polybius was two obols, equivalent in round numbers to five ases (*Polyb.* vi. 39.). Tacitus (*Ann.* i. 17.) mentions ten ases as the ordinary stipendium in his day. See the note on Suet. *l. c.* ed. Baumgarten-Crusius, from Lipsius and Gronovius.

the principal communication between Italy and Cisalpine Gaul, was the chief military station of that province. It was connected with this main trunk by a secondary route, which branched off from Ariminum, and skirted the coast of the Adriatic, passing through Ravenna to Aquileia. About ten miles from Ariminum, and twice that distance from Ravenna, the frontier of Italy and Gaul was traced by the stream of the Rubicon.¹ This little river, red with the drainage of the peat mosses from which it descends,² is formed by the union of three mountain torrents, and is nearly dry in the summer, like most of the watercourses on the eastern side of the Apennines. In the month of November the winter flood might present a barrier more worthy of the important position which it once occupied³; but the northern frontier of Italy had long been secure from invasion, and the channel was spanned by a bridge of no great dimensions.⁴ Cæsar seems to have made his last arrangements in secret, and concealed his design till the moment he had fixed for its accomplishment. On the morning of the fifteenth he sent forward some cohorts to the river, while he remained himself at Ravenna, and assisted at a public spectacle throughout the day. He invited company to his table, and entertained them with his usual ease and affability. It was not till sunset that he made an excuse for a brief absence, and then, mounting a car yoked with mules, hired from a mill in the vicinity, hastened with only a few attendants to overtake his soldiers at the appointed spot. In his anxiety to avoid the risk of being encountered and his movements di-

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 31.; Plut. *Cæs.* 20.

² Lucan, i. 214.: "Puniceus Rubicon." The name of the stream is evidently derived from its colour.

³ The 15th of January, A.U. 705, corresponded with Nov. 27. B.C. 50; Fischer, *R. Z.*

⁴ Suetonius (*l.c.*) calls it *ponticulus*.

vulged, he left the high road, and soon lost his way in the bye-paths of the country. One after another the torches of his party became extinguished, and he was left in total darkness. It was only by taking a peasant for a guide and alighting from his vehicle that he at last reached his destination.¹

The ancients amused themselves with picturing the guilty hesitation with which the first of a line of despots stood, as they imagined, on the brink of the fatal river, and paused for an instant before he committed the irrevocable act, pregnant with the destinies of a long futurity. Cæsar, indeed, in his Commentaries, makes no allusion to the passage of the Rubicon, and, at the moment of stepping on the bridge, his mind was probably absorbed in the arrangements he had made for the march of his legions, or for their reception by his friends in Ariminum. We may feel an interest, however, in remarking how the incident was coloured by the imaginations of its first narrators; and the old tradition recorded by Suetonius is too picturesque and too characteristic of the Italian cast of legend to be passed by without notice. *Even now, Cæsar had said, we may return; if we cross the bridge, arms must decide the contest.* At that moment of suspense there appeared suddenly the figure of a youth, remarkable for comeliness and stature, playing on a flute, the pastoral emblem of peace and security. The shepherds about the spot mingled with the soldiers, and straggled towards him, captivated by his simple airs; when, with a violent movement, he snatched a trumpet from one of the military band, rushed with it to the bank of the river, and blowing a furious blast of martial music, leaped into the water, and disappeared on the opposite side. *Let us advance,* exclaimed Cæsar, *where the gods direct, and our*

¹ Suet. *Jul. l. c.*; Plut. *Cæs. 32.*

enemies invite us. Be the die cast. The soldiers dashed across the bridge or the ford, and, giving them not an instant for reflection, the bold invader led them straight to Ariminum, entering its undefended walls with the first break of dawn.¹ It was there that he met Curio and the fugitive tribunes. They had no occasion to disclose their grievances. While they had lingered on their way, inflaming perhaps the indignation of their adherents in the towns through which they passed, by the recital of the proceedings in Rome, the champion of the commons had already heard the story of their wrongs, and had taken up arms ostensibly to avenge their violated sanctity.

The occupation of Ariminum was an explicit declaration of war; but Cæsar was not in a condition to push forward immediately. Consternation of the city. It was from thence, he tells us, that he despatched orders for the movement of his troops²; one legion, the twelfth, reached him within a fortnight, and another, the eighth, within a month from that time. These, together with the thirteenth legion; which he had with him, were the forces with which he had determined to confront the army of the consuls; for Cæsar also had made his calculations regarding the disposition of the Italians, and the fidelity of the troops opposed to him, and reckoned upon deriving his most copious resources from the enemy's own camp. Three of his legions were led to the neighbourhood of Narbo, under the command of Fabius, in order to check the advance of the Pompeian lieu-

¹ Suct. *Jul.* 32.; comp. Appian, ii. 35.; Plut. *Cæs.* 32. Lucan (i. 186.) introduces on this occasion the apparition of the goddess Roma. In his times, it should be remembered, the idea of Rome as a living abstraction began to take the place of the conceptions of the popular mythology. The famous Prosopopœia of the Genius of the Cape, whom Camoens summons to address the Portuguese navigators, has far less connexion with the ideas of real life.

² Cæs. *B. C.* i. 8.; Lucan, i. 396.:

“Deserucere cavo tentoria fixa Lemano,” &c.

tenants from Spain. The remainder of his forces were withdrawn perhaps gradually from their winter-quarters and concentrated in the south of Gaul, to support either the right or left wing of his position. But for some days the position of the invader, with a mere handful of soldiers about him, was extremely precarious. Had the three legions of Pompeius been arrayed in his front, and led against him by officers in whom they confided, a prompt attack could hardly have failed to destroy him. But these troops were divided and distant; perhaps their officers knew, what at least was carefully concealed from the public, that they could not be relied on; and the counsels of the nobles had relapsed once more into feebleness and vacillation. They had indulged in incredulity to the last, and the news that Cæsar had actually crossed the frontier came upon them like a clap of thunder. The conqueror of the northern world was marching, as they believed, upon them. He who had climbed the Alps and bridged the Rhine and bestridden the ocean¹, was daily, so the rumour ran, achieving his twenty miles on the broad and solid footing of their own military way. Nor was it only the Cæsar of the Curia and the Forum who was rapidly approaching their walls. Bold and reckless as he had shown himself in the civic contests of the gown, he had learnt cruelty by habitual shedding of blood; he had become, they were assured, in his nine years' intercourse with the barbarians, more ferocious than the Gauls themselves. Even his legions were not of pure Roman extraction, but filled with the fiercest warriors of the races he had subdued.² The name of the half-clad savages of

¹ Lucan, i. 369. :

“Hæc manus ut victum post terga relinqueret orbem
 Oceani tumidas remo compescuit undas,
 Fregit et Arctoo spumantem vortice Rhenum.”

² Lucan, ii. 535. :

“Gallica per gelidas rabies effunditur Alpes.”

the north was still a sound of panic dread to the populations of Italy. The Romans quailed before a second apparition of the bearded and brawny victors of the day of Allia, much as the citizens of London shuddered at the approach of the Highlanders, the shock of whose charge had overthrown horse and man at the rout of Gladsmuir. For such, they believed, were the followers of the patrician renegade, who were even now thundering down the Flaminian Way, bursting through the defiles of the Apennines, and choking the valleys of the Tiber and Nar with clouds of barbarian cavalry.¹

At this moment Cæsar, as we have seen, was waiting with only a few cohorts at Ariminum for the arrival of the succours, without which, bold as he was, even he would have deemed it madness to advance against the city. But the elements of his strength were magnified into colossal proportions by the excited imaginations of the men who, only a week before, had most affected to despise them. They counted his eleven legions, his indefinite resources of Gaulish cavalry, the favour of the Transpadanes, the zeal of the city mob, the fanatic devotion to him of the depraved and ruined of all classes. He had secured the favour of the publicani by his successful vindication of their claims; the money-lenders were dissatisfied with the sumptuary reforms which Pompeius had encouraged; and, lastly, the agriculturists of Italy were indifferent to the empty names of freedom and the republic, and would have lent their weight to the maintenance of

The chiefs of
the senate
evacuate
Rome.

¹ Lucan, i. 475.:

“Qua Nar Tiberino illabitur amnis
Barbaricas sævi discurrere Cæsaris alas.
Ipsum omnes aquilas collataque signa ferentem
Agmine non uno densisque incedere castris.
Nec qualcum meminere vident; majorque ferusque
Mentibus occurrit, victoque immanior hoste”

a kingly tyranny, if only they could avert the calamities of war. In the midst of this general panic, the consuls and the senate, with their friends and adherents, turned anxiously for counsel and encouragement to Pompeius. But the hero had withdrawn from the neighbourhood of the city immediately on the arrival of the fatal news. He imparted his views and plans to no one. He had an interview with Cicero at Formiæ; but the orator, irresolute and desponding himself, could obtain no intimation from his leader of the tactics by which he meant to oppose the invader. The streets of Rome were crowded with an agitated multitude of all ranks and classes. Consulars and patricians descended from the steps of their palaces and led the long procession of fugitives down the Appian Way to Capua and the south.¹ Such was the confusion of the moment that the rulers of the state left the city without removing the public treasure in the coffers of the temple of Saturn.² They were not less negligent of their own private possessions, all of which they abandoned to the risk of pillage by the mob, even before the public enemy should arrive to seize them. Many indeed of the nobles still retained their blind confidence in Pompeius, and calculated on a speedy return, as the result of some deep-laid schemes which they supposed him to have planned in secret. But his flight operated in general to increase the terror, and no sacrifice was thought too great to make for the safety of their bare lives.

At the moment when great political principles meet in decisive conflict, it may be observed that the inclinations of the mass of the honourable and well-intentioned, who constitute perhaps generally the numerical strength of a party, are swayed in favour

The calumnies against Cæsar deter many well-intentioned men from embracing his cause.

¹ Dion, xli. 7, 8.; Lucan, i. 486.; comp. Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 10—12.

² Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 15.; Cæs. *B. C.* i. 14.

of the side which seems to embrace the men of highest renown for patriotism and probity. It is much easier to distinguish who are the most honest men, than to discover which are the soundest principles; and it seems safer to choose the side which boasts of philosophers and patriots in its ranks than that which is branded as the refuge of spendthrifts and apostates. It was with an instinctive sense of this bias of the human mind that the nobles had studied all along to represent the followers of their enemy's fortunes as none other than the needy and rapacious, the scum of all orders of the community. They did not affect to insinuate that their vileness made them less dangerous, but they were such, they maintained, as no man who wished to keep up the appearance of public virtue could decently associate with. We may remember that Cæsar, as he appeared to the eyes of the Roman nobility at this period of his career, was an adventurer of dissolute manners and the loosest principles. For many years all his actions had been blackened by the systematic calumnies with which he was assailed, even beyond the common measure which fell to the lot of contemporary statesmen. It required more than usual candour, particularly in his avowed enemies, to divest the mind of a peculiar prejudice against him. Nevertheless, his conduct as a statesman and warrior in his foreign governments might have served to disabuse public opinion of its grossest errors in this respect. Assuredly none could fairly deny that he had formed to himself friends and admirers from among men of the best families, and the highest principles. A Cicero, a Crassus, a Brutus, had been his most devoted partisans. The connexions of his own family, the Cæsars, the Pisos, the Marcii, held a high place in the estimation of their countrymen. But, in spite of the plainness of this fact, the charge was constantly reiterated; the men whom the arch-traitor could

attach to himself could be none, it was insisted, but monsters of vice, cruelty and profligacy. The lie prevailed by repetition; and the waverers, unable to see clearly for themselves through the cloud of interested sophistry, were frightened, if not convinced, and learned to shrink with horror from a cause which was thus atrociously misrepresented. Cicero himself, of all men the most easily deceived by the colouring of political partisans, was deluded by this clamour. Much as he hated and feared the nobles, from whose victory he expected nothing but violence and illegal usurpation, he had not the firmness fairly to review the cause and objects for which Cæsar was in arms. If the invader's personal aim was self-aggrandizement, the same was at least equally true of his opponent. If Pompeius, on the other hand, had refrained hitherto from acts of violence, every one was ready to acknowledge that he was deterred by no principle; it was only because the necessities of the senate had compelled it to throw its powers unreservedly into his hands. The event of the impending contest would undoubtedly place him, if successful, in the position he had long coveted, of a military tyrant. The power of the oligarchy, upon which he leaned, hemmed in on all sides by the encroachment of popular influences, could only be maintained by arms, and arms could not fail to raise their bearer to the despot's throne. But Cæsar's success would not be confined to himself personally; it would be the triumph of the classes from whose fresh blood and simple habits the renovation of the commonwealth might not unreasonably be expected. The Transpadanes, for instance, claimed the boon of citizenship; and setting aside blind prejudices, no pretender to a statesman's foresight could deny the advantage of thus converting lukewarm allies into zealous members of the commonwealth. The principle for which their patron contended was ripe for extension to other communi-

ties similarly circumstanced, and it was apparent that a vast but bloodless revolution might be effected under the auspices of a Marian dictatorship. The interest which the moneyed classes took in Cæsar's success was another proof that the victory of the oligarchy could only lead to more hopeless embarrassments, while that of the popular faction might establish peace upon a solid foundation.¹ The native races of Italy, notwithstanding all the intrigues and violence of the long ascendant faction, still retained their old sympathy for the popular side; and they too had claims of justice which they had long despaired of urging upon the dominant oligarchy. The soil on which the forces of Pompeius were standing was mined beneath their feet. So far from his being able to raise legions by stamping on the ground, the first call of the old general upon his veterans throughout the peninsula was answered, as we shall see, by the open defection of cities and colonies. Surely these were signs of the times upon which the true patriot ought to have meditated, before he enlisted on the side against which was arrayed such a mass of interests and affections. It is not the province of the historian to condemn or absolve the great names of human annals. He leaves the philosophic moralist to denounce crimes or errors, upon a full survey of the character and position of the men and their times; but it is his business to distinguish, in analysing the causes of events, between the personal views of the actors in revolutions and the general interests which their conduct subserved, and to claim for their deeds the sympathy of posterity in proportion as they tended to the benefit of mankind. He may be allowed to

¹ Cic. *ad. Att.* vii. 7. § 5., written xiii. Kal. Jan. A. U. 704.: "An publicanos bonos putas qui nunquam firmi, sed nunc Cæsari sunt amicissimi? an sceneratores, an agricolas, quibus optatissimum est otium? Nisi eos timere putas ne sub regno sint, qui id nunquam, dummodo otiosi sint, recusarunt."

lament the pettiness of the statesmen of this epoch, and the narrow idea they formed of public interests in the contest between Cæsar and his rival. Above all, he must regret that a man to whom we owe so much affection as Cicero should have been deceived by a selfish and hypocritical outcry; for Cicero succeeded in persuading himself that the real patriots were all on the side of the oligarchy, and that it was his duty as a philosopher to follow, not the truth, but the true men, not right judgment, but honourable sentiment.¹

The consuls and senate, as we have seen, had abandoned the city on the first rumour of Cæsar's advance to Ariminum. The political effects of this rash step seem to have been little considered by them; but, in fact, in the view of the great mass of the Roman people, the abandonment of the city was equivalent to an abdication of all legitimate authority.² Once only, in the history of the nation, had a Roman imperator, in the centre of his camp, assumed to represent the majesty of the republic, and refused to obey the convention of a coerced and beleaguered senate. But the example of Camillus was justified by his success; and it was only in the expectation of a speedy and triumphant return that the magistrates of Rome could hope to retain their authority at a distance from the Forum and the Capitol. Cæsar saw how fatal a blunder his opponents had committed. A great change had taken place in the temper of the people since the last civil wars. In the contest of Sulla and Marius the whole population was divided into two hostile camps; now

Political
mistake of the
nobles in
abandoning
Rome.

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* xiv. 18.: "Illud me movet quod video omnes bonos abesse Roma." *Ad Att.* vii. 20.: "Ad fugam hortatur amicitia Cnæi, causa bonorum, turpitudine conjungendi cum tyranno" (viii. 1.).

² Comp. Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 11.: "Non est inquit (Pompeius) in parietibus respublica: at in aris et focis: fecit idem Themistocles . . . at idem Pericles non fecit . . . Nostri olim, urbe reliqua capta, arcem tamen retinuerunt."

the great mass was quiescent; its predilections were not strong enough to rouse it to vigorous action in behalf of either. Its instinct taught it that another civil war could only present it with a choice of masters. Whichever of the rival chieftains first occupied Rome, he would secure the acquiescence and apparent approbation of the citizens, and obtain the most specious sanction to his usurpation.

The consuls retired along the Appian Way instead of advancing upon the Flaminian. Such was their first false step, and it is possible that it saved Cæsar from immediate destruction. Yet he could not venture to move southward without reinforcements, while to halt at the first moment of invasion might seem a sign of weakness and an omen of discomfiture. The second move of his enemies relieved him from this difficulty. Pompeius had the weakness to keep up the farce of negotiations by sending L. Cæsar, a young kinsman of the proconsul, to solicit a final declaration of his demands.¹ To complicate the matter still more, and give further pretence for procrastination, the young ambassador was instructed to speak particularly of the good feeling of Pompeius towards his rival, and his personal wish to accommodate matters in a liberal way; as if a feud so ancient, and lately grown so deadly between the Marian camp and the Sullan, could be resolved into an affair of private and personal jealousy. Pompeius indeed had his own reasons for wishing to gain time to complete the preparations he contemplated in Italy and throughout the provinces; but he lost by delay far more than he gained, for the activity of his rival could profit more by an hour than his own stately movements by a day. To these overtures, the insincerity of which was too obvious to deceive, Cæsar replied with an energetic exposition of the claims he had repeatedly advanced, the sum

Pompeius negotiates with Cæsar in order to gain time.

¹ Cæs. B.C. i. 8.

of which was his demand that equal measure should be dealt to Pompeius and himself, and the armies of each imperator disbanded simultaneously. Such was the ultimatum with which the envoy was dismissed; and this was the moment which Labienus seized for the defection which he had been meditating.¹

The desertion of so able an officer at this juncture seems to prove how precarious, in a military point of view, the position of his leader must have appeared. But Labienus could only see what was immediately before him; he could not appreciate the more remote resources on which Cæsar calculated, or the signs of distraction and imbecility already half disclosed by his opponents. It was on the twenty-second of January that the fugitive was received by Pompeius in his quarters at Teanum.² Cæsar contemptuously sent his baggage after him³; but the nobles stomached this affront, and vied with each other in hailing the accession to their side with rapturous anticipations of triumph. Even Cicero, who had been plunged into the most abject despondency, and was only thinking how best to reconcile his position as a leader of the senatorial party with the means of recovering the favour of the enemy, now broke into exulting vituperation of the new Hannibal, the plunderer of Italy.⁴ He was well pleased to think that his commission in Campania gave him the rea-

Defection of
Labienus.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 11., *ad Div.* xiv. 14.: "Labienus rem meliorem fecit. Adjuvat etiam Piso quod ab urbe discedit, et seeleris condemnat generum suum." Dion, xli. 4.

² Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 13.: "Labienus Teanum venit, a.d. ix. Kal. Febr." Jan. 22. A.U. 705—Dec. 4. B.C. 50. All the dates of this year are forty-seven days in advance of the real time. See Fischer, *R. Z.* It must be remembered that December and January, before the Julian correction, had only 29 days each. Drumann, Billerbeck, Arnold and others make this day the 24th.

³ Plut *Cæs.* 34.

⁴ Cic. *ad Att.* l. c.: "Utrum de Imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur? O hominem amentem et miserum qui ne umbram quidem unquam τοῦ καλοῦ viderit!"

diest access to his beloved city; but Cato murmured loudly against his own destination to Sicily, at a time when all eyes were turned towards Rome, and the first question to be debated in the senate would be the acceptance or rejection of Cæsar's submission.¹

But L. Cæsar had hardly returned to head-quarters before the news arrived of further aggressions on the part of this audacious rebel. Cæsar's advance more than counterbalanced the impression made by his lieutenant's defection. Three great roads converged upon Ariminum from the south. One led from Etruria to the confines of the Gallic province, through the passes by which Brennus had penetrated to Clusium; another, the famous Way of Flaminius, was the direct route from Rome; a third led from Brundisium and the southern districts of the peninsula, taking the line of the Adriatic coast from Ancona. Arretium, Iguvium, and Auximum were important fortresses for the defence of these roads respectively against an invader from the north. Their occupation would enable Cæsar to advance upon either of the three positions which the enemy might adopt; for Pompeius might either concentrate his forces to cover Rome, or withdraw to the right towards Brundisium to keep open his communications with the eastern provinces, or to the left to maintain himself at Centumcellæ, while he recalled to his standard the legions in Spain. Cæsar's forces were still limited to a single legion. Antonius with five cohorts seized upon Arretium, which was undefended. At the same moment Thermus, to whom the senate had intrusted Iguvium and the country of Umbria which it covered, first abandoned his post,

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 15.: "Cato enim ipse jam servire quam pugnare mavult. Sed tamen ait se in senatu adesse velle quum de conditionibus agatur . . . Ita quod maxime opus est in Siciliam ire non curat; quod metuo ne obsit, in senatu esse vult."

Cæsar advances and takes Iguvium, Arretium, and Auximum.

rendered untenable by the disaffection of the inhabitants, and was straightway abandoned by his own soldiers; Auximum, meanwhile, rose against Varus, and compelled him to a hasty retreat, while it opened its gates to Cæsar in person.¹

The senate, though alarmed and irritated at the progress of an enemy who gave his opponents not a moment to breathe, still indulged the hope that he would suffer himself to be persuaded to withdraw from the places he had occupied, and come to Rome, after disbanding his forces, there to discuss, as a private citizen, the wrongs of which he complained. This was still the only condition upon which the consuls would condescend to treat, and it was with corresponding instructions that L. Cæsar was sent a second time to the quarters of the invader.² Meanwhile the levy of troops on the part of the senate proceeded slowly and with little success. The reluctance of the Italians to enlist became alarmingly apparent. The magistrates of the towns showed the strongest disposition to hail the approach of Cæsar's troops as a deliverance from the tyranny of the dominant class.³ From the moment that the consuls left Rome there was no further prospect of enlisting in the capital for the service of the state.⁴ Lentulus would have stooped to a measure which revolted the pride of his associates. He proposed to draft into the legions of the republic the gladiators, some thousands in number, whom Cæsar kept in training at Capua.⁵ But his followers remonstrated so warmly against this proposal, which was, indeed, highly impolitic as well as illegal, that he was com-

The senate attempts again to negotiate, and breaks up Cæsar's band of gladiators at Capua.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 11—13.

² Cæs. *B. C.* i. 10.

³ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 15. He mentions particularly the case of Cingulum, a town on which Labienus had conferred great benefactions.

⁴ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 14. : "Dilectus intra urbem intermittuntur."

⁵ Cæs. *l. c.*

pelled to relinquish it. It was a difficult matter, however, to dispose of a large body of swordsmen, skilful and well armed, and accustomed to regard Cæsar as their patron; and the more so as he might have no scruple himself in employing them in his own service. The numerous legionary force which would be requisite for controlling them, while collected in one spot, could not possibly be spared for such a service. After much deliberation it was resolved to distribute them in small parties among the households of the principal nobles, and break their strength and spirit by dispersion.

Attius Varus, Thermus, Lentulus Spinther, Faustus Sulla, and Libo, with their soldiers or abandoned by them, were now in full retreat from Picenum towards Apulia.¹ Pompeius appointed Larinum, on the frontier of the latter province, as the rallying point for one division of his forces, while another under Domitius, was posted in advance at Corfinium, there to collect the new levies from the centre of Italy.² He left Teanum in Campania at the end of January for Larinum, and from thence despatched pressing orders to the consuls to return to Rome, and carry off the public treasure which had been left behind.³ The want of money was felt not less severely than that of men; but the consuls did not choose to risk falling into Cæsar's hands by a retrograde movement, and refused to obey their general's orders. Pompeius himself, shocked perhaps at the arrival of his lieutenants from Picenum with the account of their disasters in that quarter,

Pompeius falls
back upon
Luceria.

¹ Lucan, ii. 461. foll.

“ Gens Etrusca fuga trepidi nudata Libonis,
Jusque sui pulso jam perdidit Umbria Thermo.
Nec gerit auspiciis civilia bella paternis
Cæsaris audito conversus nomine Sulla.
Varus ut admotæ pulsarunt Auximon alæ,” &c.

² Cæs. B.C. i. 15.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 21., writing from Cales, a.d. vi. Id. Feb. = Feb. 8.

fell back upon Luceria; and it was now evident that his eyes were turned towards Brundisium, and that he contemplated the abandonment of Italy altogether rather than oppose the public enemy in the field.¹ The first suspicion of this intention called forth from his partisans a storm of indignant remonstrance. Cowardice or treachery, they conceived, alone could have dictated it, and the bravest of their leaders broke into open disobedience to the commands of a champion of whose perfidy they were now convinced.

The arrival of the twelfth legion having given Cæsar the means of acting against larger forces, he advanced upon Corfinium early in February. He hardly condescended to notice the terms now brought by his kinsman for the second time, for every succeeding day had disclosed to him the weakness of the enemy and the increasing strength of his own arms. He speedily overran Picenum, taking the fortresses of Cingulum and Asculum, on his way, without opposition. But before Corfinium the Pompeian forces were assembled in formidable numbers, and were commanded by an officer of tried conduct and firmness. Domitius, whose zeal in the cause was inflamed by his recent appointment as Cæsar's successor in the Further Gaul, was determined to make a stand for the defence of Italy.² He hated the person of his leader, he despised his policy, and his command to retreat he threw to the winds. At the same time he sent pressing messages to the consular camp, urging Pompeius to advance to his assistance, and representing the smallness of the enemy's forces, the number and confidence of his own. At Corfinium and in the neighbourhood

Domitius
makes a stand
at Corfinium.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* vii. 23., writing from Formiæ, iv. Id. Feb. = Feb. 10.

² Cæs. *B.C.* i. 16. foll.; Dion, xli. 10, 11.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 38.; Lucan, ii. 478. foll.

he had assembled thirty cohorts: of these many indeed were raw levies, and his oldest veterans had seen perhaps no other service than the beleaguering of the forum during Milo's trial.¹ But Pompeius, dismayed at the repeated defection of his troops, had no confidence in his lieutenant's assurances. He declared that he could not in prudence advance to his succour; that in the present temper of the army Italy was untenable, and that to hazard a general engagement with Cæsar would be to rush upon certain ruin.

Domitius was not to be discouraged even by his leader's desertion; but the disposition he made of his troops was unskilful. He weakened his force by trying to extend protection to Sulmo and the neighbouring towns, and lost one division after another, until he found himself blocked up in Corfinium by an enemy whose strength and audacity were increased by these bloodless successes. A third legion, the eighth, now reached Cæsar's quarters, attended by twenty-two cohorts of Gaulish auxiliaries, and a detachment of cavalry from Noricum. The siege was vigorously pressed; for the delay of a few days was galling to him, while Pompeius, with diminished forces and fast ebbing courage, was evidently preparing to escape from his hands by flight across the sea. But Corfinium could not be left behind; and, indeed, it was a prize second only in richness and importance to Luceria or Brundisium. For besides the military stores amassed in it, and the vaunted strength of its numerous garrison, Domitius had received into his citadel many of the knights and most distinguished

Cæsar beleaguers Corfinium, which is betrayed into his hands.

¹ Lucan *l.c.* :

“Tua classica servat
Oppositus quondam polluto tiro Miloni”

These recruits were the levies Pompeius had made ostensibly for his service in Spain.

senators, who sought refuge from the invader under the protection of a favourite leader. Domitius himself made every exertion to justify their confidence. He conducted the war as an affair of personal interest, promising his soldiers large assignments of land from his own private possessions, after the manner of a principal rather than a subordinate lieutenant.¹ But his exhortations to the soldiery were at first coldly received, and soon slighted altogether. Disaffection was rife within the walls of Corfinium, as before at Iguvium and Asculum. The heart of the old Italian confederacy throbbed at the presence of Cæsar and the banners of Marius. The rumour spread that Pompeius dared not advance, and had abandoned his followers to their fate. Secret intercourse was held with the besieger, and after a few days the conspiracy broke out into open mutiny, the troops proclaiming their determination to surrender the place, with all that it contained, into the enemy's hands. The nobles, alarmed for their lives, could obtain no other indulgence than permission to make terms for themselves by special application to Cæsar. Lentulus Spinther, who was one of the number, acted as their spokesman; and he rightly conceived that to expatiate on the favours he had formerly experienced was the surest means of propitiating a generous conqueror. The time had now come for Cæsar to dispel the fears of massacre and proscription which had driven a large proportion of the senatorial party into arms against him.² His reply was full of mildness and condescension; he apologized for the necessity in which he was placed of asserting his rights by an act of violence against the state, while he insinuated, emboldened by success, that his opponents were a factious minority, and him-

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 17.; Dion, xli. 11.

² Cæs. *B. C.* i. 23.

self the real champion of freedom and the commonwealth.¹

Domitius expected to be himself marked out as the special object of the conqueror's vengeance. Cæsar was determined to render him a signal instance of his clemency. On the eve of surrender the Pompeian leader applied to his physician for poison, and even, it was said, compelled him with his drawn sword to administer a potion. But the draught had not produced its anticipated effect, when he was informed that the victor was disposed not only to spare the lives of his prisoners, but to treat them with marked indulgence. He now, in the most abject manner, lamented his precipitation; but the physician had deceived him with a narcotic, and he lived to enjoy, and afterwards abuse, his captor's clemency.² Cæsar, if we may believe his own direct statement in contradiction to an obscure rumour related by Cicero, went so far in his generosity as to restore to Domitius the large treasure in his military chest³; an act which is rendered credible by the proconsul's natural wish to show the Roman people that they had no more to fear from his want of money than from his thirst for blood. He then pressed his prisoners to acknowledge his claims and share in the brightening prospects of his enterprise. This offer the men of note steadily declined, but the fresh Italian recruits hailed the summons with enthusiasm, and speedily

¹ Cæsar was seven days before Corfinium, Feb. 14 - 21.: "Septem dies ad Corfinium commoratur." Cæs. *B. C.* i. 33.

² This story is told by Suetonius, Seneca, Pliny and Plutarch. See Drumann, iii. 22.

³ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 23.; Cic. *ad Att.* viii. 14. Appian (*B. C.* ii. 39.) confirms Cæsar's statement. Some of Cæsar's adherents seem not to have admired their leader's clemency. See the letter of Cicero's witty correspondent Cælius, *ad Div.* viii. 15. But Cælius was personally hostile to Domitius: comp. *ad Div.* viii. 12.

Cæsar grants life and liberty to Domitius and the Pompeian leaders.

ranged themselves under the banner which they regarded as their own.

The effect of this clemency, hitherto unexampled in the civil wars of the Romans, became immediately apparent. Cicero bears unwilling testimony to the consummate adroitness of the enemy's proceedings.¹ He had killed nobody, he had taken nothing from anybody; if he proceeded thus he would become the object of universal love and enthusiasm. Such was the feeling springing up among the population of Campania; the people of the country towns discoursed with Cicero on the state of public affairs; and he saw but too plainly from their conversation that the heart of Italy was estranged from the consuls and senate: peace was the general wish even among those who had no Marian predilections, and the tranquil possession of property outweighed the antiquated names of law and liberty.² And then the philosopher sighed to think how much the errors and vices of his party had contributed to bring about this state of political indifference.

Important effects of this clemency.

But, in truth, the conduct of Cæsar was set off in brighter colours from its contrast with the opposite disposition manifested by his opponents. The senate had proclaimed him a public enemy, and his adherents and followers in arms were naturally included in the same sentence. Nor was this enough. At the moment of leaving Rome, it determined, at the instigation of the ferocious Domitius, to drive the neutral and the waverers into the Pompeian camp by terror. It declared that every citizen who remained behind at Rome should be deemed a Cæsarean, and thus

It offers a favourable contrast to the ferocious threats of his adversaries.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* viii. 13.

² Cic. *l. c.*: "Multum mecum municipales homines loquuntur, multum rusticani. Nihil prorsus aliud curant, nisi agros nisi villulas nisi nummulos suos."

provided itself with a pretext for the extreme measures against the city which it seems to have already contemplated.¹ Not only were the young nobles loud in their denunciations of proscription and massacre; the older and more dignified were already parcelling out among themselves in imagination the spoils of the commonwealth. Pompeius himself had the name of Sulla always in his mouth: *Sulla could do this, why should not I do the same?*² was his constant argument. To propose the great dictator for his model was to threaten a sanguinary revolution and a thorough reorganization of the state. It was surmised with inexpressible alarm and disgust that Rome had been abandoned when it might have been defended, in order that it might be involved in Cæsar's guilt, and, when the day of vengeance should arrive, be subjected to all the horrors of a war of reprisal, to famine and fire, to pillage and massacre.³

When Domitius refused, or was no longer able, to obey his leader's injunctions, and withdraw from Corfinium to the head-quarters at Luceria, Pompeius saw the ruin his lieutenant had drawn upon himself, and felt that his own position in Italy was no longer tenable. But the rashness of the rear-guard saved the main body of the retreating column, for so rapid were Cæsar's movements, that but for this seven days' delay, Pompeius would undoubtedly have been overtaken. He now sheltered himself in Brundisium⁴, and charged the consuls and other magistrates to accompany him across the sea. When this command reached Cicero in Campania, the road into Apulia was no longer open. Cæsar was eager to recover the time he had lost before Corfinium. But the har-

Pompeius retreats to Brundisium, and prepares to cross over into Epirus.

¹ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 37.: ἀπειλήσας τοῖς ἐπιμένουσι.

² Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 10.: "Sulla potuit: ego non potero?"

³ Cic. *ad Div.* iv. 14., *ad Att.* viii. 11., ix. 7, 10, 11. See below.

⁴ Cæs. *B. C.* i. 24, 25.

hour of Brundisium was crowded with transports and vessels of every description. The consuls and the greater part of their army, which now amounted to five legions, effected their embarkation, and were already far on their way across the Adriatic; but Pompeius, with a division of the army, still lingered in the town when Cæsar's advanced guard appeared before the walls. Intercepted in his meditated flight by the celerity of these movements, Cicero hesitated to take ship at Naples and encounter before the close of winter the dangers of the straits and the Ionian sea. Filled with dark forebodings as to the designs of his leader, whose abandonment first of Rome and then of Italy he regarded as part of a long matured scheme for the destined subjugation of his country, he was not sorry, perhaps, that circumstances now placed a barrier between them. But he was still indisposed to anticipate Cæsar's success, as well as indignant at his rebellion against prescriptive authorities. In his sullen retirement at Formiæ the orator was plied by solicitations and flatteries on the part of Cæsar himself and his friends Balbus and Oppius. The strongest assurances were given him of the conqueror's good intentions and conservative principles; but these representations failed to assuage his fears or lighten his melancholy, and he continued to pour his griefs and distractions into the ear of his chief adviser Atticus.¹

Cæsar arrived before Brundisium on the ninth of March.² The forces with which he formed the siege amounted to six complete legions, together with their auxiliary Gaulish cohorts. Of these legions, three consisted of

Pompeius evacuated Brundisium, and makes his escape from Italy.

¹ See particularly Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 11—13., and the correspondence of Cicero with Cæsar and his partisans therein communicated.

Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 3.: "Erat hic dies vii. Id. Mar. quo die suspicabamur aut pridie Brundisium venisse Cæsarem." So Cæsar, in Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 13 A.

his veterans; the others were made up partly of new levies and partly of the Pompeians whom he had drafted into his own ranks. But these did not include the battalions he had recently enrolled at Corfinium; for these zealous allies had been despatched in all haste to secure the possession of Sicily. It was impossible for Pompeius with the twenty cohorts, which were all he retained, to hold the place against this overwhelming force. But Cæsar, on the other hand, was entirely destitute of ships; the sea was open, and the transports had received orders to return and bear away from Brundisium the remnant of the consular army. The port of the city is approached by a narrow passage leading from an outer into an inner basin¹, and the shore on either side of this passage was occupied by the besiegers. But the outlet could only be obstructed by the erection of immense earthworks, and Pompeius trusted to the depth of the water to frustrate or delay the accomplishment of so great an undertaking.² Full of this confidence, he refused to listen to the proposals of accommodation which Cæsar continued to offer. He declared that he was only the lieutenant of the consuls, and could not act without their concurrence. Cæsar sank vessels and drove piles in the channel, while Pompeius exerted himself to impede these operations, and succeeded in keeping it open for the transports, which in due time made their appearance.³ Upon their arrival, the troops were embarked without delay, a few soldiers being left on the walls

¹ The localities are carefully described by Keppel Craven, *Tour in the kingdom of Naples*, p. 149.

² Cæsar in a letter to Balbus, communicated to Cicero (*ad Att.* ix. 14.), speaks of his operations before Brundisium: "Pompeius se oppido tenet. Nos ad portas castra habemus. Conamur opus magnum et multorum dierum propter altitudinem maris. Sed tamen nihil est quod potius faciamus. Ab utroque portus cornu moles jacimus."

³ *Cæs. B. C.* i. 25. 28.; Dion, xli. 12.

to deceive the enemy with a show of resistance to the last moment. The streets had been carefully barricaded to obstruct his progress upon first entering the undefended city. But the inhabitants were eager to display their zeal in the cause of a triumphant and perhaps irritated conqueror, and guided his troops with alacrity to the haven. The last of the Pompeians were already safe on board; the flotilla glided rapidly down the harbour, and broke through every obstruction at the outlet, with the loss of only two vessels, which struck against the head of the embankment. These were immediately grappled to the shore with irons, boarded by the enraged Cæsareans, and their crews cut to pieces. This was the first blood shed in the civil war.

Cæsar had made himself master of Italy in sixty days.¹ Never, perhaps, was so great a conquest effected so rapidly, and in the face

Rapidity of
Cæsar's suc-
cess.

of antagonists apparently so formidable. Every step he advanced was a surprise to his enemies; yet at each step they predicted more confidently his approaching discomfiture. But at the first blast of his trumpets every obstacle fell before him, and the march of his legions could hardly keep up with the retreat of his boastful adversaries. The consuls abandoned Rome before he was competent to approach it; their lieutenants, deserted by their troops, plundered of their treasure, and denuded of

¹ Pompeius embarked March 17 = Jan. 25. B. C. 49, and Cæsar entered Brundisium the day following. Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 19. Plutarch says (*Cæs.* 35.): γεγονώς ἐν ἡμέραις ἐξήκοντα πάσης ἀναιμωτῆ τῆς Ἰταλίας κύριος. Assigning twenty-nine days to January, and twenty-eight to February, the sixty days would extend from Jan. 16--March 18, inclusive. If this calculation is to be taken strictly, the passage of the Rubicon would take place on the night of Jan. 15--16.; but I am inclined to place it a few days earlier. The interval between the flight of the tribunes, Jan. 6, and the passage of the Rubicon, Jan. 15--16, seems too long, while more time is required for the events which were crowded into the following days.

the materials of war, found themselves alone and defenceless in their camps before the invader appeared in sight. The interest which Sulla had fostered in his colonies melted away like a dream; old hopes and hatreds revived in the breasts of the Italians; the magistrates of every city flung wide their gates, and hailed the Roman traitor as their hero and deliverer.¹ The captain, second only to Pompeius in the camp and councils of the senate, was dragged a prisoner into Cæsar's presence; and Pompeius himself retreated from one position to another without a single attempt to rally, and finally crept out of the country like a hunted fox. All this time the nobles

Indignation of the nobles at the conduct of Pompeius. had been growing more and more clamorous to be led against the invader; in vain did they mutter and scowl, and heap reproaches upon their chosen champion. He was not to be diverted from his plans, whatever they might be, but he would make no disclosure of them; to their remonstrances he coldly replied by ordering the murmurers to follow him under pain of proscription. To the last they hoped that he would still make a stand on the sacred soil of Italy; when he finally deceived their anticipations and wafted the last band of his military followers from the port of Brundisium, confusion and despair prompted many among them to throw themselves upon the conqueror's generosity. The Appian Way was again crowded with knights and senators; but this time their faces were turned towards the city. Dragged so long against their will at the wheels of Pompeius' chariot, they vowed from henceforth to renounce the war, and sought the protection of the chief who alone permitted neutrality.² Many of these belonged, no doubt, to the class of

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 12.: "Municipia vero et rustici Romani illum (sc. Pomp.) metuunt, hunc adhuc diligunt."

² Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 8. (March 6.): "Urbem quidem jam refertam esse optimatium audio . . . Hinc vero vulgo vadant."

indolent and selfish voluptuaries, who had been beguiled into a momentary relinquishment of their pleasures by the assurance that they should be soon reinstated in them more securely and triumphantly. But many also were better citizens, who foreboded some undefined evil to the state from the apparent treachery of Pompeius, and would no longer lend their support to his cause, though they might scruple to turn their arms against the sacred names of consuls and senate. They left it to the needy and reckless, the disappointed adventurers and patrician spend-thrifts, to cling still to Pompeius' fortunes, and gloat over their visions of an abolition of debts, a confiscation of properties, and a reconstruction of the government. Whatever stains there might be on the character of many of the most prominent of Cæsar's adherents, it was now fully evident that the leader of the oligarchy was surrounded by a crew not less dissolute and unprincipled.

The departure of the more moderate and high-minded of his partisans was witnessed, we may presume, by Pompeius with no great dissatisfaction. There can be little doubt as to the game he had all along been playing. It is impossible to suppose that a captain so consummate and a statesman so experienced should have let the cards drop from his hands, as he had done throughout, except with a deliberate policy. Whether he admitted the consuls themselves into his confidence may remain uncertain; but it is clear that he deceived to the last the main body of his adherents, even within the camp, by a pretended defence of Italy, while it had long been his intention to surrender every post successively, and make his exit from the peninsula as fast as, with a decent show of resistance, he could.¹

Explanation
of the secret
policy of Pom-
peius in aban-
doning Italy.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ix 10. : "Hoc turpe (de fuga cogitare) Cnæus noster biennio ante cogitavit."

The eastern and western portions of the empire stood to each other in peculiar contrast, and the views which influenced Pompeius at this crisis may be traced to the nature of the resources respectively offered by them.

The Italian peninsula, stretching far into the midland sea, divided the Roman world into two hemispheres, rivals for the regard of the warrior and statesman, not less distinct in their social and political character than in their geographical position. The contrast between them was more strongly marked at this period than at any subsequent era. For both the East and the West were still instinct with the life peculiar to each, and though both equally within the reach and under the control of the same iron arm, were nevertheless as completely alien from one another in their principles, interests and feelings, as if they had been two rival empires and not parts and provinces of the same.

On the one hand, the great province of Spain was already more thoroughly Romanized than any other part of the dominions of the republic. Though some districts were not yet fully subdued, and much lawlessness and disaffection still existed in others, yet the manners of the conquering people had been introduced from an early period, and definitively adopted throughout a large portion of the country. The language of the Italians was achieving rapid conquests in every quarter, and consolidating the municipal institutions which were lavished so freely upon the natives in no other part of the empire. These results had been rendered permanent by the influence of Sertorius, who had taught the Iberians to regard the discipline and habits of their foreign masters as the true secret of their irresistible success. The subjugation of Spain had occupied one hundred and fifty years of almost constant warfare. Step by

Contrast between the eastern and western portions of the Roman Empire.

Spain more completely Romanized than any other province.

step had Rome made her way into the heart of a country, in which every mountain and desert had been defended with the same inveterate love of freedom. But she had never been compelled to retreat from an inch of ground once occupied, and the roots of her power struck the deeper into the soil from the tempests which had so long repressed its growth. The condition of the native races had been one of unmitigated barbarism; the southern and western coasts alone were slightly tinctured with the spirit of Greek and Phœnician culture. But, in the absence of civilization, the Iberians had no social institutions which could retain their vitality under the blight of a foreign conquest. Innumerable strongholds, dignified by the Roman writers with the name of cities, had been razed to the ground; the elder Cato had destroyed, it is said, not less than three hundred.¹ Deprived of every fastness, except those which the nature of the country continued to offer in some isolated districts, the barbarians, once thoroughly subdued, had no retreat in which to cherish the remnants of their nationality. The character of the people was, however, essentially warlike, and this temper the crafty conquerors did not suffer to ferment in inaction. The Iberian peninsula was the Switzerland of the ancient world. Its hardy clans had for ages supplied the infantry of Carthage; they had defeated the Romans themselves at the Trebia and Cannæ, and had enlisted under the banners of Antiochus for a second invasion of Italy. Accordingly, the rude chieftains whom the arts of peace could not soften, were more easily broken to the yoke of military discipline. It was in Spain that the Romans first adopted from their rivals the practice of enlisting hired bands of their foreign

¹ See Plutarch, Polybius and Strabo, referred to by Mannert, I. 241. ; Liv. xxviii. 1, xxxiv. 17.

subjects.¹ The colonization of the peninsula, especially in the south, by Roman citizens, had been carried on systematically, and the admission of natives to the Roman franchise had been more liberal there than in most of the provinces. The way was already paved for the much larger enfranchisement which followed at a later period. Thus it was that at the opening of the civil wars the spirit of the Iberian provinces was more thoroughly Roman than any other; the political feelings and interests of the people, no less than their social habits, had become nearly identified with those of the dominant race. In no part of the empire beyond Italy itself were the ancient traditions and prejudices of patrician and plebeian held more sacred. Spain was rather a healthy offshoot from the parent state than a conquered dependency. Strong in her indomitable character and her military resources, she was calculated to form the firmest bulwark of the republic and of the party which at this period prevailed in its counsels.

The process of civilization in Spain had been commenced by the Scipios and Catos of earlier generations, and carried on by a Metellus and a Pompeius. The colonists and the natives were attached to the senatorial party by all the ties which the policy of the conquerors could devise. We have seen how in Gaul, on the other hand, the two rival factions had been alternately in the ascendant, and that the result had been to leave the old province, for the most part, Pompeian in feeling, but to create a strong Cæsarean interest throughout the later conquests. The genius and activity of Cæsar seemed to have effected in nine years in Gaul beyond the Cevennes the moral and social transformation which it had taken a cen-

¹ Liv. xxiv. 49.: "Mercenarium militem neminem ante quam tum Celtiberos Romani habuerunt." This was in the second Punic war. A. U. 539

Progress of
Roman senti-
ments in Gaul.

ture and a half to mature in the Iberian peninsula. We have already remarked the extent to which the conqueror had availed himself of the military spirit of the northern nations; how, by enlisting the chieftains under his banner, he had so far gained their affections as to be able to leave them most of the forms at least of their ancient freedom. He thus succeeded in inspiring both their warriors and their magistrates with Roman feelings, and the desire to emulate the spirit of southern civilization. The two great nations of the west were thus rendered the allies of the republic, rather than her subjects. Either of them furnished a field on which her quarrels might be fought out, in the midst of a native population hardly less Cæsarean or Pompeian in their sympathies than the conquering race itself.

But in the eastern half of the Roman empire the ideas of the dominant people had received no such development, and no interest was there felt in the quarrels of the city. The earlier and finer cultivation of the East still regarded with contemptuous indifference the struggles of the Roman mind to obtain an ascendancy over the subject races. The Greek populations were at this period almost exhausted by war, bad government and the decay of their commercial prosperity. They submitted to the conqueror with an apathy from which nothing could rouse them, and, while they were forced to cast their institutions in Italian moulds, refused to imbibe any portion of their spirit. But beyond the Grecian provinces no attempt was made to infuse the political ideas of the republic into the dependent or tributary kingdoms on the frontier. The races of Asia acquiesced in their own immemorial despotisms, to which they had been abandoned by Sulla and Pompeius. To them the names of Liberty and Equality, invoked in turn by each

The eastern provinces indifferent to the principle involved in the civil war, and regard only the persons of the leaders.

of the Roman factions, were unintelligible. They had no conception of the nature of the contests, the rumour of which reached them across so many seas and continents. The sympathies of the Orientals centred always in men, and never in governments. A Cyrus, an Alexander, an Arsaces, commanded all their devotion; for them the foundations of law lay in the bosom of the autocrat. If summoned to take up arms in behalf of either party, it was upon the leader alone that they would fix their eyes, to his triumph the sphere of their interests would be limited. The accession of their wealth and numbers would strengthen the hands of the chief even against his own followers; to the common cause a victory obtained by their aid might be not less dangerous than a defeat. Accordingly, the introduction of such allies into a civil war could only be regarded by the genuine and high-minded among her children, as an insult to the dignity of the republic.¹ The party chief who should divest himself of the support of the national sentiment, and rally around his standards the blind obsequiousness of Egypt and Syria, the rude devotion of Colchis and Armenia², would forfeit the respect of the true patriot as much as if he had put himself at the head of a foreign invasion.

That this, however, was the course Pompeius had determined to adopt, from the moment that he saw the contest with his rival inevitable, seems sufficiently proved by the whole tenor of his subsequent conduct. He hated the oligarchy of which he was the

Pompeius places himself at their head, in order to counter-balance the authority of the senate.

¹ The true Roman sentiment is expressed by Lucan (vii. 526.):

. . . "Civilia bella

Non bene barbaricis unquam commissa catervis."

² Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 10 : "Getarum et Armeniorum et Colchorum copias ad eum adducere." ix. 11. : "Nuntiant Ægyptum et Arabiam εὐδαίμονα et Μεσοποταμίαν cogitare." Dion; xli. 13.

chief. At an earlier period, while placing himself ostensibly at its head, he had laboured to depress and degrade it. Jealous of the rival whom in self-defence it had raised against him in Cicero, he had used Cæsar, as he thought, as an instrument to crush this attempt to control him. But the instrument cut the workman's hand. The next turn of the wheel of fortune showed him in close alliance with this same party, to defend themselves against a common adversary. Pompeius, however, was well aware that these hollow friends would seize the moment of victory to effect his overthrow. If they worsted Cæsar, it would not be to submit once more to himself. He feared the hostile influence of the consuls and magistrates in a camp of Roman citizens, and felt that, in the event of a struggle with them, his title of Imperator would not weigh against their superior claims to the soldiers' allegiance. For the armies of which he was now the nominal leader were raised within the bounds of Italy; they were not debauched like the legions of Sulla, of Marius, of Cæsar, or those which he had himself led from Asia, by long absence from the city and habits of military licence. In order to strengthen his own exalted position, or even to maintain it after the defeat of the invader, he required a military force of another description. It was necessary that his anticipated victory should be gained, not on the soil of Italy, nor by the hands of Lentulus and Domitius, and that his return to Rome should be a triumph over the senate no less than over Cæsar.

Thus only can we account for Pompeius having made no arrangements for maintaining himself at Rome, or at least in Italy, while there was yet time to have brought to his succour the legions in Spain; for his abandoning Domitius with his strong detachment in the face of so inferior an enemy; and above all, for his carrying the war to

With this view
he abandons
Italy and dis-
regards Spain.

the East instead of to the West, when compelled to escape from the shores of the Peninsula.¹ It was in Spain that the great strength of his party lay after it was expelled from the hearths of the republic; there was no region where the sacred names of Rome and the senate could meet with so favourable a response in the breasts of the provincials. Twelve legions of Roman soldiers, backed by the resources of so warlike and opulent a country, might be matched with advantage against any force Cæsar could bring against them; and it was more probable that they would have crossed the Pyrenees to engage their antagonists in southern Gaul, than have awaited an assault within their own limits. In the meantime Scipio would have brought up the resources of the east and all that could be spared from the armies of the Syrian frontier, and the two ponderous masses might have met in Italy, and crushed Cæsar between them.

But Pompeius had no intention of sharing his victory on equal terms with the great men of his party, or reinstating in their ivory chairs the old chiefs of the aristocracy. There was now no disguise as to his designs, no doubt as to the attempt he would make to obliterate every vestige of ancient liberty. Some, indeed, of the nobles might still expect to impose a check upon him by their presence in his camp, but many even of the most distinguished among them were already corrupted by the hope of plunder. War against Italy, war against Rome, was the open cry of the most daring and profligate. We will starve the city into submission, we will leave not a tile on a

He exalts himself above the chiefs of his party, and proclaims war against Rome.

¹ It was at first expected that Pompeius, if driven from Italy, would have retired into Spain. Cic. *ad Alt.* vii. 18.: "Tempori pareamus, cum Pompeio in Hispaniam eamus." This letter was written Feb. 3. Appian *B.C.* ii. 38.: καὶ παρασκευῆς ἔρχεν ὡς δρηθῶν ὄπη ποτ' ἂν αἱ χρεῖαι καλῶσιν.

house throughout the country, was echoed by Pompeius himself.¹ Such was the ominous language which resounded in the senatorial camp as soon as it was pitched in Epirus, and the opposite shores assumed the character of a foreign and a hostile strand. The consuls listened to it without a murmur, for it was their own chosen champion who avowed it. *He left the city, says Cicero, not because he could not defend it, and Italy, not because he was driven out of it; but this was his design from the beginning, to move every land and sea, to call to arms the kings of the barbarians, to lead savage nations into Italy, not as captives but as conquerors. He is determined to reign like Sulla, as a king over his subjects; and many there are who applaud this atrocious design.*²

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 7.: "Primum consilium est suffocare urbem et Italiam fame, deinde vastare agros, urere, pecuniis locupletum non abstinere Promitto tibi, si valebit, tegulam illum in Italia nullam relicturum." Comp. *ad Att.* xi. 6., *ad Div.* iv. 14.

² Cic. *ad Att.* viii. 11.; comp. viii. 16., ix. 9.: "Mirandum in modum Cnæus noster Sullani regni similitudinem concupivit. Εἰδώς σοι λέγω. Nihil ille unquam minus obscure tulit." ix. 10.: "Sullaturit ejus animus et proscripturit diu."

CHAPTER XV.

Cæsar repairs to Rome and convenes the Senate.—His moderation and clemency.—He plunders the Temple of Saturn.—He proceeds to attack the Pompeian armies in Spain.—Domitius encourages the Massilians to shut their gates against him.—He leaves a force to besiege their city, and crosses the Pyrenees.—The Pompeian Lieutenants occupy Ilerda.—Military operations before that place.—Overflow of the Sicoris and peril of Cæsar.—Brutus gains a naval advantage over the Massilians.—The Pompeians compelled to evacuate Ilerda.—Further military operations, ending in the capitulation of the Pompeian armies. A. U. 705, B. C. 49.

CÆSAR now occupied without an antagonist in sight the centre of his enemies' position. Their line of operations was fairly cut in two, and the assailant might determine at his leisure against which of the wings of their army he should first concentrate his forces. Moreover, he found himself in possession of the hostile camp, well stored with the moral and material resources of war, and thronged with deserters from their flying ranks. Rome threw her gates wide open to receive him, and he fully appreciated the immense advantage in a civil war of being able to issue his mandates from the centre of law and order. He was, however, entirely unprovided with the requisite armaments for transporting his army across the Adriatic; nor, in any case, would he have ventured to encounter the gigantic resources of the East at the head of only three legions. Another grave consideration at the same time pressed upon him, the protection of Rome and Italy from the scarcity which threatened them, so long as Sardinia, Sicily and Africa were held by Pompeian lieutenants.

A. U. 705.
B. C. 49.

The consuls' abandonment of Italy gives Cæsar a great moral advantage.

Accordingly, while he quartered a portion of his forces on the Apulian coast to prevent the enemy's return¹ or the exit of his Italian partisans, he sent detachments in all haste to effect the conquest of these important positions. The appearance of a legion off the coast of Sardinia encouraged the natives to rise in arms and expel the garrison placed there by the senate.² Curio, who now occupied the place of Labienus in his leader's confidence, and whose zeal and ability might compensate for the want of experience, received orders to wrest Sicily from the Pompeians, and from thence cross over the sea, and contest with them the possession of Africa.³ The island was held for the senate by M. Cato, who had reluctantly obeyed its command to defend so obscure a dependency, for his services, he deemed, could be better employed in Italy, or wherever the consuls might pitch their camp. Accordingly, he seems to have made little preparation for the ungrateful task of arming the Sicilians to harass his beloved city. The sudden approach of the Cæsarean forces, consisting of four legions⁴, in a flotilla of unarmed transports, found him unable to cope with the invasion, and the news of the abandonment of Italy by Pompeius so shocked and dismayed him, that he determined to shed no blood in a desultory and provincial skirmish. He was satisfied with demanding of the intruder whether it was by the decree of the senate, or under the orders of the people, that he presumed to encroach upon the province of an independent

He expels the forces of the senate from Sardinia and Sicily.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 15.: "Ille (Cæsar) ut ad me scripsit legiones singulas posuit Brundisii, Siponti, Tarenti. Claudere mihi videtur maritimos exitus: et tamen ipse Græciam spectare potius quam Hispanias."

² Cæs. *B. C.* i. 30.

³ Appian (*B. C.* ii. 40.) supposes Asinius Pollio to have been first in command; but that Curio was the superior appears from the sequel.

⁴ Cæs. *l. c.*

governor. *The Master of Italy has sent me*, returned the Cæsarean lieutenant¹, and Cato bowed to the insulting summons, relinquishing the island without a blow, and seeking the head-quarters of the consuls beyond the sea.²

Meanwhile Cæsar, on his part, repaired straight-way to Rome, ingratiating himself at every step with men of all parties, who listened with admiration and favour to the plausible explanation he could give of his conduct, as well as to his gracious promises to restore security and order. In courteous terms he invited the timid and the wavering to meet him in the Capitol, and to aid him with their counsel on the affairs of the commonwealth. With Cicero he had a personal interview at Formiæ, and an animated conversation ensued between them. The orator had already been reassured, by the correspondence he kept up with friends of the proconsul, as to any fears he might entertain for his own person. He did not shrink from meeting the victorious invader, and his demeanour was not wanting in a show of firmness and dignity. Cæsar urged with all the fascination of his polished address that the refusal of so popular a statesman to return to Rome would be a cause of hesitation to others. Anxious as he was to place his interests under the shadow of legitimate authority, he invited the senate to resume its functions in its proper seat, and tender its advice to its faithful soldier.³ But

Cæsar repairs
in person to
Rome,

and seeks an
interview with
Cicero on the
way.

¹ Appian, *l. c.*

² Cicero (*ad Att.* x. 12–16.) speaks with a good deal of bitterness of the apparent pusillanimity of Cato's behaviour: "potuisse certe tenere illam provinciam scio." But his judgments on these points were formed with the utmost levity. Cato left Sicily (*Cic. ad Att.* x. 16.) April 23, A.U. 705, which corresponds with March 2, B.C. 49.; comp. Appian, *B.C.* ii. 41.; Dion, xli. 18.; Plut. *Cato*, 53.; Oros. vi. 15.; Flor. iv. 2. 22.

³ Lucan, i. 202.:

"Cæsar ubique tuus, liceat modo, nunc quoque, miles."

Cicero resolutely closed his ears against these flattering solicitations. He pleaded his personal obligation to Pompeius, and his intimate connexion with the fugitive party, whose threats of proscription were still sounding in his ears. He ventured to declare that, if he opened his mouth in the senate house, it must be to denounce the attack which Cæsar was meditating on the Pompeian legions in Spain, and the expected transport of his army into Greece, in defiance of those whom he was still bound to consider the constituted authorities of the state. Cæsar replied abruptly that he would not suffer any such public animadversions upon his conduct; and he was obliged, at last, to break up the conference with the cold expression of a hope that his friend would reflect further upon the matter. To this Cicero returned a civil answer; and so, he says, much to his relief, the interview ended.¹

Cæsar had reached Rome by the first of April, and his first care upon arriving there was to convene a council which should represent to the citizens the image of their venerated senate. Members of that body had already returned in sufficient numbers to give the appearance of a legitimate assembly; the absence of the consuls, by whom its meetings should properly have been convoked, was supplied by the tribunes, Antonius and Cassius, who revived, for the occasion, the obsolete prerogatives of their office.² The demeanour of the conqueror was studiously mild: he reiterated, in set phrases, the complaints he had so repeatedly ad-

Cæsar convenes a senate: his conduct studiously moderate.

Comp. also vii., 264 :

“ Non mihi res agitur, sed vos ut libera sitis
Turba precor, gentes ut jus habeatis in omnes.”

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 18. (iv. Kal. Apr. i.e. March 29.): “ Damnari se nostro judicio, tardiores fore reliquos si nos non venerimus, dicere . . . Tum ille, Ego vero ista dici nolo . . . Summa fuit, ut ille quasi exitum quærens, ut deliberarem. Non fuit negandum. Ita discessimus.”

² Drumann, iii. 443.

dressed to the consuls themselves. He proposed the opening of a new negotiation ; but he may be suspected of throwing obstacles himself in the way of its being carried into effect. It may be true, as he alleges, that it was difficult to find persons willing to bear the flag of truce into the camp of Pompeius, who had vowed to treat even the neutral as enemies.¹ But it was observed that, when the affair dropped, and Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, mooted it a second time, he received a rebuke for his officious interference.²

The restoration of the families of Sulla's victims to their civil rights was a measure of justice against which no exception could fairly be taken.³ But the adherents of the party now in the ascendant began to press other claims which could not be so easily satisfied. Cæsar had taken the precaution of leaving his army behind him when he entered Rome. His soldiers had allowed themselves to anticipate enormous plunder from the conquest of Italy ; and he could not venture to bring them within reach of the spoil of the capital. But the urban populace itself demanded a reward for its long-trying devotion to his cause, and its murmurs at the prospect of disappointment already raised again the hopes of his enemies.⁴ Cæsar was obliged to pay the price of his popularity in solid

His difficulty
in satisfying
the demands
of his soldiers.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 33.: "Pompeius enim discedens ab urbe in senatu dixerat eodem se habiturum loco qui Romæ remansissent et qui in castris Cæsaris fuissent."

² Dion, xli. 16.

³ Dion (xli. 18.) states that this restoration took place at this time ; but Plutarch (*Cæs.* 37.) places it after the Spanish war. I think with Drumann that the later date is the correct one, in which case it was one of a series of connected measures. But such an enactment was probably talked of at this time, and the legal disqualifications virtually set aside.

⁴ Cic. *ad Att.* x. 8.: "Nullo modo posse video stare illum diutius . . . quippe qui florentissimus ac novus, vi., vii. diebus ipsi illi egenti ac perditæ multitudini in odium acerbissimum venerit."

coin ; and the largess he promised was a frank confession that his power was founded on the will of the multitude. Cæsar had already pledged himself to give five minæ to each of his soldiers¹; he now proffered three hundred sesterces to every citizen. The fulfilment of these engagements would have greatly embarrassed him, for he had renounced the resources of proscription and confiscation to which previous conquerors had so readily resorted. But his enemies, in the haste and trepidation with which they had abandoned the city, had neglected the precaution of removing the treasure stored under the Capitol in the vaults of the temple of Saturn. This sacred hoard, as it was pompously denominated, had been chiefly amassed from the proceeds of a duty on the enfranchisement of slaves ; but a portion of the spoils of war had also from time to time been deposited there. Once only, in the most disastrous crisis of the Punic wars, had a quantity of gold, amounting to four thousand pounds in weight, been thence withdrawn by the solemn decree of the senate ; but, in later times, the coffers had been rifled, both by the elder and the younger Marius, during the licence of civil commotion. Undoubtedly the consuls Marcellus and Lentulus would not have spared it, if in the general panic of their flight from Rome they had had presence of mind to forecast the consequences of their pusillanimity. Pompeius had required them to retrace their steps from Campania, for the purpose of retrieving their blunder ; but it was then too late, and this abandonment of the public treasure was one of the faults against which Cicero had most bitterly inveighed. Cæsar easily obtained authority from his subservient senate to appropriate these resources. One voice was raised against the proceeding,

He plunders
the sacred
treasure in the
temple of
Saturn.

¹ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 47 ; five minæ may = 2000 sestertii, nearly = 16*l*.

that of a tribune named Metellus, a bold as well as a bitter opponent of the Marian party, whose courage at least may deserve honourable record. His official veto on the decree of the senate was contemptuously disregarded; but he placed himself before the door of the temple, and vehemently protested that the spoiler should not enter but over his body. He sought to enlist the popular feeling on his side by appealing to a cherished tradition. This treasure, it was devoutly believed, included the actual ransom of the city, which Brennus had carried from the gates, and the valour of Camillus had recovered. A solemn curse had been denounced, it was added, against the sacrilegious hand which should remove it for any purpose whatsoever, except to repel a Gallic invasion. *The fear of a Gallic invasion, retorted Cæsar, is for ever at an end: I have subdued the Gauls.*¹ Cæsar's anger was terrible, and Metellus quailed at last before the menaces of one whose blows, it was well known, were swifter than his words. The keys had been carried off by the consuls, and the door was broken open with pickaxes. This violent measure was undoubtedly one of extreme necessity, otherwise Cæsar would not have risked by it the character for moderation he so studiously affected. The pretended champion of tribunitian inviolability was constrained to plead the exigency of civil war, in excuse for the violation of a tribune's dignity.²

The nobles, indeed, had relied upon these con-

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 35.; App. ii. 41.; Dion, xli. 27.

² Cic. (*ad Att.* x. 8.) says, pertinently enough: "Qui duarum rerum simulationem tam cito amiserit, mansuetudinis in Metello, divitiarum in ærario." Cæsar seems to have carried off his violence with a sarcastic taunt. Plut. *Cæs.* 35.: *παρρησιᾶς γὰρ οὐ δεῖται πόλεμος.* Lucan (iii. 138.) conveys the idea even more pointedly:

"Non usque adeo permiscuit imis
Longus summa dies, ut non, si voce Metelli
Serventur leges, malint a Cæsare tolli."

quered Gauls to make a diversion in their favour. When Cicero expresses the general expectation that the invader would be checked in his career in Italy by the revolt in his rear of the provinces he had only half pacified, he relies neither upon his devotion to the state, nor his care for his own glory, to stay his onward progress. But a revolt in Gaul would have cut off the sources of Cæsar's military strength, and it was reasonable to calculate that he would rather fall back upon the basis of his operations, than throw himself headlong into the centre of his enemies without a reserve behind. But the proconsul had so effectually conciliated the vanquished barbarians, that his absence beyond the Alps was attended by no hostile movement among them in any quarter. It was not from the Gauls that his plans experienced any interruption; but the jealous government of the Grecian Massilia seized the opportunity to display its sympathy with the Pompeian party, with which a series of senatorial proconsuls had maintained it in close connexion.

Massilia declares itself in favour of the Pompeian party.

The victor's genuine or affected generosity had conceded to the captured Domitius both life and freedom. But he, burning with personal as well as political hatred against his conqueror, was neither soothed by favours nor dismayed by discomfiture. Indignant, however, at the coolness with which his leader had abandoned him, he made no effort to join the consular ranks. He disdained even to communicate with his friends in Epirus, and for a time neither party knew what were his projects, or whither he had repaired.¹ But while the Cæsarean troops were taking possession of the Italian peninsula from north to south, and establishing themselves in quarters at Brundisium and Ta-

Domitius betakes himself to Massilia.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* viii. 14., ix. 1. 3.

rentum, at Ariminum and Placentia, he contrived to elude observation in equipping a small naval armament at Cosa on the Etruscan coast.¹ From this point he opened communications with Massilia, and as soon as he heard that the little Greek republic was resolved to declare its adherence to the senate, he sailed without hesitation for that harbour of refuge.² He could not fail to perceive how important a diversion might be created for the interests of his party by securing so strong and opportune a position in the enemy's rear. But the Province, to which, in a military point of view, Massilia was the key, had been the theatre of his own family glories, and he hoped, by force or favour, to acquire actual possession of it, as the government to which he was rightfully entitled by the decree of the senate. The liberty which Cæsar had accorded him he abused for objects of personal ambition, and broke his faith to an indulgent rival, not from devotion to his party or the state, but purely from motives of self-interest and cupidity.

We have seen that Cæsar had not the means of following the flying enemy across the Adriatic; but a few days had sufficed to put him at the head of the senate and people of Rome, to recruit his military chest by the plunder of the treasury, and thus gather into his hands all the resources his enterprise required. He was not content to act on the defensive in Italy. The supineness and apparent timidity of his adversaries emboldened him to leave the city almost unprotected, while he hastened in person across the Alps and Pyrenees to crush the left wing of their forces in Spain. He was confident of success. The character of the generals opposed to him, of Afranius at least and Varro, was not such as to inspire him with any apprehension

Cæsar leaves Rome to attack the Pompeian lieutenants in Spain.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 6.

² Cæs. *B.C.* i. 34.

of defeat. He left, as he said, a general without an army, to attack an army without a general.¹ M. Antonius was appointed to watch over his patron's interests in Italy, while the government of Rome was confided to M. Æmilius Lepidus, an hereditary opponent of the oligarchy.² Cæsar joined three legions of recruits at Ariminum³, and led them with his accustomed celerity across the Alps. Under the walls of Massilia he met his lieutenant Trebonius, with reinforcements from the cantonments in the north of Gaul. In the course of this rapid march he first learned the resistance he might expect from the Massilians, whose harbour and naval resources, weak as he was in that arm, were of the greatest importance to him. Pompeius, at the moment of his flight into the south of Italy, had had the presence of mind to bestow a parting exhortation on the agents of the Greek republic in Rome, reminding them of the benefits he had conferred upon their state, and desiring them to return home, and confirm the dispositions of their countrymen in his favour. The Massilians, in consequence, had closed their gates, amassed supplies of every kind, and purchased the services of the neighbouring tribes. At the same time Cæsar received information of the enterprise upon which Domitius was bound; he learned also that Vibullius Rufus, another of the liberated captives of Corfinium, had been sent by Pompeius into Spain, to convey instructions to his lieutenants there.⁴

Immediately on his arrival the proconsul demanded

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 34.: "Professus inter suos ire se ad exercitum sine duce, et inde reversurum ad ducem sine exercitu."

² Plut. *Anton.* 6.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 41. This personage, whose name will be conspicuous on our pages hereafter, was son of the Lepidus whose insurrection was quelled by Catulus A.U. 677.

³ Oros. vi. 15.; comp. Cæs. *B.C.* i. 36.: the three legions he mentions must have been new levies, for the few veterans he had had with him in Italy were left there in garrison, or transported into Sicily, and the remaining Gallic legions had not crossed the Alps.

⁴ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 34.

an interview with the council of fifteen in whom the government of the Massilian commonwealth was vested. They proceeded to confer with him confidently in his camp, and in answer to his invitation to acknowledge the authority of Italy legitimately pronounced through a senate in Rome, rather than submit to the dictation of a private citizen, they replied that the republic, as they understood, was divided in the interests of a Cæsar and a Pompeius, to both of whom they owed great public benefits; and, as they could not presume to decide between such competitors, they conceived it their duty to close their gates equally against either. But no sooner had they left the proconsul's presence than Domitius appeared with his little squadron at the mouth of the harbour, and was at once admitted into the city with open arms.¹ A bold and experienced general was all that the Massilians needed; arms, money, ships, provisions, they possessed in abundance, and the enthusiasm of the people was fully equal to their resources.

Cæsar was intent upon his expedition into Spain, where, if a blow was to be struck, it must be aimed without delay. It was commonly rumoured that Pompeius intended to embark his legions in Greece, or even to march through Mauretania, to reinforce his lieutenants in the west.² Time was more valuable to Cæsar than men. He preferred leaving three legions behind him to conduct the siege of Massilia, rather than delay his advance till the place should be reduced

He arrives before Massilia, which shuts its gates against him, and receives Domitius.

Cæsar leaves his lieutenants to reduce Massilia, and hastens into Spain.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 34. 36.; Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 6.

² Cæs. *B.C.* i. 39. Another report indeed, at which Cicero eagerly caught, was that he was already directing his course through Illyricum and about to enter Italy by the route of the Cisalpine province, but this Cæsar no doubt discredited. Cic. *ad Att.* x. 6. (10 Kal. Mai=22 April): "Pompeium pro certo habemus per Illyricum proficisci in Galliam." He writes again May 3: "Pompeium cum magnis copiis iter in Germaniam per Illyricum fecisse."

to submission. He gave charge for the equipment of a fleet to assist in the operations against the town, and appointed Trebonius and Decimus Brutus to the command of the land and naval force respectively. In the interval which these hurried arrangements required, orders were despatched to C. Fabius to move from Narbo with the three veteran legions there under his command, and occupy the passes of the Pyrenees; at the same time the troops still quartered in remoter parts of Gaul were directed to follow as rapidly as possible. Auxiliary cohorts were levied throughout Aquitania, and the bravest of the native chieftains enlisted with alacrity. Pressed for money to conduct these operations, Cæsar had the address to borrow it from his own officers, and he congratulated himself on the success of an artifice which bound them to his cause by the additional tie of pecuniary interest.

Eight years had elapsed since the senate had assigned the province of Spain together with Africa to Pompeius. The course of his intrigues nearer home had not permitted him to repair thither in person, but he had taken a lively interest in its military organization, foreseeing the importance of such a magazine of men and arms in the event of a civil war. The republic had previously maintained in the Peninsula a force of four legions. The new proconsul withdrew two more from Africa to strengthen this armament, and these six brigades composed of veteran troops, formed together the finest army Rome could boast. To these a seventh legion was added by the enlistment of provincial colonists, and the entire force under the proconsul's orders was augmented by the contingents of the allied states and large bodies of hired auxiliaries. The Peninsula was divided into three governments, each having a military establishment of its own. In the northern and eastern region

The Pompeian lieutenants, Varro, Afranius, and Petreius.

the consular Afranius commanded with three legions. Petreius was stationed with two others in Lusitania, a district which comprised the recent conquests of Cæsar in his prætorship. The southern province, from Castulo on the Bætis to the mouth of the Anas, the politest of the Roman possessions in the west, was appropriately assigned to M. Terentius Varro, one of the most consummate specimens of Italian culture.¹ The literary genius of this illustrious man was the most universal of his day: his knowledge of the history and antiquities of his country remained long unrivalled; in the dignified profession of philosophy and the lighter pursuits of poetry he obtained an honourable distinction among his contemporaries; while his proficiency in the most practically useful of the arts was evinced by his treatise on rural economy, which has descended to modern times. For military command, indeed, he seems to have shown little aptitude; but he, in fact, alone of the three lieutenants was not heartily attached to his general, and his principal care was to contrive to appear a partisan of whichever should become the winning side. The character of Afranius is already known to us, as a zealous adherent of the senate, but a man of little vigour or prudence in political life. As an officer, however, he had served with distinction in the war against Sertorius, and had gained laurels in Asia under the eye of Pompeius. Petreius, perhaps, alone of the three was worthy of the conspicuous post he was called upon to fill. He was a sturdy veteran, whose unshaken loyalty and courage had been long before approved in the destruction of Catilina.²

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 38. There seems to be some corruption or transposition in the text, but there can be no doubt that this is the writer's meaning.

² Sallust speaks of him as even at that time a veteran of thirty years' standing, and pays a high tribute to his experience in his profession. (*B.C.* 59., see above, Vol. I. p. 129.)

As soon as their emperor's orders arrived for preparing to encounter Cæsar, the three lieutenants concerted their measures together. They prepare to meet Cæsar in the field. To Afranius, as farthest in advance, was assigned the task of preventing, if possible, the threatened irruption into the Peninsula. Petreius undertook to summon in the first place to his standard the hordes of savage warriors with which his half-reclaimed province swarmed, and then direct his march with all speed along the line of the Durius or the Tagus, and effect a junction with his colleague beyond the Iberus. Meanwhile, the government of all the south and west was deputed to Varro, who retained with him two legions to keep the province in subjection, and constitute a reserve for future emergencies. The force thus rapidly concentrated in the north of Spain to check Cæsar's advance consisted of five veteran legions and a body of eighty cohorts of auxiliaries, amounting in all, perhaps, to seventy thousand men.¹

The armies of the Scipios and Catos, in former times, had been transported to Iberia by sea; but the conquest of the southern coasts of Gaul had gradually extended the military roads of the republic from the foot of the Alps to the summit of the Pyrenees, and from Military route across the Pyrenees. thence in various directions across the whole peninsula. Pompeius had devoted himself, in the war with Sertorius, to completing the communication between Gaul and the western dependencies of the republic. The route which he opened led from Narbo, through Ruscino and Illiberis, to Ficaria,

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 39. These auxiliaries were partly heavy armed (scutata), partly light armed (cetrata). The former were drawn from the Hither, the latter from the Farther province. The proper complement of the legionary cohort was 600, but the numbers of the auxiliary cohorts seem to have varied considerably. In one place Cæsar makes particular mention of cohorts of 600 men (*B.C.* iii. 4.).

Girona, and Barcino.¹ This is precisely the line of the modern road across the Col de Pertuis, on the most eastern spur of the Pyrenees. At the highest point of this road Pompeius had erected the trophy which long continued to bear his name, and recorded upon a triumphal arch his achievements in the west. The great Roman way from Gaul skirted the coast from Barcelona to Tarragona, and thence branched out in two directions; the one to Lerida and the north-west, the other to Tortosa, València and the south. In modern times, the French armies have frequently penetrated into Spain by the route of Puycerda and Urguel, along the valley of the Segre²; but this more direct line was not adopted by the Romans. The Pompeian generals, therefore, could not have been uncertain as to the direction of the enemy's advance, and with ordinary foresight and activity they might doubtless have occupied every defensible position along his route.³ But the energy of Cæsar imparted itself to his lieutenants, while the leaders opposed to them were no less tardy and undecided than their own chief. Fabius pressed forward from his quarters at Narbo, crossed the mountains without any serious resistance, closed the ports of Emporiæ and Barcino against reinforcements from the camp of Pompeius, and, taking the road to the right of Tarraco, reached the valley of the Sicoris, and confronted the united forces of Afranius and Petreius before Ilerda.⁴

¹ The modern Roussillon, Elne?, Figueras, Gerona, and Barcelona.

² Guischard, *Mém. Milit.* i. 28.

³ Livius Salinator, an officer of Sertorius, had successfully defended this pass against the prætor, C. Annius. *Plut. Sert.* 7. All the ships Cæsar could build or collect were employed before Massilia, so that many weeks or months might be expected to elapse before he could throw his invading armies upon the coast. Besides, the Pompeian forces in Spain were sufficiently numerous to occupy all the ports on the Mediterranean.

⁴ *Cæs. B.C.* i. 37. Ilerda, mod. Lerida; Sicoris, mod. Segre.

The spirit with which Fabius pushed forward to encounter a superior enemy was the first omen of Cæsar's ultimate success. A second was the supineness, and indeed the hardly dissembled treachery of Varro, in excusing himself from joining his colleagues in the north, nor even sending the fleets of Gades to cooperate with them, or to assist the defenders of Massilia. But, on the other hand, other circumstances seemed to cloud the invader's prospects. The resistance of the Massilians, beyond all hope and expectation, and with little apparent chance of success, conveyed to the friends of Pompeius the impression that they had stronger grounds of confidence than such as were generally manifest, and their example served to confirm many waverers in Italy. The rumoured unpopularity of Cæsar himself with the mob of Rome, and the supposed disaffection of his new levies, was another topic of mutual encouragement among this class of politicians. The gross and open profligacy of the leading Cæsareans, if we are to believe the stories current regarding it, was expected to alienate the favour of the more sober citizens. It seemed impossible that men of sense could acquiesce in a domination of which, however specious were its present pretences to moderation, a speedy lapse into tyranny and proscription might be so confidently predicted. Intrigues were set on foot for raising the standard of the senate in the south of Italy. These, indeed, proved utterly abortive; it was not likely that a conspiracy conducted by a Cicero, and confided to an Atticus, should succeed in the face of such men as Cæsar and Antonius.¹ But it was with an uneasy sense of his increasing difficulties, and of the necessity

Rumours of
Cæsar's un-
popularity in
Rome and
Italy.

¹ See Cicero's letters, *ad Att.* x. 8, 9, 10, 15. Antonius would not have been puzzled by the enigmatical expressions which modern critics have penetrated, if he had thought it worth his while to intercept this correspondence.

of obtaining a splendid victory for the maintenance of the position he had acquired, that Cæsar hastened in the track of his lieutenant, and brought a chosen body-guard of nine-hundred cavalry to reinforce the troops collected on the banks of the Sicoris. The Cæsarean army numbered five legions¹, with six thousand auxiliary infantry and as many cavalry, besides the contingent of Aquitanian mountaineers, and the little squadron just mentioned. While the Pompeian generals were securely posted beneath the defences of Ilerda, Fabius had contented himself with throwing bridges across the Sicoris, and establishing communications with the open territory on both sides of the river. A sudden inundation, such as frequently occurs in that treacherous stream, had broken down one of his bridges, and placed two of his legions, thus cut off from the rest, in a situation of imminent danger. Afranius advanced to the attack and Fabius to the rescue with equal promptitude and conduct. The Pompeian, unwilling to risk a general engagement, retired before the enemy's reunited forces, and both parties remained watching each other, when Cæsar arrived to turn the fortune of the campaign.

The ensuing manœuvres of the opposing armies are replete with the highest interest. Seldom do we read in the history of the republic of equal bodies of Roman veterans meeting each other in deadly conflict, with equal valour and resolution, and equally under the command of experienced generals. The good fortune by which the details of these strategic operations are preserved to us by a narrator so clear and accurate as Cæsar himself, deserves to be remarked; and in tracing them with some minuteness

Great interest
of this cam-
paign in a
military point
of view.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 37. Fabius had three legions at Narbonne. To these are to be added apparently two others which Trebonius had brought from the north of Gaul (*quæ longius hiemabant*). The auxiliaries are enumerated (*c.* 39.). See Guischard, i. 50.

we shall gain an insight into the art of war as practised by the most military of nations at the most flourishing period of its arms.¹

An eminence rising abruptly from the right bank of the Segre was crowned by the walls of the ancient Ilerda.² The communications of the city with the opposite bank of the river were secured by a permanent bridge of stone, and the Pompeian garrison which maintained this important post commanded the resources of the wide and fertile plain which it surveyed on all sides. On a rival summit, at the distance of less than half a mile to the south, Afranius and Petreius had taken up their position; for a Roman army of several legions required ample space for its accommodation, and the generals of the republic seldom relinquished the array and discipline of the camp for the confused and straitened quarters of a city. These fortified eminences, though unconnected, appeared sufficiently near for mutual support; but between them the ground swelled into a third elevation, and this, as we shall see, the Pompeians had neglected to secure by military defences. Cæsar assumed the offensive as soon as he arrived at the scene of action. He advanced in battle array to within four hundred paces of the enemy's camp, whence it was his aim to withdraw him by offering battle in the plain below. But his antagonists had no motive for accepting the decision of the open field. They sought to protract operations in order to give their champion time for completing his extensive pre-

Cæsar entrenches his camp in front of the enemy's position.

¹ The details of this campaign are given minutely by Cæsar (*B.C.* i. 40. to the end), nor do the other authorities add anything of importance. I have availed myself largely of Guischard's critical remarks.

² Compare with Cæsar Lucan's description (iv. init.). The poet notices the position of Ilerda on the Sicoris, the stone bridge, the hill on which Afranius was posted, and the intervening height contested by the two parties.

parations in the East; and accordingly, being well supplied with provisions, and relying on the resources of the country around them, they persisted in refusing the proffered challenge. For the convenience of space, indeed, or to encourage their troops by the semblance of a bolder defiance, they drew up their array in front of their lines; but even there they were too securely posted for Cæsar to venture an attack. He was unwilling, however, to leave their movements free by retiring from the advanced position he had himself taken up; he proceeded, accordingly, to execute the bold and hazardous operation of constructing an entrenched camp in the face of his antagonists. He could not have kept his ground through the night without placing his men behind the protection of a fosse or rampart; but while the two first lines retained their arms and battle array, he appointed the third to excavate a ditch in their rear, and thus imposed upon the enemy, who believed that the whole force was equally prepared for the combat. Had the progress of these latter works been discovered, the Pompeians might have charged the two first lines with advantage, unsupported as they were at the moment by the third. It was thus that the Nervians, while part of the Roman troops were engaged in entrenching their camp, had made their attack, so sudden and so nearly successful. Anxious to anticipate such a sudden attack in the present instance, Cæsar was satisfied with the temporary protection of a fosse, and postponed the completion of the rampart behind it till he had drawn his legions within their unfinished entrenchments. The excavation of the ditch to the depth of fifteen feet was accomplished by the skilful and laborious veterans before nightfall. Cæsar was now enabled to complete the remaining faces of his camp more at his leisure. Some slight attempts were made by Afranius to interrupt the progress of these works, but Cæsar repulsed them without difficulty. Having now sur-

rounded himself with a fosse, and raised a subsidiary rampart, he possessed a fortified position whence to watch and counteract the enemy's movements. At the same time, the excellence of his Gaulish cavalry, in which force he was decidedly superior to the Pompeian generals, gave him the means of supplying himself with provisions from the fertile plain between the Sicoris and the Cinga, and the bridges which had been thrown across the former river maintained his communications with the country through which he had advanced.

The camp which Afranius and Petreius occupied was situated, as has been said, on an eminence about half a mile distant from the citadel of Ilerda.¹ In the level space between the two heights was one spot of rising ground which seemed to offer a favourable point for intercepting the communication between the two fortifications. Could Cæsar make himself master of this spot, he might cut off Afranius not only from Ilerda, but from the bridge over the Sicoris, and, of course, from the country beyond it. With this view he led three legions out of his camp, and ordered a band of picked men to rush forward and attempt to seize the hill. The three lines in which the Roman battle-array was ordinarily drawn up were not distinguished at this period, as in earlier times, by different equipments and a corresponding difference of name. The legionaries, since the time of Marius at least, were all armed alike; but the first line was generally composed of the men of the most approved conduct and courage. In each cohort a certain number of the best men, probably about one-fourth of the whole detachment, was assigned as a guard to the standard, from whence they derived their name of *Antesignani*. In a general

Manœuvres of
the hostile
armies.

¹ Cæsar says, 300 paces, i.e. a little more than 500 yards; but the localities are clearly distinguishable at the present day, and the interval is undoubtedly greater.

action these men were collected together and placed in the first line; whenever an operation was to be effected which demanded superior nerve and intrepidity, it was to these that it was confided. Cæsar selected the standard-guard of one of his legions to make the sudden attack he now directed. Rapid as were their movements, the Afranians, having the advantage in point of distance, were enabled to anticipate them. With the short weapons used by the Romans, a slight superiority of ground gave a decisive advantage in personal combats. On this occasion courage and discipline were equal on both sides, and the Afranians were not to be dislodged by the most vigorous efforts. Even the loose mode of fighting with which they had become familiar from their intercourse with the natives of the country, gave them an advantage over the Cæsareans, who expected to encounter opponents whose manœuvres would be precisely like their own, and were confused by the agility and ease with which their adversaries moved around them. For the Roman legionaries were trained to keep their ranks even in the quickest charge, and to support one another always at an equal interval of three feet. They rallied close around their standards, which it was their point of honour never to leave whether in retreat or attack. The heavy pressure of the Gaulish masses had compelled Cæsar's troops to maintain these tactics with constancy and precision; whereas the legions which had served in Spain against a foe of a different character, had been forced to depart more or less from the strictness of this system, and had learned to baffle their enemies by lighter and more desultory movements.

The discomfiture of this chosen body was retrieved for the moment by the charge of the ninth legion, which was now brought up to its relief. These fresh troops soon checked the victorious advance of the Afranians, hurled them back in confusion, and rushed

in hot pursuit to the foot of the hill upon which Ilerda stood. It was under the walls, or within the gates, that the retiring Afranians sought refuge. But the position of their pursuers was one of great peril, for the acclivity they were climbing was only wide enough for three cohorts in line, and both to the right and left the descent was extremely precipitous. With no support on its flanks, and with all the disadvantage of inferior ground, the ninth legion was extremely harassed by the obstinate resistance here opposed to it; it offered a sure mark to every dart hurled from above, while the numbers and the means of its opponents were augmented from the resources of the town in their rear. Cæsar was obliged to put forth his whole strength to drive the enemy back to the shelter of his walls, and enable the assailants, after a sharp contest of five hours, to withdraw steadily into the plain. Their retreat was effectually covered by the arrival of some squadrons of cavalry, which had succeeded in overcoming the difficulties of the ground on either side, and threw themselves at the last moment between the opposing lines.

The engagement had been fought with such alternations of success that each party claimed the victory.¹ Cæsar himself admits that he was surprised at meeting such vigorous resistance from troops which no one, he says, imagined to be equal to his own veterans. But with regard to the number slain on either side, his language is suspiciously ambiguous, while the height against which his attack was in the first instance directed remained in the hands of the Afranians, who now proceeded to strengthen it with military defences. A later historian, who seems to have had some independent materials for his account of these opera-

Each side claims the advantage.

¹ Cæs. B.C i. 47.

tions, does not hesitate to give the honour of the day to the soldiers of Afranius.¹

The check which Cæsar thus unexpectedly received was followed by another disaster for which he was still less prepared. During the months of April and May the melting of the snows of the Pyrenees causes a periodical inundation of the rivers which, like the Sicoris, descend from their southern flank. The waters of these streams swell rapidly, and rush on such occasions with excessive violence. Fabius's bridge was carried away by the impetuous torrent; but Cæsar may have supposed that, when this inundation abated, the danger was over for the year. A few days afterwards, however, it being now six weeks after the equinox, a second and still more violent flood swept away both the bridge which had been rebuilt and the other higher up the channel. The movements of Cæsar's army were thus confined between the streams of the Sicoris and the Cinga, both overflowing their banks and destitute of fords or bridges. The only communication with the country beyond on either side was by the stone bridge of Ilerda, of which Afranius had possession. The base of the triangle, of which the apex is the confluence of these rivers, was a mountainous and impracticable district, affording probably little support for an army, and access even to this must have been seriously impeded in time of flood by the channels of two other streams which intersect the plain.² The season of the year was that in which the last

¹ Dion, xli. 20. Lucan (iv. 46.) balances the result with great ingenuity:

“Sic pedes ex facili, nulloque urgente, receptus:
Irritus et victor subducto Marte pependit.”

² These streams, now called the Noguera Ribagorsana, and Pallaresa, are not mentioned by Cæsar, though he must have crossed them both under these circumstances, when he transported his coracles in waggons to the spot where he passed the Sicoris. See below

A sudden rise
of the waters
hems in
Cæsar's position.

harvest is almost exhausted, while the new crops are not yet ripe for the sickle; the whole country round had been laid under contribution by Afranius, and the light Iberian guerillas, who hovered about the flanks of the enemy's position, speedily cleared it of whatever remained. These men were accustomed to cross the rivers upon inflated skins, which they carried with them in the field as part of their accoutrements; so that while Cæsar's legions were confined to the narrow and barren peninsula on which they stood, they were liable to harassing attacks and every kind of annoyance from skirmishers whom to pursue was fruitless. An attempt to rebuild the bridges in the face of these troublesome opponents was frustrated and abandoned in despair.

Cæsar had made an effort to re-establish his communications with the highway from the Pyrenees, for he was in daily expectation of reinforcements from that quarter. A body of Gaulish archers and horsemen was advancing to join the proconsul's camp, and under their escort the deputies of various states, many noble Roman youths, the sons of knights and senators, and some also of Cæsar's superior officers, were following in long array, with an ample convoy of waggons and military equipments. The Pompeian generals obtained early notice of their approach, and made preparations for attacking them as soon as they should reach the margin of the waters. No less than three legions with a detachment of cavalry were put in motion for this service; but the horsemen were sent forward in advance, and the Gaulish cavalry, notwithstanding their consternation on discovering the peril in which Cæsar was placed, and their disappointment at being prevented from joining him, went forth boldly and confidently to meet them. The superiority of the Gauls in cavalry movements kept their assailants at bay until the legionaries arrived to

Cæsar's reinforcements arrested on the further side of the river.

their support. The Gauls now retired before a more numerous and more formidable foe; but the unarmed multitude which had come under their escort had profited by the few hours thus gained to escape with their baggage into the mountainous country, and Afranius reaped only a barren victory, instead of the rich and important capture he had expected. He retired in all haste to Herda, the defences of which had been seriously weakened by the withdrawal of so large a portion of his army upon this bootless expedition. The distress to which the enemy's troops were by this time reduced still flattered him with the brightest hopes of a bloodless victory. Day by day their scanty provisions diminished and rose to a more enormous price. The floods continued for a longer period than ordinary: yet they could not fail to abate in a few days, and Cæsar's disastrous position was not, like that of the garrison of a besieged town, without a certainty of early relief; nevertheless the officers of the Pompeian army filled all their letters to their friends at Rome with sanguine prognostications of his speedy destruction. The patrons of their cause were elated with expectations which they had not ventured to indulge since their champion's flight from Italy, and thronged the house of Afranius in the city, anxious to demonstrate to his family their interest in his heroic achievement.¹

But long before these letters had reached Rome Cæsar had extricated himself from his perilous situation by a simple expedient. He constructed a number of boats of light framework covered with skins, after the model of the coracles which he had seen in Britain.² These

The Afranians are sanguine in their expectation of destroying him.

Cæsar restores his communications by the use of coracles.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 53.; Dion, xli. 21.

² Lucan (iv. 134.) compares them also to the barks used by the Veneti on the Po, and by the Egyptians on the Nile. Though formed, according to the description, on the model of the coracle,

he transported on waggons to the spot where he proposed to build a bridge, twenty-two miles up the river.¹ On the opposite side there was a hill, from which he could carry on his works without molestation. Accordingly, he commanded a detachment to cross the stream in his frail barks, and when he had made himself master of this position and fortified it, he had no further difficulty in restoring his communication with the country beyond the Sicoris, and replenishing his exhausted magazines. At the same time his Gaulish reinforcements descended from their retreat in the hills to join him, and a successful skirmish with some of the enemy's foraging parties assisted in restoring confidence to his soldiers.

At the same moment that Cæsar effected this successful movement, he received the news of a victory gained by his navy off Massilia.² Domitius had persuaded the citizens to assume the offensive; the departure of the great captain inspired them with confidence; and, besides the superior number and equipment of their vessels, they relied upon the valour of the native tribes by which they were in a great measure manned. Accordingly, they issued from their harbour, and sought the station of the Cæsarean fleet in front of an island opposite its mouth. The ships of Brutus, hastily built of bad

Cæsar's Lieutenant, D. Brutus, gains a victory over the Massilians at sea.

these vessels were of considerable size. More than one waggon lashed together were required to convey each: "Carris junctis devehit." Cæs. *B. C.* i. 54.

¹ At this spot, a few miles above the town of Balaguer, the river is confined between steep hills. (Guischard, *Mém. Mil.* ii. 2.) I observe, upon inspection of the Atlas to Suchet's campaigns, that the valley of the river is thus confined for several miles above Balaguer. The name of a village called Pons may tempt us to fix the site of the bridge in that locality, but it is too far from Lerida. I think it was more probably at Alos, immediately opposite to which there is a hill of moderate elevation.

² Cæs. *B. C.* i. 56-58.

materials, and less skilfully manœuvred, might have failed to force them to an engagement; but seeking the conflict themselves, and joining beak to beak and side to side, they threw away all their peculiar advantages and reduced the contest to one of valour and discipline only. Here indeed the Albici, a tribe of hardy mountaineers, whose aid they had secured, did them good service; but these warriors were not a match for the picked men of the Roman legions, with whom Brutus had manned his vessels. The result was that the Massilian squadron lost nine out of seventeen vessels, and the remainder were driven with shame and disorder into their harbour.

These tidings were not confined to Cæsar's camp, but spread rapidly among the native tribes in the country around, and combined, with the conspicuous restoration of Cæsar's fortunes before Ilerda, to dispose them to enter into friendly relations with him.¹ And at the same time it became evident that the rumour of Pompeius's advance through Mauretania was altogether false. The troops of Afranius and his colleague were dispirited at these successive disappointments; their cavalry and foraging parties became daily more afraid to venture near the squadrons with which Cæsar was now overrunning and occupying the plain; they kept close under the walls of Ilerda, and contented themselves with brief nocturnal expeditions to supply their necessities.

Afranius and Petreius seem themselves to have been grievously affected by these disasters. Despairing of succour from their leader, and alarmed by the defection of the native tribes around them, they already began to look wistfully towards the central districts of Celtiberia,

Discourage-
ment of the
Afranians.

They prepare
to evacuate
Ilerda.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 60.: "Magna celeriter commutatio rerum."

which were the most devotedly attached to them, and where they might hope to find freer scope for their movements. They had voluntarily shut themselves up in their fastness at Ilerda; but the enemy was now manœuvring to cut off their retreat, and but a short interval remained for escaping from their narrow entrenchments without hazarding the general engagement, which they dreaded more than any other alternative. The most direct route to the west or south was guarded by Cæsar's camp; the other road which presented itself lay across the bridge over the Sicoris, reaching the banks of the Ebro at a distance of twenty miles, at a spot to which Cæsar gives the name of Octogesa.¹ Cæsar was anxious to check their movements on this bank of the river also; but the bridge, by which alone he could communicate with it, lay, as we have seen, about twenty-two miles above Ilerda, and he could not venture to divide his army into two bodies at such a distance from each other. He might have adopted the course of throwing another bridge over the Sicoris at a nearer point, at least he does not in his narrative state any reasons to show that this was impracticable or difficult. But, instead of this, he preferred an operation of a different kind. At a short distance

Cæsar's operations to cross the river and prevent their retreat.

¹ I cannot suppose with Mannert (i. 417.), that this place is Mequinenza, though we might naturally expect that so commanding a position would have attracted the attention of the Romans. Octogesa, from Cæsar's account, must certainly have been on the left bank of the Sicoris; possibly at La Granja, as Ukert supposes, following Guischart. I think that it lay a few miles lower down, where the present road from Lerida strikes the Ebro, opposite the town of Flix. This situation agrees with the description which Cæsar gives of the country between Ilerda and Octogesa, first several miles of plain, and then a hilly tract. This is the line of the modern road to Tortosa and Valentia, and there is an antecedent probability that it follows an ancient route. I have examined the country carefully in the atlas to Suchet's campaign (1811-12), which is as clear as a model. Napier (*Penins. War*, iii.) says off-hand that Mequinenza is the Octogesa of Cæsar.

above Ilerda he cut several ditches, each thirty feet in breadth, so as to drain off the waters of the river and throw them behind his position, until the stream was rendered fordable at a convenient point. The waters thus carried off were led apparently into an offset of the Noguera, which runs into the Segre a little below Lerida¹, and the operation upon which the whole army was employed (the Roman legionaries being thoroughly trained to the use of the spade and pickaxe) might have been completed, it is said, in the space of ten days.² The labour, therefore, was not greater than that of building a bridge, while it required no materials. As soon as the object of these extraordinary works was discovered by the Pompeian generals, they hastened the removal from Ilerda, which they had been already meditating. Orders had been previously given to collect boats for the construction of a bridge over the Ebro at Octogesa, and, in expectation of its speedy completion, two legions were transported across the Sicoris and stationed on the left bank behind strong entrenchments.

At this moment, when the bridge of boats was announced to be almost ready for the escape of the retreating Pompeians, the ford of the Sicoris was declared to be practicable for the cavalry of their pursuers, who dashed boldly across it. But the water reached to

The Afranians retreat, the Cæsareans pursue and come up with them.

¹ Cæsar does not say this, nor does he say, as has been also supposed, that he conducted these waters into an immense reservoir excavated for the purpose. It is difficult to understand clearly what the nature of the operation was. It seems that there must have been a considerable depth of soil to cut through to lead these trenches behind Ilerda into the further branch of the Noguera. Cæsar's words are simply these: "Nactus idoneum locum fossas pedum triginta in latitudinem complures facere instituit quibus partem aliquam Sicoris averteret, vadumque in eo finmine efficeret." (*B.C.* i. 61.).

² Guischart, ii. 67. foll. The length of the cut would be about 4000 toises.

the armpits of the legionaries, and its rapidity was such that it seemed impossible to keep their footing. There was no resource but to send the legions round by the circuitous route above described, and leave it to the cavalry to harass and impede the retreat of the enemy, which it was out of their power to arrest. Afranius left two cohorts in Ilerda, and carried all the rest of his forces across the river, where they joined the two legions already in advance, and thus proceeded on their way to Octogesa. Cæsar's cavalry continued to act with great effect on their rear; its operations were distinctly visible to the troops encamped on the heights on the other side, who were inflamed with admiration of the conduct of their more fortunate brethren, and stung with despair at seeing the enemy thus escaping out of their hands. The centurions and tribunes rushed tumultuously to their general, and besought him in the name of the legions to allow them to throw themselves into the ford. Cæsar himself was carried away by the contagion of their ardour, though not without apprehension for the result; he contented himself with leaving the weakest of the men behind with a single legion to protect the camp, and gave the rest the signal to advance. The passage was at length effected. The precaution had been taken to place beasts of burden in line, above and below, in the one case to break the force of the current¹, in the other to rescue such as should be swept away by it; the cavalry also assisted in picking up the stragglers, and not a man

¹ Lucan describes this operation at the passage of the Rubicon (i. 220.):

“Primus in *obliquum* sonipes opponitur amnem,
 Excepturus aquas; molli tum cætera rumpit
 Turba vado fracti faciles jam fluminis undas.”

The line of beasts below would also slacken the stream by acting as a dam to it, but it would increase the depth proportionally. The date of this passage of the Sicoris is assigned by Guischart to x. Kal. Sext. = Jul. 22. (*Mém. Mil.* iii. 193.), which corresponds with May 31 of the corrected calendar.

was lost. The retreating Afranians had left their encampment in the first dawn of morning; but such was the alacrity and speed of the Cæsareans that they came up with them in the afternoon of the same day, though they had a circuit of six miles to make, and so formidable a barrier to surmount. But the retreat of the fugitives had been checked in some degree by the enemy's horsemen, and, deeming themselves secure from more serious interruption, they had not cared to make any special exertion. Their circumstances, however, were now altered. Afranius was compelled to halt and draw out his men in battle array, for Cæsar was advancing in three lines, as if prepared to demand an engagement. The pursuer now halted in his turn to give his troops rest and refreshment before drawing their swords. Afranius again threw his lines into column, and hurried forward, till the enemy, advancing once more, and pressing closely upon him, rendered escape impossible. The Pompeian general however was informed that at a distance of five miles a tract of hilly country commenced, in which the cavalry of his pursuers would be rendered unavailing. His intention was now to secure the defiles of these hills with forces sufficient to arrest the progress of his pursuers, and so effect his retreat with the bulk of his army to the Ebro; and in this, which was the best course open to him, he might have succeeded had he persisted in continuing his march late into the night, which, considering the few miles he had yet traversed, required no extraordinary effort. But other counsels prevailed; the troops pleaded the fatigues of a day of marching and fighting, and the salvation of the republican cause in Spain was postponed to the morrow. Meanwhile, Cæsar, on his part, was satisfied with the feats his soldiers had performed that day, and he took up his position on the nearest eminence. But he maintained his vigilance through the silent hours of gloom.

About midnight some stragglers from the Pompeian camp were brought to his quarters, and from them he learned that his opponents were preparing to evacuate their entrenchments under cover of the darkness. Immediately the Cæsarean trumpets sounded to arms, the tents were struck, baggage piled, arms and accoutrements buckled on; and the uproar of a camp of four legions breaking up announced far and wide that their general was on the alert, and ready to follow hard upon the track of the fugitives. Afranius feared to risk the result of a night engagement, to which he might be compelled in the narrow passes of the mountains, and countermanded the intended movement.

The next day was passed on both sides in examining the nature of the country in the direction in which both armies were equally anxious to proceed. The Pompeian generals held a council, in which they determined to wait for the morning to continue their route, that they might at least have the advantage of daylight to repel the attacks of the enemy, whose vigilance they could not even in darkness elude. But Cæsar turned the information he had acquired to another account. By a rapid though circuitous march he saw that he could throw himself between the retreating army and the mountains. In the early twilight his battalions were observed to issue from their camp, and seemingly to retire in the track upon which they had advanced the day before. The Afranians were convinced that they were in rapid retreat towards Ilerda, overcome by famine, fatigue, or terror; but when they saw the dense columns wheel suddenly to the right¹ and sweep along the

Cæsar makes a feint, and moves to intercept the march of the enemy.

¹ Cæs. B. C. i. 69. A wheel to the right after issuing from the rear of the camp (*contrariam in partem iri videbatur*) would lead them to the east of Afranius's camp, which would thus be placed between them and the Sicoris. The *loca aspera* and *angustie* which

verge of the horizon towards the quarter whither they were themselves bound, the tactics of the supposed fugitives and at the same time their own imminent danger became apparent.

The breaking up of their camp, however, caused some little delay. At the same time the Cæsarean cavalry, hanging upon the flanks of the Afranians as they formed and advanced, impeded their movements; so that, in the efforts of both armies to gain the hills, the Cæsareans had so much the advantage as to be able to range themselves in order of battle at their foot, and effectually block up the road to Octogesa. An eminence in the plain afforded the harassed Afranians a position where at least they could recover breath and consider what course to take.¹ They first attempted to create a diversion by sending a body of the light-armed Spanish auxiliaries to occupy a hill on the flank of the Cæsareans; but the terrible Gaulish cavalry were immediately upon them, and cut them off to a man in sight of both armies. It was now evident that the Afranians, dispirited by their reverses, and inferior in cavalry, would have no chance against their assailants in the open plain. The Cæsareans were confident of dislodging them from the slight acclivity on which they had taken refuge; and, as before, the centurions and tribunes again surrounded their general, and urged him with almost threatening importunity to lead them to combat. But Cæsar had many reasons for wishing to refrain from an engagement which he believed to be superfluous; for the enemy, even though unassailed, could not

Cæsar brings the Afranians to a check, but will not suffer his soldiers to engage with them.

Cæsar mentions, Guischart supposes to be a defile between the mountains and this river. I think it describes the interior of the tract between the Sicoris and the Iberus.

¹ The level country at the foot of the hills in which these manœuvres took place is, I conceive, the tract now called la Gariga, and the spot on which Afranius pitched his camp may be that of the village of Llardecans.

long maintain their position for want of water, but, if driven to despair, might still cause him the loss of many of his bravest troops. Moreover, it accorded with his policy as well as his temper to avoid the effusion of Roman blood, whether on his own side or that of his opponents. And, above all, perhaps his experience in Italy assured him that a large portion of the men now arrayed against him were, in their hearts, well disposed to join his colours. Accordingly, he steadily rejected the demands of his imperious veterans, though in doing so he greatly offended them, and might hear them muttering, with the licence to which they had been long accustomed, that another time fight they would not when Cæsar ordered them.¹

The Pompeian generals, meanwhile, were in a state of great perplexity. All hope of crossing the Ebro was abandoned; their choice of an asylum now lay between Ilerda and Tarraco. But their movements were closely watched, and circumscribed by the squadrons which hovered around them. No handful of forage nor cup of water could they procure except at the sword's point. The parties they sent out for supplies were attacked, and only rescued by the succour of fresh battalions, which, in their turn, required to be supported by others; so that a large portion of the army was gradually drawn down into the lower ground. The generals ordered a trench and rampart to be constructed from the hill to the watering-place; the distance was great, the work arduous, and, to carry it through, required the presence and encouragement of all the superior officers. Meanwhile, the soldiers in their camp were left almost without superintendence; the Cæsareans straggled up to their entrenchments, and opened communications with

Communica-
tions are
opened be-
tween the
soldiers in the
opposite ranks

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 72.

such friends and acquaintances as the fortune of civil war had arrayed in the opposite ranks. By degrees this distant intercourse ripened into familiarity and confidence; the soldiers of either party mingled freely among one another; and the enthusiasm with which Cæsar's veterans proclaimed the merits of their commander worked surely and speedily upon the indifference of the Afranians. The rival parties soon came to an understanding. The only stipulation they made between themselves was, that the lives of the Pompeian generals should be guaranteed them. Even Afranius' own son was forced to be satisfied with this assurance; and, upon its being given, the legions arrayed under his standard declared themselves content to surrender to a merciful and munificent enemy.¹

The report of these important transactions brought both the Pompeian leaders hastily back to the camp.

Petreius interposes violently, and breaks off all intercourse between them. Afranius easily acquiesced in an arrangement in which his own safety had been carefully provided for; but Petreius, a man of sterner temper, would abandon neither his reputation nor his duty. It was usual for the general to have a body-guard about his own person, distinct from the maniples of the legions. That of Petreius consisted of a cohort of light native infantry, a small squadron of cavalry, and a number of private friends and attendants, who formed his staff or acted as his aides-de-camp. With these men who remained true to him, he rushed impetuously to the rampart at which the soldiers of the opposed armies were holding their treasonable conferences, and broke up their meeting, slaughtering as many of the Cæsareans as he could lay hands upon. The remnant, collecting hastily together, wrapped their cloaks about their left arms, and with drawn

¹ Cæs. B.C. i. 74.

swords fought their way through the assailants to their own camp hard by. Petreius re-entered his entrenchments, and the habits of discipline resumed their sway.

Petreius now proposed the solemn form of the military oath not to desert, nor betray the army or its generals, nor to hold any private parley with the enemy. He first took the oath himself, then tendered it to his colleagues; next came the tribunes, and after them the centurions, and, finally, the whole body of the legionaries, century by century. Strict orders were immediately issued that every Cæsarean who had been entertained by a relative or friend in the camp should be brought forth and slain; but mercy or shame interfered to frustrate this atrocious command, and most of them were concealed till nightfall, and then sent privily away. Meanwhile, the conduct of Cæsar was studiously in contrast with this cruelty.¹ He carefully inquired for all the Pompeians who had strayed into his camp, and offered to send them back to their own quarters unharmed. But many of the officers were already so charmed with his demeanour, that they preferred to remain in his service, in which he gave them their old rank, or even promoted them to a higher.²

The Afranians were now reduced to great distress for provisions, and at the same time were cut off from water. It was resolved to direct the retreat upon Ilerda, where their magazines were not yet exhausted, rather than Tarraco, which lay at a greater distance, and where probably no preparation had been made for the maintenance of so large a force. Cæsar pressed closely upon them, and gave them no opportunity of supplying themselves. Constant skirmishes

The Afranians are compelled to retrace their steps towards Ilerda.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 75.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 43.

² Cæs. *B.C.* i. 76, 77.

took place between the parties detached on each side for procuring provisions or intercepting them. When the Afranians pitched their tents for the night and formed their entrenchments near the river, Cæsar determined to confine them to the spot, and prevent them from reaching the water, by drawing a complete line of circumvallation around them. He had persevered for two days in this arduous work, which was already nearly completed, when the Pompeian leaders felt the necessity of interrupting it, even at the risk of provoking the enemy to a decisive combat. But Cæsar also was anxious on his part to avoid the risk and bloodshed of a general engagement with an opponent whom he expected to reduce ultimately upon much easier terms. It

The armies are drawn up opposite each other in battle array.

was only the mutinous importunity of his own troops, to all appearance, that induced him to put his men in battle array and confront the beleaguered Afranians in the attitude of defiance. The mode in which the two armies were drawn up, the main strength of each consisting equally of five Roman legions, shows how much the Cæsarean was superior in efficiency. The five legions of Afranius were ranged in two lines, each numbering twenty-five cohorts, instead of the more usual array of three; for the cavalry and light-armed auxiliaries were of so little value that the general extended his centre to the utmost, and dispensed altogether with wings for the protection of his flanks. A third line was formed of the native auxiliaries, and their leader depended for his reserve upon those very battalions in which he could place least reliance. Cæsar, on the other hand, disposed his forces according to the approved system. The legions were arrayed in triple line; four cohorts of each legion, twenty in all, formed the first, three of each the second, and an equal number the third. The intervals between the cohorts were occupied by

the light troops, the bowmen and slingers, and the flanks were protected by the redoubtable squadrons of Gaulish horse.

But the day passed without a blow being struck. The Afranians had not courage to begin the attack, while their opponent checked the ardour of his own forces. The next morning the retreating army, which had succeeded thus far in keeping Cæsar's lines open, made a demonstration upon the side of the river¹, with the desperate intention of crossing a difficult ford in the face of an active enemy. But the dispositions Cæsar made for covering the spot with his cavalry soon satisfied Afranius that escape in this direction was impossible. The moment had evidently arrived when the want of provisions for men and cattle, the discouragement of his soldiers, and the inferiority of his strength, demanded the unreserved capitulation which his adversary had so long anticipated. The terms required by the conqueror were, that the lieutenants of Pompeius should abandon the province, laying down their military command, and therewith disbanding their forces. At the same time he engaged not to press any of the soldiers into his own service against their inclinations. To those who had families and possessions in the country he gave permission to remain in the country; the rest he promised to escort safely to the frontiers of Italy, and there release them from their military engagements. With his accustomed policy he pledged himself also to abstain from any harsh treatment of their officers. Nor did he fail to display his wonted generosity, in satisfying from his own resources the demands for pay, which the soldiers were clamorously

The Pompeian lieutenants are reduced to capitulate.

¹ Cæsar gives no intimation where this ford was: it must have been at some point below Ilerda, and by this time the floods had no doubt entirely subsided.

pressing upon their unfortunate generals.¹ The campaign was thus brought to a termination at the end of forty days², and the brilliant success which Cæsar achieved added more lustre to his military reputation than even his great exploits in Gaul. He had fairly out-manceuvred a Roman army, not inferior to his own in strength, not indifferently commanded, and backed by all the strength and resources of the country in which it was engaged. The impregnable position of Ilerda, and the extraordinary swelling of the Sicoris, had contributed, in no slight degree, to the difficulties with which the assailant had had to contend; and, whether we look to the splendour of the victory or the importance of the result, the day of Cæsar's triumph over Afranius and Petreius deserved equally to be marked in the Imperial calendar, and its memory celebrated, in after ages, by a festive anniversary.³

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* i. 86, 87.

² See Curio's speech to his soldiers (*B.C.* ii. 32.).

³ Orelli (*Inscript.* ii. 396.) gives fragments of four ancient Kalendaria which record this circumstance: e. g. "Kal. Capranicorum, iiii. Non. Sext. feriæ quod hoc die imp. Cæsar Hispaniam citeriorem. vicit." The same day was the anniversary of the subsequent defeat of Pharnaces. "Kal. Amitern. iv. Non. Sext. feriæ, quod eo die C. Cæs. C.F. in H[ispan. citer. et] quod in Ponto eod. die. r[egem Pharnace]m devicit." The true date of the event is June 9, B.C. 49. See Fischer, *Römische Zeittafeln.*

CHAPTER XVI.

Siege and capture of Massilia.—Cæsar receives the submission of Varro, and establishes his power throughout the Spanish provinces.—Campaign of Curio in Africa: his defeat and death.—Disaster to Cæsar's forces in Illyricum.—Administration of Rome by Lepidus and M. Antonius.—Cæsar is created Dictator in his absence.—He quells a mutiny among his troops at Placentia, and hastens to Rome.—His financial and political measures.—He is elected consul, and resigns the Dictatorship.—Prepares to follow Pompeius across the sea.—Advantages of his position compared with that of his adversaries. A. U. 705, B. C. 49.

WHILE these operations were in progress in Spain; the success which D. Brutus had recently obtained over the Massilian fleet had given the besiegers a superiority at sea, and Trebonius was conducting his operations against the city by land with every resource the military art could supply. Mamurra, the chief of the engineering department, had merited Cæsar's unbounded favour by the skill he displayed in his profession.¹ But the defenders of Massilia were provided, on their part, with abundance of military engines, which it had been the policy of the state to provide long beforehand for such an emergency. Accordingly, both the attack and defence of their city exhibited the most consummate application of the principles and resources of warfare as then practised.² The Massilia

A. U. 705,
B. C. 49.
Situation of
Massilia.

¹ Catullus speaks of the enormous wealth Mamurra had reaped from his services in Gaul, and makes it the ground of a gross charge against him and his commander (*Carm.* lvii.). Pliny (*H. N.* xxxvi. 7.) commemorates his profuse magnificence.

² The power of the engines used in defence of a city may be estimated from Cæsar's statement, that the beams of wood, twelve feet in length, pointed with iron, which were hurled from them, pierced through four successive screens of wood-work, behind which the

of antiquity bore out little resemblance, even in its external features, to the city which has inherited its site and name. Cæsar describes it as washed by the waters of the sea on three sides; but the port which then bounded it on the south is now surrounded by streets and houses. The French antiquaries assert moreover that a considerable part of the ancient city in its western quarter has been long since covered by the encroachments of the waves. The site of the temple of Diana, upon which the modern cathedral stands, was originally in the middle of the city, but is now on the margin of the sea. The lazaretto occupies the eminence on the north, upon which, according to Cæsar's description, the citadel stood; and the side on which alone the city was exposed to attack from the land stretched from the base of this rugged elevation to the innermost angle of the port, along the line probably of the Cours St. Louis and the Rue Cannebière, which are now in their turn the most central regions in the whole assemblage of buildings.

While Trebonius was conducting his first operations against the city, by the construction of an immense rampart, eighty feet in height, over against the wall on the land side throughout its whole length, the besieged ventured to make another attempt upon the element in which they were wont to confide.¹ L. Nasidius had been sent by Pompeius with a squadron of sixteen vessels to throw succours into the city. He had directed his course from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, through the straits of Messana, either unobserved by or in defiance of Curio, the Cæsarean commander in Sicily. Indeed he had ventured to enter the port of Messana, and cut

besiegers sheltered themselves while engaged in filling the ditch before the walls. Cæs. *B. C.* ii. 2. They were obliged to construct these *vineæ* of solid beams a foot in thickness.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* ii. 1—7.

Result of a
naval en-
gagement
disastrous
to the Mas-
silians.

out one vessel from the dockyard. From thence he made sail for the shores of Gaul, sending forward one bark from his squadron to convey to the besieged the news of his arrival, and to exhort them to sally forth with their whole naval force and join him off Tauroentum, a port and fortress at a little distance on the coast. The Massilians, since their recent defeat, had devoted themselves with unwearied energy to repairing their galleys, and arming the merchant vessels and fishing boats with which their harbour swarmed. They were not disposed to shrink from making a second experiment of their prowess, while the acclamations of the unarmed multitude, of their women and old men, encouraged them to strain every nerve in a contest in which their pride was so deeply interested. Nor did the assailants, who had multiplied the numerical strength of their armament since the last engagement, and were prepared to decide the contest on the broad decks of their rude but massive fabrics, decline the proffered meeting.¹ In numbers, however, the fleet of the Massilians still preponderated; the prætorian galley of Decimus² was attacked at the same moment from opposite quarters by two powerful triremes, which dashed towards it with all the velocity their oars could impart. By a skilful turn of the rudder the Cæsarean steersman extricated his vessel from both the assailants at the instant when they were about to strike her on either side, and the opposing beaks impinged violently against each other. Thus entangled and mutually disabled they were speedily attacked, boarded and destroyed. The Massilians and their allies, the Albici, are admitted to have fought admirably; but Nasidius gave them a very lukewarm

¹ Lucan, iii. 512.:

“Sed rudis et qualis procumbit montibus arbor,
Conseritur stabilis navalibus area bellis.”

² Lucan, iii. 535.: “Bruti prætoria puppis.”

support. As soon as the fortune of the day seemed to incline towards the Cæsareans, he quietly withdrew without the loss of a single vessel, while of his allies thus treacherously deserted, five galleys were sunk and four captured. A Roman officer might naturally be reluctant to exert himself in behalf of Greeks, whom he despised or hated, against the bravest and most illustrious of his own countrymen. Nasidius seems indeed to have had further orders to execute on the coast of Spain, and it is not improbable that Pompeius had strictly charged him not to entangle himself too closely in the defence of a city to which he attached only secondary importance. He sailed for his ultimate destination without bidding adieu to the unfortunate Massilians, who with difficulty and in diminished numbers escaped into their harbour, and betook themselves, not even yet dismayed, to the defence of their walls. The entrance of the port of Massilia is so narrow that a chain drawn across it secured it from the attacks of the victorious squadron.

But the operations which Trebonius was sedulously directing against the defences of the city on the land side were such as no artificial means of resistance were capable of effectually withstanding.¹ Indeed, it may be observed that, in the best times of Roman military science, the means of attack were generally much superior to those of defence. While a fortress such as that of Ilerda, perched on a lofty eminence, with a steep and narrow access, was justly deemed impregnable, no resources or skill could avail to protect a city which stood upon comparatively level ground against the assault of a persevering and enterprising besieger. Such was the site of Massilia, which had been chosen rather for the convenience of its haven than the natural security of its position. Having effected the complete blockade of

Operations
against
Massilia :
feigned
capitulation
and treach-
ery of the
besieged.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* ii. 8—14.

the city by means of the gigantic barricade already described¹, Trebonius proceeded to construct a tower at a short distance from the point in the wall which he destined for his attack. This tower was built of solid brickwork, and so covered with skins and mattresses that the blows of the enemy's ponderous missiles fell dead upon it, while other contrivances were applied to guard it from being set on fire. When at last this prodigious edifice overtopped the walls, (a work, however, which, in the face of a vigilant enemy, must have cost much time and many lives,) the Massilians could no longer maintain themselves on the summit of their ramparts, commanded as they now were by the assailants from above. The next step on the part of the besiegers was to fill up the fosse under the protection of this tower, and erect close to the walls the *musculus*, a ponderous and well-compacted roof of timber, under which men could work without interruption, picking out the stones with crowbars, and undermining with manual labour the bulwarks of the city. The besiegers had thus succeeded in shaking one of the towers of the wall, and the rampart was tottering to its overthrow, when the Massilians hastened to anticipate, by a timely offer of capitulation, the moment which would deliver their hearths and altars to a furious and unbridled soldiery. Trebonius, on his part, had received strict orders to abstain from storming the city, which Cæsar was reluctant to surrender to the horrors of an assault. Accordingly, he was willing to accord honourable terms to the suppliant republic. His soldiers, indeed, murmured bitterly at being disappointed of the plunder which was almost in their grasp; it seems doubtful whether they would have

¹ Guischart, in his *Mém. Militaires*, ii., has an elaborate discussion of these operations; but after all the ingenuity he has displayed in the explanation of them, there still remains much to perplex at least the non-professional student.

continued to observe the armistice until the expected arrival of the Emperor himself. The apprehension of their uncontrollable fury may have driven the Massilians to violate the agreement they had themselves solicited, and taking advantage of the confidence reposed in them, to make a sudden attack upon the Roman works, and give them to the flames.

But this conspicuous instance of Grecian perfidy was displayed to no purpose. Trebonius resumed his operations with the same determination and on an ampler scale than before. The original barricade had been constructed principally of timber, and the conflagration had reduced it to ruins. He now repaired it with earthworks and solid masonry, and again pushed forward his covered galleries to the foot of the walls. Against these insidious enemies the great catapults on the ramparts were of no avail, for they were calculated to hurl their missiles to a distance, and their range could not be adjusted so as to reach an object immediately below them.¹ Once more the Massilians despaired of defending themselves, and ventured to tempt the forbearance of the conqueror by a second offer of capitulation.

This time, indeed, it was not Trebonius or Brutus, but Cæsar, the politic and the merciful, with whom, as we shall presently see, they had to treat. The return to the camp before their walls of the great captain who had delivered Italy and pacified Spain, may both have cut off the last hope of escape, and at the same time have held forth an augury of pardon. For, after the

The siege resumed.

The Massilians offer to capitulate a second time.

Cæsar establishes his headquarters at Corduba.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* ii. 16.: "Suorumque tormentorum usum *spatio propinquitatis interire.*" This obscure expression seems to be explained by Lucan (iii. 478.):

"Nec Graiis *flectere jactum,*
Nec facilis labor est longinqua ad bella parati
Tormenti *mutare modum,* sed pondere solo
Contenti nudis evolvunt saxa lacertis."

capitulation of the Pompeian lieutenants on the Sicoris, Cæsar had hastened to complete the reduction of the three provinces of the peninsula. He had marched directly towards the south, and established his head-quarters at Corduba, the Iberian capital, whither he had summoned to his presence the representatives of all the states and cities beyond the Pyrenees. Here the favourable sentiments of the Further Province were speedily pronounced, and it was with full anticipation of the general concurrence of the native and colonial cities that Cæsar had postponed his return to finish the siege of Massilia.¹ Nor had he any serious opposition to fear from M. Varro. That officer being left in Vacillating
conduct of
Varro. command of the two districts into which the south and west were divided, had excused himself from joining the camp of his colleagues, retaining two legions at his side to ensure the submission of the natives and the fidelity of the Roman inhabitants. In the first instance, he had allowed himself to express a favourable opinion both of the cause and the prospects of the invader. He admitted in his public harangues the inclination of the province towards Cæsar; but, undecided thus far as to his own course, he had faintly pleaded the duty which as a legatus he owed to his imperator Pompeius, and thus allowed himself to reconcile the maintenance of his official command with entire neglect of the active exertions demanded by the emergency. But the news of the vigorous resistance of Massilia, of the junction and subsequent successes of Afranius and Petreius, together with the assurances he received of the firm allegiance of the Hither Province, all these circumstances, coloured and magnified by the sanguine temper of Afranius in his correspondence, shook his resolution of neutrality. He now affected vast eagerness in the cause of the senate, and adopted active measures for recruiting

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* ii. 17—21.

his forces, for collecting supplies for Massilia and equipping a naval armament for the conveyance thither of men and stores. He did not scruple to wield, in the interest of his commander, all the terrors of the Roman proconsulate, imposing arbitrary contributions upon the states which he suspected of favouring the enemy, and abusing the forms of law to mulct the Roman citizens whose disaffection was reported to him. He invaded the sanctuaries of the Gods, and rifled the celebrated temple of Hercules at Gades. That important and hostile city he entrusted to C. Gallonius, a tried friend of Domitius, with a garrison of six cohorts. At the same time, the tone which he assumed in speaking of Cæsar was arrogant and violent. He described him as beaten in every engagement, and hourly abandoned by his soldiers; nor did he omit the solemn ceremony of summoning the Roman citizens throughout the province to renew the military oath of fidelity to their rightful proconsul.

But, notwithstanding all this pretended display of zeal, Varro was still cautious of openly taking the field against the general whom he so insolently disparaged. When the actual result of the contest in the north was disclosed, he proposed to shut himself up with his two legions in the insular fortress of Gades, where, supported by a naval force, and well supplied with stores and provisions, his position, he deemed, would be impregnable till the proconsul should come to his relief. Cæsar was already advancing towards Corduba; he had pushed forward Q. Cassius, with two legions, upon Hispalis, while the fame of his victories had gone before him, and penetrated to the remotest quarters of the Pompeians. His mandate for the assembling at Corduba of the Iberian deputies had been received with respect and obeyed with alacrity. The Gaditanes,

The province declares in favour of Cæsar. Varro is deserted by his soldiers, and surrenders.

indignant at the desecration of their temple, had already tampered with the tribunes of the cohorts in garrison among them, and expelled Gallonius from their walls. Varro was on his march from Hispalis, the seat of his government, to the more secure retreat of Gades, when the result of this intrigue was announced to him. Immediately one of his legions wheeled about before his face, and returned to the city from which it had just departed. Without a general, and without quarters or provisions, the soldiers abstained from any act of violence, and quietly rested in the forum and under the colonnades in the streets, until the inhabitants, admiring their boldness and perhaps sympathizing in their preference for the expected conqueror, received and entertained them in their own houses. Varro now paused and attempted, as a last resource, to gain the walls of Italica; but this city also had suddenly declared itself against the senate, and refused to admit him. No other course now remained but to acknowledge the ascendancy of the victor of the Sicoris, and proffer a timely surrender; the unfortunate general sought to make a merit of his submission, by offering to bring over the legion, which, in fact, he could no longer retain.¹ Caressed and flattered on all sides, Cæsar received the submission of his baffled opponent at Corduba. He prescribed complete reparation of the wrongs inflicted upon his own adherents, remitted the contributions which had been levied upon the provincials, and commanded at least to be restored the treasure and ornaments which had been carried off from the temple at Gades. Nor in the midst of all this liberality did he hesitate to pardon the double-dealing of Varro, and to treat him with the courtesy due to his character as a scholar rather than as a statesman or soldier. The three provinces were combined under the sole go-

Cæsar arranges the affairs of Spain, and repairs to Massilia.

¹ Cæs. B. C. ii. 20.

vernment of Q. Cassius, who had formed a thorough acquaintance with them at an earlier period, while serving in the peninsula as quæstor to Pompeius. Four legions were left behind to maintain the authority of the conqueror in the west. The inhabitants of Gades he attached to himself by the stronger tie of gratitude; for the Roman franchise, which he now bestowed upon them, more than counterbalanced the pecuniary contributions which, notwithstanding his lavish bounty in restoring his opponents' plunder, he was constrained to demand for the support of his armies.¹ In their noble haven Cæsar took possession of the ships his predecessor had summoned thither, and embarked with a portion of his troops for Tarraco; from whence he pursued his journey by land through Narbo, and arrived, finally, at Massilia at the moment when that city, as has been seen, was about to fall into his hands.²

But while the arms of Cæsar, wherever he was personally engaged, were crowned with unalloyed success, the enterprises he was obliged to entrust to his lieutenants were less uniformly prosperous. The obstinate and perfidious resistance of the Massilians, indeed, had been brought to a close by the perseverance of Brutus and Trebonius, and both the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, so important from their proximity to Rome and the resources with which they abounded, had been evacuated by the garrisons of the senate rather than

State of the
province of
Africa.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* ii. 21; Liv. *Epit.* cx.: Appian, *B. C.* ii. 43.; Dion, xli. 24., who tells a frivolous story, which I cannot quote, to account for Cæsar's liberality to the Gaditanes.

² In crossing the Pyrenees, Cæsar passed the spot where Pompeius, who had constructed the military road of communication between Gaul and Spain, had erected a trophy to commemorate his achievements in those regions. It need not be said that he abstained from destroying it, as a man of coarser mind would certainly have done: he contented himself with the indirect satire of placing in its vicinity a much simpler and more modest memorial of himself. Dion, *l.c.*

conquered by Valerius and Curio. Thus the whole of the western half of the empire had fallen from the hands of the oligarchy, excepting only the province of Africa, destined to give the first decided check to Cæsar's triumphant progress, and to become, at a later period, the last stronghold of the commonwealth and its genuine defenders. This province occupied but a small portion of the coast of the Mediterranean, comprising the region of which Carthage had formerly been the metropolis. The more distant regions of Mauretania and Numidia, over which the Punic republic had extended its influence rather than its rule, had been acknowledged by the Romans as independent kingdoms; and Juba, the sovereign of the latter country, was attached to the interests of Pompeius, and hostile to those of Cæsar, on distinct personal grounds. To the former he owed his throne, having received at his hands the succession to his father Hiempsal; from the latter he had experienced, as we have seen, an egregious insult on presenting himself as a suitor before the Roman senate. It happened, moreover, that Curio, the appointed bearer of the Cæsarean banner to the shore of Africa, had attempted to injure him in proposing, as tribune of the people, to deprive him of his sovereignty and dispose of his possessions by public sale.¹ There could be no doubt, therefore, that the fierce and vindictive Numidian would burn to avenge this ill-treatment by taking part with Pompeius against their common enemy. But it was at least possible that prudence might interpose to check the appetite for revenge; it might be presumed that, with the faithlessness attributed to his race, he would hesitate to compromise his interests on the score of ancient obligations; while, at the same time, the unsettled state of his frontiers, harassed as they constantly

Hostility of
Juba, king
of Numidia,
to Cæsar.

¹ Dion, xli. 41.; Lucan, iv. 690.

were by the marauding tribes of the interior, might paralyse his efforts, or at least retard his advance.

Such were probably the anticipations of Curio when he crossed over from Sicily, with only two of the four legions under his orders, to expel the Pompeian general Attius Varus, who commanded a force in Africa certainly not inferior in numbers to his own. The capital of the Roman province was the famous city of Utica, which had succeeded, upon the destruction of Carthage, to as large a share of the military and commercial importance of the elder metropolis as was deemed consistent with a state of dependence and subjection to Rome. Varus was posted before the walls of this city, from whence it was hardly possible for so small a force as his adversary possessed to dislodge him. But he was deceived by the idea that Curio's legions, composed of the fickle cohorts of Domitius, were not disposed to stand staunchly by him¹; he was irritated also at some trifling successes which the enemy had gained, and with these feelings he was induced to offer battle in another position, though still retaining a great advantage of ground. The charge of Curio's columns across a deep ravine and up an acclivity so steep that the soldiers required mutual assistance to mount it, spirited and brilliant as it was, could not have been executed in the face of a resolute enemy. But Varus acted with little skill or bravery, and suffered himself to be deprived of all the advantage of his new position. His troops were routed with little resistance, and fled with precipitation to their original entrenchments. Curio pursued them, and confidently resolved to undertake the siege of Utica, and to draw lines of circumvallation, after the example of his great master, round both the city and the legions encamped in front of it. A successful affair in which he had been engaged

Curio invades Africa, and obtains some successes over the Pompeians and their allies.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* ii. 28.; Lucan, iv. 695.

with a Numidian squadron encouraged him to underestimate the power of his enemy's ally, while he had reason to believe that there was a Cæsarean party in Utica which would actively co-operate with him for its reduction.

Indeed, it would appear that Varus was already so severely pressed by the clamours and threats of the hostile faction within the city, that he was on the point of capitulating, when information was conveyed to him that Juba was advancing in person at the head of all his forces to his succour. The Numidian prince had adjusted a recent quarrel with the state of Leptis, and was now at leisure to indulge himself with taking vengeance upon his ancient enemies. No sooner was Curio apprised of this formidable diversion on his rear, than he broke up from his lines before Utica, and hastened to occupy a well-known military position on the coast hard by, rendered famous and, as he deemed, auspicious by the encampment there of Scipio Africanus.¹ From thence he sent pressing orders to Sicily for the embarkation of the two legions which he had left behind. But, in the meanwhile, he felt secure in the strength of his position, as well as in the good fortune which had so conspicuously attended it.

The crafty Numidian employed a stratagem to wile the enemy from his entrenchments. The appearance of a slender detachment of the barbarians in the plain beneath, and the rumour industriously spread that Juba had intrusted the relief of Utica to his vizir Sabura, and

On the advance of Juba, Curio entrenches himself in the Cornelian camp.

He is entrapped into fighting, defeated and slain.

¹ Cæs. B. C. ii. 24.: "Castra Corneliana." Lucan, iv. 661.:

"Curio lætatus, tanquam fortuna locorum
Bella gerat, servetque ducum sibi fata priorum," &c.

Cæsar himself, on a later occasion, humoured the superstitious feelings of his soldiers, and perhaps indulged his own, in attaching great importance to the mere name of Cornelius in Africa. See below.

withdrawn from a personal share in the campaign, sufficed to impose on the rash and high-spirited Roman. But Juba, meanwhile, was lurking at a distance of only six miles, to support the advanced posts, upon which Curio launched himself in full confidence of an easy victory. Sabura adopted the common feint of retiring before the enemy's impetuous charge, till their ranks were broken and their strength nearly exhausted. When at last he turned and faced them, it was not with the paltry squadrons whose numbers they had despised, but with the whole strength of the Numidian monarchy, its clouds of native cavalry, its troops of elephants, its auxiliary infantry from Spain and Gaul; for the barbarian chieftain was no less afraid of his own subjects than of an enemy, and would only entrust his person to a guard of European mercenaries. The Romans were speedily overpowered by the multitudes which now surrounded them on every side. Fighting with their wonted constancy and valour, they could at least sell their lives dearly, and the example of their commander, who perceived at the last moment his fatal mistake, animated them in the struggle and consoled them in their fall. The gay, licentious braggart of the forum and the camp, the darling of Cicero, the counsellor of Cæsar, the prime mover of the civil wars¹, of which he was the first distinguished victim, crowned a career of inconsistencies and a character of contradictions by dying magnanimously in the foremost ranks of slaughter, rather than seek his personal safety after losing the army intrusted to him.² In vain,—so sang the dirge of the Roman oligarchy,—in vain had he profaned the rostra with his seditious eloquence, and waved the banner of democracy from the tribunitian citadel; in vain had he armed

¹ Lucan, iv. 819.:

“Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.”

² Cæs. B. C. ii, 32—42.

for unnatural duel the father against the husband; he fell before the day of mortal combat; the issue of his treason was veiled from his eyes: the gods, who failed to protect the state, were speedy in chastising the traitor. Yet he too had many noble gifts; he was tainted by the universal corruption: even his foe's malediction turns insensibly to praise. Lucan pronounces upon him the judgment of posterity with the pathos of Virgil and the sternness of Juvenal; and his name stands for ever conspicuous among the short-lived race of revolutionary heroes.¹

Asinius Pollio was one of the few officers who, with a small body of men, were able to make their escape from the general massacre. A detachment had been left in charge of the camp under M. Rufus; but the impossibility of holding the position was immediately perceived, and every effort was made to collect vessels for embarking this miserable remnant for Sicily. In the hurry and confusion with which the embarkation was conducted, many of the transports were sunk with all on board; a small number only of the soldiers got clear off; the rest, deprived of their last chance of escape, were compelled to seek terms of capitulation from Varus. But when Juba beheld them approaching the Roman encampment, he suddenly fell upon them with the ferocity of a barbarian conqueror, claiming the right to deal with them as his own prisoners. Varus remonstrated against this proceeding, having, as he urged, pledged his word for their safety; but Juba, far from paying any regard to his instances, as soon as he had seen his orders executed, rode into Utica at the head of his triumphant army, and presumed

Capitulation
of the rem-
nant of the
Cæsareans.

Cruelty and
insolence
of Juba.

¹ The reflections on the death of Curio form one of the most animated and interesting passages in the revolutionary epic. Lucan, iv. 799.:

“ Quid nunc rostra tibi prosunt turbata, forumque,
Unde Tribunitia plebeius signifer, arce,” &c.

to dictate arrangements at his own pleasure for the government of the Roman colony. To the greater shame of the republic, it was said that several senators, of whom the names of Ser. Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus are especially mentioned, did not scruple to follow in his train, and abet this act of audacious presumption. When he had thus settled everything by his own royal mandate, he returned with all his forces into Numidia.¹

At the same time Cæsar's fortunes were assailed in another quarter by a disaster hardly less signal.² The province of Illyricum, the most obscure portion of the immense government which had been confided to him, became of considerable importance to his interests, now that his opponents had placed the Adriatic between his legions and their own. As soon as he should have secured his rear by the subjugation of the western provinces, he meditated the passage of this narrow gulf. It was, therefore, essential to his plans to strengthen the position he already held on the opposite shore, to confirm the favour of the natives in his behalf, and to establish the magazines which might be requisite for a future campaign in Dalmatia or Epirus; though, indeed, he may have justly disregarded as visionary the project attributed to Pompeius by some of his most sanguine adherents, of marching through this trackless region into the north of Italy. Accordingly, he sent C. Antonius, a younger brother of Marcus, to take the command of the detachments by which the province was held, and commissioned Dolabella³ to

Cæsar sustains a heavy loss in a naval engagement off the coast of Illyricum.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* ii. 44.; App. *B. C.* ii. 46.

² There is no mention of this event in Cæsar's Commentaries on the civil war. It may be conjectured that the second book, which as it now stands is disproportionately short, has come to us imperfect, and that this, together with some subsequent transactions, was related in the missing portion.

³ This was Cicero's son-in-law, through whose influence he hoped

co-operate with him by sea as far as his inferior naval equipments would permit.¹ But Bibulus, who commanded the naval armaments of the senate, sent a superior squadron to encounter the Cæsarean flotilla, a part of which he adroitly entrapped and severely handled. Such was the ferocity of M. Octavius and L. Scribonius Libo, the senatorial leaders, such at least was it reported to be, that the Cæsareans despaired of receiving quarter. The wild resolution of the tribune Vulteius, who persuaded the crew of his vessel to destroy one another rather than fall into the hands of so ruthless an enemy, was remembered in after times as a splendid instance of the old military devotion.² If the story be true, it gives us a frightful idea of the recklessness of life engendered by the savage warfare of the times. What value would men set upon the lives of their enemies who held their own so cheap? But however cold-blooded the cruelty of the conquerors generally to prisoners who refused the alternative of taking service under them, the officers of the senate seem on this occasion to have exhibited no such inveterate hostility to the captured Cæsareans. C. Antonius, coming to the relief of Dolabella, was defeated, and thereupon entered with all his forces,

to retain the favour of the proconsul, at the same time that he so bitterly stigmatised his invasion of Italy in his private correspondence.

¹ Florus says that he was ordered “*fauces Adriatici maris occupare*” (iv. 2.); but this was quite impossible, seeing the acknowledged naval superiority of the Pompeians. The utmost Dolabella could do would be to creep along the coast from harbour to harbour, and try to preserve Antonius’s communications with Italy.

² Florus, *l. c.*; Lucan, iv. 474. foll. The poet’s gloomy application of this story is worth remarking as an illustration of the sentiments of his own times, when suicide was contemplated among the ordinary contingencies of life:

“ Non tamen ignavæ post hæc exempla virorum
 Percipient gentes quam sit non ardua virtus
 Servitium fugisse manu: sed regna timentur
 Ob ferrum, et sævis libertas uritur armis,
 Ignoratque datos ne quisquam serviat casus.”

estimated by one writer at fifteen cohorts,¹ into the service of the consuls.²

We have seen that Cæsar, on his departure for Spain, left the city under the charge of Lepidus, and Italy under that of M. Antonius. In Rome itself the members of the nobility who had remained, or had lately returned, were either devoted to Cæsar's cause, or avowedly neutral. The middle class of citizens was also generally favourable to him; it was only the licentious and versatile mob that could cause any anxiety to the prefect of the city. But this mob required to be constantly amused and humoured, and was ready at any moment to raise clamours in the theatres and other public places, which excited the hopes of the Pompeians, and hindered the complete tranquillization of men's minds throughout the country. Beyond Rome, the task committed to M. Antonius was more difficult. The patrician villas of the Campanian coast were crowded by illustrious personages openly hostile to Cæsar's schemes, and only deterred from uniting themselves with his rival by an almost equal jealousy of his designs, and still more, perhaps, by distrust of his fortunes.³ Such was Cicero, such was C. Marcellus, such was Servius

Admini-
stration of
Lepidus in
the city,
and of M.
Antonius in
Italy.

¹ Oros. vi. 15. There is no trace of any force of such magnitude being detached from Cæsar's armies into this region, and it seems most likely that Antonius's troops consisted principally of the local militia who had no personal attachment to the proconsul.

² Cæs. B. C. iii. 4. and 10. In the latter passage the reading *Corcyra* seems to be an error for *Coricta*, the scene of this event mentioned by Appian, ii. 47.; Drumann, i. 524.

³ These men persisted in amusing themselves with the vain hope that Cæsar's soldiers would turn against him. Cicero says that the centurions of three cohorts stationed at Pompeii came to him at his Cumæan villa and offered to deliver the city to him. Under any circumstances he was prudent in declining such an offer; but when it came to the point he acknowledges a suspicion that it was made in bad faith with the view of entrapping him. Cic. *ad Att.* x. 16. He adds: "Omnem igitur suspicionem sustuli." He is painfully apprehensive of giving any cause of umbrage to the men in power.

Sulpicius, all of them men of distinguished reputation both from their personal character, and from the high magistracies which they had recently filled. While these statesmen were balancing, as we have already seen in the case of the most illustrious of the number, whether they should betake themselves to the senatorial camp, Antonius received his master's orders to prevent any personage of distinction leaving the Peninsula at all. He placed all their movements under strict observation, while at the same time he carefully abstained from any harsh measures of restraint. Cicero communicated to Antonius his wish to leave Italy for a time, and seek an asylum in some place, such as Sicily, where he might hope to enjoy dignified leisure, apart from the disturbances of civil strife. Cato was still master of the island, and Cicero did not anticipate Curio's attack upon it, much less his unresisted conquest of it. But Antonius pleaded in reply the strict injunctions of his superior not to allow any one of so exalted a class to evade the direct superintendence of the central authority; at the same time he dexterously hinted that an application to Cæsar himself would be flattering and possibly successful.

Cicero and other Pompeians are forbidden to leave Italy.

Cicero, however, was not deceived as to the real meaning of this polite communication: it was, he felt, in reality as arbitrary and decisive as the formal missives by which the Spartan ephors cashiered their military sovereigns.¹ He revenged himself, in his correspondence with Atticus, by puerile declamations against the prefect's vices. He represented Antonius as making his progresses through Italy with the mime Cytheris at his side, surrounded by his lictors, followed by a train of panders and concubines, nor scrupling to introduce his own wife and mother into the same odious com-

Cicero's scurrilous declamations against Antonius.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* x. 10.: "Habes σκυτάλην Λακωνικήν."

pany¹, exciting the disgust of all moderate and decent men by his profligate manners and his audacious pride. Claiming his descent from the hero Anton, the son of Hercules, he aped, it seems, the symbols of his divine progenitor, to whom he was supposed to bear a personal resemblance.² At a later period, at least, he stamped the figure of the Nemean lion on his coins³, and presented himself publicly in a chariot drawn by the monarchs of the forest.⁴ In what way he paraded these animals at this time does not clearly appear, but Cicero encourages his correspondent not to be alarmed at Antonius's lions.⁵ It would indeed be strange if a licentious and arrogant man, such as the tribune undoubtedly was, should have exhibited no marks of bad taste and selfish indulgence on so sudden an elevation. But the colouring of his calumniator is unworthy of our confidence; and even if we were to admit every thing that Cicero says against him, the progress of Antonius through Italy would still stand in luminous contrast to the devastating march of most of its previous conquerors.

We have seen that the defenders of Massilia were

¹ Comp. *ad Att.* x. 10. with *Phil.* ii. 24. The letter in which these circumstances are related was written from his villa at Cumæ, at the very time that he was in correspondence with Antonius and Curio about the course which it would be prudent for him to take. In the speech he expressly says that he was not in Italy (implying that he was already in the camp of Pompeius) at the time. It is impossible after this to attach any special weight to the scandalous imputations he throws out against Antonius.

² Plut. *Anton.* 4.: προσῆν δὲ καὶ μορφῆς ἐλευθέριον ἀξίωμα, καὶ πάγων τις οὐκ ἀγεννῆς, καὶ πλάτος μετώπου, καὶ γρυπότης μυκτῆρος ἐδόκει τοῖς γραφουμένοις καὶ πλαττομένοις Ἡρακλέους προσώποις ἐμπερὲς ἔχειν τὸ ἀδρηνωπόν.

³ Comp. Eckhel, *Doctr. Numm.* vi. 44. This figure appears on a coin supposed to be of the date 715 u. c. It occurs also on one struck by Antonius at Lugdunum in Gaul, a city which was much attached to him. Vaillant supposes that its modern name Lyon is derived from the Antonian symbol.

⁴ Plin. *H. N.* viii. 21.

⁵ Cic. *ad Att.* x. 13.: "Tu icones Antonii ne pertimescas cave."

on the point of surrendering, when Cæsar's good fortune brought him in triumph to their gates just in time to receive their submission in person. L. Domitius, by whose fierce hostility they had been animated throughout their long struggle, contrived by slipping out of the haven to avoid falling a second time into the hands of the conqueror whose clemency he had abused. He will next reappear in the Pompeian camp at Thessalonica. The perfidy of the Greeks was prudently forgotten, their submission graciously accepted, and their city saved from pillage, though the appetite of the besiegers was whetted by perils and fatigues, and they had indulged in the fullest anticipation of military licence. The surrender of all their munitions of war, together with the treasure of the republic, was rigorously enforced: and if the inhabitants were allowed the enjoyment of their own laws and institutions, they were effectually deprived of the means of defending them.¹

Final submission of Massilia. Escape of Domitius.

It was at this moment that Cæsar received intelligence that he had been declared dictator at Rome by the appointment of the prefect Lepidus.² The creation of this extraordinary magistrate was an expedient recognized, by traditional usage, on occasions of the greatest emergency. In the earliest ages of the republic the appointment was exercised by the consuls at the command or with the consent of the senate.³ The people had no voice in the matter, nor were the peculiar restrictions under which the office was held adopted with any view to their protection. The appointment of a dictator was, in fact, the resource

Cæsar created dictator in his absence.

¹ Cæs. B. C. ii. 22.; Dion, xli. 25.; Liv. *Epit.* ex.

² Cæs. B. C. ii. 21.

³ Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, i. 144.: "One of the consuls received the name of the person to be declared dictator from the senate; he then declared him dictator, and he was confirmed and received the imperium by a vote of the great council of the euriæ."

which the nobles reserved to themselves whenever the ordinary political forms were insufficient to resist the demands of the commons. But as the commons grew in strength, and asserted equal privileges with the nobles, such an arbitrary power could no longer be safely exercised. The senate resorted to another expedient to protect itself, whenever its privileges seemed threatened with imminent peril. On such occasions it passed a solemn resolution, declaring the state in danger, and investing the consuls with summary powers for maintaining the public safety. Accordingly, with the single exception of Sulla's appointment, which was made in the intoxication of an overwhelming triumph, there had been no creation of a dictator for a hundred and twenty years. Indeed Sulla's revival of this unpopular authority, and his frightful abuse of it, had concentrated upon it the whole force of the national odium. Pompeius had not ventured to claim it; he had contented himself with the more irregular but less hateful assumption of the sole consulship. It might now be doubted whether the people would endure it, even when exercised by their own champion, and ostensibly for their own interest.

The circumstances, however, which compelled Cæsar to run the hazard of thus awakening the jealousy of his own adherents were peculiar. There can be no doubt that he had himself suggested to Lepidus to make the appointment; but, in doing so, he had not yielded to the indulgence of puerile vanity. It was the proper function of the consuls for the current year to convene the people for the election of their successors. The consulship was the dignity for which Cæsar had long contended. The exalted position he occupied, and the great services he had rendered the state, gave him an undeniable claim to the fasces, even for the second time, upon

Cæsar's object in seeking the appointment at this time, to hold the consular comitia and obtain the consulship.

the expiration of his provincial government. For this he had quarrelled with the party of the optimates, who had striven by every kind of violence and intrigue to thwart him. For this he had taken up arms and crossed the Rubicon; and now, having driven his enemies fairly out of Italy, he was ready, he declared, to present himself to the people for this, and this only. But the consuls were absent from the city; no election could take place at Rome; neither, on the other hand, could an election be made under the consular auspices elsewhere than at Rome. Lepidus, indeed, asserted that as prætor he had the right to hold the consular comitia. But an outcry was raised against the legality of this claim; and Cicero argued that an inferior magistrate could not rightly preside at the election of a superior.¹ Cæsar was studious to preserve appearances, and, on this occasion, he forbade his minister to perform an act which could bear even a colour of illegality. It was, however, of great importance to his views that the state should not fall under an interregnum. The office of the interreges was to supply the place of the consuls on the occurrence of an unavoidable vacancy, until such time as a formal election could be held under their sanction.² But the law restricted the choice of interreges to the patrician houses, and in that class there was so much jealousy of Cæsar that under their authority fresh obstacles, he apprehended, would be thrown in his way.³ There remained, therefore, only one other feasible course, and this was the appointment of a dictator, in whom the right of holding the consular comitia was undeniably vested. If such a sovereign magistrate was to be

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 9.: "Iste omnium turpissimus et sordidissimus (Lepidus) qui consularia comitia a prætore ait haberi posse."

² It was by an interrex that Sulla had been created dictator. Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 15.

³ Drumann, iii. 475.; Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 9.; "Permagni ejus interest rem ad interregnum non venire."

appointed, it was upon Cæsar alone, as the foremost man in the state, that the burden and the dignity could alight. He accepted the office as the only means of arriving at the consulship. Nevertheless, it was still a question whether, in the absence of the consuls, the prætor had strictly the right to make this nomination. It may be remembered, indeed, that the first dictator was appointed at a period when there was no distinction between the functions of these two officers, so that it is not improbable that the archives of the early republic might furnish at least a literal precedent for such a proceeding. There seems, however, to have been a general impression that there was some irregularity in the transaction, though the historians express themselves very differently upon it.¹ Under such circumstances, it must have been a matter of great satisfaction to Cæsar that the intelligence of this appointment reached him at a moment when there was nothing to prevent his setting off immediately for Rome. Delay at such a conjuncture might have been fatal; but Spain was converted to his side, Gaul vaunted her zeal for his interests, Massilia was pacified and crushed. The broad beaten track of the Aurelian Way lay before him, and the proconsul crossed the Alps with the expedition of a courier.

Nevertheless, there remained yet another labour to

Cæsar *quellis*
a mutiny
among his
soldiers at
Placentia.

be overcome before he could reach the consummation of his desires. For a moment the very foundation of all his power seemed crumbling under his feet. After the disappearance of the senatorial forces from the shores of Italy, Cæsar, as we have seen, had stationed a portion of his troops in the southern extremity of Apulia, to

¹ Flor. iv. 2. : "consulem se ipse fecit." Appian, *B.C.* ii. 47. : καὶ αὐτὸν ὁ δῆμος πεφρικῶς ἤρείτο δικτάτωρα οὔτε τι τῆς βουλῆς ψηφισομένης, οὔτε προχειροτονήσαντος ἄρχοντος. Zonaras, x. 8. : αἰρεθεὶς δὲ δικτάτωρ ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς.

resist any sudden attempt of the fugitives to regain the land. Another and apparently a larger division¹ had been quartered at Placentia, in the valley of the Po as a central point between Rome, the frontier of Gaul, and the north-eastern corner of the Peninsula; in which latter direction it was just possible that Pompeius might move upon his flank, if he were worsted in Spain, or detained under the walls of Massilia. This reserve was augmented by the arrival of the division, consisting of one or more legions, which had been detached from the army in Spain to escort the Afranians as far as the Var. It seems probable that their fidelity to their leader was partly corrupted by familiar intercourse with their fellow-citizens who had so recently served on the opposite side. We have already seen how rapidly the sense of discipline might be thus undermined. But the veterans had mortifications of their own to brood over. Their commander, it is asserted, had never yet found himself in a position to give his promised largess of five minæ to each soldier. He had also withheld from them a prize they might deem not less legitimately theirs, in forbidding the sack of cities and renouncing the confiscation of private property. The news of his having shielded Massilia from plunder roused the soldiers to a pitch of frenzy. It was in their eyes an arrogant interference with the rights of military licence. It does not appear how far the spirit of insubordination had spread; the ninth legion, however, one of the most distinguished in the Gallic wars, was thoroughly demoralized. Cæsar flew to the spot, and his presence doubtless restored the greater number to a sense of their duty. He felt that he was supported, and the

¹ Dion, xli. 26.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 47.; Oros. vi. 15. Guischart calculates that three of the veteran legions were quartered at Placentia. *Mém. sur l'Armée de César*, in tom. iii. p. 62. of the *Mémoires Militaires*.

bolder the front he assumed, the more he was assured would that support be confirmed. He addressed the mutineers in one of those stirring harangues with which, like most great commanders, he could sway their affections as he pleased. At first, assuming the boundless generosity of perfect confidence, he declared that he would release from his oath who-soever wished to retire. But when the disaffected shouted their approbation of this indulgence, and he suddenly changed the language of his address from *Romani*, or *soldiers*, to *Quirites*, or *citizens*, shocked and abashed the multitude shrank before him.¹ Such was the disparagement implied in this honourable title, according to the ideas of a brutalized soldiery, that the whole current of their fury was arrested and changed by one magic word. They were now as eager in signifying their repentance, as before in testifying their dissatisfaction. Cæsar, however, was not to be won too easily. He proceeded to disband the entire ninth legion; but at their urgent entreaty, and upon the strongest assurances of their penitence, he contented himself with making some severe examples, according to the laws of Roman discipline, to which, sanguinary as they were, the soldiers were passionately attached. He required one hundred and twenty of the most violent mutineers to be delivered to him, and selected twelve of the number for death. When he discovered that one of these had been unjustly accused, he ordered the centurion who had given the false information against him to take his place.²

¹ Lucan, v. 358.:

“Tradite nostra viris ignavi signa Quirites.”

Suet. (*Jul.* 70.) tells the same story on the occasion of a mutiny of the tenth legion before Rome at a later period. See also Dion, xlii. 53.; App. *B. C.* ii. 92. But the poet is so faithful to the letter of history, even in his ornamental details, that I think his expressions may be adopted here.

² Dion, and Appian, *ll. cc.*; Suet, *Jul.* 69. The account of this

When we consider what expectations of a dictator's rule would be formed by the various parties and conflicting interests of the republic, we cannot fail to estimate the extreme difficulty of Cæsar's position upon his return. He was now for the first time summoned to carry out the principles which he had inscribed upon his banner on his first entrance into political warfare. He was called upon to repudiate those which his enemies and his extravagant partisans alike imputed to him. His elevation was similar to that of Pompeius in his sole consulship; but it was not easy for him to imitate the moderation of his opponent in dealing with disputed rights and reforming social abuses. The old conservative element of the commonwealth, upon which Pompeius could securely lean when hard pressed by the revolutionists, was broken to pieces by the flight of the consuls and their adherents. On the other hand, the arrogance of the innovators and reformers, of those who would sweep away the foundations of social confidence, and reconstitute society on the arbitrary basis of financial enactments, was flushed by success. So great a change of men in the government of the commonwealth had never before been effected without a loud cry for blood as well as for plunder: the old animosities of class and party had never before been allayed except by the massacre of the conquered. It remained yet to be seen how far the progress of society had modified these sanguinary instincts; whether the recent growth of a middle and neutral interest of capitalists and financial speculators had tended to assuage the violence of political action; above all, whether the advance of civilization had, at last, brought upon the stage a great political champion, of more humane and philo-

Difficulties
of Cæsar's
position as
dictator.

transaction, which is wanting in Cæsar's Commentaries, would have been found in the portion of the second book, which is supposed to be missing.

sophical character than the military ruffians of an earlier generation.

We have seen that the moneyed interest of the capital had invoked the success of Cæsar, as offering the fairest prospect of that permanent tranquillity, which it prized above any party triumph. The political excitement of recent years had benumbed its industry with anxiety and distrust. But it was well known that the victorious champion of a great political change would be urged by a large class among his adherents to combine with it a social revolution also. The general abolition of private debts was a familiar cry which had long swelled the chorus of popular clamour against Sulla and the optimates, the dictator and the senate. Accordingly, the class of creditors showed great sagacity in the confidence which they placed in Cæsar, as the man of all others whose moderation would reject, and whose firmness would overcome, such a pressure. He at least, they were assured, had never adopted the language of the Cinnas and Catilinas. The good sense with which he had kept aloof from the intrigues of recent conspirators had not been lost upon the wary observers of public events. The respect he had shown for private property, under circumstances of great temptation, had raised an exalted opinion of his good faith and moral courage. His influence had extended, during his own absence, to his ministers in Rome and Italy; whatever were their faults and their personal unpopularity, Lepidus and Antonius had thus far scrupulously adhered to the principles they had imbibed from him. They had not violated public faith, they had respected property, they had refrained from blood. On the other hand, many who really wished well to the cause of the nobles durst not resort to their camp, where proscription or at least confiscation awaited them for their previous delay.

Confidence
reposed in his
firmness and
determination
to resist the
cry for con-
fiscation and
blood.

At Rome, the head-quarters of the Cæsareans, their persons were secure, and even their adhesion, with few exceptions, unsolicited. Conservatism was angry and revengeful, Innovation tolerant and placable; the striking contrast they now mutually exhibited was an efficient agent in consolidating Cæsar's victory.¹

The dictator wielded within the city the paramount authority which, in the case of the consul whom he superseded, was jealously ^{Cæsar's financial measures.} limited to the camp. He was not required to surrender the command of his army on entering the precincts sacred to the peaceful gown. In the language of the poet, he combined the sword with the axe, the eagles of the imperator with the rods of the curule magistrate.² Cæsar could now appear publicly in the forum for the first time since his appointment to the government of Gaul. He presented himself to a senate of his own adherents, and a people whose favourite he had ever been, after an absence of nearly ten years, with all his former popularity, and with more than the promised renown of his early career. As he walked over the ashes of the Clodian conflagration, among the rising columns of his destined edifices, Rome might fondly hope that the era of blood and fire had passed away, and peace revived at his command with arts and opulence. But meanwhile, the general uncertainty which darkened the political horizon had caused a wide-spread repugnance to the discharge of pecuniary obligations. The impression had long prevailed, that the time was coming for a scramble for property. Every one was

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 75.: "Denuntiante Pompeio pro hostibus se habiturum qui reipublicæ defuissent, ipse medios et neutrius partis suorum sibi numero futuros pronuntiavit."

² Lucan, v. 387.:

"Ne ferri jus ullum Cæsar abesset,
Ausonias voluit gladiis miscere secures:
Addidit et fasces aquilis."

anxious to turn his effects into money, and to keep what he could realize in his own coffers. All were eager to sell, few to buy. The creditors became harsher in exacting their dues, as the difficulty of enforcing their claims became greater. Their mortgages sunk in value, till it became expedient to make almost any sacrifice to secure an adjustment with their debtors. The method which Cæsar adopted for compromising the respective claims of the two classes, was to estimate these obligations according to the scale of prices at a period antecedent to the late commotions, when money circulated freely and plentifully, and to allow debts to be discharged without the payment of the accumulated interest.¹ The debtor was thus generally relieved from a liability which he could not discharge, while the creditor sacrificed a portion of his dues, amounting, however, as was calculated, to not more than one fourth.² As an expedient for reducing prices to their usual level, and restoring the abundance of the circulating medium, which there was so strong a disposition to hoard, the dictator sanctioned another ordinance of an arbitrary kind. He limited to sixty thousand sesterces the amount of coin which the citizen might retain in his possession.³ But as this provision, vexatious and inquisitorial as it was, would be little more than a dead letter, unless the inmates of the family were encouraged to denounce the violation of it, the multitude, delighted at any sumptuary restriction on the advantages of wealth, demanded that the

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* iii. 1.

² Suet. *Jul.* 42.; comp. Plut. *Cæs.* 37.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 48.

³ Dion, xli. 38. Drumann refers to a similar ordinance of the emperor Tiberius, Tac. *Ann.* vi. 16.; Suet., *Tib.* 49.: "Der Kaiser dachte nicht an das allgemeine Beste, sondern an seine Sicherheit: ohne Geld konnte man sich nicht gegen ihn verschwören" (iii. 472. note). The class which had speculated on a sweeping abolition of debts were so dissatisfied with Cæsar's moderation that many of them withdrew to the camp of the senate in consequence. Sallust, *Orat. ad Cæs.* ii. 2.

testimony of slaves should be received in such cases against their masters. Cæsar, however, remained steadfast to the old principles of Roman law, and refused to sanction so dangerous an innovation.¹

The dictator's next measure was to procure the recal from banishment of certain personages who had been proscribed by the enactments of his adversaries. These penalties had been inflicted, for the most part, under the law of Pompeius against bribery at elections. But the delinquents had been zealous in proffering their services to the armed assailant of the government by which they had suffered; they promised to become useful to his cause, and policy prompted him to satisfy their demands. The indignation of the patrician purists knew no bounds. While Cæsar was still absent in Spain, Antonius had held out the expectation of such an act of grace, and the sympathy he had thus expressed for the victims of the laws was branded as one of the worst of his enormities. In Cicero's view, such an act would fill the measure of Cæsar's iniquities. Sulpicius had declared that, if the exiles returned, he must himself go into exile.² In the meanwhile Cæsar had abstained from receiving these applicants into his ranks. He waited till their recal should proceed from the mouth of the sovereign people; and he now suggested to certain high magistrates to lay a proposition to that effect before the assembly.³ But the amnesty was extended to more than one class of sufferers. Gabinius was among those who profited by it to return to Rome. On the other hand, it was denied to Milo, who had perhaps made himself obnoxious in the defence of Massilia.⁴ It must be allowed that this exception was in

Amnesty granted to the victims of Pompeius's and Sulla's enactments.

¹ Dion, *l. c.*

² Cic. *ad Att.* x. 14.

³ Cæs. *B. C.* iii. 1.: "Prætoribus tribunisque plebis rogationes ad populum ferentibus."

⁴ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 48.

flagrant contradiction to the motive which the dictator himself assigns for the measure, his anxiety to reverse legal sentences which had been inflicted at a period when the tribunals were coerced by Pompeius's military force. This measure, it is probable, was connected with another, the subject of which had at least been broached on a former occasion, the rehabilitation, namely, of the descendants of Sulla's victims.¹

At the same time Cæsar accomplished an act, the policy and justice of which he had recognised at a much earlier period, and of which his own interests had never failed to remind him: this was the conferring the Roman franchise upon the Transpadane Gauls.² His connexion with this people had been of long duration, and almost at his first outset in political life his enemies suspected that it was from thence he was to draw the military force destined to support the imaginary conspiracy with which they charged him.³ We have seen the insolence and violence with which this connexion had been resented by the nobles, in the treatment of the proconsul's clients at Novum Comum. But the elder Curio, a high authority among the optimates, had allowed the abstract justice of the concession for which Cæsar contended. He withstood it only from a perverse misapprehension of the interests of the commonwealth.⁴ The time had now arrived when every obstacle was removed, and henceforward the freedom of the city was bounded only by the Alps.

The measures which Pompeius appeared to con-

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 37. Dion, as we have seen, places it before the campaign in Spain; Velleius (ii. 43.), in Cæsar's ædileship, A. U. 689; but this is certainly an error, as Cicero had maintained the exclusion in his consulship.

² Dion, xli. 36.; comp. Tac. *Ann.* xi. 24.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 9.

⁴ Cic. *de Off.* iii. 32.; Drumann, iii. 447

template for reducing the city by famine had been thwarted for the most part by the energy and success of Cæsar's lieutenants in Sardinia and Sicily. But Africa withheld her supplies, and the produce of more distant shores might be cut off by the cruisers of a vigilant enemy. The populace of Rome began to suffer from this pressure, and the dictator distributed gratuitously among them all the grain he could collect.¹ He seems to have indemnified himself for these extraordinary expenses by levying contributions on the deposits in the temples.² The people easily pardoned these depredations. They were now in the highest good humour. Cæsar could trust his fortunes confidently to their grateful favour.³ Accordingly he proceeded, without further delay, to convene the assembly for the election of consuls, and presented himself as a candidate. He could fairly represent to the people that, in the discharge of the sovereign magistracy he had paid unusual deference to their rights as legislators; in his wish to make his dictatorship a name rather than a reality, he had abstained from the appointment of a master of the horse. He now encouraged P. Servilius Isauricus to offer himself for the other chair, and no one ventured to solicit the suffrages in opposition to either. The election of the other magistrates followed, and next in order the distribution of the provincial appointments. Lepidus received the Hither Spain, Q. Cassius retained his government of the Further province, and Decimus Brutus succeeded to that of Gaul beyond the Alps.

Cæsar obtains the consulship in conjunction with P. Servilius Isauricus.

The last month of the Roman calendar had now arrived.⁴ Cæsar performed, in his capacity of dictator,

¹ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 48.

² Dion, xli. 39.

³ Lucan, v. 384.: "Lætos fecit se consule fastos."

⁴ The month of December, A. U. 705, answered to October, B. C. 49. Plutarch and Florus forget the error in the current computation of time when they state that Cæsar arrived at Brundisium at the winter solstice. See Fischer, *R. Z.* p. 273.

the solemn rites of the great Latin festival on the Alban mount; and thus, at the moment of drawing his sword, he proclaimed himself in the face of gods and men the supreme impersonation of the laws. It was by this ceremony that the chief magistrate of the republic was wont to invoke the divine favour before arming to encounter the national foes; and its celebration now seemed to denounce Pompeius, with his Oriental allies, as a foreign enemy. As soon as the sacrifice was completed the dictator abdicated his extraordinary office, only eleven days after he had entered upon it.¹ He had already summoned his veterans to attend him at Brundisium, and he went forth to the decisive conflict amidst the acclamations of the people; but their applause was mingled with painful presentiments, and at the last moment they earnestly entreated him to bring the struggle to a peaceful termination. Every eye was bent on the fatal field, where legion should be matched against legion, pile against pile, and eagle against eagle.² The antagonists had assumed an attitude of personal defiance; the names of Senate and People had sunk into ominous oblivion. Cæsar and Pompeius were now the exclusive watchwords of the contending parties; even the children playing in the streets divided themselves into Cæsareans and Pompeians.³

The judgment and ability which Cæsar manifested throughout these proceedings must raise his estimation as a statesman to the highest pitch. He who had crossed the Rubicon at the beginning of the year, in defiance of

Comparison of the position now occupied by Cæsar with that of his adversaries.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 2.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 48.; Plut. *Cæs.* 37., Zonar. x. 8.

² Lucan, i. 6.:

“Infestisque obvia signis

Signa, parcs aquilas et pila minantia pilis.”

³ Dion, xli. 39.

law and authority, and daringly confronted the government of his country, backed as it was by the general opinion of his order, had now completely turned against his opponents the current of public feeling. The moral victory he had gained over them was even more complete than the triumph of his arms. He was now the consul of the republic, legitimately elected and duly invested with full powers. Throughout the empire there were vast numbers of citizens who would bow implicitly to the wielder of this formal authority. There were many cities which would shut their gates against any party which opposed him, without asking a question as to the substantial justice of its cause.¹ On the other hand, the Pompeians acknowledged by their own conduct that they had ceased to retain the government of Rome. In Epirus, though there were two hundred senators in their camp, they dared not enact a law or hold an election, or confer the imperium. They had neither curies nor centuries, nor comitia; and the consuls, prætors, and quæstors, who had sailed from the shores of Italy, sank in the next year into proconsuls, proprætors and proquæstors.² The repre-

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 12.: "Illi se daturos negare, neque portas consuli præclusuros, neque sibi iudicium sumpturos contra atque omnis Italia populisque Romanus iudicavisset."

² Dion, xli. 43. This writer gives a confused account of the proceedings of the Pompeians, or rather the proceedings themselves were confused and inconsistent. He says that though, *as some affirm*, there were 200 senators in the camp, together with the consuls, and though they consecrated a spot of ground for taking the auspices preliminary to an election, though they possessed a legitimate semblance of the Roman people, and even of the city itself, yet they did not proceed to make any election of public magistrates, because the consuls had not proposed a *lex curiata*. The proceedings then above mentioned, if they really took place, were a mere imposition: the Pompeian chieftains preferred the retention of their military commands by a mere change of title, to going through even the bare forms of an election. Lincan (v. *init.*), and Appian (ii. 50.), preserve the popular arguments by which it was sought to give a constitutional colour to these informal proceedings; but the alleged precedent of Camillus was far from the purpose. It is probable that

sentative of the people had become the guardian of precedent and order; while the champion of the aristocracy derived his unauthorized prerogatives from the suffrage or the passions of a turbulent camp. The position of the rivals was thus exactly reversed, and with it, in the eyes of a nation of formalists, the right seemed to be reversed also.

Cæsar's senate was not less numerous than his rival's, notwithstanding the sneer of the poet:

“*Libyæ squalentibus arvis*
Curio Cæsarei cecidit pars magna Senatus.”

CHAPTER XVII.

The senatorial party assemble at Thessalonica.—Review of their forces and position.—Cæsar crosses over to Epirus.—Pompeius throws himself before Dyrrhachium.—Maritime operations of Bibulus: his mortification and death.—Sedition in Italy, and death of Cælius.—Antonius crosses over to Epirus with reinforcements.—Cæsar blockades Pompeius within his lines.—Operations in Macedonia and Greece.—Appius Claudius consults the oracle of Delphi.—Cæsar is baffled in his attack on Pompeius, and withdraws into Thessaly.—Pompeius follows, and effects a junction with Scipio.—Gives battle at Pharsalia.—Rout of the Senatorial forces.—Flight of Pompeius: death of Domitius: surrender of M. Brutus (Jan.—Aug. A. U. 706, B. C. 48.)

POMPEIUS had no sooner placed the sea between his followers and the cherished soil of Italy, than he began to develop the military plans which he had long meditated in secret. He had no further occasion to practise reserve. The consuls and their party were now really at his mercy; they could not dispense with his services, for once removed from the centre of government, their authority in the camp was merely nominal. The rulers of the allied and dependent states of the East owed their thrones to the conqueror of Mithridates. While only distant and doubtful rumours had reached them of Cæsar's exploits on the shores of the Western Ocean, they had before their eyes sensible proofs that his rival was the greatest captain and most powerful statesman in the world. Gratitude and fear therefore equally conspired to urge them to obey his summons, when he appointed Thessalonica for the rendezvous of his forces. Deiotarus and Dorilaus, princes of Galatia, Rhaseupolis and Sadala of Thrace, Tarcondimotus of Cilicia, Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, Antiochus of Commagene, were among the

Enumeration
of the forces
of Pompeius.

most conspicuous of the foreign chieftains who flocked to his standard.¹ Each of them was attended by a select body of horsemen from his own country. Among the Oriental allies, Cæsar enumerates only the cavalry, the bowmen and the slingers, who formed the ordinary auxiliary force to the main body of the legionaries.² But there can be no doubt that most of the tributary states and sovereigns of the east furnished also large contingents of foot-soldiers. These, however, were for the most part ill equipped and worse disciplined, and in the enumeration of combatants it was not commonly the practice of the Roman military writers to take any special account of them.³ The senators and knights served also in large numbers on horseback. A body of five hundred Roman cavalry, which had been left at Alexandria by Gabinius to maintain or watch the power of Ptolemæus, was brought by Cn. Pompeius, the triumvir's eldest son, who had armed, moreover, eight hundred of his slaves and labourers from the extensive estates belonging to his family. But the main strength of the army consisted, of course, in the legionary infantry. Five legions had been carried over from Italy; a sixth was formed by the union of the two incomplete divisions which Cato had commanded in Sicily; a seventh was raised from the veterans whom Sulla, Lucullus, and their successors had settled in Macedonia and Crete; two more had

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 4.; Vell. ii. 51.

² Cæsar computes the cavalry at 7000, the slingers and bowmen at 4000, bearing in each case an unusually large proportion to the legionary infantry.

³ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 70. Lucan (vii. 360.) dwells emphatically on the numbers of these Oriental allies, and compares their variety to the forces of Cyrus, Xerxes, and Agamemnon (iii. 284.). Not to insist on the testimony of the rhetorical poet, we have similar evidence in Cicero's letters; and Appian says plainly *ἔθνεσι τε πᾶσι καὶ στρατηγοῖς καὶ βασιλεῦσι καὶ δυνάσταις καὶ πόλεσι ἔγραφε κατὰ σπουδὴν ὅτι δύναιτο ἕκαστος εἰς τὸν πόλεμον συμφέρειν* (*B.C.* ii. 38.). Such troops could not, of course, be opposed to Cæsar's veterans in the field, but they might be serviceable in many operations of war.

been hastily levied by Lentulus among the citizens of the republic in the province of Asia. The strength of these divisions had been considerably increased by the addition of supplemental or auxiliary cohorts of Achaians, Bœotians, Epirotes and Thessalians. Scipio, who had gone forth to his appointed province of Syria, was expected to return with the two legions stationed on that frontier. The name of Pompeius might be deemed sufficiently terrible to curb the audacity of the Parthians; but Orodes had presumed to negotiate for the cession of Syria as the price of his active alliance, and Lucceius Hirrus was despatched on a mission to amuse his vanity while he solicited his favours.¹ To these forces is to be added the detachment of C. Antonius recently captured by Octavius.

These armed multitudes, to which Cæsar's enumeration is confined, were quite as large as could be conveniently supported or manœuvred, according to the principles and habits of ancient warfare. Though composed partly of strange and discordant elements, partly of untrained levies, they might form, in the hands of skilful officers, a military power more formidable than any the world had yet seen. Their numbers may be stated very moderately at eighty or ninety thousand men.² Pompeius employed himself in exercising them together with the utmost diligence. He condescended to go through the severe discipline of the legionary in person, hurling the pilum and brandishing the sword, on horseback and on foot, and he displayed, it was said, though fifty-eight years of age, the strength and ardour of a young recruit.³ At the same time every exertion was made to collect magazines of

His naval armaments.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* iii. 82.; Dion, xli. 55.

² Eleven legions might amount to 60,000 men. The light troops and cavalry were above 11,000. The supplemental cohorts could hardly be less than 20,000 more.

³ Plut. *Pomp.* 64.

provisions and warlike stores, while a fleet of five hundred vessels of war, and an infinite number of transports, contributed by every naval power in the eastern seas¹, was placed under the command of Bibulus, and divided into several squadrons to watch every harbour from which the enemy might issue forth, or at which he might attempt to make good his landing.²

The overwhelming naval force which Pompeius possessed enabled him undoubtedly to throw reinforcements upon any coast where his interests were assailed by the enemy. But he would not detach a single vessel or a single cohort to the relief of his provinces or his legions. He required all his adherents to seek him in the position in which he had determined to abide the attack, and looked on with apparent apathy while his best generals and his amplest resources were torn from him. Indeed his opponent's liberality restored to him the officers whom his own negligence had allowed to fall into their hands. Afranius had followed the example of Domitius and Vibullius, in turning his arms once more against the conqueror to whom he owed his freedom. The menaces of the senate left them, perhaps, no choice but to take a decided part on the one side or the other. But Pompeius was exceedingly jealous of his principal officers, especially of such as had the confidence of his party. Though compelled to entrust to them the most important commands in his army,

The nobles muster in Pompeius's camp. High estimation in which Domitius is held among them.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* ix. 9.: "Omnis hæc classis Alexandria, Colchis, Tyro, Sidone, Arado, Cypro, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodo, Chio, Byzantio, Lesbo, Smyrna, Mileto, Coö, ad intercludendos commeatus Italiæ et ad occupandas frumentarias provincias comparatur."

² Cæs. *B. C.* iii. 5. Cic. (*ad Att.* x. 8.), in one of his fits of confidence in Pompeius's preparations: "Cujus omne consilium Themistocleum est. Existimat enim qui mare teneat, eum necesse esse rerum potiri. Itaque nunquam id egit, ut Hispaniæ per se tenerentur: navalis apparatus ei semper antiquissima cura fuit. Navigabit igitur, quum erit tempus, maximis classibus, et ad Italiam accedet."

he was by no means disposed to listen to their counsels. The fortune of war which had dislodged the partisans of the senate from so many of the positions they had undertaken to defend, had now assembled at Thessalonica all the great leaders of the aristocratic faction. Various and conflicting as were their opinions on the state of affairs, they all seemed to agree in their dislike and distrust of the champion under whom they were forced to array themselves. It was with great reluctance that Domitius resorted to Thessalonica after his escape from Massilia. His leader's desertion of him at Corfinium still rankled in his bosom; he felt that it was only by his own gallant self-devotion that the consuls, the senate, and Pompeius himself, had been enabled to escape from Italy; this was a service he never permitted his associates to forget, nor was his temper such as to brook an inferior command. But he found himself naturally in his place at the head of the proudest and most exclusive section of the nobles, and in their company he ridiculed the airs of sovereignty assumed by Pompeius among the petty potentates whom he had summoned to his standard.¹

Cicero also had found his way to the head-quarters of his friends. How he evaded the vigilance of Antonius does not appear. We must suppose that he withdrew from Italy with the consent, if not the express permission of Cæsar. A crafty politician might foresee that the presence of so discontented a spirit in the hostile camp would furnish it with the seeds of dissension rather than any accession of strength. From the moment of his arrival at Thessalonica, Cicero seems to have found himself ill at ease under the control of a military chieftain. His tardy arrival was made a subject of reproach; the absence of some of his relatives gave colour to insinuations

Cicero arrives at the camp. His discontent and ill-timed levity.

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 67.

against his sincerity, which were hardly dispelled even by the devotion to the cause manifested by his brother Quintus, who abandoned his old patron and general for the sake of his party. But Cicero revenged himself as he best might by wreaking many a bitter jest upon the apparent imbecility of his traducers.¹ When Pompeius taunted him with having made his appearance among them so late, *How can I be said to have come late*, he replied, *when I find nothing in readiness among you?* He was striving to conceal from himself how little satisfied he was with his own determination to cling to a faction from which he could expect no good to his country.

The despair a sensible and practical statesman like Cicero felt for the welfare of the public, even in the event of the party with which he acted being successful in the struggle to preserve its ascendancy, shows how despised and powerless was that small but honourable section of which Cato and Brutus were the leaders. Their names have, indeed, descended to us surrounded with a halo of glory, for they were the purest representatives of a cause which posterity regarded as the antagonist of the tyranny under which it was itself suffering, and the philosophical creed they illustrated by their life and practice was precisely that which found most favour with the generations which succeeded them. But it is evident that they had little influence upon the sentiments of their own contemporaries. Cato had acted with great perverseness. The notion of arming against Cæsar he had from the first denounced. He would have combated him in the forum. He delighted in the confusion of the popular elections, and his courage never rose higher than when he found himself on the hustings, raising his voice above the clamour of the multitude, and

¹ Plut. *Cic.* 31.; Macrob. *Saturn.* ii. 3., where several of Cicero's gibes on this occasion are recorded.

Cato possesses little influence in the counsels of his party.

defying the violence of tribunes and demagogues. It was his pride to shape his course with a view to the assertion of his principles, rather than the attainment of their triumph. When forced to follow in the wake of the senate, he continued to manifest great reluctance to taking any military command. The government of Sicily was at last thrust upon him. Pompeius, no doubt, was glad to be quit of his presence, for he knew that, in the event of victory, no one would be more vigilant in circumscribing his authority than Cato. But his precipitate retreat from that island, contrary to every expectation of friends and foes, can hardly be accounted for, except as the indulgence of that untractable perversity of character which was better understood by his contemporaries than by their posterity. Nor did he feel any shame in reappearing in the camp of the nobles, where he seemed to be wholly unconscious that he was now doubly obnoxious, both as an impracticable politician and an imbecile general. On one point, indeed, his dignified humanity shamed the ferocity of his party into acquiescence in his counsels. At his instance the senate passed a decree, which became, however, in the sequel a mere empty form, that no city should be sacked, and no citizen put to death, unless taken with arms in his hands.¹

But, however limited the influence of Cato might be upon the adherents of the same cause, it was at least all-powerful with his nephew M. Brutus. The young philosopher had never forgotten that Pompeius had slain his father, and, devoted as he was by family and temper to the party of the oligarchy, he had nevertheless sternly abstained from joining in the adulation which they had showered upon their champion. But now his haughty reserve was overcome by the claim his uncle

Devotion of
M. Brutus to
his uncle.

¹ Plut. *Porp.* 65., *Cat. Min.* 53.

made upon his sense of public duty. He offered his services to Pompeius. Though inclined by nature to study and peaceful avocations he was not deficient in the qualities of a good officer, and while he devoted himself, however reluctantly, to the business he had undertaken, he seems to have refrained from any exhibition of restlessness and discontent.

Our conception of the character of Cato would be

incomplete if we omitted to notice a domestic incident which curiously illustrates it.

Cato's second nuptials with Marcia. Cicero had left his wife behind him at Rome, under the protection of his son-in-law Dolabella. He had expressed, indeed, a decent sense of apprehension at what might befall her, thus separated from a husband, whom the conqueror might be disposed to regard with bitter hostility; but, undecided as he was in respect to his own course, he thought it would conduce to his interests to show such ready confidence in Cæsar's goodwill. Pompeius, on the other hand, who had already transferred to his new wife Cornelia the tender affection he had been seen to bestow upon Julia, seemed to distrust the security of his own camp in his anxiety for her safety, and had sent her far away to the obscure retreat of Lesbos.¹ Cato, however, on his part, as far from the trickery of the one, as from the timidity of the other, had chosen the very crisis of his own and the public safety to marry, or rather to remarry the widow of Hortensius. Marcia had already been espoused to him at an earlier period. But the Roman law allowed excessive facility of divorce; and this licence, which his contemporaries adopted from passion, avarice, or caprice, Cato had assumed for the sake of gratifying, not himself, but his friend. Hortensius was childless; Marcia had proved herself fruitful; and the philosopher gravely transferred the mother of his children to the house-

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 66.; Dion, *xlii.* 2.

hold of the voluptuary.¹ But this second union, after answering every purpose for which it was contracted, had been dissolved by death; and the matron, however faithful she had proved to her second husband, was more proud of the name of her first.² She proposed that they should be reunited, and proved the genuineness of her devotion by the perils which she sought to share.³ The nuptials were solemn and private, as befitted the time and circumstances.⁴ Only one eye was deemed worthy of witnessing them: Brutus alone might attest the weakness or the strength of Cato.⁵

Cæsar arrived at Brundisium at the beginning of the Roman year, and he had probably been the more anxious to reach the coast without loss of time, as the season, which was really a little past mid-autumn, was still favourable for transporting his army across the sea. He had summoned twelve legions to meet him at the place of embarkation, but their numbers were far from

Cæsar crosses over to Epirus in Jan. 706.

¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 25. I have omitted some of the most extraordinary details of this transaction. Cæsar, in his satire which he designated *Anticato*, charged the philosopher with having had an eye to the great wealth which Hortensius had left to his widow; but we may trust, perhaps, to Plutarch's indignant disclaimer: *ἄμοιον γὰρ ἐστὶ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ μαλακίαν ὀνειδίζειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν αἰσχροκέρδειαν Κάτωνος* (c. 52.).

² Lucan, ii. 343.:

“Liccat tumulo scripsisse Catonis
Marcia.”

³ Lucan, ii. 346.:

“Non me lætorum sociam rebusque secundis
Accipis; in curas venio partemque laborum.
Da mihi castra sequi.”

It seems, however, that Cato left Marcia in Italy to superintend his domestic affairs. Plut. *Lc.*

⁴ Lucan, ii. 365.:

“Sicut erat, mœsti servans lugubria cultus,
Quoque modo natos hoc est amplexa maritum:
Non soliti luserc sales, nec morc Sabino
Exceptit tristis convicia festa maritus.”

⁵ Lucan, ii. 371.:

“Junguntur taciti, contentique auspice Bruto.”

complete. The losses of so many campaigns in Gaul and Iberia, and latterly the fatigue of a long and rapid march from the Ebro to the Ionian straits, had thinned the ranks of his veterans, while the troops which had been kept in quarters on the Apulian coast had suffered from its autumnal fevers, and were weak and dispirited through sickness and inaction.¹ All the vessels that could be collected for the transport of these forces would not contain more than fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, notwithstanding that the baggage was left behind; yet this small number comprised the complements of seven legions.² Before embarking, Cæsar harangued his soldiers, declaring that he was now demanding of them the last sacrifice he should have to require, and assuring them that the abandonment of their baggage should be recompensed by rich booty and a munificent largess. They replied with enthusiasm that his orders should be obeyed, be they what they might. On the second day, the fifth of January, the expedition came safely to land, near a place called Palæste.³ The pilots had selected a sheltered beach upon which their vessels could be run with safety, though surrounded on all sides by the dangerous promontories of the Ceraunian mountains. They had received orders to avoid the harbours on the coast, which were all understood to be occupied by the enemy: but the construction of the Roman galleys gave great facilities for debarkation, and for this purpose a naval

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 2.: "Multi Gallicis tot bellis defecerant, longumque iter ex Hispania magnum numerum diminuerat, et gravis autumnus in Apulia circumque Brundisium omnem exercitum valetudine tentaverat."

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 2—6.

³ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 6. The reading of the codices is Pharsalus or Pharsalia, which is evidently a mistake or corruption. Lucan (*iv.* 460.) supplies the name adopted in the text:

"Palæstinas uncis confixit arenas."

armament might avail itself of coves, creeks, and sand-banks, such as in modern times are only accessible to the light craft of the smuggler.

It cannot be supposed, however, that Cæsar trusted entirely to fortune in thus launching upon an element occupied by an overwhelming naval force. While completing their military equipments in Macedonia, his adversaries pretended to keep him at bay across a channel forty miles in width. But the winter was advancing, Cæsar's troops were scattered, he was supposed to be still absent himself in Spain; for a moment the vigilance of the Pompeian commanders was relaxed, and the gates of the East were left unguarded. Cæsar was, doubtless, aware that Bibulus, with the galleys, an hundred and ten in number, which he retained under his immediate orders, was lying inactive at Corcyra. Nor was he ignorant that another hostile squadron was stationed at Oricum, at no great distance from his destined landing-place. Either of these armaments would have sufficed to destroy his defenceless flotilla; but the police of the seas was imperfectly kept by the naval science of the ancients; their vessels were ill-adapted for cruising through variable weather; and the use of oars acted almost like steam in giving wings to weakness, and baffling the vigilance of a blockade. Bibulus was deeply mortified at an exploit, the success of which was sure to be attributed to his own remissness. He had become apprised of Cæsar's sudden arrival at Brundisium: he augured the lightning speed with which he would dash across the straits, and he hastened, though too late, to intercept him. It was not, however, too late to divide the invader's forces, and make it impossible either for a second detachment to cross over, or for the first to return. While he rushed himself to sea, he had sent orders to all his officers to issue simultaneously from their stations on

Tardy activity
of the Pom-
peian fleets.

the coast. From Corcyra to Salona the Ionian gulf was swept by their squadrons. Cæsar on the very evening of his landing despatched his lieutenant Fufius Calenus with the empty transports to thread the hostile armaments, and bring over his remaining forces from Brundisium. But, neglecting to take advantage of the night breeze, Calenus was descried by the enemy, and thirty of the returning vessels were intercepted and burnt, with their crews on board. Octavius, who commanded a portion of the Pompeian fleet, was less successful in an attack upon Salona, a stronghold of Cæsar's in Illyricum, and was compelled to retreat from before it with some loss. Bibulus continued to keep the sea, notwithstanding the approach of the stormy season, and although Cæsar's operations shut him out from nearly every port on the coast into which he might have run for shelter.¹

Pompeius was in Macedonia, and had hardly received information of his rival's unexpected landing in Epirus, while Cæsar was already reducing his fortresses and dispersing his garrisons. The citizens of Oricum and Apollonia refused to shut their gates against the consul of the republic, and compelled the Pompeian lieutenants, Torquatus and Staberius, to withdraw their forces. Several other towns soon followed this example, and, in the course of a few days, the states of Epirus sent a formal deputation to declare their submission to the invader who bore the insignia of the Roman government.² Pompeius was now in full march for Dyrrhachium, which he was exceedingly anxious to save from the enemy. The news of his repeated disasters met him at each successive stage of his advance, and such terror did the name of Cæsar strike into the minds

Pompeius moves from Thessalonica, and throws himself before Dyrrhachium.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 7—9.

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 12.

of his soldiers, that they began already to melt away from him, as they had abandoned his lieutenants in Italy the year before. Drooping and straggling, and throwing away their arms, the march of the Pompeian legions began to assume the appearance of a flight. Labienus came forward to check the progress of desertion, by taking the solemn military oath of adherence and obedience to the general. The formula was successively tendered to the principal officers, to the tribunes, to the centurions, and the legionaries. This appeal to the spirit of discipline seems to have revived the courage of the soldiery. Dyrrhachium was effectually covered by the lines behind which the Pompeians now entrenched themselves on the right bank of the Apsus; while Cæsar, finding his scanty forces insufficient to assail them, took up his position on the left to protect the towns in his rear which had submitted to him, and there resolved to pass the winter under canvas.

At this crisis, attempts were still made on each side to delude the other by negotiations. Cæsar employed the mediation of Vibullius, the Pompeian officer whom he had twice captured, first at Corfinium, and again in Spain. The terms which he offered were that each chieftain should disband his troops simultaneously, and refer the adjustment of their disputes to the senate and people; an arrangement which had by this time become more than ever impracticable. Cæsar's only object in proposing it must have been to gain time for the arrival of reinforcements. On the other hand, Bibulus and his colleague, being now excluded from almost every point of the coast, and severely harassed by the weather and want of necessaries at sea, were anxious to conclude an armistice for their own immediate convenience. But Cæsar understood their object, and

The Pompeian admirals attempt to prevent the passage of Cæsar's second division.

though Calenus was still prevented from joining him with the expected succours, he refused to listen to their proposals. Meanwhile, the fatigues of his naval campaign, joined to his excessive mortification at Cæsar having so narrowly escaped him, had completely broken the health of the Pompeian commander. He fell a sacrifice to his anxiety to redeem his character for vigilance or fidelity with the party which had entrusted to him so important a command.¹ He showed, indeed, ferocity enough to satisfy the most blood-thirsty of the faction, but he had no other claim on their approbation. The only service he had performed was to disperse his vessels up and down the coast of Epirus, so as to watch every creek and strand upon which Cæsar's second division might seek to effect a landing. Cæsar himself complained that Antonius, whom he had appointed to direct the operation, neglected more than one favourable opportunity of making the passage. He might have made a feint to draw off the enemy's attention, and have selected a point for running on shore where the numbers of his opponents would be insufficient to cope with him. Upon the death of Bibulus, the several detachments of the collective fleet seem to have been left at the disposal of their respective commanders. Pompeius was apparently too much disconcerted by the precarious position of his affairs to pay due attention to what was after all the point most important for his interests, the prevention of the junction of Cæsar's two divisions. L. Scribonius Libo, who had commanded under Bibulus a detachment of fifty ships, now took upon himself to act with this force independently. He quitted the coast of Epirus, and, crossing the straits, established a blockade of Brundisium, taking possession of the island which lay at the entrance of the harbour, and cruising before it

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 18.

with a force which alone was more numerous than any Antonius could bring against it. One great difficulty which the ancients experienced in conducting operations of this kind lay in the incapacity of their vessels for sufficient stowage of provisions and water. They were unable to keep the sea with a view to effectual observation. The numerous flotillas which still lingered along the shores of the opposite coast could not have been better employed than in ministering to the necessities of the blockading squadron. But Libo's manœuvre, far bolder and more decisive than any of Bibulus, or even of Pompeius, failed from the want of co-operation. He was deceived indeed with the idea that he could maintain himself by the possession of the little island he had seized, and even assured Pompeius that he might withdraw the rest of his fleet into port, and trust to him alone to frustrate the passage of the Cæsareans. Antonius, however, disposed his cavalry skilfully along the coast to prevent any of Libo's foragers landing in quest of water and provisions, and the Pompeian was compelled at last to abandon his position, and resort once more to the same feeble and inefficient tactics which had rendered Bibulus contemptible.¹

Some months had been consumed in these desultory manœuvres, and great must have been Cæsar's impatience at being prevented from acting more boldly by the absence of so large a portion of his forces. While in this state of suspense and comparative inactivity, his anxiety must have sorely increased on hearing of the progress of an attempt at counter-revolution in Rome and Italy. Cicero's correspondence has preserved to us the record of the zeal with which M. Cælius Rufus had advocated Cæsar's cause at the period of his invading Italy. He had used his best endeavours to cajole

Intrigues of
M. Cælius at
Rome.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* iii. 23, 24.

Cicero into acquiescence in the proconsul's views, and his old intimacy with his correspondent, and the terms of playful familiarity in which he addressed him, pointed him out as the likeliest person to sway that vacillating politician.¹ Cælius had been only a late convert to Cæsar's party. As one of the tribunes in the time of Pompeius's sole consulship, he had exerted himself in defence of Milo, and had asserted on that occasion the principles of the most violent section of the oligarchs. But he seems to have been won over to the popular side by the seductions of Curio, whom he was persuaded to accompany on the famous expedition to Cæsar's camp at Ariminum. The proconsul's blandishments may have completed the work of conversion; and from that period, as we have seen, Cælius devoted his talents, which were considerable, to the establishment of the new order of things. Cæsar had rewarded him by obtaining for him the election to the prætorship, second in dignity; the chair of the prætor of the city was occupied at the same time by C. Trebonius, whose fidelity had been longer tried, and whose services were undoubtedly more conspicuous. Cælius, witty, vain, and dissolute, was dissatisfied with this post, and sought to raise himself to higher distinctions by studying the gratification of the popular wishes.² He declared with plausible eloquence that Cæsar's enactments had not gone far enough for the relief of the needy citizens. He promised to lend all the sanction of his office to any debtor who should appeal against the decisions of his colleague, according to the tenor of the recent enactments for the adjustment of debts. He even proposed himself a new law for the greater relief of the debtor by the spoliation of his creditor. The multitude were well pleased with these

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* viii. 15—17., comp. *ad Div.* ii. 16.

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 20, 21.; Liv. *Epit.* cxi.; Dion, xlii. 23, 24.; Vell. ii. 68.

revolutionary proceedings, and it became necessary for the consul and higher magistrates at once to resist such democratical encroachments. Cælius was hurried forward on his career by the still increasing demands of the passions he had evoked. Tumults arose in the city; the consul applied to the senate for unusual powers; it was decreed that Cælius should be suspended from his functions, and the execution of this decree was enforced with a high hand, which controlled all opposition, and drove the discomfited demagogue from his chair of office. Baffled in his schemes and unprepared with resources, he now professed his intention of appealing personally to Cæsar, and under this pretence he left the city, to repair the web of his intrigues in greater security at a distance.

Though the consul had been able to maintain the peace of the city with the opportune assistance of a body of soldiers which was passing through at the time on its way into Gaul, Cælius, it appears, had persuaded himself that Cæsar's government had already fallen into general odium there, and that, with the exception of a wretched pack of money-lenders, the whole population was prepared to rise against his authority. It was only the dread, he argued, of the vengeance which Pompeius had vowed to wreak upon all who had ever submitted to his rival, that caused any delay in effecting a counter-revolution. New views of ambition began to open upon him. Instead of inviting Pompeius to hasten across the sea and recover Italy and Rome, while his enemy would be detained by the want of ships from following him, he left him to the chances of an encounter, which, from his knowledge of Cæsar's veterans, he believed would be unfavourable, if not fatal to him, while he conceived the design of seizing the prize him-

He attempts to raise an insurrection against Cæsar in Italy in conjunction with Milo.

self.¹ Milo, who, as the only political exile excepted from the late amnesty, had obvious grounds of indignation against Cæsar, had taken advantage of the disturbed state of affairs to come secretly into Italy, and call to his standard the remnant of the armed bands with which he had been wont to domineer over the factions of the city. Cælius had been allowed to leave Rome unmolested, and was already engaged in secret intrigues with this rash adventurer; but the consul had directed one of the tribunes to attend upon him and observe his movements. His resorting to Campania roused suspicion, and he was summoned back to the neighbourhood of the city; but, in deference to his noble birth and the high office which he still claimed, the watch which was kept over him was relaxed, and still more so, perhaps, after the speedy defeat of Milo before Capua. Cælius effected his escape, and followed the traces of his new confederate in the Lucanian mountains. Here Milo was striving to kindle heath and forest with the flame of predatory insurrection. At the same time he addressed his solicitations, on the one hand, to the municipal authorities in the neighbouring towns, asserting that he was acting under the direction of Pompeius and Bibulus, while he held out, on the other, to the needy and profligate the usual promises of a revolutionary agitator. But his career was speedily cut short; for in an attempt to seize the town of Cosa he was slain by the blow of a stone hurled from the walls. Soon afterwards Cælius entered Thurii unarmed; his levity prompted him, alone and defenceless, to make another effort;

¹ See a letter from Cælius to Cicero, written apparently at the moment of his leaving Rome. Cic. *ad Div.* viii. 17.: "Quod si timor vestræ crudelitatis non esset, ejecti jam pridem hinc essemus. Nam hic præter sceneratores paucos, nec homo nec ordo quisquam est, nisi Pompeianus . . . vestras copias non novi: nostri valde depugnare et facile algere et esurire consuerunt."

but when he tried to corrupt the fidelity of some Gaulish and Spanish horse whom Cæsar had stationed there, they turned round upon him with indignation and slew him. With the death of the two chieftains the seeds of this paltry insurrection were scattered to the winds.¹

While these ineffectual movements in the interest of the Optimates were in progress in Italy, their great champion still kept close in his quarters at Dyrrhachium, not venturing to trust his half-trained forces in conflict with Cæsar's veterans. The withdrawal of Libo's squadron from the coast of Apulia had left open the harbour of Brundisium. Antonius was well aware of his commander's impatience to combine all his forces together on the other side of the channel: nor was he or the other officers in command at all deficient in zeal to perform the duty expected of them. But once baffled in their attempt to effect the passage, and awed perhaps by the savage vengeance which Bibulus had wreaked upon his captives, they let slip more than one opportunity of embarking with a favourable wind. The winter was now nearly over, and with the prevalence of milder weather the Pompeian squadrons would find it easier to keep an effectual blockade. Accordingly, Cæsar sent repeated messages, urging Antonius to put to sea at all hazards. He represented that the loss of the vessels was of little consequence. If the troops could only be run ashore any where on the beach, it mattered not that the ships were exposed to the beating of the surf, or liable to be seized by the enemy.² It is related that in a transport of impatience, for his situation was now becoming every

Cæsar attempts to cross the Adriatic in a violent tempest.

¹ Cæsar and Dion, *ll. cc.* The story is told with some discrepancy by these two writers. The narrative of the latter has the appearance of greater accuracy in detail.

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 25.

day more critical, he determined to hazard the passage in person, and that too in the face of a violent tempest. This daring enterprise he was obliged to conceal from his own soldiers, and in a private vessel of only twelve oars he braved the chances of shipwreck or of capture. The sailors, however, could make no way against the fury of the winds and waves, and his life was probably saved by yielding to the storm. The undertaking was bold to the verge of rashness. Cæsar himself, it must be observed, does not mention it, and we may suspect that the circumstances have been distorted or coloured by successive rhetoricians, with the wish to trace throughout the exploits of the most successful of adventurers that implicit reliance upon fortune, which is all that ordinary men can discover in the most consummate calculations of the statesman or the warrior. Perhaps the whole story was invented to introduce the brilliant apophthegm which Cæsar is said to have addressed to the dismayed sailors: *Fear nothing; you carry Cæsar and his fortunes.*¹

At last Antonius embarked his forces, the men and officers being equally clamorous to be carried across. They consisted of four legions and eight hundred cavalry. The south wind, with which he sailed, was not favourable for shaping his course for Oricum. As the breeze freshened, his vessels were wafted considerably to the northward, and passed off Apollonia and Dyrrhachium.² They were descried by Coponius, who commanded a Rhodian squadron in the service of Pompeius at the latter port. He immediately gave them chase,

Antonius effects the passage with the second division.

¹ Florus is the first to tell the story, and records this celebrated saying (iv. 2.). Appian (ii. 57.), Dion (xli. 46.), Plutarch (*Cæs.* 38.), repeat all the circumstances with little variation. Lucan (v. 577, &c.) amplifies them with some of his wildest hyperboles.

² *Cæs. B. C.* iii. 26. foll

and his swift war-vessels, though only sixteen in number, were more than a match both in speed and strength for the transports in which the Cæsarean legions were embarked. The wind, however, now blew so strongly as to enable Antonius to keep his start of the pursuer, and enter the haven of Nymphæum, which lay some hours' sail to the north of Dyrrhachium. The mouth of this harbour directly faced the south, and if it was easy for Antonius to make it, it would not be more difficult for Coponius to follow. But the wind suddenly shifted to the south-west, and drove the Pompeian vessels with violence upon the coast. Here they were all dashed to pieces, their crews falling into the hands of the enemy. Cæsar, however, treated them with studied kindness, and he takes care to inform us that he sent them safe home to their native island, from which they had been summoned to maintain a cause in which they took little interest. Very different was the fate of the complement of one of Antonius's vessels. Two ships of the squadron had parted company with the main body in the night, and came to anchor off Lissus, three miles to the south of Nymphæum. Here Otacilius Crassus commanded for Pompeius. He surrounded them with a swarm of boats and transports, and invited them to surrender. One of the two, which carried a division of two hundred and twenty men belonging to a newly-raised legion, promptly obeyed, under a promise that the men's lives should be spared. But the Pompeian officer carried out the system of his colleagues without regard to mercy or good faith, and caused them all to be massacred. The complement of the other, which was a battalion of veterans, maintained their courage in the last extremity. Though suffering from fatigue and seasickness, and entirely ignorant of the strength of their enemies, they ran their ship on shore, and threw up a hasty entrenchment, behind which they repulsed

the attack of the Pompeians, and were enabled eventually to escape to the camp of the main body. Crassus had not the means of offering any resistance to the large force now collected so near him. He retired from Lissus, which immediately opened its gates to Antonius. The transports were sent across the gulf once more to bring over a detachment which was still expected, and Cæsar was speedily apprised of the place and circumstances of his lieutenant's landing.

The course of Antonius's fleet had been observed by both armies in their quarters on the Manœuvres of the hostile armies. Apsus. Both were equally eager to follow it; the Pompeians with the view of protecting Dyrrhachium, the Cæsareans in the hope of at last effecting the long-desired junction of their forces. Pompeius, on the right bank of the river, was able to move without delay, while his enemy, to whom the stream offered a considerable impediment, was obliged to seek a ford higher up. Pompeius hoped to surprise Antonius, and conducted his march with secrecy as well as speed: but his movements were discovered to the new comers by the natives of the country, and they had time to entrench themselves, while they sent messengers to inform their general of their arrival and position. On the second day Cæsar made his appearance, and Pompeius, not venturing to expose himself at the same time to an attack both in front and rear, hastily withdrew to a place called Asparagium¹, where he found a suitable spot to establish his fortified lines:

Even when his forces were so much less numerous, Cæsar blockades Pompeius within his lines at Petra. Cæsar had been eager to press the enemy to a battle. He had now doubled his available numbers, and had succeeded in dislodging Pompeius from the position he had selected to cover Dyrrhachium, so that he had every reason

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 30. The locality of Asparagium is not accurately known. It was on the left bank of the Genusus, and within one

to anticipate compelling him soon to fight at a much greater disadvantage. With this view he followed the steps of the retreating army until he arrived before their new encampment, where he drew out his legions in order of battle, and vainly hoped that his challenge would be accepted. But Pompeius kept close within his lines. Cæsar again broke up from his position, and, making a circuit to disguise the object of his movement, threw himself before the walls of Dyrrhachium in such a manner as to cut off all communication between the city and the camp of its defenders. Pompeius had attempted to anticipate this manœuvre, but his cautious circumspection was baffled by the activity of his adversary's movements. Firmly resolved as he was not to commit his half-trained battalions to a premature engagement with their veteran enemy, it was necessary to seize a position in the neighbourhood, lodged securely in which he might watch their operations and profit by circumstances. A cliff, on the sea-coast, distinguished from its bold projection with the appellation of Petra or the Rock¹, offered a favourable post for the development of these defensive tactics. It stood at a short distance from Dyrrhachium, which contained the stores and arsenals of the republican army; it possessed certain natural advantages for defence, and the anchorage it commanded was extensive and tolerably sheltered. At this spot his troops might rely upon the supply of all their wants from the sea²; but, secure though he was of this element, Pompeius made himself independent of distant resources by drawing military lines in front of his position, fifteen miles in length, and thus inclosing in a strong entrenchment

day's march of Dyrrhachium, as appears from Cæsar, *B. C.* iii. 76. The reading (iii. 41.), "in Macedoniam," must certainly be corrupt.

¹ Lucan, vi. 16.:

"Quemque vocat collem Taulantius incola Petram."

² Plut. *Pomp.* 65: πάντα πρὸν ἕνεμον Πομπηίου.

a large tract of cultivated soil. To these limits, however, his bold and unwearied assailant now determined to confine him. Cæsar planted himself firmly in front of the Pompeian position, and actually carried a counter-rampart parallel to the whole sweep of its defences, through an arc not less than seventeen miles in length, from one extreme point on the coast to the other. These extraordinary works were not raised on either side without frequent skirmishes. The forces of Pompeius were the most numerous, and the extent of his works was less, so that he was able to bring greater strength to bear in any attacks he chose to make upon the enemy. He was also superior in light troops, whose services were eminently useful in this kind of engagement; and his success in these desultory conflicts so encouraged him, that he was reported to have declared he would consent to forfeit all claim to military skill if his adversary escaped without fatal disaster from the position he had so rashly taken up. His boast, as we shall see, was not far from being fully accomplished. Nevertheless, Cæsar, though sometimes repulsed from the positions he attempted to seize, and much harassed and impeded in the progress of his operations, completed his chain of towers connected with ditch and rampart from shore to shore, and thus presented to the world the extraordinary spectacle of a superior force, commanded by the most experienced general of the age, blockaded in the centre of the country he had himself chosen for the campaign.¹

Character and authenticity of the Commentaries on the civil war attributed to Cæsar.

As the crisis of the great contest approaches, we become naturally more anxious to assure ourselves of the fidelity of the narrative before us. This narrative is given in full detail in the Commentaries of the principal actor in the events themselves: the works of

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 42—44.; Dion, xli. 50.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 61.; Lucan, vi. 29—63.

later writers add nothing to the particulars, but tend generally to confirm his account. Cæsar's history of the Civil War has indeed come down to us incomplete; the text in several places is very corrupt; and its geographical inaccuracies are many and palpable. The account even of the military operations is occasionally confused and inconsistent; but perhaps the most surprising defect of the work is its want of breadth and largeness of view. It contains no general survey of the state of parties and affairs, so essential for understanding the political bearing even of the military transactions; and the discovery it professes to make of the author's own motives and objects must be pronounced for the most part frivolous and unworthy of the occasion. The genuineness of the work is nevertheless generally admitted.¹ If we are justly disappointed at the narrowness of the sphere over which the writer's observation ranges, compared

¹ The question of the genuineness of the first seven books of the Commentaries on the Gallic and the three books on the Civil War seems to lie in a narrow compass. The ancients understood that Cæsar wrote commentaries on these wars, and that he compiled ephemerides, or memoranda, of his military actions generally; also that he left some imperfect notices of the Alexandrian and African campaigns, which were reduced to the form of commentaries by another hand. My belief is that the Ephemerides were the rough notes from which Cæsar himself either wrote, or dictated, or superintended the composition of the Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars, and that the same notes furnished the groundwork for the subsequent compilation by others of the eighth Gallic book, and those on the Alexandrian, African, and perhaps the Spanish campaigns. But that the seven books *B. G.* and three *B. C.* were written by the same person I can hardly doubt. The style and still more the character of the two works seem to be nearly identical, the only difference being such as one might expect, that the latter is written with a little less care and appearance of literary ambition. The manifest errors it contains can only be attributed to corruption of the text. To suppose that Cæsar wrote commentaries, and that the next generation suffered them to be entirely lost and superseded by the writings of any other person, whether the genuine memoirs of a contemporary, or either the acknowledged compilation or the fictitious exercitation of a later age, is the last resource of the morbid scepticism which cannot suffer any author to say more or less than harmonizes with its own gratuitous canons of historical criticism.

with the vast extent of view which he might have opened to us, we may, on the other hand, esteem ourselves supremely fortunate in the possession of a record which bears, on the whole, the stamp of truth and candour more conspicuously than the writings perhaps of any other party politician. The contemporary whose impeachment of its fidelity has had the greatest weight with later critics was notorious, it should be remembered, for trivial and perhaps spiteful detraction.¹ In the relation of minor events the author, it may be conceded, has occasionally used some artifice to disguise his failures, but seldom or never to enhance the merit of his successes. But I have abstained generally from questioning the accuracy and fairness of minute details, as disagreeable both to the writer and the reader where there is so little room for criticising them with any certainty. In some places I have tacitly corrected what seemed to me errors, or smoothed over apparent inconsistencies; but in all the main features of the narrative I am content to rely on the authority before me, leaving it to the reader's own judgment to supply what he may think imperfect, or apply a corrective to what may appear to him partial.²

¹ C. Asinius Pollio, one of Cæsar's officers, who wrote a history of the civil wars. For his remarks on Cæsar, Cicero, Livy and Sallust, see Suet. *Jul.* 56., *Ill. Gramm.* 10.; Quintil. i. 5. 56., viii. 1. 3., xii. 1. 22.

² Among the modern works which have lain open before me in studying the events of the Civil War, has been that of the late lamented Arnold, who wrote the biography of Julius Cæsar for the *Encycl. Metropolitana*. In vigour and perspicuity of narrative this early essay is not inferior to the more mature and better known historical compositions of its distinguished author; but I cannot help thinking that, at a later period of his life, he would have considerably modified the moral and political views it exhibits. I detect some places in which the author's prejudice against Cæsar seems to have misled him in the statement of facts, and still more where he appears to me to have unduly disparaged his motives and exalted those of his opponents. But on a question of pure literary criticism any opinion of Arnold's must be of very great weight, and I much regret that we do not possess the deliberate judgment of his later

The manœuvres of two Roman armies in front of one another may be compared to the single combats of the mail-clad knights of the Middle Ages. Equal strength, arms and skill might render victory on either side impossible. When every artifice had been exhausted to entice the one or the other into a false move, it was only by superior patience and endurance that the conflict could be decided. Such might seem to be the respective position of the enemies now confronting each other. The one had posted himself behind his impregnable entrenchments (for the entrenchments of the Roman legionary were quite impregnable to assailants not superior in numbers or military art), and the other had drawn a line of circumvallation around his antagonist, and held him almost a prisoner within his own works. If the one army was superior in numbers, this advantage was fully counterbalanced at the outset by its inferior discipline and self-confidence. But these were defects which Pompeius relied on time to supply. He resolved to decline a battle, and the longer the enemy persevered in his blockade, the more certain was he of being enabled in the end to cope with him successfully.¹ Meanwhile, he abided with impassive serenity the ultimate victory of which he felt assured. To Cæsar, however, the advantage was direct and

Review of the calculations on which Cæsar planned his operations.

years as to the genuineness of the Commentaries on the Civil War, which in the article referred to he appears to discredit with undue precipitation.

¹ The Roman officers devoted long and patient attention to exercising their recruits preparatory to leading them into battle. The skill, endurance, and confidence of the individuals were much more important in ancient warfare, particularly on the system practised by the Romans, than in modern. The same time and care were bestowed on restoring the discipline and moral feelings of an army which had been dispirited by defeat. Vegetius (iii. 10.) gives minute directions for the requisite exercises: labour in the trenches was one element in the system. It was long remembered as a maxim of Scipio Africanus: "Fodientes luto inquinari debere qui madere hostium sanguine noluissent." Flor. ii. 18.

immediate, of standing forth in the eye of the world as the assailant and challenger of the once boastful hero who now seemed to shrink, craven and crest-fallen, behind his battlements. This attitude of defiance was in itself an omen of success. At Rome the dictator's friends appealed to it as a proof of his intrinsic superiority, and the waverers could no longer gainsay them.¹ Close at hand the effect was still more signal. Though Epirus was the theatre which Pompeius had himself chosen for the contest, it would seem that his hold upon the favour of the natives was by no means strong. Cæsar, far from his own proper resources, was able to draw largely upon the goodwill of the provincials, many of whose towns had surrendered to him with every appearance of alacrity. At the same time he had taken measures to keep in check the armies which Pompeius was assembling in his rear. The forces of Scipio in Macedonia were confronted by the dictator's lieutenants with an adequate armament, and, from the Ionian shore to the Ægean, the fear or favour of the natives was conciliated to him, for the most part, by the brilliancy of his recent combinations. Precarious, therefore, as his position was, with a superior army in front, and an unsecured country in the rear, his game was played on a masterly calculation of the chances in his favour, and it may be confidently asserted that as a military operation it deserved success.

The first chance which entered into the great captain's calculation was that of provoking the enemy to engage with forces as yet untrained and dispirited. In this he was disappointed. Pompeius kept himself closely within

Pompeius
keeps steadily
within his
lines.

¹ See a letter of Dolabella to his father-in-law, Cicero (*Cic. ad Div. ix. 9.*), urging him to espouse the side of the dictator, written just at this time. "Animadvertis Cn. Pompeium nec nominis sui nec rerum gestarum gloria, neque etiam regum atque nationum clientelis, quas ostentare crebro solebat, esse tutum: et hoc etiam,

his lines, while the blockading army was suffering, as he knew, from a scarcity of provisions. But the sturdy veterans had often lived before, and fought too, on worse and scantier fare.¹ They threw their coarse, unpalatable loaves into the quarters of the Pompeians, that they might know the spirit of the men they had to deal with. Meanwhile, with the advance of spring the green crops began to ripen, and the enthusiasm of the Cæsareans in their general's cause warmed still more at the prospect of greater plenty and a more familiar diet. They declared they would gnaw the bark from the trees before they would suffer Pompeius to escape out of their hands. Nor was the condition of the besieged much better. Though supplied with provisions by means of the fleet, they were in great want of water, for Cæsar had dammed up or turned the watercourses which ran from the surrounding heights into the space enclosed by his lines, and the Pompeians were driven to have recourse to the wells which they sank in the sands and marshes of the sea-shore.² At the last extremity Pompeius might no doubt have effected his escape on board his vessels³; but in so doing he would have broken up all his plans, he would have incurred infinite disgrace, and his vigilant enemy would hardly have allowed him to execute such a movement without

quod infimo cuique contigit, illi non posse contingere, ut honeste effugere possit, pulso Italia, amissis Hispaniis, capto exercitu veterano, circumvallato nunc denique."

¹ Duruy (*Hist. des Romains*, ii. 495.) observes on this occasion: "On a remarqué que nos soldats manquaient de vivres quand ils gagnèrent les plus belles victoires des dernières guerres."

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 49.: "Omnia enim flumina atque omnes rivos qui ad mare pertinebant Cæsar aut averterat aut magnis operibus obstruxerat." The latter operation is hardly conceivable; besides that within so wide a circuit there must have been numerous springs and streams, as Lucan, only too magniloquently, observes:

"Flumina tot cursus illine exorta fatigant,
Illie mersa, suos."

³ See Dolabella's letter to Cæsar (*Cic. ad Dir.* ix. 9.).

scaling his undefended ramparts, and cutting off at least a portion of his followers.

It is remarkable, however, that Pompeius, whose fame as a naval conqueror was almost equal to his military reputation, should have availed himself so little of his superiority at sea throughout this campaign. The co-operation of land and sea armaments was little understood by the Romans. We have seen how ill the fleet was seconded in its attempt to blockade the harbour of Brundisium; and now, in its turn, it seems to have contributed very inefficiently to the support of the land forces within the lines of Petra. But it is impossible to suppose that Cæsar, who had combined his land and sea forces so skilfully both in his contest with the Veneti and in the siege of Massilia, would have made so little use of this important arm if the superiority had been on his own side. As it was, however, the little flotilla in which he had run his troops over was completely cut off. He had laid it up at Oricum, where he caused the harbour to be obstructed by sinking a vessel in its mouth, and he also stationed there a garrison of three cohorts. But Cnæus, the spirited son of the great Pompeius, made a dashing attack upon this stronghold, cut out four of the vessels, and burnt the rest. After this exploit he made an attempt upon Lissus, and succeeded in entering that port also and burning a number of transports or merchant vessels, but was repulsed from the walls by the bravery of the citizens, who were devoted to Cæsar's cause.¹

A naval armament which required a military guard for its defence, was an incumbrance to Cæsar rather than a source of strength, and probably he was not much discomposed by the loss of it. He was now thrown

Cæsar establishes communications with Ætolia, Thessaly, and Macedonia.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* iii. 39, 40.

entirely upon the disposition of the provinces themselves for the means of supplying his army, and, if requisite, of recruiting it. It was necessary to detach various bodies of troops to secure the co-operation of the natives and Roman citizens, and counterwork the influence which the enemy might still exert upon them. With this view L. Cassius Longinus led the twenty-seventh legion, with two hundred cavalry, into Thessaly, where Cæsar's interests were maintained by a strong party under the direction of a young patrician of the highest rank, named Petreius. A smaller force was despatched into Ætolia, under C. Calvisius Sabinus, to provide supplies for the camp before Petra. At the same time Cn. Domitius Calvinus took the great eastern road leading across the Candavian mountains into Macedonia, where there was a considerable Cæsarean party, which had already invited assistance against the Pompeians.¹ This detachment consisted of two complete legions and five hundred cavalry, for as Macedonia lay in the direct route from the eastern provinces, it was in this region that the advance of Scipio required to be arrested.

Scipio was zealous in the cause of his son-in-law, nor was there any one of the senatorial chiefs whose personal interests were more deeply involved in its success. He was a man of resolution, also, and not deficient in military conduct; yet his proceedings in the command of the eastern provinces were marked by great want of activity. He withdrew every battalion that could be spared from the frontiers of the empire, leaving them almost undefended in the presence of the formidable Parthians. He recruited his legions among the provincials of Syria and Asia Minor, and gradually assembled his

Scipio advances with his legions from Syria, lingers for a time in Asia Minor, and arrives at last in Macedonia.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 34, 35. 55.

whole force at Pergamus, in Phrygia, where he established his head-quarters for some months. His troops were for the most part fully trained to war, so that the delay in his movements could not be attributed to the necessity of devoting time to exercising them. Even had this been the case, he might have led them into Epirus, and thus have united the two great divisions of the Pompeian armies before Cæsar's arrival on the coast. He may have pleaded, perhaps, in excuse for his neglect, the reluctance of the eastern legions to be led against their own countrymen, and their mortification at being required to abandon the interests of the republic in those parts to the mercy of an insolent enemy. It was only by giving up to them, if Cæsar may be believed, the plunder of various cities in Asia, that the proconsul first debauched and so bound them to his service.¹ But it is more probable that Scipio was intriguing to secure his influence with this division of the army, to enable him to claim a share in the command of the combined forces. Accordingly, he proceeded to ingratiate himself with his soldiers by severe exactions upon the subject provinces. His officers were clamorous; they declared, not untruly, that in leaving Rome they had abandoned their personal means of subsistence, and they demanded a full compensation for their sacrifices in the spoil of the provinces in which they were quartered. Every personage of rank and influence was propitiated by the lucrative government of some city or district. The maintenance of a large and licentious army in the midst of a wealthy and feeble population may, indeed, suffice to tell its own tale. It requires no statement of the historian to convince us that the proconsul himself, his retinue, his officers and his soldiery, vied with each other in oppressing the un-

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 32.

fortunate provincials. Yet Scipio could not shake off the yoke of military obedience. He had devoted to plunder the temple of Ephesus, a shrine of almost unparalleled wealth, and had assembled the senators and principal officers upon the spot to apportion the treasures among them, when peremptory orders arrived from Pompeius to join him without delay.¹ The despatch contained, perhaps, bitter reflections upon the character of his proceedings, which could not fail to excite displeasure and alarm in the more politic commander. The greedy expectants were dismissed ungratified, and the temple was saved. Scipio now summoned his troops to active service. He crossed the Bosphorus, and was pursuing the great road westward, which led through Thessalonica and Pella, when he learned that Calvinus was strongly posted in his front in the valley of Haliacmon, while, at the same time, the more circuitous route through Thessaly was occupied with a smaller detachment by Longinus.

His advance thus intercepted, Scipio acted with great vigour and promptitude. He approached within twenty miles of his opponent, as if with the purpose of fighting, and then, leaving only a handful of men under Favonius to amuse him, turned sharply to the left, crossed the Haliacmon, and pushed on rapidly over the mountain frontier of Thessaly to cut off the division of Longinus before it could receive succour.² But Calvinus was quickly apprised of his

Undecisive
operations in
Macedonia.

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* iii. 33.

² Col. Leake supposes Calvinus to have been posted at the modern Satista on the left bank of the Haliacmon, and Scipio to have crossed that river at Servia (near the ancient Æane in the common maps). In my first edition I had described the opponents as meeting near Pella. I see now, however, the improbability of Calvinus advancing so far to the east, and I also infer from the expression: "nullo in loco Macedoniæ moratus," that Scipio must have nearly traversed that country before he came in front of his adversary. (1852.)

manœuvre, and, knowing that Favonius was unsupported, advanced without a moment's delay to attack him. Cassius had already moved in retreat, and Scipio dared not follow him and leave Favonius in such apparent jeopardy. He retraced his steps with reluctance, and rescued his lieutenant at the moment when the enemy was about to fall upon him. But with all his forces reunited he was still indisposed to meet Domitius in the field. His retirement behind entrenchments was hailed by his opponents as nearly equivalent to a defeat, for, in the wavering state of opinion among the provincials, the party which maintained the most confident demeanour was sure to carry off the palm of popular favour. Some skirmishes ensued, with various success; but, on the whole, the two armies continued watching each other, without coming to any decisive action, while the course of events was unfolding far more important results under the immediate eye of the great rivals.¹

While these movements were in progress, however, Cæsar had detached another small division under Fufius Calenus to promote his interests in Achaia.² The senate had entrusted that province to Appius Claudius, whose zeal for the cause of the nobles was by no means equalled either by his judgment or activity. He abandoned the plain duties before him to inquire idly into the secrets of futurity. The champion of antiquated political forms took counsel at the shrine of an effete superstition. The oracle of Delphi had fallen into oblivion or contempt in the general decay of faith, or on the discovery of its profligate corruption. Whatever credit might still attach to their pretensions to divine inspiration, its hierophants were no longer the confederates or the creatures of

Appius
Claudius con-
sults the ora-
cle of Delphi.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 36—38.

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 55.

the statesman. They were roused from the languid enjoyment of ample revenues and traditional dignity by the perilous compliment now paid to their obsolete functions. Alarmed and bewildered, they sought to disclaim the invidious responsibility: *the destinies of Rome, they said, were recorded once for all in the verses of the Sybil: the conflagration of their temple by the Gauls had choked the cave with cinders, and stifled the voice of the god: he who spurned from his shrine the profane and unrighteous, found none to address in these degenerate days.* But all these evasions were vain. Appius demanded the event of the war, and pertinaciously claimed a reply. The priestess took her seat on the fatal tripod, inhaled the intoxicating vapours, and at last delivered the response which her prompters deemed the most likely to gratify the intruder: *Thou, Appius, hast no part in the civil wars: thou shalt possess the hollow of Eubœa.* The proconsul was satisfied. He determined to abandon all active measures for the party which had entrusted the province to him, and fondly hoped that, in retiring to the deep recesses of the Euripus, where the sea rushes through the gorge between Aulis and Chalcis, the waves of civil war would pass by him, and leave him in undisturbed possession of his island sovereignty. But he had scarcely reached the spot when he was seized with fever, and the oracle was triumphantly fulfilled by his death and burial on the rock-bound shore.¹ From this time the interests of the nobles met with no fostering care throughout the province of Achaia; and, on the approach of Calenus, the Pompeians found themselves so weak, that they abandoned all Greece north of the isthmus, and contented themselves with fortifying the access to the Peloponnesus by land,

His delusion
and death.

Cæsar occupies
Achaia.

¹ Val. Max. i. 8. 10. ; Lucan, v. 122. foll.

the coast being secured by the undisputed supremacy of their naval armaments. It would seem that by this time Cæsar had established his interests on a solid foundation throughout the provinces from Epirus to Thrace, and from Illyricum to the Gulf of Corinth. He had restored the balance of power between himself and his rival upon the very theatre of war which the latter had chosen, and which he had had a whole year to fortify and secure.

The military operations which were conducted during this interval before the walls of Operations before Petra. Petra were of so complicated a character that, in the absence of local knowledge, and with no other guide than the Commentaries, which at this juncture are both obscure and defective, it would answer no purpose to attempt to describe them in detail. Skirmishes were constantly occurring throughout the whole extent of the lines. Cæsar enumerates the occurrence of not less than six in a single day; and in these earlier engagements it would appear that the advantage generally rested with his own side. One circumstance which he mentions in regard to them is curious, nor does there seem any reason to suspect him of misrepresenting it. It was found, he says, after a series of these petty combats, that two thousand of the Pompeians had fallen, while of his own men only twenty had been killed; on the other hand, of those engaged in a certain position not one escaped without a wound. If any inference can be drawn from so remarkable a disparity of loss, it would seem to show the great superiority of the Cæsareans in the use of their weapons, and is a striking proof of the advantage which the well-trained veteran derived from his superior skill in the warfare of those times. But if these repeated engagements gave occasion for the display of more than usual valour and devotion on the part of Cæsar's veterans, and one of them could exhibit his shield pierced in one

hundred and twenty places¹, they served, nevertheless, at the same time to exercise the Pompeian recruits in the use of their arms, and to raise them gradually to a level with their presumptuous assailants. There was one part of Cæsar's works which had not been completed. He was conscious that, with the command of the sea, Pompeius could turn his besieger's flank and attack him in the rear, by landing troops at a point outside his own lines. To provide against such a movement, Cæsar drew a second line of entrenchments from the shore parallel to his principal line, leaving a certain interval between them, and of such a length that, in order to double them, the assailant would have to penetrate inland a considerable distance from his ships.² But, to carry out this mode of defence, it was necessary to draw a transverse line along the coast to connect the first rampart with the second. This lateral intrenchment had not been completed, and, accordingly, there remained an open space between the two lines, into which Pompeius was able to throw a body of men from his vessels. This detachment not only made good its landing, but found the Cæsareans unprepared, and working at the intrenchments without their arms. It would seem that Cæsar's numbers were not adequate, especially after their late reductions, to carry out works of such immense magnitude, or to defend them when completed. In this quarter his troops were routed and thrown into confusion. He was compelled to withdraw them from the ground on which they were posted and content himself with the construction of a new encampment to confront the enemy, who had thus established themselves in a

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 53. This was the centurion Scæva, whose prowess, as recorded by Cæsar, Suetonius and Appian, to set aside the hyperboles of Lucan, was more like that of a hero of romance than of a military veteran, according to modern ideas.

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 63.

position in the rear of his trenches. The besiegers were much disheartened at the unexpected vigour which their opponents had exhibited, and their general strove in vain to rally their confidence. He was himself aware that his position was lost almost beyond recovery, for the connexion between the different parts of his immense lines was dislocated, and the ground, intersected by so many walls and trenches, presented serious impediments to the rapid movement and concentration of his forces. His eagle eye discerned one Pompeian division separated from the main body and unsupported. He moved with a very superior body against it; but the difficulties of the ground baffled all his combinations; his men, dispirited and out of breath, straggling up to the object of their attack, were repulsed with steady gallantry, and, when a larger force came to the rescue of the Pompeians, were completely discomfited, and driven back in confusion to their lines.¹

Discomfiture
of Cæsar.

The rout and disorder of the vanquished party were so complete, that Pompeius could only imagine that their rapid flight was a feint to lure him on to incautious pursuit. He abstained from pressing his advantage²; indeed the impediments of the ground would have retarded his advance, while it favoured his opponent's well-known ability in rallying his broken ranks. He had gained, indeed, a complete victory, for it was now impossible for Cæsar to hold his position. Pompeius had fully carried out the plans he had in view from the first, for he had steadily refused to be drawn pre-

Triumph of
Pompeius's
military skill.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 69, 70.; Frontin. *Stratagem.* iii. 17. 4.; Orosius (vi. 15.) here supplies what was required to account for this extraordinary rout of the Cæsarean veterans.

² He is said to have been dissuaded by Labienus: but Cæsar himself was reported to have acknowledged that the war might have been brought to a close that day if the enemy had known how to use his victory. Appian. *B.C.* ii. 62.

maturely into a decisive engagement; he had trained his men at leisure, and had at last thrown them upon their besiegers with equal confidence and superior numbers. He now broke triumphantly through the toils with which his enemy had surrounded him, and his fortunes seemed to emerge with all their former brilliancy from the cloud which so lately obscured them. When Cato, indeed, beheld the bodies of a thousand citizens extended on the ground he covered his face and wept.¹ But with this single exception, both the general and his officers now abandoned themselves to unbounded exultation. All the flattering hopes which had sustained them through the winter of soon returning to Rome to satiate their vengeance or their cupidity, damped as they had been by the course events had recently taken, now returned in their original freshness. They made no account of the disadvantages under which Cæsar had fought, and claimed the victory as the reward of their own valour and conduct. Pompeius alone had any apprehension of the result of a general engagement, to which his adherents now looked forward with impatience. In the midst of his triumph he exhibited signs of moderation which they ascribed only to pusillanimity. He accepted indeed the title of Imperator with which the victorious legions saluted him; but on this, which was perhaps the first occasion of that honourable distinction being awarded in a civil war, he declined to adopt the usual insignia by which it was accompanied, and wreathed neither his despatches nor his fasces with laurel. But his followers had no such scruples: their leader probably had not the power, if even he had the will, to restrain them in the display of their arrogance and violence. Labienus was particularly anxious to distinguish himself among his new friends.

Exultation
and violence
of his parti-
zans.

¹ Zonaras, *Annal.* x. 8.

He demanded and obtained of Pompeius the unfortunate men who had been made prisoners in the late engagement. Upbraiding them ironically with cowardice and desertion of their ranks, he ordered them all to be put to the sword in the presence of the applauding Pompeians.¹

But the gain of a victory was not sufficient to counterbalance the loss of time and reputation which Pompeius had submitted to undergo. One month earlier the defeat of Cæsar would have been his destruction, for he had then secured no friends to favour him in his retreat, and no second field on which to develop the resources of his genius. But now looking calmly around him, he saw that it was necessary to withdraw from the seaboard, and remove the war to a wider theatre in Macedonia or Thessaly. There he could unite all his forces and reconstruct the plan of the campaign. With unabated alacrity he prepared to execute this new project. The sick were sent forward, in the first instance, together with the baggage, under the escort of a single legion. The rest of the army left the camp in successive detachments, and Cæsar himself, having confronted his victorious enemy to the last, followed his advancing legions with such celerity, as to overtake and combine his march with them.

The destination of the army, in the first instance, was Apollonia; for it was there that Cæsar had made arrangements for the care of his wounded, and there lay the treasure which was amassed for the pay of the legionaries. From thence he despatched letters of exhortation to his allies, explaining the real state of his affairs, while he advanced detachments to occupy the most important points on the sea-coast. His first

Cæsar moves towards Thessaly.

He anticipates the various plans the enemy may adopt.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 71 : "Interrogans, solerentne veterani milites fugere, in omnium conspectu interficit."

anxiety was to effect a junction of the main body of his troops with Calvinus.¹ He calculated that if, by such a movement, he could draw Pompeius from his lines at Petra to protect Scipio from the combined forces of the Cæsareans, he should find an opportunity for compelling him to engage. But if Pompeius should avail himself of the retreat of his antagonist to recross the Adriatic², it was then his intention to march through Illyricum with his whole army, and confront the enemy in Cisalpine Gaul, if not before Rome itself. If, as a third alternative, Pompeius should prefer keeping close to his present quarters, and forming successively the sieges of Oricum, Lissus and Apollonia, in order to cut him off from the sea, and deprive him of all succour from Italy, Cæsar then contemplated advancing against Scipio in Macedonia, and thus forcing the generalissimo of the senate to hasten to his colleague's relief.

Cæsar sent forward despatches to notify his approach to Calvinus, and to convey the necessary instructions for his guidance. But the pompous announcement of their victory which the conquerors had circulated in all directions, had so imposed upon the inhabitants of the intervening districts, that they considered the baffled cause as lost, and were eager to conciliate the victors by intercepting his messengers. Calvinus, meanwhile, after keeping his ground for a considerable time in front of Scipio on the Haliacmon, had been compelled to withdraw by the want of provisions, and had fallen back upon the road to Dyrrhachium, as far as Heraclea, a town on the frontiers of Macedonia, at the foot of the Candavian mountains. He supposed that,

Cæsar effects a junction with the division of Calvinus on the frontiers of Epirus and Thessaly.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 75. foll.

² This was the advice of Afranius, but Pompeius did not choose to withdraw so far from his Eastern allies. Appian, *B.C.* ii. 65.

in making this retrograde movement, he was only approaching nearer to the base of Cæsar's operations, and rendering a junction with him more sure, whatever fortune might befall his general's arms in Epirus. But Cæsar, by the circuit he was compelled to make in order to visit Apollonia, had abandoned to his adversary the direct route into Macedonia; and this was the line upon which Pompeius was already advancing, the noise of the breaking up of Cæsar's camp having advertised him of his sudden retreat. It was by accident only that Calvinus became apprised of the danger gathering in his rear. Certain Allobrogians, who had recently deserted from Cæsar to his opponent at Petra, happened to fall in with the scouts sent out by Calvinus to collect information. Though now arrayed on different sides, yet from old habits of familiarity they did not scruple to enter into converse with one another, and the retreat of Cæsar in one direction, together with the advance of Pompeius on the other, were disclosed just in time to allow Calvinus to break up his camp and set out in a southerly direction to meet his general. The Pompeians arrived at his deserted quarters only four hours after he had quitted them; but he was already beyond the reach of pursuit, and the two great divisions of the Cæsarean army effected their junction at Æginium, on the confines of Epirus and Thessaly.

From this point Cæsar advanced to Gomphi, a town which had lately volunteered to place itself under the banner of his lieutenants, but which now, excited by the exaggerated report of his disasters, shut its gates against him, and sent pressing messages both to Scipio and Pompeius to come to its relief. Scipio, however, had withdrawn as far as Larissa, and Pompeius had not yet entered Thessaly. The activity of Cæsar's operations was such as to prevent the possibility of aid being rendered to the devoted city. Arriving before the walls

Cæsar fixes his quarters in the plain of Thessaly.

in the morning, he had prepared all the requisite works and machinery for the assault by three o'clock in the afternoon, and carried the place by storm the same evening. To reward the energy of his soldiers, and at the same time to inspire a salutary sense of his undiminished power, he gave up the town to pillage: but this was for a moment only, for he was immediately on his march again, and appeared straightway before Metropolis, which took warning by the fate of its neighbour, and surrendered without a blow. All the towns of Thessaly, except Larissa, followed this example without delay, thus giving Cæsar complete possession of the broad champaign country watered by the Peneus and its tributaries. Throughout this fertile region the corn was abundant and now nearly ripe. Cæsar had no difficulty in maintaining his soldiers there, and he now confined his movements to the plain southward of the Enipeus, deliberately awaiting the expected attack.¹

Cæsar had directed his advance upon the route which traverses the southern part of Thessaly, abandoning any attempt to prevent the junction of the two main divisions of the enemy's forces, which, when thus combined at Larissa, formed an aggregate of imposing magnitude. Pompeius now condescended or was compelled to share with his father-in-law the honours of the chief command. But the responsibility still attached to him alone, and the impatient senators felt assured that he purposely protracted the war, to enjoy the supremacy in the camp which must be relinquished in the city.² Domitius taunted him with

Arrogance of the senatorial chiefs: their intrigues and mutual jealousies.

¹ Appian (*B.C.* ii. 67.) supposes that Cæsar was in want of provisions, and that Pompeius wished to protract the campaign in order to profit by his necessities: but it appears that the resources of a large extent of country were now at his command.

² Plut. *Pomp.* 67., *Cæs.* 41.; Appian, *l.c.*

the name of Agamemnon, king of the kings before Troy; Favonius only exclaimed with a sigh, *We shall not eat our figs this year either at Tusculum.* But the proud array of the combined armies inflamed more than ever the hopes of their order; their numerical superiority to Cæsar was greater now than even at Petra, and the impatience to strike the blow which should free them for ever from his harassing persecution became universal and overwhelming. The chiefs contended openly among themselves for the places and dignities which should fall to their lot upon Cæsar's destruction. They already assigned the consuls for several years to come; while among the candidates for the highest offices, Domitius, Scipio and Lentulus Spinther were most clamorous for the supreme pontificate¹, Fannius coveted the villa of Atticus, and Lentulus Crus laid his finger on the house of Hortensius and the gardens of Cæsar.² The mutual jealousy of these competitors led to intrigues and recriminations which loosened the bands of authority and discipline. Attius Rufus came forward to accuse Afranius of deliberate treachery in the Spanish campaign; L. Hirrus, a man of some note in the party, having had the honour of competing on one occasion with no less a rival than Cicero, being absent from the camp on a mission to the Parthians, might fear to be thrust altogether aside in the scramble for the anticipated dignities; and Domitius proposed in council that judgment of death or confiscation should be passed at the close of the war upon every member of the senate convicted of the crime of having remained at Rome during the struggle, or even who, after joining its

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 83.

² Cic. *ad Att.* xi. 6. If this is correct, it would seem that Marcia did not bring the property of Hortensius to Cato as her dowry on their resumption of the nuptial relation, and therefore there was probably no second marriage.

standard, should have continued a spectator rather than an actor in its ranks.¹

It is possible that this menace pointed among others at Cicero, who may have advanced claims to a larger share in the contemplated distribution of rewards than was deemed proportionate to his actual services. He had been present in the camp at Petra, and had freely expressed his disgust at his leader's policy in allowing himself to be shut up in so dishonourable a position. Cicero, indeed, was one of the few sensible men who had deprecated forcing Pompeius to a premature engagement; but while he confessed that the troops of the republic were not equal in training to their adversary's veterans, he had persisted in urging the adoption of measures still more certainly inefficient, and had paraded his impracticable notions of the authority and dignity of the senate in a question of mere military means.² At last, when Pompeius advanced into Thessaly, he pleaded ill health as an excuse for remaining behind³, declining at the same time all public command, and contenting himself with sending his son to follow the fortunes of the common cause. The proposition of Domitius, if carried into effect, would have fallen with its full weight upon one who had thus offended the zealots of his party.

Their dissatisfaction with Cicero's conduct.

At length Pompeius moved to the southward from Larissa upon the road to Pharsalus, which forms the line of communication between Thessaly and Greece. The city of Pharsalus occupied a rocky eminence connected with

The opposing armies take up their positions in the plain of Pharsalia.

¹ *Cæs. l.c.* This is fully confirmed by Cicero. Even Atticus, he says, was among the proscribed: and further, "Omnes qui in Italia manserant, hostium numero habebantur."

² *Cic. ad Div. iv. 7.*: "Non iis rebus pugnabamus quibus valere poteramus, consilio, auctoritate, causa, quæ erant in nobis superiora; sed lacertis et viribus, quibus pares non fuimus." He used similar expressions in a letter to Torquatus (*Div. vi. 1.*).

³ *Plut. Cic. 39.*; *Cic. ad Att. xi. 4.*

the northern spurs of the chain of Othrys, upon the verge of the plain, five or six miles in width, through which the river Enipeus flows in a broad channel. On the southern side of this level expanse, near its eastern extremity, rise some detached hills of moderate elevation, upon one of which Pompeius is supposed to have drawn the lines of his encampment. The fortified post of Pharsalus itself lay at no great distance on the left; but the inhabitants, who had submitted to Cæsar's requisitions in the absence of his adversary, were now glad to shut their gates, and gazed, perhaps with indifference, upon the preparations which were making to decide the war before their eyes.¹ Almost at the same moment Cæsar pitched his own camp in the centre of the same plain, a little to the west of Pharsalus, at a distance of thirty stades, or about four Roman miles from that of his opponent.² Assured of the revived confidence of his veterans, he was anxious to draw Pompeius into

¹ Two cities rose successively on or near the site of Pharsalus, and it is possible that at the period of the battle the place may have been deserted. If so, this would account for the remarkable fact that Cæsar makes no mention of it, and also for its playing no part in the details of the operations conducted so close to it. See Ersch und Gruber's *Encyclopædie*, art. "Pharsalische Schlacht," by Eckermann.

² I have endeavoured to comprise in the text all the marks of locality which Cæsar, Appian, and Plutarch furnish for understanding the battle of Pharsalia; what further explanation is required I have derived from Colonel Leake's account in his *Travels in Northern Greece* (i. 445., iv. 477.), and I have to acknowledge his kindness in elucidating some points on which he has allowed me to refer to him. Dodwell and Clarke traversed the plain, but their observation was extremely cursory, and their statements, in some respects, strangely conflicting. The lively professor, indeed, acknowledges that he trotted across it in a thick fog. The map accompanying my second edition is borrowed from Col. Leake, with a trifling alteration regarding the position of Cæsar's cavalry. After weighing again the circumstances of the battle, I am inclined to leave my account substantially as before. I ought, however, to add, that the difficulty of the received explanation is increased by the use of the word *rivus* for the stream on the bank of which the armies were posted. According to Cæsar's and all correct usage, this term is only applied to a rivulet, and is constantly opposed to *flumen*, a river

a general engagement in the open country between them. He arrayed his forces at first in front of his own encampment, and gradually pushed his lines still nearer to the enemy's position. But though Pompeius caused his legions to deploy day by day on the slope beneath his own fortifications, he still kept them on superior ground, and refused to descend into the plain and confront the assailants on equal terms. The result of some cavalry skirmishes was favourable to the Cæsareans, and showed that their slender squadrons, supported by picked men of the infantry, trained to run and fight between their ranks, could stand without flinching the onset of undisciplined numbers. The nobles were irritated at these petty losses, and redoubled their pressing solicitations to be led to battle. Still Pompeius refused to move. Thus baffled, Cæsar was preparing to shift his quarters, and entice his adversary to follow him into another part of the country where the supplies were less exhausted, and where his vigilance might seize some opportunity of compelling an engagement. The movement he now threatened upon Scotussa would have thrown him between the Pompeian army and the base of its operations at Larissa,

Cæsar threatens to move on Pompeius's flank.

of breadth and volume, such as the Enipeus must be after the junction of the two streams which meet east of Pharsalus. Kiepert's map gives a much more imposing appearance to the Enipeus than Col. Leake's. The great difficulty of Col. Leake's explanation is that, from the position he assigns to the Pompeian force, the routed army must have turned at least a right angle in its flight to Larissa, besides crossing the broad channel of the Enipeus, neither of which circumstances are alluded to by the authorities. When Pompeius escaped from his camp through the Decuman gate he must have fairly turned his back upon the retreat which he is understood to have reached before Cæsar's rapid arrival. I cannot persuade myself, however, that the localities in their present configuration admit of any other hypothesis. It would be interesting to examine them, with the view of inquiring whether any material change has taken place in the course of the Enipeus and its tributary streams. The battle of Plassy was fought on the left bank of the Hooghly, which now, I believe, flows over its site, and in another hundred years will probably have transferred it to the right.

and was calculated to rouse it from its wary inaction. It was the morning of the ninth of August; the trumpets had already sounded to march in the Cæsarean encampment, the legionaries had buckled on their arms and equipments, and the camp-followers were striking the tents, when news arrived that the Pompeians had advanced a little beyond their ordinary position in front of their entrenchments, and were already extending their long columns on the level plain.¹ Their general had yielded with a sigh to the importunities of his followers, declaring that he could no longer command and must submit to obey.²

Pompeius
offers him
battle.

During the interval of suspense the minds of both the great leaders had been agitated, it was said, by melancholy reflections on the impending crisis. The one was haunted even in his sleep by the delusive vision of his splendid theatre, and by the echoes of popular applause which had so often greeted him there.³ Even Cæsar acknowledged his dejection at the prospect of an encounter, which, he said, whatever were the event, would be the commencement of many evils.⁴ But his men were full of ardour; they had invoked upon themselves, self-accused, the terrors of military execution, to atone for their pusil-

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 85. Aug. 9. A.U. 706 = June 6, B.C. 48. The day is recorded in the Kalendar. Amitern. v. Id. Sext.: "Soli Indiget in colle Quirinale Fer(iæ) q(uod) eo d(ie) C. Cæs. C. F. Pharsali devicit." Orelli, *Inscr.* ii. p. 397.; Fischer, *Röm. Zeittaf.* Lucan's assertion (vii. 410.),

"Tempora signavit leviorum Roma malorum,
Hunc voluit nescire diem,"

has perplexed the critics. He means probably that the anniversary of Pharsalia was not marked in the calendar as a dies nefastus, like those of Allia and Cannæ.

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 86.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 69.

³ Plut. *Cæs.* 42.; Flor. iv. 2.; Lucan, vii. 9.

⁴ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 69. The widespread presentiment of evil recorded in such striking language by Lucan (vii. 187.) may be referred, perhaps, to contemporary tradition. Comp. Plut. *Cæs.* 47.; Dion, xli. 61.; Gell. xv. 18.

lanimity in the disasters before Petra, and when their leader had recently offered to wait for further reinforcements, they had impatiently demanded to be pitted against the enemy unrecruited.¹

The arrangements for the battle were of the simplest kind. The plain was open, without any natural features to give an advantage to one side over the other; nor did either army seek the cover of artificial defences. The contest was to be decided by downright fighting of man and man. The rugged banks of the Enipeus afforded equal protection to one flank of either army, so that both could concentrate the whole of their covering squadrons of cavalry and light troops on the other. Pompeius ranged his legionary force so as to rest its right wing on the river, Scipio² commanding in the centre, Lentulus on the right, and Domitius on the left. In the left wing also the general himself took his station, at least at the commencement of the encounter.³ The cavalry, on which, from its numbers and composition, as well as from the level nature of the ground, Pompeius placed his principal reliance, was stationed at the extremity of the left wing. The days had long gone by when the cavalry of a Roman army was composed of the knights who served the commonwealth on horseback. In later times that force had been furnished entirely by the foreign auxiliaries, while the more distinguished of the citizens officered the legionary infantry. But now the flower of the Roman nobility mounted their horses, and crowded into the ranks,⁴ forming,

Array of the
contending
armies.

¹ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 63.; Plut. *Cæs.* 43.

² Cæsar does not mention the Enipeus, but merely says, "dextrum ejus cornu rivus quidam impeditis ripis munibat." *B. C.* iii. 88.

³ Compare the statements of *Cæs. l. c.* with Plut. *Cæs.* 44.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 76. Lucan places Domitius on the right. It is probable that Pompeius shifted his own position in the course of the battle.

⁴ This is distinctly stated by Frontinus, *Strateg.* iv. 7. 32., and is evidently implied in Plutarch's account of the battle.

no doubt, the finest body of cavalry the republic had ever sent into the field. The statement which Cæsar gives of the numbers arrayed on each side is confirmed by Appian, apparently from independent sources.¹ The Pompeian army consisted of a legionary force of one hundred and ten cohorts, making an aggregate of forty-five thousand men, while the cavalry amounted to seven thousand, bearing a much larger proportion to the whole amount than was usual in the Roman armies. Two thousand picked men were also dispersed through the ranks of the infantry to animate the less experienced by the example of their courage and discipline. The cavalry was supported by detachments of slingers and bowmen, who fought intermixed with the horses; and there were also several squadrons of mounted auxiliaries, principally from Pontus and Cappadocia.² The forces of the allied kings and states which the senate brought also into the field must have been exceedingly numerous³; but these the pride of the Roman tacticians seldom condescended to compute, and Pompeius himself seems to have had little confidence in their assistance, keeping them throughout the day in the back ground where they only served to encumber the field, and straiten the position of the effective combatants. On the other hand, Cæsar had

¹ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 70.

² Lucan, vii. 225.:

“Cappadocum montana cohors et largus habenis
Ponticus ibat eques.”

But he places them quite at random,

“Juxta fluvios et stagna undantis Enipei.”

No doubt they were posted on the opposite side of the plain, at the extreme left of the position.

³ Florus, in a passage apparently corrupt, seems to count the whole numbers engaged on both sides at not less than three hundred thousand men. This is undoubtedly a gross exaggeration; but the statements of Appian (*B.C.* ii. 70, 71.) leave no doubt that, besides the Italian forces, as he calls them, there were large bodies of allies on both sides, and especially on the Pompeian.

eighty legionary cohorts in line, so much reduced by the losses of their numerous campaigns as to amount to no more than twenty-two thousand fighting men; while in cavalry he was exceedingly weak, having only one thousand horsemen; but these were a well-trying body of Gaulish veterans, on whom, as we have seen, he could place entire dependence. His subsidiary forces must have been also much inferior in numbers to those of the enemy. Besides Germans and Gauls, he was attended by some recent levies from Greece and Thessaly. But the work of the day was to be performed by the veteran legionaries, and their leader knew and relied on the spirit which linked man to man among them; for every private seemed to feel that his general's eye was upon himself personally, and the sentiment with which the centurion Crastinus greeted him, as he passed along the ranks, was responded to by one and all. *My general*, he exclaimed, *I will so bear myself this day, that, whether I survive or fall, you shall have cause to thank me.* Crastinus was the first to hurl the pilum, and commenced the fray.¹

Such was the eagerness with which Cæsar accepted the proffered challenge, that he ordered the works of his camp to be levelled for his battalions to deploy in line without obstruction, and take up their ground instantaneously.² With forces so inferior, and posted in the middle of an open plain, he was well assured that the enemy would attempt

¹ The body of Crastinus was discovered on the field, the face pierced with a sword wound. Cæsar accorded to it peculiar honours. *Plut. Pomp.* 71.; *Appian*, c. 82. Lucan has a bitter imprecation against him (vii. 470.):

“Di tibi non mortem quæ cunctis pœna paratur,
Sed sensum post fata tuæ dent, Crastine, morti.”

² *Lucan*, vii. 326.:

“Sternite jam vallum fossasque implete ruina,
Exeat ut plenis acies non sparsa manipulis.”

Comp. Appian, *B. C.* ii. 74., who, however, does not understand the meaning of the operation.

to outflank him. Yet he could not venture to extend his front. He retained the usual battle array, drawing up his legionary cohorts in three lines, of which the third was destined to act as a reserve. To support his small body of cavalry, which occupied the extreme right of his position, he stationed in their rear six cohorts taken from the third line, disposing their front obliquely so as to sustain the anticipated movement of the enemy on his flank.¹ He took up his own position with the tenth legion at the right of his line, to encourage the cavalry by his immediate proximity, and to share with his favourite battalions the post of greatest danger and responsibility.

Pompeius, as was expected, directed his cavalry to charge and turn the flank of the opposite ranks²: meanwhile he made no demonstration of attack with his infantry, but ordered his lines to await the onset of the Cæsareans without advancing, according to the usual practice, to arrest it in mid career. He expected, we are informed, that the assailants would be exhausted by their own impetuosity, and fall into confusion on meeting the steady points of their adversaries' swords. But he had not calculated on the admirable training and tact of the practised veterans. When they saw that the opposite ranks did not advance to meet them, they drew up

Battle of
Pharsalia.

The Cæsareans
charge the
Pompeian
infantry,

¹ Lucan, vii. 522.:

“Tenet obliquas post signa cohortes.”

This seems to be the best explanation of this difficult passage. Comp. Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 89.

² The circumstances of the battle are minutely described by Cæsar, *B.C.* iii. 92—95., and his narrative is fully borne out by Appian, Plutarch, and Dion. Lucan is useful for illustration; but none of the historians give any colour to the statement he introduces for effect, that a last great stand was made in the centre by the flower of the Roman nobility (vii. 545.):

“Ventum erat ad robur Magni mediasque catervas . . .
Constitit hic bellum, fortunaque Cæsaris hæsit;
Non illic regum auxiliis,” &c.

of their own accord, recovered their breath and their order, and then rushing forward again, hurled their piles at a distance of twenty paces, and drew their swords with as much vigour and composure as their antagonists who had remained stationary. The Pompeians, on the other hand, crowded by their own numbers, and curbed by their officers, met the attack with none of the animation which the soldier acquires in the act of charging: yet they fought for a time manfully, and a bloody encounter, sword to sword, took place along the opposing lines.¹ Perhaps Pompeius's motive in not allowing his line to advance was to draw the Cæsareans onwards, and so throw upon their rear the cavalry which was beginning to operate on their flank. Against this manœuvre Cæsar had provided, to the best of his means, by keeping a third line in reserve; but the charge of the Pompeian cavalry was not, as it happened, sufficiently successful, to call forth the application of this resource. It had brought, however, its overwhelming weight of men and horses to bear with formidable effect upon the slender Gaulish squadrons. Unable to sustain the shock, they had given way before it, but still keeping their ranks unbroken, and making face to the right so as to cover as much as possible the flank of the infantry. The six Cæsarean cohorts which had been drawn up obliquely for the same purpose now advanced between the intervals of these squadrons. The legionary, well armed, active and expert, was generally more than a match for cavalry²; for the horses of the mounted

and repel the
attack of their
cavalry:

¹ Lucan, vii. 489.:

“Sed quota pars cladis jaculis ferroque volanti
Exacta est? odiis solus civilibus ensis
Sufficit, et dextras Romana in viscera ducit.”

² The Highlanders who routed the English cavalry at Preston Pans, were directed to strike at the noses of the horses, which wheeled round and became unmanageable. Comp. Lucan, vii. 528., where, however,

squadrons which attended the Roman armies were generally small and light, their accoutrements clumsy, and their training comparatively defective. The appointments of the Pompeians, indeed, were more than usually complete; their cavaliers were armed to the teeth, and if their conduct and discipline were inferior, their spirit was confident and high. But the Cæsareans, intermingled with the horses of their Gaulish allies, who returned with renewed ardour to the combat, made havoc among these gallant patricians. *Strike at their faces*, was the order which passed down their ranks; and whether they used the sword or the pilum, they wasted not a single blow on the mailed panoply of their adversaries, but thrust at their faces with a sure and vigorous aim that disconcerted the bravest of the Roman youth.¹ The Pompeian

he seems to attribute too much of the blame of discomfiture to the cowardice of the auxiliary cavalry. Florus says: "Cohortes tantum in effusos equites facere impetum, ut illi esse pedites, hi venire in equis viderentur."

¹ Compare Plutarch's description (*Pomp.* 71.). Cæsar's well-known command, *Miles, faciem feri*, was explained by the ancients on the supposition that the Pompeian cavalry being composed in great part of the young Roman nobility, the surest means of putting such cock-combs to flight was to threaten their faces with disfigurement. But this explanation rests on no good authority, nor have we any reason to doubt the gallantry of the young patricians who composed this force. Germanicus (*Tac. Ann.* ii. 15.) ordered his soldiers, on engaging the Germans, *ora mucronibus quærere*, telling them at the same time not to be discouraged by the great size of their shields. These shields covered the whole body, leaving only the face to aim at. In the same manner the Roman cavaliers were thoroughly armed, and the soldiers who had been accustomed to engage the half-clad Gauls might require this advice on meeting an enemy so differently equipped. Cæsar's command, therefore, was just such as an officer of the life-guards at Waterloo might have addressed to his men before they encountered the French cuirassiers; and it is well-known that by this lunge at the face many a personal combat was decided on that day.

The body armour of the Roman consisted generally of a headpiece and cuirass; his face and throat were bare, and the belly and thighs only slightly protected by a loose fringe or kilt. The sword-cut could hardly take effect except above or below the breast. Accord-

squadrons were completely broken, and driven in confusion to the adjacent hills, while the light-armed auxiliaries, no longer protected, were cut to pieces, and the Cæsareans, flushed with victory, advanced on the flank and rear of the main body.

Cæsar instantly called up his third line, and made a general advance upon the opposing battalions, already shaken by the first charge they had sustained, and now reeling under the sudden blows which assailed them on the flank. At the commencement of the battle he had ordered his men to confine their aim to the Romans opposed to them, and not waste their strength on the allies, whose slaughter would count little towards deciding the event.¹ But as soon as the fortune of the day had declared in his favour, he commanded them to abstain from the blood of citizens, and devote themselves to completing their victory by the destruction of the barbarians.² The hearts of the Pompeian legionaries were not in their work. As each Cæsarean confronted an opponent, he communicated to him the order he had received, and the Pompeians gladly availed themselves of the welcome respite, and even opened their ranks to let the victors rush upon their allies, who were crowded in unavailable masses behind them. Among these almost unresisting multitudes a great slaughter took place. Pompeius had already

Route of the
Pompeian
forces and
flight of Pom-
peius.

ingly, a sword-wound is generally described as on the face or neck (ore, jugulo), or belly (visceribus). *Struck to the heart* is a phrase unknown to the Romans.

¹ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 74.: ἔχεσθε οὖν μοι τῶν Ἰταλῶν μόνων.

² Appian, *B.C.* ii. 80.: ἀψαστεῖν τῶν ἠμοιβῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς συμμαχοὺς μόνους χωρεῖν, καὶ τοῖς ἠσσωμένοις προσεπέλαζον, παραινοῦντες ἀδεῶς ἐστάναι διεκθέοντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ τοῦ Καίσαρος τοὺς συμμαχοὺς οὐ δυναμένους ἀντέχειν ἀνήρουν. So Florus, "Parce civibus." Suet. *Jul.* 75.: "Acie Pharsalica proclamavit ut civibus parceretur." Lucan, vii. 319.:

"Civis qui fugerit esto."

abandoned the field, retiring moodily to his entrenchments at the first inclination of fortune. He made dispositions indeed for the defence of the works; but the routed battalions, instead of rallying to man the ramparts, fled with precipitation past them, and took refuge on a hill at a little distance. The discomfited general, alone in his tent, was soon roused from his sullen despondency by the shouts of the enemy pressing upon his outworks; exclaiming with peevish impatience, *What, assault even my camp!*¹ he mounted his horse and galloped with a handful of attendants through the Decuman or hinder gate.

The conquerors burst into the encampment, where they found every preparation made for celebrating an assured victory.² Tables were laid for the banquet, and decked with splendid services of plate; the tents of Lentulus and others were already embowered in ivy. This display of luxury and magnificence astonished and tempted the rude veterans; but, before they could address themselves to the spoil, their services were again required by their indefatigable general, and such was their devotion to him that they consented, at his earnest entreaty, to leave the fruits of victory untasted until they had dislodged the routed army from the fastnesses to which it had fled. The Pompeians were too much dispirited to make any resistance. Shivered once more at the first onset, they poured in broken masses over hill and plain. But Cæsar was not yet satisfied. Allowing a part of his troops only to return to the camps, he led four legions in hot pursuit by a shorter or better road, and drew them up at the distance of six miles from the field of battle.³ The fugitives, finding their re-

Cæsar pursues
the fugitives.

¹ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 81.; Plut. *Pomp.* 72.

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 97.; Plut. *l.c.*

³ Cæs. *l.c.*: "Commodiorem itinere Pompeianis occurrere cœpit."

treat intercepted, halted on an eminence overhanging a stream. Cæsar set his men immediately to throw up entrenchments, and cut off their approach to the water. This last labour was accomplished before nightfall; and when the Pompeians perceived that their means of watering were intercepted, they listened to the summons of the heralds who required their surrender. A few only of the senators escaped in the darkness.

Early on the morrow the fugitives descended from their position, as required, and, approaching in the attitude of suppliants, demanded grace of the conqueror. Cæsar hastened to reassure them by expatiating on the lenity which had marked his conduct throughout the contest; nor did he falsify on this occasion the character he was so proud to claim. The battle of Pharsalia, it was allowed even by his contemporaries, was honourably distinguished in the annals of civil warfare; from the close of the day no more blood was shed; the fugitives were spared, and the suppliants received mercy.¹ Nor, indeed, was the carnage of the combat proportioned to its results. The victors lost thirty centurions, and two hundred, or, as the highest estimate stated, twelve hundred legionaries: of the vanquished there fell ten senators, forty knights, and six thousand of all ranks.² But

His clemency
to the van-
quished ;
number of
the slain.

¹ It is strange that Dion should make a statement which is contradicted by every other writer. He says, xli. 62.: τῶν δὲ δὴ βουλευτῶν τῶν τε ἰππέων ὄσους μὲν καὶ πρότερόν ποτε ἤρηκώς ἤλεσκει ἀπέκτεινε. On the other hand, we read in (1.) Cæsar himself, i. 98., "Omnes conservavit." (2.) Cic. *pro Marcell.* 3., *pro Ligar.* 6.: "Quis non eam victoriam probet, in quâ occidit nemo nisi armatus?" (3.) Vellei, ii. 52.: "Nihil illa victoria mirabilius . . . fuit, quando neminem nisi acie consumptum patria desideravit." (4.) Sucton. *Jul.* 75.: "Nec ulli perisse nisi in prælio reperiuntur," with three exceptions which occurred at a later time. (5.) Florus, iv. 2. 90., speaking generally, "Reliqua pax incruenta, pensatum clementia bellum," &c.

² This was the statement of Asinius Pollio, who was present in the battle. Others swelled the loss of the Pompeians to 25,000. Appian, *B. C.* ii. 82.

this return does not include the loss of the auxiliaries, which, at least on the Pompeian side, must have been much greater. It may be added that Cæsar's clemency was not dictated merely by policy. He mourned over the destruction of so many brave men, even at the moment which satiated his own thirst for power and glory. *They would have it so*, he exclaimed, as he traversed the field strewn with the corpses of the honoured dead; *after all my exploits, I should have been condemned to death had I not thrown myself upon the protection of my soldiers.*¹ The most distinguished of the slain was L. Domitius, a man conspicuous among the basest of his class for treachery, the fiercest for ferocity, and the most rancorous for personal malice. He was cut down in the flight by Cæsar's cavalry.² In the course of this history, we shall have to brand the name of Domitius through several succeeding generations as the symbol of falsehood, cruelty and vindictiveness. We may lament that Lucan condescended to embalm the memory of the victim of Pharsalia in verses of more than usual power and pathos; perhaps they were meant as a tribute of flattery, however unavailing, to his detestable descendant, the emperor Nero.³

Domitius slain
in the pursuit.

The conqueror was satisfied with the solid fruits of victory, without claiming the title of imperator; he demanded no triumph nor thanksgiving from a senate of his own partisans; a piece of moderation which, however

M. Brutus surrenders, and is taken into favour by Cæsar.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 30.: "Hoc voluerunt: tantis rebus gestis condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem." So Plut. *Cæs.* 46.

² Cicero (*Philipp.* ii. 29.) seems to insinuate that he was slain in cold blood by Antonius.

³ Lucan, vii. 599.:

"Mors tamen eminuit clarorum in strage virorum
Pugnacis Domiti . . . victus toties a Cæsare, salva
Libertate perit; tunc mille in vulnera lætus
Labitur, et venia gaudet caruisse secunda."

trifling it may appear in our eyes, was thought worthy of being recorded to his honour by a reluctant panegyrist.¹ He bestowed his pardon and even his favour upon the chiefs of the opposite party who offered to lay down their arms. Among these was M. Brutus, who had escaped from the field, and got safely into Larissa; but, hearing of his leader's flight, and despairing of the cause, he had voluntarily tendered his submission. Assuredly this conclusion of his campaign contrasts mournfully with Lucan's address to the future hero of the republic. Unennobled by honours and offices, he had escaped, in the mass of the combatants, the deadliest aim of the Cæsareans. Yet how fatal a weapon did he wield! He is bid to reserve it for a fitter day and a riper victim. The foe has not yet scaled the tyrant's citadel, or merited, at the summit of all human power, to bow to the sacrificial steel.² Such is the strain of the poet; the historian quietly assures us that Cæsar learned in confidential discourse with his captive the direction of his adversary's flight; not, perhaps, that Brutus intentionally betrayed so important a secret, but his warmth of temperament and want of reserve made him more dangerous as a friend than as an enemy. Admitted to familiarity with his new leader (for he seems to have placed himself at once freely at Cæsar's disposal) he exerted his influence to conciliate him towards Cassius, and, at a later period, moderated his wrath against Deiotarus. Cæsar generously indulged this impetuous zeal, and was touched by its openness, however little it was tempered by prudence or reflection. *As for this young man*, he is said to have observed of him, *I know not what he wills, but whatever he does will, he wills with energy.*³

¹ Cic. *Philipp.* xiv. 8.; Drumann, iii. 516.

² Lucan, vii. 586. seqq.:

“Illic plebcia contactus casside vultus,

Ignotusque hosti, quod ferrum. Brute, tenebas!”

Cic. *ad Att.* xiv. 1.; Plutarch, *Brut.* 6.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Pompeius seeks refuge in Egypt.—Treacherous policy of the advisers of King Ptolemæus.—Pompeius is enticed from his vessel and murdered.—The fugitives from Pharsalia reassemble at Dyrrhachium and Corcyra.—Cicero withdraws from the contest.—Scipio assumes the command.—Cæsar follows in pursuit of Pompeius: receives the submission of C. Cassius: reaches Egypt, and undertakes to settle the affairs of that kingdom.—Fascinations of Cleopatra.—Discontent of the Alexandrians: they rise against Cæsar, and blockade him in the palace.—The Alexandrian war: intrigues, defeat and death of Ptolemæus.—Cæsar places Cleopatra on his throne.—Pharnaces attacks the allies of the Republic, and defeats Calvinus.—Cæsar marches against him: he is routed at the battle of Zela and slain.—Arrogance of the conqueror, A.U. 706, 707. B.C. 48, 47.

THE remnant of the vast Pompeian host was scattered in various directions. No reserve had been provided on the battle field, nor had any place been assigned in the neighbourhood for rallying in the event of disaster. The fleet was far distant, and dispersed on various petty enterprises. Yet the resources which remained to so great a party, even after its signal defeat, were abundant and manifold.¹ But Pompeius himself, mortified and bewildered, abandoned every thing, and sought only to save his own life. He fled through Larissa, declining the shelter of its walls, and, penetrating the defiles of Tempe, gained the Thessalian shore at the mouth of the Peneus.² Here he fell in with a merchant vessel lying off the coast, the master of which recognized

Pompeius escapes to the sea-coast: he takes ship, seeks his wife and son at Lesbos, and finally demands an asylum in Egypt.

¹ Lucan. viii. 278.

“Sparsit potius Pharsalia nostras
Quam subvertit opes.”

² Plut. *Pomp.* 73

and generously offered to take him on board, together with Lentulus Spinther, Lentulus Crus, the consul of the preceding year, Favonius, the Galatian chieftain, Deiotarus, and a few more. Pompeius dismissed the slaves who had hitherto accompanied him, assuring them that they at least had nothing to fear from the conqueror: it was to the loyalty of Favonius that he owed the common offices of menial attendance. The master of the vessel undertook to carry him wherever he should appoint. Pompeius merely cast anchor off Amphipolis, in Macedonia, in order to provide himself with a sum of money, and then steered for Lesbos, where his wife Cornelia, and his younger son, Sextus, were also received on board. From thence, without a moment's delay, the fugitives proceeded to run along the Asiatic coast, and were joined in their progress by another vessel with a few more adherents of the ill-fated cause. Among these were some personages of rank: when at last they landed on the shores of Cilicia, a miniature senate was convened, and a mock deliberation held under the presidency of the late consul, to determine what course should finally be taken. We are assured, strange as it may appear, that the wish of Pompeius himself was to seek an asylum in Parthia. Whether he hoped to lead the murderers of Crassus against his detested rival, or only to watch in security the progress of events, nothing can show more strongly than such a project the state of abject humiliation to which he was reduced.¹ Orodes had just inflicted another insult upon the majesty of the republic in throwing her ambassador, Hirrus, into chains, because Pompeius had refused to buy his alliance by the surrender of Syria. It was but too evident that his consent to receive Pompeius himself must be obtained by submitting to still greater sacrifices. But to these affronts Pompeius, it appears,

¹ Dion (xlii. 2.) cannot believe it possible that Pompeius contemplated taking refuge in Parthia.

could have submitted; the arguments which induced him to renounce such a plan were drawn from the danger it seemed to threaten to his own person, or at least to the honour of his handsome wife.¹ The next alternative which suggested itself was to retire into Africa, where the king of Numidia had proved his devotion to the benefactor to whom he owed his sceptre, by his signal service in the destruction of Curio. In Africa two legions awaited their general's arrival, flushed with victory and devoted to his party. The resources of the province were immense: it offered its harbours for the reception of his magnificent fleets; while, separated from Europe by the breadth of the Mediterranean, it might defy Cæsar for months even to approach it. The fatuity of Pompeius in deciding against the course which held out so flattering a prospect seems indeed inconceivable. But it would appear that he still looked fondly to the East as the quarter of the world associated with his greatest triumphs, and where the prestige of his name had taken, as he imagined, the deepest root. Perhaps he wished to make himself at all events independent of the succour of his own countrymen.

The king whom the Roman government had imposed upon the Egyptian people had died three years previously. He had requited the favour of the republic by a will² in which he had placed his kingdom under the guardianship of Rome, while he nominated his son Dionysius, or, as he was afterwards called, Ptolemæus the Twelfth, and his daughter Cleopatra, both under age, as joint successors to his throne. In accordance with the national usages, this joint authority had been consolidated by the marriage of the brother and sister, the former of whom was seventeen years of age, and the latter about two years his senior.

State of Egypt.
Quarrel between Ptolemæus and Cleopatra.

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 76.; Lucan, viii. 412.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 83

² Cæs. *B. C.* iii. 108.

The senate had appointed Pompeius guardian of the kingdom, and possibly the authority this appointment gave him, and the influence he already exercised through it, assisted in determining his choice of a place of refuge. But, at the moment of his arrival off the shores of Egypt, the existing government was less than ever competent to extend its protection to so dangerous a suppliant. The throne had become an object of contention between the brother and sister. Cleopatra had been driven from Alexandria by a popular insurrection, and the ministers of her youthful consort, who had apparently instigated the tumult, took advantage of its success to exclude her from her share in the sovereignty. The royal child was directed in all his counsels by a junta consisting of Pothinus, a Greek eunuch of the court, Theodotus, a rhetorician, who held the ostensible office of preceptor to the sovereign, and Achilles, an officer of the Egyptian army.¹ These men had acquired a complete ascendancy over their tender charge, and they used their influence unscrupulously for the furtherance of their private schemes. They had stationed Ptolemæus at the head of his troops in the neighbourhood of Pelusium, to await on the frontiers of the kingdom the invasion of Cleopatra, who had found means to raise a military force for the assertion of her rights.² The hostile armies were arrayed almost in sight of each other at the foot of the Casian hills, when Pompeius appeared off the coast with a slender flotilla bearing about two thousand soldiers, whom he had collected in his flight. The royal ministers hoped to exclude the republic, in the state of anarchy into which it appeared to have fallen, from the interference it had so long exercised in the affairs of Egypt; they might also apprehend that the new comer, if admitted within their confines, would rather

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* 77.

² *Cæs.* *B.C.* iii. 103

assist the injured sister than confirm the usurpation of the brother. Pompeius sent a message to the young king, requesting the favour of a hospitable reception. His application gave rise to anxious discussion in the royal council. If any of the king's ministers was honest and bold enough to insist on the obligations of good faith and gratitude, his counsels were speedily overruled by the arguments of a subtler policy. It was dangerous to expose the kingdom to the wrath of Cæsar by receiving his defeated enemy; it was dangerous to reject the petition of a suppliant whom the fortune of war might yet restore to power. The only remaining course, which seemed to avoid every danger, and combine every advantage, was to invite the unfortunate visitor to the shore and at once make away with him. Such a crime might deserve the gratitude of the conqueror, since it would effectually cripple and distract the plans of his adversaries.

Pompeius requests an asylum at Alexandria. Crafty policy of the king's advisers.

Accordingly, the treacherous counsel was adopted. A small fishing-boat was speedily equipped, and Achilles, with a few attendants, among whom, to inspire confidence in the intended victim, were Septimius, an old comrade in arms, and another Roman officer named Salvius, proceeded to invite Pompeius into the royal presence.¹ The meanness of the vessel assigned to convey so noble a passenger was excused by the alleged shallowness of the water near the coast; but it was really so contrived to exclude a retinue sufficient for his protection. The Roman officers, indeed, who had crowded into the ship from which their chief was about to take his departure, beheld the Egyptian galleys ranged along the shore, and the evident falsehood of the plea awakened their worst apprehensions. But Pompeius, prepared to dare or to

Pompeius is invited to land,

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 104.; Plut. *Pomp.* 78, 79.

submit, combated their fears, and repelled their entreaties to remain. He took leave of his friends with a faint smile, repeating the words of the poet: He who repairs to a tyrant becomes his slave, though he set out a freeman.¹ He descended into the fatal bark. The distance to the shore was considerable, and the passage was made in painful and ominous silence. The illustrious fugitive recognized and courteously addressed Septimius, but his salutation was acknowledged only by a bow without a word. The silence continued, and Pompeius took up a roll of parchment on which he had written the speech he proposed to address to the king, and occupied himself in studying it. Meanwhile, Cornelia and her friends watched from the ship the progress of the boat with the deepest anxiety, and when the king's soldiers and attendants were seen crowding towards the point where Pompeius appeared about to land, they indulged in the hope that he would yet meet with an honourable reception. But at the moment when Pompeius was taking an attendant's hand to help himself to rise, Septimius approached from behind and struck him with his sword. The victim knew his fate, and, without attempting to struggle against it, drew his toga over his face with both his hands, and so fell mortally wounded. His head was immediately severed from his body, and carried away as a proof of the accomplishment of the bloody order. The trunk was thrown out of the boat and abandoned in the breakers.² The friends of the murdered man beheld the deed from afar, and, uttering a shriek of horror, hurried away from the Egyptian galleys which were

and treacherously murdered.

¹ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 85.; Plut. *l. c.*; Dion, xlii. 4. The lines are from a play of Sophocles:

ὅστις γὰρ ὡς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται
κείνου ἴσθι δοῦλος καὶ ἐλεύθερος μόλη.

² Plut. *Pomp.* 79, 80.

already moving to intercept them.¹ When the bystanders had satiated their curiosity with gazing on the mangled remains, a freedman of Pompeius, who alone kept watch over them, drew the headless corpse from the water's edge, wiped from it the sand and brine, and wrapped it in his own cloak. The wreck of a small fishing-boat furnished him with wood²; and in heaping up a rude and hasty pyre he was aided by an ancient Roman soldier who had followed his patron's banner in the wars. The shadowy pageant of the Egyptian monarchy, its king, its satellites and armies, had vanished from the solitary beach, when an exile and a menial muttered with trembling haste the last farewell to the "Mighty Victor" of the East, the "Mighty Lord" of the Imperial Senate. The wretched obsequies were allowed to pass unheeded; but when Lentulus Crus landed soon afterwards on the spot, he was seized and put to death, as a victim second only in importance to Pompeius himself.

Murder of
L. Lentulus
Crus.

Thus fell the illustrious chief whom alone of all their champions the Romans had distinguished by the appellation of the Great, a title which seemed peculiarly appropriate to one whose rapid conquests in Asia could only be paralleled by those of the Macedonian Alexander.³ His fate continued to point a moral to the latest period of the Empire, and its consummation deserved to be regarded as the most tragic incident in Roman history.⁴ He had earned greater popularity, and he had perhaps surpassed his rivals more conspicuously, than any Roman before him; and, in the same proportion, his fall was more disas-

Reflections on
the death of
Pompeius.

¹ Lucan, viii. 709. 720.

² Lucan, viii. 755.

³ Pompeius himself affected this comparison from an early period. Comp. Sallust, *Fr. Hist.* iii. 32.: "Cn. Pompeius a prima adolescentia, sermone fautorum similem fore se credens Alexandro regi, facta consultaque ejus quidem æmulus erat."

⁴ Comp. Vell. ii. 58.

trous and his end more miserable. Yet no acute observer, we might suppose, could have failed to predict his discomfiture; for every move he had made for many years, whether in politics or latterly in war, had been a manifest blunder. All generals, it has been said, make mistakes, and he is the greatest who makes the fewest; but the conduct of Pompeius throughout his last campaigns had been a series of mistakes, against which the renown of his genius can scarcely maintain itself. His last imperfect success in the defence of Petra he owed indeed to his wariness in so long abstaining from offensive operations: but this delay, which he had himself rendered necessary by neglecting to secure the Iberian veterans, was improved by his adversary no less than by himself. No partial victory could compensate for the alienation of friends, the encouragement of enemies, and the loss of that prestige of invincibility which alone had thrown Rome and the provinces at his feet. Pompeius checked Cæsar in attempting an impossibility; but the attempt itself, though unsuccessful, was ruinous to his cause, and on this Cæsar had calculated. On the whole, we must admit the justice of the general verdict, that the great Pompeius was enervated by his early triumphs and constant prosperity. We have seen that in the outset of his career he possessed, with the fire of youth, all the fiercest and most vindictive passions of his times. But he was not naturally jealous, and when arrived at the serene eminence of power, his vanity easily persuaded him that he was beyond the reach of competition. He treated his associates and colleagues with lofty courtesy; to his spouses he even displayed a certain feminine fondness; but while his contemporaries could point to no particular instance of flagrant *incivism* in the spoilt child of revolutions, it cannot be denied that the general impression

he left upon them was one of deep distrust and wide-spread dissatisfaction.¹ He was roused from his dream of pre-eminence to repel the aggression of a more ardent rival; and it was truly said of the two illustrious competitors for power that Pompeius could bear no equal, Cæsar no superior.² Pompeius fell at the close of his fifty-eighth year, on the anniversary of his triumph over the greatest but one of his opponents, the renowned king of Pontus.³ His ashes, hastily entombed on the margin of the waves⁴, were removed, it is said, at a later period by the pious

Final disposal
of his remains,
and honours
paid to them.

¹ It might be expected that the memory of Pompeius would be more partially estimated under the tyranny of the emperors. Yet Lucan paints him with more discrimination than any other of his characters. The panegyric of Velleius is less judicious; but it is valuable in showing the liberty of speech allowed even by a Tiberius.

Lucan, ix. 190. foll.:

“Civis obit, multo majoribus impar
Nosse modum juris, sed in hoc tamen utilis ævo:
Cui non nulla fuit justæ reverentia, salva
Libertate potens, et solus plebe parata
Privatus servire sibi; rectorque senatus,
Sed regnantis erat: nil belli jure poposcit,
Quæque dari voluit, voluit sibi posse negari . . .
Olim vera fides, Sulla Marioque receptis.
Libertatis obit; Pompeio rebus adempto
Nunc et ficta perit: non jam regnare pudebit,
Nec color imperii, nec frons erit ulla Senatus.”

Velleius, ii. 29.: “Innocentia eximius, sanctitate præcipuus, eloquentia medius, potentiæ quæ honoris causa ad eum deferretur, non ut ab eo occuparetur, cupidissimus; dux belli peritissimus; civis in toga, nisi ubi vereretur ne quem haberet parem, modestissimus; amicitiarum tenax, in offensis exorabilis, in reconcilianda gratia fidelissimus, in accipienda satisfactione facillimus; potentia sua nunquam, aut raro, ad impotentiam usus; pæne omnium vitiorum expertus, nisi numeraretur inter maxima in civitate libera, dominaque gentium, indignari, cum omnes cives jure haberet pares, quemquam æqualem dignitate conspicere.”

² Lucan, i. 125.:

“Nec quemquam jam ferre potest, Cæsarve priorem,
Pompeiusve parem.”

³ Dion, xlii. 5.

⁴ Lucan, viii. 797.:

“Situs est qua terra extrema refuso
Pendet in Oceano.”

care of Cornelia, and enjoyed their final rest in the mausoleum of his Alban villa¹, the ruins of which are pointed out at this day. Such is the statement of his biographer; but the poet who sings his funeral dirge knows nothing of this honourable interment. Lucan bewails the disgrace of the illustrious remains, still confined to their wretched hole scratched in the sand², and surmounted by a fragment of stone on which the bare name of *Magnus* had been traced with a burnt brand.³ The imperial dynasties which owed their elevation to the victory of Pharsalia had no interest in paying honour to the champion of the commonwealth; and it was reserved for the most enlightened and the most humane of the emperors, at a distance of a hundred and sixty years, to raise a fitting monument to Pompeius on the spot where his body had been burnt.⁴

The nobles betrayed their own cause at Pharsalia by their want of courage and self-devotion. It is in vain that Lucan rounds a poetical period with the names of the Lepidi, the Metelli, the Corvini, and the Torquati, whom he supposes to have fallen in the last agony of the defence⁵: of all the great chiefs with whom

Cato leads the Pompeian forces from Dyrrhachium to Coreyra.

¹ Plut. *Pomp.* in fin.

² Lucan, viii. 756.:

“Exigua trepidus posuit scrobe.”

³ Lucan, viii. 793.:

“Hic situs est Magnus.”

⁴ Spartianus, *Hadrian.* 7.; Dion, lxi. 11.; Appian, ii. 86.:
ἐζήτησεν καὶ εὖρεν ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ Ῥωμαίων βασιλεὺς Ἀδριανὸς ἐπιδημῶν, κ. τ. λ.
The emperor offered a line for an inscription: τῷ ναοῖς βριθοντι πόση σπάνις ἔπλετο τύμβου. *Anthol. Gr.* ii. 286.

⁵ Lucan, vii. 583.:

“Cædunt Lepidos, cæduntque Metellos

Corvinosque simul, Torquataque nomina legum.”

A similar remark has been made on the battle of Waterloo. “Except Duhesme and Friant, neither of whose names were very much distinguished, we hear of no general officers among the French list of slain.” Paul’s *Letters to his Kinsfolk*, p. 191.

we are familiar as leaders in the Pompeian camp, Domitius alone perished on that day, and even he was killed in the act of flying.¹ The fragments of the mighty ruin were scattered far away from the scene of disaster. Pompeius and a few adherents fled, as we have seen, in one direction to Larissa; a larger number escaped by the road to Illyricum, and met again within the walls of Dyrrhachium. The principal reserve of the Pompeian forces was there commanded by M. Cato, and there also was the common resort of the wavering and dissatisfied, such as Varro and Cicero, who wished to secure their own safety in either event. The fleets of the republic, under Octavius and C. Cassius, still swept the seas triumphantly; the latter had recently burnt thirty-five Cæsarean vessels in the harbour of Messana. But the naval commanders were well aware that their exploits could have little influence on the event of a contest which was about to be decided by the whole military force of the Roman world; and forming their own plans, and acting for the most part independently, they began more and more to waver in their fidelity to the common cause. As soon as the event of the great battle became known, the squadrons of the allies made the best of their way home, while some, such as the Rhodians, attached themselves to the conqueror. At the same time the turbulence of the soldiers in garrison at Dyrrhachium broke through all restraint. They plundered the magazines and burnt the transports on which they were destined to be conveyed to some distant theatre of protracted warfare. The desertion of the allies, the mutinous spirit of the troops, and the report of the numerous adhesions which Cæsar was daily receiving from the most conspicuous of the nobles, convinced

¹ Cæs. *B. C.* iii. 99. Cicero truculently insinuates that Antonius put him to death in cold blood after he had surrendered. See *Philipp.* ii. 29.

Cato that the last hope of keeping the party together, and maintaining the struggle effectually, depended upon the fate of Pompeius himself. In the event of the destruction of the acknowledged chief of the senate, he only contemplated restoring to the shores of Italy the troops confided to him, and then betaking himself to retirement from public affairs in some remote province.¹ While the fatal catastrophe was yet unknown he withdrew from Dyrrhachium to Corcyra, where the head-quarters of the naval force were established; and there he offered to surrender his command to Cicero as his superior in rank. But the consular declined the perilous honour, and refused to take any further part in a contest which, from the first, had inspired him with distrust and remorse. The young Cnæus Pompeius had urged the exercise of summary vengeance upon whosoever should threaten defection at such a crisis, and it was with difficulty he was restrained from using personal violence against Cicero, when he declared his intention of embarking at once for Italy.² The recreant consular's life was barely saved by Cato's vigorous interference. At Corcyra many of the fugitives from the field of battle rejoined their confederates. Among them were Scipio and Afranius, the former of whom now assumed the command of their combined forces, and it was upon him, as soon as the fact of Pompeius's death was ascertained, that the leadership of the party most naturally devolved.³

Cæsar followed up his success at Pharsalia with unabated activity. He allowed his soldiers at the most only two days' repose on the scene of their triumph, and amidst the spoils they had acquired.⁴ His care was divided between im-

Cæsar follows up his victory.

¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 55.

² Plut. *Cic.* 39.

³ Dion, xlii. 10.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 87.

⁴ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 88.: αὐτὸς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ νίκῃ δύο μὲν ἡμέρας ἐν Φαρσάλῳ διέτριψε θύων. Cæsar himself declares that he reached Larissa the day after the battle.

proving the victory he had gained in the east, and securing his acquisitions in the west. With the latter view he ordered Antcnius to return to Italy with a large part of his forces, and watch over his interests in that quarter, where he apprehended that some of the beaten faction might hazard a descent upon the centre of his resources. He also required his lieutenant Calenus to complete, without delay, the subjugation of southern Greece. Athens had not yet opened her gates to him, but the event of the great battle determined her to obey his summons. The long resistance this city had made exposed it, by the usages of ancient warfare, to the conqueror's vengeance; but Cæsar ordered it to be spared, for the sake, as he said, of its illustrious dead.¹ The Peloponnesus was now speedily evacuated by the forces of the republic, and Calenus occupied the points on the coast where he anticipated the possibility of fresh intrusion. Scipio had landed at Patræ, probably to receive the remnant of the Pompeian garrisons in that province, but he presently abandoned it, and stretched his sails for Africa.

Cæsar devoted himself to the pursuit of Pompeius with the utmost energy and impatience, being anxious not merely to prevent his assembling a new armament, but if possible to secure his person. He pushed forward with a squadron of cavalry, and was followed by a single legion.² He reached Amphipolis just after the fugitive's departure, and, taking the route of Asia by land, crossed the Hellespont with a few small vessels. In the passage he fell in with a squadron of C. Cassius, who had been despatched to the Euxine to stimulate or cooperate with Pharnaces, king of Pontus, whose promised succours were urgently demanded. It was

¹ Dion, xlii. 14.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 88.

² Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 102. 106.

remarked as an extraordinary instance of the good fortune ever supposed to wait upon the mighty conqueror, that the mere terror of his name induced Cassius to surrender his galleys to a few fishing boats.¹ There can be little doubt that the republican commander had already made up his mind to change his side, when accident threw this favourable opportunity in his way. As a man of influence and authority, as well as an able soldier, he was well received by his adopted leader, and the good offices attributed to Brutus could hardly have been required to conciliate to him the favour of Cæsar.

Having now arrived on the Asiatic coast, Cæsar advanced more leisurely. He had received information of Pompeius's flight to Egypt, and was aware that, if the suppliant were received there, he could not be dislodged except by regular military operations. He was content therefore to await the arrival of ampler succours, and employed himself in the meanwhile with repairing the injuries which Scipio was accused of having inflicted upon the unfortunate provincials. He earned their favourable opinion by the remission of taxes, and by restraining the exactions of the farmers of the revenue.² He saved a second time from spoliation the treasures of the Ephesian Diana, which Ampius, an adherent of the opposite party, had been on the point of seizing. These benefits he accompanied with further favours and distinctions, and then handed over the government of the province to Calvinus, to whom

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 63.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 88.; Dion, xlii. 6.; comp. Cic. *ad Div.* xv. 15. Suetonius and Dion attribute this adventure to Lucius Cassius. The only personage we know of that name was a brother of Caius, one who has already been mentioned as serving in Cæsar's army before the battle of Pharsalia. The allusions, however, which Cicero makes to C. Cassius's abandonment of the republican cause (comp. *ad Att.* xi. 13. 15.) are hardly consistent with his being engaged in this occurrence, and I have great doubts as to the genuineness of the story.

² Plut. *Cæs.* 48.

he entrusted three legions, to defend it against Pharnaces and the other Oriental allies of the senate. Cæsar retained only two legions about his own person, and those so much reduced in number as to contain much less than half their proper complements. The whole of this force consisted of only three thousand two hundred infantry, and eight hundred cavalry¹, and with these he sailed without hesitation for Egypt. It was only a few days after the death of Pompeius that he appeared thus attended off the port of Alexandria. No sooner was his arrival known than Theodotus hastened to meet him on board his vessel, and brought to him the head and ring of his murdered rival. The latter might be of important service to assure the wavering of the event which had occurred, and Cæsar took and preserved it for that purpose²; but from the mangled head he turned away with horror, and gave orders, with tears in his eyes, that it should be consumed with the costliest spices.³ The ashes he caused to be deposited in a shrine which he erected to the avenging Nemesis.⁴ The murderers were confounded and alarmed at the feeling he exhibited, nor were they less astonished, perhaps, at the perfect confidence with which he disembarked upon their coast, and claimed with his handful of followers to settle the concerns of a powerful kingdom.

It had been Cæsar's policy to spare the wealth of the provinces which he wished to attach to his side, and his system was directly opposed to the confiscation of his enemies' estates; but his want of money was urgent, and it was in arranging the quarrels of a dependent kingdom that the best opportunity might be found for exacting it. This undoubtedly was the strong

His horror on beholding the head of Pompeius.

Cæsar's object in interfering in the affairs of Egypt.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 106.

² Dion, xlii. 18.

³ Plut. *Pomp.* 80.; *Cæs.* 48.; Luc. ix. 1091.; Val. Max. v. 1. 10.

⁴ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 90.

motive which impelled him to intrude upon the affairs of a jealous people, in which his principal designs were in no way implicated.¹ When Auletes came to Rome to negotiate his restoration to the throne, he had purchased the support of the leaders of the senate by the most lavish bribes. Cæsar himself had received the promise of seventeen millions and a half of drachmæ²; an obligation which had never yet been discharged. He now confined his demand to ten millions, but sternly rejected the representations of Pothinus, who pleaded for a longer time for the payment of so large a sum. But even at the moment of landing Cæsar was warned of the difficulties into which he was rushing. His military force was contemptible; it was upon the dignity of his title as consul of the republic that he could alone rely. Accordingly he entered the streets of Alexandria with all the insignia of his office, thereby offending the populace, who were easily persuaded that he offered an intentional insult to their independence.³ A riot ensued, in which many of the Cæsarean soldiers lost their lives. Cæsar felt that he had mistaken the character of the nation, and underrated their jealousy of foreigners. But policy would not allow him to give way. He boldly summoned the rival sovereigns before him, and offered to decide their disputes in the name of the republic. Ptolemæus left his camp at Pelusium, and gave Cæsar a meeting in the palace of Alexandria, where he soon found himself watched and detained as a hostage. Cleopatra had already implored the consul's mediation, and now, when her brother or his ministers obstructed her approach to his presence, she caused herself to be carried by

His first interview with Cleopatra.

¹ Flor. iv. 2. 53.

² Plut. Cæs. 48. This sum may be computed in round numbers at 700,000*l*.

³ Cæs. B.C. iii. 106.; Lucan, x. 11.

stratagem into his chamber.¹ The fame of Cleopatra's beauty², which was destined to become second only to Helen's in renown³, was already bruited widely abroad. She had been seen by M. Antonius during the brief inroad of Gabinius into Egypt; and grave legates of the republic had brought back to Rome glowing reports of the girlish charms of the Lagide princess. She was indeed, at the time of her introduction to Cæsar, little more than twenty years old, and her wit and genius were yet unknown. Cæsar forthwith undertook the championship of the distressed beauty, for it suited his purpose to play off her claims against the haughty minions of her rival. In devoting himself to her cause he did not deny himself the reward of his gallantry⁴; but while he indulged in the luxuries and dissipations of the most sensual of capitals⁵, he kept his eye steadily fixed on his main object, and at the same time carefully guarded his own person from the machinations of his unscrupulous enemies.

The ministers of the young king were well assured that the reconciliation of the brother and sister would be the signal for their own disgrace. They employed every artifice to rouse the passions of a jealous populace, and alarmed the

Cæsar's precarious position.

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 49.

² Dion (xlii. 54.) and Plutarch (*Ant.* 27.) have particularly described her charms. From the latter we learn that her beauty was not regular or striking at first sight: *αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῆς οὐ πάνυ δυσπαράβλητον, οὐδ' οἷον ἐκπλήξαι τοὺς ἰδόντας, ἀφῆν δ' εἶχεν ἡ συνδιαίτησις ἄφυκτον.* Her talents were fully equal to the fascination of her appearance and manners.

³ Cleopatra was compared with Helen not only for her beauty, but for the consequences it produced. Lucan, x. 60.:

“Quantum impulit Argos
Iliacasque domos facie Spartana nocenti,
Hesperios auxit tantum Cleopatra furores.”

⁴ Lucan, x. 74.:

“Sanguine Thessalicæ cladis perfusus adulter
Admisit Venerem curis et miscuit armis.”

⁵ Lucan, x. 109.:

“Explicuitque suos magno Cleopatra tumultu
Nondum translatos Romana in sæcula luxus,” &c.

fanaticism of priests and people against a foreigner, whom they accused of desecrating their holy places, of eating accursed meats, and violating their most cherished usages.¹ Cæsar had despatched an urgent message to Calvinus to hasten to his succour with all the forces he could muster. But while waiting for the arrival of reinforcements, the necessity of which he now keenly felt, he dissembled his apprehensions, and occupied himself in public with the society of Cleopatra, or in conversation with the Egyptian sages, and inquiry into their mysterious lore.² His judgment was no more mastered by a woman's charms than by the fascinations of science: but the occupation of Alexandria was essential to his plans, and he assumed the air of curiosity or dissipation to veil his ulterior designs. With this view he visited with affected interest all the vaunted wonders of the city of the Ptolemies³, and even proposed, it was said, to relinquish his schemes of ambition to discover the sources of the Nile.⁴ At the first outset of his career of glory, his imagination had been fired at Gades by the sight of Alexander's statue⁵; now that the highest summit of power was within his reach, he descended to the tomb of the illustrious conqueror, and mused perhaps on the vanity of vanities beside his shrouded remains.⁶

The young king, though kept in hardly disguised

¹ Dion, xlii. 54.; Lucan, x. 158.:

“Non mandante fame multas volucresque ferasque
Ægypti posuere Deos.”

² See Lucan's beautiful episode (x. 181.):

“Si Cecropium sna sacra Platonem
Majores docuere tui, quis dignior unquam
Hoc fuit auditu, mundique capacior hospes?” &c.

³ Frontinus (i. 1. 5.) mentions this conduct of Cæsar in his collection of notable stratagems.

⁴ Suet. *Jul.* 52.: Lucan, x. 191.:

“Spes sit mihi certa videndi
Niliacos fontes, bellum civile relinquam.”

⁵ Suet. *Jul.* 7.

⁶ The body of Alexander was embalmed, and the mummy pre-

captivity within the walls of his palace, had found means to communicate to his adherents the alarm and indignation with which he viewed his sister's

apparent influence over the foreign intruder. The Macedonian dynasty which had reigned for nearly three centuries in Alex-

andria, was not, perhaps, unpopular with its Egyptian subjects. Though the descendants of Lagus had degenerated from the genius and virtues of the first sovereigns of their line, their sway had been generally mild and tolerant, and both conquerors and conquered reposed in equal security under the shadow of their paternal throne. Achilles, the commander of the king's armies, had a force of twenty thousand men, consisting principally of the troops which Gabinius had employed in the restoration of Auletes, and which had been left behind for his protection. These men had for the most part formed connexions with the natives, and had imbibed their sentiments at the same time that they adopted their manners. The camp was filled, moreover, with a crowd of deserters and fugitive slaves from all parts of the Roman empire, for Alexandria was the common resort of profligate and desperate men, who purchased impunity for their crimes by enlisting in the king's service.¹ These were the men who had placed Auletes on his throne, who had murdered the sons of the Roman legate Gabinius, and expelled Cleopatra from her royal inheritance. They were the reckless agents of the populace of Alexandria in each capricious mood of turbulence or loyalty. They were

served in a glass case. See Strabo, xvii. 1.; Lucan, x. 20.; Stat. *Sylv.* iii. 3. 117.:

“Duc et ad Æmathios manes, ubi belliger urbis
Conditor Hyblæo perfusus nectare durat.”

The sarcophagus in which the remains were inclosed, if tradition speaks true, is now in the British Museum.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 110.: “Fugitivisque omnibus nostris certus erat Alexandria receptus certaue vitæ conditio, ut dato nomine militum essent numero.”

The Alexandrians rise against him.

now prepared to join in the general outcry against the intrusion of the Romans, and encouraged by their leader and Arsinoë, their sovereign's younger sister, they entered the city, and imparted vigour and concentration to the hostile ebullitions of the multitude.

Cæsar awaited anxiously his expected succours; in the mean time he sought to avert the danger by concession, and while he proposed that Ptolemæus and Cleopatra should resume their joint sovereignty, he consented to satisfy the claims of Arsinoë by surrendering to her, together with another younger brother, the province of Cyprus.¹ But before these arrangements were completed, the discontent of the Alexandrians revived with more alarming violence. A skirmish which occurred in the streets between the Roman soldiers and the Egyptians determined Cæsar to throw off all disguise, seize the royal fleet, and give it to the flames.² Thus only could he hope to keep the coasts open for the approach of his reinforcements. The city of Alexandria stretched along the sea-shore, and its port was formed by an island named Pharos, which lay over against it, and was connected with the mainland in the middle by a narrow causeway and bridge. This island was occupied by the villas of the wealthy, and the suburbs of the great city. Its position enabled it to command the entrances of the double port, which were apparently much narrower than at the present day. As a military position therefore it was invaluable, and while the tumult was raging in the streets Cæsar transported into it a

Cæsar fortifies himself in Alexandria.

¹ Dion, xlii. 35.

² Cæs. B. C. iii. 111. The conflagration reached the shore and consumed a large portion of the celebrated library of the Ptolemies. Seneca asserts that four hundred thousand volumes perished (*de Tranquill.* 9.). The resignation he expresses under the loss, "multo satius est paucis te auctoribus tradere quam errare per multos," is severely rebuked by a modern devourer of large libraries (see Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. li.). Comp. Dion, xlii. 38.

portion of his troops, and seized the tower or fortress which secured its possession.¹ At the same time he continued to occupy a portion of the palace on the mainland, which commanded the communication with Pharos by the causeway. He strengthened its defences with additional works, destroying in every direction the private houses of the citizens, which being built entirely of stone, even to the floors and roofs, furnished him with abundant materials for fresh and massive constructions. The Egyptian troops set to work with no less energy in forming triple barricades of hewn stone at the entrance of every street, and thus entrenching themselves in a fortress in the heart of their city.² They looked forward already to the arrival of winter, and were convinced that the enemy must fall eventually into their hands; when he could no longer derive supplies from beyond the sea.

But in the meanwhile the shade of Pompeius began to be avenged on his murderers. At the commencement of the outbreak Cæsar had seized the person of Pothinus, who was in attendance upon the young king, and detecting him in correspondence with Achilles he put him summarily to death. Soon after, Arsinoë, who hoped by means of the Egyptian general to elevate herself into the royal seat, having cause to be dissatisfied with his conduct, induced her confidant Ganymedes to assassinate him. The adhesion of the army she secured by a munificent largess, appointed Ganymedes her minister and lieutenant, and, assuming the diadem of her ancestors, caused herself to be proclaimed sole queen of Egypt.³

The Alexandrians pressed the blockade with pertinacity. They could not hope to dislodge the enemy by force, but they expected to reduce him by cutting off his means of

Sudden end of
Pothinus and
Achillas.

Arsinoë pro-
claims herself
queen.

Cæsar is
blockaded in
Alexandria.

¹ Cæs. *B.C.* iii. 112.

² Auct. *de Bell. Alexand.* 1, 2.

³ Auct. *de Bell. Alex.* 4. : Dion, xlii. 39.

subsistence. A contemporary writer describes the artificial contrivances by which the population of Alexandria obtained their constant abundance of water. Rain, it is well known, rarely falls in Egypt, nor were there living springs for the supply of fountains. The common people, indeed, were content with the water of the Nile in the turbid state in which it flows through their slimy plain; but the houses of the wealthier classes were supplied by means of subterranean channels, with which the whole city was mined, and through which the stream of the river was carried into reservoirs, where the impure sediment was deposited. Such of these channels as led to the parts of the city occupied by the Romans the Alexandrians obstructed, so as to prevent the river from flowing into them; they then filled them again with sea-water, raised by hydraulic machinery, in the construction of which they were eminently expert. This operation caused at first great consternation among the Romans, and still more among the native population shut up within their defences. But its effect was defeated by Cæsar's sagacity. He caused his soldiers to dig pits on the sandy beach, and the brackish water which oozed up in them furnished a sufficient supply, not altogether unfit for drinking.¹ At the same time the arrival of a legion from Asia, with a convoy of provisions and military stores, at a point a little to the west of the city, revived the courage of the besieged, and restored the fortunes of their commander.

¹ When the English besieged Alexandria in 1801, they cut the canal which supplied it with water; but the French garrison found a sufficient quantity in the tanks. Water, however, might have been procured by digging, though not in large quantities nor very good. Sir R. Wilson's *Exped. to Egypt*, p. 215. Cæsar's expedient has been resorted to by exploring parties on the coast of Australia. See for instance Eyre's letter to the Colonial Secretary of Swan River in the *Journal of the Geogr. Soc.* xiii. 180. Captain Marryat, in one of his novels, mentions this filtration of salt-water by percolation through sand as an authentic, though little known fact.

The Rhodian vessels which had betaken themselves to Cæsar's side were now of great service to him in establishing a communication with these reinforcements. The islanders of Rhodes had succeeded to the nautical skill of Athens and Corinth, and were among the most expert mariners of the time. Combined with the small flotilla which Cæsar had brought with him, and the ships which had lately arrived, these new allies presented a formidable force. The Egyptians, however, though the royal fleet had been destroyed, possessed considerable resources for the equipment of a naval armament. They collected from every quarter all the vessels they could muster, and hastily constructed others, till they found themselves in a condition to dispute once more the approach to the harbour. Nor were they less vigorous in the attack they made upon the enemy's defences by land. The crisis of danger called forth all Cæsar's energies: he never exposed his person more boldly, or encountered more imminent peril. At one moment he was so hard pressed as to be forced to leap from his vessel into the sea, and swim for his life, carrying his most valuable papers in his hand above the water, and leaving his cloak in the possession of the assailants, who retained it as a trophy, as the Arvernians had preserved his sword.¹

The Egyptians indeed were ultimately worsted in every encounter, but they could still return to the attack with increased numbers, and Cæsar's resources were so straitened, that he was not disinclined to listen to terms of accommodation, the insincerity of which was transparent. The Alexandrian populace declared themselves weary of the rule of their young princess, and disgusted with the tyranny of Ganymedes. Their rightful sovereign once restored to them, they would unite heartily with

Cæsar swims
for life.

Cæsar restores
Ptolemæus to
his subjects.

¹ Dion, xlii. 40.; Suet. *Jul.* 64.

the republic, and defy the fury of the upstart and the usurper. It cannot be supposed that the Roman general was deceived by these protestations: the bad faith of the Alexandrians was already proverbial in the West. But he expected perhaps that the rivalry of Ptolemæus and Arsinoë would create dissension in their camps: he may have preferred coping with the young king in open war, to keeping a guard over him, and watching the intrigues with which he beguiled his captivity: possibly the surrender was made in concession to a pressure he could not resist, and was adopted as a means of gaining time. But when Ptolemæus was restored to his subjects, and immediately led them to another attack upon Cæsar's position, the soldiers are said to have felt no little satisfaction at the reward of what they deemed their general's weak compliance.¹

Cleopatra, whose blandishments were still the solace of the Roman general throughout his desperate adventure, rejoiced to see her brother thus treacherously array himself in rash hostility to her protector. The toils were beginning to close around the young king. Mithridates of Pergamus, an adherent in whose fidelity and conduct Cæsar placed great reliance, was advancing with the reinforcements he had been commissioned to collect in Syria and the adjacent provinces. He reduced Pelusium, the key of Egypt by land as Pharos was by sea, and crossed the Nile at the head of the Delta, routing a division of the king's troops which attempted to check his progress. Ptolemæus led forth his army to confront the new invader, and was immediately followed by Cæsar. The Romans came up with the Egyptians, crossed the river in the face of their superior numbers, and attacked them in their entrenchments, which, from their acquaintance

Battle of the Nile, and death of Ptolemæus.

¹ Auct. *Bell. Alex.* 24.

with military art, as taught both by the Macedonians and the Romans, were probably not deficient in scientific construction. But the shock of the veterans was irresistible. The Egyptians fled, leaving great numbers slaughtered within the lines, and falling into their own trenches in confused and mangled heaps. The fugitives rushed to the channel of the Nile, where their vessels were stationed, and crowded into them without order or measure. One of them in which Ptolemæus had himself taken refuge was thus overladen and sank.¹

This signal defeat, and still more the death of their unfortunate sovereign, reduced the defenders of the monarchy to despair. The populace of Alexandria issued from their gates to meet the conqueror in the attitude of suppliants, and with the religious ceremonies by which they were wont to deprecate the wrath of their legitimate rulers. He entered the city, and directed his course through the principal streets, where the hostile barricades were levelled at his approach, till he reached the quarters in which his own garrison was stationed. He now reconstituted the government by appointing Cleopatra to the sovereignty, in conjunction with another younger brother, while he despatched Arsinoë under custody to await his future triumph at Rome. The throne of his favourite he pretended to secure by leaving a Roman force in Alexandria. The pride of the republic was gratified by thus advancing another step towards the complete subjugation of a country it had long coveted. Cæsar was anxious that so much Roman blood as had been shed in his recent campaigns should not appear to have sunk into the earth, and borne no fruit of glory and advantage to the state: he did not deem it expedient,

The Alexandrians submit to Cæsar, who restores Cleopatra.

¹ Auct. *Bell. Alex.* 29—31.

however, to constitute Egypt a province of the empire, and transfer it from the hands of a woman and a child to some warlike and ambitious proconsul.¹ The whole of this episode in his eventful history, his arrogant dictation to the rulers of a foreign people, his seizing and keeping in captivity the person of the sovereign, his discharging him on purpose that he might compromise himself by engaging in direct hostilities, and his taking advantage of his death to settle the succession and intrude a foreign army upon the new monarch, form altogether a pregnant example of the craft and unscrupulousness of Roman ambition.²

But in their deadly contests with their neighbours, the wolves of Italy were not always the assailants. The dependent monarchies on the frontier watched the intrigues of the curia and the forum, and profited by the disasters of their chiefs and parties. The discomfiture of the senate let loose upon the republic a new assailant, the son of its most inveterate and dangerous foe. Pharnaces, to whom Pompeius had granted the kingdom of the Bosporus, in reward for his unnatural treachery, had held aloof from the great gathering of the Eastern auxiliaries in the republican camp. C. Cassius, as we have seen, had been despatched, before the event of the contest was ascertained, to stimulate his flagging zeal in his patron's cause. But when the event of Pharsalia became known to him, he augured that the time was come for resuming the independent attitude of his illustrious father, and wresting the ancient patrimony of his house from a foreign yoke. He first made a descent upon the Lesser Armenia and Cappadocia,

Pharnaces attempts to recover his father's empire.

¹ Liv. *Epit.* cxii.: "Regnum Ægypti victor Cleopatrarum fratrique ejus minori permisit, veritus provinciam facere, ne quandoque violentiorem præsidem nacta, novarum rerum materia esset."

² Dion, *lilii.* 44.

where Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes occupied the precarious thrones upon which Pompeius had seated them. At the moment when Calvinus received his leader's pressing message to send all his available forces to his aid in Egypt, he was summoned also to defend these petty princes whose dominions were the outworks of the empire itself. Deiotarus had been one of the most devoted of the Pompeian allies; but he had recently submitted to Cæsar, and engaged to furnish a sum of money for the demands of his troops, an obligation which he declared it would be impossible for him to discharge, unless protected himself from the spoiler. Calvinus, while requiring Pharnaces to desist from insulting the majesty of Rome, protested that he held the honour of the republic far dearer than gold. He put himself in motion with one legion, having sent two to Cæsar, and he was joined by two other detachments which Deiotarus had equipped and trained on the Roman model, and by an equal number from Cappadocia. He had with him also another legion recently levied in Pontus, so that his force was such as might justly inspire him with confidence. Pharnaces retreated from Cappadocia, and attempted to amuse the advancing enemy by negotiations, while the fate of Cæsar was yet in the balance. But Calvinus pressed upon him, and demanded a battle. The conflict resulted in the complete defeat of the Roman army, with the loss of a large number of knights of illustrious family. The worsted general effected an orderly retreat, but he abandoned both Armenia and Cappadocia to the invader, and the province of Pontus fell again for a moment under the sway of the dynasty of Mithridates.¹

He defeats
Cæsar's lieu-
tenant Cal-
vinus.

Cæsar's policy required him to postpone the pursuit of his own personal enemies to the duty of chastising the invaders of the

The Cæsareans
suffer reverses
in Illyricum.

¹ Auct. *Bell. Alex.* 34—40.; App. *B. C.* ii. 91.; Dion, xlii. 46.

empire. The partisans of the old broken faction which still called itself the senate and people of Rome were gathering head; and the difficulties which surrounded their adversary in a remote region, together with other misfortunes which befel his cause in various quarters, encouraged many who had thrown away their swords in the flight from Pharsalia to return to the standards of Scipio and Labienus. Cæsar, on his part, even in the moment of victory, was well aware that the strength of his opponents would not succumb under a single defeat; and when he determined himself to follow in the track of Pompeius, he provided against the revival of the beaten party in the countries which had witnessed their recent disaster. He had commissioned his lieutenant Cornificius to hold Illyricum with two legions, while an additional force of new recruits was summoned from Italy to support him in that province and secure the possession of Macedonia. These reinforcements were led by Gabinius, the profligate adventurer who had first made himself notorious by his base subserviency to Pompeius, and who now threw himself without a blush into the party of his victorious rival. But his new service was one of great difficulty. Octavius still rode with a powerful fleet in the Adriatic; and though he had failed in preventing the transit of Gabinius, he cut him off from further communication with Italy, and intercepted his supplies. The country in which the Cæsarean forces were moving was so exhausted by the support of immense armies, that they were sorely pressed for sustenance, while, from their want of military stores, they could make no impression upon the strongholds which they invested. The natives, harassed by repeated exactions, and emboldened by these favourable circumstances, rose against them in the neighbourhood of Salona, and inflicted severe loss on their feeble

battalions. It was only with leaving two thousand men and many officers on the field that Death of Gabinius early in 707. Gabinius could effect his entrance into safe quarters at Salona; cooped up for months in that fortress, the state of his affairs so depressed his spirits that he sickened and died. This reverse, however, was in a great measure retrieved Vatinius obtains a success at sea. by the exploit of Vatinius, who attacked the fleet of Octavius with an inferior force, and obtained such an advantage over it, as to induce its gallant commander to desist from cruising in the narrow seas, and betake himself first to the coast of Greece, and eventually to Africa.

In vain had Cæsar affected moderation in his treatment of the provinces; his lieutenants either did not understand his motives, or felt no interest in them. The common vice of proconsular extortion had well-nigh overthrown his party in Affairs of Spain. Misconduct of Cæsar's lieutenant, Q. Cassius Longinus. Spain, almost immediately after he had himself quitted it. Q. Cassius Longinus, already mentioned as one of the pretended patriots who fled to the camp at Ravenna, had been appointed to the government of the Further Province. This man had formerly served as quæstor in the same country under the proconsulate of Pompeius, and was already infamous there for his cruelty and rapacity.¹ But Cæsar could not refuse to reward the services of an adherent of such high personal distinction. He nearly paid dear for his compliance. Cassius had already irritated his people by his exactions, when directions arrived from his chief to transport a military force into Africa, in order to curb the officious zeal of Juba, who was sending aid to Pompeius in Macedonia. The proprætor was well pleased to have the conduct of an operation which promised to open a fair

¹ *Auct. Bell. Alex.* 49—64.; *Dion*, xlii. 15. 16.

field for plunder. He made his preparations on a large scale, and his fresh demands upon the resources of the province added, doubtless, to the odium he had previously incurred. Certain citizens of Italica entered into a conspiracy against his person. He was severely wounded, and being supposed dead, one of his officers, Laterensis, prepared to assume the command, to the great joy of the soldiers, who detested their general. But Cassius surviving the blows which had been inflicted upon him, such was the discipline of the legions that they immediately returned to their fidelity. The conspirators, and with them Laterensis, who was also implicated in their abortive deed, were delivered up and put to death with torture. The news of the victory of Pharsalia which now arrived, rendered the proposed expedition unnecessary; but Cassius proceeded to indemnify himself for his disappointment by redoubling his exactions upon the people subjected to his rule. The passions of the provincials became more furiously inflamed than ever. The legions in occupation had been either raised or recruited in the province, and partook fully in the feelings of their countrymen. The authority of the proprætor was at length shaken off, and his quæstor Marcellus invited by acclamation to take the command. Cassius, who retained only a small force about his own person, now called to his support both Lepidus, the proconsul of the Hither Province, and Bogudes, king of Mauretania, while he fortified himself on a hill over against the city of Corduba. Marcellus boldly summoned him to surrender. Lepidus on his arrival took the side of the new governor, for he was convinced that it was requisite for Cæsar's interests that his lieutenant should atone by disgrace for his impolitic extortions. This service Cæsar at a later period acknowledged with magnificent gratitude. He assigned him the distinction

of a triumph, though in fact he had fought no battle.¹ But Cassius had chosen his position well, and might not have been easily dislodged from it: when, however, his successor, Trebonius, arrived in the province at the commencement of the following year, he voluntarily relinquished his hostile attitude. Being allowed to retire unmolested with his ill-gotten treasures, he took ship at Malaca for Italy, and was lost in a storm off the mouth of the Iberus. But the guilty legions, which had revolted from their hateful commander, could not easily be persuaded that their offence admitted of pardon. Uneasy and dissatisfied with their own conduct, they began to meditate defection. They deputed envoys to treat secretly with Scipio in Africa.² The result of the proprætor's misconduct was yet to be further developed.

Cæsar's protracted absence from the capital strongly marked the confidence he felt in the stability of his arrangements there. The ferocious menaces of the Pompeians against all who submitted to his ascendancy had tended to attach firmly to him the great mass of the resident citizens. But we may imagine with what anxious suspense the upper classes of Rome awaited the event of the long operations in Illyricum and Thessaly. Servilius, Cæsar's colleague in the consulship, exercised paramount authority in the city. He watched with vigilance every indication of the popular feelings, and surrounded every suspected enemy with secret spies. Every courier who arrived with news of Cæsar's successes was received with spontaneous or forced acclamations. But there were not wanting sinister rumours of his discomfiture, which many

The result of the battle of Pharsalia and the death of Pompeius announced at Rome.

¹ Dion, xliii. 1.

² Dion, xliii. 29. The soldiers who proved so unfaithful to Cæsar were mostly Afranians, who had been drafted into the victorious ranks. Comp. Dion, xliii. 36,

turbulent spirits in the great focus of confusion secretly welcomed and disseminated. The report of the victory of Pharsalia announced a catastrophe too momentous to command immediate belief. The conqueror himself had sent no official notification of the event to the senate; he felt it unbecoming to offer formal congratulations on a triumph over his fellow citizens. But as soon as the fact was sufficiently established, the government decreed the removal of the statues of Pompeius and Sulla from the open space which they occupied with kindred effigies in front of the rostra. This was a final declaration of defiance, not towards Pompeius only, but towards his party, the recent rulers of the republic; and many still feared and hesitated when they surveyed the manifold resources of the great Roman oligarchy, and mused on the rapid reverses of civil warfare. The disasters of Marius had been even more humiliating; yet Marius had returned in triumph to the scene of his former greatness, he had wreaked an awful retribution on his enemies, and had died in the enjoyment of yet another consulship. The rumours of Pompeius's assassination were obstinately discredited; but the most incredulous were at last convinced by the fatal token of his ring, transmitted by Cæsar to Rome.

From this moment the face of things was entirely changed; the previous hesitation had been inspired by timidity, not by any remains of love for the murdered hero. From henceforth every scruple about paying court to the conqueror vanished. His flatterers multiplied in the senate and the forum, and they only vied one with another in suggesting new honours for him. Decrees were issued investing him with unbounded authority over the lives and fortunes of the vanquished. When the news arrived that the standard of the republic was again raised in Africa, the power of

The senate
and people
heap honours
upon Cæsar :
Oct. A. U. 706.

making war and peace was surrendered to his sole decision. A semblance of legal authority was thus hastily impressed beforehand upon acts on which their absent ruler had already resolved. Cæsar was next created dictator for the extraordinary period of a whole year¹; whereupon he appointed Antonius, whom he had sent back to Italy, his master of the horse. Antonius constantly appeared in arms in the city, and caused both offence and alarm by the military state he maintained. But the insecurity of his position demanded these odious precautions. A popular sedition was excited by the intrigues of Dolabella, who had tried to ingratiate himself with the people in his office of tribune by reviving the measures of spoliation recently projected by Cælius.² He found himself thwarted, as always happened in similar cases, by a rival occupant of the tribunitian bench, equally unprincipled and equally anxious to distinguish himself by rushing to the protection of the menaced interests. Antonius, already incensed against the innovator on personal and domestic grounds, was compelled to interfere with a military force, in defiance of the sanctity of the much abused office, and vindicate the supremacy of the dictator and the senate against both the contending parties. He acted with unflinching vigour against the excited populace, and quelled the riot with the slaughter of eight hundred citizens.³ His armed mediation between the demagogues was maintained, however, with scrupulous moderation. He abstained from putting forth his strength to crush their noisy pretensions, so that they continued from time to time to disturb the tranquillity of the city, and were only

He is created
dictator for
one year.

Intrigues of
Dolabella
repressed by
Antonius.

¹ Cæsar's second dictatorship dates from October, A.U. 706. See Fischer, *Röm. Zeitt.* p. 282.

² Dion, xlii. 32.; Cic. *ad Att.* xi. 12.; Liv. *Epit.* cxiii.

³ Liv. *l.c.*

lulled by the periodical rumours of Cæsar's approach. As soon as the dictator was known to be still engaged abroad, they constantly broke out afresh; nor did they finally subside till his actual arrival quelled disaffection, and awed every passion to obedience.¹

Cæsar received information of these disturbances when already on his march from Alexandria to confront the invaders of the empire on the borders of Pontus. Nor were these civil commotions the only clouds which lowered in the horizon of Italy. A spirit of insubordination had broken out once more among the legions. The twelfth and even the tenth, on whose valour their general had so long implicitly relied, dared openly to disobey the orders of their officers. These two legions had been transported across the sea from Macedonia, and were now quartered in Campania. They demanded lands and largesses, and when it was announced that they were required to pass over to Sicily, they refused again to quit the soil to which they looked for their reward, and enter upon another career of unrequited service.² But even this alarming intelligence could not divert Cæsar from his undertaking, from which he expected to reap such a harvest of wealth as should relieve him for the future from all pecuniary embarrassments. He contented himself with despatching orders to Antonius to reduce the mutineers to submission by threats or promises; but he was not aware, probably, of the excesses they had already committed in stoning the officers deputed to remonstrate with them.³ Meanwhile, his own advance through the provinces of Asia resembled a triumphant pageant. The Orientals might prostrate themselves without dishonour before the conqueror of

Disaffection
of Cæsar's
veterans in
Italy.

He advances
to encounter
Pharnaces,
and defeats
him in the
battle of Zela

¹ Dion, xlii. 17—33.; Plut. *Cæs.* 51., *Anton.* 9.

² Dion, xlii. 5.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* xi. 21.: "Legio xii., ad quam primum Sulla venit, lapidibus egiæse hominem dicitur."

the great Pompeius, whom they had long regarded as the type of invincible power. Deiotarus threw himself at the hero's feet, and gave utterance to the most abject excuses for having ventured to attend upon the vanquished leader. He confessed that, as a dependant on the majesty of the republic, it was not for him to interfere in the controversies of their rival factions, but simply to obey the ministers of her power on his own frontier. But Cæsar, though he condescended to accept this submission, replied haughtily, that the battle of Pharsalia was no party quarrel, but the vindication of the senate and the consulate against rebels and traitors. He did not, however, relax for a moment from the customary rapidity of his movements. Pharnaces was struck with consternation. The crafty Asiatic was well aware indeed of the circumstances of Italy, and of the urgent necessity for the victor's speedy return thither. But in vain did he seek to amuse his impatient adversary by negotiation. Cæsar would give ear to no trifling messages: he pressed resolutely forward, and finally reached the barbarian host at the town of Zela in Pontus. Thus brought to bay, the son of Mithridates prepared for a final struggle, on the same field on which his father had worsted the detested Romans in one of his most memorable victories.¹ A bloody battle ensued², in which the arms of the republic were crowned with complete success. The undisciplined hordes of eastern sovereigns, once broken and routed, never rallied again. Pharnaces himself escaped from the field, but only to fall in an obscure conflict with a neighbouring potentate.³ His kingdom had been already stripped from him by

¹ Appian, *B. Mithr.* 120

² Kalendar. Amitern. Orell. *Inscr.* ii. 397.: "iv. Non. Sext. feriæ quod eo die C. Cæsar C.F. . . . in Ponto regem Pharnacem devicit
² Aug. 707 = 20 Mai. 47. A.C."

³ Appian, *B. Mithr.* l. c.; Dion, xlii. 47

a decree of the conqueror, and conferred upon the chieftain of Pergamus¹, whose services in Egypt have been already mentioned.

Cæsar allowed himself to cast only one distant glance towards the frontiers of Parthia, and then resolutely turned his face westward. Perhaps he was even then revolving in his mind the gigantic schemes of Oriental conquest which he announced at a later period, but was destined never to undertake. From this period, however, we begin to trace a change for the worse in his character. The hero whose freedom from display had so long charmed the world became intoxicated by the fumes of eastern incense, and the disposal of forfeited crowns. He now affected to admire the good fortune of Pompeius, whose exalted reputation was built upon the defeat of the servile armies of Asia.² The rapidity of his own conquest he signalized, we are told, by the arrogant bulletin, which has passed into a familiar proverb, *I came, I saw, I conquered.*³ But his intercourse with Cleopatra had corrupted the proud simplicity of the Roman statesman. He already meditated bringing her to the capital, and there parading her in the face of his countrymen as the partner of the honours they lavished upon himself. The state of feeling among the Romans regarding the intercourse of the sexes was such as we can with difficulty appreciate. Yet we shall very imperfectly understand the position and character of their greatest men, unless we seek to put ourselves in their place, and view things for a moment with their eyes. Marriage among the Romans was hallowed by religious feelings, but such marriage only as a strict

Cæsar's
character corrupted by his
intercourse
with Cleo-
patra.

¹ Dion, xlii. 48.

² Suet. *Jul.* 35.; App. *B.C.* ii. 91.

³ Plutarch (*Cæs.* 50.) says that this expression was used in a letter to one Amintius; the name is probably a mistake. Suetonius (*Jul.* 37.) asserts that the three words were inscribed on a banner, and carried in Cæsar's triumph. Appian and Dion refer to them as notorious.

and jealous nationality prescribed. Concubinage, on the other hand, was tolerated, licensed, and protected; but even such concubinage, in acquiring a moral sanction, submitted to certain implied restrictions. Generally, an avowed and permanent connexion with a foreigner was regarded as shocking and degrading: with an Oriental, and especially an Egyptian, whose laxity of manners offended Italian notions beyond all other people, it seemed monstrous and incestuous. The disgust of Europeans in the middle ages at the union of a noble Christian with a Jewish damsel, was faint, perhaps, in comparison with this national horror among the Romans. With all such antipathies of race Cæsar refused to sympathize; such antique prejudices he trampled under foot; and he indulged proudly, perhaps wantonly, in this lofty disregard of the prepossessions of his weaker countrymen. But man cannot defy mankind with impunity. Cæsar chilled the applause of his countrymen by this inhuman contempt for their cherished sentiments. He converted the cordial greetings they were prepared to lavish upon him into the hollow flattery of fear. Nor was this the only injury he thus inflicted on his own fame and fortunes. If the sorceress of the Nile contributed to corrupt her admirer's native sense and humanity, no less did she vitiate his taste by the enchanted cup of Canopic luxury. She taught him to despise as mean and homely the splendour of the Circus and the Capitol. She imbued him with the gorgeous and selfish principles of Oriental despotism, and debased him to the menial adulation of slaves, parasites and eunuchs.¹ It is with no wish to heap unmerited obloquy on a woman whose faults were those of her birth and position, that history brands with infamy her influence

¹ Lucan, x. 127.:

“Tum famulæ numerus turbæ, populusque minister . . .
Nec non infelix ferro mollita juvenus.”

on the Roman hero. Regardless of her personal dignity, and indifferent to human life, she maintained herself on an Oriental throne by the arts of an Oriental potentate. The course of her chequered career will display to us hereafter a character in which good contended with evil, Macedonian magnanimity with Egyptian suppleness. But in this place it becomes us to remark the fatal effect of a connexion of disparagement, by which Cæsar felt himself degraded in the eyes of his own countrymen. If from henceforward we find his generosity tinged with ostentation, his courage with arrogance, his resolution with harshness: if he becomes restless, and fretful, and impatient of contradiction; if his conduct is marked with contempt for mankind rather than with indulgence to their weakness, it is to this impure source that the melancholy change is to be traced.

CHAPTER XIX.

Character of Cæsar's policy in Rome.—He assumes the dictatorship for the third time.—He quells a mutiny among his soldiers.—The senatorial party collect their forces in Africa.—Cato lands at Cyrene, crosses the Libyan desert, and joins the forces of Scipio at Utica.—Campaign in Africa decided by the victory of Cæsar at Thapsus.—Dispersion of the Republican forces, and death of their principal leaders.—Cato undertakes to defend Utica.—His adherents abandon the contest.—He commits suicide.—The dictatorship for ten years and other distinctions showered upon Cæsar.—On his return to Rome he celebrates four triumphs, and gratifies the people with shows and largesses.—Dedication of the Julian Forum.—The war renewed by Cnæus Pompeius in Spain.—He is supported by Cæsar's discontented soldiers.—Cæsar's final campaign, and decisive victory at Munda.—Of all the senatorial leaders Sextus alone remains in arms.—Disturbances in Syria. (Sept, A.U. 707.—April, A.U. 709.)

THE dictator landed at Tarentum in the month of September, of the year 707. He arrived laden with the spoils or presents of eastern cities and potentates; he had carried off in every quarter the treasures which had been contributed for his rival's use; and to punish the city of Tyre for its devotion to the Pompeian family, he had rifled the great temple of Melcarth or Hercules, not inferior in fame and opulence to the same god's most western shrine at Gades.¹ He accepted *golden crowns*, a decorous expression for large donatives in money, from the chieftains who solicited his favour. Two things, he used to say, were needful for getting and keeping power, soldiers and money, and each of these was to be gained by means of the other. The immense sums he thus amassed were destined to satisfy the demands of his

Cæsar arrives in Italy. The nobles make their submission to him.

¹ Dion, xlii. 49.

veterans, to provide for the expenses of his triumph, and to amuse the populace of the city with spectacles, largesses and buildings, on a scale of unexampled magnificence. In reassuming the government of Italy, Antonius had received express orders to prevent any followers of the senate from landing in the Peninsula. Many of the nobles were anxious to make their submission to the new government. They trusted to recover thereby their houses and estates, and escape the proscription and confiscation now generally apprehended. But Cæsar, in the unsettled state of men's minds at Rome, could not admit into the city another possible element of discord.¹ He insisted that the deserters from the Pompeian standard should repair to him personally at Alexandria; and during his residence in Egypt there were many such who sought him in his quarters, and devoted themselves with professions of zeal to his service. Cicero alone, whose escape from Italy had apparently been connived at by Antonius at an earlier period, now obtained permission to establish himself at Brundisium.² Further he was not allowed to proceed, and he remained there for many months in a state of great perplexity and apprehension. On the one hand, cut off from the enjoyment of his estates, and debarred the exercise of his talents in the forum, he was reduced, together no doubt with many others of the proud nobility of Rome, to considerable pecuniary embarrassments³; on the other, he had the mortification to learn that his brother Quintus, who

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* xi. 7.: "Ad me misit Antonius exemplum Cæsar's ad se literarum, in quibus erat, se audisse Catonem et L. Metellum in Italiam venisse, Romæ ut essent palam: id sibi non placere, ne qui motus ex eo fierent: prohiberique omnes Italia nisi quorum ipse causam cognovisset."

² Cicero urged that he had received an invitation from Dolabella at Antonius's instigation: he goes on to say, "Tum ille edixit ita ut me exceperet et Lælium nominatim. Quod sane nollem. Poterat enim sine nomine res ipsa excipi."

³ Cic. *ad Att.* xi. 11. 13.

had abandoned his general and patron at the commencement of the war, had now thrown himself at Cæsar's feet, and was trying to regain the favour he had forfeited by calumniating his more scrupulous relative.¹ Still shaken by every breath of rumour, which at one moment resounded with the successes of the conqueror in the east, and echoed at the next the vaunting anticipations of the republican champion in Africa², the vacillating statesman awaited the result of events in uneasy seclusion. But when he heard of Cæsar's arrival on the coast, he finally yielded to the impulse to which he had been long inclined. He immediately came forward in hopes of being the first to greet the new ruler of the commonwealth, while Cæsar was generously desirous of sparing him the humiliation of mingling with the crowd who were hastening upon the same business.³ Received with affability, and treated with a show of confidence, Cicero retired with more cheerfulness than he had long experienced to the shades of his Tusculan villa; and whether there or at Rome, his placing himself under the protection of the new government gave it some colour of authority in the eyes of his clients and admirers.

The conduct of his own friends in the city was a subject of greater anxiety to Cæsar, on assuming his place at the head of affairs, than the intrigues of his adversaries. He rebuked the turbulent proceedings of Dolabella, but abstained from punishing one with whose services he could not well dispense. He maintained firmly the principles of his own recent enactment

*His firmness
in protecting
them against
the cupidity of
his own party.*

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* xi. 8.: "Quintus misit filium non solum sui deprecatores sed etiam oppugnatorem mei" (comp. 12—14.).

² Cic. *ad Att.* xi. 10. (xii. Kal. Feb. A.U. 707.): "De Africanis rebus longe alia nobis, ac tu scripseras, nuntiantur. Nihil enim firmius esse dicunt, nihil paratius. Accedit Hispania et alienata Italia; legionum nec vis eadem nec voluntas; urbanæ res perditæ."

³ Plut. *Cic.* 39.

regarding the debtors' claims¹; nor could they dispute the fairness of an arbitrator who replied to their clamours by declaring that no man in Rome was more deeply interested in the terms of the compromise than himself.² On the other hand, he winked at the private irregularities by which Antonius had disgraced his leader's party hardly less than his own character; nor would he listen to the counsels of those who exhorted him to issue a decree of proscription against his enemies. It may be doubted whether his sentence of confiscation extended further than to the estates of Pompeius himself and his two sons.³ In making these examples, he probably wished to stigmatize the family of his personal rival as fomenters of a mere private quarrel, and thus to distinguish their cause from that of a great national party. But it was impossible for the citizens, when they saw the house of the illustrious Pompeius on the Palatine sold for Cæsar's own profit, not to attribute such an action to cupidity or vindictiveness. Antonius, with his usual reckless prodigality, outbade every competitor; but he was surprised and offended when he found himself compelled to pay down the stipulated price.⁴ He deemed that his services, both past and in prospect, might command the trifling indulgence of release from a paltry debt. He found, however, that his patron was in earnest, and prudently submitted to the affront.

It is impossible not to admire the lofty idea which

¹ Dion's apparent statement to the contrary (xlii. 51.) refers undoubtedly to the compromise which Cæsar effected between the debtors and their creditors in his first dictatorship. Drumann, iii 567., ann. 67.

² Dion, xlii. 50.

³ Cic. *de Off.* i. 14., *Tusc.* i. 35., *ad Att.* xi. 20; Val. Max. vi. 2. 11.; Dion xlii. 50.

⁴ Cic. *Philipp.* ii. 25. The authority for this part of the anecdote is surely suspicious. That the estates of the Pompeii were sold and purchased partly by Antonius is stated by Dion, xlv. 9.

Cæsar conceived of the claims and duties of the monarchy he sought to establish. He felt that he occupied his exalted eminence by virtue of his acknowledged superiority to all around him in strength and sagacity of character. Obedience he demanded as submission, not to his own arbitrary caprice, but to the principles of reason. He claimed that his word should be law, as the recognised expression of the necessities of the time. It was because they had become obviously inapplicable to existing circumstances that the formal usages of the commonwealth were made to give way to the hand of the innovator. When Cæsar elevated individuals to civil offices before the legal age, he assumed that the old checks upon precocious ambition or popular favouritism were no longer required. In widening the doors of admission to the public boards and corporations¹, he was accommodating them to the increase in the number of candidates eligible to official distinction. If he replenished the senate with a crowd of men of inferior rank, selected from the most distinguished officers of his army, he was infusing new and healthy blood into a body debilitated by luxury, and deprived by the recent wars of a large portion of its members. In making his appointments to the highest offices of the state, in which the people hardly sought to retain even a nominal share, he had the great difficulty of all usurpers to surmount, to satisfy the claims of his adherents without destroying the dignity and usefulness of the offices themselves. Lepidus, who had rendered Cæsar a great service by his promptness in securing him his first dictatorship, was gratified with the proprætorship in Spain, and upon his return was allowed the honours of a triumph, though he had performed no military exploit, and acquired no tro-

Cæsar's policy in securing the services of men of all parties.

¹ Dion, xlii. 51.

phies except the presents he had extorted from the provincials.¹ The good offices of Calenus and Vatinius were rewarded with the enjoyment of the consulship for the three months of the year which remained after Cæsar's return to Rome.² Sallustius, the historian, had a strong claim upon Cæsar's favour, on account of his expulsion from the senate by Appius Claudius, which he justly attributed to his political rather than to his moral delinquencies. The doors of that assembly were again opened to him by his appointment to the prætorship. But if the ruler of the commonwealth condescended in some instances to allow the claims of party to influence his favours, he felt for the most part that true dignity and policy required him to obliterate any such distinctions, and make all men feel practically that they stood upon the same level of common inferiority, and of dependence upon himself. In the distribution of the provinces, the offices which the candidates had previously served, and even the ranks in which they had stood on the field of Pharsalia, were equally disregarded. Submission to the new government was the only condition required for the honour of sharing in its emoluments. Marcus Brutus, who had been so prominent a champion of the senate, received an equal mark of confidence with Decimus, who had served Cæsar with fidelity and success throughout the Gallic wars. The one received the government of the Cisalpine Gaul, the other that of the province beyond the mountains. A crowning act of magnanimous self-reliance was the restoration of the statues both of Sulla and Pompeius³, which the obsequious Cæsareans had overthrown in imitation of the previous examples of so many party leaders of less lofty character. But if the new hero

¹ Dion, xliii. 1.

² Dion, xlii. 55.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 75.; Plut. *Cic.* 40.: ἔφη γὰρ ὁ Κικέρων, ὅτι ταύτη τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ Καῖσαρ τοὺς μὲν Πομπηίου ἴστησι, τοὺς δὲ αὐτοῦ πῆγνυσι ἀνδρίαντας

could thus defy comparison with the most illustrious of the dead, much more did he feel himself exalted above all living competition.

Upon his return to Rome, Cæsar caused himself to be created dictator for the third time, and again for an annual term. He also designated himself and Lepidus consuls for the ensuing year. But it deserves to be remarked, that he now described himself on his coins as dictator for the second, and not for the third time. He thus turned men's eyes upon himself as the founder of a new order of things; for the first appointment had been made in accordance with constitutional precedent, and was a last vestige of the republic; while those which succeeded were altogether irregular, and betokened the establishment of a new monarchical era.¹ But in the midst of these

dazzling distinctions the demands of the legions in Campania caused Cæsar the greatest disquietude; for the forces of the enemy were daily augmenting in Africa, and it was incumbent upon him to go forth without delay, and combat them on another field of battle. Sallustius, who had been sent to quell the rising mutiny, was driven back to Rome ignominiously.² Two senators of prætorian rank, Cosconius and Galba, had been slain in the tumult. The refractory legions, imbued with the blood of their officers, marched in frantic excitement to the gates of the city, and pitched their tents in the Campus Martius. Cæsar sent once more to inquire the causes of their discontent, but they replied that they would confer only with himself in person. All the military force he had in attendance upon him consisted of the few cohorts with which

¹ See Drumann, iii. 565. This is true of some of the coins of this date, on which we read "cos. tert. dict. iter.;" but others are inscribed more correctly.

² Dion, xlii. 52.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 92.

Cæsar assumes
the dictator-
ship for the
third time:
Oct. A.U. 707.

He quells a
mutiny among
his soldiers.

Antonius had recently maintained the peace of the city, and of the fidelity even of these he was doubtful. He relied on his own courage to save him. Without betraying any symptoms of anxiety, he confronted the mutineers, and demanded what it was they desired. They claimed their discharge and the liquidation of their long arrears; if required, as they expected, for further service, their swords must be bought by an extraordinary largess. But Cæsar acted over again the part which had succeeded so well at Placentia. He took them immediately at their first word: they had claimed their discharge; they were discharged. The composure and deliberateness of his resolve was signified in the word *Quirites*, by which he addressed them.¹ The legionaries were at once overcome with shame and confusion; the veterans of the Tenth especially felt the deepest remorse at the injustice of which they now accused themselves. But this time the indignant general remained cold and unmoved. He refused to lead his ancient favourites to another field of glory; he only permitted them to follow him, and exacted of their officers the most dangerous services, in which he did not choose to sacrifice the men whom he really loved. Nor did he miss the opportunity of the first occurrence of a breach of discipline to remind its authors of their recent misconduct, and to dismiss them with ignominy from his ranks.²

The chiefs of the republican party who had met at Coreyra soon began to act independently of each other, without submitting to any recognized leader or plan of operations. While Scipio, their ostensible head, led the largest division of their forces to the province of Africa, to effect a

Scipio joins
Varus and
Juba in
Africa.

¹ See the parallel occurrence above, Vol. II. p. 228. It seems not improbable that Cæsar employed the same mode of rebuking his rebellious soldiers on two distinct occasions..

² Auct. *B. Afric.* 54.

junction with the victorious armies of Varus and Juba¹, Labienus directed his course farther eastward, and made an attempt to possess himself of Cyrene, which, however, resisted and repulsed him. Cato

Cato on hearing of the death of Pompeius crosses over to the coast of Africa.

united himself with Cnæus Pompeius, and fell in at Patræ with Petreius and Faustus Sulla. Their combined squadrons now² crossed from the shore of Greece to that of Africa, with the intention of following the general who had abandoned them, and whom their last accounts represented as having betaken himself to Egypt. But when they met the flying vessels which bore Cornelia, together with Sextus, from the scene of her husband's murder³, being unaware of Cæsar's movements, and how scanty were his military equipments, they turned their faces from the east, at a juncture when an act of energy and boldness might have retrieved every disaster. Cnæus, indeed, urged with all the vehemence of his character a desperate attack on his father's murderers³, but he was overruled by the cautious prudence of Cato, who was now only anxious to unite together in one spot the scattered fragments of the party. The Roman general landed his little army in the neighbourhood of Cyrene, and demanded admittance. The inhabitants again closed their gates, but they had more respect for Cato than for their last assailant, and yielded on the first demonstration of force.⁴ Cato only required rest and provisions, and allowed no violence to be exercised against them; a rare act of clemency in a leader of the republican party towards a town which had made any show of resistance to its authority.⁵

From Cyrene Cato set sail to the westward. His

¹ Plutarch, *Cat. Min.* 56.; Appian, *B.C.* ii.

² Lucan, ix. 46.

³ Lucan, ix. 150. 166.

⁴ Lucan, ix. 297.; Plut. *Cat. Min.* 56.

⁵ Cato had himself sacked the town of Phycus in Crete for refusing shelter to his vessels. Lucan, ix. 40.

flotilla seems to have reached the Lesser Syrtis in safety, but at that point it was assailed by a tempest by which it suffered considerably, and it was not deemed prudent to coast those dangerous shores any farther in the boisterous season which had now set in.¹ The vessels were left in charge of Cnæus, to await more favourable weather for the continuation of their voyage.² But Cato was impatient of further delay, and, having laid before his followers the dangers of the route he was determined to take, put himself at the head of a devoted band, and led the way into the depths of the desert which skirts the head of the Lesser Syrtis.³ The winter was about to commence, and his march was fortunately more practicable than it would have been at any other season of the year.⁴ Nevertheless, the scarcity of water, the excessive heat, and, it is added, the noxious reptiles by which some districts were infested, rendered it a succession of unprecedented hardships. The inhospitable sands stretched for a distance of seven days' journey.⁵ The camel, it must

He traverses
the Libyan
desert.

¹ Lucan, ix. 320.

² Lucan, ix. 374.:

“Hæc eadem suadebat hyems quæ clauserat æquor.”

³ Lucan makes Cato land in the neighbourhood of the lake Tritonis, that is, at the Lesser Syrtis. He is the only author who gives any local details of this expedition, and our confidence in him is shaken by his introducing the temple of Hammon into the line of march. See Luc. ix. 511. seqq. The superstitious character of Labienus is indeed noticed incidentally by Plutarch, *Cic.* 38.: *Λαβιήνου δὲ μαντείαις τισὶν ἰσχυρίζομένου*, and I think it probable that the curious episode in the *Pharsalia*, in which Labienus advises Cato to consult the oracle of Jupiter Hammon, which the sage refuses to do, is founded upon some real fact, though its local application is undoubtedly fictitious.

⁴ Lucan, ix. 375. Plutarch says the same, but they were misled perhaps by the unreformed calendar. See the following note.

⁵ This is Plutarch's statement. Lucan makes the march through the desert occupy two whole months (ix. 940.):

“Bis positis Phœbe flammis, bis luce recepta
Vidit arenivagum surgens fugiensque Catonem.”

I conclude that this was the whole time from Cyrene to Utica. Pompeius was killed Sept. 29.—July 24. Cato must have landed at

be remembered, was only known to the Romans as a denizen of Bactria and Arabia¹; the ocean sands of the African continent had never yet been navigated by these ships of the desert.² Accordingly, the difficulties and privations of such a march are not to be estimated by our modern experience. Undoubtedly it deserves to be commemorated as one of the greatest exploits in Roman military history. The poet of the republic exalts it indeed above the three triumphal processions of Pompeius, above the victories of Marius over the tyrant of Numidia. He turns with pardonable enthusiasm from the deified monsters, the Caligulas and Neros of his own day, to hail its achiever as the true father of his country, the only worthy object of a freeman's idolatry.³

The arrival of Cato and his gallant band at the head-quarters of the republicans at Utica was followed at a later period by that of Cnæus; and in the course of the next year, A.U. 707, the remains of the great host of Pharsalia were assembled, with many additional reinforcements, under the banners of the oligarchy. These forces amounted to not less than ten complete legions, and their chiefs relied for support upon the whole military

Cyrene within the first month from that date, and left it probably before the end of a second. The two following months would include December of the Roman calendar, September or October of the real time. Strabo (xvii. 3. 30.) makes the time thirty days.

¹ Plin. *H. N.* viii. 26. Plutarch says that Cato employed a large number of asses to carry water.

² That is, not to the westward of Egypt. Pharaoh had camels; and the Israelites, on their coming out of Egypt, are forbidden to eat the flesh of the camel. Strabo (xvii. 1. 45.) speaks of the camels of Coptos and Berenice.

³ Lucan, ix. 598 :

“Hunc ego per Syrtes Libyæque extrema triumphum
 Ducere maluerim, quam ter Capitolia curru
 Scandere Pompeii, quam frangere colla Jugurthæ.
 Ecce parens verus patriæ, dignissimus aris
 Roma tuis, per quem nunquam jurare pudebit;
 Et quem si steteris unquam cervice soluta
 Tunc olim factura Deum.”

resources of Juba¹, who could bring one hundred and twenty elephants into the field, and squadrons of light cavalry, wild and numberless as the waves of the stormy Syrtis. The officers began to brag of their future triumphs in almost as loud a strain as recently at Thessalonica. Their notes of confident defiance were re-echoed to the opposite shores of Italy, and caused fresh dismay to the time-servers, who had abandoned the good cause on the event of its first discomfiture. Strange, indeed, it must seem, that the leaders of so powerful an army should have made no attempt to regain their footing in the country to which all their hopes pointed, and which lay at only three days' sail from the Gulf of Carthage. It is possible that they purposely refrained in order that the population of Rome and Italy might feel the full effect of the tyranny or anarchy which was said to prevail under the new regime, and learn from bitter experience the weight of the yoke to which they had submitted. Expecting to see the colossus which Cæsar had reared fall to pieces by its own weight, and overwhelm the arch-traitor in its ruins, they had neglected the opportunity of crushing him in Alexandria, no less than the means of intercepting him on his passage from Greece to Italy. They were destitute, we may suppose, of the means of putting a large army readily in motion. The province of Africa was small, nor was it one of the wealthiest of the empire, and the alliance of Numidia was too important to be discarded for the hope of plunder. This inaction may be partly accounted for also by the jealousies which already prevailed among the chiefs of the party. Moreover, Juba, whom both Scipio and Varus strove by every means to attach to themselves respectively in their rivalry for the leadership, was doubtless anxious to retain the Roman forces

¹ *Auct. B. Afr.* 1. 19.

in their present position, both for his own security, and with a view to the recompense he expected for his aid, if the power of the enemy should be overthrown on the shores of Africa. Of the remnant of those who had fought at Pharsalia Scipio stood the highest in rank and consideration; he could boast of having been associated in command with Pompeius himself. But Varus was proud of his share in the defeat of Curio, and declared that, as legitimate governor of the African province, he would yield the supreme authority to no other imperator within its limits. The army, indeed, would have settled the dispute by conferring the first place on Cato by acclamation; a remarkable tribute to the personal influence of one who, in point of fact, had never measured his sword with an enemy in the field. But that noble-minded man felt that it would be unbecoming to usurp the place of an officer of higher rank, and immediately devolved the command upon Scipio the consular.¹ The name of Scipio was one of good omen for a campaign in Africa; but his first act was to authorize the destruction of the city of Utica, at the instance of Juba, who was jealous of its power and splendour as the rival of his own neighbouring city of Zama, and represented it as dangerous to the republican cause from the disaffection imputed to its inhabitants.² Fortunately Cato possessed sufficient influence to save it; but Scipio affected to make him responsible for its good behaviour, and was glad to thrust him on one side, by giving him the command there, while he shifted the quarters of his own army to the neighbourhood of Adrumetum.³ Cato, indeed, was obliged to adopt vigorous measures of precaution. He expelled the multitude of unarmed inhabitants from the city, placing them within entrenched lines outside the

¹ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 57.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 87.; Dion, xlii. 57.

² Plut., Dion, *l. cc.*; Liv. *Epit.* cxiii.

³ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 95.; Auct. *B. Afr.* 24.

gates, under the guard or protection of a body of soldiers. The senate, an object of just suspicion, he placed under rigorous confinement.¹ We feel a melancholy pleasure in contemplating the brave philosopher busying himself in the collection of stores, and preparations for defence, and glad to devote himself to any dull and thankless office rather than draw his sword against his countrymen in the field; for of all the professed defenders of Roman liberty, he alone really mourned over the necessity of asserting his principles by arms. From the first outbreak of the civil war he had refused to trim his venerable locks, or shave his grizzled beard; and from the fatal day of Pharsalia he had persisted in sitting at his frugal repasts, and denied himself the indulgence of reclining on a couch.² Nevertheless, it was good policy to remove him from the councils of the party, where his unbending principles must have proved seriously detrimental. Cicero might harmlessly whisper into a private ear at a distance his mortification at the deference paid to a barbarian potentate by the representatives of the republic³; but when Cato, at the head-quarters of the allied powers, expressed his haughty indignation, he was sowing the seeds of certain rupture. It was related that when Juba, attending a council of officers, presumed to seat himself between Scipio and Cato, the latter rose and walked round to the other side, to preserve the place of honour for the Roman general.⁴ But he was more alert in striving to rouse the spirit of his countrymen for the last struggle than any of his colleagues in command. He encouraged Cnæus to make a diversion in the west; for in Spain the provincials were still believed to be at heart Pompeian, and the

¹ Auct. *B. Afr.* 87.

² Plut. *Cat. Min.* i. 56.; Lucan, ii. 375.

³ Cic. *ad Div.* ix. 6. to Varro: "Ad bestiarum auxilium confugere," i. e. the Numidian lions; comp. *ad Att.* xi. 7.

⁴ Plut. *Cat. Min.* 57.

Cæsarean garrisons were known to be wavering. Cnæus commenced his enterprise with an attack on a stronghold of the king of Mauretania; but suffering a repulse in this desultory and inglorious warfare, he withdrew to the Balearic islands, and there rested for a time on his arms.¹

The sovereignty of the great tract of country known by the name of Mauretania was divided between two brothers, Bogudes and Bocchus, whose father had deserved well of the unscrupulous republic by betraying Jugurtha into its hands. These chiefs were both disposed to throw themselves into Cæsar's arms, out of jealousy probably of the rival king of Numidia, whose influence with the opposite party they had every reason to fear. Bocchus was prepared to take an active part on the side of his ally, and his military power was the more respectable from his having engaged in his service a Roman adventurer named P. Silius. This man had found means to maintain himself at the head of a band of outlaws of all nations, whose swords he disposed of to decide the quarrels of the petty chieftains of the country.² Silius was a native of Nuceria, in Italy, and had acquired some notoriety at Rome as an extensive money-dealer, in which capacity he had established intimate relations with some foreign potentates, and especially those of Mauretania. It was surmised that losses incurred in his trade, or the prodigality which had more than kept pace with its profits, had tempted him to connect himself with the revolutionary visions of Catilina; but the proof against him had failed, and his connexion with P. Sulla, who was defended against a similar charge by Cicero, obtained him the distinc-

The chiefs of Mauretania favourably disposed towards Cæsar.

Adventures of P. Silius.

¹ Auct. *B. Afr.* 23.

² The history of Silius is gathered from *B. Afr.* 25.; Dion, xliii. 3.; Appian, *B.C.* iv. 54.; Cic. *pro Sulla*, 20.; Sallust, *B.C.* 21.

tion of a panegyric from the renowned patriot. It seems, however, that he subsequently fell under sentence of banishment on some other account. He collected about him a band of ruffians, and crossing over to the coast of Africa was ambitious of playing a more distinguished part on that theatre of lawless adventure. Bocchus, having secured this man's aid in the diversion he meditated in Cæsar's favour, prepared to make an inroad into Numidia, and draw off the forces of Juba for the defence of their own territories, as soon as he heard of the arrival of the dictator in the Roman province. The representative of Marius, whose name had been so illustrious in Africa, might depend also on the favour of a portion of the Roman colonists; and even among the Gætulians and Numidians there were many whose fathers had won distinctions under the old veteran's standard, and who bequeathed to their descendants a faithful remembrance of his benefactions.¹

A whole year had now passed in a state of comparative inaction on the part of the republicans, while Cæsar was quelling the resistance of the Egyptians, destroying Pharnaces, and consolidating his power in Rome. He must have left the city before the end of November, 707; for he led his troops through the whole length of southern Italy, crossed the straits of Messina, and traversed Sicily to Lilybæum at its western extremity, arriving there soon after the middle of December.² So rapid indeed had been his march that he had not allowed a single day of rest throughout; and, on reaching his destination, he pitched his tent on the sea-shore, to show his anxiety to sail without a moment's delay. He had appointed Lilybæum for the rendezvous of his legions, and had directed that all the war and transport vessels that

Cæsar leaves
Italy and
lands in
Africa.

¹ Auct. *B. Afr.* 32.; Dion, xliij. 4.

² Auct. *B. Afr.* 1.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 95.

could be mustered should there await his coming. The weather continued unfavourable for some days ; but fresh battalions reached him in the interval, and a force of six legions and two thousand cavalry was in attendance upon his orders when he gave the signal for embarkation. He sailed himself with the first detachment before the end of December of the Roman year, that is, before the commencement of the winter season. The enemy kept no look-out to intercept him. He passed Utica, the usual place of landing from the coast of Europe, and steering southward, disembarked his troops, consisting of only three thousand foot, and one hundred and fifty horse, in the neighbourhood of Adrumetum, which was occupied by C. Considius with a powerful garrison. Cæsar was not strong enough to make an attack upon this place ; he despatched a captive under a flag of truce, to open a negotiation with the commander. But when Considius demanded in whose name the herald appeared, and he answered, *In that of Cæsar the emperor, There is no emperor in Africa but Scipio*, replied the republican officer, and inflicted condign punishment upon him as a deserter.¹ The dictator saw that so vigorous an adversary was not to be cajoled, and broke up from his camp, amidst the desultory attacks of the Numidian skirmishers, whom however he repelled in a brilliant affair of cavalry. He was favourably received by the inhabitants of Leptis, and invited to take shelter within their walls, while he despatched messengers to expedite the conveyance of stores and recruits from Sardinia and the neighbouring provinces, and to direct the course of the second detachment of his legions, which had been scattered by adverse winds.

But while these reinforcements came slowly in,

¹ Auct. B. Afr. 4.

Cæsar's little army was exposed to imminent peril. The combined forces of Scipio and Juba moved rapidly upon them; and, in the course of their manœuvres to secure their communications with the sea, they found themselves reduced to the necessity of hazarding a general engagement. Cæsar had with him at this time thirty cohorts and some hundred cavalry and archers; the number of the republicans was so enormous that Labienus could boast that even to destroy them unresisting would weary out the puny band of Cæsareans. Labienus and Petreius were the principal leaders of the attack, which was confided almost entirely to the Roman and Numidian cavalry. The former of these officers made himself particularly conspicuous, fighting in the thickest of the conflict, and railing in bitter language at the Cæsarean legionaries, to whom his person was well known. The Roman veteran was proud of his length of service, the experience, valour and fidelity, which it betokened. No sarcasm was more biting to him than to be addressed as Tiro, or raw recruit. *Who are you? I never saw you before,* was the insulting language which Labienus addressed to his old companions in arms as he thrust his lance in their faces. *I am no tiro,* replied one of them, *but a veteran of the Tenth,* hurling his ponderous pilum at his old commander. The skilful horseman covered himself by a rapid movement of his steed, which received the blow in its chest and fell under him. But the valour of the Tenth was unavailing; the pressure of the enemy's massive squadrons drove the men close together, or, in Roman military phrase, within the rails. Hardly able to use their arms in the throng, they gazed anxiously around in search of their commander, while they moved their bodies and inclined their heads to avoid the shower of missiles. By a great effort Cæsar threw his lines into a wedge,

An engagement ensues, in which Cæsar is worsted.

ranging the alternate cohorts back to back and separating the dense array of the enemy in the centre. The combat was divided into two parts on the right and left; but Cæsar had pierced an opening for retreat to his camp, and was glad to draw off his men, and abandon the field of battle to the republicans.¹

Cæsar now fortified his position on the coast, in connexion with the town and harbour of Ruspina, with more than usual care, for he felt the extreme precariousness of his position while awaiting the arrival of the expected supplies. At this period, however, events began to tell in his favour, both in the advance of Silius and the Mauretians upon the Numidian capital, Cirta, which drew off Juba from Scipio's headquarters, and also by the growing manifestations of feeling in his favour within the province. Even now, distressed and harassed as he was, many personages of rank and station began to resort to him; the harshness of the proconsul's administration drove the noble and the wealthy to his camp.² Cæsar published their complaints in his appeals to the rulers of the neighbouring provinces for supplies. He had come to Africa, he declared, to save the natives from spoliation, and the allies from utter destruction; but for his opportune arrival nothing but the bare soil would soon be left them. Four more legions shortly joined him from beyond the sea, and provisions with all kinds of military stores were collected in abundance, while Scipio, deprived of the aid of his Numidian allies, was seeking to train a squadron of elephants to war, by a series of mimic combats.

The arrival of so large a number of Cæsar's veterans gave a decisive inclination to the scale of

The provincials regard him with favour. His reinforcements arrive.

¹ Auct. B. Afr. 15—18.

² Auct. B. Afr. 26.

fortune. The legionaries of the republican army were personally no match for them, and even its numerical superiority in cavalry was greatly diminished, while the terror of Cæsar's prowess more than counterbalanced any other advantage it might possess. Scipio felt that he was unfit to contend with such an adversary in the field, and avoided a battle; while at the same time he had conceived no other distinct plan of opposition to him. But even this feeble policy was disconcerted by the rapidity of the assailant's movements. A month had scarcely elapsed from his first landing when he found himself in a condition to assume offensive operations. He surprised Scipio's position near Uzita, and forced his troops to an engagement from which they did not escape without considerable loss. The discomfited general could only revenge himself by putting to the sword the complements of two of Cæsar's transport vessels, which were cast away at Thapsus, and on the island Ægimurus.¹

During these operations, however, the diversion on the side of Cirta had not proved so important as had been anticipated. Juba, after making his observations on the strength of the invaders, contented himself with deputing the defence of his capital to Sabura, while he returned with the larger part of his forces, to share in person the fortunes of his allies. The necessities of the Roman chiefs compelled them to submit to revolting indignities from the pride of their presumptuous colleague. He took upon himself to forbid Scipio the use of the Imperator's purple cloak, which he declared to be an ensign of the kingly office; and restricted him to the white colour of the ordinary toga. When the barbarian issued his royal mandates to Roman officers, they were observed to

Cæsar obtains
an advantage
over Scipio.

Insolence of
Juba in the
senatorial
camp.

¹ Auct. *B. Afr.* 46.

be more punctually obeyed than the orders of the general himself.¹ But every insult was borne to secure the aid of the Numidian cavalry, which Cæsar was compelled to train his soldiers to baffle by a peculiar system of tactics. They were discouraged also by the elephants, which their horses would not encounter. Cæsar fetched some animals of the kind from Italy, on purpose to familiarize both men and horses with the sight of the uncouth creatures; and it was found that, when the first terror of novelty was overcome, the unwieldy monsters did little service in battle.²

Thus prepared for a decisive struggle, Cæsar long tried in vain to draw his adversary into a general engagement. At last, on the fourth of April, 708, he issued from his encampment by night and marched sixteen miles to Thapsus, where Virgilius commanded for Scipio with a considerable force.³ When his determination to invest this place, important as well from its devotion to the republican cause as from the numbers of the garrison it contained, became known, Scipio felt the necessity of making an effort to preserve it. He summoned resolution to follow in the enemy's track, and pitched his camp over against him, at a distance of eight miles from the town. Cæsar had profited, in the meanwhile, by the few hours by which he had outstripped his opponents. There was only one route by which they could communicate with the place, which ran along a narrow strip of land, enclosed by the sea on one side, and a salt-water lake on the other. This isthmus Cæsar had secured the day before Scipio's arrival, throwing up fortifications, and posting a strong body of troops behind them. Having made these dispositions, he was applying himself to the investment of the city, when Scipio,

The hostile
armies meet
before
Thapsus.

¹ Auct. *B. Afr.* 57.

² Auct. *B. Afr.* 72

³ Auct. *B. Afr.* 79.; Dion, xliii. 7.

unable to force an entrance into it, contented himself with taking up a position on the shore, from whence he might observe and impede the works of the besiegers. While some of his troops were employed in casting up the entrenchments, the main body was drawn up in battle array for their protection. Cæsar saw that the moment was arrived; he immediately led forth his own troops to the encounter, leaving two legions to cover the works already commenced, and, at the same time, gave orders to a portion of his fleet, which was riding off the shore, to divert the attention of the enemy by threatening to land a detachment in their rear.¹

If Cæsar felt a momentary distrust of the result of the approaching combat, it was caused by the consciousness that a large portion of his men were fresh recruits, who had never encountered an enemy before. To these he pointed out the sturdy veterans dispersed through their ranks, and bade them emulate the fame they had acquired; and merit similar titles and rewards. Some symptoms of vacillation on the part of their opponents gave new force and spirit to his exhortations. Men and officers crowded round their general, imploring him to give the word for the onset. While he still hesitated, or watched his opportunity, checking with hand and voice the impatient swaying of the lines, suddenly the blast of a single trumpet burst forth on the right wing. The impetuous ferocity of the Tenth legion could no longer brook restraint; they had raised the signal unbidden, and now the whole army rushed forward in one unbroken body, overpowering the resistance of their officers. Cæsar, when he beheld rank after rank pouring by him, without the possibility of recal, gave the word *Good luck* to his attendants, and spurred his horse to the

Battle of
Thapsus,
Apr. 6.
A. U. 708
= Feb. 6.
B. C. 46.

¹ Auct. B. Afr. 81.

head of his battalions. The combat was speedily decided. The elephants, thrown into confusion by the first discharge of stones and arrows, turned upon the ranks they were placed to cover, and broke in pieces their array. The native cavalry were dismayed at losing their accustomed support, and were the first to abandon the field. Scipio's legionary force made little further resistance; their camp was close in the rear, and they were content to seek shelter behind the entrenchments. Deserted by their officers, they looked in vain for a leader to direct the defence of the ramparts. No one had been left in command of the camp. The fugitives, seized with panic terror, threw away their arms and betook themselves to the Numidian encampment near at hand. But, on reaching it, they found it already in the hands of the Cæsareans. They now withdrew in a body to a neighbouring eminence, and held out their bare arms and empty hands in sign of submission. But the victorious veterans were mad with fury and exultation; they would give no quarter to the unresisting multitude, and even slew some of their own comrades, men of gentle birth and nature, lately enlisted at Rome, and uninitiated in their brutal habits, in resentment at the attempt to curb their ferocity. Cæsar beheld the transaction with horror; but neither entreaties nor commands could prevail on the butchers to desist from their carnage.¹

This sudden and complete victory cost the conquerors no more than fifty men. Cæsar celebrated it by a grand sacrifice in the presence of the army, after which he addressed his soldiers with encomiums on their valour, and distributed a largess to the whole of his veteran forces, with special rewards to the most deserving. After this,

Dispersion of the senatorial chiefs.

¹ Auct. *B. Afr.* 85

leaving considerable detachments to conduct the siege of Thapsus and Thysdrus, he followed up the first report of his success by appearing before the walls of Utica. The destruction or rout of the republican army in the late battle had been no less complete than at Pharsalia. And, precisely as on that fatal day, the chiefs of the party had sought each his own safety by escaping unattended from the field. As the fugitives from Pharsalia had made no attempt to rally within the walls of Larissa, so for the most part the remnant of the slaughter of Thapsus left Utica in their rear, nor looked behind them till they had gained the sea or the recesses of Numidia. Scipio, with a few officers of high rank, attempted to make his way into Spain; but their vessels were driven by stress of weather to the harbour of Hippo, where Silius, who had routed and slain Sabura, had stationed a flotilla of much greater force. The unequal combat ended in the destruction of the flying armament; while Scipio, after exhibiting pride and courage worthy of a Roman imperator, thrust his sword into his side, and leaped overboard.¹ A Damasippus and a Torquatus sank ingloriously with the vessels.

Death of
Scipio and
others.

It was late in the evening of the eighth of April when Cato received information at Utica of the result of the battle. The next morning he assembled the Roman senators and knights, together with the three hundred², in the temple of Jupiter. By this time the news of the overwhelming disaster had spread among

Cato animates
the Romans in
Utica to
defence.

¹ Auct. *B. Afr.* 96.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 100.; Liv. *Epit.* civ. "P. Scipio in nave circumventus honestæ morti vocem quoque adjecit: quærentibus enim Imperatorem hostibus dixit, Imperator bene se habet."

² These "three hundred," according to Plutarch, were Roman citizens engaged in commercial and monetary transactions in Africa, of whom Cato formed a council for the government of the city. Plut. *Cat. Min.* 59.

them. With surprise and admiration they beheld the calmness of their general's demeanour. He began by stating that he had summoned them to deliberate upon affairs of grave importance.¹ Though professing himself still full of hope, and urging every one to nerve his courage for a magnanimous defence, he left the determination of their conduct to their own decision. For himself, he would not exercise his military authority to prevent them either from seeking safety by flight, or even opening the gates to the enemy; but if they were determined to defend the liberty of Rome to the last, he would place himself at their head, and lead them against the enemy, or prolong the struggle in some other quarter. He read the list of men, arms and stores which were still at their disposal; and the example of his calm courage was so effectual that they resolved on the spot to prepare for resistance, and began manumitting and arming their slaves. The remnant of the Roman nobility remained firm in their determination; their blood was more thoroughly inflamed against the enemy, and their hopes of pardon seemed more precarious. But the three hundred, for the most part private speculators, men who had no personal quarrel against Cæsar, and had taken no part in the contest until the establishment of the republican head-quarters in the centre of their peaceful town had compelled them to assume the attitude of political partisans, soon relaxed from the high-wrought enthusiasm to which they had for a moment given way. The few days which followed seemed to have been passed in mutual intrigues between these parties and the natives of Utica, each fearful of being betrayed and sacrificed by the other. Cato felt the impossibility of reducing to harmony such discordant elements. The last duty which remained

His exhortations failing, he recommends them to make their escape.

¹ Auct. B. Afr. 88.

to the patriot general was to save the persons of all Roman citizens from the treachery of the provincials, as well as from the vengeance of the conqueror. When it was announced that Cæsar was advancing at the head of the merciless legions which had given no quarter on the field of Thapsus, Cato closed all the gates except that which led to the sea, and urged the Roman senators to betake themselves to the ships which lay ready to receive them. He entreated all his personal friends to make their escape in the same manner, but about securing his own safety he said nothing, and seemed to take no thought. No one indeed doubted that he had formed his own resolution to die. Finally, he consulted with L. Cæsar on the terms in which he should intercede with his kinsman on behalf of the three hundred, and despatched him to the conqueror's camp. When he had thus dismissed every one, excepting his own son, who would not abandon his father, and one or two friends and attendants, with whom he was wont to take his meals and discourse or declaim on subjects of sublime speculation, he passed the evening in animated conversation on his accustomed themes, and harangued with more than usual fervour on the famous paradox of the Stoics, that the good man alone is free, and all the bad are slaves. His companions could not fail to guess the secret purpose over which he was brooding. They betrayed their anxiety only by silent gestures; but Cato, observing the depression of their spirits, strove to reanimate them and divert their thoughts by turning the conversation to topics of present interest.

The embarkation was at this moment proceeding, and Cato repeatedly inquired who had already put out to sea, and what were the prospects of their voyage. Retiring to his chamber he took up the *Dialogue on the Soul*, in

Cato commits suicide.

which Plato recorded his dying master's last aspirations after immortality. The academy might be justly proud of the homage of so noble a disciple of the Porch. But the Stoic could dispense with the consolations of any other school, for he had been taught to believe in a future existence, coeval at least with the frame of a perishable universe.¹ After reading for some time, he looked up and observed that his sword had been removed. In the irritation of the moment he gave way to a burst of violence, such as often characterized the behaviour of the Roman master to his slaves: calling his attendant to his presence he struck him on the mouth, bruising his own hand with the blow. He then sent for his son and friends, and rebuked them sharply for their unworthy precaution; *as if*, he said, *I needed a sword to kill myself, and might not, if I chose, put an end to my existence by dashing my head against the wall, or merely holding my breath.* They saw that it was vain to avert the blow which he seemed to meditate, and reassured, perhaps, for the moment by the calmness with which he conversed, they restored him his weapon, and at his earnest desire once more left him alone. At midnight, still anxious about those who were departing, he sent once again to inquire if the embarkation was completed. The messenger returned with the assurance that the last vessel was now on the point of leaving the quay. Thereupon Cato threw himself on his bed, as if about to take his rest for the night; but when all was quiet, he seized his sword and thrust it into his stomach. The wound was not immediately mortal, and the victim rolled groaning on the floor. The noise at

¹ This was the doctrine of Zeno (comp. Diog. Laert. vii. 156, 157. Plutarch, *de plac. Philos.* iv. 7.); Cicero's railery is unmerciful (*Tusc. Disp.* i. 31.): "Stoici vero usuram nobis largiuntur, tanquam cornicibus; diu mansuros aiunt animos; semper, negant."

once summoned his anxious attendants. A surgeon was at hand, and the patient was unconscious while the protruding intestines were replaced, and the gash sewn up. But on coming to himself he repulsed his disconsolate friends, and tearing open the fatal wound, expired with the same dogged resolution which had distinguished every act of his life.¹

Such was the proud though melancholy end of the gravest philosopher Rome had yet produced: the first of a long line of heroes of the robe, whose dignified submission to an adverse fate will illustrate the pages of our history throughout the gloom of the imperial tyranny. The ancient heathens but faintly questioned the sufferer's right to escape from calamity by a voluntary death. It was reserved for the Christian moralists, in their vindication of nobler principles, to impugn the act which has rendered Cato's fame immortal.² The creed of the Stoic taught indeed that the world is governed by a moral Intelligence, and from such premises the obvious inference is, that it is the part of man to conform to its behests, and fulfil his appointed lot whether for good or for evil. But the philosophy which exalted man to a certain participation in the nature of the Deity³, seemed to make him in some sort the arbiter of his own actions, and suicide, in Cato's view, might be no other than the accomplishment of a self-appointed destiny. The wisest of the heathens never understood that the true dignity of human nature

Judgment of
the ancients
upon this act.

Plut. *Cat. Min.* 58—70.; Dion, xliii. 10, 11.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 98, 99.; Auct. *B. Afr.* 88.

² Cato's suicide is applauded by Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 30., *Off.* i. 31., and Seneca, *Ep.* 24. 67. 71. 95. fin., 104. See also *de Prov.* 2. S. Augustine, on the contrary, contrasts it with the genuine heroism of Regulus (*de Civ. Dei*, i. 24.).

³ Lucan, ix. 564.:

"Ille deo plenus tacita quem mente gerebat."

consists in its submission to a higher Existence; that its only hope for the future is in the consciousness of its imperfection and weakness and responsibility here.

Cato had no cause to despair of retaining life under the new tyranny. At an earlier period he Deaths of Juba and Petreius : had meditated, in such a contingency, seeking refuge in retirement and philosophy. But his views of the highest Good had deepened and saddened with the fall of the men and the things he most admired. He now calmly persuaded himself that with the loss of free action the end of his existence had failed of its accomplishment. He regarded his career as prematurely closed, and assuredly the dignity of his acquiescence demands our respect and compassion, if not the principle on which it was based. Far different was the manner in which the rude barbarian Juba and the coarse soldier Petreius rushed forward to meet their ends. They had escaped together from the field of battle, and the Numidian offered to provide shelter for his companion in one of his own strongholds. The Roman province was so ill-disposed towards the barbarian chief, that he was obliged to hide himself by day in the most secluded villages, and roam the country on his homeward flight during the hours of darkness. In this way he reached Zama, his second capital, where his wives and children, together with his most valuable treasures, were deposited. This place he had taken pains to fortify at the commencement of the war, with works of great extent and magnitude. But on his appearance before the walls, the inhabitants deliberately shut their gates against him, and refused to admit the enemy of the victorious Roman. Before setting out on his last expedition, Juba had constructed an immense pyre in the centre of the city, declaring his intention, if fortune went ill with him, of heaping upon it everything he held most dear and precious, together with the murdered bodies of the prin-

cipal citizens, and then taking his own place on the summit, and consuming the whole in one solemn conflagration. But the Numidians had no sympathy with this demonstration of their sovereign's despair, and resolved not to admit him within their walls. Juba, having tried in vain every kind of menace and entreaty, to which no reply was vouchsafed, at last retired, but only to experience a similar reception in every other quarter to which he resorted. He at least had little to hope from the clemency which the victor had extended to his conquered countrymen. His companion, hard as his own iron corslet, scorned to accept it. The fugitives supped together, and, flushed with the fumes of the banquet, challenged each other to mutual slaughter. They were but unequally matched: the old veteran was soon despatched by his more active antagonist; but Juba was constant in his resolution, and only demanded the assistance of an attendant to give himself the last fatal stroke.¹

Nor was the fate of Considius, of Afranius, and Faustus Sulla less disastrous. The first of these had abandoned the defence of Thydrus at the approach of the forces which Cæsar despatched against it, and attempted to make his escape with the treasures he had amassed into the territories, until now friendly, of the Numidian chieftains. He was destroyed, for the sake of his hoarded booty, by the Gætulians who accompanied him in his flight. The others had retained the command of a squadron of Scipio's cavalry, and after burning one town which had shut its gates against them, had made a desperate attack on the military post which Cato maintained outside the walls of Utica, to wreak an unworthy vengeance on the Cæsarean partisans there kept in custody. Baffled in this object, they had made their way into Utica, while

Of Considius,
Afranius, and
Faustus Sulla.

¹ Auct. *B. Afr.* 91. 94.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 100.; Dion, xliii. 8.; Senec. *de Prov.* 2.; Flor. iv. 2. 69.

Cato still commanded there, and had added bitterness to his last days by the violence and ferocity of their behaviour. From thence they led their ruffians along the coast in the hope of finding means of transporting them into Spain. But on their way they fell in with Silius, who was advancing to join Cæsar; their men were routed and themselves taken. The bands of the Roman adventurer carried on war with the same brutality as the barbarians among whom they practised it. The captors quarrelled among themselves; their passions were inflamed, perhaps, in the distribution of the prisoners and the booty; and both Afranius and Faustus were killed in the fray which ensued.¹ But the massacre of the son of the dictator Sulla, accidental as it was, or at least unauthorized, could hardly fail of being charged as a deliberate act upon the representative of Marius.

While his foes were thus flying and falling, Cæsar advanced triumphantly from the scene of his last exploit, receiving the submission of the towns on his way, carrying off the stores and treasure collected for his enemies' use, and leaving garrisons to retain them in fidelity. As he drew near to Utica he was met by L. Cæsar, whose petition for mercy seems to have been confined to his own person, and to whom, as well as to a long list of distinguished nobles, the conqueror extended the promise of his protection.² He lamented with every appearance of sincerity that Cato had robbed him of the pleasure of pardoning one who, of all his antagonists, had been the most obstinate in his

Cæsar exacts large sums from the conquered cities.

¹ Such is the statement of the author of the book *de Bello Africano*, and it is supported by Suetonius, *Jul.* 75. Other writers, Dion, Florus, Eutropius, and Orosius, countenance the notion that Cæsar caused them to be put to death.

² Dion (xliii. 12.) gives currency to a report that Cæsar caused his kinsman to be put to death privily some time afterwards. Such a story need only be mentioned to put the reader on his guard against the historian's inaccuracy.

opposition, and the most inveterate in his hatred. The fatal compliance of the Utican senators, who, not content with obeying his enemies' commands, had contributed money to their cause, furnished him with a specious pretence for rifling their coffers of the treasures he now most urgently needed.¹ His requisitions amounted, it is said, to two hundred millions of sesterces. The city of Thapsus was mulcted in two millions, and the company of Roman traders in three. Adrumetum paid down three millions, and its Roman capitalists five. Leptis and Thysdrus also suffered in due proportion. A grand auction was held at Zama for the sale of all the objects of Juba's royal state, and of the goods of the Roman citizens who had borne arms under the tyrant's orders. Upon the people who had so boldly defied their sovereign, and refused him admittance within their walls, honours and largesses were munificently showered, and the taxes heretofore demanded for the royal treasury were partially remitted by the collectors of the republic. But the country of Numidia was deprived of its independence, and definitely reduced to the form of a province, under the procon-

¹ Appian (*B. C.* ii. 100.) asserts that Cæsar caused as many of the three hundred as he captured to be put to death, and Dion speaks of the assassinations he privately commanded. Nicolaus Damascenus says that Cæsar was very implacable towards the captives of the African war, σφόδρα ὀλίγοις τῶν ὑποπεσόντων αἰχμαλώτων συγγνοῦς, διὰ τὸ τοῖς προτέροις αὐτοῖς μὴ σεσωφρονῆσθαι πολέμοις. His kinsman Octavius with great difficulty extorted from him the pardon of a brother of his friend Agrippa. *Fragm.* xcix.: περὶ τῆς Καίσαρος ἀγωγῆς, 7. Nevertheless, I see no reason to credit statements at variance with the direct evidence of other writers, and opposed to the general opinion of his clemency towards his countrymen when they fell into his power, an opinion never popularly held of those who shed Roman blood on the scaffold. Appian allows that Cæsar pardoned Cato's son, and restored the daughter of Pompeius, the wife of F. Sulla, with her two children, to Cnæus; and Dion acknowledges that he burnt Scipio's papers unread, and exhibited other marks of moderation and generosity: καίτοι καὶ τὸν Κάτωνα ἔσωσεν ἄν (xliii. 13.).

sulate of Sallustius.¹ The rewarded and the punished acquiesced equally in the conqueror's dispositions; the submission of Africa to his authority was from thenceforth complete. The Uticans were allowed to commemorate with a funeral and a statue the humane and noble conduct of their late governor.

Cæsar settled the affairs of Africa with his usual despatch, and sailed from Utica on the thirteenth of June.² On his way to Italy, he stopped at Caralis, in Sardinia. The aid which the island had afforded to his adversaries furnished him with a decent pretext for extorting from the inhabitants large sums of money. At the end of the same month he again weighed anchor; but the prevalence of easterly winds drove him repeatedly to shore, and he at last reached Rome on the twenty-eighth day after his departure from the Sardinian capital.³ The reports he received at this time of the revival of the republican cause in Spain did not give him much uneasiness. Cnæus had been detained by sickness in the Baleares, and the fugitives from the field of Thapsus had been almost all cut off in their attempts to reach the point to which their last hopes were directed. The legionaries who had mutinied against Quintus Cassius were still either dissatisfied with their treatment under the commander who had superseded him, or fearful of their general's vengeance when a fitting opportunity should arrive. It was from Cæsar's own soldiers

¹ Auct. *B. Afr.* 97. Dion, xliii. 9.: τῷ Σαλουστίῳ, λόγῳ μὲν ἀρχειν, ἔργῳ δὲ ἄγειν τε καὶ φέρειν, ἐπέτρεψε. The same historian goes on to describe in bitter language the shameless rapacity of the proconsul, and to contrast it with the pretensions to purity he makes in his histories.

² June 13, A.U. 708 = April 14, B.C. 46. Fischer, *Röm. Zeittafeln*.

³ Auct. *B. Afr.* 98. The period seems extraordinary for so short a distance, and the author's words will perhaps bear the meaning, that it is to be computed from Cæsar's leaving, not Caralis, but Utica. But from certain notes of time which will appear below, I think the statement in the text is correct.

that the invitation had gone forth to the republican chiefs to renew the struggle on the soil of Spain. The spirit of the old commonwealth still survived in many of the towns of Bætica; promises of support were freely given; but the remnant of the African armament was contemptible both in numbers and ability. Of all the haughty nobles who had thronged the tent of Pompeius at Luceria or Thessalonica, not one with a name known to history remained in arms, except Labienus alone. He indeed had succeeded in making his escape from Africa, in company with Varus; but the insurgents had already placed themselves under the command of Scapula and Aponius, officers of their own, nor would they suffer themselves to be transferred from them to any other except the son of the great Pompeius. The extent to which the flame of insurrection had spread was probably unknown at this time to Cæsar. He was impatient to reap at last the fruit of so much bloodshed, to assume the powers and prerogatives he had extorted, and to work out the principles and objects of so many years of anticipation. A distant and contemptible outbreak might be subdued without meeting it in person. Accordingly, C. Didius, an officer of no eminent reputation, was sent with a naval and military force to the succour of Trebonius, whom, however, he found already expelled from his government by the growing force of the new movement.¹

Revival of
opposition to
Cæsar in
Spain.

Meanwhile, Rome had sunk, during the conqueror's absence, into a state of torpid tranquillity. The universal conviction that the dictator's power was irresistible had quelled all further heavings of the spirit of discontent. Dolabella had been gratified with a command in the late campaign; while others, in whose

Honours
showered upon
Cæsar by the
senate and
people during
his absence.

¹ Dion, xliii. 29.

fidelity and military skill the usurper could rely, had been left behind in the city to overawe disaffection. The most illustrious of the nobility, having now no occasion to remain at Rome for the sake of paying court to a jealous ruler, had retired generally to their country seats; but Cicero seems to have feared giving occasion for distrust if he withdrew himself from the broad eye of public observation.¹ He occupied himself, however, in his philosophical studies, and could rejoice that he had never, like so many of his contemporaries, when plunging into the excitements of political life, abandoned the literary pursuits common to them in youth. While he still regarded the contest in Africa with the sentiments of a true republican, he confessed with a sigh, that though the one cause was assuredly the more just, yet the victory of either would be equally disastrous. He probably held aloof from the proceedings of the servile senate, which occupied itself during the months of Cæsar's absence in devising new honours for his acceptance. First of all it decreed the religious ceremony of a thanksgiving of forty days, being twice the term to which the compliance of popular gratitude had ever previously extended, and it was by the length of the observance that the honour was estimated. Next it appointed that the victor's triumphal car should be drawn by horses of white, the sacred colour,² and that the number of his

¹ Cic. *ad. Div.* ix. 2. (to Varro): "Quæres cur, cum hæc in urbe sint, non absim quemadmodum tu. Nobis stet illud, una vivere in studiis nostris, a quibus antea delectationem modo petebamus, nunc vero etiam salutem." *Ibid.* 6: "Equidem hos tuos Tusculanenses dies instar esse vitæ pnto: quod nos quoque imitamur ut possumus, et in nostris studiis libentissime conquiescimus." *Ibid.* 20.: "Literis me involvo, aut scribo aut lego." See Fischer, *R. Z.* In the autumn of this year (708), i.e. after Cæsar's return to Rome, Cicero wrote the *Laus Catonis*, and the *Brutus, sive de claris Oratoribus*.

² Dion, *xliii.* 14. Camillus triumphed with white horses by a special decree of the senate. But this unwonted and impious flattery

attendant lictors should be doubled. He was to be requested to undertake the office of Censor for three years, under a new title, which should not remind the citizens too closely of the times of republican liberty, that of *Præfectus morum*, or regulator of manners. The changes which the revolutionary storm had effected in the condition of so many of the citizens justified a resort to the old constitutional resource for purging the senate of scandalous or impoverished members, and infusing new blood into its veins. The most substantial, however, of all these tributes to Cæsar's ascendancy was the decree by which he was appointed dictator for a period of ten years; for thus the initiative of legal measures was united in his hands with the command of the legions both at home and abroad. Other specious honours, in the taste of the times, were accumulated upon him. His chair was to be placed between those of the consuls in the assembly of the senate; he was to preside and give the signal in the games of the circus; and his figure in ivory was to be borne in procession among the images of the gods, and laid up in the Capitol, opposite the seat of Jupiter himself.¹ A statue was to be erected to him in bronze, standing upon a globe, with the inscription, *Cæsar the demi-god*.² His name was to be engraved on the entablature of the Capitol, in the place of that of Catulus, its true restorer. The historian who recounts these honours, assures us that many others besides these were offered; he has only omitted to specify them because Cæsar did not think fit to accept them. It is difficult to imagine to what lower depth of obsequiousness the senate could have

conducted to his fall. Plut. *Camil.*; Aur. Viet. *de Vir. Illust.* c. 23. It seems not to have been repeated till this occasion.

¹ Dion, xliiii. 14. The *thensa*, Gr. *ἄρμα*, was properly a sort of litter in which the statues of the gods were carried in certain processions.

² Dion, *l. c.*; comp. Servius on Virg. *Ecl.* ix. 47.

descended, or what higher dignities the conqueror would have rejected.

The time had now arrived for the celebration of the Gallic triumph, which had been so long postponed. In the interval, the imperator's victories had been multiplied, and the ranks of his veterans had been recruited by fresh enlistments; so that every soldier who had shared in his later perils and successes, demanded the reward of participating in his honours. Cæsar claimed not one, but four triumphs: the first, for his conquest of the Gauls; the second for his defeat of Ptolemæus; another, for his victory over Pharnaces; and the last, for the overthrow of Juba. But he carefully avoided all reference to what were in reality the most brilliant of his achievements. In Spain and Thessaly he had routed the disciplined legions of his own countrymen; but their defeat brought no accession of honour or territory to the republic. The glory it reflected on the victor was dubious and barren.¹ The four triumphs were celebrated, with intervals of a few days between each, that the interest of the public might not pall with satiety. The first procession formed in the Campus Martius, outside the walls of the city. It defiled through the triumphal gate at the foot of the Capitoline hill, and crossed the deep hollow of the Velabrum and Forum Boarium, on its way to the Circus Maximus, which occupied the valley between the Palatine and Aventine. In passing through the Velabrum, the chariot in which the imperator stood, happened to break down; a mischance which so affected him that he never afterwards, it is said, ascended a vehicle without repeating a charm.² The long procession wound round the base of the Palatine,

Celebration of
Cæsar's four
triumphs;
August,
A.U. 708.
= June,
B.C. 46.

¹ Comp. Val. Max. ii. 8. 7.

² Plin. *H. N.* xxviii. 2., who adds, "Id quod plerosque nunc facere scimus."

skirting the Aventine and Cælian hills, to the point where the arch of Constantine now stands.¹ There it began the ascent of the gentle slope which separates the basin of the Colosseum from that of the Roman forum. It followed the same track which now leads under the arch of Titus, paved at this day with solid masses of hewn stone, which may possibly have re-echoed to the tramp of Cæsar's legions. Inclining a little to the right at the point where it gained the summit of the ridge, and looked down upon the comitium and rostra, in the direction of the Capitol, it passed before the spot where the temple of Julius was afterwards built; thence it skirted the right side of the forum, under the arch of Fabius, till it reached the point just beyond the existing arch of Severus, where the two roads branched off, the one to the Capitoline temple, the other to the Mamertine prison. Here it was that Cæsar took the route of triumph to the left, while Vercingetorix was led away to the right, and strangled in the subterranean dungeon. The Gaulish hero doubtless met with firmness and dignity the fate to which he had so long been doomed, while his conqueror was exhibiting a melancholy spectacle of human infirmity, crawling up the steps of the Capitol on his knees, to avert, by an act of childish humiliation, the wrath of the avenging Nemesis.² The next instance of similar degradation recorded is that of the emperor Claudius, who, being corpulent and clumsy, performed the ungraceful feat with the support of an arm on either side.³ The practice was probably

¹ I abstain from tracing more minutely the route of the triumphal procession, which must be considered as still open to discussion; Becker's views, however, seem to me on the whole nearly conclusive. See his *Handbuch der Röm. Alterthümer*, i. 145. foll.

² Dion, xliii. 21. That there was, however, some better feeling mixed with this display of superstition may be believed from the fact that Cæsar caused the blasphemous inscription on his statue to be erased.

³ Dion, lx. 23.

of no unusual occurrence, and was deeply rooted, we may believe, in ancient and popular prejudices. A remnant of it still exists, and may be witnessed by the curious, even at the present day, on the steps of the Araceli, and at the Santa Scala of the Lateran.

The days of triumph which succeeded passed over with uninterrupted good fortune. The populace were gratified with the sight of the Egyptian princess, Arsinoë, led as a captive at the conqueror's wheels; but she was spared the fate of the Gaulish chieftain out of favour to her sister, or perhaps out of pity to her sex. The son of the king of Numidia who followed the triumphal car was also spared, and lived to receive back his father's crown from Augustus.¹ Though Cæsar abstained from claiming the title of a triumph over his countrymen, he did not scruple to parade their effigies among the shows of the procession. The figures or portraits of the vanquished chiefs were carried on litters, and represented the manner of their deaths. Scipio was seen leaping desperately into the sea; Cato plunging the sword into his own bowels; Juba and Petreius engaged in mortal duel; Lentulus stabbed by the Egyptian assassin; Domitius pierced perhaps in the back, in token of his flight. The figure of Pompeius alone was withheld, for fear of the commiseration it might excite among the people whose favourite he had so lately been.² Nor, as it was, were the spectators unmoved. Upon the unfeeling display of

The populace amused with spectacles.

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 55. While he remained at Rome he received an education in Greek literature, and became a respectable historian: μακαριωτάτην ἁλοῦς ἔλωσιν, says the man of letters. Comp. Strabo, xvii. 3.

² The illustrious citizens thus represented were not only those who by their alliance with the barbarian potentate in Africa might be supposed to have forfeited all claim to the consideration of their countrymen. Duruy, ii. 520. Appian says expressly that Pompeius alone was excepted of all the chiefs of the republican party.

Roman defeat and disaster they reflected with becoming sensibility. But the pictures of Achilles and Pothinus were received with unmingled acclamations, and loud was the cry of scorn at the exhibition of Pharnaces flying in confusion from the field.¹ After all, the most impressive part of the ceremony must have been the appearance of the rude veterans whose long files closed the procession. With what ignorant wonder must the children of Gaul and Iberia, of Epirus and Africa, have gazed at the splendour of the city, of which the fame resounded in their native cabins! What contempt must they have felt for the unarmed multitudes grinning around them! How reckless must they have been of the dignity of the consuls and senators, they who claimed the licence of shouting derisive songs in the ears of their own commander! Little did they think that grave historians would sum up their coarse camp jokes in evidence against the fame of their illustrious leader; still less did they dream of the new power which the military class was thenceforth to constitute in the state. Rome in fact was their own; but it was a secret they were not yet to discover.

The satisfaction of his armed supporters, however, was the first condition on which the supreme power of the dictator must henceforth be maintained in the city. It was a matter, indeed, of hardly less importance to secure the good humour of the urban population. While the soldiers received each a donative of twenty thousand sesterces, the claims of the much larger multitude of the free citizens were not undervalued severally at four hundred; especially as they received the additional gratification of one year's remission of

Largesses distributed to the soldiers and people.

¹ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 101. Compare a similar representation in Scipio's triumph as described by Silius Italicus, xvii. ad fin.:

“Sed non ulla magis mentesque oculosque tenebat
Quam visa Hannibalis campis fugientis imago.”

house-rent.¹ It does not appear how this indulgence differed from that for which Cælius and Dolabella had raised their commotions; but the dictator had so strenuously resisted every attempt to set aside the just claims of creditors on all previous occasions, that it can hardly be doubted that in this case he gave the landlords compensation from the public treasury. The mass of the citizens were feasted at a magnificent banquet, at which the Chian and Falernian wines, the choicest produce of Greece and Italy, flowed freely from the hogshead, and towards which six thousand lampreys, the most exquisite delicacy of the Roman epicure, were furnished by a single breeder.² The mighty multitude reclined before twenty-two thousand tables; each table having its three couches, and each couch, we may suppose, its three guests, so that the whole number feasted may have amounted to nearly two hundred thousand.³ When Cæsar undertook the functions of his censorship, the number of recipients of the public distributions of corn was estimated at three hundred and twenty thousand. Upon a scrutiny into their claims as genuine and resident citizens, he was enabled to strike off as many as one hundred and fifty thousand from this list.⁴ Adding to the remainder of the senators and knights, and the few wealthy individuals who might have scorned to partake of a state provision, the sum will

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 38. The sums mentioned are equivalent to about 200*l.* and 4*l.* respectively.

² Plin. *H.N.* xiv. 17., ix. 81.; Varro, *R.R.* iii. 17.

³ Plutarch's words (*Cæs.* 55.) are: ἐστίαςας ἐν δισμύριοις καὶ δισχιλίοις τρικλίνοις ὁμοῦ σύμπαντας.

⁴ Suet. *Jul.* 41. Dion, xliii. 21. Undoubtedly Suetonius's words will bear no other meaning: "Ex viginti trecentisque millibus accipientium frumentum e publico ad centum quinquaginta retraxit." Livy, however, is supposed to have given a different account (*Epit.* cxv.): "Recensum egit quo censa sunt civium capita centum quinquaginta millia," and he is followed by Drumann and others. So also Plutarch. This is very probably the error of the epitomizer, afterwards repeated by later writers. Dion contents himself with saying that the number was reduced by about one-half.

correspond pretty accurately with the number of the imperial guests as above computed.

The public shows with which these gratifications were accompanied, were carried out on a scale of greater magnificence than even those recently exhibited by Pompeius.

Exhibition of gladiatorial shows.

There was nothing in which the magistrates of the republic vied more ostentatiously with one another than in the number of wild beasts and gladiators which they brought into the arena. The natural taste of the Italian people for shows and mummerly degenerated more and more into an appetite for blood; but in this, as in every other respect, it was Cæsar's ambition to outdo his predecessors, and the extraordinary ferocity and carnage of the exhibitions which he complacently witnessed, excited a shudder even in the brutal multitude.¹ The combatants in the games of the circus were either professional gladiators, who sold their services for a certain term of years, or captives taken in war, or, lastly, public criminals. But Cæsar was, perhaps, the first to encourage private citizens to make an exhibition of their skill and valour in these mortal combats. He allowed several men of equestrian rank, and one the son of a prætor, to demean themselves in the eyes of their countrymen by this exposure to the public gaze, It was only when a senator named Fulvius Setinus asked permission thus to prostitute his dignity, that the dictator was at last roused to restrain the growing degradation.

If the people of Rome were shocked at the bloodshed which they were invited to applaud, it seems that they were offended also at the vast sums which were lavished on these ostentatious spectacles.² They would have preferred, perhaps, that the donative to themselves should have

Dedication of the Julian forum.

¹ Dion, xliii. 24.

² Dion, *l. c.*

been greater, and the soldiers even exhibited symptoms of discontent and mutiny in consequence. No instance of Cæsar's profuse expenditure excited greater admiration than his stretching a silken awning over the heads of the spectators in the Circus. This beautiful material was brought only from the farthest extremity of India, and was extremely rare and precious at Rome at that time. Three centuries later it was still so costly that a Roman emperor forbade his wife the luxury of a dress of the finest silk unmixed with a baser fabric.¹ But a more permanent and worthy object of imperial expenditure was the gorgeous forum of which Cæsar had long since laid the foundation with the spoils of his Gallic wars. Between the old Roman forum and the foot of the Quirinal, he caused a large space to be enclosed with rows of marble corridors, connecting in one suite halls of justice, chambers of commerce, and arcades for public recreation. In the centre was erected a temple to Venus the ancestress, the patroness for whom Cæsar had woven a breastplate of British pearls,² and whose name he had used as his watchword on the days of his greatest victories.³ He now completed the series of his triumphal shows by the dedication of this favourite work.⁴ It remained for centuries a conspicuous monument of the fame and magnificence of the first of the Cæsars. His successors

¹ Vopisc. *Aurel.* 45.

² Plin. *H. N.* ix. 57.

³ He had vowed this offering to the goddess on the morning of the battle of Pharsalia. Appian, *B. C.* ii. 102.

⁴ "Kalend. Pincian. vi. Kal. Octob. Veneri Genetrici in foro Cæsar." Orell. *Inscr.* ii. 399. According to Dion the consecration took place on the day of the last triumph: this then was the 26th of September, A.U. 708. The series of triumphal shows was comprehended in a period of one month. It must have begun therefore about the end of August, and the preparations having, no doubt, been made before, it is not likely that Cæsar delayed the celebration more than a few weeks after his return to Italy. This consideration seems to confirm the account (p. 385.) that he was twenty-eight days in his passage from Caralis to Rome.

were proud to cluster new arches and columns by its side, and bestowed their names upon the edifices they erected in connexion with it. Finally, Trajan cut through the depressed ridge which joined the Capitoline with the Quirinal, and impeded the further extension of the Imperial forums. The level space thus obtained he crowded with a new range of buildings, occupying as much ground as the united works of his predecessors in this quarter. To the magnitude of this elevation a reference is made, not without some obscurity of expression, in the inscription on the pillar which bears his name.¹

Our review of the dictator's proceedings in the discharge of his civil functions must be postponed, but only for a moment, to relate the short episode of his last military exploit. The despatches of his lieutenants in Spain represented that province as rapidly falling into the hands of the republican faction. Varus and Labienus had escaped from Africa, and joined the standard under which Scapula marshalled the disaffected legions in Spain. Cnæus Pompeius had also issued from his retreat in the Balearic Isles, and as soon as he appeared in their camp every chief of the oligarchy waived his own pretensions to the command in deference to the man who represented the fame and fortunes of their late leader. Yet Scapula had the confidence of the soldiers, Labienus was an officer of tried ability and reputation, and Varus had at least held the highest military commands, while Cnæus

The republicans make head in Spain under Cnæus.

¹ The inscription on the base of the column runs: “. . . . ad declarandum quantæ altitudinis mons et locus tantis operibus sit egestus.” The height of the column is supposed by some to indicate, not indeed the elevation of the ridge, but the point of the two opposite declivities from which the soil was scooped away to form a level in the centre. The column is 130 feet high, while the summits of the Capitoline and Quirinal are not more than 137 and 151 feet respectively above the level of the Tiber. Bunsen, *Beschreibung Roms*, i. 31.

himself was personally unknown to the legions in Spain, and his only achievement in war had been a dashing naval exploit. So cowed by its repeated reverses was the spirit of the old Roman party, which had revived for a moment in Africa with vain exultation at finding itself relieved from the ascendancy of its own military champion. Cnæus, on his part, seems to have regarded the renewed contest in the light of a private quarrel. His war-cry was not *Rome, Liberty, or The Senate*, but *Pietas, Filial duty*.¹ The disaffection among Cæsar's soldiers had spread; a large body of them had enrolled themselves under their new leaders; their numbers had been augmented by provincial enlistments; even slaves had been drafted into the ranks²; while the cities and states of the peninsula lent their aid more or less openly to the cause. It was not in the remoter parts of the province, or among the half subdued native principalities, but in the centre of Roman influence and civilization, in Corduba itself, that the standard of the adventurers was unfurled. Cæsar had completed the ceremonies of his quadruple triumph, and was deeply engaged in the arduous task of legislation for the new system of government which he had undertaken to raise, when he found it necessary to postpone every other occupation to meeting his enemies once more in arms. So uncertain and tedious was the navigation of those days, that he may have chosen the land route across the Alps and Pyrenees, for the sake of reaching his destination with greater speed.³ The details of the campaign into which he immedi-

Cæsar's final campaign in Spain, decided by the victory of Munda, March 17, A.V. 709.

¹ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 104.

² Appian, *B.C.* ii. 103.

³ Appian (*l. c.*) says that Cæsar arrived in *Spain* from Rome in twenty-seven days accompanied by a part of his army; Suetonius (*Jul.* 56.) that he reached the *Further Province* in twenty-four. Strabo seems to rely on the same authorities as Appian (iii. 4.). From Rome to Corduba or Obulco, is more than a thousand miles, a dis-

ately plunged are given, but very obscurely, in the last of the series of contemporary memoirs which have hitherto been our guides throughout the military history of the period. In point of composition it betrays less literary accomplishment than any of its kindred works. The rude soldier who seems to have been its author, had no hesitation in recording in their undisguised enormity the cruelties which disgraced the conduct of both parties. Cæsar's character for humanity suffers more in this than in any other contemporary narrative of his actions. The campaign was, indeed, a series of butcheries on either side, but Cnæus, was, perhaps, the most savagely ferocious of all the captains of the civil wars.¹ The scenes of the last act of Roman liberty were laid in the valley of the Guadalquivir and the defiles of the Sierra Blanca. After a variety of desultory movements, of which we obtain from the narrative only an indistinct notion, we find the rival armies at last drawn up in hostile array on the field of Munda.² Cæsar was this time superior in numbers, and especially in cavalry³; but the enemy was well posted, and fought well: never, it is said, was the great conqueror brought so near to defeat and destruction. He exhibited, as on other critical occasions, all the personal courage of a private soldier, snatching a shield from one of the legionaries, and rushing within ten paces of the enemy's line, where he was exposed to the aim of two hundred piles and javelins. The officers were the first to dash forward to protect him with their bodies; and the soldiers, at the very height of their dismay, were recalled to themselves by this splendid example.

tance which it is utterly impossible for an army to accomplish in the longest of these periods. The author of the *Commentary on the Spanish War* is contented with the expression "celeri festinatione," and Dion prudently follows him.

¹ Comp. a letter of C. Cassius to Cicero (*ad Div.* xv. 19.).

² Munda, the modern Monda between Ronda and Malaga.

³ *Auct. Bell. Hispan.* 30.

When the battle was at last gained, Cæsar is said to have remarked, that he had often fought for victory, but never before for his life.¹

Thirty thousand men were left on this decisive field, and among them Varus, Labienus, and many others of the remnant of the Roman nobility. Cnæus escaped from the scene of his disaster, and gained the coast with a few adherents. He had taken refuge on board a vessel, and was in the act of putting to sea, when having accidentally entangled his foot in a rope, an over-zealous attendant, in attempting to extricate him, wounded his ankle with the blow of a hatchet. He was now compelled to land again for the sake of obtaining surgical assistance: his retreat was discovered by his pursuers, and he was forced to quit it and betake himself to the forests. Wearied and desperate he threw himself at the foot of a tree, where he was speedily overtaken, and killed after a miserable struggle.² His head, with those of his colleagues in arms, was presented to the conqueror; and the complete defeat and ruin of the adventurers was thus publicly notified. Of all the

Sextus alone maintains himself in arms.

leaders of the senatorial party, Sextus Pompeius was now the only survivor. He had made his escape from the field of Munda, and had sought an asylum in the wildest districts of the Hither Province. He had nothing to hope from the clemency of the conqueror, who had shown unusual bitterness against his family by the confiscation of their patrimonial estates, and was now preparing to celebrate his triumph over them as

¹ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 104. The battle was fought on the 17th of March A. U. 709.: "Ipsis Liberalibus fusi fugatique sunt Pompeiani." Auct. *B. H.* 31. Ovid, *Fast.* iii. 713.: "Tertia post Idus lux est celeberrima Baccho;" i. e. the third day inclusive; the Ides was the 15th Kal. Farnes. xvi. Kal. Apr. Liber. Libero in Ca . . . Cæsar Hi[spaniam] Orell. *Inscr.* ii. p. 387.

² Appian, *B.C.* ii. 105.; Dion, xliii. 40.; Auct. *B. Hisp.* 39.

foreigners and enemies of the state.¹ Thus driven to despair, he infused new spirit into the predatory habits of the tribes among whom he had taken refuge, and continued to defy the power of the provincial authorities. Cæsar occupied himself for some months in reconstituting the government of Spain, taking precautions for the entire subjugation of the party which had shown such vitality in that quarter. The battle of Munda was fought on the seventeenth of March, but the dictator was not at liberty to return to Italy till September, after an absence of ten months.

The hostile attitude of the last of the Pompeii in Spain was not the only exception to the tranquillity which prevailed generally throughout the empire. In Gaul the Bellovaci had risen in arms; but this movement was expeditiously repressed by Decimus Brutus, the proconsul of the newly conquered province.² In the extreme East, however, the republican party still continued to make head, under the leadership of Cæcilius Bassus.³ Their champion was an obscure knight, and their forces were insignificant, consisting principally of two legions which Bassus had seduced from their allegiance to Sextus Cæsar, the commander to whose care Syria had been entrusted by his kinsman.⁴ But the proximity of the Parthians, ever on the watch for an opportunity to wound the sides of their great rivals, rendered any movement in this quarter formidable. Sextus Cæsar was murdered by his soldiers, and Bassus took possession of the city of Apamea, which, with the assistance of the national enemies, he continued to hold against the petty attempts which were

Disturbances
in Syria.

¹ Appian, *l. c.*; Cic. *ad Att.* xii. 37.; Dion, xlv. 10.; Strabo, iii.

² Liv. *Epit.* civ.

³ Liv. *l. c.*; Dion, xlvii. 26.; Strabo, xvi. 2.; Auct. *B. Alex.* 78

⁴ Auct. *B. Alex.* 66.

made to dislodge him. The dictator kept his eye upon him, and already meditated his destruction: but for the present he was content to leave his temerity unpunished, while he applied himself to the consolidation of his power by bold and comprehensive legislation at home.

CHAPTER XX.

Cæsar's legislation: His sumptuary laws: Increase of the number of the Senate: Limitation of the term of Provincial Governments: Extension of the Franchise: Distribution of lands to the veterans: Measures for multiplying the free population of Italy: Assignment of the *Judicia* to the senators and knights, to the exclusion of the *Ærarian* tribunes: Repression of crimes of violence and abolition of the clubs.—Cæsar contemplates the establishment of an uniform system of administration: He proposes to compile a code of laws, and to execute a complete map of the Empire.—Cæsar's patronage of literature: His reform of the Calendar: His reforms are viewed with jealousy by the nobles: He is accused of pride and arrogance.—The demcanour of Cleopatra tends to make him unpopular; at the same time he is flattered and his clemency extolled.—He disbands his soldiers, and relies on the favour of the citizens.

WE have now followed the career of Julius Cæsar to the point at which his supremacy is finally established, and the proud defiance of a licentious oligarchy has subsided into the murmur of a broken and proscribed faction. We have seen him commence his political existence with the assertion of the popular claims identified with the hero of his own house. He urged them with a fearless vehemence, in which it is impossible to mistake the sincerity of his devotion. The first steps of every popular champion are bold and decided. At the outset he has a distinct object before him; he knows what his grievances are, if not their true remedies. He may delude himself as he proceeds with the fancy that he is reconstructing, but there is no deception about the fact that he is pulling down. His days and years are marked by the successive demolition of real and substantial things, while his new creations are perhaps no more than ideas. Such, however, was

General view
of the spirit of
Cæsar's legis-
lation.
A. U. 709.
B. C. 45.

not the case with Cæsar. From the time, indeed, of his first entry into public life, his name had been signalized by the overthrow, one by one, of the strongholds of ancient privilege, and in the ardour of the attack, straitened in his means and controlled in his natural impulses, he had little opportunity of applying himself to the task of renovation. Accordingly, when the ruins of the past began to be cleared away, he was astonished to behold how great was the gap he had made. The solemn question now urged itself upon him, how this desolate space was to be again filled up; and in the boldness and originality of his views, it found an appropriate solution. But the work to be performed was long, and the time granted to him was but short; we shall see him, however, erect more than one durable edifice of utility and justice, and bear witness to his planning of others on a scale still more magnificent, while many vast conceptions were obviously floating in his mind of which he was not even permitted to shadow forth the outline. His undisputed tenure of power lasted hardly more than one year and a half, including an interval of ten months' absence from the city. It was, therefore, impossible that his ideas, however long he may have actually brooded over them, could receive their complete and methodical realization. We are the less able to appreciate with accuracy the clearness of Cæsar's views, and the process of their development, from the fact of there existing no record of the order in which his enactments succeeded one another. We know not at what stage his legislation was interrupted by his departure for Spain, nor have we the means of judging whether his reforms gained in boldness or lost in impartial justice, when his power seemed secured by his final victory. It would have been deeply interesting to have remarked how one idea may have germinated in many new directions; how

various imperfect measures may have conduced to one harmonious result. But the measures themselves, confused and disjointed as is the form in which they present themselves to us, point decisively to the existence in their author's mind of a comprehensive plan for the entire reconstruction of the national polity. The general principle which pervades them is the elevation of a middle class of citizens, to constitute the ultimate source of all political authority. The ostensible ruler of the state is to be in fact the creation of this body, its favourite, its patron, its legislator and its captain. To this body he is to owe his political existence.¹ He is to watch over the maintenance of an equilibrium of popular forces, checking with the same firm hand the discontent of the depressed nobility, and the encroachments of the aspiring rabble. The eternal principles of rule and order he is to assert as sacred and immutable; but he is to be himself responsible for their application at his own discretion to the varying wants of society. This idea of government was perfectly new to the ancient world. It was the first rude conception of popular monarchy, the phantom of philosophers and jurists, which has been so often shadowed forth in theory, but never permanently realized in practice. The event indeed proved that an attempt to combine the discordant elements of despotism and freedom² could avail only as a temporary expedient, under favour of a strong

¹ In Justinian's view, derived by constant tradition from the earliest times of the Imperial monarchy, the people are the fountain of power. He lays it down as the first principle of public law: "Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem, quum lege regia quæ de ejus imperio lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem concessit." *Inst.* i. ii. 6. *Comp. Gai. Inst.* i. i. 5. The *lex regia* here appealed to was, as we shall see hereafter, a mere fiction of the jurists to account for the existence of the authority which they found established.

² Tac. *Agric.* 3.: "Quanquam Nerva Cæsar res olim dissociabiles miscuerit, principatum et libertatem."

popular reaction from a period of anarchy and suffering. It was repeated, as we shall see, under these conditions, with limited and transient success, by Augustus and Nerva. But its effect was either to exchange the sword of the open foe for the dagger of the assassin, or to crush all independence of thought and speech, and congeal in stagnant inaction the life-blood of the nation. If, however, it contained, in execution, the seeds of premature degeneracy and corruption, the humane experiment at least deserved, and did not fail to obtain, the sympathy of mankind.

The pomp of four triumphs, the spectacles of the theatre and the circus, the unwonted splendour of the decorations lavished on the dictator's person, were merely frivolous expedients for amusing the people, and enhancing the popularity and dignity of their favourite. To consolidate the power he had acquired on the firm basis of the national affections was a much more arduous undertaking. The demands of the age, as they presented themselves to Cæsar's mind, may be summed up in the language of the discourse attributed, though with little authority, to the historian Sallust, but in which some later rhetorician appears at least to have embodied the sentiments ascribed to antiquity by his own contemporaries.¹ A noble object of ambition, it was said, lay open to the emperor who should aspire to rule over the Roman people. He found them bloated and corrupted by the excess of luxury, overwhelmed with debt and degraded by the vices which debt engenders. The nobles were selfish and cruel, and had sought in a civil war the surest refuge from their creditors, and the only means

¹ There is no other external evidence for the genuineness of these *Orationes ad C. Cæsarem*, than the titles of the MSS. Their style has little in common with that of the historian; and the freedom with which they speak of Cæsar's ascendancy as a *regnum*, seems to me inconsistent with the language of the times.

Reforms
demanded by
the spirit of
the age.

of retrieving their fortunes. But this faction had now been crushed; let the seeds of such passions be prevented from taking root again. Let luxury be repressed by sumptuary laws: let the numbers of the privileged orders be increased, let the rights of citizenship be extended; let colonies be planted in the provinces; let military service be required equally of all, and none be retained under their standards beyond a reasonable period. Let the magistrates and judges be chosen for their virtues and dignity, and not merely for their wealth. It would be vain to entrust the working of such reforms as these to a commonwealth of free and equal citizens; but the impartial eye of a supreme ruler may watch securely over their execution, and neither fear, nor favour, nor private interest interfere to clog their operation.¹

These counsels represent, no doubt, the views which the Romans themselves entertained regarding the most urgent of their political wants. Couched as they are in feeble generalities, they still seem to point with sufficient distinctness to the kind of reforms which were really most essential. They were seconded assuredly by the cry of the provinces, which felt themselves entitled to make their interests known in return for the support they had given to the conqueror. If the city acknowledged its weakness and exhaustion, and declared its eagerness to receive an invigorating supply of foreign blood, the provincials offered for the honour of incorporation their best and noblest families. If the commonwealth demanded that the privileged order of the senate should be enlarged by the admission of new members, men of capacity and distinction, Gaul, Africa, and Spain presented their sons to the censor as soldiers who had fought for the new government, or civilians

A single ruler
required to
effect them.

¹ These recommendations may be compared with Cicero's suggestions (*pro Marcel.* 8.): "Constituenda judicia, renovanda fides, comprimendæ libidines, propaganda soboles."

learned in the laws and skilled in the conduct of public affairs. Rome had groaned under the severity with which the military service had pressed on the diminished ranks of her citizens; they had endured twenty, or thirty, or even forty campaigns, and the state had persisted in declaring that it could not afford to discharge them. But every frontier of the empire was burning to enlist its hardy warriors under the Roman eagle, to supply the places of the Italian husbandmen, and take their turn in the dangers and emoluments of conquest. And if the jealous democracy of the forum could behold without alarm the ascendancy of the man from whom alone it could expect to obtain all these benefits, much less would the subjects of the republic scruple to heap honour and power upon him, and constitute him the uncontrolled arbiter of their destinies. From the vigilant superintendence of a single ruler alone could they hope for any repression of the tyranny of their local governors. The interests of the sovereign dynasty would be naturally opposed to the elevation of rival families on the spoils of the conquered. The provinces might even hope that the ruler of the Roman world would seek to counterbalance the authority of a turbulent and jealous capital, by favouring the competition of her ancient rivals in Greece and Africa. Such perhaps were the vague hopes with which the native populations of the East and West had uniformly ranged themselves on Cæsar's side throughout his campaigns against the oligarchy. They now joined with the great body of the citizens themselves in pressing nearly similar suggestions upon him.

Cæsar was not appalled by the magnitude of the task which was thus thrust upon him. He had great examples before him in the projects of Drusus, and the legislation of his own relative, who had carried the Julian law for the admission of the Italians to the franchise; nor less

Cæsar's
sumptuary
enactments.

in the policy of Sertorius, whose wise liberality had renewed the image of Rome herself on the shores of the Iberian peninsula. In some matters of detail he had also the experience of the Pompeian reforms to guide him; these were at least safe and moderate, and might conciliate many by their specious propriety. Among the first of the dictator's enactments was one for restricting the luxury of dress and the table, and some other objects of ostentatious prodigality.¹ The ancient legislators, as is well known, never renounced the futile hope of checking private extravagance by formal decrees; but though experience had uniformly shown the futility of such expedients, it may still be urged in excuse for Cæsar, that his new position as a sovereign ruler placed his legislation in this respect on a different footing from that of the republican arbiters of manners; for he could continue to watch over the execution of his own laws, and not be constrained to abandon them, as soon as made, to the superintendence of indifferent or hostile successors. He was obliged also to consider that the censorship of manners which he virtually discharged was invested in the eyes of the people with the peculiar function of checking the growth of aristocratic luxury, and the democracy demanded, at least in this instance, that the traditions of the republic should be respected. It is true that Cæsar's legislation in this direction only added another to the long list of similar failures. Nothing but his own presence in the city, and his personal vigilance, could secure even the pretence of obedience to it. His mortification at this result seems to show that he had reposed more faith in the expedient than we, from his natural sagacity, might have expected. Doubtless the real object he had in view was not so much to control vicious extravagance, as to break down the pre-eminence of the wealthiest class. Other means

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 43.; comp. Cic. *ad Div.* vii. 26., ix. 15., *ad Att.* xiii. 7.

offered themselves towards this end, more sure in their operation as well as more equitable in their character. The restriction of the term of provincial governments to one year in the prætorian, and at farthest to two¹ in the consular provinces, opened the door to these lucrative appointments to a larger number of candidates, and in the same proportion reduced their emoluments. Cæsar could combine the satisfaction of the numerous claims which were urged upon him with a further development of his policy. He was glad to degrade the highest offices of the republic by distributing its honours among his adherents in rapid succession. The consuls, at his instigation, were

He abridges the consuls' term of office arbitrarily, and increases the number of the senate.

elected for the abridged term of six, three, or even two months.² Yet he did not venture to recommend a foreigner to the suffrages of the people, to which he still pretended to appeal in the appointment to the highest magistracies.³ The case was different where the appointment lay solely in himself. In revising the list of the senate in his censorian capacity, he raised it to nine hundred in number, which was probably nearly double what it had been in recent times. When we consider how many of that body had fallen in the war, or were still self-banished from the city, besides those whom Cæsar, by the exercise of his special functions, removed from the list for their misconduct or their poverty, we cannot doubt that more than two-thirds of the whole number were new importations. Nor were these elevated for the most part from other classes of Roman citizens. It was Cæsar's policy to place his allies from the provinces on the same benches with the proud descendants of

¹ Cic. *Philipp.* i. 8.; Dion, xliii. 25.

² Dion (xliii. 46.) says, even for a few days; comp. Lucan, v. 399.

³ Cornelius Balbus, the first foreigner who obtained this honour (Plin. *H.N.* vii. 44.), was not consul till the year 714, after Cæsar's death. Dion, xlviii. 32.

their father's conquerors. The representative of many an old patrician house, glorying in the images of prætors, consuls and imperators, with which his halls were crowded, fancied that he saw in the new senators whose Roman toga he was constrained to honour, the same uncouth figures which, in Gallic kilt or trouser, had followed the victor's car and graced his triumph.¹

The Romans exercised their wit upon these upstart strangers losing themselves amidst the forest of columns which thronged the public places of the city, and placards were posted recommending no good citizen to guide them to the senate house.² But wander where they would on the banks of the Tiber, the Gaul and Syrian might see their own Rhodanus and Orontes mingling with its turbid waters.³ The crowds of foreigners whom they met in every street or theatre must have reminded them that Rome was even now, in some sense, invaded by the barbarians. When Cæsar reduced the claimants of the public corn from three hundred and twenty thousand to little more than half that number, we must suppose that a great portion of those excluded were strangers who had fraudulently represented themselves as genuine children of the republic. But he made amends to these disappointed applicants by a large measure of enfranchisement. The policy was wise and humane by which he declared that all practitioners of medicine, and professors of science and liberal knowledge,

Communication of the Roman franchise to provincials.

¹ Suetonius (*Jul.* 80.) quotes, among other jests of the day, a popular song:

"Gallos Cæsar in triumphum ducit, idem in curiam.
Galli braccas deposuerunt, latum clavum sumpserunt."

² Suet. *l.c.*: "Bonum factum: ne quis senatori novo curiam monstrare velit."

³ What was said by Juvenal of a later period (*Sat.* iii. 62.), was almost equally appropriate even in the time of Cæsar:

"Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes."

should receive the full rights of Roman citizenship.¹ In the provinces, though his steps were slow and uncertain, he marched in the track which had been pointed out by the founders of the Marian party. The freedom of the city was conferred upon various states in Gaul, Spain, and possibly in other provinces. The whole legion *Alauda*, composed of Gaulish mercenaries, was enlisted in the ranks of the commonwealth by communication of the same honourable boon.² It seems probable that Cæsar already meditated a much further extension of this salutary principle of incorporation. Sicily was selected to furnish an example of its gradual application, if it be true that a project for conferring upon the inhabitants of that island the inferior or Latin franchise, was found among the dictator's papers at his death.³ He had no more confidential agent and counsellor than a Spanish provincial, Cornelius Balbus, by whom we may suppose such measures would be suggested or promoted. But the fate of Drusus must have been ever before the eyes of the Roman statesman, who sought to amalgamate the conquering with the conquered races. Cæsar shrank from or postponed the completion of his own liberal views, and could only leave behind him some isolated precedents for a generous policy, instead of working out the principle himself.

The assignment of lands to the veterans was a measure sanctioned by custom and repeated legal enactments. Cæsar, however, was more magnanimous in regard to this than Sulla. He despised the crafty policy of planting a cluster of military colonies in Italy, so as to form a camp of his own partisans within call of the central

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 42. The franchise was also given as a reward for laying out money in improvements such as building. Gai. *Inst.* i. 33.; Thierry, *Gaule*, i. 75.

² Suet. *Jul.* 24.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* xiv. 12.

government. Some territories indeed, here and there, were assigned to the disbanded legionaries within the Peninsula, but they were neither extensive, nor contiguous to one another.¹ There were no tracts of public domain left within the Alps for the state to distribute in public grants; there had been comparatively little confiscation of the enemy's estates; nor does it appear that the government entered into the market to buy lands for the purpose of so distributing them. Undoubtedly several of Pompeius's most obstinate adherents, the malignants of the oligarchic faction, had suffered spoliation on various pretences.² There were, we may suppose, many cases of particular hardship, some of gross injustice. But the voice of remonstrance was not unheeded. Cicero could plead for a friend or a client, and the cry he raised was directed rather against accidental oversights than intentional wrongs.³ Respect was paid to the rights of the owners of lands, even where they lay most convenient for occupation, and the veterans were generally scattered over the face of the country, instead of being collected together, as under Sulla, in compact masses.⁴ Not more than six insignificant colonies were settled in Italy, namely, at Bovianum, Veii, Aufidena, Casilinum, Calatia and Lanuvium.⁵ But as many as eighty thousand Roman citizens were transplanted to found new cities beyond the sea.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 38.; Dion, xlii. 54.

² Varro's villa at Casinum had been confiscated by Antonius (Cic. *Phil.* ii. 40.). Its owner had abused Cæsar's clemency by resorting to the Pompeian camp in Epirus after surrendering himself to the conqueror in Spain. Comp. Cic. *de Div.* i. 32., and Varr. *de R. R.* i. 4. Yet Cæsar extended his pardon to him a second time, and afterwards conferred further favours upon him.

³ Cic. *ad Div.* ix. 17., xiii. 8.

⁴ Compare Tacitus's account of the ancient mode of assigning lands (*Ann.* xiv. 27): "Olim universæ legiones deducebantur cum tribunis et centurionibus et sui cujusque ordinis militibus, ut consensu et caritate rempublicam efficerent."

⁵ Panvinius, *de Imp. Rom.* c. xi.

Carthage and Corinth were bidden to rise once more from their ruins.¹ It was a bold and generous undertaking, to restore the two great maritime cities of the western world, of both of which Rome had long shown herself so ignobly jealous.

The settlement of the veterans on the soil of Italy added little directly to the population of the country, and the experience of similar plantations on recent occasions had assuredly proved that no numerous or robust progeny was likely to spring from a stock so worn-out and enervated.² But the centre of the empire had been more exhausted by the civil wars than any of the provinces. The rapid disappearance of the free population had been remarked with astonishment and dismay, at least from the time of the Gracchi. If the numbers actually maintained on the soil of the Peninsula had not diminished, it was abundantly certain that the independent native races had given way almost throughout its extent to a constant importation of slaves. The remedies to which Cæsar resorted would appear as frivolous as they were arbitrary, were we not allowed to surmise that they were no more than the first imperfect outlines of a more comprehensive scheme. He prohibited all citizens between the age of twenty and forty from remaining abroad more than three years together, while, as a matter of state policy, he placed more special restrictions upon the movements of the youths of senatorial families. He required also that the

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 42.; Plut. *Cæs.* 57.; Dion, xlii. 50.; Strabo, xvii. 3. 15.; Pausan. ii. 1, 2.

² Compare Tac. *l.c.*: "Veterani . . . adscripti, non tamen infrequentiæ locorum subvenere . . . Neque conjugii suscipiendis neque alendis liberis sueti orbas sine posteris domos relinquebant." This of course was not without exceptions. Horace speaks of "Pueri magnis e centurionibus orti" (*Sat.* i. vi. 74.), the rustic descendants of these veteran colonists, and Tacitus gives a hint of the same kind (*Ann.* iii. 75.): "Atcius . . . avo centurione Sullano."

owners of herds and flocks, to the maintenance of which large tracts of Italy were exclusively devoted, should employ free labour to the extent of at least one-third of the whole.¹ Such laws could only be executed constantly under the vigilant superintendence of a sovereign ruler. They fell in fact into immediate disuse, or rather were never acted upon at all. They served no other purpose at the time but to evince Cæsar's perception of one of the fatal tendencies of the age, to which the eyes of most statesmen of the day were already open. In one particular he counteracted a certain amount of good which his rival had unconsciously promoted. Pompeius had distributed corn without making strict inquiry into the claims of the recipients to citizenship. This was found indirectly to encourage the manumission of slaves, who, receiving thereupon a share of the public largess, became less onerous to their masters as free labourers than they had been in their former capacity.² This effect, as far as it went, was doubtless checked by Cæsar's fiscal severity. But in fact the great cause which operated to stimulate the increase of slave-labour was the burden of the military conscription, which fell upon the free classes alone. This was perceived by Cæsar's successors in the supreme power, but was overlooked apparently by himself.

Another series of enactments, however, with a similar view, had a very different fortune. The privileges which the dictator assigned to paternity became the basis of much subsequent legislation, and established certain principles in Roman jurisprudence from which it never afterwards departed. The relative importance which was attached to the population of different portions of the

The *ius trium liberorum*.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 42. This law was merely the revival of an ancient enactment with the same view. Appian, *B. C.* i. 8.

² Dion, xxxix. 24.

empire was shown by a graduated scale. The father of a family of three legitimate children born at Rome, of four in Italy, or of five in the provinces, enjoyed exemption from certain personal charges.¹ Cæsar knew, it seems, the weakness of either sex. If he encouraged the paternal instincts by the boon of immunity from taxation, he flattered those of the other parent by an appeal to female vanity. The proudest of the ancient matrons had boasted that her children were her only jewels; but the mothers of the modern Gracchi might glory in the special privilege of riding in litters, dressing in purple, and wearing collars of pearls.²

In providing for the due execution of justice and the security of the commonwealth, Cæsar was compelled, as dictator, to reverse in some instances the policy which his party had maintained. He restricted the orders of citizens, from which the judges were to be chosen, to the senators and knights; thus excluding the most popular of the classes to which that privilege had been previously extended, that of the ærarian tribunes.³ Whatever were the precise alterations which he effected in the law of treason, they seem, at least, to have lain in the direction of greater strictness and severity. The same was undoubtedly the case in his enactments against other crimes of violence, to which the law had hitherto shown the most vicious leniency. Even when blood was shed, as in a party scuffle by Milo, the Roman citizen claimed the privilege of withdrawing into banishment before trial. The lawless excesses into which faction was so constantly rushing, invested this privi-

¹ Aulus Gellius (*Noct. Att.* ii. 15.) mentions cases in which pater-
nity and the number of children gave precedence.

² Suet. *Jul.* 43 ; Euseb. *Chron.* a. 1972. referred to by Dureau de
la Malle, *Econ. Polit. des Romains*, ii. 240.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 41, 42.

lege with especial popularity. But Cæsar, though he did not venture entirely to abrogate it, went so far as to mulct the culprit of half his property, and, in the most heinous cases, to confiscate the whole.

The settlement of the veterans on the land averted that which is the great difficulty governments generally have to contend against on the restoration of peace after a long war. There were no disbanded soldiers left to roam about the country, unaccustomed to labour, and corrupted in morals. The lawlessness of the times was, at least, not aggravated by this fertile element of mischief. Nevertheless, the effect of the licence of civil wars must have been to increase frightfully the insecurity of person and property. The institution of slavery was a temptation to at least one odious crime, of which modern times have little experience, that of kidnapping. The factories and secluded estates of the great proprietors were so many prisons where freemen might be detained in galling servitude without the possibility of making their injuries known. Of the prevalence and publicity of assassination some idea may be formed from a single allusion in the literature of the time. Didactic writers, it must be observed, were accustomed to throw their disquisitions into the form of dialogues; and it was generally contrived that, in each division of the work, a conversation of this kind should be brought to a conclusion. It was some exercise of ingenuity to devise easy and natural means of breaking up these supposed meetings of friends for philosophical discussion. In the first book of Varro's treatise on Husbandry, the interlocutors of the dialogue meet in the temple of Tellus. When they have said as much as the author thinks fit, he finds no more opportune means of dissolving the party, than the sudden announcement of the priest's attendant, that his master has just been killed by an assassin in

Lawlessness of
the times and
personal
insecurity.

a public place. He comes to invite them to assist at the obsequies on the morrow. They express themselves pleased with his courteous attention, content themselves with wafting a sigh to the uncertainty of human life in the centre of Roman civilization, and so retire to their homes.¹

Another salutary though unpopular reform was the dissolution of the *collegia*, or combinations, which held so much sway in the capital, overawing the independence of the judges, and trampling upon the execution of the laws. *Cæsar dissolves the collegia.* *Cæsar* herein did tardy justice to the principles of the party which he had spent his life in combating, and overthrew the corner-stone of the licentious legislation of *Clodius*. While he abolished the political clubs, however, he spared the original trade-guilds, upon the model of which they had been formed. An exception was also made in favour of the Jewish residents in the city, who were permitted to form an organization among themselves for social and religious purposes.² The feelings of that people had been peculiarly outraged by the profanation *Pompeius* had inflicted upon their temple. *Cæsar*, on the contrary, they were disposed to regard as their avenger, and, during his campaign in Egypt, they

¹ *Varro, R. R. i. 69.*: “Cum hæc diceret *Stolo*, venit libertus æditumi ad nos flens, et rogat ut ignoseamus quod simus retenti, et ut ei in funus postridie prodeamus. Omnes consurgimus ac simul exclamamus, Quid? in funus? quod funus? quid est factum? Ille flens narrat ab nescio quo percussum cultello concidisse, quem qui csset, animadvertere in turba non potuisse; sed tantummodo exaudisse vocem, perperam fecisse. Ipse cum patronum domum sustulisset, et pueros dimisisset ut medicum requirerent ac mature adducerent, quod potius illud administrasset quam ad nos venisset æquum sibi esse ignosci. Nec si eum servare non potuisset quin non multo post animam efflaret, tamen putare se recte fecisse. Non moleste ferentes descendimus de æde, et de casu humano magis querentes quam admirantes id Romæ factum, discedimus omnes.” This work is assigned by *Schneider (Comment. de Vit. M. Ter. Varronis in Script. R. R. i. 225.)* to the year A.U. 717, only eight or nine years after *Cæsar’s* legislation.

² *Joseph. Antiq. xiv. 10. 8.*

had shown themselves remarkably zealous in his service. In return he accorded to them various privileges, remitting, among other things, the tribute of the seventh or Sabbatical year, in which they still made it a point of conscience neither to sow nor to reap.¹

The measures of reform which have been thus far enumerated, refer, for the most part, to the solution of immediate practical difficulties. Project of a complete code of laws. In the removal of actual and pressing evils Cæsar's movements were rapid and decisive, though his enactments were little more than the repetition of older experiments. On the other hand, when he had leisure to look further into the future, and to meditate schemes for the development of a new system of administration, his views, as far as we are enabled to trace them, were more liberal and original; but the execution of them was unfortunately postponed to pressing necessities. To contemplate the empire as one complete whole, to sweep away anomalous usages and traditions, and organize it under a single uniform system of administration, was a conception worthy of the greatest and most powerful of Roman statesmen. But to make any real progress in so vast a scheme would have required at least the greater part of one life; one or two vague indications of its conception, hastily struck out in the course of a few months of feverish excitement, are hardly enough perhaps to justify us in attributing to their author any fixed purpose in this respect, or maturity of view. Cæsar only lived long enough to intimate his noble design of reducing to one harmonious code of laws the inconsistent decisions of preceding centuries.² The science of the law was

¹ Joseph. *Antiq.* xiv. 10. 6.

² Suet. *Jul.* 44.: "Destinabat . . . jus civile ad certum modum redigere, atque ex immensa diffusaque legum copia optima quæque et necessaria in paucissimos conferre libros."

a mystery which the nobles had retained in their own power. They had claimed to be its sole authorized expositors until its technicalities were divulged by a treacherous partisan. During the last century, however, though this veil had been in a great measure withdrawn, the whole system had been so entangled by conflicting precedents and the independent edicts set forth by the prætors, as to present a labyrinth of vexatious confusion. Cicero, whose natural good sense appears in nothing more clearly than in his contempt for the pedantry of the jurisconsults of his day, had conceived the idea of reducing to form and principle the most anomalous of the sciences. A treatise on this subject, even by such a master, might easily be forgotten after the reform it advocated had been actually effected; but the work in which Cicero first paved the way for this beneficent undertaking seems to have survived, though known perhaps only to the learned, for some centuries after the first remodelling of the Roman law.¹ The glory of effecting this reform was not reserved for Cæsar; he could only point out to the succeeding generation the importance of the undertaking, as a bold step in the direction of administrative uniformity.

Precisely the same may be said of another project which the Roman people owed to this great creative genius. Cæsar proposed to execute a complete map of the empire from actual survey.² He divided the whole extent of the Roman world into four portions, and appointed men of approved science as commissioners to examine them personally throughout. The work was to be executed in the most minute manner. The Roman landsurveyors had long been familiar with the technical pro-

Of a complete
map of the
empire.

¹ This work of Cicero is referred to by Aulus Gellius, i. 22.

² We obtain our knowledge of this fact from the preface to the *Cosmographia* of Æthicus, a writer of the fourth century. The measurement was begun B.C. 44.

cesses by which the inequalities of natural limits are duly measured and registered. Throughout Italy and in many of the provinces every estate was elaborately marked out on the surface of the soil, and its extent and configuration inscribed on tablets of brass and preserved with scrupulous care.¹ The sages of Greece had begun also to apply the knowledge of astronomy to the measurement of the globe. The age was ripe for a great achievement in the science of geography, and the systematic way in which it was carried out, together with the long period of thirty-two years which was devoted to it, is a guarantee for the substantial results of this magnificent undertaking.²

One of the brightest features in the dictator's character was his genuine and unaffected love of literature. He was not only distinguished himself as an orator, a grammarian, an historian and even an astronomer; he was also attached to literary men and enjoyed their society. His institution of a public library, not offered to the citizens for their use, but surrendered to them for their own property, was a novelty in the career of civilization. Cæsar paid a graceful compliment to literature, which should be of no political party, by assigning to the veteran antiquarian Varro, the most learned of the Romans, the arrangement and care of these intellectual treasures.³

Establishment
of the first
public library.

The reform of the calendar was a vigorous and

¹ Consult on this subject Dureau de la Malle, *Econ. Pol. des Romains*, i. 166—207.

² It may be conjectured that the chart of the world which M. Agrippa published, and which is referred to under his name by Pliny (*H. N.* lii. 3.), was in fact the completed undertaking of Cæsar's commissioners.

³ Compare Suet. *Jul.* 44., and Plin. *H.N.* vii. 31. The former tells us that the arrangement of Cæsar's collection was confided to Varro; the latter, that Varro's statue was placed in the library of Asinius Pollio, to whom he attributes the honour of setting the first example of such a public institution. But Pollio's library was formed, he says, *ex manubiis*, from the spoils of war, and Pollio's

well-timed effort for the removal of a great practical abuse.¹ The Roman year, even before the time of Cæsar, ought to have equalled, on the average, three hundred and sixty-five days and six hours; so near had the astronomers even of the period assigned to the reign of Numa already arrived to the real length of the earth's revolution round the sun. This year had been calculated on a basis of three hundred and fifty-four days, with the intercalation of a month of twenty-two and twenty-three days alternately every second year; but another day had been added to the three hundred and fifty-four to make an odd or fortunate number, and, to compensate for this superfluous day, the number of intercalations was proportionally diminished by a very intricate process.² The simplicity of the original arrangement being thus violated, great carelessness had soon prevailed in making the requisite corrections. In course of time the pontiffs, to whose superior knowledge the guardianship of the national calendar had been entrusted, had shrouded their science in a veil of religious mystery, and began to turn it to political or private purposes. They commanded the intercalation of a month arbitrarily³, when it suited them to favour some partisan who desired the extension of his year of office, or the postponement of the day on which his debts should become due.⁴ They

most noted exploits were of a later date (A.U. 715, in Illyrieum). It seems likely, however, that the statue of Varro would be placed in the library which he had himself arranged; and I am inclined to follow the account of Suetonius, and to suppose that Pollio only made additions to Cæsar's original foundation. It may be remarked that the first Alexandrian library, though open to the public, was the private property of the king. So was Lucullus's a private collection. Plut. *Lucull.* 42.

¹ Ideler, *Handb. der Mathem. und Techn. Chronologie*, ii. 117. There is some discrepency in the most modern observations of the precise length of the solar year.

² Macrob. *Sat.* i. 13.; Censorin. *de Die Natal.* 20.

³ Censorin. *l. c.*; Plut. *Cæs.* 59

⁴ Censorin. *l. c.*; Macrob. *Sat.* i. 14.; Ammian, xxvi. 1.; Solin. 1.

abstained from the requisite insertion, at the instance of some provincial governor who was anxious to hasten his return to the enjoyments of the capital.¹ This control over the length of the civil year, as well as the power of proclaiming the days on which business might or might not be transacted, had become an engine of state in the hands of the oligarchical government with which the sacerdotal functionaries were for the most part politically connected. Cæsar indeed had broken down in his own person the barrier which had been systematically raised against the intrusion of the opposite party into this body. The supreme pontificate which he enjoyed gave him the legitimate means of working this instrument for his own advantage. But he felt the extreme inconvenience which had latterly resulted from its abuse. The grievance had indeed become intolerable. In the distracted state of public affairs, and amidst conflicting personal interests, the pontiffs had abstained from making any intercalation since the year of the city 702, and had even then left the civil calendar some weeks in advance of the real time. From that time each year had reckoned only three hundred and fifty-five days, and the civil equinox had got eighty days in advance of the astronomical. The consuls, accordingly, who entered on their office on the 1st of January of the year 708 of the city, really commenced their functions on the 13th October, B. C. 47, that is, eighteen days after the astronomical equinox. The confusion which resulted from such a state of things may be easily imagined. The Roman seasons were marked by appropriate festivals assigned to certain fixed days, and associated with the religious worship of the people. At the period of harvest and vintage,

¹ As Cicero, for instance, in his government of Cilicia. He writes to his friends at Rome to entreat them to hinder the pontiffs from intercalating in that year, and so protracting his term of absence (*Ad Att.* v. 9., *ad Div.* vii. 2., viii. 6.).

for instance, certain offerings were to be made and certain divinities thereby propitiated.¹ The husbandman was obliged to reject the use of the calendar altogether, and to depend upon his own rude observations of the rising and setting of the constellations.

Cæsar had acquired a competent knowledge of the science of astronomy, in which the duties of his office as supreme pontiff gave him a particular interest. He composed himself a treatise upon the subject, which long retained its value as a technical exposition.² The astronomers of Alexandria were considered the most expert of their time, and with them he had made acquaintance during his brief and busy sojourn in the palace of the Ptolemies. But if the Alexandrians made their year to consist of three hundred and sixty-five days, without any intercalation³, their error was out of all proportion greater than that of the original calendar of Numa. It is more probable that Cæsar took this latter as the basis of his own calculations. He was not unaware that the period of three hundred and sixty-five days and six hours exceeds, in a slight degree, the true length of the solar year. The astronomer Hipparchus⁴ had calculated this excess as constant at four minutes and forty-eight seconds, and Cæsar, or his adviser Sosigenes, was no doubt acquainted with this result. But if the excess were really constant and not greater than this, it would make the difference of only one day in three

Amount of error in the computation of time.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 40: "Ut neque messium feriæ æstati neque vindemiarum autumnò competèrent."

² Macrobi. *Saturn.* i. 16., where the writer asserts also that Cæsar derived his knowledge from the Egyptians.

³ Censorin. 18.: "Nam eorum annus civilis solos habet dies CCCLXV sine ullo intercalari." Ideler shows that the Egyptians knew of the increment of six hours, but did not introduce it into their civil year till B.C. 30. Ideler, ii. 118.

⁴ B.C. 160, or thereabouts. See Ideler, *l.c.*

hundred years, and this amount of error he may have been contented to neglect. In fact, however, the more accurate observations of the moderns have ascertained that the excess of the Julian year over the solar progressively increases; that at the present time, it amounts to as much as 11^m 22^s, while at the commencement of the Julian era it was only 11^m 12^s. It appears, then, on taking the average excess between that era and the present time, that the error would really amount to as much as one day in each hundred and thirty years. Cæsar, however, was satisfied with assigning to each year the average of three hundred and sixty-five days and a quarter, by the regular intercalation of one day in every fourth year. The consequence was that the sum of the trifling increments of each successive revolution of this period had occasioned a loss of nearly three days at the date of the council of Nice, A. D. 325. Accordingly, in that year, the solar equinox was found to fall not on the 23rd of March, as in 45 B. C., but on the 20th. When the Romish calendar was corrected by Pope Gregory XIII. in A. D. 1582, it had got forward as much as thirteen days. That pontiff proceeded to cut off ten of these superfluous days, and so restored the calendar to its position at the date of the council of Nice. This alteration has since been adopted throughout the Protestant states of Europe, with an adequate provision against the future accumulation of error; but there still remains a constant difference of about three days between the civil and the astronomical equinox.

The basis of Cæsar's reform was that the commencement of the new era should coincide with the first new moon after the shortest day. In order to make the year of the city 709 thus begin, ninety days required to be added to the current year. In the first place an intercalary month of twenty-three days was inserted in its proper

Cæsar's reform
of the
calendar.

place between the 23rd and 24th of February¹, and at the end of November two new months were added, comprehending sixty-seven days, or rather as we may conjecture, the months comprised twenty-nine and thirty-one days respectively, and the seven supplemental days were counted separately. The shortest day of the year 46 B. C. was the 24th of December, and the first new moon fell on the eighth day succeeding, from which accordingly the new era received its date.² The period which was marked by this series of alterations received vulgarly the appellation of *the year of confusion*; *the last year of confusion* was the term which a writer of a late date more significantly applied to it.³ In a political as well as a social point of view it must have been hailed by the mass of the people as the commencement of a new era of steady and reasonable government. Even the discontented could not raise the cry so popular in England on the occasion of the reformation of our own calendar in the last century, *Give us back our eleven days*. Cæsar, on the contrary, had given them ninety. The jests which they did level at this wholesome enactment were miserably pointless. When some one observed to Cicero, *To-morrow Lyra rises*, Yes, he replied, *by command*.⁴

After all, the most salutary of the dictator's reforms were embittered to the minds of the noblest of the Romans by the compulsion with which they

¹ In our ecclesiastical calendar the intercalary day of leap-year is still inserted at this place.

² Ideler, ii. 122.; Servius on Æn. vii. 720.: "Proprie sol novus est octavo Calend. Januariæ."

³ Macrob. *Sat.* i. 16.

⁴ Plut. *Cæs.* 59.: *ναὶ ἐκ διατάγματος*. The edict, in fact, reconstituted the civil limits of the seasons according to certain phenomena of the heavens. Thus an ancient calendar remarks on Aug. 11.: "Fidicula occasu suo autumnum inchoat Cæsari." We can detect from this the way in which Cicero's jest may possibly have been spoiled by the mistake of the reporter.

were attended. Both Cæsar and his familiar friends had been accustomed to express openly their contempt for the republic as a name only, and not a reality, a title without form or substance.¹ The name of king was alone wanting to complete the actual tyranny which they saw gradually closing around them. The despot made little show of veiling the arbitrary nature of his proceedings. He caused, indeed, the decrees he issued from the solitude of his own chamber to be subscribed with the names of the senators who were supposed to have assisted in his councils²; but so flagrant an imposition only added insult to the injury. Nothing struck the Romans more forcibly with its assumption of regal state than the difficulty of access to the great man. Accustomed as the nobles were to the most perfect external equality, and the easiest intercourse among each other, their indignation rose high when they found their approach to the dictator barred by a crowd of attendants, or impeded by ceremonious formalities.³ In this, however, there may have been no affectation on his part; he felt the unpopularity of such a position, and lamented the soreness which it engendered towards him. But the enormous pressure of business, however rapid was his despatch of it, and in this respect he had an extraordinary facility, made it necessary to restrict the times and means of claiming

The dictator begins to assume regal state.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 77.; comp. Cic. *ad Att.* x. 4., *ad Div.* ix. 9.

² Cic. *ad Div.* ix. 15. He alludes, perhaps, to a single instance of the kind. Dion attests that Cæsar generally required the sanction of a council selected from the senate, or of the whole body, to his decrees (xl.iii. 27.).

³ Cic. *ad Div.* vi. 13.: "Magnis occupationibus ejus, a quo omnia petuntur, aditus ad eum difficiliore fuerunt" (comp. vi. 14., iv. 57.). Cæsar had expressed his sense of the unpopularity he incurred from the necessary inconvenience he caused his friends: "Ego dubitem quin summo in odio sim quum M. Cicero sedeat, nec suo commodo me convenire possit?" Comp. *ad Att.* xiv. 1, 2.; Drumann, iii. 626.

his attention. Thus it was that the first rudiments of an Oriental court began to rise in the centre of the western republics. The colours of this imitation of a hateful original were heightened by the demeanour of Cleopatra, who followed her lover to Rome at his invitation.¹ She came with the younger Ptolemæus, who now shared her throne, and her ostensible object was to negotiate a treaty between her kingdom and the commonwealth. While the Egyptian nation was formally admitted to the friendship and alliance of Rome, its sovereign was lodged in Cæsar's villa on the other side of the Tiber, and the statue of the most fascinating of women was erected in the temple of the Goddess of Love and Beauty.² The connexion which subsisted between her and the dictator was unblushingly avowed. The national prejudice against the foreigner and the Egyptian was openly outraged and insolently disregarded; and Cleopatra was encouraged to proclaim that her child, whom she called Cæsarion, was actually the son of her Roman admirer. A tribune, named Helvius Cinna, ventured, it is said, to assert among his friends his intention of proposing a law, with the dictator's sanction, to enable him to marry more wives than one, for the sake of progeny, and to disregard in his choice the legitimate qualification of Roman descent.³ The citizens, however, were spared this last insult to their cherished sentiments. The queen of Egypt felt bitterly the scorn with which she was popularly

¹ Dion, xliii. 27.; Suet. *Jul.* 52.

² Appian, *B. C.* ii. 102.

³ Suet. *l.c.*; comp. Dion, xlv. 7. But the story is a confused one. The words of Suetonius ("Cinna . . . confessus est, habuisse se legem," &c.) imply that the statement was made after Cæsar's death, as was the case with regard to many other schemes ascribed to him; but the same writer also tells us (c. 85.) that Helvius Cinna was murdered in the fury of the mob immediately after the funeral.

regarded as the representative of an effeminate and licentious people.¹ It is not improbable that she employed her fatal influence to withdraw her lover from his jealous capital, and urged him to schemes of Oriental conquest to bring him more completely within her toils. Meanwhile the haughtiness of her demeanour corresponded with the splendid anticipations in which she indulged.² She held a court in the suburbs of the city, at which the adherents of the dictator's policy were not the only attendants. Even his opponents and concealed enemies were glad to bask in the sunshine of her smiles. Cicero himself, the moralist and the patriot, was not the last to submit to the blandishments of the sorceress. He was still unable to shake off his apprehensions of an impending proscription, and with all his professions of personal purity he was not scrupulous as to the character of those whose favour or resistance he required. He had availed himself of the infidelity of a Fulvia; he now flattered the vanity of a Cleopatra. The desire to obtain some precious manuscripts and works of art from Alexandria was the excuse he made for presenting himself in her hall of reception.³ The queen's behaviour to him was exceedingly gracious; she promised every thing he desired, and charged the grammarian Ammonius, who followed in her suite, to remind her of the engagement. But Cicero did not refrain at the same time from expressing himself with great bitterness against her in his private correspondence, in

¹ The sensuality of Canopus was proverbial. Comp. Propert. iii. 11. 39.:

“Incesti meretrix regina Canopi.”

Juvenal, vi. 84.:

“Prodigia et mores Urbis damnante Canopo.”

² Cic. *ad Att.* xv. 15.: “Superbiam ipsius Reginae, quum esset trans Tiberim in hortis, commemorare sine maximo dolore non possum.”

³ Cic. *l.c.*: “Quæ omnia erant φιλολογία et dignitatis meæ.”

which he seems anxious to assure Atticus that her agent Sara was only admitted once into his house. It is probable that Cleopatra arrived at Rome before Cæsar's expedition into Spain¹, which interrupted and perhaps frustrated her intrigues. But she continued to reside there till after his death, as will appear in the sequel.

The flattery of the nobles was, after all, pronounced in a louder strain than their discontent. Adulation of the nobles. Cæsar heard himself addressed daily in the senate with language of fulsome adulation. A crowd of parasites of the highest education and the most polished manners imparted grace to homage, and threw a charm over the most abject obsequiousness. Of all the attributes of greatness which were lavishly ascribed to the dictator, none was more celebrated by his courtiers than his clemency. M. Marcellus had retired from the field of Pharsalia to Mitylene, and dared not even solicit the favour of the conqueror, whom his fatal insolence to the Transpadanes had offended beyond the hope of pardon. But his friends had learned not to despair. They plied Cæsar with piteous appeals to his generosity. C. Marcellus, the cousin of the exile, prostrated himself at the dictator's feet, and a crowd of the noblest of the Romans followed his example. The question of his recal was remitted to the decision of the senate itself. The oration which Cicero delivered was a laboured panegyric upon Cæsar; the anticipated pardon of Marcellus was exalted above the greatest of his actions; and the usurper was bid to rest secure in the gratitude of the nobles, and in the firm conviction of the nation that his life was indispensable for the maintenance of order.² Marcellus was accordingly in-

¹ According to the order of events as related by Dion, see xliii. 27.

² The genuineness of the *Oratio pro Marcello* has been abandoned without due consideration, in my judgment, by many modern critics. The arguments against it seem to me at least inconclusive, and I

vited to return to his country; but on his way he fell under the dagger of an assassin at Athens. The deed was undoubtedly the effect of some private enmity, but it did not fail to be for some time currently ascribed to the instigation of the man who had forgiven him. Cicero made a speech some months afterwards in favour of Ligarius, against whom, on account of the pertinacity of his opposition, the dictator was said to be peculiarly exasperated. In this address, the orator adopted undoubtedly a bolder tone than appears in the oration of Marcellus. But, as Cæsar's character became better known, the most timid summoned courage to affect freedom of speech in his presence. The fear of proscription had vanished, and with it much of the breathless subservience of the proud Roman nobility.

Cæsar indeed felt the ground firm beneath his feet. He was conscious that the real strength of the nation was with him. The nobles might intrigue against him, and the mob of the city might be ready to sell itself to any restless adventurer; but the good sense of the middle class of Rome, backed by the general sympathy of the Italians and the enthusiastic veneration of the provinces, concurred to secure the foundations of his power. It was to these classes only that he felt himself responsible for the exercise of his delegated authority. Accordingly, he disbanded his veterans, or despatched the legions to distant quarters. He even dismissed a band of Spanish auxiliaries whom he had retained about him for a time as a chosen body-guard.¹ When his personal friends among the senators and knights offered to arm a select corps of their own number, to watch over the safety of his person, he waived the

The general feeling of the nation favourable to Cæsar's power.

should expect the work of a rhetorician composed after the event which confuted so many of its prognostications, to betray some consciousness of the impending catastrophe.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 86.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 109.

honour of their services, in the confident assurance that the state had more need of him than he of the state.¹ And such was the impression of its general beneficence which his administration had created in almost every quarter, that he might fully depend upon it to protect him at least from any public enemy. No precaution he well knew could guarantee his life from the insidious attack of the private assassin: but he declared that it was at any time better to die than to live always in fear of dying.²

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 57.

² Plut. *l.c.*; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 108.: ἀμφὶ δὲ αὐτῷ στρατιωτικὸν οὐκ ἦν, οὐ γὰρ δρυφόροις ἠρέσκετο, τῇ δὲ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ὑπερέσει μόνῃ.

CHAPTER XXI.

Tranquillity of Rome during Cæsar's absence in Spain.—Character of his principal friends: Balbus, Oppius, Matus, Hirtius.—Their Epicurean principles.—Cæsar himself a free thinker, but addicted to superstition.—His return to Rome, and last triumph.—Harsh treatment of Laberius.—Honours and dignities showered upon Cæsar.—He receives the appellation of Pater Patriæ, and the prænomen Imperatoris: is elected Consul for ten years, and created Dictator for life, etc.—His magnificent schemes for works of public utility.—He manifests symptoms of intolerable pride.—Cæsar's urbanity of character.—He visits Cicero at his villa.—Cicero exhorts him to make war on the Parthians.—He prepares to set out on an expedition of foreign conquest, and appoints magistrates for the interval of his intended absence.—Cæsar appears to covet the title of king.—The people express their disapprobation.—He refuses the diadem.—A conspiracy is formed against his life by men of both parties in the state.—They place Brutus at their head.—Assassination of Cæsar on the Ides of March, beneath the statue of Pompeius (A. U. 709 – March 710. B. C. 45, 44.).

THE prudent mildness with which the government was administered during Cæsar's absence in Spain had maintained perfect tranquillity in Rome during a period of unusual anxiety. At the beginning of the year Cæsar had been elected consul for the fourth time, and without a colleague. The old republican office of prætor had been also dispensed with. Lepidus, as master of the horse to the dictator, convened the senate, and presided, with the assistance of six or eight prefects, over the administration of affairs in the city: the higher magistracies were all in abeyance, excepting those of the tribunes of the people and the ædiles. Cæsar had prudently taken with him Dolabella, and had invited Antonius also to accompany him. But the latter smarted under the blow his arrogance and cupidity had recently

State of Rome during Cæsar's absence in Spain.

Resentment of Antonius against him.

received from the dictator, and refused to leave Italy in his train.¹ It does not appear whether he was entrusted with a share in the government, but his mere presence in Rome was enough to keep alive the apprehensions of the most timid of the malcontents, who still foreboded that Cæsar's final triumph in Spain would be the signal for dropping the mask of clemency, and plunging into a career of confiscation and blood.

On mature reflection, however, Antonius seems to have felt that it would be imprudent to indulge in animosity towards his patron, from whose generosity he was anxious to obtain the honour of the consulship.² He left Rome with the intention of overtaking him. Taking the route to Gaul, he did not proceed further than Narbo, from whence, pleading the insecurity of the roads, he suddenly returned.³ It was now confidently surmised by Cicero that he came with authority to execute the long delayed vengeance of the conqueror.⁴ The fact seems to have been simply that having lately taken to wife the notorious Fulvia, who had been left a widow successively by Clodius and Curio, he thus abridged his absence out of passion or jealousy.⁵ He possibly may have had some apprehensions lest the government should take advantage of his absence to restore to their owners, or sell for the benefit of the state, the estates of the unfortunate Pompeians, which he had contrived to grasp.⁶ Another rumour arose that he had heard in Gaul of Cæsar's defeat and death, and of the impending restoration of the republican party.

Though Lepidus was nominally at the head of the administration of affairs, it would seem that his in-

¹ Antonius abstained from taking part in Cæsar's campaigns either in Africa or Spain. Plut. *Anton.* 10.; Cic. *Philipp.* ii. 29. "Tam bonus gladiator rudem tam cito accepisti?"

² Cic. *Philipp.* ii. 30.

³ Cic. *l. c.*

⁴ Cic. *Philipp.* ii. 31., *ad Att.* xii. 19.

⁵ Plut. *l. c.*

⁶ Cic. *ad Att.* xii. 18.

fluence was less regarded than that of others among his colleagues. The wealth and dignity of his family, his descent from the chief who had been the first to attempt the overthrow of the Sullan ascendancy, the favour which his brother, Æmilius Paullus, had acquired with Cæsar by his well-timed defection from the ranks of the Pompeians, had all contributed to raise him nominally to the first place among the dictator's adherents, and elevated him eventually to a position of still greater eminence. But it was through the channel of private friendship that the good will of the sovereign of the Roman world was to be conciliated, and it was those who enjoyed his personal intimacy and confidence who were felt to be most influential in the distribution of honours and favours. It may serve to illustrate the character of the central figure itself if we pass rapidly in review the personages who were grouped most closely around him.

The dictator's
personal
friends :
Lepidus.

Of these the most conspicuous in the history of the times was C. Asinius Pollio, who had first brought himself into notice by assailing the tribune C. Cato for his violent proceedings in favour of the senate. He assumed this attitude perhaps in the first instance for the sake of notoriety only; but from that moment he attached himself more and more closely to Cæsar. He attended the proconsul in some of his campaigns in Gaul, and formed one of the scanty band of devoted followers with which he crossed the Rubicon. When Cæsar had so rapidly traversed and conquered Italy, he sent Pollio into Sicily and Africa as lieutenant to Curio. It was under his command that the remnant of that unfortunate expedition had been conveyed home. Throughout the campaigns of Epirus and Thessaly he served by the side of his patron, and was present at the battle of Pharsalia. His fidelity and talents were next charged with the administration of Cæsar's

C. Asinius
Pollio.

government in Rome, in which he had the merit of opposing Dolabella's seditious movement.¹ He served again in a military capacity both in Africa and Spain. Pollio was one of the most finished specimens of the man of business and literature combined. His great work on the history of his own times was the result of the leisure of his latter years. He strode with a bold and firm step over the volcanic ashes of the civil wars.² Critical in his judgment and impartial in his sentiments, he reflected no less severely on the misrepresentations of Cæsar's personal narrative, than on the exaggerations of Cicero's invectives. But in the most active period of his political and military career he distinguished himself as an accomplished orator, and put forward no mean pretensions to poetical celebrity. The encomiums of Catullus and his youthful admirer Horace represent his character to us in an amiable light: but it was the amiableness of a practical eclectic, of one whose good-humoured selfishness found no difficulty in accommodating itself to the tempers and habits of men of very different principles.³ His taste was refined and fastidious: the style even of Cicero and Livy did not escape his animadversions.⁴ Subsequent critics represented his own as rough and jejune, formed, as it were, rather in the school of the Appii and Menenii

¹ Plut. *Anton.* 9.

² Hor. *Od.* ii. 1. 3.:

“Incedis per ignes
Suppositos cineri doloso.”

This work, which was in fact a history of the Civil Wars, commenced with the consulship of Afranius and Metellus, A.U. 694, that is, with the formation of the triumvirate:

“Motum ex Metello consule civicum.”

³ His popularity in society may be estimated from the fact recorded of him that he was the first to introduce the practice of an author's reciting his own works to an audience of private acquaintance. Senec. *Controv.* iv. præf.

⁴ Senec. *Suasor.* vi. vii.; Quintil. *Instit. Orat.* i. 5. 56., viii. 1. 3. He discovered *Patavinity*, or the provincialisms of Patavium, in the language of the great historian, who was born there,

than of his more polished Augustan contemporaries.¹

If Pollio was a familiar associate of Cæsar, Oppius seems to have been one of the most confidential of his friends. It was to him, together with Balbus, that the dictator entrusted the management of his private affairs; and at a later period a volume of letters was preserved, in which he had corresponded with them in cypher, probably on matters of the most domestic and personal interest.² The high favour in which they stood with their patron induced Cicero to consult them, throughout the painful struggle he made to secure the conqueror's protection without attaching himself to his party. When the topics of his adulatory addresses were in their judgment ill-chosen, he consented to withdraw or remodel them accordingly. The character of Oppius seems to have been warm and affectionate. He wrote the lives of many distinguished Romans, and among them of some of his contemporaries, and even of Pompeius himself; but in these his partiality for Cæsar rendered him unworthy of confidence.³ A pleasing anecdote is related of Cæsar surrendering to him, when he had fallen sick on a journey, the only room in the hut at which they were to rest for the night, while he took up his own lodging in the porch outside.⁴ Such is the influence which a gentle and feminine nature often exerts over a sterner character. It seems probable that the counsels of Oppius confirmed Cæsar's natural inclination to make the mildest use of his power, and certainly he became the channel through whom assurances of pardon and favour were most generally conveyed.

L. Cornelius Balbus was a not less intimate associate of his great patron, but the genuineness of his

¹ Tac. *Dial. de Orat.* 21.

² Gell. *Noct. Att.* xvii. 9.

⁴ Plut. *Cæs.* 17.; Suet. *Jul.* 72.

³ Plut. *Pomp.* 10.

attachment is not equally indisputable. His talents and industry were devoted through life to securing his own advancement and maintaining his personal safety, and his career proved a remarkable instance of worldly success. Balbus was by birth a provincial, of the town of Gades, in Spain. His fellow-citizens took the part of the republic against Sertorius, and it was thus that he found means of recommending himself to Pompeius. From the champion of the oligarchy he received the Roman franchise, and upon this foundation he built his fortunes. The prospects of advancement which it seemed to open induced him to remove to Rome, where he cultivated the favour of his first patron; but another star was rising in the firmament, and he did not neglect at the same time to attach himself to Cæsar. While the outward show of alliance between the rival leaders still subsisted, his new civic rights, invidiously impugned, gained the advocacy of Pompeius, Crassus and Cicero. Cæsar, however, secured at last his entire devotion by confiding to him, in conjunction with Oppius, the management of his private concerns. The spoils of the Gallic war were thus dispensed through his hands, and he did not fail to profit by the opportunity to amass riches. At the same time the trust which he exercised at Rome enabled him to avoid siding with either party in the field, and he came to the councils of the conqueror with a judgment and temper undisturbed by the passions of the civil wars. His position in the court of the dictator now became highly influential, and the anxious nobles vied with one another in soliciting his mediation.

But the most disinterested perhaps of all Cæsar's associates was C. Matus Calvena; for he alone abstained from taking part in public affairs, and derived neither wealth nor station from his friend's success. His natural predilections were

*C. Matus
Calvena.*

probably on the side of the senate, but the ties of personal attachment were stronger with him than any political preference. He asserted the justice of Cæsar's claims in the most perilous crisis of his life, and persevered after his death in defending his memory against every detractor. Nor did he fail to use all his influence, which was justly considerable, in saving the conquered. The line of conduct pursued by one so honest and magnanimous is a strong proof that the most humane and reasonable men of the day, though they might scruple to put their own hands to the work of destruction, were satisfied that the safety of the commonwealth demanded the overthrow of aristocratic ascendancy.

A. Hirtius held commands under Cæsar in the Gaulish campaigns, but it was apparently A. Hirtius. rather as a negotiator, or in a civil capacity, that he approved himself to his leader as a zealous and able auxiliary. His literary accomplishments, which doubtless contributed to raise him in his patron's estimation, are known to us by the last book of the Commentaries on the Gallic War, in which he appears as a cold but correct imitator of Cæsar's style. But it was to Hirtius also that Cæsar confided the task of replying to a work which Cicero published at this time in praise of Cato; and all the traits we discover of his private character, his moderation, want of ambition, and habits of kindly intercourse with his political adversaries, seem to point him out as an opponent of the philosophical no less than the political sentiments of the renowned Stoic. Among the principal adherents of the usurper the tenets of Epicurus seem universally to have prevailed. Vibius Pansa, another of Cæsar's friends and admirers, was noted alike for his amiable temper and the fashionable indifference of his speculative creed; for at this time every man of education in Rome professed a creed, and felt

Epicurean
tenets of
Cæsar's
friends: Vi-
bius Pansa,
C. Cassius.

himself obliged by the rules of good society to pretend to some consistency between his creed and his practice. Similar sentiments were maintained by C. Cassius, and no doubt the great principle of Epicureanism, its apathy on political subjects, served to reconcile him so easily to the change of government. The rigid virtues of the Stoics had found little favour with a generation to which corruption and tergiversation had become so notoriously familiar. The sceptical schools of the Academy were too restless and argumentative for men to whom acquiescence in the irresistible march of events had assumed the form of a policy. But the dogmas of Epicurus, while they indulged political indifference and made time-serving respectable, were also easily distorted to cloak vice and voluptuousness; to disclaim the inference which so many of their professors drew from them in favour of licentiousness both of action and principle was the faint and hypocritical endeavour of a few sanctimonious pretenders. The spread of such opinions was favoured by the social corruption of the times, and by the exigencies of the public crisis. The miseries of civil dissension had at last raised a general cry for peace at any price. Rome could bear the long exhaustion of her foreign wars without a murmur; for they brought her glory and lucre, and opened boundless prospects to her avarice or ambition. But the civil wars were destitute of every charm. The principles of the fashionable philosophy coincided with the longings of the multitude. To the men who could recommend these principles by the brilliancy of their personal accomplishments and amiableness of their tempers the favour of Cæsar most naturally inclined. He loved the sleek in person and easy in disposition; the lean and eager-minded were those he instinctively feared.¹ The philosophy of the Garden had recently been raised in popularity and

¹ The well-known passage in Shakspeare's *Julius Cæsar* is adapted

fashion by the most elaborate work that had ever yet issued from the study of a Roman sage. The great poem of Lucretius on the Nature of Things formed an era both in the literature and the social state of Rome. The work was nobly executed, with all its defects of argument, and, with all its defects of feeling, its aim was noble also. It opened a long career to the peaceful triumphs of thought, and every interest it excited was so much detracted from the domain of evil and sanguinary passions. The sublimest of the Roman poets sighs for rest from war as heartily as from the terrors of superstition. If he once only relaxes from his hapless abnegation of a superintending Providence, it is in his pathetic address to the goddess, power or principle, which associates all things in their appointed harmonies, and can alone effect the restoration of placid peace to his countrymen.¹

Cæsar himself professed without reserve the principles of the unbelievers. The supreme pontiff of the commonwealth, the head of the college whence issued the decrees which declared the will of the gods, as inferred from the signs of the heavens, the flight of birds and the entrails of victims, he made no scruple of asserting in the assembled senate that the immortality of the soul, the recognised foundation of all religion, was a vain chimera.² Nor did he hesitate to defy the omens which the priests were especially appointed to observe.³ He decided to give battle at Munda in spite of the most adverse auspices, when the sacrificers

Cæsar himself
a professed
unbeliever.

from Plutarch, *Anton*, 11.: *μη δεδιέναι τοὺς παχεῖς τούτους καὶ κουήτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὠχροὺς καὶ λεπτοὺς ἐκείνους.*

¹ Lucret. i. 1—41.:

“Alma Venus

. . . . petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem.”

² Sallust, *B.C.* 50.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 59.: “Nec religione quidem ulla a quoquam incepto absterritus unquam vel reta: datus est.”

assured him that no heart was found in the victim.¹ *I will have better omens when I choose*, was the scornful saying with which he reassured his veterans on another similar occasion.² He was not deterred from engaging in his African campaign either by the fortunate name of his opponent Scipio, or by the unfavourable auspices which were studiously reported to him.³ Yet Cæsar, freethinker as he was, could not escape from the universal thralldom of superstition in which his contemporaries were held. We have seen him crawling on his knees up the steps of the Capitoline temple to appease the Nemesis which frowns upon human prosperity. When he stumbled at landing on the coast of Africa, he averted the evil omen with happy presence of mind, looking at the handful of soil he had grasped in his fall, and exclaiming, *Africa, thou art mine!*⁴ In a man who was consistent in his incredulity this might be deemed a trick to impose on the soldiers' imagination; but it assumes another meaning in the mouth of one who never mounted a carriage without muttering a private charm. Before the battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar had addressed a prayer to the gods whom he denied in the senate, and derided in the company of his literary friends. He appealed to the divine omens when he was about to pass the Rubicon.⁵ He carried about with him in Africa a certain Cornelius Salutio, a man of no personal distinction, to neutralize, as he hoped, the good fortune of the Cornelii in the opposite ranks.⁶

Cæsar's character is strongly contrasted with those of some later and spurious imitators by the gallant

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 77.; comp. Polyæn. *Strateg.* viii. 23. 32. The same prodigy occurred a second time, and was equally disregarded. Appian, *B. C.* ii. 152.; Plin. *H. N.* xi. 71.

² Polyæn. *l. c.*

³ Suet. *Jul.* 59.; Cic. *de Div.* ii. 24.

⁴ Suet. *l. c.*

⁵ Suet. *Jul.* 32.

⁶ Suet. *Jul.* 59.; Plut. *Cæs.* 52.; Dion, xlii. 57.

confidence with which he left his actions to be their own heralds, never deigning to anticipate by a single day the effect they were calculated to produce upon his friends or his enemies. In modern times it will hardly be credited that he allowed the capital to remain for months in ignorance of his proceedings in the Spanish campaign. Confident of ultimate success, he was not unwilling that some mystery should hang about the means and movements which conduced to it.¹ If he had any affectation about him, it was the noble one of concealing the details of his operations, and bursting suddenly upon the world with a victory when it was least expected. But he could depend upon the awe which his mere absence inspired. The rumour of a great disaster having overtaken him found only a few fond listeners; the great mass of the citizens remained spell-bound in their conviction of his good fortune; and when the despatch at last arrived which announced the crowning victory of Munda, it was as if the sun had shone forth from an eclipse, and relieved them from anxiety without exciting their surprise.

Rumours and anticipations at Rome during Cæsar's absence in Spain.

It was the eve of the Parilia, the anniversary of the foundation of the city.² A rude shepherds' festival, at which the ordinary precautions for the health of their sheep received a religious sanction, had gradually gathered round it the most solemn traditions of the Roman people. The walls of Rome had been cemented with blood. The stain of fratricide could never be entirely wiped away, and the conscience of the city was for ever haunted by the recollection of its original guilt. The senate received the announcement of Cæsar's

Tidings of the victory of Munda arrive at Rome.

¹ Compare Lucan's illustration of his character (v. 670.):

“Desint mihi busta, rogosque,
Dum metuar semper, terraque expecter ab omni.”

² The Parilia, or Palilia, were celebrated on the 21st of April.

victory just in time to decree that the festival of the morrow should be celebrated with more than usual solemnity. The conqueror of his fellow-citizens, it declared, deserved the honours of another Romulus. Thus the second foundation of the city was laid, like the first, in brother's blood.¹ A decree immediately followed to appoint a thanksgiving for fifty days. The year before Cæsar had been pronounced a demigod; now a statue was erected to him inscribed, *To the Invincible Deity*, and placed in front of the temple of Quirinus, the venerable founder of the Roman nation. Cæsar had extended the limits of the empire both in Gaul and Africa, and to this, the highest of all public services, a special honour was assigned, though it had been rarely conceded even to the greatest conquerors. Sulla was the last Roman imperator who had been permitted to advance the pomerium, or extend the bounds of the city. This peculiar distinction was now accorded to Cæsar.² The bold design attributed to him of turning the Tiber to the west from the Mulvian bridge, and enlarging the area of the Campus Martius, seems a mere wild rumour of the day.³ It does not appear whether he really made use of the honourable privilege granted to him. We know for certain that he did not extend the walls

Decrees passed
in Cæsar's
honour.

¹ Lucan, i. 95.:

“Fraterno primi maduerunt sanguine muri.”

² Dion, xliiii. 50.; Gell. xiii. 14. Comp. Tac. *Ann.* xii. 23, and the commentators.

³ Cic. *ad Att.* xiii. 30.: “Sed casu sermo a Capitone de urbe augenda. A ponte Mulvio Tiberim duci secundum montes Vaticanos: campum Martium coedificari: illum autem Campum Vaticanum fieri quasi Martium campum.” The project, if such it may be called, seems to have been to lead the Tiber with a bold sweep to the foot of the Vatican hill, and so back to its old channel near the Pons Triumphalis. The space thus added to the Campus Martius would have remained an open area for public exercises, while the actual Campus would have been covered with buildings, perhaps inclosed in the walls.

themselves, but it is possible that he may have advanced the sacred limits outside them, within which the auspices might be taken, so as to include some portion of the Campus Martius.

In due time the conqueror himself returned to Italy. Faithful to the prescriptions of the republic at the moment that he was trampling it under foot, he abstained from entering the city before the day of the triumph which had been again decreed him. This last victory over Roman citizens was cloaked under the specious title of a conquest in Spain ¹, and a similar designation was given to the triumphs subsequently granted to his lieutenants Fabius and Pedius. On this occasion Cæsar gratified the populace with a show and a festival not less magnificent than in the year preceding; the most remarkable incident in the ceremony was the rehearsal of scenic entertainments in a variety of languages ², for the amusement, not of the Romans alone, but of the multitude of foreigners from all parts of the world who had followed in the wake of the conqueror's victories. To the eye of the farsighted statesman this might justly appear the greatest step that had ever yet been taken towards the fusion of mankind into one nation. But the Romans in general gave little heed to this and similar prognostics of social revolution; they were much more interested in the singular phenomenon of a knight named Laberius appearing on the stage and reciting a dramatic composition of his own. The profession of the actor was one from which the Roman's pride revolted; he considered it a mark of degrading frivolity in the Athenian so to cultivate art at the expense of dignity.³

Cæsar returns to Rome, and celebrates his last triumph.

¹ Liv. *Epit.* cxvi.; Vell. ii. 56.

² Suet. *Jul.* 39.: "Ludos . . . per omnium linguarum histriones." The significance of this as well as many others of Cæsar's measures is proved by their imitation by Augustus. See Suet. *Oct.* 43.

³ There was no such feeling in the early ages of the republic, as is elaborately shown by Macrobius, *Saturn.* ii. 10. It is pro-

But certainly in the succeeding generation we find that knights, and even senators, came frequently on the stage of their own accord, till it became necessary to make decrees to interdict the practice. Laberius, it is said, was a rude assertor of republican sentiments, and Cæsar resolved to break his spirit by harshness. He requested him to make this public appearance, and, with a refinement of cruelty, offered him apparently a large sum of money, that he might seem to have been bribed thus to degrade himself. The request of the master of the Roman people was already felt to be a command. Laberius went through his task, but avenged himself by introducing into it some pathetic lines, in which he threw on his instigator all the infamy of the act.¹

More honours continued still to be heaped upon the favourite of fortune. A decree was passed that Cæsar should receive the designation of father of his country, the highest compliment a really free state could ever bestow upon a citizen.² A second conferred upon him the style of Emperor, not in the usual way as an appendage to his other names and titles, implying authority over the soldiers, but as a constant prefix to denote a permanent and more general application.³ His person was invested with legal sanctity, like that of the tribunes of the people, the consulship was assigned to him for ten successive years, and, to crown all, the office of dictator was confirmed to him for life.⁴ Other distinctions, which in modern times would be supposed to gratify none but the most paltry

Cæsar receives the appellation of father of his country, with other honours.

bable that the Romans first conceived their dislike of the actor's profession from the contempt they were led to entertain for Greek fashions.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 39. The lines are preserved by Macrobius, *Sat.* ii. 7.

² Suet. *Jul.* 76.; comp. Appian, *B.C.* ii. 106.; Dion, xlv. 4. Florus, iv. 2. 91.; Liv. *Epit.* cxvi.

³ Suet. *l. c.*; Dion, xlviii. 44.

⁴ Suet. *l. c.*; Plut. *Cæs.* 57.; Dion, xlviii. 45.; Appian, *l. c.*

vanity, received importance from the place they held in the estimation of the people. Such were the triumphal robes which Cæsar was solemnly authorized to wear on all occasions in public, and the crown of laurel, which it was said was peculiarly acceptable to him to conceal the premature loss of his hair.¹ The right of coining money was assigned to certain of the higher magistrates of the republic, and the noblest names of the nation of kings have thus been stamped upon the most durable of historic monuments. But Cæsar's was the first human face which the Romans allowed to be impressed upon their coinage.² This privilege, which has since become one of the most distinctive marks of regal power, was followed by another of similar significance. Cæsar had declined the offer of his friends to form a body-guard for his personal protection; but the senate adopted the sacred formula of swearing by his name, and bound itself by a solemn oath to watch over his safety.³ Like most men who have risen by their own acts to a great and unexpected elevation, Cæsar believed in destiny. But he threw himself upon it with a resolution and unreserve which no other perhaps has equalled. At every step of his ascent to power he was ready to stake his life upon its success, to become the Cæsar of his imagination or to perish; and when he had attained the object of his aspirations he was no less prepared to sacrifice existence to the full enjoyment of all its charms. Perhaps it was this consciousness that he must soon perish, and that his work must perish with him, that unnerved his arm for the execution of the Herculean task of reconstructing the commonwealth. When his contemporaries observed the contemptuous

¹ Dion, xliii. 43.; Suet. *Jul.* 45. Baldness was opprobrious among the Romans, inasmuch as it was supposed to be the result of excess. Comp. Plin. *H. N.* xi. 47.

² Eckhel, *Doctr. Numm.* vi. 7. No undoubted coin of Cæsar bears his head before the year U. C. 710.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 84. 86,

indifference with which, living in the midst of perils, he renounced all armed protection, nor took even the ordinary precautions for the care of his health, they surmised that life had lost its interest for him, and had already lasted as long as he felt it could conduce to his pleasure or glory.¹ The extravagant visions in which he indulged of isolated works of public utility seem to betray the restless and feverish excitement which gradually crept over him. He planned, it is said, the emptying of the lake Fucinus, the draining of the Pomptine marshes, the construction of a canal from Rome to Tarracina², of a new road across the Apennines, and of a magnificent harbour at Ostia, the erection of a superb temple to Mars, the cutting of the isthmus of Corinth³; while at the same time his mind was wandering to the scenes of warfare with which it had been so long familiar, and new visions of conquest were opening before him in grand but misty proportions.⁴ Meanwhile the recklessness of his humour betrayed itself in a demeanour more and more haughty and contemptuous. Sulla, he bluntly said, was a fool for resigning the dictatorship.⁵ But nothing offended the senators more bitterly than his not rising from his seat to receive them, when they came to communicate to him the honours they had

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 86.

² Mr. Long, in his *Notes on Plutarch*, points out some engineering difficulties which would oppose such a project. Indeed, the fall of the Tiber from Rome to the sea is said to be now only fifteen feet, and it is difficult to suppose that the bed of the river in its course through the city is not higher at the present day than it was eighteen hundred years ago. The fall from Rome to Tarracina would be only a few inches to the mile, and a slight rise of the sea level with a south-westerly gale would overflow the Pomptine marshes. The Romans were not sufficiently skilful to overcome such obstacles.

³ Suet. *Jul.* 44.; Plut. *Cæs.* 58.; Dion, xliv. 5.

⁴ Suet. *Jul. l. c.*

⁵ Suet. *Jul.* 77.: "Sullam nescisse literas qui dictaturam deposuerit." The play on words cannot be preserved effectively in English.

lavished upon him in his absence. It was to the upstart foreigner Balbus that they were willing to attribute this wanton insult; the Spaniard, it was said, had plucked Cæsar by the sleeve when he was about to rise to his visitors, and bade him remember that he was their master.¹ The Romans, in the progress of refinement among them, were very strict observers of social etiquette. Courteousness in its members one among another is the very essence of an aristocracy. Cæsar had exacted due homage to himself with scrupulous precision. When his chariot passed in the triumphal procession by the bench occupied by the tribunes, one of them, by name Pontius Aquila, had rudely kept his seat to mark his independence. The dictator remarked bitterly on the affront, and when anyone came to him to solicit a favour, was wont to say ironically, *I confer it, as far as the tribune Pontius will suffer me.*²

Yet this pride and haughtiness, the fretful indications of a mind ill at ease within itself, were still tempered by gleams of the polished urbanity which had distinguished the accomplished statesman of earlier times. The true Roman gentleman was eminently a man of easy and conciliatory manners, of unaffected good humour and literary taste. His conversation sparkled with the most refined wit, or if at times his raillery would appear rude to modern ideas, it served at least to exercise and enliven the general equanimity of his temper. The practice of rhetorical discussion was a discipline of forbearance, and taught men more genuine respect for each other's characters, as it gave them a deeper insight into them than the vapid

Cæsar's urbanity: he visits Cicerò in his villa at Puteoli.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 78.; Plut. *Cæs.* 60.; comp. Dion, xlv. 8.

² Suet. *l. c.* His villa at Naples was confiscated and bestowed by the dictator on his favourite Servilia. Cic. *ad Att.* xiv. 21. He became one of the conspirators against Cæsar's life. Dion, xlvi. 38.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 113.

generalities of our polite conversation. Such a gentleman was Cæsar, such was Cicero. One of the orator's letters preserves a curious record of the visit which the dictator paid him at the end of December in this year. Cicero had recently published a work in praise of Cato.¹ We may conjecture that it was not written in such a tone as would really offend Cæsar, for no man, as has been shrewdly observed, was more easily flattered by the pretence of refusing to flatter him.² But Cicero had felt, or at least affected to feel, some apprehension of how it might be received. He had consulted Balbus and Oppius as to the effect it would produce upon the great man. He might smile when he was told that Hirtius was commissioned to reply to it; but he was probably both flattered and reassured when he found that Cæsar himself had found leisure in Spain to write a laboured invective against the subject of his encomiums.³ The conqueror's sword he could neither resist nor parry, but he might trust to his address to appease or cajole him in a literary controversy. Cicero was residing at this time at his marine villa near Puteoli. Amidst the ruin of the commonwealth, and the overthrow of public interests, he had recently catered for his own domestic comforts by espousing in second nuptials a maiden, young, wealthy, and high born. He had reasoned himself, with the assistance of his friends⁴, into resignation under the loss of his darling child Tullia, the wife,

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* xii. 4.

² Shakspeare, *Julius Cæsar*, act ii. sc. 1.

³ It was composed in two books or orations, which obtained the name of Anti-Catones. Cicero says with reference to it: "Collegit vitia Catonis sed cum maximis laudibus meis" (*ad Att.* xii. 40.). He proceeds, "*Itaque misi librum ad Muscam ut tuis librariis daret: volo enim eum divulgari.*" Landor (*Imag. Convers.* ii. 18.) brands this as "the worst action of Cicero's life." It is little extenuation of its selfishness to say that Cato, whose weaknesses he was so willing to have exposed or exaggerated for the magnification of his own merits, was never an intimate friend of Cicero.

⁴ See the elegant letter of Sulpicius, in the correspondence. Cic. *ad Div.* iv. 12.

though latterly divorced, of P. Dolabella. He had withdrawn almost entirely from public affairs, and was devoting himself to his favourite studies, when Cæsar, who had been visiting at the house of his kinsman Philippus in the immediate neighbourhood, invited himself to dine with him.¹ The dictator, on this occasion, was attended by a guard of two thousand soldiers, besides many friends and followers of various ranks. Cicero was much perplexed how to accommodate such a guest. The soldiers were encamped on the estate, but tables were spread in several rooms for the more distinguished members of the retinue. Cæsar continued transacting business with Balbus till one o'clock; he then walked on the sea-shore, arrived at his host's villa at two, and took a bath. While he was thus refreshing himself, an attendant was not afraid to recite for his amusement a scurrilous epigram against him by the fashionable poet Catullus.² In Roman society such verses and the imputations they conveyed for the most part excited only a smile. Satire had overreached itself. It was not worth while to punish ribaldry which no one heeded. Cæsar listened without emotion. He then anointed and dressed, and took his place at the table; and, having provided beforehand for the full and secure indulgence of his appetite, eat and drank heartily and cheerfully.³ Nor was the dinner a bad one, adds the narrator, with complacency; and, what is more, it was seasoned with much good and pleasant conversation, to his own share in which he evidently looks back with satisfaction. Politics were shunned: the subjects discussed were wholly literary. The

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* xiii. 52.

² Catull. xxix. or lvii. The author of the disgusting lampoon apologized afterwards, and was pardoned. Suet. *Jul.* 37.

³ Cic. *l. c.*: "ἐμερικῆν ἀγεβας, itaque edit et bibit ἀδεῶς et jucunde." See the notes of Manutius and Schutz in explanation of this custom which was considered, as in this instance, as complimentary to the host. Comp. Cic. *pro Deiot.* 7.; Senec. *Consol. ad Helv.* 9.

great man was well pleased, and showed himself to be so.

There is one circumstance, however, in Cicero's relations with Cæsar, which may give rise to some grave speculations. It appears that the former, in his anxiety to pay court to the conqueror on his return from Spain, addressed to him an elaborate letter of praise and congratulation. The scruples which he expressed to his friend Atticus, and the excuses he made to himself for his apparent subservience, need not detain us. The circumstance most important for us to observe is, that in this epistle the writer urged Cæsar to avenge the commonwealth by conducting an expedition against the Parthians. After some consultation with Balbus and Oppius, Cicero abstained from sending what he had written; his advisers had recommended him to expunge the suggestion relative to Parthia, and he became dissatisfied with the letter altogether.¹ The indignity under which the commonwealth still laboured while the ghost of Crassus roamed unavenged, might point many idle appeals to public sensibility. Cicero might amuse himself with painting it in his most glowing colours, and believe that he was leading the popular sentiment, while in fact he was only obeying the suggestion of more crafty intriguers than himself. For to arm against Parthia would be to suspend the progress of administrative reform, it would be to remove Cæsar from Rome, the citadel of his strength, and entangle him in an adventure of no ordinary peril. All this his friends immediately perceived, and they detected perhaps in their correspondent's harangue a deep plot for their patron's overthrow. They may have acquitted Cicero himself of any evil design.² They

Cicero writes a letter urging Cæsar to invade Parthia, but withdraws it.

¹ Cic. *ad Att.* xiii. 27. 30.

² Cicero acknowledges to his correspondent that his counsel to Cæsar was a mere compliment: "Quid enim aliud argumentum epis-

were content to parry the fatal counsel, and doubtless they would continue to employ all their influence in diverting Cæsar from any such undertaking. The same idea, however, was now continually presented to him from various quarters. The Roman people, it was affirmed, were deeply interested in seeing it realized. There can be little doubt that Cleopatra, disconcerted by the haughtiness of her admirer's subjects, would lend all her fascinations to a scheme for withdrawing him into the East. The project was flattering moreover to Cæsar's personal ambition, and to the passion for war which exercised undiminished sway over him. The difficulties of the task of civil reform were becoming more and more arduous: he would have rejoiced perhaps in any excuse for tearing himself away from a scene where his views were thwarted at every step; his increasing contempt for the people who obstructed while they flattered him, must have sometimes tempted him to abandon his schemes for their welfare, and plunge blindly into an unknown future.

The plan which Cæsar was now meditating had assumed, perhaps, no definite shape in his own mind. According to one version which has been given of it, he proposed to direct his arms in the first instance against the Dacians, to protect Thrace, and even Asia Minor, which were exposed to their predatory incursions, and proceed from thence into the East.¹ Another and bolder conception was also ascribed to him, that of first overwhelming the Parthians, and then returning along the coasts of the Euxine, in the track of Pom-

Schemes of conquest attributed to Cæsar.

tolæ nostræ nisi *κολακία* fuit?" The letter was not sent; but Balbus and Oppius probably communicated Cicero's views to their patron, and he replied that he would not leave Rome till he had settled the government. On this Cicero remarks, "Idem ego suadebam in illa epistola;" but from a hint which follows, it would appear that he had so managed as to suggest a different course.

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 44.

peius, subduing all the nations between the Caucasus and the Carpathian mountains, and assailing the German barbarians in the rear.¹ Both one and the other of these supposed schemes is coloured apparently by the ideas of a later generation. But that Cæsar had resolved upon some extensive project of conquest in the East admits of no doubt. So long accustomed to the absolute authority of the proconsular camp, and the immediate accomplishment of every political and military conception, the delays and embarrassments which impeded the path even of a dictator in the city became irksome and intolerable to him. At the close of the year 709, he issued orders to his legions to cross the Adriatic and assemble in Illyricum, there to await his arrival. He contemplated an absence from Italy of considerable duration. He provided beforehand for the succession of consuls and prætors for the two following years.²

Cæsar's fifth
consulship,
Jan. 1, 710.

On the first of January he entered upon his fifth consulship, in which he was associated with M. Antonius: at the same time he obtained the designation of Hirtius and Pansa for the year 711, and that of Decimus Brutus and Munatius Plancus for 712. Though the people had waived the right of suffrage in his favour for a period of ten years, he considered himself precluded from wielding the consular fasces while absent from the spot where the auspices were to be taken, and other local functions to be exercised. The prætors appointed for the year 710 were sixteen in number,

¹ Plut. *Cæs.* 58.

² Drumann (iii. 681.) collects the authorities principally from scattered intimations in Cicero's letters. Suetonius (*Jul.* 41.) says that the dictator shared the right of appointing the higher magistrates, except the consuls, with the people. These latter he selected without any foreign intervention. But Dion remarks that in point of fact, all the superior offices were filled at his recommendation, though the ordinary forms of popular election were maintained. Dion, xliii. 47. 51.

and among them were M. Brutus and C. Cassius. Lepidus, who had accepted the government of the Hither Spain and Gallia Narbonensis, was replaced in the mastership of the horse by Domitius Calvinus. In the assignment of the provinces, which was no longer made by lot, but depended upon the dictator's sole appointment, conspicuous men of either party were favoured almost indiscriminately. Asinius Pollio received the charge of the Further Spain, together with the task of confronting the hostile attempts of Sextus Pompeius. Among the other proconsuls and proprætors of the same or the following year were D. Brutus, Trebonius, and C. Cassius, whose names it is important to remark on this occasion, on account of the faithless return they were soon to make for the confidence now reposed in them.

There was no difficulty, it would seem, in effacing the memory of Pompeius from the minds of his late adherents, and the constitutional reforms which Cæsar carried into effect were so moderate and reasonable as to give little cause of serious anger to the party he had beaten in the field. It may be presumed, however, that the nobles were more sensibly offended by the elevation of new men into their own class. It is true that many of them might have cause to resent the establishment of a new system, under which there was no room for them to enjoy the preferments they had been wont to monopolize. But some at least of the dictator's most bitter enemies had not even these personal grounds for hostility against him. The real motive of their hatred, in almost every case, was no other than wounded vanity; accustomed to regard all of their own class as their equals, and the most conspicuous of every other as their inferiors, the nobles were indignant at seeing one man rise to a permanent pre-eminence among them, while they sank themselves undistinguished into the common

Cæsar
adopts C.
Octavius as
his heir.

mass of the citizens. The forms of the constitution, strained as they had been to recognise the establishment of the dictatorship for life, had thrown all real power into the only hands which at the time were competent to wield it. Yet Cæsar himself was not perhaps satisfied with this splendid tribute to his acknowledged superiority. If, however, he really longed for the glittering title of king, which some at least of his adherents were willing to have conferred upon him, it must not be supposed that he was seeking to gratify his vanity by the assumption of an empty name. Of human feelings none is more natural than that which prompts a man to seek the perpetuation of his own privileges and honours after death in the person of his heirs. Cæsar, indeed, had no legitimate or acknowledged children. The person nearest to him in blood was a great-nephew. Satisfied with the talents and temper the young man exhibited, it was to him that he looked for a successor to his name and station. The object of this dangerous favour was C. Octavius, whose father had been head of the distinguished house whose name he bore. The elder Octavius married Atia, a daughter of Cæsar's younger sister Julia¹, but had died when his only son had scarcely attained the age of four years. The child had been carefully brought up under the care of the mother and grandmother; his step-father, L. Marcius Philippus, had watched over him with paternal interest, and from an early period Julius Cæsar himself had taken a share in his education. The object of all these regards had been born in the year 691, memorable for the conspiracy of Catilina, and the consulship of Cicero. Accordingly,

¹ Julia, the younger of the dictator's two sisters, was married to M. Atius Balbus, by whom she had a daughter Atia, wife of C. Octavius, and mother of the future Augustus. She died A.U. 702 or 703, and her grandson pronounced her funeral panegyric, being then in his twelfth year.

he was now in his nineteenth year, at which age the noble youth of Rome had generally entered already upon their military career. But the extreme delicacy of his health had frequently prevented him from taking part in his great-uncle's exploits. From this cause he had been compelled to abstain from following him into Spain in his campaign against Afranius, and on his recent expedition in that quarter had been an eye-witness of only a few of his operations. Elated by the distinction with which he was treated by the foremost man of the state, the young Octavius had presumed to solicit the appointment to the mastership of the horse as early as the year 709. But the dictator considered him too young to be thrust all at once into so conspicuous a position, and refused his request. Among Cæsar's reforms he had made no attempt to fuse the two ancient orders of the people together. On the contrary, he studiously kept the patrician and plebeian houses distinct, and confirmed the monopoly of certain offices which the former possessed. He reserved the patrician rank as a sort of order of nobility, for the reward of personages whom he wished to honour.¹ Accordingly, it was a conspicuous mark of favour when he caused the senate to raise the Octavian house to the superior rank. Cæsar now directed the young aspirant to resume his literary studies at Apollonia in Illyricum under accomplished teachers, and familiarize himself at the same time with the exercises and habits of the camp which was there established. Conspicuous for the graceful beauty of his mouth and chin, the expression of which was of almost feminine delicacy, and not less for the breadth of his commanding brow and the expressive lustre of his eyes, the person of the young Octavius was well calculated to engage the favour of the legions, and to become the

¹ The same policy was maintained by his successors in the supreme power. Drumann, iv. 254.

darling of the most devoted Cæsareans. The dictator himself might rejoice in the good fortune which had given him such an heir, to whom to bequeath, if fate might so far favour him, the prize for which he had done and suffered so much ; in the fond hope that what he already felt, perhaps, to be a disappointment to himself might become a source of more genuine enjoyment to his successor.

But Cæsar might have had another motive for wishing to consolidate the power he had obtained by acquiring a title which he might transmit to his posterity. He had done no more than lay the first foundations of the great edifice which he contemplated in his own imagination ; and he might be anxious to bequeath its completion to one whom he had himself bred to inherit his views together with his station. The title of dictator had never descended from one generation to another ; there were no associations connected with it as an hereditary office, no prestige of traditional veneration to blind men's eyes to the naked usurpation of supreme power. But the appellation of King seemed in itself to legitimize its possessor's claim to rule. It was the recognised symbol of hereditary sovereignty. It dazzled men by its brilliancy, and prevented them from looking too curiously into the fact which it really represented. Cæsar might conceive that it was only under the shelter of this illusion that the successor to his principles of administration could maintain the position in which he could carry them into effect. But even if he was conscious of cherishing any wish for the title of King, he concealed it with studious care. It was in the counsels of his friends, at least, that the idea of obtaining it appeared to originate¹ ; and it was perhaps first suggested to

The royal title a symbol of hereditary power.

¹ Dion (xliv. 9) says of Cæsar's friends: βασιλέα αὐτὸν προσηγόρευον καὶ πολὺν τοῦτο τοῦνομα καὶ κατὰ σφᾶς διεθρύλλουν. Comp. Plut. Brut. 9. : αἴτιοι δὲ τούτων οἱ Καίσαρος κόλακες, κ.τ.λ.

them by the craft of his enemies, who sought thereby to exasperate the nation against him. While there were, as Cæsar well knew, a hundred poniards ready to bury themselves in his bosom, he was aware that they were restrained by the consideration that, popular as he still was with the army, the provinces, and the mass of the citizens, his assassination might only be the signal for a general massacre of all his real and supposed enemies. It required a series of dark and artful intrigues to warp the affections of these classes from the person of the dictator, and there might seem no readier method of overthrowing a victorious adversary than to fasten upon him the charge of affecting the kingly title.

However this may be, it happened that one morning a laurel garland, with a diadem attached, was found affixed to Cæsar's statue before the rostra. The tribunes, Marullus and Cæsetius, indignantly tore it down, and punished the convicted perpetrator of the scandal, pretending that they were acting in the spirit of the dictator's own sentiments. The populace, it was observed, expressed great satisfaction at their conduct, and saluted them with the title of the new Brutuses.¹

Cæsar is saluted by the title of King.

Cæsar only lamented in public, as on the deaths of Pompeius and Cato, that they had deprived him by their activity of the opportunity of proving his loyalty to the republic. A short time afterwards, on the 26th of January, the dictator had assisted at the great Latin festival on the Alban mount, preliminary to his expedition against the foreign enemies of the republic. On the same occasion he had enjoyed the honours of an ovation decreed to him by the senate: a gratuitous indulgence to his passion for personal display, for he had gained no new victory to justify

¹ Dion, xlv. 9.; Appian, *B. C.* ii. 108.; comp. Suet. *Jul.* 79.; and Plut. *Cæs.* 61., *Anton.* 12., whose narratives apply in part to a different occasion.

it. The most sanguine of his adherents determined to take this opportunity of trying the temper of the people a second time, when their enthusiasm might be supposed to be excited by beholding their champion in his highest glory. It might be remembered that the popular chief Saturninus, on the last occasion on which the fatal title had been bruited in the ears of the Romans, had been urged by his own adherents to assume it.¹ Accordingly, officious voices were hired to salute him, as he passed, by the title of King. But as they dropped one by one into silence, no others were heard to take up the cry: on the contrary, a low and stifled murmur sufficiently indicated the disapprobation of the people. *I am no king, but Cæsar*, exclaimed the dictator hastily.² The tribunes seized some persons who had joined in this salutation, and threw them into prison. The dictator, however, thought fit to rebuke them for their superfluous or invidious zeal, in which he detected a scheme for bringing him under unjust suspicions: he played upon the word Brutus, which signifies a fool, and declared that they well deserved the name they were so proud of, if they supposed he was unaware of the intrigue to which they had lent themselves. Nor did his anger confine itself to these sharp words. Helvius Cinna, indeed, one of their colleagues, went as far as to propose that they should be punished with death; but Cæsar allowed himself to be appeased by their deposition from their offices.

Cæsar's friends, however, were not yet satisfied that the coveted distinction was beyond his reach. They sought to familiarize the people gradually with the idea of royalty by suggesting it repeatedly to their imaginations. Perchance the sight of the white linen band,

Antonius offers him a royal diadem, which he rejects.

¹ Florus, iii. 16.

² Dion, xlv. 10.; Suetonius and Plutarch, *ll. ec.*

the simple badge of Oriental sovereignty, might disabuse them of their horror at an empty name. On the fifteenth of February, the day of the Lupercalia, Cæsar was seated in his golden chair before the rostra, to preside over the solemn ceremonies of that popular festival.¹ The Julian flamens were elevated to the same rank as those of the god Lupercus, or Pan. Antonius the consul was at their head, and next to the dictator occupied the most conspicuous place in the eyes of the multitude. Possibly the novelty of the sight of the one consul stripped to his skin, with only a narrow girdle round his loins, waving in his hand the thong of goat's-hide, and striking with it, as he ran rapidly through the principal streets, the women who presented themselves to the blow, which was supposed to avert sterility, was still more attractive than that of the other in the laurel crown and triumphal robes, which use had rendered familiar.² When Antonius had run his course, he broke through the admiring multitude, and approached the seat of the dictator. He drew from beneath his girdle a diadem, and made as if he would offer it to him, exclaiming that it was the gift of the Roman people. The action was hailed by some clapping of hands; but it was faint and brief, and easily betrayed that it was preconcerted. But when Cæsar put away from him the proffered gift, a much louder burst of genuine applause succeeded. Antonius offered it a second time, again there was a slight sound of applause, and again on Cæsar's rejection of it a vehement expression of satisfaction. The pulse of the city had once more been felt, and once more the symptoms had proved unfavourable. *I am not a king*, repeated Cæsar, *the only king of the Romans is Jupiter*. He ordered the diadem to be

¹ Appian, *B. C.* ii. 109., and the authorities above cited.

² Plut. *Anton.* 12.; Cic. *Philipp.* ii. 34. 42.

carried to the Capitol and suspended in the temple of the god as a trophy, commemorative of the gracious offer of the people and his own modest refusal. He even caused it to be inserted in the *fasti*, that on the fifteenth day of February the Romans presented a diadem to Cæsar, and Cæsar declined it.¹

Among other intrigues to keep the idea of the royal title constantly before the people, a report was studiously spread that the Sibylline books declared that Parthia could be conquered only under the auspices of a king.²

Whatever had been the origin of the genuine Sibylline verses, on which so much of the Roman state religion was grounded, those compositions, it was acknowledged, had perished in the Sullan conflagration of the Capitol. The oracles, which at this period went under that name, were supposed to be fragments collected by subsequent research, or restored from memory, to replace the primitive vaticinations. Whatever confidence had been placed by the people in the original documents, neither the circumstances of the case nor the temper of the times, it might be imagined, would allow of faith being reposed in their modern substitutes. When the government ventured, with the sanction of the priests, to whom they were entrusted, to produce from them any alleged predictions with reference to the policy of the day, the manœuvre might have been presumed transparent to the meanest apprehension. Yet we have seen the nobles once before shrink from offending the popular belief even

¹ Compare besides the authorities above, Liv. *Epit.* cxvi.; Vell. ii. 56.; Zonar. x. 11.; Flor. iv. 2. 91. Nicolaus of Damascus, a panegyrist of the Cæsarean house, asserted that the people actually saluted Cæsar as king, and conjured him to accept the diadem. Antonius, he insinuated, urged him to make himself king in the hope of being named his heir. See the recently discovered fragment of the *Vita Cæs. Octav.* published from a MS. in the Escorial by Duebner in Didot's *Fragm. Hist. Græc.* (Nicol. Dam. fr. ci. § 20.).

² Dion. xlv. 15.; Suet. *Jul.* 79.; Cic. *de Divin.* ii. 54.

in these doubly spurious oracles; and now the most disastrous consequences were anticipated by Cæsar's enemies from the bare rumour of such a prophecy existing. The Quindecimviri, or college of fifteen priests, to whose care the sacred deposit was committed¹, deliberately examined their records, and affirmed that the fact was so. Upon this Cæsar's friends proposed to obtain a decree of the senate to confer upon the dictator the title and authority of king over the foreign subjects of the commonwealth²: it could be easily foreseen that such a step would carry him more than half way to the achievement of his ultimate design of becoming king of the citizens also. And if the question were once brought formally under the notice of the senate, it would be impossible for the malcontents to avoid giving expression to their opinions. They must array themselves decisively in opposition to their master's interests, or allow their silence to be interpreted into consent. The apprehension of being reduced to this dilemma served perhaps to hasten the catastrophe which had been long in contemplation among them.³

The discontent which had spread through the ranks of the Roman nobility was founded, as we have seen, rather on personal envy of the dictator's pre-eminence, than on political hostility to his measures. His unexampled clemency had been of little avail to disarm such a feeling as this. Even if he had resorted to the bloody policy of his predecessors, and cut off by proscription every leader of the party opposed to him, he would have been not the more safe from the machinations of his own principal adherents.⁴ Both Antonius and

A conspiracy
is formed
against Cæsar's
life.

¹ Drumann, ii. 493. not. 72., iii. 692. not. 41.

² Appian, *B.C.* 110., who adds that Cæsar repressed their zeal.

³ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 113.

⁴ Vell. ii. 56.: "Adjectis etiam consiliariis cædis, familiarissimis omnium, et fortuna partium ejus in summum evectis fastigium." Comp. Suet. *Jul.* 83.

Dolabella had already been subjected to the imputation of plotting against their patron's life.¹ But a much more extensive conspiracy had now been formed against him; not less than sixty, or even eighty², persons are said to have connected themselves with it, and some of the most conspicuous of these were the very men who had appeared most to merit Cæsar's confidence by a long course of faithful services. Every party leader must make enemies, when he comes to power, of many of his ancient adherents, by the unavoidable mortification of their self-love. Among the conspirators against Cæsar's life were some, perhaps, who thought themselves inadequately repaid for their early devotion to his interests. But such could not have been the case with Decimus Brutus, who had recently received the government of the Transalpine Gaul, who had been latterly appointed to the Cisalpine, and who was already designated for the consul of a future year. Such could not have been the case with Trebonius, who had only just descended from the ivory chair, and was about to assume the administration of a province. Another of Cæsar's favourite officers, who now became a traitor to him, was Minucius Basilus; this man had been prætor in the last year, but Cæsar not having the power of assigning to him a province, had hoped to compensate for the disappointment by a grant of money. Basilus, it is said, had resolved, in his mortification, to starve himself to death.³ C. Cassius found him in this desponding mood, and when he opened to him the plot against the dictator's life, easily persuaded him to live

¹ Cicero (*Philipp.* ii. 14) asserts it as notorious that Antonius had consulted with Trebonius about taking Cæsar's life. Such a charge, however, from such a quarter, does not deserve much attention. The charge against Dolabella is still less substantial. *Plut. Anton.* 11. It was part of the policy of Cæsar's enemies to raise suspicions in his mind against his adherents.

² More than eighty, according to Nicolaus: *fr. ci.* § 19.

³ Dion, *xliii.* 47.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 113.

for vengeance. Publius Casca had been recommended by the dictator to a seat on the tribunitian bench; he, it is said, was disappointed at not rising at once to a still higher office. L. Tillius Cimber had also been recently preferred to the government of Bithynia. This man indeed might entertain a private grudge against the dispenser of these honours, on account of his brother, who having been banished from the city, could not obtain Cæsar's intervention for the reversal of his sentence.¹ But of all Cæsar's adherents who now turned against him, his old lieutenant Servius Galba, to whom he had been forced to refuse the consulship, was the only one, perhaps, who had failed to reap riches or advancement from the establishment of his power.²

Even the chiefs of the senatorian party who had arrayed themselves against Cæsar in the field, had betrayed no reluctance to accept office under his sway. It was not the destitute or the disappointed among them, but those whom he had gratuitously honoured and promoted, who at last raised their hands for his destruction. The most active of the conspirators, and perhaps the original author of the design, was C. Cassius, who had recently been appointed prætor. In this dignified magistracy there were now sixteen associates; but the first place in rank and importance, the wardenship of the city, with its six attendant lictors, had been contested between Cassius and Brutus, and it was in favour of the latter that Cæsar had decided.³

Character of Cassius, the author of the conspiracy.

¹ Plut. *Brut.* 17.; *Cæs.* 66.; Appian, *l. c.*

² Cic. *Philipp.* xiii. 16.; Suet. *Galb.* 3. The testimony of Nicolaus, an admirer of the Cæsarean dynasty, may be deemed invalid in such a matter; it must be stated, however, that that writer fully confirms the general opinion of the unworthy motives which influenced the chiefs of the conspiracy, while he allows that among their followers there were some honest enthusiasts swayed by the authority of their names. Nicol. Dam. *l. c.*

³ Plut. *Brut.* 7., *Cæs.* 62.

The rich province of Syria, however, which was promised to the disappointed suitor, might have sufficed to obliterate any feelings of pique at this repulse. The cry of liberty and the republic, which was in the mouths of all the conspirators, could have little real influence on the sentiments of Cassius, whose avowed Epicurean principles, no less than his late political conduct, might vouch for his indifference to party. He had been known to express the utmost horror at the prospect of a new Pompeian ascendancy under the championship of Cnæus, whom he branded, at least in his correspondence with Cicero, as a monster of cruelty.¹ But he was by nature vain and vindictive; his temper fluctuated between mean subservience and rude independence; the ascendancy which Cæsar's unruffled equanimity exerted over him embittered his selfish spirit, and, in his passionate resolve to overthrow, at all hazards, the supremacy which galled him, he seems to have looked no further, to have taken no precautions, but thrown the die without calculating the chances.

If the conspirators and their principal instigator evinced any forethought, it was in seeking for their projected tyrannicide the sanction of the name of Brutus. Atticus, who, amidst the public commotions, amused himself with genealogical studies, had flattered M. Junius Brutus by tracing his descent from a supposed third son of the founder of the republic, whose elder brothers perished, as was well known, childless, by the axe of the lictor.² Servilia, the mother of Brutus, derived her lineage from the renowned Ahala, whose dagger had avenged the ambitious projects of Spurius Mælius.

Weakness and
inconsistency
of Brutus.

¹ Cic. *ad Div.* xv. 19. He wrote to Cicero, A.U. 709: "Malo veterem et clementem dominum (Cæsarem) habere quam novum et crudelem (Cn. Pomp.)."

² Comp. Corn. Nepos, *Att.* 18.; Plut. *Brut.* 1. Cicero maintains this popular derivation of his hero (*Tusc. Qu.* iv. 1., *Phil.* i. 1.). But Plutarch allows that its accuracy was disputed.

But so far from inheriting the zeal of his imputed progenitor, the Brutus of the expiring republic had acquiesced in Cæsar's usurpation with less apparent reluctance than perhaps any other member of the Pompeian party. Despondent in her hour of distress, he had been the last to join, the earliest to desert, the unfurled banner of the republic. After Pharsalia he was the first to seek refuge in the camp of the victor; in the city he was the foremost to court the friendship and claim the confidence of the dictator; he was zealous in serving his interests by the discharge of important offices; nor did he blush to govern Cisalpine Gaul for Cæsar while his uncle still held Utica against him.¹ A feeble panegyric of the sturdy sage whom he had abandoned while he affected to adopt his principles and emulate his practice, seemed to Brutus a sufficient tribute to his virtues. He disparaged the merits of Cicero, and exalted the services of Cato in the suppression of Catilina; but both his depreciation and his praise were blown to the winds by the caustic irony of Cæsar's reply.² His consort

¹ Plutarch assures us that his government of this province was a great blessing to it: εὐτυχία τιμὴ τῆς ἐπαρχίας . . . καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν ἀτυχημάτων πᾶντα καὶ παραμυθία Βρούτου ἦν. Cæsar was exceedingly gratified at witnessing the beneficial results of his administration. *Comp. Cic. Orat.* 10. 34.

² Cicero's letters to Atticus, in which this subject is mentioned (*ad Att.* xii. 21.), is curious: "Catonem primum sententiam putat (Brutus) de animadversione dixisse; quam omnes ante dixerant, præter Cæsarem: et quum ipsius Cæsaris tam severa fuerit, qui tum prætorio loco dixerit, consularium putat leniores fuisse, Catuli, Servilii, Lucullorum, Curionis, Torquati, Lepidi, Gellii, Volcatii, Figuli, Cottæ, L. Cæsaris, C. Pisonis, etiam M'. Glabronis, Silani, Murenæ, designatorum consulum." Brutus, it seems, sought to enhance Cato's merit by a deliberate falsification of history. Cicero goes on to explain why the capital sentence was ascribed to Cato's advice, namely, because, though the whole party spoke and voted for it, his arguments were considered the most forcible and effective. Middleton (*Life of Cicero*) supposes that it was from Brutus's account, rather than Cicero's, that Sallust drew up his own narrative. He was a contemporary and though not a witness of the scene, he required no written record to remind him of that awful debate.

Claudia he had divorced to espouse the philosopher's daughter Porcia, a woman of more masculine spirit than his own. But thus doubly connected with strength and virtue, Brutus failed nevertheless to acquire the firmness which nature had denied him. Although in his habits a professed student, he could not resolve to withdraw to the shades of philosophy from the fiery glare of a season of revolution. The thirst of lucre still beset him; the victor caressed and the vanquished courted him; he was a greater man to-day than yesterday, and the path of official distinction seemed safe and flowery. With Brutus, by circumstances a revolutionary partisan, by temper a sophist, the conspiracy would never have originated; the admission of his inherent weakness is the fairest extenuation of his crime. But the deaths of all their more distinguished leaders had elevated him to undue importance among the remnant of his party. His uncle's renown seemed to shed its light upon him, and he was supposed to inherit the political spirit of the hero whose disciple he had avowed himself in the tranquil walks of science. The name of Brutus forced its possessor into prominence as soon as royalty began to be discussed. The Roman people were neither moralists nor genealogists, but they had imbibed from the traditions of four hundred and fifty years an unreflecting horror of the mere title of king, and admiration not less blind for the name of the first of the Consuls.

The weakness of Brutus's character may be estimated by the means which were employed to work upon him. A bit of paper affixed to the statue of the ancient hero with the words, *Would thou wert alive*, billets thrust into his hand inscribed, *Brutus, thou sleepest, thou art no Brutus*, shook the soul of the philosopher to its centre.¹ His vanity had already been excited by a

He is cajoled
by the con-
spirators,

¹ Plut. *Brut.* 9., *Cæs* 62; Dion, xliv. 12

compliment attributed to Cæsar, which was no doubt reported to him, *Brutus only waits for this dry skin*¹; implying that he of all the Romans was the most capable of succeeding to pre-eminence. Cassius, who was brother-in-law to Brutus, and admitted to his familiar intimacy, watched narrowly the effect of these incentives to his ambition, and led him gradually to the point at which he could venture to disclose the deed which was in contemplation. Brutus, adroitly plied, embraced the schemes of the conspirators, and assumed the place of chief adviser, which was, at least in appearance, tendered to him. The renowned name became at once a charm of magic potency. It raised the sick Ligarius from his bed.² A pardoned follower of Pompeius, the clemency of Cæsar rankled in his bosom. *How sad for Ligarius, said Brutus to him, to be disabled at such a moment.* The sick man raised himself on his elbow and replied, *If thou hast any project worthy of Brutus, behold, I am well again.* Ligarius was admitted to the secret, and took an active part in the deed which followed. We learn with pleasure that the conspirators did not venture even to sound Cicero.³ Favonius withheld his countenance from them, and declared that it was better to acknowledge a master than to plunge again into the miseries of civil war.⁴ The fatal intrigue was now ripening to its execution. As long as Cæsar remained at Rome his fearless demeanour exposed him almost undefended to the daggers of assassins, for he had dismissed the guard which had at first surrounded him, and he appeared daily in the forum and the curia with no other attendance

and induced
to assume
the lead
among
them.

¹ Plut. *Brut.* 8., *Cæs.* l. c.

² Plut. *Brut.* 11.

³ Plut. *Cic.* 17.: ἀλλ' ἔδεισαν οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν, ὡς ἐνδεῶ τόλμης. Antonius, indeed, tried to fasten the charge upon him. Cic. *Philipp.* ii. 11. 12., *ad Div.* xii. 3.

⁴ Plut. *Brut.* 12.

than that of friends and casual suitors. If the statement is correct that he had assembled as many as sixteen legions in Illyricum, he must have sent almost every disposable soldier out of Italy.¹ But from the moment he should leave the city and assume the command of his armies, his security would be guaranteed by the fidelity of the troops; an attack upon the cherished life of the emperor would be difficult of execution, and sure of prompt punishment. Once intoxicated with the splendour of royalty in the provinces, he would never consent to return a citizen to Rome. He had promised, it was said, to restore the ancient towers of Ilium, the cradle of the people of Æneas and Romulus; possibly he might transfer thither the throne which the proud nobility forbade him to establish in the Capitol.² Or, if the charms of Cleopatra should still retain their power, he might take up his abode in Alexandria, and transfer the seat of empire to the shrine of the Macedonian conqueror.

Cæsar's preparations for his departure were almost complete. The senate was convened for the Ides of March, the fifteenth day of the month, and at that meeting, it was confidently expected, the odious proposition would be openly made for conferring the royal name and power on the dictator in the provinces. The conspirators determined to make their attack upon him

The conspirators prepare to execute their design.

¹ Appian, *B.C.* ii. 110. The same writer, however, speaks afterwards of the legion quartered at Rome in the island of the Tiber (c. 118.).

² Suet. *Jul.* 79.: "Valida fama percrebruit, migraturum Alexandriam vel Ilium, translatis simul opibus imperii." Lucan, ix. 998.:

"Restituam populos, grata vice mœnia reddent
Ausonidæ Phrygibus, Romanaque Pergama surgent."

The Ode of Horace (*Od.* iii. 3.), in which he deprecates a transfer of the seat of empire, shows how deep an impression this rumour had made, though I cannot imagine that Augustus could have seriously contemplated it, or that Horace would have so earnestly denounced it, if he had. See the commentators on Horace, *l.c.*

as soon as he should enter the assembly. Among the floating stories of the day was a prediction that the Ides of March should be fatal to Cæsar. He had received, it appears, intimations from more than one quarter of the danger which threatened him; but he resolutely rejected all advice to guard himself against it¹, relying, as he declared, implicitly on the good sense or gratitude of the citizens. It had long been the fixed principle of his philosophy that the only way to enjoy life was to banish the fear of death.² On the eve of the fatal day he was entertained by Lepidus, and when, in the course of conversation, some one started the question, *What kind of death is the best?* it was remarked that he cut short the discussion abruptly with the reply, *That which is least expected.* The constant tradition of antiquity declared that, among many prognostics of an impending catastrophe, his wife had revealed to him in the morning an ominous dream, and when she prevailed upon him to consult the sacrificers, the signs of the victims were fearfully inauspicious.³ Whether his own superstitious feelings gained the ascendancy, or whether he was overcome by the entreaties of Calpurnia, he consented at last to send Antonius to dismiss the senate, or to excuse his absence. At this moment Decimus Brutus came to attend him on his way to the place of meeting. On hearing the dictator's reluctant avowal of his scruples, he was struck with consternation at the prospect of the victim's escape; for the conspirators meanwhile were in momentary apprehension of discovery. Brutus himself,

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 86.

² Plut. *Cæs.* 58.; Vell. ii. 57. Certain expressions currently attributed to Cæsar at this period of his career, as in Cic. *pro Marc.* 9., "*Satis diu vel naturæ vixi vel gloriæ,*" have been supposed to indicate that he was dissatisfied with life, and reckless of the perils of his position.

³ Suetonius (*Jul.* 81.) relates the occurrence of various prodigies. Comp. Plutarch, *Cæs.* 63.; Dion, xlv. 17.

tormented by fear or conscience, had failed to conceal his agitation since he had embarked in the enterprise, and his nervous excitement was shamed by the firmness of his wife, who pierced her own thigh and long concealed the wound, to extract his secret from him by this proof of her self-control.¹ With Porcia indeed the secret of the tyrannicides was secure; but not so with many of the wild unprincipled men to whom it had been confided; every moment of delay made the danger of its divulgement more imminent. Under pretence of escorting the son of Cassius, who had just assumed the gown of manhood, the conspirators assembled early, and proceeded in a body to the portico before the theatre of Pompeius, the place assigned for the meeting of the senate being a hall immediately adjacent.² It had never been the ordinary custom of the Romans to wear arms in the city, and when the commotions of Milo and Clodius were put down, a special enactment had been introduced to check such a practice, which seemed to be creeping in through the licence and perilousness of the times. But the Roman senator carried his iron stylus in a little case, and in the place of the implement of writing the conspirators had furnished themselves each with a dagger. While awaiting the arrival of the dictator, Brutus and Cassius occupied themselves as prætors with listening to casual applications, and the freedom with which the former expressed himself, rebuking those who boasted that Cæsar would reverse his decisions, was especially remarked. But as the morning wore on, the conspirators were exposed to redoubled risks. A senator, addressing Casca with a significant smile, said, *You have concealed your secret from me, but Brutus has revealed it.* In another moment Casca would have

¹ Plut. *Brut.* 13.

² Suet. *Jul.* 80.: "Senatus idibus Martiis in Pompeii curiam edictus est." Plut. *Brut.* 14.; Appian, *B.C.* ii. 115.

pressed his hand and communicated the design, but the other went on to allude to his meditated competition for the ædileship, and the conspirator saw that he was undiscovered. Popilius Lænas whispered to Brutus, *What you have in hand despatch quickly*, and was immediately lost in the crowd. It was never known to what he referred, but the conscious assassins were disconcerted and alarmed.¹

Meanwhile, Decimus Brutus had recovered his presence of mind. He saw that all was lost unless Cæsar could be brought to the spot where the ambush awaited him. He rallied him on the weakness of Calpurnia, hinted some friendly disparagement of the hero's own resolution, and assured him that so favourable a moment might not again arrive for the sanction of his views and wishes by the decree of the subservient senators. Cæsar yielded, and quitted his house. Hardly had he turned his back when a slave besought an audience of Calpurnia, declared to her that there was some design in agitation against her husband's life, and desired to be kept in confinement till the event should prove his assertion.² As Cæsar proceeded along the Forum and Velabrum from the mansion of the chief pontiff to the theatre of Pompeius, more than one person, it seems, pressed towards him to warn him of his doom. But the conspirators to whom that part of the business was assigned crowded closely about him, and the press of his attendants was almost too great to allow of a mere stranger's approach. One man, indeed, succeeded in thrusting a paper into his hand, and earnestly exhorted him to read it instantly. It was supposed to have contained a distinct announcement of the impending danger, but Cæsar was accustomed to receive petitions in this way, and paid no immediate attention to it, though

Cæsar enters
the senate
house.

¹ Plut. *Brut.* 14–16.

² Plut. *Cæs.* 64.

he had it still rolled up in his hand when he entered the senate house. As he was borne along in his litter (for he affected sickness to countenance the excuse which Calpurnia had persuaded him to send to the senate) he observed complacently to the augur Spurrinna, who had foreboded evil on that fatal day, *The Ides of March are come; Yes*, muttered the sage, *but not yet passed*.¹

At the moment when Cæsar descended from his litter at the door of the hall, Popilius Cæsar assassinated. Lænas, the same who had just before spoken so mysteriously to Brutus, approached him, and was observed to enter into earnest conversation with him. The conspirators regarded one another, and mutually revealed their despair with a glance. Cassius and others were grasping their daggers beneath their robes; their last resource was to despatch themselves. But Brutus, observing that the manner of Popilius was that of one supplicating rather than warning, restored his companions' confidence with a smile.² Cæsar entered: his enemies closed in a dense mass around him, and while they led him to his chair kept off all intruders. Trebonius was specially charged to detain Antonius in conversation at the door. Scarcely was the victim seated when Tillius Cimber approached with a petition for his brother's pardon. The others, as was concerted, joined in the supplication, grasping his hands and embracing his neck. Cæsar at first put them gently aside, but, as they became more importunate, repelled them with main force. Tillius seized his toga with both hands, and pulled it violently over his arms. Then P. Casca, who was behind, drew a weapon and grazed his shoulder with an ill-directed stroke. Cæsar disengaged one hand and snatched at the hilt, shouting,

¹ Suet. *Jul.* 81.; Dion, xlv. 18.; Val. Max. viii. 11. 2.

² Plut. *Brut.* 16.

Cursed Casca, what means this? Help, cried Casca to his brother Lucius, and at the same moment the others aimed each his dagger at the devoted object. Cæsar for an instant defended himself, and even wounded one of the assailants with his stylus; but when he distinguished Brutus in the press, and saw the steel flashing in his hand also, *What! thou too, Brutus!* he exclaimed¹, let go his hold of Casca, and drawing his robe over his face made no further resistance. The assassins stabbed him through and through, for they had pledged themselves, one and all, to bathe their daggers in his blood. Brutus himself received a wound in their eagerness and trepidation. The victim reeled a few paces, propped by the blows he received on every side, till he fell dead at the foot of Pompeius' statue.²

¹ Καὶ σὺ τέκνον, is the expression given by Dion and Suetonius. Plutarch only says that on seeing Brutus's dagger Cæsar resisted no longer. The "Et tu, Brute," with which we are familiar from Shakspeare, has no classical authority. See the commentators on *Julius Cæsar*. But some such exclamation seems natural; while the allusion to the pretended parentage of the assassin has an air of later invention.

² Plut. *Cæs.* 66., *Brut.* 17.; Suet. *Jul.* 82.; Val. Max. iv. 5. 6.; Dion, xliv. 19.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO. LTD., NEW-STREET SQUARE
LONDON

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

This book is **DUE** on the last date stamped below

Form L-9-15m-2,'36

LOS ANGELES
LIBRARY

DG
276 Merivale -
.M54h History of
1865 the Romans
v.2 under the
cop.2 empire.

Grad. R. R. McC 1950
MIS 12-1-1952

DG
276
M54h
1865
v.2
cop.2

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



A 000 361 909 5

RANCH,
CALIFORNIA,
CALIF.



