

No. 2558

DEF. DOC. #261

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

Versus

ARAKI, Sadao et al

AFFIDAVIT. *(translation)*

Affiant MASUDA, Kanetoshi

Swearing in accordance with the formality adopted in our country as indicated on the attached sheet I make the following statements:

1. I was born on Sept. 17, 1913 at No. 881, KIKKO YOSHIMATSU-MURA, SHIKAMOTO GUN. KUMAMOTO-Pref. Which is my domicile. I am presently living at the First Demobilization Bureau.
2. My personal record is as follows: commissioned 2nd lieutenant in 1934, promoted to a captain in Dec. 1941 becoming a staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters, a major in March, 1944 becoming a staff officer of the 11th Army, and in Dec. of the same year staff officer of the Imperial Headquarters ^{and} remaining there till the termination of hostilities.

DEF. DOC. #261

3. I took part in the capture of KWEILIN, having been a staff officer of the 11th Army under the command of the commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces. The town of KWEILIN is surrounded by insurmountable rocky hills several hundred metres high. As the Chinese soldiers strongly defended themselves from these rocky hills, we suffered greatly in attacking them. There were rocky mounds throughout the town also where the Chinese soldiers planned and took up positions to offer stubborn resistance. The military strength of the Chinese army consisted of four divisions (about 20,000 men) Resolved to defend this place to the end before the Japanese army closed in, the Chinese army forbade the residents at large to carry away any provisions in their possession, (This matter concerning provisions is a conjecture on my part) and ordered them to evacuate the town leaving their provisions intact in order to supply the Chinese soldiers (I remember intercepting this order) By the time hostilities were begun, not one single resident was left in town. Accordingly, the enemy resisted to the end, and it took a week before we were able to draw up near the town. But since our unit on the eastern side crossed the river and assaulted the enemy fiercely from the eastern side of the town for two days the enemy at length retreated toward the southwest and we finally managed to capture KWEILIN. Japanese aircraft bombed only the airfield, south of

DEF. DOC. #261

KWEILIN, and did not bomb the city sections of the town whatsoever.

4. A comparison of the Japanese air strength with that of ^{the} Chinese at the time of our KWEILIN attack, found the Chinese army's strength including the U.S. air units in CHUNG-KING consisted of seven or eight hundred planes while ours was but 150. Of these, in the way of bombers, we had not more than 30 light bombers. There was such a vast difference in air strength that it was all we could do to but reconnoitre ^{with} a few planes. The command of the air was entirely in the enemy's hands and the situation was such that it was absolutely impossible for us to carry out any bombings. So our ground units in this area fought the enemy without the assistance of air support.

5. In the SIANGTAN-KWEILIN operations, the Japanese army did not bomb within city limits at all (AT HENYANG, we did ^{bomb} military establishments); CHIANGSHA was destroyed by ^{fire} from daytime bombings by large formations of enemy planes including U.S.B. - 23 s, about a week after the Japanese occupation of the town. As a result, many Chinese civilians were killed by the bombings, and a good number of casualties were suffered by the Japanese army also.

In the HENGYANG operations too, after we had interred prisoners of war in the town, and about a week after the occupation, a formation of more than 10 Chinese planes raided and bombed the town, inflicting considerable damage.

DEF. DOC. #261

For this reason when we occupied KWEILIN, we did not h
our army enter the city. The enemy planes however did
come to bomb KWEILIN either.

6. Since commander-in-Chief HATA had issued very strict
orders concerning military discipline and public morality befo
hand, bringing our attention even to the minutest detail
we gave our best efforts not to violate the commander's
orders and instructions. Accordingly, in the SIANGTAN
and KWEILIN operations, our army absolutely did not commit
any misdeeds such as pillage, rape and massacre of the
Chinese inhabitants. On this 24th day of December, 19

At the 1st Demobilization Bureau
HASUDA, Kanetoshi

I certify that the foregoing was sworn to signed, and
sealed before me.

Same date and same place

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu

The Written Oath

I swear to depose the truth according to the dictates
of my conscience with holding nothing and adding nothing.

MASUDA, Kanetoshi

DEF. DOC. #261

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the ^{attached} affidavit is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date 28 Jan. '47

Affidavit of MASUDA, Kanetoshi.