

not have been any disturbance of peace in that district.

Rivalry of foreign powers to obtain concessions in China, creation of spheres of influence, leased territory or division of China, etc., were the causes of unrest in China or East Asia.

Now China was reported to be preparing a war with the assistance of foreign powers. The anti-Japanese movement was running high. It was really in a dangerous condition. As incense fire might be ignited to a conflagration.

The statement was made under such circumstances in order to draw attention of the parties concerned for the purpose of preserving peace and order in East Asia.

We had no intention to interfere with international affairs of China, much less to dominate over her. It is clear beyond doubt that it is quite impossible to over-rule her. Nor had she any intention to disturb the relation of other powers with China or to interfere by force with other powers, but she only desired to keep peace in East Asia. East Asia is our home. The East Asian affairs are to us a question of life or death. We wanted to safeguard our life and our home. We wanted to prevent an outbreak of fire in our house. As Ambassador Saito was reported to have remarked in Chicago on May 21, 1934, "It was in the nature of a protective measure taken only in a diplomatic way. Prevention was always preferable to cure".

It was also reported that Japan's policy also had been somewhat misunderstood in the United States. Some took "The Japanese Formula" as intention on the part of Japan to exercise overlordship over neighboring nations and territories or to claim "Superior interests in Eastern Asia". However, as the Japanese Ambassador in the United States protested it was not the meaning of the formula. We claimed nothing but what was to be derived from our geographical position in the Far East.

Every country has its own geographical position. Nobody can alter the geographical position of a country. The Ishii-Lansing Agreement recognized that territorial propinquity would create special relations between countries and therefore the United States recognized Japan's special interests in China. The agreement has been since abolished, but the geographical position of Japan or China cannot be altered.

Japan is situated in the Far East, and therefore, has particular interests there which are different from other countries not situated in the same position as she.

This is the same with other countries. The United States, for example, may have its particular interests arising from her geographical position she occupies, such as the Carribean districts.

It was expressed in the statement that we were concerned with peace in East Asia where we had particular interests. Of course, we respect the rights and interests of other powers in that district.

Neither overlordship nor superior rights, but natural sequence induced from our geographical position in East Asia that we expressed in the statement.

THE NINE POWER TREATY - THE PRINCIPLE OF OPEN DOOR.

The Nine-Power Treaty was concluded for the purpose of "stabilizing conditions in the Far East" and the statement was made in order to prevent disturbance of conditions in the same region. Both had the same objective.

By the Nine-Power Treaty, the contrasting powers other than China, of the treaty agreed "to refrain from countenancing action inimical to the security of friendly states" and the statement gave warning about such action.

It was beyond doubt that neither the statement was in contradiction to the treaty nor we had any intention to ignore the treaty rights of other powers. However, having learned that there seemed to be some misunderstanding about it, I fully explained about the statement on the 20th April at our press conference with foreign correspondents, while the Foreign Minister himself clarified the American and British Ambassadors on occasion of his meeting with them.

It was a fact, however, that there was strong current of opinion for revising or abolishing the Nine Power Treaty in my country at that time for the reasons that:

- a) China had not yet been united and her condition becoming worse, while she had failed to fulfill her obligations regulated in the Washington Nine Power Treaty and Resolutions.
- b) The fundamental conditions were changed in East Asia since the Treaty had been concluded.
- c) Though the U.S.S.R. was not a party to the Treaty, her position could not be ignored as she had been greatly changed.
- d) Our public opinion grew to feel more and more seriously

that collective intervention of other countries in the East Asian affairs under the pretext of an application of the Treaty was not only ineffective but rather harmful for the maintenance of peace in that region.

On the Manchurian question, many foreign countries most of which had none, or if any, little interests there but simply followed some big powers, intervened collectively, in the affair and put pressure upon Japan in the name of the League, Japan consequently was obliged to withdraw from the League. Many Japanese were then afraid that foreign powers could continue to do the same under the name of the Nine Power Treaty in the affairs of East Asia. Japan's interests in East Asia were vital to her. It would be intolerable to her if other powers would abuse the Treaty for the sake of their interference with the East Asian affairs. This might be the opinion of the majority of Japanese people at that time.

We stood, however, against renouncement of the Treaty.

Not only in Japan, but in other parts, were there bitter criticism of this Treaty. Dr. Sun Yat Sen himself complained of it because China, being assured by other powers of their respect of her sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity was treated as a colony. He, therefore, resented the Treaty.

The London Times pointed out as it was quoted above, that the administrative integrity had never been exercised by the Chinese Central Government since the Nine Power Treaty had been signed and suggested that it would not be the immediate business of the British Foreign Office to defend it in its editorial of January 11, 1932. Thus the British Government did not adhere to the American proposal suggested by Mr. Stimson to send a note to Japan and China (Stimson Doctrine). It showed, however, its attitude to revise it if necessary.

However, we assured in our statements to respect the treaty. Only we saw necessity to give warning to the public in order to maintain stability of China as well as peace and security in East Asia for which the treaty was concluded. This was done because the conditions of East Asia including Japan were in danger of being disturbed on account of the actual situation in China and the action and attitude of other foreign powers.

We did not intend to raise a legal argument concerning the Treaty but just to express our feeling generally and therefore it should be interpreted in accordance with and not in contradiction to, the letter and spirits of the treaties.

We assured also to respect the Principle of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity in China.

In reality, it was not Japan but the League that closed the Chinese door to Japan. On February 24, 1933, the Assembly of the League adopted a report declaring that the Chinese boycott subsequent to the Manchurian Incident was a legitimate means of reprisal in the light of International Law and thus virtually closed China to Japanese trade. Japan did not shut her door but she herself was shut out.

Japanese trade was competing favorably with that of other powers in many parts of the world which were far from Japan, and consequently Great Britain and other powers began to plan various measures in order to prevent Japanese goods from entering their territories in violation of the commercial treaties. Japan was fully confident that she would compete with and beat other powers in trade and commerce in China which was in a position much more advantageous to her than to them. The principle of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity was really welcomed by Japan.

It was particularly stated, moreover, in the statement that Japan would not interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance and trade and she only would object to such action as it would be detrimental to peace and order in East Asia.

Extract from "Volcanic Isle" by Wilfred Fleisher, 1941 - pages 258 - 263.

In the meantime the Foreign Office had appointed a new spokesman, Eiji Amau, who had just returned to Japan from a period of service as counselor of the Japanese Embassy at Moscow at a time when Russo-Japanese relations were particularly strained in the wake of Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Amau had been subjected to all the annoyances with which the Soviets were capable of treating unwelcome visitors: perpetual shadowing, forced isolation, and diplomatic procrastinations and evasions.

After Shiratori, Amau came as something of a letdown for the correspondents. Amau undoubtedly had contacts outside the Foreign Office, but he was above all a Foreign Office official and took orders from the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was nominally the chief officer in charge of press relations and who was then Mamoru Shigemitsu, now ambassador in London.

Amau was cheerful, almost always smiling, seemed to enjoy himself immensely in his new role, cracked jokes with the correspondents, and having his Soviet days close behind him, engaged in frequent verbal tilts with Alexis Naghi, the Tass correspondent, which often went to bitter lengths and provided lively entertainment for the other correspondents. Naghi was a sharp-witted man who loved arguing, with a dictionary in mind in which seemed to be pigeonholed all sorts of facts covering the widest variety of subjects and people. Naghi was recalled to Russia in 1936 and disappeared. Visitors who have since passed through Moscow and inquired for him have been told that he is working at the headquarters of the Tass agency but they have never been able to contact him directly.

Amau quite unconsciously and accidentally became famous overnight. It happened on the evening of April 17, 1934, when he was holding one of his regular press conferences with Japanese newspapermen. Little realizing the importance his words might have, and devoid of the sense of news values his predecessor possessed, Amau picked up a sheaf of telegrams lying on his desk, consisting of messages exchanged between the Foreign Office and Japanese envoys abroad, and read out a dispatch from Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Mamoru Shigemitsu to the Japanese minister to China, Akira Ariyoshi. This statement, which later became known as the Amau statement, pointed to Japan's "special position in China" and warned foreign powers not to assist the Chinese or interfere in their affairs.

The statement was translated from the Japanese by the JAPAN ADVERTISER and appeared in the American newspaper on the following morning. It was then picked up and cabled abroad by foreign correspondents. The Foreign Office, on Amau's instructions, took the ADVERTISER's version, made some slight alterations in the English, and issued it in mimeographed form to a limited number of foreign newspaper correspondents. Later when the Foreign Office disowned the Amau statement it made frantic efforts to recover these mimeographed copies from the correspondents.

Amau's statement created an immediate sensation abroad, and the American and British ambassadors both asked Foreign Minister Koki Hirota to explain it, pointing out that it was contrary to Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty and her repeated professions of observing the Open Door and respecting the integrity of China. Mr Hirota was compelled to retract the statement a week later by assuring the two ambassadors that Japan had not "the slightest intention" of infringing on China's territorial integrity.

Although the Amau statement dates back to 1934, it is still of interest today. As corrected and issued in mimeographed form by the Japanese Foreign Office, it read as follows:

Owing to the special position of Japan in its relations with China, doctrines advocated by Japan concerning China may not agree with the ideas of foreign nations, but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost efforts in carrying out its mission in East Asia and fulfilling its responsibilities. Japan was compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because Japan and the League failed to agree about Japan's position in East Asia, and although Japan's attitude toward China may differ from other countries, such differences cannot be avoided due to Japan's special position and mission.

Japan is endeavoring to maintain and enhance its friendly relations with foreign nations, but Japan considers that to keep the peace and order in East Asia it must act single-handed and on its own responsibility. Japan considers that no other country except China is in a position to share that responsibility with Japan.

Accordingly, the preservation of unity in China

and restoration of order in that country are two objectives ardently desired by Japan for the sake of peace in East Asia. History shows that unity and restoration of order can only be attained by waking up China.

Japan will oppose any attempt of China to avail itself of the influence of some other country to repel Japan, as this would jeopardize the peace of East Asia, and will also oppose any effort by China to resist foreigners by bringing other foreigners to bear against them. Japan expects foreign nations to give consideration to the special situation created by the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents (the Japanese Manchurian invasion in 1931 and the Japanese fighting in Shanghai in 1932) and to realize that technical or financial assistance to China must attain political significance. Acts of this kind must give rise to complications which might necessitate discussion of problems such as fixing zones of interest or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and have the most serious effects upon East Asia and ultimately upon Japan.

Japan must therefore object to such undertakings in principle, although it will not object to any foreign country negotiating individually with China regarding propositions of finance or trade, as long as these propositions are beneficial to China and do not threaten the maintenance of order in East Asia. If such negotiations threaten to disturb peace in East Asia, Japan will be compelled to oppose them.

For example, supplying China with war planes, building airdromes and detailing military instructors or advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to separate Japan and other countries from China and would ultimately prove prejudicial to the peace in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude should be clear from the policies Japan has pursued in the past, but due to the fact that gestures for joint assistance to China and other aggressive assistance by foreign countries is becoming too conspicuous, it is deemed advisable to make known the foregoing policies.

Amau himself had never anticipated the reaction his statement created. He was astounded. He seemed, however, to thoroughly enjoy the limelight into which he had been projected, and if he was censured by both Foreign Minister Hirota and Vice-Minister Shigemitsu, as he undoubtedly was, he was praised and congratulated by many outside the Foreign Office who concurred in the views he had unwittingly given publicity to.

But, as spokesman, Amau became extremely cautious from that time on. He kept his smile and his good humor at press conferences, but he would ward off questioners by turning questions back on them. It was with relief that he abandoned the difficult task of spokesman in 1937, to become minister to Switzerland and later ambassador to Italy. Amau's career in Rome was cut short when he was recalled last August in the wholesale purge of the Japanese diplomatic service under the present Konoye cabinet.

Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji.

April 28, 1934.

"These are days of political intensity. Indeed, in our job the interesting situations and work come in cycles; we pass through periods of comparative calm, with more or less routine duties to perform, and then quite suddenly something breaks and we are busier than bees. Ever since the statement of Foreign Office spokesman Eiji Amau on April 17, the political pot has been boiling; long telegrams out and in; ambassadors, ministers, charges d'affaires, press correspondents constantly coming in for information or diagnosis of events; there is little rest. Amau at least has given the press correspondents plenty of occupation while the diplomats have been spending thousands of dollars on telegrams. I told Amau at a dinner the other night that we were all going to send our telegraph bills to him, to which he replied that that would be all right because he would naturally get a rake-off from the Ministry of Communications for stimulating the telegraph service. It is difficult these days to judge whether Amau is regarded in Japan as an enfant terrible or a hero; it rather depends on whether you seek opinions from the camp of the moderates or that of the chauvinists.

"The first reaction of the Japanese press to Amau's original statement was one of unqualified approval, but when the unfavourable repercussion began to come back from abroad, some of the papers, while approving without qualification the doctrine that Japan has the sole responsibility for the 'preservation of peace in the Far East,' agreed that the wording of the statement was a little awkward. It will be noted that the statement given me by Hirota on the 26th differed from Amau's statement. According to the unofficial translation of the statement of the 17th, Amau said:

'This country considers it only natural that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, it must act singlehanded and upon its own responsibility. In order to be able to fulfil this obligation, Japan must expect its neighbour countries to share the responsibility of maintaining peace in East Asia, but Japan does not consider any other country, except China, to be in a position to share that responsibility with Japan.'

"In the official translation of the 26th the wording is modified:

'However, Japan cannot remain indifferent to anyone's taking action under any pretext which is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order in East Asia for which she, if only in view of her geographical position, has a most vital concern. Consequently, she cannot afford to have questions of China exploited by any third party for the execution of a

Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU EIJI.

selfish policy which does not take into consideration the above-mentioned circumstances.

"Amau, in his statement of the 17th, is further reported to have said:

'Japan will oppose any attempt of China to avail herself of the influence of some other country with the idea of repelling Japan, as this would jeopardize the peace in East Asia; and it will also oppose resort by China to any measure intended to 'resist foreigners by bringing other foreigners to bear against them.' Japan expects foreign nations to give consideration to the special situation created by the recent Manchurian and Shanghai incidents, and to realize that the undertaking of joint operations in regard to China, even if they be in regard to technical or financial assistance, must eventually attain political significance for China. Undertakings entailing such significance, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might even necessitate discussion of problems like fixing zones of interest or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have the most serious effects upon East Asia and, ultimately, Japan.

'Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although it will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China in regard to propositions of finance or trade, as long as those propositions are beneficial to China and are not likely to threaten the maintenance of order in East Asia. If such negotiations are of a nature that might disturb peace and order in East Asia, Japan will be obliged to oppose them.

'For example, supplying China with warplanes, building aerodromes in China, and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to separate Japan and other countries from China and ultimately would prove prejudicial to the peace of East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

'The foregoing attitude should be made clear by the policies followed by Japan in the past. But, due to the fact that gestures for joint assistance to China and for other aggressive assistance, by foreign countries, are becoming too conspicuous, it is deemed advisable to make known the foregoing policies.'

'There has been much conjecture regarding the reasons for the issuance of Amau's statement of April 17. I endeavoured to define those

Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji

reasons in our telegrams and in our last dispatch to the Department, based chiefly on the theory that Japan was becoming restive at the cumulative evidence of foreign activities in China. Furthermore, approval of the doctrine that Japan alone is responsible for the maintenance of peace in the Far East would give Japan added claims to naval parity in the forthcoming naval conference, and would also enable her to dominate China. Amau had been pressed by the Japanese newspaper correspondents for comment on these various matters and Shigemitsu finally agreed to his giving out the substance of an instruction already sent to Ariyoshi, Minister to China.

"Whether or not Hirota approved the issuance of the statement is unessential, for the statement accurately expresses the policy which Japan would like to pursue. While there has been criticism of the phraseology, the substance of the statement seems to have the unqualified approval of practically all Japanese, and Hirota, in the present state of public opinion, could not repudiate the statement and remain in office. The net result of the statement will probably be: (1) an intensification of the feeling of isolation that has prevailed since the Manchurian campaign; (2) a furtherance of the Army and Navy campaign to prepare for the 'crisis' of 1935-36, and (3) the development of patriotic feeling to such an extent that no Japanese Government will be able to compromise with the powers in case of decided differences in viewpoint regarding policies towards China or with respect to naval ratios."

April 29, 1934.

"Fortunately I was at home when Mr. Hull's aide-memoire on the question of foreign assistance to China came in. It was decoded at 5 and typed at about 5:30. In spite of its being Sunday and the Emperor's birthday I immediately wrote a personal letter to Hirota asking if he could see me urgently. He replied by telephone, setting the hour at 6:30, and I was therefore able to deliver the document without delay. He read it slowly and carefully and then asked me what portion or portions I considered the most important. I replied that I did not feel that I ought to try to interpret it and that the text seemed to me to be quite clear. He merely remarked that Amau's statement had caused 'great misunderstanding' and said that he would reply after studying our aide-memoire in due course. He was perfectly friendly and showed no surprise or disapproval. In my opinion the aide-memoire is wholly admirable, absolutely called for by the circumstances, drafted in masterly fashion, perfectly clear in substance, moderate and friendly in tone.

"It seems to me that after all that has passed, Sir John Simon appears to have accepted a little too readily Hirota's assurances that

Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji.

Japan intended to respect the Nine-Power Treaty, and his statement to the House of Commons to the effect that he was satisfied with those assurances may cause certain elements of the British public to feel that something more was called for and desired. At any rate, we have registered our own position with complete clarity. I think that the Department's 'rush' instruction to me to present the aide-memoire at the earliest possible moment was probably to forestall another pious statement which it was reported that the Foreign Office would issue to the press to-morrow. Evidently it did forestall it because on the following day Amau announced to the press that there would be no further statement for the present. Whatever the other nations may think or do, we shall have their (perhaps grudging) respect. I am very happy about it."

December 27, 1934.

"Perhaps this gives the impression that we at the Embassy are developing something of an 'anti-Japanese' complex. This is not the case. One can dislike and disagree with certain members of a family without necessarily feeling hostility to the family itself. For me there are no finer people in the world than the best type of Japanese. I am rather inclined to place Hirota among them; if he could have his way unhampered by the military I believe that he would steer the country into safer and saner channels.

"One of these friends once sadly remarked to us: 'We Japanese are always putting our worst foot foremost, and we are too proud to explain ourselves.' There has been and is a 'bungling diplomacy'. They habitually play their cards badly. While it is true that the military and the extremists are primarily responsible for the 'bungling diplomacy' of Japan, the Japanese as a race tend to be inarticulate, more at home in action than with words. But the military and the extremists know little and care little about Japan's relations with other countries, and it is the desire of people like Shiratori, Amau, and other Government officials to enhance their own prestige at home and to safeguard their future careers by standing in well with the military that brings about much of the trouble. Perhaps we should be grateful that they so often give their hand away in advance."

February 12, 1937.

"This afternoon Alice, having a cold and feeling poorly, stayed at home while I did the family duty by going to a reception at the Chinese Embassy, and it was worth while because it gave me an opportunity for a long and intimate conversation with Amau. Amau said that he thought that Japanese-American relations had undergone a great change in the

Excerpts from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew -- AMAU Eiji.

last two or three years and that Japan's attitude towards America was very different from that of three years ago. He said that there were really no important issues pending between us at the present time and he thought it very significant that the speech which the Minister for Foreign Affairs is about to make in a few days is going to state that Japan desires the most friendly relations with both the United States and Great Britain; so far as the United States is concerned he will stop right there, but so far as Great Britain is concerned he will continue to the effect that current controversies can be settled by diplomatic negotiations. In other words, said Amau, the absence of comment with regard to the United States would indicate that there are no prime issues worth mentioning.

"I said I thought that this situation was in large measure due to Mr. Hirota and his efforts in curbing the Japanese press, which had caused so much trouble in times past in its bitter comment about the United States; these comments were repeated by correspondents to America, and of course the American press took them up there, causing a vicious circle all around. Amau then told me of his own efforts in this direction and how in the weekly meetings with representatives of Japanese journals he had tried to influence the editorial writers to lay off bickering with the United States. In this respect he had been rather successful. I told Amau that although I had ascribed the credit for our improved relations to Hirota I knew very well that he himself had had an important hand in this development. I mentioned the press report about Shiratori as possible Vice-Minister, but Amau brushed Shiratori aside, saying that he wanted war with Soviet Russia and would therefore certainly not fit into the present regime. I said I thought that Japan was at present in a very critical position and that she really stood at the parting of the ways; Amau agreed with me and said that this was why a moderate cabinet had been appointed at the present time. On the whole this conversation seemed to me significant because Amau emphasized so distinctly the fact that the present cabinet is moderate and it looks at present very much as if this might prove to be the case."

February 21, 1941.

"Plenty of dust has been stirred up by Matsuoka's reported offer to Mr. Eden to mediate for peace in the European conflict; the press abroad was full of it and questions were asked in the House of Commons. My original guess as to how the thing happened eventually proved correct and Matsuoka told me the whole story on February 26. It appears that in the face of criticism of Japan's action in mediating in the Thailand-Indo-China dispute, Matsuoka wrote a memorandum to Eden,

Excerpt from "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew" -- AMAU Eiji.

through Shigemitsu in London, in which, in the course of a long exposition, he said:

'Lastly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Matsuoka) would like to make it clear that Japan, deeply concerned as she is with an early restoration of peace, is fully prepared to act as a mediator or to take whatever action calculated to recover normal conditions, not only in Greater East Asia but anywhere the world over.'

"What actually happened was that Ishii, deputy spokesman of the Information Bureau, ran across this memorandum in the Foreign Office and gave out certain parts of it to the press, in precisely the same way that Amau had given out one of Hirota's instructions to the Minister in China in the celebrated 'Amau Statement,' and in both cases the publicity was given without the prior knowledge or approval of the Minister. Matsuoka told me that he had been very angry with Ishii and had issued to him 'a severe warning,' but that, of course, Ishii's face had to be saved in public. However, the harm had been done and it was considerable. Matsuoka said that the British had used it to imply that Germany was in bad straits and needed peace, which was the last thing he had intended to convey. At this point in our talk he got much stirred up and his eyes became bloodshot with suppressed anger."

AMAU on The 3rd. KONOYE Cabinet's Foreign Ministry.

The Second KONOYE Cabinet resigned and the Third KONOYE Cabinet was formed in July 1941. Mr. MATSUOKA, Foreign Minister, resigned and Admiral TOYODA Teijiro was appointed Foreign Minister in the Third KONOYE Cabinet. The new cabinet was formed in order to continue negotiations with the United States. I was appointed Vice-Minister to assist Admiral TOYODA for the negotiations in August.

At the beginning of October of the same year, we received a reply from Mr. HULL to our proposal. The Prime Minister and his colleagues concerned were going to meet to discuss on the negotiations and Prince KONOYE asked the foreign minister of his opinion on the prospect of the negotiations - whether he thought there would be any prospect of coming to an agreement or not.

Thereupon, we presented our view on the negotiations, emphasizing the necessity of coming to an agreement and explaining why we should avoid a war at any cost. Here are the two documents describing our opinion.

About the 14th of October, I decided to see General TOJO War Minister, by consultation with my Minister to ask his reconsideration. I saw him about 10 o'clock at night and talked with him about two hours. I insisted upon concluding an agreement with the United States by making concession on the question of withdrawal of our troops from China for which I went to see him. I had so hot a talk with him that twice he said to me that I had better go home, during my conversation. I left him about midnight.

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1943.

NEW INFORMATION CHIEF AMAU

By Kei-ichi NAGASAKA

"When the Toho Cabinet was reorganized in April last, Mr. Eiji Amau was appointed President of the Board of Information. The new information chief, because of his brilliant past records, appears to be well qualified for handling all weighty official statements and interpreting the cardinal policies of the Government. From 1933 to 1937, he was director of the now defunct Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, and during this period he successfully discharged his duties as the diplomatic spokesman of the Government. In 1934, he leaped into international prominence by issuing what is generally called the Amau declaration on non-recognition of third Power interference in purely East Asiatic affairs. Taking strong exception to the technical assistance rendered to China by the League of Nations and the economic and military aids given to General Chiang Kai-shek by the Governments and interested quarters of Britain and the United States, spokesman Amau made an epochal statement on April, 17, 1934. It, in part, reads:

'Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters concerning China may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations; but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia.....We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we also oppose any action taken by China calculated to play one Power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance.....Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia. However, supplying China with warplanes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political use, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.'

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1938.

"The Amai declaration frankly and without any diplomatic frills pointed out that to Japan the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in East Asia was of vital need, and, at the same time, requested foreign nations not to implement measures construable as harmful to the cause of Sino-Japanese harmony. London and Washington strongly resented the interpretation contained in the Amai declaration of the China policy of Tokyo. By way of registering its protest, the American Government on April 30 sent a note to the Japanese Government and specifically drew the attention of the latter to the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty. It would not be fallacious to say that Mr. Amai through his outspoken declaration unveiled the portrait of Japan's independent China policy, which thenceforward aimed at restoring stable cordial relations between the two neighbouring countries.

"Prior to the outbreak of the current Pacific war, Japan did everything in its power to seek a solution of all pending Far Eastern issues in an endeavour to meet the just demands of Britain and the United States, as well as to effect an understanding with Chungking, thereby facilitating the return of peace in China. Animated by such a noble motive, the Japanese Government opened negotiations with the American Government. But the latter, spurning the good intention of the former, submitted a provoking proposal, with the result that Japan was reluctantly obliged to enter into a state of war with Britain and America as the only recourse left to settle diverse Sino-Japanese differences without the intervention or mediation of third Powers. Now that the Anglo-American interference in greater East Asia has been reduced, regardless of the contrary proclivity of Chungking, the independent China policy of Japan, so ably outlined by Mr. Amai in 1934, has started functioning in a fairly smooth manner by receiving the required support of the Nanking Government.

"Diplomatically speaking, the Amai declaration was made in the nature of a warning to Britain and America, which nations had been persistently scheming to hinder the growth of genuine Sino-Japanese harmony. They unnecessarily feared that, in the event of a Sino-Japanese accord being reached, their special rights and interests in China would suffer a great deal. This apprehension on their part was merely hypothetical, especially when the Amai declaration conveyed no such idea. It is regrettable that a section of public opinion in Japan, desiring to conciliate America at any cost, vehemently criticized the Amai declaration as a piece of inopportune statement. On top of this, certain influential circles went so far as to cold-shoulder it, for they attached prime importance to the policy of 'go slow' in dealing with the United States. Nevertheless, the new turn in the China policy, on the whole, came to be accepted in the country as a settled fact.

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1938.

"In April, 1937, when Mr. Naotake Sato assumed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau was promoted Minister and assigned to Switzerland. During his stay in Berne, he made a detailed study of the international situation, being comparatively free from heavy diplomatic work. In September, 1939, when Admiral Nomura joined the Abe Cabinet as Foreign Minister, Mr. Amau was made Ambassador to Rome. In this new role, Mr. Amau displayed marked ability in strengthening the structure of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Then, with the assumption in the second Konoye Cabinet of the post of Foreign Minister by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, former president of the South Manchuria Railway Company and prime mover in leading Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, Mr. Amau as Ambassador to Rome made no small contribution to reinforce further the Axis unanimity of purpose. He, in conjunction with Mr. Saburo Kurusu, then Ambassador to Berlin, brought about the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy. By virtue of this agreement, the major credit for which must be given to Mr. Matsuoka, Berlin and Rome acknowledged Japan's leadership in East Asia, while Japan recognized the leadership of Berlin and Rome in Europe, and thus the Axis solidarity was cemented to strive for organizing a new world order in replacement of the status quo policy of the Anglo-American nations.

"Mr. Amau retired for a short while from diplomatic service in February, 1941; but, with the formation of the third Konoye Cabinet, he was recalled to take charge of the office of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this capacity he greatly assisted Foreign Minister Admiral Teijiro Toyoda in conducting negotiations with America with a view to reaching an agreement for the settlement of the China affair. In October, 1941, the Konoye Cabinet tendered its resignation and General Hideki Tojo, who was War Minister in that Cabinet, organized a new Ministry. Consequent upon the organization of the Tojo Ministry, Mr. Amau resigned from the office of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Premier General Tojo resumed negotiations with the United States and dispatched Mr. Kurusu as special envoy to Washington for the purpose of assisting Ambassador Nomura in effecting a mutually acceptable rapprochement with the Roosevelt administration. Since the attempt failed, on account of President Roosevelt's dictatorial attitude, the war in greater East Asia eventuated as a natural development.

"Until his appointment as President of the Board of Information, Mr. Amau remained somewhat inactive. A few months ago, he accepted the post of chief of the neighbourhood association department of the National Service Association--a post which he is still retaining with the object of scrutinizing closely the wartime life of the nation. Now that he has become the information chief, it is popularly expected that he will not only invigorate the thought warfare structure of Japan, but also will

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1938.

speed up the dissemination of accurate informations concerning the latest activity pertaining to the construction of a greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. In addition, because of the perfect understanding existing between him and Mr. Mamoru Shighemitsu, Foreign Minister, it is obvious that the Board of Information and the Foreign Office would function as one well-knit organization to yield greater good to wartime diplomacy and information service of the nation.

"Born a second son of a wholesale fertilizer merchant of Tokushima, Shikoku, Mr. Amau, after graduating from the Kobe Higher Commercial School, prosecuted his post-graduate studies at the Tokyo Higher Commercial School. In 1912, he entered the service of the Foreign Office and successively served as consul at Antung and Sydney, embassy secretary at London and legation secretary at Berne. After that he came back to the Foreign Office as a secretary of the European and American Affairs Bureau. During the time of the Washington Conference, he acted as one of the staff members of the Japanese delegation. Then followed his appointment as consul-general at Canton and Harbin and secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Peking. Subsequently, he served twice as charge d'affairs in Moscow, from whence he was transferred to the Foreign Office to become director of the Information Bureau. From this list of posts he has had held, it is apparent that Mr. Amau in his early career received a sound training to educate himself as an astute diplomat. Perhaps that is why he was later assigned to Rome as Ambassador, where he offered his best service for the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance Pact. In recognition of his ability, he has now been entrusted with the administration of the information set-up of the Government.

"At the time when Mr. Amau was spokesman of the Foreign Office, he exhibited a keen sense of diplomatic judgement in issuing statements and in replying to questions put by newspaper correspondents of foreign countries. He was always ready to help them in appreciating the policies of Japan and give them informations as impartially as possible. When subjected to a barrage of questions tinged with suspicious motive, he would maintain his equanimity with a broad smile and reply wittily, thereby disarming the suspicion of the questioners. On the other hand, in voicing the reasonableness of the contentions of Japan, he would take a firm stand and present plainly the viewpoints of this country. In liberal circles of those days he was known as the enfant terrible of the Foreign Office. It may be that he nourished a militant complex being influenced by such militant diplomats as Mr. Kumataro Honda and Mr. Kenkichi Yoshizawa, under both of whom he served as secretary respectively at London and Peking. It is certainly a fact that Mr. Amau is a man of strong character. At this time of super-emergency confronting the Japanese people a man of his calibre cannot but be welcomed.

Extract from "Contemporary Japan", July 1938.

"Immediately after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, British and American correspondents posed a number of questions to Mr. Amai for the purpose of ascertaining the future moves of this country. The day was cold and a severe biting wind was blowing. To the astonishment of the Anglo-American newspapermen, they found all the windows of Mr. Amai's room wide open. They started shutting the windows, whereupon the spokesman remarked: 'The windows have just been opened. Please leave them open for a while to have more fresh air. It is good and as healthy as the open door policy you people so fondly advocate.' This wisecrack elicited a roar of hearty laughter and incidentally the Anglo-American correspondents received their answer in parable. Under cover of such an enjoyable joke, Mr. Amai took the occasion to declare that Japan was following an open door policy, and that it would follow the same policy in the future for the healthy progress of East Asia. It will be refreshing to know that the Amai declaration of 1934, which was scathingly attacked by Britain and the United States, in a way tried to safeguard the legitimate special privileges and interests of foreign Powers, and for that reason it naturally sought the execution of a genuine open door policy in East Asia through Sino-Japanese collaboration and consultation. Japan parted company with the League of Nations, because Geneva, taking shelter behind non-realistic issues, flatly refused to give its assent to the operation of a Sino-Japanese open door policy in East Asia.

"Today, Mr. Amai in the capacity of the new information chief has been called upon to play a notable part in promoting the 'open door' policy of Japan for the regeneration of intercountry homogeneity in greater East Asia. Britain and America devised their own plan of open door in China mainly to shut out the natural evolution in Sino-Japanese cordiality. They played both East Asiatic neighbours. The Nine-Power Treaty was concluded not for the benefit of China, but for depriving Japan of the means to foster Sino-Japanese amity. This agreement hampered the activity of Japan in regard to the promotion of East Asiatic stability. It is, indeed, fortunate that the present Tokyo-Nanking combination has receded the London-Washington open door policy to the background and has simultaneously accelerated the consummation of the long-standing ideal of independent East Asiatic 'open door' doctrine cherished by the nations of this part of the world. Mr. Amai, who has all along manifested opposition to alien interference in East Asiatic affairs, has now been provided with powerful administrative authority to add his weight to the task of constructing the envisioned regional 'open door' in greater East Asia."

AMAU Eiji's Appointment as President of the Board of Information-1943.

When the TOJO Cabinet was formed in October 1941 and the war broke out in December 1941, TOGO Shigenori was Foreign Minister and TANI Masayuki was President of the Bureau of Information (Tani was not a Cabinet member).

TOGO resigned on account of the establishment of the Ministry of Great East Asia in September 1942.

The Army was contemplating the establishment of a central bureau to deal with Chinese affairs after the China Incident occurred. The Foreign Office was strongly against it. The Foreign Minister (General UGAKI) resigned in protest when the establishment of the Central Independent Office for Chinese Affairs was proposed at the Cabinet meeting at the time of the KONOYE Cabinet in September 1938. However, the China Affairs Board was set up in November 1938. During the time of the TOJO Cabinet, there was a rumor that a plan to aggrandize the China Affairs Board to a ministry was being considered in the government as well as in Army and Navy circles. Those who had connections with the Foreign Office drew attention of Foreign Minister TOGO to this matter as early as the beginning of 1942. However, the Foreign Office did not evidently expect that there might be a sudden change.

The proposal of the establishment of the Great East Asia Ministry was made about the middle of September 1942. The Foreign Office opposed. TOGO resigned but was appointed member of the House of Peers in September. The Great East Asia Ministry was established in September 1942 and TANI was appointed as Foreign Minister and concurrently President of the Information Bureau.

The Foreign Office and the Bureau of Information were the most closely related to each other in their functions and history. It is, therefore, essential that the Foreign Minister and the President of the Information Bureau should work harmoniously.

The Information Bureau was established by aggrandizing the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office. It was traditional that the President was selected from the Foreign Office officials. Therefore, it was the strong desire of the Foreign Office that this tradition be kept.

On the other hand, there was demand by the public that a Foreign Minister and a President of the Information Board should be of such types of men as those who could do fine team work with each other and that if the suitable men could not be found, it would be better that both posts should be occupied by one man.

It was not unnatural, therefore, that TANI occupied both posts.

However, it was found that it was too much for one man to do both jobs, particularly in war time. Voices had been raised more and more strongly that different men should be appointed to the different posts, particularly rumors were running high after the special session of the Diet of March 1943 that a full time President of the Information Bureau should be appointed.

The TOJO Cabinet was reshuffled in April 1943. The four ministers (Foreign, Home, Agriculture & Forestry, Education) were changed and one new Minister without portfolio appointed. SHIGEMITSU Mamoru was appointed as Foreign Minister, TANI as Ambassador to China and AMAU Eiji as President of the Information Board. (AMAU was not a Cabinet Member). The public seemed to have received the impression (and the press also reported in such sense) that the scope of the selection had been widened and the men of real capacity had been chosen as regards the Foreign Minister and the President of the Information Bureau. (If AMAU's memory is correct).

Since AMAU came back from Europe at the end of 1940, there occurred always rumors of AMAU to fill the presidency whenever there was a rumor of the change of a president of the Board of Information. As a matter of fact, as early as the beginning of 1941 one of the members of the Second KONOYE Cabinet sounded out AMAU of his intention for the post of president of the Board when there was a rumor of the change of it just after AMAU had been dismissed by MATSUOKA. Of course AMAU replied negatively.

When AMAU was offered the post of the President of the Board in April 1943, he was assured that the reorganization of the Board would be executed (by which all Army and Navy officers would be withdrawn from the Board) and the Vice-President (OKUMURA) would be changed. AMAU consulted with two or three of his senior colleagues who recommended him to accept it.


AMAU was then under the impression that TOJO or some of the Government people had consulted with or sounded out some of the Foreign Office men and found that there would be no other suitable person available than AMAU for it and also that whatever feeling TOJO might have had by his hot discussion with AMAU at the time of the Japanese-American Negotiations in October 1941 seemed to have faded away by the necessity.

Though bitterly against war, AMAU thought that he had to do his best in accordance with the Imperial Rescript after the outbreak of war to bring the war to a conclusion as satisfactory as possible to Japan. He knew also quite well that it was a sentiment of the whole Foreign Office that the post of President should be retained by a Foreign Office man both for the sake of the country and of the Foreign Office. AMAU was appointed President and MURATA (Home Office man) as Vice-President in April 1943.

About the time of Saipan, TOJO was rumored of considering of reshuffling of the Cabinet again in Spring of 1944. AMAU was intimately informed

from various directions that besides some of the Cabinet members he himself would be changed according to rumors (even some names were mentioned). AMAU had once expressed his willingness to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to leave the post for reason of ill health in February 1944.

The TOJO Cabinet failed on account of the reorganization of the Cabinet and other matters and resigned in July 1944.



Extract from NIPPON TIMES, 28 June 1945

ASIA DEVELOPMENT BODY INAUGURATED WEDNESDAY

New Association to Replace Headquarters
Under Rule Aid Organ Recently Dissolved

The Dai Nippon Asia Development Association was inaugurated at a ceremony held on Wednesday morning at the Marunouchi Kaikan with Greater East Asiatic Affairs Minister Shigenori Togo and representatives from the War, Navy and Foreign Affairs Ministries and the Board of Information attending. This new organ will take the place of the Asia Development Headquarters of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which was dissolved recently in line with the progressive dissolution of the mother organization.

Taking the place of the Asia Development Headquarters, the Dai Nippon Asia Development Association will engage in the spreading and promotion of the idea of Asiatic development in line with the situation. It will strive to strengthen the solidarity of the East Asiatic peoples and engage in powerful thought war in line with the armed hostilities.

With the completion of the selection of the governing personnel, the structure and members, the new organ was launched on Wednesday. General Iwane Matsui, retired, is President and Eiji Amau, former President of the Board of Information, is Vice-President and concurrently Chief of the Board of Directors. Advisors to the organ are Admiral Baron Kiyokazu Abo, retired, Hachiro Arita, former Foreign Minister, Kazue Shoda, member of the House of Peers, Rikuro Takagi, Admiral Sankichi Tatekawa, retired, former Ambassador to Soviet Union, Iichiro Tokutomi, noted writer, Kumataro Honda, former Ambassador to China, Rentaro Mizuno, member of the House of Peers, General Jiro Minami, president of the Dai Nippon Seijikai, and Kenkichi Yoshizawa, former Ambassador to French Indo-China.

Takashi Mori, former Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy in Brazil, is Chief of the General Affairs Bureau, and Mr. Amau is Chief of the Promotion Bureau and concurrent President of the Board of Directors and Business Manager. Vice-Admiral Eijiro Kondo, member of the House of Representatives, will serve as Chief of the Training Bureau.

BACKGROUND:-

CHINA'S CONDITIONS - JAPAN'S CONDITIONS

by AMAU Eiji

The Far Eastern conditions have entirely changed after this war. Particularly there have been fundamental changes on the position of the United States of America in the Far East. I am, therefore, afraid that if a statement which was issued soon after the Manchurian Incident had occurred, is judged by the present conditions it may be liable to misleading. Therefore, we have to study the conditions existing then in order to explain my statement.

China was still in chaotic condition at that time. The Central Government had been established in Nanking but China was far from being united. At the Washington Conference, we had made to China various concessions in the hope that she, soon achieving unity and settling her house in order, would on her own part redeem the various obligations which she had shouldered at that conference. However, such hopes were betrayed by subsequent events. China failed to unify herself and to meet her obligations of the Washington Treaty. It is to be remembered that when Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State, proposed to Great Britain and France to send a similar note which we was going to send Japan, the Government of Great Britain did not adopt the suggestion and published its own communique (which was entirely in a different sense). The London Times had an editorial on January 11, 1932 in support of the British Government to the following effect:

"Nor does it seem to be the immediate business of the Foreign Office to defend the "Administrative integrity" of China until that integrity is something more than an ideal. It did not exist in 1922 and it does not exist today. On no occasion since the Nine Power Treaty was signed has the Central Government of China exercised any real administrative authority over large and varying areas of the huge territory. Today its writ does not run in Yunan or in other important provinces, and while its sovereignty over Manchukuo is not disputed, there is no evidence that it has exercised any real administration there since Nanking became the Chinese Capital."

On the other hand various kinds of anti-Japanese movements such as movement to despise Japan and the Japanese, to resist Japan by force or to boycott Japanese goods were rampant and spreading vehemently among the Chinese people throughout China. There were many evidences that the Nanking authorities were behind such movements. Not only they were agitating or instigating them but also were busy in importing arms and ammunition and war-planes, building aerodromes, detailing military instructors or

raising political loans to be used as funds for the purchase of arms. Various reports from various directions coincided that China was preparing her forceful resistance to Japan or even to wage war against Japan by assistance from other Powers or the League.

It was reported also that China was increasing her armies, by disbursing an enormous amount of money out of the loan which has been raised for use of National welfare in spite of the resolution passed by the United States of America and other nine powers at the Washington Conference to the effect that "It is resolved that this Conference express to China the earnest hope that immediate and effective steps be taken by the Chinese Government to reduce the aforesaid (the maintenance in various parts of the country of military forces) military forces and expenditures as it will not only advance the cause of China's political unity and economic development but will hasten her financial rehabilitation, etc.

(It may be interesting to know some of the news concerning this matter).

a) A Spokesman of the Chinese Government was reported to have said that Japan aimed to bar the sales of American and other airplanes, China's employment of American flying instructors and experts, and to object to Nanking's employment of German military advisers and employment of the international rehabilitation experts recommended by Geneva, etc. (New York Times, April 20, 1934).

b) The British Government notified the Japanese Government in writing in February 1935 that it regarded a loan to China as not only futile but harmful, for it would only increase China's indebtedness.

c) The Japanese Foreign Office informed Dr. T. V. Soong in July 1933 that it objected to the loans which China had been contemplating to raise and the contract which China had planned to make with other powers for supplying arms to China

d) The United States of America was reported to have passed a bill for purchase of Chinese silver in June 1934 and agreed to advance a loan for cotton and wheat for \$50,000,000. - and made agreement of currency with China by which she purchased a great deal of Chinese silver in 1935, 1936 and 1937.

There were some doubts about the American attitude. We wondered if the United States of America would help China by supplying her arms and ammunition to fight with Japan while she recognized that Japan would assume responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia. Such suspicion was deepened by learning the reactions of the statement in the United States of America and studying carefully different repercussions made by

the statement in different countries. (Reactions abroad will be treated later). It was still deepened by various reports such as for example was reported in the Japan Advertiser later:

"Arms Deal Details Aired by Nye Group - September 16, 1934.

Senator Gerald P. Nye, Chairman of "Senate Munitions Investigations Committee" told newspapermen that they, the Committee, was in possession of evidence indicating that China used the Ten million dollars wheat and cotton loan she obtained from the United States for the purchase of guns and airplanes. (A.P. Report).

The Nye investigators today produced evidence that a Du Pont Agent in Shanghai named R. E. Montague Smith, suggested to his home office that representations be made to the State Department and the British Foreign Office in an effort to lift the British restrictions on shipping explosives to China during the hostilities at Nanking and Canton in 1933.

Senator Nye, Chairman of the Committee, charged that China used the thirty million R.F.C. loan last year (1933) to buy arms and ammunition for the Chinese troops engaged in hostilities with Japan. He did not reveal the details of such transaction but it is understood most of the grain was traded to Italy. The Committee curtailed certain startling disclosures due to Secretary of State Hull and Secretary of Commerce Roper having protested against the inquiry's wide scope, as foreign governments were harassing the State Department with protests. Secretary Roper said American business would suffer as a result of the disclosures of private negotiations."

It seemed then to have been confirmed that the policy of the United States of America would help to increase China's supply of arms and restrain Japan's supply for the reason that she "would not be disposed to take any action which would favor the military operations of the Japanese". According to "Peace & War", Mr. Hull said in a statement made to the Senate Committee on May 17, 1933, concerning embargo on the export of arms from the United States of America that:

"In the spring of 1933, in connection with proposed legislation to authorize the President under certain conditions to apply embargoes on the export of arms from the United States, consideration was given to the possibility of an arms embargo against Japan.

He said that an arms embargo would not be an effective means of restoring peace in this instance, that Japan was an important producer of arms with industries sufficiently developed to supply its own needs; that China was dependent upon her importation of these commodities; that an arms embargo applied to both China and Japan would, therefore, militate against China and in favor of Japan; that an embargo directed against Japan alone would probably result in the seizure by the Japanese of arms intended for China.

thus ultimately decreasing China's supply of arms and increasing Japan's supply. The Secretary stated that this Government would not dispose to take any action which would favor the military operations of the Japanese. Further, he said that we would not under any circumstances agree to participate in an international embargo of this kind unless we had secured substantial guaranties from the Governments of all the great powers which would insure against the effects of any retaliatory measures which the Japanese might undertake".

What would be the result if it were left as it was going to be? Disturbance of peace or outbreak of war would be inevitable in East Asia.

It was our fundamental policy in East Asia to maintain peace. The instructions given by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to the United States delegate to the Brussels Conference (The Nine Power Treaty) in November 1937 stated that the first objective of the foreign policy of the United States was national security and consequently we sought to keep peace, promote the maintenance of peace. ("Peace & War" page 25). This was exactly in the same line as ours. We must, first of all, preserve peace and security in the Far East at any cost. We had, therefore, to give warning to the parties concerned.

Now I would turn to the internal conditions of Japan. As Mr. Stimson wrote in his book ("The Far Eastern Crisis" - page 28) there had been two kinds of policy toward China. One was the "friendly policy" which was guided by the Minseito party (Wakatsuki, leader of the party and Prime Minister Baron Shidehara, Foreign Minister) and the other was "The Positive policy" which was advocated by the Seiyukai party (Baron General Tanaka). But after the Manchurian Incident and the proclamation of the Imperial Rescript on withdrawal from the League of Nations, our people were united on our policy on Manchuria and East Asia.

Baron Wakatsuki himself explained Japan's position in his article in the American Magazine "Foreign Affairs" in July 1935. He was Prime Minister at the time of the Manchurian Incident and was regarded as champion of the liberal policies in foreign affairs as Mr. Stimson wrote. I understood also this article had been submitted to Baron Shidehara before it was published.

Refer to "Japan and her Aims" by Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki. July 1935. American Magazine "Foreign Affairs".

Baron Matsui, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and member of the Privy Council who was regarded to be in the same school as Baron Shidehara wrote to the "Fortnightly Review" a little earlier than Baron Wakatsuki".

Refer to "Anglo-Japanese Relations" by Baron Kishiro Matsui.

After the Manchurian Incident, our policy was to consolidate the new state of Manchukuo as was clearly guided in the Imperial Rescript, and it was our duty to make other powers recognize the new situation of Manchuria and understand our position and policy in East Asia as was enunciated by the Foreign Minister.

It was not an easy task for me to make foreign people, particularly the American and English people whose conditions were entirely different from ours, as Baron Wakatsuki and Baron Matsui had mentioned in their articles referred to above, understand our policy and mission. However, I had to do my best.

First I had to explain that the actual conditions of Japan would not allow the Japanese people to be compressed within the limited area of their small islands. Baron Wakatsuki and Baron Matsui well explained it. And then I had to explain why we tried to consolidate Manchukuo.

We thought it was the natural course to move to the north, Manchuria, which was adjacent to Korea and it was the safest way to confine our activities to Korea and it was the safest way to confine our activities within Manchuria, if we had to bound outward. Marquis (Baron at that time) Komura advocated a policy of concentration of Japanese immigration to Manchuria when the immigration question had been raised in the United States after the Russo-Japanese war.

Dr. Sun Yat Sen, father of the Chinese Revolution, and founder of the Kuomintang Party, preached the doctrine of the so-called "Great Asianism" and, urging its cooperation of Japan and China, declared that China should abandon Manchuria which was most likely source of friction between these two countries (1913). Manchuria was a part of China but it was in reality different from other parts of China in many respects and governed by a ruler independent from the central authorities for a long time, having an entirely independent status. As the London Times said in its editorial quoted above, on no occasion since the Nine Power Treaty was signed has the Central Government of China exercised any real administrative authorities over Manchuria.

We thought honestly that the American public would gradually understand our position and policy if we sincerely explained our real intention to them, particularly more progressive element of them would easily grasp it. (Such as Colonel House or ex-Ambassador Geste, for example).

References:

a) Colonel House often met Count Makino and other Japanese representatives at the Versailles Conference and he well understood Japan's position. He wrote later that "It is understandable that

Japan should with its dominating influence in the Far East and she has a right to demand an outlet for the crowded population within the restricted borders". He continued that "Japan is looking for her easiest and most effective channel into which she may pour her superfluous population and trade", and he appealed to the four powers possessing the world - Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States - to reconsider the drastic territorial readjustment for the sake of international peace and mankind.

b) Mr. Hugh Byas wrote that the "Industrial revolution struck Japan much later than Europe and America but its results - increasing wealth, enormous energy, rising population - were the same". The situation then reveals in active operation some of the most powerful factors in the historical process which has made and is continuously making the world - necessity, power, and opportunity". (Hugh Byas "Japan's Destiny As She Sees It" the New York Times Magazine, August 26, 1934).

c) Mr. Yoshida, Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain (Foreign Minister at present) said to Mr. Hull on June 12, 1936 that the people of the United States should recognize the rapidly growing population of Japan and the absolute necessity for more territories for their existence. ("Peace and War" - page 29).

d) Mr. Hull expressed his conviction in his address on November 1, 1938 that without economic security and well being there could be no social or political stability in national life and that without economic, social and political stability within nations, there could be no peaceful and orderly relations among nations.

It is stated in "Peace and War" that Mr. Grew reported a comprehensive appraisal of the situation in Japan in his dispatch of December 27, 1934 in which he said that:

"A comprehensive appraisal of the situation in Japan was sent to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Grew in a dispatch of December 27, 1934. The Ambassador reported that things were being constantly said and written in Japan to the effect that Japan's destiny was to subjugate and rule the world. He said that the aim of certain elements in the Army and Navy, the patriotic societies, and the intense nationalists throughout the country was "to obtain trade control and eventually predominant political influence in China, the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, Siam and the Dutch East Indies, the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in Korea and Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and then continuing as soon as the intervening obstacles can be overcome by diplomacy or force."

The conditions in Japan were so complicated indeed at that time that it was sometimes very difficult to conjecture the real

intention of the military and naval circles or the right wing elements. Sometimes it might be rather easier for foreign observers to grasp the real state of affairs when the Japanese civil officials themselves who had been left out as a rule in the cold. However, I myself conceived at that time that those elements were mainly concentrating their energies upon consolidation of our footsteps in Manchuria. There were some elements which advocated the Southward Expansion policy but I thought they were not so strong and significant as the Northward Expansionists. However, insignificant as they were, we endeavored to suppress such movement.

It was our policy to encourage the healthy development of the new state of Manchukuo. It was a tremendous task to do so. Our both hands would be so full of work for it that no more energy would be left for any other task. Moreover, we did not like to pick up another difficulty with other powers. However, as regards Manchuria, we thought the United States and Great Britain would not fight with us on it. There might be conflict with the U.S.S.R. but she would not fight with us on it, particularly now that she had disposed of the Chinese Eastern Railway. On the contrary, the Southward Expansion would cause trouble with Great Britain and the United States. We were afraid such clash of interests as that might lead to war among those powers. We had to maintain peace in East Asia at any cost. Therefore, we thought that the Southward Expansion should be thwarted. Therefore we fought against the Southward movement. On the other hand, it would be good policy to restrain the military orientation to the already established direction and the narrowest sphere if its activities could not be checked. The military clique was, as it were, like a spoiled child; we had to give him always some toy to play with. The Manchurian Affair was found to be the best toy for them. This was what we thought at that time.

It did not mean domination of China nor did it reflect a policy of world supremacy, on the contrary, it aimed to check the dangerous movement to the South and other directions.

It is not to be overlooked in this connection that there were some pamphleteers published in the U.S.S.R. Urging an alliance of the two Soviet Empires of Russia and China (The Sinchin Government) and furiously raging over the advent of Manchukuo because it shattered a link for the projected alliance. There was another factor which we had taken into consideration in connection with my statement. We had really apprehension of our military men going too far into Chinese affairs to retreat. We thought we must have had our hands off China. We, foreign office officials, had been endeavoring tacitly and tediously to achieve that purpose. One of the reasons why we advocated the so-called "Hands-Off Policy" was to lead our military clique to retreat from its intervention in Chinese affairs. Our claim to foreign powers to "Hands-Off China" would, of course, reflect eventually to us in the same way.. "Our Hands-Off China". We have lately succeeded in crystalizing it

into a "New Policy to China" in recent years. At that time there was a strong movement for renouncement of the Nine Power Treaty but we were against it. (See later).

We thought that if the East Asian affairs were left to them, they would keep peace there. If the Chinese affairs were left to them, they would keep peace there. That was the fundamental idea underlying the statement which aimed above all at preserving peace in the Far East.

Our military power had been in ascendancy after the Manchurian Incident. The military clique began to influence more positively and sometimes dominate home politics and foreign policies. It was a very dangerous tendency. I sometimes talked intimately that my country would be ruined by the military men if this tendency went further. It was, however, always a delicate matter to us, foreign office officials, how to deal with the military circles. If we opposed them in the direct front, we must have parted with them. If we obeyed them blindly, we would have ruined our country. The best way for us was to lead them tactfully and wisely by working with them.

At the time when I was appointed Chief of the Information Bureau, the Army and Navy had established their own organization concerning information and propagation in their ministries respectively. There was the Investigation Bureau and, under, the Press Section, in the Department of War while there was the Propagation Bureau in the Department of Navy. The selected men were appointed to the posts. They had probably more money to spend than we, and their accounts were not to be submitted to audit of the Board of Audits. They had tremendous influence upon the various right wing bodies which were very active always about that time. They disseminated news freely. We very often entered into collision with them because they were suspected of having given out news on foreign affairs which was to be naturally within our jurisdiction.

The Army, as a rule, cried out the so-called Continental Policy while the Navy, advocating the so-called Oceanic Policy tried to get rid of the restriction of the Naval treaties. Both demanded increase of their budgets, emphasizing "The Crisis of 1936". One favored the northward expansion policy while the other, the southward expansion. My Bureau of Information had to steer between these two dangerous reefs of the army and navy. It was not an easy task. I had great struggles with them constantly. Only their frequent changes of the personnel at the high posts relieved me of unbearable pressure.

First of all, we (Our Bureau) had to propagate by the spirits enunciated by the Foreign Minister. We had to help the healthy development of Manchukuo. We had to clarify to the world our position and missions in East Asia, and if necessary the causes of the Manchurian affair.

On the other hand, I thought it was most important to dis-

seminate foreign news as much as possible in our press in order to educate our public. It was at this time and for this purpose that I established the press investigation room at our Bureau and planned to increase foreign news.

We grinned sometimes that we had to take more pains to deal with the military and naval bureaus than with foreign governments. But they planned at last to abolish the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office and transfer it to the Prime Minister's Office. I had fought against it but they succeeded in establishing an Information Committee under the Prime Minister in September 1937 after I left my post of Chief of the Information Bureau. Later it was developed into the Board of Information of the Cabinet directly under the Prime Minister when Mr. Matsuoka was Foreign Minister in 1940, and the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office was abolished.



Below is an explanation and translation of the Foreign Minister's Opinion on the Japanese-American Negotiation (13 October 1941) by AMAU, Eiji. The original document is in AMAU's possession.

The Foreign Office on the Japanese-American Negotiations, October 1941

In the course of the Japanese-American negotiation at the time of the Third KONOYE Cabinet, the Japanese Government received a note from the American Government at the beginning of October 1941 in reply to the note of the Japanese Government. A question then arose among the Cabinet members whether there would be any prospect of reaching an agreement with the United States. The Prime Minister held a meeting of some of his cabinet members who were directly concerned with the negotiation about the 13 of October at his residence (the so-called "Ogikubo Conference"). The Foreign Office insisted upon continuing the negotiation, observing that there was a prospect of coming to an agreement. The Foreign Minister also sent two notes to the Prime Minister, expressing his opinion on the negotiation and explaining the international relations and Japan's foreign policy at that time.

The Foreign Minister's Opinion on the Negotiation (13 October 1941) (Excerpt).

Taken into consideration the American attitude and the progress of the negotiation, there is no possibility of reaching an agreement, if Japan sticks to the proposals presented to the United States by her on September 6 and September 25 last.

I will do my best to achieve our object, without undergoing virtual alteration on the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and various policies concerning it, if the Government decides to continue the negotiation with a revised proposal and to take proper measures in internal and external affairs of Japan.

I believe that our fundamental policy, that is to say, the establishment of a New Order in East Asia should be attained only by peaceful means. Forces shall be used only for the necessity of self-defense.

1. There is no possibility to come to agreement upon our proposals already made. The United States' authorities seem to be suspicious and uneasy of our Government as to if our government is well controlled itself or if it has really an

intention to execute its policy by peaceful means. They attach therefore great importance to the question of the withdrawal and the stationing of our troops in China and French Indo-China and desire to have this point clarified most explicitly by the Japanese Government. I think the United States has no intention to come to agreement unless and until it is assured that Japan's policy is not in contradiction to the four principles (proposal by the United States) in these matters and Japan will take actual measures in order to enforce her policies, and it is confident that Japan will really keep her promise.

Therefore, there is no hope of agreement unless such suspicion on the side of the United States be cleared off, the question of the stationing of Japanese troops be clarified more explicitly and a revised and compromising proposal be made.

2. I have hope of coming to an agreement if the following plans are formed and the execution of them is firmly assured on the question of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and various policies connected with it as well as the internal and external affairs in Japan.

- (a) The reinforcement of the Japanese troops in French Indo-China should be suspended.

All kinds of such action as may cause suspicion of Japan's territorial ambition in French Indo-China or if her intention of forceful advance to the adjoining districts of French Indo-China should be avoided.

- (b) As regards the question of the withdrawal and the stationing of Japanese troops in China, the United States thinks that (i) in the Japanese proposal, the question of the withdrawal of troops is confused with that of the stationing of troops and no definite limit of time of the withdrawal is mentioned, (ii) the insertion of the item of stationing of troops in peace conditions is in contradiction to the ideas of the withdrawal of troops and the peace agreement itself and also it is not in agreement with the four principles, (iii) the indefinite stationing of troops under whatever reasons can not be recognized, etc.

Therefore, our proposal shall be revised in the following way on these matters while the question of the stationing of

troops be stricken out of the peace conditions and the American understanding be procured by means of exchanging the confidential notes or of recording in the protocol.

All Japanese troops in China shall be withdrawn in accordance with the items of the Sino-Japanese Agreement which shall be concluded between these two countries.

The withdrawal shall commence soon after the peace is restored between these two countries and be completed within two years at the latest in accordance with the agreement.

A part of the troops shall be stationed in certain parts of North China and Inner Mongolia for five years after the peace is restored, in order to cooperate with Chinese troops for maintenance of order and for reconstruction of China, in accordance with the protocol which shall be concluded between Japan and China at the same time with the restoration of peace. The period of the stationing may be prolonged at the expiration of the time upon agreement of the two parties and consideration of the situation at that time.

(c) As regards the Japanese troops in French Indo-China, the United States seems to harbor suspicion of Japan having intention of using French Indo-China as her base to advance her forces to the neighboring districts or having territorial ambition in French Indo-China.

Therefore the following draft shall be proposed for agreement.

"Japan assures to respect the sovereignty of French Indo-China.

"The Japanese troops stationed in French Indo-China shall be withdrawn as soon as the conditions which necessitate the just defense cease to exist. The withdrawal shall be completed not later than the China Incident is solved."

Japan shall be ready to revise the items concerning the stationing of Japanese troops in French Indo-China in the Agreement between Japan and French Indo-China in agreement with the parties concerned as soon as an agreement is reached between the United States and Japan on these matters.

(d) The action and speeches of the Japanese people in Japan shall be led and controlled not to be in contradiction to the Governmental policies or not to give bad effects upon

the negotiation.

3. The National policy of Japan shall be executed only by peaceful means. The solution by forceful measures shall be avoided.

It is contrary to the fundamental foreign policy of Japan to use forceful means in order to execute our national policies. Moreover if we take into consideration, the internal conditions of Japan, the progress of the China Incident, and the prospect of the European war, it is absolutely impossible and unwise to attain our object by use of forceful measures. It should be our fundamental policy and our mission that we should do our best to adjust our relations with the United States first of all, solve the China Incident, then settle definitely the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and maintain the security on the Pacific districts. The forces should be used only for the purpose of self-defense.

Below is a translation of a document prepared by AMAU Eiji on Views on International Situation and Japan's Foreign Policy. The Original document is in AMAU's possession.

Views on International Situation
and Japan's Foreign Policy.

Attached to the Foreign Minister's views on the Japanese-American Negotiation presented to Prime Minister Prince KONOYE on 13 October 1941, prepared by the Foreign Office (By AMAU Eiji, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Third KONOYE Cabinet, from August to October 1941).

1. It is Japan's immutable policies to finish successfully the China Incident and establish a Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and to carry out these policies on its own initiative and not to permit interference by other powers. However, it is absolutely impossible to carry these policies to a successful completion, if we disregard the complicated international situation. There are indeed inseparable relations between our policies and the European War and the international situation arising therefrom.

2. The present war had occurred at first between England and France on one side and Germany and Italy on the other, but it was extended to the Balkan States while the U.S.S.R. was involved. The United States did not declare war but she is helping England with her whole strength and exercising in reality her belligerent rights.

It was presupposed that the U.S.S.R. would join the Tripartite Alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy when it was concluded, but she entered the Anglo-American block. Thus the combination of England, the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the Chiang Regime was formed while the encirclement of England, the United States, the Netherlands and the Chiang Regime against Japan was more and more strengthened.

3. The burning point of the actual situation is principally the Russo-German War. If Germany fails, it will really give fatal blow upon the morale of her people as well as upon her occupied territories and, consequently, upon her war with England. If she succeeds to occupy Moscow before this winter, she will probably try to make a peace proposal to the U.S.S.R. and if it is not accepted by the U.S.S.R. she will perhaps try to have a decisive battle with England, while she will hold the eastern front by force, by proceeding towards the South Russia or the East Asia. However, judging the present conditions of England, she will certainly continue more and more strong resistance to Germany with the

American assistance and consequently the war will probably be prolonged. And the longer the war lasts the more unfavorable will it be to Germany and Italy. We may well be apprehensive of the prospect of the war.

4. The solution of the China Incident and the establishment of a Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere are relevant to each other. Now we have been engaged in war already for four years with China during which we have exhausted various means to finish the incident, but there is still not the slightest sign of the collapse of the Chiang Regime. It has often been reported of the internal unrest or shaking within the Chungking regime, but it will continue its resistance to Japan, relying upon the United States and England. We stand, therefore at a cross road, at present, of whether we will try to wipe out the Chungking regime solely depending upon our force or we will try to sever the American and British assistance to it by our diplomatic means. We are now meeting with more and more difficulty on account of the economic blockade and the pressure of the encirclement forced by the United States, the British Empire and the Netherlands, etc. We should consider carefully, therefore, whether it is advantageous or not to enforce our policies by the use of our military and naval powers.

If Japan puts in motion southwards, we shall meet in collision with the encirclement camp of the United States, the British Empire and the Netherlands with which the U.S.S.R. and the Chiang Regime may rise in cooperation therefore we must be singlehandedly engaged in a war on the four fronts. Germany and Italy may move to render assistance to us in accordance with the terms of the Tripartite Alliance, but it is impossible for them to help us in any way under the present circumstances. Even if it is assumed, though it is hardly thinkable, that the U.S.S.R. will collapse, it may be extremely difficult for the German and Italian armies to move as far as the Russian territories in the Far East while their navies are not powerful enough to give any assistance to us. Only it may be impossible for the German army to hold in check the Russian Far Eastern army by giving pressure at its rear in Europe, but much can not be expected for it. Therefore, we can not expect any assistance but the moral one from them.

On the contrary, the United States will render assistance to the U.S.S.R. and at the same time move toward Japan by using of Siberia as the bases, of its attack. In China, the Chiang Regime will strengthen its resistance to us while we must even have an eye to the attitude of the Wan Chin Wei

Government of Nanking.

If a war breaks out between Japan and the United States, the United States will concentrate her whole strength and power on the Pacific, lessening her assistance to England and on the Atlantic and consequently it may bring advantageous effects upon the German strategies operation to attack England. But it is hardly possible for Germany to invade England. On the contrary, we can not overlook a presumption that a chance of restoring a peace between England and Germany may be accelerated by Japan's participation in the War. At any rate the United States will not hasten to have a decisive battle with Japan but she will take a strategy to prolong the war by strengthening the encirclement camp against Japan.

If the war ceases in Europe or a compromise is made between England and Germany while we are still at war with the United States and other powers, Japan must stand at the most difficult situation, facing singly with so many enemy powers. If Japan moves northward, the enemies may move from the south. If we move southward, there may be agitation of the enemy in the north. We cannot but expect to meet with the worst and the most difficult situation, if we try to execute our national policies by force.

It is well known that the officers and men of our army and navy are of matchless loyalty and valour while our people are faithful and courageous and their ardent feeling of patriotism can well endure a prolonged war. However, having constant endeavors for the war for a number of years already, they require sometimes some rest and their national resources should be fostered. More so, if we anticipate the change of international situation in the near future which may require still more national exertion of our country. Now is the time that we should think carefully and sincerely of a far-sighted policy of our state.

5. We are now in danger of withering away our economic resources on account of the economic blockade instituted by the United States and Great Britain against Japan by which the routes for obtaining raw materials have been cut off. If we drag on ourselves procrastinatingly, it is feared that we may be obliged to die meaninglessly. Therefore, there have been voices raised that instead of sitting and expiring, we should fight and seek a way out from the road to death.

However, we must see that since there are few natural resources in the north, we can not obtain resources by advancing northwards. There are resources in the south but if we

try to seize them by force then the equipment for exploiting these resources will be destroyed before we capture them and it will take considerable time and effort for their recovery. Furthermore, when we take into consideration the exploitation and transportation of these resources, we find that there are many difficulties to use these materials.

On the other side, if we go into a long fight without replenishing our resources, our national resources will be so exhausted and our national will be so fatigued that when the European war is ended and peace comes, our country will not have the prestige and power to have a voice in the decision of international relations.

Just now our country is using up our stored supplies without imports of materials but we should not overlook a fact that other powers are also consuming more acceleratively their resources as they are all engaged either in war or in semi-war. What is most important for our country at this juncture is to conserve its national strength at any cost so that it may be able to wield its power most effectively at the time of emergency.

6. Under such circumstances as stated above, it is extremely dangerous for our country to take arms and use up our national strength and to stake our country's destiny upon the outcome of the European War. Our country should restrain itself for a while and should foster the real and powerful strength of our nation in the Far East. At this moment, Japan should seek the recognition of Manchukuo by China through the American-Japanese negotiations and thus strengthen Manchukuo's position and the China Incident should also be solved so that Japan's stand in China may be strengthened. In case she has still any surplus power, then she may extend it to French Indo-China so that a base will be laid for the carrying out of Japan's southern policy at a later date. This will be our wisest policy.



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
SUBJECT: Recommended Reduction Repatriation Passenger List

TO : AG of S, G-2, Eighth Army, APO 343

1. During the staff visit of Maj Christberg, ATIS, to MAIZURU on 9 - 11 June 1947, the officer commanding repatriation at that port recommended that "the number of repatriates per ship be reduced to not more than two thousand five hundred (2,500) for health reasons and in view of approaching hot weather," adding that such a reduction would permit the interrogation of a larger proportion of repatriates.

2. In this connection, request that the commanding officer, MAIZURU Repatriation Port, be informed that his recommendations have been brought to the attention of G-3 Repatriation, GHQ, SCAF, FEC. G-3 Repatriation states that the problem of reducing the number of passengers per vessel is under advisement, that the Public Health and Welfare Section is cognizant of conditions, but that limited shipping and turn-around requirements make it impossible, at present time, to fix any maximum load for repatriation vessels.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:



E. H. P. SVENSSON
Colonel GSC
Director, WDI Div



G-2 ADMIN
EHFS/bzw

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
SUBJECT: Recommended Reduction Repatriation Passenger List

TO : AS of S, G-2, Eighth Army, APO SF

1. During the staff visit of Maj Oberberger, AFM, to HAINAN on 7-11 June 1947, the officer commanding repatriation at that port recommended that "the number of repatriates per ship be reduced to not more than two thousand five hundred (2,500) for health reasons and in view of approaching hot weather," adding that such a reduction would permit the investigation of a larger proportion of repatriates.

2. In this connection, request that the commanding officer, HAINAN Repatriation Port, be informed that his recommendations have been brought to the attention of G-2 Repatriation, GPO, SMC, G-2 Repatriation states that the problem of reducing the number of passengers per vessel is under advisement, that the Public Health and Welfare Section is cognizant of conditions, but that limited shipping and four-round requirements make it impossible, at present time, to fix any maximum load for repatriation vessels.

For the AS of S, G-2, Eighth Army, APO SF



W. H. V. BARRISON
Colonel, GPO
Director, WDLR



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Tab
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YOKOYAMA Yui, Internee in Sugano Prison

G-2

Legal Section
(Attn: Invest. Div.
Lt. Col. R. E. Rudisill)

20 JUN 1947

CIS/OD:TPD/mc

Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.
Mr. E. P. Monaghan)

1. Primary motive for arrest and internment of YOKOYAMA Yui was the accusation from many quarters that this nebulous figure, on whom little if any official information is available, was operating on Occupation personnel in much the same manner in which he had worked upon various elements in Japanese and Axis societies before and during the war. It was thought best to curtail these activities until his activities could be investigated.
2. Curriculum vitae of YOKOYAMA Yui cannot be compiled from authentic records because no official records on the man have been found.
3. YOKOYAMA's own depositions (of which originals are held by IPS) and data received from other informants brand the man as an unscrupulous pander and peddler of information, whose egotism assumes the proportions of a mental aberration.
4. Evaluation of YOKOYAMA at the time of his arrest in December, 1945 (TAB A), was based on reports indicating that he was important in the KOKURYU KAI (Black Dragon Society) and the GENYOSHIA (Black Ocean Society) and that he had been an informer for the Nazis, the Russians and the Japanese Military Police (KEMPEI).
5. Essays written by YOKOYAMA and presented to IPS give a pretty clear idea of the man's despicable character, consist of:-
 - a. "GENYOSHIA" (TAB B)
 - b. "Political Income" (TAB C)
 - c. "YOKOYAMA Yui" (TAB D)
 - d. "Relations with the Kempei Tai (TAB E)
 - e. "KIHARA Fusanosuke in 1931" (TAB F)
 - f. "The Political Activities of KIHARA Fusanosuke from 1932 to 1936" (TAB G)
 - g. "The TANAKA Cabinet---TOKONAMI's New Party---YOKOYAMA's trip to Nanking" (TAB H)
 - h. "UGAKI Issei in 1931" (TAB I)
 - i. "March Incident---May 15th Incident and other terrorism--- Lt. Gen. MUTO Akira---Brutalism of the Kempei Tai---

G-2 File Copy
JHK/AG:TPD/mc

RSPB

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YOKOYAMA Yui, Internee in Sugano Prison

G-2

Legal Section

20 JUN 1947

(Attn: Invest. Div.)

CIS/OD:TPD/ms

Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.)

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cont'd

Bureaucrats of the Home Ministry" (TAB J)

- j. "IZAWA Takio, well-known wire-puller of politics---
TOJO's Relation with Young Officers" (TAB K)
- k. "TAISEI YOKUJAN KAI" (TAB L)

6. Data received from other sources consist of:

- a. "Petition For War Criminal Suspect by his counsellor,
OKAI Toshiro" (TAB M)
- b. "YOKOYAMA Yui" by an admiring but anonymous journalist
(TAB N)
- c. "Prison Record of YOKOYAMA Yui" (TAB O)
- d. "Interview" (by IPS) with Tanaka Saburo, YOKOYAMA's
secretary (TAB P)

7. Copies of CIC findings on YOKOYAMA are not enclosed as evidence because it is necessary to protect the sources; however, these may be said to constitute a highly uncomplimentary series of distribes on the part of people from all walks of life, accusing YOKOYAMA of all manner of petty informing operations.

8. Proof that YOKOYAMA had large funds at his disposal and used them to move "highly, widely and handsomely" in Tokyo's international circles is proved by excerpts from the Mirror Times concerning his lavish entertainments, such as (TAB Q)

9. Individuals such as KURIHARA Fusanosuke and HITOTSUMATSU Sedayoshi (present Welfare Minister) who are accused of supplying YOKOYAMA with large funds deny the connection.

10. CIS's investigation of YOKOYAMA over a period of two years has resulted in controversial gossip which emphasizes the unscrupulousness of YOKOYAMA's character but does not constitute definite evidence against him.

11. CIS believes that:-

- a. YOKOYAMA is an unbalanced megalomaniac.

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YOKOYAMA Yui, Internee in Sugamo Prison

G-2

Legal Section
(Attn: Invest. Div.)

20 JUN 1947

CIS/OD:TFD/mc

Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.)

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b. YOKOYAMA has been a thoroughly despicable political bootlicker and informer in the past and may well resume his activities.

c. YOKOYAMA is a potential although minor danger to occupational objectives because of his ability to buy the adulation of inferiors with money which he inveigles from his superiors. He may well apply his blandishments to credulous occupational personnel.

d. But evidence to date is not such as would place YOKOYAMA in any category of individuals triable in occupational courts.

12. G-2 recommends that YOKOYAMA be released without preference of charges, but under advice to GIC (through G-2 and CIS) to watch his future activities.

- TAB A - Evaluation of YOKOYAMA Yui at time of his arrest
- TAB B - "GENYUGELA" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB C - "Political Income" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB D - "YOKOYAMA Yui" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB E - "Relations with the KESSPEI TAI" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB F - "KUHARA Fusanosuke in 1931" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB G - "The Political Activities of KUHARA Fusanosuke from 1932 to 1936" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB H - "The TANAKA Cabinet---TOKONAMI's New Party---YOKOYAMA's Trip to Nanking" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB I - "UGAKI Issei in 1931" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB J - "March Incident--etc." by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB K - "IZAWA Takio--etc." by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB L - "TAISEI YOKUSAN KAI" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB M - Petition from YOKOYAMA's legal counsel
- TAB N - Anonymous petition re: YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB O - Prison Record of YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB P - Interview with TANAKA Seizaburo
- TAB Q - Extract from Japan Times



C.A.W.

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YOKOYAMA Yui, Interview in Sugamo Prison

20 JUN 1947

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Info Copy for IIS (Asst. Invest. Div.)
Legal Section (Asst. Invest. Div.)

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
1. YOKOYAMA has been a thoroughly dependable political bootlicker and informer in the past and may resume his activities.

2. YOKOYAMA is a potential although minor danger to occupational objectives because of his ability to buy the attention of informers with money which he travels from his superiors. He may well apply his blandishments to credulous occupational personnel.

3. But evidence to date is not such as would place YOKOYAMA in any category of individuals triable in occupational courts.

12. G-2 recommends that YOKOYAMA be released without preference of charges, but under advice to GID (through G-2 and GIE) to watch his future activities.

- TAB A - Revision of YOKOYAMA Yui at time of his arrest
- TAB B - "REVISION" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB C - "Political Income" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB D - "YOKOYAMA Yui" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB E - "Relations with the KENNEDY TAB" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB F - "KIMURA's Resurrection in 1931" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB G - "The Political Activities of KIMURA's Resurrection from 1932 to 1936" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB H - "The TAMURA Cabinet--TAMURA's New Party--YOKOYAMA's Trip to Hankow" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB I - "Small Jewel in 1931" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB J - "March Incident--etc." by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB K - "KIMURA's Trip--etc." by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB L - "TAMURA YOKOYAMA Yui" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB M - "Petition from YOKOYAMA's legal counsel" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB N - "Amoyan Petition re: YOKOYAMA Yui" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB O - "Prison Record of YOKOYAMA Yui"
- TAB P - "Interview with TAMURA's Secretary" by YOKOYAMA Yui
- TAB Q - "Extract from Japan Times"



SECRET



A
SECRET**Evaluation of YOKOYAMA Yui at the time of arrest*****YOKOYAMA Yui**

Has never had any regular above-suspicion business but none-the-less moved in widely different circles before and during the war, maintaining quarters in the Imperial Hotel and entertaining lavishly Nazi and neutral diplomats. He acted at one time as publicity agent for Manchurian Heavy Industries Co. Ltd., later in the same capacity for Fusanosuke KUHARA. At another time he had "headquarters" in the Sanno Hotel, frequented by the notorious Seigo NAKANO (late leader of the fascist TOHOKAI). He apparently had close contact with the Black Dragon Society, as he was the man who in 1941 arranged a meeting with Mitsuru TOYAMA for visiting Chilean diplomats. Close relationship with the German Nazi group and with the KEMPEI is indicated by the fact that he was frequently seen with such people as HANDKE, KINDERMANN, MEISINGER and men known to be connected with the Military Police. He had some sort of connection with the SCORGE Spy Case as he is known to have requested a special interview with MEISINGER on the subject.

YOKOYAMA should be apprehended because of his close relationship with the Kempei Tai suggesting that he might be an agent; and because of his associations with the ultra-nationalists and Nazis."

Arrested 15 January 1946, Sugamo Prison

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority

795006

EEC

NARA Date

11/8/11

B

Re. GENYOSHA.

By: YOKOYAMA, Yui.

The original transcript, the original Japanese statement and the original translation of this document will be found in the I.P.S. Exhibit File.

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Re. GENYOSHA

Written by YOKOYAMA, Yui on 24 February, 1946.
Translated By: Mosaburo KOBAYASHI.
Checked By: M. SADAYASU.

It was because I was born in FUKUOKA that I joined at the age of 13, the "Genyosha" which was found in 1870 by Mr. TOYAMA and his associates. The name "Genyosha" was derived from the "Genkai-Nada", which is a sea lying to the north of FUKUOKA.

What then was the purpose of its establishment? As this organization has a long history, people have various opinions and interpretations in regard to it, but I want to state my own interpretation, both historical as well as theoretical, on the basis of what I have learned through my long years' contact with Mr. TOYAMA.

The Meiji Restoration, which restored the Emperor's direct and personal rule in place of the Tokugawa Shogunate, was accomplished by such powerful clans as Satsuma, Nagato, Tosa, Hizen and Higo, which held the leadership. My native clan of Chikuzen failed to rise and take part in this great event of the Meiji Restoration, although it was bordered by Satsuma, Hizen and Higo clans on the same island of Kyushu. It was because there was no capable warrior with the ability to foresee the times around the lord of the clan. It was Mr. TOYAMA and his associates who rose up in indignation at this miserable state of a dishonorable straggler.

When the Meiji Restoration was accomplished in 1868, Mr. TOYAMA was a lad of only 13. He was only 16 years of age when he organized the Genyosha. As was common with the loyalists of his time, he was a very precocious lad, but it was quite natural that he, a lad of 13, could not participate in the epoch-making event of the Meiji Restoration. He being very young then, could not fulfill his desires, but it was greatly deplorable for the sake of the honor and credit of his native prefecture that his senior clansmen were idle and incompetent and simply looked on at this great task of developing the country. It is my interpretation and conviction that the true motive of the Genyosha was to clear this disgrace by striving hard to promote patriotic enterprises befitting the new era.

What then did Mr. TOYAMA and his associates do in the early stages of the Genyosha in the way of pushing through the construction of the new state in accordance with the Genyosha spirit?

The biggest internal event in the early part of Meiji which shook the foundation of the Empire, was the civil war of 1877, that broke out as the result of Takamori SAIGO's so-called "Korea must be conquered" argument and his subsequent resignation as senior state councillor. Mr. TOYAMA was 18 years of age when SAIGO resigned in 1872.

It was at the beginning of September 1899, that I, a lad of 17, visited Tokyo for the first time and paid my respects to Mr. TOYAMA at his residence two or three days later. On that occasion, as was usual with youths full of vitality, I indulged in big talks concerning national politics and world affairs.

When the topic touched on SAIGO and I referred to his "Korea must be conquered" argument, Mr. TOYAMA, who until then held his tongue as usual, asked me, "YOKOYAMA, what did you mean by the 'Korea must be conquered' argument?" In accordance with the common historical notion, I replied lightly, "I mean Mr. SAIGO's argument for conquering Korea". Mr. TOYAMA staring me in the face and straining somewhat his usual calm voice, said "What Mr. SAIGO advocated was not the conquest of Korea, but friendship with Korea."

Astonished at his abrupt unconventional theory, I retorted laughing "But all historians call it the Argument for conquering Korea. What do you mean by 'Friendship with Korea'?"

Thereupon Mr. TOYAMA, raising his voice higher, said "It means not the conquest of Korea but to become friendly with Korea. Mr. SAIGO insisted on visiting Korea all alone without formality in the popular attire of komono. How could he wage war against Korea in such a manner? Mr. SAIGO's continental policy was based on Mencius' Creed that "There's nothing insusceptible to Sincerety". If we associate with sincerety, we can become brothers with Korea, and with China, too. If Japan Korea and China become brothers, peace in the Orient can be secure. Do you now understand what I mean?" He then kept gazing at me for a long time.

I felt as if my nervous system had been electrified, and as if my soul had been clutched by an eagle and benumbed. I took my leave, repeating his pro-Korean policy in my heart all the way home.

It was this Pro-Korean and Pro-Chinese policy, which was deeply imprinted in my youthful and highly susceptible heart and soul, that constituted the life blood of the political and diplomatic activities to which I have devoted myself with all my energy through the past forty odd years.

Further, the subsequent chronological and politico-geographical knowledge which I gained from my studies in Europe and America was nothing but the scientific interpretation and supplementation of Mr. TOYAMA's aforementioned precept.

Acting upon the above-mentioned creed and policy, I sponsored the organization of a new political party with Mr. TOKONAMI as its head in August 1928. Mr. TOKONAMI was the most popular figure in political circles at that time, and I also succeeded in settling within a day the Shantung expedition problem and the consequent CHIANG-KAI-SHEK Government's boycott, for which the TANAKA Cabinet had spent six months without any prospects of success in sight. This experience of mine brought home to me the hopeless incompetency of the Japanese Foreign Ministry as well as the tragic character of the Japanese militaristic diplomatic policy. My subsequent diplomatic ~~views~~ views and policy always tended to disagree with those of the authorities, especially so during the recent war, with the result that they even held me in custody for about seven months from January to August of last year. The Manchurian Incident occurred two years and eight months after my return to Japan from Nanking. Soon after the outbreak of this fatal event, I made public an essay entitled "Where Are the Japanese Going To?" wherein I emphasized that the Manchurian Incident would develop into a Sino-Japanese War and then finally into a World War.

My prediction came true. What then was my view on the war? In March of last year when I was being detained, I predicted openly that Japan's capitulation would occur in August. One of the authorities who had known this prediction of mine, sent me a letter after my acquittal, expressing his profound respect for my far-sightedness. The letter is still in my possession.

What then was the ground of my prediction of defeat? Prince HIGASHIKUNI, in his speech as Premier at the 1st special Diet session, pointed out three reasons for Japan's defeat. They were: firstly, the failure of munitions production to increase as planned, secondly the deterioration of the people's morales as shown in the black-marketing by the Authorities openly and by the general public secretly, thirdly, the rapid decrease of fighting power toward the end of the war. In my opinion, however, these conditions were not the cause of the defeat, but merely explanations of the condition which prevailed in the course toward defeat. They are like the case chart of a consumptive in the third stage, which shows the daily temperature, such as 39 degrees yesterday, 40 degrees today, but does not explain why and how the fatal consumption was contracted.

What then was the real cause of Japan's defeat in the present war? It is simply because Japan made an enemy of America and Britain. I did not hesitate to publicize this opinion of mine before, during and even after the war. Nevertheless, I did not assume the attitude of an idle on-looker during the course of the unsuccessful war. Although I was firmly convinced, since the start of war, of utter impossibility of victory for Japan, still I believe that there was a means of not losing the war. That means was to carry into execution the diplomatic policy of my own conception.

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POLITICAL INCOME

By

YOKOYAMA, Yui.

The original transcript, the original Japanese statement and the original translation of this document will be found in the I.P.S. Exhibit File as Exhibit #414.

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26 February, 1946.

By: YOKOYAMA, Yui.

In 1914, that was during the OKUMA Cabinet, I held an important post because of my relationship with the Justice Minister OSAKI. Taking the opportunity of the general election which was held at that time, I received from Kinjiro TADA, a business man with whom I had been on intimate terms for a long time, the sum of Yen three million. Out of the three million I used two million for election expenses and other political purposes, and the remaining one million I kept for myself to be used for political purposes which I need for the next ten years or so of my political career and also for my living expenses.

Businessman Kinjiro TADA was affiliated with various sorts of enterprises and was especially keen on the rice stock market being an influential character in that world. In 1914, the price of rice was very low and a "koku" of rice was only nine yen. It was extremely difficult for the farmers to maintain their living on such price of rice and in the Hokuriku district, there occurred a rice riot caused by the farmers.

The OKUMA Cabinet decided on the policy of raising the price of rice to fourteen yen per "koku", a measure that was necessary for the actual welfare for the farmers and also to serve as an election counter-move which was announced just prior to the general election. Kinjiro TADA who was fully informed through me about this before the announcement was made, reaped huge profits ~~next~~ by utilizing his long years experience and the powerful organs that was in his control. It was for this reason that he donated to me the aforementioned Yen three million.

In 1928 during the TANAKA Cabinet when I organized the new party headed by Takejiro TOKONAMI, I received Yen five million from Gokichi MATSUMOTO who was then a secretary to Prince SAIONJI and also a member of the Peerage.


Of the Yen five million, I used three million in the organization of the new party and the general election and also to pay for expenses in the China trip. The remaining two million was set aside to be used for my political career and others which I have spent until today.

My friendship with Gokichi MATSUMOTO began in the latter part of the Meiji period and our close friendship has been kept up in our public and private life.

After the close of the special Diet which occurred just after the general election, he (MATSUMOTO) visited me as the messenger of Premier TANAKA. In reply I called upon the Premier at his Official residence and arranged the plan to establish the new party headed by TOKONAMI.

The following day MATSUMOTO called upon me again and we went over the details together, regarding the organization of the new party, and it was at that time that MATSUMOTO promised to supply all the necessary funds and would be given to me directly. Since I found it necessary to know exactly the source

of those funds from the standpoint of TOKONAMI, I asked about this to MATSUMOTO in which he replied that the funds, of course, will not be supplied by the government but from a wealthy Taiwanese by the name of Ling whom MATSUMOTO is on very intimate terms. After several months I was introduced to the manager of the Ling Household, which I in return introduced this manager to TOKONAMI.



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YOKOYAMA YUI.

The original transcript, the original Japanese statement and the original notes of the translator will be found in I.P.S. Exhibit File as Exhibit No. 598.

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YOKOYAMA YUI.

Written by YOKOYAMA, Yui on March 6th, 1946.
Translated By: Soma, KAZUMASA.

I got through with the political circles for reasons of my own in the 7th year of Showa (1932) just after the Manchurian Affair, and in summer of the same year, in the beginning of August I left Tokyo to live in retirement at my present residence at the seashore of CHIGASAKI.

To do so, there were three reasons:

The first was the rampancy of terrorism like the May 15th Incident and the February 26th Incident, etc., which occurred successively, making the 6th year of Showa (1931) as center. The second, the Manchurian Affair, which broke out on September 18th, and the third, the breach of trust case, instituted against me for the reason that I had got a bill of KUHARA Fusanosuke discounted at the MEIJI Bank.

Among those the second, the Manchurian Affair, agotated my mental attitude.

As substantially stated in another note, I went to NANKING two years and eight months before this Affair, i.e., in the middle of December of the 3rd year of Showa (1928), to negotiate and settle both problems of the SHANTUNG Expedition and the boycott of Japanese goods, when the most important and practical opinion was expressed by the head, CHIANG KAI-SHEK and the Foreign Minister, WANG CHENG-TING, in connection with the Japanese policy towards Manchuria. We agreed with their opinion with our whole heart and declared that the Japanese government had no intention to make the military intervention to Manchuria, as they desired it, and we would do our best to ensure that such a thing should not occur. But, that the Manchurian Affair occurred only after two years and eight months! At that time I felt all my nerve go numb. It occurred to me to commit suicide without hesitation leaving my testament in which my conviction had been described boldly and fearlessly. After a while I restored the presence of my mind somewhat, when the fear flashed in my brain like an electric light that this was not only my personal problem of default against the brains of the NANKING Government, but would become the course for a more serious event between 5th countries and if war would occur between Japan and China, it would become an evil course for the world war. And this intuition made me give up the suicide which was apt to become an immediate self-satisfaction. But I could not contain my anxiety and later published a discourse, "Where Do The Japanese Go?" The outline of its contents is that the Manchurian Affair will occasion the Sino-Japanese Affair, and the Sino-Japanese war, the world war.

About the same time as this discourse, I published another discourse under the title, "Daily Life Gathered Up", in which I related the real state of the political state at that time, which caused me to live in retirement at CHIGASAKI, and my mental attitude of exclusively engaging in the literary work as my task after retiring from the political circles. My life in CHIGASAKI lasted for more than five years since that time, but I was not in want of my living expense during the period, as there was the remainder of more than one million yen from the money which was received from MATSUMOTO Goichi, in the 3rd year of Showa (1928).

But as I had foretold, the Manchurian Affair caused expectantly the Sino-Japanese Affair. In July of the 12th year of Showa (1937), the war broke out between Japan and China with the so-called LUKOUCHIAO Incident as its fuze. This was the point of the fundamental destruction of the Japan-China friendship policy, which had been hammered into my mind by the old Mr. TOYAMA when I came up to Tokyo in summer of the 32nd year of Meiji (1899). Having been driven by the fiery shock, I threw off retirement life as well as my literary work and came back in activities of the political circles.

I came to know HOTOTSUMATSU Masaji, in my native place FUKUOKA, about the 5th year of Showa (1930). He was born in KYUSHU as I, and had been in America. He understood diplomacy and politics well for a business man. M.D. HOTOTSUMATSU Mitoshi, his cousin, who graduated the KYUSHU Medical University at FUKUOKA, is my most reliable doctor. They both were enthusiastic students of GIDAIYU (T.N. - One of the classical musics of Japan) and appearing always on the stage of the private performances of GIDAIYU, held under my auspices, they cooperated in the execution of my cultural enterprise. As a man of such character and taste, HITOTSUMATSU, Masaji understood me well and gave in compliance with my wishes, the necessary expenses for my political activities. I do not remember exactly now but the first time was about the 14th year of Showa (1939), I suppose. At first the amount was about 1,000 Yen or 2,000 Yen a month, but later it gradually increased and in the 19th year of Showa (1944) it came up at times to 20,000/30,000 Yen a month, I suppose.

I think I received from him about 500,000 Yen or 600,000 Yen during five or six years from the 14th year of Showa (1939) to the 19th (1944).

In this connection there is an important matter which I must state here without fail. For about seven months from January 16th last year (1945) to August 21, I was detained at the Foreign Affairs Section of the Special Service Department of the Metropolitan Police Board.

I will describe about the exact circumstances during the time separately, but HITOTSUMATSU too was similarly detained for about one month from the middle ten days of March on account of his relation to me. About our money transaction he prepared a precise calculation on the basis of a copy which he had at hand and submitted it to the official in charge. As it was shown me by the police inspector KUROYANAGI, Jisaku, official in charge, I recognized it as it was. I do not remember now the exact amount but I think the total amount of the money, contributed to me by HITOTSUMATSU for five or six years, was 500,000 or 600,000 yen, according to his calculation. Of course, I myself had not a copy, but my estimate too was nearly so much. Like a true business man that he was, he stated in this calculation not only amounts of expenditure, but also dates of expenditure very clearly. The official in charge of examination at that time was the above-mentioned police inspector KUROYANAGI, and the chief in charge was the police inspector NAKANO. They both were under the instruction of the prosecutor OMORI, Takahira of the Prosecution Bureau of the Tokyo Local Court and the right of the final decision was in the hands of the prosecutor AMORI. I was released by the prosecutor OMORI on August 21 for the reason that there was no necessity for detaining. According to the calculation of the amounts of money, contributed to me by the above-mentioned HITOTSUMATSU, was removed to the hands of the prosecutor AMORI, together with all other protocols and is kept there, I believe. Truly, I witnessed at that time KUROYANAGI and other policemen carry those documents to the Prosecution Bureau. My contact with HITOTSUMATSU came to an end in the first 10 days of January of last year on account of the Metropolitan Police Board's Affair, and I have had no communication with him since that time. Our money relations too came to an end by that time. As stated at the beginning of this note, I lived in retirement at CHIGASAKI for about six years from the 7th year of Showa (1932) to about the 13th year of Showa (1938), and after I came back to the political circles, HITOTSUMATSU Masaji was the only man with whom I had money relations. Accordingly, my income during the time from the 12th year of Showa (1937) to the 20th year of Showa (1945) was only of the above-mentioned amount I received from HITOTSUMATSU. My expenditure during the said term, exceeding the above-mentioned amount was spent from my money, held since the 3rd year of Showa (1928).

What was the amount of expenditure during these eight years? I think it will be recognized as very natural that I do not know the exact figure of it. I have no choice but to indicate the amount of expenditure by a very rough calculation, recollecting my political activities or living state during the term, or considering after adding the income amounts. But as in the early years of about 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941 the amount of my monthly expenditure was small and besides it is long ago, it is now impossible to indicate the amount of expenditure at that time in figures even if it is rough.

But the only example of a comparatively large expenditure was that I invited the diplomatic corps and other influential foreigners in Tokyo to the Industrial Hall at MARUNOUCHI in the evening of December 9, 1941, to show them the Japanese classical dances, which were produced by me, and at the same time served them dinner. Of course, I do not remember exactly, but the expense of that evening would have probably amounted to about 5,000 yen.

After that I often invited the foreign Ambassadors and Ministers as well as their staffs in Tokyo during the Greater East Asia War to the KABUKI (T.N.- KABUKI is a Japanese Classical drama). The Japanese theaters for KABUKI performance traditionally the same drama throughout almost one month and change the play to be performed every month. Therefore my invitation to the diplomatic corps was made every month and when the diplomats of different countries were invited separately I invited them sometimes three times a month to the same theater. Besides I consulted with theater managers and famous actors to perform a specially interesting drama once every year and invited all diplomatic corps in Tokyo together. The invitation of the diplomatic corps to KABUKI appreciation needed a considerable amount since 1941, as almost every time meals were served. It is sure that this ranked first among my social expenses (fund for cultural policy as I mean).

The next is the expense for my office at the Imperial Hotel. I had seven or eight permanent secretaries and part-time secretaries in all. Their salaries and allowances at that time were about 1,500 yen in total every month. As they were always provided with dinner and for their over work in the afternoon with supper, such kind of expenditure of my office increased gradually with a rapid development of the war and shortage of food. Furthermore, as my office was at the Imperial Hotel, I used to serve dinner or supper to visitors from my habit. Accordingly, the expense of my office, including payments to the Hotel, reached to a considerable amount every month. In 1944 when the war approached to the end, the expense of my office amounted sometimes to about 15,000-20,000 yen at the highest I think. My office at the Imperial Hotel was closed after the middle of January 1945, on account of the Metropolitan Police Board's affair. Besides, as I often invited my guests to Japanese restaurants, its costs amounted sometimes to more than 3,000 in a month. Furthermore, I assisted many people in circles of politics, culture and art, so those expenses if summed up would amount to 30,000 yen every month in 1944, at the highest and at the lowest 15,000-20,000 yen, I think. Of course, in these amounts the living expense of my family was included. I suppose it was about 2,000 or 3,000 yen a month in 1944.

As already mentioned, I was detained at the Metropolitan Police Board from January 18 to August 21 in 1945. In the meantime the war came to an end and the circumstances of the world changed. Inevitably I retired from the active state of the real politics, so much expenditures as those until the end of 1944 were no more necessary. Since I returned home on August 21 last year, I have been confined indoors at home, severing all connections with the outer world, and have spent my time with the mental attitude such as "What will all vast creatures do with me?"

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RELATIONS WITH THE KEMPEI-TAI.

By: YOKOYAMA, YUI.

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RELATIONS WITH THE KEMPBI-TAI.

Written by YOKOYAMA, YUI on March 10, 1946.

Translated By: Kentaro MURAKAMI

I am not sure about the exact date, but I think it was just before the War of Greater East Asia (1940), that through the introduction of a baron's son, Tomokiyo IWAKURA, whom I had employed as interpreter in French, a Gendarmerie officer named Masakichi SOH (then a sergeant-major, later a lieutenant) of the Tokyo Gendarmerie began to call on me frequently. As he was from my native place, FUKUOKA Prefecture, he had already known about me. Being in service with the Foreign Affairs Division of the Tokyo Gendarmerie, he was interested in my knowledge concerning international affairs, particularly in connection with my intercourses among the diplomatic corps in Tokyo, and he used to listen to my various talks. My relation with him, however, was chiefly because we were from the same prefecture. His birthplace being quite near to mine, we unconsciously found ourselves on intimate terms, similar to that existing between a "boss and his protege", a peculiar inclination among the Japanese, especially the people of Kyushu.

He began to call me "SENSEI" (a Japanese term of respect) while I called him SOH without title. Moved by this emotion of "a senior and a junior" from the same prefecture, he became friendly with my family and often called at my house, accompanied by his wife and children. Thus our intercourse went on developing. I believe I am not being self-conceited to say that I was to him the most respected man in Japan.

One day SOH came to see me accompanied by Major Shoichi NOMURA, chief of his division, and asked me to meet him. NOMURA hailing from YAMAGUCHI Prefecture where the Chushu clan together with the Satsuma clan played the most active part in the great task of the MEIJI RESTORATION, seemed to have made a lot of researches in the spirits and deeds of his ancestor patriots of the Restoration. I myself being deeply devoted in the same research from boyhood, had something in common with him and much to talk about from our first meeting; and I was much interested in his character. Thereafter he held me in high respect, and introduced me to one of his senior officers, Colonel Aizo KAWAMURA, chief of the Third Section of the Gendarmerie Headquarters. Born in Tokyo the Colonel was an active man of deeds. That both he and NOMURA had the confidence and respect of their subordinates certainly is worth an admiration. KAWAMURA especially, was sociable, full of common sense and broad-minded, rather a unique existence among military men. He too held me in high respect and understanding and my relation with the Gendarmerie Headquarters was centered upon him, as it was indeed, unnecessary for me to get in touch with any higher officer.

KAWAMURA had under him a Major named Hyozo YASUNO a clever man well versed in office work, a man in whom he had much confidence and whom he would send to my office in his place.

My connection with the Gendarmerie Headquarters was concerned ~~extremely to the~~

extremely, to these three officers, Colonel KAWAMURA, Major NOMURA and Major YASUNO, with whom I had continued our mutual confidence and understanding for the during of their terms of office in Tokyo. They always respected me as their senior. They have all gone abroad to some distant land, and we have never heard of each other for a long time. There's no telling when we shall be able to see each other again, but if they are alive, I am quite sure that they will recollect me with as much, or even more respect than before. Here again, I believe, I am not being self-conceited.

NOMURA left for his new post in Java in the summer of 1943, KAWAMURA was promoted to the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie Headquarters in Manauria in April 1944, and YASUNO was despatched to Burma in October the same year.

My relation with the Gendarmerie Headquarters and the Tokyo Gendarmerie was virtually severed with their departure, moreover Lieutenant KNE SOH was despatched to Canton in about February 1943, prior to the others' departure.

First, I shall relate the most striking event which took place in my intercourse with these persons. If I remember correctly, it was toward early spring in 1942, at the end of the Malay campaign that I visited Koki HIROTA immediately after a telephone call. HIROTA explained to me his very important plan. He said "We have both been against this war from the start, but since we are in it, there's no other way than to take measures to end it as soon as possible". Here, I have a plan; and that is, to send all American prisoners of war home to their country. I believe there is quite a considerable number of PW's in our custody today. We shall first make them understand thoroughly that Japan does not want war; that there ought to be eternal peace between Japan and the United States, and that it is not impossible. Then we shall strive to urge them to make their families and friends to start with, and then the general public in the United States, thoroughly understand this true intentions of Japan on their return. As the United States is a country of public opinion, this measure of sending home all war prisoners, first of its kind in the annals of war and international law, will be certain to bring great results. Is there some able military officers who can immediately execute this plan? I request that you do your best". This was the gist of HIROTA's proposition. His explanation was full of insight and accuracy becoming to his character and experience. Listening to him, I even took his opinion as a voice of God that would save the situation of the war.

Instantly I thought Colonel KAWAMURA was the right person to talk it over. I telephoned him but as he was out, I called Major NOMURA to my office, and after explaining to him the outline of HIROTA's plan, I asked him to make it known to KAWAMURA and to take proper measures.

possible, by having our Military Attache in Bucharest negotiate directly with the Rumanian Government. Things were carried out as promptly as planned. At about five in the afternoon on the 13th, the same month, Military Attache RADOLESKO came flying into my office. They had received a telegram from their Government on that day and Minister BAGLESKO had been discharged and he himself had been appointed Charge D'Affairs. This was just the fifth day since I saw him on April 8. He related in amazed expression and said that I was a God. Therefore, as a matter of course, the Ex-Minister bore malice against the New Minister and in revenge he occupied the legation as before and would not move. The Charge d'Affairs had to dispose of all the affairs of the legation at the Military Attache's residence which was so confined and he was quite at a loss so he reported it to the Foreign Office. But the Foreign Office, could not settle the matter for more than five months. According to the ex-minister's opinion he was going to move to Peiping but he had too many things and that he would leave Japan immediately if these things would be completely transported. The Foreign Office was willing to execute this proposal but under the intense situation of the war at that time the transportation condition between Japan and the continent, was too stringent. They could do nothing about the actual military circumstances which would not allow such goods numbering 36 lots to be accepted for transportation, and they had been placed in a dilemma for nearly half a year under the pretext of both the ~~Rumanian~~ ex and new Rumanian Ministers. RADOLESKO came to me again with pathetic countenance, and I accepted his proposal at once, like I previously did and promised him that I would fix it up within three days. I talked it over with Colonel KAWAMURA immediately and ordered Major YASUNO to execute the whole matter. A smart young both mentally and physically, YANUSO constantly on the move according to my will, succeeded perfectly at last in booking a cabin on board the "16th KOSHIN MARU (?)" which was to leave Yokohama after about a week. This took only three days. On the day before ex-Roumanian Minister Major General BAGLESKO left for Peiping, we held a farewell luncheon party at the "Tokyo Kaikan". Of course, the major General BAGLESKO had never dreamed that I had taken a part in such a scheme. In his address of thanks at the meeting I still remember him saying "Monsieur YOKOYAMA is a Commander-In-Chief having no unit to command, I'd like to accept the charge of his unit".

From what I have related it seems as if I am an offender and Minister BAGLESKO a victim. I think, however, that he always respected me from his heart because when the other year he was about to be assaulted by the chauffeur due to penuniary trouble and for outrageous insulting the chauffeur, I helped him settle it on my own responsibility.

These are some of the conspicuous examples of how the Gendarmerie Headquarters gave me cooperation with Colonel KAWAMURA as leader. On the other hand, how did I give them my cooperation? What they received with great appreciation from me were pessimistic informations concerning the war situation. I was getting these informations from some of my subordinates who wer at important posts in the Army's General Staff Office or in the Navy's General

Staff Office, but KAWAMURA and his men believed that I was getting them from the foreign embassies or legations. My true motive in providing them with only pessimistic informations was because I was convinced that by giving these men who were engaged in the execution of important duties apprehension of the real situation of the war, (which was always pessimistic) it would help greatly to hasten the remedial measures of our nation. Of course, they never dreamed that I was getting these informations from the Army and Navy General Staff Officers, and naturally I would never do such a bungling as to make them perceive. They began to have more confidence and value in my informations, which were the real facts of the war situation as I gave them more and more pessimistically each day.

The second of my contributions to them was my own personal influence. While dining together at my invitations they used to listen to my opinion on politics, diplomacy, art and especially on realities of social life. Like the others they also began to hold me in respect and admiration. Always calling me "SENSEI", they were willing to be instructed.

Like any civil official just out of college these men of the Army were always found helpless before a man of my personality because of the marked difference in our faith, experience, education and social knowledge. I am definitely convinced it is not at all my self-conceit to say that my personal influence upon them was infinite.

Another thing I would like to say here is my materialistic connection with the staffs of the Gendarmerie Headquarters. Some men of the Metropolitan Police Office, Special Service Police Division (TOKKOKA) noted for their ignorance and barbarisms, once declared credulously, and later intentionally that I had been acting as an agent and spy for the Gendarmerie. But I had constantly been creditor and never a debtor in my materialistic relations with the Gendarmerie Headquarters or with the staffs of the Gendarmerie. I used to bear all materialistic charges to myself and there is not a single case when I left even a penny, to their expenses.

Who would accept a mission of spying for a government office by bearing all materialistic expenses to himself? Who could be respected as a "SENSEI" and instruct and lead them, if he should charge the expenses on the government officials who were always bothering themselves about their scanty salaries and trifling secret ~~XXXXXX~~ service funds? If there should be anyone who thinks this is possible he must be a fossil of the impractical formalism which has been monopolized for many years by the Japanese soldiers and government officials.

Such a person must be unable to understand real active politics and diplomacy; and he must have the ruinous spirit which led Japan to this disaster. Politics and diplomacy are the most realistic affairs among the realists. In the true meaning of the word, realistic would mean the coming of Spring, summer, Autumn and winter in order. In their efforts in trying to make these seasons come in reverse order, they indulge in such words as "diligence" and "effort" as their life endeavors. This is the so-called bureaucracy of Japan.

Another phase of my relations with the Gendarmerie Headquarters to which I paid preceutions attention, was my counter-plot against Premier TOHO's Gendarmerie policy. The Gendarmerie's oppression and infringement upon people's rights were far beyond expression; and it was particularly dangerous in the affairs connected with diplomatic circles. From this point of view, my cooperation with the Gendarmerie Headquarters made my position perfectly safe for a certain while. But there was a sudden change in the situation after Colonel KAWAMURA and Major YASUNO went abroad. As a reaction of their deep respect in me and our intimacy this turned to the worst. Lieutenant ONISHI, chief officer in the Special Service Division, Tokyo Gendarmerie, ordered one of his subordinates Sergeant-Major Teruo KOKUSHO to keep a watch and scout on me day and night by engaging a small room close to my office in the Imperial Hotel. They had installed a radio receiving equipment in that room and were always listening in to the conversations in my office. Sergeant Toshio SUZUKI, a graduate of Aoyama Gakuin who understood English was ordered by KOKUSHO to serve as the listener in charge of the equipment. This scheme, however, is said to have been unsuccessful because the radio equipment was not perfect.

Fascinating as it may seem, I have learned about all these inside circumstances from Toshio SUZUKI himself. Being a graduate of the Aoyama Gakuin a mission school, SUZUKI was in addition to being a naive youth greatly influenced by religion, full of philosophy and literary sense. His peculiar duty concerning ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ me naturally gave him an opportunity to study me closely; and when, gradually, he began to underatand and respect me he confessed to me all of his secrets, unable to endure the torment of his conscience and the stupidity of ~~his~~ his duty.

I was charged as a war oriminal suspect on December 3 last year. He came to see me as soon as he read the revengeful wicked propaganda article against me written in the Mainichi Shimbun the following day, by a former member of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Metropolitan Police Office. Pointing in the article where it said that I had been a spy for the Gendarmerie during the war, he swore that he would devote himself in drastically defending me by revealing the schemes and intentions of the Gendarmerie against me and settling the matter of t e duty he was once engaged in at the Imperial Hotel.

This was not all the malicious scheme against me by the Tokyo Gendarmerie. Tatsuko TATSUKE, a non-commissioned staff of the Foreign Office, Ceremony Division, was also secretly ordered by the Gendarmerie to scout on me. Being a daughter of a former diplomat she was educated in Paris and was proficient in French. She was related to Yosuke MATSUOKA, with whom she had been engaged as an interpreter when the delegates from French-Indo-China were invited to Tokyo. Masakichi SOH, my fellow-countryman was the one ordered by the Tokyo Gendarmerie to keep his eyes on the progress of the negotiations between French Indo-China's delegates and the Foreign Office. He was always getting informations of the negotiation from TATSUKE. MATSUOKA's downfall was a great blow on her circumstances. Introduced to me by a former diplomat, she began to come to my office, and since late in 1943 I had employed her for about a year as an interpreter in French. She was a widow with an adopted son-in-law married to her daughter, and as he was a wounded veteran and an unhealthy youth, her home was always gloomy. She used to complain to me about her circumstances and wanted my help.

To my peculiar nature, I would furnish her with rather excessive help both spiritually and materially, and she often called at my house and became friendly with my family. As at that time, the war situation was hard pressed and everyone's life becoming difficult, my wife used to send her food-stuffs. Such were the circumstances. Nevertheless, on being interrogated as a witness when I was detained at the Metropolitan Police Office last year, she related that she had been keeping her eyes on me under orders of a certain lieutenant in the Tokyo Gendarmerie. I read this statement in the "Record of Interrogation" shown me by Police Inspector Gissaku TAKAYANAGI.

I knew she had some relations with the Tokyo Gendarmerie ever since her connections with Masakichi SOH. She was a non-commissioned staff in the Foreign Office; she made radio broadcasts in French toward French Indo-China, and especially as she was in intimate relations with the staffs of the French Embassy it is not a wonder that she must have had some connections with the Gendarmerie. But indeed, I had never dreamed of this connection, being utilized in scouting about myself. In spite of being of fairly good decent family, I could not see in her so much of culture nor nobleness, from the beginning of our intercourse. Rather, I judged and observed her to be a woman of short-sighted and superficial personality. Being well advanced in age, and especially as she used to avow in public that I was her only boss ever since she was separated from MATSUOKA, who on earth could have imagined that she was scouting on her only boss? Was it the result of an automatic manifestation of her weak and stupid character? I imagine so. Here again, however, I can clearly recognize the peculiarity of the Japanese Gendarmerie.

In short, she must have been driven to this unwilling situation through that coercive measure peculiar to the Gendarmerie. By the installing of the radio equipment and the spying activities of Tatsuke TATSUKE, it is clear that the Tokyo Gendarmerie had planned to immediately arrest me at the least proof they could acquire. This is not merely my conjecture for I have reliable evidence to prove it. Kazuma NAKAYAMA, a "nisei" born in the United States of whom I had referred to in another note, and whom I began to love as my son, came to see me at my office with a very uneasy countenance, one afternoon in the autumn of 1944 when he was serving as secretary to the former Philippine Ambassador VARGAS.

A few days before, he had been summoned by a certain colonel (I have forgotten his name) chief of the Third Division, Gendarmerie Headquarters, and was questioned in detail about my relation with the Ex-Ambassador VARGAS. The chief, showing him a diagram of my connection in every sphere written on a large sheet of paper declared, as though he was convinced about my breach of the national law, that he could before long, "see to this matter" directly with me. Being timid from lack of experience in social affairs, NAKAYAMA stammered with a dejected air, "If something wrong should happen to "Sensei", I shall have to die". And as the chief was from his same province, Hiroshima, he wondered if there wasn't a scheme in this connection. Though deeply struck with this sentiment of my native "son" I replied laughing "Don't you worry. According to MENCIUS, "virtue disarms opposition". Leave it up to me". At this moment, I felt I had the complete and thorough understanding of the Gendarmerie Headquarters' scheme against me. Well, I was determined to "look into the matter" myself according to the development of the situation. Especially if the opponent was the chief of the Third Division of the Headquarters, nothing suited me better. As he was the successor to Colonel KAWAMURA with whom I had been most intimate, he must have known thoroughly of our relations and friendship both private and public. Furthermore, when Major Yasuno came to bid me farewell before leaving for Burma, he related precisely to me the following event. Ever since Colonel KAWAMURA had gone abroad, YASUNO had been the officer in charge of the Third Division and as he was well-versed in office routine the new chief disapproved of his leaving. So he consulted his senior officers but there had been some overseas affairs that required YASUNO and he was obliged to leave. His departure was just a few days ago and the new chief should know of our relations.

I have no intentions of judging matters from the viewpoint of humanism or sentimentalism, but will solemn moral sense ever permit them to punish me knowing of my relations with Colonel KAWAMURA and Major YASUNO or rather to punish me particularly because they knew of our relations. However, it will be the height of nonsense to make an attempt here to discuss morality toward Japanese Gendarmerie disposition.

It was the Metropolitan Police Office that held me in custody before the Gendarmerie did. Both the Gendarmerie and the Metropolitan

Police were trying to arrest me for something like infringement of the National Defense Preservation Law but were unable to find any clue. Incidentally, Seiroku SUZUKI, chief of the supply department of the Yokohama Specie Bank was put into custody for breach of the economic law at the Shiodome Police Station which is under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police Office.

In SUZUKI's statement I was found to have been buying things from him at black-market prices; and delighted at this opportunity they put me under arrest. It is true that the Metropolitan Police, meanwhile, made exhaustive inquiries to the Gendarmerie concerning my relations with them. I heard this unofficially from an officer in charge of myself at the Metropolitan Police Office. He further told me of the Gendarmerie's intentions and preparations against myself. For all that, some former members of the Foreign Affairs Section, Special Service Police Division of the Metropolitan Police Office, have furnished the press with propoganda materials that I had been engaged as a spy for the Gendarmerie during the war; and I have the intuition right now that they are still announcing some sort of lies. One can deceive a man not never God.

To venture false propoganda knowing it to be a lie not only injures the one that is being lied upon, but also commits a great sin in deieving God. The result of a great sin in deceiving God must be keenly felt from the bottom of the heart and is a point of introspection by the Military clique and the Bureaucrats who bear the most responsibility for the defeat of Japan.

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NARA Date

11/8/11



KUHARA FUSANOSUKE IN 1931.

By: YOKOYAMA, YUI.

KUHARA FUSANOSUKE - in 1931.

Written by: YOKOYAMA, Yui.
Translated by: ICHINOMIYA, Masakichi.
Checked by: SADAYASU, Mitoichi.

When the TANAKA Cabinet was formed in the winter of 1927, KUHARA was sent to Russia and Germany (26th March) with the title of Economic Envoy. This was done not because he had any special mission as financial envoy to fulfill, but because Premier TANAKA, in order to make KUHARA one of the Cabinet members, as the latter was related to TANAKA in a special way, thought it necessary to give to KUHARA a political colour, since he had been up to that time only a businessman. KUHARA left Japan at the end of 1927 and came back in February of the following year. Soon after his return he entered the Cabinet as Communications Minister.

While abroad KUHARA did not do anything worthy of the name of Economic Envoy, but in Russia he met STALIN twice and came home with his own peculiar view of STALIN and also the policy toward Soviet Russia based on that view. On his way he had two interviews with Chang Tso-lin, who was the ~~nominal~~ nominal President. In these interviews he submitted to Chang his long-cherished Manchurian policy. According to that plan, Chang-Tso-lin was to evacuate and disband all the Army stationed in Manchuria and entrust to Japan all the defenses and the maintenance of public peace; as a compensation for this, Japan would protect Chang-Tso-lin and his family, secure for them a happy livelihood and as regards the economic management of Manchuria, as appropriate compromise plan would be set up between the two parties.

In the first interview Chang got so angry that he was about to leave the room without saying good-by, but being aware of the relation between KUHARA and TANAKA, Chang probably changed his mind, thinking that he must not act in that way. That night he sent a messenger to KUHARA and had another interview the next day. In this second interview Chang replied that as for himself it would be all right to accept KUHARA's proposal, but that it was altogether impossible to convince and control his Army under such conditions. Thus the two did not come to a satisfactory conclusion.

At that time this proposal of KUHARA was strictly kept secret, so there were scarcely any who knew about this, even among the Government officials, much less among outsiders. Since that time KUHARA lost hope in Chang, and came to believe that Chang was not to be the man who could be depended upon to execute his policy toward Manchuria.

On this point Premier TANAKA had a somewhat different view. During the Russo-Japanese War, TANAKA had used Chang as his tool, and since then he had a personal understanding toward Chang, so he did not favor such a thorough-going policy as KUHARA held against Chang. He believed there still remained room for utilizing Chang, depending upon the plan and method.

Then suddenly on the 4th of June 1928 in the suburbs of Mukden Chang-Tso-lin died from an explosion bomb. I well remember that on December 23rd of that year I was invited to a dinner by Chang's son Hsueh-liang, to whom I expressed condolence for the untimely death of his father.

The TANAKA Cabinet collapsed just a year after this incident, in July 1929, because of the incident. The circumstances surrounding the downfall of the TANAKA Cabinet are very interesting in the political history of Japan. As I was then managing the only third party which was upholding TANAKA's policy in the diet, I had an important part to play in the retirement of TANAKA, so I am well versed about the circumstances but I omit them here. But one thing must be made clear here. That is, whether or not TANAKA especially KUHARA, had anything to do with the death by explosion of Chang-Tso-lin.

Briefly speaking, I have every reason to believe that both persons had nothing to do with it and the report of his death was a great surprise to them. It could be suspected at first that KUHARA might have been the instigator of the plot or might have taken some part in it, as he was the exponent of the Anti-Chang policy. As I was at that time in a position to know all the top secrets of the cabinet and had such close relation with TANAKA and KUHARA, especially as to discuss with them problems vitally affecting the life of the Cabinet, it was not difficult for me to discern whether or not they had anything to do with the death of Chang. I omit here the description of the details, but one thing I should not omit is the fact that the central person connected with the death by explosion of Chang was Colonel Daisaku KAWAMOTO, who was then a staff officer of the Kwantung Army. As the man responsible for it. He was discharged by War Minister Yoshinori SHIRAKAWA in the TANAKA Cabinet. Thereafter he remained in Manchuria and moved about actively. And the politician who was closely associated with him and who delved deeply into the Manchurian problem was Kaku MORI of the SEIYUKAI ~~Party~~ Party. As parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Foreign Ministry when Premier TANAKA held the concurrent post of Foreign Minister, MORI was the strongest exponent of a strong policy toward Manchuria and China. (This has been already stated in note of March 3). It was not KUHARA but MORI who actively cooperated with Colonel KAWAMOTO in Manchurian affairs after the resignation of the TANAKA Cabinet.

The TANAKA Cabinet was succeeded by the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet of the Minseito Party in July 1929. Premier HAMAGUCHI was stabbed by a ruffian of the rightist party on November 14, 1930, and as the result passed away in March of the following year. REIJIRO WAKATSUKI of the MINSEITO party became the succeeding Premier. On the 18th of September the Manchurian Incident broke out and the Cabinet collapsed; in December TAKESHI INUKAI, who was the President of the SEIYUKAI Party after the death of GIICHI TANAKA, formed a new Cabinet. And although KUHARA then occupied the important position of Chief Secretary of the party, he did not enter the Cabinet. There were extremely complicated reasons for this.

When the Manchurian Incident broke out, KUHARA lost no time to act. In view of the great repercussion the incident caused in the world, he keenly felt the necessity of reconstructing the internal politics of the country. In order to cope with the situation, he advocated the formation of a nationally united cabinet. That is, he meant the formation of coalition Cabinet of the SEIYUKAI and the MINSEITO Parties. After consulting with KOJIRO TOMITA, who was Chief Secretary of the Minseito Party, he had TOMITA go to and persuade KENZO ADACHI, then Home Minister of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet (Minseito) Cabinet and succeeded in obtaining his informal consent. Home Minister ADACHI immediately prevailed upon Premier WAKATSUKI to submit the matter to the Cabinet meeting, but due to the Finance Minister JUNNOBUKE KEN INOUE's dissent, the plan did not go through. When as a result Home Minister ADACHI expressed his desire to resign, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet finally collapsed.

Thereupon INUKAI received the Imperial Mandate to form a new cabinet, but KUHARA persisted in his demand for the formation of a coalition cabinet in accordance with his promise to ADACHI and TOMITA. The conference of INUKAI and KUHARA at INUKAI's residence lasted five long hours, but KUHARA, in order to maintain his demand for a coalition government, refused to enter the cabinet, because INUKAI did not support his view. This INUKAI Cabinet fell as the natural consequence of Premier INUKAI's assassination by young officers at his official residence on May 15, 1932. This was the so-called May 15th Incident.

With this Party Government ended, the Saito Cabinet, which had no political party background came into existence. Following his resignation as Premier, Saito became the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. While in that post he was assassinated by young soldiers on February 26, 1936. This was the so-called February 26th Incident.

After the INUKAI Cabinet of the Seiyukai Party fell and the SAITO Cabinet came into being, the political parties became completely impotent. As the presidents of both the Seiyukai and Minseito parties had been assassinated, the members of the political parties were so terror-stricken that they could scarcely utter words in public. Naturally KUHARA's activities were impeded such that they could not help becoming negative. At any rate the activities of KUHARA in 1931 may be said to have reached the climax when, with the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, he stressed the necessity of constructing a nationally united structure and, as its first step, schemed the formation of a coalition cabinet of the Seiyukai and Minseito parties, which led to the collapse of the Minseito cabinet at the very moment when this scheme was about to succeed to a certain degree.

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THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF KUHARA FUSANOSUKE
FROM 1932 to 1936.

(ADDED THE PALMY DAYS OF GENERAL ARAKI SADA0).

By: YOKOYAMA, YUI.

The original transcript, the original Japanese Statement and the original notes of the translator will be found in I.P.S. Exhibit File as Exhibit No. 798.

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The Political Activities of KUHARA
Fusanosuke from 1932 to 1936. (Added
the palmy days of General ARAKI Sadao).

Written by YOKOYAMA Yui on March 29, 1946.

Translated by: K. MATSUZAWA
Checked by: M. SADAYASU.

As described, at the beginning of my note dated February 25, I retired completely from the political world at the end of 1931, and secluded myself at my present residence at Chigasaki in the summer of the following year. I had three reasons for doing so: The first was the violent political changes provoked by the terrorism which was then prevalent; the second was the fact that the solemn promise which I had made to Chang-Kai-Shek and others at Nanking at the end of 1928 was absolutely broken by the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. The third, I must add, was the legal proceedings arising from the KUHARA Check case. For these reasons, KUHARA and I steadily drifted apart from each other day after day, both politically and personally. Naturally my description of him cannot help becoming deficient in substance.

As stated in my note of March 26, entitled "Fusanosuke KUHARA in 1931", on the occasion of the establishment of INUKAI's cabinet, KUHARA refused to join the cabinet because INUKAI failed to honor his demand for a nationally united cabinet, which had been his political slogan then and which was also the main cause of the collapse of the WAKATSUKI cabinet.

As a result, KUHARA's relation with Premier INUKAI and other central figures of the Cabinet naturally lacked harmony and hence things could not be handled in a cooperative manner. By the central figures of the Cabinet, I mean Home Minister SUZUKI Kisaburo, Education Minister HATOYAMA Ichiro, and Chief Secretary of the Seiyukai Party MORI Kaku.

The balance of influence within the political parties of Japan was much affected by prefectural elements. As SUZUKI hailed from Kanagawa prefecture, HATOYAMA from Tokyo, and MORI from Tochigi prefecture, all three belonged to the Kanto district. Accordingly they gathered around themselves so-called Kanto group in the Seiyukai Party, and with this influence as base, they ~~reigned~~ reigned supreme in the party. Since the Home Minister in those days occupied the position of vice-president of the party, the influence of Home Minister, who had as his right and left men, HATOYAMA and MORI, was virtually overwhelming. After INUKAI's death, he succeeded to the Presidency of the Seiyukai Party.

Here, I must add a few lines to my note in regard to the relations of the INUKAI Cabinet and the Seiyukai Party with the military interests that had suddenly come to the limelight in political circles and society at large following the Manchurian Incident. As described in detail in "Fusanosuke KUHARA in 1931", KUHARA's movement for the formation of a nationally united cabinet, that is, a coalition cabinet of the Seiyukai and Minseito Parties, had as its main object coping with the internal situation and the international relations that had developed from the Manchurian Incident. Such being the case, it is needless to say that he paid the greatest and closest attention to the study of the internal conditions of the Army and the measures for dealing with them. Nevertheless, his position in the Cabinet and the Seiyukai Party rendered his relations with the Army very unfavorable and fall behind time. In those days, ARAKI Sadao was the "Hope" of the Army, especially the younger officers.

MORI Kaku, who had shown brilliant achievements in his positive policies toward Manchuria and China since he had served as the parliamentary vice-minister of Foreign Affairs in the TANAKA's Cabinet and had gone deep into Manchurian problem, especially even after the cabinet's resignation, succeeded in placing ARAKI as War Minister in the INUKAI's Cabinet by virtue of the advantageous background his group had occupied in the cabinet and in the Seiyukai Party. This appointment was not only a great success of the INUKAI Cabinet but also increased the power of SUZUKI, HATOYAMA and MORI in the Cabinet as well as in the party. On the other hand, it rendered KUHARA's position disadvantageous by that much. In fact, it was a fatal blow to KUHARA's political activities to have lost ARAKI, the representative of the Army, to MORI's group.

ARAKI's popularity at that time was so extraordinary that he remained as War Minister in the SAITO Cabinet which succeeded the INUKAI Cabinet. He was expected by the public to become prime minister in the near future. In those days he once lectured in a theatre in Osaka. It is said that, whereas the lecture was planned to being at one o'clock in the afternoon, a long line of people had waited in front of the theatre as early as eight o'clock in the morning. One could well imagine KUHARA's mortification to see ARAKI, who had such popularity among the whole people, snatched away by his opponents.

Being a man of self-confidence, boldness and resource KUHARA had indeed schemed many-sided measures to tie up with the army interests centering around ARAKI, but actually things betrayed his efforts and he was always forestalled by the faction led by MORI. However, against this, KUHARA stuck fast to the slogan or strategy of advocating the united front of the people and party coalition.

At this juncture the May 15th Incident suddenly broke out. This occurred late at night on May 15th by nine young army and naval officers. Premier INUKAI was assassinated at his official residence, causing the collapse of his cabinet. Admiral SAITO Makoto succeeded him as Premier. The measures taken by War Minister ARAKI during this crisis were truly characteristic of leadership. In the preceding six years, complete party cabinets namely TANAKA, HAMAGUCHI, WAKATSUKI and INUKAI cabinets had successively existed. Both HAMAGUCHI, President of the Minseito Party and INUKAI, President of the Seiyukai Party, had been assassinated during their terms of office as Minister. This was the manifestation of the antagonism held by the radicals and extremists in the Military against the political parties. As the result of deliberate consultation with Director of Military Affairs, KOISO Kuniaki, the Provost Marshal HATA ~~Shunroku~~ Shinjo, War Minister ARAKI recognized the necessity of making a presentation of the Army for coping with the crisis directly to Prince SAIONJI, who was the sole senior statesman "Genro" and the recommender of a succeeding prime minister. It was arranged to have Provost Marshal HATA visit Genro under his order. After three or four days from INUKAI's death, while Genro SAIONJI was on his way from Okitsu to Tokyo the succeeding Premier, HATA, waited for him at the Koza station. Having been permitted to accompany the "Genro" HATA privately explained minutely the internal situation of the Army and their view on the domestic situation of the country. At the same time, he naturally conveyed their opinion and desire concerning the nature of the succeeding cabinet as well as its leader.

HATA's explanation and opinion concerning the existing situations were so direct and plain and very thoroughgoing that it could be taken in a certain sense as coercive. In other words, he meant that, if the succeeding cabinet should be established under conditions other than those based on their observation and opinion, it would surely meet the same fate as the INUKAI cabinet had met. Prince SAIONJI recommended Admiral SAITO as the successor in a few days after his arrival at Tokyo. SAITO established a so-called super-party cabinet that was not directly based on political parties. Although a few members entered the cabinet, they were not given important positions, but only nominal posts. Thenceforth until this day no one has been appointed as prime minister in the capacity of the president of the party. The end of party government with the INUKAI Cabinet as the last one constitutes the political history of Japan to date.

I feel it necessary to present here the following question: If War Minister ARAKI had not informed Genro of the so-called opinion of the Army through Provost Marshal HATA, would SAIONJI have made Admiral SAITO establish such a kind of cabinet as he actually did? Various interpretations may be made in regard to this question. Of course, I can not explain SAIONJI's mental state as I did not hear from him directly, but it was widely circulated subsequently, among well-informed political circles that SAIONJI had the intention of making Home Minister Kisaburo SUZUKI as President of the Seiyukai Party, after INUKAI, and recommending him as the succeeding premier. That is, it was alleged that SAIONJI was a supporter of party cabinet as before. One cannot definitely say that such was not the case. However, according to my confident, judgment based on my knowledge of SAIONJI's character and his way of doing things, he went up to TOKYO without any prediction or plan as to the succeeding cabinet. Once he told me of the following effect: We often encounter many difficult problems. It is just like riding on a horse and striking against a large wall. In such a case, we must not immediately dash forward to break through the wall, nor must we retreat. While wandering to and fro, neither dashing nor retreating, we shall be able to find the best and last way by chance.

I have confidently believed since then down to this date that this great statesman, far surpassing others in wisdom, deliberation, and resolution, had, after reviewing and examining HATA's advice in the train as well as the information and suggestions he had received during the several days of his stay in Tokyo, decided everything on his own responsibility. The result was the SAITO Cabinet.

ARAKI remained as War Minister in the SAITO Cabinet; also his popularity was all the more heightened. The public even expected the appearance of an ARAKI Cabinet. At this juncture he suddenly resigned from his post. Then he was recuperating from flu at Atami. It was officially announced that his resignation was ~~due~~ due to pneumonia. HAYASHI Senjuro was recommended to succeed him as War Minister.

It was nothing but a superficial excuse to say that ARAKI had retired on account of illness. The fact was that his resignation was due to clash of opinion in the cabinet. ARAKI and Finance Minister TAKAHASHI Korekiyo had clash on the budget question. Owing to the internal situations after the Manchurian Incident and especially to the demand within the Army for highly positive policies, ARAKI's request for military budget reached an unprecedented amount.

Finance Minister TAKAHASHI flatly opposed this demand. With his age and experience, he was the ace man in the cabinet. He had preceded TANAKA Giichi as President of the Seiyukai party and moreover he was an ex-Prime Minister. Previous to that he had several times held the post of Finance Minister. During the Russo-Japanese War he was sent to England and America as Chief Financial Commissioner, and succeeded in floating foreign currency bonds. Being well-versed in international affairs, he was one of the most intelligent persons in our country who heartily considered and prayed for fair and reasonable foreign and financial policies. Having already rendered service and won fame, he had no ambition in the political world, but he could not look unconcernedly at the national crisis, and took the post of Finance Minister under Premier SAITO, his junior. I wish to add here that his views on foreign financial policies naturally agreed with those of Prince SAIONJI in many points and he was a statesman who enjoyed the deep trust of the Prince. Whereas other Finance Ministers would have easily consented to the War Minister's demand, TAKAHASHI acted just the opposite. Hemmed in between TAKAHASHI and the demand of the Army, ARAKI resigned at last. Very popular as he was, ARAKI's fortunes began to decline thereafter.

Later he was appointed Education Minister in the First KONOYE Cabinet and remained in that post in the succeeding HIRANUMA Cabinet but this was only the momentum of a strong arrow. His palmy days had ended. In fact, on the one hand, he demanded of TAKAHASHI an increase of the military budget, and on the other hand he tried to check the Army's demand with all his power, but in vain. Even he who had enjoyed such a popularity among the faction which held power in the Army could no longer do anything about it.

And three years thereafter both TAKAHASHI and SAITO were assassinated in the so-called February 26th Incident. The situation rapidly turned, as a round stone rolls down a steep slope, and developed into the China Affair and the War of Greater East Asia, which finally ended in Japan's defeat. That was the destiny of our country.

KUHARA, living amidst these circumstances, probably did not neglect to carefully watch and study them. As I have stated in the beginning of this note, I devoted myself in ~~xxxx~~ writing at Chigasaki in those days and entirely held aloof from actual politics. Therefore, I could not get such concrete knowledge of KUHARA's practical activities as I was able at the time of the TANAKA cabinet. However, according to what I heard indirectly he still maintained as usual his argument for a one party government which has as its basic condition a nationally united policy, and endeavored to realize it. I can well imagine how KUHARA, great idealist and an extraordinary opportunist as he was, acted to cope with this situation, but I omit giving an account of it as it belongs to the realm of imagination.

Nevertheless, as KUHARA himself stated in the trial, it is clear that he had special information concerning the February 26th Incident through his contact with a young kinsman who was one of the young officers involved in the incident. This young man was found guilty of a serious crime, as it was found in the trial that he had been deeply connect ed with the incident. On the other hand, KUHARA was acquitted. These facts prove how deeply KUHARA was interested in the internal situations of the Military.

Thus for many years I did not have the chance to meet KUHARA, but in the Autumn of 1943, if I remember correctly, he attended the wedding reception for my second daughter at the Imperial Hotel. This meeting was indeed the first in a long time since I had seen him, and it may prove to be the last meeting, as I have not seen him since.

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H.

THE TANAKA CABINET - TOKONAMI'S NEW PARTY
YOKOYAMA'S TRIP TO NANKING.

By: YOKOYAMA, Yui.

The original transcript, the original Japanese statement and the original translation of this document will be found in the I.P.S. Exhibit File.

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Written by YOKOYAMA Yui on 3 March, 1946.

Although I cannot remember the exact day and the month, I think it was in the latter part of 1927, possibly the early days of winter, that the TANAKA Cabinet was formed. The TANAKA Cabinet was the so-called Seiyukai Party Cabinet and was formed in place of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet of the Minseito Party cabinet. It was the SHIDEHARA diplomacy and the publicly known China policy which served as the main reason that made the WAKATSUKI Cabinet unpopular and eventually caused its downfall. It was during the latter days of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet that the Nanking incident broke out, in which two Japanese subjects were killed in Nanking, that gave rise to unfavorable public opinion towards WAKATSUKI cabinet's China policy - that revealed the weakness of the so-called SHIDEHARA policy. Needless to say, the Seiyukai Party, which was the opposing party, took up the torch of attack against the government. Thus the WAKATSUKI Cabinet vacated its post to the TANAKA Cabinet.

The characteristics of the Seiyukai Cabinet's China policy, headed by Giichi TANAKA, which was formed after going through such course, advocated a firm and resolute China policy from its outstart and had it publicly announced, and which could be easily imagined, was a deep contrast to the so-called weak SHIDEHARA diplomacy of the Minseito Party. Premier TANAKA himself held the additional post of Foreign Minister and appointed Kaku MORI as vice-minister, who was also one of the medium leaders of the ~~Seiyukai Party~~ Seiyukai Party, and was on intimate terms with medium leaders of the Army. Kaku MORI was an active party politician who always advocated firm China policy. When he became Vice Foreign Minister, he displayed his inborn activity and with his positive China policy as his slogan, he opened the so-called Greater East Asia Conference. Notwithstanding the contents of this conference, ~~the~~ the atmosphere brought about by the consecutively held conference had, no doubt, given China an unusual impulsion. Nextly, two other Japanese nationals were killed in Tsinanfu.

Soon after announcing an extremely firm China policy, the TANAKA Cabinet despatched the Fifth Division of Hiroshima to the Shantung Province and in a very short moment took possession of the railway line between Tsingtao and Tsinanfu and occupied the capital province Tsinanfu.

In reply to this, the Nanking government of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK who knew that it would be fruitless to use military force resorted to economic warfare as measure against the Japanese army, which was in boycott of Japanese merchandise. The boycott of Japanese merchandise was the general economic boycott against Japan and the Nanking government resorted chiefly in the carrying out and strengthening of sabotage against the textile mills in China that was under the capital and management of Japan. The greater majority of the workers in the Japanese owned textile mills were Chinese and their sabotage almost ruined the Japanese textile industry in China.

At that time, there were over sixty factories in Shanghai, Tsingtao, and Manchuria which were subjected to sabotage lasting for six months and the losses suffered by our "Kaibatsu" and persons affiliated with the textile industry was enormous. Consequently, the criticism unfavorable to the TANAKA Cabinet arose from this section and with each ensuing day it became worse.

At that time, the TANAKA Cabinet carried out a general election, but the result was unexpectedly bad for the cabinet notwithstanding the shallow date of the cabinet formation due to the reflection of these reasons. The Government party which is the Seiyukai party copped 213 seats, while the opposing party which is the Minseitō Party copped 210 seats, the difference of only 2 seats. During the special session, which was held soon after the general election, the government was manhandled by the minority parties holding less than 20 seats, and consequently holders of the casting votes. The Home Affairs Minister Kisaburo SUZUKI, who was surrounded with reproaches of intervening in the election, was forced to resign in the middle of the special session. I think the time must have been at the end of March in 1926, and there hasn't been much of such cases in Japanese political history where a cabinet experiences such a piteous plight in its first session, especially only six months or so after it has been formed. In such a state, it seemed a hopeless situation to the public, that the government could break through the ordinary session of the Diet which was to be held from the end of the year to spring of the new year and the cabinet, also, fully anticipated this fact and was much worried.

It was the day after or two days after the closing of the piteous special session that Matsumoto GOKICHI, member of Peers and a specially intimate friend of mine in public and private life for number of years, visited me at my home. He was the right hand man to Prince Kinmochi SAIONJI, the only Genro who held the absolute and special position to nominate the head of the cabinet to the Emperor and was, therefore, on very close terms with Premier TANAKA. He was also an experienced politician. The main purpose of his urgent mission was to inform me that Premier TANAKA wishes to see me and at that time Matsumoto never revealed a single word about what the Premier wishes to see me about, but I assented and as instructed, I called upon Premier TANAKA at his official Foreign Minister's residence.

As we dined, together, the Premier did his best to explain the course of the last special session which turned out to be extremely against his wishes. Then he spoke frankly stating that there was no hope of him in over-riding the next ordinary session in such state of affairs. It was his aim to wipe out the China policy of the former cabinet and accomplish his long dreamt continental policy and it was extremely regrettable that with the joint post of Foreign Minister, he was unable to achieve what he wished. He asked me if there wasn't some plan on which I could be of help to him.

While I listened to his words, I was able to perceive the prime intention of the Premier's wishes in me. Both the Premier and Gokichi MATSUMOTO knew of my relationship with Takejiro TOKONAMI and they wanted me to make utmost efforts in extricating TOKONAMI from the Minseito party and support the government. TOKONAMI was, at that time, one of the foremost leaders of the Minseito party and it was just recently that he left the Seiyukai party and established the Seiyuhonto party of which he became the president. He joined the Minseito party and held the post of advisor. Since his movements in the political world has caused quite a number of commotion in the near past and to force or encourage him to withdraw again from a party when the sprays from the last commotion has not fully quieted down, I felt that, even to a person of my character and general trend, it was impossible of me to be too optimistic. But, in the conversation that lasted over 3 hours in which Premier TANAKA repeatedly emphasized on the subject of the China policy and while I listened, a sudden idea rose in my mind. I straight forwardly expressed my views stating that although I do not approve of the Minseito's so-called SHIDENANA China diplomacy, I also oppose the firm diplomatic policy taken against China by the present cabinet, that is, by His Excellency, because there is plan that is cooperative and eternal bound by destiny and geopolitically between the countries of Japan and China. I have been devoted and studying this problem from my childhood and since I believe that TOKONAMI would also approve this plan, I have firm conviction that I could persuade TOKONAMI and build a new party composed of over thirty representative members provided that His Excellency would approve of TOKONAMI establishing a new party based upon my contention and plan.

For a while, it seemed as if the Premier was very much displeased, but since he was unable to contend against the demand of his cabinet's last extremity, he at last consented to my request.

It was a whole lot difficult to have the consent of TOKONAMI. In the first place, TOKONAMI has already changed his party standing twice in three years and to withdraw from the Minseito party again would be unfavorable to his personal character. In the second place, as previously said, from actual conditions of the special session of the Diet, the life of the present cabinet is not long and it was firmly believed and observed that the next cabinet would, as a matter of fact, fall upon the Minseito party, therefore, TOKONAMI would not hear of adventuring the danger of forming a new party individually. But, at last, I succeeded in persuading him and caused a big uproar in the political circles which job was one of the most bone-racking in my whole political career.

The new party, centered around TOKONAMI, announced its establishment on August 1, 1928. The proclamation was written by my hand and the words in the head paragraph reading "Both Japan and China sit in the same boat, destined to live and prosper mutually", formed the backbone of the China policy which I have cherished for number of years, and also presents the characteristics of the new party's China policy which I strongly stressed and advocated during my discourse with Premier TANAKA. TOKONAMI's influence in political circles at that time was indisputably rare and standing on such unfavorable standing, he was able to assemble thirty representative members under his standard.

This the TANAKA Cabinet was able to have confidence in riding safely through the coming ordinary Diet but, it was not my real objective in establishing the new party as fulfilment of the promise I made with Premier TANAKA. My real objective was in the diverting and renewing of the internal political conditions and thereby solving speedily and peacefully the Japan-China strife which the TANAKA Cabinet was unable to solve in the last six months of its regime.

How was the Japan-China relations at the time of the new party announcement? How was the advanced state of condition of the Chinese boycott of Japanese merchandise strengthened by the Nanking government in retaliation to the Shan tung expedition?

The Japanese government contention was that, as soon as China stop her boycott against Japanese merchandise, Japan would withdraw her troops, but the Nanking government answer was that Japan despatched her troops into Chinese territory and has infringed her rights. China's boycott of Japanese merchandise was a legitimate self-defense measure which China is resorting to without military weapons and if Japan withdraws her troops, China will immediately stop boycott measures.

Thus the negotiation between the two countries were brought at a standstill and during that time, the casualties received by the Japanese economical circle was heavy which resulted in the unpopularity of the cabinet increasing each day.

I think the CHIANG KAI SHEK government knew of these facts and saw that the TANAKA Cabinet would eventually be overthrown in the next ordinary session of the Diet. Considering from the number of members represented by both parties in the previous special session, the situation seemed absolute. If the Seiyukai Cabinet falls, the next cabinet will be formed by the Minseito party and much could be depended upon the SHIDEHARA China policy. Therefore, in order to meet the new situation, the pending question between China and Japan could be settled in friendly atmosphere, it was judged and much effort was exerted to strengthen the boycott against Japanese merchandise.

Then suddenly announcement was made of the establishment of a new party headed by TOKONAMI, that is, TOKONAMI's withdrawal from the Minseito party. The astonishment and disappointment of the Nanking government did not fall behind to those of the Minseito party, who were eagerly looking forward to grasp the next cabinet. At that time, I observed that it must have been such so I deliberated on the next move.

It was several years before this, during the International Christian Association meeting in Tokyo, that C. T. WANG who was China's representative to this meeting lodged at the residence of my friend, Daikichiro TAGAWA. In 1928, Wang Cheng TING was the Foreign Secretary of the Nanking government. Suddenly, the relationship of TAGAWA and WANG rose in my mind. TAGAWA who held the seat in the House of Representatives for many years and a deeply trusted politician of Yukio OZAKI, travelled number of times to Europe and the United States and especially in regard to China he was man

of great erudition. We have been friends from the latter years of the Meiji period extending over 20 years. I invited him to Karuizawa and explained to him in detail the formation of the new party. I requested him to go to China at once and meet the Foreign Secretary WANG and try prepare sufficient preliminary movements and pave the way so that TOKONAMI and I could go to China. He gladly consented to my request and at the end of August he left for China and met Wang Cheng TING. After fully reconnoitering he returned at the end of September.

By his report, I became confident of our negotiations with the Nanking government and soon after the coronation ceremony which was to be held in Kyoto between the early part to the middle of November, I left Tokyo on the 7th of December and reached Nanking on the late afternoon of the 14th. With only one negotiation, held that night, we immediately settled the pending question which the TANAKA Cabinet could not settle in a half year and furthermore had no idea how many months it would take to settle. The Nanking government stopped the boycott the following day. After our return to Japan, the Japanese government completed withdrawal of troops from Shantung by the end of January the following year.

My connection with the TANAKA Cabinet was the closest as in the aforementioned case but I never meddled much in internal political affairs.


The TANAKA Cabinet safely carried through the Diet session held between the latter day of 1928 to March of the following year with the assistance of the TOKONAMI party but in the end of July, resigned en masse.

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UGAKI, ISSEI in 1931.

By: YOKOYAMA, Yui.

The original transcript, the original Japanese Statement and the original notes of the translator will be found in I.P.S. Exhibit File as Exhibit No. 602.



UGAKI Issei in 1931.

Written By: YOKOYAMA, Yui on March 27, 1946.

Translated By: T. YAMAMOTO.

I am firmly convinced that UGAKI will never forget that the year 1931 has been the most profound and epoch-making year in his eventful career.

The so-called "March Incident" had been plotted to be carried out on March 20 of that year. According to an outline of the plot, a group of influential officers, high and low, in the army, would effect a coup-d'etat by surrounding the Diet building during a session, and send a special messenger into the House; force the resignation of the Cabinet, then organize a new Cabinet led by UGAKI. Of course UGAKI himself was thoroughly acquainted with the details of the plot and had consented to take part in it. Although the plot was not carried out due to the reasons which I shall relate here later, we are able to conclude that the roots of all revolutionary movements, some upholding bloodshed and some not, which gave rise suddenly, subsequent to this "Incident" with the middle class of military officers as their nucleus, are traceable to this incident. UGAKI was at that time the War Minister in the Minseito Cabinet led by HAMAGUCHI. The HAMAGUCHI Cabinet was formed in 1929 and took the place of the Seiyukai Cabinet led by TANAKA, but the way in which UGAKI came about to occupy the post of War Minister is so interesting that I must relate it here in outline form.

The fatal bombing of Chan Tso-Lin was the cause of the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet. When this incident suddenly occurred in the outskirts of Mukden on the 4th of June 1928, Premier TANAKA visited Prince SAIONJI, who was then the only surviving elder statesman, at Okitsu, to report on the details of the incident, after the former had received various information from Mukden. SAIONJI advised him to report the case to His Majesty without delay and to make the facts known to the world. It is only proper that the case be reported to the throne. However, as to announcing the facts to the world, TANAKA was against it, for he took it that the incident was a disgrace on the army and a stain on the nation.

The elder statesman was frank, plain and thorough. The gist of SAIONJI's opinion is as follows: If the facts are announced, the Japanese Army will be open to the censure of the world; but that is inevitable. It is due punishment imposed upon a perpetrator of atrocities. International incidents such as this can never be kept in absolute secrecy. Therefore, it is advisable to announce the truth as quickly as possible, then submit quietly to the censure of the world.

It is only by announcing the facts as they are concerning the misconduct of the Japanese Army that the world will come to recognize Japan's courage and honesty. If we make a foolish attempt to conceal the facts, we shall only impair our country's reputation later on. If we keep the facts in absolute secrecy because the Army is under the command of the Emperor, we shall be doing the very thing that will injure the divine ways of His Majesty. Even if the Army is under the command of His Majesty, the world will come to recognize Japan's trustworthiness only when we give out the facts the way that we were wrong when we have done something wrong.

To the Emperor, Premier TANAKA reported the actual facts of the case, but he was unable to carry out the advice of the elder statesman and announce the actual facts of the case to the public. Herein we can see the contrast between Premier TANAKA, a member of the military clique and SAIONJI, the great statesman who has personally participated in the mighty achievement of the Meiji Restoration and who has always kept up with international affairs for all his advanced age.

While I am writing this, I recall the words I heard directly from Prince SAIONJI some 17 or 18 years ago. During the course of conversation on this occasion, Prince SAIONJI put on an extremely distressed appearance and said: "What I am most anxious about concerns international relations and the Imperial Household". At that time I did not pay much attention to those words, but while the war of Greater East Asia was going on, the words of this great senior statesman frequently returned to my mind and tortured as well as aroused me. Look at the result of the war!

While I am gazing on the bright rays of a spring sun through my window, I call to mind the words "Kan Rai" (I see a thunderbolt) written on a tablet by Prince SAIONJI, hung in the entrance hall of my house at Chigasaki, and I wipe my tear-clouded spectacles many times. The tablet is a gift which I received from the aged Prince as symbolizing my personal character following my return from Nanking towards the close of 1928 after a successful negotiation with President Chiang-Kai-Shek.

When Premier TANAKA reported the details of the incident to the throne, he made it clear as to the Cabinet's plan in dealing with the persons involved in the incident, which he said will be decided by court marshal. However, the Premier, as well as the War Ministry, were unable to try the participants by court marshal. They could not suppress the opposition which came from those who were involved in the incident and from those in the Army who supported those men. Thus the Premier and the War Minister were obliged to rely upon a luke-warm administrative measure by which the participants were dismissed from office.

When Premier TANAKA reported the final issue of the case to the throne, it is said that the Emperor promptly observed as follows: "You at first said that the issue will be settled by court martial, but I see you have resorted to administrative measures." TANAKA was filled with trepidation by His Majesty's words and immediately decided on a general resignation of the Cabinet. Immediately after leaving the Imperial Palace, TANAKA called me over and related to me the above.

Forecasting that the development of the bombing incident would eventually lead to the end of the TANAKA Cabinet, the Minseito or the opposing party had long been preparing and had already even set up a program for operations. And all these preparations were based on the information sent them by UGAKI. UGAKI was then the leader of a group of military men who opposed the TANAKA Cabinet, therefore he had made himself acquainted with the true intentions of the participants in the incident as well as their supporters, not to speak of the details of the incident itself, and had made clear estimations as to how the incident will effect the political situation.

The men who acted as liaison between UGAKI and the Minseito Party was YUJI, Yoku, who later became the Railway Minister in the succeeding HAMAGUCHI Cabinet. Premier TANAKA tried to get UGAKI in his Cabinet because War Minister SHIRAKAWA was now in an extremely disadvantageous position due to the Chang Tso-Lin incident. He sent Count KODAMA, Hideo, the son of late General KODAMA, Gentaro, Chief of the General Staff during the Russo-Japanese war and who hails from the same home town with TANAKA to negotiate with UGAKI, but UGAKI would not accept the offer. Finally, in order to avoid the Premier's persuasions, UGAKI left for Kansai on an inspection mission. Perceiving the unfavorable situation, the Communications Minister, KUHARA, now took the same train with UGAKI, under the pretext that he was going to see his family at Mikage in Kansai near Kobe, and talked with him, but UGAKI would not accept. KUHARA even went so far as to persuade UGAKI to join the Seiyukai Party if it was impossible for the latter to accept the post of War Minister, but of course UGAKI determinedly refused. After completing his official duties in Kansai as Army Inspector, he leisurely stayed in Onomichi (Hiroshima Prefecture) and did not return to Tokyo. In the meantime the TANAKA Cabinet collapsed.

When the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet succeeded, UGAKI was naturally appointed War Minister. When this new Minseito Cabinet was formed, UGAKI felt great self-importance. Judging by the circumstances in which the Cabinet was formed, UGAKI expected that he would be heartily welcomed and treated with honor by both the Cabinet and the party, but contrary to his expectations he was received rather coldly. Unable to suppress his indignation, UGAKI ordered Vice-Minister ABE, Nobutsuka to take charge and he himself left for Hakone under the pretext of illness, and even hinted at resignation. Surprised by UGAKI's actions, the leaders of Minseito

Party appealed to Prince SAIONJI through the Railway Minister YEGI, to appease him.

In the meantime the anti-political-party feeling among the younger Army Officers grew daily and on the 14th of November, 1930, a year after the formation of the Minseito Cabinet, Premier HAMAGUCHI was shot at the Tokyo Station by the rightist political bullies, making the situation worse than ever. Thus the year 1931 the year of the "March Incident" the question which we have been dealing with, which plotted to set up an UGAKI Cabinet by effecting a coup d'etat was ushered in.

The agents which led to plot of the "March Incident" almost up to the igniting point were the Lieutenant-Colonels in the Army who were dissatisfied with the existing state of things. The voices which cried for reconstruction of the state and tearing down of present state of things, in reply to the failure of the Manchurian policy of the TANAKA Cabinet and the ever-same and tiresome policies of the political parties, had now saturated the upper ranks of the army, driving the upper and lower ranks of the Army into the same direction and toward a common goal.

The SAKURA KAI (The Cherry Society) which was the central body of the above movements, even went so far as to proclaim in the first article of its prospectus as follows: "The final objective of this organization is aimed at National Reconstruction. In order to achieve this aim, we shall not, if necessary, abstain from taking up arms."

A memoir written by a certain officer who was connected with the March Incident reads as follows: "On the night of January 9, 1931, UGAKI firmly made up his mind to enter into politics and form a Cabinet. He conferred with:

Vice-Minister of Army
Assistant Chief of General Staff
Chief of Army Service Department
Chief of the Operations Section
Chief of the War Affairs Section
(Represented by

SUGIYAMA, Gen
NINOMIYA, Harushige
KOISO, Kuniaki
YAMAWAKI
NAGATA, Tatsuzan
SUZUKI, Teiichi (Lt.Col)
HASHIMOTO, Kingoro (Lt.Col)
NEMOTO, Hiroshi (Lt.Col)

to discuss what steps and measures should be taken to effect a national reformation."

For reference I wish to add that among the names mentioned above:

SUGIYAMA, Gen, was the Chief of the General Staff during the War who committed suicide, together with his wife, immediately following the termination of war.

KOISO, Kuniaki became Premier during the war and was named a war crimes suspect after the war ended.

SUZUKI Teiichi has served as a Minister without Portfolio in the TOJO Cabinet and has been named a war crimes suspect.

HASHIMOTO Kingoro was the Director of General Affairs of the Imperial Ruse Assistance Association. He was named a war crimes suspect following the war.

The memoirs of this certain officer continue as follows:

"A little past 3:00 p.m. on the 7th of February we met at the home of Colonel SHIGEO, Chiaki, member of the General Staff Office, in Shinagawa. Following a conference, we decided to take destructive measures, a rough outline of which is as follows: (Omission here). We will seize the government on the day the Labor Bill is introduced into the Diet. On this same day we will bomb the Headquarters of the Seiyukai and Minseitō and the official residence of the Premier. We will use high detonation bombs, but which will not cause any casualty. (Omission here). At this state a certain Lieutenant General (The name has been kept secret to the last) will take with him either Major General KOISO or Major General TATEKAWA, one of the two, with several other officers; enter the House and address the Ministers as follows and force them to resign: 'The nation has no confidence in the present Cabinet. They will have confidence in a Cabinet led ~~xxxx~~ only by UGAKI. The country now faces a critical situation. We request that you act prudently.' The entire Cabinet including the Acting Premier SHIDEMARU will be forced to file in their resignation. We will make it so that Imperial appointment will fall on UGAKI according to our plans. (Special messengers to be sent to Prince KANIN and Prince SAIONJI have already been named.)"

The above is an outline of the actions which were to be taken but how is it that such well arranged and elaborate plans should fail from being carried out? One important reason may be attributed to the fact that the plan ~~sixxxx~~ met with the rise of a sudden opposition by some among the Section Chiefs of the Army, but a far more important reason is that the plan was opposed by Lieutenant General MAZAKI Jinzaburo, who was at that time Commander of the 1st Division. (He was later promoted to a General, and following the end of the war, he has been named a war crimes suspect).

When MAZAKI heard of this plot from his Staff Chief, ISOGAYA Ryunosuke, he became greatly angered and issued a stern notification to the Garrison Commander, his superior as follows: "I am the Commander of the 1st Division, and I am going to act according to my convictions. Whether he be the Minister or the Vice-Minister, I will lead an army against him. Please make a note of it".

MAZAKI, it is true, commanded the largest number of troops in Tokyo, and therefore any attempt at a coup d'etat by military force could never have been carried out against his opposition.

The "March Incident" ended without being carried out, but I must write more and say how much UGAKI was concerned and how far he participated in it. In the memoirs of the officer referred to above, we find the following conjecture made with regards to UGAKI's willingness to carry out the plot.

"It is plain that UGAKI was strongly for a revolution along the lines of the so-called 'March Incident' for he made it clear when persuaded by Dr. OKAWA (the powerful civilian rightist who is now on the list of war crimes suspects) in the following words: 'If you will carry things out as far as that for me, I shall act.'" And when the Vice Chief of the General Staff NINOMIYA; the Chief of the Army Service Department, KOISO; and Section Chief of the General Headquarters, TATEGAWA Yoshitsugu, showed him the plans and pressed on him to make the Army act, UGAKI said: 'The time has come when it is necessary for the Army to Act'".

During the court trials regarding the "May 15th Incident" held on March 11, 1933, Dr. OKAWA referred in part to the "March Incident" in the following exposition:

"During the Diet session in February 1931, rumors went around that UGAKI was going to join a political party. Therefore, SHIGETO, HASHIMOTO, NINOMIYA and TATEGAWA of the General Staff Headquarters, and KOISO of the War Ministry met once in a while to talk about it. Prevailed upon by KOISO and TATEGAWA, I met UGAKI to sound his mind. When I met UGAKI, he asserted to me that he did not entertain the slightest idea of joining a political party. Two days later, I met him again and found him sorely indignant toward the political parties. He also told me that being a military man, he is always willing to give up his life for the sake of his country.

Another two days later, SUJIYAMA, KOISO, NINOMIYA and TATEGAWA held various discussions while dining together. According to the information I received from KOISO, UGAKI told them exactly what he had previously told me."

In short, the plan was that in view of the people's resentment towards party-government, a national demonstration will be held, with the Army putting on the finishing touches.

UGAKI is a character easily prevailed upon by others. Therefore, it can not be known whether the particulars dealing with the execution of the coup d'etat had been discussed or not, but it is unthinkable that the leader of such a huge undertaking could have overlooked such things. As for myself, I am convinced that he was thorough with the details, considering his prudence, ability, to make plans, and powers of execution.

The most interesting fact about it all is that, though the plot did not materialize, how is it that anything planned on so huge a scale could have been smothered without anyone answering for it, and most of all kept from the public in perfect secrecy? Of course, it was the military leaders who had UGAKI as their head that used every power within their reach and smothered the whole affair. What is even more strange is that MAZAKI, who had crushed the whole affair at the final ~~moment~~ moment and who had already been appointed to command the Kwantung Army, was suddenly ordered to go to Formosa as the commander of the Formosan Army, under the appellation of a promotion, while HONJO Shigeru who was already appointed to command the Formosan Army replaced MAZAKI to command the Kwantung Army.

According to information originating from the inner circles of the Army the appointment is based on something deep and far-sighted, and that if MAZAKI is appointed head of the Kwantung Army it might again hinder the execution of the Manchurian policy. Sure enough, the Manchurian incident broke out during HONJO's time as Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Lastly, a few words must be said in connection to UGAKI's relation with the plutocrats. It ~~has~~ has long been taken for granted in political and financial circles that MITSUI, one of the Big Two was closely connected with the Seiyukai party while the other MITSUBISHI went hand in hand with the Minseito political party. During the latter part of the Meiji era, Prince KATSURA, Taro organized the Doshikai and became its first president, but he soon died and the presidency was succeeded by Count ~~KATO~~ KATO, Komei. Besides KATO, there were Count COTO Shimpei, and two or three others who were recognized as likely successors to KATSURA, but KATO outstripped them and easily became the succeeding president of the party. The chief reason for it is was because he had for his wife the eldest daughter of IWAZAKI, Yataro, founder of MITSUBISHI.

WAKATSUKI Reijiro succeeded KATO to become the party's third president, but he held the position for only a very short time. HAMAGUCHI Yuko succeeded WAKATSUKI. Though he led the party for ^{two} or three years, his term ended only with his assassination and death. HAMAGUCHI hailed from Tosa in Shokoku, the same home town as IWASAKI Yataro. Moreover one of the most powerful leaders of the party, SENGOKU Mitsugi, who guided and supported HAMAGUCHI also hailed from Tosa. He was a business man inseparably bound to MITSUBISHI, and ~~possessor~~ possessor of a unique character. He served as Railway Minister on the KATO Cabinet and as President of the South Manchurian Railway Company during the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet. Throughout KATO's and HAMAGUCHI'S terms as president of the Minseito, the financial relations between MITSUBISHI and the party were managed by SENGOKU.

On the other hand, the Seiyukai was under the financial backing of MITSUI for a long time. But the connection was getting somewhat looser at the time when TANAKA Giichi became the president. Premier TANAKA concurrently held the portfolio of Foreign Minister with MORI, Kaku as the political Vice-Minister. MORI, Kaku who strongly advocated a positive policy toward Manchuria and China and who was making a great show of himself in politics spirited himself into asking MITSUI for a ¥50,000,000 donation for the party.

This same MORI used to work for the MITSUI-BUSSAN KAISHA Ltd., when he was young. He left MITSUI sometime following his appointment as head of the Shanghai Branch and entered into politics. Although he ~~xxxxxx~~ made himself a highly influential member of the Seiyukai during those times through his characteristic energy and ~~xxxx~~ shrewdness, in the eyes of MITSUI he was just an ex-clerk and a stripling. Moreover, as the money he requested was a large sum, they looked upon him as an impertinent fellow and refused the donation. Consequently the connection between MITSUI and the Seiyukai actually came to an end, but still MITSUI saw the necessity of having a political reign which will protect the interests of the plutocrats, and consequently their choice fell on UOAKI. Thus it came about that DAN, Takuma and IKEDA Seihin, MITSUI's representatives and giants of the financial world, came and went on and ~~xxxxxx~~ behind the political scene together with UOAKI for a long time afterwards. With every political upheaval, UOAKI's name always came about to be mentioned as a candidate for Premiership.

Recently, especially, when the Shimpoto (Progressive Party) was busy looking around for a leader in view of the general elections just ahead, there were some elements in the party who voted for UOAKI, but it is needless to say that they were guided by their interest in UOAKI's financial background.

THE END.

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"MARCH INCIDENT" MAY 15TH INCIDENT" AND
OTHER TERRORISMS.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTO AKIRA.

BRUTALISM OF THE KEMPEI TAI.

BUREAUCRATS OF THE HOME MINISTRY.

By: YOKOHAMA, YUI.

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Written by YOKOHAMA YUI on 27th February, 1946.
Checked by: Mitolchi SADAYASU.

In looking at the present situation of the country as a Japanese, the year 1931 reflects most strongly in my mind. On the 18th of September of that year the Manchurian Incident occurred. In the book "Where Are The Japanese People Going", which I wrote immediately after the outbreak of the Incident, I stated that the Manchurian Incident would cause a Sino-Japanese war, which in turn would lead to a world war. Unfortunately, those words of mine proved to be a prophecy, and, as a result, Japan has become a defeated nation and has lapsed into the present state.

In order to explain why the year 1931 was so fateful to Japan, I shall have to describe the several outstanding incidents which occurred successively during that period. Firstly, the so-called "March Incident, which became the fatal factor in bringing Japan into her present fate, was planned to be executed on the 20th of that month following the assassination of Premier HAMAGUCHI at the end of the preceding year. Takuma DAN, leading Japanese businessman and Junnosuke INOUE, Finance Minister of the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet were assassinated in 1931. These were followed by the assassination of Premier INUKAI in the so-called May 15th Incident, that of former Premier SAITO and former Finance Minister TAKAHASHI on the 26th of February in the following year in the "February 26th Incident" and the attack on OKADA, Premier, and SUZUKI, Grand Chamberlain, on the same night. The prevalence of this so-called terrorism threw the people into the depth of fear.

From the standpoint of the objective of this note I will state my opinion very briefly in regard to the above unfortunate incidents. As the details of the plan of the so-called "March Incident" show, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction and discontent against the prevailing situation of the country, especially against party government, amongst the young military officers, of whom Lt. Colonels were the backbone, who manifested their strong will for the reformation of the state. It was reported that they even went so far as to plan to force the existing cabinet to immediately resign by intimidating the then Acting Premier Baron SHIDEHARA after encircling the Diet which was in session then, with armed forces, and to form a military cabinet with General UGAKI as Premier. The fact that the young military officers were to be the moving force was the special feature of this plan. That is, it was terrorism to be carried out by the military officers.