

Ida Husted Harpe

MRS. ANNIE RILEY HALE.

(*Frontis. Rooseveltian Fact & Fable.*)

Rooseveltian Fact and Fable

By Mrs. Annie Riley Hale

Illustrations by Will H. Chandlee

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BY

MRS. ANNIE RILEY HALE

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DEDICATION.

To the Galleries,
to whom my hero has played so long
and so successfully,
this little volume is affectionately dedicated.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

The book is intended merely as a contribution to the truth of history, and is offered without malice, and without apology. Its author is neither Mr. Roosevelt's apologist nor his accuser,—save as the Facts accuse him. She has no personal grudge to satisfy in the publication of things derogatory, and no private wrongs to avenge. As a disinterested "looker-on here in Vienna" during the past five years, she has watched the progress of events surrounding the head of the nation, and noted the utterances falling from Executive lips. She has marveled ofttimes at the swift ingenuity with which these events were wrested from their original setting, and given a wholly different coloring from that they at first wore; marvelled likewise at the equal celerity with which other doings and sayings of the Strenuous President were hustled completely out of sight, and the public mind immediately occupied with different matters. Out of this watching and wondering grew the idea for this little book.

To those whose admiration for Roosevelt is a matter of conviction rather than of fore-ordination; to those who still have the courage to look a fact in the face, and the honesty to assign it its proper place in any summing up of character, this faithful compilation of Fact and Fable may appeal with some force, and to that extent fulfill its modest mission of shedding light in dark places. But having been born and reared a Presbyterian, the writer early learned the folly of going counter to a fore-ordained belief, and

how idle and irrelevant is any evidence in the court whose mind is made up in advance of it.

All this class of Rooseveltian worshippers therefore, —large or small as the case may be—are hereby warned against wasting any valuable time on these pages.

It may be true, as P. T. Barnum once observed, that "the Americans *love* to be humbugged,"—love it, at least, while the delusion lasts.

But there are straw indications, here and there, that many of them are emerging from the Roosevelt spell. The time seems ripe for appealing from the American people drunk to the American people sober; and to take advantage of the lull in the shouting, for applying the historic measuring-rod to the Roosevelt dimensions.

A. R. H.

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ROOSEVELTIAN FACT AND FABLE.

CHAPTER I.

HIS PUBLIC BEGINNINGS.

It is recorded that when District Worker "Joe" Murray had quarreled with his chief, Barney Hess, and was casting about in 1881 for a proper instrument of revenge upon Hess, he hit upon Theodore Roosevelt as his most available candidate to represent the Twenty-first District in the New York Assembly, in the year of our Lord, 1882.

Theodore is described at that time as a thin, pale stripling, just emerged from Harvard and European travel, in his twenty-third year.

The reason assigned by the historians for Murray's choice of this untried political quantity was that his Family Name was one to conjure with in the Twenty-first District, being a Name of great age and eminent respectability in that locality. The adoring Jacob Riis rapturously asserts: "It was the bluest of old Knickerbocker blood!" A less fervid, but perhaps more accurate historian, affirms: "It (the Name) had been borne by five generations of smug, sleek, thrifty business men, following an ancestor of homely, sturdy frugality. Though they had not been of great importance in civil life, aldermen and other municipal officers had risen from their ranks. They were men of substance and power. A remote strain of Jewish blood had possibly intensified the native Dutch shrewdness." Nothing particularly high-sounding about this

lineage, to ears unattuned to the higher Rooseveltian symphonies, even tho' one must concede it is always a problem beset with more or less difficulty—to determine the precise quantity and quality of "blue blood" in this Red-White-and-Blue Republic of ours.

Perhaps "A Member of the Well-Known Bulloch Family of Georgia" may save the day for T. Roosevelt's aristocratic pretensions,—however, it is with more important things than the Roosevelt "blue blood" that this narrative is concerned.

Having been elected a New York Assemblyman in 1882, by the grace of "Joe" Murray and the accumulations of his thrifty Dutch ancestors, our hero quickly "found himself" politically. It appears that at first he went in for "reform," tho' the reform program exhibits serious breaks early in his career. The above-quoted historian further says of the Name: "Pursuit of money for money's sake had worn its keen edge to dullness. Fads of charity and public service had grasped this good name. It was known by its works as well as by its thousands."

Theodore Senior—whose death occurred in the third year of his son's college course—had been active in New York's Social Settlement and Charitable organizations. It was partly following a family tradition, therefore, when the son flashed his maiden sword under the banners of reform. Again, the political complexion of New York at this time—(and most all other times)—made the reform program the only alternative for a legislative novice seeking to attract attention.

A well-known political writer thus sums up the situation: "Tammany Democrats looted the city; machine Republicans as regularly looted the State. Machine Republicans covered up their own iniquities by exposing the city wickedness of Tammany. Tammany Democrats defended their plunderous strong-

holds by bombarding the hypocrisy and crookedness of the up-State hordes." In a place where political corruption was the established order, in both the great parties, our young statesman quickly perceived that the easiest way to focus on himself the wondering gaze of the multitude, was to make a noise like a "reformer"—and so he chose his role. His aggressive temper, and the odd sense of proportion in all matters affecting himself which hath ever covered him like a garment—provoked some derision in this first legislative Assembly, and from the older Republican members the gentle admonition to "go back and sit down." Needless to say, the attractions and advantages of a back seat have never appealed strongly to the Roosevelt fancy.

His "strenuosity," as it became later known to the nation, was not so pronounced in those days, tho' he early exhibited the restless energy which delights in "stirring things up," and an insatiable craving for the lime-light which time hath not abated. In this first year, he learned the value of dramatic display, and from his trading ancestry he drew the full importance of liberal advertising. It was remarked of him even then that he went out of his way to cultivate the favor of newspaper men. The devoted Riis (at that time on the staff of the New York Sun) makes an heroic episode of the noisy part his virtuous young solon bore in the impeachment of a federal judge in this first session of the N. Y. Legislature, tho', it seems, nothing much came of the impeachment. Even Riis admits, "in the end the corruptionists escaped"—a fate which appears to have pursued the reform measures of this particular reformer throughout his reforming career. But as in this instance, the faithful Riis took care of the "glory" for his hero, even so, there hath ever been found an obliging and clever artist to paint the *reformer* in letters of light, with little or no attention

paid to the insubstantial character of the *reform.* Indeed, as much as possible, the people are made to forget about the reform, and to concentrate their thoughts upon the reformer. The reform is but an incident—the reformer is the main thing.

Francis Leupp, Indian Commissioner, and member of the "Tennis Cabinet," finds evidence of rare promise in the fact that, "while still a mere youth, Roosevelt had risen to the leadership of the Republican side in the Assembly at Albany." Historian Leupp did not think it necessary to remark in that same connection, that the New York Assembly in which Roosevelt "rose to the leadership of the Republican side"—was overwhelmingly Democratic, having come in with the victorious Cleveland over the wreck of the Republican machine; and that so many of the veteran Republican legislators had gone down to defeat, Roosevelt—whose district was a Republican stronghold—easily captured the barren honor of "minority leader" on the floor. The emptiness of the title, *per se,* is well set forth in the following story: The nine-year-old son of John Sharp Williams, Minority Leader in the National Congress, was required by his teacher in a public school exercise, to write down the name of his father's vocation. "Please, ma'am," said Kit, hesitatingly, holding up his hand for attention, "he is leader of the minority, but I don't know what that is, nor how to spell it. But I know he goes over to the Capitol every morning." "Oh, well," returned the sapient shooter of juvenile ideas, "just say he works at the Capitol!" When the incident was related to the facetious Mississippian, he remarked with grim humor: "Better 50 years a scrub-lady than a cycle of mock-sway!"

In this Democratic Assembly of 1883, Roosevelt as "minority leader," accredited with reform leanings, was permitted to introduce and pass a primary law

recommended in Governor Cleveland's message, but from the rest of the Cleveland reform program, he appears to have held aloof.

This is notably true of the Civil Service law which was passed by this Democratic Legislature, and later appropriated by Mr. Roosevelt's biographers as one of his achievements. Fact and Fable are so sharply at issue in the matter that it becomes necessary to be specific.

Stratemeyer in his "American Boy's Life of Theodore Roosevelt," says:

"One of the greatest services done by Roosevelt at that time (when he was assemblyman) was the support given by him to a Civil Service law for the State." On page 34 of Leupp's "The Man, Roosevelt," may be found the statement: "Mr. Roosevelt who had been his (Dorman B. Eaton's) enthusiastic colleague in the National Civil Service Reform League, *was author* of the bill which passed the New York Legislature during Gov. Cleveland's administration, about simultaneously with the Federal Act." Riis likewise claims the credit of this first New York Civil Service law for his hero, and with a fine disregard of chronology, says this "Roosevelt law" was made the model for the national law!

Now for the Facts in the case so grossly and strangely perverted by the aforesaid authorities. Civil Service Reform had been agitated by such men as George Wm. Curtis, Carl Schurz, and Allen Jenckes of Rhode Island, while Roosevelt was yet in pinafores—back in the 60's. Several Presidents had endorsed it, and finally through the persistent efforts of Pendleton, Democrat, of Ohio, in Congress, assisted by Dorman B. Eaton, Independent, of New York, and backed by the Curtis crowd and the Civil Service Reform League on the outside, a national Civil Service law was placed on the statute books in January, 1883.

This was about the time the New York Legislature convened, which five months later passed the first effective State civil service law, with Grover Cleveland in the governor's chair. *Five months later,* yet Riis says it furnished the *model* for the Federal law. Perhaps if the dear, simple-hearted old Dane had suspected how little his hero had to do with framing or passing this law, he would not have been tempted to play such havoc with the dates. So far from having fathered or promoted this state Civil Service law, the records show that Roosevelt did not even vote for it. Several bills were introduced (none of them by Roosevelt), the one which finally passed by a vote of 96 to 2 was introduced by Michael C. Murphy of New York City, and chairman of the Committee on Affairs of Cities. There were about 85 Democrats and 48 Republicans in the Assembly, and on pp. 1338-39 of the Assembly Journal Theodore Roosevelt is recorded "not voting" on this bill, tho' if he was not present when the vote was taken, he was shortly before, and perhaps the eulogists will explain *why* he was not on hand to honor with his vote a measure for which he was supposed to have such patriotic zeal that *they* have marked it for his own.

In 1884, the Republican machine came into its own again, and began to celebrate its return to power by assaulting the Cleveland Civil Service law. While there is no evidence that Roosevelt openly joined in the attack, neither is there any proof that he made any strenuous defence of it. Certainly, tho' he was a prominent member of that Assembly, he could not, or did not prevent its emasculation at the hands of its enemies. Concerning this coy attitude toward Civil Service in its inception, John W. Bennett, in his "Roosevelt and the Republic," says:

"In the civil service matter, Theodore Roosevelt's action was characteristic. This wise and discreet

young man had already learned not to pin his faith to new and strange measures of doubtful and untried popularity. Let others do the pioneer work. The band-wagon must be well filled and tooling along swimmingly before he claims a seat, he then sees to it that the most conspicuous place is accorded him. Our discreet young solon—as in after life—was impulsive only on the surface. Impulsiveness with him was a stage business, used only for dramatic and advertising purposes. Under the skin, Theodore Roosevelt was wary as a wood-lynx. . . . Time would tell how the crowd would take this Cleveland measure, supported by impossible Tammany men. If popular, there would be plenty of time to use it in one's business; if it proved a fiasco, the Tammany shoulders were broad and strong—Roosevelt's skirts were clean."

We next find our hero, at the age of twenty-six, figuring in national politics. He was made chairman of the New York delegation to the National Convention of 1884 which cast its vote for Senator Edmunds, leader of the Reform forces in the State.

Blaine, "the Plumed Knight" of brilliant parts and besmirched reputation, was everywhere supported by machine Republicans, and the allied forces of corruption. He was hostile to everything which savored of reform,—civil service, tariff revision, and clean politics. In addition, the Mulligan and Fisher letters had unearthed a black scandal connected with his name, convicting him of using his office of Speaker for private gain—a scandal which not even his dazzling and magnetic personal qualities could wholly offset. The Reformers would have none of him, and Roosevelt, Curtis and Company fought him valiantly in caucus and in convention. But Blaine secured the nomination of his party, despite the Reform contingent, and

flung down the gauntlet to Grover Cleveland and the "unterrified Democracy."

Hundreds of Independent Republicans abandoned their party to its fate, and gave their votes to the Democratic candidate who brought into the contest a record for official efficiency and clean politics.

And what of Theodore Roosevelt in this crisis? The Cleveland program was the Roosevelt program, as Roosevelt himself had noisily proclaimed it from his seat among the Reformers. Surely, for this earnest, insistent young "reformer," of lofty ideals and clamorous honesty, there could be but one choice between these two. Nay, gentle reader, be not o'erhasty in judging the actions of the great. Theodore Roosevelt bade adieu to his Reform associates without a tremor, and cheerily took his stand under the soiled banner of "the Plumed Knight."

This crucial test applied at the outset of his political career, demonstrated that which has had frequent demonstration since, that, above everything else, Mr. Roosevelt is a partizan. And one may be a partizan, and be a good man, so far as honesty goes. Or one may be a civic reformer, if he prefers that role, tho' this is more difficult. But one must make a choice—the two are absolutely incompatible.

It were as easy to serve God and Mammon.

Roosevelt is accredited somewhere with the pious formula, that "sometimes a man must sacrifice party allegiance to the public weal," or words to that effect; but he is extremely fortunate in never having encountered this painful necessity in his own experience. The closest inspection of his political record throughout, fails to discover a single instance wherein he permitted party action to separate him for ever so short a time from the Republican fold. Even Historian Leupp makes the surprising statement: "Born with the mental and moral equipment of an independent, he has

made of himself, by unremitting endeavor, *a pretty good partizan.*" How fortunate is Mr. Roosevelt again in having a discerning biographer to wreathe his partizanry with the halo of self-sacrifice!

In that third session of the New York Assembly of which Roosevelt was a prominent member, a measure came up which was vital to good government. This was a constitutional Amendment for municipal home rule, whose effect was to exempt the city's affairs from interference or control by the State government at Albany—a prolific source of corruption and misrule. This Amendment would have done more than anything else to secure the municipal reforms for which Roosevelt had put forth such noisy advocacy. At the critical moment, when its friends were pressing it to a vote, Roosevelt suddenly became solicitous about the legal form of it, and defeated it by springing upon it the time-honored device of legislative crooks, of referring it to the Judiciary Committee.

It was never heard of more.

As assemblyman, Roosevelt also got through a "reform" measure, taking away from aldermen the power of confirming mayoralty appointments.

New York mayors were sometimes Republican, the Board of Aldermen was nearly always Democratic. As this law would prevent a virtuous Republican mayor from being handicapped in his appointments by corrupt Democratic aldermen, it was of course, in the interests of "good government." Once establish the doctrine that all good was practically resident in the Republican party; that no evil was so much to be dreaded for the State or the city as Democratic control, and the path was made smooth for our "reformer's" feet. David Harum's liberal dictum, that "one man has as much human nature as another—if not more," has no place in the Roosevelt reform creed.

Panegryist Riis gives us this explanation of Roose-

velt's choice of a political career, warm from his hero's lips: "I suppose, for one thing, plain, every-day duty sent me there to begin with. But more than that, I wanted to belong to the *governing class,* not to the *governed,"*—concerning which, an unfeeling critic makes the cynical observation, "It could never occur to *him,* that the two might be the same."

But taking his motive at his own appraisement, let us see, as this narrative proceeds, whether the "plain duty" or the "governing" instinct ran ahead in the race.

Yet whatever harsh verdict the Facts may bring in at the close of the Roosevelt trial, it will be modified in every charitable mind by a perusal of the worshipful biographies of Messrs. Leupp and Riis.

Scant admiration goes to the fulsome adulation of a President, with patronage to dispense; or to the fawning that goeth before thrift; but real genuine affection, wherever bestowed, should command not only respect but sympathy. Especially does this apply to the dog-like devotion of Jacob Riis, the simple-hearted, simple-minded old Dane, whose love for his chief is as sincere as his judgment of him is awry. It is worthy of note also, that Mr. Riis has never accepted any of the "spoils of office" in liquidation of his hero-worship debt.

One can but feel, however, that this epic-hymning pair would have made out a stronger case for their "arma virumque," had not their enthusiasm betrayed them into reproducing upon their luminous pages a youthful portrait of "Theodore Roosevelt at twenty-four," which is well, to say the least of it—disquieting. It suggests the villain in the play "being good" for a season; or, more aptly, the melodramatic hero of a mining camp, who has come to church, it is true, but whether to join with the worshippers, or raise a row

on the back seat, is a question not to be settled at a glance.

However the students of history and psychology may agree in the future, that the devices which brought Theodore Roosevelt into the "governing class" were not such as to develop the man's better nature, that he had a better nature, no one will doubt who reads the idyllic odes to Roosevelt, penned by Jacob Riis. We are ready to believe that "Teddy" may have had something "really good and sweet" in his early make-up,—albeit the look of that young photograph is disconcerting.

Its friends should suppress it.

CHAPTER II.

THE SAN JUAN HILL MYTH.

"It was on his war record that he made his campaign for the governorship of New York."

This, being quoted from Historian Leupp, must be authoritative.

An irreverent critic has dubbed Leupp's book "a Campaign Life of Roosevelt," it having appeared simultaneously (in January) with the campaign year of 1904.

Perhaps as the "war record" had done such valiant and successful campaign service in New York in 1898, it was still counted on to fire a few shots in the Presidential fight of 1904. A war record which has made so many drafts on the nation's gratitude, should be something out of the ordinary, and may be worth investigating.

In the winter of 1897-98 prior to the Spanish-American blaze, Roosevelt (according to the biographers) made the acquaintance of one Leonard Wood, an army surgeon, who was immediately engaged as military coach for the future commander of the "Rough Riders."

Wood had also been McKinley's family physician when McKinley was a congressman, and now stood in high favor with the President.

As both Wood and Roosevelt were spoiling for a fight, it was speedily arranged with President McKinley that Wood should be made Colonel, and Roosevelt Lieutenant-colonel of a regiment which Roosevelt

had decided should be called "the Rough Riders." From Historian Leupp we get the information that "the idea of the Rough Rider regiment was Roosevelt's own." There is a tradition (found in encyclopaedias) that the original "Rough Riders" were a class of couriers employed on the Western frontiers in 1859, before the days of the "pony express," and Colonel Wm. F. Cody—"Buffalo Bill"—had made them a feature of his "Wild Western Show."

How entirely natural, how perfectly in keeping with everything bearing the stamp of Rooseveltian activity before and since, that when our nascent "war-lord" came to choose his fighting men, he should find the regimentals best suited to his fancy under a circus tent!

So many "ideas" and "policies" have been attributed to Mr. Roosevelt which rightfully belonged elsewhere, that it is positively refreshing to encounter one Rooseveltian idea whose authorship is beyond dispute.

The "Rough Riders" had been riding, while Roosevelt was yet in swaddling clothes, but the idea of decking out a regiment of soldiers in their picturesque garb was—as Mr. Leupp claims for him—"all his own."

After some drilling and parading on American soil, bv way of getting the spectacular brigade well into the public eye, we find the gallant Rough Riders "drawing first blood" in Cuba, at the ill-considered and prematurely fought battle of Las Guasimas. As has been so often recounted, the Rough Riders under Wood and Roosevelt ran into an ambush on this occasion—Spaniards hidden in an old cemetery between the creek and the road—from which they were narrowly rescued by the timely arrival of the Negro troops, this last having furnished the text for much reproachful oratory since the Brownsville affair.

As it was, 68 brave fellows went down before the unseen fire, 16 of them to rise no more. Among the

slain was the gallant Captain Allyn Capron, who had done more than anyone else to increase the efficiency of the Rough Rider brigade. Reliable military historians relate that General Wheeler, who commanded the cavalry, had weakly yielded to the importunities of "the ardent young Roosevelt and others" in giving the order for this attack, or "reconnaissance"; thereby violating his own order from the superior officer to wait for General Lawton with the infantry.

And that "rough old General Lawton," coming up and seeing the blunder, "said some unpleasant things" —bluntly charging the blood of Captain Capron and the slain troopers upon this unauthorized haste.

Roosevelt received his first baptism of fire and blood at Las Guasimas, and having accomplished his purpose of securing for the "Rough Riders" the credit of having "started things in Cuba," it is not to be supposed he allowed the casualties of war to disturb his complacent reflections. There was more "glory" ahead. Panegyrist Riis says:

"All the way up, it (the Rough Rider regiment) had been the vanguard. . . . 10 days of marching and fighting in the bush culminated in the storming of the San Juan hills, with Colonel Roosevelt in full command, Colonel Wood having been *deservedly promoted* after Las Guasimas!"

The piece-de-resistance of all the Rough Rider exploits,—as it exists in the popular fancy—was the assault on the Spanish entrenchments on top of San Juan Hill. This has been "sung in song and story" until it ranks in the annals of military glory with Pickett's charge up the Gettysburg Heights. It is a thankless task to show that, as a Rough Rider achievement, it more properly finds a place among Baron Munchausen's Tales, or in some standard work on mythology,—yet such is the merciless showing of the Facts. Let us first note the heroic Fable. The New

York Sun of date, July 4, 1898, published the following vivid account of the San Juan charge: "When they came to the open, smooth hillside, there was no protection. Bullets were raining down at them, and shot and shells from the batteries were sweeping everything.

"There was a moment's hesitation, and then came the order: Forward, charge! Colonel Roosevelt led, waving his sword. Out into the open the men went and up the hill. Death to every man seemed certain. The crackle of the Mauser rifles was continuous. Out of the brush came the Riders. Up, up they went, with the colored troops alongside of them, not a man flinching, and forming as they ran. Roosevelt was a hundred feet in the lead. Up, up they went, in the face of death, men dropping from the ranks at every step. The Rough Riders acted like veterans. It was an inspiring sight and an awful one. . . . The more Spaniards were killed, the more seemed to take their places. The rain of shells and bullets doubled. Men dropped faster and faster, but others took their places. . . . Roosevelt sat erect on his horse (all authorities now agree there was not a horse in the fight), holding his sword, and shouting for his men to follow him. Finally, his horse was shot from under him, but he landed on his feet, and continued calling for his men to advance. . . .

"He charged up the hill afoot. It seemed an age to the men who were watching, and to the Rough Riders the hill must have seemed miles high. But they were undaunted. They went on, firing as fast as their guns would work. At last the top of the Hill was reached. The Spaniards in the trenches could still have annihilated the Americans, but the Yankee daring dazed them. They wavered for an instant, and then turned and ran.

"The position was won, and the block-house cap-

tured. In the rush, more than half of the Rough Riders were wounded." . . .

This vivid, glowing picture, with Roosevelt on horseback as the central figure, was copied in the press throughout the country, and the Russian military painter, Vereschagin, was inveigled into committing the salient details to canvas. Riis declares with ecstatic fervor, that "it will live forever in the American mind," and cause a thrill in the American heart, unequalled by any other vibration before or since.

It really seems nothing short of sacrilege to mar this heroic picture in any of its inspiring details. Yet the clear, cold light of history, unmindful of the pangs of the hero-worshippers, has been steadily turned on this glowing battle scene, with the cruel result (to the worshippers) of completely eliminating the central heroic figure—horse and all!

The first to turn on the disillusioning stream was Senator Alger in his "Spanish-American War," published in 1901.

On page 164 of Alger's History, we read: "A part of the cavalry division which first attacked Kettle Hill, *did not advance on San Juan Ridge at the time of the assault by Kent's infantry division. The 1st Volunteer Cavalry, under Colonel Roosevelt,* as well as parts of the Regular regiments which captured Kettle Hill, *did not join the infantry in its charge on San Juan block-house* and that portion of San Juan Ridge to the left of Santiago Road, commonly known as *San Juan Hill.*"

The "Kettle Hill" here referred to, was a low, steep knoll, surmounted by a farm house and some huge iron caldrons—whence its name—to the right of San Juan Ridge whereon were the main Spanish entrenchments, and separated from them by an open, grass-covered glade, a third of a mile wide. "Kettle Hill" therefore presented the first obstacle to the American

advance, and was held by a skirmish line of Spaniards, who quickly gave way before the attacking force, consisting (according to Alger, p. 157) of "one squadron of the 1st Cavalry, the 9th Cavalry (colored), and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry (under Colonel Roosevelt), who all charged together over the crest."

And here, according to the best authorities, the gallant Rough Riders rested on their laurels. Having easily dislodged the Spaniards from this unimportant and slightly defended hillock, they calmly watched their comrades, the Infantry division led by Hawkins and Kent, storm and capture the main Spanish position on top of San Juan Hill.

Historian Alger—who was Secretary-of-War Alger when this history was in the making—very cleverly makes Historian Roosevelt himself corroborate his account of the disposition of the troops in this battle, by citing an isolated paragraph from the "Rough Riders," pp. 134-136: "No sooner were we on the crest of Kettle Hill than the Spaniards from their line in our front, where they were strongly entrenched, opened fire upon us with their rifles and two pieces of artillery. . . . On the top of the hill was a huge iron kettle, probably used for sugar refining. Several of our men took shelter behind this. *We had a splendid view of the charge on San Juan block-house to our left and a third of a mile to the front,* where the Infantry of Kent, led by Hawkins, *were* climbing the Hill." . . .

The average reader will wonder how he missed this tell-tale paragraph in Colonel Roosevelt's book, which somehow or other conveys such an impression of Rough Rider valor and omnipresent activity, that one forgets all other participants in the war, and agrees with Mr. Dooley that the book should have been named "Alone in Cuba." Surely Historian Alger has made a mistake. We turn to the indicated page incredulously. No, there it is as quoted, securely sand-

wiched between Rough Rider acts fore and aft in the rapidly moving picture—paeans to right of it, paeans to left of it. Yet obscured as it is by the more important business (in the mind of the author) of glorifying the Rough Riders, and completely lost as it has been in all the shouting evoked by the publication of the myth; here is the statement in plain black and white from their gallant commander himself, that, instead of *leading* the charge on the San Juan block-house, the dashing troopers (including their commander) *viewed it* from behind the sugar kettle a third of a mile away!

We never could have believed it upon any other authority, though other authorities are not lacking. The military reports of General J. Ford Kent, of Captains A. C. Markley, Henry Wygant and Charles Dodge of the 24th Infantry, all of whom took part in the San Juan Hill charge, make no mention of Colonel Roosevelt or the Rough Riders. Captain Herbert H. Sargent's book on the Santiago campaign, and General Shafter's (Commanding General) Report in 1898, establish the fact that Las Guasimas was a cavalry fight, but that the victory at San Juan was due primarily to the Infantry.

Moreover the Cavalry division was only one-sixth of the strength of the corps actively engaged before Santiago on this July 1st, and the Rough Riders made up but one-fifth or less of the Cavalry. So that the whole Rough Rider organization counted not more than one-thirtieth in the fight, and their commander—directing only about 500 men out of 16,000—could not have had any great influence upon the result.

Commenting on Roosevelt's statement that, at a certain stage of the battle he "found himself at the front, in command of fragments of all six regiments of the Cavalry division," John W. Bennett asks: "What had become of Wheeler, Sumner and Wood? not to speak of the other brigade and regimental officers, many of

whom, down to lieutenant-colonel, must have outranked Roosevelt? Did they all think themselves in command of all six regiments? Participants in a battle rarely get the true historic perspective, or properly gauge their own or the part borne by others in the fight. Disinterested civilians like Bonsal say the Infantry took the Hill and the Cavalry came afterward. This seems to be the Fact."

It long ago became apparent to the country, that there was not enough glory in that Spanish-American imbroglio to "go around."

Barring the Sampson-Schley controversy, and the Dewey Parade, most of the participants—even including Richmond Pearson Hobson—have tacitly agreed that it served its highest mission in furnishing a convenient stage setting for the Rough Rider star actor,—and to let it go at that. By the time the 5th Army Corps were mustered out on Long Island in the summer of 1898, Theodore Roosevelt, commander of 500 men in an army of 16,000, loomed bigger than every living soldier in the Republic!

Such things are incredible, and inexplicable to the understanding of the ordinary individual, but it is all clear as day in the mind of the press agent.

The New York Sun of date June 28, 1908, under an editorial caption, "Once More the Old Fiction," calls attention to the recurring persistence of this San Juan Hill fable every time a Rough Rider dies (or gets himself arrested for disorderly conduct), citing a case in point—an obituary sketch of Lieutenant-Colonel Augur of the 24th Infantry who died at Fort Thomas, Ky., on June 25th—and concludes by severely holding Roosevelt responsible for the wide circulation of the misleading picture, and calls on him to "either suppress the picture, or courageously change the mendacious title."

In view of its present attitude, it must make the Sun

mighty mad to remember (or does the Sun remember?) that this "mendacious" picture of the Rough Rider charge appeared in large type on its own front page on the morning of July 4, 1898. Ten short years make a wonderful difference in the point-of-view sometimes, but the Sun may take comfort in the thought that it is not the first or only great dispenser of truth who has been too hasty in enlightening the world.

Moreover, as appears from Mr. Roosevelt's own account of the San Juan battle, he did not claim to have led the charge on the block-house, but distinctly states that he "viewed" it from the crest of "Kettle Hill"; and as probably for one person who read the book, a thousand read the newspaper story, perhaps the Sun's responsibility for the wide circulation of the mendacious account, is greater than Mr. Roosevelt's.

True, the book ("The Rough Riders") did not appear until 1900, *after* Mr. Roosevelt had been safely elected Governor of New York—"on his war record," according to Leupp—and was on his unconscious way to the White House. True also, that there is nowhere any mention of Roosevelt's having "courageously" denied this "mendacious" newspaper account during the gubernatorial campaign which was "made on it," soothing his conscience no doubt with the mental reservation that he had at least told the truth in his book. As further experience of the Roosevelt conscience, reveals occasions wherein it was appeased on much slenderer grounds, there is no special reason for carping in this instance.

After all, why should the Sun or any other ill-natured stickler for accuracy be raising a rumpus now about the Facts in this bit of Spanish-American history, when Mr. Roosevelt has been enjoying the substantial benefits of the popular fiction for ten years?

Certainly, it is not with any thought of undoing what has been done, or of depriving Mr. Roosevelt of

"PERHAPS, LIKE RIIS, HE HAD LEARNED TO *LOVE* THE PICTURE."

(*Facing page 21.—Rooseveltian Fact & Fable.*)

the fruit of his toil. It is only interesting as a striking instance of the curious and ingenious fashion in which Fable has donned the garb of truth to serve the needs of Roosevelt, and as throwing considerable light on Rooseveltian methods early in his career.

In 1902, Mr. Roosevelt being President, Vereschagin, the famous Russian painter of war scenes, came to Washington, and taking up his abode at Fort Meyer, began his now celebrated painting of the San Juan Hill Charge. By whose order, or upon whose initiative, this was done, no one now living in Washington appears to have any knowledge. There are residents who "remember that an effort was made to induce the Government to buy the picture," but by whom this effort was made no one will undertake to affirm. Certain old newspaper correspondents of Washington remember vaguely seeing the painting "while it was on exhibition at the White House," but the White House ushers are all afflicted with confusing recollections. "It may have been there, or it may not," is the baffling reply to all queries. Inquiry of Wm. Loeb, Jr., as to "when this picture was at the White House?" elicited the illuminating response, that he "has no idea where the picture is now, nor whether any copies of it are extant in Washington." Diligent search in various quarters has failed to discover any "copies" of the painting in Washington.

From a Fort Meyer employee, the writer learned that the picture was sent to New York, after Vereschagin's death in 1904, and sold for $10,000. This Ft. Meyer employee, who was on the spot when the painting was being executed, further vouchsafed the information, that the work was done mostly "under cover," the artist not inviting public inspection; that he (the Ft. Meyer attache) had seen it only once, and was struck with the equestrian figure of the President in the center; that the President came several times to

Fort Meyer during the progress of the painting and was in consultation with the artist.

Perhaps by this time the President had forgotten the details of the battle which he had put into his "Rough Rider" annals; perhaps familiarity with the sight of that horse-back figure in the thick of the fray, had convinced him of its truth; perhaps, like Riis, he had learned to "love the picture," and as we have learned by this time, the President is notoriously "short of memory." The artist, Vereschagin, might have unfolded a tale to set all doubts at rest, but he did not tarry long in this country, after finishing this masterpiece, and thereafter very prudently got himself drowned on board a Russian battleship at the siege of Port Arthur, thereby escaping likely membership in the "Ananias Club."

This San Juan Hill picture, in what it represents, and taken in connection with Historian Leupp's statement that it secured the governorship of New York, is a conspicuous and fitting illustration of the sort of foundation on which was reared this fair structure of Rooseveltian greatness and fame.

CHAPTER III.

"ROOSEVELT'S ROUND ROBIN."

The dictionary definition of "round robin" is: "A petition or manifesto signed by a number of persons, the signatures being inscribed in a circle, so that no one should have precedence of the others"; but whoever imagines Colonel Roosevelt taking part in any business where "no one is to have precedence of the others," does not know the man. This is entirely opposed to the Rooseveltian scheme of things.

There came a time, it is true, when he was none too eager to have the authorship of the Cuban Round Robin ascribed to him, but at the time of the promulgation of that historic paper, he took some pains, as this chapter will show, to have it associated with his name, and to appropriate all the credit for the good results claimed for it.

Biographer Riis calls it "Roosevelt's Round Robin" in his "Roosevelt, the Citizen," and Riis should be good authority on this point. His testimony is reinforced by the New York Tribune and New York Sun of date August 5, 1898, both good Roosevelt witnesses at that time. The Tribune published a dispatch from Santiago de Cuba, date August 3rd, to the effect that Major-General Shafter had summoned all the commanding and medical officers of the 5th Army Corps to a conference, resulting in the framing and sending of the famous Round Robin to the Secretary of War at Washington.

The Tribune further states: "As an explanation of

the situation, the following letter from Colonel Roosevelt to General Shafter *was handed by the latter* to a correspondent of the Associated Press *for publication.*"

Then follows the "Colonel Roosevelt letter": "Major-General Shafter, Sir: "In a meeting of the general and medical officers called by you at the Palace this morning, we were all, as you know, unanimous in view of what should be done with the army. To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or a brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire command north at once. Yellow fever cases are very few in the Cavalry division, where I command one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in this division, except among the men sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I believe, contracted it. But in this division there have been 1,500 cases of malarial fever. Not a man has died from it, but the whole command is so weakened and shattered as to be ripe for dying like rotten sheep when a real yellow fever epidemic, instead of a fake epidemic like the present strikes us, as it is bound to, if we stay here at the height of the sickness season, August and the beginning of September. Quarantine against malarial fever is much like quarantining against the tooth-ache. All of us are certain, as soon as the authorities at Washington fully appreciate the conditions of the army, to be sent home. If we are kept here, it will in all human possibility mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the sickly season, will die. This is not only terrible from the standpoint of the individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the standpoint of military efficiency of the flower of the American Army, for the great bulk of the regulars

are here with you. The sick list, large tho' it is, exceeding 4,000, affords but a faint index of the debilitation of the Army. Not 10 per cent. are fit for active work. Six weeks on the North Maine coast, for instance, or elsewhere, where the yellow-fever germs cannot possibly propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting-cocks, able as we are and eager to take a leading part in the great campaign against Havana in the Fall, even if we are not allowed to try Porto Rica. We can be moved north if moved at once, with absolute safety to the country, altho' of course it would have been infinitely better if we had been moved north or to Porto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much indifference as we face bullets, but there is no object in it. The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing for us to do here, and there has not been since the city surrendered. It is impossible to move into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the sick rate in our present weakened condition, and anyhow, the interior is rather worse than the coast, as *I* have found by actual reconnaissance. Our present camps are as healthy as any camps at this end of the Island can be. I write only because I cannot see our men who have fought so bravely and who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplainingly, go to destruction without striving so far as lies in me to avert a doom as fearful as it is unnecessary and undeserved.

"Yours respectfully,

"THEODORE ROOSEVELT,

"Colonel Commanding First Brigade."

Had not "circumstances" rendered the immediate suppression of this famous epistle expedient for many reasons, besides rescuing the "brave fellows" from the yawning yellow fever peril, it might also have served

a more peaceful but not less noble purpose as a model of English composition in an eighth-grade Grammar School. Mr. Roosevelt's fame as a writer is as widespread as his renown as statesman and warrior, and the inspiration this historic document would impart to the literary buds which flower in the public school atmosphere, as well as the ease with which they could copy its ornate, pellucid style, must commend its use to all progressive and patriotic instructors in English.

On the same page with the "Colonel Roosevelt letter" in the old files of the New York dailies, is found the "Round Robin," addressed to Major-General Shafter, and by him forwarded to the War Department: "We, the undersigned officers commanding the various brigades, divisions, etc., of the Army of Occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be at once taken out of the Island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern sea coast of the United States; that it can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that yellow fever in the Army at present is not epidemic; that there are only a few sporadic cases; but that the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever which is sure to come in the near future. We know from the reports of competent officers, and from personal observations, that the Army is unable to move into the interior, and that there are no facilities for such a move, if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late.

"Moreover, the best medical authorities of the Island say that, with our present equipment, we could not live in the interior during the rainy season, without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever. This Army must be moved at once, or perish.

"As the Army can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for preventing such a move, will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, who understand the situation absolutely.

"Signed: Maj.-Gen. Jos. Wheeler, Maj-Gen. J. Ford Kent, Maj-Gen. J. C. Bates, Maj.-Gen. Adnah R. Chaffee, Maj.-Gen. H. W. Lawton, Brig.-Gen. Sam'l S. Sumner, Brig-Gen. Will Ludlow, Brig.-Gen. Adelbert Ames, Brig.-Gen. Leonard Wood and Col. Theodore Roosevelt."

As appears from the above, the Round Robin was merely the Roosevelt letter boiled down and with the edge taken off. Even thus, it was too much for the military palate of bluff old General Lawton, who accompanied his signature to the memorable petition with the following protest:

"In signing the above letter, I do so with the understanding it has been seen and approved by the Commanding-General. I desire to express it as my strong opinion that the best medical authorities of the Island, and all the surgeons of the command be also required to sign the paper. I desire also to express the opinion that the *mandatory* language used in the letter is impolitic and unnecessary. . . . Milder expressions to those in high authority accomplish just as much, &c., &c."

At this time "the Big Stick" had not been heard of, but General Lawton appears to have caught a prophetic swish of it in the Round Robin, and to have otherwise regarded with suspicion this apparently proper paper.

Needless to add, General Lawton's protest was not "handed to the press correspondent for publication," along with the Round Robin and the Colonel Roose-

velt letter, but found its way with these to the War Department, and is reproduced on page 267 of Alger's History.

However the responsibility for the Round Robin proper may be divided up among the "signers in the circles," there can be no possible question as to the authorship and individual responsibility for the communication signed "Theodore Roosevelt, Colonel, commanding the First Brigade." The only question—one which has rarely if ever been *raised,* be it remembered—is, how did these important communications, carrying such weighty state secrets, and presumably intended only for the confidential ear of the War Department, find their way into the public prints? We know *who* received praise for the action, at the time when it was hastily adjudged worthy of praise, from an editorial which appeared in the New York Tribune of that same date, August 5, 1898: "Colonel Theodore Roosevelt is credited with having taken the initiative in making representations which put any delay in this matter out of the question.

"If the Round Robin was due to his efforts, then his well-known aggressive activity has been of good value to his fellow soldiers, &c."

That the Tribune's view of the matter was not shared by President McKinley and the War Department, appears from Alger's statement: "When President McKinley read the Round Robin for the first time in the newspapers, he became very much excited and indignant. . . . The matter was regarded so seriously that, after a conference at the White House, the following reprimand was cabled to General Shafter: "White House, Washington, August 5, 1898. Maj.-Gen. Shafter, Santiago:

"At this time when peace is talked of, it seems strange that you should give out your cable signed by your general officers, concerning conditions of your

army to the Associated Press, without permission from the War Department. You did not even await a reply to your communication.

"R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War."

To which Gen. Shafter cabled prompt reply:

"To the Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington: The report was given out, as I have learned since, *before* it reached me. I called the general officers together to tell them what I proposed to do, to express to them my views and to ask them to give me theirs. I found we all felt alike. *Someone* then proposed they write me a letter setting forth their views, and I told them to do so. Meanwhile I wrote my telegram, and later it was handed in and forwarded with the letter of the surgeons and that of the officers. It was not until some time after, that I learned this letter had been given to the press. *It was a foolish, improper thing to do,* and I regret very much that it occurred. . . .

"*Roosevelt's letter I know nothing of, nor of what he said.* . . . I have been very careful about giving to the press any information, and I will continue to be so.

"W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General."

This telegram in which Gen. Shafter completely exonerates himself from any complicity or responsibility for the "foolish and improper" publications, is found in full in the New York Sun of issue August 6, 1898, in a dispatch from Washington, on page 271 of Alger's book, with the significant elision (in the book) of the sentence referring to "Roosevelt's letter."

Now then, the New York Tribune of August 5, 1898, stated that the Roosevelt letter had been handed by General Shafter (to whom it was ostensibly addressed) to a correspondent of the Associated Press for publication; but General Shafter, the highest commanding officer of the Army in Cuba, in a cablegram

to the Secretary of War, which is to become part of the history of the country, emphatically denies this statement, and further disclaims all knowledge of the letter or its contents. If there were any missing link in the chain of evidence fixing the responsibility for this publication upon Theodore Roosevelt, it was furnished by Senator Foraker in an illuminating sentence uttered in the Senate last Spring.

Wm. Alden Smith of Michigan had declined to produce in the Senate a letter addressed to him by President Roosevelt, or to confirm a report of it which had appeared in the morning paper, saying he was not responsible for its publication, as he "made it a rule never to divulge any personal communication from the President." (Wise Senator Smith!)

Whereupon Senator Foraker, with his most judicial air, enunciated the following syllogism: "There are but two parties to a letter, the man who writes it and the man who receives it. Since the recipient in this case declares he did not give it to the public, it must have come from the White House."

So it is manifest, the only "two parties" to the Round Robin letter were Colonel Roosevelt and the press correspondent!

Close attention to the subject matter of that letter must convince any candid mind that it was never intended for General Shafter, but for the public to whom it was "handed" without delay. Such a letter intended merely as a private communication to a superior officer is an absurdity, on its face. The minute and expansive details as to the physical features of the Island, and the condition of the Army, addressed to the commanding officer who was on the spot, and supposed to be as familiar with the whole situation even as Colonel Roosevelt himself, must have appeared very Pickwickian to any but the Rooseveltian sense of humor.

The Round Robin letter was the picturesque forerunner of that notable series of "personal communications" which Mr. Roosevelt has thought proper to "hand" to the press before mailing to their lawful recipients; and which have formed such a unique feature of his public career.

Concerning the Round Robin, on page 269 of his "Spanish-American War," Alger says: "Of the Round Robin itself, I have no criticism to offer.

"General Shafter invited his officers to a conference, and himself telegraphed to the War Department their conclusions and recommendations, which was entirely proper for him to do. But I do criticise the agencies through which these alarming utterances were given to the world.

"The publication of the Round Robin at that time was one of the most unfortunate and regrettable incidents of the war. It did not, as commonly reported, result in the selection of Montauk Point, nor hasten the return of the Santiago Army, as every possible effort had already been made, and was then making for the re-patriation of our troops. . . .

"The Round Robin dated August 3rd was not received at the War Department until August 4th, *after* General Shafter had already been ordered to send the Cavalry division back on August 1st, and the entire Army on August 3rd. For reasons of public policy, these orders, as well as the alarming messages received from General Shafter as to the condition of the Army, were not made public. It was therefore generally believed that the 'Round Robin' was responsible for the order issued for the return of the 5th Corps, and for the selection of Montauk Point. As a matter of fact, it had nothing to do with either. . . . On the other hand, the information this startling paper made known, not only brought terror and anguish to half the communities and neighborhoods in the land,

but it returned to Cuba in due time to spread demoralization among our troops. . . . It threatened and might have accomplished an interruption of the peace negotiations then in progress between the United States and Spain, which had reached their most delicate stage at the time when the Round Robin, with all its suggestion of panic and disaster, was made public to the four corners of the earth. That a satisfactory agreement between the two governments was at last reached, cannot be credited to those who precipitately gave out information which might have prevented it. . . .

"Moreover, *the publication of this official letter was a gross breach of army regulations and military discipline;* and through its agency the enemy secured information regarding our situation, when the Government was most anxious to conceal the facts, until the acceptance of the demands of the United States could be secured."

A wayfaring man or a quick-witted child may grasp the proposition,—had a less debilitated foe than Spain been given to understand that disease in the American ranks was fighting on her side, she would not have been o'er hasty in concluding terms of peace. Besides the international complications threatened by the Round Robin publication, Alger thus writes of its effect at home: "It would be impossible to exaggerate the mischievous and wicked effects of the Round Robin. It afflicted the country with a plague of anguish and apprehension. There are martyrs in all wars, but the most piteous of these are the silent, helpless, heartbroken ones who stay at home to weep and pray and wait—the mother, sister, wife, and sweetheart. To their natural suspense and suffering, these publications added the pangs of imaginary terrors. They had endured through sympathy, the battle-field, the wasting

hardships of the camp, the campaign in the tropics, the fever-stricken trench.

"They might at least have been spared this wanton torture, this impalpable and formless, yet overwhelming blow." (Span.-Am. War, p. 273.)

And there was yet another feature of the Round Robin episode, which has not been much exploited, and which places the insistent demand of the noble Rough Riders to be removed from Cuba in no very heroic light.

In order to relieve the 5th Army Corps at Santiago, five regiments of U. S. Volunteers—so-called "immunes"—were ordered there for garrison duty, and of this Alger says: "As soon as the announcement was made that the "immune" regiments were to be sent to Santiago, many protests were received against such action. No attention, however, could be paid to these communications."

One of these protests, sent by Senator Bacon of Georgia, against allowing the 3rd regiment of Volunteers, a company of young Georgians, to go into the fever-stricken country, set forth the facts, that these young fellows—most of them minors—had not stood any "immune" test; that, as a matter of fact, they were not as much "immune" as the soldiers already in Cuba, and quite naturally, they had no greater relish for being sent there "to die like rotten sheep" than the men who were so urgently seeking to avoid that fate; that, of course, if there were fighting to be done, and *more men* needed, they were volunteers, and ready for action. But to be sent into a pestilential region as a vicarious sacrifice for the soldiers who had reaped the "glory of the fighting" and were now fleeing the pestilence, was a wholly different matter, and did not appeal either to their sense of justice or of patriotic duty.

Doubtless considerations of this nature formed the

basis of the "many other protests" filed with the War Department. But as Secretary Alger relates, "no attention could be paid to them." The fiat had gone forth. The star actor in the gallant Rough Rider show had heard the curtain call in New York—he must away! The 5th Corps must be repatriated, and the "immunes" must take their chances with the fever.

On page 271 of Alger's book, occurs this statement: "Every possible effort was made to ascertain the name of the person responsible for its (the Round Robin) publication, that he might be called to proper account for the act, but in vain."

It is very painful to encounter a snag like this in the smooth current of an apparently truthful narrative, and from the pen of a man whose historic integrity is above reproach. But there are extenuating circumstances. A present United States Senator who served in the Cuban campaign, is authority for the statement, "Alger *knew who* was the author of the Round Robin mischief, and made no secret of his wrath in a conversation I had with him on my return from the war." There is other evidence that the Secretary of War was not suffering from any delusion regarding the military character of the Rough Rider commander.

On the same date (August 5, 1898) on which it published the Round Robin and the "Colonel Roosevelt letter," the New York Sun, in a dispatch from Washington, published an interesting bit of correspondence between Colonel Roosevelt and the Secretary of War of a previous date, July 23rd, which the dispatch stated the Secretary had just given out for publication. This ran as follows: "Santiago de Cuba, July 23. My Dear Mr. Secretary: I am writing with the knowledge and approval of General Wheeler. We earnestly hope that you will send us most of the regulars, and at any rate the cavalry division, including

the Rough Riders, who are as good as any regulars, and *three* times as good as any state troops, to Porto Rica.

"There are 1,800 effective men in this division. If those who were left behind were joined to them, we could land at Porto Rica in this cavalry division close to 4,000 men, who would be worth easily any 10,000 National Guards armed with black powder, Springfields, or other archaic weapons, &c., &c., &c.

"Very respectfully,

"THEODORE ROOSEVELT."

Following this, the Sun gives the rebuke which was cabled to Colonel Roosevelt: "Your letter of the 23rd is received. The regular army, the volunteer army, and the Rough Riders have done well, but I suggest that, unless you want to spoil the effects and glory of your victory, you make no invidious comparisons. The Rough Riders are no better than other volunteers. They had an advantage in their arms, for which they ought to be very grateful.

"R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War."

The hero-worshippers were scandalized by this publication, and the obedient press "wondered *why* Secretary Alger wanted to *publish* a correspondence of this sort"; even as Secretary Alger doubtless wondered *why* Colonel Roosevelt wanted to publish a correspondence like the Round Robin.

"The Rough Riders *are no better* than other volunteers!"

The promulgation of this new and strange and audacious doctrine stamps the promulgator as a man of exceptional moral courage. But Alger resigned from the War Department in 1899—probably in disgust—and his "Spanish-American War" did not appear until 1901, *after* Mr. Roosevelt, by the death of McKinley, had succeeded to the presidency.

There is a rumor—which the writer of this took

some pains to verify—that the Alger History was edited, revised and partly written by a well-known newspaper man of Washington. Ah! Now the light breaks on what was before enveloped in mystery. Under the deft, discriminating touches of one of those clever, chameleon artists who manufacture editorials for the Washington local press, one understands how the incriminating sentence, "I know nothing of the Roosevelt letter, nor of what he said," disappeared from the Shafter telegram. It is perfectly clear likewise, how the Roosevelt letter itself, and all reference to it, or to any possible connection he might have had with the Round Robin, were most carefully omitted from the Alger book. For these Washington artists are thoroughly imbued with the conviction—handed to them with their salaries—that there is no crime in the category like *lese majeste* toward the White House throne. Historical accuracy, individual conviction, and every other consideration must be sacrificed to the paramount duty of making the "present administration"—whatever its complexion and while it lasts—in all its details and appurtenances, "one grand, sweet song!"

But while this explains the misleading paragraph and the significant omissions in the Alger book, it does not explain the "conspiracy of silence" between the War Department, the military authorities in Cuba, and the New York press—all of whom had knowledge of the facts—to shield *Colonel* Roosevelt in the Summer of 1898 from the consequences of his "gross breach of army regulations and of military discipline"—according to Alger.

To understand this, one must review the political situation in New York at that time. The Republican outlook in that State was not a cheerful one,—as the managers themselves admitted. Governor Black's overwhelming plurality in 1896 had given an extra

reckless swing to the Platt machine. The "Boss" interpreted the sweeping Republican victory as a special tribute to his personal popularity. But Governor Black no sooner began to rule than he began to blunder. Then the Canal scandal was unearthed, revealing $3,000,000 of the people's money wasted and stolen by Republican leaders and heelers. To re-nominate Black, with all the sins of his administration crying to Heaven, meant certain defeat at the polls; and no other available candidate was in sight. Finally after a gloomy conference, one of the leaders remarked to another, "If Teddy comes home a hero, we will nominate and elect him governor." That settled it. "Teddy *must* come home a hero!"

In that same historic summer of 1898, Richard Croker was accredited with the cynical remark, that "no man need be nominated for governor of New York, who could not show at least one scar received in the Cuban fight."

And so it came about, as set forth by Historian Leupp that "Teddy" made his campaign for the governorship upon his "war record," and "court-martial proceedings" would not have looked well in a "war record" employed in such a noble cause. John W. Bennett in his (pp. 102-12) "Roosevelt and the Republic," gives an interesting account of another important factor which entered into this far-reaching gubernatorial campaign. Bennett relates that Roosevelt made a bargain with the "Citizens' Union"—the Independent organization of New York who were encouraged by the peculiar political muddle to put out a ticket—to accept their nomination, upon condition they would allow him to use the backing of the Independents as a "club" to force the regular Republican nomination; with the further understanding that if he failed to secure the Republican nomination, he would be free to reject the Independent nomination also. To

this the Independents agreed, stipulating in their turn, that they would select the other names on their ticket, and that not all of them would be Republicans. To this, Roosevelt agreed also, and thus they parted, with the distinct understanding that *if he ran for governor at all,* he was irrevocably committed to the Independent nomination. The Republican nomination was to be additional. Thus the agreement stood for weeks, while the Independents perfected their organization—involving some statutory complications—and earnestly canvassed the State in Roosevelt's behalf. Then when this Independent side-show had served the purpose for which he had engaged it—that of capturing the Republican nomination—Roosevelt calmly threw over the Independents, and took up his political headquarters in the camp of Platt, Odell & Co.—the very men whom he had covenanted with the Independents to overthrow. The Independents, astonished and aggrieved, contented themselves with publishing the facts and naming another candidate, but too late to do any effective work for him. They had "shot their bolt" for Roosevelt, and it was past recall. Commenting on this episode, Bennett says: "If a cleverer piece of political manipulation can be found in the history of the United States, it has escaped our notice. Roosevelt demonstrated himself a past master at the game of politics. Squeamish persons might object to the bad faith involved, but they make the mistake of judging Roosevelt by ordinary standards.

"What would have been rank trickery in Platt, Quay, or Gorman, might be quite laudable in a gentleman of high and holy motives, seeking an end much to be desired."

Roosevelt had not had the nomination many weeks before his astute political sagacity warned him that he would be beaten unless he broke the policy of silence imposed on him by the Platt machine, and openly de-

nounced the Canal thieves. Taking his cue with the promptitude of the born actor, he rushed through the State, carrying a few Rough Riders along as a reminder of his "war record," declaring from the rear end of his car at every stop that, "*if* there were Canal thieves, they should be punished." By dint of working both roles at once, as military hero and civic reformer, ably assisted by the substantial efforts of the Republican machine and the contributory blunders of Richard Croker, our Strenuous hero attained his goal —the State House at Albany, by a narrow plurality of 17,000 votes, as contrasted with Gov. Black's plurality of 212,000, two years previous, and Odell's plurality of 111,000, two years later. After all, the "war record" may have had a great deal to overcome in the way of reluctance on the part of voters to support this particular hero and reformer. And the "Round Robin" incident, which was a part of the "war record," was completely relegated to the limbo of oblivion, dropped from the stage properties henceforth.

But for those silent witnesses, the yellowed files of the New York dailies of ten years back, there is no scrip nor sign to show that Mr. Roosevelt ever had any connection with the once famous document.

True, the devoted Riis, who has the happy faculty of turning every Rooseveltian act into a paean of praise, in his book (which was not brought out until his hero became President) speaks of it: "The Colonel of the Rough Riders at the head of his men on San Juan Hill, much as I like the picture, is not half so heroic a figure to me, as Roosevelt in this hour of danger and doubt, shouldering the blame for the step he knew to be right!"

This is interesting as showing to what maudlin lengths of misrepresentation even a good man may go, when he resigns himself unreservedly to the transports of hero-worship, and also as pointing to the fact

that *Riis also knew* Roosevelt to be the author of the Round Robin.

So far from "shouldering the blame for what he knew to be right"—tho' everybody else knew it to be wrong—there is every reason to believe Roosevelt tried to affix the blame of the publication—if blame there should be—upon Gen. Shafter, by authorizing the New York Tribune's statement that "Gen. Shafter had handed the letter to the press correspondent." If Col. Roosevelt did not authorize that statement, who did?

He and the press correspondent were the only two individuals who had any knowledge of the letter prior to its being given to the public.

Perhaps the correspondent just *dreamed* Gen. Shafter handed it to him.

President Roosevelt was rather severe upon a "conspiracy of silence" some years later, when Negro soldiers were the guilty party; but will the American people render harsher judgment in the case of negroes—following a blind racial instinct—than in the case of the highest military and governmental officials in the land? It was a curious trick of Fate, that the *beneficiary* of the Round-Robin "conspiracy of silence" should by means of it, mount the steps of his judgment-throne to pass sentence upon the negroes! Unless the Roosevelt sense of humor is an inappreciable quantity, he must smile to himself over this sometimes.



"MOUNTED THE STEPS OF HIS JUDGMENT-THRONE
TO PASS SENTENCE ON THE NEGROES."

Facing page 41.—Rooseveltian Fact & Fable.

CHAPTER IV.

"ROOSEVELT-REFORM" LEGENDS.

Of all the plastic poses struck by Mr. Roosevelt before an admiring public, the one which suits him best is that of "reformer." Out of the entertaining notion that the universe somehow revolves about his belt, was evolved that other engaging idea that everything was wrong until he touched it. With him, to see is to condemn, and having condemned, the natural and logical business is to "reform." He would have "reformed" all those faulty statesmen and so-called "great men" of the Past, had they not considerately passed off the boards before he came up with them. Having escaped in the flesh, he was forced to content himself with assailing their memories, and pointing out to this generation of deluded Americans, the radical defects and moral deformities of such men as Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Monroe, Morris, Otis, Samuel Adams, and Patrick Henry; while Aaron Burr and Jefferson Davis are selected to point the moral and adorn the hideous tale of American treason. All these weighty deliberations, and infallible estimates were made up by the author at the mature age of thirty, and handed out in his Lives of Benton and Morris, and his "Winning of the West."

Any Rooseveltian admirer who has not yet found opportunity to become acquainted with his hero in his capacity as a maker of literature, should take a day off and read some of these marvelous literary creations. It will be hard work, but it will repay the trouble, in

the illumination it will shed on the writer's order of intellect and cast of thought; more especially on that bumptious arrogance and "cock-suredness" which hath ever characterized the great thinkers of all ages.

Having settled the case of the dead statesman in his books, Mr. Roosevelt next turns his attention to their living prototypes, the politicians, who, as everybody knows, are always in need of "reforming."

So hot has been his pursuit of their manifold wickedness, and so faithfully have the newspaper claquers heralded the proceedings, that the average American who absorbs his knowledge of men and affairs from his morning paper between morsels of toast and coffee, who reads no histories, consults no official records, and wastes no valuable time putting two and two together to reach a conclusion not being voiced by the crowd—is morally certain that Roosevelt is the greatest civic reformer that ever came down the American pike; and that whenever he passes in the neighborhood of Thomas Circle in Washington, the bronze statue of Martin Luther trembles on its base. Equally certain is this well-informed average American that all the "wicked trusts" and "high financiers" in the country are cowering in their predatory lairs, in hourly expectation of a blow from the Big Stick.

It will be an interesting, tho' difficult and delicate task, to investigate these "reform" legends which have taken such a hold on the popular mind. But we shall ask these plain, every-day Americans, those who toil and spin, and love and hope; those who have no special interest in fostering delusions—either in themselves or in others—about the "governing class," to travel with us a little way into the realm of Fact.

Let us get right down to "brass tacks"—the historic and official records—and find out for ourselves *what has actually been done* by this Strenuous "reformer" who is claiming so much glory for his performances.

"HE MAKES THE BRONZE STATUE OF MARTIN LUTHER TREMBLE ON ITS BASE."

(*Rooseveltian Fact & Fable.*)

We have seen how he toyed with the Civil-Service law, passed by the New York Legislature during Governor Cleveland's administration; have seen also how lightly he shed his "reform" garment to don the partizan regimentals of Blaine in 1884. After Blaine's defeat, finding his old Reform associates in New York look somewhat coldly on him, Roosevelt sought the seclusion of the Dakota wilds, and solace for his wounded spirit in the warm blood of grizzlies and other roaming beasts. It was here he acquired some acquaintance with, and taste for, cow-boy life and manners. Here also, he is supposed to have gained in a few months, that intimate knowledge of the habits and peculiarities of the wild creatures—denizens of the forest, field, air and water—which was to throw confusion and terror into the ranks of the "nature-fakirs" (some of whom had vainly devoted their lives to the same study) in after years.

From the Dakota wilds, our hero answered the partizan call from his native State to come back and carry the Republican standard in the mayoralty contest of New York in 1886, when Henry George and his Socialistic followers were threatening "property and respectability" in that city.

The result was the election of the Tammany candidate, and Roosevelt came out a poor third in the voting. This was not particularly flattering, but then he *had saved the city* from the "anarchists"—saved it to Tammany and the "interests," and laid another votive offering before "the star-eyed goddess of Reform!"

As a reward for his active services in the Harrison-Cleveland campaign of 1888, Roosevelt asked to be made Assistant Secretary of State. But Blaine, the then premier, opposed his appointment, having no fancy seemingly for this aggressive and self-assertive trouble-maker to complicate affairs of state in his Department. Such is the short-lived gratitude of princes

and "plumed-knights." Foiled in this design of advancing his position among the "governing class," Roosevelt was forced to accept the humbler office of Civil-Service Commissioner.

But by the attention this attracted, from the flamboyant methods of the new incumbent, it suddenly took rank with the most important offices in the Government. The pioneer work done by Cleveland, Eaton, Lyman, and others, had cleared the way and assured the popularity of the "merit system." The new Commissioner was taking no risk in championing it, and he had no sooner warmed his seat than through effusive magazine articles, he was telling the country all about Civil-Service. He lambasted its "enemies"; courted newspaper controversies with congressmen and senators who had been heard to criticise the system. An unsympathetic observer remarks: "It was not *his* fault that these men were prominent, nor his misfortune that, because of their prominence he could by means of these controversies mount into the public view."

The work which had hitherto been done quietly and unostentatiously, was now done clamorously and in big type. Historian Leupp unconsciously confirms this: "Whoever expected Mr. Roosevelt to remain long hidden in any position, however insignificant, did not know the man. . . . Hence it came about that on Mr. Roosevelt's entrance into it, the Civil-Service Commission, for the first time since its foundation, threw open its office doors freely to all comers. *The newspaper correspondents in Washington were made welcome, and furnished with any information that* could properly be given out."

Naturally enough, the eyes of the country were frequently turned toward the Civil Service Commission, where "the thunderous Roosevelt always held the center of the stage." Just as naturally the impression

grew that here was the original if not the only C. S. reformer.

Biographer Riis tells us: "He found 14,000 Government employees under Civil-Service rules, and left 40,000." Riis likewise makes the unblushing statement: "In the New York Legislature he had *forced through* a civil service law that was substantially the same as he was here set to enforce (as C. S. Commissioner)."

We have seen how he "forced it through," by declining to honor it with his vote!

Pushing aside fulsome biographies and "inspired" newspaper reports, let us for a little while inspect some facts and figures taken fresh from the books of the Civil-Service Commission. At the end of Arthur's administration and the beginning of Cleveland's regime, there were in the classified service about 14,500 places out of a total 125,000. During his first term President Cleveland by executive orders, added 7,000 places to the classified service; natural growth added 5,000 more. So that when Cleveland left office in 1889, the date of Roosevelt's entrance as Commissioner, there were approximately 28,000 employees under civil service rules, representing a gain of nearly 100 per cent. in four years.

Civil Service reform made slow progress under President Harrison, until he was defeated for re-election, and then, Jan. 5, 1893—two months before he must yield the place to President Cleveland, Harrison, by executive order, placed all the free-delivery post-offices under the classified service.

By this "eleventh-hour" coup, 7,660 places were added to the classified list, and 7,660 *Republicans* were threby made secure from the anticipated assaults of Cleveland's hungry followers. Before this, Harrison had added only about 350 other places in the three years of his administration, and yet this shabby par-

tizan trick has been charged up on the credit side of Mr. Roosevelt's Civil-Service account!

When Cleveland returned to the helm, he resumed the extension of the classified list, placing therein teachers in the Indian schools, meat inspectors, messengers in the Departments, and watchmen. Smaller customs-houses, steamship mail clerks, railway mail clerks, and many excepted places in the postal service were also included. Roosevelt resigned in May, 1895, to become Police-Commissioner of New York City, but the Civil-Service Commission appears to have wagged along pretty well without him.

The Treasury Department, Pension agencies, Indian affairs, and the Government printery were all successively brought under the Commission, and by the Cleveland order of May 6, 1896, nearly half the places in the executive list were brought under C. S. rules, a gain of 25 per cent. since Harrison's exit. A recent writer on Civil Service says: "Cleveland was also accused of getting his partizans under cover of Civil Service before giving up his official ghost; but as his sweeping order was made nearly a year before his term expired, and his work in the same direction had been so consistent throughout, the charge has little force.

For practical, consistent work, Cleveland stands head and shoulders above every other presidential civil-service reformer. While his work was done quietly and simply, it was thorough, greatly strengthening the weak places, and striking down evasion and fraud." The same writer speaks thus of Roosevelt: "Without adding to or subtracting from Roosevelt's record as C. S. Commissioner, we may say he was an efficient officer, despite his bluster and grand-stand posing. . . . Aside from the clamor of it, however, his record is in no sense extraordinary. Had Roosevelt never been connected with the Civil-Service Commission, it is more than probable the cause would be

just as far advanced. . . . Effective fighting was done by his predecessors and by his overshadowing chief. His work in the Commission was that of a faithful, but noisy and spectacular, tho' very ordinary officer, nothing more."

Certain is it, that but for Harrison's "eleventh-hour" stroke, for the protection of his partizans, his administration—under which Roosevelt served the bulk of his term as Commissioner—would have meant very little for the cause of Civil-Service reform; and but for Cleveland's timely return to power to swell the classified list during the last two years of Roosevelt's term as Commissioner, there would have been no such plethoric array of Civil-Service *figures* for anybody to translate into Roosevelt "reform" glory.

So much for his Civil-Service halo, which suffered further tarnishment during his administration of the presidency. Historian Leupp gives an amusing account (Leupp didn't intend to be amusing) of Roosevelt when Commissioner, assembling all the Southern newspaper representatives in Washington, and bidding them spread the glad tidings throughout the benighted and poverty-stricken Southland that *He*—Roosevelt, was now at the helm; and that it was his magnanimous desire that the blessings of Civil Service fall equally upon the descendants of the secessionist and the slave-driver. Leup adds, with charming naivette: "The effect was magical. The examinations on the Southern routes began to swarm with bright young fellows, to whom, by the then modest standards of the South a *salary of* $1,200 *was riches!*"

It is very painful to have to subtract anything from Mr. Roosevelt's *Southern* credit-sheet, but facts are facts, and this is a true story.

That the South has found a better use for her "bright young fellows" than to permit them to stagnate in the executive Departments at Washington, is

abundantly proven by the notorious fact, that far fewer men from the South have been caught by the departmental lure than from any other section of the country. The heads of the C. S. Commission will tell you to-day, that despite the cordial invitations extended not only by Roosevelt, but by several of his successors, the examinations on the Southern routes have *not* "swarmed" with applicants, and that all efforts on the part of the Commission have been unavailing to induce Southern young men to abandon more independent, not to say more lucrative jobs at home. It is no exaggeration to say that, with the South's industrial renaissance, at any time during the past twenty years, a thoroughly efficient cotton buyer or travelling salesman received more salary—some of them twice as much, as Mr. Leupp says, "by the South's modest standards," was accounted "riches." It is not improbable that the South's standard of riches and of most other things, is not more "modest" than are Mr. Leupp's demands on the public credulity with his Roosevelt fairy tales.

Having exhausted all the arts of the press-agent in the office of the Civil-Service Commission, Roosevelt wearied of the place, and and turned his eyes toward New York—"the storm-center." He was accredited with congressional aspirations at that time, and in order to get himself prominently before the people, Leupp says, "he yielded to Mayor Strong's solictations" to become the head of the re-organized Police Commission.

Another authority says Mayor Strong offered him the position in response to a timely suggestion from one of Roosevelt's friends, that Roosevelt would like to have it. That is immaterial. Friends and foes alike testify that he made a good police commissioner, one of the best New York has had. Bennett says of him in this capacity: "Roosevelt is an excellent censor of

commonplace morality. He appreciates order and respectability. Order and respectability are the things policemen are designed to enforce. Roosevelt was in his element."

He was also in his element in being assigned the agreeable task of castigating Tammany offenders. Of all his "reform" roles, none has given him such holy joy as that of the Republican St. George slaying the Tammany dragon. Parkhurst, the fiery zealot, in his crusade against police rottenness, had blazed the way; Mayor Strong, elected on the reform wave, had reorganized the Board. Everything was in readiness for the coming of Roosevelt,—and he came. Needless to say, the work of reform went on merrily, and with the usual brass-band accompaniment.

As it had been in the C. S. Commission, so it was in the Police Board, *the doors were thrown wide open to interviewers,* and for months the city talked of Roosevelt and police,—to the secret joy of certain "high financiers" who knew the people thus harmlessly engaged, would not keep such close tab on their maneuvers. Of which, J. W. Bennett testifies: "Roosevelt and Parkhurst, both resonantly honest, cast out real Tammany devils whose numbers were legion, while the 'Interests,' silently, deftly, swiftly, captured New York public privileges richer than Golconda."

So intent was the Strenuous commissioner in impressing his own righteous will upon the New York police system, that he ruthlessly trampled police statutes, which to mere ordinary thinkers might seem to make for fairness. One of these was that no man should be dismissed from the service without a trial, and the Commissioner's action was reviewable by the courts. Another was, that policemen should be chosen by competitive examination. During Mr. Roosevelt's administration of police affairs, 100 men "walked the plank" without trial; and the *candidates* for examina-

tion, *were chosen by himself*—he of course being the best and final judge of their fitness! When as an Assemblyman, he had been appointed to investigate Tammany wickedness, he had found this arbitrary selection of men by the Police Board, a final sign of partizan depravity.

Historian Leupp finds it necessary to "explain" this apparent inconsistency, as he does many other things in his "campaign life" of Roosevelt.

Leupp evinces occasional glimmerings of the fact (of which Riis appears wholly oblivious), that there may be somewhere abroad in the land *a different* view (erroneous of course) of the Roosevelt acts from that so enthusiastically held by himself and other members of the "Tennis Cabinet"; or at least that *some* of these acts are susceptible of being "misjudged" by some perverse and mischievous critic. And so Apologist Leupp puts forth with impressive gravity a blanket "explanation" of all suspicious Roosevelt acts: His hero, tho' a man of lofty moral concepts, yet has a saving "practical" side (he owned to this himself later, it will be remembered), which invariably rushes in, in the nick of time, to save his "reform" policies from running to the demnition-bow-wows in the Democratic camp.

This Apologist Leupp calls "sacrificing the lesser to the larger good,"—"the larger good" being always the success of the Republican party, and the personal glorification of T. Roosevelt. The "lesser good" may be most any old thing which happens to conflict with these laudable ends. Should the laudable ends themselves be at variance,—as has occasionally happened—why then the Republican party becomes the "lesser good." Whatever goes or stays, T. Roosevelt *must* have personal glory.

Though opinions differ as to his "reform" methods on the New York police force, there is practical unan-

imity in the testimony that they produced an awful row in the Board. One writer says: "The friction became public, and discipline suffered." He also asserts that, in the factional strife engendered by his methods," "Roosevelt was driven into a corner, and finding himself without support, threw up his hands. Instead of holding on to the end, like a thoroughbred fighter, he *quit,*—like a fake prize fighter, retired under fire, and went to the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, which Friend Lodge had in readiness for him at Washington."

Needless to state, this raconteur is not catalogued among Mr. Roosevelt's admirers. But here is what Apologist Leupp says of that portion of his hero's career: "The result was disappointing. For in spite of a series of notable reforms, the influence of one of his colleagues blocked so many of his projects for improvement, that *he was glad of the chance* afforded by President McKinley's election to go to Washington as Assistant Secretary of the Navy."

Which may, after all, be only another way of stating the same fact.

In his "Roosevelt and the Republic," John W. Bennett does not lavish praise upon Mr. Roosevelt, tho' he exonerates him from any taint of "dollar lust," and says he might have served his country better in the office of Secretary of the Navy, in beating off the rapacious and conscienceless naval constructors who beset the Government at that time, than by the most signal gallantry on the battle-field: "A man of stern integrity in financial matters, such as Roosevelt undoubtedly is, was sorely needed right there to fight American ghouls, rather than Spanish soldiers. . . . There were plenty of volunteers to fight the Spaniards in the field, few to fight the grafters at home."

As to how well the Assistant-Secretary deserved this

encomium from his sometime unsparing critic, as well as to his methods of "beating-off" the pirates with ships to sell, we learn from Leupp's "campaign life," see pp. 107-110. With much explanatory preamble, and apologies on the side, Leupp gives in detail, a dramatic incident in the office of the Assistant Secretary, when he one day surprised him in the act of excoriating an attorney for one of these rascally naval contractors. Leupp would have beat a hasty retreat, but a signal from his chief, rooted him to the spot, and made him an involuntary witness of the verbal storm. The attorney was told in thunderous tones that he "ought to be ashamed of himself to come there day after day, offering his worthless craft to the Government in its time of need," and letting fly a few more fulminating bolts, the chief actor in the one-act farce conclued wrathfully: "No! I don't want any more of your old tubs. The one I bought yesterday is good for nothing except to sink somewhere in the path of the enemy's fleet. It will be God's mercy if she doesn't go down with brave men on her—men who go to war and risk their lives, instead of staying home to sell rotten hulks to the Government!"

Then after the naval grafter had crawled through the small hole adapted to his shrivelled dimensions, the facile actor turns toward his admiring audience with a beaming smile: "You came just in time," he cried. (To be sure, just in time to give it a write-up.) "I wanted you to hear what I had to say to that fellow; not that it would add materially to *your* pleasure, but that it would humiliate him to have anyone else present while I *gave him his punishment*. It is the only way I have of getting even!"

This incident illustrates to a dot the quality of the Roosevelt "reforms." He "got even" with the naval grafter with a verbal castigation, even while confessing

to him that he had bought his "rotten hulks," and as both he and the naval grafter knew—he intended to buy others, and to pay the price demanded, *after* he had satisfied his melodramatic instincts with this childish rodomontade. His responsibility to the Government, and to the American sailors whose lives he was jeopardizing on these worthless ships, does not appear to have weighed on him greatly.

Apologist Leupp says, "It was the best he could do"; that, if he had refused these insecure and high-priced boats, "Heaven only knew where any good ones were coming from to take their places (immediately). . . . He was not the man to waste much time figuring on the consequences. . . . The one fact which stared him in the face was that the Government must have coalers, *and right away!*"

Ah! Here is the Senegambian in the Roosevelt-Leupp puzzle picture. For the Assistant-Secretary to have adopted the resolute and obviously proper course of refusing this worthless craft, and of holding the whole grafting horde up to public scorn until they were forced to furnish better ships, would have *delayed* the war with Spain, in which Roosevelt thirsted to bear a spectacular part. According to his biographers, he had done much "to bring the Cuban controversy to a head"; he admits it himself with commendable modesty, and now his martial spirit, aroused to fever-pitch, would brook no delay.

In his view, the all-important thing was to *rush the war with Spain.* All other considerations were secondary. Here again, he is subordinating "the lesser to the larger good." The "lesser good" in this case was the honor of the American Government; protection to American sailors; and justice to American taxpayers. All these were ruthlessly, but *justifiably* sacrificed to the "larger good" of gratifying Mr. Roose-

velt's military spirit, and subserving his personal ambitions!

The author of "Roosevelt and the Republic" scores somewhat in: "When men and nations stand up to be judged before some higher, more clear-sighted civilization of the future, the part played by many American newspapers and public officers in forcing a war with Spain, will not be a subject of highest praise." How much of this "praise" or condemnation of the future should go to Mr. Roosevelt, may not be determined with exactitude. As is generally conceded, he was a "very busy" Assistant-Secretary. During the frequent and prolonged absences of Secretary Long, the nominal head of the Navy Department, Roosevelt was in entire charge. We all know what it means when Mr. Roosevelt "takes charge" of things; there must be action of some sort. If it were he who sent the Maine on her foolish and fateful errand into Cuban waters, there should be no difficulty in gauging his responsibility for the war.

Even now, ten years from the date of the conflict, without waiting for the light of a future civilization, there is a growing conviction that, that "glorious war for humanity," was neither so glorious nor so humane as it once appeared. Even now, some of Mr. Roosevelt's admirers regret the premature haste of biographers in claiming so much credit for his efforts in "bringing it to a head." True, it made him governor of New York, according to Leupp, and that, in Leupp's and Roosevelt's view, was subserving "the larger good."

It is recorded that when Governor Roosevelt sent his first message to the Legislature, "New Yorkers blinked, rubbed their eyes, and blinked again. Had they after all elected Roosevelt *President?* Or had New York over night become an independent nation?

For the message congratulated the PEOPLE OF NEW YORK on carrying to a successful conclusion 'one of the most righteous wars of modern times!' "

This first message likewise ran the whole gamut of righteous legislation which the new governor wanted enacted at once. He ordered an investigation of the Canal scandal, and that there might be no suspicion of bad faith, he commissioned two Democratic lawyers, Messrs. McFarlane and Fox, to conduct the investigation. The lawyers reported crookedness a plenty, but for technical reasons, clear only to the profession, the offenders could not be prosecuted. In the end, no Canal thieves were punished. The story of the State Trust Co. investigation will be told elsewhere. He dismissed Lou Payn, whose administration of the office of Insurance Commissioner had been notoriously scandalous, but permitted him to go unscathed, and permitted Platt to name his successor. He revived and placed upon the statute-book the civil service law passed by Cleveland and scuttled by Black. He also advocated the Ford Franchise law, a measure to tax the big corporations introduced by Senator Ford, and characterized as a "mild reform, but a step in the right direction."

Some progress was also made in dealing with labor problems, and tenement conditions, but the extent of the Roosevelt achievements in his administration of the governorship, may be inferred from the following summary in the New York Tribune, usually a very friendly critic of Roosevelt:

"His position at the beginning of his term was exceedingly strong, and he might have made it impregnable. Doubtless he has meant to do so, but he has not succeeded. He has rendered himself liable to attacks which it will not be the easiest thing in the world to repel, and is now forced to admit that he needs another term to finish the work which his own indiscre-

tions have made unnecessarily difficult. . . . In case his desire for re-election is gratified, we shall hope to see him grow to the full stature befitting a great office." . . .

And the rest of the "Roosevelt-Reform" legends, are they not written in the book of the Acts of T. Roosevelt, President of the United States?

CHAPTER V.

COURT FAVORITES.

There is a traditional idea, gathered from the histories of dissolute European kings, that it is a final and fatal sign of weakness in a ruler, to be swayed in his executive acts by considerations of personal favoritism. Charles I. of England, and Louis XVI. of France lost their heads through the baleful influence of court favorites. Theodore Roosevelt, as ruler and reformer, has frequently "lost his head"—metaphorically—in cases involving the promotion or protection of his personal favorites, but the American people have not yet acquired the habit of visiting even political decapitation upon such rulers.

The first "court favorite" to turn aside "the strong lance of justice" in the Roosevelt armory was Elihu Root, one time Secretary of War, now Secretary of State, and at the time Roosevelt was enacting the role of "Reform Governor" of New York. Root was also one of the directors of the New York State Trust Company, a flourishing and outwardly impeccable banking establishment. In January, 1900, Mr. Kling of New York presented to the Governor a grave and specific indictment of the management of this State Trust Company, and asked for the appointment of a commission to investigate the Company's affairs. These charges, if true, were enough to send the whole board of directors to the penitentiary for long terms.

The Governor was much moved by these revelations, and declared he must know all the facts. He

appointed former Adjutant-General Avery D. Andrews of New York City as a special investigator in the matter, with instructions to "go to the bottom of it, no matter whom it might affect."

Charles Edward Russell, who wrote an account of the incident, says:

"The State Trust matter properly belonged to the official care of H. P. Kilburn, Superintendent of the State Banking Department. For some reason not officially disclosed, the Governor totally ignored Mr. Kilburn. . . . Whereupon Mr. Kilburn started an investigation of his own." . . .

New York newspapers, taking the scent, conducted a third.

General Andrews finished first. His appointment was telegraphed him on Jan. 12th, and he began work on the 13th. His investigation lasted less than five hours. Then he ceased his labors and returned two documents. One was a report of what he had found, and the other a letter asking to be relieved from further research into the matter. . . . Gen. Andrews was relieved according to his request. No one was appointed in his place; his report was locked up in Albany; and Supt. Kilburn's report coming in shortly afterward, that, too, was consigned to oblivion. . . .

In spite of all demands, the government refused to make either public, to give any idea of the contents of either, or to take any action on either. . . . On March 12 the New York World managed to secure in some way a copy of the Kilburn report (so sedulously suppressed at Albany), and published it practically in full. . . . The country gasped at the official confirmation it contained of the worst charges made by Kling, or hinted at by the newspapers. There seemed no longer a chance to doubt that the official investigation had been muzzled because of the prominence of the persons involved, who now stood forth in the white light, painfully conspicuous. They were:—

"Elihu Root, then Secretary of War,
"John W. Griggs, then Attorney-General of U. S.,
"Thomas F. Ryan,
"William C. Whitney, et al., who were convicted by the evidence of making illegal loans to dummies, politicians, and directors. Lou F. Payn, Insurance Commissioner, was one of the men to profit by the crookedness to the extent of more than $400,000.

"Elihu Root negotiated a loan to the dummy office boy."

Secretary Root has been the brains of the Roosevelt Administration. His cool, guiding hand has toned down many a spectacular performance, and licked "my policies" into some semblance of statesmanship.

It was Root who explained with lawyer-like patience, that certain jingo demonstrations were "acts of war," and when the threatened collision was with a first-class power, it was Root who pointed the way to a graceful back-down. With the exception of Hay, Root, Taft, Hitchcock, and Wilson, whom he inherited from McKinley—the men whom President Roosevelt has collected about him, have been of the garden variety,—these being the fittest instruments to execute the Strenuous will. It is not every Cabinet officer who will permit a President to use him as a messenger boy, see Historian Leupp's explanation of Secretary Gage's resignation from the Treasury Department, pages 73-74. Leupp likewise gives the superfluous information (p. 58): "With Mr. Roosevelt the counsel of valued associates is always welcome, but his decisions he prefers to make himself."

Whoever imagined Mr. Roosevelt following any man's lead? Perish the unworthy thought! But if Roosevelt has used Root, the service has been mutual.

One of the most conspicuous favorites of the Roosevelt regime is General Leonard Wood, the military governor of the Moro country in the Philippines. His-

torian Leupp testifies: "Wood's advancement from a captain's grade in the army medical service to a full major-generalcy in five years, is perhaps the most remarkable recorded in our day," and Leupp ascribes Wood's good fortune in large measure to Roosevelt's grateful recollection of the important part Wood played in making him the commander of the Rough Riders. When on August 8, 1903, Roosevelt raised Wood to the rank of Major-General over the heads of many older and more worthy aspirants, there was a storm of angry protest from many quarters. Brig.-Gen. Thos. M. Anderson, commenting in the Independent, says:

"Wood has been promoted over 67 officers of cavalry, 66 of artillery, and 150 of infantry. He has also passed over 27 adjutant-generals, 16 inspector-generals, 35 quartermasters, 11 judge-advocates, 27 commissaries, 27 paymasters, 49 engineers, and 8 of the ordinance. Lastly, but not least, he has jumped over 70 of his own corps. In all, 596 of higher rank and longer experience passed over in five years! This would seem to indicate that in our generation the scalpel is mightier than the sword."

When the Senate was asked to confirm Wood's appointment in December, 1903, they were at the same time confronted with certain charges against him, which a committee was appointed to investigate. And these were the accusations pointed at the confirmation of Leonard Wood as Major-General:

I. That he never had any military experience, but was merely a regimental doctor; II. that he performed no military services of special distinction and merit during the Cuban campaign, and was made a brigadier-general through personal and political influence; III. that he won his place as governor-general of Cuba by intrigue and undermining his superiors. Letters between Major Runcie and Wood were produced,

showing connivance with Runcie to attack General Brooke, and subsequent mean abandonment of Runcie; IV. that he put his relatives in positions of financial profit in Cuba, and was open to the suspicion of making financial profit himself; V. that he granted a ten-years' concession to the Jai Alai Co., a notorious gambling establishment in Havana, for a material if not a corrupt consideration."

This last charge was preferred by Bishop Canler of Atlanta, Ga.

Senator Henry M. Teller, speaking in the U. S. Senate Dec. 8, 1903, charged Gen. Wood with having maintained a lobby at Washington in the interest of the Cuban reciprocity treaty,—a measure designed to benefit the Sugar Trust and injure American sugar growers, a measure which Senator Carmack wittily characterized as "combining the attractions of a bargain-counter and a missionary-box; a rare opportunity to serve God and get your money back,"—according to its advocates. Senator Teller stated that he and other senators were in receipt of letters from the Governor-General of Cuba, in the interest of this legislation, further affirming: "A more indefensible thing for an army officer to do, could not be conceived of. I venture to say that under ordinary circumstances, any officer who would write such a letter, would be cashiered." Senator Teller also charged that Governor-General Wood, commencing in September, 1901, had sent out letters and telegrams to the alcaldes of the different towns in Cuba, urging them to demand concessions of this character.

The demand in reality came from American owners of sugar lands in Cuba, who were also members of the Sugar Trust.

Whatever the findings of the Senate committee as to these accusations against President Roosevelt's pet army officer,—it is not difficult to guess what they

found when they knew whom they had to please in the findings—Leonard Wood vaulted lightly over the heads of the battle-scarred veterans, and landed in the Moro country with his title of Major-General securely fastened to his coat-collar, and with the additional title of Military Governor of the islands.

Historic precedent and parallel are not wanting for this act of favoritism. It is said the Duke of Marlborough owed his first advancement to the questionable influence of his sister, Arabella. Napoleon received the command of the army of Italy because Barras approved his marriage to the widow Beauharnais. But the favoritism shown Napoleon and Marlborough found justification in their great military careers.

General Wood has not yet given proof of great military capacity, either before or since his promotion. If the standard of military historians be accepted, that nc engagement in which the loss is less than 100, shall be rated as a battle—Wood never commanded even a brigade in battle. But his critics lose sight of the fact that Gen. Wood had enjoyed the advantage of putting T. Roosevelt through his first military paces,—a privilege denied to Marlborough and Napoleon—and what are mere battles in comparison with this great and signal distinction?

Francis B. Loomis was Assistant-Secretary of State when John Hay, by reason of illness, was much absent, and the first duties of the office frequently devolved upon Loomis. When that brilliant Panama coup was executed,—whereby we gained not only an immediate permit to "dig the ditch" between the oceans, but likewise came into possession of some very valuable machinery belonging to the French Panama Company who had abandoned the enterprise, and all for the trifling sum of $50,000,000,—a mere bagatelle, —it was Loomis who in an interesting address before the New York Quill Club, defended the "irregular"

method of acquiring the right of way across the Panama strip, and loudly extolled the President's course. In the language of the Hon. Samuel G. Blythe, Loomis is reported as "handing out a nifty line of language" on this occasion. He represented President Roosevelt as "peering into the future" and seeing the consummation of "this great world enterprise" by his own hand, naturally, he was attracted by the vision. An irreverent critic in the U. S. Senate remarked at the time, that, had the President "peered into the law" as studiously as Mr. Loomis says he "peered into the future," he might have found a shorter as well as a more honorable Canal route across Nicaragua; and some other disgruntled folk have remarked since, that the whole trouble with this inter-oceanic Canal is, that it seems to be a continuous process of "peering into the future"—like Pope's "man who never *is,* but always *to be* blest." But this is a digression. Assistant-Secretary Loomis, in this "interesting" address, quieted all scruples, and made the whole Panama transaction smooth and fair to the minds of the American people. And when this same Assistant-Secretary Loomis later became involved in an embarrassing complication with the Asphalt Trust and the Venezuelan government, Roosevelt was not the man to desert a friend in need.

It appears that adventurous foreigners have for years been going into the Central and South American States, and securing "concessions" from some incompetent or corrupt officials of their governments to pretty nearly everything worth having in the way of natural wealth in those countries. Then these rascally foreigners go home and "capitalize" these concessions, and then the trouble begins. Americans had also been in this concession-hunting business. Back in the eighties, Horatio R. Hamilton of New York had secured asphalt, timber, and navigation "concessions" from somebody in temporary control in Venezuela, promis-

ing in return certain navigable and other improvements in Venezuelan territory, and then proceeded to "capitalize" his Venezuelan holdings in the United States.

There was no pretense of carrying out the stipulations involving outlay by Hamilton or his assignees, but the asphalt mine proved more lucrative than a gold mine to the American stockholders. Miles of city streets were paved from it, by aldermen willing to pay good prices.

The Barber Asphalt Co., the General Asphalt Co., the New York and Bermudez Asphalt Co.,—all different names for the same asphalt combine—were flourishing like green bay trees, when the plucky little Venezuelan President, Castro, decided he would put a stop to this wholesale plundering of his people, and started a suit for the annulment of the franchise.

The success of this suit would accomplish two results not at all approved by the Trust. American cities might get cheaper pavements, and Venezuelans might get some benefit of their own natural resources.

The story of this affair is well told in Bennett's "Roosevelt and the Republic," pp. 186-90: "Those patriotic gentlemen of asphalt fame who had been seeing to it that American municipalities paid $3 a square yard for paving worth $1.50, now invaded Washington to prevent their labors from being undone. Lobbies were organized about the State and other departments. Newspapers scored Castro. Statesmen denounced Castro. He was ambitious, self-seeking, crooked, bent upon holding up saintly foreigners and despoiling them. His country was going to the dogs; he was about to be overthrown. There was a terrible state of affairs in Venezuela. . . . Castro stuck to his text. The suit for annulment went serenely forward. If the concessionaires had a claim, let them press it in the courts of Venezuela. The concession

rested upon Venezuelan governmental authority; its interpretation should certainly rest there also. Castro was at the head of a sovereign nation, the same sovereign nation which was recognized when the concession was accepted. No objection was then made to the authority of Venezuela's government. Then it was giving away the heritage of the Venezuelan people. Now that the Venezuelan government was trying to reclaim that heritage for its people, it would hear no questioning of its authority. Castro's position was unimpeachable. He had justice and law, too, upon his side. . . . Then came forward that pure and ingenuous public servant, Assistant-Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis, one of the high-minded men whom President Roosevelt delighted to honor, and suggested that Castro arbitrate. Castro was barely polite. The courts of Venezuela were open. American concessionaires would get all they were entitled to, no more. . . . Faithfully did the State Department stand by the Asphalt Trust. Diligently, with Francis B. Loomis as spokesman, did the Administration at Washington labor to preserve to the Asphalt Trust its monopoly of the paving material most favored in American cities. . . . The situation became critical when Castro appointed a receiver for the New York and Bermudez Co., and the receiver was mining asphalt and placing it on American markets in competition with the Trust. . . . So insistently did the State Department urge and threaten, that it brought out a protest from the American minister in Venezuela, Herbert W. Bowen. He said he could not properly exert such pressure for the concessionaires, that their cause lacked righteousness. Besides, he was embarrassed by the fact that the former American minister to Venezuela (Mr. Loomis), and the then Assistant-Secretary of State, his superior, had, when in Venezuela, openly pressed against the Venezuelan government claims in which he (Loomis)

had a pecuniary interest. He had used his position for private gain. . . . All this had injured the standing of America's representative in Venezuela, &c., &c."

Naturally enough, this protest from the American minister, falling into the hands of Loomis, who was practically head of the State Department, was not given to the public. On the other hand, the things he required of the minister became more and more galling, until Bowen could stand it no longer, and being unable to make any impression on the State Department, he resolved to appeal to the American people. He gave the story of the whole unsavory mess to the New York Herald which printed it in full. The country will remember the storm which burst on Bowen's head. Bennett thus describes it: "Minister Bowen was angrily recalled by the man whom he had accused. Hot with indignation, Bowen came. Secretary Taft, the general utility man of the Roosevelt administration, was assigned to apply the white-wash. The big Secretary gave the white coat to Francis B. Loomis. It seemed as agreeable to him as a dose of wormwood, but it was done heroically. Mr. Taft has never balked yet at a job set for him by the 'Dutch Uncle,' whose heir-expectant he is. . . . Shades were pretty dark for the thickest coat of white-wash—but it sufficed. . . . Hot in the anger of an honest man, Minister Bowen went before the President and offered to prove his charges to the satisfaction of a disinterested person who might go into them. . . . That was not the point. His charges might or might not be true. He was *undiplomatic*. . . . State Department iniquity could do the Administration no harm while it was unknown to the public. . . . Minister Bowen made it known to the public. . . . He was obviously a traitor to the Administration. . . . No! No! there was no explanation. . . . He had violated diplomatic courtesy. He had been insubordinate. Honesty was all right in its

place, but it was not in a class with courtesy, and subordination in an Administration that was absolutely above suspicion! Minister Bowen was officially branded as an Ananias, Roosevelt himself giving the mud bath. . . . Bowen, who mingled too much blunt and straightforward honesty with his diplomatic tact, retired from the service in disgrace. . . . Loomis was promoted to a ministry and permitted later to drop silently out of sight."

Similar to this, though not quite so flagrant, was the favoritism displayed in the case of Hon. Paul Morton, one-time vice-president and traffic manager of the Atcheson, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, and in 1904-05 Secretary of the Navy in President Roosevelt's Cabinet.

Morton had not, like Loomis and Wood, rendered such conspicuous personal service to his chief, and was not rightfully entitled to the same consideration. He was, moreover, the son of a prominent Democrat, a member of Cleveland's Cabinet; and tho' he himself had sought to avert the consequences of his father's sin by joining the Republican party, and tho' Democratic affiliation was never a bar sinister to Rooseveltian favor when the said Democrats could serve Rooseveltian ends, it was obviously a handicap. Secretary Morton, therefore, could only claim such immunity as is freely extended to all those about the Strenuous person who are obedient to the Strenuous will. This, however, was sufficient to hide Mr. Morton in the day of his threatened calamity, when the Sherman Anti-trust law arose and pointed an accusing finger at him.

On Jan. 9, 1905, one of those impertinent Democrats who ever and anon disturb the placid current of Republican equanimity, arose in the House of Representatives, and offered the following "Resolution of Inquiry Relative to Hon. Paul Morton: Whereas the

traffic manager of the Atcheson, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., gave evidence on Dec. 29, 1904, before the Interstate Commerce Commission, showing that said railroad did on, and after Aug. 19, 1902, grant secret rebates to the Colorado Fuel and Iron Co., said rebates, according to the Chicago Inter-Ocean, amounting to $400,000; and whereas it is claimed, that the effect of this secret rebate was to bankrupt certain competitors; and whereas the head of the traffic department of said railroad during the time this secret rebate was allowed, was the present Secretary of the Navy, the Hon. Paul Morton, who is reported as defending the granting of said rebate, Resolved: I. That the Attorney-General be requested to inform this House whether the act of Mr. Paul Morton in allowing the said rebate to the Col. Fuel and Iron Co. is not in flagrant violation of law, and what steps if any have been taken to prosecute him criminally for said act. II. That this House respectfully asks the President whether it is in harmony with his message of December 6th, wherein he declares it is necessary to put a complete stop to all rebates, and also conductive to the public interests, to retain Mr. Morton as Secretary of the Navy."

Then up-rose that great head of the Judiciary Committee, and devoted friend of Temperance, Hon. John J. Jenkins of Wisconsin, and promptly "moved that both these resolutions be laid on the table," and the thing was done. It is seldom that a partizan majority fails to respond to a call of that kind. Too much publicity had been given the affair, however, to make it easy for a "trust-busting" President to ignore it entirely, and with his usual flourish of trumpets he ordered an "investigation" of the Honorable Paul's guilt. After that, there were some occasional references in the press to the "Judson-Harmon report," which was returned, but never divulged. It sleeps with the re-

port of that New York State Trust Company investigation, and like that, may some day be available to the "future historian." Mr. Morton remained in President Roosevelt's Cabinet until he got ready to retire, June 30, 1905, whence he graduated to the presidency of a big Trust Company, where the salary was much larger, and the "resolutions of inquiry" much less annoying.

President Roosevelt has lavished administration favors upon George B. Cortelyou, having appointed him successively, Secretary of the Bureau of Commerce and Labor, Postmaster-General, and Secretary of the Treasury.

Some persons are possessed of a crude notion that experience and special study of the subjects embraced by the various executive Departments, are essential to the successful administration of them, but Mr. Roosevelt knows that the more Cabinet officers are shifted about, the better they do. And this is exemplified in the case of Mr. Cortelyou.

From the position of private secretary to the President, he was promoted to the head of the new Department of Commerce and Labor. Having remained in this post long enough to learn the state secrets of the "close corporations," Mr. Cortelyou was selected as the most available and effective Manager of the Roosevelt presidential campaign in 1904.

Only when we remember the envious and ill-natured slings about an "accidental President," prior to November, 1904, and how galling were such expressions to a man of Mr. Roosevelt's spirit, can we realize how much was at stake in this campaign, wherein Cortelyou was set the task of silencing all cavil as to Roosevelt's "overwhelming popularity."

Right royally did the Chairman of the Republican National Committee execute his mission. Campaign funds flowed generously, and the sources of supply were carefully concealed from the prying, vulgar

crowd, with the solitary exception of Judge Parker's "malicious" charges, to which no one of course paid any attention after they had been denied by our virtuous President. There is a pretty story, circulated in the newspapers at the time, that after the November returns were all in, the President-elect approached his wife with mock, smiling deference, and the words: "My dear Edith, I congratulate you that you are no longer an accident!" Truer words were never spoken. Just how little of accident (or freedom), and how much of design entered into the result of that election, no one knew better than Roosevelt, except perhaps his faithful lieutenant, Cortelyou, or his "dear friend Harriman."

Manager Cortelyou had earned a promotion, and stepped with a sense of conscious merit into the position of Postmaster-General. From this he mounted to the head of the Treasury Department, to take charge of "Uncle Sam's pocket-book" just in time to help Harriman, Morgan, Hill, Rockefeller, and a few more of the erstwhile "criminally rich," but now "substantial and conservative business men," save the country, not from the wicked Democrats this time, but from a disastrous money-panic which had the temerity and the *inopportuneness* to happen under Roosevelt rule.

But the versatile and resourceful Cortelyou was equal to this appalling event also. He issued Panama bonds, to the amount of $50,000,000, and deposited most of the money thus raised in the State of New York, which had already swallowed up all the money in the country, giving to two banks owned by John D. Rockefeller in the City of New York alone, the sum of $24,000,000. Senator Gore of Oklahoma made the facetious remark in the Senate last Spring, that, if Secretary Cortelyou could only have spared John D. $5,000,000 more, he would have had enough to pay that $29,000,000 fine he owes the Government, without seri-

ous inconvenience to himself. Secretary Cortelyou's next promotion will no doubt be as a high-salaried bank-president.

Mr. Roosevelt's fondness for William H. Taft, whom he has named in the presidential succession, would require a chapter by itself, a chapter also lacking the historic perspective which should give it a place in this book, while the trial is still in progress to determine whether Roosevelt has loved Mr. Taft "wisely, or too well."

A list of the Roosevelt "court favorites" would not be complete, without mention of his barber, Wm. B. Dulaney, colored, whom the President has recently placed on the Government pay-roll as an "expert accountant" in the office of the Auditor of the Navy; tho' Dulaney performs no duties in the office of his appointment, the duties of his nominal position being performed by the other Government employees; and William is only required to draw his departmental salary of $1,600, and to continue his tonsorial attendance upon the President, for another Government salary. In this, Mr. Roosevelt demonstrates both his devotion to the colored race, and to the cause of Civil Service. The former, it seems, should appease to some extent, the wrathful emotions stirred in the Afro-American bosom by the Brownsville decree. But the trouble is, only *one* negro can serve as barber to the President, whilst there are so *many* negroes who are mad about Brownsville!

CHAPTER VI.

ROOSEVELT, THE PREACHER.

"Oh, master! grant us only this, we prithee;
Preach not! but mutely guide to bless, we prithee!
We walk not straight? Nay, 'tis *thou* who squintest.
Go heal thy sight, and leave us in peace, we prithee."
—*Rubaiyat.*

Concerning a ruler of Mr. Roosevelt's many-sided personality, there must of necessity exist various, and sometimes conflicting opinions.

The only Roosevelt trait about which there is practical unanimity of view, with never a dissenting note, is his preaching habit. All agree on this point, however widely they may diverge at others. Rooseveltian critics of every degree, hostile, friendly, serious, jibing, caustic or gay, can all rally on this common meeting-ground to hear Roosevelt, the preacher.

It appears to have been one of his earliest developed tendencies. Riis reveals him to us teaching a Sunday-school class at a tender age, and tho' this appears to have had a stormy sequel—Riis relating that he became involved in a row with the Sunday-School authorities, wherein of course Roosevelt cleaned up the bunch and came off with flying colors—this only adds the heroic touch so necessary to the Riis view of all Rooseveltian performances.

He carried his preaching habit into his public life, and so insistent and platitudinous were his precepts, that they provoked Thomas Brackett Reed's famous

sarcasm, that what he "particularly admired about Roosevelt, was his original discovery of the Ten Commandments." All his public addresses, and even his state papers strongly betoken the moral guide and ethical teacher, whilst his impressive manner of dragging forth some old maxim or well-established truism and stamping it with the bran-new Roosevelt O. K., has conveyed a wide-spread notion of him as "a man of sensitive moral sense" and of deep religious convictions.

It was Drummond who said, "the religious life of a great many people consists entirely of religious phraseology," and taking this standard, one easily comprehends the popular notion anent Roosevelt's "goodness."

His "religious phraseology" has been more abundant and obtrusive than that of any other president or public man the country has produced,—more even than the average pulpit-occupant who is paid to preach.

Wherever he goes, he sets up an impromptu pulpit, and his pious enunciations fall—like the rain and sunshine, upon the just and the unjust—accompanied with a timely warning to the latter to look sharp!

So impressed were some of the patriots in Congress with the great value to the people of this movable presidential pulpit, that when the railroads were restrained (two years ago) from their munificent and indiscriminate practice of handing out passes to everybody unable to pay or walk (like senators, congressmen, federal judges, and such like impecunious persons, including the President of the United States), these congressional patriots promptly voted an additional $25,000 a year for the President's "travelling expenses," in order that "the great unwashed" might not be deprived of the privilege of gazing upon the countenance, and listening to the inspired words of the Preacher.

True, some one (Representative Underwood of Ala-

bama) pointed out, awkwardly enough, that there was a constitutional provision forbidding this sort of thing; and having "the courage of his convictions" in the back of his head, and a copy of the Constitution in his hand, he rose and read it to the astounded and grieved legislators: Article II. Sec. I. (7) Const. U. S.:

"The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, *which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the* period for which he shall have been elected, *and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States or any of them.*"

The Constitutional objector and his supporters were promptly overruled, the discussion taking a non-partisan turn. The Hon. Wm. Bourke Cockran of New York, Bourke the Magnificent, the Oratorical, than whom no man living better knows the value of spontaneous eloquence, gave his voice to the measure, declaring in his impassioned Celtic speech, it would be a shame—for the sake of a paltry $25,000 a year, to deny to *the people* the profit and pleasure of seeing and hearing their Chief Magistrate.

Mr. Sherley of Kentucky did not purpose to let any small, picayunish notions of expenditure enter into *his* large, Blue-grass liberality towards the head of the Nation. The idea advanced by some of the objectors, that the Executive, having all his expenses—except the food on his table and the clothes on his back—paid out of the public Treasury, might, with a salary of $50,000, move about over the country at his own expense, with as much ease as congressmen, Supreme justices, and other public servants, who out of much smaller salaries had also to provide houses, servant-hire, equipages, &c., for themselves and families,—was denounced as rank socialism. The "points of order" leveled at the bill (it having ridden in on a general appropriation bill) were likewise brushed aside,

and the House of Representatives cast its vote in favor of making the people pay the railroad fare of the Presidential circuit-rider.

When the bill reached the Senate, Senator Bailey suggested that, if the measure were so framed as not to become effective until the present Executive had retired from office, and for the benefit of some future President, that would remove the Constitutional objection.

But no, no! That would not answer. The people wanted to hear Roosevelt!

His high moral precepts, his beautiful platitudes anent law and order, his wonderful pronouncements on the evils afflicting the body politic, as well as the governmental remedies implied, when not boldly expressed, must appeal to every patriotic senator as a great means of educating the masses. Senator Tillman, ever on the qui vive for the African in the legislative wood-pile, while conceding Mr. Roosevelt's unusual gifts as a preacher, expressed the fear that the President's travelling companions, in a *campaign year* for instance, might not be such as could properly adorn a preacher's staff. Tillman was tormented with a vision of "Uncle Joe" Cannon, "Little Tim" Woodruff, and other sporty Republican spell-binders accompanying these moralizing and highly instructive pleasure jaunts. Senator Foraker also had doubts about the constitutionality of the measure, and always thoughtful of Roosevelt, Foraker proposed that the resolution be divorced from the appropriation bill, and made a separate and independent bill, so that if the President should wish to veto it, upon the ground of its unconstitutionality (so sure was Foraker that President Roosevelt would not accept any unconstitutional favors), he might do so, without the embarrassment of vetoing the whole Appropriation bill. This thoughtfulness upon Senator Foraker's part turned

out to be wholly unnecessary, since the President promptly signed the bill when presented to him—with never a constitutional misgiving—and it became a law June 25, 1906.

After all, as Grover Cleveland's Irish henchman remarked to him on one occasion: "What is the Constitution, between friends?" And they were all "friends" in that first session of the 59th Congress.

With the Republican President urging the passage of a measure taken bodily out of the Democratic national platform; and all the Republican representatives in Congress forced to vote for it—except Senator Foraker, and "the man with sand" from Massachusetts—Samuel McCall, rancorous party lines were effaced—*almost*. In the noble enthusiasm evoked by the righteous battle for railroad-rate regulation, even the Tillman lion and the Teddy-bear consented to "lie down" for a season; though as might have been expected, they got into a scrap before they rose up.

The battle won, and everybody in fine humor, they were ready to donate an additional $25,000 a year to send the presidential voice crying again into the wilderness, to prepare the way for other gigantic reforms.

The Roosevelt sermons are too long and too numerous to be reproduced in any work of ordinary size, but here are a few sample texts:

"Let *reverence for the law* be taught in schools and colleges, be written in primers and spelling books; be published from pulpits, be *proclaimed in legislative houses,* and enforced in the courts of justice."

"He is the most unsafe adviser who would suggest the doing of evil that good may come."

"The party man who blindly follows party, right or wrong, and who fails to make that party in any way better, commits a crime against the country."

"The people who do harm in the end are not the wrong-doers whom all execrate; but they are the men

who do not do quite as much wrong, but who are applauded instead of being execrated."

"Calhoun's purposes seem to have been in the main pure; but few criminals have worked as much harm to their country as he did. *The plea of good intentions is not one that can be allowed to have much weight* in passing historical judgment upon a man whose wrong-headedness and distorted way of looking at things, produced, or helped to produce such incalculable evil."

"A man is not a good citizen, I care not how lofty his thoughts are in the abstract, *if his actions do not square with his professions.*"

Sometimes the utterances are Delphic in character, like, "We must shackle cunning, as we have shackled force"; and then all the people fall on their faces and cry, "Great is Theodore, oracle and preacher!"

To find fault with the exponent of such immaculate theories is but a thankless office usually. But taking Text Number 6 as our guide, we will now turn from the realm of ornamental philosophy to the considera-tion of a few historic Facts.

CHAPTER VII.

ROOSEVELT AND THE "BOSSES."

"There must be no compromise with official corruption. . . . We can not trust those base beings who treat politics only as a game—out of which to wring a soiled livelihood. . . . The real and dangerous foe is the corrupt politician. . . . No man who is corrupt, *no man who condones corruption in others,* can possibly do his duty by the community."

This is taken from the Rooseveltian repertoire of ornamental texts, but when it comes to the business of advancing his own political ends, Roosevelt immediately becomes "a practical man," and Rooseveltian practice is a far cry from Rooseveltian preachment, as these presents shall demonstrate.

The acknowledged prince of political corruptionists in New York when Roosevelt was seeking the nomination for governor, was Thomas C. Platt,—otherwise designated as "his feline majesty of the U. S. Senate"; and his disciple and lieutenant in political chicanery, was Benjamin B. Odell. When after a conference with these two, Roosevelt learned that in order to secure the Republican nomination, he must break with the Independents whose alliance he had sought, and with whom he had covenanted to overthrow Platt and Odell, he did not hesitate to break faith with his Independent allies and join forces with the corruptionists.

Roosevelt himself refers to Odell as "my trusted friend and adviser in every crisis." This ideal friend-

ship suffered some estrangement, in after years when "the trusted friend and adviser" had nothing more to contribute to the Rooseveltian program—a fate which has not infrequently overtaken the Roosevelt friendships. In the summer of 1900, having announced his wish for another term as Governor, Roosevelt declared: "Under no circumstances could I, or would I, accept the nomination for the vice-presidency," adding, "I am happy to state that Senator Platt cordially acquiesces in my views in the matter." This virtual acknowledgment of Platt domination received very striking and emphatic confirmation some weeks later, when Roosevelt donned his Rough Rider regimentals and went down to Philadelphia, where sat the Republican National Convention, and swearing by all his gods that he "would not be the vice-presidential candidate"—quiescently suffered Platt, Quay and Company to "kick him upstairs" into the vice-presidency!

Various explanations have been given of this episode in the Rooseveltian march of events, some friendly and apologetic, others cynical, and all ingenious. But the episode itself seems to stand out in sufficient bas relief, without explanation of any kind. It was very characteristic and typical of the Roosevelt mode (now very familiar) of fierce charge, and quick surrender. Some have speculated on whether he was really sincere in his clamorous renunciation (we have had so many verbal renunciations from him since) of the vice-presidential nomination, or cleverly scheming to get it. . . . That seems immaterial. The point is, the whole proceeding shows him to have been in the hands of Platt,—Platt, the corrupt political "boss," with whom Roosevelt, the preacher, says, "There must be no compromise." He knew he could not have the re-nomination for Governor, if Platt opposed it; and if Platt wanted him to be the Vice-Presi-

dent, that was all there was in it for Roosevelt, and he was never the man to pass up the only things in sight.

It was an open secret that McKinley didn't want Roosevelt for a running mate, and Marc Hanna, McKinley's manager, who was a "practical" politician of the old-fashioned pattern—with no misleading "reform" frills basted on him—had no fancy for this newly risen Rough Rider type, whose chief political asset was a perennial circus parade.

But Platt, Quay & Co. willed it otherwise, and Platt, Quay & Co. were in the lead in that Convention. Hanna was overruled in the matter of the vice-presidential candidate, and told to confine his personal attention to the "barrel." From this it will appear that Roosevelt as governor had not proved an acceptable quantity to "his Feline Majesty," and this of course is seized upon by the hero-worshippers as presumptive and inductive proof of Rooseveltian virtue. But it was a fact observed by all, that as governor, Roosevelt was openly friendly with "the machine"; he himself had announced before election, in a letter to his friend Leupp (one of those strictly personal communications of his, which in some inadvertent fashion always find their way into the public prints), that, if elected, he "would consult and treat with the leaders—not once, but continuously, and earnestly strive to agree with them on all important questions."

Yet it would be difficult to imagine two men more opposite in temperament and methods, than Platt and Roosevelt,—albeit possessing practically the same standards of political ethics—with the slight balance, if any, going to Platt. It is not surprising that they were not harmonious. Platt himself throws some light on the situation when he says: "It was not that Roosevelt wouldn't do what we wanted. It was the things he did, that we didn't want."

The story of Mr. Roosevelt's unholy "compromises" with the political "Bosses" after he became President, is a long and interesting one, and may be summed up in Friend Leupp's statement that "Mr. Roosevelt cherishes an almost *morbid horror of doing anything to split his party!*"

How is that as a prime qualification for the leading performer in a "reform" programme?

The Pennsylvania appointments, McMichael as Philadelphia postmaster, and McClain (one of the impeccable "city fathers" of Philadelphia) as Internal-Revenue Collector, made early in his administration, show President Roosevelt subservient to the "Boss-rule" in that State. In 1902, the New York Nation stated that Addicks, the giant corruptionist of Delaware—making Platt and Quay almost respectable by comparison—"was made the sole dispenser of federal patronage in that State, having the President's support. In order to appoint an Addicks tool U. S. District Attorney, Mr. Roosevelt passed over the temporary incumbent of the office, J. P. Nields, who was endorsed by nearly every lawyer in the State, irrespective of party, by both federal judges, and the entire judiciary of Delaware. The Addicks tool, W. M. Byrne, was notoriously unfit, having been rebuked in open court by Judge Bradford for neglect of duty, and to take such a man at the behest of Addicks, was unspeakably degrading and humiliating. . . .

"The loathing which the honest people of Delaware and of the whole country felt for Addicks could not have been unknown to President Roosevelt. The facts were beyond dispute. . . . What excuse does the President give for this flagrant compounding with brazen corruption? He says, in effect: that Addicks had 12,000 votes behind him, while his Republican opponents could show but 8,000; that he, Roosevelt, cannot interfere with a factional fight within his own

party; that he is forced to deal with any party leader whom the majority of the party voters send him, and that he must recognize Addicks as he has recognized Platt and Quay." . . .

How is this, as a rule of conduct, for a President "with a sensitive moral sense,"—to embrace brigands whenever they come to him with the party label on their backs? But it seems not even this dubious rule would apply to Addicks. The Nation goes on to say of him: "He was not yet elected senator; not like Quay, a successful pirate in charge of the ship. Addicks *was still fighting,* and the beleaguered crew *hoped to beat him off;* whereupon the President, seeing the piratical assailants outnumber the crew in danger of massacre by 12 to 8, decides to go to the aid of the buccaneers!"

Friend Leupp, in his Campaign Book of Apologies for Roosevelt, says that this "unfortunate excuse" for the President's course in the Addicks mix-up, was unwisely and incontinently put out by Postmaster-General Payne, during the President's absence, and Leupp is rather severe upon Payne for so misrepresenting his incorruptible and high-minded chief. Not that Leupp denies the facts in Roosevelt's alignment with Addicks; or with the other Republican "bosses," he admits them all; but Leup has a different "explanation" of the President's motives, from that given out by Payne; though Leupp's book is a remarkable illumination of the text that, "explanations never explain." The Apologist makes no effort to square the President's action in the Byrne case with his removal of Internal-Revenue Collector Bingham of Alabama, "for the corrupt and vicious scheme of denying to negroes qualified to vote under the laws of the State, their just political rights," though even in the judgment of Northern Republicans, Byrne's offence was fully as flagrant as Bingham's. Did the President

pause to inquire whether the Collector and his associates represented the dominant faction among Alabama Republicans? What is good for Delaware might be considered good for Alabama, tho' this is by no means a solitary instance wherein President Roosevelt has taken observations of longitude and latitude in making federal appointments. The reason assigned by Apologist Leupp for the President's deferring to the wishes of the "bosses" in the distribution of federal patronage, resulting ofttimes in appointments so obnoxious to his righteous feelings, is, that "senatorial courtesy would hold up any appointment not endorsed by the Senators from the State in which the appointment is to be made."

And will Apologist Leupp or some other competent authority, kindly inform us what became of this same obstructing "senatorial courtesy" in the South Carolina Crum case? Not only the Senators from that State, but every Southern Senator on the floor, voicing the unanimous white sentiment of the entire South country, vehemently protested against the appointment of a negro Collector of the Port at Charleston, but it did not prevent his appointment. Republican Senators appear to have done their best in upholding their end of "senatorial courtesy,"—having refused to confirm the appointment of Crum through a long, a short, and an extra session of Congress. Only after our Strenuous and sinuous and law-abiding President had taken advantage of a provision in the Constitution never designed to fit such cases, but only for filling vacancies caused by death or resignation,—to appoint his negro Collector during a recess of Congress, and the Senate still withholding confirmation during the extra session convened in November, 1903, he attempted a still further twisting of the Constitution, in his "constructive recess" appointments of Dr. Crum, Mr. Byrne, Leonard Wood et al.; and finally,

when the close of both the extra and regular sessions found the Crum appointment still unconfirmed, he threatened—and there was a rumor of an all-night seance at the White House endeavoring to restrain him from carrying out the threat, to hold another extra *summer* session of Congress to compass Crum's appointment,—then, and not till then, did the Republican Senate yield in the matter of "senatorial courtesy," and promised his Strenuosity, if he would only get quiet, they would confirm his negro Collector of the Port of Charleston the first thing at the following regular session, e'en tho' Tillman's "pitchfork" and every Southern objector barred the way! And the Republican Senate kept its pledge.

When the "Reform battle" was on in Philadelphia in 1906, when the decent people of that city were making a life-or-death struggle to wrest their municipal government from the hands of the corrupt "gang" which had so long abused their patience, Wayne MacVeagh, Garfield's Attorney-General, and one of the reform leaders, in an article in the North American, pointed to "the extraordinary fact, that the *whole effective power of the Administration at Washington was against the reformers*."

Commenting on the alliance between the Executive Department of the National Government and the "Bosses" engaged in despoiling Philadelphia and the State, MacVeagh asserts: "Almost every person in Pennsylvania honored with a commission bearing the signature of Roosevelt, was the avowed, persistent, and reckless opponent of that decency and honesty in politics for which the President is supposed to stand."

MacVeagh was to learn, in common with many other people, that President Roosevelt will "stand for" most any good thing when the "standing for" involves nothing more than the formulation of a high-sounding preachment.

So long as people are willing to accept words for deeds; so long as they are content with profession instead of performance, and exempt from honest criticism those in high official position; just so long will artists of the Rooseveltian genus flourish in this world of "mortals" discovered by Puck.

CHAPTER VIII.

ROOSEVELT AND THE PRESS.

"Let me have free access to the channels of publicity—and I care not who makes my country's laws, or what *the other fellow does.*"

In these words—according to one who once held an intimate and honored place in the Roosevelt press-bureau—is embodied Mr. Roosevelt's full political creed, "the other fellow" being a polite Rooseveltian figure-of-speech for a personal or political foe.

Mr. Roosevelt's clever and powerful manipulation of press agencies is conceded by both friends and foes; the tone adopted being admiring or censuring, according to their respective bents,—but all agree as to the fact. Those seeking historic parallels have likened him to Bismarck, and to Louis XIV., the "Grand Monarch" of France, who secured his tottering throne for half a century by looking after the welfare of all literary men within his realm. Mr. Roosevelt's influence over the press appears to have been secured by a happy combination of the methods of the "Grand Monarch" and the "Iron Chancellor." A Washington correspondent thus writes of him: "Mr. Roosevelt has adopted two methods to bring the body of correspondents to a proper state of humility and subjection. He has rewarded with a lavish hand, and he has been equally unsparing in his punishments."

Until he came into the presidency, Roosevelt was not in a position to employ any cast-iron or "big-stick" methods toward the publicity hosts, and his

attitude toward newspaper men, magazine writers and the literary cult in general, was most cordial and conciliatory.

After his establishment in the White House, he selected about 40 out of the 200 or more newspaper correspondents in Washington to be his special messengers to the public, and these are known, in the popular parlance of the Capital, as "White-House cuckoos." These are the birds which roost close to the Executive chamber, and give out to their editors for the benefit of an expectant public, the internal workings of the Executive mind. By means of these, the public is kept closely informed as to the President's views, purposes and plans.

One of the best-known newspaper men of Washington, who was at one time "Capitol reporter" and political writer on the staff of the principal Washington daily, and incidentally a "White House cuckoo," in an article published in Harper's Weekly (Sept. 28, 1907), thus affirms:

"Theodore Roosevelt secured his popularity through publicity; has retained, strengthened, and extended it through publicity. . . . The unbroken chain of personal triumphs scored by Roosevelt the President, can be traced directly to the press-bureau of which he is the sole manager, and the cuckoos the mere reporters of his views and attitudes. . . .

"And woe betide the luckless cuckoo who violates the President's confidence, or misinterprets his opinions! He chooses his press-agents as he does the members of his Cabinet, and it is as incumbent upon the one as upon the other to step aside whenever the President desires a change,—only in the case of the deposed cuckoo, when he flutters with broken wing from his roost under the White House eves, he may find that his editor has separated him from his salary,—not always, but sometimes."

Needless to say, this "cuckoo" had been "separated" from his White House perch, though his efficiency as a journalist still insured him a salary. Because of his deposed state, some persons may discredit his utterances and attribute them to personal spite; but the point seems not well taken. It is perfectly patent that he could not honorably give out information about the internal workings of the presidential press-bureau while he was part and parcel of the same. Being "down-and-out," it was optional with him as to what use he should make of knowledge therein obtained, and the President in deposing him must take his chances on that score, and this he must have known. It would seem that the ex-cuckoo's testimony is entitled to as much credence at least as any other "witness for the State."

The assertions of this particular ex-cuckoo, he says, are "based on personal experience of about a year as assistant press-agent under the President, and on close observation extending over the entire period of his occupancy of the White House."

He further testifies: "The presidential cuckoo has an extremely difficult and hazardous task, but he learns considerable detail of White House methods and purposes under the present regime. . . . In handling his press-agents, President Roosevelt observes the Napoleonic method of not entrusting the full details of a campaign to any of them."

The writer goes on to explain that, in this way, the President will have one set of reporters contradict the information he has given out through others, when contradiction seems expedient. When he wishes to launch some plan or "policy," he throws out at first, by means of an obedient cuckoo, what may be called "a feeler"; and waits to see the effect. If popular approval is instant and preponderant, well and good,

the first statement concerning the President's intentions will stand.

If, however, the original promulgation fails to strike a popular chord, and there are indications of strong dissent and sharp criticism from powerful sources, another obedient cuckoo is immediately set to work to convince the public mind that the President was "misrepresented" by the first report. The above quoted ex-cuckoo says: "It was thus he launched the Taft boom nearly two years before election. He chose to start it in Washington, where Congress was in session, and he would thus be able to locate the enemies as well as the supporters of the idea. And so he told his Washington cuckoo—the contrite writer of these lines—to publish the fact, that it is President Roosevelt's wish to have his Secretary of War succeed him in the White House. At the same time, he told some of the out-of-town cuckoos to 'knock' the suggestion in their papers."

Thus Mr. Roosevelt learned in short order which congressmen were friendly, and who of them were hostile to the Taft presidential idea. The two conflicting statements left the President's position in doubt, and those who sought an interview on the subject, found him wrapped in non-committal silence, or "impenetrable ambiguity."

He waited six months before he set the out-of-town cuckoos openly to work on the Taft boom. Then the whole broad continent rang with it.

In his speech before the National Editorial Association at Jamestown in June, 1907, Roosevelt uttered probably the most sincere sentiment of his being: "It is of course a truism to say, that no other body of our countrymen wield as extensive an influence as those who write for the daily press and for other periodicals."

At this Jamestown meeting, he treated the publicity

hosts to a revised resumé of "my policies"—to make an editorial holiday—and to give the country a congressional forecast of the measures he would recommend the following winter. The speech was duly reported by all the assembled journalists to their respective papers throughout the land, and by the time Congress convened, the "policies" had been thoroughly aired and exploited. He has all of the actor's appreciation of the value of "advance notices." It is thus he wins most of his battles. His "cuckoos" are sent before, to spy out the land,—"where all the shores of promise lie, and where the rocks that he must flee"—and thus fore-warned, fore-armed and equipped at every point, the Roosevelt battleship sails proudly into port. A veteran Washington newspaper man, who has watched the Roosevelt career closely, says: "After careful and extended observation, it can be truthfully asserted that scarcely a publication in the United States of broad circulation and influence, but has upon its staff in an important capacity, a Roosevelt cuckoo. He has invited to Washington, and entertained at the White House, a larger number of men who write than have any half dozen of his predecessors. The list of those he has singled out for this distinction is a long one, and includes cartoonists as well as writers."

Apropos of this, shortly after the Panama coup set all the tongues to wagging, and all the "knockers" to knocking, Alfred Henry Lewis, a clever political writer of the day, was calling at the White House.

The Panama stroke possessing something of a Jacksonian flavor, and Jackson himself being still a popular hero in the memory of many American citizens,—some in the mountains of Tennessee yet casting their votes for him at every election, according to the "delineators" of mountaineer types—Lewis recounts that at this interview referred to, Mr. Roosevelt

brought his fist down on the table with characteristic emphasis and exclaimed:

"Andrew Jackson was my kind of a man!" Some persons carried a dim recollection of Roosevelt referring to Andrew Jackson in his "Life of Benton" as the "ignorant, headstrong" President who "appealed to the passions and prejudices, but never to the reason of his hearers," and who had been selected when the public mind was in a "wholly irrational state." But now that Roosevelt himself had done something which he and his admirers fondly imagined savored of Jackson, the latter immediately becomes Roosevelt's "kind of a man!" To be sure, why not?

The tip was sufficient for Alfred Henry Lewis. The brilliant writer whose keen satiric lancet had pierced many a fake panoply of other public men promptly took the presidential cue, and went off to write a most ingenious "parallel" between "Andrew Jackson, Old Hickory; and Theodore Roosevelt, New Hickory!" (See "Success" magazine for Sept., 1904.)

Those who would witness a marvelous transformation of a satiric scalpel into a spellbinder's paint brush are referred to this Lewis "parallel," which combines in a rare degree, misstatement, exaggeration, and fulsome adulation. It is probably true, if "Old Hickory" had wanted that Panama strip, he would have seized it, in the nick of time, just as Roosevelt did,—with slight regard for law or precedent,—with two *very important differences:* Jackson would never have *planned* that *impromptu* stroke, nor would he have apologized for it afterwards, as did Mr. Roosevelt. (See Senator Hoar's speeches in the Senate Nov., 1903, and Feb., 1904.)

Again, when the scandal in the Post Office was unearthed, in 1903, and "smelled to Heaven"; when after much talk and bluster, and righteous "orders for a thorough investigation," some months elapsed, and ill-

natured critics began to hint at a Government "white wash" for the guilty; William Allen White, another literary friend of Mr. Roosevelt's, blossomed out in an article on "Roosevelt and the Postal Frauds" (Sept. McClure's, 1904), wherein the President is depicted as the stern and virtuous judge, and relentless investigator, inexorably proclaiming, "Let no guilty man escape," and impervious alike to personal appeals and to the unholy political pressure which certain senatorial "bosses" sought to bring to bear.

Apologist Leupp also treats of the Postal Frauds in his "Campaign Life," and clears all suspicious circumstances with a comprehensive arraignment of Postmaster-General Payne, "a dyed-in-the-wool politician, with a politician's traditional contempt for reform"—whose previous political training as an exploiter of Democratic crimes and Republican virtues, had not fitted him to be an ideal "investigator" when the subject of the investigation was his own Department. As Leupp naively puts it: "He was puzzled to decide just how to go at the task of raking over the misdeeds of his Republican associates."

This of course explains all the queer doings in the conduct of the Postal Frauds; why Machen, a Democrat, and Tyner (a helpless old man whom nobody of consequence was especially interested in shielding)—were selected to feel the full weight of governmental discipline, while other equal, if not greater offenders, were permitted to go unscathed.

President Roosevelt has put into the public service more newspaper men and other writers than can be easily enumerated, but the following partial list will convey a general idea of this phase of Rooseveltian activity: Whitelaw Reid, ambassador to England; Robt. J. Wynne, correspondent of a New York paper, and president of a Dining Club in Washington, composed almost exclusively of newspaper men, was

successively advanced to the post of Assistant-Postmaster-General, then to the head of the Department, and finally to be Consul-General to London, the best paying post in the consular service. Of the three D. C. Commissioners who govern Washington under the direction of Congress and the President, two were active newspaper men when appointed by Roosevelt. Maj. John M. Carson, of the New York Times, was made chief of the Bureau of Manufactures; Francis E. Leupp, a newspaper man, was made Indian Commissioner; George Horton, appointed consul-general at Athens; Albert Halstead, Consul at Birmingham, England; J. Martin Miller is Consul somewhere in Europe; and Jos. Rucklin Bishop was taken from the editorship of a New York paper, and made the secretary of the Panama Canal Commission, at a salary of $10,000 a year.

It has passed into a proverb in Washington: "Write a biography of Roosevelt, and pull out a consulship."

President Roosevelt's method of dealing with the Washington correspondents is thus described by one of them: "When President Roosevelt gets ready to lodge a fresh impression in the public mind, or to contradict something displeasing to him which has appeared in the public press, he assembles the Washington representatives—usually his 'cuckoo' flock, tho' sometimes an outsider gets in, too—and addresses them after this fashion: 'While you are on no account, to *quote me* personally, yet these are the *facts,* which you can make such use of as you think proper, and they will not be contradicted.' In communicating 'the facts,' the President makes a great show of frankness, and of taking the press representatives into his confidence, so that a general feeling of good fellowship pervades the interview. Sometimes this frankness is carried to extremes, as when the President assails some public character, calling him "a scoundrel," or

"a crook," &c., in the presence of the reporters, and it is really very much to the credit of the newspaper men of Washington, that they have allowed so few of the President's reckless criticism of others to get into print."

This correspondent, whose stay in Washington covers four administrations, concluded his description of Mr. Roosevelt's method with the correspondents, with "No other President in my knowledge, has ever done this."

The next day after one of these Roosevelt confidential chats with the newspaper hosts, the press of the country teems with what "the President thinks," or what "the President intends"; and if the presidential intentions and meditations do not find ready response in the popular heart, the responsibility is on the misleading newspapers, and not on the worthy President.

Naturally, since he relies so implicitly upon the power of the press, he chafes under the criticisms of that power. Editor Noyes, of the Washington Evening Star, speaking before the National Editorial Association at Jamestown, said of Roosevelt: "He has declared himself in favor of 'clean, healthy newspapers, with clean, healthy criticisms, which shall be fearless and truthful'; but when it comes to the test, it is seen that he does not relish these 'fearless and truthful criticisms' when they are exercised at his expense. Not a bit of it. He goes on in his old way, doing things in a hasty, ill-considered manner, and his output of vituperous epithets is rather larger than ever."

The Evening Star is Republican in politics.

The New York Sun's strictures upon Rooseveltian conduct have become notorious, and Roosevelt has more than once observed of its editor: "I wish somebody would take it into his head to pull him (the Sun)

apart for purposes of dissection, in order to ascertain what sort of human he is, and then forget how to put the parts together again!"

This pious wish for the Sun's carping editor only illustrates the Rooseveltian inability to comprehend adverse criticism of himself.

That any one should impugn his motives, or question his sincerity, or infallibility, argues something radically wrong with the audacious questioner, some abnormality, which calls for vivisection!

Wasn't it Thomas Carlyle who said: "The greatest of all faults is to be *conscious of none?*"

When Theodore Roosevelt is assigned his final place in the Hall of Fame, he will most probably occupy a niche (as yet unveiled) underneath which is inscribed: "He was the greatest self-advertiser among the sons of men."

CHAPTER IX.

ROOSEVELT AND THE MOTHERS.

In the days when every utterance from the Rough Rider commander and the Hero of San Juan was duly recounted and applauded, in the buoyant confidence that when the words could not pass muster for real wisdom or real wit, they would be accepted by the people as "real cute," an exuberant writer in the Metropolitan, Cosmopolitan, or some other polite magazine, thus describes the Hero's home-coming: When the ships bringing the victorious Rough Riders touched shore, and they stepped forth amid the plaudits of the assembled multitude, the spokesman of the political delegation commissioned to welcome Colonel Roosevelt and whisper gubernatorial hopes in his ear, stepped up to him, and after cordial greeting, inquired after his health.

"I feel like a bull-moose!" responded the gallant Colonel, and thus it was recorded in the magazine.

It is not surprising that the exponent of such lusty animalism should be found exploiting Napoleon's view of womankind, "that she is greatest who hath borne the most sons for the Republic." Hence among the first presidential lectures to the people, is the one to mothers, on the duties of maternity, and the awful, awful sin of race-suicide!

The mother's vitality, the father's financial ability to care for a numerous brood, are secondary considerations—indeed not mentioned.

It is not the *quality* but the *size* of the family that is

important; the first and greatest Rooseveltian commandment is like that post-diluvian one: "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth"—the "earth" being a polite name for the United States, while Roosevelt is steering the ship of state.

After the first fulmination against the race-suicide criminals, we find Roosevelt figuring in "Mothers' Congresses," and such like assemblies, ever reiterating the cardinal idea. All mothers "look good" to Roosevelt, but those are most esteemed who can exhibit the longest family registers. There is apparently no recognition of the fact that there are mothers, and mothers; so-called Christian mothers as faithless to their trusts as Medea, whilst some of the truest, sweetest mothers the world has ever known, have been the old-maid guardians of orphaned ones who never tasted the joys of maternity. But having said so much in praise and exaltation of the office and estate of motherhood, we shall at least expect to find President Roosevelt treating the individual mother—or using the term generically—the individual woman with marked consideration.

Let us see how the Rooseveltian preachment comports with Rooseveltian practice in this regard in specific instances.

The President holds every year certain official receptions; one in honor of the Supreme Court, one for the Foreign Ambassadors, one for Congress, and one for the Army and Navy. Not a great while after Mr. Roosevelt succeeded to the presidency, at a White House reception given to the Supreme Court, some members of the Diplomatic Corps arriving about the same time as the Supreme Justices, through somebody's blundering, the Diplomats were presented to the President and his "receiving line" *before* the waiting justices in whose honor the reception was held.

This was of course a serious breach of official eti-

quette, for which no one, however, could possibly hold President Roosevelt responsible, since he is not supposed to attend to such details. While it was regrettable, there being no lives lost and no bones broken, sensible people were not disposed to magnify the incident. It appears, however, that some of the justices were resentful (cherishing a great notion of their dignity as one of their constitutional traditions), and even threatened to leave without greeting the President, tho' they did not carry out the threat.

The Society editor of one of the Washington dailies, a woman highly respected in her profession, heard in the course of the evening the remarks of the offended justices, and in her report of the reception, she referred to the incident, as she avers, with no thought of malice or wrong doing. Those who know her testify that she is a conscientious and accurate reporter; that, with large opportunities to write unpleasant things, she has carefully abstained from the sensational and unworthy.

But Washington correspondents and reporters of every class and degree have learned that, under the Roosevelt Administration, it is a flagrant example of *lese majeste* to chronicle any misdeed or mischance occurring at the White House; and this Society editor was to have the fact impressed on her in most uncomfortable fashion. As soon as her story of the reception appeared in the paper next day, its Managing Editor received a phone message from the President's private secretary, telling him the writer of the story would no longer be permitted to enter the White House, and he must send some one else to report the social doings under the presidential roof; if he desired an explanation, he could call at the Executive office. It is unhappily true, that with very many managing editors—and some in this town of Washington, such a message from the White House would have meant dismissal

for the offending reporter. But fortunately in this case, the editor, possessing a quality which many lack, and upon investigation finding his Society reporter had only stated the facts, refused to be influenced by the presidential displeasure; and quietly informed the Executive office that Miss Blank would remain in his employ, and that if she were not acceptable to the White House authorities, he would make up his paper without the chronicling of White House social news thereafter. And for three years, this particular Washington paper was not represented at White House functions. At the end of that time, the owner of the paper died, and the office changed managing editors, likewise proprietors. In due time came the same insistent demand from the White House for a change in the head of the Society department, and the new manager—being of different caliber to the old—acceded to the unworthy request, and gave Miss Blank her discharge. Only think of *presidential* vengeance pursuing for *three years* a young woman who had not only her own living to earn, but upon whose efforts combined with her sister's, two aged and semi-invalid parents were dependent. The writer had the young woman's own assurance that this circumstance was brought to Mr. Roosevelt's attention by her friends, who tried in vain to remove from her the White House cloud of disapproval. Not only the local paper with which she was connected, but all the big New York press bureaus, which had employed her to gather their Washington Society notes, were notified that Miss Blank was *persona non grata* at the White House; and while this did not prevent her furnishing to them social news from other quarters, it greatly crippled her usefulness, and involved a pecuniary loss to her of four or five hundred dollars each winter. And consider, if you please, the nature and magnitude of the *offence* for which this woman suffered this persecution!

It has been stated in certain quarters, that not the President, but his wife had been the cause of this woman's banishment from the White House, that Mr. Roosevelt himself had so stated to the managing editor.

All who admire the President more in this Adamic role are welcome to accept this plea. To the mind of the writer, the most pathetic feature in the whole story is, that the mother of the young woman,—old and invalid, and hailing from the rock-ribbed Republican State of Pennsylvania, *grieved most of all,* that her daughter should have fallen under the displeasure of a *Republican President!*

In the summer of 1903, Postmaster-General Payne (according to Historian Leupp removed Miss Huldah Todd, postmistress at Greenwood, Del., because she was distasteful to Senator Allee, the latter having donned his toga by the grace of Addicks, and Miss Todd's brothers—so it was charged—were guilty of the heinous offence of belonging to the anti-Addicks element of Delaware. This of course was ample cause for overturning Civil-Service in Miss Todd's case, by an administration with a particularly sensitive conscience toward Civil-Service. But Apologist Leupp says it was all the fault of that "blundering" Postmaster-General Payne. Payne appears to have been as useful in the capacity of scapegoat in those early days as Wm. Loeb, Jr., in more recent times.

Anyway, by the time the matter was brought to the attention of our good President, the deed was done, and past recall. Sifting the evidence in his most judicial temper, and finding himself in "a most uncomfortable position" by some conflict in the testimony, he finally delivered a verdict as convincing as it was oracular, and must have been entirely satisfatcory to Miss Todd: "Had he been consulted before the Postmaster-General acted, he would not have considered the case against Miss Todd strong enough to warrant her dis-

missal; as she was already out, however, and her place filled, he did not consider the evidence in her favor strong enough to demand her reinstatement." This reasonable and righteous decree does not appear to have met with the popular favor it deserved, since Leupp says: "The whole effect of Mr. Payne's tactless performance was to bring unnecessary public censure upon the President," and he darkly hints that for less offences, Cabinet officers have *resigned*.

The saddest case wherein a woman was made to feel the weight of the "Big Stick," which has fallen under public observation, is that of Mrs. Minor Morris, the brutal mode of whose ejectment from the White House on January 4, 1906, shocked the whole country—such portion of the country at least as keep their sensibilities in trim for receiving a shock. Here again, nobody would have thought of holding President Roosevelt responsible—had he not voluntarily assumed the responsibility—since the outrage upon Mrs. Morris and affront to American womanhood, was the work of an ill-bred underling—an assistant secretary of some sort, and the ruffianly White House guards who executed the secretary's order. The President was as innocent of the outrage as he was ignorant of it at the time it occurred. An account of the affair appearing in one of the afternoon papers, however, an account written by an eye-witness of the proceedings, and which, while exonerating Mrs. Morris of everything except a foolish desire to petition the President for some private grievance, showed the conduct of the under-secretary (whose name was Barnes) and his ruffianly minions in a most unfavorable light,—President Roosevelt had his private secretary write to the editor of the paper that this account of the Morris incident published by him was "very displeasing to the President and everyone else at the White House!"

Whereupon the plucky Washington editor (may his

tribe increase!) sent back the prompt and vigorous reply that he was satisfied his reporter had stated only the facts as he witnessed them, that he—the editor—had been managing his paper for some years without any suggestions from the White House, and if the "Big Stick" was to inaugurate a policy of muzzling the press, it must begin with some other than the Washington Evening Star,—or words to that effect.

The Washington Star is a staunch Republican organ, and up to the date of the Morris incident had been a consistent supporter of the Roosevelt administration. Yet its venerable and respected editor, Mr. Crosby S. Noyes, in an address before the National Editorial Association, June 13, 1907, speaking of President Roosevelt, said: "His hasty approval of the brutal deeds of his subordinates at the White House when the 'knock-down-and-drag-out' outrage was committed upon Mrs. Minor Morris, a refined, cultured, respectable Christian woman, was an act of cruel, heartless injustice."

The incident was published in detail by the press throughout the country at the time, but as some of these accounts—tho' not all—evinced the artistic touches of the White House cuckoos, it were well to state the facts connected with it in this truthful history of Rooseveltian acts, that all men may know them, and be able to distinguish them from the "inspired" fables they may encounter elsewhere.

From the time of issuance of his reprimand to the Evening Star for publishing the truth, President Roosevelt made Secretary Barnes's cause his own, and the movements instituted and the means employed to vindicate Barnes, must be considered as carrying the President's endorsement. The first statement of the unhappy occurrence, given out by a newspaper man who witnessed it from the door of the White House press room, is as follows:

"Coming in from lunch at 1 o'clock, I noticed in the general lobby, near Mr. Loeb's door, a lady whom I afterwards found out to be Mrs. Minor Morris, sitting very quietly, evidently waiting to see one of the secretaries.

"She was not different in appearance from other well-dressed women, and I gave no special heed to her, as I passed into the press-room—which opens off the lobby—and engaged in conversation with three other newspaper men who were in there. The door to the press-room is always open, and as it was near the President's lunch hour, everything was unusually quiet in the lobby. . . . Very suddenly we heard a loud exclamation which sounded like, 'Oh, no, no! Don't do that!'

"All of us jumped to the door and entered the main room, where we found a secret-service man and Officer Frech in the act of pulling the woman out of the chair in which she was sitting. *Prior to this, we had heard no loud voice, and I am positive there was no boisterous conduct.*

"A word spoken above an ordinary tone would have reached our ears very easily. The men pulled the woman to the door, where Officer Murphy relieved the secret-service man. Their object was to get her to the guard-room just opposite the Treasury Building. To do this, they had to carry her down the path leading to the basement of the White House, and through the long corridor used during receptions. Before going twenty feet Mrs. Morris fell to her knees, but was jerked to her feet and dragged on. Before they disappeared from sight, she must have fallen six or eight times. Just before disappearing thro' the archway leading to the basement, I saw a negro man, Charlie Reeder, the President's footman, rush out and pick her up by the heels. The last I saw of Mrs. Morris she was being carried off like a sack of salt, with the

negro at her feet, and her dress hanging above her knees. I went around to the guard-room, and saw Mrs. Morris literally thrown into a waiting cab, which carried her to the House of Detention."

This account of the manner of Mrs. Morris's arrest and expulsion from the White House, was corroborated by other newspaper men who were in the press room at the time, and who had no plausible motive for misrepresentation. Moved by the indignation expressed in the local press, at the Capitol, and in Washington circles generally, Secretary Barnes, the principal in the disgraceful scene, issued the following statement from the White House, manifestly with the President's sanction: "Mrs. Morris called at the Executive office yesterday about 1 o'clock, and asked to be allowed to see the President. . . . Upon inquiry as to the nature of her business, she stated with considerable reluctance, that her husband had been unjustly dismissed from the War Department; that she did not propose to have anything to do with the Secretary of War concerning it, but that she wanted the President to take it up and see that justice was done. She was informed that the President could not give personal attention to such a matter, and that the decision of the Secretary of War would be final. She insisted that she must see the President, and when told that that was out of the question, she asserted in a boisterous manner that she would not be prevented from seeing him, and that she would remain where she was for a month, if need be, unless she saw him sooner. She was allowed to remain for some moments. When Mr. Barnes returned to the reception room shortly after, he found her pacing excitedly to and fro, and informed her as quietly as possible, that she could not see the President, and it would be useless for her to wait. She replied in a loud voice that she would see him, and that she would stay there

until she did. She was again advised to drop the matter and go away quietly. This in still louder tones she refused to do. She was then told she must either leave the office at once voluntarily, or it would be necessary to have her put out of the building. At this she shrieked at the top of her voice, 'I will not be put out,' rushed to a chair, threw herself into it, and shouted: 'Don't you have any hands laid on me. I'm going to stay here until I see the President!' Mrs. Morris's piercing shrieks were heard throughout the building, and it became necessary in the interest of order to have her removed. She was accordingly taken in charge by a police officer who had witnessed the whole affair. He asked her to go with him quietly. She refused, and told him that if she was removed, she *would have to be dragged* every step of the way. Before applying force, the officer asked her three times to leave the office quietly. She *shrieked her refusal to each request,* and was then *led* from the room.

"She struggled violently with the two police officers, striking, kicking and biting them all the way from the office building to the eastern entrance of the White House. As soon as she was outside the office building, she threw herself on the ground, and it became necessary to carry her. The officers repeatedly asked her to stand up, and walk quietly with them, so that they would not to have to use force, but she refused to do so, and defied them with shrieks that were heard throughout the White House. She was finally removed to police headquarters, where she was charged with disorderly conduct. . . . There is no truth whatever in the statement made by many of the morning papers, that a negro laid hold of Mrs. Morris and assisted in carrying her. One of the colored messengers of the office followed the policemen, and gathered up such small articles as were dropped in the

woman's struggles, but there was no other foundation whatever for the statement."

As will be seen, this Barnes statement, issued under Executive approval, represents Mrs. Morris behaving very badly indeed upon the occasion of her ill-fated call at the White House, and like the story turned in by the cub reporter, "it is important, *if true*." Considering what it had to defend, one may almost forgive the gross exaggerations and whole-cloth fabrications which it was later proven to contain.

Mrs. Morris testified that Barnes's statement of what occurred was wholly false, except the part relating to telling him the nature of her business with the President, which she did, reluctantly as he says, because he informed her that it would first have to be transmitted to the President through one of his secretaries, before she would be accorded an audience with him, if at all. As she was averse to speaking to him at all on the subject, she says she purposely lowered her voice, that others might not hear; that when told the President was engaged, and could not see her then, she had replied that if there were any chance of seeing him for even five minutes, she would gladly wait all day, as she had nothing particular to do; and that, tho' Mr. Barnes was exceedingly gruff and rude in his manner from the outset, she at no time raised her voice above the ordinary tone in her pleading with him for a presidential hearing, until he signalled to the officers to seize her, and then she uttered the exclamation heard in the press-room, and which brought the reporters on the scene. As her story in this particular is fully corroborated by five or six reputable newspaper men of Washington, there seems no good reason to doubt it, nor to accept in lieu of it Barnes's statement that "her shrieks rang throughout the White House" before he ordered her forcibly removed—not even though the latter *was* issued under Executive

sanction. Of his assertion that she threw herself on the ground, Mrs. Morris said she fainted,—and this also is easily credited, if there was any faint in her—that was certainly the occasion for it. It is the greater pity that the poor woman could not remain unconscious throughout the whole degrading proceedings. Barnes, later, was forced to retract his emphatic denial of the negro footman's part in the dragging-out performance. Too many witnesses were found who had "seen it with their own eyes," and told Mr. Barnes so, up and down, without any blinking. Then the noble secretary, backed by his chivalric chief, took refuge behind the excuse that the officers who reported the matter to him, had their attention so engrossed by the struggling, screaming Mrs. Morris, that they could not affirm positively (tho' Mr. Barnes had affirmed very positively for them) *who else* had assisted their humane efforts. This is what "Uncle Remus" would call "a mighty likely tale!" Their engrossed attention also prevented their noticing or affirming positively who subtracted the seven or eight dollars from the purse, which was dropped with the other "small articles in the woman's struggles," and which Mrs. Morris said was empty when returned to her.

Consider this for a moment, if you will, fellow-citizens of free America! An American mother, a lady and a Christian, is insulted, assaulted, and robbed in the White Palace by the Potomac which was built for Washington, occupied by Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and the two Adamses; by the chivalric Jackson, and the great-hearted Lincoln, and the silent, prodigious Captain who said, "Let us have peace." In all the long, illustrious line of American Presidents who had gone before, there was none whose reign had looked on such a spectacle. Let us at least return thanks for this.

And what said Theodore Roosevelt, the then occu-

pant of the historic mansion, of this unseemly happening beneath his official roof-tree?

Surely the President who has gone out of his way to expatiate more than all his predecessors upon the dignity and beatitude of motherhood, as soon as the facts in the case are brought out, will repent his hasty message to the Evening Star, will use "the Big Stick" upon the miscreant Barnes, and send some kindly message of apology to his victim?

We shall see. The ejectment occurred on January 4th. On the 17th, Senator Tillman—whose special mission in the United States Senate is to see that no Roosevelt misdemeanors "get by," without his ringing the publicity bells on them—announced more in sorrow than anger, that he had waited nearly two weeks for the President to make reparation, and finally, failing to discover that the Chief Magistrate who had sent a message of sympathy to Fitzsimmons, the prize-fighter, had made any movement to assuage Mrs. Morris's injured feelings, he (Tillman) felt it his duty, &c., &c.

As he was detailing the incident in his graphic way, Tillman was interrupted by Senator Hale of Maine,—that same Senator Hale, who on a former occasion, had risen with so much dignity, and announced: "If the Senator from South Carolina will but modify his extreme language toward the Chief Executive, I will assure him of my support in his resolution against the 'constructive recess' proposition. I believe the Constitution of our fathers to be a frank, open document, framed by open, fair-minded men, who never intended it to be a trap for any of us."

And now Senator Hale, with equal dignity, sternly rebuked Tillman for "making such serious and defamatory charges against the President of all the United States,—having nothing whatever that he adduces as proof. It is not seemly that he should make

this chamber the place to exploit his personal malice toward the nation's Chief."

The Senator from Maine should have learned ere this, that Tillman, tho' only "a corn-field lawyer," upon his own confession—seldom came into court without his "proofs" well-primed and assorted. White with wrath, tho' with marvelous composure (for him), he now faced the Maine Senator:

"I want to say to you, sir, that if you will offer a resolution appointing a committee of this body,—*composed of Republicans alone*—to examine into the *facts,* I will give you the names of four witnesses, as reputable as you or I, who will *swear* to the statement I have made as to what actually occurred."

Hale not anticipating this broadside, wavered somewhat, but resuming the original line of attack, reiterated, "Let us have the proof"; and Tillman fired back: "Bring on your committee."

Finally, after some sparring, Hale, who had raised the issue, told Tillman, if *he* would offer a resolution for an investigation into the facts of the case, "nobody on this side the Chamber will oppose your resolution."

Tillman, never the man to decline a gage-of-battle flung squarely in his teeth, thereupon gave notice that he would offer such a resolution in the Senate the following morning. Then rose up that courtly gentleman of the old school, Senator Daniel of Virginia, and "hoped the Senator from South Carolina would reconsider this intention. Not that he—Daniel—as everybody knew, would condone any mistreatment or discourtesy shown a lady. But he did not consider it seemly or consistent with senatorial dignity or good taste, for the Senate to inquire into the domestic affairs of the President's house, any more than it would be proper for the President to inquire into domestic happenings in a Senator's home. He thought

they must assume that the President would do the proper thing in the matter, &c., &c., &c.

Ironically acknowledging his indebtedness to both the Senator from Maine and from Virginia, for the lesson in manners he so much needed, Tillman stuck to his text: Barnes was a public servant, paid out of the public Treasury; Congress appropriated the money from which he was paid. If he had been guilty of improper and unofficial conduct, and his official master, the President of the United States, failed to call him to account, it was both the right and the duty of Congress to inquire into his offence.

Stating further that he would leave the question of senatorial dignity, courtesy, &c., for the Maine and Virginia and other Senators to settle, whilst he would strive to see justice done to this maltreated woman.

True to his word, next morning Tillman offered his resolution, and Senator Daniel, pursuing his courteous idea, promptly moved to table it.

All the Democratic Southern Senators, who couldn't dodge it by being either absent or "paired," voted with the Virginia Senator, except eight:

The two Senators from Kentucky, two from Mississippi, two from South Carolina, one from Missouri (Stone), and the one from Tennessee (Frazier), who was present, voted to sustain Senator Tillman's resolution of inquiry.

All the Republican Senators voted to table it except Hale, who taking counsel only of his own fairmindedness, had assured Tillman that "no one on that side of the Chamber would oppose it."

Foiled in his honest purpose, and rebuked by his own Southern colleagues for a breach of senatorial decorum, Tillman subsided on the Morris case for some weeks. The nine-days' wonder over, the incident would probably have slept with others of its kind in the limbo of things forgot, had President Roosevelt

been content to let bad enough alone. But his Strenuosity never goes in for half-way measures in such laudable undertakings as this. By way of further putting the seal of his approval on Barnes, and the stigma of his disapproval upon Mrs. Morris, Roosevelt on April 1, 1906, appointed his delectable under-secretary to be City Postmaster for the city of Washington, one of the most important and lucrative positions within the gift of the Executive.

When the Barnes appointment came to the Senate for confirmation, Tillman brandished the "pitch-fork" afresh. He sent a written statement to the Committee on Post-offices and Post-roads, preferring specific charges against Barnes: That he had been guilty of brutal conduct in ordering Mrs. Morris's arrest, and had issued a false statement about it afterwards; that he had lodged a charge of insanity against Mrs. Morris, causing her to remain a prisoner several hours; and that he had caused the circulation of stories derogatory to her character and mental condition.

To these charges against Barnes, Tillman appended the names of seven well-known newspaper men of Washington, whom he asked to have called as witnesses in the case.

The battle was on between the "pitch-fork" and "the Big Stick."

Roosevelt was forced to go through the form of ordering an "investigation" of the Barnes-Morris incident. Maj. Sylvester, Chief of Police for the City of Washington, conducted the investigation. Some very interesting facts were brought out in the evidence submitted. Tillman reviewed them all in the open Senate, and they were inserted in the Congressional Record of that date, where they may be found to-day.

It appeared that Officer Frech, Barnes's brother-in-law, and one of those to execute his brutal order, had at first only charged Mrs. Morris with "disorderly

conduct" when they arrived at the police station; but on returning to the White House, and conferring with his amiable relative, he learned that he *should* have said she was crazy; and he accordingly rushed back and lodged the additional charge of insanity. This necessitated holding her a prisoner, until a medical board could be found to pass upon her sanity. The doctors, when called, promptly removed the charge of insanity, saying that while much shaken up, and very hysterical, "she was *not* insane."

One of the things adduced by the argument for the defense, as evidence of Mrs. Morris's mental disorders, was the statement of the police matron, that as soon as she was released from the grip of the officers, "she fell on her knees in the parlor of the Detention House, and prayed aloud!"

Tillman's expression in commenting upon *this* damaging testimony, was very characteristic and amusing.

Numerous letters and statements were produced, all dealing with Mrs. Morris's peculiarities and eccentricities, to show how little deserving she was of any public sympathy. About the most important of these was a statement obtained from Dr. A. B. Weaver of Asheville, N. C., to the effect that Mrs. Morris, two years before on her return from Florida, had stopped in Asheville, and been under the professional care of Dr. Weaver, who testified that, "she was very peculiar indeed,—what is commonly called a crank."

When Dr. and Mrs. Morris issued a statement, sworn to before a notary public, that neither of them had ever been in Asheville, N. C., neither two years previous nor at any other time, "this pink of medical propriety"—as Tillman characterized him—issued a retraction in the Asheville paper, saying he "had treated *a* Mrs. Morris at the time referred to, but whether Mrs. Minor Morris, or some other Morris, he could not say positively; he had supposed it to be

the same from the fact her husband was a physician, but he really did not remember the first name of his former patient; and he concluded by complaining that he had been *tricked* into making an unprofessional statement about a patient, having believed it to be confidential, and not for publication."

The Weaver deposition was typical of many others, and whatever credence should attach to them, they bear prima facie evidence of the fact, that *somebody* had been in the "muck-raking" business,—to further increase the woes of Mrs. Minor Morris; and whether Barnes or Roosevelt had manipulated the "muck-rake" will be settled according to individual opinion and preference. Tillman also pointed out the important fact that none of these so-called "affidavits" collected for Maj. Sylvester's use, which had any bearing on the case, were sworn to; but were simply uncertified statements; that he (Tillman) had personally inspected them all and knew such to be the fact. He stated it on his honor as a senator, at any rate, showing the farcical character of Maj. Sylvester's "investigation." Tillman likewise called attention to the *very peculiar* circumstance, that of the seven newspaper witnesses whom he had cited, only one, Elmer E. Payne, had been permitted to testify in the case. He had prepared, at someone's request, a "memorandum" for the President, which set forth Mr. Barnes's conduct in the best-possible light; applying the white-wash brush deftly where it was most needed, and conveying the general impression that the under-secretary "had really done the best he could, under the circumstances!" This "memorandum" showed a marked revision of Mr. Payne's first impression of the affair, as according to his associates in the press-room, he was as indignant as any of them the afternoon it occurred.

Tillman's illuminating "pitch-fork" brought forth

the further interesting circumstance, that, about the time Maj. Sylvester and Elmer E. Payne rendered their important services to the cause of Barnes, two Annapolis cadetships were awarded by the President to the two sons respectively, of Maj. Sylvester and of Mr. Payne. Of course, it might only have been a coincidence, wholly unconnected with the Barnes case, but Tillman regarded it as "very peculiar" (almost as "peculiar" as Mrs. Morris herself)—the more especially, as the President is supposed to award the cadetships within his bestowal only to sons of Army and Navy officers, who have no congressional districts from which they could be appointed. Merely a coincidence, but *"very peculiar!"*

To make a long story short, Mr. Barnes was vindicated and confirmed, and still rules over the City Post-Office in Washington. "The Big Stick" had prevailed over the "Pitch-fork," as was of course to be expected; but it is such a valiant and fearless "Pitch-fork" withal, that the mothers of the country at least should pause to do it reverence.

In concluding his defence of Mrs. Morris, Senator Tillman said: "It is not my province to play Don Quixote, and roam around the country, in Washington, or elsewhere, as the champion of distressed women. But in my home, since my mother now dead, used to hug me to her bosom and say—"My son, tell the truth'; and since her departure, my association for 38 years with another woman as wife who has been an inspiration and solace, my every instinct as a man has taught me to respect and love women.

"And when I see a man who ought to be a gentleman, altho' in high official position, ignore his plain duty to seek out the truth, make due apology, right the wrong as far as he could, and punish those about him who are guilty of this outrage, I would have been false

to every instinct of my nature, if I had remained silent on this occasion. . . . "

In a magazine article (Sept. Review of Reviews, 1896), Mr. Roosevelt once observed: "In Tillman and Watson is embodied retribution on the South for having failed to educate her cracker, the poor white which gives them strength."

It is related that, after Mr. Watson had explained to Roosevelt's satisfaction that *he* did not belong in the "cracker" class, but had had a "grandfather"—who, if the Honorable Tom's account is to be credited, was really more distinguished than any Roosevelt grandfather of whom we have record, the gracious Roosevelt promptly made the *amende honourable* for his error in Mr. Watson's case. Senator Tillman (whose lineage is probably as good as either Watson's or Roosevelt's) declined to join in the "grandfather" controversy, thereby demonstrating himself a better man than either.

Questions of family, rank, and official titles aside, it may be safely left to the chivalric sense of the world to decide, whether Senator Tillman or President Roosevelt appears in the more manly role, in the unhappy occurrence above related. And Mrs. Morris, what of her? Ah, yes, Mrs. Morris! The newspapers stated about a year ago that "Mrs. Minor Morris, the lady so summarily ejected from the White House some time ago, has been adjudged insane by a board of alienists, and sent to a private sanitarium."

That was all. Just a press-dispatch, but to those acquainted with the circumstances, how full of tragic import! A Washington woman of high character and culture, who was associated with Mrs. Morris in the League of American Pen-women, testified of her: "She *was* a little peculiar, tho' I always liked her, perceiving her good traits as well as her peculiarities. She was one of the brainiest women in the League,

and perhaps the most accomplished. Besides being an essayist and poet of no mean order, she was a brilliant pianist, having had exceptional advantages in the best musical schools of Europe. Her technique surpassed that of many professionals. She was kind-hearted, and deeply religious. She was moreover a very generous woman with her means, and more loyal in her friendships than the average woman. I always found her truthful and honorable. She was foolishly fond of her husband (perhaps this made her "a little peculiar" in the City of Washington), and that was what caused her trouble. She didn't care for the salary attached to her husband's position in the War Department, but she felt that some sort of disgrace or blight hung over him because of it. And so she resolved in his absence to make her appeal to the President, with such unhappy sequel. She was extremely jealous of her dignity, and this, added to her quick, excitable temper, made her a little inharmonious with some members of the League. Her husband seemed fond of her also, and they appeared very happy in their home."

"Jealous of her dignity," super-sensitive, ah! pitying Heaven! What agonies of mortification must this woman have endured! Is it matter for wonder, that brooding over her wrongs, smarting under her deep humiliation, morbid imaginings took possession of her reason? And does the man who has such keen appreciation of retributive justice for others, and keeps such close tab on cause and effect, where it involves a local election, that he sent his Secretary of State to New York to charge the murder of McKinley on Wm. Randolph Hearst—in a Marc Anthony harangue over Cæsar's body—does he feel no twinge of conscience for this chattering mad-woman, and the wreck of her happy home? Her only offence so far as he was concerned, was taking at its full face value his

posing as Haroun the Just; and such was her faith in, and admiration for him, that one little kindly message from him would have gone far toward healing her wounds, grievous tho' they were. But it might not be.

Platitudes anent mothers, and motherhood in the abstract, are one thing. Kindness to real mothers, if it involves any sacrifice of the doctrine of Roosevelt infallibility, is what Kipling calls "another story."

Since this went to press, Mrs. Morris has returned to Washington in normal mental health, having escaped from the asylum where she was fraudulently detained for ten months, as she will undertake to prove in the courts.

CHAPTER X.

ROOSEVELT AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

There is a craning of necks in the neighborhood of Fifteenth street, on Sunday mornings, among those citizens of Washington, in whom the sight of the President is still potent to cause a flutter of excitement.

For at such times, President Roosevelt may be seen, attended by his secret-service guard, betaking his way with his "seven-league-boot" stride to the Dutch Reformed church near Fifteenth and O streets, where he claims membership, and where, when in Washington, he is consistent in attendance.

Knowing his church affiliations to be Protestant, one does not readily understand the statement so frequently made, therefore, that Mr. Roosevelt owes much of his power and popularity to the friendship of the Roman Catholic church. While the religious tolerance prescribed by our Constitution makes it incumbent upon the President to treat Catholics with as much consideration as other sects, there is no good reason, easily discerned, why these should be shown any special favors over others—by our Chief Executive. Yet such seems to have been the fact in the case of President Roosevelt, according to the testimony of his friends.

At a White House dinner given to capital and labor leaders on Nov. 12, 1904, shortly after Mr. Roosevelt's election to the presidency, the Hon. Paul Morton, Secretary of the Navy (and of subsequent Santa

Fe notoriety), one of the speakers of the occasion, among other felicitations, said: "It is a notable fact, without an important exception, that the Catholic press of the United States supported President Roosevelt in the last election. The policy of the United States in working in hearty co-operation with the Catholic church in settling the question of friar lands in the Philippines, is believed to have stimulated this friendliness."

As the haziest notions appear to exist in the minds of Americans, in regard to the "friar lands" transaction, it may not be amiss to review the facts, for the benefit of the uninformed, misinformed, and o'er well-informed.

When, by the Treaty of Paris which marked the close of Spanish-American hostilities, the United States came into possession of the Philippine Islands and all of the inhabitants thereof, not the least of the troubles we acquired by this cession was the complication arising from what were known as "the friar lands" in the Philippine Archipelago.

These lands, comprising about 425,000 acres, had been appropriated by the religious orders of Spanish priests, or friars, more especially the Dominicans, the Augustinians, and the Recoletos (the "barefoot" friars), who during the Spanish sovereignty of the Archipelago, were the virtual and actual rulers of the Filipinos, having been invested by Spain with all powers, political and governmental, as well as ecclesiastical and educational. The friars were the instruments of the oppressive rule in the Islands with which Spain was charged, and typified to the people the worst exactions of the tyrannous home government. In the two revolts against the Spanish government which had occurred in the Philippines before the United States came into the game, a bitter feeling of hatred and opposition had grown up among the people

against the friars, which was agrarian as well as political. When sovereignty over the Islands was transferred from Spain to the United States, whose Constitution requires absolute separation of church and state wherever American jurisdiction extends, the problem for the New Philippine Government was, how to get rid of the friars who had already caused so much trouble, and tho' stripped of their civil functions by the new authority, were still potent to cause a seething tumult wherever they appeared. During the war, many of these priests had been driven from their respective parishes into Manilla, where they were under the protection of the American soldiery, and by the Treaty of Paris, as well as by the American Constitution, were guaranteed freedom of speech and religious opinion. They claimed the ownership and control of these large agricultural tracts, as "vested property rights," and they were demanding rentals of their Filipino tenants upon the one hand,—which the Filipinos refused to pay, or from the New Philippine Government upon the other, the prompt eviction of these delinquent tenants. The people held that the friars had no just claim to these lands, having plunderously seized them to begin with, and extortionately used them afterwards.

However, the friars having been sustained in their proprietary rights for ages by the Spanish Government, and by the supreme head of the church, the Roman Pontiff, and enjoying the traditional advantage of the "nine points" of possession, the United States Government resolved, in the interest of peace in the Islands, to purchase anew from the friars—or from their ecclesiastical head, the Pope, these lands—which the United States had already acquired from Spain by treaty, and by the payment of $20,000,000 for both the Islands and the peoples. And so it fell out, that the then Governor-General of the Philip-

pines, William H. Taft, being on a visit to the United States in the Spring of 1902, was commissioned by President Roosevelt to "go by" Rome on his return to the Islands, for the purpose of negotiating with Pope Leo the purchase of "friar lands" in the Philippines.

Although there was official denial of any diplomatic import in Mr. Taft's mission to the Vatican, our Constitution not permitting any diplomatic relations with any sort of church dignitary, the correspondence between the Governor-General and the Holy See, bears all the usual "ear-marks" of diplomatic exchanges. True, Governor Taft's letter of instructions from Secretary of War Root contained the paragraph:

"Your errand will not be in any sense or degree diplomatic in its nature, but will be purely a business matter of negotiation by you as Governor of the Philippines for the purchase of property from the owners thereof, and the settlement of land titles, in such manner as to contribute to the best interests of the people of the Islands."

But this same letter of instructions concludes with the usual assurance to regularly appointed ambassadors and envoys-extraordinary to Foreign Courts.

"Any assistance which you may desire, whether on the part of officers of the civil government or of military officers, to enable you to perform the duties above described (the negotiations with the Vatican) in a manner satisfactory to yourself, will be afforded."

Governor Taft also carried credential letters from Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, and from Mr. Roosevelt, the President of United States, together with a present from the latter to Pope Leo, consisting of a set of his literary works! Mr. Taft's first formal greeting to the Papal See, upon arrival, opened with: "Your Holiness: On my departure from Washington, President Roosevelt committed to my hands an autograph note of personal greeting, and eight bound volumes of

his literary works to be delivered to your Holiness." . . .

Further diving into the "diplomatic correspondence" connected with this affair, does not divulge the fact that there was any *express stipulation* that His Holiness should *read* the "eight bound volumes" thus presented, tho' if there were any *implied* obligation of that kind, it may account in part for the non-success of Ambassador Taft's main proposition to the Vatican. At any rate, it would seem a wise precaution, in future missions of this delicate nature, to leave out the "literary works."

In an article published in the Independent (of Aug. 14, 1902) entitled "The First American Mission to the Vatican," Salvatore Cortesi, the Rome correspondent of the American Associated Press, gives an interesting account of Mr. Taft's proceedings upon his arrival in Rome. Cortesi writes as a resident Catholic, and a faithful reporter of news:

"From Washington they had taken great pains to proclaim that the mission of the Governor of the Philippines had not the least diplomatic character, the Constitution not allowing the United States to entertain relations of that kind with any head of any religion. However, Judge Taft was provided with credentials and with an autograph letter from President Roosevelt to Leo XIII., exactly like Mr. Whitelaw Reid for the coronation of King Edward VII., or like Lord Denbigh, the special envoy of England, who similarly to Judge Taft, congratulated the Pope on his twenty-five years of Pontificate. The American representative seemed in reality more of a special envoy than the other two, as he even had a present from the President to the Pope, consisting in a set of the literary works of the former, and the instructions given to him by Secretary Root ended precisely as to any other ambassador or envoy extraordinary. Besides, once in

Rome, Governor Taft thought it his duty to be the first to pay visits to the ambassadors of France, Austria, Spain and Portugal, accredited to the Holy See, thus putting himself on an equality with them. . . . A few days after he arrived in the Eternal City there was a Consistory at the Vatican, which is one of the most gorgeous and important functions of the Roman Church, and Governor Taft accepted an invitation to assist at it in the *diplomatic tribune,* together with the ambassadors of the great Catholic Powers, he being styled *Envoyè Extraordinaire* of the President of the United States. . . . Therefore, at the same time that in Washington they were emphatically denying the mission having anything to do with diplomacy, its head, either through the influence of the Roman atmosphere, or with the view of reaching a success superior to that which he eventually obtained, *was acting as tho' he had that diplomatic character* which his Government seemed so anxious to deny him."

Cortesi further states that before the arrival of the American mission in Rome, he had received a letter from "a prominent writer in Washington" who was close to the White House throne, as follows:

"Judge Taft does not go as Ambassador or Envoy, and there has never been any intention on the part of the Government of sending one, altho' it has been strongly urged by both the Ireland and Corrigan factions. There is to be no recognition of the temporal power, directly or indirectly; let that be distinctly understood."

After the arrival of the "mission," and while it was exchanging notes with the Vatican, this Rome correspondent of the press was furnished with still further assurance by the editor of a prominent New York paper, which stated: "Governor Taft is not in any sense a diplomatic representative, and the greatest care has been taken on this side to make it quite clear that

we had no intention of getting mixed up in the controversy over the question of the Pope's temporal sovereignty."

All of which "inspired" assurances as to the character of Judge Taft's mission to the Vatican, savor strongly of that Shakespearian lady who was thought to "protest too much." Another interesting circumstance which throws some light on the Taft mission to Rome, was, that it was undertaken at the instance of Archbishop Ireland, Mr. Roosevelt's oldtime friend and political ally, tho' Cortesi says this circumstance was one of the obstacles to Judge Taft's success. He says, moreover:

"The presence among the advisers of the Governor of Bishop O'Gorman, one of Archbishop Ireland's best friends, had the effect of raising the question of *persons,* and the *suspicion of personal advantage,* on the part of the Archbishop and his adherents, which I am sure are without foundation, but which nevertheless aroused the animosity of the two parties which my friend in Washington called, 'the Ireland and Corrigan factions,' who are as divided and opposed in Rome as in America. . . . Of course the followers of Ireland were for the success of the mission, while the others wanted to see the friars triumph." . . .

On the whole, this Rome correspondent is disposed to take an optimistic view of Governor Taft's "first mission to the Vatican"; thinks he "did very well, considering"; and says despite the "Ireland-Corrigan" factional note injected, and despite the further fact that Cardinal Satolli, "the only member of the Sacred College who has a really perfect knowledge of American habits and feelings, and a true love for the United States, was not included in the commission of Cardinals which studied the American propositions, the conclusions reached are not so unsatisfactory as might have been expected, as between the Vatican and the

United States was secured a *broad basis of negotiation,* to be carried on in Manila, by the Governor and the Apostolic Delegate, as to specified details."

"A *broad basis of negotiation,"* looking to future adjustments.

This has that delightfully vague, ambiguous flavor, always detected in diplomatic utterances; but how about that *straight, plain business proposition,* which Secretary Root says Governor Taft went to lay before the head of the Roman church in his "purely business" capacity as the owner and vender of "friar lands?"

It is all set forth in detail in the "Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the year 1902," see pp. 233-60. The first thought suggested to a dispassionate mind in its perusal, is that, here is a vast amount of diplomatic pow-wowing and kow-towing, for a "purely business" transaction. And the second query arising is, what substantial advantage accrued to the United States Government, or to its Philippine subjects, from this remarkable real-estate deal? On page 250 of the aforesaid Secretary's report, we find the form of agreement or *concordat* drawn up between Pope Leo and President Roosevelt through their intermediaries, Cardinal Rampolla and William Howard Taft, Civil Governor of the Philippines, and submitted by them to His Holiness:

I. The Philippine government agrees to buy all the agricultural lands, buildings, irrigation plants, and other improvements thereon, situate in the Philippine Archipelago, of the Dominican, Augustinia, and Recolet orders, and to pay therefor a reasonable and fair price, to be fixed in Mexican dollars by a tribunal of arbitration to be composed of five members, two to be appointed by His Holiness, the Pope, two by the Philippine government, and the fifth to be appointed by the governor-general of India. . . . A majority of the tribunal may make the award. . . .

The *expenses* of the tribunal of arbitration, including reasonable compensation to each of the members, *shall be paid by the Philippine government.* The price (for the lands) shall be paid in three installments, one-third cash within thirty days, one-third in nine months after date of the first payment, and the remaining one-third in eighteen months, the deferred payments to bear 4½ per cent. interest from the date of the first payment. The purchase money shall be paid to the *representative of the Roman Catholic Church to be designated by the Pope,* and the receipt of such representative shall be full acquittance to the extent of the amount paid by the Philippine Government.

II. The Philippine Government agrees to release by legislative act to the representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, designated by His Holiness, the Pope, all lands or enclosures upon which Roman Catholic churches or conventos now stand, *which were never by deed or formal grant conveyed by Spain to the Roman Catholic Church,* the same to be held by such representatives for the use of the Roman Catholics of the parishes in which such churches and convents stand; without prejudice, however, to the title, if any, of the municipality in which any such church or convent may stand, in ordinary courts of law." . . .

III. The Philippine government and the Holy See will by compromise, if possible, reach an agreement in respect to the charitable, educational, and other trusts, concerning which there is now dispute as to the proper trustee, by determining which of the trusts shall be administered by the civil government, and which, if any, shall be administered by the Roman Catholic Church, &c., &c." . . .

IV. The reasonable rentals, if any, which ought to be paid for convents and other church buildings which have been occupied by United States troops during the

insurrection, shall be ascertained for the information of both parties, by the above-mentioned tribunal of arbitration. . . . In each case they shall take into consideration the question whether or not the church or convent was *enemy's property,* occupied in time of war without incurring obligation to pay rent, &c., &c. . . . The Secretary of War undertakes to present to the Congress of the United States the results of the inquiry herein provided for, with request for authority and means to pay the rentals so ascertained to be due." . . .

Such, as set forth in Secretary Root's report, were the obligations proposed to be incurred by the United States Government, and their representatives in the Philippines, in this Papal land bargain, and the counter concessions demanded are thus outlined (p. 251): "The foregoing stipulations are made on the following conditions:

(a) That titles of the three religious orders to the agricultural lands mentioned in paragraph I, and of any subsequent grantees thereof, shall be duly conveyed by deeds of usual and proper form to the Philippine Government, and no part of the purchase price shall be paid until this provision is complied with.

(b) *That all members of the four religious orders of Dominicans, Augustinians, Recoletos, and Franciscans now in the Philippines, shall withdraw* one-half within nine months after the date of the first payment, and one-half within eighteen months thereafter, and meantime they shall not teach, preach, or do parish work in the parishes of the Archipelago; *except,* that for a period of two years after the first payment, a sufficient number of such members may remain to conduct the schools, university, and conventual churches now conducted by them, withdrawing from the Islands at the close of such period; and that *no Spanish mem-*

bers of said four orders shall hereafter be sent to the Islands. . . .

His Holiness on his part hereby agrees to the stipulations and conditions hereinbefore set forth, and contracts that the four religious orders herein named, and their members, shall comply with the stipulations and conditions on their part to be performed." . . .

In his second formal communication to the Pope. Governor Taft had stated that the only purpose the American Government had in this proposal, was to "secure political peace and absence of disturbance in the Philippines; that the Filipino people, as a whole, are deeply incensed against these four religious orders in the Islands, because responsible, as they suppose, for the alleged oppressions of Spain. . . . Nor was this understanding without foundation, for by the laws in force under the Spanish regime, the heads of these religious orders and the head of the hierarchy, the Archbishop of Manila, were of the Council of the Governor-General of the Islands."

Governor Taft further calls the attention of the Holy Father to the fact, that *"these orders have a newspaper which is still published by them, and which is in spirit, anti-American, anti-Filipino, and pro-Spanish."*

It clearly appears from this showing of the Governor-General, that these obnoxious friars were "public enemies," and by all known rules of war, and all laws of nations, they could have been banished by the Philippine government, and their lands made confiscate to the State. It is a well-known fact, referred to both by Root and Taft, that it was part of Aguinaldo's plan—had he and his insurgent band succeeded in establishing their independence—to thus banish the friars and appropriate their holdings for the use of the "Philippine Republic."

It could not have been, therefore, to conciliate their

Filipino subjects, that the American Government decided to adopt this liberal policy toward the Spanish priests in the Philippines and their ecclesiastical Head at Rome. Such liberal policy might be justified, however, if it had secured its ostensible purpose, to wit, the immediate and peacable withdrawal of the Spanish friars from the Philippine Islands, but did it?

The Pope's reply (of July 9, 1902) to the articles of agreement submitted by Governor Taft (as above recited) is also given in Secretary Root's Report (pp. 252-4), and says in effect: That the Holy See is much gratified by the attitude assumed by the American Government, and "on the economical points the views of the Holy See accord almost entirely with those of the American and Philippine governments"; but further than this, the Holy Father does not share the American and Filipino view of the religious orders aforesaid, nor can he consent to their withdrawal from the Islands. On the contrary, he says most emphatically:

"The Holy See cannot accept the proposition of the Philippine government to recall from the Archipelago in a fixed time all the religious of Spanish nationality—Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinians, Recoletos and to prevent their return in the future. . . . Such a measure would be, in the eyes of the Filipinos and of the entire Catholic world, the explicit confirmation of all the accusations brought against the said religious by their enemies, accusations of which the falsity, or at least the evident exaggeration can not be disputed. . . . Finally, *if the American Government, respecting as it does individual rights, does not dare interdict the Philippine soil to the Spanish religious* of the four orders above named, *how could the Pope do it,* he the common father of all, the support and born defender of the religious?"

Did the Holy Father intend the last words to carry

any satirical import? Certainly, they clearly indicated that in the matter of removing the friars, the American Government had as much "rights in the premises" as the Pope. Then why pursue the subject further with the Papal head? If this were the purely commercial transaction, which all the Administration organs had taken so much pains to proclaim it, when the only important stipulation on the American side had been rejected, and the main advantage sought had failed of accomplishment, surely the shrewd American business sense would prompt the immediate breaking off of Papal negotiations. But was such the case? Not a bit of it. The complaisant American Government, manipulated for the nonce by Messrs. Roosevelt and Taft, returned a polite message to His Holiness, that, while they are very sorry he cannot see his way clear to accede to their proposal of retiring the friars, they still hope His Holiness will accept the money for the lands, and all their other generous proposals; while they upon their part, are perfectly willing to accept the diplomatic assurances of His Holiness that he will do the best he can for them; and that he will send his Apostolic Delegate to Manila, who with the assistance of the amiable Governor-General, Wm. Howard Taft, will no doubt be able to "find a way" for an amicable adjustment of all present and future difficulties! And so this unique negotiation between the Vatican and the United States ended by the latter paying to the former, seven and a quarter million dollars, for lands to which our Government already had a clear title, and to secure an advantage which it was understood in advance, would *not* be secured. If this was a strictly "business" transaction, as given out, it is not immediately apparent to an innocent bystander "whereabouts" the United States "got in" on the deal. "Uncle Sam's" usual trading astuteness seems to have been off duty. This surprising complaisance of the

United States authorities toward the Papal See becomes the more remarkable when contrasted with the action of Catholic Governments in the case of these same troublous religious orders, who, realizing the tremendous influence of these orders with the heads of the church, "have (according to Cortesi), without even trying to come to any agreement with the Holy See, adopted severe measures against the friars."

The defenders and apologists of the "friar-lands" purchase explain that, for the United States to have banished these hostile and turbulent friars, upon its own authority, and devoted their so-called possessions to the betterment of the people whom they had so long oppressed, "would have been very *un-American.*" Oh! Having set aside the cardinal doctrine of our American Declaration, in the purchase of the Philippines and the imposing on the inhabitants a rule which they didn't want, it was probably imperative to give to the world some conspicuous, signal proof that the "present Administration" was yet running on *American* lines,—in spots anyway. And whenever there is an emergency call for a shining example of virtue, personal, civic, or national, T. Roosevelt is your man! It is extremely lucky (for the friars) that this call came while he was running the Government,—some other President might have missed this glorious opportunity for disinterested benevolence!

The first intimation to the general public that the "friar-lands" transaction was neither so benevolent nor so disinterested as appeared at the first blush, was given by the publication of the "Storer-Roosevelt" correspondence four years later (December, 1906), wherein Mr. Roosevelt is shown to have aided and abetted his "dear friends," Mr. and Mrs. Bellamy Storer, in their very natural efforts to advance Archbishop Ireland to a Cardinalate, the Storers being prominent and influential Catholics, and up to the time

of the sensational divulgence of the correspondence, very intimate friends of Mr. Roosevelt. The story of how "Dear Bellamy" and "Dear Maria" joined the "Ananias Club" after that unhappy denouement, belongs to another chapter, but when Governor of New York, in reply to a letter from Mrs. Storer bespeaking his aid in the matter, Roosevelt wrote: "I need not say what a pleasure it would be for me to do anything I can for Archbishop Ireland. You know how high a regard I have always felt for him. He represents the type of Catholicism which in my opinion must prevail in the United States if the Catholic Church is to attain its full measure of power and usefulness with our people and under our form of government."

He also wrote to Mrs. Storer at this time (while Governor of New York) that he had written to President McKinley in Ireland's behalf, but warns her that "the President cannot (in his official capacity) try to get a certain archbishop made a cardinal, because it would be a good thing from the standpoint of the body politic here, than he can try to get a certain Methodist minister made bishop for similar reasons." . . . Then follows his contemptuous reference to the Protestant clergymen of "that fool type, who want to abolish the army canteen," and says that, officially, he could not even oppose one of *these* who was aspiring to be bishop.

Now no one can justly find fault with Mr. Roosevelt for praising Archbishop Ireland, nor for valuing his friendship as a man; but if his non-sectarian role were genuine, and he were honest in proclaiming, as he has so often done, that he wanted to give all sects a "square deal," why must he couple eulogiums of the Catholic prelate with such unflattering allusions to the Protestant clergy,—even of "that fool type" who would abolish the army canteen? To "Dear Bellamy,"

while he was ambassador at Madrid, Mr. Roosevelt as Governor wrote: "On every account, I should feel that the election of Archbishop Ireland to the cardinalate would be a most fortunate thing for us in the United States, Catholic and non-Catholic alike. . . . While I would not like to have this letter published, you are most welcome to show it to anyone you see fit." . . .

But Mr. Storer states, that after Roosevelt became Vice-president, he manifested great apprehension lest the Protestant public should learn of his Catholic sympathies and activities, and of his relations with Archbishop Ireland, and wrote to ask Mrs. Storer if she had ever allowed his letters on the subject to get out of her possession? He had heard in some way that Cardinal Rampolla at Rome had one of them.

This, it would seem, taken in connection with one very frank passage in a letter to Mrs. Storer, should help Catholics and non-Catholics to place the proper valuation on Mr. Roosevelt's "Catholic sympathies and activities." The passage referred to is the playful remark to "Dear Maria," that "this Dutch-Reformed individual appears to be collecting a great deal of Catholic interest and information; it is not exactly *support,* but rather a *desire to be supported.*"

This passage is unique, in that it is the solitary expression in all the voluminous Roosevelt output, which evinces a momentary flash of honest introspection and frank humor at his own expense. In the midst of the great mass of solemn pomposity, and absorbed self-appreciation, this little side remark, so appealingly human, to his "warmest of friends, and staunchest of supporters"—shines like a good deed in an evil world!

As all who read the Roosevelt-Storer correspondence will remember, Mr. Storer states, that in the summer of 1903, after his appointment as ambassador to Vienna, while on a visit to President Roosevelt at

Oyster Bay, the latter had delivered to him an oral message to the Pope, Pius X. to the effect that Archbishop Ireland was *his*—Roosevelt's friend; and that the President would be much gratified if Ireland could be promoted to be a cardinal,—or words to that effect. Monsignor O'Connell was also commissioned by Mr. Roosevelt to say the same thing to Pius X., which he did on Sept. 24, 1903; and the Pope had transmitted a message, saying the President's wishes would probably be fulfilled.

But it seems, just about the time the Pope had made up his mind to give Archbishop Ireland a red hat, somebody else turned up in Rome with another "oral message" from President Roosevelt, that he would be pleased to see Archbishop Farley made a cardinal! It was this report from Rome which called forth Mrs. Storer's protesting letters to President Roosevelt and Judge Taft, demanding an explanation of this apparent double dealing. "Dear Maria" might have been spared a public reprimand from her presidential friend, and much consequent mortification, if she had only appreciated the fact that the "Dutch-Reformed individual" who wished to *receive*, rather than to *give* Catholic support, could not concentrate his sympathies and activities on any *one* aspirant for the cardinalate, however much he might esteem him personally. While Archbishop Ireland had a large following of Catholic voters in the West, Archbishop Farley had some useful Eastern connections.

There is a story current in Washington, for the truth of which the writer does not vouch: A Catholic priest and a layman, living in a Balitmore suburb, had the same name; in consequence, letters for the one were sometimes opened by the other. In the summer of 1904 the layman was astonished to receive a letter which ran: "Instruct your parishioners to vote for Roosevelt and Fairbanks in this election."

Signed by the Papal Delegate at Washington.

The story may or may not be true. It is reproduced only because it tallies so exactly with the public statement of the Hon. Paul Morton, that "the Catholic press of the United States, without exception, supported President Roosevelt in the last election."

Tho' it is a well-known fact (on which Mr. Roosevelt builded so confidently), that members of the Roman Catholic faith are more deferential to the wishes of their church superiors, than are the laymen of other sects, it would seem that self-respecting lay-Catholics, those at least who breathe the liberty-loving air of America, would resent being made pawns on the political chess-board, to serve the personal ambitions of either a Catholic prelate, or a Dutch Reformed President.

CHAPTER XI.

ROOSEVELT AND THE NEGRO.

The very general dislike and distrust felt for President Roosevelt during his first term by Southerners was attributed by Northerners, almost without exception, to the Booker Washington luncheon at the White House.

In like manner, the more recent bouquets flung at his feet by admiring hands in the South, have all been charged up to the Brownsville edict, and the consequent humiliation of the 25th Infantry.

As a Southerner, with some jealous regard for the honor and reputation of her section, the writer wishes we might sometime reach a point where we could be accredited with a perception of some other things in Heaven or earth besides the Race Problem; and occasionally be swayed by some other influence than our traditional and reputedly dominant prejudice against the negroes. Until this time arrives, it would be at least gratifying to see Southerners manifesting this prejudice in an intelligent and discriminating fashion, and not behold them striking blindly at everything in the North or upon the part of Northerners, which looks like a subversion of the Southern code.

Barring the extremely questionable taste, and the manifest impropriety, of any hospitable demonstration in the *Nation's* house of which the Nation had not signified its approval, Roosevelt's lunching with Booker Washington was one of the most natural and un-

studied things he has ever done, and to that extent, one of the least reprehensible.

Born and reared in the North, where the few resident negroes enjoy all the public utlities with the whites, without discrimination; and educated at Harvard, where the negro students share with the white boys the privileges of the mess-hall, it probably never entered President Roosevelt's head, that there was any reason why he and the Tuskegee professor should not partake of the same repast under the National roof.

Assuredly, if under his own roof, and in his private capacity as Theodore Roosevelt, Citizen, he had chosen to wine and dine negroes every day in the week, he was clearly within the domain of his own personal rights; and the only sensible comment for any disapproving observer was, *de gustibus.* Of this Booker Washington incident, Historian Leupp, ever close to the Roosevelt throne, says: "Mr. Washington is one of the men whom President Roosevelt most admires, and whom he is proudest to number among his friends. They meet on terms of *frank equality,* except inasmuch as the presidential office itself confers a special dignity upon its occupant which all patriotic Americans recognize." . . .

This ought to settle it, so far as Mr. Roosevelt is concerned. The accident of his presidential rank might square-off the accident of Booker T.'s black skin, and make "honors easy" between them on every account.

And really, considerations of race, policy and official rank aside, if one seeks only a fair estimate of the mentality and character of the two men as revealed in their writings and speeches, one must admit that Washington's evince the more orderly mental processes, and the greater self-restraint. Flashes of originality, scintillations of genius, and far reaches of thought, are not observable in either. They both pos-

sess in a remarkable degree the faculty of turning things to their own advantage, and sticking comfortable feathers—both black and white—into their individual nests. This thrifty trait alone should make them very congenial companions. Truly there seems no good reason to dissent from Friend Leupp's statement, that Mr. Roosevelt meets Booker Washington upon a plane of "frank equality"—except where he drops below. The writer thoroughly agrees with Mr. Leupp's strictures upon the "torrential Southern journalism" which made so much fuss over the luncheon. It was a great mistake. The South should have passed it over with the philosophic remark: "If the Negro and the white race of the North can stand it, we can." As a matter of fact, the immediate effect of the incident fell much more uncomfortably upon the North than upon the South. The owners of Northern hotels, cafes, barrooms, and barber shops were suddenly beset with numerous damage-suits by pestiferous black litigants, who were refused accommodation, and who, emboldened by the White House luncheon, were not to be put off with the usual devices. If Mr. Roosevelt were carrying out "the Northern idea" in this affair, it proved a Northern chick which came quickly home to roost in most disagreeable fashion.

In the South, where no pretence is maintained about "equality" in matters social, no such laws (forbidding discrimination in public accommodations) exist, and the owners of public resorts are subjected to no such annoyance as this occurring in the North; and which, as a further unhappy consequence, engenders an intense racial animosity toward the Negro, in the North, which bodes ill for the future of his race in this country.

Perhaps it was a perception of these truths, which led the independent press of the North to condemn the Roosevelt-Washington luncheon in no uncertain terms.

Certainly it was this criticism, if any, and not the "torrential Southern journals," which disturbed the Rooseveltian complacency in the matter, and led him to "regret" the incident, as was so widely rumored,—though Leupp thinks, without sufficient "authority."

In executing his righteous decree to abolish the Indianola (Mississippi) post-office, and force the inhabitants of the Southern town to send thirty miles for their mail, President Roosevelt is represented by his glorifying biographer as exercising much self-restraint and virtuous forbearance toward a community which was so "barbarous" as not to want a negress as a postmistress. The President's clemency in the matter shines all the more by contrast with Postmaster-General Payne's severe temper, who was so "indignant at the poor woman's treatment" that he wanted to "send her back to Indianola under military escort, place a cordon of troops around the post-office to protect its occupant and its business from further molestation until the excitement died down!"

Postmaster-General Payne's notion about the proper means to allay popular excitement in a Southern community, is as remarkable as his holy zeal for the cause of the persecuted colored postmistress; and the latter is particularly impressive when we remember that this is the noble public servant who deprived Miss Todd (a white postmistress) of her office in Delaware, because her brothers had the temerity to oppose the saintly and patriotic Addicks! And if memory serves us aright, this is the same Postmaster-General who in 1904 dismissed from the Postal Service Col. John Bell Brownlow of Tennessee, a man who had served in the Civil War on the Union side, whose father, the famous "Parson" Brownlow, had been the staunchest supporter of the Union cause in Eastern Tennessee, had served as Tennessee's "war governor," and later as United States Senator, yet this man, Col. John Brown-

low, his son, who had been an honest and efficient public servant for 24 years, against whose record there was not a breath, was ruthlessly and summarily thrown out of the service without cause and without a hearing, to gratify the peevish whim of Payne. But the magnanimous President, who had upheld his Postmaster-General in both these righteous acts, which signalized so strikingly the effectiveness of Civil-Service rules under the Roosevelt regime, was not to be influenced by his extreme counsel in the case of the recalcitrant Mississippians—not he! In a lofty spirit of pitying scorn for the narrow race prejudice of these benighted Southerners, tho' "not a whit less indignant than Payne," we are informed, he preferred to "fit the punishment to the crime; (to borrow the chaste language of Leupp) a community which had relapsed into barbarism had no longer any claim upon the luxuries that accompany modern civilization. No armed force was sent to compel it to be decent against its will; a privilege it had enjoyed while decent, simply dropped out when it surrendered its self-respect!"

If the citizens of Indianola, or any portion of them, had—as was charged—forced this colored postmistress either by violence or threats of violence, to resign her office and leave the town, there was a clear provision of the Constitution—belonging to the legislation of the Reconstruction era, under which the offenders could have been punished. But without making any attempt to call them to account according to forms of law, our Strenuous and virtuous President preferred to go the Indianolans one better in the matter of violating the Constitution.

And so he closed up their post-office, which he had no more legal right to do, than he had to close their churches, or their court-house.

Commentator Leupp further elucidates the inconsistency and absurdity of the Southern position toward

the Negro, by citing the fact that these Indianola citiezns, after all the fuss and trouble they had made over receiving their mail from the hand of a negress, and after they paid the penalty of their folly, hired a negro man to go to the nearest post-office—30 miles distant—and bring the mail addressed to Indianola, thus receiving it at last from a pair of black hands!

Of course any one with the born intelligence of the humble candle-fly must readily perceive the force of this Leuppine reasoning.

Southerners so stupid as not to see that taking their mail from "a pair of black hands" serving in the lowly capacity of their own hired servant, had precisely the same bearing on the "social-equality" dogma, as taking it from black hands which were handing it out to them with all the official airs borrowed from Federal authority—are not worth the consideration of philosophers of the Leuppine and Rooseveltian genus!

Having trampled upon the Constitution in the Indianola affair, with no unpleasant consequences to anybody except the aforesaid stupid Southerners (who most likely would not have cast any ballots for Roosevelt, any way), the Strenuous one was in the mood for further trampling, in the Crum appointment to the Port of Charleston, S. C., and if report be true, he trampled some other laws, in this case, which a great many people regard as binding as the Constitution; but, of course, these are persons of ordinary understanding and standards of honor, which can not be applied to the actions of the great and only T. R.

It was asserted at the time of the Crum appointment, upon the authority of certain reputable citizens of Charleston, that President Roosevelt while on his visit to the Charleston Exposition in the Spring of 1902, *had given his word* to a prominent business man of that city, that he would *not* appoint a negro as Collector of Customs at Charleston.

Of course this prominent and reputable Charlestonian has discovered and acknowledged his mistake by this time; and if not, you can find his name on the membership roll of the "Ananias Club."

But by far the most reckless, vicious and disastrous Rooseveltian trampling of law and precedent in the case of the negroes, in the view of Northern colored voters,—aye, there's the rub,—was in his wholesale dismissal of the 25th Infantry who were charged with shooting up a Texas town. This alas! raised a tumult that was not confined to the South country, but rolled uproariously through the Northern belt from Cape Cod to the sweep of the Oregon, and wherever colored votes are specially prized and *counted*. It was no doubt a wholesome premonition of this unpleasant uproar, which led our sapient President to defer the Brownsville order, prepared in October, until after the November elections of 1906. There is as little reason to doubt that he wishes now he had withheld it until after the November elections of 1908!

It is probable, however, that this active and resourceful Executive might have had the Brownsville incident relegated to the rear, and the memory of it erased from the Negro mind, before the date fixed for counting the ballots, had it not been for the inconvenient and mischievous meddling of Senator Foraker, who not only focused the attention of the whole country upon the affair, with his Senate "investigation," but also—by and far, and much more—he had intensified the burning sense of wrong in the mind of the whole Negro race, culminating in a *threatened* revolt from the "Heir Apparent" at the polls! No wonder Roosevelt loves Foraker!

This Foraker persistence in keeping alive the Brownsville incident, made it incumbent upon our prudent and adaptable President to send a Special Message to the last Congress asking for a Congres-

sional decree under which these discharged and disgraced Negro soldiers might *re-enlist*—such of them at least, as could prove their innocence to the satisfaction of the President,—he the omniscient judge who, little more than a year before—had been so thoroughly satisfied of the guilt of all!

And this provoked Senator Tillman's cynical resolution, asking that every senator be provided with exact copies of the President's two orders,—"the one discharging the Negro soldiers, and the one taking it back!"

Between the polite attentions of Foraker and of Tillman, the Rooseveltian pathway through the 59th and 60th Congresses has not been as flowery as it might have been. One readily understands the warm regard Mr. Roosevelt entertains for them both.

Mortifying to relate, the Brownsville decree was greeted with a unanimous burst of applause from the South country. Without waiting for particulars, without caring about particulars, evidently, all the Southern hats went up for Roosevelt! Southern hats being proverbially of generous width of brim, when they are all in the air at once, they naturally obscure the Southern vision to other happenings at the time.

So absorbed were the Southerners with their Roosevelt huzzas, that another order of his to the War Department, coincident with the Brownsville order, entirely escaped their notice; it is here given for their benefit, and that they may see how hasty and ill-considered is much of the Southern cheering for Roosevelt; Col. Wm. L. Pitcher, of the 27th Infantry, and commander at Fort Sheridan near Chicago, was reported to have said in commenting on the Brownsville disturbance: "For the life of me, I can not see why the United States should try to make soldiers out of the negroes. Certainly there are enough fine white

young men in this big country to make soldiers of, without recruiting from such a source."

This alleged statement by Col. Pitcher which appeared in the public press, having been brought to President Roosevelt's attention, the following communication in regard to it was sent to the War Department by Secretary Loeb:

"The President directs that an immediate report be called for from Col. Pitcher, to know whether or not he is correctly quoted in the enclosed clipping; and if he is correctly quoted, the President directs that proceedings be taken against him for such punishment as can be inflicted. *The President thinks that such conduct is but little better than* that of the offending negro troops themselves."

Now it will hardly be disputed that the sentiment expressed in Col. Pitcher's statement receives hearty endorsement throughout the South; not, let it be said, because the South does not recognize that the negroes properly trained and officered, make very good soldiers, and have shown themselves capable of facing dangers and winning battles; but the South's opposition to negro soldiers is based upon the same ground as her opposition to them as electors, as civil officers, or any other capacity which brings them into social relations with the whites, resulting in racial friction and strife. Whether this Southern view be right or wrong, tenable, or untenable, it is unequivocally and solidly the Southern position, on which there has never been any wavering. Whether, if the Negro question could be divested of its sectional and political complications, this Southern view would not quickly become the Anglo-Saxon view of the entire country, is an interesting speculation, which may not be settled at this time, tho' there are straw indications that such would be the case. But that is not the point in the Brownsville case.

The present policy of this Government is to make soldiers of the negroes, and so long as this obtains, it is certainly only common justice to give them "a square deal" before the law. Whether this was done in the Brownsville imbroglio, is not the province of this little book to decide. It only seeks to point out President Roosevelt's vacillating course in the matter, and the small justification for Southern plaudits. In the winter following the Brownsville edict, it was announced in the papers that the President had selected Ralph Tyler, a negro journalist of Columbus, Ohio, to be Inspector of Customs at Cincinnati.

Then all the Southern hats went into the air again; for now was it imminent that Foraker was to "get it in the neck." As usual, the Southern shouters did not watch for the sequel to this announcement. It will probably be news to many of them, to this good day, that when the Ohio protests began to pour into the White House, and it was gently whispered into the Executive ear that a negro Inspector of Customs at Cincinnati, would split "the party' in twain in Ohio, he quietly and modestly backed down on his Ohio appointment—he who had over-ridden the Constitution, senatorial courtesy and his pledged word to his Southern entertainers—in order to land Crum in the Charleston Custom House—and instead, made Ralph Tyler the Auditor of the Navy Department in Washington, where his coming created immediate turmoil, resulting in the resignation of at least six white clerks. It is asserted upon good Washington authority, that under Tyler's regime, this Department has become the headquarters for negro politicians.

It may be that the country is a long distance yet from the proper solution of its Negro problem. Certainly, it may be observed, that neither the North nor the South has yet brought to its consideration, that broad, national, patriotic spirit, in which alone it can

ever be settled wisely and amicably. Meantime, it may be truthfully said, that Theodore Roosevelt has done more uselessly to agitate the question and keep it at the acute stage, without offering a single helpful idea; has more sharply accentuated its sectional feature—by far its worst feature so far as the South is concerned—than any other man who has ever sat in the seat of the Presidents. As such, he has no clear title to any Southern hand-clapping. Neither has his course earned the confidence and good-will of either whites or negroes.

CHAPTER XII.

THE "ANANIAS CLUB;" "UNDESIRABLE CITIZENS;" "RICH MAN'S CONSPIRACY."

As clearly appears to any dispassionate observer, the Rooseveltian pathway has been much beset with liars of various kinds and degrees. So keen is his faculty for ferreting these out, and so unerring his instinct for spotting them, that he has not infrequently discovered them in places least suspected by their neighbors and acquaintances, until Mr. Roosevelt turned on the search-light and revealed them in their true—no, no, in their mendacious character. He has put the Ananias badge upon some in high official position, and on others alas, who at one time held an honored place in the esteem and affections even of their deluded fellow countrymen. But as truth is said to be no respecter of persons, much less is mendacity, as proven by Mr. Roosevelt.

He has encountered these disciples of Ananias among the quick and the dead, on the cold, storied page of history, and in the warm, living present. Thomas Jefferson, the founder of Democracy, and distinguished in some other ways, Mr. Roosevelt found, upon inspection, to be "constitutionally incapable of putting a proper value on truthfulness."

Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a New England publicist of some note, once pointed out that, of the two men, Jefferson and Hamilton, who are popularly supposed to have furnished opposing political ideals for this country, Jefferson has by far the larger fol-

lowing. In fact, Mr. Higginson affirms, "the average American, no matter what party affiliations he may claim, consciously or unconsciously, accepts the Jeffersonian theory of government." In the light of this fact, which has other endorsement than Higginson's, Mr. Roosevelt's charge of mendacity against Jefferson has almost the force of a national indictment. Can it be that "the average American" is, by instinct and habit, "constitutionally incapable of putting a proper value on truthfulness?" Most assuredly, those who have dared lift their puny voices against the infallible purposes, opinions, or *recollections* of T. Roosevelt, have quickly found themselves in this mendacious class, for whom is rightly provided no court of appeal.

There is no particular shock to American sensibilities in T. R.'s discovery of Napoleon's "utter unscrupulousness, and marvelous mendacity." We have long entertained the opinion that the Man of Destiny was "no gentleman,"—from his treatment of poor Josephine, and certain traditions that have come down to us about his table manners. So if it pleases our T. R. to add lying to the Napoleonic accomplishments, we shall enter no demurrer. N. Bonaparte being one of those European "down-and-outs" and "dead-so-longs," who have left not even a shining "footprint on the sand" for the emulation of American youth,—but only those warning initials, N. B.—to "take notice" and avoid his fate, most anything that T. R. or anybody else may wish to say in derogation of the once mighty ruler, whose Star of Destiny has set in eternal gloom, cannot get up any controversy on this side the water.

With Jefferson and other American statesmen who have come under the lambasting pen of Historian Roosevelt, the case is different, naturally.

But the liveliest American interest was aroused when Mr. Roosevelt began applying his favorite epi-

thet to prominent living citizens of the Republic. The first of these to receive the Ananias decoration was Judge Alton B. Parker of New York, who—as some persons may remember—was the Democratic candidate for President in 1904, when T. Roosevelt was leading the Republican hosts. In October of that year, Judge Parker issued from Esopus the statement: "Vast sums of money have been contributed for the control of this election in aid of the Administration by corporations and trusts."

This statement was of course promptly nailed by Administration organs as "a campaign lie."

Then on Oct. 31 in a speech at the Madison Square Garden, Parker reiterated his charge and inserted in it a pin-prick for Roosevelt, as follows: "In an earlier utterance, I have referred in detail to what is notoriously going on in the matter of the collection of funds by the Republican party for this campaign. . . . Congress creates a new Department of Commerce and Labor. Of that Department, the President appoints a Secretary (Cortelyou), who has been *his* private secretary. Within that Department provision is made for the collection from large corporations—including the so-called trusts—of information which, be it borne in mind, is to be submitted to the President, for public or private use as he may direct. . . . By grace of the same Executive, this Secretary of Commerce and Labor, through whose Department this information is collected, becomes Chairman of the Republican National Committee. His chief duty in this position is to collect funds for the purpose of securing the election of the President. And it is more notorious that there has resulted from this organized importunity—whatever may be the precise way in which it is made effective—an overflowing treasury to the Committee, of which boast is openly made." . . .

In Jersey City, Nov. 1, Judge Parker again: "As I

have taken occasion to say before, and deem it my duty to say again, the trusts are furnishing the money with which they hope to carry this election."

President Roosevelt, with commendable self-restraint, waited until Nov. 5—three days before election, and then let fly the fulminations of his wrath and righteous denial of the "slanderous accusations repeated time and again by Judge Parker. . . . He has neither produced nor can produce any proof of their truth. . . . I speak, lest the silence of self-respect be misunderstood. The gravamen of these charges lies in the assertion that the corporations have been blackmailed into contributing, and in the implication, which in one or two of Mr. Parker's speeches has the form of assertion, that they (the trusts) have been promised certain immunities or favors, or have been assured that they would receive some kind of improper consideration in view of their contributions. . . . Mr. Parker's accusations against Mr. Cortelyou and me are inventions. *If true, they would brand both of us with infamy;* and inasmuch as *they are false,* heavy must be the responsibility of the man making them. . . . I cannot understand how any honorable man, a candidate for the highest office in the gift of the nation, can take refuge not merely in personalities, but such base and unworthy personalities. . . . The statements made by Mr. Parker are unqualifiedly and atrociously false!"

And so it came about, when Judge Parker was buried 'neath the snow of adverse ballots on November 8, 1904, he also went down to political death with Mr. Roosevelt's Ananias decorations pinned all over him.

The accusations anent the campaign contributions by the trusts, were forgotten for a time. The man who had made them was found guilty of that gravest American offence of "failing like failure;" the man who had issued such indignant, manly denial of them

was riding the top crest of "succeeding like success." Rebuked by both President Roosevelt and the American people, there seemed no immediate rôle open to Judge Parker, except to "keep still, and be good." And so he retired to the shades of Esopus, silenced if not convinced.

But tho' the publicity organs grind slowly, they sometimes grind well, even for a defeated presidential aspirant, and to the manifest discomfiture of the man entrusted with the job. The investigations and consequent exposures of crookedness in the big life insurance companies of New York in 1906, brought out in sworn testimony the fact that the Equitable, Mutual and New York Life had contributed $150,000 to the Republican campaign fund of 1904, the same being the money of their trusting policyholders. This damaging revelation—being sworn to before a Committee empowered to take evidence in the case, was not denied by the Republican managers,—denial in this case being rather risky, since both Treasurer Bliss and Chairman Cortelyou could have been summoned on the witness-stand by the investigating Committee.

Cut off from the sacred right of "denial" by this hard, unyielding circumstance, Mr. Roosevelt was represented in the public press, as "much stirred and grieved by the Insurance disclosures." He was even reported to have remarked to one of his intimates, that he "felt his election in 1904 was somewhat discredited" by the Insurance scandals, and he "wanted to know" if there were not some means of restoring the money!

This was immediately construed by a trusting public as fresh proof of that "sensitive moral sense" accredited to Mr. Roosevelt, and no doubt the despoiled widows and orphans were comforted in a measure by the knowledge thus afforded, that their virtuous President "suffered with them" (mentally) over their

losses. George W. Perkins of the New York Life should have been able to quiet the Rooseveltian misgivings to a degree, since he it was, we believe, who had owned to contributing the Insurance money to the Republican fund in a Bryan campaign year, and justified it upon the ground—that it was better to do this than to allow the country to go to the demnition bow-wows under Bryan! This eminently patriotic view (in which Mr. Roosevelt doubtless concurred) was perfectly natural to men in the Perkins class; only, it did seem, in the pious cant of that class, a trifle "un-American" not to allow the innocent policyholders to choose their own mode of going to destruction,—whether at the hands of Bryan or the Insurance companies.

This George W. Perkins, as we learn from an article in July Munsey (1903) entitled "Men About the President," from the pen of a Roosevelt admirer, was "one of President Roosevelt's *close friends and unofficial counselors,* who could have almost any position in the power of the President to offer!"

Quite naturally, this "close friend and unofficial counselor" of President Roosevelt wanted to have him elected in 1904, and probably thought also, that Parker's splashing around in that impudent fashion about the "Interests," showed him to be as great a menace to the country as Bryan.

And so Friend Perkins was again ready to lay the money of widows and orphans upon the altar of his country and his Rooseveltian friendship,—only of course, out of delicate consideration for the "sensitive moral sense" of his Presidential friend, he kept the painful fact from him, until it was too late to do anything except "grieve and wonder."

The Insurance disclosures revived the memory of the Parker charges, and vindicated their truth in large measure, though nobody was so irreverent as to con-

nect President Roosevelt's name in any official way with the "corruption fund." Judge Parker's accusations received further confirmation in the Spring of 1907, by the publication of the now famous "Harriman letters," which brought President Roosevelt directly into the fray.

Those who keep track of current events will remember the sensational headline, "President Roosevelt on Harriman's Trail," which appeared in the public prints about March 23, 1907, followed by the announcement: "President Roosevelt is understood to have reached a determination to prosecute E. H. Harriman. Under the President's *personal direction,* the Department of Justice is looking into the matter, altho' the final hearings on the Harriman Merger will not be held until April 4th. The President wants to know whether on the evidence already submitted, he can make a case against Harriman under the Sherman Anti-trust law, or under the Interstate Commerce Act." . . .

On being informed by the Government's lawyers that Harriman, if prosecuted at all for his iniquitous "Chicago-Alton deal," would have to be prosecuted under the State laws of Illinois, President Roosevelt promptly called Gov. Deneen and Attorney-General Stead into the conference, and being confronted with the further astounding fact, brought forward by the Illinois attorney-general, that there was not at present, any State statute which was competent to deal with the Harriman offence, he had Gov. Deneen to formulate a bill *at once,* and submit it to the Legislature—which if enacted into law, would make it impossible in the future for criminals of the Harriman type to escape the just reward of their crimes.

The public was not informed at the time (and but for the untimely production of Harriman's letter to Sydney Webster, it is not likely it would ever have

been so informed), that in the Fall campaign of 1906, E. H. Harriman had politely but firmly refused the Hon. Jim Sherman's (he that is now James Schoolcraft, but at that time Chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee) solicitations for funds with which to carry the Grand Old Party to victory in New York State,—the reading public was not informed of this at the time of the righteous and vigorous Roosevelt purpose to impale Harriman upon the teeth of the law; and if the reading public *had* been acquainted with this antecedent event, the Roosevelt claquers would not have permitted any logical connection between it and the proposed Harriman prosecution, not if *they* knew it!

But the publication, on April 3rd, 1907, of Harriman's letter to his personal friend and business adviser, Sydney Webster (who had just sent him a friendly warning to beware of being drawn into politics), throws a flood of cruel light upon the whole unhappy Harriman-Roosevelt mix-up.

This letter, which came to light on the aforesaid date, was penned by Harriman late in Dec., 1905, and contained the following startling information: "About a week before election, in the autumn of 1904, when it looked certain that the State ticket would go Democratic, and was doubtful as to Roosevelt himself, he, the President, sent me a request to go to Washington to confer upon the political conditions of New York State. . . . I complied, and he told me he understood the campaign could not be successfully carried on without sufficient money, and asked me if I could help them in raising the necessary funds, as the national Committee, under control of Chairman Cortelyou, had utterly failed of obtaining them, and there was a large amount due from them to the New York State committee. . . . We talked over what could be done for Depew, and finally he agreed that if found

necessary, he would appoint him as ambassador to Paris. . . . With full belief that the President would keep this agreement, I came back to New York, sent for Treasurer Bliss, who told me I was their last hope, and that they had exhausted every other resource. In his presence I called up an intimate friend of Senator Depew, told him that in order to carry New York, it was necessary that $200,000 should be raised at once, and if he would help, I would subscribe $50,000. . . . After a few words over the telephone, the gentleman said he would let me know, which he did, probably in three or four hours, with the result, that the whole amount ($260,000) had been raised. . . The checks were given to Treasurer Bliss, who took them to Chairman Cortelyou. If there were any among them of Life Insurance companies, or any other like organizations, of course Cortelyou must have informed the President. I do not know who the subscribers were, other than the friend of Depew, who was an individual. This amount enabled the New York State committee to continue its work, with the result that at least 50,000 votes were turned in the City of New York alone, making a difference of 100,000 votes in the general result." . . .

After the noise caused by this bomb exploding at Mr. Roosevelt's feet, and the responsive explosion of Rooseveltian wrath, had somewhat subsided; after "the short ugly word" had been passed from the outraged President to the railway magnate and "malefactor of great wealth," and Roosevelt had prepared and submitted what the New York Sun cynically characterized as "his defensive, protective, and antiseptic statement" to Representative Jim Sherman (now James Schoolcraft, and Candidate for the Vice-presidency); Harriman explained, quietly enough, that *he* was not responsible for the publication of the unlucky epistle; that he learned to his dismay, that it had

been reproduced from stenographic notes by a former employe of his, who had been dismissed, and by this unscrupulous stenographer sold to a New York newspaper. That he very much regretted the making public of what he had intended for the eyes of his friend alone. *But,* now that the letter was out, through no fault of his, he had *nothing to retract* as to the statements therein contained. He had related only facts as to what occurred between the President and himself in the Fall of 1904, and he was ready to defend it with his latest breath, and anything else of value he possessed,—or words to that effect.

It is manifestly not the province of this modest little volume, to decide so delicate a question as an issue of veracity between a President of the United States, and a president of a Railway Merger, who was also a "malefactor of great wealth," and after his rencontre with the President, acquired some other titles more or less flattering.

The candid reader must determine for himself, whether Mr. Harriman's letter to Sydney Webster carries the ring of truth, and what possible motive he could have had for stating anything but his honest recollection of the transaction, recited to his friend at a time when he could not have expected the letter to be made public, whatever may have been the mode or the motive for its final publication. For it must be borne in mind, that the letter was written *more than a year before* any proceedings had been instituted by the President against Harriman, several months even before Harriman's churlish refusal to contribute to Mr. Sherman's campaign needs, and while he was yet on the friendliest terms with President Roosevelt. The candid reader will likewise form his own opinion of the aforesaid "defensive, protective, and antiseptic statement" given out by Mr. Roosevelt to the Hon. Jim.—beg pardon, to the Hon. James Schoolcraft

Sherman of New York. Herein Mr. Roosevelt is convicted of trying to make it appear that Harriman had taken the initiative in the negotiations of 1904, and that he—Roosevelt had allowed him to come to Washington at his own request. Thus, Mr. Roosevelt writes to Mr. Sherman: "On his (Harriman's) return from spending the summer in Europe, on Sept. 20, he wrote me, stating that if I thought it desirable, he would come to see me at any time, then or later. On Sept. 23 I answered his letter saying: 'At present there is nothing for me to see you about, tho' there were one or two points in my letter of acceptance which I would like to have discussed with you before putting it out.'"

Hereupon Harriman, with the cold, business instinct of a "practical man," and troubled now with no foolish squeamishness about the sanctity of a personal correspondence, promptly gave to the press the following letter which he says he received while in Europe: "White House, Washington, *June* 29, 1904. My Dear Mr. Harriman: I thank you for your letter. As soon as you come home, I shall want to see you. The fight will doubtless be hot then. It has been a real pleasure to see you this year. Very truly yours, Theodore Roosevelt."

All of this interesting and highly instructive Harriman-Roosevelt correspondence (too voluminous for reproduction here) may be found in the issues (April 2nd, 3rd and 4th, 1907) of the Washington Post, and in other large dailies of the country. Senator Gore, on April 9, 1908, had one of them read in the Senate and inserted in the Congressional Record, page 4745, which he had quoted from the New York Tribune of April 3, 1907.

As this one, we understand, has been pronounced a "forgery" by some of Mr. Roosevelt's Western admirers, we give it as quoted from the Tribune:

"Oct. 14, 1904. My Dear Harriman: A suggestion has come to me in a roundabout way that you do not think it wise to come on to see me in these closing weeks of the campaign, but that you are reluctant to refuse, inasmuch as I have asked you. Now, my dear sir, *you and I are practical men,* and you are on the ground and know the conditions better than I do. If you think there is any danger of your visit to me causing trouble, or if you think there is nothing special I should be informed about, or no matter in which I could give aid, why, of course, give up the visit for the time being, and then a few weeks hence, *before I write my message,* I shall ask you to come down to *discuss certain Government matters* not connected with the campaign. *With great regards,* Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt."

It is asserted, upon the authority of a United States Senator and a lawyer of repute, that any *signed communication* appearing in the public prints, and *not contradicted* by the signer, becomes a *public fact,* further established by the legal liability of any newspaper publishing a bogus letter. We respectfully call the attention of our Western enthusiasts to this opinion, and to the further fact that *their hero himself* never denied (with all his great powers of denial) the authorship of this letter, but included it—somewhat paraphrased and edited perhaps—in his "defensive, protective and antiseptic"—before referred to.

The only thing in this Harriman mix-up which Mr. Roosevelt branded as a malicious falsehood, was the statement, that "I ever asked him to contribute to the presidential or my personal campaign!"

Ah, but that was not the Harriman statement! Mr. Harriman stated, as clearly appears from his letter, and reiterated by him afterwards, that Mr. Roosevelt asked him to raise funds for the *New York State* campaign, and if before his and Mr. Roosevelt's eyes there

swung the political aphorism, "as goes New York, so goes the nation," nothing of this sort is mentioned in their correspondence. True, Mr. Roosevelt had promised as a reward of the Harriman services, to appoint Senator Depew ambassador to Paris,—a promise which he did not afterwards find it "necessary" to keep, it appears.

However the Roosevelt-Harriman contention may be settled, according to individual opinion and preference, it clearly appears above it all, as also from the Insurance exposures, that Judge Parker only spoke forth "the words of truth and soberness" in his campaign charges of 1904; and if there were any doubt about it, it would be settled in some minds by an editorial appearing in the Washington Post (which usually has a fresh boquet every morning for the Roosevelt plate)—some months ago, commenting on somebody's jesting proposal of Alton B. for the Democratic presidential nomination,—the Post seriously affirmed, that if the country had known as much about the "campaign contributions" in 1904 as it *does now,* there is no reason to doubt that Judge Parker would at this moment be seated in the White House.

It was certainly not the Judge's fault that the country *didn't* know all about these unholy "campaign contributions." He had done his best to enlighten the country on that head, but the country, it seems, at that time preferred to accept the T. R. version; and just so long as the country evinces this marvelous avidity for Rooseveltian fable, just so long will Rooseveltian fable pass current. The supply will always be equal to the demand, with no danger of shrinkage or short crops.

Yet tho' the Parker charges have been fully established, probably not even the wicked editors of the New York Sun and Harper's Weekly would be so cruel as to apply Mr. Roosevelt's own verdict, that, "if

true, they brand both Mr. Cortelyou and me with infamy."

Nobody in this courteous age would wish to say anything like that of either Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Cortelyou. They are both very proper, virtuous gentlemen, who are sometimes driven by political exigencies, to adopt the ordinary methods of the ordinary "practical" politician,—*without* the ordinary politician's saving grace of frankness.

In the political gossip which the Hon. James Schoolcraft (we got it right that time!) Sherman carried to President Roosevelt of the Harriman-Sherman interview over the subject of campaign funds in 1906, Harriman is represented as not only so impervious to patriotic appeal, as not to care whether New York was saved from Hearst and Socialism or not, but likewise so lost to decency as to declare, that "when he wanted anything he could buy the New York Legislature—no matter what its political complexion—or he could buy Congress, or buy the Judiciary if necessary!"

This brazen assertion from the wealthy corruptionist naturally gave a great shock to the moral sensibilities of both President Roosevelt and Secretary Root (so reported by the Washington local press), Root probably receiving an extra shock on his own account, since this same "indecent" Harriman had openly asserted that all the successful "octopus" schemes of Mr. Thos. F. Ryan of New York had been manipulated for him by "the adroit mind" of Elihu Root! Truly, E. H. Harriman's "cup of iniquity was full."

He was not only "a deliberate and malicious falsifier," but also "an undesirable citizen of the same class as Eugene Debs, and Haywood and Moyer!"

True, Mr. Harriman *denied* the assertions imputed to him by the Hon. Jim (oh, you know the rest), tho' *not* the one anent the Ryan-Root combination, he evi-

dently entertaining the crude idea that one man has as many rights as another in this country—in the matter of denial. He was to learn his mistake. He had been branded as a "liar"—*officially* branded as such, and the brand bore the T. R. signature, which made it unmistakable. Hereafter, none of the Harriman statements will be believed by any proper-minded persons. And the saddest part of it all was, that this had befallen one who was once a "dear friend" and trusty campaign ally; who had even been bidden to state councils, to confer on "governmental details" in the letter of acceptance, and the anticipated message!

Alas, poor Harriman! He doubtless deserved his fate, which of course made it all the harder to bear, and his only crumb of comfort—that time-honored solace of the miserable—was in the knowledge that he was not the first nor only victim of Rooseveltian love-grown-cold.

There was ex-Senator William E. Chandler of New Hampshire, a Republican of unflinching personal integrity,—tho' confessedly a partizan, who stood so high in Rooseveltian esteem in the Spring of 1906, that he was made the President's chosen emissary to the Democratic camp in the negotiations between the latter and the White House over the pending railroad rate bill. And then when that unnatural and short-lived Tillman-Bailey-Roosevelt alliance went all to smithereens, with the result on the face of the returns, that either the President or his intermediaries (Chandler and Attorney-General Moody) had been guilty of bad faith toward the Democratic allies, Mr. Roosevelt promptly charged that he had been misrepresented by Senator Chandler. Chandler reiterating his "misrepresentation," Mr. Roosevelt changed the charge to a shorter, uglier accusation, and his discredited emissary had no choice but to wear his Ananias badge as gracefully as possible, seeing it had been pinned on by his

own political sovereign, who was forced to do it in order to save his own political honor!

Then there were Mr. Roosevelt's Catholic friends, "Dear Bellamy" and "Dear Maria" Storer, with whom he had been corresponding for years on the freest, most intimate terms, in regard to a project dear to them all three,—the elevation of Archbishop Ireland to the cardinalate. (See the full text of the Roosevelt-Storer correspondence in Washington Post of date December 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 17th, 18th, 28th, 1906.)

But alas!, there came a time when, by some untoward leaking, Mr. Roosevelt's intrigues, or attempted intrigues with the Vatican, became known to the public, and the American Constitution being rather explicit on this score, he was again confronted with the hard alternative of being compromised before the American public himself, or compromising his friends, —with the usual sequel. Pursuing his usual chivalric lines in such cases, he administered a stinging rebuke to poor "dear Maria" in the form of a letter, which he exhibited to others before mailing to Mrs. Storer. "Dear Bellamy" was given the Ananias decoration, because of his assertion that President Roosevelt had in the summer of 1903 sent a message to the Pope by him in regard to making Ireland a cardinal.

But "dear Bellamy" does not appear to have worn his new honors as submissively as some others, similarly decorated—more honor to him!

He gave to the press enough of the mutual correspondence to vindicate his and his wife's position; he likewise said: "When the President *denies* authorizing my oral message to the Pope, he forgets that he told Archbishop Ireland the same thing, and that I have the Archbishop's letter to prove it."

Along with the correspondence, Mr. Storer published the following:

"I cannot trust myself to express fully the feeling of indignation with which I read the letter to Mrs. Storer. Tho' I was in the public service, I felt, and still feel, that I had lost none of the rights which a man has to judge of the propriety of letters addressed to his wife, and to resent an improper communication. I did not then know what I have since learned, that the letter was not even written for my wife's eyes or mine alone, but had been shown to others before it was sent, and thus used to make a case against a lady, a trusting friend, who could not be heard in her own defence. My wife was deliberately accused of having quoted isolated sentences from the President's letters to convince other persons that he was doing exactly what, as *he* asserts he had explicitly stated that he would not do. . . . The tone of long-suffering and outraged patience, the *careful omission of anything that the writer himself had done, or authorized to be done* in the matter complained of, the quotation from the letters written at the time of my errand to the Pope, without any of the facts which would give those letters their true character, or show that they were an angry complaint because what he had directed to be done, had become known,—these things, with the abusive personal characterization of my wife, and the assumed indignation with what had been permitted—where not expressly directed—seemed to me to put the letter outside the limit of anything justifiable even in a stranger." . . .

Time and space forbid anything like a full membership list of the now famous "Ananias Club" founded by Mr. Roosevelt. Suffice it to say, that for a while in Washington, it looked like pretty nearly everybody in the nation would be proven a liar—*except* Roosevelt!

Then the "liars" were given a little respite, after

Harriman's misdemeanors brought the "undesirable citizens" into the lime-light.

These also comprise a numerous class (embracing at present all who intend to vote for Bryan), but in the beginning the charter membership was small,—Harriman, Debs, Haywood and Moyer. No just plea can be made for the first two, the one being a rich malefactor, and the other a red-handed anarchist—by all the rules of the game. But the circumstances surrounding the last two at the time of the President's denunciation, made it a little grave. Haywood and Moyer were labor-union leaders, and on that account, may have belonged in the anarchistic class in the opinion of some people. But the significant thing in Mr. Roosevelt's characterization is, that these two men were on trial for their lives; were charged with a capital crime. They might, or might not, be guilty of complicity in the murder of Idaho's governor; the decision lay as yet in the hands of "twelve unprejudiced jurors. Was it consistent with Presidential decorum, or with the "square deal" guaranteed by the laws of the country, for Mr. Roosevelt to attempt to influence the jury, and anticipate their verdict with a pronunciamento of his own?

Some there were who thought they perceived a marked decline in Mr. Roosevelt's popularity after this episode, but this also passed, in the quickly moving Roosevelt cyclorama, and was forgotten,—so he hoped.

Then in the late Spring of 1907, Mr. Roosevelt dreamed a bad dream, which he deemed it his duty to communicate immediately to his publicity-mongers. This perturbed vision was of a political "black hand"; there was a "rich man's conspiracy" to *defeat* the Roosevelt Policies!

The discovery of this iniquitous plot is ascribed to the President's private secretary, Wm. Loeb, Jr. He

it was who "caught on" to it, identified the conspirators, and dragged them to the light. Mr. Loeb has been the subject of some facetious newspaper comment, because he once (so the story goes) became panicky over a ferocious attack by Jack-rabbits while accompanying one of the President's hunting trips in the West.

This encounter with the Jack-rabbits perhaps unstrung Mr. Loeb's nerves, and pre-disposed him to frightful apparitions. The plot, as given in detail in the press, was as follows: A drunken Senator, babbling in his cups, had told an intimate friend of President Roosevelt at a dinner party, that $5,000,000,—not a penny more nor less—had been subscribed by some of the "criminally rich" to defeat Mr. Roosevelt, or "any man of his type," for election to the presidency; and with consistent plutocratic cunning, this bibulous and plotting Senator offered the Roosevelt intimate $25,000 to come into the conspiracy!

Think of trying to corrupt a Roosevelt intimate with a paltry $25,000! No other evidence is needed of the conspirator's maudlin condition. Of course the intimate only waited long enough to get the names of all the wicked and predatory plotters to post off to the White House, and communicate the alarming news to Loeb,—and Loeb, after getting "good and scared" went and told the President, and the President told the cuckoos, and the cuckoos told the country!

And does the country believe it? Great pains have been taken to give out the impression to the country that it should love Mr. Roosevelt for the "enemies he has made." Wall Street and all the Captains of "predatory wealth" have been pictured lined up in a solid phalanx against Roosevelt and Roosevelt "policies." No attention whatever is paid to the fact that Roosevelt was *born* into the wealthy class, and naturally sympathizes with them, his life-long associates and

friends, more than with this strange, uncouth, and horny-handed multitude. No account is taken of Roosevelt's plutocratic associates and intimates. One of the reasons assigned for Platt's consenting to his nomination for governor in 1898, was that "two influential campaign contributors, Mr. Morgan and Mr. Whitney—especially Mr. Morgan—liked him." It will be remembered that Mr. Morgan was at an Oyster Bay conference in 1904, for which the Roosevelt cuckoos supplied some innocent and plausible explanation. In this (1908) campaign year of grace, when Mr. Archbold's (vice-president of Standard Oil) private yacht is observed at the Oyster Bay moorings, Mr. Loeb hastens to assure a curious and interested public that Mr. Archbold's visit "has no political significance!" I don't know what we should do without Loeb. Without his ever-present, and ever-satisfying explanations, we would lose the key to the Rooseveltian combination time out of number.

One thing stands out in bold relief, from the Insurance investigations and the Harriman letters, and that is, that Roosevelt was made President in 1904 in consequence of a "rich man's conspiracy"; and if there is any "rich men's conspiracy" existent at present, it may be safely argued that it is not against Roosevelt, but against the toiling masses, and by all the signs of the Roosevelt zodiac, he is in it, of it, and for it!

CHAPTER XIII.

THE BIG STICK.

"An American President is no bloodless, tame affair. He selects his own cabineteers, and of his motion may disband them. He rules; he isn't ruled. He listens, but he decides. His veto is equal to two-thirds of Congress. He arbitrarily controls 200,000 underlings of government, who draw an aggregate annual salary of 200 million dollars. An English king may hardly name his cook, or select his coachman. The President is in absolute command of the Army and Navy, and may order them to attack anybody or anything, at home or abroad, and they will obey that order. Legally, he has no power to declare war; but since in fact he may provoke it, begin it, and end it, one sees that the Constitution, while providing a distinction, has forgotten to provide a difference. Every department of government is under the presidential thumb. He is, if not above, then beyond the law; for the highest courts will not issue its writs of summons, subpoena, attachment, mandamus, injunction, or contempt against him. There are but two checks to your President,—public opinion and the Congressional power of impeachment. The latter has been resorted to but once, and it failed."

In this graphic language has Alfred Henry Lewis, one of the Roosevelt boomers in 1904, set forth the varied governmental functions of our Chief Executive. Whether he caught the idea of the "big stick" from Mr. Lewis' inspiring epigrams, or evolved it out

of his own inner strenuousness, pretty soon after this, —or was it before? It really doesn't matter, for it seems to be as well established as the Ten Commandments or the Golden Rule—or any other ancient wisdom which has neither beginning nor end—at some point in his well-marked and well-advertised career therefore—T. R. let fall the careless remark which was to secure him more fame than all his voluminous "literary works," or all his strenuous speechifying,—more even than the unprecedented output of presidential messages, regular and special.

"Speak softly, carry a big stick, and you will travel far," quoth T. R. in that lucky moment when his Star of Destiny twinkled in the American firmament. Altho' "speak softly" seems to have had precedence of the "big stick" in the original grouping, the latter has so far distanced it in the business of "travelling far," that many persons do not even remember that "speaking softly" was once the ornamental antithesis of the Roosevelt BIG STICK. This has grown by what it feeds upon, until it fills all the land with its bigness, and has completely revolutionized our former ideals of government. Most thoughtful students of our Constitution realize that it gives too much power to the President. It has been pointed out by more than one conservative publicist, that this Executive power, even within Constitutional limits, might become a great menace to popular government, when placed in the hands of a self-seeking, unscrupulous President. Fortunately for the Republic, most of her presidents, while evincing the common infirmities of our infirm humanity, have not shown an aggressive spirit in the matter of transcending the bounds set for them by the Constitution.

We may even go further than that, and say that few of the Presidents preceding Roosevelt have even come up to the full measure of their Constitutional

prerogatives. It may also be asserted with utmost truth, and without any exaggeration, that Theodore Roosevelt has overridden his Constitutional bounds oftener and further than any other President the country has had. The BIG STICK has indeed "travelled far" in its inroads upon the Constitution.

The favorite method inaugurated by the rule of the BIG STICK is to rule by means of commissions and bureaus, which are to act "within the discretion of the President." And so we have a Panama Commission appointed by the President, which is administering affairs on the Isthmus, and what the Commission is not empowered to do, the President is supplying by Executive order. Courts are created, and judges appointed by Executive order, and Congress has nothing to say or to do about any of it, except to appropriate the money as the President calls for it.

We have also a Philippine Commission, which operates the machinery of government for the Filipinos, and is answerable to no one but the President. The Philippine Courts are also established by Executive order, and the judicial decisions are in entire accord with the Roosevelt "policies." When the head of the Insular Office was asked: "Who advised Mr. Roosevelt that the title to the friar lands was vested in the Pope?" he replied, "It was so decided by the Philippine Court."

"And who established the authority of the Philippine court?" and the answer was, "President Roosevelt." Ah! the service was mutual.

When President Roosevelt sent Secretary Taft on his last visit of inspection to the Islands, the amiable Secretary brought back a most optimistic report. But if everything isn't "lovely, and the goose hanging high" in the Philippines, it is hanging too far away to disturb the reflections of the average American citizen.

So many commissions and bureaus have been created whose members are appointed by the President, and act "within his discretion," that the fear has been expressed in some quarters, that all the functions of Congress are being gradually absorbed by the Executive, and pretty soon, if the present trend continues, Congress will be in the forlorn position of nothing to do but sigh—like Othello—over its vanished occupation! Many of these commissions are given supervision of work which the standing committees of Congress are appointed to do.

For instance, Congress has a committee on Rivers and Harbors, which is supposed to look after all needed improvements in inland waterways and which, having a most efficient membership, has very thoroughly fulfilled the purpose of its appointment. But the Strenuous President decided that we needed also an "Inland Waterways Commission"; and so he appointed one, by authority of the BIG STICK, and without the consent of Congress which of course must appropriate the money to pay the Commission, if it is paid. The last advices from the "Inland Waterways Commission," stated that Congress had not come up with the requisite appropriation, but that the BIG STICK had announced to the "congress of Governors" assembled at the White House,—"if Congress did not find a way pretty soon to perpetuate the Inland Waterways Commission, that *he would!*"

Whereupon Senator Teller remarked in his quiet, plaintive fashion:

"If the President can find a way to maintain this commission without any appropriation from Congress, it may be economy to let him do it!"

The subjects calling for BIG STICK regulation range from the highest to the most trivial affairs of the nation. But whether it is delivering an ultimatum and timely warning to a foreign power—little ones,

that is, like the Latin-American Republics,—or causing the arrest and suspension of a steamboat pilot for the daring impertinence of running his boat in such manner as to outdistance the one carrying the Presidential person, there is the same complacent intimation of "the divine right" of this Rooseveltian sceptre.

The days of the rule of the BIG STICK are now numbered. But still reaching after "the good, the beautiful, and the true," Mr. Roosevelt has recently suggested that a "commission to look after sanitary conditions in rural homes, particularly in the South," is one of the urgent needs of the times, but the suggestion doesn't appear to have evoked any very great enthusiasm. If Mr. Roosevelt has any future designs on the colored vote, either for himself or for others, some one who is interested in him, should give him the friendly tip, that a strenuous enforcement of sanitary laws upon the colored population of the South would likely cause as great a hostile commotion as Brownsville!

CHAPTER XIV.

"MY POLICIES."

So much has been said in the press, in Congress, and in the boarding-houses of the Roosevelt "policies," and so insistent and clamorous has been the claim of the Strenuous one himself that *he had* "policies," that the average American comprehends in some vague general way, that T. R. either has *better* policies than anybody else in the policy business, or more of 'em,—or probably both—the average American is not quite clear. But if you *ask* this average American—with this well-defined conviction about the Roosevelt policies—*what are these* policies?—nine chances to one, he will be thrown into stammering confusion, and cannot even hazard an intelligent guess.

Sympathy has always gone to the U. S. Senator who, when accused of complicity in "the rich men's conspiracy" to defeat the *only* policies of the *only* T. R., stoutly protested his innocence, and urged in defense, that he was an ardent admirer of Mr. Roosevelt, and that he had always voted for the "Policies," whenever he could find out what they were!

The best known writer on public men and political subjects in Washington, was asked by a bewildered onlooker, as to the "Policies," and he replied: "Mr. Roosevelt has been on both sides of the tariff, on both sides of the Negro question, on both sides of the Octopus chase, and on both sides of Civil-Service Reform."

No wonder that poor U. S. Senator was confused!

William Jennings Bryan,—ever more charitable in his judgment of Roosevelt, than Roosevelt has ever been in his judgment of Bryan—once attempted a formal classification of the Roosevelt policies, as follows:

"Democratic doctrines advocated by Roosevelt:

"I. Railroad Regulation. II. Enforcement of Anti-trust law. III. The Income tax. IV. Arbitration in Labor disputes.

"Democratic doctrines Roosevelt has *not* endorsed: I. Tariff Reform. II. Election of U. S. senators by popular vote. III. Ultimate Independence for the Filipinos. IV. Restraint of government by Injunction. (This was before the date of the Chicago Anti-injunction plank.)

"*Un*-Democratic doctrines of Roosevelt:

"I. National Incorporation of railroads and other interstate corporations. II. Ship subsidy. III. Asset Currency. IV. Militarism."

With this categorical outline as a lamp to our feet, we will travel apace into the realm of history and official record, to see what we can discover about the famous "POLICIES."

Early in 1906, when Mr. Roosevelt gave forth his strenuous "Yi, yi, yip! siss-boom!" mandate to Congress to "regulate the railroad rates," it is related that the Hon. Nelson Aldrich from Rhode Island—otherwise known unofficially as "the Boss of the Senate"—mistook it for the "college yell of a Correspondence School of Economics"; but on becoming convinced that it proceeded from the White House, the Boss sat up and made extensive observations. Faithfully in the weeks that followed, did this conscientious servant of the "Interests" strive to thwart this foolish "regulating" Act, by the eccentric, erratic, and chaotic President (who was unfortunately attached to the Boss's own party at this time), and his absurd Democratic

following. But by and by, this pitiful Democratic minority became not so pitiful as was its wont. Not attempting to explain, even to itself, *why* the strenuous Republican President had chosen to champion a measure taken bodily from the Democratic platform—and about which the platform on which *he was elected,* had been ominously silent, this hard-working and astute Democratic minority, being able to decipher a good thing when it was stuck under its legislative nose, kept steadily on the railroad-rate job, until it was ascertained that the President had secured enough pledged votes on the Republican side of the Senate, which added to the entire Democratic contingent—could carry the bill on its final passage. This bill, as agreed upon between the President and his Democratic allies, would empower the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix the shipping rates of common carriers at a reasonable figure, where there was complaint of exorbitant charge by the carrier; with the *narrowest* possible opportunity for the *courts* to *review* and overturn the Commission's findings. This was the sort of railroad-rate bill the Democrats favored, and this was the sort the President favored, and would support with his pledged Republican votes,—at least this was the message Chandler and Moody brought from him to the Democratic Senators who were engineering the bill.

But this sort of a railroad-rate bill was by no means pleasing to the Hon. Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island,—the aforesaid Senate-Boss. Accounts vary as to the subsequent proceedings, in some minor details. Some assert, that when everything was in readiness for a final vote on the rate bill carrying a narrow court review, in that merry month of May, 1906; when all was peace and quietness along the Potomac, the "big stick" and the "pitchfork" having been both wreathed in peach-blossoms and tied together with red-white-

and-blue ribbons for the occasion,—suddenly the wily Senate Boss arose and beckoned to Senator Allison of Iowa; and that between them they fixed up the scheme which caused the President's sudden change of front, and sent the bolt out of the clear blue into the Democratic camp, causing angry turmoil where gladness and harmony had reigned. Others say that Senator Allison was sick abed at the time the "Amendment" bearing his name was formulated and laid before the President—and knew nothing about it until it was all over.

All agree that the adroit Senator from Rhode Island carried the so-called "Allison Amendment"—for years the Boss had been modestly launching his choicest measures under other Senators' names—to the White House, and in presenting it, took occasion to whisper, Iago-like, into the Executive ear: "Do you realize that you are playing into the hands of Tillman and Bailey, who are preparing to cut the throat of the Republican Party? And that they are simply making a tool and an object of ridicule of *you?*"

The Boss was better acquainted with the temper of the "tool" than were the wicked, designing Democrats. To "cut the throat of the Republican Party" might have been condoned, if T. Roosevelt were to be glorified over the remains; but that *he* should appear in the unflattering light of a "tool" and an "object of ridicule" was not to be endured for a moment! The Boss —who had come nearer to being unhorsed than ever before in his victorious career—was once more in the ascendant.

It was all up with the "narrow court-review." The "Allison Amendment" which provided for a very *broad* court-review, was promptly espoused by Mr. Roosevelt, and in this emasculated form, the railroad-rate regulation—which had promised so gloriously for

the cause of the shippers against the railroad "octopus"—finally passed both Houses and became the law.

Tillman uttered his scornful charge of "bad faith" against the President, in the open court of the Senate, —and he adduced Senator Chandler's statement in proof of the Rooseveltian perfidy. Senator Lodge, who wears always a Roosevelt chip on his shoulder, rushed out to the telephone, and obtaining the White House connection, told His Strenuous Majesty what dreadful things Tillman was uttering on the floor of the Senate at that very moment. Soon Lodge was back in the Senate Chamber, armed with the Executive *denial,* and interrupted Mr. Tillman's oratorical flow long enough to tell him, with his most emphatic, uncompromising manner, and in his best Boston grammar, that the things he was attributing to the President upon the authority of Senator Chandler, were absolutely and unqualifiedly *false,*—upon the President's own avowal—now then!" It appears that even Tillman was staggered by the force of this presidential denial, for he dropped into silence for the time.

Two days later, however, Tillman returned to the charge, this time armed with Senator Chandler's *written* and *certified* statement as to what transpired between the President and himself in the railroad rate negotiation. Chandler retracted nothing of his previous statement, but reaffirmed and added to; and a note from Loeb to Senator Chandler was introduced as refuting evidence of the President's disingenuous showing that Tillman had *approached him* with a request for negotiations.

Roosevelt does not evince his usual shrewdness in this. It was all very well to charge Harriman with making advances to the White House throne, but it was too great a straining of public credulity in the case of Tillman. It may well be doubted, if Lodge himself

believed that Senator Tillman would make an overture of any kind to President Roosevelt.

In one of the most dramatic and impressive scenes ever enacted in the Senate, Tillman, with unprecedented calmness, and with the dignity and solemnity of a judge passing sentence, arraigned President Roosevelt before the "facts and the evidence," for breaking faith with his Democratic allies, without cause and without warning; and for surrendering the people's cause to the railroad "interests." "I do not say," declared the Pitchfork Senator in his most judicial tone, "that the President was bound not to change his mind; but I do say, that, having come to a definite and positive agreement with us through his own accredited agents, he was bound to *give notice* of such change; and to claim otherwise,—as Attorney-General Moody is trying to do—is to assert that the ordinary code of honor which obtains among *gentlemen*,—is not binding upon the President and his Cabinet."

Senator Bailey, rather more charitable than Tillman, and probably with a more accurate discernment of the situation, was inclined to think the President had merely "surrendered" to the Boss; and he ironically congratulated "the Senator from Rhode Island on having resumed control of the Republican Party"; at the same time he declared: "Let us hear no more of this *man-of-iron* in the White House. He has shown himself in this, a man-of-clay, and very ordinary clay at that!"

Meantime Mr. Roosevelt, finding himself in a most awkward position before the public, had recourse to his usual panacea. He assembled his faithful "cuckoo" flock to the White House, and "gave out" a statement for the press: All legislation is based upon compromise, as they knew; the President could not force *his will* upon Congress; he must take what he could get, and do the best he could. The Allison bill,

being the last compromise submitted, seemed to embody about all in the way of rate regulation that could be obtained at present; and so the President had decided to recommend that to Congress, as the best they could do!

The astonished "cuckoos" listened in silence—being well-trained birds—tho' most of them had received previous and authoritative information, that the President had corraled and counted enough Republican votes in the Senate to pass—with the help of the Democrats—the form of bill (with the "narrow court-review") which he had at first declared he would support. But the first duty of a presidential cuckoo is like that of "the famous Six Hundred,"—"theirs not to reason why; theirs, but to do or die!" And so they *did,* finding it preferable to death or dismissal. And now, oh faithful cuckoo-brood, bend attentive ear to another interesting bit of information with which your presidential master would regale the public mind, and give it something else to think about besides his own unhappy predicament in the railroad-rate legislation. He has caught from far-off Texas the premonitory rumblings of Mr. Bailey's factional fight in his own State; he has been advised that Mr. Bailey's seemingly frank and earnest advovacy of railroad-rate regulation is only a pose,—the Texas Senator being in fact in direct collusion with the "octopus"; he has heard also that Tillman distrusts Bailey; he (the President) cannot of course compromise his own position, by any unholy alliance with the suspected Texas Senator, and so—(by way of demonstrating his absolute incorruptibility before all the people)—he accepts a measure framed by Senator Aldrich, whose patriotic devotion to the people's cause, is always above reproach!

And so next day, the country was warned—through

the obedient publicity hosts—to have a care, and keep an eye upon Senator Bailey!

Then followed Bailey's memorable angry defence in the Senate, wherein he freely applied the Ananias decoration to the President or to the newspaper hosts, —he didn't care which—whoever was most entitled to wear it. Tillman sustained Bailey, remarking in his characteristic way, "Here seems to be another muck-rake, with its handle in the White House."

But consider for a moment, if you please, gentle reader, this spectacle of the President of the United States, assailing—in the presence of an irresponsible newspaper clique—the honor of a U. S. Senator, in anticipation of a charge not yet brought against it, and when it was, clearly a matter for the State of Texas to deal with, and decide.

As a matter of fact, Texas later decided it,—decided it twice, we believe, in Senator Bailey's favor. But even had the verdict been adverse, and Mr. Bailey convicted of too great friendliness with the "Interests"—as was charged—was it fitting, or seemly, think you, that the man who had shielded Elihu Root, Paul Morton, and Francis B. Loomis,—to say nothing of his own shady connection with Harriman and the Insurance Companies, should cast the first stone at him? The malicious cunning, the ineffable meanness, and the Pecksniffian pharisaism of this covert thrust at the Texas Senator, put it outside the pale of anything presidential which this country had ever before witnessed, and let us hope that it will continue *sui generis*.

This is a faithful report of the way in which Mr. Roosevelt "advocated" the Democratic doctrine of railroad-rate regulation, and if you think it lacks official confirmation, kindly consult the Congressional Records and the Washington newspaper files of that period, March, April and May, 1906.

If this Rate Bill has secured any great practical

benefits to the toiling masses, few persons are so well posted as to be able to put a finger on them, off-hand. It was a very large legislative mountain, which labored strenuously and resonantly for many months, and in the end, a very small legislative mouse came forth; yet small as it is, it is the only reform measure which can hold a brief for Roosevelt in the day of his trial. Let him have the full measure of credit, therefore, for all there is in it.

And now let us take a peep at his Anti-trust record, of which there has been such noisy exploitation. If you have taken your impression of Rooseveltian "trust-busting" from the newspapers, and the special claquers who are retained to fill magazine space for the glorification of Roosevelt, you probably think that organized wealth and large industrial combines—"operating in restraint of trade"—have never had such an uncompromising foe and vigorous prosecutor in this country, as the present Strenuous occupant of the White House. But if you are asked the specific question,—*which trusts has he busted?*—you will probably be puzzled for a reply. And if you want an exact and succinct statement of what has been *actually done,* or of what has been attempted by the Roosevelt Administration, in the direction of curbing the trusts, you may find it in a neat little pamphlet issued by the Department of Justice, containing a complete list of all "civil and criminal cases instituted by the United States under the Sherman Anti-Trust law of 1890 and the Act to Regulate Commerce (of 1887) as Amended, including the Elkins Act" (1903). This record of anti-trust prosecution by the Government covers four Administrations,—Harrison's, Cleveland's second term, McKinley's, and Roosevelt's down to Dec. 2, 1907, and Roosevelt's portion, briefly condensed, is as follows: Actions of every kind under the Sherman law, brought by the Roosevelt Administration, are 34

in number, comprising 16 bills in equity, and 18 criminal indictments. Of these 34 cases, only 8 are of the major class, all the others being of minor importance, and just such cases as have been instituted in the courts every year since the law was enacted, under Democratic and Republican administrations alike. Of these 8 big cases, only *three have been won* by the Government, as compared with *six* important cases won by the Government in the eight years preceding Roosevelt.

Under the Act to Regulate Commerce (approved 1887), 48 suits were instituted by Harrison's Administration, 102 cases prosecuted under Cleveland's second Administration, 15 under McKinley's, and 21 under Roosevelt.

Most of the actions aimed at "predatory wealth" by the Roosevelt Administration, have been brought under the Elkins Rebate law (approved 1903) which his predecessors in office did not have, tho' they repeatedly won rebate cases under the old statute to regulate commerce. The cases, both civil and criminal, instituted under the Elkins Act, which are accredited to Mr. Roosevelt's Administration, are 129, yet it may be questioned, if in all the 129, there was *one* so flagrant as that of the Santa Fe Railway Company, which implicated his dear friend and cabineteer, Paul Morton, and was therefore quietly quashed.

Many of the cases instituted under the Roosevelt regime have been of small importance, and of the three big cases prosecuted and won under the Sherman law, namely, U. S. vs. Northern Securities Co.; U. S. vs. Swift & Co. (Beef Trust); and U. S. vs. General Paper Co. (Paper Trust), what has been the practical outcome? An injunction was granted against the Paper Company, and the combination was ordered dissolved; yet a large delegation, representing the largest consumers of white print paper in the country,

called on President Roosevelt in November, 1907, to inform him the decree had been wholly ineffective, and that the Paper Trust still controls prices. It will be remembered that one of the things the last Congress was most urgently importuned to do, was to take the duty off wood-pulp and print paper, in order to afford some relief from the exorbitant prices of the Paper Trust. The case against the packers was equally disappointing. An attempt to bring criminal action against the officers of the Beef Trust, ended in failure, and the housewives of the country can probably testify as to the effect of the Government's victory in lowering the price of beef. Of the Northern Securities merger, Bennett in his "Roosevelt and the Republic" says: "The merger has been a hard fact in the Northwest since those days in 1901, when the Hill-Morgan interests gained control of the Northern Pacific and the Burlington railways. It was as hard a fact *after* the Government victory as before. Now it is as hard a fact as it was before the Government brought its suit. . . . As to results, the rose is just as sweet by any other name, the merger just as profitable by any other title or no title at all, as by the title of the 'Northern Securities Company.'"

Thus it will appear, that when we come to sum up the practical results of the Roosevelt "trust-busting," we haven't much to the good.

Nor has he consistently adhered to the "trust-busting" theory,—not in several conspicuous and notable instances. These are sufficient to indicate pretty clearly, that whenever trust prosecution was going to involve any of Mr. Roosevelt's "dear friends," or hinder his personal ambitions, the Roosevelt roaring-lion in the path of the "wicked" trust became suddenly a timid sheep. E. H. Harriman was as much of a "rich malefactor" in 1904, when Roosevelt sought his aid, and affectionately put him in the same "practical"

class with himself, as he was in 1907, when the Strenuous "trust-buster" almost threw the State of Illinois into the Chicago River in his efforts to "get at" the wicked Harriman.

Yet the only observable difference (to a dispassionate on-looker) between the "dear Harriman" of 1904 and the "undesirable citizen" of 1907, is that in the one case he was a compliant campaign contributor, and in the other he had refused to contribute to Republican resources in 1906, and (a much greater offence) had said some unflattering things about Roosevelt in the same connection.

Again, when the U. S. Steel Corporation wanted to absorb the Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. in the winter of 1907, its president, Mr. Gary, came to Washington, and apprised Mr. Roosevelt of his "octopus" intention; at the same time asking immunity from the Sherman anti-trust law, and darkly hinting that if such immunity were not granted, it would result very disastrously for the "business interests" of the country, and precipitate a worse panic than the one already on.

The newspaper gossip of Washington averred that the conference between the Steel-Trust magnate and the Presidential octopus-chaser, *lasted all night,* but at daybreak, Mr. Gary came away smiling and confident.

The story of the all-night White House seance may be an invention, but it is no invention that the Steel Trust *did* absorb the Tennessee Coal and Iron Co., and you may search the records of the Attorney-General's Office in vain for any suit instituted by the Government against the Steel Trust in consequence. The most recent instance in which Mr. Roosevelt stayed his prosecuting hand against monopolistic greed, was the case of the New Haven Railway merger last May (1908). Investigations instituted by the Department of Justice several months previous, brought out the

fact that this Railway Company had swallowed up all competing lines, and monopolized about all the transportation facilities in three States.

The rumor getting abroad that the merger was liable to prosecution by the Government, brought several vice-presidents of the Company to Washington to confer with President Roosevelt. These were given to understand—so they said—that no action would be taken against the Company, for the present at least, and on no account, without due notification. Meantime the government attorneys, under the direction of Attorney-General Bonaparte, prepared an indictment of the New Haven Co. for gross violation of the Sherman Anti-trust law. News of this brought Vice-president Tymothy E. Byrnes promptly to a White House conference, on Thursday, May 21, and when it ended, Mr. Byrnes gave out the statement, that he had no fear of government prosecution for his Company.

When therefore suit was filed against the New Haven merger next day (May 22) in Boston in the U. S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, probably Mr. Byrnes was the most surprised man in the country—except Mr. Roosevelt. The latter immediately telephoned to the Attorney-General's office a peremptory order to "kill the news" of the suit, and stop the proceedings. But the afternoon papers had already published the item, and when in the Cabinet meeting next morning, the President angrily demanded an explanation of Mr. Bonaparte, the Attorney-General, greatly to his credit, met the issue squarely. He had supposed it to be the policy of this Administration to punish offenders against the Anti-trust law. The New Haven Railway Company had come within the exercise of that law, upon the findings of the Department. And furthermore,—his fighting blood stirred evidently by the flourish of the Big Stick—the President must understand, that the peti-

tion filed in the Boston Court against the New Haven Railway Company *would stand,* or he, the Attorney-General who had ordered the petition, would tender his resignation from the Cabinet.

This ultimatum from the Attorney-General had the effect of cooling the presidential ire and retiring the Big Stick from the controversy.

A report of the Cabinet clash which appeared in the newspapers was promptly rebuked—as he has rebuked so many things—with an Executive *denial.* Everybody was too polite of course to continue the subject, but the man who had reported the incident, one of the most accurate, and conservative newspaper men of Washington, assured the writer that the *facts* are as above related.

So much for the Roosevelt enforcement of anti-trust laws. Of his championship of the income tax,—ascribed to him by Mr. Bryan, we have heard but little; and certainly nothing has been accomplished in this direction by anybody, if we except the tax on the incomes of the "criminal rich" levied every four years for the purpose of electing to office the men who make it possible for them to continue their "crimes."

Mr. Roosevelt was the beneficiary of a very large "income-tax" of this sort four years ago.

As to arbitration in labor disputes, there is the Coal Strike Commission of some years ago, on the credit side of the Roosevelt balance sheet; for this, being one of his earliest presidential acts, is also probably the best. Longer lease of power has not improved the Roosevelt "policies," nor sweetened the Rooseveltian spirit. On the other side of the balance sheet is his sending the United States troops to Goldfield, Neveda, to overawe and crush the miners who had refused to accept cashier's checks in payment for their wages, without some form of guaranty from the mine owners. The report of the commission which the

President later sent to investigate the conditions, proved the sending of the troops to Goldfield to have been wholly unnecessary, and unwarranted by law. It was very characteristic of Roosevelt, to send the troops first, and the investigating commission afterwards, though a reversal of the program might have saved a great deal of trouble, and needless irritation to the miners.

True, the troops were sent at the request of the Governor of the State, but as afterwards transpired, this request had been obtained from the Governor while in a compliant mood superinduced by convivial banqueting, provided by the mine owners, among whom was the delectable Simon Guggenheim of Colorado, the plethoric gentleman who "had the price," and didn't mind giving it for a seat in the United States Senate, nor boasting about it afterwards.

Of the "un-Democratic" policies attributed to Roosevelt, namely, national incorporations of railroads (there is some difference of opinion as to the authorship of this "policy"), asset currency, ship-subsidy, and militarism, not much need be said, except that any man espousing them, may be allowed all the glory he can extract from the espousal.

The last mentioned,—militarism, is probably the most genuine and truly representative Rooseveltian "policy." He would like to be a "war lord," tho' at present his war record is neither very long nor very glorious. But if allowed to work his own sweet will in this nation, he would maintain a large standing army, and a costly, spectacular fleet.

It is worthy of note, that the "policy" which is most essentially his own, which most accurately reflects his ruling passion, is at the same time the most dangerous and destructive one for this Republic.

If we wish to see what militarism of the Roose-

veltian type does for a people, we need only look across the sea to France—the puppet nation.

Roosevelt asked the Congress just past for four additional battleships, and inspired a battle royal for them upon the part of the more ardent and martial spirits in Congress. But older and wiser counsel prevailed, and Congress appropriated money for two new battleships.

Roosevelt has sent more messages to Congress—regular, special and "extra"—than any other President the sun ever shone upon, yet for the most part, they give very little specific information anent the "policies."

Unlike the messages of ordinary presidents, which have only aimed at conveying their authors' policies, opinions and recommendations in matters governmental, the Roosevelt communications to Congress are expansive and comprehensive treatises of universal knowledge; but when they come to handing out exact information as to "what the matter is in America," and what Mr. Roosevelt thinks had better be done about it, these oracular messages are much like a certain bill which Mr. Blythe says Dr. Seth Low recently submitted for the President's consideration, and "which, when you read it one way, handed out enormous quantities of up-lift for the toiling masses, and when you read it another way, was not without its crumbs of comfort for the spoiling classes."

This bill must have found instant favor with Mr. Roosevelt, who, as a "good Lord, good Devil" orator, is unsurpassed. This Delphic mode of expression is what his admirers call "being fair to both sides," but it is sorely puzzling to the honest seeker after truth who is trying to find out "where Mr. Roosevelt is *at*."

On January 31, 1908, President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress, which was a notable exception to the great mass of Rooseveltian iteration.

This message is clear-cut, vigorous and manly, and couched in such cogent, irreproachable English, that suspicious persons detected the fine, Italian hand of Secretary Root in the composition of it. But the reform note in this message was unequivocal. It denounced the trusts and all their works, and did not at the same time,—as one of the Roosevelt delineators puts it—"shake labor in the other hand." But alas! just as the people were settling comfortably down on something really tangible and definite in the shape of Roosevelt "policies," near two months later, on March 25, Mr. Roosevelt sent another message to Congress, which sounded much like a "surrender to the trusts, in return for their assistance in nominating Mr. Taft," —and this upon the deliberate, open charge of a Republican ex-Senator who has some reputation as a civic reformer, and was at one time a close friend of Mr. Roosevelt.

In the June and July numbers of Everybody's Magazine, Lincoln Steffins—the man who has taken the lid off of several municipal "hells," and poked the lurid fires for the entertainment of the public,—gives some interesting interviews with presidential possibilities (at that time), Roosevelt-Taft-LaFollette, and Bryan—Jon Jonson, as to "What the Matter is in America and What to do about it." One naturally expects some illuminating passages from this source as to the political wisdom of T. Roosevelt; but disappointment meets us on the threshold. The Steffins probing finger is restrained in some mysterious way from the Roosevelt lid. This we are given to understand at the outset, covers a political and civic "Holy of Holies," before which we must stand with bared heads and bated breath, as the officiating priest "the Square Deal" (all copyrights reserved, T. R.), reveals to our profane and wondering eyes such of the esoteric, Rooseveltian mysteries as seem safe and expedient for

the common people,—and with this elucidation we must fain be content.

We are indebted to Mr. Steffins, however, for presenting his hero to us in a brand new light, when he has him naively admitting "that he does not know what the matter is, fundamentally; and that he does not know what to do about it, fundamentally,—he wishes he did!"

Such modesty from T. R. is as surprising as it is novel,—and also raises our hopes. If he is neither able to diagnose the American malady, nor to prescribe for it, there is clearly no longer any excuse for giving him charge of the case. As a leader of our national destinies, he is disqualified and disbarred by his own words. Was it this unwonted modesty which overcame him when he reached the heroic height of third-term renunciation? Perhaps. But tho' T. R. may not know what is the fundamental trouble in our body politic, nor what to do about it,—and we are perfectly willing to take his word for it—he always *knows what to* do on the eve of a political campaign which involves a struggle for the spoils.

He put so many good sound Democratic doctrines into that January message, that the Democratic Minority leader of Congress, with all his Sharpness—was caught in the trap. For weeks he contributed to Republican vexation in the House, and to the gaiety of the galleries, by yanking these Democratic measures out of the President's message and inviting the Republican majority to join with the minority in passing them,—which of course the Republican majority declined to do, even as Roosevelt knew they would. And if the majority were at all disturbed by the fact that they were put in the attitude of opposing their President's "policies"—before the country—there was no outward sign of such embarrassment. The only thing in the Democratic filibuster which troubled the

majority, was the useless prolongation of the session into the hot weather. In the end, John Sharp was left all flattened out under the Elephant's hoofs—still clutching the Roosevelt "policies!" With this net result. The attention of the whole country was focused upon the fact that the Roosevelt recommendations were such that Democrats could endorse and support them.

Now, then; with the Democracy putting its O. K. on Mr. Roosevelt, and Mr. Roosevelt putting his O. K. on Mr. Taft, and Mr. Taft sworn to carry out the "policies," let the befogged voters find the firing line in this campaign, if they can! There are many men in the Republic who can make rings all around Mr. Roosevelt in the matter of oratory, literature, statesmanship, and even as fighters,—his particular boast. But when it comes to the skillful manipulation of the game of "practical" politics, T. Roosevelt is like Uncle Remus's Brer Rabbit, "a leetle de soonest ob de bunch!"

One who has shown much commendable perseverance in becoming familiar with the literary writings of Roosevelt, says, apropos of his accredited Democratic tendencies, that "contempt hardly expresses the feeling of the Spanish War hero for Thomas Jefferson. . . . There are scores of references, direct and indirect, which evince an intense and bitter hatred of the man who foiled Hamilton's plans for a centralized government."

So far as we have been able to interpret Mr. Roosevelt's ideals of government, he goes Alxender Hamilton one better, and fashions them upon those of the Kaiser and the Czar. He did not quite reach the point of asking Congress for a Commission to take off our heads, "within the discretion of the President,"—but that would doubtless have come with the "third term."

CHAPTER XV.

CAESAR PUTS BY THE CROWN.

Altho' the Constitution does not fix the limit of presidential service in the United States, the precedent established by our first President, and followed by all his successors, has made the two-term custom and tradition as binding as any written law; and is probably more respected by the mass of the people than a great many of the graven statutes. When Mr. Roosevelt was elected Vice-president in 1900, he was at the same time elected president—in the event of certain untoward happenings, which in this case happened. When therefore he was re-elected in 1904, it probably never occurred to anybody except himself that he was entitled to any more presidential runs, and there was no occasion for any lofty and resonant renunciation of a third-term program, so far as the public was concerned. Since a man can only renounce that which he possesses, or is reasonably sure of obtaining—and in this case, it is only a lively hope—the force of this great Roosevelt self-sacrifice is not readily obvious to just a plain every-day sort of person, accustomed to reason about things in just a plain every-day fashion. His election-night declaration, that he would not again be a candidate for the presidency, did not attract very much attention, nor impress anybody very deeply at the time, it seems,—most persons passing it by as one of the more harmless manifestations of Rooseveltism—until sometime afterwards, when it became manifest that Mr. Roosevelt

repented his hasty renunciation of a third-term ambition.

Then was inaugurated that systematized effort by all the various press agencies in the employ of Roosevelt, to create the impression that there was a *great popular demand* for a continuance of Roosevelt rule. This suggestion, appearing here and there in the press, in special articles, and in cartoons, as early as 1906, became more frequent in 1907, and grew more insistent up to the time of the Chicago Convention in June, 1908. Finding himself handicapped both by presidential precedent and his own express declaration, Mr. Roosevelt found it necessary either to declare for himself or for some other, in order to justify his activity in strengthening his hold upon the "organization," so that it would still be his to wield either in the interest of his own candidacy, or of a candidate of his selection. Thus in November, 1907, he issued his famous order to his Cabinet heads, to forbid Federal officeholders who might go to the National Convention being instructed for *himself*, at the same time ordering them to go *uninstructed*, so that they would still lie in the hollow of Roosevelt's hand, to be turned to himself, or to another, as events might render expedient or imperative. And so he let it be known through his faithful cuckoos that it was his desire to have Secretary Taft as his successor. Still the third-term talk kept up, in one form or another, and the President when appealed to for confirmation or denial, took refuge in non-committal silence or "impenetrable ambiguity"—to quote Colonel George Harvey.

So patent was it that the President was playing a waiting game in the presidential nomination, that it elicited an open rebuke from one of the members of our highest tribunal. Justice Brewer of the U. S. Supreme Court, addressing the Civic Forum of New York, Nov. 20, 1907, in advocacy of a single seven-

year elective term for our presidents, said: "If that were the provision, with ineligibility to re-election, we should not now have the spectacle of our strenuous President playing hide and seek with the office."

Finally this intermittent and recrudescent third-term talk for Roosevelt caused such uneasiness and uncertainty in the ranks of the Taft boomers, that they resolved to force Mr. Roosevelt to a positive, unequivocal declaration of his position,—which they did. As he could not yet read his fate in the stars, he was forced to reiterate his election-night declaration. And so the campaign for Mr. Taft's nomination went merrily forward, with Roosevelt as commander-in-chief of all the forces in the field. Federal officeholders in every portion of the Union were set to work on the Taft boom, and those keeping tab on the maneuvering, reported them all *very busy*. Where federal appointees were found more favorable to some other presidential aspirant, they were promptly displaced, and Taft men put in. President Roosevelt had long since abolished a safeguard which Grover Cleveland had imposed for the protection of Civil Service employees, —that they should not be dismissed without a charge filed against them by the head of the Department, and an opportunity afforded them for a reply to the charge.

Our foreign possessions, and our construction of the Panama Canal, "as the President may direct," had opened up numberless opportunities for special appointments, and temporary appointments by the President, all of which were bestowed as "spoils" upon those who could serve the President's purposes. Mr. Hitchcock was taken from the head of the Post Office Department, and made the manager of the Taft campagin. His knowledge of postal affairs might make him as useful in that capacity as Manager Cortelyou's knowledge of corporation affairs had made him,

Washington dispatches of March, 1907, gave in detail the story of 32 postmasters appointed in Ohio to help Secretary Taft control the State.

So flagrant and notorious was this manipulation of federal offices in the interest of Mr. Taft's candidacy, that a writer in the March, 1908, Arena, George L. Rees, emphatically charges: "Mr. Roosevelt has farmed out federal patronage in as shameful a manner as the French Louises sold the tax-collectorships to the highest bidders.

But in this manner, Mr. Roosevelt built up a powerful "organization," which was to be the obedient creature of his imperious will when the time came to use it. Then about two or three months before the date fixed for the Republican National Convention, sinister reports began to circulate anent Mr. Taft's "inherent weakness" as a candidate; and tho' President Roosevelt was still depicted as the ardent, strenuous supporter of his heir-apparent, the impression was getting more and more prevalent, that the country wanted—not Taft, but Roosevelt!

In the days when he was "playing hide-and-seek" with the third-term lure, President Roosevelt was reported as saying, "if he believed he could break the *Solid South,* he might be tempted to reconsider his determination not to try again for the presidency," and whether this inspired John Temple Graves' maudlin toast, or the maudlin toast inspired "Teddy's" wobbling on the third-term proposition, is not recalled in the exact order of sequence—nor does it matter. What interests and impresses us is T. R.'s sudden and affectionate solicitude for the Solid South. When he was making up his general estimates of peoples and things, which he has embalmed in his "literary works," he had observed that "through the Southern character has ever run a streak of coarse and brutal barbarism." Not content with the ordinary appellation of "traitors,"

he had in a Washington address referred to the ex-Confederates as "anarchists"; and he had gone out of his way to be particularly offensive in his characterization of Jefferson Davis,—even assailing his private character, which at least had escaped criticism from reputable Northerners before the time of Roosevelt.

But now if the "brutal and barbarous, traitorous and anarchistic" South will only display a genial rift in its solid front for the Roosevelt sun-god, and thereby afford him an excuse for going back on his word, and attempting to overturn the third-term precedent, the magnanimous T. R. is willing to forgive and forget—"until after election" anyhow!

And so, about a week or two before the Chicago meet, a pretty story appeared in one of the Washington papers, written by a Georgian, describing a wonderful "Roosevelt wave" in the Sunny South; beginning in the little town of Rossville, the home of President Roosevelt's mother (by way of lending a romantic touch), a petition was circulated, beseeching for four years more of Roosevelt, and with incredible rapidity it grew and grew, until 30,000 Southerners had affixed their signatures to the petition!

The writer of the story avowed himself wholly at a loss to account for the phenomenon, averring it was "unprecedented" in the political history of the country. But being from Georgia, we think he should have been able to understand most any ovation to a "Member of the Well-known Bulloch Family," and it is likely the "signers" themselves could not have given any better explanation of their enthusiasm, had they been asked.

It was freely rumored in the Washington papers that though everything was in readiness for Mr. Taft's nomination, there was a strong likelihood of the Convention "stampeding" for Roosevelt, and dispatches from Chicago gave out the thrilling news that

mention of the "stampede" was sending nervous chills up the spinal cords of the Taft men.

Then the fateful day dawned, and Washington headlines reported 50 minutes' cheering for the name of Roosevelt in the Chicago Convention!

After this, the stampede seemed imminent, and we bowed our heads in Christian resignation, and waited for the final rush. If 30,000 "signers" in Georgia and 50 minutes' hand-clapping in Chicago are not warranted to bring on a stampede, we have no clue to the proper combination, and no advice worth offering. That this combination *should* have worked, we are convinced, because we are reliably informed it was *expected* to,—but it didn't. The stampeders got all balled up, for some unknown reason, and the stampede refused to work, and went all "a-gley"—like mice and men and other perverse things. Instead of the stampede, there was only the steady crunch, crunch of the "steam-roller," rolling over the "Allies" and seating the Taft delegations. And then it was duly announced that the Hon. William Howard Taft, and the Hon. James Schoolcraft Sherman would lead the Republican hosts to victory in November, 1908.

And while the New York Sun and Harper's Weekly were feeling contrite and mean over the uncharitable things they had been saying about T. R.'s wishing to take the nomination away from Taft; and after the New York Times had declared editorially that T. R.'s resolutely putting off a crown like that, which the American people were literally forcing on his head—was one of the most sublime acts of self-abnegation the world had ever seen,—*this story* was given the writer, first-hand, by an active participant in that Chicago drama, one of the wheel-horses in the camp of the Allies, who vouches for its truth: "On the night before the day when the balloting was to begin, a messenger came from Washington; a man close to

the President, an ex-Senator. Knowing my opposition to Taft, and thinking perhaps I might be more friendly to Roosevelt, he took me aside, and said: 'If the Convention should stampede for Roosevelt, I am authorized to say he would accept.' I replied to him: 'My friend, the President has reached this conclusion too late. He has overplayed his Taft game, and in my judgment, Mr. Taft will be nominated to-morrow.' And it was so, but it is probable that no one of the so-called Allies was more sore over the result of that balloting than was Mr. Roosevelt!"

And thus did our Cæsar put by the coveted crown, tho' like his great Roman prototype, with much inward heart-burning, and many a fond, lingering look behind.

And now it is announced, as the next thing on the Rooseveltian program, he is going to Africa, elephant-hunting,—a most appropriate occupation and to work off his joy over Mr. Taft's nomination. It is also announced that he is to write a book about his African travels, for which an American publishing company—completely overturning the traditional crust-in-a-garret notion of the wages of genius—have offered him a dollar a word! If the book lambasts the wild living creatures of Africa as mush as some of his others do the dead statesmen of America, it will probably furnish very interesting reading matter for the Nature-fakirs; otherwise, and if the publishers are depending on the general reading public, they are likely to lose money on their $1 a word investment. They are doubtless calculating on the phenomenal personal popularity of the author, of which there has been such persistent, insistent proclamation by the newspaper claquers.

Without assuming to deny the much exploited Roosevelt popularity, let us submit it to a little critical dissection, in the instances wherein it has been sub-

jected to a practical test. When he ran for governor of New York—as was noted in another place—he received a bare 17,000 plurality, which while sufficient to make him governor, was not a striking proof of "overwhelming personal popularity" in his own State, numbering 1,500,000 voters. When he was elected President in 1904,—when most of the shouting over the "phenomenal popularity" was pulled off—an old Republican resident of Washington, a man accustomed to keep tab on popular elections, and rarely found tripping in his "figgers," estimated that the excess of Roosevelt's plurality over McKinley's, corresponded very closely to the normal increase in the Republican voting population, whilst his large plurality over Parker was accounted for by the disgruntled Democratic vote which stayed at home. After the interesting revelation made by the Insurance investigation and the Harriman letters of the Roosevelt-Cortelyou campaign methods, it would seem his large plurality over Parker might be accounted for in some other ways beside Democratic disaffection. Surely, in the light of those revelations, no one will claim that the election of 1904 carries convincing evidence of Theodore Roosevelt's "overwhelming personal popularity." It may be as claimed, that he has this "overwhelming popularity," but it may also be claimed that it has never successfully stood any practical test.

Perhaps Fate was kinder to T. R. than he knew, in not permitting him to risk the explosion of the "popular-idol" conceit in this campaign year of our Lord, 1908. To conclude otherwise, is to despair of the love of truth and the sense of humor in the American people.

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