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
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AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

VOL. VI.—JANUARY, 1892.—NO. I.

NON-CATHOLIC MARRIAGES BEFORE THE CHURCH.

THE newspapers recently expressed great surprise about a decision of the Holy See in the case of an American marriage. It was reported that Leo XIII with his usual liberal spirit had gone so far as to recognize as valid a marriage which had been contracted before a Methodist minister, and no small amount of praise was for this reason paid by Protestant journalists to the great Pontiff. Catholics on their side were wondering where the pressmen had blundered, since there was nothing new in the decision if it had involved no other issue than the one emphasized by the reporters. It was plain to any informed Catholic that a different objection, stronger than the presence of a Protestant minister, had been raised against the marriage, and that such was the fact soon appeared from explanations given to the public. The validity of the tie in the case had been contested on the ground that at the time when it was contracted the marriage was null on account of the existence of the diriment impediment called "disparitas cultus," a nullity which had never been cured by dispensation at any time, and which remained even after the disappearance of the impediment because the necessary renewal of consent was wanting. The interest excited by this occurrence relative to the Catholic law in matrimonial causes, will, we think, make the exposition of the principal points of theology bearing on this subject a not unwelcome article for our clerical readers.

Non-Catholic marriages, that is marriages either of unbaptized non-Catholics (infideles) or baptized heretics or of Catholics who marry outside of the Church, may be in some cases valid and lawful, as when they are contracted by non-Catholics who act in good faith; or they may be unlawful but valid, as when they are contracted in bad faith by heretics or by Catholics who are free from an *annulling* but not from an *impeding* impediment; or they may be invalid for any class of persons, whether contracted sinfully or not, when there is an impediment rescinding the effects of the consent. From these various causes many complications are apt to arise which may bring the disputed marriages before the tribunals of the Church. Let us examine how far the Church would recognize them as valid or lawful, and what she can do either to annul or on the other hand to validate them. Before answering we shall premise a few principles which are held as incontestable by all Catholics. They are :

By the law of nature marriage requires only the free and mutual consent of two persons who are capable of conjugal union. At the beginning this union was in virtue of a divine positive law, which was founded on the strongest motives of natural law, to be between one man and one woman only until death took away either of the consorts; that is, marriage was to be one and indissoluble. An exemption, however, from this law was admitted for a time, and polygamy as well as divorce were under certain conditions allowed to the Jews, and hence probably also to the Gentiles "on account of the hardness of their hearts." (Matt. xix. 8). But Christ, who came to restore perfect man, again raised marriage from its lowered condition. He blotted out the two stains which had defaced the divine institution, and by his supreme authority abolished for the whole human race polygamy and divorce. Nay more, he elevated matrimony among Christians to the dignity of a sacrament of the New Law, adding to it the virtue of conferring grace, and thus placing it, like the other sacraments, in the care of His Church to which he entrusted its administration till the end of time. (Cfr. the *Constitut. Arcanum* of Leo XIII.)

The subject matter of this Sacrament may be said to consist of the conjugal rights resulting from the contract. The form of the sacrament is contained in the expression of the consent of the contracting persons who thus become also the ministers of the sacrament. (Cfr. Heiss, *De Matrim.* § 5.) To constitute the essence of the Sacrament of Matrimony as such, nothing more is required than

the ability of the baptized parties to contract the alliance of husband and wife, and their expressed intention of belonging in this sense one to the other forever. The ceremonies of the Church, the blessing of the priest, the presence of witnesses are desirable, and even prescribed, but not absolutely necessary. By their mutual contract alone Christians, otherwise not disqualified, become husband and wife, and receive the Sacrament of Matrimony, even if sinfully yet validly, so that, when they become properly disposed, the Sacrament may and will "per reviviscentiam" produce its sacramental effects of grace. We now come to answer the questions concerning the possible action of the Church in regard to non-Catholic marriages.

I.

How far does the Church recognize non-Catholic marriages?

We shall first consider marriages contracted by non-baptized persons, whom theologians are wont to call infidels. Such unions are subject only to the rules of the natural and the divine positive law, and if at the time of the contract there existed no impediment established by either of these laws, v. g. *impotentia* or *ligamen*, they are true marriages, "matrimonia legitima," and when persons thus joined in wedlock enter the Church by conversion and baptism, their marriage remains valid and it becomes absolutely indissoluble, even if it should not become a Sacrament, a question on which theologians are at variance (Cfr. Heiss § 4). Later on we shall see how in one particular case such a marriage may be dissolved.

Christians, that is baptized persons, whether members of the true Church or heretics—for heresy does not free its votaries from obedience to or from the effects of ecclesiastical laws—marry validly when otherwise capable, unless the Church, who is the custodian of the Sacrament, for valid reasons, were to annul the contract or declare the parties incapable of contracting. The man and the woman, as said before, who enter wedlock, are themselves the ministers of the Sacrament, and when they present the proper matter and form, they receive the Sacrament of Matrimony, whether they do so lawfully before the Church, or unlawfully by marrying either clandestinely or before an unauthorized ecclesiastical officer, be he a Catholic or a heretic. It is only when a diriment impediment intervenes that the contract is null and void and hence the Sacrament is, in such case, not received. Thus in all parishes where the Tridentine decree "*Tametsi*" has been promulgated and is still in force, clandestinity or the act of not marrying before one's own

pastor and two witnesses nullifies the contract ; but it does not invalidate the marriage in places where the old common law is still maintained, as in England and in the greater part of the United States. In the same way a "substantial" error in regard to the person, or several degrees of the various kinds of kindred, or grave fear, or disparity of religion and some other ecclesiastical impediments make the contract null and void between persons who according to natural and divine law could have validly married. Hence the Church does not recognize as valid marriages which were null and void on account of a *diriment* impediment whether between Catholics, or between heretics, or between a Catholic and a heretic, wherever celebrated. She recognizes them as valid, although *per se* unlawful, when contracted with an *impeding* or forbidding impediment.

The contraction of a marriage, otherwise valid, is sometimes unlawful and sinful. Thus persons under the obligation of a simple vow of chastity, or not freed from the bond of solemn betrothal to another person, contract validly, but not without the guilt of grievous sin. Likewise marrying clandestinely where the Tridentine law does not exist makes the union as binding as if it was blessed by the priest, but it is a grave transgression of one of the most salutary ordinances of the Church. Mixed marriages, that is between a Catholic and a baptized heretic or schismatic, fraught as they are with the danger of apostacy from the faith and the practice of religion of the Catholic party and his or her children, have been always held in abhorrence by the Church, and they cannot lawfully be contracted except by dispensation of the Holy See after a solemn pledge has been given that the dangers to which these marriages are so apt to lead will be obviated. Again it is a grievous sin to marry before an unqualified minister of the sacred rite, such as a lay officer of the law, or a priest suspended from his functions, or a Protestant minister. In the last case the transgression, being a "communicatio in sacris" with a heretic, entails excommunication, the absolution of which in this country is reserved to episcopal jurisdiction (Conc. Balt. III n. 127); but such marriages are always valid if there is no other absolute disqualification according to the natural, the divine, or the ecclesiastical law.

Here it is that the public press was mistaken in regard to the Bridgeport case. It was supposed that a marriage which had been *unlawfully* contracted by a Catholic would on that account be declared *null and void* by the Church. This was assumed in spite of the now certain doctrine in theology that the contracting parties are

themselves the ministers of the Sacrament, and that the Sacrament is received whenever the contract is valid. The presence of a clergyman who is the pastor of either the bridegroom or the bride is, it is true, required for the validity of the tie where the "Tametsi" decree of the Council of Trent is in vigor, but only because the Church in such case by her divinely delegated power annuls a contract to which the pastor is not a witness and makes the parties "inhabiles ad sic contrahendum." Even there, however, the suspension of the pastor or the crime of heresy incurred by him does not incapacitate him from being validly present at the marriage. Deposition only or privation of his benefice or office disqualifies him absolutely. For his presence is required not as of a minister of the Sacrament, but as of a qualified witness, a "testis autorizabilis."

If, thus, a pastor fallen into heresy is a competent witness in places where the presence of the pastor is an indispensable condition to the validity of a marriage, we cannot deem null and void the marriage which is contracted before a non-Catholic clergyman in places where the presence of a priest is only required for the becoming reception of the Sacrament and for the sake of protecting the contracting parties and their offspring as members of the Church and of society. A marriage, therefore, privately contracted, if properly proved, is, although pronounced unlawful, recognized as valid by the Church. A marriage before a layman, be he a judge or any other magistrate, is likewise recognized as valid although forbidden. A marriage before a Protestant minister, adding as it does, the sin of a "communicatio in sacris" to the malice of neglect of religious duty, entails a reserved excommunication, but it is none the less recognized as valid and absolutely indissoluble.

What non-Catholic marriages, then, will the Church not recognize?

The general answer is found in what has already been said. Any marriage which is invalid on account of a natural, a divine or an ecclesiastical impediment is not acknowledged by the Catholic Church. As such we mention the following :

Null and void are, by natural right, marriages between "impotentes," between parents and their offspring, between children who do not understand the nature of the contract, a marriage with or between insane persons. It is evident that such contracts, whether made between non-Catholics or Catholics, could not be accounted as binding, and that the Church would declare them absolutely void. Such would likewise be a marriage entered with the stipulation that

it may be dissolved by a divorce; for such a stipulation is contrary to one of the essential "bona" of matrimony, viz.: "bonum Sacramenti." But when the right to a possible divorce is not stipulated in the contract, although believed in by both or either of the contracting parties, it does not annul the union, because the intention of contracting for life, according to the nature of wedlock, is presumed to prevail over the merely speculative disposition or opinion regarding the lawfulness of divorce. Some years ago the contrary opinion was strongly defended by the well-known late editor of the New York *Freeman's Journal*; but the common doctrine of theologians was against him, and in accordance with the declaration of Pius VI (Ad Archiep. Pragenses. 11 July, 1789) the view, which was apt to disturb the permanency of many households, does not seem at present to be held as probable by any authoritative writers on the subject. (Cfr. Kenrick Tract. XXI. 40.)

By divine positive law, as said above, the contract of marriage between persons, one of whom at least is still validly married to another, is, even for non-Christians, null and void on account of the "impedimentum ligaminis." The case presents itself most frequently in consequence of the facility with which divorces "a vinculo," that is absolute nullifications of an existing marriage tie, are granted in many states of this country. Catholics maintain that, whatever may be the cause or provocation, a valid marriage "consummatum" between baptized persons can be dissolved only by death; and before the tribunals of the Church, in the confessional as well as in the ecclesiastical court, the decision will always be "unus cum una et pro semper."

Finally, marriages contracted under an ecclesiastical diriment impediment are likewise null and void. The Church, having the power to bind and to loose, may render the parties incapable to contract, or annul the contract itself when it is being made. Consequently, whether or not persons who are by baptism subject to the legislative ordinances of the Church, may have been considered as married before the civil law, if there was between them a nullifying impediment, they are not married before God, and their union is a mere concubinage. (Cfr. Letter of Pius IX. to the king of Sardinia, 12th September, 1852). Of these impediments the number is much larger than those which are proclaimed by natural or divine positive law; but unlike them they are not perpetual nor are they irremovable. The Church establishes them or suppresses them for the welfare of Christian society, according to the requirements of times,

places and circumstances, and she dispenses in them in individual cases when the good of souls can be secured by the relaxation of the law. Some of them can even be removed by the very persons thus wedded, when they take away the obstacles which caused the nullity, as, v.g., when an unbaptized person receives baptism and renews the contract.

The principal ecclesiastical impediments are the condition of servitude of one of the parties when that condition was unknown to the other; solemn religious vows or holy orders; relationship in various ways; lack of the proper age; fear or abduction; crime of murder to procure marriage, or of adultery committed with the promise of subsequent marriage; disparity of religion between a baptized and an unbaptized person, and clandestinity where the law of the Council of Trent is in force. All these obstacles unless taken away by dispensation, or otherwise, make the conjugal union not only unlawful but impossible. Even when the existence of the impediment is unknown to the reputed married couple, the marriage is null and void, and, after it is discovered, the persons concerned are obliged to separate, unless the defect should be cured either by the parties themselves, where this is in their power, or by competent dispensation. Catholics who have thus knowingly married before a priest, or a minister, or a magistrate are in the state of sin as long as they persevere in their pretended wedlock, and they cannot be allowed to receive the Sacraments. Nay more, if their transgression is public they may be visited with censures and other punishments. Baptized non-Catholics, upon entering the Church, if thus married, are also obliged to separate unless the impediment can be, and is, actually removed.

But it may happen that there is no certainty about the existence of an impediment between persons who have nevertheless contracted marriage either in good or in bad faith. Such is frequently the case with the impediment of clandestinity where the decree "Tametsi" has been published, as in Catholic Europe, in Catholic America and in some dioceses of the United States. The ecclesiastical tribunals there and consequently in Rome have numberless cases of clandestinity to try, and the best canonists are not seldom at variance as to the respective merits of a particular case, because it is frequently difficult to decide who was the proper pastor of the parties, and whether his presence and that of two qualified witnesses had validated the contract. Don Abbondio in the "Promessi Sposi" of Manzoni is a telling example of the troubles to which this impediment

may give rise, and the *Acta S. Sedis* are full of complicated clandestinity cases brought for solution to the supreme tribunal of the Church.

Where, however, this impediment does not exist, as it does not in the greater part of the United States, it is the impediment resulting from the disparity in religion, which comes most frequently before the matrimonial courts.

A Catholic marries a Protestant before a minister or a squire, or even privately, without inquiring whether the non-Catholic party was baptized at all. They live together a while, but become estranged, and the Catholic consort, taking up with some new love, this time wishes to marry according to the laws of the Church, or else simply marries without mentioning the former tie. On the other hand the Protestant party may become a Catholic after having become entangled in a new union or when wishing to marry a Catholic. The question in such cases arises, Which of the two unions is to be considered as binding and valid? The law directs the priest to refer the case to the bishop. For he is in the first instance the ecclesiastical judge of matrimonial causes, and he has a tribunal, a necessary member of which is the "Defensor Matrimonii," the Defender of the marriage tie. The duties and functions of the latter, together with the whole procedure in matrimonial cases are set forth in the Constitution of Benedict XIV, *Miseratione divina*, and more in detail in the *Instructio S. Congregationis de judiciis ecclesiasticis circa causas matrimoniales*. (Append. Conc. Plen. Balt. III p. 262).

When it is evident that the first marriage was null and void on account of an indisputable impediment, such as *ligamen* or *disparitas cultus*, the bishop may according to a decision of the S. Office pronounce at once upon the nullity of the tie without going through the usual canonical formalities of courts. (Resp. ad Ep. Wayne-Cast. Cong. S. Off. 20 Mart. 1889.) But where there is the least doubt, he is obliged to have the case investigated and decided by the regular tribunal on matrimony. Should the sentence here be against the doubted marriage, the "Defender of the marriage tie" must appeal to the metropolitan tribunal, and if the decision there be in the same sense, he may either accept the decision or else appeal to Rome. This appeal he is bound to make whenever the first decision has been in his favor and the second on appeal from the plaintiff against the tie.

Let us for the purpose of illustration suppose that Caius, a Prot-

estant, has married Bertha, a Catholic, before a Protestant minister, consequently without any dispensation. Afterwards Caius, having separated from Bertha, desires to marry Cornelia, another Catholic who, however, is only willing to accept him if he be free before God and the church from his former tie. This Caius asserts he is, because he has heard of the impediment of "disparitas cultus," and says he never was baptized even as a Protestant. The case is brought before the bishop who, suspecting that the allegation of Caius might possibly be false or erroneous, ordains that canonical proceedings be entered in his court. The merit of the cause will turn entirely on the question whether Caius had been baptized at the time when he married Bertha, and if so, whether his baptism was valid; the one a question of fact, the other of law.

To settle about the fact, evidence is taken on both sides, and the matter is judged on the same grounds as other historical doubts. If there is a moral certainty that baptism was never received by Caius, he is declared free to marry Cornelia, but this he can do only after the case, if appealed, has been decided in second instance in his favor. Should the probability be that baptism was received, the marriage with Bertha will be presumed to stand, as the Church does not by her impediment mean to annul what is a probable right. Caius will not be allowed to marry Cornelia. (Cf. *Resp. ad Epum Savan. in App. Conc. Balt. III p. 246.*)

If there exists a doubt about the validity of baptism received by Caius outside of the Catholic Church the decision will depend on the amount of probability in favor of the validity of such baptism. Should it be shown that it was administered in a manner certainly invalid on account of the absence of the essential requirements as to matter or form, the marriage of Caius with Bertha will be declared null and void. But this is by no means the case, if the Sacrament appears to have been validly administered; for the Church accepts a baptism, even doubtful, as a sufficient disposition to render a marriage valid and binding. The impediment in fact, being established by the Church, can also be removed by her, and that she does in such cases remove it is clear from her code of jurisprudence and from the unanimous teaching of her canonists and theologians. In difficult cases recourse should of course be had to the Holy See.

Should it happen that, after a decision has been given by any ecclesiastical tribunal or authority, new evidence be discovered which would show the sentence to have been erroneous, the case may be reopened. For decisions in matrimonial matters concerning the tie

never pass into *rem judicatam*, that is, they are not irreformable, and on any new evidence the former decision may be reversed.

II.

Does the Church ever annul non-Catholic marriages, and in what manner?

As was explained before, a marriage that is "ratum et consummatum," whether between Catholics or between heretics or between a Catholic and a non-Catholic, cannot be dissolved except by death.¹ The Church has no power to separate such unions. No cause, not even adultery can legitimate a true divorce. This is a doctrine not directly, it is true, but indirectly defined by the Council of Trent in the following canon of the XXIV session: "Si quis dixerit Ecclesiam errare cum docuit et docet . . . propter adulterium alterius conjugum Matrimonium non posse dissolvi, anathema sit," and it is therefore theologically certain and proximate to faith. This doctrine she always taught as a revealed truth, which to maintain she fought the most powerful princes, underwent the severest persecutions and allowed whole nations to be torn away from her rather than to grant or to approve a decree of divorce. "On this head," says Leo XIII in his grand constitution *Arcanum*, "all future ages will admire the courageous documents issued by Nicholas I against Lothair; by Urban II and Paschal II against Philip I of France; by Celestine III and Innocent III against Philip II of France; by Clement VII and Paul III against Henry VIII; and finally by the holy and unyielding Pius VII against Napoleon I at a time when the latter was at the height of his prosperity and power. "Marriage, then, is indissoluble even when the consorts find their wedded life to have become unbearable to them; all the Church can do for such is to allow to them a limited divorce, that is separation from bed and board, such as Our Lord himself, when re-establishing the indissolubility of marriage, declared to be lawful "fornicationis causa": "Quicumque dimiserit uxorem suam, nisi ob fornicationem, et aliam duxerit, mœchatur: et qui dimissam duxerit, mœchatur." (Matt. xix, 9.)

But marriages can be dissolved when they are merely "legitima," that is, between unbaptized persons, or only "rata," that is, between baptized persons who have not made use of their marriage right. In the former case a marriage contracted in infidelity is dis-

¹ This is true likewise of a marriage between a Catholic and an unbaptized non-Catholic which was valid through a dispensation in "disparitate cultus." (Cfr. Heiss § 4.)

solved even as to the tie when one of the consorts having embraced the faith and having in vain called upon the other consort to live with him, or her, without insult to the faith of the converted party, contracts a new marriage with one of the faithful. This is the "Casus Apostoli;" thus named because St. Paul makes it known in his first Epistle to the Corinthians: "Quod si infidelis discedit, discedat: non enim servituti subjectus est frater, aut soror in hujusmodi" (vii, 5). This text has practically been thus understood by the Church, who, notwithstanding the growling of some canonists of the now defunct Gallican school, has positively allowed and allows converts to remarry under the stated conditions and under legitimate restrictions. In so far as the Church acts here and sometimes dispenses in the "interpellatio," she may be said to annul non-Catholic marriages which were contracted outside her domain.

Marriages that were "rata tantum" may likewise happen to come within the range of non-Catholic unions which are annulled by the Church. Theologians teach as an undoubted point of law, supported by the common practice of the Church, that a marriage which was not "consummatum" is annulled if either of the consorts within two months after the wedding enters a religious order and afterwards makes a solemn profession of religious life. The tie is dissolved at the moment the vows are validly made, and the party not bound by the vow becomes free to remarry. As this might be done by non-Catholics who have become Catholics, it might be said in this case that a non-Catholic marriage is dissolved by the Church; but it is clear that it would be so for a reason entirely independent of the fact that the marriage was contracted outside of the Church.

A similar nullification of a valid marriage occurs when the Pope, as has frequently been done during the last three centuries, dispenses in a marriage that was "ratum" but not "consummatum." Not seldom were such marriages contracted outside or in spite of the Church, and the converted and repentant consort applies for this remedy to sever a union which has proved ill-omened and unfortunate. The dissolution is granted or refused according to the gravity of the motives and the opportuneness of the circumstances, but only after due investigation and a trial, when necessary, by the local authorities on the non-consummation of the marriage, and the petition for the dispensation is presented to the Holy Father generally through the Congregation of the Council, which adds its recommendation for the granting of the favor, when deemed useful, for the

good of souls, but which also not unfrequently decides "non expedire," this phrase implying that the dispensation should not be insisted on by the postulator at Rome.

III.

Our last query is what can and will the Church do towards validating non-Catholic marriages?

There is question here of marriages which would otherwise be invalid. Consequently we have not to treat of mixed marriages, properly so called, between a Catholic and a baptized heretic or schismatic. These are not null even when contracted without the necessary dispensation, which is granted only by the Holy See, that is, by the Congregation of the Holy Office or its delegate for very serious reasons and with every reasonable provision for the protection of the faith of the Catholic party and the offspring; but such marriages would, as stated before, be grievously sinful. The Church, however, on account of the general danger, strives to prevent them, especially where the governments attempt to use such marriages for proselytizing purposes, as was the case in Prussia some fifty years ago and as is still done in Hungary. As she cannot annul the marriages when validly although unlawfully contracted, she endeavors to save these wretched members of her flock from the danger of spiritual ruin by due precautions to guard the faith of the Catholic consort and his or her children.

Validation, therefore, of a non-Catholic as well as of a Catholic marriage means the ratification before God and the Church of a union which otherwise would be null on account of a diriment impediment. Should the impediment be of such a nature that it would invalidate marriage between Catholics in similar circumstances, it will cease for converted non-Catholics in the same way that it would for Catholics. Thus the "impedimentum ligaminis" ceases by the death of one of the parties of the first marriage, and the surviving party, if already married to another, can make this union, hitherto null, valid by renewing the consent, and this even privately, unless prevented by the law of clandestinity. In the same way the impediment of "disparitas cultus" will cease either by dispensation or by the baptism of the "pars infidelis"; but here too the express renewal of the consent is required, and for this even cohabitation "affectu conjugali" is not sufficient. For a consent which was null when given cannot be renewed unless at least the party that gave it is aware that he or she are actually binding themselves by a true

obligation. The impediment of clandestinity can likewise cease without a dispensation if the married couple take domicile in a district where the Tridentine law is not in force, and there, after having acquired domicile or at least quasi-domicile and knowing the nullity of their previous contract, renew their consent. Thus in all such cases the knowledge of the nullity of the marriage and the subsequent renewal of consent are strictly necessary for its validation, unless a dispensation "in radice" should cure the defect. "Sequitur," says Lehmkuhl, (de sanat. matr. in radice n. 829), "si quod ecclesiasticum impedimentum alia ratione quam dispensatione cesset, matrimonium validum fieri non posse, nisi per *novum* consensum; quum Ecclesia primum consensum numquam acceptarit: in dispensatione vero ordinario modo data *per se quidem* etiam talem prioris consensus acceptationem non contineri, contineri tamen *posse* ex voluntate Ecclesiæ in casibus difficilibus *tacite data*."

"Explico: Si qui contraxerunt clandestine in loco, ubi lex Tridentina viget, impedimenti dirimentis ignari: quamquam postea in loco, ubi lex Tridentina non viget, vitam conjugalem agunt, matrimonium non convalescit, siquidem haec vita conjugalis fundatur in priore consensu invalide dato. Verum si scientes, se antea invalide contraxisse, nunc vero se a valido matrimonio per legem Trid. non impediri, vitam conjugalem producunt, matrimonium reddunt validum, eo quod non verbis quidem, sed re consensum novum a priore independentem ponunt."

We have mentioned the validation of a marriage by means of a dispensation. This, in fact, is a general remedy for all unions which are, or would be null and void on account of ecclesiastical impediments. The same power, which in virtue of its authority to bind and loose on earth can establish such impediments, that is the Church, and the Church alone, can also take them away. In some of them, however, she rarely, and in others she never dispenses. Such are consanguinity in the first lateral degree, solemn religious vows, holy Orders, especially of priesthood; in others she dispenses for grave reasons, such as more remote degrees of kindred, affinity, spiritual relationship, *crimen, disparitas cultus*. Others need no dispensation, as explained already. The parties themselves dispose of them where they can do so, and thus remove the obstacle to a valid union.

The Church at times dispenses without requiring the renewal of the consent from one or both consorts. This is done by the dispensation "in radice." The effect of this relaxation of the law is

that a marriage already contracted, but null on account of some ecclesiastical impediment, is made valid as if it had been so from the beginning, and this without the knowledge of one or even of both parties. Such dispensations are granted only for very serious reasons, v. g., when one party, whose consent is reasonably presumed to continue, could very likely not be induced, if made acquainted with the nullity, to renew formally the consent previously given. The continuation of that consent is in such cases inferred from the fact that it has never been retracted, and that cohabitation takes place between the reputed husband and wife. (Cfr. Van Der Moeren De Spons. et Matr. p. 160). Dispensation *in radice* is an extreme remedy which is applied for the revalidation especially of marriages which are null on account of clandestinity, *disparitas cultus*, or the forbidden degrees of kindred. Our bishops have among their "Facultates extraordinariæ" that of "Sanandi in radice matrimonia contracta, quando comperitur adfuisse impedimentum dirimens, super quo ex Apostolicæ Sedis indulto dispensare ipse possit, magnumque fore incommodum requirendi a parte innoxia renovationem consensus, monita tamen parte conscia impedimenti de effectu hujus sanationis" (Facult. Extraord. D. n. 6.).

H. GABRIELS.

SCIENTIFIC AND METAPHYSICAL COSMOLOGY.

THE title we have put at the head of this article may sound somewhat strange to the generality of our readers. We acknowledge the apparent singularity, and hasten to explain it.

Cosmology, which by its etymological derivation means a discourse on the cosmos or the universe, has always been understood as implying that branch of Philosophy which treats of bodies in general; that is, not of this or of that peculiar species of bodies, but of certain things which are found to be in all bodies, and which bring all of them under one genus.

But the general theory of the material world or bodies is composed of two distinct parts, which in modern times have come so close together as almost to touch each other. The first is the province of the scientist; the second, the peculiar branch of the metaphysician. We must guard against confounding one with the other.

The scientific theory busies itself exclusively with the phenomena of the material world. But it is not content with merely observing them, or with making experiments in order to find the laws of said phenomena, and the consequences of those laws by means of induction. It does more. It does what every theory ought to do ; it explains in putting order among those phenomena. Instead of letting the immense accumulation of facts, which observation and experiments have discovered, remain in a confused manner in our intellect, it arranges them and subordinates one to the other, by showing that such phenomena are the effects, of which such other phenomena are the causes. It is by so doing that it finally arrives at those elementary phenomena, the combinations of which give rise to all others, and which consequently, in the purely material world, play the role of universal causes. This may rightly be called scientific cosmology.

But does scientific cosmology fix the limit and the end of human knowledge as to the material world? Does it raise and resolve the many and varied problems, which may be and have been proposed in time and space by the human intellect, in relation to the sensible universe? Evidently not. To assert the contrary would be to woefully mistake the nature, aim and means of experimental sciences, or to admit that there exists and can exist nothing beyond or above what is the legitimate object of the same.

This object is that which can be ascertained by observation and experiments, and nothing more.

True, science as we have said, gathers a great number of phenomena and facts, arranges them under certain laws, points out how certain phenomena are the effect of other phenomena, and from effect to cause it gradually arrives at the ultimate and simple phenomena which are the cause of all the phenomena which affect bodies. But mark well ! Every phenomenon of the series must be proved and verified by observation and experiments ; and when the series is completed and science has arrived at the last and universal phenomena, the cause of all others, it must not take these for granted or approve them by way of reasoning and logical conclusion, but must uphold them only because ascertained to be so by observation and experiments. The consequence of this is that the only legitimate and proper object of experimental science, in order to produce certainty, is that which falls under observation and can be demonstrated by the testimony of the same.

The second consequence, which follows close upon the above, is

that if there be any theory in the material world which observation and experiment cannot reach ; if there be any substance under the phenomena which renders them possible and sustains them ; if we should want to know the nature and essence of such substance ; all this is outside the province of the scientists, and is the distinctive, proper and exclusive object of metaphysical cosmology. To deny the latter is the same as to deny that there is a substance under the phenomena of the material world ; or, that the sciences of observation have changed their role and assumed the place of Metaphysics.

We would not spend so much time in putting in its proper light a truth so well known to those who understand this matter, were it not that a modern author in treating one of the most fundamental questions of metaphysical cosmology has mistaken it for one belonging to scientific cosmology and has flatly denied that metaphysics have anything to do with it. Nay he has gone so far as to call to an account the greatest and the best of ancient and modern metaphysicians of the Catholic Church, such as St. Thomas, Suarez, and all the schoolmen of mediæval times, and among the modern such names as Liberatore, Sanseverino, Cardinal Zigliara and a host of others. He has read them a lecture for persisting to maintain old fashioned views long exploded, and for ignoring willfully and with malice prepense the present results of science. Here are a few extracts: "After comparing a number of our most widely known Catholic philosophical authors on the question mentioned, one can hardly avoid coming to the conclusion that the strict scholastic orthodoxy of some of them is fairly in proportion to their *ignorance of the very elementary principles of modern chemistry.*" ¹ Again, "Catholic philosophers as have not given themselves considerable trouble to get acquainted with the results of modern chemical and biological investigations still uphold with a zeal worthy of a better cause, the mediæval views, etc." ²

We forbear making any remarks upon such language. Our readers will draw their own conclusion when, for the sake of truth and justice we have made good the following statements :

1st. It is absolutely false that any of the authors alluded to were ignorant of this result of modern science. Anyone who will take the trouble to open the cosmological part of the works, say of Liberatore, Sanseverino, Zigliara, Harper, Lahousse, Pesch, Van der Aa, Cornoldi, Schneid, and others whom we need not mention,

¹ Rev. J. Gmeiner, *Mediæval and Modern Cosmology.* Page 12.

² *Id* : page 23.

will see how great and how profound is their knowledge of the theories and results of modern sciences and how carefully and accurately they state them and give them all the importance and weight which they deserve. A superficial survey of such works will satisfy any one that Catholic authors have stated modern theories with greater knowledge, accuracy and fullness than, as we shall see, the author of "Mediæval and Modern Cosmology" has done.

The second fact is, that besides knowing and appreciating the true results of modern science, they are thoroughly conversant with their business as metaphysicians. They can discriminate within a hair's breadth what is a physical and what is a metaphysical question.

We regret to own that we cannot say the same of the author of "Mediæval and Modern Cosmology." How far he understands the difference between what pertains to physical science, and what to metaphysics, may be seen by the following quotation, page 17. He is refuting the opinion of Aristotle in regard to the essential elements of bodies and says, "Cardinal Zigliara claims that the question concerning the essential principles of bodies is not a physical but a metaphysical one." What is the answer of the author to this claim of the learned Cardinal? *Risum teneatis amici*. "We reply that Aristotle and his followers did not consider the first matter and substantial forms as *abstractions* but as concrete realities continually manifesting themselves in physical phenomena."

What a pity that Aristotle and his followers did not look upon matter and form as *abstractions*, for in that case they would have been part and parcel of metaphysics, and their treatment would have been a metaphysical question. But being looked upon by Aristotle and his followers as realities they must of course be a physical question. It is too bad for Cardinal Zigliara not to know that a reality is the object of the physical science, and to be treated accordingly. Abstractions only are under the exclusive treatment of metaphysics and metaphysicians.

What can our readers say of such profound knowledge and high appreciation of the queen of all philosophical sciences as displayed by the author to whom we are alluding? They will perceive that this author is so hard on Catholic philosophers not because they are not acquainted with the results of modern science, but because he, the author, does not know what a metaphysical question is. He has a great respect for F. Secchi. We recommend to his attention the following extract from the same: "The physicist admits bodies as an external reality, and acknowledges also as a fact

the transmission of movement from one to the other by means of contact, but he does not *busy himself to explain it, but only to bring it into union with other facts. He leaves to the metaphysician to discuss subjects placed beyond those limits.* Also it is not the province of the physicist to decide with regard to elements if they be simple or not. It is the same for us to imagine that the primitive impenetrable atom fills the space of a solid sphere *R*, as to picture to ourselves in the centre of a geometrical sphere a simple being which may act as far as *R* from the centre itself, thus producing impenetrability. The effects being practically the same, the physicist cannot decide the question and must leave it to metaphysicians.”¹

Here F. Secchi marks with great felicity the boundaries which divide the ground of the physicist from that of the metaphysician. The province of the former is the physical world as far as it can be ascertained by observation, therefore it is limited to take notice of phenomena and effects and to assign their cause, if that can also fall under his observation and can be demonstrated by the same means.

If the cause is beyond observation, if it defies experiment, then the physicist has accomplished his role and must hand over the matter to the metaphysician.

The point at which both come in contact is, that the latter accepts all the results of the former as the groundwork and the foundation for his investigations. Metaphysics is not a process founded on abstractions, on *a priori* principles exclusively, a web constructed of mere abstract premises and conclusions, having no foundation in nature. It is a science founded on facts and phenomena. It takes as the subject for its departure those facts and phenomena which have been observed and proved by the natural philosopher, and upon them it builds its construction. It says to the physicist, you have observed such and such properties to belong to bodies, you have ascertained the fact beyond doubt; in your investigation you have traced these phenomena to this or that cause, and you have arrived at the last and simplest cause ascertainable by observation and can now go no farther. Very well, I accept with pleasure and with a very great sense of obligation all the conclusions you have arrived at. I take your facts and your phenomena together with your explanation and I will now investigate the substance underlying such phenomena, the nature hidden in that substance. As your work has ceased, you must let me now attend to mine, without interruption or interference, and in my own way and with my own in-

1. Secchi, *L'Unita delle forze fisiche*, V. 2, Book 4, Ch. 1.

struments. One thing you have a right to insist upon which is of great importance to you and to me. This is, that the result of my investigation shall not be anything contradictory to any of the facts well ascertained by you. This rule I accept and will keep before my mind as a guiding light. It is my interest to do so. If I were to transgress it I would be cutting the ground from under my feet and construct my reasoning upon the air.

As a specimen or example illustrating the theories we have so far endeavored to explain we shall take one of the most important and fundamental problems of Cosmology and discuss it in this and in the following articles.

The problem is :—the essential constitution of bodies organic as well as inorganic. In other words, we wish to find out the first necessary essential principles which enter into the composition of a body which make it what it is, and distinguish it from all other beings in the universe. We shall demonstrate how the most probable opinion which we hold not only admits all the real facts received by scientists in reference to the question, but how it raises its whole construction upon those facts and how it furnishes the best and the most satisfactory explanation of the same.

It is unnecessary to mention that such a problem as the essential principles of bodies has exercised the intellect of philosophers of all ages and nations. The result of their speculation has been a great variety of opinions. They may be reduced to the following : Atomism, pure or mechanical, Dynamic Atomism, Chemic Atomism, Dynamism and the Peripatetic system, the last being followed by all Catholic philosophers in the middle ages and with very few exceptions by Catholic metaphysicians of modern times. We shall not spend much time upon the first two as they are generally discarded at present by the majority even of physicists.

The first, that is pure atomism, maintains that a body is made out of a multitude of smaller bodies called molecules and that there are groups of much smaller bodies called atoms. These are essentially extended, indivisible and impenetrable. To form a molecule they are brought near each other but without ever touching each other by the force of attraction, and are kept at a distance by the force of repulsion. They are in juxtaposition and thus form a molecule. These in their turn are brought together and kept apart by the same force and thus form the body. Movement of every kind, such as attraction or repulsion, comes to the atoms from without and never from within, as they are endowed with no internal force of any kind ;

hence their action is only mechanical and transmitted in the same way from one to another. From the variety of movement communicated to the atoms these philosophers explain the variety of bodies, as variety of movement produces difference of grouping and figures.

This system is untenable both in physics and in metaphysics. In the first because

1st. It cannot prove by actual observation that the movement or forces come to the atom from without and not from within.

2d. It cannot prove by observation that variety of movement causes the difference in body.

It is false in metaphysics as it is a contradiction to suppose a being absolutely devoid of all action. Every being must have a nature of its own. Nature is the first principle of action in every being. A thing absolutely inactive is equivalent to non-existence.

These reasons have given rise to Dynamic Atomism. This accepts the system just explained in all its parts, except that touching on movement. It holds that force and movement in the atoms come from a principle interior and not exterior to it.

When we are explaining the true opinion we will show what the Dynamic Atomistic system really amounts to. We proceed to the expounding of the Chemical system:

1st. This maintains that matter which means the same as corporeal substance is divided into ponderable and imponderable. The first is called that part of matter which can be weighed. The second has been so called because no weight has as yet been found in it. Imponderable matter, as ether, not only mingles with all sensible bodies, but fills all cosmic space. To it are attributed all the phenomena of light, heat, electricity, magnetism, and universal gravitation.

2d. All bodies resulting from ponderable matter are either simple or composite. Those bodies are called simple which cannot be resolved into other bodies of different nature. These according to the latest discoveries of science amount to seventy in number. Those bodies are called composite which can be divided into bodies of different nature.

3d. All bodies can be divided into parts. But those parts of a body which cannot be divided into other parts, but resist all mechanical contrivance to that effect are called *integrant molecules*. These are homogeneous, that is of the same nature with each other and with the whole. The molecules of composite bodies can, however, be resolved into heterogeneous parts by chemical analysis. And these heterogeneous parts of integrant molecules are called *constituent*

molecules. The latter may be composite also, because only in substances essentially simple do we find absence of all composition. These incomposite little bodies may be styled primitive atoms.

4th. From all this it follows that bodies are an aggregate or cluster of substances ; since as many substances are to be counted in a body as there are primitive atoms, which compose it.

5th. The difference in the nature of bodies must be accounted for by the different nature of integrant molecules.

6th. These molecules are drawn to each other by the force of attraction which is called also molecular and obtains over integrant molecules of the same nature as well as over constituent molecules. When it is exercised upon homogeneous integrant molecules it is called cohesion and to it is due the compactness of bodies ; when it is exercised upon constituent molecules it is called affinity. From it arise all the combinations of heterogeneous molecules and from the latter combinations arise the integrant molecules of composite bodies.

7th. As cohesion unites molecules, so heat separates them. Hence the difference in the degree of cohesion among molecules ; it being greater or less in proportion, as one or the other force prevails. The distinction of bodies into solid, liquid, or gaseous is due to the different degrees of cohesion.

These scientists conclude, from all the statements laid down :

1st. That atoms of any one substance are all alike as to mass and gravity.

2d. That atoms of different substances are different as to mass and gravity.

3d. We know that atoms exhibit different figures from the phenomenon of chrySTALLIZATION.

4th. Nearly all chemists agree upon the essential properties of atoms, which are *extension* and *resistance*.

The remark we have to offer upon the chemical atomistic theory is, that as a solution of the problem of the constitution of bodies from the standpoint of scientific cosmology it is very probable. Moreover, all those facts on which the theory is constructed, but which are well ascertained and true results of science and are admitted by the best modern scientists, may be taken as a groundwork for the investigation of the metaphysician.

The theory considered and assumed as the final solution of the problem cannot be accepted. First, because, as we have demonstrated in the introduction to this article, no solution of a problem by any of the experimental sciences can ever be final, for

the simple reason that these are founded on what can be observed by the senses with, or without, mechanical aid. And, therefore, anything, such as the essence, the nature, the substance of a being which defies observation is beyond the possibilities and capacity of science.

Secondly, because as a final solution of the problem, the atomic chemical theory is absurd.

In the first place we ask : Has the existence of atoms been so well ascertained as to be beyond doubt a received fact among scientists ? Is it a truth founded on observation and experiment ? What justifies the question is that, as Father Secchi remarks, "observation cannot decide on the question since atoms cannot be handled with the fingers, nor seen through the microscope." ¹

Every one however can see that the existence of atoms is the ground-work of the whole system. If the ground gives away the whole structure must fall and involve every thing in its ruins.

Now what does science say to our question ? Let us listen to the author of "Mediæval and Modern Cosmology." "Whether atoms in the strictest sense of the word do *exist*, or whether these hypothetical atoms are, or not, alike these are questions still open for dispute." ²

The childlike naiveness of this author is charming beyond expression. He bids all Catholic philosophers abandon the system of the noblest and brightest minds that ever honored the human race, to reject that philosophy which has been the glory of Catholic schools. He issues his commands with a peremptoriness and authority not to be trifled with. He blames them, in anything but gentle terms, for their obstinacy in clinging so tenaciously to antiquated, flimsy theories. He casts upon them the reproach of willful ignorance as to the result of modern science. He can barely hide the contempt he feels for them and places them before his readers in a light anything but enviable or flattering. And for what special reasons ? For their great crime in refusing to accept his favorite theory of the primitive atoms as the essential, constituent principles of bodies. And then coolly, deliberately, without any apparent concern, as if he were uttering the most natural thing in the world, without the remotest suspicion of the figure he himself might cut, he tells his readers that after all it is by no means certain that atoms do exist, that their reality is anything but an indisputable fact ; that, perhaps, they are only hypothetical.

¹ L' Unità delle forze fisiche, Vol. II, Book 4, Chap. 1.

² Gmeiner Mediæval and Modern Cosmology, Page 15.

Can any thing be more delightful or amusing? You want me to fling away the support from under my feet; you blame me for being rather averse to such a step; and for my only ground you propose to leave me nothing but vacuum.

But, assuming that we were to content ourselves with so little and accept your atoms as an answer to the problem, what should we gain? The question is, What are the primitive essential principles of bodies? You reply, atoms. Pray what is your definition of an atom? A body of infinitely small dimensions. Then your atom, small as it may be, is a body after all. Then your answer to the problem, What is a body made of? is, a body is made of smaller bodies. We are much obliged for the explanation; but we find ourselves as much in the dark now, as we were before you condescended to throw so much light on the subject. It is as much as to say a tree is made of smaller trees, a house is the result of smaller houses.

Let our readers keep in mind that, according to the chemical system, a body is a mass of molecules placed in juxtaposition to each other, but without touching, so kept in their places by the forces of attraction and repulsion. Atoms then, which form a molecule though indivisible and simple, are the same as bodies which fall under our observation, little bodies resulting from parts yet more tiny, and grouped together by the same forces. To offer them as the first essential elements of bodies is to say that bodies are constructed of other bodies. This may be a very fine and elegant invention of modern science, but, according to common sense, sounds very much like a tautology.

Again, let our readers bear in mind that we are disputing about the essential principles of bodies, those which, in order to be essential, must be the first which come into the composition of a body.

For an answer we are told that such principles are atoms of their own nature extended, because, as chemical philosophy admits, no being which is not essentially simple can be supposed to be unextended. If atoms are extended they must necessarily be the result of all the parts which enter into its composition. Therefore, they are not *first* and cannot be assumed to be the essential elements of bodies. I am seeking for those things, whatever they may be, which mark the boundaries of my investigation as to the composition of bodies. I am analyzing the natural body, and from one thing to another I want to arrive at some entity beyond which I cannot go; an entity or entities which may stand for the very first components and you answer by setting before me something which is the effect

and result of other components. I want a unity beyond which I must not go ; and you give me a number, which is a sum of other unities, which I can analyze and divide into its parts.

Then your answer does not advance me one step towards the solution of our problem.

But there is something much worse than that in your answer to the problem. There is the impossible and the absurd. You say the atom is essentially extended, that is, made of parts. These parts, tiny as they may be, are in their turn also extended, otherwise they would be simple, a supposition which you scornfully reject. They are then also made of parts. These in their turn are also extended and made of parts, and we may go on from one extended part to another without ever stopping.

It matters little if you say that such a division is physically impossible ; that we have no means either natural or artificial to make any such division ; that such parts must be held to be practically indivisible.

I say grant all that ; the fact yet remains that there is in *rerum natura* actually existing a portion of matter infinitely small, but yet extended : otherwise it would no longer be matter, and made up of parts also extended and the result of other parts.

In your system such thing is a reality, something objective. It matters not whether our instruments can analyze it or not. It exists and asserts itself and will not be set aside.

Therefore, mark the conclusion : an atom in your system presents in itself an objective foundation for an infinite division. This is admitted by chemists. "The primitive atoms" says Tongiorgi, "though simple (in the chemical sense) are still in force of the essence of the continual, divisible ad infinitum, at least mentally." *Cosm.* Lib. 1st, ch. 3, art. 2.

If divisible ad infinitum the atom must contain an infinite number of parts, and each part in its turn be composed of other infinite parts. Now an infinite number is not possible, it is a mathematical absurdity.

Therefore the atom of the chemical system is an absurdity. There is no escaping this conclusion: either we admit the ultimate parts of a molecule to be simple and therefore mathematical points as far as extension is concerned, or we must grant them to be composed and then the absurdity of an infinite number starts before us in all its hideousness and stares us in the face.

Moreover, will these chemico-atomists be kind enough to tell us how in their hypothesis they explain the existence of each atom in the unity of substance and activity? By their acknowledgment an atom is a body in miniature, an aggregate of infinitesimal parts, brought together by the law of cohesion. Now what principle gives this aggregate this grouping, that union which must be substantial to make each atom an individuum or a subsistence? Some have answered that it is fully sufficient that such a union should be accidental. It need by no means be substantial. It need not be, if you don't want to speak of an atom individually. But so long as you represent atoms to be distinct, each having a subsistence of its own, each being a thing by itself, if you deny a principle which unites all the parts substantially, you will speak nonsense and contradict yourself.

This becomes more evident if we consider the activity of an atom. Pray, how can an atom act as one agent if all the parts which compose it are not united by some substantial principle? And as every force in the physical world can be reduced to movement we may put the question in another form, and ask—how do a number of parts, only accidentally united, conspire to produce one movement? How explain the conspiracy without a unity of principle bringing them together and causing them to move in one direction? Is there anything in nature or art which shows the supposition possible? Take any mechanical contrivance, say a locomotive. It has a number of parts. They are joined together, one being placed in contact with the other. Could all those parts unite in producing movement if one substantial principle—steam did not animate them all and propel them in a given direction.

You will say the parts of a locomotive have only a mechanical movement; they have no internal force which prompts them to act from within, and that is the reason why they require a principle of movement.

But even supposing a number of parts acting by an internal principle, we must still exact a substantial principle informing them all to bring them into unity of action. Take an atom; supposing it made up of a million of infinitesimal parts. How are these united together to form one atom? You answer, by the force of adhesion resident in each of those parts and forcing them together. Is this force of adhesion something which has an existence of its own, or does it have to lean on those parts in order to exist, so that if it were not for that support it would not exist at all?

Moreover, is that same force one and identical in all of those parts, or is it something different?

If you answer that that force has an existence of its own independently of those tiny parts, and that it is identical in all of them, then you admit one substantial principle bringing into unity of existence and action all those elements. Because everything which has an existence of its own is a substance. In this case you concede that your atoms do not, and cannot, officiate as the primary essential principles of bodies, and are of no use as an answer to the problem.

If, on the other hand, you look upon that force of adhesion as different in each one of those parts, and as an accident leaning on them, you absolutely fail to explain how those different accidents can conspire to unite all those particles, and make them exist in unity of existence and action. The effect cannot be greater than its cause, any more than a consequence can be wider than its premises. And in this case the accident which would not exist without the substance, which must lean on it to be conceived possible, would be the cause of movement in the same substance.

This without taking into account the absurdity of multiplying forces without necessity, a supposition in utter conflict with every observation of nature. For nature acts in the most simple manner and with the fewest possible forces.

What we have said of the atom must be said of all the bodies called simple in the system we are remarking upon and also of all the mixed bodies; as the reasoning applies to both with equal urgency. Again we beg to know how this system explains the total change which takes place in the specific qualities of elementary bodies in their combination to form mixed bodies and *vice versa*. The author of "Modern and Mediæval Cosmology" denies that change. He asserts with proud confidence that Aristotle considered the substantial forms of terrestrial elements to be something transmutable, but that of course is false. Because "*modern chemistry holds the immutability of the properties of the ultimate chemical atoms.*"¹

Whether modern chemistry holds this or not is of very little consequence. The important point of the question is whether it has any right to hold such a thing, and if so, on what foundation?

We need not tell the learned author that he must not take every assertion of chemists or chemistry as so much pure gospel. He must not be allowed to think that blundering is the exclusive privilege of his opponents, or that assertions and abstractions are the

¹ I. C. page 17.

peculiar gift of metaphysicians, from which all scientists are debarred.

Have then chemists any reason to assume the immutability of the properties of the ultimate chemical atoms? Certainly not; because observation and experiment are against them. It is a fact put beyond all possibility of doubt, and acknowledged by chemists, that simple bodies when taken separately and by themselves exhibit properties different from those which they show when forming a part of a mixed body. Purely as simple they show one kind of properties; mixed with each other they yield another kind. Oxygen, for instance, and hydrogen, when taken separately offer one kind of properties; when mixed up so as to form water show different properties. Sodium is a soft argentiferous metal; on the other hand chlorine is a greenish yellow, energetic, poisonous gas. When both are combined they yield common salt, the properties of which have no similarity with those of its components. Oxygen in itself is an odorless gas and as such necessary and useful to animal life, yet if mixed even in a small quantity with ozone it becomes a strong, highly offensive poison.

How now account for these facts and a thousand more unless we admit a specific change in the nature of the bodies which are united? Different specific qualities and properties imply difference of nature in the principle which gives rise to them. If then two simple bodies looked at separately exhibit one kind of properties and when combined yield a different, sometimes, contrary kind of property, some essential change must have taken place in them by the combination; or we should have an effect without a cause. It will not do to say that the first can be accounted for by alleging the phenomenon of neutralization. Because to say that the forces are neutralized is merely to assert the phenomenon in different words but is not any kind of explanation of the same.

The chemico atomic theory utterly fails in accounting for the fact of the change taking place in the specific properties of simple bodies when these are combined and *vice versa*.

Finally, this system renders the existence of a mixed body and its action absolutely inconceivable. It maintains that no change can ever take place in the ultimate chemical atoms. Therefore no change in the simple bodies of which they are parts. In such a supposition no mixture of two simple bodies is conceivable, except by juxtaposition to each other; that is, no real mixture at all.

This is evident, because these two simple bodies are of course

material and therefore extended, and could be united in three ways, either by compenetration, or by both occupying the same place, or by both being turned into a third, the result of the combination. The first and last hypothesis is denied by chemists. The third is impossible, because two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Therefore the mixture of bodies according to the chemists, can only amount to this, that one body approaches the other.

We conclude this article with a quotation from St. Thomas, to show how old are some of the notions which some of our modern wiseacres think they have just discovered, and how irrefragably they have been disposed of by the geniuses of Catholic schools. "Avicenna maintained that the substantial forms of the elements remained unchangeable in the mixed body, and that the combination took place because the different qualities of the elements were reduced to a medium (modern neutralization). But such a theory is impossible, because the different forms of elements cannot exist in different parts of matter, among the differences of which those of dimension must be taken into account; otherwise matter would no longer be divisible. Now, matter subject to dimensions is only found in bodies, and different bodies cannot be in the same place. . Therefore it follows that the elements in a mixed body cannot be in the same place as to site or location, and thus there could be no true mixture as to the whole, but only in the sense that the smallest parts were in juxtaposition to each other." St. Ths. S. Th. 1 Pars. qu. : 76 Art. : 4 ad 4.

J. DE CONCILIO.

THE SEAL OF THE CONFESSIONAL AND THE CIVIL LAW.

In speaking of the religious duty on the part of a priest to keep absolutely secret whatever has been revealed to him in sacramental confession, we have regard here, principally, to the case where this obligation comes in conflict with the requirements of civil law.

The rights of a public court to exact testimony, where there is question of the common safety or of the vindication of justice within its sphere, stands admitted by the code of common law. Right and charity, under one title or many, oblige the individual, even in conscience, to give such testimony. Nevertheless there are

limits beyond which the State may not trespass. Its office of controlling the external order for the commonweal does not authorize it to enter the private sanctuaries of the domestic life, the family and the individual, unless the latter were to obstruct the common good and destroy the public safety. The silent reflection of a penitent upon his sin before God cannot be said to obstruct the common good. He is not bound by any law of State to confess his guilt, and until direct or circumstantial evidence convict him, he is free before the civil tribunal. Now when a person confesses sacramentally to a priest he means simply and only to confess to God. He would not reveal his guilt under any other consideration and the confessor accepts the condition of his penitent as such and as such only. So far as the State, the court, the public, even the priest himself, outside of the confessional is concerned, the words spoken in the sacred tribunal are as though they were never uttered. The keeping, therefore, of them as a secret has no direct effect whatever upon the commonwealth; they are like the thoughts of repentance which are spoken to the inmost heart where neither judge nor jury nor witness may pry.

In acknowledgment of this fact secular jurisprudence admits on general grounds the sacredness of the confessional. The courts of Germany and France, for example, whilst their governments exercise public discrimination against the Catholic Clergy, allow that a priest, called to testify in court, may disavow all knowledge obtained from a criminal in confession. The conduct of Paul I, toward the beginning of the present century, having threatened the abbé Alexander, a French emigré, with torture and death unless he revealed the confession made to him by a dying conspirator against the Russian throne, proves that a Tartar despot knows how to respect the sacred duty of a priest towards his penitent.¹

The legislation in the United States on this subject is not uniform even where it is pronounced; and in many States, as will be seen from Mr. Claxton's reference, no provision is made at all to shield a priest against being punished for contempt of court in case he refused to testify to knowledge which he is presumed to have obtained in the exercise of his sacred ministry as confessor. In the earlier part of the present century a case occurred in the City of New York

¹ Paul I on finding that his angry threats had no effect upon the abbé turned to General Kutaissoff, saying: "Conduct this priest to his home. I honor him for his valor and his virtue." Unfortunately the cruelty of the Czar relented in nothing toward his subjects, and he was afterwards assassinated by the conspirators.

calling forth wide attention and which has served not only as a precedent in similar instances, but caused the adoption of a clause in the Revised Statutes of New York to the effect "that no minister of the Gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules and practice of such denomination." (Revised Stat. III c. 7, art. 8. sec. 72.)¹

But few cases have since then occurred (notably one in the courts of Richmond, Virginia, October, 1855,) in which American judges showed any disposition to place a priest in the embarrassing necessity of declining testimony which he was supposed to have received through the confessional.

Yet while our courts have on the whole deferred to the duties of conscience in the individual citizen, irrespective of religious denomination, we have no guarantee that this would be the case under all circumstances. The question which we here raise is not merely a speculative one. Those who are at present in possession of the rudder of public opinion make no secret of their tendency to elevate state authority to the position of supreme arbiter in matters not only political and social but also domestic and religious. The insistence upon compulsory education where there is no actual necessity for such force measure is but one straw which points out the direction in which the common current is driving us with the noisy ripples of liberty and advancement. It is taken for granted as a sort of ethical maxim useful in practical politics that the universal conscience must supersede the individual conscience and that where religion comes in

¹ Dr. Gilmary Shea relates the case as follows: A man and his wife were indicted for receiving stolen goods, but before trial the owner of the property acknowledged that he had received his property back from the hands of Rev. Anthony Kohlmann. The clergyman was subpoenaed to appear at the trial as a witness against the supposed thieves and those accused as receivers. When called to the witness box Rev. Mr. Kohlmann asked to be excused from answering, and said: "Were I summoned to give evidence as a private individual (in which capacity I declare most solemnly, I know nothing relative to the case before the courts), and to testify from those ordinary sources of information from which the witnesses present have derived theirs, I should not for a moment hesitate and should even deem it a duty of conscience to declare whatever knowledge I might have but if called upon to testify in quality of a minister of a sacrament, in which my God Himself has enjoined on me a perpetual and inviolable secrecy, I must declare to this honorable court, that I cannot, I must not answer any question that has a bearing upon the restitution in question; and that it would be my duty to prefer instantaneous death or any temporal misfortune, rather than disclose the name of any penitent in question." The court through the Hon. De Witt Clinton, who presided, carefully reviewed the whole case and decided that a priest could not be called upon to testify as to matters which he knew only through the confessional.—*History of the Cath. Church in the United States*, Vol. III, pp. 165, 166.

conflict with the popular will expressed in the government and state legislation, it must yield as a private interest to the general good. Even where the law seems to favor the freedom of conscience and to insist upon the sacredness of certain confidential communications, it may readily be quoted against such exemption, even setting aside the discretionary power of a judge to interpret its meaning as going aside of the letter.¹

As to the obligation of a priest to guard the seal of confession, it admits of no exception, of no distinction as to the gravity of the sins confessed or the persons concerned; and it differs from all other bonds of secrecy in this that it restricts the confessor no less in reference to the person who has confided to him his or her secret, than towards others who may or may not have cognizance of the matter. No consideration on earth can authorize a priest to betray by word or deed, or sign, or omission, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, what he has learned in the confessional. "Nunquam revelatio fieri potest etsi de totius rei publicæ salute agatur." (Lehmk. Theol. moral. I, n. 821, 7.) Any violation of this duty which has the sanction of the natural and divine as well as the ecclesiastical law, involves the crime of sacrilege. The penitent may indeed allow a confessor to make use of the sacramental subject matter outside of the confessional, but such leave is never to be sought unless in cases of unquestionable necessity to adjust a wrong and then is to be used with the utmost caution. If such permission be refused, the matter ends there, and on no account can the liberty of interpretation as to what a penitent might allow be employed in the case of his or her confession.

If a doubt arise in the priest's mind whether certain knowledge has come to him through the confessional or otherwise, he is equally bound to guard it. (In materia sigilli probabilitate uti non licet, scilicet: Probabilitas facti, seu si probabile est fuisse et etiam probabile non fuisse sacramentalem confessionem ex qua hausi notitiam,

¹ Thus in Chitty's Blackstone, Bk. III, n. 370, we read "No counsel, attorney, or other person, intrusted with the secrets of the cause by the party himself shall be compelled, or perhaps allowed, to give evidence of such conversation or matter of privacy, as came to his knowledge by virtue of such trust and confidence." In the American edition a note upon this passage refers to the New York statute which says "physicians, surgeons and clergymen are not allowed to disclose matters confided to them in their professional character"—2 R. S. 406, § 72. Another note interprets the text as follows: "But the principles and policy of this rule restrain it to that confidence only which is placed in a counsel or solicitor, and which must necessarily be inviolable where the use of advocates and legal assistants is admitted. But the purposes of public justice supersede the delicacy of every other species of confidential communication." Chitty's Blackstone American ed., vol. II, ch. XXIII, note 32.

non dat mihi jus aliquid dicendi vel agendi, quod fortasse sigilli læsionem contineat. Lehm. Theol. mor. II., 458, 5.)

Under the same obligation are comprised not only sins with their circumstances of persons, places, etc., but the character, state of life, defects—such as scrupulosity and the like—of the penitent. Things known otherwise, which have likewise become the subject of confession, do not prevent a priest from giving testimony, but his evidence must exclude all possibility of reference to the confession. Any subject confided to a priest with the understanding that it is meant as a confessional secret binds him equally, although he receives it outside of the sacred tribunal.¹

The gravity of this duty to protect the secret of a penitent's confession is at once evident from the solemn alternative imposed upon the confessor, viz., to accept death under all circumstances rather than to commit a violation in any way of the seal of the confession. (Si sine violatione sigilli confessarius necem sibi paratam effugere seu evitare nequit, aut sacrilegium objectivum non potest evitare: hæc potius pati aut permittere *debet*, quam sigillum violare.—Lehm. II, 467, 8.) Nor may he allow himself to be swayed in the expression of his judgment in regard to persons whom from their confession he knows to be unworthy of certain positions. Thus a superior cannot remove from office, even though he find some plausible external pretext, a subject who has confessed that he injures the community including the confessor, unless there were direct and sufficient cause for such removal independent of the confession.²

Founded as is this obligation of preserving secrecy, in the matter of sacramental confession, on divine and natural right, the Church has determined its application by the severest censures against those who would violate it. According to an ancient canon of Gratian, deposition from office and perpetual banishment were the penalty of such a crime. Many Synods ordain additional penance for life in bread and water and retirement in a monastery. It is remarkable that the penitential codes of the Anglo Saxon Church contain no canons in reference to the "sigillum," which may be explained by the fact that such violations are hardly known to have ever occurred.

¹ Aliquando aliquis dicit alicui aliquid secretum, et ille recipit sub sigillo confessionis. Dicendum, quod aliquis non debet de facili aliquid recipere hoc modo; si tamen recipiat, tenetur ex promissione hoc modo celare ac si in confessione haberet, quamvis sub sigillo confessionis non habeat.—S. Thom. Summ. III, Suppl. VI, 2, 2.

² Confessarii caveant diligentissime, ne ea notitia, quam de aliorum peccatis in confessione habuerunt, ad exteriorem gubernationem utantur.—Decr. Clement. VIII, Mai. 1594.

It is said that in the entire history of the Church scarcely half a dozen instances can be recorded where a priest allowed himself to be intimidated by the threat of death to reveal a confessional secret.¹

An important and practical question is : how is a priest to conduct himself in cases where he is authoritatively required to make statements which involve the violation of the "Sigillum." According to the old canon law a priest was not to appear as witness in criminal cases before a civil court. To-day he has no longer the protection of withdrawal to keep him from the possibility of committing himself even by evading a question or by obstinate silence when confronted with the cross-examining lawyer. Theologians agree that under such circumstances a mental restriction could not be construed into a falsehood even were a confessor to assert under oath that he is absolutely ignorant of any matter which had been communicated to him solely under the seal of confession. A witness is adduced in civil court to testify as man against man and whatever has been confided to him as alone it would be confided to God, is not or cannot properly be an object of inquiry by a civil court. (*Homo non adducitur in testimonium nisi ut homo ; ideo sine laesione conscientiae potest jurare, se nescire, quod scit tantum ut Deus.*—St. Thom. Suppl. XI, a, 1 ad 3.)

But a course which is always open to a priest in such cases is the one adopted by F. Kohlmann, mentioned above, which not only shields the penitent but has the additional good of giving public testimony to the sacred obligations of our office and religion. "The question before this court is this : Whether a Roman Catholic priest can in any case be justifiable in revealing the secrets of sacramental confession? I say he cannot ; the reason whereof must be obvious to every one acquainted with the Tenets of the Catholic Church." With these words the noble Jesuit opened a clear and forcible explanation of the Catholic doctrine on sacramental confession. The exposition was listened to with great attention and the court through the Hon. DeWitt Clinton, who presided, expressed its decision that a priest under these circumstances was to be exempted from testifying. "Although we differ from the witness and his brethren in our

¹ Binterim relates a case which is said to have occurred in 1095 at Rheims. Another instance is told by Wolfgang Menzel. A French priest Chaubard, near Toulouse, was suspected to have heard the confession of an assassin. The two sons of the murdered man, seeking to wreak their vengeance, threatened the priest with death if he would not point out the guilty party. He did so, and the murderer was killed. The facts becoming known the priest was placed on the wheel and tortured to death, whilst the judges did not dare to resist the infuriated mob which took part with the two sons, who received only the penalty of being banished from home.—*Wetzer u. Welte, Beichtsigel*, V.

religious creed ” said the judge, “ yet we have no reason to question the purity of their motives or to impeach their good conduct as citizens. They are protected by the laws and constitution of this country in the full and free exercise of their religion, and *this court can never countenance or authorize* the application of insult to their faith, or of torture to their consciences.”

Among the ordinary causes which would make a confessor liable to subpœna is that of restitution made through him by a penitent, whom the law is in search of. The teachings of pastoral theology advise a confessor, in cases where he is made the medium of restitution, to take every precaution that no suspicion be cast upon any person, and if possible to transact the matter through a prudent friend at a distance to whom nothing more is to be mentioned than the name and place of the party entitled to the restored property for which a receipt in writing is to be asked in order that the penitent may receive the assurance of the restitution faithfully made. In court nothing is to be said which would indicate the penitent. If it be taken for granted that an accused person be guilty because it is known that he or she went to confession to the witness, the confessor should explicitly state that nothing for or against the person could be deduced from his (the confessor’s) silence or from the act of going to confession. If an innocent person be accused and in danger of conviction owing to the suspicion aroused by the fact of having made a sacramental confession, the priest may obtain an explicit statement of innocence from the accused, and with his or her leave make the same known as a witness in court.

Other cases which may subject a priest to requisition as witness in court are those in which an accomplice who repents desires the priest to restrain or admonish others involved in the commission of certain crimes, so as to make them desist. Such duty is rarely to be undertaken by a confessor. He may prevail with his penitent to induce the guilty parties to approach him in the confessional, but it is rarely prudent to use the knowledge of the confessional—even though the penitent have not only given leave but explicitly desired him to do so—for the correction of others unless justice or charity equivalent to necessity make such measure urgent. If there be grave reasons for admonishing the guilty accomplices let the penitent state the matter outside the confessional ; and to avoid all risk of suspicion as to the violation of the secret of confession the priest would have to say that he received his information in the ordinary course of communication.

Although the undefined character of our present legislation on this subject in the different States seems to allow of only a general classification as to the specific statutes to which a confessor might appeal, in case of subpœna, for the privilege of exemption from testifying under the circumstances mentioned, it will no doubt be of some service to have a general survey of the purely legal aspect of the case. This we leave to the gentleman whose profession entitles him to speak more distinctly on the subject.

IN a number of well-known cases the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that "Christianity is part of the Common Law of Pennsylvania," and has then gone on to explain that the term "Christianity" is to be taken in its broad, general signification, and not restricted to the definition that would be given it by any one body calling itself Christian. That is, as the title Christian is held by Catholics and Quakers, for example, only that is to be called Christianity in the sense of the court which Catholics and Quakers would agree upon. This decision in its vagueness is an expression of what has been called in the language of jurisprudence *public policy*, because any narrower meaning given to the term "Christianity" would be a recognition, to a greater or less extent, of some one body calling itself Christian.

Under the operation of this principle of public policy, certain communications are held to be privileged. That is, they may not be demanded of the person to whom they are made, even in judicial proceedings. Of these privileged communications the most familiar are such as have been made by a husband to a wife, or *vice versa*; the confidences reposed by a client in his attorney after that relation has been established between them; and, in some States of the Union, confessions made to a priest or minister of the Gospel, by a person regarding such confession as a religious act. The privilege extended by the law to confidential communications between husband and wife, and attorney and client, exists in all the States of the Union, and, in the case of priest (or minister) and penitent, in *New York*,¹ *Wisconsin*, *Missouri*, *Michigan*, *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *California*, *Kansas*, *Minnesota*, *Ohio*, *Nebraska*, *Arkansas*, *Colorado*, *Wyoming*, *Montana*, *Nevada*, *Oregon*, *Washington*, *North and South Dakota*, as well as *Utah* and *Arizona*.

Such communications, therefore, in States where the privilege does not exist, may be the subject of judicial inquiry, and the priest

¹ It is note-worthy that in this list, New York is the only one of the original States.

(or minister) to whom they have been made is liable to be committed to prison for contempt of court, if he decline to reveal them.

It would *seem* that in the United States Courts the privilege may be extended, as a matter of grace, for in the case of *Totten v. U. S.* 2 Otto, 105, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Field, declares that communications made in the confessional are not proper matter for judicial inquiry, putting them in the same category as those between husband and wife, and attorney and client, the revelation of which is opposed to public policy.

It cannot be said that such communications *must* be protected in the United States Courts, as the question (of the confessional) was not *the* one before the court, the specific question in *Totten v. U. S.* being, whether a person who had been employed by the President of the United States, in a secret service for the United States, could disclose the secret entrusted to him, in an action to recover compensation for such service. The decision of the court is in the negative, and it puts such "secrets" in the same category as the others just mentioned. As the decision, here, was unanimous, it is reasonable to assume that, if the question of the confessional comes before the Supreme Court, directly, unembarrassed by any State law binding that court, it would hold that it is privileged, on the broad ground of public policy, and not on the authority of any Act of Congress, for there is no such Act.

As to the States in which the privilege does not exist, probably some judges would endeavour to dissuade counsel from seeking to discover communications of this nature, but, so long as there is no legislation forbidding it, it will be the duty of counsel, if the interests of their clients seem to prompt an examination of a priest concerning matters revealed in the confessional to do all in their power to effect disclosures. From a detailed examination, we find that under the law of twenty States and two Territories, a confession made by a penitent to a priest, is privileged, and under the law of the other States such confession can be made the subject of inquiry in judicial proceedings. This contradiction will not seem strange, perhaps, in view of the similar contradictions that prevail in most matters wherewith the laws of the several States deal, were it not for the fact that no priest (or minister worthy of the name,) could be induced, by fear of imprisonment for contempt of court, to divulge any such confession. Hence in permitting questions of this nature, the law gains nothing, unless the imprisonment of a priest be, in itself, a gain.

Wharton, in his well-known work on Criminal Law, after setting

forth that, at Common Law, confessions to clergymen were not privileged, quotes an eminent English judge as saying—"I for one, will never compel a clergyman to disclose communications made to him by a prisoner, but if he chooses to disclose them, I shall receive them in evidence." Of course, this is not tantamount to declaring that he would not permit questions to be asked in such matter, but the ruling would be a protection to the witness who declined to answer them. No doubt, this declaration of Chief Justice Best, for it was he who made it, has been a guide to many another judge.

Sir James Stephen, in his "Digest of the Law of Evidence," commenting on the refusal of privilege at Common Law to religious confessions, uses the following language, "I think the modern Law of Evidence is not so old as the Reformation, but has grown up by the practice of the courts, and by decisions in the course of the last two centuries. It came into existence at a time when exceptions in favor of auricular confessions to Roman Catholic priests were not likely to be made."

The above historical explanation by Sir James shows why by the Common, *i. e.* the unwritten¹ Law of the several States of the Union, "the general rule is that every person must testify to what he knows." Stephen, *loc.cit.*

In Greenleaf on Evidence [Redfield's Edition] where the same doctrine is laid down, there is a note² on the Roman Law, Vol. I, Part II, Chapter XI § 229, containing the following quotation from Mascardus, De Probat. Vol. I, Concl. 377. "Confessio coram sacerdote, in pœnitentia facta, non probat in judicio; *quia censetur facta coram Deo*; imo, si sacerdos eam enunciat, incidit in pœnam."

The note continues "It was lawful, however, for the priest to testify in such cases to the fact that the party had made a penitential confession to him, as the Church requires, and that he had enjoined penance upon him; and, with the express consent of the penitent, he might lawfully testify to the substance of the confession itself."

As, therefore, the Common Law of England was in force in the several Colonies whence sprang the States of the Union, in so far as it was applicable to them, they received the doctrine of non-privilege of the confessional as a part of their jurisprudence at the Revolution, and for that reason it has required the direct act of the Legis-

¹ The Common Law of England being, in effect, the judicial tradition of England, the Colonies received that tradition with their existence, and they, upon becoming the United States, preserved the tradition, except where it was not congruous with their altered political position. Hence it has required positive legislation to change the rule of Law on the matter here considered.

lature of a State to exempt a priest or minister from testifying to knowledge received by him from a penitent. The "religious" Statistics of the States will sufficiently explain why some Legislatures have granted the privilege, and others, not.

If the government of any State, wherein the prevailing religious opinion is opposed to extending the privilege, were capable of compelling a priest to testify to knowledge obtained by him in the confessional, there might be some sufficient justification for the courts of such a State commanding a witness of this description to answer ; but, when experience shows that no such command can practically be executed, it seems difficult to explain the law as it now is in so many States.

It is the conviction of thinking men that a law which is not, or cannot be enforced had better be expunged from the body of the law, as a dead branch is cut from an otherwise healthy tree. Instead of the rule permitting questions of this nature leading to the revelation of crime and therefore, the furtherance of justice, it often has a precisely contrary effect, because, when a priest declines to answer as to the matter of a confession, that refusal to answer is frequently commented on by counsel as equivalent to a declaration that this or that has been actually revealed to him in the confessional. Even if the court, under such circumstances, were to instruct the jury that the priest's refusal to answer indicated nothing as to his knowledge, one way or another, yet in many, if not most cases, the judicial warning would fail to overcome the impression so apt to be made by a witness declining to answer a question. Sacramental confessions being simply a part of a Catholic's ordinary religious obligation and the hearing of them being a complementary part of a priest's ordinary duty, it is a grievous hardship to the priest that he may be subjected to serious embarrassment merely because of the discharge of such duty.

As for the penitent, it is manifestly unfair to him, for he is without choice in the matter, the church, resting on divine authority, ordains that he should confess, and the State commanding the priest to disclose the confession, the refusal of the latter to do which, in judicial proceedings, places the penitent in the very trying position adverted to above.

H. J. HEUSER,
W. R. CLAXTON.

THE COUNTRY PRIEST'S WEEK.*

(Sunday.)

First Mass is over, and the farmers go
 Along the roads, where budding bushes grow,
 A sense of peace upon them,—“ Winter wheat
 Is fair to middling ;”—as they meet and greet
 Their scraps of talk are not so full of gloom
 As on the other days ;—the windflowers bloom
 In the sparse clearings, where the oaks are thin,
 Among the puff-balls and the acorns ;—in
 A sheltered place arbutus shows its crest
 Near where a meadow lark begins her nest.

There is a stillness in the sunny air,
 There is a quietness,—a softness rare,—
 The quality of Sunday—rest for all,
 Except the priest, who answers to a call
 From one in illness ; late night till the moon
 Late silvered the young wheat as light as noon
 He heard confessions ; betimes again to hear
 The contrite tales he rose this morn ; from near
 And far the farmers gather ;—fasting still
 He greets them kindly, as he mounts the hill ;—

He greets some neighbors as they churchward pass,
 Who take his horse ; and then he vests for Mass ;
 What time the farmers, in their Sunday coats,
 Talk of the weather, and count up the votes
 For and against the party of their loves ;
 Their wives,—a little solemn in tight gloves,—
 Exchange receipts and wonder if the beef
 Will burn at home, and tell of joys or grief,
 A recent death, or that a batch of bread
 Came from the stove as light as thistle-head.

The Mass begins ; the sad melodeon wails ;
 The Kyrie is sung ; uncertain gales
 Bear up the Gloria ;—why will she who takes
 The treble part raise high her painful “ shakes,”
 While alto, organ, and the bass profound,
 Each independent, makes discordant sound ?
 Veni Creator ! Then the triumph comes !
 The practice of a month that grand burst sums ;
 The bass o roars, the treble, soaring, flies,
 The alto trembles, sings alone, and dies.

* Suggested by Annette von Droste-Hülshof's “ Des Alten Pfarrers' Woche.”

On bended knees the old priest waits until
 The warblers in the loft have worked their will ;
 "Veni Creator !" cry the four at once,
 And then the basso, (sure the man's a dunce)
 Repeats it and repeats it ; then in turn
 The treble and the alto show they burn
 To rival his out-pouring, till the priest
 Is faint with weary waiting ; and the feast
 Of music falls in fragments in the air,
 And somehow there is gladness everywhere.

A sermon on the duty of the time,—
 The Easter time,—some Scriptural words sublime
 Of love and hope,—a wish about the pews
 Whose rent is rather backward,—certain views
 About a dance announced for Tuesday night,
 In which plain speaking points the course of right ;
 The young folk look ashamed, the elders nod ;
 " True to your Church, and you'll be true to God,
 Which grace I wish you all." A little while,
 And all the place is radiant ; angels smile ;

Our Lord descends ; the church is glorified ;
 The roughest face in some new flame is dyed ;
 The lights before the altar leap with joy,
 The candles glow,—and that stout, red-cheeked boy
 Who holds the censer (to-morrow he will plough)
 Is rapt, seraphic, for a moment now ;
 The gray-haired priest is mightier than kings ;
 And this poor chapel, lacking many things,
 Is grander than a palace : let them sing !
 (Discords forgotten)—words of seraphs ring !

The Mass is done,—“ Father, the banns next week,—
 Don't call them loud ! ” And then the widow meek,
 Approaching stills the laugh ; she comes to seek
 Another word of hope ; her sad eyes speak
 Of tears unshed,—“ Father, a Mass,” she asks ;
 Then come some farmers, full of daily tasks,—
 “ Shall the new school-house be of brick or stone ?
 Who will haul wood on Thursday ? Is it known
 Whether the railway passes Riley's field ?—
 But up the women glide,—then the men yield.

A hasty dinner and a sorry one,—
 (“ The roast you ought to know, is overdone ?
 And who can keep potatoes on the fire
 Without their growing soggy ? ” Thus the ire
 Of her who guards the threshold of the priest
 Takes form in words,—“ You might have come, at least

Before the pudding burned ; they chatter so ! —
 These country louts ; they'd stop it if you'd go,
 And let them bite their tongues ; —the gravy's cold), —
 He eats, and says no word ; —the plaint is old ;

And this grim lady, (you have met her sir ? —
 This guardian spirit ? —here's success to her !)
 Creeps to the door because a ring is heard ;
 " His Riv'rence is eatin', —can't you leave word ?
 No, you can't see him ! Come to-night, I say, —
 You can't ? —well, try to come another day ! "

The door is slammed before the pastor can
 Arise and stop the too persistent man
 Who, when the supper waits " will come again," —
 The guardian knows the wicked ways of men !

The Sunday school, —some words the priest must say
 To little children ; and they must be gay,
 Yet with instruction fraught, —a picture here,
 A medal there, a smile for eyes that peer
 From golden curls, a joke for that small boy,
 A warning word for this : here, smiling coy,
 The maidens come, —the altar needs repair,
 And they will do it ; then, with taste and care
 He steers his way between the factions who
 Hate all the good that other factions do.

Vespers and Benediction ! —and the day
 Of faith and love and all the various play
 Of life in many tints, draws to its end ;
 The people in the sunset homeward wend,
 And, in an hour, stern Martha lights the lamp, —
 (" You've caught a cold, sir, standing in the damp) —
 The pastor takes his chair. (" Old Clarke is here
 About the money, —supper's spoiled, —that's clear !
 And Mary Devlin wants, —Pat's at the door, —
 I'll leave this house ! —warning I give once more ! ")

The crowded day is gone ; the lights are out,
 The pastor rests at last ; beyond a doubt
 Pat Smith will come no more this night, at least !
 And balmy sleep steals o'er the weary priest.
 The day is done, well filled with duties, too,
 And kindly thoughts and acts and sayings true.
 He dreams a golden dream of Heavenly rest ; —
 [Ah broken dream ! from out the lowering west
 A man rides hastily, as the rain falls thick :
 Three miles away, for Patrick Smith is sick !]

A MODERN PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY.

The German University Professor is a typical figure. No less a man than Göthe has said of him that he possesses the faculty of rendering the sciences inaccessible to the ordinary intellect. Probably this is true, although men like Père Didon and Sidney Whitman, who have studied the German system from their separate national points of view, tell us, that (to use the words of the latter writer) "amidst all the nebulous theories of speculative philosophy that raise the smile of foreigners, it remains a fact that the German people have carried more philosophy into every-day life than any other nation." Whatever be the explanation of this seeming contradiction, it must be allowed that the average university professor in Germany, as probably everywhere else, is much more of an instructor than an educator. The position is justified from the standpoint of those who hold that the university is a finishing school where those only are supposed to be admitted who have attained a certain ripeness of intellect and definite moral habits, which qualify them to make proper use of instruction under a system of so-called academic freedom, absolving the instructor from all responsibility beyond furnishing a supply of knowledge. According to this view the university professor is not supposed to educate but only to inform. His duty is to present the results of independent scientific research by which the field of knowledge is enlarged. He delivers his lectures and may answer questions, but short of this he does not hold himself accountable as to the use his hearers may be induced to make of the knowledge he holds out for sale.

The subject of this sketch, Dr. Hettinger, already known to English readers of high-class Catholic literature through Father Bowen's excellent translations, had a wholly different view of the duty of a university professor. Like Cardinal Newman, he held that the vocation of an educator found its highest expression in the academic teacher. The duty to educate and to put his knowledge to the best uses could never cease for the man of learning who realized the true end of all wisdom; and hence it was his task not simply to inform the minds of those who trusted him for knowledge, but above all, to influence and direct the energies of early manhood which had been rendered capable of accepting higher knowledge by the needful preparation in the lower courses of study. The professor was to him eminently an originator, a creative character, producing and fostering by his intellectual labors scientific study, together with that enthusiasm which is to the young mind what the heat of the soil is to the

healthy seed ; it develops the latent powers of the individual and turns them, drives them, so to say, gradually toward fruitful activity in practical life such as is the proper sphere of each man in society.

In the struggle, of late years, between those who were in favor of confining the teaching of theology wholly to the seminaries, according to the instructions of the Council of Trent, and those who upheld the old system of endowing Catholic chairs at the national universities, Dr. Hettinger was on the side of the latter. The increase of Diocesan Seminaries was, he thought, indeed in many respects a desirable measure; but this should not imply the disestablishment of the philosophical and theological faculties at the imperial universities. The very existence of Catholic chairs at the centres of intellectual activity would, he contended, give a certain prestige to the learned men among the Catholic body, whilst it afforded exceptional opportunities to those whose talents fit them for the leadership in equal contest against the infidel or sectarian representatives at these same universities. "Let us consider thrice" he wrote, "before we make a demand from the government of substituting endowed seminaries in place of the Catholic chairs at the universities." The champions of negative criticism, like Hegel, Darwin, Comte, and their following, as well as historians of the schools of Machiavelli, Sismondi, Giannone, would have it all their own way, unless the presence of men, schooled in the same tactics and capable of applying the test of critical science to the false theories of infidelity, acted as a wholesome corrective to vindicate the honor of Catholic science without compromise or sacrifice of truth. Whilst then the ordinary student of theology receives sufficient information in the seminary, those who rise above their fellows by reason of talent and the impulse to use the same through the cultivation of superior knowledge in the contest of truth against error, seek the university. But are they properly equipped by the mere demonstration of scientific truth? We believe not. The traditional lecturer points out the advantages of certain intellectual weapons, their construction, their management, but the professor of Catholic science, and above all of theology, is required to do this and more. He is interested in the man who has to handle the weapon, because he is interested in his victory. Accordingly he illustrates his theory by practice, he strives with his pupil as a captain with his line; he makes the student take hold of the steel and watches his trying to use it; he corrects the awkward movements of the tyro; and, what is most important, he quickens the energy by proposing some real aim, which awakens enthusiasm; and in doing so he directs the action

of the disciple by a natural impulse more effective to overcome constitutional habits than the best understood precepts. Such was Dr. Hettinger during the many years in which he taught theology at the University of Würzburg. We have his biography by one who was not only an appreciative and privileged pupil but later on an intimate friend of the man who aside of many able professors in the same field was to the university students of Catholic Germany what Newman may be said to have been to those of England, a man all-sided in his knowledge as in his sympathies; a light, mild yet sure, to whom several generations of talented and high-minded youth have instinctively looked up for guidance amid the turbulent intellectual movements of this skeptic age.¹

Dr. Hettinger's principal chair was that of Apologetic Theology. His two masterly works, the *Apologia* and the *Apologetica* give us a picture of the style and method of the man as a professor. It was not so much by his large figure and classic countenance, as rather by the quiet simplicity and noble yet genial benevolence which lit out of his face, that his mere presence exercised a notable influence over the students. There was always a large attendance at his lectures. The whole class arose, as if by an instinct of reverence, at his entrance. He would say a few words to rivet attention upon the definite subject of the lecture. One of the students then read for some minutes from Dr. Hettinger's text-book of Apologetics, where he has laid down in precise terms the principles of apologetic science with a clear and complete application to the different branches of practical theology. This served to give usually an outline of the subject matter of the lecture.

A clear mind, trained by exact studies for years, a rich imagination ennobled by habitual intercourse with whatever is elevated in literature and art, and chastened by the corrections of life's daily experience, gave to his exposition a peculiar charm and practical force. Dr. Hettinger possessed an agreeable voice, a careful enunciation, a naturally classic style of diction, and that lucidity of arrangement of his thoughts which is so pleasant to the attentive and intelligent hearer. In these gifts we may partially recognize the reason of Dr. Hettinger's popularity. But above it all there was that which contained the true secret of his permanent hold on, and directive power over his pupils. He made them feel what he felt, namely, his strong and lively faith, his love of the Church, his lofty

¹ Franz Hettinger. Erinnerungen eines dankbaren Schüler's. Von Fr. Kaufmann.—Frankfurt & Luzern: Foesser Nachfolg. 1891.

realization of the vocation to the priesthood. What he strove after was to point out to the students in theology the way to become thoroughly versed in divine and human knowledge. For the accomplishment of this purpose he considered it absolutely necessary to cultivate the ascetical element. With him personally the priestly character always predominated over that of the academical professor, and he demanded from the theologian to keep constantly in mind that the purpose of all knowledge in his case was to show forth and represent God in his capacity as sacred minister of the altar.

In his exposition of the subject matter he avoided the slightest suspicion of pedantry. He had no sympathy for those of his learned fraternity who hold that it adds to a professor's weight if he indulge in mystifying abstractions, or that knowledge could gain by being rendered exclusive and inaccessible to the ordinary student. In the recurring lectures of each year he made changes which showed the chastening and progressive quality of his thought and how intercourse with his students taught him to enter more fully into their manner of receiving scientific truth. He affected no novelty or originality as to the exposition of Catholic doctrine, and adhered with a large-minded reverence and closely to the traditional teaching of the Church. In truth the care with which he respected the received doctrines of truth, whilst he took full and impartial cognizance of the development of critical science and the philosophy of history, made one conscious of the ardent attachment which he bore to the Church as the unfailing fount of orthodoxy.

In 1871 he assumed the professorship of dogmatic theology whilst he retained the chair of apologetics. Here he observed the same method as mentioned above. He would dictate slowly and intelligibly a brief outline of the argument contained in the lecture, thereby facilitating a systematic survey of the matter to be treated. Then followed the explanation in his usual style. It has sometimes been suggested, by way of criticism, that Dr. Hettinger did not always closely adhere to the strict interpretation of his subject, but often digressed, for the seeming purpose of illustration, into kindred fields. The fact can hardly be disputed; but it remains an open question whether the object to be attained in the case of a theological professor is better served by the exclusive cultivation of special knowledge during the lecture hours, than by arousing at the same time the attention of the student to the manifold beauties and advantages which the special study of theology opens to him in the future. A university-course cannot complete the education of a

specialist in any profession ; it can only school him to the ways and means, and point out the sources whence he may draw in his professional activity. But in order that these instruments of future utility may be properly appreciated it is well to show their many-sided application and to animate the youth to find in his labors that pleasure which makes of them a work of love. This is of course essential in the priesthood. He who does not love the burden of the sacerdotal office has the temper of a hireling ; hence, whatever stimulates admiration for the duties and opportunities of that office serves directly the end to which the student of theology addresses himself.

Thus it happened that Dr. Hettinger frequently introduced into his lectures topics which did not strictly belong to the scientific development of his theme. He realized however that theology, as the queen of sciences and the art of arts, stood in harmonious relation to all other sciences and arts. His abundant knowledge of the ancient and modern classics, his love of art and the beauties of nature, his taste for travel and observation furnished him at all times with apt and interesting illustration which rendered his diction all the more vivid and impressive. The principles of æsthetics laid down in his different works on subjects of art are all drawn out with reference to God as the pattern of absolute and unchangeable beauty. Truth and goodness and beauty are but different forms of one and the same subject, vari-colored reflections of the Deity. This he demonstrates in his exhaustive and charming exposition of Dante's *Divina Commedia*.¹

His numerous writings on all sorts of topics, such as the social question, on liturgy, jurisprudence, pedagogy, the various polemical issues of the day in Church and State, independent of his more solid ascetical and theological works² attest the rich treasury of a mind otherwise formed to habits of exact thinking. From it he knew how to draw for the instruction of the young men who eagerly flocked to hear him.

In both theological branches he frequently held public disputations. The defenders and objectors were appointed, and Hettinger himself took a lively part in the discussions of the theses. The language used in these intellectual skirmishes was always Latin.

¹ On this subject alone he has written 1, The fundamental idea and character of the *Divina Commedia* ; 2. The theology of the *Divina Commedia* ; 3. The *Divina Commedia* of Dante, an exposition ; 4. *De theologice speculative ac mystice connubio in Dantis præsertim trilogia*. Commentatio etc. ; 5. Dante and Beatrice ; 6. The Spirit of Dante.

² His published writings under separate heads number more than thirty volumes.

He knew and appreciated the value of that exact terminology which is nowhere so well acquired as in the study of St. Thomas Aquinas, of whom he was an ardent admirer and constant student.

For a time he also taught Homiletics, and it is needless to say that he applied here also the principles and method already mentioned. Himself an easy and graceful speaker, he managed to inculcate a right practice, together with solid precepts, for which he usually referred to Bossuet whom he considered a model for preachers. He insisted upon young priests writing their sermons. "For twelve years," he said, "you must commit them word for word. Careful writing preserves you from commonplaces and fashions good expression. This you owe to your position and to your hearers."¹

Whilst it was evident to all who observed the current of feeling at the University, that Dr. Hettinger exercised a decided influence upon the young men who attended his lectures, he was by no means inclined to abuse this power of which he must have been conscious. He always stood for liberty and independence and believed that with the inculcation of correct principles on the part of the authorities nothing was to be feared from the allowance of academic freedom. Of course he did not expect that the students should make their own code of discipline, but the academic law being determined by those whose experience and judgment entitled them to legislate, the system of enforcing order should be supported by an appeal to reason and honor rather than *espionage* or police control. He deemed it wise to convince the young men that their highest duty in practical life was to make sacrifices for the common good, and that a candidate for the priesthood could make no better preparation for his sublime calling than by training his will to self-control and seeking continually to cultivate the spirit of manly discipline. On the other hand he was as opposed to the arrogant appeals of that self-assertive liberty which ignores every restraint simply because it is a restraint as he was averse to liberalism in matters of doctrine.

His pronounced orthodoxy, which admitted of no compromise, was well known in government circles and he was for that reason supposed to be a *persona ingrata* with the high officials of state. Overtures were made to him from time to time showing that the influence which he exercised at the University might be extended if he were disposed to exchange "less ultramontane" views with the opportunists who waited on the ministry of state. When he was asked

¹ Erinnerungen, p. 27.

to express himself as to what attitude he would assume if a certain high position were accorded him, he simply answered the representative of the government who proposed the matter to him: "Your Excellency, I am a Catholic priest." That said everything. He was a Catholic priest, Catholic wholly and entirely, and that meant no compromise with a masonic and temporizing government on questions of religion, which included those of so-called educational reforms.

As for worldly honors, he cared nothing for them. When in later years the authorities, yielding to the popular voice, gave to him the decoration and rank of a nobleman, he did not even go through the formality of acknowledging the privilege, by having his name enrolled in the register of the national nobility. The neglect did not arise from any reprehensible sense of pride, but because he was not conscious that it was an honor of which he should make use. And what was true of honors was equally true, in his case, of wealth. He lived always poor and in very modest apartments. From his surroundings one could glean that he had an appreciative sense of what was beautiful, but it only showed itself in a certain chaste simplicity, and in a few objects in his room which betokened fine taste and a love of nature. Such was the man who instructed many unto justice, a Catholic professor of the true type, a theologian whose influence will linger and engender life-giving activity not only among those who heard and conversed with him but those also who may read his works. One of these, perhaps his best, entitled "Letters to a young Student of Theology" we hope to introduce to our readers, beginning with our next number, sure that its beautiful doctrine will both delight and benefit many to whom it is not otherwise, or only partially, accessible.

THE EDITOR.

MIRACLES.

A Christian Apology by Paul Schanz, D. D., Ph., Professor of Theology at the University of Tübingen. Translated by Rev. Michael F. Clancy and Rev. Victor J. Schobel, D. D. Vols. I, II.

The two volumes, the title of which we have placed at the head of this article, form a very valuable contribution to modern polemical literature. We have no intention of reviewing this great work of the

eminent German professor, but merely wish to call the attention of the readers of the REVIEW to the Christian Apology, which we regard as an *opus classicum*. Certain chapters are deserving of special mention—in particular those on the “Various forms of Life,” “Man,” “Design and Purpose”—which are found in the first volume. In the second volume we were struck with the masterly essay on Miracles, and the general interest which, owing to recent discussions of the so-called “faith cures,” attaches to the subject makes some light, such as Dr. Schanz throws upon the question of miracles, opportune. It is the fashion at the present day in the scientific world to deny the antecedent possibility of miracles. In other words miracles must be ruled out of court, they cannot receive a hearing. “In ancient times,” says Prof. Schanz, “Sceptics and Pantheists strenuously maintained that miracles were impossible. And since the rise of Deism this denial has been the watchword of all the forces drawn up in battle array against Christianity. It is the war-cry of Spinoza, Hume and the entire pantheistic and semi-pantheistic host. It is the pæan of modern rationalists and pantheists, who regard the impossibility of miracles as self-evident. Neither mechanical nor idealistic Monism, nor shallow Deism, nor Dualism can give truce or quarter to miracles. For the Monist sees in all things a necessary evolution, either material or spiritual of universal being, while the Deist banishes God, after creation to an airy region beyond the universe. The one point in which all these systems agree, is in denying, or setting aside, or scrupulously avoiding all reference to the supernatural. For, as science is bounded by nature, and as all but experience and sense-perceptions are beyond its ken, concern about the supernatural is considered beneath the dignity of a scientific man.” The best refutation of these false theories will be found in the simple exposition of a miracle.

By a miracle we understand an effect which cannot be explained by the ordinary course of nature. That such an effect is possible, follows from the fact that God Himself by an act of His free will established the laws of nature. He may consequently suspend any of these laws, (if such is His holy will), for the benefit of man for whom they were principally intended.

It is true, indeed, that the course of nature must be constant. If it were not, men could not exist. But this constancy of nature is by no means disturbed, when in a particular instance, the effect of a special law is suspended. The course of nature remains the same. Its laws in general are not changed; God simply by working a

miracle in a particular case suspends a law, in order to make known His will to us. As God freely created these laws by which nature is governed, He may change one or the other for the benefit of man and the exaltation of His own glory. Even natural agents may sometimes suspend natural laws in certain instances, without in the least disturbing the harmony of the universe. Some of the laws of nature, such as gravity for example, are not essential. It follows, therefore, that a miracle is a sign of God's will; for as the production of a supernatural effect is the only means by which God in the present order of His providence, can communicate truth to us, He cannot allow the evil spirit to make use of the same means to deceive us. Otherwise we would be at a loss to distinguish the voice of God from the delusions of Satan.

If then a miracle is performed in confirmation of a doctrine which is not evidently against any known truth, and which contains nothing derogatory to God, either in the manner in which it is revealed, or in the end for which it is proposed, we must acknowledge that doctrine to be God's revelation. Moreover, mankind have always considered miracles as the voice of God, and have felt the necessity of being taught by God Himself the doctrines necessary for salvation. God may, indeed, permit Satan to perform certain effects which we are obliged to hold as preternatural, since they are outside the well-known laws of nature. Yet when God allows this, He gives us the means of distinguishing between His own works, and those of the demon.

It must also be borne in mind that the evil spirit cannot perform true miracles, though he may do what to us might seem supernatural, since it is contrary to the known laws of nature. Now it may be objected that we do not know all the laws of nature, and cannot, therefore, say whether one of them has been suspended by miraculous power. To this we answer that it is not necessary to be acquainted with *all the laws* of nature in order to be judge of the nature of a miracle; but it suffices to know that the effect which we now witness is contrary to those laws of nature with which we are acquainted.

The astonishing effects produced by mesmerism cannot be justly urged against the truth of miracles. Many of these effects are the result of natural laws, for it is well known, that when the same cause has been applied in the same circumstances, the same mesmeric effect has invariably followed. There are other effects, however, which can not be attributed to any natural cause; for on the one

hand they are contrary to the laws of nature, and on the other are controlled by the will of a free agent. No Christian, therefore, can submit himself to be a medium, nor recklessly under every circumstance allow himself to be acted on by mesmerism.

From what we have said above, it follows that God does not change His mind, when He performs a miracle. From all eternity He decreed when and where an exception to the ordinary course of nature should take place. Again, the certainty we acquire from the testimony of competent witnesses is such as to exclude every fear of doubt. We have, indeed, a physical certainty that the general course of nature will always be the same; but we have not physical certainty of each law in every particular effect always remaining the same. When we say that a law will be the same we imply the condition that God will have it so in all circumstances. From physical certainty we predict; but from moral certainty based on testimony we affirm the fact of a miracle.

There is, therefore, no contradiction, for the terms of our assertion and prediction fall on different times and circumstances. Hence, we have no right to reject a miracle attested by competent witnesses on the plea that it is contrary to the laws of nature. Any one, however ignorant he may be in natural science, is capable of testifying to the existence of a miraculous fact, for he has simply to state what was obvious to his senses, namely, the external fact itself. The fact that men are very apt to believe in miracles proves only that, before admitting the truth of them, we must carefully examine the testimony on which they rest.

This, however, gives us no right to assert that all miracles are merely legends. The Catholic Church, says Bishop Hay, "teaches that the power of working miracles was never withdrawn and never will be withdrawn from her communion—that in all preceding ages, God has from time to time, raised up many great and holy men, by whom He has wrought miracles, and that He will never fail to do the same in all succeeding ages, in defence of the truth as taught by her, to the confusion of all those who separate themselves from her communion. During almost the first three centuries after Christ miraculous powers were manifested in the Church in an extraordinary manner. The Holy Ghost then descended on the faithful as He did on the Apostles on the day of Pentecost. Many persons received the gift of tongues and thousands of miraculous cures were performed. In the fourth century these extraordinary events partly ceased. The Holy Ghost no longer descended on

those who were confirmed, and the gift of tongues was no longer generally heard of. The necessity of religion required no longer the manifestation of these extraordinary favors and the fervor of the Christians in the first ages of the church was also passing away.”

St. Augustine in his Book of Retractations speaks of the cessation of miracles and then adds: “But what I said is not to be so understood as if no miracles are to be believed in; and are not performed now in the name of Christ. For I, myself, when I wrote that book, knew of a blind man having received his sight in the city of Milan, in presence of the bodies of the Milanese Martyrs. Nay, such numbers of miracles are performed in our days, that I neither can know them all, and if I knew them, I could not enumerate them.”

From this passage it is clear, that when the Holy Fathers speak of the cessation of miracles, they mean only the extraordinary graces given to the Christians in the early Church.

Dr. Middleton the great advocate of the cessation of miraculous powers after the Apostolic times makes this startling assertion. “As far as church historians can illustrate there is not a single point in all history so constantly and explicitly affirmed by them all, as the continual succession of those powers through all ages, from the earliest father who first mentioned them down to the time of the reformation.” The only way that this writer can get over the difficulty which he himself stated, is to say “that all church historians are credulous fools or crafty knaves.” If the primitive Fathers of Christianity were impostors, as Middleton says, on what authority are we to receive the Bible itself, since it is on their testimony we must rely in proving the authenticity of Holy Scripture?

If their testimony be not admitted, the Christian religion on Protestant principles falls to the ground, inasmuch as the Bible alone is their rule of faith. Most Protestant writers, however, admit that miraculous powers remained with the Christian church after Apostolic times, since these powers were necessary for the establishment and preservation of the faith. Now the same presumptive evidence may be brought forward to show that these same powers have continued to exist in the church in every age; for faith has always to be preserved and propagated. The reasons given for the cessation of miracles after the first four centuries are the same which are to be found in the first, second and third. If miracles are incredible in the fourth century, they are incredible in the first, and if testimony cannot be received for miracles in the fifth and sixth centuries,

neither can it be received for those in the first and second. We conclude with a passage from Prof. Schanz's essay on Miracles.

"It is as hopeless to try to disconnect the pure doctrine of Christianity from miracles and to purge religion of them as to represent the personality of Christ as purely human, and yet to hold fast to His divine origin. The miracle of Christianity is so intimately bound up with the person, doctrine and legislation of Jesus, that no sort of concession to rationalism will profit anything. The conditions of a miracle may be maximized as well as minimized. Both extremes are alike harmful.

Traditionalism, by postulating a deeper conception of historical certainty, almost swamps ideal certitude in historical Ontologism, and by setting metaphysical, moral and ideal certitude at the summit, all but abandons historical certitude to the mercy of the wind and waves. Not facts alone, nor ideas and speculations alone, can provide religious and philosophic thought with a safe basis. The Vatican Council teaches: If any one shall say that miracles are impossible, and therefore that all the accounts regarding them, even those contained in Holy Scripture, are to be dismissed as fabulous or mythical; or that miracles can never be known with certainty, and that the divine origin of Christianity cannot be proved by them: let him be anathema."

J. J. QUINN.

PSYCHOLOGICAL HEREDITY.

La Vie et l'Hérédité par P. Vallet, P. S. Paris: Victor Retaux et fils. 1891.

I.

"Heredity is that biological law by which all beings endowed with life tend to repeat themselves in their descendants; it is for the species what personal identity is for the individual. By it a groundwork remains unchanged amid incessant variation; by it Nature ever copies and imitates herself."¹ In this general statement the law is universal in the organic world. Like produces like. The truism holds for plant and animal, irrational and rational. In the case of

¹ Ribot, Heredity, page 1.

man, continued inherited likeness extends to minutest details of external structure. "The Romans had their Nasones, Labeones, Buccones, Capitones and other names derived from hereditary peculiarities."¹ Internal conformation follows the same law. Characteristics general and special of the osseous, muscular, digestive, circulatory, nervous systems are transmitted from parent to child. Immunity from certain diseases, duration of life, peculiarities of voice, gesture—in a word, the generic, specific, and at least the naturally acquired individual qualities of the human organism come, more or less, all under the influence of heredity.² And so passing from the domain of physiology into that of psychology, we are prepared to find peculiarities of the psychic powers that depend subjectively and directly on the organism—qualities of sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell, of imagination, too, and of memory handed on by ancestry to posterity. Though there are depths of mystery—mystery on which science throws but little, and that unsteady, light, in the workings of the forces which this law regulates, yet the darkness here is not greater than it is in any other inner region of the living world. That tall oaks from little acorns grow, that a few, tiny grains produce this year's harvest, the counterpart of last year's, are marvels at which we wonder not, *assiduitate vilescunt*, as S. Augustine observes. But when we hold in mind the spirituality and origin by direct creation of the human soul, the marvel grows. We are not so prepared to find that dispositions of the intrinsically spiritual powers should be subject to heredity, that qualities of intellect and will should pass from parents to their offspring. In the materialistic view of human nature, in which the soul is, at best, but the inner side of the material phenomena, the outer side of which strikes our senses, it is but logical to hold that the "Ego, the person, the constitutive element of the individual are transmitted by heredity, just as the other modes of mental activity."³ It does not concern us here to refute the premises, whereon this conclusion rests, but assuming it has proved that the human soul is an immaterial form, vitalizing the material organism and combining herewith to constitute the one complete

1 Ribot, l. c. page 2.

2 "Most of the children of talkative persons," says Dr. Lucas, "are chatterboxes from their cradles. Words—idealess, aimless, and unbridled—appear in them to be prompted by a sort of elastic spring, over which they have no control. We once saw at a friend's house a servant girl of irrepressible loquacity. She would talk to people, who could scarcely get in a word edge-wise; she would talk to dumb beasts and to inanimate things; she would talk aloud to herself. She had to be sent away. 'But,' said she to her employer, 'it is no fault of mine; it comes to me from my father, the same fault in him drove my mother distracted, and one of his brothers was like me.'" Ap. Ribot, page 6.

3 Ribot, l. c.

nature and person—man—we wish to look into the qualities of its purely spiritual energies and see how far they may be and are subject to heredity, and to note the agencies that modify them when transmitted.

II.

Starting from the facts of consciousness, we distinguish in the soul two supreme faculties, intellect and will—the powers of knowing and willing the supersensible. Fixing our reflexion on the intellect we discern there a number of qualities which in their germinal state we may call dispositions, in their developed condition, habits. The first of these is what the scholastics call the habit of intelligence in regard to speculative, *synteresis*, in regard to moral truths—the habit of first principles—a quality whereby the intellect perceives immediately evident truths. The second is science, or the habit engendered in the intellect by the exercise of its act of demonstration. Wisdom, the third habit, is the perfection of the scientific habit, developed by discursive penetration into things in their ultimate causes. Art, the fourth habit, perfects the intellect in the ready vision of means conducive to the construction of external works ; while prudence, the last mental virtue or habit, perfects its subject in the determination of the particular objects whereon the will shall exert its act of choice. Prudence, though subjected in the intellect, sends its influence over on the will.

Turning next to the will, we find it when its energy is developed aright under the guidance of intellective prudence ; but itself, the resting place of justice, which gives steadiness to its action in choosing what is due to other persons ; of temperance, which strengthens it in ruling the concupiscible, and of fortitude, which makes it firm in governing the irascible passions.

In a word, therefore, reflection on our psychic acts and states shows that our intellect is, or may be, the subject of the speculative dispositions, or virtues ; intelligence, science, wisdom, art, prudence. Our wills the subject of the moral or cardinal virtues. Now, to what extent may these immaterial qualities come under the law of heredity ? Intelligence, the intuitive quality of the understanding being as it is an affection of a purely spiritual faculty, can as such no more be inherited than the soul itself, with its intellective faculty. The intuition of the truth, for instance, that “the whole is greater than any of its parts,” is due to a radical, essential state of the intellect, connotes, therefore, in case the meaning of the

terms is apprehended, a property found equally in every human being, and can never be an accidental quality which might have been derived from ancestry. Nevertheless, it is plain that even this natural state of the spiritual power may be strengthened, widened in individuals, and its increased perfection be a legacy to posterity. The perception of what is a whole, what a part, is conditioned by ideas formed by the abstractive intellect from the *phantasmata* of sensible things. Now, the faculty which forms the phantasms, the imagination, is an organic power, directly and subjectively dependent on a portion of the brain. Cerebral qualities, however, are influenced by heredity. So, too, therefore, may be those of imagination, and, consequently, indirectly, through increased perfection, or the opposite, of brain and imagination, a greater, or less, range of intuitive power may be received by posterity from their ancestry.¹

The same theory lends itself to heredity in the order of science. The tendency to scientific knowledge is native in every mind. *Omnis homo naturâ scire desiderat*, like every other truism, expresses a deep thought. But the development of the inborn capacity, the drawing out of the mind's native gravitation, depends on exercise, on action in definite lines. These lines terminate at large groupings, or generalizations of objects. These objects, under the abstractive light of the intellect, fall into three grand divisions—the physical, mathematical, metaphysical—according as they rise above the conditions of matter, and so stand in proportion to the immaterial faculty, with its spontaneous proneness to penetrate into their reasons, causes, principles. The physical group of objects purified by the mind's light of their singularity, retain simply the universalized qualities of matter. The mathematical presents to the mind merely the quantitative properties of material things, whilst the metaphysical includes the range of purely immaterial entities, or spirit, together with those transcendental and supremely generic aspects of

1 All this is admirably summarized by St. Thomas in his questions on *Habits*. "Habits," he says, "follows the nature of the species and of the individual. * * * *Sed nullo modo contingit in hominibus esse habitus naturales, ita quod sint totaliter a natura.* In the apprehensive powers there may be *inchoate* habits, following both the specific and the individual nature. Following the *specific nature, ex parte ipsius amenæ*, as the *intelligence of principles*, is called a *natural habit*; for, by virtue of his intellectual soul, man as he apprehends what is a *whole*, and what, a *part*, immediately perceives that *every whole is greater than any of its parts*, etc. But *what is a whole, and what, a part, cognoscere non potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatis abstractas.* And, therefore, the *Philosopher* shows that knowledge of principles comes to us through the senses. Following the individual nature there is a cognitive habit *secundum inchoationem naturalem*, in as much as one man by reason of his organic disposition *est magis aptus ad bene intelligendum quam alius, in quantum ad operationem intellectus, indigenus virtutibus sensitivis.* S. T., 1. 2, q. II, a I.

being which are common alike to matter and spirit, and so prescind from all material conditions, such as substance, accident, etc. The intellect, with its discursive energy, bent on these three generalizations of its objects, develops within itself the corresponding habits, physical, mathematical and metaphysical science, with their subaltern mental states.

Now it is obvious that these perfections, conditioned as they are in their acquirement and use by the imagination with its organic instrument, the brain, come under the law of heredity in the same way as does the native intuitive habit. *A priori*, therefore, we should look for physical and mathematical science, which are more directly dependent on cerebral conditions than is metaphysical, coming more generally under the influence of heredity. Such too is, in fact, the case. "Families eminent in science are not rare. Many scientific men take after their fathers. The atmosphere of free inquiry in which they were brought up has not been without influence on their vocation. Still, education does not constitute genius; and in order to have a turn for scientific investigation, something more is required than the external transmission resulting from education. It has also been observed that the mothers or grandmothers of several men of science were remarkable women, as in the case of Buffon, Bacon, Condorcet, Cuvier, d'Alembert, Forbes, Watt, Jussien, etc. *Heredity among philosophers is somewhat rare.*"¹ We do not think M. Ribot has given the root cause of this latter phenomenon when he adds that "few philosophers have left any posterity." We believe the reason lies deeper in the nature of the philosophical habit itself, as farthest removed from material conditions. "The law of heredity," says Fr. Vallet, "is applicable with less rigor as we rise higher in the scale of mental faculties."² An illustration of this statement is found in the fact that the highest state of the highest mental faculty—genius—is not transmitted. Materialism strives to account for this fact by "the complexity of genius," its dependance "on a very unstable equilibrium of cerebral faculties," etc. As Fr. Vallet remarks, "we readily admit that genius is a very complex thing, and consequently of very difficult realization. It is claimed that it supposes a marvelous equilibrium of various faculties. This too we concede, at least to some degree. But we hold that its transmission is not only exceedingly rare, but that we have not one precise instance of such transmission. And this depends not on the fact that this intellectual superiority 'is due to a very unstable equi-

¹ Ribot, 1. c., p. 72.

² P. 286.

librium of cerebral faculties the most humble and the most exalted,' but on the contrary, on the fact that genius is not a cerebral thing at all, but a thing immaterial—which the organism can second, but not beget. It is talent much more than genius that results from an equilibrium and harmony of various faculties. But outside of that perfect poise, genius is possible, provided the master power, intelligence, attains at least one phase of its ideal perfection. We distinguish poetical, musical, scientific, metaphysic, military genius, but all these superiorities are never found in the same man, however happily gifted we may suppose him to be."¹

The metaphysical habit is wisdom, taken as a purely speculative and natural endowment, the third intellectual habit;² we need add nothing more as to the bearing of heredity on this perfection.

The fourth habit, art, is so intimately involved in the organic faculties, the senses, the imagination, and the motive powers, that we naturally expect it to be transmitted, and to find that poetry, music, painting, sculpture run in families. But here, too, as in science, we find that the application of the law is conditioned by the immaterial sphere of the art. "Families of poets are extremely rare, and here is the reason. A man cannot be a musician without an exquisite sensibility of ear, nor a painter without an innate gift of colors and forms, which supposes a certain conformation of the visual organ. Poetry does not require to the same degree such physico-psychic dispositions, but it supposes an ideal more elevated, more immaterial, and consequently, a greater soul, a more lofty intelligence. For this double reason heredity has much less influence on poetry than on the other arts."³

Turning now to the perfections of the other spiritual faculty, the will—to the moral virtues—we find them more subject to hereditary influences than the dispositions of the intellect. "According to my observations and reflections," says DeCandolle, "hereditary transmission is more apparent in moral than in intellectual matters."⁴ This is due to the fact that in man the affections of the will are more closely dependent on organic conditions than are the actions of the intellect. The movements of the sensitive appetites, the passions, are immediately dependent on the nervous system, and thus at least mediately, but at the same time intimately, connected with the action of the heart. Physiological states, therefore, are favorable to the

¹ Page 297.

² Being merely the highest perfection of the scientific habit.

³ Vallet. p. 293.

⁴ Apud Vallet, p. 202.

excitation or repression of movement of the passions. But the passions act and react incessantly on the will. The genesis of dispositions or habits in the latter faculty is consequently in large measure conditioned by states of the organism, and thus tendencies of the will pass indirectly under the law of heredity.

In reading the lives of the Saints we are struck by the almost constant fact that at least ninety-nine out of every hundred of these divine heroes were born of pious parents. Sanctity, of course, is not a natural endowment. The stream rises not above its source. Nature can give no grace. Holiness is the formal work of grace. Still grace supposes nature—the natural conditions favorable to its action. These conditions are frequently inherited and thereafter nurtured by education. What is true regarding the transmission of good qualities is unfortunately only too strongly confirmed by experience in regard to that of evil tendencies. We need not run over the dismal list of vices to see how each of them infects the stream of humanity, and like diseases in the body, saps the moral life of generations. Statistics and works like M. Ribot's contain full details of the sad story.

It would be interesting here to trace the facts of psychological heredity to its radical principal which lies in the union of the soul as substantial form with the body as its material subject, or to follow the complexities and singularities of the law in its different realms, to study its relation to free will evolution, etc. All this and much more that is useful the reader will find in Fr. Vallet's chapters. We shall content ourselves here with noting something on the modifications of heredity by environment and education.

The human organism is being incessantly influenced one way or another by food, air, climate, heat, cold, light, electricity, etc. How far these agencies favor or impede the transmission of physical and psychic qualities, who can tell? Doubtless heredity is preponderant. It acts from within and radically; environment from without and accidentally. "Heredity influences the organism necessarily, as the force of gravitation draws bodies of necessity towards the centre of the earth, so that if nothing interferes the effect will follow infallibly. Environment, in certain circumstances, may produce no real change at all, and it is conceivable that an organism be preserved from all abnormal influence."¹ In general we may say that heredity and environment are as two component forces. What the resultant will be we may experience, but the value of each

¹ Vallet, p. 341.

component we are unable to measure. The flexibility, however, of the former is evident even in regard to organic peculiarities. Fr. Vallet gives us a typical illustration: "A very interesting work," he says, "has been recently founded at Argelès by the widow of Dr. Douillard, under the direction of a number of physicians of the Paris hospitals. There are in the institution twenty young girls, all born of consumptive parents, one or both of whom had died of phthisis. These children were chosen when already ill, and showed most unequivocal signs of the disease whereof their parents had died. For the past ten years during which the institution has existed *not one child* has succumbed to that disease. Such is the power of proper hygiene, supplemented when needed by medicines, in combatting the most powerful hereditary influence¹ known to physicians."²

We may argue in the same vein as to the value of education. "In our day," says M. Guyan, "since the researches made on heredity, we hear the most contradictory assertions. Many scientists and philosophers are now persuaded that education is radically powerless in profoundly modifying the temperament and racial qualities of an individual. Man, they hold, is born a criminal as he is born a poet. Between the power attributed by some thinkers to education, and by others to heredity, there exists an antinomy which is felt throughout all moral science."³ "Some," says M. Ribot, "such as Lamarck and his daring predecessors—have attributed so much to the influence of the physical environment, as to make it simply a creator; and so great power has often been attributed to education, that the individual character would be its work, to the exclusion of all native energy. Thus the expression of Leibnitz was bold: 'Entrust me with education and in less than a century I will change the face of Europe.' Descartes, too, attributing to his method what was the fruit of his genius, goes so far as to say that 'sound understanding (*bons sens*) is the most widely diffused thing in the world and all differences between mind and mind spring from the fact that we conduct our thoughts over different routes.' The sensist school, in its abhorrence for everything innate, has exaggerated even this view. According to Locke 'out of one hundred men more than ninety are good or bad, useful or harmful to society, owing to the education they have received.' Helvetius, carrying this view to its extreme, holds that 'all men are born with equal faculties, and that education alone produces a difference between them.'"⁴

¹ It is not certain, we know, that phthisis itself is inherited. But the disposition thereto is transmitted.

² p. 367.

³ Education et Héreditè, ap. Vallet p. 343.

⁴ Ribot, page 347.

The truth here, as often elsewhere, lies midway between extremes. The child is neither an aggregate of transmitted qualities, nor the outcome of developed properties. It is in the hands of parents and other early teachers, endowed with no definite habit of mind or will, but it has the organic conditions favorable for the unfolding of the germs of virtue or of vice—germs which, through the medium of its body, may be said to exist in the tendencies of its psychic powers. The development of these germs, the drawing out of these tendencies, is in great part the work of early tutors. “The child,” says Fr. Vallet, “is not as Plato imagined, a miniature man endowed with general ideas and generous sentiments, which only require to manifest themselves and which it suffices to arouse. There are in the child neither innate knowledge nor sentiments of any kind, but merely *faculties* and *aptitudes*. And these faculties and aptitudes do not pass by their own native energy from potency to act; exterior agents must come and arouse them, education above all must come to animate them, direct them, trace their paths, now urge them onward, again restrain them and prevent their going astray. Behold the general law established by the author of nature: here below, the different orders of beings must keep increasing mutual relations with one another, and it belongs to the superior to come to the aid of the inferior, by communicating to the latter something of their superabundance.

On the other hand, the soul of the child is as plastic as its body; its tendencies have no consistence, no firmness, and scarcely one the power of resistance; nothing is more easy than to combat them, arrest their development, and even to substitute for them contrary tendencies. The poet has said of the youth *Cereus in vitium flecti*. Of wax, indeed, whereof one can form what he will, good or evil—‘*potest omnia fieri*.’ Thoughts, sentiments, direction—the child has to receive all from those who surround it; their look, their words, the tone of voice, their example—these form its book and its code. All these things make a lively impression on its senses; it believes in them all with entire confidence; and thence it receives the ideas, the passions and often the prejudices which will be its motives, perhaps throughout its entire life. The words of the poet express a great law of human life:

‘Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit ordorem
Testa diu.’

Few men, if any, have the occasion or the leisure to revert to their primitive ideas, to control or ratify them; and amongst those

whom circumstances lead thus to revert, a very small number succeed in divesting themselves of those ideas or in modifying them in their essential lines. For those early impressions have become in the lapse of time habits, then instincts, then a second nature, whereof may be said as of the first :

‘Naturam furcâ expelles, tamen usque recurret.’”¹

Whilst education must always be more or less conditioned by the native powers of its subject, yet, when rightly conducted, its influence may extend not merely to the development of those powers, but, as was said above, to implanting in them quite contrary tendencies. No faculty, of course, can be carried outside the range of its *formal* object. The eye can never be made to hear, nor the ear to see. But the reach of their *material* objects is large enough to allow the training of human faculties in contrary directions. The evil tree of itself can produce no good fruit; but engrafted with vigorous shoots its radical defects may be corrected. So, too, education, by acting aright and steadily on the mind and heart of the child, may convert its natural inclinations from evil to good, as it may, with sadly greater facility, turn them from good to evil.

Nor is the influence of education in modifying hereditary dispositions restricted to childhood. It remains to some extent throughout life, for man in his social environment is ever under influences more or less formative, in proportion as his will is open to their reception. “One of the traits,” Fr. Vallet happily observes, “which distinguish man from the brute, and civilized man from the savage, is that his intelligence remains longer capable of new acquirements. It does not close upon its attainments as do certain flowers on the insects which light upon them.”²

Still, the influence of education is as that of physical environment; it modifies, it cannot create. The main cause of character will always remain at the root in the individual—his native, inherited endowments.

We think, however, that M. Ribot minimizes over much the value of education. “We restrict it,” he says, “within its just limits, when we say that its power is *never* absolute, and that it exerts no efficacious action except on mediocre natures.”³ If nature has sown her seed sparsely and on poor soil, no amount of culture can produce an abundant harvest. Still, the influence of right edu-

¹ Vallet, p. 346.

² P. 333.

³ l. c., p. 349.

cation will be appreciable even in the slightly endowed character, for here, unlike in earth's culture, mind and heart can be brought to second the fostering work. On the other hand, where nature has sown more generously on soil prepared, there is all the more reason to expect large results!" "We see very well," says M. Guyan, "why an idiot is susceptible of slight education, but we do not see why the great natural qualities of genius should not be accessible to education. The more *intelligent* one is by nature, the more is he capable of learning and of becoming a *scholar* by education. The more *generous* one is by nature, the more capable is he of becoming *heroic* by education, etc. Perfection already gained is a condition for acquiring more. * * * * We think, therefore, that genius realizes at once the maximum of hereditary and of educational influence.¹

Failure in developing endowments in less gifted individuals is often due to defective method. The very fact that heredity plays so prominent a part in the formation of character, shows the necessity of educators studying the native peculiarities of each of their pupils, so as to adapt their methods of unfolding nature's gifts in due proportion. Education is an art, and as such can perfect nature only when it takes hold of the inborn powers and whilst eliminating their defects draws out their right energy in harmony with their natural origin.

F. P. SIEGFRIED.


THE "STATIO" IN THE TITLES OF THE MASS—FORMULARY.

IN the "Proprium de Tempore" of the Roman Missal, the title *Statio* together with the name of some Saint or Saints, is frequently prefixed to the "Introit" of the Mass. Thus on Ash-Wednesday we read *Statio ad Sanctam Sabinam*; on the following Friday we have *Statio ad SS. Joannem et Paulum*. It will be interesting to inquire into the significance of these titles, whose origin dates far back to the early days of the Christian Liturgy.

In ecclesiastical literature, we meet the word *Statio* under various meanings. It often stands for *jejunium* or fasting in general. Thus Rabanus Maurus observes² "*Jejunium et Statio dicitur.*" More

¹ Apud Vallet. p. 349.

² *De Clericorum Institutione*, Lib. II, c. 18, Migne, Patr. Lat. Paris, 1864, 40.



frequently, however, *jejuniium* signified a fast which individuals imposed upon themselves as a work of supererogation, *Statio*, on the other hand, such as were ordered by the Church to be observed, namely: Wednesday and Friday¹ of each week, the Ember weeks and the fast of Lent. Probably the latter fast was called *Statio* because it was kept on fixed days, *Statis diebus*, although St. Ambrose gives another account of the origin of this term. "Our encampments," he says, "are our fasts, which defend us against the devil's attacks; in short, they are called *Stationes*, because standing, *stantes*, and staying in them we repel the insidious attacks of our enemies,"² thereby implying that its signification is derived from the military sense of the word, as St. Isidore assures us to have been the case, "*Statio autem de militari exemplo uomen accepit.*"³

This word, however, more commonly signified certain days on which the faithful assembled for divine worship in certain fixed places. During the times of persecution for the first two centuries, the Christians met in previously appointed places or stations for the celebration of the sacred mysteries on Sundays. Not long afterwards, when there was less need of secrecy in common worship, we find the Church observing the custom of meeting for solemn service on Wednesdays and Fridays, on the vigils of the more solemn festivals, the anniversaries of the Martyrs, and during the forty days of Lent. These being fast-days the ceremonies continued until the hour of *None*, at which hour the fast might be broken, and hence the expression *stationem solvere* was equivalent to *jejuniium solvere*. Later the greater festivals and the fifty days between Easter and Whitsuntide, which were kept as a continuous feast, were added.

In the days of persecution these meetings were held in the Catacombs near the tombs of the Martyrs. They consisted probably in the reading of portions of Sacred Scripture, prayer, preaching and communion, as St. Justin gives us to understand.⁴ In the beginning of the fourth century, when peace was granted to the Church by Constantine, these conventions began to be held publicly and were surrounded with greater pomp and magnificent ceremonies. Anastasius, the Librarian, relates that St. Hilary, who ascended the pon-

¹ Because on these days respectively the betrayal of Christ was planned and the Crucifixion was accomplished.

² *Sermo XXI. De Sancta Quadrag. V. Opera St. Ambrosii*, Studio Cong. S. Mauri, Venetiis, Albrizzi, 1751, vol. IV. p. 518.

³ *Lib. VI. Originium, cap. XIX Opera, Parisiis, Sonnius, 1601, p. 83.*

⁴ *Apologia I pro Christianis, Migne, Patr. Graeca, Parisiis, 1884, Vol. VI. col. 430.*

tifical chair in 461, appointed clerics to assist at the Holy Sacrifice in the churches in which the *Stationes* were celebrated.¹

To St. Gregory I, in 590 must be given the honor of having firmly established them. He reduced them to a fixed number, regulated the ceremonies to be observed, appointed the days and the Churches in which they were to be held, assigned the places at which the people and clergy assembled and from which they processionally proceeded to the *Stations*, granted certain indulgences to all who would participate, and ordered them to be noted at the beginning of the Masses in the Roman Missal.²

The ceremonies observed were as follows: The clergy and laity assembled in a Church near the *Station* to receive the Pontiff. After his arrival he recited a prayer called the *Collect*. Then the cross-bearer followed by the laity, clergy according to rank and the Pontiff barefooted, reciting prayers or singing psalms, in solemn procession wended their way to the *Stationary* Church. Having arrived at the Church the women and men separated and occupied distinct places. The litany was then chanted and the cross placed near the altar. The Pontiff was received at the door of the Church by the Cardinal Titular and his clergy and incensed, and was then led to the sacristy, where the washing of the feet took place. When all was prepared mass was celebrated by the Pontiff or another, and after the Gospel a homily was preached.³ After Communion a sub-deacon, holding a chalice, published from the corner of the altar, the place of assembly and of the *Station* for the following day with this formula: *Crastina die veniente statio erit in Ecclesia Sancti (Sanctæ) N*, and the choir answered *Deo Gratias*. After the Holy Sacrifice one of the acolytes dipped a wick in the oil of the Altar-lamp and, having cleaned it, presented it to the Pontiff to be blessed, saying *Jube Domne benedicere*. The Pontiff having blessed and kissed it gave it to his chamberlain, who preserved these wicks until the death of the Pontiff and made with them a pillow to be placed under the head of the Pontiff in his coffin. After the Pontiff

¹ *In urbe Roma constituit ministeriales qui circumirent constitutas stationes.* Migne, Patr. Lat. Paris, 1880, Vol. 128, p. 350. Although there is a difference of opinion concerning the meaning of the word *ministeriales*, some supposing it to have reference to *clerics*, others to *chalices* used on these occasions, yet the passage sufficiently demonstrates that this Pontiff made certain regulations for the solemn observance of these ceremonies.

² The Churches assigned by St. Gregory I, were the five Patriarchal Basilicas, viz.: St. John Lateran's, St. Peter's, St. Paul's, St. Mary Major's and St. Lawrence's, the cardinalitial titular churches, and several others.

³ Often by the Pontiff himself. We have many delivered on these occasions by St. Leo I, and St. Gregory I.

blessed the wick the acolyte sang, *Hodie fuit statio ad Sanctum, (Sanctam) N., qui (quæ) salutat te*, to which the Pontiff answered *Deo Gratias*. The people and clergy were then dismissed.

We find many ceremonies in the Ritual of to-day, which seem to have derived their origin from these assemblies. Thus the oration recited at the beginning of Mass is called the *Collect*, because in it the priest prays for the welfare of the assembled Congregation. In Catholic countries, and even in some places of our own country, it is still customary to separate the women from the men during divine worship. The custom of receiving ecclesiastical dignitaries, and especially Cardinals in their titular churches, at the door is still observed. The people place unbounded confidence in the curative power of the oil taken from lamps that burn before the altars of Our Lady and the Saints. On the fourth Sunday of Lent the *Station* was celebrated in the church of the Holy Cross, at which solemnity the Golden Rose was blessed, which is yearly done even to this day. On the Saturday of Easter Week the wax, of which the *Agnus Deis* are made, was blessed at St. John Lateran's, at which the *Station* was celebrated on that day. The same ceremony is performed the first year of a new Pontiff's reign, and every succeeding seventh year, on that day.

These regular solemn processions to the *stationary* churches went into disuse towards the XIV. Century, owing probably to the transfer of the Pope to Avignon. But, although the grand ceremonies were discontinued, or at least only rarely performed, the custom of celebrating them, of visiting the churches and gaining the indulgences, which, together with counteracting the idolatrous practices of the pagans, seemed to be the principal object of their institution, is still in vogue.

With regard to the churches and the days assigned for their celebration, those ordered by St. Gregory I are still in use with few exceptions. Formerly only one church was assigned to any particular day, but at present we find two¹ and at times three churches,² enjoying this privilege on the same day, although only one is noted in the Roman Missal for each day. To gain the indulgence it is sufficient to visit one of these churches. There are one hundred and one *Stationary* churches in Rome, assigned to

1 On Ash-Wednesday the *Statio* is at St. Sabina's and at St. Mary's in *Cosmedin*; on the following day at St. George's and at the *Gesu Maria al Corso*.

2 On the Saturday before the fourth Sunday in Lent the *Statio* is at St. Cajus', St. Susanna's, and at St. Mary's *degli Angeli*.

eighty-four days.¹ There are probably few devotions to which the Roman Pontiffs have granted so many and great indulgences as to this, and in consequence on those days the *Stationary* churches are much frequented by the Romans.

The word *Statio* is used also to signify a church, oratory or other place at which processions make a halt, and hence the processions themselves were often called *Stationes*. By the same name are also designated the pictures representing passages from the Sacred Passion before which the Catholic people are wont to meditate, as likewise the churches in which certain courses of sermons are delivered by specially appointed preachers.

S. L. E.

¹ Circumcision, Epiphany, Septuagesima, Quinquagesima, every day from Ash-Wednesday to Low Sunday, St. Mark, Rogatiou days, Ascension, from the Vigil of Pentecost to Saturday before Trinity Sunday, four Sundays of Advent, from the Vigil of Christmas to the feast of the Holy Innocents and Wednesday, Friday and Saturday of the Ember Weeks.

ANALECTA.

DUBIA CIRCA FACULTATES EPISCOPIS STATUUM FOED. AMERIC.
CONCESSAS.*S. CONGREGAZIONE DI PROPAGANDA,
SEGRETERIA.*Roma, li 24 Luglio, 1884.*

No. 3081.

*Oggetto: Trasmissione di risoluzioni.**Ilme ac Rme Domine.*

† Dubia ab Amplitudine Tua proposita circa facultates Formularum quibus fruuntur Episcopi Foederatorum Statuum Americae communicavi Congregationi S. O. Nunc antem Tibi responsiones remitto, quas Emi Inquisitores dubiis propositis dederunt.

Interim Deum precor ut Te diutissime sospitet.

A. T.,

Uti Frater addictissimus,

JOANNES CARD. SIMEONI, *Praef.*R. P. D. Tobiae Mullen,
Epo Erien.Pro. R. P. D., *Secretario,*
Antitghardi, O. P.

DUBIA.

Circa facultates Formularum, quæ Episcopis Foed. Stat. Amer. Sept. conceduntur.

I. Facultatatum formula I, sub no. 1 tribuitur potestas conferendi ordines extra tempora. Ad dubium vero ab Archiep. Quebecensi propositum, "an quum conferuntur Ordines sacri extra tempora omnino legendum sit Breve Apostolicum facultatem hanc tribuens"? S. Rituum Congtio, die 23 Maii 1835, respondit: "Ad 5. Affirmative juxta Pontificale Romanum." Pontificale Romanum autem, juxta quod affirmativum dubio datur responsum, hæc habet: "legitur mandatum Apostolicum, sive supplicatio, cujus vigore Pontifici facultas conceditur ordinandi." Præterea in dubio proposito sermo est de Breve Apostolico. Quæro num verba Pontificalis, *juxta quod* Responso datur, et verba "Breve Apostolicum," quæ occurrunt in dubio,

* The text of this *Dubium* as addressed to the Archbishop of Quebec has been inserted in the "Commentarium" of P. Konings, App. B.

afficiant facultatem Episcoporum harum Provinciarum, quæ nec ad eorum supplicationem, neque in forma Brevis Apostolici concessa fuit?

II. Ejusdem Formulæ I. no. 6 facultatem tribuit dispensandi in quibusdam consanguinitatis *et* affinitatis gradibus. Dubitatur num particula *et* copulative an disjunctive intelligenda sit?

III. Eodum no. 6 datur facultas dispensandi super quibusdam gradibus consanguinitatis et affinitatis cum his qui ab heresi convertuntur ad fidem Catholicam. Quæro num *vi hujus* facultatis etiam potestas detur: *a*, quod matrimonia post unius conversionem invalide ob prædicta impedimenta contracta: *b*, quoad matrimonia mixta olim invalide contracta, licet pars hæretica nunc sit conversa.

IV. Eodum no. 6 facultas datur dispensandi cum his qui ab infidelitate convertuntur. Infidelis autem legibus ecclesiasticis non subjiciuntur. Hinc facultas frustanea esset casu quo duo infideles in gradibus pro quibus hoc num datur facultas, contraxissent et uterque vel alteruter ad fidem converteretur. Quæro igitur, *a*, num ex hoc numero detur facultas dispensandi cum infideli converso, qui ante conversionem cum parte acatholica baptizata in præfatis gradibus contraxit, et num requiratur ut hæc etiam pars acatholica conversa sit: *b*, num detur ex hoc eodem numero facultas cum infideli converso, qui ante conversionem cum parte acatholica in præfatis gradibus contraxit?

V. An no. 9 Formulæ I. de cognatione spirituali orta ex baptismo tantum intelligendus; an vero etiam de eadem cognatione orta ex confirmatione?

VI. An facultates Formularum, quibus datur potestas dispensandi in impedimentis matrimonialibus, valeant etiam quando agitur de matrimonio nulliter contracto, utraque parte, dum contrahebatur, nullitatis conscia? Dubitari de facultate haud posse credo quoad No. 6 Form. I., aut quoad Facultates extraordinarias D et E; nam in his facultatibus potestas datur legitimandi prolem; quæ potestas manifeste supponit matrimonium nulliter initum utraque parte nullitatis conscia: proles enim suscepta ex matrimonio invalido sed cum scientia nullitatis ex altera tantum parte inito, illegitima non est. Dubium igitur vertitur circa num. 7, 8, 9, Form. I. in quibus non conceditur facultas legitimandi prolem. Cum res controvertatur inter Doctores, quæro num tuta conscientia utramvis sententiam sequi liceat?

VII. An facultas sub. no. 14 Form. I. communicari potest ab Episcopo sacerdotibus in sua diœcesi laborantibus?

VIII. Quid intelligitur per "Rosarium" in No. 26 Form. I? An Rosarium quindecim, an vero etiam quinque decadum, et an aliæ preces, de quibus in eodem num quantitate moraliter æquivalere debent rosario?

IX. An altare quod ab Episcopo vi no. 8 facultatum extraordinariorum C privilegiatum declarari potest, censendum sit privilegiatum perpetuum? Sunt qui existimant Episcopum altare privilegiare non posse ultra terminum facultatum: quo certe casu Episcopi nostri sæpe minus possent quam Episcopi in Europa, qui si altare aliquod privilegiatum declarant, privilegium altari ad septennium communicant. Alii vero opinantur, Episcopi quidem facultatem declarandi altare privilegiatum expirare cum ipsis facultatibus extraordinarius C.; altari autem designato ab ipso indulgentiam communicari in perpetuum, quemadmodum ex. gr. confraternitatibus ab eo ac

coronis ab eo benedictis, vi no. 9 earumdem facultatum in perpetuum communicantur indulgentiæ.

X. Posito quod Episcopo anno 1883 ad triennium data fuerit potestas utendi facultatibus, quibus *gaudet* dispensandi super impedimentis matrimonii, quando hæc impedimenta cumulantur. Facultates decennales, vel quinquennales, vi quarum in impedimentis matrimonii dispensare potest, expirabunt anno 1884. Quæritur num prorogatis ad illud decennium vel quinquennium facultatibus, per biennium etiamnum uti valeat facultate anno 1883 sibi data? Sunt qui negent, cum, *juxta litteram*, potestas triennis dispensandi in cumulatis impedimentis valeat tantum pro usu facultatem quibus *gaudet*; *i. e.*, pro usu earum, quibus anno 1883 gaudebat, non pro usu earum, quibus iterum anno 1884 gaudebit. Alii vero putant hanc interpretationem nimis litteralem esse, seu minus consentaneam menti S. Sedis, quæ facultatem dispensandi in cumulatis valere voluit ad triennium.

FERIA IV. DIE 2 JULII, 1884.

In Congregatione Generali habita coram Emis ac Rmis DD. S. R. E. Card. Inquisitoribus Generalibus perpensis suprascriptis dubiis ab R. P. D. Episcopo Eriensi propositis, præhabitoque Rmorum Consultorum suffragio, iidem Emi. ac Rmi. DD. Cardinales decreverunt.

AD 1m.

Negative.—

AD 2m.

Verba formulæ ita accipienda esse, ut facultas concessa intelligatur dispensandi tam ab impedimento consanguinitatis, quam ab impedimento affinitatis se junctim tamen non vero quando utrumque impedimentum in uno eodemque casu concurrunt.

AD 3m ET 4m.

Affirmative ad utrumque.

AD 5m.

Oriri tum ex Baptismo tum ex Confirmatione.

AD 6m.

Facultates de quibus agitur valere etiam quando utraque pars conscia est nullitatis matrimonii jam initi.

AD 7m.

Posse.—

AD 8m.

Intelligi integrum rosarium, sed relinqui prudenti arbitrio et conscientiæ Episcopi, attentis peculiaribus personarum circumstantiis, commutationem in tertiam partem, aut in preces tertiæ parti respondentem.

AD 9m ET 10m.

Affirmative.—

Eadem die ac feria

SS mus resolutiones Emorum P. P. confirmavit,

Pro. D. Juvenali Pelami S. R. U. I. Not.

L. † S.

Gustavus Persiani Subs.

BOOK REVIEW.

MEDIEVAL AND MODERN COSMOLOGY. By Rev. John Gmeiner. St. Paul, Minn.—Milwaukee: Hoffman Bros. Co., 1891.

It is some months since we received this pamphlet of 55 pages; but owing to our custom of presenting to the readers of the REVIEW, simultaneously with any important criticism of new books, one or more papers which would be apt to throw some *positive* light on the topics contained in such publications, we had to defer a notice of this brochure until the present.

A *Censor librorum* might have had some difficulty in pointing out errors against faith or morals in this production from the pen of one otherwise favorably known as a writer on subjects of popular science, but we doubt whether the S. Congregation would endorse in this case the publisher's claim, written on the title page, to represent the "Printers of the Holy Apostolic See." It was possibly on the ground of this approbation that some of our American Catholic periodicals lauded the work and generously recommended it to our young students, a well-meant effort and harmless enough if it could be presumed that the students would read no more of the book than did these reviewers or publishers who found room for its praises.

The opening passage of the pamphlet contains a reference to the Encyclical "Aeterni Patris" of Leo XIII. and to St. Thomas. A cursory glance at the occasional references to the champions of the "modernist" doctrine and the flippant and incautious language in which the old scholastic writers are referred to, would of itself be apt to arouse the suspicions of any serious student of cosmology, whether ancient or modern. Scientists may sneer at Christian philosophy because, whilst well schooled in experimental science, they may know nothing beyond it; a Christian philosopher, too, may oppose the scholastic tenets on many points; but no man who knows anything of the Thomistic school will speak of it with disdain or undervalue its importance, whether as a system of mind-training or as an armory for the defense of fundamental truth or as a touchstone for the discovery of error. Indeed, we cannot convince ourselves that Fr. Gmeiner has been true to himself. He has shown better knowledge elsewhere, and it is difficult to resist the temptation of looking on this pamphlet as one of those publications in which one man's name is meant to do service for another man's aim. However, of this the reader will judge. To avoid all ambiguity we shall let Fr. Gmeiner contradict his own statements by contrasting his views in 1884 with those exhibited in 1891. If it be objected that six years are enough to allow for a change of views in favor of modern progress, we answer that, although this would not, of itself, prove the change to have been for the better, we would accept the position if the author himself did. It would leave him the credit of sincerity which we must respect; but there is no

account given of, or apology for such a metamorphosis. On the contrary, we find the book of 1884 prominently advertised, both in front of the title page and at the end of the present work, as a "Popular Defense of Christian Doctrines." If the one book be a defense, the other must be an offense.

The pivotal point upon which the difference of modern cosmology from the scholastic system turns, is the *Constitution of Bodies*. Here we have the Thomistic as opposed to the Atomic theory. Father Gmeiner holds that the cosmological theories of the scholastics are "antiquated," which would be no great harm if it referred only to their age, seeing that the same could be said in the days of Horace, regarding virtue and old fashioned honesty. But when we are told that the mediæval philosophical formulas are "worse than useless husks" (page 54), we feel quite sure that our author could not have expressed himself to that effect before, and turning, quite at random, to the chapter on biology in a former book by him we find him extol that same mediæval system, assuring us that on this point (the doctrine of matter and life), modern science is "not a step ahead of Christian Philosophy as taught in the days of St. Thomas Aquinas." (Cf. *Modern Scientific Views and Christian Doctrines Compared*. Page 99.) And he gives us the reason why it cannot be otherwise. Modern science is, he tells us, unable to define what is matter, what is force, what is life, sensation, intelligence, will. "The answer of Modern Science to these questions is contained in the words of DuBois Reymond: Ignoramus—ignorabimus; we know not—and in this life never shall know;—and yet all phenomena of the visible world have their source in matter, life, sensation, etc."—(l. c. p. 94.)

In his last work the author strongly objects to the scholastic distinction of *first matter* and *substantial form*, and he cites Catholic writers who have manifested a similar objection, although since the revival of Thomistic studies these have mostly retired from the field of controversy, and their text-books are no longer in general use. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to have Fr. Gmeiner champion a view which has, so to say, been discarded by the abler Catholic philosophers of recent days, especially since in his former book he apparently teaches the opposite doctrine when he says in reference to corporeal beings: "in all we find two distinct yet intimately united principles of their being—a material and an immaterial one. The former is called by Christian philosophy *materia* or matter, the latter, *forma*, or the formative principle. (page 96.)

Fr. Gmeiner is wroth with Cardinal Zigliara for maintaining that this question of the composition of bodies belongs, in reality, to the domain of metaphysics. The Cardinal did not say so without explaining what he meant. Whilst the physicist observes phenomena, facts and experiments, he cannot penetrate to the hidden causes of these phenomena and facts because they are invisible to the corporal eye, and intelligible to the intellect alone. Hence he must aim to discover them by the mind or as a metaphysician. This is the Thomistic reasoning. Time was, when Fr. Gmeiner believed the same. "There is a science which penetrates a little farther into these mysteries (of being and life) than the strictly so-called natural or

experimental sciences, viz: Christian philosophy. Here is a realm of hidden truths that cannot be touched with the hand or seen with the eye, but must be reached by reason or the intellect, which does not stop at the visible phenomena, but penetrates beyond them by reading the nature of causes in the effects." (page 95.) Evidently this is not entirely relegating "the theory of matter and form to the sublime and misty heights of metaphysical abstraction." (page 16 of *Mod. Cosmol.*)

We may remark here in passing, that the danger alluded to on page 14 (i. e. that new forms are educed from the potency of matter according to the Aristotelian view) exists only in the false interpretation of the phrase. Surely St. Thomas qu. 90, art. 2 ad 2, never meant to convey that forms are latent in matter, as for example the tree is in the seed, and that consequently the animal soul being a form is the final outcome of matter. He taught explicitly that matter is the subject of the form—from which it receives its being and specific action—induced therein by the action of some agent.

Singular is the inconsistency with which our author discusses the physical reality of the plant-soul. The contemptuous treatment which he accords to the Catholic philosophers (mentioned on pages 22 and 23) who uphold medieval views because, he thinks, they are ignorant of the results of modern chemical and physical science, is not calculated to inspire respect for the author's sense of fairness. Not only does he bring forth nothing which was unknown to them before the appearance of his previous work, but it would be preposterous to assume that they were ignorant of the fact that Tongiorgi or Secchi held views different from their own. They simply held fast, as did Fr. Gmeiner himself, until the time of this recent development, to the Thomistic doctrine which had, and has still, the concurrence of very learned and distinguished scientists among Catholics, as Fr. Gmeiner must have recognized at the Cath. Congress of Scientists, at Paris, where he was present.

But we need not pursue this reference any farther. Enough has been said to make the curious inquirer hearken with caution to the proclamations of modern scientists, even such as live in our own midst. The book is small, but is, for that very reason, calculated to effect more mischief than larger or more profound books of its kind might do. The subject is certainly of importance, for there is a progress in cosmological science, but it is not such as to destroy or prejudice in any perceptible way the scholastic method, which is, on the whole, constructed upon lines which will hardly ever vary, but need simply be filled out. It is very true that the Thomistic terminology does not cover all the phases of recent development in physical science, but it is not impossible to supply this defect, without rejecting the entire theory of *matter* and *form* which, more or less, pervades the whole scholastic system. Respect for the old distinction is all the more imperative, since we have, as yet, really nothing that may safely be substituted for it. Whatever Fr. Gmeiner may have to bring forth in favor of Modern Cosmology, he cannot justly afford to sneer at the scholastic system. For the rest we refer the interested reader to the paper of Mgr. De Concilio in this number. The subject will be thoroughly discussed in the REVIEW.

EDUCATION: TO WHOM DOES IT BELONG?—

By the Rev. Thomas Bouquillon, D. D., Professor of Moral Theology at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.—Baltimore, : John Murray & CO., 1891.

This pamphlet has been expected for some time. It is also well known that one of our leading Catholic Periodicals had refused to print the original manuscript on grounds which the public was left to conjecture.

Those among us who are especially interested in this question of the right to educate will be glad to know what are Dr. Bouquillon's views on the subject, all the more since he writes, we are told, at the request of his ecclesiastical superiors, the exponent of whose views we may suppose him to be.

The author's erudition is beyond question, even if he did not give ample evidence of it in this pamphlet. Nor may we criticise his practical judgment as to the application of certain principles drawn from the works of theologians and jurists, old and new, concerning the right to educate, since he repeatedly protests that he "deals with theoretical principles only" and that he regards any attempt to point out the practical application of his principles as equivalent to giving directions to those whom "God has placed at the head of the Church and the State.

The scope of Dr. Bouquillon's treatment of the question is, therefore, reduced to the exposition of the theory of the right to educate. He professes to have no bias as to the effect of this theory when applied to particular instances. We must confess that this limitation materially diminishes the value of so learned an exposition. There has never been much difficulty in recognizing, or admitting the principles of inherent and fundamental right in the matter, at least among those who have studied the subject, and that is to say, those who are likely to read Dr. Bouquillon's pamphlet for the purpose of obtaining light. The ultimate result to which the considerate reader would come would be that which the writer has summed up on his last page, namely that education "belongs to the individual, to the family, to the State, and to the Church." We fancy that, in the sense in which Dr. Bouquillon indiscriminately applies the word "educate", this is true and will be admitted by all except the most fanatical defender of the "family right" in education, for the State has its legitimate function in organizing the social relations of men and as such becomes to a certain extent an educator or, better said, an instructor in such matters as the parent cannot or will not supply for the common good. The real difficulty lies in the application of principles or the relative adjustment of individual rights in which there is unquestionably an order of priority. "*Precisely in the harmonious combination of these four factors (the right of the individual, the family, the State and the Church) in education is the difficulty of practical application.*" These are Dr. Bouquillon's own words. If there are errors committed by those who either deny to the State the right to control the education of its citizens under the circumstances, or exaggerate that right so as to allow it to *precede* the parental right, such errors are the

result, not of a want of recognized principles, but of their interpretation, when they come to be applied to certain social and political conditions. The actual position may be expressed thus: If the parent neglect his or her natural duty towards the child in educating it so that the want of education becomes a public nuisance, then the State has a right to prevent the injury done to the community by the negligence of the individual, provided such negligence is equivalent to disturbance of the public order. Hence the right of the State is not absolute or independent, but conditional, and is subject to the will of the individual unless cause can be shown, as in judicial or penal proceedings, that the parental will is exercised (or not exercised) to the actual injury of the community.

How far this may be *practically* the case with us *in America* has been shown in two papers on this subject which appeared some months ago in the *ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW* (Vol. III, p. 420) wherein the writer, (whilst decidedly deprecating the introduction of "compulsory education"), pointed out the possibility of certain conditions arising from the increasing immigration of semi-civilized masses into the midst of a well organized and settled community, under which the State might be compelled to exact a measure of education for the sake of protecting the interests of the community.

The principles which Dr. B. collects from approved authors, and arranges in a masterly way, do not prevent their misapplication in practice. Moreover, whilst he himself does not pretend to pronounce on their practical worth, he unconsciously selects them and disposes them in a way which gives us a comparatively clear sight of how he would have us apply them. There is a noticeable tendency to say the "State and the Church," rather than the "Church and the State," even in places where the logic of the subject would demand the latter position. As the brochure comes with the apparent approbation of the University authorities, it deserves more attention than we can give in a book notice and we hope to have a further treatment of the subject from competent hand and with reference to Dr. B.'s exposition.

Almost simultaneously with the pamphlet to which we have made reference thus far comes an answer to it in the form of the following publication:

THE PARENT FIRST. An answer to Dr. Bouquillon's query, "Education: To whom does it belong?" By Rev. R. J. Holaind, S. J.—New York, Cincinnati and Chicago: Benzinger Bros., 1891.

"Last night," says the author in the opening words of his rejoinder, "we had the good fortune to receive a pamphlet written by the eminent Dr. Bouquillon." Skilled in the application of the Catholic principle to the social issues of the day and in America, Fr. Holaind discerns in the "theoretical principles" of Dr. B. certain statements which are apt to produce dangerous consequences, because they are susceptible of misapprehension "both by his friends and by his opponents." Thus, though apparently

not so intended by its author, the pamphlet of Dr. B. bears, in the light of existing facts, an aggressive character, and like a true knight from the ranks of Loyola, the conservative Jesuit takes up the glove dropped as though by accident, but dropped by one who has given sign of being an adversary in deed, if not in words.

Father Holaind is lucky both in discovering the weak spots of his opponent, and also in the perfect good humor with which he points them out. Considering the very short time which was allowed him to write his answer (three days), we must admire the pointedness and the thorough manner in which the work is done.

It is unfortunate for the defence of Dr. B.'s theory, even if it were without any definite tendency in pointing to a particular practice, that he occasionally applies the word "right" in the same sense to instruction as to education, though the two things are often distinct, and then indeed very different.

Naturally Fr. Holaind emphasizes the right of the parent as against the state-assumption, because it is a right first in order and springs essentially from the parental duty, whilst the state-right, so far as it goes, is only accidental or subsidiary and exercised on entirely different principle from that of the parent. The pamphlet, while it throws practical light on the subject, for which the authorities, to whom the application of principles belongs, will be thankful, gives a terse *rationale* of the question in a number of theses drawn from a work of Jansen's, where he treats the juridical aspect of the right of education. This latter addition will be of service to students. However, we expect to have more of this interesting discussion on the primary living issues of the day which cannot be judged properly by what is presently or apparently useful but must be weighed with its consequences and results as regards those to whom we are obliged to transmit undiminished and unembarrassed the precious inheritance of our faith.

CHRISTIANITY AND INFALLIBILITY — Both or Neither. By the Rev. Father Lyons.—New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891.

Infallibility is a common difficulty with persons who make no specialty of religious inquiry. They look upon the claim of the Church to teach infallible truth as a species of arrogance akin to that which actuates the self-appointed critic or dogmatizer in the ordinary walk of life. And yet, if we admit the legitimate call of any church appointed to communicate divine revelation, we must necessarily suppose infallibility. Truth which is not infallible is not truth at all in the sense in which we receive it from God. Man might as well be left to conjecture in regard to the facts of faith, if in their interpretation he is to have no infallible assurance that he understands or applies them correctly. This fact, though very plain, is largely overlooked by those who, to all appearances, are sincere in their conformity to the pattern of Christianity. They misunderstand the Catholic view of the subject, and from an innate prejudice, so common among re-

ligious Protestants, fail to enquire at the proper source. "Anyone at all acquainted with non-Catholic views of the subject" says the author of the book before us, "knows that the majority of objections to the dogma arise from a misunderstanding of its true scope and meaning." From this standpoint Father Lyons elucidates the subject. His method is thoroughly popular, and whilst he has admirably succeeded in avoiding that didactic and argumentative style which is apt to repel the ordinary reader of our day, he nevertheless leaves the distinct impression that his reasoning is based on sound logic and strengthened by such authorities as would command the attention of every theological student.

Whilst the work appeals more directly to Protestants, it not only tends to convince intelligent Catholics who may be weak on this point, but shows the way to the adoption of a useful system of polemics with sincere men of all ranks of belief.

The writer first defines the meaning of the dogma and then shows reason why Catholics believe and why every consistent Christian should believe it. By disposing of the objections commonly made against the Catholic claim, he clears the way to a reasonable faith which at once dispels all doubts from the anxious soul groping after truth. A suitable conclusion to the work is the testimony of a number of illustrious converts who have publicly acknowledged the happiness which, in their case, resulted from the acceptance of this truth. Among these witnesses are Mrs. Elizabeth Seton, Father Hecker, Dr. Brownson, Mr. Allies, Aubrey de Vere, Cardinals Newman and Manning. All agree that the dogma need only be understood in order to be embraced by every fair minded Christian.

The work is full of erudition, as is shown by the numerous notes indicating a wide range of pertinent and careful reading. The final chapter (Appendix B) contains some interesting notes relative to the action of the bishops at the late Vatican Council anent the declaration of Papal Infallibility, and also records a few of the evil prophesies, from enemies of the Church, which were made void. The book is a solid and timely contribution to the theological literature of the day.

LA VIE ET L'HÉRÉDITÉ. Par† P. Vallet, P. S.—Paris : Victor Retaux et Fils, 1891, pp. XI, 388.

The question—what is life?—ever interesting and important, has never had deeper interest or higher importance than it has to-day. Scientists and philosophers alike are now thoroughly persuaded of the inanity of the exaggerated dualism in Anthropology, defended by Descartes and his followers, and are tending, many of them, to an equally exaggerated monism. Life is regarded as but one of the physical energies resulting from matter organized; sensation is called a mode of such life; intelligence and volition, other forms of sensation. All interwoven with the problem of life is that which concerns its source—heredity. Physiological dispositions are transmitted from parent to child. Diseases of body and mind, temperament, character, are largely inherited. Why not purely intellectual and moral peculiarities, why not all voluntary determination, why not the whole higher life?

He who throws sure light on the questions, vital in more than one sense, merits well in the cause of truth. He must bring to his work qualities not generally united in the same man—a critical eye and sure possession of at least the special categories of facts in biological science, together with a clear view, and a steady, skillful grasp of philosophical theory. That Fr. Vallet possesses these traits in no small degree is evident from his other kindred writings, and he shows them no less plainly in the present book on life and heredity.

Starting with vital action as differentiated from the energies of brute matter, by well-determined attributes, he follows the functions and principle of life in the plant, then upward in its elevation by the property of sensation in the animal; and lastly in its still higher workings in the passions, intellect and will of man.

The foundation is thus laid broad and deep for the facts and law of heredity. Inductive here as in the first part, he describes the law in the domains of physiology and psychology, noting its complexity, singularity and exceptions, notwithstanding its general extension to all the "aptitudes" of living organisms. Searching for a radical basis, and a rational theory of the facts and law, he finds them in the union of soul and body in the one complete substance and person—man. The modifications of heredity by physical environment and education; its perfect harmony with human freedom, and with a right theory of true progress, these subjects adequately treated, close the volume.

We content ourselves with this brief outline of the work, as a paper in the present number of the REVIEW will go somewhat into its details. We commend Fr. Vallet's book to our readers as giving in graceful form the leading facts and sound theory of its all important subjects.

F. P. S.

THE SCHISM OF THE WEST AND THE FREEDOM OF PAPAL ELECTION. By Rev. Henry Brann, D.D., LL.D.—New York, Cincinn. & Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1892.

Early during the present year there appeared in the "American Cath. Quarterly Review" a paper on the schism of the West. It was a rather favorable critique of a French work by the Abbé Gayet who cleverly attempts to vindicate the claims of Robert of Geneva, commonly styled Clement VII, a pontiff who has not been acknowledged in the Catalogue of Popes, and is generally spoken of by Catholics and the more conservative Protestant historians as an anti-pope.

The succinct history of the case is brought out in Dr. Brann's pamphlet, with a terse emphasis which courts conviction. The writer shows how the claims of Urban VI are sanctioned, not only by the line of learned pontiffs who followed him and who acknowledged no Clement VII except him who succeeded Adrian VI (1523), but by every right and title in Canon law. Incidentally, but very successfully, the question is turned into an argument in favor of the temporal independence of the Holy See, and in this lies

perhaps the main significance of Dr. Brann's defense, which gives evidence of all-sided study and of a just sense regarding the rights of the Holy See. The essay serves a good purpose, and we recommend it especially to those who read the "American Cath. *Quarterly Review*."

HIS HONOR THE MAYOR AND OTHER TALES. By John Talbot Smith. Eight Illustrations by Williamson. —New York: The Vatican Library Co. 1891.

The winter and particularly the Christmas season calls for interesting books to be put into the hands of our young folks. Father Smith as former editor of a Catholic weekly which ranked among the best of its kind in point of originality, cleanness, and especially in a marked freedom from that vulgar, half infidel, half obsequious tone which characterizes some of our so-called Catholic Journals, is in touch with the needs of our reading generation. We have Professor Egan's assurance—whose judgment we prefer on such matters to our own—that these tales are of a high order of literary merit. They depict scenes from actual life, showing a rare power of penetration; and, if at times somewhat too realistic, they are never false to human nature or dangerous in their tendency. The fact that a priest and one who wields as clever a pen as Father Talbot Smith has undertaken to write a book of this kind is not only an evidence of the need of such literature, but also a sign that it deserves the attention of those who are or should be interested in providing the young with proper material for a kind of recreation which, in this case, is not devoid of wholesome lessons.

TOM PLAYFAIR; or MAKING A START. By Francis J. Finn, S. J.—New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros., 1892.

A well told novel or biography with a high moral tendency outweighs in practical importance a multitude of learned books, even when they have a moral or religious aim. "Tom Playfair" is neither a novel nor a biography, but a mixture of both. Much like "Tom Brown's Schooldays" it is fresh and original in its entire cast. The same noble purpose, or one still more exalted, which animated Mr. Hughes in describing Tom's life at Rugby, has led Fr. Finn to sketch the trials and victories of his young hero at St. Maure's. He does it with a winning grace and a natural feeling which convinces you that he relates in part, at least, the actual experience of an observant and kindly conscientious teacher. No doubt, this story will give to our boys at College some noble lessons which are apt to abide in after-life; and we believe that it would be well also for teachers and masters of boy-schools to read it for the sake of the lights which it gives in dealing with certain faults of the young lads who come to our Colleges.—Last year the author published a similar book, called "Percy Wynn," which is in reality a sequel to the present story. It seems that the accident of the inverted order in publishing the two books is due to the modest estimate which the writer formed of his own labor and which made him

keep his first manuscript until others forced it to light. Both books are equally interesting and well written, and make a wholesome addition to College and school-libraries as well as to the home-reading shelf.

THE ALTAR BOY'S MANUAL. Instructions for serving Mass, Vespers, Benediction, etc., with the proper Responses and Prayers at Mass, Morning and Evening prayers, etc. Benziger Bros., 1891.

A useful little manual which contains the most necessary things an altar boy should know and observe in and outside the sanctuary. Teachers and Sacristans will find it an excellent aid to good order and devotion on the part of their charge.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE CORRECT THING FOR CATHOLICS. By Lelia Hardin Bugg.—New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros., 1892.

LA ELEZIONE DEL PAPA.—Storia e Documenti. Giovanni Bertheliet. Roma: Forzani E. C. Tipografi—Editori. 1891.

CHRISTIANITY AND INFALLIBILITY.—BOTH OR NEITHER. By the Rev. Daniel Lyons. New York: Longmanns, Green & Co. 1891.

BOOK OF INSTRUCTION FOR CHRISTIAN MOTHERS. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1891.

GUIDE IN CATHOLIC CHURCH MUSIC. Published by order of the First Provincial Council of Milwaukee and St. Paul. With a Preface by Rt. Rev. Bishop M. Marty, D.D. St. Francis, Wis., J. Singenberger.

ON A TASTE FOR GOOD READING. Selections from Fr. Faber's works. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co.

EDUCATION: TO WHOM DOES IT BELONG? By the Rev. Thomas Bouquillon, D.D., Prof. of Moral Theology at the Catholic University of America. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1891.

THE PARENT FIRST. An answer to Dr. Bouquillon's Query "Education: To whom does it belong?" By Rev. R. J. Holaind, S. J. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1891.

TOM PLAYFAIR. By Rev. Francis J. Finn, S. J. Author of Percy Wynn. Benziger Bros. 1892.

BIRTHDAY SOUVENIR. By Mrs. A. E. Buchanan. Benziger Bros. 1892.

AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

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CLERICAL STUDIES.

Philosophy.

DURING the whole course of the present century, the principal field of human investigation has been the visible World. Eagerly, yet patiently and methodically questioned, it has yielded up, one after another, its wonderful secrets, investing man with new and almost limitless powers, and giving him over Nature a Kingship unknown since the Fall. It is only natural that the inventions and discoveries which have so marvelously transformed and expanded human life should stand high in the estimation of our contemporaries. As a fact, Science is the idol of the day, and whoever possesses in any special degree a portion of its magic power is sure to receive a corresponding share of the popular worship.

Yet Science is not the greatest power in this world. Deeper and more wide reaching still in its action is Thought—that manner and form of thought which bears the name of Philosophy.

I.

By Philosophy we mean here what is commonly understood by that name. Definitions we have already by the score, and it would serve no purpose to add one more to their number. The fact of there being so many only proves the great variety of meanings which have come to be attached to the term. In the course of ages

it has covered, sometimes a wider, sometimes a narrower field. A time was when it embraced all knowledge except of the commonest kind. But by little and little many of the objects which it originally embodied grew into prominence and assumed an individual existence, with distinctive names, just as in the history of Art, we see the sculptured figures gradually stand out in bolder relief and become independent statues ; or the mural paintings long spread over the walls of temple or palace, drop as it were, from them one day and become movable pictures ; so in the course of ages, now one, now another of the sciences detaches itself from the common parent ; mathematics first, then astronomy—much later, almost in our own times—the different natural sciences. But they left behind them the general notions and higher principles from which they proceed, in common with all other forms of human knowledge, and which, brought together and systematized, present a special and more exalted sort of science—behind and beyond nature—which we call *Metaphysics*. There remain, besides the science of the human faculties or *Psychology*, the laws of thought which are treated in *Logic*, the laws of human action, treated in *Ethics*, to which have been added, in modern times, the laws of the beautiful as the subject matter of *Æsthetics*. All these kept together, retain the traditional name of Philosophy.

It may be fairly questioned whether there exists between them a sufficiently close connection to gather them all under a single denomination. A conception which aims at embracing things so unlike has always something artificial and strained about it. Psychology is as much a distinct science as Physiology. Logic has as independent an existence as Algebra. Aesthetics and Ethics develop side by side without interference—almost without contact. Perhaps it might be said that Philosophy, as commonly understood, represents, like our knowledge of Nature, a group of sciences rather than a single one of them. But this is of little consequence for the present, as our purpose is not to examine critically the nature and unity of Philosophy, but to call attention to its great importance as an object of study for cleric and priest, and to suggest what we consider the most practical means and methods of pursuing it usefully. In the present article we will confine ourselves to the first aspect.

The study of Philosophy may be considered

As a means of culture ;

As a source of influence ;

As a necessary key to the science of Theology.

II.

To begin with the last, as the most direct and practical aspect of the question, we may state the case in a single short sentence. Philosophy is not merely an easier means of access ; it is the only gateway through which the mind can get admittance to scientific Theology. And the reason is obvious. Theology, as a science, owes its existence to Philosophy. Its very definition teaches us this : “*rerum divinarum scientia per discursum seu ratiocinationem acquisita.*” Theology is, indeed, built on revelation. But a belief in revelation rests on the existence and veracity of God, which it is the business of Philosophy to demonstrate. Theology is revealed truth, but developed—*treated*, as chemists would say—by philosophical thought.

As it reaches us originally through the Word of God, written or unwritten, revealed truth is fragmentary and unconnected. From the pages of Sacred Writ come forth, in irregular succession, faint glimmerings of the unseen and vivid flashes of divine light—distinct doctrines and vague yet pregnant suggestions—symbols and facts full of meaning, which need to be realized. To elucidate all these, to classify, to evolve, to connect them ; to convert confusing variety into unity and, with loose and unfashioned materials dropped from heaven to earth, to raise up a structure solid and harmonious in all its parts, such has been at all times the task of Theology, to be attempted successfully only by those who had learned to see deeply into things, and had become familiar with the evolution and co-ordination of thought.

And this is just the class of men who, from beginning to end, have reared the noble structure of Catholic Theology, minds trained in the schools to subtle thought and fashioned by the discipline of philosophical studies. In the encyclical “*Æterni Patris*” Leo XIII. points out the abundant use made by the early Fathers of philosophical principles and methods to demonstrate, develop and defend the teachings of the Christian Faith. “*Providence itself,*” he says, “*requires that in bringing back nations to the Faith, human science should be asked to lend its aid; and the records of antiquity attest that such was the practice of the most illustrious Fathers of the Church. The part which they were accustomed to assign to reason was neither small nor insignificant. St. Augustine sums it up concisely when he points to human science as a means by which Faith is begotten, nourished, defended and strengthened.*” And the learned Pontiff proceeds to develop the words of the great Afri-

can Doctor, by showing how, as a historical fact, the greatest lights of the early Church appeal to philosophic proof whenever available, whilst exhibiting, themselves, great familiarity with the speculations of the period as well as careful dialectical training.

The same law reasserts itself many centuries later. When Theology, after her protracted slumber, awakens to fresh life and vigor, with St. Anselm and his contemporaries, it is by contact with philosophic thought. As for the great theological movement of the XIIIth century, it is well known that it received its principal impulse from the introduction into the schools of the works of Aristotle. Nor was it otherwise in the third great efflorescence of theology, corresponding to the XVIth and XVIIth centuries. As in the past, its noblest representatives are invariably men of the highest philosophical powers, rich in the traditions of the schools and familiar with the most arduous problems of abstract thought. The greatest of them all, Suarez, felt so keenly the dependence of his work as a theologian on the notions and problems of philosophy, that, as he tells us himself in the *Proemium* of his *Disputationes metaphysicae*, he felt compelled to turn aside for a time from all theological research in order to elucidate them more thoroughly. To this happy necessity we owe, under the above-mentioned name, one of his greatest productions.

III.

As only a deep philosopher can be a great Theologian, so those alone who have mastered the elements of Philosophy can hope to acquire any technical knowledge of the sacred science. There is not a department of Philosophy which they have not again and again to go back to; scarce a single theological question that does not imply conceptions which it is the business of Philosophy to elucidate. Thus, to say nothing of the fundamental proofs of Christianity, which are all philosophical or historical, the doctrine of the Trinity, for instance, reposes on the ontological notions of essence, unity, personality, substance. The deepest problems of Psychology are involved in the mystery of the Incarnation. The workings of grace can be understood only by a philosophical study of the natural man. Behind the doctrine of the Sacraments, especially of the Blessed Eucharist, we reach the problems of causality, space, matter, accidents, etc. Moral Theology, from beginning to end, is based on Psychology and Ethics. In short, Theology in all its parts is so much of a philosophical science that it can

neither be taught, nor learned, nor even thought of with any distinctness and detail, unless through the medium of the earlier discipline.

Hence it is that they have never been separated in the Church. From the XIIIth century, in all the clerical schools and universities, wherever Theology was studied, Philosophy was taught beside it. In the religious orders devoted to active work, measures were taken to secure to the aspirants a thorough philosophical training. Their Constitutions and practical directions in this connection offer a very interesting subject of study, showing how fully realized was the fact we are presently concerned with, that outside a philosophical preparation, no theological science can be imparted.

Finally a priest is not only a student and exponent of the Christian faith, he is also its champion. From whatever direction it may be assailed, on him devolves the duty of defending it. Now while it scarce can be said that, at the present day, religious truth is safe from attack on any side, yet it is clear that some of its most dangerous enemies are to be found among the modern representatives of philosophic speculation. In former times, the sacred structure itself was more in peril; in our day a determined effort is made to sap its very foundations. For religion is built on belief in a personal God, distinct from the Universe, on belief in the soul, spiritual and immortal, on human liberty and responsibility. The denial of any of these truths is destructive of all faith, yet, there is not one of them which is not violently assailed or contemptuously ignored amongst us. The agnostic school lays it down as a fundamental principle that such truths, even if they happen to exist, are beyond the reach of man and can never be ascertained as we ascertain the facts and the laws of nature. Thus the whole fabric of religious belief is imperilled by men who have caught the public ear and are listened to and trusted by countless followers.

On one ground only can they be met and defeated. Their difficulties are philosophical, they have to be met by philosophical argument. Authority cannot be appealed to. Reason alone is recognized as the supreme arbiter, and hence the necessity of getting a firm grasp of philosophic truth. "Because, says Leo XIII. (l. c.) in this age of ours Christian belief is wont to be assailed by the devices and cunning of sophistical wisdom, all our youth, but especially those who are the hope of the Church, should be nourished with that strengthening and solid meat of doctrine."

IV.

But the study of Philosophy is not merely a preparation for the work of apologist or theologian. It trains and equips the mind for every kind of intellectual pursuit. It imparts the methods and principles which guide investigation in every region of human knowledge. It is in particular the necessary corrective of the study of the natural sciences which, when pursued exclusively, narrows the mind to one process and one form of knowledge, leaving out man, the soul, moral liberty and responsibility, eternal truth, that is, the highest objects of human thought. Philosophy brings them all back, and begets an abiding sense of their reality. As a discipline, it accustoms the mind better than aught else to distinctness and accuracy of conception. Its constant concern is to take asunder the elements of thought, to concentrate the whole attention on each one of them and ascertain their true relations. It regulates and strengthens that unceasing play of mind by which, from every fresh element of knowledge, we are led backwards and forwards to new forms of truth. For this is the very nature of our mental activity. We observe, we compare, we reason up from facts to laws and down from laws to new and unobserved facts. The principle of causation is so deeply imbedded in our mental structure, that we are ever striving to lift up the veil and see what is behind each fact of nature, of history, of the human soul. The cause—the underlying principle of things—the broader synthesis by which they are seen in their unity—facts, no longer unexplained and unconnected, but lighted up and held together by some deeper truth—this is what the cultivated mind has ever longed for:

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas—

and what Philosophy teaches to discover. The very pursuit is elevating; it develops the highest faculties, and independently of its results, it gives such keen delight that a great thinker, Malebranche, was wont to say: "If I held truth captive in my hand, I would set it free, in order that I might capture it afresh."

The pursuit yields more than enjoyment. It brings power, power born of the pursuit and power in each truth thus won. At no period of life is there such a conscious increase of mental vigor as in the first systematic study of Philosophy. We may compare it to the ascent of commanding heights. Each step forward enlarges the sphere of vision and reveals new beauties to the eye until the summit is reached, where the purer air and brighter sky and vaster expanse of wood and water and cultivated field beneath thrill with

delight and lift up the whole soul. So in the study of Philosophy. Each new law of mind or of life, each principle of higher truth enlarges the range of mental vision and adds, as it were, new realms to the empire of thought. Well may Cicero exclaim :—*Quid optabilius? quid præstantius? quid homini melius? quid homini dignius?* and well may philosophers have seen in it the noblest form of human happiness and theologians a picture of that higher contemplation in which is found the supreme beatitude of the Saints in Heaven.

V.

The power of Philosophy is not confined to speculation. It leads to results of the most practical kind. Of all the influences that impel the human race, after religion, Philosophy is the greatest. Human passions are strong, but their reign is short-lived. They exhaust themselves quickly, and they neutralize one another in the great struggle of life. Truth never dies. Inventors and discoverers have revolutionized the conditions and habits of social life, but thinkers have acted more powerfully and more deeply still.—*Mens agitat molem.*—The power of science is irresistible, but it needs guidance. Thought gets hold of it and turns it to its own purposes.

Thought, principle, truth, or what is taken for truth, all men finally appeal to and profess to follow. Individuals and nations are ever working out a theory, true or false, which they have learned, perhaps unconsciously, from some thinker. He may have been conspicuous or unknown, it matters not. Like the seed of the parables, his thought has dropped noiselessly into the minds of men, and after a time it has sprung up, and spread, and covered the land. Rousseau in his life-time was considered by most people as only a harmless dreamer; twenty years after his death he was the inspired prophet and legislator of the French Revolution. Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, lived and died almost unknown and unnoticed, yet what a following he has had in our age! A small book of Beccaria gradually transformed the criminal laws of Europe. At the present day, the legislation of almost every country in the world is being slowly but steadily modified under the action of philosophical views. Who, again, can question the influence of the theories of heredity, of determinism, of evolution on our whole administration of justice? Who can doubt the action of our new views of marriage on the domestic life, or that of Karl Marx and his school on current notions regarding private ownership? Who, having watched the course of thought in this country and in England for

the last thirty years, does not see at once the deep impress it bears of such men as Herbert Spencer or Stuart Mill?

Thus everything tends to emphasize the fact that, taken broadly, Philosophy is at the very root of all human history and human life. But in whose possession do we find it at the present day? Often in the hands of the most incompetent—of men whose intellectual habits would least fit them for philosophical speculation. And yet they cannot keep themselves from it. Scientists, such as Huxley and Tyndal, are constantly overstepping the natural limits of their investigations and settling dogmatically the most arduous questions of Philosophy or unsettling the most necessary beliefs of their fellow-men. Only a short time ago Mr. Edison, whilst claiming to be a stranger to theory and speculation, treated us to a number of views, more or less original, on the nature of matter and life. Hundreds of thousands read them in the Sunday newspapers, and doubtless adopted them, knowing no better.

For such is the condition of things to-day. Views and theories which in former times continued to dwell in the heights where they had come to light, and percolated but slowly, if at all, through the lower strata, now permeate the social body from top to bottom almost at once. The Philosophy of yesterday is the literature of to-day. Orators, poets, writers of fiction, all those who form the public mind, seek inspiration from the thinker. A vein of philosophy runs through most of their productions, and it may be truly said that at no period of history has speculative thought been so quickly taken up and so widely and rapidly propagated.

The conclusion comes forth of itself. It is the one to which our great pontiff, Leo XIII, has given the weight of his sacred authority and of his genius in the memorable Encyclical already referred to, and of which the present paper is meant to be a feeble echo. To those who have received from above the mission of diffusing salutary truth, who are, by their calling, the light of the world and the salt of the earth, it belongs, before all others, to be the intellectual guides of their fellow-men, familiar with the devious paths of error into which the unwary are so easily betrayed, and ever holding bright before them the welcome radiance of truth, as it comes down from heaven, and as it issues forth from the depths of philosophical contemplation.

THE TOUCH-STONE OF CATHOLICITY.

AMID the present sad and gloomy condition of society, threatened everywhere with anarchy and the subversion of the most fundamental principles of right, the one bright and cheery spot is the presence of the Church ; the one supporting and encouraging sound comes from her authoritative and infallible voice. It is this voice destined ever to guide the nations, and to save the world, which, well heard and faithfully obeyed, constitutes that impregnable strength of unity in Church and State, against which even the gates of hell can never prevail. No wonder, then, if the enemies of the Church, who are at the same time hostile to well-ordered society, have always endeavored, if not to stifle that mighty voice, at least to weaken its authority and moral power. On their standard they bear the "*Non Serviam*," which is the motto of him who was the first to rebel against God.

We cannot deny that their efforts have been to some extent successful. The history of the last three centuries, nay, of our own days, furnishes us with a sad but undeniable proof of this fact.

However, we are sure that the aims of the enemies of the Church would have met, and would meet with little or no tangible results if among those who bear the name of Catholic some had not extended to them a friendly hand, and, enrolling themselves under their standard, had not joined them in repeating "*Non Serviam*."

These false Catholics, in the words of Pope Pius IX, "acting, as it were, in concert with the enemies of the Church, are endeavoring to establish a union of light and darkness, of justice and iniquity, by means of those doctrines which they call *liberal Catholic*." "These men," the Pontiff continues, "are more dangerous than the open enemies of the Church, both because they second the efforts of the former without seeming to do so, and also because, keeping carefully outside of the limit of condemned opinions, they give an appearance of soundness and of fairness to their teaching, which allures the thoughtless and deceives good men (particularly among the class of young students) who would, were it not for them, firmly oppose error wherever they recognize it."¹

The adepts of this so-called liberal school deceive themselves when they fancy that it is necessary to follow the course which they point out in order, as they say, "to reconcile the progress of modern institutions with the Gospel, and to remove the cause of dissen-

¹ Brief of Pius IX given at Rome, March 6, 1873.

sion among brethren or citizens of the same commonwealth." They will effect no reconciliation, and will rather increase dissensions by sacrificing truth and by putting themselves at the service of those who claim uncalled for rights in favor of a false liberty. "No man can serve two masters ;" he who attempts it must unmistakably fail.

There have been, and there are in the United States, as well as in Europe, men who are imbued with these principles of liberal Catholicism, and who, usually under the mask of an exaggerated patriotism, act up to them and endeavor to spread them among their followers, stigmatizing those who oppose them as obscurantists and obstructionists.

These "advanced thinkers," as they call themselves, can be easily recognized. "By their fruits you shall know them." In the Brief we have already quoted they are described by Pius IX as "*men who display their animosity against everything which indicates prompt, entire, absolute obedience to the decrees and warnings of the Holy See; who speak of that See with a sort of disdain as 'the Roman Curia;'* who apply the names of 'Ultramontane' and 'Jesuit' to the most zealous and obedient sons of the Church; who, in fine, overflowing with pride, esteem themselves wiser than the Church, to whom the divine assistance has been promised in an especial manner and forever."

As appears from the words which we have italicized, the first and most pernicious principle of this liberal or "advanced" school has reference to the obedience due to the voice of the Church, an obedience which is the touch-stone of Catholicity. The liberal Catholic holds, 1, that if a doctrine is not defined by that infallible voice he, as a Catholic, is free to hold or reject it ; and, 2, that even if defined by the Church, its truth can be questioned, provided only the doctrine thus defined be not a revealed one.

Both propositions are, to say the least, "erroneous, and in the highest degree insulting to the faith of the Church and to her authority." We shall briefly prove our statement, and thereby show that we do not exaggerate; for the words we have used are not our own, we have borrowed them from the highest authority which God has established on earth.

A few words of explanation are here necessary to avoid any misconception of the point at issue. The first proposition of the liberal school limits the duty of obedience to doctrines that have been infallibly defined by the Church. Now there is a two-fold obedience to be distinguished, one which is of faith (*assensus fidei*) the other

which is of religion (*assensus religiosus*). The former has for its motive *either* the authority of God revealing, if the truth defined be a revealed one, and then it is called *assensus fidei divinæ et catholicæ*, or the infallibility of the Church defining, if the truth defined be *not* revealed but in contact with revelation, and then it is called *assensus fidei ecclesiasticæ*. The latter, that is the "*assensus religiosus*" would have for its motive the sacred authority which Christ has given to his Church, to feed, rule and govern his flock.

We hold that Catholics cannot without a sin which will entail a total or partial sacrifice of the Catholic profession refuse this two-fold obedience to the decrees of the Holy See. Liberal Catholics, on the contrary, are satisfied with the former (the *assensus fidei*), which moreover, as appears from their second proposition, they limit to the *assensus fidei divinæ et catholicæ*; for they take for granted that the Church (the same must be said of the Pope) is not infallible when it defines a truth which is not revealed, whatever be the relation of that truth to revelation. With regard to this point, viz.: the extension of infallibility to truths *not* revealed but in contact with revelation it will suffice here to remark with Cardinal Mazzella that "this extension is held by the unanimous teaching of all theologians, who reject the contrary opinion either as a great error, or even as a heresy."¹ Of this point we expect to treat *ex professo* in another paper.

From what has been stated it must be clear to all that there is no question here of the *assensus fidei divinæ et Catholicæ*. This, it is granted by all, must be given by Catholics to all revealed truths that have been defined by the Church, and for the sake of greater clearness we may add that this assensus *cannot* be given but to such truths. The decree of the Vatican Council on this point is known to all "Fide divina et catholica ea omnia credenda sunt, quæ in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur, et ab Ecclesia sive solemnî iudicio, sive ordinario et universali magisterio tamquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur."²

The question, therefore, has reference only to the *assensus fidei ecclesiasticæ*, and the *assensus religiosus*. In other words, it refers to the obedience due to the Church when it teaches truths which are not revealed, but either are connected with revelation, or simply concern the Church's general good, and her rights and discipline. It will suffice for our purpose to show that *besides* the *assensus fidei divinæ et catholicæ*, there is *another* assensus required of Catholics.

¹ Card. Mazzella, De Vera Religione, Disp. 4 art 8.

² Const. "Dei Filius." Cap. 3.

No one will deny that if the Church has been instituted by Christ to be the infallible keeper of revelation, its authentic teacher and witness, and the supreme judge in all matters that belong to it, the Church must needs have the right not only to assert the existence of her authority (which is a revealed truth), but also to declare its nature, its properties, and the range of its power; the Church must have the right to *decide* the obligation on the part of the faithful to submit to that authority. This right cannot be denied without denying the mission which the Church has received from Christ. It would be absurd to suppose that Christ would give to the Church a mission to fulfill, without giving to her the means that are necessary to fulfill it.

This doctrine has received light and authority from the words of Leo XIII, "De utroque genere nimirum et quid credere oporteat et quid agere ab ecclesia *jure divino* praecipitur, atque in ecclesia a Pontifice Maximo. Quamobrem *judicare* posse Pontifex pro auctoritate debet quid eloquia divina contineant, quae cum eis doctrinae concordent, quae discrepent: eademque ratione ostendere quae honesta sint, quae turpia; quid agere quid fugere salutis adipiscendae causa necesse sit: *aliter* enim nec eloquiorum Dei certus interpres, nec dux ad vivendum tutus ille homini esse posset."¹

Hence, should the Church use this right, and decide that Catholics are strictly bound to submit to her teaching even when the object of that teaching is not a revealed truth, Catholics will be strictly bound to accept this decision, and to abide by it.

Moreover, should the Church, in order to enforce her decision, make submission to her teachings on matters which are not revealed the object of a special precept, Catholics will be forbidden under penalty of anathema to hold that they are not bound to observe it. "If any man say that those who are baptized are not bound to observe all the precepts of Holy Church [whatever those precepts may be], unless they be willing to accept them, let him be anathema."²

Now, has the Church ever *decided* that all Catholics are bound to submit to her teachings even in matters that are not revealed? Has she by a special, solemn precept required that *assent* and *obedience* be given to her decision on these matters?

In answer to these questions we shall quote, out of many doctrines that have been collected on this subject, only a few, the clearness and positiveness of which puts the above asserted obligation beyond the possibility of a doubt.

¹ Encyclical "Sapientiae Christianae." 10 Jan. 1890.

² Conc. Trid. Sess. vii. c. 8 de Baptismo.

Pius VI in his Constitution "Auctorem Fidei" (28 Aug. 1794), which is acknowledged in Catholic theology to be an *ex cathedra* document, condemns the doctrine of the Synod of Pistoia. This doctrine is expressed in eighty-five propositions, only a few of which are declared to be heretical, and, therefore, to be directly opposed to revealed dogma, the others, being simply qualified as "erroneous," "false," "temerarious," "scandalous," "leading to heresy," etc., and therefore, as directly opposed to a doctrine which is *not* revealed, but which comes in contact with revelation and is necessary for the defence and safe keeping of the same. The Pope, however, without making any distinction between heretical and not heretical propositions, commands Catholics to reject them all in the same sense in which he has rejected them, and to judge them to deserve the same censure which he has inflicted upon them. "*Mandamus, igitur omnibus utriusque sexus Christi fidelibus, ne de dictis propositionibus et doctrinis sentire, docere, praedicare praesumant, contra quam in hac nostra constitutione declaratur.*" It is clear that the obedience which the Pope commands Catholics to give to his teaching is absolute. They are forbidden even to *think* or *judge* (*sentire*) of those propositions otherwise than he does in the aforesaid Constitution! The same words "*Mandamus, etc.*," are found in the Constitution "*Unigenitus*" of Clement XI, with reference to the errors of Quesnell.

Liberal Catholics know that what is called in theology a "dogmatic fact," such, for instance, as that heretical propositions are contained in a certain book written by Jansenius, is not a revealed truth. Yet the Church has always required, and requires under the most severe penalties, that her children submit their judgment to her teaching on this fact and others of like nature. Here are the words of Clement XI, in the Constitution "Vineam Domini" of July 16, 1705. They refer to the fact of five heretical propositions being contained in the book of Jansenius, called "Augustinus"—a "dogmatic fact" which has already been defined by Innocent X (1653), and more clearly still by Alexander VII (1665).¹ "Ut quaevis in posterum erroris occasio penitus praecidatur, atque omnes catholicae ecclesiae filii ecclesiam ipsam audire, *non tacendo solum* (nam et impii in tenebris conticescunt), sed et *interius obsequendo, quae est vera orthodoxi hominis obedientia*, condiscant, hac nostra *perpetuo volitura* constitutione, obedientiae, quae praeinsertis apostolicis constitutio-

¹ "Quinque illas propositiones ex libro praememorati Cornelii Episcopi Iprensis cui titulus est *Augustinus*, exceptas fuisse declaramus et definimus."

nibus debetur, obsequioso illo silentio minime satisfieri . . . decernimus, et declaramus, statuimus et ordinamus." Here we would call the special attention of the reader to the nature of the obedience which the Pope declares to be "the obedience of the orthodox man." This is to be not only exterior (*tacendo*), but also interior (*interius obsequendo*), which implies the assent of the mind to the teaching of the Church, although the object of that teaching be only a "dogmatic fact," that is to say, a truth which is not revealed.

And, indeed, that the obedience of the true Catholic, as a matter of strict obligation, cannot be confined within the limits of revealed dogma defined by the Church, is also the explicit and solemn teaching of the Vatican Council. "Quoniam vero" it says "*satis non est* haereticam pravitatem devitare, nisi ii quoque errores fugiantur qui ad illam plus minusve accedunt: *omnes officii monemus servandi* etiam constitutiones et Decreta, quibus pravae ejusmodi opiniones, quae isthic diserte non enumerantur, et ab hac Sancta Sede proscriptae et prohibitae sunt." In other words the true Catholic is not to limit his obedience to that teaching of the Church, the denial of which would be heresy, but he has, moreover, the duty to observe all the Constitutions and Decrees by which pernicious opinions are condemned by the Holy See.

Hence follows the duty of every Catholic to accept the *Syllabus* of Pope Pius IX, and to reject the errors that are therein condemned. To forestall a possible difficulty of some of our "advanced thinkers" who consider it "a high act of patriotism" to ignore the *Syllabus* and the obligation which it implies, it may be useful to remark that all Catholic theologians, even those who cannot be suspected of being "obscurantists" and "obstructionists," and who like Cardinal Newman¹ and Bishop Fessler² doubt or deny the *ex-cathedra* value of the *Syllabus* agree in teaching that "every Catholic is bound to pay obedience to it;" that "he is required in virtue of the true obedience which he owes to the head of the Church to take for granted that all the propositions of the *Syllabus* have been if not *infallibly*, at least *justly* condemned." Leo XIII speaking of his predecessors who "magna sententiarum gravitate," and "cum probe intelligerent quid a se postularet apostolicum munus" had at various times condemned different errors, refers to the propositions of the *Syllabus* of Pius IX who "*non absimili modo* ut sese opportunitas dedit ex opinionibus falsis quae maxime valere coepissent *plures notavit*, eas-

¹ "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk."

² "The true and false infallibility of the Pope."

dem postea in unum cogi jussit, ut scilicet in tanta *errorum* colluvione haberent catholici homines quod sine offensione sequerentur.”¹ Encycl. “Immortale Dei,” 1 Nov. 1885.

This is not all, we have a very important document of Pope Pius IX, the Encyclical “Quanta Cura” which is commonly received as an *ex-cathedra* utterance. In this document the head of the Church “in virtue of the Apostolic authority” which he has received from Christ solemnly condemns the very error of the liberal school of which we are treating, and “wills and commands that it be held as reprobated, proscribed, and condemned by all the children of the Catholic Church.” It matters not whether they be “timid” or “fearless” thinkers. “We cannot pass over in silence,” these are the words of the Sovereign Pontiff, “the *audacity* of those who not enduring sound doctrine contend that ‘without sin and without any sacrifice of the Catholic profession, *assent* and *obedience* may be refused to those judgments and decrees of the Holy See, whose object is declared to concern the Church’s general good, and her rights, and discipline, provided only they do not touch the dogmas of faith and morals.’ But there is no one who does not clearly see and understand how grievously this is opposed to the Catholic dogma of the full power divinely given by Christ our Lord to the Roman Pontiff of feeding, ruling, and governing the Universal Church.”

These words prove: 1, that the Church has authority to teach not merely points of doctrine which touch the dogmas of faith and morals, but also whatever concerns the Church’s general good, her rights and her discipline: 2, that to *this* teaching “*assent and obedience*” cannot be refused without sin, and without some sacrifice of the Catholic profession: 3, that the liberal Catholic opinion limiting as it does the assent and obedience only to infallible judgments which touch the dogmas of faith and morals “is grievously opposed to the dogma of the full power of the Roman Pontiff:” and 4, that this opinion is expressly condemned by the Holy See as an “error” held by those “whose audacity makes them unfit to endure sound doctrine,” and as a “pernicious doctrine” which “every child of the Catholic Church is *bound* to hold as condemned.”

It might seem that nothing clearer could be said in condemnation of the liberal Catholic opinion; however if we read the Brief

¹ Those who desire to see the arguments in favor of the *ex-cathedra* value of the *Syllabus* might consult with profit *Card. Mazella*, “De Vera Religione,” Disp. 5, art. 6; *Schrader*, “De Theologia generatim,” p. 136 et seq.; *La Civiltà Cattolica* (1887, Serie 13, vv. 4, 5); *Etudes Religieuses*, (May 1875); *Dublin Review*, (April and July, 1875); *The Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, (1866, p. 87-95), etc.

Gravissimas of Dec. 11, 1862 of the same Pontiff we shall find words which if not clearer, are certainly stronger. We shall give the exact statement of the Pope: "Ecclesia, ex potestate sibi a divino suo auctore commissa, non solum jus sed officium praesertim habet non tolerandi, sed proscribendi ac damnandi *omnes errores*, si ita fidei integritas et animarum salus postulaverint; et *omni philosopho, qui ecclesiae filius esse velit*, ac etiam philosophiae officium incumbit nihil unquam dicere contra ea, quae Ecclesia docet, et ea retractare de quibus eos Ecclesia monuerit. *Sententiam autem quae contrarium docet omnino erroneam, et ipsi fidei ecclesiae ejusdemque auctoritati vel maxime injuriosam esse edicimus et declaramus.*" Which in plain English means that the liberal Catholic doctrine is by the supreme Head and Doctor of the Church "said and declared to be altogether erroneous, and in the highest degree insulting to the faith of the Church and to its authority."

In the "Syllabus Errorum," the 22d *condemned* proposition reads as follows: "The obligation by which Catholic teachers and writers are strictly bound is restricted only to those doctrines which are proposed by the infallible judgement of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all."

Leo XIII is not less explicit than his predecessor. Speaking in his Encyclical "Sapientiae Christianae" of this same obedience to the Church, he tells us that this obedience, which "must be *perfect* and *absolute*," is "the characteristic mark whereby true Catholics have always been and are recognized"—it is *the touch-stone of Catholicity*. Now which are the limits of this perfect and absolute obedience? To this question Leo XIII answers as follows: "In constituendis obedientiae finibus *nemo arbitretur* sacrorum Pastorum maximeque romani Pontificis auctoritati *parendum in eo dumtaxat esse*, quod ad dogmata pertinet, quorum repudiatio pertinax disjungi ab haereseos flagitio non potest. Quin etiam *neque satis* es sincere et firmiter assentiri doctrinis, quae ab Ecclesia, etsi solemniter non definitae iudicio, ordinario tamen et universali magisterio tanquam divinitus revelatae credendae proponuntur: quas fide catholica et divina credendas Concilium Vaticanum decrevit. Sed hoc est praeterea in officiis christianorum ponendum, ut potestate ductoque Episcoporum, imprimisque Sedis Apostolicae regi se gubernarique patiantur."

To these we shall add one more document expressing, as we think, the duty of obedience of which we speak, in the clearest and most forcible manner that could be conceived. It is taken from the

well known Encyclical "Immortale Dei" of the same Pontiff. "In opinando *quaecumque* Pontifices Romani tradiderunt vel tradituri sunt, singula *necesse est* et tenere iudicio stabili comprehensa, et palam, quoties res postulaverit, profiteri. Ac nominatim de iis, quas *libertates* vocant novissimo tempore quaesitas, *oportet* Apostolicae Sedis stare iudicio, *et quod ipsa senserit idem sentire singulos.*"

The point we undertook to prove against the liberal school is, therefore, made manifest. All the documents which we have quoted clearly assert *the duty* by which all Catholics are bound to submit their judgment to the teaching of the Church not only in matters that are revealed, but in those also that are *not* revealed and concern the safety, defense and explanation of revealed truths, the general good of the Church, her rights, and discipline. Will any one dispute the right of the Church to assert this duty? Is she not the *only* supreme and infallible judge of the rights she has received from her divine founder? Has, then, the Church erred in asserting this duty? If so, in spite of the divine assistance promised to her "all days even to the consummation of the world," she has repeatedly declared to be sinful what is not sinful; she has solemnly pronounced to be necessary for the safe keeping of the Catholic profession what could be omitted without *any* sacrifice of it. In other words she, who was constituted by Christ to be our guide in the path of truth and virtue, has shamefully deceived us; she has failed in her mission, she is no longer the true Church of Christ!

We are sure that our "advanced Catholic thinkers" will shrink with horror from this heretical conclusion. Let them then shrink with equal horror from their "pernicious principles" which will logically and ultimately lead them to that conclusion. "Muta antecedentia" is the golden advice of St. Augustine "si vis cavere sequentia."

The Church is built upon a rock, and that rock is the Sovereign Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ and the successor of St. Peter. Whoever dashes against that rock will sooner or later lament the effects of his temerity. "Qui ceciderit super lapidem istum, confrigetur, super quem vero ceciderit, conteret eum" (Math. 21.44).

DR. BOUQUILLON ON THE SCHOOL QUESTION.

FROM the beginning to the present men have differed, and it is not saying too much to assert that they will continue to do so to the end, where some authority which merits their respectful submission will not make them of one mind. This general proposition can be applied to the Church also; and so well known is the fact that it has given rise to the adage: In things necessary, unity; in things uncertain, freedom of opinion; in all, charity. We shall endeavor to follow this wholesome rule in what we are going to say.

Just now a very vital subject has come up for discussion in the Church in the United States; so vital that, in the opinion of the writer, the matter comes under the first head of things necessary, and does not admit freedom of opinion, but calls for absolute unity of thought and action. The discussion has been started by the earnest anxiety of the Most Rev. Archbishop of St. Paul, Minn., to settle—on a basis of kindly spirit towards our non-Catholic fellow-countrymen, and in order to meet some wants of the mass of Catholics, very many comparatively recent emigrants and their children in the new world—the school question that has so long exercised the minds of our best men and taxed the energies and resources of our people. But much as we share in common this kindly spirit towards our fellow-citizens, and are grateful for this zealous manifestation of charity, we cannot accept the mode which is proposed as a settlement of the difficulties of the day. The Faribault matter occupies a secondary place in the question. It is an outcome of the solution proposed, and in point of time does not antedate it. We believe there are circumstances connected with that occurrence, at least in the manner in which it was effected, for which the Most Rev. Archbishop of St. Paul is not responsible. His acceptance of all responsibility is in the nature of a chivalrous assumption of the shortcomings of a subordinate. Even in the Church the subordinate is not always strict in his duty of submission to his ordinary, nor docile to his wishes in that for which a moment's thought should make him see that one above him must bear the responsibility. Is there something in the air of America which affects us all this way, from the highest to the lowest, in the army, in the State, in the Church?

The pamphlet of Professor Bouquillon, of the Catholic University at Washington, is the bugle-note that the battle is on and the combatants prepared. He wrote because he was told to write. Who told him? His "ecclesiastical superiors." He says in his introduction: "He has written this pamphlet at the request of his eccle-

siastical superiors." What he writes, therefore, can properly be taken as an authoritative exposition of their views, the more so as we are informed in two interviews—one in St. Louis with the Rt. Revd. Rector of the Catholic University, and the other in New York with the Most Revd. Archbishop of St. Paul—that the views of Professor Bouquillon are in agreement with their own.

Revd. Dr. Bouquillon, as was to have been expected, has treated the question with much learning and research. His pamphlet is no ordinary one, and this makes it the more desirable that those who differ with him on this question should express their opinion, with due deference, but manfully, and with weight of reason also. The learned Doctor states he writes only theoretically, to establish his principle; he is too recently arrived to judge of what should be done in practice; besides, that is not his line; that belongs to his "ecclesiastical superiors"—all the same, however, he has furnished the powder and loaded up the guns. We should have been better pleased if it had been smokeless powder, for there appears to us to be a certain amount of mist that obscures quick perception of delicate points. For instance, there is a looseness in his manner of reasoning which impresses us with the conviction that he writes under the imperious influence of the *ἐπίδωλον* in his mind, apart from the desire of those over him. As a general rule French ecclesiastics—and no one loves them better than ourselves—labor under the influence of the *cultus gubernii*. "Le gouvernement" has a great claim on their regard, and in general the authority of France, even under the republics she has seen, has been thrown in favor of that Church of which she is the eldest daughter. But a long time ago—in 1662 and the years which followed it—the magnifique monarch imposed upon the clergy his way of thinking, and notwithstanding the fact that he was too good a Catholic and too sensible a man not to revoke his decrees, the influence of them remained; and this, taken with the power of Jansenism and Gallicanism, has brought about a habit of thought which is at variance with the cordially received definitions of the Vatican Council, though we willingly grant not maliciously. It is rather the unconscious form of thought begotten of habit; a form which leads to a kind of worship of the States. At the same time, be it said, that there are no more staunch defenders of what is of faith than the clergy of France and their missionaries and religious the world over. They are in the van in spreading the faith and in training men for this great work, and everywhere throughout this country is the impress of their labor and foresight.

To come to the mistiness, the Rev. Professor cannot find fault with us in thus speaking as he has expressed himself in like manner with regard to the reasoning of the *Civiltà Cattolica* and of Costa Rossetti. On page 12 he has the following argument which he considers apodictical: "Civil authority has the right to use all *legitimate* (italics ours) temporal means it judges necessary for the attainment of the temporal common welfare, which is the end of civil society." This major premise requires distinction; it is too sweeping; and it makes the government a judge in its own case, in determining what is legitimate and what is not. "Now," the minor proposition goes on to say, "among the most necessary means for the attainment of the temporal welfare of the Commonwealth is the diffusion of human knowledge." This we are disposed to grant though something might be said in reference to the wording "most necessary;" we should be inclined to modify it, and use the words very useful, as nations have been moral and prosperous and happy without this diffusion of human knowledge as imparted at the present day. We are in favor, however, of this diffusion under proper auspices. The conclusion of the syllogism follows: "Therefore, the civil authority has the right to use the means necessary for the diffusion of such knowledge, that is to say, to teach it, or rather have it taught by capable agents." *Latius patet*—too much Professor! You have left out one important word in your conclusion—the word *legitimate* which restricts the word *necessary* and then you need another syllogism to get in your explanation or enlargement of the conclusion "*to teach or have taught.*" Some things of this kind have struck us in reading this pamphlet, and they serve to obscure the issues and mislead. Of course, there is no such intent on the part of the Rev. Professor; of this we are persuaded. But the closer we adhere to logical rules the better, in a pamphlet, as in a thesis from the professorial chair.

To come to the question at issue, had the learned writer confined himself to the statement he makes, p. 15, that the action of the State must be supplementary, few except extremists would find fault with him. Is not the supplementary work of giving Catholic schools the portion of the taxes the Catholics pay, what we have been asking for? Those who are favoring a direct superintendence of the State have the same object in view; they want the "current expenses of the school" paid. The State will find itself out so much just the same. Letting us have the fund and educate in our own way, in a Catholic way, that is the just and manly thing to do. So thought

Chief Justice Taney, who urged agitation in moderation, to obtain this result. So also thought James Russell Lowell, as he expressed himself in the interview lately published.¹ A prominent editor in an Eastern city recently said to the writer, that so diffused had a similar conviction become, that he would not be surprised to see it take a permanent hold on the country, should a prominent and popular educator advocate it. It is a well-known fact that others besides Catholics are taxing themselves to support their schools without this "supplementary" aid of the State. The Methodists, the Lutherans, the Episcopalians, and of late the Presbyterians. In view of the fact that this movement in favor of religious education is spreading, we cannot but look upon it as unfortunate that a thesis has been published, advocating subjection of Catholic schools to the State control, and in the vital matter of the studies and text books, of course. It is to be supposed that those who favor this step, take for granted they can control all this. But can they? If attention be not attracted to what they are doing, it might be possible. But attention will be attracted to their actions, and has been already. In the letter of Mr. S. B. Wilson, secretary of the Board of Education of Faribault, lately written to calm the excited feeling of the non-Catholic population who thought that the Public School had surrendered to the Catholic Church, and which was published in the *Christian Union* of October 8, last, he says: People need not fear, as the present arrangement is not a permanent one, and the children may be divided up according to wards and scattered among the public schools of the town.

The teachers, who, Mr. Wilson goes on to state, compare favorably with "our teachers" in ability and education, may have to modify their dress. Why? Because they are religious women, and wear the garb of their order? Shades of Queen Elizabeth, of James the Second, and of the sainted rulers of England! How they must flit in glee as they see their spirit still lingers in the XIXth century, and in America the land of the free!

This only shows what is liable to happen, and how those who are going in this direction, are trusting to chance and tempting Providence. But as we said, the Faribault case is a secondary matter. What is boldly advocated is State-control of education—and, so prominently, that the parents' right and the Church's right sink into comparative insignificance. As Professor Bouquillon declares: "the right of the State is *to supplement*;" that is, the State is to take

the place of parent when the parent neglects his duty, or teaches vice and immorality; to aid the parent when he is doing his duty and teaching or having taught by those to whom he entrusts his offspring. Let us hear what Professor Costa Rossetti has to say on this point. Thesis No. 151 of his Moral Philosophy has these words: The primary duty of civil authority is the care of the juridical order—the law; its secondary duty is to assist, to give aid; “*munus primum auctoritatis civilis est cura ordinis juridici; secundarium, oblatio subsidiarum.*” In his Thesis No. 154, speaking about personal rights he teaches: The personal good of each one which makes up the matter of general rights is not within the sphere of civil authority formally and directly; although civil authority may extend itself indirectly to that matter. “*Bona singulorum personalia, quae materiam iurium generalium constituunt formaliter et directe in sphaera auctoritatis civilis non continentur; quamvis haec ad illa indirecte se extendat.*” How civil authority may indirectly extend itself to this matter of general rights, the personal good of each one, he explains: by reason of the influence on it of what authority has a right to do. In this way Costa Rossetti safe-guards individual rights, which he tells us the State has no authority over except in so far as, legislating within its sphere for the public good, its action indirectly affects individual right.

Thesis 175 says: “Civil authority can indeed found schools and direct those founded by it; but of itself it cannot prohibit citizens from opening schools, even public schools; putting in order and directing the schools they open, without however permitting absolute liberty in teaching.” This absolute liberty to teach he explains to be: First, the establishment of schools without any regard to already existing schools, their nature and number; Second, The power to teach everything even though contrary to religion or morality.

In this thesis Costa Rossetti admits the right of the State very clearly to found schools, but it is nothing more than the supplementary action which the State must extend to the people should they need it. Certainly a great deal can be said in favor of a State founding or favoring education, provided it be disposed to found and favor schools that are Christian. The difficulty with us is that the State officially is debarred from protecting any one church. It has therefore no choice, and the American public school maintained by the State is the non-sectarian school which Catholics cannot in conscience accept. Nor can they accept any

compromise which may eventually ignore their faith, and make the pupils think less of it.

The manly and straight-forward course is therefore to let our fellow-countrymen, with all due deference understand this, and place before their minds the reasons which should lead them to appreciate what an injustice it is to those who cannot conscientiously accept their schools, to withhold from them their share of the public funds, or to refuse to allow them to carry on their schools in their own way, where such share of the public funds is given. The funds should supplement the work of Catholics, and not be a title to control. Any compromise means that we cannot obtain all our rights, and that we give up something which is our due, to save the rest. This is not right on the part of the State, nor is it safe for us to accept it. Individual rights are sacred things. As an American the members of whose family have fought the battles of the country for three generations before him, beginning with the Revolutionary war, we are intensely attached to the maintenance of the people's rights, and it is moreover Catholic teaching that it is the duty of the State to respect them. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty ; and the American people should recognize and stand by the principle that a wrong done to one, curtailing his liberty, is a wrong done to all, tending fatally to eventual loss of liberty, to the absorption of all right by a powerful centralizing State. We should watch the efforts made for this purpose from whatever sources, and especially the efforts of narrow men to amend the Constitution, as is just now proposed, to prevent those religiously inclined having aid from the State to help care for their orphans and destitute, for whom a non-sectarian State would either provide no religious training, or that which is objectionable.

The pamphlet of Professor Bouquillon has been replied to by F. Holaind, S. J., in a solid and able manner. This is not our opinion only, it is that of able men. And we make this remark because a slur has been cast on his work. We do not think we violate confidence when we state that Rev. F. Holaind did not especially represent the great order of the Jesuits, as has been remarked, but that he did represent others outside of it, who are grateful to him for the principles he defends, which are the basis of just and stable government.

THE RIGHT OF INSTRUCTION.

Education: To whom does it belong? By the Rev. Thomas Bouquillon, D.D.

The Parent First. By Rev. R. J. Holaind, S.J.

THE burning issue just now with Catholics in the United States is the School Question. Started by what appeared to be the cold and stiff necessity of actual conditions, it was quickly fanned into a hot flame by a northwestern blizzard, and very recently received new energy from a southern sirocco blowing along the lines of abstract theory. The question has become public in the fullest sense of the word, not only on account of its universal importance, but also by the general interest which it has awakened. The two pamphlets mentioned above occupy important places in the present controversy; both have earned praise and blame, and both have got, rather than begotten, ardent friends and foes. It will, therefore, be of some interest to pass them in review and compare their relative position and strength. Having carefully read both, section by section, we are left under the impression that, with the exception of only one important point, there is very little difference between the opinions of the excellent writers. While the first gives a short and clear exposition of the theoretical principles only, the second calls chiefly attention to their practical bearing. The latter seems to us only a necessary supplement (corrective in part) of the former. We say *necessary*; for by confining himself to the statement of the mere theory within such narrow limits, Dr. Bouquillon has laid himself open to being misunderstood in more than one point. If he had only given us a hint, at times, how the principles were to be applied, the general reader would more easily catch the real and full meaning of the author. We fear that his pages will be used in support of conclusions and of practical purposes, which are not contained in the premises. Fr. Holaind's pamphlet serves to correct such abuse, at the same time that it takes exception to some of the opinions stated.

Let us remark right here for the general reader, that when there is question of the rights of the State in connection with education, a source of much confusion lies in the indiscriminate use of the term *education* itself. While in a general sense it may refer to any imparting of knowledge, physical or moral, secular or religious, yet it is more properly used to indicate the moral and religious training, the forming of character, while in order to designate physical and

secular training and the development of the intellect, we use the term *instruction*. Webster in his dictionary (s. v. education) clearly defines: “*Education* is properly to draw forth, and implies not so much the communication of knowledge as the discipline of the intellect, the establishment of the principles and the regulation of the heart. *Instruction* is that part of education which furnishes the mind with knowledge.” Tommaseo says: ¹ “*Instruction* regards the mind; *education* embraces the whole man; the object of the former is truth, that of the latter whatever is true and good and useful and becoming. Instruction without education avails nothing, rather it is injurious. . . . The education given by a poor woman may do more good than the instruction given by a learned man. Where those who are to instruct, have not also the required virtue, the authority, and the intention to educate, at least indirectly, there society will necessarily suffer.” It is easy to see what disastrous confusion must arise from a loose, indiscriminate use of these terms when we inquire into the right to educate, the qualifications of the teacher, the method to be applied, etc. What may be true of instruction, may be false of education. Nor would it be at all logical to conclude from one to the other, or to say that the right to instruct includes the right to educate. Hence, if education is here taken in its specific meaning as the moral training of man, it would be unwise to assent unconditionally to propositions such as the following: “This authority (over education) is included in that general authority with which the State is invested for promoting the common good, for guaranteeing to each man his rights, for preventing abuses.” Morality is directly and by intrinsic necessity based upon and connected with man’s relation to God and his last end; hence it belongs *per se* and immediately to religion. The State may deal with it only in as much as the immoral actions of man trespass on the rights of society and thus become civil crimes. Morality as such comes within the competency of the secular power only then and in so far, when and in as much as the State may control public religion. This, Catholic writers tell us, would happen in the mere natural order of things. For organized society *qua talis* is as truly bound to practice morality and religion (social or public), as the individual is. There must, therefore, be an authority to regulate and control this public religion even in the mere natural, *i. e.*, civil society, and if God do not appoint himself the subject on whom this duty and authority rests, it devolves by necessity upon the existing civil authority. But in the present economy God has established a

religious authority distinct from the State, the Catholic Church. And even in "regard to those moral truths which belong to the natural order, but which the pagan philosophers have never fully known, and which modern pagans forget and distort," Fr. Holaind observes "that the Church has the mission to teach those truths; for, although they do not singly transcend natural reason, yet it is morally impossible for men to acquire the knowledge of all, and even to retain the knowledge once acquired, without the help of an infallible exponent." Education, therefore, belongs no longer independently to the civil authority, but is the direct and primary object of the Church. Nor can one separate in reality the mere natural education from the supernatural in one and the same person.

All the right which under the existing economy remains to the Christian State, that is, to the Government of a Christian people, in regard to morals and religion, and consequently in regard to education properly so called, is to second the object and efforts of the Christian Church. When Catholic writers affirm that "auctoritate sua debet status civilis compescere doctrinam et docentes impios, et quantum in se est bonam doctrinam bonosque mores fovere verbis et exemplis" (*Zigliara*, Philos. vol. iii, l. i, ct., a. 5, n. viii.), they always imply the restrictive clause: "servata subordinatione ad ecclesiam," and all of them equally maintain that such a right is only indirect, or mediate. We know that assertions like these are not palatable to those who refuse to acknowledge the superiority of the Church over the State, but in discussions like the present we have no right to set aside the Church of God, or to deny that the American people is Christian.

Speaking of the relative functions of instruction and education, a very important distinction is likewise to be made between *elementary* and *higher* education (taking the term in that wider sense, in which it is generally understood). Catholic writers on the whole agree that in proportion as higher education advances from class to class, from college to university, it becomes less necessary that the mental discipline, the training and development of the mind, should be absolutely united with the moral discipline. This follows from the nature and method of higher mental training as well as from the personal condition of the learning youth, although even then education must never be wholly separated from instruction. On the other hand, not only Catholics but all serious-minded Christian men are of one accord in maintaining that the instruction of the child cannot be separated from education. During those early years, they say,

when the child begins to learn how to read and write and number, when reason first opens and unfolds its powers, and the heart wakes up, moving to and fro along the avenues of sense and feeling—whatever instruction the child then receives is and of necessity must be education. On account of the singular nature of the infant-soul and its mysterious activity, whatever touches it will leave its impress on the heart more than on the mind. In other words : you cannot instruct the child without educating it.

But here a question arises which is of greater consequence than may at first appear. Suppose a case where instruction is *inseparably* joined with education for good or bad—can he, to whom we must allow the right to instruct, but who has neither right nor mission to educate, assert and exercise his right to teach so long as no other provision is made for the proper education of the child? Would not the right to teach in such a case remain, as they say, *in suspenso* for the time being?

Against the assertion that in childhood instruction cannot be separated from education, it has been urged that in the soulless school-room the strict order of the class, the unity of mechanism which makes a hundred children as it were but one, the constant exercise of the mind in gathering the diverse fragments of elementary knowledge, all preclude any direct influence upon the heart. Hence public elementary instruction is not necessarily education, as it would be if given by the parent at home.

But does not this imply the admission that in the public school the child's heart is left wholly inactive or put to sleep? That the circumstances mentioned alter for a time the child's natural condition? That they suppose the impressionable child to be a grown person who has learned in a degree to control his impulses and direct his attention? That the mechanism of the school deadens the bright eyes, the quick ear, the anxiously curious mind, the sharp sense and the soft feeling of the boy or girl? Wherever the child may be, in church or at school, at home or on the street, his heart governs the mind, feeling runs away with reason, impulse hinders reflection, impression is stronger with him than argument. In reality, instruction itself becomes impossible at that age without education. Moreover, in the case of the child, no education is equivalent to bad education. We repeat, elementary school instruction is necessarily education, either good or bad ; there is no medium, and the instructor who teaches in those schools without providing at the same time the proper education, forfeits his right and authority to teach because his instruction

which is necessarily defective and partial, becomes injurious to the young heart. This is a question of principle with Catholics. It is the reason why the Church has condemned *in principle* any elementary school system among Christians which discards Christian education, as P. Holaind clearly shows.¹

That primary schools, in as much as they supply the place of the family, must make it their object to impart education, not merely instruction, is beautifully set forth in the pastoral letter of the *Belgian Episcopate*, 7 Dec., 1878. They say: "The voice of religion is one with the voice of nature in proclaiming that the education of children belongs not to the State, but to their parents, and that it is for them at once a right and a duty. The teacher is simply the representative of the father; he is a delegate charged by the latter to advance and finish the noble task of educating his children; and to fulfill the task he ought to instruct and bring them up in such a manner that they may find the training at school a supplement of home training. . . . Can it be denied that the education of the family must be based on religion, and that the first desire of the father who entrusts his child to a school, is to see it receive not only solid instruction, but rather an education which will render his child docile, respectful, God-fearing—in a word to obtain for it a religious education? To open, at the cost of the public treasury, schools from which religious teaching and religious influence are banished, in order to instruct the children only in the elements of letters and profane sciences, is nothing else than to use the money of the parents to pay for an education which their heart and their consciences must equally condemn."²

It is not always easy, as we have before intimated, to recognize at a glance whether Dr. Bouquillon speaks of education in its more general or in its restricted sense. Whilst we admit and maintain the direct mission and authority of parent and Church to educate, we cannot consistently with Catholic principle allow the same right to the State; nor do we believe that Dr. Bouquillon actually holds this. On p. 5 he informs us that his object is to determine what are the relative rights of parent, State and Church "in the intellectual formation of man;" he asks only whether the State has a "right of teaching human knowledge" (p. 11), such as will give to the nation "citizens able to take interest in the commonwealth, workmen that

¹ Page 16.

² See an article by Prof. Lamy in the *Dublin Review*, July, 1879, on "The Education Question in Belgium," where excellent material will be found throwing full light on the so-called "Poughkeepsic and Minnesota plans."

are intelligent, surveyors that are skilful, physicians that are experienced, jurists that are learned," a people superior in agriculture, industry, arts and war (p. 12); he affirms (p. 19) that the State has a special duty "of providing education in the letters, sciences and arts", and (p. 27) that the obligatory minimum of instruction comprises as a rule the famous three R's. Hence, while we cheerfully grant with Dr. Bouquillon to individuals and societies, secular and religious, the right to instruct or to impart secular knowledge, we do as firmly deny with Fr. Holaind that the State has the duty and authority to *educate*, in the sense of forming the moral and religious character of our children.

So much for the difference between instruction and education. Reviewing the two pamphlets before us we are struck by a decided difference in form. The first is a masterly exposition not only as regards the clear and lucid arrangement of the subject matter, but also in the short, terse and complete statement of doctrine. Dr. Bouquillon considers three main questions, the right, mission and authority of education in regard to the family, the State and the Church. From this results a natural and delightfully plain division of the whole subject in three main sections (right, mission and authority), each with three subdivisions (family, State and Church). While a preliminary chapter treats of the right of educating in the individual, a fourth section, on "The Liberty of Education," closes the small but weighty work. In it the right and mission (special office), as also the authority, ("the right of watching over, controlling and directing education," p. 21), are vindicated in favor of the parent, the State and the Church. "Each of these societies has its proper authority, the character and extent of which authority are indicated by the nature of the society itself" (p. 22). The author's principles and arguments, as applied to instruction, will in the main be accepted by all, if we except his opinion concerning the extent of State compulsion. For ourselves we readily grant the State full power and authority to promote secular knowledge, elementary and superior, as far as the needs of society demand; also the right to compel parents, *if need be*, to educate their children and to take the place of the parent in the fulfillment of this duty *in certain cases* (pg. 25). But we absolutely deny that it has the right "to determine a minimum of instruction and make it obligatory," and "to exact that minimum by way of prevention and of general precept" (p. 26); or that it has the right to examine the teachers (p. 24), and to prescribe a uniform method and standard for any schools not its own. But be-

fore stating our reasons we desire to quote a pertinent passage from the chapter on the authority of the Church in Education. Having first claimed for the Church the direct right over the religious and moral education of Catholic youths Dr. Bouquillon continues on p. 29: "As to the teaching of letters, sciences, arts, the Church has only an indirect authority over that, she can busy herself with it only in its relations to religion and morality. Schools, colleges and other like institutions are subject to the ecclesiastical authority, not only in religious teaching, but also in secular teaching, with this notable difference, however; that religious teaching comes directly and exclusively under her control, whereas secular teaching, which directly is under the control of the civil or domestic authority, depends on the Church only indirectly in the name of faith and morals. This comes to saying that the Church has the right to see to it that any teaching whatsoever do not injure faith, morals, the salvation of men, things of which she has the guardianship."

Père Holaind does not give us a closely reasoned essay. His pages supply us rather with notes and comments, embodying solid and grave doctrines, but jotted down, as is evident, under the high pressure of a few hours given to him to accomplish the work. A most valuable appendix containing passages from eminent writers on the subject makes up for any deficiency in the form of the preceding part. The main divisions answer to the questions of the right of education in the individual (§ 2), the parent (§ 3), the Church (§ 4), and the State (§§ 5-6). Referring to the practical question of the whole subject, the right of the State, Fr. Holaind, in a preliminary paragraph (p. 5), calls attention to a very important point in this connection, namely, whether the State of which we speak be Christian or Unchristian. He insists that the right to educate (in the stricter sense) may be allowed the "Christian State united with the Church, obedient to her in things spiritual, and (although itself supreme in the temporal order) acknowledging her indirect authority when she calls on rulers to come to her assistance."

No one denies to Society the right of having its own schools and teaching secular knowledge, simply because the State is unchristian or professes no religion. Everybody admits that in regard to secular instruction the State does have "its rights and duties from its own natural make-up, independently of its connection with supernatural religion." But the case is different when we speak of education in its truer sense. Dr. Bouquillon states this clearly enough when he says (p. 15): "It is plain that the right of the State in education

is not an unlimited right. The State, just as individuals or the family, cannot teach error and vice, *cannot set up schools that are atheistic or agnostic.*" Again, when he affirms that no pope has ever declared "that the State went beyond its right in founding schools, *provided the instruction be organized in the spirit of Christianity*" (p. 14). Or again, when he so truly observes: "In these days of religious indifference, in the presence of an education that is indifferent or hostile to religion, bishops found schools, colleges, academies, universities. Clearly this is a case of necessity, regrettable necessity, implying the regret that the State is indifferent to Christianity in the premises" (p. 20.). These are few but golden words.

The main portion of Fr. Holaind's pages and especially the appendix, are devoted to the question of compulsory education as regards the parent and the State. This constitutes, no doubt, the principal issue of the two pamphlets. On other points American Catholics hardly need any special enlightening; they are questions beyond controversy and sufficiently understood.

But what to most of them was probably new was the assertion that the State possessed an immediate right to force a general, and what has been called compulsory, education. Against this doctrine Fr. Holaind raises his voice in section 6, on State Control. Here, instead of pursuing the writer's arguments, we take leave to digress for a moment. No doubt the Church allows free scope of opinion on this matter of compulsory education. A Catholic may defend State compulsion as a direct right and as of general necessity, or he may deny both. Hence, while no one has the right to give ugly names to those who stand for the first opinion, it is equally unwarranted, if not unjust, to brand its opponents as men behind the age, opposed to civilization, and in fact, as blind zealots, injuring the very interests of the Church. We personally confess to being "stationary" in this matter, for all the arguments so far as they rest either on the merits of the case or on authority adduced in favor of general State compulsion, have not been able to convince us of the existence of such right. We hope to show in the next number of this REVIEW why these reasons have failed to convince us. For the present we rest content to endorse the reported saying of a most prominent Congressman, a Protestant, who, when spoken to on the subject, replied: "I would be very sorry to see the Catholics of America committed to the theory of compulsory education, when it is of the highest importance that every American should uphold individual rights and parental authority." Not to speak of the severer

forms of State compulsion, we cannot even allow the State *to compel all parents by a general law* to give to their children a certain minimum of secular instruction and to directly control such instruction.

In this grave question it is of primary importance, first, to remember the general principle of sound political economy, that the State or Government has no right to limit the natural liberty of its subjects, except in case of a real, social necessity. Mere utility is not a sufficient cause to use force or compulsion. In the second place we are to understand clearly by what title or on what ground the State may claim the right to compel parents to educate their children. The nature and object of a right is best explained by the reason of its existence. This reason is derived from the end of the civil authority. Now, as Dr. Bouquillon (p. 18) has very well said, "The purpose of civil authority is (1) to maintain peace between citizens, protect their mutual rights, their legitimate activity; (2) to supply the insufficiency of individuals." He then remarks that "The duty of teaching is not for the State an essential duty, it is accidental," corresponding to the secondary purpose of the State. From these premises we necessarily infer that this duty of the State to teach is not absolute, but conditional; it does not belong to the State primarily or directly, but only in the second place and by devolution. The State may therefore with the *free* co-operation of the citizens exercise it as far as it promotes the common good; but it can *enforce* instruction *only* when it is necessary to supply the deficiency of the parents. All this, indeed, follows from the very nature of our subject; it follows from the essential and immutable relation between the State and the family. By nature the child belongs to the family first, and only through and in the family to the State. By nature the duty and right not only to educate but also to instruct belong to the family. We say advisedly *the family*, not the parent only. For we hold it to be the intention of the natural order that when father and mother are unable to fulfill their duty towards their offspring, this devolves on the next of kin before it falls upon society. The idea of "child" is just as inseparable from that of "family" (agnati or cognati) as the idea of "State-ward" is incompatible with the latter. That the child should be a ward of the State, indicates an abnormal condition of the family or of society. Fr. Holaind rightly observes that "young orphans are at a disadvantage from the start, as keen observers of human nature well know. In political life, history tells the same tale." What we have thus far said leads to an

important conclusion, on which we desire to lay particular stress. It is this : *the State has no right to take hold of the child without showing cause*, as lawyers would say ; that is, without proving its right to interfere, or showing evidence that compulsion is necessary. In what are essential rights, the family stands on equal terms with the State. The *prima facie* right is with the family. So is the *prima facie* presumption for the family and can be set aside only by strong evidence. What is said of the family applies equally to the private schools to which the parents entrust their children.

But here we meet the objection: How can the State fulfil its duty of promoting the common interest without official inspection as to whether there be any deficiency in instruction, or without demanding, by way of prevention, at least a *minimum* in every school, private or public?

The answer is simple enough. The presumption being in favor of the family, the State has no right to take any such deficiency for granted; it has, therefore, no right to intrude by making inquiry into such deficiency until there be good cause to suspect its existence. If the foregoing objections were well grounded, it would only be logical to take a step farther and by the same inference claim for the State the right to send an "inspector" into every household to inquire whether parents fulfill their duty towards each child in its physical, intellectual and moral development. Why not prescribe for every family a uniform *minimum* of physical, intellectual and moral education? In a word, why not make of the State a supreme and universal bureau of detectives? In many lands the law gives to the State the right to take a child away from his parents, if they are proved to be of such character, that their offspring may not be safely entrusted to them. We certainly endorse such law. Yet we know of no law allowing official or State inspection and control of what passes within the family circle. Why not? Because everyone feels that the government has no right to intrude into those sacred precincts without showing good cause for doing so; because the law does not pretend to ferret out such cause, but will act only when it obtains public or official cognizance of the evil. These are plain axioms of public government and State rights. It cannot, therefore, be surprising that we should remonstrate against the assertion and inference that "if the State may coerce parents who neglect the education of their children, so also may it determine a minimum of instruction and make it obligatory," implying, as the words taken in the ordinary sense do, that the State has directly the right to con-

trol and inspect all schools. There is no logical connection between the former and the latter. We hold, therefore, as a matter of principle, that the government has no right to inspect or control private schools, or to examine its teachers, or to prescribe the order and method of teaching, *as long as it has no evidence* that the children in these schools do not acquire sufficient elementary knowledge to secure their social well being or that of their future fellow citizens. The duty of proving an insufficiency in this case rests with the State.

Before concluding our review we cannot refrain from making a few additional observations. It is a matter of satisfaction to us that the principles underlying the school question are being freely discussed by Catholic writers. We must not leave the field to the outsider. But it is regrettable to see Catholic papers conduct the discussion in a spirit of intemperate heat and prejudice. *In veritate et caritate*. The friends of State rights have nothing to fear from those who uphold family rights ; nor have the friends of the parochial schools any reason to deny to Cæsar what belongs to him. Many of the latter, we know, are greatly afraid that by admitting the theory of compulsory education, the State may eventually and justly claim that right in regard to Catholic parochial schools and interfere with their work. True, the State might thus *abuse* that right ; and the danger is near enough with us in the United States, where the government officially recognizes neither religion nor church. Is it not somewhat *inopportune* on the part of Catholics to vindicate for the State the right of compulsory education, while every careful observer of political events sees the time not very far off when our Government will claim that right loudly and forcibly enough? Still the question of right in general is never to be determined by the possible abuse of it. "This is bad reasoning," as Dr. Bouquillon rightly observes. General compulsory education and direct State control can be refuted by other arguments. But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the government have the fullest right of general compulsion in regard to education, *may it exercise that right in regard to schools, elementary or higher, established by the Church?*

We answer decidedly : no ; the State has no right whatever over the instruction, secular or religious, given in the schools belonging to the Church, we mean schools erected and managed under the immediate direction and by the authority of the Church, and which are, therefore, claimed by the Church as her own schools. The question is not about schools erected and managed by private individu-

als, although these may happen to be members of the Church. We speak principally of our Catholic parochial schools. As distinguished from the State schools on the one hand, and from mere private establishments on the other, our parochial schools are juridically or legally *ecclesiastical schools* and within the exclusive competency of the Church ; they belong to her, are hers by every right and title. Now the Church being a society both in its character and aim, superior to and independent of, the State, has the free and exclusive, the absolutely independent administration of whatever belongs to her.

Let none object that secular instruction does not lie within the scope of the Church's teaching, and cannot be claimed as her own ; that consequently the State may inspect and control the secular instruction, although it happen to be given in a Catholic or Church school.

The reasoning seems to us false *in asserto* and *in supposito*. The Church does have, and may therefore claim, a positive right to impart secular instruction to her own children at least. She has a right to whatever is necessary in order to carry out her great mission. Her special mission, it is true, is to give spiritual education, yet not to the poor, the lowly and the illiterate alone, but also to the rich, the high-born and the cultured. She is to teach the most sublime knowledge to every race and nation on earth, and to defend the truth of her doctrine. In discharging this mission she has to adapt herself to the condition, intellectual and moral, of the people whom she addresses. If, to support compulsory instruction in the State, it is said that instruction must keep pace with the march of civilization in society, it may be said with equal truth that the Church needs better trained and more fully instructed children as well as pastors and teachers, in proportion as the demands which civilized society makes upon her increase. As knowledge grows and develops among mankind in general, so it must grow and develop within the Church. The greater the progress of science is outside of the Church, the more assiduously must she labor to have men of ability and eminent learning within her fold. Without progress of secular science it would be difficult to imagine a real *scientific* progress of Christian knowledge. The Vatican Council, Const. I, ch. IV, aptly says: "Not only can faith and reason never be opposed to one another, but they are of mutual aid one to the other ; for right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith, and illumined by its light cultivates the science of things divine. . . . So far, therefore, is the Church from opposing the cultivation of human arts and

sciences that she in many ways helps and promotes it.”¹ For no other reason has our illustrious Pontiff, Leo XIII., so emphatically proclaimed the necessity of renewed efforts on the part of Catholic men of science in the various departments of philosophy, classical studies, history and social science, but because the Church has need of such efforts amid the present intellectual crisis. We should go even farther and grant for the sake of argument that the Church does not have *per se* the right to impart secular knowledge to her children. Nevertheless, if once she has established such schools for the purpose of imparting moral education, together with intellectual instruction, she would, by right of accession, have exclusive authority over the secular training which she thus gives to the children under her control. This follows from the absolute independence of the Church as a perfect society and her superior position as regards the State.

What we have thus attempted to explain has been beautifully and elegantly summed up by Dr. Bouquillon in the following passage (p. 16): “The Church, having thus received *directly* from God the right to teach revealed religion, is thereby *indirectly* endowed with the right to teach the sciences and letters, in so far as they are necessary or useful to the knowledge and practice of revelation. The right to teach religion comprehends the right to communicate whatever may serve religious education. We do not say that the teaching of profane sciences and letters belongs to the Church by the same title that the teaching of religion does; much less do we say that such teaching belongs to her exclusively; what we do say is, that the right to spread the revelation entails the right to whatever is profitable to revelation. Now human sciences and letters are destined by God to be handmaidens of faith and of the chief among sciences, theology.—This right is a special right, proper to the Church, direct as to revelation, indirect as to other knowledge.—Moreover, if we consider the Church merely as a human association, we cannot refuse to her the natural right to teach the truths she is adapted and fitted to impart to men. Such right belongs, as we have seen, to associations.” Dr. Bouquillon considers it as a self-evident truth that the Church has entire and exclusive control over her own schools. He dismisses the subject with the simple remark (p. 28): “It is not a question here of the authority of the Church over schools founded by her.” What he observes in the above ex-

¹ See the admirable words of *Leo XIII* in his Encyclical “*Libertas*,” in the paragraph on the ‘Freedom of Education.’

tract concerning the sciences and letters, applies more fully and strongly to primary instruction, on account of its inseparable connection with education.

As the question of the absolute independence of our parochial schools from State control is of paramount consequence, we may be allowed to quote at length from a foremost Catholic writer of the day. Cardinal *Zigliara* (l. c., l. i., c. v., a. 3, n. v.) establishes the thesis "*Ecclesia plenissima gaudet facultate docendi independente a potestate civili.*" To be clearly understood, he observes at once that he does not speak of that general commission to teach all nations, but of the special right to erect schools (*peculiariter de potestate aperiendi scholas*). The Church, he argues, is not only a perfect society, but she moreover is above civil society, in fact the latter is subordinate to the former. Now, as the Church needs intellectual and moral instruction as well as society at large (which is the premise implied in the Cardinal's reasoning), she must in this respect enjoy the same full rights as the State, although independently from it. "*Sed insuper addo, Ecclesiae competere jus seligendi magistros, designandi scholas, praescribendi methodos et doctrinas suis subditis, QUOD JUS STATUI DENEGAVIMUS*" (46, ix. et. x). The Church, being essentially spiritual, has an essential duty to procure the perfection of her subjects in the development of both intellect and will. Hence the Church is essentially a teaching society (*societas doctrinalis*) . . . Infidels do not admit this, but their denial cannot destroy the truth, nor need the Church renounce her right, because her adversaries deny it. The Cardinal concludes this part by insisting again on the right of the Church to open and control schools of her own. Nor can it be objected, he claims, that this holds only in regard to theological science; for all truths are mutually connected, and there is no knowledge that has not some relation with Christian theology. Hence the Church enjoys an independent, an inherent and native right of teaching primarily and directly in matters of faith, secondarily and mediately in matters of natural science (*magisterium scientiarum naturalium*).

If then we were to define the Catholic position in regard to the question, To whom does education belong, to the State or to the Church? we should answer: Education as moral and religious instruction belongs to the Church exclusively. As to secular instruction, whether it be primary or of the higher grades, the State has the right to teach. This right is primary, direct and essential, in as much as it offers to the social activity of the individual all the requi-

site and useful means and opportunities within the limits of distributive justice and in due subordination to religion. So far as it implies the authority to compel and control, it is secondary, indirect and accidental. Moreover, this right of the State, as above defined, is supreme and independent within its own sphere. But it is not exclusive. The Church also has the right to impart secular knowledge, although with her the right is mediate and secondary, as a means to serve her immediate purpose, Christian instruction and the cultivation of virtue. Where the State furnishes the proper secular instruction, the Church need not use her own right, though she may; if she does, she is herein independent and supreme. But this right is not exclusive on the part of the Church, since the State enjoys the same. Neither has the Church an absolute right to compel anybody to learn secular knowledge in her schools rather than those of the State, if the latter pay due regard to Christian faith and morals. Nor may the State, on the other hand, prevent any subject from acquiring human learning in schools established by the Church. If the Church be allowed full and unrestricted liberty of education, the State need have no fear whatever that its subjects or society would thereby suffer the loss of any *real* good, or that the Church's action would retard the advance of social welfare, or the progress of civilization.

“Quin imo ecclesia, quod re ipsa passim testata est . . . humanarum quoque doctrinarum omne genus favere et in majus provehere studet. Bona enim per se et laudabilis atque expetenda elegantia doctrinae: praetereaque omnis eruditio, quam sana ratio pepererit, quaeque rerum veritati respondeat, non mediocriter ad ea ipsa illustranda valet, quae Deo auctore credimus. Revera Ecclesiae haec beneficia debentur sane magna, quod praeclare monumenta sapientiae veteris conservavit; quod scientiarum domicilia passim aperuit; quod ingeniorum cursum semper incitaverit, studiosissime has ipsas artes colendo; quibus maxime urbanitas aetatis nostrae coloratur.”
(Leo xiii. l. c.)

S. G. MESSMER.

NOTE.—Since the printing of the above article Dr. Bouquillon has published a “Rejoinder to Critics.” The reader will find our answer in this number.

ED.

THE SCHOOL CONTROVERSY IN THE UNITED STATES.

IT is with extreme reluctance and against my better judgment that I take any part in a controversy which ought never to have been opened and which can serve the cause of God and religion only by choking itself as soon as possible. To me the whole discussion looks like a raging tempest in a very diminutive tea-pot. To be sure, we have heard some hard words bandied on either side. We have even been informed that "two antagonistic schools" are forming amongst us, the one "progressive" with its headquarters, I believe, in the far Northwest and its literary centre in Washington, the other "fogy" and "stationary," fossilizing about the Ordinary of New York or Milwaukee—I am not certain which, nor does it matter much, since the Jesuits are at the bottom of it.

I admit that in one direction, at least, there has been a "new departure." To those of the clergy who learned their notions of clerical and episcopal etiquette in the dignified school of a Kenrick or Wood or McCloskey (men who never appeared in public except in an official capacity), it certainly is novel and bewildering to be obliged at each instant to make distinctions between the eloquent utterances of Mr. Thomas Jones, American citizen, and the orthodox pastorals of the Right Rev. Thomas, Bishop of Jonesville. Now, mind, I am not finding fault at all. If any person in authority conceives it timely or necessary to doff his official robes and mount a stump, either in his shirt-sleeves or a swallow-tailed coat, that is no business of mine: *Mirror magis*. But whoever appeals to Cæsar, to Cæsar must go, and by Cæsar's judgment abide. A great many soldiers are delighted when they see their commander brandish his shillalagh and plunge into the thickest of the fight, giving and receiving black eyes. Many others might prefer that he should take his stand upon some vantage-ground from which he could quietly survey and direct the operations of his host, without making his person a receptacle for dust and bullets.

After this enigmatical exordium, I have no insuperable objection to stating my "views" on the educational question, if the REVIEW deem them worth the printing.

1. The main question (and, indeed, so far as the priests can be made to take any interest in it, the *sole* question) is the important one of *expense*. In the words of a distinguished statesman: "It is a condition, not a theory, which confronts us." If the establishment and maintenance of our parochial schools did not involve the outlay of great sums of money, each dollar of which represents hard toil and copious

sweat on the part of pastor and people, who doubts that there would be a flourishing parochial school, under exclusively Catholic superintendence, attached to each of our churches? If the question be one of *rights*, has any one ever denied that we have the right to educate our Catholic children in our own schools and to see to it that their education be thoroughly saturated with Catholicism? As for the "minimum of education," has any priest been haggling about the amount to be imparted? It seems to me to be a point of honor with each of our priests to show forth his children more talented and better instructed than any children in the neighborhood, or in the wide universe. Oh that some inventive genius would strike upon an easy method of raising funds for the support of our schools! A pamphlet from him would be more valuable to us than a cart-load of abstruse speculations.

2. I presume that the vast majority of my brother priests have as vague a notion as I must confess to, regarding the exact meaning of the phrase "State education, *as such*." But we all have, to our cost, an intimate familiarity with the "trend" and signification of "State-education, *as it is*," and as it is going to remain during the span of our mortal existence. Since busy men are not wont to coalesce into "antagonistic schools" over subjects which are not, and in all human possibility never will be, of practical importance to them, let us, first of all, ask whether there is on this wide continent a reputable priest who is willing to defend, as correct in principle, the only form of State-education which has been offered us. But let the same man write the theoretical and the practical part of the disquisition, for it is clearly unfair both to the moralist and to his readers that one man should discourse in abstract terms about mythical "States" which nowhere exist outside of his imagination, and that a brilliant commentator should make those abstractions intensely concrete by applying them as satisfactory solutions of existing difficulties. The only "State education" which concerns us is the actual public school system of this country. It is of the essence of this system, however it be modified, carefully to eliminate from its curriculum every vestige of Christian doctrine. It forces Christian children to be virtually un-Christian and "colorless in religion" during the six hours of each school-day. Will any Catholic undertake to advocate this *as a system*? We are not asking whether a Catholic under given circumstances, can *tolerate* it. Since the question is one of "inalienable rights," let us know by what right the "State" presumes to force innocent little Christians at certain

intermittent periods to become non-Christians and little Catholics to become non-Catholics, as the price of this inestimable boon of State-education. It will be said, of course, that I am fighting imaginary foes; that no Catholic ever approved, or ever will approve, this feature of the public school system. But it is precisely this which I am aiming to show and to bring out in relief. If then it is agreed among all Catholics, first, that we have a perfect right to establish, maintain and superintend our own parochial schools and, secondly, that the "State" has absolutely no right to thrust upon us a system of education which eliminates the all-important element of religious instruction, what becomes of those two mythical schools of the "Progressists" and the "Fogies?"

3. Brushing aside this irrelevant lore about "abstractions," let us, since we agree in our principles, come down to the practical *quaeritur*. Suppose that a priest is so circumstanced (and, unfortunately, I am one of them) that in his judgment and the judgment of his Ordinary it would be imprudent for him to shoulder the burden of a parochial school. Why, he will do the next best thing, which is, however, infinitely inferior to the only desirable thing. He will, in theory, gather his children together very frequently outside of those sacred six hours a day which the wisdom of the "State" has consecrated to "unsectarianism." In cold reality, he will meet them little oftener than once a week for an hour of a Sunday afternoon.

4. This brings us, at last, to consider the so-called "plans." Now, there is all the difference in the world between a *system* and a *plan*. A system is the rational and logical evolution of assumed principles; a plan is the expedient by which a man makes the best he can of circumstances not of his creating. The American "State," inspired by the laudable desire to secure the education of the masses, and by the reprehensible wish to accomplish the thorough fraternization of the population at the sacrifice of religious differences, founded the "unsectarian" school system, which is, confessedly, most admirably adapted to effect both the good and the evil purpose. The Catholic Church, just as desirous as the "State" that her little ones should receive the benefits of education, and equally determined that this should not be done at the expense of their Catholic faith, in her dissatisfaction with the State-system, founded the parochial school. Here are two rival *systems*, which are perfectly rational from start to finish. As I stated above, not a Catholic in the land would attempt to reconcile the unreconcilable, were he not put to his wit's end by financial embarrassment. But that same distress which prevents me from

building a parochial school suggested to my very dear and honored friend, Dr. McSweeney, the half-way measures known as the Poughkeepsie Plan. I do not presume to represent his sentiments, for he is well able to represent himself. But I state a notorious fact when I say that the Doctor did not inaugurate the plan with a loud flourish of trumpets. He scattered no literature broadcast over the land. He did not interview himself in newspapers. He is, indeed, the typical propagandist ; but he undertook no propagandism in other parishes of an expedient suggested to his superior intellect by the immediate necessities of his own congregation. When his Bishop rewarded his sacerdotal labors by transferring him to a larger and wealthier parish, he did not introduce his "plan" into his new field. I must really beg his pardon for taking such freedom with his name ; but I wish to show that the ingenious inventor of an excellent expedient was no idle theorist, but a practical American priest. I only wish that our Philadelphia Board of Education were made up of gentlemen as large-minded as were those gentlemen of Poughkeepsie who blushed to educate their own children with money extorted from poor Catholic laborers. I wish, further, that my people were in the condition of the Doctor's congregation of St. Bridgid in New York, that is, able to pay an iniquitous tax in support of a system which is of no earthly use to them, whilst they maintain, in addition, a school which accords with their conscientious convictions.

I have written condensedly, for I have been addressing intelligent men. The outcome of this lamentable discussion, so inadvertently opened, can only be to unnerve and discourage those noble priests and brave congregations that have been battling against fearful odds and deserved better treatment in the house of their friends ; and to afford to irresolute priests and to people chafing under a double taxation a specious pretext for relinquishing the struggle. All of which is respectfully submitted.

JAMES F. LOUGHLIN.

THE "REJOINDER TO CRITICS."

Education: To Whom Does It Belong?—A Rejoinder to Critics. By the Rev. Thomas Bouquillon, D. D., Professor of Moral Theology at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.

DR. BOUQUILLON has found it necessary to explain the statement of principles made in his recent pamphlet "Education: To Whom Does It Belong?" The fact that he had meant to treat only the theoretical aspect of the question, did not prevent an immediate application on the part of those who had reason to defend or approve the so-called "Faribault-plan," whilst experienced Catholic educators, who had the matter at heart, rose at once to protest against Dr. Bouquillon's exposition. The criticisms evoked from temperate men, who were at the same time practical educators, have therefore proved our previous assertion that the pamphlet bore "in the light of existing facts" an aggressive character, whatever may have been the intention of the writer to the contrary. Dr. Bouquillon takes exception to this statement, and asks: "Those existing facts—are they mine?" We should answer, certainly no. But they were existing nevertheless. One might very safely demonstrate the harmlessness of nitro-glycerine absorbed in some compact substance, by setting fire to it. It would burn quietly and make a fine light. Yet it were the height of folly to attempt such demonstration with the same substance in a position where the slightest touch might send it down an inclined board, and cause a concussion with the hard ground. The principle of harmless ignition would suffer nothing, but the disruptive force set free by the attempted demonstration under the circumstances would endanger the lives of those within reach.

Dr. Bouquillon believes that our criticism was "not fair" and intimates that in it we have followed the *procès de tendance*. This is an objection difficult to refute. We confess to a bias; but then it came largely from Dr. B's pamphlet and from the recollection of a similar method pursued in a work recently condemned by the S. Congregation, which, as is well enough known, was looked on favorably by the same authorities that have inspired the pamphlet on education. But our criticism was, we had hoped, very temperate. Some of our readers, strangers to us in a way, even found fault with us for "temporizing" in a matter of such importance. If we were more moderate than inclination suggested, it was because we dis-

tinctly recollected the works of Dr. Bouquillon, which he had written in France, and which are so full of erudition and value to the student that we found nothing but praise for them. Nevertheless, we knew that an able author's views might change or be modified without making it incumbent upon him to retract previously stated principles. Nor are we alone in this estimate of Dr. B.'s latest work. A prominent critic in Europe, who read this pamphlet, and who is quite familiar with American conditions, having lived here as an educator for many years, exclaims: *O quantum mutatus ab illo!*

However, it is futile for us to attempt a defense against the charge of being biased by simply stating that we are not. We anticipated the charge, and have made the only answer which we could make with consistency and possible satisfaction to Dr. Bouquillon. It is this: We invited some gentlemen of experience as educators and of acknowledged authority to review the pamphlet. In doing this we have tried to guard against every probable charge as if we were fostering a partisan view. We have asked those who would be apt to view the subject from different stand-points. We excluded the Jesuits. We excluded foreigners, although the loudest champions of State-control in education are, we believe, themselves foreign-born citizens. Dr. Messmer was urged to write, because he was best qualified, we thought, to present the theme on equal grounds of authority with Dr. Bouquillon, since he has not taken part in any controverty of the kind heretofore, and is at the same time a friend and fellow-professor at the Catholic University. Being an acknowledged expert in Civil as in Canon Law, no one would be likely to take into more accurate account the different elements of our civil and religious legislation. Moreover, he is a practical schoolman, thoroughly americanized, as they say, and a lover of peace like Dr. Bouquillon. We did not know whether the writers of this projected symposium would agree on the details of the school question; but we knew that they were Catholics, learned, and interested in the practical welfare of Catholic citizens. Dr. Loughlin's plea has, like his style, a peculiar force of its own. He takes the standpoint of a priest who cannot see his way to supporting a Parochial school and who would therefore readily welcome any offer of State assistance, which does not imply a sacrifice of conscientious principle in the shape of undefined State-control whereby the religious training of our little ones must or may suffer. He points out that the originator of the so-called Poughkeepsie plan was very far from intending it as a model-system, but simply adopted it as

the most favorable compromise under difficult circumstances. We beg the reader to give careful thought to the three papers of the symposium. The fourth article on the position of Catholics in regard to education in Great Britain shows merely what those think on the subject who have been taught by experience under State-control in its various phases. American citizens have enjoyed an unequalled liberty, simply because they had few laws which they had occasion to violate. No Catholic at present objects to having his children educated, but many object to having the State interfere with their religion, which will surely be done if we give the State the supreme right of controlling the education of our children.

Our answer, therefore, as a Reviewer, to Dr. Bouquillon, is to refer him to the arguments of men who are above the suspicion of personal prejudice. They all speak with deep respect of the author, who is very much superior to the reasoning shown in his latest pamphlet. Of the latter we have still a word to say apart from any criticism which previously appeared in our Review. It merely illustrates the weakness of principles when the logic of their meaning is ignored.

In repelling the charge of having misapplied certain quotations from reputable authors, Dr. Bouquillon places a dilemma before his critics. "*Evidently*," he says, "some one does not know how to read or is lying to the public. That some one is either Fr. E. A. Higgins, S. J., or Dr. Bouquillon. As no one is a judge in his own case, I produce the documents and appeal to the public. Let its verdict be Fr. Higgins' punishment or mine."

Now, this is exceedingly strong language, and it almost takes one's breath away when, on comparing the proffered documents with the words of Fr. Higgins, the public must come to the conclusion that the hurtful horn of the dilemma actually lifts Dr. Bouquillon off his ground and leaves Fr. Higgins serenely master of the field. Here are the texts :

Father Higgins states that not one of the authorities (quoted by Dr. Bouquillon) "gives to the State the right of education as he has formulated it, that is, the right to establish schools, pay teachers, *prescribe programmes*" (italics ours).

Dr. B. answers : "Here are the documents." And then he cites passages from Costa Rossetti, Hammerstein, Sauv e and Zigliara. As they all say practically the same thing, and Cardinal Zigliara would for several reasons be the least objectionable authority from Dr. B.'s point of view, we quote his words : "Statui jus simul et

officium inesse procurandi *media aptiora ad educationem* tum intellectualem tum moralem, negat profecto nemo." That is to say, the State has the right and duty to provide the most suitable means for the intellectual and moral education of its subjects. Surely no one gainsays this. We Catholics are constantly insisting on it when we claim that the taxes paid by Catholics for purposes of education be used to supply them with proper means, such as school-houses and salaries for teachers and inspectors, to that end. We only want an equivalent whereby our children may be benefited. Is there any philosopher who maintains that this phrase "the State has the right to *provide means*" implies that the State may *prescribe programmes*. "To prescribe programmes" includes anything that a Russian despot might exact from his subjects. Can the men who advocate such principles forget that the State laws which proscribed the Catholic faith and even a knowledge of the mother tongue in Ireland, and which are the cause of their very plea for more education among the immigrants, were the laws of Elizabeth which "prescribed a programme" for Irish schools? It is very true that "prescribing programmes" *may* mean nothing more than exacting the rudiments of a literary education, but it *may* mean a *great deal more* as it does even now in Minnesota where the religious teachers might at any moment be forced out of the schools at the mere representation of a bigoted parent, that the religious dress inspires his child with prejudices in favor of Romanism.

Who is to give us the power of drawing limits when once we have committed ourselves to the civil system which allows politicians to make and enforce programmes for teaching our children without regard to their religion, because the non-Catholic voters are perchance in a majority!

This, surely, is reason, and we urge it without any slightest personal animosity, simply because those who seem to take nothing into consideration but present and apparent advantages, urge the contrary and urge it openly, identifying their name with a principle always dangerous, but particularly so just now.

THE EDITOR.

STATE CONTROL OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

The following paper points an important lesson in regard to State control where it limits the freedom of religious education. In most European countries under non-Catholic governments necessity has forced Catholics to accept a compromise, which is, however, opposed to their sense of equity as free citizens. Hence, whilst they tolerate what it is out of their power to change, they make nevertheless every legitimate effort to secure the freedom of religious education to which they are justly entitled. It must seem strange to our Catholic brethren abroad that in the face of such facts there should exist in the United States a party calling itself Catholic which invites the very bondage (and indeed one far more dangerous and degrading, under our State system, than it is anywhere in Europe) from which Catholics everywhere in the world are striving to free themselves.

The article here refers specially to Catholic Elementary Schools in England and Wales, and is written by an experienced schoolman.

ED.

SCOTLAND has had since 1696 a legalized system of national elementary education. By law, each parish was provided with a primary school at the expense of the landowners or heritors, who had to maintain it and provide the teacher with certain emoluments, though he was also allowed to charge a small fee for each pupil. Ireland, too, has had a system of (so-called) national primary education since 1831 ; but, as it is an undenominational system thrust upon a people who desire denominational schools, it is not a great success from an educational point of view. I believe, however, that it has to some extent attained the object of its promoters in raising up a generation of Catholics not so distinguished as were their fathers for simple faith and affectionate devotion to their pastors.

Unlike Scotland and Ireland, England had not, and hardly has still, any national system of primary education. The first Parliamentary grant for elementary education in England and Wales was made in 1833. Before this time the schools for the working classes had been carried on entirely by voluntary efforts. Two extensive organizations were then in existence—the National Society for the Education of the Children of the Poor in connection with the Established Church, and the Home and Foreign Society for the children of others not so connected. The first grants voted by Parliament were devoted entirely to purposes of building or enlarging schools, and the appropriation of them was intrusted to the two societies before mentioned by the Committee of the Privy Council on Education.

Up to the year 1846 all Parliamentary grants were used for building purposes; but in this year the "Pupil Teacher System" was introduced from Holland, and the stipend of the pupil teacher, as well as certain gratuities to the head teacher for the extra lessons given, were both paid by the Committee of Council on Education.

In 1847 the Catholics of England and Wales were aroused to the importance of their claiming a share in the State aid given to elementary schools. The Vicars-Apostolic now determined to create a committee consisting partly of ecclesiastics and partly of laymen, whose business it should be to keep themselves informed of whatever was going on in Parliament on the subject of popular education, and to take steps to secure for Catholics such share of State aid as they were justly entitled to. This committee, so formed by the Bishops of England, and afterwards joined by the Bishops of Scotland, is still in existence. It is now called "The Catholic School Committee," and it represents, in matters which concern elementary education, the Catholic dioceses of Great Britain, having one clerical and two lay members for each diocese. In this representation it is recognized by the Government. On the 18th of December, 1847, a minute was passed by the Committee of Council on Education accepting the Poor School Committee, as it was then called, as the ordinary channel of communication between themselves and the Catholic body. The late Hon. Charles Langdale was the first chairman of the Catholic Poor School Committee, and in 1848 Mr. T. W. Marshall was appointed by the Privy Council as the first Catholic Inspector of Schools.

Until 1870 the Government never took the initiative in promoting education. It only gave grants to those that did, no matter who they were or to what denomination they belonged, provided always that they could show they were working out satisfactory results, as tested by government inspectors. These grants in aid were (1) for building; (2) for maintaining schools; (3) capitation grants of so much per head for each scholar whose proficiency satisfied the school inspectors.

Before the year 1870 all the State-aided schools were strictly denominational. Our schools were then thoroughly Catholic; not only taught by Catholic teachers, but also inspected by Catholic government inspectors nominated by the representatives of the Bishops. Then the dogmatic teaching of the Church and the pious practices of our Holy Religion could not be banished for a single minute from our schools. We are told that this Denominational System was a

failure because under it about two-thirds of the children of the country were not on the rolls of any school, and that secular Board schools should be established to educate these "gutter children." I am sorry to find intelligent Catholics even now admitting the failure of the Denominational System and recognizing the necessity of the Board School System. If there were so many children not attending school, it should be remembered that there was no power to compel attendance in those days. I most emphatically deny that the Denominational System was a failure. It never had a fair chance. It was starved out of existence. The voluntary efforts of the religious denominations were miserably seconded by shabby and niggardly grants from the State. The total government grant in 1870 was £903,978, whereas in 1890 it had risen to £3,678,540.

Lest it should be thought that this increase of grant is entirely owing to increase of attendance, I may mention that the grant *per head* on the average attendance in 1870 was 9s. 9¼d, while in 1890 it almost reached 17s. 10¾d. In addition to these augmented grants from the Government, the board schools receive several millions of pounds annually from the local rates which contribute nothing towards the maintenance of the voluntary schools.

However, in 1870 a radical change was made by the passing of an Education Act (33 Vict. c. 75) generally known as Mr. Forster's Act. This Act deprived State-aided schools under voluntary management of their purely denominational character by its conscience clause, which provides that children of any religion or no religion shall have the right of admission to any school; that there shall be two hours purely secular instruction each time the school meets; and that the time or times during which any religious observance is practiced, or instruction in religious subjects is given at any meeting of the school, shall be either at the beginning or at the end, or at the beginning and end of such meeting, and that any scholar may be withdrawn by his parents from any religious observance or instruction without forfeiting any of the other benefits of the school. Mr. Forster's Act established a system of school boards in England and Wales. It gave to each board the power to frame by-laws compelling the attendance of all children from five to thirteen years of age within the school district. It enacted that there should be provided by the school boards out of the local rates a sufficient number of public elementary schools for each school-district, available for all children residing in that district for whose elementary education suitable provision is not otherwise (that is, by voluntary

schools) made. The general expenses connected with managing these schools also must come off local rates. Existing schools were to receive Government aid (but no share of the local rates) on condition that the buildings and apparatus were suitable, that they were taught by duly qualified teachers, that the secular education they gave reached a certain standard of efficiency, that they submitted themselves to the examination of an undenominational inspector, and that they admitted the conscience clause as part of their regulations. In districts where the school accommodation is sufficient and the schools efficient, the rate-payers may or may not elect a school board, as they please, and, consequently, there were districts in which there was no provision for compulsory attendance. But in 1876 it was enacted that in such districts the town council or the guardians of the poor should appoint a school attendance committee and the compulsory powers possessed by the school boards were extended to these school attendance committees and thus compulsion has become universal. The Act of 1876 also extended the school age from thirteen years to fourteen years. Last year (1891) an act was passed under which an additional grant of ten shillings per head is offered to every school. All schools that accept this grant must make a reduction of ten shillings a head per annum in the amount of school fees which they charge. As the amount of fees raised annually by a large proportion of the schools is less than ten shillings a head, all these schools, if they accept the fee grant, become absolutely free, and they must always remain free schools. In the majority of the remaining schools also the fees will be very considerably reduced. The average rate of fees for 1890 came to but fourteen shillings a head. It will therefore be seen that in England elementary education will, in the future, be practically free and compulsory.

The Act of 1870 is a compromise between religion, as represented by the voluntary schools, and freethought, as represented by the board schools. Owing to our poverty and to the fact that we are but a small minority in the country, we Catholics are reluctantly obliged to accept the compromise.

The non-conformists, who form the backbone of the great Liberal Party, are the champions of the board school system, and they show no sign of wishing to abide permanently by the compromise. On the contrary, they have set their hearts upon making the board system the national system of education. The two systems are now running alongside each other; but the Church of England shows

signs of weariness in the unequal race, being now surpassed in examination results by the board schools, and having already given over many of her schools to the school boards. Our Catholic schools for the past twenty years have kept ahead of the board schools with their unlimited resources. These schools are now abreast with us. Shall we let them pass us? If the board schools surpass the voluntary schools to any very considerable extent in secular efficiency, the doom of the voluntary school system will be sealed. It is then our duty as Catholics to contribute generously to the support of our schools until by a change in the law, we can secure the share of the local rates to which we are justly entitled.

J. MURRAY.

SCIENTIFIC AND METAPHYSICAL COSMOLOGY.

(*Second Article*).

Any theory which endeavors to explain the essential constitution of bodies and to define the nature of those ultimate principles out of which bodies are formed, upon the assumption that matter is extended and continuous, must face the great problem which is at the foundation of all these questions.

This is, how to maintain matter to be extended, or in other words, to be a continuous quantity, and at the same time, to get over the unavoidable difficulty of its divisibility *ad infinitum*.

Do what you list, you are in a dilemma. If you admit matter to be extended, you come to acknowledge that it is made up of parts. Now, these parts are either extended or not. If they are extended, they must in their turn be composed of parts which, if extended, are also resolvable into other parts, and so on *ad infinitum*. This endless divisibility and its absurd consequence, the imposition of an infinite number, seems to be the necessary result of any theory holding matter to be a continuous quantity.

To get over this difficulty, which many philosophers have considered unanswerable, the system of Dynamism has been invented. This maintains that what we call a body, as it is in nature, is composed of a number of substances, which are the elements we are seeking for. That these substances are unextended and really simple, hence absolutely devoid of parts. These simple points which may be called atoms are active. One may ask in the first place,

How do these simple unextended points form a body? They answer, By the force of attraction and repulsion interior to the atoms. The first draws them together so as to form an approach; the second keeps them at a sufficient distance, so that the approach may not become a contact.

The second question is, How do these simple points grouped together by the internal forces of attraction and repulsion cause the phenomenon so familiar to our senses, that of extension and resistance?

They reply that the extension and continuity which appears to our sense is only phenomenal and need not be real; for they maintain that it is not essential to the idea of existence, even material, to be extended and continuous.

It is sufficient that a corporeal element, obeying instinctively and unconsciously dynamic laws, occupy at each given instant a certain definite position in space either absolute or relative to other elements equally localized. That is to say it suffices, if it find itself at certain distances from others and if these change, that it transport itself from one place to another to place itself in adjusted relation with the others.

By maintaining such unextended atoms kept at a distance by forces such as that of attraction and repulsion, one may have bodies endowed with as much resistance as is necessary to account for our observation and experience of the phenomenon.

By locating these atoms in different ways in respect to others we can explain all the polyhedric figures which are observed by Crystallography.

This system is held to-day by the most eminent metaphysicians and mathematicians who do not follow the scholastic theory.

But even a cursory examination of its main points will make it evident to our readers that it is utterly untenable.

In the first place, it not only does away with real extension, which its upholders concede, but it renders impossible even the idea and concept of phenomenal quantity, which, according to them, consists in a representation of extension arising from the impressions made on our senses, by the simple bodies acting at a distance from each other.

But this cannot be; since as extension cannot be conceived without continuity, neither can the phenomenon of extension be produced without the appearance of continuity. Now it is utterly impossible to have the phenomenon of continuity from unextended

points. For suppose these simple bodies to touch each other, what is the consequence? Evidently they must be forced, so to speak, into one; since there can be no impenetrability between two simple bodies for the reason that such bodies either touch each other with the totality of their being or not at all. How otherwise could they come in contact with each other? By placing surface against surface? But there is no surface, where there are no parts.

But allow that they do not come in contact but keep at a distance from each other. In such a case, as the parts which compose the whole body are not extended, neither can the body which results from them be extended.

Whether, therefore, the simple bodies touch each other or whether they keep at a distance, they cannot offer any foundation for the phenomenon of continuity and hence for that of extension.

One can easily understand how that is produced in spite of the porosity of bodies; how the surface of a body may appear to be continual in spite of the real breaks which exist on it. This is because, first, the little interstices or pores escape the perception of our senses, and because the ultimate parts are, after all, really welded together.

But in no possible way can we conceive how a number of unextended simple points, which are absolutely devoid of continuity, either singly or united, can yield the slightest foundation for the appearance of continuity.

Dynamism, then, cannot be accepted, because it is contrary and in utter variance with the observation of our senses, which perceive the phenomenon of continuity and extension, which perception it absolutely fails to explain.

But it is contrary also to metaphysical principles. It must necessarily suppose for the sake of theory that there can be such a thing as *action at a distance*. It is a fundamental principle of the system that the atoms or simple substances which compose the body are not in contact with each other, but mutually attract and repel each other. When their tendency is to go too far away from each other then the force of attraction comes into play, not to let them wander too far off; when their tendency is to draw them too near each other the law of repulsion asserts itself to maintain them at a respectful distance. It is evident, therefore, that though at a distance they act upon each other, or that the system supposes the possibility of action at a distance.

Now, such action is impossible. For an agent cannot act except

where it is, or where its influence reaches. But, in the case supposed, neither can take place, because a simple being cannot be in another, which is separated from it, nor can it reach it for want of a medium which may act as a vehicle of the movement, or as a bond of communication between the agent and the object acted upon. And truly, as it implies a contradiction that a cause should act without being endowed with activity, so it is contradictory to suppose that its activity should have any effect without being applied to the subject which is to be the term of its action. This is the more so as the action we are speaking of belongs to those acts which are called transient. A transient act is a movement which arises in an agent and which terminates in the object acted upon. If both the agent and the object are in immediate contact, such as, for instance, the soul and body in man, then we can conceive how a movement arising in one can find lodgement in the other. But if they are separate from each other, if they are at a distance, if no medium of communication exists between them, how can the movement of one be transmitted to the other and find its termination therein? Action at a distance, therefore, is not possible.

Dynamists have an answer to this argument, and it is but fair to examine it. We will let one of the best exponents of the system develop it in his own words:

“Phenomena which in the last analysis can be reduced to movement are essentially in space. They could not exist unless they existed in some place. Can we say the same of the substances which produce those phenomena? Perhaps the question has never occurred to those who look upon the principle that bodies can act only where they are, as indubitable. It is nevertheless sufficient to carefully examine it to cause the celebrated difficulty to vanish.

“It is certain that there exists in our spirit a necessary relation between space and those substances. We know them but as causes and could not conceive their effect except in supposing them to be in a definite place. It is for the same reasons that they have a necessary relation to time. By their action they are necessarily in time; that is, it is impossible that they could act except in time, their activity being unable to develop itself except by a continual series of successive phases which produce their phenomena. But if we try by means of abstraction to consider them in themselves and outside of and in opposition to their action, so to speak, and then to place them in time and to extend their existence therein, we should be denying their permanent identity and reduce them to distinct

things. This would eliminate from them everything which gives them their definite character. We must say of space what we have said of time.

“A material substance acts here or there, and to such an extent, but if we were to isolate it from its action, that is from all which attaches it to space we could no longer say that it is here or there nor attribute to it any dimension. Thus isolated from its effect the cause may or may not be, it may be a free or a necessary cause; but to continue in this isolation to so surround its essence with the geometrical attributes which characterize its effect is like combining in our imagination the different elements of a chimera. It is in space by its action; it is not there by its essence. And yet it should be in both senses in space in order to apply to it the principle which affirms the metaphysical absurdity of the action at a distance. For what can be meant by a distance between two things one of which is conceived to be in space, and the other is excluded from the same? We might as well speak of the distance between the centre of a circle and a theorem of geometry. The answer then concedes that the simple substances are not in space as to their essence, but they are in it by their action.”¹

The answer would be very ingenious if Dynamists admitted space to be something material and really extended. In that case it is true that between space and a simple substance we could not expect a contact of quantity but of action. A contact of quantity, which consists in the fact that two objects touch each other in such a manner that each part of one object touches the corresponding parts of the other, is possible only between two beings having real extension and made up of parts. But it is not conceivable between a composite being and a simple substance. In this case the latter having no parts cannot of course touch the parts of the other. Hence this contact between them can only exist as much as one acts upon the other. This is the contact which the above author claims for his atoms or simple substances and believes that he has removed the difficulty of the action at a distance. The essence, he maintains, of those substances exists in itself; its action is in space; where then is the distance?

But even in the case of a simple being acting on a composite being the presence of the essence and substance of the being must be where the action is and where it extends. What is the action of being? It is a movement of the being. Is it, and can it be,

1. Carbonelle, *Les confins de la Science et de la Philosophie*. Vol. I, p. 201.

separated from the being so that the being can exist in one place and the action can be in another? Evidently not, any more than a modification can be separated and have a distinct and independent existence from the subject on which it leans, and which it modifies.

It is absurd therefore for the Dynamists to say that the essence of their simple substances can be in itself and their actions in space. The two can be distinct but never separated and the second cannot be where the other is not.

But the fact of the matter is that in the Dynamic system neither space or extension or distance are conceivable. And the effort which its upholders make in explaining away the objection about the impossibility of the action at a distance puts this truth in its clearest light and boldest relief. Pray what is meant by real space except real extension ; and what is real extension except a body formed of a number of parts, one outside the other but contiguous to and touching each other, and what is distance except that amount of real extension existing between two bodies?

With your simple substances which are nothing but geometrical points you abolish all continuity and therefore you do away with all ideas of extension, space and distance. "Imagine," says H. Martin, "a simple and single force and suppose it to be an unextended substance. This simple force not being extended cannot occupy any space. Its only possible presence is then that of action. Now, in order that an action be directed upon a determinate place, it is necessary that this place be determined independently of that action by the corporal presence of a real extension either in the same place or in another. But in the given hypothesis there is no possible real extension but only absolute and indefinite space. Hence that simple and single force cannot be in any place ; its existence cannot introduce any definiteness and determination in the indefinite space. The same will happen to the second monad as happened to the first and exactly as if the first did not exist. Hence the second monad cannot enter into any relation with the first either as to space or distance. In fact distance supposes a unit of extension which has real dimensions because distance cannot be determined except by means of its relation to one of the dimensions of extension. Now in the hypothesis of dynamism there is no real extension, no unit of extension and of distance in space, no point of reciprocal location."¹

1. H. Martin, *Philosophie Spiritualiste de la Nature*. Vol. 1 part 2 Ch. 14, page 360.

The Peripatetic System.

Neither the atomistic, nor the chemico-atomistic, nor the dynamic system answer the problem of the essential construction of bodies. Let us see if the scholastic theory does it with any better success. But before giving an accurate explanation of it we wish to premise a few words of Leibnitz. "We, too, have applied, and that not merely in a perfunctory manner, to the study of mathematics, mechanics and experimental philosophy; and though it must be confessed that in the beginning *we inclined to the very opinions to which we have just alluded, yet we have been compelled by the progress of study to return to the principles of the old philosophy.* And, perhaps, were it permitted to explain the course of our researches, there is no one except those who are pre-engaged by the prejudices of their imagination, who would not admit that these ideas are not of that confused and absurd character which is commonly attributed to them, by those who despise the received doctrines, and who scoff at Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas and other illustrious men, as though they were but children in philosophy."¹ And again: "It seems that since some time the name of substantial forms has become infamous with some people, and who are ashamed to speak of them. In this, however, there is more of fashion than of reason."² It is clear that at the time of Leibnitz the opponents of the scholastic theory were only superficial minds, and those who cried it down did so more to follow the fashion than the dictates of reason. The same may be said of its enemies at the present day. Science is the fashion, and a blind faith not only in the true, well ascertained results of the same, but in all the pretensions and clamors which it raises, in all the extravagant demands it makes on the easy credulity of ignorant or superficial readers. We maintain that the scholastic system, when properly and sufficiently understood, is the only possible solution of the problem of the essential constitution of bodies. We will try our best to state it here at proper length and in the clearest possible manner, so that our readers may easily grasp the main fundamental points of the system, before we proceed to develop the reasons on which it rests.

The scholastic system, then, is the system of those philosophers, who, following in the footsteps of Aristotle and the Fathers, endeavored to investigate the essential constitution of bodies *by unit-*

1 *Systema Theologicum*, translated by Dr. Russell. London, 1850. Page 112.

2 *Nouveaux Essais*. Lib. 3, ch. 6.

ing reason with observation, arriving at the conclusion that a body is the result of two principles, one passive and the other active. The first they called *matter*, the second they called *form*. Hence the system of Matter and Form. You may ask, How did they reach such conclusions? By the following process. First of all they stated the question at hand most accurately, a thing which modern scientists do not always do. They distinguished in the composition of bodies the general and universal causes from the particular ones. And this they did most wisely. Because a material thing may be considered under two different aspects, in general and in particular, that is, as a body in general or as a particular body. Iron, for instance, if regarded in general, is a body, just the same as gold, lead, bronze, and such-like; but if it be considered as having all those requisites by which it is known by everyone as iron and distinguished from gold, silver, bronze, and other substances, it is a particular body. From this it is evident that if I am asked, What are the causes of the composition of bodies? I cannot answer by giving a single reply. I must inquire in turn, What do you wish to know, the intrinsic universal causes which form a body in general, or do you ask what are the causes which form such a body and no other?

The internal, universal causes which enter into the formation and constitution of a body in general, and which apply to all bodies, without exception, were called by the schoolmen *Principles*.

The particular causes which make a body as distinct from others were styled *Elements*; and they maintained that these elements were the product of principles, and not vice versa, the principles, the product of the elements.

You may inquire, How did they explain these two things, *principles* and *elements*? A principle is that from which a thing originates, in any way whatever. A cause is that from which a thing is produced or receives its being. Hence in ontology we are told that a principle has a wider application than a cause. The first implies a general idea of origin; the second conveys the specific concept of the same origin.

By elements the schoolmen understood those last things into which a particular body can be divided, hence they regarded three essential conditions in an element. 1st, That it must be the first to enter into the composition of that body; 2d, That it be always contained in the body of which it is the element, at least virtually; 3d, That it be the last thing found in the body when analyzed.

Take, for instance, hydrogen and oxygen, the two elements of which water is formed. It is evident that nothing is found in the water before those elements; they are always to be found in the same, at least virtually, no matter what alteration may be made in the water, and they are the last elements into which the water may be divided when analyzed.

A few corollaries of the utmost importance result from the above doctrine.

1st, That both the principles and the elements are intrinsical causes of the body. The first, the internal universal causes, since from them results the common nature of all bodies. The second, the particular causes, because to them is owing the special nature of every particular body.

The second corollary is, that when the schoolmen raise the problem as to the essential constitution of bodies, they do not mean to inquire what are the particular causes which constitute this or that body, but what are the universal principles which constitute a body in general, and are as such applicable not to any particular body, but to all bodies. They ask what are the essential principles of bodies, not what are the elements forming this or that body. The last question they leave to experimental sciences. The first they claim as within the province of metaphysicians. The question having been thus stated with a clearness and precision which leaves nothing to be desired, they proceed to state their theory.

They assign two principles as absolutely adequate to account for the essential constitution of bodies, one passive, the other active. The first they call Matter, the second Form. But what do they understand by Matter? Matter may be considered in two different aspects: as already actualized by the form, or before receiving any form whatever. In the latter aspect it is called first or primitive matter; in the former aspect it is called secondary matter. We will first give an idea of primitive matter.

It may be defined to be a certain incomplete corporal substance having neither essence, nor attribute of its own, but capable of receiving any kind of form. What do I mean by incomplete? I mean that it is not a full-fledged substance, nor could exist as such, but that to do so it must unite to another incomplete substance which officiates as the active principle in this union. We have said *corporal*, in as much as it must have the aptitude to furnish the substratum for the triple dimensions—length, depth and breadth—without which a body could not be formed.

It has no special essence, nor quantity nor quality, or any other attribute by which a being is defined and circumscribed.

You will say, you are describing an impossibility, something which cannot be conceived.

I am doing no such thing. I am not saying that such an entity as I am describing can, or does exist. For to suppose a substance incomplete having no special nature, nor essence nor attributes by which it might be, and be called something special, having a real existence of its own would be inconceivable. But I am analyzing a body in its essential principles, and to do so I must separate each principle and consider them in the abstract, and not as they really exist in the concrete. Primitive matter therefore, taken in the abstract, and not as actually existing or capable of existing, in the same manner as it is considered in the abstract, can easily be conceived as something having no special nature or attribute, but only representing a generical corporal substratum, and capable of receiving any special essence and attribute from another principle.

We say capable, because not having any special nature or attributes of its own it is indifferent to assume any nature or attribute, offering for that very reason no hindrance to be moulded into anything or form; and once having undergone one modification to change it for another *ad indefinitum*.

It follows from our definition that primitive matter is, in the first place, something real; not in the sense that it really exists in the abstract or in general, but in the sense that as a real substratum of all bodies in nature, as one of their principles, it is a reality.

It is in the second place one and the same in all bodies.

Thirdly, it is incorruptible and incapable of being generated, and also inert.

You may ask, How does this incomplete substance, possessing no nature of its own, nor any other attributes or categories attributable to being, and which, as such, cannot exist in nature, acquire actuality and real existence and become a specific something? I answer with the schoolmen by the Form. And what is meant by the Form?

It is an incomplete, simple substance having a specific nature of its own, intended to take hold of primitive matter, to actualize it and to give it its own specific nature. It is called specific because it could not exist really and independently of the primitive matter; but both must complete each other, the first yielding the substratum

and the capacity to be moulded into any thing; the other furnishing real actuality and a specific nature.

Hence the Form is: (1) the actuality of Matter; (2) it is inseparable from it; (3) the forms of things specifically different are also of different species.

A body such as exists in nature is therefore the result of this substantial composition of primitive Matter and Form, the first being the passive principle of bodies, the second the active; both forming one complete material substance.

Any one wishing to form a clear idea of the theory has but to follow up the example mentioned by Aristotle—that primitive matter stands to substantial forms as the same material to the different arts. Imagine then Michael Angelo with a raw block of marble before him. Considered from the point of view of the art of sculpture, the block has no particular form or shape. It has no specific nature, or any other attribute applicable to works of art. It is indifferent to undergo any form or shape and is capable of being broken or cut or chiselled into any thing. Michael Angelo stands before it. A multitude of forms rush and crowd upon his mind. He could impress any one of these upon that primitive material. He selects one; it is a statue. At first he reduces that block to a kind of rude, unshapely human form; then he submits it to a more delicate and finer operation, and draws from it the semblance of a solemn majestic human figure, with the human face divine. That is not sufficient; the figure must manifest the original; it must live and breathe. He works, and cuts and chisels, and polishes and corrects, and brings to perfection. He persists in it, goes over it again and again, to produce the ideal which is flashing before his mind and quickening his pulse, and redoubling his life and intensifying his energies. He stops exhausted and enchanted. There is the Moses. One looking at it would seem to see the Hebrew law-giver in his majestic carriage and mien, instinct with the vision of God just passed away, and addressing his people and enjoining upon them the mandates of the Omnipotent. None looking at it need be told that it is Moses. He speaks for himself in that masterpiece of the best among artistic productions.

What the block of marble is in respect to the chisel of Michael Angelo, primitive matter is in respect to the natural body.

That block, as we have already remarked, has no special nature or attribute, or any other denomination or category in the world of art. In fact, it is in the same world as if it did not really exist. Yet

it is the substratum, the raw material that can be moulded into anything, and acquire an honorable existence among the prodigies of human genius. Who is to do that? The artist, by impressing on it the particular form he has chosen among the thousands teeming in his mind. That piece of marble would be nothing without the Form ; this, in its turn, would have no realization or actuality without the block of marble. One is, as it were, the principle of the other. The form actualizes the piece of marble as a work of art, this offers itself as a substratum to the form, and gives it support and consistency.

Primitive matter, in the corporal world, has neither essence, nor nature, nor attributes. In fact, as such, and isolated from anything else, it has no real existence or actuality. It is, *in fieri*, on the way to becoming something ; because it offers no resistance, owing to the want of special nature or attributes, and is possessed of a pliability to submit to anything and to become anything in the corporal world.

The form appears. It actualizes that substratum or matter, impresses upon it its own special nature and attributes, and from that union a natural body is formed. Matter and form are two incomplete substances, incapable of real existence independent of each other. By the union they complete each other and acquire real existence in the composition resulting therefrom, that is to say, in the body as it exists in the material world. One is principle of the other, matter the passive principle, form the active.

We think we have explained with sufficient accuracy and clearness the scholastic theory as to the essential principles of bodies. To complete its explanation we must add a few words on the changing of forms.

We have said that matter is indifferent to submit to this or that form. That when it has undergone one form it does not lose the capacity of changing that form into another, and so on, ad indefinitum. It is also a common fact that bodies are continually being transformed, that is, setting aside one form to take up another. We must then inquire, How is this transformation explained in the scholastic theory? To do this we will just state a few principles.

1st : A thing may come to exist absolutely from no previously existing materials, but by the action of the Omnipotent. In this case we say that the thing exists by creation.

2d : A thing may be produced or drawn from some material already existing. In this case, in the language of the school, the thing is said to exist by generation.

3d : A thing remaining substantially the same may receive some accidental change. In this case we say the thing has undergone alteration.

4th : It is evident that a body cannot have two forms at the same time ; if it present a circular form, for instance, it cannot exhibit the square or the triangular ; if it has the form of wood, it cannot present the form of ashes.

From all these principles follows that 1st, a change of form may be substantial or accidental. It is substantial when it changes the substance, as in the latter example. A piece of wood by burning becomes ashes. This change is substantial ; a piece of wood of square form is changed into a circular form. This change is accidental, the substance of the wood remaining.

2d. A substantial change in bodies cannot occur by means of creation, because the creative action excludes all previous material from entering into the formation of its effect.

3d. Therefore a substantial change in bodies can only occur by generation, in as much as by means of a natural agent, either intrinsic or external to the body, the form existing previous to the agent's operation is destroyed, and a new one is drawn from the matter, which is permanent and indestructible under any transformation. Take the example given above, a piece of wood ; put the wood under the action of fire. It corrupts and destroys all nature and substance of wood by burning it to a cinder, and a new substantial form is deduced from the capacity of the indestructible primitive matter underlying all bodies, ashes.

We are aware that this theory of the substantial changes in bodies has been sneered at by some of our modern scientific wiseacres. With the modesty so peculiar to them they have uttered their fiat and their infallible pronunciamento that the theory is childish, antiquated, absurd ; that it rests on no foundation whatever except the wild dreams of musty old men. The author of " *Mediæval and Modern Cosmology* " joins in the cry by saying: " *Modern chemistry leaves no standing room for the Aristotelian theory of first matter and substantial form as far as the substantial changes of inorganic bodies and plants are concerned ; in this respect the only safe place of refuge for the theory seems to be the sublime and misty heights of metaphysical abstraction.*" (Page 16.)

In our next article we shall give proof in support of the Aristotelian theory, both as regards the essential principles of bodies, and in respect to its explanation of the substantial transformation of

bodies. Our main line of evidence will be to take all the facts which fall under the observation of mankind, all the truly and well ascertained results of science for granted. Upon these facts, and these alone, we shall raise the structure of the scholastic theory, by the aid of the reason which God has given us and the rules of logical reasoning. We shall see whether the followers of Aristotle, St. Thomas and of all the schoolmen merit the strictures affixed upon them by the author of "*Mediæval and Modern Cosmology*;" or whether he and his pet friends, the scientists, possibly without being aware of it, and merely owing to over-confidence, are not the very ones who are perched in the air, and drawing largely on their imagination assert as facts and legitimate conclusions therefrom what has never been so claimed by true and honest science.

J. DE CONCILIO.

CONFERENCES.

CASES OF CONSCIENCE.

CASE I.

EDITOR A. E. REVIEW :

Please give your views on the following theological case, and oblige many readers of your excellent periodical.

Thomas and Anna, both non-Catholics—it being a matter of doubt whether they were even baptized—meet at a summer resort, and after a brief acquaintance conclude to get married. For this purpose Thomas goes to the Rev. Fr. Emilius, a priest having charge of a congregation a few miles distant, and who happens to be a particular friend of his, and induces him to come and perform the ceremony, which he does at the hotel where they were stopping. Now it happens that Anna had a couple of years previously, contracted a marriage *coram praecone haeretico* with David, also a non-Catholic, from whom she almost immediately separated, the marriage, as afterwards testified to by herself, never having been consummated. As soon as Anna's parents heard of her union with Thomas they took steps immediately to have the marriage annulled, by persuading her to institute divorce proceedings, on the ground that Thomas was a minor at the time of his marriage, he being only eighteen years of age, and the consent of his parents had not been previously obtained, as required by the laws of the state—the real cause, however, being that they considered Thomas beneath them in station. A divorce was granted. Immediately after the Court proceedings David appears on the scene again; and, a reconciliation having been effected between Anna and himself, he remarries her, and now lives with her.

What is to be said of her marriage with Thomas—and what of the priest who assisted at such marriage under the circumstances?

The priest afterwards said in extenuation that he merely assisted at it as a magistrate or in a civil capacity. Could he do this?

How does he stand in view of the case *coram ecclesia*? An answer in an early number of the REVIEW will greatly oblige.

SACERDOS VEXATUS.

Answer.

The marriage with Thomas was null and void from the beginning, not because of his age (eighteen years) nor for want of his parents' consent (this would at most have made the act unlawful and punishable, but not invalid), but because the lady had been already married to, and was at that time, the lawful wife of David. The fact that this prior marriage had not been consummated (a fact moreover which her testimony alone would be insufficient to establish) did not prevent it from being a true and valid marriage, which once contracted, the parties themselves could never dissolve.

As for Fr. Emilius, it was his duty either not to assist at all, or at least before doing so to have made careful inquiry as to whether the parties were free to marry. It looks very much as if he failed to do this and so violated a grave obligation. He ought not to have been content with a mere State license, if there were one, but should have made proper inquiries himself. Possibly, however, he may have done so and been deceived. The mere act of assisting as an authorized witness, without using any Catholic rite or benediction, at a non-Catholic marriage otherwise lawful, does not appear to be reprehensible; the reasons alleged by some against it do not seem very strong. It was done by some of our early missionaries and is favored by such theologians as Laymann, Lacroix, St. Lignori and others. See Laymann, Lib. V, Tr. X, p. 2, 4, 8. Lacroix, II 99. St. Alphonsus, VI, 54.

The doubt as to their baptism, if investigation failed to clear it up, would not practically matter much, as a really doubtful baptism is for the purpose of marriage to be held as valid.

L. V. McC.

 CASE II.

A priest of a certain diocese, without having been guilty of any very grievous fault, has nevertheless proved very unsatisfactory to his bishop. He has been imprudent to the verge of scandal, light and frivolous in his conduct, and a constant cause of disagreement and annoyance to the priests in various parts of the diocese in which the bishop has placed him. At length the bishop told him he could not keep him any longer, and gave him "leave of absence" for five years, without, however, putting him under canonical censure, and told him he might go to any bishop that would receive him. The priest left, was received by another bishop and placed in charge

of a mission with the same faculties as the other priests of that diocese. It was understood, however, that he still claimed affiliation to his former diocese, and at any time might return to it, or might be recalled by his former bishop. Nevertheless, it was implicitly understood, though not committed to writing, that his present bishop would not dismiss him as long as he proved satisfactory.

After some time he became troublesome, unsatisfactory, and finally disobedient and openly defiant of the bishop's authority. The bishop then formally dismissed him in writing; depriving him of all connection with the diocese, and forbidding him the exercise of any ecclesiastical function or duty in the diocese. After receiving this notice, the priest went to another part of the diocese, where there was no resident priest, and taking possession of the chalice, vestments, etc., celebrated Mass, preached and gave Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament.

Quaeritur: Did the priest incur irregularity by exercising these functions? And, if so, what must be done should he desire to return to his former diocese, to which he really belongs?

LEVITICUS.

Answer.

I. No. A formal suspension would be required.

II. His bishop would have power to absolve him; and in this country any priest authorized to hear confessions, in virtue of the special faculties usually, if not always, given.

L. V. McC.

CATHOLIC PRIESTS AT PROTESTANT FUNERALS.

Qu. Recently an Episcopal minister died here with whom I had been on friendly terms for a number of years. The family sent me an invitation to the funeral which I politely declined, but my absence, under the circumstances, must have been remarked. Could I have stretched the principle of charity without compromise of my faith?

Resp. For a priest to participate in a Protestant function, such as the funeral service of a minister, would be equivalent to saying openly there is no distinction of religious worship which binds us in conscience. It would be a practical denial of the truth that Christ established but one church as the means of salvation, open to all, and which no authority of man can alter to make it agreeable to

the larger number under the plea of charity. If we failed to insist upon the prerogatives of that Church, men would cease to examine the claims of the Catholic Church as the sole heir of that grand inheritance the neglect of which bears such awful consequences to the thoughtless and indifferent. On the other hand the absence of a priest under the circumstances as given above, is a direct assertion of that claim, and whilst it may wound for the time the feelings of those who consider themselves slighted, it may cause them to think seriously of the reason, especially where a priest shows in every other way that he is kindly disposed and generous in his judgment of others.

As to the mind of the Church on the subject it is very well expressed by the following answer of the S. Congregation in a similar case, at least so far as the *principle* involved is the same.

DUBIUM.

An Sacerdos Catholicus in locis, quibus hæretici proprios non habent ministros, possit comitari cadaver hæretici a domo ad cœmeterium, etsi cadaver in ecclesiam non deferatur, neque campanæ pulsentur? Et quatenus affirmative, an ejusmodi praxis permittatur aut toleretur aliquibus in locis specialibus tantum, aut extendi possit etiam ad Italiam nostram? Et quatenus affirmative, quibusnam sacris indumentis uti valet sacerdos hoc in comitatu, si præcedi debeat a Cruce?

Resp. Ad primum : *Negative.* Ad secundum et tertium : *Provisum in primo.* S. I. C, 19 Jan. 1886 ad Archiep. Utinens.

ANALECTA.

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EX S. CONGR. INDULGENTIARUM.

Indulgednced Prayer to St. John Evang.

Beatissime Pater,

Ioannes Ponzi sacerdos romanus ad pedes S. V. humiliter provolutus S. V. exorat, ut universis Christifidelibus, qui infrascriptam orationem in honorem S. Ioannis Apostoli et Evangelistae recitaverint, aliquam Indulgentiam benigne tribuere dignentur.

ORATIO.

Inclite Apostole, qui ob tuam virginalem puritatem Iesu tam carus extitisti, ut supra pectus eius reclinares caput, quique dignus es habitus quem, loco sui, Matri beatissimae uti filium relinqueret ; da mihi, supplex oro, ut Iesum et Mariam flagrantissima caritate complectar.

Fac quaeso, tuâ ad Deum prece, ut ego quoque, corde ab omni terrena affectione emundato, Iesu fidelis discipulus, Mariae filius amans, semper adhaeream in terris, ut eis in sempiternum coniungi merear in Caelis. Amen.

(S. Cong. Indulg., 21 Martii, 1891.)

ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

O glorious Apostle, who on account of thy virginal purity wert so dear to Jesus as to be permitted to rest thy head upon His breast, and who wert considered worthy to be left in His stead as a son to His most blessed Mother ; grant, I beseech thee, that I may become attached to Jesus and Mary with a most ardent affection. Pray to God for me, I implore thee, that with a heart cleansed from every earthly affection, I may be ever devoted on earth to Jesus as His faithful disciple, and to Mary, as her loving child, so that in heaven I may merit to be for ever united with them. Amen.

SSmus Dñus Noster Leo PP. XIII. in audientia habita die 21 Martii, 1891, ab infrascripto Secretario S. Congregationis Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praeposita, benigne concessit omnibus utriusque sexus Christifidelibus, corde saltem contrito, ac devote recitantibus supradictam orationem, Indulgentiam, defunctis quoque applicabilem, *Centum dierum*, semel in die lucranda. Praesenti in perpetuum valituro absque ulla Brevis expeditione. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque.

Datum Romae ex Secretaria eiusdem S. Congregationis die 21 Martii 1891.

I. CARD. D'ANNIBALE *Praef.*

AL. ARCHIEP. NICOP. *Secretarius.*

COMMUNICATIO IN SACRIS.

Instructio ad parochos Urbis 12 Julii 1878 italice data per Vic. gen. suæ Sanctitatis, Card. Monaco, quæ in S. Officio examinata et a Leone XIII. approbata, ab eodem Cardinali, qua Episcopo Albanensi, in Synodo Diocesana anno 1886 in translatione, ut sequitur, evulgata est.¹

1. Excommunicationem latae sententiæ Romano Pontifici speciali modo reservatam incurrunt illi omnes, qui etiamsi animo hæresi non adhæreant, sese vel nomine tenus adscribunt sectæ, cujuscumque sit ea nominis, hæreticæ vel schismaticæ, quacumque de causa id fiat.

2 Item qui communicant damnatis hæreticorum aut schismaticorum ritibus ubicunque illos exercent : vel qui conciones, collationes aut disputationes eorum audiunt illa impia ac nefaria mente, ut *si quidem persuasi fuerint* fidem eis sint habituri.

3 Item qui auctores quoquo modo aliis sese præbent adeundi fana seu aulas hæreticorum ad horum conciones aut sermones aut disputationes audiendas, quocumque modo hæc incitatio fiat, nempe pecunia, auctoritate,

1. Translationem parum differentem habes apud Act. S. Sed. XI, p. 168 seq.

consilio, vel etiam solummodo propositis clam seu palam invitamentis (avvisi).

4. Peccant vero graviter qui vel sola curiositate ducti scienter ingrediuntur fana seu aulas hæreticorum dum hi conciones vel collationes habent, quique illas audiunt, similiter qui damnatis eorum sacris materialiter tantum adstant eisque communicant, et vel cantu aut musicis instrumentis eisdem sacris co-operantur, etsi id fiat solius lucri aviditate.

5. Nec a peccato gravi excusantur, qui fanis hæreticorum extruendis architectos operumve edemptores ac præfectos agunt: excusantur tamen caementarii eorumque adjutores si absque ulla co-operandi hæreticorum sacris intentione, secluso etiam scandalo, rem agant, et dummodo opus manifeste non fiat in contemptum catholicæ religionis. At parochorum et confessoriorum sollicita erit cura minores ejusmodi artifices monendi, ut ab ipso materiali opere locando omnino abstineant, quando vel opus communiter habeatur ut signum falsam religionem protestans, vel aliquid contineat quod unice et directe approbationem damnati hæreticorum cultus portendat, vel si constet ad opus eos vocari aut cogi in contemptum catholicæ religionis.

6. Multo autem gravioris et supra quam dici aut cogitari possit enormis culpæ rei fiunt parentes, qui in animas filiorum suorum vere crudeles eos ad scholas hæreticorum mittunt, etiam quod intolerabilius est, vi adhibita. Et horum quidem tum parentum tum filiorum resipiscentiam omnibus modis per parochos et confessarios procurari deberi palam est. Quamdiu vero parentes animo obdurati filios minime ab hæreticorum disciplina revocaverint, a sacramentis arcendi erunt. Nec ipsi etiam filii, si scienter et sponte illas scholas adeant, a gravi peccato excusari possunt. In casibus autem veræ coactionis confessoriorum erit eos monere et dirigere, personarum ac rerum perensis adjunctis, juxta regulas a probatis auctoribus circa similes casus traditas.

7. Graviter item peccant typographi etiam gregales qui libris hæreticorum edendis dant operam, licet id metu expulsionis agant. Si autem res erit de impressione libri in quo propugnatur hæresis, nec secundarii ministri effugiunt excommunicationem speciali modo Summo Pontifici reservatam.

RESPONSUM S. PÆNIT. DE DISPENSATIONIBUS SEDE VACANTE.

Infrascriptus Episcopus L. devotissime exponit dubium quod sequitur: Vicario Capitulari, tempore, quo sedes episcopalis vacat, dispensationes matrimoniales exequendæ a S. Sede committuntur. Peracta verificatione causarum necnon imposita separatione sponsorum vi litterarum apostolicarum præscripta, Vicarius Capitularis officio suo cessat, eo quod novus Episcopus munus episcopale legitime exercendum suscipit. Hinc quæritur:

I. Utrum Vicarius Capitularis executionem dispensationis, in qua, ut supra, res non jam integra est, usque ad finem peragere valide possit?

II. An a novo Ordinario ejusmodi executio perficienda sit? Et, casu affirmative ad secundum, iterum quæritur:

III. Utrum novus Ordinarius dispensationem exequendam suscipere

valeat statu, quo actu reperitur, ita ut non requiratur nova verificatio causarum ab ipso instituenda nec nova separatio sponsorum ab ipso imponenda? An executionem ab initio ita suscipere debeat, quam si Vicarius Capitularis nihil in eo negotio jam fecisset, id est, quam si res omnino jam integra esset?

Sacra Pœnitentiaria ad præfata dubia rescribit prout sequitur :

Ad I. *Negative* ;

Ad II. *Negative*, si dispensationes remissæ fuerint Vicario Capitulari ; *affirmative* vero, si remissæ fuerint Ordinario ;

Ad III. *Negative* ad primam partem ; *affirmative* ad secundam.

S. Pœnitentiaria 3 Apr. 1886.

DE ABSOLUTIONE A CENSURIS.

RESPONSUM DE OFFICII DE 29 AUG. 1888.

1. Utrum absolutio a censuris *omnibus catholicis qui coram hæretico ministro* nuptias contraxerunt, *necessaria sit*, an potius in eo tantum casu impertienda sit, quo in hujusmodi celebrationem ab Antistite censuræ promulgatæ sint? Et quatenus *negative* ad primam partem, quæritur :

2. Utrum absolutio a censuris *necessaria sit* eis saltem, qui in hujusmodi nuptiis, consenserunt acatholicæ prolium educationi?

3. Num hæc absolutio requiratur solummodo tanquam formalitas in executione dispensationis stylo Curiaë inducta, an etiam iis catholicis sit necessaria, qui post matrimonium coram acatholico ministro valide initum cum Ecclesia reconciliari desiderant?

Feria IV, die 29 Aug. 1888, in Congregatione generali S. Inquisitionis Eminentissimi Patres responderi mandaverunt :

Ad primum : *Affirmative ad primam partem, negative ad secundam.*

Ad secundum et tertium : *Provisum in primo.* Eadem feria ac die Sanctissimus Dominus Noster Eminentissimorum PP. resolutionem approbavit.

BOOK REVIEW.

R. P. BERNARDINI A PICONIO TRIPLEX EXPOSITIO
 B. PAULI APOSTOLI EPISTOLAE AD ROMAN-
 OS. Ad Usum Studiosorum S. Theol. et Sacerdotum.
 Per P. Michaellem Hetzenauer, Ord. Cap.—Oeniponte,
 Typis et Sumptib. Societatis Marianae. MDCCCXCI.

The "Triplex Expositio" is so well known to students of theology and biblical letters that no apology need be offered for republishing it. The saintly author had written it as one who, having withdrawn from the active world, occupies himself in spiritual retreat with the study of the S. Scriptures, and who notes down, with the habitual order of a well-trained mind, whatever lights come to him during times of special illumination, in order that he may feed his soul on their repetition afterwards. We owe the publication of the work, in the first instance, to the learned Bishop Faydeau, the intimate friend of the humble Capucin. The latter, however, had to bear a good deal of censure and annoyance from the Jansenistic party, who tried to prevent the circulation of this book by every means in their power. Nevertheless, it gained continually in popularity with the better class of theologians, and for well nigh two hundred years has served as a standard of reference to the interpretation of the Pauline Epistles. The present editor gives us the Epistle to the Romans; but it is not a mere republication of the original work. Whilst the order of Analysis, Paraphrase and Commentary are preserved, even in detail, many errors have been corrected. These were of minor or no importance heretofore, but have become more marked in the light of recent exegesis. For the same reason, valuable additions have been made throughout. The Greek text has been added to that of the Latin Vulgate, for the purpose of exact criticism. Many notes of an historical and ascetical character have been inserted, so that the work of Bernardino a Piconio, precious for its sterling critical worth before, has become doubly so in this new edition. This applies both from the practical and theoretical point of view.

PHILIP; A TALE OF THE COAL REGIONS. By Pat-
 rick Justin McMahan.—Philadelphia: H. L. Kilner &
 Co.

Mr. McMahan tells an interesting story about the life of the miners in the Pennsylvania coal regions during the time when the secret society of the so-called "Mollie Maguires" was terrorizing the entire district. The novel throws much incidental light on facts which to the ordinary reader of the history of that period must bear a more or less mysterious

character. Apart from this, the whole plot is fashioned with a view to teaching sound moral lessons. Much skill is shown throughout in the portrayal of character, and Father Moran is the typical faithful pastor, not wholly devoid of human nature. The style of the book is unusually natural, and occasionally marked by a happy blending of good sense and humor.

The book is well printed, and forms a good installment of the "Catholic Library," published by Messrs. Kilner & Co.

AN EXPLANATION OF THE BALTIMORE CATECHISM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. For the use of Sunday-School Teachers and Advanced Classes. By Rev. Thomas L. Kinkead—Benziger Bros., 1892.

The notice of a forthcoming explanation of the Baltimore Catechism was received with general satisfaction; and now that the work has appeared, it will, without doubt, find a general welcome. A work intended to assist those who teach Christian doctrine to the children in our parishes has been greatly needed; the book before us is destined for this end, and is admirably adapted to the purpose for which it was written. In his preface, Father Kinkead tells us the mission of his book; it is intended, primarily, as an aid to the Sunday-School teacher. A long experience in Sunday-School work has convinced Father Kinkead that some reliable source of information by which the Catechism might be developed and supplemented is absolutely necessary. Merely calling the roll, marking the attendance and hearing the lesson, is not teaching Christian doctrine. The questions and answers must be explained. But where was the teacher to look for what he needed? The work before us offers a rich store of useful, practical, earnest teachings, well calculated to instruct, to impress, and to edify those who listen to its words. In a style remarkable for its grace, as well as for its simplicity, Father Kinkead comments in order on each question in the Catechism. His remarks are so simple that anybody can readily understand them, and so interesting that a Sunday-School teacher can with their help make the lesson entertaining. Comparisons, analogies, illustrations, examples taken from every-day life, abound in the work, and give it a pleasing air of freshness and originality.

The "*Explanation*" will, as its author hopes, be found useful for the instruction of converts and for reading in Catholic families, in the Catechism classes of our parochial schools, in academies and other institutions. Father Kinkead's work may well find a place on the desk of every teacher. All priests who have ever examined Catechism classes, or have charge of the spiritual direction of children, must have noticed the false ideas conveyed to the little ones by indiscreet, inadequate, or faulty instructions. Without any disrespect to the efficient teachers in our Catholic schools, attention may be drawn to the fact that the members of many teaching-communities and congregations have had no opportunity of studying a course of theology; consequently we cannot be surprised to find them unable to impart to their pupils a thorough or accurate knowledge of the great doc-

trines of Christianity. In some instances a mistaken zeal may lead them to fill in the tedious Catechism hour with blood-curdling stories of apparitions, ghosts and visions, or with tales of little girls who were sent to hell because they were proud of their curls and concealed this awful crime in confession ; of donkeys that kneel on Christmas night when the clock strikes twelve, all of which narratives are strictly articles of the children's faith, all received by the youthful mind just as it receives the Trinity or the Incarnation,—because God has revealed them, and “our teacher told us so.” Nobody can fail to see the great harm resulting from such a course; in after years the mind will revolt against such miserable nonsense ; and in that revolt the sacred truths of Christianity may easily be included. Father Kinkead's work, if carefully studied, will be a great help to our teachers in school or in Sunday School ; and we think that it might, with great advantage to the children, be used as a text-book in more advanced classes of Christian doctrine.

J. J. S.

THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Tobias Mullen, Bishop of Erie.—Fr. Pustet & Co., 1892. Pp XXIV, 664.

Our English Catholic literature on the Bible is very scant. Especially is this a fact in regard to works introductory to Scriptural study. Outside of Dr. Dixon's work, which, though excellent in its day and sphere, is now somewhat behind the advance of its line, there is hardly anything in English by a Catholic hand that will guide a thorough student. In Latin, French and German such works are numerous, but they are locked up for those who have not keys to their language. We are informed that an able Professor of Exegesis in one of our leading Catholic seminaries intends publishing his course of Introduction, and rumor had it a year ago that the English Jesuits were contemplating an extensive Commentary on the Sacred Text. Biblical students will hail with joy these adjuncts to knowledge. In the meantime they will welcome the present scholarly contribution to their study—Bishop Mullen's work on the Old Testament Canon.

The main point which its author aims to prove, and the candid reader will admit his success, is that the “Canon of the Old Testament is that catalogue of books of which, together with those of the New Testament, the Council of Trent in its fourth session declared God to be the author.” The line of argument establishes : 1st, That in the old law God charged the High Priest with the guardianship of the sacred books, and the commission to decide as to the adding to the collection such writings as appeared from time to time. This trust must, by analogy, have been handed over from the Jewish pontificate to the High Priest of the Christian dispensation. 2d, The Old Testament Canon in the days of our Lord was not contained in the present Hebrew text, but in the Septuagint. 3d, The Apostles transmitted this version to the churches which they established. “That the Apostles did so seems indisputable in view of the fact that not only the Roman Church founded by SS. Peter and Paul, but

all those schismatical communities which at first maintained communion with that church, but ceased to do so, most of them more than a thousand years ago, find their Canon of the Old Testament solely in the Septuagint, or in a version of it, instead of in the existing Hebrew Scriptures. In fact, East as well as West, this is still as it was the case everywhere until Martin Luther and his Protestant disciples borrowed the Jewish Canon in the sixteenth century, a time when that Canon was no longer what it had been when the Redeemer lived among men, or when the Apostles delivered the Scriptures of the Old as well as the New Testament to the Christian Church" (p. 636). These arguments are all developed with great fullness. For instance, some thirteen elaborate chapters are given to the history of the Hebrew and Septuagint Canons; five to the Canon among the Schismatics; seven to its fate amongst the sects, ancient and modern; four of these chapters are devoted to the English Protestant version alone. Eight chapters are given to the Catholic, especially the English, versions. In connection with these subjects, a large amount of pertinent matter is introduced, for example, on the history and purpose of Bible Societies, on the attitude of the Church regarding popular Bible reading, the principles on which the Protestant fixing of the Canon is based, the force of the Tridentine decree.

All this wealth of material is not simply exposed. It is treated with a critic's discernment. Modestly, because truly, Bishop Mullen professes his attitude toward those who disagree with his Thesis. "Throughout the discussion of the principal question . . . the reader will find that the sentiments expressed by eminent writers, whether Christian or Jewish, who respect the Tridentine Canon of the Old Testament, have been fairly stated, indeed, generally in their own words; and that the references in each case have been plainly . . . indicated in the foot notes. Rarely has an appeal been made to the Christian Fathers, or to the action taken by Ecclesiastical Councils in reference to the compass of the Old Testament, and hardly has any attention been devoted to objections derived from this source. Because to have done so would have required at least another volume, which may or may not, according to circumstances, be written hereafter, although materials are already at hand for the purpose" (p. 638).

One must deplore the condition of things which necessitate a scholar to restrict to one volume his treatment of so vast a subject. But we trust that the reception of this book will warrant not only the completion of its author's design, but also the expansion in a subsequent edition of the present volume into two, so as to give room for fuller reference to the entire range of recent kindred literature.

The work appeals to the clergy. In no single book will they find so much useful material on the general composition of the Old Testament and connected subjects. To reach as much they must peruse many a volume. It appeals to the intelligent Catholic layman, whom it will enlighten as to the attitude of the Church in establishing, maintaining, and spreading the S. Scripture, and enable him to answer thoroughly the calumnies of her enemies on this head. It is not intended merely for

specialists, or profound students. Its clear, straightforward style adapts it to the comprehension of any serious, fairly educated reader. It appeals, also, especially to those outside the Catholic Church, for it deals with a theme, which, as its author observes, "no Christian, and least of all a Protestant can regard with indifference. The Bible is justly regarded the Book of Books, the best of all books: because it alone has God as its author. It has been written for our instruction and edification; that by reading and meditating on its contents we may be enabled through the grace of God to live well, and die well, and be happy forever. Whether therefore, we have the Bible, and have it as it was written by God, is a question that concerns us all, a question which demands immediate and profound attention, especially from every one who is not absolutely certain that he has in his Bible all those sacred books, which the Christian Church received as such from those by whom she was founded. For until he is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that his Bible is complete, every Christian has a right to suspect that it does not embrace all truths which God requires him to believe, or that books contained in other Bibles, but omitted in his, may explicitly set forth some revealed doctrines, which being but vaguely, perhaps not at all, referred to in the books in his canon, he therefore doubts, if he does not actually deny, and doubts or denies to his own condemnation." (p. 637.)

"The Bible," says the Rev. Dr. Philip Schaff in the *January Forum*, "is independent of all human theories of inspiration and stands upon the impregnable rock of truth. It is not a manual of geology, or biology, or astronomy, or chronology, or history, or science. Even the Pope of Rome does not claim infallibility in any of these departments. The Bible is a book of religion, a rule of faith and duty, no more, no less." And yet how are those who refuse allegiance to an infallible Church, in these days when, as Dr. Schaff admits, "the original autographs [of the Bible] which nobody has seen or will see—for they are irretrievably lost," when, too, modern infidel criticism is tearing the sacred book into shreds, how, I say, are they to determine what were the original contents of the Bible, the divinely given "rule of faith and duty?" The question is an old one, yet it is ever new and needs oft-repeated answering. How fully, learnedly, clearly it can be answered in the light of Biblical science of to-day, the reader will find in Bishop Mullen's present work.

F. P. S.

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COMMENTARY ON THE DECREE “QUEMADMODUM.”

THE Decree “*Quemadmodum*” was promulgated the 17th Dec., 1890, in order to suppress abuses that had arisen in certain religious communities. It is our purpose to make a few notes and remarks on its bearings and meaning, and solve some difficulties that may arise as to its interpretation. In doing so we shall present the text by paragraphs, making use of the official translation sent by our Ordinaries to the superiors of those religious communities that are concerned with it. The text of the Decree is italicised.

Just as it is the fate of human things, how praiseworthy and holy soever they may be in themselves, even so is it of laws wisely enacted, to be liable to be misused and perverted to purposes opposed and foreign to their nature. Wherefore it sometimes happens that they no longer serve the purpose which the lawmakers had in view; nay, they sometimes even produce quite a contrary result.

1. In this first paragraph a general reason for the promulgation of the Decree is presented, and the mind is prepared for its dutiful acceptance. Moreover, an objection which would seem to present itself most readily to us is anticipated; for we are reminded that experience teaches us that what has been established for the general good is very often turned to evil. Consequently, what had been wisely sanctioned or granted by the supreme authority is now pru-

dently taken away, and that, too, without the least suspicion of contradiction or fickleness. Therefore there is no question here of a law, new in all its bearings, but only of certain arrangements and limitations for suppressing the abuses that have evidently crept in, and of restoring to usefulness what has become fraught with danger.

Much it is to be deplored that such has proved to be the case with the laws of several Congregations, Societies, and Institutes, both of women who emit simple or solemn vows, and of men who by their profession and discipline are merely laymen. For, inasmuch as occasionally their Constitutions permitted the making a manifestation of conscience, in order that thereby the members might the more easily learn, in their doubts, from experienced Superiors, how to walk in the path of perfection, it has happened, on the contrary, that some of the latter have introduced the practice of thoroughly inquiring into the state of their subjects' conscience, which is a thing reserved exclusively to the Sacrament of Penance. In like manner, and in conformity with the prescriptions of the Sacred Canons, it was ordered that Sacramental Confession in all such communities should be made to the respective Ordinary and Extraordinary Confessors; while, on the other hand, the arbitrary conduct of some Superiors has gone so far as to refuse to their subjects an Extraordinary Confessor, even in cases where the conscience of the persons so refused stood greatly in need of such privilege. These Superiors were given a rule of discretion and prudence for the purpose of enabling them to direct their subjects in a proper and right use of peculiar penitential exercises and other practices of piety; but this very rule, also, was so perverted by abuse that they [the Superiors] took it on themselves to permit, at their pleasure, their subjects to approach the Holy Table, or even sometimes to forbid them Communion altogether. Hence it has happened that such regulations as these, established for the salutary and wise purpose of promoting the spiritual progress of members and fostering in communities the union growing out of peace and concord, have not unfrequently resulted in imperilling the salvation of souls, in deeply disturbing consciences, and, moreover, in the disturbance of exterior peace,—as it is most evidently proved by the appeals and complaints frequently made to the Holy See.

2. Here we come more closely to the object of the Decree; and, the points in particular, to which the abuses that are to be corrected tend, are laid before us.

These points are three—*a*, the manifestation of conscience ; *b*, the recourse to Extraordinary Confessors ; and *c*, the frequency of Holy Communion. A few words on each.

a.—Manifestation of conscience, which is called in other places in this Decree "a close searching of the conscience," "an intimate manifestation of heart and conscience," is described by Father Lehmkuhl, in his annotations on this Decree as "a communication made to a Superior, of the thoughts and affections, temptations and interior struggles of one's soul." Father S. Franco, S. J., in a letter to a certain Superioress, a letter which is a full and excellent commentary on the Decree itself, expresses the same opinion ; for he says that "by manifestation of conscience, such as is commonly understood in religious communities, is meant a knowledge of the state of one's soul, imparted by a subject to a Superior, not indeed freely or voluntarily, but because the rule obliges it, and so given that one's dispositions and desires for doing good, the obstacles and difficulties met with, the passions and temptations which move or harass the soul, the faults that are more frequently committed, are sincerely and unreservedly made known."

That this and no other manifestation of conscience is the object of this Decree is evident, not only from the very tenor of the words, but from the reason which is added ; namely, on account of the abuses and dangers which arise from it ; the abuses, we know, come from the arbitrary severity exercised by some Superiors ; the dangers from this, that women and lay-persons undertake to manage matters that belong strictly to the Sacrament of Penance, and meddle in the business of Confessors.

Wherefore with respect to the manifestation of one's exterior actions nothing is changed. Superiors still have the right to inquire about external faults that they may take measures against the guilty, so too Masters and Mistresses of Novices may inquire strictly if their instructions on the different works of piety and the exercises of spiritual life were rightly understood. But here I must confess that as far as my own knowledge goes hardly anything else but this is the custom in the convents of this country. And yet far be it from us to infer that the Decree exaggerates, or that on the other hand there is no need to be solicitous on this very point. Who imagines for a moment that all these abuses, at which the Decree hints, have place in each and every religious community, or in this particular section of our Lord's vineyard ? But we cannot close our eyes to that open fact of poor human nature, to that

inborn curiosity, I mean, which has such a strong hold on all, and on women especially, to that more than solicitous anxiety they have to know everything and to inquire after a great deal beyond.

b.—With respect to an Extraordinary Confessor, we know that one is not only allowed but even required by the laws of the Church for those religious who live under rule, and this for the purpose of more effectively preserving liberty of conscience. Recourse to him may be considered as a necessary consequence of that law by reason of which not all Confessors, but only those specially appointed, can validly and licitly hear the confessions of nuns and of religious in general.

On this point two essentials may be noted: the first is that nuns should have a special and suitable Confessor who can lead them safely and prudently on the way to perfection; the other, that this seeming restriction should not degenerate into absolute subjection, that so the danger of sacrilege or despair may be avoided. To this two-fold necessity corresponds the two-fold head of ecclesiastical legislation, in consequence of which both the Ordinary Confessor of nuns ought to be specially approved, and besides an Extraordinary Confessor offered to them several times during the year.

These provisions, which were sanctioned by the Council of Trent, sess. 25, De Reg. c. x., and by many Roman Pontiffs, especially by Gregory XV. and Clement X., were, with even more explicitness, confirmed and impressed by Benedict XIV. in the Bull "*Pastoralis Curæ*," August 5, 1748. In it that Holy Pontiff complains of the rigorous severity which some Prelates and Superiors use in granting Extraordinary Confessors. This same severity is the reason for the fatherly complaint of Leo XIII.; and the very thing that once for all should be crushed is this abuse of power.

Here perhaps it may be asked whether this point of the Decree has any practical application in this country; and the reason for the question is that here with us, with very few exceptions, we have no nuns in the strict sense, such as were meant by the Council of Trent and by Benedict XIV. And yet the Decree does apply to us, because, from the very words of the Pontiff, the privilege of having recourse to an Extraordinary Confessor should be conceded to all those religious to whom the Decree is directed, and the Decree is directed to all congregations, societies, and institutes of women and merely lay-men, and that independently of the kind of vows they make, whether they be simple or solemn. But apart from this is it true that the legislation enacted by Trent and by Benedict XIV. has

no application to our nuns for the reason that, for the most part, they are not such in the strict sense, that is, according to the strict standard of canon law? Such would indeed be the case, if we are to understand that this legislation was not *made* for them; but not, if we think that the legislation is not *applicable* and, in fact, *applied* to them. Not only the statutes of the two last Councils of Baltimore require this application, but also the intention of the Church, frequently made known to us in these later days, and, besides, a parallel reason; for when once the law of having one Special Confessor has been admitted, the liberty of having recourse to an Extraordinary Confessor must follow as a consequence. Before me are the words of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 96: "And with regard to the Sisters who make only simple vows, our Bishops should not neglect to follow out the prescription of Holy Church which provides not only for an Ordinary Confessor appointed by the Ordinary or other Superiors, but also that an Extraordinary one should be delegated several times during the year. Reason itself and the Rules and the practice of these new Institutes approved and commended by the Apostolic See, demand both."

There is, however, one case in which this obligation of providing for an Extraordinary Confessor ceases. It is when, in any diocese, whether from the expressed or tacit consent of the Ordinary, nuns have permission to go to any Confessor as they please; and though an Ordinary Confessor has been named for them, he is not considered as one who alone can validly and licitly hear their confessions, but only because they can go to him with more freedom and convenience.

c.—The third abuse the Holy Father complains of, is that some Superiors of these several congregations and institutes have taken upon themselves to decide who, among their subjects, may go more frequently, and who more rarely, to Holy Communion.

Now decisions like these belong to the tribunal of the soul, over which the Confessor alone is judge, and so it is easy to see how unauthorized is such a manner of acting, how liable to abuse and danger.

The Holy See through different Congregations has often made known its mind on this very subject as well as on that which relates to the manifestation of conscience. Passing over those more ancient decrees I mention now but two of more recent date. And first we have a reply given by the S. Poenitentiaria on the 19th of November, 1885. It was asked, "to whom it belonged to allow nuns to go

more frequently to Holy Communion," and the answer was, "it belongs to Confessors to grant permission to individuals, according to the rules laid down by approved authors, and especially by St. Alphonsus Liguori."

Again when the S. Congr. Conc. was asked concerning the meaning in which the statutes of religious communities were approved, statutes that constitute certain days as Communion-days for all, the S. Congr. on the 4th of August, 1888, answered that "the faculty of going frequently to Holy Communion must be left, with the right of denying it, to the judgment of the Confessor, independent of the consent of the Superior or Superioress."

Wherefore our Most Holy Father, Leo XIII., impelled by the peculiar solicitude for which he is distinguished toward this most select portion of his flock, in the audience which he gave me, the Cardinal-Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, on the 14th day of December, 1890, after carefully and diligently considering everything, has willed, determined, and decreed as follows :

3. From these words we can clearly conclude how great is the judicial authority of the Decree, what too is the force of its obligation. True, many are the opinions of Canonists on the value of force of decisions, declarations, and answers coming from the Congregations of Rome, and to arrive at the truth in those questions we must have in mind many nice points and fine distinctions. But there is no question whatever about this, the supreme judicial force I mean, of any document bringing with it a new and general law, and which we know, by some Congregation, to have come to us from the hand of the Holy Father. The reason is given by Lehmkuhl, namely, that since the Roman Congregations have not by their own right legislative power, it follows that if ever they do formulate a true law, as in the case we are now dealing with, it is not the Congregation that acts, properly speaking, but the Holy Father himself, who, in the exercise of his supreme power, makes use of the same Congregation as a means to promulgate it. The binding power of this Decree is then the greatest; to disobey it would be a sin.

His Holiness annuls, abrogates, and declares of no force whatever, hereafter, all regulations whatsoever in the Constitutions of

Pious Societies and Institutes of women who emit either simple or solemn vows, as well as in those of men of the purely lay order (even though the said constitutions should have received from the Holy See approbation in any form soever, even that which is termed most special), in this one point, in which these Constitutions regard the secret manifestation of conscience in whatsoever manner or under what name soever. He therefore seriously enjoins on all the Superiors, Male and Female, of such Institutes, Congregations, and Societies to absolutely cancel and expunge altogether from their respective Constitutions, Directories, and Manuals all the aforesaid regulations. Likewise he declares whatsoever usages and customs in this matter, even such as are from time out of mind, to be null and void and to be abolished.

4 In this part of the Decree three things must be noted—*a*, the statute ; *b*, the precept ; *c*, who they are, to whom statute and precept apply. We will touch these three points briefly :

a.—The statute consists in this—that the Pope in the fulness of his power takes away from the rules and constitutions of the religious, to be specified below, any approbation ever given with regard to the manifestation of heart and conscience. The effect of the Pope's will is that whatever has been written on this subject now becomes a dead letter, whatever custom has established ceases to be. Consequently, though no precepts were given, from this statute alone it would follow, that a Superior who should exact such an account of conscience would act arbitrarily, and the subject who should refuse to make such a manifestation, would be guilty of no fault.

We must notice also that the force and extension of this law reaches not only to the repealing of any approbation given in specific form, which embraces any special approbation given spontaneously, from certain knowledge and personally by the Roman Pontiff himself, but, that it also embraces the annulment of any law whatsoever, even unwritten and coming from long established customs.

b.—It would seem that the above enactment would suffice of itself to gain the end in view. But, because human nature like history, repeats itself, and to avoid any danger of the old abuses cropping up again, the Holy Father admonishes all whom it concerns to cut out from their rules, constitutions and directories whatever refers to or in any way whatever explains this same manifesta-

tion of conscience. This eradication may be done in many ways, provided it be thorough and effective. And at the same time it is clear that this is the duty not of each and every Superior, but only of those higher ones who have the charge and care of the whole congregation or institute.

c.—And now we must enquire who are the religious to whom this law and precept apply? No doubt, nor difficulty, with respect to women can present itself. It is clearly stated that the law binds all institutes and all congregations of women, no matter whether their vows be simple or solemn. But the case of men is not so evident. For it is so expressed, “that these only are bound by the law who are of the *purely lay-order*, or who by their profession and discipline are merely *lay-men*.”

Let us see now which are the religious communities of men, so called.

According to Canon Law a *lay-man* is so styled in distinction to a cleric; consequently, men of the *purely lay-order* are those who do not receive even the first tonsure; consequently, again, those congregations of men are here meant from whom the clerical state is excluded, either by their profession or discipline; such are, for instance, the Christian Brothers.

But a difficulty comes from the letter which Cardinal Verga, Prefect of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, sent to all the Metropolitans when he published this very Decree. In that letter, it is said, that “only those institutes of men are excepted, which, by nature and rule, are purely ecclesiastical.” These words certainly have a wider meaning than those of the Decree, for they seem to embrace even those institutes in which non-clerics are admitted as members; these institutes may perhaps be said, at least in some sense, not to be *purely*, that is in all their members, *ecclesiastical*. The point at issue was brought to the Congr. Ep. et Reg. The doubt stated thus: “Whether the Decree comprised, besides the institutes of women, only those institutes of men of purely lay character as the Brothers of the Christian Schools, etc., or embraces also ecclesiastical congregations like the Salesians, founded by Don Bosco, the Rosminians, Lazzarists and the like, in which, besides Priests, many lay brothers are numbered?” The Cong., on the 15th of April, 1891, answered *affirmatively* to the first part, *negatively* to the second.

He, moreover, forbids absolutely such Superiors, male and female, no matter what may be their rank and eminence, from endeavoring,

directly or indirectly, by command, counsel, fear, threats, or blandishments, to induce their subjects to make to them any such manifestation of conscience ; and he commands these subjects on their part to denounce to the higher Superiors such as dare to induce them to make such manifestation ; and if the guilty one be the Superior-General the denunciation should by them be made to this Sacred Congregation.

5. The precept mentioned in the preceding paragraph would lose its efficacy and fall short of its object were it not supplemented by another. For it is not beyond the range of possibility that some Superiors, whilst acknowledging that they have no right to oblige their subjects to an account of conscience, might nevertheless, by means of blandishments, or by counsel and exhortation, draw their subjects to a full manifestation of their interior. Such subtle ingenuity had to be guarded against by a new precept which carries with it its own sanction. And so in this paragraph two other precepts are imposed : one absolute, prohibiting any recourse to blandishments, counsels and the like ; the other hypothetical, commanding that those Superiors who are guilty of such conduct be denounced to the proper authorities. The first precept applies to all Superiors no matter what may be their rank and eminence ; the second is directed to inferiors. Both may be called, and in point of fact are, auxiliary precepts ; for just as the precept which binds one to denounce Superiors is given to sanction and confirm the one which forbids all use of persuasive arts, of coaxing or urgent counsel, so the other which binds Superiors is imposed to concur with the one mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the object of which is the total abolition of the manifestations of conscience.

If it were asked whether both oblige under pain of mortal sin I would answer that, beyond all doubt, the first does ; so that those Superiors who have recourse to these counsels and blandishments, to gain their end sin grievously. And the reason is drawn not only from the very tenor of the words, especially from that term, "*districte*," that is, *severely, absolutely*, but also from the serious penalty imposed ; for to be denounced for punishment is certainly not a light thing, but something very serious ; and, besides all this, we must consider also the very matter of the precept and the end in view and draw our conclusions from both ; for if this precept had not been imposed the whole force and efficacy of the Decree itself would be weakened and in a very short time would be utterly destroyed.

On the other hand, however, I would say that the precept obliging inferiors to denounce the guilty Superiors does not bind under pain of grievous sin, although Father Lehmkühl says that its violation ought to be deemed a sin *grave ex genere suo*, that is, mortal of itself, but whose matter admits of extenuating circumstances, in consideration of which the sin may or may not remain mortal.

For my part I advance my opinion, because among the reasons brought to support this particular precept I cannot find even one that is ordinarily assigned by theologians as indicative of the gravity of the obligation.

This, however, in no wise hinders subjects from freely and of their own accord opening their hearts to their Superiors, for the purpose of obtaining from their prudence, counsel and direction, in doubts and perplexities, in order to aid them in acquiring virtues and advancing in perfection.

6. In this part of the Decree we have an explicit statement of what could be already inferred, namely, the right and lawfulness of that particular manifestation which is called "amicable," which might be made by reason of intimate friendship and confidence. Consequently, inferiors can still lay open the state of their souls to Superiors and seek from their prudence consolation and direction.

All suggestions to this, all counsels from Superiors and exhortations with this in view, must be avoided; because in that case such a manifestation would cease to be given *freely* and, consequently, would by no means be confidential. In a word, it is strictly required that the manifestation should be given by inferiors "*freely*" and "*of their own accord.*"

• Another restriction, which, though not expressed, is certainly understood, is to abstain, whilst manifesting doubts and perplexities of soul, from such frailties of our fallen nature as are so naturally connected with danger and shame that they should be manifested only to the Confessor in the sacred privacy of the tribunal of Penance.

But besides these two conditions, namely, that this manifestation of conscience should be voluntary and unasked, and not touching upon the vow of chastity, is there not another condition required? Is not that which is permitted in this paragraph so to be understood that it may fully agree with that clause so often, even in our own

times, affixed by the Sacred Congregation to the approbation of the rules of nuns, namely, that one may freely manifest her conscience but only in regard to her progress in the acquisition of virtues and perfection?

To this I answer that there is no foundation whatever for such an interpretation; because "to lay open the soul in doubts and perplexities," means a great deal more than "to tell how much progress each one is making." Even before the promulgation of this Decree many were of the opinion that "progress in virtue" signified "the internal difficulties of the soul." But now, as F. Lehmkuhl says, "there is no longer any question of *opinion* in this matter, since the words of the Decree are so expressive, by which this manifestation of one's progress in virtue is permitted to subjects according to their own discretion."

Moreover, while the prescriptions of the Holy Council of Trent, Sess. 25, Cap. 10, de Regul., retain their full vigor, as well as the decrees of Benedict XIV. of holy memory in the Constitution Pastoralis Curæ, His Holiness admonishes Prelates and Superiors not to deny their subjects an Extraordinary Confessor as often as the need of their conscience requires it, and without seeking to find out in any way the reason why their subjects make such a demand, or without showing that they resent it. And, lest so provident a disposition as this should be made illusory, he exhorts the Ordinaries to name, in all localities of their dioceses, in which there are communities of women, well-qualified priests with the necessary faculties, to whom such Religious may easily have recourse to receive the Sacrament of Penance.

7. In this paragraph there are four points: 1. The injunction of Trent and that of Benedict XIV. about the Ordinary and Extraordinary Confessors of nuns are confirmed, or rather, as such, are taken for granted. 2. "*Prelates*," that is to say Bishops or the Ordinaries of the places and "*Superiors*," by whom are meant the local or General Superiors, are admonished not to deny an Extraordinary Confessor to their subjects. This admonition applies to the Prelates in granting the necessary faculties: to Superiors where they would prevent recourse to the Confessor as often as he is reasonably called for. 3. These same Superiors are warned not to inquire into the reason why an Extraordinary Confessor is requested. 4. The Bishops are exhorted to appoint suitable priests and to grant them

all faculties that the nuns may have easy recourse to one of them as to an Extraordinary Confessor.

On each of these points a few words must be added in explanation.

a.—The words of Trent that refer to the Extraordinary Confessors of nuns are the following: “ Besides the Ordinary one an Extraordinary Confessor shall be appointed twice or three times during the year who ought to hear the confessions of all.”

At first sight a difficulty arises from these very words, for they seem to impose an obligation rather than grant a privilege. But Benedict XIV. explains their meaning to be that the Extraordinary Confessor must hear the confessions of only those nuns who wish to confess to him. They are not, however, obliged to make a confession to him, although each and every one is bound to present herself before him to receive spiritual advice and direction.

b.—With regard to the caution given to Prelates and Superiors not to deny an Extraordinary Confessor to their subjects as often as the needs of their conscience require one, we must remark that the sense does not seem to be that Superiors must have positive knowledge of that existing need of their subjects, because this would imply that they should know why the Extraordinary Confessor is asked for, an inquiry which they are by no means allowed to make. The meaning, therefore, seems to be this: taking it for granted that the request is reasonable, which must always be done according to that rule of canon law that no one is to be deemed guilty unless evident facts prove him to be so, then the Extraordinary Confessor ought to be granted in all those cases in which there is no right to suppose that the request is unreasonable. And if it were asked when or how we can be sure of the propriety of the demand, we answer that this is a judgment that depends entirely on circumstances, due allowance made for the persons asking, their manner, and above all for the greater or less frequency of their entreaties.

c.—The prohibition that stops all inquiry into the reasons why the Extraordinary Confessor is called for is a dictate of the natural law. Such prying curiosity is of itself sinful, and perhaps these are the reasons why the caution is not expressed in more sharp and more solemn words. Such inquisitiveness would soon sound the depths of the soul and would fetter and destroy all liberty. And this brings us face to face with the very abuses and disorders which the Holy Father wishes to crush out of existence by the present Decree. Therefore such over-curious questioning is of itself a serious

fault, and only from mitigating circumstances could it be considered a light one.

d.—In the exhortation given to Ordinaries for the appointment of *suitable priests* we notice the plural is used, that so the privilege of having recourse to an Extraordinary Confessor when necessary, may meet with no difficulty. The intention of the Holy Father is that there should be, if possible, not one but several priests having faculties for each community; and this provision should not be confounded with the admonition given above to *Prelates* not to deny Extraordinary Confessors, for that caution comes from necessity and is made against any actual request of any nun in particular, whilst the measure now before us provides for a privilege and anticipates any contingency of the community.

As to what regards either permission or prohibition to receive Holy Communion, His Holiness also decrees that such permission or prohibition belongs solely to the Ordinary or Extraordinary Confessor, the Superiors having no right whatever to interfere in the matter, save only the case in which any one of their subjects had given scandal to the community since his or her last confession, or had been guilty of some grievous public fault, and this only until the guilty one had once more received the Sacrament of Penance.

8. Almost all that is contained in this and the following sections relative to going to Holy Communion may be said to belong already to common law; but here we have a forcible and solemn statement of the fact.

In note No. 3 (*c.*) I cited certain documents, but there yet remain many answers and decrees of Roman Congregations from which we could easily infer even before the promulgation of this Decree that the established rule of common law is that the confessor may give permission to go frequently to Holy Communion, and that the consent of the Superior or Superioress is not necessary, but merely that they should be informed of the matter. There are, however, two points here to which our attention is called. First, that whereas before in particular decrees only the Ordinary Confessor was named as the one who could give this permission, now it may be granted also by the Extraordinary Confessor. Second, that there are cases in which the Superior can prohibit the inferior from going to Holy Communion for a time only, that is until the subject goes to confession again.

This can have place when the inferior has given scandal to the community or is guilty of some serious public fault.

We must now examine more closely into the meaning of this. How are we to understand this little word *or*? Does it connect the two clauses between which it lies, or does it separate them? For if it is taken in the copulative sense, then the scandal and the serious public fault must go hand in hand, and in that case the Superior can forbid the inferior to go to Holy Communion only when the guilty one has scandalized the community by some culpable external misbehavior. But if the *or* is taken in the disjunctive sense, then we would have, strictly speaking, two cases, and Holy Communion would be forbidden, either when some serious external fault had been committed, but not before the community, or when the community has been shocked, seriously shocked, but not necessarily by extraordinary public guilt.

My decided opinion is that this last meaning is the true one; and the reason is, not only that it is the obvious meaning of the conjunction *or* and of the whole sentence, but also that, if we would take the first interpretation, we should have to conclude that the Decree is inaccurate in its wording, that it says more than it intends, for it would have been sufficient, if the first meaning were the true one, to say "if anyone has scandalized the community," without adding "or is guilty of some grievous public fault."

All are hereby admonished to prepare themselves diligently and to approach Holy Communion on the days prescribed in their respective Rules; and when the Confessor may judge conducive to the spiritual advancement of any member to receive more frequently, he may give the needful permission. But whoever receives from the Confessor the permission to receive more frequent or daily Communion is bound to inform the Superior of the same; should the latter think that he has just and serious reasons to oppose such frequent Communion, he is bound to make them known to the Confessor, in whose judgment he must absolutely acquiesce.

9. Excepting the admonition to prepare themselves diligently and to approach Holy Communion on the days prescribed in their respective rules the first part of this section does not pertain to the religious but to their Confessors. To these also belong the exercise of that right with which, as noted in the preceding paragraph, they have been exclusively empowered.

Let these Confessors, then, examine and consider the rules given

by doctors and theologians to guide them in granting frequent or daily Communion. They may be found in the Praxis Confessarii of St. Alphonsus No. 152, and, in the Philothea of St. Francis of Sales, part ii., cap. 20. The scope of these rules and directions is that daily or very frequent Communion is to be granted only to him who besides his ardent desire to receive the Blessed Sacrament has acquired a certain freedom from deliberate venial sins and with earnest manly endeavor is pushing ever onward to greater perfection.

Here I would call the attention of the Confessors to two suggestions. The first is that since there is question now of persons living in community life who are often worried and worn out by all kinds of occupations, due consideration must be had for the numberless distractions and obstacles which arise from these different duties and offices, as well as for all the little jealousies that might arise in the minds of the less privileged ones.

The second suggestion is intended for those who, to say the least, are more than willing to grant daily Communion. They draw a parity from the example of priests who celebrate Mass daily. But the cases are entirely different, and the reason of the disparity is well put by F. Lehmkuhl; for the priest in celebrating Mass is no longer a mere individual, but is invested with a public character and acts for the faithful, and so he is permitted more readily, nay even counseled, to offer the Divine Sacrifice each day, notwithstanding his many imperfections. As a practical rule, if there is question of persons living in community, I would seldom grant Communion on days on which the rule does not prescribe it. More rarely still would I allow daily communicants.

In the second part of this paragraph there is question of the information to be given to Superiors by the subjects who have obtained permission from their Confessors for frequent Communion.

Is this a question of real obligation, and must Superiors be informed each and every time? I think that here we have a case of real obligation, even though it binds but venially, as I argue from the words "is bound," which certainly mean more than a mere direction, and besides, if this information were withheld, not a little disorder and confusion in domestic discipline would follow.

To the second query I answer that it is not necessary to inform Superiors each particular time one obtains permission for an extraordinary Communion, but only when one has been allowed to communicate daily, or, for a certain fixed time, more frequently.

The whole intent and purpose of the words seems to favor this opinion, and besides it was so declared by the Congr. S. Of., 2 July, 1890, with a full approval of the Holy Father ; and although this was a declaration made for a particular case, applying to the Confessors of the Sisters of Charity, yet it can, with safety, be taken as a general rule.

On the last part of this paragraph it is well to note that the just and serious reasons which the Superior may have to propose to the Confessor, in opposition to such frequent Communions, can come not only from the general and particular conduct of him who has obtained this permission, but from the general rule and discipline of the house and from any other source that has direct bearing on the individuals or on the whole community. In this I differ from some commentators on this Decree who seem to hold that the just and serious reasons must be drawn only from the conduct of the subject to whom the permission for more frequent Communion has been granted.

His Holiness, furthermore, commands all Superiors General, Provincial and Local Superiors of the Institutes aforementioned, whether of men or of women, to observe zealously and accurately the regulations prescribed in this Decree under pain of incurring ipso facto the penalties decreed against Superiors who violate the mandates of the Holy See.

10. The command that is here given has been hinted at already ; now we have its explicit statement and its sanction in ecclesiastical penalties.

A word on the command and its sanction :

a.—The persons who are bound by the regulations of this Decree are of different orders or conditions. We have the Bishops or Ordinaries, the Confessors, the Religious and their Superiors ; and yet this particular command is not given to all these persons, but only to Superiors ; and we must further notice that this same order does not direct them to take all possible measures for the observance of all the regulations of the Decree, but simply says that “ they should observe them ; ” and this means that the object of the command is merely that Superiors observe such regulations as directly pertain to themselves.

These regulations are reduced to the five following :

1. That Superiors expunge from their rules, be they written or

only sanctioned by custom, whatever bears upon the secret manifestation of conscience.

2. That they never induce their subjects to make such a manifestation, whether by counsel, by threats, by blandishments, or any other such persuasive methods.

3. That they never deny their subjects recourse to an Extraordinary Confessor, when they reasonably ask for one, nor give any sign of displeasure at such a request.

4. That they never in any way inquire into the reason for this demand.

5. That they do not meddle with the permissions or the prohibitions made by the Confessors of their subjects with regard to Holy Communion.

b.—To the question, what are the penalties fixed in sanction of this Decree, some commentators reply that they vary, and are in proportion to the gravity of the transgression; they may be censures, deposition from office, loss of active and passive voice, and whatever else to be determined by the proper authorities.

But I cannot accept this answer, because it is contrary to the very words of the Decree, words which declare that the punishments are not "*ferendae*," but "*latae sententiae*;" that is, the guilty do not wait for judgment, but incur the penalties by the very violation of the Decree.

I agree, then, with what Fr. Lehmkuhl holds, who quotes the Apostolic Constitutions, "*Officii nostri Debitum*," promulgated by Innoc. VIII, Jan. 25th, 1491, and "*Romanus Pontifex*," published by Clem. VII, Dec. 29th, 1533, by force of which excommunication is incurred by those who impede the execution of Apostolic Letters.

And if this interference is abetted by the support of lay-power, an excommunication is incurred, which is in a special manner reserved to the Pope, in the Con. "*Apost. Sedis*," enacted by Pius IX.

He lastly commands that copies of this present Decree, translated into the vernacular, shall be inserted in the Constitutions of the said pious Institutes, and that at least once in a twelvemonth, at a stated time in each House, either in the public Refectory, or in Chapter assembled for this special purpose, this Decree shall be read in a loud and intelligible voice.

11. What is here ordained refers to the future inviolable ob-

servance of this Decree. These several regulations rightly fulfilled, no plea can be made on the ground of ignorance or desuetude.

And thus hath His Holiness determined and decreed, notwithstanding all things to the contrary, even such as are worthy of special and individual mention.

12. The seal of authority is stamped upon the Decree by these words, and whatever objection might be made against it is anticipated and set aside.

A. SABETTI, S. J.

DEFENCE OF THE "A SIMULTANEO" PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

THE AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW for December, 1891, contained a criticism of an article written by me in the *Catholic Quarterly* of last July, entitled "Proofs of the Existence of God, drawn from the metaphysical or ideal order."

For the benefit of those who did not read the article referred to, it may be well to state here that those proofs were two in number, and were drawn respectively from the human conception of finite essences, and from the idea which created minds have of the Infinite. It was claimed that the demonstrations furnished by these two different *media* were quite as valid and as perfect as any of the *a posteriori* arguments employed by the Philosophers. It was asserted, moreover, that neither of these arguments could be properly classified as an *a posteriori* proof; that they are more correctly denominated *a simultaneo*.

My critic rejects the argument founded on man's idea of the Infinite as sophistical and totally worthless. He admits the demonstrative force of the reasoning based on concepts of finite essences, but objects to my classification of that reasoning; he believes that it is a strictly *a posteriori* argument, and contends that in the effort to establish my thesis I plainly advocate Ontologism and manifest a leaning towards Pantheism.

I shall have to consider first the objections brought against the assertion that the argument drawn from ideal finite essences is not an *a posteriori* but an *a simultaneo* argument. Secondly, I shall

show in what I differ from the school of Ontologists. Thirdly, I shall endeavor to demonstrate that the charge of pantheistic tendencies is groundless and unmerited. Lastly, I shall examine my critic's reply to the metaphysical proof drawn from the idea of the Infinite in the finite mind.

The critic was kind enough to cite the entire passage written by me in support of the assertion that the demonstration of the existence of God from finite essences is justly called an *a simultaneo* demonstration. The paragraph in which he detects Ontologism runs thus :

“ Metaphysical essences have no being in themselves, and they exist only in the essence of God, of which they are possible participations. When, therefore, they are expressed by the human mind, it is in truth the divine reality *as participable according to this or that mode which is the object represented*. All metaphysical concepts represent under a created, analogical similitude or image, the being of God as capable of being participated by creatures. It is that, and nothing else, which the intellect manifests when it conceives the nature of man in the abstract, or any other ideal essence.”

Now, if it be admitted that our concept of merely possible finite things represents a reality, and that this reality does not exist outside of God, it is perfectly clear that such concepts in some way represent the reality of God. The mere analysis of these conceptions, therefore, leads directly to a cognition of the divine *Esse*, the ultimate objective reality corresponding to them ; and thus, as I concluded before, “ in all such conceptions the existence of God is implicitly asserted.”

However, “ these views,” I am told, “ are contrary to sound philosophy, ontologicistic and false.” “ What is it according to common sense and sound reason that the finite essences, these possible participations, *i. e.*, partial imitations of God's essence really represent when expressed by the human mind? What does *e. g.*, a horse, tree or stone as conceived by the mind contain and place before the mind's eye? Evidently nothing but the reality, the nature and qualities of a horse, a tree, a stone. It is a horse, a tree, a stone and nothing else that we think and speak of when we have these ideas in our mind and use the corresponding words. And whatever the ideas when reflected upon and analyzed put before our mind as contained in them we accordingly enunciate of their respective objects as in reality identified with them. Hence we form judgments like these : A horse is a quadruped, a tree is a vegetating substance, a stone is lifeless matter. In this manner all men, following their natural rea-

son, understand and use abstract ideas and universal terms. Thus we think and speak of all things we become acquainted with, and we understand at the same time that this is the correct way of thinking and speaking."

If an intelligent student of philosophy were told that a horse, as conceived by the mind, evidently contains and places before the mind's eye nothing but the reality, the nature and qualities of a horse, the following questions would naturally suggest themselves to him: What are the reality, the nature and qualities of a horse? Since there is a question of an ideal horse, not of one actually existing *a parte rei*, what is and where is the objective reality *extramentem* which corresponds to the ideal in the mind? Is this metaphysical essence something entirely subjective, just as is an *ens rationis*, e. g., the subject of a proposition, or is it something that possesses real entity, objective being? The legitimate curiosity of the tyro would receive but little satisfaction from the profound reply of our critic, to wit: According to common sense and sound reason the aforesaid metaphysical essence or the reality, nature and qualities of a horse are the reality, nature and qualities of a horse and nothing else! The point raised as to the objectivity of such essence and the distinction between it and the *ens rationis* is utterly ignored in this reply. A sensible question is answered by a truism. Can "common sense and sound reason" be invoked to justify such a response?

Quite different was the answer given to these questions in the article in the *Catholic Quarterly*. I there asserted that metaphysical essences are "possible participations of the essence of God;" or in other words meaning precisely the same thing, they are "the divine reality as participable according to this or that mode. They have no being in themselves and exist only in the essence of God. They are possible participations of an actually existent eternal necessary and Immutable Being."

A *possible* being is a being which has no actual existence, but is contained in the power of something that is capable of producing it. Whatever of reality it has, therefore, is found in that "something that is capable of producing it." It is an *effect* not yet produced but contained in a *cause* that can bring it into being. It is denominated *real* merely for the reason that its cause is a real entity. Now every one knows that an effect *as* contained in its cause is one and the same thing as the cause considered reduplicatively as containing that effect. As F. Lepidi puts it, in writing on this very

subject, “ effectus in causa est ipsum esse causae praeise sub ea ratione, quatenus causa potest similitudinem sui imprimere in effectu ad extra.” Every one admits, moreover, that finite ideal essences are merely possible beings; and that their possibility is eternal, necessary and immutable, not hypothetically but absolutely so. It is evident then that they are unproduced effects contained in an actually existent, eternal, necessary, unchangeable cause, which can be only the essence of the Infinite. It is evident furthermore, that their only being or reality is the being or reality of that Infinite Cause. For these reasons we defined them in our former article: “The Divine Reality as participable according to this or that mode.” And I do not claim that I have here presented a new definition of possible beings or finite essences, or that I have even employed any new terminology. P. Vallet, in his *Prælectiones Philosophicæ* had written before us: “*Possibilia nihil aliud sunt nisi variæ res creabiles. Porro variæ res creabiles nihil aliud sunt nisi divina essentia quatenus secundum varios infinitosque modos a variis creaturis participari potest.*” In his *Philosophia Christiana*, Lepidi writes thus: “*Possibile-ideale, ut in re est, est divina realitas ut imitabilis ad extra-vel: Imitabilitas seu participabilitas divinæ realitatis.*” And he adds immediately: “*Quando ergo mens possibile-ideale considerat, et quærit, quæ sit realitas ejus objectiva, nonnisi divina realitas occurrit ei; sola quippe realitas Dei potest esse ratio quod esse possibile vere significetur in mente sub nota necessitatis immutabilitatis æternitatis absolutæ.*”¹

It is scarcely necessary to add here that these finite effects are not contained formally in the Divine Reality or in the essence of God. The Infinite is not an agglomeration of all the various specific finite essences. It is, on the contrary, one simple substance, undivided and indivisible. It contains, indeed, all the perfections which exist or can exist in creatures, but it contains them *eminently*, not *formally*. That supremely simple *ens*, in virtue of the excellence of its nature and its unlimited perfection, not only is equivalent to, but also excels in an infinite degree each and all of the finite things which exist or can exist. A horse does not exist in God according to its specific formality as a horse, nevertheless all that there is of entity and perfection in the horse exists and from eternity has existed *virtualiter-eminenter* in the infinite essence of the divine Being. Precisely the same is to be said of every other species of creature. The divine Reality is the sole *ratio sufficiens essendi* of them all, and

1. The italics here and in the preceding quotations are mine.

indefinite though they be in number, yet in the supereminent perfection and simplicity of its being it contains them all and in a sense *is* all of them.

I am fully confident that in all that has been said thus far in explanation of the nature of finite essences there is not a single proposition which will not be ratified by every intelligent scholastic philosopher. And in the principles enunciated and defended here we find a complete vindication of the assertion made by me in my previous article to the effect that the proof drawn from those essences is evidently nothing else than an analysis of our ideas of them; in other words, that "in all such conceptions (of finite essences) the existence of God is implicitly asserted." I have shown that when we seek the *reality* manifested by our ideas of metaphysical essences we find it not in these essences themselves—for of themselves they have none—but in the cause which can give them actual being, *i. e.*, in the *Divine Reality*; in the Infinite, Eternal, Immutable, Necessary Being of which they are but possible participations. Therefore every mental conception when it is analyzed is found to contain the assertion that such a cause, such a being, such a reality exists, for the reason given by me in the *Quarterly*. Unless these principles be admitted, Catholic philosophers may cease to philosophize and quietly surrender the field to Kant and the other subjectivists. To quote Lepidi once more: "Qui ergo, divina realitate repudiata, philosophantur sane non sunt philosophi dicendi sed, frivophili."¹

I now pass to the charges deduced from the theory here enunciated. Most students of philosophy are familiar with the two following propositions: 1. Contra Ontologistas et Pantheistas ostenditur quod ens-finitum-ideale non sit ipsa claritas et realitas Infiniti. 2. Ens-finitum-ideale ut est in re est divina realitas quatenus imitabilis seu participabilis ad extra. It is not difficult to distinguish between the two propositions. In the former the "Divina Realitas" signifies the

¹ The texts quoted here from F. Lepidi are taken from a treatise, "De natura entis-possibilis-idealis," in the fourth volume of his *Philosophia Christiana*. This volume has not been published, but the advanced sheets of it are in my possession. I take special pleasure in quoting this author as confirming the doctrine here enunciated. My critic accuses me of holding a fundamental tenet of Ontologism. I hope to dispose of this charge further on. In the meantime I desire to call attention to the fact that it was F. Lepidi who, in his great work, the *Examen Philosophico-Theologicum*, dealt the death-blow to Ontologism as a philosophic system. It was from the lips of this revered master that I received all my ideas of Philosophy, among them those which we are developing in these pages. Years ago in the works just referred to he wrote the following words: "Habet hæc theoria (Ontologismus) aliquid veri in eo quod asserit, Deum intelligibiliter movere et perficere iutellectum creatum, eumque esse realitatem objectivam, ultimam, fundamentatem omnium intelligibilium idearum. Atqui negari non potest occasione hujus questionis ab Ontologistis motæ rationem objectivam intelligibilem cognitionis in majori evidentia fuisse positam."

essence of God precisely as such—*ut est in se*. It denotes, therefore, the Infinite, All-perfect, Simple, Indivisible Being, God as He exists in Himself. In the other it expresses the *imitability*, the *participability* of this Being. It implies consequently this Being precisely as capable of communicating its supereminent perfections to creatures. The object expressed by the term *divina realitas* in the former proposition is one; for there is but one self-subsisting, necessary, Infinite thing. That which it implies in the latter is multiple—as manifold as are the species of possible creatures, or specifically distinct imitabilities of the only self-existent Being.

This distinction having been clearly drawn, let us now see what is the teaching of Ontologists with respect to finite essences and then compare it with my own as put forth in the *Catholic Quarterly* and here defended.

Ontologists affirm that the object represented by the human intellect when it considers metaphysical essences or necessary verities is nothing else than the essence of God as it is in itself. They claim, forsooth, that these essences are identified with the being of God—“*ab ente divino reipsa entitative non discrepant.*”¹

They contend, moreover, that this being of God is immediately present to the human intellect; that it is the light in which all necessary truths are manifested to the mind. No created image, say they, can represent the Infinite. Consequently, when the mind of man represents the Divine Reality, it does not even produce a *verbum mentis*, but is informed and illumined by the very substance of the Infinite. The Divine Being is not represented to the mind by way of analogy, *i. e.* in some created image only faintly and imperfectly representing it as it is in itself. That Being is so immediately present to the mind, so intimately united with it that it may be truly and strictly said that the mind beholds God’s essence intuitively—*facie ad faciem*. All this teaching, gathered from the various works of the adherents of ontologism, is thus aptly expressed by F. Lepidi in his definition of the system:²

“*Ontologismus est systema in quo asseritur Deum esse immediate et per se praesentem intellectui creato; eique se objicere tanquam lucem intelligibilem et rationem idealem in qua mens naturaliter Deum intuetur ac omnes quascunque videt veritates necessarias, immutabiles, æternas et absolutas.*”

I distinctly and absolutely reprobate this doctrine; and disavow

¹ Branchereau, Psych. page 33.

² Exam. Philos-Theolog., page 9.

all adherence to this very absurd and unphilosophical system. I deny that the human mind does or can represent naturally the divine Reality *ut est in se*. It does not and can not see intuitively the infinite, all-perfect essence of God. Only in the blest life to come will the *visio facialis* be given to the minds of mortals. Then, but not till then, shall we possess an intuitive knowledge of God. Only then will the divine Essence be immediately present to the cognoscitive faculty of man. I deny, moreover, that necessary truths and ideal essences are identical with the Divinity. Just as I hold that an actually existent creature—though a participation of the divine Esse—is not identified with God, is not God, so do I contend that a possible creature, a participation of God not yet realized, is really distinct from God. For I do not claim that God is a possible participation of Himself; and yet I assert that all finite essences are possible participations of His Entity.

Notwithstanding all that I have stated here, I still claim, of course, that men can and do know God in this life. And when they know God they know the “divine Reality.” Because they do not know Him *ut est in se*, it does not follow that they do not know Him at all. They possess that knowledge of Him which is called by the philosophers *cognitio specularis*. They see Him in created analogical images or similitudes. They know Him as a First Cause, as an Eternal Being in which the *rationes omnium rerum* are virtually contained. To know the divine Reality as it is the First Cause is not to know it as it is in itself. I asserted that the human mind knows that divine Reality as virtually containing all things—as participable according to this or that mode,—claiming that this is precisely the ultimate object of the mind when it considers finite essences. And because of this assertion I am accused of holding “a fundamental tenet of ontologism.” To know God as He is a cause is to know nothing else than God’s power of causing. To know Him “as participable” is to know nothing else than His participability. In both cases the being of God is manifested under a certain peculiar aspect. In neither case is the *Esse Divinum* manifested as it is in itself. From this parallel we must conclude that unless the critic disclaims all knowledge of God in the present life his “views” must be at least as ontologistic as my own.

I come now to the allegation of fostering a tendency to Pantheism. Having quoted my definition of metaphysical essences, my critic proceeds: “Let us apply this canon and see the result. What we find contained in our universal ideas must needs be predicated

of the objects which are represented, being in reality identified with them. Hence, in our case, the attributes of a horse, of a tree, of a stone, are to be predicated of the divine Reality as participable according to this or that mode, and God is therefore, in a certain respect, a quadruped ; in another, a vegetative substance ; in another, lifeless matter. From such language there is only one step to pantheism." This seems to me a very innocent objection. If its author has ever taught a class in ontology, he must have given his students the very reply which I now give here. Why, of course God is, *in a certain respect*, a quadruped, a vegetating substance, and lifeless matter. He is all these things, not formally, indeed, but *virtualiter-eminenter*. He is, in His simplicity, all that there is of perfection in the horse, in the tree, the stone, and every other creature that He can produce. Each of these, when existing *in re*, is not only actually distinct from God, but exists apart—outside of God, so to speak—in its own specific formality. They are all so many distinct participations of the Infinite Being which, remaining in itself always the same immutable, necessary, indivisible *ens*, communicates its perfections in an indefinite number of specific forms. Before they are actually created, they exist only in God, the cause that has the power, the *virtus* necessary to effect them. Their only being while in that state is God's essence precisely as participable according to the specific nature of a tree, a horse, a man. And this is just the reason why I have asserted that in this state they can be known only in as much as the divine Reality is known. For being and intelligibility are correlative. Once these essences have been brought into actuality by God's creative power, they have being in themselves, and therefore have also a certain amount of knowableness, and can be understood—at least, imperfectly—by the human mind, without a simultaneous or coexistent knowledge of the divine Reality. Previous to creation, while in the possible state, they can not be known independently of God's essence, for they exist only in it.

Before proceeding to the objection made against the second ontological proof of the existence of God as stated by me, I will briefly sum up the principles advocated in the foregoing remarks. They are :

1. Metaphysical essences have no being in themselves ; they are possible participations of the divine Being ; their only reality is in God ; and it is, therefore, sheerest nonsense to talk of "metaphysical being" as something *real* apart from, and out side of, God.

2. Since entity and knowableness are correlative, these essences cannot be known except as participabilities of the Infinite.

3. Since the participability of a thing cannot be known unless that thing itself be known, every concept of a metaphysical essence, *when analyzed until its foundation is reached*, explicitly asserts the existence of the Infinite; and therefore all such concepts demonstrate *a simultaneo* the existence of God.

The primary object which I had in view in writing the article for the *Catholic Quarterly* was to set forth, in what I believed to be a new form, the proof of the existence of God drawn from the human mind's idea of the Infinite. My sole purpose in introducing the argument, founded on finite essences, was to show that the two proofs are of precisely the same character, and that while scholastic Philosophers admit the demonstrative force of the latter argument, they are illogical and, as it appears to me, inconsistent in rejecting the former. I claimed then, as now, that the two proofs must stand or fall together, and that to reject either of them is to unite with the Kantian School in denying the objectivity of ideas. I knew of the general prejudice which exists against what has been improperly termed the *a priori* proof of the existence of God, and therefore expected, and even invited, criticism of the manner in which this proof was presented. It was, then, no matter of surprise to me that this demonstration was subjected to adverse criticism; however, I had not believed that the former proof would be selected as the special and chief object of censure.

The proof in question may be thus briefly stated: Entity is the object of all intellectual conceptions; every idea represents being either actually existing in itself or contained in a cause. We have an idea of the Infinite. The Infinite is, then, a real being. It cannot be contained in the power of a cause. Therefore, it actually exists.

To this argument my critic replies, in substance, as follows: Besides the merely possible and the actually existent there is, relatively to human knowledge, a third class of objects; there is, to wit, a "positive, thinkable something" which, as far as we know, is not *determinately* a merely possible thing nor an *ens actuale*. *A parte rei*, it may be either. In order to discover whether it exists actually or only potentially we must use the faculties with which nature has provided us, and investigate the case. This third object is called the "simply possible." To illustrate: A may be either dead or alive. He is certainly one or the other. A person ignorant of A's history must make inquiries if he desire to know whether or not he be yet living.

This reply does not, it seems to me, touch the point at issue. The "simply possible" is by no means and in no sense a medium be-

tween the objectively "merely possible" and "actually existent." It signifies nothing else than "dubiously existent." Is my critic playing with words when he uses "possible" in the sense in which he here employs it? I have given the philosophical definition of the term "possible" above. It means that which is contained in the power of a cause. As my objector employs it, it does not affect the object *a parte rei*, but the mind which thinks. It implies merely that with relation to this mind the existence of such or such an object is doubtful, uncertain, unknown. But how, we would ask, can a dubious state of a man's mind be called a medium between an *ens existens in se* and an *ens existens in alio*? Before we begin our inquiry as to the existence of the Infinite, that existence is "simply possible;" that is to say, we do not know whether the Infinite exists or not. If we supposed the Infinite as a certain, undeniable objective reality, it would be superfluous to investigate. The same is true of the other example which my critic employs. Before inquiring we do not know whether or not there exists in nature a snow-capped mountain. By reasoning from the principle "*Objectum intellectus est ens*" we arrive at the conclusion that the mountain is at least a possible being, and that the Infinite—which cannot be contained in a cause, and cannot, therefore, be merely possible—is an actual reality. The subjective doubt or ignorance which we had previous to inquiry in no wise affects the conclusions here deduced. If nothing else can be brought forward against the validity of my conclusions they seem to remain quite firm and unshaken.

The remaining remarks implying a stricture of my views need hardly be touched upon. I quite agree to the definition of the nature contained in the human idea of the Infinite. It is a "mixed, improper and analogical one." The question as to the origin of that idea is entirely out of place in this connection, and I pass it over. It is sufficient for our purpose that we possess such an intellectual concept, and we care not whence it came. Finally, the assertion as to the distinction between *physical* and *metaphysical* real being has already been disposed of above.

Having thus fully explained my position, I submit it to the judgment of the philosophical public, and without any ill-will towards my opponent, I retire from this controversy, hopeful that the discussion may have served to cast some light on momentous and important questions.

CLERICAL STUDIES.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

PHILOSOPHY (CONTINUED.)

PHILOSOPHY is the necessary crowning of a liberal education. It is the basis of all theological study. As embodied in, or giving birth to, theories of moral and social life, it is one of the most potent factors in human action. Hence the evident necessity for the clerical student to become acquainted from the beginning with its teachings, and, later on, amidst the manifold duties of his ministry as a priest, to watch its course, and, so far as may be, to guide its action on the minds of his contemporaries.

We have now to consider how this may be best accomplished. The question is a complex one. It concerns equally the beginners and the proficient, those who teach and those who learn. It implies in some measure, besides, a choice between rival schools and methods.

Happily we are not left to ourselves for a reply. In his memorable Encyclical, of the 4th August, 1879, Leo XIII. points out clearly, though in general terms, the course to be followed, and, although his instructions are familiar to most of our readers, we may be permitted in the present paper to recall some of the most important among them.

I.

First of all, our Holy Father would have us ENGRAFT OUR PHILOSOPHY ON THE WISDOM OF THE PAST.

“Verum ut pretiosis suis afferendis fructibus par Philosophia inveniatur, omnino oportet ut ab eo tramite nunquam deflectat quem veneranda Patrum antiquitas ingressa est.” Like all true science and art, Philosophy has, at every stage of its existence, to be built on what has gone before. Of its very nature it comes forth, not full-grown and clad in armour, like Minerva from the brain of Jupiter, but slowly evolved from many minds and shaped by the wisdom of ages. To depart in some particulars from such a tradition may be occasionally allowable and even necessary. It is through dissatisfaction with current solutions, arguments and theories that men are led to seek for and to find better. Where the old rulings are never questioned, where no effort is made to look more deeply and see more accurately into the problems of thought,

the mind becomes stagnant and loses all its power. Its unrest, on the contrary, is often a sign of youth and vigor—a sort of prophetic anticipation, like that of Columbus, leading to the discovery of vast and hitherto unexplored continents in the intellectual world. But to break away bodily from the past and undertake to build up all things anew, as Descartes, Kant, and others have attempted to do, can never be wise. Still less is such a process admissible in regard to doctrines and methods long and closely wedded to revealed truth. In the Catholic Church there is necessarily a certain continuity of Philosophical as well as of Christian thought, and Leo XIII. only recalls the practice of the greatest religious minds of all times when he tells us that, whilst looking around and beyond us, we have still more to look backward and gather inspiration and guidance from the past.

II.

The second principle laid down by the Encyclical is *LOYALTY TO REVEALED TRUTH*.

For a Christian, this is not only a religious duty ; it is a logical necessity. We cannot, like some erratic thinkers of mediæval times, admit things as true in philosophy and false in theology. A genuine belief in Revelation excludes whatever is opposed to it, and this it is that constitutes the essence of a Christian philosophy.

Secular philosophy recognizes no rule, no limit to human thought outside itself. Such was the philosophy of pagan antiquity. It is that of those modern schools which have proclaimed themselves independent of all authority from without or from above. Our Encyclical rightly traces back their main source to the Protestant Reformation. “*Adnitentibus novatoribus sæculi XVI, placuit philosophari citra quempiam ad fidem respectum, petita dataque vicissim potestate quælibet pro lubitu ingenioque excogitandi.*”

Christian philosophy, on the contrary, is that which not only adapts itself to all the requirements of Christian orthodoxy, but finds in the data of Faith, a constant appeal to its highest powers of speculation, and at the same time gives a sense of security and of intellectual strength which contact with divine doctrine can alone impart. As a fact, never has the mind of man shown such a combination of penetration, depth, elevation and serenity, as in the philosophical handling of the mysterious truths of the Christian faith.

Such a philosophy has always existed in the Church, though in various shapes. Approaching the doctrines of faith, with minds al-

ready fashioned by the speculations of the period, the Fathers instinctively sought to harmonize the two different forms of truth, and borrowed freely from each to illustrate and expand the other. Indeed, to the earlier Greek Fathers, philosophy seemed to have something of a divine character. It was a manner of natural revelation—the special gift of God to the Greeks. Whatever of truth the latter possessed and set forth in their works, they owed (it was held), to the divine Logos. Can we wonder, if, in the patristic writings, we so often meet views and expressions visibly inspired by the great masters of ancient thought?

But, although freely borrowed from all, the philosophy of the Fathers was mainly that of Plato. Between the intuitions of that great thinker and the highest teachings of Christianity, there were points of contact and resemblances strange and striking. His fascinating theory of ideas, immutable, eternal, and dwelling (so the Fathers understood him), in the Divine Intellect itself, his admirable exposition of the existence and of attributes of the Divine Being, the poetic and often forcible proofs of the immortality of the soul scattered through his dialogues, his deep sense of the reality and supremacy of the invisible world, it alone being, as it were, solid and substantial, whilst the world of sense was a something shadowy, unreal, oscillating between being and non-being, and last, though not least, the ascetic, elevating character of many of his moral doctrines, all this invested with the charms of a poetic imagination and set forth in the most exquisite language, was more than sufficient to captivate the Fathers, many of them men of high philosophic and literary culture. And so Plato, became their inspirer and their guide, and Platonism, divested of its errors, the Christian philosophy of their times.

In a much fuller sense, Aristotle, was the intellectual dictator of a later period—not indeed the Aristotle comparatively genuine and complete we now possess, but an Aristotle fragmentary, and as much distorted as illustrated by translation and commentary. Yet, even in that imperfect condition, and though devoid of all literary charm, the writings of the great and long-neglected philosopher were destined to exercise on Christian thought a formative influence deeper and more abiding than any other.

The time had come to organize the elements hitherto disconnected of Christian belief, to gather up and build into the regular forms of a science all that human thought under divine guidance had evolved from the first data of Revelation. Only a philosophy,

both speculative and practical, spreading out in every direction and touching on truths of all kinds, with methods to analyze, to classify, to build up thought into structural form, only such a philosophy could serve the purpose, and just at the time it came to hand in the principal works of Aristotle. Less Christian than Plato, his theories, nevertheless, lent themselves infinitely better to the development of most of the Christian Doctrines. They came nearer to the average intelligence by their constant reference to experience and to the common sense of men. His genius was more practical and better suited to the Western mind, yet his powers of generalization were greater, and as a master of method he stood high above all. A high place was therefore naturally assigned to him in the new science. Scholastic Theology was literally built on the Bible, the Sentences and Aristotle. As it took shape under the great Doctors of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, while still retaining some of the earlier conceptions, it became in its fundamental theories, in its forms, in its vocabulary, in all its leading aspects, essentially Aristotelian.

One would expect that an alliance so close and sanctioned by such high authorities should last forever. But it was not to be. When we come down to the seventeenth century we find Aristotle and the scholastic philosophy fast losing ground in the public mind and weakening even in the schools. Yet awhile and the decay will show itself more visible and more rapid still, until, as happened in the first half of the present century, scholasticism has become a thing of the past, and its very language so little in use or even understood, that in the general directions given in 1832 to the professors of philosophy of the Society of Jesus, we find a recommendation which has all the appearance of a concession, that at least the future students of theology should be taught the meaning of the scholastic terms they were likely to meet.¹

Yet it cannot be said that during this last period the Church was without a philosophy. Independently of what survived of scholasticism in some of the schools and in some of the religious orders; new thoughts and new theories had come to light, and were welcomed by theologians as well as by the world at large. Associated with the names of Descartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Balmes, Rosmini, etc., they became familiar to the new, as pure scholasticism

1. *Quamvis eæ fugiendæ sint voces quibus, quæ res subjiciuntur, facile intelligi non possint, sermonem tamen scholasticorum eos non ignorare necesse est qui theologiæ deinde vacabunt.* PACTLER RATIO STUDIORUM, Soc. Jes. II, 332.

had been to the older generations. It was a sort of eclecticism, not very deep, or systematic, or strong ; yet it was truly a Christian Philosophy, loyal to the faith and to the Church, and concurred as in the past, to light up the obscurities of revealed truth, defend its doctrines and establish a lasting peace between Reason and Faith.

But it would seem as if a permanent basis for such an alliance could never be found. Within our own generation a new current of thought has set in, leading back our schools to the philosophy of the middle ages, and giving once more to the great minds of the past something of the unquestioned and beneficent sway which they held so long and had lost to the great detriment of religious and philosophical truth.

The preponderant share of Leo XIII. in this movement is sufficiently known. The Encyclical "*Æterni Patris*" deals largely with it, and in this connection supplies us with a new and important rule for our guidance.

III.

The rule is laid down in the shape of a clear and strong recommendation to GO BACK TO THE DOCTRINES OF S. THOMAS as the most complete and the safest guide in philosophical as well as in theological inquiries. The recommendation is based on reasons which we would gladly recall if space permitted, but which are accessible to all in the text of the Encyclical. What we are most concerned in presently is to ascertain its true sense in this particular aspect. For the "teaching" recommended to us as a rule, of one like S. Thomas, whose voluminous writings touch upon thousands of questions, can hardly be said to extend to all that is stated or countenanced, or implied in them ; nor can it be applied in the same measure to each one of those doctrines to which S. Thomas unquestionably lends something of the weight of his authority.

The question, as may be seen, is far from being a simple one. If we may venture to suggest a reply, we would distinguish in the philosophy of S. Thomas the three constitutive elements of all comprehensive philosophical systems—its Methods, its Truths and its Problems.

By Methods in general we mean the processes by which the mind is led to knowledge ; the discipline by which it is trained to discern truth from falsehood, to demonstrate, to discover, to reach in short the highest attainable exercise of its powers.

By Truths we understand the ascertained principles of the human intellect. Some are the logical basis of reason itself ; others are the necessary groundwork of moral action or of religious belief ; others,

still, whilst practically less essential, yet add considerably to the range and grasp of the mind, lighting up and ordering in it much that without them would remain hopelessly dark and confused. They all possess two characteristic features ; first, they are either intuitively known or susceptible of clear demonstration ; secondly, they commend themselves naturally to the sense and judgment of men, and, as a fact, they supply the common stock of abstract truth in current use, the common ground on which men may meet and hold intercourse of thought together. Philosophical systems are valuable in proportion to the number and breadth of the truths thus supplied, and to the firmness of grasp with which they may be held.

By Problems, we mean those questions ever coming up from the depths of the soul, or suggested by the contemplation of the visible world or of human life, and which have never been satisfactorily answered. It is one of the noblest purposes of philosophy, and what makes its chief attractiveness for many, ever to struggle with them and dispel the mystery that surrounds them. In each succeeding period they give rise to new conjectures and hypotheses, which in most cases afford no general or permanent satisfaction. Rival theories are imagined and flourish for a time, and then they are neglected and decay. And so the Problems remain, with the systems they have given birth to, still dividing the most thoughtful and the most enlightened minds.

As a rule, the truths and problems are closely connected, the truths standing out in the foreground, whilst the problems emerge from behind them. Thus I know for certain that I am free, but whence my liberty proceeds and how it can coexist with the other laws of my nature is a problem. The reality of bodies is a truth ; their essence and ultimate elements a problem. The close connection and correspondence of body and soul cannot be questioned—how they act upon each other can only be conjectured. I carry within me the notions of causality, goodness, duty, etc., etc., but where have they come from ? The question has been before the world for ages, and still remains undecided.

Such, then, are the main elements of every system of thought, Method, Truths, and Problems with the Theories which they originate, all in combination with numberless notions, remarks, views, illustrations, arguments, which gather round or proceed from the central points of each system. All this, as has been said, we find in S. Thomas, and the question comes back : to what in these principal features and minor elements does the Papal recommendation extend ?

First, there can be no doubt that it applies in full to the method of S. Thomas, unquestionably in this the highest representative of those scholastic processes, of which Leo recalls the praises written centuries before by another great Pope, Sixtus V.: “*Apta illa et inter se nexa rerum et causarum cohærentia, ille ordo et dispositio tanquam militum in pugnando instructio; illæ dilucidæ definitiones et distinctiones; illa argumentorum firmitas et acutissimæ disputationes, quibus lux a tenebris, verum a falso distinguitur hæreticorum mendacia multis præstigiis et fallaciis involuta, tanquam veste detracta patefiunt et denudantur.*”

Here we have the characteristic features of the scholastic method—accuracy, clearness, subtlety of distinction and analysis, logical order, strength of argument, and at the same time a striking picture of the method of S. Thomas, as Pope Leo loves to repeat, and as may be seen at a glance by whoever has even a superficial knowledge of the writings of the Angelic Doctor.

In this all are practically at one. Even those who have departed from the more rigid forms of the school acknowledge their indebtedness to them, and are the first to proclaim that the precision and accuracy of thought, so much greater in modern than in ancient times, is principally the work of the mediæval schoolmen.

In the second place, the Encyclical refers clearly to the philosophical Truths of S. Thomas.

Here, again, we must refer the reader to the Pontifical document itself. What strikes the mind of the Pontiff is the vast and invaluable body of truths brought together in the writings of the Prince of Theologians—how the wisdom of the Fathers and of the great thinkers of antiquity seems to have come to him as an ancestral heritage, to which he adds abundant treasures of his own, drawn from the depths of a mind, profound, acute, open and active in all directions, and ever guided by an almost unerring judgment. Nobody can read much of S. Thomas without feeling the truth of these remarks. At each page he lights upon ingenious observations, pregnant views, illustrations of the happiest kind, and, above all, great general principles, lighting up almost every region of human knowledge. He feels that the admiration of Leo is more than justified, and that by calling back our age to such an inexhaustible treasure of truth, with all the authority of the Pontiff and the sage, he has done the world at large an invaluable service.

Last of all come the Theories by which St. Thomas and the school have attempted to solve the mysteries of the natural and

of the supernatural world. These theories are borrowed almost entirely from Aristotle, and for this and various other reasons it has been doubted whether they, too, come under the sanction of the Encyclical.

To us the affirmative appears certain. Not, indeed, that the questionable can be commended in the same degree as the unquestioned. But it is clear that the Pontiff has found the solutions and theories of the school more satisfactory than any others, forming a more complete and more consistent system of thought, and less liable to lead away the mind into unsubstantial and unorthodox doctrines. Consistency and safety are surely strong titles to commendation in any system, and the disorder of thought so lamentably prevalent in the world for the last two centuries is well calculated to make men consider whether finally they had not better go back to the conceptions of the past, which, though falling short of demonstration, had satisfied so many great minds and given for centuries intellectual peace to the world.

Such seems to be the sense of the Encyclical, a weighty recommendation to give more attention and thought to the writings of St. Thomas and to the whole philosophy of the schools—too much and too long neglected—with the assurance that such attention and thought would be abundantly repaid. The Pope could not have meant to go farther. Philosophy, as such, that is, outside its connection with revealed truth, does not come any more under his authority than natural science. He deals with it in his directive capacity, not as the infallible teacher of Christians. He knows, besides, that outside the region of religious belief and of evident truth the mind is essentially free, and cannot, even if it would, bind itself to what has failed to satisfy it.

Nor should his recommendation be extended to all the particulars of the scholastic philosophy. He himself distinctly disclaims any such purpose. “*Si quid enim est a doctoribus scholasticis vel nimia subtilitate quasitum, vel parum considerate traditum ; si quid cum exploratis posterioris ævi doctrinis minus cohærens, vel denique quovis modo non probabile, id nullo pacto in animo est ætati nostræ ad imitandum proponi.*”

This applies in an especial manner to the *Physics* of Aristotle, which for ages formed part of the philosophy of the schools. But by the very general and indefinite terms employed, the Pope leaves each one to judge for himself what other opinions may be implied in the restriction.

Again, he cautions us against unauthorized interpretations of S. Thomas, thereby giving us to understand that the great doctor is by no means responsible for all that is attributed to him. Indeed, almost since his works first came to light, the ablest men have been divided as to the true mind of the writer in many passages.

Besides, no commendation of the philosophy of S. Thomas can be interpreted more strictly than that so often bestowed on his theology by the highest authority. Yet we know how broadly and freely such commendation is taken by theologians of the highest note and by religious orders, though pledged by their rules to the doctrines of S. Thomas. Of this we have a notable example in the "Ratio Studiorum," already referred to, in which the general principle is accompanied by a long list of exceptions. The same may be said equivalently of various other religious bodies, thus showing in what a liberal sense loyalty to S. Thomas was understood and practised, even when he was looked up to as a guide. It is a remarkable fact that at the present day, the same freedom of spirit is to be found even among the sons of S. Dominic, the natural heirs and traditional guardians of the Thomistic doctrines. With none do we find more readiness to enlarge the ancient boundaries and to accommodate the traditional teaching to the discoveries and theories of modern science.

Finally the existence of the Scotist school, side by side with that of S. Thomas through so many ages, with the well known differences in Philosophy and Theology which separate them, would be of itself a conclusive demonstration of what we contend for. S. Bonaventure shares with S. Thomas the admiration of the highest authorities in the past and the praise of Leo XIII himself, and whatever we may think of the Scotist doctrines in themselves, we cannot think that the Pontifical document should restrict in any measure the liberty enjoyed by their supporters at all times in the Catholic Church.

Thus limited to its true meaning, the Encyclical loses the restrictive character, which made it objectionable to some only because they confined their attention to separate passages, and failed to grasp the spirit of the whole.

Taken as it stands, we find in it the wisest and most valuable guidance. But because that guidance, is only of a general kind, we have still to deal with a considerable number of questions of detail.

We hope to do so in another paper.

FATHER MINASI ON THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS. ¹

THE publication of a text, discovered eight years ago, and rendered famous on the spot, might seem late on its appearance in 1891. A manuscript newly found was given to the world in 1883 by the Metropolitan of Constantinople; and since that date it has re-appeared under every possible form. It is called the *Διδαχὴ*, *Didaché*, "The Doctrine or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles." Yet the work recently published by Father Minasi, S. J., seems to be rather the first instalment of a theological and critical kind of erudition and of matured conclusions, which, at the very least, are full of edification for the Catholic world, and furnish from the side of remote antiquity a commentary of the gravest import on the doctrine and practices of the Church to-day.

Were we to dwell at length on the critical erudition exhibited in this work we should still be doing it but scant justice for its perfection of treatment on the different lines of theology, liturgy, history and sacred linguistics. If the author has waited for several years to take note of all the discussions carried on in the learned world, it has not been without the best effects resulting in the comprehensiveness and clearness of his own commentary. Within the limits of that same kind of critical work, already so largely expended on the manuscript, he has contributed of his own learning a wealth of illustration, which renders his production an entirely new monument of research in dogmatic and exegetical science.

The author is led to infer that "The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles" dates from some time after the composition of St. Matthew's Gospel, and before the other three Gospels were composed. It is itself smaller in compass than any one of the four Gospels. He considers that it emanated from a certain Council of the Apostles, held probably at Antioch, and referred to in the Canon of the Holy Apostles, as well as in a letter of Pope Innocent I. The document itself is cited by Eusebius, St. Athanasius, the anonymous author of *De Aleatoribus*, by Hermas, Barnabas, Clement of Alexandria. (Proemio, Capo III, pp. xix-xxiv.) For its matter and its style of language, it invites comparison chiefly with the Gospel of St. Matthew, the Acts of the Apostles, the first letter of St. Paul to the Corinthians; and, among patristic writings, it admits of special

¹ *La Dottrina del Signore pei Dodeci Apostoli bandita alle Genti, detta La Dottrina dei Dodeci Apostoli. Versione, note e commentario del P. Ign. M. Minasi d. C. d. G. Roma, Tipografia A. Befani, 1891. Un volume in 80 di pagg. LII, 389.*

illustrations only from the very earliest, such as the works of St. Justin Martyr, Hermas, and the Martyr St. Ignatius. (Proemio, p. xviii.) It is more characterized by Hebrew forms of speech than any book of the New Testament. And the whole tenor of it, the tone which pervades it, as well as the very title, "The Teaching of the Lord Through the Twelve Apostles to the Nations," all go to show that the directions which it contains, for priests, levites and the laity, on the gravest subjects of worship and morals, are not being merely transmitted from a higher authority through some intermediary, but are being promulgated directly by the Apostolical authority itself, for the observance of the entire Church of God.

If practically it became a lost monument, because copies were allowed to grow scarce, that would be no unique instance of the kind in the history of the early Church. A sufficient reason for such scarcity existed in the imperfections which crept into current copies. For, as time went on, the document became, in certain parts, somewhat less fitted for the use of the faithful; and, in view of being rendered more practical, it underwent some modifications.

Additions and changes were made, which brought it finally into discredit; and thus it ceased to be ranked among canonical Scriptures. St. Leo touches upon this process.¹ But, as to the copy lately discovered, what with the authenticity attaching to it, as a well preserved and very ancient monument, and the authority intrinsically belonging to it as the teaching of the Lord, formulated by the immediate authority of the Twelve Apostles themselves, it throws into relief questions of dogma, morals, rites and sacred language in a manner prolific of Christian instruction and edification. To attain, however, this result in any considerable degree, the wealth of critical erudition thrown upon it by the learned author is altogether indispensable.

We shall have space to give a single example, which, like any other instance that might be taken, will be drawn from the various parts as they are aptly co-ordinated in the work—from the Proemium, in which the general notions are summarized; from the Text, which is most accurately reproduced, from the author's own Translation, with the Notes immediately appended; but chiefly from the ample Commentary which follows; and, finally, from the interesting Lexicon of words employed in the *Didaché*. The example, which we shall take, is that of the meaning or sense of the most sacred mystical rite, the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. And to this ex-

¹ Epistola 15.

planation of the Sacrifice, we shall append the order of Divine worship as observed in the Holy Mass on Sunday.

It is this order of worship on certain days of the week, and especially the ritual on the Lord's Day, that forms the central subject of instruction in the *Didaché*. Sunday, the Lord's own day, as having been signally honored both by His rising from the dead and by His first solemn apparitions, is first and foremost in the week. Next in dignity are Wednesday and Friday. In the first two centuries of the Church's existence the Christians celebrated the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass only on the Lord's Day. As late as the time of St. Justin this was the practice everywhere. It is not necessary, says our author, to define the precise date when the celebration of the Holy Mysteries took place on Wednesday and Friday also, or when Saturday was added. Whatever that date may have been, the day of days in the week at the time when this document was written was the Lord's Day, on which the Mystery of Faith perpetuated the Sacrifice instituted at the Last Supper. Wednesday and Friday were days of fast and penance, the one because of the treason of Judas, the other because of the Passion and Death of Our Lord. Hermas, writing earliest after the time of this document, calls them Stations, which, as we see in our Missals, is the same denomination that has entered into the regular discipline of the Roman Church.

The faithful then, on Sunday, held their *συναξίς*, *synaxis*. This is an exclusively Christian word, and the meaning of it involves many heads of doctrine. Its proper and principal sense is "the uniting" of the faithful to the Body of the Lord; from which union with Christ followed union among themselves, as if they were one body and one substance among themselves. The argument of the Apostle to the Corinthians turns upon this point (I Cor., x, 17)—"The chalice of benediction which we bless is it not the communion of the Blood of Christ? And the bread, which we break, is it not the partaking of the Body of the Lord? For we being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread." From the first and principal meaning, so explained, others were derived, so that *synaxis* came to mean the assemblage of the faithful in one place, then the place in which they met, finally the prayer which was offered in that holy place, because in it and with it we are united to Jesus Christ. In this last sense the word *synaxis*, translated into Latin, becomes in Tertullian (*oratio*) *Collecta*, the same word which we use now when we speak of the "Collects" of the Mass.

As the term *synaxis* has for its first meaning the idea of incorporation in the Immaculate Victim on the Altar, and from this meaning others are derived, so the Sacrifice, wherein they are incorporated is the *θυσία*, *thusia*, which, as the *Didaché* expressly teaches, is the *θυσία καθάρη*, *thusia kathara*, or "clean oblation," foretold by the Prophet Malachy. And from this first use of the term *thusia*, or "sacrifice," other meanings are derived. The faithful themselves, who are incorporated in the Sacred Victim, are called the "sacrifice." For the *Didaché* teaches that they are to confess their sins and to be reconciled to their brethren, "in order that their sacrifice be clean," "in order that their sacrifice be not profaned." Now, it is quite plain that there can be no question of the Immaculate Victim Himself requiring purification. So that the Church herself is considered as the victim washed and purified. And as Jesus Christ is the Lamb, with the attributes of being innocent and of being intended for sacrificial consecration, so the faithful are styled by the Prince of the Apostles "immaculate lambs," *agni immaculati*. Indeed, as the *Didaché* expresses itself, the Father "has made Christ take up His abode within us." Each one of us becomes, as St. Paul says, "another Christ."

The sacred bread itself, which is taken from the oblations made by the Christians at the Offertory, represents in a symbolic manner the real and underlying purpose of Him, who suffers Himself to be placed under those species. The bread is made up of many grains of wheat, which form one leaven; so the Body of Christ upon the Altar is considered in the Sacrifice, not merely as what it really is, the physical substance of Christ, but also as what mystically it is, the body of His Church, composed of every tribe and nation under heaven, united intimately, in the holy *synaxis*, to Himself, the Eucharistic Oblation. Hence, the *Didaché* has these words in its beautiful eucharistic prayers, which on the days of the Stations are to be recited by the faithful before Holy Communion: "As this fragment (the species of bread) was scattered over the mountains and was gathered (*i. e.*, the grains of wheat, which form the bread, were gathered), and became one, so may Thy Church be gathered from the confines of the earth into Thy kingdom." This is the gathering of the nations spoken of by the Prophet Malachy, whom the *Didaché* quotes thus: "In every place and time offer me a clean sacrifice, for a great king am I, saith the Lord, and my name is wonderful among the Gentiles." And speaking of these peoples and tribes and nations, St. Paul says that we are the body of Christ;

that we are one body in Christ; that Jesus is the Saviour of this body; that He is the Head of the body, the Church; that He suffers in His body, the Church.¹ In this same sense, again, the *Didaché* speaks of the mystical body of Christ as sacrificed, as consecrated by oblation. For the exquisite eucharistic prayers, to be used by the faithful after Holy Communion, contain the following: "Remember Thy Church, O Lord, to free it from all evil, and to perfect it in Thy love; and from the four winds unite it (*σύναζον ἀνεμήν, synaxon autem*), sanctified into Thy kingdom, which Thou hast prepared for it. For Thine is power and glory forever and ever. Let grace come and the world pass away. Hosanna to the Son of David. Amen." Here the word "sanctified" means sacrificed, made holy by oblation; and thus the Church is "made perfect" in the sacrifice of the charity of Jesus Christ.

Several interesting difficulties have attached to some parts of the Canon of the Mass, and what we have just said gives us a footing for clearing them away. How, for instance, does the Priest venture to bless the Consecrated Species after the sacred words have already placed under them the Body of Christ, and there is nothing else there to bless? Or again, how does he come to pray soon after: "Bid these oblations be borne by the hands of the Holy Angel up to Thy sublime Altar," etc.?

The reasons appear from what has been said; they are the same which govern the tenor of the prayers before consecration. Under the form of the bread presented at the offertory the faithful have been symbolically united, from the very first, to Christ, the Head, and to all other members of the Church. Similarly, under the form of water mingled with wine in the chalice, they have been united to Christ, as all the liturgies of the Church indicate. Then, as being so united with Him, they are understood in all that follows. Thus, extending his hands over the oblation, not yet consecrated, the Priest applies the rite of the Old Law to the New, signifying, in precisely the same sense as of old, that the offering over which he extends his hands is substituted for those who offer it, and that these are represented in it. Then, making three signs of the cross over it, he pronounces these words:—*Quam oblationem tu Deus, in omnibus (membris), quæsumus, benedictam (in terris), adscriptam (in cœlis), ratam (in corpore Christi confirmatam), rationabilem (spiritualem) acceptabilemque facere digneris*; that is to say, while designating the sacred species, he asks that the oblation may be

¹ 1 Cor. xii, 13; Rom. xii, 5; Eph. v, 23; Coloss. i, 18, 24.

blessed in all its members upon earth, may be entered or registered in heaven, may be ratified in the Body of Christ, may be spiritual, no longer carnal, and so may be acceptable. Clearly, he is contemplating something else before him, in the Sacrifice, than merely the physical Body of Christ about to be placed there. Making two more signs of the cross, he adds : *Ut (oblatio) nobis (pro nobis) corpus et sanguis fiat dilectissimi filii tui Domini nostri Jesu Christi*; the desires expressed in the preceding part of the prayer will be fulfilled, if the oblation which he is designating and blessing become the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ.

When the consecration has been accomplished, the faithful are effectually united, as the mystical body, to their Head present and sacrificed. This union is what is signified by the term, *synaxis*. The Priest blesses the *synaxis*; he prays that it may be taken up by the hands of the Holy Angel to the sublime Altar of the Divine Majesty; and that all, who are partakers, sharers, in this sacred Altar or sacrifice, may be filled with every celestial grace and benediction. It is only when the sacrifice itself is entirely completed, in the Holy Communion, that the faithful partaking in it will be replenished with every grace. Then Christ at last is incorporated vitally in every living member present. No wonder our Lord has multiplied His presence on myriads of altars over the world, that, from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same, "in every place and time," (as the *Didaché* quotes the words of Malachy), this vital incorporation of each and every child of man in Christ's own Being may be possible to all, by the *synaxis*, or union in His Sacrifice completed at the eucharistic banquet of Holy Communion!

Just by the way, we may remark, what light this doctrine throws on the Sacrament of Matrimony, as explained by St. Paul! (Eph. v, 22-32). Explaining this union, the Apostle declares it to be a great Sacrament, and he adds emphatically: "But I speak in Christ and in the Church." He has enjoined on husbands to love their wives; he has required wives to be subject to their husbands in all things. And what are the reasons? He repeats them over and over again: That Christ is the Head of the Church; that He is the Saviour of His body; that Christ loves and nourishes and cherishes the Church, "because we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother; and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great Sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

We have taken this one instance of the author's treatment to show how his researches illustrate the liturgy ; and not only that, but dogma also, whereof liturgy is an authentic and organized expression. To complete the instance, we may add from this proemium the sketch which he gives of the Lord's day, as hallowed by this most solemn act of divine worship.

He premises and demonstrates from St. Justin Martyr, that the ordinances relative to this day are from our Lord Himself, who instructed the Apostles on various occasions after His Resurrection. Then the author goes on to describe the ritual observed on Sunday.

The faithful assemble, either in the synagogue, which has become Christian or in the *cœnaculum* of a private Christian, like that "Church which was in the house" of Prisca and Aquila, at Rome. (Rom. xvi, 5.) The day on which they meet is called, in Jewish language, *una Sabbatorum*, "the first day of the Sabbath," in Gentile terms, *dies Solis*, Sunday ; in Christian terminology, *dies Dominica*, "the Lord's Day." A section is read from a Prophet, or some part from the Gospel ; then follows the homily delivered by the President, the *antistes*, the *archiereus*, that is to say, the Bishop ; after that, the confession of sins and the reprehensions. Prayers are now offered up for all the faithful, and by them all.

These being finished, the Deacon takes part of the offerings made by the faithful, a loaf and a chalice of wine. He delivers the oblations to the President, who rehearses over them the words and actions of Our Lord at the Last Supper. So the *Didaché* expressly directs ; and then says no more about it, referring merely to the Gospel of Our Lord : "As you have in the Gospel of Our Lord."

The consecration being thus effected, the President alone in the name of all makes a solemn thanksgiving to God the Father, for all gifts granted in the order of nature and grace. After this thanksgiving, the consecrated gifts are distributed to those present and borne to those absent by the hands of the Deacons. And the faithful, having received the Body and Blood of the Lord, sing hymns to Jesus Christ.

The authors says: "The sense of this rite was understood in this manner. The offering of the substances necessary to support life is made instead of the persons offering, who are represented therein. When the bread and wine have been consecrated, the body of the faithful are represented now, not in the offerings which were made, but in the Body itself of the Lord ; and for the body of the

faithful the Body of the Lord is substituted. The conception is fundamental in the sacred rites of Jews and Christians.”¹

The idea of personal presence at Mass, on the part of the faithful, is so much a part of the original conception, that the author notes it as an addition made later in the Roman Canon of the Mass to include expressly those “for whom we offer,” as distinct from “those who offer.”

So much for the sacrifice itself, and its place in the week. The *Didaché* treats besides of the Ministers destined for the celebration of the Holy Mysteries. They are called *episcopi* and Deacons, different from the Apostles, Prophets and Doctors. These *episcopi* mentioned here and in the New Testament, generally, are proved to be not what we mean by Bishops; for, in that sense, the Apostle, or his consecrated legate, the President, the *antistes*, the *archiereus* of the *synaxis*, is the Bishop. The *episcopi*, spoken of both here and in the New Testament, are priests as understood by us. This is abundantly shown by the author.²

The precise state of the Church for which the document legislates is one which has never existed since the first century. It speaks of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost as common among the Christians, and of the ministry of the Prophets, still subsisting as in the Old Law. Of these charismata St. Paul treats at length in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapters XII-XIV. The *Didaché*, moreover, addresses Christian communities in which there was not yet established a *Presbyterium*, or clergy, composed of Bishop, Priests and Deacons, under the general jurisdiction of an Apostle or some legate of the Apostles.

Belonging to the latter class of apostolic chiefs were Evodius at Antioch, Mark at Alexandria, Timothy at Ephesus, Titus in Crete.³ The apostolic authority with which Paul and Barnabas were invested included all that was termed, at a subsequent period, “episcopal.” The present designation, “Bishop,” had not as yet the fixed and settled meaning, which it was to receive in the future.⁴

These well-formed Christian communities, not yet provided with the Priesthood in their midst, had their origin in the conversion of entire synagogues to the faith, or of portions which withdrew from a rebellious synagogue and formed a Church among themselves. So the Apostle St. Paul did with his neophytes at Corinth.⁵ St.

1 Proemio, capo v., p. XI.

2 Commentario, cc., XXIII-XXV.

3 Proemio, capo III, p. XVIII; Comentario, c. XVII. 4 Comentario, c. XXIII, p. 232.

5 Acts XVIII., 7, i. Minasi, Proemio, c. VI.

James addresses his Catholic epistle "to the twelve tribes which are scattered abroad." St. Peter indites his first letter "to the strangers dispersed through Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia."

Writing in A. D. 112, Pliny the Younger says that he found in Bithynia many Christians who had professed the faith for twenty years before his arrival; and he speaks of the large numbers belonging to every order and class of persons; he describes how they are scattered in the cities, the towns and the country; and he states that the temples are deserted, there are no more sacrifices, and none to purchase victims.¹

But we are now touching upon points, any one of which would furnish an example similar to the one we have chosen, for illustrating early Christian faith and practice. We might mention, besides, the newness of the Christian code of morals presented at that time to a Gentile world; and even a newness of Christian language which had to correspond. But, having filled the space available we can do no more than refer to the learned work from which the above is taken.

THOS. HUGHES, S. J.

SCIENTIFIC AND METAPHYSICAL COSMOLOGY.

(THIRD ARTICLE.)

Proof of the Scholastic Theory.

THE strongest argument in favor of the Peripatetic theory as to the essential principles of bodies is that which is drawn from the never-ceasing substantial changes which take place in the material universe.

It is a postulate of common sense, which no scientist will ever dream of denying, that there is such a thing as a substantial difference in bodies—a difference which is manifested by the variety and dissimilarity of attributes and operations of the same. Air, for instance, is something substantially different from water. Water is something substantially different from wood—the latter something wholly dissimilar in substance from ashes, from grass, flesh, bones, and the like. This difference does not consist in a diversity of combinations of previous substances, as homogeneous or heteroge-

¹ Lib. X., ep. 97.

neous, but is found in the first and fundamental being itself, which locates and establishes each body in its own proper species.

Now, it is a part of common daily observation that the substances just mentioned and others innumerable, under the action of proportionate and adequate causes, are changed into others. Thus, wood, under the action of fire, is changed into ashes; the latter, dissolved in water and attracted by the plant, is turned into an alimentary fluid of the same. This fluid, undergoing different elaborations, is changed into buds, and flowers and fruits. The fruit, partaken of by the animal, is transformed into blood, and afterwards into muscles, tendons, nerves, membranes, and other organic parts of the animal. The same must be said of the continual transformations going on unceasingly in the three kingdoms of this visible world.

The schoolmen, backed by the universal verdict of mankind, contend that these changes are substantial—that is that when, for example, wood is changed into ashes, the substance of the wood disappears and a new substance takes its place.

Science, of course, admits these facts, but some scientists deny that such changes are substantial, contending that in all these transformations, so-called, and transmutations of bodies, nothing substantial perishes, and consequently that no new substance is substituted instead of the first. They maintain that every new body is formed of the same identical atoms which were part and parcel of the previous body, atoms which undergo no essential change or alteration whatever. They explain the fact of the change by supposing a new arrangement and order and binding together of the same parts, which, by these accidental external phases, develop new and previously undiscovered properties and operations. In other words, they hold all change to be merely accidental and external to the atoms, which remain unchangeable, and are only outwardly affected.

The esteemed author of "*Mediaeval and Modern Cosmology*," with that absolute confidence which characterizes him says; "These (the schoolmen) considered the terrestrial elements to be something transmutable, whereas modern chemistry holds the immutability of the properties of the ultimate chemical atoms," page 17 and more clearly page 21. "It is an antiquated view that life, whether in plants or animals, or man, changes the intrinsic nature of the ultimate chemical elements, molecules, or atoms. These remain the same whether in or outside an organized body. Hence the scholastic view of a changing form and a permanent matter is, according to

the present state of chemical science, inadmissible even as far as the 'most ultimate possible chemical elements or atoms are concerned.'" Again, "We must say, according to the present state of chemical science, that these ultimate molecules or atoms can naturally have only that form, which they have, as it is the only one given them by the Creator, and so far as human observation reaches, cannot be altered by any human agency."

When this author on the strength of such stupendous display of knowledge of modern chemistry undertakes to lecture and to chastise the best philosophical intellects of the world ; when he does his best to inflict on them the stigma of deliberate, wilful ignorance, and by implication represents them as the enemies of science and of modern progress, he should at least speak sense, be consistent with himself, and not turn the very science which he so much idolizes against himself.

Atoms can only have that form which the Creator gave them ! As far as observation goes that form cannot be altered by human agency ! Pray how do you know that the Creator intended atoms to have but one form ? Observation indeed ! Who has ever observed, or ever pretended to have observed that atoms cannot be altered by human agency ? To listen to this author one would think that the existence of atoms was a thing ascertained beyond the possibility of a doubt, that they were the easiest thing in the world to be found as a subject of observation and experiment, that they could be seen, handled, smelled, tasted by any one who pleased, that they could be taken up or laid down at pleasure. Does he forget that he himself has admitted the existence of atoms to be problematic ? (page 15.) For the edification of our readers we will produce a few scientific authorities upon the subject. "They (atoms) are so small, that they can neither be seen nor counted, even by means of the most powerful magnifying glass, and they have, therefore, only an imaginary existence." (Stöckardt Principles of Chemistry page 246.)

Wurtz, in his "Atomic Theory," a standard work on the subject, says : "In admitting the existence of atoms we employ an hypothesis. I know well that atoms are invisible and inappreciable to the senses, and I do not believe that the direct proof of their existence and mutual attraction can ever be furnished." (The Atomic Theory, by Ar. Wurtz, N. Y., Appleton, 1881.)

Professors Armstrong and Meldola, in the Encyclopædia Britannica, say : "The exceeding small masses or molecules, of which *it is supposed* matter consists, are composite beings, made up of in-

divisible particles or atoms. The molecules of the elements *are assumed* to consist of similar atoms ; whereas those of compounds are congeries of dissimilar atoms, and the molecules which constitute a given kind of matter, *it is supposed*, are alike in weight and general properties, but differ from those of which all other kinds of matter are composed, so that every molecule belongs to one of different kinds of species." (Encyclop. Brit., art. Chemistry.)

We presume now to ask, if by acknowledgment of all true scientists the very existence of atoms is held to be highly doubtful ; if they are *assumed* or *supposed* for the sake of building a theory ; if the reason of that doubt lies in the fact that they defy all effort at being observed or examined, as they are beyond all natural or artificial means of observation, how can anyone who respects his own intelligence or that of his readers, assert so categorically and so peremptorily that they have, and can have, only one form—the one given them by the Creator—and that that form is absolutely unchangeable? How can anyone pretend that the only possible change which can be supposed in them is that of a different arrangement and different way of grouping them together? A general of an army, who arranges his corps, and his brigades, his regiments, and his battalions, and who can scan every movement and every evolution in the same with his telescope, could not be more certain than is the author of "Mediæval and Modern Cosmology" in arranging his atoms, which he never *saw*, which nobody has ever *seen*, which can never be *seen* by human eyes, instrument or no instrument, and in accounting for every change and every evolution to explain the constant transformation which takes place in bodies.

But is it really true that Chemistry admits the unchangeableness *in the nature* of the ultimate atoms ?

Undoubtedly the contrary. This for the very good reason that Chemistry disclaims to have anything to do with *the nature* of atoms. Here are a few authorities : "The properties of elementary and compound bodies are probably dependent upon the *innate nature* of atoms, upon their form and their mode of motion. But these *matters are uncertain and unknown*." (Wurtz, page 331.)

"We make no assumption," says Professor Maxwell, "with respect to the *nature* of the small parts (atoms)." (Ency. Brit., Art. Atom).

This disclaiming all knowledge as to the intrinsic nature of atoms is in perfect harmony and keeping with the object of true science, which is, as Chevreul expressed it so emphatically, *what I have seen*.

Not being able to bring the atom, its form, its mode of motion, its nature, under observation and experiment, true science abandons all pretension to have anything to say as to all those subjects. But the author we are dealing with has no such unnecessary scruples, and states without hesitation or doubt that atoms can only have one form ; that their intrinsic nature is unchangeable, and that whoever does not take these statements on the faith of his word is an enemy of science and of progress, which is the besetting sin of Catholic philosophers of ancient and modern times.

We contend that all the well-ascertained results of chemistry point the other way—in the opposite direction of the opinions of the author we are alluding to. They prove, as far as they can go, a capacity of change and transformation in the atoms. In our first article we alluded to the phenomenon of the chemical combination of bodies. We must speak of it here at some length, not only to study its real nature, but also in order to pave our way for the demonstration of the scholastic theory.

Two or more simple heterogeneous bodies are sought to be fused together so as to make one compound. These bodies, differing from each other in nature, in attributes and in operation, are placed under the action of chemical causes, and what happens ?

First, a profound internal alteration and transformation is produced in the components. This is evinced by the phenomena which they exhibit.

Secondly, the effect and result of the transformation is a homogeneous compact mass.

Thirdly, this mass develops properties and operations different from, and oftentimes contrary to, those of the component bodies.

Fourthly, the specific weight of the compound mass is found to be equal to the sum of the weight of the constituent bodies.

Fifthly, this change is permanent, and the components could never, by themselves, return to their former state.

Let us select a few authorities. Pelouze and Fremy in their *General Chemistry*, a standard work on the subject, say : “Chemical combination is characterized by a profound modification of the bodies combined by a change of smell, of color, of taste, and by the complete homogeneousness of the mass consequent upon the combination. It is ordinarily accompanied by a change of temperature and by an emission of light and electricity. Thus if we heat a mixture of copper and of sulphur, heat at once determining the affinity of copper for sulphur disengages a strong light and heat,

and a black homogeneous body is found which *differs essentially* from copper and sulphur—the sulphate of copper. In this case a chemical combination has taken place.”

The eminent chemist, Bertholot, states the theory in the same manner: “The object of chemistry is the exact knowledge of the facts of combination. Thus, two or more bodies, in the presence of, and under certain special agents, are totally transformed, and engender a new body, the properties of which are different from those of the elements of the constituent bodies, and the weight of which is equal to the sum of that of the components. Thus, for instance, if we place some water, acidulated with sulphuric acid, in a voltmeter, crossed by a current from a pile, we shall observe at once a different gas to escape from each of the electrodes—oxygen and hydrogen—two properties very distinct and different; two new bodies, and the sum of their weight is equal to the decomposed water. The transformation is complete; it is also permanent to the extent that the gases, left to themselves, can never regenerate the water which produced them.” (Dictionnaire des Dictionnaires art. Chemistry).

Finally the words of Professor Watt, the greatest authority on the subject, will close the list of our quotations. “A true chemical compound exhibits properties different from those of either of its constituent elements, and the proportions of these constituents, which form that particular compound, admit of no variation whatever.” (Manual of Chemistry, page 3, Philadelphia, 1885.)

The better to illustrate the nature of chemical combination, chemists take good care to compare it with chemical *mixture*, and to point out the essential differences of the one from the other.

“In the mixture, on the contrary,” says the “General Chemistry” above quoted, “bodies undergo no observable modification or change of temperature, nor emit any light. If the mixture be made of solid matter, one can easily distinguish the different parts by means of instruments, or of the naked eye; and by means of a mechanical process one can easily effect a separation of the different bodies forming the mixture.” (Page 3.)

The chemical combination, then, differs from the mixture, inasmuch as in the first its components undergo a deep and internal transformation, whereas in the second no alteration can be observed. In the first the components are so fused together as to result in a homogeneous, compact mass—a new body,—having properties and

operations different from those of each of its constituents. In the mixture no homogeneous or compact mass is produced.

In the first, no trace of the component parts is observable ; in the second, they can easily be discerned by the naked eye, or by means of instruments. And, finally, the first is constant and permanent, and its constituent parts cannot be reduced to their former state without chemical agents ; whereas in the latter they can be so reduced by means of mechanical instruments.

Now these absolutely certain and well-ascertained results of science, this total change and transformation of two or more bodies into one homogeneous, compact mass, differing in attributes and operation from those of its constituent parts, must receive a *proper, adequate explanation*.

Some chemists, like the author we are contending with, pretend that the change is merely accidental, that it does not change the internal nature, structure, or form of the component parts.

Upon this explanation we have to remark in the first place that it has not a single fact to rest upon. Let us listen to one of its most strenuous supporters. "Our present convictions that such transmutation (substantial) is impossible are based on the knowledge we have obtained by following to its legitimate consequences the great principle of Newton : when the weight remains we are persuaded that the material remains. The weight of the sulphide of iron is exactly equal to that of sulphur and iron combined. Hence we conclude that every atom of the iron, and every atom of the sulphur still remain in our product, the only difference being, that whereas previously the atoms of sulphur were associated together to form molecules of the sulphur, and those of the iron to form molecules of the iron, they are now associated with each other to form molecules of sulphide of iron." (Cooke, Atomic Theory, page 106, N. Y., Appleton.)

We abstain from commenting on the amusing way in which this author gets over the difficulty of the chemical combination of sulphur and iron. You are very much puzzled to explain how certain atoms of iron and certain atoms of sulphur come together so as to produce a new body with properties wholly different from those of the component parts? Why ! you must be very simple indeed to take so much trouble and to be so much exercised. You must have very little confidence indeed in the resources of science, and must be quite new to its miraculous inventive genius. There is nothing more easy than the explanation of that fact. When sulphur was

sulphur, and iron iron, it meant simply that a certain number of atoms of sulphur were associated together to form molecules of sulphur, and that a certain number of atoms of iron were associated together to form molecules of iron. They are *now* associated together to form molecules of sulphide of iron. If you don't admire such lucid explanation it is evident that you must be very hard to please indeed!

The only appearance of reason given in the passage in favor of the theory is that the weight of the compound being equal to the sum of the weight of the components it is inferred that no change whatever must have taken place in the components by the chemical combination. Now if these scientists were to pay a little attention to the most elementary rules of reasoning they would see that their conclusion is wider than the premises. Because one property of the components remain in the compound they concluded that no change whatever has taken place. The legitimate consequence would be whatever changes the facts of combination imply they must be explained in such a way as not to conflict with the fact of the weight remaining unchangeable. And it is thus that all chemists of different opinion have explained it:

“Matter,” says Youmans, “may be changed from state to state thousands of times without the smallest loss. A pound of ice converted into water or into steam continues to weigh exactly a pound. When fuel is burned or water disappears by evaporation or our own bodies are resolved into earth and air it is only the migrations of matter through the circle of natural transformation. *Forms alone are destroyed; matter remains imperishable.* (Class Book of Chemistry, page 28, Appleton, New York.) And this is the only possible explanation; otherwise the well ascertained facts of chemical observation and experiments cannot be accounted for in any satisfactory way.

Two bodies of different nature and properties are brought under the action of chemical agents, and at once a transformation and alteration takes place in them. Their temperature is changed, their color, taste, smell become different. An amount of light and electricity is generated by them. They become fused into one homogeneous compact mass. A new body results from the combination. This new body yields properties and operation totally different from those of the constituent parts. These become absolutely indiscernible. The change is permanent. And in spite of all these facts you pretend that no internal modification, no essential change,

no substantial transformation has taken place ; in fact, that the constituent bodies have not been internally affected in any way whatever except and inasmuch as they have been placed under a different arrangement? What right have you to make such statement in utter conflict with the combined force of all the facts pointing to the opposite view? Have you seen or observed that the component parts, after the combination, preserve their nature, properties, structure and form? If so, where are your proofs and your authorities? But you could observe no such thing, as it is admitted by all scientists that the constituents of a chemical compound, after the combination, are absolutely unobservable. And you pretend to go by science, by observation, by experiment and reproach the schoolmen, the very élite of human intelligence, with revelling among the misty heights of metaphysical abstractions? Your explanation, then, is in utter conflict with the facts observed by true science. It does away, also, with all possible chemical combination, and reduces everything to a chemical mixture.

If no internal change takes place, no substantial transformation in the constituents of a compound, if no fusion take place of the component bodies into another different from each, then all combination becomes external, accidental and consequently of approach and juxtaposition, in other words a chemical mixture. But science distinguishes the two most carefully ; it describes their different nature, and marks with greatest possible accuracy all those points wherein one essentially differs from the other. Therefore your explanation is in utter conflict with science.

Cooke admits the consequence that in his theory all chemical combination is reduced to a mixture. “According to our atomic theory then chemical combination is only a mixture of finer degree.”

Here one may ask : Is there any fact of science proving such a thing? We subjoin the words of the author. “If we place on the stage of a powerful microscope a portion of the powder with which we have just been experimenting we can distinguish the grains of sulphur and those of iron, side by side ; and so according to our theory, if we could make microscopes powerful enough we should see in the sulphide of iron the atoms of its two constituents.” (Page 106.)

Putting this passage in common language it amounts to this : We hold every chemical combination to be equivalent to a mixture. But facts are against us ; especially that stubborn fact that in the combination no trace, whatever, of the components is to be seen or observed, in spite of all efforts to the contrary ; whereas in the mixture

we can easily and distinctly see the atoms composing it standing side by side.

Still *our atomic theory demands* that we should be able to distinguish the components even of the combination. What is to be done? Why let us lay the fault at the door of the microscope. If we could make the microscope powerful enough, we should certainly see, in the chemical combination each distinct atom of the components lying side by side in happy fellowship.

Some simple-minded mortal might ask : if no change whatever takes place in the constituents of a chemical compound but just a change of place, if they are in no way affected as to structure, form, shape, or size, why, in the name of common sense, should it require a more powerful microscope to distinguish them in the combination any more than is necessary to distinguish them in the mixture?

One must have very powerful digestive faculty in the matter of modern science. The very fact of its being modern, up to the times, in full harmony with the giant steps of progress and evolution, settles the question. On its testimony you must stifle the clamors of your reason and common sense and accept blindly whatever its advocates are condescending enough to place before you.

But the explanation we are commenting upon flatly contradicts the most universally accepted principles of reason.

The effect of a chemical combination is a homogeneous compact mass, a new body, in the truest and strictest sense of the word. For this compound exhibits and manifests new properties and new operations, which differ from and oftentimes are contrary to those of each of the constituents of the compound. On this chemists of every opinion and of every school are agreed without a contradictory voice. Now, we ask : how do we discover and find out the nature of a theory? Assuredly, from its attributes, faculties, and operations. This, for the simple reason that a being acts and must act as it is, in conformity with its essence and nature. Nobody ever dreamt that a thing will act contrary to its nature ; for the nature of a being is just its first principle of operation, and it would be the height of absurdity to suppose that it followed a bend in utter conflict with itself. Hence the saying, that *operatio sequitur esse*. This principle is admitted by scientists and acted upon by them, and is not merely the doctrine of metaphysicians, for whom the author alluded to by us has such instinctive horror. It is upon the strength of this principle that chemists, not being able to observe the nature of things in itself, build the essential difference between one body

and another, be it simple or compound. One body is observed to manifest certain operations producing certain peculiar effects; another body is found to exhibit different or contrary operations and results; science on the ground that a being acts as it is, and that a different or contrary set of operations and effect indicates difference or opposition of nature in the cause, comes to the conclusion that there are substances and bodies specifically different from or contrary to each other.

Difference of operations, therefore, argues difference of nature in the agent. If, then, in the chemical combination, we have a compound wholly dissimilar in operation from that of the component parts, we must necessarily conclude that the compound is of different nature from that which the components exhibited before the combination.

It will be said that science maintains that the component parts in the combination must remain, because it is demonstrated that the weight of the mass of the compound is equal to that of the constituent bodies.

Certainly something must remain of the constituent bodies, otherwise we should no longer have a change or transformation, but a destruction of the constituent bodies. But what can that be? Certainly not the constituent bodies precisely and exactly in the same conditions in which they existed before the combination. Certainly not a new and different arrangement and grouping which has supervened, and which does not alter or affect the bodies in any real sense but leaves them whole and intact as previously to the composition, for all that does not account for the production and generation of a new body with different properties and operations.

What then must be said to remain? The general material substratum which enters in the composition of all bodies. The chemical agent acting upon the component bodies effaces and destroys the present real substantial form in which they exist and from the material substratum common to all bodies, which is ever permanent and imperishable, extracts, or to express it in the scientific language commonly used, disengages a new form which reduces them to one solid homogeneous mass—a new body.

This is the only possible explanation of the phenomenon of chemical combination consistent with all the facts and results of chemistry, and in absolute harmony with reason and common sense.

But it is exactly the explanation of the scholastic system as to

the essential constitution of bodies, as must be apparent to all those who have followed our demonstration.

In that theory it is held that two are the principles absolutely necessary to constitute what all mankind calls a body. One, which officiates as permanent imperishable substratum, entering into the composition of all bodies. This principle is held to be of itself shorn of all special native attribute or operation, but capable of assuming or receiving any special nature or attribute, retaining, even after having undergone a special nature, the capacity to lose it under proper and adequate influence of agents and forces, and to assume any other kind of nature and attributes. This is the passive principle called Primary Matter.

The other is the active principle, true and real and substantial, which impresses upon the primary matter a special nature and properties, subsistence, individuality and activity, as such. This principle is the Form.

The substantial change and transformation going on in bodies, a fact of daily and hourly occurrence, can be explained in no other system. This transformation, as we have repeatedly remarked, requires to be real and substantial, otherwise it cannot be accounted for consistently with the facts observed by Chemistry. There must at the same time be something left of the former bodies which enter into the combination; otherwise it would be no longer a combination, but utter destruction, and the fact that the compound's weight is equal to the sum of the weight of the components would remain inexplicable. The schoolmen's theory explains and accounts for everything. For it teaches that a substantial change can be effected in bodies inasmuch as under a proper agent they are deprived of a certain true, real form, and from the remaining imperishable material substratum underlying all bodies a new form is educed or evoked, and hence a new body is constructed, presenting nature properties, operations wholly at variance with those of the constituents. We have purposely used the scholastic word *educed*, for the opponents of the peripatetic system have indulged in any amount of merriment over that expression. They have laughed at the idea that one could extract new forms from matter as if it were a magical box, by opening which all sorts of wonderful things might be drawn forth. But with what reason they have done this we shall see. The word is necessarily metaphorical, as we are, according to the condition of human language, bound to make use of words drawn from sensible representations, and therefore relating or alluding to some sensible phenomenon.

But in this we have a goodly company. The word *disengage* has passed into common use among scientific men of all kinds, and especially of chemists, to express how a new phenomenon is produced in certain bodies under the action of physical and chemical agents. That expression surely is no better than the word *educed*, drawn forth or extricated, used by the scholastics. Both are metaphorical, and both convey the idea as well as human language permits. And those who permit themselves to laugh at the expression of the scholastics, actuated by the feeling of supercilious scientific superiority, forget that they are availing themselves of an equivalent expression, and are not aware that in laughing the schoolmen to scorn, they are turning the laugh against true science and its professors.

We could prove the truth of the theory we are advocating from the principal properties of bodies, such as extension, resistance, impenetrability, activity, and crystallization. But we have no room to develop more than one of them, and shall select the most important one among them, that is *Extension*.

To form an idea of real extension various other concepts are necessary. First, we must conceive something which is possessed of that which, for want of better expression, we shall call parts. For it is evident that without supposing a mass made up of, or resulting from a multiplicity of parts, one standing outside the other, we could never begin to form the concept of extension.

In the second place we must conceive a continuity in the parts of the mass which appears as expanded and extended. But what is meant by continuity? The better to define it is well to state the difference which exists between continuity and contiguity. The first implies the idea of a mass supposed to be composed of parts one outside the other, but which parts considered as something really definite or distinct from each other in the bosom of that mass, do not really exist, but are a creation of our mind. Contiguity on the other hand conveys the idea of a mass made up of parts one outside the other; but these parts have a real definite distinct existence in the bosom of the being and only touch each other by their extremities. In other words if a mass is given made of really definite and distinct parts in juxtaposition to each we say that those parts are contiguous and that the mass offers the phenomenon of contiguity. On the other hand let a mass be given the parts of which have no real definite existence of their own but appear so welded together that the extremity of one is the beginning of the other, and we have the phenomenon of continuity.

The idea of extension then implies a multiplicity of parts one lying outside the other, and at the same time continuous to each other. Without this multiplicity and continuity we could never account for the perception of extension, a fact of daily experience with us.

Now in order that this multiplicity of parts might yield a compact continuous whole a principle is necessary which so informs penetrates and masters all the parts, and brings them together as to result in a perfect unity potentially divisible, but in reality undivided. This principle must be simple and the source of activity in the body. It must be simple otherwise it would be itself a body. It must be active to give unity to the being.

To explain then the property of extension in bodies a double principle is necessary. The first which may account for the multiplicity of parts and their expansion. The second which may give unity and indivisibility to those parts so that all may result into one compact continuous body. The first is matter the other is the form. These are both real and substantial and hence account for all the requirements necessary to establish real extension, and at the same time eschew the great difficulty prevalent against any system which attempts to explain the extension of bodies by means of any other supposition except that of a *substantial extended substratum* brought into unity by a *simple substantial principle*.

It may be objected to us that the Peripatetic system does not avoid the difficulty, but leaves it whole and intact, for if it be conceded that a body is truly extended and continuous it becomes absolutely necessary to admit that a small particle of it is infinite as containing an infinite number of parts. In fact, given real extension in a body we must needs grant that it may be divided into smaller bodies, also extended, and these in their turn being so, may be cut up into bodies yet smaller, and so on ad infinitum.

St. Thomas has foreseen the difficulty, and has replied to it as he is wont to do. And to clearly state his answer we must distinguish between the mathematical continuous and the physical continuous. The first is the continual quantity mentally abstracted from the substance or real body which is the subject of the same. The second is the real body or substance with the quantity of which it is the subject.

The question may be raised whether both one and the other are made up of infinite parts. We answer, in the mathematical continuous there are no actual parts either finite or infinite in number ;

for the simple reason that it is not a discreet quantity, that is a quantity the component parts of which have a separate and distinct existence. But it is potentially infinite in number.

The physical continuous has no real parts, either finite or infinite, but is potentially capable of finite parts.

The first statement is proven by the remark that, be the supposed quantity ever so small by the very fact of its being essentially extended, it can never by division, be brought to that state that on one side there may be left an extended part and on the other an unextended or mathematical point, or that the last extended point may be divided into two mathematical points. A continuous quantity, therefore, considered as such, must be essentially divisible into parts also divisible, and we can never look upon a further division as impossible. Consequently, the mathematical continuous is potentially divisible ad infinitum. But it is not so of the physical continuous. It is not pure quantity. It is the *solid substance* on which, as its subject, quantity is found to lean. Hence such quantity could not be divided without dividing the substance in which it resides. If we confined our consideration to the quantity alone as abstract from the substance which it modifies, the continuous would be divisible ad infinitum potentially, but not actually. But, regarding the continuous as a substance, it is not and cannot be divisible ad infinitum, either potentially or actually. The reason of this two-fold impossibility arises from the very essence of the substance and concrete nature of the being. For every substance must be regarded in a two-fold aspect ; in its intrinsic nature and essence, and in its extension or irradiation, so to speak, inasmuch as it extends to occupy space. The latter takes its origin from the substance itself as a force or power of the same. And it can easily be conceived how a corporal substance may be reduced to a minimum degree of extension, so as to have no longer the power to occupy space, or to prevent another substance from taking its own identical place.

Hence, whether a body attempted to be divided be an elementary substance or a composite body we must necessarily, at least in thought, arrive at a limit beyond which the division cannot be carried unless the body ceases to have the virtue of power of extending itself, or of preventing another body from occupying its own identical place. In other words, without its ceasing to be continuous. "Corpus," says St. Thomas, "quod est magnitudo completa dupliciter sumitur, scilicet mathematice, secundum quod consideratur in eo sola quantitas, et naturaliter secundum quod con-

sideratur in eo materia et forma. Et de corpore quidem naturali; quod non possit esse infinitum in actu manifestum est. Nam omne corpus naturale aliquam formam substantialem habet determinatam; cum igitur ad formam naturalem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad determinatam formam naturalem consequantur determinata accidentia, inter quæ est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet determinatam quantitatem, et in magis et minus." (St. Th.: S. 1a p. qu. : 7, art. 3.)

We conclude our demonstration by adding that the scholastic theory has the support of all those naturalists who admit the atomodynamic system to explain the essential principles of bodies.

This system, which maintains that atoms are something really active and extended, if it means anything, amounts to this, that a force is essential to the primitive atom, that without such a force it would neither exist nor be extended. Hence this force must enter into the very essence of the atom, for that thing is surely essential to a being, without which it could not exist. On the other hand, this force cannot be conceived except as simple and unextended. Hence, according to this system, the primitive atom, which is extended and also endowed with continuity and resistance, must necessarily be the result of an extended reality and of a force from which its properties and laws depend. Both constituents are necessarily required for its existence. Because without the extended reality we could not conceive force, not even in a single point of space. Without force extension itself would lose all reality.

Now, who can fail to see that such a system coincides perfectly with the scholastic system of matter and substantial form? The extended reality, which cannot exist by itself alone without force, and the extension of which vanishes without the action of the simple principle, exhibits and represents the scholastic idea of matter, the source of extension, but of itself indeterminate, and incapable of subsisting without form. Force, on the other hand, necessary to the first existence of matter, represents the substantial form.

Hence the system we have been defending can lay claim not only to the extrinsic authority of so many eminent scientists who have supported the atomodynamic system, but also to all those reasons, absolutely irrefutable, on which it is grounded.

Professor Cooke, of Harvard, who is a chemist of the school of the author of "Modern and Mediæval Cosmology," feels the great and momentous weight of the atomodynamic theory, and says: "I must confess that I am rather drawn to that view of nature which

has favor with many of the most eminent physicists of the present time, and which sees in the cosmos, besides mind, only two essentially distinct beings, namely, matter and energy ; which regards all matter as one, and all energy as one, and which refers the qualities of substances to the affections of the one *substratum*, modified by the varying play of forces." (The Atomic Theory, page 102. Appleton, N. Y., 1881.)

J. DE CONCILIO.

THE ASPIRANT TO THE PRIESTHOOD.

By the Late Dr. Francis Hettinger.

[The right of translation of this series of Letters has been purchased exclusively for the pages of the *American Ecclesiastical Review*.]

The following "Letters" to a young Seminarian were not published until after the death of their illustrious writer, which occurred in January, 1890. They treat in systematic order, although in the familiar form of epistolary correspondence, the chief points of the ecclesiastical training to the holy ministry, and with special reference to the requirements of modern society.

The priest can never be, in the ordinary sense of the word, a man of the world ; his very position places him above it. Nevertheless, he cannot always make that position felt by sanctity of life alone. There are men who will remain unmoved by religious sentiment or the convincing force of truth, yet who are at times attracted by the culture of mind or tastes which they recognize in a priest, and which open to him a way of fulfilling his ministry toward those who would else remain in the shadow of death.

Dr. Hettinger, during the long years which he spent in training the clergy, recognized this need whilst he was in frequent touch with the social elements that most influence the education of a nation. The topics which he treats in these letters appeal to the Catholic priesthood the world over, and his natural breadth of view, emphasized by an exceptional experience, makes them of as much practical worth to the candidates for the priestly mission in America as they are for those to whom the author meant in the first place to address himself. The order of subjects is as follows :—VOCATION, PREPARATORY TRAINING, CLASSICAL STUDIES, PHILOSOPHY, THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES, THE ARTS, THE HIGHER SEMINARY, ASCETICAL TRAINING, THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY, APOLOGETICS, DOGMATIC THEOLOGY, MORAL THEOLOGY, CANON LAW, BIBLICAL STUDIES, CHURCH HISTORY, STUDY OF THE CHRISTIAN FATHERS, PASTORAL AND PRACTICAL THEOLOGY, CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTION, HOMILETICS, LITURGY.

In his treatment of these themes the author largely mingles the belletristic with the didactic element. This may seem to some a defect, whilst others will consider it a decided advantage, inasmuch as it opens many secondary useful and agreeable sources of information, which of itself tends to the elevation and refinement of thought and expression.

As for the translation, we cannot pretend to anything like the characteristic warmth and poetic grace of the original. Any attempt to an even approximately literal rendition would lead to the adoption of an artificial style, which is never more repulsive than when applied to spiritual themes. We were obliged, therefore, to use a certain freedom of judgment and expression throughout. In many places we shall have to cut out portions, not only where merely local or individual references, which do not appeal to the sympathy of the English reader, are introduced, but also where the mode of thought, or rather of thinking, differs from our own. The entire mental and spiritual constitution of the German, as expressed in his idiom, requires, so to speak, a welding in order to adapt it to the genius of English, and more especially, of American thought and speech. If we should seem to have exceeded at times in the use of this freedom, so as to lessen the merit of the original, our only apology is to be found in the desire to be practical.

I.

The True Idealism—Temporal and Eternal—Pessimism and the Christian View—A Mark of Vocation.

MY DEAR YOUNG FRIEND :

Your letters have not only shown me marks of absolute confidence but they have also allowed me a clear insight into your soul. You have had doubts and difficulties ; and whilst ever longing for higher and nobler things, your path seemed obscured by darksome clouds. But have courage, my dear friend. These are only the nebulous mists gathering at early morn before the rising of the sun. Soon the light will ascend, and its strong, warm rays will dissipate the uncertain atmosphere and let you look clearly into your own, inmost soul. Was not a light given you even as your birthright to guide you from your cradle through the devious paths of this world to your heavenly destiny ?

Call it reason or knowledge or that native longing of the will to possess the perfect good—all three combined in varying degrees offer unto every man their illumining rays to lead him on to the source of all grace, of all that is spiritual.

Nor is that fluctuating, restless yearning of your soul for something nobler far away and undefined, without its meaning. To-day it rouses you to a joyous confidence at the recital of generous sacri-

fices made by men, who, like yourself, were doomed to struggle against earth ; to-morrow you are cast down with disappointment at yourself and others, when the ideal which you had before you proves but a fancied reality. And yet you cannot live without ideals. “ Res contempta homo est, nisi se supra humana eleverit.” This yearning within you, this mingling of joy and sadness all in one which holds your soul spellbound in the hour of affliction, is nothing else than the state of a heart wherein the principle of love is struggling unto perfect development. Everything will depend on the character of this development. Plato’s ingenious myth wherein he pictures *Eros* as the offspring of *Poros* and *Penia* is a truth exemplified in the history of each single soul. Does not the eye turn naturally upward to the skies, when the heart, abandoned by the fickle promises of earth, finds within naught but weakness and doubt and sin, and yet, above all else, the necessity of a sustaining power? Such is the force of heavenly attraction, and the love which yields to it is the inborn love of the child of God. But the love of earth casts down its eye and finds its happiness below. *L’uno tira al cielo e l’altra a terra tira.*

Sensual love fancies to have found true joy ; but it is as in a dream, and on awaking the soul feels the more keenly its void, and disappointment makes it smart with a hopeless pain. The love which fixes on heaven outlasts the pleasant phantasies of its first stage and gains in eager desire with every new glimpse of that undying beauty which rests above the clouds, whereas the worldling feeds on momentary joy growing dull and insipid as the years drag on amid sullen remorse and despair.

Keep then, my dear young friend, your eye with steady gaze upon that rising light on high. It will lead you on to the enjoyment of that eternal beauty on which Angelic Hosts have looked for endless centuries never wearying in chants of grateful praise.

From your letters I am convinced of the purity of your motives, your earnestness of purpose and, I may add, the cleanness of your heart. Happy the youth whose early years have not been tainted by grave sins. Purity of heart is like precious ointment which spreads its sweet odors over all the faculties of the soul ; it somehow acts in a chastening way upon the intellect, and makes it capable of clearly perceiving truth, whilst it elevates the affections to seek only the noblest ideals for their object. Ah yes ! “ The clean of heart shall see God.” It is true even of earthly understanding. The gifted yet unfortunate Sainte Beuve says somewhere “ Dissipation

is a strong dissolvent of faith and it engrafts into the soul a more or less decided skepticism. The sense of melancholy which proceeds, like an odor of death, from the bosom of earthly pleasures, and the restless weariness which frightens whilst it enervates, do not merely affect our senses but react in a certain sense upon our judgment. The principle of certitude becomes in course of time deranged and breeds confusion in the reason." He spoke from experience.

You tell me that the thought of death, the uncertainty of earthly hopes and the perishable frailty of all things round about you have of late made a deep impression upon your soul. You ask whether the word of the Angelic Doctor "Modicum est hoc totum spatium quo praesens pervolat saeculum" may not apply also to the aspirations of your soul, so that, as in the case of many men, the heart would in time grow dry and weary. These thoughts seem to attest a lack of confidence in the immortal purpose of our being, and yet I am hardly disposed to blame you for indulging them. St. Thomas saw in this feeling of insecurity rather a mark of the in-working grace of God. All those great minds whose genius we admire in the production of masterpieces in letters or arts, have given expression to this conviction of the insufficiency of earthly elements for the realization of man's highest ideals. Witness the strains of Homer and Sophocles, or, in Christian times, those of Dante,¹ Shakespeare,² Michael Angelo.³

The saintly youths who, following the generous impulse of a chivalrous nature, renounced the temporal advantages of society that they might devote themselves to a loftier pursuit of heavenly treasures, were never found to yield to the *tedium vitae* in the same way as the worldling does. If they were sad their sadness had

- 1 Because mine eyes can never have their fill
Of looking at my lady's lovely face,
I will so fix my gaze
That I may become blessed beholding her.

Vita Nuova—Rossetti's Transl.

- 2 Wheu I have seen by Time's fell hand defaced
The rich-proud cost of out-worn buried age :
When I have seen such interchange of state,
Or state itself confounded to decay ;
Ruin has taught me thus to ruminatè—
That time will come and take my love away.
This thought is as a death which cannot choose,
But weep, to have that which it fears to lose.

Sonnets, LXIV.

- 3 Veggio ben, che della vita sono
Ventura e grazia l'ore ben corte
Che l'umana miseria han fin per la morte.

nothing of melancholy or of that gloomy fear of death which follows the exciting pleasures of earth. "Tristitia mundi mortem operatur" says the Apostle.¹ The mourning of the "blessed," of whom our Lord speaks, is full of peace and sweet tranquillity. Like the floating dew of heaven it fructifies, whereas the dejection which succeeds the false joys of the world, like the miasmatic vapors from below, poisons and kills the struggling germ of life.

But if it is true that all that which the earth holds of sweetest gifts must needs pass away, are we, therefore, to account it of no value to us? By no means. Certainly we are not to argue with the philosophers of old that the limited cup of pleasure is to be quickly drained lest its contents evaporate ere we can fully enjoy them. Nor could we endorse the severe but shallow reasoning of the modern Buddhist or the stoic Pessimist, who sum up the uses of life in the precept: Endure and hail death as a liberator. This is a sad philosophy, for it robs man of his truest ideal and destroys the noblest aspirations of the human heart.

If the world with its show of good things disappoints us, it is because we take the curtain, that hides the real good from superficial view, as the fulfillment of the soul's yearning after perfect beauty and happiness. Those objects which strike the outward sense are but the symbols of an inward perfection, which alone can satisfy our nature. Lift the veil and you will find that for which your inmost soul does long.

Nurture, then, within you this aspiration. It is part and indication of your truest life perpetuating the youth of your heart. Have you never met men with hoary heads yet youthful faces, men who are never wholly sad and still not frivolous, but whose souls seem to soar upward on the wings of higher hopes than those which can disappoint the creatures of earth? On the other hand you will find men young in years, who from the very threshold of their boyhood seem to take away a load that makes them droop and bend with weariness of life. These are they who have early lost or been deprived of noble aspirations. It is true that the wordly man considers the pursuit of an ideal perfection as folly. "Invicem insanire videmur," says St. Jerome. The Governor Felix thought St. Paul but a visionary whom his very learning had made mad.² But are there not others who, having drained the world's reality, found it impossible to satiate their thirst for happiness, and who in turning to the higher fountain gained peace of soul and joy un-

1 II Cor., 7, 10.

2 Acts, 26, 24.

quenchable in the pursuit of the heavenly ideal. Listen to St. Augustin:¹ "Turn us toward Thee, O Lord of Hosts, show us Thy countenance and we shall be saved! (Ps. 79, 4.) For whithersoever the soul of man may turn, unless to Thee, it is affixed to sorrow, yea though it is affixed to beauteous things without Thee and without itself. But they were not, unless they were from Thee. They rise and set, and by rising they begin as it were to be, and they grow that they may become perfect, and when perfect they wax old and perish; and all wax not old, yet all perish. Therefore, when they rise and tend to be, the more rapidly they grow that they may be, so much the more they hasten not to be. This is the way of them. . . . Hearken then. The Word itself invokes thee to return; and there is the place of rest imperturbable, where love is not abandoned if itself abandoneth not. Behold these things pass away that others may succeed them . . . but do I depart anywhere, says the word of God. There fix the habitation of thy rest, O my soul now at length that thou art weary of the world's deceit. Commit to truth what truth has granted thee, and nothing shalt thou lose; and thy wounds shall be healed, and what is sore and sick in thee shall be restored and cured, and shall not perish with the things which pass away, but bide forever with the everlasting God."

It is then in God that we must seek our permanent satisfaction. He alone is sufficient for the void within us, who fills all things, and without whom we must remain needy and restless. "What is it that I love? I have asked the earth and it answered: It is not I. I have asked the sea and the abyss and they replied: We are not thy God. I have asked the heavens, the sun, and moon and stars, and they all answered me: We are not the God whom thou seekest. Then I called out to all the things without and around me: Tell me something of my God, whom, you say, you are not, tell me something of Him? And they returned with mighty voice: He has created us."² But if these earthly things are perishable they show that which is immortal; they quicken our search for that which lies within; they give impulse to thought and action which will live forever. The gilt-edged cloud may darken our path, but yet it guards and intensifies the hope of seeing the fair sun that hides behind it for a time.

Herein then lies, my friend, the value of the things that are but dust in many shapes. The thought of eternity behind them gives

¹ Confess. iv. 10, 11.

² Ps. 99. 3. Aug. l. c. 10, 6.

them price and worth ; only when you separate them from the central body which makes their attraction do you render them worthless. Science, arts, religion, all that is fair in life or lends it dignity, has its precious value to him that knows the use thereof. To this does all knowledge tend. From the individual and accidental it proceeds to the universal and to that which contains the first and final cause of all existence. Aristotle defines pure wisdom as theology. ¹ He was right, for the idea of truth as the object of the wise man's inquiry leads of necessity to the origin and the author of truth, just as the notion of good, and that of being, force the mind toward the recognition of perfect good and an absolute independent being, which is God.

Yet mere speculative theology cannot be our ultimate aim. It does not, as such, answer to the necessity of our being. Although this noblest occupation of the intellect proposes to lead the human mind, link by link, along the chain of finite phenomena until it reaches God, there are many gaps which reason and the evidence of sense are unable to bridge over. We may trace the sunlight to its source by the broken rays that reach us from the clouded sky above or by the reflected glare on some smooth form below. Still it is but an assurance of light far short of the reality that shines out from the royal orb. Nor could we bear with our shaded eyes the full rich splendor of the heavenly sun, to which we turn for light. And is not this itself a proof of some radical need in our present condition, since the limitation which binds our senses and our reason does not extend to the desire for a full and perfect knowledge of truth, which is ever present within us. It points to a higher source of evidence which is both to secure and perfect human science. Socrates felt this need,² and Plato, where he speaks of the *λόγος θεϊός τις*,³ and the Christian recognizes this source in revelation. Thus *faith* becomes the *complement* of human science. All true science simply leads up to the gate which faith alone can eventually open into the temple of absolute truth. Human knowledge gives us but a foretaste of that knowledge which surpasses all the wisdom of earth.

Mark then the path of genuine science. It considers this world, notes the results of rational investigation through the constant changes from life to life and to decay ; and convinced of the insuffi-

¹ Alcibiad., II.

² Phæd., p. 85.

³ Nomen simpliciter sapientis illi reservatur, cujus consideratio circa finem Universi versatur, qui etiam est Universitatis principium. *St. Thom. contr. G. I. 13; secund Aristot. Metaphys. I, 1.*

ciency of that which is controllable by sense and reason, hearkens to the divine voice, which in the light of eternal existence gives certainty to man's unceasing search. Thus are we led, step by step, from physical science to that of positive and supernatural theology. Of this we shall treat in the following letters.

This distaste, therefore, regarding the things of earth, allied to a longing for what is higher and seemingly beyond your reach, need not discourage you. Nay, it should cause you to rejoice with habitual gratitude to God. And if it does this you may take it as a token of your vocation; for St. Thomas lays great stress upon habitual joy as being a sign that God is within and that He lifts the soul preparatory to embracing it. Cultivate these evidences of your calling to the sacred ministry. Let not the noise round about you drown the subdued whisperings of love which come from the Holy Spirit, and defend the sanctuary of your heart from the encroachments of the world. Do so by being watchful in prayer.

CONFERENCES.

LENTEN QUERIES.

Qu. The Lenten Indult in force in the United States allows the use of *lard* (adepts suilli) in place of butter for the preparation of Lenten food. Does this privilege extend to the days of abstinence throughout the year?

Resp. The common interpretation of theologians is that the *usage*, which has occasioned the legislation by way of special Indult, also regulates its legitimate application. Hence we would unhesitatingly answer the above query in the affirmative. We know that such is the opinion of authorities like P. Sabetti, who, if they do not state the matter explicitly in their Moral Theology, simply indicate that in the matter of local usage which regulates special legislation, no general statement can be made.

Qu. Is *clam-chowder* allowed for days of abstinence and fast? Please answer. (Query sent twice.)

Resp. That depends on the quality. Not versed in the details of the culinary art, and yet wishing to satisfy our correspondent, we consulted an approved cook-book :

Clam-Chowder.

50 clams,
1 pound *veal*,
 $\frac{1}{2}$ pound *bacon* or *ham*, &c., &c.

Line the bottom of the sauce-pan with the bacon or ham cut into dice, &c., &c.

THE "HAIL HOLY QUEEN" AFTER MASS.

Qu. Should the people join the celebrant in reciting the "Hail Holy Queen" after Low Mass?

Resp. It is not necessary, although where the congregation unite in well-trained chorus with the priest it helps devotion and gives edification. The prescribed rubric *recitandæ sunt preces alternatim cum populo* refers to the prayer as a whole.

A PRIVILEGED ALTAR.

Qu. I want to get an altar *privileged*. Will you be kind enough to tell me how I must go about it? If a regular *form* is to be filled for application, please send me one.

Resp. Our Bishops have the faculty of granting one privileged altar for every parish church in their diocese. "Declarandi privilegiatum in qualibet ecclesia suæ diœcesis unum [altare, dummodo aliud privilegiatum non adsit," &c.

The phrase *dummodo aliud privilegiatum non adsit* does not exclude the right of a second privileged altar in the same church, provided it has been granted under a separate title.

The ordinary privilege for the parish church is obtained from the Bishop in the following or similar form :

Illme. Rme. Domine,—N. Rector Parochiæ N. hujus diœcesis, pro ecclesia sua parochiali sancti N. atque in ea sito summo altari, sancto N. dedicato, petit humiliter privilegium quotidianum a Clemente P XIII omnibus ecclesiis parochialibus benigne concessum.

This privilege is applicable to *all churches and chapels in which parochial functions* are performed. (Decr. auth. n. 219 ad 3 et 4.) Where a separate privileged altar is desired under a separate title application is to be made to the S. Congregation (*Segretaria dei Brevi*, Via di S. Apollinare n. 8 Roma, Italia). The petition must be endorsed by the Bishop of the diocese and contain the following statements :

1. Name of the Church and Diocese.
2. Reason for asking the privilege.
3. For how long this privilege is desired.
4. Whether the church is a regular parish church or a chapel, etc.
5. Title of the altar.

These items are embodied in a form similar to the one given above in addressing the Bishop.

ANALECTA.

LENTEN INDULT.

Apostolic Letter dispensing the Faithful from Fast and Abstinence on account of the Influenza (grip).

The character and symptoms of the malady called *Influenza*, which prevails throughout Europe and in other countries, has aroused the solicitude of the Sovereign Pontiff. Our Most Holy Father, Leo XIII., concerned not only for the welfare of souls but also for the physical well-being of his children, is moved by the prevalence of the above-named disease to a desire of affording all possible help for the lessening of its evil influence. He therefore avails himself of the offices of the S. Council of the Roman Inquisition and in virtue of his Apostolic authority grants to all the Archbishops, Bishops and Ordinaries of every land where the aforementioned disease prevails, the faculty of dispensing the faithful under their charge from the obligation of fasting and abstinence, so long as, in their judgment, the state of public health requires it.

His Holiness however wishes, that, while the faithful avail themselves of this privilege, they perform with great earnestness special works of piety which may move the mercy of God. For since it is plain that the many evils which presently afflict us, are to be attributed to the divine justice which punishes men for the corruption of morals and the multitude of transgressions which exceed all bounds, His Holiness exhorts the faithful to appease the anger of God by prayer, by works of mercy toward the poor, by assiduous attendance at the public devotions in their churches, and by the devout frequenting of the sacraments.

✠ R. CARD. MONACO,

(*Ex S. Rom. et Univ. Inquisitione, Romæ, die 14 Jan. 1892.*)

DUBIUM DE SCAPULARIUM IMPOSITIONE.

Rector Decanus Ecclesiae B. M. V. a Berchorio, Diocesis Pictaviensis, huic S. Congnii Indulgentiarum haec quae sequuntur exponit :

Aliquando impositio Scapularium ab Ecclesia approbatorum, ita pro fre-

quentia populi protrahitur, ut fiat cum assistentium taedio et Sacerdotis defatigatione, praesertim post primam puerorum Communionem vel exercitia Missionum, quia tunc permulti accedunt ad hos sacros habitus suscipiendos; quae praecaverentur incommoda si Sacerdoti liceret una tantum vice dicere formulam numero plurali, imponendo successive, sed nulla interposita mora, scapulare fidelibus praesentibus; quod quidem licitum videtur cum adsit unio moralis inter formulae prolationem et impositionem scapularium et sic efficeretur unicus et completus actus.

Unde supradictus Rector sequens dubium dirimendum proponit:

Utrum liceat Sacerdoti, in impositione Scapularium, ab Ecclesia approbatorum, omnibus rite peractis, dicere semel numero plurali formulam: *Accipite fratres, vel sorores, &c.*, imponendo successive et sine interruptione scapulare omnibus praesentibus: vel potius formula numero sigulari pro singulis sit repetenda?

Sacra Congregatio Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praeposita exhibitio dubio respondit:

Affirmative quoad primam partem; negative quoad secundam uti decretum est in una Valentinensi, die 5 Februarii 1841, ad dubium IV.

Datum ex Secretaria eiusdem S. Congregationis, die 18 Aprilis, 1891.

Ios. Card. D'ANNIBALE, Praefectus.

L. ✠ S.

ALEXANDER ARCHIEP. NICOPOL., Secretarius.

(*S. Cong. Indulg. et S. Relig. 18 Ap. 1891.*)

DECRETUM DE APERITIONE CONSCIENTIAE.

SUPERIORIBUS HAUD EXIGENDA, DEQUE JURIBUS CONFESSARII QUOAD MONIALES ET INSTITUTA VIRO RUM LAICORUM.

Quemadmodum omnium rerum humanarum, quantumvis honestae sanctaeque in se sint: ita et legum sapienter conditarum ea conditio est, ut ab hominibus ad impropria et aliena ex abusu traduci ac pertrahi valeant; ac propterea quandoque fit, ut intentum a legislatoribus finem haud amplius assequantur: imo et aliquando, ut contrarium sortiantur effectum.

Idque dolendum vel maxime est obtigisse quoad leges plurium Congregationum, Societatum aut Institutorum sive mulierum quae vota simplicia aut solemnia nuncupant, sive virorum professione ac regimine penitus laicorum; quandoquidem aliquoties in illorum Constitutionibus conscientiae manifestatio permessa fuerat, ut facilius alumni arduam perfectionis viam ab expertis Superioribus in dubiis addicerent; e contra a nonnullis ex his intima conscientiae scrutatio, quae unice Sacramento Pœnitentiae reservata est, inducta fuit. Itidem in Constitutionibus ad tramitem SS. Canonum praescriptum fuit, ut Sacramentalis Confessio in hujusmodi Communitatibus fieret respectivis Confessariis ordinariis et extraordinariis; aliunde Superiorum arbitrium eo usque devenit, ut subditis aliquem extraordinarium Confessarium denegaverint, etiam in casu quo, ut propriae conscientiae consulerent, eo valde indigebant. Indita denique eis fuit discretionis ac prudentiae norma, ut suos subditos rite recteque quoad peculiare pœnitentias ac alia pietatis opera dirigerent; sed et hæc per abusionem extensa

in id etiam extitit, ut eis ad Sacram Synaxim accedere vel pro lubitu permiserint, vel omnino interdum prohibuerint. Hinc factum est, ut hujusmodi dispositiones, quæ ad spiritualem alumnorum profectum, et ad unitatis pacem et concordiam in Communitatibus servandam fovendamque salutariter ac sapienter constitutæ jam fuerant, haud raro in animarum discrimen, in conscientiarum anxietatem, ac iusuper in externæ pacis turbationem versæ fuerint, ceu subditorum recursus et querimoniam passim ad S. Sedem interjectæ evidentissime comprobant.

Quare SSmus D. N. Leo divina providentia Papa XIII, pro ea qua præstat erga lectissimam hanc sui gregis portionem peculiari sollicitudine, in Audientia habita a me Cardinali Præfecto S. Congregationis Episcoporum et Regularium negotiis et consultationibus præpositæ die decima quarta Decembris 1890, omnibus sedulo diligenterque perpensis, hæc quæ sequuntur voluit, constituit atque decrevit.

I. Sanctitas Sua irritat, abrogat, et nullius in posterum roboris declarat quascumque dispositiones Constitutionum, piarum Societatum. Institutorum mulierum sive votorum simplicium sive solemnium, nec non virorum omnimode laicorum, etsi dictæ Constitutiones approbationem ab Apostolica Sede retulerint in forma quacumque etiam quam aiunt specialissimam, in eo scilicet, quod cordis et conscientiam intimam manifestationem quovis modo ac nomine respiciunt. Ita propterea serio injungit Moderatricibus hujusmodi Institutorum, Congregationum ac Societatum, ut ex propriis Constitutionibus, Directoriis, ac Manualibus præfatæ dispositiones omnino deleantur penitusque expungantur. Irritat pariter ac delet quoslibet ea de re usus et consuetudines etiam immemorabiles.

II. Districte insuper prohibet memoratis Superioribus ac Superiorissis, cujuscumque gradus et præminentiam sint, ne personas sibi subditas inducere pertentent directe aut indirecte, præcepto, consilio, timore, minis, aut blanditiis ad hujusmodi manifestationem conscientiam sibi peragendam; subditisque converso præcipit, ut Superioribus majoribus denuncient Superiores minores, qui eos ad in inducere audeant; et si agatur de Moderatore vel Moderatrice Generali denunciatio huic S. Congregationi ab iis fieri debeat.

III. Hoc autem minime impedit, quominus subditi libere ac ultro aperire suum animum Superioribus valeant, ad effectum ab illorum prudentia in dubiis ac anxietatibus consilium et directionem obtinendi pro virtutem acquisitione ac perfectionis progressu.

IV. Præterea, firmo remanente quoad Confessarios ordinarios et extraordinarios Communitatem quod a Sacrosancto Concilio Tridentino præscribitur in *Sess. 25, Cap. 10 de Regul.*, et a *S. M. Benedicti XIV* statuitur in Constitutione quæ incipit "Pastoralis, curæ:" Sanctitas Sua Præsules Superioresque admonet, ne extraordinarium denegent subditis Confessarium quoties ut propriam conscientiam consulant ad id subditi adigantur, quin iidem Superiores ullo modo petitionis rationem inquirant, aut ægre id ferre demonstrent. Ac ne evanida tam provida dispositio fiat, Ordinarios exhortatur, ut in locis propriæ Dioceseos, in quibus Mulierum Communitates existunt, idoneos Sacerdotes facultatibus instructos designent, ad quos pro Sacramento Pœnitentiæ recurrere eæ facile queant.

V. Quod vero attinet ad permissionem vel prohibitionem ad sacram Synaxim accedendi, Eadem Sanctitas Sua decernit, hujusmodi permissiones vel prohibitiones dumtaxat ad Confessarium ordinarium vel extraordinarium spectare, quin Superiores ullam habeant auctoritatem hac in re sese ingerendi, excepto casu quo aliquis ex eorum subditis post ultimam Sacramentalem Confessionem Communitati scandalo fuerit, aut gravem externam culpam patriverit, donec ad Pœnitentiæ sacramentum denuo accesserit.

VI. Momentur hinc omnes, ut ad Sacram Synaxim curent diligenter se præparare et accedere diebus in propriis regulis statutis; et quoties ob fervorem et spiritualem alicujus profectum Confessarius expedire judicaverit ut frequentius accedat, id ei ab ipso Confessario permitti potest. Verum qui licentiam a Confessario obtinuerit frequentioris ac etiam quotidianæ Communionis, de hoc certiores reddere Superiores teneatur; quod si hic justas gravesque causas se habere reputet contra frequentiores hujusmodi Communiones, eas Confessario manifestare teneatur, cujus judicio acquiescendum omnino erit.

VII. Eadem Sanctitas Sua insuper mandat omnibus et singulis Superioribus Generalibus, Provincialibus et localibus Institutionibus de quibus supra sive virorum sive mulierum ut studiose accurateque hujus Decreti dispositiones observent, sub pœnis contra Superiores Apostolicæ Sedis mandata violantes ipso facto incurrendis.

VIII. Denique mandatur, ut præsentis Decreti ex emplaria in vernaculum sermonem versa inserantur Constitutionibus prædictorum piorum Institutorum, et saltem semel in anno, stato tempore in unaquaque Domo, sive in publica mensa, sive in Capitulo ad hoc specialiter convocato, alta et intelligibili voce legantur.

Et ita Sanctitas Sua constituit atque decrevit, contrariis quibuscumque etiam speciali et individua mentione dignis minime obstantibus.

Datum Romæ ex Secretaria memoratæ S. Congregationis Episcoporum et Regularium die 17 Decembris 1890.

I. Card. VERGA, *Præfectus*,
Fr. ALOYSIUS EPISC. CALLINICEN. *Secret.*

Romæ, mense Jan. 1891.

EX. S. CONGR. EPISC. ET REGULARIUM.

Documenta ad Decretum præcedens spectantia.

I.

Perillustris ac Reverendissime Domine uti Frater.

De mandato SS. D. N. Leonis P. P. XIII præsentibus litteris adnexum transmitto Amplitudini Tuæ Decretum, jussu ejusdem Sanctitatis Suxæ ab hac Sacra Congregatione negotiis et consultationibus Episcoporum et Regularium præposita nuper latum, quo manifestatio conscientix, quocumque nomine veniat, omnino prohibetur, tum pro monasteriis monialium, etiam votorum solemnium tum pro Institutis votorum simplicium utriusque sexus, iis dumtaxat virorum Institutis exceptis natura ac regimine prorsus ecclesiasticis.

Declarationes insuper et dispositiones dantur de moderatione communionum, et de confessariis extraordinariis facilius concedendis.

Ad hoc autem Sanctitas Sua mihi commisit Amplitudini Tuæ, uti Metropolitanæ præfatum Decretum transmittendum, ut illius exemplaria cum Episcopis ab eadem Amplitudine Tua dependentibus communicare curet; qui vicissim cum singulis Superioribus et Superiorissis Monasteriorum piarumque Domorum respectivarum dioecesum, ejusdem Decreti exemplaria communicent. Præcipit denique Sanctitas Sua omnibus locorum Ordinariis ut enunciati Decreti plenam executionem sedulo diligenter vigilare et procurare non intermittant, etiam vi specialis Apostolicæ Sedis delegationis.

Hæc erant a me significanda atque declaranda Amplitudini Tuæ, cui omnia fausta deprecor a Domino.

Amplitudinis Tuæ

Addictissimus uti Frater

I. CARD. VERGA, *Præfectus*.

FR. ALOYSIUS, Episc. Call., *Secret.*

Romæ, mense Jan. 1891.

II.

Rescriptum.

Sacra Congregatio Em. ac Rev. S. R. E. Cardinalium negotiis et consultationibus Episcoporum et Regularium præposita, sequentibus dubiis propositis:

1. An Decretum incipiens *Quemadmodum* diei 17 Dec., 1890, etiam Filias Charitatis a S. Vincentio a Paula institutas comprehendat?

2. An Decretum præcitatum præter Instituta feminarum, sola virorum Instituta conditionis laicalis, uti Fratres Scholarum Christianarum etc., comprehendat, an etiam Congregationes Ecclesiasticas, veluti Salesianorum a D. Bosco fundatorum, Rosminianorum, Lazzaristarum et similium in quibus, præter sacerdotes, multi reperiuntur fratres laici?

Censuit respondendum prout rescripsit:

Ad 1.—*Affirmative* juxta modum. Modus est: Attenta peculiari Puellarum Charitatis institutione, attentisque Pontificiis declarationibus ac privilegiis indultis, præsertim a S. M. Pio VII et Leone XII, confirmatis a SS. D. N. Leone XIII die 25 Junii, 1882, publicationem et vigilantiam super executione præfati Decreti quoad dictas Puellas spectare ad Superiorem generalem pro tempore Congregationis Presbyterorum Missionis sive per se, sive per ejusdem Congregationis Visitatores, salva tamen delegatione Apostolica Ordinariorum locorum in casu negligentia Superiorum Congregationis Missionis.

Ad 2.—*Affirmative* ad primam partem. *Negative* ad secundam. Et facta de præmissis relatione SS. D. N. Leoni XIII in audientia habita a me Card. Præfecto die 12 Aprilis 1891, Sanctitas Sua resolutiones S. Congregationis approbavit et confirmavit. Contrariis quibuscumque non obstantibus.

Datum Romæ, ex Secretaria ejusdem S. Congr. Episcoporum et Regularium, die 15 Aprilis 1891.

I. CARD. VERGA, *Præfectus*.

FR. ALOYSIUS EP. CALL., *Secretar.*

BOOK REVIEW.

MEDITATIONS ON THE PRINCIPAL TRUTHS OF RELIGION AND ON THE HIDDEN AND PUBLIC LIFE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST. By the Most Rev. Dr. Kirby, Archb. of Ephesus, Rector of the Irish College of Rome.—Dublin : M. H. Gill & Son, 1892.

There are few of our present generation who have visited the Eternal City and not become familiar with the figure, or at least the name, of the venerable rector of the Irish College. Mgr. Kirby's love for Pius IX was a by-word with his friends, and there is something in this volume of meditations from his pen that gives a pathetic freshness to the memory of the saintly prelate's devotion to the late Pontiff, a devotion which has been transferred to Leo XIII, thus showing that it was not simply a personal love, but that it had its root in a deep attachment to the Holy See. As Superior of a seminary, he felt the need for the young ecclesiastics, of some text-book which would be useful to them in making occasional spiritual retreats by themselves. There were, of course, good books for such a purpose, but they did not in every respect fit the particular circumstances of his students. The *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius are matchless in their way, and it suited both the aim and the modest unpretentiousness of our author to adapt them for the use of the clerics in his seminary. When the labor had been half done it was suddenly interrupted by the entrance into the Holy City of the revolutionary hordes, who took Pius IX captive and upset and harrassed the colleges and seminaries. The MS. begun twenty years ago remained forgotten until within a short time. It appears that the present Primate of Ireland, Dr. Logue, had incidentally come across them when in Rome, and urged the author to publish them in spite of their incompleteness, which was finally done under modest protest from Dr. Kirby. So we have in this volume what will be to many a relic of one still living and greatly revered and loved for his sterling qualities, and especially for his loyal devotion to the Holy See, as also a book of useful and holy reflections. There are twenty-nine meditations embracing the eternal truths, the life of Christ, and the institution of the most Blessed Sacrament. The second part contains a continuous meditation in several distinct chapters on "the election of the ecclesiastical state." An appendix gives a selection of maxims and sentences culled mainly from the writings of the Fathers, especially St. Jerome.

As to style and language these meditations are simple and they are direct in their appeal to the mind. The illustrations are in the main citations from the sacred text or the Fathers. For the rest the method of St. Ignatius is preserved. It seems to us that it would not be difficult to complete these meditations. With the pattern clearly given by Mgr. Kirby another trustworthy hand might be found to do in a supplement what is wanting, and thus render the work doubly valuable.

EDUCATION : TO WHOM DOES IT BELONG? A REJOINER TO THE CIVILTA CATTOLICA.

By the Rev. Thomas Bouquillon, D. D., Prof. of Moral Theol. at the Cath. University of America, Washington, D. C.—Baltimore : John Murphy & Co., 1892.

There is very little to be said about this third pamphlet of Dr. Bouquillon, so far as its contents go, on the important issue of the School question.

No doubt the statements can be defended in detail ; but as the whole discussion plainly shows the practical deductions (of so much laborious reasoning and even more laborious congesting of citations which can be made to support opposing views) turn altogether upon the meaning of words. Hence what was originally intended as a clear exposition of the Educational question from the moralist's point of view, has become a rather tangled concern requiring the addition of so much explanation that it has swelled the first pamphlet to more than thrice its bulk. That fact itself might suggest the need not so much of principles as rather of the wisdom to select and properly adjust them.

Apart from this view of it, Dr. B.'s last pamphlet as well as the second bears something of a personal character and contains remarks which cannot be justified on the "tu quoque" principle. He repudiates the idea of being called a Frenchman, as if it were impossible to become an admirer of French institutions by twenty years of sojourn under their patronage even though one's cradle had stood on Flemish ground. Similar to this in character is the note about the Germans, who, Dr. B. finds, are shy of compulsory education because it might force them to learn the English language. (p. 32.) Rather an odd bit of conclusion, for the Germans seem as a rule anxious enough to learn English, although unwilling in many cases to give up their native language as a substitute. As a matter of fact it would be difficult to find any German school where English is excluded. But these are things which in a pamphlet of this kind rather lower the position of the one serious advocate of state control in the United States, whose reputation as a professor at our University has given him a hearing where otherwise it might not have been so readily accorded. As the matter now comes from him, it means nothing less than inviting the civil authorities to take control of schools which we are managing for the common good and at our own expense, as a proper and necessary annex to our religious worship. For the parochial schools, as recommended by the Holy See and our Councils, and as we have them, are nothing else than complements of the churches, with which our civil authority has no

right to meddle, unless it wish to give us back an equitable share of the taxes which are paid for that purpose. In this case the State has certainly some right in the management, but not any which will hinder the legitimate aim, or limit the proper sphere of the Parish School; that is to say, to teach religion in conjunction with secular training, or rather to use the latter as a means for the religious education of the child, which we hold to be the primary aim of life. This is the recognized position of denominational State schools in Europe, where not only the teachers are of the same religious creed as the pupils, but where the text books in use are prepared by Catholics, and religious instruction is imparted during the regular school hours. In the United States, on the contrary, the State provides nothing for the religious training of the child, and, as long as the Constitution stands, cannot legitimately do so. It excludes all religious exercise, which, as every educator of Catholic children knows, is so essentially necessary to form the heart to the proper appreciation of the true faith; but our State system, as a rule, requires us to accept text books as well as examiners and supervisors without any regard for our religion. Under such circumstances no Catholic can accept State-control, much less advocate it, without laying himself open to the charge of bias for one reason or another in behalf of State-worship, at a sacrifice of our liberty and to the injury of our religion.

We know that Dr. B. denies that he has any special bias in behalf of the State, but his reasons and the whole method of his argument contradict this assertion. A writer in the current number of the *Lyceum*, who speaks rather favorably throughout of Dr. B.'s position, may serve us as an unprejudiced witness. *The pamphlet*, says the writer, *was evidently written with a view of placing before the Catholics of the United States the best arguments that could be brought forward in support of State-directed education.* A little before this the same writer says: *He (Dr. Bouquillon) devotes by far the larger portion of it (his pamphlet) to discussing the right, mission and authority of the State in the matter of education, and poses (sic!) as an advocate of State control over education within certain limits.* (*The Lyceum*, Jan. 15, 1892, p. 83.)

Whilst it is not necessary to suppose that those who are against Dr. B. endorse every statement or consent to the various methods that have been employed in answering him, it is rather remarkable that all the leading minds and authorities on the subject of education have turned against him or his peculiar doctrine. Though the Jesuit writers who have published their views do not speak in the name of their Order, they plainly indicate what the Society of Jesus, embodying the champions of Catholic education in word and work throughout the world for the last three hundred years, holds on the subject.

Besides these, the Hierarchy, or at least and especially those more learned, who have expressly written on the subject of education, and who cannot be charged with un-American or anti-republican views, are pronounced against Dr. B.'s position, not only on the ground of Catholic principle but on that of freedom of legitimate action. It is perhaps difficult for outsiders properly to judge of this particular case in the United States, but men like Archbishop Logue of Armagh are not likely to commit themselves to

rash public utterance when they have any doubt as to the right view in such matters. The same may be said of the Roman authorities, so far as their judgment in this matter has been made known. We may here remark for the guidance of innocent Catholic journalists who reproduce *Roman* dispatches, and "communications" from the *Moniteur de Rome*, that the said journal stands in anything but good repute in Rome. It has hardly—we speak from trustworthy information—a five-hundred circulation in the Holy City, but vegetates on "foreign" subsidy, and abounds in Roman news which is evidently made to order for the purpose of creating impressions abroad as if *Rome* had spoken. The past history of the *Moniteur*—since the accession of Leo XIII.—is not a very edifying one. Mr. Des Houx who was dismissed from the editorship at the request of the Holy Father, afterwards wrote a scandalous book against the Roman authorities, which was placed on the Index. It is therefore something to be regretted, for our own sake as American Catholics, loyal to the Holy See not only in words but in feeling also, that the *Moniteur* undertakes to champion the work of an American Catholic Professor by giving it the place of honor—*grand Dans son genre, nidi el genre est petit*—in its issue of the 25-26 January. A few of the American Catholic papers such as the *Mirror* (Baltimore,) copied the article. We were rather surprised to see it in the *Catholic Standard*, where it must have crept in surreptitiously at least so far as approbation of its sentiments was implied, for the very same issue contains an editorial which might serve as a complete refutation of Dr. B's principles. Moreover the Archbishopal Imprimerie and the well-known position of the respected and able editor of the *Standard* on the School question gives the lie to anything which might be clipped from the *Moniteur*, no matter how it comes into type.

But enough of this and other pamphlets which might follow. There is just the faintest appearance of the ridiculous coming to light in this accumulation of pamphlets and rejoinders.

THE STATE LAST: A Study of Dr. Bouquillon's Pamphlet: "Education; to whom does it belong?" With a Supplement reviewing Dr. Bouquillon's Rejoinder to Critics. By Rev. James Conway, S. J. Canisius College, Buffalo, N. Y.—Fr. Pustet & Co., New York and Cincinnati, 1892.

As Fr. Conway's pamphlet suggests in its title, he admits that the State may, under certain conditions, control the schools of its citizens; but he strenuously, and with much evidence of a full grasp of the principles in the case, points out that such right is secondary, exceptional and supplementary. It has no existence whilst the parent and the Church assert their claim to educate.

Although, therefore, Fr. C. at first sight seems to minimize the legitimate voice of the State in promoting the culture of its free citizens, he repudiates, in fact, only the exaggerated State-claim which Dr. B. represents. As Fr. C. is making an argument for what we believe the only safe theory

to advocate at present and in the United States, we here simply endorse his views and urge the reading of his well-written brochure on every Catholic who has not made up his mind "*jurare in verba magistri*," for, whatever the advantages of State control may be in a financial or social point of view, they can never, we deem it, counterbalance the good effect of a feeling of independence in the matter of education as well as religion.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CEREMONIES OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. By Rev. J. J. Burke.—New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1892.

THE GLORIES OF DIVINE GRACE. A Free Rendering of the Original. By P. Eusebius Nieremberg, S. J. By Dr. M. Jos. Scheeben. Transl. by a Benedictine Monk of St. Meinrad's Abbey, Ind. Second Edition. Benziger Brothers.

AD UNA SUPERIORA RELIGIOSA intorno ad un recente Decreto Pontificio Lettera del P. Secondo Franco, D. C. D. G.—Modena. Tipogr dell' Immacolata Concezione. 1891.

DAS PAPSTL. DEKRET "QUEMADMODUM OMNIUM." Die Aufhebung der Gewissens-rechenschaft u. a. betreffend. Erklärt u. begründet von Secondo Franco, S. J. Aus d. Italien. übersetzt u. mit Anhang, etc. versehen von Max Huber, S. J. Für Oberinnen, Obere die nicht Priester sind, und Kloster Beichtväter.—Approbirt. Regensburg, New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1892.

RITUALE ROMANUM. Pauli V. Pont. Max. Jussu Editum et a Benedicto XIV. auctum et Castigatum cui novissima accedit Benedictionum et Instructionum Appendix. Editio Tertia post Typicam.—Ratisbonae, Neo-Eboraci et Cincinnatii. Fr. Pustet. MDCCCXCI.

DARSTELLUNGEN AUS DEM LEBEN JESU UND D. HEILIGEN. In Holzschnitt nach Original-zeichnungen. Von Prof. Ludwig Seitz in Rom.—Freiburg im Breisg: B. Herder. St. Louis. 1891.

PSALLITE SAPIENTER. Erklärung der Psalmen in Geiste des betrachtenden Gebetes und d. Liturgie. Von Dr. Maurus Wolter, O. S. B. II Edit. Band IV.—B. Herder. 1891. St. Louis.

HOFFMANN'S CATHOLIC DIRECTORY, ALMANAC AND CLERGY LIST. Quarterly for 1892, containing complete Reports of the Dioceses in the United States, Canada and Newfoundland, the Vicariate of the Sandwich Islands and the Hierarchy in Germany. Vol. VII, No. 1.—Milwaukee: Hoffmann Bros. Co. 1892.

GESETZE DER BRAUT CHRISTI. Nach d. Ehrw. Maria von Agreda. Neu herausgegeben von einem Mitgliede d. Kapuziner-Ordens.—Regensburg, New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co. 1892.

AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

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SOCIETIES FORBIDDEN IN THE CHURCH.

THROUGH some misunderstanding or misinterpretation of facts the opinion has recently gained ground, both within and outside of the Church, that Catholics may safely and without distinction join associations formed for the ostensible purpose of mutual protection, whether purely beneficial, or industrial, or political; provided such associations do not come under the express name of "Freemasons" or "Masonic" societies. That this is a manifest error we propose briefly to show, and also to point out how far the prohibition of the Church against so-called "secret societies" actually extends.¹

Before entering upon our argument it will be necessary to have a clear understanding of some of the terms used in connection with the subject of "condemned societies." When there is mention in ecclesiastical statutes of such words as *allowed*, *not allowed*, *forbidden*, *excommunicated*, etc., we must guard against accepting these terms in the vague and indefinite sense in which they are indiscriminately used in ordinary language.

Forbidden, and, consequently not allowed is that which by some law, natural or positive, divine or human, man is restrained from doing. As the present question deals with societies which are forbidden by the Church, we say, that a society is forbidden or not allowed, if the laws of the Church characterize it as such. On the

¹ Some time ago we wrote a paper on this important subject for our Archdiocesan Organ, "The Catholic Citizen." The present article is substantially a reproduction of the same.

other hand, a society is allowed or not forbidden, if Catholics are not, by any law of the Church, restrained from joining the society.

More or less identical with the terms forbidden or not allowed is the term "dangerous"; for what is dangerous to faith and morals, is, in proportion to the greatness of the danger, in itself more or less strictly forbidden by the natural law.

"Excommunicated" and "forbidden" are by no means identical terms. To be excommunicated means to fall under the ban of the Church, to be, in a certain sense, cut off from the community of the faithful. Excommunication, or the ban of the Church, is a positive penalty, attached to a prohibition, and as the sanction thereof.

Every excommunication presupposes a prohibition, but the transgression of a prohibition does not in every case draw excommunication as a punishment upon the transgressor.

There is another distinction to be made. An action or a society can be forbidden with the express mention of its name, or else simply by a general law. Thus excommunication can be pronounced upon a person or society with express mention of the name, or, again, by a general law forbidding certain acts under the penalty of excommunication. Therefore, a particular society may be excommunicated by name, whilst another may not be excommunicated by name but by virtue of a general law. Again, a society may not be excommunicated, yet this does not imply that it is allowed; for, though not excommunicated, it may be forbidden, and even forbidden expressly *by name*. Moreover, a society may neither be excommunicated nor expressly or simply forbidden; still, it may be a dangerous society, and on account of the danger it may not be allowed to Catholics to join it, under pain of mortal sin.

After this explanation and distinction of the various terms we proceed to state our proposition and prove it. *It is absolutely not true that the Freemasons are the only society forbidden by the Church, and that, consequently, a Catholic may join any other lodge or society, except the Freemasons.* The Third Plenary Council of Baltimore plainly enjoins:

1. That all former decrees of the Roman Pontiffs against all societies condemned by the Holy See are to remain in full force, according to the tenor of the Constitution "Apostolicæ Sedis" and the meaning of the Roman Pontiffs.

2. That the Freemasons and the Carbonari are excommunicated by name.

3. That all other societies, though not mentioned by name, are excommunicated, if they are of the same nature as the Freemasons and Carbonari, that is, all those societies which openly or secretly plot (*machinantur*) against the Church, or against the lawful government, the State.

4. That all those societies are excommunicated which have their own minister or chaplain, their own (religious) ritual and their own (religious) ceremonies, in such a manner as thereby to become a heretic or schismatic sect.

5. That any society which requires its members, be it under oath or otherwise, not to reveal its secrets to any one, not even to the ecclesiastical authority, that is, the bishop ; or which demands, be it by oath or by mere promise, from its members a blind and absolute obedience, is forbidden under grievous sin, and that the members of such a society cannot be absolved until they actually leave the society or at least promise to do so at once.

6. That the faithful and especially youth, are to be taught and earnestly admonished carefully to avoid all such societies, as in the *judgment of the bishop of their own diocese*, are in any way dangerous to faith and morals ; for, as the instruction of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, dated May 10th, 1884, remarks, it is well to be considered that there are still other societies which, though they do not clearly belong to those enumerated above (that is to societies excommunicated or forbidden under mortal sin), are at least doubtful and dangerous. The bishops, whose chief care it must be to preserve the doctrine pure and the morals uncorrupted, must know that it is their duty to deter and keep away their flocks from these societies.

So much for the decrees of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore. Certainly, these decrees show clearly and plainly :—1. That besides the Freemasons and Carbonari there are other societies, which, though without express mention of their names, are forbidden by the Church, and which, consequently, no Catholic may join. *There are others, and such as are implicitly* (not expressly or by name) *excommunicated* ; again, *others which are forbidden under mortal sin* ; and finally *others which are full of danger*, and let this be well understood, *of such a danger that the confessor becomes*

bound to refuse absolution if the danger be not shunned. 2. It also becomes evident from these decrees that the Bishop of the diocese has indeed a duty in this matter, not only to declare whether a society be allowed, but also to warn against a society when he is convinced that it will injure his flock.

It appears from local statistics that the society of "Odd Fellows" has within late years gained large increase of members from the Catholic ranks, on the plea that they are not "Freemasons," and therefore not a society forbidden by the Catholic Church. Let us see if this is true.

In the year 1850 the Congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, upon the repeated inquiry of the then Bishop of Philadelphia, Most Rev. Francis P. Kenrick, declared that the "Odd Fellows" and the "Sons of Temperance" are included in the Pontifical Bulls against the secret societies. From that time the "Odd Fellows" in America were considered as a society *expressly and by name* forbidden by the Church, and, as we believe, with good reason. For, in the question, submitted to the Holy See, they were expressly named, and to this express question the answer came from the highest ecclesiastical authority "they are included." The only doubt which could remain was whether they are also expressly *excommunicated*, the Bishop having only asked whether they were forbidden. But it seems that the answer went farther than the question.

Before the opening of the Vatican Council, Pius IX, in October, 1869, issued the Constitution, *Apostolicæ Sedis*, for the purpose of reducing the number of Ecclesiastical Censures (therefore also of excommunications). As the "Odd Fellows" are not mentioned in this Constitution, it is inferred that they are not *expressly and by name* excommunicated, and that if they had been so before, the express excommunication has been removed by virtue of this Constitution. This inference is strengthened by a remark of the late Cardinal Franzelin, who with the American Archbishops prepared the subject-matter for the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore. However, both the intention of Pius IX, namely, to reduce the number of excommunications, and the remark of Cardinal Franzelin, prove at the most, that the Odd Fellows are no longer excommunicated *expressly by name*; but by no means that the declaration of the Congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition has been rescinded. Rome may set aside a positive ecclesiastical penalty, but will never contradict itself, will never declare at one

time that a certain society is included in the Pontifical Bulls which prohibit secret societies, and again, that it is not forbidden. If, therefore, the ecclesiastical legislation has changed anything in this question, it is only in this, that it has removed the express excommunication. We believe, with entirely good reason, that the "Odd Fellows" are a society *expressly and by name forbidden*, waiving the question of their being also excommunicated.

Another society which, in consequence of the above mentioned erroneous interpretation, has considerably increased its membership from Catholic ranks is that of the *Knights of Pythias*. Hitherto the Knights of Pythias have not been expressly condemned by any ecclesiastical authority. Hence they are to be considered in the light of the general provisions of the Council of Baltimore. But as according to their own official organs they put themselves on the same platform with the Freemasons, impose absolute secrecy on their members, use a quasi-religious ceremonial, (*cæremoniis valde suspectis*) it is, in accordance with the principles of the Council of Baltimore, sufficiently clear what we are to think of them. However, we do not wish to write of the various societies, whose number is legion, in particular, but only desire to demonstrate that it is radically false to call *only* the Freemasons a society forbidden by the Church.

The objection may be urged against us that the same Council of Baltimore to which we appeal has appointed the College of the Archbishops of the United States as the only competent tribunal in the matter of secret societies, and that the Archbishops assembled in Boston (July, 1890) have published a declaration by virtue of which only the Freemasons are a forbidden society. It is in this rumor that the dangerously false opinion which we are endeavoring to displace seeks its justification.

As to the first part of this assertion, it is true, that the Council of Baltimore has decreed, that the College of the Archbishops shall be the competent tribunal to decide, in the first instance, whether a newly organized society is to be condemned by name or not; but the Council of Baltimore has not granted nor could it grant, to the Archbishops the power to modify, or set aside a decision already given by a higher ecclesiastical court.

Now with regard to the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance and Fenians we have already a decision to the effect that these societies are included in the condemned (*damnatas*) societies, and that, consequently, they are expressly forbidden, to say the least. As re-

gards the declaration of the Archbishops in their meeting at Boston (July 1890) it must be allowed, that it has been misunderstood and misinterpreted ; and it is certain, that the construction which has been given to that declaration was not in the minds of the Archbishops, all of whom had taken part in the Council of Baltimore.

A short time ago the report of the Secretary of the meeting of the Archbishops in St. Louis (November, December 1891) was made known. Most Rev. John Ireland D. D., Archbishop of St. Paul, acted as Secretary of that meeting. From his report it appears that the erroneous interpretation given to the declaration of the Archbishops at Boston, was the very reason why the Archbishops at St. Louis *reconsidered* the question about the forbidden societies. The report of the Secretary of the Archbishops' meeting at St. Louis contains the following significant passages with regard to forbidden societies : " It was generally agreed upon that the wording of the resolution of the previous conference, as reported by the Secretary, was somewhat inexact and did not give the correct idea of the mind of the conference. * * * After further discussion the resolution was passed, that the rules of the Third Plenary Council, regarding societies be adhered to, the resolution of the Boston Conference to be explained as not having altered these rules." After all this, we ask : " Are only the Freemasons a forbidden society ? " A decided " No " must be our answer and we believe to have shown it beyond any doubt.

We should not be surprised, however, if some would attempt to cavil at our line of reasoning and our application of the rules of the Council of Baltimore to other societies besides the Freemasons. Every one, nevertheless, can satisfy himself as to whether or not our statements and deductions are in strict keeping with the teachings of the Council.

In the instruction of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, which has been embodied in the Council, it is made the bishop's official duty to warn the faithful even against such societies as are not clearly forbidden, but which are doubtful and dangerous, and to keep them away from these societies. We certainly know that wise ruling of the Council which forbids any single bishop or archbishop to condemn, by name, a society as excommunicated or forbidden under mortal sin, before an unanimous declaration of all the archbishops, or a Roman decision has pronounced them as such ; but this by no means relieves the bishops of their duty to watch, warn, admonish, and to declare, if they deem it necessary, that the faith-

ful of their dioceses cannot join any society at will. In doing this no bishop can be charged with acting over-zealously or arbitrarily; he simply fulfills his duty as one of the God-appointed watchmen of Sion.

F. X. KATZER.

CLERICAL STUDIES.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

PHILOSOPHY. (CONTINUED.)

IT has been our object, in a recent article, to point out the direction given to philosophical studies by Leo XIII in his Encyclical "*Aeterni Patris.*" Since, by its very nature, Philosophy is at the root of all human knowledge, every other subject of inquiry leading back to it, we see at once that in no intellectual pursuit is there greater need of wisdom and caution, none in which authoritative guidance should be more welcome. Hence the special value that attaches to the recommendations which we have gathered from the pontifical document.

But general directions, however safe, require to be worked out in detail and completed, and to this we propose to devote what remains to be said on the study of Philosophy.

In practical questions the best guide, after authority, is experience. In the present matter, experience reaches us in many ways. There is, first of all, our own experience and that of those around us who have devoted themselves to the study—some, in addition, to the teaching—of Philosophy. No thoughtful man can have done one or the other for any time without reaching many practical conclusions as to most effective methods of attaining or imparting philosophical knowledge, and we confess our readiness to attach much more importance to such experience, especially when multiplied, unprejudiced and independent, than to rules, though ever so plausible, when they are only the outcome of *a priori* theories or principles.

Then there is the general experience of mankind at large. Almost as far back as we can look into the past, we find man struggling with the obscurities which envelop him on all sides, and guessing at the hidden causes and connections of things. The record of human

thought thus striving to solve the fundamental problems of mind, and to build up knowledge on the solid foundation of ascertained truths is what constitutes the History of Philosophy. To us it seems that nothing is more instructive to seekers after truth than to trace accurately the paths that other explorers have followed, and to consider what they have been led to. In this, as in its other shapes, History is the best of guides—*Magistra vitæ*, as Cicero calls it; teaching most practical lessons to whoever has learned to read them.

It is to the latter that we would beg leave to call the attention of the reader in the present paper, as they come forth, not from the whole history of Philosophy, but from that form of it in which we are mainly interested—the Philosophy of the schools. This Philosophy has been long before the world, and the history of its various fortunes through past ages is sure, if properly understood, to convey to us the most valuable lessons.

I.

We have already explained briefly in what manner the scholastic philosophy came into existence; how it was gradually built up until it reached its full, majestic height under the master hand of S. Thomas. A structure so complete and so solid, a shrine in which the whole Christian world came to worship, might well seem destined to stand for ever. But such is not the lot of man's work, whatever shape it may assume. That of the schoolmen soon exhibited signs of decay, and it is its gradual decline, from within and from without—in itself and in its hold on the minds of men—that we have presently to follow out and to account for, in order to preserve, so far as may be, its renascent life from what proved fatal to it in the past.

The general fact is unquestionable. Before the close of the XIIIth century the great philosophical and theological movement, begun well nigh two hundred years earlier, had reached its highest level. A few years later, and we look in vain for a sequel to the deep views and bold speculations so common in the two foregoing ages. No great thinker emerges; no powerful, synthetic mind. A dead level prevails, scarce broken by a few who emerge momentarily from the crowd and disappear. There is nothing, after all, exceptional in this. It would seem to be almost a law of human development that periods of especial brilliancy in any direction should be followed by a term of powerlessness and sterility. The collective strength of a nation or of a race is seen, like that of an individual, to exhaust itself

in a supreme effort and then to collapse. The generations that follow are content to enjoy the transmitted heritage without hoping or wishing to add to it.

So was it in the schools at the close of the great creative epoch. All the principal questions had been settled—it seemed for good. They had gone through the accustomed phases of obscurity, of discussion, of light. The master minds had passed their verdict on them, and thus stamped, they had passed into the current teaching of the schools. Why open them afresh? Yet speculation lives only on condition of being ever stirred up and compelled to fresh efforts. *Vita in Motu*. Stagnation means decay and ultimately death. But there was little then to keep men's minds, astir, no new strong current of thought, not even a deep intellectual heresy, such as awakened and compelled the highest mental efforts of the Fathers. Heresies indeed there were, but the fruit of fanaticism rather than of reflection, and dealt with by the secular arm in preference to theological argument. Neither was there any of those collateral developments which invariably lead to further philosophical speculation. There was no history to speak of, nor could there be, in the circumstances. Literature as a distinct pursuit was unknown. Nature indeed was open to observation, but Aristotle was supposed to have seen all there was to be seen in it, and to have accounted for all. Thus confined to the narrow channel of scholasticism itself, that is of a science almost as definite and settled as mathematics, what remained of mental activity had to spend itself on the little which was still open to it;—a rehearsal of the old theses and the old arguments—questions mostly trivial or unanswerable, yet solved by means of abstract and often arbitrary principles—classifications of the most artificial and fanciful kind, subtleties, refinements and distinctions without end. Of all this, indeed, there was more than enough from the very outset, and such was its hold that St. Thomas even did not feel at liberty to entirely do away with it, although one of his objects in writing the *Summa* was, as he tells us himself (Prolog.), to remove such obstacles from the path of beginners. “Consideravimus enim novitios a diversis plurimum impediri . . . partim propter multiplicationem inutilium quæstionum, articulorum et argumentorum.” Perhaps the fault lay originally with the great master, Aristotle, himself, whose keen, methodic mind seems to lead him on to distinguish and divide indefinitely, without any special regard to practical purposes. From whence-ever it came, the evil flourished more and more as time went

on, to the detriment both of the dignity and the usefulness of the Philosophy and the Theology of the schools.¹

II.

Side by side with this evil, another of no less magnitude flourished in the Schools from beginning to end—the love of disputation—not as a means to test new views, to clear up obscurities, to refute error, or even to sharpen the mind by dexterous dialectic fencing, but for its own sake, as a display of ready wits and on all manner of subjects. It was doubtless in some measure a necessity of the times, for, without books, which were rare and accessible only to a few, on what could freshly awakened minds spend their energies, unless in discussing whatever came before them? And then for the quick-witted who cared not to learn, it became an easy means of asserting their superiority, whilst it kept up for all the pleasant excitement of an incessant contest, such as is found in the public games of our own times, of which the record is so eagerly sought for in our daily papers.

Whatever the cause, the practice of disputations became constant, and gradually spread to all forms of learning. Of this we find evidences at every period from the XIIth to the XVIth century. To show what it had come to in the end, we cannot do better than quote the description left us by the Spaniard, Vives, tutor to Queen Mary of England: “Nullus est alius studiorum fructus quam præ-senti animo non cedere adversario, intrepide eum vel aggredi vel sustinere, et callere quo robore, qua arte, qua supplantatione sit subvertendus. . . . Consultum fuit statim assuefacere puerum et eum perpetuo exercere, ut altercandi recens natis initium, finis nullus nisi cum morte sit. Puer ad scholas deductus primo die jubetur disputare et docetur jam rixari qui fari nondum potest.

1. To give some idea of what the mania for artificial dissection and arrangement of thought had come to, we may quote the following extract of the Commentary by WILLIAM DE VORILLONG, a Franciscan of the XVth century, on the first words of the sentences of Lombardus. “Dividitur ista pars in quatuor . . . Primo agitur de beata Trinitatis immensa natura . . . secundo de creatæ novitatis ostensa factura . . . tertio de electæ caritatis firma junctura . . . quarto de abjectæ vetustatis ablata fractura. Prima iterum particula in tres partes dividitur. In prima distinctionum præmittitur necessaria notificatio, in secunda earundem concluditur utilis epilogatio. In tertia inseritur Trinitatis miranda explicatio . . . Rursus ista prima pars in tres partes dividitur. In prima quarum ostenditur penes quod versatur doctrinæ speculatio—in secunda distinguitur voluntatis distinctio. In tertia triplex concluditur utilis dubitatio . . . Rursus ista prima pars in tres partes dividitur, in quarum prima rerum et signorum ponitur distinctio, in secunda datur distinctionis declaratio, in tertia concluditur distinctionis applicatio . . . Secunda pars . . . in tres partes dividitur . . . Tertia pars . . . in tres partes dividitur,” and so on for another half page, with much more of a similar kind almost in every part of the work.

Idem in Grammatica, in Historicis, in Dialectica, in Rhetorica, in omni prorsus disciplina. Nihil est tam liquidum quod quæstiuncula aliqua velut excitato vento non perturbent" —(De corruptis artibus tradendis, c. i.)

Such a condition of things could not but give rise to protest and opposition. The Popes, ever alive to the interests of the Church, were among the first to raise their voices in warning. Availing himself of his presence in Paris, at that time the most active centre of learning, Alexander III strictly forbade the thousands of students who, with their teachers, had gathered around him to deal henceforth in Theology with figures (allegories doubtless) and inappropriate questions "omnino interdixit," says the contemporary chronicler, "omnes tropos et indisciplinatas quæstiones in theologia." So again John XXII, in his directions to the same University, points out for correction the practice of certain theologians, "qui postpositis vel neglectis necessariis, utilibus et ædificativis doctrinis, curiosis, inutilibus et supervacuis philosophiæ quæstionibus et subtilitatibus se immiscent."

Another influence helped to counteract the tendency of the schools to dryness and subtlety, and ultimately to weaken their power. Simultaneously with scholasticism a different form of Theology had grown up, based, not on argument, but on contemplation and direct intercourse of mind and soul with God. This Mystical Theology, as it has been called, found its natural home in the religious orders, and through them diffused itself widely, not only among the pious laity, but in the great seats of learning to which they were wont to send their most promising aspirants. Thus, in the very centres of intellectual excitement as well as in the quiet retirement of the cloister, were heard words of gentle reproof and kindly warning to the too ardent votaries of scholastic science. We catch their echoes all through the *Imitation of Christ*. "Quid prodest magna cavillatio de occultis et obscuris rebus? . . . Quid curæ nobis de generibus et speciebus? . . . Noli extolli de ulla arte vel scientia, sed potius time de data tibi notitia." . . . The three first chapters of that wonderful book are especially striking when read in the light of the mental conditions of the age in which they were originally written.

III.

A far more active and more destructive influence was brought to bear on scholasticism by the great movement of the Renaissance. To its two principal factors—the dispersion through Europe of

Greek literature by the taking of Constantinople, and the invention of printing—was due that wonderful enthusiasm for the ancient classics and the development of literary taste which spread with such rapidity all over the Western Church. As an immediate result, there grew up, in thousands of the most cultivated minds, a feeling of contempt and aversion for the school—dry, unattractive, and blighting, as it were, the natural beauty of everything it touched. Hence the enmity between the humanists, as they were called, and the schoolmen, so graphically described by Audin in his *Life of Luther*.

In the struggle between new and old which lasted better than a century, two characteristic figures of the distant past stand out in bold relief—Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle, the great and revered teacher, whose word had been law for so many generations—"the master," as Dante calls him, "of those who know,"—familiar with all subjects, deep and subtle in thought, but in form confessedly uninviting, obscure and, as Cicero himself remarks, compelling the mind to a constant effort, "*Magna animi contentio adhibenda est in explicando Aristotele.*"—Plato, deep, too, and far-reaching, but at the same time accessible to all, smooth and simple in style, bright and playful in his dialogues; vivid, dramatic, overflowing with fancy, an epitome, in a word, of all that was most refined and fascinating in the Greek genius. Upon a generation awakened to a sense of literary beauty, his power of attraction, as might be expected, was irresistible. To take up his writings after those of Aristotle, was like emerging suddenly from the dreary depths of winter into the bloom and fragrance of spring. Plato—the divine—was hailed with enthusiasm, studied, translated, commented. Academies were founded to propagate his doctrines. Many of the most powerful and original minds of the period adopted them, and although the movement died out in little more than a century, it had one great permanent effect, it destroyed the undisputed sway of Aristotle, and taught men to listen to many masters and to think for themselves.

Protestantism, which burst forth in the latter part of this period, naturally helped in the same direction. But it affected scholasticism in a far deeper, though less apparent, way. It made Catholic Theology polemical. In the increasing controversial warfare of the XVIth and XVIIth centuries, the abstractions and subtleties of the school were gradually dropped, to be replaced by the more effective weapons of biblical and patristic learning. Greek and Hebrew,

solid erudition and well authenticated facts supplied the only argument that told against Protestants; and Catholics themselves, in course of time, rested on them with an assurance which the metaphysical arguments of the past no longer inspired. Positive Theology thus brought back was cultivated more and more for its own sake. Its sources, historical and biblical, to be properly explored, required a manner of mental tact which metaphysics and dialectics could do very little to develop. The latter ceased, accordingly, to be cultivated with the same general, genuine conviction, and though still holding a prominent place in the programme of studies, and utilized in public disputations, they were little thought of outside the schools.

This is clearly shown by the small place they occupy in the principal ecclesiastical writings of the XVIIth century. Fleury (5c discours sur l'hist. eccles.) describes the ponderous tomes of the schoolmen enjoying on the shelves of libraries a dignified repose, which few were tempted to disturb. Mabillon, "the most learned man of a learned age," gives them only a very humble place in his *Treatise on Monastic Studies*; and the greatest educators of the period, Rollin, Nicole, etc., are in agreement as to the worthlessness of the subjects and exercises on which most time was spent by teachers and students.

IV.

Whilst the Philosophy of the schools was thus losing much of its importance from within, a new movement came from without which shook it to its very foundations. We refer to the development of the Natural Sciences and of the methods by which they came to be cultivated.

Aristotle had supplied the Middle Ages with a science of Nature as well as with a science of Thought. But though a close observer himself, and remarkable in his classifications of known facts, as of all else, his speculative mind led him to build theories of the universe devoid of any solid foundation. Yet his authority was such that his cosmology was as much believed in as his metaphysics. Thus all unhesitatingly admitted, because Aristotle had taught, that the earth was the centre of the universe; that it was composed of the four elements, distinguished from each other by their relative heaviness or lightness, warmth or coldness, dryness or moisture; that the celestial sphere and the stars consisted of a fifth essence called ether, the noblest of all, neither heavy or light, and moving

in a circle, the most perfect of all lines because nothing can be added to it. In this manner, on observations of the most ordinary and limited kind, Aristotle and the schoolmen after him had built up a whole theory of the universe, and explained by endless complementary hypotheses whatever facts they were confronted with. But gradually it came to be felt that a knowledge of the world based on *a priori* principles could be worth little and would lead to less; that only from nature herself, by direct and untiring observation, could man learn her powers and her laws. To the name of Francis Bacon, more than to any other, History has attached the honor of this new method of study. He certainly taught it more eloquently than any other philosopher, and formulated it more distinctly, as when he writes: "Ea est vera philosophia quæ mundi ipsius voces quam fideliter reddit, et veluti dictante mundo conscripta est, nec quidquam de proprio addit, sed tantum iterat et resonat." (Nov. Organ.) It met with much opposition, as might be expected, but it ultimately prevailed. This was another fatal blow dealt to the Philosophy of the schools, as much committed to the Physics of Aristotle as to his Metaphysics. The prestige of the latter was besides considerably dimmed by the failure of the former, and this accounts in some measure for the spirit of scepticism so noticeable at that time. Everything on which men had rested their convictions seemed to fail them. On the one side the traditional Religion was questioned, whilst on the other, the venerable philosophy of preceding ages was fast crumbling into dust.

V.

It was just that condition of mind, in a young man of extraordinary gifts, that led to the greatest philosophical revolution of modern times, and gave the finishing stroke to the supremacy of Aristotle and the schools. Descartes had studied the latter, like those of his time, but they had not satisfied him. He clung to his faith as a Christian, and remained loyal to it through life, but he felt his philosophical convictions to rest on an unstable foundation, and he resolved to take them asunder and build them up on a solid and immovable basis. We know the result, the *Discourses on Method*, which Bossuet called "the greatest book of the age," and which, followed by his *Meditations* and other writings, gave food to the reflections and fresh activity to the minds of men for a whole century.

Space does not permit us to retrace here the growth of Cartesian-

ism in spite of the most powerful and the most violent opposition. It is described summarily in all the manuals of the History of Philosophy, and a detailed and most interesting account of it will be found in the *Histoire du Cartésianisme* by *Bouillier*, and *Histoire du Cartésianisme en Belgique* by *Abbè Monchamp*. Still less can we undertake to examine each one of the theories of Descartes in detail. With a mind prodigiously active and original, he spread his investigations and reflections over the whole field of knowledge, and left permanent traces of his passage in every direction. Of his physical speculations much has disappeared, but certain fundamental conceptions originally due to him remain, and he is the acknowledged founder of one of the most important branches of mathematics—analytical geometry.

In Philosophy he was more radical, ruthlessly putting aside conceptions the most ancient and the most universally accepted, to set up his own in their stead. The minds of men thus disturbed in their habits, their prejudices, even in their religious beliefs, rightly or wrongly associated with the philosophical theories of the past, naturally resented such boldness, and resorted to every imaginable means to put it down. In France, in the Netherlands, where the new doctrines appeared, they became the object of a concentrated attack. Professors of Philosophy, theologians beyond counting, Catholic faculties, protestant Synods, bishops, papal nuncios, the Index itself and the irresistible power of Louis XIV, all combined to destroy them. The religious orders collectively were unanimous in their opposition. Even the Oratorians, who subsequently became the most ardent supporters of Descartes, laid down the rule in their general assemblies of 1671 "that none of the members shall depart, even from the Physics of Aristotle, commonly taught in their colleges, or favor the new doctrine of Descartes, which the King, for good reasons, has forbidden to be taught."

But the most active opponents of all were the Jesuits, bound by their Constitutions to the doctrines of Aristotle; "In Logica et Philosophia naturali et morali et Metaphysica, doctrina Aristotelis sequenda est" (Pachtler, *Ratio Studiorum* ii, 129), and making his writings, as was the common custom of the time, the groundwork of the philosophical teaching in all their colleges.

Yet at an early period some of their ablest men yielded to the fascination of the new doctrines. The trials endured by P. André in that connection have been pathetically told by Cousin. P. Buffier is full of the spirit of Descartes. Sympathy for his doctrines grew

so rapidly among the members of the Society that the General, Angelo Tamburini, felt compelled, in 1710, to issue directions forbidding a series of doctrines of the new school, this among others : “*Systema Cartesii defendi potest tanquam hypothesis.*”

VI.

Gradually the storm subsided. In a modified form the theories of Descartes had lost their original opposition, real or imaginary, to orthodoxy. Catholic faith, on the other hand, had been freed in the contest of some of its adventitious accretions. Almost in every religious order we find open defenders of the Cartesian Philosophy. Several are almost entirely won over to it, and we reach the middle of the XVIIIth century to find one of the most eloquent panegyrics ever written on Descartes bearing the signature of a Jesuit, P. Guenard.¹

But long before, the greatest minds had been weaned from the old philosophy and become imbued with the new. No reader can take up the works of Bossuet, Fénelon, Arnaud, Thomassin, or, indeed, of any of the great writers of the period, without noticing the change. Outside the religious orders it is almost universal. And whilst the old traditions of the schools are thus broken up and scattered, no single system takes permanent possession of men’s minds. Descartes is largely superseded by Locke and Condillac. Leibnitz and Wolf reign over Germany. A sort of general eclecticism pervades even the ecclesiastical colleges and seminaries. The manuals of Toul and Lyons, both mainly Cartesian, are the popular text-books of France during the XVIIIth century. The manuals of Belgium are of a similar description. Italy and Spain are more slow to change, but, if we may judge by the works which have come under our notice, they move in the same direction. Balmes is an eclectic, and Ventura, the first in Italy to raise his voice in favor of the old schools, declares in his *De Modo Philosophandi*, published in 1828, that though educated by men of learning and piety, he had imbibed in his philosophical course most of the false notions of Locke and Condillac.

In short, from the middle of the last to the middle of the present century, Aristotle and the scholastic Philosophy were almost entirely forgotten. Their methods continued to be followed in seminaries ; their principal theories were superseded by those of modern times.

1. This discourse, which won the academic prize, may be found in Migue’s *Demonstr Evangeliques*, tom. 12.

Outside the Dominican and Franciscan orders the earlier philosophy was seldom mentioned and still more rarely discussed. In the general direction of studies issued in 1832 for the Society of Jesus, there is no trace of a disposition to go back to the Philosophy of S. Thomas—no special recommendation, in fact, of any school. If we are to judge by the works of the leading professors of the order during the period that followed, such as Dmowski in Rome, Fournier in France, Rothenflue in Fribourg, Cuevas in Spain, etc., the prevailing tone of their teaching was a free adaptation of Cartesian doctrines and methods with a tinge of Platonism.

But the second half of the century has witnessed a great change in favor of the Philosophy of the Schools. Once more it has been enjoined on the professors of the Society of Jesus, and some of its ablest supporters belong to that learned body. Leo XIII has given it the authority of his name and the weight of his influence. Under his inspiration Academies of S. Thomas have sprung up in various places, text-books embodying the ancient doctrines have been introduced into all the clerical schools, new editions of the great mediæval thinkers are being published on all sides.

Hitherto the movement seems to be confined almost entirely to the clergy, secular and regular. Occasionally, indeed, we meet among the laity men who show a leaning for some of the theories peculiar to the ancient philosophy. In connection with Aristotle, the speculations of the great schoolmen have come to be studied with more care, and to occupy in the History of Philosophy a place of which they had been long and unjustly deprived. They are clearly distinguished now from the unworthy accretions which made them, not long ago, a general object of ridicule. Yet nowhere outside the sphere of influence of the clergy can we discover, so far, anything like a collective, healthy movement tending to their adoption as a general system of thought.

But the slowest movements are not the least durable, nor ultimately the least widespread. It took more than a century to ripen and to diffuse the Philosophy of the Schools when first it came to light. We must not wonder if it takes more than a generation to accommodate it to its new environments and win back something of the universal favor which it formerly enjoyed.

Its success must ultimately depend on two things. First and foremost on its intrinsic value, positive and relative. Authority may have been necessary to originate the new movement by compelling attention. But Philosophy cannot be long sustained on such

a basis. Once known, it must rest solely and simply on its own merits. Free discussion and thorough ventilation can alone give it a permanent hold on the minds of men. Secondly, success must depend on the avoidance of the faults which proved so harmful in the past.

How this may be done we shall be more free to explain in our next paper, the last and, as we hope, the most practical, on the study of Philosophy.

J. HOGAN.

A REMINISCENCE OF CARDINAL MANNING.

IT was in the summer of 1884 when as a young priest I met for the first time that wonderful man about whom so much has lately been said and written, and who, aside of Cardinal Newman, had haunted my youthful imagination for years as a pattern of duty and as the ideal representative of the Catholic priesthood amid the influences of modern social life.

Just at that time he was prominently before the British public as a member of the royal Commission "for housing the poor." Probably no man on that Commission understood, as Cardinal Manning did, both the material needs and the feelings, as also that truer, because spiritual, destitution, which made the care for London's outcasts an imperative and preservative measure on the part of England's noble Lords. A friend from America and I had called at the Cardinal's house and presented letters of introduction. The Rev. Dr. W. Johnson, who received us courteously, told us that every hour of the Archbishop's time was so scrupulously occupied that between his many standing engagements it would hardly be possible to see him, at least, for some days to come. Incidentally and without intending to be impertinent I asked how the Cardinal employed his evenings.—"If there is no special appointment he usually goes out unaccompanied and on foot, none can tell where; only this we know, that the wretched hovels and tenements where London's poor are crowded together, are accustomed to the sight of a tall thin stranger, who sits down with them and talks kindly and familiarly with them, leaving comfort and human hope behind when his silent figure disappears in the darkness." Was this the man whom in later years the surging crowd of hungry and desperate dockyard-laborers recognized as their truest and only friend, when single-handed he urged them to

desist from the reckless course into which the arrogant attitude of merciless employers had goaded them? One can hardly doubt it. The people knew him as one of their own, though many did not know what was his rank, or name, or occupation.¹

The next day we were informed that the Cardinal would be free and see us on the following morning. Lord Petre was to be buried that day; the Archbishop would celebrate the Requiem at eleven, and we could meet him an hour earlier.

Every stranger who has visited the old mansion has probably, upon first entering it, experienced something of that weird impression associated with the gloomy massiveness and large halls of the bare and simple edifice. One would be likely to receive a similar impression on seeing the Cardinal for the first time at a distance— austere in feature and hardly approachable. It would be impossible to act frivolously in his presence. It was under some such sense of restraint that we sat in one of the long parlors with its high ceiling and dark woodwork, when a servant entered to announce that His Eminence would be with us in a few minutes. He had hardly spoken when the Cardinal, accompanied by a gentleman, passed through the room where we were to a neighboring parlor in which another stranger seemed to await him. He nodded pleasantly and said to us "I shall be back directly to see you." We felt at our ease. The few words were spoken in a quick nervous manner, but with some sort of kindly emphasis which banished all thought of formality. If this was a great Prince of the Church whom we had thus far only read about, he was also the father of a Catholic flock to whom anyone might read out the most discouraging page of his heart. After a few minutes he returned. We saluted him in the customary fashion by kissing his ring, and he then moved a chair opposite to us and literally began to catechize us. It was very pleasant, because he was very amiable, and carried us at once back to our own home and diocese in America. The late Archbishop of Philadelphia, Mgr. Wood, was intimately known to him. There was a similarity of character between them, and both had a common attraction towards the devotion to the Holy Ghost. The conversation had gone on in this channel for a short time when, feeling

¹ "Friend of the people," says the Archbishop of Capua, in writing of his now dead brother Cardinal, "because the friend of God, he goes in advance of contemporary philanthropists, economists, philosophers, in his study of the possible means for restoring the dignity and amending the condition of the poor. No man is more beloved by the laborer; and his name is almost as dear among Protestants as among Catholics, among the rich as among the poor. Temperance, arbitration, peace-making, public charity, have in him an eloquent, a persistent, a fearless advocate."

that, as the Cardinal had not yet said mass, our visit was a favor which forbade anything like protracted or commonplace conversation, I expressed our gratification at his having allowed us to see him and asked him to bless us for our journey to Rome. We meant to leave London in a day or two, as the outbreak of the cholera in the south of France was threatening to obstruct travel on the Continent and we were not prepared to pass through a lengthy quarantine. The Cardinal advised us to avoid the French frontier altogether, saying that we could reach Rome in sixty hours and give ourselves more time on returning. Upon mentioning our great desire to delay in Lombardy so as to visit the scenes of the life of St. Charles, the Cardinal slightly started as if affected by some inward emotion. "He is my patron," he said slowly, almost unnaturally; then quickly added: "You will be in London for to-day. I dine at half-past one. Come, and we can have an hour to talk over these things." He arose abruptly, repeated the words "at half-past one—come," and quietly glided out of the room.

I had looked at him with intense admiration all the time that he sat before us. His individuality had deeply impressed itself both on mind and heart. He seemed like a man who had never known trifles but outside of himself, yet who took account of them as the husbandman takes account of the weather-cock. He spoke as though time carried away precious burdens of thought and deed before the idle breath of useless words. His mind seemed eager for information. Every expression of the stranger with whom he conversed was quickly caught and turned over as though to find at once its purpose. You could not fail to carry away the conviction that here was one of God's master-builders, one who had taken a solemn contract to devote all his energies to the erection of a solid and lofty edifice which men might ascend, and which would bring them nearer to heaven, whilst it gave them a right survey of the flitting sights below. He had planned the way long ago, and had found on trial that such a structure could be raised only on Catholic principles. Once he had realized this he spared no pains; he neglected no opportunities; every stone in his path was a help; he hewed it or combined it and quickly placed it in its proper position. Cardinal Manning never broke his material, he did not believe in tearing down; and though relentless in exposing the hollowness of sounding pretence, he ever respected and sympathised with the sincere, even if passionate efforts to do good in any field. How many of England's people has he helped to rise and take a broader and truer

view of God's Church ; how many, even though they have grown weary and timid in the upward struggle, have nevertheless become better and therefore nearer to the outstretched hand of a merciful Father who does not wish the death of the sinner. And this splendidly massive tower, whose height points to the bosom of God and lodges in the hallowed atmosphere of Christ's Church, has been a consoling lighthouse to the world's mariners around. "There are multitudes of us in London and elsewhere," says Mr. Stead in his beautiful tribute to his dead friend and counsellor,¹ "who are left forlorn and desolate. He was as a father in Israel, an Israel now orphaned and solitary, not knowing where to look for a guide so resolute and courageous and yet so tender and true."

Occasionally during our conversation I had noticed a nervous contraction of the face-muscles, as though they had been overstrained and lost their elasticity in the effort to penetrate into the solution of some problem which the heart's love for his fellow-man prompted with an eagerness different from that of the mere philanthropist.

The tone of the Cardinal's voice and his general manner had something incisive, and a sensitive person could hardly help the suspicion that there was a dormant fount of satire beneath the sober, though at times also playful, current of his conversation. Some of his desultory pieces written for the press and under the pressure of immediate provocation show that he was a master in handling this keenest of weapons, which often saves great men from encounters more or less dishonorable because of the position of their wanton antagonists. The same trait has been noticed as prominent in some of the pictures of the Cardinal. Perhaps such qualities are brought out more distinctly by the photographer's art, since men who are not accustomed "to pose" are apt to look with something of disdain upon the machine which compels them to sit for public show.

In manner the Cardinal was a Prince of the Church, and a man who unconsciously determined the attitude of those around him ; a sort of centre which at the same time suggested the measure of the circle in which it lay. Yet there was nothing of imperiousness, nothing of that greatness which comes from mere environment or the insignia of worth. If his eye fastened on a pharisee it made the latter shrink by the force of that chaste light, which generated, diamond-like, within the recess of a pure and humble heart, marks

with unfailing certainty the counterfeit by its side, luminous without borrowing its rays from the gold foil in which it is set.

We had occasion to see more of the Cardinal shortly after, at dinner. There are some features of considerate kindness which he showed us but which I must here pass over for fear of wearying the reader with too much of the writer's personality. When dinner was announced, Dr. Johnson, with whom we had chatted for a short time before, led the way to the dining room. It is a large hall adorned with a few portraits, of which I only remember that of Bishop Challoner and the Cardinal's own. The latter took us by the hand and introduced us to those present—the Very Rev. Canon Bamber, of Thorndon, Sir Archibald Douglass, a gentleman from Surrey whose name I forget, and the priests of the household. After the blessing one of the clergy read a portion in English from the Bible—I think it was the old Testament—and afterwards a short sentence in Latin. The meal, which was the regular dinner, consisted of soup, meats, wine and dessert. I noticed that when the servant presented a dish to the Cardinal he would in the first and second instance nod his head as if wishing to be helped, but without looking at the food. After that he touched very little of anything and no wine. It seemed as if he considered eating as one of the courtesies of life which had to be performed by a kind of habit but which required no special attention.

Lord Petre and the Requiem service of the morning became for a time the topic of conversation. The Cardinal was a decided advocate of Gregorian Church music and told us that we must not fail to go to the Ratisbonne Cathedral where we might hear the kind of singing which he had been anxious to introduce into his own diocese. He had made a mistake in beginning his reform by banishing the ladies from the Cathedral choir “for they had taken the men with them.” Someone remarked that the present leader at the Kensington Pro-Cathedral was an able musician, an Oxford graduate and a Bachelor of music. “Yes, yes” added the Cardinal, turning to us, “there is more in it—for the singers are mostly old maids of music.” Another subject which for reasons known to some American Publishers made us feel a trifle uncomfortable at the time, was the different methods of publishing books and the freedom of the American press. “With us here in England” re-remarked the Cardinal, “there is really no restraint—in truth the law is not felt to exist until one violates it.” Towards the end of the meal the Health Exhibition which was going on at the Crystal

Palace was broached. Had we seen it? No.—“Well” said his Eminence “we shall make a party and go there this afternoon. I have an appointment with the Commissioner of the United States’ Department and we can see the exhibit to advantage.” All arose from the table and after grace retired to a domestic Chapel where a visit was made to the Most Blessed Sacrament. On returning, coffee was served to the guests who stood in groups and chatted while the Cardinal withdrew. We were to meet him some time later and found that our tickets for the exhibition had been purchased by his order.

The exhibition made no particular impression on me. The American section contained simply plans and diagrams of public buildings intending to show the advantages of construction from a sanitary point of view. Mr. Meyer, of New York, the American representative explained the very meager character of the exhibit on the ground that the United States had not been notified in time, that originally no room had been allotted for the purpose, and that the actual representation was really of a private character under the cooperation of the Sanitary Commission of New York City. There was good deal of explanation about “political” influence and the like, when the Cardinal, who had been engaged in examining some plans cut short our rhetoric by a succession of questions which showed that he had the mapping of the whole contribution in his mind. Every now and then he would return upon a previous answer as if to test its accuracy by some cross-query, and then repeat the statements slowly as though he wished to impress it on his own mind.

We walked through “Old London” of 300 years ago and then to Prince Albert’s Hall where the music corps of the French Guard and of the Madgeburg Cuirassiers, Prince Bismark’s regiment, met to emphasize their want of harmony and to intimate that they could properly appreciate each other only in battle.

All this time the Cardinal had been the unobtrusive centre of observation, as we could well notice. The high-bred loiterers here easily recognized him. Men gave way, as he approached; the ladies took position to view him unostentatiously as ladies alone know how to do when the observed commands their homage. The Cardinal seemed truly unconscious of any notice being taken of him. He walked with a grace and firmness which was surprising considering his age even then—straight as an arrow—from place to place hardly stopping anywhere, never sitting down even for a few moments during those two hours.

However the time came for us to leave him. "Call on me when you return from Rome," he said, "I have something for you." We promised. He blessed us and pressed our hands. Once more we were to see him in his home, and to deepen the clear impression of his own unequalled character upon our striving souls. But the details of this second visit I must keep for another paper.

DIVORCE "A VINCULO" IN THE SCHISMATICAL CHURCHES.

AT the close of the Council of Florence on the 6th of July, 1439, the memorable "Document of Re-union" between the Greek and the Latin Churches was issued. Pope Eugene IV, several days after this, asked all the oriental bishops then still at Rome¹ to appear in his court for a consultation on matters of discipline. This consultation was held on the 14th of July. The first reform proposed by the Pope himself on that occasion was "that their custom of allowing divorce *a vinculo* be abolished." The prelates present acknowledged the custom, but added, they could give no decisive answer as to its abolition, without having previously communicated with the Emperor and their absent colleagues. Their private view on the subject, however, was "that marriages among them are divorced only on *solid grounds*."² The re-union did not last, nor were the desired reforms introduced. Already in 1443 the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem pronounced against the union. In Constantinople itself it was incessantly opposed and finally rejected. In 1453 Mahomet II marched into the capital of the Eastern Empire, established his throne there, converted St. Sophia into a Mosque, and placed the crescent above the Christian shrines. The Schismatical Greek Church now became a tool of the Turkish Sultans.³

The Græco-Russian Church in its turn was brought under the jurisdiction of the Tsar.⁴ In 1448 the metropolitan of Moscow was

¹ The Russian metropolitan, Isidor of Kiev, active in favor of the union, was also at Rome. See *Migne, Patrol. Græc.* 159.

² See Hefele, *Concilien Geschichte*, Vol. 7, book 48, § 818.

³ See Brück's Church History, § 205, p. 729.

⁴ "The Russian Church from its origin to the end of the 16th century was subjected to the jurisdiction of the bishop of Constantinople, who, until then, had been acknowledged as its legitimate patriarch." See "Die morganland. Griechisch-Russische Kirche," Schmitt, V Chapter, 14 section, Ed. 1826. Prince Wladimir became a convert to the Christian faith in 989, and with that era began the history of christianity in Russia.

promoted to the primary of all Russia. In 1588 he was made patriarch of Moscow, and the patriarch of Constantinople was no longer recognized after 1660. His jurisdiction in Russia was at an end. The Holy Synod was established in 1721. Even at this day it constitutes the highest authority in church affairs with the sanction of the Tsar.

No inducement offered for a re-union by the Latin Church has since then ever been successful either in Russia or in Greece.¹ The Greek and Græco-Russian Churches obstinately refused to enter upon any negotiations with the Roman See. The papal legate, Possevin, sent to the Tsar Ivan IV, in the last half of the 16th century, could effect no reconciliation. When Peter the Great visited Paris in 1717, the University of the Sorbonne drew up a document of agreement. It was presented to the Tsar, and he accepted it, but beyond that nothing came of it. Intrigue and violence were on the other hand used to make proselytes of the Catholic Polanders, the inhabitants of Lithuania and Roumania.² Reforms aiming at perpetuating the schism were violently forced upon Roman Catholics under Catherine I (1703-1725), under Anne Twanova (1730-1740), under Catharine II (1762-1796), even under Nicolaus I, in spite of the concordat which he had made with Pius IX, in 1847. Nor did this system change under his son Alexander II.³

The Greek Church remained subject to the patriarch of Constantinople, whilst he in turn was at the mercy of the Sultan. In the "Declaration of Independence" of Greece from Turkish rule, the 13th of January, 1822, the Oriental-Orthodox Church was proclaimed the church of the State. In 1823 a project to remodel the State-religion was proposed and adopted at the National Congress of Astros. Finally, in compliance with the royal desire, 63 metropolitans, archbishops and bishops, came together at Naplia in 1833 to proclaim the independence also of the Greek Church from the patriarch of Constantinople.⁴

Thus fared the Greek and Græco-Russian Churches. It is remarkable that in spite of these changes, both churches have firmly clung to the ancient faith. They professed all along to be one in

¹ A number of Monophysite Armenians were joined again to the Roman See about the middle of the 16th century.

² The Catholics of the Russian provinces conquered by Poland re-united with Rome in 1595.

³ See Brück's, *Church History*, § 227, p. 824, "Persecutions of the Catholic Church in Poland;" and "L' Histoire de la Russie," Rembaud, Vol. II.

⁴ See "Kritische Geschichte der Neugriechischen Kirche," Schmitt, 2d Ed. book 1 § 8.

faith with the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed they cling to many of their heir-looms brought over from Rome with a singular tenacity. All attempts that have been made by the Protestants at various times to gain recognition or make fellowship with the Schismatics have proved futile. Many tempting offers have been made to them. They were requested simply to consider and adopt. The union it was urged, would be firm, strong and profitable, both practically and religiously. But Jeremiah, the patriarch of the Greek Church repudiated the "Confessio Augustana" which the Lutherans had sent to him in 1592. In his letter these words occur: "We say, that the Fathers handed down to us, that the church is *one*, holy, Catholic * * * That in that self-same Catholic and Orthodox Church there are *seven sacraments*, namely, baptism * * * and *matrimony*."¹ The Calvinists, though more wary, fared no better.²

The Anglicans made overtures to both churches as late as the Tractarian movement, with as little success.³ This is certainly remarkable. It cannot be accounted for by mere obstinacy, nor does it arise entirely from an aversion common in the East for all things coming from the West. The Greek Church thus faithfully preserves the ancient apostolical tradition, though outwardly enslaved, and inwardly separated by many factions, the result of personal ambition and pride.⁴ In points of discipline both the Greek and the Russian Churches differ from the Roman, although not very materially.⁵ The vital difficulty with both is the dogma of papal supremacy, that is the supremacy of jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome and, as a necessary corollary, the infallibility of the Pope. The procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son was, indeed, at one time hotly opposed by the East. Some historians are of opinion, that this difference not only assisted in bringing on, but actually led to the separation. Yet this opinion is not borne out

¹ This patriarch later admonished the Lutherans to quit their errors and not molest him in the future. In 1559 Melanchthon had sent a Greek translation of the "Confessio Augustana" with a commendatory letter to the patriarch of Constantinople, Joasaph. But the patriarch did not even reply. See Brück's "Church History," § 205.

² See "Geschichte des Protestantismus in der Orientalischen Kirche im 17ten Jahrh." By Dr. Aloys Pichter, p. 2.

³ See Rev. William Palmer's "Harmony of Anglican Doctrine with that of the East." His "Travels in Russia," the "Patriarch and the Tsar" which he published after his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church.

⁴ See "Kritische Geschichte der Neugriechisch. Kirche und der Russisch. Kirche," Schmit, 2 ed., Book III, section 4, § 27.

⁵ For juridical and liturgical canons obtaining in the Greek and Græco-Russian Churches, see Dr. Silbernagel's "Verfassung und gegenwärtiger Bestand sämtlicher Kirchen des Orients," Chapters I, II and III.

by any objection made in that direction by the Latins against a union with the Greeks. If that heretical view had been still held at the Ferrara-Florence Council no union could have been effected then.

But the question which has been a sore puzzle to many, is how the Schismatics can admit of divorce "a vinculo" in marriage, which, like ourselves, they hold to be a sacrament; for precisely because it is a sacrament Christian marriage is pronounced to be insoluble, in both the Greek and Latin Churches. Yet practically it is not so with the Schismatic Greeks, whatever they pretend to hold doctrinally. Pope Eugene IV, demanded abolition of the custom of divorce. The answer, as well as the explanation given by the Archbishop Dorotheus of Mytelene, on the same subject, to a number of Bishops of the Latin Church was unsatisfactory and rather evasive.¹

At the Council of Trent, a canon was formulated clearly setting forth the insolubility of marriage in the Christian Church, without, however, bringing the Greeks under immediate sentence. This may appear odd. Yet it was precisely in order to spare the Greeks or to offer them the chance of an approach to the Mother Church. The essential condition for such an offer to bring about unanimity of faith, was not wanting.²

To Protestants, indeed, such an approach could not have been made. They would disown at once what is here supposed as a fundamental doctrine common to the Greek and Latin Churches. Marriage is no sacrament with Protestants.³

In fact they charge the Roman Catholic teaching as contrary to the Gospel in this particular.⁴

The Schismatics have always admitted and without hesitation, that matrimony is a sacrament, and that therefore it is severed only by death. This has been repeatedly avowed by them at several Councils. But it appears certainly inconsistent to proclaim that according to their faith marriage is a sacrament, and nevertheless to allow divorce, "a vinculo." We are constrained to ask, what

¹ See Hefele, "Concilien—Gesch." Vol. 7, book 48, § 818.

² See Palmieri, "De Matrimonio Christiano" Thes. XXVII.—Hurter Comp. Vol. III, Thes. 259.

³ "Matrimony is not to be counted a sacrament." Art. XXV, Digest of the canons of the Protestant Episcopal Church

See Bishop Potter's article in *North American Review*, November 1889.

"Matrimony, like eating and drinking, is a mundane affair," says Luther in *Table-Talk*, Plochman edit. vol. 61, p. 235, and in another of his writings he adds, "marriage is a mundane affair, subject to civil authority, which is proven by as many imperial laws as have been made regarding it." *Ehesachen*, vol. 23, p. 93, edit. of 1530.

⁴ See Bellarmin, *De Matrimonio*. lib. I, ch. XVII; Möhler, *Symbolik*, § 29.

can those "solid grounds" be which admits a practice contrary to their profession of faith?

In the history of the Council of Trent, by Pallavicino, we are informed that a canon was drawn up, as follows: "Whoever maintains that consummated marriage can be dissolved by reason of adultery let him be anathema."¹ The envoys from the Republic of Venice took offence at this canon. Among their constituents were many Greeks or those who observed the Greek rite.² It would, they asserted, give occasion of no slight scandal in the Oriental Church. Although the Greek Church dissents in some respects from the Roman Catholic Church, still their differences were not such as to forbid the hope of good result if a lenient policy were adopted. An anathema would certainly cause angry feeling, and probably lead to an irreparable breach between the churches. Besides, they argued, that the Greeks have always allowed dismissal of an adulterous wife, permitting new espousals *in accordance with a very ancient custom of the Fathers*. This practice had never been condemned by any General Council. They proposed, therefore, that a milder course be taken, and with this view presented a canon of their own forming which they begged the Fathers to consider, and, if feasible, to adopt. "At least, it is hoped," said they, "that the wishes of the Republic will be taken into account by the most prudent judgment of the Fathers assembled." However, there was a vast difference of opinion among the Fathers regarding the best form to be adopted. The members of the committee appointed to consider this matter were no less at odds. The substitute offered by the Venetian envoys called forth much criticism and the Papal legates cancelled the introductory clause because it seemed to hint at a neglect on the part of Rome to invite the Greeks as it had invited other nations. The Bishop Cuesta of Leon next objected to the form of the opening words: "Whoever says that the Church has erred, etc." The Church cannot be supposed by any Catholic to err. "Then," he added, "indissolubility of marriage is a truth long since confirmed in the Council of Mileve,³ in the sixth General

¹ See "Istoria del Concilio di Trento," Sforza Pallavicino, part 3, lib. xxii, num 17—Editio Neapoli, 1759.

² The Melchitarites, named after the Abbot Melchitar, who was born in Sebaste, in Armenia, 1676, are classed with the United Armenians. As a religious order they follow principally the rule of St. Benedict. Their monastery, formerly on the island of Morea, was destroyed by the Turks in 1715. They settled shortly after on San Lazzaro, near Venice, where the Abbot Melchitar died in 1749.

³ This memorable Synod was held by the African Bishops at Mileve to condemn Pelagius and Celestius. It was approved by Innocent I. in 416. The sixth General Council is the third of Constantinople in 680. The Council of Basel-Ferrara was transferred to Florence by Eugene IV. in 1439 owing to a plague at the former place.

Council, and in the Council of Florence." To corroborate his statement he quoted most appositely from the very same writings of the Fathers¹ which had been adduced to extenuate the fault of this irregular practice of divorce. The address made on this occasion by the Bishop of Leon would have turned the scales against the envoys if it had been made earlier.

Such was the general impression, according to Pallavicino. But as it happened the majority commended a more considerate formula. The following canon was consequently drafted, and adopted. "If any one holds, that the Church errs inasmuch as she taught and teaches in accordance with the Gospel and Apostolic doctrine that the adultery of either husband or wife be not a reason sufficient to dissolve matrimony "a vinculo" ; and that either of the two, though it be even the innocent party who has given no occasion for adultery, cannot contract a new marriage during the lifetime of the other ; and that he who, having dismissed his adulterous wife, marries another, commits adultery and that she who is dismissed of her adulterous husband and marries another also commits adultery ; let him be anathema."² Thus the Fathers of the Council of Trent offered a conciliatory approach towards the schismatical churches. Whether it was a happy coincidence that the Bishop of Leon spoke at the end of the deliberation, is difficult to say. Certain it is, that the doctrine of indissolubility of christian marriage is here clearly defined and distinctly expressed. No sacrifice of truth was made in order to gain favor. The canon first drawn up was, indeed, brief and concise. It left no escape from its anathema. But since the Greeks openly affirmed their belief in the doctrine, which the canon defended they fell not under the anathema.³ How far their tolerated practice brings them under the ban of this condemnation is difficult to state. In the Latin Church such custom cannot obtain. The Fathers of the Council have never in the slightest way sanctioned it. It could readily be supposed that the Greeks would be open to dissuasion, if they were re-united to the church of Rome. In the present canon then the

¹ St. Clement of Alexandria and St. Basil.

² Si quis dixerit, Ecclesiam errare, quum docuit et docet juxta evangelicam et apostolicam doctrinam propter adulterium alterius conjugum matrimonii vinculum non posse dissolvi et utrumque vel etiam innocentem, qui causam adulterii non dedit, non posse altero conjugate vivente aliud matrimonium contrahere ; moecharique eum, qui dimissa adultera aliam duxerit, et eam, quae dimisso adultero alii nupserit, A. S." Conc. Trid. sess. XXIV, C. 7.

³ See Palmieri, *Matrim. Christ. th*" XVII. Hurter, "*Medulla Thes. CLXX, Oswald Meilige Sacramente*—"Unarfosbarkeit der Ehe," p. 411.

explicitly defined dogma is that Christian marriage is indissoluble, as taught by the church, who infallibly interprets the Gospel and Apostolic doctrine. To this doctrine effect is given by the admitted practice in the discipline of the Church.

In Russia, in Greece, and in parts of Turkey the ancient faith has been substantially retained. Handicapped, however, tyrannized over by a despotic rule in Russia, oppressed at once and protected by Moslem power in Turkey, it has held its own by that tenacity which is characteristic of the oriental Greek. Nevertheless many destructive elements have been inoculated during the course of centuries. The continual intercourse with strangers of an opposing religion, the obligation of civil observances, open violence, and secret political manipulations have made serious impressions upon the Catholic population. The eye of a mother was not allowed to keep watch, or to sound a warning alarm. Final dissolution will undoubtedly be brought on in course of time, and the Schismatical Churches will hardly survive a change of present dynasties unless fresh vital force is infused from the only life-giving source of all faith on earth.

But let us take a closer view of the grounds upon which the Greek Schismatics have countenanced divorce "a vinculo." No doubt they felt a sense of guilt, as appears in the answer given to Pope Eugene, and in the explanation offered by the Venetian envoys. There must not have been a solid certainty then about those alleged grounds, which seem to have centered in "an ancient custom deriving from the Fathers," and in the further fact that "no condemnation was ever issued against the practice by any general Council." How correctly these reasons indicate the source of the present practice will be better understood in the light of the following observations. Origen, who died in 254, in his commentary on St. Matthew, has this remark: "Some church-elders have permitted, *contrary to Holy-Writ*, that women remarry during the life-time of their husbands." He desires that to be criticized mildly, as it came to pass to avoid worse¹ (*συγχρησσει χερσίνων*)." St. Basil, who died in 379, expressly states that the evil custom came into vogue, *although Christ forbade it*. According to this custom, he goes on to explain, the husband can repudiate his unfaithful wife, but the wife cannot in turn leave her unfaithful husband. Should she nevertheless separate from him, and the husband thereupon take another wife, he should hesitate to say whether that be adultery, since the wife, who ought to have remained, is the cause thereof.² St. John Chrysostom seems

¹ Origen in St. Matth., Tom. 14 num. 23.

² St. Basil's 1a Epistola Canonica ad Amphiloichium. num. 188.

to intimate in some passages that adultery dissolves matrimony. St. Epiphanius, in his *παναρω* insinuates as much.

The above-mentioned Greek Fathers were quoted at the Council. Yet it must be noticed that they do not at all approve of the custom. They themselves say that it is contrary to Holy Writ and forbidden by Christ. It is a transgression in their view, an abuse which has never had the sanction of law. In some parts of their writings these Fathers are pronounced against the legality of the practice. In the passages quoted by the Schismatics we can see nothing more than a palliation of sin, for although the doctrine of the indissolubility of Christian marriage was understood, yet in legal codes, especially of a civil character, much was left undefined; much was tolerated with a view of gradual change.

In the first centuries of Christianity when Pagan customs and Jewish ideas could not at once be expelled we find that extreme views on marriage were held here and there among Christians. After the death of one party the second marriage of the other party, for instance, was considered by some to be likewise adultery although not of a gross character ("εὐπρεπὴς μοιχείαι"). Clement of Alexandria, who borrowed this rather extreme view from Athanagoras,¹ defined marriage in this wise:

"Marriage is *the first* uniting of man and wife according to law, to the end that legitimate children be begotten"—Γάμος μὲν ἐστὶ σύναδος ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἢ πρώτη κατὰ νόμον ἐπὶ γνησίων τεχνῶν σπορά. ²

According to this definition, a marriage following upon the first union, even after death severed it, was unlawful. This rigid limitation of Christian marriage was possibly due to primitive fervor. The apologists of the first centuries defended the unity and sanctity of the marriage bond against profligate pagans³ and degenerate Jews. In opposition to the shocking accusations and biting calumnies made by the heathens, Jews, Gnostics and heretics, they held out the ideal of purity and virginity in the Christian Church, and some of them, in the heat of debate may have gone too far. They expatiated less upon the indissolubility of Christian marriage which is rather a sequel of its unity and sanctity. Besides, this doctrine

1 Athanagoras belongs to the brave band of Apologists of the first age of the Church. He presented his "Legatio pro Christianis" to the Emperor Marc Aurel and to the Emperor's son Commodus about 177.

2 Clem. Alex. "Libri Hromat." in quibus maxime Grusticis refellit," says Fessler in his "Patrologia," vol. I., p. 224-25.

3 "At nos pudorem, non facie, sed mente præstamus. Unius matrimonii vinculo libenter inhæremus, cupiditatem procreandi aut unam aut nullam scimus." Minutius Felix in his "Octavus," c. 31. Felix lived about 166.

is sufficiently dwelt upon in the Sacred Writings of the New Law, so as to be readily understood, while its unity is rather supposed than expressly dealt with.¹ Thus the apologists demonstrated Christian marriage to be of a higher, nobler character than mere civil, pagan, or Jewish marriage. It was, in their view, a union of reasonable creatures, serving God by their free will, and subduing their passions. "It is becoming, therefore," wrote the martyr St. Ignatius, third bishop of Antioch, to St. Polycarp, "that those of both sexes who desire to marry unite according to the direction of their bishop, that thus their nuptials be according to God and not according to concupiscence."² But the formation of so restricted a monogamy gave rise to a false asceticism. Heretics, like the Montanists, Kataphrygians and others, explicitly condemned second marriage, to be null and void. Even Tertullian was captivated by this view. After the Church distinctly pronounced this to be wrong it was abandoned; although the third and fourth marriages were regarded as indecent and unbecoming to Christians, and, strangely enough, during the fourth and fifth centuries it happened that in those very districts of the Oriental Church³ where this severe restriction of monogamy had originally prevailed, practice gradually went to the other extreme. Re-marriage was permitted after man and wife had been separated already during their life-time. Preference, as has been shown above, was shown to the husband. There is no need to mention here the Gnostic and Manichæan heresies. They absolutely denied all dignity and sacredness to the marriage bond.⁴

What has been said thus far is not to be understood as if a lenient view could be taken of divorce *à vinculo* under any circumstances. In the Latin Church rare cases of such divorces and re-marriage have occurred. The declaration of its absolute unlawfulness given by St. Ambrose,⁵ St. Jerome, St. Augustine,⁷ and many Roman Pontiffs could not prevent its occurrence under certain circumstances.

¹ See I Cor., c. vii, v. 1, ss.

² St. Ignatius suffered martyrdom about 107. St. Polycarp was a disciple of St. John the Apostle. See "Epistola V a, ad Polycarpum."

³ Novatiau and his adherents in Rome during the pontificate of Pope Cornelius appear to have been the sole opponents of second marriage in the Western Church.

⁴ "In novissimis temporibus discedunt quidam a fide . . . in hypocrisi loquentium mendacium . . . prohibentium nubere." I Tim., c. iv, 1, 2, 3.

⁵ St. Ambros in Lucam, libr. VIII, num. 5-6, et De Abram. lib. VII num. 59.

⁶ St. Hieron. Epist. 55 ad Amand, and his Epistola 77 ad Ocean.

⁷ St August. lib. De Bouo Conjugali; De Nuptiis et concupiscentia; in his two books Ad Pollentium De Adulteriis Conjugiis.

In the sixth and seventh centuries some divorces *a vinculo* were granted by local and obscure synods particularly in Spain but not by supreme authority. In fact, these centuries mark a crisis in the ecclesiastical history on this subject both for the Eastern and Western Church. Political and social vicissitudes, change of dynasties, decline of old and rise of new empires, gradual abolition of pagan customs, made in turn trying demands on the Church. A new civilization had been effected by her influence and fostering care. New codes had to be enacted. The family, and its source, marriage, were certainly a most important factor.

But while the Church in the West clung to Peter and emerged safe, the Church in the East gradually lessened its hold in order to grasp at deceitful hopes thrown out by ambitious leaders. These leaders found that the existing custom of divorce—if indeed the occasional violation of an undefined law could create such a custom—much to their purpose. Rome always protested against such a violation but she was not always heeded amid the turbulent times. The perverse practice thus developed into a tolerated custom in the East. What by universal consent was erst considered contrary to Holy Writ decked itself in legal apparel and rose to the dignity of legitimate usage. "Marriage, that is its actual existence according to the Christian idea, is, humanly speaking, due to the Primacy of Peter in the West," says Oswald. This fact demonstrates how necessary united action was to preserve a most essential characteristic of Christian marriage. In the West, as well as in the East, the Church met with bitter opposition. Corrupt human nature everywhere and always the same, remnants of Pagan legislation, retained and lingering long in the civil codes, frustrated her attempts to enter the Christian law of marriage in the civil enactments. And this condition explains how such cases as divorce *a vinculo* could happen.¹ But she finally succeeded. Explicit condemnation from a General Council was hardly necessary. Universal consent of indissolubility, continual rebuke of divorce *a vinculo*, sense of guilt arising from its permission sufficed. There was no silence on her part, equivalent to consent in this matter, as the Bishop Cuesta of Leon clearly demonstrated to the Fathers of the Council of Trent. Whatever were the instances cited the fact of divorce *a vinculo* remains undoctinal and illegal. Right by prescription is here excluded, and the appeal

¹ "Aliae erant leges Cæsarum, aliae Christi; aliud Papianus, aliud Paulus noster praecepit," wrote St. Jerome in his 30th letter to Oceanus. In this letter St. Jerome explains the re-marriage of a certain divorced woman, named Fabiola.

to isolated cases only evinces an anxiety to justify divorce and re-marriage.

Other abettors of the cause have pointed to imperial laws ; or adduced the 87th canon of the Trullano Synod, the second¹ of that name, which was convened and held under the auspices of Justinian II. in 692. But what value can attach to imperial laws in regard to the sacraments. Furthermore, the canon referred to is most indefinite and obscure.

It is difficult to point to any one cause as the source of the practice in the Schismatic churches. Many concurrent circumstances seem to have favored it. It is not likely that a false interpretation of that hypothetical clause in St. Matthew's Gospel, "excepting the cause of fornication," Chap. V, v. 32 ; and "except it be for fornication," Chap. XIX, v. 9, had any influence upon the Greek discipline, because no such interpretation has ever been authorized in the Christian Church, even though the preference given in case of adultery to the husband might seem to point that way. The correct interpretation of the text and its clause could be learned from general acceptance. A false interpretation would, therefore, at once be stigmatized, and could certainly not have formed a basis for action so divergent from general rule. It was also admitted by the Greeks that the sense in which the Fathers generally accepted the clause by no means set adultery apart as reason for divorce *a vinculo*. Matrimonial bonds they held to be indissoluble. There may be a difference, indeed, with them as to the radical reason, why Christian marriage² is indissoluble. Whatever the views of theologians are as to reason the doctrine itself remains unimpeached. Since the infallible declaration of Trent, there can be no room for misapprehending that clause, and we have only been speaking of the subject as it stood prior to that Council.

Theologians and canonists have been most assiduous in searching out every case of divorce *a vinculo* on record. They have given

¹ Much ill-will was expressed against Rome in the decrees of this Synod. The Byzantine Court exercised a baneful influence in both Synods, and widened the breach between Rome and Constantinople. Political changes in Italy at the time excited the ambitious Emperor of the East. The Trullano Synod is numbered among the ecumenical Councils by the Greeks, but Rome has never acknowledged it as such. See Hefele, "Concilien-Geschichte," vol. iii. p. 298.

² See Sanchez, De Matrim. Christ. lib. II, d. 13 ; Bellarmin, De Matrim. c. IV.—"Et quidem certum est quod quatenus extrinsice quoque indissolubile est, ratio ultima est, quia Deus ita voluit" says Palmieri, De Matrim. Christ. thes : XVII et. XXIV.—St. Thos. distinguishing between "finem primarium et fines secundarios" leaves it to the reader to conclude the ratio from either, though he himself inclines to the first. See Suppl. 2. LXV, art. 1, ad 4 um et ad 8 um. Duns Scotus adds that the virtues of obedience and filial piety, and the welfare of society are preserved and fostered by indissolubility of marriage. See Scotus, Reportt. 4, 28, 1.

much attention to the explanation of dubious passages in the writings of the Fathers. Decisions of local synods bearing upon this subject have been minutely scrutinized. The effect of it all has been to strengthen the persuasion of universal concurrence as to the indissolubility of christian marriage from the beginning of Christianity.

Had the Schismatical churches remained in union with the See of Peter the blot upon their robe of faith would have long since been erased. The seamless garment of Christ should never have been rent. The sacredness and sanctity of marriage would be in fairest contrast with the usages of Turkish harems and domestic slavery in Russia. The woman and mother could appear upon the public thoroughfares unveiled, an ornament of society as of the family "nor uninformed of nuptial sanctity and marriage rites," and be man's companion, not his slave.

"And they shall be one flesh, one heart, one soul."

JOS. SELINGER.

THE COUNTRY PRIEST'S WEEK.*

(Monday.)

The early Mass is said, the sunlight glows
 With tinge of red ; the pastor homeward goes,
 To pause a moment, just to say a word
 To that old woman, whose sharp tongue,—he's heard,—
 Has made much havoc all the previous week,—
 " You ask forgiveness, yet you evil speak ;"
 He says, with sternness, " at each morn you rise,
 In spite of wind and weather,—turn your eyes
 In fervent ecstasy ; you beat your breast,
 And have not love ;—of what avail's the rest ?"

Abashed, the ancient dame, in shawl of black
 And veiled bonnet, sighs at this attack,
 And hastens off, with bobbing courtesy short,
 To face the parish with an altered port ;
 And he goes onward through the tender green,
 Following a furrow in the changing sheen
 Of winter wheat ; the rain has passed away,
 The new world glitters in a radiant day,
 " Which God has given us !" he, reverent, says.
 " How glad and glorious, O my God, thy ways !"

'Tis Monday, and his sermon's in the past,
 And in the future,—freedom can but last
 A day at most ; no name is on the slate,—
 There's an account, but those small bills can wait ;
 He scans the slate again ; no letters mark
 Its ebon surface ;—there is Susan Barke ;—
 He ought to see her, she's been ill, they say,
 'Tis but a mile ; he'll take it on his way
 To " Jack " Maginn's,—forgive the " Jack " you can,
 A priest's a priest, and yet a priest's a man :

For " Jack Maginn," now " Father," if you please,—
 Lives just four miles away, where willow trees
 Bend o'er a garden, bound by mignonette,
 And with a duck pond in an arbor set :
 Here rose and cabbage in the summer time
 Elbow each other ; in another clime
 Parochus learned to garden, by the sea,
 (There's shamrock under glass, kept carefully !)
 In far-off Ireland,—(of his heart the pulse !)—
 The only thing he can't grow here is *dulse*.

*[The first part of this interesting poem appeared in the January number of this year. It will be continued.--EDIT.]

There was a time when "Jack" was young and gay,—
 A player on the cornet,—so they say,—
 He plays no more, at which his friends rejoice,—
 A seminarian with a tenor voice
 Who sang "The Minstrel Boy" and "Tara's Harp;"
 But now his voice is just a trifle sharp
 In upper notes;—one wouldn't care for that,
 If in the lower it were not so flat;
 A man, like grave St. Paul, he holds no thing
 Of boyish days,—except that he will sing.

The "Jack Maginn" of '60 is no more:
 The cares of office, and the burdens sore
 Of all the burdens of his little flock
 Have changed him greatly,—yet there is a lock
 That holds a secret portal, and the key
 Is kept by him who journeys cheerily
 Across the fields; behind this portal, bright
 Are memories, and jokes, that saw the light
 When Russell ruled at Maynooth,—of the young
 And gifted cantors he had oft outsung!

The horse is stabled, and the old friends meet.
 'Tis Monday,—you would know it as they greet;
 "The ducks are in the stove, you'll stay and dine."
 "Who talks of dining; it is not yet nine."
 The arm-chair's out, the grate is made to glow,
 And wreathes of fragrant smoke soft upward blow;
 Now joke meets joke:—away, dull care, away!
 For this is Monday, and a little play
 Is good for men that think; the Office said
 As far as possible; no work ahead.

Cigars and pews, the Bishop's health,—who spoke
 At certain funerals,—(all this in smoke,)—
 The sermon of last Easter,—Hogan's boy,
 ("Gone to the bad,") and Jimmy Quinlan's joy
 Over the rise in hay,—of course, the school;
 And both agree the editor's a fool
 Who, in his leader, took the other side
 In Irish politics,—the man that lied
 In last week's *Tribune* on old Froude's new book;—
 And, for the season, how well all things look;

"Delaney and his tricks!" he died at sea,
 Of yellow fever, caught in steerage,—he
 Spent all the voyage among the sickened crowd
 In the foul steerage; he was never cowed.
 "Ordained a month!" And may he rest in peace!

A knock is heard ; and now the talk must cease !
 The ducks are ready, and a cook will wait
 No more than time or tide, if men be late.
 "The ducks are roasted." What !—already noon !
 For once, at least, the diners dine too soon.

Nor is the day without its argument,
 A wordy war,—the smoky air is rent
 With *pros* and *cons* upon the Moral Law,—
 "Père Gury says"—"In printing there's a flaw ;"
 "Yes !" "No !" "De Lugo !" "St. Alphonsus !" "Good,
 Yet there's a gloss."— "No casuist ever could—"
 "What nonsense !" "On the *Index* !" "In *Le Pape*
 De Maistre says—"Come, come, I'll take my nap,
 If you mix history and 'Moral' so !"
 And then our pastor thinks it's time to go.

But not till twilight, where the wheat is sowed,
 Turns green to gray, does he take to the road,
 Refreshed and strengthened for the coming week,
 When life and death shall meet, and he shall speak
 Most august words ; now at his horse's head,
 He quick remembers what he might have said.
 "De Lugo settled *that* !" These words he hears
 Hurl'd from the darkness, as the gate he nears ;
 He pauses, tempted ; then into the gloom
 Rides laughing at the tempest in the room.

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN.

COMPULSORY EDUCATION.

“EX TERMINIS male intellectis oritur haeresis.” If Catholic writers always kept in view this axiom, common among theological students, they would sooner arrive at a mutual understanding in this matter of compulsory education. The terms, as well as the state of the question, ought to be clearly defined before beginning a discussion in which all depends on the exact definitions of the words state, education, compulsion, direct and indirect right, public welfare, private interests, etc. Indeed, it would require a whole treatise on Politics to show the practical consequences of divers definitions. Our paper will supply a few illustrations.

The term “State” is more properly used to indicate an organized society or multitude united into a body politic under a supreme ruling authority. As in the present question it will make but little difference, we shall sometimes apply the term directly to this authority, or what we call the Government. In this we follow the general custom, although a strictly scientific method could not allow a similar use of terms without exposing the author to the danger of most serious blunders. State and Government are not identical, though they are inseparable ; their respective operations are not of the same nature ; nor are their proximate ends entirely the same, though they will often meet.

In regard to “Education” writers seem to drift quite generally into the habit of using the term indiscriminately for the moral as well as the mere intellectual training. The clear and well defined distinction between education and mere instruction seems gradually to disappear and the reader is left to find out for himself whether education means education properly so called (in German *Erziehung*) or only instruction (*Unterricht*), or both.¹ In the present paper when speaking of education we generally understand the moral training, the forming of character, the imparting of moral truth, not as a mere scientific speculation (Philosophy of Ethics), but in order to shape man’s heart and life. Our views in regard to

¹ As the terms *education* and *instruction* bear not only a wider but also a stricter meaning, we must, when the latter is the case, distinguish in the use of the two terms. If instruction is nothing else but the imparting of knowledge, then all education is instruction, but if we invert the proposition it is not equally true. Education, strictly speaking, is instruction of a special kind, and more than a mere communication of truth ; it is rather a communication of morals. Would we call an illiterate Saint, say a devout lay-brother, a well *educated* man ? If the term be used in a loose sense (as is generally done in ordinary conversation), no ; but if used in the strict sense, yes ; for he has learned the Science of the Saints by the pious training and instruction obtained in his monastery.

State Education have been clearly stated in the last number of the REVIEW. But it may be well in this connection to add a few remarks to illustrate what has been said above concerning the difference between State and Government. Man is to be educated in and by society, as to him society is the necessary means for attaining his full natural development in regard both to soul and body ; it is society that gives man not only food and clothing, but also intellectual and moral knowledge. But it is not the Government. Is it not also society, organized society, call it the State or the political body of which man is a part, that must help him to Heaven? Did not the Creator ordain that man should attain his last end in and through society, and for that reason create him essentially a *social* being? Is not society itself God's work and the natural means in His Almighty Hand to bring man back to Himself after this earthly life? Yet who ever maintained that all this rests with the Government? Writers too often forget to distinguish between the necessary, natural and spontaneous working and influence of society upon man, and its free or political action. One is the work of the natural laws governing mankind at large, the other is the effect of positive laws shaping the politics of a State. While we may, therefore, truly say (speaking only of the natural order, abstracting from any further or positive provision made by God) that it is organized and well regulated society which must provide man with everything necessary to attain his end, consequently with spiritual as well as corporal means, we are free to deny that all this must be done by its political action and pertains to the direct and immediate competency of the Government. The State is greater than the Government. Nor does the Government give to the State its whole organism. It defines the political organization, yes ; but there is also the civil organization of society, whether produced by necessary natural action, as the family, or by necessary social action, as that of towns, cities and provinces, or by the free agreement of individuals, like that of unions, guilds and estates or classes. The less a Government interferes with this manifold organism of society, and the more it leaves to the natural action or social evolution, the better it is for the State. In fact, a Government has but one end, namely, to secure and further the natural working of society. This leads to another important observation to better understand the real nature of political action.

Social life must necessarily partake of many qualities of the individual life. This is true, especially in regard to liberty. For what

is social life if not the combined and harmonious action of all the citizens. Now, as the highest privilege of man consists in working out his end by the exercise of his own free will, so it must be the highest ambition of a body politic to secure its end by the free and spontaneous co-operation of all. True social life needs freedom as much as any private life. That government is the most perfect which interferes least with the freedom of its subjects, while it offers to their voluntary action ample and opportune means of happiness. Hence, *ceteris paribus*, the fewer the laws restricting the natural liberty (not the mere physical, but the moral liberty) of the citizens the happier the people. Freedom is the characteristic mark of the citizen. The millions of Roman slaves were denied the honorary title of *civis*, because they were not free; and a Roman made prisoner in war lost his *caput*, his civil and political rights, till he should have regained his freedom. With that liberty of its subjects the State must not interfere by its political action, except when and as far as they would obstruct the natural social action, by disturbing the public order and violating the rights of other men. We repeat again what we said in our first article: "It is of primary importance to remember the general principle of sound political economy,¹ that the State or Government has no right to limit the natural liberty of its subjects, except in case of a real, social necessity. Mere utility is not a sufficient cause to use force or compulsion."

Compulsory education! What compulsion is here meant? In what is man's liberty to be curtailed by the Government? We limit the question to secular teaching, moreover to mere elementary instruction.

In the light of history, past and present, we may easily distinguish three stages of compulsory education. The first, the least and lowest one, consists in the supposed right of the State to compel parents to give to their children a *minimum* of secular instruction (*Lehrzwang*). The ways and means by which this result is to be obtained are left to the free choice and arrangement of the parent, although public authority will control the whole instruction, determining in what that *minimum* consists, examining the teachers to see if they are competent to teach that *minimum*, inquiring in the schools or at home whether such *minimum* be really taught. There is some liberty left to the parent, only he is no longer free to bring up his child in ignorance of that *minimum*.

The second stage is compulsory school education (*Schulzwang*).

¹We mean political sociology.

The child may not receive that *minimum*, that most elementary instruction, at home or under a private tutor ; it must go to school, public or private. These schools, whether supported by public moneys or by voluntary contributions, are under full control of the Government. The principle implied is evidently that every child must receive its elementary knowledge under immediate State supervision ; it cannot be left to the family.

Finally, the third and highest degree of compulsory education is the compulsory State school (*Schulmonopol*). All children must frequent the public or State school ; private schools are not to be tolerated, nor is home instruction recognized. No other primary or elementary schools are allowed than those of the State, which in this matter claims an exclusive right and the monopoly of instruction, denying to its citizens the "freedom of education."

To a mind trained in logical thought, acquainted with the nature of man and versed in the history of the human race, the intrinsic falsity and the disastrous consequences of the last two theories are evident. They are dreams of blind Statolatry and Socialism, both tyrants destroying individual liberty, although both extremes strangely met. But compulsory education in its first or milder form presents an attractive side to not a few men learned in science, loyal to their religion and anxious for the good of their fellow men. Indeed, what more desirable at all times, but especially in this XIXth century, than that all children should get such elementary knowledge as they will need to make their way in life and become useful members of society? How can morality and religion form the rising generation if the mind of the children is not supplied with a minimum of ordinary knowledge? How will coming generations further spread the light of culture and civilization if they themselves be brought up in mental darkness? Does it not belong to the mission of the State, is it not within its native power to see to all this? Besides, why should a parent demur at being compelled to do what is best for his child, rather than be allowed the useless, nay injurious liberty of bringing the child up in ignorance? Moreover, does not the natural law impose on every parent the grave duty of providing not only for the bodily but also for the mental or spiritual needs of his offspring ; and may not the State enforce the exercise of that duty? Where is there in this an unjust interference with the parent's liberty? The more, as the arm of public authority strikes only a handful of lazy parents, while the great majority have their children educated of their own free will and under great sacrifices,

without any compulsion at all? Further, the actual state of society, the public good, imperatively demands that education be general and universal; all must be instructed. But who will dare to deny that it is the direct and immediate right of the State to promote the public welfare? You must then allow it the right of compulsory education as explained. Finally, man may freely give up the use of his liberty in this or another matter. Suppose, then, in a democratic country like our own where the majority rules, a majority of voters insist that there shall be compulsory education, how can the minority deny that right of the Government?

Did we state the case of our opponents fully and strongly enough? Some reader may think *et ultra*; what are you going to answer?

Before giving a general answer it may be better to clear away in advance the special difficulty involved in the last argument. The authority, the rule or law, the government in a democratic State is not the collective will or power of the individuals who form the majority. Otherwise we should have the State à la Rousseau. Sound philosophy tells us that the public authority and power, whether represented by a democratic majority or by an absolute monarchy or by a constitutional government, is in itself and by nature always and everywhere the same. True, the distribution and exercise of that public power may differ in various countries; it is precisely this polity or form of government that makes the monarchy differ from the republic; but the public authority itself is the same in both. It is nothing else than the sovereign social power which, by the law of nature, is demanded in society for the attainment of its end. The nature and extent of that power are defined by its proximate end, the public welfare. *Salus populi suprema lex*. Beyond these limits it cannot reach. Hence, the majority in a republic may not legislate as they please, nor make any rule as they like, if we are not to adopt the axiom that might is right. A majority, no matter how strong, has no more power over the citizens of the country than the public or common good demands. If, individually, they are willing to give up some rights of their own and to deprive themselves in part of their natural liberty, they may do so *as far as they alone are concerned*, but they cannot take those rights from their fellow-citizens, apparently their subjects, except the public welfare render such a measure necessary. Nor is this enough; the matter also must of its nature lie within the jurisdiction of civil authority; else they are incompetent to legislate about it. This brings us to the

general answer to be given to the arguments brought against us. We say a *general* answer ; it would require a whole pamphlet to take up the charges in detail, though we may find occasion to enter upon a few in the course of our paper.

Our opponents, we think, very often call *necessary* what is only *useful* in regard to the end and purpose of society. Necessary is only that, without which the primary and essential end of society cannot be obtained, *i. e.*, the maintenance of order and peace, the security of every one's right. That high degree of usefulness, which amounts to a *moral* though not absolute necessity, seems to imply a kind of conflict of rights, where the rights and claims of the majority on the one hand have become so strong and manifest, that the few individuals on the other hand can no longer maintain their original rights without injustice towards the community, or without endangering the public order. It is, therefore, no longer mere utility but real necessity, although of a lower degree. Whatever helps, *over and beyond this*, to further temporal prosperity, belongs to the secondary and accidental right of the State ; it is useful, most useful perhaps, but it is not necessary. Yet compulsion supposes necessity. Again some confound what we may be allowed to call *compulsive* legislation with *voluntary* legislation, we mean the promotion of the common good by compulsion or by free co-operation. Again others seem not to pay attention enough to the *intrinsic nature* of the subject in question, taking it apparently for granted that whatever concerns man falls within the competency of the State ; hence the State may enforce the exercise of every duty or virtue, not merely those of commutative and legal justice, which are the only *judicial* duties of man. Some again do not distinguish clearly enough, at least, to our mind, between direct and indirect right or power, and do not hesitate to affirm that the State has an immediate direct right, even of compulsion, to whatever promotes the public good. Others again seem to forget that the State is an organism, not a mechanism, and that free scope must be given to the action proper of each organ ; hence they allow the State direct interference with the independent working of the family. And this, to rest here, is one of the most important factors in the solution of the question of compulsory education.

We have referred to the mutual relation between State and family in our last number. But a few words from a famous philosopher may find a place here. P. Liberatore, S. J., in his work on Ethics

and Natural Law, speaking of the domestic society, explains in art. V. the duties of parents towards their children, especially that of education. Of this he says : " id inconcussum censendum est : ejusmodi jus parentibus et patri potissimum natura sua competere, nec posse a societate usurpari, quin patriam potestatem violet et familiæ conceptum debilitet. Debet utique societas efficere ut publica media non desint, quibus parentes ad rite educandos et edocendos natos uti possint. Debet etiam modis consentaneis, sed non violentis, curare ut parentes tantum officium minime negligant. At in rem hanc se directe immiscere eamque potestatem sibi vindicare nequam potest sine evidenti læsione juris paterni, cum parentum omnino sit educationi et disciplinæ filiorum prospicere, eorumque non modo corpus alere, sed animam etiam effingere et conformare. Nec dicas, filios membra esse societatis, quæ ipsis invigilare debet. Nam membra societatis sunt non seorsum per se, sed vi familiarum, ex quibus proxime civilis societas constat, et quarum naturale regimen offendi nequit, quin ordo rationis pervertatur et ipsa civilis societas pessum abeat." And in a note he adds : " Quamdiu homo sub potestate patria vivit, societati jungitur vi familiæ cujus est pars ; societas vero ipsi tutelam impartitur, quatenus in familiam influit, etc." The family is a natural institution, a creation of God, independent of and prior to the State ; Although part of the State and inseparably bound up with it and in this sense dependent on it in many ways, yet the family differs from the state in its origin, its constituent elements, its proper end, its essential form and its peculiar operation. All these belong to it independently from the State. The family is a perfect creation and a well defined organized society outside of any state. Being as much the immediate work of nature as the State itself, nay much more so (for the State arises after and from the family,) it is in regard to the State and individual, a moral person possessing native, inherent rights of its own as truly as any private citizen. In its internal private affairs it must be allowed the same liberty and independence as any individual citizen ; the State may not intrude upon this privacy without urgent cause. Now, the raising up of children, the care of their corporal and spiritual development is of its very nature an internal, private affair, belonging exclusively and *per se* independently to the peculiar work of the family ; not to the State. Public authority, therefore, has no direct, immediate right over the child ; it cannot control the inner operation of the family and prescribe the programme according to which the mother is to nurse the child, or the father feed and clothe it, or

both to educate and instruct it. But if the State has no direct and immediate right over these matters, it cannot generally legislate on them. For *general* legislation supposes a direct and immediate jurisdiction over the object and the subject of the law. Our main reason, then, for denying that the State may introduce compulsory education by a general law, as a general preventive measure, lies in the peculiar relation between family and State.

But may we not find another reason in the subject itself—education? Is it not of such a nature as to be *per se* outside the sphere of political action, because outside of the competency of civil authority? There is no question here of education in the proper strict sense. For with the best will we are simply unable to understand how morality, which is essentially the work of free will, how the teaching of moral truths which must be freely believed to be of any use, how all this which is to shape directly the internal, moral life of man, can *per se* or directly belong to a power which is essentially and exclusively directed to regulate and control the outward, social life of man. What essential or direct connection is there between that object and this power? Whence does the State derive the power to *compel* a man or child to receive their morality according to an official programme or method, were it only a minimum? This is true of natural morality; it holds even more in regard to supernatural or Christian education. Those who would give the State the right to teach Christian children at least the general principles of natural morality, ought to remember that for the Christian *in concreto* there is no such division between natural and supernatural morality. Although in him not every single act need be supernatural and meritorious, still his habits, his principles, his motives, in a word, the morality of his life, must be supernatural. It is difficult to imagine how a Christian, raised by baptism to a supernatural order, could lead for any length of time a mere natural moral life without being in the state of sin. In him natural virtue alone ceases in a sense to be virtue; mere natural morality, independent and separated from religion, becomes immoral. In fact, in the life of a Christian the practice of morality and religion are one. Then, what right, *direct* right, has here the Government?

But what of instruction, secular instruction? May not the State claim this at least as an object within its immediate jurisdiction? We distinguish: as an object for the free co-operation of the citizens, yes, assuredly, but within the limits of distributive justice as in all other things; as an object of compulsive legislation, no, pos-

itively no! What right has society to force me to learn reading, if I do not want to? or writing, if I can get along without it? or numbering, if I will know enough of it by the practical schooling of hard life? or geography, if I can make my way through life without the maps? But you are an adult. What of it? The State compels the child to learn not as it, the child, wanted that knowledge, but because the future adult citizen needs it for the good of society. If the State may compel the child to learn on the ground of public utility or necessity, why not also compel the adult who has neglected social duty? And if Government cannot lawfully compel either adult or child to learn, why should it force the parent to teach? The State may threaten me: if you know not how to read or write or number, you shall not have all the privileges granted to other citizens. All right, that is my own concern. When the State gives me the means and opportunities to learn all these things, if so I will, it has done its duty, its right goes no farther.

But the child, we are told, has a strict right to get from his parents such elementary knowledge as will fit him for life.

We shall not dispute the strict right. Grant it and the corresponding duty of the parent, does this give the State a right of stepping in and forcing the parent to fulfil that duty? The child has a stronger right to be taught true morality; can the State force the parent to do that? The child has the very strongest right to be taught true religion; can the State force the parent to do this? In a word, are all these rights of the child objects of either commutative or legal or distributive *justice* to which in the parent corresponds what philosophers call *officia juridica*? If not, by what right does the Government interfere while its compulsory power is absolutely confined to safe-guarding and upholding the public *juridical order*? The State cannot, therefore, in this matter play the role of the public guardian of the rights of the child. It cannot force the parent to exercise the *officium pietatis*, which does not lie within the direct or immediate sphere of political government.

But the State has an indefeasible right to protect itself; an ignorant multitude becomes either a public nuisance and burden, or a great social danger. Hence the right of their future fellow-citizens demands as a matter of necessity, that all children should acquire such an amount of secular knowledge as will make them useful citizens. The theme, no doubt, is quite tempting for a lively imagination to paint in dark or flaming colors an army of idle and hungry beggars living on the fat of their industrious neighbors, or the hordes of

bloody anarchists and lawless mobs. We have ourselves heard stirring appeals for compulsory schools to teach the children of the poor, ignorant, unlettered foreigners coming to our shores. Compulsory education was held out as the only way to save the country from a terrible social catastrophe, etc. Such declamations leave us very cold, and when uttered by Catholics make us simply impatient. They are exaggerations based on false suppositions like these :

A.—That a man cannot be honest and industrious without having passed through a primary school ; that it is secular instruction, the knowledge of letters and figures and geography, that makes the good citizen, and not religion, or the love of God and one's neighbor ; that the real agents and prime movers in social disturbance are the simple unlearned people, and not wicked men with a certain amount of knowledge but without religion. Declamations like the above suppose moreover that without the three R's, a man cannot receive a sufficient amount of religious instruction to make him a good and faithful servant of God. What then becomes of some of the most glorious days of Catholicity, when millions were unable to read and write ? What becomes of our own times when statisticians tell us in cold figures that the more our so-called intellectual culture advances the more systematic vice and suicide increase ? Such harlequins ought to remember the history of Greece and Rome, of Alexandria and Cæsarea, intellectual centres of ancient times. Their heathen culture did not save these nations from ignominious ruin, while European civilization began its triumphant march under the guiding and protecting arm of Christianity.

B.—Another assumption implied in the above objection is this : Although society may offer to the people all the needed opportunities, public and private, to get an elementary education, there will yet be so many parents neglecting those means, that their children must become a danger or burden to the State. This is absolutely false. The natural love of parents will impel them to provide as best they can for the future of their child, and if the condition of society demands a general education and the Government offers the necessary facilities, there will be few parents who will not send their children to school. History proves it. If there have been in France and England up to within recent times, millions of children who received no instruction at all, it was not the fault of their parents ; was the fault of the Government which spent the public money in wars or in raising and supporting an immense army or for any other purpose, except schools. As soon as the Government gave the

required facilities, parents began to send their children to school with out compulsion. Proofs are easily found in Cardinal Manning's valuable little book on "National Education."

C.—In regard to the poor emigrants coming to our country it is an equally false assumption to think that the public opinion, the popular movement, the character of the business civil or public, the mode of life, and with all this the great and almost universal facilities to get instruction, are not strong enough to force "the foreigner"—if yet he have some love for his child—to send it to school, without being compelled by the police. Witness the thousands of our Parochial Schools, built by the Irish, German, French and even the poor Italian immigrants, notwithstanding the heavy burden of a double, unjust taxation. There may be, for all we know, a few nationalities with us who are as yet rather slow in getting Catholic Schools for their children. This is another question. Where Catholic schools are wanting, it is mostly because of the lack of money and means which under a general school tax the Government is in justice bound to furnish. But we have yet to learn that human nature is another in the foreigner than in the native, red or white. Believing that human nature is not totally depraved and in particular that parental love for the offspring is still the normal rule in the family, we do not see how in any civilized country a general State compulsion can be necessary except under very abnormal social conditions.

Allied to the foregoing, but equally ambiguous, is an argument like the following: Our democratic form of Government demands well instructed citizens, if the American people shall continue to live in peace and happiness. We need intelligent voters. Certainly, and we are the very last to deny the assertion. Therefore, they continue, the Government must compel parents to send their children to school; it must see to it that all its future citizens shall get the *minimum* of secular knowledge required to exercise their political rights in a proper and intelligent manner. To be candid, in the light of the confusion and machinery of our elections and the manipulations of our returning boards, the foregoing looks rather satirical. Taking it in sober earnest, we answer: That all and every voting citizen must be intelligent and well instructed in secular knowledge is claimed either on the ground of mere utility or of necessity. If the first, we don't admit Utilitarianism. The second supposes an abnormal state of society, and we do not admit that such a condition exists now or will in the near future exist in our beloved land. We are convinced that in our present social condi-

tion, with our present facilities of popular education backed by public opinion, we shall have intelligent citizens enough to last for another glorious century—without Government or State compulsion. Besides, to look at the principle, if the Government needs intelligent voters, the logical conclusion is that it may deprive of their political rights all those who have not got the necessary qualifications. But it cannot, in a normal condition, compel them against their will to acquire the requisite secular and political knowledge. Otherwise you must also grant the State the power of compelling every citizen to vote and take part in the political life. Now, we think, no sound writer on politics has as yet vindicated for the State the right of compulsion in regard to the exercise of political rights, although they all give it the power to establish and fix the conditions under which citizens may exercise those rights, if they choose to do so.

It is hardly worth while to clear up the following argument for State compulsion, namely, that it is necessary to produce and foster a spirit of political unity and harmony, a true love for the country and uniform loyalty to its laws. The argument is an insult to all who deny State compulsion. Besides, it would logically lead to absolute compulsion which allows no other than State schools—State education for all. It is socialism and tyranny.

The plea most commonly put forth (so much so that Cardinal Zigliara says of it : *quam ad nauseam usque adversarii recantant*,) in favor of compulsory education is to this effect : general education is most useful, nay truly necessary in the present condition of society ; but all that promotes the public welfare is within the direct power of the State.

The plea is simple enough, but full of ambiguity. What kind of *general* education is necessary ? An absolutely universal education, so that no child or family shall be without an elementary instruction ? This is nonsense. States have been very prosperous and flourishing even when a large percentage of their people had received no schooling at all. It may be granted that under present conditions it is absolutely necessary that the large majority of the people should receive at least primary instruction. But this can and will be attained without compulsion, if the State sufficiently supports private enterprise and activity. Universal education of all classes would be very useful—N. B., *ceteris paribus*—and most desirable. But mere utility does not justify compulsion. Few political writers, except socialists, to whom the State is omnipotent and sole owner of origi-

nal rights, would allow the doctrine that the Government has the right and power to *compel* its citizens to whatever promotes the common welfare. This would simply bring us forward to the social conditions of Bellamy's "Looking Backward." It is an illogical process, and most disastrous in its assumed principle, to infer that because a general secular education is useful to society, the State may impose it on the people by a law of compulsory education. The greatest political writer of Ancient Greece, Aristotle, has established long ago the important principle of political science: *Non omnia quæ necessaria sunt civitati, partes sunt civitatis*. We most willingly admit, however, that the State has the right and authority to offer to the *voluntary* co-operation of the citizens all and everything that really and truly promotes the "common good," for such is her natural mission. But here is the great difficulty: What is the "common good?" It certainly is not the private good of each and every individual; and the State is not to work for the private interests of any one, be it individual or association. It must labor for the good of the whole society as such; for the public welfare and public interests. Now, to what extent and in what manner must that "common good" affect the different classes of the population, in order to be truly common, social, and not merely the boon of a party or section? Again, it must be remembered, that the real and true welfare of society does not consist in material welfare or opulency, in abundance of money or other temporal possessions, nor in a highly developed intellectual culture and refined taste. These may be ingredients of social prosperity and happiness, but they are not essential. True happiness of social and political life must embrace the same constituent elements as the happiness of the individual: it is in the connatural development of man's nature, physical, intellectual and moral. Still this evolution must be harmonious. When a people increases its national wealth, when it progresses in mental culture, it must advance in due proportion in public morality. Temporal prosperity and intellectual greatness, without morality and religion, are not true and real civilization. All Christian writers maintain that these virtues, morality and religion, are the very foundations upon which the edifice of national prosperity and happiness must rest.¹ In regard to public life, justice is the virtue most directly concerned. Hence, "*justitia fundamentum regnorum*." Whatever is against justice in its different forms, whatever unjustly, *i. e.* unnecessarily limits the natural

1 Leo XIII, in his Encyclicals on the Social Questions of the day, *passim*.

rights and liberties of the citizens, whatever goes outside the legitimate end and purpose of society, does not and never can promote the common good. If by it some temporal advantage ensue, if the external condition of things seems to be improved, it is *per accidens* and only for a time; it cannot last. All such proceedings on the part of the Government must sooner or later be disastrous to society, because destructive of the very foundations on which organized society rests. Utilitarianism is a false theory, whether applied to morality or politics.

Another difficulty in our question would be this: Who is going to determine the amount of elementary instruction imposed by law? Shall that minimum be determined by public opinion, as we have been told? "Public opinion," in the modern sense, is not only an unsafe but a very dangerous master. Woe to the Government that would follow no other guide than public opinion. "Quod autem iniquum ex arbitrio illam (the public authority) pendere multitudinis, primum opinione falluntur, deinde nimium levi ac flexibili fundamento statuunt principatum. His enim opinionibus quasi stimulis incitatae populares cupiditates sese efferunt insolentius magna que cum pernicie rei publicæ ad cæcus motus, ad opertas seditiones proclivi cursu et facile delabuntur." (Leo XIII, Encycl. "Diuturnum.") The criterion of useful laws is not public opinion, but truth and justice. "In genere rerum politico et civili, leges spectant commune bonum, neque voluntate judicioque fallaci multitudinis, sed veritate justitiæque diriguntur." (Idem, Encycl. "Immortale Dei.") We fully admit the value of public opinion, not in the modern sense, but in that of the sober old Canonists, when it represents the "*pars major ac sanior* populi." Is any legislative majority going to fix that minimum? Suppose our different State Legislatures were to do it, by what common standard measure would this assembly of many minds and thoughts determine what is absolutely necessary for all children to learn? What are the "educational scales" to show the line where necessity stops and where the right to compel ceases? The difficulty seems to lie not only in the mere exercise, but in the principle itself.

We have seen it stated somewhere that "what the Church may do within the spiritual sphere and in view of the spiritual welfare that the State may do within the temporal sphere and in view of the temporal good." This may be true enough in a sense, but cannot take the place of a general principle. Nor can it be logically argued from it that whereas the Church has the right to compel every mem-

ber of hers to know a minimum of religious knowledge the State may compel its citizens to acquire a minimum of secular instruction. The authority of the Church in the spiritual sphere is much greater in intensity and in extent than the authority of the State in the temporal sphere. This brings into light an essential difference in the nature of either society—a difference which ultimately originates from their respective ends and objects. The end of the Church is the spiritual welfare of every single individual member as well as that of the whole ecclesiastical body; the end of the State is the temporal welfare of the whole society *qua talis*. One looks at both, the individual and the public good; the other at the common good only. Hence the authority of the Church reaches just as directly and immediately the activity and the good of the individual as that of the whole body. She has, therefore, a *forum internum* and *externum*; while the State procures the welfare of the individual, not directly, but only through the common, the social good, it influences the individual activity only through society, and consequently has only a *forum externum*. The immediate object of civil authority promoting the social welfare common to society as an external, visible body or union of individuals can consist only in enforcing external peace and order and in wisely directing its subjects in the proper use and enjoyment of things external and visible. Things that directly concern the intellect and will of man belong essentially to the individual as such and cannot be common in any sense except inasmuch as the external and juridical relations of the members of society are affected by them. Hence the State has a direct and immediate authority and control over temporal and corporal things, while in regard to things of an intellectual and moral nature it can only exercise an indirect, mediate right whenever the needs of society demand it.

The same ideas may be expressed in another form. The Church has direct immediate authority *individually* over each of its members, while the State has such a right only *socially* (*media societate*) over its subjects. Hence no conclusive argument can be drawn *a pari* from the authority of the Church to that of the State. They both do not only move in different spheres, but their respective rights and powers bear a different application even within their sphere.

Here a remark may, perhaps, help to dispel some confusion arising from the use of these terms, *direct* and *indirect* right. Is it not the *usus loquendi*, the common way of speaking, that in simple,

ordinary writing or conversation, when affirming or denying a right, we only mean the direct right ; but do not thereby necessarily deny the indirect right? Thus to the question has a man the right to kill another, everybody answers without hesitation: No. And yet moral theology maintains that I have the right to kill an unjust aggressor, if it is necessary in self-defence. It is an indirect right. To the question, has man a right to seize and use the property of his neighbor, the quick reply follows: No. And yet man may take his neighbor's loaf to avoid starvation. It is an indirect right. If a writer, then, simply denies to the State the right of compulsory education, he does not thereby deny the indirect right where public necessity calls for it. In the same way, by denying to the State the right of teaching morality and religion, one does not necessarily deny the indirect right of the State in the manner and to the extent that the public welfare demands. The same usage of speech among Catholic writers may be observed in a parallel case, viz: in the question whether the Church has a right or power over temporal, civil and political affairs. In common parlance we answer: No; without entering upon the fine distinctions that theological writers have drawn out on this subject. Yet, there is no Catholic writer who does not claim for the Church the indirect right to concern herself positively not only with ordinary temporal matters but even with the politics of a country, if her end and mission render it necessary.

The practical importance of this distinction between direct and indirect right is very great, as appears from the case just mentioned, the right of the Church in regard to politics. Suppose it were simply affirmed that man has a right to kill or rob his neighbor; that the State has a right to teach (by authority, as the phrase necessarily implies,) morality and religion; that the Church may enter into politics, everybody would understand the direct and immediate right, and consequently immediate control, direction and administration of the matter implied. The same difference in regard to practical consequences applies fully in the matter of compulsory education, according to whether we call it a direct or indirect right. It is a *question of principle*, and it is unnecessary to tell Americans of what paramount importance all questions of principle are, when they concern the respective rights of citizens and Government. This is true even, though, for the time being and under present circumstances it would practically make little difference in which way the question be answered. Solid prosperity and the lasting good of a nation can be secured and guarded only by carry-

ing out in its life the true principles of politics and public economy. The contrary will infallibly, in the course of time, work the ruin of the nation.

Last January the *Baltimore Sun* published a correspondence pretending to come from Berlin, which was evidently calculated to impress the reader with the conviction that in Europe the Catholic Church fully and unhesitatingly acknowledges on the part of the State the direct right of compulsory education. What we consider to be the true interpretation of the facts adduced by that writer may be briefly stated in the following remarks: ¹

1. There is nowhere any direct, clear and explicit utterance of the Church, the hierarchy or her theologians acknowledging such a right of the State. All the words that came from this source can, we believe, quite sufficiently and fully be explained of the direct influence by which the State ought to promote general education by fostering and guiding the public sentiment and opinion in this matter, and by offering to the voluntary co-operation of its subjects all the facilities and opportunities demanded by the people. Where the State fulfils its whole duty in this manner compulsion will be unnecessary and consequently unlawful. It must also be remembered that utterances of a few individual Catholics, no matter how loyal to the Church, do not of themselves voice the sentiment of the ecclesiastical body.

2. In submitting to State compulsion in the matter of public education the Church and religious orders simply gave way to dire force and necessity. In many or most cases it would also have been useless and often perhaps inopportune to protest against that usurpation on the part of the State. Cardinal Manning, l. c., in his article: "Is the Education Act of 1886 a just Law," having enumerated the principles of the Act, remarks: "Now these principles have been so long admitted and have worked themselves so deeply into public opinion and daily practice that no scheme or proposition at variance with them would be listened to. The condition thus made for us (he speaks of the Catholics of England) being irreversible, our duty is to work upon it and to work onward from it for the future." These last words are the key to the policy of the Church in Europe.

I cannot a competent writer, fully acquainted with the history and actual state of public education in Germany, France, Belgium and England give us a fuller view of the position taken by the Catholic Church in those countries? It would be a most valuable contribution in the present question.

She had to take the actual conditions, make the best of them, as we would say, and hope better things from the future. Still, even while the Church did silently tolerate the unjust claims of the State in order to avoid greater evil, she never tired of demanding loudly and persistently free admission and influence over primary schools to make them truly Christian.

3. From the action of the Church, therefore, nothing can be inferred as to her doctrine concerning the question of principle. She silently admitted what she could not prevent or change. Under such circumstances the axiom, *qui tacet, consentire videtur*, is inapplicable.

4. When in former times bishops, synods and councils did call upon civil authority to compel parents to send their children to school, it is to be observed, *a*, that such schools were Catholic; *b*, that the government was Christian; *c*, that the purpose, moreover, was not secular instruction, but Christian education; *d*, that this was the surest and most efficacious way to make Christian education universal for all children. Hence, as the intention was *propter religionem*, the Church had a right to invoke the secular arm in her support, and civil authority was bound to answer the call. But where is there in all this any acknowledgment of a direct right of State compulsion to promote secular knowledge?

Here we close our paper confined to the subject of compulsory education as considered in itself, independent of the teaching of other writers on the matter. What we have thus far said may show, at least, that the right of compulsion claimed for the State is not so absolutely certain as to render its opponents deserving of a pitiful smile on account of their simplicity and ignorance. *Pauvres imbéciles!* If many things may be said in favor of such compulsion, there are just as many and stronger objections that can be raised against it.

In regard to authorities or Catholic writers put forth as champions of compulsory education, we believe a critical analysis would show them to speak, with few exceptions, of the right to *promote* general instruction by public means and with public moneys, but only of an indirect and accidental right of *compelling* in certain cases, which is not the same as general compulsion. The task showing this fully we must leave to others. The celebrated philosopher, Card. Zigliara,

may serve as an example. In his treatise on this question (*Summa Philosophica*, vol. iii, p. 11, l. 2, c. 1, a. 5), he is very positive in asserting the primary and inadmissible right of the parents. Having argued against absolute State compulsion or exclusive State education, he puts the objection (3d): "The State has, at least, the right to see that parents instruct their children. Therefore, as regards instruction, the State has certain rights which it alone may define." The next inference would naturally be: the State may judge it proper to compel parents to have their children taught, and the law must be obeyed. What is the Cardinal's answer? It is very guarded, and, to our mind, quite significant. He says: "*Nihil detrudere volo juribus Status civilis; at jura ipsius non sunt jura divina, sed jura limitata, quibus alia jura præ-existunt non minus sacra, imo magis sacra quam jura Status et quæ non destruere sed tutari Status tenentur. Jura autem Status tantum se extendunt, quantum se extendit aperta necessitas boni communis societatis.*" This certainly does not look much like compulsory education. In the same place Zigliara answers to the common objection (l. c.) that education bears directly on the common welfare, *quia ab educatione puerorum maxime pendet prosperitas societatis politicæ*. But social authority may regulate the external relations of the family with the body politic. *Ergo socialis auctoritas potest disponere de instructione*. Listen to the Cardinal's answer: *Imprimis si hæc ratio valeret, nimis probaret*. For there is no civil external act which does not bear some external relation to civil society, and thus, under the pretext of the common good, civil authority could regulate every single external act of man. *Hoc est, non homines, sed pecudes essent homines in societate viventes*. But grant the major premise; *ex hoc quid sequitur?* only this (*illud solummodo*): that civil society has the right and duty to furnish parents with the best means (*media aptiora*) to educate their children; that it has the right and duty to watch (*invigilare*) in order that neither parent nor teacher nor school may pervert the mind of the children instead of instilling into them knowledge, good morals and religion; *TUTANDO HOC MODO CONTRA ABUSUS jurium parentum vitam moralem filiorum, sicut contra eosdem abusus potest et debet tutari vitam eorum corporalem. En limites societatis civilis quos non nisi contra sacra jura paterna excedere fas est.*¹ This certainly is not compulsory education. The passage which we have put

¹ See also in the same place the interesting question concerning the State's right of conferring academic degrees.

in capitals gives the key to the meaning of the Cardinal if the rest should leave any doubt. That right to watch (*vigilandi*) over the schools is not a direct right, implying full control of schools, examination of teachers, official programmes, etc., but only an indirect right to prevent abuses that would endanger society in the growing-up generation. It is the same right by which the State can hinder parents from sending their children to labor beyond the strength of their age, say in the mines. It is the same right defined by our glorious Pope Leo XIII. in his Encyclical on the Condition of Labor (*Non civem*), where he says: "*Quamobrem. . . . si periculum in officinis integritati morum ingruat a sexu promiscuo, aliisve perniciosis invitamentis peccandi: aut opificum ordinem herilis ordo iniquis premat oneribus, vel alienis a persona ac dignitate humana conditionibus affligat: si valetudini noceatur opere immodico, nec ad sexum aetatemve accomodato, his in causis plane adhibenda, certos intra fines, vis et auctoritas legum. Quos fines [mark the following well, for it contains a fundamental principle of legislation] eadem, quae legum postulat opem, causa determinat: videlicet non plura suscipienda legibus, nec ultra progrediendum, quam incommodorum sanatio vel periculi depulsio requirat.*" No compulsion without necessity and even then only as far as the evil goes.

In regard to texts borrowed from the Scholastics, we should reply what a modern Catholic writer said of them concerning some passages upon the origin and nature of civil authority, viz. : If those men had to write about these subjects in our days and under our conditions, they would express themselves with less freedom and with greater care. Compulsory education was no bugbear to them, for two reasons: first, the State as well as the schools were then Catholic; secondly, there was at that time no such thing as our modern compulsory education. The history of compulsory education, ancient and modern, would show that, as at present carried out, it is both a pagan revival and a modern invention.

S. G. MESSMER.

STATE CONTROL AND RELATIVE RIGHTS IN THE SCHOOL.

THE certainty that the State has rights and duties regarding child education is shadowed by the difficulty, and, in one or another direction, uncertainty, of limiting and defining them. With a view rather to seek, than fixedly to determine what a State may or must do towards developing the mental and moral faculties of the children within its jurisdiction, a number of queries are set down in this paper to which answers are suggested. They concern mainly State rights, since less question at present attends duty. Hence only one query shall here be noted in the line of the *ought*. Some advantage of methods may come of throwing our points in the following scheme.

Rights¹ of the State regarding :

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|---|---|
| { | Teachers ; |
| | { 1.—Has the State the sole right to select and appoint them?
2.—Has the State a right to examine them? |
| { | Doctrine ; |
| | { 3.—Has the State a right to prescribe what shall be taught in Schools?
4.—Has the State a duty to limit the same? |
| { | Pupils ; |
| | { 5.—Has the State a right to compel parents to send their children to a State School?
6.—Has the State a right to compel parents to send their children to any School? ² |

A—PRINCIPLES.

Principles which lead to a solution of these problems run as follows :

I.—The natural duty and right of *educating* their children lies *primarily* in parents. The *supernatural* duty and right of *educating*

¹ No attempt is here made at an adequate summary of State rights in the matter of education. The queries are meant to touch only some salient points.

² Cfr. Van der Aa *Ethica*, p. 225.

belongs *primarily* and *supremely* to the Church.¹ Since the natural must be subordinate to the supernatural, parents *in educating* their children are *organs*, animated in sacramental marriage, of the *Church* in her mission, duty, right of educating.

II.—The State as such has no duty nor right to *educate*. Her two-fold end of protecting the juridic order and of supplying necessary external public aids to her members founds no such right.

III.—*Instruction* being an essential *part* and *auxiliary* of *education* cannot, at least in the case of the child, be severed from education. The agents, therefore, who are naturally or supernaturally endowed with duty and right to *educate*, have the corresponding duty and right to *instruct* children. Parents, consequently, and Church alone have duty and right to instruct children. They may exercise their right in this respect either *per se* or may delegate it to other persons. The State as such has no *intrinsic* duty or right to *instruct* its subjects *explicitly*. It does it, of course, *implicitly* in all its authoritative enactments.

IV.—The School is an institution both for *instructing* and therefore for *educating* children. It is *essentially* a *substitute*, in this dual function, of the *family*, and an *annex* to the *Church*. The State has therefore no *direct* authority over the School.

V.—The State has an *indirect* right in regard to the School and its functions. It may and should erect schools, equip them for their work. It may appoint teachers, prescribe programs and methods, &c. But these rights it must exercise in just subordination to the *prior* and *higher* rights of family and Church. Further development of these principles will appear in their application to the queries placed above.

¹ Quod jus Ecclesiae circa scholas attinet distinguendum est. 1.—*Jus divinum* ecclesiae doceendi omnes gentes, ex quo consequitur jus ejus instruendi pueros in religione catholica et vigilandi pro educatione puerorum baptizatorum (quamvis hoc jure relate ad liberos baptizatos Protestantium ad majora malo vitanda uti non soleat); inde sequitur jus ecclesiae vigilandi super scholas, quantum necesse est, ut pignus securum habeat, educationem Catholicam in illis promoveri, quare prohibere potest e. g. ne libri mali adhibeantur, ut magistri doceant, qui sunt impii, haeretici &c.; 2. *jus humanum*, quod ecclesia praeterea habere potest circa scholas ab ipsa fundatas vel e fundatoribus donatas, in quibus certe plenum jus habet omnem etiam profanam iustractionem dirigendi et omnia ordinandi, sicut quilibet negotium proprium ordinandi jus habet. Cf. Syllab. Pii IX, No 45-48. Costa-Rosetti, Phil. Mor. p. 746.

B.—QUERIES.

1. The State has a right to select and appoint teachers for its own schools, but no such right over teachers of schools established by private persons, families or church. The teacher as such represents no State authority. He stands in *loco parentis vel ecclesiae*. The State has no *monopoly of teaching*, is not the one supreme schoolmaster. Socialists seek to vindicate for the State these prerogatives on various grounds. They claim that teaching is a public function, and therefore belonging to the State; that State control over all schools is the only assurance of progress in science and advanced methods of instruction, the only way to universalize enlightenment so that it may reach all classes and conditions of society, &c. These reasons are abundantly refuted not only by Catholic ethicists but by other advocates of individual liberty against State interference. The forcible arguments of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer are too well known to need citation here.

2.—Has the State a right to examine *all* school teachers? The State has a right to assure itself of competency on the part of the teachers to instruct and educate their pupils in such wise and degree as necessary to the right exercise of citizenship. If this assurance is obtainable without examination, as *per se* it is, the right of the State to examine is precluded.

3.—Has the State a right to prescribe what shall be taught in schools? The indirect right which the State enjoys over the school involves the right of determining courses and methods in the Schools it may establish. Nay more its duty of providing for the general public prosperity includes the *duty* of providing schools equipped with all that is requisite for solid instruction in the branches that are necessary or highly useful for the general public good. It hardly need be repeated that, in the exercise of the right which answers to this duty, the prior rights of family and Church must be held sacred.

4.—The State has the duty and consequent right of prohibiting doctrine that is *evidently* contrary to moral, religious, social order. *Quum auctoritatis civilis infallibilis non est, eos solos errores prohibere potest, qui vel evidenter omnibus ex ipsa ratione apparent esse falsa doctrina ac proinde nociva intellectibus, vel ex effectibus practicis clara experientia deprehendantur exitiales esse.*¹

5.—The State has no right to compel parents to send their children to its schools. Parents are bound by no law natural or supernatural to use the aid of a State School in instructing or educating their offspring. Therefore, the State can not oblige them to make use of such means. The widest reach of permissible State interference on this head is thus given by Fr. Cathrein : *When it is proved in a concrete case that parents utterly neglect their children, so that the latter are liable to become a burden and a danger to the community, the civil power can force such parents to fulfill their duty, and therefore, also to send such children to school, or the civil power itself can provide for their education, with just recognition however, of the higher right of the Church.*¹

6.—Has the State a right to force parents to send their children to any school, leaving them the *right of selecting* the school? This is a point on which we find varying theory among jurists. "It is commonly admitted," says Fr. Cathrein, "that since it is, on the whole, impossible for one to fulfill properly his social duties without some elementary knowledge, the State may exact from all its children, by law, the acquiring of such knowledge. Moreover, the Church, in order to exercise her function of religious education, may, in certain circumstances, oblige parents to send their children to school. In such a case the civil power may, in agreement with the Church, hold children to school attendance."²

Distinction must be carefully held between *compulsory education* or *information*, and *compulsory attendance* at school. Parents may be obliged, by law, to provide their children with the amount of instruction necessary for the latter to perform their social duties. How such instruction shall be obtained is, *per se*, left to the judgment of parents. "At most the State may reserve for itself to examine children at a determined age with a view to assure itself of the observance of its law. For such parents, therefore, who are not in a condition to instruct their children themselves, or to secure for them a private teacher, there follows an *indirect compulsion* to send their children to some school, for thus only can they satisfy the requirements of the law. Whoso holds that a certain amount of informa-

¹ Moral Philosophie, Vol. II, p. 498. In other words the State has a right in *special cases* and *per accidens* to force parents to send their children to an elementary School, *salvis juribus ecclesiae*. Vid Costa-Rosetti, p. 744.

² It goes without saying that the State can make school attendance a necessary condition for obtaining of certain social advantages, such as public positions.—Cathrein, p. 498.

tion is *necessary* for every citizen in order to get along in society and to fulfill his social duties, may logically maintain the justification of compulsory instruction. The minimum of generally necessary knowledge marks the highest limit of such compulsion. However desirable other attainments may be, this simple utility gives the State no right to extend force into the domain of parental rights.’¹

As to the matter of *compulsory attendance at school* the State’s right hereto is by no means well-founded. The natural right of parents to educate, and consequently to *instruct* their children cannot be invaded without a violation of *commutative justice*. The State therefore to impose on parents a determined mode of exercising their right must prove a claim to a stronger right to which the parental must by consequence yield. Now the State can show no such right. Let us see. The providing of schools belongs to the *secondary*—the *subsidiary* end of the State—to the supplying of means making for the general public welfare. Now the State can force no one to make use of such means unless non-use involves a violation of the juridic order, which it is the *primary* end of the State to keep intact; and consequently unless force is necessary to protect its own or its subjects’ rights.

Is compulsory school education necessary for the State to defend its own rights? What are these rights? They are summed up in the phrase—“*general public property*.” In conflict with this the natural rights of private citizens must at times be restricted. Does lack of elementary *schooling* conflict in such wise with the “general public property” that parents must yield their *prior right* to educate their children *in the way and with the means* they judge proper. Grave writers think that it does. The common public weal, they say, demands that the intercommunication of head and members in the State be easy, unobstructed, that therefore all subjects should have the requisite information for knowing and receiving official enactments which are ordinarily made through the press. This is certainly highly desirable, especially for the convenience of public functionaries. Still it does not clearly found a right of interfering with the higher parental right. *Grave necessity* not *official advantage*, alone can do this.

Social unity, moreover unity of minds and wills, of the members of society, is requisite, it is said, for the common weal. This unity demands that instruction and education which can be given to

children only in school. It may be granted that social unity can be attained only through the aid of schools in a State wherein all schools, their government, teachers, programmes, methods, agree as to the fundamental principles of morality and religion. Where in the present world shall we find such a State?

Moreover, the large advantage of such compactness of thought and deed as involves school education shows that all inducements should be held out to parents to send their children to school, but does not *per se* imply the State right of coercing them to do so.

It must not be lost sight of that the stress of compulsory schooling falls mainly on the poor. The well-to-do can employ private tutors in their families, and thus are regarded as co-operating sufficiently towards social unity. It is not quite clear why the State on the *grounds of protecting its own rights* may force the poor man to send his child to be instructed outside his own home.

Morality and religion it is urged are at the basis of public prosperity. Now ignorance is the mother of vice. Schoolless children fill our highways with vagrants, our prisons with criminals. Sufficient ethical instruction can be given only in the school-room.

No thinking man will deny or attempt to minimize the moral evils that so often darken the ways of the ignorant. Neither will any one, on the other hand, contend that vice is always the effect of ignorance. The *omnis peccans est ignorans* is often overstrained. Moreover, statistics show that where "culture" most abounds crime is not unfrequently most rampant.

"Some zealous advocates of reformatories, houses of refuge, houses of juvenile delinquents, etc., in their congresses, I am informed," says Dr. Brownson, "proposed to urge upon the civil authorities to take forcibly the unoffending children of poor and vicious parents, not likely to bring them up properly, even against the assent of their parents, and to place them in State institutions, where they will be instructed in the religion or no religion of the persons selected to manage them; but in all such cases they are likely, as experience proves, to grow up worse members of society than they would have done had they not been taken from their parents."

These institutions are never successful reformers—either of the young or the old, of individuals or of society, in morals or in politics. The intention of these reformers may be good, their sentiments benevolent, and their liberality large, but their institutions seem always to lack the blessing of God and their subjects, when they come out, are, as a rule, covetous and dishonest, infidels or fanatics, without

any true or fixed principles. Then it is a great mistake to suppose that the class from which these are taken, is the most dangerous class in our cities. Drunkenness is a vice and a sin, but it is not confined to the lower class, nor is it more hurtful to the soul, or *distructive to society* than pride and covetousness. There is not less virtue in the so-called lower classes than in the so-called upper classes ; and the children of those we call the poor and vicious are not worse brought up than the children of the rich and fashionable. The really alarming feature of our society is the constant growth of corruption and wickedness, of vice and crime, in high places. The extravagance of shoddy and petroleum, the frauds of bank presidents, cashiers and tellers, of railroad directors and managers, the failure of banks, especially of saving banks, to say nothing of the corruptions in Congress, State Legislatures and Municipal Governments, are a thousand times more *threatening to the State, to society*, than intemperance, theiving, robbery and murder, so appalling among what are called "the dangerous classes" of our cities and towns.

If we make the State supreme in morals and education nothing is to be said against taking away the children whose parents, whether rich or poor, educated or uneducated, fashionable or unfashionable, seem to the police to be incompetent to bring up their children in virtuous habits, and sending them to a protectory or a house of refuge ; but if we accept the rule given by Catholic tradition we can send none without the consent of their parents, who have not committed some offence punishable by law, nor even then send them without the same consent, to institutions in which ample provision is not made for their being trained in the religion of their parents."¹

The general prosperity of society, we are told, largely depends on the progress of the mechanical arts, which, in these days, demand some, at least elementary, schooling on the part of artisans.

It may be answered that parents who find it their interest to devote their children to trades, etc., necessitating book learning, will freely supply the condition or have it supplied in the proper school.

If now we turn to the rights of children we do not find here *per se* a title to the State right of coercion. Within the family *in se* children have a right rather to education in harmony with the will of

¹ No one will say that Dr. Brownson was not intimately acquainted with the genius of the American people and their institutions. His great work on the Republic, which receives the highest approval even of those who are alien to his faith and philosophy, bears ample testimony to his truly American feeling. The principles laid down in our citation and throughout the article whence it has been extracted (on "Whose is the Child?"), seem *mutatis mutandis* to make strongly against the right of the State to force school attendance. Brownson, Works, vol. 13, p. 403.

their parents than to schooling at variance with that will. Again, where is the proof that children have a *strict right* to be educated *à l'école?*

Looking at the family as a member of the body politic, it may be claimed that children have a right to share in the general civil and social advantages which it is the secondary end of the State to furnish for all, but from which they are excluded, and are therefore practically outside the range of the subsidies of civil society, unless they have received some school training.

The main supplementary purpose of the State is to furnish external goods, necessary, useful, for the true temporal happiness of its subjects. Now we needn't go back to the dark ages nor seek in illiterate communities to-day an experimental argument, to show that true temporal happiness even as conditioned by the external goods supplied by the State does not depend upon a certain amount of knowledge, especially such as must be gleaned in the schoolroom. It lies fairly evident in the nature of things that a man may have no small degree of culture, mental and moral, and quite a sufficiency of true happiness, without book-learning.

We have no ambition to pose as an apologist of illiteracy, nor to defend parents who neglect sending their children to school, but whether we look at the rights of the State to its own well-being or to the rights of children, as subject to State protection, we do not see a just title for *forcing* school attendance.

IS IT OPPORTUNE?

IN connection with the discussion occasioned by Dr. Bouquillon's pamphlet "Education, to whom does it belong?", compulsory education as one of the phases of the controversy has been attracting special attention. Whatever the merits of the question in the abstract may be, it seems clear that a plea, on the part of Catholics, in favor of compulsory education is, to say the least, inopportune, and as Dr. Bouquillon himself tells us "inopportune truth is truth accidentally injurious."

Waiving the accuracy of the unqualified proposition that "the State has a right to enforce education," we cannot agree with those who practically propose such a measure of forced education by the civil government, whether we consider the people on whom it would

be foisted, the character of the government under which we live, or the evil consequences to which it would inevitably lead under the circumstances inseparable from its application.

On what ground do the defenders of compulsory education urge such a right and its exercise upon the State? Because, say they, the State must see to it, that it has enlightened citizens capable of carrying on the government. Surely no careful student of American history, no shrewd observer of the tendency of our times or of the character of the American people will say that there is actually any danger that we may want citizens competent to discharge with intelligence and credit the highest offices of the State. But, it is urged, such a want may occur, and then the argument will hold good. It is just here we see the inopportuneness of the plea for compulsory education. That the State has this right is the point to be proved. Now, to urge upon the State the exercise of a right, which it is doubtful that it possesses, and because of an emergency that may arise and at a time, when, humanly speaking, the probability of such an emergency is reduced to a minimum, is to say the least inopportune and the axiom "inopportune truth is truth accidentally injurious" may here find its application.

Many, however, see in the employment of great numbers of our young children in shops and factories, at an age when they should be in school, a tendency to lower the appreciation of education and a sign that the emergency, in which the State must exercise its right of compulsory education, is not so remote after all. But before this evil, which all must deplore, can become an argument for compulsory education, it must become evident that parents send their children to work at this early age because they are adverse to giving them an education. Surely this cannot be said. Are we not rather to seek the cause in the fact that poverty pinches or that parents are overeager to grasp the mighty dollar? Then, too, are there not laws about which there is no question or doubt as to whether the State has the right to enact them, and by which this abuse can be regulated? With just laws in the power of the State to correct an evil of this kind it is surely inopportune to attempt to settle upon the State the questionable right of compulsory education.

Americans have always emphasized and glory in the fact that in our free country the liberty of the individual is absolutely safeguarded in the exercise of his rights. This principle is laid down in our written charter and interwoven with the moral fabric of our legislation. The liberty of our citizens corresponds in just proportion

with their responsibility, and to this fact mainly do we owe our healthy and vigorous growth as a nation. To restrict individual liberty or to take from the citizen any part of his personal responsibility is contrary to the spirit of American institutions and injurious to the best interests of our national life. Now among the most sacred rights of the individual is the right of the parent to educate his child. By the right of compulsory education the State practically lays down the principle that without necessity it may hinder the parent from the exercise of his personal rights, and assumes to itself the responsibility, naturally intrusted to the parent, of discharging the duty which this right entails. It must not be forgotten that the parent has from nature the prior right to educate his child; for before the State existed this right and responsibility rested in the family. Instead of the exercise of rights prompted by the inborn love of the parent, who wishes for his offspring the best—even though this be relative—in the physical, intellectual and moral order, we have the State, simply on the avowed principle of utility, assuming parental rights and the discharge of parental duties. We say nothing of the fact that to enforce such a law the people must be taxed for the support of a corps of officers to examine into its observance; but the individual liberty is further lessened by the necessity of invading the sanctuary of the home on the mere supposition that the parent is not discharging his duties unless he proves the contrary to the minions of compulsory law. Is this in harmony with the Constitution, which guarantees us the free exercise of our rights? Are we to say to the State: Drive us! and we are willing to consent to pay the police in order that they may whip us into the spontaneous abandonment of rights which our Constitution says we are free to exercise.

And what are the actual conditions of a people among whom this plea of compulsion is being made. Is there any flagrant neglect of duty on the part of parents? Is the safety of the State threatened by such neglect? Not at all. This argument for compulsory education is made at a time when the people are for the most part exercising these rights and performing these duties to the best of their ability and with singular success. We are living in a country where the government of the people spontaneously agrees to enforce a stricter civil service law, and where are found in abundance men and women competent to undergo the necessary examinations as a guarantee that the offices of the State may be discharged with safety and ability. We find too that under the free exercise of the

rights guaranteed by the Constitution our people has of its own accord reared up institutions of learning which attest the intellectual advance and efforts of the nation. So numerous have these institutions supported by the people become that the question has been raised whether private schools are not useless or perhaps a national evil? We are of the mind of President Eliot of Harvard, who sees in such individual efforts a legitimate and useful exercise of private rights, more in accord with our Constitution than are our much vaunted public schools. Surely it will be allowed that, under such circumstances, the plea for compulsory education, foreign as it must seem to our political principles, is in every sense inopportune.

“Free attendance upon free schools seems to most befit a free people,” are golden words taken from Gov. Pattison’s recent veto to the bill for compulsory education in the State of Pennsylvania. It is quite to the point and we take the liberty of quoting from it. “This legislation is the first step taken by our Commonwealth in the direction of compulsory education. That feature of a common school system involves serious political, educational and social problems. They have not yet been definitely or satisfactorily solved by the experience of other States. In grappling with them therefore, it is needful that sure ground should be occupied in order that it may be successfully maintained. The State has provided with increasing liberality for the education of all the children of all its citizens. While it has furnished the opportunity to all, it has imposed the obligation of attendance upon none. Free attendance upon free schools seems to most befit a free people. I am well aware of the necessity claimed to exist for compelling certain classes of people to avail themselves of the opportunities offered them, but compulsory education is such an invasion upon existing systems in our Commonwealth, that if it is to be inaugurated it should be done under the most favorable circumstances. It will not avail to pass a law of uncertain character or so widely at variance with the popular sense of what is just that it shall be a dead letter on the statute books.” The plea for compulsory education is against “the popular sense of what is just,” it is against the spirit of American institutions and hence is inopportune. “Free attendance upon free schools seems to most befit a free people.”

Catholics in this country have had from the beginning certain convictions on the School questions, convictions growing out of the conditions of Church and State in this country, convictions confirmed

by the careful legislation of our Bishops assembled in the Plenary Councils, convictions sanctioned by the decrees of Sacred Congregations and the instructions of the Holy See, convictions indorsed by millions of Catholics who patiently endure an unfair taxation that they may exercise their God-given right to educate their children and to exercise it without hindrance as guaranteed by the Constitution, convictions in support of which thousands of zealous priests are dedicating their best efforts and their lives that they may build up, support and carry on conscientiously our system of parochial schools. Is it not inopportune to weaken and destroy such convictions? And weaken and destroy them the plea for compulsory education does. Compulsory education logically leads to compulsory State schools. For the State, with the right of enforcing a system of education, with the right of compelling the adoption of fixed programmes, may prescribe what private schools cannot accomplish. The right of judging of the competency of teachers would not in our country be always in safe hands. The officials may disapprove where they will. The State may enter the parochial school to take possession, and who will stop it? Remonstrate! The State will say I have the right to compel the acquisition of such and such an education, your standards, your methods, your teachers do not suit the majority. The ideal to be reached in all schools would have to be found in the State schools. How long then can we suppose the State would conduct a laborious and expensive inspection of private schools in order to be assured of their fitness to be convinced that its standard is reached! The same right which allows it to control private schools would suggest the simplifying of the whole system by compulsory State schools. Here are the programmes it prescribes, here the teachers it judges competent, here the methods it approves, here the schools you must attend, to wit, State schools! It may be urged that this would be an abuse of power. It can hardly be regarded as such, for where will you draw the line of rights if it belongs to the State to judge of the legitimate means which it deems necessary for the common temporal good? The State judges the State school a legitimate means and necessary for the common temporal good, and hence compulsory education ultimately and logically means compulsory State schools. What then is to become of our convictions, what of the legislation of our Councils and bishops, what of the labors of our priests and the enormous sacrifices of the Catholic people, if we sanction a plea that will inevitably lead to State schools. These schools must be,

as they actually are in the true sense of the word, godless, since the State has no mission to teach religion, and owing to the peculiar circumstances surrounding us in this country could not do so without violation of individual rights of conscience. Are then our convictions never to be realized? Are our parochial schools to be secularized? Is the religious training of our children, their true education in our Catholic schools to be exchanged for the irreligious instruction of the public schools? Certainly, any plea that asks this, violating directly or indirectly our most sacred convictions, is inopportune.

We need not dwell upon the fact that the plea for compulsory education is the first step in bringing about a condition of affairs which will lead in this country to a conflict between Church and State. In no country in the world does the Church enjoy the liberty of carrying on her divine mission, untrammelled by State interference, such as is granted her in this country, and the argument which leads to an abridgement of this liberty is surely in every sense inopportune.

Compulsory education is the first door opened to the State by which it may enter upon the general control of our domestic affairs; it is the first step towards the imposition of the intolerable yoke of paternalism so galling to intelligent Europeans; it is the beginning of that process of absorption by the State of all individual and corporate rights and powers, making for the complete centralization, and abject worship by its citizens of the State. The whole tendency of this movement is un-American and as Americans we oppose it. It is detrimental to our best Catholic interests and as Catholics we can never approve of it. Even if such right appeared to be established, we would both as Americans and as Catholics deprecate and discourage its exercise. What then must we conclude, seeing on the one hand the doubtful existence of the claimed right and on the other the dangers with which it is fraught hindering the exercise of our liberty as citizens and our freedom of conscience! Assuredly, there is no other way but to admit that the plea for compulsory education is wholly inopportune, and if ever "inopportune truth is truth accidentally injurious," it seems to be particularly so in this case.

CONFERENCES.

CORRECTION.

In a book notice which appeared in the March number of the REVIEW M. Des Houx was erroneously mentioned as a former editor of the *Moniteur de Rome*. We are indebted to Dr. O'Gorman, of the University, for directing the attention of the Catholic public to the mistake in a letter published in several newspapers.

The error was an accident which it would be useless to explain here, because it does not in the least change the nature of our statement to the effect that the *Moniteur* is an untrustworthy source of information regarding Vatican affairs; that it advocates, and makes no secret of professing, "Liberalism" in religion, and that, while avowedly Catholic, it is often hostile to the actual interests of the Holy See and out of accord with its open intentions. In short, it can in no sense be said to speak the mind of the Sovereign Pontiff. In Rome it enjoys no credit; but Catholics abroad are largely at the mercy of it on account of the "Associated Press" dispatches, which reach us through the same channel. The pages of the *Moniteur* for the last seven years will amply bear out these statements, even if we had not the assurance of such authorities as the *Civiltà Cattolica*, a periodical wholly indorsed by the Holy Father. We are restrained from personalities, which require a more serious indictment than the above-mentioned letter; but we repeat that Catholic journalists who copy from such papers, even though it be by "special request," are liable to risk their reputation for independence of judgment, if not for honesty and Catholic loyalty.

 THE CEREMONIES OF HOLY SATURDAY.

Qu. Is it permitted to have two celebrants for the ceremonies of Holy Saturday; one to bless the fire, the candle and the Easter-water, while the other is reciting the Prophecies and saying the Mass? It would save much time and be a great relief to the priests since the service is very long and fatiguing.

Resp. The rubrics regulating the service of Holy Saturday suppose that there is but one celebrant who performs all the func-

tions in successive order as indicated in the Missal. (Cf. Rubr. Miss. Sabb. S.)

In this connection we may mention that the question has been raised whether one priest could perform the Blessings and another celebrate the Mass, both succeeding each other in the prescribed order. De Herdt (*Praxis* iii, n. 57, ed. 8,) seems to favor the affirmative in cases of necessity or long established custom. In support of this opinion he cites a number of decisions given by the S. Congregation in favor of particular churches. But we doubt the validity of his inference because the same Congregation has in several instances plainly refused to sanction such usage, intimating that the ceremonies must be performed by one and the same celebrant. Hence the references given by De Herdt merely prove that in the estimation of the S. Congregation the functions of Holy Saturday are not necessarily inseparable and that in particular cases it would actually dispense with the rubric prescribing their performance by one priest.

A writer in the *Ephemerides Liturgicæ* (Feb., 1887,) takes up this view and strenuously defends it, showing that, although the ceremonies of the Blessings on Holy Saturday are "divisibiles et posse ab uno fieri Benedictionem Fontis, ab alio Missam cantari," it nevertheless requires a special dispensation in each case, since such is the tenor of the liturgical laws. "Ita Rubrica ita decreta, ita congruentes rationes, ad quorum exigentiam maxime peroptandum, ut omnes sese ecclesie accommodent." De Herdt cites one instance where the request to allow one priest to perform the Blessings and another to celebrate the Mass was refused by the S. Congregation, but there are a number of later decisions than the one he gives to the same effect, viz., "Usum contrarium decretis," showing that the burden of former decrees is opposed to the practice.

It should be added, however, that the Diocesan Bishop may perform the Blessings and delegate another priest to act as celebrant of the Mass, "est enim illi potestas delegandi, et quod in casu per alium facit, per seipsum facere videtur, cum delegatus Episcopi nomine celebret." (*Ephem. loc. cit.*)

CONDEMNED SOCIETIES.

A number of questions have been sent us from time to time regarding the attitude of the Church toward particular societies, such as the "Odd Fellows," "Knights of Pythias," etc. Although it is

well known that the number of "Secret Societies" under different names is very great, and that they are, for obvious reasons, forbidden by the Church, the Holy See has enjoined upon the clergy that they abstain from condemning such societies *by name* before the united voice of the Archbishops have sanctioned such condemnation. This restriction, the object of which was plainly to avoid odious discrimination and to assure some unity of action in a matter which might prove dangerous if left to the individual judgment, has been misinterpreted as if it allowed free scope to Catholics in joining societies not *nominally* condemned. The article of the Archbishop of Milwaukee, which appears in this number, will throw some light on the subject. It gives the result of the recent private deliberations of the united Archbishops at St. Louis. We subjoin the *Instructio* of the Most Rev. Dr. Katzer to the clergy of the Archdiocese (vide *Analecta*) as a practical illustration of the outcome of the St. Louis conference. The distinction of societies *nominally* excommunicated and societies either nominally or summarily *forbidden* is worthy of note in the practical dealing with the subject.

PURPOSE OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE SCHOOL QUESTION.

It may appear to some that the discussion on the School question is being drawn out with unnecessary length, and that hardly any definite result is likely to be gained from it, unless it be the free exchange of views. We must confess that we should not be satisfied with this result. When the subject had been started from an authoritative quarter we felt it our duty as Catholic publicist to defend the approved method in education against an innovation which seemed both inopportune and hazardous to Catholic interests. The REVIEW thus became an exponent of Catholic sentiment from various points of view. What is still wanting we hope to supply. The article by Bishop Messmer, in the present number, is truly a masterly exposition of the subject of compulsory education. He takes account of the attitude of his opponents with the most fair-minded and keenest power of discrimination, and there seems nothing wanting to the completeness of the theme. The other articles on the same subject have a merit of their own in viewing separate phases of the same subject, and treating it in an original manner which may appeal more distinctly to different minds.

As a further step, however, and a result of the preceding discussion, we propose to lay before our readers a *practical scheme*, setting forth in legal form such demands as Catholics might in equity make from our civil Legislature. This scheme will be drawn up by a representative jurist, with the co-operation of an experienced Catholic schoolman. It will then be published, together with notes and suggestions from leading lawyers and educators in this country, so as to form the basis of a uniform proposal to the State on the part of Catholics in case there be any question as to who is to undertake the education of their children. Such a platform would be most desirable under any circumstances, but it will be the part of the clergy to determine eventually how much or how little we should yield in the matter of individual rights.

Before we carry out the last part of our programme, as just detailed, we shall bring an exact summary of the existing conditions of State education in Europe, partly to point out the relative advantages and disadvantages of the State system ; partly to refute an erroneous statement made (under similar auspices as the pamphlet of Dr. Bouquillon) some time ago in our papers, as if the Catholic Church expressly indorsed certain systems of education in European States, which handicapped the parental right. Mgr. Dr. Schroeder, of the Catholic University, has collected the necessary data on the subject in a paper which will appear in our next number.

INCENSE AT HIGH MASS.

Qu. May incense be used in the ordinary *Missa cantata*?

Resp. No. There is a decision of the S. Congregation, dated March 18, 1874, as follows :

In missa quæ cum cantu sed sine ministris celebratur incensationes omnes omittendæ sunt.

(*Decr. authent. Mihlb. Suppl. III, Thurificatio.*)

ANALECTA.

SOCIETATES PROHIBITAE.

Instructio.

Per Secretarium Conventus Archiepiscoporum habiti in urbe Sti. Ludovici diebus 29. Nov. et sequ. A. D. 1891, certiores reddimur, Archipraesules protestari, se nunquam intendisse Decreta Conc. Balt. III. quoad Societates prohibitas ullo modo immutare hisque Decretis omnino adhaerendum esse.

Huic protestationi innixi transmittimus Reverentiae Tuae Instructionem, quae pars Schematis Synodi habenda est.

1. *Massonici et Carbonarii* nominatim et expresse excommunicati sunt.

2. Dubium moveri nequit, quin Socii Singulares (Odd Fellows) et Filii Temperantiae ad minimum nominatim et expresse prohibiti sint.

3. Licet non explicite et nominatim, implicite tamen excommunicatae sunt omnes sectae, quae sub quocumque nomine sive adversus Ecclesiam et Religionem Catholicam sive adversus legitima gubernia machinantur sive exigant a suis asseclis sive non exigant juramentum de secreto servando.

Concilium autem Provinciale Milwauchiae a S. Sede approbatum declaravit, hujus generis esse Communistas, Socialistas, Anarchistas et Tornatores, qui associati sunt foederi generali vulgo vocato "Turnerbund."

4. Implicite insuper excommunicatae sunt omnes societates, quae "presbyterum" seu capellanum proprio Marte sibi vindicant aliumve ministrum cultus, cum rituali proprio ac ceremoniis, non quomodolibet, nec sicuti aliquando apud nostrates fit quum preces quaedam in civium conventibus recitentur, sed eo modo quo ipsa societas, pravo sibi fine proposito, secta schismatica aut haeretica evadit.

5. Sub gravi peccati culpa vitatae et ob hanc causam vitandae sunt societates, quae asseclas suas sive juramento sive mera fide data ad secretum tam stricte servandum adstringunt, ut illud ne auctoritati quidem ecclesiasticae (i. e. Ordinario) legitime interroganti impune revelari possit.

6. Sub eadem gravi culpa prohibitae sunt societates, quae obligant socios ad illimitatam et caecam obedientiam.

7. Sunt praeter has et aliae societates, quas nec excommunicatas nec directe et sub gravi prohibitas esse constat, quae tamen dubiae et fidei moribusque periculis plenae sunt, a quibus propterea Episcopi et Rectores Fideles sibi commissos arcere et deterrere tenentur.

8. Sodalitates operariorum, qui nihil aliud sibi proponunt quam sodalium in propria arte exercenda, in sua conditione mediis licitis in juribus suis defendendis mutuo sese tueri et adjuvare, in se licitae sunt, sed plerumque periculosae sociis Catholicis, quia timendum, ne justitiae limites excedant, vel propius ad sectas damnatas accedant, vel propter nimis arctam cum hominibus erroneae vel nullius religionis familiaritatem indifferetismo et aliis falsis doctrinis sensim imbuantur.

Propterea Catholici ab hujusmodi societatibus in quantum fieri potest, dissuadendo retinendi sunt.

9. Generatim omnes societates cujuscunque nominis, quae ex sociis diversae vel nullius fidei constant et magis minusve institutiones, signa, usus et ceremonias Massonicorum imitantur societatibus saltem dubiis et periculosus adnumerandae sunt.

In praxi igitur :

1. Massonici et Carbonarii absolvi nequeunt nisi secta de facto relicta, casu semper excepto in quo moribundus nonnisi coram testibus vel etiam in extrema necessitate soli confessario promittere potest, se recessurum esse.

2. Socii Singulares et Filii Temperantiae absolvi nequeunt, donec effectu ipso a societate recedant vel saltem se continuo recessuros esse *serio* promittant.

3. Quando Sacerdos scientia *omnino* certa, extra confessionem obtenta cognovit, societatem quandam ob rationes supra allatas sive implicite excommunicatam sive sub gravi culpa prohibitam esse, hujusmodi foederis socium absolvere nequit, nisi impleta conditione sub num. 2. memorata.

4. Quando Sacerdos in confessione deprehendit, poenitentem esse assecclam societatis, de qua dubitatur utrum licita sit necne, religiose a poenitente inquirere debet, utrum ad unam ex classibus sectarum *implicite* excommunicatarum vel prohibitarum pertineat necne; si ex responsis detegit, eum pertinere ad talem, socium hujusmodi foederis absolvere nequit nisi impleta conditione sub num. 2. memorata.

5. Quando vero ex responsis cognovit, foedus esse sive per se sive socio confitenti magis minusve periculosum (quoad fidem et mores), poenitentem juxta principia Theologiae Mor. ceu in periculo propiore vel proximo versantem tractare debet.

6. Generatim fideles tam in confessionali quam extra ab omnibus dubiis societatibus pro viribus arcendi et deterrendi sunt.

7. Praecipue vero Rectoribus curandum est, ne Uniones Catholicae, si ab auctoritate ecclesiastica ut tales recognosci et ad ecclesiam cum insignibus suis admitti cupiunt, assecclas Societatum etiam dubiarum tantum sibi socios adjungant.

Quoad funera autem sociorum hujusmodi societatum haec statuimus.

1. Massonici, Carbonarii, Socii Singulares, Filii Temperantiae, nisi actu recesserint a secta, sepultura ecclesiastica privandi sunt, excepto casu, in quo moribundus promittere solum modo potuit coram testibus se recessurum esse.

2. Quum ceterae societates tanquam prohibitae nominatim declaratae non sint, earum socii, nisi aliud quid obstet, sepeliri possunt; prohibemus vero, quominus ipsorum consocii "in corpore" vel cum insignibus et "regalibus" funeri intersint vel incedant ullosque ritus vel ceremonias perficiant excepta forte Unione, quam vocant "Grand Army of the Republic," quia haec societas militaris magis et patria habetur, exclusis tamen ritibus et ceremoniis quae honores stricte militares non sunt.

Milwauchiae die 14, Febr., 1892.

† FRIDERICUS XAVERIUS.

Archiep. Milw.

BOOK REVIEW.

LA QUESTIONE SCOLASTICA NEGLI STATI UNITI.
 ESAME CRITICO DI UN RESPOSTA DEL REV.
 PROF. BOUQUILLON A' SUOI CENSORI. Estratto
 dalla *Civiltà Cattolica*. 5 Marzo 1892.

This is a rigorous examination of Dr. Bouquillon's "Rejoinder to Critics." It will be remembered that in his first pamphlet, which at once called forth an almost universal protest from representative Catholic Educators and Theologians in this country and elsewhere, Dr. Bouquillon referred to the *Civiltà Cattolica* as having taken a position on the school question which it could not support by sufficiently sound reasons. Fr. Brandi, S. J., one of the editors of the *Civiltà* and who had been active for years in America both as an Educator and also as a writer, promptly answered the imputation in a clever article for the *Civiltà*, published later on in pamphlet form. He showed that Dr. Bouquillon did not sufficiently attend to the distinction of the terms which he used, and that the learned authorities which he quoted could hardly be interpreted to mean what he read out of them in order to sustain his thesis. Dr. Bouquillon in turn repudiated the assertion that he did not correctly interpret the eminent writers whom he cited.

As the whole question resolved itself into the particular meaning which was to be attached to certain words or expressions of men acknowledged on both sides as competent authorities, the only way to obtain a satisfactory answer was to refer to these authorities themselves. What gives special value to their testimony is that they have not only written very solidly on the subject in question, but have done so with reference to modern social circumstances and from a thoroughly Catholic point of view. Accordingly they are asked by the Rev. Editor of the *Civiltà*, whether their teaching and the citations quoted from their works by Dr. Bouquillon can be used to support his defence of State-right in the matter of education. The learned Dominican Cardinal Zigliara whose texts are taught in our best theological schools simply answers, that he does not admit any such interpretation. "Non ammette che lo stato, qualunque esso sia, abbia il diritto proprio e speciale di educare i figlioli de' suoi cittadini," (page 15). Another living authority to whom Dr. Bouquillon repeatedly appeals in his pamphlet is Mgr. Cavagnis, member of the S. Congregation and Professor in the Pontifical Seminary of the Appollinaris. Dr. Bouquillon takes pains to extol the erudition of this author and then asks why it would not be proper to teach in America a doctrine published under the eyes of the Sovereign Pontiff and taught in the Roman Seminary. But Mgr. Cavagnis tells in a letter addressed to the *Civiltà* that no such doctrine is taught in the Pontifical Seminary.

Fr. Brandi goes very minutely into the examination of Dr. Bouquillon's

statements, and points out among other things from the author's own work, "Theologia Fundamentalis" that he did not teach in 1887 what he defends in his recent pamphlet "Education: To whom does it belong?"

CHRISTIAN FREE SCHOOLS; or, The Right of Parents to Provide Religious Education for their Children without Let or Hindrance. The subject discussed by B. J. McQuaid, Bishop of Rochester.—Union and Advertiser Press, Rochester, N. Y., 1892.

It is most opportune to have a Catholic Bishop, who has been for more than twenty years before the American public as a defender of parental right in the school question, come forth at this time to re-state his convictions on the subject. Dr. McQuaid addresses himself as an American to Americans on the vital subject of schools for our children in which the welfare of our Republic may find some guarantee of future stability as of present peace. He does not assail the State schools as at present constituted for those who prefer such schools, although he laments the absence of the religious influence in them. But he pleads, and pleads with unmistakable sincerity and reasonableness, in favor of the rights of parents, who desire for their children "religious instruction, training and enforcements in the schools to whose care they entrust them." His is not an advocacy of compulsory education in the objectionable sense of the word, but an argument for parental right and with the special view of removing those groundless apprehensions in the mind of many Americans, which are fostered by unscrupulous politicians and bigots, as though Catholics proved a hindrance to the progress of popular education by their maintenance of old traditions and a mistaken loyalty to their religion.

This is a book to place in the hands especially of non-Catholics who may have a wrong view of our aims and methods in this grave contention over the rights in education.

N. B.—Want of space obliges us to defer a number of important book reviews to our next issue.

THE PARENT FIRST. An Answer to Dr. Bouquillon's query, "Education: To whom does it belong?" By Rev. R. I. Holaind, S. J. Second edition.—New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros.

We wish simply to call attention to this second edition of the now famous brochure. Many persons interested in the present school question are no doubt anxious to preserve a complete collection of the different arguments provoked by Dr. Bouquillon's pamphlet. Fr. Holaind was the first in the field, and in conjunction with the subsequent and very thorough critiques by Fr. Brandi and Fr. Conway it is of especial worth as showing that the Jesuits were not, as was assiduously reported, prevented by the Superior of their Order to desist from taking a definite stand on the subject or from publishing their well-sustained views.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- A PILGRIMAGE TO THE HOLY COAT OF TREVES.** With an account of its History and Authenticity. By Richard F. Clarke, S. J.—London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1892.
- PSALLITE SAPIENTER.** Erklärung der Psalmen. Dr. Maurus Wolter, O. S. B. Vol. V (Schluss).—Freiburg im Br., B. Herder. 1890. St. Louis, Mo.
- THE RELATIONS OF THE CHURCH TO SOCIETY.** Theological Essays by Edmund J. O'Reilly, S. J. Edited with a biographical notice by Matthew Russell, S. J.—London: John Hodges. 1892.
- MOMENTS BEFORE THE TABERNACLE.** By the Rev. Matthew Russell, S. J.—London: Burns & Oates. 1892.
- CORPS ET AME.** Essais sur la Philosophie de S. Thomas. Par M. J. Gardair, Prof. de Philos. Sorbonne.—Paris: P. Lethielleux. 1892.
- NOTRE SEIGNEUR JESUS CHRIST.** La Vie et ses Enseignements. Par M. L'abbé, S. E. Fretté. Deux volumes.—Paris: P. Lethielleux. 1892.
- CURSUS SCRIPTURAE SACRAE.** Commentarius in S. Pauli Epist. ad Corinth. alteram et ad Galatas. Auctore Rudolpho Cornely, S. J.—Parisiis: Lethielleux. 1892.
- EXPLANATIO CRITICA.** Editionis Breviarii Romani. Studio et opera Georgii Schober, C. S. S. R.—Ratisbonae, Neo Eboraci et Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet. 1892.
- THE AUGUSTINIAN MANUAL.** A Practical Prayerbook. By an Augustinian Father. American Edition.—New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co.
- SACERDOS MAXIMUS** omnes Christi Jesu ministros viam et veritatem docens. Bernardinus Aquilante.—Romae: Soc. S. Joannis Evang. (Benziger Bros., New York.) 1891.
- THEOLOGIA MORALIS** per modum Conferentiarum, ductore cl. P. Benjamin Elbel, O. S. F. Novis curis edidit P. F. Irenaeus Bierbaum, O. S. F. Vol. I (partes tres), Vol. II (partes tres).—Paderbornae Typogr. Bonifaciana. (Benziger Bros., New York.) 1891—1892.
- THE TRIAL OF MARGARET BRERETON.** By Pleydell North.—New York, Cincinnati and Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1892.
- EDUCATION FOR THE INDIAN.** Fancy and Reason on the subject. Contract Schools and Non-Sectarianism in Indian Education. By Rev. L. B. Palladino, S. J.—Benziger Bros. 1892.
- SHORT ANSWER TO REV. DR. BOUQUILLON'S PAMPHLET,** "Education: To whom does it belong?" By Pauker von Blechingen.
- PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.** By Fr. Liberatore, S. J. Translated by Ed. Heneage Dering.—London: Art and Book Co. New York: Benziger & Co. 1891.
- CHRISTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY.** By Rev. John Thein. Introduction by Prof. Chas. G. Herbermann, Ph. D., LL. D.—New York: Benziger Bros. 1892.

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THE TEMPORAL POWER HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED.

Osservazioni sopra la Storia Universale di Cesare Cantù del P. Giuseppe Brunengo d. C. d. G. : Roma, tipografia A. Befani, 1891 ; Articoli estratti dalla Civiltà Cattolica ; pagg. 143.

REVIEWING the tenth edition of the Universal History of Cesare Cantù, Father Brunengo has issued from time to time various critical notices in the *Civiltà Cattolica*. These "observations" have been put together in the form of a pamphlet. Among the categories of topics treated by the eminent historical critic, we notice that the fifth is "The Papacy and the Empire ; the Temporal Power." As this last-mentioned subject is distinctly a vital topic to-day, and involves the question of the spiritual well-being of the Church by means of the Pope's temporal independence, it invites no little consideration ; and I propose to dwell upon the two points which Fr. Brunengo touches in the pages of Cantù. One is the general ascendancy of the Popes over the minds and the hearts of the men and the peoples who controlled the destinies of Italy and of Europe. It was the manner of exerting this ascendancy, in a way befitting their office as Vicars of Christ, which was assured and invested with proper conditions of freedom by means of a temporal sovereignty. The other point for consideration is the bearing of this same Temporal Power on what is called the political development of Italy.

Speaking of the Temporal Power in its origin, Cantù expresses himself thus :—"When the Bishops had grown to be great person-

ages in the kingdom, it was natural that their chief (the Pope) should acquire, in relation to the State, a position that was not of the essence of his mission, still was not at variance with that mission. If already in the earliest times the Pope possessed rich estates, which were not only in keeping with his dignity, but also served to answer the demands of charity, or to build new churches and restore those in decay, it became proper to enlarge his resources when he stood at the head of persons (*i. e.* Bishops) exercising a dominant influence in the government. Pepin and Charlemagne thought it opportune to augment the possessions of the Holy See, as well for the purpose that the Lombards should not domineer over Italy, as also because they knew how much the Church could assist in restoring discipline and the reign of laws, now gone into disuse; and therefore they saw how fitting for this purpose would be the possession and use of such wealth as alone was known then, that of territorial domain." Moreover, the Pope was regarded as a judge and arbitrator, and Cantù observes that this official character was appealed to for a very frequent discharge of its duties, when the extended monarchy of Charlemagne was followed by a number of little kingdoms, balancing one another in material power. The discharge of his office as judge or arbitrator was "a popular exercise of influence which averted wars, protected the weak, lent a hearing to the appeal of right as against the abuses of power. It is, in truth, a sublime conception, that of a priest unarmed, who himself, apart from earthly interests, defines the question of right in the contests of princes, or between princes and people."

Touching on the question of the relations between the Temporal Power and the political condition of Italy, Cantù says:—"Unfortunately, to maintain in requisite independence the spiritual power in times when material force prevailed, it was found necessary to attach them to a temporal principality, lest the Pontiff of the world should be reduced to the condition of chaplain to the king, within whose jurisdiction he lived. . . . Italy derived much profit in the line of its intellectual development, but it was hampered in its political evolution." (Cantù, V, 204; VII, 589.)

How far these observations of Cantù are correct, and how far they are inaccurate, will appear most readily from a cursory inspection of the historical effects in the case; and such a sketch will suggest the logical inferences to be drawn. Another mode of treatment which would be more analytical, exhibiting the conditions

of necessity and expediency, of justice and equity, in the Pontiff's possession of a Temporal Power, would offer precisely the same conclusions ; but one weighty reason for not undertaking that mode of demonstration here is the fact that it has just been expounded for Catholic enlightened readers, in a manner truly scientific and exhaustive.¹

In the very first ages of Christianity, the different churches, and especially that of Rome, acquired, through the free oblations of the faithful, not only the means requisite for the proper performance of divine worship and the support of the clergy, but also farms and estates, with the amplest revenues. When in his own person the Emperor Constantine had made the empire nominally Christian, he ordered the restoration of houses, possessions, fields, gardens, and everything else which had once belonged to the Church. At the same time the ecclesiastical patrimony began to receive the most extensive additions. The Christian Emperors themselves were in the first rank of benefactors ; but, passing them over, "no one", says Thomassini,² "is such a stranger in matters of Church History as not to know that, in those times, almost countless numbers of noblemen, as soon as they accepted the Christian faith by receiving baptism, or entered the ranks of the clergy by ordination, or adopted the monastic profession, resigned immense patrimonies, distributed the proceeds to the poor, and looked upon themselves as truly rich, when they had left all these false and deceptive riches behind them. Now it was one and the same thing then to give to the poor and to give to the Church, that nourishes all the poor. For, as all the substance of the Church was the patrimony of the poor, so whatever was dedicated to their use was wont to be consigned to the Church."

The annual revenues of the properties belonging to the churches of Rome alone, without counting the rich Basilica of Constantine, amounted in the time of the first Christian Emperor to \$52,000 and more.³ The basilica just mentioned, enjoyed a revenue of over \$46,000. These sums are large indeed, considering the value of money then. The farms, plantations and estates generally, which were given or bequeathed for the use of the Pontiffs, and which carried with them the tillers and husbandmen attached to the soil, are computed by John the Deacon, in his *Life of St. Gregory*

¹ In a pamphlet by Mgr. Schroeder, entitled *American Catholics and the Roman Question*.—Benziger Bros.

² *Vetus et Nova Ecclesiae Disciplina*, pars III, lib. I, c. 16, n. 5.

³ Gosselin, *Power of the Pope*, vol. I, Introduction, nn. 73, 74.

the Great, to have been in the time of that Pontiff, twenty-three "patrimones"; nor did he include all in his calculation.¹ The Cottian Alps, comprising the city of Genoa and all the neighboring coasts to the frontiers of Gaul, were only one of these patrimones. Others were distributed all over Italy. They were found in Sicily, Africa, Corsica, Gaul, Dalmatia. Those in Sicily and Calabria alone, which Leo the Isaurian confiscated, yielded an annual revenue of \$80,000.

With these possessions there was connected a proportionate administration. Multitudes of clerics, of the poor, of widows and consecrated virgins were provided with temporal necessities from these resources. One item of St. Gregory's expenses was the support of 3,000 nuns to whom he gave annually a sum exceeding \$15,000; and they needed it, if we may judge from his letter to the Princess Theoctista; for he speaks of nuns who had not wherewith to protect themselves "from the piercing cold" of the winter nights. Writing to the Empress Constantina, the same Pontiff mentions incidentally various heads of expense. "As in the territory of Ravenna, the solicitude of our masters has appointed a treasurer who provides the daily expenses to meet contingent needs, so in this city I am treasurer to meet the same needs. And yet this Church, which at one and the same time expends so much without intermission on clerics, monasteries, the poor, the people and on the Lombards besides, is moreover weighed down by the affliction of all the churches. . . ."

The title to all this property was that of ownership. It was a right vested in the Bishop, not held in the name of the State, or the Emperor of Constantinople; nor was it a trust held for the benefit of others, except in the sense that the Christian charity of the Bishop always regarded it as such,—a trust held in behalf of the poor and the suffering, of the orphan, the widow and the stranger, who were always at home under the shadow of God's Church, and had never to fear destitution as long as there was a chalice left to melt down into money for food. For they are in truth God's living temples, and their hearts are His altars, more so than the consecrated stones on the marble altars, and the pillars of onyx and candlesticks of massive silver and walls lined with purest gold, which reflected a thousand lights to the eyes of kneeling worshippers. This was the organization of Christian beneficence, without taxation; it was not sterile philanthropy, but Christ's own charity.

1 Brunengo, *Origini della Sovranità Temporale dei Papi*, Parte I. capo 2.

The very amplitude of such resources, dispensed in this manner, involved the Bishop in something like a civil administration. But there were many other circumstances, inseparable from his office, or at least inevitable in the condition of the times, which concurred to make a chief pastor nothing less than a civil magistrate. He became a judge in the fullest sense of that term. The very connection between things temporal and spiritual, the confidence of the people in the ecclesiastical authority and their profound reverence for his person, made him necessarily a referee; but besides all that, the legal codes of the Valentinians, of Honorius, Theodosius the Younger and Justinian, invested him with the fullest judicial capacity; and what these enactments established, the successors of Justinian amplified.¹ And, in the West this official competency of the Bishop, whether judicial or administrative, civil or military, advanced to a degree of almost unlimited control, according as the successes of barbarian invaders weakened ever more and more the bonds of political union between the West and Constantinople. In the light of this we can well understand St. Gregory's complaint, in a letter to the Bishop Sebastian: "At one and the same time to have charge of Bishops and clerics, of monasteries also and of the people at large, to keep a vigilant watch against the insidious attacks of the public enemy, to be always on the alert against the treachery and malice of the governors—what labor all this entails, and what pain it gives, your fraternal charity is the better qualified to divine, according as you bear a sincerer attachment to me who am the sufferer under these inflictions."²

In the eighth century of the Christian era the force of so many concurrent agencies, operating in the very nature of the political crises which arose fast and intense, pressed the Roman Pontiffs forward to the full exercise and possession of a Sovereign power. As Cantù expresses it, "If any hope of a resurrection, or at least of some relief, still remained to the Italians, there was no one on whom to rest such a hope except that Pontiff who, by his character, was called to be just and forbearing; who still kept in honor among the nations that Roman name which on other accounts was held in contempt."³ Governed by the Exarchs of Ravenna, in the name of the Greek Emperor, those parts of Italy, including the Roman "duchy," which still acknowledged their dependency on Constantinople, were made to feel their subjection in two very

¹ Gosselin, Introduction, §§ v, vi.

² Jungmann, Dissert. in Hist. Eccl. XIV, n. 11.

³ IV, 556.

sensitive ways ; first, in the wretchedness of a government which was utterly helpless against the attacks of the northern invaders ; secondly, in having to endure a tyrannical rule, which, in proportion to its helplessness without, signaled its power within by levying the heaviest taxes and drawing the last drop of blood still left in the hapless country. Not content with material oppression, the civil power invaded the most sacred rights of conscience. Nominally Catholic, orthodox, and most devoted children of the Church, the Greek Emperors then, like so many others of the same kind since, would fain dictate to the Popes doctrinal decrees and dogmatic formulas, order synods and prescribe canons, and force them to be accomplices and abettors in furthering all the novelties and heresies which took the fancy of the Emperors. Fortunately, when a bold warrior like Leo the Isaurian undertook to enforce his heresy with the edge of the sword, he was but helping to sever the last ties which kept the Roman Church in servitude. All Italy was up in arms, and the Pope alone kept them in their obedience. Hoping still for the conversion of the Emperor, he commanded the fidelity of the Italians to the cause of the true faith, but he bade them not to waver in their fidelity likewise to the Greek Empire.

If it were a people's choice that was to determine the complete emancipation of the Pope from any temporal jurisdiction, on whom was the choice of the Italian communities likely to fall, as between a Phocas and a St. Gregory the Great, between a Constans II and a St. Martin or Vitalian, between a Justinian II and St. Sergius, between a Leo the Isaurian or a Copronymus and Sts. Gregory II, Gregory III, Zachary and Paul I? However, it was not choice which settled the question of the Pope's temporal sovereignty. The willing consent of the populations concerned was not wanting ; and every legitimate title of cession, of donation, of restitution, was formulated in the final establishment of his power. But that which has a right to be considered his fundamental title to an independent sovereignty is that which alone escapes the free disposition of men, and is manifestly the work of Divine Providence in the order of the world—the imperative necessity of self-preservation, the temporal salvation of a people, and, in the instance before us, the salvation likewise of faith and morality in the face of devastating hordes, which, if not repelled, would have hurried all to a common grave, nor have come themselves to the knowledge of Christian faith, morality and civilization.

It was the era of the Lombards. They were a nation already largely Christian, but scarcely Catholic. For they had been anticipated in their belief by the frauds of Arianism. They had already laid a yoke of thirty-six "duchies," like a harness of iron, on the subjugated and despised Italians. Whole provinces were depopulated by the sword; and, though Rome was a territory exempt as yet from their rule, the Romans themselves were not exempt, any more than the rest of Italy, from the slaughter of nobles and priests, the sacking of churches and the destruction of cities. The Roman territory at this time coincided pretty closely with what has been known in our day as the Patrimony of St. Peter, along with a part of Umbria and the Campagna of Rome. After many perilous crises, finally, in the year 739, while the Iconoclast Emperor Leo was carrying on his war of heresy against the Roman Church, Luitprand, king of the Lombards, carried fire and sword into the imperial exarchate of Ravenna, ravaged the patrimonies of the Holy See in those parts, and then turned to Rome. Nothing was spared on his way. And on the 16th of June he laid siege to the eternal city.

A curious composition of humanity these Lombards were. The three kings who at this time figured successively on the stage of history, fulfilling in a remarkable way the designs of Providence with respect to the Roman See, were, we may take it, a fair specimen of the rest of their kin and clans. Paul the Deacon, himself a Lombard, describes Luitprand as a man of much wisdom, sagacious, very pious and a lover of peace; mighty in war, moderate, pure, modest and so forth; not ignorant of letters, but a bit of a philosopher, etc. No doubt he was so, as long as the fit was on him, and spells of a different kind did not control him. Indeed, the reverence and docility which these semi-barbarians showed to one Pontiff after another is one of the marvels of history. In the full career of victory, at the moment they were reaching the goal of a long-cherished ambition, we find men like Luitprand humbly sacrificing all, at the word of the Vicar of Christ, and that while actually besieging the same Vicar of Christ in his own city! Hence we may appreciate how sincerely happy was a barbarian like this, when, after taking dinner with Pope Zachary at Pavia, he expressed his lively sense of the Pontiff's sweetness, and the air of sanctity which surrounded everything, by saying that "he did not remember having eaten so much in his life before!"

His immediate successor Rachis was undoubtedly a valiant man,

as much so as Luitprand, but he was endowed with a genuine piety and mildness of disposition ; and, on receiving a solemn legation from the Apostolic See, he signalized his love of peace by granting the Pope a peace of twenty years ! All treaties of peace in those times regarded a limited time, and it was yet to be one of the achievements of the Bishops of the Church, by means of the pious and ingenious device of the "truce of God," to keep men from cutting one another's throats at least for a few days each week. But perhaps a twenty years' peace in those times was quite as long-lived as a "perpetual" one in these days of mildness and mutual benediction. In point of fact, this twenty-year peace lasted fully five years, and, after that long period of good behavior, we find him pouring his forces with great fury on the Roman territory. The saintly Pontiff Zachary went out to meet him at Perugia. The Roman forces were the same as usual ; they consisted of the Pontiff's own personal sweetens, with the presence of some of his clergy, and considerable gifts. The immediate raising of the siege of Perugia was not the only effect of this interview. With the Pope's exhortations ringing in his ears, the good king a few days after abdicated his throne, and coming as a humble pilgrim to Rome, accompanied by his wife Tassia, and his daughter Ratrude, he begged the Pope to admit him into the ranks of the clergy. The Holy Father gave him the clerical tonsure and the Benedictine habit, and sent him to Monte Cassino, where Carloman, the eldest son of Charles Martel, was already a monk. Tassia and Ratrude became Benedictine nuns at Piumarola, not far from Cassino ; no rare spectacle in those days, when, within the space of fifty years, England alone beheld five kings and one queen exchanging the crown of their own accord for a cowl or veil.

The successor of Rachis seems to have been a villain, if ever man was. This was Astulph, the brother of Rachis. He was astute and ferocious, yea, the most ferocious of even the Lombards ; he was wicked, impious, atrocious ; the like had never been seen in the days of even the Lombards. So the various historians of the time agree in describing him. It was fortunate for Europe that he was so, and that Pepin was the king of France at the same time. Things never went better than when they went so badly, God arranging all things for the good of His Church. But what was the end of this man, as soon as the excess of his wickedness had occasioned the inauguration of a new order of things, by the final and permanent establishment of the Temporal Power ? Stricken by the

hand of God, "the first example," says Cesare Balbo, "of what we have often witnessed since, that whoever in Italy revolts against the Pope is not far from his fall."¹ Astulph died in the arms of monks, whom he had always loved and fostered much during life. Under the spur of an insatiable ambition he had indeed been carrying on wars to the last extremity of violence and brutality against the Pope, but at the same time he had been building churches and splendid monasteries; and, with a refinement of devotion, which must have been exquisite according to a barbarian's standard, he had robbed the churches which he was devastating round Rome of the bodies of the holy martyrs, but only to transport the sacred relics with every demonstration of honor to his new temples and altars at Pavia.² After all, it is quite conceivable that a passably honest barbarian, whose Christianity is just beginning to work outwardly from his heart, is as good as many an hereditary Christian whose religion, having exhausted itself within, is gradually disappearing without, like a fading complexion, the product of climate and environment. But to return to the order of events, as resulting in the establishment of the Papal Temporal Power.

At the time that Luitprand was beginning his career of conquest in the exarchate of Ravenna, and pushing on into Italy against Rome, Leo, the Isaurian, was carrying on his war of persecution against the Church. He sent a fleet against his own city of Ravenna which had rejected his impious heresy, and he "expropriated" the ancient patrimonies of the Holy See in Calabria and Sicily. This Emperor, as chief sovereign, was the natural protector of Rome. But, whereas his protectorate and that of his predecessors, had been distinguished for some centuries by a truly imperial freedom in the imposition of excessive taxes and an unremitting vigor in religious persecution, now, when the Lombard was at the gates of Rome, the natural protector kept at a safe distance, busily occupied in sacking churches and murdering Catholics.

Many a time before the Roman Pontiffs had faced the storms which swept over Italy, and had saved the relics of civilization from the swords of Huns, Goths and Vandals. But never before had the moral ascendancy which alone they could employ been so utterly without temporal aid, as when the tempest burst upon Rome from the side of Luitprand the Lombard. Pope Gregory III. knew not whither to turn for protection; and therefore, looking beyond

¹ Brunengo, *Origini*, parte I, c. 10.

² Brunengo, *Origini della Sovranità Temporale dei Papi*, parte I, cc. 5-10.

the Alps, he appealed to Charles Martel. The French warrior's intervention seems to have turned Luitprand from his purpose, and Rome was left in peace. But the following year the exarchate of Ravenna, still belonging to the Greek Emperor, was again made the scene of the Lombard's depredations, and this time it was the Pope's intervention in behalf of the feeble province which saved it for the Court of Constantinople. The prestige of Rome was mounting high ; to friends and strangers alike His Holiness was the one arbiter of the fortunes of Italy. This was in 743. But in 751 the ferocious Astulph took possession of all the territory of Ravenna, captured the city itself, and put an end for ever to the dominion of Constantinople in northern Italy. Apparently neither the people of the conquered country thought it worth their while any longer to dispute who should be their masters, nor did the Emperor Copronymus seem to think the loss of the western province worth a moment's attention, his arms were too busy elsewhere propagating the iconoclastic heresy.

Now it was Rome's turn again to feel the invader's sword. But here the history of Pepin begins, like an epic at the opening of mediæval politics. We cannot follow him as he routs Astulph at Susa, and receives the pledges of his plighted faith under the walls of Pavia, nor pause to narrate how, when that faith was broken, and such scenes followed under the walls of Rome as make the blood run cold,¹ Pepin hurried once more over the Alps and brought the abject Astulph to terms. One thing only need be recorded, and that is the restoration of all properties to the Roman See, and the bestowal of the extinct exarchate of Ravenna on the Pontiff. Through the length and breadth of the exarchate, and of what was called the Pentapolis, Pepin received the formal and final surrender of every city ; and not one of them but was glad to be liberated for ever from all claims of the Greek empire over them and from the hated dominion of the Lombards. These Pepin conceded to Rome, because he considered they belonged to Rome. He "restored" them and all other properties, because as he said to the envoys of the Greek Emperor, he would be alienating them from St. Peter, if he acknowledged any other title to these domains. All were to remain under the exclusive and absolute temporal jurisdiction of Rome. And neither now, nor later when Charlemagne confirmed and enlarged the "donation," was there any reserve of power or jurisdiction to themselves, as if they were

¹ Jungmann, *Dissert. in Hist. Eccl.*, XIV, n. 55.

to be the suzerains of Rome. They were only its protectors, to be called on when the Pope thought fit. Thus every form of legality by public treaty was made to confirm the intrinsic legitimacy of the Papal Temporal Power. The city and its dependencies which had long been the Rome of the Popes, the "Sacred" Republic of the Romans, having for their legitimate prince, possessor and lord, St. Peter in his successors, now took a place of their own in the political relations of nations, just at the epoch when the nations were forming into that system of polity, known as modern Christendom.

The divine philosophy underlying all this is thus sketched by Bellarmine.¹ "Even if absolutely speaking it were perchance preferable that Pontiffs should manage only spiritual things, and kings temporal affairs, still, on account of the wickedness of the times, experience openly proclaims that it was not only useful but necessary, in the divine arrangement of Providence, that some temporal principalities should be conferred on the Pope and other Bishops. For, if in Germany, Bishops had not been princes, there had been no Bishop remaining in his See to our day. As therefore in the Old Testament there were for a long time Pontiffs who wielded no temporal power, and yet in the later ages religion could no longer maintain itself and be defended, unless the Pontiffs were also kings, viz., in the time of the Macchabees; in like manner we see in the affairs of the Church, that whereas in the first ages she did not need a temporal principality to defend her majesty, now she seems to require it as a necessity." It was the difference between a state of infancy and adult age; between her being in an environment of political government, whereof she could not be a part, though she was in it, and being in quite another environment, which could not do without her as an integral part of Christian polity, and as the vivifying centre of law, morality and national life.

From that time to this, in the enjoyment of an imprescriptible right and with accessions, neither slight nor dubious, made to their possessions by various Catholic Emperors and by the Countess Matilda, the Popes have presided over the moral welfare of Christendom, and in particular, have made and preserved the fortune and heritage of Italy. If Cantù speaks of their "having hampered the political development of the peninsula," he may have in mind those material interests which, broadly speaking, can be classed under the general head of the accumulation of mammon—an accumulation which we observe has taken place in a superlative degree

¹ De Rom. Pontifice, lib. V, c. 9.

precisely there, where faith in the supernatural has been paralyzed by heresy, where morality has declined more rapidly than faith, and where misery and pauperism abound exactly in proportion to the apoplectic fulness of wealth. But, if the prime element in the political development of a people is social happiness as bound up with faith and morality, we find that the fortunes of Italy have been in the ascendant according as the Roman Pontiff has been in honor and power. Any other conception of the political well-being of Italy rests either on some gratuitous and revolutionary theory about the "rights of man," or as far as it emphasizes some special inabilities as to constitutional change, the true conception of Italy's highest welfare was long ago expressed by M. Thiers in these terms: "This interest" he said, speaking of the Pope's Temporal Power, "is one of a superior order, which should overrule inferior interests, as, in a state, the public interest silences individual interests."¹ This is an elementary principle which has been applied, not only by Europe in neutralizing certain nations like Belgium or Switzerland, or in closing the Dardanelles, but also by the United States of America in practically disfranchising the District of Columbia, as being the honored seat of a higher government.

The story of Italy's prosperity or adversity as varying with the fortunes of the Roman Pontiffs, would form an apt commentary on this philosophical conception of the country's history. And at the present moment when the Pope's rights are forcibly withheld from him, a primacy has indeed been attained by the "constitutional" policy which is in control of the peninsula. It is such a primacy as has nothing to equal it in the whole extent of Europe, but it is not exactly in the line of civilization and wealth. No, it is portentously in the line of taxes and debts, of financial depression and official tyranny, of destitution, depopulating a flourishing land and, moreover, of deeds of blood and social vices, all of which seem to be the distinguishing characteristics or results of God's vengeance for a great national sin.²

THOMAS HUGHES, S. J.

¹ Dupanloup, the Papal Sovereignty, ch. 4, 23.

² Consult the *Civiltà Cattolica* Jan. 16, Feb. 7, 1892, *L'Italia dopo trent' anni di Rivoluzione*.

CLERICAL STUDIES.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

PHILOSOPHY. (CONCLUSIONS.)

UNDER the title, *De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna* an old Gallian Doctor of Sorbonne, named Launoy, gave, better than two hundred years ago, a history, still read with interest, of the vicissitudes through which the works of Aristotle had passed during the Middle Ages. The scholastic Philosophy, so closely wedded to that of Aristotle, shared largely, as we have seen, its varying fortunes. In our day we witness its recovery from the almost total neglect in which it had lain for a whole century. But the length and vigor of its new life must depend in a great measure on the manner in which it is henceforth set before the public mind and imparted to the new generations which come up in succession for philosophical training.

We propose in the present paper to state our personal conceptions of what that training should be. We do so with a hope that, though many of our remarks may be already familiar to the reader, it will still be useful to express and to emphasize them. They will bear principally on three things :

The ends to be kept in view ;

The practical difficulties to be encountered ;

The special requirements of each one of the branches of a philosophical course.

I.

Philosophy may be studied for a variety of purposes. All are not equally important, nor can all be fully compassed within the time usually allotted to such studies. It becomes consequently a duty for the teacher to ask himself at the outset, and to keep the question steadily before him : How can I be most serviceable to those whom it is my duty to teach ? What questions, what methods, what mental discipline will best fit them for the work of life as a whole ?

1. The first object of a course of Philosophy is *knowledge—technical knowledge*. Philosophy, like all other sciences, means a body of notions, facts, problems, theories, doctrines, demonstrations. To become acquainted with at least what is principal in all these ; to

have realized their true meaning, their mutual connection, their bearing on the most important issues of thought and life, is the direct and immediate object of systematic philosophical studies. Of this knowledge, as the necessary crowning of a liberal education, and as a necessary introduction to the study of Theology, enough has already been said in a previous article.

2. The second object is *mental discipline*. All methodic teaching trains the mind, but such training is one of the main purposes of a course of Philosophy.

The untrained mind is inaccurate: outside the commonest subjects it is easily darkened and confused. It stops at the surface of things; it fails to see into their depths, to catch their connection. It grasps but feebly the higher objects of thought, and is an easy prey to sophism. To correct these deficiencies, nothing can compare with philosophical training, intelligently pursued. Thus, by the constant use of rigorous definitions, it compels the mind to distinctness of conception and accuracy of statement, a schooling of the mind begun, it is true, much earlier, since all real knowledge, nay, all use of words, implies something of it. It is, in fact, one of the principal advantages to be found in the translation of ancient languages, a process implying a clear discernment of the different shades of thought and of the corresponding propriety of words.

But such exercise, however valuable in the hands of an intelligent teacher of Greek or Latin, lead to no scientific distinction, and apply much more to the things of life than to those of abstract thought. Hence, the vagueness and confusion so noticeable in the ordinary student who takes up for the first time any philosophical subject.

The same may be said of all the other familiar processes of philosophical studies. To divide and classify properly requires the most close attention and careful analysis. To build up an argument, or even to realize its value, brings into play the faculties of abstraction and comparison. To follow out a series of deductions accustoms the mind to grasp and hold simultaneously many thoughts together. The daily thoughtful handling of books, ancient and modern, educates of itself in that direction.

To say nothing of others, Aristotle, the great master of definitions and distinctions, Plato reflecting in his dialogues the questioning mind of Socrates and ever striving to get at the meaning of terms, can hardly be touched without imparting something of their nicety and depth of discernment.

The third object of philosophical training is the development of *mental power*. It is meant to broaden the mind and enable it to take in the manifold aspects of things. It is meant to give depth of thought, to accustom the student to go to the very heart and root of things, to seek for and to find the underlying principle, the ultimate reason beyond which the mind feels neither the need nor the power to go. It is meant more still to impart that *strength of intellect* by which men test and try whatever comes up before them, to weigh the value of each statement, of each proof, to verify principles and facts, admitting, rejecting or doubting, according to the amount and value of proof supplied. Finally it goes to form that healthy condition of mind known under the name of vigorous *common sense*—a quickness to distinguish shams from realities, sound from sophistical argument, to take a steady view of things, to get a solid grasp of truth not to be easily shaken by unintellectual influences from within or from without.

Knowledge, discipline, power, such then are the main objects to be kept in view by teachers and students, by the former especially, whose duty it is to determine the methods and exercises by which they may be most effectively attained. The task is no small one; in fact it is beset with difficulties. The principal of these it may be well to consider here, as on the manner of dealing with them the final result must entirely depend.

II.

1. The first difficulty the professor of Philosophy has to contend with is the unphilosophical cast of mind of some of his pupils. For, amongst those who may fairly aspire to a professional career, or to the priesthood, it is not at all unusual to find young men entirely unfitted for the ordinary exercises of the scholastic discipline. They are by no means devoid of intelligence; they have derived a fair share of benefit from their previous liberal training; they are sensible, shrewd; but speculation and formal argument are entirely beyond them. Theirs is a sort of intuitive Philosophy. They see, but they cannot deduct or formulate. They are and perhaps will always remain, incapable of constructing a syllogism, but they somehow reach the right conclusions as often as others. They cannot tell you just where the fallacy lies in an unsound argument, but instinctively they feel it is there, and are not deceived by it. Do not expect from them the ordinary definitions and classifications of the human faculties, unless they speak from memory; but their

knowledge of character may be equal to the best. Abstract principles seem to be beyond them, yet the correctness with which they judge the things of life would prove that such principles are in some manner present to their minds.

Such as they are, not much philosophical knowledge can be imparted to them. The elementary notions, a statement of the essential doctrines and proofs, is about all they can be expected to understand or to remember. To strive for more in that direction is only a waste of time and labor. But much more may be done to discipline and strengthen such minds, either by eliciting personal effort in what they can compass, or merely by having them watch attentively the training of others, this being about the most improving part of their discipline.

2. A second difficulty, of the most serious kind and common to all beginners, arises from the utter strangeness of the new field that is opened to their activity. In their previous studies, there was an even, steady advance from what was familiar to what was unknown. Each new form of knowledge began by what was most accessible, and the mind was led on by easy steps to what was most complex and highest, whilst the whole work was done through the medium of the native tongue, and of a vocabulary easily mastered.

But for a beginner in scholastic Philosophy, all these facilities are missing. All is new and difficult—the notions, the terms, the methods and the language. He is suddenly introduced into a world of abstract ideas hitherto unknown. And then Latin, as a vehicle of thought, is unfamiliar to him. Even the old, well known truths assume strange, and, to him, unnatural forms, whilst the terminology of the schools is obscure and bewildering. He is soon lost, as in a fog, and if he continues to grope his way through the darkness, it is only because he is encouraged by the voice of his teacher and occasionally cheered by glimmerings of brightness from beyond which tell him of the region of light to which he is being led. Some never emerge from the gloom, and even those who do, always remember it as the most trying period of their intellectual formation. Too often the teacher, to whom all has become familiar, fails to realize this condition of things, and proceeds serenely on his way, forgetting how hard it is to follow him. Yet his plain duty is to measure accurately each one of those accumulated obstacles and to do what may be done to remove them.

1st.—As regards the concepts of Philosophy, it is clear that the

mind of the student has to be led on, as in mathematics and in every other department of knowledge, from what is simple and accessible to what is farther removed from ordinary conceptions ; from the concrete to the abstract, from the familiar facts of psychological experience to the higher laws and principles of thought. In this way he feels from the beginning the solid ground under his feet ; he can retrace his steps to the starting point at any time, and, at every stage of his course, he knows exactly where he stands and whither he moves. For this reason, among others, experimental psychology should come first in philosophical study. It is of easy access, attractive, and it prepares the mind naturally and logically for all that follows.

2d.—This leads us to another remark relative to the *subtleties and refinements of the schools* on which so much time and intellectual power were frittered away during the Middle Ages. Although the scholastic Philosophy was confessedly encumbered and weakened by them, an attempt is positively made in our day to bring them back again. Ardent inquirers into the older Philosophy having been led to study them, gradually have come to enjoy them, and now they would persuade the world at large to share the enjoyment. That such nice discriminations and dissections of thought are generally groundless or valueless, we would by no means imply ; that in the discussion of many curious and, for the modern mind, silly questions, a wonderful sagacity and penetration have been exhibited, no reader of the schoolmen will be tempted to question ; that even an acquaintance with all this is necessary for a thorough knowledge of mediæval Philosophy, we freely admit. But there it should rest. It has little or no business in our text books for beginners. They are too busy ; too many objects, solid and important, claim their attention to leave room for so much that was of interest to other ages. The numberless possible forms of the syllogism, the various degrees of the *materia prima*, the entities, entelechics and quiddities in which our forefathers reveled and lost themselves, may have been very well in their day, but their interest henceforth must remain largely of a purely historical and archæological kind.¹

1. It will be remembered how keenly it was felt, even as early as the XVIth century, that the subtleties referred to above were a subject of reproach to the schools, and would have to be thrown overboard in order to save the cargo. The following passage from the celebrated work of Melchior Cano (de locis theol., lib. IX, c. 7), though somewhat radical, will prove interesting and probably comforting in its admissions to more than one of our readers: "Nostri autem Theologi, importunis vel locis, longa de his oratione disserunt quæ nec juvenes portare possunt, nec senes ferre. Quis enim ferre possit disputationes de universalibus, de nominum analogia, de primo cogito, de principio individuationis

3d.—The beneficent excision of such excrescences, whilst relieving scholastic Philosophy from a reproach not unmerited in the past, will remedy in some measure the inconvenience arising from the use of the *scholastic vocabulary*, but enough still remains to create a serious difficulty. To understand it, we have only to remember that among the causes which contributed most to the diffusion of the Cartesian Philosophy was the fact that its author and followers took up and dealt with the highest questions in the language of every-day life. All technical terms were discarded, so that educated persons could, without any special training, follow the developments and discussions to which the new system gave birth. Since then Philosophy has ceased to be scholastic in the original sense of the word ; that is, confined to the schools. In its various shapes it has gone abroad and impressed itself on the literature of the day. It has formed the conceptions and the language of society, and thus already has been taught in some manner to those who have not yet entered on its technical study. Now this study, when pursued on the lines of scholasticism, introduces them, not only to objects entirely new, but to a new conception of things already familiar. Thus the intellectual processes are differently analyzed and described, the powers of the soul distinguished and classified after a different plan. Again, the old terms of the school which had fallen into disuse, brought into prominence anew, convey at first no distinct meaning ; some of them, expressive of conceptions foreign to the modern mind, have no equivalents in our language, and are spoken of only in their original Latin form. Others, such as *Matter, Form, Cause, Motion, Accident*, etc., are taken in a technical sense more or less at variance with their ordinary meaning. Hence that painful condition of obscurity and confusion so common in beginners, and lasting unhappily in some to the very end. The teacher cannot be too much concerned to dispel it as speedily and as thoroughly as possible. No real work is done as long as it lasts. The student commits to memory and recites, when required, a set form of words, definitions, theses, proofs ; he

(sic enim inscribunt), de distinctione quantitatis a re quanta, de maximo et minimo, de intensione et remissione . . . deque aliis hujusmodi sexcentis, quae ego etiam, cum nec essem ingenio nimis tardo, nec his intelligendis parum temporis et diligentiae adhibuissem, animo vel informare non poteram ? Puderet me dicere non intelligere, si ipsi intelligerent qui haec tractarunt. Quid vero illas quaestiones nunc referamus ? Num Deus materiam possit facere sine forma, num plures angelos ejusdem speciei condere, num continuum in omnes suas partes dividere, num relationem a subjecto separare, aliasque multo vaniores quas scribere hic nec libet, nec decet, ne qui in hunc forte locum inciderint, ex quorundam ingenio omnes scholæ auctores aestiment."

answers objections in the prescribed form, but with only the haziest notions of what it is all about. Ask him to state the same things in other terms, or to put in plain English what he so glibly throws off in Latin ; he is powerless to do it. Clearly he knows nothing, and is learning nothing but words.

4th.—The evil is far from being lessened by the *Use of Latin*, as the medium of philosophical instruction. No language, it is true, is better fitted for the expression of any Philosophy than that in which it developed originally and reached its perfection, and if the student's knowledge was to be strictly confined to mediæval Philosophy, and if the Latin tongue was familiar to him, there would be no reason to go outside it. But neither supposition corresponds to the facts. It is well known that most aspirants to the priesthood in this country enter the Philosophy course with far less knowledge of Latin than is found elsewhere in students similarly situated. And then they come to learn, not only what was thought in past ages, but also what modern investigation has added to the treasure of philosophical knowledge, and even the courses which men's minds have followed when they wandered from the truth, for how else can they be won back to it ?

We may be permitted in this connection to repeat what was written several years ago by Dr. Kavanagh, senator of the Royal Irish University (Study of Mental Philosophy). " Shall Catholic teaching be confined exclusively to scholastic Philosophy in its ancient forms, or shall the Professors of Philosophy in Catholic Colleges be required to expand and develop the principles of St. Thomas, and apply them to the wants of modern discussion ? Shall we ignore the living present, and direct our teaching exclusively to the dead past ? Shall we teach our students to refute errors unheard of for centuries, except in scholastic disputations, and to ignore errors which are in active operation around us and are eating into the very vitals of Christian faith and Christian moral teaching ? For the answer to this question, I appeal to St. Thomas himself, ever busy with the errors of his day, and to our Holy Father, Leo XIII. To me it would seem more rational to strike out of the curriculum all the discoveries of science since the days of Descartes, than all the developments of Philosophy since the days of St. Thomas. A Catholic gentleman can get on fairly without a knowledge of higher Mathematics, as of the recent advances in Physical Science ; but how can he mix in society without peril to his faith,

if he is ignorant of the facts and views of modern Philosophy which are discussed at every dinner table? In England, Philosophy is a favorite study with the educated classes, and no one can share in their discussions who is not familiar with its more prominent systems and has not mastered the questions which divide the various schools. If then Philosophy is taught at all, it should not be taught exclusively in a language unintelligible, except to the disciples of a particular school. . . . We must not send the young Catholic into society to do battle for his faith, to unmask error and to defend truth, using a language which would require an interpreter, and trained only on a system which unfits him to take part in modern intellectual conflicts."

All this is, to say the least, as true of aspirants to the priesthood in this country as of the young Catholic laity of Europe. It entails on the professor of Philosophy an arduous task.

He has, in the first place, to translate for his pupils all that is new or unusual in the conceptions or vocabulary of the schools into the language of ordinary thought. He can be sure to reach the minds of many of them only through the medium of their mother tongue. Text books, recitations, occasional essays, all in Latin, are a practical necessity in view of the subsequent study of Theology and of the important place which the Latin language occupies in the intellectual and devotional life of a priest. But it has been the experience of the writer for many years that, of those who have been taught Philosophy, and especially scholastic Philosophy, only in Latin, not more than one in half a dozen had brought away with him much more than a set of formulas, with only a very imperfect notion of their meaning, though not unfrequently accompanied by a strong determination to cling to them all, indiscriminately and at any cost.

Hence the most experienced professors, whilst using Latin as the ordinary vehicle of their teaching, do not fail, in their classes or in private conference, to appeal to the vernacular whenever it is necessary to convey the full and true meaning of things to the minds of their hearers. To the student himself, nothing of what he learns is of any value unless he is thus taught to realize it and make it his own. Thus only will it help him to further truth, or will he be able to speak of it in an easy, intelligible manner, and with that completeness and naturalness of conviction with which he speaks of any ordinary matter. Short of this, he will be afraid to wander beyond the limits of the technical phraseology which he has learnt,

and a stiff, awkward, dogmatism will take the place of a living and communicative conviction.¹

5th.—But such a discipline, it will be said, bringing home to the mind of the student every notion and every truth, requires more time than is practically available. Why then recommend it?

This brings us to the last, but not the least, of the many difficulties which a professor of Philosophy has to contend with.

The fact upon which it rests is unquestionable. It is with the mind as with the body. Just as some forms of nutriment are promptly absorbed into the system, whilst others are of slow assimilation, so certain forms of knowledge can be acquired continuously and rapidly, whilst for others more time is essential. Literature, Art, Philosophy belong to the latter class. They can not be taught or learned at the same time quickly and effectively. Like the beneficent rain, they need to fall on the mind softly and gently in order to sink into its depths. An able professor can deal with most questions of Philosophy in a single year's course, and his work, if he gives it to the public, will read well. But if you look for it in the minds of his auditors, what remains? Definitions, statements, proofs, committed to memory, and still retained, perhaps, but how little realized? The conscious growth of power, the mental elation, the craving for more, which invariably follow on all genuine increase of knowledge, are painfully absent, except from a few. In other words, a full course of Philosophy, such as it is generally understood, especially when combined with other important matters of study, cannot be given with advantage in a single academic year. Either it has to be limited in matter or extended in time. Even though, by increasing the number of classes, the whole ground may be covered, the other ends above mentioned—discipline and power—are necessarily lost sight of.

And yet they are more essential than mere knowledge, because through them the best sort of knowledge becomes accessible, and, in a measure far beyond, and of a kind far above, what comes by mere teaching. In fact when the time is so inadequate to all purposes, the best method would, perhaps, be to consider Philosophy principally as a means of mental discipline and mental vigor. In this way the professor would be less concerned to introduce his

¹ In this connection, the Stonyhurst Series: Manuals of Catholic Philosophy, recently published in English, will be found very serviceable to professors and students. We would also mention an Elementary Philosophy, by Mr. James Wilcox, of Philadelphia, which seems to be less known than it deserves.

auditors to a large number of questions, than to fit them to understand and to be interested in all.

That abiding interest in philosophical questions is one of the most valuable results of a judicious training, and it can be secured far better by an occasional momentary lifting of the veil, giving an impression of the vast extent and beauty of what lies beyond, than by rushing right through it all, and reaching the end with a notion that all has been seen. A student, unless devoid of the philosophical faculty, who cares not to go back and look more intently and see more, gives proof that he has seen very little indeed, it may be because little has been rightly shown him.

III.

The views which we have expressed in these pages apply to every part of a philosophical course. Each principal section would require to be considered at length, but here we have room only for a few general observations.

1st.—*Experimental psychology*, as already remarked, we consider the best to begin with. As a distinct branch of the science, it has grown rapidly within the last century in interest and popularity. Its most recent developments in connection with physiology have made it one of the most engrossing subjects of the day. Its data, old and new, are the starting point of some of the gravest problems of mind and life. Yet, strange to say, in most of our scholastic manuals, it obtains only the faintest recognition, appearing, if at all, only for a moment and in its antiquated form and garb. The student lays down the book knowing nothing of the human soul, its powers, its laws, its mechanism and working, nothing of the action, normal and abnormal, on it of the nervous system, beyond what any one may know without special study. Surely there is here a considerable lacuna which demands imperatively to be filled by author or professor.

2d.—*Logic* comes next. Properly taught, it is a splendid training school for the mind, and can be made as interesting and enjoyable as it is too often disheartening and dreary. The operations of the mind are, after all, not difficult to understand, and the forms and laws of argument, whilst offering in their endless varieties a very healthy exercise for the mind, if time could be spared for them, may be indefinitely shortened and simplified with little positive inconvenience.

There are two other exercises on which the time commonly given them would be better spent. The first is the practice of analysis, by which students might be required to take up a page, carefully selected, and point out the statements and arguments which it contains; the statements to be set forth separately, the arguments reduced to syllogistic form by expressing the implied premises. The second is a critical dissection of some chapter of book or passage of discourse, in which a weak or sophistical line of argument would have to be detected and refuted. The time-honored Disputations should not be put aside, but they require a judicious guidance, much drilling, and are really accessible only to a chosen few.

All these exercises accustom the mind to close attention, to reflection, to accurate thought. They give a growing sense of power which leads on of itself to greater efforts.

3d. A new branch of study, often connected with logic in the early part of the century, deals with the groundwork and laws of *Human certitude*. In the general healthy condition of mind during the Middle Ages, it was little needed, but its importance in a period, such as the present, of widespread scepticism, can scarcely be exaggerated. On all sides we meet men highly gifted, yet unsettled in almost all their convictions "knowing everything," as has been said of them, "and believing nothing." It is part of the sacerdotal calling to bring them back to natural as well as to supernatural belief. But the disease is hard to cure, and it is contagious. The matter consequently requires to be handled with great caution and tact. We must confine ourselves here to observe briefly. *a.* That far from allowing the basis of certitude to be narrowed, as was done by Descartes, Kant and so many others, it should be maintained, in conformity with the wisest schools of Philosophy ancient and modern, on the broad foundation on which nature herself has placed it. *b.* This is the only service that Philosophy can render in such matters, for neither the system of Aristotle nor any other can add to the natural, primitive, indestructible fact of human trust in the human faculties. *c.* Certitude is strengthened in all, but especially in young men by habitual contact with those whose minds dwell in the regions of serene conviction. St. Thomas is admirable in this regard. He works his way through the most intricate questions with the same security as a mathematician works out a problem. One feels that he walks in the light.¹

¹ A homage of a more general kind to the Angelic Doctor from the pen of a Protestant bishop will be welcome to our readers. "If penetration of thought, comprehension of

d.—To be too trustful is as perilous to certitude as to be too diffident. To find weakness where none was originally suspected produces a reaction leading to the opposite extreme. The mind is best balanced when it recognizes the true value of the grounds upon which theories and systems are built.

4th.—Of *metaphysics*, still more than of the other branches, there is so much to say that a whole article would scarcely suffice to convey it. We must confine ourselves here to respectfully recommend, first, that the section of ontology, or *general metaphysics*, should not be made unnecessarily obscure or dry. It need not be either. It is not desirable that everything should be made easy, or dropped where it becomes difficult. The very difficulties become positively attractive and exciting when the mind is properly led up to them.

Secondly, that in view of the modern condition of minds, the section of natural Theology, especially the proofs of the existence of God, should be developed as fully as possible.

Thirdly, that in consideration of the universal prevalence of the inductive methods, they should be freely employed by the professor to establish the necessary principles of demonstration when not self-evident. A happy illustration of this will be found in an article of Rev. J. Vaughan, of the Existence of God, in the *Dublin Review*, of January, 1892.

5th.—The course of ethics has to be drawn out for clerical students with a constant reference to their subsequent studies of Moral Theology. There are several fundamental questions, purely philosophical, which have assumed such importance in our day and in this country that they have to be dealt with thoroughly at some time or another.

6th.—We will conclude by observing that our age being both literary and historical, the philosophical training of our clerical youth, to be practical and effective, should share in that twofold character. They should be taught not only to think, but to give a free, forcible and happy expression to their thoughts. The success of Platonism, Cartesianism, Malebranchism, in the past, of all forms

views, exactness the most minute, an ardor of inquiry the most keen, a patience of pursuit the most unwearied are among the merits of the philosopher, then may Aquinas dispute the first place among the candidates for the supremacy in speculative science. Dr. Hampden, Bishop of Hereford, England, art. Thomas Aquinas in the *Metropolitan Cyclopædia*.

of agnosticism in the present, has been and is largely due to the literary ability of their supporters.

Finally, as far as time permits, the theories, systems and truths taught should be exhibited to students not in abstract isolation, but as they emerged from the minds of men and developed and spread in the course of ages. It is only by this living presentation of them that they can be clearly understood.¹

A thorough knowledge of the history of ideas is essential to the professor. He has to make himself familiar with the great originators of thought, Plato, Aristotle, S. Augustine, S. Thomas, Bacon, Descartes, etc., as well as with the vicissitudes of their systems. In possession of this knowledge, he will find it both easy and helpful to introduce it into his teaching and still more to show his hearers the bearing of ancient abstract speculations on the living issues of the day. It would be desirable, and we believe possible, that students themselves should go back occasionally to the sources. One of Aristotle's shorter treatises, a few dialogues of Plato, something of the mediæval, modern, and contemporary writers, would give them a more vivid sense than aught else of the true meaning and spirit of philosophical systems and be a powerful inducement to pursue in after-life studies thus made attractive from the beginning, and sure to prove elevating and strengthening to the end.

J. HOGAN.

OUR FAIR LADY'S UNIFORM.

THERE is no instinct in the human heart which the Catholic religion does not convert into nobler aspirations than those which earth can supply. Every one understands why the soldier is proud of the ensign which betokens his military rank, why the statesman displays his ribbon, or the collegian the medal of his graduation. These things derive worth, not from their intrinsic value nor simply as being rewards of victory and honorable achievement, but much more because they supply the wearer with an ideal ;

¹ Abbe Vallet whose *Manual of Scholastic Philosophy*, specially recommended by Leo XIII, has become the most popular book of the kind in France, gives in his *History of Philosophy* a very full and interesting account of scholasticism. Stoeckl's *History* is also very valuable. Paul Yanet has recently given to the public a most useful volume in which the history of each subject is pursued separately and consecutively. It is in this form that the history of Philosophy is most helpful to students.

because they bind him to a purpose which has its sanction from a source far above his own conscious sense of merit.

Such is the meaning of a badge or medal in Catholic devotions. As the soldier proclaims silently his allegiance to the sovereign, the uniform of whose service he wears, as the student recognizes in his badge of honor a pledge which binds him to the ideals placed before him in his Alma Mater, so the Catholic who wears a medal of our Blessed Lady, not only attests thereby his willing allegiance to the principles of the Catholic faith, but he emphasizes his admiration of the high ideal which this token represents, and with it he expresses silently, but constantly, his wish to imitate, as far as may be, the noble qualities which raised the modest Virgin of Nazareth to the high dignity of Mother of our Redeemer. To youth and maiden, to spouse and parent the ideal of the Immaculate Mother of Christ appeals alike with ennobling tendency.

With a similar, only a more emphatic purpose do Catholics don the Scapular of our Blessed Lady. It is an ensign which stands for the uniform chosen by the legions of the fair Queen of heaven whom all Christians love to serve and honor, because she is the Blessed Mother of our Saviour. This fact cannot be sufficiently dwelt upon, because it is often lost sight of; for external habits of devotion may become mechanical, and in a case like the present they foster a sort of superstition which is as unwholesome to the soul as it is unreasonable.

When, some years ago, the Holy See announced that it would be requisite hereafter to inscribe in the registers of the different confraternities, the names of those who are invested with the Scapulars, the restriction aroused in many, even of the clergy, a sense of uneasiness as though this new measure would result in a loss of good to the faithful generally. Yet there was a strong reason for the restriction which was likely to produce greater good in the end. The universal custom of wearing the Scapulars had made it, in many cases, a mere perfunctory and outward act of devotion. Some looked upon the little garment as a sort of charm which would ward off all manner of ills irrespective of the disposition and moral life of the wearer. This view is apt to foster superstition rather than devotion. In reality the Scapulars represent a religious dress; those who assume it become affiliated to a religious order; and whilst they participate in the spiritual advantages and privileges of this community of which they become members, it is but just that their initiation, equivalent to a religious profession, should be marked by some solemnity or formality, and their names be duly enrolled in

the catalogue of the order. In this way the obligations implied by the assumption of the Scapular are emphasized and apt to become more fruitful by influencing the practical life of each member. Even though the mere assumption of the Scapular implies veneration for and a desire to cultivate the high ideal represented by it, which thus becomes a source of grace and protection in spite of our frailty, yet it is nevertheless true that "the dress does not make the monk." The neglect to inscribe the names may lessen the number of those who participate in the good work of the religious communities represented by the various Scapulars, but the obligation of doing so intensifies, on the other hand, the intelligent devotion of those who, going to the trouble of a formality which is entirely reasonable and just, realize the duty which they assume thereby and lead more worthy Christian lives.

But, whilst it is of the nature of every reform that it causes many to fall off because the zeal of the few serves as a chastisement to their indolence, the ingenious mercy of God ever invents new ways of drawing within its circle the weak and the slow. Every new devotion or old devotions newly revived seem to imply a wider concession to human frailty. Such it appears to us, is the devotion of the *Blue Scapular*, which for several reasons recommends itself to Catholics at this time, and to American Catholics in particular.

THE BLUE SCAPULAR.

Among the different Scapulars in use, is that of the Immaculate Conception, commonly called the Blue Scapular. Up to recent years, few, except pilgrims to Lourdes and the members of the Theatine Order had devoted themselves to its special propagation.¹

It is noteworthy that the Blue Scapular does not represent any religious order and hence *does not require that the names of those who are invested with it, be inscribed in any register.* The Superior of the Theatines in Rome has the primary faculty of blessing these Scapulars and of delegating others to do so. Some of our Bishops, we understand, have received the same faculty from the Propaganda.

ORIGIN OF THE BLUE SCAPULAR.

In 1583 Ursula Benincasa, the daughter of an old Neapolitan family formed a society composed of devout maidens whose object

¹ The fact that there were zealous hearts at work in our own midst in behalf of this beautiful devotion, was brought to our immediate attention through a paper which appeared in a recent number of the *Ave Maria* entitled "A Devotion for American Catholics." (March 5, 1892.)

was to lead a life of purity, prayer, labor and charity, in close imitation of the life of the Blessed Mother of Christ. The number of associates was originally limited to 66 in honor of the years which, according to Catholic tradition, the Blessed Virgin Mary spent on earth. Later another similar institute was formed under the title of "Immacolata" which allowed affiliation of lay persons. These religious wore a white woolen dress, blue Scapulars and blue mantle. The community was placed under the direction of the Theatine Fathers who still retain its patronage, although the order founded by the devout Ursula has, as a religious community, ceased to exist. Her beautiful example, her broad charity and generous spirit of self-sacrifice had given her a wonderful influence over all classes of people, and utilizing, for the honor and glory of God, this admiration of her personal gifts, she led the willing crowds who sought her intercession, to follow the path of virtuous living by giving them a memento—a pledge of affiliation and fidelity, in the small token of a Blue Scapular which they were to wear night and day as reminders of purity, charity and self sacrifice. This is the origin of the Blue Scapular.

The death of this holy woman occurred in 1618. So great was the reputation for sanctity and the power for good which she had among her countrymen that when it was rumored that she was going to die, the leading citizens of Naples assembled around her bed making a solemn request that she would continue in heaven the patronage which she had exercised in their midst during life for the reform of morals and the cultivation of public and private virtue.¹

GENERAL AND SPECIAL OBJECT OF THE DEVOTION.

The general objects which the wearers of the Blue Scapular have in view are :

- I. To honor the Blessed Mother of Christ, in her special prerogative of the Immaculate Conception, by purity of life and the cultivation of other Christian virtues expressed in the model of womanhood.
- II. To pray and labor for the conversion of those in error and sin.

When we apply the purpose which the saintly Ursula had proposed to herself in establishing the devotion of the Blue Scapular, to our conditions and country, there seems to be in it a particular

¹ The process of her canonization was inaugurated under Pius VI, by a decree dated Aug. 7, 1793. Clement X, by Brief of Jan. 30, 1671, Clement XI, by Brief of May 12, 1710, and Pius IX, by Rescript, Sept. 19, 1851, have sanctioned the devotion of the Blue Scapular as originated by the Venerable Ursula Benincasa.

aptitude and a separate appeal for its cultivation among American Catholics.

The United States have been placed under the special Protectorate of the Immaculate Queen of heaven. The title of Immaculate Conception is a national one, in the religious sense of the word. As clients of this august Patroness it is most fitting that we should don the uniform which is used in a special way to designate the members of the militia of our heavenly Protectress. That there is a warfare impending which demands our united efforts, no one who marks the signs of the times can doubt. Indeed, there are many dangers actually present and at work in our midst. The writer in the *Ave Maria*, to whom we referred above, points this out in the following words :

The dangers that threaten our country are insidious and powerful. True religion and Catholic morality are held and observed by only a small proportion of its inhabitants—one-sixth at the largest showing. Moreover the air is full of evil influences tending to undermine them,—moral evils which assail us all, and errors in doctrine to which five-sixths of the people are a prey, and which are not without peril even to the faithful. We have but to name a few of these evils to appreciate their danger : Intemperance, divorce, political corruption and business dishonesty, social evils, pauperism and crime, godless education, infidel literature, agnosticism and heresies, worldliness and greed of riches, enmities and strife between capital and labor, speculation, gambling and extravagance. There are, besides, dangers arising from conditions unfavorable to the growth of traditions of piety and purity,—conditions brought on by constantly shifting populations, indiscriminate immigration, and the necessity of letting our young people drift out into the world alone and unprotected to seek their fortunes. Many of these evils we share in common with all peoples, but many arise from our peculiar circumstances and temptations. They are American evils, or at least are felt here with exceptional force.

Blue is the color of our national army. It won the victory for freedom in behalf of an enslaved race. Although we are not fighting "the gray," who are our brothers in this warfare against common evils, we may make the blue our national color on double grounds. It speaks to us of the freedom that reaches beyond the fair vaults of heaven or the azure expanse of mountain and sea. The color of sapphire and turquoise reflects from the gates of heaven and adorns the mantle of our Queen. Knights and maids of honor, we wear her ribbon as tokens of our allegiance to the august Sovereign whose virtues we strive to imitate. We bend our knees for her blessing and ask her to make use of our service to defend

the walls of Sion in this New World, the interests of our American Church, and under her guidance we may hope to carry on successfully the crusade against the false doctrines and lax morals of our day.

“Cunctas haereses sola interemisti in universo mundo.”

CONDITIONS AND ADVANTAGES,

There are but few requisites as conditions for the proper reception of the Blue Scapular.

1. It is to be made of woolen cloth, blue in color. There is usually a picture of the *Immaculata* on one side of the Scapular, but this is not essential. The strings may be of any color and material.

2 The Scapular is to be blessed. This requires a special faculty. If Priests ask their Bishops for it they will obtain it. Otherwise the General of the Theatines (at *San Andrea Della Valle*), in Rome, will grant the same and send all necessary instructions.

3. There is *no inscribing* of names.

4. No special forms of prayer or devotional practices are essential. Any pious work may be offered to God with the intention mentioned above as the particular object of the devotion. The wearing of the Scapular is, of course, necessary, and it acts as a help and reminder, morning and night, of our resolution to cultivate the virtues expressed by the symbol.

5. There are numerous spiritual advantages and indulgences to be obtained under the usual conditions by Catholics who sincerely repent of their sins and pledge their good will to lead pure lives. (See *Analecta : Privileges of the Blue Scapular.*)

6. Every mass said for a deceased person who has during life worn the Blue Scapular enjoys the *privilegium altaris*, no matter on what altar or by whom the mass is celebrated.

CONCLUSION.

The month of May gives to devout Catholics a special impulse and inspiration to do something in honor of our Blessed Lady. It also offers more numerous opportunities than other seasons, for inculcating whatever zeal and charity may suggest to a faithful priest for benefiting his people.

A very efficient way to accomplish both these ends is to explain the meaning and to recommend the wearing of the Blue Scapular. This will be an opportunity all the more desirable, if we should have been either the conscious or the innocent cause of neglect to have

the names of persons whom we have invested with other Scapulars inscribed and who consequently lose the privileges of affiliation to the congregations which the Scapulars, requiring enrolment, represent. Here we have a method of making reparation.

Thus we may increase our forces for good, and aid in the promotion of true prosperity amid our people in this land of the free, so full of temporal blessings yet so full of dangers on that very account. Let the fair blue mantle of our spotless Queen touch every child of the Catholic Church in America, proud that we may wear the beautiful emblem of her Immaculate Conception, an omen of blessings for us and our country.

*Et sic in Sion firmata sum, et in civitate sanctificata similiter re-
quievi et in Jerusalem potestas mea !*

MUSIC IN THE SEMINARY.

THE series of articles contributed to the REVIEW on the subject of clerical studies by the Rev. J. Hogan, D. D., of the Catholic University, shall furnish the present writer both with a text and with an apology for venturing to discuss in these pages the position which music should hold in the curriculum. We desire to make a plea for more attention to vocal culture, and to the history and theory of ecclesiastical music, ancient and modern, than is ordinarily given to these subjects in Catholic seminaries. Of course, a general argument for broadening the course of studies might be found in the fact that the Church should still keep, in this "age of the electric light," that wonderful pre-eminence of hers which eighteen centuries of our Christian civilization have attested with an unvarying and most impressive emphasis. For *Trivium* and *Quadrivium* shall no more be the measure of intellectual training. The "encyclopædia" is made vastly more ample in our times than the *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία* of the Greeks, the "*orbis doctrinae*" of Seneca. Steam and electricity have canopied our minds with ever-widening horizons of intellectual progress; so that, alas, even by jealous hoarding and specialization of energy the brief span of life can furnish us but grudgingly the alms of a partial and short-lived success. The purely theological studies of our curriculum could alone baffle the mental energies of a life-time. In them, too, the spirit of specialization has been at work, and has indicated various particular lines of thought still leading the despairing inquirer to an *embarras*

de richesse. Nevertheless, we are here contending for a multiplication of studies in the Seminary ; and from the pleas of general and special culture we are striving to draw arguments for broadening the course in music. Let it be granted that we cannot attain to a tithe of the wide intellectual riches that mock our very avarice—what then? Shall we embrace the sad doctrines of an “optimistic pessimism,” as the philosophy of Horace has been rather paradoxically termed, and, crying out with that pagan poet,

Quid brevi fortes jaculamur aevo
Multa?

forthwith make the Horatian inference,

Laetus in praesens animus quod ultra est
Oderit curare?

Begging the reader's kind indulgence for this rather lengthy preface—meant, however, to anticipate the *non-multa-sed-multum* objection urged so untiringly and so successfully against the multiplication of studies in our seminaries—we proceed to make a plea for greater breadth as well as greater depth in the subject of ecclesiastical music.

I.

(Le beau est aussi utile que l'utile, plus, peut-être.)

Victor Hugo.

Perhaps a sufficient answer to the objection we have just stated would be a clear appreciation of the position of the time-honored “learned professions” in relation to this modern intellectual hurry and bustle. If at any time the man of one book is to be feared, it surely is at the present day. But this gentleman is most to be feared because he is not sufficiently fearful. He is too apt to construct a little heaven and earth of his own; and his philosophy too often dreams not of the “more things” hidden in the larger earth his feet tread so lightly, and in the wider heaven which “baffles him forever.” We fear him, not because he knows his specialty so well, but because he knows it so imperfectly. Principle rubs against principle in the machinery of science: the more we know, the less, as a rule, shall any single principle be urged in its widest extent. The dogmatism of the present day is the dogmatism of the “specialist.” Says Matthew Arnold—correct here, at least—in his *New Age*:

Bards make new poems ;
Thinkers new schools ;
Statesmen new systems ;
Critics new rules ;

All things begin again
 Life is their prize ;
 Earth with their deeds they fill—
 Fill with their cries.

In an age which finds a separate sphere of activity for every faculty of body and mind, which is so apt to educate hand at the expense of head, and head at the expense of heart, it is a refreshing thing to meet the man whose culture is the product of education in its primary meaning—of a harmonious blending of his physical, mental and spiritual powers. There is, in all our “push and go,” in all the utilitarian heresy of the times, room still for the man of “general” culture. His temperate judgments, his world-wide sympathies, his appreciation of the good, the true, the beautiful, in whatever forms they assume, his well-rounded scholarship — all will prove an instructive object-lesson to the New Age :

Thundering and bursting
 In torrents, in waves,
 Carolling and shouting,
 Over tombs, amid graves ;
 See on the cumbered plain,
 Clearing a stage,
 Scattering the past about,
 Comes the New Age.

Now we might quote endless testimony of the highest authority in asserting the prerogatives of music in the culture of head, and heart, and hand. “Plato and Aristotle agree in thinking that the rhythm and harmony of music inspire the soul with the love of order, with harmoniousness, regularity, and a soothing of the passions.”¹ “Is it not, then,” says Plato in his *Republic*, “on these accounts that we attach such supreme importance to a musical education, because rhythm and harmony sink most deeply into the recesses of the soul, bringing gracefulness in their train, and making a man graceful if he be rightly nurtured ; but if not, the reverse?”² We might show at length how this precious heirloom has come down to us through the *quadrivium* of the Middle Ages, in which it held an honored place. We might trace the religious pedigree of music from our own day, back through the Ages of Faith to the time when it brought sweetest tears to the eyes of St. Augustine, back through the apostolic ages till we find “great David’s greater Son” singing the hymn with His disciples before going out to Mount Olivet, back to the Second Temple, in

1. Compayré : History of Pedagogy, p. 20.

2. Version of Vaughan and Davies.

whose chanting, doubtless, the same Divine Master joined, "to fulfill all justice," back to the splendid service of the First Temple, back to the canticle of Moses on the banks of the Red Sea, back to the morning hymn of creation, "when all the sons of God made a joyful melody." But music, the first-born of the arts, does not, or should not, need any recommendation either of pedagogy or of liturgies in these latter days.¹

Nevertheless, while the culturing power of music is generally admitted, and the necessity of some familiarity with its genius and laws cheerfully conceded in theory, the utilitarian character of the age we live in has virtually, if not formally, constituted a new "specialty"—has branded it with a trade-mark, and made of it almost as distinct a profession as law or medicine; so that any one who for the sake of personal improvement essays acquiring a becoming mediocrity in the science or art of music is weighed, not in the balance of general culture, but in that of trade skill, and is forthwith dubbed an "amateur." That this tendency, from a pedagogical point of view, seems to be false and misleading, we should not be required to prove. But we call attention to the tendency

1. A certain Dr. Hanchett, a musician, wrote an article for the November number, 1890, of the *Voice Magazine*, on "The Mission of Music." The editor sent a list of questions to various prominent authors and educators, inviting criticism of the article. In justice let it be said that the opinions passed on the position of music in the "fine arts," its power for good in training the character, its value as a mental discipline, etc., ran through the whole range of favorable and adverse criticism. Whilst no question was put as to its position in the curriculum of colleges, some of the correspondents chose to allude to that phase of the subject. We beg indulgence for a few extracts. Juliau Hawthorne says: "Music differs from all other arts or sciences. Its objects and effects are distinct. For that reason music is the most valuable single element in our present scheme of education." T. W. Higginson, the historian, ranks music "higher than any art except the highest poetry." President Low, of Columbia College, says: "It is a refining, civilizing art. It tunes my mind up, often a whole octave. It lifts me into the altitudes of my soul. It pushes all life and pettiness and humdrum cares out of sight." President Hall, of Clark University, ranks music "very high." President Bashford, Ohio Wesleyan University: "Our present education is too purely mental. Education should develop the mental, physical and moral power of the student . . . Music tends to develop both the imaginative and emotional faculties, but these faculties are generally neglected by the ordinary school curriculum. I would, therefore, rank music as worthy of insertion in the school and college curriculum, because it cultivates the imaginative and emotional faculties, and thus contributes to that well-rounded development which should be the object of all education. President Grose, University of S. Dakota: He seems to think that the study of music alone should yield all of character. As well decry the study of mathematics because it does not make one a good grammarian or kludly in disposition. Music is one factor in "character-building." He ranks music "as one of the chief educators of the aesthetic faculty, which must be developed if a symmetrical character is to be obtained." May we give a Shaksperian turn to the discussion?

"The man that hath no music in himself,
And is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, stratagem, and spoils."

Merchant of Venice. Act V, Sc. I.

here because there is reason to fear that it has made some progress even in the conservative atmosphere of the Catholic seminary, and that it is in some measure responsible for the present peculiarly degenerate state of church music—a state for the bettering of which so many able and pious and energetic musicians now labor in vain.

We began to plead the cause of music from the stand-point of general culture, and we find ourselves unconsciously shifting to the vantage-ground of a utilitarian argument. This latter, indeed, it was our main intent to occupy, albeit we leave with regret the splendid array of argument which the former would present for winning attention to

The higher things
Lost with base gain of raiment, food and roof.

Without yielding the point that a sufficient vindication of the high offices of music may be found in the personal advantages gained by its faithful wooers, we shall borrow wisdom from the methods of the present age, and shall make a plea from the rostrum not of the more real, but of the more obvious utility of the study of music.

II.

“Gratefully use what to thee is given.”

Omar Khayyam.

What are the uses to which music, the universal heirloom of mankind, should be put? What golden threads of musical culture should give strength and beauty to the texture of ecclesiastical education?

We spoke of the present degraded status of church music. It is a status that has called forth much comment in public and private. Reasoning, and wit, and satire have exhausted themselves to little purpose. After all, if any reform is to be made in the present state of affairs, should it not be championed, inaugurated, and carried on by the great body of the priesthood? Councils and synods may preach the higher things, and point the way to their attainment—a sign-post shall never bring the listless traveler to his destination. The desideratum seems to be: first, an intelligent appreciation of what church-music *should be*, and what it really is, at present; and secondly, the ability to enter into an intelligent discussion of the means proper for restoring the service of our temples to a position in the musical proprieties demanded by its very nature. But does the seminary aim at imparting any instruction in these matters to its alumni as a body? Is the study of the history and characteris-

tics of sacred music an integral and necessary part of the curriculum? On the contrary, does not the possession of any musical ability by a student constitute him a *specialist*, and not, as it should, merely an abler man amongst his musically-educated fellows? The use which a priest has for a knowledge of geometry, of history, of Latin metres, nay of Canon Law and General Liturgy, cannot be shown to be of more practical moment in his official duties, than the many uses which he has for a knowledge of music. To pass over, for a moment, the imperative function of music in all the solemn offices of the liturgy, we need but instance the practical questions which are at this time clamoring for solution—what kind of music should be considered sacred? what kind may be tolerated by the priest, *meliora sperante*, for the present? what kind he may not brook for a moment? what are the possibilities and advantages of congregational singing? what those of Cecilian music? what those of Gregorian chant? how shall we encourage and properly direct vocal music in the school? how shall we train up the young to an appreciation, as well as a recognition, of the higher music which refines the taste, as opposed to the lighter, more trivial, more sensuous, which may lower the moral as well as the mental tone of the younger folk? How shall the *personnel* of the choir be regulated—by ability purely, or zeal purely, or piety as well as ability? and so on to the end of the chapter. However reasonable this comparison between music and the other branches of instruction cited by way of example may be, the fact still remains that at the end of his course in the Catholic seminary the student that showed special aptitude for any of these latter studies does not find himself, and is not considered, a specialist; but he does find a companion, not brighter in musical knowledge than he himself was in Latin or Canon Law, the *rarissima avis* of a specialist.

In estimating the comparative utility of music, we said we should pass over, for a moment, the *imperative* functions of music in the solemn offices of the liturgy. Here, of course, the strongest argument might be made for a thorough training within, at least, the limits of the Gregorian Chant. Specialization must stop its ravages in the face of the stubborn fact that for the celebrant and the ministers at the altar, no vicarious fulfillment of legal prescription shall be tolerated. Liturgically speaking, they *must* sing. And so, councils and synods have provided some place in the curriculum for plain chant. It has the same reason for existence in such a place, as the study of Rubrics and General Liturgy. But having said this,

we have not said all—we have not said enough. The strange fatality which has been pursuing music has made this common gift of nature—a gift practically co-extensive with that of voice and language—a rare enough specialty in seminaries, even within the province of liturgical necessity. The stubborn facts seem to be not only that plain chant has lost caste, but that it has well nigh sunk out of recognition. No itching of the fingers shall succeed in diverting us into a rhapsody on the subject of Gregorian music. We *will not* say that its “heavenly melodies” must have approached the dignity of inspiration; we will not quote any of the striking testimonies of musicians friendly and inimical to the Church, as to the inherent majesty and power of the liturgical song, or the peculiar fitness of traditional use, its venerable antiquity, its freedom from all worldiness, vanity, or sensual suggestiveness, have given it for clothing the words of the sacred text in becoming drapery. This has been already said, and well said, and often said. And if we should dare to repeat any of that glowing eulogy, it would be for the purpose of calling attention to the incredulous smile, perhaps the undisguised sneer we should provoke. *Caste* has been lost for it, surely, in the musical world. Of that we do not propose to speak; nor indeed, of the amount of clerical humor, too, expended on the subject. But worthy of note is the fact that it has lost *caste* even in the sisterhood of the ecclesiastical sciences. Possessing as eminent a right to recognition as General Liturgy, the tacit understanding amongst all seems to be that while the details of ceremonial should be carefully attended to, any kind of rendition of plain chant will suffice. The man who tries to sing the melody as indicated—in the missal, even—is doing the chant “honor over-much.” The fatuity which gives birth to such a principle of action is another remarkable element in the downward path of Gregorian chant. A first principle in the ceremonies is that decorum be observed—for may not the infinite detail of the rubricists be reduced, in the last analysis, to the most decorous way of doing something which is a necessary part of the liturgy? And thence, we conceive, comes the unwritten law of making a mistake in “ceremonies” as gracefully as possible—“so that no one will be the wiser?” Strange fatuity! We are punctilious in observing the directions of the rubricists—a matter in which many years’ study cannot give us more than a mediocre success, and a subject peculiarly foreign to the knowledge, and so often, alas! to the interest of the faithful—and all the while we care little or nothing for decorum in the singing,

a thing which is as common a possession as language ; a subject in which the very children of the congregation may play the part of judges. The seminarian who is in sacred orders will wax warm in defence of the exact degree of profundity in his reverences to the celebrant, and will make merry sport of his weirdly original *Ita missa est*. Nevertheless, while the faithful may not be proficient in geometry or rubrics, they may be depended upon to have a pair of ordinary ears and so all the beauty of ceremonial will be lost in the echoes, both in and out of the church, of our last cacophony. Let us not be understood as speaking in any slighting way of the least of the ceremonies of the Church. We should heartily deprecate such a suspicion, even if the assurance of St. Theresa that she would lay down her life willingly for the observance of each of them were not ringing in our ears. Nay, rather, for the very sake of reverence are we insisting on a decorous performance of one portion of the liturgical service. Do we "despise the small things" in lifting up from the dust the greater? But we must be careful lest, while conscientiously tithing mint and anise and cummin, we leave the weightier things of the liturgical law.

We venture therefore to submit that such a state of affairs as we have described, is, to say the least, one-sided and intelicitous. It is also, we think, pedagogically erroneous. Viewed from the standpoint even of a rigid and narrow utilitarianism, it is a sad neglect of the "practical" advantages of education. If we should seek a reason for this neglect, we should doubtless find the double excuse given of "no time for musical instruction," and "those that have 'ears' don't need it, and those that have not 'ears' couldn't profit by it." The answer to the former might be that in education the evolutionary formula of "survival of the fittest," should, perhaps, be a potent factor in the determination of what few branches shall be selected for the curriculum out of the one hundred and one that clamor for some recognition. But such a principle may well be modified by the other, that "the weak have rights which the strong are bound to respect." The question, then, cannot be peremptorily settled by a final triumphant appeal to the paramount importance of theologies and philosophics, and liturgics *et id genus omne*. Again we fear the man of one book! A scientific pedagogy will regard the usefulness of any special branch of education as a function (to borrow a geometric term) of the results gained divided by the time spent in gaining these results. If we apply this formula to the various branches of study in the clerical curriculum, we shall

not find music the lowest in the scale of utility. We do not propose to enter upon a laborious calculation of the *utilities*, but shall at once proceed to point out some of the *synchronous* results of musical instruction. These may be divided into physical, mental and æsthetic, if we regard vocal music merely as a factor in what is primarily meant by "education." Of the function of music in "instruction," which is too often the latter-day meaning of education, we may speak further on.

It is a patent fact that the long and necessarily severe course of preparation for the high dignity of the priesthood is too apt to strengthen the spiritual at the expense of the animal and vegetative faculties of students. The dark embers give a weird emphasis to the inner fire they can feed no longer. The necessities of our poor clay are humiliating, certainly, but they are stern facts; and a well-rounded culture dare not despise them. Juvenal's proverb about the *mens sana* is nevertheless more remarkable for the endless and universal indifference shown by mankind towards its great lesson, than either for its happy truth, or its venerable antiquity. We are forever killing the hen that lays the golden eggs. The school-room and the school curriculum have come down to us through the misty ages as one unmistakable object-lesson of how-not-to-do-it. Seminaries have not been worse off in this respect than other schools, but their very lengthy course has served to emphasize the principle better. The protests of physicians are, however, at last listened to with some respect, and have resulted in better lighted and better ventilated halls, and various systems of calisthenics for the lower schools, and in the many athletic associations of the colleges and universities. But one very thoughtful recommendation has not been listened to with much deference, or at least, with much result—we mean the introduction into schools of vocal practice. In another place¹ we have pointed to the fact that "the benefit to the physical nature, in developing and strengthening the lungs by deep respirations, places it on a level with calisthenics. Without claiming for it all the 'innumerable advantages' described by physicians of various ages, we may simply note here the comparatively recent testimony of Colombat de l'Isère, who believed it to be a great guard against epidemic diseases. But we may not omit the striking testimony of an eminent English authority of the present day, Gordon Holmes, whose position as physician to the Edinburgh Municipal Throat and Ear Infirmary, and of *chef-de-clinique* at the

¹ Course of Study for the Philadelphia Parochial Schools.

Hospital for Diseases of the Throat, entitled his opinion to special consideration. He says : ' The general well-being of the constitution is promoted by voice-practice, because the wider chest movements accelerate the circulation of the blood, at the same time that they cause a more ample flow of fresh air in and out of the lungs And, moreover, these effects have a certain permanency on account of the gains to the thoracic capacity derived from the habitual increase of lung expansion necessitated by constant vocal exercise.' ”¹

But while other physical exercises develop and strengthen particular muscles and sinews, and contribute therefore only generally to the well-being of the body, vocal exercise directly develops the power of voice-production, and therefore directly strengthens that organ of the body which in a priest is too often the weakest and yet the most necessary in his public ministry. This thought opens out wide vistas of demonstration of its utility which, however, we may not enter upon now.

The purely physical value of singing places it, therefore, on a level with calisthenics. But besides this, music has what calisthenics has not, the concomitant element of a strong mental stimulus and disciplinary power. A writer in the *Normal Review* has pointed out that " Music, when rightly studied, becomes a *means of mental discipline* over which mathematics, with all its boasted glory, can claim no superiority. Any one who sings will acknowledge at once that no problem in arithmetic calls for a keener use of the perceptive faculties than does the singing, at sight, of a difficult piece of music." We shall not discuss the æsthetic gains resulting from vocal culture. We have already, in the first part of this essay, hinted at some of them. But we may note here that not a little of the difficulty that stands at present in the way of congregational singing would be removed, as the priest would then be in fact, what he is in theory, the natural exponent and teacher of ecclesiastical music.

We should, then, recommend a course of instruction in vocal music, extending throughout the whole of the seminary course, and if possible, through the whole of the preparatory collegiate course. Fifteen minutes' daily practice would soon demonstrate, better than many words, the justice of our plea. Indeed, under a competent teacher, a few months of such practice would yield, even in the most obdurate cases, little short of musical miracles. And here we glance

for a moment at the second objection urged against spending time in the study of music, viz., that instruction and practice are quite unnecessary for any one who has a "voice" and an "ear," and hopelessly useless for any one who has not. We need scarcely say that such a plea can have currency only where the stock of musical information is of the scantiest kind. The limits of our essay will not admit a proof of the statement; nor, indeed, as we are not addressing novices in music or in educational matters, is there any necessity for proof. But from the double fact that good voices and good ears require culture, and that defective ones can by culture be vastly improved, we beg to insist again on what we conceive to be a first requisite in any musical course in our seminaries, namely, daily voice-practice. By this, intonation could be made correct and secure; volume could be marvellously improved; the *timbre* could be made much more pleasing. We should then have a demonstration that the rarest of the *lusus naturae* is an absolute lack of responsiveness to melody—the *bête noir* of a bad ear. In his own experience in the class-room the present writer has found ample demonstration of the power which even scant vocal practice has for improving volume and intonation and *timbre*. He has found classes bashful, listless, discouraged; he has left them hopeful, energetic, and filled with a pleasing sense of security in their ability to sing. Singing, like swimming, is a natural operation; but, like it, requires some courage for the first plunge. He has found the patient drilling of a few lessons changing what sounded at first like the confused murmur of distant seas into a rich, round, decided, choral unison. Defective ears, slovenly intonation, and harsh voices, together with listlessness and vocal mannerisms, were responsible for the former; a little effort and patient practice for the latter.

While the class could be made to join ultimately in the exercises as a whole, sufficient time should be given to individual voice practice first of all. This is, indeed, the most important part of the training. In a Catholic seminary there should be no class of "incurables"—to borrow a word from the Rev. Arthur Ryan. Too often, alas! we charge to nature the results of our own carelessness and physical improvidence. The eve of ordination is hardly the proper time for beginning to realize the fact that the liturgical offices generally require singing as a *sine qua non* of their performance, and that both ear and voice declare their utter unfitness for the task. Shall we say that nature has played the step-mother to us? That no one can remedy a congenital defect?

Side by side with voice culture should begin some instruction in the elementary theory of music, the conventional modes, ancient and modern, of representing sounds to the eye, the nature of intervals, etc. The history of church music would furnish occasional variety and give interest to a subject which is, however, by no means a dry one. Some *obiter dicta* in the Pastoral Theology of Church-music, some suggestions about "our choir," "our organists," "our solo-music," might not be amiss; and if they were made in the spirit of their subject could not fail to provoke a healthy laughter. In fine, the class might be constantly reminded of the words of St. Bernard: "Sunt quidam voce dissoluti, qui vocis suae modulatione gloriantur, nec tantum gaudent de dono gratiae, sed etiam alios spernunt. Tumentes elatione aliud cantant, quam libri habeant, tanta est levitas vocis, forsitan et mentis. Cantant ut placeant populo magis quam Deo." Insistence should be made on singing the exact melodies of the chant, on the ground that beauty unadorned is, especially in plain chant, adorned the most. Thus on the basis of nature might be built a decent superstructure of a knowledge of ancient and modern tonalities—the former necessary for the priest in his sacred functions, and the latter able to clothe, with other than merely official authority, his supervision of the music performed in his church.

H. T. HENRY.

THE PERSONALITY OF CHRIST.

ONE of the most striking features of the so-called Reformation, is its gross inconsistency. When Luther separated from the *old* Church, he found it necessary to have a body of doctrine, and he forthwith excogitated that famous watchword of the *new* religion, "Faith alone justifies." He lived to repent the folly of attempting to improve upon the Church of God. The dictum *Crede firmiter sed pecca fortiter*, was disastrous to morality, which is intimately connected with dogma, and we have the testimony of the German monk himself, that the people were much worse in point of morals in his time, than they had been under the Popes.

Whilst "Creeds not deeds" was the peon of the Reformers, Protestantism of to-day has veered completely around, and made it "Deeds not creeds." Such is the fate of error: it is by its nature

inconsistent. Similarly great changes have taken place in regard to other dogmas of the Christian faith. We find ministers of the gospel, denying the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation—two of the fundamental dogmas of the Christian religion. Under such circumstances sincere Protestants turn to the Catholic Church for a solution of questions of the soul which hinge upon facts of revealed truth. It will not then be deemed an idle speculation if we turn to one of the fundamental subjects of this kind—namely, the Personality of Christ, and trace it briefly in its dogmatic bearing.

Our exposition of the dogma will consist of a summary of what the best theologians have written on the subject.

Person is distinguishable but not separable from *nature*, for no person is really conceivable as existing without a nature; and though human as well as divine nature is distinguishable from person, yet neither is conceivable as existing without person or personality. The human nature of Christ is not human nature divested of personality; it is a human nature as much as is the human nature of Peter or John, but its person is divine, not human. Hence Christ is two distinct natures in one person, which divine person is God or the Second Person of the ever-adorable Trinity. Human nature cannot exist without a personality, and the human nature of Christ was not, and could not have been generated without His divine personality. As our soul united to our body makes but one person, so the Son of God united to the soul and body which He assumed, makes also but one person. Christ as God has a Father but no mother; and as man he has a Mother and no father. Christ as God has a Father because He is the only begotten Son of the Eternal Father. As man He has no father, because He was conceived by the operation of the Holy Ghost. The Blessed Virgin, then, is really the Mother of God, because the Son of God took in her womb a body and soul like ours. Mary really conceived and brought forth the Man-God. The body of the Son of God was formed of the substance of Mary. All this is of faith. The Church is ever on the alert to condemn any error, however slight, regarding the Incarnation, for she knows that on this dogma rests the whole scheme of Christianity. Destroy the Incarnation and all religion becomes a mere name. Grace and Redemption are out of the question.

In the Incarnation it is not the divine nature that loses its personality, but the human nature that gains, instead of its own, the divine personality. God retains in the Incarnation His own divine person, as the one person of the two ever-distinct natures, and is no more

under a finite form as incarnated, than He is as not incarnated. He loses, He gains nothing ; it is the human nature assumed that gains. It is modified and singularly elevated by receiving a divine instead of a human personality ; but God the divine person remains unchanged, unaffected, immutable in all the fulness, majesty and glory of His own eternal and incommunicable divinity. In the Incarnation, the divine nature is not incarnated, but the divine person, that is the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity ; and the Incarnation is not in the divine person becoming subject to the limitation of the human person, but in taking human nature up to Himself, and giving it the dignity of His own person.

Christ is one person, *suppositum hypostasis* or subsistence, and in this one person subsist, forever distinct and inseparable, two natures, the human and divine. So that He is not two persons or two subsistences, but two natures subsisting in one person. The divine nature is common to each of the three persons, all and entire, undivided, indivisible, indistinguished, under each one of them, but the three persons in their personality are distinct from one another, and one can never be another. Person is incommunicable. This is a philosophical axiom. It is an error to suppose that the doctrine of two distinct natures, subsisting in one person of Christ, necessarily implies that of two subsistences ; for two natures may without implying any contradiction have only one subsistence. The word person does not express the limitation or circumscription of rational nature in its completeness or supreme dignity, and therefore may apply to God as well as to man. And since God is unlimited and infinite, person may be infinite as well as finite. It cannot be said that the divine nature is changed after the Incarnation. When we say that God became man, the becoming or change is on the part of the nature assumed, not on the part of the person assuming. There is not and cannot be the least impropriety in predicating all that we predicate of God or the divine nature.

Christ as God is, at the same time, the suppositum of the human nature assumed, and as that nature loses nothing, but gains in perfection by being assumed, or having a divine instead of a human suppositum, there can be just as little impropriety of predicating of Him all that belongs to a perfect man. Human and divine things are predicable of Christ not in a figurative or representative sense, but really and truly, and in the strictest sense of the words ; because He is in the strictest sense both God and man, not in the blending, intermingling, or confusion of the two natures, but in their distinctiveness as the only simple suppositum of the two.

Nature to do or to suffer must be concrete, must have its suppositum, and the doing or suffering, though impossible without nature, is predicable solely of the nature in its suppositum. As the suppositum in Christ is the same for both natures, whatever is done or suffered by Him is done and suffered by one and the same suppositum. He is God because He is a divine person or suppositum, and in Christ the suppositum or person is not separable from the divine nature. He is a man because He has a perfect human nature, and is in His one person its person. The whole mystery of the Incarnation is precisely here. Christ is one Christ, one person, and there is no divine Christ distinguishable from the human and vice versa. The humanity of Christ has no suppositum, never had any suppositum separate and distinct from the divine suppositum of the Word made flesh. The Word did not assume a human person, but a human nature. But this does not dissolve the person of Christ. Nor can it be said that God was born in His divinity, nor that He died in His divine nature; for He was before all worlds, from all eternity, immortal and impassible. This is predicated by His human nature, which from the moment of the Incarnation was as truly His as was the divine nature. Now, as person and nature are inseparable, though distinct, we can say it was truly God that suffered and died for us.

All this is beautifully explained in the Athanasian Creed from which we quote. "Furthermore it is necessary for salvation that we believe rightly the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the right faith is that we believe and confess that Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and man: God of the substance of the Father begotten before worlds; and man of the substance of His Mother born in the world. Perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting. Equal to the Father as touching His God-head; and inferior to the Father as touching His manhood. Who, although He be God and man, yet is not two, but one Christ. One not by conversion of the God-head into flesh, but by the taking of the manhood into God. One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person.

"For as the rational soul and body is one man, so God and man is one Christ who suffered for our salvation, descended into hell, rose again the third day from the dead. He ascended into heaven, He sitteth at the right hand of the Father, God Almighty, from which He shall come to judge the living and the dead. At whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies, and shall give an account

of their works. And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting, and they that shall have done evil into everlasting fire. This is the Catholic faith, which unless a man believe faithfully he cannot be saved."

J. J. QUINN.

AMERICAN CATHOLICS AND EUROPEAN SCHOOL LEGISLATION.

CUI bono? This question has doubtless been asked by many, interested in the present school controversy, who have read a somewhat lengthy Associated Press despatch from Berlin, which came to light some time ago in Baltimore,¹ and was reproduced not only in the secular press throughout the country, but also in some Catholic journals. Its object was ostensibly "to give a review of the policy of the Church towards State schools and of the present condition of the school question in the principal countries of Europe," and its author was said to be "a Catholic prelate deeply interested in the subject of public education."

The despatch might have been forgotten or passed over if a certain importance, as well as a wider circulation among Catholics, had not been recently given it by the fact that Dr. Bouquillon introduced it into the last installment of his well-known pamphlet: *Education: to whom does it belong?*² The author makes some comments on the despatch which, despite his former protest of dealing only with "theoretical principles," are very suggestive of definite practical tendencies.

As "the facts" of the despatch are not quite true and as the deductions actually drawn from it are seriously misleading, we deem it an honored duty and a service done to American Catholics to set forth the actual facts, and to point out the legitimate conclusions following upon them so far as they can be of any use to us in the struggle for maintaining a right position on the subject of popular education.

The facts stated in the despatch must for clearness' sake be briefly repeated. They are substantially as follows: In *Prussia*, "the programme of the deputies and of the bishops does not propose that the Church shall have free (parochial) schools over which the State is to have no rights . . . the Church in no wise denies the

¹ Baltimore, Sun., Dec. 23. ² A Rejoinder to the *Civiltà Cattolica*. Appendix pp. 35-41.

right of the State over the schools ;” “ a similar policy has been adopted by the Church in *Austria* ;” in *France* the Catholics “ without ceasing to adhere to the new system (of ‘ gratuitous and compulsory education ’) sought to secure the right of both Church and State” certain bishops “ employed the official teachers (of neutral schools) to give catechism lessons outside of school premises” and “ have carefully abstained from issuing any edicts depriving of the sacraments those parents who send their children to neutral (non-sectarian) schools ; in *Belgium* “ the Holy See obliged the Belgian episcopate to assume the same position with regard to M. Frère-Orban’s law on non-sectarian education ; in *Italy* “ a concerted effort is everywhere being made to promote religious instruction in the public and obligatory schools by a prudent compliance with circumstances.”

From “ these facts ” the sender of the despatch draws the following conclusions for the benefit of American Catholics : “ *First*, that the Catholic Church does not practically contest the right of the State over the primary schools, and that this implied recognition is especially admitted in German-speaking countries ; *second*, that the Church everywhere strives to have religious instruction given in the public schools by adapting itself to the existing laws ; *third*, that the Church never condemns to deprivation of the sacraments those who send children to public schools in which there is no immediate and certain danger to faith and morals ; *fourth*, that the State school in which religious instruction is given seems to be the *practical ideal of the Catholic parties* of the Continent.”

Let us examine the “ facts ” and in doing so keep in mind the avowed object of the despatch which was : to show the attitude of European Catholics towards *neutral schools* and the *principles* defended by them in regard to the “ direct ” and “ proper ” right or mission of the *State* to educate and to establish compulsory education.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

For the better understanding of the present state of school legislation in Europe it will be necessary to make a brief historical review.

Up to the Reformation, State schools, as well as compulsory education, were wholly unknown in Europe. The Church had entire control of the school. Janssen, in his learned work,¹ bears out the

1 See the chapter on “ Popular Schools ” before the Reformation, I, 2.

assertion that the Church was never more active in the matter of popular education than precisely in the XVth century, and this particularly in Germany. In the articles of the peace of Westphalia (Art. 32) the school is mentioned as the "annexum religionis," and it is stipulated that all things connected with Church and school should be left to the management of each denomination. This same stipulation was formally renewed in 1803 for the then German Empire.¹ Luther and Melancthon had earnestly recommended that the secular princes, as supreme masters temporal and spiritual of their realms, should have control of the schools. It was an efficient measure for carrying into practice the principle: *Cujus regio ejus et religio.*

The same principle obtained in France through the Revolution. According to Danton the children belonged to the State first and then to the parents. The *Université*, that is to say, the central board of education for the whole of France, established by Napoleon I, although it introduced once more religious instruction into the schools, was, in point of fact, imbued with the ideas of State-absolutism. This spirit has prevailed in France up to the present day. It was in truth French influence which introduced State education in several of the states of Germany, whilst at the same time the influence of the Church was being constantly weakened by the spoliation of her possessions. Prussia's Protestant government hastened to proclaim in its Landrecht (public right), 1794, Feb. 6, the following principle, which has been and still is a part of the so-called "Prussian traditions:" "All public institutions for instruction and education are under the control of the State, and are at all times subject to the examination and visitation of the State authorities."² In the same right the popular schools are distinctly declared to be "Institutions of the State."³ In Catholic Bavaria compulsory education was introduced by Minister Montgelas, a freemason. Josephinism willingly aided the work of the secret societies in Austria by promoting State education. Liberalism, under the deceitful motto, "instruction laïque, gratuite et obligatoire," is to-day in all European States the heir and promoter of the principles of 1789 in general, and of compulsory State education and school monopoly in particular.

¹ Decree of the Deputies, Feb. 25, 1803.

² "Alle öffentlichen Unterrichts- und Erziehungsanstalten stehen unter der Aufsicht des Staates und müssen sich den Prüfungen und Visitationen desselben zu allen Zeiten unterwerfen."

³ Veranstaltungen des Staates.

I.—PRUSSIA.

Only one-third of the population of Prussia is Catholic. Their representatives, the illustrious Deputies of the Centre, must of necessity be, and remain, a minority in the Prussian Landtag,¹ which includes the House of Representatives (Abgeordnetenhaus) and the Senate (Herrenhaus). The majority in both Houses is composed of the Conservatives, almost all Protestants, and of the different parties of Liberals, who are bound together by a common tie—hostility towards the Catholic Church. As the King of Prussia is at the same time the Summus Episcopus of the Protestant Church, it has never happened, within the last forty years, that any loyal Catholic was chosen to be member of the ministry. The Minister of Public Worship especially has always been a Protestant. The Government, Conservatives and Liberals unanimously declare, that all schools are “institutions of the State,” that the State must have supreme control over all teaching, including religious doctrine. Under such circumstances it is manifestly futile to expect that the Government or Parliament would ever recognize the full rights of the Church in the matter of education. Never. Nay, this very Government and this majority consider themselves justified in making laws concerning the internal management of the Catholic as well as of the Protestant Church. They have done so, and many of these laws are still in force. It is true that many of them, as v. g. those concerning the administration of Church property, have been “recognized” by the Catholic body, that is, the Catholics have “adapted” themselves to the circumstances, and this with the approbation of the Pope and the Bishops. Every pastor in Prussia (we speak from experience!) knows what a vexation such measures are; but he must accept them and comply with them if he is to remain a “possibility.” As long as Prussia exists, the Catholic pastors will have to be satisfied with this “practical ideal.” These measures form in Prussia a part of the “religious-political legislation of the State,” they guarantee what is called “the obligatory State control over the administration of parishes.” The Bishops do not protest against them, neither does the Centre party; it may be truly said that “the programme of the Deputies and of the Bishops does not

¹ It throws a curious light on the information of the Berlin correspondent who sent the above mentioned despatch that he repeatedly mentions the “Reichstag” in connection with the school-law of Prussia. The *Reichstag* or Imperial Parliament has nothing to do with the school-legislation of Prussia, which is within the exclusive province of the “Landtag” or legislative body of that kingdom.

propose that the Church shall have free" administration of the parishes "over which the State is to have no rights;" they do not "claim" independence of this administration; they "do not practically contest such rights of the State"—but this passive though express compliance with the existing laws and conditions is far from "implying" that the Catholics of Prussia recognize the management of schools as the proper and special "right of the State." And to propose such a condition of things as the *practical ideal* for American Catholics is in reality an insult to the Catholic episcopate of America as to that of Prussia which would be far from sanctioning such an ideal if it were not a practical necessity.

The Catholic Centre party of Germany has become remarkable throughout the world for two things: Its unfailing adherence to Catholic teaching as well as loyalty to the authority of the Church, and the prudent diplomatic discernment of its leaders. In all questions of moment it has acted according to the well known principle of Montalembert: *en politique il n'y a de légitime que ce qui est possible*. And this has been its deportment in the school question. It has never yielded in its political programme even the smallest right of the Church; but, on the other hand, it has had the sagacity not to advocate in that programme certain propositions of the syllabus, although it has always manfully defended the syllabus in all of its propositions, not excepting those regarding education, whenever there was occasion for doing so. That only is *possible* for the Centre in Prussia, for which it can obtain the consent of the Government and of at least a part of the majority of the House. For this reason it has never combatted compulsory education; it recognizes the present situation and "has always maintained" conjointly with the Conservatives, "that Church and State should cooperate peaceably and harmoniously in the management of secular and religious instruction." It supports with all its power the religious tendency of the Prussian Government, which always recognized the necessity of religious instruction, and which could never be induced by the Liberals to make the State schools non-denominational or neutral, not even during the Culturkampf. Hence the despatch is at fault when it says that the Catholics protested, because "under the Falk ministry the priest and Catholic instruction were excluded from the primary schools." The Falk school laws were strenuously opposed by the Catholics because they distinctly and openly asserted the *principle* that the schools belong to the *State alone*, that the State has the control over *all* branches of instruction,

over all teachers, those of religion included, not only in the elementary schools but in seminaries as well ; the Catholics were opposed to the Falk Laws because they removed many priests—not all—from the position of provincial or local inspectors of schools, and by a system of “ simultaneous ” or “ mixed ” schools made it impossible in many places—not everywhere—for the clergy to teach or manage or even visit the schools. It sounds almost like irony, when the despatch, after thus misleading its readers, adds : “ what was claimed, however, by the Catholics in all protests and petitions (against the Falk Laws) was not freedom of education.” Every one knows that the era of the Falk Laws was a time when the State more than ever oppressed the Church, when many Bishops and priests were imprisoned or exiled, when it was forbidden to say Mass without the permission of the State. It was a time then when Catholics did not think of seeking vindication of the rights of education, because they had not even the liberty to *live* and *die* as Catholics !

What course did the Centre pursue in the school question when the Government ceased open hostility, and was forced to call religion to its aid in its onslaught upon Socialism ? In the words of the dying Emperor, William I., whose life the assassin Nobling had attempted, it proclaimed aloud : “ Religion must be given back to the people.” Hence the State school must again be made denominational everywhere, and the minister of religion must be allowed *free* access to the school ! This was at the time not only the most necessary measure, but also the only possible one. The Government and the majority of the Houses upheld the “ principle of the State’s control over all schools ; ” the Protestant minister, Stoecker, one of the leaders of the Conservatives, declared solemnly, as late as 1889, that “ it would never be permitted in Prussia to teach this principle.” On this account Dr. Kopp, Bishop of Breslau—who is also a member of Herrenhaus,—declared, as the despatch says, “ that the State school principle should not be discussed.” On this account Windthorst said expressly in the Abgeordnetenhaus : “ We demand only what we *can* and *must* demand ; we acknowledge the constitution, because it guarantees religious instruction, and we will support it ; we ask only for the abolition of the State control established by the Falk Law and the acknowledgment of the principle that the Church alone has power to *direct* (leiten) religious instruction.” Even in 1889 the principle was not recognized by the majority in Parliament, and Windthorst’s proposition was defeated. The despatch says : “ In order to reach a thorough

understanding of this campaign, which was begun some time ago by Herr Windthorst, one should remember that the Church in no wise denies the right of the State over the school, but does deny the right of the State to exclude the co-operation of the Church." But we would also call to mind the fact that neither in Prussia nor anywhere else has the Church ever affirmed the inherent, special and proper right of the State over the schools. As far as the practical side of the question is concerned we know that the Church does not actually contest the right over primary education which Prussia and all the States mentioned assume. This is simply recognizing a condition of affairs which the Church could not prevent, however much she might wish to do so, and her prudent compliance with circumstances by no means involves any recognition of the right as inherent in the State. Thinking only of the salvation of souls, she adapts herself to the existing laws. Not being able to struggle against brute force, she demands that the souls, so dear to our Divine Saviour, may not be taken away from her entirely, and that some place may be left to her ministers in the State schools; and when a modern State, like Prussia, from motives of self-preservation, opens the doors of its schools to religious teaching, she accepts, even with gratitude, what she might otherwise demand in strict justice. But surely this is not a normal situation. Nor is it befitting the divine mission of the Church and its right and duty of teaching all nations in virtue of the divine "ergo" (*data est mihi omnis potestas, euntes ergo docete. . .*) independent of every earthly power. There can be but two motives for the action of the Church in such cases as those mentioned: the arrogance of the modern State and her own love of souls. The Centre party in Prussia follows faithfully this attitude of the Church. Instead of generalizing the fact and of deducting from it his favored conclusion for the American public, the author of the despatch "from Berlin" would have done better to study the fact and the question *in Berlin* itself, "in order to reach a *thorough* understanding of this campaign." If he had consulted the heirs of the great Windthorst's policy in this matter, he would have learned the following facts:

1st.—That compulsory education (*Schulzwang*) as it exists in Prussia, is compulsory education in the State school (*Zwangsschule*); that the Catholics are not allowed to establish their own schools; that they demanded in vain for many years the permission to estab-

lish at least a Catholic University which the Government refused in so categorical a manner, that they entirely abandoned the project.

2d.—That the Centre party never affirmed in its programme that the State as such had the mission to educate.

3rd.—That the *Catholic Deputies* considering the question from their own practical standpoint did not, do not, and will not protest against compulsory education: *a*, because such protestation would be fruitless in view of the “Prussian traditions;” *b*, because by it, as proposed, religious instruction is also secured to Catholic children; *c*, because the establishment of parochial schools would be actually impossible in many parishes without the aid of the State; that therefore they claim only the abolition of the “Zwangsschule,” and demand the liberty to have free schools or at least private schools.

4th.—That the “practical ideal” of the German Catholics was expressed in the meeting of all the Bishops of Germany (not only of Prussia,) held in Würzburg, November 14, 1848, in the following words: “The Church claims now as it ever did, the unrestricted liberty of instruction and education, the establishment and direction of her own institutions for instruction and education in the widest sense.” “We must reject,” said they, “every measure which encroaches on this domain as incompatible with the just claims of the Catholics of Germany.”

5th.—That “in order to foster among the Catholic people the true principles concerning education” and to “prevent the loss of correct views on the school question by the autocratic ruling of the State,” a society, the “Canisiusverein,” was founded during the Culturkampf with the express purpose of keeping the people enlightened in this matter; that the most prominent Catholics and Catholic writers on pedagogy are at the head of this association;¹ that the first pamphlets published in the name of this society bear the title: “State education as a principle is to be rejected,” “State education in its consequences is pernicious;” that the same principles were developed again and again almost every year in the great

¹ To wit: Dr. Haffner, Bishop of Mayence; Dr. Knecht, Dr. Schulte, Dr. Kleinheidt, etc. On the committee are among others Barou de Loë, Dr. Schaeffler, Dr. Dasbach, Deputies of the Centre party.

Catholic Congresses of Germany and explained by many Catholic writers besides those mentioned of that country.¹ All the works of the "Canisiusverein" are written in the same spirit; not in one of them a natural right over education is attributed to the State. The Deputy Dasbach, well known as one of the most scholarly and worthy priests of Germany, an editor of several journals learnedly defends the thesis: "The State has neither an innate nor an inherited nor an acquired right over the education of youth; it has only such right as it took for itself and which Liberalism everywhere claims for it, which is but a constitutional or legal right." This throws some light upon the statement of the despatch that "compulsory education is dear to the German heart at this very time in Germany!" The views of the German Catholics must not be confounded with those of their non-Catholic compatriots, especially when one wishes to prove that the right of the State over education is "The Catholic principle." We should certainly not cavil with a Catholic writer for using his liberty in defending the advantages of compulsory education; we also know that there are among German Catholics those who strongly advocate it, but we protest against the statement that such is or has been the attitude of the "Catholics of Germany" or of their leaders, the Bishops and the Centre party. It might be said that militarism also is "dear to" certain "German hearts," even to some "Catholic hearts." Why? Because the bureaucratic atmosphere in which they have habitually lived has made the people become accustomed to it and to lose sight of the principles of natural liberty. "We have for several decades been accustomed," says the Bishop of Mayence, "to a State monopoly and compulsory education. We are much like children who having been violently torn away in their infancy from their home, have almost forgotten it and look upon their captors as their rightful parents."²

To the foregoing facts we add that,

6th.—As is well known, the present Government of Prussia, the Emperor and his Chancellor Caprivi at its head, is profoundly convinced of the necessity of religious instruction in the popular schools.

¹ "Die Staatserziehung ist im Princip verwerflich;" "Die Staatserziehung ist in ihren Folgen verderblich," by the celebrated Dr. Knecht. See also Lucas "der Schulzwang ein Stück moderner Tyrannei;" Annuarium Osseg (Pachtler); "Die geistige Knechtung der Völker durch das Schulmonopol des modernen Staates."

² The Rt. Rev. Dr. Haffner, address before the Catholic Congress of Mayence, September, 1875,

The principal object of the law proposed by the Government a few weeks ago was to suppress all simultaneous or mixed schools and to establish definitively and everywhere denominational schools. What we have said above about the parliamentary parties in Prussia makes it evident that such a law can pass only with the co-operation of the Conservatives and the Centre. Even in the law as originally proposed by the Government there are two points which evidently recall the "Prussian traditions." It declared, 1st, that the schools are "an institution of the State:" 2d, "that the teachers of religion are appointed by the school-board."¹ The Centre party immediately declared that it *neither could or would ever accept the bill* with these features, and *that it would rather sacrifice all the advantages to be derived from the new law than depart in the least from its Catholic principle.* Dr. Hermes, in a pamphlet just published in Germany, explains the Catholic standpoint very clearly. He says: "The fundamental idea of the law is absolutely incorrect. Why? It is certainly the province of the popular school to educate. *But it is not the office of the State, as such, to educate*; this only comes immediately within its sphere; its primary office, above all else, is *to protect the rights of its citizens.* The State is not father, but only the chief protector of right *in foro externo.*"²

Another fact is still more eloquent. In the report of the Commission instituted last February to examine the law of instruction, the following phrase was found: "The public school (Oeffentliche Volksschule) is an institution of the State and is under its control."³ Both the Conservative and Liberal members of the Commission voted in concert for this clause, but the members of the Centre voted with equal unanimity *against it.*

It is well known how, through the combined agency of atheistic socialists and liberalists, the bill has had to be withdrawn. But this very fact goes to show with what hostile elements the Catholics in Prussia have to contend even in their most just claims, and how handicapped they are in shaping what has been miscalled their "practical ideal!" No, indeed; Prussia is not the land to give birth to such ideals—nor to any which could serve as a model for free-born Americans. Ideals assuredly can and must be modelled according to existing circumstances, but one of the most essential

¹ "Die Lehrer werden von der Schulbehörde mit der Ertheilung des Religionsunterrichts betraut." Begründung des Entwurfs² J. 17, par. 18.

² Der Katholische Standpunkt in Bezug auf den Entwurf des Volksschulgesetzes wahrheitsgetreu dargelegt von Dr. Hermes. Cologne, 1892.

³ Die Oeffentliche Schule ist eine Veranstaltung des Staates und steht unter seiner Aufsicht.

conditions of their growth and thriving is an atmosphere of genuine liberty !

AUSTRIA.

After Prussia the despatch next deals with Austria. "A similar policy has been adopted by the Church of Austria. The Austrian Catholics have constantly acknowledged the *same principle* and defended the *same doctrine*." (Italics ours.) "They have ever been unanimous in demanding that the Government should show due respect to the rights of the Church, though *never questioning the State's own rights*." Quite recently the Episcopate "proclaimed this policy of adaptation to the present system of obligatory State schools."—As a matter of fact we would state that,

1. The "Church of Austria" follows no other principles in the question of education than does the universal Catholic Church. The Austrian Episcopate and Austrian Catholics no more defend the so-called rights of the State in education as a principle or doctrine than did the Catholic party in Prussia.

2. Unfortunately Liberalism has had controlling influence in the ministry of Austria as well as in its Parliament, for years. Since 1866, when the Protestant Chancellor, Herr von Beust and the ministry of Plener & Co. came into power, the Liberal majority introduced non-denominational schools into a country almost exclusively Catholic, and sought to eliminate religion in every way from public instruction. These liberal schools have been most detrimental to the religion and morals of the country, and have moreover undermined the traditional Austrian patriotism. True to its programme, Liberalism looks upon the schools as obligatory State institutions. The so-called reaction, under the undecided ministry of Count Taaffe, did not bring about any essential change in this respect. The Catholics, as a Parliamentary party, have not the unity and therefore not the strength and influence of the Centre in Prussia. On this account the system which the "Catholic Prelate" of the despatch calls the "practical ideal" is forced upon the Austrian Bishops by circumstances; they openly lament the present situation and point out the harmful effect of the State schools both to Church and Government; they insist upon the necessity of religious doctrine as the principal branch of instruction, and upon the right of the Church to control the religious part of education.

3. Thus the Catholics of Austria are simply forced to adapt themselves to the present system in as far as their religious convictions

will allow. "This adaptation," as the despatch correctly states, "is a part of their programme; but the author confounds two very distinct ideas and contradicts himself when he represents the unavoidable "adaptation to a system" as equivalent to a defence of the "principles" and of the "doctrine" on which that system is founded.

4. Again, if the Catholics in their practical programme have "never questioned the State's right" in the matter of education, circumstances show quite plainly that the maxim "qui tacet consentire videtur" can find no application here.

5. A small district in Austria has its own constitution, it is the entirely Catholic Vorarlberg, next neighbor to the Catholic Tyrol, both being subject to the same administration. Liberalism has no home here and Catholics can freely harmonize their practical ideal with their religious convictions. This they have done by a law passed in the Legislature of Vorarlberg in the year 1876. The first paragraph of that law under the heading: *Principles* for the organization of the Catholic elementary school system, reads thus:

I. "The entire, corporal as well as spiritual education of the child is by the law of nature a duty, and hence an inviolable right of the *family*.

II. "It is the duty of the Catholic family to give the child a *Catholic education*. The family cannot give the child a Catholic education without the *Church*. The Church, therefore, by reason of the right of the family, by reason of her own divine mission, has for her province the education of the child, by imparting knowledge in the matters of faith and morals, by dispensing the Sacraments and by supervising all other instruction, so that it may remain in harmony with her educational method.

III. "It is the office of the State to *protect* the rights of the family and also of the Church in education."¹

Such is the language of the Catholic people of Austria! This is the true doctrine of the Church, these the principles of natural law, clearly evincing the proper conception of the State's office.

FRANCE.

"In France," says the despatch, "legislation has entirely banished religious instruction from the public schools which are non-

¹ See Osseg, L. c. p. 117.

sectarian, gratuitous and compulsory." One should think that American Catholics had but little to learn from such a state of things. Yet the author seems to judge otherwise. The French had no choice but to follow out certain well-known principles, sufficiently known to every Catholic in the United States, but the application of which everywhere and at all times is justified only by actual necessity. The despatch apparently wants to convey a different view, as is plain from the portions which Dr. Bouquillon italicizes. "The Deputy Brun suggested," it says, "the following modification: 'Upon the request of parents the ministers of certain creeds or persons deputed by them, *shall be allowed to impart religious instruction on the school-premises and outside of class hours;*'" and "the Bishops employed the official teachers *to give catechism lessons outside of the school-premises.*" This harmonizes excellently with the plan adopted in Minnesota and the authors of the latter thus find their justification in the fact that it is practised in France.

But the despatch forgets to add that the Bishops mentioned, viz., Guilbert, Dounet, Bonnechose and Freppel did not propose to surrender to the State any schools over which they had actual control and which were Catholic, and thus barter the religious for a neutral school, proclaiming that they would be satisfied with "outside" religious instruction.

In their last letter the French Cardinals expressed in most emphatic terms their indignation in view of the fact that the French youth should have been given over to the neutral State schools and they confess their regrets that they cannot remedy the evil by instituting free parochial schools. The renowned theologian, de Margerie, Professor at the Catholic University at Lille, describes in the "Revue de Lille" the evil which the godless schools have brought upon his country, and concludes with the remark that a people who defend State schools under such circumstances sign their own death warrant or "commit suicide." Listen to the judgment which experience and observation has forced from some impartial French Liberals, who have not sacrificed their convictions to anti-religious sects:

"We no longer live in a time," said Laboulaye, "when a minister can appear before the Chamber and say that public instruction and education belong to the State and are subject to the supreme directions of the Government. The hand by which the State tries to control the spirit of the rising generation, and the right which is claimed for the State power to form young according to its own

fashion, are to-day rejected by all parties whatsoever. We simply demand of the Government to guarantee us general security and private liberty, we *refuse to grant the State the right to take the place of the family and the individual.*¹

“*Neutral instruction,*” declares Jules Simon, “*is no instruction.*” “The State,” says the famous academician, as early as 1863, “is obliged to prepare for its own resignation” (in the matter of education).²

And Guizot : “Il faut que l’instruction soit profondément religieuse, pour qu’elle soit vraiment bonne et socialement utile. Et je n’entends pas seulement par là que l’enseignement religieux y doit tenir sa place, et que les pratiques de la religion y doivent être, observées ; un peuple n’est pas élevé à de si petites et si mécaniques conditions : *il faut que l’éducation populaire soit donnée et reçue dans une atmosphère religieuse, que les impressions et les habitudes religieuses y pénétrèrent de tout part. La religion n’est pas une étude ou un exercice auquel on assigne son lieu et son heure ; c’est une loi qui doit se faire sentir constamment et partout, et qui n’exerce qu’à ce prix, sur l’âme et la vie, toute sa salutaire action. C’est à dire que dans les écoles primaires, l’influence religieuse doit être habituellement présente.*” (Mémoires, tome III, pp. 68-69.)

ITALY.

We shall not dwell on the official State-schools of modern Italy ; but merely intend to mention the two facts emphasized by the despatch, namely, that the “public school is obligatory,” and that “a concerted effort is everywhere being made (by the Catholics) to promote religious instruction in the public schools by a *prudent compliance with circumstances.*” We patiently wait for another despatch to tell us wherein the “prudent compliance with circumstances” consists, and, above all, what Catholics are to gain by it ! In the meantime it suffices for us to know what the despatch itself concedes, viz., that practically the Italian school-law “is very

¹ “Nous ne sommes plus en temps où un ministre (Royer-Collard) pouvait dire à la chambre que l’instruction et l’éducation publique appartiennent à l’état et sont sous la direction suprême du gouvernement. Cette main mise sur l’esprit des générations nouvelles, ce droit reconnu à la puissance publique de façonner à sa guise la jeunesse, sont aujourd’hui repoussés par tous les partis, sans distinction d’opinion. Nous ne demandons plus au gouvernement que de garantir la sécurité générale et la liberté privée, nous refusons à l’état de se substituer à la famille et à l’individu.” (See Verhaeghen, “l’État hors de l’École,” p. 22.)

² L’enseignement neutre est un enseignement nul ; “L’État est obligé de préparer sa destitution,” (en matière d’instruction.) Ibid. p. 51.

troublesome and prejudicial." The practical conclusion for us is to be found in the example of the Holy Father himself, who "has founded many free schools in Rome," the more so, because we know that *free Catholic schools* are the practical ideal of Leo XIII. for all countries in which they are possible.¹

BELGIUM.

What the despatch tells of Belgium surprised us most of all. The report is incomplete as well as inexact; far from giving even an approximately correct conception of the Belgian situation in regard to schools, it is designed to create a false impression concerning it. Yet Belgium, of all countries in the world, is the one that might teach American Catholics a most salutary lesson by the stand it has taken in the school question. The reason is: 1st. Because Belgium is, by virtue of its constitution, the freest country of Europe. 2d. In no other country, particularly during the past fifteen years, has the school question been treated more thoroughly by Catholics in the Legislature or spoken and written about more exhaustively. 3d. Nowhere did Catholics have a better opportunity of giving full expression to the Catholic principles on instruction and education both theoretically and practically. 4th. Nowhere were the divinely appointed teachers of the people—the Bishops—more free and independent in upholding the principles of the Church; nowhere were these principles carried out with greater determination and unanimity. 5th. For many years the Catholics of Belgium were in the same situation with regard to schools as Americans are, for all the State schools were declared neutral. Lastly—6th. The Catholics were given an opportunity of expressing their views regarding religious instruction outside of school hours, which the State allowed and urged.

Our despatch says nothing about the principle or the doctrine which the Catholics of Belgium defended in this question. It tells us nothing about their practical ideal, much less does it make mention of the great struggle for free parochial schools, a struggle in which the Belgian Catholics were really "a spectacle unto angels and men." At all this the "interested prelate" does not even hint, but rather leaves the reader, unacquainted with the circumstances and under the impression that the Belgian episcopate was foremost in urging the compromise in favor of the neutral school and as though

¹ See Letter of Leo XIII. to the Bishops of England, Nov., 1886.

this were done by order of the Pope himself! The following is the entire report, italics included, upon Belgium.

In 1879 the Holy See obliged the Belgian episcopate to assume the same position (as the French Catholics) with regard to M. Frère-Orban's law on non-sectarian education. It is true that in the beginning the Bishops of Belgium refused to authorize the State school teachers to teach the catechism. But the instructions given by the Cardinal of Mechlin, June 14, 1880, which in accordance with the Pope's demand, considerably modified those previously issued, simply forbade the teachers to presume to teach the catechism "without having obtained from ecclesiastical authority explicit permission to do so, which permission, for certain special reasons, may be granted them." In 1879 Monsig. Vannutelli wrote, by order of the Pope, to the Cardinal of Mechlin: "I find the principle under consideration very just and very much in accordance with the decisions of the Roman congregations, viz. : *That those schools alone deserve condemnation in which there is a true and real danger to the faith or morals of the pupils.* Hence if, notwithstanding the new law, this or that school, under whatsoever management it may be, offers no real danger to the faith and morals of the pupils, said school is to be exempted from the general condemnation, and children cannot be forbidden to attend such schools."

Does it not seem from this report as if the Belgian Bishops could teach us better how to hide the Catholic standard instead of openly unfurling it as they actually had done? Surely the solution of the school question for us Catholics does not consist in merely making concessions to the arrogant claims of others. To the honor of Belgium and for the sake of truth, let us correct these misstatements and briefly relate the true condition of things in that land of valiant Catholics. We do this not without a glow of enthusiasm, for we were privileged to witness in person what we believe to be the grandest success in the effort to settle the school problem which our century has thus far seen.

I. The following is a summary of the political programme of the Belgian Catholics on "the rights of the State:"

a.—The representatives of the Belgian Catholics in the Legislative Chambers have not at any time defended compulsory State instruction or education, they *never admitted State compulsion* of any kind; on the contrary, they always rejected it explicitly both as a principle and as a practical measure, and they still reject it vigorously to this day.

b.—The Belgian Catholics, in their programmes or in the laws which they enacted, never recognized the so-called “State’s own rights,” viz. : any “proper” and “special” right of the State over education, but they emphatically denied the existence of any such proper right.

c.—Parochial schools, free and independent of the State, were and are even now the practical ideal of Belgian Catholics. According to their view the part of the State in the solution of the school question is none other than that it should *guarantee the freedom of the family* in the matter of education. The only purpose of the public schools is, according to the Catholic view, to supplement the efforts of the family and the individual. When this is necessary, then and only then the State may exercise authority in the field of education.

d.—As regards the neutral public schools the Belgian Catholics in and outside of the legislative body have publicly condemned them. They persistently *refused* a proffered compromise of the Liberals respecting *religious instruction outside of the school hours* as irreconcilable with the dignity of the Church and of religion. The Belgian *Constitution itself* is an irrefutable proof of this. It was framed in the year 1830, when Belgium, after the revolution against the King of Holland, William I, had declared its independence. Catholics were in a great majority in the constitutional congress. The Constitution itself was the outcome of a union with the Liberals (who at that time were not so fanatical as later on) on the basis of freedom. Art. 14 of this fundamental act guarantees “liberty of worship.” Art. 17 reads thus : “Instruction is free ; every prohibitory measure is forbidden. The repression of misdemeanors is regulated only by law. Public instruction at the expense of the State is also regulated by law.”¹

Hence there were to be no obligatory State schools whether denominational or neutral. Nay the Constitution does not even express the obligation of the State to organize public or official State schools; it can do so in a case of necessity, viz. when parents, though they enjoy perfect liberty, are unable to provide for the instruction of their children.²

¹ “L’enseignement est libre ; toute mesure préventive est interdite ; la répression des délits n’est réglée que par la loi. L’instruction publique donnée aux frais de l’État est également réglée par la loi.”

² “Cela (l’article 17 de la Constitution) veut-il dire que cet enseignement de l’État, cet enseignement public sera *organisé de droit*, que ce soit un *enseignement national* ? Non, jamais on n’a pu admettre cette interprétation. L’enseignement de l’État vient remplir la lacune laissée par l’enseignement libre, et l’enseignement de l’État ne doit exister que lorsque cette lacune se présente.” Senator Baron Surmont de Volsbege, Feb. 5, 1892.

Let us hear the words of one of the many framers of the Constitution. Nothomb explaining the spirit and the meaning of the Constitution declared in 1836: "The maintenance of public order lies within the domain of the Government. Outside of this the State is powerless. *Intellectual religious and moral direction is not within the sphere of politics.* Our society has thought itself strong, upright enough, to maintain its own direction in matters of intelligence, religion and morality. *This is what especially distinguishes Belgium;* we might sum up the articles of the Constitution thus: *no intervention on the part of the Government in the intellectual, moral and religious direction of the country.*"¹

This Constitution has its full force as the fundamental Belgian law to this day. Just at this moment the Chambers are preparing themselves for the first time to revise certain articles therein, but as regards the article on instruction not even a motion was made to change it in any way.

The Liberal party, which during the last twenty years has openly shown its hostility against religion, does not conceal that liberty of instruction is a stumbling-block in its way. In Belgium as well as elsewhere they want to de-Christianize the country through the State, and one of the wishes they would have realized is compulsory instruction. At the time when they were in power, of which we shall speak directly, they openly proclaimed the device of the Revolution, "Secular instruction, gratuitous and obligatory." But in Belgium a change in the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority. The Liberals cannot expect this much, least of all at present. If, however, the above article were changed to-day with the consent of Catholics, *it would certainly not be in favor of the advocates of State schools.* The intervention of the State would probably be still more restricted, perhaps entirely excluded. Even during the school struggle, 1879-1884, the watchword with many Catholics was "L'Etat hors de l'école." The State has no business in the school! Minister Malou declared in 1879 that "this summary way of solving the question had a great many adherents among the Catholics of the Parliament;" that "it is the best and most glorious solution of the school question."²

¹ Verhaeghen op. cit. pag. 28. See also *ibid.* the declarations of other prominent members of the Constitutional Congress.

² La première des solutions, celle qui compte de nombreux partisans dans nos rangs a été formulée: "l'Etat hors de l'école!" c. a. d. abdication complète des pouvoirs publics, Etat, provinces, communes; une confiance absolue dans l'action de la liberté seule. Au point de vue de la force de la nation, de la liberté, de l'énergie qui doivent exister dans tous les

Before him Minister Dechamps, brother of the late Cardinal, had declared "free concurrence" to be the system which suited Catholics best.¹ The following fact is very significant. Two months ago, on February 5, 1892, the school question was again touched upon during a discussion on the budget of the Interior, the leader of the Catholic party in the Senate, Mr. Lammens, clearly and unequivocally laid down the principal "*l'état hors de l'école*" as the practical ideal of Belgian Catholics, and declared that in the whole of Belgium "Catholic parents feel a deep aversion for the State schools."² In the same session Baron Orban de Xivey styled this solution of the school question: "*The desire of all those who have the welfare of society at heart,*" "*The traditional principle which is a distinctive character of the Belgian nation.*"³ Baron Lurmout de Volsberghe closed his brilliant speech, on that same day, with the words, "the true principle is 'away with the State out of the school,' and, I repeat, I hope that I myself shall see it realized."⁴

The reader will now understand the reason why the defenders of compulsory education and of the rights of the State over education could not appeal to Belgium. This explains perhaps the laconism or rather the dead silence of the despatch upon the real point in question. But it, furthermore, fails to give us correct information concerning the position of Catholics regarding *neutral* schools. This becomes plain when we consider:

II.—*The position of the Belgian Episcopate and the Belgian Catholics towards neutral schools.*

Belgian Catholics were not satisfied to defend the principle of freedom of instruction. They evinced a constant and untiring zeal for its practical accomplishment. Immediately after the year 1830 they began under the leadership of the Bishops, among whom Mgr.

elements d'une nation libre, c'était certainement la meilleure solution et c'eut été la plus glorieuse."

Malou also adds the reason why the Belgian Catholics did not realize by *legislation* this practical ideal: namely, because the Liberals could not endure Catholic concurrence in the establishment of free schools. He says: "Si elle (cette solution) ne peut pas se réaliser, ce n'est pas notre faute, c'est bien la votre. Nous avons fait notre grande et large part dans cette oeuvre sociale de la diffusion de l'enseignement populaire. Nous serions eu droit de vous dire aujourd'hui: Nous avons fait notre part, faites la votre."

¹ See Verhaegen, p. 43.

² "Je prends acte de ces faits pour justifier *la repulsion* que les peres de familles catholiques éprouvent pour l'enseignement officiel.

³ "Le rêve de tous les gens qui ont a coeur l'avenir de la société," "Le principe traditionnel qui est le caractère particulier de la nation belge."

⁴ "Le principe vrai, c'est l'État hors de l'école, et, je le répète, j'espère en voir un jour la réalisation."

van Bommel, Bp. of Liège, a famous educator, deserves special mention, to erect free schools, without any and every State intervention. The Liberals, as a liberal paper openly confessed, were unable to cope with this kind of courageous self-sacrifice. Therefore, they desired State aid and asked that it be conceded by law. The Catholics met them with that magnanimity which is characteristic of the defenders of truth. They declared that they could do very well without the aid of the State, but admitted it out of consideration for their adversaries. However, they put the condition that the religious character of the schools to be erected by the State should not be interfered with. Thus the school law of 1842 was brought about, which Dechamps very correctly characterized as a "transaction" or a "concordat" when he said: "We admitted State instruction; they (the Liberals) granted legal religious instruction; this was our concordat."¹

The law reads thus: Art. VI, "Primary instruction necessarily embraces the teaching of religion and morals Instruction in religion and morals is under the direction of the ministers of the creed professed by the majority of the pupils in the schools." Art. VII, "The superintendence of the schools as regards instruction in religion and morals is to be exercised by the delegates of the heads of the various creeds." "The ministers of creeds or their delegates *will at all times, have the right to inspect the school.*"²

At that time one of the leaders of the Liberals, Minister Lebau, could still say: "I would consider an anti-religious school-master a real pest."³

But the anti-religious evolution of Liberalism worked itself out in Belgium as elsewhere. The cry: "*il faut arracher les âmes à*

¹ "Voici ce qui s'est passé en 1842, l'opinion libérale se rattachait plutôt aux *idées françaises*, elle demandait qu'on fortifiât l'*action du gouvernement*. L'opinion catholique se rattachait plutôt à l'*idée anglaise*, au système de *libre concurrence*. . . . Quelle fut la transaction? Nous cédaions l'enseignement de l'Etat, on cédait l'enseignement religieux-légal. Voilà quel fut ce concordat." (Verhaegen p. 43-44.)

See also the masterly exposition of Catholic principles in reference to this law in the "Exposé des vrais principes sur l'éducation publique, par Mgr. van Bommel, évêque de Liège," particularly p. 86-87.

² Art. 6. L'instruction primaire comprend nécessairement l'enseignement de la religion et de la morale l'enseignement de la religion et de la morale est donné sous la direction des ministres du culte professé par la majorité des élèves de l'école."

Art. 7. "La surveillance des écoles . . . quant à l'enseignement de la religion et de la morale sera exercée par les délégués des chefs des cultes. Les ministres des cultes et les délégués du culte auront, en tout temps, le droit d'inspecter l'école."

³ "Je n'hésite pas à répondre que je regarderais un instituteur primaire anti-religieux comme une véritable peste." (Verhaegen, p. 31.)

l'èglise” by and by became its open motto, and when the ministry of Frere-Bara-Vanhumbecck came to the helm, in 1878, it immediately manifested its purpose to abrogate the law of 1842, and—of course in the interest of “liberty of conscience” and “national education”—to establish State schools, and neutral State schools at that, for all communities alike. As soon as this intention became manifest a common Pastoral from the six Belgian Bishops appeared, in which they condemned with apostolic fearlessness the neutral schools and prepared Catholics for the approaching contest.¹

But the resolve of the Loges to de-christianize Belgium, small in territory but strong as a bulwark of the Church, did not abate. A new law, entirely contrary to the spirit and even the letter of the Constitution was passed by the Chambers, (by a majority of *one* vote in the Senate). The fundamental article of this law, which is of special interest to us here, reads :

Art. IV. “Religious instruction in the public schools is henceforth to be left to the care of families and to the ministers of the various creeds.”

“A room in the school-building is to be at the disposal of the ministers of the various creeds to give religious instruction to the children of their denomination before or after school hours.”²

It is important to note the tactics of the Freemasons when waging war against religion in a Catholic country. The hypocrisy of the second paragraph is engrafted upon the impiety of the one preceding ; first, religion is entirely banished from the school, then it is re-admitted theoretically whilst practically it is proscribed. Impiety begot the law, hypocrisy was its external garb. A further Pastoral of the Bishops, published immediately after the promulgation of this law, (June 1879) again condemned it and expressly prohibited parents and teachers from aiding to carry out the same. The words of the Bishops re-echoed in the hearts of all the people. A formidable opposition was organized and the most prominent Catholic Deputies as leaders of the people stood firmly by the Bishops. The Liberals were not prepared for so decisive an opposition, hence the Ministry tried by addresses and circulars to the people to win them to the persuasion that “nothing was changed,” (“rien n’est changé !”) that “la religion du peuple,” “la religion de

¹ “Lettre Pastorale,” Dec. 7, 1878.

² “L’enseignement religieux est laissée aux soins des familles et des ministres des divers cultes.” “Un local dans l’école est mis à la disposition des ministres des cultes pour y donner soit avant, soit après l’heure des classes, l’enseignement religieux aux enfants de leur communion fréquentant l’école.”

nos pères" is still held in honor and that it is only intended more distinctly to guard liberty of conscience etc. Vanhumbecck went so far as to allow teachers to impart religious instruction even *during school hours* "as it was formerly done." The people were only by degrees to be made familiar with "the principle" that the school belongs to the State alone and is in no wise under ecclesiastical supervision. We have to keep all these circumstances, in mind, the better to understand and appreciate the energetic measures which the Bishops eventually took. They first of all appealed to Catholic doctrine and the express decisions of the Holy See especially to the decree of Pius IX, for the United States, 24 Nov. 1875, thus to "reprove and condemn" the neutral schools, which "by their very nature, and precisely on account of their neutrality are dangerous and harmful, an attack upon faith, upon piety, and the religious rights of the Belgian people." In their instructions they put as a general principle: "eas (scholas publicas ex se malas et nocivas) nec frequentare, nec instituere, nec regere licet." Exceptions, (si causam gravem habent et praeterea occasio proxima fit remota) for parents as well as for teachers were of course provided for. One item of the instructions of Sept. 1, 1879, which concerns us here in a special manner, lay in the fact that the Bishops withdrew from all teachers of the State schools the *missio canonica*, forbade all of them without exception to give religious instruction upon the ground that the Church "cannot allow that Catholic doctrine be taught *in her name* in schools which are in themselves objectionable, opposed to the tenets of Catholic belief, and established to the injury of religion."¹

The Bishops thought it necessary in the beginning of the struggle not to allow a single exception to this rule, in order at the outset not to imperil the erection of free Catholic schools, and play into the hands of the Government which only allowed religious instruction for the purpose of retaining the children in the State schools. They stated expressly in the first instruction that this general prohibition was necessary "in circumstantiis in quibus nunc patria nostra versatur." After the Pastorals had effected their purpose and had sufficiently convinced the people of the dangerous character of neutral schools, they could, without in the least denying the principle, allow exceptions in particular cases; hence it is said in the resolutions of June 14, 1880, which the despatch mentions, that "teachers are not permitted to explain the catechism in

1 Instructiones practicae pro confessariis, Sept. 1, 1879.

State schools *sine expressa auctoritatis ecclesiasticae licentia quae ob peculiares rationes concedi poterit.*¹ But let us not forget that the Belgian Bishops *never authorized* the clergy or teachers to give *religious instruction* according to the intention of the Government in the department set aside in the school, *outside of school hours.* "You are not so simple," they said, addressing the faithful, "as to allow yourselves to be deceived, and thereby second the true intentions of our adversaries. The school is not a building, four walls and the floor and ceiling of a class-room; the school is the teacher imparting his lessons to his assembled pupils. Religion taught in the school is religious instruction as it is imparted by the teacher or with his assistance during class and as a class matter, under the guidance of the Church."²

The grand result which the Belgian Bishops achieved is the best proof of the wisdom of their measures. "We shall make the earth produce millions, that we may combat this *loi de malheur*, the *écoles sans Dieu* and erect a Catholic school in the shadow of every Church." These words of the Parliamentary leader of the Catholics, Mr. Malou, were literally verified. In less than four years more than 3000 Catholic schools were erected in that little country with its small population of only six millions, while official State schools were more and more deserted, and especially country school teachers had often to face empty benches.

In 1884 the country freed itself from the Masonic yoke in the memorable elections which have been truly styled "le suffrage de l'indignation universelle." A Catholic Ministry came into power and is holding it to this day supported by a majority greater than which no party ever had in the Belgian Parliament. The true reason of this triumph was the "caractère traditionnel" of the Belgians, alluded to above, the "aversion" which the Catholics of the country felt against the Liberal tyranny of conscience. The Catholic

1 A Belgiau Bishop, who took a prominent part in the struggle, writing to us on the subject, says: "When the Belgian Bishops in the beginning of the school struggle refused to allow the catechism to be taught in all the State schools it was evidently not because they held this unlimited prohibition to be prescribed by their principles; but they thought this provision necessary in order that the country might not be deceived by the notorious formula "rien n'est changé," in order that in a Catholic country a law might not be acclimatized, which was the more criminal because it combined with malicious impiety a most perfidious hypocrisy. We did not choose to go into the trap which the Freemasons had set for us; we did not want to permit the faithful to be deceived and look upon a school system as lawful which the Church severely and justly condemned. Later when we had accomplished this, nothing stood in the way of allowing the *missio canonica* under certain circumstances to those who deserved it.

2 Pastoral letter Jan. 31, 1879.

Ministry of Malou-Jacobs naturally did away with the Masonic law and substituted in its stead a school law which above all else breathes the spirit of constitutional freedom and which excludes State compulsion in every form.

After these facts there remains but little to say regarding the statements which the despatch makes. We have only to add that—

1. It is *not true* “that in 1879 the Holy See obliged the Belgian episcopate to assume the same position (as the French Bishops) with regard to Frère-Orban’s school law on non-sectarian education.” The Holy See never did this, neither in 1879 nor at any other time. The conditions in Belgium were not at all the same as those in France.

2. As to the pretended “considerable modification” of the episcopal instructions, the reader will judge for himself from what has been said.

3. It is true that the Nuncio to Belgium, Mgr. Vannutelli, wrote to the Cardinal of Mechlin in the alleged manner, but it is *not true* that he did so “*by order of the Pope.*” A moral theologian will know that the general principle contained in the utterances of the Nuncio was speculatively correct, and the Belgian Bishops never denied it. According to the maxim “*consilium tenemur non contemnere, non vero sequi,*” they, in consideration of the peculiar situation of the Belgian Catholics, have always maintained their own practical application of the advice given by the Nuncio. Their regulations, therefore, “*de frequentandis scholis publicis,*” have always remained the same, and they were also approved of at Rome.

4. From the despatch it appears that there was a difference of opinion between the Holy See and the Belgian Bishops. The reader unacquainted with the circumstances would so conclude. Yet it is not the case. On the contrary, the Holy See publicly and solemnly approved of the stand which the Belgian Bishops and Catholics had taken; and all this in spite of a Masonic Government, which in a manner coerced the Nuncio to obtain from Rome a declaration opposed to the Bishops. To accomplish this Frère-Orban employed diplomatic intrigues as well as bold impertinence; the most abject and despicable means which he used against the Holy Father was the threat to dismiss the Nuncio and to break off all diplomatic relations with the Holy See in case of refusal. If we consider the humiliation which such a threat implied and must have caused the august prisoner of the Vatican we find it doubly regretful that his situation should have been made the background of a

discussion about the Belgian school law. The Holy Father himself wrote twice to the King of the Belgians, asking him to repeal this law. Cardinal Nina, Secretary of State, sent one despatch after another to the Nuncio and the Ministry in answer to the infamous reproaches of Frère. The Vatican did not wish to leave any means untried in order to prevent a break with the Government of a Catholic land. But Frère was not satisfied ; he recalled the Belgian Minister from Rome and banished the Papal Nuncio.

And, what conclusion are we to draw from the various documents regarding the school question which at that time were sent from Rome to Brussels? The Curia has published these documents and clearly indicated the inference which is just and natural. They are a splendid vindication of the Holy See and of the Belgian episcopate.¹ We shall have to omit giving even a brief extract from the documents which lie before us. It is enough to allude to the Allocution of August 20, 1880, in which the Holy Father makes known to the whole world his judgment concerning the action of the Bishops and people of Belgium.

“ We have,” says the Sovereign Pontiff, “ repeatedly condemned the Belgium school law, and reprove and condemn it again” . . .

“ The Belgian Bishops understood perfectly what the circumstances and their duty demanded from them ; they employed all their energy in order to keep from such schools the youth entrusted to their care, and for this reason they erected Catholic schools.”

“ It is a great honor for the Belgians that they devoted themselves so willingly to this eminently opportune work.” . . .

“ In order not to be the occasion of increased hostility, we in the spirit of Christian charity advised the Bishops to proceed mildly in carrying out their prescribed regulations, and to use clemency in the application of the penalties of their laws.” . . . “ But all this did not satisfy the Belgian Ministers. They wanted us to rebuke the Belgian Bishops who most energetically fulfilled their duty, to find fault with conduct which merits naught but praise. We constantly and spontaneously rejected such exactions.” . . . “ The same odious and gratuitous pretexts were employed to banish our

¹ “ Collection des documents publiés par le Saint-Siège relatifs à la question de l'instruction primaire en Belgique et à la cessation des rapports diplomatiques entre le gouvernement belge et le Saint-Siège,” Malines, 1880. The following quotations contain the gist of the whole: “ Les évêques belges, en s'opposant à la nouvelle loi, afin de la rendre moins funeste aux fidèles dan son application, ont obéi à un devoir sacré de leur ministère, et n'out jamais pu être désapprouvés en cela par le Saint-Siège,” p. 13. “ C'est sans aucun fondement et même par une insinuation malveillante qu'on a voulu accréditer le bruit d'un désaccord sur cette question centre le Saint-Siège et l'Episcopat Belge,” p. 16.

Nuncio; it is evident that the dismissal was made solely because we refused to be traitorously false to our duty, because we would in no wise separate ourselves from our venerable brethren, the Bishops of Belgium, *with whom we are of one accord* as we had previously testified."

CONCLUDING REFLECTION.

In conclusion we may be permitted to make the following brief reflection:

1.—What is the real school question for American Catholics? Is it not, first of all, by what schools and methods shall we *most surely* save the souls of our children? Where shall we find the *best guarantees* for the preservation of their faith and their virtue? In what schools are the dangers, by which both are menaced, warded off *most effectually*?

The answer need not come from ourselves. Competent judges, representatives of the authority of the Church, have already given their opinion and their instructions, and that in the most solemn manner, in our Plenary Councils.

Our Bishops legislating on the subject were not ignorant of the laws or of the conduct of European Catholics in regard to them; and it would be absurd and unjust to say that they were not familiar with the "theoretical principles," either theological or philosophical, of this important matter. Now, our Bishops say not a word about inducing Catholic writers to defend what is called the special mission or the particular rights of the State over education. They nowhere intimate that Catholics injure their own cause by denying or not defending these rights and this mission. Indeed some influential members of our hierarchy have more recently endeavored to remove all doubts upon this subject from our minds by declaring in an unequivocal manner that in their opinion the principle of State right in this matter belongs as little to Catholic discipline as to American tradition.

But we find something more than this in the solemn utterances of the assembled Fathers in Plenary Council. In taking up the grave problem of education the Council fixes at the outset upon a very positive programme, which indicates the attitude which all Catholics ought to hold. It may be summed up in these words: *The defence of the rights of the Church in the school, against the encroachments of the modern State.* To begin with, the Council shows its

realization of the present needs by declaring in the very opening sentence that it faces the school question as a serious conflict with the spirit of our own difficult time in which the State seeks supreme control. "*Si ullo unquam tempore, certo haec hac nostra aetate Ecclesia Dei et spiritus saeculi mirando quodam et acerrimo conflixere duello.*"

It adds immediately after : "*Homines enim spiritu mundano penitus imbuti iam multis ab annis, nullum non movent lapidem, ut Ecclesiae, quod ipsa a Christo accepit, Catholicam iuventutem docendi munus eripiant et in manus societatis civilis tradant vel subdant gubernii saecularis potestati.*"

From this declaration, so grave and formal, and from the explanation of it given by the Council, logic and Catholic instinct deduce the following conclusions :

a.—It is the solemn duty of American Catholics, especially in our days, to defend the principle that "the Church has received from Christ the mission of educating the young."

b.—It is their duty to combat the tendency which teaches "that this mission should be conferred upon the State," or that it "should be subordinated to the power of the State."

All the principles announced by the Council accord perfectly with the doctrine which denies the pretended mission of the State, while the advocates of that mission will search in vain for the least support of their theories in the authentic teaching of the American Church.

2.—Do the authorities of the Catholic Church at present exaggerate the dangers of the neutral or secular school?

The Council has sketched those dangers in plain words and they are evidently true :

Inter eos qui hanc educationem mere secularem strenue advocant, non pauci quidem inveniuntur, qui nec religioni ullum detrimentum afferre nec iuventuti pericula parare velint. Attamen ex ipsa rei natura sequitur, et tristissima etiam experientia comprobatur, educationem mere secularem paulatim ita degenerare, ut fiat irreligiosa et impia, adolescentium fidei et moribus maxima berniciosa. (Cap. I.)

Hence the conclusion of the Council in harmony with that of the Holy See : The erection of Catholic schools is "the best and only means" of assuring the good education of our children (*Optimum, immo unicum quod superest medium,*) and in the solution of the school question "nothing is more necessary than the foundation of Catholic schools." (*Omnium consensu nil tam necessarium.*)

Under such circumstances can any one believe that he renders a service to the cause of Catholic education in America by emphasizing the advantages of European State schools?

The Council obliges the priests and the faithful in the most solemn manner) (*conscientias sacerdotum et fidelium . . . strictissime oneramus*) to found Catholic schools, even at the cost of great sacrifices. It is useless to insist here on the difficulties with which the enlightened zeal and the generous devotion of Catholics often come in contact. It is on that account that the Council devotes so much space to the consideration of this subject (six pages,)¹ of how best to promote the erection of parish schools. Surely the recent agitation in favor of State control and the message of "the Berlin prelate," which is evidently a part of it, has shown itself to be out of harmony with the Catholic spirit of our country.

We affirm, without fear of contradiction, from any quarter, that this whole latest controversy so recklessly provoked among Catholics by the advocates of State control has not helped to construct a single school. God grant that it may have been equally ineffectual in preventing or destroying any!

JOS. SCHROEDER.

¹ *De viis et mediis scholas parochiales quam maxime promovendi.*

ANALECTA.

JUS RECENTIUS DE MATRIMONIO NON PRAESUMENDO.

LEO PP. XIII.

Ad Perpetuam Rei Memoriam.

Consensus mutuus, unde matrimonia iusta nascuntur, non verbis dumtaxat sed aliis quoque signis exterioribus patefieri ac declarari potest. Quamobrem Alexander III,* Innocentius III,† et Gregorius IX,‡ decessores Nostri, merito decreverunt ut carnalis copula, si sponsalia de futuro certa ac valida praecessissent, cum in iudicio tum extra iudicium pro vero coniugio haberetur, nisi impedimentum canonicum obstitisset. Et in hac iuris praesumptione tantum roboris inesse voluerunt, ut firmum ipsa statueret sanciretque ius nec probationem contrariam ullam admitteret. Deinde vero matrimonia clandestina, id est non praesente Parocho et duobus tribusque testibus inita, quum Concilium Tridentinum § irrita infectaque esse iussisset, ius illud priscum, ut erat necesse, valere desiit ubicumque promulgata vel moribus usque recepta Tridentina lex. Quibus autem illa locis non viget, in iis semper Apostolicae Sedis iudicium fuit, canones, quos indicavimus, ratos atque firmos permansisse. Sed aetatum decursu, ex conscientia et cognitione christianorum sensim effluxere. Plures enim Episcopi ex iis regionibus, in quibus matrimonia clandestina contra fas quidem inita, sed tamen valida iudicantur, haud ita pridem rogati quid populus ea de re sentire videretur, plane retulerunt, canonicam de coniugii praesumptis disciplinam passim exolevisse desuetudine atque oblivione deletam: propterea vix aut ne vix quidem contingere ut copula inter sponso affectu maritali nec fornicario habeatur: eamque non matrimonii legitimi usum sed fornicationis peccatum communi hominum opinione existimari: imo vix persuaderi populo posse, sponsalia de futuro per coniunctionem carnalem in matrimonium transire.

His igitur rebus et causis, de consilio Venerabilium Fratrum Nostrorum S. R. E. Cardinalium in rebus fidei Inquisitorum generalium, supra memoratos canones et alias quascumque iuris canonici ea de re dispositiones, etiam speciali mentione dignas, per hoc Decretum Nostrum abrogamus et abolemus, et pro abolitis et abrogatis, ac si nunquam prodiiissent, haberi volumus.

* Cap. *Veniens*, de Sponsal. † Cap. *Tuam nos*, eodem tit. ‡ Cap. *Is qui fidem*, eodem tit.
 § Sess. XXIV. Cap. I de Reform. matrim.

Simul per has litteras Nostras decernimus ac mandamus ut deinceps illis in locis in quibus coniugia clandestina pro validis habentur, a quibusvis iudicibus ecclesiasticis, in quorum foro causas eiusmodi matrimoniales agitari et iudicari contingeret, copula carnalis sponsalibus superveniens non amplius ex iuris praesumptione coniugalis contractus censeatur, nec pro legitimo matrimonio agnoscatur seu declaretur. Huius tamen auctoritate Decreti induci nolumus necessitatem formae Tridentinae servandae ad matrimonii validitatem ubi illa forma modo non viget.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die 15 Februarii, MDCCCLXXXII, Pontificatus Nostri anno decimo quarto.

LEO PP. XIII.

PRIVILEGES OF THE BLUE SCAPULAR.

Indulgences.

According to a Rescript of Pius IX, 7th June, 1850, the indulgences of the Blue Scapular may, without exception, be applied to the Poor Souls in Purgatory. The usual conditions for gaining the Indulgences are Confession, Communion and Prayer according to the intention of the Sovereign Pontiff.

Plenary Indulgences.

1. On the day of investiture.
2. For a priest on the day of his First Mass.
3. At the hour of death.
4. At the Annual Retreat
5. On the first Sunday of every month.
6. On Saturdays in Lent.
7. On Passion Sunday and Friday of Passion week.
8. On Wednesday, Thursday and Friday of Holy Week.
9. On Christmas, Epiphany, Easter, Ascension, Pentecost and Trinity Sunday.
10. On the feasts of the Immaculate Conception, the Nativity, Purification, Annunciation and Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary.
11. On the principal feasts of the Theatine Order, viz. : St. Joseph (19th March), Bl. Joseph Mary Thomasio (24th March), Finding of the Holy Cross (3d May), Bl. Paul Buralis (17th June), St. John Baptist (24th June), SS. Peter and Paul (29th June), on the last Sunday of July, on Portiuncula (2d Aug.), St. Cajetan (7th Aug.), St. Augustine (28th Aug.), Exaltation of the Holy Cross (14th Sept.), St. Michael Arch. (29th Sept.), Guardian Angels (2d Oct.), St. Teresa (15th Oct.), All Saints (1st Nov.), St. Andrew Avellino (10th Nov.), Bl. John Marinonio (13th Dec.).
12. On the first and last days of a Novena for Christmas.—At the Forty Hours' Devotion once a year.—On the 12th April.—On one day of the year chosen by the wearer of the Scapular.

Besides the above, there are Plenary Indulgences attached to the visits made to any church of the Theatines, to the Holy Land, to the church of the Portiuncula, to that of St. James of Compostella, and to any of the Seven Station churches in Rome.

Partial Indulgences.

1. An hour's meditation (60 yrs.).
2. Visiting the sick in order to relieve them spiritually or corporally, or, if prevented from doing so, by reciting the Pater, Ave and Gloria five times (20 yrs.).
3. On the Octaves of the feasts of Our Lord, and on the principal patron-feasts of the Augustinian, Dominican, Carmelite, Trinitarian and Servite Orders (20 yrs.).
4. On all feasts of the Blessed Virgin Mary, after receiving the sacraments of Penance and the Holy Eucharist ; on accompanying the Blessed Sacrament when carried to the sick ; on saying seven times the Pater, Ave and Gloria for the sick who have received the Blessed Sacrament ; on visiting a church of the Theatines on any feast of the year ; on reciting the Salve Regina at Vespers for the triumph of holy Church ; on any day from Septuagesima to Palm Sunday, after receiving holy Communion or reciting seven times the Pater, Ave and Gloria for the triumph of holy Church ; on the feasts of the Finding and Exaltation of the Holy Cross. after bestowing some alms ; on three Fridays of every month after receiving holy Communion ; on seven days during a Novena for Christmas ; on every Monday upon visiting the Blessed Sacrament (7 yrs. and 7 quarant.).
5. Visiting a church and reciting five times the Pater, Ave and Gloria (5 yrs. and 5 quarant.).
6. Every day during the Octave of Pentecost (300 days).
7. Each time in attending the preaching of God's word (200 days).
8. On performing any work of piety (60 days).
9. On devoutly invoking the holy names of Jesus and Mary— reciting one Pater, Ave and Gloria for the living and the dead, in some church (50 days).

BOOK REVIEW.

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Father Liberatore, S. J. Translated by Edward Heneage Dering. —London: Art and Book Company. New York: Benziger & Co., 1891., 8v., pp. XXIV, 295.

“This book is not addressed to the learned. That would have required greater powers and more knowledge. It is meant for aspirants and novices. *Virginibus puerisque Canto*. I could have wished for more time to write it in; but my advanced age of nearly eighty years forbade me to expect that.” Thus Father Liberatore, after well nigh sixty years spent in the field of Catholic Philosophy, introduced his “Principles of Political Economy” to the world. With a modesty characteristic of a great mind he tells why he wrote “this little work.” “On the one hand,” he says, “I saw that our young men, not only laymen, but clerics also, had need of initiation in economic science, because it is interwoven with almost all the affairs of civil life; whilst, on the other, I found no course of instruction fitted to be a safe guide for them. The earlier writers on Political Economy had their minds mislead by the sensistic philosophy of their time; and philosophy, when bad, infects, being the root of them, all the other sciences. Those who came after, followed their predecessors blindly, or if they differed from them, wrote nevertheless under the influence of modern liberalism. Now, modern liberalism is like a blue bottle fly. Wherever it settles it leaves a germ of corruption and a bad smell. My intention, therefore, was to prepare something like a compendium of sound principles that would suffice to put young men on the right road, along which they might proceed safely. In carrying out this idea I have availed myself of the theories taught by the best professors, but not without freely discussing their doctrines and refuting their errors.”

The work therefore embodies what its author aimed at—an exposition of the radical principles which run up from Ethics and pervade Economics—showing the way in which *public wealth* must be *produced, distributed* and *consumed*, so as to keep in harmony with man’s nature, moral environment and destiny. It is needless to say that these principles Fr. Liberatore has firmly grasped, that he sets them forth in steady light and in their just bearing on the matter of economic science. The path of his teaching lies, as he says, between the Scylla of liberalism and the Charybdis of socialism. “Liberalism boasted of having introduced into the economic world two grand ideas, freedom and property; but to say the truth, instead of introducing it falsified them, desiring freedom without any restraint, and property unguarded by the duties of its possessor.” He attacks both these errors, and shows “that unlimited competition is bad, and that the rich are bound to give their surplus to the poor. Socialism mainly rests

on the following assumptions: Firstly, that labor is the only source of wealth. Secondly, that the right of having property is dependent on the State. Thirdly, that the State, therefore, has a right to alter the foundations of it and make it collective, instead of individual." He shows first, "that the principal factors of wealth are natural agents, which are incorporated in matter, and are an object of appropriation; secondly, that the right of the individual man to have property is a natural right independent of the State; and thirdly, that the State cannot touch its essence. Private property cannot be justly abolished, even by agreement of all the States together."

These it will be noticed are the lines of the recent Encyclical of Leo XIII. on the labor problem. The book is therefore most timely as giving a scientific development to the truths sent out to the world in that great document.

The extracts we have given show that the translator has put the original in a neat English dress. There is just the faintest foreign color about the style, which, if anything, makes it more attractive. In two ways the version might have been made more useful: 1. by making it bear more on recent kindred English literature—though, of course this would have changed considerably the form of the matter and the compass of the volume; 2. by translating the Latin, French, etc., citations. This would have made the work more extensively available.

AMERICAN CATHOLICS AND THE ROMAN QUESTION

By Mgr. Jos. Schroeder, D. D., Ph. D., Prof. of Dogm. Theol. in the Cath. University of America.—New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Bros., 1892.

The well-written defence by Mgr. Schroeder, of the just claims of the Holy See for independence, which appeared in a recent number of the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, has called forth much favorable comment. The question is one that is frequently misunderstood, even by Catholics, not because there is a lack of reason for a categorical answer to it, but through a false notion of historical facts and through impressions which are imbibed from popular reading and superficial reasoning. "I can easily understand," says Fr. Edmund O'Reilly, whose papers on the *Relations of the Church to Society* have just been republished, "a well-meaning, intelligent, educated Catholic replying, that as to the necessity (of the Temporal Power) there is none, and in his judgment, things would be better otherwise, not exactly as they have been since 1870, but with a different arrangement, still excluding the Temporal Power. I can understand, I say, a reply of this kind being given through want of accurate knowledge, and through impressions made by reading or hearing false statements and superficial sophistry; but I cannot understand its being innocently persevered in after even a brief explanation of how matters really stand." Such and similar reasons have induced the learned apologist of our American Catholic University to issue, in separate book form [and considerably enlarged as to detail, the article on the "Roman Question" in the *Quarterly*.

What recommends the present publication in addition to its merits of style, thoroughness, erudition and the transparent spirit of loyal attachment to the Holy See which breathes from every page, is an analysis of the entire subject at the beginning of the treatise. This puts the reader from the outset into possession of the line of thought and argument and allows him to impress on his mind the various phases which ought to be emphasized in explaining or discussing the subject of the Temporal Power.

We hail these tokens from the Catholic University as signals which mark it as the central watchtower whence the standard of truth and doctrinal unity may ever be recognized by American Catholics and their unprejudiced brethren.

THIRTY-TWO INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MONTH OF MAY AND FOR THE FEASTS OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN. From the French. By Rev. Thos. F. Ward, Church of St. Charles, Brooklyn, N. Y.—Benziger Bros., 1892.

What the careful translator claims in his Preface, namely, that these Instructions "are flowing with a spirit of piety, eminently practical, and especially free from all sentimentalism," is true. Not much more praise could be bestowed on a book, which as a rule, is always in demand by the clergy and of much utility to the laity.

MARY QUEEN OF MAY AND OTHER "AVE MARIA" ESSAYS. By Brother Azarias.—The "Ave Maria," Notre Dame, Ind.

"A handful of wayside flowers" from the garden of Notre Dame, planted there by an ardent lover, and offered in bright blue binding to Mary's children far and wide—such is this little book. There is so much of the Faberian grace in the flow of Brother Azarias' pen when he touches the theme of our Blessed Lady, that we wish he sang of her in all the intervals of grateful tranquillity which his serious tasks of discoursing on philosophical themes allow him. Spread the pretty volume ye Fathers in Christ and Children of Mary!

BOOKS RECEIVED.

GUIDE TO LATIN CONVERSATION, containing a collection of useful words, a list of comparatives and of superlatives, the principal irregular verbs, familiar expressions and phrases, dialogue, etc., etc. By a Father of the Society of Jesus. Translated from the French of the seventh edition, by Prof. S. W. Wilby, Epiphany Apost. College.—Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1892.

- IGNAZ VON DOLLINGER.** Eine Charakteristik von Dr. Emil Michael S. J., Prof. d. Kirchengeschichte, Innsbruck. II Edit. Mit einem. Porträt Döllingers.—Innsbruck: Fel. Rauch. 1892.
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A PAGE FROM THE THEOLOGY OF THE CATACOMBS.

THE history of the first three christian centuries w alway possess an absorbing interest for students, not only because of the number and magnitude of the questions involved, but because of the very scarcity of historical materials. This adds a zest to the task of research, and leaves a wide field for the play of imagination and conjecture. For information we naturally turn to the christian literature of the period. But that was never very extensive, and the greater part of it did not survive the immediate circumstances which brought it forth. If it were not for Eusebius, that christian Varro and “curiositatum omnium explorator,” we should be quite in the dark as to the early polity, teachings and struggles of the christian Church. Not to speak of the fragile material, papyrus or parchment, to which the early ecclesiastical writers committed their works, the closing persecutions of the third century,¹ the neglect of the immediately succeeding ages, the altered tastes and needs of churchmen, brought about the disap-

¹ For the causes of the dispersion of the early Christian libraries see De Rossi, *De origine, historia, indicibus bibliothecae sedis apostolicae*, the preface to *Codices Palatini*, Vol. I. Rome, 1886. cf. Ruinart, *Acta Martyrum sincera* (ed. Ratisbou, 1859,) praef. geu. § 1, no. 4.

What Prudentius (Hymnus de SS. Martyribus Emetherio et Chelidonio) says of the Acts of the Martyrs may be applied to a large share of the early Christian literature.

O vetustatis silentis obsoleta oblivio!
Invidentur ista nobis, fama et ipsa extinguitur,
Chartulas blasphemus olim nam satelles abstulit.
Ne tenacibus libellis erudita saecula
Ordinem, tempus modumque passionis proditum
Dulcibus linguis per aures posterorum spargerent.

pearance of countless precious documents. With the renaissance of historical studies and the improved methods of our age these have become such great *desiderata* that every new discovery awakens the keenest interest. From time to time some Vatican palimpsest or Capitular Archives of Northern Italy disclose a rare document of those primitive ages, some solitary monastery of the Orient yields up the original text or a version of a well-known, long-lost work, some familiar pages of extant patristic writings are recognized to be of the remotest christian ages, some obscure passages of our ancient documents are illumined by a happy ray of exegesis, or a delicate operation of criticism.¹

But these are accidental and disjointed revelations, rare and fragmentary finds, where we look for a richer mine. Long since, the students of early church history became aware that those richer sources of information are to be found in the study of the primitive ecclesiastical institutions, the life, manners, customs, thoughts and hopes of our fathers in the faith, such as their remaining monuments reveal them to us. The written remains of early Christianity are not so obscure to an honest, unprejudiced reader, but fear and passion have begotten a numerous brood of conflicting interpretations. Time was, too, when their integrity was at the mercy of every ignorant or malicious transcriber. The monuments, on the other hand, are comparatively numerous, they speak for themselves, they betray at once any violation of their original form, they are scattered over the christian world, belong to all classes of society and to every epoch of christian development. They are the rich *detritus* left by the broad current of human life as it sweeps down the ages, the undying echoes, the indelible images of the past. It is not that brass and stone and clay may not perpetuate pompous lies and exaggerations,—witness the results of Assyrian and Egyptian research,—but such public unblushing mendacity is rare, and then, our suspicions are naturally aroused where kings and states are the recorders of their own glorious deeds, or when we may justly suspect a substratum of selfish motives. It is quite otherwise with that multitude of unobtrusive monuments in which the every-day life of

¹ Besides the treasures contained in the *Nova Collectio Patrum* of Cardinal Mai, and the *Spicilegium Solesmense*, *Analecta Sacra* and *Analecta Novissima* of Cardinal Pitra, the *Philosophomena*, and the Paschal Letters of St. Athanasius, we may recall the modern discoveries of the entire text of the Epistle of Barnabas and the Epistle of St. Clement to the Corinthians, the Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles, the Canons of Hippolytus, and the fourth book of his commentary on Daniel, the Apology of Aristides, and several other valuable texts.

a people or an age has crystallized. It were monstrous to suppose in their unsuspecting authors a pre-concerted design to deceive the after-comers on the scene of life. Their number, their minuteness, their mutual support and illumination, their happy concord with the written remains, their very simplicity and unpretentious form, their slow accumulation through all the changes of empire, philosophy, and society, are so many guarantees of their veracity,—in a word, they form a compact, indestructible mass of evidence,

Quod non imber edax nec aquilo impotens
Possit diruere, aut innumerabilis
Annorum series et fuga temporum.

I.

The theological value of the ancient monuments was never unknown to our Christian writers. St. Clement of Rome points to the pillar of salt into which Lot's wife was turned, as an example of the results of disobedience. The "Pastor" of Hermas, that earliest manual of moral theology, allegorizes its teachings in the history of the building of a tower. St. Justin refers to a statue of Simon Magus at Rome. The Roman priest Gaius at the end of the second century points to the glorious sepulchres of the Apostles at Rome as proofs of their sojourn and death in the Eternal City. Tertullian refers to the *very chairs* of the Apostles yet preserved in his time, as visible proofs that the apostolic continuity of succession and doctrine still existed. St. Optatus of Mileve appeals to the Chair of Peter at Rome, to which no heretic could have access, Eusebius to that of St. James at Jerusalem, as a sign of the apostolic origin of the see, to the tombs of the two Johns at Ephesus in discussing the canonicity of the Apocalypse, and to the statues of the Haemorrhoida at Paneas as a proof of the miracles of Christ.¹

Theologians of the middle ages were not entirely ignorant of the christian monuments, nor of the light they shed upon many points in theology,—the sufferings of the martyrs, the virtues of the saints, the antiquity and origin of the christian religion. But they were not catalogued in those days, and students could not obtain more than a hazy notion of their number and importance. Metaphysical prob-

¹ Ep. S. Clem. ad Cor. c. XI; Pastor Hermae ap. Funk. Patres Apostolici, vol. 1.; S. Justin Apol. I. 26; Euseb. II. 25, VII. 19, III. 39, VII. 48. Tertullian de Praesc. 36. S. Optatus ad Parmenianum II. 4. cf. Piper, Einleitung in die monumentale Theologie. Gotha 1867.

lems occupied the human mind, and theology, like all other sciences, is governed by the law of demand and supply. In the schools of Christendom the authority of the Church, supreme and intact, supplied in great measure the place of positive theology, and in an age of faith the purely critical faculties had not reached that fullness of growth, necessary to guard against fraud and ignorance. With all that, the christian monuments received considerable attention. The martyrologies and the histories of the translations of saints are full of interesting details concerning them. The *Liber Pontificalis* notes with tender reverence the vicissitudes of the Roman churches, above all, the fortunes of the Basilica of St. Peter, the enlargements, the conflagrations, the restorations, the gifts, the great ceremonies. In the lives of the earlier Popes it commends their pious solicitude for the catacombs, the ancient monasteries, the church-plate and the like. Then the *Itineraria* to Rome and the Orient, those guides for pilgrims, which have served in De Rossi's hands to reconstruct the christian Rome of the fifth to the ninth centuries, kept alive the veneration of the holy places and objects connected with the christian faith. The annals of the Middle Ages quote not infrequently the monuments, inscriptions and epitaphs, *e. g.* Flodoard of Rheims, Landulf of Milan, Hugh of Fleury, Ordericus Vitalis, Otto of Freisingen. Finally we possess two extensive descriptions of the Lateran and the Vatican basilicas, written in the twelfth century, by two canons of these respective churches, as well as the numerous references to Christian monuments in the famous Golden Legend of Jacobus a Voragine.¹

The passionate devotion of the humanists to the relics of pagan culture contrasted strangely with the neglect of the christian monuments during the fifteenth century. Yet there were not wanting theologians who recognized their value and cultivated their study. Petrarch (Ep. XXV. 12) expresses his admiration for Rome, the city of the martyrs, and recalls in his description of it the sepulchres of the saints, and the holy places where ancient tradition had localized the memories of St. Peter, St. Paul, St. John and others. The learned Camaldulense Ambrogio Traversari had an eye for christian

¹ *Liber Pontificalis* (ed. Duchesne) 2 vols. Paris, 1886-91. Similar material is to be found in the *Liber Pontificalis* of Ravenna, as well as in that of Naples. On the *Itineraria* cf. De Rossi, *Roma Sotterranea*, I. 128-157. *Mirabilia Urbis Romae*, ed. Montfaucon in his *Diarium Italicum*, *Graphia aurea urbis Romae*, ed. Ozanam in *Documents inédits*, etc. Johannes Diaconus, *Liber de ecclesia Lateran.* ed. Mabiller in *Museum Italicum*, *Petri Mallii Liber de basilica S. Petri in Vaticano*, *Acta SS.* June. t. VII. *Legenda Aurea*, (ed. Graesse) Dresden, 1846, 8°. French translation by Bruet, 2 vols. 12°. 1843.

antiquities, and his correspondence shows us with what joy he welcomed the occasional discoveries of the time. His contemporary, Flavio Biondo, showed still more affection for the study of the monumental remains of the early christian ages. In his *Roma Instaurata*, published about 1447, he mentions with enthusiasm the graves of the Apostles and the martyrs, describes the various churches of the city, their treasures, ornaments and the like. Finally Maffeo Vegio, (†1457) a canon of St. Peter's, in whom the humanist and the theologian met, has left us a curious work on the Vatican Basilica. It is of very great value, for the sad destruction of the ancient monuments of that church had already begun, and much of our knowledge concerning them is now to be found only in the pages of Maffeo.¹

In modern times Cardinal Baronius (†1607) was the first to recognize the proper place and value of the christian monuments. In his *Annals* he cites frequently and with evident pleasure the remains of christian antiquity, whenever he comes across them,—coins, epitaphs, frescoes, and sculptures. In his edition of the Roman Martyrology he makes frequent use of the ancient Roman churches and the souvenirs of the martyrs contained in them. It is to him that we owe the restoration to its mediaeval beauty of the ancient basilica of SS. Nereus and Achilleus (his titular church) so intimately connected with the history of St. Peter.²

With Baronius a new epoch was ushered in. Since then the christian monuments have been ardently sought out and studied in every European land. In France the immortal names of Mabillon, Ruinart, Montfaucon, Tillemont, Fleury, head the list of the *cultores* of christian antiquities, in England we have the monumental work of Bingham,³ in Italy Bosio, Muratori, Mamachi and Bianchini, in Belgium the indefatigable school of the Bollandists.

It has been reserved for our own age to recognize more fully than any other the priceless worth of these remains of the past. Every-

¹ Maffeo Vegio, *De rebus antiquis memorabilibus basilicæ S. Petri*, ed. Janning, Acta SS. June. t. VII. 61-85. He complains bitterly that "tot ex iis quæ ad basilicam pertinebant deperierunt, ut dolendum sit quantum vel negligentia vel malignitas hominum omnia consumat."

² It is usually identified with the *titulus Fasciolaræ* of the VIth century, the church erected on the spot where the bandage is said to have fallen from the bruised leg of the Apostle St. Peter on the occasion of his attempted flight from Rome. See Armellini, *Le chiese di Roma dal secolo IV al XIX*, p. 591-4, and Lipsius, *Die Apocryphen Apostellegenden*.

³ *Origines sive antiquitates ecclesiasticæ*. Halæ, 1723, 11 vols. 40. The chief archaeological works of this period are collected by De Smedt in his valuable *Introductio critica ad hist. ecclesiasticam*. Ghent, 1876. pp. 384-90.

where they are collected with extreme care, classified and edited with great precision, studied with passionate devotion.¹

The christian life of the first three centuries is becoming more clearly outlined, its frame-work begins to loom out better amid the surrounding gloom, and we may begin to hope for him who is appointed to vivify these dead materials, for the christian Gibbon on whose pictured pages our descendents will read with ever-increasing interest the sublime tale of the birth, growth and triumph of Christianity.

II.

We have already noticed in the pages of THE REVIEW the labors of one of the most active investigators in the field of monumental theology.²

During the past year he has been busied with certain discoveries of great importance made in the catacomb of Saints Peter and Marcellinus.³

This venerable necropolis was well known to Bosio, and had been frequently visited by him, in particular the three *cubicula* which have since proved so rich a mine, and are numbered 52, 53 and 54 on the plan of the catacomb. Bosio had even taken copies of the frescoes in the first of these chambers and of some in the second—he looked on the frescoes of the third as in too hopeless a condition to repay his trouble. After a lapse of over two hundred and fifty years they have been brought to light in spite of the almost insurmountable difficulties of the task. In the first of these chambers (52) large sections of the stucco had fallen off, and the remaining part was so stained that only a practised eye could detect the origi-

1 The early Christian inscriptions, for example, have been the object of the most careful research in our generation. De Rossi, *Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romae VII saeculo antiquiores*, fol. vol. I. Romae, 1857, vol. II, pars. I, 1889. Le Blant, *Inscriptiones Chretiennes de la Gaule anterieures au VIII siecle*, Paris, 1856-65, 2 vols. Hubner, *Inscriptiones Hispaniae Christianae*, Berlin, 1871. *Inscriptiones Britanniae Christianae*, ibid. 1876. Kraus, *Die altchristlichen Inschriften des Rheinlandes*, Freiburg, 1890-92, see Zaccario, *De veterum christianorum inscriptionum usu in rebus theologis*, 1761, and De Smedt, op. cit. pp. 391-398.

2 A Disciple of De Rossi, *American Ecclesiastical Review*, July, 1891.

3 This cemetery is on the Via Labicana at the third milestone from Rome, in the direction of Valmontoue, near the Torre Piguatara or mausoleum of St. Helen. Excavations were begun there in 1881. A little beyond are the interesting cemeteries of the Four Crowned Brothers (Quattro Coronati) and of S. Zotico, Stevenson, *Il cimitero di Zotico*; Modena, 1876. The bodies of SS. Peter and Marcellinus were abstracted from their original resting place in 827, by an agent of Einhard, the famous chancellor of Charlemagne, and translated to his new monastery of Seligenstadt in Thuringia. Cf. *Translatio SS. Petri et Marcellini*, Acta SS. Jun. I, 181-206, and Walafrid's prologue to Einhard's *Vita Caroli Magni* in Jaffé *Bibl. Rer. Germanicarum*, IV, 496-7.

nal drawings. In the last (54) the stucco was yet intact but so disfigured with black and grayish spots that only a few faint traces of the original coloring and framework of the composition could be seen. With characteristic pertinacity Dr. Wilpert has at last deciphered every detail of the complicated groups that the pencil of the ancient christian artist once delineated. It is the history of this triumph and the exposition of its practical results that lie before us in the neat quarto entitled "A Cycle of Christological Frescoes."¹

During a chance visit to the catacomb he happened to hold at a favorable distance and sideways the little *cerino* or wax taper, so familiar to visitors to the catacombs. In this moment he caught a faint glimpse of the outlines of a figure in the ceiling. On closer examination it was seen that, as the artist drew the outlines, his pencil had crushed through the thin glazed surface of the fresh stucco, and, when the color was laid on, the brush mixed it with the outer and softer coat of plaster. It was owing to this odd circumstance and to the fact that the stucco sheeting of the roof has remained intact that Wilpert was able to follow throughout the indentures of the artist's pencil, and thus restore the entire original design, in spite of the blotches with which the ceiling was covered. In the neighboring chambers the mortar was harder when the artist began to work, hence his pencil made no furrows, and the color can yet be wiped off with the finger where it has been laid on thickly.

The familiar figure of one of the Magi was the first thus rescued. Soon a second was laid bare, and in the middle space the Madonna and Child. The Magi wore the usual Oriental dress, a close-fitting tunic bound with a girdle, the Phrygian cap and shoes. In their hands they held large oval plates, symbolical of their gifts. Next, above the entry of the chamber, a group of the Annunciation was revealed. A female figure clothed in an ample flowing tunic is seated in a chair. In front of her stands a man, dressed in pallium and tunic. The latter garment is held up gracefully by his left, while the right hand is raised as though he were about to speak.²

¹ *Ein Cyclus Christologischer Gemälde aus der Katakomben der heiligen Petrus und Marcellinus, zum erstenmal herausgegeben und erläutert von Joseph Wilpert*, pp. VI, 52, and nine plates. Freiburg in Breisgau, Herder, 1891.

² The discovery of this group may be said to end whatever doubts, if any, remained concerning the famous Annunciation in St. Priscilla. The attitude, figures and grouping are exactly similar. The group in St. Priscilla belongs to the earlier half of the second century, and ranks therefore among the most ancient and venerable paintings of the Blessed Virgin executed at the expense of the Acilii Glabriones, one of the noblest of Roman families. See Liell, *Darstellungen der allerseeligsten Jungfrau auf den Kunstdenkmalern der Katakomben*. Freiburg, 1887, pp. 210-11, and De Rossi, *Bulletino de archeologia christiana*, 1889, pp. 15-66.

The presence of two figures of the Madonna in the same ceiling suggested at once the idea of a connected series of groups. In point of fact, another group of the Magi was soon laid bare on the other side of the ceiling. This time the traditional three were visible, two standing, a third in a kneeling posture, while all three point with outstretched right hand towards a star. This is not the only example of the Messianic star in the catacombs. It can be seen in the famous fresco of the Madonna and the Prophet Isaiah in the cemetery of Priscilla, and elsewhere. But it is the first example in which the rays are so numbered and disposed as to form the monogram of Christ after the pre-Constantinian type, this being an intertwining of the initial letters **I** and **X**.¹ It is evident that the words of the sacred text inspired the artist, for a lively joy is visible on the features, and in the attitude of the Wise Men, who seem in great haste to reach the limit of their holy pilgrimage.²

In due order our indefatigable searcher discovered the remaining members of the series. By slow and tedious tracing of the pencil-strokes he made out in the following (fourth) compartment the figure of a man whose hand rested on the head of a child. At this period the Papal Commission for the promotion of christian archæology came to his aid, the chamber was cleared of the accumulated rubbish, and he could work standing, instead of, as heretofore, in a kneeling or reclining posture. Some of the blotches were removed by careful washing, and it was finally seen that the compartment contained a group of the Baptism in the Jordan. The Baptist, clothed in a garment of skins, stands on the river bank, his right foot resting on a stone at the water's edge. He leans forward, and his right hand rests on the head of Jesus. The latter is represented as a naked youth, his hands outstretched as in prayer, while the Holy Ghost hovers over him in the shape of a dove. Many readers will at once recall the glorious masterpiece of Carlo Maratta in Santa Maria degli Angeli, and reflect how little the great canons of christian art have changed in fifteen hundred years. The scene of the Baptism is occasionally met with on the christian sculptures, but rarely in the frescoes. This is the oldest example known, and

¹ Cf. *Bulletino di archeologia christiana*. 1884-85. p 67. n. 1.

² "Secundum Incarnationis mysterium Christus est stella. Orietur enim stella ex Jacob et exurget homo ex Israel. . . Ipse est stella splendida et matutina; sua igitur luce ipse luce se signat." (S. Ambros. in Lucam. Lib. II. c. 2.)

"Vidimus hunc aiunt puerum per sidera ferri

Et super antiquos signorum ardescere tractus."

(Prudentius, *Apoth.* V. 813-14.)

remarkable for the attitude of Christ as an Orans (cf. Luke iii, 21), the only scene in the catacombs wherein He is thus represented.

In the circular space left free by these four groups appeared a most interesting scene, the Judgment of the Soul by Christ. Our Lord is seated on a throne, His left hand grasps a roll, the right is outstretched as if He were about to speak. At His feet is a large *scrinium* or box filled with scrolls, on either side are seated four figures of saints, clothed like Christ in the *tunica laticlava*, with pallium and sandals. They look towards the beholders, and appear to make gestures of assent. There can be no doubt that we have here the Divine Judge among His assessor saints, "Judicantes duodecim tribus Israel."¹ The corners of the ceiling were utilized by the artist for four figures of the Good Shepherd and Orantes, which alternate. The latter are clothed in the long, broad-sleeved tunic and ample pallium which constitute in the third century the usual dress of Christ and the saints.²

The Good Shepherd is clothed in the *tunica exomis*, a short close-fitting garment that leaves the right arm and side free. In His left He holds the pastoral pipe, while with the right He grasps at His neck the legs of the lost sheep that reposes on His shoulders.

The same chamber contains other interesting frescoes on the walls. Above, to the right, is the healing of the woman troubled with an issue of blood (Matt. iv, 20. Mark v, 25. Luke viii, 43). She is kneeling, dressed in tunic and pallium, with a veil drawn over her head. With both hands she clasps the edge of His mantle while she looks imploringly up to the Divine Physician. Christ is clad in the long loose tunic and pallium, on which the artist has painted the letter I. (*Ιησοῦς*).³

¹ I append the remarkable words of the contemporary bishop St. Denis, of Alexandria, "But these same martyrs *who are now sitting with Christ*, and are the sharers in His Kingdom and the *partners in His judgment*, etc. Euseb. H. E. VI. 42.

² Hitherto only one example of an Orans in tunic and pallium was known. It exists in the *Cripta della Madonna*, in the same cemetery. Dr. Wilpert, who is the first to publish it, says that "the figure of the Orans is designed with great skill, the features are noble and expressive, the garments fall in thick and elegant folds about the body, without hiding the contour. It sweeps lightly and gracefully upward, as though borne on the clouds of heaven, and is very clearly from the same hand as the works we have been describing." Op. cit. p. 6. (plate VI. 7.)

³ This group has a special interest for the students of Christian iconography. Eusebius (H. E. VII, 18.) relates that the Haemorrhissa was said to have erected a group at Paneas in Palestine representing the miracle of her healing, in which group she appeared *ἐπὶ γόγγυ κεκλιμένον καὶ τεταμέναις ταῖς χερσίν, ἰκετευούσῃ ἐσιχός*. The group existed in the time of Eusebius who saw it, and believed the traditions regarding it, giving as his reason that he had seen portraits (*pictas imagines*) of Peter and Paul and of Christ himself dating from those ancient times. This story of Eusebius

As usual He wears sandals, and not shoes. Beneath, in the same field, is the healing of the man sick of the palsy. (Matt. i, 40-42.) Christ appears in profile, stretching His hand toward the object of His mercy, who is seen joyfully bearing off his bed and its furniture. To the left, above, is the healing of the man born blind. Christ stands, and rests His left foot on a stone as He bends over to touch the eyes of the blind man. The latter kneels on one knee, with hands outstretched after the christian form of prayer. Beneath is Christ with the Samaritan woman. Our Lord, as the sacred text states (John iv, 6). is seated by the well of Jacob, and addresses the woman with uplifted hand. She stands opposite, a somewhat vulgar and unwieldy figure, holding in her hands the bucket and rope. The figure of Christ is extremely graceful both in dress and attitude. This group is very seldom seen in the monuments of early christian art. Garrucci has collected seven reliefs and two frescoes.

When this rare collection of christian frescoes had been successfully recovered and their meaning deciphered, correct photographs of them were taken. They are appended in the plates of Dr. Wilpert's work. But the wear and tear of so many centuries made it desirable to attempt a restoration of the series for those who cannot study the originals *in situ*. Every one will be grateful to the author for the excellent outline drawings in which he has reproduced the entire collection. They were executed in presence of the originals to which they adhere faithfully, as to features, dress and attitude. In doubtful places he was guided by the remaining works of the same artist in the neighboring *cubicula* and by similar subjects in the *Cripta della Madonna* in the cemetery of Saint Priscilla.

III.

Who executed this remarkable series of frescoes, and to what period in the history of the catacombs do they belong? We shall never know what Giotto or Cimabue set us these first noble lessons of christian art; just as we are condemned to ignore on earth the names and fate of the immortal architects of the gothic minsters, or

has been doubted, but the discovery of our fresco, exactly similar in the attitudes, to the group of Eusebius, and dating most probably from the earliest half of the third century, adds much weight to his story. (cf. Euseb. l. c. ed. Reading, 1720. *Notae variorum*, p. 343, and Piper op. cit. p. 164.) The silence of St. Justin cannot be urged, since in his Apologies he does not pretend to exhaust the evidence of the miracles of Christ, nor that of Origen since we have but fragments of his writings, nor of St. Irenaeus and Tertullian, since they probably never visited the spot. Cf. Garrucci, *Storia dell' arte christiana*. I. 405-6.

those illuminators whose skilful fingers lit up so splendidly the massive folios of our ancient church song. But whoever he was, his touch was quick and sure, his figures are nearly all correctly drawn, the attitudes are suited to the circumstances, and the draperies are managed with great taste and dignity. There is nothing stiff nor stilted about the composition, nothing that reminds us of the fourth century when the bold creative art of an earlier day had become fettered by the iron rules of an unimaginative formalism. The subject matter of the frescoes also leads us back to an earlier date than the peace of the Church. The pre-Constantinian monogrammic form of the star is in itself a sufficient motive for assigning the third century as the latest date, the *terminus ad quem* for this admirable series of frescoes. On the other hand the architectural surroundings, the fulness and richness of the symbolism, the abundance of the decoration, bespeak a certain development of wealth and taste among the Christians, as well as a period of comparative peace, conditions which suit better the third century than the preceding one. The paintings may therefore belong to the period from the accession of Alexander Severus to the death of Philip Arabs (222-249),¹ or to that which extends from Gallienus to the beginning of the persecution of Diocletian (260-303). With a nicer precision Dr. Wilpert fixes the middle of the third century as the date of their execution. By his accurate training, his intimate acquaintance with the Christian monuments, his long years of residence at Rome, and the proofs already given to a special insight into things archæological, he is well qualified to utter such a judgment, and we may safely accept it in the absence of further light.

1 cf. Paul Allard, *Histoire des Persecutions*, vol. ii, p. iv. "C'est l'époque où la propriété ecclésiastique se fonde, où les catacombes romaines se creusent et se décorent, grâce aux ressources d'une communauté nombreuse et déjà puissante; malgré l'extrême réserve des chrétiens de cette époque qui confiaient rarement à la pierre leurs émotions intimes ou les événements de leur histoire, plus d'une épitaphe éveillent ou satisfont par un nom, par un titre, par une image discrète notre désir de savoir. L'architecture et la décoration d'une catacombe avec leurs phases diverses, si clairement distinguées aujourd'hui, raconteraient à elles seules les vicissitudes traversées par l'église. Ici, des galeries régulières d'élégantes chapelles, construites dans un intervalle de paix: le pinceau d'artistes théologiens les a couvertes de symboles médités à loisir dont l'enchaînement forme parfois comme une prédication muette, et un cours de doctrine; on sait que le peintre et le penseur n'ont pas craint d'être troublés par une irruption de l'ennemi, et d'entendre resoudre sous les voûtes prochaines le pas des soldats traquant les chrétiens. Puis tout se brouille; le plan régulier est interrompu, la belle ordonnance des traveaux paraît abandonnée, aux galeries droites succèdent les labyrinthes, les issues tortueuses, les escaliers dérochés; la persécution menace ou sévit, et les fidèles se préparent les moyens de lui échapper. Le contre coup des révolutions se fait sentir jusque dans ces souterrains, qui nous en ont gardé après seize siècles l'empreinte encore reconnaissable."

IV.

Whoever be the author, whatever the date of these compositions, it is clear that they have a more than ordinary significance. The place chosen for their exposition, their number and symmetric grouping suggest that they were meant to convey certain lessons to the visitors of these *cubicula*, *i. e.* to the body of the faithful. If our fathers in the faith had left us any little manual such as the Painter's Book of Mount Athos, or the Climax Manuscript of the Vatican, we would be able to spell out with more ease and certainty the numerous symbolic compositions of the early christian painters and sculptors. As it is, these "shapes of shut significance" give occasionally no little trouble to the honest and careful student. He may, indeed, draw upon his imagination, but to do so successfully requires a thorough knowledge of all the christian monuments, the written authorities, and the relative literature, as well as a temperate mind and habits of correct thought. Not a few who ventured to interpret the christian symbolical compositions with no greater intellectual preparation than curiosity and a vigorous fancy, have built the monuments to their own folly. The symbolism of the primitive Church belongs properly to the province of the intellect, not to that of the imagination. It rests on simple, solid, reasonable principles, quite like any other science. These are discovered, their number and definitions fixed by *the comparative study of all the monuments*, inscribed, graphic, and plastic, and by a further comparison with the christian literature of the early centuries. Naturally we do not exclude nor undervalue the use of classic antiquities, history and philology—they have rendered and render daily the most valuable services to christian archaeology, just as the social and literary history of the Middle Ages throws a flood of light on their monumental treasures.

One of these principles of christian archaeology may be thus enunciated: what the inscribed monuments—epitaphs, and inscriptions,—express in words, is expressed in symbols by the graphic,—frescoes, gilded glasses, *graffiti*,—and the plastic,—sculptures, coins, medals, lamps, and such like.¹

Thus the famous epitaphs of Abercius of Hieropolis and Pectorius of Autun express in words the belief of the second and third

¹ In a similar manner the well known christian epigraphist, M. Le Blant, of the Académie des Inscriptions, interprets the Acts of the Martyrs by the contemporary epitaphs of the Christians, *Manuel de l'Épigraphie Chrétienne*, Paris, 1869, pp. 1-14 cf. Northcote, *Epitaphs of the Catacombs*, London 1878, pp. 176-182.

centuries in the reality of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament. The same doctrine is symbolically depicted in the contemporary frescoes of the Sacrament-Chapels in the catacomb of Saint Callixtus. These two classes of monuments illustrate and complete one another. They help us to interpret all kindred monuments, they show us that within the same period the same teachings were prevalent in Rome, Gaul and Asia Minor, and thus that the early christian symbolism was not something peculiar to a single city, but the common property of the whole church.

Now, in the newly discovered frescoes of the catacomb of Saints Peter and Marcellinus we have acquired another valuable guide for the comparative study of the early christian monuments. These compositions betray a profound and connected reasoning expressed with lucid simplicity. The subjects are taken from the Gospel and executed throughout with a rare and remarkable fidelity to the details of the inspired narrative. No ordinary artist planned and executed these compositions. Some one fully and exactly instructed in the christian mysteries and possessing a profound veneration for the letter of the gospel story must have inspired the painter. Or was it the same person whose head planned and whose hand executed this garland of pious frescoes,—some former painter become a deacon or a priest, and possessed now of all the qualities requisite for such a work? ¹

V.

Over the entrance to the chamber we have been describing is the group of the Annunciation, for which the artist found his inspiration in the sacred text: "And the angel, being come in, said unto her: Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee; blessed art thou among women . . . Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a son, and thou shalt call his name Jesus." (Luke i, 28-31.) In the two succeeding compartments the artist has evidently desired to convey the thought that Christ is the Light of the World. In the first we see the Magi rejoicing at the sight of the star, as though it were the moment of its reappearance, and in the

¹ The heretical writer Hermogenes, about this time, was a painter—*pingit illicite et nubit assidue*—says Tertullian. Diognetus the teacher of Marcus Aurelius had been in early life a painter; it is not certain that he is not the Diogone to whom the *Epistola ad Diognetum* is addressed; Funk, *Patres App.* I. p. CII, Smith, *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, II, 163. We meet with a priest Diouysius who continued to exercise the profession of a physician; Marchi, *I monumenti delle arti cristiani primitive*. Rome 1844.

second they adore the new-born Babe and offer Him their symbolic gifts.¹

St. John (i, 9) says of our Lord that He is "the true Light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," and (xii, 46) Christ says of Himself: "I am come a light into the world that whosoever believeth in me may not remain in darkness." The aged Simeon (Luke ii, 32) calls Him "A light to the revelation of the Gentiles." St. Paul (II Cor. iv, 4, 6) speaks in the same strain of "The light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God," and tells us that God "hath shined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, which is in the face of Christ Jesus." And we cannot doubt that the sublime prophecy of Isaiah (lx, 1-6) esrouded in the artist's mind as he sketched the scene in which the Magi appeared: "Arise, be enlightened, O Jerusalem, for thy light is come and the glory of the Lord is upon thee And the Gentiles shall walk in thy light, and kings in the brightness of thy rising. . . . The multitude of camels shall cover thee; the dromedaries of Madian and Epha; all they from Saba shall come, bringing gold and frankincense, showing forth praise to the Lord." The literal fulfillment of this prophecy was familiar to every Christian. "And seeing the star they rejoiced with exceeding great joy. And entering into the house they found the child with Mary his mother, and falling down, they adored him; and opening their treasures, they offered him gold, frankincense and myrrh." (Matt. ii, 10-11.) To this, the first solemn recognition on the part of mankind, corresponds the painting in the fourth compartment of the ceiling—the Baptism in the Jordan—expressive of the first public recognition on the part of the Divine Father, "And behold, a voice from heaven saying: This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased (Matt. iii, 17); hear ye Him." (*Ibid*, xvii, 3.)

The divinity of Jesus Christ is clearly enough accentuated in the paintings described, but the artist insists on placing before us those very proofs on which Christ Himself insisted—His miracles. "If I had not done among men the works that no other man hath done they would not have sin, but now they have both seen and hated me and my Father." (John xv, 24.) We see, therefore, on the walls four frescoes which show us how the powers of nature

¹ The Scriptures do not mention the number of the Wise Men, but on christian monuments of the second century they are three, and such is the constant tradition. Once, in St. Domitilla, they are four; here, and on another occasion, they are two, but these exceptions are owing to the demands of symmetry or the want of space.

and the secrets of the heart were subject to Jesus. In the first three—the healing of the woman troubled with an issue of blood, the man sick with the palsy and the man born blind—it is their *faith in the Messiah* which was the impelling motive. (Cf. Matt. ix, 22 ; Luke xviii, 42 ; Mark ii, 5.) The early Church recognized with one accord that faith in Jesus as the Messiah was the first and absolute condition of salvation.¹

This thought, so frequent in the primitive writings and in the christian epitaphs, is here fittingly expressed by the painter's art. The fourth wall fresco, the meeting between Jesus and the Samaritan woman, expresses likewise the belief in the Messiah, since it was the immediate cause of her conversion : " Now of that city many of the Samaritans believed in Him for the word of the woman giving testimony, and many more believed in Him because of His own word. And they said to the woman : we now believe, not for thy saying, for we ourselves have heard Him and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world." (John iv, 41-42.)

So far these ancient frescoes show us the sublime theandric Person of the Messiah, born for the salvation of the world, of the Virgin Mary—the Light to those that sat in darkness and the shadow of death. (Luke i, 79.) But if the living are enlightened by faith, to which they are led by the miracles and prophecies, it is as yet but a darkling vision, *quasi per speculum et in enigmate*. The dead, on the other hand, live in the very effulgence of the Divine Light ; they are citizens of that celestial city " where night shall be no more, and they shall not need the light of the lamp, nor the light of the sun, because the Lord God shall enlighten them, and they shall reign for ever and ever. (Apoc. xxii, 5.) The same thought recurs frequently on the Christian epitaphs. " *O noble Maritima ! thou hast not quit the sweet light, since thou hast with thee the Fish (IXΘΥΝ—Christ) who dwelleth in regions utterly inaccessible to death.*" Christ is called the Light of the Dead, *φῶς τὸ θανάτων*, in the ancient epitaph of Pectorius. We read again that the soul of the deceased was rapt upward in the Light of the Lord, *cujus spiritus in luce Domini susceptus est*. The dwelling of the elect is called *Via Lucis* on an inscription in the basilica of St. Paul.²

¹ Cf. Ep. S. Clem. ad Cor. c. 42, 59, 64. St. Ignat. ad Magn. c. 8. Ep. ad Diognetum, c. 9.

² Bosio, *Roma Sotteranea*, p. 154. The Two Ways of Life and Death was a much beloved Christian allegory of the first and second centuries, a remnant, perhaps, of the ancient Jewish catechetical teaching of the proselytes. See *Doctrina XII Apostolorum* (ed. Funk), 1887.

An epitaph in the cemetery of Saint Cyriaca begins :

“Corpus humo, animam Christo, Petroni, dedisti
Nam justæ mentes foventur *luce celesti.*”¹

The Church herself prays daily that her children may enter into this celestial light : *Ipsis Domine et omnibus in Christo quiescentibus locum refrigerii, lucis, et pacis, et indulgeas deprecamur.* But before entering those *loca lucida*, the guerdon and sustaining hope of the Christian, he had to abide by the Judgment. Hence we see in the centrepiece of this composition the judgment of the soul by Christ. There can be no doubt that the soul in question is that of him whose mortal remains lay underneath, nor that the artist considered the result as anything but favorable, since we see the intercessor saints on either side. Their joyous attitude recalls the words of an epitaph found in the basilica of St. Lawrence : CUIQUE (CYRIACAE) PRO VITÆ SUÆ TESTIMONIUM SANCTI MARTYRES APUD DEUM ET (CHRISTUM) ERUNT ADVOCATI.²

But because the judgment is both severe and final the soul has recourse to the mercy of God, which the artist represents by the figure of the Good Shepherd in the oval interstices. The judge is appeased, the happy sentence is issued, and the defunct is now seen in the other ovals as an Orans praying for those left behind, that they, too, may experience the same indulgent judgment. We may well imagine that the prayer was substantially similar to that on the contemporary epitaph of Pectorius : “*O Lord and Saviour ! satiate them now, I pray Thee, with the Fish (Christ). Grant my mother eternal rest, O, Thou Light of the Dead ! Aschandius, dearly beloved father, mayst thou rest with my dear mother and sisters in the peace of the Lord, and be mindful of thy son Pectorius.*”

It is scarcely possible to parallel in the catacombs this series of frescoes. In a single *cubiculum* we have, embodied in the clearest symbolism, the divinity of Jesus Christ, His Incarnation, Birth and Baptism, the veneration of the Blessed Virgin, the Intercession and Communion of saints, the particular Judgment, and the Resurrection to life everlasting. When now we read the simple word FIDELIS on the slab that closes the grave of some unknown Christian of the earliest times, we know what hopes it expresses, what Credo it is equivalent to. They are no other than the hope

1 Le Blant, Inscr. Chrétienues de la Gaule I, p. 229.

2 De Rossi, Bullettino di archeologia cristiana, 1864, p. 34.

and the faith publicly professed by that holy soul and ardent admirer of the martyrs—Pope Saint Damasus, in the epitaph on his sister Irene, a consecrated virgin.

“ He who walked upon the treacherous floor of Ocean,
 Who quickeneth in the furrow the mouldering germs of earth,
 Who struck th’ encircling cerements from Lazarus three days dead,
 And gave him back to life and to his sister Mary,
 The same—such is my firm belief—
 Will raise Damasus from his dust unto life eternal.”¹

V.

The most useful pages of this monograph, are, without doubt, those in which the writer handles the delicate and much discussed question of the Orantes. By Orantes are generally understood those standing figures with hands uplifted in prayer, which are so frequent in the Catacombs. Scarcely a chapel in this subterranean city is without one or more of them, and their very number makes it highly desirable to understand their significance. The older archaeologists of the school of Bosio were not of one mind in this matter. They saw in the Orantes a defunct occupant of the neighboring grave, or the Blessed Virgin, or the saints in general, or some particular saint. Macarius thought they were portraits of the holy women who had contributed to the establishment or decoration of the cemeteries. The modern archaeologists are scarcely more united than their predecessors. For them the Orans is by turns the Church, the Bride of the Good Shepherd, the Virgin Mary, the personification of Faith, the portrait of the defunct, the soul in purgatory, the soul in heaven. None of these conjectures rests upon a complete study of the monuments of the Orantes. Dr. Wilpert has performed this task with great care, and, as the result of his studies, we are in a condition for the first time, to form a fairly accurate notion of this much-beloved symbol. He begins by excluding all figures that represent well-known biblical subjects, such as Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Daniel, and the like, and defines the Orantes as “ those praying figures which were executed over the graves when first opened.” For the rest, it is indifferent where

1 “ Qui gradiens pelagi fluctus compressit amarus,
 Vivere qui præstat morientia semina terræ,
 Solvere qui potuit Lazaro sua vincula mortis,
 Post tenebras fratrem, post tertia lumina solis
 Ad superos iterum Mariæ donare sorori
 Post cineres Damasum faciet quia surgere Credo.”

they are found, whether on the ceiling or the walls, whether painted, sculptured or etched—all this is immaterial to the question of their general significance. The next natural step is to examine whether in individual cases the artist or the proprietors of the crypt, or the visitors thereto may not have left some sign of identification on or near the figure. In point of fact, the name is sometimes inscribed beneath or beside the figure. Thus in this same Catacomb of Saints Peter and Marcellinus, the name ELIOBORA is found upon the figure of an Orans. On a sarcophagus in the Lateran Museum we find similarly the name JULIANE, so also the names GRATA, FLORIA and others. Under this catalogue come also the Orantes accompanied by the significative formula IN PACE, or by a formal epitaph like that of VENERANDA in Saint Domitilla and two others in the Coemeterium Ostrianum. Dr. Wilpert adds an interesting example which he found in the cemetery of Domitilla. It is the bust of a little child surmounted by a cross and resting on a slender pillar. The little arms are outstretched as in prayer, and on the colonnette is written : SECUNDILLA IN PACE. It may therefore be accepted that in all these cases the Orantes represent the souls of the deceased occupants of the graves over or near which they have been placed. Proceeding now *de notis ad ignota*, we will not be wide of the mark in assuming as a rule that all the other unnamed Orantes in similar attitudes and positions represent the souls of the defunct. But by what method shall we surmise the secret of their praying posture? There can be no better source of information than the contemporary and neighboring epitaphs. Between these and the paintings there is the closest and most natural connection. Both were executed at the same time and by order of the same parties, for the same purposes, and were equally well understood by the contemporary christian world. Only the sense of the symbolic monument, graphic or plastic, is frequently obscure. The language of symbolism depends often on an accurate knowledge of the actual circumstances to which its monuments owe their origin, above all, of the individual mind which conceived them. Who will reconstruct for us the christian *ateliers* of the third century, and give us an insight into the secrets of an incipient art, show us what previous studies the artist made, what stock in trade he derived from his christian predecessors, what pagan materials he was allowed to work in, by what process of blending and absorption, of excision and abandonment the peculiar art of the Christians was evolved in the midst of a grim struggle for existence? We might

as well ask for some one to construct again in miniature the fabric of christian society as it existed before Constantine. Some day, perhaps, another Fustel de Coulanges will arise, and give us *La Cité Antique* of christian history, and with it the evolution of our christian art. In the meantime the epitaphs come to our aid. We must not ask too much of them. They were never destined to play the part of a commentary. And yet they are like voices out of the remote past, like antique glosses which reveal to us the beliefs shut up in the neighboring symbols, like phonographic rolls that supply the long-lost text of some sweet melody. What do the epitaphs therefore say of the dead?

a. On a large number of epitaphs we meet with short, sententious prayers which *the survivors utter to God in behalf of the defunct*.¹

Thus—LUCRETIA, PAX TECUM IN DEO.

PAX TIBI OCTAVIA IN PERPETUUM.

PAX DOMINI ET CHRISTI CUM FAUSTINO ATTICO. GAUDENTIA SUSCIPEATUR IN PACE. AEMILIANE, ROMANE, VIBATIS IN DEO. URSULA, ACCEPTA SIS IN CHRISTO. REGINA, VIBAS IN DOMINO ZESU. IN PACE SPIRITUS SILANI AMEN.

b. In addition to the many epitaphs in which the living pray for the dead, there is another class in which it is expressly said that *the departed are already at rest*, among the saints, living with God, have entered into Christ, *i. e.*, have attained their final happiness, *e. g.* POSTHVMIVS EYETHERION CVJVS ANIMA CVM SANCTOS IN PACE. JOBINA RECESSIT A SECVLO INGRESSA IN PACE. PROCVLA CL (ARISSIMA) FEMINA FAMVLA DEI A TERRA AD MARTYRES. JVNIVS BASSVS V (IR) C (ONSVLARIS) NEOFITVS IVIT AD DEVM. PRIMA VIVIS IN GLORIA DEI ET IN PACE DOMINI NOSTRI CHRISTI. SEVERIANVS, CVJVS SPIRITVS IN LVCE DOMINI SVSCEPTVS EST.

c. In a third class of epitaphs the defunct are requested to intercede for the living.—PETE PRO PARENTES TVOS, MATRONATA MATRONA. SABBATI DVLCIS ANIMA PETE PRO CELSINIANV(M) CONGVGEM. VINCENTIA IN CHRISTO, PETAS PRO PHÆBE ET VIRGINIO EIVS. The same dogmatic view is revealed by the countless *graffiti*

¹ Of the epitaphs cited, two belong to the second century, a few to the fourth, by far the greater part date from the third century. Dr. Wilpert cites nearly one hundred and fifty, the verification of which may be found in his work, p. 34 sqq.

scratched on the walls of the catacombs in the neighborhood of the more famous martyrs. An epitaph of the third century restored by De Rossi, runs thus:—

VICTORINVS ANIMA
INNOCENS INTER SANC
TIS ET IVSTIS ora TIONIBVS
tuis petas pro nobis.

Another one reads thus.—*Gentianus, a believer, who lived 21 years, 8 months, 16 days. Intercede for us in thy prayers for we know thou art with Christ (in orationibus tuis roges pro nobis quia scimus te in Christo).*¹

The following exquisite epitaph was found by Father Marchi in the Cœmeterium Ostrianum and is now kept in the Kircherian Museum at Rome.

ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΟΥ ΝΗΗΙΘΣ
ΑΚΑΚΘΣ ΕΝΘΑΔΕ ΚΕΙ
ΤΑΙ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΩΝ Α
ΓΙΩΝ ΜΝΗΣΚΕΣΘΕ
ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΗΜΩΝ ΕΝ ΤΑΙ
Σ ΑΓΙΑΙΣ ΥΜΩΝ ΗΡΕΥΚΑΣ
ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΓΡΑΨΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΓΡΑΨΑΝ
ΤΟΣ²

d. In still other epitaphs the *immediate object of the petition* to the defunct is specified. Thus, on one in St. Callixtus:—*Praestes in orationibus tuis ut possit Deus amartias (peccata) meas indulgere. (Sixtus ?) pete pro nobis ut salvi simus.* The fourth century epitaph of Saint Damasus in honor of Saint Agnes concludes with a similar formula: O veneranda mihi sanctum decus alma pudoris *Ut Damasi precibus faveas precor inclyta Martyr.*

It is clear now that in all these four classes of the christian epi-

¹ Compare the contemporary words of Origeu, *Exhortatio ad Martyres* c. 30 (Migne P. G. XI. 602). Αἱ ψυχὰὶ τῶν πεπελεκισμένων ἐνεκεν τῆς μαρτυρίας Ἰησοῦ μὴ μάτην τὴν ἐν οὐρανοῖς θυσιασθηρῶ παρεδρέβουσαι διακονοῦσι τοῖς ἐνχομένοισ ἀφ᾽εσιν ἁμαρτημάτων, and Hom. 16 in Josue, "Ego sic arbitror quod omnes illi qui dormierunt ante nos patres pugnent nobiscum et adjuvent nos orationibus suis." See also for the Intercession of the Saints the famous epitaph of Agape. *Bulletino di archeol. crist.* 1884-85, p. 72 sqq.

² *The innocent child Dionysius rests here with the saints. In thy holy prayers remember us also, the writer and the sculptor (of these lines).* Among the objects found during the late excavations in the Cemetery of Priscilla is the epitaph of the infant Philemou, whose prayers are asked by his parents, ἐῶχου ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν μετὰ τῶν ἀγίων. *Bulletino di archeologia cristiana*, 1890. p. 144.

taphs the defunct appear as souls already in the enjoyment of happiness, or for whom that state is so eagerly desired that they are looked on as already in possession of it. To these happy souls the prayers of the epitaphs are directed. On the other hand we know that the early christians were wont to pray with outstretched arms, exactly the posture of the Orantes. This is therefore the natural shape in which a christian would paint the soul whose intercession he was asking. It is thus he piously supposes them to exist in a better world, praying for the salvation of those they have left behind. The Orantes are not *likenesses* of the departed. Wherever placed, whether in frescoes, or on sarcophagi, or etched on the humble slab, whether male or female, *they are merely ideal figures of the blessed dead.* Hence none of them is ever depicted with a beard, female Orantes are occasionally seen on the graves of males,² and veiled ones over the resting places of little children. Naturally, we will not look among the Orantes for souls which have not yet reached their destined reward. These need yet the prayers of the Church which has been always wont to intercede for them. We have the proof of it in a very ancient Mass that dates from the epoch of the persecutions.³

(Omnipotens Deus) sanctorum tuorum nos gloriosa merita, ne in poena(m) veniamus, excusent; defunctorum fidelium animæ quæ beatitudinem gaudent, nobis opitulentur, *quæ consolatione indigent ecclesiæ precibus absolvantur.*

Many of these Orantes surely represent the martyrs and saints over whose remains they were placed. Thus Saint Cæcilia, SS. John and Paul were painted as Orantes over their graves. But it does not seem so clear that the saints were thus depicted on graves other than their own. It is true that the ancient liturgies mention the Blessed Virgin, the apostles, and the *martyres vindicati*, that occasionally the epitaphs invoke the prayer of local saints, that the

1 Cf. I Tim. II, 8, and Exod. XVII, II Ps. CXL. Clem. Alex. Lib. VII. Strom. τὰς χεῖρας εἶς ὀρθῶν ἀρρομεν. Tertullian de oratione. c. XVII, "cum modestia et humilitate orantes. . . . ne ipsis quidem manibus sublimius elatis, sed temperate ac probe" etc. See also c. 11 and 13, Apol. c. 16, 30. Eus. H. E. VII, 18, and *Vita Constantini* IV, 15. The great Emperor was painted with outstretched arms and uplifted eyes. Cf. Origen, *De Oratone* c. 31. Smith, *Dictionary of christ. Antiquities*, I, 757.

2 Thus, for instance, the soul of Saint Lawrence is represented as a *female* Orans. De Rossi, *Bullettino*, 1867, p. 85. and 1869 pr. 50-51, plate VIII. In the Acts of Saint Cæcilia she sees the souls of Valerian and Tiburtius "Egredientes de corporibus quasi *virgines* de thalamo." In mediæval sculpture the souls of the blessed departed appear frequently as little infants wrapped in rich cloths, borne heavenward by angels.

3 (Deus præsta) *si quies adridat te colere, si timplatio ingruat, non negare.* Mone, *Lateinische und Griechische Massen.* p. 22.

walls of the most famous subterraneous shrines are covered with petitions and invocations, *Προσυχήματα* as they are called. But although the invocation of the more celebrated saints was a frequent practice in the early church, no monument properly belonging to the catacombs has yet been found on which, apart from their own graves, the saints are represented as intercessors for the Church. The gilded glasses on which the Blessed Virgin and Saint Agnes are thus represented may have been part of the furniture of the catacombs, but they do not properly belong to that class of monuments. The apostles and saints appear often in the catacomb frescoes, in the scenes of Judgment, of Introduction into Paradise, but there they act as *assessores*, *advocati*, or as welcoming guides to the new-born citizens of the celestial city. A serious objection to this statement is the famous Madonna Orans in the Cœmeterium Ostrianum, a fresco of a female Orans with a small child before her. It has been usually accepted as an image of the Blessed Virgin in prayer, (De Rossi, *Imagini Scelte della B. Vergine*; and Liell, *Darstellungen der allerseligsten Jungfrau*.) Dr. Wilpert sees in it only an ordinary female Orans. His reasons are worthy of consideration and force us to suspend our judgment until some parallel is brought for this unusual way of depicting the Blessed Virgin.

VII.

What was the purpose of these and similar frescoes in the catacombs? In the Lateran Museum (Pil. ix, 10) is an epitaph which says of Lucifera that she “meruit titulum inscribi *ut quisquis de fratribus roget Deu(m)* ut sancto et innocenti spiritu ad Deum suscipiatur.” Though the same motive underlies all the christian epitaphs, this particular one is remarkable for giving it expression. But the religious paintings acted much more forcibly on the imagination than the epitaphs. The latter invited the passers by to pray, the former suggested to him what to ask and how. For example, in the Cemetery of Priscilla are two scenes of the resurrection of Lazarus and of the daughter of Jairus, on which we meet with various *graffiti* of pious pilgrims which express a wish that their dear ones may live in Christ. The sight of the paintings led the thoughts from the material resurrection upward to the higher and more spiritual conception of life. It is even so with the frescoes of the sepulchral chamber we have been describing. “Let us suppose that a son visits there the grave of his mother. His eyes rest upon the paintings: in the centre he beholds Christ the

Divine Judge enthroned among His saints, and round about Him the Annunciation, the Baptism in the Jordan, the Magi led by the star, their adoration of Jesus, the Good Shepherd, and the Souls of the blessed departed, the three miracles of Christ and the meeting with the Samaritan woman. As he gazes upon these compositions his thoughts shape themselves into words, and the words take the form of some such prayer as the following: ¹

Dear Lord Jesus! Thou Light of the departed, be mindful of my mother. Permit not her soul to dwell in darkness. She believed in Thee, in Thee was her only hope, for Thou art He who was to come. Thou art the Light of the world, the true God to whom alone belong all glory and adoration. For the enlightenment and redemption of the heathen Thou wert clothed with human flesh in the womb of the Virgin Mary, and baptized in the Jordan. Thou hast overwhelmed men with Thy benefits, to the crippled and the sick Thou hast restored their health; relieve Thou the soul of my dear mother. Deal not severely with her, but look upon the merits of Thy saints who intercede for her before Thy mercy-stool. Thou broughtest back the lost sheep to the fold upon Thy shoulders. Even so, O Lord! let the soul of my mother be received into the troop of Thy elect, and dwell forever more in the regions of light everlasting. Sweet mother, live in God and pray for me.

VIII.

The discovery of Dr. Wilpert has a peculiar interest for archaeologists inasmuch as it serves to confirm the view always held by De Rossi that the church authorities of Rome controlled to a certain extent the symbolic compositions, and employed the artist's talent to convey to the masses in an easy intelligible way the teachings of the Church. The incatenation of symbols in this case is no less striking than in the famous *cubicula* of St. Callixtus, known as the Chapels of the Sacraments. Some Hippolytus planned the work for the Christian artist, no less accurately than the mediaeval Dominican who planned the intricate symbolism of the great portal of the Cathedral of Freiburg in Baden. Or perhaps he was a priest and painter at once, a primitive Fra Angelico. In any case we cannot but be grateful for the sermon in colors that he has given us,

¹ This prayer has been put together by Dr. Wilpert (op. cit. p. 51.) out of well-known formulas of ancient epitaphs, and does honor at once to his head and his heart.

and we note it down among the most valuable authorities and sources for the knowledge of early christian belief.¹

Slowly but surely, because scientifically, the lines and proportions of the latter are becoming visible. The specific Catholic doctrines concerning the divinity of Christ, the Eucharist, the Blessed Virgin, the veneration of the saints, their intercession for the living, prayers for the dead, have received confirmation upon confirmation from this quarter. Only solidly entrenched prejudice can resist the evidence. Of the earliest christian literature we possess but the sorriest remnants, a few flying leaves, and we cannot always be certain that they represent accurately the autograph of the writer. Hence the multitude of viewy, fanciful systems concerning the origins of the christian Church. But there is no gainsaying the inscriptions, paintings, sculptures, and other remains of ancient christian life, without being guilty of self-stultification. We note with satisfaction the growing tendency of ingenious and erudite Protestant writers like Harnack, Caspari, and Lightfoot to take this into account, and to embody in their works the best results of Catholic labors in this direction. It is another proof that the most durable apology for the Catholic Church is honest and thorough scientific work, which does not disdain the perfection of modern methods, nor shock our modern tastes by its uncouth and cumbersome form. The life of De Rossi is an undeniable example of this. It is a full half century since he abandoned a professional *carriera* and went down into the bowels of the earth in search of the life and polity of the early Christians of Rome. If Bosio was the Columbus of the Catacombs, De Rossi is their Cortes, the explorer and conqueror who gave to all future scholars new provinces for thought and investigation. It has been a slow, laborious and sometimes ungrateful task. Destroy-

1 "Sans doute il y aurait excès à chercher une intention subtile dans chacun des traits échappés au pinceau des premiers chrétiens; cependant on ne saurait nier qu'un ensemble de sujets aussi bien reliés que ceux dont il vient d'être question soit toute autre chose qu'une œuvre due à la fantaisie individuelle. La pensée du théologien s'y reconnaît, guidant la main docile du peintre. L'enchaînement des symboles est, ici, aussi précis, aussi savant que dans les célèbres chambres des sacrements, au cimetière de Calliste. Il est clair que, au moins pour certaines des compositions symboliques des catacombes, l'autorité religieuse ne laissa point les artistes sans surveillance, mais se servit d'eux pour rendre visible et traduire à tous les regards l'enseignement des doctrines. C'est la théorie plusieurs fois exprimée par M. De Rossi; certaines peintures du cimetière de Calliste l'appuyaient d'exemples incontestables: la découverte de Mgr. Wilpert achève de la démontrer. En présence de ces hautes et délicates synthèses du dogme chrétien, qu'on ne saurait trouver partout, mais qui parfois sont évidentes, que vaut la théorie soutenue par quelques archeologues protestants, pour qui les peintures des catacombes sont pour la plupart empruntées aux scènes de la vie réelle, ou n'offrent que des motifs de décoration?" Paul Allard, in *La Science Catholique*, Jau. 15, 1892, p. 170.

ing time and still more cruel man had dealt harshly with the christian monuments. They were like the fragments of a letter flung to the winds, which must be collected and pieced together again, but their precious message was worth a century of toil and pains. He has been a source of inspiration to many, the model of an honest and prudent critic to all, the director and moulder of a few. The best proof of his living creative influence is the frequent appearance of such works as those of Wilpert and his fellow-disciples in this new Roman school. Is it too bold to say that they are legitimate successors, as apologists, of the great Roman school of the second century, the school of St. Justin, Rhodon, St. Irenaeus, and St. Hippolytus?

The study of Dr. Wilpert is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the Catacombs. It is not easy to find matter for criticism in it. Perhaps cognate materials have been too widely scattered. Some repetitions might have been avoided, and the unity of the study better preserved. But the method is correct, the materials abundant, the discussion honest and conclusive. Nothing more can be asked in a short monograph, especially when it treats of the Catacombs, where the writer is often hampered by the inexact or insufficient notions of his readers.

THOMAS SHAHAN.

THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE HOLY SEE.

I.

THE necessity of temporal power for the Pope is not a dogma, but the natural consequence of a dogma. It is not a revealed truth, but one which is closely allied to revelation.

It is a dogma that the spiritual power of the Pope should not be dependent upon political rulers. The kingdom of Christ, that is to say the Church, is not of this world, and does not derive its origin from this world. Jesus Christ Himself, when in the presence of Pontius Pilate, answered him saying, "My kingdom is not of this world." (*Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo.*—*Joannes xviii, 36.*)

If then the Church does not owe its origin to this world, it follows that the supreme authority which governs it, the Papacy, from

which all jurisdiction is derived by the prelates who compose its hierarchy, cannot be subject to the secular power.

The origin of a thing gives us the key to its nature, and explains the attributes that belong to it. "It is clearly evident," said Pope St. Nicholas I., in his letter to the Emperor Michael, "that the Sovereign Pontiff cannot be either bound or unbound by secular powers." (*Satis evidenter ostenditur a saeculari potestate nec ligari prorsus nec solvi posse Pontificem.*) The independence of a society—and the Church is a perfect society—is identical with the independence of its supreme head.

Now, what is to be done in order to guarantee this independence? Emancipate the Pontiff from all subjection to secular princes. In other words, constitute him a civil sovereign; for, in human society, there is no middle term between subject and sovereign—all are either subjects or sovereigns. The temporal power of the Holy See, although not *absolutely* requisite for the spiritual independence of the Papacy (since for several centuries the Popes were without it) is nevertheless, morally speaking, indispensable in order that its spiritual independence may, without hindrance, be freely exercised in the face of the whole world.

The temporal power of the Holy See is, if the term be allowable, the social form of its security, and is required, not *ad esse*, but *ad bene esse*. Imagine the Pope subject to any prince or government whatsoever. He, in the interests of the political world, would be continually exposed to the open solicitations, active pressure, and silent influences of the prince or government to whom he owes allegiance and subjection. And, admitting that the Pontiff himself, by his own strength of character, aided by divine wisdom, was firm enough to resist, he could not always preserve those who serve him as co-laborers and ministers from the inevitable consequences of their chief's dependence. The Pope needs the College of Cardinals for aid and counsel. He stands in need of the *Dicasteri* and various congregations for the despatch of business which is forced upon him from every quarter of the globe. How could he feel sure of the impartiality, fidelity, and complete obedience of those who are employed in his service in so many ways, if they were not legally also subject to his authority?

But apart from this, the diverse conditions of the faithful, whom the Pope governs, suffice to prove the necessity of his temporal power. The spiritual head of a society which is composed of so many nations cannot, politically speaking, belong to any one of them, but

should be extra-national,—or, to use a more correct term, super-national. This can only be accomplished by constituting him sovereign ruler of the place in which he resides.

We find a splendid acknowledgement and illustration of this principle in the civil order. The Constitution of the United States of America provides that the President or Congress should have their seat of government, not in any of the States, but in the City of Washington, the inhabitants of which, as well as those of the surrounding district, are subject only to their immediate authority. This was considered by the founders of the American commonwealth to be the only means by which the republic could be rendered lasting and secure against outside influence, whether of intrigue, or violence.

If such measures be deemed not only wise but necessary in the interests of temporal matters, how much more are they so in the safe guarding of spiritual interests, which are of an infinitely more important and delicate nature.

The Pope as member, or even as guest, of any one nation would justly arouse the jealousy of the other nations; and few would be disposed to accept the direction of spiritual affairs from one who might be suspected of serving the interests or being the creature of a foreign sovereign. Napoleon I, before the progress of his ambition had influenced the soundness of his judgment, had said in his famous discourse cited by Thiers :¹

“The Pope is far from Paris, and it is well that he is. He is neither at Madrid nor at Vienna, and therefore we willingly submit to his spiritual authority. At Vienna and Madrid the same reasons exist for saying this. Do you suppose that, were the Pope in Paris, the Austrians or Spaniards would consent to accept his decisions? Consequently, it is very fortunate that the Pontiff should be in the Eternal City, keeping the balance between Catholic sovereigns, and always leaning slightly toward the stronger side, though quickly aroused to his right position whenever the mighty become oppressors.

“In the government of souls, this is the best and most benevolent institution, and I do not say so through any bias but on reasonable grounds.”

Gregorovius² the historian, a Protestant, writes :

“The metropolis of Christianity, representing a universal principle, should be free, and of free access to all peoples, and the High Priest residing there should not be subject to any earthly king.

“It was to this conception of the question that, until our days, the Sovereign Pontiff owed the preservation of the small states of the Church.”

¹ Cf. *History of the Consulate and the Empire*. Thiers.

² Gregorovius, *History of the City of Rome during the Middle Ages* Vol. III, p. 5.

It is unquestionably just that access to the Pope should be free to all, especially those who claim the right of his jurisdiction. From every quarter of the globe Catholics are entitled to come, in order to venerate, in his person, the common Father of all the faithful, and to listen to his voice as to that of the Supreme Teacher, to receive his counsel, warning, rebuke, and answers to their doubts.

Yet this privilege and right could never be guaranteed so long as any prince or potentate should have it in his power to interfere with or forbid the free movements of the Pontiff and those who would approach him ; or who would be incapable of, or unwilling, to protect the one and the other from any wanton attack by hostile factions.

Have we not, quite recently witnessed with our own eyes, such things on occasion of the French pilgrimage to Rome? Under a most unwarrantable pretext, a large number of inoffensive people who had come to the Holy City from motives of devotion to the Sovereign Pontiff, were made the victims of a fanatical and brutal assault. Although these peaceful strangers were not only publicly insulted but some received blows and severe injuries, the government was neither willing nor able to protect them and took no efficient steps to put a stop to these and further shameful and lawless excesses.

II.

The question of the Pope's temporal power is not a subject open for discussion to Catholics. It has been clearly pronounced on by the authorities of the Church, to whose decision the faithful Christian readily submits his judgment. As it is the undoubted right of the Church to demand for her head absolute independence from political powers it follows that she has likewise the right to employ the lawful and necessary means whereby she can procure and safeguard this rightful independence.

Whoever has a right to the possession of a thing evidently has a clear right to the just means of procuring it ; for, were it not for this latter right, the former would be useless and without value. Nor does the right of determining the proper choice of ways and means to secure this possession belong to any and every body. As a matter which turns upon Church-government, it belongs, in the first instance, to those to whom God has confided the care of His Church. They are : The Bishops, who constitute the hierarchy, having for their chief the Roman Pontiff. The Holy Ghost Himself

has declared the Bishops to be governors of the Church of God. "Posuit episcopos regere ecclesiam Dei." (Act. x, 28.)

And the Roman Pontiff and the Bishops have solemnly affirmed their sense of the necessity of the temporal power in order to maintain the independence of the Church in the present condition of secular affairs.

Pope Pius IX, in the Bull by which he excommunicated the invaders of a portion of his dominions, said :

"Divine Providence, with special design, has ordained that, once the Roman Empire had fallen and been divided into many kingdoms, the Roman Pontiff should acquire a temporal principality, he being chief and centre of the whole Church, so declared by Jesus Christ Himself. The All-Wise God thus ordained that in the midst of so many secular princes the Sovereign Pontiff alone should enjoy, without any impediment, the political independence which is necessary to him for the proper exercise of his spiritual power and jurisdiction over the whole world."

The present Pontiff, Leo XIII, whenever he has had occasion to address the Bishops, whether by word of mouth or by letter, has never ceased to proclaim the same necessity and to assert his violated rights, since they are the guarantee of his liberty and independence in the exercise of his apostolic ministry. To these declarations of the Sovereign Pontiffs in our own times the voice of the entire episcopate throughout the Catholic world has been added more than once, in proof of which we need only quote a paragraph from the address presented by the Bishops to Pope Pius IX in 1862 :

"Having been despoiled of the provinces which enabled you, Most Holy Father, to carry on with dignity the proper administration of the Church, you have resisted the iniquitous attack with invincible courage, and in the name of all Catholics, we deem it our duty to express to your Holiness our deep sense of gratitude. Moreover, we recognize, that the temporal power of the Holy See is a necessary appendage of the same, and manifestly designed by divine Providence. Hence, we do not hesitate to declare that this same civil principality is, in the present condition of society, an absolute necessity for the free and dignified government of the Church and the faithful.

"It is, moreover, an incontestable right that the Roman Pontiff, Head of the whole Church, should not be the subject of any secular prince, still less the guest of any sovereign, but should reside in his own dominion, possess absolute control over it, and, in undisturbed tranquillity and august liberty, be free to defend, protect, sustain, and rule over the domain of the Catholic faith and the Christian republic."

From the foregoing arguments, it becomes plain that the neces-

sity of temporal power for the Sovereign Pontiff, in the sense explained, is a doctrine implied in the teaching of the Church.

To this judgment of the Church as a *teacher*, it is imperative that the Church *taught* should conform. The Church taught, that is to say, the body of the faithful, properly give, not only exterior, but also interior assent to the doctrine authoritatively proposed. Respectful silence is not sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the loyal Catholic. Unlike the power of civil rulers, that of the Church is not limited to exterior acts only, but extends also to interior judgments. It may be said that the latter are the principal objects of the ruling of the Church, which governs the soul, not the body.

The magistracy of the Church is an act of jurisdiction which binds the will by reason of the commandment given. Consequently, when teaching, the Church commands our judgment and will, that is to say, commands us to believe her teachings.

If then the Church has declared that the temporal power is actually necessary to secure independence and liberty of action on the part of the Sovereign Pontiff, it cannot be lawful for the faithful to consider it in any other light. To do so would be to assume that the Church had erred in her judgment, or had interfered in matters not within her jurisdiction.

In the first case the prerogative of infallibility of the Church would suffer; in the second, her holiness. And to admit either hypothesis would be to concede that the gates of hell had prevailed against her.

From the foregoing, a great number of inferences might be deduced bearing on this subject, but it will suffice to call the attention of our readers to three only.

1. That the temporal power for the Pope is a sacred right, because held for a sacred purpose, which is the security, liberty and independence of the apostolic ministry.

Pope Leo XIII, in his allocution of the 24th March, 1884, says :

“In this government (of the Pontifical state) there is contained a sacred character and form which is altogether peculiar to it, and not shared by any other commonwealth ; and this because it carries with it the freedom, stability and security of the Apostolic See in the august and sublime exercise of its charge.”

It is an axiom that the means participate in the nature of the end to which they tend. The Temple is sacred, and the chalices used in the celebration of the Divine Sacrifice are sacred also. Why? Be-

cause both are destined for a sacred purpose, namely, the worship of God.

In the same way we conclude that, as the functions of the papal office are sacred, the temporal sovereignty which is its adjunct, guarantee and safeguard, is likewise of a sacred character. We need not be surprised, therefore, that the Popes have looked upon the usurpation of this sovereignty as a sacrilege, and branded it with the sacred anathema of the Church.

Nor does it change the aspect of the question that it deals with a purely temporal matter. The object which the temporal power serves in the first instance renders it sacred. Were not the vessels taken from Jerusalem by the impious Balthazar, and profanely used at his banquet, sacred? Yet they were but earthly material, being made of gold and silver.

2. Another corollary to be deduced from what has been said is that the question of the temporal power is a matter which concerns the entire Church; for the liberty of the Church implies the liberty of the Sovereign Pontiff. The dependence and servitude of the head of a society affects the entire social body. Would the kingdom of Italy be considered free if its King were subject to the Emperor of Germany or the President of the French republic? Most assuredly not.

Apply this to the religious order of things. Let the Pope be subject, and by implication we find that the Church also is subject. The dependence of the Pope entails in a manner the dependence of all the faithful who receive their rule of conduct and law of conscience from the Sovereign Pontiff.

It is for this reason that the Roman question has become a universal question and that Catholics, all the world over, have taken part in the discussion relating to the present condition of the Pope. Everywhere we have had congresses in which Catholics have declared themselves as by right entitled to demand the re-establishment of the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See.

And observe that, up to the present, no suspicion has ever been entertained that the Sovereign Pontiff could be in connivance with the King of Italy. Everyone is convinced of the Pope's entire moral independence. This conviction is due to the defensive attitude of the Pontiff *vis-à-vis* the Italian government. The liberals complain of this attitude, but their complaints are unreasonable. Any change of position on the part of the Pope would be a veritable disaster, and would arouse on every side doubt and suspicion. In-

deed the Pope cannot act otherwise than he does in claiming his absolute right to independence, that is to the possession of his former territory.

3. And this is the third corollary which we draw from our previous proposition, viz., the impossibility of the Pope's renouncing the temporal sovereignty or ceasing to claim it as his rightful prerogative.

The Italian Liberals, through ignorance, or rather petulant malice, complain bitterly of what they are pleased to call the "obstinacy of the Pope." They attribute it to his ambition and the desire to reign. This is a senseless calumny. The invincible firmness of the Popes on this head is but the fulfillment of a sacred duty. The Pope is the custodian and vindicator of the rights and liberty of the Church. Rather than fail in this twofold obligation of his position, he should be ready to suffer every kind of martyrdom. The constancy of St. Gregory VII, in his struggle against the abuses of investitures, has won for him the universal praise and admiration of posterity. In order to overcome the enemies of the Church, he did not hesitate to have recourse both to spiritual and to material weapons which were lawfully placed at his disposition.

The present subjection of the Pope is no less injurious to the interests of the universal Church than were the ancient usurpations by the German Emperors, to which the courage and perseverance of Gregory put an end.

III.

Not long ago the Hon. Ruggiero Bonghi, ex-Minister of the Italian Government, wrote in his periodical,¹ *La Cultura*, the following words :

"It is neither agreeable nor becoming to have the Pope for a subject ; indeed, it is so very awkward that we preferred to acknowledge him as sovereign."

The first part of this statement is a fact ; the second is a declaration not altogether logical. To have the Pope as subject is indeed a very great inconvenience, because, by his presence, he somewhat obscures and eclipses the dignity of the secular princes who have placed themselves in possession. Rome has always been, and will ever be, the Rome of the Pope. If other rulers share his residence they are like the moon as compared to the sun when seen in the same heaven.

The papal authority is supreme [in the world ; to it is offered the

¹ No. XXXI, of the 30th of August, 1891.

universal respect and veneration of all Christians. In its vicinity the prestige of secular authority must necessarily diminish.

This, no doubt, was one of the reasons, and not the least important, which decided Constantine, immediately after his public acknowledgment of the sacred authority of the Pope, to quit Rome, and seek a capital on the shores of the Bosphorus. No other Emperor after him dared to establish his seat of authority in Rome, any more than any of the ancient kings of Italy,—Odoacer, Theodoric or the other semi-barbarian rulers—who respected nothing else that was sacred. The secular throne, aside that of the Holy See, would have been too insignificant.

But the most serious difficulty is that the State, receiving the Pope in the quality of a subject, thereby loses a considerable part of its own autonomy. The present Italian Government knows this only too well. It is obliged to tolerate a double diplomatic corps, with all its accessory exemptions, etc., seeing that every nation has the right to have a representative at the Court of the Pope.

Although she might be unwilling, Italy is obliged to keep the gates of her capital open to untold multitudes of strangers; for free access to the Pope can only with bad grace be refused the faithful, from whatever corner of the earth they may come. Moreover Italy is accountable for the manner in which the Pope is treated, both legally and civilly; because all Catholics have a right to see that the dignity and independence of their Supreme Chief be assured and respected. With the liberty of the Pope their own religious freedom is closely bound up; since, for Catholics, freedom of conscience depends in a measure upon the liberty of him who directs and governs their moral conduct. No doubt, all this is a very great source of embarrassment to a State which pretends to count the Pope among its subjects.

In order to solve this awkward question, Signor Bonghi, if he had intended to be logical, should have said: "We have preferred to *restore* to him his sovereign dignity." But instead of "restoring" he uses the expression *acknowledge* (*riconoscere*). Now, is a sovereign acknowledged when you have destroyed his sovereignty? Can any one acknowledge what does not exist? "It is true that we have destroyed the sovereignty of the Pope; but we have done so in order to reconstruct it." Reconstruct it! And how? By virtue of the law of guarantees. This is sheer mockery. The law of guarantees supposes the Pope to be a subject, and leaves him a subject. The man for whom a law can be made in his

own dominion is subject to the power which enacts it. By enacting this law in behalf of the Pope his sovereignty is denied and a pretext is created to enforce his subjection.

Nay, more. Article XIV of this law declares that

“ Every case of dispute regarding the non-observance or violation of any of the prerogatives allowed in the preceding articles is to be referred to the supreme judicial authority of the kingdom.”

If the recognition and determining of a person's rights depend on the *judicial* authority of a state, that person is evidently and unquestionably subject to the *political* authority of the same state. Is not the judicial power an essential part of the political authority?

The State, therefore, regards the Sovereign Pontiff as a subject; and as, through the medium of its parliament, it has granted certain privileges, it has also, through the medium of the civil tribunals, determined and limited them.

But be this as it may, the very existence of the so-called law of guarantees is precarious.

The leaders of the Italian Revolution have declared it to be an *internal* (i. e. not an international) law, and consequently its observance is dependent solely upon the will of the political party in power. As they have made it, they can also break it, should they so please.

There is no denying the evident fact that the overthrow of the Pope's temporal power has rendered him a subject of the Italian kingdom; and if this is a source of grave difficulty to the Government, the only way to overcome it is to return to the Pope his lawful domain and to replace him upon his throne. To this, *bon gré mal gré*, Italy must finally consent. To secure a sacrilegious acquisition and under the continued inspiration and pressure of secret agencies and hostile factions, she has preferred to enter into an alliance with Austria and Germany, an alliance which is contrary to all her national sympathies and interests. But is she certain that the alliance will be lasting? And if lasting, is it certain that the stranger will eventually endorse Italy's sacrilegious claims? We doubt it. This is the view not only of Catholic Italy, but of others whose shrewd outlook makes them see things as they are. Senator Tacini has well said that Italy, by her occupation of Rome, has put into circulation an unsigned letter of credit going the rounds in the political market of Europe.

THE COUNTRY PRIEST'S WEEK.

The swift week passes, each recurrent day
 Brings a new duty,—light and shadows play
 Across the pastor's path ; no rest he knows ;
 He feels the touch of joys, the weight of woes :—
 On *Tuesday*, Burke the carpenter lies low,
 The scaffold broke, a sudden fall, a blow ;
 From life to death the robust man is struck.
 Happily for him there's neither fate nor luck ;
 He bows his head unto the chastening rod,
 And, as a Catholic, longs to meet his God.

Across the fields, the anxious pastor speeds,
 Bearing our God, to fill the poor soul's needs,—
 And when the rites are over, and have ceased
 The aspirations, and the soul's released,
 The family turn in hope unto their friend ;
 "He's safe," the pastor says, "death does not end
 Your life or his,—pray, pray, I pray you, *pray*,
 And you shall meet him in the Light of Day!"
 The candles fall upon the pallid face,
 The family kneel;—about them, peace and grace,
 The soft tears flow,—ah, not in wild despair!—
 There's golden hope ; and why? "*The priest was there.*"
 He only of all men can do this thing,—
 Tear from the mouth of death its poisoned sting!
 Gentle he was,—but see him as he walks
 Quick by the side of yonder man who talks
 In maudlin nonsense,—angry is the word
 He hurls upon the drunkard ; who unheard
 Excuse scarce murmurs, cowed, if not contrite ;—
 Our pastor can be wrathful in the right!

On *Wednesday*, there's a wedding,—nuptial Mass,
 And then a warning word for lad and lass
 The pastor speaks ; a red-hued barn is cleared
 For the great feast, a pine that late upreared
 Its green boughs to gray skies is stripped and bare
 To decorate a bower for the pair
 Above the board whose oak firmness groans
 Beneath the beef and fowl,—soon to be bones
 When hearty appetites shall circle round,
 And cider sparkle and tongues be unbound.

The farmers gather with their gifts and jokes,
 And from the village come a crowd of folks,
 Friends of the groom, (who keeps the village store,
 And stands uneasy, one foot on the floor,

Bashful, yet bold,)—a strong hand lifts the latch,
 The priest has come,—'tis said he made the match,
 "And many others" add the chatting groups,
 "All good ones, too." How coy the fair bride droops!
 Who'd think she'd helped with careful hands to make
 That centre of her thoughts, the bridal cake?

The pastor reads these homely thoughts and lives,
 And into homely topics gayly dives.
 "The bride looks well,—a little girl at school,—
 Baptized her, sir. But, come, the feast grows cool!"
 And there's a rush, subdued a trifle, too,
 When 'tis remembered that a "grace" is due;
 He blesses the repast,—that farmer who
 Sat down too soon, now rises, almost blue
 With sudden flush, a laugh begins the chat;
 A pleasant hour; the pastor takes his hat:

Full well he knows the meaning of the floor
 Smoothed well and swept, and that behind the door
 The fiddles wait; and young folks, too, the chance
 Of cutting capers in a country dance;
 How they protest! He must not go so soon,—
 He'll wait till dark,—'tis easy,—there's a moon
 This time o'month,—the family all swear
 They'll keep him by main force; but he must tear
 Himself away; he's not by this deceived,
 He fancies that the young folks look relieved.

On Thursday, there's the funeral,—sad and slow
 The neighbors drive their buggies, and talk low
 Of Wednesday's wedding, and the widow's way
 Of getting on; the pastor bids them pray
 For death in grace; "good deeds, not ceaseless plans.
 For money-getting, leave the pots and pans
 And constant worry over kitchen stuff,
 And pray each day; O friends, 'tis well enough
 To live by bread, but not by bread alone,
 Up, souls and hearts!" he cries, in pastoral tone.

New resolutions move the serious crowd,
 Our Lord descends, and every head is bowed;
 God help the widow,—kind thoughts turn to her,
 Born of his words, for well our priests can stir
 The simple chords in honest hearts like these,
 As well as quote St. Thomas; through the trees
 To the near graveyard goes the mourning train,
 And prayers are fervent, though the soft spring rain
 Falls on the clay that waits the sacred dead
 And touches with its brilliantts each low head.

On Friday, childhood claims him, for he must
 Visit the school,—such visits rub the dust
 Of daily struggles from him,—now he smiles
 And tells fine stories; many childish wiles
 Are used to keep him there, the children know
 That while he stays the hours will not go slow:
 And when he's grave, the children love him still,
 For, if he scolds, some pocket will he fill
 With last year's walnuts, which will soothe the heart
 That in the "First Commandment" got a smart.

And here comes Tom Malone,—his student boy,
 To read a page of Virgil, and, with joy,
 To hear the news that he may go in Fall
 To a great college,—this will be a call
 Upon the pastor's purse, but only one
 Of many such, no wonder that the sun
 Shows white on his best cassock, that the books
 He loves are bought infrequent, that he looks
 A little rusty in his Sunday dress,
 When claims, like Tom's on his resources press.

But God is good!—and Tom is grateful, too,
 He'll stay all night, and many a chore he'll do.

On Saturday, the sermon looms aloft,
 A cloud upon the day,—alas, how oft
 The pastor wishes it in retrospect.
 At last 'tis done; (next week he will select
 From out a certain drawer his Easter-one,
 Quite new, beloved brethren, for 'twas done
 In eighty-two; 'twill fill the reverent fold
 With holy awe; 'tis new because 'tis old!)

The church is chill; confessions must be heard,
 The hour comes, it can not be deferred;
 He sits in patience, as the sun recedes,
 Absolves the sinner, and the beggar feeds
 With words that he alone, of all his kind
 Can use to cleanse the heart and soothe the mind,
 And force repentant sinners to atone
 With power that rests on no mere earthly throne;
 At night he waits, to hear the good-willed men;—
 His week has ended,—to begin again.

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN.

COLOR OF THE VESTMENTS.

NOTHING is more natural than that man should show respect and reverence, not only in posture and behavior, but also in dress, when presenting himself to God for prayer or sacrifice. For this reason we find among all civilized peoples that their priests were accustomed in their sacred ceremonies to make use of garments distinct from those in daily use. Liturgists are of opinion, that the dress used by clerics and lay people in the beginning of christianity was alike in form and pattern, but that they used one set in their daily occupations, and another, distinct from this, in the divine worship. This may be deduced from the regulation of St. Stephen I., 257,¹ who, instituting the blessing of the sacred vestments, ordained that priests and deacons could not use such except in their ministerial functions, and forbade laics to employ them under any consideration. And Benedict XIV. remarks: *Valde verosimile et omnium fere eruditorum consensione, Apostolos non iis vestibus communibus quas quotidiano et continuo usu adhibebant, sed aliis quibusdam peculiaribus indutos missam celebrasse.* And to show that this distinction was not in the form or pattern, he adds, *Potuit enim sacerdos aliquis albam et planetam, cum haec indumenta omnibus erant communia, adhibere cum domi se continebat; peculiari autem alia planeta uti, cum ad altare accederet.*²

In course of time, after the fall of the Empire, the fashion in ordinary attire underwent a revolution, and a variety of garb for the laity crept in; but the Church, with her customary conservative policy, retained the old forms on the whole. To render her ceremonies more pompous, however, she introduced a variety with regard to their size as well as the richness of the material of which they were made. In this she was only executing the will of her Founder, who in the Old Law prescribed most minutely everything that had reference to the ornaments of the temple and the sacred priesthood, commanding that all the vessels and ecclesiastical apparel should be made of the most precious material that could be procured.³

The retention of the old forms in the vestments is not intended merely to preserve the memory of antiquity, but they have, besides, a moral and a spiritual meaning, which we shall trace in a subsequent article. Here we have only to do with the color of the vestments,

¹ Platina, De Vitis RR. PP., Lovanii, Bogardus, 1572, p. 27.

² *De Sacrificio Missae*, Lect. I., c. xxviii.

³ Exod. xxviii.

whose spiritual signification we intend to explain, after having given an exposition of the XVIII. Rubric of the Roman Missal.

At the beginning of the fourth century only *white* vestments were used in the celebration of the Sacred Mysteries, probably in conformity with the vision of St. John, in which he saw the Angels, who represented the priests of the Altar, clothed in white robes.¹ St. Isidore mentions the use of white vestments with red borders, which shows that in the seventh century a variety of color had been introduced. Down to the thirteenth century the Greeks used only white and red ; the latter for fast-days and in the services of the dead, the former on all other occasions.

In the West, Innocent III.² assures us, that in the twelfth century *white, red, black* and *green* were in general use. He supposes that for mystical reasons they correspond to the colors of the sacerdotal vestments in the Old Law.³

Moreover, he makes mention of *purple* for the feast of the *Holy Innocents*, and for *Laetare Sunday*, and shows that during the seasons in which we make use of this color, namely, from the first Sunday of Advent to the Vigil of Christmas and from Septuagesima to Holy Saturday, black was used in its stead. Not long afterwards *violet* was introduced for days of abstinence and in the services indicative of affliction and for the dead. Hence the custom still practiced of burying Bishops, Priests and Deacons in violet vestments. (The Roman Pontiffs and Cardinal Deacons are buried in red vestments.)

After the violet color was firmly established for the services of Advent and Lent, the *roseate* color (purple of a lighter hue,) was used for Gaudete and Laetare Sundays. Vestments of *gold* cloth were afterwards introduced to be used indifferently for white and red, and according to some authors for green also. In France the *yellow* and *ash* colors are also employed, and in some dioceses of Spain *azure*, on feasts of the Blessed Virgin.

The Greeks and other Orientals, besides the white and red formerly used, employ at present also the black and purple in the services of the dead, and in places where the Latin churches are in the majority they make use of all the colors prescribed by the Latin church, as far as their Liturgies permit. Even among the Latin churches the colors are not always alike for the same feasts. Thus for instance with us *white* is used on Corpus Christi and on the feasts of Confessors, but in Paris *red* is used for the former and *green* for the latter, and in Autun the color is *yellow*. In the Ambrosian

1 Apoc. vii, 13, 15.

2 De Sacro Altaris Mysterio Lib. I. c. lvi.

3 Exod. xxviii, 5.

Church the *red* is used on the feast of the Circumcision, when we use the *white*. *Violet* is used on the Sundays of Lent down to Palm Sunday, as is the custom with us, but on the ferial days she uses *black*. On Palm Sunday and during Holy Week, except Good Friday, *red* is employed, we, however, use *violet*. On the feasts of the Holy Innocents and Corpus Christi she uses *red* whereas we employ *violet* on the former, and *white* on the latter day. These, however are differences of no great importance, and since they do not imply any serious obstacle, the Church, who tries to make herself all to all, allows all to carry out their peculiar rites.

In the Roman Liturgy only *white*, *red*, *violet*, *green* and *black* can be used. These colors are prescribed by the eighteenth Rubric of the Roman Missal: *Paramenta Altaris, Celebrantis, et Ministrorum debent esse coloris convenientis Officio et Missae diei, secundum usum Romanae Ecclesiae: quae quinque coloribus uti consuevit, Albo, Rubeo, Viridi, Violaceo, et Nigro.*

Paramenta altaris. This rubric supposes that the Mass which is celebrated is in conformity with the office of the day. Should the Mass not agree with the office, as is the case when votive Masses or Masses for the dead are celebrated, the question may arise, whether the *paramenta altaris* must agree with Mass or with the office. Cavalieri¹ says that in *low* Masses they should agree in color with the office, but the vestments of the celebrant with the Mass. In *solemn* Masses, both the *paramenta* and vestments should agree in color with the Mass, which is also the case on November 2, Commemoration of the Poor Souls, when at all Masses black must be used, except at the altar at which the Mass of the Octave of All Saints is celebrated, and when on that day the *Missa pro Pace* is sung during Forty Hours Devotion; in the former case *white* is used, and in the latter *violet*.

With regard to the cover of the Tabernacle, it should agree in color with the vestments, or at least white should be employed. *Black* can never be used, but *violet* should be employed in its stead.

Celebrantis. This has reference to the maniple, stole, chasuble, chalice veil and burse only. Thus the cincture may or may not be of the same color. This supposes, however, that the priest is celebrating Mass in his own church or in churches celebrating the same feast. Should he celebrate in another church in which the office, and consequently the Mass, is different from his own, this rubric cannot be applied. For such case the following general rules must

be observed. If both offices are *duplex*, or of a rite that excludes *votive Masses*, and of the same color, this color must, of course, be used, but he must celebrate the Mass which is conformable to his own office. If both offices are *duplex*, or of a rite that excludes *votive Masses*, but of different colors, the Mass and color of vestments must be conformable to the office of the church in which he is celebrating.

If a priest's office is a *duplex* and that of the church in which he is celebrating is a *semi-duplex*, he is obliged to celebrate Mass according to his own office.

If a priest's office is a *semi-duplex* and that of the church in which he is celebrating is a *duplex* and both offices demand the same color, he may celebrate the Mass conformable to his own office or to the office of the church, or select a *votive Mass* of this color. When both offices are of a rite that admits *votive Masses*, any *votive Mass* or a *Mass de Requie* may be celebrated, and the corresponding color must be used.

Debent. This word implies a precept and not merely a counsel. St. Pius V. ordained that the Mass must be celebrated *juxta ritum, modum ac normam* of the missal which he published. The Bull by which this is prescribed is found at the beginning of every Roman Missal. And the S. C. of Rites on November 12, 1831, prescribes, *ut servetur strictim Rubrica quoad Colorem Paramentorum*. There is one exception, namely, in case vestments of the prescribed color cannot be obtained. For according to St. Liguori it is better to celebrate Mass, *secluso scandalo*, without observing the rubric with regard to color, than to omit the Holy Sacrifice when the color cannot be had.¹

Coloris convenientis Officio et Missae. These words exclude vestments of various colors, or of colors not included in the XVIII. Rubric, viz : white, red, green, violet, and black. Hence vestments of divers colors in which no color predominates cannot be used. Should, however, one color predominate it can be used for that color only, yet Cavalieri notes, "*Parce adhibendus est istiusmodi ornatus.*"²

WHITE.

Whatever is striking or beautiful in nature, or noble and excellent in the order of grace seems to be symbolized by this color. Among the elements, water (*nitida*), among the planets, the moon (*nivea*),

¹ De Euch. n. 378, dub. 5.

² Tom. iii, dec. 79, n. 7.

among the faculties, eloquence (*eloquii nitor*), among virtues, chastity (*candida*), among gems, the diamond (*lucidus*), and among ages, infancy (*lactea*), are indicated by it. Prosperity and fortune are designated by it. Hence among the ancients bright days and brilliant gems were always considered signs of future happiness. Victory and triumph were equally betokened by it. Thus we find the angels announcing the triumph of the Risen Lord clothed in a white garment, and the victorious Romans returning from their battles were vested in white robes. Moreover, it is everywhere considered a mark of innocence and purity, and for this reason the Church vests the newly-baptized with this color. Hence the word *Candidatus* for those who aspire to any office or position. Among the ancients they presented themselves in white *togas* to indicate their integrity and probity, thereby to commend themselves to the favor of the classes when soliciting the votes of the electors. It is not surprising, therefore, that on feasts which are indicative of glory and triumph, peace and joy, innocence and purity, the Church should make use of this color.

In the XVIII. Rubric of the Missal, after having noticed that only the above-mentioned five colors should be used, she prescribed *white* for the following festivals: From the Vespers of the *Vigil of Christmas* to the end of the Octave of the *Epiphany*, except on the feasts of martyrs. On *Christmas* to express the beauty of the new-born King, the splendor of the Father,¹ and the True Light which enlighteneth every man that comes into this world,² who, as the Son of God, comes to celebrate His nuptials with human nature. It is at the same time expressive of the spotless purity of His Virgin Mother, the joy which the Angels proclaimed to the world, and the cleanness of heart with which we ought to approach the divine manger. On the *Epiphany*, on which day for several centuries the Nativity of our Divine Saviour was celebrated, to commemorate the joy of the Magi from the East, who, under the guidance of a bright star, were led to the abode of the divine Infant.

During this cycle the feast of the Circumcision, which commemorates the first shedding of blood, occurs. We should expect that *red* would be used, which seems to be more indicative of this mystery than *white*. Liturgists generally account for the apparent anomaly, that this feast is not so much in honor of the Circumcision as it is to celebrate the Octave of the Nativity and the Maternity of Mary,

1 Hebr. i, 3.

2 John i, 9.

with whom the prayers, antiphons and responses are mostly concerned. A more suitable reason, however, might be alleged. This first shedding of blood was not an immolation, but rather a preparation for the great sacrifice to be consummated on the altar of the Cross. For a similar reason the Church uses *red* on the feasts of the martyrdom of her children, which is changed into *white*, as a sign of joy and gladness on the day of the finding or translation of their sacred relics.

On the feast of the *Holy Name* "because," according to St. Bernard, "the name of Jesus is that bright light by which God has enlightened us and has called us unto His admirable light."¹ On *Maundy-Thursday*, on account of the blessing of Holy Chrism, which has for its object the cleansing of souls, as well as to commemorate the washing of the feet of the Apostles by our Lord, and to express the cleanness of heart with which we ought to approach the august Sacrament of the Altar, which was instituted on that day. Probably, also, on account of the color of the garments with which Christ was clothed at the Last Supper.

From *Holy Saturday* to the *Vigil of Pentecost* in memory of the glorious resurrection and ascension of Christ, who, in this season's services is called the Light of the World, which knows neither spot nor shadow. The mysteries celebrated during these days, moreover, above all others produce in a faithful soul sentiments of joy and purity. It has reference also to the Angel who announced the Risen Lord to the women. His countenance was as lightning, St. Matthew relates, and his raiment as snow.² The two men also who addressed the Apostles when a bright cloud received Our Lord out of their sight, were robed in white garments.³

On the feast of the *Blessed Trinity*. Because God is Light and in Him there is no darkness.⁴ He is sanctity and majesty itself of which white is most expressive. Moreover, just as white is the principle of all color, so also God is the principle of all beings. Again in all their manifestations the three Divine Persons seem to vindicate for themselves this color. Thus Daniel saw the Father, whose robes were white as snow and whose hair was like clean wool.⁵ St. John saw the Son of Man, whose hair was white as wool and as snow.⁶ The Holy Ghost descended upon Christ in the form of a white dove.⁷

On the feast of *Corpus Christi*. White, being indicative of grandeur

¹ Fourth lesson of this Feast.

⁵ vii, 9.

² xxviii, 3.

⁶ Apoc. i, 13.

³ Acts i, 9.

⁷ Luke iii, 22.

⁴ John i, 5.

and solemnity, it is appropriately used on this greatest of all solemnities in the ecclesiastical year. Probably also on account of the whiteness of the species of the bread and the purity of Him who has become in this sacrament the Bread of Life for man.

On the festival of the *Transfiguration*, because in this mystery the face of Christ did shine as the sun; and His garments became white as snow,¹ when speaking to Moses and Elias.

On the feasts of the *Blessed Virgin*. On account of the immaculate purity of the Mother of God, whom as the prototype of all purity, St. Anslem says,² it behooved to possess that purity which could be second only to that of the Divinity, purity itself. Hence in the *Canticle of Canticles* she is compared to those beings, which of their very nature are indicative of cleanness, beauty and purity. She is called a lily, a white dove, a pure fountain, a tower of ivory, and the morning star.

On the feasts of the *Holy Angels*, who are always described in the Sacred Books as being vested in white robes, which are admirably suited to their dignity, their office and their nature. For white is indicative of comeliness and purity, glory and dignity, as well as of the joy they proclaim in their missions to fallen man. St. Sophronius calls them mirrors of the Divinity and images of the Divine Beauty.³ When the holy Virgin Richmundis, who had been favored with visions of the Angels, was asked to describe them, she answered, that they had a human form, a virginal countenance, their cheeks were like roses and the remainder of their form was covered with robes whiter than snow.⁴

On the feast of *St. John the Baptist*, because as the Angel had foretold many would rejoice at his birth. No color, however, expresses joy and gladness so well as white. As we have seen, this is also the color peculiar to the Angels. Although St. John by nature was human, yet by his office and grace he was an Angel. "For this is the one of whom it is written; I shall send my Angel who will prepare my way before thee."⁵ This color being also an index of purity is most appropriately used on his day, since he enjoyed above all the grace of being sanctified in his mother's womb.

On the principal festival of *St. John the Evangelist*, indicative of

1 Matthew xvii, 2.

2 De Conceptu Virginali. Chap. xviii, Migne, Patr. Lat. Vol. clvii, Col. 451.

3 Enconium Archang. et Ang., Migne, Patr. Gr., Vol. xxxvii, Col. 3315.

4 And. du Saussay, Panoplia Clericalis, Lut. Paris, Cramoisy, 1649. Pars. ii, Lib. iv. p. 579.

5 Matth. xi, 10.

his virginal purity, who on account of his chastity was so especially beloved by our Lord, that He commended to his charge His virgin Mother.

On both festivals of the *Chair of St. Peter*. Formerly the episcopal thrones were ornamented with white hangings to designate not only the purity of doctrine, but also the dignity and authority of their occupants, the Bishops of the Church. It is not surprising, therefore, that on the days commemorative of the Chair, whose occupant had been made the pillar and foundation of all truth by Christ, and whose dignity and authority is the principle of all power, the Church should use this color.

On the festival of *St. Peter's Chains*, because having been liberated from his chains, he went forth from the darkness of his prison and was led by the Angel from death to freedom.

On the feast of *St. Paul*, because he was changed from Saul into Paul, from a wolf into a lamb, from a persecutor into a faithful preacher, from a child of anger into a vessel of election and grace, and from darkness to light.

On the feast of *All Saints*, to indicate the ineffable glory and happiness of those chosen ones who are clothed in white robes and whose habitation is enlightened by the glory of God. There is no night or darkness there, for the Lamb is the lamp thereof.¹

On the feasts of *Pontiffs* and *Confessors* expressive of the purity of their lives, the sincerity of their faith and the crown of glory with which they have been rewarded. On the feasts of *Doctors*, because according to the prophecy of Daniel, "The learned shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that instruct many to justice as stars for all eternity."²

On the feasts of *Virgins* and *Neither Virgins nor Martyrs*. St. Chrysologus says that Virgins and Angels are of the same kindred. *Angelis cognata Virginitas*,³ and St. Cyril of Jerusalem asserts *Virgines Angeli in terra ambulantes*.⁴ It is not singular, therefore, that she should use white for both. White, moreover, symbolizes chastity which makes the Virgin. Why she should use white on the feasts of those that are not virgins, is, because she considers rather the grace which they have received and the tears of penance, than the guilt of sin which was washed away by repentance and works of mortification.

¹ Apoc. xxi, 23.

² xii, 3.

³ Sermo CXLIII, Migne, Patr. Lat. vol. LII, col. 583.

⁴ Cat. XXII, Migne, Patr. Gr., vol. XXXIII, col. 767.

At the *Dedication* and *Consecration* of a *Church* or *Altar*. Probably on account of the analogy between the earthly and material and the spiritual and heavenly temple, of which, according to the Psalmist, holiness is a special character.¹ And the Altar signifies Christ, who is the essence of glory, purity, dignity and authority.

At the *Consecration* of the *Roman Pontiff*, on the *Anniversary of his Election* and *Coronation*, as well as on the day of a *Bishop's Election* and *Consecration*, to designate their authority and dignity, and the purity of doctrine and discipline, which, above all others ought to reside in them.

In the *Nuptial Mass* as an index of the purity and integrity of the bride. For the same reasons as noted above the same color is used during the Octave and in the votive Masses of said feasts.

RED.

Red is no less symbolical of, objects both in nature and in the order of grace than *white*. Among the elements, fire (*flammeus*), among the planets, Mars (*sanguineus*), among the signs of the Zodiac, Leo (*ardens*), among ages, youth (*ignea*), among flowers, the rose (*rubens*) and among virtues, modesty (*rubescens*) are characterized by it. Hence St. Gregory Nazianzen remarks that: *Decor unicus in mulieribus est amabilis, bonus rubor, scilicet pudor.*² And no less beautifully does the Spouse in the Canticle of Canticles take occasion of the red lips and cheeks of his bride to recommend her beauty and purity: "Thy lips are as a scarlet lace; thy cheeks are as a piece of pomegranate."³ Even among the pagans a suffused countenance was looked upon as a mark of innocence. Thus Diogenes took occasion of the blush on the face of a young student to attest the purity of his soul: *Macte fili, hujusmodi est enim ingenuae virtutis tinctura.*

It is also, at least in Sacred Scriptures, an index of sin and vice. Hence Isaias promises forgiveness on repentance, even though our sins should be as red as scarlet;⁴ and probably for this reason our Saviour allowed Himself to be clothed in scarlet and white garments, and blood and water flowed from His sacred side, by the former to represent the enormity of our crimes, and by the latter His own innocence, by which we were to be pardoned. For although Christ is the Just One, on which account white, which is

¹ Ps. xcii, 5.

² Poema xxix Adversus Mulieres. Migne, Patr. Lat., vol. xxxvii, col. 903.

³ iv, 3.

⁴ I, 15.

indicative of innocence and mercy, grace and glory, would be more appropriate, yet because He is also our Defender and Saviour, as a sign of the battles, trials, troubles and sufferings He was to undergo for our sake, He allowed Himself to be clothed with a red vesture. These same wars the Church, His representative, has had to wage ever since her institution, not only during the centuries of persecution, but also in her peaceful years. For St. Augustine remarks, that to appease the angry, to protect the just, to oppose the avaricious, and to humble the proud is no less a martyrdom than to shed one's blood.¹

Again, as in the Old Testament, red was a symbol of the bloody sacrifices and the fire upon which the offerings of the faithful were burned,² so the Church appropriately uses this color on festivals that have connection with the sacrifice of the cross, and which are expressive of the fire of love which the Paraclete came to enkindle in the hearts of the faithful, by which the martyrs were encouraged to imitate their Divine Model. They, like true warriors, filled with youthful ardor, veritable lions, modestly depending upon the divine assistance, went forth to meet their enemies and to valiantly fight the battles of their Master, and having achieved a victory they are crowned with wreaths of everlasting glory.

Red is used during the *Octave of Pentecost*, to commemorate the descent upon the Apostles of the Holy Ghost, who, in a rushing wind, under the form of fiery tongues, rested upon them when they were assembled in the upper room at Jerusalem, the birthplace of the Church. On the feasts of the *Holy Cross* and the *Precious Blood*, in memory of the priceless drops shed for our redemption on that infamous gibbet.

On the feast of the *Beheading of St. John the Baptist*, in honor of the precursor of Our Lord, who shed his blood for duty's sake and justice. On the feasts of the *Apostles* to commemorate the martyrdom and triumph of these glorious princes of the Church. On the feasts of *Martyrs*, who in times of persecution, after cruel tortures and sufferings, laid down their lives for the true faith. It is used also during the octaves of these feasts, and in their votive Masses for the same reasons.

On the *Octave of the Holy Innocents*, because it was only after the resurrection of Our Lord that the glorious title of Martyrs could be applied to them. And when the feast itself falls on a *Sunday* which is commemorative of Christ's resurrection.

1 Serm. Cl. de Tempore.

2 Num. xix, 3.

In the Mass *pro eligendo Summo Pontifice*, because the Mass of the Holy Ghost, who is the *Spiritus ardoris, fons vivus, ignis, charitas*, of which this color is symbolical, is celebrated.

GREEN.

Innocent III. remarks that *green* is a color *medius inter albedinem et nigredinem et ruborem*. Hence the Church uses this color on those days which have no festive character, and at the same time are not indicative of penance or affliction. Such days in the ecclesiastical year are the Sundays and Ferials which do not occur during the octaves of great feasts, during the penitential seasons or during the glorious Paschal cycle. Above all other virtues this color is symbolical of the second theological virtue, hope. For just as green is a color between white and red, so hope is between faith and charity, the former of which is symbolized by white, the latter by red. St. John seems to allude to this, when in the Apocalypse he says, that there was around the throne, which according to interpreters signifies the mercy of God, a rainbow like an emerald¹ which betokened hope; for all our hope of salvation is centered in the mercy of God. Hence, Quarti infers, that to signify that we are wayfarers and strangers in the world, the Church uses this color to exhort us to exercise this virtue more frequently during these days.

This color is used from the *Octave of the Epiphany to Septuagesima* and from the *Octave of Pentecost* to the first *Sunday in Advent*, except Trinity Sunday, the Sundays within octaves, the Ember days and vigils of feasts. All the prayers during these seasons seem to be directed to increase our hope. They beg that the grace of God may flourish in our hearts, that the love of virtue and justice may never grow cold, but rather increase, that the love of purity and hatred of sin may always reside in our breasts and that true devotion might be fostered. For only by exercising these virtues can we reasonably hope for eternal salvation.

VIOLET.

Violet, palish blue or livid color is universally acknowledged to be indicative of modesty, humility and temperance, the roots of true penance. The Church uses this color during the seasons set aside for mortification and fasting, and on days which are dedicated in a special manner to prayer, petition and supplication.

The rubric demands this color from the *first Sunday of Advent* to the Mass of the *Vigil of Christmas* indicative of the tears and ardor with which the Church awaits the arrival of her Spouse. She thereby unites herself with the Israelites of old, who, clothed in sack-cloth and ashes, yearned for the first coming of the Messias. She thereby signifies the sadness which ought to fill our hearts for past sins, as well as the works of penance whereby we ought to prepare ourselves for His second coming in the hearts of men. She lastly thereby alludes to His final coming as Judge of the living and the dead, and desires to put us in mind of that day of terror and wrath.

From *Septuagesima* to the Mass of *Holy Saturday* and on the *Ember days*. Because they are seasons of penance, fasting and mortification, during which our vices and evil propensities are to be curbed, our flesh is to be purified, our soul is to be drawn from earthly affairs and directed to those of heaven. For just as purple is a combination of white, red and black colors, so by mortification of the flesh, which is represented by violet the whiteness of innocence is restored and the fervor of charity is increased after the filth of sin has been washed away.

During the *Prophecies* before Mass on *Holy Saturday* and on the *Vigil of Pentecost*, because they are expressive of the desires of better things, and necessarily include sadness ; for “ Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul ”¹ and because to these prophecies prayers are added, which beg for tears of true compunction and orrow and ask for mercy.

During the *Litanies* on the feast of *St. Mark* and on the *Rogation days* and in *Processions*, which were introduced as services of public expiation. On these days the faithful are to devote themselves to penance to appease the anger of Almighty God, and thus avert calamities of every kind.

On the feast of the *Holy Innocents*, to express the lamentations of the mothers who beheld their babes cruelly butchered by Herod's soldiers. *Red* vestments would be too expressive of that stream of infant blood, which excludes all consolation for the mothers, whereas joyous *white* would ill accord with their inconsolable sorrow. She therefore vests in violet, the symbol of grief and affliction.

On *Palm Sunday*, to express the kingly dignity of Christ, who was received in Jerusalem with royal pomp and ceremony. In

Masses of the *Passion*, to commemorate the purple vestment with which Christ was clothed by Pilate, and the blood and water that flowed from His Sacred Side.

In Masses *pro quacunq̄ue necessitate, etc.*, because they are celebrated on occasions of sorrow, affliction and penance.

At the *blessing* of *Candles, Palms* and *Ashes*, to express the power of the Church over the demons, who are dispelled by the exorcisms pronounced in blessing the objects.

BLACK.

Black, being the negation of color, is peculiarly expressive of darkness. In the Sacred Scriptures misfortunes of every kind are frequently designated by darkness. Hence this color became symbolical of evil and adversity, both physical and spiritual.¹

It is for this reason that down to the XIII. century it was used during seasons of affliction and penance. But since sin, the only true misfortune in the spiritual life, does not make us absolutely impervious to the light of grace, this color was changed into violet, which, though sombre, is not altogether lightless. Thus black was retained in the Liturgy only on Good Friday, and in the services of the dead as symbolical of our entrance into the darkness of death.

S. L. E.

ARE THE KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS A FORBIDDEN SOCIETY FOR CATHOLICS?

BEFORE approaching the question it may be well to state that from 1850 until several years after the proclamation of the third Plenary Council, the *Odd Fellows* and *Sons of Temperance* were considered as included in the censure of the Church. The *Knights of Pythias*, when first organized, were also looked upon as under censure. During my service in the Diocese of Richmond until 1881, and after that date in the Diocese of Natchez, the sacraments and Christian burial were denied to Catholics belonging to any of these three secret societies. Within the last four or five

¹ Theodore *Lector* relates that Acacius, Patriarch of Constantinople, had the altar and his throne draped with black cloth to show his grief at the edict of Basiliscus against the Synod of Chalcedon. *Historia. Eccles.* Paris. P. Le Petit, 1673, p. 556.

years it has been asserted that the Bulla "Apostolicae Sedis" had freed the two first named and all similar societies from the condemnation of the Church, on the plea that they were not specially mentioned in said Bulla. The Bulla dates from the year 1869, yet, to my knowledge, the above interpretation was never advanced by any American canonist for at least seventeen or eighteen years after its publication. Konings, in all the editions of his Moral Theology, and Sabetti, in the editions issued before the Boston conference of 1890, in explaining the Bulla, concluded that the *Odd Fellows*, *Sons of Temperance* and *Fenians* were condemned. It was also asserted in recent years that Cardinal Franzelin, who presided over the meetings of the American prelates called to Rome for the preliminaries of the third Plenary Council, had interpreted the Bulla as not including the above mentioned societies. No *official* recognition, however, has been given to whatever the Cardinal may have said. If it deserved such recognition, why do the official acts of the council fail to mention it? The following documents, which were used in the preparation of the decrees of the third Plenary Council, and which speak of secret societies are silent regarding this interpretation.

1st. "Capita proposita et examinata in collationibus, quas coram nonnullis Emis. Card. S. Congr. de Prop. Fide ad praeparandum futurum Concilium Plenarium habuerunt Rmi. Archiepiscopi et Episcopi Foed. Statuum Am. Septi. Romae congregati, cap. ix."

2d. "Relatio collationum quas Romae coram S. C. de Prop. Fide Praefecto habuerunt Archiepiscopi pluresque Episcopi Stat. Foed. Am. 1883, cap. ix."

3d. "Schema Decretorum Concilii Plenarii Baltimorensis Tertii, p. 73."

None of the prelates present at the conferences at Rome, so far as I know, thought it necessary to mention Cardinal Franzelin's words on the subject; nor was any allusion to them made either in the committee rooms, or in the private or public sessions of the council, or in the decrees of the council itself. At the council no one ever expressed a doubt as to the condemnation of the *Odd Fellows* and *Sons of Temperance*, and yet the Bulla "Apostolicae Sedis" was already fifteen years old. The Boston conference of archbishops was reported somewhat inexact, and the St. Louis conference, November 1891, declared "that the rules of the third Plenary Council regarding societies be adhered to, the resolutions of the Boston conference to be explained as not having altered these rules." The

Odd Fellows and *Sons of Temperance* were held condemned before, during and after the third Plenary Council. The inexact report of the Boston conference cannot be held as proof to the contrary, since the St. Louis conference desires them to be explained according to the rules of the third Plenary Council; and unless Rome or the assembled archbishops give a precise decision to the contrary, these societies should be held as forbidden.

We now come to the *Knights of Pythias*. The third Plenary Council of Baltimore, has laid down general rules, according to which it is to be determined whether a society be lawful or unlawful, forbidden or dangerous. It is in the light of these laws that we shall have to consider the *Knights of Pythias*.

1st. The Council No. 247 decrees "a society, if it enjoins a secret to be so kept, as not to allow that it be made manifest to the authority of the Church, is to be numbered among the forbidden societies, and the members are to be deprived of sacramental absolution until they recede from it, or at least seriously promise to recede at once. And as the right and duty to enquire is incumbent on the bishops, every society which refuses its secrets to be made known to the Ordinary lawfully inquiring therein, may be supposed to refuse such knowledge to the authority of the Church." Let us apply this rule.

The following is a compendium of the ceremonial at the reception of a candidate.

The members in masks are clothed in black robes; loud talk or heavy walking must be avoided; the candidate is dressed in a white robe and his eyes are blindfolded; the outer guard is commanded not to converse with him in a frivolous manner, but with grave solemnity. He is asked whether he believes in a Supreme Being; *absolute* obedience is expected of him and he takes the oath to keep secret *forever*, all he may hear or be instructed in *hereafter* regarding the mysteries of the order. He is made to kneel down by the side of a coffin, containing sometimes a skeleton; he places his hand on the Bible, members cover him with their lances as a warning of what may happen should he fail to keep the oath. The oath of secrecy refers to things present and things in the *future*, and is as follows: "I, in the presence of these true and tried brethren, do most solemnly promise, declare and swear that I will *never* reveal to the day of my death and will keep secret all the mysteries which I have been, or may be hereafter instructed in." He declares the same about passwords, etc., and finishes "so help me God," and in token of sincerity he must kiss the Bible. Some members pre-

tend that the ceremonies of the order mean nothing ; if this be so, then the ceremonies are simply a blasphemous mockery of God, abusing the sacredness of an oath, and of the Holy Bible. But all the ceremonies, preceding and following, clearly show that the order is in real earnest when it imposes this oath on the candidate. These quotations I have made from a ritual of the order lying before me.

The secrets are not allowed to be made manifest "except it be in a regular lodge or to an authorized officer of the order." I have on four or five different occasions asked Catholics, members of the order, to show me the ritual. I was refused ; their answer was that they were not allowed to do so. Our Chancellor addressed a note in my name to a high officer in town asking the favor of being supplied with a copy of the ritual of the *Knights of Pythias* ; or, should it not be in his power to do so, to point out a superior officer who could. He answered "I have no authority to supply Archbishop Janssens or any other person with a copy of the ritual of the Knights of Pythias, nor do I know of any person having such authority." He referred however to the Supreme Chancellor of the world. April 9, a registered letter indicating the legitimacy of the request, was directed to said officer, courteously asking him to send a copy to me for inspection. The "Supreme Chancellor of the world" kindly answered : "I would be pleased to be of any service to the Most Rev. F. Janssens, Archbishop of New Orleans, but no member of the Knights of Pythias has authority to disclose the contents of our Rituals, and the only manner in which cognizance of the Ritual can be taken by any person, is to make application for membership in a subordinate Lodge of the Order, receive the ranks and become a member in accordance with our laws and regulations."

The Knights of Pythias come under Decree 247 of the third Plenary Council. The order does not allow its secrets to be made manifest to the authority of the Church, *i. e.* to the Ordinary legitimately inquiring therein. "It is to be numbered among the forbidden societies and the members are to be deprived of sacramental absolution."

"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." An oath to be lawful should be ordered by lawful authority, be it civil or ecclesiastical, or at least for great and sufficient cause. By what authority does the chancellor or prelate of a Pythias Lodge assume the right to make a Catholic kneel down, kiss the Bible (most likely a Protestant one) and swear by God that he will keep secret things present and in the future till the day of his

death? Pythians, who calls themselves Catholics, dilate on the arbitrariness of the Church, which has her power and authority from Christ, the Son of God—and they kneel down and take an oath by order of a man who has no other power or authority over them but that which he assumes. In the initiation of the third rank the candidate calls God as witness that “he may suffer all the anguish and torments possible for man to suffer, if ever by word or sign he expose the secret work or ceremonies of the order.” What an imprecation, degradation, and slavery?

The *oath* of secrecy, moreover, is *absolute*, without reserve or restriction; the *promise* of obedience is conditional. The candidate “promises to obey *all orders that may be given*, emanating from the Supreme etc. Lodge.” He promises obedience as to things unknown, to commands of the future, to all orders that may be given, with the only proviso, a weak one forsooth, “so long as they do not conflict with my political or religious liberty.” This is the formula of the third rank. I call it a weak proviso, for politics in these days seem to have thrown off the shackles of conscience, and it may be safely assumed that religion has no longer any restraining power over Catholics, who have proceeded to this third initiation, and who, as some have declared, would rather leave the Church than their Pythian Lodge.

There is a controlling power in this dark and dangerous society, called the Council of Ten, consisting of the King and his nine Counsellors. This Council is the Supreme Court “from whose decision there is no appeal, whose edicts oncesent forth are established law.” There is much talk of secret work, whatever it may be, and the ceremonies according to the ritual repeatedly mention Pluto, the pagan god of the internal regions.

I leave it to others to judge whether the promise of obedience is one of *blind* obedience, and as such condemned by section 247 of the Plenary Council. I believe it is.

The Plenary Council, section 249, also condemns any society that has its own chaplain and its own rites and ceremonies. The Knights of Pythias are not satisfied with a chaplain, they aim higher; they have a prelate. He leads in prayer, and so might a father in his family. But he is the expounder of the Pythian religion and its mysteries the expounder of the emblem, symbol or skeleton of their “honored and revered Patron Saint Pythias.” Mark the title “Patron Saint!” and placed, too, before the candidate as a model of charity, (there is no mention, of course, of the charity of our Blessed Lord);

he administers the Pythian oath and explains it ; he presides at the ceremonies of this religion, and the order so insists on the services of its prelate at the death of members, that it threatens poor widows or relatives not to pay death-benefits unless the deceased member be buried with the prayers and ceremonies of this Pythian prelate.

If it be said that the ceremonies employed by the order of *Knights of Pythias* be not the form of a religion, why make a mockery of religion? But if they be such—and there is every appearance of it—Catholics should be allowed rather to join a Protestant religion, which works in the clear light of the day and does not bind a man's conscience with an abominable oath of secrecy and a promise of obedience.

The order of the K. of P. first weakens, then destroys the faith of Catholics; it substitutes the religion of man for the revealed religion of Christ; it ties a man with an iron chain of oath and obedience to an order, closely allied to the Free Masons; its chiefs are in good standing in the Masonic fraternity and use this order for a mere pretence by which to draw Catholics to the Lodge and away from the Church.

To the question: Are the *Knights of Pythias* a forbidden society for Catholics? there can be but one answer. According to the decrees of the third Plenary Council of Baltimore it is to be numbered among the forbidden societies and the members are to be deprived of sacramental absolution until they recede from it, or at least seriously promise to recede at once.

F. JANSSENS.

Archbishop of New Orleans.

A LAST WORD.

This article had been solicited and was in our hands before the decision of the Roman Commission appointed to examine into the compromise between the Catholic authorities in the archdiocese of St. Paul and the Minnesota Board of Public Schools was made known. The words *tolerari posse*, in so far as they exclude the adoption of the Faribault and Stillwater plans in other Catholic communities, implicitly condemn the theory which would seem to support or advocate any similar move on the part of Catholics. This practically puts an end to the controversy.

Since, however, there has been some misrepresentation, as if the criticisms which have appeared in our REVIEW were needlessly severe, we deem it a matter of prudence to place on record a brief summary of the principles involved in the past controversy, by which every impartial reader may convince himself of the true merits of the case. The Reverend Fr. Holaind was the first to call attention to the dangerous theory advocated by Dr. Bouquillon; it is but proper that he should say a word in conclusion, which will show how just and timely was his criticism. Such is the purpose of the following paper.—THE EDITOR.

THE title of this article is not of the writer's own choosing. On so momentous an issue as the educational question he cannot pretend to speak the last word. But, if the above heading does not imply a claim which, under the circumstances, would be presumptuous it conveys at least the earnest wish of the able editor of the AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW that in the present number the controversy should be brought to an end. Various questions of hardly less importance than that of the schools claim the well filled pages of the monthly, and the attention of its readers need be directed to other points where Catholics—and above all the Catholic clergy—are to present a solid front against the common foe of their holy faith. Controversy, whatever its beneficial results may be, has reached its legitimate measure as soon as the arguments on both sides have been clearly and fully stated, and any further contest is likely to end in mere personal opposition.

The honor accorded us of closing the discussion in the ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW is due probably to the fact that, after having dealt the first blow against a theory both dangerous and aggressive, we retired from the field—not through any lack of confidence in our position; much less through any overweening self-assurance that our reply had settled the question, but because we found that men of greater weight had taken up the weapon in defence of parental authority. It seemed to us both unnecessary and unwise to press forward in the immediate struggle and thus perhaps hamper the movements of those whom we knew to be experienced and skilled in so just a warfare.

It may be asked, why then it was, that we “rushed” so to speak “into print with such breathless haste.” The answer is simple enough. Dr. Bouquillon's pamphlet appeared but a few days before the proposed assembly of the Archbishops at St. Louis. It was not unlikely from what had been publicly stated that the meeting would give occasion for a discussion regarding Catholic schools with the

view of harmonizing the action of the hierarchy through the States. Dr. Bouquillon's plea was evidently in defence of State right. He claimed to have written at the request of his ecclesiastical superiors. It was to be supposed that such authority would exercise considerable influence upon the deliberations of the prelates who would be at least slow to condemn statements so well sustained whatever misgivings they might have as to their soundness when tested. In any case there was hardly time for them to formulate an answer supported by such criticism as could have weight with men of learning. When this fact was brought to our notice with a request to examine some of the assertions of Dr. Bouquillon which were, to say the least, novel, we felt it a duty to act without delay. There were evidently misstatements and erroneous inferences in the Doctor's argument, and if we were to point them out it was essential that it should be done at once, before the weight of authority could have biased the minds of those who had no reason to suspect the correctness of the learned Professor's principles or reasoning. Nor could we be charged with presumption in undertaking the task. It might be supposed that there were a number of men besides Dr. Bouquillon who had given their earnest consideration to the school problem and who were acquainted with the literature to which he appealed in support of his singular doctrine of State right. If our criticism did not contain a complete account of what might be said on the subject, it was nevertheless satisfactory inasmuch as it called forth a very necessary explanation without obliging us to alter or withdraw any of our propositions in a subsequent pamphlet.

But there were many considerations which made it desirable to lose no time in replying to the perplexing question publicly asked and answered by Dr. Bouquillon's "Education ; to whom does it belong?" Not a few Catholics might be found who were already weary of the long and costly struggle of supporting a parochial school, and who would be only too willing to cast the burden and responsibility of education upon the State if a plausible pretext could be found for doing so. On the other hand, we could not ignore the fact that there was and ever will be a host of men, unfriendly to our holy faith, anxious to weaken the hold which pastors have on their flocks, who would urge any measure by which the control of the school may be wrested from the Church. They speak of "advanced thought" and "true Americanism" as if either quality depended on the control of the State over the education of its citizens. Besides such worshippers of Leviathan we have to guard

against the large class of politicians who, if not directly hostile to the Catholic Church, professedly aim at centralization of civil power. Give them an opportunity to enter our schools and they will arrogate to themselves the right of criticizing, dictating and reforming, as if it were the essential prerogative of their position. And when this interference is resented by Catholics the elated State officials will be well pleased if they can appeal to authorities in our own ranks who teach that the State has an absolute right to educate. This fact has been glaringly illustrated in a recent case before the Courts of Ohio, where Dr. Bouquillon's pamphlet was repeatedly cited as evidence against the Catholic parish priest who wished to protect his school, which is entirely supported by private means, against the arbitrary and unnecessary interference of State officers.

No doubt Dr. Bouquillon in originating the recent controversy, did not contemplate any of the inferences which were deducible from his arguments; indeed he has eloquently protested against them. But the fact stands, nevertheless, that others found in his statements the weapons which could, at any time, be used against the parochial school system.

As the controversy is to cease for the present, we may be allowed to summarize the differences which have led to it. To show that ours was not a wanton attack and with what reason we took exception to the statements of Dr. Bouquillon, we shall place the objectionable propositions of his pamphlet by the side of those held and taught by Catholic theologians of unquestionably superior rank. We owe it in justice to the author to say that he has subsequently explained and qualified certain of his previous statements; nevertheless they have gone before the public, and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to undo the harm which their teaching may have produced on the minds of those who were not aware of the errors contained in them, or who wish to make use of the doctrine for their own private ends hostile to the true interests of Catholicity.

Propositions in the Pamphlet of Dr. Bouquillon; "Education to whom does it belong?"

1 "It must be admitted, as the larger number of theologians do admit, that the State has a right to educate. We say *special and proper* right: for there can be no question of a vague and general right. The

Against which we maintain the following:

1 "The State is incompetent to educate, both in right and in fact. The right of parents over the education of their own offspring is a sacred right of the order of nature. It is derived from the divine law,

State as legislator and judge, has in virtue of this double capacity the right of imparting education."

(*First Pamphlet*, p. 11-12.)

2 "Most assuredly I make no difference between the State Christian and the State non-Christian."

(*Rejoinder*, p. 11.)

"The sovereign political power of the State is everywhere the same." (*Ibid.* p. 12.)

3 "What the Church may do within the spiritual sphere, and in view of the spiritual welfare, that the State may do, within the temporal sphere, and in view of the temporal good."

4 "Authority over education is the right of watching over, controlling and directing education."

(*First Pamphlet*, p. 21.)

"The question is about schools of human science founded by individuals, families, associations. . .

and limited by the divine law alone." (*National Education and Parental Rights*, by Cardinal Manning, p. 35, Burns, Oates & Co., 1872.)*

* This admirable little pamphlet ought to be in the hands of every parent.

2 An *ideal* State has everywhere the same essential *political* power, but a Christian ruler often receives from the Church delegated powers which affect spiritual or mixed matters: "Such rights do not by nature belong to the civil ruler, but are delegated by the ecclesiastical authority. . . . Hence, civil laws in spiritual matters, either have no validity, or derive their validity from a higher power." (Suarez, *de Legibus*, L. iii, c. xi, 12, 10.)

3 "The authority of the Church in the spiritual sphere is much greater in intensity and in extent, than the authority of the State in the temporal sphere. . . . The end of the Church is the spiritual welfare of every single individual member as well as that of the whole ecclesiastical body; the end of the State is the temporal welfare of the whole society *quotalis*." (Bp. Messmer, *AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW*, *April*, p. 293.)†

† We indorse every line of this remarkable article.

4 "We have affirmed that the education of Christian children cannot belong to the jurisdiction of the civil power." (Card. Manning, *op. cit.* p. 35.) "A civil power rejecting all religion from its public action, and excluding it from its popular education, and

We affirm that the State has authority over education. This authority is included in that general authority with which the State is invested for promoting the public good, for guaranteeing to each man his rights, for preventing abuses." (*Ibid.* p. 21, 23.)

5 "If the State may coerce parents who neglect the education of their children, so also may it determine a minimum of instruction and make it obligatory."

(*First Pamphlet*, p. 26.)

"If the State may exact on the part of teachers evidences of capability, on the part of the children a minimum of instruction, if it may punish negligent parents, it follows that it may also prescribe the teaching of this or that branch, the knowledge of which, considering the circumstances, is deemed necessary to the majority of the citizens." (*Ibid.* p. 28.)

nevertheless meddling with teachers, schools and books, becomes the worst of social tyrannies, the tyranny of bureaus and pedants." (*Ibid.* p. 19.) "This claim of the State is equivalent to a State supremacy over conscience." (*Ibid.* p. 20.) "In such a system the State has not only got rid of sacerdotalism, but has usurped the parental rights of the people." (*Ibid.* p. 19.)

"But the State, even if it had the right, has no power for such an enterprise. It has jurisdiction over the body but none over the soul." (*Ibid.* p. 39.) "As the Church cannot surrender to any power on earth, the formation of its own children, *so it cannot surrender to any the direction of its own schools.*" (*Ibid.* p. 35.) (Italics ours.)

5 "We readily grant the State full power to promote secular knowledge . . . also the right to compel parents, *if need be*, to educate children and to take the place of the parents in the fulfillment of this duty *in certain cases*, but we absolutely deny that it has the right to determine a minimum of instruction and make it obligatory, and to exact that minimum by the way of prevention and of general precept; or that it has the right to examine the teachers, and to prescribe a uniform method and standard for any schools not its own." (Bishop Messmer, AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW, February, p. 109.)

"In virtue of the natural law, parents cannot in justice be directly compelled to send their children to an elementary school; they may, however, be compelled

accidentally in certain individual cases." (Costa Rossetti, *thesis*, 176.) "The direct object of instruction is the perfection of the individual, but individual goods do not come directly within the jurisdiction of the civil power." (*Ibid. thesis*, 175, *Dem.* 3-4.) "Compulsory education has been not unjustly regarded by some as *intellectual socialism and communism.*" (*Ibid. thesis*, 175, *corol.* 3, p. 745.) "The jurisdiction of the courts in the education of children is a mere accident of the case. The liberty and the rights of the poor are equally sacred. They descend from the same divine laws. They may be touched only in the case of proved neglect; and that, not more to protect the rights of society than to protect the rights of the child." (Card. Manning, *lococit.* p. 37-38.)

Such are, we deem it, the main points of difference. Any attempt to reconcile the statements under the two separate columns might call for an acknowledgment of good will and love of peace, but no logic short of the Hegelian could convert the thesis into the antithesis. To those who have glibly pronounced the whole dispute a question of "tweedledum and tweedledee" we recommend that they ask their good sense whether any legislator or statesman or pastor who adopts Dr. Bouquillon's maxims as here stated in his words could consistently act out the principles of Costa Rossetti, Bishop Messmer or Cardinal Manning as set forth in the corresponding column, likewise in their own clear words.

To defend these authorities is needless. If anything be wanting to show how fully they disagree with the objectionable statements referred to, we have sufficient material in the previous contributions to the controversy, notably in Fr. James Conway's learned and conscientious study. Since its publication Dr. Bouquillon has written on the same subject in the *Educational Review* (April, 1892): but his paper contained nothing new unless the rather harsh and unmerited strictures upon Dr. John A. Mooney whose admirable scholarship and gentlemanly character place him above such treatment.

Before concluding these remarks, we must brush aside some irrelevant questions which have diverted attention from the main issues.

Is our plea in favor of independent Catholic education an attack on the public schools?—Not at all, we did not find fault with the State for erecting schools where they were needed, we merely said that it had on its hands a bad bargain. This is the case with any person physical or moral, where duties are assumed which cannot be fully discharged. In a school, *education* should be given, but where religion is excluded, *instruction* only can be imparted. “Those who are only taught in secular instruction are not educated,” says Cardinal Manning, “a system of national education not based on Christianity is an imposture. It is not education, it cannot educate the people. Call it national instruction if they will ; but in the name of Christianity and also of truth, let it not be called education.” (National Education, p. 11¹). However the State not being able to give education in its full sense, attempts to impart instruction. The result is that education is “shallow and fragmentary, and often proves a curse instead of a blessing,” but this the State cannot help. If non-Catholic parents are satisfied with this shallow and fragmentary education, we have nothing to say ; we certainly do not wish to interfere with their parental rights. Where nothing better can be obtained, we cannot blame parents for trying to get their children thus instructed, provided they take care to supply what is wanted, and counteract, as far as possible, the dangerous influence of a teaching which must needs be irreligious, that is in a negative sense.

But the same cannot be said of Catholic parents who having at hand efficient Catholic schools prefer to give their children a shallow and fragmentary education. They are not shorn of their parental rights by the Church, but having once admitted the paramount authority of the Church, they cannot consistently spurn her guidance in the exercise of these rights. On this point let us quote the Right Reverend Bishop Kean. We take the quotation from his answer to Dr. Mead, who wanted a penalty to be imposed by law on the parish priests who refused absolution to the kind of Catholics who prefer State to parochial schools. These are the words of the eminent prelate :

“Christians believe that the Christian influence, the Christian spirit, ought to run as an integral element through the whole school-life of the child, as I tried to unfold and explain this morning.

¹ On this subject we strongly advise the reading of a valuable pamphlet by the Rev. Thos. Jefferson Jenkins: Christian schools, Murphy & Co., 1889.

Christians therefore believe that it is the bounden duty of Christian parents to give such an education to their children. Christians therefore believe that any Christian parent who has the opportunity to give his child such an instruction, and will not do it, does wrong. Christians believe that any parent who deliberately does wrong to the life, the character, or the soul of his child, is no fit person to receive holy communion. If a Catholic parent had the opportunity to give his child Christian education, and would not do it, *the Catholic Church would consider herself guilty of sacrilege if she gave that person holy communion.*"¹ (Italics ours.)

This doctrine does not preclude the possibility of an agreement between Church and parents on the one hand and the State on the other. We object to the State claiming *as a special and proper right* the control of education, but not to its helping the parents, exercising authority delegated by the parents or by the Church, or acting *loco parentis*, when the natural guardians of the child are either unable or unwilling to fulfill their sacred duty. But whenever contracts are made between parties whose respective might is so unequally matched, great caution is needed. A partnership between a lamb and a lion is seldom to the advantage of the former : the lion, even when good-natured, is likely to take a lion's share. Yet an agreement, or at least a *modus vivendi*, may sometimes become advisable, provided that it can be attained without a sacrifice of principle.

One word more.—Some time ago, when any one stood up for individual or parental rights, he was saluted with the titles of, obcurantist, obstructionist, or relic of the XIIIth century ; now the favorite cry is Cahenslyite, or neo-Cahenslyite. These neologisms are made to do duty for arguments, they are only solemn jokes. Hon. L. Montgomery, Mr. Condé Pallen, Judge Dunne, or Dr. Mooney are not likely to favor the plans which Mr. Cahensly failed to make acceptable even to his own countrymen. Another prominent champion of parochial schools, Dr. M. Walsh comes from the Island of Saints which gave us his Grace of St. Paul, and the Right Reverend Rector of the Catholic university. Dr. Walsh is, we believe, a relation of the illustrious Archbishop of Dublin.—Cahenslyism need not be apprehended from these.

With regard to the author of "The Parent First," whilst he admires the sterling qualities of the German race, just as he acknow-

¹ Denominational schools, a discussion at the National Educational Association meeting Nashville, Tenn., July, 1882.

ledges the merits of Dr. Bouquillon's noble work the "Theologia Fundamentalis," yet he may be permitted to say that he is entirely free from Cahenslyism. Although for many years an American citizen, he has neither forgotten his native France, nor the fact that the German armies treated that country somewhat roughly. Could the thing be done without injustice and without bloodshed, he would not be sorry to see the compliment returned.—No Cahenslyism there; in fact, Cahenslyism is a worn out piece of stage property.

For the ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW the controversy is then at an end, but this does not mean that the subject matter is exhausted. Far from it! This complex business of education touches on many vexatious problems which may later be discussed without causing the least unpleasantness. Let us mention some of them *obiter*. *First*.—By what rules are we to be guided amid the conflict of rights, chiefly when they belong to different orders? *Second*.—What change did the all-important fact of the Incarnation produce in the functions and duties of the mere ethical State, viz: The State as regarded from the point of national reason alone? *Third*.—What are the exact boundary lines between individual rights, family rights, and State rights? These and other similar questions might be discussed with profit, but we must allow the smoke of the battle to pass away. When the atmosphere shall have become completely clear, we may find our late opponent ready to fight on the same side with us, a consummation devoutly to be wished.

R. J. HOLAND, S. J.

CONFERENCES.

CATHOLIC BRIDESMAIDS IN PROTESTANT CHURCHES.

Qu. Lehmkuhl, Vol. I, No. 295, states that as long as communication in a false rite is absent, it is not sinful to go to Protestant churches, etc. I have been asked several times by young ladies whether they could conscientiously act as bridesmaids at fashionable weddings in Protestant churches where it was quite certain that their names would be published as having participated in the ceremony. My personal opinion is that it is not lawful for them to act in such capacity, as they make up part of the function. On one or two occasions, where serious difficulties would have arisen if the Catholic party had not acted as bridesmaid, I have ruled that if the Catholic party did not act as the first bridesmaid or witness to the marriage, that her presence was merely a mark of honor, and could not be construed as participation in the ceremony. Will you kindly give me your opinion on the question?

Resp. The statement of P. Lehmkuhl cited above is endorsed by the common opinion of Catholic Theologians. The expression "licet," however, is wisely restricted, so as to show that, if the marriage-service in a Protestant church be of a distinctly *religious* character assistance at it would not be lawful. This can rarely be said of the modern sociable wedding among non-Catholics who do not recognize the sacramental character of the marriage contract. The fact that weddings are usually ratified in a church is due partially to a traditional instinct which retains the solemnity of a sacred function for an act regarded merely as a grave, social and civil contract. Those who act on such occasions as bridesmaids are looked upon as fulfilling an office of particular friendship and esteem. They are parties to a solemn contract and in no wise supposed to accept the religious convictions of the minister who acts as the official witness to the contract. In this sense P. Sabetti, discussing the subject in the ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW: (See *Casus moralis*, Vol. II, 447 of the REVIEW), says of the assistance as first bridesmaid at a Protestant marriage ceremony: "apud nos reputatur ut merum officium civile et signum amicitiae . . . siquidem illae ad tale munus seligi solent quae ex una parte sunt ad illud implendum aptiores ratione aetatis et civilis conditionis, et ex alia majori amicitia et strictiori vinculo benevolentiae feruntur erga sponsam."

It can not therefore be said that it is unlawful to assist in such cases at a non-Catholic marriage, especially when a refusal to do so would be justly deemed a violation of such urbanities as every member of a mixed society owes to the other, creating misunderstanding and ill feeling.

Nevertheless, when called on to give a practical decision in such cases, which must be judged upon their *individual* merits, it is wise to keep in mind that there are circumstances which would render the act plainly unlawful.

First, there are instances where a distinctly *religious* coloring is given to the marriage service either on account of the pious proclivities of the parties to be married or those of the functionary who acts as minister.

Secondly, there may be particular reasons for apprehending scandal, as, for example, in a place almost exclusively Catholic, or where there is a strong sectarian feeling between different parties. Scandal which arises from narrowness of judgment or is merely pharisaical can be undone by a prudent word [from the altar or pulpit. In most cases the whole matter becomes a question of judgment, unless we have some definite diocesan or local law to guide us. The main ground upon which prudent judgment fortifies itself is the fact that the ultimate purpose of every law and rule, divine or ecclesiastical, is to procure the *salvation* of souls.

THE VOTIVE MASS ON THE FIRST FRIDAY OF THE MONTH.

Qu. By privilege granted some time ago, in 1890, I think, it is permissible to celebrate a votive Mass of the Sacred Heart after the fashion of a solemn votive with Gloria and Credo in those churches where there are pious exercises in honor of the Sacred Heart on the morning of the First Friday. Does this privilege require that the Mass be sung in order that the votive Mass may be said on a double feast of the second class?

Resp. The answer to the question may be found in Volume II, p. 404, of the REVIEW. The Decree of June 28, 1889, simply states: "In iis vero Ecclesiis et Oratoriis, ubi feria VI, quæ prima unoquoque in mense occurrit, peculiaria exercitia pietatis in honorem Divini Cordis, approbante loci Ordinario, mane peragentur, Beatissimus Pater indulset, ut hisce exercitiis addi valeat Missa votiva de Sacro Corde Jesu; dummodo in illam diem non incidat aliquod Festum Domini, aut Duplex primæ classis, vel Feria, Vigilia, Octava ex privilegiatis: de cetero servatis rubricis."

As there is no limitation of the word *missa*, we may infer that a Low Mass suffices to make the privilege available.

MATRIMONIUM CORAM MINISTELLO.

Qu. I. Do Catholics who contract marriage before a sectarian minister incur a censure, or is it merely that the Bishop reserves to himself the power of absolving for the purpose of restricting the occurrence of the practice?

II. Has a confessor the right of absolving, without special faculty, in cases where the nuptial ceremony before the minister was merely an *attempted* marriage owing to a previous marriage still binding or the existence of any other impediment which would render the attempted marriage invalid?

Resp. Yes, the reservation in the above case implies also a *censure*, as is evident from the words of the third Plenary Council of Baltimore (Tit. IV, 127), which decrees: *Catholicos qui coram ministro cujuscumque sectae acatholicae matrimonium contraxerint vel attentaverint . . . excommunicationem incurrere Episcopo reservatam.*

The same decree answers the second question, namely, whether the censure is incurred also in case of an *attempted* marriage which is in itself invalid. The word "*attentaverint*" sufficiently shows that it is.

The question has sometimes been mooted whether the Council speaks here only of marriages in which *both* parties are Catholics, so as to exclude from the censure persons who contract *mixed* marriages. P. Nilles, in his commentary on the third Plenary Council, adverting to this doubt, thinks that it includes Catholics who contract marriage with members of non-Catholic sects. "Ad Catholicos solemniter conjungentes nuptias cum haereticis ea excommunicatio spectare videtur, quae lata est in Catholicos qui coram ministro cujuscumque sectae acatholicae contraxerint vel attentaverint." (*Commentar.* pars II, p. 187.)

ANALECTA.

CHANGES IN THE INSTRUCTIO S. CONGREGATIONIS DE PROPAGANDA FIDE CIRCA CAUSAS CLERICORUM.

Under the title "Instructio S. C. de Propag. Fide 1883 de modo servando in cognoscendis et definiendis causis criminalibus et disciplinariis clericorum in Foederatis Statibus Americae Septentrionalis" the Acta Sanctae Sedis (Febr. 1892 pp. 385-390) bring the text of the Instructio *Cum magnopere*, contained in the Appendix of the III. Plenary Council of Baltimore (pp. 287-292).

It is important, however, to notice that there are several changes introduced into the text of the *Instructio as now published*, which have some practical bearing upon Canon Law in the United States. We give the sections of the Document which read different from those contained in the Decreta of the Baltimore Council, referring to the former text in the foot notes.

XXVII. Inquisitus, ubi ex his noverit quae in actis contra ipsum relata sunt, ad ea respondere potest, ac si velit, utetur jure defensionis a se ipso¹ peragenda.

XXX. Qua die causa proponetur, inquisito fiet facultas defensionem suam per alium sacerdotem suo nomine peragendi.²

XXXII. Defenso debitis sub cautelis in Cancellaria Curiae processum ejusque summarium inspiciet, ut reum tueatur; ac defensionem scripto *exhibere poterit*.³

XXXIII. Processus ejusque summarium ad procuratorem fiscalem mittitur, ut officio suo fungi possit; dein ad Ordinarium remittitur, qui ubi in plenam causae cognitionem devenerit, diem constituet, in qua ejus discussio ac decisio locum habeat, idque inquisito significari curet.

N. B. There is a considerable difference here from the former text which requires that the Procurator fiscalis should formulate his conclusions upon the summary process and forward them to the Advocate of the accused so that he may, if he wish, reply to them in writing. The section in the Baltimore edition of the Instruction reads:

Processus ejusque summarium ad procuratorem fiscalem mittitur, ut officio suo fungi possit. *Postquam procurator fiscalis suas conclusiones ediderit, easdem defensori rei communicandae sunt ut ad easdem si placuerit in scriptis respondeat*; tum omnia ad ordinarium remittuntur qui, ubi in plenam causae cognitionem devenerit, diem constituet in qua sententia dicenda sit.

N. B.—It will be noticed that, according to the new form, the case may be discussed before the ordinary, before he pronounces sentence.

XXXIV. Praestituta die causa coram Episcopo vel Vicario generali, praesenti procuratore fiscali, defensore et Cancellario, proponitur.

1 The former text has here inserted the words *in scriptis*.

2 The original clause read: Qua die causa proponetur, inquisito fiet facultas defensionem suam per alium sacerdotem suo nomine *in scriptis exhibendi*.

3 Propositionem scripto *exhibebit*. Conc. Pl. Balt. III.

XXXV. Audito fisci procuratore, ac defensione rei, sententia pronunciat, ejusque pars dispositiva Cancellario dictatur, ° expressa mentione facta, si damnationi sit locus, sanctionis canonicae, quae contra imputatum applicatur.¹

DE EXTENSIONE DECLARATIONIS BENEDICTINAE.²

ad loca Statuum Foederatorum, ubi viget Cap. Tametsi.

Pariter expostulavit Amplitudo Tua, ut Declaratio Benedicti XIV, pro Hollandia edita a° 1741 ad ea loca Statuum Foederatorum, ubi decretum *Tametsi* concilii Tridentini viget, et de quibus non constat, eandem fuisse extensam, extenderetur.

Supplicatio A. T. hoc modo se habet.

Beatissime Pater :

Archiepiscopi et Episcopi totius Americae Septemtrionalis Foederatae, in Concilio Plen. Balt. III. congregati, inter alias res, collatis consiliis, id etiam diligenter egerunt, ut ad liquidum deducerent, quibus in locis Statuum Foederatorum Americae Septemtrionalis decretum Tridentinum *Tametsi* de matrimoniis clandestinis (Sep. 24, c. 1. de ref.) vigeat ; et in quibus non vigeat. Re studiose indagata in hanc devenerunt sententiam :

Decretum *Tametsi* NON VIGET in sequentibus Provinciis ecclesiasticis scilicet : 1, *Baltimorensi* ; 2, *Philadelphiensis* ; 3, *Neo-Eboracensi* ; 4, *Bostoniensi* ; 5, *Oregonopolitana* ; 6, *Milwaukiensi* ; 7, *Cincinnatiensi*, excepta dioecesi Vincennopolitana ; 8, *S. Ludovici*, exceptis ipsa civitate S. Ludovici et quibusdam aliis locis ejusdem Archidioecesis mox nominandis ; 9, *Chicagiensi*, exceptis aliquibus locis dioecesis Altonensis proxime citandis.

In ceteris vero locis eorumdem Statuum Foederatorum decretum *Tametsi* VIGERE CENSETUR, scilicet : 1, in tota Provincia Neo-Aurelianensi ; 2, in Provincia S. Francisci, cum territorio Utah, excepta ea parte ejusdem territorii, quae jacet ad orientem fluminis Colorado ; 3, in Provincia S. Fidei, excepta parte septemtrionali territorii Colorado ; 4, in Dioecesi Vincennopolitana ; 5, in civitate S. Ludovici, necnon in locis dictis S. Genovetae, S. Ferdinandi et S. Caroli Archidioecesis S. Ludovici ; 6, in locis dictis Kaskaskia, Cahokia, French Village et Prairie du Rocher, dioecesis Altonensis.

Ejusdem Concilii Plen. Balt. III. Patres item consilia contulerunt ad determinandum, quasnam ad partes Americae Septemtrionalis Foederatae, in quibus decretum *Tametsi* viget, extensa fuerit *Declaratio Benedicti XIV*, a. 1741 pro Hollandia edita.

Ea de re Patres in hanc convenerunt sententiam :

Declaratio Benedictina *extensa fuit* 1, ad Provinciae Neo-Aurelianensis sequentes dioeceses, scilicet : Archidioecesim Neo-Aurelianensem, dioeceses Natchitochensem, Natchetensem, Petriculanam, Mobiliensem ; 2, ad

¹ These two sections were originally grouped under oue, XXXIV, of the Baltimore Council, the words *audito fisci procuratore, ac defensione rei* are of importance. The former text reads: XXXIV. Praestituta die, ab Episcopo vel Vicario generali *praesente procuratore fiscali et defensore* sententia pronunciat, ejusque pars dispositiva etc.

² Conc. Pl. Balt. III, cap. CVII seq.

Provinciam S. Francisci cum territorio Utah ; 3, ad dioecesim Vincenopolitanam Provinciae Cincinnatiensis ; 4, ad Archidioecesim S. Ludovic quoad partes in quibus viget decretum *Tametsi* ; 5, ad loca Diocesis Altonensis, in quibus idem Decretum obtinet.

Declaratio Benedictina *non extensa* fuit ad Provinciam S. Fidei. Quoad dioeceses vero S. Antonii, Galvestonensem, Brownsvillensem, quae pertinent ad Provinciam Neo-Aurelianensem, *res est dubia*, utrum necne declaratio Benedictina extensa fueit. Quae cum ita sint, quae uniformitas hac in re, omnibus in locis, in quibus viget Decretum *Tametsi* inducatur, nullusque relinquatur ambigendi locus, visum est Patribus Concilii Plen. Balt. III. Beatitudini Tuae *supplicare*, ut suprema sua auctoritate benigne dignetur *Declarationem a Benedicto XIV*, pro Hollandia editam, *ad eas extendere partes* Americae Septemtrionalis Foederatae, in quibus viget decretum *Tametsi*, *de quibusque constat eandem declarationem hactenus non fuisse extensam* ; uti et ad omnia alia loca, *de quibus dubium movetur*, aut in posterum moveri possit, utrum necne eadem Declaratio jam extensa fuerit.

Beatitudinis Tuae

Servus humillimus

Jacobus Gibbons,

Archiep. Balt., Deleg. Apost.

Porro hae petitiones ad *Congregationem S. O.* pro examine remissae sunt. Emi. vero Universales Inquisitores re mature perpensa, die 25 Nov. 1885 reposuerunt :

Ad I. Supplicandum SSmo pro gratia juxta preces.¹

Ad II. Supplicandum SSmo pro extensione ad dioeceses S. Antonii, Galvestonensem et ad Vicariatum Apostolicum Brownsvillensem tantum.

Sanctitas vero Sua, cui haec omnia eadem die relata sunt, Patrum Concilii Plen. Balt. III precibus. Juxta S. Congregationis sententiam benigne annuere dignata est.

Amplitudinis Tuae,

Uti Frater addictissimus

R. P. D. JACOBO GIBBONS,
Archiepo. Baltimorensi.

JOANNES CARD. SIMEONI, *Praefectus.*

† D. Archiep Tyr, *Secr.*

(Romae 31 Decembris 1885.)

FORMULA BENEDICTIONIS.

ET IMPOSITIONIS SCAPULARIS CAERULEI IN HONOREM CONCEPTIONIS BEATAE MARIAE VIRG. IMMACULATAE.

Sacerdos stola alba indutus dicit :

V. Adjutorium nostrum, etc.

R. Qui fecit, etc.

V. Dominus Vobiscum.

R. Et cum spiritu, etc.

Oremus. Domine Jesu Christe qui tegimen nostrae mortalitatis induere dignatus es, tuae largitatis clementiam humiliter imploramus, ut hoc genus

¹ Hoc non pertinet ad hoc punctum, sed ad festorum reductionem, de qua in eodem Responso sermo est. Cfr. C. Pl. Balt. III., p. CV.

vestimenti, quod in honorem et memoriam Conceptionis B. Mariae Virginis Immaculatae, nec non ut illo induti exorent in hominum pravorum morum reformationem institutum fuit, bene † dicere digneris, ut hic famulus tuus qui eo usus fuerit (*vel* haec famula tua quae eo usa fuerit ; *si plures suscepturi sunt dicatur*: hi famuli tui qui eo usi fuerint, *vel* hae famulae tuae quae eo usae fuerint), eadem Beata Maria Virgine intercedente, te quoque induere mereatur (*vel* mereantur). Qui vivis et regnas in saecula saeculorum.—R. Amen.

Postea sacerdos aspergit scapulare aqua benedicta, deinde illud imponit dicens:

Accipe frater (*vel* soror) scapulare Conceptionis Beatæ Mariae Virginis Immaculatae, ut, ea intercedente, veterem hominem exutus (*vel* exuta) et ab omni peccatorum inquinamento mundatus (*vel* mundata), ipsum preferas sine macula et ad vitam pervenias sempiternam. Per Christum Dominum nostrum.—R. Amen.

Deinde subjungit:

Et Ego ex facultate mihi concessa recipio te (*vel* vos) ad participationem omnium bonorum spiritualium, quae in Clericorum Regularium Congregatione ex gratia Dei fiunt et quae per Sanctae Sedis Apostolicae privilegium concessa sunt. In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti.—R. Amen.

AD JUBILAEUM EPISCOPALE SUMMI PONTIFICIS.

Indulgentiae concessae Christi fidelibus occasione Jubilaei episcopalis SSmi, Patris Leonis XIII.

BEATISSIME PATER:—Commissio centralis, Romae constituta, ut debito honore celebrentur solemnia jubilaei episcopalis S. Vestrae, humiliter provoluta ad osculum S. Pedis, haec quae sequuntur exponit :

Una simul cum operibus constitutis ad faustum celebrandum eventum, promotum fuit etiam pium opus orationis, de Emi Cardinalis Vicarii consensu. In programmate, ad id evulgando, proponuntur Fidelibus sequentia pietatis exercitia.

1. Celebratio s. Missae qualibet Dominica, a die 19 Februarii, 1892, ad diem 19 Feb. 1893 cum communione fidelium, ssmi Rosarii recitatione, brevi sermone, addita aliqua precatione pro Summo Pontifice, et benedictione SSmi Sacramenti in Ecclesiis designandis a respectivis Ordinariis.

2. Communio, aut sanctae Missae, quibus adsistant fideles utriusque sexus.

3. Recitatio sanctissimi Rosarii, aut privatim, aut in commune, praecipue apud domesticos lares.

4. Visitationes ad SSimum Sacramentum, tempore praesertim, quo publicae exponitur venerationi.

Quamobrem eadem commissio humiliter exorat Sanctitatem Vestram, ut adnectere dignetur praedictis pietatis exercitiis sequentes Indulgentias :

1. Indulgentias partiales: *a.*—septem annorum totidemque quadragenarum ab illis lucrandas qui devote et corde contrito adfuerint functioni hebdomadali, de qua agitur sub n. 1. *b.*—tercentum dierum pro quolibet, ex tribus pietatis exercitiis, de quibus agitur sub n. 2, 3, 4.

2. Indulgentiam plenariam primo die, quo locum habebit praefata functio

sub n. 1; dummodo fideles qui illi adfuerint vere poenitentes, confessi sacram synaxim susceperint.

Finis praefatorum piorum operum ille est quem sibi commissio praestituit, nemp: 1.—Incolunitas SS. Dni Nostri Patris, et S. Sedis exaltatio. 2.—Bonus exitus inceptorum et solemnitatum Jubilaei. 3.—Triumphus et propagatio S. Ecclesiae.

SS. D. N. Leo PP. XIII in Aud. habita die 16 Jan. 1892 ab infrascripto Secretario S. C. Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae, universis Christifidelibus pietatis opera peracturis, prout in precibus exponitur, petitas Indulgentias, etiam animabus igne Purgatorii petentis, applicabiles, benigne concessit, servatis de jure servandis. Praesenti valituro absque ulla Brevis expeditione.

Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque.

Datum Romae ex Secretaria ejusdem S. Congnis die 16 Jan. 1892.

J. CARD. D'ANNIBALE, *Præf.*

L. † S.

† AL. ARCHIEP. NICOP, *Secretarius.*

INTERPRETATIO CONSTIT. "APOSTOLICAE SEDIS."

Ex S. Cong. Inquisitionis.

Super Interpretatione aliquorum Articulorum Const. Apostolicae Sedis.

S. R. et U. Inquisitioni sequentia dubia proposita fuerunt:

I. Utrum scienter legentes publicationes periodicas in fasciculos ligitas, habentes auctorem haeticum et haeresim propugnantes, excommunicationem incurrant, de qua Bulla Apostolicae Sedis 12 Octobris, 1869, in excom. Romano Pontifici speciali modo reservatis art. 2?

II. Utrum per acta a S. Sede Apostolica profecta designentur tantum acta quae immediate a S. Pontifice proficiscuntur, an etiam quae mediate a SS. RR. Congregationibus proveniunt?

III. Utrum absolventes complicem in re turpi cum ignorantia crassa et supina hanc excommunicationem incurrant an non?

IV. Utrum colligentes eleemosynas majoris pretii pro missis, si eas celebrari faciunt in eodem loco ubi collegerunt, pro minori pretio, hanc censuram incurrant, nec ne?

V. Utrum clericus in sacris constitus, vel regularis, aut monialis, si praeter impedimentum voti solemnem castitatis alia habeat impedimenta ex. gr. affinitatis, consanguinitatis, hanc censuram incurrant, an non?

VI. Quoad absolutionem censurarum specialiter reservatarum in articulo vel periculo mortis dubitatur: utrum infirmus si convalescit et onus non adimplet se praesentandi Superiori, in eadem excommunicationem reincidat, an non?

Feria IV die 13 Januarii, 1892.

In Congregatione Generali S. Rom. et Univ. Inquisitionis habita eoram Emis et Rmis DD. S. R. E. Cardinalibus Generalibus Inquisitoribus propositis suprascriptis dubiis, ac praehabito voto DD. Consultorum, iidem Emi ac Rmi DD. rescribi mandarunt:

Ad I. Affirmative. Ad II. Negative ad 1. partem; affirmative ad 2. Ad III. In casu, incurrere. Ad IV. Affirmative ad 1 partem; negative ad 2.

Ad V. Incurrere. Ad VI. Detur Decretum fer. IV, 19 Augusti, 1891, super dubiis quae sequuntur :

1st. An obligatio standi mandatis Ecclesiae a Bulla Apostolicae Sedis imposita sit sub poena reincidentiae, vel non ?

2d. An obligatio standi mandatis Ecclesiae in sensu Bullae Apostolicae Sedis idem sonet ac obligatio se sistendi eoram S. Pontifice, vel an ab illa debeat distingui ?

Responsum : Ad I. Affirmative ad 1 partem ; negative ad 2. Ad 2. Obligationem standi mandatis ecclesiae importare onus sive per se sive per confessarium ad S. Pontificem recurrendi.

Feria autem V. die 14 Januarii, 1892, facta de his omnibus per R. P. Adsessorem, S. O. Sanctissimo D. N. Leoni, PP. XIII relatione, Sanctitas Sua resolutiones Emorum PP. adprobavit et confirmavit.

Ex Cancellaria, S. O., die 16 Januarii, 1892.

JOS. MANCINI, *S. Rom. et Univ. Inq. Notarius.*

A NEW INDULT,

For the Confraternities of Christian Mothers, Canonically connected with the Pittsburgh Archconfraternity.

Beatissime Pater :—Hodiernus Moderator Provinciae Min. Cap. Pennsylvaniae in Statibus Americae Foedaratis, ad pedes S. V. humillime provolutus, quo Sodales Archconfraternitatis Matrum Christianarum in ecclesia parochiali S. Augustini Min. Cap. Civitatis ac Dioeceseos Pittsburgensis, per Rescriptum S. C. de Prop Fide diei 16 Jan. 1881 rite erectae, ac deinde Sacris Indulgentiis ditatae magis ac magis in incoepa salutifera semita inoblectentur, novas iterum a Benignitate Apostolica summis precibus efflagitat gratias, videlicet :

Indulgentiam plenariam (defunctis applicabilem) omnibus Sodalibus praefatae Archconfraternitatis, quae rite expiatae ac Sacra Synaxi refectae, respectivam ecclesiam parochialem visitaverint ibique ad mentem S. V. pie oraverint, in Festo B. M. V. Perdolentis, quae, sub hoc vocabulo patrona est principalis praedictae Sodalitatis—item in Festo S. Rosae Limanae Virg., ejusdem Sodalitatis patronae secundariae—necnon in Festo Angelorum Custodum, qui pariter in secundarios Sodalitatis patronos selecti sunt.

Placeat insuper S. V., quod eas Indulgentias (prout pro aliis eidem Sodalitati elargitis benigne concessum est), diebus festis ut supra adsignatis, etiam, in casu legitimi impedimenti, Dominica immediate insequenti, lucrifacere possint ac valeant. Qua de gratia.

Ex Audientia SSmi. habita die 13 Martii 1892. SSmus. Dominus Noster Leo Divina Providentia PP. XIII, referente me infrascripto S. Cong. de Propaganda Fide Secretario, benigne adnuere dignatus est pro gratia in omnibus juxta petita.

Datum Romae ex Aedibus dictae S. Cong. die et anno ut supra.

IGNATIUS, *Archiep. Tamiathen, Secretarius.*

For information about the Archconfraternity and aggregation to it address the Rev Rector of St. Augustine's Church, Pittsburgh, Pa.

BOOK REVIEW.

EXPLANATIO CRITICA EDITIONIS BREVIARII ROMANI, quae a S. Rituum Congreg. uti typica declarata est. Studio et Opera Georgii Schober, C. SS. R.—Ratisbonæ, Neo Eboraci et Cincinn. Frid. Pustet., MDCCCXCI.

The Canonical Office daily recited by all the Catholic clergy is one of the oldest monuments of the christian faith. It is a form of prayer which attests the belief of the Apostolic age. St. Damasus, with the aid of St. Jerome, first divided the hours. Gregory the Great and Gregory VII. did much to perfect the method of canonical prayer without introducing any considerable changes. Successive Pontiffs made additions and corrections. Still, as up to the Council of Trent, or rather up to the invention of the art of printing, the canonical books had to be copied by hand, mistakes easily occurred, either through oversight, lack of judgment, or presumption of transcribers, who sometimes omitted, changed, added, accordingly as their limited knowledge suggested. As one copy often had to serve an entire community for the public daily service it easily happened that mistakes which could not be detected without comparing the new text with the original, clung to the memory and were thus perpetuated. It became afterwards a question of prudence whether changes should be introduced, which, though they favored accuracy, were apt to create confusion. For the same reason we find that to this day some of the scriptural passages in the Breviary and Missal are different from the Vulgate text.

Where these differences were universal, so that one reading was adopted everywhere, though it might not be the most perfect, no difficulty would be felt in preserving the devotional and doctrinal integrity of the liturgical service. But there were parts in which the readings of separate editions tracing different sources were at variance with each other. This was a hinderance to uniformity in the public liturgy. Some decided reforms were made during the XVIth and XVIIth centuries, especially by Urban VIII., but it was not until Leo XIII. ordered a "typical edition", that those lesser, yet often insidious defects, which had been previously passed over, were removed.

Chiefly instrumental in this work has been P. Schober. His work has been done from a strictly critical point of view and was afterwards subjected to the examination and approval of the S. Congregation. The difficulty of the task will be in some measure understood when we remember that the learned Redemptorist examined more than eighty different editions of the Breviary, and that he compared carefully the excerpts with the original sources whence they were taken, such as the authentic texts of the S. Scripture and the Fathers. In the work before us he gives these sources, the reasons of the various changes, the decisions of the S. Congregations

where a previously received text was to be retained and the doubts which had to be solved by authority. Occasionally we find a change seemingly unimportant, yet which the critic deems justly imperative. Such is, *e. gr.*, the accent on the word *Theotocos* which in nearly every Breviary is given and read *Thebtocos*. The former means *Deipara*, the latter *Ex Deo natus*. It is evident that the difference in accentuation imports a difference of meaning which in the latter case is not only ungrammatical but heretical as it applies to the Blessed Virgin Mary. (18 Dec. Expectatio Partus B. V. M. p. 289.)

The cleric anxious, as is meet, about the accurate recitation of the divine office will find this work of great assistance to him. It also contains an introduction in which the excellence and history of the Roman Breviary is set forth with much erudition.

**THE REASONABLENESS OF THE PRACTICES OF
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.** By Rev. J. J. Burke.—
Benziger Bros., 1892.

Some time ago the author published a brief and attractively written compend entitled "The Reasonableness of the Ceremonies of the Catholic Church." The present booklet, containing little over fifty pages, treats in a similar and familiar way of the subjects which every true Catholic knows and practices, yet which few only comprehend in a manner which renders their worship not only intelligent and a means of saving grace but attractive and sanctifying. Vespers and Benediction—the Sacraments—Familiar Devotions—Feasts—The Marriage Tie—Celibacy, these and a host of other points of Catholic doctrine and practice form a series of healthy instructions which need only be repeated from the altar or read by the faithful to do the work of the Good Shepherd among the flock.

THE RELATIONS OF THE CHURCH TO SOCIETY.
Theological Essays by Edmund J. O'Reilly, S. J. Edited
with a biographical notice by Matthew Russell, S. J.—
John Hodges: London, 1892.

The first of the essays here collected in book form was published nearly twenty years ago in the *Irish Monthly*. If they were timely then, they are even more so now; for it is true of writers like Fr. O'Reilly that they see not only the good and evil in the society which surrounds them, but they observe above all the tendencies of their age, and thus they are enabled to project the results of presently active elements and can suggest the remedies which a future generation will perchance stand in need of in order to relieve itself of certain evils. The questions which our author treats define the position of the Catholic Church, the Clergy, the Sovereign Pontiff, towards the world, its intellectual formation and moral regeneration. Authority, legislation, executive power, rights and duties of the clergy, politics, liberty of conscience, such are among others the vital points discussed. They all touch the eternal basis of natural law and the limits of revealed truth. Within this sphere society constructs its varying forms—

all to be measured by the given radius and the arc that bounds or touches them. The arguments throughout are free from that peculiar dogmatism which has become so offensive to the modern conscience and which rather injures than aids a good cause in our day. Fr. O'Reilly's method impresses one by its reasonableness, by the frankness with which he approaches and exposes the weak side of a strong argument. By this process he gains our confidence; we feel that truth rightly understood is its own best apology. A fair example of this will be found in the three chapters on the "Pope's Temporal Power," which we only refrain from analyzing here because we hope for a further occasion to bring this work to the attention of our readers.

We owe thanks to the publisher for the altogether superior style in which he has issued this and several other monumental works in the series of the Catholic Standard Library.

CHRISTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY. By Rev. John Thein, pastor of St. John's Church, Liverpool, O., with an introduction by Prof. Chas. G. Herbermann, Ph. D., LL. D. —New York: Benziger Bros., 1892, 8v., pp. 576.

There are golden words of fraternal suggestion in the preface to this book which it were well if every priest, who is called to deal with the reading man of the world in these days, would treasure up. "Difficulties, arguments on a new discovery, on scientific phenomena, against revealed truth, present themselves sooner or later to every priest in the exercise of his ministry; they are propagated in books with high-sounding titles, in cheap and popular reviews and magazines; by swarms of demi-savants, or even by children who frequent the schools; they may come up at any moment, perhaps unconsciously, in the bosom of Christian families or even in a lesson of the Catechism. Nowadays the cleric who knows only his dogmatic and moral theology may be surprised and confounded by objections formulated in entirely new language, supported by pretended fact or by a discovery wrongly interpreted. If a priest is ignorant or little acquainted with the weapons and methods modern men of science make use of to break down and destroy the Christian religion, he must not be astonished that his theology, his scholastic methods of argumentation, are not always sufficient to remove the uncertainty of the victim of pseudo-scientific fascination, who comes to him with his doubts and his cruel anxieties. The ordinary Christian may perhaps be able to rest content without inquiry and study; he may hold fast in simplicity and in faith to the teaching of his Church, and may not suffer himself to be shaken in his belief by all the objections of human science; but deliberate ignorance would be sinful in a theologian and priest and worthy of blame in one who wishes to be considered a man of education."

The points of assault by the infidel scientist and rationalistic critic are mainly those which centre round the creation, origin, early history of man; and the difficulties which they here raise are such as can be settled not by *a priori* reasoning, but by careful study of sources and facts. Fr. Thein

has done a service as well to his clerical brethren, who have not time to follow up many of the recent phases of materialistic science, and to study their true inwardness, as well as to the layman who hears at his daily work and reads in his magazine and newspaper the glittering generalities of so-called science (which endanger the brightness of faith), by seeking out the real basis of quite a large number of the prevailing scientific theories and exposing their contents in the light of true fact and principle, in such wise that his reader may with comparative ease assimilate their truths and reject their errors.

Beginning with a study of the origin of life and its development, he exposes the errors and weakness of Darwinism and Monism, especially as they concern man's origin. He institutes an extensive comparison between man and the lower animals, treats of man's primitive state, the antiquity of the human race, in the light of Biblical and profane chronology and of geology, dwells at some length on the unity of the human species, on the deluge as known from the Bible and racial traditions, and as viewed by geology, analyzes man's component elements from a scriptural and rational standpoint, and closes with the proofs of the soul's immortality furnished by the Bible, the consent of the human race, and natural reason. The reader who is familiar with Reusch's *Bible and Nature* will see that the present work covers about the same ground as does the second volume of the German professor, but he will notice that Fr. Thein has made good use of more recent kindred literature, European as well as American. On the whole, the work shows widely extended reading of all kind of matter connected with its theme, and the result is set forth in a thoroughly critical light. We have neither time nor space here to discuss any of its weighty subjects, though we hope to return on one or more of them in a future number.

In the meantime we recommend it warmly to our readers as giving in moderate compass and easy, attractive form a wealth of information on subjects which infidel science has made its principal battle-ground in its assault against the truths of philosophy and revelation. There is no book, we believe, in English from a Catholic pen, which can form so fitting a completion to Dr. Molloy's *Geology and Revelation* by supplying the Anthropological section, which the gifted Maynooth professor has not as yet given to the public.

SOME LIES AND ERRORS OF HISTORY, By Rev. Reuben Parsons, D.D. Author of "Studies in Church History." Reprinted from the "Ave Maria."—Notre Dame, Indiana. Office of the "Ave Maria," 1892.

To readers, familiar with the abundant resources of foreign Catholic literature, which warn the student of history against the false impressions gathered from partisan (although chiefly popular) expositions of historical facts in connection with the Catholic Church, it must have been long ago a matter of regret that we should have no work like Barthélemy's *Erreurs et Mensonges Historiques* or the more comprehensive German *Geschichts-*

lugen. These works, as a whole, cannot be well translated into English because they appeal largely to facts of a distinctly national character and refer as documentary evidence mostly to writings either unknown or inaccessible to the English student. Some of our magazines have engaged in the laudable task of supplying their readers periodically with original and well-sustained refutations of popular historic errors. Still these articles fall short of the good which might be done by such work if presented in handy book form.

In these days of omnivorous reading and inquisitiveness we are often confronted with statements of history which seem to imply inconsistency on the part of the Church in the past. People go to see "Richelieu" on the stage; they find the traditional interpretation given by Bulwer and others to the character of the great statesman who was also a churchman, and they are puzzled, even if their sense of reverence for the priesthood is not lessened, at the freedom—half a lover's half a guardian's—of the Cardinal, or at the undisguised weakness and mock asceticism of Friar Joseph. Yet the facts are the very contrary of what is here indicated. Richelieu had not a trace of the weakness attributed to him towards his ward by the playwright. He thoroughly understood the dignity and the obligations of the priesthood. Some of the most beneficial reforms introduced among the clergy of France were due to his zeal for the honor of the Church and the glory of France. Though a nobleman well known to the Court he lived the life of a model Bishop at Luçon, a very poor diocese, where he got to know and associated with himself in his labor of ecclesiastical reform, the pious and learned capuchin, Friar Joseph, a man of noble instincts and self-denial who has been caricatured for the purpose of contrast but to the detriment of truth and morality.

Such questions, and others of a similar character, as for example, the "Divorce of Napoleon and Josephine," "The 'Orthodox' Russian and the Schismatic Greek Churches" etc., besides those ever freshly distorted facts about the Inquisition, Galileo, the Massacre of St. Bartholomew etc., are well treated in this small volume. It is needless to point out how much good such a book does in the hands of the laity especially the young if attention be directed to its existence by the clergy.

EXPLICACION DEL CATECISMO. Abreviado de la Doctrina Cristiana. Traducción según la séptima edición alemana de la Explicación del Pequeno Catecismo el R.P. Deharbe, S. J. por el Canónigo Dr. D. J. Schmitt, y adaptada al Catecismo Abreviado con las Modificaciones y Adiciones necesarias por Bernardo Augusto Thiel, Obispo de Costa-Rica. Con la Aprobación y Recomendación del R. Arzobispo de Granada. Segunda edición.—Friburgo de Brisgovia. B. Herder, 1891. St. Louis, Mo.

The method employed by the Very Rev. Canon Schmitt for helping Catechists in the duties of teaching Christian Doctrine, though not new,

is so good, that we wonder why text-books of this kind do not oftener find their way into our schools. The Right Rev. Senor Bernardo Augusto Thiel, Bishop of Costa-Rica, conscious of its merits, has made a translation of this work for the use of the people of his diocese; and it certainly deserves to be adopted by the Spanish speaking people of America. Mgr. Thiel has accomplished his praiseworthy task in a masterly manner, adapting the text to the necessities and national genius of his own flock. Here and there we notice original strokes of his pen, and throughout he has overcome the difficulty of sacrificing the beauties of rhetorical phrase to plain speech. There is also the tone and touch of tenderness with which a loving father instructs his children. In his version the Right Rev. author has adopted the orthography lately taught by the Spanish Academy in its Grammar and Dictionary, and the editors have taken pains in bringing out a very correct edition.

EUSEBIO GUIERAS.

QUATUOR ANTIPHONAE BEATAE MARIAE VIRGINIS, ad 4 voces inaequales compositae. By L. Bonvin, S. J. Op. 11. N. Y. J. Fisher & Bro.

We have in the fifteen octavo pages of this little work the four anthems of the B. V. M., for four mixed voices, as well as an alternate arrangement of the *Regina Coeli* for soprano, alto, tenor and organ. Written with somewhat intricate but withal effective and winning harmony, they leave the impression of a carefully executed and musically thoughtful harmonization. This supports, and includes in the melody, a graceful haunting of the Gregorian Chants, which present themselves plainly in the opening measures, and reassert themselves at short intervals with pleasant suggestiveness. The blending of the ancient and modern styles of musical thought will commend the *Antiphonae* to the attention of lovers of both schools of musical expression. The publisher deserves more than a word of praise for the clear and handsome typography. It is all that could be desired.


THE SEALED PACKET. A Story for Girls, by Marion J. Brunowe. Philadelphia: H. L. Kilner & Co.

Marion Brunowe has given us a number of sprightly and well-written stories. This one, her last, is, we believe, her best. It is a story for girls which Catholic teachers and parents will do well to place within reach of their wards. There is a remarkable naturalness in the writer's descriptions of home life which withal elevate the young heart to higher things and nobler aims than those of every-day life. We recommend it especially for the "Distribution" season.

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- POLITICAL ECONOMY.** By Charles S. Devas. (Manuals of Cathol. Philosophy, Stonyhurst.)—Benziger Bros., 1892.
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- THE CATHOLIC HOME LIBRARY.** The Bric-a-Brac Dealer.—Her Father's Right Hand.—Benziger Bros., 1892.
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