

No. 3375

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- - Against - -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN

DEPOSITION

Deponent:

KOISO, Kuniaki

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was born on 22 March, 1880 (13th Year of Meiji), and was commissioned an infantry second-lieutenant in June, 1901 (34th Year of Meiji). I was promoted to the rank of major general in December, 1926 (15th Year of Taisho).

I was appointed Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry in August, 1930, and promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general in August, 1931 (6th Year of Showa), I was assigned as Commander of the Korean Army from 2 December, 1935 (10th Year of Showa) to 15 July, 1938 (13th Year of Showa), and was promoted to the rank of full general in November, 1937 (12th Year of Showa). I was attached to the Army General Staff on 15 July, 1938 (13th Year of Showa), and in the same month was placed on the reserve list ending my career as a military man.

After retirement from the Army I had no further connections whatever with military affairs and my political activities were limited to the time and duties of the offices to which I was

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appointed but which I did not request but accepted only as a duty to my country.

2. After World War I the armaments of the military forces became obsolete. As there were movements for their reduction due to the pressure of public opinion, the military improvement was not satisfactory for the nation to wage any war and the condition of military equipment, material and ammunition industries grew alarming from the standpoint of national defence requirements.

In order to readjust at least nominally the mobilizable strength of thirty-two divisions, which heretofore had been the basis of the wartime fighting strength, was reduced to twenty-eight divisions after April, 1931 (6th Year of Showa) Moreover, about the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September of the same year, a proposal was under consideration to further reduce our peacetime strength of 17 divisions by reducing and changing the Imperial Guard Division to simply the Imperial Bodyguards and abolishing the two divisions of Utsunomiya and Kyoto. This was the state of the Army's strength which I learned through performance of duties in the Military Affairs Bureau, and the Military Equipment Bureau.

After I assumed the post of Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau I heard of the frequent occurrence in China, particularly in Manchuria, of acts committed by Chinese arising from anti Japanese sentiment, of the infringement of Japan's vested interests, of interference with the Japanese right of residence and business, and of acts endangering their lives and properties, and that as the result of these incidents, feeling between Chinese and Japanese residents in Manchuria was becoming daily more strained. In view of the situation at home and abroad as stated above - - I do not remember the exact date - - I presented my view to the War Minister and Vic Minister on how to avoid war, by adhering to the policy of pa-

tience and forbearance in the face of any development of situation in China, especially in the Manchurian area.

Being aware of the situation, both the Minister and the V. Minister agreed with me. I expressed this view also to the V. Chief of the General Staff, and I found him entertaining entirely the same opinion.

I also heard that because of such condition of the military forces the Chief of the Army General Staff KANAYA sent Major General TATEKAWA to Manchuria in the middle of September, 1931 (6th Year of Showa) to transmit to the Commander of the Kwantung Army the central army authorities' intention of adhering to a policy of patience and forbearance, regardless of developments.

3. Some of the young officers of the armed forces, became extremely indignant over the condition of armaments, and because they thought certain internal political practices were disregarding the interests and welfare of the nation. Some of these young officers planned to effect administrative reforms with certain civilians and some did individually do so. Actual instances of their actions are the March and October Incidents, which were successfully nipped in the bud, and the May 15th and the February 26th Incidents. Officers on the active list of army and navy had been prohibited as a matter of policy from engaging in political activities in such a way.

Dr. OKAWA and his followers, resented corrupt party politics and wanted to reform the internal political system by giving birth to a cabinet under the Premiership of General UGAKI, who was then war Minister, Dr. OKAWA wanted General UGAKI to take an active post but the plan they formulated was reckless and it met with General UGAKI's refusal and they were thus obliged to abandon the plan.

This was the so-called March Incident, and had no relation with the Manchurian Incident to my knowledge.

In relation to the above, I was requested, by Dr. OKAWA, whom I met for the first time, to make arrangements for him to see General UGAKI, so that he could inform the General of his plan. After asking the nature of the plan that he wanted to suggest to the General, I voiced my disapproval of arranging for an interview to suggest such a reckless plan and advised the Doctor to abandon it. I recall that the Chief of the Appointment Section of the Army Ministry at that time, Colonel OKAMURA, Yasuji, was present at this discussion. Dr. OKAWA, however, refused to listen to my advice, and persisted in his request to see the War Minister. I said to him if he handed me his plan in writing, I could report it to General UGAKI. As I expected, on reading this document, General UGAKI flatly rejected the plan. I informed Dr. OKAWA of this which ended our discussion there. Prior to this, when I had asked Dr. OKAWA for the plan in writing and he answered that he would submit it after consulting and making it out with others, I inquired who "the others" were. He did not reveal their names, but, this is when I learned that they were young officers of the Army General Staff.

As I was in a position as chief of the Military Affairs Bureau which required me, by virtue of my office in the War Ministry, to discourage military men from such action, I advised Dr. OKAWA to abandon this plan and to sever his connections with such young officers as were concerned with it, explaining that officers were prohibited from engaging in such political activities.

Besides making a report to higher officials I also informed the Vice-Chief of the General Staff and suggested that he should warn the young officers of the General Staff not to approach to associate with OKAWA in such matters. It was at this time that I was told by the Vice-Chief of the General Staff that there were indications that Army Fire Crackers had been delivered to OKAWA's faction by these young officers. I called his attention

to the necessity for having them returned immediately in order to avert trouble for such army personnel and to protect the prestige of the army.

Later I heard that Dr. OKAWA was still intending to put his plan into practice. Having thought that such an eventualty would bring trouble for the young officers of the General Staff, who had been connected with Dr. OKAWA, I requested Marquis TOKUGAWA, Yoshichika, in whom Dr. OKAWA was said to have had confidence, to persuade Dr. OKAWA to abandon his reckless plan and return the Fire Crackers to the young officers of the Army General Staff; with the result that Marquis TOKUGAWA succeeded in having Dr. OKAWA abandon the plan he had formulated.

However, I received information that despite the request of the officers of the Army General Staff, the Fire Crackers had not been returned and that they remained as ever in the possession of the OKAWA faction. I personally and the War Ministry had nothing to do with such articles, but since the effort made by the officers of the Army General Staff to recover them was insufficient I was afraid trouble might crop up in the future to the detriment of the Army's prestige, if the matters were left alone. So, I saw Dr. OKAWA and requested him to turn the Fire Crackers. Although he said he would do so, he took no immediate steps to keep his promise.

Therefore in order to hasten the matter I again requested Marquis TOKUGAWA to persuade Dr. OKAWA to return the Fire Crackers. As through Marquis TOKUGAWA's efforts final arrangements were made to return the Fire Crackers, I informed the Army General Staff of the fact. Later I received information that the officers of the General Staff received from OKAWA's faction the Fire Crackers in their original form and number.

Thus, the so-called March Incident was brought to an end.

Prosecution witnesses, UGAKI, Kazushige at Court Record pages 1603 and 1627, TOKUGAWA, Yoshichika at Court Record pages 1441 to 1446, and SHIMIZU, Konosuke at Court Record pages 1402 to 1404 and 1406 to 1408, and 1410 to 1411 in their testimonies have made a few misstatements, but these were cleared up to some extent by cross examination, and in light of their testimony, regardless of the few misstatements, I believe the Tribunal will find my statement to be true.

4. With regard to the October Incident, there is in the interrogatory of the defendant HASHIMOTO, Record pages 15,676 and 15,677 a statement that would lead the Court to misunderstand and to think that I was a participant in the planning of that Incident. This is a mistake. I had no connection whatsoever with the October Incident.

From what I learned in the course of the disposal of the Incident as a part of my official duty, it was the plan in October, 1931 (6th Year of Showa), of some young officers of the General Staff, to effect a renovation of the domestic organization of Japan. Before the plan took any concrete shape, being still in the stage of occasional conferences, however, comparatively moderate elements in the group secretly informed IMAMURA, Hitoshi, the Second Section Chief in the Army General Staff, of the attempt. The information was conveyed by him to NAGATA, Tetsuzan, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, and by the latter to me.

Upon receiving this information I at once reported the matter to the War Minister and the Vice Minister. The Minister of War requested TOYAMA, Commander of the Gendarmerie, to take measures to confine immediately and hold incommunicado all the young officers concerned, who were then confronted with their improper activities and were severely reprimanded for their indiscretions, and told to disband and discontinue such activity.

This put an end to the incident.

The truths of the March and October Incidents are just as I have said before and what is stated in Court Exhibit 179F is a false report and the statement/ <sup>in Court Exhibit 2177A is also</sup> a mistake. Also I had no connection whatsoever with the May 15th Incident mentioned in Court Exhibit 2178A.

In the Interrogatory of Dr. OKAWA, concerning the 15th May Incident, he mentions the March Incident and makes it appear as if in deciding upon his actions he took into consideration the future of Manchuria. However, when OKAWA called on me in connection with the March Incident, wanting to arrange an appointment with General UGAKI, his explanation did not include even a single mention of policies towards Manchuria.

5. In connection with Exhibit 2202A the invitation extended by the War Ministry to the leading members of the Manchurian Railway Company on 30 June, 1931 (6th Year of Showa). This was a courtesy banquet, given by the War Ministry by way of a return invitation to the leading members of the Manchurian Railway Company, and no talks were made discussing politics pertaining to Manchuria or Mongolia.

6. The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident was not due to any plan or intrigue on the part of any Cabinet member or official of my acquaintance as far as I know, and I never saw or heard of any such plans for aggression as alleged by the Prosecution, and I never conspired with anyone to do any of the acts charged in the Indictment.

7. On the night of 18 September, 1931 (6th Year of Showa), when the Mukden Incident broke out, I was asleep at my home in Azabu. Although I do not recall the exact hour, I think it was between 2.00 and 3.00 A.M. on the 19th that a telephone call came from the War Ministry and I was for the first time informed that around 10.30 P.M. on the 13th some Chinese soldiers in



Manchuria had blown up the railway line near Liutiatkou, to the north of Mukden Station, and that fighting had ensued between the Chinese Troops and the Japanese garrison. Summoned by the War Minister, I arrived at his official residence at about 6.30 A.M. and found that Vice-Minister of War SUGIYAMA, was unable to show up on account of illness. Pursuant to an order given by the War Minister, I requested Secretary KUSHIBUCHI to inform by telephone those government offices concerned, and give them an outline of the Incident, and to request the Premier, through the Cabinet Chief Secretary, to convene an emergency cabinet meeting. I then conferred with the War Minister and both of us were of the opinion that handling of the situation should be carried out so as to localize the Incident and to restore the peace.

Then since summons came from the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff to the Vice-Minister of War for consultation at his office, and as the Vice-Minister was ill and absent, the War Minister sent me in his stead. I met Vice-Chief of Staff NINOMIYA at about 7 A.M. in the Chief of the Army General Staff's drawing room and we deliberated on the following points, which we suggested to the government: namely, that the best measure was to adhere to a policy of localization and thus stabilize the Incident; that although the Chinese side may be responsible for the outbreak of the Incident, our position should be defensive; that the conditions for the settlement of the Incident should not be determined by the Army alone; that if the Chinese acts were based on an anti-Japanese policy, this may give rise to the outbreak of another incident, and the Kwantung Army would then have to face much more provocation; and therefore taking advantage of this situation a proposition should be made to the Char Hsueh-ling Regime requesting them to observe existing treaties and rights acquired thereunder.

I recall that when the Vice-Chief of Staff and I held this conference, IMAMURA, head of the Second Section was there also. When the War Minister notified me after the Cabinet meeting that the Cabinet had decided on making the best of the situation according to a policy of localizing the Incident, I reported this to the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff. The War Minister then sent a telegram which the Military Affairs Bureau drafted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, stating that the Imperial Japanese Government wished to exert its utmost towards the localization of the Incident, and that therefore they desired the Kwantung Army to keep this in mind.

On the same day, a telegraphic report was received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army that in view of the urgent Manchurian situation he was preparing to dispatch a mixed brigade to Manchuria. The War Minister requested the Chief of Army General Staff to wire that this measure should be suspended and he did as he was requested. We found out on September 21st, however, that the brigade had already crossed the border, on its own initiative, despite the instructions of disapproval of the Chief of the Army General Staff, so this matter was taken up for discussion at the cabinet meeting of September 22nd.

The cabinet finally gave ex post facto approval. Since the Imperial sanction had been obtained expenses of the Army had to be met and were paid out of the second reserve funds.

Towards the end of September it was decided that since the main strength of the Kwantung Army was concentrated along the railway zone and since the railway, as well as lives and properties to be protected extended over such a vast area, the War Minister, after consultation with the Chief of the Army General Staff indicated to the Commander of the Kwantung Army that although it was necessary to station the Japanese

patrol detachments along the line connecting Kirin, Changchun, and Chengshiatun, and along the line of the Taliaho, the Japanese troops should not advance either to the north or to the west of these lines. At the same time, the Kwantung Army units close to Chinchow should be withdrawn within the lines designated. On 26 November, a disturbance broke out in Tientsin. The Commander-in-Chief of the North China Army requested the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army to send reinforcements, on account of insufficient troop strength, for the protection of the Japanese Community and for the maintenance of peace and order in foreign settlements, and on the 27th of the same month, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army dispatched a unit as far as Koupangtzu for the purpose of reconnoitering the Chinchow area, in preparation for transportation of troops.

However, the War Minister requested strict observance of the lines designated, in accordance with the policy of the Cabinet for localizing the Incident, and the Chief of the Army General Staff, in compliance with this expressed desire, ordered the Commander of the Kwantung Army to withdraw the unit to the east of the Taliaho River.

8. On 10 December, 1931 (6th Year of Showa), the WAKATSUKI Cabinet resigned en bloc, and a new cabinet was organized on the 13th under the premiership of INUKAI with Lt. General ARAKI as War Minister. Prior to this, diplomatic negotiations had been started in an attempt to prevent further clashes between the Japanese and Chinese troops near Chinchow.

However, settlement had not been reached even as late as December, 1931, and on 23 December, 1931 a battle took place between the units of the Kwantung Army and those of the Regular Chinese Army, because the latter advanced from Chinchow and attacked the units of the Kwantung Army that were engaged in the suppression of the soldier bandits near Tienchuangtai. The Regular Chinese Army evacuated Chinchow, however, and the

Kwantung Army effected a bloodless entry into the city on January 3rd, 1932 (7th Year of Showa) and took charge of maintaining public peace and order there.

In January, 1932 (7th Year of Showa) Japanese and Korean residents in Harbin and some Chinese officials and civilians were repeatedly asking the Kwantung Army for dispatch of rescue forces and the Kwantung Army had reported that they would like to comply with those requests but the central Army authorities had been withholding approval of the requests made by the Kwantung Army with respect to the necessity of rescuing Harbin, but the disordered and confused situation of the city was such that it made the central Army authorities believe that such action was necessary, and they finally gave their approval to the request made by the Kwantung Army Commander. Whereupon the Kwantung Army Commander dispatched necessary troops to maintain peace and order in Harbin, and on 5 February, 1932 (7th Year of Showa) the troops drove back the soldier-bandits there.

9. Following the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident at the end of January, 1932, the necessary troops were dispatched to Shanghai areas, but later on 5 May, 1932, a truce was concluded and part of the Army units were transferred to Manchuria and the rest were returned to Japan.

10. The personnel/<sup>including myself</sup> of the War Ministry endeavoured at all times under the leadership of the War Minister to check the aggravation of the situation in Manchuria on the basis of a policy of non-aggravation. But unfortunately the Incident developed as it did which was unavoidable and those concerned therewith did their best to meet the situation in accordance with the above policy.

11. Next concerning the Army Budget. Exhibit 74, refers to the period/<sup>1942</sup> after the official organization of the War Ministry was revised, and it was by virtue of this revised official organization that

the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau would assist the War Minister in matters concerning control of the budget, but before this revision the Chief of the Intendance Bureau was responsible for the supervision of all business related to the Army budget, and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau had neither authority, control, nor responsibility in that connection, which was the case during the time I held such office. Reference is made to Record page 27,717, line 17 where the witness states "Control of the budget" as a duty of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau came in later years as a revision.

12. The independence of Manchukuo was declared in March, 1932(7th Year of Showa). Consequently the new regime made various requests of Japan, and the Japanese government was pressed by the necessity of examining its policies in order to meet with those requests economically and politically. Though the policy, at large, to support and uphold the development of Manchukuo was roughly established. I recollect, that up to the time when I left my position in the War Ministry in August, 1932 (7th Year of Showa) most of the concrete measures had not yet been decided.

13. In Exhibit 227, I, as Vice War Minister, received an advice from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army dated June 4, 1932 (7th Year of Showa), with respect to the taking over of the Dairen Customs, and I reported to the War Minister about it. But as at this time the government had not decided a policy concerning customs and as it was a matter which could not be carried out by the Army alone no action was taken thereon.

14. I will now explain the use made of the funds mentioned in Exhibit 2210. The sum of 20,000 yen turned over to me as Vice Minister of War on 4 July, 1932, was handled under my supervision by the Senior Adjutant of the War Ministry and the Secretariat Pay-Master and was used to defray expenses for

social occasions held at the Minister's official residence and in the Ministry itself, for incidental expenses of various bureaus and sections of the Ministry and to pay persons employed temporarily.

15. I was transferred to Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on 8 August, 1932 (7th Year of Showa), and therefore I turned the sum of 18,500 Yen given to me as Vice War Minister, which is stated in Court Exhibit 2211, over to Lt. General YANAGAWA, Heisuke, my successor in office, and I do not know how it was used.

16. The sum of 1,970,000 Yen, turned over to me under my name when I was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on December 27, 1933 (8th Year of Showa), as stated in Exhibit 2213, was actually handled by the Senior Adjutant and the Pay-Master of the Superintendance Department under the supervision of the Vice Chief of Staff in charge, in accordance with the order of the Kwantung Army Commander, and I was merely to supervise its use.

The expenditures during the two months up to the time of my departure from the Kwantung Army was appropriated to incidental expenses at the Kwantung Army Commander's official residence and for the various divisions, independent brigades, independent garrison units, Gendarmerie and Special Service Organizations under the Army, but the largest amount was retained by the Headquarters.

During the tenure of my post as Chief of Staff, the sum which had been allotted to the various units and special organs was spent for obtaining information and especially for payment for collected weapons from potential and defacto bandits. The amount for use under this system for collection of these weapons included sums which were due but had not been paid as well as sums which were to be paid in the future.

This was the use made of these funds during the time I was

Vice-Minister of War and Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and I can only say that the way the Army paid out secret service funds was such that no individual use whatever could be made of it.

17. I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on August 8, 1932 (7th Year of Showa), and arrived at Mukder on the 26th of the same month, accompanying the new Kwantung Army Commander, General MUTO, Nobuyoshi, who is dead, and who <sup>concurrently held the</sup> ~~post of~~ Ambassador Plenipotentiary. General MUTO as Ambassador Plenipotentiary signed the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol on 15 September, 1932 (7th Year of Showa), whereby Japan recognized Manchukuo and the duty of joint-defense was assigned to the Kwantung Army in order to secure the integrity of Manchukuoan territory as well as to maintain law and order there.

The State of Manchukuo, in its declaration of independence issued on 1 March, 1932 (7th Year of Showa), announced that the four North-Eastern Provinces under the rule of Chang Hsueh-liang were within its territory. Therefore it was necessary for the Kwantung Army in cooperation with Manchukuo to make efforts for restoring law and order in Jehol Province. But it was more urgent to restore peace and order in the area east of the Taliaho River, especially along the South Manchurian Railway where dwelled multitudes of Japanese and Manchurians. Therefore the Army Commander continued to drive out the remnants of the Ting Chao, Li Tu, Ma Chan-shan armies making efforts to restore law and order in the area east of the Taliaho River along the railway and the main roads, with the cooperation of the Manchukuoan Army and the local self-government and police organizations, and also carried out the "Pao Chiao" system at the same time which was adapted since it subsequently ensured the maintenance of law and order.

Those bandits or potential bandits who surrendered weapons

received compensation therefore, and measures were also taken for giving employment to those among them who were without employment or farms to return to; and many were employed as labourers by the National Road Bureau of the Manchukuoan Government.

General Ting Chao visited General MUTO, Commander of the Kwantung Army, at Chanchung to express his gratitude for the treatment accorded him and his army, and swore to do his utmost for Manchukuo in the future. I understand he was later given important work by the Manchukuo Government.

At the end of 1932 (7th Year of Showa), Su Ping-Wen, who was given a military post at Kulumbair after the State of Manchukuo was formed, rebelled against Manchukuo, leading troops under his command, and many Japanese residing in that district were killed or imprisoned. Therefore the Kwantung Army was faced with the necessity of using force for the immediate protection of the residents. However, fearing that rash action might bring about further harm, the Kwantung Army asked the Soviet Union to rescue the Japanese residents. As a result, through the good offices of the Russian Authorities the Japanese residents were accommodated into Soviet territory, then transported to Vladivostok on the Amur Railway, and from there sent safely to Japan. Subsequently the Commander of the Kwantung Army dispatched a unit to that district and peace and order was restored after defeating Su's forces.

A part of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops who left Chinchow and Tungliao was received by Tang Yu Ling, the Governor of Jehol Province and joining the powerful bandits of the Jehol area, they established a base in Jehol province as a stronghold from which to carry out insidious activities in South Manchukuo.

So General MUTO, the Commander of the Kwantung Army, advised



Hsieh Lu Sheng, a representative sent from Jehol Province and secretary of Tang Yu-ling, that the Kwantung Army's policy was to restore peace and order in Jehol as peacefully as possible, and that it was necessary for the Governor of Jehol province to provide for the peaceful participation of Jehol province and its cooperation with Manchukuo in maintaining peace within the borders, and in securing the welfare of the inhabitants of Manchukuo in the cause of justice and humanity, and for the maintenance of friendly relations and suggested that he so advise Tang Yu-ling. But Tang Yu-ling did not accept this advice and started a campaign to disturb the peace of Manchukuo in collusion with bandits and therefore the Japanese and Manchukuoan troops were obliged to take action for restoring peace and order in Jehol province.

After peace was restored in Jehol province the Commander of the Kwantung Army ordered all the units to defend the line of the Great Wall and the borders but not to penetrate into North China and Chahar areas. Everytime they were attacked, all the units drove back the defiant attacks of Chinese units from their line of defence by way of defense.

By the end of April, Chinese groups increased their strength and their attacks became persistent. Against these some Kwantung Army units driving away the enemy, pursued them into the North China area. However, they withdrew thereafter to the line of the Great Wall in accordance with the order of the Kwantung Army Commander.

However the Chinese Army further increased its strength and repeated regular persistent attacks against the line of the Great Wall following the Kwantung Army units withdrawing toward the line. At this juncture, units of the Kwantung Army by order of the Army Commander, counter-attacked and pursued the Chinese troops as far as the line of the Chi-Ho River in early May, to prevent the enemy from repeating its obstinate attacks.

The Kwantung Army Commander strictly ordered all units to stop in the area east of the line of the Chi-Ho River, considering the fact that the entry of the Japanese forces into the Peiping-Tientsin area might lead to aggravation of the situation. The Chinese Army proposed a truce on 25 May, and the Kwantung Army Commander accepted this offer, and, on 31 May, 1933 (8th Year of Showa), a truce was concluded at TANGKU, putting an end to the Manchurian Incident.

I was relieved of the post of Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on 5 March, 1934 (9th Year of Showa), and my duties in Manchuria covering a period of twenty months were associated with Staff work under the direction of the Commander of the Kwantung Army. During this time I was not in command of troops, and it is needless to say that I had no power whatsoever to command any troops, because I was only a staff officer, responsible only for administrative matters in the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

18. It is stated in Exhibit 230, Record page 2902, that I sent a communication to the Vice-Minister of War, concerning "The Program of Guidance for Manchukuo", dated 3 November, 1932 (7th Year of Showa). The document showed the opinion of the Commanding Officer on the spot and was prepared by his order in reply to an inquiry from the War Vice Minister and was made according to the draft plan of the Second Division of the General Staff. It was a reply in Document Form written by order of the Army Commander expressing his opinion on the matter inquired about in reply to an inquiry from the War Vice Minister, and was not made on my own initiative and was not my own opinion.

All assistance to Manchukuo derived from the Kwantung Army while I was Chief of Staff was carried out under orders of higher authority issued in accordance with the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, (Exhibit 440, Court Record page 5035), and its annexed

documents for restoration and maintenance of peace and order, for protection of transportation, communications, industry and the residents of Manchuria, in view of the promotion of the happiness of the Manchurian people, and all such activities as far as I knew were carried out at the initiative and on the request and with the cooperation of the government organizations of Manchukuo itself.

19. After I left my duties in Manchukuo on 5 March, 1934 (9th Year of Showa), I did not serve in any capacity, either officially or privately, which had any direct connection with the Manchurian or China problems. However, I felt that the outbreak of the China Incident and its continuation without cessation was most regrettable. On occasions when I talked to friends, I advanced the view, purely as a private individual, that the most appropriate measure to save the situation would be to request Great Britain and the United States, the two countries which had close relations with China, to mediate a Sino-Japanese peace. But little attention was paid to my view. For five months from April to August of 1939 (14th Year of Showa), and again for six months from January to July of 1940 (15th Year of Showa), I served as Minister for Overseas Affairs, but I had no connection with any work related to the China Incident. The capture of CHANGSHA occurred during the time I was still the Governor-General in Korea, and I had no connection with it whatsoever. As for the battles, at Hengyang, Kwailin and Linchow all of them were actions taken from the standpoint of tactical operations and were matters outside of my responsibility.

20. From December, 1935 (10th Year of Showa), until 15 July, 1938 (13th Year/ of Showa), I was Commander of the Korean Army.

Now with regard to the Lake Khasan Incident, Court Record page 22,742, 22,743, and 22,751, Witness TANAKA, Ryukichi, testified in relation to the concentration of the 19th Division. But

this is his imagination and differs with the facts. The actual situation was that in view of the movement of Soviet troops in the vicinity of CHANG-KUFENG, the commander of the 19th Division first of all had taken precautionary measures on the bank of the Tumen River by stationing there a part of the division strength, and then in order to enable the taking of appropriate and corresponding defensive measures in the face of changes that might take place in the situation in the future, requested my permission as Commander of the Army on 14 July, 1938 (13th Year of Showa), to concentrate the main strength of the division on the bank of the Tumen River. Before giving any order, I immediately wired to the Chief of the General Staff and War Minister for instructions from the Central Command in Tokyo in relation to taking such action.

However, before receiving the reply to my inquiry, I received orders the next day, 15 July, 1938 (13th Year of Showa), transferring me to Tokyo. The Telegram from the Chief of the General Staff in reply to my inquiry arrived 16 July, 1938 (13th Year of Showa), and was delivered to General NAKAMURA my successor as Commander of the Korean Army. I think that the new Commander who succeeded me, disposed of this matter on the basis of these telegraphic instructions, as the order for concentration was not issued by me.

At the time of the Khalkin-Gol Incident, I was Minister for Overseas Affairs, and the nature of my duties had no connection whatever with such matters in Manchuria, and I did not participate in any discussions concerning problems related to the U.S.S.R. or Outer Mongolia.

21. According to Court Exhibit 2214 with regard to the Tri-Partite Pact it is alleged that ITAGAKI on the 8th of May, 1939, and I on the 9th gave an interview to a reporter of the Domei News Agency. Part of the statement in this Exhibit relat-

ing to myself is a mistake; ARITA, the Minister of Foreign Affairs may have made the statement therein but I did not. It was quite common for the Minister of Overseas Affairs and Minister of Foreign Affairs to be confused by those not well versed in their respective duties. I do not recall having given an interview, to such a reporter. However, assuming that I had given such an interview, I certainly would not have given out any statement as alleged in this Exhibit, for from the nature of my duties as Minister for Overseas Affairs, I possessed no authority or responsibility of any kind with regard to diplomatic or military matters, and I was not allowed to make any public statement in such a form.

Furthermore, while I was in office as Overseas Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, I only knew vaguely that the problem of the Tri-Partite Pact was being discussed at a five-ministers' conference composed of the Prime Minister, the War Minister, the Navy Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Finance Minister.

During this period when I held office as the Minister for Overseas Affairs in the HIRANUMA Cabinet, my views on this subject were never requested or expressed at any Cabinet meetings when I was present or on any other occasion that I can recall, except one, when in August, 1939 (14th Year of Showa), I received a request from the War Vice-Minister Lt. General YAMAWAKI, through a messenger, asking me to help restore friendly relations between the War and Navy Ministers who had opposite views concerning the contents of the conclusion of the alliance. To this request, I replied, in a note which I entrusted to the messenger, that although I was an outsider, I believed it would be best for Japan to put off the conclusion of an alliance with Germany and Italy. Therefore, although I was an outsider in the Cabinet with regard to this question, I also expressed in reply my anti-alliance view to Prime Minister HIRANUMA on this occasion in view of the circumstances in which I had replied to

the War Vice Minister of my opposition thereto, and thereafter, I never entered any other discussions thereon.

22. Court Exhibit 523, Record page 6174, a telegram sent to Berlin by German Ambassador OTT concerning the results of a discussion he had with me, is full of statements that are false. It is true, that, on 20 June, 1940 (15th Year of Showa), in response to a request made by TOKUGAWA, Yoshitomo, for his friend, Ambassador OTT, I talked with the Ambassador, whom I had not met before, for about half an hour with TOKUGAWA acting as our interpreter. I did not invite Ambassador OTT to call on me, and this meeting had no connection whatever with the defendant, MUTO, whose name was not even mentioned in our talk, and at this short interview Ambassador OTT did most of the talking and explained his views, through the interpreter, namely, that the conclusion of a German-Japanese alliance and a non-aggression pact between Japan and the U.S.S.R. would be of benefit to the economic development of Japan in the south-western Pacific area, and in this connection suggested the economic value of French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. It is entirely contrary to the fact to say that I put to him a question concerning the attitude of Germany in case Japan started military actions in these regions, or that I would gladly promote the idea of the Ambassador, to have Japan attack the Philippines and Hawaiian Islands and hold in check the United States in the Pacific. This would call for an important utterance concerning a matter about which I, as Minister for Overseas Affairs had absolutely no authority and no concern, and it was a matter about the contents of which I was not authorized to express my attitude or my opinion to anyone and in my position as Overseas Minister, I could not think of speaking even as my private opinion, especially, to a foreign Ambassador, whom I met then for the first time.

The telegram of Ambassador OTT to the effect that I said that there was a possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union further proves that the Ambassador made such a false statement for the purpose of realizing his own view to make Japan follow the course he had planned and was not aware and was confused in his knowledge of the functions of the Overseas Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. Further, the Ambassador's observation that I belonged to the Konoye faction was wrong, because at that time I knew Prince KONOYE only by name.

This can be seen from Court Exhibit 1278, page 10 and page 11 of the Kido Diary, in which Prince KONOYE states that he did not know me, and this proves the fact.

23. In relation to my answer to the question on the Southern expansion raised by Mr. FUKUDA, Member of the House of Representatives, in the 75th Session of the Diet on 17 March, 1940 (15th Year of Showa), Court Exhibit 2215A, the reply I made at the outset that I agreed with him did not mean that I approved of the method proposed by that member, but it meant that I only agreed that it was necessary to pay attention to economic movement in the south. This is proved by the very contents of my reply. The fact that I held the opinion that the Southern regions were not suitable for large scale Japanese emigration because of climate and customs is also clear from the contents of my reply. Furthermore, it is needless to say that there was no military significance to this discussion, as may be seen by reading the whole discussion which took place at the time, as it only deals with purely economic problems of commerce and emigration.

24. According to Court Exhibit 1309, page 16, it is said that the arrangement of sending Ambassador SAWADA to Dutch East

Indies as the Economic Envoy in July, 1940 (15th Year of Showa), was dropped because of myself. However, I did not know, that Ambassador SAWADA had been intended to be the Envoy, nor did I know that the plan was changed later. Also I declined the offer of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister when I was requested to become Economic Envoy because I was not suited for it.

25. I was Prime Minister from 22 July, 1944 (19th Year of Showa), to 7 April, 1945 (20th Year of Showa).

The matters mentioned in Exhibit 661 were decided by the Supreme Council on 1 February, 1945 (20th Year of Showa).

In view of the necessity that some measures should be taken to defend French Indo-China for self-subsistence and defense in the face of a situation where the United States forces had already landed in the Philippines at that time, and their planes were at times raiding French Indo-China, and possibility existed of American landing at any time in French Indo-China, coupled with the attitude of the French Indo-China forces which became decidedly non-cooperative with our forces it had been decided at the Supreme Council for the Direction of War that measures be taken to have the armed forces and constabulary in French Indo-China reorganized and placed under control of a Japanese Army Commander, but to leave the date and the execution of this decision to the consultation and decision of the Army Commander and the diplomatic representatives on the spot, who should obtain the consent of the Governor-General of French Indo-China to our request at this time and to make efforts to arrange by peaceful means to put it into execution, and such measures were taken by the authorities on the spot on 9 March, 1945 (20th Year of Showa), but I had no connection therewith or responsibility therefor, as its execution was within the competence of the Supreme Command.

26. In relation to the treatment of prisoners of war and internees.

The responsibility for the treatment of the Prisoners of



War and Internees rested with those concerned with the Central Command, and the Prime Minister, could not participate in matters concerning the Command according to stipulations in the former Japanese constitution. I was allowed to attend the Imperial Headquarters by Imperial Command on 16 March, 1945 (20th Year of Showa), only three weeks before my resignation as Prime Minister. This privilege was confined however to listening to reports on the progress of war operations and did not allow me to participate directly in the Supreme Command. Thus I had no responsibility for the treatment of prisoners of war and during the three or four meetings of the Staff Officers of the Imperial Headquarters that I was allowed to attend (they were held twice per week), I was not informed even once about any problem of mistreatment of prisoners of war at least there was no discussion of such matters at any meeting at which I was present.

The Prosecution alleges that matters concerning atrocities and mistreatment of prisoners of war were well known before I was appointed Prime Minister, but in fact there was no public knowledge about such matters. Especially I knew nothing about them since I was located in Korea from May, 1942 (17th Year of Showa), to July, 1944 (19th Year of Showa). I believe that only those directly in charge of Prisoners knew about the existence of such problems. Also the possession of short-wave radios was prohibited as a security measure <sup>for maintenance of peace and order as</sup> to both civilians and officials alike, and I did not possess a short-wave radio nor did I hear the Eden broadcasts, nor was any report ever made to me about such matters.

Censorship on the publicity of information may also account for lack of public knowledge about such matters.

Furthermore the notification to be issued by the Vice Minister

of War on the treatment of prisoners of war according to Court Exhibit 2012/<sup>Exhibit 2013 and Exhibit 2014</sup> was outside of the scope of the duties of the Prime Minister, and was not of a nature required to be reported to me.

The dates cited by the Prosecution of almost all of the protests or inquiries from foreign countries regarding the treatment and services of prisoners of war, sea victims and internees in general came at the time when I was not Prime Minister, and even /if a few might have ~~come~~ during my tenure as Prime Minister, I received no reports about them from the Foreign Minister. Therefore I knew nothing about those matters and therefore I did not investigate as to what <sup>action</sup> was taken in relation thereto.

I firmly believed that prisoners of war were being treated properly by our country because of the established customs for treatment of prisoners of war, which had always been praiseworthy. Such cases described in this Court of cruel and inhuman acts were beyond my imagination, and it never occurred to me to suggest any investigation to those concerned with such matters, during my tenure as Prime Minister.

27. In December, 1941 (16th Year of Showa), I was invited to a party by my acquaintance, YAMANAKA, Yuzaburo, and there I expressed my cherished view opposing the opening of hostilities. I said that it was my desire to avert the opening of war against America and Great Britain to the utmost degree, and stated my reasons therefor.

Mrs. YAMANAKA, who was present at the party that night, recollected my view advocating the prevention of war against America and Great Britain, and wrote a letter to my wife stating that she recalled what I said and that I was far-sighted.

On receiving word that I was to stand trial, I went voluntarily to Sugamo Prison on 23 November, 1945 (20th Year of Showa), and at that time I had that letter with me, thinking that it might serve as evidence in my behalf. When my personal belongings were examined, I made a plea that I wanted to keep the letter with me since it was my personal documentary evidence. But it was taken away from me by the Prison authorities who said that it would be returned when necessary. After this Tribunal opened, I approached the Prison authorities through the American Counsel and asked for the return of the letter, but I regret to say I have been unable to get it back, since we are told it has been lost.

Besides the above, my other memorandum which was prepared, soon after my entrance to the Sugamo Prison, by relying upon my faint memories, with a view to using it as reference material when investigations are conducted against me, also this memorandum was taken away from me on 22 March, 1946 (21st Year of Showa), by Major Hummel, a member of the International Prosecution on the condition that the same might be returned to me upon translation. Thinking that this may be work as evidential document for personal defense although there may be a slight error in my memory on the dates, I requested the return of the memorandum through my Counsel after the opening of the present trial. I was unable to have it returned to me for the reason that the Prosecution attribute it, as being lost.

The fact I consistently maintained a view opposing the commencement of war against America and Great Britain can be shown in the latter part of a statement of Major-General F.S.C. PIGGOTT Military Attache to the British Embassy in Tokyo. The statement shows that when the said General visited me in my house in autumn in 1939 (14th Year of Showa), I informally expressed my opinion that our relations with America and Great Britain must

be improved for the happiness and interests of the three nations and that such improvement must be achieved through peaceful negotiations and we must by all means avoid resorting to arms.

28. Court Exhibit 277 states that in the administrative policy speech which I delivered to the Diet on 7 September, 1944 (19th Year of Showa), as Prime Minister, I declared that the independence of the Netherlands East Indies would be recognized.

The facts were as follows: According to reports to the military administration, the natives had long wished for independence, they had been extending wholehearted cooperation to the military officials and their national consciousness had increased markedly. On consultation, the Supreme Council for Direction of War agreed that in order to establish the welfare and prosperity of these races, it was very necessary to take steps to recognize their independence. Therefore, I submitted this matter to the Cabinet Conference and obtained its approval, so I made a statement of this policy to the Diet and steps were taken to prepare for its effectuation.

Also in this speech on administrative policy it is stated towards the end of the second paragraph that "Concentrating all efforts, I wish to gather the national strength together with a harmonious national unity to achieve the war's end, in accordance with the expected operation of our armed forces, which will soon be realized, to destroy America and Britain."

I submit that this is a speech any Premier would make under the circumstances, for at the time of my taking office we were fighting on the defensive, and the allied powers threatened to destroy Japan.

My real intention behind this statement in another way was that we can no longer hope for the last victory for the war so now that our army and navy are anticipating a decisive battle in the near future, if they would destroy even temporarily the

advancing power of the enemy it may be that by taking advantage of such an opportunity we may plan to bring about the termination of war and thus arrange for a negotiated peace. This idea was maintained not only by myself alone, but also by members of the Supreme Council for Direction of War, and by members in the Cabinet as well.

The Council for Direction of War also decided to devise two schemes for the realization of future peace. This serves to prove that the Supreme Command also had the will to end the war and make peace.

And one of those measures to realize peace was through the good offices of the Chungking Administration, and the other through the Soviet Union. It was my plan that if fortunately both of these peace measures bid fair to be successful, the one through the Chungking Administration would be limited to the realization of peace between Japan and China upon negotiations with Chungking, while the conclusion of peace in the Pacific War would be primarily through the mediation of the Soviet Union. For this purpose, on the one hand, we hastened to establish a direct communication route with Chungking, while on the other hand, we endeavored to dispatch proper representatives to the Soviet Union, in addition to our ambassador already stationed there and thus we set about the preparations for the termination of war and restoration of peace.

However, the project of the Army and Navy which was to destroy the advancing power of the enemy ended in a failure in the Philippines and the adjacent areas, and all the measures for the project of the termination of war and making peace confronted various obstacles and could not effect a speedy progress.

During all this time, the war situation turned out to be increasingly unfavorable day by day. Therefore I devised, by way of some new methods, to bring about further adjustment and harmonization of state policy and the Supreme Command and also the

increased production of munition and food-stuff. Hereby, in a natural way, we would be enabled to hold an accurate notion as to the substance of our war potential of state, whereupon it was my desire to make a prompt decision of future policy. As to the harmonization of state policy and the Supreme Command, I had obtained the Imperial Sanction previously to create the Supreme War Directing Council which was to be a more simplified and powerful organ as compared with the Liaison Council of the Government and the Supreme Command. With regard to the increased production of munition and food-stuff, all efforts were concentrated to achieve this purpose in accordance with the harmonious unity of our cabinet members in utilizing and directing man power and material power in the full.

However the Supreme War Directing Council did not come up to my expectations and was ineffective in its operations and the Supreme Command was prone to develop into unexpected directions without the least knowledge of the Premier. Also, reduction of our war potential was seen to be accelerated, owing to exclusively increasing damages by bombing on our manufacturing establishment and function. Hereupon, for the purpose of eliminating the defective point of the former, I was authorized to attend the Imperial Headquarters conference by order of the Imperial Command, yet being bound by the provisions of the constitution, I was given no authority to take active part in matters pertaining to military operations and tactics. On the other hand, in order to improve defects of the latter, every effort was made to remove manufacturing establishments to places of safety, especially underground, but being confronted with difficulties in problems concerning materials and labor and in transporting capacity we were hardly able to attain expected results.

However, a War Minister, being engaged in affairs related both to state policy and the Supreme Command, could not only be well informed of the war potential in material but also be aware of even the secrets of the plans with regard to operations and tactics of the Supreme Command in advance of their decision, through his routine, though delicate business.

On the other hand, he was authorized, at the same time, in the scope of military administration, to apply military forces, equipment and transporting capacity occasionally to fields most necessary in view of strengthening the war potential. Hereupon, I asked for the Imperial Sanction<sup>10</sup> to return me to the active list so I could hold the additional post of War Minister, though it had been felt a little too late. I, as Premier, was resolved to extirpate the two big defects, whereby to grasp the true situation of the real war potential of state and thus to prosecute my policy since the time of the formation of the cabinet.

On 3 April, 1945 (20th Year of Showa), I suggested to War Minister SUGIYAMA the effectuation of the plan of the Premier's holding the additional post of War Minister, but met his opposition. Thereupon, upon consultation with Admiral YONAI, co-operator in this joint-cabinet, I applied for resigning from the post of Prime Minister, wishing ever more for the realization of such a new and powerful cabinet such as I had in mind, and on 5 April, 1945 (20th Year of Showa), the Cabinet applied for resignating en bloc, and I resigned from the post of Prime Minister, and thus permanently withdrew from public life.

29. At no time did I ever have any conversation with any of the other accused or anyone else involving the planning, scheming and conspiring, as alleged in the Indictment.

I had no official or personal relationship with the following accused:

DCIHARA, HASHIMOTO, HOSHINO, KAYA, KIMURA, MUTO, OKA, OSHIMA, SHIMADA, TOGO and TOJO.

I did not become acquainted either officially or personally with the other accused until the following dates:

MINAMI, December 1899; HATA, December 1908; ARAKI, 1918; MATSUI, August 1920; UMEZU, April 1925; SATO, August 1929; SUZUKI, August 1930; SHIRATORI, September 1931; KIDO, April 1932; HIRANUMA, August 1932; ITAGAKI, August 1932; HIROTA, July 1944; SHIGEMITSU, July 1944.

\* \* \*

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

On this 10th day of September, 1947.

At Tokyo.

Deponent: /S/ KOISO, Kuniaki (Seal)  
KOISO, Kuniaki

I, SAMMONJI, Shohei, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date.

At Tokyo.

Witness: /S/ SAMMONJI, Shohei (Seal)  
SAMMONJI, Shohei